THE MARX-FREUD SYNTHESIS OF ERICH FROMM

A Critical Examination and Appraisal.

A Thesis submitted for the degree Master of Arts.

Presented By: Leopold Nikolai Podlashuc.

Supervisor: Prof. André du Toit.

January, 1988.

University of Cape Town.

ABSTRACT:

The general aim of this thesis is to provide an exposition and critical analysis of aspects of the political philosophy of Erich Fromm. As such it is a study in systematic political theory. The specific objective of the thesis is an investigation of the way in which Fromm redefines Marx's historical materialism by recourse to Freud's psychological theory in an effort to comprehend the relationship between the economic substructure (base) and the ideological and cultural superstructure more adequately. In so doing, it critically examines the following problematic: In what way did Fromm synthesize Freudian psychological insights with a Marxist sociology, and how were the concepts of both Marx and Freud transformed in the process?

In chapter 1 the origins and background to Fromm's synthesis is examined. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with Fromm's concept of social character and the social unconscious as an attempted synthesis of Marx and Freud. Chapter 4 is a close examination of Fromm's concept of human nature.

The main focus of the thesis is on Fromm's thought as an unorthodox amalgamation of Marx and Freud. It indicates how Fromm, working from an initial Freudian position reworked and revised Freud so as to better accommodate his psychoanalytical insights within a basically Marxian sociology. With respect to the Marxian component of Fromm's synthesis the thesis contrasts Fromm's use of Marx with that of the then prevailing theories of the Second and Third Internationals. It demonstrates how Fromm's emphasis and use of the Hegelian elements in the works of the younger Marx distinguish him from these theorists and how it was also due to these Hegelian elements that Fromm could make a connection with Freud.

The thesis takes the form of a critical exegesis of extracts of Fromm's own work while at the same time distilling elements from the prevailing secondary literature. The thesis in no way attempts to be a thorough intellectual history but rather seeks to be an explication and indepth analysis of the elements of Fromm's work crucial to his Marx-Freud synthesis.

CONTENTS:

Introduction. 1

Chapter 1: The Origins and Background to Fromm's Synthesis:

1.1. Introduction. 6

1.2. Freudianism. 6

1.2.1 Elements of Psychoanalytic Theory. 7

1.2.2. Freud's Social Philosophy. 10

1.3. Marxism. 17

1.4. The Institut für Sosialforschung. 32

1.4.2. The Relevance of Freud and Psychoanalytic Theory. 39

1.5. Conclusion. 43

1.6. References. 46

Chapter 2. Fromm's Notion of Social Character as an attempted Synthesis of Marx and Freud:

2.1. Introduction. 49

2.2. The Concept of Social Character in Fromm's Mature Work. 51

2.3. A Critical Examination of Social Character. 59

2.4. Conclusion. 67

2.5. References. 70

Chapter 3. The Concept of the Social Unconscious:

3.1. Introduction. 72

3.2. The Nature and Dynamics of the Social Unconscious. 74

3.3. The Concept of the Social Unconscious as a Synthesis of Freud and Marx. 77

3.3.1. Fromm's Demystification and Transformation of Freud's Unconscious. 79

3.3.2. Fromm's Concept of the Social Unconscious as a Transformation of Marx. 90

3.4. Conclusion. 99

3.5. References. 102

Chapter 4. Erich Fromm's Concept of Human Nature:

4.1. Introduction. 104

4.2. A Description of Fromm's Human Nature. 106

4.3. Fromm on Human Needs. 114

4.4. A Critical Examination of Fromm's Notion of Human Nature 121

4.5. Conclusion. 128

4.6. Reference 131

Chapter 5. Conclusion. 133

Bibliography of Works by Erich Fromm. 143

Bibliography of Secondary Literature. 157

INTRODUCTION

The general aim of this thesis is to provide an exposition and critical analysis of aspects of the political philosophy of Erich Fromm. As such it is a study in systematic political theory. The specific objective of the thesis will be to investigate the way in which Fromm redefines Marx's historical materialism by recourse to Freud's psychological theory in an effort to comprehend the relationship between the economic substructure (base) and the ideological and cultural superstructure more adequately. In so doing, it will critically examine the following problematic: In what way did Fromm synthesize Freudian psychological insights with a Marxist sociology, and how were the concepts of both Marx and Freud transformed in the process?

The main focus of the thesis will thus be on Fromm's thought as an unorthodox amalgamation of Marx and Freud. It will indicate how Fromm, working from an initial Freudian position, reworked and revised Freud so as to better accommodate his psychoanalytical insights within a basically Marxian sociology. With regards to the latter, the thesis will seek to contrast Fromm's use of Marx with that of the then prevailing theories of the Second and Third Internationals. It will demonstrate how Fromm's emphasis and use of the Hegelian elements in the works of the younger Marx distinguish him from these theorists and how it was also due to these Hegelian elements that Fromm could make the connection with Freud.

As any thesis begs the question as to its choice of subject let us examine briefly some of the reasons why Fromm and his Marx-Freud synthesis is our topic of analysis. Erich Fromm was an extremely popular and influential

writer and thinker. His books The Art of Loving; The Fear of Freedom; To Have or to Be? and The Sane Society are often still to be found on the best seller shelves. He also has been credited with originating the slogan "Make Love not War!" universally popular during the 1960's and 1970's. Although this kind of popularity is often considered symptomatic of intellectual shallowness, Fromm's enormous literary output (see bibliographical appendix) and the academic response they have elicited indicate the contrary. A glimpse through introductions to the Frankfurt School (e.g..M.Jay and D.Held) and contemporary psychoanalysis (e.g..J.A.C. Brown) will suffice to show the extent of his influence.

Fromm's importance can in part be attributed to his ambition of synthesizing Freud and Marx. As any description of the importance of these two thinkers cannot but be understated, and as the majority of their vast followings would consider them wholly separate fields - his task must be significant. In this respect Fromm's project, while innovative, was not unique (e.g. Wilhelm Reich) and the value and relevance of his theory must be seen in terms of its influence and longevity. The Frankfurt School have acknowledged Fromm as the initiator of their project of incorporating psychoanalysis into their "critical theory", even though they later came to differ with his formulations of this (due to Fromm's considerable revisions of Freud). Even this difference is indicative of Fromm's influence. Herbert Marcuse, for instance, sets out in particular to answer Fromm's arguments and the extent of his polemic (see the introduction to Eros and Civilization) is a measure of the weight of Fromm's writings.

Considerable academic attention has been given to Fromm in the realm of critical examination and dissertations (e.g. V.I.Dobrenkov, R.Funk,

N.A.C.Heuer, A.Kaushik, M.Maccoby, J.H.Schaar etc.) and this thesis hopes to further extend this literature by shedding light upon the particular way in which Fromm links Freud to Marx. To this end it will seek to distil elements from the prevailing secondary literature while offering an in-depth examination of extracts of Fromm's own work. The thesis will in no way attempt to be a thorough intellectual history but rather an explication and ciritical analysis of elements of Fromm's work crucial to his Marx-Freud synthesis.

The structure of the thesis will be the following:

In Chapter One we will investigate the origins and background of Fromm's synthesis. This chapter will enquire why Fromm found it necessary to join Marx and Freud in the first place. It will briefly explore the context of Fromm's entry into the subject (the 1920's - 30's), though it must be made clear that this thesis in no way attempts to offer a full intellectual history of this period. It will merely sketch the general dissatisfaction with Orthodox Marxism which prevailed in certain intellectual circles at the time as the relevant background to Fromm's own project. The origins and thought of the Frankfurt School are dealt with only in so far as these bear on the particular answer Fromm devised to the dilemmas facing Marxism at the time by linking Freudian psychoanalytical theory to a Marxist approach. To start with, it will be necessary to provide basic accounts of both Freudianism and Marxism which will be used as a theoretical background for the rest of the thesis.

In Chapter Two we will explore more specifically Fromm's notion of "social character" as an attempted synthesis of Marx and Freud. In this chapter the

thesis will examine the first of the two pillars of Fromm's mediation between the economic base and the ideological and cultural superstructure i.e. the concept of social character. As this concept exemplifies the interface Fromm establishes between Marx and Freud, the thesis will seek to explain and critically examine it as fully as possible. In what way does the notion of social character enable Fromm to link Freud and Marx? How does this concept distinguish Fromm's Marxist theory from the then prevailing theories of the Second and Third Internationals?

In Chapter Three we will investigate Fromm's concept of the "social unconscious". The thematic exegesis begun in the preceding chapter will continue in the examination of the related motif of the social unconscious. This chapter will thus seek to explain and critically appraise Fromm's description of the "unconscious forces" linking the economic base and ideological and cultural superstructure. Again our aim will be to reconstruct Fromm's synthesis of Marx and Freud, while contrasting this with the views expressed by the Marxist theorists of the Second and Third Internationals.

Chapter Four is concerned with Erich Fromm's concept of "human nature". Owing to the fact that both the concepts of social character and the social unconscious are dependent upon Fromm's underlying concept of human nature, this chapter will offer as full a treatment of this issue as possible. It will explore Fromm's notions on the origins and history of mankind, and will seek to eludicate and criticize this anthropology in terms of the problematic of synthesizing Marx and Freud, while again contrasting this concept with the formulations of the Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals.

Finally the conclusion will offer a recapitulation of the major points established in the course of the thesis and will seek to draw a final evaluation of Fromm's synthesis of Marx and Freud.

CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND TO FROMM'S SYNTHESIS.

1.1 INTRODUCTION:

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the sources and reasons which gave rise to Erich Fromm's synthesis of Marx and Freud. To do this, it will examine certain aspects of the intellectual milieu in which Fromm's thought germinated, though it must be made clear that this will not be a full intellectual history but merely an attempt to identify the relevant antecedents of his paradigm. Particular attention will be paid to circumstances in the 1920's and 1930's which led to the formation of the Institut für Sozialforschung and the Frankfurt School's specific interest in linking Freud and Marx as a background to Fromm's relations with the Institut, and to his particular Marx-Freud synthesis.

So as to facilitate this examination and also for the purposes of comparison throughout the course of the thesis, this chapter will begin with succinct precis of some essential tenets of both Freudian and Marxian theory. This will then lead to a discussion of the problems which faced intellectuals in the 1920's and 1930's in coping with certain inherent defects which had been exposed in these theories. From this it will be shown firstly, how the Critical Theory of the Institut für Sozialforschung was a specific response to these dilemmas; secondly, how the work of Fromm originally was an aspect of this; and thirdly, how his particular conclusions led him away from the Institut's corporate position to the unique position he later held.

1.2. FREUDIANISM:

To grasp the structure of Freud's work, it is useful to view his theories as

falling roughly into the following three categories: 1) His clinical theory of psychoanalysis , with its psychopathology, its accounts of psychosexual development and character formation and the like; 2) that which Rapaport (1950) has called the general theory of psychoanalysis, also called metapsychology; and finally 3) what has been termed Freud's phylogenetic theory which contain philosophical conclusions on such subjects as the nature of society and civilization, war and religion.For the purposes of this precis we will deal with 1) and 2) together in a survey of the main elements of psychoanalytic theory and then consider the relevant aspects of 3) as Freud's social philosophy.

1.2.1 ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY:

According to J.A.C.Brown [1] there are five postulates which form the underlying matrix of Freudian psychoanalysis:

(1) Freud's application of the principle of causality to the study of personality in the form of a literal and uncompromising psychic determinism which accepted no mental happening as accidental. For Freud there appeared to be a logical continuity in the mental life of the individual, and therefore irrational symptoms were not mysterious incursions from without but rather exaggerated expressions of processes common to everybody which revealed the specific stresses of the patient. They were not fortuitous in the classical sense, and their causes could be uncovered by analysis.

2) The unconscious is seen by Freudians as a dynamic force which plays a dominant part in mental life, taking its energy from instinctual drives (the life and death instincts: Eros and Thanatos). The contents of the unconscious are kept out of awareness not because they lack significance but because

they may be so significant as to constitute a threat to the ego. This 'repression' can result in unconscious feelings finding expression only by devious means (e.g.. in symptoms, character traits, slips of the tongue, etc). These represent compromise solutions to a conflict between primitive drives seeking an outlet and learned ego and superego behaviour patterns inhibiting them. Repression is itself an unconscious process, and in their disguised form the true nature of the drives remain unknown to their possessor after their transformation by the ego defences. Simply understood, Freudians describe this as the Reality Principle opposing and halting the Pleasure Principle which urges the organism toward drive gratification. The energy of the latter is not dissipated however, and must then seek its outlet in other ways. Neurotic symptoms are thus, in this view, unstable compromises, attempts at drive gratification inhibited by learned responses as incompatible with other dominant personality trends. [2]

The most significant aspects of Freud's complex doctrine of the unconscious is summarised by The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences as including

> "the general proposition that cognitive and other psychological events can go on outside of awareness; the influence of unconscious 'motivation on behaviour'; and the special qualitative characteristics of unconscious processes - the primary process and symbolism. The primary process is the kind of primitive functioning of the "psychic apparatus" that characterizes the unconscious id, indeed it is the principal property by means of which the latter is defined. Processes characterized by magical rather than rational logic and by wishfulness - a seeking for immediate gratification of crude sexual or aggressive impulses - are called primary. Freud emphasized the concepts of displacement and condensation of psychic energy in his conceptualization of the primary process and noted that it often makes use of symbols, which differ from other types of displacement substitutes in having been shared by many persons for generations. These were the main theoretical

> resources Freud called upon to explain dreams, neurotic symptoms, psychotic thought and language, normal character traits, myths, creative thought, art, and humour " (3)

3) The postulate that all behaviour is motivated and goal directed: Freud's early studies of hysteria had shown that symptoms could be understood in terms of psychic determinism and also that they had a purposiveness of their own. The patient with hysteria would forget events which were painful or would appear discreditable to the conscious self. The symptoms of hysteria could then be seen as a form of wish fulfilment. The contention here is in Groddeck's phrase: "we are lived by our unconscious" (4) It is the function of the Reality Principle to channel this energy into modes of expression in accord with the demands of society and objective reality, both of which are mutually inconsistent variables. The unconscious is thus understood to be constituted by biological drives, capable of almost infinite variation through experience. Thus it is the contention of Freudian theory that to understand the unconscious one must understand the individual's experience;

4) A developmental or historical approach to the how and why of human behaviour. The fact that present symptoms appeared to be connected to past events inevitably led to a search for origins necessitating the replacement of a cross-sectional view of the patients present reactions with a longitudinal one which presented the problem historically and developmentally:

> "He showed the necessity of knowing facts of development in order to understand personality; the importance of the events of early life for the main features of character, including the specific syndromes of the oral and the role of identification as a principle of learning and development; the importance of drive delay and control in development; and the nature of

psychopathology as regression along a developmental path." [5]

While it is generally accepted that the child is the father to the man, Freud thus insisted on the overwhelming importance of infancy and early childhood as the period during which the undifferentiated psyche of the newly born child is moulded and takes on the directions it will later follow.

5) The biological orientation and libido theory. Here the practical issue is that for Freudians personality is based on biological drives (e.g. the drive for self-preservation, mainly sexual in nature, rooted in the body with its unalterable hereditary constitution) passing inexorably through certain stages of development - the oral, anal, and genital (with its subsequent latency stage, incorporating the Oedipus complex) - during the first five years and then ceasing to develop but continuing to influence behaviour throughout life.These component drives combined to form sexuality. This can be delayed, transformed or fixated, and interest can be shifted from one "component drive" to another. This appears, as Freud discovered, early in life (infants masturbate, have sexual curiosity etc) and follow a typical developmental sequence. As a result, bisexuality and "polymorphous perversity" are universal endowments or potentialities; and sexual perversions are explained as pathological developments or fixations.

1.2.2 FREUD'S SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY:

V.I.Dobrenkov [6] shows that Freud's phylogenetic theories extrapolate conclusions drawn from analyses of the behaviour of individual patients to social or ethnic groups and even to whole peoples. In the Freudian view, the healthy individual differs from the neurotic only in so far as the former is subject to a socially useful form of neurosis. Neurotic phenomena are thus not coincidental, but rather universal and intrinsic to all men without

exception, at all times. The conclusions drawn by Freud from the analyses of individual behaviour are used by him to characterize social phenomena, to interpret laws of historical development. Hence Freud's belief that we "can treat peoples as we do the individual neurotic". [7]

When considering the evolution of Freud's ideas pertaining to social philosophy, Dobrenkov [8] notes that Freud was led through his study of nervous disorders to view the social conditions of human existence as the main obstacles to mental health, and that eventually he reduced the problem of the cause of neuroses to the conflict between man's natural instincts and society. Freud maintained that man's sexual and aggressive impulses, inherent in his very nature, always conflict with social necessity and contradict the moral demands and values of society. The main cause for the emergence and progression of nervous diseases in Freud's opinion was excessive suppression and bridling of sexual instincts by social morals.

While it is with reference to the "theory of instincts" that Freud attempted to disclose the causes of man's mental activity, it was to the "theory of repression" that he turned in order to explain the dynamics of human social behaviour. According to Freud, the harsh demands of self-preservation oblige man to suppress his instincts and direct his energies along socially acceptable channels. "Our civilization is, generally speaking, founded on the suppression of instincts" [9] the mental energy of which is diverted from its original sexual goal and redistributed to satisfy various socially useful needs. Freud then went on to conclude that "from these sources the common stock of the material and ideal wealth of civilizations has been

accumulated". [10] Freud refers to this capacity of man to rechannel his sexual impulses under pressure of social demands as sublimation. He writes;

> "Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life." [11]

The degree of sublimation is determined by the capacity of this or that individual in question, which in its turn depends on the strength of his sexual instinct. When the demands of civilization are in excess of the individual's capacity for sublimation, Freud argues, that is when criminals or neurotics are made. According to Freud, to men who are prey to strong instincts demanding satisfaction,there are three paths open in Society. If his inner impulses are not held in check at all he becomes a criminal; if they are suppressed he becomes neurotic; and finally if they are sublimated in socially useful activity, he is able to live in the given society without any friction. In order to rule out the first two possibilities, which inevitably introduce discord in social life, two types of therapeutic measures are essential in Freud's view. Firstly, society must somehow be brought to reduce the demands it makes on the individual, thus relaxing the unduly rigorous repression of instincts. And secondly, the power of man's consciousness in the struggle with his instincts must be enhanced and his capacity for sublimation increased by means of improved rational control. Freud [12] saw the search for the individual's optimal adaptation to social demands as the only acceptable solution for the conflict between man's biological nature and society. He was convinced that the qualitative diversity of human behaviour could be reduced to aspects of the process of instinct repression, to the various types of conflict between man's biological

nature and his social environment.

In Freud's writings, an individually unchangeable system of external social conditions is thus seen in conflict with a static system of man's inner world in the form of immutable instincts. This rigidity was to pose a significant problem to later psychologists, like Fromm, who found this incompatible with their own observations. Furthermore the interaction between the internal and the external is also depicted in terms of polar opposites. Freud saw the conflicts between human nature and society not as a dialectical whole and interpenetration of opposites but merely as a confrontation of two separate sides that were not dependent on each other. For Freud the external social conditions of man's existence did not in any way determine his mental activity; he considered that they merely impeded the manifestation of that activity, holding back the realization of man's instinctive urges. Freud's socio-psychological interpretation of the relationship between human nature and society thus amounted to a dilemma which he found himself unable to resolve: on the one hand he saw the bridling and rejection of instincts as one of the essential conditions for the very existence of society, indeed of civilization as such, and on the other, he postulated the unimpeded and total satisfaction of instincts as an essential condition for man's mental health.

Freud saw society as the product of three independent variables: (1) necessity (ananche) stemming from Nature; (2) a dualistic pair of instincts: love and death (Eros and Thanatos); (3) various institutions and ideals which constitute the social environment or society. The advance of civilization is shaped by the interaction of these three variables. Society is

seen by Freud as a profoundly tragic phenomenon, for not only is it unstable and unreliable, but the synthesis and reconciliation of these three components not only will never be effected but is in principle quite impossible. Despite the fact that society seeks to make use of man's instinctive impulses so as to preserve and consolidate social life, all it can really do is establish a dubious balance, that is always exposed to the danger of man's unbridled instincts. On frequent occasions Freud calls attention to the inner contradictions intrinsic to society, stressing, as he does so, the impossibility of surmounting them.[13]

> "Civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this has to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this. These collections of men are to be bound libidinally to one another. Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together. But man's natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and all against each, opposes this programme of civilization. This aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside Eros and which shares world-dominion with it". [14]

The existence of a variety of social systems, too, is in Freud's eyes "a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between the trends of love and death".[15] In this connection the American psychologist Norman Brown aptly observes that on Freud's interpretation "history is shaped, beyond our conscious wills, not by the cunning of Reason but by the cunning of Desire".[16]

Social life is thus presented by Freud as an everlasting, unending struggle between instincts and morality, between the individual's biological needs

and the demands made upon him by the group or society to which he belongs. It follows that society for Freud does not answer any real need stemming from human nature. His theory thus leads to the paradoxical conclusion that man is not created for social living but at the same time needs society. Freud's ideal would be a society in which no pressures are brought to bear on the individual and he would be assured free scope for the satisfaction of his instincts. Yet since this ideal is unfeasible, because instincts by their very nature are antagonistic to society, Freud asserts that violence and coercion are therefore the logical foundation for any society that actually exists.

Freud's theory of human nature bears a close resemblance to conceptions expounded by Machiavelli and Schopenhauer; any principle of virtue is alien to the human essence and therefore evil, destructive tendencies predominate in the world. In Freud's opinion man has never had and still does not have any naturally humane feelings or impulses, and only fear of violence restrains him and holds in check his antisocial nature.

Freud's view of the prospects for the development of civilization is equally pessimistic. He holds that, as civilization develops, the need to bridle instincts becomes more and more acute and that eventualy history cannot but degenerate into universal neurosis. The successes which society scores in the course of its development are only achieved at high cost, namely man's growing sense of being unsatisfied, which in Freud's opinion permeates the whole history of civilization; "the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the

sense of guilt".[17]

In his conviction that man has no hope whatsoever of changing the existing state of affairs, Freud recommends that man should submit to the inevitable. Life should be courageously accepted such as man finds it. From Freud's point of view the world in which we live is the best of worlds only in so far as it is the only possible world. The future is an illusion, which means that all fundamental ideals and faith in human progress are also illusory. The only aim in life according to Freud is the process of existence itself, namely the eternal struggle for survival. This pessimism of Freud's is a natural consequence of his psychoanalytical theory of the origin and development of civilization.

Freud's view that man is a self-sufficient individual who is governed by the Pleasure principle and limited and modified by the Reality principle held a serious defect for thinkers like Fromm, for it did not take adequate account of the influence upon the individual, of society's structure and demands. This lack of a sociological content and its emphasis on a libidinous structure of drives was the major point of issue between Freud and Fromm. Freuds absolutization of the biological mechanisms did not take sufficient regard of the material living conditions affecting individuals, which to Fromm was crucially important: e.g.,

> "The absolutization of the Oedipus complex led Freud to base the whole development of mankind on the mechanism of father hatred and resultant reactions, without any regard for the material living conditions of the group under study." [19]

Fromm's criticism of Freud implied that not only did Freud misinterpret his phylogenetic knowledge, but that he was wrong in his ontogenetic interpretation of the Oedipal phase in the child. While Fromm does not deny

the significance of the sexual element, he views this factor to be dwarfed by the more powerful and obvious material interests. It is this difference of emphasis which formed the fundamental distinction between Freud's formulation of psychoanalysis and that of Fromm. From this distinction would follow all the major and subsequent differences in their theories. And if socio-economic conditions are the primary shaping factors in personality formation for Fromm (and which immediately separate him from Freud) then the most obvious model for him to follow would be that of Marxism.

1.3.MARXISM:

Owing to the immense extent of this topic, the thesis will limit itself to a summary account of versions of Marxism which prevailed at the time until Erich Fromm had established himself within the field itself. The purpose of this will be to show how and from whence the Frankfurt School grew and that Fromm's particular theory was a specific answer to philosophical needs experienced at the time.

By 1900 (the year of Fromm's birth) Marxism was a major social force in Western Europe and would soon become even more significant in Eastern Europe. But for all its growing importance, and this must be emphasized, Marxism did not remain an immutable dogma and the early decades of the twentieth century became the proving ground of many of Marx's hypotheses about revolutionary transformation. During this period Marxism both as theory and practice underwent profound changes. The Second International (1889-1914) coincided with the peak of Early Market

Capitalism (which was typified by a laissez-faire market established upon the principle of supply and demand.) The Western European working class appeared ready to assume the revolutionary responsibility that Marx had outlined. However, this was not to be the case, due to profound structural reasons exemplified by the growth of monopolies, government interventions to secure markets, the shift from Adam Smith type economic forces to the more appropriately Keynesian model and international political events (which might of course be seen as the ultimate working out of the changing economic order) especially, the rise of nationalism and its inevitable consequence; the First World War. The International had been fragmented and the proletariat effectively integrated into bourgeois society. Nationalism and the new style economic laws had resulted in the proletariat no longer being the fundamental antithesis of bourgeois society. Government control had succeeded in preventing the immenent collapse of Capitalism which the Marxists had predicted given the internal contradictions of the profit system. This was exacerbated by the change of focus rendered by the Russian Revolution and the Third International. For while the Russian Revolution was initially invigorating to Marxists in general, it contradicted the Marxist model of Revolution (which held that the Communist Revolution would occur in industrialised societies and not agrarian societies like Russia), and the strategies which emerged were often inappropriate to the rest of Europe. And as sympathy with the Bolshevik Revolution was synonymous with the International, to conflict with these strategies meant breaking with the International altogether. This inflexibility led to a greater fragmentation amongst Marxist theorists. These factors, amongst others, led to the

International inevitably splitting-up and Marxism evolving in seemingly contrary directions, as thinkers tried desparately to comprehend how these changes in socio-historical reality had and would effect their theory.

So as to better appreciate the effect of these changes on Marxist theory, we will show what it ideally meant to be a Marxist in the twenty five years preceding the First World War. In this regard we will refer extensively to the description offered by Leszek Kolakowski in the third volume of his series on the Main Currents of Marxism [20] According to Kolakowski, the notion of Marxism at that time may be most simply defined by enumerating some classic ideas that distinguished Marxists from the adherents of all forms of utopian socialism and anarchism, and a fortiori from liberal and Christian doctrines. The typical pre-World War One Marxist was one who accepted the following propositions:

The tendencies of capitalist society, in particular the concentration of capital, had activated the natural tendency of the historical process towards Communism, which is either the unavoidable or the most probable consequence of the processes of accumulation.

This Communism involves public ownership of the means of production and thereby the abolition of exploitation and unearned income, of privilege and inequality deriving from the unequal distribution of wealth. There must be no discrimination of race, nationality, sex, or religion, and no standing armies. There must be equal opportunities for education, democratic freedom for all - freedom of speech and assembly, popular representation at all levels - and a comprehensive system of social welfare.

Communism is in the interest of all mankind and will make possible the universal development of culture and welfare. The standard-bearer in the fight for socialism is the working class as it is the immediate producer of all basic values and as it is the class most strongly and directly interested in abolishing wage labour.

The advance towards Communism calls for an economic and political struggle on the part of the proletariat, which must fight for the short-term improvement of its lot within the capitalist system and must make use of all political forms, especially parliamentary ones. In order to fight for socialism, the proletariat must organize itself into independent political parties. Capitalism cannot be radically altered by the accumulation of reforms, and its catastrophic consequences of depression, poverty, and unemployment are unavoidable. Nevertheless, the proletariat must fight for reforms in the shape of labour legislation, democratic institutions, and higher wages, since these make conditions more tolerable and also provide training in class solidarity and in the techniques of battles to come. [NB: This is an obvious contradiction in strategy and implies a serious problem in theory. The consequences of this problem were profound for the International, for it saw the proletariat caught between revolutionary compromise on the one hand and revolutionary solidarity and activism on the other (e.g.. typified by the streams of thought promulgated by Bernstein with regards to the former and Luxembourg, Gramsci, and Lenin et al with respect to the latter). This of course was an underlying factor contributing to the infighting and subsequent fragmentation of the International.]

