WESLEYAN MISSIONS AND THE SIXTH FRONTIER WAR

1834 to 1835

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Thesis

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by

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WESLEYAN MISSIONS AND THE SIXTH FRONTIER WAR 1834-35

Synopsis of the Thesis

submitted by D.E.Seton.

A combined study of Wesleyan missions in Kaffraria and the Sixth Frontier War of 1834/5 is no artificial union of topics since each is closely tied to the other. Nevertheless, the thesis traces two apparently separate streams of thought which eventually merge into one. First comes the founding of Methodism's missions beyond the Eastern Frontier of Cape Colony, 1823-1830; then follows the record of the causes, conduct, and conclusion of the 1834/5 War; while, to close, there is an examination of Methodist attitudes toward the War and its issues.

This terse summary may now be expanded by a review of the contents of each chapter.

I. The Rise of Methodism in South Africa. After a rapid survey of the founding of the Methodist movement in Britain, attention is focused on the entrance of Methodism to South Africa, with particular reference to the Church's establishment in Albany and its desire to evangelize Kaffraria. Special consideration is given to the work of William Shaw because of the central part he played in the Wesleyan-colonial story.

II. Into Kaffraria. When Shaw, as an 1820 settler and the only Methodist minister on the frontier, first considered mission work beyond the Fish River boundary, he thought in terms of a chain of stations stretching from Grahamstown to Natal. The story of the forging of the first two links in that chain, Wesleyville and Mount Coke, covers early Wesleyan activity in the Ciskei, and affords a sample of the Society's mission policy.

III. Beyond the Kei. In recording the founding of the four Transkeian missions of Butterworth, Morley, Clarkebury, and Buntingville, the mission story is brought to the eve of what is commonly known as the Sixth Kaffir War. A tracing of mission history, however, inevitably takes cognizance of important secular situations, with the result that a study of the six missions that Shaw established between 1823 and 1830 also provides considerable information on colonial and Xhosa affairs during that period.

IV. The Sixth Frontier War. Part I - From Unrest to Invasion. With Wesleyan missions firmly settled between the Great Fish and Mzimvubu Rivers, a backward glance is taken at European-Xhosa relations during the years that followed the arrival of the 1820 settlers. That glance sees a mounting dissatisfaction that finally erupted into the Xhosa invasion of the Colony in December 1834. The frontier was thrown into confusion, the colonial government was aroused from its lethargy, and mission work was rudely interrupted.

V. The Sixth Frontier War. Part II - Counter Invasion. With a cautious deliberation that irritated the dashing Harry Smith, D'Urban launched the colonial counter invasion against the Xhosa tribesmen and took his troops over the Kei to impose a peace upon the Gcaleka chief, Hintsa (who was not nominally at war), to evacuate missionaries from situations that were not unduly dangerous, and to emancipate the Fingos from a subservience to the Gcaleka that fell short of slavery. While still east of the Kei, the Governor issued his May proclamation to declare the annexation of 7,000 square miles of Xhosa territory that lay between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers, and to announce the expulsion of the recalcitrant tribes from its confines. Within three days of the proclamation, Chief Hintsa was shot while attempting to escape from custody, but D'Urban withdrew from the Transkei and endeavoured to establish the newly-proclaimed Province of Queen Adelaide, not realizing that the enemy was still unconquered. Because of their placement, and because of the vo-

lubility of some of their representatives, Wesleyan missions were involved in many of the war's military and political operations.

VI. The Adjusted Peace. Several weeks went by before D'Urban realized that peace did not follow from his proclamation. When he awoke to the true situation, several factors, including a Methodist proposal for securing peace, led him to modify his original edict and to offer the Xhosa more moderate terms; and resulted in the signing of a treaty in September. But peace on paper meant neither the pacification of the tribes nor the satisfaction of the critics of D'Urban's policies, and some of the most important battles concerning the frontier issues were fought when the war was over. Methodist missionaries, especially William Boyce, took up the cudgels in defence of D'Urban and in opposition to Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and gave a pro-colonial tone to Wesleyan pronouncements respecting the conflict. Since many of these judgments have been quoted in support of the Governor by popular historians, they have coloured the generally accepted views of the D'Urban era and need critical examination.

VII. Recovery, Reckoning, and Reflection. This closing chapter recounts Methodism's recovery from the disruption caused by war and the steady advance of its mission programme, even to the completion of Shaw's chain of stations, in the immediate post-war years. Wesleyan attitudes toward the war are reviewed, and an appraisal is attempted, particularly in respect of the relationship of missions to politics.

This study, while concentrating on one small area of South African history, sheds light on a wider scene since it revolves around frontier problems and deals with the question that concerns so many today—the encounter of white and black in Africa.

J.E.Soton

PREFACE

It is generally conceded that the Sixth Frontier War proved to be a turning point in South African history. But there are widely divergent opinions as to the causes of the war, the justice of its conduct, and the wisdom of its settlement. Among its many interpreters, Sir George Cory and Professor W.M.Macmillan may be taken as protagonists of the extreme schools of thought: Cory being the stout defender of the colonial viewpoint, while Macmillan stands as the later champion of the Xhosa tribes.

Between these extremes there lie other possible views that merit serious attention. One of them derives from a study of the Wesleyan Methodist mission programme beyond the eastern frontier, a study that has hitherto received little scholarly attention. The Society's steady expansion from the Ieiskamma to the Mzimvubu inextricably involved its missionaries in martial matters and made them observers of and, at times, participators in the conduct of the war and its aftermath. Fortunately for the historian several of the Methodists were voluminous writers who left letters, journals, and books from which rich veins of contemporary opinion may still be mined as contributions to the objective understanding of a critical period of colonial history.

This is not solely an academic pursuit, for the issues at stake in 1835 are very much alive today, and conclusions regarding D'Urban's fulfilment of his task are liable to mould attitudes to current racial problems in South Africa, and vice versa. The study then takes on topical undertones that blend with the major questions that clamour for answers in the present Republic.

Here, a word of warning is in order. Consideration of Wesleyan Missions and the Sixth Frontier War will disclose no magic formula for a solution of the difficulties that vex a multi-racial society, but it may induce a helpful tolerance that will enable a solution to be found. In the seventh decade of the twentieth century Africa is becoming increasingly aware

of its past in the interests of its future, and any study that enables that past to be seen from what, for want of a better term, may be described as the African side of the shifting frontier barriers, is a potential promoter of mutual understanding between the two main racial groups in one small section of the sub-continent.

The author, though not a Methodist, writes as a Christian who is appreciative of the leading part played by Wesleyan missionaries in the religious, educational, and social life of a developing South Africa, and who is deeply interested in the past, present, and future history of Christian missions in the territory.

A brief explanation is due the reader concerning the terms used in referring to the native inhabitants of the Cis- and Transkei in the 1835 era. It was then usual to refer to them as "Kaffirs"—or "Kafirs", or "Caffres"—but those terms have become increasingly offensive to the people so described. The alternatives, "Natives", "Africans", or "Bantu", have now acquired a flavour that is scarcely less distasteful than those they were designed to replace. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, the generic and more polite term "Xhosa" is used for general reference while further tribal distinctions are acknowledged in the use of Ngqika, Ndlambe, Gcaleka, and other patronymics.

There now remains the genuine pleasure of thanking the many who have helped these pages to be written. First must come the hospitable University that provided the inspiration and opportunity for preparing such a thesis. In close concert there follow Professor L.M.Thompson under whose keen and enthusiastic eye the theme first took shape, Professor Monica Wilson whose perceptive guidance has meant more than she will know, and Dr. T.R.H. Davenport who so ably and helpfully took Professor Thompson's place. The staff of the Jagger Library cheerfully rendered assistance whenever demands were made upon them, while the Photographic Department attended to the reproduction of the maps. Similar appreciation springs to mind for the help given by the staff of the South African Public Library in making its wealth of Africana material so readily available.

Special thanks are due the Rev. A.[illegible]F. Garrett who, with unfailing kindness and sympathetic interest, placed the holdings of the Methodist Archives, Cape Town, at my disposal. And if gratitude is proportionate to the length of time spent in the Government Archives (Cape), then Mr. J.H.Esterhuyse and his staff receive many thanks indeed. The Rev. Fr. L.A.Hewson of Rhodes University, Professor Donovan Williams and the Librarian, both of University College, Fort Hare, willingly made specific material available on request, and are thanked accordingly.

Miss M.E.Hawkins, Mrs. C.Bain, and Mrs. F.Coles have each given valued help in the onerous task of typing the following pages; while a special word of appreciation falls to the Sentinel Publishing Company, Kenilworth, for its patient endurance of a long programme of study, for its practical assistance in the binding of the thesis, and for help from several members of its staff.

Finally, to my wife, this tribute for believing that the task could be done, and for uncomplainingly paying the price, domestically, that enabled it to be finished.

Bonnebosch, B.E.Beton

March, 1962.

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A. Cape Colony c. 1830.

B. The Eastern Frontier c. 1835.

C. The Eastern Frontier to Illustrate the 1834/5 War.

* * *

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED

IN FOOTNOTES

ABM - Minutes of the Albany District Meeting (with appropriate year).

Alexander, Narrative - J.E.Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage ... and of a Campaign in Kaffirland ... . 2 Vols.

Boyce, Notes - W.B.Boyce, Notes on South African Affairs from 1834 to 1838.

C.Brownlee, Reminiscences - C.Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History.

Cory - Sir George Cory, The Rise of South Africa, 4 Vols.

Goldswain Chronicle - U.Long (ed.), The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, 2 Vols.

IBB VII.538 - Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines.

IBB VII.425 - Part II of the preceding volume.

IBB XXXIX.50.252 - Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa ... .

IBB XXXIX.279 - Caffre War and Death of Hintza.

IBB XLIII.503 - Part II of the preceding volume. Despatches Concerning the Late Caffre War.

Kay, Travels - S. Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria.

Long, Index - U.Long (ed.), An Index to Authors of Unofficial, Privately-owned MSS Relating to the History of South Africa, 1812-1920.

Macmillan, BBB - W.M.Macmillan, Bantu, Boer, and Briton.

Mem.Shrewsbury - J.V.B.Shrewsbury, Memorials of the Rev. Wm.J.Shrewsbury.

Roxborough, Colonial Policy - J.Roxborough, Colonial Policy on the Northern and Eastern Frontiers of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-45.

Shaw, Defence - W.Shaw, A Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries in South Africa.

Slee, Albany Methodism - A.T.C.Slee, Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District 1830-1844.

SMM - W.Shaw, The Story of My Mission in South Eastern Africa.

Smith, Autobiography - Sir H.G.W.Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.Gen. Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutley, G.C.B.

Steedman, Wanderings - A.Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures in the Interior of Southern Africa. 2 Vols.

Theal - G.M.Theal, History of South Africa, 5 Vols.

Theal, Documents - G.M.Theal, Documents Relating to the Kaffir War of 1835.

Theal, Records PQA - G.M.Theal, Records of the Province of Queen Adelaide. 3 Vols.

Van der Walt, Geskiedenis - A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A.Wiid, A.L.Geyer (eds.), Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. 2 Vols.

Whiteside, History - J.Whiteside, History of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa.

WMM - The Wesleyan Methodist Magazine (with appropriate year).

* * *

Errata

Due to a typist's error, the correct spelling for some Xhosa proper nouns, notably for the Mthatha (Umtata) and Mzimkhulu (Umzimkulu) Rivers, has not been consistently followed, particularly in Chapter III.

* * *

CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF METHODISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

I. BIRTH AND GROWTH OF METHODISM

1. The Birth of Methodism. The gulf of almost a century yawns between the rise of the movement that gave birth to the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society and Wesleyan involvement in the 1835 South African frontier war; but since a live connection exists between the origins of Methodism and the character of its contributions to the South African scene, it is well to consider the earlier developments before giving close attention to their sequel that followed the passage of ninety-five years.

The second quarter of the eighteenth century in England has, not without reason, been credited with being the Augustan Age of English Literature. In 1725 Congreve, Steele, Defoe and Gay were still alive; Swift, Pope, Fielding and Richardson still had many productive years ahead of them; while Smollett, Goldsmith and Johnson were lending their lustre to the era before it closed. But if that period merits the title of Augustan for its literature, it hardly less deserves that of Tiberian for its spiritual decadence. It was a day of deadness in a great part of the established church, a day when many of the clergy were ignorant, idle, and dissolute; a day when religious apathy had settled like a London fog on a large portion of Britain's population.[1]

Into that religiously dismal scene there stepped the brothers John and Charles Wesley, and their early collaborator George Whitefield. The formation, under their leadership, of the Holy Club at Oxford in 1729 set in motion a train of spiritual events that stirred England to unsuspected depths and profoundly affected countries that were then little known to Europe. Ten years later came the move that is generally held to mark the foundation of the movement known as Methodism -- the opening of the Foundry, near Moorfields in London, as the Methodists' own meeting place. From

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[1] The present writer is aware of the historiographical trend that rejects the earlier gloomy picture of the state of religion in 18th century England in favour of a more cheerful view. But, while agreeing that dark spots might have been exaggerated, he believes they cannot be reasoned away and that the above qualified description harmonizes with known facts.

then until his death in 1791 John Wesley gave the society that came to bear his name a dynamic, methodical, almost tireless leadership, while Charles, through his more than 6,000 hymns, inspired a unity among a diverse and constantly growing membership. At no time did the brothers intend to found a new denomination. They were both ordained clergy of the Church of England, and claimed only to be revitalizing the body to whose service they had dedicated their lives. But they themselves were swept along in the stream their ministry had served to unleash and were carried beyond the point where they could return to the bosom of the church in which they had been reared. In 1784 John took the decisive step of ordaining his own preachers, while the autonomy of American Methodism in the same year marked yet another stride away from the Establishment and a move toward complete independence.

Wesley, who has been aptly described as the Loyola of Protestantism, possessed genius for government. Instinctively he marshalled his followers into an orderly system of classes, bands, and circuits that cared for the members' spiritual, social, and ecclesiastical needs. When he and the circle of his close associates could no longer cope with the increasing demands that were made upon them, he appointed lay preachers to care for the growing congregations. On the selfless service of these men he built a close-knit organization that conserved numerical and spiritual gains while providing a basis for further growth. At the pinnacle of his structure he eventually set the Conference that became the governing body, the parliament of Methodism, a group of one hundred ministers who met annually to elect a president, to examine and admit preachers, and to direct the expanding movement. When the founder laid down his leadership after fifty years of Herculean toil there were, among the 6,000,000 people in Britain, 135,000 who followed his interpretation of Christian doctrine and church government.[1]

2. The Influence and Growth of Methodism. The widespread interest in Wesley's teaching may be partly explained as a reaction against

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[1] The above summary may be expanded by reference to any of the many excellent histories of Methodism and biographies of the Wesleys that are too numerous for listing here. A selection is given in the Bibliography appended to this study.

the Deism of eighteenth century Europe. The Age of Reason satisfied many of the intellectuals' demands but left men, especially common man, without food for the soul. Wesley's warm-hearted brand of Christianity nourished the hungry and gave them the fare for which they sub-consciously craved. Amid the squalor and degradation of Georgian England he preached the compassionate fatherhood of God, the redemptive power of Christ, and the worth of the individual. He unashamedly appealed to his hearers' emotions, and stressed their need for a personal experience of the reality of God; yet, at the same time, his logical mind provided a firm groundwork of reason, preventing the evaporation of his appeals into mere emotionalism. His emphasis on experimental religion, theologically formulated into the doctrines of Assurance and Christian Perfection, gave his hearers teachings that were fresh enough to arouse their interest and practical enough to transform their lives. His theology was not content with theory; it embraced a catholic concern for social issues and led him to combat crime, waste, gambling, liquor, and slavery. Multitudinous interests prevented Wesley from giving all these issues an effective attention, but his fervour inspired others to do what he could not have accomplished single-handed. Wilberforce and Buxton were indebted to him in their fight against slavery, John Howard and Elizabeth Fry drew freely from his humanitarianism in their struggles for prison reform, and Robert Raikes owed something to Wesleyanism when he began his Sunday Schools. The Evangelical Revival, with its religious, educational, and social reforms, had Methodism as its forerunner.

This far-reaching work was not done without encountering opposition. Wesley and his associates were often ill-treated in the early days of their work, but quiet persistence in their mission gradually earned respect even from bitter opponents. John's influence was on the side of law and order. Though he was no mere rabble-rouser, he had great influence over the rabble and helped to transform much of it into a respectable citizenry. Though he was no revolutionist in the political sense, he launched a revolution that profoundly affected millions of lives. His orthodoxy, his cool-headedness, while not always emulated by his enthusiastic followers, were powerful enough to steady England, especially

in its shopkeeping, working-class levels, during the unsettlement that swept through Europe in the age of the French Revolution.

It was hardly possible for such a movement to be confined within the limits of one island. Wesley himself paid frequent visits to Ireland and saw a strong work spring up there from 1752 onwards. But the first missionary move came in 1759 (annus mirabilis!) when a layman, Nathaniel Gilbert, returned to his property on Antigua, West Indies, and began working for the conversion and welfare of his plantation negroes. In the following year, Methodism entered Italy, and in succeeding years other countries opened their doors to the movement's missionaries. Work for Indians began in Canada (1765); in the American Colonies where John himself had served in 1735, meetings commenced for the Europeans of New York in 1766, the first church was opened in 1768, and by 1784 the work was strong enough to be given independent status under its own bishops, Francis Asbury and Thomas Coke. Progress nearer home went more slowly. Although Methodists went to France in 1783, it was not until 1790 that they really gained a foothold there, while Germany was only reached from the United States in 1789. Entrance to Africa came through Negro Methodists from Nova Scotia who settled in Sierra Leone in 1792, then further spectacular advances awaited the turn of the century and the inspirational leadership of Dr. Coke. Between 1812 and 1816 Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were supplied with missionaries. In 1813 the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society[1] was formed, with local branches throughout Britain; and in 1815 the Society became an integral part of the church's organization.

Responsibility for the selection, the training, the direction, and the support of missionaries lay in the hands of the Society which rapidly developed an efficient organization for the care of its world-wide programme.[2] Funds were derived, in the first instance, from the contributions and solicitations of the branch societies at home; but as

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[1] Hereinafter abbreviated as W.M.M.S.

[2] Details that follow are drawn from Miscellaneous Regulations: being an Appendix to the General Instructions of the Wesleyan Missionary Committee. For the Private Use of the Missionary. (London, 1832).

missions established themselves they were expected to become at least partially self-supporting and even to take a financial interest in the extension of the work in other lands. Annual publication of amounts raised by each group helped to stimulate the raising of such funds. Under normal circumstances, candidates for mission service were chosen from among those who had given at least four years' service at home. This procedure enabled the committee to base its appointments on experience, and ensured a supply of tested workers to overseas posts. When calls were urgent, or when candidates were unusually mature, a liberal interpretation was given to the official regulations. Terms of service varied according to the climate enjoyed by the mission station. In tropical areas which, in the 1830s included the West Indies, India, and Ceylon, the minimum was 10 years; in healthy regions such as Canada and South Africa, the term was extended to 20 years; but in West Africa and Gibraltar service was limited to two or three years. Exceptions to the policy were allowed for stated reasons, such as ill-health or the return of bachelors for the purpose of marriage; but candidates were clearly told that theirs was a call to sacrificial life service. Were missionaries obliged to return for bona fide reasons, however, they were assured of employment in the home country. A Preachers' Fund to which all ministers contributed six guineas per annum after 1826, provided a financial reservoir on which the committee could draw to meet extraordinary expenses in the care of its corps of workers. There were allowances for missionaries' children who were educated in England with the committee's consent, and missionaries' widows received monetary aid. The missionaries themselves were subject to stringent regulations concerning their personal finances so that it was difficult for them to get into debt with the Society, no matter how hard-pressed they might be in their mission field. Frequent correspondence with headquarters was encouraged, and all missionaries were required to write to the committee at least four times a year. This regulation, though not always faithfully observed, yielded a good harvest of primary records for the reconstruction of the early history of many Wesleyan missions.

Church government at home provided a model for the administration

of mission work abroad. Local authority was vested in the annual district meeting where business was conducted according to well-defined rules, and where decisions were recorded in minutes that conformed to a common pattern. All workers were subject to the directives of the meeting, and the chairman was required to pose searching questions to his colleagues concerning their spiritual status and progress in Christian ministry. The missionaries in turn closely supervised their converts through the circuit system. Each station was the centre of a circuit to which all small units were responsible. In this way there were no unattached groups. Converts passed through a long probation before baptism and admission to full church membership. Ministers were instructed to confine baptism to those whom they had taught and to members' children: "This is our rule, and we have no desire to go beyond it." Methodist ministers in England were not allowed to conduct marriage services, but their counter-parts were given power to do so in Newfoundland and Canada, and, after delay, in South Africa also. In addition to ordained ministers or those who were working toward ordination, the Methodist mission policy provided for the appointment of assistant missionaries who, however, were on a different footing from their immediate superiors. It was the Society's intention that assistants should eventually be drawn from the ranks of native membership that an indigenous leadership might develop. But, possibly warned by unfortunate exhibits at home, it specifically instructed its representatives: "No Natives from any part are to be brought or sent over by you to England, without the leave of the Committee". Finally the regulations made provision for the employment of artisans, laymen who were charged with the erection of mission homes, chapels, schools, and other buildings needed on new stations. These men, regarded as temporary workers, were subject to dismissal when their services were no longer required, but some magnified their office and proved more valuable than their original contract had anticipated.

The founders of the W.M.M.S. intended that all branches of their work should be but parts of one large whole.

> ... our Foreign Missions and work at home form but <u>the same Connexion</u>, under one government, and united for the same objects; for

> though they are supported by different funds, these very funds are chiefly derived from the same common source,-- the pious liberality of our societies and congregations at home and abroad.[1]

In the early days these ideals were easily retained. Mission staff was drawn from Britain, funds came from Britain, and ties with the home country were naturally strong and precious. As the oversea missions developed, however, the connection became more tenuous. Workers were recruited locally in addition to reinforcements from the United Kingdom, local contributions for mission support became more significant, and the passage of years weakened sentimental attachment to Britain, established a spirit of independence, and as was the case in America, led to the establishment of an autonomous church. Thanks largely to the Declaration of Independence, the process moved much more rapidly in the United States than in strictly British possessions, but it operated elsewhere, none the less. During the first few decades of its existence, however, the W.M.M.S. was staunchly loyal to British traditions. This loyalty was more than a sentimental attachment to the home country of most of its missionaries. Other societies drew their personnel from similar sources without becoming subject to that form of imperialism that appeared to possess the Wesleyans, especially in South Africa. The tendency must not be exaggerated, for much of it may be shown to stem from local circumstances rather than an ingrained imperialistic trend; yet might not the origins of Methodism have predisposed its followers to a sanctified jingoism and made them fervent patriots in alien lands? Wesley's love of law and order, his adherence to the Established Church, the Society's choice of colonial territories for its early mission endeavours — were these straws showing the prevailing direction of the Wesleyan wind? A study of one particular set of circumstances in South Africa may provide a partial answer to the question, but will not necessarily supply criteria for a judgment of the whole Society.

II. METHODISM REACHES SOUTH AFRICA

1. Arrival in the Cape. The first steps in Methodism at the Cape of Good Hope were propitious in that they were taken by a layman and were

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[1] Miscellaneous Regulations, p.2.

not due to any artificial effort to enlarge the bounds of the growing church. In the ranks of the 72nd Regiment that was serving under General Baird in 1806 was a fervent Methodist, George Middlemiss, who was not ashamed to share his faith among his fellow soldiers and the few townsfolk with whom he came into contact. When he was transferred, his place was taken by Sergeant Kendrick who showed still greater initiative in fostering an interest in Methodism. In 1812 he appealed to London for a minister to be sent to the Cape, and received his answer in 1814 with the arrival of the Rev. J. McKenny. The encouragement was short-lived, however. The recruit fell foul of the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset,[1] and, finding no legal outlet for his spiritual activities, he withdrew and went to Ceylon. Two years later, in April 1816, a party of Wesleyans reached the Cape, and profiting from earlier rebuffs, went cautiously about their mission and explored possible avenues of service among the population of Cape Town. Due to restrictions which favoured the English and Dutch established churches their potential usefulness was very much restricted, and when permits to exercise their office among the Europeans were refused, they turned their attention northward. Under the leadership of Barnabas Shaw, a mission, known as Leliefontein, was opened at Kamiesberg in Little Namaqualand toward the end of 1816. For ten years Shaw nurtured the slender threads of interest shown in his Christian message by the Namaqua, but converts came slowly and in small numbers. By 1821 two further stations were opened, both in Great Namaqualand, but the nomadic nature of the natives was unfavourable to the development of mission stations, and the work, compared with that in other parts of Southern Africa, proved unproductive.[2] Bechuanaland opened her doors to the Wesleyan missionary Stephen Kay in 1821, and in 1823 Broadbent went to the Barolong, giving evidence of breadth of vision and depth of courage that were on a level with Robert Moffatt's qualities. In such work the Methodists were not tamely following the tracks worn by others' wagons, but were boldly blazing trails of their own.

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[1] Lord Charles is reported to have said to G. Thom, the Dutch clergyman at the Cape: "I hate the Methodists and I will do everything in my power to hinder their increase." (Quoted by D.K. Clinton The South African Melting Pot (London, 1937), p.111.

[2] The annual membership figure for the whole area north of Cape Town remained at 67 for the years 1820-1824.

While Shaw was working at Leliefontein, the situation in Cape Town was slowly becoming more favourable to his Society. The Colonial Office, under pressure from interests that favoured the Methodists, and possibly influenced by the movement's increasing respectability and its acceptance by the influential evangelical party, had conceded the right of its ministers to practise their profession in the Cape of Good Hope. The concession was regarded with disfavour by the Roman Catholic secretary for the Colony, Col. Bird, but he could not deny its existence, and was obliged to tolerate the growth of Wesleyanism in the capital city. By 1822 the movement was strong enough to open a humble church building of its own in Barrack Street, with Dr. Philip performing the ceremony; while, at a little later date, an Anglican Bishop consecrated a Methodist Church at Simonstown. Then, in 1826 Barnabas Shaw transferred from Namaqualand to Cape Town, and gave nearly 30 years wise leadership to work in the mother city and the missions that radiated from it.

2. Entrance to Albany. Thanks largely to the initiative of one man, the Methodists were in on the ground floor when the Cape Colony began to develop its hitherto neglected eastern frontier section. The development came in the form of that strange mixture of foresight and fortune, the 1820 Settlement.[1] Lt. Col. Graham had earlier urged assisted emigration from Britain to the Cape, but his ideas received no support. In 1817 Benjamin Moodie gained official approval for a scheme to populate the Colony, and sailed for Table Bay with a party of 50 Highlanders; but stronger forces than those of private enterprise were needed if the vast spaces of the Eastern Cape were to be occupied by industrious colonists. Those forces came into action by reason of economic, political, and sociological currents that were beyond the control of either the colonial or the home governments.

The Industrial Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and an unprecendented increase in population combined to upset the economy of early nineteenth century England and to recommend emigration as a partial panacea for the

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[1] Isabel E. Edwards gives a scholarly account of the Albany Settlement in The 1820 Settlers in South Africa (London, 1934).

difficulties that beset the British Government toward the end of the second decade.[1] The loss of the American Colonies was still a vivid enough memory to render any government cautious on colonial matters, but the industrio-economic changes stemming from mechanization and the population explosion came to ensure a fair hearing for reasonable schemes of emigration. The strongest streams of emigrants flowed across the Atlantic to populate the United States and Canada, while the more distant South Africa and Australia were comparatively neglected. But the need for a defensive barrier on the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, and the lack of money with which to pay for troops, led to a change in official policy and caused the British Government to favour the colonizing of the Eastern Cape with emigrants from the United Kingdom. Plans laid in February 1818 received vigorous impetus from the 1819 attack on Grahamstown, although the authorities were careful not to publicize the defence motive when advertising their emigration scheme. The sum of £50,000 was voted for the assistance of groups of would-be settlers, the money being granted to leaders of parties of ten or more able-bodied persons over 18 years of age. A nation-wide interest was aroused until, according to Thomas Pringle, himself one of the settlers, over 90,000 applications were received.[2] Circumstance and selection reduced the acceptations to the comparatively small figure of 4,000 souls -- 1,455 men, 795 women, 960 boys, and 790 girls -- only 42 per cent of the men being connected with agriculture, although all were expected to be self-supporting farmers when they reached Albany.[3] When these, carried in a flotilla of 21 ships that had left England at intervals commencing 5 December 1819, arrived in Algoa Bay via Simonstown from April 10 and onwards, they doubled the English population of the Cape at one stroke and set a British mould on the eastern frontier region that has persisted for more than a century.

The articles governing the emigration provided for the payment of

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[1] In their introduction to Select Documents on British Colonial Policy 1830-1860 (Oxford, 1928), K.N. Bell and W.P. Morrell (Eds.) ably examine the European scene in respect of emigration in the early decades of the century.

[2] Some Account of the Present State of the English Settlers in Albany, South Africa (London, 1824), p.7, footnote.

[3] H.E. Hockly, The Story of the British Settlers of 1820 (Cape Town, 1957), though strongly biassed in favour of the settlers, furnishes many useful facts respecting the settlement.

salary to any minister of religion who might be elected to accompany a group of not less than one hundred families, subject to the Secretary of State's approval. Only one group, the Sephton Party of 344 individuals, took advantage of this provision. Although they were by no means all Wesleyans they elected to take with them a 21-year old Methodist minister, William Shaw (no relative of Barnabas), who had volunteered for missionary work and was appointed by the W.M.M.S. "as one of their duly accredited Missionaries, but in the special capacity of Chaplain" to the party of settlers.[1] Methodism, the settlers, and South Africa, were fortunate in obtaining the services of such a man as Shaw. It is hard to find or to deduce his weaknesses. From the day in early February 1820 when he boarded the Aurora at Deptford and refused the distinctive treatment that would have been willingly accorded his cloth, until his death in 1872 there was a crescendo of praise concerning his character and his achievements. Colleagues, acquaintances, and even those who differed from him, painted similar pictures of his many excellencies. Not that he was a saint in the stained-glass-window sense of the term. His was too practical a nature to permit the wearing of a halo: his feet were too firmly planted on the ground for his head to be lost in the clouds where the other-wordly are supposed to dwell. His portrait[2] reveals a broad forehead, shaggy eyebrows over deep-set eyes from which a twinkle was never far distant, a prominent nose, a large fleshy mouth, a sharp chin, and bushy side-whiskers framing a good-humoured face. But no two-dimension picture can reveal the mental and spiritual qualities that made Shaw so fine a Christian leader during a crucial period of South Africa's development. They can be drawn only from the record of his multifarious activities and the testimonies of many varied admirers. Part of the record will appear in the pages that follow; some of the testimonies may well be given here.

W.B. Boyce, five years Shaw's junior, met the missionary in 1830 and built a friendship that lasted 42 years. He had heard the senior man's

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[1] W. Shaw, The Story of My Mission in South Eastern Africa (London, 1860) (hereinafter abbreviated as SMM), p.5.

[2] A photograph of Shaw, taken in midde age, is reproduced in W.B. Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. William Shaw (London, 1874) and J. Whiteside, History of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa (London 1906), (hereinafter abbreviated as Whiteside, History).

praises sung in England, and expected to meet "a respectable, methodical, high and dry martinet, — an official with qualities suited to his responsibilities, but not the sort likely to attract a young man." Their first encounter in Grahamstown soon showed Boyce his mistake. Shaw put the newcomer at ease by his thoughtful courtesy, and longer acquaintance only served to deepen the bond that grew between them. "During my residence in Africa", Boyce later wrote, "Mr. Shaw exercised an influence amounting to fascination over me. The more intensely I knew him the more thoroughly I respected him."[1]

> He had no weaknesses to mar the general effect of his character; there was nothing behind, which, if known, would have diminished his influence. To me he seemed to be an incarnation of conscience and judgement, — a man acting altogether wisely, and from the highest and most noble principles. Under circumstances the most trying he never lost his temper or his self-possession. No man was more enterprising, and yet no man more cautious.

Others of Shaw's fellow-workers confirmed the high estimate placed upon him by Boyce. Samuel Young, who succeeded him as director of the first mission station beyond Albany, was impressed by the efficiency of his methods, and modelled his own after them.[2] William Shrewsbury, who stepped into Shaw's shoes as chairman of the Albany District on Shaw's departure for England in 1833, hoped he would soon return to his post, for he looked upon him as "the Francis Asbury (pioneer bishop in the U.S.A.) of Southern Africa" which was the most eloquent tribute a Methodist could pay to any missionary.[3]

But eulogy of Shaw was not confined to his co-religionists. Thomas Philipps, an 1820 settler who became an Albany J.P., attributed the good behaviour of one of the tribes "to the very excellent conduct of Mr. Shaw who went in among them."[4] Major Dundas gave similar credit in similar terms; while Andries Stockenstrom described the missionary as being "incapable of an intentional misrepresentation".[5] Since these contemporary

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[1] Boyce, op.cit., pp.186-189.

[2] The Wesleyan Methodist Magazine (hereinafter abbreviated as WMM, with appropriate year of issue) 1831, p.55.

[3] John V.B. Shrewsbury, Memorials of the Rev. Wm. J. Shrewsbury, (hereinafter abbreviated as Mem. Shrewsbury), (London, 1869), p.386.

[4] Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (Imperial Blue Book 1836, VII.538 (hereinafter abbreviated as IBB VII.538), p.33.

[5] Ibid., pp.142 and 81 respectively.

opinions were uttered, many others have been added, one of the most apt being that of John Bond who has described him as "that missionary statesman, who combined the courage of a lion, the gentleness of a child, and the wisdom of a serpent."[1] The record of his ministry in South Africa showed that contemporary and later estimates of his achievements were founded firmly on fact.

Such was the man who saw his party ashore in Algoa Bay by 25 May and with them reached the Assegai Bush River Valley in the newly-named District of Albany. Sharing the inevitable hardships of pioneer settlement, he quickly turned to his spiritual duties and ministered to the needs of the scattered settlers. Those needs were many, for at that time there was no organized religion for Europeans east of Uitenhage and Graaff Reinet. Even the troops at Grahamstown had no chaplain, and it was generally understood that the practice of Christianity stood at a low ebb throughout the frontier region. The Sabbath was reputed to have halted at the Sundays River (about 30 miles east of Uitenhage) and to have found it difficult to cross. Shaw had therefore little professional competition in his new parish. Only one other clergyman officiated among the settlers on the eastern seaboard,[2] and he was unwilling to move beyond his own locality. Shaw, with a catholicity that marked much of his subsequent ministry, undertook the spiritual care of the whole settlement. From all sections of the community came urgent calls to preach and visit. As he responded, his fame grew, and demands for his services increased. As he travelled, he passed beyond the immediate circle of British settlers and came into touch with Dutch and Hottentot groups who invited him into their primitive pulpits. Since he had begun to study the Dutch language during the three-

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[1] They were South Africans (Cape Town, 1956), p.76. See also J. Whiteside, History, p.95; W.J. Townsend, H.B. Workman, G. Eayrs (Eds.) A New History of Methodism, 2 Vols. (London 1909), Vol.II, p.272; Sir George Cory, The Rise of South Africa, 4 Vols. (abbreviated as Cory, with appropriate volume number)(London 1930) Vol.II,p.98; C.P. Grove, The Planting of Christianity in Africa, 4 Vols. (London, 1954 plus), Vol.I. p.247. All of these, while critical of others, are uniformly favourable to Shaw.

[2] Shaw was the only minister officially attached to a party of settlers. Of three others who came out, Francis McClelland went to the abortive site in the west, at Clanwilliam; Samuel Duxbury, Baptist, did not function as a minister until later; and William Boardman who went to Albany showed little interest in his potential parishioners, and resigned his office after charges of misconduct.

month voyage from England, he was soon able to address the earlier colonists in their own tongue. His parish, bounded by the Buchman and Fish Rivers, came to embrace about 20,000 souls -- 15,000 immigrants of all ages, and 5,000 soldiers, Dutch farmers, and Hottentot labourers. He rode 130 miles every other week, preached eight times in addition to conducting five services on Sundays, and still had to develop his own holding - digging, planting, fencing, building, establishing his home in a strange land while answering the innumerable calls for spiritual leadership. No one man could carry such a load. Within a few months of his arrival in Albany he was writing to his Missionary Committee, explaining:

> ... it is utterly impossible for me to supply this scattered multitude with the Bread of Life. Beloved Fathers, believe me, I am ready to ride over hill and dale, through wood and water; and to preach wherever I come, and in every place, the unsearchable riches of Christ. I declare to you I have no wish to ask for help that I may sit down and eat the bread of idleness; but unless you send, at least another missionary to the station, many important places must be neglected; many Englishmen will become heathens -- many thousand of children will grow up in ignorance, and your unworthy servant of the gospel must kill himself with labour and fatigue.[1]

The Committee undoubtedly gave sympathetic study to Shaw's appeal, but the 6,000 miles between Albany and England could only be slowly spanned in those days, and the most prompt response could only be expected to produce an assistant after the passage of many months or even a year. Shaw was well aware of that, and set about solving his own immediate difficulties in an orthodox Methodist manner. By January 1821, only five months after reaching Salem, as the Sephton's party's central settlement came to be called, he had organized a group of ten local preachers to serve the 115 declared members of the Wesleyan Methodist Society. Three Sunday schools with 136 scholars were already operating, and plans were laid for others to cover the entire district. The minister himself was administering the sacraments to 80 persons, and was seeing a steady growth of interest in his church. Not that he was actively proselytizing, but his unstinted service on the settlers' behalf commended his religion to all classes and predisposed them in favour of Methodism.

A little more than a year after the foundation of Salem, its citizens were planning the erection of a chapel. The first stone was not laid until January 1, 1822 but the chapel was officially opened on the last day

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[1] Undated letter in WMM 1821, p.150.

of the same year. Among those who preached during the opening ceremonies w were William Threlfall and Stephen Kay. Threlfall had arrived in Albany from England toward the end of 1821, but had his heart set on working among the heathen and consequently gave Shaw only temporary help among the settlers. After an 18-month stay in Salem he returned to Cape Town and offered himself for service at Delagoa Bay, but never attained his goal, being treacherously murdered in Namaqualand. Kay, an English minister who had been serving in Bechuanaland since 1820, was transferred to Albany during 1822 and brought Shaw some of the relief he was so urgently needing. The early days of single-handed struggle were over; faithful and capable assistants were multiplying; he could stand back and see a pattern of growth that augured well for the future. The Sunday schools which were originally opened for the benefit of neglected children came, under the direction of Mrs. Shaw and a Methodist teacher named Matthews, to satisfy a wider need. Well-cared for children crowded into them and gained not only religious instruction, but the rudiments of education which were at that time not obtainable elsewhere in the district. Matthews' success in teaching his pupils to read led to his being appointed by the Governor as salaried schoolmaster to the Salem settlement. The school thus started later became a boarding school which drew its pupils from near and far throughout the frontier region, even when Salem itself had lost its original eminence. When it became apparent that the appointed land was by no means as fertile as its occupiers had been led to expect, many settlers left their original holdings and tried their fortunes in other areas. This movement reduced membership in the Salem chapel, but resulted in the formation of many other congregations and the building of chapels in Bathurst, Clumber, Port Frances, Green Fountains, Manley's Flats, and Seven Fountains, making Methodism the most strongly entrenched of the settler churches.

From the early days of his residence at Salem, Shaw was aware of the strategic position occupied by Grahamstown in Albany affairs, and he seized every opportunity to promote Wesleyan interests in the growing town. At first that called for some civic vision, for the "town" was little more

than an extension of the military barracks. In the eight years between the founding of the town in 1812 and 1820 only ten additional houses were built, so the place was little more than a frontier post when Shaw first rode into it; but the next eight years saw the number of houses leap to four hundred.[1] In 1820 there was neither preacher nor church in the embryo city, but, as in Cape Town, a Methodist interest sprang up from among the soldiers. A Sergeant Lucas held meetings each Sunday until he heard of Shaw's arrival when he asked him to take charge of the services. In spite of his many other duties, Shaw accepted the invitation and began a ministry that was to spread over many years. Before many months had passed the congregation was calling for the erection of a chapel, and by June 1821, less than twelve months after reaching Albany, Shaw was submitting his second memorial to the Governor asking for permission to build. In faith, he assured the authorities that responsibility for the work in Grahamstown would not hinder the execution of his government-sponsored duties in Salem since he was expecting a second missionary who would share the ministerial load. In July he reported to his Committee: "We shall begin to build the first week in October, and I hope we shall succeed in raising a decent place without much expense." On August 1 he received the Governor's permit to build a chapel, and on the following Sunday, supported by official sanction, held public services in a large room on High Street. There he gathered a growing congregation to support his ambitious plans. His own resources were extremely limited. He was obliged to beg funds from the military and civilians alike. They supplied him with £250 -- a considerable sum, considering the frontier conditions under which it was raised. The balance of the five hundred pounds needed to complete a suitable building was borrowed, at a fixed rate of interest, and was to be re-

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[1] R. Godlonton, Memorials of the British Settlers of South Africa (Grahamstown, 1844), p.40. But Jeremiah Goldswain, writing of Grahamstown in 1820, said: "thear ware not more them twentey or twentey five Houses in it that was worthey tobe called Houses". U.Long (ed.), The Chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain, 2 Vols. (abbreviated as Goldswain Chronicle) (Cape Town, 1946,)Vol.I, p.24

paid by the members as they used their chapel. On this basis a plot was purchased in October, the foundation stone was laid on December 5 when Shaw had but a half-crown in his pocket,[1] and the building was opened on November 10 in the following year -- nearly two months prior to the dedication of the Salem chapel. The possession of a central place of worship gave Methodism a pre-eminence in Grahamstown for many years, and provided the movement with headquarters for its work on both sides of the frontier.

Any success enjoyed by Shaw could hardly be credited to the settlers' natural interest in spiritual matters, for the minister bewailed their "worldly-mindedness, violation of the Sabbath, and an awful disrelish for the solemnities of religion".[2] But his self-forgetful dedication to their higher interests, and the congeniality of Methodism to the primitive conditions inseparable from frontier life, recommended his brand of Christianity to the inhabitants of Grahamstown and district until by 1824 it could be said, with pardonable exaggeration, that the town was almost wholly Wesleyan. In the following year Kay reported a regular attendance of 600 or 700 at the chapel and the existence of a group about 200 strong at the Cape Corps barracks; while the society membership of fully-fledged Methodists stood at 60 Europeans and 16 Hottentots.[3] Church organization grew strong enough to warrant the holding of the first of the annual meetings of the Albany district in the same year, 1825, and their regular sequence in succeeding years ensured that Grahamstown would be the headquarters for the frontier region for many years to come.

As the settlement grew it was inevitable that other denominations should begin to share the responsibilities that were at first carried

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[1] Shaw's accounts of his early work in Salem and Grahamstown are given in WMM 1821, pp.150, 151, 634, 534, 788; WMM 1822, pp.127, 264, 671; WMM 1823, pp.619, 620; SMM, pp.88-107.

[2] WMM 1821, p.788.

[3] WMM 1826, p.346, recording a report of July 1825.

almost entirely by the Wesleyans. After an initial apathy, and an unfortunate succession of unworthy clergy, the Church of England awoke to its opportunities, ministered to widely-scattered but growing congregations, and in Grahamstown built a church that was larger than the Wesleyan chapel. The Baptists, first under a layman, Miller, then under a minister, Duxbury, slowly gathered adherents and obtained their own place of worship in the same town, but never gained a strong enough following to challenge Methodist supremacy in Albany. The Dutch Reformed Church found its followers among the older established Dutch farming families to the north-west; while the Roman Catholic Church had scarcely a foothold in the whole Colony in those days. The two other major religious bodies within reach of the English settlement — the London Missionary Society and the Glasgow Missionary Society[1] — concentrated almost entirely on work for the Hottentots and native tribes and therefore had little direct effect upon the European population with whom the Methodists were then working.

In those early days, relations between the several denominations were generally cordial. Dr. Philip's good offices in Cape Town led to the removal of a government ban against inland travel on the part of missionaries, and enabled Wesleyans to cross the northern frontier in 1820 and 1821. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when Philip visited Salem in November 1821 he received a welcome from Shaw who later guided him on a tour of the English settlement. Philip, in turn, was favourably impressed by the work Shaw was doing in the district, and in his

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[1] Hereinafter abbreviated as L.M.S. and G.M.S. respectively. The L.M.S., founded in London in 1795 on a non-denominational basis, began work in South Africa in 1799 through the ministry of Dr. van der Kemp and associates. Their chief concern came to be for the welfare of the Hottentots; but from 1816 until his death in 1818 Joseph Williams worked among the Ngqika. The most famous L.M.S. agent, John Philip, landed in Cape Town in February 1819 and spent the next 30 years as superintendent of the Society's missions in Southern Africa. The G.M.S., founded in 1796, did not enter the South African field until 1821 when it sent W.R. Thomson and J. Bennie to the Tyhume Valley. These men and others who soon followed worked so closely with the L.M.S. under John Brownlee that it is sometimes difficult to separate the work of the two societies. The fluidity of denominational distinctions is illustrated by W.R. Thomson's later becoming a most faithful minister of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Researches in South Africa (1828) gave fair notices of the early Wesleyan missions, and of the work of other societies.[1] Episcopalians and Baptists both profited from Shaw's personal ministry to their people in addition to being given the use of the Wesleyan chapel before they had buildings of their own. For the scattered Dutch farmers, the Methodist held services, solemnized their marriages, and baptized their children; but when ministers of their own church appeared, Shaw and his helpers retired, knowing that their assistance was no longer needed. Relations continued to be friendly, however, and ministers of each church would participate in the services of the other, particularly during anniversaries and the opening of new church buildings. For several years to come the number of clergymen in Albany and neighbouring districts was so small that there was ample room for all. As late as 1837 the Methodists had resident ministers only in Grahamstown, Salem, and Bathurst.[2] Initially, therefore, there was little reason for rivalry; but, as memberships grew, opportunities for friction increased, and elements of competition came in to mar the original harmony. A glimpse of this development is given in a letter addressed to Col. Bell on 7 January 1830 by William Wright, the Church of England minister at Bathurst. The writer regretted the necessity of using the Methodist chapel at Port Frances, yet was ready to suggest the use of a similar building at Riet Fonteyn. He further analysed Wesleyan memberships at various centres and concluded that

> the actual members bear no proportion [sic] to the number of hearers. The sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Communion are administered by the Wesleyan Methodist preachers, and some who are not members of the Society have participated therein. Marriages have also been, I know not on what authority, performed by them.[3]

On another occasion, W.J. Shrewsbury, who succeeded Shaw as chairman of the Albany District, dryly remarked that the Dutch had "no great predilection for a Wesleyan missionary",[4] revealing that the Methodists were

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[1] WMM 1822, pp.671 and 473; Philip's Researches II, pp.196, 197.

[2] SMM, p.191.

[3] C.O. 381, Letters Received, No.6.

[4] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.387.

not everywhere received with open arms. In fairness to the W.M.M.S., however, it must be stated that available evidence shows them consistently doing their best to maintain good relations with the ministry and membership of other churches even while vigorously evangelizing people who professed no particular denominational loyalty.

3. Over the Great Fish River. Although Shaw had accepted appointment as official chaplain to the Sephton party of settlers, he had no intention of always limiting his ministry to white congregations, but hoped that work among the Europeans in Albany would open the way for the establishment of missions among the native tribes beyond the frontier. This involved no deceit on his part, for to his mind the gospel commission called the Christian minister to work for all men, irrespective of colour. Such thinking was in harmony with declared Methodist policy which regarded all sections of the Society's work as being parts of one whole. In 1820, Albany was a fine proving ground for Wesleyan ideals. In addition to the white colonists there were thousands of indigenous Hottentots, a sprinkling of Xhosa people throughout the Zuurveld and as far north and west as Somerset East,[2] and black slaves as kept by the Dutch farmers. Grahamstown itself was a mission field in miniature for the military included many Hottentots who, together with their families, numbered about 1,000 individuals; while a small neglected Xhosa community furnished a sample, not necessarily typical, of the people who lay to the east. Shaw's plans embraced the care of all human beings, and it was not long after his arrival until he was preaching to European, Hottentot, and Xhosa congregations; and when he visited Dutch farms he drew their slaves into the circle of his care.[3]

This work for different races was made easier by the fact that there was reputedly no colour bar in the Colony.[4] Shrewsbury claimed, and his

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1 Cf. supra, p.7.

2 M. Wilson, in "The Early History of the Transkei and Ciskei", African Studies, Vol.18, No. 4 (1959), p.176, has conclusively shown that there were Xhosa living as far west as the site of Somerset East in 1702, and "three or four days west of the Gamtoos" prior to 1772.

3 WMM 1821, pp.150, 634, 788.

4 T. Phillips before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, p.37.

colleagues supported him, that the colonists were without colour prejudice and were willing to assist missionaries in their work for other peoples.[1] This liberality in public opinion made possible a mingling of the races that modern South African legislation discourages even when it does not explicitly forbid. Not only did white, coloured, and black enjoy the same preaching (within the limits prescribed by problems of language), but they came to share the same sacramental symbols around the common communion table.[2]

His early contact with people other than his fellow-countrymen served but to stimulate Shaw's determination to work beyond the colonial borders. He had early taken an interest in the legalization of a fair for trade between colonists and the border tribes, and when the fair at Fort Willshire was authorized, he wrote: "I think of attending, in order to vend ... those wares which exceed all others in value. ... I also intend to go as far as Tume [Tyhume], the residence of Gaika [Ngqika, the chief of the tribe that bore his name]."[3] His interest was quickened by his knowledge that on the Keiskamma more than 1,000 British soldiers were stationed without the services of a chaplain while at Bruintjies Hoogte were many Dutch and Hottentots who had no minister of religion among them.[4] These shepherdless sheep, as he would regard them, strongly appealed to his evangelical conscience, giving yet another reason for his adventuring east of Grahamstown. Not that he had any intention of abandoning Albany. He needed his European congregations as bases from which to work for the coloured races. Before the work in Grahamstown developed he expected Salem to be "the key to Caffreland,"[5] and he was not dis-

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[1] WMM 1833, p.665. "I have never known a community of Englishmen so free from illiberal prejudices concerning race and colour." Ibid., p.735.

[2] WMM 1834, p.472.

[3] Journal, 27 Aug. 1821, WMM 1822 p.127. There are considerable differences in the spelling of Xhosa proper nouns by early 19th-century writers and that adopted by present-day linguistic authorities. A Glossary of the Xhosa names appearing in this Thesis, s owingthe earlier and the preferred forms, is given in Appendix I.

[4] WMM 1821, p.635.

[5] Ibid, p.150.

appointed since it was from there that the first missions were planned and from there that the first missionaries left for their stations.

We may well pause here to note two contrary trends of Christian thought in the days when Albany was settled. One, exemplified by the Dutch Reformed and Anglican Churches, directed their efforts almost exclusively to the white population; the other, of which the L.M.S. and C.M.S. were outstanding examples, concentrated on the Hottentot and other African peoples. Shaw agreed with neither of these schools of thought, and wrote of the L.M.S. as "pursuing what I must ever regard as a very mistaken course of action for any Missionary Society having Missions in our Colonies" when it "did not allow its Missionaries to devote any systematic labours for the benefit of the European colonists".[1] His own philosophy of missions told him that

> wherever there is a British Colony in juxtaposition with heathen tribes or natives, it will be our wisdom to provide for the spiritual wants of the Colonists, while at the same time we ought not to neglect taking earnest measures for the conversion of the heathen.[2]

He could be reasonably sure of support for such views since some of the immigrants had come to Albany with the idea of evangelizing the neighbouring tribes;[3] while among the members of his own communion he discovered an interest in missions that even extended to "those in uncivilized countries, as New Zealand and the Boschuana country [Bechuanaland]".[4] The Methodist Church was young enough to be zealously missionary-minded, and when Shaw judged the time for advance to be ripe, or when conditions permitted him to move east, he knew that his settler congregations would not only release him, albeit regretfully, but would support him financially.

Earlier missionaries had sometimes tried to take their objectives by storm and had been repulsed by official opposition, indifference, or deliberate dilatoriness. It is possible that Shaw learned from his

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[1] SMM, p.95. [2] SMM, p.95.

[3] I.E. Edwards, The 1820 Settlers in South Africa, p.55.

[4] WMM, 1823, p.836.

forerunners' mistakes, for, in spite of his ardent desire to work among the African tribes, he made sure of his groundwork before attempting to fulfil his missionary designs. It was a wise procedure. He gained the affection and confidence of the settlers, and through them, the approval of the authorities. His reputation was made, and when he came to apply for permission to cross the frontier he was looked upon not with suspicion but favour. His initial lack of haste made for greater speed when his plans had ripened.

In spite of his evangelical fervour, the strength of which was never doubted by those who best knew him, Shaw had nothing of the rebel in his make-up. His influence was consistently on the side of law and order. From the day of his landing at Algoa Bay he had endeavoured to make the settlers satisfied with their lot. That could not have been an easy task, for there were troubles enough to strain the endurance of the hardiest and the serenity of the most equable, yet Shaw cheerfully reported home:

> It is impossible for any language, however strong, fully to express the care which has been taken to secure the interest of the settlers. ... The consequences of this liberality in rations and repayment of deposit money on the part of the Government is, that the settlers are, to a man, satisfied; and, as far as I know, without one exception, speak in the most respectful and grateful terms of their rulers. With this I am well pleased; and I know that it cannot but give pleasure to you, as you so carefully instruct your Missionaries to encourage sentiments of loyalty to Governors; and you will not contradict me when I say, that the religion of the Bible is never received where rules are disobeyed, and the good order of society is disturbed.[1]

This appreciation of governmental aid was free from any touch of servility however. He gave credit where credit was due, but had no intention of truckling to bigoted authority if it discriminated against him as he exercised his ministerial prerogatives. Had he adopted a more timorous attitude, his movements would very soon have been shackled, but, as he explained in print:

> As I had long before received and put faith in the dictum of an eminent English lawyer, that 'the Toleration Act travels with the

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1 WMM 1821, pp.71, 72.

> British flag', I resolved to regard the matter in this point of view; and hence I never applied for any licence or permission from any functionary whatever, but at once proceeded to discharge all public duties wherever I met with any class of people willing to receive me in the capacity of a Minister. I preached, and celebrated the services formarriages, baptisms, and funerals, never allowing it to be supposed that I considered any man in a British Colony had any right to interfere with my religious liberty as a free-born Englishman.[1]
>
> On one occasion a gentleman in high office asked me by what 'authority' I did these things; and I simply showed him my certificate of ordination, and of the usual oaths required by the Act of Toleration, which I had taken before the Lord Mayor of London. At another the acting Colonial Secretary intimated that the Government conceived I should confine my labours to the locality where the settlers resided for whom I was the recognised Minister; but as I had no mind that the Government should assume the authority to direct my ministerial conduct, I quietly proceeded in my own way, without taking the slightest notice of this intimation; and I heard no more about it.[2]

Here was an independent mind, willing to observe the law but refusing to be restricted by pettifogging officialdom. These were the principles that governed Shaw's conduct in Albany and beyond, and government officers soon respected him for them.

Methodism was fortunate indeed in the man appointed to accompany the Albany settlers as their minister. Had he been of any smaller stature than time proved him to be, the story of the Church's growth must have included many more than the few failures that were eventually recorded. As it was, Shaw's character firmly moulded the Society's history east of Algoa Bay, it largely determined the direction of its missionary efforts, and it gave Methodism its primacy in South African mission development.

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[1] See supra, p.6. for reference to Methodist standing in other colonies which gave Shaw some justification for performing marriages in South Africa.

[2] Ibid, pp.27, 28.

CHAPTER II

INTO KAFFRARIA

I. WESLEYVILLE

Wesleyan entrance into Kaffirland was no sudden, unpremeditated move. From the time of his appointment as chaplain to the Sephton party Shaw had nursed the intention of evangelizing the indigenous peoples who lay beyond the colonial boundaries. Soon after his arrival in Albany, even in 1820, he had written to his home committee and urged that they consider the establishment of missions as far away as Delagoa Bay.[1] His plea fell on responsive ears, for the committee was just as keen for advance as was their representative in Southern Africa, but no move was immediately possible for Somerset's policy of non-intercourse with the native tribes hindered mission effort beyond the frontiers of the Colony and prevented the lone Wesleyan from securing a permit to work among the Kaffir peoples.

1. Shaw's Chain of Stations. Transient circumstances, however, never quenched Shaw's zeal. While he waited he worked untiringly among his fellow-countrymen, and while he worked he dreamed of taking the Gospel into regions where few white men had then penetrated. These dreams were practical enough to share with his superiors in England:

> I hope the Committee will never forget that, with the exception of Latakoo, which is far in the interior north of Kuruman, there is not a single missionary station between the place of my residence [Salem], and the Northern extremity of the Red Sea; nor any people, professedly Christian, with the exception of those in Abyssinia. Here then is a wide field--the whole eastern coast of the Continent of Africa![2]

In his Journal for 21 March 1821, he reveals his preoccupation with this missionary theme, and records the support he received from an old-timer:

> Walked home from Grahamstown: arrived just in time to have half an hour's conversation with Mr. Read [L.M.S.]. He gives most affecting accounts of the need of Missionaries far up the east coast; and

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[1] SMM, p.315.

[2] To the Missionary Committee [n.d.], WMM 1821, p.151 (author's italics).

> I unhesitatingly join with him in opinion, that if a number of zealous and prudent Missionaries were allowed to enter Caffraria, the disturbances occasioned by that untutored, but noble race of men would soon terminate.[1]

And his was no arm-chair enthusiasm: he was itching to be one of those "zealous and prudent Missionaries", and was only awaiting the opportune time to open the way into "Caffraria". Again, in a letter to his London headquarters, written from Salem on 21 October 1821, he referred to Delagoa Bay:

> ... a very important station for Missionaries. I hope Eastern Africa will not be neglected. The expense of such Missions will never be great, and the probabilities of doing good are, in my opinion, as great as in any part of the world. ... For my part, my heart is set on this people. I hope when our affairs in Albany are in such a state that successors can enter with ease upon the Circuit, that the Committee will then allow me to take up my abode in the midst of an entirely heathen population.[2]

His subsequent life demonstrated the sincerity of those sentiments, and testified to the continuity of his desire for personal mission service; but his plans ranged far beyond the fulfilment of mere ambition. In the same letter to London he uncovered the wide sweep of his thinking as he expressed the hope that a chain of stations would soon connect Albany with Latakoo. The initial thrust might be eastward to Natal, but his eager mind swung also to the north and west, constructively surveying the sub-continent.

Frontier unrest made any forward move unwise and even impracticable during the first year or two of the Albany settlement, but, wrote the young minister:

> I hope the present turbulent spirit of that people [the Xhosa] will soon begin to subside, and then I could wish to see a Wesleyan missionary ready to take advantage of the opportunity to enter and proclaim upon their mountains 'good tidings, and to publish peace and salvation'. The time might soon follow when you would see on your lists stations among the Tambookies, the Nanbookies, and the various tribes of people between us and Delagoa Bay.[3]

In the meantime he was content to build up his European congregations, believing they would prove to be bases for his future ministry

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[1] WMM 1821, p.788.

[2] WMM, 1822, p.265.

[3] WMM, 1821, pp.150,151. The tribes referred to were the Thembu and Bomvana respectively. See Glossary, Appendix I, for the modern as opposed to the early nineteenth-century spellings of Xhosa names, or for variant designations.

among the Xhosa tribes. He was convinced that the Wesleyan settlers would themselves be ready to meet the expense of employing a second missionary.[1] Armed with that conviction he became more insistent in his requests for reinforcements:

> Send a zealous, lively Missionary to my assistance. ... In addition to the prospects among the Colonists and Hottentots, I do think the time is rapidly advancing, when your Missionaries shall be called to lay the axe to the root of Caffrarian ignorance and cruelty. The clouds begin to disperse, the Caffres[2] are at present disposed to be peaceable, and I am confident two or three prudent Missionaries will render them even friendly to the English. If there were two of us here, we might occasionally make a tour of observation, and gain the most valuable information as to the proper time, the proper place, and the proper manner of forming a missionary establishment among them.[3]

This plea, penned in January 1821, must have been somewhat anticipated by the Committee for by June 15 of the same year Shaw heard from Barnabas Shaw in Cape Town that an additional missionary had already been appointed.[4] He could therefore look forward to putting his plans for Kaffraria into operation. In October 1822 the Missionary Committee announced the appointment of two more missionaries for Africa, so local enthusiasm and headquarters planning were marching hand in hand. When William Threlfall arrived in Albany early in 1822, Shaw probably thought his plans were on the verge of fulfilment. If that was so he was doomed to disappointment, for Threlfall himself was so keen to work among the heathen that he fretted at the delays preventing the immediate opening of a mission, and after little more than a year in the Colony gladly accepted an appointment to Delagoa Bay, leaving Shaw to await the appearance of a second colleague, James Whitworth, who, although marked out as leader for the Delagoa Bay mission, would temporarily relieve him in Salem and release him for his cherished mission project.[5]

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[1] SMM, p.122; WMM, 1822, pp.150, 151, 788.

[2] The early missionaries and colonists used the term "Caffre" or "Kaffir" where present-day writers would use "Bantu" or, preferably "Xhosa". Generally speaking, it was not until the Wesleyans had crossed the Kei and begun work among the Thembu and Mpondo that they employed distinctive tribal names for the people they were serving.

[3] WMM, 1821, p.635 [4] Journal, 15 June 1821, WMM, 1822, pp.126,127.

[5] WMM 1823, pp.698, 760; SMM, p.122. Threlfall shortly after met a violent death at the hands of treacherous guides in Namaqualand.

To Threlfall it was the farthest fields that looked greenest, but to Shaw it was the nearer pastures that offered the best prospects. In retrospect, and after considerable experience he was able to say, and to support theory by practice, that:

> ...however zealous it may appear, as a missionary proceeding, to make a long stride at once into the remoter regions of heathenism, it is nevertheless a wiser course of action, and far more likely to lead to important results, to commence Missions within convenient reach of some Christian community, and afterwards push on step by step, as men and means are provided, and opening doors are presented. By this means every new Station successfully established will furnish aid for the extension of the work to the regions immediately beyond; ...[1]

Those words were written after forty years of experience in mission administration, but their precepts were practised from the very beginning of Shaw's ventures into Kaffraria. With firm caution he reconnoitred the districts that lay near at hand, kept in touch with his base, and never allowed himself to become dangerously isolated. The success of his projects demonstrated the wisdom of his policy.

2. The First Link. The first specific move to forge the first link in the proposed chain of stations was recorded on August 3, 1822, when he said:

> I obtained permission from the Landdrost and Commandant to proceed on a short visit to Caffreland; the Brethren Kay [from Bechuanaland][2] and Threlfall [who had not yet left], with Jan T'zatzoe, an interpreter[3] from the L.M.S., were also included in the passport.

Within three days the party had left Salem, passed through Fort Willshire, and reached Chumie[4], the mission station established by John Brownlee, the L.M.S. worker who was then serving as government missionary among the Ngqika in the upper Tyhume valley. There the travellers met

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[1] SMM, p.563.

[2] For details concerning Stephen Kay, see below, pp.64,65, and Appendix V, pp.422-427.

[3] WMM 1823, 186. Pages 187-190 give a detailed account of the route and reception of Shaw's party.

[4] Although the Xhosa name for the stream near which the mission stood is now spelled "Tyhume", the old spelling is retained for the mission station.

Mr. Bennie of the G.M.S. and Makooa [Maqoma, Ngqika's oldest son but not the heir], and after some delay, Ngqika himself. At that first meeting the powerful Xhosa chief, the possessor of a dozen or so wives, made an impressive figure in the eyes of the white travellers. Shaw painted his appearance in colourful detail:

> He is a tall, well-proportioned, and good-looking man. He wore round his head a band studded, not with diamonds, but with white and black beads, so disposed as to form the shape of half-diamonds, or triangles. His kaross, or cloak, was of tiger-skin, and it seemed, from its appearance, to have been a royal garment. ... As to ornaments, his right fore-arm was almost covered with metal rings, as were the two thumbs and third fingers of each hand with brass rings, given him at various times by visitors.[1]

The obverse of this not unfavourable portrait was given by Kay who declared, probably in the light of later knowledge, that "in this sable ruler ... we found a lying, sordid, avaricious, and beggarly wretch".[2] If Kay had been the only holder of such hostile opinion, his view could possibly be dismissed, as so many kindred criticisms are, as that of a narrow-minded evangelical; but others have concurred in his judgment and described Ngqika as rude and careless, alienating many even of his own people by incest with Thuthula, Ndlambe's wife, and soon degenerating through over-indulgence in strong drink.[3]

But whatever may have been his personal character and appearance, the chief possessed great authority. His territory marched from the colonial border to the Kei, and was bounded on the north by the Mathole range, and on the south was limited by sub-divisions of his own tribe.[4] Proximity to the Colony brought him more power than he would otherwise have possessed and more fame than his qualities possibly deserved. Until his death in November 1829, he was a king-pin in frontier politics, and after death his name lived on in the tribe over which he had ruled. Contacts with Methodists, though few, since his domain was an L.M.S.

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[1] SMM, p.333.

[2] S.Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria (hereinafter abbreviated as Kay, Travels), (London,1833), p.46.

[3] J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu, pp.154,155.

[4] See Map B for tribal areas.

and G.M.S. reserve, were cordial, and advanced rather than hindered their cause.

On this occasion the visiting missionaries gained a good reception by informing the chief that they had no wish to travel in his country without his permission. This permission was not readily granted. In accordance with Xhosa custom[1] Ngqika refused personally to grant the request, but insisted that he would have to consult his full council before replying; then, in true potentate style, played with his visitors before granting their petition (reluctantly, if Kay's account is to be trusted[2]) and giving formal consent to their visiting the Gqunukwebi chief, Congo (sub-ordinate to Ngqika) and permitting them to begin work among Congo's people if their chief were willing.

Congo's kraal was believed to lie about eighty miles south-east of Chumie, east of the Keiskamma River and therefore outside of the Neutral Territory,[3] so the missionaries did not attempt to reach him at that time, but returned to Salem, knowing that an important part of their task had been accomplished in securing Ngqika's consent to their plans.

The next step was to secure government sanction to open a Wesleyan mission beyond the border. On 24 June 1823, Shaw reported that this permission was granted, but gave no hint as to the factors that led the Governor to accede to his request. It is possible that Shaw's three years of faithful ministry to British settlers persuaded Somerset of the man's trustworthiness, and that a temporary easing in frontier tension induced him to change his earlier policy of non-intercourse. Whatever the Governor's reasoning, the missionary lost but little time in using the permit that he now possessed. He already knew where he wanted to

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[1] For the relationships between Bantu chiefs and their councillors, see I. Schapera (ed.), The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa (Cape Town, 1937), pp.183, 184.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.50. His version of the visit to Ngqika is given, with faulty chronology, in pp.27-50.

[3] For the significance of the Neutral Territory, see Chapter IV, especially pp. 145-152.

go, and toward the end of July, about one month after receiving authorization, he planned a two-week tour to choose the site for the first Wesleyan mission in Kaffraria, hoping to open it no later than October.

The direction of Shaw's exploratory trip seems to have been largely determined by agreement with the L.M.S.-G.M.S. missionaries at Chumie who were already working with the Ngqika at the northern end of the Eastern Frontier but who were perfectly willing for another society to operate among a separate tribal group to the south.[1] These men,— J. Brownlee, W.R. Thomson, J. Read, and J. Bennie-- were among the first-comers to the field of Xhosa evangelization, and it was natural for Shaw, who cultivated good relations with all his fellow-clergymen, of whatever persuasion, to consult them and to profit from their counsel and benediction before launching out into the deeps of pioneer mission enterprise. It would appear that the advice given by his L.M.S. brethren, his own policy of beginning near to a European base, and the readiness of a nearby tribe to receive his ministry fell into concord and determined the location of his first mission station. As he himself said, soon after receiving official permission to establish a mission:

> I ... believe that our first station among the Caffres will be in that part of the country where I first intended it, namely, with the Chief named Congo, whose people inhabit a slip of fine country of about 60 miles along the coast, and 30 miles broad, extending from the sea inland ... the western extremity of Congo's country adjoins the colony, having for its boundary the Keiskamma which forms the separation of the Colony and the Caffre country. The site of our mission station will, probably, be not more than about 100 miles from Grahamstown, and about the same from Salem. This vicinity to the Colony, for the first link in that chain which I have always contemplated, will be of great advantage.[2]

Here was no aimless wandering, but the pursuit of a carefully-thought-out plan. For its fulfilment he inspanned William John Shepstone, a British settler who, at the age of twenty-four had joined the Bristol

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[1] SMM , p.327.

[2] 24 June 1823, WMM 1824, p.761. For the origin of Congo's tribe, the Gqunukwebi, see Appendix II. His people originally occupied land that stretched from the Fish River to the Buffalo along the coast, narrowing inland towards the sources of the Bika, and continuing between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo. H.H. Dugmore's Papers, in A Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs (Col. C.B. Maclean, ed., Mount Coke, 1858) p.7.

or Holder's Party with his wife and three-year-old boy Theophilus. On arrival in Albany they settled on the location that developed into Bathurst, and there, since he was a mason, he advertised himself as an architect and builder in the Bathurst-Grahamstown district. In addition to business initiative he possessed an active Methodist faith which brought him into early contact with William Shaw. While engaged in building his own house he received a visit from his minister who, perceiving him to be "a man of true piety and sound judgment" invited him to join his growing band of local preachers. The invitation was accepted and its responsibilities most faithfully fulfilled. In 1827, contrary to the usual Methodist policy concerning the employment of married men withfamilies, he was accepted into the regular ministry, on trial, and after a searching period of probation, was ordained in 1831.[1] He entered our story here, however, by virtue of his potential usefulness to Shaw in the plan of setting up a permanent mission station: the preacher would be better able to pursue his calling if the more practical tasks were in the capable hands of a builder who was also dedicated to the mission's spiritual objectives. Shaw chose his companion wisely: Shepstone gave yeoman service from the beginning.

Together, the two Wesleyans visited Chumie, where they were reinforced by W.R. Thomson and an interpreter (probably Tshatshu), before heading south for Gqunukwebi territory. The old chief of the tribe, Congo (a colonial curruption of Kungwa), had been killed in the 1819 war, and his son Cobus Congo had been acting as regent until the rightful heir, Phatho, the son of the deceased chief's right-hand wife (a Thembu),[2] became of age. The young man had recently attained his majority and assumed his authority, so was ready to treat with the strangers on their

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[1] SMM, pp.338-340; Cory II, p.78; Goldswain Chronicle I, Appendix, List of Settlers, Biographical Notes, p.156.

[2] The Xhosa chiefs "invariably take their principal wives from among the Amatembu; and it is from the male issue of these that the royal heir is always chosen". Kay, Travels, p.152.

arrival at his umzi or kraal. A council was called, and all the assembled councillors agreed with the chiefs in welcoming the establishment of a mission in their midst. A central site, between the residences of Phatho and his older brother Congo, was readily offered and just as gladly accepted by the missionaries who were quick to see the advantages of linking church and state in such a proximate manner. When the site and its environs were examined, the Europeans agreed on their quality: the scenery was pleasant; good water, fine grass, and useful timber were close at hand; the Keiskamma ran only eight or nine miles to the west; the sea, at the mouth of the Tsholomnqa River was only ten miles away; and, most important of all, within two miles of the assigned plot there was an estimated population of 1,000, while others were near enough to be attracted to the site once the mission was established.[1]

Early in August the prospectors had returned to their respective homes, and Shaw concluded his immediate ministry to the settler congregations and committed them to the care of Stephen Kay, for his official replacement in Albany, Samuel Young,[2] had not yet arrived from England. Shaw with his family then moved to Grahamstown to await the birth of a child and to prepare for the journey into Kaffraria. They remained in town from September 10 until the end of October, during which time a son was born and Shaw had collected supplies for his new home. By that time rumours of Xhosa unrest were once again disturbing Albany's peace, and well-meaning friends were urging the family to abandon their intentions and to stay within the Colony for, as Shaw observed, "such an undertaking

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[1] Shaw, 28 Aug. 1823, WMM 1824, p.56. The fullest contemporary description of the site is given by Kay, and is interesting for its slight variations from Shaw's account, and for its evaluation of the Xhosa huts: "The site of the Mission village is a low rocky ridge, with a beautiful valley at its base. The view is enriched by a line of yellow-wood trees, ... at the foot of these, meanders a small rivulet; the water of which, however, is far from being either good or abundant. ... The soil is good, and capable of being rendered very productive. On the opposite side, and right in front of the Mission premises, stands the Chief's umzi, consisting of a few filthy, shattered, and exposed huts: Their appearance at a distance is not much unlike that of so many ant-hills." Travels, p.61.

[2] For details concerning Samuel Young, see below, pp.58,59.

... was considered to be an almost certain course to destruction".[1] He himself had other views, however, as he explained to his superiors in England:

> I have abundant evidence that a Missionary has nothing to fear from the cruelty of the Caffres; they are all too deeply impressed with veneration for the Missionary character, and too anxiously desire (I will not say from what motive) the residence of Missionaries among them, to injure any person who gets among them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.[2]

On whatever slender evidence such confidence was based— and it can hardly have been other than hearsay at that time—his judgment was to prove remarkably accurate, for in spite of recurring hostilities between white and black, the missionaries, almost without exception, were preserved from harm and allowed to exercise their office under a type of diplomatic immunity that was rigorously respected by the non-Christian belligerents. But Shaw was no clairvoyant, and the main source of his courage had to be his profound conviction that his endeavours would come under divine protection. In this outlook he was fully supported by his wife, who abetted rather than discouraged his decision to go into Kaffraria. Their departure from Grahamstown was delayed, however, by the onset of heavy rains which fell ceaselessly for ten days, causing temporary houses to collapse, roads to be impassable, and rivers to be so swollen that passage across them was impossible. But by the second week of November conditions had improved and Stephen Kay was able to report that the two Williams, Shaw and Shepstone, left the frontier town on the afternoon of Thursday, November 13.

By nightfall the party had reached Kooster's Drift on the Great Fish River, and it took them three hours to take the wagons across the next morning. Monday the 17th saw them over the Kat River and into Fort Beaufort where they visited the spot on which Joseph Williams had begun his mission work in 1816. Two days later the Wesleyans entered Kaffraria

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[1] SMM, pp.348-353.