Within the confines of general Marxist theory though, Capitalism will finally

be swept away by revolution, when its internal contradictions and the class-consciousness of the proletariat are ripe for this. The revolution, however,was not to be a coup d'état to be carried out by a handful of conspirators, but must be the work of an overwhelming majority of the labouring population.

It was a central tenet of Marxist theory that the interests of the proletariat are identical on a world scale, and that the socialist revolution will come as an international event, (at least in the advanced industrial societies).

On the materialist view of human history, technical progress is the deciding factor in bringing about changes in relations of production and class structure, and these changes in turn determine the basic features of political institutions and the reigning ideology.

Marxist Communism is not only a political programme but a world-view based on the premise that reality is susceptible to scientific analysis. Only rational observation can reveal the nature of the world and the meaning of history. Religious and spiritualist doctrines are the expression of a 'mystified' consciousness and are bound to disappear when exploitation and class antagonisms are abolished. The world is subject to natural laws and not to any kind of Providence; man is the work of nature and is to be studied accordingly, although the rules that govern his being cannot be simply reduced to those of the pre-human universe.

The main lines of Marxist doctrine as thus formulated were, as mentioned, open to important differences of interpretation. The changing world situation had exposed fundamental flaws in Marxist theory. These led to the formation within Marxism of political movements and theoretical positions that were

often radically hostile to one another. Marxism was no longer a categoric credo, and its underlying defect lay in the many ambiguities of interpretation which the evolving socio-historical context had given rise to. The problems arising from this were many and complex, for instance; within the framework of the general definition above it was possible to hold quite different views, as typified by Lenin and Lukács, as for example, in the case of the degree of validity of historical materialism or, e.g.. between Bernstein and Kautsky on the relationship between the 'base' and the 'superstructure'. Communism might be regarded either as Kautsky did as a 'natural inevitability' or as Luxembourg saw it, as a possibility within the historical tendency of the capitalist economy which had to be actively assisted. Furthermore the struggle for reform might be treated as valuable in itself or merely as training for the revolution to come. Another problem was that it was also possible to advocate the political exclusivism of socialist parties or to admit, with greater or less freedom, the legitimacy of alliances of various kinds with non-socialist movements. The revolution could be envisaged either as a civil war or as the result of non-violent pressure by the majority. There was a profound ambiguity as to whether the socialist world-view was an all-embracing, self contained system providing the answer to every important philosophical question, or whether its philosophical criticism might draw freely on pre-Marxist or non-Marxist thought in respect of questions that Marxism itself did not decide one way or the other. All these differences and ambiguities were gravely problematic in defining objectives and policy of socialist parties.[It should be borne in mind that the latter were not mere discussion groups but had to take many practical decisions. They were

constantly confronted by developments and new situations which Marx's doctrine had not foreseen; this obliged them to draw particular conclusions from the master's principles which in their immediacy often conflicted with long term directives and subsequently aggravated the situation.]

However, what most members of the Second and Third Internationals did agree on was that Marxism is a form of what Engels termed, "scientific socialism,"charting laws of societal motion and predicting the collapse of the Capitalist system based upon an understanding of these laws. But even within this accord, there was a conflict of view of which Karl Kautsky and Lenin are two examples of the main divergent positions which prevailed, for while both endorsed "scientific" models of Marxism, their political programmes differed fundamentally - for Kautsky advocated democratic means of change and Lenin the dictatorial vanguardism of the Communist Party.

During the Second International, this scientific concept of Marxism heralded the apparently immanent breakdown of the Capitalist economic system. To thinkers like Kautsky and the neo-Kantian Austro- Marxists, (and even Rosa Luxemburg), capitalism appeared to be reaching the end of its "natural" life, beset by deep crises. These thinkers (with the exception of Luxemburg) developed versions of "scientific socialism" that likened Marxism to the natural and physical sciences in its predictive reliability. This prospect of an imminent collapse of Capitalism led Kautsky to an economic determinism in which there was little room for political spontaneity or action in hastening the collapse of the system. Kautsky implied an "inevitable" breakdown of the

system. This concept of a "scientific socialism" (heralding the immanent breakdown of capitalism) was incapsulated in the Erfurt Programme published in 1891. Engels and Kautsky attempted to provide Marxism with a scientific legitimacy similar to the natural and physical sciences (ignoring Marx's own Hegelian inheritance and his idea of the dialectical method that was opposed to the deterministic character of the natural sciences). Kautsky in particular tried to separate the scientific from the ethical and political dimensions of Marx's theory, suggesting that the "political" goal of socialism must be separated from the methods used to achieve it. Kautsky was in the peculiar position of (a) on the one hand upholding a rigorously " scientific" conception of Marxism, virtually reducing consciousness to material conditions possessing a logic and vitality of their own and (b) on the other hand advocating a peaceful, democratic model of the transition to socialism. Kautsky fiercely opposed the Marxist-Leninist justification of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the vanguard model of the role of the Communist Party.

This kind of separation of "political theory" from socialist political movements was almost a replication of the stance taken by Max Weber in his value neutral philosophy of the social sciences (Weber argued that the ethics and political values of the social scientist must not be allowed to sully his research and teaching, and advocated the doctrine of scientific "value-freedom"). The scientific Marxists of the Second International, led by Kautsky, located themselves between Marx and Weber (Weber opposed Marx on political and scientific grounds), combining Weber's concern with scientific impartiality and Marx's ethical-political vision of socialism.

Kautsky, in his 1906 work Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, outlined the dichotomy between "scientific socialism" and ethics that characterized the thinking of most members of the Second International. Kautsky's work on ethics stressed the need for a moral ideal with which to orient the struggles of the proletariat. This moral ideal was to appear at the end of the historical process, after the proletariat has been emancipated.

> "... this ideal has nothing to find in scientific socialism, which is the scientific examination of the laws of the development and the movement of the social organism..." (21)

Here Kautsky presented the classical distinction between a Marxian ethics and Marxian social science. "Science has only to do with the recognition of the necessary," (22) echoing Hegel and Engels' concept of scientific enquiry. Finally, "Science stands above Ethics." (23)

The ethical ideal of Marxism is the abolition of class conflict, according to Kautsky.

> "...that ideal we can now recognize for the first time in the history of the world as a necessary result of the economic development, e.g.: the abolition of class." (24)

Kautsky intimates that the abolition of class conflict will be a necessary result of historical progress; Marxian social science gains insight into this necessity.

Kautsky depicted this historical necessity in terms of the growing productivity of industrial technology.

> "The productivity of labour is grown so huge that today already a considerable diminution of the labour time is possible for workers." (25)

He argued that the ethical goal of Marxism is not the elimination of the division of labour per se but abolition of the distinction between rich and

poor. Kautsky suggested that this historical necessity will reveal itself as the productivity of labour grows, diminishing human labour time and thus freeing workers for socialist creativity.

The moral ideal of socialism is "won from sober economic considerations" [26] - considerations about economic necessity and the inevitable growth of industrial productivity as the source of socialist liberation. Kautsky concluded with the sentiment that

> "socialism is inevitable because the class struggle and the victory of the proletariate is inevitable."[27]

What this meant is that the Scientific Marxists of the Second International claimed for Marxism the predictive reliability enjoyed by the natural sciences. In thus contending that Marxism is a natural science of history they also tended to adopt a relatively passive political stance. For if the revolution is bound to happen, and if its happening is beyond the control and choice of individuals, a passive view of politics is implied. These Marxists suggested that the most important revolutionary task in the short term is not to devise new methods or agencies of class radicalism but to develop a structural theory of what will happen during and after the revolution, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism. For if Marxism is a type of Weberian social science, then theorists need not take an active part in change itself but they might rather stand back and merely comprehend predetermined social processes. In this view the duty of a Marxist must merely be to record reality as reality transforms itself automatically (through the allegedly natural, automatic collapse of capitalism). These determinist Marxists thus did not oppose socialist change but rather believed that change

would occur as a function of certain natural economic processes - "internal contradictions" as Marx termed them - that will force the working class to revolt and abolish capitalism.

The scientific Marxism of the Second International gradually withered away as the outbreak of the First World War split the International asunder, giving way to the Marxist-Leninism of the Bolsheviks who came to dominate the Third or Communist International of 1919.

Lenin, too, argued that Marxism is a form of natural science that "reads" social reality in much the same manner as science reads nature. In Materialism and Emperico - Criticism (1908), he outlined a theory of Scientific Marxism based on the so-called reflection-theory of knowledge. Lenin's scientific Marxism, though very important to the development of the Second International, served an entirely different political purpose in the hands of the Bolsheviks. The theory of science which he had developed in his book, became after the Bolshevik's seizure of power, the orthodox/authoritative text of dialectical materialism. The foundation of Lenin's argument was that scientific materialism was a form of knowledge of the natural necessity of social dynamics :

> "... consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best, an approximately true... reflection of it." (28)

This followed from the specific distinction, Marxism- Leninism made between dialectical materialism, historical materialism and political strategy. Dialectical materialism was the all embracing theory of the nature and law of things in general - "the science of universal interconnection." (29) Its emphasis was on the real and material laws which govern the connection between

universal objects and sees every action as being linked to every reaction. Historical materialism was the specific extension of this understanding of nature to include the cognition of human society. Political strategy deals with the appropriate use of these laws which govern society for the purposes of the correct functioning of that society, as established by the Party. This Political strategy assured the Russian masses that they were incapable of theorizing about their own exploitation; and therefore they needed tight discipline and leadership "from without", from Marxist thinkers and intellectuals. These leaders were to form a "vanguard" that would lead the revolutionary movement and that would then represent the "dictatorship of the proletariat" immediately after the coup dé tat.

Leninism thus had two integrated components: (a) the theory of the vanguard party, required to lead the working class and peasantry towards revolutionary and post-revolutionary activity: (b) the system of philosophical and theoretical justifications rooted in Lenin's concept of Marxism as a reflection-theory that provides insight into the necessities of societal "motion". The second component importantly served to legitimize the elitist character of the first component, the vanguard of model socialism. The vanguard, in particular, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had a tremendous political strength in that all of its acts were justified <u>because</u> it held a monopoly on social scientific truth.

What Leninism or Bolshevism achieved in this way was to recover Marx's own commitment to historical specificity in analysis. Where the Second International Marxists had grounded their "logical succession of social categories" upon a fixed theory of productive forces, the Bolsheviks reasserted class-struggle as the motor of historical progress and social change. Marxist-Leninism though also purporting to scientific validity, threw out

some of the major tenets of Second International dogma. They rejected the Second Internationalists postulates that the revolution was an inevitable, historically based, scientific necessity; and the conceptual and historical separation of Bourgeois and Proleterian revolutions and therewith the stages which govern it.

This official Soviet ideology protected the Soviet experiment in that every act of the regime could be philosophically and theoretically justified.
Marxism-Leninism became more than a general theory about how to seize power, it became a means for justfying the peculiarities of the Bolshevik ascension to power and the centralised, authoritarian version of socialism that resulted. After 1919, when the Bolshevik ideologist Zinoviev took over the leadership of the Third International, criticism by Marxist/Socialists of the Soviet Union became tantamount to treason, anti-marxist.
This generated grave problems within the ranks of Western Marxism. Not only were Leninist political strategies often inappropriate to industrially developed and democratic Western Europe, the Soviet concept of "socialist truth", defined in terms of allegiance to the Soviet regime, forced Western Marxists to fall in line with Moscow or to break ranks and risk excommunication.

Though Kautskian type scientific Marxism and Marxist-Leninist Bolshevism were the major strains of Marxism dominating the Second and Third Internationals respectively, they were not the only varients current. Within the Second International at least, other and more revisionist perceptions also prevailed. To some thinkers, typified by Eduard Bernstein, it seemed clear that, for fundamental structural reasons relating to the historical

development of capitalism, the "contradictions" of the capitalist system were not going to mature as Marx had anticipated and the scientific Marxists predicted. In Western Europe the working class had become an integrated part of the capitalist system, and not its fundamental antithesis. Advanced capitalism seemed to have successfully staved off the revolutionary fate predicted for it. It was this observation of the successful integration of the working class within bourgeois society, which provided Bernstein with his point of departure. He argued, as against scientific Marxism, that capitalism was not nearing its final collapse, but was instead gradually changing into socialism. To assist this process he advocated a democratic class struggle, carried on through parliamentary and electoral means, to create a practical form of social-democracy. This was a major revision of Marxist revolutionary theory. Instead of propagating revolution, Bernstein suggested that the proletariat accomadate itself to the process of electoral politics and gradually metamorphosize capitalism into socialism.

To people like Lenin and Luxemburg this was a sell-out, though Luxemburg, also, explicitly opposed the theory of the inevitable break-down of Capital. To her this degraded the contribution to be made by theoretically articulate, struggling workers. Luxemburg set out to show how Marxism could be both a structural theory of contradictions and a theory of class struggle. She argued that there could be no appropriate Marxism without both structural and subjective aspects: the system would not collapse of its own accord, nor would the system change merely because human beings recognized their own alienation. In Luxemburg's eyes the proletariat had to develop an action-orientated theory of class radicalism to guide it in the radical reconstruction of all capitalist institutions. This implied a symbiotic

relationship between the revolutionary working class and certain revolutionary leaders. Though for some time Luxemburg sympathised with the Bolshevik revolution, she attacked Lenin's concept of revolutionary leadership as overly authoritarian and elitist, and argued instead that the period of revolutionary transition - the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" - must be very short and had to be very quickly democratised in order to prevent the erection of an authoritarian socialist state (such as arose in the Soviet Union).

After the break-down of the Second International and with the Bolshevik domination of the Third International, Marxism in Western Europe effectively went underground, in the process also abandoning many of the tenets of original Marxism. In response to the failure of the anticipated socialist revolution in Western Europe to materialise, many theorists revised and rewrote Marx's analysis of revolution, in an effort to comprehend this phenomenon. Thus, as a cogent response to Marxist-Leninism and its authoritarian logic, Lukács and Korsch sort to reconstruct Marx by returning to his Hegelian roots. Already in the 1920's, Lukács and Korsch (who were active members of the Hungarian and German communist parties respectively) wrote important works questioning the dominant Marxist orthodoxies - the established doctrines of the Communist and Social Democrat Parties. By challenging Marxist orthodoxy and by re-examining Marxism in the light of contemporary events, they created a basis for a fundamental reappraisal of Marxist theory and practice. Initially, both Lukács and Korsch took specific issue with the "determinist" and "positivist" interpretations of Marxism. To them such positivism and determinism corresponded to a form of thought which Marx had rejected - "contemplative materialism", i.e. a

materialism which ignored the importance of human subjectivity. Human agency was for Lukács and Korsch the fulcrum of revolutionary activity and they set about devising a rationale which would analyse and expose the hiatus between actual and possible, between the existing order of contradictions and a potential future state. Their theory was thus orientated to the development of class/revolutionary consciousness and the promotion of active political involvement.

It is the work of these men which provided an important context for the Frankfurt School's Hegelian Marxism in general as well as Fromm in particular. Lukac's concerns of: The interplay between history and theory, the importance of theory as a "promotive factor in the development of the masses"; [30] the relation of production and culture; the effects of reification and the way each aspect of society contains within itself "the possibility of unravelling the social whole or totality",[31] were perpetuated and more deeply explored by the Frankfurt School (and of course, Erich Fromm). Furthermore, though the Frankfurt School were inspired by and adopted these motivations and premises one of the most significant differences was that they, (the Frankfurt School), had access, unlike Lukács and Korsch, to Marx's earlier works which became available in the 1930's.

1.4. THE INSTITUT FOR SOZIALFORSCHUNG:

The Institute for Social Research located in Frankfurt, Germany in the late 1920s and early1930s was the original site of the development of "critical theory," perhaps the most influential form of Western Marxism following the First World War. The Frankfurt critical theorists were led by Max Horkheimer, the Director of the Institute from 1930 to 1958, and included Theodor W.Adorno (who replaced Horkheimer as Director in 1958), Herbert

Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Walter Benjamin, Henryk Grossman and Friedrich Pollock. The rise of fascism and with the Nazi assumption of power in 1933 the position of this predominantly Jewish, Marxist institution was threatened and the School moved location firstly to Geneva and finally to New York City, USA.

So as better to understand this, we will embark on a description, (in the main drawn from M.Jay's Dialectical Imagination [32]) of the circumstances and problems which led to their genesis and particular inclination of theory.

A profound repercussion of World War One, particularly in terms of its impact on intellectuals, was the transfer of the socialist leadership to Lenin's Russia. The unexpected victory of the Bolshevik Revolution seen against the fragmentation and failure of its Central European counterpart , posed serious dilemmas for those who had previously been at the nub of European Marxism, the left-wing intellectuals of Germany. For no longer could they hold a consolidated front, but were obliged to take a stand on one of the following choices: firstly, they could support the moderate socialists and their freshly created Weimar Republic, thus eschewing revolution and scorning the Russian experiment: or secondly, they could accept Moscow's leadership and join the newly formed German Communist Party, and work to undermine Weimar's bourgeois compromise. Although the war and rise of the moderate socialists to power, had brought these to a head, these alternatives in one form or another had been at the center of socialist controversies for decades. A third course of action, however, and which was almost entirely the product of the radical disruption of Marxist assumptions, at the time due to the war and its aftermath, was however available. This last alternative was the searching reexamination of the very

foundations of Marxist theory, which contained the dual hope of explaining past errors and preparing for future action. This initiated a process that as Jay puts it,"inevitably led back to the dimly lit regions of Marx's philosophical past, [33]" which involved a revival of interest in the original Idealist formulation of Marx's dialectical method, bringing into light the Hegelian foundations of Marx's socialist vision. Theorists like Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch initiated an approach that became fundamental to the Frankfurt School, which stressed the philosophical dimensions of this dialectical method in order to avoid both the deterministic fatalism of the Second International's prevalent interpretation of Marxism as a form of natural science (drawing upon Kautsky and Engels' version of Marxism as "scientific socialism"), and the authoritarianism of Marxism-Leninism that attempted to "speed up" [34] historical dynamics through forced industrialization and capital accumulation at the expense of the working class and peasantry.

Lukács and Korsch and subsequently the Frankfurt School, felt that the deterministic fatalism of the Second International and the authoritarian elite of the Third International had a common source in a mechanistic, deterministic interpretation of Marxism. These thinkers felt that by reinvigorating the Hegelian foundations of Marxism, centered around the theory of alienation and the concept of creative praxis found in the early writings of Marx, they could restore the dialectical foundations of Marx's vision of emancipation without at the same time re- idealizing his theory of socialist transformation.

This return to the Hegelian origins of Marx thus also provided an answer to

the problem of the relation of theory to practice, or in Marxist vernacular: 'praxis.' This, loosely defined, designated a kind of self-creating activity, which differed from the externally motivated behaviour produced by forces outside mans control.

Those Hegelian Marxists (and for our purposes we must emphasize the presence of the Frankfurt School) who sought to salvage Marx from the interpretations offered by the Scientific Marxism of the Second International and the Orthodox Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet-dominated Third International, argued that the dialectical method derived from Hegel preserved both objective-scientific and subjective-philosophical dimensions of theoretical analysis. Implicitly the subjective-philosophical dimension was seen to preserve the notion of ultimate political and moral freedom of the individual - drawing upon Hegel's assumptions that the human being must himself confront and overcome his own alienation.

Although Hegel and Marx differed in their characterization of alienation, they shared the belief that human beings can resolve and overcome alienation. Hegel in the Phenomenology of the Spirit [35] suggested that the essence of being could be revealed through the philosophical attempt to comprehend the self-externalization of human beings and of whole societies and historical ages. Freedom, he asserted, would arise on the basis of comprehension and reason. Marx argued that human beings could liberate themselves by grasping the reason of history, and thus the possibility of their own emancipation, acting upon that vision of possible socialist change. To these aforementioned Western Marxists, Marx was Hegelian precisely to the degree to which he located self-emancipation within the activity of human beings and not in a deterministic historical process. Following Hegel,

Marx felt that human beings could realize their freedom through productive externalizing activity: Praxis.
In doing this these Hegelian Marxists believed that they were defending Marx against those whom they perceived as distorting Marx's basic doctrine in the direction of a passive determinism or elitist and authoritarian vanguardism.

In effect, the Frankfurt School thus returned to the concerns of the left Hegelians of the 1840's. [36] At first sight, it might seem paradoxical for Marxists to turn to the "idealism" of Hegel. On close analysis it appears that they were concerned with the integration of philosophy and social analysis and with exploring the possibilities of transforming the social order through praxis. Hegel's thesis on consciousness, as constitutive of the world thus signifies a challenge to the passive materialism of the Second International's theorists. Like Sorel, they were concerned with spontaneity and subjectivity.
Though it developed along similar paths to that set by Korsch and Lukács the Institut differed rather substantially in outlook. Agger sees this as the result of differing economic epoch's. [37] He sees the Frankfurt School being linked intrinsically to the era of growing monopoly capitalism; and that this held two significant developments, which separated it from the crisis-bound "early" capitalism which Marx had confronted. According to Agger, these were:

> "First, as Lenin recognized, capitalism became imperialist in order to extract cheap raw materials from underdeveloped countries and to find new foreign markets for manufactured goods. Second and most important, human tastes could be manipulated in such a way that people would consume endlessly, protecting the economy against stagnation and thus a falling rate of profit. Marx failed to

> pay serious attention to the sphere of consumption. for he did not foresee that the manipulation of taste would become an important factor in sustaining and enhancing profitability and in achieving social control."[38]

The Frankfurt theorists attempted to provide an analysis of the consumption sphere and of ideology that orthodox Marxists had neglected. They took note of the new roles of ideology and false consciousness in dampening working-class radicalism. Horkheimer [39] recognized that the "ideological crisis of the proletariat," as Lukács [40] called it, had grave consequences for Marx and Engels' model of the class struggle and socialist class-radicalism. It appeared that the western working classes in the 1930's and 1940's were far from being the revolutionary agent that Marx had expected in The Communist Manifesto and, later, in Capital. Reification and false consciousness took a heavy toll in manipulating the potentially revolutionary spirit of the working class.

Accordingly the Frankfurt theorists did not agree with the tenor of Marx's (or for that matter, even Lukác's) crisis-theories, for they believed that monopoly capitalism, was capable of forestalling the manifestations of these "internal contradictions" supposed to emanate from the growing organic composition of capital as well as from its centralization and concentration. While in a strict sense they did not suggest that the contradictions had disappeared, they argued that the contradictions were now contained (mainly via an interventionist state that, as Marx noted, was an "executive committee of the bourgeoisie") in such a way as to prevent the emergence of destructive crisis-tendencies.

No longer was there an automatic or even plausible relationship between economic contradictions and the political situation of the working class. Horkheimer and his colleagues recognized that the rates of profit were not falling, and moreover, that the working class was not being immiserated. On

the contrary, owing to imperialism, the expansion of war economies, and unionization, workers were entering into a class compromise with capitalists. The service sector in society was growing rapidly, weakening the strict distinctions between manual and mental work. These developments, coupled with the rise of Keynes' new analyses of the necessity of state intervention in the economy and the consequent weakening of economic liberalism and the ideology of laissez faire, threatened to subvert crucial aspects of Marx's analysis of economic crisis.

This issue of the capitalist state's ability to contain and thus diffuse "contradictions" is the most telling difference between original Marxism, whether the scientific socialism of Engels and Kautsky or the Hegelian Marxism of Lukács and Korsch, and post-orthodox Frankfurt Marxism. It argued that crises could be contained indefinitely, requiring that Marx's entire model of socialist transformation be seriously modified.

This is not to say that the capitalist system is devoid of crises. However these 'crises' were seen by the Frankfurt School, as no longer structurally threatening to the capitalist system because advanced capitalism could be technocratically administered through the creation of the so-called infinite consumer (e.g. Fromm's 'Homo Consumens), deep-seated commodity fetishism and false needs. This" administered" consciousness of bourgeois everyday life could indefinitely forestall the legitimistic crisis.

Although the Institut had originally been committed to the Marxist theory of intensive contradictions, they thus came to reject this orthodox version of crisis and class struggle as a result of their observations that domination - via the vehicle of the "false consciousness" - actually restructured the very character of workers, rendering the prospects of class consciousness very dim indeed.

To comprehend this development, the Frankfurt School concerned itself primarily with analysing the bourgeois superstructure. The Frankfurt theory became a generalised critique of bourgeois society losing its specifically class-based focus. Critical Theory thus in effect called into question the traditional Marxist formula regarding the relationship between the economic substructure and the cultural superstructure. In this context, Horkheimer developed a position-piece on Marxism entitled "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937) [41] in which he attempted to change the terms of reference of Marxism. He argued that the revolutionary consciousness of the working class could no longer simply be assumed, and that the class struggle would initially have to take the form of political education and the critique and demystification of ideologies. The manipulation of consciousness had to be countered by a critical theory that abandoned the deterministic strains of Marx's Capital. Instead, consciousness would have to be rehabilitated in such a way that the false consciousness of bourgeois existence could be revealed and reversed.

Critically important in this, was the role of Social psychology, in bridging the gap between the individual and society, and for filling in the missing link in the classical Marxist mode of substructure and superstructure.

Under Horkheimer's direction social philosophy could not be understood as a single science in search of immutable truths. It was rather to be understood as a materialist theory enriched and supplemented by empirical work. It would have interdisciplinary synthetic goals which crucially, also involved psychoanalysis.

1.4.2.The Relevance of Freud and Psychoanalytic Theory:

"The Institut für Sozialforschung's attempt to introduce psychoanalysis into its

> neo-Marxist Critical Theory was a bold and unconventional step. It was also a mark of the Institut's desire to leave the traditional Marxist straightjacket behind.[42]

They claimed that Freudian theory provided concepts and theories which revealed a great deal about the socio-psychological formation of the individual. Psychoanalysis showed, as Horkheimer wrote, how:

> "the lack of independence; the deep sense of inferiority that afflicts most men; the centering of their whole psychic life around the ideas of order and subordination; their cultural achievements: are all conditioned by the relations of child to parents or their substitutes and to brothers and sisters." [43]

Marxist social theory, on the other hand provided an analysis of the structures and conditions which the theory of identity formation presupposed. Each theoretical framework supplemented the other.

There appears to be universal agreement amongst writers describing the Frankfurt School that the major force in reconciling Freudian and Marxian insights was Erich Fromm, e.g.:

> "It was thus primarily through Fromm's work that the Institut first attempted to reconcile Freud and Marx." [44]
>
> "It was Erich Fromm . . who was perhaps the most significant single stimulis to Horkheimer's recognition of the importance of Freud's discoveries." [45]

According to David Held, [46] Fromm, already in his earliest contributions to the Zeitschrift , expressed the nature of his interest in psychoanalysis and some of his earliest objections to Freud. Utilising Freud's notion of libido (the energy underlying the sexual instinct), his early view that sexual and self-preservation instincts are at the root of human psychic life, and his stress on the significance of early childhood experiences for the overall formation of the individual, Fromm sought to show how Freudian theory could enrich Marx's concept of man and the whole Marxist enterprise. Freud's work, on Fromm's account, presupposed ideas which made it

compatible with Marx's sociology; these included Freud's insight that individual psychology is simultaneously social psychology. The individual, Freud maintained, must be understood in his or her relations to others. But Freud, as most psychoanalysts after him, had not produced an adequate account of people's 'social being'. Freud's psychology had to be synthesized with Marx's grasp of social structure. Thus, the task of what Fromm called 'analytic social psychology' became that of understanding social phenomena in terms of 'processes involving the active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation'. In certain important respects, Fromm maintained:

> 'the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The primary formative factors are economic conditions', while the family 'is the essential medium through which the economic situation exerts its .... influence on the individual's psyche."[47]

In asserting that the primary formative factors are economic conditions, Fromm was not advocating a mono-causal view of the development of psychic life. One could not predict from the economic base the future development of the individual or of society. Furthermore Fromm also argued that character traits can take a long time to alter and, therefore, impede the development of new and radical changes in the economy.

In the early 1930's, Horkheimer, along with other members of the Institut, had been sympathetic to the thrust of Fromm's writings and, especially, his critical reception of aspects of Freud's metapsychology. Fromm referred to Freud's postulation of the death instinct as a weak 'intermingling of biological and psychological tendencies".[48] The death instinct, a notion developed late in Freud's working life, contradicted his early view of the instincts as, according to Fromm, 'primarily wishing, desiring, and serving

man's striving for life'.[49] The early view, Fromm felt, was the correct one. Not only was the idea of a death instinct poorly supported by clinical evidence but it seemed to lead to a false view of man which could justify civilization in its present form. However, in Fromm's later essays, the basis was set for the disagreements which were to motivate his departure from the Institut. Not only did he totally reject Freud's death instinct (which Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse constantly maintained as an important concept) but he castigated Freud's working life, and contradicted his early view of the instincts because it prevented understanding the individual's whole personality in its 'social relatedness and isolation'.[50] Furthermore, he found and argued that the main elements of Freud's work are bound to bourgeois and patriarchal values. Freud's neglect of social structures had led him to generalize phenomena like the Oedipus complex into universal human mechanisms; which was misleading. It failed to register the historical specificity of many of the problems Freud tackled. It also meant that Freud failed to capture the particular authority relations that were at the root of many social and individual situations.

As the 1930's progressed, Fromm became less and less committed to orthodox Freudianism. From the beginning of his career he had been interested in philosophical anthropology. In the mid 1930s he was influenced by the work of Johann Bachofen. Marx's 1844 manuscripts were to become even more important for the development of his views - more important even than Freud's ideas. By the time he published Escape From Freedom (1941), wherein Fromm posited against Freud the notion of an original unity between people and nature, the beginnings of his dual anthropological and existentialist approach were already present.

In short, Fromm was more and more committed both to the idea of an essential human nature, which could of course be perverted and repressed, and to the view that Freud's work needed to be supplemented by a more sociological and historical approach.

Fromm's distinction between Freud's clinical findings (which he accepted), and his metapsychology (which he increasingly rejected), together with his abandonment of the libido theory and other important aspects of Freud's thought, began a rift between himself and his Institut colleagues which was never reconciled.

Although Fromm never ceased his efforts to merge psychoanalysis and Marxism, his later attempts relied less on certain aspects of Freud's work and increasingly on his own clinical observations and psychological insights that Marx himself had anticipated. When he came to write his intellectual autobiography in 1962, he declared Marx to be a far more important figure in his own development:

> "That Marx is a figure of world historical significance with whom Freud cannot even be compared in this respect hardly needs to be said." (51)
>
> "The prophetic notion of universal peace that he had learned in his youth led him to appreciate a similar note struck by Marx and to turn away from the less affirmative implications of Freud's thought, although he remained faithful to many Freudian concepts." (52)

1.5. CONCLUSION:

In this chapter we have shown that the Frankfurt School's philosophical inclination filled an intellectual gap which prevailed during the 1920's. The Frankfurt School's growth came at a time when there was a profound questioning of Marxist dogma. It developed in contra-distinction to both the Second and Third Internationals in an effort to answer the problems that these movements had either created or not answered.

To many thinkers at the time these perspectives were (at the very least) insufficiently explanatory. The role and description of the subjective factor particularly, was a controversial issue. Developing from similar premises to those initiated by Luxemburg and Gramsci, Lukács and Korsch began an exploration into the role of human consciousness which became the effective jumping-off point for the Frankfurt School and with it Erich Fromm. To these thinkers, the role of the subjective factor was inadequately explained by Marxism as it was presented by the Second and Third Internationals, and they delved deep into Marx's Hegelian past to come to some appreciable answer to this question. Coincidently to the Frankfurt School's search, came the discovery and publishing of some of Marx's earliest works. These had previously been unavailable and had frustrated the attempts of Lukács, Korsch et al in their respective searches. The idealist humanism which prevailed in these earlier works coloured the Frankfurt School. In including the subjective-philosophical aspect of the Hegelian Marx to its already existing scientific-objective content, with the resultant implications for Praxis it contained, it gave Marxism a semantic scope previously not had in the formulations of the Second and Third Internationals (which were limited purely to the scientific-objective). This allowed the Frankfurt School to search in diverse fields in order to overcome the problems they still encountered, e.g.. the very fact that Fromm not only could contemplate linking Freud and Marx but did so, exemplified the "open-endedness" of the approach. The Hegelian elements they discovered indicated quite clearly to them that the Second and Third Internationals were wrong in their assumption of a direct relationship between Base and Superstructure. It became obvious that Marx had had to leave this area unresolved, owing to his lack of a sufficient model of

psychoanalysis (which only originated as a fully fledged field some time later with the work of Freud). Because of this and in the light of Freud's discoveries, it was to this area that Erich Fromm,(himself a practicing Freudian analysist) applied himself. His efforts showed that; Freudian tenets of psychoanalysis could be effectively used to bridge this gap between Base and Superstructure which Marx had left unexplained. In time though his own psychoanalytic discoveries would lead him to be less and less commited to Freudian and initiate a whole new paradigm based on a fusion of diverse psychological and ethico-mystical insights (derived eclectically from Jung, Bachoven, Judaism, Meister Eckhardt, Zen etc.) and idealist Marxism. For the purposes of this thesis though, we will deal with those concepts of Fromm which at least originated from Freud and still have some Freudian content. In the following chapter, we will examine one of the focal points of Fromm's original Freudian reconstruction of Marx, namely the concept of Social Character.

1.6. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post Freudians, pp 3-16
2. Ibid
3. "Sigmund Freud," The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences pp 3-4
4. J.A.C.Brown, Op. cit, p.10
5. The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences , op.cit, pp 3-4
6. V.I.Dobrenkov, Neo-Freudians in Search of Truth, pp.41-45
7. S.Freud, Moses and Monotheism p. 128
8. V.I. Dobrenkov, ibid.
9. S. Freud, " 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness" , Sexuality and the Psychology of Love , p. 25.
10. Ibid
11. S.Freud, Civilization and its Discontents , p. 44
12. Ibid
13. Op. cit, p. 69
14. Op. cit, p. 18
15. N.D.Brown, Life Against Death , p.57
16. S.Freud, Civilization and its Discontents , op.cit, p. 62
17. Op. cit, p.81
18. E.Fromm, "Uber Methode und Aufgabe einer Analytischen Sozial Psychologie," in R.Funk, The Courage to be Human, p.15
19. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, p. 365
20. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism - its Rise, Growth and Dissolution , Vol.11, The Golden Age , pp. 4-6
21. Karl Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History , pp.202-206

22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirico-Criticism , pp. 159-160
29. F. Engels, The Fundamentels of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy , p. 126
30. G.Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness , p. 33
31. Ibid
32. M.Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 3
33. Ibid
34. B.Agger, Western Marxism, an Introduction, p. 120
35. G.W.F.Hegel, The Phenomenology of the Mind, p.107
36. M.Jay, op.cit, p. 42
37. Ibid
38. B.Agger, op. cit, p. 120
39. Horkheimer cited in Agger, op.cit, p. 122
40. G. Lukacs, op.cit, p.19.
41. Horkheimer cited in Agger, op.cit, p. 123
42. M.Jay, op.cit, p.87
43. M.Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, p. 7
44. M.Jay, op.cit, p. 88
45. D.Held, Introduction to Critical Theory,. p. 111
46. Ibid
47. Fromm cited in D.Held, op.cit, p. 112.

48. Ibid

49. Op.cit, p. 113.

50. Ibid

51. E.Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 14

52. R.Funk, op.cit, p. 27

CHAPTER 2. Fromm's Notion of Social Character as an attempted Synthesis of Marx and Freud:

2.1. INTRODUCTION:

As we have seen in Chapter 1 the intellectual origins of Fromm's thought should be located specifically in the problems facing theorists in the broad Marxist tradition in the 1920's and 1930's. In the changed economic and political conditions of the time they had to cope with the general dilemma that the crucial question as to the nature of the relationship between base and superstructure had been insufficiently answered by Marx, Engels and the Second and Third Internationalists:

> "For those unorthodox Marxists who could not accept the official simplistic doctrine of superstructure and consciousness being merely "reflections" of the base; one central question remained open: What was the nature of the link between economic and cultural factors?" (1)

For although Marx had postulated the interdependence between the economic base of society and political and legal institutions, its art, religion etc. with the former determining the latter (the ideological superstructure), Marx and Engels had not shown how the economic base is translated into the ideological superstructure. To the Hegelian Marxists like the Frankfurt School, Marxism in particular did not give enough attention to the subjective factor; human personality formation. In their view that was why the Marxism which had prevailed to date, was incapable of explaining the inconsistencies of existent social reality. The Frankfurt School felt that the answers to these problems lay somewhere within the "consciousness" of society, and the only way of appreciating this "consciousness" would be by developing some Marxist model of social-psychoanalysis; in other words linking Marxism to Freudian Psychology. This was the task of Erich Fromm who attempted to show that by using the tools of psychoanalysis, this gap in

Marxism could be filled, thus making it possible to introduce the mechanisms through which the economic base and cultural superstructure are connected.

According to Fromm there are two such connections; the one lying in what he called the "social character" and the other in the nature of the"social unconscious". In this chapter we are going to examine the concept of social character in Fromm's mature work so as to exemplify the manner in which Fromm links Freud and Marx. It will not be attempted to provide a proper intellectual history of the genesis of Fromm's Marx-Freud synthesis in general or of the concept of social character in particular. That would require a detailed analysis of Fromm's many articles and reviews on these and related themes from the early 1930's. (See bibliographical appendix of Fromm's writings.) Fromm did not produce any major and systematic statement of his views during this time, and the development of his thought would have to be reconstructed from scattered comments in his many and diverse incidental publications. This would be a major and specialised exercise in historical exegesis which lie beyond the scope of the present thesis. Instead we will proceed by taking as our point of departure Fromm's treatment of the concept of social character in three of his mature works, The Sane Society (1955), To Have or to Be (1976) and Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962). Our discussion and analysis will proceed in two stages. First a general expository account will be provided of Fromm's concept of social character and its functions based on these three works. Then we will proceed to a more critical analysis of these themes as a product of Fromm's project of arriving at a Marx-Freud synthesis. In particular we will be concerned with the way in which, and the extent to which, both Fromm's

Marxism and Freudianism were transformed in the process of elaborating this synthesis. It will be shown that Fromm differs fundamentally with orthodox Marxism (as presented by the Second and Third Internationals), abandoning their rigid materialism for a new theory, rooted ultimately upon forces within Man's psyche. This theory, while in itself a fundamental revision of Freud's bio-instinctual determinism, postulates the real motor of social change in relation to man's instinctual framework (human nature) rather than the economic base. It will be concluded that this is in effect, a return to a neo-Hegelian position, raising the issue of how one sees Marx in relation to Hegel. Even in his mature work Fromm's postulates are thus, in effect, the consequence of the Frankfurt School's interest and study of the then recently rediscovered works of the younger "Hegelian" Marx. Together with the Frankfurt School's rejection of the posivitism of the Second International and the Bolshevism of the Third International, this led to the kind of theory that Fromm produced.

2.2. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CHARACTER IN FROMM'S MATURE WORK.

The concept of social character features prominently in three of the major works, The Sane Society (1955), To Have or to Be (1976), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), which Fromm wrote in his later, American period.
In his analysis in these books of the psychological aspect of various historical societies Fromm drew the conclusion that there is in each of them a constant feature. He argued that when it comes to psychological properties, individuals in any society, despite their individual psychological differences, also have something in common constituting them as typical representatives of the given society. It is this common element which Fromm referred to as "social character", [2] by which he understood:

> "the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture in contradistinction to the individual character in which people belonging to the same culture differ from each other".(3)

Fromm specified that Social Character is not a statistical concept (in the sense that it is simply the sum total of character traits to be found in the majority of people in a given culture) and that it can only be understood in reference to the way it functions within a broad societal context. It follows that Fromm's concept of social character is not merely a descriptive concept of empirical social psychology but actually a theoretical construct derived from general social theory. For the purposes of studying and analysing the general assumptions and implications of this theoretical concept in Fromm's mature work it will be best to start with some extended extracts from these books, to give a general flavour of his thought on these themes, and then to proceed to a more detailed exposition.

In The Sane Society Fromm gives the following general account of the nature and function of social character in the larger social context:

> "Each society is structured and operates in certain ways which are necessitated by a number of objective conditions. These conditions include methods of production and distribution which in turn depend on raw materials, industrial techniques, climate, size of population, and political and geographical factors, cultural traditions and influences to which society is exposed. There is not "society" in general, but only specific social structures which operate in different and ascertainable ways. Although these social structures do change in the course of historical development, they are relatively fixed at any given historical period and society can exist only by operating within the framework of its particular structure. The members of the society and/or the various classes or status groups within it have to behave in such a way as to be able to function in the sense required by the social system. It is the function of the social character to shape the energies of the members of society in such a way that their behaviour is not a matter of conscious decisions as to whether or not to follow the social pattern, but

> one of "wanting to act as they have to act and at the same time finding gratification in acting according to the requirements of the culture. In other words, its the social character's function to mold and channel human energy within a given society for the purpose of the continued functioning of this society." (4) [my italics]

Fromm's similar account of the nature and function of social character in To Have or to Be also gives a general indication how this is supposed to overcome the dilemma of finding an appropriate connection between material base and the ideological superstructure in Marxist terms:

> "To explain the psychic attitudes shared by a society, one must assume a formation process of psychic energy. This process of transforming general psychic energy into specific psychosocial energy is mediated by the social character. . . .What is of interest, therefore, is not individual peculiarities, which make the individual unique and which are the result of chance factors of birth (such constitutional factors as temperament) and particular life experiences. Rather, research into the social character tells us how human energy is channelled and operates as a productive force in a given social order. If the energy of most members of a social group takes the same direction, it follows that their motivations are the same and that they are receptive to the same ideas and ideals. From a formal point of view, social character is something like the transmission belt between the economic structure of society and the prevailing ideas. It is only the 'economic basis' which creates a certain social character which in turn creates certain ideas. The ideas, once created, also influence the social character and, indirectly, the social economic structure. The social character thus mediates in both directions, and the concept of social character can be clarified in the following way:



(5)

We will return below to a more detailed and critical analysis of social character as mediating between the material base and the ideological superstructure, but at this stage we may suffice with completing the extract from his general account in The Sane Society. According to Fromm, the actual genesis of the social character thus:

"cannot be understood by referring to one single cause but by understanding the interaction of sociological and ideological factors. Inasmuch as economic factors are less easily changeable, they have a certain predominance in this interplay. This does not mean that the drive for material gain is the only or even the most powerful motivaitng force in man. It does mean that the individual and society are primarily concerned with the task of survival, and that only when survival is secured can they proceed to the satisfaction of other imperative human needs. The task of survival implies that man has to produce, that is, he has to secure the minimum of food and shelter necessary for survival, and the tools needed for even the most rudimentary process of production. The method of production in turn determines the social relations existing in a given society. It determines the mode and practice of life. However, religious, political and philosophical ideas are not purely secondary projective systems. While they are rooted in the social character, they in turn also determine, systemize and stabilize the social character. . . .(to) state again, in speaking of the socio-economic structure of society as moulding man's character, we speak only of one pole in the interconnection between social organisation to man. The other pole to be considered in man's nature, molding in turn the social conditions in which he lives . . . Needs like the striving for happiness, harmony, love and freedom are inherent in his nature. They are also dynamic factors in the historical process which, if frustrated, tend to arouse psychic reactions, ultimately creating the very conditions suited to the original strivings."(6)

On the basis of these passages, and taking into account other relevant aspects of his mature work, we may now attempt to give a more systematic account of Fromm's view of the nature and function of social character. It will be evident that in Fromm's view there exists a common character structure in each society which is intrinsic to it, a structure that is common to the majority of groups and classes in that society. This Social Character, Fromm sees as the psychological mould of the individual which shapes not only his behaviour, but also his thought patterns, emotions, indeed his whole perception of the external world and his relationship to that world. As such social character is a psychological factor enhancing the

stabilization of society's functioning. Fromm maintains that this social character system can be considered "the human substitute for the instinctive apparatus of the animal" [7] of major significance for the adaptive functions of the individual. For the individual as such, the significance of social character consists in the fact that it allows him to adapt to the requirements of society as effectively as possible, involving the least possible psychological disruption. In the words of R.Funk Fromm's views on the adaptative functions of social character may be summarized as follows:

> "The individual who, being a member of a given society, has been shaped by the character of that society is spared all confrontation with the society's demands because he wishes to think, feel, and act as he must (and is happy in so doing because he is behaving in what is, for him, a psychologically satisfactory manner). The social character is the essential stabilizing (system-maintaining) factor for the survival of the society and its underlying economic base because "the energies of people are molded in ways that make them into productive forces that are indispensable for the functioning of that society. [8]

At the same time social character is itself not an ultimate determinant in some idealist fashion, but the product of other forces. The social character of an individual or a society is moulded largely by the socio-economic conditions of a society and a range of further factors. Social character takes shape on the one hand under the influence of such social factors as the education system, religion, literature and art and on the other in the process of the children's upbringing within the family. The latter fact is particularly important because the family is seen by Fromm as the:

> "psychic agency of society, the institution which has the function of transmitting the requirements of society to the growing child". [9]

The direct influence of the social character of the parents themselves (which has already been shaped) and those methods of upbringing sanctioned by the given culture, are the factors which according to Fromm,

enable the family to accomplish the task of moulding children's characters in such a way as to be acceptable to society. The significance of social character lies in the fact that this concept made possible a new understanding of social processes which included the psychology of the individual.

If we consider the factors that shape the social character, we will in fact observe the interplay of the following elements: [10]

1. Social and economic factors, which have a certain preponderance because it is difficult to change them.
2. Religious, political, and philosophical views ("ideas and ideals"), which, though rooted in the social character, also define and stabilize it.
3. Fundamental human needs such as those for relatedness, rootedness, and transcendence, which all must be satisfied and are indispensable to successful human life, play an active role in this interplay.

On the basis of this extended theoretical framework, including social character as a mediating factor, Fromm developed a theory of social change. This was drawn from a Marxist sociological framework and a Freudian theory of dynamic psychology established upon a system of "human needs" all Fromm's own, which derived from the human existence as such. This last element originated neither wholly from Freud nor Marx, but rather derived from Fromm's own psychoanalytical observations which interpreted the drives of man to be rooted fundamentally in his existential situation. It was presented though as pivoted upon Marx's concept of alienation.

As long as the interaction between these aforementioned three elements remains harmonious and stable, the social character has a predominantly

stabilizing function. But if conditions change so that a discrepancy develops between the factors that determine social character and the already existing social character, the social character becomes an element of disintegration, "dynamite instead of a social mortar, as it were." (11) In elaborating this new theory of social psychology and change, Fromm postulated the existence of the following types of social character: receptive, exploitative, hoarding and marketing types. In addition there are specific psychological mechanisms and methods by means of which individuals resolve for themselves the problem of human existence - masochistic, sadistic, destructivist and conformist - and which underlie each of these different types of character. Fromm referred to these mechanisms as defence mechanisms, i.e. compulsive reactions on the part of the individual to a frustrating situation, the essential feature of which is that it does not allow the individual to realize his natural potential within the given social structure.

Let us examine the implications of this somewhat more closely. Fromm's theory amounts to a combination of a general psychological theory of human nature based upon man's existential position with a historical account of sociological and psychological change. In terms of the former, psychological mechanisms such as masochism and sadism enable man to attain an illusion of independence and power, while either voluntarily submitting to, or on the contrary dominating, something or someone. Feelings of powerlessness, helplessness or a lack of confidence in the face of the existential problem are compensated for by destructivism; the individual's urge to destroy or annihilate what appears to him as the outside cause of his inner anxiety. The individual himself can in the final

analysis be the apogee of destructivist mechanisms. Conformism is man's rejection of his own ego through which he lets himself be absorbed into the mass, into the crowd. These methods for resolving the existential problem were seen by Fromm as universal. Yet, the individual's option for one or another method would be predetermined by their respective society. Fromm concluded that social conditions always lead to the predomination of one of these types of, character. For example, the receptive orientation he saw as typical of feudal society; the exploitative and hoarding orientation becoming widespread under the capitalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and marketing orientation as typical of modern capitalist society. Insofar as each of these character orientations is merely a special apparatus for the individual's adaptation to society, (his specific reaction to those social conditions in which it is impossible for human nature to come fully into its own), so each one of them proves, in Fromm's opinion, unproductive, since it fails effectively to solve the problem of human existence.

In his later work Fromm went on to develop a particular normative response to this existential problem, not satisfied with a descriptive and explanatory account of social and psychological change only. According to Fromm, the only reliable and reasonable means of resolving the problem of human existence, is through love and the productive orientation rooted in it. Fromm sees mature love as the union between the individual and the world, the individual and another of his kind, in which his integrity and individuality are preserved. The main elements of this love are for Fromm: "care, responsibility, respect and knowledge".[12] In this condition it represents a method for resolving the problem of human existence which

does not exploit others or prevent the individual from finding his own true inner self and actualizing himself. Love is for Fromm the creative psychological principle. It is synonomous with the productive orientation and it incorporates the "humanistic conscience" [13] and the "inner voice" [14] of human nature. It is this force which actively changes society. However, to date, no society has managed to institute that structure of social organisation which would allow this orientation to prevail. For once change had been effected, men responding to needs within them would institute some new authoritarian and conservative social structure.

Ultimately, both the unproductive character and the productive, as viewed by Fromm, play the part of active psychological forces influencing the historical process. They differ only insofar as the activity of the first trend is in the direction of stabilization and consolidation of the existing social structure and the second leads to change and negation of that structure. Distilled then; change or revolution is a consequence of the "inner voice" of mankind. This "inner voice" comes to the fore, when a discrepency arises between the external forces that determine social character and the already existing social character. Social character is always a mediation between this "inner voice" and social reality.
Until such time as the productive orientation (mature love) prevails as a social character, society will be continually disrupted by change.

2.3. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CHARACTER:

Having provided a general exposition of Fromm's views on social character based on his later works, we will now address this concept in terms of the Marx-Freud problem i.e. (1) To what degree does it overcome the theoretical dilemmas in Marx and Freud outlined in Chapter 1; (2) To what

extent can it be viewed as a Marx-Freud synthesis; (3) How is the Marx-Freud position changed in the process.

To most observers, Marx and Freud are radically different, if not incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense. For the one is unequivocably grounded in the realm of the economically determined, socio-political exterior and the other being no less unequivocably grounded in that of the individual's psychic interior. Consequently it would appear that Fromm's concept of social character - which is drawn from the fusion of Marxist and Freudian insights, contains an implicit paradox. Yet Fromm, despite this apparent contradiction, felt able to link the two, and in fact pointed out that it was the very differences between these theories which made it viable for him. Following from this, Fromm envisaged social character to be a conceptual nexus between Freud's description of the individual's psychology and Marx's dialectical description of society, whereby each would effectively supplement the other and thus assist in the explanation of that most problematic issue which faced the Critical theorists; what was the relationship between the individual and society? In so doing Fromm hoped to produce a new and far more profound theory drawn from the best aspects of both theories, done in such a fashion so as to overcome the problems which Fromm and others like him beheld to be implicit in their original form.

The first indication of a solution to this question as to the "medium" of the mediation between socio-economic conditions, and psychic and intellectual phenomena, Fromm found in Marx's distinction between the "constant drives" and the "relative drives" or "desires". The former for Marx

contained the sexual drive and hunger, whose form and direction alone could be changed by social conditions; and the latter being wholly dependent in both origin and content upon the particular prevailing type of social organisation. To Fromm this suggested the general idea of extrapolating Marx's approach to social psychology:

> " Marx already linked the relative appetites with social structure and conditions of production, and communication, and thus laid the foundation for a dynamic psychology which understands most human appetites - and that means a large part of human motivation - as being determined by the process of production." (15)

The specific psychology which Fromm used for this purpose, however was derived from Freud. And the underlying Freudian motif which Fromm utilised for his concept of Social Character was what he called:

> "one of the most significant of Freud's discoveries: his dynamic concept of character" (16)

By this Fromm meant that Freud developed an original as well as consistent and penetrating theory of character as a system of strivings which underlie, but are not identical with, behaviour. Strivings are the forces by which man is motivated. Freud recognized the dynamic quality of character traits, and that the character structure of a person represents a particular form in which energy is canalised in the process of living. Freud interpreted the dynamic nature of character traits as an expression of their libidinous source. (17) Character orientation, in Freud's sense, is thus the source of man's actions and of many of his ideas. Character is the equivalent of the animal's instinctive determination, which man has lost.

This is the psychological foundation upon which Fromm in turn created his edifice of social character. While he acknowledged the astuteness of Freud,

Fromm was not content merely to accept the latter's principles without scrutiny and amendment: With regard to character and the social process which moulds it - the injection of Hegelian Marxist precepts and sociology created a fundamental difference of definition and context. For a start, the 'sociobiological' angle of Fromm's concept implies that man is primarily a social being, moulded phylogenetically and ontogenetically by the social conditions in which he lives. This is in sharp contrast to the self-enclosed unitary man of Freud's, who is a physiologically driven and motivated "homme machine". Freud's physiological and mechanical conception of character is transposed into a social dimension. This implies a fundamental break with Freud's basic libido theory. In the words of R.Funk:

> "The fundamental difference between Freud and Fromm is found in their opposing views of psychic energy and its function in the shaping of man. For Freud, the libido is a psychic energy that develops as an instinct according to its own, physiologically determined law so that the development of man's character remains tied to the phase by phase development and psychic energy of the libido and social processes depend on the latter. Fromm on the other hand, believes that what makes man specifically human is his relative independence from the instincts. Against the libido theory, he sets the vision of an individual and social character that makes possible a new understanding of social processes and therefore of the things that shape man." (18)

A further aspect of Fromm's concept of Social Character which implies a fundamental critique of Freud is that the analysis of the Social Character of certain socioeconomic structures with their corresponding ideas and ideologies yields a set of criteria for evaluating the concept of man, of history, and of the world. Thus, in Freud's own concept of man as a primarily isolated, egoistic being who is forced into relatedness because he seeks optimal satisfaction, Fromm recognized a parallel to the "homo economicus" of the nineteenth century bourgeois market economy, a

being who can satisfy his economic needs only through exchange in the marketplace. In both variants, people essentially remain strangers to each other, being related only by the common aim of drive satisfaction.
More generally, Fromm subjects Freud's theory of a duality of life instinct and death instinct to a sustained critique. In part, he objects [19] to Freud's lumping together of hostility, aggression, destruction, and sadism under the death instinct, because reactive aggressiveness for example, stands wholly in the service of the preservation of life. Much more important is Fromm's critique of the instinctual nature of Thanatos. For Fromm, the death instinct is no biological necessity. While Eros must be viewed as the biologically normal goal of development, the death instinct should be seen as the expression of the failure of normal development and "in this sense as a pathological though deeply rooted striving." [20] The affinity for death is therefore a secondary pathological phenomenon that occurs when the conditions of life make a biophilous unfolding impossible.

So if one looks more closely at the implications of Fromm's concept of Social Character, it amounts to far more than a simple fusion of Freudian psychological insights into a Marxian Sociology and vice versa. Instead we find that Fromm actually rejects most of Freud's theory and revises it to the point that, ultimately the only basic (Freudian) biological drive Fromm recognizes in man is the drive to live and to grow. This itself, Fromm ameliorates considerably to accommodate his 'notion of' Love.

If this is what became of Freud in Fromm's work, the question obviously arises as to how did he tackle Marx? And how did he accomodate this revised Freudian psychology within Marxism? Fromm on frequent

occasions repeats the idea that man is above all a social being, and that:

> "the structure of society and the function of the individual in the social structure may be considered to determine the content of social character".(21)

At first glance, statements of this kind appear to reflect a materialist standpoint with regard to the relationship between the individual and society. Yet, on closer scrutiny it becomes clear that Fromm's arguments develop beyond the Marxist perspective. For when it comes to the psychological implications of the concept of social character, as reflected in the concrete historical individual, Fromm qualifies character as:

> "the specific form in which human energy is shaped by the dynamic adaptation of human needs to the particular mode of existence of a given society".(22)

Consequently social character emerges as being the result of the dynamic adaptation of human nature to the structure of a specific society. The form of this adaptation and therefore social character, however is variable and determined by the type of social structure. So, while, on the one hand, Fromm shares an orthodox Marxist point of view, according to which the material base shapes ideas and ideals, he also, on the other hand, declares that some ideals are independent and do not stem from society at all. In an important sense he sees the ideals of freedom, justice and love as rooted in human nature .(23)

Fromm's concept of human nature is a critical departure from Marx and this in reinforced by the concept and function of social character. Essentially it provides a reverse link between these two points of innate human ideals and the base. Through the medium of social character ideas and ideals can influence the base. It becomes clear that because Fromm views this area of innate "needs" as a perpetual constant, the real nature of this reverse influence of ideas and ideals on the base, eventually depends

on the former. For according to Fromm it is only those ideas and ideals that are rooted in human nature that can produce change in the economic base, via the medium of social character.