[2] Letter, 1 Jan. 1822, WMM 1822, p.672.

and were soon enjoying the hospitality of their L.M.S. friends at Chumie. There they remained for ten days, visiting the Thomsons and Mr. Bennie, and discussing the prospects of the proposed mission. John Brownlee had gone to Cape Town to meet their most recent recruit, John Ross of the G.M.S. who, with Bennie, was being asked to open a new station [Burnshill] deeper in Ngqika territory.[1]

At Chumie they learned of a commando that had recently swept into Xhosa country and penetrated to within three miles of Phatho's kraal in search of stolen cattle. This news was not unexpected by Shaw, in fact he had foreseen its possibility before he left Grahamstown,[2] but he was anxious lest it should lead the Gqunukwebi to reject him. He therefore sent a messenger to enquire of Phatho if he and his people were still willing to receive the missionaries. As it turned out, the tribesmen had collected the stolen cattle and returned them to the authorities, but the chief's reply removed all doubt from Shaw's mind: Phatho sent a group of seven men to escort the party safely to its destination. Under such friendly protection the two families left Chumie on December 1 and four days later, after cutting a road through the bush for their wagons, completed the eighty-mile trip from Grahamstown and drew up before Phatho's kraal.

The risk they were taking should not be minimized. They were committing their lives into the hands of a people who were yet unknown and whose chiefs they had never personally met. Shaw was habitually slow to pronounce judgment on his fellows, even when they were unlettered pagans, but the less judicious Kay had no such reticence and has left us a frank pen-picture of the man to whom the two families were about to trust themselves:

> Lechery, and gross heathenish depravity, form his [Phatho's] most prominent characteristics. His reign is but in its infancy; and during his minority, all public affairs were transacted by his elder

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[1] Shaw, from Wesleyville, 26 Dec. 1823, WMM 1824, pp.487, 488.

[2] Shaw, Grahamstown, 3 Nov. 1823, Ibid., p.202; also Kay from Grahamstown, 10 Dec., Ibid., p.489.

> brother [Congo] who, consequently, still retains considerable influence in the tribe ... and possesses a much greater degree of general information than his brother.[1]

In spite of such gloomy characterization of the man who held the power, the Englishmen's reception was encouraging. Phatho, Congo, and Kama—three brothers, closely associated in the administration of the tribe—gave them a welcome that time proved to be sincere, and at the tribal council next day the elders or counsellors declared Shaw to be "their father", and he reported that "they would make of me, ... a Bush of defence from wind and rain"[2]—altilitarian motives, no doubt, but satisfactory enough for the missionaries' immediate purposes.

3. Early Days at Wesleyville. The omens attending the birth of the new mission were propitious. It now rested with the white men to develop the favourable beginning. This they did by building a simple four-roomed home to house the two families, caring for their own needs and impressing the natives with the fact that they had come to stay and were willing to share their communal life (within certain limits imposed by hygienic considerations!). Within six months the erection of two separate and permanent homes provided the nucleus around which a Christian village began to grow. Visitors may have been critical and even unsympathetic over the missionaries' religious endeavours, but they were compelled to acknowledge that their work visibly improved the living standards of those who responded to their teachings, for within a short time the temporary huts of the typical African village was being replaced by rows of neat white-washed homes. Less than three months after the opening of Wesleyville,[3] in February 1824, other material blessings were brought nearer by the cutting of a road from the new station to Grahamstown by way of the Keiskamma, Trompetter's Drift, and Governor's Kop. The district to within a few miles of the town was found

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[1] Kay, Travels, p.64. Even though other missionaries did not commit their views to print, it should be borne in mind that their standards of morality were identical with Kay's.

[2] Shaw, 26 Dec. WMM 1824, pp.487, 488.

[3] In SMM, pp.376,377, Shaw states his reasons for giving English names to his Kaffrarian missions: the local inhabitants rarely had specific names for exact localities, and if they had succeeded in naming a district, the Xhosa word would generally have been unpronounceable by a European.

to be uninhabited, apart from abundant game which included hippo and elephant , but it should be noted that this did not indicate unowned territory: the Gqunukwebi regarded the area as belonging to them but kept out of much of it because of its forming part of the disputed Ceded or Neutral Territory. Shaw was to find that his new friends were extremely sensitive on this issue and were always hopeful of recovering what they considered to be their own hereditary possession.

The erstwhile minister to Europeans proved himself to be no bad judge of Xhosa character. He doubtless made some false estimates of their capacities and responses, but his early judgments remained surprisingly valid as he came to know different tribes more intimately. Before he went to live with Phatho he had jotted down some observations concerning Kaffraria and its peoples which reveal his perspicuity and his practical approach to his chosen work. In his journal he noted that "Caffreland is a superior part of the country," in respect of fertility of the soil, plentiful water supply from numerous rivers, and excellence of timber. He found the population more scattered than it appeared to be further inland, but probably denser for "it seems scarcely possible to travel eight or ten hours on horseback in Caffreland, without passing several hordes, kraals, or small villages."[1] He recognized that proximity to the Colony simplified language difficulties since interpreters would be relatively easy to obtain and Dutch-speaking natives would be encountered.

He sought to describe the people by comparing them with the Boschuanas [Bechuana]. He believed them to be "somewhat fiercer and more courageous than the other [the Bechuana]. They are both prone to plunder, even from their childhood. War ... is not so prevalent amongst the Caffres as amongst the Boschuanas."[2] In January 1821, when he had been in the Colony only seven months, he spoke of his future parishioners as "such a noble race of people."[3] Increased knowledge led him to modify

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[1] WMM 1823, p.546 [n.d.].

[2] WMM 1823, p.546 [n.d.].

[3] WMM 1821, p.635.

that encomium, but he was always ready to see the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the Africans' character. After thirty years' experience among several tribes, he declared:

> The Kaffirs are men possessing all the faculties and feelings of humanity. There are, of course, diversities of mental power among them, as among all other races of mankind; but they probably possess as much capacity for mental improvement as the people of any other nation; and no one who has seen them would ever question their physical ability for being trained to any of the arts or habits of the most civilized society, were they placed in circumstances that favoured such a development of their powers and faculties. ... In regard to their original moral condition they are neither better nor worse than others. But for thousands of years their ancestors, like themselves, have been Heathens. The light of traditionary knowledge concerning God and moral subjects has been growing more and more dim, till at length we found them in a state of almost total darkness.[1]

When questioned in 1836 by the Aborigines Committee concerning the quality of Xhosa intellect, he cited queries that were posed by his hearers after a brief doctrinal exposition of the creation and fall of man: "If all men are from one man how is it that there are so many languages?" "Do not black men come from black men, and white men from a white parent, originally created by God? What colour, then, was the first man?"[2]

The missionary began and continued his work under the conviction that the dark-skinned people to whom he was ministering were members of the same human family as himself but deprived by circumstances of the opportunities that led other races to develop high levels of civilization. When replying to a leading question from the same Aborigines Committee, he emphatically stated: "I cannot at all concur with those who denominate them irreclaimable savages";[3] and it was in this sanguine spirit that he persisted in his efforts to uplift them.

While he recognized that the bulk of the people were not ready for close contact with European culture, he was prepared to introduce their leaders to such examples of civilization's amenities as a frontier town

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[1] SMM, p.137 (published in 1860). [2] IBB VII,538, p.94.

[3] Ibid., p.57. This was a clear rejection of D'Urban's view which, he declared, coincided with that of the missionaries. Infra, pp.271,300.

afforded. In February 1824 he went into Grahamstown for supplies and took Congo and Kama with him. The African chiefs enjoyed a good reception. They were entertained at the Wesleyan mission house, and introduced to the congregations, whereupon Cobus Congo gave expression to some of his conclusions, saying: "I now perceive why the English are men: God has made them great, because they serve Him. We are but children, and not men, because we neither know nor serve God."[1] The townsfolk were also kind to them and they went away the richer by several presents, notably, outfits of European-type clothing which they proudly displayed to their own people some days later. Congo, being the elder, had received an even more costly gift—a horse, the donor being the commandant of the colonial frontier troops, Capt. Henry Somerset.[2] This trip was the forerunner of other visits, each of which made a deep impression on the visitors' minds for their only previous glimpse of Grahamstown had been when they attacked it in 1819. The appearance in the town of Mdushane, Ndlambe's son, during the first few days of 1826 caused some commotion for he had been one of the leaders of the abortive raid, and naturally formed a special object of interest to the inhabitants, yet he shared in the generous treatment given to the visiting chiefs.[3]

In January 1824, after less than two months' residence with Phatho, Shaw was asked by Somerset, to arrange for a meeting between him(Somerset) and some of the local Xhosa chiefs, Phatho, Congo, Kama, and Ndlambe. The missionary demurred, for he wished to keep clear of political entanglements; but when he saw that he would be rendering a service to both sides by bringing them together, he agreed to effect a meeting. At first, Ndlambe refused, saying he had been "hunted like a spring bok in 1819", and that he feared a trap now; and Shaw had to make two or

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[1] Reported by Kay, Travels, pp.56,57.

[2] Shaw, SMM, p.385; Kay, Journal 18-21 Feb. 1824, WMM 1824, p.711.

[3] S. Kay, Journal 28 Jan. 1826, WMM 1826, pp.635,636.

three approaches before the chief agreed to meet the commandant, and then only if the missionary went with him. There was thus some justification for Shaw's claim that "without missionary influence it would have been scarcely possible for the colonial authorities to obtain friendly interviews with the border chiefs."[1] On this occasion between two and three thousand natives advanced to Line Drift on the Keiskamma where Somerset met them with a mixed force of three or four hundred men consisting of Cape Corps Cavalry and a small party of Dutch farmers.

The gathering was successful. The chiefs asked Somerset to voice their request that the Government should negotiate with them through the missionary instead of through Ngqika. In turn, the chiefs would restore deserters from the Cape Corps and send back stolen cattle. Somerset, possibly moved by the general atmosphere of goodwill, granted their dearest wish by permitting Ndlambe's people to graze their cattle on part of the Ceded or Neutral Territory between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, subject to good conduct. Shaw, the mediator, earned the gratitude of both sides and had the satisfaction of reporting that depredations decreased "for a considerable time afterwards".[2]

A little more than a year later, on 15 February 1825, Shaw received a letter from Col. Somerset asking him to arrange for the chiefs to meet the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, at Caffre Drift on the Great Fish River. Shaw complied, and the next day set out for the rendezvous with the three Gqunukwebi chiefs, leaving his family under the faithful care of a guard appointed by Phatho. The meeting with the Governor on 17 February proved satisfactory to the authorities, the chiefs, and the missionary. Lord Charles encouraged the type of work being done at Wesleyville and assured its leader of official support. At the close of the talks, Shaw, and his three friends accompanied the Governor and his suite to Grahamstown where a permit was later issued to Phatho allowing his tribe to graze their cattle between the Keiskamma and Bika Rivers.[3]

[1] IBB VII.538, p.92.

[2] Ibid., and SMM, pp.366-375.

[3] Shaw, from Wesleyville, 25 March 1825, WMM 1825, pp.848, 849.

Before long, Shaw carried his intermediary work a step further. On 6 April 1826, he wrote to J. Gregory, secretary of the Commission of Inquiry that was then investigating affairs in the Colony, and placed before him the unsatisfactory position of the Gqunukwebi. He pointed out that this tribe, whose numbers he estimated to be between 7,000 and 10,000 souls, had lost its territory at the time of the Government's agreement with Ngqika in 1819, and had since then been living on land that rightfully belonged to Ndlambe's people. This was a very unsatisfactory position, and he urged that the Government permit Phatho's peaceable tribe to live nearer the Colony, where they would more readily enter into domestic or agricultural service with the colonists.[1] There is no record that Shaw's appeal was heeded: it probably went the way of other excellent information collected by the Commission. Cory states that Colonel Somerset frowned on the petition, and that when the matter was finally referred to Lord Bathurst, British Colonial Secretary, Somerset's view was upheld and Shaw warned to keep out of political affairs.[2] As a result, Phatho's people stayed where they were when Shaw first found them.

The Xhosa authorities had cherished great hopes that their missionary would be a successful ambassador on their behalf. When Ndlambe and Mdushane first saw Shaw, and after they had recovered from their surprise at seeing him, Shepstone, and their families unarmed in Xhosa country, they said: "It is well that you have come; we want peace; and you must be our mouth to give our words to the white Chiefs."[3] Twelve months later, when arrangements were being made for the opening of a second mission, Mdushane plainly asked if the missionaries would help them recover their land in the Ceded Territory, but Shaw discouraged the

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[1] Papers Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa, within the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope (Imperial Blue Book 1835, XXIX. 50.252, hereinafter abbreviated as IBB XXXIX. 50.252.), p.177.

[2] Cory, II, pp.343,344.

[3] SMM, p.366.

request, explaining that he did not meddle in political questions of that nature.[1] When, in 1826 he yielded to their importunity and wrote to the Commission on their behalf, the disappointment and even disillusionment of his native hosts must have been bitter. Yet it must be noted that their loyalty to the Wesleyans did not waver; they retained them in their midst and continued to support and protect them in their work.

This tractability on the part of these southern tribes is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that Shaw himself had often urged good conduct upon them by holding out the hope that the government would then regard them more favourably.

> On their urging the hardship of their having been placed in the lands of a neighbouring chief who was very jealous of them, I promised to present their case to the colonial government, provided they would give me a pledge, to issue an order directly to the people to abstain from all further aggression on the colony ... orders were issued in my presence to the principal men ...[2] ... they refrained from committing depredations in the colony from that time to the present [1836], a period of about ten years. There may have been instances of individuals belonging to the tribe [Gqunukwebi] ... who committed occasional depredations; but the chiefs have always shown a disposition to punish the delinquents.[3]

That evidence, given at a distance both in time and space, was corroborated by a letter written by Shaw to Gregory from Grahamstown on 18 January 1825, in which the missionary stated:

> I do not believe that any individual of the tribe has been engaged in plundering excursions to the colony since the commencement of the mission [Wesleyville]; I know that the chiefs have been particularly attentive to that point, and during thirteen months past, in which the military have been more than ordinarily alert, they have never pursued a "spoor", or track of stolen cattle, into Congo's district, nor ever found it necessary to fire a shot against any of his people. I do not mean to place this circumstance solely to the credit of the mission; other causes, which I could explain, have contributed to this result, but I may nevertheless be allowed to claim for the mission <u>its share</u> in educing this state of things.[4]

This is a reasoned and reasonable claim, yet if its maker were its only supporter its validity could well be doubted. The fact is, however,

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[1] <u>Ibid.</u>, p.471.

[2] <u>IBB VII.538</u>, p.53.

[3] <u>Ibid.</u> This is confirmed by Kay's Journal, 21 Feb. 1824, <u>WMM</u> 1824, p.711.

[4] <u>IBB XXXIX.50.252</u>, p.189.

that though the missionary made it on several occasions[1] it was never contradicted but rather confirmed by many independent observers, ranging from Governor D'Urban, through officials like Major Dundas and Captain Stockenstrom, to visitors such as Andrew Steedman. Such commentators recognized that the Gqunukwebi were more remote from the colonial boundary than were the Ngqika group to the north, and were therefore less exposed to temptation in respect of cattle-stealing, but opportunities were not lacking, and the fact that these were allowed to pass by over such a long period is incontrovertible testimony to one tangible, positive influence that the Wesleyan mission had over its primitive parishioners.[2]

The efforts exerted by Shaw to control Xhosa predatory instincts on the one hand, and to persuade the colonial authorities to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the other yielded a harvest of goodwill towards him on the part of the local tribes. He modestly testified that "they having some notion that I had promoted their interests, with reference to the correspondence with Government about the neutral territory, and other affairs, I had acquired almost unbounded influence over them".[3] Here was a case of the missionary's being regarded not as an agent of colonial imperialism, but as a trustworthy spokesman for the people he was claiming to help.

The pioneer said little about the initial hardships involved in setting up house in a primitive community, partly because he was never

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[1] In retrospect, when writing SMM just prior to 1860, he could survey the time of his ministry among Phatho's people and say: "No stolen cattle were traced during all those years among them; nor during that time did a single military patrol of military [1], or party of burghers, come after any cattle into the country of these Caffres. Occasionally a batch of stolen cattle were captured from robbers belonging to other tribes; but they were promptly and invariably brought to me, that I might furnish a passport to the Caffres whom the Chief sent in charge of them to the nearest military post, that they might be restored to their lawful owners." p.365.

[2] See also Cory, III, pp.304,307; and W.M. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer, and Briton (hereinafter abbreviated as Macmillan, BBB)(London, 1929), p.109.

[3] IBB VII.538, p.56.

one to stress what most would count as primitive, and possibly because his earlier experience in Albany made the Wesleyville operation comparatively simple. When the primary domestic needs had been satisfied he left the remaining material tasks to his assistant, Shepstone, and turned to develop the spiritual opportunities that lay around him. From the beginning he had publicly conducted Christian worship for the two missionary families, under the trees, expecting that curiosity would draw some of the nearby people into the circle; but immediately he was free from the more pressing duties incidental to home-making he began to visit the nearby kraals, to make friends with their inhabitants, and to invite them to the services at the mission house. He thus laid the foundations of his intimate acquaintance with the native character: he accepted the people's hospitality, ate their food, drank their curdled milk, and slept in their often-verminous huts. The language barrier hampered his early efforts at communication, but the universal language of kindness overcame hostility and drew men, women, and children to his meetings. His first messages had to be given through an interpreter who, while doing his best, often distorted the speaker's meaning and deepened the confusion which already existed in the minds of the hearers who were trying to puzzle out what the white man was doing among them. It would appear that for a short time Shaw thought of making English the medium of instruction, in harmony with his declared intention while still in Albany;[1] but he soon realized the futility of any such plan and set himself to learn Xhosa as quickly and as thoroughly as possible-- an example that was followed by his successors.[2]

4. To Civilize or Christianize? A member of the Aborigines Committee once asked Shaw: Which is better, to civilize and then christianize, or vice versa? to which question he unequivocally replied:

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[1] "We are determined to attempt spreading the English language among the heathen of the Colony." W. Shaw, 10 May 1823, WMM 1823, p.762.

[2] Infra, pp.379-382 for Wesleyan achievements in the discipline of Bantu languages during this period.

"... the only possible means of civilizing rude and barbarous people is through the influence of Christianity ..."[1] In support of his statement he cited the case of Port Natal where there was a settlement but no missionary and where there was no observable civilizing of the Zulu by the exclusively commercial contact of white with black. Official attempts at civilizing by commerce, he declared, had always failed: mission influence was essential. He then posed a decisive question: Who else but a missionary will go and reside among "barbarians" to improve their morals and their habits?[2] This rhetorical question can be partly answered by observing that the pages of history rarely record the names of commercial or philanthropic idealists who have left home comforts for the sole purpose of raising the material and moral standards of primitive peoples. Experience demonstrates that humanitarian ideals, no matter how worthy these may be or how largely acceptable to the civilized society from which they stem, rarely drive their possessors to sacrificial residence among the people whom they avowedly seek to uplift. Religious conviction has been the principal source of the power that has led men into what we, for want of a better term, describe as missionary service.

William Shaw was never inveigled into believing that moral and material progress were synonymous. He knew that human culture could walk hand in hand with depravity and that, contrariwise, moral stature could flourish in circumstances that permitted little of what is generally accepted as culture. In theory he was firmly convinced that morality, indissolubly linked for him with Christian ethics, must come first, and that material progress should take second place; though in practice he was prepared for the two processes to take place simultaneously, as he explained to the Aborigines Committee:

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1 IBB VII.538, p.124. Shaw's dictum agrees with a statement made by the Rev. J. Beecham, Secretary of the W.M.M.S.: "I regard Christianity as the parent of civilization, and am persuaded that true civilization cannot be produced without it." Ibid., p.525.

2 IBB VII.538, p.124.

> The opinion of myself and most of my brethren has ever been, that while Christianity alone can give us influence with the natives, and excite in them a desire of [sic] improvement, yet we ought to connect with the inculcation of its principles every judicious plan which we can possibly bring to bear on their case, so as to raise them to an improved condition ...[1]

A raising of the native standard of living, he insisted, would confer "A boon upon the colonists", for he conceived it quite impossible that peace could "long be maintained between the Caffres and the Borderers, unless the savage habits arising from ignorance and paganism" were removed.[2]

In pursuit of this policy Shaw and his colleagues set up their households as object lessons to the natives; they endeavoured to be models whom their observers could imitate, they imparted the rudiments of European-type education, they taught the elements of hygiene, they shared simple agricultural and mechanical skills with their dark-skinned neighbours,[3] they promoted commerce, they encouraged the wearing of minimal clothing,[4] — in short, they tried to give the Xhosa some of what they themselves had been given, in the persons of their ancestors, through the centuries that followed the Roman occupation of Britain.

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[1] Ibid., p.125. Similar sentiments were expressed by Thomas Philipps, J.P.: "The exertions of missionaries and progressive extension of peaceful and commercial habits go hand in hand." Ibid., p.33.

[2] Ibid., p.57.

[3] Shaw tells how a chief, seeing a plough in action for the first time, exclaimed: "This thing that the White people have brought into the country is as good as ten wives!" SMM p.420. Some years later, Phatho gave Shaw the money to buy him a plough, and thus the tribe was started on the road of agricultural progress.

[4] The subject of missionaries' efforts to clothe natives has generally been contentious and cannot be ignored. It must be admitted that some purveyors of the Gospel went to ridiculous lengths to make their converts coloured replicas of themselves, down to the last stitch. But it should be recognized that all missionaries were not injudicious, and that many did not conform to the caricatures that have raised such easy smiles. In respect of Kaffirland, two factors should be borne in mind: (1) The male Xhosa habit of almost utter nakedness was extremely embarrassing for European ladies, whether missionaries or not; (2) The natives were often more eager to acquire the white man's clothing than the white man was eager for him to get it. The picture of the unspoilt child of nature, clad in less than a fig-leaf, may charm the mind, but it does not survive serious thoughts of social, material, and spiritual progress.

This they did under the urge of a two-edged conviction: that it was useless to share religious beliefs with a people while denying them the opportunity for material progress, and that material progress divorced from religious belief was of doubtful value if it was not definitely harmful. In their day, as in ours, there were those who strongly differed from them, but if we would understand the missionaries' aim and work, we must grasp their simple but compelling philosophy.

This philosophy, based on Christian doctrine, placed prime value on a man's soul. In comparison with the more material aspects of life, a man's spiritual welfare was of supreme importance, "for what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul, or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"[1] This outlook, so foreign to many in our present age, was more readily accepted and respected in the days before the evangelical movement of the late 18th and early 19th centuries had lost its impetus, though, of course, there were thousands upon thousands of men and women, even in the 1820s, who did not share the evangelical fervours of the missionary; yet they probably accepted them with less scepticism than is the case today.

Whatever may have been others' assessment of the Wesleyans' motives they themselves believed that their first task was to convert the African to Christianity. If they were asked: Which brand of Christianity? they would have described Methodist doctrine, thought they were surprisingly tolerant of other versions of Christ's teachings, and were generally very co-operative with other mission societies. But they had no doubts about their being called to present the Christian Gospel in such a winsome way that the heathen would gratefully accept it as their own religion. They were encouraged in this attitude by their observation that the Xhosa apparently had no organized religion of his own as compared with other non-

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[1] Matthew 16:26.

Christian peoples such as the Hindus and Chinese.[1] They admitted that the "Caffres" were not idolators, and that they had "some notion of the existence of God and of a future state"., but felt that this was so vague and unformulated as not to merit the description of 'religion'.[2] They, therefore, felt justified in conveying to the tribesman something which they believed him not to possess, namely, knowledge of redemptive religion.

Their first approaches to the Xhosa were extremely simple, as Shaw noted at the time of his visit to Tshatshu's kraal:

> We held service after dark; a great number attended, and when they had seated themselves round our fire, we sang a hymn, and delivered, in short sentences, a few simple truths. We find it an advantage to draw them into conversation on religion.[3]

While his "constant theme" was "the guilt and danger of man, and the salvation purchased for us by Jesus Christ", Shaw explained:

> The first general truths we were extremely anxious to impress upon them were ... the existence of God and the immortality of the soul."[4]

He encouraged his hearers to ask questions, and found them capable of theological subtleties that tested his didactic skill. "But you say God is almighty, and can do all things: why does He not change me at once himself, without sending teachers to tell me what I must be?" and "Why does not God change the Devil first; he is very wicked." To such enquiries Shaw returned simple but persuasive replies that centred on the Gospel and satisfied at least some of his audience since one headman urged his people to listen to the missionary who knew so much more than they.[5] As interest developed and audiences became a little more stable, the preachers used Bible texts as a basis for their talks, expounding them in an African setting, using local illustrations to make the message real to their listeners. Kay told of reading the Ten Commandments to his congregation and of being satisfied that they understood what they had heard.[6] When Shaw was able to use

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[1] W.J. Shrewsbury, WMM 1826, p.491.

[2] Shaw, IBB VII.538, p.126; Shrewsbury, WMM 1832, p.145. They noted the Xhosa names for deity, and identified them as "Utixo" (meaning unknown to them), "Umdali" (Former, Fashioner), "Umanzi" (Maker).

[3] WMM 1823, p.189.

[4] IBB VII.538, p.126.

[5] WMM 1823, p.188.

Ihosa he taught the Christian Creed in that language, and had his people commit part of it to memory, making sure that they understood what they were repeating.[1]

Discussion of these topics opened the way for further instruction in the major tenets of Christianity, and in their application to Xhosa ways of life. Prominence was given to Sunday sacredness, at first without much success since their congregations found the reason for the observance of a day of rest and worship highly theoretical and unrelated to their mundane needs. The results of persistent instruction may be seen, however, if we look ten years ahead of Shaw's first lessons on Sabbath-keeping. In November 1833 Shepstone wrote from Wesleyville to the secretaries of the Missionary Society, and enclosed a copy of the November 14 issue of the Grahamstown Journal which gave news of a law, voluntarily passed by Phatho on October 29, commanding the Gqunukwebi to reverence and observe the Sabbath, and to refrain from all secular occupations on that day. Colonial traders coming under the chief's jurisdiction would be fined if they bought or sold on a Sunday. The missionaries, with an enthusiastic disregard for the tainted source of the law (Phatho never confessed Christianity), and for its violation of the principles of religious liberty to which they owed their own freedom to preach, accounted the edict as a victory for their cause and a major step in the christianization of the whole tribe.

But if the missionary had expected his teaching to be immediately and eagerly received he was bitterly disappointed, and was compelled to report:

> They disputed every inch of ground with us; they were willing to go into inquiry, but we found them very different in that respect to [sic] the Hottentots in the colony, who always receive with implicit credit what is stated to them by their teachers. The Caffres exhibited considerable powers of mind, and were not willing to receive any dogma until it was proved to their satisfaction.[3]

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[1] WMM 1829, p.198.

[2] W.Shepstone,25 Nov.1833,WMM 1834.p.392.

[3] IBB VII,538, p.60.

In addition to what appeared to them to be an inbred scepticism, Shaw and his colleagues faced competition from the tribes' social customs. The most obvious of these were the frequent dances, with their alcoholic and sexual excesses which unfitted their participants for the religious exercises promoted by the missionaries. Then came the activities of the witch doctors that so often culminated in a witch hunt and the procedure of "eating up" the convicted man or woman—confiscation of his goods and prolonged torture of his person in a manner that left the missionaries with "mingled feelings of disgust and pity" and frustration when they failed to halt the cruel proceedings.[1] As Shrewsbury remarked after protesting against the manner in which the Xhosa killed their oxen: "... every species of cruelty, whatever may be the cause of it, has a bad moral influence on the general temper of an uncivilized people."[2] The clergy realized that they would make little spiritual progress among the people until they had educated them to change some of their customs for those that were more humane.

Frequent drinking parties also hindered the work of the mission. Those who were drunk on village-brewed beer were in no state to listen to the Christian message; and when they were sober they had little inclination for spiritual instruction that would dissuade them from their indulgences. The missionaries' influence was therefore on the side of temperance, and converts were encouraged not to attend the social gatherings where strong drink would lead to a breakdown of the standards set up by the Christian workers. There was at this time, however, no clear-cut rule of total abstinence in the Wesleyan Church. Indeed, temperance was not seriously taken in hand by British Methodism until 1873.[3]

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[1] Vivid descriptions of "eating up" were sent home by Shaw and Kay. WMM 1826, p.703; 1827, pp.347-349, 636-638; 1829, p.199. Shrewsbury, after some three years' contact with the Gcaleka and Ndlambe pessimistically declared: "As to morality, neither the theory nor the practice thereof was discernible among them in their native state. There was no justice, no mercy, no holiness, no truth..." WMM 1832, p.147.

[2] WMM 1826, p.638.

[3] W.J. Townsend, D.D.; H.B. Workman; George Eayrs (eds.). A New History of Methodism. 2 Vols. (London 1909), I, p.465.

A position in advance of the home churches was then hardly to be expected on remote African mission stations. Nevertheless, Wesleyan influence in South Africa was strongly on the side of sobriety, both for the European and African people.[1]

Another obstacle to the spread of Christianity in Kaffraria, as in so many parts of Africa, was the prevalence of polygamy. Wesleyan sources of the period do not provide much material on the vexed topic, but it is clear that the missionaries demanded monogamy of their converts.[2] This insistence slowed the rate of conversions, but was in harmony with contemporary interpretation of Christian standards. Several decades were to pass before missionaries seriously considered accepting into the Church men who had more than one wife.

After the struggles against licentiousness, witchcraft, cruelty, and polygamy had partially eased and enabled a few hard-won converts to be baptized, there came the ministerial heartaches as some of the new members returned to their old ways. Yet Shaw, when a Gqunukwebi woman lost interest in his message, looked the situation in the face and remarked:

> Nothing is more painful to the mind of a Missionary than occurrences of this nature; and yet, considering the depravity of the human heart, and the immoral, sensual principles and customs of this people, the greater cause of surprise is, that <u>all</u> do not leave us, and recede from their attachment to the word.[3]

He refused to lower his standards or to be rushed into careless acceptance of members:

> We held our Class Meeting. ... We have good reason to hope well of all who were present; but they are very weak in the faith, and very ignorant, and must be treated with much tenderness and forbearance. We shall consider them on trial for an indefinite period, and when it is deemed expedient [i.e. fitting] they will be baptized.[4]

Such caution over the reception of new converts was typical of Methodist approach to the problem, and promotes confidence in the work done by its missionaries.

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[1] See the Methodists' letter to D'Urban, <u>infra</u>. p.299.

[2] <u>WMM</u> 1825, p.849.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p.850.

5. Education. Consideration of early Methodist contributions to the education of the people among whom its missionaries were working must be given against the background of contemporary attitudes toward formal schooling in England and South Africa. And in the 1820s the public conscience in those two countries was largely dormant respecting education. England did not possess compulsory elementary education until 1870; and while South Africa was ahead of the mother country and appointed Rose-Innes as its first inspector-general of education in 1834, compulsory school attendance was not introduced until 1905.[1]

An initial contributory factor in Wesleyan delay in setting up schools stemmed from the Society's own history. In spite of the high standard of John Wesley's own education, he was child enough of his times to accept the non-education of the masses,[2] concentrating on their spiritual in preference to their academic progress. His disciples not unnaturally followed his example and awoke relatively slowly to the responsibilities and possibilities of educating the mind as well as the heart. The Kaffrarian missionaries were in advance of their times and their heredity in showing an early concern for the secular training of their flock; but the birth of a fully-fledged educational system was not to be expected during the first few years of their work among the Xhosa tribes. They were too busy with the foundations of the specifically spiritual structure to spend much time in the erection of what they then regarded as the subsidiary departments of education and industry. In addition, their funds were limited and they were straining their resources in man-power to extend the chain of stations. Until after the 1835 war, therefore, missionary correspondence only briefly referred to the establishment and growth of schools. Systematic development of Christian education came later.[3]

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[1] E.G.Pells, Education in South Africa, 1652-1938(Cape Town, 1938).

[2] J.H.Plumb, England in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1950), pp. 96. et seqq.

[3] The G.M.S., with traditional Scots emphasis on education, gave earlier and more effective attention to schools, as at Lovedale, but did not multiply their stations to the same extent as the Wesleyans.

In spite of their circumstantial limitations, the Methodists were keen enough to perceive that education would play an essential part in their programme. They saw it as the handmaid of civilization, as the medium through which a pagan people could be influenced in favour of Christianity, and as the creator of literate congregations to whom the spiritual resources of the Bible, catechisms, hymns and other Christian literature would be made available. And if they had not taken the initiative, their congregations, eager to share the white man's knowledge, would have pressed for some form of schooling. Each mission, therefore, soon provided simple classes in reading, writing, and arithmetic.

At first, the missionaries themselves were schoolmasters to the boys and men while their wives taught such domestic arts as sewing and mothercraft to the women and girls. In February 1825 Shaw wrote: "I commenced an Adult School, and had about twenty adult natives learning to read. They are to be assembled every morning at sunrise."[1] As the interest grew, the two missionary families at Wesleyville shared scholastic duties among their members; but in June 1828, four and a half years after opening the mission, they appointed a full-time teacher, Roberts, thus releasing themselves for other duties and placing the school under the direction of a qualified man. By the following year, the enrolment rose to 106 -- no mean figure in a school that was scarce out of its infancy. At the same date, the even younger schools at Mount Coke and at Butterworth respectively enrolled 42 and 17 pupils.[2]

When once the Wesleyville school's teething troubles were over, it fulfilled its limited objectives to the satisfaction of both missionary and African. Phatho and his associates adjured the children to use their educational opportunities, and tested the scholars to see what progress they made. Even the colonial government utilized the school's facilities by sending two English youths there to study Xhosa with a view to becoming government interpreters.[3] In later years the mission schools supplied trained indigenous assistants to the European missionaries and laid the foundations for a corps of Xhosa evangelists.

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[1] WMM 1825, p.848.

[2] See Appendix III for Mission Report to Government, 1829-30.

[3] Shaw, Journal, 13 June 1828. WMM 1829, p.492.

6. Trade. Missionaries were not the only white men in Kaffraria, even in the 1820s. Commercial instincts had driven some men into the wilds from very early days, and although the government had made several attempts to prohibit or at least control such enterprise,[1] there were isolated traders scattered throughout the area when Wesleyville was established. They were not always good advertisements for the white man's way of life, and some merited the distrust and hatred of their customers, but of others Stephen Kay could later say:

> English settlers [traders] are thus dispersed all over the land, as far as Morley [in the Transkei, c.1830]. Several of these have been members of the Methodist Society in the Colony; and their little settlements will form so many points in various directions for collecting Sunday congregations, and afford to each Missionary, in a way never contemplated by us, such local help in our respective tribes, as we have long ardently desired, but could never see how it could be possibly obtained.[2]

The first of these Methodist traders was Richard Walker, an original settler who, at the age of 26, had come out from Manchester with his wife and two children. His was a steady, devout character, and before long he was accepted as a local preacher among the Wesleyan congregations in Albany.[3] By profession he was a shop-keeper, so was a natural choice for Shaw when he was looking for a reliable man to take charge of the trading store he was hoping to open at Wesleyville. The missionary had long believed in the mutual advantages to be derived from the co-operation of spiritual and commercial endeavour in the raising of cultural standards among the Xhosa, but he was wary of introducing the discordant note on his mission such as would have been sounded had he encouraged a merely secular trader to display his wares. He therefore

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[1] On 17 Sept. 1822 Somerset forbade all intercourse with the native population, except at fairs. Eleven months later an agreement was reached with Ngqika, and Fort Willshire fair was opened the following year (23 July 1824) and functioned until 1830 when Europeans were granted licences to trade in Kaffraria. Cory II, pp.177-180. But the authorities recognized that illicit trade was very profitable and could not be entirely stopped by governmental decree, wherefore restrictions were lifted in 1830.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.453

[3] Goldswain Chronicle I, Appendix, List of Settlers, Biographical Notes, p.160.

bided his time until he could find a store-keeper with a sense of vocation, and found him early in 1827 in the person of Walker, whom he employed as a salaried mission worker.[1]

The councillors were quick to perceive the advantages of having a trading post in their own community and the benefits to be derived from commercial intercourse with the Colony. In company with other unsophisticated peoples they were eager to acquire the trappings of civilization and not averse to sharing in any profits that were to be gained. They therefore readily agreed to Shaw's proposal for the opening of a store, and lent weight to the formal request for governmental licence to trade. The comparatively disinterested motives behind the conduct of this Wesleyville store made it popular with the natives who sensed the likelihood of their getting a square deal from its operator.

> In the conduct of trade on the Methodist mission stations every care was taken to ensure fair practices. The interests of the trader were subordinated to the welfare of the Natives, and the conduct of trade was circumscribed by numerous regulations which were intended to secure this end.[2]

The success of such a policy was demonstrated by trade returns. For the seventeen months, July 1827 to the end of 1828, Wesleyville sales amounted to 9,000 rix dollars or £657.[3] This commerce was complementary to rather than in competition with colonial trade, as Shaw was careful to explain to an English audience at Leeds in January 1835:

> No opposition to any reasonable scheme for benefitting the conditions of the native tribes need be apprehended from the English settlers of Albany. There may be exceptions; but, in general, they have too much good sense, not to see that the progressive civilization of the aborigines will prove a source of security and wealth to themselves:..[4]

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[1] Alan T.C. Slee, Wesleyan Methodism in the Albany District 1830-1844, (hereinafter abbreviated as Slee, Albany Methodism)(unpublished thesis, n.d.), p.112. "To begin with," Slee reminds us, "trading stores on mission property were run as departments of the mission and the store-keeper was a salaried official of the Missionary Committee." Walker justified his quasi-ministerial status for he had a regular congregation of 70 each Sunday. Kay, Travels, p.453.

[2] Slee, Albany Methodism, p.112.

[3] Kay, Travels, pp.450-454, quoting from a Cape paper for April 1832 and from private information: reviewed in WMM 1833, p.793.

[4] WMM 1835, p.127.

For a time the colonists appeared to agree with this analysis of missionary commerce, but the day came when secular traders complained that their interests were being harmed by the Wesleyville store. They applied pressure on the colonial authorities, and towards the end of 1829 the civil commissioner for Albany revoked the trading licence held by the mission. But the chiefs realized the advantages of having a store in their midst, both for convenience and as a medium for raising living standards among their people. At the missionary's suggestion they dictated a letter in Xhosa to the mission schoolmaster, Roberts, appealing against the decision to close the store. This letter, with a translation, Shaw forwarded to the Governor, and supported it with remarks of his own, pointing out that the chiefs wrote on behalf of a tribal group of some 8,000 souls (the estimate of Gqunukwebi numbers were, of necessity, approximate and therefore variable), that the Moravians and the L.M.S. (at Theopolis and Bethelsdorp) were permitted to operate stores, and that the G.M.S. were wishing to do the same at Burnehill. Reference was made to the approval given to the combination of commerce with missionary endeavour by the H.M. Commission of Inquiry, and the value of unrestricted free trade with the Xhosa in any area was urged upon the authorities. Official fears that such enterprise would damage the Fort Willshire fair were dismissed as unfounded. "I am sorry to say no notice whatever was taken" of the appeal, adds William Shaw in his evidence before the Aborigines Committee; but that was a pessimistic verdict, for the store was later allowed to continue.[1] By that time, however, the Wesleyans in their District Meeting of 1830 were reconsidering their policies concerning trade: while stating that "we are clearly convinced that a well-regulated store on a Mission Station is productive of great advantages to the heathen and tends in various ways to promote

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[1] IBB VII.538 pp.93,94. Shaw's letter, undated but received at the Governor's office on 25 Feb. 1830, is preserved in Colonial Office, Letters Received (C.O.381) 1830.2.

civilization, industry, and morality ...", they voted that the storekeeper should henceforth work on his own account.[1] The merchant was to be a Methodist, authorized by the District Meeting, selling only those articles that were approved by the superintendent, and subject to dismissal by the authorizing body. It was an adroit move. The Committee retained control of commerce on its stations, yet satisfied the governmental intention of promoting secular trade.

By the end of 1830 restrictions on trade beyond the frontier were lifted. This could have led to the establishment of trading posts and the introduction of contrary moral influence on the very doorsteps of mission stations, but Wesleyan encouragement of their own lay business men had forestalled such moves and, for spiritual ends, had kept commercial enterprise in their own hands. By 1835 each of their Kaffrarian missions had its own store directed by a self-employed Methodist.[2]

7. Progress. In no case did the Wesleyan missionaries find the indigenous inhabitants of Kaffraria to be easy converts to their message. "They disputed every inch of ground", and yielded but slowly and in small numbers to the severe moral demands that were placed before them. Progress was perceptible, however. On 18 January 1825 Shaw wrote to Gregory[3] in response to an official enquiry made in the previous month, and gave a brief review of the first year's work at Wesleyville. He reported that there were about 150 people attached to the mission, of whom 100 were adults, while 60 or more children received instruction in the school. Attendance at religious services varied between 150 and 200 souls, among whom were numbered the chiefs who were "themselves rarely absent from divine worship", and who "have ever afforded all necessary countenance and protection."[4]

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[1] Minutes of the Sixth Albany District Meeting (hereinafter abbreviated as ADM, with appropriate year) Grahamstown, 11 Feb. 1830.

[2] Slee, Albany Methodism, p.113.

[3] Supra, p.41.

[4] IBB XXXIX, 50, 252, p.189.

One year went by before Shaw could claim his first convert, but on 22 March 1825 he formed the first Methodist class meeting in Kaffraria when six people gathered for instruction in the Christian faith. Five months later the first public baptism took place, and three of the six accepted the rite. One of the early converts was the first Fingo whom Shaw ever saw, Sigliki by name, and he became the minister's personal servant and an exemplary Christian.[1]

The relatively slow rate of numerical growth is reassuring rather than perturbing, for it spelt solid as opposed to superficial gains. It was not until June 1826 that the next baptism was held and another three members were added to the small company of confessed Christians.[2] By the time W.J. Shrewsbury paid his first visit to the station towards the end of November in the same year the total native membership had risen to fourteen, but not all of them were Wesleyville converts, some having been drawn into the mission from the Colony. Further accessions came on December 31 when five more Africans were baptized, four adopting the Biblical names of Thomas, Mephibosheth, Mary, Lydia, while one incorrigibly clung to Beki! The number of communicants at the service then numbered sixteen.[3]

The missionaries would have been less than human if they had not desired to include the chiefs on the roll of believers, but such victories were not easily won. Shaw had to wait until he was called away from Wesleyville after six years' work before he experienced the satisfaction of knowing that Phatho's brother, Kama, was baptized. The young man, about twenty-five years of age, had shown a lively interest in the Christian message from the mission's inception but both he and his teacher had moved cautiously, waiting until the minister and candidate were convinced that he was ready for such a radical step as baptism. The year of decision was 1830, and the act was not unopposed. Phatho

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[1] Shaw, SMM pp.391, 380, 525.

[2] J. Davies, reporting from Albany, 7 June 1826, WMM 1826, p.852 .

[3] Shrewsbury, Journal, 24 Nov. 1826, WMM 1827, p.562; and Mem. Shrewsbury, p.244.

resented his brother's break with tribal traditions and his refusal to support such customs as that of "eating up" the coveted possessions of a prosperous subject.[1] Kama, however, while remaining true to what he considered to be the best interests of his people, endeavoured to regulate his conduct by the new-found faith, grappling with the inevitable conflicts as effectively as his emergent religion would permit. What was probably his greatest test came in the form of matrimonial offers from neighbouring chiefs who wanted him to accept their daughters in marriage in addition to Ngqika's daughter whom he had taken as his first wife before baptism. Rejection of these offers raised delicate diplomatic problems, for it could be taken as a slight on the powerful families whose daughters he was refusing, and might have led to war. The Gcaleka chief, Hintsa, went so far as to send his favourite daughter to Kama as his second wife, but the girl was politely returned to her father, and Kama remained monogamous.[2] In the year following his own baptism the reception of his wife and his mother into the church made his immediate family circle completely Christian.[3] Thereafter, Shaw could describe him as "one whom we regard as a true Christian, and having made considerable progress in his knowledge of Christianity, for he very frequently assembles the natives for religious worship, and gives them instruction."[4]

Kama's brothers never accepted the new teaching, but in many respects conformed to its standards, were a credit to the mission, and had commendable influences on their people.[5]

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[1] Shaw, Grahamstown, 1 April 1830, WMM 1830, p.632.

[2] IBB VII.538, p.64; Whiteside, History, p.180.

[3] S. Young, Wesleyville, 25 Nov. 1831, WMM 1832, p.665.

[4] IBB VII. 538. p.61.

[5] Ibid., p.125. Yingaria, another of Phatho's brothers, was, for a time at least, also inclined towards Christianity. S. Young, 17 May 1831 WMM 1832, p.56.

8. Shaw Leaves Wesleyville. While Wesleyan work was firmly entrenching itself at Wesleyville it had also been extending its operations in Kaffraria by establishing five additional missions. These, together with two distant stations in Bechuanaland, and a growing European membership in Albany (numbering about 315 in 1830), called for a central administration. The London Committee saw this need, and directed William Shaw to move into Grahamstown early in 1830 to superintend Methodist activities in the Albany-Kaffraria-Bechuanaland district.

With genuine regret, for he loved the personal ministry that formed so large a part of mission life, he prepared to leave the place where he had spent more than six productive years. He left behind him in the mission village a native population of about 300 souls, and a church membership of more than 30 mature believers.[1] This was no spectacular growth, but was solid enough to assure the pioneer that his labour had been worthwhile, especially since it had been spent on primitive material that had previously been untouched by Christianity.

Shaw's place at Wesleyville was taken by a man in whom he had expressed every confidence--Samuel Young, the man who had come out from England in July 1824 to release yet another minister, in addition to Shaw, from Albany for work among the Xhosa-speaking tribes. Boyce, who was a colleague of Young's for some years, describes him as "a plain, simple-minded, loving pastor and preacher, remarkable for having never missed an appointment; neither rain nor rivers ever stopped him."[2] On 17 July 1828, while serving at Mount Coke mission, he lost a child by death, and in mid-1830 his wife died, but in spite of great loneliness he continued his work. By 1833, however, he was requesting a temporary return to England, but was not released until 1835 when the disruption of mission work permitted him to withdraw without prejudice to the local situation. Before his transfer to Wesleyville he had acceptably served the settlers

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[1] ADM 1830; SMM p.393.

[2] W.B. Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. William Shaw, p.145.

in the Grahamstown area and had been a missionary at Mount Coke, but at the call of the Committee was ready to take up the work that Shaw was laying down. The mission grew under his charge, and when the superintendent re-visited his old stamping ground after nearly two years' absence he found an increasing church membership, a greater cultivation of land, and improving harvests. A few months later, on 21 March 1832, the first Methodist missionary meeting to be held in Kaffraria took place at Wesleyville. Lt.Col. Somerset was in the chair; Donald Moodie and the Rev. W. Carlisle were the guest speakers; Shaw and three fellow-missionaries and the local chiefs completed the list of notables who were present; and over 1,000 natives formed the congregation.[1] The pioneer days were over. Wesleyan Methodist missions in that region had come of age.

The station continued to grow. In 1832 its membership stood at 47; by 1834 it had risen to 66; and when Shaw addressed the Aborigines Committee in 1836 he was able to report:

> At the station of Wesleyville we had several hundred persons in immediate connexion with the station; and the natives who came there abandoned polygamy when they became residents of that village; amongst those we had our principal attendants at the place of worship, and amongst them we had not a few who received baptism; and there are at this time about 80 persons in that station who had embraced Christianity and who were not only believers of the doctrines of Christianity but were very excellent Christians.[2]

These records of growth in Methodism's first Xhosa mission should be borne in mind when reference is made to the categorical statements of Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Col. Harry Smith to the effect that all missions operating in Kaffraria at the outbreak of war in December 1834 had miserably failed.[3] To the results achieved by the one mission add those of its younger companion ventures, five in number, and it will be seen that in the eleven years prior to hostilities Wesleyan missions alone had made significant contributions to the welfare and uplift of the

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[1] S. Young, Wesleyville, 21 March 1832, WMM 1832, p.666.

[2] IBB VII.538, p.60.

[3] Infra, pp. 256, 300.

Ihosa, contributions that cannot be summarily dismissed by a few strokes of ill-informed official pens.

Appreciation for achievements at Wesleyville come not only from Wesleyan sources. Thomas Philipps, a member of the Church of England, an 1820 settler, serving as magistrate in Albany, visited the mission in 1827 in company with Major Dundas. His visit made a deep impression on his own mind, for eight years later he recalled some of its details for the benefit of the Aborigines Committee:

> I have been twice in Caffreland; the last time with Major Dundas, who was then our chief magistrate. The object was to gain a more perfect knowledge of them [missions] by personal acquaintance and inquiry. The first missionary institution we came to was Wesleyville, ... here we witnessed the Caffres attending Divine Service. The Chief Cobus Congo accompanied us throughout our tour from hence; we witnessed here also missionary influence in preventing a Caffre accused of witchcraft from being tortured, and probably murdered; his chief, Pato, was ill, and he was charged with having caused it. This man had become obnoxious, and was besides rich in cattle, all of which would be divided among his accusers. From Mr. Shaw's influence over the Chief Pato, he resisted all the importunities of his councillors to allow the ceremony to proceed; many of these superstitions have been overcome, and the Caffres have rapidly improved in many respects.[1]

In subsequent evidence he dealt more specifically with the mission's religious influence, saying:

> I have attended Divine Service, read in the Caffre language, at Wesley village, where the Commandments particularly were read in the Caffre language, and the responses were made by the Caffres themselves, and their chiefs behaved in a proper manner ... they seemed to be affected by what was read to them, and to be extremely attentive; this was at an early period; great improvements have been made since.[2]

These observations, made by a moderately sympathetic but substantially neutral observer, strongly support accounts of the mission's achievements given by the Wesleyans themselves. But still stronger testimony may be cited from the lips of one who, in Cory's words, "cannot be accused of an inordinate enthusiasm for mission work", namely, Major W.B. Dundas:

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[1] IBB VII.538, p.27.

[2] Ibid.

> I think the Wesleyan missionaries have done wonders, more than could possibly be expected from people in their situation. I have the highest opinion of their usefulness. I was in almost daily communication with some of them; their work, their acts, and their discretion bear me out in my opinion, and the influence they seemed to have over the Caffres in restricting depredations and plunder to a certain extent.[1]

Even when due allowance is made for the suspicion that Dundas is praising the Wesleyans in order to denigrate the L.M.S., there is an element of sincerity in his testimony that cannot be dismissed. It seems clear that Wesleyville earned the respect of thoughtful colonists, had gained a hold on the affections of the Gqunukwebi, and gave legitimate encouragement to its founders.

II. MOUNT COKE

1. The Second Link. Although Wesleyville, as the eldest child of Shaw's planning, held first place in his heart, he never allowed it to fill the whole horizon of his thinking. The concept of a chain of stations was not forgotten. At an early date he urged its continued fulfilment upon the Missionary Committee and gained their permission to explore further into Kaffraria for the establishment of a second station. His African sponsor, Phatho, was willing for him to extend his sphere of operations when he heard that they would embrace the territory of his neighbour, Ndlambe,[2] with whom he was nominally in alliance, but from whom he was always fearing an attack. It therefore lay with Shaw to choose his time for a further reconnoitring expedition.

The opportunity came in March 1825. Wesleyville was fourteen months old, the arrival of Samuel Young had settled the care of the Albany pastorate and released Stephen Kay for taking charge of a second mission. When Shepstone returned from a business trip to the Colony on March 28 Shaw was free for his exploratory journey. Once again James Whitworth, whose movements since the opening of Wesleyville are obscure, became

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[1] IBB VII.538. p.142.

[2] According to H.H. Dugmore in A Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs, p. 7, the Ndlambe occupied the land that lay east of the Bika, across the Keiskamma and the Tsholomnga, to the lower course of the Buffalo.

the leader's travelling companion. Together they planned to go as far as "Tambookie" country [Thembuland] and thus cover far more ground than was involved in establishing one new station beyond Wesleyville. It was Whitworth who described the trip in his journal, and told how they left Shaw's home at two o'clock in the afternoon of the last day of March 1825 hoping to reach Mdushane's kraal by the same evening. But the going was hard, for the road led over rugged hills and into deep dales, and it was April 4 before they rode into the umzi of Ndlambe's eldest son. Their welcome, however, was encouraging. The chief laid his country open before them and bade them choose whatever site they wished for a mission among his people. The following day they travelled to Ndlambe's own kraal and met the old chief who, although the planner of the abortive attack on Grahamstown in 1819, had proved to be a wise and cautious ruler of his own people as well as regent for the young Ngqika before the latter attained his majority. He was now a sick man, eighty years of age, with not much longer to live, yet he still ruled his people with a rod of iron. Nevertheless, the missionaries' reception was cordial, and they were again invited to go through the land and choose the spot that best suited their purposes. It would seem that the chief's fires were burning low: while keeping a tyrannical hold over his own subjects, he feared his neighbours, both black and white, and was eager to see a mission settled within his borders as insurance against aggression. It is clear that he had no personal interest in the spiritual objectives of the Wesleyan teachers.

Ndlambe's visitors did not then stay to stake out their claims. Instead, they concluded their embassage and travelled north-east, crossed the Kei River to visit Hintsa, chief of the Gcaleka, on April 7 and Vusani, the Thembu chief, on Sunday, the 10th. With this preliminary reconnaisance accomplished they turned homewards, and reached Wesleyville after an absence of sixteen days.[1]

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[1] Shaw and Whitworth, Journal, 31 March-10 April 1825, WMM 1825, pp.850-854; and SMM pp.469-471.

The next step was taken on June 26 when Kay with Young and John Davis arrived in Wesleyville from Grahamstown and discussed strategy with Shaw. The conference appointed Kay as director of the proposed mission, and agreed that all should go with him to determine its site. In pursuance of this plan they visited Ndlambe who was not very hopeful about the outcome of their tour; his conscience appeared to trouble him, for he stated: "Your intentions are very good, but my people are too bad to learn. What teacher will come to live among them?" Then, on a more hopeful note, he declared: "The thing is determined: you can choose your place; the land is before you." In an eloquent harangue one of his councillors supported this favourable decision by asserting: "Your name is great, but your character is bad amongst the nations; now is the time for redeeming it." On the strength of these sentiments, the elderly chief's two sons, Mdushane and Mqhayi, were appointed to conduct the visitors to spots that might prove suitable for a mission station; but the task of selection proved more difficult than they had expected for, as it afterwards transpired, father and sons each wanted the missionary to live in his own particular territory--an impossible proposition since their jurisdictions were separate.[1] Furthermore, the countryside seemed almost denuded of its inhabitants, for although the colonial government had recently given Ndlambe's tribe permission to re-occupy the land that lay between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo Rivers, they had not yet taken possession of the area, and some time would elapse before it would again be comfortably populated. In spite of such auguries, the missionaries went ahead and chose a site on the southern bank of the Umkangiso which led through a fertile valley into the Konya or Buffalo River. The land lay high, the soil was rich, the water good and unfailing. The sea, visible on a clear day, lay about 30 miles to the south-east, and the snow-capped Winterberg and Mathole bounded the northern horizon. A

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[1] Kay tried, without success, to persuade Ndlambe to live near the mission, realizing that the chief's presence would attract his followers. This failure to build up a large constituency around Mount Coke was a serious hindrance to growth.

nearby peak dominated the scene, and led the prospectors to name the new station Mount Coke in honour of the deceased Dr. Coke who had been one of the early builders of the W.M.M.S.[1]

With the site selected and named the clerical cavalcade turned their horses' heads toward Grahamstown and laid plans for the occupation of the mission. Following the precedent set by the Shaw-Shepstone combination at Wesleyville, they decided to provide Kay with an assistant who would care for the building activities at Mount Coke; and chose a British settler, Tainton by name, who, toward the end of July travelled to his new post via Shaw's station. His first task was to build a house for the director and thus make it possible for Kay to remove from Grahamstown by October 1st and supervise the development of the station.[2]

2. Kay at Mount Coke. Contemporary Methodist literature is inclined to be eloquently silent on the subject of Kay's accomplishments, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he was injudicious in his administration, was unbalanced in his outlook, and did not possess the full confidence of his brethren. If this were so, there is no hint that Kay himself was conscious of his shortcomings: he wrote in a confident, knowledgeable way of the usual matters that belonged to mission life, and, as will be seen, sometimes posed as an authority on Kaffraria and its problems. For this he had some justification since he gave six years' service among the native tribes of South Africa; but he seemed to live apart from the general stream of Wesleyan life, to be somewhat of a law to himself, and to hold views that were so personal that his colleagues were not prepared to endorse them. These factors, but vaguely foreshadowed in 1825, were to play a larger role when the W.M.M.S. was defending itself against detractors.

In spite of such observations, it must be acknowledged that Kay

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[1] S. Kay, Journal, 26 June-7 July 1825, MMM 1825 pp.855, 856; Travels, pp.83-84; Shaw, MMM, pp.473,474.

[2] Kay, Journal; and MMM p.475.

faithfully fulfilled his duties as a missionary. He cheerfully endured the discomforts that were inseparable from a pioneer's life; he taught the Gospel in the uncompromising way that was typical of the period, and earnestly tried to win his hearers to the Christian faith. At times he was encouraged, as when the abundant rains that fell during the first six months of his stay among the Xhosa were ascribed to his coming and made the basis of favour in the eyes of the headman: at others, he despaired of making any lasting, positive impression on the African heart. After only a few months' work he expected the people to respect Sunday as a day of rest, and to attend the services that were held throughout the day, and thought he could detect some response to his teachings; but his congregations were small, and he found the people more intent on caring for their crops or more concerned about hunting expeditions. On one such occasion he remonstrated with their chief, whereupon Mdushane replied: "It is a shame; but our teahher must bear in mind that we are only Caffres yet; when the word gets into our hearts, we shall act as the English do."[1] If there were irony in that reply, we may be sure that Kay did not detect it.

To help his neighbours act as the English did, the missionary erected a flagpole on which the Union Jack was hoisted each Sunday "as a holy [?] remembrance to a people who as yet 'took no notice of time'."[2] If the moulding of the natives according to the British pattern were the goal, a more appropriate time-marker could hardly have been chosen; but it must be made clear that this was not typical Wesleyan practice. The missionaries were generally good patriots, but they had a more sensible vision than that of producing black Englishmen out of the Kaffrarian bush: they were more interested in aiding their converts to become African Christians, leaving their political affiliations to be settled by secular authorities.

It would be wrong to think of the early missionaries as pig-headedly trying to drum an alien culture into native minds with little or no reference to their environment. Even as earnest a doctrinaire as Kay was

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[1] Kay, Journal, 12 Feb. - 19 March 1826, WMM 1826, pp.636, 705.

[2] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.252.

vitally interested in the indigenous African life, taking pains to study Xhosa domestic and social customs, making well-written, informative notes over a period of years, adding a measurable amount of knowledge about a people who, in the 1820s, were but little known in European circles. Those researches would not conform to present-day scientific standards, for social anthropology was then still young, but many of its first steps were taken with the help of missionaries such as Kay.[1]

The worker's labours were sometimes ill paid. On 1 August 1826, after a brotherly visit to Brownlee who had recently settled on the banks of the Buffalo,[2] Kay returned to Mount Coke to find that his house had been burgled; treasured possessions were missing, and papers were scattered to the winds. The chief was genuinely upset at this breach of Xhosa laws of hospitality and protection, and vowed severe measures against the culprit and his family when he was discovered. After some delay, the thief and most of spoil were traced, and the promised punishment threatened to fall, but Kay's intervention lightened the culprit's penalty and earned increased respect for the intercessor in Mdushane's tribe.[3] The benefits of this more friendly atmosphere were not long enjoyed, however, for after a two-year term Kay was asked to serve at Somerset East, and Samuel Young took his place at Mount Coke.

3. Slow Advance. The new director soon found that he had been inducted into no sinecure. In spite of Shaw's claim that the early history of the mission was encouraging[4] it would appear that the Xhosa around the mission were largely unresponsive to Christian

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[1] Travels and Researches in Caffraria displays a careful curiosity about the peoples who lay beyond the frontier, and provides reasonable justification for the title of the book.

[2] On July 22 Kay received a note from the L.M.S. missionary inviting the Wesleyan to call upon him at his new station (eventually the site of King William's Town.) Kay gladly responded since he believed the two missionaries would be able to help each other. Kay, 30 July 1826, WMM 1827, p.271.

[3] Ibid., and Travels, p.162.

[4] SMM, p. 475.

teaching. Young won the affections of chief and people, however, and visited among the villages without fear, finding that he was everywhere respected as Ndlambe's missionary. New kraals sprang up near the station, more land was cultivated, the district took on an air of more permanent settlement, and the number of families residing on the mission increased to such an extent that the primitive chapel would not hold all who wished to worship there.[1] But conditions were not stable. The old chief's death, early in February 1828, interrupted the flow of events just as it was taking a favourable turn, and momentum was not restored even by the accession of the heir Mdushane who, although an "altogether superior man", noted for his foresight, wisdom, and zeal,[2] did not live long enough to press the tribe into a more stable mould. The population continued to be scattered and tended to hide in secluded parts of the country, consequently the congregations were small and the potential of converts restricted, and progress appeared painfully slow compared with that enjoyed by Wesleyville. The people were by nature contentious, those who had initially attached themselves to the mission were often backsliding, while those who had rejected the missionary's overtures seized every opportunity to indulge in mockery, profanity, irreverence, and mercenary-mindedness. Early judgments formed by Shrewsbury on the occasion of his first passing through Mount Coke, were confirmed by later and wider experience:

> On this occasion [at Ndlambe's], as on all others, we found the Kaffirs to be an acute and inquisitive people, and peculiarly evidencing a natural tendency to scepticism, since they are much more ready at raising objections against divine truth, than at receiving it with a meek and lowly mind. Much care and wisdom are required in conveying instruction to the Kaffir tribes, or they will become mere smatterers in science and a nation of infidels.[3]

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[1] Young, Mount Coke, 10 Jan. 1828, WMM 1828, p.707; J. Davis, Grahamstown, 23 July 1827, WMM 1828, p.202.

[2] J.H. Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu, p.150.

[3] Mem. Shrewsbury, p. 232.

When Shrewsbury succeeded Young in January 1830 he found he had undertaken uphill work and soon had no illusions left concerning the task of christianizing the Africans between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo.[1] Nevertheless, he could report an average congregation of seventy, and by December 1831 saw enough signs of growth to warrant laying the foundations of a new chapel.[2]

Wesleyan policy itself partook of the instability that prevailed among the Ndlambe. There was no continuity of leadership such as had been accorded to Wesleyville. In rapid succession Mount Coke was administered by Stephen Kay (1825-27), Samuel Young (1827-30), W.J. Shrewsbury (1830-33), W.B. Boyce (1833-34), and H.H. Dugmore (1834.) Consistent growth was unlikely under such a swift succession of directors; it is rather surprising that there was any progress to record. After five years of witness, the membership only amounted to 13, by 1833 it had risen to 18, but the following year saw it drop to a mere 7. There had been four European lay-members attached to the mission, but in 1833 two of these returned to the Colony, while two went native, taking black wives and living in kraals away from the station.[3] The missionary who faced such conditions and continued to work needed all the courage he could muster if he were to serve with any semblance of optimism!

But the picture was not entirely black. Mount Coke had a destiny to fulfil, even in those heart-breaking days. It became the publishing centre for Kaffrarian Methodism, and the products of its press more than justified its hardly-earned existence.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 337,342,356.

[2] Shrewsbury, Mount Coke, 30 Sept. 1831, WMM 1832, p.526.

[3] ADM 1830-1834. Wesleyan sources are discreetly brief, recording no censure and giving no details concerning the miscegenation.

CHAPTER III

BEYOND THE KEI

I. BUTTERWORTH

1. Extending the Chain. The journey which began at Wesleyville on 31 March 1825 took Missionaries Shaw and Whitworth through Ndlambe territory then across the Buffalo River in a north-easterly direction through thinly-populated country to the broad reaches of the River Kei (variously referred to in those days as the "Gnee", the "Kye", or the "Kaye"). On April 6 they crossed the river and pushed forward to a certain Kamakasha's kraal, and on the following day travelled a further twelve miles in two and a half hours through a densely populated region to reach Hintsa's kraal at the head of the Goowa (Gcuwa) stream. They were about to meet the Gcaleka chief, the son of Gcaleka himself, the man in whose veins ran the blood of ten royal generations, and who was undoubtedly the superior authority among all the descendants of Xhosa and able to take precedence over his relative and fellow-chief, Ngqika. The chief's seven wives were the first to welcome the visitors, but after a decorous interval Hintsa himself came forward, "shook hands cheerfully, sat a few minutes, then walked away." Royal hospitality provided the white men with an ox and placed a hut at their disposal, but a messenger informed them that the king was too busy to discuss business with them just then: if they would wait a few days he would assemble his councillors and consider any request the visitors might be pleased to lay before them. A rider was added to the effect that he would be unable to reach any final decision until the petitioners had also consulted the other Xhosa chiefs, Ngqika, Ndlambe, and Mdushane--even as these authorities should have conferred with him before permitting the establishment of any mission in their territories.

At the time, the visitors thought that Hintsa was stalling, unwilling to open his country to European and missionary influence, but they later learned that whatever his personal attitude to their request might have been he was but following established Nguni procedure which stressed

the principle of the collective responsibility of associated chiefs, councillors, and people rather than the arbitrary power of himself as near-paramount chief.[1] If the missionaries had clearly understood this from the beginning they would have made faster and smoother headway, and would have been paying the African peoples the courtesy of conforming to their customary diplomatic modes. In ignorance, however, they blundered on and prejudiced their own prospects while bruising the legitimate sensibilities of those whom they hoped to serve. When viewed through Bantu eyes, Hintsa's conduct in this instance was orthodox, and he is freed from the charges of obstruction that have been so often levelled against him.

Shaw and Whitworth, however, were too green in Kaffraria to be conversant with the intricacies of native diplomacy, so with as much grace as their experience could muster they lingered for two days at Hintsa's before leaving for Thembuland with their mission, as they viewed it, only partly accomplished since Hintsa agreed to their request only on condition that the Ngqika chiefs also acquiesced.[2] From the Thembu chief Vusani they obtained a quicker decision since he was not encumbered with a collection of near-equals who could question or veto the decision reached by his own council.

If Shaw had taken Hintsa's ruling seriously he would, on returning to Wesleyville in the middle of April, have sought out Ngqika and his associates with a view to obtaining their consent to the founding of a station within Hintsa's jurisdiction, but there is no record of any such approach until nearly two years later, and even then, only upon Hintsa's own insistence. The delay may be explained on two grounds: they might have approached the chiefs and been rebuffed, and they might not have pursued the matter further in view of the lack of personnel with which to staff the proposed

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[1] Report and Proceedings with Appendices of the Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs, January 1883, pp. 20,21, paragraph 31; D.W.Brokensha, The Political Institutions of Some Southern Tribes (Oxford, 1950, unpublished thesis), pp. 127-134.

[2] J.Whitworth, Journal, 31 March - 9 April 1825, WMM 1825,pp.851-854; SMM,pp.478-481

new station. They were probably unaware of the delicate nature of the ground on which Hintsa had asked them to tread since they were not at that time fully conversant with the intricacies of Gcaleka-Rarabe relationships. These latter had been based on very tenuous threads of friendship ever since Hintsa had joined Ndlambe in the sanguinary battle at Debe Nek which he (Ndlambe) had successfully provoked against his nephew Ngqika in 1818. Matters worsened when Ngqika appealed to Lord Charles Somerset for aid which, when obtained, he used against his fellow Xhosa to the discomfiture of the Ndlambe, and when the Governor unadvisedly treated with Ngqika as if he were the paramount Xhosa chief, thereby ignoring the seniority of Hintsa.[1] The relationships between Hintsa and Ngqika were naturally strained almost to breaking point, and neither was ready to destroy the precarious balance by agreeing to a further white penetration without securing the prior consent of the other. Hintsa's hesitancy was constitutionally explicable, and Ngqika was understandably unwilling to express his acceptance of the Methodist advance until he was sure of his senior's attitude. It was into this scene of strain and rivalry that the Wesleyans unwittingly blundered, and which was to cause them some delay and dissatisfaction in the opening of their mission among the Gcaleka.

At that time, however, the missionaries showed no awareness of these difficulties, and on 30 January, 1826, Young could write from Grahamstown that his Society was under engagement to supply the most powerful chief (Hintsa) with at least one missionary for a station about 70 miles beyond Mount Coke "and in a <u>direct line</u> towards Port Natal."[2] They had no free worker to appoint as director of the proposed station, but providence was already taking a hand to supply the need, unbeknown to the missionaries themselves. In June 1824 there had landed in England a Wesleyan minister, William J. Shrewsbury, who had been driven home from the Barbadoes by persecution.

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[1] S.M. Molema, <u>The Bantu, Past and Present</u> (Edinburgh,1920), pp. 72-74, 389

[2] <u>WMM</u> 1826, p.423.

In spite of the difficulties through which he had recently passed he was willing to be re-assigned for foreign service, had accepted appointment for Madagascar, and had left Britain in January 1826, sailing via Cape Town where he arrived on April 4. At the Cape, he was unexpectedly detained, and while waiting received word that South Africa and not Madagascar was to be his field of labour. He accepted the change uncomplainingly, and when Shaw wrote and asked whether he would prefer to serve in Albany or in Kaffraria, he replied that his preference was for genuine mission work among the natives, but that he left the decision in his brethren's hands. His brethren first used this freedom of action to appoint him as third minister in the Albany Circuit, to assist Davis and Young, but priorities were altered, and on June 14 he received a second letter from Shaw in which he learned that he was being asked to "attempt a new and third station in Caffraria," and to fix his residence with the chief Hintsa."[1] The needed recruit had been found!

The latest addition to Methodism's working force was no fledgling but a mature minister, 31 years old, who had already given several years' service to the West Indies where an outspoken report on the conditions under which slaves worked in the Barbadoes' plantations, published in The Wesleyan Methodist Magazine for 1820, had aroused the planters' anger. Resentment smouldered and finally burst into a flame so fierce that Shrewsbury's house, furniture, library, and chapel were destroyed, and the missionary and his wife, who was very near to confinement, had to flee for their lives to St.Vincent. His became a cause celèbre, defenders and accusers of his conduct sprang to verbal arms, and the case was debated at home in the House of Commons.[2] The pattern behind that incident was also to peep out from behind the events of later years, and it is possible that Shrewsbury's mixture of dedication, unwisdom, and clerical belligerence persisted throughout his missionary career and brought some

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[1] Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.207-215; WMM 1827, p.200.

[2] George Smith, History of Wesleyan Methodism (London,1861),III,p.69.

of his troubles on his own head and that of his Society.

But no matter what questions might be posed concerning Shrewsbury's wisdom, neither his consecration to the ministry nor his academic ability to fulfil his vocation was ever in doubt. He was reputed to be a model pastor and a great preacher; his linguistic abilities were decidedly above the average for not only could he study the Old Testament in its original Hebrew but he corresponded with a rabbi in the same tongue, and, for whatever the exercise might have been worth, wrote out the entire Pentateuch in beautiful Hebrew script. In addition, he read the Septuagint and the Vulgate in the original. On learning that he was to work in South Africa, he set himself to learn Dutch and made such good progress that after nine months' study he was able to preach his first extempore sermon in that language. Having mastered the elements of Dutch, he immediately applied himself to Xhosa with the result that when he eventually arrived in Kaffraria and was fluent in the vernacular he was well-equipped for the translation of the Scriptures into the Xhosa tongue. Such knowledge on the part of one who was not university-trained spoke of great diligence, and one is not surprised to find that he rose early for study, and was a voracious reader. He kept a record of the books he read, and even in Kaffraria, with its frequent need for travelling and daily distractions, he averaged a book a week throughout the year.[1] Boyce was not exaggerating when he wrote of "William J. Shrewsbury, our best preacher, an able divine, and most respectable scholar, as familiar with the Scriptures in their original languages as with the English version";[2] but Col. Wade, in the light of events yet to be related, was possibly painting too favourable a picture when he said:

> ... Mr. Shrewsbury has been described, by the chairman of this Committee [Aborigines], 'as a minister of great zeal, and mild and conciliatory manners, whose conduct (in the West Indies) was marked with the greatest prudence', to which was added, in my humble opinion, the highest meed of praise

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.433-440.

[2] W.B. Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. Wm. Shaw, p.145.

> that can be bestowed upon a missionary, 'that he had abstained from all political interference, devoting himself solely to the duties of his mission; ... 1

The family remained in Cape Town from April to October awaiting the birth of a son,[2] then left for Algoa Bay where it was met by Davis and Young. By way of Bethelsdorp, the mission convoy travelled to Grahamstown and remained in the vicinity for nine days until November 22, allowing the Shrewsburys time to collect equipment and to visit the local Wesleyan congregations before moving off into the wilds. The newcomers were charmed by the fields of oats and barley, by the vegetable gardens that reminded them so vividly of the homeland as to be described, with pardonable inaccuracy, as "England in miniature." But they had come for a more earnest purpose than to admire the scenery: they left the Colony and civilization behind them and journeyed onto Wesleyville, the place that had become the hub of Methodist mission endeavour. There they found a neat mission village and twenty white-washed houses, and there they met the man who was the then unofficial head of their church in that part of Africa, the man whom Shrewsbury described as "our excellent and prudent Brother, William Shaw", and of whom he said:

> ... I cannot write in too high terms. I thought him a prudent and judicious man before I knew him personally; but in witnessing his daily conduct in the superintendence of this Mission, and his acquaintance with the work at large, I see him to be the very man for the station he fills, as though he had been born for Caffreland."

He was also favourably impressed by his first glimpses of the field in which he was being called to serve. Doubtless drawing on others' opinions he declared that "never was there so much quiet and peace, so that, to use a Caffre mode of expression, 'a man may travel in safety without his assegai.'" Shepstone, too, came in for favourable comment, so that of the Wesleyville partnership the new arrival could state: "It would be difficult to find two more effective missionaries"; and since this was no singular judgment it may be

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[1] IBB VII.538, p.410.

[2] In terms of family prestige, the wait was justified, for the infant grew to be his father's biographer, and the author of Memorials of the Rev. Wm.J.Shrewsbury.

accepted that the two men had, in the three years of their residence, made the station an attractive exhibit of the uplifting effect of Christian mission work. Further commentary on their influence came when Shaw and Shrewsbury were about to leave for the Transkei: Phatho and his brothers assured the missionaries that they need have no fears about leaving their wives and children at the mission for the chiefs themselves would guarantee their safety. It is true that Shepstone was also staying behind, but Xhosa solicitude for the white men's families must also have reflected the esteem in which the white men were then held.[1]

After a ten-day stay at Wesleyville, Shrewsbury accompanied Shaw to Mount Coke where they made Kay the third member of the embassage that was to negotiate with Hintsa. Before they left Kay's station, however, they took advantage of their proximity to visit the new mission that Brownlee of the L.M.S. had established about twelve miles north of Mount Coke on the banks of the Buffalo just four and a half months earlier (July 18.) It was with pleasure that they found that in this brief time the pioneer had erected a temporary home and a chapel, had cleared land for the plough, and had gathered a congregation of one hundred hearers. After a cordial visit with him who has been described as "the fittest man, in every sense, to lay a solid foundation for mission work in Kaffirland", [2] they returned home with Kay and the following day, December 6, crossed the Buffalo at Kay's Ford on their way to Ndlambe's kraal. The old chief, they found, was very ill, beyond the help of any medicaments they could provide, while he in turn could do little to aid them in their mission. But his sons Mdushane and Mqhayi were at their father's headquarters, and if the missionaries had wished they could have discussed with the heir-apparent their plans for settlement among Hintsa's people; but there is no record that they did so. Instead, they continued their journey and on December

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[1] The account of Shrewsbury's journey from Cape Town to Wesleyville and his comments thereon are drawn from Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.218-228 and WMM 1827, pp.200,201.

[2] John Chalmers, Tiyo Soga, quoted by R.W. Rose-Innes, The Rev. John Brownlee (Lovedale,1905), p.8.

ll crossed "the broad and noble river Gnee [Kei,]" and by noon the next day had reached Hintsa's kraal which lay "in a singular hollow, of a circular form, nearly surrounded with hills of an equal height, so that his kraal cannot be seen until you are within a few yards of it."

The visitors soon discovered that they had arrived at an inopportune time. The chief had recently married his eighth wife, and at least one thousand guests were present to celebrate the wedding. In the missionaries' presence, and to their horrified disgust, four oxen were slaughtered in the cruel way that was customary among the Xhosa at that time (Shrewsbury timed the death struggles of two helpless beasts and found them to last seven and ten minutes respectively,) but since they were newcomers and foreigners they were powerless to halt these and other barbarisms. They were also in the middle of an armed multitude and any intervention on their part might have rung the death-knell of their mission before it had even started. They therefore kept silent and awaited the appearance of Hintsa to greet them, only to be told that "the Great Bull was not at home". This, they soon discovered, was but a court-fiction, for one of the visiting party saw the chief and advised his companions to wait a little longer when he would doubtless appear. The forecast proved correct: within an hour Hintsa came and received them as his guests, but refused to consider the question of a mission that afternoon since the day was one for mirth, and business would have to wait until the morrow. With this decision the missionaries had to be content, and they spent the remaining daylight hours examining the neighbourhood for a likely mission site. They found two or three suitable spots, and optimistically, possibly presumptuously, called the non-existent station Butterworth in honour of the recently deceased M.P.,Joseph Butterworth, who had also been Lay General Treasurer of the WMMS.

The next day, December 13, at about ten o'clock in the morning, Hintsa and his councillors visited the missionaries, and in their

leisurely way discussed the request for permission to establish a station among the Gcaleka. The issues at stake on both side were great. The Wesleyans hoped to forge another link in their chain of stations, and to bring the Gospel to an important branch of the Xhosa-speaking tribes whose chief was the senior and probably the most powerful among the Xhosa, and whose territory legitimately stretched from the Kei to the Mbhashe, a distance of some sixty miles, but whose writ generally ran another twenty miles still further north-east towards the Mthatha. If their request were granted they had made a great stride towards Port Natal; if it were refused a great obstacle was flung athwart their path and further progress might have proved impossible. On the Xhosa side it could be defensibly claimed that the issues were still greater. From time immemorial they had lived without European interference: were they now to open their doors to the first white group that knocked, in face of the suspicion that the door, once opened, would let in such a flood of visitors that it would never close and they would no longer be able to call their house their own? Did they want what the white man said he would bring them--a knowledge of God, of whose existence they were but dimly aware, if they were aware of Him at all?[1] Some things they were ready and even anxious to receive--the white man's commerce, his mechanical skills and material favours--but even these could be bought at too dear a price. One perceptive old man asked if the new religion would strengthen or weaken the chief's authority, to which the missionaries replied that it would support the chief, doubtless having in mind the respect for the powers that be enjoined by New Testament teaching, but ignoring or being unaware of the weakening of the chief's hold that would certainly follow any general adoption of Christianity.[2]

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[1] Shrewsbury comments on the absence of organized religion among the Xhosa peoples, noting that they cherished no idols, and displayed no formulated notions of the Supreme Being. 31 Dec.1826, WMM 1827,p.491.

[2] For the position of chiefs and the influence of councillors in an Nguni tribe (Mpondo) see M.Hunter, Reaction to Conquest (Oxford,1936), pp.392-395; compare H.H.Dugmore in A Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs, p.23.

Inter-tribal considerations also came into the picture: it would be policy to consult Ngqika, Ndlambe, and Hintsa's brother Bhukru, for "it was the custom of the great chiefs to do nothing of importance without consultation." And so the discussion went back and forth for about five hours until a truly Delphic decision was reached: the chief and his councillors would never turn their backs on what was so manifestly a good thing, but they must consult with their neighbours that harmony might reign throughout Kaffraria.

In retrospect the missionaries discerned three main reasons for their failure to obtain a ready invitation to work with the Gcaleka: the headmen genuinely desired to maintain their long-established national customs; they wished, by obliging the missionaries to get the prior consent of the Ngqika chiefs, to reprove the Rarabe section for having accepted missions in their territory without having first obtained at least the agreement of their senior, Hintsa, and, in the third place, the other chiefs' agreement to consider and decide on the issue would be tantamount to acknowledging Hintsa's superiority. The Wesleyan plea was then not being decided on what might be termed its evangelical merits, but as part of a broader political contest in which they had conveniently appeared as pawns. Neither Hintsa nor his advisers could be blamed, however, for taking advantage of the opportunity that played into their hands: caution and expediency demanded that they make no precipitate move, and they obeyed their instincts. Would any white nation have done less?

When the decision was made known, Shaw and his companions determined to send their own interpreters as observers and reporters with any embassy that should be despatched by Hintsa to the Rarabe chiefs. But this proved a useless refinement when the chief invited them to constitute the embassage, and placed no obstacle in the way of their persuading Ngqika and Ndlambe to agree to the setting up of a mission with the Gcaleka. What could the missionaries do but accede to the suggestion and be grateful for the freedom of persuasion that it

accorded them? They regretted the delay in fulfilling their plans, and Shrewsbury, the most personally concerned in the whole affair, chafed at the postponement of his residence among a people to whom he had already dedicated himself; but they could only retire with as much dignity as they could muster and set about breaking the impasse that confronted them.[1]

The negotiators' return journey, begun on December 14, proved strenuous for the rains set in, the tracks were slippery, and their wagon overturned twice before they drew into Ndlambe's village two days later. But they felt somewhat rewarded for their exertions and discomforts when they found that in addition to the old chief and his sons they were able to meet Ngqika who had arrived at Ndlambe's since they had passed through eight days beforehand. There, under one roof, as it were, were all the authorities whose blessing was needed for resolving the Butterworth stalemate. Surely their troubles would soon be over! But Ngqika had other ideas: he refused, quite wisely, to come to any decision until he had consulted his councillors. Had he taken any other course he would have risked a head-on collision with his headmen and lack of tribal support in the event of a clash with Hintsa over the missionary question. The petitioners must therefore visit him at his kraal. This the missionaries refused to do at the time. Not being as well versed in Xhosa customs as they were in after years they felt they were going round in circles and that their request was being bandied from one chief to another in an effort to avoid any definite decision. In this, as hindsight clearly shows, they were wrong, but they can hardly be blamed for giving up in some disgust and steering the straightest possible course for Mount Coke and Wesleyville where they arrived on the evening of December 16 after an absence of thirteen days.

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[1] The Shrewsbury Journal, given in WMM 1827, pp.562,563 and 638, 639, is the base for the fuller narrative of the above events in Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.229-244 and SMM pp.478-482.

The death of Shaw's recently-born child, and the illness of John Davis delayed further moves for several weeks. It was March before Shrewsbury could accompany Shaw on another visit to Chief Ngqika, only to find him away. They therefore took the opportunity to visit the Chumie and Lovedale missions, about twenty miles from the chief's kraal, and on their return met Ngqika and re-opened the subject of his agreement to their working among Hintsa's people. This raised the question of his own attitude to Christianity, and he confessed that some years beforehand (a probable reference to Joseph Williams' ministry, 1816-18) he had been favourable to the Christian message but had been persuaded against it by his headmen, doubtless on political grounds. Nevertheless, although he himself was not prepared to yield to the missionaries' appeals, he was ready to support their request to Hintsa. This spelt progress, and the applicants were satisfied that part of their objective had been achieved--by 19 March 1827, almost exactly two years after Shaw and Whitworth had set out on the first journey that took them to the Gcaleka.

On their return to Wesleyville they found that Major W.B. Dundas, the Landdrost of Albany, had passed through the mission on his way to visit Hintsa in the interests of Colonial-Xhosa relationships. He promised to speak favourably of the mission project although he was personally sceptical of their being able to accomplish much good in such a venture, for, as he said to Shrewsbury: "I look upon your going to attempt it [the conversion of Hintsa and his subjects] as a work of desperation." Whatever his doubts as to the Wesleyans' success, he fulfilled his word and managed to impress the chief with the desirability of having a mission within his borders.[1]

In less than a month the two ministers were again calling on Ngqika, but their reception was less cordial than on the previous occasion for the chief's main concern seemed to be the acquisition of brandy, and when the missionaries refused to humour him, he was

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[1] Shrewsbury, Journal, 14 Dec. 1826-31 March 1827, WMM 1827, pp.639, 775-78; Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.244-55.

angry and abruptly closed the conversations. It was then unlikely that the united agreement of Ngqika and Ndlambe to the Methodist proposal would ever be gained, so the would-be diplomats went back to Wesleyville and planned another type of campaign. Seeing that it was very difficult, if not impossible to get the stipulated permissions they decided to go ahead without them and to settle Shrewsbury on a Transkeian site, hoping to receive Hintsa's blessing on the fait accompli. The morality of such a procedure was certainly open to question, for how could they justify their moving on to another's property without his consent, and without having fulfilled the conditions he had expressly laid down? The plan, no matter how expedient it seemed, smacked of clerical imperialism, and did not square with theoretical respect for the rights of the Gcaleka over what was unquestionably their own land. This squatter technique seems alien to Shaw's policy, and it is possible that he allowed Shrewsbury's understandable impatience and his excessive zeal to persuade him to an act that his better judgment would otherwise have scorned. Since the fullest records of the move come from Shrewsbury's hand it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion and definitely apportion responsibility for this particular piece of strategy, but the initiative may have come from the appointee who was eager to enter his parish.

2. The Third Link. By 14 May 1827 the talking was over and the Rev. and Mrs. Shrewsbury, with their family and servants, moved out of Wesleyville after a stay of six months. They were accompanied by the indefatiguable Shaw and the artisan Tainton who was released from service at Mount Coke to help set up the new mission. When the initial stages were over it was planned that Shepstone should join the staff at Butterworth while Tainton returned to his former post.

The domestic convoy moved slowly, and two weeks passed before it came in sight of Hintsa's kraal. The chief was not at home so there was no formal protest to the missionaries' unloading their possessions and setting up house on the spot they had chosen. On inquiry

they learned that Hintsa was still waiting for his councillors to come to a decision on the Methodists' request, but that one very old headman, a councillor of the chief's father, was strongly in favour of the white men's coming. On the strength of this report, and judging that such an opinion, coming from a hoary head, would carry much weight in tribal councils, the missionaries decided to stay. On June 4 they erected a temporary cottage, and moved into the new home on the 12th. By June 21 they expressed their own certainty respecting the future by beginning to plough for the sowing of crops, but this confidence was not shared by all the local people for one of the headmen questioned the wisdom of their act, believing that Hintsa would not allow them to remain, and many of the onlookers had great doubts about the permanency of their tenure of the land on which they had chosen to settle. These doubts were expressed in a more ominous way when all who at first had agreed to help the Europeans laid down their tools and left the newcomers to their own resources. It was obvious that Hintsa's subjects had made careful inquiries to determine the direction of the prevailing political wind and, deciding that this was not favourable to the self-invited missionaries, were playing safe until the wishes of the chief and his council were clearly known.

Shrewsbury and his entourage were unhampered by any such caution, however. They had received no unequivocal rejection of their proposals and were confident that time would produce the desired consent. In this assurance they laid the foundations of a normal mission programme. On Sunday June 24 they held a public service at which twenty were present; the next day they opened school for the missionaries' own children and the three belonging to the interpreter, Peter, a man who was reported to be "greatly affected by the Gospel." These unpretentious beginnings were closely watched by the local residents, some of whom lost their initial fear and, coming with greater and greater regularity to hear what the missionary was talking about, formed the nucleus

around which larger congregations were slowly built.

Shaw had remained with the party long enough to see that it had reasonable prospects of success, then, after a month's absence he returned to Wesleyville and sent Shepstone to relieve Tainton. The Butterworth party was then left to develop its position as strongly and as rapidly as circumstances would permit.

The site of the mission lay about one mile from Hintsa's own residence, was well supplied with water, and had rich grazing lands nearby. According to the first estimate it was reckoned to be set about 40 miles from the coast, 110 miles from Wesleyville, and 210 miles from Grahamstown;[1] but these calculations, made on horseback by weary prospectors, were modified by later geographers to 30, 70, and 160 miles respectively. But even these reductions cannot disguise the fact that in settling with Hintsa the Wesleyans had made a great stride toward Port Natal which now lay only as far to the north-east of Butterworth as the mission lay in the same direction from Grahamstown. The Methodists were half-way toward their goal!

Meanwhile, Hintsa was playing a cautious hand. Two months elapsed before he interviewed the missionaries and cautiously expressed approval of their coming while at the same time refusing to forward a letter from the government to Lt.Farewell in Port Natal on the grounds that he knew nothing of the tribes that lay beyond his own and would not be responsible for the safety of any communication after it had left his own hands. He was plainly anxious not to commit himself to a policy that might compromise him in the eyes of his neighbours. Within four days, however, on August 3, he and thirty of his councillors paid a visit to the missionaries' encampment and discussed their position during a four-hour talk. He still gave no definite permission for the continuance of their work, but neither did he demand their with-

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[1] Shrewsbury, Journal, 31 Dec.1826, WMM 1827, p.492; Kay, Travels, p.267.

drawal. On the following day he returned and showed a friendliness that grew warmer still when Shrewsbury presented him with gifts on behalf of the Missionary Committee, which gives rise to the suspicion that if the customary exchange of presents had taken place earlier, and if the gifts had been commensurate with Hintsa's rank, the chief's favour would not have been so difficult to obtain. The facts are that when protocal had been satisfied, recognition of the mission, on a most generous scale, rapidly followed. On August 9, Shrewsbury recorded in his journal that "Hintsa has given the most solemn and formal establishment possible to the mission, so that, so far as human acts go, nothing more can be desired to render it permanent."[1] This glowing report was no product of a foolish optimism but arose from a formal act that had taken place that same day. "Hintsa," wrote Shrewsbury in the same entry,

> adopted us into that house (his father's) or family; yea, and constituted us the head of it: and these councillors (his father's) were appointed to be our guardians, and from them were we to seek redress for every wrong.

The significance of this act of Hintsa's was stressed by Shepstone in words that were recorded in the journal of John Davis:

> 'It is impossible,' says Mr. Shepstone, 'for anyone who has not laboured in Caffreland to know all the advantages that will arise from this circumstance. It assures to them full protection, and gives them free access to all the people. Hintsa is often at the mission residence and appears free and friendly; he says, he should be more so, if he knew the children had plenty of milk and food: "But," says he, "this will be by and by." This implies that he intends supplying the Mission gratis with such things as he has. 2

Such a signal favour, never before enjoyed by any foreigner among the Xhosa, made elation excusable and justified the optimism with which the white party now viewed their prospects. Secure in the great chief's approval, and enjoying the respect due to members of the royal family, they could look forward to developing a strong

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.264. The story of the Wesleyan arrival and settlement at Butterworth is given in pp.256-264.

[2] 21 Aug.1827, WMM 1828, pp.202,203.

third link in their lengthening chain. With confidence, therefore, they collected stone and dug the foundations of a small chapel and saw immediate benefit from official favour in the cheerful service rendered by the local people. Due to other activities, the building of the chapel was delayed, and it was not until December 4 that the foundation stone was laid, but the occasion was then marked by a memorable ceremony. The mission director explained it as follows:

> To help as much as in us lies to abolish from the face of the earth those vile distinctions arising from caste, ... we selected from the congregation to unite in laying the foundation stone, one man out of every tribe or nation then present, as a representative of the rest. It was singular to find in this retired spot of the world a union of eight nations or tribes.1

It looked as if the hopes concerning Butterworth's wide influence were going to be fulfilled from the beginning. When, less than two weeks after the foundation ceremony, the chapel area proved to be too small for the congregation and many listeners had to be accommodated outside its walls, hopes rose higher still. The number of residents around the mission increased; those who attended the services began to distinguish Sunday from the other days of the week, and many forsook practices which the missionary declared to immoral. Six families moved on to the mission property and formed the nucleus of a Christian village - polygamy was abandoned, and peaceful behaviour became the rule rather the exception. The celebration, early in May 1828, of the first Christian wedding between a local couple, whom some humorist named Cupid and Gritta, confirmed the chapel's popularity and set a pattern for future marriages.

But the preacher had had to wait until the middle of March before seeing the Gcaleka chief attend a Sunday service, and he was then wise enough in Xhosa ways to recognise that before Hintsa ever yielded himself to the mission's teachings there would be stiff

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[1] Mem.Shrewsbury, p.277. The nationalities or tribes represented were: English, Dutch, Bushman, Hottentot, Xhosa, Fingo, Batavian, and Mozambique.

resistance from the many pagan customs to which he was so firmly attached. In this stand, the chief would be supported by his councillors and by his subjects' own propensities, for, as the missionary observed, "the most discouraging fact is the licentiousness of the people, which exceeds all description." There were others, however, who heard the call to a higher morality and, joining the small class of catechumens formed by Shrewsbury, received regular instruction in the Christian way of life. When Shaw, accompanied by the Revs. J. Brownlee, S. Young, and J. Davis, opened the completed chapel on 22 June 1828, four people, three men and a woman, confessed their new-found faith and were baptized as the first first-fruits from Butterworth, one year after its foundation.[1]

But the building of a chapel had not occupied all of Shrewsbury's time and energy. No sooner were the foundations dug than he left on a trip to Bomvanaland that opened the way for the eventual establishment of another mission. On his return, he devoted himself to extending the spiritual influence of the Butterworth station, and to this end, on the first Sunday in September 1827, conducted the first sacramental service in the Transkei. It was on that occasion that he initiated the natives into the pleasurable discipline of giving, and received, as an offering, one hundred strings of beads, thirteen ear-beads, and two buttons--total value, six shillings and fourpence (1827 value)-- a remarkable sum from such a primitive congregation.

Those were also the days in which Shrewsbury established his reputation as an itinerant. He formed the habit of spending every fourth week in travelling, first throughout the neighbouring villages, then to the more distant sections of Hintsa's country. This entailed continual travel, for the pastoral occupation of the people led them to live in scattered kraals that sheltered only ten

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.278-290; SMM, p.491.

to twenty families. In visiting these, he tried to live as they lived; he shared their diet of milk and corn, slept in their huts, and tried to get very close to their modes of thought. His congregations were naturally small--groups of six to twenty people formed the average audience, but he adapted his ways to theirs and, with enlightenment that was rare for his day, limited the length of his extempore sermons to ten minutes, thereby doubtlessly increasing the chance of his messages being understood in addition to earning the gratitude of his listeners. In October of his first year of residence with the Gcaleka, he preached in Hintsa's own kraal and, as he expressed it, saw the notably unresponsive chief bow his knees to God for the first time in all his fifty years.

The minister's travels also introduced him to classes of people whom he had never previously met, and in whom he became very interested. In his diary for 27 October 1827, there is this entry:

> At the extremity of Yalusa's (Nyaluza's) people, who is a great Chief, but subordinate to Hintsa, I preached to several Bushmen, mingled with the Caffres, whom Yalusa had taken in war. Amongst the Bushmen, polygamy is unknown. They are an acute, sagacious race of men; but their look betrays the utmost suspicion of everyone who approaches them. 1

The following day he passed a party of Fingos, and from their salutation of Umfundis (teacher) found that his own status was recognized far beyond the locality of the mission. Some days later his visits took him along the sea-coast where there had been a prolonged drought which rain-makers had turned to their own ends by declaring that no more rain would fall until the missionaries had been driven from the country. As the dry weather continued their confidence increased, but about nine days after Shrewsbury's arrival among them, the heavens opened, abundant rains fell, the rain-makers were confounded, and the missionary enjoyed a measure of popularity.

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[1] WMM 1828, p.633.

3. Butterworth and the Fingos. The opening of Butterworth brought the Wesleyans into immediate contact with a people of whom they had previously known very little, namely the Fingos.[1] Although Shaw had seen his first Fingo at Wesleyville in 1825, it was not until he visited Hintsa's kraal that he met a group of the people; then he found them to be the African equivalent of the Gibeonites who had deceived Israel during the settlement in Canaan[2]-- with this significant difference--the Fingos were genuine wanderers rather than cunning imposters. Their migration was recent enough for them to know that they had come from "west of Delagoa Bay" (as Shaw put it); and their language was recognizable as being akin to Kaffir or Khosa.[3] There was a large kraal of the migrant refugees within seven or eight miles of Hintsa's own headquarters, and therefore within easy reach of the mission; and on one of his early trips, Shrewsbury passed through two large kraals which were occupied entirely by Fingos. As the mission became known a large Fingo population flowed into Butterworth, and under missionary influence began to prosper. But their habits of husbandry aroused the cupidity of the Gcaleka, and led to their being fleeced. When normal methods of exaction failed to secure all their extortioners wanted, then they were accused of witchcraft and were tortured before being relieved of their goods.

An oppressed people are naturally susceptible to a teaching that promises an improvement in their condition. The Fingos saw their own salvation in Christianity and became willing listeners to the missionary's exhortations. When Shrewsbury perceived their interest he believed he had in his hands a powerful means of extending Methodist missions still further into undeveloped Africa:

> A people so humbled and depressed by war and its attendant calamities will probably receive the word with gladness of heart, and who can tell how far they may hereafter be instrumental in the conversion of their enemies and conquerors, and in

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[1] See Appendix IV for notes on the origin of the Fingos.

[2] Joshua 9.

[3] Mem.Shrewsbury, p.236; SMM pp.524-528.

> carrying the word of life to the distant tribes from whence [sic] they came. It is certainly a singular providence which has brought them in such numbers into Caffreland at the very time increased efforts are being made to spread the Gospel of Christ throughout its whole breadth and length.[1]

It was good that the Wesleyans made hay while the sun shone, for the more successful their ministry among the Fingos the more jealous Hintsa became of the favour they received and the prosperity they enjoyed. The day came, not long after Shrewsbury had left Butterworth, when the chief ordered all Fingos to move westwards to the Tsomo River, and threatened death to all who remained at the mission.[2] His menaces do not appear to have materialized thoroughly, for when D'Urban's forces crossed the Kei in April 1835, the mission was still thronged by those who were supposed to have been expelled. In its early days at least, Butterworth may be said to have been built upon a Fingo congregation. And what was true of one place became true of many, for in August 1830, Kay, writing from Butterworth, reported that "increasing numbers [of Amafingu, as he called them] are now to be found amongst the inhabitants of every mission village in Caffraria. ... They are obviously becoming the special objects of Missionary attention..."[3] The Fingos, refugees as they then were, and with most men's hands against them, were turning for acceptance to the one class of men who could be counted on to receive them. Their reception was never open to question, neither was it an act of despair--we'll take these because no others will come..; it was rather the fulfilment of the missionary's creed which bade him welcome any who were in need and any who were willing to listen to the message he was proclaiming. That the Fingos were willing to listen is no discredit to them, and that the Wesleyans did all they could for a rejected people confirms the integrity of their missionary service.

4. Butterworth and the Mfecane. But the martial thrusts that had sent the Fingos into Gcalekaland also brought other excitements to Methodist missions. As early as 31 July 1827 when he heard of the

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.236 .

[2] J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, History of the Abambo (Butterworth, 191 p.21.

[3] 8 Aug.1830, WMM 1831, p.502.

"Fikaanie" (Mfecane) inroads upon the district of Somerset, Shaw at Wesleyville was considering their effect upon his line of mission advance, and consoling himself with their distance from his establishments:

> Our stations, being along the line of the coast, are somewhat remote from the disturbed district; and we have, at present, no apprehension that the concerns of our Mission will sustain any interruption from these movements.[1]

His forecast proved correct for that year, but in less than twelve months his most advanced station, Butterworth, became the outpost for a firm bid to stop further encroachment on the tribes that insulated the Colony from Mfecane aggression.[2] It was Shrewsbury who sent to the Colony the first warning about the Mfecane irruption into the Transkei region;[3] and it was the Wesleyan missionaries bound for the dedication of the Butterworth chapel on June 22 who first saw the Gcaleka warriors running to answer Hintsa's call for the defence of their country against the invaders. Shrewsbury also became the medium through whom the news of Tshaka's threats (as they were then supposed to be) was passed on to Grahamstown. He learned that the enemy was incensed against Faku, but was planning a grand attack on Hintsa, saying: "I seek the head of Hintsa and the horses of the white people." The missionary became personally involved in the emergency when the Gcaleka came to sound out his probable attitude in the anticipated hostilities:

> Some of the councillors of Hintsa came to me a few days ago, and asked if I would accompany them to the field of battle, if the enemy advances amongst them. I replied, I must first provide for the safety of my family; but then I would stand by the Chief to the very last extremity. That I could not fight, for a Missionary's hands must not be stained with blood; but if the enemy would listen to arguments, and an interpreter would accompany me, I would do all in my power to prevent the miseries of war, and to promote, on both sides, the blessing of peace.

He then heard that the enemy was within 70 miles of the mission station, and about 20 miles from the place where Hintsa planned to

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[1] Wesleyville, 31 Aug. 1827, WMM 1828, p.125.

[2] For a summary of the 1828 Expedition against the Mfecane invaders, see Appendix V.

[3] See Appendix V, p.417 for the text of Shrewsbury's letter to Major Dundas.

give battle against the Mfecane, a plain near the Mbhashe River which was judged to be about 34 miles from Butterworth. The distances quoted are demonstrably unreliable, but do convey the fact that the invading force was uncomfortably close. This nearness, and the firm intention to attack Hintsa, were made still clearer by a vaunting message that the chief received from his foe: "... take care that all the cattle were fat, and in good condition, when they should come for them, three months hence."[1] It was understandable, in view of such threats and the fearsome reputation borne by Tshaka, that consternation reigned west of the Mbhashe, and that Xhosa and European saw the urgent need of putting their common house in order.

Yet, in the midst of such commotion, the Methodists calmly promoted the expansion of their mission programme! After the dedication at Butterworth, the Revs. Shaw, Davis, and Shrewsbury visited the Bomvana chief Mdepha, who lived near the Umtata, with a view to opening a mission among his people.[2] The troubled state of the country prevented their accomplishing all they intended, but the initial contact had been made, and on July 2 the visiting ministers, accompanied by Shepstone who was visiting the Colony to purchase supplies, returned to their several posts, leaving Shrewsbury to hold Butterworth during the exciting weeks that lay ahead. In mid-July he welcomed Major Dundas from Grahamstown and agreed to accompany him and his party when they advanced to meet the Mfecane. He therefore went as far as the Umtata, and witnessed the modest battle on July 26 when Dundas put the advance guard of the Ngwane to flight, and, on the basis of this brief encounter, became the defender of British military honour against the imputations that Kay was reputed to have made against it.[3]

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[1] These details are given by Shrewsbury, 30 June 1828, in WMM 1828, p.203, before the British engaged any of the enemy.

[2] Infra, pp.104,105.

[3] Dundas gave written expression to his appreciation of Shrewsbury's support: "I have also to state that I received much kind assistance and attention from the gentlemen at the several mission stations in Caffreland; and to Mr.Shrewsbury in particular, who accompanied me as far as the Umtata River, and who gave me much useful and interesting information, I am more especially indebted." IBB XXXIX.50.252, p.33. Dundas to Lt. Col. Bell, from Grahamstown, 15 Aug. 1828.

Not long after Dundas' return to Grahamstown Shrewsbury received a letter from the Major urging him to move nearer the Colony for Tshaka was advancing and the mission would be unsafe for him and his family. While the missionary appreciated the advice and the friendly thought that prompted it, he did not follow the counsel but stayed by his post. A few days later the little community had news of the approach of a large contingent under the command of Col. Somerset. This was the expeditionary force, appointed by the colonial government to answer the tribes' appeal for military aid. Its appearance brought hope to Gcaleka and Thembu hearts, and the disciplined conduct of the troops earned increased respect for British arms. To the soldiers, the mission station with its white-washed buildings must have seemed a veritable oasis of civilization in a primitive wilderness, and they gratefully shared in the religious services which were held during the weekend they passed through the station. The missionary reported that "our chapel was filled with British troops and their officers, listening with deep attention to the word of God"; and at the same time noted that his teachings were having some effect on the natives for they not only prayed for their British benefactors, but also for the advancing enemy, with special mention of the arch-enemy, Tshaka, by name.[1]

In little more than a fortnight the return of Somerset and his troops brought news of victory over the Ngwane at Mbholompo, and the enemy's retreat towards Zululand. To the dedicated mind of Shrewsbury, this represented a providential opening into an area that had hitherto been closed, and he commented: "Those events which seemed unfavourable to the enlargement of Missions are evidently paving their way, and will facilitate their progress." When, towards the end of September, an embassy from the Ngwane chief Matiwane visited Vusani, asking for a tract of country just above Hintsa's boundary, the enterprising missionary was immediately ready to include the defeated newcomers in his circuit, and

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[1]Shrewsbury, 30 Sept. 1828, WMM 1829, pp.350,351.

even anticipated the extension of his parish to Delagoa Bay when peace should have been made with Tshaka.[1] This eagerness for advance accorded with the outlook of his superior, for on October 11, after hearing Shrewsbury's news, Shaw at Wesleyville surveyed the situation and decided:

> The whole line of coast, even as far as Delagoa Bay, may be regarded as now open to us. Our duty appears plainly to be that of extending the Mission from tribe to tribe, until we reach the utmost limit of this tract of country. Divine Providence seems especially to have called the Wesleyan Missionary Society to be one of the principal instruments in communicating the light of the Gospel to the heathen tribes who inhabit the coast country, from the Keiskama to Delagoa Bay.[2]

In the light of subsequent events this vision proved over-optimistic. Tshaka indeed had died,[3] but the repercussions of his policies rumbled through Kaffraria long after his death, and continued seriously to disturb the very areas where Shaw was planning to plant his missions. At the time of an exploratory trip to Mdepa and Faku in May 1829 the missionaries found that the people who had been scattered by the Mfecane incursions were returning to re-occupy their own lands, but, almost simultaneously they were obliged to report that a minor chief, Gezana, was attacking the Bomvana and undermining Mdepha's position. The integrity of the Transkeian tribes was disrupted and large numbers of the people were wandering as sheep without a shepherd. This condition made them eager to receive a missionary in the hope that he would be a unifying, stabilizing factor; but the very circumstances that favoured the mission prevented its establishment. Neither did the situation improve with the passing months. From August onwards there were an increasing number of reports concerning Mfecane attacks, first on the Mpondo, then on the Bomvana. The full story

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[1] Ibid.

[2] WMM 1829, p.567.

[3] Shrewsbury was one of the first Europeans outside of Natal to learn of the murder of the Zulu king. He passed the news to Shaw at Wesleyville by 10 Nov. 1828. WMM 1829, p.634.

may better be told in connection with the early days of Morley, the station set up by Shepstone in May, while all that is needed at this juncture is to record the abandonment of the new mission late in October and Shepstone's withdrawal to comparative safety among the Thembu. Thus, almost exactly twelve months after Shaw's hopeful forecast of the prospects that opened before the Methodists, Butterworth was again their farthest outpost.

5. Sunlight and Shadow. Life in Butterworth had not been standing still during those twelve troubled months. There was a constant coming and going on the station, and a steady, though slow, development of the mission. A few weeks after the battle of Mbholompo, Shrewsbury took his wife to Grahamstown where, on November 14, she gave birth to a son. Early in the new year (1829) Shepstone left to attend the annual district meeting in the same town and to prepare for opening the new mission among the Bomvana. When Shrewsbury followed him five days later Butterworth remained in the care of Nicholas Lochenberg, a friendly non-Methodist Dutchman who had already spent more than twenty years in exile from his fellow-countrymen, and was then living in semi-native style as a sub-chief among the Gcaleka. In April, eight shipwrecked French sailors from L'Eccle of Calcutta reached the mission and told how an English trader had sheltered them when coastal natives had threatened to kill them, and how Hintsa and his brother Bhukru had come on the scene and had personally supervised measures for their safety in a conscious effort to practise the missionaries' teaching.[1] Another break in their isolation came in September when Lt.Farewell and his party passed through Butterworth on their way to settle at Port Natal, but any pleasure derived from such a visit was lost in the news of the murder of the party five weeks after it had left the mission.

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[1]Hintsa received a tangible reward for his virtue: Sir Lowry Cole sent him a personal expression of thanks and, by the hand of Kay, presented him with several useful gifts in a ceremony at the mission village on 7 April 1830. Kay, Travels, p.267.

The Wesleyans hardly needed such a grim reminder of the violent milieu in which their lot was cast, for ample evidence of its character was offered them within a stone's throw of their own residence. Shrewsbury's journal for September 21 of the same year, 1829, tells of a sick babe that had been thrown under a bush to die. When found, the infant had lain four days exposed to wintry weather and possible visits from wolves (jackals?), and the missionary hardly expected the mite to live; but patient care saved its life and added another member to the mission family. On several occasions European workers rescued old women who had been abandoned in the bush, too weak to work, and too ill to fend for themselves. At other times the missionaries poured all their slender medical skill into the healing of those who had been tortured by having heated stones placed on the body's tenderest parts that they might confess to having bewitched a chief or some other prominent person. This custom of "eating up", one of the great curses of Kaffraria, was one against which the missionaries exerted their strongest pressure, but often without avail. All too frequently they were compelled to stand aside while an unfortunate was robbed of wealth and life in this diabolical manner. When they tried to interfere, as did Shrewsbury when he rebuked Hintsa and his headmen for bringing about the death of a man and his wife and son for the sake of their cattle, as the missionary believed, they were told not to meddle for "it is the custom of our country." At such times the Christian worker grew heart-sick, and wondered if he would ever civilize the pagans he had come to uplift.

Yet, through the clouds of ignorance, fear, and superstition, rays of light occasionally gleamed. There was the time when Shepstone overheard local natives defending the mission and the Christian religion from their detractors, and there came the red-letter day of Christmas 1829 when Butterworth's first Fingo convert, one Richard Watson, twenty-one years of age, was baptized and publicly joined the Christian church.

This was a courageous act on the Fingo's part, and was carried out in the face of open and covert opposition from tribal opinion. Would-be adherents to mission teaching were warned of social consequences of confessing Christ's name, or were mocked as being mad.[1] In spite of such discouragements baptisms did take place, but at so slow a rate that there were no grounds for alleging a wholesale conversion of Fingos seeking to escape Hintsa's oppression. By February 1830, the total membership stood at sixteen, but the quality of these few appears to have been of a high order, for when John Ayliff came to the mission later in the same year he was impressed by the sincerity of the converts and the depth of their understanding of Christian ethics and doctrine.[2]

Shrewsbury had family troubles to contend with in addition to administrative burdens. His wife's health was never robust, and the privations endured in the early days at Butterworth, when they lived for months in temporary and unsatisfactory dwellings, made her subject to rheumatism and induced ophthalmia. These complaints, coupled with frequent child-bearing, further reduced her energies and made it desirable for her to be within closer reach of medical help than she could be at Butterworth. Therefore, in January 1830 the Shrewsbury family moved to Mount Coke, closer to Grahamstown, after nearly three years' service among Hintsa's people.

At the sixth Annual Meeting for the Albany District, held in the de facto capital of the eastern frontier territory on 11 February 1830, it was noted that Kay, who had been serving in Somerset East, had replaced the Shrewsburys at Butterworth, but it was also understood that his term there would be brief since he intended returning to England toward the end of the year. Action was taken to ensure that

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[1] Shaw, Journal, 4 Jan. 1829, WMM 1829, p.634, and Shrewsbury, Journal, 4 Jan. - 25 Dec. of the same year(WMM 1830, pp.838-843)give enlightening cross-sections of life at Butterworth during that period.

[2] ADM 1830; and J. Ayliff, Butterworth, 13 Dec. 1830, WMM 1831, p.643.

Ayliff, who had followed Kay at Somerset East, would then take over his responsibilities beyond the Kei. In keeping with Wesleyan reticence concerning Kay, who seems to have kept himself apart from the body of his brethren, Shrewsbury made no mention of Kay's succeeding him, but spoke as if Ayliff were his immediate successor. From Kay's own journal, however, it is clear that he vigorously continued the work at Butterworth and made special efforts to draw Hintsa into the gospel net, but with little success. The heathen chief attended divine service, but gained no pleasure from worship; he found prayer a hard exercise, attempts at reverence sat on him like penance, and when the Ten Commandments were presented as a standard of conduct he was visibly uneasy--a hardly surprising reaction in view of his habit of forcibly taking young girls, between ten and twelve years of age, into his harem, in addition to his octet of wives.[1] When the minister rebuked him for his cattle-raiding and destruction of property, he shook off the sermonette and walked sneeringly away. On another occasion, however, the words fell on more receptive ears:

> ... (he) represented to Bookoo (Bhukru) (in the presence of Hintsa)... the evil consequences likely to result from the predatory system still persisted in by certain parties of his people, who had been committing very serious depredations upon the frontier colonists. Agreeably to my request, he promised to warn them of their danger, and to take such steps as might tend to prevent similar deeds in future, so that peace might be preserved in the land.2

The intricacies of European-Xhosa relationships are revealed by an incident that occurred during Kay's directorship of Butterworth. A colonial commando attacked several native villages in the vicinity of the Buffalo River, in the course of efforts to recover stolen cattle. One chief had been shot and another taken prisoner, in addition to twelve or thirteen humbler casualties. News of the clash spread like wildfire through Kaffraria and soon reached Butterworth, eighty or ninety miles from the scene of action, where "the most exaggerated and romantic

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[1] Ayliff speaks of Hintsa as being a very trying person with whom to deal--changeable, unpredictable, dominated by witchcraft, and so violently moody that people went in constant fear of him. Butterworth, 31 Dec. 1832, WMM 1834, p.224.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.284.

stories obtained full credence," reported Kay. The missionary was asked by Commissioner-General Stockenstrom to allay Hintsa's fears of colonial aggression, but it then came out that two years previously a party of Boers had warned the chief that the Wesleyans' "establishment of a Mission in his territory had no good end in view, being merely designed as a snare for his person, and likewise for his people; who, when tamed by the Missionaries would be taken for soldiers by the British Government." Nicholas Lochenberg had then sought to set the chief's fears at rest, and had warned him of Boer designs on his territory; but now the old fears were re-awakened and seemed confirmed. An especially damning fact was pressed upon Hintsa to the effect that no mission village had been disturbed by the commando, and the chief's councillors used this to prejudice him still further against the mission on his own doorstep, and it even looked for a time as if vengeance would be wreaked on Butterworth; but when it became clear that the colonials were only interested in recovering and restoring stolen cattle, fears were allayed, and the alarm subsided.[1] Such upsets made the pacific task of the missionary still harder, however, and Hintsa can be pardoned in after years for thinking that his suspicions of colonial intentions were not altogether unjustified.

Nevertheless, in spite of opposition from tribal leaders, Christian teaching progressed. On Ayliff's arrival towards the end of September he found people wanting to abandon their customary nakedness and acquire rudimentary clothing; some had the ambition to build small cottages instead of the usual round huts; the plough was making its way in agriculture; and girls were ready to attend sewing-classes conducted by Mrs. Ayliff.[2] Before a year had passed he found signs of religious revival and saw improvement in the spiritual state of his congregations.[3] The baptized membership of the mission never went higher than twenty-two

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[1] Ibid., 302-305; and Journal, 21 June and 10 July 1830, WMM 1831, pp.127,355.

[2] Ayliff, 13 Dec. 1830, WMM 1831, p.642.

[3] Ayliff, 29 July 1831, WMM 1832, p.57.

prior to the outbreak of war in 1835, but the frequent political disturbances and the almost constant antagonism of Hintsa and his councillors must be considered when assessing the mission's achievements. Furthermore, its influence cannot be gauged solely in numerical terms, especially in view of Wesleyan caution in adding converts to the church roll, but it may be reasonably assumed that hundreds of Gcaleka were moulded by the Christian spirit that radiated from Butterworth. In addition, its position made it the key to all that lay beyond in the direction in which the Methodists wished to develop.

For almost five years, from September 1830 until May 1835, Butterworth was directed by John Ayliff. We may well pause, then, to trace the history of the man who stood at the crossroads of so much Xhosa and Wesleyan mission history. Although his name does not appear on any of the three lists of Settlers, he came out from England in 1819 as a passenger on the Belle Alliance, on which vessel he was married at the age of twenty-three. On arrival in South Africa he successively became a clerk in the Ordnance Store, a farmer in Albany, a manager of the stores at Somerset Government Farm, and a teacher in Grahamstown--so it cannot be said that he lacked experience![1]

In England Ayliff had been a Methodist and a local preacher, so it was not surprising that when once he was in Albany he was soon discovered by Shaw and enlisted first for conducting services among the scattered settlers, then, when communities had taken root, at Somerset East and Grahamstown. So faithfully did he fulfil his calling that in 1827 he, with W.J. Shepstone, and contrary to regular denominational policy respecting men with families, was invited into full-time ministry on a probationary basis--"travelling", in Wesleyan parlance. He continued to serve within the colonial boundary until 1830 when Shrewsbury's removal

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[1] Goldswain Chronicle I, List of Settlers with Biographical Notes, p.138. In the case of Ayliff, the notes are not entirely accurate: he was not "ordained" as a missionary of the W.M. Church in 1827, but merely employed on a probationary basis; and he was not appointed to Butterworth in 1831 but in 1830 as noted above. For other details the student is referred to ADM 1830 and 1831.

to Mount Coke and Kay's move to Butterworth led to his being called first to Somerset East, and then to Butterworth itself on Kay's departure for England. A year later, at the district meeting in February 1831, he and Shepstone were ordained as regular ministers of the Gospel according to Methodist custom. By then he had given four year's proof of his ministry, and had served more than eleven years as a Wesleyan preacher in South Africa. When he died in 1862, he had given over forty years of service to the Methodist cause.

From the beginning of his work at Butterworth his sympathies were aroused on behalf of the Fingos.

> He became not only their pastor and teacher, but he watched over their interests with untiring vigilance, and was largely instrumental in delivering them from their oppressive bondage. The Fingos were deeply grateful, and for nearly a century [written in 1912] they have throned the name of Ayliff in their hearts as one of the greatest of their benefactors. 1

It will later be seen that others were to dispute with Ayliff the title of deliverer, and other, less flattering estimates of his character were made by both Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Col.Harry Smith--but in the interim the point can be made that he was undoubtedly loved by the people whom he so devotedly served. Secure in that affection, he can be left to pursue his ministry as a neighbour of Hintsa's, while the story of the extension of Methodist missions in South East Africa is taken a few stages further.

II. MORLEY

The history of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society demonstrates that the organism contained its own genius for expansion, and that its leaders whole-heartedly shared the outlook of its founder who declared: "The world is my parish." Other lesser impulses also operated, increasing the number of missions and enlarging the field they served. Mild, almost fraternal competition with other societies was one such impulse that played a part in multiplying the number of stations and quickening the rate of their establishment. In retrospect, that most brotherly of men,

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[1] J. Whiteside, in History of the Abambo by J. Ayliff and J. Whiteside, p.21.

William Shaw, could write:

> I am happy to say that since I entered Kaffraria, besides the Wesleyan Missions, there have been important and successful Missions established among the Amaxosa and Amatembu, or border tribes of Kaffirs, on the western or colonial side of the great river Kei, by the United Presbyterian Church, the Free Church of Scotland, the Moravian Mission, the London Missionary Society, the Berlin Society, and the Anglican Church. All the Missionaries work together as 'fellow labourers' in the common cause. Each Society pursues its own plan of usefulness, but the Missionaries generally display a brotherly feeling towards each other; and I believe they all rejoice in whatever success is gained on any Station, as so much strength added to the common force of Christianity in the country.1

This broad tolerance sat well on Shaw's shoulders as he looked back on thirty years of Wesleyan growth between the Great Fish and Mzimkhulu rivers, but it would be a misjudgment of human nature to take for granted that such a spirit always flowed between the various societies that were endeavouring to evangelize Kaffraria. A closer glimpse into the day by day motivations in mission strategy is afforded by Shrewsbury's remarks as he first passed between the Keiskamma and the Kei. After noting that there were no intermediate stations between Mount Coke and Hintsa's kraal[2], "though two eligible spots might be chosen, in the midst of a numerous population," he records his colleagues' decision to preach through that tract of country on their way to and from the quarterly district meetings.

> We shall then secure the ground for ourselves, and keep the --- [undoubtedly the L.M.S.] out, for whom, indeed, we have a sincere Christian affection, upon Methodist principles, being happy to find that they are successful, where, for want of labourers, our better system and doctrine cannot be introduced.3

1. Into Bomvanaland. This same desire to "secure the ground for ourselves" probably played its part in moves that were made beyond the Kei, for it was known that other societies were also hoping to get a foothold among the hitherto unentered tribes that lay between Hintsa

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[1] SMM, p.519.

[2] It has seemed strange that the Methodists should have left such a great gap, then reckoned at 105 miles, so early in their chain of stations, but Shrewsbury's comment shows that the missionaries were aware of the omission and hoped to remedy it at the earliest possible moment, even while continuing their drive toward Natal.

[3] Mem.Shrewsbury, p.237. In common with many other denominationalists, the doctrinaire Wesleyan had no doubts but that he and his co-religionists were the elect.

and Tshaka. It is not surprising, then, to learn that when Shrewsbury heard of an old chief, of European descent, who favoured the idea of having a missionary in his territory, he should act quickly to investigate the prospects for further advance. His informant was the same Nicholas Lochenberg who has already figured in the Butterworth story, who told of the descendants of three white women who had been shipwrecked higher up the east coast, near the mouth of the Mzimvubu, about 70 miles south of Port Natal, some time between 1745 and 1750.[1] One of the women, known to the Bomvana as Gquma, had three sons, the third of whom, Mdepha, became chief of the tribe, ruling in Bomvanaland between the Mbhashe and the Umtata. The tribe was then generally known to the Europeans as the Mambookies.[2] This Mdepha had a sister, in whose Khosa name the missionaries discerned the English word "Betsy", and who still spoke of her white mother. Mdepha himself, known to the Wesleyans as "Dapa", was getting on for eighty years of age, and had lost his manly vigour, but was eager to have a resident missionary within reach of his kraal.

On hearing of Mdepha's interest, Shrewsbury, with his committee's consent, lost no time in paying him a visit. The day after he had superintended the opening of the foundations for the Butterworth chapel (20 August 1827), and only two and a half months after his own arrival on the new station, he left the mission in Shepstone's care and, with Lochenberg as guide and sponsor, made a nine-day trip to see the old chief. On August 22 the travellers reached Lochenberg's own kraal, then crossed many small rivers before coming to the Mbhashe and, three days later, the "Umtati... or Sneezewood River." Two hours east of the Umtata they came to Mdepha's village, which they mistakenly judged, possibly on the false evidence of their own weariness, to be "at least

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[1] It was commonly supposed that the wreck was that of the Grosvenor, foundered on 4 Aug. 1782, but Shrewsbury corrected that misconception at the time of a later visit (30 June 1828). WMM 1829, p.204.

[2] J.H. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.329-333.

120 miles from Butterworth", but which more sober measurement reduced to 60 miles. The aging chief, very European in appearance, welcomed his white visitors and so earnestly asked for a missionary that Shrewsbury, on his return to Butterworth, reported the case to the district meeting, telling his brethren that "the door is wide open", and gained a vote that William Shaw should visit Mdepha to negotiate for the setting up of a mission in his territory.[1] A later sequel was a call from the annual district meeting, held in February 1828, to the Missionary Committee in London, for a minister to work with the Bomvana.[2] Shrewsbury's cup was running over; enthusiasm ran high; he saw his society making a great stride forward, and refused to share the fears of those who thought the Wesleyans were over-reaching themselves. "'Sir,' said a gentleman once to me, when a Mission to Dapa's tribe was first contemplated, 'you are extending your labours a great way up the country.' 'O Sir,' I replied, 'that far is nothing; I hope we shall go on until we come to Egypt.'"[3]

It looked as if the Bomvana were no less eager than the ardent missionary, for after allowing five months to pass from the time of the first missionary visit, and seeing no result from the call, Mdepha sent a special messenger to Butterworth during the first week in February, asking when his missionary might be expected, saying, "I am very ill; but let the Missionary come, that he may bury my bones." Shrewsbury was absent from the mission, attending the annual meeting in Grahamstown, but Shepstone wrote to him, saying:

> The anxiety of the Chief and of his people to receive a messenger of peace, is greater than ever. In fact, a contention has arisen between Dapa, and one of his principal men, relative to the place where the Missionary shall reside; each one arguing his special claim to the honour and privilege of having the Mission premises close beside his own kraal.

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[1] Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.266,267; SMM, pp.488-490; J. Davis, Journal, 21 Aug. 1827, WMM 1828, p.203.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.377.

[3] Shrewsbury, Mount Coke, 31 March 1831, WMM 1831, p.859.

Shepstone's own response to the appeal was that he would be the friend of all the chiefs, at which the messenger was very pleased.[1] The news of this eagerness was very sympathetically received by the committee in session, but unfortunately, there was no missionary to send to Mdepha. This set Shrewsbury to thinking on the matter of personnel, and he began urging that William Shepstone be released from Butterworth and appointed to fill the prospective post at the earliest opportunity that mission resources would permit. But the wheels of God, retarded by the limitations of His human instruments, moved very slowly, and Mdepha could be pardoned for doubting if a missionary would ever arrive. It was not until the time of the Mfecane alarms that Shaw was able to cross the Kei again, and it says much for the courage of the men that after opening the chapel at Butterworth on 22 June 1828 they--Shaw, Davis, and Shrewsbury--continued their journey eastward. They soon fell in with Lochenberg who went with them to the coast, passing by Mazeppa Bay, and meeting Hintsa at one of his distant kraals. It was hoped that the coastal route would keep them clear of the Mfecane invaders, and in this they were correct: they met no warriors, and saw very few people--the population had gone into hiding.

On the fourth day of their trip the travellers met Mdepha, on the banks of the Mnanga, a few miles west of the Umtata. They were not the old man's first visitors: the Mfecane had been in the neighbourhood only eight days previously and had left the whole countryside in confusion. The raiders had retired toward the Mzimkhulu but, having met advance parties of other marauding tribes who had also been set in motion by Tshaka's troops, they were returning, falling back upon the Umtata with the avowed intent of taking back "the scalps of Faku, of Vusani, and of Hintsa, as also some hair, horses, and muskets of white men."[2]

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[1]Shepstone to Shrewsbury, from Butterworth, (n.d.), WMM 1828, p.568; Mem.Shrewsbury, p.279; Kay, Travels, p.377.

[2]Shrewsbury, Journal, 25-28 June 1828, WMM 1829, pp.492, 563-5.

The main brunt of the most recent Mfecane attacks had fallen on Faku and the neighbouring chief Myeki, while Mdepha had escaped the enemy's direct attention. This neglect brought him small comfort, however, for he had abandoned his home, and when the missionaries found him, was a miserable, fearful old man wandering on the west side of the Umtata, and willing to settle on any spot the missionaries might choose, provided that one of them would remain with him. He was pitiably eager for the personal presence of a minister, but this should not be solely ascribed to the exigencies of war, or to old age and ill health, for it must be remembered that he had been calling for a missionary for at least ten months by then. But the visitors had no man to leave behind them, and were able to offer the chief nothing more tangible than the promise that a worker would be sent as soon as they could expand their working force. With this assurance both sides had to rest content. Mdepha continued his peregrinations until the British victory over the Ngwane in August gave him some respite, while the Wesleyan party, unable to fulfil its further desire to visit Faku, returned to Butterworth by July 1.

The next move came from Wesleyville where, on December 20, Shaw received news that the London Committee sanctioned the establishment of an additional mission, in Bomvanaland.[1] Throughout the story of Methodist mission expansion in Southern Africa it is clear that the missionaries on the spot were most loyally supported by the home committ It was no case of local visionaries being sternly held in check by the holders of the purse-strings who were far from the firing line: those at the home base were just as eager for advance as were their represent ives in Kaffraria. In this instance, a request had gone to London from the Grahamstown meeting in February and within ten months, by December the same year, had been answered in the affirmative--speedy action in t days when letters from Albany took at least three and often four months

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[1] Ibid., p.634, 20 Dec. 1828.

reach England. On the strength of this response to their plea, for official consent meant that arrangements were being made for other missionaries to be sent to the Albany base, Shaw authorized the early attendance of Shepstone at the fifth annual district meeting, 1829. The prospective director of the proposed new station left Butterworth on January 13, five days before Shrewsbury's departure, and busied himself in Grahamstown with collecting supplies he would need in establishing an outpost some 70 miles east of the River Kei. During the committee meetings he was officially appointed to the new mission, the fourth in the chain, and plans were laid for Shaw and Shrewsbury to accompany him when he went to settle with the old Bomvana chief.

There was a heartening community of effort in these new Wesleyan ventures. The European and African members revealed a personal interest in the progress that was planned, and seemed just as eager for success as were the main characters. The expansive enthusiasm at the top spread through the ranks below and ensured such solid support for any forward move that those who pioneered new stations were amply sustained by those behind the front line. This spirit even spread to Africans who were not members of the church: Shaw records that Kama and Phatho made a money gift towards the cost of taking the Gospel to Mdepha!

2. The Fourth Link. On May 5 a valedictory service was held at Butterworth for those who were going to Morley, as the embryo mission was called.[1] The next day two wagons pulled away from the hollow where the Shepstones had lived for the previous two years; on board were Mr. and Mrs. Shepstone, Mr. & Mrs. Robinson, the young Salem converts who were to serve as assistants, and the senior ministers, Shaw and Shrewsbury. They traversed Vusani's territory but did not then meet the Thembu chief, although they would have liked an interview, having heard on the one hand that he was ready to receive a missionary, and on the other that the LMS were anxious to gain a foothold across the Kei among

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[1] In honour of one of the Society's senior secretaries. SMM pp.500-502; WMM 1829, p.707.

the Thembu. They also knew that the United Brethren, or Moravians, had already begun work, at the request of the colonial government, with a branch of the Thembu people two years before but had been forced to abandon their mission at Shiloh on account of the Mfecane disturbances. From a denominational point of view, therefore, there was little time to lose; but they could do nothing without first seeing Vusani, and since he was not within reach, they were obliged to pass on their way and leave their meeting with him to fortuitous circumstances that lay far beyond their ken.

The going was difficult and even dangerous for wagons since their route lay across the line of rivers, through rugged country where even today there are few main roads. It was not until their sixth day out from Butterworth that they crossed the Mbhashe and entered Bomvanaland. Then they received a message from Mdepha that he was awaiting them at the kraal of Wanda, or Quanda, his principal sub-chief. On their arrival at the rendezvous they were welcomed, but discovered that they were in the midst of tribal intrigue. Three chiefs, of varying degrees of authority, were each wanting the mission to be fixed in his own district. At first, the missionaries ignored the conflicting invitations and went about finding their own site, and having settled on a suitable spot, Ngcwanguba, where the Mfecane had encamped eleven months earlier, left Shepstone and Robinson to occupy the spot while the two ordained men went on in search of the Mpondo chief, Faku. Once again they found the locality disturbed by inter-tribal warfare: Gezana, a local chief, was attacking the outlying Bomvana kraals and striking fear into hearts that were only then beginning to recover from the Mfecane raid of the previous year. When the white envoys returned from Faku, however, they visited Gezana and found him more ready for peace than they had dared to hope. Their presence, though of short duration on this occasion, was already contributing to the tranquillity of the country.

When Shaw and Shrewsbury returned to Ngcwanguba they found a perplexed Shepstone who had abandoned the originally-chosen site and was being pulled in several directions by the insistent advice of rival

councillors. Eventually a Daniel came to judgment and it was decided that the mission should be sited at Amadola, or Amandola,[1] on a high ridge about five miles east of the Umtata, and sixteen miles from the sea. The position was watered by a dozen springs and surrounded by rich grasslands and wooded sections. Shaw, who by that time had travelled extensively through Kaffraria, declared that he had not seen any place in South Africa better suited for a village or town. The contending headmen must have seen the wisdom of the white Men's choice for they agreed to build new kraals around the mission which thus became, in Shrewsbury's words, "the centre of union to the whole tribe."

When they had seen the Shepstones and Robinsons safely settled in temporary qurters, the visiting ministers returned to Butterworth, and left the two isolated families to develop the opportunities that Morley held out to them.[2]

3. The Broken Link. To the newcomers' eyes, the mission held out stimulating opportunities for the fulfilment of their main purpose--the christianizing of the Bomvana tribe. The people had received them with such genuine warmth that Shrewsbury, in his flowery way, had remarked: "It is impossible to describe the universal gladness of the tribe on the arrival of their Missionary."[3] Mdepha and his closest associates had not only persisted in asking them to come, but had officially welcomed their arrival and were re-building tribal life around the missionaries' homes. A nearby chief, Khethani, a man of some considerable influence, had proved most helpful when the location of the mission was still a matter for dispute. This many-sided endorsement of the Wesleyan design stood in happy contrast to the suspicious, even antagonistic atmosphere in which Butterworth was set up, and was taken as an augury of success. When Shepstone

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[1] Mistakenly identified as Wilo by J.H. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, p.312, and on map in Transkeian Native Territories (Lovedale,1923) by Frank Brownlee. But the Wesleyans are very clear on its position east of the Umtata. See Kay, Travels, p.376; Boyce, 11 May 1830, WMM 1830, p.774-775, SMM, p.506. It would appear that Mdepha's jurisdiction extended some distance east of the Umtata at that time.

[2] The above account of the establishment of Morley is drawn from Shaw's Journals, WMM 1830, pp.56-63; Shrewsbury's Journals, Ibid., pp.838,839; SMM, pp.500-503; Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.292-315; Kay, Travels, pp.376-380.

[3] Shrewsbury, 30 June 1829, WMM 1830. p.127.

had had time to explore the surrounding countryside he found some 15,000 souls within a day's journey from the station, while within a greater radius, but still inside a practical evangelistic range, there lay a population of 30,000 people.

These favourable portents were rapidly out-balanced by calamities, however. On June 21, less than a month after the pioneers had been left to themselves, the artisan Robinson was killed by a falling tree while he was clearing ground for mission use. This was a bitter blow. It turned a nineteen-year old girl, a bride of three months, into a widow, and left Shepstone without the skilled manual help that was so essential in the erection of permanent buildings. It also laid a heavy moral and administrative burden on his shoulders, a burden which he had to bear alone until the middle of July when Shrewsbury arrived to care for the mission while he conducted the young widow to the comparative civilization of Wesleyville. Apart from the sorrow caused by the accident he had to reckon with the effect that so early and so swift a death would have on the superstitious Africans with whom he was surrounded: they would be ready to interpret the fatality as supernatural disapproval of the white man's work. Shepstone's continuance of the work revealed more than ordinary courage.[1] He was not left alone, however, for a Mr. Freemantle from the Colony was soon appointed to fill the deceased assistant's place.

Other tragedies affecting the mission followed hard on the heels of the first. Nicholas Lochenberg, having lived long among the Gcaleka, had become embroiled in the inter-tribal strife that swirled around Faku and Mdepha. With his white prestige and his still more powerful fire-arms, he was a valuable ally to the ill-protected Mpondo and Bomvana tribes who were under strong attacks from the Qwabe, a branch of the Mfecane. In the middle of July, the news reached Morley that Lochenberg had been killed during a skirmish between the contending parties. The Wesleyans thus lost a knowledgeable friend who had always proved helpful to their cause.[2]

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[1] Shrewsbury, Ibid.; Mem. Shrewsbury, p.320; Shaw, Journal, WMM 1829, p.851.

News of a greater though less intimate loss filtered through in October when it was learned that Lt.Farewell, with his companions Walker, Thackwray, and five natives, who had only a short time before passed through Butterworth and Morley on their way to Port Natal, had been treacherously murdered by the Qwabe under orders from their chief, Nkqetho.[1] This was serious intelligence, for what the chief had not hesitated to do to an armed party of Europeans he was unlikely to shrink from doing to a couple of non-combatant missionary families. Yet the news could hardly have taken Morley by surprise for from the time he began visiting around the mission, Shepstone had been aware of unrest, and a frequency of martial clashes that were worse than anything he had previously known. On August 1, when he had returned from taking Mrs. Robinson to Wesleyville, therefore, he was relieved to find his family safe, but was somewhat unprepared for the rumours of Mfecane attacks that were coming out of Faku's country. A week later he received a note from an unnamed English trader who was then staying with Faku in which he learned of increasing danger from marauders, and within three days he heard that the unwelcome visitors were only 45 miles from the mission. Worse tidings came on August 17: Faku had been driven from his base, and the enemy were converging on Morley in a pincer movement, one arm of which was advancing along the coast while the other was approaching from the north, down the Umtata.

For more than two weeks the tension continued. Information was scanty and unreliable, but the missionaries stayed at their post. The friendly chief, Khethani, assured them of his loyalty and of his military support in case they were attacked, but the Europeans recognized that if the Ngwane push reached them, no local power would save them from being overwhelmed. Then, at the beginning of September, came word from Faku that the enemy wanted peace but that this was regarded as a ruse to gain

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[1] Ibid., p.386, Shepstone, 26 Sept. and 15 Oct. 1829, WMM 1830, p.274; Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.324,331.

This Nkqetho, generally known to contemporary Europeans as Ceto, was a fugitive from Tshaka's successor Dingaan, and was seeking lebensraum near the Mzimvubu. His murder of the Farewell party was apparently not committed from motives of cupidity but as a self-protective measure against those whom he suspected of spying on behalf of Dingaan. See J.H. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.312,313.

time and ground for further attacks. Faku proposed a counter-deception, but this was discountenanced by the missionaries who refused to employ the devil's weapons even when fighting his cohorts. The passage of four more days to September 9 brought the report that Gezana, who lay to the east of Mdepha, under pressure from the Mfecane was planning to fall on the Bomvana leader, but increasing danger to himself from the foreign raiders led him to withdraw, and Mdepha was spared. Again there was a period of uncertainty, followed by the news that the Mfecane were once more on the move, and by September 25 they were reported to be within 30 miles of the mission. Although no actual invasion of Morley had taken place, the tribal upheavals had very real effects upon the life around the mission: poverty-stricken refugees poured into the area, food resources were strained beyond the local limits, and famine conditions spread over Bomvanaland.[1]

Such was the situation on September 26 when Lt.Farewell left Morley en route to Natal, and the position had not much changed, certainly not for the better, when, some nineteen days later, one of the natives from Farewell's group escaped back to the mission with the appalling news of the massacre of the lieutenant and his companions, even while they were trying to promote peace between the warring tribes. The threat to the isolated body of Europeans at Morley became more real. Nkqetho, emboldened by his success, decided to by-pass Faku and make a direct attack upon the Bomvana. This move brought him within striking distance of the station where the missionaries were, with understandable anxiety, trying to gauge the immediacy of the danger. It was not until they saw the flames that rose from burning huts that they abandoned the mission, filled two wagons with as many personal and domestic goods as they could carry, and crossed westwards over the Umtata to comparative safety among the Thembu.[2]

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[1] The above survey is drawn from Shepstone's Journal, 1 Aug. to 25 Sept. 1829, WMM 1830, pp.272,273.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.388; Shaw, 3 Nov. 1829, WMM 1830, p.274; SMM, pp.504,505.

This retreat was but sorry news for the man who had so doggedly sought to forge a chain of stations from the colonial frontier to Natal, but he had no intention of meekly yielding what he had so hardly gained. On receipt of the front-line reports he rode to Mount Coke and there consulted Young before sending Shrewsbury and Shepstone clear counsel in a letter dated November 3rd. He gave them the following sane advice: Shepstone and Freemantle were to stay between the Umtata and Mbhashe as long as possible in order to hold the line and obtain accurate news, but it would be wise to move Mrs. Shepstone and the children to Butterworth; Morley should be held, since retirement to Butterworth involved abandonment of Morley, though he did not want the missionaries to expose themselves to undue hazards; even if the Mfecane retired there was to be no rush into a re-settlement of the mission; and, finally, the men were to use their combined judgment for, being on the spot, they were better able to assess the situation.[1]

Such counsel fell on co-operative ears. The men on the far side of the Kei did not panic but steadfastly made the most of their limited opportunities without needlessly exposing themselves to danger. The Shepstone family, with Freemantle, continued to live in the two wagons under the protection of Vusani and his Thembu, and to cultivate the unentered field that lay all around them. But they mourned the interruption at Morley, for just prior to their flight they had built up a congregation numbering 150 hearers. As soon as was practicable, the leader of the party went back into Bomvanaland to find out how the land lay, and to discover the temper of the chiefs who had discreetly withdrawn when the mission was threatened by Nkqetho's advance. He found them rather shamefaced: they regretted having left the missionary circle to its fate, and were anxious to see it reinstated on a securer basis.

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[1] Shaw, 27 Nov. 1829, WMM 1830, pp.275,276.

Even while these exchanges were passing to and fro, the military and political situation between the Mbhashe and the Mzimvubu was changing. Faku found it impossible to rest with the warlike Nkgetho on his doorstep and recognized that a day of reckoning was necessary. By the turn of the year he had manoeuvred the Gwabe into a corner and inflicted an almost annihilating defeat upon them, news of which action reached Shrewsbury in Butterworth, by the mouth of an English trader, on 6 January 1830.[1] Nkqetho and the survivors retired into Natal where the chief fell a victim to Dingaan's jealous fears.

4. The Link Re-forged. The Methodists were never ones to allow grass to grow beneath their feet, and they did not dawdle on this occasion. By the beginning of January their Kaffrarian and Albany missionaries had foregathered at Grahamstown in readiness for the sixth annual district meeting which began on February 11. There the Morley situation was carefully revieved. The mission from which Shepstone had withdrawn was no more, for it had been burned soon after he had left, but the need for the mission still existed and its welcome was still assured. It was therefore voted that Shepstone and a recent addition to the ministerial ranks, Richard Haddy from England, who had already given able service in the Colony, should accompany the chairman, the Rev. Shaw, on a trip into Bomvanaland and neighbouring territories with a view to re-establishing Morley and to opening a fifth mission either with Faku or Vusani, as circumstances should dictate.[2]

Some administrative changes, that have been previously noted but that bear repetition at this juncture, took place in the Methodist camp. Shrewsbury moved to Mount Coke and became acting head of the organisation during Shaw's absence on his rehabilitating and exploratory tour; Kay temporarily took over the direction of Butterworth, although it appeared that John Ayliff had already been indicated as the one who

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.337; Shrewsbury, 16 April 1830, WMM 1830, p.634.

[2] ADM. 1830.

would eventually fill that position; and two recruits from the home country, Richard Haddy and William Boyce (how rich South African Methodism has been in its wealth of Williams!) were at the committee's disposal for reinforcement or advance.[1]

With his forces so satisfactorily marshalled, Shaw was free to embark on his Transkeian journey, and early in April pulled out of Grahamstown with those whom he hoped to place on the periphery of his extensive diocese. His first task was to re-settle Shepstone with Mdepha's tribe. By common consent the first site was abandoned, and a better location selected on high ground, a few miles west of the Umtata and within twenty miles of the sea. Here the climate was cool, the River Aweelo or Wilo ran nearby, deep ravines held richly fertile soil in their troughs while fine timber grew on their slopes. The ravines also provided natural hideouts for a dense population with whom the missionaries could work in reasonable safety.[2] The physical beauty of the neighbourhood impressed most visitors, one of whom, writing a few years later, said:

> And here also we rode hour after hour through a land of silence and desolation, where the Eland and the Hartebeeste range undisturbed over the sites of deserted or destroyed villages, and where the rank luxuriance of the vegetation impeded the progress of our horses. We reached Morley about 10 o'clock at night, after a journey that seemed as though it would never end.[3]

It was amid such surroundings that William Shepstone again went through the initial hardships inevitably associated with establishing a new mission. In addition, he found himself again surrounded by bickering chiefs, particularly Khethani and Qanda who kept the district in a constant state of unrest. Other troubles arose from wolves (jackals?) who proved to be very voracious, carrying off children from their huts at night. But in spite of hindrances from human and animal sources the work met with a good response from the beginning. Shrewsbury, reflecting

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.326 ff.

[3] In an unsigned MS article, apparently designed to be read at some colonial gathering, by the same writer who penned the MS Diary which is mistakenly attributed to W.B. Boyce in the Methodist Archives, Cape Town. The writer was more probably H.H. Dugmore; the time, about 1835 or later.

the sanguine spirit that radiated from beyond the Kei, could write at an early date:

> All the people that formerly delighted in war have been scattered; the Morley Mission is successfully re-established; and at the present there is no reason to suppose that any wars or commotions will arise, to prevent the peaceful labours of the Missionary in preaching to those nations the Gospel of the Son of God.1

There were some grounds for this optimism, although, in the light of later events, it may appear unrealistic. Shepstone was soon reporting that attendances at the regular services on the mission rarely fell below one hundred and fifty; later he wrote of having to preach out of doors because the building was too small for the two hundred people who wished to hear his message; and by May 1832 he began to build a substantial brick chapel, sixteen by eighteen feet. The Bomvana were losing their fear of the white man and his religion, and several were beginning to live at the mission itself.[2] At the same time there were serious impediments to growth which were not peculiar to Morley but were shared by Butterworth, too--notably the sustained opposition from witch-doctors, the all-pervasive influence of diviners, and the callous cruelty that seemed ingrained in the people's nature.[3] Yet in spite of alternating hope and despair, solid progress was made, and membership figures began to rise from nine in 1831, through twenty-four in '32, twenty-eight in '33; and back to twenty-four the following year.[4] Some of the founders' hopes were being fulfilled in reasonable fashion, and the condition of the second Morley was, compared with that of similar ventures, satisfactory.

While not detracting from the resolute service rendered by Shepstone, Methodist chroniclers credit most of Morley's stability to Samuel Palmer who joined the missionary ranks in January 1830, not as a

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[1] Shrewsbury, Mount Coke, 31 March 1830, WMM 1831, p.860.

[2] Shepstone, 4 April 1830, WMM 1831, p.784; 1 May 1831, WMM 1832, p.377; 31 May 1832, WMM 1833, p.61.

[3] Shepstone, 16 Jan. 1832; J.Ayliff 8 March 1832, WMM 1832, pp.754,753.

[4] ADM 1831-34.

novice but as a seasoned minister from England. For two years he worked in the Colony around Salem and Port Frances before his appointment to Morley early in 1833, and there he served for thirteen or fourteen years. Such continuity in leadership, especially leadership of the calibre that Palmer supplied, gave that station an advantage that was denied to other places where directors were more frequently changed. Boyce described him as being "in person almost as handsome as the late Dr.Newton, a laborious and valuable Minister,"[1] -- not a worthless eulogium even to those unacquainted with the physical charms of Dr.Newton. More practical praise came from the pen of William Shaw who wrote of "a man of indomitable spirit, who often showed an undaunted courage amidst frequent and great dangers. He was an indefatiguable and successful Missionary; and under his care Morley attained a high degree of material and spiritual prosperity."[2]

Life on a mission station that lay between Thembu and Pondoland provided many opportunities for the exercise of all the fine qualities that Palmer possessed. Andrew Steedman, who visited Morley in the course of his wanderings in Southern Africa, relates how Gankca, a "captain" living near the mission, was taken seriously ill. In accordance with Xhosa custom, search was made for the one who had caused the sickness, and suspicion fell on the man's younger brother who was then bound and prepared for a cruel death. News of the melancholy proceedings reached Palmer's ears, and he hastened to the kraal where the accused lay, released him in the face of those who were about to become his executioners, and had him removed to safety in the mission compound.[3]

In October 1833 disturbances around Morley became worse than usual.

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[1] Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. Wm.Shaw, p.145.

[2] SMM, p.506. A.Slee, op.cit., p.50, suggests that Palmer, in contrast to Boyce, was first and foremost a missionary.

[3] A.Steedman, Wanderings and Adventures in the Interior of Southern Africa, 2 vols. (abbreviated as Steedman Wanderings), (London, 1835), II, p.302.

Ncaphayi, a chief who lived on the eastern side of the Mzimvubu sent out his warriors to plunder the people who were living near the mission. Many cattle were captured and about 150 Bomvana were slain. It looked as though in addition to danger to Morley an inter-tribal war on a large scale was on the point of breaking out. The fraternity of missionaries--Ayliff from Butterworth, Davis from Clarkebury in Thembuland,[1] Satchell from Buntingville in Pondoland,[2] and Palmer from the threatened station itself-joined forces in the interests of peace, and set out to persuade Ncaphayi to cease hostilities. But the Mpondo chief, Faku, refused to grant them passage through his domain, saying it would lead to the shedding of European blood, for which he would be blamed. The missionaries were therefore obliged to return to their several homes without apparently having accomplished their purpose, yet in reality having achieved most of what they set out to do since news of their embassy induced peace on that occasion.[3]

But peace was an inconstant visitor on the Umtata frontier, for rival chiefs were so often frightening her from their jurisdictions, and the Rev. Palmer had numerous opportunities to exercize his peace-making gifts. On 28 February 1834 he was approached by a dozen or more Thembu "captains" who feared they would soon be the objects of Ncaphayi's next attack. The delegation asked the missionary to write to Col. Somerset on their behalf, requesting his aid against the threatening aggressor. Palmer wrote, and on May 8 received a reply from Somerset which included a letter to Ncaphayi with the suggestion that the missionary personally visit the chief to read him the letter and dissuade him from unprovoked attacks on Thembu kraals. Six days later Palmer rode out of Morley accompanied by an interpreter and three mission natives, and made for the neighbouring station of Buntingville where he was joined by Satchell. Together they called on Faku to gain his approval before they sought out Ncaphayi. This time they were successful; the Mpondo chief placed no obstacle in their way but rather

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[1] Infra, p.125.

[2] Infra, pp.139-141.

[3] Ayliff, 19 and 22 Oct. 1833, WMM 1834,p.708.

gave them his blessing. Thus armed they forced their way through very rugged country, and on the morning of May 17 came face to face with the recalcitrant chief who listened to the brief service the ministers conducted and with more interest still heard Palmer read Col.Somerset's letter. As a result of the meeting, the chief assured the white men that he was "sitting still", and would not make war on his neighbours unless Faku, his superior, called upon him to do so. His attitude was friendly; he killed an ox for his visitors, and ended the interview by asking for a Christian teacher to settle with him and his people.[1]

In June 1834 Palmer was confronted by trouble from a fresh quarter and in a form that required considerable skill to handle. Between the stations of Morley and Buntingville there lived a belligerent chief, Myeki, who, finding Morley to be a hindrance to his predatory operations, tried to persuade Faku to attack the station and the friendly chiefs who lived around it. But Faku was pledged to support Buntingville and found it in his interests to observe his word, and could not be brought to attack a mission that was sister to one in which he had a personal stake. Myeki, therefore, not only failed to gain an ally but provoked a foe, and found Faku pressing uncomfortably on his borders. In his extremity he appealed to the man whose mission he had hoped to despoil, but Palmer declined to help, refusing to be drawn into a purely secular quarrel, and saying that the two chiefs must settle their own disputes.[2]

Within a month, however, the missionary was serving as mediator between the same two parties. Three of Faku's men, engaged in cattle rustling, had fallen into the hands of Myeki's warriors who killed one of the raiders and set the war machines of both tribes in motion. In that instance, Palmer had no scruples about stepping between the contestants and nipping the incipient war in the bud.[3] But having

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[1]Steedman, Wanderings, II, pp.301-309, quoting Palmer's Journal.