In effect this scheme of the interraction of the three factors of base, social character and ideas and ideals, in relation to each other within society amounts to a radical interpretation of conventional Marxist postulates. The primary significance in this scheme accorded to the influence of "innate human needs and ideals," would be rejected by both Second and Third Internationalists and their inheritors, as invalid Marxism. In essence it amounts to a return to what more appropriately would be a Hegelian position. It would seem as if Fromm in his turn "stands Marx on his head" and (via Freud) returns to Hegel. For although Marx never rejected outright (as did the Second International) the importance and independence of the subjective-philosophical factor in history, it was this very point, that ultimately, the subjective-philosophical is shaped by socio-economic conditions which distinguished him from Hegel. Fromm's conclusion that the force of positive and creative change in the social system is ultimately dependent upon the extrahistorical nature of man cannot be deemed truly Marxist in any orthodox sense. Fromm's revisionism becomes clear by his insistence that only "man's nature" proffers that system of true values, which must guide him to become a "free and active personality".[24] Fromm further indicates his non-materialist 'Marxist' perspective by contrasting "social" factors with all that is essential to man. In his view the social factors are always something removed from man, which serve to standardise and alienate him from himself.[25] Consequently Fromm is negatively disposed to all forms of social norms and demands which are historically relative in

character and, instead, postulates his own system of extra-temporal norms and demands. Hereby Fromm rejects that the Marxian interpretation which sees any system of norms and values as the product of a concrete historical society's productive activity and therefore always of a transient character and directly dependent upon the evolution of man's material activity. In these terms there can be no extra-temporal factors involved whatsoever.

In his description of the evolution of mankind, expressed in terms of Social Character, Fromm also resembles Hegel. When looking at the total social process of thought as a historical reality, Fromm, like Hegel, discerned a pattern of meaningful change in it. He perceives a gradual movement toward greater and greater human self-consciousness [26]; an increasing consciousness of the character and interrelationships of natural processes, and therefore a movement towards greater freedom of mind to control the world through increased understanding of its laws - a conception of freedom (like Hegel) realized in the context of necessity. The major difference is that, whereas for Hegel the idea of "Geist" [27] emerges as the primary reality of the world, becoming self conscious and thus free, for Fromm there is, instead, a gamut of Neo-Freudian primary needs and ideals. The nexus between all three (Marx, Hegel and Fromm) lies in the fact they all see history as a process of the dialectical realisation of freedom, with the idea becoming actualised in empirical existence. In this the traditonal antithesis between thought and action falls away. This began with Hegel's fusion of the two and culminated in Marx's famous remark that until our time

"Philosophers have only contemplated the world: the point is to change it." [28]

This is Fromm's fundamental and underlying maxim as well.

These Hegelian theories and elements in Fromm's Marxism is complicated by Marx's own complex and controversial relation to Hegel. Ultimately whether one considers Fromm as being primarily a Hegelian or a Marxist, depends upon one's conception of Marx. According to W.T.Bluhm:

> "Commentators disagree on the extent to which Karl Marx, intellectually formed by the Hegelian system, differs from Hegel on the nature of freedom and ultimate reality. Some believe that the mature Marx, in his collaboration with Engels, radically inverted the Hegelian dialectic by propounding a thoroughgoing materialist metaphysic in which economic forces rather than ideas, blindly and mechanically determine human events. Others believe that the Marxian emphasis on the material forces of production in shaping human life was merely intended to draw our attention to the importance of economic factors in society. These interpreters assert that Marx remained throughout his life an Hegelian, and that he affirmed the primacy of spirit over matter. These same interpreters, however, show that Marx also eliminated the reified Hegelian abstraction called "Spirit" (Geist) from his philosophy and substituted as ultimate reality the rational action of free human persons. For those who read Marx in this way, he becomes the outstanding humanist philosopher of our age, and much more truly a humanist than Hegel." (29)

In this latter sense, at least, Fromm's reversion to a Hegelian Marxism via Freud could be construed as in line with the Hegelian origins of Marx himself.

2.4. CONCLUSION:

Fromm's concept of Social Character which ostensibly was a simple fusion of Freudian psychological insights into a Marxist sociology as an effort to overcome the inadequacies of Marxism in dealing with the relationship between Base and Superstructure: turns out, in the light of our examination to be somewhat different. It was found that though Fromm does utilise Freud's dynamic concept of character his particular interpretation of human nature sees him depart substantially from the main thrust of Freudian

theory. Fromm rejects, in effect, most of Freud's postulates, retaining only a semblance to the Freudian instinct of Eros which he transforms to be the need to live, reproduce and grow. He sees all negative activity, or unproductive orientations, as the consequence of this drive being unable to find fulfillment. Thanatos is not a biological necessity, it is merely a secondary pathological phenomenon occurring when the social reality frustrates the development of the positive (biophilous) drive. Eros, too, in Freud's terms proved to be insufficient for Fromm's needs. This concept he ameloriated to accommodate his notion of Mature Love; that "love" which is the fulfillment of the biophilous drive. This biophilous drive is what Fromm sees as being the fundamental motor of mankind. Social character was shown to be the mediation betwen this primary drive and social reality. The cultural superstructure is the synthesised consequence of this interaction. It is a gamut of "symptoms" which indicate the manner of the integration of instincts and reality.

It is the instinctual drive which makes the social character "dynamite as opposed to social mortar".[30] Because it is extra-temporal and endemic to all of mankind, this concept has profound consequences for Marxism. Fromm, by postulating this essential and determining concept of human nature, contradicts the essence of the orthodox approach to Marxism. His motor of extra-temporal drives is the antithesis to their economic determinism. However, in the light of the Frankfurt School's Hegelian Marxism and the inspiration they drew from Marx's earlier works, this is, to a degree, acceptable. The Hegelian idealism which they found within the works of the younger Marx gave Fromm a certain elasticity which accommodated his premises. The fundamental common denominator between Marx, Hegel and

Fromm was that they all saw history as a process of freedom (as an idea) becoming actualised in empirical existence.

Marx's influence on Fromm's thought, especially with regard to his concept of social character, is obvious. The final conclusion we can draw at this stage, is that how one sees Fromm's theory in relation to Marx's, depends on how one sees Marx in relation to Hegel. If one sees the Hegelian tenets which prevail in the earlier works as being consistent with the rest of Marx's philosophy, then Fromm's paradigm can be justified upon the premises he draws from these earlier works. Acknowledged as such, one has to credit Fromm for (in the particular case of the social character) producing an illuminating and practically useful sociological tool which is infinitely more satisfying in it's explanatory capacity than the crude dialectical materialism of the Second and Third Internationals.

2.5. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Arato and Gebhardt, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. p. 127.
2. E.Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion , p. 83.
3. E.Fromm, The Sane Society , p. 78
4. Op.cit, pp. 79-80
5. E.Fromm, To Have or to Be? , p.132
6. The Sane Society, op.cit, pp.80-91
7. Op.cit, p.78
8. R.Funk, The Courage to be Human, p.20
9. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, pp.82-83
10 The Courage to be Human, op.cit, p. 21
11. The Sane Society , op.cit, p.81
12. E.Fromm, The Art of Loving, p.26
13. Ibid
14. Ibid
15. E.Fromm, The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays , p vii
16. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, p.68
17. Ibid
18. The Courage to be Human , op.cit, p.24
19. Ibid
20. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, p.68
21. Op.cit, pp. 82-83
22. Escape From Freedom, op.cit, p.305
23. The Sane Society, op.cit, p.29
24. To Have or to Be, op.cit, p.79
25. Ibid
26. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, p.97

27. Ibid

28. K.Marx, " Theses on Feuerbach," in R.Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader , p.109

29. W.T.Bluhm, Theories of the Political Systems , p.412

30. The Sane Society , op.cit, p.83

CHAPTER 3 : THE CONCEPT OF THE SOCIAL UNCONSCIOUS.

3.1 INTRODUCTION:

Social Character is one of the two mechanisms through which Fromm sees the economic base as being connected to the cultural superstructure. The other connection, besides social character, lay in what he termed the "social unconscious":

> " The Social Character which makes people act and think as they have to act and think from the standpoint of the proper functioning of their society is only one link between the social structure and ideas. The other link lies in the fact that each society determines which thoughts and feelings shall be permitted to arrive at the level of awareness and which have to remain unconscious. Just as there is a social character; there is also a 'social unconscious' " (1)

It is to the extrapolation of this concept of the social unconscious that this chapter is devoted.

In the last chapter we examined the concept of social character as an example of Fromm's method of fusing Freudian psychoanalysis into Marxian sociology. Though superficially the concept of social character resembled a direct meld of Marxian and Freudian insights; our examination disclosed it to be something somewhat different: Marx was seen to be returned to his Hegelian origins and Freud was reduced to the barest of life drives - the single instinct Eros. Most of Fromm's psychological injection turned out to be the consequence of his own observations; and that motif of Eros which he retained, was itself considerably ameliorated to accommodate his own concept of Mature Love. Fromm did however retain Freud's notion of a "dynamic psychology".

Just as we did in the last chapter with regard to the concept of social

character, we will in this chapter examine Fromm's concept of the social unconscious, in an effort to understand the way in which he synthesizes Marx and Freud. We will be seeking to uncover the novelties and also the inconsistencies of his method, hoping to make clear the distinction between his ostensible intentions and what he actually arrives at. We will be examining the degree to which he adapts and changes both Marx and Freud, and the degree to which the concept of the social unconscious incorporates his own views on the matter.

We will begin, as before, with extensive and definitive quotations from Fromm's mature works on the nature of the social unconscious. These will then be systematically extrapolated and clarified. Next we will offer a critical appraisal of Fromm's concept of the social unconscious as a synthesis of Marx and Freud. It will be seen that Fromm's primary concern was to demystify the subject of the "unconscious". Because he sees Freud as largely responsible for this mystification, he strips Freud's postulates down to the most rudimentary framework and rebuilds it with his own psychoanalytic observations. It will be seen that Fromm's neo-Freudian concept of the unconscious fits successfully into a Hegelian Marxist position and gives it an added empirical dimension. The view that the young Marx transmuted Hegel's idealism into humanism by dropping the mysterious concept of Geist from his philosophical vocabulary, and that he remained a humanist - a believer in the irreducable autonomy of human thought and action - gave Fromm a considerable elasticity of paradigm compared to the thinkers of the Second and Third Internationals. Working in this light; and adopting Marx's distinction between "constant drives and relative drives," [2] allowed Fromm to introduce certain precepts of psychoanalysis into Marxism.

On this basis we will then embark upon a comparison between Fromm's type of theory and that of the Second and Third International's: Fromm's notion of the social unconscious and its implications will be contrasted with the reductionist economic determinism of the Second and Third Internationals. Fromm's injection of his neo-Freudian concept of the social unconscious will be shown to be an effective and innovative explanation of the way in which the base and the superstructure interact. The point of this comparison will be to show quite clearly the novelty and efficacy of Fromm's theory over the economic reductionism of the Second and Third Internationals.

3.2 THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE SOCIAL UNCONSCIOUS:

Fromm's fullest account of the nature and dynamics of the social unconscious occurs in Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962). He introduces the term "social unconscious" to refer to the functional repression of areas of social experience:

> "By 'social unconscious' I refer to those areas of repression which are common to most members of a society; these commonly repressed elements are those contents which a given society cannot permit its members to be aware of if the society with its specific contradictions is to operate successfully..." (3)

However Fromm immediately goes on to qualify the notion of "unconsciousness" as a mystification:

> "The term 'unconscious' is actually a mystification. There is no such thing as the unconscious; there are only experiences of which we are aware; and others of which we are not aware; that is; of which we are unconscious..." (4)

Instead of simply postulating a mystificatory category of the social unconscious Fromm sets out to provide an account of the specific and concrete determination of consciousness by social forces amounting to a socially conditioned conceptual filter:

"For any experience to come into awareness it must be comprehensible in accordance with the categories in which conscious thought is organized. . . Some of the categories, such as time and space, may be universal, and may constitute categories of perception common to all men. Others such as causality, may be a valid category for many, but not for all forms of conscious perception. Other categories are even less general and differ from culture to culture. . . However this may be, experience can enter into awareness only under the condition that it can be perceived, related, and ordered in terms of a conceptual system and of its categories. This system is in itself a result of social evolution. Each society, by its own practice of living and by the mode of relatedness, of feeling and perceiving, develops a system, or categories, which determines the forms of awareness. This system works, as it were, like a socially conditioned filter: experience cannot enter awareness unless it can penetrate this filter. . . " (5)

Fromm distinguishes different aspects of the "social filter" mediating the degree to which experiences are cultivated in a given culture and so arrive at social awareness. One such aspect is provided by language:

"There are many affective experiences for which a given language has no word, while another language may be rich in words which express these feelings. In a language in which different affective experiences are not expressed by different words, it is almost impossible for one's experiences to come to clear awareness. Generally speaking, it may be said that an experience rarely comes into awareness for which the language has no word. . . . but this is only one aspect of the filtering function of language. Different languages differ not only by the fact that they vary in the diversity of words they use to denote certain affective experiences, but also by their syntax, their grammar, and the root-meaning of their words. The whole language contains an attitude of life, is a frozen expression of experiencing life in a certain way. . . Language, by its words, its grammar, its syntax, by the whole spirit which is frozen in it, determines which experiences penetrate to our awareness." (6)

A second aspect of the filter enabling awareness is the logic, Aristotelian or otherwise, directing the thinking in a given culture:

"Just as most people assume that their language is 'natural' and that other languages only use different words for the same things, they assume also that the

rules which determine proper thinking are natural and universal ones: that what is illogical in one cultural system is illogical in any other because it conflicts with 'natural' logic." (7)

The third, and most important aspect of the social filter, crucial to its repressive function, is the various social taboos:

"While language and logic are parts of the social filter which makes it difficult or impossible for an experience to enter awareness, the third part of the social filter is the most important one for it is the one that does not permit certain feelings to reach consciousness and tends to expel them from this realm if they have reached it. It is made up by the social taboos which declare certain ideas and feelings to be improper, forbidden, dangerous, and which prevent them from even reaching the level of consciousness. . . ." (8)

The rationality or irrationality of different societies, according to Fromm, is thus a product of this mediating filter of language, logic and social taboos, which is itself a function of underlying social conflicts:

"The irrationalities of any given society result in the necessity for its members to repress the awareness of many of their feelings and observations. This necessity is the greater in proportion to the extent to which a society is not representative of all its members. Throughout human history, with the exception, perhaps, of some primitive societies, the table has been set only for a few, and the vast majority received nothing but the remaining crumbs. If the majority had been fully aware of the fact that they were being cheated, a resentment might have developed which would have endangered the existing order. Hence such thoughts had to be repressed and those in whom this process of repression did not take place adequately were in danger of their lives or freedom." (9)

The converse of this socially functional repression of awareness is the creation of ideologies or forms of false consciousness:

"The repression of awareness of facts is, and must be supplemented by the acceptance of many fictions. The gaps which exist because we refuse to see many things around us must be filled so that we may have a coherent picture. . . these ideologies are impressed on the people from childhood on by their parents, by the schools, churches, movies, television, newspapers and they take hold of men's

minds as if they were the result of the men's own thinking or observation. If this process takes place in societies opposed to ours, we call it 'brainwashing' and in its less extreme forms 'indoctrination' or 'propaganda'; in ours, we call it 'education' and 'information'." (10)

Finally Fromm comes to some general conclusions about the anthropological significance of the socially conditioned filter and the resultant social unconscious:

"Formally speaking then, what is unconscious and what is conscious depends on the structure of society and on the patterns of feeling and thought that it produces. As to the contents of the unconscious, no generalization is possible, but one statement can be made: it always represents the whole man. The unconscious is the whole man - minus that part of him which corresponds to his society. Consciousness represents social man, the accidental limitations set by the historical situation into which an individual is thrown. Unconsciousness represents universal man, the whole man, rooted in the cosmos; it represents the plant in him, the animal in him, the spirit in him; it represents his past, down to the dawn of human existence, and it represents his future up to the day when man will become fully human, and when nature will be humanized and man will be 'naturalized' ". To become aware of one's unconscious means to get in touch with one's full humanity and to do away with barriers which society erects within each man and consequently, between each man and his fellow man. To attain this aim fully is difficult and a rare occurrence; to approximate it is in the grasp of everybody as it constitutes the emancipation of man from the socially conditioned alienation from himself and humankind. . . .The social and the individual unconsious are related to each other and in constant interaction. In fact, unconsciousness/consciousness is, in the last analysis indivisible. What matters is not so much the content of what is repressed, but the state of mind and, to be more precise the degree of awakedness and realism in the individual." (11)

This then constitutes Fromm's description of the social unconscious, it remains now for us to analyse and explain this within our own terms:

3.3. THE CONCEPT OF THE SOCIAL UNCONSCIOUS AS A SYNTHESIS OF FREUD AND MARX:

Fromm himself clearly situated his account of the social unconscious in the

dual context of Freud and Marx. Before going on to provide a critical analysis of this concept as a synthesis of Freud and Marx, which would involve both the questions of how Fromm's concept of the social unconscious (1) enabled him to overcome the limitations and inadequacies of Freud and Marx, and (2) in the process transform the positions of Freud and Marx, we would thus do well to consider an extended passage from Beyond the Chains of Illusion for Fromm's own discussion of these dual origins. Fromm finds the basic common ground in the fact that both Marx and Freud believed:

> "that most of what man thinks consciously is determined by forces which operate behind his back, that is, without man's knowledge; that man explains his actions to himself as being rational or moral and these rationalisations (false consciousness, ideology) satisfy him subjectively. But being driven by forces unknown to him, man is not free. He can attain freedom (and health) only by becoming aware of these motivating forces, that is of reality, and thus he can become the master of his life (within the limitations of reality) rather than the slave of blind forces." (12)

Fromm also points out the basic difference underlying this common ground:

> "The fundamental difference between Marx and Freud lies in their respective concept of the nature of these forces determining man. For Freud they are essentially physiological (libido) or biological (death instinct or life instinct). For Marx they are historical forces which pass through an evolution in the process of man's socio-economic development. For Marx man's consciousness is determined by his being, his being by his practice of life, his practice of life by his mode of producing his livelihood, that is, by his mode of production and his social structure, mode of distribution and comsumption resulting from it." (13)

On this basis, then, Fromm proposes the task of a synthesis which would mold together the relevant insights of both Marx and Freud in a single unified theoretical account:

> "Marx's and Freuds's concept are not mutually exclusive. This is so precisely because Marx sets out from the real acts of men and on the basis of their real life process, including, of course, their biological and physiological conditions. Marx recognised the sexual drive as one existing under all circumstances which can be changed by

its social conditions only as far as form and direction are concerned.
Yet while Freudian theory might be incorporated in some fashion into that of Marx, there remain two fundamental differences. For Marx, man's being and his consciousness are determined by the structure of the society of which he is a part; for Freud society only influences his being by greater or lesser repression of his innate physiological and biological equipment. From this first difference follows the second:
Freud believed that man can overcome repression without social changes. Marx on the other hand was the first thinker who saw that the realisation of the universal and a fully awakened man can occur only together with social changes which lead to a new and truly economic and social organisation of mankind. Marx has only stated in general terms his theory of the determination of consciousness by social forces. In the following I try to show how this determination operates concretely and specifically." (14)

It will already be clear that Fromm proposed to incorporate Freud's psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious within the framework of Marx's social theory. In what follows we will first consider how the Freudian notions are transformed in this process, and then assess to what extent Marx's theory has been amplified or itself transformed.

3.3.1 FROMM'S DEMYSTIFICATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF FREUD'S UNCONSCIOUS:

As we have seen, Fromm's point of departure for his concept of the social unconscious, was Freud's notion of the unconscious. Fromm remarked in a letter to Martin Jay:

"I consider the basic achievement of Freud to be his concept of the unconscious its manifestation in neurosis, dreams, etc. resistance and his dynamic concept of character. These concepts have remained for me of basic importance in all my work." (15)

Increasingly however, Fromm found Freud inadequate and inaccurate in certain areas and came to view Bachofen's matriarchical studies, and

Ferenczi and Groddeck's methods of psychoanalysis as superior and appropriate for his own purposes. However even if Fromm moved substantially from the Freudian position as a whole; he did retain specifically Freudian components in his psychoanalytical mechanisms as the mediating concepts between the individual and society.[16] In the last chapter we examined the other main mechanism of this mediation, viz. the social character; and we saw that the Freudian elements were substantialy revised so as to accommodate his psychoanalytic observations and his Hegelian Marxist perspective. We are now going to examine the other main mechanism of mediation, the social unconscious, so as to ascertain precisely how this is transformed in turn.

The significance of Freud's concept of the unconscious for Fromm lay in his recognition that most of what is real within ourselves is not conscious and that most of what is conscious is not real. And that this repression of reality was based upon fear and could be ovecome by the rationalization of this fear; in other words, making the unconscious conscious.
Freud's unconscious, however, was based purely upon physiological and biological forces. These were limited in their manifestations to the individual in particular. Freud's concept of the unconscious thus did not extend beyond the individual, and society was seen only as an objective force acting upon the subjective individual.And in this respect Freud was a pessimist who held that as civilization grew, so repression would grow and that not only would history fail to eliminate repression but, on the contrary, reinforce it. Freud did not include society within his psychological model. Consequently for Freud the overcoming of repression did not necessitate social changes. Furthermore for Freud the role of fear as the

repressive force was purely the consequence of parent/child sexual confrontation.

Fromm's initial concern was thus to demystify the subject of the "unconscious", a mystification which he attributed in large part to Freud. Fromm considered the very term the "unconscious" to be a mystification, for he saw that there is no such thing as the unconscious; instead he pointed out that there are only experiences of which we are aware, and others of which we are not aware, in other words, of which we are unconscious. (17)

Fromm found the source of this mystification in Freud's approach to personality as the receptacle for "unconscious" biological and instinctive desires. These "unconscious desires" (18) operated for Freud in a fashion contrary to society, for it is society which prohibited their emergence into a conscious plain. This ahistorical and asocial view of personality was responsible, in Fromm's opinion, for creating the psychological interpretation that views the "unconscious" as something with which the individual is biologically equipped at birth. (19)

Fromm singled out three fundamental premises in psychoanalysis as a specific system of ideas: First, the idea that man, whether he likes it or not is obliged in his every day life to suppress his awareness of many feelings and emotions; second, the idea that a conflict arises between the implications of the unconscious and consciousness, a conflict which nearly always results in neurosis, and third, the certainty that this conflict will dissappear as soon as the unconscious is brought to the threshold of man's consciousness. (20)

Fromm was not so much concerned to dispute or modify any of these basic assumptions of classic psychoanalysis concerning the unconscious and the mechanisms of repression as to reinterpret them by incorporating them into a social theory: First of all, in contrast to Freud, who regarded the unconscious as a wholly extra-historical, anti-social phenomenon - biological by nature, Fromm maintained that the unconscious (like consciousness) is also a social phenomenon, functioning as the "social filter". [21] Accordingly he centered his attention on the social unconscious, namely those areas of repression which are not individual but common to most members of a society. It is only with the help of a socially conditioned filter that society can ensure its stable functioning, given the Marxian premise that society has to grapple with specific inner contradictions. Experience cannot enter awareness unless it penetrated this filter, thus consciousness is only that quotient of perception which has not been trapped by society's filtering net. Accordingly, the greater part of man's life experiences remain outside the limits of consciousness, that is they remain unconscious.With this Hegelian Marxist starting point Fromm did not separate the individual and his society. What is unconscious and what is conscious depend ultimately upon the structure of a particular society or the patterns of feelings and thought it produces. The unconscious is the whole man subtracted from that part of him which corresponds to society. Fromm emulated Marx in examining social structure as determined by economic factors and it followed from this that the psychic structure of the unconscious is not also shaped by socio-economic conditions via the medium of language, logic and taboo. In connection with the elaboration of his socio-psychological method Fromm thus presented the socio-economic

structure as dominant over the libidinal/familial relationship. [22]

Superficially this represents a fusion of Marxist social theory and Freudian psychoanalysis; but actually it involves the application of certain selected Freudian psychoanalytic insights to a Hegelian Marxist understanding of social phenomena. In contrast to Freud and others who viewed social entities as structured by psychic mechanisms and laws that resemble those at work in the individual, and who analyse the psychic structure of social entities in analogy to the structural regularities of the individual psyche, Fromm maintained that the psychic structure of social entities had to be understood through their social structure i.e. through their socio-economic situation. The difference between Fromm and Freud lies not so much in their respective psychoanalytic methods but in Freud's lack of a sociological starting point. For Fromm both the psychic structure of the individual and social dynamics are properly grasped only when seen against the background of the social structure. For the analysis of social phenomena this leads to the following sociological method [23]: The phenomena of social psychology can be understood as processes involving the active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation. In certain fundamental respects, the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factor goes to the economic conditions. With respect to social character, the family is the essential medium through which the economic situation exerts its formative influence on the individual's psyche; with respect to the social unconscious it is the influence of the social filter (comprised of the components; language, logic and taboo) which serves this function. The task of social psychology is to explain the shared, socially

relevant psychic attitudes and ideologies - and in particular their unconscious roots - in terms of the influence of economic conditions on libido strivings. [24]

As we saw in the opening section of this chapter, the essential ingredients of this socially conditioned filter as Fromm sees it, are; (a) language, (b) logic, (c) social taboos. The most important of these is the third. The function of social taboos is that these actually do not allow certain feelings which might threaten the continued survival of society to reach consciousness, and to expel them from this realm if they have reached it.[25] Certain feelings are improper, forbidden or dangerous and consequently prevented from ever reaching the level of consciousness. In this way society endeavours to suppress and impede the apprehension of those sensual experiences whose implications are incompatible with the demands of the given society and which constitute a threat to its smooth functioning. The existence of taboos makes it easier for society to mould a social character such as will consolidate it, and through its influence constantly reproduce the main features of that society. Society cannot wipe out the workings of hidden human experiences and feelings, anti-social in their implications, but it can push them out of consciousness by repressing them with the help of the social filter which carries out the role of a special censor in social consciousness. This process, of driving out undesirable experiences from man's consciousness is, according to Fromm, simultaneous with efforts to fill man's consciousness with various sorts of ideological fictions.[26]

If economic conditions are thus primary factors shaping the unconscious

for Fromm, then his view must differ substantially from Freud's. On Fromm's view, psychological agency like the unconscious, as a repressive mechanism conditioning man's feelings, thinking and acting decisively, is not "natural" but is itself ultimately conditioned by the mode of production and the social structure resulting from it. Thus Fromm posed and resolved the question of the unconscious differently to Freud. He drew attention to the social nature of the factors calling forth the unconscious and regarded it as something essentially functional. Unlike Freud, for whom the unconscious contained all that is negative in man, Fromm, when defining the qualitative implications of the unconscious, stressed the individual's 'creative, productive potentialities'. In interpreting the unconscious as a 'good' principle Fromm was akin to views expressed by the likes of Horney, Sullivan and Erickson. [27]

But for all these ways in which Freud and Fromm differed in their interpretations of the unconscious, Fromm too continued to rely on basic assumptions regarding human nature in relation to history.(Which we shall explore fully in the following chapter.) They both presented the essential forces of the human ego as being unconscious, extra-historical needs. For Fromm these unconscious needs find fulfillment in the process of human evolution. History in this light can be seen, for Fromm, as entirely the product of the unconscious finding fulfillment. [28] This premise can be seen as in line with Fromm's Hegelian Marxism: The ultimate conclusion of this line of reasoning would thus be that when unconsciousness becomes conscious, or in Hegelian terms, "when Mind (Geist) grasps its own nature", the last stage of history has been reached. Or, as expressed in Marx's vision of the fulfillment of Communism, the last stage of history would

occur when the human community has entered into its own as a true 'Gattungswesen' :

> "Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, or human self-estrangement and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore is the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being - a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This Communism, as fully developed naturalism equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be the solution.[29]

The connection to Fromm's psychoanalytical observations is quite apparent: Fromm rejected Freud's concept of repression based upon a generalised notion of fear and instead replaced it with a repression which was based upon a specific kind of fear: the fear of ostracism and isolation. As opposed to Freud, for Fromm the primary factor which inhibits man from awareness of real sensual experiences which are incompatible with demands of society is his desperate fear of isolation and ostracism. Fromm was here developing an alternative psychological theory to that of Freud as well as an important connective to the social theory of man. [30] According to this theory man is afraid of finding himself in a position that sets him apart from others; the opinion of the crowd acquires for him at times more importance than his own ideas. It was Fromm's conviction that the content and direction of man's social activity is determined by the norms and rules sanctioned by society and subscribed to by the overwhelming majority of its members. He held that because man sees the socially acceptable clichés as the criteria for truth, reality and sanity, anything which contradicts

these clichés is excluded from man's awareness and is thus relegated to the unconscious. Yet simultaneously and paradoxically it was Fromm's opinion that society cannot dehumanise and repress man *ad infinitum*, [31] for man is more than just a constituent member of society, he is also a member of the human race. Man is thus prone to this continual paradox; he is afraid of isolation from his social group or society, and he is also afraid of being cut-off from mankind, from the generic principle which he bears within him and which constitutes human nature This is the paradox from which Fromm concluded that society cannot subjugate man to itself completely.