[2]Palmer, Journal, 24 June 1834, quoted by Steedman, Wanderings II, pp.291,292.

[3]Palmer, Journal, 14 July 1834, WMM 1835, p.387.

made peace on the right, he almost immediately had to turn round and avert war on his left where the Thembus were threatening Myeki's western flank as a result of other cattle-stealing. On Sunday morning, August 4, word reached Palmer that because Myeki's people had taken Thembu cattle the Thembu were massing for a retaliatory attack. The missionary deemed the occasion sufficiently serious to justify his breaking the Sunday calm and riding ahead of the cattle-stealers to dissuade them from driving the beasts away and to get them to herd the animals on to the mission compound where they would be held, in cold storage as it were, until judgment on the issue could be given the next day. The situation looked ugly, for about 1,000 of Myeki's men were halted in front of two or three thousand Thembu who were eager for battle when they saw themselves in such an overwhelming majority, and were loath to forego an easy victory. But by dint of much talking Palmer lessened the tensions and persuaded the would-be warriors to go home. Then came the court-case which continued three days until both parties were satisfied. When judgment was finally given, Thembu and Mpondo were loud in appreciation of the missionary's intervention and his impartial justice.[1] Peace was not thereby made a permanent inhabitant of the Morley district, but war was held at bay for yet another period. Palmer maintained his role of peace-maker until the larger issues of 1835 withdrew him from the station he had so ably served and gave him still wider scope for his pacific talents. He did not then return to Morley until 20 April 1836.

III. CLARKEBURY

1. Approach to Thembuland. Wesleyan work among the Bomvana owed its inception primarily to Mdepha's eagerness to have a mission for himself, but the establishment of stations in Thembu and Mpondo country was a further stage in the deliberate fulfilment of Shaw's long-range planning for his chain towards Natal. Ever since he had crossed the Kei

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[1] Steedman, Wanderings II, pp.311-315, based on Palmer's Journal.

and become aware of the tribal pattern that lay ahead of him he had been keen to plant Methodism among Vusani's and Faku's people. On the occasion of his first visit to Hintsa in April 1825, he had pushed on into Thembuland and sought out Vusani.[1] The chief was not at his kraal when the missionaries arrived, but appeared the next day and called his councillors together to consider the Wesleyan proposal that a missionary should come and reside among them. While smoking "daka" (dagga) the councillors studied the request, and before sunset had agreed to receive such a teacher whenever he should be sent.[2] Five years were to pass before they were called upon to redeem their promise.

This tribe whom the Methodists were hopeful of evangelising, was distinct from those among whom they had hitherto been working. One Wesleyan writer, on doubtful authority, described the Thembu as being the "oldest or great stock of the tree, from which the other divisions in remote periods have probably descended",[3] and suggested that they settled in the Transkei about A.D. 1400, (possibly exaggerating the regnal years of the sixteen chiefs who preceded Vusani.) The Xhosa historian, J.H. Soga, (more moderately) dates their occupation of what came to be known as Thembuland from about the beginning of the seventeenth century, but even so places them earlier than the Xhosas who settled between the Umzimvubu and the Umtata.[4] It seems reasonably certain, however, that the tribe was already settled in the vicinity of what is now known as Thembuland by the close of the sixteenth century (1593).[4A] Their location is pin-pointed by Frank Brownlee in the following words:

> The Abatembu as they term themselves, the Tembus or Tambookies as we term them, were found by shipwrecked seamen in 1688 occupying the country between the Bashee and Umtata Rivers, and there they were still living at the commencement of the present century (19th).[5]

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[1] Whitworth, 10 April 1825, WMM 1825, p.854.

[2] Supra, pp.68,70.

[3] W.C. Holden, Past, Present and Future of the Kaffir Race (London c. 1866), p.142.

[4] J.H. Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, p.469.

[4A] M. Wilson, in African Studies, Vol.18, No. 4, pp.175,178; G.M. Theal, Records of South East Africa, Vol. I, pp.108 ff.

The tribe spread westward beyond the Mbhashe and came to occupy the upper sources of the Kei that lay between the Stormberg and Great Winterberg mountain ranges where pressure from the neighbouring Mpondo and Bhaca peoples tended to drive them.[1] Tribal distinctions are stressed by Soga who states of the Xhosa and Thembu that "they are totally different branches of the race",[2] and says of the Thembu that they have no point of contact with the Nguni or Mbo divisions of the south-eastern Bantu, while suggesting that they are possibly of Basuto or Lala origin.[3] To this obscurity in origin must be added the fact that tribal purity was diluted by admixture of 'foreign' blood, largely through intermarriage, particularly with the Xhosa.[4]

It took Christian missions a long time to secure a permanent foothold in Thembuland. According to Kay,[5] the first approach was made by missionaries Brownlee and Rennie of the G.M.S. in 1821; and the Wesleyan approach of 1825 has already been noted. In 1827 the United Brethren, or Moravians, began work with the westernmost Thembu at Shiloh, between the Kliplaat and Black Kei Rivers north of the Mathole mountains. The L.M.S. had hopes of opening a mission with the tribe, but this was known to the Methodists[6] and served to stiffen their determination to enfold the Thembu within their own denominational arms. It could hardly be said of the Thembu, however, that they were eager to accept the embrace, for although their chief expressed his willingness to receive a missionary he made no move to ensure his arrival. When Shaw, Shrewsbury, and Shepstone were on their way to settle one of their number with Mdepha in 1829 they passed

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[1] Dugmore in Kaffir Laws and Customs, pp. 7,8.

[2] J.H. Soga, op.cit., p.87. [3] Ibid., p.466.

[4] D.W. Brokensha, The Political Institutions of Some Southern Nguni Tribes, p.18. The Thembu chief Vusani married one of Faku's daughters, and had as his mother one of Ndlambe's sisters. J.H. Soga, op.cit., p.477; R. Haddy, 25 Aug. 1830, WMM 1831, p.505.

[5] Kay, Travels, p.285.

[6] Shaw, 7 May 1829, WMM 1830, p.56. On 9 Nov. 1829 the G.M.S. missionaries Ross and M'Diarmid passed through Butterworth on their way to set up a mission with Vusani, but were not successful and soon retired. Mem.Shrewsbury, p.332.

through Thembu country, but although they understood that Vusani was prepared to accept a mission they did not meet him and drew no nearer their goal of working with his people.[1] In fact, Kay seems to have gauged the chief's attitude correctly when he described him as being "evasive."[2] But this reluctance collapsed in an unforeseen but satisfactory way. When Shepstone retired from Morley in the face of Mkqetho's threats at the end of October 1829, and took refuge with the Thembu, he lived so circumspectly that suspicion melted and he was assured that a missionary such as himself would be welcomed. No stronger invitation was needed by the waiting Wesleyans. At their annual meeting in February of the next year they laid plans which led to the appointment of Richard Haddy as Vusani's missionary,[3] and they agreed that Shaw should travel into the Transkei to re-settle Shepstone, to negotiate the placement of Haddy among the Thembu, and to prepare the way for Boyce to work with Faku.

2. The Fifth Link. In Haddy the Methodists had an able representative for a difficult field. He had been transferred from Cape Town to Albany in the previous September, and had already given acceptable help among the European congregations around Grahamstown. To Boyce he appeared as "an able man and a scholar, remarkable for his great perseverance, under which most obstacles gave way to him";[4] while the later Methodist historian, Whiteside, testified:

> Mr. Haddy possessed great energy, both of body and mind. He could work as hard at making bricks with which to build a church, as he did at making sermons to preach in it. He had taught himself a fair knowledge of Greek and Latin, and could preadh in English, Dutch, and (later) Kaffir.5

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[1] Shaw, 7 May 1829, WMM 1830, p.56.

[2] Kay, Travels, p.285. That Vusani was also known by the sobriquet "Ngubincuka" (Wolf's Cloak) may have had ample justification!

[3] Supra, p.114. In committee, Haddy was seconded for a mission with Faku, but plans were changed before the locating body left Grahamstown on April 1.

[4] Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. WM. Shaw, p.145.

[5] Whiteside, History, p.190.

This minister was, in keeping with Wesleyan policy, accompanied by an assistant, Staples, of whom little is now known. These two were left to their own resources in Thembuland in mid-April while Shaw went further east to settle Shepstone on a more suitable site than old Morley had proved to be, and to introduce W.B.Boyce to the Mpondos. For six weeks the pioneers camped in a strange land, then on May 31 Kay from Butterworth joined them, and within a few days a site was selected in a populous neighbourhood near the Mbhashe River, about one mile from the chief's kraal, and permission to establish the mission there was granted by Vusani.[1] The name chosen by Haddy for the new station, the fifth in the chain, was Clarkebury, in honour of Dr.Adam Clarke, the Methodist author of the famous Bible Commentary.[2]

Politically, the time could not be said to have been opportune for entering a new field, but if the evangelists had waited until the Transkei was at rest they might never have fulfilled their intentions, so frequent were the tribal clashes in that area. Even while Haddy was laying out his encampment, Vusani's men were molesting Hintsa's people, lifting their cattle, and bringing the two tribes to the brink of war. It transpired that the two chiefs were sworn enemies, and Kay claimed that they were only prevented from fighting on that occasion by his own remonstances against their barbarous methods of warfare. "We cannot do anything," said one of the belligerents, "for the Abafundis are in the way."[3] The reality of the hostilities were brought home to Kay however, as he went to join Haddy and his assistant on the first of June: the cornfields in Thembuland were flourishing, but were abandoned because of the threatened war between the neighbours.[4]

The first two months on the new station were chiefly occupied with the building of simple homes and a chapel, although outdoor services were held for any who might want to attend before the work was properly

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[1] Kay, Travels, pp.286,295.

[2] SMM, p.507.

[3] Kay, Travels, pp.270,271,298 .

[4] Kay, 1 June 1830, WMM 1831, p.128.

organised. The initial response was disappointing for attendances were small and few showed serious interest in the message that was being preached. There was, on the other hand, plenty to make a missionary's heart ache. Soon after his arrival, Haddy found that Chief Vusani was gravely ill and that the supposed instigator of his sickness was being sought for by the diviners. Many accusations were laid before the tribal authorities and ten victims were "eaten up" and tortured, even to death, in spite of all that Haddy could do, in an effort to discover him who was responsible for the chief's illness. The cruel proceedings did nothing to prolong Vusani's life: he died on June 18, and his brother Fadana became regent until the rightful heir should come of age. The missionaries' position might then have become precarious, but Fadana reassured them and asked them to remain with his people.[1]

3. A Quiet History. The historian is very much at the mercy of the literary qualifications and ambitions of those who were in a position to record the contemporary scene. In the case of Clarkebury, the mercies are few for Haddy, with all his intellectual abilities, was no prolific reporter, especially when compared with Shrewsbury, Boyce, and Ayliff. There is a two-year gap, between August 1830 and September 1832, in his significant contributions to The Wesleyan Methodist Magazine (WMM), and when he did break the silence it was only to say that the Thembu were tranquil, in contrast to the previous year, and were therefore prospering; and to report that he could use their language freely, having been able to pray in Thembu for several months past.[2] This news, though undoubtedly welcome to his co-religionists, represented no very remarkable achievement in view of the time involved, for many other missionaries have attained equal fluency in a foreign tongue in a much shorter period.

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[1]Haddy, 28 July and 25 Aug. 1830, WMM 1831, pp.279-281, 505.

[2]Haddy, 30 Sept. 1832, WMM 1833, pp.33, 374.

A further entry came three months later,[1] and while admitting that there was no observable change in the nation as a whole, it recorded that there was an increased confidence in the missionary which might yield a harvest in the not far-distant future. The harvest, measured in terms of membership, must have been disappointing to one who had worked so long at the sowing, for in the years 1833 and 1834 there were only twelve members on Clarkebury's books.[2] But the Rome of a Christian community was not to be built in three or four brief years of pioneer missionary work: foundations were laid, and the superstructure arose only when those had settled firmly into place.

Others beside Haddy built on the site he had laid out. The second director was yet another William, a William John Davis, "a most laborious and efficient missionary, who has since distinguished himself by his two editions of Boyce's Grammar, and by his practical Kaffir Grammar and Dictionary..."[3] This worker replaced Haddy in 1833[4] and found the going hard, especially when Clarkebury's slow progress was contrasted with conditions on other stations where results came a little more swiftly; but he nevertheless stayed at his post for four years and prepared the way for J.C. Warner, the man who was to make Clarkebury peculiarly his own province. Continuity of service again gave good returns. Warner, who had served a long apprenticeship as artisan-catechist, became a "perfect master of the Tembu dialect", and was eventually acknowledged as the "uncrowned king of the Tembus."[5] By that time Clarkebury had justified its obstinate refusal to go into liquidation and had become a stabilizing factor around which much of Thembu life revolved.

IV. BUNTINGVILLE

1. To Pondoland. It was inevitable that the Wesleyans' advance to Gcalekaland should also bring them into contact with the tribes that

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[1] Ibid., 7 Jan. 1833, p.526.

[2] ADM 1833, 1834.

[3] Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. Wm. Shaw, p.146.

[4] Haddy continued to serve the Methodist cause as minister at Bathurst in the Colony.

[5] Whiteside, History, p.190.

lay still further on the road to Natal. This, as has been seen, was not fortuitous, but formed part of the over-all design to which Shaw had been working from the beginning of his African ministry. The Bomvana and Thembu had taken their anticipated place in the scheme, but the Pondo people still had to be incorporated before the group of stations based on Butterworth could be said to be complete. The same hindrances that retarded the establishment of Morley and Clarkebury, however, operated no less effectively in delaying further eastward progress. On the exploratory trip that was made from Butterworth in June 1828[1] Shaw, who could hardly be accused of timidity, found the country in too unsettled a state for him to fulfil his original plan of visiting the Mpondo chief, Faku; but he gained a clear enough idea of the country to realize that four main tribes lay between the Colony and Natal--the Amakosa (in which he must have included the Gcaleka), Amatemboo Amabambo, and Amapondo, to use his spelling[2]--and to be stimulated in his desire to place missionaries with the three who at that time possessed none. The induction of Shepstone among the Bomvana in May 1829, and of Haddy with the Thembu in April 1830, left only Faku's tribe uncared for, and that not for long since Haddy's arrival at Clarkebury preceded Boyce's introduction to Faku by only a few days.

The existence of the Mpondo had been known to Europeans at least since the wreck of the Stavenisee in 1686 and Jacob van Reenen's expedition, 1790-91, in search of survivors from the Grosvenor which had been wrecked off the Pondoland coast on 4 August 1782.[3] But these isolated contacts yielded little information about the hitherto unknown people and resulted in no penetration of their country by white men. In the early nineteenth century isolated traders worked in the area, and a few travellers such as Henry Fynn passed through, but it was not until the Wesleyans settled among them in 1830 that their history and customs

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[1] Supra, pp.104,105.

[2] Shaw, 27 June 1828, WMM 1829, pp.565,566.

[3] F. Brownlee, op.cit. p.65.

became gradually known to Europeans.[1] The tribe was subsequently found to be distinct from that branch of the Bantu family from which the Xhosa sprang--the Nguni--and to have been part of the Mbo with whom the Xhosa have no known point of genealogical contact;[2] but their speech was so similar that it was reckoned to have only dialectal differences with Xhosa. Dissimilarities were also noted, such as the greater industry of Mpondo men and women in comparison with those who lived nearer the Colony, and the more elaborate hair-styles adopted by Mpondo women; but these were superficial comments, and it is only in recent years that the tribe has been scientifically studied as an entity.[3] In the third decade of the nineteenth century it was accounted a member of the tribal family of which the Xhosa were known to form so large a part, yet distinct from the Zulu group who lay still further to the north-east.

It was later found that as a result of the early Zulu wars, Faku and his people had been driven across the Mzimvubu in 1819 or 1820, had settled between the west bank of that river and the Mngezi, and had occupied the country as far west as the Umtata. Four or five years later further pressure temporarily drove them westwards across the Umtata for shelter in the rugged coast country.[4] At the time of Matiwane's attacks in 1828 they were therefore thinly spread out along the coast and were in no position to resist the invaders: all they could do was to hide and hope that the storm would pass. In this rather abject situation it is easy to believe that they welcomed British intervention and had grateful memories of the meeting between Major Dundas and their chief, and of the conduct of the expeditionary

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[1] Fynn's chief preoccupation lay with the Zulu, while Gardiner did not arrive in South Africa until November 1834.

[2] J.H. Soga, op.cit., p.336.

[3] For an exhaustive field study of the Mpondo, see M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest.

[4] Charles Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History (Lovedale, 1896), p.105.

force.[1] Such feelings lingered until the following year when Shaw and Shrewsbury left Shepstone negotiating for the site of a mission with Mdepha[2] while they pushed on to find Faku. This they succeeded in doing at noon on 16 May 1829 when they reached his kraal and met the chief amid several of his wives and twenty-three children. The Mpondo headquarters were established on both sides of the Mngazi and surrounded by such a large population that the visitors, on what must have been rather slender grounds, judged the tribe to be as numerous as the Thembu and Xhosa, though they afterwards recognized that the concentration of population arose from Zulu pressure. They reckoned that the Mpondo kraals were about three times the size of those in the Ciskei, and although the soil appeared good, the grazing was found to be inferior to that of Albany. They also became aware of other differences between their hosts and the tribes nearer the Colony for, compared with the Mpondos, the Xhosa, thanks to their contacts with Christianity, appeared as an enlightened people.[3]

William Shaw, with his statesman's eye, had already realized the strategic value of a mission among the Mpondo, and believed that if this could be linked with one in the region of Port Natal a great stride would have been made to the attainment of permanent peace. But the first of these stations still had to be established, and he had not yet persuaded Faku of its desirability. Fortunately at this juncture there arrived at the chief's umzi three natives who had lived near Wesleyville and Mount Coke and were now, on the basis of their own experience of the benefits of mission influence, ready to be Shaw's advocates before Faku. Yet still the chief was in no hurry to grant the request: he was not used to the excessive haste in which white men expected to resolve grave business, and needed time in which to counsel with his headmen. Then, in a royal gesture, he presented his visitors

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[1] Appendix V p. 418 , and Steedman, Wanderings II, p.269.

[2] Supra, pp. 107,108.

[3] Shaw, 16 May 1829, WMM 1830, pp.59-61.

with an elephant's tusk which they firmly but courteously refused, saying they were not there for personal gain but had come to help him and his subjects. This apparently unexpected response impressed him favourably, and without further delay he expressed his readiness to receive a missionary whenever one could be sent--demonstrating that there are short cuts even in African protocol.[1]

Having attained their limited objective, the Wesleyans returned to their bases and, by way of wishful thinking since they had neither the men nor the means for such an advance move, laid plans for occupying Pondoland. Shaw was so interested in the proposition that he wanted to make Faku's mission his own endeavour, while Shrewsbury penned a moving appeal to the home committee asking for the reinforcements and funds that would be needed before a new station could be opened.[2] After this came months of waiting and the frustration occasioned by Nkqetho's excursions around Morley,[3] and Shepstone's discovery in November that a body of Mfecane, thrusting themselves athwart the road that lay between him and Faku, were making it impossible for him to communicate with the Mpondo.[4] When the committee assembled for its annual meeting, however, its members were eager for advance, and, of more practical value, by then had both the men and the means to fulfil their ambitions.

2. The Sixth Link. Three new recruits had reached South Africa by the end of 1829, and two of them, the Rev. S.Palmer[5] and a younger unordained man who had been in the ministry for only one year, William Binnington Boyce, came directly from the Cape to Albany and were present at the annual district meeting in Grahamstown on 11 February 1830.[6] Palmer began ministering to European churches but Boyce was, from the beginning, destined for African service. The precise location of the latter was at

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[1] Ibid., pp.61-63.

[2] Shrewsbury, 30 June 1829, WMM 183(p.127.

[3] Supra, pp.110-113.

[4] Letter from Shrewsbury to Shaw, 18 Nov. 1829, WMM 1830, p.277.

[5] Supra, pp.115-119.

[6] The third recruit was James Cameron whose retention at Cape Town by Barnabas Shaw was described by the Albany Committee as "an unjustifiable interference with the affairs of our District..." If Cameron could not join the Albany forces, then the asked for another missionary. ADM 1830.

first left in the hands of the chairman, then, as the situation clarified, it was decided that Boyce should assist Shepstone at the new Morley station for one year before opening a mission with Faku.[1] But even before these plans were formulated conditions in Pondoland had been changing for the better and Faku, being once more master in his own house,[2] was able to receive and care for any missionary who might be sent to him. When, therefore, a missionary party left Grahamstown on April 1, bound for the Transkei, Boyce was one of its members and Faku's kraal was his destination.

By April 26 Haddy had been left with the Thembu, Shepstone had chosen a new site for Morley, and Shaw, Shepstone, and Boyce passed on their way, via Amandola, the original site of Morley, to meet Faku. The youngest member of the party, sensitive to the strangeness of all that he was seeing, noted the rough mountainous roads, the well-cultivate dells, the predominance of tillage because Zulu raids had removed a large proportion of the cattle, the hillsides covered with kraals, the greater industry of the Mpondo, both men and women, compared with the Xhosa, and he described the Mpondo chief's great place as being three or four hundred feet above the Garana (Mngazi?), about twenty miles from the sea, and surrounded by seven or eight thousand people within a radius of two or three miles.[3] When the time came for official introductions Boyce was presented as the teacher who had been promised eleven months earlier and who, Faku was assured, would be settling with him within "three moons." This estimate proved a little optimistic, for it was not until seven months had passed that the missionary came to make his home in Pondoland.[4] There was some suggestion that the station, to be named "Buntingville" in memory of Dr.Jabez Bunting who had been such a prominent figure in the founding of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Supra, pp.112,113.

[3] Steedman, Wanderings II, p.264; Boyce, first letter from Africa, 11 May 1830, WMM 1830, p.775.

[4] Boyce, WMM 1830, p.775; SMM p.514.

Society, would be located on the further (left or eastern) side of the Mzimvubu since the Mpondo were wishing to re-occupy the lands from which they had recently been driven. The word spread that Tshaka's successor, Dingaan, was threatening to fall on Vusani and Hintsa while leaving Faku in peace. Mpondo hearts were therefore lifting and the missionary discussion was held in a sanguine atmosphere.[1] There was a tide in the affairs of these sorely harassed men: the Wesleyans may be said to have sailed smoothly into Buntingville on its favourable flow. Steedman analysed the timing of the entry into Pondoland and noted how propitious it was: Faku was humbled, his people were needy, their mood was receptive to a degree that would hardly have been possible in any of the immediately following years when their fortunes revived and their martial spirit was again eager to vent itself upon neighbouring tribes.[2]

But first the missionaries had to return to headquarters to instruct and equip the neophyte for his onerous duties. At Mount Coke they found an artisan, Tainton, who although he had a wife and five small children, was willing to take his family and go with the bachelor Boyce to erect the necessary buildings on the new station. Thus yet another mission was to owe a great debt to the humble tradesman who attended to the brick-and-mortar duties--or, at first, the mud-and-wattle-while his professional brother built up religious life among the heathen with whom both were stationed.

For some unstated reason Boyce's settlement with Faku was long delayed, and when he at last left Grahamstown he had before him a journey that proved to be so slow and arduous that the Mpondo great kraal did not come in sight until November 22. On his arrival the missionary found that the chief and his headmen had allotted him a site called "Emapondewene", about four miles from the Great Place, on the Dangwana

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[1] Boyce, Ibid.

[2] Steedman, Wanderings II, p.287.

stream, between the great and little Mngazi rivers. There was fine grass in the neighbourhood, but very little water, save at an inconvenient distance, and the Dangwana was dry in summertime, while the nearest timber was ten miles away. The intended mission was surrounded by a large, concentrated population, estimated by Boyce to amount to 10,000 souls--from a hill near Faku's kraal Shepstone had counted one hundred kraals--and Boyce believed the Mpondo to number 20,000 souls. Within a week of his arrival he had noted that the people possessed a sense of time that was unknown among the Ciskeians, that they were orderly in their habits, and were ready to adopt a more generous amount of clothing than were their cousins nearer the Colony. But he also found great distress among those with whom he had come to work, due to the destructive wars that had ravaged the countryside. On one of his early trips Tainton met over three hundred people who were grubbing for edible roots in the absence of other food, and it was common knowledge that the less-favoured wives were driven from their domestic circles to fend for themselves, so acute was the famine. The newly-arrived missionaries aided the needy to the limit of their own resources, but had had no time to build up any reserve food stocks, and the Mpondo harvest was still six or eight weeks away, so their supplies were soon depleted and their ability to help exhausted.[1] It afterwards transpired that Faku had knowingly placed the mission on a drought-stricken spot hoping that the men of God would make rain for themselves and thus benefit the whole dry countryside. But by mid-June of 1831, when the mission had experienced a severe water-shortage for six weeks, it was apparent that the missionaries were not rain-makers, and that they needed to look for another site nearer to a permanent water supply. For some months Faku opposed the move, doubtless hoping that a miracle would still be worked, but eventually on September 9, the mission transferred to a better site, near the greater Mngazi, two miles nearer the Colony, and where the river was always running.[2]

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[1] Boyce, 29 Nov. 1830, WMM 1831, p.644.

[2] Boyce, 16 June 1831, WMM 1832, p.220; Steedman, Wanderings II, pp.281-287.

But the story has run ahead of itself in the settlement of the water problem, and must retrace its steps to the third day after the Wesleyans' arrival when Faku and fifty of his councillors paid their first visit to the site they had granted. This was taken as public acknowledgement of Buntingville as the chief's school and as demonstration of his favour. Further confidence was shown in the decision to build a place for the royal cattle one a mile from the station, "that we may be one house"--a gesture not hitherto made by any other chief. These significant preliminary courtesies led to an exchange of presents and the founding of mutual respect between the contracting parties.[1]

After this first meeting, Boyce penned an interesting description of the Mpondo chief:

> ... in many respects Faku differs from the Caffre chiefs. His authority is less limited, and he decides on matters of business chiefly on his own responsibility. His answers are given in plain and unequivocal language, so that it is possible for a person even not well versed in the intricacies of Caffre diplomatic phraseology to understand what he means by what he says, which is a rare case in this country.2

The man of whom this was written was then fifty years old and had another thirty years of life before him. Although he never became a Christian, and neither he nor his pepple showed much disposition to listen to the Gospel, he proved to be a faithful friend to the mission within the limits set by his environment. Boyce, in common with his fellows, hoped for a more immediate and positive response to his teaching than would be expected or deemed desirable nowadays because of the cultural gulf that lay between the European concept of Christianity and the pagan African tradition; but as the time of his service lengthened from weeks into months he began to recognize the hard facts of the situation that faced him. An exceptionally good harvest followed the time of famine, and the distress that was at first so widespread disappeared. This change in fortune relieved the population of their temporary dependence on the mission, their interest waned, and they

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[1] Boyce, Ibid., p.645.

[2] Ibid.

returned to their old ways. So much of the then abundant corn was used for making beer that the white men foresaw a recurrence of famine conditions before the next corn crop ripened. The missionaries suffered a different type of distress as they heard, in March 1831, of several who had been "smelt out", pitilessly tortured, and beaten to death, within earshot of the mission as it were, because prominent personalities had fallen ill and died. The small missionary community felt sick at heart, as many before and after them have felt, as they came face to face with the cruelties that accompanied tribal judicial customs. They did not subscribe to that school of thought which bids the white man leave the African to his pristine innocence, to his Edenic bliss. They knew, from bitter first-hand knowledge, that such a state was mythical: it never existed. They therefore renewed their dedication to the task of bringing the African a higher moral and judicial code that had its roots not merely in alien European customs but in the spiritual ethics of the Christian religion. Some time later the seed they sowed bore fruit in Faku's decision to remit torture and the death penalty in cases of witchcraft, and to be satisfied with a cattle fine.[1]

3. The Buffer Station. Other troubles, of a more general nature, also claimed the missionaries' attention. the Pondo chief was incensed against his neighbour Khethani who, said the Mpondo, had called his dog "No-Faku", that is, the Mother of Faku. This alleged affront to family pride was made the occasion for three raids upon Khethani early in 1831. It would appear that Boyce, recognizing his own inexperience, called upon Shepstone to act as peacemaker for the latter came to Buntingville from Morley on May 18 with the intention of reconciling the estranged chiefs. The missionary identified the economic factors that skulked behind the facade of injured pride and saw that Faku, strong in numbers

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[1] Boyce, 21 March 1831, WMM 1831, p.860; 23 Jan. 1832, WMM 1832, p.663.

but poor in cattle, was hoping to augment his stock at his neighbour's expense. Although the gamble had failed to come off, the mediator won the day, even to the extent of receiving an ox from Faku for presentation to Khethani as a token of his peaceful resolutions. The peacemaker met with the gratitude that is customarily meted to those who intervene in others' quarrels: Faku suspected Shepstone of wishing to harm him, and lent a willing ear to the report that the servant of God from Morley had sent "men on horseback to plant <u>booti</u> (bewitching matter) upon his place..." On his brother worker's behalf Boyce firmly rejected the imputation and disabused the chief's mind of any thought of the missionary's wishing him harm.[1]

The advanced position of Buntingville brought the mission into closer contact with Natal and its troubles than had been the lot of the older stations. Only six months had passed since the Wesleyans' arrival when envoys from Dingaan visited Faku to spy out the land and get the facts concerning this latest white advance towards Zululand. The Mpondo leader, with an eye to his own safety and prestige, invited Boyce to share in the interview which yielded no immediate results. Natal came still nearer to Boyce, however, when William Fynn and party, in flight from Dingaan, sought temporary asylum with Faku in July 1831. After a harrowing twenty-five day journey they reached Faku's kraal, only to find the chief adopting a very cautious attitude toward his unexpected visitors until he had been able to obtain counsel from Boyce as to what treatment he should mete out to them. Boyce replied: "They are my countrymen and in distress, therefore I should help them as much as I could;... Faku must take care that they are not injured while living under his protection." On the following day, July 8, the refugees visited the mission homes and enjoyed such hospitality as their fellow-countrymen could offer, and for this the Fynns were grateful. The whole party, numbering about seventy individuals, then

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[1] Steedman, <u>Wanderings II</u>, p.282, quoting from Boyce, 23 June 1831.

retired to a neighbouring kraal where food was more plentiful, and recouped their energies. There they rested until August 1 when a Mr.Collis with two other Englishmen and a group of Hottentots rode into Buntingville from the Colony on their way to Natal where they hoped to settle and trade. The newcomers, armed with a letter from the Governor to Dingaan, were ready to add the Fynns to their party and to attempt to restore good relations between the Zulu and the English. Eight days later Faku received a message from Dingaan to the effect that all was once again quiet and that the Fynns could, without fear of attack, return to Natal in company with the Collis party. It was afterwards learned that the Zulu never intended to kill the Fynn brothers and their party.[1] On November 8 Boyce received a letter from the travellers in which they announced their safe arrival in Natal and their appreciation of the kindness shown them at the mission.

Within less than a month the isolation of Buntingville was again interrupted when six wagons, carrying several branches of the emigrant Cawood family, lumbered on to the mission grounds. The convoy was on its way to Natal, and was reassured at the pacific nature of the news that came from the land where its members were hoping to settle. When they reached their destination, however, they discovered it was not their land of promise. The subordinate Zulu chiefs fixed such exorbitant prices for hides and produce that trade held little profit, and after a year's experiment the party abandoned their new homes and removed their remaining property to Buntingville.[2] Visitors of another calibre passed through the mission during the following January, while Boyce and Shepstone were attending the district meeting in Grahamstown. At that time, the scientific party led by Dr. Andrew Smith and Lt.Edie, called at Buntingville on their way to Natal, and while disappointed at not meeting its superintendent, were gratified at the reception given them by Faku.[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp.283, 286-289; H.F.Fynn, The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, (Pietermaritzburg, 1950), p.207.

[2] Steedman, Wanderings II, p.289; H. Fynn, Diary, p.220.

[3] Boyce, 23 Jan. 1832, WMM 1832, p.663.

Apart from the pleasure derived from occasional visits by Europeans, proximity to Natal brought little benefit to Buntingville.[1] The mission personnel were kept continually on the alert by news and threats that came out of Zululand. Dingaan resented the shelter offered by the Europeans in Natal to more than three thousand black subjects who fled from his own tyranny, and was liable to wreak sudden vengeance on the most accessible communities of white men. Any pebble cast into the political pond was bound to cause considerable ripples throughout the borders of Zululand, and a Zulu attack on trading settlements would have unfavourable repercussions on the nearest mission station. The Mpondo, too, were in a vulnerable position and had to tread warily if they were to avoid becoming misused pawns on the political chessboard. The danger became real in the middle of 1832 when the Bhaca chief Ncapha̲yi revolted from Dingaan and allied with Faku, for the alliance presented the Zulu with ample excuse for attacking Faku and injuring the mission. The Methodists at headquarters became concerned at the situation and expressed fear for the safety of Messrs. Haddy, Shepstone, and Boyce who were so closely involved in the potential explosion.[2] The danger passed, however, and the three remotest stations--Clarkebury, Morley, and Buntingville--were spared the threatened assault.

But Dingaan's reticence opened new prospects of unrest before the eyes of Boyce and the Tainton family. In the early days of their mission their Mpondo host had been docile, tamed by misfortune, and ready to follow the pacific advice offered by the Wesleyans; but as trouble turned her back and vanished over the horizon his spirits rose, acquisitive ambitions revived, and he began again to look with covetous eyes upon his neighbours. So restive did he become, that Boyce began to fear that peaceful news from Natal would remove a useful check on Faku, unleash him against his local enemies and involve all from the Mzimvubu to

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[1] Boyce, 29 Nov. 1830, WMM 1831, p.645.

[2] Shrewsbury, Mount Coke, 30 June 1832, WMM 1832, p.822.

the Mbhashe in a war of attrition.[1] Reference to the troubles that worried Morley and Buntingville between 1832 and 1834 attested the accuracy of Boyce's analysis.[2]

4. Build-up under Boyce. Social and political occupations, however, were supererogatory to the main work of the mission which was perseveringly carried on in spite of interruptions and obstacles. The customary round of meetings was conducted,[3] classes were taught, and surrounding villages were visited. Boyce's letters do not contain the same number of references to spiritual matters as are found in the correspondence of some of his fellow-missionaries, but it is evident that Christianity's struggle against entrenched paganism was no easier among the Mpondo than among the tribes with whom the Wesleyans had previously worked. During Buntingville's first three years the membership rose no higher than five, and by 1834 it had climbed only to eleven. Here was no mass turning to a new religion but a painful wresting of converts from the reluctant hands of heathenism. An early star that shone in an otherwise dark sky was a visit, a state visit, paid to Boyce by the mother of Faku on 8 July 1831. The elderly woman--she must have been nearly seventy years old, a considerable age among those to whom the years were rarely kind--came, according to her own confession, to hear the Gospel and to learn to pray that she might be able to teach Faku the Christian way and to set a good example to her other children.[4] No sequel to the visit is given in Boyce's journal: there is no record of the mother's being baptized, and her teaching never made a Christian of her son, but neither did it make him an enemy of the mission; although he rejected its supreme spiritual appeal, he followed its counsel in mundane matters and countenanced its work until his death in 1867. His mission was the only one of Shaw's six which was never destroyed by war, and it became the base from which two other missions were established--

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[1] Steedman, Wanderings II, p.288. [2] Supra, pp.116-119.

[3] In 1830, the average number of sermons preached by Wesleyan missionaries was three per week ADM 1831.

[4] Boyce, 8 July 1831, WMM 1832, p.378.

Shawbury among the Bhaca, and Palmerton which was founded, at Faku's request, on the further side of the Mzimvubu when he himself moved there.[1]

The man who faced the initial discouragements in Pondoland could later write to his committee and say that "he would not exchange his situation as a Kaffer missionary for the throne of any kingdom upon earth",[2] He did agree, however, to change his station and take Shrewsbury's place at Mount Coke in March 1833 when the latter moved to Grahamstown to act as chairman of the Albany District during Shaw's absence overseas. By that time Boyce had been ordained and received high commendation from his ministerial brethren who agreed that "his character is unimpeachable, and...his ministerial abilities, and diligent application to missionary duties, will render him...both an honour to the Connexion, and a blessing to the Church of God, in whatever department he may be called to service".[3] During the same meeting at which he was consecrated he asked permission to go to England to be married, and pledged himself to return to Africa within twelve months. All that the local committee could do with the request was to pass it on to London, with the result that it was 1834 before he was released from Mount Coke to fulfil his matrimonial plans.[4] This arrangement took him away from Africa during the crucial months of the 1834/35 war, a fact which should be borne in mind when considering his assessment of the conflict.

5. After Boyce. When Boyce departed, Buntingville came under the care of yet another William-William Satchell who had been in Africa for a year before being posted to Pondoland. In company with two other recruits, John Edwards and William J.Davis, he had landed at Port Elizabeth in May 1832 after a three-month voyage from England to Cape Town and a rough three-week trip to Algoa Bay.[5] Satchell's arrival had already

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[1] SMM, pp.516,517.

[2] WMM 1836, p.680.

[3] ADM 1833.

[4] Haddy, at Bathurst 1 April 1834, reports Boyce as then being on his way to England.

[5] Reminiscences of the Early Life and Missionary Labours of the Rev. John Edwards (London 1886), pp.31,42,43.

been anticipated, and it was arranged that he should care for the Grahamstown district while Shaw undertook a long-deferred visit to Natal.[1] The newcomer thus enjoyed a period of apprenticeship before being launched into the deeps of an outpost mission. But the comforts of the frontier capital were left behind on 14 March 1833 when the Satchell and Palmer families began their long north-eastward trek, the Palmers to take Shepstone's place at Morley, the Satchells to relieve Boyce at Buntingville. Fifteen days later the incoming director was welcomed at Faku's mission by the assistant, Tainton, and the Satchell administration began.

William Satchell's work at Buntingville does not appear to have been notably fruitful or ordinarily happy. Rumours that all was not well began to drift down to Grahamstown, and in September 1834 his conduct was reviewed by four of his senior colleagues--Shepstone, Palmer, Ayliff, and Davis--who decided that the charges laid against him were serious enough to warrant a thorough investigation. He was therefore called before them, first at Buntingville, then at Clarkebury, and closely questioned. The records do not disclose the nature of his offence, but their language, kindly reticent as it is, makes probable that it was a moral lapse. If that was the case, his fault was unlikely to be softened by the fact that his wife was pregnant; and her death in childbirth on 8 February 1835, can have done nothing to lessen the bitterness of the fraternal rebukes that were harbingers of still sterner reprimands.

At the 11th Annual District Meeting, March 1835, while the Frontier War was at its height, it was voted:

> I. That Brother Satchell from his culpable imprudence (to say the least) even supposing his innocence could be proved, having disqualified him for usefulness in Kaffirland or Albany, can no longer be permitted to exercise his ministry in this country, and is therefore suspended,...
>
> II. That Brother Satchell leave for England as soon as possible.

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[1] The Annual District Meeting 1831 had voted that the chairman make an exploratory trip into Natal, and Shaw intended to make it in Shepstone's company. He was so busy in Albany, however, that he had not made the trip by February 1832. On 5 March 1833 he left for England, so the original plan was never fulfilled.

In a letter to the Society's secretaries in England, written on May 19 of the same year, the responsible ministers at Grahamstown unanimously recommended Satchell "to the kind consideration of the Committee";[1] but their resolution to return the erring brother to Britain was quickly put into effect, for the Grahamstown Journal of May 19 carried a notice asking "all persons having any claim against him, to forward them to the Wesleyan Mission House by Wednesday, 3rd of June." So ended Satchell's mission service, while his ministerial career continued in the land he had left three years before. Although the Albany Committee received no official guidance on his case, and no reply to their report, they privately learned that the alleged delinquent had been received back into "full connexion" as a minister in England. On reception of this news, the 1837 meeting went on record regretting this lack of cooperation between the parent body and itself, not because its members harboured any animus against Satchell, but because they believed they should have been informed about the home committee's decision concerning his future. There was a sturdy independence of judgment in early nineteenth-century South African Methodism!

An epitaph on Satchell's work may be found in Alan Slee's comment:

> ... there can be little doubt from the extravagant and emotional language which he used, that he was a rather strange character. However, he had been successful as a missionary at Buntingville and his reputation stood high with Faku.2

6. Retrospect. But before the home-goer left Albany, the first chapter in Buntingville's history, and indeed in the history of Shaw's chain of stations, had closed. D'Urban's advance from Grahamstown to Butterworth had turned the pages of a new era for all Kaffraria missions. This is therefore a good point from which to summarize Wesleyan achievements up to the end of 1834, and to see where the Society stood at the outbreak of war.

The colonial church in Albany, consisting largely but not entirely of European settlers, proved to be a solid base into which was set the

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[1] ADM 1835.

[2] A.Slee, Albany Methodism, p.87.

staple of an ever-lengthening chain of younger churches. In a space of seven years, from the founding of Wesleyville in December 1823 to the entrance into Faku's territory toward the end of November 1830, a small group of men, at first no more than three in number, had successfully planted six mission stations over a great tract of country where few Europeans had been, and where no other evangelizing agencies had staked a claim. Rarely had such a scheme been so clearly conceived and so satisfactorily executed. Apart from the gap between Mount Coke and the Kei--a gap which was due to be closed[1]---the missions were spaced so evenly and placed so strategically that they embraced the major tribal units, so thoroughly possessing the land for the Wesleyan Methodists that other societies were going to find it hard to obtain a foothold. This progress cannot be attributed to superior resources, for their means were but slender, and there is no evidence that the W.M.M.S. was prodigal with money; but the missionaries' vision and sacrifical readiness to realize their vision, had been great. In spite of initial discouragements and the absence of spectacular results, they tenaciously continued their work and gained tolerance, if not acceptance, for their missions over the eleven year period 1823-34. This was solid, deliberate progress, the out-working of a master-plan, instead of haphazard advance wherever circumstances appeared to point the way. Behind the plan was a master-mind, visionary yet practical, enthusiastic but calm, compassionate yet firm, devout yet business-like---the mind of William Shaw. His vision determined the shape of Methodist endeavour beyond the Great Fish River; his hands held the reins, gently but firmly indicating the road from one mission to another; his spirit flowed through the growing corps of workers and imbued them with ideals similar to his own; to him must go the major credit for the consistent advance towards Natal. Nevertheless, he could not have covered the ground by himself, and recognition of his leadership must also acknowledge the merit of the dozen or more colleagues who co-operated in the fulfilment

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[1] As early as the Annual District Meeting 1830 the committee was considering the opening of a station between Mount Coke and Butterworth.

of his vision. These co-workers were themselves no ordinary men. More than average talent was needed to establish and to hold a mission in a pagan tribe: that so many succeeded is a tribute to their abilities and their characters. Men who founded and built up stations not only among the relatively peaceful Gqunukwebi, but also in the midst of the Ndlambe, Gcaleka, Bomvana, Thembu and Mpondo---none of whom was naturally pacific---men who did such work must have possessed some gifts of leadership.

When Shaw left Grahamstown in March 1833 for his first visit to England in thirteen years, he must have felt reasonably satisfied with what he was leaving behind him and with the prospects that lay ahead. He was within striking distance of his goal, Port Natal; he could look forward to an early return to South-East Africa with the best years of life still before him for the completion and consolidation of the task to which he had set his hand. He did not know that four years were to pass before he would again set foot on African soil, and he could not foresee the violent interruption to his plans that would occur while he was absent. In the light of subsequent events it proved unfortunate that the captain's experienced hand was removed from the helm of Wesleyan missions in Kaffraria during the stormy 1834-36 period: had he been in control some problems would probably not have arisen, and the re-launching of the missions that had been stranded through the storms of war would possibly have taken place more smoothly and expeditiously.

But such thoughts arise from hindsight. In mid-1834, when Shaw had been away for just a year, only a prophet could have foreseen the crying need for his stabilising presence; yet within six months that need arose. The Sixth Frontier War erupted on the frontier, and the wagon wheels of Methodist mission progress rumbled to a costly though temporary halt.

CHAPTER IV

THE SIXTH FRONTIER WAR

PART I — FROM UNREST TO INVASION

I. FRONTIER MISSIONS: FRONTIER PROBLEMS

1. Troubled Inheritance. When the Wesleyans crossed the Great Fish River in 1823 and established their first mission beyond the Keiskamma, they inextricably involved themselves in frontier politics. They would not have entirely escaped involvement had they restricted themselves to the Colony, but their task would have been easier: they would have personally seen only one side of the question and have been spared the discomfort of straddling the frontier fence and sharing the incompatible views of those who dwelt on either side of it. Other contemporary missionary societies were shielded from the full force of conflict that arose from such opposing viewpoints by their policy of working exclusively for European, or Hottentot, or Bantu communities. The Methodists' founding of Wesleyville while they vigorously continued their ministry to the colonists, however, gave them double vision and enabled them, if they wished, to see both the Xhosa and the European points of view with almost equal clarity. An examination of Methodist behaviour in face of white-black tensions may reveal their lack of complete success in being impartial, but will show that they tried to be just. And in those times, as in our own, who was detached enough to stand like Justice, blindfold, scrupulously weighing every factor in the scales of Truth?

By arriving in Albany with the British settlers, the Wesleyans made themselves susceptible to anti-Xhosa sentiments. Memories of the Ndlambe attack on Grahamstown in April 1819 must still have been vivid in the minds of those who were then already on the frontier. The settlers soon discovered that they were intended to serve as a human barrier

against further inroads upon the Colony, and when they were established and their herds began to grow they bore the brunt of many a cattle raid. It was hard for any people to remain judicially neutral under such circumstances, and particularly difficult for the Methodists who so completely identified themselves with their fellows. Their sympathy for "the noble savage" was constantly modified by their own colonial status. They could not, as other missionaries have sometimes done, pose as uncompromising champions of oppressed aborigines for they had their feet in both camps. They tried—their writings leave no doubt on that score—to present the African case when conflicting claims were discussed, but there were limits beyond which their European commitments would not allow them to go.

Their work in Albany and Kaffraria provided the Wesleyans with many opportunities for testing their abilities to serve both peoples. The first of these concerned the Neutral Territory. After the British defeat of the abortive Ndlambe attack on Grahamstown the colonial government had given serious attention to the subject of frontier defence, and in October 1819 Lord Charles Somerset had called a conference with Ngqika and other Xhosa chiefs. At that meeting, Ngqika, under pressure of circumstances, verbally agreed to the formation of a neutral zone in which neither white nor black, apart from colonial military patrols, would be allowed to settle. The Neutral Territory, as it was first called, lay between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, and extended from the sea to the Winterberg Mountains. In agreeing to Somerset's demand, Ngqika exceeded his own authority, for he had no right as chief to give away his land to an alien power, while the southern section, belonging to the Gqunukwebi clan, was not even his to give.[1] The agreement temporarily served to satisfy the European need for a buffer zone between themselves and the

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[1] Shaw, stating the Gqunukwebi viewpoint before the Aborigines Committee on 7 Aug. 1835, reported that they were very dissatisfied with the loss of their land between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers. They maintained that Ngqika "had no right whatever over those lands, and they ought to have been consulted previously to the alienation of their lands". IBB VII.538, p.52.

tribes, but was always regretted by the other party. To the colonial authorities the designated area soon became known as the Ceded Territory, and it was hard for them not to regard it as an extension to the Colony, available for settlement. To the Xhosa, however, it continued to be a cause for discontent. The Ngqika who had regarded themselves as allies of the British, considered they had lost territory to Britain; the Ndlambe and Gqunukwebi felt that their possessions had been disposed of unlawfully; while grass for their cattle was a recurring need for all the tribes who were excluded from the neutral strip.[1] From the time of its sequestration, therefore, the territory was a source of contention, until, even in colonial circles, it often went by the name of "the Debatable Land".[2]

When, therefore, Shaw entered Kaffraria in 1823 and founded his first mission at Wesleyville he entered upon a troubled inheritance. The tribe with whom he worked was dissatisfied over its enforced withdrawal east of the Keiskamma and soon made known its hopes that the missionary's coming would lead to the restoration of its lost lands. Shaw was chary of embroilment in politics, but did act as intermediary between his hosts and the colonial governor and secured permission for the Gqunukwebi and Ndlambe to graze their cattle in sections of the neutral zone.[3] This lessened the immediate tension on the southern half of the Keiskamma boundary but by no means satisfied all the natural demands of the dispossessed tribes. The missionary and his associates had to reckon with the fact that at Wesleyville and Mount Coke they were working with people

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[1] A. Stockenstrom before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, p.48; Shaw, SIM p.140; Major W.B. Dundas, before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, p.136; Humanus [Hermanus?] deposing before H. Smith, 25 May 1836; and H. Somerset to D'Urban, 3 and 10 Oct. 1834, emphasized the gravity of the question of grazing, and although their statements primarily referred to a later period, the principles applied also to the 1820s.

[2] T. Phillipps, before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, p.27.

[3] Shaw's efforts to gain concessions are recounted in supra, pp.40-42.

who had a concrete grievance against the Colony, and that they themselves would be regarded with some suspicion while grounds for the grievance continued. It says much for the wisdom of the Wesleyans that they were able to work so long and so peacefully in so tense an atmosphere.

From the days when he was preparing to open his mission among the Gqumukwebi, Shaw had to contend with the adverse effect exerted by commandos on his relationship with the native people.[1] His own pacific influence on Phatho's tribe well-nigh eliminated cattle-raiding on their part and gave them respite from visits by military patrols or burgher groups. But as depredations by other tribes continued and the colonial authorities took counter-measures, the subject of commandos was kept alive and had to be considered by the Methodists. Shaw declared that his Society had

> always strongly condemned it [the commando system] and in every published document wherein we have expressed our opinion of the subject we have invariably recommended that reprisals should not by made by farmers, even under the control of a military officer,

but according to native law.[2] He believed that it was impossible to ensure that the innocent did not suffer with the guilty during commando operations, and preferred the spoor system for tracking down those who were guilty of depredations against the Colony.[3]

2. Frontier in Flux. If Shaw's chosen parish of Gqumukwebiland remained peaceful through the middle years of the third decade, no such claim could be made for the more northerly stretches of the frontier

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[1] Supra, p.35.

[2] A Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries in South Africa (hereinafter abbreviated as Shaw, Defence)(London, 1839), p.28.

[3] IBB VII,538, pp.61,62. Shaw recommended that the border area be divided into districts, each under the care of a chief who would be responsible for the restoration of any stolen cattle whose spoor (tracks) should lead into his district. Boyce also castigated the commando system— "It was as unwise and impolitic as it was unjust". He preferred the imposition of a fine, from 4 to 10 head of cattle for every one stolen. Caffre War and Death of Hinza (Imperial Blue Book, 1836, XXXIX,279) (hereinafter abbreviated as IBB XXXIX,279), p.46.

country. Three years after the formation of the Neutral Territory, Maqoma and his Ngqika were allowed to return to the headwaters of the Kat River under a gentlemen's agreement which depended on their good conduct. This, according to Stockenstrom, breached "the strongest hold in the whole of the frontier line, from the Orange River down to the sea, ... the best line of frontier defence" the Colony could find.[1] It also defeated the zone's pacific purpose by bringing the Xhosa once again within easy reach of colonial farms, and opening the way for further cattle raids. The results of this official tolerance could not have been unbearable, however, for Maqoma continued in his occupation of the coveted valleys for seven uninterrupted years. But toward the close of that sabbatical period there were signs of mounting tension,[2] though the actual disturbers of the peace came from outside the disputed area. The Mfecane had driven the Thembu westwards over the Kei into Ngqika country whence Maqoma thrust them into the colonial borders and took 3,000 of their cattle, in January 1829. For this defensive though provocative act, it was decreed that Maqoma and his people should be expelled from the Kat River area by the end of March.[3] The Governor, Sir Lowry Cole, planned to "secure" the vacated area, "together with such part of the remainder of the ceded territory as it" might thereafter have "become an object to occupy" (an intriguingly vague phrase!) "to the colony".[4] This plan to annex the territory and extend the

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[1] IBB VII.538, p.81.

[2] On 13 Jan. 1829 W. R. Thomson asked to be relieved of his post as government agent at Chumie since, he claimed, he had lost influence with the chiefs, and his position was useless and even dangerous. C.O.362. Letters Received, No. 2.

[3] It was actually effected early in May by Stockenstrom as Commissary-General, and he thereafter accepted responsibility for the expulsion. IBB VII.538, pp.82,213,214,228,244.

[4] To Sir G. Murray, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 June 1829. IBB XXXIX.50.252, pp.42,43.

colonial possessions failed to gain the unqualified approval of the Colonial Office whose secretary wanted more information before authorizing "the occupation of the ceded territory";[1] but the brake was applied too late. Stockenstrom had launched the Kat River Settlement scheme, and 480 square miles, "among the best in South Africa",[2] were lost to the Xhosa and given to the Hottentots in the hope of strengthening the Colony's defences.

The hope proved frail. The settlement acted as an acute irritant to the dispossessed Ngqika who saw their choicest land delivered to the Hottentots against whom they had had no grudge but of whom they became understandably jealous. Many contemporary observers agreed that the expulsion and its sequel, the settlement, were among the major causes of increased Xhosa unrest and the war that eventually burst upon the Colony. As early as July 1829 the Rev. Thomson, who was still holding his post as Government agent, was writing to Cole, in response to an enquiry, and making the following significant comments:

> So far as I have had an opportunity of observing, their removal has produced a considerable degree of irritation and hostility, in the minds of those particularly, who have suffered by it; and it is likely to cause an unfavourable impression upon the natives generally. Such effects are more particularly to be noticed, as the measures affect those united under the Chief Macomo, who have been expelled from the upper end of the Kat River and its sources. The occupation by them of the other tract of land towards the Koonap River was by favour, and removable at pleasure; but the other district alluded to, though evidently included within the Colonial boundary, according to the terms of the treaty of 1819, was left undisturbed at the time when the Kaffirs were driven out from the other parts of the ceded territory; since which the original occupants and others have continued there: and when the boundary line was strictly kept up in other parts, the same was continued in a direction which left the country in question still in possession of the Kaffirs. Such being the case they would naturally consider it as connected with Kaffirland. And, it would appear, that this was the idea entertained by those who were appointed to survey the boundary, as I apprehend will be found by a reference to the Surveyor's report. Under these circumstances it is not probable that

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[1] Murray to Cole, 15 Oct. 1829. Ibid., p.44.

[2] J. S. Marais, The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937 (London, 1939), p.218.

> the natives will perceive or acknowledge the claim which the Government now makes to the country in question.[1]

Such comments, based on personal observation, geography, and history, and made by one who was certainly not unduly in favour of the native, provided strong support for Maqoma's view that he was being driven from land that was rightfully his, and that irritation at the Colony's vacillations was justified. When Shaw looked back on the same events, he too, had his strictures, though he did not look the facts of Xhosa ownership so squarely in the face as Thomson had done. He called the Kat River Settlement an "honest and bold measure", but recognized that "it was an experiment; and however well and honestly intended, it led to some very disastrous results, both as it regards the colonists and the natives" and that "the time and mode of doing it, ... entailed certain evil consequenses".[2] Steedman, writing in sympathy with the Wesleyans, made the cogent observation that the Settlement was warmly though incongruously approved by those (Dr. Philip and his party) who later were "so greatly excited" over the Xhosa's rights.[3] Boyce, in his Notes on South African Affairs, made extended comment on the ejection of Maqoma and the locating of the Hottentots in the disputed area, and described it as

> an event which more than any other continued to confirm the suspicion of the Kaffir tribes, that the gradual usurpation of their territory formed part of the policy of the Colonial Government. To the jealous feeling created by this expulsion, we may trace the real origin of the Kaffir war of 1834-5 ... In its effects ... it was a most serious error, for, from that day, the irruption of the Kaffirs into the Cape Colony was, with them a mere question of time and opportunity. A sense of the general insecurity of the whole of their territory pervaded the tribes of Kaffraria, ...[4]

In a footnote, Boyce perceptively remarked:

> The Kaffirs had of late years been uncommonly sensitive as to land,

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[1] C.O. 362, no. 36, 1 July 1829.

[2] SMM, pp.144, 145.

[3] WMM 1836, p.603.

[4] W. B. Boyce, Notes on South African Affairs from 1834 to 1838 (hereinafter abbreviated as Boyce, Notes)(Grahamstown, 1838), pp.5,10,11 (Boyce's italics).

> and especially land near the Colony; and nothing was more calculated to excite jealous and revengeful feelings, than the occupation of their favourite grazing ground by the Colonial Government.[1]

In the light of these judgments, it was hardly surprising that the second half of 1829 was marked by unrest on the fluctuating frontier. By August 12, Lt. Col. Somerset was reporting that the Khosa had again taken possession of the upper branches of the Kat River and were robbing farmers and Hottentots.[2] In the same letter, he relayed rumours, which he appeared to accept, about preparations for war among the Ngqika. He declared: "... the country is in the most alarming state from the number of the Caffres, who are committing the greatest depredations." Yet, when Cole visited the frontier in September he found "that the alarm of threatened invasion had in a great measure subsided" and he was "persuaded that a coalition to invade the colony never entered into their [the Khosa's] contemplation".[3] Boyce, however, categorically stated: "Nothing but the prompt measures of Sir Lowry Cole prevented an immediate outbreak, and the anticipation of the scenes of 1835 in the year 1829"[4] — showing how easily a mistaken idea could get into circulation. The Methodists who were in Grahamstown at the time of the Governor's visit had a little clearer concept of his purpose when they wrote: "Much good is expected from his visit, and it is hoped that the right of the Caffres to the neutral country, willbe finally settled, and a better understanding between them and the colonists take place."[5] The calmer attitude proved to be the right one. Several missionaries, writing independently in answer to a circular from Thomson, emphatically denied that the tribes had any intention

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[1] Notes, p.7.

[2] To Major Dundas, 12 Aug. IBB XXXIX.50.252, pp.44-46.

[3] Cole to Murray, 2 Jan. 1830. Ibid., p.52.

[4] Notes, p.11. Boyce, it should be noted, had not then arrived in South Africa.

[5] Journal of J. Davis, 23 Sept. 1829. WMM 1830, p.202.

of attacking the Colony.[1] Chalmers of Chumie described the talk of war as "false and groundless". Bennie and Ross at Lovedale both believed the rumours to have originated in the Colony, and reported that Ngqika and Maqoma denied any hostile intentions. Shaw at Wesleyville was "not aware of any hostile feeling", and neither were Brownlee, who was visiting Lovedale, nor Young of Mount Coke who wrote from Grahamstown.

The absence of overt acts against the Colony was no indication of satisfaction with colonial policy, however. Shaw testified that during the last few years of his residence in Caffraria (he left in 1830), "there was certainly a growing desire amongst the chiefs generally to be upon friendly terms and to live in peace with the colony",[2] yet, at the same time, he recognized that from 1829 there was a growing dissatisfaction among chiefs other than the Gqumukwebi. He attributed this to Maqoma's expulsion which convinced the Xhosa that there would be no lasting security for them on the border: they feared they would be pushed further and still further to the east.[3] He also corroborated Thomson's report concerning their belief that the extreme north-easterly section of the Neutral Territory had been reserved for the Xhosa tribes under the verbal treaty of 1819.[4] But apart from endemic cattle raids, there was no martial protest by the Ngqika and Ndlambe people against what they considered the unjust policy of the Colony.[5]

So passed another year. Toward its close, in August 1830, Samuel

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[1] C.O. 362, no. 60. Thomson to Dundas, 23 Sept. 1829.

[2] IBB VII.538, pp.54,55.

[3] Thomson also realized that the border tribes were subject to pressure from the rear, and that this might "exasperate them against the Colony". C.O. 362, no. 36 (continuation of letter quoted on pages 149,150.)

[4] Vide supra, pp.149,150.

[5] Ngqika had a restraining influence upon his people, but he died on 15 Nov. 1829, and Maqoma became regent during the minority of the heir, Sandile, who was then only 8 years old.

Young, who had taken Shaw's place at Wesleyville on the latter's removal into Grahamstown, reported that there was talk of war in Kaffraria.[1] His letter touched on so many interesting aspects of the situation that it is worth quoting in extenso:

> Some of the Chiefs say, "Let us first kill all the white people on the stations; for it must be they that tell where the stolen cattle are; but others say, "No; for it we kill them, we shall have no friends to plead our cause at a future period." We are therefore in jeopardy every hour, and it requires a high degree of faith at this moment in Caffreland to say, "We will not fear what men can do unto us." We do not believe every report which we hear ... but ... it is clear that a great number of Chiefs are determined not to be satisfied with anything less than war.
>
> The Chiefs of this tribe [Gqumukwebi] assure me that they have no hostile intentions against the colony, but many of the people seem disposed to join the other tribes. The Caffres now say, that if they have another war with the colony, they shall not all come in a body as before; but they will divide themselves into separate parties, and each party must have their [sic] route appointed them; and in this way they say they can avoid our troops, and come upon the settlers and the boors before they can have time to collect themselves together. The adoption of this plan by the Caffres is to be feared.

While the letter breathed clerical timidity and slight alarmism, it also reflected the unsettled state of the tribes in 1830, and showed that there was some war talk and even a consideration of the most profitable tactics if an attack were to be launched against the Colony. The last point is of particular interest since it foreshadowed the plan, five years before it went into operation, by which war was eventually made.

The missionary included in the above letter a sentence which revealed where his sympathies lay:

> I do not wish you to understand that the fault is in our Government, even should Caffreland become a scene of war and bloodshed; for I believe there is no Government on earth that would have been so lenient with the Caffres as our own.

He failed to see that the very leniency, coupled with a weak and vacilla-

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[1] WMM 1831, pp.55,56.

ting policy, might have been one of the chief causes of the war that came.[1]

It was early in 1830 that another factor entered the picture in the person of Dr. Philip. He visited the frontier region in company with his son-in-law John Fairbairn, editor of the Commercial Advertiser, James Read the L.M.S. missionary, and certain French missionaries. The visitors interviewed the border chiefs and discussed with them the problem of the Neutral Territory. In the course of their tour they called on Young at Mount Coke, but found him unsympathetic to their enquiries. Young testified:

> I did not think that the proceedings of the doctor were at all calculated to lead to any good; he seemed to strengthen the idea that they had been unjustly dispossessed of it [the Neutral Territory] and pledged himself to do all in his power to have it restored. ... The general impression produced on my mind was, that the doctor was interfering in such a manner as did not become him, and in the character of a missionary.
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> After the doctor's departure, Young used all his influence with the chiefs to do away with such bad impressions as he conceived the doctor's conference likely to make, and is of the opinion that he succeeded in doing so.[2]

This comparatively unimportant incident — for it did not need a visit from Philip to convince the chiefs that "they had been unjustly dispossessed" — injured the hitherto friendly relationships that obtained between the L.M.S. and W.M.M.S. workers. The Wesleyan apologist, Boyce, declared that "this interference on the part of entire strangers was remonstrated against, as calculated to produce endless irritation". He appeared to ignore the long-formed L.M.S. connection with the Ngqika, and the natural interest in their allies, the Ndlambe; and he passed over the awkward fact

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[1] As examples of the instability of Governmental policy, reference is made to two Colonial Office despatches to Governor Cole. The first, 6 May 1830, from Murray, states: "I am not ... prepared to authorize you to expel them [Kaffirs] by force of arms from the land of their birth". The second, 26 May 1831, from Goderich, suggests: "The consideration of the subject has led me to think, that the lands of the Ceded Territory might henceforth be appropriated to general purposes of settlement", and expressed the opinion that many colonists would also be interested in better land! IBB XXXIX.50.252, pp.54,57. Surely Xhosa fears of increasing encroachment were amply justified!

The present writer has discovered no corresponding record of Philip's point of view.

[2] Despatches concerning the Late Caffre War (Imperial Blue Book, 1837, XLIII.503)(hereinafter abbreviated as IBB XLIII.503). p.78.

that when hostilities did occur, the Ndlambe among whom Mount Coke was situated followed the Ngqika lead and were not restrained by their Wesleyan advisers. While relieving Philip of the odium of wishing to do the Colony an injury, he so stressed the harmful results of his visit as to place a large share for Xhosa unrest on the doctor's shoulders.[1] If Boyce's remarks faithfully reflected Wesleyan attitudes towards the L.M.S., it was little wonder that relations between the two societies deteriorated. The rift was nonetheless unfortunate, however, for it set two Christian bodies at variance and helped to identify the W.M.M.S. as pro- and the L.M.S. as anti-colonial for many years to come.

In spite of the definitive pronouncements about expulsion, the ebullient Maqoma was permitted to graze his cattle in the Ceded Territory during 1832; but the continuance of cattle raids against European and Hottentot farmers led to orders for his withdrawal over the Keiskamma in November 1833. European observers agreed that the manner and the time of expulsion were most unfortunate,[2] and the consensus of opinion both white and black, named the act as one of the chief causes of the war that followed thirteen months later.[3] The sense of injury was heightened rather than lessened by Somerset's complaisance. He returned from leave in January 1834, and sympathized with Maqoma and Tyhali, allegedly promised to use his influence for the restoration to them of at least the eastern portion of the land from which they had been driven, and in February

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[1] Notes, pp.12-14. J. Whiteside, History, follows Boyce's lead in criticising Philip's approach to the Xhosa chiefs.

[2] W. Chalmers to Capt. Stretch, 21 Nov. 1835, U. Long, Index. pp.81-83; Capt. R. S. Aitchinson before Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, pp.8,9; Col. Wade, Ibid, pp.291, 307, 308; D'Urban to Spring Rice, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 Nov. 1834, IBB XXXIX.50.252, pp.103.

[3] Macmillan, BBB, pp.68-70, investigates the expulsion question. His pro-Bantu approach contrasts with Cory's coverage of the same subject (II pp.383-385) from the colonial standpoint. There was something to be said on both sides, but the Xhosa's must certainly be judged the greater grievance since they were arbitrarily deprived of their best land.

allowed them to return to the Gaga district. But he did this without consulting the civil authorities, with the result that in March the Xhosa were again obliged to abandon their huts and their corn in a forced withdrawal to the left bank of the Keiskamma.[1] Such cat-and-mouse policy could only produce bewildered resentment in the minds of the chiefs and their followers. If the natural consequence of that policy was to be avoided, firm action and skilful diplomacy were immediately needed, for no high-spirited people would long endure such treatment without turning on their erratic tormentors.

And what were the prospects for diplomatic action? Superficially they were good, for Lt. Col. Wade, who had been Acting-Governor of the Cape since the retirement of Sir G. Lowry Cole in August 1833, gave way to Cole's successor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, on 2 January 1834. The new Governor had specific instructions from the Colonial Office to seek a solution to the long-standing and worsening frontier problems,[2] and many people on both sides of the border hoped he would succeed in his search. But several matters awaited his attention in Cape Town, and he had plausible reasons for remaining there and postponing his personal investigation of conditions beyond the Fish River.[3] He lingered throughout 1834, and only reached the frontier under compulsion from the Xhosa invasion early in 1835, more than a year after his arrival in the Colony. Had this been the only serious case of delay in his administration, D'Urban might have been excused by reference to the pressure of official business at the seat of government, but his leisurely conduct of the ensuing war

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[1] Aitchison and Chalmers, as in Note 2, supra, p.155.

[2] Spring Rice to D'Urban, 27 Nov. 1833.

[3] Among the urgent matters claiming D'Urban's attention were the Vagrancy Ordinance, the emancipation of the slaves, measures for effecting economy in the Colony's administration, and the conclusion of a treaty with the Griqua chief, Waterboer.

and the extraordinary dilatoriness of his despatch writing suggest that his failure to visit the frontier was typical of his sluggish approach to responsibility. A brisker official would have averted at least some of the calamities that overtook the border regions.

Unfortunately for the colonists and the native tribes, D'Urban was far from brisk. He intended to visit the eastern districts but gave precedence to more proximate business and allowed months to slip by without his making any tangible contribution to the pacification of the frontier. Instead of paying the personal visit that the situation demanded, he temporized and "availed" himself "of a tour which Dr. Philip ... made through those tribes later in the year ... to explain to them more fully, and in detail, the nature of the agreements into which" he would be prepared to enter with them.[1] Philip faithfully fulfilled his part of the arrangement, but saw his mission foiled by D'Urban's failure to pay the promised visit.[2] The missionary left Cape Town in August, saw Maqoma, Botomane, Kama, and Tshatshu in September, waited in vain for the Governor's arrival, and on October 27 decided to return to Cape Town irrespective of D'Urban's appearing. On his way coastwards from the Kat River Settlement, which had been his headquarters during his visit and which he left on November 4, Philip passed along the west ridge of the Tyhume basin, and, "during a ride of perhaps twenty miles, ... did not find a single Kaffir kraal or hut which had not been burnt or otherwise destroyed by the military".

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[1] D'Urban to Spring Rice, 5 Jan. 1835. IBB XXXIX,50,252, p.118.

[2] The vexed question of Philip's relationship to D'Urban at the time of the tour may be traced in IBB XXXIX,50,252, pp.117,118,132,133; IBB VII, 538, pp.379,550-552,595; Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines, Part II (hereinafter abbreviated as IBB VII,425,) pp.720-722; IBB XLIII, 503, pp.163,164,168; D'Urban-Smith correspondence in D'Urban Papers and in G.M. Theal, Records of the Province of Queen Adelaide, 3 vols. (hereinafter abbreviated as Theal, PQA)(Typescript, Cape Town, 1913), II, p.602. Macmillan, BBB, pp.86-101, thoroughly examines the matter of Philip's tour as a preparation for D'Urban's intended visit, and convincingly defends Philip at the Governor's expense.

Yet he still advised Maqoma to comply with official demands and trust in the Governor's coming to correct the situation.[1]

The Wesleyans, already prejudiced by Philip's earlier visit to the frontier, were unlikely to have welcomed his further appearance among the disturbed tribes; but there is no record of any protest at the time of his conversations with the chiefs. When Boyce came to give his version of events that led to war, however, he insisted that Philip was D'Urban's official agent conveying the Governor's official proposals to the tribes who ought, therefore, to have patiently awaited the realization of the Governor's benevolent plans instead of taking matters into their own hands and irrupting into the Colony.[2] This was a partisan attitude. It passed over, if it did not entirely ignore, the equivocal nature of D'Urban's dealings with Philip on that occasion, and gave no credence to the doctor's own concept of his status during his sojourn in the Neutral Territory.[3] It was also unsympathetic to the Xhosa point of view , not acknowledging the provocations and pressures to which they were subject, but expecting them to endure the expulsions, the military disciplines, and the Governor's hope-destroying delays. The chiefs, as their actions eventually demonstrated, dissented from the missionary's opinion.

Though D'Urban failed to respond to Philip's promptings and gave no evidence that he appreciated the mounting urgency of the frontier situation, he could not plead complete ignorance of the tensions that were building up on the border. On October 31, Somerset reported that unless the tribes were allowed to have gardens on the banks of the Tyhume and Gaga streams, that is, inside the Neutral Territory, they would starve and would invade the

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[1] IBB VII.538, pp.552,553. [2] Notes, pp.16-21.

[3] Boyce accepted the colonial view that Philip's visit exacerbated the situation and provoked the war, in spite of statements to the contrary by Tyhali and Ganya (great councillor to Ngqika). (Theal PQA II, p.568; IBB XLIII.503, p.74).

Colony. They had already "been subjected to great distress". The commandant looked to D'Urban's arrival on the frontier with "extreme anxiety, ... as a matter of first importance". It was "of the utmost importance that no time should be lost in coming to a fair understanding with the Caffres. ... I see nothing but confusion on this frontier, unless very decided measures are adopted, and those speedily."[1] But D'Urban, awaiting the day for the emancipation of the slaves (December 1), made no move in response to his subordinate's appeal. Somerset's next letter, dated December 20—the day before the invasion wave broke on the Colony—betrayed no less agitation,[2] but there was no sign that it would have goaded its recipient into action. The commandant's next communication had the desired effect, however, but gave no satisfaction to writer or reader since it announced the fulfilment of the officer's fears. The invasion was on!

But before following the trail of havoc that ensued, some attention needs to be given to the intensified unrest that developed after Philip had left the frontier, and the extent to which the Colony was aware of the danger that lurked on its borders.

II. BEFORE THE STORM

1. Deceptive Calm. As their story shows, Wesleyan Missions had not advanced to the Mzimvubu without experiencing the alarums of war, but each of these had subsided and left the missionaries poised for further progress. In view of the distance they had already put between themselves and the Colony, Port Natal seemed already within reach of their steady expansion, while Delagoa Bay, though still further away than they probably realized, was a not unreasonable goal. Any obstacle to the extension of their chain of stations would presumably lie ahead in the yet unoccupied territories: little consideration did they give to the likelihood

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[1] CBB XLIII.503. pp.154,155. [2] Ibid., p.160.

of their being hindered by events on the Eastern Frontier.

The Methodists were not alone in their complacency regarding the stability of the colonial situation toward the close of 1834. The Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in spite of the many problems that crowded upon him, believed he was facing a period of peace rather than of war, and in his own dilatory way was still planning that tour of the frontier that would right most wrongs and induce tranquillity. True it was that Boers had been leaving the Colony in ever-growing numbers, but two hundred traders in Kaffraria carried on their business as usual, while the Xhosa, after a severe drought, were planting large gardens and reaping good crops.[1] The C.M.S., working with the Ngqika, reported that "things were not worse at the beginning of December [1834] than they had often been before"; and their directors, in anticipation of continued peace, were increasing the Kaffrarian staff.[2] James Read Snr., of the L.M.S., recalled that "about twelve days before the war Mr. Brownlee came to see me in my illness, and stated that everything was quiet in Caffreland."[3] In retrospect he could say, on behalf of his associates, "The war was altogether unexpected and sudden to us; we never heard a sentence to that effect; we were all astounded; no chief or Caffre had ever spoken a word that led us to think of war."[4] James Read Jnr., himself a missionary at Kat River like his father, when asked in the Aborigines Committee whether he had any idea of the possibility of war just prior to its outbreak replied, "No-, I had not the most distant idea that such a crisis was approaching."[5] If the Reads be dismissed as unreliable witnesses, James Laing, C.M.S. missionary, can be called on for his evidence. Speaking at the Annual Meeting of the Albany Auxiliary of

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[1] Macmillan, BBB, pp.120,121.

[2] 40th Report, C.M.S., 16 June 1835. IBB XLIII.503, p.170.

[3] IBB VII.425, p.601.

[4] Ibid., p.602.

[5] IBB VII.533, p.691.

the W.M.M.S., he said, according to the Grahamstown Journal of 27 March, 1835:

> Some have said that the Missionaries must have seen the preparations which the Kaffirs are supposed to have made previous to their infatuated and cruel attack on the colony. Preparations they may have made, and plans they may have formed previous to their murderous attacks on this Frontier, but they contrived to keep the Missionaries entirely in the dark, both as to their hostile intentions, and also to their preparations. ... In company with my respected brother, the Rev. J. Ross, of the G.M.S., on the very eve of the Kaffir irruption, I travelled over a considerable part of the Kaffir country. This journey we began on the 9th, and ended on the 13th December. In the course of it we visited and preached to the Kaffirs ... whom we found not only attentive to our message, but extremely kind and peaceable.

As late as December 22, the day after the invasion began, the Wesleyans were still unaware of any major unrest. On that day Shrewsbury, returning from Bathurst to Grahamstown, met Col. England who inquired, "What are these rumours about the Kaffirs?" "Nothing more than their ordinary stealing," was the reply, for only a few days before, Shrewsbury, holding the office of superintendent of the W.M.M.S. in Albany (which, in Methodist organization, included Kaffraria) in Shaw's absence, had received letters from his missionaries in which they expressed gratitude for the tranquillity in which they worked.[1] This ignorance of the actual state of affairs was explained by Shaw to be the result of deliberate secrecy whereby the Xhosa effectively kept knowledge of their plans from the missionaries.[2]

This accords with what has long since been accepted as true concerning exchange of information between missionaries and the people whom they serve: while the missionaries may possess intimate knowledge about the habits and mode of thought of their flock, they are often effectively kept in ignorance of activities and decisions which it is known they would condemn and try to reverse. Shaw's explanation can also be taken as extended comment on Henry Fynn's terse statement concerning "missionaries, who on all occasions are kept in the dark as much as possible".[3]

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.402.

[2] IBB VII.538, pp.55,56.

[3] Deposition of H.F.Fynn, given at King William's Town, 28 April 1835. IBB XLIII.503, p.232.

Sir Benjamin D'Urban was shortly to cite missionary ignorance of Xhosa plans in extenuation of his own officials' failure to gain advance information of the projected invasion:

> I cannot conclude [my despatch] without calling your attention to the extraordinary fact, that this extensive combination and congregation of Caffre tribes ... should have been assembled without attracting the notice of several missionaries, as well as many free traders living with and among them, as must be presumed from none of these individuals having sent any intelligence to or in any way aroused the suspicions of the frontier authorities of the colony.[1]

In his next despatch, written from Grahamstown on January 21, the Governor felt free to state:

> It is now clear that this invasion has been the result of long combination; and so well have these wily savages masked their purpose, that the missionaries, of whom many have been long living among them, any more than the free traders scattered through all tribes, had no suspicion of it; nor were any entertained by the frontier authorities, accustomed as they are to the Caffre disposition for a long period of years.[2]

From his own confession it must be accepted that the outbreak of war took D'Urban utterly by surprise. Yet, as will be shown, several other observers, some before and some after the event, claimed to be expecting serious trouble on the Eastern Frontier during 1834.

2. The Storm Foreseen. In one of his appearances before the Aborigines Committee, Dr. John Philip stressed the evils arising from the lack of a consistent frontier policy, and quoted the South African Commercial Advertiser of January 18, 1834 in support of his contentions. The newspaper said:

> There is at present no system, or one that is good for nothing, and a cloud is gathering in that quarter [beyond the frontier] , which, but for the speedy intervention of wisdom and prudence will certainly descend in a shower of blood.[3]

These words, ostensibly addressed to the public, in reality directed to the newly-arrived D'Urban who had been sworn in as governor only two days earlier, were meant to direct attention to the serious conditions that ob-

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[1] D'Urban to Spring Rice, 5 Jan. 1835. IBB XXXIX.50.252, p.119.

[2] Ibid., p.132.

[3] IBB VII.538, p.554.

tained north and east of Grahamstown. There was, unfortunately, no "speedy intervention of wisdom and prudence"; D'Urban found nearer and apparently more urgent matters clamouring for his attention and justifying neglect of frontier problems.

During the months of March and April Philip and his associates heard that "the Caffres were very much discontented, and that they were becoming very troublesome," and they learned that conditions worsened during May. But when the doctor toured the frontier region early in September, "everything within the colony wore the aspect of peace; and the principal things which seemed to occupy the people's [that is, settlers'] minds were the emigration of the boers beyond the frontier and the expectation that when the governor came to the frontier he would grant them new farms beyond the limits of the colony".[1] Further evidence was supplied by Col. Wade (acting-governor of the Colony from August 1833 to January 1834) when he toured the frontier territory in October. He travelled from Bathurst through Wesleyville, Fort Willshire, skirted Fort Beaufort, visited the Tyhume valley as far as the Gaga stream and the Mancazana sources. As a result of what he saw by way of Xhosa unrest, of widespread burning of huts by patrols from Fort Beaufort, of mounting resentment in the minds of Maqoma and Tyhali, and of European dissatisfaction at the increase in depredations, Wade strongly expressed to Col. Somerset his "positive conviction, ... that affairs could not remain in the state they then were a month longer". He believed that the Xhosa would not remain inactive, and that the colonists would not submit to plunder. He urged Somerset to obtain explicit instructions from the Governor concerning the course of action he should take in case matters came to a head. "... I felt perfectly convinced that a crisis was fast approaching that would place him [Somerset] in no ordinary difficulties, and the colony in the utmost danger."[2] Here was a level-headed, experienced man

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[1] IBB VII,538, pp.550,551.

[2] Ibid., pp.314,315.

of affairs assessing the danger-potential of a situation, and sharing his fears with the local chargé d'affaires, but failing to make his judgments known in the only place where they could then have done much good—Cape Town. But it was too much to expect the predecessor to give gratuitous information and opinion to his successor in the high office of governor, and there appears to have been no love lost between Wade and D'Urban.

A lesser figure, Captain Spiller, an artillery officer who spent fourteen months on the frontier, was bold enough to declare: "It [the war] was a thing certainly expected; I expected that something of the kind would occur previous to my leaving the frontier, ..."[1]

Somerset, an actor who was much more closely concerned with the whole issue, realized that the situation was deteriorating toward the end of the year, and on the very eve of war said: "Indulgence and forbearance have been tried to their extreme limits with the Caffre tribes; the result has been a more continued system of depredations (quite unprecedented at this time of the year) ..." He also reported that "Caffre traders in Caffreland have in many instances been ordered by the chiefs to quit the country"[2]—an ominous sign to any who chose to heed and interpret it! Somerset indeed sensed that something was brewing but was not perceptive enough to judge the nature or the strength of the mixture. Within three days of writing the above words, however, he was adequately enlightened, and knew that the "Caffres" also had been tried to the extreme limits of their forbearance.

Xhosa records are, as usual, meagre. For so much of African history the only literary records come from the European side, and one is left almost entirely in the dark concerning Xhosa motivations and reactions, and

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[1] Ibid., p.66.

[2] H. Somerset to Major Dutton, Fort Beaufort, 18 Dec. 1834. IBB XXXIX 50,252, p.120. See also G.M.Theal, History of South Africa, 5 vols. (hereinafter abbreviated as Theal, with appropriate volume number), (London, 1883-1900), IV, p.6.

any gleams of light that slip through have, for the most part, already been filtered through a white man's lens, and are therefore of doubtful validity. Occasionally, however, there is a genuine record which gives a glimpse into the African side of affairs. One such gleam is provided by Samuel Young who tells of a visit paid to him in Grahamstown in April 1835 by Congo, brother of Phatho. The missionary asked the Gqumukwebi if the chiefs "knew anything about it [the war] before it broke out, and he replied, Yes, they were requested by Maqoma and Tyhali's messengers to join in the war, but they had positively refused".[1] To this may be added Boyce's declaration that the "probability of a war, and the best and most efficient manner of annoying the Colony, had been frequent subjects of common conversation among the Kaffirs". In a footnote to the foregoing, Boyce continued:

> Of this all the Wesleyan Missionaries are aware; I frequently heard the subject discussed, and also occasional threats, while at Mount Coke, in 1833; but in common with others, I regarded their talk as merely the idle bravado of vain young men.[2]

From these statements it would appear that the Xhosa, far from plunging into an unpremeditated attack upon the Colony, were but realizing plans over which they had been brooding for more than a year, and which were finally accelerated and sparked off by what they deemed to be an insupportable provocation. How, then, could missionaries, being at least vaguely aware of such plans, claim ignorance of the advent of war? Was it not that they, in common with most colonists, could not conceive that the tribes would have the temerity to attack the Colony? They discounted the threats, comfortably forgot whatever advance information they acquired, and consequently were as rudely surprised as the most complacent farmer when war actually came. The

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[1] IBB VII, 425, p.659.

[2] Boyce, Notes, p.18. There is no contradiction between the above statements and those given supra. pp.160-2, for Boyce was referring to earlier talk (1833), and confesses that he gave little credence to it. Boyce was also writing three years after war broke out.

storm, partially foreseen but its possibility barely acknowledged, broke on unsuspecting and unprepared heads.

III. THE STORM BREAKS

1. Casus Belli. The spark that set the frontier on fire fell from what appeared to be a routine patrol which had been ordered to seize cattle in lieu of four stolen horses that had not been returned or for which restitution had not been made. The patrol, under Ensign Sparks who was "one of the youngest officers in the corps [Cape Mounted Rifles] , ... quite incapable of commanding the respect of the Kaffirs", ordered out from Fort Willshire on December 2, seized forty cattle in addition to sixty already exacted by the Ngqika chief Nqeno. On its way back to base, the patrol was attacked, and Sparks was injured, an assegai passing through his arm. The drawing of European blood quickly brought Somerset on the scene. He called Nqeno to account on December 4 and insisted that all his people withdraw from the Neutral Territory and move eastwards over the Keiskamma. The chief, it is clear, did his best to co-operate, although, according to Theal, his people were even then ready for war.[1]

With expulsion once again the order of the day, Somerset was obliged to enforce it north of the Fort Willshire district, into the Tyhume and Gaga valleys. By so doing he was touching the sorest spot in Kaffraria, and was irritating those most likely to retaliate against their being again expelled from territory which they prized so highly and where they had been subjected to such cat-and-mouse treatment. But Somerset seemed unaware of the rumblings from the volcano on which he was treading, and continued

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[1] The Sparks' affair, and that of Sutton which became a sequel to it, is fully recounted in Theal IV, ll.3-5, and Cory III, pp.54-58. Macmillan, RBB, pp.105,106, covers the same ground but allows for the Xhosa point of view. Theal and Cory provide detailed narratives of the ensuing war, while Macmillan acutely analyses its conduct and results. Further page references to these three volumes will only be given for special emphasis.

to demand removal over the Keiskamma, and the handing over of cattle and horses. According to the commandant's own report[1] Mqeno did his best to meet the demands, though they must have appeared inconsistent and exorbitant, and sent in 137 cattle and 13 mares and foals in spite of the fact that the greater part of the stock had already been driven over the Keiskamma because of the expulsion order. The total number of animals surrendered rose, within a few days, to 237 cattle and 18 horses[2]--a tangible enough gesture of submission!

On December 10, Lt. Sutton was sent out from Fort Beaufort to enforce the expulsion of a group of Tyhali's men.[3] The military burned huts, and seized cattle that were reckoned as royal since theybelonged to Tyhali. It is hardly surprising that the Xhosa attacked the patrol, or that the soldiers had to open fire in order to extricate themselves from their dangerous position. In the skirmish, Xhoxho, half-brother of Tyhali, was slightly wounded and thereby gained a niche in history that would otherwise have eluded him, and also provided the casus belli needed for this as for the majority of wars. Xhoxho, then a young man about twenty years of age, was, according to Charles Brownlee who had known him personally,[4] despised by his own father Ngqika, and characterized by a low cunning rather than by any of the sterling qualities possessed by his half-brothers Maqoma and Tyhali. But he belonged to the royal house, and he had been injured. This conjunction was sufficient, in the then disturbed state of the Ngqika

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[1] H.Somerset to Major Dutton, Grahamstown, Dec. 11. IBB XXXIX.50.252, p.119.

[2] Somerset to Dutton, Fort Beaufort, Dec. 18. Ibid., p.121.

[3] Sutton's own report to his superior, Major Burney, Dec. 10. Ibid.

[4] C. Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life and History (hereinafter abbreviated as C. Brownlee, Reminiscences) (Lovedale, 1856), p.320. Brownlee, however, was writing many years later, and could have been unconsciously expressing biased judgments.

district, to make him the hero in a rapidly-developing drama. In a council of leading Ngqika men recent events were reviewed and possible action was discussed. Tyhali was reported to favour an amicable settlement, while Maqoma was quoted as saying: "Shall the blood of a Gaika [Ngqika] chief be shed, and shall we not avenge it? There must be war."[1] Chalmers, who was Tyhali's own missionary, told D'Urban that his chief was enraged by the wounding of his brother;[2] while the G.M.S. missionary, Ross, reflected Xhosa thinking on the matter when he wrote:

> The Caffres reckon he was dead in intention. ... Some indeed said, if we are to pay 200 head of cattle for wounding an officer in the arm, what is to be paid for wounding our chief in the head?[3]

When Philip's protegé, the Ntinde chief Tshatshu, was asked to state the cause of the war, he unhesitatingly replied, "The shooting of Xoxo."[4] From an historical point of view such a ready answer is inadequate, but it does reveal contemporary Xhosa thought on the incident, and harmonizes with Cory's observation that the wounding was regarded as "an insult to the memory of their ancestor Rarabe", and with Macmillan's judgment that it was "the last straw".[5] In the words of the G.M.S. Fortieth Report: "This was the torch that kindled the war. It was no great matter itself, but it was applied to combustible materials, and the whole country was speedily in a blaze."[6] The fact that Xhoxho, five days after the affray, was leading a party into the Colony as far as the Winterberg, in no way vitiates Xhosa indignation at the shooting nor lessens the significance of his injury: indeed, such activity might be placed to his credit and produced as evidence of bravery. Many a European reputation has been gained on similar slender

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[1] C.Brownlee, Reminiscences, pp.24,25.

[2] At Grahamstown, 6 Feb. 1835. IBB XLIII. 503, p.82.

[3] Ross to Philip, from Pirie Mission, 31 Jan. 1836. IBB VII.425, p.718.

[4] IBB VII. 538, p.567.

[5] Cory III, p.59; Macmillan, BBB, p.121. [6] IBB XLIII. 503, p.170.

grounds, and many a calamitous war waged on even less plausible pretexts.

Whatever relative value may be placed on Xhoxho's rôle, there seems little room for doubt, in spite of Tshatshu's denial,[1] that it led to a council of war. It is inconceivable that such thorough operations as shortly took place could have been executed without a meeting where an attack was agreed upon and planned in some detail. Brownlee's words in this connection sound eminently credible:

> A declaration of war is a step of supreme moment and importance to a Native tribe ... the commencement of hostilities was preceded by numerous meetings between the chief and councillors, and between the councillors and the people.
> The chance of success, the plan of campaign, weak spots to attack, strong places to avoid; all these proved material for endless discussion and argument at these gatherings.[2]

Yet, in this case, the question of responsibility for deciding on the act of war remains a confused issue. Tshatshu told the Aborigines Committee that Hintsa had instructed the Ngqika chiefs not to fight, but that the latter were unable to control their followers. The people remonstrated with Maqoma and Tyhali: "Since Gaika's death you do nothing; do not you see that the people are going to kill you at last?"[3] This is not difficult to reconcile with the statement of James Read Snr. before the same Committee:

> It is my impression, and that of most of the other missionaries, that the Caffres rushed into the Colony without the orders or the knowledge of the chiefs. When Mr. Kayser [G.M.S.] went to Macomo, the councillors said, "It is not Macomo's war; it is our war".[4]

While this harmonizes with Brownlee's report on Tyhali's attitude, it conflicts with the same writer's record of Maqoma's response.[5] May it not be that the chiefs, realizing the gravity of an attack on the Colony, endeavoured to restrain the hotheads among their followers, but were out-

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[1] IBB VII, 538, p.564. As a prominent L.M.S. adherent, Tshatshu may have been deliberately kept in ignorance of preparations for war.

[2] C.Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.337.

[3] IBB VII, 538, p.567.

[4] IBB VII, 425, p.602.

[5] Supra, p.168.

voted and, capitulating to the demand for war, gave loyal leadership to the hostilities?[1]

The chiefs, if the above be a true assessment of their position, were not the only ones to be in a predicament. Mission adherents were on the horns of a dilemma. Contact with white missionaries had given them a certain sympathy with the European point of view, yet they were Xhosa, naturally responsive to a tribal call to arms. Failure to answer such a call was accounted treason, and was punishable by death.[2] It was hardly to be expected that those whose mission ties were yet tenuous would be conscientious objectors at such a time of tribal crisis. They joined their fellows and went to war, though, to the missionaries, "they expressed deep regret that they had gone".[3] For all practical purposes, therefore, the invasion was supported by all classes of Ngqika and Ndlambe society. Numbers had increased since the abortive 1819 attack, many corps of choice young men had been formed in the intervening years, warriors were well supplied with spears, some had guns, and horses were more numerous than ever before. The primitive tribesman, unacquainted with the military resources of a great colonizing power, hoped to sweep the encroaching white man far west of the Great Fish River; and after the success of the initial thrust, victory seemed within easy reach.

2. The Onset. Without quoting his sources, Theal claims that on the night of December 11/12, almost immediately after the wounding of Xhoxho on the 10th, the blaze of signal fires between the Keiskamma and the Mbashe called warriors to arms.[4] If this were true, it might truly have been

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[1] C. Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.338, says that though Tyhali advocated peace, he loyally supported the war once the decision was taken. Maqoma may have reacted similarly.

[2] D.W. Brokensha, The Political Institutions of Some Southern Nguni Tribes (unpublished thesis, Oxford, 1950), p.119.

[3] Fortieth G.M.S. Report, IBB XLII. 503, p.170.

[4] Theal IV, p.6.

said that all Kaffraria was on fire; and the Colony would surely have had news of the call-up and have been ready for any subsequent hostilities. But who reported the burning of beacons over so wide an area? Theal does not enlighten us, and the men who were best situated to observe any such signals—the missionaries—said nothing about them. The story of their appearing may then be dismissed as unreliable. In their stead we can place the statement made by the G.M.S. missionary, Laing of Burnshill, at Grahamstown on 27 March, 1835:

> The first indications of the irruption presented themselves to my observation on the 17th December. Never had I seen such commotions among the Caffres before. ... I began to be apprehensive of the destruction of the property of the traders: I feared also that their lives might be endangered; and it was very apparent that the safety of the Missionaries was somewhat precarious. In these circumstances I wrote letters which I wished to be forwarded to the Colony, but all correspondence with it was cut off.[1]

If Somerset had received any such warning, he would have had a few days' grace in which to prepare his counter-measures. The letters never reached him, however; and on the basis of his interpretation of other clear signs of the times, it may be doubted whether he would have accepted and acted upon Laing's information. As it was, he remained unaware of the crisis that was fast building up in his military diocese, and persisted in his provocative endeavours to drive the Ngqika over the Keiskamma without realizing that he was thus precipitating war.[2]

On Saturday morning, December 20, the commandant received a letter from Chalmers, missionary in charge of Chumie station among Tyhali's people. The minister, in an effort to serve as mediator between the chief and the British soldier, explained Tyhali's wish to meet the colonel for discussion of current frontier problems, and at the same time expressed the Ngqika's fear of being seized by the military—hence the request for a meeting at Chumie with two men accompanying each principal

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[1] Quoted by A. Steedman, Wanderings II, p.354.

[2] Macmillan, BBB, p.106.

in the conversations. To this letter Somerset immediately replied, saying that he had nothing to say to Tyhali since the time for words had passed. Still on the same day, December 20, Chalmers wrote on Tyhali's behalf stating that the chief was willing to accept punishment for thefts of cattle by his people and to pay whatever would be demanded of him.

> Speak the word today. Let me and my people come out of the bush; chastise us today; let us know how many head of cattle we must pay for the offence of the child who fought your man [Ensign Sparks]. I shall willingly pay what is demanded of me.[1]

Thus Tyhali to "Father Somerset"!

But even while this correspondence was passing between the missionary and the commandant, Tyhali's people were growing increasingly restless and probably chafing under their chief's restraint. Three hundred of them gathered around the mission where the proposed meeting was to take place, and ignored Chalmers' appeals for them to return to their kraals. Their presence at Chumie provided the foundation for later reports that Tyhali had treacherous intentions toward Somerset and was merely using Chalmers as a decoy to get the commandant in his own power. Somerset himself believed this to be the case, and Theal and Cory accepted the interpretation and enshrined it in their histories; but Chalmers does not support such a view. He is more concerned with his own safety which must have seemed very precarious even while he was penning his mediatorial notes, and he can scarcely be blamed for appealing to Somerset for protection in the face of an intractable multitude of irritated men. Somerset blandly assured him of the desired protection while, at the same time, revealing his inability to guarantee it by urging him to move at once to the nearest military post. Three days later and two days after hostilities had begun, Chalmers sought to serve his compatriots by sending to an unnamed authority an inside report on Xhosa plans, telling how they were determined to get

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[1] IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.123. Chalmers' letters and Somerset's replies are included among the many Enclosures that accompanied D'Urban's report to Spring Rice, on 1 Jan. 1835.

into the Kat River bush, to filter past several posts by night, and to make Chumie mission the receiving depot for any booty their operations would yield, the mission natives being powerless to resist their fellows. An interesting insight into Xhosa mentality is given in Chalmers' closing words: "They reckon up forty-four Caffres who have been killed formerly by the soldiers and the colonists, and they wish to avenge their deaths."[1] Little attention has been given in the past to such accumulated resentment, but there is no doubt that it merits a place among the causes of the war that had just begun.

Chalmers' rôle as an intermediary had ended without his accomplishing any visible good. It is possible that if the authorities had enlisted the missionaries' aid earlier and more consistently, and if they had sought their counsel as to the true state of affairs in Kaffraria, the conflagration might have been avoided. But this the authorities did not do. They should have foreseen the irruption, but according to their own confessions, it took them completely by surprise. Some credit, however, rests on Chalmers' efforts to reconcile the two sides of the frontier and to warn the Colony of the dangers it was courting. This service was not unrecognized at the time, for Boyce speaks of the "zealous and praiseworthy interference of the Glasgow Society's Missionaries" which "failed to prevent the irruption of December 1834".[2] But, as will be seen, Chalmers himself did not enjoy great favour in official circles which, not without reason, came to doubt his wisdom in political matters.

Chalmers' effort at conciliation on Saturday, December 20 proved to be the last opportunity for preserving peace. No matter how genuine Tyhali's desire for co-existence may have been, the bulk of his followers and those of other chiefs were bent on war and threw off any restraints

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[1] LBB XXXIX. 50.252, p.127. Chalmers, from Chumie, Dec. 23.

[2] Boyce, Notes, p.12. Cory (III, p.60) describes Chalmers as "the most important witness of the incidents connected with the first outbreak of war".

the chiefs tried to impose upon them.[1] On Sunday the 21st there was a general surge westwards over the Keiskamma, and the invasion was on. This does not necessarily indicate a minutely worked-out plan of campaign by a general staff: news in Africa can travel very rapidly, and the irruption of a group at the northern end of the frontier in the evening could quite easily activate others at the southern end later the same night. In military terms the distances were small while the provocations, and consequently the readiness to irrupt, were great. The fire had been smouldering for weeks: the slightest wind was sufficient to fan it into a blaze.

Conservative colonial estimates placed the number of invaders at 12,000, but these figures have been increased to 15,000 by several historians,[2] while by December 25, Somerset was asserting: "There are at least 20,000 Kaffirs in the Colony, ..."[3] Even the lowest figure must be accepted with caution since it was difficult to estimate the strength of an enemy who was rarely seen and was never encountered en masse. Similar caution should be applied to statements that give the impression of a concerted crossing of the border from the Great Winterberg range to the sea, a distance of 90 miles.[4] Without question there was a general filtering of warriors over the fords, first of the Keiskamma and the Tyhume, then of the Great Fish, the Kat, and the Koonap Rivers; but the greatest concentrations were in the north between the Mathole Mountains and Fort Willshire for two rather obvious reasons—that was the most thickly populated area, and there the rivers, not far from their sources,

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[1] Supra, pp.169,170.

[2] Theal IV, p.6; Cory III, p.46; A.J.H.van der Walt, J.A.Wiid, A.L.Geyer (eds.), Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika 2 Vols. (hereinafter abbreviated as V.d.Walt, Geskiedenis)(Cape Town, 1951), I, p.255. E.A.Walker, History of Southern Africa (London, 1957), p.185, however, abides by the figure of 12,000.

[3] Somerset to Commander-in-Chief, IBB XXXIX, 50,252, p.128.

[4] Theal IV, p.6; Cory III, p.64.

were more easily crossed while toward the sea the width of the drifts and the comparative ease with which they were guarded made them harder to negotiate. To this there must be added a further qualifying factor—the seaward end of the frontier faced Gqunukwebi territory, the greater part of whose inhabitants, under the control of Phatho and his brothers, took no active part in the attack on the Colony, although an undefined though clearly small number of the tribe were drawn into the aggressor camp. The reader, then, should visualise the bulk of the invaders entering the Colony on the northern section of the Neutral Territory, though allowance must be made for the entrance over the lower river courses of sufficient numbers to endanger the safety of the main Albany settlements centred on Bathurst and Salem.

3. The First Encounter. The Xhosa had the advantage of surprise, while their plan of attacking in small parties in accordance with their own methods of warfare served to throw the whole border region into confusion and to make it difficult if not impossible for any orderly defence to be conducted. The forces at Somerset's disposal were pitifully small, and his use of them so ineffectual, that during the first few days the aggressors virtually had the field to themselves. From Fort Beaufort to the sea, a distance of about 70 miles, he had under his direction only 40 officers and 311 other ranks, a total of 351 men to face thousands of swarming tribesmen. The bulk of the defence force was where it was least needed at the time: 449 men were in Grahamstown,[1] and Grahamstown knew nothing of the invasion until the 22nd, by which time it was well under way over so wide an area that no single counter-attack was capable of arresting it.

At this stage Somerset makes an easy target for armchair critics. His intelligence services were so inadequate that he could gain no reliable picture of the enemy's moves; he knew he could not cope with whatever

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[1] CBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.129; Boyce, Notes, p.19.

situation was rapidly developing around him; where a more decisive man would have struck boldly at a chosen spot, he exhausted himself and his troops by ineffective jabbings at an elusive enemy whom he rarely saw. In his first despatch to D'Urban on December 22, he made three appeals for instructions while reporting on the troubles that surrounded him.[1] He saw himself responsible for having let the Xhosa enter the Colony and rather frantically wondered how far they would penetrate and what devastation they would leave in their train. He appeared haunted by a fear of exceeding his authority, not having sufficient strength of character to take matters in his own hands in the belief that crises called for bold measures. There was also the possibility that his assumption of superior powers would have been jealously sabotaged by other authorities, although Duncan Campbell, the Albany Civil Commissioner, claimed to have responded to all his calls for aid.[2] A survey of the scene, then, lends some weight to Cory's strictures, especially since they came from one who was not unfriendly to the colonel, when he wrote of having misgivings

> as to Col. Somerset's military ability and his fitness for so responsible and difficult a position as Commandant of this dangerous frontier, although there can be no question about his ceaseless activity, useless and misdirected as it often may have been. In spite of him and his forces, the Kaffirs seem to have done almost as they pleased . . . . In no instance did the military under Col. Somerset make any stand against the enemy such as that made by the Winterberg Boers under Piet Retief.[3]

Against such censure may be placed D'Urban's praise contained in his despatch to Spring Rice, 21 January 1835:

> ... Col. Somerset ... had omitted nothing within his power to stem the torrent of invasion, and to preserve all that he could; and his measures for securing Fort Beaufort, and the Kat River Settlement adjoining, deserve great praise...[4]

This establishes two points: Somerset did do something during the emergency, and D'Urban was ready to look for praiseworthy features in his

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[1] IBB XXXIX. 50.252, p.121.

[2] Ibid., p.124.

[3] Cory III, p.89.

[4] IBB XXXIX. 50.252, p.132.

subordinate's conduct. Apart from such observations, Cory's would appear to be the more accurate assessment of Somerset's conduct at a time of crisis.

By Monday night, the 22nd, Somerset had reached Fort Willshire, only to find it surrounded and almost useless if not untenable. He therefore abandoned the post, and in so doing gave a moral boost to the enemy who were convinced that they were gaining the upper hand and need only persist to win greater victories.[1] The way into the Colony lay open before them, and they took immediate advantage of the opening with the result that the area around Trompetter's, Committee, and Double Drifts on the Fish River suffered more severely than any comparable section. Having penetrated thus far, progress deeper into the Colony was only a matter of time: military obstacles could be by-passed, the sparsely-occupied countryside left the Xhosa free to travel with little danger of molestation, they outflanked Grahamstown on the north and south, and inside of ten or twelve days there were reports of "straggling parties of Caffres" who had gone beyond Sundays River, carrying panic as far as Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, while others in the north were pushing as far as Somerset East.[2] But these were not professional soldiers, advancing only when all was secure in their rear: they were isolated parties of invaders worming their way through relatively empty country, plundering farms, collecting cattle, lured deeper and deeper into colonial territory by the prospects of richer booty than their imaginations could conceive, but extremely vulnerable if a military drive, centered on Grahamstown, had been made against them.

Grahamstown, however, was in no position to launch such a drive. In the absence of Somerset, the military command of the town was in the hands of Col. England who, on Monday the 22nd, had learned of the irruption

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[1] H.H.Dugmore, The Reminiscences of An Albany Settler (Grahamstown, 1871), p.41. Theal IV, p.8 ascribes the abandonment of the posts to Somerset's fear that the small garrisons would be cut off.

[2] D'Urban to Spring Rice, 21 Jan., 1835. IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.131.

by way of Somerset's appeal for help. He at once posted officers to prevent the town's being surprised, and worked with the civil commissioner, Capt. Campbell, to send Boer and Hottentot reinforcements to the front, but reluctance of the burghers[1] and the overflowing of the Fish River's banks[2] hindered the arrival of the help he intended Somerset to receive. Inside the town England found "an aspect of alarm without any parallel in my observation of the eastern frontier", but his measures, seconded by those of Campbell, succeeded in quieting civilian fears of an immediate investment by African hordes. "A very respectable municipal body of English" placed themselves under the Colonel's orders, and these showed "considerable willingness to act" but "a desire to act near home". Military officials, however, did not expect a direct attack on Grahamstown. They were more concerned for the safety of the outlying smaller places such as Bathurst to which England sent a party of 30 mounted armed civilians, and for Somerset who was obviously unaware that the enemy were already far in his rear, and within 20 miles of Grahamstown. But there soon came a time when the "hourly calls for help" and Somerset's appeal for arms and ammunition had to go unanswered for the ordnance stores were exhausted, although it was hoped that further supplies would be sent from Port Elizabeth. By Friday the 26th panic, even among the old frontiersmen, had increased, and England had his hands full trying to maintain calm, while it is possible that the commander himself was infected by the fear that surrounded him. For several days he had been holding on to Gualana Post in the Neutral Territory, but by the 26th had decided to abandon it and use its defenders in and around Grahamstown: this seems to have had a depressing effect, for he then declared that the

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[1] "...there has been no attention paid to the demand made by the civil commissioner on the Burgher force." England to Military Secretary, 25 Dec. 1834. IBB XXXIX 50.252, p.126.

[2] Somerset to D'Urban, 24 Dec. 1834. Ibid., p.125.

setback arising from the panic would not be overcome for years, if ever.[1]

On December 29, eight days after the outbreak, Somerset arrived in Grahamstown from Fort Beaufort, and added to the alarm that already filled the city by stating: "There cannot be less than one hundred thousand Caffres in Colonial territory."[2] Like a thick cloud pessimism lay over civil and military alike, sapping their initiative and keeping them from the action that alone could have improved their situation. As early as December 22 Somerset had written to D'Urban expressing his belief that the time had come to punish the Xhosa and to preserve the Colony, and that a mounted force of 350 or 400 men, with 200 infantry would secure the success of any measure; yet he had 350 of the needed men already under his own command, with another 450 in Grahamstown, and he had imposed no effective check on the enemy at any point. It is true that his troops were not all mounted, and that he had consolidated his forces at Fort Beaufort and Kat River, but the fact remains that the invaders virtually did what they liked during that first week and the two that followed, while the colonists and their defenders marked time, immobilized by lethargy and fear. For more than three weeks, from December 21 to January 13 when the army regained the initiative, the Ngqika warriors and their associates had the upper hand.

While the tide was still running in their favour, however, and before there was any show of European force, the Xhosa called a halt to hostilities and began to negotiate with their opponents. Before a crowd assembled in the Chumie church on 31 December, the leaders, headed by Tyhali, dictated a letter to Chalmers for transmission to the British authorities.[3] In their communication they listed fourteen points. They did not argue their case in European style, but wove their way in and out of their

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[1] The above account is drawn from England's two despatches, 25 and 26 December. 1834. IBB XXXIX, 50,252, pp.126,127.

[2] Cory III, pp.88,89.

[3] IBB.XLIII, 503, pp.49,50.

grievances, relying on their total impact to impress the reader with the justice of their cause. The first three points referred to the fatal shooting by commandos of Nqeno's son and another chief without the payment of any compensation; yet, when a European officer was wounded in the arm, 200 cattle were demanded of the Xhosa. Great emphasis was then placed on the taking of Tyhali's cattle and the wounding of Xhoxho, while it was explained that those two offences were regarded as extremely serious by Xhosa communities. Points six and seven dealt with the looked-for return of Somerset from leave in England, and their bitter disappointment when he drove them beyond the Tyhume, and their wearying of waiting for the Governor who never came. Other sections underlined their claims to land up to the Fish River, their proven willingness to co-operate with the English in delivering up transgressors, their disgust at the treatment meted out to Xhosa who strayed into the Colony, and their inability to grasp the inconsistent policy pursued by the English in regard to frontier affairs. From the Xhosa angle, so rarely presented, the fourteen points were just and merited a formal statement.

James Weir, of Chumie, was commissioned to carry the letter to the nearest British officer while Tyhali ordered all operations against the colonists to cease until a reply should be received from Col. Somerset and the Governor. "They shall now hold up from fighting until they obtain an answer", was the way Chalmers expressed the black man's thought. It is probable that they wished to negotiate from a position of strength, while the colonists preferred to hold on until their situation improved, but there is room for regret that the suggested truce was not exploited, for it might have prevented some of the unhappy events that followed. But Somerset chose to reject the offer, not regarding the lull in fighting as a genuine move toward peace, and replied that hostilities would continue.[1]

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[1] IBB XLIII. 503, pp.49,50. D'Urban (to Spring Rice from Grahamstown, 21 Jan.) quotes Smith and Chalmers as believing Tyhali's request was but a ruse to gain time for the disposal of the abundant booty that had accumulated since Dec. 21. There is no concrete support for such an interpretation, however.

He could hardly have done otherwise, for there would have been an outcry from the colonists and reprimand from his superiors if he had accepted the olive branch at that stage.

The day following the Chumie meeting, the first day of the new year, Maqoma, with the help of Laing, addressed a letter to the Governor who, he was convinced, did not know of the many ills which the black people had suffered at the hands of Col. Somerset. The list of real or imagined injustices against which the chief protested was weighty enough to persuade a fair-minded observer that there were genuine causes for deep dissatisfaction and tangible reasons for revolt, particularly in respect of repeated but inconsistent expulsions from the northern end of the Neutral Territory.[1] But, at the time, the letter went no further than Grahamstown, and the fighting continued.

And what was the true nature of the invasion that has been dignified by the title of "war"? The feelings that first set the Xhosa in motion may have been those of revenge for the wounding of Xhoxho, and those of irritation at the constant pin-pricks applied by military patrols; but the deeper motives that united the various tribal groups for a simultaneous descent on the Colony were the common wish to regain the Neutral Territory and the need for halting the encroachments of the ever-advancing white man. The prospect of plunder, while not to be ignored, should not be exalted into a first cause. It was a natural corollary to the invasion, inseparable from its conduct, but definitely incidental to its main design, particularly so far as the chiefs were concerned. But there stood the rich herds of cattle, poorly protected; there rose the farmsteads, humble by European standards, luxurious to African eyes: black flesh and blood could not resist the opportunities that lay on every hand. And when the early invaders returned laden with booty, their less enterprising fellows were

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[1] IBB XLIII, 503, p.48.

easily persuaded to take part in so profitable a venture. But this degeneration from the original design should not obscure the more important motivations which launched the attack across the Keiskamma.

Another feature of the invasion that calls for more consideration than has generally been granted it is the comparative mildness of the onslaught, especially in its total results. Official estimates of losses in the final ten days of 1834, from the outbreak of war until the last day of the year, gave the following picture: 456 houses burned; 5,715 horses lost (killed or driven away), and similarly 114,930 cattle, and 161,930 sheep and goats; with £300,401 of property destroyed or swept away.[1]

These are distressing figures, for they spell much suffering and considerable loss on the part of many families who were personally inoffensive to the Xhosa. Some settlers lost all they possessed while many more were placed in very straitened circumstances. These facts must not be glossed over nor callously disregarded. But neither should they be exaggerated. In terms of war, the invasion was small indeed: many Indian raids on the north-west frontier of the American Colonies inflicted far worse losses with far less publicity. At the time there were gloomy prophecies concerning the ruin of Albany and Somerset, but these were happily disproved by the rapid recovery made by the stricken areas in an amazingly short while.[2] Furthermore, responsibility for the losses must be laid not only at the door of the invaders but also on the shoulders of the inept authorities who

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[1] D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1836. IBB XLIII. 503, p.69. Even these figures need to be accepted with some caution, though they were cited by D'Urban as if they were mathematically accurate. Cp. J.S.Marais' careful analysis of reported stock losses in the Zuurveld, 1790-1793, as given in Maynier and the First Boer Republic (Cape Town, 1944), pp.18-23.

[2] "It is said that should the Grahamstown District flourish for twenty years to come it will be impossible for it to recover the loss it has sustained in fact it is the ruin of the Albany District." Frederick Rex to his father, George, 9 Jan. 1835 in Una Long (ed.), An Index to Authors of Unofficial, Privately-owned MSS relating to the History of South Africa. 1812-1920 (hereinafter abbreviated as Long, Index) (unpublished, University of Cape Town, 1947), p.163.

allowed them to roam at large in the Colony for three weeks without having made one genuine effort to get to grips with the marauders.[1] Then, further to distort the picture, comes the massively-mounted campaign to restore order—the employment of cannon against bush-buck—the remedy was so out of proportion to the disease that the final picture is inevitably enlarged beyond its true measurements—yet this is the picture that is reproduced by most South African histories.

A healthy corrective to such distortion may be found in the figures of European casualties during those three weeks of Xhosa supremacy. If the number of invaders who took part in the "irresistible rush"[2] be set at the minimum of 12,000, the roll of those who suffered at their hands could reasonably be expected to be painfully long; but the facts are that in those three weeks, while thousands of irate tribesmen were free to wreak their worst on a civilian population, only 32 Europeans were killed—8 traders, and 24 farm people. The death of some traders is understandable when it is remembered how bitter can be the resentment aroused by sharp trading practices.[3] and the murder of farmers, brutal and reprehensible as it was, is not surprising when viewed as part of the general battle; but the smallness of the number of victims speaks volumes for the deliberate restraint with which the Xhosa

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[1] Piet Retief and his Boers form notable exceptions in that they firmly resisted Xhosa intrusion in the Winterberg district during the early days of the irruption (Cory III, pp.68,69). But this was private enterprise rather than official action. The failure of the military to take effective steps to halt the invasion is rendered still more lamentable when viewed against James Read Snr.'s careful remarks: "It is believed that if there had been any check on the colonial side the first eight or ten days, the war would have ceased; and it has been said that the abandoning of the military posts gave great encouragement to the Caffres. It appears also that the greater part of the Caffres took no interest till they heard that there was no opposition, and that to get cattle was very easy." IBB VII. 425, p.602.

[2] Sir Harry G.W.Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.Gen. Sir Harry Smith, baronet of Aliwal on the Sutley, G.C.B., edited by G.C.Moore Smith. (hereinafter abbreviated as Smith, Autobiography)(London, 1903), p.369.

[3] "...Macomo had declared that the missionaries and their families would be spared, but that all the traders must die." Report in Grahamstown Journal, 2 Jan. 1835.

campaign was conducted. If such a multitude, relatively undisciplined and rarely under the direct influence of highly-placed leaders, could be at large for so many days and inflict so little mortal damage, then they could hardly have been primarily bent on murder. They were certainly not conducting total war according to European standards.[1]

It appears that there was general agreement among the Xhosa detachments to refrain from unnecessary sacrifice of life, and to leave women and children untouched.[2] If the chiefs had had their way there would probably have been still less bloodshed. On this point, the missionary Ross threw light, for he stressed Maqoma's unwillingness to consent to violence against missionaries and traders, and quoted Kayser's report to the editor of the Commercial Advertiser concerning the murder of Trader Warren:

> I was told by two counsellors that the meeting on the preceding day [prior to invasion] was continued from the morning early until the commando of Kaffirs left for the station Knapps Hope, before Macomo could be prevailed upon to consent to the murder ...[3]

Tyhali also declared that missionaries and traders would be spared, yet Robert Rogers and seven other traders were killed in the early days of the irruption, suggesting that while the chiefs desired moderation their followers ignored instructions, took matters into their own hands, and wreaked vengeance on those whom they imagined, rightly or wrongly, had defrauded them in trading transactions.[4] Missionaries, however, fared much better than their commercial brethren for none suffered physical violence during the war. Those in Ngqika territory were pressed into service as mediators between the Xhosa and the colonial authorities, and

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[1] Philip pointed out to the Aborigines Committee that if bloodshed had been the Xhosa aim, they could have done much worse than they did. IBB VII. 538, p.558.

[2] On this point, most writers give the Xhosa ample credit. Fred. Rex in Long, Index, p.163; Theal IV, p.7; Cory III, p.73; Macmillan, BBB, pp.12,123. Only one woman, a Mrs. Jacob Trollip, was known to have been killed, and that not until May 1835.

[3] IBB VII,538, p.719.

[4] Cory III, pp.73,74.

were in some danger from irresponsible elements who might have thrown off their chiefs' restraints, but at no time were their lives actually threatened. The timid Chalmers might, with some justification, write: "An angry look just now would be enough to send all the missionaries into eternity", but Laing at Burnshill correctly assessed the situation when he reported:

> Much as the Caffre chiefs have erred in their present murderous attack on the colony, they have shown some regard to their reputation in protecting missionaries from such as would have done them harm.[1]

The G.M.S. workers felt safe enough, or were so cornered, that they remained at Chumie and Burnshill throughout the first weeks of the war and until the colonial counter-invasion was well under way; while Kayser at Knapps Hope was advised by Maqoma on December 28 to abandon his station and take refuge at Burnshill which came under the special protection of Sutu, Ngqika's great wife. John Brownlee, at his more isolated station on the Buffalo (King William's Town) remained at his post even longer since he was among the Ntinde who, under Tshatshu, were professedly neutral. The Methodists at Wesleyville were at first in an even more favoured position because of the Gqumunkwebi refusal to join in the attack on the Colony, but at Mount Coke, amid the Ndlambe, they were surrounded by belligerent Africans and were in a situation similar to that endured by the G.M.S. and L.M.S. ministers. As early as December 23, the third day of hostilities, Shepstone was reporting from Wesleyville:

> Yesterday I sent to Slambie's [Ndlambe's] people, and found that the trading station had been plundered, and the house and waggon all burnt. This morning I received a letter from Mount Coke mission station, stating that the trading station near that place was surrounded yesterday, but was saved by Zetu, a brother of Umkay [Mqhayi, Ndlambe sub-chief]. Last night the cattle kraal of Mount Coke station was broken open, and the oxen of trading waggon taken.
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> Mr. Dugmore, who is at Mount Coke, requests help, which I am unable to give. This tribe, Pato's [Phatho of the Gqumukwebi], may be depended upon, but there is every appearance of general war. I fear,

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[1] Chalmers to Capt. Armstrong, and Laing to D'Urban, 1 Jan. 1835, from Chumie and Burnshill respectively. Chalmers' was a whining, unmanly note, written by a nervous man. But perhaps only the truly brave would have remained calm in such circumstances.

if the Government does not render help soon to the interior of Caffreland, all traders will lose their lives. It is said two are murdered already.[1]

On the same day, Shepstone was relaying to Somerset an affirmation of loyalty from the Gqunukwebi brothers, Phatho, Kama, and Congo, who said: "... at this juncture of general ferment in Caffreland we possess the same feelings and sentiments towards the Colony as those embodied in our manifesto of September 3 1833."[2] Thus, from the outset, the cleavage in policy between the Ngqika tribes and the Gqunukwebi was apparent. The difference in attitude is susceptible of more than one explanation. Some attribute Gqunukwebi neutrality to mercenary motives, suggesting that they refrained from joining the invaders only because they hoped to curry favour with the colony and permanently regain a still larger portion of the Neutral ferritory than they already enjoyed on sufferance. This interpretation is open to serious question in view of the steady friendliness of the tribe over a long period of time, and of their voluntary declaration of loyalty, quoted above, more than a year before hostilities broke out. Their attitude was consistent, in times of peace as well as of war. Moreover, there was nothing reprehensible in their hoping to gain from a policy of loyalty to the colonial authorities, for where is the nation that has not been similarly motivated in its decisions? Other assessors of the tribe's conduct see in their stand a reflection of their origin as a rejected people, outside of the orthodox tribal circle occupied by the Ngqika-Ndlambe branches of the Xhosa family.[3] Such a judgment rests on a surer footing than that which depends solely on the mercenary motive, yet it is weakened by the fact that some Gqunukwebi did join in the attack on the Colony and that a dozen years later, during the War of the Axe, Phatho's whole tribe, apart from one section,

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[1] Shepstone to Col.England at Grahamstown IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.128.

[2] Quoted in Cory III, p.64.

[3] Appendix II traces the origin of the Gqunukwebi.

fought with their fellow Xhosa against the Europeans. A third explanation gives credit to the pacific influence of Wesleyan teaching. This was acknowledged by the colonial authorities, from D'Urban downwards, in 1835, and will bear examination now. Methodist missionaries had been resident with the tribe for eleven years, and from the beginning had received the respect and co-operation of its chiefs who were willing to be guided by the superior know-how of Europeans when it came to a crisis in white-black relations. Although Phatho and Congo never became Christians, they were sympathetic rather than antagonistic to the missionary teachings, and did not actively oppose their people's entrance into the Church, with the result that the Wesleyans were able to build up a strong Christian community and to exercise a noticeable influence on tribal policy. This stands in sharp contrast to the situation within neighbouring tribes where missionary efforts had been less successful—among the Ndlambe whose acceptance of Mount Coke mission rarely rose above the lukewarm, and among the several branches of the Ngqika who tolerated the C.M.S. and L.M.S. workers without allowing them to make much impact on their traditional way of life. When the call to arms came, those where missionary influence was weakest responded the most readily, and vice versa. In the war of 1846 this difference was even more sharply accented, for the bulk of the Gqumukwebi sided with the Xhosa against the whites, while the Christian minority, under their Christian chief, Kama, remained strictly neutral.

But an assessment of mission influence in relation to participation in war against the Colony cannot be made solely on the evidence of Ciskeian attitudes. Account must be taken of the positions adopted by the tribes beyond the Kei during a later stage of the war. This will be done at the appropriate place, while at this juncture it may be observed that the Gqumukwebi through hopes of gain or because of their "reject" status or because of the accumulated influence of Methodism—with greatest weight being given to the religious factor—of their own free will and as a matter of considered

policy, refrained from attacking the Colony.

This neutrality on the part of Phatho and his people, or pro-colonial attitude, for that is what it soon became, led the Wesleyans under Shepstone to remain at Wesleyville long after the frontier had been overrun, and made the mission a haven for other missionaries and traders who were obliged to abandon their own stations; but the time came when Wesleyville also had to be evacuated. Before that day, however, the character of the war had changed for the initiative had passed from black to white hands.

IV. REMEDIAL MEASURES

1. Government Awakes. Although it was possible for letters to travel from Grahamstown to Cape Town within five days[1] it was not until December 31, ten days after the initial invasion, that D'Urban received the startling news of what had happened on the Eastern Frontier.[2] He was then handed reports from the frontier authorities covering events during December 21-26. The contents of the letters from Somerset, Campbell, and England galvanized him into action. By the evening of the 31st he was instructing Col. Smith concerning his duties in Grahamstown, and before dawn the next morning had the satisfaction of knowing that his second-in-command was on his way to the frontier,[3] and that there would soon be a capable, vigorous soldier in charge at Grahamstown. The Governor then turned to set administrative affairs in order against his own impending departure, and to arrange for the maximum possible help to be sent to Albany. He had been occupied with the Vagrancy Ordinance, preparations for the Emancipation of Slaves, a treaty with the Griqua chief Waterboer, and problems of colonial economy. In haste he tied the ends of the threads of these matters and left their completion in

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[1] Major Dutton received Col. England's report of Dec. 26 on Dec. 31. IBB XLIII , 503, p.161.

[2] D'Urban to Spring Rice from Cape Town, 5 Jan. 1835.

[3] Smith, Autobiography, p.370.

the hands of a Provisional Council of Government which would care for affairs of state during his absence. On January 5, D'Urban, at last spurred to official correspondence, addressed a long despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Spring Rice, in which he comprehensively described the frontier situation during the preceding half-year, gave a bird's-eye view of the invasion, briefly indicated the steps he had taken and was planning to take to cope with the emergency, and announced his own impending departure for Albany aboard H.M.S. Trinculo.

It was January 8 before the Governor left Simonstown for the six-day voyage to Algoa Bay, but some troops and stores had travelled overland, others had preceded him by sea, and one company of the Cape Town garrison sailed with him, so that when he reached Grahamstown on the 20th the major part of his striking force was there at his disposal. He also had the satisfaction of meeting that "tried and very perfect officer", Harry Smith, and of hearing from his own lips of the energetic steps he had taken to deal with the invasion since his arrival in Albany on January 6. With the conduct of his second-in-command D'Urban expressed complete satisfaction.

> I cannot speak too highly of him in the execution of the arduous duties with which I had entrusted him. He rode post night and day from Cape Town to Grahamstown, a distance of six hundred miles, accomplishing it in less than six days; and since his arrival here his exertions have been as able as they have been indefatigable to expel the savage enemies from the ground which their unexpected and treacherous invasion had gained ... he had succeeded to an extent which has surpassed my expectations.[1]

The Governor had reason to be satisfied with his deputy. When Smith reached Grahamstown he found the whole population disheartened. "Had twenty Kaffirs shown themselves in the neighbourhood of Grahamstown a day or two before my arrival, all would either have run away or shot one another."[2] But his buoyant personality and vigorous measures breathed new life into the

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[1] D'Urban to Spring Rice from Grahamstown, Jan. 21. Similar praise is given in a letter to Col. Thomson, at Port Elizabeth, Jan. 23.

[2] Smith to his wife Juana, Jan. 26. Autobiography, p.720.

inhabitants. He dismissed the Committee of Safety and put the town's defence on a sound footing. Within two days of assuming command he had taken the initiative against the invaders. On January 7 he replied to the fourteen points made by the Ngqika chiefs on December 31, [1] and informed them that their grievances would be considered only when they had retired behind the 1819 boundary line and had restored all stolen property.[2] Such bold conditions, laid down when the Europeans were in retreat, needed to be underwritten by military successes which Smith lost no time in producing. Somerset was sent to the rear, to the Zuurberg, to cut off the Xhosa in that area and to improve communications with Port Elizabeth, while Major Cox, in whom the colonel had great confidence, was given 300 men for the invasion of Ngeno's kraal and thus struck the first successful blow against the enemy. These operations were a shock to the invaders: hitherto the field had been theirs, but from that moment they were being rapidly forced to recognize that their heyday was over. Military posts that had been hurriedly abandoned by Somerset were re-occupied, the Fish River drifts were again brought under colonial control, and, in short, Smith's first objective of regaining the territory between the Sundays and Fish Rivers was speedily effected. This was to be but a preliminary to a projected counter-invasion of Kaffraria, but D'Urban's arrival in Grahamstown deprived Smith of the pleasure of executing the larger measure and condemned him to the subordinate rôle of fulfilling the Governor's less precipitate designs.

The two men whose duties brought them close together in Grahamstown were to hold the destiny of the Eastern Frontier in their hands for many months to come, so we may well pause to look at the impression they made on each other.

Sir Benjamin D'Urban, after considerable military experience and creditable service in the Peninsular Wars, had been Governor of the British

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[1] Supra, pp.179,180. [2] Smith to Maqoma, IRB XLII, 503, p.50.

colonies of British Guiana and Barbadoes before being called to govern the Cape in 1834 when he was 57 years of age. His portraits reveal an aristocrat with a sensitive, possibly over-sensitive face set beneath an unusually high-domed forehead. To Harry Smith he was "a most amiable man, ... the most educated and accomplished soldier I have ever served with", "this noble soldier and able statesman".[1] This admiration, this esteem, was never disavowed in the months that followed, though it was modified by closer acquaintance with his superior's foibles. The impetuous Smith found D'Urban irritatingly cautious: he was "far too scientific for this guerilla warfare", all science and no dash, constantly holding back where his second-in-command would have swept ahead, and thereby earning the nickname, "Sir Slow".[2] The Governor was clearly a methodical man, objecting to being hustled by circumstance or humanity. His meticulous planning often appeared unrealistic to his officers, while his orders, if one believes Smith, were sometimes so high-flown as to be unintelligible.[3] He tended to be touchy, peevish when crossed, and difficult to advise.[4] Yet, when the time for action arrived his subordinate could say: "Master is quite ready for anything. He is really a perfect soldier in the field".[5] In addition, he was beyond dispute, a gentleman. Smith speaks of him as "the dear old gentleman", "poor old Master, who now is very kind to me, and treats me with the most marked attention", "the poor old Governor is so kind today .... He is a wonderfully good-hearted man, and wants nothing but a little more

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[1] Smith, Autobiography, pp.368,370.

[2] Ibid., pp.731,733,723. Smith's own temperament should be borne in mind, however, when judging D'Urban, for to Smith anyone slower than himself was apt to appear sluggish.

[3] "Arrangements, as His old Excellency calls them, are leather and prunella, for he writes them beautifully, and in the most military and technical terms, there is not a soul in this camp who understands what he means; ..." Smith, Autobiography, p.730.

[4] Ibid., pp.733,737; Macmillan, BBB, p.145; JEH VII, 425, p.723.

[5] Smith, Autobiography, p.729.

nerve", "the old Master is all kindness to me".[1] As to religion, he was a well-bred member of the Established Church, wary of evangelical fervour, but holding himself accountable to God for the ultimate effect of his administration, and frequently concluding his letters with "God bless you my dear Smith".

Such was the man who was called upon to handle, among many other responsibilities, the effervescent Harry George Wakelyn Smith.

Although Lt.Col.Smith had been stationed in Cape Town since July 1828 and was there at the time of D'Urban's arrival in January 1834, their intimate partnership did not begin until the alarming news from theEastern Frontier made the Governor look for a vigorous deputy who could handle the emergency in Grahamstown. In Smith he found an able, fearless, and extraordinarily energetic officer, 46 years of age, one who could confess to being very tired at the start of a 600-mile ride but who, after the first 25 miles could say, "I got a cup of tea at the post-house, and never felt fagged again", and who could write to his wife, "You cannot think how well I am. Nothing fatigues me .... It is really wonderful how I bear work".[2] During the strenuous months that followed he was to need even greater physical stamina than nature had given him, and before his duties in Kaffraria were done his health broke under the many strains that he placed upon it. In the beginning, however, he had more strength than he could use, especially after D'Urban assumed full command on the frontier. Then, like a high-spirited horse, he chafed at the bit, resenting the restraining hand that prevented him from careering through the country at the dictates of his superabounding energy. This frustration led him to criticize his more phlegmatic superior. But relations between the two men were so good that the criticism rarely became more than a harmless banter based on their

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[1] Smith, Autobiography, pp.733,740,757.

[2] Ibid., pp.370,719,722.

pronounced temperamental differences, and it was always laced with a patient affection on Smith's part that excluded rancour and preserved fundamental loyalties.[1] His deputy's flamboyance and superfluity of energy were to cause D'Urban many a worry, however.

But whatever anxieties he brought the Governor, Smith could be relied on to perform his military duties faithfully, for he was a born soldier and one who zestfully enjoyed his work. A letter to his wife Juana, written on 13 February, 1835, before large-scale operations against the enemy were launched, said: "Was on horseback 28 hours, attacked Kaffirs in five points, like fun, gave them a good licking with a trifling loss on our parts [sic] ..." A few weeks later he was writing, "But all this is good fun enough, compared to the quill-driving in Grahamstown" — the fun consisting of shooting "the wily Kaffir, whom I look upon just as a wild beast and try to hunt him as such"![2] His Spanish wife apparently shared her husband's callous attitude toward the native, for her dear Enrique takes up one of her suggestions and replies—"So you recommend shrapnel, grape, howitzers, shells! Well done! We will take your advice..." And he did, reporting within two weeks, "...gave them some of your shrapnel shells".[3] Perhaps such bravado should not be taken too seriously, but be credited to Smith's class and upbringing which were closely linked to the fox-hunting-squire tradition and were tinctured with a snobbishness that made him gush over titled friendships and be curt with humbler acquaintances. Yet, for all his bombast, he was warm-hearted and soon became the friend of the very Xhosa whom he had so lightly set out to exterminate. His religious con-

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[1] Samples of Smith's exuberance frequently appear in his correspondence. "Master is always floundering in the midst of information, whilst I like to take a look at the ground, march, and take possession." "When I came flying down from Fort Willshire the other day it was, as you may suppose, for the purpose of inducing my master to get under weigh and not to mind a Kaffir and a half, ... Master and I very nearly fell out." Smith, Autobiography, pp.721,722.

[2] Ibid., pp.719,728,732.

[3] Ibid., pp.718,719.

victions cannot be described as deep, but were real enough to give him a steady interest in Christian missions and to permit frequent appeals to the Almighty in his correspondence. His was too impatient a nature to be contemplative! With justice he has been described as "a dashing soldier and a magnetic person—a knight-errant born five centuries too late".[1]

It was to this picturesque character that D'Urban entrusted the initial redemption of the Eastern Frontier, and through whom he continued to work after his own arrival in Grahamstown. This conjunction of opposites lent colour to the military and administrative scene, and produced tempting material for a dramatist's pen.

Wisely and generously D'Urban gave his deputy carte blanche for dealing with any situation that his first hurried instructions did not cover, and accepted full responsibility "for all that he [Smith] may think it necessary to do"; while Smith for his part "fully ascertained his views and desires, and then made a resolution ... never to swerve from his principles where circumstances permitted of their application".[2] This spirit of mutual trust survived the strains that were placed upon it, and enabled the two soldiers to work in harness without destructive disagreement. Smith thoroughly enjoyed his two weeks of authority in Grahamstown, and thereafter often longed for his independence, but he remained loyal to his "old Master" throughout the war and its aftermath.

With an apartment in Ayton's Hotel as his headquarters, the Governor set up his staff for the campaign that he saw ahead of him. Smith became chief-of-staff with responsibility for organizing supplies, but was later made second-in-command so as not to cramp his authority, "... by which means

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[1] K.N.Bell and W.P.Morrell (eds.), Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1330-1860 (Oxford, 1928), p.xix.

[2] Postscript to D'Urban's own instructions to Smith, Jan. 31. IBB XXXIX 50, 252., p.136; Smith, Autobiography, p.370. D'Urban said to Smith: "You now understand me thoroughly. Rely on my support in every way, and my perfect readiness to bear all responsibility." Ibid.

I can order everybody about like himself"! Major Dutton had accompanied D'Urban from Cape Town to continue as his military secretary, Lt.G. de la Poer Beresford was aide-de-camp, while Charles Somerset and Sir James Alexander were added as extra aides a little later.[1] Together these officers took stock of the situation and began planning their campaign against the Kaffir invaders. This was to be no hastily conceived exercise but an operation so carefully prepared that it could not fail in its objective, which was nothing less than a counter-invasion and occupation of Kaffraria. There was to be ~~an~~ conciliatory straightening out of the frontier, no re-imposition of the old boundary line, but a thorough chastisement of the tribes and the establishment of a defensible frontier far to the east of Grahamstown. The execution of so thorough a plan could not be left to guerilla tactics or to Harry Smith's brilliant dashes into danger but was rather to be accomplished through a model military plan that would lack none of the orthodox preparations. And this, of course, took time, so much time that the editor of the Grahamstown Journal complained, in his issue of April 10, about the 95 days that elapsed before the launching of the counter-attack; but the writer blamed the previously unprepared state of the Colony for the need for such a time-consuming build-up. A month later still Smith was bemoaning the long delay at headquarters, maintaining that the task could have been finished and the military have been back in Cape Town if more expedition had been used. But D'Urban was commander-in-chief, and he, grinding as fast as the mills of God, had no intention of being hustled.

2. Rescue Operations. If one group of Europeans was in greater danger than another it was that made up of the C.M.S. and L.M.S. missionaries

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[1] J.E. Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage of Observation among the Colonies of Western Africa, in the Flagship "Thalia"; and of a Campaign in Kaffirland on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in 1835. 2 Vols. (hereinafter abbreviated as Alexander, Narrative). (London, 1837, 2 vols.), I, p.360.

in the stations north of Fort Willshire. At Pirie (G.M.S.), between the upper reaches of the Keiskamma and Buffalo Rivers, Ross was on the main route by which bands of armed men were constantly hurrying to and from the Colony. His colleagues at nearby Burnshill (G.M.S.) urged him to join them, since they were protected by Sutu, the dead Ngqika's great-wife. He yielded to their pleas and reached the neighbouring mission after sunset on January 13, finding that Kayser from Knapps Hope (L.M.S.) had arrived before him. At Chumie (G.M.S.) Chalmers and Weir were in the heart of Maqoma and Tyhali territory, and although the two chiefs had pledged the safety of all missionaries there was little assurance that they would be able to enforce their word at any place other than Burnshill. It must therefore have taken some courage for Chalmers to penetrate Maqoma's hideout, in the mountains about 12 miles from Chumie, to interview the chief and plead for peace. His reception was discouraging: Maqoma was very haughty, he recalled past grievances, he refused to restrain his people, and was prepared to go on fighting.[1] Chalmers must then have returned to his mission where he rejected Major Cox's appeal to retire within the colonial boundary on the grounds that it was just as dangerous to travel as to remain at Chumie. By January 16, however, the lives of Weir and himself were being definitely threatened by the Ngqika councillor, Soga; this led them to seek help from Fort Adelaide where they arrived at 11 p.m. on the 18th. On the following day they conducted their families to the safety of the Fort, and thence took them to Grahamstown.

On the evening of his arrival in Grahamstown (January 20) D'Urban received a note, addressed to Smith since the writers were unaware of the Governor's presence at frontier headquarters, asking for an escort to safeguard the evacuation of personnel from Burnshill. For some unknown reason six days were allowed to elapse before Major Cox was despatched from Fort

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[1] Chalmers to Capt. Armstrong, Ft. Adelaide, Jan. 20. IBB XLIII. 503, p.51.

Beaufort with a body of 250 men to effect the withdrawal. The soldiers found a mixed group (35 strong) of missionaries, traders, and Africans ready to return with them to the Colony. The evacuees included the missionaries Ross, Kayser, Laing, and M'Diarmid; three traders; and two petty chiefs, Matwa and Tenta, both Christians whose lives were endangered by their colonial sympathies. On the return journey the cavalcade passed by Lovedale, adding Mr. and Mrs. Bennie and dependents to the party, and bringing all in safety to Grahamstown by the 29th.[1]

South and east of Pirie lay Brownlee's station. The missionary family, together with a dozen refugee traders, remained on the Buffalo station for many more weeks, troubled by nothing more serious than an attempt by fifty Xhosa women to rustle fifty of the missionary's cattle. This comparative immunity from molestation may be ascribed to several causes— a slight remoteness from the invasion front; the initial decision of the Ntinde, the small tribe among whom Brownlee was working, to take no part in the war; and the moral stature of the missionary himself which led the Xhosa to respect him and his family.[2]

The character of the Ntinde chief Jan Tshatshu has been severely criticized, but his conduct at this juncture was reasonable. The Ngqika chiefs were constantly inviting him to join in the war, and threatened to attack him if he did not come out on their side. His brother Soka yielded to pressure and joined the invaders; but Tshatshu resisted, staying by the Brownlees until a very late hour, and then joining Phatho while offering to

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[1] D'Urban to Spring Rice, Jan. 30 and Feb. 27. IBB XXXIX. 50.252, p.137 and IBB XXXIX. 279, p.3; A. Steedman, Wanderings II, p.339; Cory III, pp.102,103. Although Smith took no personal part in the actual rescue operations, he was very proud of having planned it. "This rescue of the missionaries was the best thing I ever did during the war, but one which these holy gentlemen and their Societies never acknowledged as they ought, though always ready to censure." Autobiography, p.379.

[2] Chas. Brownlee gave a firsthand account of war-time conditions in his Reminiscences, pp.23-47. It should be borne in mind, however, that his story was based on boyhood memories, and written about 60 years after the events he describes.

escort the missionary's family to security among the Gqunukwebi.[1] But Brownlee preferred to remain with his family and refused to abandon the station. Tshatshu eventually reached the Colony and was ordered by Smith to join the government forces. This he did, bringing 400 of his tribe to scour the countryside east of the Buffalo in search of enemy warriors and cattle for the space of three weeks. His position was unenviable. He had long been regarded as a bright light in L.M.S. endeavour: if he abandoned the missionary cause he would be branded as a renegade; if he did not support his own race he would be called a traitor; if he remained neutral, then the settlers said "you are an enemy, you are a rascal".[2] Whatever course he took made him the target for criticism, and it is not surprising that weaknesses were found in his conduct during the crises that thickened around him.

Brownlee's nearest white neighbour was the Wesleyan missionary Dugmore at Mount Coke, about 12 miles south of his own station. When Dugmore decided to withdraw he asked Brownlee to join him and even sent wagons to assist in the removal; but the older missionary declined the proffered assistance, declaring his intention of staying at his post with his family and that of Trader Kirkman, while gladly using the transport to send the other traders and their families into a safer area. There came a time however, toward the end of February, when the situation around his mission deteriorated sharply. An enemy band broke into his home demanding that he deliver Kirkman into their hands, but the calm and commanding presence of the godly white man subdued their immediate urge for violence and enabled both families to

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[1] This is Chas. Brownlee's version. The Grahamstown Journal, Feb. 27, prints a different story, speaking of "the faithless Jan Tzatzoe [who] was the first to fly from the scene of danger, leaving Mr. Brownlee and his helpless family to shift for themselves..."

[2] LMS VII. 538, p.565.

escape.[1] After an arduous 22-mile journey they came to Wesleyville where they were welcomed by *Dugmore* who was then preparing to abandon that station and withdraw to the Colony. By February 24 the combined party was safe in Phatho's care on the Bika.

The Wesleyan parish of Mount Coke and Wesleyville, being to the south and east of Ngqika territory, was at first spared the trouble that came to other missionary societies. But this did not spell detachment from the war for from its earliest days the question of Gqunukwebi attitudes was a warmly debated issue.[2] As the invasion continued it became even more urgent until Shepstone, on January 2, felt obliged to write to the Grahamstown Journal (without identifying himself) in defence of the tribe among whom he was working. He repeated

> the assurance of the pacific intentions of the chiefs Pato, Cobus, Kama, and Umgai [Mqhayi, Ndlambe sub-chief, friendly to the whites] and observes that they not only remain firm, but have done all in their power to promote the same feeling among their people; and that had they not been steadfast, the Colony long before this would have been over-run by their people.

D'Urban, writing from Cape Town to Spring Rice on January 5, cautiously touched on the matter of Gqunukwebi loyalties, and said:

> I do not believe that the tribes of Pato, Cobus Congo and Kama, long living by sufferance within the colonial territory on the banks of the Keiska, had as yet joined the confederacy [against the Colony]. They have, upon former occasions, been very faithful to the colony, and may be so now. This, however, is problematical.[3]

The problem was shown by Shepstone to be non-existent. On January 13 he followed up his earlier (January 2) vindication of his hosts with

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[1] A vivid pen portrait of the L.M.S. missionary is given by "an old Colonist" in Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.45. "I have his figure before me:- almost gigantic in height, but losing an inch or two in his latter years, as age bowed his herculean frame; with breadth of chest and shoulders proportionate, and an arm and hand, the sinewy power of which it would have been dangerous for most men to rest [resist?] if occasion had ever called it forth. Grave in deportment, as became a Scottish minister, but hiding under his gravity a vast amount of blended information and intelligence."

[2] Cp. Supra, pp.186-188.

[3] IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.118.

an even more impassioned defence of their attitude and subsequent conduct. Addressing the editor of the paper, he wrote:

> In your 158th Number January 2, 1835 ... you observe 'That it was supposed they [Phatho and his associates] might be induced to declare in favour of the colony, if security were afforded.' Are you aware, that previous to any serious rupture, or before they knew its extent, they sent a manifesto to the Commandant [Somerset], declaring their views to be the same, and their determination equally firm, as in October 1833? Are you aware that Pato reinforced the Gwalana Post, at the call of that Officer, with 200 men; that he remained in the service of the English, until that Post was vacated? That since then those three brothers have been employed night and day, and many of their men, sending messages to every part of Kaffirland; that they have patrolled their own boundary, taken horses and cattle from marauding parties; seized all such cattle amongst their own people, some of whom (I believe chiefly are of one branch of the tribe) have broken loose from the very formal declaration of the chiefs, and have plundered; on these no punishment has as yet been inflicted, but I believe the chiefs only wait to know from the British Government how they wish them to act towards such, and they are ready to comply. I will add, I have witnessed the conduct of these chiefs, they have stood without wavering, surrounded by threats from the hostile tribes in every direction. They have protected every Englishman within their power; and I believe no colonist has been more anxious to see the British cause prosper than they have been, and still are. ...
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> Some petty chiefs among the persons alluded to, have already been demanded as hostages for the good behaviour of the tribes to which they belong, during the continuance of hostilities with the other Kaffirs, and until restitution be made of the stolen property.[1]

This is a long letter, but its quotation is justified by its clear delineation of the Gqunukwebi position, and by its frank acknowledgement of a dissident minority with which, however, the tribal authorities were planning to deal. As an exposition of Phatho's attitude, the letter needs little amplification, but before it appeared in print, the Journal itself had published a report from an unnamed source covering similar but supplementary ground. Its citation will add detail to the broader picture already given by Shepstone.

> It is confidently affirmed that there has been no plunder by the people from that part [Phatho's] since Umgai [Mqhayi] has returned, and given out his orders. He says if anyone is found stealing, let him be shot; he has forsaken him and disobeyed his order. Pato and his brothers held a council of war on the 31st ult., at which Pato stated, he had been called a coward for not joining, but a

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 23.

coward he would remain, as he was determined he would not fight against the English. He would still hold fast the word, "I fight not", and as they were all assembled, he took the opportunity to declare, that if any of them wished to join the invaders they could do so, in which case all their property must be taken away, and they must go out forever from amongst them. If they all left him, he should as a solitary individual still hold fast to the English.[1]

The pro-Phatho declarations did not go unchallenged. The Journal of January 23 carried a joint letter from George Southey, W.Southey, and W.Shaw (no relative of the Wesleyan leader) that questioned the validity of Shepstone's defence of the chief and his people as reported on January 16. As a missionary, they alleged, he saw only the best in the Gqumukwebi, but they believed him to be mistaken. "We disclaim imputing any improper motives to Mr. Shepstone; we believe him only to be under the same sort of delusion that has caused the ruin of half the colony..." Then followed a blunt expression of colonial thinking about the warring Xhosa.

> ...there now remains no innocent tribe in Kaffirland. The Governor, therefore, we conceive, has only one plain and straightforward path to pursue, viz:- to declare war against the whole Kaffir nation, and carry it on with vigour. Nothing short of this, will, we believe, satisfy the colonists - afford them justice - or give them hopes of ever living on this Frontier in peace. ... all Kaffirland must be driven before us; a better boundary must be formed; and the Kaffirs must never again be known as a nation.

This may have been an extreme expression of opinion, but there were undoubtedly many colonists who held similar views, believing that the only way to ensure peace, and incidentally to enlarge the colony, was to break the Xhosa power once and for all.[2] The holders of such views drew strength from the few reports that appeared of anti-colonial conduct on the part of Phatho and his people. Thomas Howard, a trader, claimed that he had been threatened by "that ruffian", Phatho, that his home had been ransacked by

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 16. The unnamed informant was probably Roberts, the schoolmaster at Wesleyville.

[2] Samuel Young sprang to the Gqumukwebi's defence in succeeding issues of the Journal, but his arguments were by no means as strong as the purity of his intentions, and his letters could have done little to counteract those of the writers of the initial joint letter.

the chief's followers, and that his life had been endangered.[1] Another report spoke of Phatho's son,

> a youth who had been educated at Salem, and who, while in the Colony, had been treated with distinguished kindness, and yet he was amongst the first to lift the murderous assegai to despatch an unresisting trader, (Mr.Roberts), whose conduct among them had been such as deservedly to raise him high in the esteem of all who knew him.[2]

A sequel to this incident is provided by Steedman, however. He tells of the attack on Roberts, a young trader who had done business on the Bika, as he was about to flee into the Colony. On the point of being assegaied, the young man cried out that Phatho had pledged his safety, and the fatal blow was stayed. The assailants checked the claim with the chief who confirmed it, and, standing by his pledge, vowed to kill any who harmed the trader. The attackers then turned into friends and escorted Roberts to safety in the Colony.[3] As is so frequently the case, there is more than one possible interpretation to war-time reports. In this instance, Phatho is vindicated, while his son appears to have conformed to the well-known ~~supra~~ hyper-nationalist pattern of the educated native, violently reacting against the race that has educated him. It is not surprising, however, that the Colony demanded, in the columns of the Journal, some guarantee of Phatho's adherence to their cause, insisting that he and his brothers must restrain their people from unfriendly acts, or, if they as chiefs were powerless, they should seek British protection and cut themselves off from their marauding followers. In the same issue of the paper there appeared a Government Notice which must have been either the inspirer of the editorial remarks just quoted, or have been inspired by a foreknowledge of the editor's views.

> Congo, Pata [sic], and Kama, have been required to prove the sincerity of their friendship by delivering up to the Officer in command of the Gualana Post, the inferior chiefs Gwashu, Lolo, Mama, Ruby, and Delima, they having incited their people to commit outrages on our Traders.[4]

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 16. [2] Ibid.