This concept of belonging to the human race can be seen as an obvious corrolary to Marx's motif of the 'Gattungswesen', in which man's true self or essential nature is to be a 'species being' (Gattungswesen). Man as 'Gattungswesen' expresses, however, the end of the historical process - when man finds his fulfillment - a teleonaturalist wish. The present reality is one of estrangement, alienation in which man comforts himself with the false consciousness of ideologies, myths and religion, etc., but these are merely the expressions of his 'alienated selfconsciousness'.

This formulation finds obvious expression and parallel in Fromm's schemata: Fromm equated alienation and false consciousness to the consequence of the "social filter" and suggested that man's need to be a "Gattungswesen" lie submerged in his subconscious. This existent contradiction between the aims of a given society and Fromm's so called "universal aims of mankind" (to be explored in the next chapter) is according to Fromm, one of the main reasons behind the social fabrication of various fallacies and illusions concealing that contradiction. [32]

Therefore the ability to act according to one's own conscience depends, Fromm suggested on the degree to which one has managed to transcend

the limits of one's society and has become a "citizen of the world", in other words, on the degree to which one has apprehended the limitation's of merely social aims and is using instead the universal human goals as one's guide to action. These goals are those in which the essence of human nature finds expression. Obviously, for Fromm, insofar as man's appreciation of his truly human goals threatens not merely to disrupt the functioning of the existing social system, but also inevitably leads to social actions directed towards changing that system, society has to obstruct man's perception of his natural essence.[33] And therefore there will be a constant tension and conflict between the individual and his society until such stage as the ultimate society is instituted. Needless to say this society was for Fromm established upon the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. The "final revolution " is thus one of arriving at the essence of mankind within each man, of making the unconscious conscious, of liberating man from the alienation of his blind conformism to society.

To assist this process, i.e. to overcome the problematic conflict of society's control over consciousness and unconsciousness, Fromm emphasized the notion of a practical "de-repression", that is, the elaboration of methods of social therapy, which in his opinion should free man of the heavy burden of the unconscious. Fromm wrote that:

> "Making the unconscious conscious transforms the mere idea of the universality of man into the living experience of his universality. it is the experiential realization of humanism". [34]

The solution to this problem of de-repressing the unconscious lies, in Fromm's view, firstly in removing and neutralizing fear, which impedes man in his feeling and thinking, and freely expressing that which he really experiences; secondly in the development of man's faculty for critical

thought, doubt, independent formulation and resolution of vital questions; and finally in the dissemination of humanist ideals that further the intellectual development of each individual. The first condition for the successful implementation of de-repressing the unconscious is the elimination of those psychological barriers (clichés and fictions) which society has "erected" in the consciousness of each individual. This will enable man to apprehend social reality as it really is. Fulfillment of the second condition will make it possible for the individual to understand social dynamics and achieve a critical appraisal of his own society from the standpoint of universal human values. Finally, compliance with the third condition will facilitate the individual's appreciation of the needs inherent in his nature that can be satisfied by him through activity directed towards the creation of a truly human society.

This then is how Fromm in his account of the "social unconscious" went about overcoming the limitations and mystification which he saw in Freud's general description of the "individual unconscious". What Fromm did was to reduce Freud's psychoanalytic concept to its most fundamental principle of awareness - repression based upon fear - and then to redefine this mechanism in his own terms after the evidence of his own psychoanalytical observations. In this area Fromm rejected Freud's generalised, universal anxiety as the "trigger" of the repressive mechanism and replaced it instead with a specific kind of fear, namely, the fear of loneliness and ostracization or isolation. The introduction of this description of the "trigger" of the repressive mechanism revealed Fromm's Hegelian-Marxist inclinations. For this kind of "fear" can be seen as deriving from the Marxian notion of the essence of man as "Gattungswesen". This ameliorated

fear with it's Marxian base is the pivot upon which Fromm's social unconscious is established. From it, he can show the strength and influence of society upon the individual and the system of mutual dependence which exists between them both. This was of course, an area which Freud (in Fromm's view) had neglected and failed to properly account for, and which Fromm hereby overcame. It is in this fashion that Fromm fused and instilled Freud's "individual unconscious" with certain Marxian premises.

3.3.2. FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE SOCIAL UNCONSCIOUS AS A TRANSFORMATION OF MARX:

According to Fromm the task of an analytical social psychologist was, to understand unconsciously motivated behaviour in terms of the effect of the socio-economic substructure on basic psychic drives.

This represented a new and radical form of social interpretation typifying the Institut für Sozialforschung's attempts to introduce psychoanalysis into it's neo-Marxist Critical Theory. It indicated the Institut's abandonment of the "traditional Marxist straightjacket" [35] of base and superstructure.In Martin Jay's words:

> "Marxism, however; was in need of additional psychological insights, which such Marxists as Kautsky, Bernstein with a naive, idealistic belief in inborn moral instincts had failed to provide. Psychoanalysis. . . could flesh out materialism's notion of Man's essential nature. " [36]

In this regard Marx's notion of alienation would be linked to Freud's notion of the unconscious. (Jay: "Freud's work needed to be supplemented by a more sociological and historical approach." [37])

It was Fromm who spearheaded the original attempts at fusing Freudian psychology with Marxian sociology. But the consequences of his own

psychoanalytical studies eventually led him to abandon the strict regimes of this project. As with the concept of social character, Fromm received the initial impetus for the theoretical rôle of the social unconscious from Marx himself. The transmuted notion of Hegel's alienation (and its corrollaries with respect to consciousness) so prevalent in Marx's earlier writings, was clearly at the root of Fromm's concept.[38] Marx's notion of alienation with its description of consciousness, linked to Fromm's strong interest in Man's existential condition and his growing commitment to the idea of an essential human nature (which could be perverted and repressed [39]) formed the starting point for the concept of the social unconscious.

The use of these motifs indicate Fromm's view of Marx to be close to the so-called humanistic or anthropological interpretation of Marx. This orientation was typical of the Frankfurt School, whose humanistic concern was articulated and substantiated principally in the writings of the young Marx (e.g. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.) This orientation assumed that these earlier works were the key to understanding Marx and that they indicate that Marx's entire oeuvre constituted an explication of the humanistic approach. However, this humanistic interpretation stood in marked contrast to the interpretations established by the Second and Third Internationals, and the novelty of Fromm's kind of approach can only be appreciated when seen in contrast to those prevailing dogmas:

Our examination of Fromm's 'social unconscious' so far has indicated that it was a complex and elaborate concept. If we take an even closer look we discover that, Fromm distinguished the unconscious into two types: Firstly, there are man's "real" or sensual experiences, awareness of which, in view of

its capacity of introducing elements of disorganisation into the functioning of society, is subject to strict social censure. (With this type of unconscious, Fromm has in mind a socio-psychological behaviour mechanism underlying social character). Thus, if man in capitalist society were to become aware that his life was meaningless, that everything he does is uninteresting and tedious, that he has no real freedom and cannot behave and think in the way he would wish, then it would be difficult for him to function correctly in that society.

The second type of unconscious is that which Fromm described as the 'universal unconscious', and is seen to embrace everything which constitutes human nature. [40] Becoming aware of this type of unconscious gives rise to that type of activity on the part of the individual which leads to change in existing social reality and to the creation of a society more compatible with human nature.

Both types of unconscious, according to Fromm, are influenced and moulded by society, as they are the consequences of society's negative function; that is, they are the consequences of the repression by society of feelings and thoughts actually experienced by individuals, which are undesirable for that society. [41] However in the case of the second type of unconscious, it is the awareness of this very repression that leads to action involving change. So in Fromm's analysis of the problem of the unconscious, it emerges that the potential needs of human nature, which motivate the social behaviour of the individual in a positive direction and which determine in general the progressive course of history, lie in the unconscious. Fromm thus attributed to consciousness a subordinate role in men's historical activity. He held that since consciousness represented social man, it did not reflect the real man but rather a compromise between the fundamental "unconscious needs" of

mankind and the existent social reality. To the degree that man's social inclinations impinge upon his "true self" it was for Fromm a curse. Thus everything which goes beyond the framework of the practical needs of existing society is seen by Fromm as being unconscious in character and this includes too, those ubiquitous extra-historical needs of mankind, which are for Fromm the source of all positive change in society.

The sheer conceptual complexity of Fromm's theory is the most immediate difference to that of the Second and Third Internationals; whose simplistic, reductionist schemata are incapable of the penetration or detail of Fromm's analysis. This difference permeates all levels of a comparison between Fromm and the Second and Third Internationals, and in fact the only area upon which concord might be reached is on the level of the first type of unconscious which Fromm described, where Fromm gave what might seem a hardline materialist point of view when he declared that those elements of sensual experience excluded from man's consciousness because of their socially disruptive potential, are of a historically relative character. This similarity is superficial and only extends to the realm of the first level of the unconscious. For Fromm immediately transcended hardline materialism with his creation of the second category of the unconscious, i.e. the 'universal unconscious' (parallel to Marx's 'Gattungswesen'). In so far as he understood the 'universal unconscious' to be rooted in Human Nature and regarded it as social only in so far as its expression or repression conforms to society's ability to obstruct or further the manifestations of these extra-historical needs - he stood in marked contrast to the dialectical materialism of the Second and Third Internationals. In the latter's case, any analysis of the political, economic and psychological relations must be reduced to the

antagonism between ruling minority and oppressed majority. It is this class conflict too, which for them held the answer to the 'social unconscious'. These Marxists, contra Fromm, do not see the answer as lying in abstract psychological notions of the unconscious, but rather in the material relations of man and society. According to this logic it is merely a matter of discerning the agents of historical action and establishing which class stands to gain from suppression of an awareness of social reality and which class would benefit from and bring about changes in the existing social order. The theoretical evidence for the Second and Third Internationalists lay in the so called "later works" of Marx, that is, those written in collaboration with Engels, as can be seen in this extract, which though a relatively early work, already shows a marked change in emphasis:

> "The ideas of this ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.. the ruling ideas are nothing more than the expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance... [furthermore] ... The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it ... The individuals composing the ruling class ... regulate production and distribution of the ideas of their age..." (42)

Accordingly it is only at the initial stage of the emergence of a socio-economic formation distinguished by class antagonism, when the progressive class assumes power, that its interests, as those of the ruling class, for an extremely short period, truly correspond to the interests of other classes;

> "under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as a particular interest of a particular class." (43)

And at that initial stage of the formation's development a certain shared interest can manifest itself, an interest in the elimination of the old society, that has outlived its potential, which is subscribed to by the majority of classes. However this is no real implication of a latent and shared character - the 'Gattungswesen' of the younger Marx or the unconscious, fundamental human needs of Fromm.

What emerges from this reductionist method is that the ruling class endeavours with the help of certain negative sanctions to suppress the opposite class's awareness of the real situation and of realising their real material historical needs. It is these material historical needs of the oppressed class, needs stifled by the ruling class, which constitute for the Second and Third Internationalists and their inheritors, the 'unconscious' in class society. Thus for these Marxists the nature of the unconscious and its role in the historical process can be found not in the depth of the individual's mind (as in the abstract existential contradiction which Fromm postulates), but rather as resulting from the material relations (whatever they may be) pertaining to man's social life. In terms of this paradigm, it also follows that although man's historical activity incorporates, as an essential component, unconscious factors, nevertheless the decisive role must be accorded to consciousness. And consciousness in this description is that awareness produced by material relations. Engels wrote in this connection that:

> "In the history of society... the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals: nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim".(44)

Within this theory the dialectic of the correlation between the 'unconscious' and consciousness in men's socio-historical activity is such that the first

always gives way to the second, and in the final analysis the latter determines men's social and transforming activity.
Fromm was fundamentally opposed to this view. In this case there is a difference in methodology between the Second and Third Internationals Marxism based upon its economic determinism and Fromm's humanistic Hegelian Marxism based upon an anthropological psychology. For whereas the Second and Third Internationals understanding of the unconscious is rooted on a very simplistic economic determinism, derived from the collaborative works of the later Marx and Engels; Fromm's is a complex notion derived from depth psychology and the works of the younger Marx.

If we look at their respective approaches we discover that the main difference between Fromm and the Second and Third Internationals treatment of the unconscious lies in Fromm's universalisation of the unconscious containing the universal aims of mankind, bearing in mind that in Western philosophy the idea of the 'universal' has always been a concept of intelligibility, goodness and fulfillment. For Kant and Hegel, the universal meant 'freedom', so too for Marx - the human being as 'Gattungswesen' is a free person. As Marx expressed it:

> "Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other beings) but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species ; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being." (45)

Fromm's notion of the unconscious's universality, draws its substance from this, especially when the term (Gattungswesen) is translated 'community being' or 'universal being'.
This of course contradicts the interpretation established by the Second and Third Internationals. They - unlike Fromm who held that at the transition

from one historical society to another there always remains some proportion of unconscious, as not yet actualised potentialities - maintained that the progressive class which is aware of its needs and opportunities in a specific socio-economic formation and actualises these in its historical activity virtually wipes out that which constituted the 'unconscious' in the preceding formation. From this viewpoint the unconscious in the historical activity of classes is social both in content and origin.

This is obviously in profound contrast to the way in which Fromm with his "universal unconscious" saw it. This conflict of interpretation can be related to the differences in the opposing theoretical views of the critical dialectic between base and superstructure, more specifically that of 'consciousness' (or unconsciousness) to the economic base. Commentators within the Second and Third Internationals, in their application of the dialectic to consciousness and unconsciousness as determined by economic factors, view any wider interpretation as erroneous, on the grounds that Marx himself in his later works refuted his earlier writings.

Fromm's theory of the social unconscious contested this, and when he extends the dialectic to the universal relationship of man and his subconscious nature, it is primarily the Marx of the "Paris Manuscripts of 1844" etc. who is being appropriated.

The issue of man's consciousness/unconsciousness has crucial implication for the notions of "liberated man" - i.e. of man in his true reality. The Second and Third Internationals and their inheritors who judged Marx by his mature economic works, believed that man will be liberated when he has become the master of economic conditions because these economic conditions will no longer dominate him as incalculable natural forces. This

interpretation places some limitations upon the degree of freedom which can actually be achieved - for on this interpretation, freedom is relative solely to necessity. In contrast to this view (which limits itself only to the perception of the "real possibilities" in socio-economic processes), Fromm's application of the critical dialectic to the nexus between man and nature (via the latent human needs in the unconscious) allowed a far more encompassing view of man's 'true reality'. In this view, it is man's perfection that is at issue - in other words man's capacity to exhaust all his possibilities in complete unity with nature. Fromm's notion of the unconscious made consciousness reflect a resolution of the conflict between existence and being - between freedom and necessity and between awareness and alienation. This was the predominant theme in Marx's earlier writings In these, for Marx, man in his concrete situation could only be taken seriously if he is understood as moving toward a certain perfection and in his capacity to realize it. But although in these earlier works he formulated this task, he could not adequately express it in psychological terms. He did however provide some important psychological insights into man's true reality, and it is Fromm's achievement that he took up the questions that the young Marx asked and was unable to answer sufficiently - and to have juxtaposed these successfully with the insights of psychoanalysis. In a sense, Fromm's specific theory represented a logical development of Marx's earlier investigation into man's true reality. It is a development in the sense that it attempted to take seriously the way in which man is dependant and motivated by his psychic needs. Fromm's concept of the social unconscious reveals how this psychic influence mediates with the economic reality and is forced 'behind men's backs'. Furthermore it offers a practical method for overcoming this problem. In the light of this, it proved, in comparison, to be a far more sophisticated theory than those of the

Second and Third Internationals, having greater scope in explanatory power and offering a far more encompassing understanding of man than these theories could offer within the limitations of their economic determinism.

3.4. CONCLUSION:

Looking back at the chapter as a whole we can see that Fromm's concept of the social unconscious proved to be a most controversial and unorthodox one. In postulating an extra-historical, 'universal' notion of the 'unconscious' in man - it attacked the very nub of the Second and Third Internationals economic determinism. This was further exacerbated by the fact that Fromm saw the motor force of social change to be rooted in this 'unconsciousness' (history for him was seen to be a process of the unfolding of the forces of the unconscious - the making conscious of the previously unconscious.) This is of course opposed to the very definitely 'conscious' forces of revolution advocated by the Second and Third Internationals.

It was not only in the area of Marxism that Fromm's concept of the unconscious proved to be unorthodox: In his effort to demystify the unconscious, Fromm was shown to have reduced Freud's psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious to its most rudimentary framework, replacing it instead with a rather different model based mainly on his own observations. This 'amelioration' of Freudian theory was shown to be typified by the manner in which Fromm understood the workings of repression; e.g. the trigger of the repressive mechanism, which Freud took to be a generalised, aspecific 'fear', Fromm restated in a far more definite fashion: For him the trigger (still based upon anxiety) was discovered not to be just a generalised fear, but a specific kind of fear - namely the fear of loneliness, isolation or

ostracization. This reinterpretation of Freud was seen to be an effective corollary to the Marxian notion of the essence of man as 'Gattungswesen' (translated as species - community - universal being). This Marxian motif was identified as belonging to as the works of the younger Marx. Again it was stated that in these works Marx held a strongly Hegelian influenced position. It was inferred that Fromm accepted this latent Hegelianism as consistent with all of Marx's writing and it is upon this foundation of a materialistically orientated idealism which Fromm established his ideological edifice. We showed that Fromm thus adopted and was dependent (for theoretical credibility) upon the Hegelian elements in Marx. This was shown to be in marked contrast to the theories established by the Second and Third Internationals. We examined briefly the difference in implication between Fromm's theory and that of the Second and Third Internationals, and we discovered that while Fromm's theory is wholly unacceptable to these theorists (due fundamentally to his suggestion of extra-temporal, 'universal' human needs) he did in the final analysis produce a far more comprehensive and credible analytical model than these reductionist theories were capable of.

Our major discovery was of Fromm's use of Marx's notion of 'Gattungswesen'. This was shown to be the unifying link between Hegel, Marx and Fromm and by corollary, to Freud. It was shown that in using this concept Fromm managed to justify his interpretation of Marx as a humanist and by reverse implication reinterpreted Freud's notion of fear as the trigger of repression. Once again we are obliged to conclude that Fromm, by virtue of the Hegelian elements in the writings of the younger Marx, was capable of introducing certain specifically psychoanalytical elements into Marxism and produce a

novel and cohesive theory capable in comparison of a far more comprehensive and practical applicability than the theories of the Second and Third Internationals. The validity of Fromm's theory, of course, depends, again on how you see Marx in relation to Hegel.

3.5. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. E.Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion , p. 84
2. E. Fromm, Marx's contribution to the Knowledge of Man, p.65
3. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, p 84
4. Op.cit, p. 108
5. Op.cit, p.109
6. Op.cit, p.112
7. Op.cit, p. 113
8. Op.cit, pp.115-116
9. Op.cit, pp.117-118
10. Op.cit, pp.120-122
11. Op.cit, p. 106
12. Op.cit, pp. 106-107
13. Op.cit, p. 107.
14. Ibid
15. D.Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 114
16 M.Jay, The Dialectical Imagination , p.92
17. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 93
18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. Ibid
21. Op.cit, pp. 84-89
22. Op.cit, p.84
23. Op.cit, pp.108-120
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid

27. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, p. 149
28. Beyond the Chains of Illusion , op.cit, p. 87
29. K.Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", in Tucker, The Marx Engels Reader, p. 70
30. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, pp. 84-120
31. Ibid
32 Ibid
33. Ibid
34. E.Fromm, Zen Buddhism et al. . ., p. 107
35. M.Jay, The Dialectical Imagination , p. 92
36. Op.cit, p.91
37. Op.cit, p.99
38. D.Held, op.cit, p. 114
39. Beyond the Chains of Illusion , op.cit, p. 120
40. Op.cit, p. 121
41. Ibid
42. K.Marx and F.Engels, The German Ideology , p. 61
43. Ibid
44. K.Marx and F.Engels, Selected Works Vol. 3, p.366
45 K.Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844", cited in Tucker, p .61

CHAPTER 4: ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE

"That all men share the same basic anatomical and physiological features is common knowledge, and no physician would think he could not treat every man, regardless of race and colour, with the same methods he has applied to men of his own race. But does man have also in common the same psychic organization; do all men have in common the same human nature? Is there such a thing as a "human nature" ?".(1)

4.1 INTRODUCTION:

By implication, Hegel's thesis on consciousness as constitutive of the world, which was implicit in the Frankfurt School's Hegelian Marxist reading of Marx, challenged both the passive materialism of the Second International and the dialectical materialism of the Third International. The Frankfurt School argued that Marx's dialectical method preserved both objective-scientific and subjective-philosophical dimensions of theoretical analysis. They were concerned with spontaneity and the individual, and particularly with the possibility of transforming the social order via the medium of the actualized individual - through praxis.

The failure of the international working class to come into its own as predicted had caused the Frankfurt School to re-examine the orthodox Marxist theory of 'crises' and to challenge it by postulating that the 'crises' had been displaced from the economic sector to the cultural and ideological sphere. Accordingly the Frankfurt School had concerned itself particularly with analysis of the bourgeois superstructure. Their 'Critical Theory' increasingly called into question the traditional Marxist views regarding the relationship between the economic base and the ideological superstructure.

In the last two chapters we examined Fromm's notion of the 'social character' and the 'social unconscious', which were the two links he had defined as

forming the mediating bridge between the previously insufficiently connected poles of material base and ideological superstructure. We examined Fromm's ostensible meld of Freudian and Marxian theory, and came to similar conclusions. With respect to Freud, we found that Fromm undertook some fundamental revisions and in fact retained only the barest framework of classical psychoanalysis, which he complemented with his own psychoanalytic observations. With regard to Marx, we discovered that, contrary to the Second and Third International Marxists, Fromm rejected the reductionist method of economic determinism. Instead, he was seen to embrace fully the Frankfurt School project of returning to the Hegelian roots of Marx in an effort to overcome and comprehend the paradoxes prevailing in the then orthodox theories of the Second and Third Internationals. This angle of penetration, with its emphasis on the subjective dimension, had allowed Fromm to accommodate his psychoanalytical premises with practical analytical success within a Marxist social schema. The concepts of 'social character' and of the 'social unconscious' were seen, in this respect, to be useful analytical tools, offering a depth and complexity of analysis impossible to the Second and Third Internationals.

One thing, though, was not sufficiently dealt with: Both 'social character' and the 'social unconscious' , were observed to depend upon a pan-historical system of human needs and thus on that most nebulous of things - human nature. It is to the comprehension of precisely what Fromm understood by the concept of human nature that this chapter is devoted.

As in the preceding chapters we will initiate the topic by first providing an explicit account of Fromm's concept of human nature closely based on his own

formulations. This will be succeeded by an elaboration and explication of the various "needs" which constitute this human nature. Throughout, Fromm's understanding of human nature will be explained by examination of the way in which Fromm unites Freudian psychological insights with a Marxian sociology so as to bridge the gap between the economic base and the ideological, cultural superstructure. We will then offer a critique of Fromm's concept of these human needs, within the terms of the problematic stated above. In so doing, we will show how Fromm's emphasis on certain Hegelian precepts prevalent in the earlier works of Marx, allowed him to unite Marx and Freud, and how he approached Freud in order to make this synthesis coherent. We will display too, how Fromm's formulation stands opposed to the then prevailing Marxist theories of the Second and Third Internationals. This chapter will bring to a close our examination of the particular way in which Erich Fromm overcame the gap between the superstructure and base which Marx had left insufficiently explained.

4.2 A DESCRIPTION OF FROMM'S HUMAN NATURE:

In the preceding chapters on his notions of the 'social character' and of the 'social unconscious' we discovered that both these concepts were based on the assumption Fromm makes that man has an essential nature. The question as to the nature of this human essence, to which Fromm gave such considerable attention and which systematically justifies his humanistic views and informs his version of Marxism, is crucial for this thesis.

Fromm's first efforts in defining the essence of human nature were to distinguish his own approach from those of the two prevailing intellectual views, i.e. the relativist position - succinctly, this position claims that man's nature has no inherent quality/ies whatsoever and is nothing but the

reflex reponse to external social conditions - and the substantivist approach - which is based upon an ahistorical belief that the nature of man is a substance present from the very beginning of history. (2)

As against these prevailing accounts of human nature Fromm presents a view established on what he saw to be a synthesis of Marx's and Freud's positions. He did this because in his opinion the importance of Marx's dialectical approach was that he rejected both the relativist and substantivist positions, though he never formulated a complete picture of an alternative essence of human nature. And though Fromm is critical of Freud because ultimately Freud is a substantivist, nonetheless he does think that Freud's concept of a 'dynamic tension' between the libidinal drives and the social fulfillment of them is appropriate for filling this psychological gap in Marxism. In his own efforts to define the essence of man, Fromm worked to consolidate Marx and Freud on this issue, and so to transcend both the perspective of an immutable human nature and the position that human nature is purely relative to the environment. Fromm makes a point though of not limiting himself to these two theories albethey revised. He makes explicit use of findings in contemporary fields of study, as well as his own clinical observations. All of these he uses to assert the existence of a human nature - as opposed to orthodox interpretations of Marx, and to represent this nature in terms other than the relativist and substantivist:

> " The main argument in favour of the assumption of the existence of a human nature is that we can define the essence of Homo Sapiens in morphological, anatomical, physiological and neurological terms. In fact we give an exact and generally accepted definition of the species man by data referring to posture, formation of the brain, the teeth, diet and many other factors by which we clearly differentiate him from the most developed non-human primates. surely we must assume, unless we regress to a view that considers body and mind as separate realms, that the species man must be definable mentally as well as physically. "(3)

Fromm proposed a model which he hoped would transcend the difficulties and problems of contending theories. It is based, as R.Funk [4] points out, on the mathematical idea of constants and variables:

> "One could say that in Man, since he began to be a man, there is something that remains constantly the same, a nature, but within man, there is also a great number of variable factors that make him capable of novelty, creativity, productivity and progress."[5]

The basic source of Fromm's understanding of the human essence lay in the distinction Marx made between human nature in general and the human nature that is historically modifiable in each and every epoch. Marx's distinction implies that human nature in general can never be seen because what one observes are always the specific manifestations of human nature in various cultures. But it can be inferred from these various manifestations not only what this 'human nature' in general is, but what the laws governing it are, as well as what the needs are which man has as man. Fromm understood Marx to be saying that the nature of man was a given potential, a set of conditions, the human raw material which man through the process of history becomes:

> "The whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins"[6]

Fromm, though, felt Marx's definition of man's nature was incomplete and clumsily formulated; for while Marx defined the species character as "free, conscious activity"[7] and saw man as a being that produces with forsight and imagination,[8] Fromm still felt that such definitions could not tell us anything about man's nature, but only about human traits.