[3] A.Steedman, Wanderings, II, p.327. [4] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 16.

The letter of the Notice does not appear to have been ever carried out for there is no record of the named chiefs' having been taken into 'protective custody'; but after some delay the intention of the Notice was fulfilled in the following manner:

> The Port Elizabeth yeomanry, a small party of volunteers under the command of Captain Harris, who had exchanged the auctioneer's hammer for the officer's sword, had been sent by way of Kaffir Drift to demand Pato's son as a hostage for his fidelity to the Colony. The energy of Col. Smith was more conspicuous than his wisdom in this demand, and might have done mischief but for the tact of shrewd old Kobi [Cobus Congo] , Pato's brother, who offered himself in his nephew's place. The Yeomanry returned by the roundabout way they had come, taking their hostage, and accompanied by Pato's missionary (Rev. W. Shepstone) who went to give explanations.[1]

According to the Journal of February 6, the trader Fynn joined with Shepstone in caring for Congo, who, by the first week in February, arrived in Grahamstown. The original intention may have been to take Phatho's son, as guilty of the attempt on the life of Trader Roberts; but it would seem that such a step would have ignited flammable material and have alienated the tribe from the British cause. The voluntary submission of Congo must have satisfied the most exigent, and it certainly put D'Urban's doubts to rest.

Several interested people recognized that the Gqumukwebi would need protection from the vengeance of their compatriots if they were to remain faithful to the colonial cause, and it would seem that Smith was prepared to supply the tribe with arms and ammunition, having the defence of Wesleyville particularly in mind. But D'Urban believed it would be better to evacuate the Europeans from the mission, especially since there was some talk of the withdrawal westward over the Keiskamma of all of Phatho's people who had been living around the mission. He would talk over the matter with Shepstone before

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[1] An old Colonist, in C. Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.51.

[2] "Cobus Congo has placed himself in my hands as a hostage for his tribe, and I believe that the latter will stick to us if we on our side give them protection, which I will do." D'Urban to Col. Bell in Cape Town, Feb. 5. Quoted in Theal, Documents Relating to the Kaffir War of 1835 (hereinafter abbreviated as Theal, Documents)(London, 1912), p.50. The Governor expresse similar sentiments to Spring Rice in a despatch on Feb. 27.

reaching a decision, but then, in a postscript written in his almost indecipherable hand, showed that he was already favouring evacuation--"... the people of Wesleyville to be brought in by tribe of Pato when they cross the Keiskamma".[1] The oldest of the Wesleyan mission stations was becoming untenable.

As was to be expected, Mount Coke heard the rumbles of war before they reached her sister mission. The Ndlambe tribe had entered the war almost to a man and were active in passing cattle from the frontier to remoter regions in the Kei valley. The director at Mount Coke, Henry Dugmore (he had been there since March 1834), reported that the whole upper basin of the Tsholomnqa River was alive with cattle. This large scale cattle-rustling excited the people and added to the unrest that stirred up the countryside. European lives were at a discount. Traders were the special objects of attack. Some of them fled to the mission, and there related how they "had barely saved their lives, and scarcely knew how they had done it.

> One of them (as he told me himself) had, while the Kaffirs were discussing the subject of putting him to death, given them some lessons in shooting, that they might kill him with as little pain as possible.[2]

Trading places within the district were plundered, and one store just above the mission was surrounded by excited Africans. Mount Coke was no longer a healthy place for white men. Warriors returning from forays into the Colony taunted the missionary with assurances that they would soon attend to him and those who were sheltering with him. In spite of the threats, Dugmore held on until violence increased and he could see that no useful purpose would be performed by his staying. It was then, as previously related,

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[1] D'Urban to Smith, Feb. 14. D'Urban Papers, Cape Archives.

[2] H.H.Dugmore, The Reminiscences of an Albany Settler (Grahamstown, 1871), p.41. Dugmore kept an intermittent diary from the time of his arrival at Mount Coke until the outbreak of the war, but no sooner did the war get under way than the diary broke off. It is preserved in the Methodist Archives in Cape Town, where it is mistakenly ascribed to Boyce.

[3] Supra, p.198.

that he decided to abandon the mission and invited Brownlee to accompany him and a group of peace-loving Xhosa in a withdrawal to Wesleyville.

> After the station at Mount Coke had been abandoned, Umgai [Mqhayi] sent four men to sleep at the Mission house at night; but while they were there, the people under the chiefs Inyolo and Kasama came and broke the windows, and the next day set the whole village on fire. The places destroyed are a large Mission house, a new chapel, the old chapel, used as a schoolroom, the assistant's house, the workshop, together with a number of huts and Kaffir houses, connected with the station.[1]

The destruction of Mount Coke, followed soon after by Brownlee's flight from his station on the Buffalo, left Wesleyville as the only occupied mission in Kaffraria two months after the war had begun. It had become a haven of refuge for many traders and their families, and towards the end of February its population had swollen to about one hundred persons. The presence of so many people in a place that normally had accommodation for only two European families must have created many problems, but there is no suggestion that these were met with any other than a cheerful spirit. As days lengthened into weeks, however, and as news of the continuance of the war and the apparent inactivity of colonial forces reached the mission, anxiety at Wesleyville increased. A vivid, firsthand account of the last days at the mission comes from the pen of the "old Colonist" previously quoted, and who was probably none other than Dugmore himself.[2]

> Kaffir experts cut out half a dozen horses loose from under our very noses one pitchy dark night, and carried them off, though English sentinels were pacing to and fro just beyond them. ... The army of the Eastern Slambies [Ndlambe] from the Gomubi passed Wesleyville at eight or ten miles distance on their way to the Fish River Bush. When opposite the station they halted, (as we were afterwards told), and deliberated as to whether or not they should 'grease their heels' with the plunder of the mission before passing on. Providentially for us, the 'noes' carried the day.
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> In the midst of these cares, we were one morning astounded by the intelligence that Mr. and Mrs. Brownlee and the family were within a few miles, making their way on foot to Wesleyville.[3]

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Feb. 6.

[2] The story is told with that puckish humour and cheerful disregard of discomfort and danger that appears in other contributions from Dugmore's pen.

[3] C.Brownlee, Reminiscences, pp.51,52.

The Brownlees were arriving just in time, for military aid was on its way from the Colony. A force under Col. Somerset's command had fought its way through the Fish River bush to where Peddie now stands, and was prepared to assist in the evacuation of the mission; but Somerset wanted its people to cross the Keiskamma under their own initiative and link up with him on the western side. This in itself would be a protective move for once over the Keiskamma the refugees would be in the district to which Phatho himself had withdrawn and where he had established his headquarters on the banks of the Bika. But the occupants of the mission had many possessions and removal threatened to be a cumbersome operation until beggage was reduced by the abandonment of much material. Before the wagon wheels had turned many times the convoy's cattle were whisked off by detachments of the enemy, and when the men of the party went off to recover the stolen animals, the less active members were left to struggle over rough terrain towards the Keiskamma Drift. When the river was reached it was found to be running too high for a crossing, and the whole party, hungry and rain-soaked, had to wait on its left bank throughout the night before effecting a passage the following morning. Then their main troubles were over for they were in friendly territory, enjoying the welcome given by Phatho and his councillors, and awaiting the arrival of Somerset who was a day later than he had planned.[1] On reaching the Bika, the Commandant only paused to supply Brownlee, as the senior of the party, with an escort to Grahamstown then went forward to scour the Keiskamma valley for lurking enemies. Dugmore, if such was the identity of the writer of the memoir, remained at the Bika headquarters in response to the Gqunukwebi chiefs' earnest request, and thus maintained the tribe's connections with both the Colony and the mission. But Wesleyville joined Mount Coke as a burnt offering on the altar of

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[1] Both Theal (II, p.15) and Alexander (Narrative, p.425) appear to have confused the earlier expedition of Port Elizabeth yeomanry under Capt. Harris (Summa, p203) with Somerset's operation, though there were actually two weeks between the two undertakings.

Ngqika-Ndlambe rage against the encroaching white man. Within a few hours of the missionaries' withdrawal, the work of eleven years was reduced to ashes.

No sooner had Brownlee arrived in Grahamstown than he sought out the Governor and asked for permission to return to the Bika, where he had left his wife, to arrange for the settlement there of Tshatshu and about thirty of his followers. To this proposal D'Urban offered no objection, only stipulating that the Ntinde must remain south of the road to Wesleyville, and thus keep clear of all entanglements with the warring tribes. In respect of the Wesleyans, Sir Benjamin took counsel with their leading missionaries, then addressed the following message to Col. Smith:

> I have had conversation with the Wesleyan Missionaries, Shepstone, Shrewsbury, and Boyce, since I received your letter, and they wish that those of their Institution who have come from Wesleyville should remain at Belda for the present, therefore so let it be, and signify to the Chiefs that I am glad in this matter to do what they wish, and that I am much pleased with the promptness with which they brought in the party from Wesleyville and with the kindness which they describe them to have shown towards them.
>
> By the way in allowing the People of the Institution to remain on the Belda I wish you to allow no Trader or other English subjects to do so; let them all be sent into the Colony. ...[1]

A little later, we find the Governor giving further thought to Gqumkwebi affairs, telling Somerset of his decision concerning the hostage, Congo:

> It will be better too, that for the present, Cobus Congo should remain here [in Grahamstown], and Pato and Kama proceed home. Adhering to the Original Hostage.
>
> Let it be so arranged, for this is the securer Plan, and as Mr. Shepstone the Interpreter [Theophilus] goes by my order—with Pato tomorrow, be so good to send for his Father—the Wesleyan Missionary, and say to him that I shall expect from him the due surveillance of Cobus—until his son, who is now charged with it, returns.[2]

In this document we have one of the earliest instances of D'Urban's leaning on the Wesleyans. Circumstances had concentrated several of the Society's missionaries close to him in Grahamstown and had begun an association that was to grow yet stronger and to continue until long after the war was over.

The practical assistance rendered by Phatho and his brothers to needy Europeans served to temper colonial opinion on the worthlessness of the

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[1] D'Urban to Smith, Feb. 24. D'Urban Papers. [2] March 3, Ibid.

whole Xhosa race, and to open the door for the idea that some were capable of friendly acts toward white men and women. This was officially recognized in a notice published in the Grahamstown Journal, February 26, when the Military Secretary, Major Dutton, following D'Urban's lead, stated: "These chiefs have indeed shown great fidelity and steadiness of adherence to the colony throughout the late occurrences". D'Urban embodied his tribute in a despatch to the Secretary of State,[1] and Theal, who cannot be accused of pro-Xhosa sentiments, acknowledged that these same chiefs offered asylum to all white men who could get to their country, though, on the same page he impugned their motives and made their non-participation in the war a mercenary act, pursued only in the hope of recovering the territory between the Bika and Fish Rivers.[2] It is not necessary to deny the existence of any such hopes in Gqumukwebi breasts—their hearts would scarcely have been human had they rejected such aspirations—but their actions were too spontaneous, too fraught with the milk of human kindness to have sprung merely from thoughts of material gain. Credit must be given now, as it was then, to the feelings of loyalty provoked by years of Wesleyan ministry among the compact and isolated tribe.[3]

3. Wesleyanism's Early Reactions. The Methodist Society's involvement in the war was not limited to practical interest in the fate of its two missions (Wesleyville and Mount Coke) and their residents. The bulk of its membership still lay within the Colony,[4] so, unlike the G.M.S. and the L.M.S., the Society had its feet in both the Xhosa and the European camps and was obliged to view events from both sides of the frontier.

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[1] Feb. 27. IBB XXXIX, 279, p.3. [2] Theal IV, p.14.

[3] In the Aborigines Committee Shaw made repeated references to the help rendered by the Gqumukwebi and quoted it as evidence of the beneficent effect of Christian missions. IBB VII, 538, pp.56,61. Cp. supra, pp.186-188.

[4] The membership report for 1834 shows 437 members in Albany and 142 in the whole of Kaffraria (including the Transkei). ARM, Feb. 4, 1834.

It did this with greater facility than did the sister societies whose ministry was almost wholly limited to the African tribes. Nevertheless, missionary and frontier circles were stirred by the vehemence of a letter that appeared from a senior Methodist minister in the middle of January 1835.

Shrewsbury, acting superintendent of Wesleyan affairs since March 1835 in the absence of Shaw in England, was asked by Col.Smith for his views on the frontier conflict. The minister's response came in the form of the following letter:

Graham's Town,
16 January 1835.

Sir,

In accordance with your wishes I respectfully present for your consideration a few thoughts on the principles to be adopted in reference to the Caffre tribes.

Article I. The chiefs who have invaded the colony to forfeit their chieftainship; and their people to forfeit their country, their arms and their property. This end accomplished the righteousness of British law, and the equity of British judges, may decide the rest.

Article II. Deserters from the British government who may have taught the Caffres the use of arms, to be punished with rigour.

Article III. The actual murderers of British subjects to be everywhere demanded, and, when obtained, executed on the spot; that the Caffres may see that murder with Britons is an unpardonable crime. Every chieftain to be informed that if he substitute innocent persons for the really guilty, the chieftainhimself will forfeit his own life, as being himself the friend of murderers, and the cause of the shedding of innocent blood, under the colour of law and justice.

Article IV. The chiefs who profess friendship towards the colony to be informed that, if they allow our enemies shelter in their territory, or connive at the concealment of colonial cattle or property, they will at once be considered as enemies, and dealt with accordingly.

Article V. In conducting the war, the advice of the Dutch, and of well-informed British civilian settlers, will be of great advantage, and superior to a strict observance of military tactics, as observed in European warfare. In thickets and ravines caution must be used to avoid falling into ambuscades, etc.

Article VI. Calculating on the ultimate success of our arms, since ours is the righteous cause, on the termination of the war:

1. The neutral country to be occupied by the British, to prevent the Caffres from lurking in the Fish River bush.

2. Caffre offenders whose lives may be spared, to be employed in making highroads in every part of Caffreland; if necessary, even to Natal: their labour as convicts being a visible proof of the punishments mercifully inflicted on those who might have lost their lives, etc

3. An universal registration of Caffres to be effected; every man wearing on his neck a thin tin plate, containing his name, and the name of his chief, which will be to him a passport of peace, and the absence of it a token of enmity. This will both serve to

identify offenders, and enable the British government at once to know the number and strength of the frontier tribes.

4. British agents to reside in Caffreland to carry this registration into effect, and otherwise subserve the great principles of justice and mercy which will benefit all people who are indirectly controlled by the government and laws of Britain.

(Signed) W.J.Shrewsbury.[1]

By any standard the letter's recommendations were extremely severe and were unlikely to be adopted by any responsible government. Smith's immediate reactions to it are not known, but D'Urban enclosed a copy of it in his voluminous and delayed despatch to the Secretary of State on 19 June 1835 and used it to support his own measures which he justly regarded as less severe than those recommended by Shrewsbury.[2] In doing so he eulogized the missionary as "a most benevolent and humane clergyman",

> ... long resident among the Caffres, and experienced as well in their character as in colonial frontier history ... a man of peace and religion, a teacher of the gospel, and as all who know him will vouch, in every regard a most pious and exemplary Christian minister. I think my measures are not quite so severe as those which he, in his conscience, considers necessary, and openly recommends.

The Governor's sympathetic description of Shrewsbury need not be gainsaid in order to evaluate the letter. The missionary was all that D'Urban claimed him to be yet, in this instance, acted unwisely and unfortunately. In the turmoil of beleaguered Grahamstown, under the shadow of the yet unchecked invasion, he committed his pro-colonial views to paper, and failed to present any angle of the case that could have been made out for the Xhosa people. He also failed to realize that his words would be taken not only as the expression of his personal opinion, to which he was entitled, but as the official pronouncement of Methodism's attitude to the war since they were penned by its chief local officer.

Some time elapsed before knowledge of the letter circulated throughout the Colony, and its impact naturally weakened with the passage of time. But on June 13, the South African Commercial Advertiser made a personal

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[1] CO XXXIX, 279, p.44. [2] Ibid., p.20.

attack on Shrewsbury and impugned the Wesleyans. In a muddled, rather ineffectual way, Shepstone defended his colleague and his society in the Grahamstown Journal of June 27, and there matters rested within the Colony but not within the Society. D'Urban's copy of the letter legitimately came into the hands of James Stephen, Assistant Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, who, on behalf of his superior, Lord Glenelg (who had become Secretary of State for the Colonies in April 1835), drew the attention of Wesleyan headquarters to the offending document. It would appear that the Wesleyan Committee were previously unaware that any such letter had been written, but on receipt of Stephen's communication, they lost no time in calling for Shrewsbury, who by that time was in England,[1] to appear before them. The missionary came, and on 24 December 1835, submitted his defence for having written such a letter to Col. Smith. He retracted nothing, but justified his statements as coming from one who was on the spot in contrast to those who presumed to judge from a distance of 6,000 miles.

> ... I thought that, although it was stepping out of my usual course, I owed it to my King and country, when requested to do so, to express my views on the then state of public affairs. ... I mention not, on the opposite side, the steps I took to benefit the Caffres; but, nothing, next to the Gospel, will so much benefit them as subjection, in common with the colonists, to our government and laws.[2]

The Committee were by no means satisfied with Shrewsbury's explanation, realizing that no words at that date could nullify the effect of "the very censurable paper" written in Grahamstown at the beginning of the year. But they had to reply to the Colonial Office, and did so on 9 January 1836, conveying to the Secretary their complete disavowal of

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[1] Mrs. Shrewsbury's health had been severely undermined by the hardships endured in Kaffraria, and doctors recommended a sea voyage. Before this could be arranged, however, her condition worsened and on 13 June 183[illegible] she died. Ten days after the funeral, the widower with his seven children whose ages ranged from 12 years to 20 months, left Grahamstown for Port Elizabeth whence he sailed for England. Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.397-400.

[2] LBS XXXIX, 279, p.120.

Shrewsbury's sentiments, declaring:

> ... they now regard it [the letter] with the deepest regret and disapprobation, and will reiterate in the strongest terms to all their missionaries the duty of wholly abstaining from proceedings so utterly at variance with their sacred character and calling.[1]

The missionary's son reported that his father "retired from the committee in London, thoroughly wounded and crushed" after the reprimand, but later quoted him as saying that he would probably have arrived at a similar judgment had he been in the committee's place.[2] Some of the offender's ex-colleagues wrote sympathizingly from Africa, but the core of their comments was not so much the rightness of Shrewsbury's words (though they upheld the *righteousness* of his conduct) as the belief that the Lord would soon vindicate the Wesleyan cause to the humiliation of their opponents, i.e. the L.M.S., and particularly Dr. Philip.[3] For some time, however, the Methodist/were at an embarrassing disadvantage: it was difficult for them to explain away their agent's letter. It confirmed what some were suspecting and others were maintaining--that the Wesleyans' work on behalf of the natives was neutralized by their ministers' strong bias in favour of the Colony. This in turn affected colonial judgment on the Wesleyans--such staunch supporters of the white man's viewpoint easily gained the white man's approval, while those who worked only for the Africans were considered misguided philanthropists, nigger-lovers, members of the much-hated Philippine party.

The Methodists in Africa were at pains to discourage these extreme views of their policy, ever asserting their equal interest in the spiritual welfare of colonists and tribesmen. The fact remains, however, that they condemned the Xhosa invasion without making an adequate statement of the black man's grievances, and so thoroughly identified themselves with the colonial attitude that it requires care to distinguish some of their pro-

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[1] LMB XXXIX, 279, p.120.

[2] Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.413,415.

[3] Ibid., p.416.

nouncements from those of ardent empire-builders. On 31 January 1835, Shrewsbury, Young, and Haddy, on behalf of their fellow missionaries addressed a letter to their leaders in London, and, after greeting their "Honoured Fathers and Brethren", broached the subject of the war and said:

> A more wanton aggression upon a peaceable people, who were desirous of promoting their best interests, has never been committed; and the effects resulting from it are so disastrous, that the colony must be brought to the verge of ruin. ... although not a few have accused the colonists of cruelty towards the Caffres, from a thorough knowledge of most transactions connected with Albany, we are bold to maintain that such accusations are unjust. To a great extent true philanthropy prevails amongst the people here, without that ostentatious boast thereof which is found in some who excel therein more in word than in deed.[1]

This is a fair sample of the more sober statements that were made concerning the war in its early stages. Black men were wholly black, and white men, provided they were good colonials and owned no connections with Dr. Philip, were bleached to near-whiteness. From this pattern, sincerely designed but drawn against a background of pro-colonial bias, the South African workers rarely departed. This loyalty to Grahamstown set them somewhat apart from their co-religionists in England who were generally under the influence of Exeter Hall, and therefore likely to take the Africans' part against those whom they regarded as encroaching Europeans. The leaders at Wesleyan Mission House, 77, Hatton Garden, London, more easily saw eye to eye with the evangelical officials in the Colonial Office:[2] while those who guided Wesleyan destinies at Grahamstown rather naturally saw the colonial point of view which was that of the greater part of their constituency, without, however, relinquishing their missionary intentions toward the Xhosa. This dichotomy was neither easy to

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[1] MS VII, 538, p.182. The letter was later published in the Grahamstown Journal, 27 June 1835.

[2] The Secretary, Lord Glenelg, and his capable, influential assistant, Stephen, were both closely linked to the Clapham Sect and shared its humanitarian convictions, though possibly in differing degrees. See K.N.Bell and W.P.Morrell (eds.), Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860, Introduction, i-xlix.

explain nor to maintain, but its defence was attempted by the Society's South African writers, notably Shaw and Boyce. The latter's contributions will be dealt with at a later stage, but Shaw's handling of the opposition can be profitably considered here.

> The Wesleyan Missionaries had been openly assailed, and that frequently, by a portion of the press, and also from the platform, in England, as being hostile to the interests of the Kaffirs, and pro-colonial in their views and aims. The basest motives, wholly alien to those which ought to influence Missionaries in their intercourse with the native tribes, were attributed to them. One of their number [Shrewsbury] who had returned to England in consequence of domestic bereavement, was singled out for special attack, on account of a paper which, at a time of great anxiety, he had hastily written at the request of the Governor, the object and aim of which were probably misunderstood, but certainly misrepresented by the parties referred to. The whole of these proceedings were evidently got up to damage the Wesleyan Missionaries as witnesses before the British public; for it was known that while as anxious as any class of persons to secure the real interests and welfare of the Kaffir tribes, yet their views of the cause and origin of the recent war [1835] were not in exact accordance with the representations that had been made by those whom the colonists regarded as their enemies [i.e. Dr. Philip's party].[1]

The superintendent's defence of his deputy, Shrewsbury, could hardly be described as satisfactory since no attempt to explain away the troublesome unequivocal letter stood much chance of success. He was happier when dealing with attacks on the integrity of his Society's mission operations, for there is no doubt that the opponents of Methodism exaggerated their devotion to the colonial cause and minimized their valuable, consistent contributions to the welfare of the native tribes. Moreover, the Wesleyans were not alone in their support of the Government's war measures. In the early days when the Xhosa menace was very real, representatives of all societies were unanimous in condemning the invasion, in taking advantage of official protection, and in wishing success to British arms.[2] Most

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[1] SAM, p.167.

[2] "It was quite a mistake into which the Colonial Secretary, Lord Glenelg, was led, when he supposed that the Wesleyan Missionaries alone deemed the attack of the Kaffirs upon the colony, to be on their part unjust. ... In the opinions expressed by the Wesleyan Missionaries, the Ministers of the Established Church of England, the Missionaries of the Glasgow, London, Baptist, and Moravian Societies coincided." Boyce, Notes, Appendix, p.vi. See also D'Urban to Spring Rice, Jan. 21. IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.133.

missionaries agreed that the best way to handle the irruption was to give it an immediate check through strong military action.[1] It was only when sectarian differences and divergent policies were emphasized that it began to appear that the Methodists were bending backwards to support the colonists while the L.M.S. and G.M.S. doggedly upheld the Xhosa tribes. But such an analysis was too simple: it did justice to neither party, and misrepresented both. Nevertheless, in over-crowded Grahamstown during January and February a new factor took shape--the Governor who had hitherto lent an ear to Philip's advocacy of the native cause, now inclined his head in another direction and listened to "his new advisers the Wesleyan Missionaries",[2] and adjusted his views on frontier politics, transferring his sympathy from the Xhosa to the European.[3] This was not hard to do: it would have required a stronger character thanD'Urban's to have retained an impartial interest in the welfare of both parties while surrounded with European distress and daily reminders of the devastation caused by Xhosa intransigence.

4. D'Urban's Deliberation. Many shared the belief that a swift, hard blow at the invaders would quickly bring them to their knees. By the turn of the year it was reported from Wesleyville that

> the chiefs engaged in this desolating warfare, despair already of the success of their enterprise; and it was the opinion of the writer that nothing was wanting but the presence of a Commando in Kaffirland to put an effectual stop to the devastation of the colony; that it was the perfect impunity with which they had succeeded in their first attacks, that had led to their subsequent daring outrages. So sensible were the friendly chiefs of the good effects which the presence of a Commando would have in withdrawing the marauders from the Colony, that they were

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 16.

[2] Macmillan, BBB, pp.126,128. E.A.Walker writes of Boyce as the rival of Philip. History of Southern Africa, p.173.

[3] "That a change took place in Sir Benjamin D'Urban's mind after his arrival in Grahamstown, was a matter of triumph there, and proclaimed loud enough for all the world to hear it..." Philip to Shaw, from Cape Town, 1 Aug. 1838, in Shaw, Defence, p.11.

anxious beyond expression for its appearance.[1]

Harry Smith's arrival in Grahamstown and the military operations that followed his assumption of command must have appeared as an answer to the implied prayer from Wesleyville.[2] Then came an apparent lull when the rescue of missionaries ranked as a major activity and the Xhosa, though driven east over the Fish River, still held the initiative and regarded victory as theirs. This largely arose from D'Urban's concept of war—his refusal to be rushed, his insistence on being fully prepared, and his determination to succeed when he had once set his military machine in motion. As a wise general he refused to move forward until his rear and existent front were secure, and such security took time to effect even though Smith's vigorous action had done much to make it possible. Furthermore, his plans were hampered by the need for economy, and by the knowledge that the Treasury in England would censure him even for the most necessary expenditures. In his first despatch from Grahamstown he felt the need to forestall some of the criticism that his measures would arouse:

> To avenge it [this work of pillage and rapine] , to provide for future security, and to alleviate, as far as may be practicable, the sufferings of the people, I have no alternative but to incur great expense, and to take upon me heavy responsibility ...[3]

and five weeks later he took pains to assure Spring Rice that all was being done with the utmost economy, though expenses were necessarily high.[4] The fact was that decades of neglect had left frontier defences in a deplorable condition, and it was taking time, money, and careful concentrated planning to overcome the handicap and prepare the punitive, corrective campaign against the victorious Xhosa. In that first despatch, already quoted, the

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Jan. 16, quoting a letter from Wesleyville of Jan. 2.

[2] Cp. supra, pp.189,190.

[3] To the Secretary of State, Jan. 21. IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.132.

[4] Despatch, Feb. 27. IBB XXXII. 279, p.4.

Governor declared:

> It will be imperatively necessary to finish this war by an invasion of Caffreland to a certain extent, and for a settled extent of purpose [whatever those cryptic, cautious words might mean] . At least 3,000 men of all descriptions (Burghers and others) will be necessary for this object; and in the meanwhile Grahamstown and the frontier posts must be securely and efficiently occupied.

To fulfil this tentative plan, the Commander-in-chief had less than half the number of troops at his disposal that were on the frontier at the time of the 1819 attack on Grahamstown.[1] By the end of February this gloomy picture had brightened owing to the arrival of reinforcements from Cape Town, the addition of contingents of burghers from Uitenhage, George, and Graaff Reinet, and the raising of militia throughout Albany.[2] D'Urban could therefore later report that he had attained the necessary numerical strength and had under his command "3,000 rank and file of all arms" for invasion, and a further 2,000 for the defence of the frontier districts.[3] Of this young army, 1,200 men, a good portion of whom were British infantry, came under the command of Col.Smith on whom, and on whose troops, the Governor could scarcely lavish enough praise.[4] But mingled with the professionals were the amateurs, many of whom doubtless shared the sportsman's outlook revealed by Frederick Rex when he wrote to his father from Grahamstown in January:

> I have been into the bush with farmers but could not manage ((to)) get a single shot but I hope I shall be able to bag a brace or two before the season's over...[5]

Nevertheless, this mixed force was the best that could be mustered, and with part of it D'Urban maintained some pressure against the Xhosa while he was

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[1] J.Alexander, Narrative, II, p.34. [2] Despatch, Feb. 27.

[3] D'Urban to Lord Aberdeen, (who had succeeded Spring Rice as Colonial Secretary in Dec. 1834), June 19. IBB XXXIX. 279, p.15.

[4] D'Urban to Smith, Feb. 10. D'Urban Papers; "I cannot speak too highly of Col.Smith's conduct and ability throughout the whole of it [an operation west of the Keiskamma] , or of that of the troops under him." Despatch, Feb

[5] Long, Index, p.164.

preparing his larger plans. By March 13, however, the Governor was telling Somerset that "every appearance of Kaffirs" was gone from the line of the Keiskamma, and two days later he was informing the same officer:

> It is obvious from them [reports received] as well as from Rademeyer's account, that the Kaffirs are gone from the Kap, Kooms, and Fish Rivers and from the space between the latter and the Keiskama.[1]

The rapid changes in what was obviously a very fluid situation induced a swift reversal of plans, and troops were once more assembled on the Keiskamma in preparation for the long-projected invasion of Kaffraria.

Since before the outbreak of war, a moot question in colonial circles had been the attitude of the Hottentots in the Kat River Settlement and the Cape Corps towards the restive tribes. They were under suspicion from October 1834 onwards, and many colonists came to believe that members of the Cape Corps at Fort Willshire had been ready to deliver the Fort into Maqoma's hands in December and to throw in their lot with the invaders.[2] Any doubt as to the wisdom of standing by the Colony, however, was removed on January 10 when Cox attacked Ngeno's kraal and demonstrated that the Europeans were not as powerless as they had hitherto appeared. From that time on, there was little cause to question Hottentot loyalty. Their contribution to colonial welfare finally outstripped that of many of the colonists since at the conclusion of the war they were kept under arms beyond the terms of their original contract. But, apart from this compulsion for them to go an extra mile, it may be rightly claimed that they as a people made notable contributions to defence, and in the case of the Kat River Settlement they fulfilled one of the purposes for which it was established—they provided an effective barrier against the Ngqika tribes.

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[1] D'Urban to Somerset, March 11, 13, 15. D'Urban Papers.

[2] Theal IV, p.12; Cory III, pp.47-51; Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.25. But J.S.Marais (The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937, London, 1939, p.227) quotes W.M.Macmillan for the view that any charge against the Kat River Hottentots was based on "utterly inadequate evidence".

If the Settlement had not been placed on the Kat River the northern frontier would have been open to the invaders and the course of the war could have been considerably worse than it proved to be.[1]

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[1] Shaw believed that the Settlement exasperated Maqoma and his concentration of people since it was established on land that they regarded as their own; that its concentration of about 4,000 Coloureds made it a potential trouble-spot; and that its proximity to Kaffraria led to a dangerous intercourse between the two peoples. SMM, p.145.

CHAPTER V

THE SIXTH FRONTIER WAR

Part II — COUNTER INVASION

I. THE OFFENSIVE

1. To the Keiskamma. Renewed Xhosa activity during the early days of March, combined with faulty intelligence about the numbers of native warriors still inside the Neutral Territory, had halted D'Urban's slow-moving invasion plans for a few days, and had led him to concentrate on clearing the bush between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers. This was done to his satisfaction by March 13, and by the 14th he was ready to set the wheels of invasion in motion once again. Lt. Col. England was given command of the first line of defence which stretched from the Winterberg, down the Tyhume and the Keiskamma, to the sea, with Grahamstown as the "main object and pivot of all his defensive measures". For this responsibility he had at his disposal 1,989 men.[1] The force of 3,000 built up for the actual invasion consisted of 1,997 cavalry and 1,157 infantry, or two-thirds mounted and one-third on foot, divided into four divisions. To the left or north went Field Commandant van Wyk, next came Major Cox based on Fort Beaufort, in the centre at Fort Willshire Smith originally held command but was soon replaced by Col. Peddie so that he—Smith—could take over as second-in-command under D'Urban, and on the right stood Somerset and Rademeyer.[2]

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[1] Smith's General Orders given at Grahamstown, March 16. IBB XXXIX. 279, pp.23,24.

[2] Smith to Juana, March 17, Autobiography, p.723; sketch-map accompanying a letter written in March by Frederick Rex, Long, Index, p.167; Cory III, p.123. Smith speaks of the centre as being under the command of "Me myself and Sir Slow as far as he goes", and of his almost immediate rise to second-in-command—"by which means I can order everybody about like himself".

A small initial force under Stockenstrom moved out of Grahamstown on March 15. Smith followed six days later (all these major moves seemed to have been leisurely, devoid of urgency), and on the 26th D'Urban himself set out for Fort Willshire where he arrived on March 28. Once free from his superior's restraint, Smith dashed into action. He reconnoitred as far north as Old Lovedale, finding the mission burned; and on the 26th he crossed the Keiskamma, and scoured the bush to the Inthaba Yendoda Mountains, mainly in search of cattle for his troops, and claimed to have captured about 2,000 head.[1] It may have been this surprising thrust that startled the widow Sutu into calling for a truce on the 27th, but whatever her motives she was disappointed for the call was virtually ignored and her envoys were imprisoned.[2] The avenging forces were not to be turned back by belated words from one who certainly did not represent the martial section of Xhosa opinion at that time. By March 30 D'Urban was writing to Somerset from Fort Willshire and unequivocally declaring that his immediate object was to drive "Tyali and Macomo from their holds about the upper Chumie and the Amatola Mountains".[3] Within twenty-four hours this objective was made clear to whites and blacks as the three divisions nearest to the mountains moved into Kaffraria. Twelve weeks after Smith's and ten weeks after D'Urban's arrival in Grahamstown the counter-invasion had begun.

At the time when Sir Benjamin was planning to enter Kaffraria,

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[1] Cory III, p.122; Smith, Autobiography, p.287.

[2] Letter, signed "W", in the Grahamstown Journal, April 17. The writer said that two Xhosa women arrived at Fort Beaufort on March 27 with a flag of truce. "... they stated that they came from Sutu, who desired them to say—she was tired of the war Tyali and Macomo was [sic] waging against the colony, and that she had sent for them both to desire them to make peace; ..." The Journal expressed disgust at the imprisonment of the two envoys, and justly observed: "... from her uniform generous conduct towards the colonists, she had a right to expect better treatment at our hands".

[3] D'Urban Papers.

unsolicited guidance was being prepared for him by the principal of his "new advisers", William Boyce. This missionary had been to England to get married and had returned with his bride in January, and found himself restricted to Albany because of the war. He may thus have had more leisure than if he had been on a mission station, and was better able to give his attention to secular as distinct from spiritual matters. He had already made the acquaintance of Capt. Alexander, a member of D'Urban's staff, who described him as "that most intelligent man and enthusiastic missionary, the Rev. Mr. Boyce", that "excellent Missionary".[1] This may have encouraged him to share with the Governor his strong convictions on frontier matters. It is possible that D'Urban may have expressed his readiness to hear the missionary's opinion, reckoning that his experience at Buntingville and Mount Coke would make his views worthy of consideration. Be that as it may, on March 31 Boyce addressed a letter to His Excellency in which he dealt with the frontier question under five main heads: 1. Settlement of the Colonial Boundary; 2. Punishment of Wrongs by Either Side; 3. Treaties with Xhosa Chiefs; 4. Relations with Transkeian Chiefs; and 5. Check on Kaffrarian Settlers.[2]

In the first section, the writer broached the vexed question of the Neutral Territory and stated: "It would be extremely unjust and impolitic to drive the Caffres out of that portion of the ceded territory which they now possess", and suggested that "they should continue to hold these lands as colonial fiefs (the nature of which they well understand), and be prevented from exceeding the limits at present assigned to them." It is well to remember that these words were written after the invasion and less than six weeks before D'Urban's May proclamation which proposed to expel the recalcitrant tribes over the Kei.[3] There was, then, a great gulf

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[1] Alexander, Narrative I, p.347; II, p.31.

[2] IBB XXXIX. 279, pp.45,46. Also given in IBB VII. 538, pp.179-182.

[3] Infra, pp.270,277.

between Boyce's thinking in March and D'Urban's decision in May; yet when D'Urban's proclamation was made known Boyce forgot his convictions that such provisions "would be extremely unjust and impolitic" and expressed his approval of the Governor's drastic measures.[1] In view of the missionary's volte-face, the value of at least the first portion of his March letter may well be discounted. When he turned to his second point, however, he was on surer ground. He sketched the Xhosa attitude to stock thieving, and declared:

> ... the chiefs are only restrained from plundering each other and the colony by fear of consequences. This salutary fear it is necessary to maintain, and it can only be obtained by the prompt and severe, yet just punishment of wrongs committed upon the colony, or the colonists upon Caffreland.

Leniency, he believed, would always be regarded as a sign of weakness, and should therefore not be permitted. "The necessity of a military force on the frontier will remain for the present, until some decided change takes place in the habits and feelings of the frontier tribes." Any move to reduce the available military force would be an "absurd policy". In respect of treaties, he advocated separate rather than collective agreements with each chief, and the enforcement of fines for cattle stealing on the basis of the payment of from 4 to 10 head per stolen animal. He defended the reputation of the majority of white traders in Kaffraria, but felt that their relations with the tribes would be improved by the appointment of "consular agents to the native chiefs", but since missionaries were the only people qualified for such posts, and since it was impossible for them to accept such positions, the only recourse open to the government was to continue working through the military commandant.

Under his fourth head, Boyce recommended continued contact between the Colony and the Transkeian chiefs—Hintsa, Fadana, and Faku—with regular visits from government officials: a sensible suggestion that was

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[1] Infra, p.277.

worthy of adoption. In his final section, the missionary called for control over settlement in Kaffraria, especially on the part of Hottentots and discharged soldiers, with entry only upon the production of an authorized pass.

The letter was prepared by a capable mind. Its paragraphs contained some wisdom, based on firsthand experience among the Trans- and Ciskeian tribes. With justice the writer could later claim that some of the better features of the Stockenstrom system were identical with recommendations embodied in the letter under review. But that letter was the product of a politician rather than of a missionary. Its writer took the precaution of sending a copy to the Wesleyan Missionary Society "that the Secretaries and Committee ... might be aware of the extent of" his "intermeddling in Colonial politics, and the occasion which compelled" him to give his opinion; but such a course did not absolve him from the charge of having stepped out of his rightful realm into the political arena. He probably never realized it, but he had taken the first step to becoming the Wesleyan counterpart of Dr. Philip. He was to write other politically-slanted documents before the war had ended, and within four years he was to write his book, even as Philip had produced his—with this significant difference: while Philip's energies were bent to the defence of the aborigine, Boyce's efforts largely supported the colonists.

There is no record of D'Urban's reaction to the missionary's suggestions— but the letter contained so much in common with his own outlook that it was unlikely that he would take exception to its contents. Furthermore, its recommendations concerning the frontier were extremely mild compared with the wholesale annexation that the Governor would soon be proclaiming; they were surprisingly similar to the scheme that emerged under Stockenstrom's brief administration. The letter itself was studied outside of D'Urban's immediate circle—Col.Wade approved of its tenor and spoke favourably of it to the Aborigines Committee.[1] Whether that were a

[1] IBB VII, 425, p.309.

recommendation or disparagement depended on the observer's policy, pro or contra the Colony. Aside from the intrinsic value of the "Remarks", as Boyce's letter came to be called, they had another value in that they launched their writer on a course of participation in politics that was contrary to the declared policy of the Wesleyan Missionary Society.

By an understandable coincidence, Boyce's superior, William Shaw, was exercising his mind on the frontier situation during the very same weeks in which Boyce was preparing his "Remarks". News of the war had reached Shaw in March while he was at Leeds, and from that town he addressed a long communication to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Aberdeen. The letter is dated 17 April 1835, but since it must have taken several days to prepare, it was probably conceived at about the time when Boyce was presenting his comments to D'Urban. It, too, represented a Wesleyan incursion into the political field, yet with a difference that must have stemmed from the difference in the characters of the two writers. Shaw ventured to place his wide knowledge of the frontier and its peoples at the disposal of the Secretary, and although he wrote with authority and made concrete suggestions toward the solution of border problems, the tone of his letter was persuasive rather than dogmatic.[1]

The letter reviewed Shaw's own 13 years' experience in Albany and Kaffraria, then turned to answer the question: "What has been the cause of this ruthless attack by the Caffres?" The principal cause of the trouble was identified as "the moral state and habits of the Caffre tribes", which Christian missions were endeavouring to improve. The missionary exonerated the colonists and the military forces from charges of wilful cruelty towards the aborigines, refusing to implicate the settlers, and declaring: "I cannot perceive that true philanthropy requires me to blacken my white friends for the purpose of making my black friends white".

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[1]The letter is published in IBB XXXIX, 50.252, pp.137,138. It is too long and diffuse for verbatim quotation.

At the same time, he stated: "Our border policy is extremely bad", and made it responsible for the invasion. Then, turning from a review of the past, he submitted nine suggestions for satisfactory frontier policy. He recommended a just rather than a vindictive punishment for the invasion; the advancement of the colonial boundary to the Keiskamma; the restoration to the Gqunukwebi of all their original land in the Neutral Territory, and the offer to friendly tribes of smaller sections to the north. In the administrative field he suggested the making of separate treaties with each of the frontier chiefs so that each was fully aware of his responsibilities towards his own people and the Colony; the appointment of a government agent to reside in Kaffraria and of a protector of native tribes to live in Albany; the trial of British subjects living beyond the frontier when they transgressed colonial and frontier regulations; and the appointment of a Lt.Governor for the Eastern Province with headquarters at Grahamstown. As a final point he wanted the Government to co-operate with missionaries in the work of converting and improving the conduct of the Xhosa people through the establishment of schools and financial assistance to mission societies. He acknowledged that some of his recommendations had already been made by the Commission of Inquiry which sat in 1824, but since they had not been implemented they bore repetition.

In spite of its prolixity, the letter made a positive and moderate approach to the frontier problem, and merited the close attention of highly-placed officials. Although the investigator has found no reference to its reception, it is unlikely that it went unnoticed at the Colonial Office where Shaw's stock must have stood high. It is possible that it was included among the documents studied by Lord Glenelg when he formulated the policy expressed in his despatch of 26 December 1835.[1]

But while Boyce in Grahamstown and Shaw in Leeds offered their sol-

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[1] Infra, pp.350-353.

utions to the knotty questions raised by the impact of whites and blacks along the Great Fish River, Sir Benjamin was busy mounting his counter-invasion.

From the outset the offensive fell into the pattern it was to retain throughout operations that were hardly worthy of the name of "war". The campaign was planned to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, but the enemy were rarely to be found. The regular units of the British army rode or marched in approved array into the wild, largely unexplored tangle of the Kathole Mountains without ever fighting a pitched battle; and the burghers and colonists, better accustomed though they were to the terrain and the elusive tactics of their opponents, rarely came to grips with the enemy. Xhosa policy concentrated on withdrawal into remote districts where no large forces could follow, and the removal of thousands of cattle beyond the colonial reach. When the first troops advanced north and east from Fort Willshire, therefore, they found an empty country from which the Ngqika and Ndlambe fighters had fled. Smith had to advance into the Poorts of the Buffalo before coming up with the foe and there he had "the prettiest affair by far of any during the war, and the most like a fight". Other divisions had even less contact with those they were pursuing: they saw groups of Xhosa on distant slopes above deep ravines but were rarely able to touch them. Such a campaign was frustrating—it denied the enemy the use of their own country but failed to inflict the proposed defeat and consequently could claim no victory. Its most plentiful achievements lay in the recovery of cattle. In an early letter to his wife, Harry Smith explained:

> This Kaffir war is nothing else than that [looking for cattle]. Read of Walter Scott's Borderers, and you will learn what Kaffir warfare is:
>
> He would ride
> A foray on the Scottish side.
>
> It is just that. You gallop in, and half by force, half by stratogem, pounce upon them whereever you can find them; frighten

their wives, burn their homes, lift their cattle, and return home quite triumphant.[1]

A little later, he was writing: "It is quite an affair of Smithfield Market now, or will be in a few days."[2] And when once the cattle were captured (a more accurate word than "recovered" since there was little or no discrimination betwen colonial and native beasts) they still had to be cared for, and that was wearying work, far removed from normal military duties. Small wonder that Smith later grumbled to his chief: "There is neither name nor fame to be acquired in this war, replete with everything but glory."[3]

Within two weeks the war was petering out for lack of any general engagement of the enemy. From Fort Willshire the army had advanced to the skirl of bagpipes into a country which one observer found very beautiful, better than anything in the Colony.[4] But, as the diarist said, "Our route was distinctly marked by the towering columns of smoke issuing from the blazing huts, which had been fired by the rear guard." These huts may not have been very elaborate, but they were the only homes that most of their owners possessed, and were reckoned by a missionary to be worth one bullock, or more than a year's labour, so were not to be destroyed with

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[1] To Juana, April 1, "Tom Fool's Day". Autobiography, p.729. Even after allowing for the irony in the final words these sentences reveal a callous, professional approach to the sorry business of administering their own medicine to the Xhosa which was all too typical of soldier Smith.

[2] April 12. Ibid., p.732. In a footnote (III, p.129) Cory refers to reductions in estimates of cattle captured: 15,000 was later scaled down to 9,000, while Boyce reduced another figure from 60,000 to 30,000. It was easy for untrained eyes to exaggerate the numbers of swaying, two-horned heads!

[3] Theal, Documents, p.312.

[4] From an unsigned letter, possibly written by Lt. C.T.Bailie who was killed in action on June 26, and addressed to Alexander Jardine of Cape Town from Butterworth, April 8. Long, Goldswain Chronicle, pp.133,134. The date is inaccurate, since the British forces did not cross the Kei until April 15,16.

impunity.[1] Furthermore, if a chief's home were burned, something of real value was given to the flames, for, according to the above diarist, some of them were fine buildings, having three or four rooms, and were capable of holding thirty or forty people.[2] To this extent were the Xhosa paid back in their own coin, since they had worked similar havoc in the Colony. But still the army could not manoeuvre the enemy into a face-to-face encounter, with the result that the troops tasted very little fighting. Casualties were therefore extremely light. From March 30 to April 13 the British forces suffered only 3 killed and 11 wounded.[3] This was not war as known to veterans of Wellington's Peninsula campaigns, and D'Urban was disappointed at not fighting a pitched battle, while his second-in-command confessed that "the little excitement there was in the warfare has subsided, now that we have no enemy and I cannot make my little patrols. I have no ambition to be a Smithfield Market drover".[4] In addition, there was friction between several high-ranking officers of the inadequately occupied army. The Governor's caution continually irked the dashing cavalier who served immediately under him, and co-operation must have been difficult for both men.[5] Worse was Col. Peddie's antipathy for Smith because it did not possess the saving grace of the mutual tolerance that enabled D'Urban and Smith to work together in spite of their differences. Peddie appeared to be disgruntled at Smith's promotion over his own head,

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[1] Rev. P. Hallbeck, head of the Moravian Missions in South Africa, before the Aborigines Committee. IBB VII.539, p.338.

[2] Goldswain Chronicle, p.135. [3] IBB XXXIX.279, p.36.

[4] Smith to Juana, April 13. Autobiography, p.733.

[5] Smith found it ever hard to endure D'Urban's slow orthodoxy: "I am half afraid Master is only to go to the Gonubie tomorrow—six miles—and halt the next day. Such slow work is quite dreadful. Last night I had a regular fight with him. He funked dividing the army—nay, actually gave it up for all I could do or say. I was perfectly mortified. However, in the middle of the night he changed his mind, and I had it all my own way." To Juana, April 11. Autobiography, p.731.

and was consequently ready to quarrel with most of Smith's policies and actions. D'Urban did his paternal best to reconcile his two subordinates, but with little success, and their incompatibility must have caused him sorrow and have weakened his chain of command.[1] Another problem in human relationships was posed by Somerset who did not always measure up to D'Urban's standard of military efficiency and, to his own pique, earned his general's rebuke.[2] By June, the Governor was complaining, in a confidential letter to his secretary John Bell:

> In three or four days ... I shall proceed to Grahamstown [from King William's Town] where, entre nous, it is high time I should make my appearance, for it is impossible to conceive the imbecility of the instruments I am obliged to act with there, as well at the head (to speak confidentially to you) of the Military as of the Civil Departments. In a word, neither Campbell [Civil Commissioner] nor Somerset are [sic] equal to their duties,[3] and being on bad terms with each other, they counteract, as far as may be, the little good which either might otherwise do.[4]

He then describes the Somerset-Campbell feud as "this millstone which hangs round the neck of my measures". Many were the afflictions of the kind, patient, well-intentioned Governor!

2. Across the Kei. The army had moved out of Fort Willshire on March 31 and in a fan-like movement had driven the bulk of the Xhosa fighters before it into the mountains, while its commander had slowly advanced his headquarters to the left bank of the Buffalo, to the site of Brownlee's station among the Ntinde. There was no prospect of staging a pitched battle with the enemy. By their continual retreat the tribes had apparently admitted defeat, but when, many weeks later, attempts were made

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[1] Peddie's grievances crop up in the Governor's correspondence from April 10 to Aug. 14. D'Urban Papers.

[2] D'Urban to Somerset, March 11 and April 4. Ibid.

[3] Yet Smith said, a propos his January command in Grahamstown: "No man was ever better seconded and supported in every way than I was by Capt. Campbell." Autobiography, p.376.

[4] D'Urban at King William's Town to Bell at Cape Town, June 2. Theal, Documents, p.197.

to negotiate with them, the chiefs refused to accept that verdict since they had not been beaten in the field. But both Soga and Theal maintain that the Ciskeian Bantu were defeated in this first reach of the campaign, [1] in which case it might be argued, in company with Soga, that the British forces, having accomplished their mission, could have retired at least behind the Keiskamma. But such action was never for a moment contemplated by the European command. D'Urban and his staff had long since decided to carry the war at least as far as the Kei, and further if necessary. As early as January 9 such a plan was being discussed in colonial military circles. Major C.C. Mitchell, with whom Frederick Rex was going to Grahamstown, said

> that to give the Caffres what they deserve and what he will be delighted to give them we will have to go to the —— [blank] River more than half way between this [Port Elizabeth] and Natal, in which case I cannot expect to be back in less than a month or perhaps two month ...[2]

This anticipation of governmental policy was confirmed by Boyce's explanation of the Governor's plans:

> From the beginning of the war, the grand measure to which Sir Benjamin appears to have looked for ensuring permanent peace and security on the frontier, was the extension of British jurisdiction on the Kei. That his was no sudden thought, is evident from His Excellency's statement [?] and from the fact that his intentions in this respect were generally known in the colony, even so early as the end of January 1835; and previous to his arrival on the eastern frontier. The measure itself was no afterthought, suggested by "interested Colonists" but was planned by His Excellency.[3]

At first sight it may be difficult to believe that D'Urban in Cape Town, before following Smith to Grahamstown, had already decided, however tentatively, to extend the colonial boundary to the Kei. But belief is

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[1] J.H.Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, p.179; Theal IV, p.23, emphasizes that Xhosa resistance had ended by April 10.

[2] F.Rex to his father, George Rex, from Port Elizabeth, Jan. 9. The reference is clearly to the Kei, even though its name is omitted in the above letter.

[3] Boyce, Notes, p.30. Boyce could appeal to the Governor's own confidential orders to Smith: "Its [the invasion's] object, to advance beyond the Great Kye River, and to conclude its operations in the country of Hintze ... perhaps to the Bashee." Feb. 22. IBB XXXIX.279, p.26.

easier when it is remembered that there had long been military and settler agitation for the removal of the frontier further eastward. Those charged with frontier defence, including Col. Somerset and his predecessors, had frequently expressed their conviction that the Fish River boundary was indefensible owing to the thick bush that lined both its banks, and had asked for a more easily guarded border. At first, the Keiskamma was regarded as a satisfactory substitute, but the recent invasion would have convinced Sir Benjamin of its unsuitability, and it is quite possible that advisers had already mentioned the desirability of the distant Kei as the eastern frontier of an enlarged colony. There need be no doubt, then, that the idea of extension to the Kei had taken root in the Governor's mind before he ever set foot in Albany. It is unlikely, however, that Smith was acquainted with his master's thinking on this subject for he was at great pains to make, for him, a closely-reasoned cautious approach to the topic, and then was one long jump behind D'Urban on the matter:

> It is of the greatest importance that the Country immediately beyond the Frontier should be perfectly open, not presenting any of those irregularities of surface and extensive bush Forest which preclude the possibility of closing the present Boundary line against Kaffir marauders. This is indeed absolutely indispensable, for it is evident that Christian principles of conduct which they are taught by their religious Instructors are disregarded whenever an opportunity presents itself for indulging their unconquerable propensity to commit robbery and murder on their neighbours. I would therefore recommend the Buffalo River form the future boundary of the Colony, that river being free from bush ...[1]

Some four days after this carefully-worded recommendation, Smith was again urging an enlargement of the Colony:

> ... to afford future security to the distressed inhabitants of this district, it will be necessary to include within our future boundary line a large portion of the country which is now occupied by treacherous and murderous savages, a proposition to which effect I have already received from the Caffre chief Macomo, and which I shall have the honour to pay before your Excellency ...[2]

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, from Grahamstown, Jan. 14. Theal, Documents, p.13.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, from Grahamstown, IBB XXXIX, 50.252, p.134.

On coldly practical grounds Smith's argument could be defended, and there have been many since his time who have excused progressive seizure of territory by reference to the weakness of earlier frontiers. In recent times both Russia and China have explained their absorption of others' land in similar terms of self-defence, but half the world has condemned their actions. And at the time of Smith's first suggestions there was no thought of establishing a mandate over occupied territory: the projected move was an expansion of the Colony by an advancement of its eastern boundary and a consequent pushing back of the indigenous peoples into a country that was not their own. And to those who question the morality of power politics it is strange reasoning which says that the solution to the black man's protests against your taking large slices of his land is to seize even larger slices! Yet that is how both government and colonists justified their continual encroachment on Xhosa territory, and those who contested the policy were sneeringly labelled "philanthropists" or pilloried as traitors. In this instance, however, there is a faintly humorous facet to Smith's letters—he was actually lagging behind his chief! D'Urban's mind had already reached the Kei while that of his deputy had only crept as far as the Buffalo. It is improbable that much persuasion was needed to bring Smith into line with the Governor's thinking.

One of the troubles with such an expansionist policy was that it had no end. Its supporters were caught in a momentum of their own making and were unable to bring the movement to a halt at any predetermined line. This was illustrated not only in D'Urban's day but also in the administrations of his successors. Some twenty years after the time when Smith and his master were wrestling with their problems, Sir George Grey was working out his solutions to the frontier question and unconsciously demonstrating the probability of what the tribes had long feared would happen:

> He wanted to institute a positive, progressive native policy which would bring the frontier tribes under British rule and pacify them by civilising them and amalgamating them with the European settlers. A negative, defensive policy, he believed, would only invite a

> perpetual succession of frontier wars. His alternative was to defend the Cape frontier by extending it to Natal.[1]

And there we are faced with the logical outcome of the D'Urban-Smith policy —it took them further than they dreamt of, from the banks of the Fish River, over the Keiskamma, beyond the Kei, far away to Natal, and, if we bring the story up to date, to the Limpopo and beyond. Neither D'Urban's nor Grey's schemes received Colonial Office support, however, and neither met with the success that its author had hoped for it.

But territorial considerations were not the only factors persuading the authorities of the need and the desirability of an advance to the Kei. The character and actions of Hintsa had long been mistrusted in the Colony, and not without cause. Since 1828 he had permitted Louis Trichardt to find refuge within his territory, and it was suspected that the two were plotting with the Ciskeian Xhosa against the Colony.[2] In July 1834 he seemed to have permitted, if he had not connived at, the murder of an English trader, William Purcell, for refusing to trade on a Sunday. Ayliff, the missionary in charge at Butterworth, reported the "unprovoked murder" to his superior, Shrewsbury at Grahamstown, in a letter dated July 13, the day after the deed. Shrewsbury, in turn, informed Duncan Campbell the Civil Commissioner, who passed the news to Cape Town. In subsequent correspondence it emerged that Purcell, a young man employed by one George Golden, a trader, had possibly incurred the enmity of the Gcaleka by beating one of their number, though this story was doubted by the missionaries. The murder seemed more likely to have resulted from greed, for the murderer demanded of the widow that she throw out all she had in the house, and when she had partially complied, he fled. The chiefs, Hintsa and Bhukru,

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[1] J.Rutherford, Sir George Grey, K.C.B., 1812-1898; A Study in Colonial Government. (London, 1961), p.292. An illuminating comparison can be drawn between the D'Urban and Grey administrations with the aid of Part III of Rutherford's work - "South Africa, 1854-1861".

[2] The report appears to be accepted by Walker, History, p.192. See also Macmillan, BBB, p.168.

appeared to act circumspectly. They declared their willingness to convict the assailant, and Bhukru offered the widow the chance to identify the criminal at a parade of all his men; but the poor woman refused the ordeal. Shepstone, who was well acquainted with the Butterworth district, "expressed his conviction that Hintza was the real murderer", and though he gave no evidence in support of his opinion, the idea gained currency in colonial circles and served to blacken the chief's character to a still greater degree. But Ayliff testified that both Hintsa and Bhukru exerted themselves to lay hold on the killer, and that one suspect was slain when the Gcaleka tried to capture him. Final satisfaction, however, seemed elusive, and on September 23 Ayliff wrote: "The whole of the painful business is involved in so much obscurity that I have not as yet been able to understand it ..."[1] There the matter rested, though the rancour and suspicion against Hintsa remained. The missionary believed that such a deed could only have been done if the people knew that it would gain the chief's tacit consent, and that its occurrence revealed Hintsa's anti-European sentiments, while the failure of the Colony to impose any punishment for the crime encouraged contempt for British authority. In retrospect, Godlonton, the editor of the Grahamstown Journal, saw the trouble that arose from the murder as inciting Hintsa to plot against the Colony;

> From this moment [of Purcell's murder] this chief [Hintsa] appears to have decided upon attacking the colony. To this end he removed shortly after the murder of Purcell, from his usual residence near Butterworth, to northward, toward the sources of the Kei, a position which afforded him the most perfect facility for carrying on without observation his nefarious schemes with the frontier chiefs for the devastation of the colony.[2]

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, pp.238-244; Boyce, Notes, p.16. The letters that passed between the missionaries and the government were included in D'Urban's despatch of 9 June 1836. But no satisfactory solution emerged from the correspondence that stretched over two months, and there was no evidence to convict Hintsa of complicity in the murder.

[2] R. Godlonton, Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, A.D. 1834-35, (Grahamstown, 1835-6), p.113. Most of the Methodists interpreted Hintsa's removal as an effort to escape the spiritual appeals made by Ayliff. WMM., 1835, p.960; SMM, p.155; Whiteside, History, pp.200,201. Boyce, however, gave weightier significance to the move, saying: "In this state of affairs, Lt. Sutton's and Ensign Sparks' patrols did not cause, but merely precipitate the war by a few months". Notes, p.20. But this was no more than an unwarranted assumption on Boyce's part.

This theory—it was nothing more—took firm hold of the official mind in spite of the absence of adequate supporting evidence. Hintsa was seen as the instigator of the Xhosa invasion, as the master mind behind the movements of Maqoma and Tyhali, as the profiteering director of a grand cattle-rustling campaign conducted from the remote safety of the Transkei. Yet when D'Urban sought for chapter and verse to substantiate his claim that the Gcaleka was behind all the trouble he had great difficulty in producing convincing evidence. He did secure the deposition of a Hottentot, Louis Arnolus, to the effect that many of Hintsa's people joined the invaders and that Hintsa directed the war, expecting the Kat River Hottentots to take part in it; but apart from that doubtful testimony there was much to modify the assumption of his responsibility for and participation in the hostilities. Capt. Armstrong wrote to Harry Smith on January 9, passing on the report that Hintsa had been willing to help the Ngqika but had withdrawn his offer on hearing rumours that the Mfecane were planning to attack him. The chief told Tyhali to fight his own battles and not to depend on him, Hintsa, who would not even allow captured cattle to cross the Kei.[1] Armstrong encouraged the chief in this attitude and promised English aid should the Mfecane threat materialize. Some two weeks later another message, in similar vein, was relayed to D'Urban to the effect that the chief remembered British help in 1828 "and had nothing in the least to say about the present invasion of the colony".[2] Further light on Gcaleka policy came from Tshatshu who, when asked by the Aborigines Committee, "Did Hintsa send any message?" replied, "Yes Hintsa sends his word to you, and Hintsa says you must not fight, for I do not fight".[3] When Maqoma was questioned in 1836 he insisted that the chief planned to stay neutral in the conflict while being quite ready to gain in cattle; and

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[1] Theal, Documents, p.90.

[2] Message given through D'Urban's emissary (infra, p.237), Van Wyk, Jan. 25. IBB XLIII. 503, p.213.

[3] IBB VII.538, p.564.

Hintsa's own chief councillor, Umzata, testified that both Trichardt and the chief decided to be neutral while encouraging the Xhosa who were actually engaged in the war.[1]

But the Governor could not go on hearsay: he needed first-hand information about Hintsa's position. Toward the end of January, soon after his own arrival in Grahamstown, he therefore sent Field Commandant van Wyk, who was well-known to the chief, to learn of his intentions, to find out what help he would render the Colony against the invaders, and to ask him to intercept all stolen cattle. It is not surprising that such a naif mission proved unsatisfactory: no leader in Hintsa's position could be anything less than evasive in the face of such enquiries. Neither did the situation improve with time for van Wyk's second mission, sent off during the first week of March to keep a watch on the chief and to report on his movements, failed to make contact with him and learned little apart from a Fingo report that the Gcaleka planned to assassinate the party should it come within his reach.[2] Van Wyk therefore returned to the Colony.

D'Urban, however, was not entirely dependent on military sources of information. The Wesleyans had had personal knowledge of Hintsa since August 1827, and must have built up the most accurate of all contemporary European estimates of the chief's character and policies. This knowledge must have been available to D'Urban in Grahamstown and it may be reasonably assumed that he made use of it there. In addition, the director of Butterworth mission, John Ayliff, who had had over four years of personal contact with Hintsa,[3] and was still at his post during January and February 1835, must have been in a better position to report on the Gcaleka situation than was any other white man. Mission work at Butterworth had never been easy,[4] and

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[1] Maqoma's deposition, taken at King William's Town, April 28, 1836; Umzata's, May 3, same year. IBB XLIII.503, pp.232,233. It would have been easy for both witnesses to have laid full blame for the war on Hintsa, who was then dead. That they did not yield to the temptation renders their testimony still more credible.

[2] Ibid., p.213; Cory III, pp.116-119. [3] Supra, p.99. [4] Supra, pp. 81-87.

was too urgent to ignore. Ayliff and his family packed a few belongings in a wagon and fled to Clarkebury the next day and there remained until rescued by colonial forces. Hintsa, balked of his prey, wreaked his vengeance on the mission buildings without completely destroying them since enough of Ayliff's house was still standing two months later for an observer to describe it as "a very fine one".[1]

Under such circumstances it is understandable that the Methodists were prepared to believe in Hintsa's complicity in the original attack on the Colony and in his readiness to join his fellow-countrymen when the propitious hour struck.[2] The news out of Butterworth would also confirm colonial suspicions concerning Hintsa's involvement in the war and would be used to justify the Governor's intention of advancing the frontier to the Kei and of entering the Transkei if necessary. That such use was made of Hintsa's deeds and words is abundantly clear from contemporary records and later comment. Alexander describes the chief as "the prime mover of the invasion of the colony".[3] Godlonton saw him as having planned the invasion at least five months before its outbreak, and the Grahamstown Journal naturally reflected its editor's view.[4] Theal and Cory agreed on the theme,[5] and most subsequent writers have followed the lead so strongly given them. Not until Macmillan (1929) and Soga (1931) are reputable voices raised in protest against the assumption of Hintsa's "guilt", and in condemnation of the policy that arose from that assumption. Macmillan believed that Cory was mistaken in saying that Hintsa was the "chief instigator of all the

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[1] From the letter referred to in Note 4 , p.228.

[2] W.J.Davis was already convinced of Hintsa's hostile intentions. Grahamstown Journal, March 13. Ayliff said, "I have reason to think that Hintsa's tribe will openly join the enemy". Ibid., April 3. Shrewsbury carried his perceptions to the ridiculous extreme of recording that "four years prior to the outbreak, Hintsa was privately acquainting himself with the use of the musket"! Memorials, p.402.

[3] Narrative II, p.129.

[4] Supra, p.235.

[5] Theal IV, pp.24,25; Cory III, pp.53,54.

there were signs that Hintsa's tolerance of Ayliff was coming to an end during the early weeks of 1835. In January he moved back to Butterworth and placed one of his principal men in charge of the mission, though he had earlier refused Ayliff's request for protection. Colonial observers judged that the return to Butterworth was prompted by fear that arose from three sources—the withdrawal of the Boers (Louis Trichardt's party), the effectiveness of Cox's attack on Ngono's kraal, and the number of Xhosa casualties in the few blows struck by the Colony.[1] The same fears probably intensified his dislike of the missionary and goaded him into the open hostility that was reported by Ayliff and published in the Grahamstown Journal of February 20:

> ...of late the conduct of Hintsa almost amounts to an open avowal of his hostility. ... The Missionary station has been several times plundered, and on the people residing there attempting to resist, Hintsa's people turned out to fight. No disguise is made of Colonial cattle entering that country. It is said that when the commando [that is, D'Urban's invasion force] enters Kaffirland, the Kaffir force now on the Frontier is to fall back upon Hintsa, who is preparing for a determined resistance.

For some time the missionary had felt a measure of safety, even in the face of violence, since the Fingos had pledged themselves to defend him and white traders against Hintsa's hostility, and had offered to act as messengers between him and the British forces. They kept him informed about the chief's movements, so there was little danger of a surprise attack on the mission.[2] Yet the warning that possibly saved the missionary's life came not from a Fingo but from Hintsa's great wife, Nonsa, who secretly went to Ayliff on the night of February 16 and told him: "There is a snake in the grass and you will not see it until you tread on it. Take warning and go."[3] In view of an earlier report that her husband had said to his warriors, "Don't touch the missionary. I've got my assegais ready for him",[4] the later counsel

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, Feb. 6, and A.Steedman, Wanderings II, p.340.

[2] J.Ayliff and J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, pp.24,25; Steedman, Wanderings, II, pp.349,350.

[3] Ayliff and Whiteside, op.cit., p.25. [4] Whiteside, History, p.201.

mischief" since he was too remote from the locus of invasion; and, furthermore, that D'Urban's sending of the Van Wyk mission was culpable in that it extended the sphere of operations and drew Hintsa into the maelstrom of frontier conflicts when he might have remained on the periphery.[1] Soga, who may here be quoted not as an unbiased authority but as a representative of Xhosa opinion, stated that "the Gcalekas, on their part, had nothing to do with this war and yet the Governor determined to implicate them in it."[2] Without doubt, this is too partisan a claim for all evidence points to the fact that the tribe did have something to do with the war in that some of its members joined in the invasion of the Colony, its territory was a kraal for the reception of stolen colonial cattle, its chief and peoples openly sympathized with the Xhosa cause, and revealed hostility to the whites. Yet Soga's statement may be defended on the score that there was no official declaration of war by the Gcaleka, and they did not throw all their considerable weight into open support of their neighbours. It may indeed be claimed that they did no more than many a neutral had done in European wars. Furthermore, Soga accurately analyzed D'Urban's mental processes in respect of the Gcaleka when he wrote of his being "determined to implicate them" in the war. The only way the Governor could justify his march to the Kei and his invasion of Hintsa's domain was to prove that Hintsa's was the hidden hand behind the whole Xhosa campaign. The advisability of less drastic action did not seem to enter his mind, though he could have advanced to the Kei and have demanded redress of colonial grievances against the Gcaleka. Had this been done without success, then could D'Urban have crossed the river with some semblance of justice. But the more patient course was not taken. The Governor was intent on condemning Hintsa before he had been fairly heard, and in this self-imposed task D'Urban had loyal help from official, colonist, and missionary who undoubtedly thought they were presenting a true picture of Hintsa's

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[1] BBB, pp.109,110.

[2] South-Eastern Bantu, p.173.

acts and intentions but who were all the time looking at a many-sided situation from one angle—the colonial—only.

That there was any other legitimate point of view seems never to have occurred to responsible makers of white opinion; yet those who wished to be just should certainly have made room in their thinking for a study of the reverse side of the picture, the Xhosa outlook on the war. That this was rarely if ever done was one of the major tragedies of the conflict, and the repeated failure of succeeding white generations to consider the African view point has intensified the bitterness born of 1835.

A contemporary Methodist commentator, clearly trying to be just, made the following observation:

> But of whatever Makomo and his brother Tyalie might have to complain, in respect to the policy pursued by theColonial Government, Hintza had no personal grievance to be redressed. His territories were too remote to suffer any incursions from the Colony.[1]

From a very restricted point of view, this was fair comment, but it failed to appreciate the position in which Hintsa found himself in 1834/35. For fifteen years he had watched Europeans strengthening their hold on the Fish River boundary while they claimed to exercise authority over the Neutral Territory. He had seen traders and missionaries plant pockets of white influence throughout Kaffraria and, in common with many another native ruler, he viewed both classes of men as agents of the colonial power.[2] He may have had no "personal grievance to be redressed", but he had ample cause for fear that the passing of a few years would bring the insatiable white man on to his own doorstep and even inside his house. When, therefore, Maqoma and Tyhali proposed to attack the Colony, he could not be other than sympathetic. He might have doubted their chances of success, and have cautiously refrained from declaring himself until he had seen which way

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[1] WMM 1835, p.960.

[2] Ayliff to D'Urban, from Grahamstown, 19 June 1835. IBB XLIII. 503, p.228.

the tide of war would turn, but his race, his territorial position, his chieftainly responsibilities forbade him to wish them anything less than victory against those who threatened to engulf first his fellow Xhosa and then his own Gcaleka people. It would have been poor statesmanship on his part to have stood idly by while the land-hungry Colony swallowed his neighbours. He knew that once the Ciskeian tribes were reduced, his turn would come next, and if he could only have lived until the later decades of the century, what justification he would have found for his fears! The post-1835 record of Briton and Boer in the annexation of Bantu territory vindicates the native nationalists whose instincts, however dimly, told them to resist the advance of the white juggernaut that rolled relentlessly over the only lands that they, the black men, knew as home.

The above defence of Hintsa's stand involves no starry-eyed claims concerning his integrity. In European terms he was a savage, unacquainted with the etiquette of continental diplomacy, uninstructed in the lore of international protocol. He showed himself to be cunning, shifty, evasive. He played a cautious hand, standing somewhat aloof from the conflict, ready to secure the utmost gain at the minimum loss—but what European power would not have acted similarly? To expect differently is to expect more of the Xhosa than of those who boasted of their superiority over him. It is unjust to insist on Hintsa's savagery on the onehand, and with the other to demand of him civilized conduct. Nor is it fair to judge him only from the white man's standpoint: he must be viewed against his Transkeian background. When needful adjustments have been made in the thinking of those who condemn the Gcaleka's approach to the war the black man may assume a lighter hue while his opponents grow somewhat darker, and resultant judgments will deal in half-tones rather than extremes of black and white.

But in April 1835, confronted by the invasion of Albany and an enemy with whom they could not come to grips, D'Urban and his advisers were in no mood to make a calm appraisal of both sides of the frontier question. They

had already convinced themselves of Hintsa's guilt. In his despatch to the Secretary of State on March 19, theGovernor had stated: "Hintsa ... has been playing a double game"; and in his voluminous report to the Earl of Aberdeen on June 6 he elaborated his charge in the following words:

> ... early in the month of February, I ascertained beyond all doubt, that Hintsa ... had been, if not the original contriver and instigator of the combination among the chiefs of the savage tribes in western Caffreland against the colony, very early referred to and consulted by them therein; that he afforded them his countenance and advice; received into his territory the plundered herds and effects sent thither from the colony; permitted (if not directed) many of his own tribe to join in the invasion; and that, consequently, the border tribes in all their measures relied upon his support, and upon the ultimate refuge of his country in case of their failure.[1]

A more unrealistic indictment would be hard to imagine. What had D'Urban expected Hintsa to do other than the above? Would not the chief of the Gcaleka, occupying a position that approached to paramountcy, be "consulted" by closely-related and neighbouring tribes on the grave subject of war against the white man? Could he have been expected to counsel continued submission to white authority and endurance of accumulating grievances? Could any informed official have believed for a moment that the tribe would stay strictly neutral? Could those living east of the Kei have refused to permit the entrance of stolen cattle? Could Hintsa, who had shown no sympathy to the white man and his missions, have prevented (even had he wished) some of his people from joining the Ngqika and Ndlambe fighting men when Phatho, who came out on the colonial side, could not restrain an appreciable number of his men from taking part in the attack on Albany? And on what grounds could a chief have refused asylum to his fellows in case of need? He would just have been aiding the white man to absorb those who stood between him and the uncomfortably-near colonial boundary and would have hastened the day of his own submission to the Europeans.

But D'Urban had already made up his mind and formulated his plan. It was thus not difficult for him to ignore the Xhosa side of the question and

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[1] IEB XXXIX.279, p.15.

to see only "a chain of proofs" which, when accepted, conclusively established Hintsa's accountability and the need to deal with him militarily. At his camp on the Buffalo he was two-thirds of the way from Grahamstown to the Kei, and the remaining distance lay over relatively easy ground that could be covered rapidly.[1] On April 11, less than two weeks after the main exodus from Fort Willshire, headquarters moved from the King William's Town site in a north-easterly direction across the Gonubie to the place where Komgha stands today. The passage of the cumbersome military machine appears to have been unopposed. This was not surprising, for apart from the impressive show of strength which would have discouraged an attack, there was the fact that most of the Xhosa warriors had retreated into the Hathole fastnesses, and that the area between the Buffalo and the Kei was only thinly populated even under normal conditions. The army therefore made its way unopposed. Its progress was impeded, however, by internal disagreements between the commander and his principal officer. D'Urban wanted to plot his advance according to the most cautious tenets of military science; Smith was all for speed. The result was a compromise: D'Urban consented to move, and Smith contented himself by going ahead of the main body.

> ... I took care to be long before my time on horseback at his [D'Urban's] tent, with the advanced guard and my escort. He said with his usual politeness, "Pray, do not wait for me, Smith. Go on." The hint was quite enough. It was all I wanted...[2]

By 11 a.m. on April 15 the colonel was on the right bank of the Kei. The river was very low; the opposite hills were covered with Gcaleka and the plains with cattle.[3] When Smith greeted the assembled men they called back to him: "Hallo, English, do you know what river this is? This is

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[1] Smith hoped to be back on the Buffalo within 12 days. Autobiography, p.731. Forty-two days were to pass before he saw that camp again (May 23).