For Fromm, that which is constant in man, man's essence, can only be established in a comparison between man and animal:

> "... One must look for a concept of Man's nature in the process of human evolution rather than in isolated aspects." (9)

Palaeontologically speaking, Fromm arrives at an understanding of man's nature based on the blend of the two fundamental biological conditions that mark the emergence of man. According to Fromm these were the ever decreasing determination of behaviour by instincts and the growth of the brain (especially of the neo-cortex). In other words the genetic precondition for the appearance of man as such, was the decline in his animal biological adaptability to the environment, which took place at a specific stage of the natural world's evolution. (This view on the evolutionary foundation of human anthropology was not peculiar to Fromm, but was also developed at the time and later by various other German philosophers, such as Arnold Gehlem, Adolf Protman and Helmuth Plessner.)

> "Man can be defined as the primate that emerged at the point of evolution where instinctive determination had reached a minimum and the development of the brain a maximum." (10)

Fromm continues to argue that as the biologically most helpless and frail of all animals, the more inadequate his biological apparatus for instinctive adaptation to the world proved, the more man's brain and capacity for thought and conscious powers of orientation developed. This growth of the brain not only enabled man to increase his "instrumental intelligence" but to acquire an entirely new quality - that of self-awareness and its related aspects, e.g.. the ability to remember the past, conceive of the future, and symbolically denote objects and acts (logos) etc. Thus from the biological perspective, man is the most helpless animal. But it is this very biological weakness which also makes possible his specific human qualities - self-awareness, reason and imagination:

> "Man's thinking has acquired an entirely new quality, that of <u>self-awareness.</u> Man

> is the only animal who not only knows objects but who knows he knows. Man is the only animal who has not only instumental intelligence, but reason, a capacity to use his thinking to understand objectively.
> Gifted with self-awareness and reason, Man is aware of himself as being separate from nature and from others: he is aware of his powerlessness, of his ignorance; he is aware of his end: death." (11)

These distinctive human qualities preclude interpreting man wholly according to instinctual, animalistic or biological categories. Man understands himself adequately when, as he defines who and what he is, he makes his specific human qualities his point of departure and asks what their relevance for his self-understanding is.

But it is these new qualities that have destroyed the harmony between man and nature, and this break with nature has made man into a strange abnormality, into the

> "freak of the universe. He is part of nature, subject to her physical laws and unable to change them, yet he transcends nature. He is set apart while being apart; he is homeless, yet chained to the home he shares with all creatures. Cast into this world at a accidental place and time, he is forced out of it accidentally and against his will . . .Man's life cannot be lived by repeating the pattern of his species; he must live. Man is the only animal who does not feel at home in nature, who can feel evicted from paradise, the only animal for whom his own existence is a problem that he has to solve and from which he cannot escape." (12)

At the same time, this break can be viewed as the birth of mankind, analogous to the birth of an individual man (in this connection, Fromm emulates a view expressed earlier by Schopenhauer and Rilke that man is an abberation produced in the course of history, cursed with self-consciousness). It is apparent that the original break with nature was by no means abrupt. Man in the beginning was still closely bound to "mother nature" and aeons had to pass before his distinctive human nature began to emerge. Though the break was not sudden, it does prevent man from succeeding in any attempt

to return to the 'womb', to regain the purely animal harmonies:

> "He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature, and he does not know where he will arrive if he goes forward." (13)

The emergence of man endowed with reason and self-awareness thus disrupts his natural, primitive links with the natural world, annulling the original harmony between early man and Nature and gives rise to the existential contradiction which Fromm postulates as the central problem of human existence:

> "Man's existential contradiction results in a state of constant disequilibrium. This disequilibrium distinguishes him from the animal which lives, as it were, in harmony with nature..." (14)

Human nature thus amounts to a basic paradox; man is at once part of nature and subject to its physical and biological laws, and he has also overcome the limits imposed on him by nature, confronting it as a self-aware agent. While being a part of nature, the individual is at the same time also in conflict with it. (There is a close resemblance in this formulation to Paul Tillich's man who "finds himself, together with his world in existential estrangement."(15))

So to Fromm, it is the conflict (which is based on the anthropological contradiction between man and nature which expresses the universal condition and problem of human existence), that determines the psychological needs which together make up the genetic essence of man:

> "I propose that Man's nature cannot be defined in terms of a specific quality, such as love, hate, reason, good or evil, but only in terms of fundamental contradictions that characterise human existence and have their root in the biological dichotomy between missing instincts and self-awareness." (16)

These existential contradictions give expression to the specific character and implications of the 'human situation' in which each individual finds himself,

regardless of the historical conditions of his existence. The existential contradictions, also form the underlying mechanism in the drive for progress:

> "Indeed what has often been considered Man's innate drive for progress is his attempt to find a new and if possible better equilibrium." (17)

Man cannot return to the condition of 'pre-human' harmony with nature and, therefore, Fromm claimed that man must continually seek a new unity with nature by developing and perfecting his rational, truly human capacities. This in effect represents the fulfilment of positive freedom. This need to resolve the problem of human existence becomes, as Fromm infers, the need for the individual to find higher forms of unity with nature (including with other individuals and himself). It is simultaneously for Fromm the source of all the peculiarly human feelings, emotional reactions and actions. All man's inner psychological potentialities are, according to Fromm, determined by his endeavour to find a new harmonious correlation between himself and nature, to replace the original relationship which he had lost, peculiar to the 'pre-human', namely purely animal existence. In similar fashion to the recurring theme of the german idealist poet, M. R. Rilke,(18) Fromm envisions man as the only living creature for whom his own existence presents a problem and who must come to terms with it, for only that can make him truly human. This existential contradiction places before every individual a vitally important question, how should the conflict inherent in human existence be resolved? Or, what needs to be done and how should man live so as to set himself free from these intolerable tortures of loneliness and fear of abandonment so as once more to be at one with the world and himself? Fromm held that the answers which every man must give to this question differ not only within the scope of one specific historical situation, but also in the process of the historical evolution of the conditions of human existence.

He stressed that none of these answers as such constituted the essence of man but that what does constitute the essence of man is rather the question and the need for an answer (not the answers themselves) in other words the various forms of human existence are not in themselves the essence but they are merely the answers to the conflict which in itself is the essence.

The source of man's mental activity, of 'the specifically human dynamism', thus lies for Fromm in the uniqueness of the human situation, which forces man to ask questions about his existence. All man's activity, both in the process of his ontogenetic and also that of his philogenetic development, are subordinated to a single aim which is the resolution of this constant problem of human existence. In Fromm's view, the process of man's historical development is a reflection of the dynamics of this search for new solutions. A process which will continue until man reaches the final goal of becoming fully human and being in complete union with the world.

By defining man's nature or essence as a contradiction (as we shall now examine) containing the potential for its own resolution, Fromm avoids substantivism on the one hand and total relativism on the other. The specific human qualities of self-awareness, reason and imagination both give rise to this contradiction and are at the same time the conditions for its resolution. However whether these specific human qualities are actually employed to bring about an optimal and positive solution depends on a variety of factors, not least among them being an appropriate ethical goal. What this indicates is that although the specifically human qualities give rise to a state of contradiction between Man and his world, and the means of resolving it, the number of variables involved prevent them from being sufficient to

constitute the whole essence or nature of Man. Consequently for Fromm it is rather the state of contradiction itself, which represents the essence of Man. The root of this definition lies, as Fromm explains, in the fact that while there exist solutions to these contradictions, the contradictions themselves cannot be abolished. They are problems which man cannot annul but to which he can react in various ways, relative to his character and his culture.

These perennial contradictions, are what Fromm terms the "existential dichotomies." [19] They are the fundamental facts of existence; i.e. the realization that we are born without choice and must ultimately die; and that our abilities can never reach far beyond the limits set by the level of culture attained at that time.

The existence of these dichotomies and their correlories, Fromm explains, generates complex needs in an effort to establish some form of equilibrium between Man and nature. It is these needs that we will be examining below.

4.3 FROMM ON HUMAN NEEDS:

As mentioned above, Fromm describes the essence of Man in terms of existential contradictions. These dichotomies are explications of the situation and of the peculiar circumstances of human existence. They indicate that Man is biologically and naturally fixed yet

> "transcends all other life because he is for the first time; life aware of itself." [20]

This conflict is Man's essence and it both allows and forces him to find an answer to his dichotomies. These existential dichotomies must be distinguished from what Fromm calls "historical contradictions." [21] As opposed to the existential dichotomies that constitute Man's essence because

they are inextricably part of his existence, there are those needs or dichotomies which are experienced by Man at a given time in human history when some or other constituent aspect of the given reality contradicts the equilibrium of Man's existence. These latter needs, given time and the will to solve them, may possibly be overcome (e.g. the problem of war, of hunger in the midst of plenty, of sickness etc.)

The difference between the existential and the historical dichotomies is important. It shows which contradictions in the individual's life and in Mankind as a whole can be resolved given sufficient consideration and which constitute Man's essence and can only be reacted to as his specifically human qualities dictate. A further distinction has to be made between existential needs and "inhuman needs".[22] These are artificially produced and are best equated with what Marx termed "false consciousness".

Returning to the existential needs of Man Fromm says:

> " Man's existential conflict produced certain psychic needs common to all men. He is forced to overcome the horror of separateness, or powerlessness and of lostness and find new forms of relating himself to the world to enable him to feel at home. I have called these psychic needs existential because they are rooted in the very conditions of human existence. They are shared by all men, and their fulfillment is as necessary for Man's remaining sane as the fulfillment of organic drives is necessary for his remaining alive. But each of these needs can be satisfied in different ways, which vary acccording to the differences of his social condition. These different ways of satisfying the existential needs manifest themselves in passions, such as love, tenderness, striving for justice, independence, truth, hate, sadism, masochism, destructivism, narcissism." [23]

Thus it is Man's existential conflict which produces the psychic needs that are common to all men. These needs derive from the fact that Man is forced to

overcome the "horror of separateness" (from both nature and therefor each other too) of powerlessness (loss of instinctual mechanisms etc.) and of lostness (life aware of itself in an incomprehensible universe) and find ways of relating himself to the world which compensate for these feelings and make him "feel at home". Fromm termed these psychic needs "existential needs" as their source is in the very conditions of human existence. As with physiological needs, the existential needs are common to all men and have to be satisfied if the individual is to remain healthy. But unlike physiological needs they can find fulfillment in many different ways, depending on prevailing social conditions. These differing responses express themselves as a variety of character traits and character orientations which Fromm classified as either "rational" or "irrational" , depending on whether they are productive (based on love, justice, compassion etc.) or unproductive (deriving from hate, sadism, destructivism etc.). These character orientations are extremely powerful and even the physiological needs are subject to their influence. For although like all members of the living world, Man's life functions are imperative for survival (i.e. thirst, sexuality, hunger), unlike the rest of nature (though Konrad Lorenz and others would disagree) Man's character has the capacity for overriding - even contradicting these physiological needs (consider suicide by starvation, celibacy in certain religious orders etc.).

Returning to the existential needs of Man, we find that Fromm identifies these, but is not consistant as to their number or names (e.g.. in The Sane Society he lists five such needs, whereas, in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness he lists six.). After the fashion of R.Funk, [24] we will isolate and consolidate the six needs as listed below:

1. The need for relatedness:

The severance of primary ties - i.e. the instinctual unity with nature - makes it necessary for man to create distinctly/specifically human forms of relatedness to nature, to other men and to himself. This is assisted by his specifically human qualities of love, reason and imagination etc. When this need for relatedness is not satisfied, human life becomes impossible.
For without this reponse, man becomes psychotic, "spiritually ill". However the necessity to repond to this need is not sufficient to ensure that the form that this relatedness takes will be appropriate to the specific human situation, for only productive relatedness can do full justice to this need and the human situation that creates it.(25)

2. The need for transcendence:

This is a need closely connected with the preceding one. It concerns man's situation as a naturally situated being yet simultaneously endowed with specific qualities that oblige him to transcend this very state of a passively determined being, and become either a creator, or a destroyer and dominator of things. These two reactions, though fundamentally different, are both methods for transcending nature. In the first case; of the productive reaction, the individual in question becomes a creator by creating life and culture, and in the second instance, the nonproductive man seeks to destroy life and creation. As Fromm suggests, to destroy life is as transcendent as to create it. (26)

3. The need for rootedness

As a consequence of being born, man physically loses that safety and security which until that event had been assured to him by his physiological "rootedness" (gestation) in nature. However, in a psychic sense he has to actually renounce his rootedness in nature before he can become truly human

by creating new roots which are appropriate and peculiar to him. It is only in this new rootedness that Fromm feels man can actually begin to feel at home in this world.[27] Ontogenetically, this rootedness in nature is realized in an elemental sense in the child's tie to his mother. The child's development to maturity is a continuous birth, the ever-renewed cutting of the umbilical cord that symbolizes rootedness in nature. Ontogenetically and philogenetically, man's birth amounts to the acquisition of genuine independence and freedom, which are realised when man reacts to the need for rootedness by planting new human roots for his existence. As in the case of all the needs that Fromm defines, man has two possibilities in his reaction to this need for rootedness.These are to either persist in what Fromm calls man's craving to regress and to pay for it by symbolic dependence on "mother" [28] (and on symbolic substitutes, such as soil, nature, God, the nation, a bureaucracy), or to progress and to find new roots in the world by his own efforts. This last alternative is achieved by the individual experiencing the "brotherhood" of all men and by freeing himself from the insularity of his tradition and history. Again, in this connection we find a variety of possible reactions, both negative (all forms of incestuous fixation) and productive. With the latter, being ultimately a rootedness in the experience of a universal brotherhood which will transform man's world into a truly human one.[29]

4. <u>The need for an experience of identity or unity:</u>

This need is very similar to the preceding need. In his existential separation from nature, and in being endowed with reason and imagination, man has to form a concept of himself as "I am I" - an awareness of himself as a subjective entity.[30] For Fromm, this problem of the experience of identity is not only a philosophical one that concerns intellect and thinking. It also takes in the entire person and expresses itself as the search for the experience of

unity with oneself and with the natural and human environment. The ways of realising the need for this experience of identity or unity are very closely related to the degree of both mankind's and the individual's development. The more closely the possibility of the experience of identity is tied to the consciousness of a social grouping, the less developed and productive this experience of identity will be (for the self will literally be "forgotten" so as to conform). Conversely, it may be said that the need for an experience of unity or identity is satisfied most strongly when man experiences his individual identity as productive activity, because then it is in line with the specific human qualities of love and reason.

5. The need for a frame of orientation and an object of devotion:

The conditions from which this need derives are the specific human qualities that cause man to become aware of his break with nature. Fromm's man, being endowed with reason, must orient himself intellectually in his world if he is to understand himself and the meaning of his life. [31] In this process, it does not matter initially whether the interpretation he gives himself, his life and his world is correct or false. At first, there is simply the necessity to find a form of orientation for his existence, whatever that might be, so that he may react to the dichotomies inherent in that existence. Such frames of orientation or systems can be religious, or philosophical in nature, or even world views like the striving for money, prestige, success etc. [32] It is only with regard to the object of devotion that the question concerning the content and the truth of such frames of orientation arises. For Fromm the real answer to this need depends on the capacity for seeing the world, nature, others, and oneself objectively, as they are. This means that reality must be grasped by reason and not veiled by illusions and rationalisations. The more reason and the less irrational elements determine the content of the frame of

orientation, the more adequate the answer to this need will be, and the more fully will man realise his own distinctive qualities.[33] This need is an essential part of man and must be satisfied. As with the preceding needs the kinds of reactions to this need which can be elicited differ considerably between being regressive or progressive in inclination. Man can devote himself to the most diverse of goals or idols, or, he can find fulfillment in loving and of being productive.

6.The need to experience oneself as an effective being:

The loss of harmony with nature when man is born is a consequence of the loss of instinctive adaptation to nature. The break with nature not only signifies man's superiority over nature, but also nature's superiority over that "defective being" [34] which is man. And this superiority is experienced as life-threatening. The human need for effectiveness is the expression of this dichotomy between nature and man. Man needs to experience himself as an "effective being". Someone who can accomplish things. There are many ways of responding to this need. If the need for effectiveness is frustrated by prohibitions, it can express itself in a variety of flawed forms in which what is forbidden or even impossible, has a special attractiveness. Basically, two opposite reactions can be observed here as well: In human relationships the fundamental alternative is either to feel the potency to effect love or to effect fear and suffering. In a more univeral situation, the alternative is between constructing and destroying. With the correct response to the need for effectiveness, man is productive in a manner suitable for his continued and harmonious existence.

What must be understood, is that for Fromm, in this case and in respect to all the preceding needs the need itself does not predicate a specific reaction. The needs themselves are neutral, but the designations for the reactions to the

needs are value terms that acquire their positive or negative quality from Fromm's psychoanalytic ideas about what constitutes a sick and a healthy psyche.

4.4. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF FROMM'S NOTION OF HUMAN NATURE

The conceptual origins of Fromm's anthropological-philosophical interpretation of man and his nature lie in a meld of the Freudian principle of a psychological dynamic tension between the individual's instinctual and existential needs and society's capacity for fulfilling these; and Marx's description of the dialectical relationship between man and his society. This foundation allowed Fromm to avoid the defects of both the prevailing theories of relativism and substantivism; and it also enabled him to overcome the equally narrow, economic reductionism [in itself a relativist theory] of the Second and Third Internationals.

At one level, Fromm's theory can simply be seen as a mediation between the theories of Freud and Marx, according to which; on the one hand, man embodies innate panpsychic needs [physiological or existential] and, on the other, he is the product of the historical process. In this light Fromm's conception of human nature can be seen as a compromise between their theories as to the essence of Man - a philosophy of the golden mean aimed at distilling and reconciling the best of these diametrically opposed definitions of the essence of man, rather than advancing beyond them.

Yet while Fromm's efforts were established on a fusion of both these theories, he also made a point of extending beyond their limitations by incorporating many of his own insights and the insights of others. He also emphasized the selectiveness of his use of Freud and Marx. [35] Marx and

Freud then become, for Fromm, a carefully constructed, eclectic skeleton for the body of his arguments.

Fromm's ability to do this is attributable to his development of the Hegelian elements within Marx. This pursuit, typical of the Frankfurt School, held that Marx shared the view of Feuerbach (in an inversion of the Hegelian dialectic), that man in the process of history, although subject to change, at the same time actualizes some unchanging innate potentiality. Acording to this view, Marx not only accepted the existence of an independent nature of man separate from his social one, but also attributed decisive significance to that independent nature. Furthermore, in this Hegelian-Marxist perspective, Marx himself drew the distinction between a "modified" nature of man, and human nature in "general" and accordingly he divided man's needs into being "relative" and "constant".[36]

But, in Fromm's eyes, Marx, although an opponent of both substantivism and relativism, never developed his own theory concerning the nature of man in full. This would effectively have transcended these theories - this point is taken up very seriously by Norman Geras, who in his book Marx and Human Nature [37] presents a most detailed and powerful argument based on Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach, wherein he refutes outright the traditional Marxist belief that Marxism denies the existence of human nature. Geras goes on to show that quite the opposite is true, that the entirety of Marx's oeuvre is informed by an idea of a specifically human nature, which fulfills both explanatory and normative functions. At the time, however, Fromm's own theory and his interpretation of Marx (based upon the earlier works), proved extremely controversial.

To Marxists of the Second and Third Internationals, Fromm's neo-Freudian

Hegelian Marxism with its humanistic emphasis, was anathema. It was incompatible with the positivistic orientation of their "scientific" Marxism that Marx should ever have acknowledged any abstract, extra-historical human nature of the kind Fromm attributed to him. In their view, Marx (and, of course, Engels) was severely critical of any such subjective, idealist speculations concerning "human nature" in general. They insisted that Marx and Marxism was committed to the view that the development of man proceeded simultaneously with changes in society itself and that there could be no such thing as "human nature in general" but only a historically determined human nature modified in each new epoch. According to the Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals the needs of the "concrete historical individual, which eventually become the individual' s life forces, express the demands of evolving social reality. Consequently, on this view, the changes in human 'needs' always coincides with change in his social environment. Psychological needs therefore are not existential, but are shaped in the process of man's own modification of the historical conditions in which he finds himself. Man is the creator of his own psychology via the dialectic of his relationship to society. The human essence is merely the ensemble of the social relations within which man finds himself.

Against these theories Fromm's formulation clearly indicates that society does not create the fundamental needs of man, but is rather that influence which determines which of the limited number of potential passions are to become manifest or dominant. Society, in Fromm's description, as opposed to those theories, only developes or deforms that which is already potentially inherent in mans very nature. Society is both the product of, and also beyond the needs stemming from human nature; it constitutes an entity superimposed

upon man's essence, which both fulfills and contradicts it at the same time. The fact that, for Fromm, the existence of these inherent needs is extra-historical and not dependent upon the concrete historical situation, is contradictory to Second and Third International logic. As opposed to their version of historical materialism, Fromm views the historical process as the dialectical relationship between the existential psychological and physiological needs of human nature and the possibility of their satisfaction within a concrete social structure. History in Fromm's opinion, bears witness to the degree to which these needs are satisfied and to the nature of the influence of a given social structure on these needs. Fromm's psychological needs emerge, against the model offered by the Second and Third Internationals, not as the mere reflections of the contradictions of an evolving social world, but rather as deriving from an existential situation which Fromm distinguishes from both the "biological" and the "social."

The key concept [38] for Fromm in his polemic against Scientific Marxism and to making the connection to Freud, lay in Marx's concept of alienation. Marx's notion of alienation came most directly from Hegel, though the origins of this concept are much older. To Hegel,[39] reality was Spirit realizing itself. In time Spirit perceived this world to be its own creation. Spirit, which existed only in and through its productive activity, gradually became conscious that it was externalising or alienating itself. Alienation, for Hegel, consisted in the failure to realize that the world was not external to Spirit. Alienation would therefore cease when men saw that their environment and culture were creations of Spirit. When men saw this, they would be free, and this freedom was the aim of history. Marx summed up what he conceived to be Hegel's view as follows:

> "For Hegel, the human essence, man, is the same as self-consciousness. All alienation of man's essence is therefore nothing but the alienation of self-consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as the expression of the real alienation of man's essence reflected in knowledge and thought. The real alienation (or the one that appears to be real) in its inner concealed essence that has first been brought to the light by philosophy, is nothing but the appearance of the alienation of the real human essence, self-consciousness.(40)

Marx's fundamental criticism of Hegel was that alienation would not cease with the realization of the world as not being external. The external world, according to Marx, was part of man's nature and what was vital was to establish the right relationship between man and his environment.

> An objective being (Marx wrote) has an objective effect and it would not have an objective effect if its being did not include an objective element. It only creates and posits objects because it is posited by objects, because it is by origin natural. Thus in the act of positing it does not degenerate from its 'pure activity' into creating an object; its objective product only confirms its objective activity, its activity as an activity of an objective natural being.(41)

Marx thus rejected the notion of Spirit (as does Fromm) and replaced its supposed antithesis to the external world by the antithesis between man and his social being.

Fromm interpreted alienation as an existential problem, and in this way established a link with Freud while simultaneously transcending the latter. For Fromm, as we have seen, the definition of man's nature was expressed as a contradiction inherent in human existence. While acknowledging both a core of biological impulses and the dynamic tension between society and the individual through which these impulses find satisfaction, Fromm reduces the biological aspect to a secondary significance. In fact he established the existence of primary needs, (the existential dichotomies) precisely on the demise of the instinctual framework which was so important to Freud.

According to Freud there was an irreconcilable antagonism between the individual (possessed of a specific set of biologically determined needs) and society (whose rule is limited to thwarting, suppressing or sublimating these needs). As against this Fromm held that society performs not only a negative, repressive function, but also a "creative" one.

Fromm's description sought to prove that Freud's formula of the dynamic tension was not sufficiently fulfilled. Freud's description only covered one side of the dynamic tension, which in reality has a reciprocal equation through which man has the ability to influence society (and thereby inevitably himself):

> **"man's nature, his passions and anxieties are a cultural product, as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history ." (42)**

What Fromm would convince us, is that all these characteristics of Man are in actual fact, qualifications of a more general notion of alienation (and in the inferrence they are effectively reduced as such) as described originally by Hegel.

From this follows Fromm's point that all men, sane or neurotic are forced to find a means for overcoming this alienation, and find an answer to the question of human existence. For to do this means to move beyond the state of uncertainty and loneliness, which mankind faces by the very fact of their separation from nature.

Precisely because of this, Fromm does not accept the Freudian conclusion that man's behaviour can be explained as simply the result of the repression or sublimation of the individual's instinct.

Furthermore, and this is a consequence of his Hegelian Marxist humanism, he rejects Freud's manichaean idea that good and evil (a rewording of Freud's primary drives of Eros and Thanatos) are simultaneously present within man and constantly warring against each other.

Fromm proposes that human nature is completely neutral in the ethical sense - "neither good nor evil". [43] How man will evolve in the concrete historical conditions of a given situation will depend on the external conditions in which he finds himself. The progressive and regressive answers are both inherent potentialities and are neutral with regard to each other. The so-called primary potentiality, to which he refers in his work, "The Heart of Man" as biophilia ,[44] is actualized if normal social conditions are at hand; and the secondary potentiality, referred to as necrophilia, is actualized in case of abnormal, pathogenic conditions which impede the actualization of the primary potentiality. This means, in Fromm's view, that both potentialities equally express man's nature and that . . . "evil has no independent existence of its own, it is the absence of the good, the result of the failure to realize life." [45] This is reminiscent of the Neo-Platonist doctrine that evil is merely the absence of good.

The realization of the primary potentiality coincides, in Fromm's view, with the actualization of the "good"; the "human" principle. The realization of the secondary potentiality, is none other than . . . "man's loss of himself in the tragic attempt to escape the burden of his humanity". [46] In conditions which obstruct the realization of the primary potentiality, this coincides with the actualization of the "evil" or "animal" principle. Fromm's proximity to existentialism is very clear: Cf Sartre in Les Mouches "Human freedom is a curse but that curse is the unique source of human dignity". [47]

Thus in respect to Freud's understanding of human nature, Fromm undertakes some serious revisions : firstly he relegates the 'biological' or 'physiological' needs, which were of primary significance to Freud, to being actually dependent on a far more profound system of needs, i.e. the needs deriving from man's existential dilemmas (which are essentially the consequence of a fundamental 'alienation'). Secondly, he rejects Freud's death wish, Thanatos, as a primary drive, and instead describes it as the frustrated and internalised consequence of the positive, 'progressive' drive when it cannot find fulfillment or its appropriate release. Thirdly, Fromm reworks Freud's concept of a "dynamic tension," until it is accommodated as an aspect of a more extensive Hegelian Marxist dialectical process.

4. 5 CONCLUSION:

The entire edifice of Fromm's theory is centred inevitably upon his description of human nature. This description formed the apriori foundation from which the two fundamental pillars (the social character and the social unconscious) of his theoretical bridge between the base and superstructure are drawn. In this chapter we examined what this "human nature" was. We found that it was an attempt by Fromm to fulfill what he saw to be an idea of human nature which Marx might have postulated, had he had the requisite psychoanalytical frame of reference. In this it does not so much depart from Marx, as try to recreate from him this vision of human nature, which was suggested in his earlier works. Consequently our examination centred about those elements of Marx from which Fromm drew his substance: The basic source of Fromm's description of human nature was discovered to derive from the distinction Marx made between human nature in general, and that

human nature which is historically modifiable in each epoch. Fromm interpreted Marx's human nature in Hegelian fashion, to be a certain potential inherent in mankind which in the course of history is fulfilled. This formulation as it stood, was too vague for Fromm and we showed how he set about redefining this in biological and palaentological terms. In effect what Fromm did here, was to take the Idealist formulation of the young Marx, and give it a materialist base through recourse to contemporary discoveries in biology and anthropology etc. This series of postulates we saw, led Fromm to conclude that man's evolutionary situation had led him to a position of simultaneous "self-awareness" and "instinctual helplessness", bearing profound psychological implications for both the individual and mankind in general. This biologically definable position, Fromm was shown to conclude, presented intself as the most significant existential problem. This problem and its corollaries were seen to be the essence of what Fromm held to be human nature. Human nature in Fromm's terms, boiled down to a complex cluster of existential needs finding fulfillment in historical process. While expressing these needs in psychological terms, and using Freud's "dynamic psychology" as his foundation for these, Fromm was seen to differ quite radically from orthodox theory. It became clear that Fromm rejected the Freudian view of an individual, innately equipped with a specific set of biological drives either being satisfied or frustrated by a society which is essentially external to the individual. If we look back at Fromm's formulation of psychology we can see that it was based on the two assumptions: a) That the fundamental problem of psychology has nothing to do with the satisfaction or frustration of any instinct per se, but is rather that of the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards his world and b) that the relationship between man and his society is constantly changing and not

as Freud suggested - a static one. Fromm's human nature was seen in contrast to Freud's to be a cultural product which may be limited by but cannot be completely explained in terms of man's biological nature. Man, in Fromm's opinion, was seen to be creating his own nature, via the passage of history, based upon the way he resolved the fundamental existential dichotomies which face him. Fromm's ability to link the realm of man's existential needs to the Marxian dialectic was shown to be dependant upon his use of the Marxist concept of alienation. This description of alienation was shown to be rooted, although in a revised materialist fashion, in the original formulations of Hegel. Alienation in Fromm's terms became the fundamental social and existential problem, and it was shown that it was through this concept that Fromm linked Freud and Marx.