[2] To Juana, April 15. Ibid., p.735.

[3] Letter referred to in Note 4, p.228. "When we cross'd the River it was very shallow and stony, with some trouble I dare say one might have cross'd it dry, by jumping from stone to stone..."

Hintsa's country. What do you want here?" To this legitimate question, the English officer replied that they were coming to make Hintsa answer their former demands.[1] They were then entering Gcalekaland as friends: future relations depended on the inhabitants themselves. This was pure drum-beating, backed up by superior, fear-inspiring force; and it worked. The colonial forces crossed the river without opposition. It was an historic occasion: colonialism was taking yet another stride in the march that eventually took it to the Limpopo and beyond.

Under the illusory banner of friendship—for when had a foreign army entered a strange territory without the consent of its rulers and still merited the title of "friend"?—the mixed British forces climbed slowly up the left bank of the river. The operation took several hours due to the steep slopes that confronted them. Two span of oxen were needed to haul one wagon, and movement must have been snail-like. What an opportunity for sniping attacks by the Gcaleka, but there was none. The army rolled on its deliberate way, camped first at Shaw Fountain until April 17, then moved to Butterworth to await Hintsa's reply to the latest demands that D'Urban had by then placed before him. During the ensuing wait the weather, which had been favourable to the expedition, deteriorated. A violent thunderstorm blew down the general's tent and those of many of his officers; troops were soaked to the skin and were cold; a reduction to half-rations left them complaining and dispirited. It was clear that the year's best campaigning days were over.[2] But the patient D'Urban waited until the 20th, observing his pledge of non-belligerency in the hope of receiving a satisfactory reply from Hintsa. When no word came, the truce was extended to the 24th and when that date brought no response from the chief the period

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[1] Surra, p.237.

[2] Grahamstown Journal, April 24 reported: "The weather during the past week has been as severe as any ever remembered at this period of the year. Much rain has fallen, whilst the wind has been piercingly cold. ... We may now reasonably expect a continuance of cold weather for the next four months."

of "friendly" occupation ended and the army took up its arms with a view to enforcing the settlement that diplomacy had failed to achieve.

3. Evacuation of Transkeian Missions. But British interests were not limited to Gcalekaland. The 1828 expedition, the extension of the Wesleyan chain of stations, and the bold experiments of traders had enlarged colonial horizons until they passed the Mzimvubu and embraced Natal, making the authorities aware of Transkeian politics. With some justification the claim could be made that D'Urban could hardly have avoided involvement towards Natal since the possible fate of British subjects would have obliged him to take some action in that area. But that remains somewhat hypothetical. A less dubitable point is that, having once crossed the Kei he could not limit his attention to Hintsa; he was bound to take cognizance of the tribes that lay still further north and east.

It was February 17 when Ayliff escaped from Butterworth and took refuge at Clarkebury in Thembuland.[1] With him went 49 other men, women and children, all of whom found shelter under Fadana, regent for Mtirara the son of Vusani.[2] The arrival of the missionary-trader party must have preceded by only a few days the receipt of letters from the Governor to Fadana and his Wesleyan missionary, W.J.Davis, for on February 21 D'Urban wrote to both men for the purpose of securing Thembu friendship toward the Colony in its struggle against the Xhosa incursions. Using Davis as his intermediary, he sent three tiger (leopard?) skins to the chief—"with the expression of my good feeling towards him, and of my belief in his friendly professions towards the Colony". In return he expected Fadana to fulfil the promise of loyalty that had been made through the missionary, which suggests that there had

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[1] Supra, pp.238,239.

[2] Supra, p.124. The figure for the fugitive party is given by Davis, May 29, at Grahamstown. WMM 1835, p.709. Among the refugees were four traders who later thanked Ayliff for the safety he had enabled them to enjoy. WMM 1836, p.945.

already been an interchange of views between the two parties. To Davis himself, the Governor wrote, in part: "I avail myself of your (comparatively) near neighbourhood to Facoo [sic], chief of the Amapondas," and asked the missionary to be his emissary in quest of Mpondo allegiance to the colonial cause. Whatever may have been official opinion concerning the efficacy and desirability of mission work, the authorities were rarely averse to making use of the missionaries when the need arose. But D'Urban was thoughtful enough to add to his letter the assurance: "Whatever expenses may be incurred by you in this or any other service to the general cause, I will cause to be immediately repaid."[1] The Wesleyans proved to be acceptable agents and for this the Governor gave them credit saying, in his despatch to Aberdeen, that through their efforts the "tribes [Thembu and Mpondo] now remain upon excellent terms of reciprocal amity and good understanding with us."[2]

Those who had fled from Butterworth to Clarkebury soon found that Hintsa was not the only source of trouble. One month after their arrival among the Thembu, Ayliff was writing of

> the alarming intelligence that the Ficani were descending from the mountains a short distance in the rear, and attacking the tribes under the Chiefs Tooboo and Doko [?]. As soon as this was communicated to the Europeans on the spot, several traders proceded to the scene of action for the purpose of assisting the Tambookies in repelling the enemy.[3]

The raiders turned out to be the Bhaca under Ncaphayi. Their attack was serious, annihilating smaller sections of the Thembu people and threatening the security of the main body of the tribe. But, strengthened by the presence and the guns of the traders, the Thembu held off their enemy in an action that saw one trader, Rawlins, killed. The Bhaca temporarily

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[1] Theal, Documents, pp.71,72.

[2] Despatch, 19 June, 1835. IBB XXXIX,279, p.17. At no time did D'Urban require Fadana or Faku to take an active part in the war in proof of their adherence to the colonial cause. See Cory III, pp.119,120.

[3] Quoted by A. Steedman, Wanderings, II, p.351.

retired, but the Europeans believed they would soon return and attempt to subdue the Thembu nation.[1] Thus a further complication entered the Transkeian scene and an additional pressure was brought to bear upon the Thembu and their neighbours, the Mpondo. If the Xhosa were driven over the Kei they would be bound to pile up against the other tribes, to the discomfort of the latter.[2] There is nothing to substantiate Godlonton's suspicion[3] that the Xhosa were incollusion with the Bhaca: the coincidence of their movements toward the Thembu was probably fortuitous, that of the Bhaca arising from Zulu-inspired pressure on their own northern flank. Nevertheless, Ncaphayi could be depended on to take advantage of the ferment to press in upon the Thembu, who would thus be caught between the upper and nether millstones. Under such circumstances, elementary diplomacy would suggest the advisability of Fadana's being on good terms with the Colony, the only possible source of aid against his Bantu assailants, actual and potential. This realistic assessment of the situation may appear to weaken the Methodist claim that it was their influence that drew the Thembu and Mpondo to the British side,[4] but the facts are that realism and Methodism pointed in the

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[1] A. Steedman, Wanderings, II, p.351, and Theal IV, p.20.

[2] This danger was foreseen by the Thembu and reported to D'Urban by Ayliff, about March 18. Further possible repercussions were also studied: "There is a point arising out of this attack [Ncaphayi's] which is calculated to excite some apprehension at the present moment, the possibility of there being some collision between Capaai and the Caffre Chiefs engaged in hostilities against the Colony. Should this be the case, the whole of the tribes from the Colonial frontier to the Zoolas would most likely be thrown into commotion, and the present war in that case protracted to a date yet very distant." Quoted by Steedman, Wanderings II, p.353. This threat never materialized due to the recoil of the Xhosa tribes in the face of superior forces.

[3] Grahamstown Journal, 3 April 1835.

[4] A typical statement was embodied in a report to the W.M.M.S. in December 1835: "The fact, however it may be accounted for, cannot be denied, that the two whole nations of the Amatembu and the Amapondos, to which the Wesleyan Missionaries had carried the Gospel, and that of the Amakosa, or Kaffer Chiefs, excepting Hinza, among whom the Society had carried on its missionary operations, have remained at peace, though greatly urged by the hostile chiefs to embark in their cause." WMM, 1835, p.959. It may be noted that this claim does not quite square with the facts: the Ndlambe people, among whom the Society had been working for nine years at Mount Coke, joined the Ngqika in the attack upon the Colony. Wesleyan sources are singularly reticent on this matter, and appeared to leave it out of their reckoning when discussing missions and the war.

same direction for these two tribes. Their chiefs had accepted the missionaries[1] and, in the absence of other extensive experience, had been favourably disposed toward the race they represented. Now, in a time of crisis, they were ready to accept military help from forces that ordinarily constituted no threat to their own sovereignty. The missionaries, at the same time, were ready to welcome the arrival of their fellow-countrymen to rescue them from situations that were tending to slip beyond their own control. Events conspired to lead both the chiefs and the missionaries into welcoming the British advance, and to cast the missionaries in the rôle of liaison officers between the tribes and the European forces. It is difficult to see how the missionaries could have played any other part since they could hardly have stood by and seen their parishioners crushed either by retreating Xhosa or advancing Bhaca.

On this occasion the missionaries did not initiate the plan to remove them into the Colony, although they were eventually willing to profit from any opportunity that arose for their temporary retirement from a deteriorating situation. On or about March 18, Ayliff wrote to D'Urban concerning conditions at Clarkebury where he had been since February 17:

> By this conveyance we forward a memorial to the Governor on behalf of Fadana, (the Tambookie chief), praying for assistance to punish Capaai [Ncaphayi] . The traders, who are with their families thirty in number, besides drivers and leaders of waggons, also send a second memorial, for an armed force to remove them from this place to the Colony, through the upper part of Hinza's country. Should this be granted, we purpose, in conjunction with our brethren from Morley and Buntingville, to remove into the Colony until these troubles shall have subsided.[2]

From this letter three distinct points emerge. Fadana, doubtless under missionary guidance, but in harmony with the Governor's own letter of February 21,[3] formally asked the Colony for aid against the Bhaca. If

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[1] Supra, pp.123,130,131.

[2] Quoted by Steedman, Wanderings, II, pp.352,353. According to Ayliff, there were 11 traders on Clarkebury station at that time.

[3] Supra, p.246.

he had wished, D'Urban could have made some use of this request to justify his crossing of the Kei, but he did not do so, possibly because he recognized that he could not have chased over Southern Africa in answer to any and every call that might have reached him from distressed chiefs whose territory lay well beyond the colonial frontier. The second memorial, coming from British subjects, presumably carried a stronger moral appeal regardless of the legality or otherwise of the traders' residence so far afield from the Colony, and D'Urban would be unlikely to ignore such a petition. The third point was the missionaries' recognition of the temporary uselessness of their remaining at their posts should the Colony evacuate the traders and send military assistance to the Thembu. As events worked out it would seem that they could have stayed on their respective stations without incurring greater dangers than those through which they had already passed, but none could know that at the time, and a temporary withdrawal seemed a wise move. As soon as they were able to gauge the situation calmly, however, they were all, without exception, eager to return and chafed under the restraining hand of officialdom.

Ayliff's letter takes added significance from the fact that it was written in the middle of March, nearly two weeks before D'Urban left Fort Willshire. Fadana had made his decision and thrown his lot in with the Colony more than one month before white troops had encamped at Butterworth. He had also, according to the same letter, given tangible evidence of his sympathy with the colonists by collecting all the stolen cattle (admittedly few in number) that Ndlambe people had tried to conceal in his country, and was ready to return these into European hands. This friendly attitude continued through ensuing weeks and was confirmed by Davis on April 21 in a letter to the Governor. By then, the colonial leanings of the Thembu had deepened Hintsa's enmity toward them, but Fadana was anxious to be recognized as an ally of the English and not to be confounded with the tribes who were at open or covert war with the Europeans. The chief even expressed

a desire to move nearer the Colony. In his eagerness to escape the attentions of the Bhaca, he failed to consider that he might have been jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire. The genuine nature of his amity toward the English was never seriously in doubt, however. On April 22 a group of twenty-five traders who had found refuge with him at Clarkebury publicly expressed their gratitude to the chief for the fact that he had taken no advantage of their distress, he had encouraged his people to bring them food, and he had ensured that they should suffer no loss of property while in his country.[1] On the same occasion they acknowledged their indebtedness to the missionary:

> To the Rev. Mr. Davis and family we have to state, that as a gentleman and a christian minister, he received us with open arms at this place, gave shelter to four of our families, and used his utmost endeavour to render our circumstances comfortable.

Here was an illustration of constructive mission work within the framework of one tribal unit. The missionary had won the confidence of the chief and his councillors, he had bolstered the morale of the people and was standing by them during the emergency, his influence had led to the offer of sanctuary to a considerable group of whites whose lives would otherwise have been endangered. No matter how strong Fadana's pro-colonial interests may have been, it is doubtful if they would have created such a favourable climate for both Thembu and trader had the missionary not been there.

A similar situation developed at Morley where Palmer was serving the Bomvana, and is depicted in the missionary's own report:

> ... the whole of the tribes connected with the station refused to join Hintsa, and the other Kaffirs, in their war with the colony; they manifested the greatest possible desire to be considered the friends of the colony, and declared that no evil should come upon me, unless it came upon them first. This gave me confidence in them; but as we were not more than 25 miles from some of the clans belonging to Hintsa, I saw that it was necessary to be on our guard, notwithstanding the faithfulness of our immediate neighbours; and accordingly persons were appointed to watch every night. ... During the whole of January, February, and March, we were in this state of

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[1] Published in the Grahamstown Journal, May 8.

anxiety, not knowing what our troops were doing (there being no communication with the colony).[1]

English traders wanted Palmer to accompany them on their withdrawal into the Colony by a circuitous route, but the missionary preferred to remain at his post while they went as far as Clarkebury. He stayed at Morley until D'Urban sent troops to evacuate Europeans from Clarkebury. At that critical juncture, the Wesleyan consulted the chiefs around the mission station, and he only left after they had urged him to go and acquaint the Governor with their situation. They were prepared to move rather than be swept into hostilities against the Colony. They were thus conforming to the pattern set by their more numerous Thembu neighbours.

The conduct of Faku, the Mpondo chief, was not quite so unequivocal. He was subject to the same Bhaca pressure as the Thembu, but was far enough from the Kei not to be immediately concerned about dangers arising from a Xhosa retreat over that river. He therefore wavered, unable to settle his policy toward the Colony. This vacillation affected his treatment of his missionary, Satchell, and led Davis to report as late as April 19 that his conduct had not been so favourable as in previous weeks. Satchell, indeed, had heard a rumour that the Mpondo chief was planning to destroy Buntingville and Morley.[2] This information reached Grahamstown in a garbled form and led the Journal to credit Ncaphayi with designs against the two missions; but, as the paper remarked, such rumours had been circulating for three years. Against these doubts of Faku's intentions there stands Henry Fynn's declaration that the chief was faithful to the British in spite of Hintsa's efforts to persuade him to join the Xhosa cause. Fynn went so far as to state, with reference to his attitude toward the Colony: "Faku, to my knowledge of him during the space of twelve years, has always acted on the strictest principles of justice".[3] There is no evidence that the chief was anti-

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[1] WMM 1835, p.708.

[2] IBB XLIII.503, p.225.

[3] Deposition at King William's Town, April 28. Ibid., p.232.

European. His efforts to hinder Satchell from joining his colleagues at Clarkebury appear to have sprung from a genuine desire to keep the missionary by him, possibly because of the prestige and safety value of having a white man under his care. When, at last, he did release the missionary it was on condition that his assistant Tainton and family should remain at Buntingville.[1] That Satchell and his fellows felt few qualms at leaving Tainton behind is persuasive testimony that conditions in that part of the country were more stable than was generally imagined. D'Urban, however, did not feel quite so happy on the matter, and instructed Fynn, as his representative, to attach Tainton to himself in a subordinate capacity and to bring him away should, he, Fynn, ever leave the Mpondo people.[2]

While awaiting Hintsa's tardy reply to his ultimatum, D'Urban at Butterworth had some time to consider the predicament of those British subjects whose situations have just come under review. Their plight led him on April 22 to instruct Capt. Warden to effect the evacuation of 65 families from Clarkebury. It was estimated that 365 people would need removal: before the operation was over, 613 had been brought away. As has been seen, the request for removal did not originate with the missionaries, some of whom would have preferred to have continued their work, but the Governor spoke of "their further stay in these countries being for the present at once utterly useless to the cause of religion, and very perilous to themselves".[3] Warden was therefore told to take 50 soldiers, and some of the more than one thousand Fingos who had volunteered for service against the Xhosa, for the purpose of escorting the Clarkebury party to safety. The relief column left camp on the 23rd and covered the 45 miles to the

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[1] Satchell to Col. Smith, from Buntingville, April 29. Theal, Documents, p.139. There was some confusion of names, for Satchell's assistant is referred to as "Hamilton", whereas the artisan at Buntingville was a Mr.Tainton. Cp. Sunn, p.131.

[2] D'Urban to Fynn, May 6. Theal, Documents, p.146.

[3] D'Urban at his headquarters on the Dabakayi, May 3. IBB XXXIX.279, p.31.

mission by the following day. On arrival they found that over six hundred people would be ready to return with them into the Colony. The waiting group was of a mixed character. Four missionary families accounted for 14 souls, three artisan households added another 13, 16 trader families supplied 38 persons, while 24 Hottentots and 524 natives brought the total to 613 individuals.[1] Traders far outnumbered missionaries, and both classes of Britishers were eclipsed by the surprising number of natives who were seizing the opportunity to exchange what they considered to be the uncertainties of tribal life for the expected safety of British protection. Seventy-one of the Bantu came from Clarkebury, 87 from Buntingville, 150 from Butterworth, and 216 from Morley. Since they were described as "residents" of the missions, it may be assumed that they were attached to the Wesleyan establishments and were following their respective missionaries in their withdrawal. According to Davis, there were only eight wagons at the disposal of this multitude, among whom were numbered 21 white families. It may have been that the traders had abandoned their stores so hurriedly that they had travelled light, leaving the missionaries as suppliers of transport for them all.

At the time of Warden's arrival, Satchell and his ten-week old child had not reached Clarkebury from Buntingville, but it was decided to await their coming. The military utilized the delay to scour the surrounding countryside, and in one engagement clashed with Hintsa's men on the Mbhashe and took about 4,000 head of cattle from them. Warden also investigated Fadana's attitude toward the Colony, and found him ready to call out 5,000 men against Hintsa's forces. This was 5,000 more than D'Urban had hoped or planned for, since he had only asked for Thembu moral support, short of military aid. But Warden believed the offer to be genuine, as well he might since it represented sound military policy on Fadana's part.[2] The

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[1] Official Report, IBB XXXIX.279, p.38.

[2] Warden to D'Urban from Clarkebury, April 26. Theal, Documents, p.136.

course of the war, however, made it unnecessary for the offer to be tested.

In the meantime a letter from D'Urban, asking for the release of Palmer and Satchell, had been delivered to Faku. Palmer had already left his station and arrived at Clarkebury a few hours before Warden; but the letter may have helped Satchell to get away from Buntingville for he joined his colleagues within a few days, and enabled the evacuation from Clarkebury to begin on May 3.[1] The exodus of more than six hundred people over the Transkeian hills must have provided the Thembu with quite a spectacle, while the superintendence of the long column of civilians must have kept Capt. Warden and his soldiers fully occupied. The 45-mile march was accomplished without opposition, however, and the evacuees reached the British camp near Butterworth on the night of the 5th and there remained until Col. Somerset and the 2nd Division left for Grahamstown on May 9.

The charge of ingratitude toward their rescuers has been levelled against the missionaries who were escorted to safety during the 1835 war. The principal source of the accusation was undoubtedly Harry Smith who, not without cause, believed the L.M.S. and G.M.S. workers to be ungrateful for their deliverance under Major Cox in January.[2] The colonel's altruism shone with increased radiance against the alleged ingratitude of the "holy gentlemen", but no such foil was provided in the Clarkebury operation. Soon after their arrival in Grahamstown the combined body of Methodist clergy from over

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[1] D'Urban to W.J.Davis for Faku, Theal, Documents, p.130; WM 1835, pp.708,709.

[2] Supra, pp.196,197.Note 1. Alexander was at some pains to exclude the Wesleyans from the charge while castigating other missionaries who could only be L.M.S. and G.M.S. representatives among the Ngqika. "... certainly we had little cause to be satisfied with some of the missionaries, (not Wesleyans,) who were rescued at their earnest entreaty from Kaffirland. After they had been a little time in safety, they turned round on the military and said: 'We were in no danger among our flocks; we might have stayed longer in our vineyards, and in the field of our labours;' and this after they had declared that their lives were in hourly peril, and after great trouble and risk had been incurred in extricating them!" Narrative, I, pp.75,76. But this is recorded by an ardent admirer of Smith, D'Urban, and the Methodists. The accused missionaries' version might have presented a different angle to the story.

the Kei publicly expressed their gratitude to those officially responsible for their safety—including Warden, Smith, and Somerset—by means of an announcement in the Grahamstown Journal for May 29. In his own journal, Palmer, referring to the trip between Butterworth and Grahamstown, said: "During the whole of the journey we had nothing but kindness shown us by the Colonel [Somerset] and all his officers".[1] Such appreciation should have satisfied even Smith's exacting standards, but he had already breathed out other opinions in a letter to his sister, Mrs. Sargent, dated May 7. The dogmatism of his views can be best conveyed by a lengthy quotation from the letter:

> The only thing I pride myself upon is the bold and enterprising exertions I have made in bringing off every missionary at his own request from amongst the savages whom he had been induced to hope he might reclaim. Here I have succeeded. There is not one of them who does not acknowledge that his exertions have totally failed, and all this canting hypocritical jargon of the day, which made the mother church tremble ready to be rent in twain, has so failed in this present instance that I do think the tide of dissension may be stemmed, and the torrent of religious bigotry, equal to that of the Roman Catholics, be turned once more by a great reaction, caused by the late events, and made to flow in favour of our blessed religion. Every missionary, no matter of what persuasion, London, Glasgow, Wesleyan, etc., all, all have failed, and although that Satan Dr. Philip has been the great author of the savages' delinquency and atrocities, not a clergyman now goes with him, but all view the fanaticism of his conduct in its true light and abhor the practices by which he has endeavoured to attain ascendancy in what he calls the Christian world. Your brother Harry has destroyed the enemy, while every Missionary says, "Col. Smith, God bless you".[2]

The weaknesses in the above passage are so numerous as to prohibit a full consideration of each, but they are all so readily accepted by the uninformed or prejudiced that the most blatant need at least a brief denial. Smith took credit for a deed in which he personally played little part. He revealed an anti-nonconformist bias which might have been pardonable in him as a loyal member of the Church of England but which it was to be hoped, did not materially influence his administrative and military judgments. Granted he was writing privately to his sister, but the self-revelation sows seeds of doubt as to the likelihood of his attaining the

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[1] MMI 1835, p.709.

[2] Theal, Documents, p.151.

judicial balance expected in a public figure. Then, his emphatic conclusions concerning the failure of mission endeavour were vigorously contested by the missionaries on whose behalf he claimed to speak, so that his assumptions were shown to be gratuitous. Finally, his indictment of "that Satan" Dr. Philip as "the great author of the savages' delinquency" unveiled a prejudice that was blind to the many other possible causes of the Frontier War. If Smith were the only one to believe his own extravagancies, little need have been said, but, unfortunately, they have gained credence in circles that should have been more discriminating. Dr.S.F.N.Gie, for instance, after quoting the greater part of the above letter, comments: "Ryperd!" ("Excellent!")[1]

The missionaries not only expressed thanks—they also received a considerable amount themselves, particularly from traders who had found refuge with them. Shaw could with reason claim:

> Each of our missionary stations in Caffraria became a place of refuge for a number of the scattered traders, and in every instance when they reached our settlements, our missionaries were enabled to afford them protection.[2]

A backward look at conditions prevailing east of the Kei during April and May suggests that while the traders' lives were in danger the safety of the missionaries was never seriously at stake. The one exception was the case of Ayliff who was undoubtedly threatened by Hintsa: but even there some allowance must be made for this particular clergyman's timidity and his melodramatic tendencies. As for the rest, it is probable that they could have remained at their posts without incurring any danger greater than that through which they had previously passed. This appears to have been their own conclusion, too; but they agreed to a temporary withdrawal in expectancy of a speedy return. They might have been less willing to accompany

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[1] Geskiedenis vir Suid-Afrika of ons Verlede (Stellenbosch, 1939), p.287.

[2] Before the Aborigines Committee, 8 Aug. 1835. IBB VII. 538, p.125. Thomas Philips, J.P. corroborated Shaw's statement before the same body. Ibid., p.33.

the traders had they known how long official caution would keep them away from their flocks!

4. Emancipation of the Fingos.[1] When news of the English advance toward the Kei first reached Gcalekaland it caused some dismay among the Fingos. They had been the principal friends of the Butterworth mission since its inception in 1827, and the Xhosa invasion of the Colony and the prospect of the war's spreading into the Transkei intensified their pro-colonial, anti-Gcaleka leanings. At an early stage in the conflict they decided that no Fingo should "in any way take part in the invasion of the Colony", that they would protect English missionaries and traders, and that they would provide a messenger service between Ayliff and the British forces.[2] The discharge of these decisions naturally deepened Gcaleka hatred and justified Fingo concern for what would happen if hostilities broke out in their area. In addition they harboured a contrary fear—that the British would take them for Gcaleka and mete out the same treatment to both parties. When, therefore, D'Urban crossed the Kei on April 15 they hurried to seek his protection. This the Governor, encouraged by a letter from Ayliff at Clarkebury, readily gave.[3] Sir Benjamin seems to have taken the people (they cannot correctly be termed a "tribe") to his heart without delay. He was impressed by missionary reports of their responsiveness to Christian teaching, and by their contributions to the safety of missionaries and traders. He was moved by accounts of the oppression they were alleged to have suffered, and appears to have lent a credulous ear to all that Fingos told him of their maltreatment at Hintsa's hands. In a letter dated May 3 he relayed their reactions, saying:

> ... their apprehension of future danger from them [Hintsa's

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[1] For the origin of the Fingos, see Appendix IV.

[2] J.Ayliff and J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, p.24.

[3] IBB XLIII,503, p.225.

people] was so great, in consequence of the assistance they had recently afforded to the British missionaries, that they were determined, at any rate, to emigrate and seek some other country.[1]

There is no evidence that at this stage D'Urban himself was contemplating the wholesale transplantation of a people, but the Fingos' own desire to escape from the Gcaleka may have slanted his thoughts in that direction. Other events conspired to encourage such thinking. Soon after headquarters had been set up at Butterworth a large body of Fingos offered their services against the Xhosa enemy. Their support was welcomed: they came under European command and took part in a sweep through Hintsa's country that eventually brought the chief to terms. In addition, "so long as the war lasted, 500 armed Fingos were in the field, fighting on the side of the British. ..."[2] On April 24, the whole tribal group were accepted as British subjects by the Governor on behalf of his sovereign, who had not been consulted. Any hatred felt for them by Hintsa must have deepened on hearing that his "dogs" had become one with those whom he could only regard as his foes. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that he sought some opportunity for revenge, although he showed little skill in his choice of occasion. He had just accepted D'Urban's "peace" terms and offered himself as hostage,[3] when the news came in that a group of Fingos had been attacked on his orders and that 30 had been slain. D'Urban was shaken out of his customary placidity and declared that he was ready to hang the chief, his son Rili, and his brother Bhukru if the massacre did not stop immediately. The killing ceased, but the useless slaughter might have persuaded the British commander that the Fingos' only security lay in complete removal beyond Hintsa's reach. Any qualms that he might have felt on the legality and the wisdom of such a move were quietened by reference to Britain's own emancipation of the slaves and the benefits that

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[1] CSP XXXIX.279, p.31.

[2] Ayliff, op cit., p.35.

[3] Infra, pp. 265-267.

their (the Fingos') settlement on the frontier would bring to the Colony.

> There can be no question, I think, that this measure is in the true spirit of that which the mother country has recently pursued upon so immense a scale; it is in itself of unspeakable mercy to this liberated people, since in no one instance did that extensive emancipation rescue any race from a life of misery bearing any comparison to that wretched life of slavery and oppression under which this nation groaned; it will have secured, besides, an acquisition of incalculable value to the colony.[1]

This may be regarded as a piece of special pleading, but D'Urban himself believed that he was performing a compassionate act on a vast scale by enabling more than 16,000 people to emigrate, and he continued in this belief through later years, counting the Fingo move as one of the best deeds of his administration. He failed to foresee the bitter animosity that would surround the Fingos in Xhosa territory and failed to gauge the resentment that his favour would bring down on them throughout Kaffraria. He, with his limited knowledge of the African population, could not be expected to understand the complications that would arise from his philanthropic designs, but there were well-enough informed men in his entourage who should have advised him against the plan. Amelioration of the conditions under which the Fingos were living in Gcalekaland could have been secured in the locale to which they were already committed, especially after Hintsa's agreement had given Britain some influence in his territory. But no local solution of the admittedly real problem was tried. Instead, orders were given for the mass exodus of the Fingo population under British surveillance.

The commander-in-chief appointed Somerset and the 2nd Division to return to the Colony with the emigrant Fingos. The movement began from near Butterworth on May 8, but was delayed by rain which made the steep tracks so slippery that progress was almost impossible. The Kei was not reached until the 9th. In addition to the military there were over 17,000 other human beings to care for: 2,000 Fingo men, 5,600 women, 9,200 children,

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[1] To Lord Aberdeen, 19 June 1835. IBB XXXIX,279, p.16.

plus the large party from Clarkebury. The Fingos drove their own cattle (18,200 head, excluding calves) and goats, and carried their own food, so they were no drain on the commissariat.[1] All reports agreed that the mixed multitude's progress went surprisingly smoothly and that morale was high. The presence of the missionaries undoubtedly helped to keep the eight-mile long procession in order throughout the six days of its trek, and to minimize the frictions that were bound to occur in an operation of that magnitude. It was not until they had crossed the Keiskamma on the 14th that any trouble occurred, and then the column was twice attacked by Xhosa warriors. Neither incident was serious in itself, but they were a foretaste of bigger clashes that were to come. No further difficulty hindered the emigrants, however, and they finally assembled at Emqwashwini (half-way between the sites of Peddie and Breakfast Vlei) and pledged their loyalty to William IV as British subjects, and their readiness to be guided by the missionaries in their daily conduct.[2] The Wesleyans remained with their charges and the main Fingo body for some days, then left them under the care of John Ayliff, who was to become known as the Fingos' missionary, while they went forward to Grahamstown which they reached on May 18, sixteen days after leaving Clarkebury, and ten days after their departure from Butterworth. The Fingo story had not ended, but its subsequent course must be charted later,[3] while this narrative returns to follow Hintsa's lot in the Transkei.

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[1] IBB XXIX.279, pp.37,16. It seems reasonably certain that they were generous in their interpretation of what was "their own". Soga reproaches D'Urban for failing to prevent them from plundering the Gcaleka in the course of the exodus, and says he "was culpable in the extreme". South-Eastern Bantu, p.195.

[2] Ayliff, op. cit., pp.32-34.

[3] Infra, pp. 294-298.

II. ANNEXATION

1. Territorial Extension. It was April 15 when the colonial troops crossed the Kei. D'Urban had lost no time in despatching a message to Hintsa with the object of initiating talks between the two parties concerning the Gcaleka attitude in the war. The Governor had hoped for a reply by the 20th, but when that date passed with no word from the chief, he extended his deadline to the 24th. This saw him encamped for 10 days in the territory of an officially friendly tribe without having made any declaration of war to justify his being there. Not that some incitement to war was lacking. At 3 a.m. on Monday 21st, a strong party of Hottentots, under the command of a settler, John Armstrong, was sent off with despatches for the Colony. Not far from camp, Armstrong was killed by an attacking party.[1] Hintsa could hardly be blamed for the occurrence since he was many miles away at the time and knew nothing about it. The killing was probably an unplanned act by a party of Gcaleka who were ready to attack any vulnerable white man; but the despatch-carrier's death stoked the anti-Xhosa fires that were burning in the hearts of Europeans around Butterworth. The so-called truce, misnamed since a state of war had still not been declared, was observed until the 24th, but on that date D'Urban ordered the 1st division to move north-west in search of the chief who had failed to answer his summons. Smith, leading a mounted patrol of 300 men and accompanied by some Fingos, swiftly covered the hilly countryside and in two days reached Hintsa's kraal, hoping to surprise and capture the chief. But the bird had flown with his followers. The colonel ordered the kraal to be burned, "the only kraal I burnt in his country", and taking the cattle he had captured 24 hours earlier, he returned to headquarters.[2] Hintsa was astounded at the "rapidity of these inroads, the

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[1] Goldswain Chronicle, p.99.

[2] Smith claims that he took 14,000 head of cattle, but he was apt to exaggerate such numbers. The claim should be borne in mind, however, when reckoning the number recovered or seized by the Colony from Hintsa's people.

extraordinary extent of country traversed by the troops" that were with Smith, and "on the day after his kraal was burnt" presented himself, with his son and retinue, at the British camp, "a humble suppliant for peace and mercy".[1] In the meantime, D'Urban had moved after Smith and set up camp on the Isolo stream. From that remote spot he sent some thousand head of cattle to Somerset in the Butterworth district, and returned a detachment of the Albany and Uitenhage burghers saying that they were "the best Troops of their kind I have seen". He also warned Somerset to look to his cattle, "that they be not whistled away".[2] On the Isolo he was visited by messengers from Hintsa, but they were turned away since the Governor refused to see anyone save Hintsa himself. His firmness was justified, for the following day, the 29th, the chief appeared in the rôle of "humble suppliant", together with 60 of his councillors. D'Urban stated his demands which included the cessation of aid to the Khosa tribes that were in arms against the Colony, the return of stolen cattle, and execution of justice against murderers of British subjects. Smith "was never more astonished than by the ability with which Hintsa argued on every point and by the shrewd and cautious opinions expressed by Umtini [a councillor 'of great repute'] ." The Gcaleka chief, however, was at least temporarily impressed with British power and was ready to come to terms. "I shall agree tomorrow to the Governor's demands in every respect," he said.[3]

The next day, April 30, saw the convening of a meeting for the formal statement and acceptance of the British peace terms. At the ceremony many eyes were turned upon the Gcaleka chief who had for so long been the subject of much governmental speculation. One member of D'Urban's staff, James

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[1] Smith, Autobiography, pp.391,2. He appears to have telescoped events a little, omitting the chief's attempt to send representatives to interview D'Urban in his behalf.

[2] D'Urban to Somerset, April 27. D'Urban Papers.

[3] Smith, Autobiography, p.394.

Alexander, committed his impressions to paper:

> The great chief of the Amakosa appeared upwards of six feet in height, robust and fleshy, and about 55 years of age. His skin was very dark, and might have claimed for him the title of another African king,— "The great black one". His crisp hair was without ornament, and he wore whiskers and a short beard. His nose was low and aquiline; his eyes and lips were prominent and large; though his carriage was dignified, he could not look any one steadily in the face; and he had altogether a most sinister expression of countenance.[1]

Harry Smith, who had entertained the chief to dinner on the previous day, and who had heard the chief describe himself as Smith's "son", formed a similar though more lively impression:

> ... the Great Chief, a very good-looking man, and his face, though black, the very image of poor dear George IV. He seemed perfectly satisfied of his safety among us, and acted majesty with great dignity, though nearly naked like the rest.[2]

Others, who were not concerned with the physical portrait presented at the peace-making meeting, had other opinions to express. Henry Fynn, who was better acquainted with Khosa character than either of the writers just quoted, categorically stated: "... I had every reason to be satisfied that Hintsa was the most faithless chief I had ever met with ..."[3] D'Urban and Smith soon had difficulty in expressing the opprobrium they wished to cast on the chief's name, and later writers did their best to include whatever the earlier judges may have missed. Theal vilified him without mercy:

> He was a poor specimen of Kosa, this paramount chief of the tribe, in intellect and in demeanour infinitely beneath Kreli, his son ... . He was without affection for anyone, sensual in a very high degree, and cruel to ferocity, but withal wily and plausible. His great redeeming feature was personal bravery.[4]

Cory followed suit and called him "the wily and treacherous savage".[5] Except for Smith's ephemeral tomfoolery no one seemed prepared to admit of any good in the chief, nor were they ready to grant him a defensible point

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[1] J.Alexander, Narrative, II, p.129. [2] Smith, Autobiography, p.742.

[3] Deposition at King William's Town, April 28, 1835. IBB XLIII.503, p.232.

[4] Theal IV. p.25. [5] Cory III, p.118.

of view. An unusual or tragic death has often erased the memory of a man's faults and furnished the deceased with a halo, albeit small. But not so with Hintsa: his character has been blackened to match his skin, until scarce a word can be found in his favour. This should not blind us to the inherent reasonableness of his position, nor prevent us from acknowledging his right to defend that position by all the means at his disposal. Across the camp table in the commander's tent he faced the invader of his country. He could not be expected to welcome the invader's presence nor to do other than checkmate as many of his moves as possible. Remembrance of this natural reaction to an intolerable position will serve to explain many quirks in the sorry drama that followed.

In the meantime, however, the chief had to listen to the statement and explanation of the peace terms. These largely revolved around cattle. Hintsa was asked to return 25,000 cattle and 500 horses within five days—surely, a demand that the authorities could hardly have expected to be fulfilled in so short a time, especially in view of the 14,000 head that Smith claimed to have recovered only five days previously. Then, in one year's time, the Gcaleka would be obliged to furnish the same number of cattle and horses for the second time. It would seem that the Colony was trying to recoup its major stock losses at the hands of the Gcaleka. In addition, D'Urban demanded of Hintsa two hostages against the fulfilment of the terms and as guarantee of the chief's good faith.[1] The chief had no alternative but to accept. He was a virtual prisoner, even though he had come into the camp voluntarily. The gun was pointed at his head: if he wished to enjoy any future, he was obliged to agree to whatever proposals his opponents put forward.[2] He recognized the impasse that confronted him, bowed to the inevitable, and, in company with his councillors, agreed to the terms that

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[1] Smith, Autobiography, p.744; Cory III, p.140.

[2] Compare Macmillan, BBB, p.111.

were imposed upon him. He sent messengers to collect the cattle that were required of him, as well as to secure the return of colonial cattle. His apparent readiness to fulfil the impositions was so great that on May 2 the Governor ordered the withdrawal of his troops toward the fords of the Kei where they were to remain until the treaty conditions were fulfilled. Rain delayed their falling back, but they reached the river in time to witness the passage of the Fingos, the missionaries, and their followers on the 9th.

The tenor of Hintsa's intentions and the sincerity of his acceptance of the peace terms came under suspicion almost immediately. Harry Smith told his wife: "... I can see that as these rascals are bereft of their fears they will become bold and try every shift in their power."[1] D'Urban and others were soon to share this view, and not without cause since the chief's conduct justified their maximum suspicion. In view of the fact that he had assented to the peace terms, his efforts to recover stolen cattle were less than half-hearted. On May 2 his brother Bhukru brought 20 cattle into camp, and by May 5 only 35 had been delivered. D'Urban believed that he secretly commanded his people to drive the cattle to the source of the Tsomo River, beyond the reach of the Europeans.[2] During the same period occurred the massacre of 30 Fingos[3] for which Smith disarmed his Gcaleka "guests" and declared them to be prisoners, threatening to carry them into the Colony. At D'Urban's insistence, Hintsa sent to the Ngqika chiefs, Maqoma and Tyhali, a message which counselled submission and which appeared satisfactory at the time but which was later shown to have been accompanied by a secret communication encouraging the recipients in continued resistance against the Colony.[4] But such double-dealing was not unique with Hintsa:

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[1] To Juana, May 1. Autobiography, p.746.

[2] To Aberdeen, June 19, IBB XXXIX, 279, p.18.

[3] Supra, p. 259.

[4] Infra., p. 274.

it had been practised by rulers under duress from ancient times. Hintsa's unusual touch was the offering of himself as hostage in place of the two demanded by D'Urban. In his despatch to Aberdeen D'Urban advanced a three-fold explanation of the chief's ready offer of his own person: by being under detention he escaped responsibility for the restoration of cattle; he kept Rili with him, away from the conciliatory influence of his mother, Nonsa; he was indulging in an over-refinement of cunning, hoping thoroughly to deceive his captors.[1] If this were so, the gesture lost its efficacy when the chief repeatedly asked for permission to ride out and meet those of his people who were supposed to be bringing in cattle, especially when the cattle failed to appear. The Governor was convinced that he had no intention of fulfilling his treaty obligations and was seeking an opportunity to escape. Within a few days, if plans went well, the British army would retire over the Kei, and if Hintsa continued as voluntary hostage he would go with his captors. This would have been a bitter insult to the Xhosa peoples, and was to be avoided if at all possible. D'Urban therefore proposed that two other hostages should take the chief's place, and Hintsa offered two members of his rank and file. This did not satisfy the British commander, who demanded the persons of Rili, the chief's son, and Mhukru the chief's brother. When Hintsa saw the way events were shaping, he, for an undetermined reason, offered to go with Smith to collect the stipulated quota of cattle. The Governor agreed, though, according to Smith, he "was always of the opinion that Hintsa was playing false and that his liberty was his sole consideration".[2]

Further evidences of Hintsa's duplicity were adduced by members of the headquarters' staff. Smith was convinced that the chief sent a trusted follower to his, Smith's, tent in order to kill him. Alexander told of a plot, discovered by the interpreter Hermanus, for an attack on the camp

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[1] CBB XXXIX, 279, pp.17,18. [2] Autobiography, p.398.

from outside while Hintsa's suite would rise from within, overpower the guard, and join forces with their fellow-countrymen. Such schemes could have been anticipated: most men in Hintsa's position would have made some such attempt. But the plot was discovered and therefore miscarried.[1] Its discovery did nothing to allay colonial fears or to strengthen the modicum of trust that the authorities might stillhave been willing to place on the chief's word and in his intentions.

But D'Urban had other preoccupations apart from the suspected faithlessness of Hintsa. For some time his mind had been grappling with the frontier problem, and he now thought he saw the way to solve that for some years to come. On his outward journey from the Keiskamma eastward he had formed a high opinion of the Ciskei:

> The whole of this Country is magnificently fertile, beautiful, open, yet sufficiently wooded for all purposes of use and comfort, and the finest climate that I think I have ever lived in, witness the health of our troops. ... We have not had a sick man ...[2]

Nor was the Governor the only one to be favourably impressed. Smith had looked on the Kei with a military eye and judged it to be a natural, defensible frontier. He wrote to Juana on April 12, saying: "This Kei should be our boundary. It is as bare of wood as the fens in my country, ... scarcely covert for a hare, much less for the wily Caffre, ..."[3] It would be unlikely that the two senior officers would live and travel together for several weeks without exchanging views on so important a matter as a change of frontier; or that both would refrain from mentioning their judgment on the merits of the Kei as a potential boundary. It is therefore probably that each knew the other's mind on the matter. But it was May 7 before D'Urban officially told Smith of his plans for annexing all the

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[1] Autobiography, p.397; Alexander, Narrative II, p.142.

[2] Letter to Capt. Campbell from camp on the Impotshana, May 12. D'Urban Papers.

[3] Autobiography, p.732.

country between the colonial boundary and the River Kei.[1] The next two days saw the drafting of the proclamation that was to lay claim to that extensive territory, and Sunday May 10 was the day chosen for making the decision known. Yet, on the day when he was revealing his plans to Smith he was also replying to Sir John Wylde, the chief justice of the Colony, who had raised a question concerning the validity of any of a governor's orders that might be issued from beyond the colonial frontier. The letter was written at Cape Town on April 10 and received by D'Urban on April 27.[2] This meant that the legal query was communicated to him at the very time he was considering the question of advancing the boundary some 75 miles eastward, and while he himself was on the remote side of the river he was planning to turn into the frontier. Doubt as to the legality of his proposal did not seriously worry him, however. In his reply to Wylde he wrote of

> the difficulty, which, it appears, has been got up at Cape Town, and which, if it really be a legal one, and involving a well founded objection, to the validity of any executive act of mine, because I have passed the hair-line which is called the Colonial Boundary, then indeed, locally and circumstantially situated as this Colony is, there may often be occasions, (and there never could be a more prominent one than the present) when I can be but a very inefficient servant of His Majesty.[3]

Is there not a slight hint of persecution mania here? Opponents in Cape Town had trumped up a legal hindrance to the work he proposed to do beyond the Fish River, that rather broad "hair-line" of a boundary that he was planning to upset. It would appear that he resented any geographical limitation to his authority. He begged the whole question by maintaining his virtual need of extra-territorial powers. He was convincing himself

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[1] Autobiography, p.753. D'Urban was at some pains to establish his own entire responsibility for the plan. "... I know that I have acted of myself unbiassed by anyone, no one indeed having been aware of my intention two days before it was executed, and according to the best judgment which God has given me, after the most mature consideration of the subject, and the exercise of patient and careful local examination." To Col.C.Bird from Balfour, July 20. D'Urban Papers. Compare Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa (Cape Town, 1924), p.15.

[2] D'Urban Papers.

[3] Ibid.

of the legality of the contemplated move, and reasoned so persuasively that no effective doubt remained to thwart his design.

Somerset, the 2nd division, the missionaries, and the Fingoes had all crossed the Kei. Only the 1st division remained on the river's left bank with D'Urban, Smith, and Hintsa. On Sunday May 10 these assembled to hear the Governor's proclamation which purposed to establish what was soon known as the Province of Queen Adelaide.[1]

PROCLAMATION

By His Excellency Maj.-Gen. Sir Benjamin D'Urban.

Whereas in the months of December and January last past, the Caffre chiefs and their tribes inhabiting the country along the eastern frontier of His Britannic Majesty's colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and between that line and the River Kye, viz. Tyali, Macomo, Eno, Botomane, T'Slambie, Duchane, and others, their connexions and dependents, with the concurrence and countenance of Hintza, chief of the country between the Kye and the Keiskee, and paramount chief of Caffreland, during a period of established peace and unity between the colony and these chiefs, without provocation, or any previous notice or declaration of war, suddenly and unexpectedly broke into the colonial frontier along its whole extent, at the same time laid waste all the country with fire and sword, savagely murdered the unprepared and defenceless inhabitants of the farms, plundered and burnt their houses, carried off horses, cattle, sheep, etc., leaving those districts a desert.

And whereas, with the troops of the King my master, I have defeated, chastised and dispersed these chiefs and their tribes, and overrun and conquered their country, and thence penetrated into that of Hintza, compelling him to sue for peace and to accept the terms of it which I had offered, and which he has ratified. And whereas it is absolutely necessary to provide for the future security of the colony against such unprovoked aggressions, which can only be done by removing these treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a safer distance.

I now, therefore, in the name and behalf of His Britannic Majesty, and by virtue of power vested in me as His Majesty's representative,

Do hereby proclaim and declare, that the eastern boundary of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is, henceforward, extended eastward to the right bank of the Kye River; its new boundary, effected by this extension, being henceforth a line commencing at the source of the Kye River in the Stormberg Mountains, thence following its course along the right (or western), bank through the White Kye into the Great Kye, and thence to the mouth of the latter.

From the aforesaid country, which they have lost by the operations of the war which they have so wantonly provoked, and which they have justly forfeited, the above-mentioned chiefs, namely Tyali, Macomo, Eno, Botomane, T'Slambie, Duchane, etc., with their tribes, are for ever expelled, and will be treated as enemies if they be found therein.

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[1] Neither the formation of a new province nor any name for the annexed territory is mentioned in the document.

God save the King!

By His Excellency's command,

H.G. Smith, Colonel,

Chief of the Staff.

Given under my hand and seal, the 10th day of May 183

The European listeners were doubtless sympathetic to the substance of what was read, and had no inclination to doubt either its validity or its accuracy. Few of the Xhosa would understand the document's contents: its import would only become clear as its provisions were effected. But other eyes could quickly pick holes in the declaration. It assumed Hintsa's responsibility in the war by speaking of his "concurrence and countenance" of it. It painted an inaccurate picture of relations between the Xhosa and Europeans by referring to the existence of "a period of established peace and unity" immediately prior to the war. It unequivocally described the attack as being "without provocation", taking no note whatever of the grievances that lay behind the invasion. The Governor then made some claims that would be comical, from a military point of view, if they had not had tragic overtones: "I have defeated, chastised, and dispersed these chiefs and their tribes, and overrun and conquered their country ..." This extravagant language, as must have already been seen and will later be shown, did not square with the facts, but there was no one who could effectively question it at the time of reading. He had, a few lines earlier, accused the Xhosa chiefs of making war without "any previous notice or declaration", but failed to record that he took his own army several miles and several days into Hintsa's territory before making any such declaration. Then, in words that were to re-echo many times, he spoke of "removing these treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a safer distance",[2] an intention that was later explained to mean the expulsion of

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[1] CO XXXIX, 279, p.41.

[2] The phrase "irreclaimable savages" gained greater notoriety when it was incorporated in D'Urban's despatch to Aberdeen, June 19.

the Ciskeian Xhosa from their own lands, and their treatment as enemies if found therein.

The proclamation declared an extension of the colonial boundary to the right bank of the Kei, from its source, then along the White Kei to its junction with the Great Kei and so to the sea. No north-western limit was given to the proposed new province, so the area was ill-defined, but an official map, submitted to the Colonial Office,[1] showed the western boundary extending from the Nu Gariep in the north, over the Stormberg to the Winterberg, along the Kamcazana and the Gaga, and so down the Keiskamma. Thus even if the Neutral Territory be left out of the reckoning, a vast area was being taken from the tribes and placed under the colonial wing.

The grounds on which such an annexation of territory was made were, to say the least, very slender. The proclamation spoke of "the aforesaid country, which they have lost by the operations of the war"— an absurd claim from one who had, in a leisurely fashion, done little more than travel on a narrow track fromFort Willshire to the Kei. He had scarcely caught sight of the enemy, and unless the withdrawal of Maqoma into the mountains be taken as final confession of defeat, had delivered no decisive blow against him. Even the treaty with Hintsa had a shaky foundation in that it was based on a temporary intimidation rather than a military success. It might indeed be charged that D'Urban had not fought a war but had merely supervised a series of skirmishes with an elusive enemy who soon passed beyond his reach. It is difficult to perceive much exercise of generalship in the operations and even harder to see how such limited action could serve as the base for such sweeping annexation. Finally, the questionable morality of the seizure and the proposed expulsion of the native inhabitants of the "province" was exposed in the phrase "which country they have justly forfeited". Had the Xhosa invasion, which many were to explain on the basis

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[1] IDB XXXIX. 279, p.56. Compare Map, infra, B.

of provocation, had it merited the confiscation of 7,000 square miles of territory and the expatriation of its peoples? These are fundamental considerations that were hotly debated then and still call for judgment today.

Even such a summary examination of the proclamation as the above reveals that it was a hastily-prepared and ill-conceived measure, although there was no reason for its being so since its author had had several weeks of leisurely campaigning in which to meditate on its composition. So responsible an official should never have been guilty of issuing so irresponsible a document— as he himself was soon to realize. But, at the time of its issuance on the bank of the Kei, the proclamation had a warm welcome from its auditors. After the royal salute from the troops came three resounding cheers which were prolonged into a fourth "for our King".[1] In the Colony it was hailed as a right and progressive move.[2] Its condemnation by the home government was delayed by the simple fact that its existence was officially unknown until the receipt of the famous 19th of June despatch, which left D'Urban free to enjoy his satisfaction at empire-building for a few months. But there were misgivings, and the Governor's correspondence in ensuing weeks revealed anxiety as to the Colonial Office's reception of his measure. There were few illusions as to the impact it would make on those who were most closely concerned with its provisions—those who were to be dispossessed. Smith, writing to Cox, averred: "I know what they

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[1] D'Urban to Capt. Campbell at Grahamstown, May 12. D'Urban Papers.

[2] A sample of colonial reaction and anticipation is found in a letter written by Charles Michell to Frederick Rex from Warden's Post on the west bank of the Kei, May 18: "... The land is ours, ... Grants will of course be made, when the fitting hour arrives and neither you nor Lorenza [Chiapini] who are both perspiring young heroes ambitious of extinguishing yourselves shall be forgotten when the topographical squad is mustered,—particularly as your application argues your wish to take Time by the firelock." Long, Index, p.145. In spite of the facetious tenor of the letter, the hope of land grants shines clearly through.

Praise is still lavished on the extension measure. Witness the words of B.L.W.Brett: "Sir Benjamin D'Urban now issued one of the wisest proclamations in the history of the Colony." Makers of South Africa (London, 1944), p.41.

[Kagoro and Tyhali] will think of our having taken possession of their country."[1] But nothing came of that knowledge until circumstances forced the abandonment of the impolitic declaration.

In an effort to make his proclamation and implied peace all-conclusive, the Governor despatched Major Cox to a rendezvous with the Ngqika chiefs Kagoro and Tyhali on May 12. He hoped that the Ciskeian tribes would accept the submission of Hintsa as an example to themselves and be ready to treat with the British and thus end all hostilities. To cast his net as widely as possible he duplicated the instructions and terms given to Cox and sent a copy to Dugmore who was holding the Wesleyan station on the Buka that he might make them known to Nomube, great-widow of Ndlambe, who, with her son Hintsa, was living under Dugmore's protection.[2] If the move had been successful, the Ndlambe would have also beenincluded in the peace. The two-pronged attempt at spreading the peace was doomed to failure, however. In Cox's words:

> Unfortunately the very morning I saw Kaconse and Charlie [Tyhali] they had got a message from Hintsa, telling them not to trust themselves, for he knew the terms offered to them, and Hintsa sent two messengers, and unfortunately those men told them not to place themselves under our protection; that he was under surveillance in the governor's camp, and he told them not to trust themselves in our camp; and but for that message from Hintsa, I think they would have come into my camp and have complied with the governor's intentions.[3]

Hintsa showed himself no less far-sighted than D'Urban by sending his colleagues his own version of what had transpired near Butterworth; while the Ngqika chiefs acted naturally in refusing the British overtures in the light of what Hintsa told them. But there was another version of the interview between Cox and the Xhosa leaders which was circulated by Dr. Philip. According to his report, Cox insisted that the war had to continue, pro-

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[1] May 12, Autobiography, p.755.

[2] Notice by Major Dutton, Military Secretary, June 18. IBB [illegible].479, p.53. The move is also recorded in D'Urban's Despatch, June 19. Ibid., p.21.

[3] Before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.533, p.334.

sumably because of the rejection of D'Urban's peace terms. Maqoma was stated to have replied: "Very well, you may fight, but I will not," since he was tired of the war and wanted to be left alone. But that, said Philip, would have cut the ground from under the Governor's plans and prevented the establishment of the Province of Queen Adelaide.[1] Cox, however, added a supplementary explanation of his failure to win the chiefs over to his side. He believed they were personally in favour of peace but were prevented from accepting the terms by their councillors who wanted to continue the fight.[2] Whatever may have been the true account of the conversations, the result was a failure for Cox. The Ngqika withdrew to their mountain strongholds, and the officer had to return with his mission unfulfilled. There is no record to show any tangible reaction to whatever moves Dugmore may have made to the Ndlambe authorities, so D'Urban made no progress in his scheme for a rapid pacification of Kaffraria. Sporadic fighting was destined to go on for another four months.

Sir Benjamin, however, could not allow his momentous decision to face the world undefended, although he allowed more than five weeks to elapse before committing his official defence to paper. Then, in his despatch to the Colonial Office he, with some eloquence and obvious sincerity, expressed his convictions on the frontier question and justified his establishment of the Province of Queen Adelaide, as he had called the annexed territory.

> This extension of the colonial border had now become not only expedient, but absolutely and indispensably necessary and unavoidable. The only measure that could promise to repay the expense of the war, ... and place a defensible barrier between the heart of the colony and the savage tribes of Central Africa, provide security for the future, and a just indemnification for the past.

In further support of his policy, he painted a gloomy picture of what would happen if the status quo were maintained:

> ... I may securely pledge my word to your Lordship [Earl of Aberdeen], that unless a safer boundary be extended beyond the present frontier

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[1] Macmillan, BBB, p.125.

[2] IBR VII.538, p.348.

> district of Albany and Somerset, they will be altogether deserted, since not a farmer will venture to return to the occupation of lands where such certain loss and such frightful perils await him.[1]

This, it will be noted, was a running away from the problem presented by the Fish River boundary: because it was difficult to defend, abandon it and take a more defensible frontier further east, without being deterred by the fact that the intervening country belonged to other peoples. It also advanced the debatable point concerning the possible emptying of the eastern province if no solution were found to the frontier problem. But the correct solution, surely, was to ensure the safety of the Fish River line and not take its weaknesses as excuses for a further seizure of Xhosa land. But D'Urban made no attempt at strengthening the eastern defences. He could not claim that he had tried and failed. He leap-frogged the problem and chose the easy way out by adopting a new frontier.

He hoped to win his superiors' approval for his plan by showing that the Kei border would be more economical to hold than its predecessor, especially in respect of the number of troops it would call for— 2,740 as against 3,400 on the Fish River.[2] But there he was pitting theory against fact since defence of the proposed new frontier had never been attempted. The open terrain along the Kei's banks would certainly make the task of military patrols easier, but that advantage might have been outweighed by the increased explosiveness that would be generated by the compression of the Ngqika and Ndlambe tribes into the Gcaleka district. But D'Urban either had few qualms about pushing tens of thousands of people into an already populated area, or, what is more likely, had failed to consider what his measure would mean in terms of human movement. He assured the Secretary of State that there was ample fertile land for dispossessed tribes between

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[1] CBB XXXIX.279, pp.19,20.

[2] Ibid., pp.22,23. But Smith later declared: "100,000 men would not have kept the people over the Kei." Letter, Nov. 10 1835, quoted by Macmillan, BBB, p.142.

the Kei and Mbhashe without crowding the peoples who were already there. This was little more than a gratuitous assumption based on wishful thinking. Similar reasoning could have found abundant room for European farmers west of the Fish River, but there were plenty of Europeans who were ready to insist that they were crowded and needed further living space. The Xhosa, however, could not readily gain the ear of the Governor. Those who might have been expected to have been their spokesmen were approving D'Urban's policy in a way which they were later to regret and renounce. This was particularly true of the Wesleyan missionaries. On May 31, three weeks after the proclamation, Lt.Beresford was writing to the commander-in-chief, saying that he had seen W.B.Boyce, and

> he expressed the great satisfaction felt by himself and his Wesleyan brethren at all Your Excellency's measures, and their firm conviction that the extension of the Frontier to the Kye was the only measure that could ensure security to the Colony; ...[1]

After all possible allowance has been made for this being a second-hand expression of opinion, it remains an awkward document for those who wished to portray the Wesleyans as the consistent modifiers of D'Urban's May policy, for it shows the falsity of that image. The Methodists went along with general colonial opinion in approving the annexation of the Ciskei. They were further committed by Ayliff in a letter to the Governor in which he encouraged the driving of the tribes across the Kei:

> ... the country of Hintsa is sufficiently extensive to receive all the hostile tribes merely in filling up the vacant lands within the present boundary of that tribe, and particularly now, so much land being vacated by the removal of the Fingos. ... there is there country of the finest pasturage, of an unlimited extent, and totally unoccupied. The former inhabitants having been destroyed by the marauding chief, Matiwane.[2]

To this letter, which might have been solicited by D'Urban since it bore the same date as the Governor's long despatch, Ayliff added the information that Hintsa had expected the tribes to be driven over the Kei and had ordered the

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[1] Theal, Documents, p.193.

[2] CO 2503, p.230. Ayliff to D'Urban, June 19.

lower section of his country to be vacated for their use. Even if that were so,— and Hintsa had the moral right to do what he wished with his own land— it gave foreigners no sanction to dispose of another's territory nor to undertake its population by tribes whom they were anxious to remove from their own frontier doorstep. Ayliff was also guilty of distortion in claiming that there was available pasturage "of an unlimited extent". He knew only too well how limited were the boundaries of the tribes beyond the Kei. He should have been as well informed as any white man upon the Mfecane pressures to which the Gcaleka and their neighbours had been subject, and a little reflection would have convinced him of the folly of adding to such pressure by packing thousands of Xhosa peoples into an already explosive area.[1] Nor could the withdrawal of the Fingos be quoted in extenuation of a faulty policy, for that move itself was anathematized by almost the entire Xhosa family.

Further Wesleyan support, but keyed to a different note, came to D'Urban at a later period from one whom he described as that "humane and very excellent clergyman, Mr. Boyce, long resident in Caffreland, to whom I referred the Colonial Office for information when he visited England early in 1834".[2] In his book, Notes on South African Affairs, Boyce voiced thoughts that he had doubtless worked out from 1835 onwards. They represented a defence of D'Urban's policy in the light of the criticism it evoked, but they also gave an insight into a section of Wesleyan thinking at the time the policy was being evolved. Boyce claimed: "This measure [the May Proclamation] was never intended to imply the expulsion of such of the native inhabitants as were willing to abide in their old territory in peaceable submission to

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[1] "Had Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy been carried out, the only result would have been furious intestine wars between the tribes thus thrust back over the Kei and those at that time occupying land in the Transkeian districts. These conflicts would have resulted inevitably in a further inroad into the European area—an area which would have been more sparsely populated than that which the Bantu had just overrun." Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, p.16. The Wesleyan leader, Shaw, also foresaw such conflicts as a result of expulsion. IBB VII.538, p.65.

[2] IBB XXXIX.279, p.20.

British Laws."[1]

But no one could have arrived at such a benevolent interpretation of the proclamation from a study of the document itself. Boyce realized this, and claimed that the Governor softened his words two days after the reading of the proclamation. Sir Benjamin made no such claim when writing to Aberdeen in June, so any softening that was done may have been no more than verbal, and did little to reconcile the belligerent chiefs to a harsh edict, as Boyce admitted when he said that the offence to the Xhosa still remained and that persistance in the policy would have led to trouble. He failed to account for D'Urban's clinging to that policy from mid-May to mid-September, a space of four months, long enough for the situation to become yet more dangerous. He did intimate, however, that the eventual modification of the May declaration came as a result of Wesleyan intervention prior to July 27.

> ... the Wesleyan missionaries deemed it their duty to state their views as to the impolicy of renewing the war for the purpose of effecting a measure, which, if possible to effect, was of a very questionable nature, and would, at all events, be accompanied by a vast addition of human suffering.[2]

He was a little astray on his dates, for the letter in which the Wesleyans stated their views was not written until July 28, so could not have modified D'Urban's policy until some time <u>after</u> July 27 rather than <u>prior to</u> that date. Moreover, by that time most intelligent observers had seen the danger and the injustice of enforcing the expulsion, and the Methodists could not appropriate all credit for changing Sir Benjamin's mind. Far from the scene of action, however, the wisest of the Wesleyans deeply regretted the proclamation when news of it eventually reached him. Writing to the Society's secretary in August William Shaw said:

> ... I certainly regret that he [D'Urban] should have been induced to make the Kye River the boundary of the Colony—and have a great mind to state reasons against the measure to Lord Glenelg—who can either confirm or cancel it in the King's behalf as he may deem

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[1] <u>1BB XXXIX.279</u>, p.30.

[2] <u>Ibid.</u>, p.32. For the Wesleyan statement, see <u>infra</u>, pp. 306-310.

> expedient.— ... I cannot easily bring my mind to the total disinheriting 80,000 people of the lands which belong to them—including a territory of 7,000 square miles—without lifting up my voice against so sweeping a measure. ... the death of Hintsa is a most calamitous event.[1]

Here was a sensible voice uttering a sane judgment on D'Urban's scheme. Had he been by the Governor's side in May 1835, instead of being in England, South Africa might have been spared some of its troubles. But he clearly saw that once the proclamation had been made it would be difficult to undo the damage it had done. As he testified before the Aborigines Committee on 8 August 1835, the pronouncement

> ... struck me as being a very injudicious and disadvantageous measure; but ... the declaration, ... has been made so formally, and in the presence of the leading Caffre chiefs, whether cancelling a measure of that kind now would be wise, is another question.[2]

When due allowance is made for the two to three months taken for the news to reach England, it will be seen that Shaw at once perceived the pernicious nature of D'Urban's plan and protested against its intentions. Some eleven days later, before the same committee, he was asked: "What suggestions would you offer as to the occupation of this large ceded territory [up to the Kei] ?", to which query he submitted an extended reply.

> ... I would recommend in the first place that it should be divided into sections or townships; and secondly, that one or more of these sections be granted to each of the tribes that are willing to become tributary to the British; thirdly, I would place those who are most deserving of confidence nearest the old border; fourthly, I would reserve some intervening sections or townships in suitable places for military posts and British settlements; fifthly, I would discourage the practice of forming solitary farms; let the settlers be located in those townships, and let there be a village conveniently situated in every township to form a place of assembly and safety for the more scattered settlers on every farm. I beg leave to adduce Salem and Theophilus [sic] as instances of the advantages of this system. These villages, although much exposed in the late war, formed places of refuge which did not exist where the inhabitants live in solitary farms far from any village; sixthly, I would absolutely prohibit and declare to illegal, the sale or letting on lease by the aborigines of their lands to any European settlers; and, lastly, I would grant in every section of the county suitable tracts of land to missionary societies for the formation of missionary settlements and school establishments.[3]

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[1] Quoted by J.Rorborough, Colonial Policy, p.129.

[2] IBB VII.538, p.65.

[3] Ibid., pp.94,95.

When once the act of annexation had been accepted, it must be conceded that Shaw's proposals were well thought out, and considerate toward the Xhosa people. It is possible that his views reached the ears of Glenelg and played some part in that minister's decisions.

There is some evidence to suggest that the Glasgow missionaries declared themselves more fully on the Xhosa side of the issue even earlier than any Wesleyan ~~intervention~~ statement. A letter of May 22 said:

> I am happy to say that the Scottish missionaries are now commencing to exert themselves to save part of the country for the Caffres while on the other hand the Wesleyans are strong for confirmation of the Proclamation and vowing vengeance and murder on the heads of the Caffres—if this latter be the creed of the Christianity of the Wesleyans, God forbid they should have any influence and the sooner they are expelled from the Colony the better.[1]

This is so clearly an expression of partisan opinion as to lose much of its force, but it does establish the fact that within a dozen days of the May statement the G.M.S. were seeking to modify the extreme provisions of D'Urban's declaration, and that some in the Colony believed the Methodists to be in favour of the Governor's policy. Confirmation of the G.M.S. stand came in their own 40th Report dated June 16, three days before D'Urban's report to Aberdeen, in which they cautiously expressed the hope that humanity and mercy would be shown towards the Xhosa, "in so far as justice to the interest of the Colony" would allow—the closing phrase almost neutralizing their pious hope, however.[2]

It will be seen, then, that misgivings were abroad concerning the justice and practicability of the Governor's proposals. Even had D'Urban no doubts concerning his plan, others were gathering courage to question its wisdom. But the Governor foresaw more serious opposition to his scheme coming from a party with power in England:

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[1] An anonymous letter quoted by J.Roxborough from C.O.48, Vol. 165. Colonial Policy on the Northern and Eastern Frontiers of the Cape of Good Hope, 1833-45 (hereinafter abbreviated as Roxborough, Colonial Policy) (Unpublished thesis, Oxford, n.d.) p.117.

[2] IEB XLIII.503, p.175.

> ... I have reason to believe that the important measure of extension will be assailed by Dr. Philip, and of course by the London mission, on the ground of injustice in itself, and very probably (since it is a party peculiarly liable to exaggeration in statement, where an object or theory is to be supported) of severity in its execution ...[1]

By mid-June, therefore, he was harbouring no illusion concerning the reception of his plan to annex Xhosa territory. He was already informed about its being questioned in South Africa, and anticipated that it would be assailed at home. It nevertheless took him a further three months to modify his policy, and even then he failed to satisfy his most earnest critics.

2. The Death of Hintsa. While British troops halted on the left bank of the Kei to hear of D'Urban's solution to the frontier question, Hintsa's fulfilment of the treaty terms was still problematical. The commander-in-chief did not intend to await the chief's compliance with those terms, but needed a reasonable assurance that as much as possible would be done. He therefore appointed Harry Smith to accompany Hintsa on a tour of Gcalekaland in the interest of collecting the cattle that the colonial leaders had stipulated as a price of peace and that Hintsa had agreed to deliver into their hands. Hintsa may have known how impossible a task this was, but the British authorities must have been unaware of the unlikelihood of its being fulfilled else they would never have made it a condition of peace.

Official records stated that the Gcaleka chief had received into his territory from the Ngqika and Ndlambe insurgents a total of 50,000 cattle and 1,000 horses.[2] These, according to Ayliff, were distributed throughout Hintsa's country, some by the sea-coast and river mouths as far as the Mthatha, others in the centre where they passed by Butterworth, while others crossed the Kei higher up and made their way to the Colossa and Tsomo river valleys. Tainton reported from Buntingville that some herds were being

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[1] To Aberdeen, June 19. IBB XXXIX.279, p.22.

[2] Ibid., p.17. How figures for such an elusive operation were obtained is now beyond discovery, but they could have been little more than estimates.

sent to the mountainous regions north of the Ameva River.[1] But it would be a mistake to regard these cattle as having then belonged to Hintsa or that they were at his disposal. He would be ostensibly holding them on behalf of the Ciskeian Xhosa who had sent them eastward out of harm's way.[2] Nor would all of the cattle so concealed have been stolen from the Colony: some must have been Xhosa cattle on which the Colony could have no just claim apart from the question of reparations. Furthermore, the Fingoes had taken 22,000 head away with them on their trek into the Neutral Territory, and colonial troops under Smith claimed to have taken 14,000 on their first sweep through Hintsa's country.[3] The removal of 36,000 head within the space of two weeks must have drastically reduced the number of readily available cattle and must have rendered the task of collecting 25,000 cattle within five days a difficult if not an impossible feat.[4] But Smith was one with his master in making the subject chief toe the treaty line, so he was nothing loath to attempt the rather hopeless assignment.

But the optimistic colonel had his doubts on the probability of recovering the quota of animals. "I fear this cunning rogue, Hintsa, will give us some trouble ere we get the cattle," he told Juana. "He is a shuffling scoundrel. I am making him go with me on a bit of a tour. He says he can get the cattle if I can help."[5] The suggestion as to Smith's going actually came from the chief who could have had one or more motives in mind. He may have welcomed Smith's military authority to aid in the collection of cattle; he may have intended to prove how impossible a task had been set him; or he may have wanted to lure Smith into alien surroundings

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[1] A.Steedman, quoting Ayliff, Wanderings, II, p.351.

[2] Compare Umzata's deposition at King William's Town, May 3, 1836. IBB XLIII.503, p.233.

[3] Supra, p.262.

[4] Supra, p.265, and infra, p.342. Compare Theal IV, p.30; Cory III, p.1

[5] May 9. Autobiography, p.754.

where positions would have been reversed, making the white soldier his prisoner. Which, if any, of these was the true reason for Hintsa's suggestion will never be known; but his plan was accepted and while D'Urban returned westward, Smith was ordered to accompany the chief on his cattle-finding expedition. A formidable number of troops went with him—50 members of the Cape Rifles, 2 companies of the 72nd Regiment, 3 companies of the 1st Battalion of Hottentots, and 15 of the Corps of Guides who, in civilian life, were traders. This mixed group made a total of around 500 men.[1] There was little danger that such a force would be overwhelmed, and it might have been thought strong enough to guarantee the safe custody of Hintsa.

When the party rode away from the British camp, Hintsa was loaded with presents from the Governor and could scarcely have been expected to look on himself as a prisoner. Soon, Harry Smith admitted: "I had a feeling of kindness towards the chief daily growing upon me, which I could not account for".[2] This may have been due to Hintsa's power to charm, but it also reflected on Smith's immaturity, the ease by which his judgment was swayed by his emotions. If the chief cherished any hopes of escaping from the provisions of the treaty, however, he must have been quickly disillusioned by the colonel's unequivocal statement of his status: "... you are ... to look upon me as having full power over you, and if you attempt to escape, you will assuredly be shot." To this Hintsa replied that the fact of his son Rili's being in British hands was a sufficient guarantee of his sincerity, and that he had no intention of escaping. "Very well, Hintsa," responded Smith, "act up to this, and I am your friend. Again I tell you, <u>if you attempt to escape, you will be shot.</u>"[3] The sequel to these warnings is too well-known to need re-telling in detail. On May 13, the fourth day out from camp, after several suspicious moves, Hintsa escaped the vigilance of

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[1] <u>Autobiography</u>, p.396; <u>Theal</u> IV, p.30.

[2] <u>Autobiography</u>, p.399.

[3] <u>Ibid.</u>, p.400.

Smith, fled for cover to a river bed, and was there shot by the guide Southey on Smith's command and was killed by a second shot fired by the same man.[1] The sorry affair was worsened by the mutilation of the corpse—the chief's ears were cut off by some unknown hand.

It is not difficult to exonerate Smith in the matter of Hintsa's death. There is no ground for doubting that he had warned the chief of what would happen if he attempted to escape from his custody, and that to a man imbued with the European military code of honour such a warning amply excused the tragedy that followed. It is no less clear, however, that such reasoning had no place in Hintsa's own thinking. He saw the British as invaders of his country; he feared they would there accomplish what they were already suffered (supposed) to have effected on the other side of the Kei. Without there having been any effective war between himself and the invaders he had been forced to accept an unpalatable treaty, then while peace was supposed to prevail between the colonials and the Gcaleka, he himself was treated as a prisoner and made to bear the consequences of any attempt at escape. In all this there was an inconsistency that hardly bears close examination. On the onehand Smith expected of a Xhosa chief an adherence to the finer points of conduct usually associated with the concept of 'parole'; on the other he declared Hintsa to be an unenlightened barbarian, incapable of understanding white men's ways.[2] It may be fairly assumed that no unlettered chief would attach the same importance to his pledged word as would a European officer, and that other chiefs in Hintsa's position would

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[1] Autobiography, pp.400-406. Macmillan (BBB, p.111) follows Theal's lead (IV, p.31) and dates the shooting on May 11, the second day of Smith's march. But Smith himself rehearses each day's events and places the death on the fourth day. It is well to remember, however, that the Autobiography was written many years after the events it professes to narrate, and that it was, above all else, an apologia.