At the outset of this chapter we had noted that Fromm's synthesis of Marx and Freud grew out of an intellectual need felt by, amongst others, the Frankfurt School, that the relationship between base and superstructure in Marxist theory had been insufficiently explained. And that the then prevailing theories of the Second and Third Internationals were inadequate to deal with this. We saw in the course of this chapter how Fromm's description of Human Nature effectively overcame this "gap" in Marxism and how it contrasted with the formulations offered by the Second and Third Internationals. We showed how Fromm differed from these theorists and how he set out to and superseded the bourgeois alternatives of relativism and substantivism.

4.6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. E.Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 26
2. Op.cit, p. 29
3. E.Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, pp. 296 - 305
4. R.Funk, The Courage to be Human, p.56
5. E.Fromm, The Nature of Man, introduction.
6. K.Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," in E.Fromm's, Marx's Concept of Man , p. 139
7. K. Marx, Early Writings , p. 328
8. E.Fromm, cf The Heart of Man , p. 116
9. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, op.cit, pp. 296-305
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Ibid
15. N.A.C. Heuer, The Concept of Theological Dynamics , p. 209
16. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Ibid
17. Ibid
18. M.R.Rilke, cf "der Achte Elegie" in Werke ihne Bunden 1 p.137
19. E.Fromm, Man for Himself , p. 45
20. E.Fromm, The Heart of Man , Ibid
21. Man for Himself , op.cit, cf p. 43
22. E.Fromm, "Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man", in Social Sciences Information 3, pp.70-72
23. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, op.cit, pp. 296-305
24. R.Funk, op.cit, pp. 61-66

25. E.Fromm, The Sane Society , p.30
26. R.Evans, Dialogue with Erich Fromm, p. 19
27. The Nature of Man, op.cit, introduction p.15
28. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness , op.cit, p.232 f
29. Ibid
30. The Sane Society , op.cit, pp. 60-61
31. Man for Himself, op.cit, cf pp. 47-50
32. Ibid
33. Ibid
34. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, op.cit, p. 237
35. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, op.cit, p. 9
36. Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man, op.cit, cf p. 65
37. N.Geras, Marx and Human Nature,
38. The Sane Society, op.cit, pp.120-190
39. D.McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx , pp. 117-118
40. D.McLellan, Karl Marx , Selected Writings, p. 102
41. Op.cit, p .103
42. The Sane Society ,op,cit. p. 143
43. Man for Himself , op.cit, p. 6
44. The Heart of Man, op.cit, p. 44
45. Op.cit, p.107
46. Man for Himself , p. 148
47. J.P.Sartre, Les Mouches , p. 73

5. CONCLUSION:

As stated in the introduction, the specific objective of this thesis was to examine the way in which Erich Fromm redefined Marx's historical materialism by using Freud's psychoanalytic theory in an effort to comprehend the relationship between the economic substructure (base) and the ideological and cultural superstructure more adequately. The problematic which we have pursued throughout was: In what way did Fromm synthesize Freudian psychological insights with a Marxist sociology?

In order to arrive at a final evaluation of this problematic it may be helpful to provide a retrospective presentation of some of the major points which we have established in the course of this thesis.

Initially we examined some areas of the intellectual milieu from which Fromm's unconventional theory grew. To most observers, Marx and Freud would appear radically different - Marxism being unequivocably grounded in the realm of the economically determined, and Freudianism being no less unequivocably grounded in that of the individual's psychic interior. This fundamental difference in orientation would appear to make them incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and therefore any attempt at a reconciliation of these paradigms would seem to contain an implicit paradox. Whence then Fromm's attempt at a synthesis of such incommensurables? To understand this we situated Fromm within the Frankfurt School. We discovered that Marxism at the time was experiencing profound problems in both strategy and theory: The changes in the world situation during the early part of the century had fundamentally altered the structural relationship of Europe (as this was understood by Marxists). The proletariat at last seemed ready to assume its revolutionary responsibility -

transcending the passive positivism of the Second International's scientific Marxism - and yet the rise of nationalism, consumerism, government intervention into markets, World War 1 etc., effectively shattered this hope. The International was fragmented and the proletariat effectively integrated into bourgeios society. The internal contradictions of the capitalist system which Marx had analysed had fundamentally altered. Added to these problems was the sudden change of focus produced by the Russian Revolution and the authoritarian vanguardism of Soviet Communism. To many Marxists the alternatives of the "scientific Marxism" of the Second and Third Internationals, i.e. either a passive determinism (as typified by Kautsky in the Second International) or the dictatorial elite of the Third International's Marxism-Leninism, were unacceptable.

We proceeded to the responses made by Korsch and Lukács in their effort to revitalise a Humanist Marxism, and we saw how this project led them to a reappraisal of the Hegelian elements in Marx. We showed how Korsch and Lukács took issue with the scientific Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals on the grounds that these positions either corresponded to a form of thought Marx had categorically rejected - "contemplative materialism" - which ignored the importance of human subjectivity; or which totally overrode the area of subjectivity in its "vanguard of intellectuals" directing the revolutionary movement.

Following from this we looked at the critical theory of the Institut für Sozialforschung (the Frankfurt School). Here we saw how the Institut took up the Hegelian Marxist initiative set by Korsch and Lukács. They agreed that Marxism had to be rescued from the deterministic fatalism of the Second International and the authoritarian elite of the Third International by reinvigorating its Hegelian origins. To this end, the Frankfurt School

centered their attention upon the earlier works of Marx (then recently rediscovered) with the theory of alienation and of praxis that these contained. The Frankfurt School thus argued that Marx's dialectical method preserved both objective-scientific and subjective-philosophical dimensions. This is crucial for our appreciation of Fromm's synthesis, for it is from this background that his union of Marx and Freud is drawn.

With a view to our problematic, it was also important that the Frankfurt School not only produced a rejection of the orthodox variants of Marxism but that it also set out to comprehend the unforseen structural changes that had taken place in European society. The changes in the sphere of consumption and ideology which had confounded Marxism led the Frankfurt School to reject the orthodox interpretation of crises and to query the relationship between economic base and cultural superstructure. In their view there was no longer a plausible explanation for the economic survival of advanced capitalism and the political situation of the working class. Their "critical theory" called into question this traditional Marxist formula. We saw how it became clear to them that Marx had had to leave this area unresolved, due to his lack of a sufficient psychological theory. As a consequence it was of crucial importance for them to establish a <u>social psychology</u> to bridge this gap. It was to Freud, as the most viable and appropriate psychoanalytical theory, that these theorists turned. At this point it becomes clear that Fromm's synthesis was not such a strange and incongruous phenomenon as it initially appeared to be. It was in fact part and parcel of the Frankfurt School's social philosophy, which sought to be as open-ended as possible - a materialist theory enriched and supplemented by interdisciplinary synthesis, particularly by that of psychoanalysis.

What, then, were the main features and achievements of Fromm's specific synthesis of Marx and Freud's? The thesis focused on the two concepts , social character and the social unconscious, which Fromm constructed as the mediating mechanisms through which the economic base is translated into the cultural and ideological superstructure; and on the underlying view of human nature upon which these concepts were based.

With regards to social character, we concluded that this notion of Fromm's was something more than a simple fusion of Freudianism and Marxism. For while adhering to Freud's dynamic concept of character , Fromm was seen to reject the Freudian system of fixed biological needs and a static society. Instead he posited his own notion of a primary drive (established upon a reworking of Freud's "Eros" instinct) encountering a malleable society. The interface of this primary drive and social reality resulted in the ideas and ideology which prevail in society. This relationship expressed itself in terms of the social character which effectively was the link transmitting the economic base of the society to the cultural and ideological superstructure and vice versa. We showed that it was this reciprocal equation which was the difference between Fromm's theory and that of the Second and Third Internationals. Against their mechanistic and deterministic "scientific Marxism," Fromm's formulation with its implications for praxis proved a return to the Hegelian elements of Marx begun by Lukács and Korsch and subsequently adopted by the Frankfurt School.

Our examination of the social unconscious dealt with the other half of Fromm's mediating mechanism between base and superstructure. Here it was found that with respect to Freud, Fromm's major concern was to demystify the Freudian formulation of the unconscious by giving it a

sociological frame of reference. Fromm thus substantially revised the entire fabric of Freud's mechanism of the unconscious; e.g. the unconscious in Fromm's terms did not represent merely the repressed expression of biological desires but incorporated the whole of mankind's potential nature. In this connection, Fromm's notion of the "trigger" of the unconscious also differed substantially from Freud's. Here Fromm rejected the more generalized account of Freud's libidinally based fear and replaced it with a specific fear of loneliness and ostracization derived from his reading of the Hegelian Marxist concept of "Gattungswesen". This concept of "Gattungswesen" formed the pivot of Fromm's notion of the unconscious. Here is the justification for his view that the unconscious is merely that awareness which is not conscious - i.e. the awareness that society represses via its "social filter" because it is threatening to it. Consequently it follows for Fromm that man's eventual liberation into the Communist state means man's liberation from neuroses (hence his "sane society")! The task of the analytical social psychologist was to understand unconsciously motivated behaviour in terms of the effect of the socio-economic substructure on basic psychic drives. But it was also in his acceptance of the influence of basic psychic drives that Fromm differed fundamentally from the Second and Third Internationals. Disputing their economic reductionism, Fromm postulated the real motor of change in society to lie in the unconscious. We showed how, in Fromm's description of the social unconscious, progress is the bringing to consciousness of previously suppressed and therefore unconscious needs. Furthermore, we saw how he delegated consciousness which in Second and Third International terms is of decisive significance (because it is the real awareness produced by concrete material relations) to a subordinate position. In that the unconscious, or potential needs of man

and their fulfillment corresponded to the notion of "Gattungswesen," Fromm rejected these theorist's simple class-based description of the unconscious and returned to the Idealist formulations of the Hegelian Marx. Fromm thus extended Marx's early investigation into man's reality (which was not fulfilled due to the latter's lack of a proper psychoanalytical framework), with an albeit revised Freudianism.

Both the concepts of social character and the social unconscious were seen to be dependent upon a certain vision of human nature. On examination it appeared that Fromm's construction of human nature was a meld of the following elements: 1.) The Freudian principle of a psychological dynamic tension between the individual's instinctual and existential needs, and society's capacity for fulfilling these; and 2.) Marx's description of the dialectical relationship between man and his society. These were based upon a redefined series of needs drawn from Marx's notion of alienation which was extended to accommodate Fromm's own psychoanalytical observations. These needs were described by Fromm as originating from man's existential situation - a situation produced as the consequence of man's biological evolution.

What Fromm was doing, was thus to reject the description of man's nature in Second and Third International terms (as being merely the product of economic relations). Instead he returned to what these theorists would consider as an Idealist formulation of the essence of man (derived from the concept of alienation in the earlier works of Marx) and gave this formulation a materialist proof based on contemporary physiological and biological evidence. In this enterprise, we witnessed Fromm logically recreate and fulfill an idea of human nature which he saw suggested in the earlier works of Marx. This effort, we saw, distinguished him from the then prevailing

orthodox Marxist theories.

Implicit within the problematic explored in this thesis are a number of questions relating to the coherency and consistency of Fromm's synthesis as Freudian and Marxist theory, and to its ability to resolve the problems described in Chapter One. With regard to these, we discovered through the course of the thesis, that Fromm's description of Marx differed substantially to the views expressed by the Second and Third Internationals but that within its own bounds it remained consistent to an understanding of Marx discovered within the latter's earlier works. Furthermore we found that in its formulation of these Marxist postulates it might be that Fromm's theory can be considered selective but that it was nonetheless coherent and fashioned in a manner logical to his synthesis of Freudian elements.

Fromm's use of Freud was more problematic. He was seen to utilise Freud very selectively, and even these elements were revised considerably. It was this, which led him to differ so substantially with the Frankfurt School in due course. Freud in Fromm's paradigm occupied a lesser position to Marx, giving way on the whole to Fromm's own psychoanalytical observations. As Fromm was described as beginning his project from a Freudian position and subsequently revising these premises, it can be concluded that Fromm is not consistent in his use of Freud. However, Fromm does retain some Freudian elements viz. a dynamic psychology and need motivated behaviour and although these are revised to the point of being almost incomparable to their original form, in his use of these he does coherently fuse them to Marx.

This, of course, can be attributed to Fromm's attempt to fulfill a description of human nature begun by Marx, but never completed. Obviously as a consequence, Freud's description of this is rejected.

Fromm's enterprise was ostensibly an attempt to overcome certain problems discovered in the then prevailing descriptions of both Marx and Freud. As has been seen in this thesis, Fromm to a large extent managed to overcome these. Even though his formulation is far from perfect (as V.I.Dobrenkov at length points out) it does suffice to make the principles of historical materialism more comprehensible via the incorporation of an albeit revised Freudian psychology. The extent of its success can be measured in terms of its influence upon thinkers (e.g. the Frankfurt School) and the neo-Freudian trends of H.Sullivan, K.Horney and M.Maccoby etc.

From this recapitulation we can now state our conclusions: The synthesis of Freud and Marx, which Fromm presents as a redefinition of Marx's historical materialism, is controversial and unorthodox but is one which is plausible and coherent in its formulation. It is seen, as opposed to those critics (e.g. V.I. Dobrenkov) who would view Marx and Freud as being incommensurable and therefore irreconcilable, as following from and contributing to the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School, while at the same time going beyond their parameters (with Fromm's revision of Freudianism). It called into question, and successfully resolved the traditional Marxist formula regarding the relationship between economic base and cultural superstructure. Fromm's synthesis is a conceptual nexus between elements of Freud and Marx, assisted by his own observations and formulations which, in its distillation of these elements produces a new and profound theory. While it is definitely revisionist and somewhat eclectic in its use of Freud, Fromm's synthesis does retain the most crucial elements of classical psychoanalysis. By introducing the Freudian elements of a "dynamic psychology" and "need motivated" behaviour into Marx's social theorem,

Fromm provided a theorem which revealed a great deal about the socio-political formulation of the individual.

Furthermore, social character and the social unconscious are significant and practically useful analytical tools for explaining and overcoming that "gap" between the superstructure and the base which the Hegelian Marxists had found so problematic. Also, in that it was based upon a socio-economic materialism, it offered a practical means of analysis into the structure and conditions of society which Freud's theory of personality formulation had taken for granted and was thus incapable of explaining.

The mechanisms of social character and the social unconscious, by including the individual as a significant aspect of a now enlarged dialectical process, was an answer to the fatalistic determinism and closed positivism of the Second International and the dictatorial, mechanistic determinism offered by the Third International. In including the individual it took cogniscence of the subjective-philosophical dimension which the orthodox dogmas had neglected. This had important implications for the Frankfurt School project of "praxis": For in his synthesis Fromm could explain social structures in such a way as to facilitate class consciousness aimed at liberating the individual from the fetters of false consciousness and other socially induced "neuroses". Fromm's description of social character and the social unconscious were a profound contribution to the Frankfurt Schools effort to rescue Marx from the orthodox interpretations and re-establish his Hegelian humanism. It located emancipation within the activity of individuals and not in a deterministic historical process. In a Hegelian fashion it explained, how ideas can motivate change. It also offered a working analysis of contemporary consumer orientated society and ideology which Marxism had not explained and which had effectively staved off any immanent revolution. Fromm's synthesis of

Marx and Freud and its workings, as understood within this thesis, offered a complete and illuminating analysis of contemporary society in which the major defects and problems, (as described in Chapter One), produced and faced by the then prevailing theories (both sociological and psychological) were overcome.

In the final analysis, Fromm's synthesis effectively resolved the "gap" between base and superstructure by a logical continuation of the Idealist postulates formulated in the works of the young Hegelian Marx and given a new materialist proof by contemporary discoveries in psychology, palaentology, biology and anthropology. Its validity then as an exercise in political theory depends on the way one sees Hegel in relation to Marx.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY ERICH FROMM :

(This is based upon Rainer Funk's definitive bibliography as it appears in the book: Erich Fromm : The Courage to be Human. Continuum. New York 1982 pp 374 - 383.)

This bibliography attempts to be as complete as possible. It therefore contains titles to which no reference is made in the text.

All titles are chronologically ordered and numbered according to the date and language of their first publication.

1922 "Das jüdische Gesetz. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Diasporajudentums." Ph.D.dissertation, Heidelberg: 1922.

1926 "Dauernde Nachwirkung eines Erziehungsfehlers, "Zeitschrift für Psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Vienna: 1926/7

1927 "Der Sabbath." In Imago. Zeitschrift für Answendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften. Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1927.

1929 "Psychoanalyse und Soziologie, "Zeitschrift für Psychoanalytische Pädagogik. Vienna: 1928/1929.

1930 "Die Entwicklung des Christusdogmas. Eine psychoanalytische Studie zur sozialpsychologischen Funktioner Religion." Imago. Vienna: 1930. English version 1963,pp 1-70.

1930 "Der Staat als Erzieher.Zur Psychologie der Strafjustiz." Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik, Vienna: 1930.

1930 Review of S.Bernfeld, Die Schulgemeinde und ihre Funktion im Klassenkampf, Zeitschrift für Psychoanalytische Pädagogik, Vienna: 1930.

1930 "Odipus in Innsbruck. Zum Halsmann-Prozess. "Psychoanalytische Bewegung. Vienna:1930.

1931 "Zur Psychologie des Verbrechers und der strafenden Gesellschaft." Imago. Vienna:1931. Quoted according to the reprint of the German version, 1970.

1931 "Politik und Psychoanalyse," In Psychoanalytische Bewegung. Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 1931.

1932 "Uber Methode und Aufgabe einer Analytischen Sozialpsychologie: Bemerkungen über Psychoanalyse und historischen Materialismus." In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Leipsig: Hirschfield Verlag. 1932. English version in 1970.

1932 "Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie."

In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Leipzig: Hirschfield Verlag. 1932. English version in 1970. pp163-189.

1932 Review of Fedor Vergin, Das unbewusste Eruopa. Psychoanalyse der europäischen Politik. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Leipzig: Hirschfield Verlag, 1932.

1932 Review of Sir Galahad, Mütter und Amazonen. Umriss weiblicher Reiche. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Leipzig: Hirschfield Verlag. 1932

1932 Review of Otto Heller, Der Untergand des Judentums. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Leipzig: Hirschfield Verlag, 1932

1933 "Robert Briffaults Werk über das Mutterrecht." In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: Librarie Felix Alcon, 1933.

1933 Review of Wilhlem Reich, Der Einbruch der Sexualmoral. Zur Geschichte der sexuellen Okonomie. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1933

1933 Review of Fedor Vergin, Das unbewusste Europa. Psychoanalyse der europäischen Politik. Imago. Vienna: 1933.

1933 Review of Lord Raglan, Jocasta's Crime. An anthropological Study. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1933.

1934 "Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie." In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1934.

1934 Review of Willy Hellpach, Elementares Lehrbuch der Sozialpsychologie. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1934.

1934 Review of Sandford Fleming, Children and Puritanism. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934.

1934 Review of S.M. and B.C. Grünberg, Parents, Children and Money. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934.

1934 Review of E.Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934.

1934 Review of Jeoffrey Gorer. The Revolutionary Ideas of the Marquis de Sade. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforshung. Paris: 1934.

1934 Review of Louis Berg, The Human Personality. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934

1934 Review of E.J.H. Buytendyik, Wesen und Sinn des Spiels. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934.

1934 Review of Alenxander Kerensky, The Crucified Liberty. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1934.

1935 "Die Gesellschaftliche Bedingtheir der psychoanalytischen Therapie." In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1935 Review of A.Forel, Rückblick auf mein Leben; V.P. Snowden, An Autogiography, R.H.B.Lockhart, Retreat from Glory. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris:1935

1935 Review of I.S.Wile, The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult: An Inquiry into and an Interpretation of Current Sex Practice. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1935 Review of Gerhard Adler, Entdeckung der Seele. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1935 Review of C.G.Jung, Wirklichkeit der Seele. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1935 Review of Heinrich Meng, Strafen und Erziehen. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1935 Review of Peter Vrowe, Beiträge' zur Sexualethik des Mittelalters. In eitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1935.

1936 "Sozialpsychologischer Teil." In M.Horkheimer. ed. Schriften des instituts für Sozialforschung. Vol. V.Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1936.

1936 "Geschichte und Methoden der Erhebung." In M.Horkheimer, ed., Schriften des Institus für Sozialforschung. Vol.V. Studien über Autoritat und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung. Paris:1936.

1936 Review of John Dollard, Criteria for the Life History. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1936.

1936 Review of Margaret Mead. Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1936.

1936 Review of George Britt, Forty Years - Forty Millions. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1936.

1936 Review of Conrad Aiken, King Coffin. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris:1936

1936 "Die Arbeiter-und Angestellten-Erhebung." In M.Horkheimer, ed., Schriften des Instituts fur Sozialforschung. Vol.V.Studien uber Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1936.

1937 "Zum Gefühl der Ohnmacht." In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of Margaret Mead, Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of Harold D.Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When,How. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of R.Osborne, Freud and Marx. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of J.F.Brown, Psychology and the Social Order. In Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of Carl J.Warden. The Emergence of Human Culture. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1937 Review of Paul Thomas Young, Motivation of Behaviour. The Fundamental Determinants of Human and Animal Activity. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1937.

1938 Review of Roger W.Babson, Actions and Reactions. An Autobiography. In Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Paris: 1938.

1939 "The Social Philosophy of 'Will Therapy,' "Psychiatry. Washington: The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1939.

1939 "Selfishness and Self-Love." Psychiatry. Washington: The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1939.

1939 Review of Wilhelm Stekel, Die Technik der analytischen Psychotherapie. In Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (formerly Zeitschrift für Socialforschung.). New York: Social Studies Association, 1939.

1939 Review of D.D.Bromley and F.Britten. You and Sex. In Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. New York: Social Studies Association,1939.

1941 Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1941.

1942 "Should We Hate Hitler?" Journal of Home Economics. Washington, Apr.1942.

1942 "Faith as a Character Trait." Psychiatry. Washington: The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1942.

1943 "On the Problems of German Characterology." Transactions of the New York Academy of Science. 4 (1943): 79-83.

1943 "Sex and Character." Psychiatry (1943): 21-31.Quoted from the reprint in R.N.Anshen, ed., The Family: Its Functions and Destiny. New York: Harper,1949.

1943 "What Shall We Do with Germany? "Saturday Review of Literature, May 29,1943.

1944 "Individual and Social Origins of Neorosis." American Sociological Review (1944): 380-384.

1947 Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1947.

1948 "Introduction." in P.Mullahy, e.d, Oedipus: Myth and Complex: A Review of Psychoanalytic Theory. New York: Hermitage Press, 1948.

1948 "Sex and Character: The Kinsey Report Viewed from the Standpoint of Psychoanalysis." In D.P.Geddes and E.Curie, eds., About the Kinsey Report. New York: The American Library,1948. Quotations are from the reprint in Himmelhoch and Fava.,eds.,"Sexual Behaviour in American Society. New York: Norton, 1955.

1949 "The Nature of Dreams."Scientific American (1949): 44-47.

1949 "The Oedipus Complex and the Oedipus Myth." In R.N.Anshen, ed., The Family: Its Functions and Destiny. New York: Harper & Bros., 1949.

1949 "Psychoanalytic Characterology and Its Application to the Understanding of Culture." In S.S.Sargent and M.W.Smith., eds., Culture and Personality. New York: Viking Press,1949.

1950 Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

1951 The Forgotten Language: An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams,Fairy Tales and Myths. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1951.

1951 " Man-Woman." In M.M.Hughes, ed., The People in Your Life: Psychiatry and Personal Relations. New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1951.

1952 "The Contribution of the Social Sciences to Mental Hygiene." Procedings of the Fourth Congress of Mental Health (Mexico City, 1951), ed. by A.Millan.Mexico City; La Prensa Medica Mexicana, 1952.

1954 "The Psychology of Normalcy." Dissent (Spring 1954): 139-143

1955 The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1955.

1955 "The Human Implications of Instinctivistic 'Radicalism': A Reply to Herbert Marcuse." Dissent (1955): 342-349.

1955 "The Present Human Condition." The American Scholar 25 (1955/56):p29-35.

1955 "Remarks on the Problem of Free Association." Psychiatric Research Reports 2 (1955): 1-6.

1955 "Psychoanalysis." In J.R.Newman, ed., What is Science? Twelve Eminent Scientists & Philosophers Explain their Various Fields to the Laymen. N.Y.Simon & Schuster,1955

1956 The Art of Loving. New York and Evanston: World Perspectives Vol.9, Harper & Row, 1956.

1956 "A Counter-Rebuttal to Herbert Marcuse." Dissent (1956): 81-83.

1956 "Bases Filosoficas del Psicoanalisis." Revista Psicologia 2 (1956): 59-66.

1956 "Palabras a la edicion espanola." In E.Fromm, 1955a, Spanish edition.

1957 "Man is Not a Thing." "Saturday Review (March 16,1957): 9-11.

1957 "Socialismo o Robotismo?" El Sol.Uruguay: Nov.1957.

1957 "Psychoanalysis - Scientism or Fanaticism?" Saturday Review (June 14,1958): 11-13, 55f.

1958 "Interview" (with Mike Wallace). In Survival and Freedom., No. 5. New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1958.

1958 "Los factores sociales y su influencia en la desarrollo del nino." La Prensa Medica Mexicana 23 (1958): 227-228.

1958 "The Moral Responsibility of Modern Man." Merril-Palmer Quarterly of Behaviour and Development 5 (1958): 3-14.

1959 Sigmund Freud's Mission: An analysis of His Personality and Influence. New York. World Perspectives Vol.21. Harper and Brothers, 1959.

1959 "Values, Psychology, and Human Existence." In A.H.Maslow, ed., New Knowledge in Human Values. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959.

1959 "The Creative Attitude." In H.A.Anderson, ed., Creativity and Its Cultivation. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959.

1949 "Love in America." In H.Smith, ed., The Search for America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1959.

1959 "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism." Psychologia 2 (1959): 79-99.

1959 "Freedom in the Work Situation." In M.Harrington and P.Jacobs, eds., Labor in a Free Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.

1960 "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism." In D.T.Suzuki, E.Fromm, and R.de Martino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis. New York: The Call Association, 1960.

1960 Let Man Prevail - A Socialist Manifesto and Program. New York. The Call Association 1960.

1960 "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament." Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Wesleyan University Press, 1960.

1960 "The Prophetic Concept of Peace." In S.Yamaguchi, ed., Buddhism and Culture: A Festschrift in Honor of D.T.Suzuki. Kyoto:Narkana Press, 1960. Quotations are from 1963a.

1960 "Foreword." In A.S. Neill, Summerhill - A Radical Approach to Childrearing. N.Y. 1960

1960 "Foreword." In E.Bellamy, Looking Backward (2000-1887). New York: New American Library, 1960.

1961 May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy. New York: Doubleday, 1961.

1961 Marx's Concept of Man. With a translation from Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, by T.B.Bottomore. New York: F.Ungar Publishing Co., 1961.

1961 "Afterword." In George Orwell, 1984. New York: The New American Library, Signet Classics, 1961.

1961 "Vorwort." In E.Fromm and H.Herzfeld, eds., Der Friede. Idee und Verwirklichung. Festausgabe für Adolf Leschnitzer. Heidelberg: L.Schneider Verlag. 1961.

1961 "Sane Thinking in Foreign Policy." In E.Fromm et al., eds., Sane Comment. New York: National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 1961.

1961 "Das neue kommunistische Programm." in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik. Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag. 1961.

1961 "Communism and Co-Existence" The Nature of the Totalitarian Threat Today: An Analysis of the 81st Party Manifesto." Socialist Call 4 (1961):3-11.

1962 Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud. New York: Simon and Schuster, Credo Series, 1962.

1962 "A Debate on the Question of Civil Defense" (with Michael Maccoby). Commentary: A Jewish Review 33 (1962): 11-23.

1962 "The Philosophy Basic to Freud's Psychoanalysis." Pastoral Psychology 13 (1962) 26-32.

1963 The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963.

1963 "The Revolutionary Character." In above.

1963 "Medicine and the Ethical Problem of Modern Man." In above.

1963 "Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem." In C.Urquhart, ed., A Matter of Life. London: Jonathan Cape, 1963.

1963 "C.G.Jung: Prophet of the Unconscious: A Discussion of 'Memories, Dreams, Reflections' by C.G.Jung; Recorded and Edited by Aniell Jaffe." Scientific American 209 (1963): 283-290.

1963 "Humanismo y Psicoanalisis." La Prensa Medica Mexicana 28 (1963): 120-126

1963 War Within Man; A Psychological Inquiry into the Roots of Destructiveness. A Study and Commentary. Comments by J.Frank and others. Philadelphia: American Friends' Service Committee, 1963.

1964 The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil. New York and London: Religious Perspectives Vol. 12, Harper & Row, 1964.

1964 "Second Preface." In May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. New York: Doubleday, 1964.

1964 "Our Way of Life Makes Us Miserable." The Saturday Evening Post. July 25, 1964, pp 8-10.

1964 "Foreword." In Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. by T.B.Bottomore. Edited with an introduction and notes by T.B.Bottomore and M.Rubol. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

1964 "Foreword." In M.R.Green, ed., Interpersonal Psychoanalysis: The Selected Papers of Clara M.Thompson. New York/London: Basic Books,1964.

1964 "Creators and Destroyers." The Saturday Revew, January 4, 1964, pp22-25.

1964 "The Assassin (Kennedy's Murderer)." The Correspondent 30 Jan/Feb.,1964.

1964 "Foreign Policy After the Test Ban." The Correspondent 30 (Jan/Feb.,1964): 58-62.

1964 "Detente Through Firmness." The Correspondent 31 (Mar/Apr.1964): 6-9

1964 "Legitimate Discontents. The Correspondent 32 (Fall 1964).16.

1965 Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium, edited by Erich Fromm. New York: Doubleday, 1965.

1965 "Introduction." In above.

1965 "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory." In above.

1965 "Problems of Interpreting Marx." In I.L.Horowitz,ed., The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C.Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press. 1965.

1965 "Preface." In a Reza Arasteh, Rumio the Persian: Rebirth in Creativity and Love. Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1965.

1965 "Interview" (with Richard Heffner). McCall's 92(Oct.1965):132-133,213f.

1965 Different Forms of Violence 4 pages.New York: Fellowship Publications of New York, 1965.

1965 "Foreword II." In Escape from Freedom. New York: Avon Books, 1965.

1965 "Editorial." Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 1 1965

1965 "Summary for the Opposition." The Correspondent 34,Spring-Summer'65

1965 "Los fundamentos y el disarrollo del psicoanalisis." Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 1 (1965): 10-19.

1966 You Shall Be as Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966.

1966 "The Grundpositionen der Psychoanalyse." In Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse. Internationales Jahrbuch zur Weiterentwicklung de Psychoanalyse.Vol.II. Göttingen: Verlag für Psychologie C.J.Hogrefe.Orinigally given as lecture in 1961.

1966 "The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed Income.: In R.Theobald, ed., The Guaranteed Income, Next Step in Economic Evolution? New York: Doubleday & Co.,1966.

1966 "Afterword." In 1961b. New ed. 1966.

1966 "A Clinical View of the Problem of Human Rights." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 36 (1966): 195-197.

1966 Dialogue with Erich Fromm (with Richard Evans).New York:Harper & Row, 1966.

1966 "The Psychological Problem of Aging." Journal of Rehabilitation (Sept/Oct.1966): 10-13, 51-57.

1966 "Is Germany on the March Again? War/Peace Report. Mar.1966 p3f.

1966 "A Global Philosophy for Man." The Humanist 26 (1966):117-122.

1966 "Marxismus, Psychoanalyse und 'wirkliche Wirklichkeit.'" Tagebuch. Monatschefte für Kultur, Politik, Wirtschaft 21 (1966): 5-6.

1966 "El complejo de Edipo:Comentarios al 'Análisis de la fabia de un nino de cinco anos." ^Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 4 (1966): 26-33. Quotations from the English translation in Contemporary Psychoanalysis 4 (1968):178-188

1966 "Scientific Research in Psychoanalysis: An Editorial."Contemporary Psychoanalysis 4 (1968): 168-170..

1966 Review of K.M.y S.Grossman, The Wild Analyst. Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 2 (1966): 89f.

1966 "La investigacion cientifica en el Psicoanalisis." Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria 3 (1966): 3-6.

1967 "Memories of Dr.D.T.Suzuki.:The Eastern Buddhist, New Ser.2(Aug.1967)86-89

1967 "Prophets and Priests." In R.Schoenman, ed., Bertrand Russell:Philosopher of the Century: Essays in His Honor.London:George Allen & Unwin, 1967

1967 "Vorwort." In Heinz Brandt,Ein Traum, der nicht ausführer ist. Mein Weg zwischen Ost und West. Munich: Paul List Verlag, 1967

1967 "The Present Crisis in Psychoanalysis." Praxis. Philosophische Zeitschrift. (Zagreb) 3 (1967): 70-80

1967 "Do We Still Love Life?" McCall's 94 (Aug.1967): 57, 108-110.

1967 "Foreword II." In E.Fromm, 1950a,pp.vi-viii.

1967 "Observaciones sobre el problema de la destructividad."Revista de Pscoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 5 (1967): 3-5.

1968 The Revolution of Hope" Toward a Humanized Technology.New York: Harper & Row, World Perspectives Vol. 38,1968.

1968 The Nature of Man. Readings selected, edited, and furnished with an introductory essay by Erich Fromm and Ramon Xirau.New York:Macmillan, 1968.

1968 "In the Name of Life"Psychiatry and Social Science Review,July 1968.

1968 "Why is America Violent?" National Catholic Reporter, June 12, 1968.

1968 "On the Sources of Human Destructiveness." In Alternatives to Violence: A Stimulus to Dialogue. New York: Time-Life Books, 1968.

1968 "The Condition of the American Spirit: Are We fully Alive?" Newsday, Jan.13,1968.

1968 "Introduction." In 1968.

1968 "Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man." In Social Science Information 3. Den Haag, 1968.pp 7-17.

1968 "Hacia el ano 2000." El Nacional (Mexico), Mar.4,1968.

1968 "Editorial." Revista de Psicoanalisis, Psiquiatria y Psicologia 9 (1968):3f

1969 "In the Name of Life." In Alexander Klein, ed.,Natural Enemies? Youth and the Clash of Generations. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1969.

1969 "Letter to Lord Bertrand Russell." In Bertrand Russell; The Autobiography of Bertrand Russel 1944-1967.Vol.3., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969.

1970 The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx and Social Psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970.

1970 Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Sociopsychoanalytic Study (with Michael Maccoby), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1970.

1970 "The Crisis of Psychoanalysis." In 1970.

1970 "Freud's Model of Man and Its Social Determinants." in 1970a.

1970 "Humanistic Planning." in 1970a.

1970 "The Significance of the Theory of Mother Right for Today." In 1970a.

1970 "Epilogue." in 1970a.

1970 "Zur Theorie und Strategie des Friedens." In O.Schatz., ed.,Der Friede im nuklearen Zuitalter. Eine Kontroverse zwischen Realisten und Utopisten. Munich: 4. Salzburger Humanismusgespräch, 1970.

1970 "Essay." In Summerhill, For and Against.New York: Hart Publishing Co.,1970

1970 "Die psychologischen und geistigen Probleme des Überflusses." In O.Schatz., ed., Die erschreckende Zivilisation.Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1970.

1970 "Introduction." In Ivan Illich, Celebration of Awareness: A Call for institutional Revolution. New York;Doubleday & Co., 1970.

1970 "Introduction." In A.Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual. New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1970.

1971 "Vorwort" to the German edition of 1968a.

1971 Letter to Martin Jay, May 14, 1971. Unpublished.

1972 "Der Traum ist die Sprache des universalen Menschen." In H.J.Schultz, ed., Was weiss man von den Träumen.Stuttgart/Berlin: Kreuz Verlag,1972.

1972 "Einige post-marxsche und post-freudsche Gedanken über Religion und Religiosität." Concilium. Internationale Zeitschrift für Theologie 8 Einsiedeln/Mainz (1972):472-476

1972 "The Erich Fromm Theory of Aggression." The New York Times Magazine, Feb.27,1972.

1973 The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness New York: Holt,Rinehart & Winston,1973

1974 "Einführung." In H.J.Schultz, ed., Psychologie für Nichtpsychologen. Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag. 1974.

1974 Im Namen des Lebens.Ein Gespräch mit Hans Jürgen Schultz. Stuttgart:Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974.

1974 "Hitler, wer war er und was heisst Widerstand gegen diesen Menschen? Erich Fromm im freien Gespräch mit Hans Jürgen Schultz." In H.J.Schultz.ed., Der zweanzigste Juli - Alternative zu Hitler? Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 1974.

1974 "Ein Gespräch mit Erich Fromm" (with Robert Jungk). Bild der Wissenschaft. Oct. 1974.pp.59-62.

1974 "Vorwort." In Boris Luban-Plazza, ed., Praxis der Balint-Gruppen. Beziehungsdiagnostik und Therapie. Munich: J.F.Lehmann, 1974.

1974 "L'erede di Freud guidica il referendum.U N colloquio con Erich Fromm."(with Giulio Nascimbeni). Corriere della Sera, May 23, 1974.

1974 "Forword." In Maiahilo Markovic, From Affluence to Praxis Philosophy and Social Criticism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974.

1975 "Remarks on the Policy of Détente," In Détente: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relaions, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session, On United States Relations with Communist Countries Aug/Oct. 1974.Washington:U.S.Government Printing Office, 1975.

1975 Aggression und Charakter.Ein Gesprächt mit Adalbert Reif. Zurich: Verlag die Arche, 1975.

1975 "Die Zwiespältigkeit des Fortschritts.Zum 100.Geburstag von Albert Schweitzer."Evangelische Kommentare 8. Stuttgart (1975);757f.

1975 "Die Aktualität der prophetischen Schriften." In H.J.Schultz., ed., Sie werden lachen - die Bibel. Überraschungen mit dem Buch. Stuttgart/Berlin: Kreuz Verlag,1975

1975 "Anmerkungen zur psychoanalytischen Theorie und Therapie." Lecture at a Symposium on the occasion of his 75th birthday in late May 1975 in Locarno. Audiothek des Buchclubs."ex libris." Zurich, 1975.Tonband Cassette CWO 7034.

1975 "Introduction." In U.Bernath and E.Day Campbell, eds., You Are My Brother: Father Wassons's Story of Hope for Children.Huntington, Ind.; Our Sunday Visitor, 1975.

1975 "Rache des ungelebten Lebens. Erich Frommüber Katastrophen-Filme." Der Spiegel 9 (Feb.24,1975).

1975 "Prigionieri delcaos. Intervista con Erich Fromm" (by Maria Luigia Pace e Gian Luigi Rosa). Panorama, Milan Dec.16, 1975,pp 124-134.

1975 "In fondo, L'uomo e un buon uomo Colloquio con Erich Fromm (with Luciano Aleotti). L'Espresso, Feb. 16, 1975, pp.56-59, 94.

1975 "La paura dell'anno 2000. Intervista von Erich Fromm," (with Guiliano Ferrieri). L'Europeo (Milan), June 27, 1975, pp.30f.

1976 To Have or to Be? New York: Harper & Row, World Perspectives,Vol.30.1976.

1976 "Die Bedeutung des Ehrwürdigen Nyanaponika Mathera für die westliche Welt." In K.Onken, ed., Des Geistes Gleichmass. Festchrift zum 75. Geburtstag des Ehrwürdigen Nyanaponika Mahathera. Konstanz:Christiani Verlag.1976.

1976 "The Will to Live." Preventive Medicine: An International Journal Devoted to Practice and Theory 5 (1976): 518-521.

1976 "The Secret Diaries by Albert Speer." Book jacket text of Albert Speer, The Secret Diaries. New York: Macmillan, 1976.

1976 "Ober biologische und soziale Wurzeln der menschlichen Destruktivitat." Lecture at the 1st Biennial for Psychiatry at Basle, Mar.12-13, 1975, Basel:Sandoz Produkte, 1976.

1976 "How Will We Live? America's Future - A Discussion with Americans."The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 4, 1976.

1976 "Vita activa." In M.J.Schultz., ed., Was der Mensch braucht,Anregungen für eine neue Kunst zu leben. Stuttgart/Berlin: Kreuz Verlag, 1977.

1977 "Das Undenkbare denken und das Mögliche tun." A conversation with Erich Fromm (with Alfred A.Hasler) ex libris, May 1977.

1977 "Interview über 'Haben oder Sein' mit Adalbert Reif."Arbeiter-Zeitung 16,Vienna, April 23, 1977.

1978 "Religion und Gesellschaft." In Rainer Funk, Mut zum Menschen. Erich Fromms Denken und Werk, seine humanistische Religion und Ethik. Mit einem Nachwort von Erich Fromm. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlage-Anstalt, 1978.

1978 "Das Undenkbare, das Unsagbare, das Unaussprechliche." Psychologie heute 5, Weinehim (1978): pt.11.

1978 "Brief an Karola Bloch." In K.Bloch and A.Reif eds., Denken heisst Überschreiten. In memoriam Ernst Bloch 1885-1977. Köln/FRankfurt: Europäsche Verlagsanstalt, 1978.

1979 Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought. New York: Harper & Row,1980.

1979 "Konsumreligion." Neues Forum, Vienna (1979): 301/302.

1979 "Wir sitzen alle in einem Irrenhaus. Heinrich Jaenecke im Gespräch mit Erich Fromm." Der Stern, Hamburg, Apr.19, 1979.

1979 "Erich Fromm: du Talmud á Freud. Interview avec Gerard Khoury." Le Monde Dimanche, Oct.21,1979.

1980 Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches. Eine sozialpsychologische Untersuchung, edited by Wolfgang Bonss, transl.into German by Wolfgang Bonss. with the colloration of Cornelia Rülke and Rosmarie Thrul. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980

1980 "Wer hat Interesse an der Wahrheit. Interview with Robert Neun."Für uns 4, Solothurn 1980.

1980 "Ich habe die Hoffnung, dass die Menschen ihr Leiden erkennen: den Mangel an Liebe." Ein Gespräch mit Heinrich Jaenecke. Der Stern (Mar.27,1980), p.14.

1980 "Die Kranken sind die Gesündesten/Ein. Interview, geführt kurz vor seinem Tode" (with Micaela Lämmle and Jürgen Lodemann). Die Zeit, Hamburg,Mar.21,1980.

1980 Erich Fromm, il coraggio di essers, Intervista di Guido Ferrari. Bellinzona: Edizioni Casagrande, 1980.

1981 On Disobedience and Other Essays, New York: The Seabury Press, 1981.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SECONDARY LITERATURE :

Agger, Ben. Western Marxism, an Introduction, New York: Goodyear Publishing Co.,1979

Althusser, Louis. Lenin & Other Essays , New York: McGraw Hill, 1968

Anshen, Ruth Nanda. "Authority and Power: Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse." Journal of Social Philosophy 5, (Sept.1974): 1-8.

Arato A. & Gebhardt.(eds) The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, New York: Routledge & Kegan, 1978

Baker, John.F. "Erich Fromm. "Publishers Weekly 210 (Sept.9, 1976)38-42.

Benedict, Ruth Review of "Escape from Freedom." Psychiatry 5 (1942)111-113

Birnbach, Martin Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy, Stanford: Prentice Hall, 1961

Bluhm. W.T. Theories of the Political System 3rd Ed.,New York: Prentice Hall, 1978.

Blum, Gerald S. Psychoanalytic Theories of Personality. New York: Mc Graw Hill,1953.

Boisen,Anton T. Review of "Escape from Freedom." Psychiatry 5.(1942).

Brams, Jerome "From Freud to Fromm." Psychology Today. No.1.(1968)

Briggs, Asa. Review of "The Sane Society." The New Statesman and Nation: The Week-end Review 51 (London,June 23,1956): 739.

Brossard, Chandler "Erich Fromm -Influential and Controversial Psychoanalyst." Look (May 5,1964): 50-52.

Brown, J.A.C. Freud and the Post-Freudians. pp.145-160.Baltimore: Penguin, 1961.

Brown, N.D. Life Against Death, Middletown: Routledge & Kegan, 1959.

Browning,Don S. "Erich Fromm: The Productive Personality and the Coming of the Messianic Time. "In Generative Man: Psychoanalytic Perspectives, ed.,by D.S.Browning,pp105-144.Phildelphia:'73

Brunner Heinrich E. Man in Revolt, New York, Scribner & Sons: 1939.

Brynes, Asher Review of "Man for Himself." The Saturday Review of Literature 31 (Feb 7,1948): 25f.

Buss, Arnold The Psychology of Aggression. N.Y., Wiley & Sons Inc: 1961.

Coates, J.B. The Crisis of the Human Person, London, Longmans: 1949.

The Crisis of the Human Person , London, Longmans: 1949.

Cobb, John B.Jnr.	The Structure of Christian Existentialism, Westminster: Philadelphia, 1967.
Copi, I.	Introduction to Logic , 4th Ed.,London, Macmillan: 1972.
Cox, Harvey	Review of "You Shall be as Gods." The New York Times Book Review. Nov.27,1966.
Daglish, R.	The Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy , Moscow,Progress Publishers: 1972.
de Crespigny, A & Minogue,K.	Contemporary Political Philosophers, London, Methuen: 1976.
Dobrenkov, V.I.	Neo-Freudians in Search of Truth, Moscow, Progress Publishers: 1979.
Evans, R.	Dialogue with Erich Fromm , New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
Freud, Sigmund.	Sexuality and the Psychology of Love , New York: Routledge & Kegan, 1963.
	Civilization and it's Discontents, New York: Routledge & Kegan, 1962.
	Moses and Monotheism, New York: Routledge & Kegan, 1939.
Funk, Rainer.	The Courage to be Human , New York: Continuum,1978.
Geras, Norman.	Marx and Human Nature , New York: Verso Editions, 1983.
Hegel, G.W.F.	The Phenomenology of the Mind , New York: Evanstrong, Harper & Row, 1967.
Held, David.	Introduction to Critical Theory, London: Hutchinson, 1980.
Heuer, N.A.C.	The Concept of Theological Dynamics... PhD Thesis. University of Natal.
Hill, Lewis.B.	Review of "Escape from Freedom", Psychiatry 5 , Washington (1942): 117-118.
Horkheimer, M.	Eclipse of Reason , New York: Seabury, 1974.
Horney, Karen.	The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. , New York: W.W.Norton and Co., Inc., 1937.
Hyman, Stanley E.	"Psychoanalysis and the Climate of Tragedy." In Freud and the 20th Century, ed., by N.Nelson, pp.163-181, London: MacMillan, 1958.
Jay, Martin	The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1973
"	"The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism."

Social Research 39 (1972), 285-305.

Kariel, H.S. "The Normative Pattern of Fromm's Escape From Freedom", Journal of Politics, xix (Nov,1957).

Kaushik, Asha. The Neo Marxist FRamework of Erich Fromm, The Indian Journal of Political Science , April 1978.

Kautsky, Karl. Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, Chicago: Kerr,1918

Kecskemeti, Paul. Review of "The Sane Society." Commentary , 21 (1956);176-179

Kolakowski, Leszek. Main Currents of Marxism -it's Rise, Growth and Dissolution, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Lenin, V.I. Collected Works , Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1958.

Lindzey, G. "Erich Fromm, "In Psychology , ed by G.Lindzey et al.,pp 540f New York: 1975.

Locke, John. Two Treaties of Government , London: Dent. 1973.

Lorenz, Konrad On Aggression, Translated by Marjorie Kerr Wilson, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1966.

Lukacs, G. History and Class Consciousness, London: Merlin, 1971.

Maccoby, Malcolm. "Emotional Attitudes and Political Choices." Politics and Society 2 (Winter 1972): 209-239.

Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

" Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.,1955

Marx, Karl. Capital Vol.1, Vol.III. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.

Selected Writings. ed.D.McLellan, Oxford: MacMillan, 1977.

Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 , In above.

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. "

Grundrisse Translated M.Nicolous, London: Penguin, 1973.

The German Ideology Selected Writings, D.Mc Lellan ed., Oxford: MacMillan, 1977.

Critique of the Gotha Programme. "

Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Intro.

On the Jewish Question "

On James Mill "

The Poverty of Philosophy "

	The Holy Family.
	Selected Works Vol. 1 & 2, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973.
Marx, K., Engels, F.	The Communist Manifesto, (intro. A.J.P. Taylor) London: Penguin books, 1977.
McLellan, D.	The Thought of Karl Marx , 2nd Ed., Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1980.
	Karl Marx, Selected Writings, Oxford: MacMillan Press, 1977.
Mill, J.S.	Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government , London: Dent , 1980.
Mills, C.F., and Hans Gerth.	Character and the Social Structure, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1953.
Montagu, M.F. Ashley	Review of "Escape from Freedom." Psychiatry 5 , Washington: (1942): 122-129.
Mullahey, Patrick.	Review of "Escape from Freedom." Psychiatry 5 , Washington: (1942): 118-122.
Nagler, Simon H.	"Erich Fromm", in Interrupting Personality. A Survey of Twentieth-Century Views, edited by A.M. Freedman and H.I. Kaplan, pp. 193-200. New York: Harper & Rowe, 1972.
Neel, Ann F.	"Erich Fromm, "In Theories of Psychoanalysis: A Handbook, pp. 303-309. Cambridge: Mass., 1969.
Nelson, Benjamin	Freud and the Twentieth Century , London: Allen & Unwin, 1958
Niebuhr, Reinhold	The Nature and Destiny of Man , Vols. 1&11, London: Nisbet, 1946.
"	Review of Man For Himself , by Erich Fromm, Christianity and Society, xiii (Spring, 1948).
Nietszche, F.	"La Gaya Scienza" , London: T.N. Foulis, 1910.
	Twilight of the Idols, & The AntiChrist , London: Penguin Classics, 1980.
	Beyond Good & Evil , London: Penguin Classics, 1982
	A Nietszche Reader , London: Penguin Classics, 1982.
Padover, K.	The Letters of K. Marx , Oxford: Prentice Hall, 1973.
Petrovic, Gajo.	"Humanism and Revolution." In In the Name of Life: Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm, ed by B. Landis & E.S. Tauber. pp 288-298. New York, Harper & Row: 1971.

Petuchowski, Jakob J	"Erich Fromm's Midrash of Love: The Sacred and the Secular Forms." Commentary 22 (1956), 543-549.
Plato	The Republic, London: Penguin Classics, 1979.
Rauche, G.A.	The Abdication of Philosophy = The Abdication of Man, Nijhof: The Hague, 1974.
Rawls, John.	A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Massachusetts, 1972.
Reich, Wilhelm.	"Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis." In W.Reich, Sex-Pol.Essays 1929-1934, ed. by L.Baxandall, pp 65-69. New York: Columbia University Press,1972.
"	The Mass Psychology of Fascism" , New York: Harper & Row, 1956.
Rickman, John (ed)	A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, Garden City: Doubleday and Co.,Doubleday Anchor Books,1957
Riesman, David	"Psychological Types and National Character: An Informal Commentary, "American Quarterly 5 , (1953):325-343.
"	Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays. London: MacMillan, 1954
	The Lonely Crowd, Boston: Yale Univ.Press, 1950.
Roazen, Paul	Freud - Political and Social Thought, New York: Knopf, 1968.
Rust, Eric	Evolutionary Philosophies and Contemporary Theology, Westminster: Philadelphia Press, 1969.
Rilke, M.R.	Werke ihn Bunden 1 , Berlin: Eichman, 1957.
Sartre, J.P.	Les Mouches , London: Hamlyn, 1952.
Schaff, Adam	"Marxism and the Philosophy of Man" In Socialist Humanism, ed., by Erich Fromm, pp.129-137. New York: Harper & Row,1965.
	"What does it Mean to 'Be a Marxist'?" in In the Name of Life; Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm, ed.,by B.Landis & E.S.Tauber, pp.299-312. New York: Continum,1971.
Schaar, John H.	Escape from Authority, New York: Basic Books Inc. , 1961.
Schacht, Richard	Alienation. With an Introductoru Essay by Walter Kaufmann, London: Hutchinson, 1971.
Schecter, David E.	"Of Human Bonds and Bondage." In In the Name of Life; Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm,ed.,by B.Landis & E.S.Tauber, pp.84-89. New York, 1971.Also in Contemporary Psychoanalysis 11, (1975): 435-452.

Schelling, F.W.J.von	The Ages of the World, Translated with an Introduction and notes by Frederick de Wolke Bolman.Jr.New York:Columbia University Press,1942.
"	Of Human Freedom, Translated with an Introduction by James Gutmann. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.,1936
Shinn, Roger L	Man - The New Humanism, Westminster: Lutterworth, 1968.
Singer,P.	Marx Oxford: Oxford Press, 1980.
Smith, W.A.	The Writings of Erich Fromm: A Detailed Critique and in-Depth Evaluation, New York: Abacus1970.
Suttie, J.	Origins of Love and Hate, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1935
Tauber, Edward S.	"Some Biographical Notes," In In the Name of Life:Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm, ed., B.Landis & E.S.Tauber, pp.x-xiv.N.Y. 1971. Also in Contemporary Psychoanalysis 11 (1975): 390-395.
	"The Role of Immediate Experience for Dynamic Psychiatry: The Sense of Immediacy in Fromm's Conceptions." In American Handbook of Psychiatry pp.1811-1815.N.Y.:1959.
	"Erich Fromm:Clinical and Social Philosopher." Contemporary Psychoanalysis 15 (11979): 201-213.
Tawrey, R.H.	Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,Middelsex: Penguin, 1964 ed
Thompson, Clars	Psychoanalysis - Its Evolution and Development, New York: Hermitage House, 1950.
Tillich, Paul	Review of"The Sane Society"Pastoral Psychology 6 (1955)13-16
	"Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought.", Review of Religion, ix (Nov., 1944), pp 5-19.
"	"Existential, Philosophy" Journal of the History of Ideas, V (Jan., 1944). pp.44-70.
"	"Existential Thinking in American Theology"Religion in Life, x (Summer, 1941), pp. 452-456.
"	"Existentialism and Religious Socialism", Christianity and Society, XV (Winter, 1949), pp. 8-11
"	"Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and the Nature of Man",

	Pastoral Psychology, XI (June, 1960), pp. 10-18.
"	Review of E.Fromm, "Sigmund Freud's Mission." Time, Feb. 9, 1959, p.49.
Verchese, P.	"Humanisation as a World Problem", Study Encounter, 5.No.1
Wirth, R, Louis	Review of "Escape from Freedom." Psychiatry 5, Washington (1942): 129-131.
Xirau, Ramon	"Erich Fromm: What is Man's Struggle? In In the Name of Life; Essays in Honor of Erich Fromm , ed.,by B.Landis & E.S.Tauber pp.150-160. New York: Continuum,1971.
Yonker, Nicholas,Jr.	Ambiguities of Love, An Inquiry into the Psychology of Erich Fromm, New York: Harper & Row, 1961.