[2] "The poor savage always buries the past in oblivion, and regards the present only. He has not the most distant idea of right or wrong as regards his line of conduct. Self-interest is his controlling impulse, and desire stands for law and rectitude." Autobiography, p.393.

have felt justified in making every possible effort to escape.[1] If Hintsa had succeeded in his attempt he would have been hailed as a hero by his fellow-countrymen and had no obloquy attached to his name. As it was, he committed the unpardonable sin of failing, and thus incurred the condemnation not only of his captors but of some of his compatriots. Soga quotes a Xhosa proverb: "Isi-kuni sibuya nonkwezeli", that is, "The firebrand recoils on the person who tends the fire", implying that evil rebounds on the evil-doer, or that Hintsa who fomented the war was killed in the course of that war.[2] Such philosophy, even if it were current at the time, belonged only to a minority. The majority of the Xhosa resented the chief's death and did him the doubtful honour of describing the conflict as "The War of Hintsa". Not unnaturally the shot that slew Hintsa also undermined his fellow-chiefs' confidence in British promises and made them unwilling to entrust themselves to the military.[3]

Smith regretted the shooting, but was more concerned with clearing his own name of the charges that he knew would be quickly levelled against it. This desideratum was not achieved until the official inquiry which took place during August and September 1836. This was followed by Lord Glenelg's retraction of any injurious statements he had made in respect of Hintsa's death; then the wheel had turned full circle and Smith felt that he was belatedly relieved of the odium attached to the unfortunate affair.[4]

Of more importance than Smith's personal feelings, however, was the reaction that the killing was bound to have on an influential section of the British public. This was immediately realized by the Governor and his entourage:

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[1] See J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu, pp.196,197, where he defends Hintsa's conduct and blames D'Urban and Smith for his death. A propos of his detention, he maintains: "Hintsa never was a voluntary hostage, and was unjustly arrested while parleying with Smith."

[2] J.H.Soga, The Ama-Xosa: Life and Customs (Lovedale, 1931), p.333

[3] Macmillan, BBB, p.111.

[4] Autobiography, pp.417,418.

> The Governor was much depressed at the unfortunate loss of the chief Hintsa by his own treachery, not only from the natural feeling of humanity towards the individual, but because he fully anticipated the hold the canting party would take of it in England. Such men, stripped facts of all collateral circumstances, so changed the features of that incident as to twist it into tortuous shape of their own cunning duplicity.[1]

This assessment of D'Urban's prescience concerning opposition is corroborated by the commander's own words to Capt. Campbell:

> I am sorry for the death of Hintsa, inasmuch as a certain party at home may, however unjustly, make some handle of it—but he was an incorrigible, treacherous, and most ungrateful and designing villain, and assuredly deserved the fate which he had thus brought upon himself.[2]

These forebodings were justified, for capital was made out of the tragedy by critics of D'Urban's policy who were to find a mouthpiece in Aberdeen's successor at the Colonial Office, Lord Glenelg. Yet in the place where the biggest outcry might have been expected—Gcalekaland—there was scarcely a whisper. The shooting of their chief should have been enough to bring the whole tribe to arms, but apart from a few sporadic attacks on Smith's party on its return journey to the Kei, there was no news of any martial protest against the deed. And, once again the lack of a literate Xhosa historian leaves the inquirer in the dark concerning the African reaction to a critical event in the sub-continent's story. The Gcaleka appear to have accepted the succession of Hintsa's son Rili without question: they may have been glad to exchange father for son since they had suffered from Hintsa's extortions.

Six days after Hintsa's death, on May 19, D'Urban interviewed the young chief, seeking to win his co-operation with the colonial government. His persuasion fell on receptive ears, for Rili agreed to accept the terms of the treaty made with his father and also to acknowledge the right bank of the Kei as the colonial boundary. This sweet reasonableness on the part

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[1] Autobiography, p.417. This is no unusual sample of the language Smith employed against the philanthropists who attacked his policies and actions.

[2] From the Camp at Impotshana (west of the Kei), May 18. D'Urban Papers.

of the young man gave D'Urban some hopes for the future. "The son is a fine boy," he wrote to Campbell:

> What he may become it may be doubtful to say, but he has been treated by us with great kindness and attention, and professes gratitude,—at any rate, he cannot do worse than his father.[1]

The prospects for friendliness with the new chief make it all the harder to understand the harsh treatment meted out to his uncle, Mhukru, and one of the principal councillors of the tribe, Kinki, who were both sent to Grahamstown and there imprisoned for more than two months.[2] Mhukru's record was good: he had had his troubles with Hintsa, and had been a friend rather than an enemy of the Colony;[3] but his goodwill must have been sorely strained to survive such behaviour on the part of the Europeans.

While the news of Hintsa's death had been travelling to the Kei and beyond, Smith had pushed ahead in his cattle-finding expedition. He reached the Mbhashe and captured 3,000 animals, but had the chagrin of finding only a few of them to be truly colonial. Either Hintsa had been exceptionally skilful in ordering the disposal of the colonists' beasts that were reportedly sent into his country, or reports had been exaggerated, in which case he had accepted an impossible assignment in agreeing to collect vast numbers from among his people. But Smith was glad enough to see 3,000 head. He left them in the care of Capt. Ross, and continued north-east, getting within sight of the Mthatha. There, a long way from his base, he became a temptation to the Xhosa, some of whom hung around his rear, skirmished during the day and attacked at night. A small party under Major White was wiped out, but the main body withdrew over the Mbhashe, and eventually crossed the Kei on May 17, seven and a half days after having left D'Urban's camp. During that period they had covered 218 miles—no mean feat under the

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[1] D'Urban Papers.

[2] See Cory III, p.167. The two were released on July 31.

[3] Ayliff to D'Urban from Grahamstown, June 19. IRB XLIII 503, p.228.

circumstances in which they travelled. For their services they were thanked by the commander-in-chief who stated, in an order of the day, that they had "brought off from the further side 3,000 head of cattle which had been plundered from the Colony"; but this hardly corresponded with the facts, for Smith declared that there were "very few colonial ones among them",[1] which illustrates the ease with which even well-intentioned officials could pass on faulty information.

3. The Final Phase? The geographical limits of the Sixth Frontier War had been reached, and Smith's reunion with D'Urban on May 17 marked the beginning of what the two men believed would be the brief closing episode in a successful campaign. The total amount of action up to the proclamation on May 10 had been small indeed—no definite engagement of the enemy, no pitched battle, little more than a few skirmishes and precautionary sweeps that drove the other side more deeply into its mountain retreats—and that little had been compressed into the space of six weeks. But hopes for a speedy conclusion to the war were drawn from a misconception, from a belief that the colonial purpose had been accomplished, that the unrealistic peace foisted upon Hintsa and the subsequent extension of the colonial boundary were based on the defeat of the Xhosa. That these were mistaken assumptions the authorities took time to realize, and in the meantime they acted as though the Province of Queen Adelaide was firmly established by the Governor's fiat. But, in Macmillan's picturesque phrase, "Sir Benjamin D'Urban was giving away the skin before he had caught his lion",[2] and the next few months were to prove that the lion was still very much alive though anxious to keep out of the hunter's way.

But D'Urban showed no awareness of the true situation. Two days after

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[1] Autobiography, pp.416,409.

[2] DNB, p.114. D'Urban was so sure of his conquest that during May and June he gave names to several localities and landmarks. D'Urban Papers, letters dated May 22,28, June 13.

the proclamation he was writing to Somerset from his new camp west of the Kei, saying: "I am here hard at work constructing the entrenched camp for my first post of occupation of the 'conquered' territory".[1] Three miles to the east he placed Fort Warden as his "advance post of observation on the Kye". There Smith rejoined him on May 17, on his return from the trip that had taken him as far as the Mthatha in search of the elusive cattle. Of the 3,000 that had been recovered, only 700 remained by the time Fort Warden was reached—the balance having died on the journey, or been eaten by the troops, or been rustled by the Xhosa who had hung on the rear of the column. With the British forces safely over the Kei, the army left a small force under Capt. Warden near the river and retraced its own steps westward as far as the left bank of the Buffalo by the 21st. After three days of experiment headquarters for the new province were established on the site of Brownlee's mission—after repairs, the missionary's old home became the Governor's temporary residence, while Tshatshu's house eventually became Harry Smith's stable. In honour of the reigning sovereign, the site was named King William's Town. D'Urban grew lyrical about its potentialities: "There never was a site more perfectly prepared by Nature for a splendid Provincial Town than this spot."[2] In this pleasant place he remained for three weeks, until June 11 when he left for Grahamstown and Smith was appointed Commander of the District of the Province of Queen Adelaide.

Before he became tied down to administrative duties, the colonel made

> some more rapid and extensive marches throughout the whole of the new province, the object being, in virtue of the proclamation, to compel the Kaffirs to return behind the Kei in the spirit of the conquest by which they had some years previously crossed it.[3]

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[1] D'Urban Papers.

[2] To Campbell, May 24. D'Urban Papers. Smith was no less enthusiastic. "The site for the town is beautiful. The main road will run through it, and the river also. It will be perfectly magnificent." To Juana, May 23. Autobiography, p.756. Major Dutton, D'Urban's military secretary, also sang the praises of the embryo town. IBB XLIII. 503, p.53.

[3] Autobiography, p.418.

Had he more clearly foreseen the difficulties of the task he was attempting he might have compared himself to a man trying to pick up spilled mercury with his fingers, for the Xhosa, not unnaturally, resisted his efforts to deprive them of their country and to drive them over the Kei. Also, had he been better acquainted with Bantu history he would have known that he was seriously underestimating the length of time during which the Xhosa tribes had occupied the Ciskei, since they had reached the Fish River almost 100 years prior to Smith's incursion into Kaffraria.[1] But in terms of the proclamation the Ngqika and Ndlambe chiefs, "with their tribes", were to be "for ever expelled" from the country between the Fish and Kei Rivers, and to Smith had been given the task of expulsion. Simultaneously he hoped to compel them to sue for peace, though, if they were to be driven across the Kei, they may not have seen any value in making peace with those who were taking over their territory. But neither the methods nor ethics of expulsion had been very carefully worked out; both developed in the field: but Smith was too good a soldier to question his orders, even had they conflicted with his own convictions, which was not the case in this instance.

While the Governor was settling on the site of King William's Town, his second-in-command scoured the country to the south-east, between the Buffalo and the Nahoon Rivers. In this work he soon received assistance from the Gqunukwebi who met him near Mount Coke on May 21 and augmented his forces by 1,000 of their own men, 500 Fingos, and a Hottentot levy under Capt. Halifax. This, on a grand scale, was a continuation of help already rendered by Phatho who had personally driven his wagons to Butterworth by April 16 and placed them at the disposal of the Colony. He then received permission to fall on the hostile tribes from the Keiskamma to the Buffalo, with some assistance from Halifax, and with the incentive of being allowed

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[1] Soga gives c.1740 as the date when the Rarabe chief Lenga settled on the Fish River. South-Eastern Bantu, p.125.

to keep all the native cattle he might capture provided that he returned any beasts that belonged to the Colony.[1] Smith later expressed complete satisfaction with the help thus given. He perceived the value of having Xhosa allies in the struggle against the Xhosa.

> ... I cannot but view the circumstances of the friendly Chiefs having taken the field as a most fortunate event towards the completion of the war. The enemy appears to be more alarmed at their approach in conjunction with our troops than I can describe: they are acquainted with every footpath in the country; and if they are as brave as they appear willing, they will be valuable friends.[2]

The colonel recorded no awareness of the motives that prompted Phatho and his followers to fight on the colonial side, and showed no fears concerning Xhosa reactions against the Gqunukwebi and Fingo people for having sided with the white man.

Official thought could have well afforded concern at the fact that there were any enemy to be subdued in the south-eastern section of the newly-formed province. The Gqunukwebi had long been active in that area, and the army had presumably made a wide sweep over much of the country prior to crossing the Kei in mid-April; yet, a month later, after proclaiming the territory as an extension of the Colony, it contained enough Ndlambe-Ngika opponents to stimulate Smith's operations. Within that same period there had also been noteworthy activity on the far northern front towards the Stormberg where many colonial cattle were reportedly concealed. D'Urban was clearly unaware of the magnitude of the task to which he had set himself, but passing weeks were to reveal the true situation to him. While his back had been turned in the Transkei the Xhosa had gradually come out of retirement in the Mathole Mountains and had entrenched themselves in the heights that overlooked the more level country to the south. From their strongholds they were able to wage guerilla-type warfare against the less mobile European troops and to keep a considerable portion of the army tied up with defence.

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, May 1.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, June 1. Theal, Documents, pp.194,196.

Hopes of an early end to the war began to fade among the soldiers. Frederick Rex wrote to his sister on May 27 from his camp on the Debe Flats, and said: "Our opinion of the war is that it will last for many more months. In fact we cannot see how it is to end soon."[1] It was some time before the authorities made a similar admission, but their realization of its truth must have come some time before their public acknowledgement of it.

A sense of frustration may have led D'Urban to issue his strongly criticized instructions to Capt. Armstrong on June 26:

> ... fall upon any Kaffirs that may be there [over the Block Drift beyond Fort Hare] unexpectedly—do them as much mischief as may be practicable—burn all the Kraals—destroy all the Corn—command the women to go beyond the Kye [some 60 miles away!] (treating them with all kindness however)—and assuring them this they must all do so.[2]

This memorandum resurrected the practice of kraal-burning that had fallen into disuse since the early days of the counter-invasion when it had been used to show European superiority in arms, "to drive the enemy into submission, and thus speedily to stop the further effusion of blood. The firebrand was therefore applied; and hut after hut sent forth a dense smoke, sparks, and red glaring flames".[3] On May 15 Smith had forbidden any further burning of kraals, except under express orders; but here was D'Urban reviving the custom and ordering a scorched-earth policy which included the destruction of the people's food. And this in "conquered territory" which the enemy had "lost by the operations of the war ... and which they" had "justly forfeited"!

Further afield the stalemate led Smith to mount a show of force during the first few days of July when in operations between the Nahoon and the Kei he killed 30 Xhosa and claimed to have captured 4,000 head of cattle. The numerical success of the attack was ominous rather than comforting since it

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[1] Long, Index, p.172.

[2] From Grahamstown. D'Urban Papers. The Governor was accused of inhumanity in respect of these orders.

[3] J. Alexander, Narrative II, p.68.

was gained in what might have been termed the rear of the army, in the vicinity of two newly-established forts—Waterloo and Warden—and in an area where the enemy could hardly have been expected to survive.[1] Although the skin had been given away, the lion was taking a long time to deliver its pelt!

On the same day in which D'Urban issued his "scorched-earth" order there occurred a tragedy that would have received small notice had the war been on a larger scale, but which loomed large against the relatively drama-free background of quiet military operations. Lt. Charles Bailie and his party of 23 soldiers of the 1st Hottentot Battalion were killed while on patrol in the Inthaba Yendoda region of the upper Keiskamma valley. The character of the young officer, an earnest Methodist, was such that his death caused quite a stir throughout the Colony. His father made a search for his son's remains and found them some months after the young man's death; while D'Urban commissioned W.B.Boyce to convey to the widow the final news of her husband's end and burial near the site of Pirie mission.[2] Apart from the unnecessary and unprofitable nature of the young man's death the irony of the regrettable event lay in the fact that on the probable day of its occurrence, the Governor was writing to the Secretary of State and saying, in a postscript: "All is well upon the frontier, and in the new province, as when I wrote to your Lordship on the 19th inst."[3] The death of Bailie and his companions showed that all was not as quiet as the Governor would have the Colonial Office believe.

Other troubles, partly of his own devising, rose up to plague the kind-hearted enlarger of the British Empire. Through a combination of kindness and policy he had decided to deliver the Fingos from "a state of the most

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[1] Corr. III, pp.190,191.

[2] R.Maddy, Memoir on Lt.Charles E.Bailie, WMM 1839, pp.87,88; F.Rex to his sister, 23 July 1835, Long, Index, p.175; D'Urban to Boyce, 19 Sept. 1835, D'Urban Papers; Alexander, Narrative II, p.104.

[3] IBB XXIX.279, p.59.

grievous bondage" and

> to place them in the country on the east bank of the Great Fish River, in order to protect the bush country from the entrance of the Kaffirs; and also that, by bringing a large population into the Colony, the Colonists may supply themselves with free labourers.[1]

The plan was too neat to be practicable. It embraced too many designs—deliverance for the Fingos, protection for the Colony, and free (as against slave) labour for the colonists. It also expected miracles of husbandry from the transplanted population. "If they [the Fingos] be settled in the present uninhabited and worse than useless district between the Fish River and the Lower Keiskama, they will soon convert it into a country abounding in cattle and corn", claimed D'Urban,[2] without explaining that the "uninhabited and worse than useless district" was part of the coveted Neutral Territory from which the Gqumukwebi, Ngqika, and Ndlambe tribes regarded themselves as unjustly expelled and which they were always hoping to regain. Nor did he reconcile the contradiction between his plans for the permanent expulsion of the Xhosa peoples from the Ciskei and his scheme for planting the Fingos as a barrier between those same people and the Colony. If the concept of Queen Adelaide Province were serious, it rendered a buffer settlement of Fingos a redundant complication since there would be no marauding Xhosa west of the Kei. But the Fingos had crossed the Keiskamma and needed definite settlement if they were not to become an unmanageable problem on the colonial doorstep.

On paper the settlement was made on May 15, the day when Somerset led the exodus into the Neutral Territory, and reported to D'Urban that the Fingos were established between the Keiskamma and the Fish

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[1] Quoted by Shaw, SAM, p.528.

[2] D'Urban, Notice, May 3. PRO XXXIX.279, p.31.

rivers.[1] Ayliff agreed to remain as their pastor, making his headquarters on the Guanga near Mt. Somerset, and within a week John Mitford Bowker had been appointed as government resident to assist him in caring for the thousands of emigrants, with the admonition that "in all cases of emergency you are particularly recommended to consult with the Rev. Mr. Ayliff."[2] But the strength of Ayliff's administrative abilities was open to doubt, and neither he nor Bowker possessed any judicial authority over their charges: they could do no more than advise the 16,000 who must have milled around in distressing confusion west of the Keiskamma. The two white leaders could make only tentative plans for their settlement since they were awaiting definite instructions from the Governor. D'Urban with what appeared to be typical slowness, did not issue his orders until July 13, nearly two months after the Fingos' arrival, yet on August 20 he was writing to Bowker citing the slowness in locating the people <u>after</u> he had issued instructions in the middle of July as a reason for the failure of the settlement![3] The first two months of indecision, together with an epidemic of dysentery, were more than enough to incite the Fingos to move from their first encampments, even had they not had nomadic tendencies. The fields around them looked greener and they spread out on three points of the compass, towards King William's Town, Fort Thompson (near Alice), and Grahamstown. In so scattering they removed themselves from official care, they provoked the enmity of their Xhosa neighbours, and they added to the problems that the Governor found

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[1] The northern boundary of the district that became known as Fingoland with Fort Peddie as its centre stretched from the junction of the Tyhume and the Keiskamma rivers to the junction of the Kat and the Fish rivers; while the southern limit followed the courses of the Guanga and Clusie streams into the Keiskamma and Fish rivers respectively. The area had the advantage of being well-defined on a map and reasonably defensible on the banks of the two main rivers; but to the north lay the Ngqika and to the south the Gqunukwebi, juxtapositions that were bound to prove troublesome.

[2] D.Campbell, Civil Commissioner for Albany, to J.M.Bowker, May 21. Theal, <u>Documents</u>, p.182.

[3] <u>D'Urban Papers</u>.

on his hands.

From the beginning D'Urban had closely linked the Fingos with the Wesleyans, and especially with Ayliff who had taken a genuine interest in them while he was at Butterworth. The Methodists also recognized Ayliff's attachment to the displaced people, and allowed him to remain with them on the Guanga while the other Clarkebury evacuees went on to Grahamstown. But he was in danger of being engulfed in the secular duties arising from the daily care of an uprooted multitude and it is probable that the missionary committee was anxious to withdraw him from a work that should have been done by government officers. In view of their instructions, they could hardly have done otherwise, for their directives forbade entanglement in secular affairs. Even while Ayliff was assisting with the Fingos the central committee was considering the relationship of its missionaries to civil responsibilities, and issued a statement which read, in part, as follows:

> The Committee are anxious that the Missionaries of the Society should ever avoid, as completely as possible, an entanglement with civil affairs; but the very peculiar circumstances in which these brethren [in respect] of the Fingo settlement were placed, appear to have rendered it almost necessary that they should take a part in a work of so great humanity. Whatever differences of opinion may prevail on the subject of the new province of Adelaide, to the plan of this settlement no valid objection can be offered.[1]

By the time this opinion reached Albany, decisions concerning Ayliff had already been taken, but the local committee and its superior body were clearly in harmony over general policy, though it is doubtful if they would have seen eye to eye on the question of the new province. But the matter of Ayliff's remaining with the Fingos had to be considered, and there the Methodists faced a dilemma. The people were attached to the missionary whom they knew, yet the Society was anxious to re-open Butterworth at the earliest possible moment and thought only in terms of Ayliff as its director. It would therefore appear that the officers in Grahamstown were responsible for pulling Ayliff out of Fingoland, but D'Urban ascribed his going solely to

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[1] WMM December 1835, p.960.

the man's own fickleness. In the letter to Bowker to which reference has already been made,[1] he gave as the second cause for the Fingos' abandonment of their settlement the failure of Ayliff to stand by as their missionary:

> ...that Mr. Ayliff upon whom they very much leaned—who had volunteered to be their Pastor and to live among them—should have left them altogether—His quitting them immediately after my visit, was disadvantageous,—but his second quitting them—after staying with them a very few days—and that, as it seems, for good and all, has unquestionably been of very prejudicial effect.

D'Urban's resentment against the minister can be understood, and there may have been an element of unreliability in Ayliff's character that led him to abandon what D'Urban considered to be his charge. At any rate, the Governor did not forget his going, and held it against him long afterwards. He failed to realize that the man was not his own master but was subject to the decisions of his own committee. The Governor may also, with justice, have expected that committee to inform him should the removal of Ayliff have become necessary. The episode did not prejudice him against the Wesleyans, however. He placed the blame on Ayliff and continued to draw on Methodist counsel. But the Fingo problem was not solved: it bedevilled affairs in the new province for many months to come.

Some fleeting rays of sunshine did pierce the clouds that hung over the Governor's plans for Adelaide. On June 2 Sir Benjamin received moral support in the form of an address prepared by the Wesleyan missionaries of Albany and Kaffraria.[2] It was a strange document.

> To Sir Benjamin D'Urban:
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> May it please your Excellency:
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> 1. We, the Wesleyan Missionaries of Albany and Caffreland, assembled in Graham's Town this 2d day of June 1835, to deliberate on the concerns of the Wesleyan missions in Caffraria, feel it our duty, as Christian ministers, to acknowledge the numberous instances of your Excellency's kindness towards us for which our unanimous thanks are hereby tendered to your Excellency.
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> 2. Lamentable and distressing as the events of the Caffre war

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[1] August 20. Supra, p.296.

[2] MMS XXXIX.279, pp.56,57.

have been, as well towards the Caffres themselves as the colonists, we are yet consoled with the reflection that, so far as the Colonial Government is concerned, it has been conducted in accordance with the principles of justice and of mercy. We know, in common with our countrymen, that the Caffres were themselves the aggressors; and that they most wantonly, cruelly and ungratefully commenced this war, with a people who sought and desired their welfare and prosperity; yet, to deny the righteousness of God in our public calamities would be equivalent to a renunciation of the Christianity we profess; while, to trace the correspondence between those calamities and our sins, is unquestionably a sound application of its holy principles to their legitimate purpose. When a considerable portion of the public revenue is drawn from licensed houses, where intemperance is encouraged, and where multitudes amongst the people greedily avail themselves of that encouragement to indulge without restraint a thirst for ardent spirits, in places where poison is legally sold, it cannot be considered unjust in the Almighty to waste such a revenue in an expensive war, or to cause such a people, in various ways, to feel the miseries resulting from the irruption of hostile tribes on their border. We crave your Excellency's indulgence for venturing on the above momentous remark; and beg leave most respectfully to assure your Excellency, that it proceeds not from that wild spirit of dissatisfaction which is, in the present day, so clamorously expressed in various parts of the British Empire, but from the honest plainness of Englishmen and of Christians, who love their constitution and their country, and ardently desire its universal prosperity.

3. To your Excellency's fatherly care some of us are mainly indebted for the preservation of our lives; and the arrangements your Excellency made for our safety and comfort in the camp, and in travelling to the colony, which arrangements were humanely carried into effect by all who were under your Excellency's command; the considerate attention of your Excellency to the necessities of the natives associated with us in our distresses, and the condescension which has marked your Excellency's intercourse with us, whenever circumstances have rendered an interview with your Excellency necessary or desirable, all lay us under a lasting debt of gratitude which we feel cannot be easily repaid. May the God whom we serve reward your Excellency with his eternal love and favour!

4. Sensible that we can most effectually discharge the duties of our high and holy calling, as well as best serve our revered Sovereign, and promote the interests of our country, by steadily pursuing our own work in our proper sphere, we should not have obtruded ourselves on your Excellency's notice by the formal presentation of an address, had we not felt that the omission thereof might be justly deemed a dereliction of our public duty; and now, havingperformed this duty, we return to our retirement, with high sentiments of respect, esteem and affection for your Excellency, and with hearty wishes for health, long life and happiness both of your Excellency, and of your Excellency's family.

Signed, in behalf of the meeting,

W. J. Shrewsbury, Chairman.

W. B. Boyes [sic] , Secretary.

The language of the address betrays its committee-origin. Boyce,

secretary of the committee, was too good a writer to have composed such a hotchpotch: the fulsome piety of its phraseology smacks more of Shrewsbury who was chairman, while the other five members, Haddy, Palmer, Ayliff, Shepstone, and Davis possibly added their contributions since they, with the two officers, accepted joint responsibility for the document. But in spite of the structural weaknesses of the address, D'Urban appears to have received it with pleasure and to have placed some value upon it. To offset anticipated criticism of his policy from Dr. Philip and party, he enclosed the address with his long despatch to the Secretary of State on June 19, and felt that it served to vindicate the course he had been pursuing. It is doubtful whether it accomplished that purpose: it was rather used to pillory its writers and the addressee before the British public.

In the course of his despatch, the Governor saw fit to evaluate the influence of missions upon the Xhosa, and elaborated as follows:

> The residence of the missionaries [Wesleyan] had, besides, become utterly useless to the interest of religion; for they all acknowledged to me, with the reluctance natural to such an admission, but with the expression of their sincere conviction, that in the course of their long and difficult labours, although they had been, as they hoped, successful in the conversion of many of the race of Hottentots and of Fingos, they could not flatter themselves that they had ever made a lasting salutary impression upon one of the race of Caffres; and they not at all inaptly compare the latter to wolves.[1]

When seeking to evaluate this statement it is not necessary to accuse either D'Urban or the missionaries of deliberately lying. In a season of discouragement a missionary might very well have been pessimistic over the prospects of the work he was hurriedly leaving, and one unwise tongue might even have spoken disparagingly of the people they had been trying to help; but the missionaries involved firmly denied ever having made the statements imputed to them by Sir Benjamin. Two years after the notorious despatch they were still defending themselves against his remarks and speaking

of the extreme improbability, that they could have made statements,

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[1] IBB XXXIX.272, p.17.

> so utterly irreconcilable with the existing and well-known facts connected with the progress of Christianity on these several stations;— facts which are flatly contradictory of the alleged statement. ...
>
> The brethren also decidedly disclaim having compared the Kaffirs to wolves; and they protest against such a construction of any expression used by them, in conversation with any person whatever. The Wesleyan missionaries of this district [Kaffraria] , at that time, having never concurred in the opinion, that the Kaffirs are 'irreclaimable savages'.[1]

It may be assumed that the Methodists did not know the contents of the Governor's despatch and had had to wait until the reaction to the objectionable statements had filtered back to them from England. They must then have mulled them over for a long time without making any public refutation until the return of Shaw when they carefully considered the imputations against their missionary work and issued their official disclaimer against D'Urban's statements.[2] But by that time their address to the Governor and his mistaken report of their sentiments concerning their mission work had fanned into flame the latent fires of disagreement that lay between the Wesleyans and what may be loosely termed the Philippine party. Dr. Philip regarded the June address as sycophantic, an opinion in which others shared, both then and now; but he spoiled his case by interpreting the composition as a defence of the commando system and approval of the extension to the Kei, which it certainly was not. He further associated himself with some unworthy allies, namely, the Rev. J.Blackburn and Mackenzie Beverly who dabbled in scurrility in their efforts to discredit the Wesleyans. With commendable patience the Methodists kept quiet, but not for ever. Shaw eventually took up the cudgels in defence of his society and conducted a vigorous correspondence with Philip which was later published as A Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries. When a neutral reader has threaded his way through the barrage of accusations and counter-accusations he suspects that the doctor was often

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[1] Minutes of a special District Meeting, held at Morley, May 11 1838. Shaw, Defence, p.71 and similarly in Boyce, Notes, p.x.

[2] The matter appears to have been first discussed at Morley, 13 May 1837 when, according to Boyce (Notes, Appendix) it was "for the first time brought under their notice".

playing with words in order to wriggle out of awkward corners while the Wesleyans were using the occasion to vindicate themselves in view of the criticisms they had incurred during the Frontier War. If Shaw had been in South Africa in 1835 it is arguable that such a controversy would not have arisen since it is doubtful if he would have rushed in where his less judicious colleagues did not fear to tread. But that is rather hypothetical. What is indisputable is that the Methodists emerged as supporters of D'Urban's policy while their opponents claimed to be the Xhosa's friends. As is so often the case, neither judgment is completely true though each contains truth.

In sending the Governor a loyal message, the Wesleyans were but keeping hundreds of others company. About the same time Sir Benjamin received written gratitude, in the form of addresses, from the inhabitants of Grahamstown, Albany, and Somerset, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, George, Graaff Reinet, Caledon, Worcester, Swellendam, and Cape Town—to mention only the major centres.[1] The documents undoubtedly expressed the majority opinion of the colonists who hailed D'Urban as deliverer from the Xhosa menace, as executor of just retribution on the invaders, as resolver of the frontier question, and potential rewarder of the land-hungry in the wide spaces of Queen Adelaide Province. The Governor saw the addresses as unsolicited confirmation of his policy, and was careful to pass them on to the Colonial Office where he undboutedly expected them to serve as his silent but eloquent advocates.

By the middle of June three months had passed since D'Urban's last despatch to the Secretary of State,[2] and that minister must have been justifiably

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[1] CBB XLIII.503, p.181.

[2] The predecessor to D'Urban's despatch of June 19 was that of March 19 in which he had no more to report than Harry Smith's initial measure to contain the invasion and push the Xhosa back over the Fish River. For the next three months he was silent.

For a critical discussion of D'Urban's dilatory attention to despatches, see Macmillan, EBB, pp.149-159.

concerned at the lack of news at such a crucial stage in the Colony's history. Since the outbreak of war his office had received only brief accounts of what had been happening. On January 5 the Governor had sent a report on the overrunning of the frontier and the steps he was taking to turn back the invasion. Aberdeen acknowledged receipt of that despatch and on April 11 sent a reply in which he conveyed the King's approval of D'Urban's energetic measures to compel the Xhosa "to retire within their own territory. ... H.M. Government are anxiously desirous to learn the causes of this extensive and, so far as I can judge, unprovoked aggression on the colony". He expressed the government's firm reliance on D'Urban's judgment and discretion, both for the security of the Colony and for "tempering the horrors of warfare, ... by all those considerations of humanity which it becomes the servants of a civilized nation especially to bear in mind in avenging the assaults of ignorant savages." Due to the slowness of communications in 1835[1] those words must have reached Sir Benjamin too late to have influenced the application of his May policy; but they may have given him an added impetus on the road that led to his September treaty. Before his eyes perused them, however, he had compiled and sent off his fateful despatch of June 19, with its 22 enclosures, in which he endeavoured to atone for his long silence. It must have been difficult for its London readers to have understood the lapse of time between the proclamation on May 10 and its author's official intimation of its existence on June 19—a lapse of 40 days, days which should have been used for conveying the news of so extraordinary a decree to its final arbiters in Britain. For the delay, D'Urban proffered the following excuses:

> In the process of this service [the war] and in the confidence of its speedy conclusion, it had appeared to me that it would have been at once useless and unsatisfactory, from such a distance, to report

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[1] Some despatches took five months to reach the Cape from London, but even if the posts were good, that dated April 11 could not have been in Grahamstown much earlier than the end of July.

> the separate steps of its progress (somewhat desultory, too, from the nature of things) and that it would therefore be more expedient to await its termination, and then to bring the whole at one view under your Lordship's notice.[1]

It must be conceded that there was some reason in the first few clauses of the above explanation, but that the close of the sentence is unsatisfactory since the war had not ended and the writer was not able "to bring the whole at one view" under the Secretary's notice. But the most serious aspect of the despatch lay in its failure to convey to the Colonial Office the true state of affairs. The authorities were left with the understanding that the war had virtually ended, and that the May policy was a fait accompli. They had no other recourse but to base their judgments and decisions on this misleading information. They are not to be blamed for condemning the only policy of which they had been made aware; yet, far too often, their reply, embodied in Glenelg's despatch of December 26, is judged against the background of D'Urban's September policy. This cannot be too strenuously deprecated. Glenelg's despatch can only be fairly balanced against D'Urban's of June 19: to take any other course is unfair to the Colonial Office and improperly partial to D'Urban.

When D'Urban did at last set pen to paper he made a thorough coverage of events from the beginning of his counter-invasion on March 31 until the writing of his despatch in mid-June. He dealt with the problem of Hintsa and his death, the liberation and transfer of the Fingos, the parts played by the Wesleyan missionaries, and their opinions concerning the war, and the extension of the colonial boundary, in addition to an official recital of the course of the war thus far. If that material had been progressively forwarded to England instead of having been kept in cold storage, the Governor might have averted some criticism. And, above all else, if he had given immediate notice of his May proclamation, or, better still, had submitted its principles for his superiors' consideration and had awaited

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[1] BPP XXXIX.279, p.15.

their reaction before publication, he might have spared himself the storm that later broke around his head. But he was convinced of the rectitude of his own policy and anticipated an unfavourable reaction only because of the short-sightedness of the London officials. Having sent the despatch,[1] he, figuratively speaking, sat back to await news of its reception. Had he been more perceptive and less dilatory he would have supplied the Colonial Office with supplementary reports on the progress of affairs on the Eastern Frontier, and thus have made them aware of the true situation there. Instead, apart from a few minor despatches, he left them only with his unsatisfactory account of June 19, even while he was planning to invalidate the core of its contents by drastically changing the policy that it aimed to justify. His own failure to keep London informed of the developing scene was responsible for much of the criticism that was soon to pour out upon him.

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[1] The bearer was D'Urban's aide-de-camp, Lt. de la Poer Beresford, "a very intelligent young officer", who sailed from Cape Town on June 28 and reached Downing Street on Sept. 11—according to a note in D'Urban's own hand on his draft of the document. D'Urban Papers.

CHAPTER VI

THE ADJUSTED PEACE

I. THE ROAD TO PEACE

1. Wesleyan Intervention. While the Governor was compiling and sending away his June despatch, the leisurely prosecution of the war took an even slower turn and gave some basis to D'Urban's claim that all was well upon the frontier and in the new province. He took advantage of the lull in hostilities to make a belated tour of the border early in July. From Grahamstown, where he had been since June 12, he travelled as far as Port Frances on the coast, to Fort Beaufort and the Kat River Settlement to the north, and was everywhere greeted as the deliverer of the Colony from the Xhosa menace. He received in person the gratitude of the frontier settlers who had already expressed their feelings in the written addresses. The tour took nineteen days. July 27 saw him back in Grahamstown. His trip served to convince him of the rightness of his policy. In a letter to Col. Bird, dated July 20, he averred:

> I have been every day more and more confirmed in the expediency, necessity and justice of the measure--and your opinion has well supplied the keystone.
> Approved at home, or disapproved therefore--I shall have neither [need to] repent of what I have done-- nor in the latter case, be ruffled by its consequences--without it, believe me, your colony is scarcely worth keeping--and your District of Albany and probably much of Somerset will be abandoned.[1]

Yet even while he was recording these convictions, others were seriously questioning the feasability of the course he was pursuing. These doubters were not followers of Dr. Philip, from whom D'Urban expected bitter opposition, but were men who had only a few weeks before addressed him in most loyal and grateful terms--in short, the Wesleyans, whom the Governor had cited to Aberdeen as supporters of his policy. Sin their ill-considered letter of June 2 the Methodist ministers had more critically surveyed the situation and concluded that the Governor was

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[1] D'Urban Papers.

attempting both the impossible and the undesirable. Immediately after D'Urban's return to Grahamstown from his frontier tour, Boyce sought and obtained an interview for the purpose of conveying to him the Society's views on the enforcement of the May proclamation. Since Shrewsbury's departure from the Colony at the end of June[1], Boyce, although only secretary to his committee, would appear to have been regarded by the secular authorities as leader of the Albany and Kaffrarian Wesleyans and to have found the task congenial. The story of his interview with the Governor, outlining as it does the Methodists' appraisal of the situation, may conveniently and profitably be told in the words of the Society's secretary, John Beecham, before the Aborigines Committee:

> We have evidence that our Missionaries did, in the first place most decidedly object to the proposed banishment of Makoma and Tyali across the Kei. In a letter, dated Graham's Town, August 1, 1835, the Rev. W. Boyce gives an account of an interview which he had with the Governor a few days previously, in which he freely expressed his opinion on the painful state of things resulting from the continuance of the Kaffer war. Mr. Boyce says, he felt it his duty to state wherein he thought His Excellency's policy was objectionable, and might be misrepresented; he decidedly objected to the expulsion of the tribes of Makoma and Tyali beyond the Kei, -- he argued that the thing was impossible, -- that Hintsa's son would not allow them to pass the Kei, -- and that should it be attempted to enforce the measure, the result must be the extermination of about 50,000 people, partly by our troops, -- partly by famine, and partly by Hintsa's son. He showed that, as a matter of mere policy, the measure, if it could possibly be carried into effect, was questionable; that so many people, all acquainted with the localities of the colony, and exasperated into enmity, and concentrated in all their strength just beyond the Kei river, and close to a weak frontier, without any check from English influence among them, would prove very serious enemies to the colony; whereas, if taken under Colonial protection and British law and checked by British influence, and watched by a judicious resident, they might not only have their active enmity neutralized, but be converted into our good friends.2

These are commendable sentiments. The pity of them is that they were not made known earlier, for contrary to Beecham's opening words, as quoted above, they were not made known "in the first place", but only two and a half months after the objectionable decree had been promulgated on the banks of the Kei. If the Wesleyans had analyzed the proclamation soon after its publication, and had boldly voiced their objections they might have spared the Xhosa people, the colonists, and the Governor much

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[1] Supra, p. 211, Note 1.

[2] IBB.VII.538, pp.495,496.

unnecessary suffering. Some passage of time was undoubtedly needed for them to evaluate the new measures, but it is to be regretted that they had not formed and conveyed their opinions more speedily. The delay in their protests decreased their value and, with Boyce's statement and Ayliff's approving letter and the Wesleyan address[1], gave substance to the charge that they supported D'Urban's plans. Boyce's interview, coming nearly two months later, could not immediately undo the damage already done to the Wesleyan reputation in the eyes of liberal opinion, but for this the missionaries had only themselves to blame. In August, while they were promoting peace, they were being judged for their impolitic pronouncements of May and June. In this they were singularly like D'Urban who suffered similar misjudgments for similar reasons - news of repentance failed to overtake earlier reports of harsh decisions.

But, to continue Beecham's account, the clergyman had other persuasions to present to His Excellency:

> He moreover respectfully submitted that the insisting upon the expulsion of so many people, involving as it did the loss of so many lives, and perhaps the extermination of the major part of them, would tend to injure His Excellency's measures in the opinion of the public at home, and would, perhaps, prevent the confirmation of even the most judicious and beneficial of his plans by His Majesty's government; he, therefore, begged His Excellency not to insist upon the Kaffers' going beyond the Kei; especially as the fact that Hintsa's son Crili would not permit them to cross into his territory, afforded him a favourable opportunity for modifying his conditions to meet the altered circumstances of the case.

The approach was skilful -- it appealed to D'Urban's fear of having his measures countermanded at home, to his desire to salvage at least part of his plan should his policy be disapproved, and it offered a face-saving opportunity to modify the offensive provisions. Boyce was proving himself no mean diplomat. When he found that his judgments were not peremptorily rejected, he offered to attempt to persuade the chiefs to negotiate for the cessation of hostilities. On the favourable receipt of that suggestion, he, in consultation with his colleagues, submitted the following

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[1] Supra, pp.298,299.

written plan to the Governor:[1]

Graham's Town, 28 July 1835, Tuesday evening.

May it please your Excellency,

This afternoon I consulted with my brethren on the best means of communicating with the chiefs in the Amatola Mountains secretly, so as to excite no suspicions, and at the same time to send such a message as would answer the desired end without in theleast committing your Excellency.

If the following plan be approved of, we think of leaving Graham's Town on Monday for Caffredrift Post, on our way to visit Kama and Kye and from them to procure women to carry our message.

First, Kama's wife and Pato's last wife are sisters of Maccmo; we think that they personally, one or both of them, will undertake to convey a message to Maccmo and Tyali in the Amatola Mountains. Some of Kye's women will easily be found to carry a message to Umhala, Zetu, etc., who are probably in some part of the country between the Cooncobre and the Kay [sic] Rivers.

Secondly, to prevent the necessity of using your Excellency's name, which might possibly lead the chiefs to form extravagant ho es as to the terms they might expect to obtain, we purpose to act as follows'

1. Mr. Shepstone will send to Maccmo and Tyali, thanking them for their orders to spare his life, and by way of recompensing them for this kindness, will commiserate their present distressed condition, and as their friand who wishes them well, and as a missionary whose duty it is to seek the establishment of peace, will advise them strongly to send to your Excellency to ask for mercy, stating, as a matter of private opinion, that in such case their expulsion beyond the Kye would perhaps be avoided, and other conditions less destructive to them be imposed, such as the giving up stolen cattle, horses, guns, murderers, etc., and further advising them to ask from your Excellency a place to sit in, i.e. a country, there to live under English law. This advice will be enforced by the intelligence sent them at the same time of the determination of your excellency to carry on the war with increased vigour as soon as the ploughing season is over in the colony, and the consequent certainty of their speedy destruction.

2. I shall send a similar message to Umhala and Zetu, the sons of Slambie, backed with the additional authority of my character as the missionary of their father's tribe, reminding them of the last advice of Slambie to his sons, viz. that in all cases of difficulty, the advice of the missionary was to be followed.

3. We can also state to these chiefs, that although their conduct has made us ashamed of them for a long time past, yet that now, in their distress, and in the certainty of their destruction if peace be delayed until the boors return from ploughing, we will venture to intercede for them, provided they send first to ask for mercy from your Excellency, and thus embolden us to speak in their behalf before they are completely ruined.

By this means we shall avoid using your Excellency's name, and thus prevent the chiefs from imagining that the colonists are tired of the war. Should the chiefs send to ask for mercy, then your Excellency can negotiate unfettered by any promises, etc., and can impose such terms as the circumstances at the time may render desirable. If the chiefs remain obstinate, then the colonial government cannot be charged with inhumanity, as your Excellency will have made every effort to save them from impending ruin. But we are almost certain that at least some of the chiefs will gladly embrace the opportunity of throwing themselves upon your Excellency's mercy, and that immediately, as the Caffre time for cultivation is quickly approaching, and they will be anxious to obtain a place in which to settle in peace previous to its commencement; otherwise, even if the sword

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[1] LBB.XXXIV.279, p.253.

spare them this year, they must die of famine the next.
I have thought it better to write a few lines to your Excellency rather than to seek another interview. If your Excellency would prefer giving me a verbal approval or disapproval rather than to write, I can wait on your Excellency at any time that may be appointed.
Trusting your Excellency will excuse this hasty scrawl at this late hour,

I remain, etc.
(signed) William B.Boyce.

The missionaries may be credited with wishing to save lives by calling a halt to further useless fighting and saving the tribes from the possibility, none the less bitter because remote, of banishment from their homelands. To this extent their intervention in political matters may be justified. At the same time, they should have recognized that they were doing the very thing for which they castigated their liberal brethren -- meddling in secular matters instead of confining themselves to spiritual affairs -- with this fundamental difference: they were assisting in the subjugation of the tribes to white control, while others sought to protect the native from white encroachment. Had they been confronted with this judgment, the Methodists could have replied that they were ensuring the application of the lesser of two evils, one of which was bound to operate. Had they remained neutral, D'Urban might have blindly persisted in his policy of "extermination", or expulsion, with his superior military power guaranteeing some kind of success. By their intervention, the Wesleyans benefitted the Xhosa and secured them easier terms of peace. Nonetheless, in this instance the missionaries, in a guileful manner[1], served as government agents by encouraging the tribes to sue for peace, and to that extent they were the agents of imperialism. But it is hard to see how they could have acted otherwise. They had no power nor chance of stopping the hostilities, nor of staying the white man's advance. Their intervention was undertaken as an act of mercy, to lessen the severity of the inevitable clash between the two opposing cultures. They should not, therefore, be too

1. A study of Boyce's letter suggests that the adjective "guileful" does not exaggerate the tenor of his proposals. Some critics might even accuse him of being Machiavellian.

glibly labelled as conscious, deliberate agents of European advance: their acts need also to be judged from the viewpoint of those who performed them.

Once D'Urban had given a cautious approval to their scheme, the conspirators, as they might not unkindly be called, lost no time in utilizing the gubernatorial sanction to explore possibilities for peace. Shepstone, Palmer, and Boyce left Grahamstown on August 3, arrived at the kraal of Cobus Congo on the 4th, and by the following day met Phatho and Kama with Cobus at the senior chief's kraal on the Bika River.[1] The three chiefs agreed that the object of the missionaries' visit was "worthy of the children of God", and arranged to send four women to deliver the Methodist suggestions to Maqoma and Tyhali, in language that would find a ready entrance into Xhosa hearts. The messengers were to stress the Governor's intention to "sweep the country clean", and to urge the chiefs to cry for mercy before a second invasion was launched. The missionary trio then rode off to Mqhayi's kraal in order to get a similar message sent to the Ndlambe belligerents. Mqhayi was more sceptical about the efficacy of such an attempt at peace-making but was willing for it to be made. On their return to the Bika, the Wesleyans met the four women, Nombulu, Notonto, Meso, and Deliene, as they left for the Ngqika hideout. Then came twelve anxious days of waiting until, on August 17, the envoys returned and brought word of the chief's reactions to the proposals. Both Maqoma and Tyhali appeared grateful for the Wesleyan suggestions, and Tyhali gave an interesting glimpse into the Xhosa camp:

> We have been separated by war from our missionaries, and we have had no one through whom we could send to the Governor; we have sent thrice, but have had no reply. We thought that when the Governor passed by and made peace with Hintsa, that all would be peace, and since then we have merely defended ourselves in the mountains; when things came upon us, we only just pushed them off... We will not at first ask for a place to sit in, neither will we mention our not going over the Kei; we will merely ask for mercy; afterwards when we obtain a hearing, then we can ask.

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[1] The Journal of the three missionaries, kept by Boyce, is preserved in IBB XLIII,503, p.254, and in Boyce, Notes, Appendix.

Though it was well to remember that these words were intended for missionary consumption and not for tougher military circles, they contained several valuable insights into what had been transpiring in the Mathole Mountains since the beginning of May. There seemed no valid reason for disbelieving the statement that the Ngqika had made three unsuccessful attempts to communicate with D'Urban & the Governor was capable of ignoring such approaches if they did not conform to his pattern of right conduct. Neither should their interpretation of the Hintsa peace be rejected. If, as the colonists claimed, Hintsa had been the chief instigator of the war and the sinister power behind all hostilities, it was reasonable to suppose that peace with him would mean peace with all who were his instruments. The Ngqika and Ndlambe tribes could thus have been genuinely at a loss to know just where they stood. They may well have regarded themselves as merely conducting a nominal defence against colonial attacks pending the final resolution of hostilities. Such interpretations merited consideration at the time, and are worthy of still more today when the paucity of material for understanding of the Xhosa viewpoint leaves the field almost entirely to champions of the colonial cause. Finally, the chiefs demonstrated their diplomatic gifts in planning to obtain a hearing first and concessions later. Armed with this favourable response to their overtures, the three Methodists turned their horses' heads westwards and, re-entering Grahamstown on August 18, reported to the Governor.

2. Armed Persuasion. During the missionaries' absence Sir Benjamin had displayed an unusual burst of energy. His interview with Boyce may have stirred him to action, though it appears likely that he had planned to break the stalemate before the missionary broached his suggestions at the end of July. He wanted peace, but that was unobtainable until the hostile tribes had been forced or persuaded to lay down their arms. Boyce had gone to sow the seeds of persuasion; D'Urban was in a position to apply the military heat that would encourage the seeds to bear fruit. The missionaries left on August 3: by the 7th a plan was afoot to clear

the Tyhume and Mathole mountains of the enemy. Alexander led a force out of Fort Armstrong on the 9th, and joined Major Cox at Fort Cox on the 10th. Four days later Alexander's decisive victory over the Xhosa near Inthaba Yendoda led the natives to broach the question of peace.[1] Cox, following D'Urban's instructions to encourage any such overtures, but ignoring his chief's admonitions about not trusting himself to his opponents[2], met with about 500 of them on the 15th and proposed a truce. The next day, taking Captain Warden with him, he parleyed with Maqoma and Tyhali and found there were prospects for peace. It was possible that the Wesleyan suggestion was bearing fruit, and the Wesleyans were willing to take the fullest possible credit for the success of their diplomacy; but their influence at that juncture should not be exaggerated. There was a propititious conjunction of persuasion and force, with force speaking in louder tones. A partial defeat had just been inflicted on the confederate tribes, the Colony's military resources were very evident, and there was much to gain from a cease-fire.

Cox was authorized by D'Urban to offer modified peace terms, the most important of which was the softening of the expulsion order to permit the chiefs to occupy some land west of the Kei. Maqoma and Tyhali were willing to accept the revised conditions, but Colonel Smith was sceptical concerning their sincerity, and believed the negotiating officers were being duped by the Xhosa. Henry Somerset, of whom little had been heard for some time, then offered his services in the cause of peace, being convinced of his own fitness for the task, but D'Urban declined the proposal, maintaining that he was needed in the field.[3]

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[1] D'Urban commended Alexander for his conduct in this encounter, speaking of "the humane forbearance with which you admitted his [the enemy's] overture, as a sufficient plea for sparing him when he was entirely at your mercy." Letter to Alexander, Aug. 28. D'Urban Papers.

[2] D'Urban to Cox, Aug. 21 and to Smith, Sept. 2. D'Urban Papers. The contrast between the safety enjoyed by Cox among the Xhosa and the undignified treatment meted out to Chief Hintsa together with the reprehensible circumstances that led to his death have already been noted by Macmillan, BBB. p.123.

[3] H. Somerset to D'Urban, Aug. 19, and D'Urban to Somerset, Aug. 20. D'Urban Papers.

Both the Governor and Smith had confidence in Major Cox in spite of or because of his liking for the Xhosa[1], and preferred to retain him as intermediary along with Captain Warden who was known and liked by the border tribes. The two were therefore again commissioned to approach the Ngqika captains. At a second meeting on August 24, however, it was discovered that the Xhosa temper had hardened. The chiefs were no longer submissive; they realized they had not been conquered in the field and believed they could resist the imposition of the more irksome peace terms. "They were no longer a beaten enemy, suing for mercy - but assumed an air of equality, and instead of deprecating [sic] justly merited chastisement, talked of benefits expected..."[2] A story going around the European camp alleged that

> upon Captain Warden telling Maccomo [sic] that the Governor was a great man and that whatsoever he said was the Law of the Land he very cooly replied: 'I know the Governor, but God is greater, and God said there shall be peace among all nations.'3

The "irreclaimable savages" were not so gullible as some expected to find them, and were surprisingly reluctant to be pushed around at the white man's convenience. They may have been tired of war and desirous of peace, but there were limits beyond which they were not then willing to be thrust.

It looked as if these chiefs whom D'Urban had "defeated, chastised and dispersed" and whose country he had "overrun and conquered" were, some three months after the quoted claims had been made, proving unreasonably recalcitrant and were ready to offer further resistance to their "conqueror." This was the point for Smith's personal intervention. He joined Cox and Warden at Fort Cox, placed troops in strategic positions, and issued an ultimatum to Maqoma, adding "that if he was not with me

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[1] "Macomo was a favourite of mine. I confess I thought a great deal could be done with him,,and I thought he had been in some instances rather harshly treated. I have a more favourable opinion of Macomo than of any other chief." "I always thought him an enterprising, smart, clever fellow for that description of savage that he is. I consider Macomo and Umhala two of the cleverest chiefs in Caffreland." Cox before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.425, pp.563, 348.

[2] D'Urban to Smith, Aug.28, D'Urban Papers; and Smith, Autobiography, p.427.

[3] Fred.Rex to his father, Aug. 28. Long, Index, p.177.

in two hours after the receipt of my message, I would sweep him and all his host off the face of the earth."[1] It is to be hoped that the interpreter used his discretion in translating such swash-buckling language. This melodrama bore some fruit in a parley between the opposing parties, and an agreement for another meeting. Before that took place there was great coming and going of letters between the Governor and his officers. To Smith the commander moralized and administered self-comfort:

> Whatever be the ultimate results, [we] stand upon high moral ground - we have made every effort to bring these People to an amicable settlement - by means of Missionaries - by the means of an accredited officer in whom they trust [Warden] and we sheathed the sword upon their first attempt at an overture - when a large body of them were at the mercy of the Troops, and could not have escaped - this surely is enough to satisfy humanity.2

And the writer meant every word he said, failing to see that such palliatives did not atone for the declared intentions of expelling the tribes from their home country, or, when that was modified, of subjecting them to supervisory British rule. Even at that late date he was thinking of permitting the Xhosa no more foothold west of the Kei than the corner of country that lay between that river and the Gonubie. In the same letter he declared to his second-in-command

> that no tolerable security, or anything like lasting tranquillity to the Colony can ever be had, while Kaffirs are suffered to inhabit the Chumlibe, Amatoli, Keiskama, Buffalo and Tabindoda Ranges of Mountains.

To Cox, by the same mail, he was giving guidance concerning peace negotiations and stating

> it is absolutely necessary to an amicable conclusion, for them [the chiefs] to make a full disclosure ... of all that has been suggested to them by the Boers, and others within the Colony ... from the beginning of the War to the other day - when they say they received the last message of that description.

So here were complicating factors, Boer influence inciting the Xhosa to resist, and shades of the pestiferous Philip inspiring a rejection of

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[1] H. Smith, Autobiography, p.427.

[2] D'Urban to Smith, Aug. 28. D'Urban Papers. Smith believed that "humanity", that is, the philanthropists, would be satisfied: "The Saints are in power, and the terms so humane and liberal that old Buxton himself must admit them." To D'Urban, Sept. 1. Theal, Documents, p.367.

the modified peace terms and a fresh determination to continue the struggle.[1] There was no specific corrobation of these suspicions -- they could have been little more -- but the colonial forces held the master hand and were in a better position to exert effective pressure on the tribes. Another meeting was called, and on September 6 Smith, with Cox, Warden and an aide met Maqoma and Tyhali near the grave of their father Ngqika. According to Smith's own account of the meeting[2] he read the riot act to the Xhosa chiefs and browbeat them into accepting all the terms D'Urban was prepared to offer, whereupon the whole company retired to Fort Cox and enjoyed generous refreshments. The sequel was a further series of talks at Fort Willshire in which the Governor, "trampling under-foot" his "preconceived opinions, and sacrificing also some prejudices" consented to treat personally with the tempestuous Maqoma. The time was most opportune for such a course since the 27th Regiment, consisting of 540 officers and men, reached Grahamstown from England on September 8 and made it appear that the Colony had great reserves of men available. On the 11th, the Ngqika chiefs met the Governor at Fort Willshire and there discussed treaty terms with him. These had originally covered the withdrawal of the tribes from their mountain retreats in the Mathole, the surrender of all firearms to Smith at King William's Town, the transfer of the tribes to the eastern extremity of the new Province between the Gonubie and the Kei, and the acceptance of the Xhosa as British subjects. But, faced with the intransigence of Maqoma and his associates, D'Urban felt obliged to modify his terms, permitting them to remain in their own territory and ration-

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[1] D'Urban to P.B.Borchards, Aug.16: "In truth, the Publications and the doctrines promulgated within the Colony (under the direction of Dr. Philip and his party as it would seem) in favour of the enemy - and in violent reprobation of the Colonists, have been without any doubt industriously communicated to the Kaffir Chiefs, and have revived in them a spirit of obstinate resistance in the Amatoli, which but for these unnatural invictives (?) would never have been thought of.

"The fire was nearly extinguished, and these gentlemen have lighted it again; we shall soon however settle it finally." D'Urban Papers.

[2] Autobiography, p.428. He had some authority for acting high-handedly, for D'Urban had instructed him (Sept.2) that if Maqoma rejected the interview or refused the terms, then he was to attack immediately. Ibid.

alizing the considerable concessions by the claim that they would there be easier to manage. Even then the chiefs did not readily rise to the proffered terms, while their people so little understood what was happening that they continued to raid European property. It was not until the Governor had issued a three-day ultimatum that the chiefs brought their followers under some control and demonstrated that they were nominally ready for peace.

3. Peace on Paper. On September 17, some seven weeks after Boyce had proposed his peace mission, hostilities were officially ended by the signing of peace treaties between the British and the Ngqika and Ndlambe leaders.[1] By their terms tribal boundaries were defined in the expectancy that all groups would observe the limits thus prescribed. The Ngqika were pushed eastwards over the Keiskamma, the Ndlambe were also compressed in the same direction between the Mahoon and Kei Rivers, the Gqunukwebi gained what they had been so ardently desiring -- the return of their land up to the Fish River, the Fingos were confirmed in their tract of country between the Fish and the Keiskamma, while the smaller groups who had been loyal or helpful to the Colony were assigned parcels of land in areas where they might be reckoned to serve as buffers between warlike elements or between the Colony and the Ngqika. The Xhosa were to be brought under British rule as British subjects; the chiefs were to be gradually transformed into magistrates with greatly reduced powers; the clan spirit was to be weakened; chiefs were to stop raids on the Colony; major crimes were to be subject to British law, although domestic and internal tribal regulations were retained where they did not conflict with English law; industry was to be promoted, and European-type civilization encouraged. The Christian religion, fostered by missionary endeavour, was to be the handmaid of these secular objectives and would therefore receive official support from the government.

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[1] IBB.XXXIX.279, pp.95-98. Grahamstown Journal, Sept. 24, made public the terms of the treaties.

All this was planned in the name of the King of England, on the authority of the British Government that knew nothing of the commitments that were made on its behalf. The Governor undoubtedly thought he was applying the best possible solution to the situation that confronted him, but reference to his instructions on taking office would have reminded him that he was acting contrary to official policy. But nearly two years had passed by since he had been briefed by the Colonial Office, and present exigencies naturally loomed larger than earlier directions. Nevertheless, he felt the need for justifying his decisions and unburdened some of his misgivings to Colonel Bell in Cape Town:

> That they [the treaties with the tribes] will be assailed and abused - and misrepresented - I doubt not - and I care not - I have brought the best Judgment God has given me to the Question (upon the bearings of which perhaps, I may be allowed to have some experience and information) I have reflected on it - long, anxiously and I hope, impartially and dispassionately - and I conscientiously believe, that the conclusion to which I have arrived - is the best practicable measure in the circumstances - for the combined interest of humanity - policy and real future security .... these are the only terms upon which the conquered Tribes could be received, and suffered to continue in it (the new Province)... Now, for good or evil, more or less of one or the other - they are the King's subjects.[1]

Here Sir Benjamin struck the note on which he was so often to harp in the future; the note of self-defence with its anticipation of disapproval. Taking refuge in his own sense of rectitude, he ignored any validity the official position might have possessed and rested on the purity of his own purposes. This mental attitude was to yield him a harvest of disappointment. In the meantime it was pointed out to him by Judge Menzies in Cape Town that he was attempting to establish what was illegal since only the Crown could naturalize aliens, aliens could not own land in British territory, the chiefs could only become magistrates by charter, and treaties were only valid when ratified by the Crown. There is no evidence that these legal points carried much weight with the Governor since he persisted with his plans; yet he knew that his scheme was subject to official approval and was therefore built on a

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[1] Sept. 25. D'Urban Papers.

flimsy foundation. To Colonel Hare he acknowledged:

> The whole [treaty] is an experiment. - It has never been tried before, and we must give it a fair trial - If it fails - it is vain for the future to talk of any other Relation with these people [the Xhosa] than the Bayonet's point.1

This was more than caution: it breathed an undertone of pessimism that augured poorly for the future. Local European opinion did little to dispel any doubts that may have nibbled at the Governor's mind. The Grahamstown Journal reported the acceptance of the treaty but made clear that there was no unqualified welcome for its provisions.[2] The chiefs, it maintained in reflecting public opinion, were not sufficiently humbled, and it was unwise to permit them to occupy the Mathole Mountains. Its editor declared, "... we have not heard one solitary instance in which those treaties have been spoken of in terms of unqualified approval." He wrote of "the exceeding emptiness of the professions made by the hostile chiefs", and of the British "having failed to inflict upon the despoilers of the Colonists, that adequate punishment which they so unquestionably merit..." The colonists demanded, in terms that sound strangely modern, - "their unconditional submission, - and the restoration of the stolen property,..." and compliance with all the conditions of the treaties with the various chiefs. This attitude hardened in succeeding weeks, until Smith could report to his chief:

> There is a spirit pervading all classes of society at Grahamstown, exceeding all conception, to reprobate the present Policy, and to teach every one to view and treat a Kaffir as a Beast. I am the individual spoken of, you the one meant.3

It is probable that the colonists were bewailing the supersession of the May proclamation and the vanishing prospects of extensive land grants that would have followed the expulsion of the tribes from the Ciskei. D'Urban was therefore exposed to criticism from two quarters whose opinions were soon to be widely divergent - the colonial public and the home government. The poor man's path was certainly a thorny one!

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[1] Sept. 17 D'Urban Papers.

[2] Issue of Sept. 24.

[3] Nov.10 Theal, Records PQA, I, p.152.

II. PEACE IN PRACTICE.

1. The September Scene. When D'Urban paused to compare the losses sustained by both sides during the hostilities that were ostensibly ended, he found that his forces had suffered less than a hundred casualties while he believed the enemy to have lost about 4,000 warriors, about 80,000 head of cattle, and almost all their goats.[1] These figures were later reduced by Boyce, who claimed to have been responsible for the original estimate, to 1,400 warriors killed and 30,000 cattle lost, though he placed the colonial loss of cattle at 111,418.[2] Even such reduced reckonings needed to be accepted with caution, however, in the light of Maqoma's statement that with all the firing of British field-pieces "in the Buffalo and Amatola kloofs he had not lost a single man, and that when the Missionaries returned into Kaffirland they would scarcely miss any of the Kaffirs they had been accustomed to see."[3] It was therefore conceivable that the Colony's convictions concerning the defeat of the Xhosa were based on faulty information, and that their opponents had not been so thoroughly chastised as they had imagined.

As the tribes contrasted their September prospects with those that had confronted them in May they must have felt some satisfaction at the difference. Without great military exertions they had secured a reversal of the threat of total expulsion, and, with some exceptions, were back in their own lands and under their own chiefs. But the number who understood the provisions of the treaties that D'Urban had made with their leaders must have been very small indeed. To apply a later judgment -

> ...no small mistake has been made in supposing that the Kaffirs could immediately and spontaneously accept a system of government such as that to which their obedience has been invited.[4]

The elaborate articles to which the chiefs had subscribed could have meant but little to the rank and file of the tribesman whose loyalties

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[1] D'Urban to Bell, Nov. 11. D'Urban Papers. D'Urban to Glenelg, 17 Feb. 1836.

[2] Notes, pp.xi,xii. [3] Grahamstown Journal, 1 Oct. 1835.

[4] Native Laws and Customs (1883), p.43. Section 117, with its apt statement of Bantu understanding of government, is particularly pertinent to the post-September scene in the Ciskei.

were pledged to their chiefs, and to whom the British Government could have been hardly more than a name. It was even doubtful if news of the treaties and their significance had reached the scattered groups who lay beyond the immediate reach of Maqoma and his fellows. Meticulous observance of the treaty terms was therefore not to be expected.

The Governor showed some awareness of the nebulous nature of the situation that obtained after September 17, for in letters to his officers during the first two weeks of peace he spoke of a "bellum in pace", of the need to "keep the country well scoured" and to "shoot all Kaffirs found in it [the old Neutral Territory.]" To Armstrong he wrote on the 26th: "Keep the district clear. You have still the right to shoot them; this is an absolute necessity."[1] Raids that had been carried out against colonial property even while the peace was being signed were continued in the months that followed. The Grahamstown Journal faithfully reported such incursions, and demonstrated that formal agreements between Xhosa and European leaders stood little chance of being observed by those tribesman who were not personally under the control of their chiefs. As late as May 1836 the paper was commenting: "We think them [the complaining farmers] somewhat unreasonable in expecting that this frontier should, immediately after the recent disturbances, subside into a state of perfect quiescence."[2] There was a realization that the signing of a peace treaty did not solve the deep-set frontier problems, and that the nature and habits of the tribes did not undergo an instantaneous change on the day agreement was reached between the leaders at Fort Willshire. But there was also a failure to recognize the difference between the European and Xhosa understanding of the tenure of land. White men thought in terms of individual ownership of tracts of land, while the black men's concepts revolved around the usufructory rights over land which was held for the benefit of all though it ultimately belonged to the chief.[3] This set the

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[1] D'Urban Papers. [2] Sept. 19, 1835.

[3] Compare Macmillan, BBB, pp.27, 54.

two sides at cross-purposes and militated against their understanding one another's position.

2. The Great Experiment. D'Urban's first attempt at peace, as embodied in the May proclamation, was resisted by the Xhosa, rejected by the more thoughtful Europeans, and finally abandoned by himself. The September treaties resulted from a compromise, even from a retreat since the Governor conceded far more than he had intended. Even so they were an attempt to foist on an African population a European-type settlement. They demanded that the Xhosa accept a European system of government and conform to many European standards of conduct. To expect immediate success was to expect too much of human nature: no people could so quickly adapt to an alien culture imposed from above - acceptance, if it came, could only be a gradual process. And, slowly, D'Urban and his assistants slowly became aware of the experimental nature of the scheme on which they had embarked.

At an early date Sir Benjamin began to realize that he was dealing with tribes that were larger than he had suspected. "The Gaikas," he wrote to Smith on November 17, "seem to be more numerous than we had formed any notion of." A census taken by the commissioners revealed that there were an estimated 56,000 Ngqika, 9,200 Ndlambe, 7,500 Gqunukwebi, and 18,500 Fingo people between the Fish and the Kei Rivers - a total of 91,200 souls suddenly taken under the wing of the British Government.[1] When D'Urban returned to Grahamstown on September 25, Smith was left with the responsibility of adminstering the hybrid European-Xhosa system to the mixed multitude. He did so though the agency of the white commissioners and the chiefs who worked under them as field-cornets or magistrates, while keeping his own hands firmly on the details of government and assiduously building up the image of himself as the Inkosi Inkulu or Great Chief. His unflagging exertions justified some of the deference paid to him, but his love of adulation and his flamboyance led him into

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[1] Government Notice, 27 Jan. 1836. IRB XLIII.503, p.9. The actual total was probably nearer 100,000 souls.

theatrical displays of power which were excused by their alleged effect on his primitive audiences. In addition to his showmanship, however, he did make genuine efforts to understand Xhosa society. He spent six days in a study of Xhosa laws and rights of person before he legislated on what was required of the newly-inducted British subjects. Then, on January 7, he held a Great Meeting at King William's Town and, amid an impressive pageantry, issued instructions to the assembled chiefs and thousands of their people. Under the new regime the tribes were to abandon belief in witchcraft (as if belief could be doffed like a garment) and the practice of "eating up" individuals who were judged to have transgressed against tribal standards; murder, perjury, arson, rape, and treason were listed as punishable offences. Men were encouraged to work in the fields while women were to concentrate on domestic duties; lobola and nakedness were both discouraged; encouragement was given to the burying of the dead, and to the use of money. Few departments of native life were left untouched by the Inkosi Inkulu. Those of his hearers who understood the spate of regulations and who watched their application in the weeks that followed must have concluded that they were witnessing a major revolution in one large section of a primitive society, and, without doubt, must have resented the white man's effort to change their ways so drastically and so suddenly. Resistance did appear, but firm discipline, supported by military power, plus the compulsive charm of Smith's knight-errantry, with a little aid from the competitive spirit that worked among the magistrate-chiefs, resulted in "a benevolent despotism, exercised under martial law."[1]

The new subjects were not the only critics of Smith's system. During the early months of 1836 the Grahamstown Journal carried letters from colonists who deplored the policy operating in the new province. One writer in the issue for May 19, agreed that the system worked well -- "for the Kaffirs it does" -- but maintained that Maqoma and his fellows

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[1] W.M. Macmillan in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. VIII, Chapter XIII, p.315.

were unrepentant and were smilingly praising Smith to his face while jeering behind his back. Smith, slightly dizzy on the peak of his paternal power over a family nearly 100,000 strong, probably found it difficult to credit the humble Xhosa with a perspicacity superior to his own. Instead, he cherished the picture of their eating out of his hand. In a report to D'Urban, dated February 28, he had stated: "Within this Province nothing can exceed the happiness of the people... they all say that crime never was one-hundredth part so little as at present;" and as the weeks passed by he was confident that the experiment he was directing would succeed. An even more extravagant report came from his pen on June 4:

> ... everyone kisses my hand and greets me, not by outward show but inwardly, with his heart and voice, as his Inkosi Inkulu ... and never was the authority of the Normans more thoroughly established over the Saxons, than the British over this mass of human beings from the Keiskama to the Umzimvooboo; for it is not only on this side of the Kye but beyond it that I am looked up to as the Great Chief.1

The prospect of an enlargement of the Smith empire was too strong to resist and he recommended an extension of the colonial boundary to the Mzimvubu, but D'Urban would not hear of it since he realized that it would entail a still greater stretching of their already strained resources and would be immediately condemned by the home government. Smith was therefore told to confine his attentions to the area west of the Kei, possession of which had not yet been confirmed or denied by the authorities in London. In consequence, the administrator's energies continued to concentrate on the well-being of Queen Adelaide Province. He urged upon Sir Benjamin the need for more mission stations, more schools manned by teachers other than clergy, the founding of schools of industry, the establishment of towns and villages, the prohibition of liquor, the fixing of salaries for chiefs as magistrates, and the appointment of a judge at King William's Town.[2] By July he had supervised the drafting of a simple code of laws for the new territory.

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[1] Theal, Records PQA II, p.625.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, April 10. Theal, Records PQA II, pp.502-5.

D'Urban, who had left Grahamstown for Cape Town at the end of October, carried with him an uneasy mind regarding the new province. Xhosa consent to the Fort Willshire terms had been grudging, the colonists generally looked upon the September treaties as retrogressive moves, there were serious doubts as to whether the home government would even endorse the second and milder solution of the frontier problem, and there was Harry Smith's unreliability. The last-mentioned factor caused the Governor many anxious months, and his correspondence, to Smith and to others, mirrored the strain that the colonel's unpredictability placed upon him. When, on November 28, Smith abruptly resigned, his master, after a most careful consideration of all that had gone before, and towards the close of a long, graciously-worded, surprisingly-patient letter, reluctantly admitted:

> I am compelled to the conclusion that "Gold may be bought too dear" that even your acknowledged ability may be had at too high a price, and that in the choice of evils thus forced upon me, I must endeavour to take the least - that namely of employing Instruments of less power and energy, but which can be wielded according to some given rule, ..1

but still assured the impetuous reader - "I have ever been, - am - and shall ever be, your firm, - faithful, and affectionate Friend." One may wonder how many other major-generals and colonial governors addressed troublesome subordinates in such sincerely intimate terms! In this instance, the language softened its reader's heart. Smith pleaded for pardon, and nothing more was heard of resignation.

Another of D'Urban's headaches arose from the question of land grants. The bright hopes aroused in many colonial breasts by news of the annexation of the Ciskei grew dim before the sterner realities of the September policy but hope revived with the passage of time, and colonists looked forward to acquiring tracts of land in the new territory. That there were grounds for hope was made clear by D'Urban's confidential notes, accompanying his despatch to Glenelg on September 17, which stated that "large tracts are left vacant for the occupation and speculation of Europeans." No less

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[1] To Smith from Uitenhage, Dec. 8. D'Urban Papers.

clear were Glenelg's reactions to this bait that was dangled before him:

> I cannot too distinctly impress upon you the instruction, that under no circumstances a single grant or licence of occupation be made of any part of the territory in favour of any European. Even if ultimately added to the British dominions, it must be reserved exclusively for the occupancy of the natives.1

But three months had to pass before D'Urban received that unequivocal directive, and in the interval the matter of land grants must have been thoroughly discussed in South Africa and England. A confidential note from Boyce to Smith informed the latter that Shrewsbury in London had convinced Buxton that not a foot of the Neutral Territory or the new province was to be occupied by British settlers, except for military posts, trading towns, and mission stations.[2] Boyce declared that he would resign his commissionership (with the Ndlambe tribe) rather than condone land grants to Europeans, while the Wesleyan Missionary Committee in London, expressed "their decided disapprobation of any of the Kaffir lands being reserved for the Colonists".[3] Yet, in spite of official instructions, unofficial denials, and private disapproval, there is no doubt that there was widespread expectation of land grants within the annexed territory. It was all very much sub rosa, or, as D'Urban and his correspondents so often said, "entre nous", since it was officially a proscribed topic; but, nevertheless, hope refused to die, and there is evidence to suggest that it was given enough official encouragement for it to be alive both before and after Glenelg's statement had been received in the Colony. On 8 December 1835, Frederick Rex wrote to his father, saying:

> Do you know of any favour worth asking of His Excellency either for myself or for any of us? as now is the time I could get almost anything done. I would have asked for a farm in the neighbourhood [Fort Beaufort] but am afraid they will only be granted on condition that they be occupied and not sold for a certain number of years. Of course I would not have one on such conditions all this Entre nous.4

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[1] Despatch, 17 Feb. 1836. IBB XXXIX.279, p.110.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, 15 March 1836. Theal, Records PQA II, p.442.

[3] Beecham before the Aborigines Committee. IBB VII.538, p.497. The W.M.Missionary Committee opinion is dated 29 Oct. 1835 and is quoted by Roxborough, (Colonial Policy,) p.122.

[4] Long, Index, p.184.

Such a letter would not have been written unless there had been a lively chance of a farm's being granted in what the Ngqika still regarded as their hereditary land. Some months later, in the following June, D'Urban was telling Bowker first to give adequate lands to the Fingos in the Clusie area, then to Englishmen interspersed among the Fingos, giving precedence to Bowker's own claim, then to those of the Southey family, and then to the young Shepstone. The rider was added, however, that European applications would not be conclusively granted until the King's pleasure were known - a proviso which left D'Urban a way of escape but did not exonerate him from having endorsed hopes concerning grants of land beyond the Fish River.[1] This interpretation is confirmed by Cox's admission to the Aborigines Committee that there were many applications for land between the Fish and the Buffalo Rivers;[2] and if any further proof were needed it is supplied in D'Urban's own handwriting in the form of a tabulation of requests for grants during the years 1836 and 1837. The lists reveal that 318 grants, covering 1,922,721 acres, were made in 1836, while in the following year 482 grants tentatively disposed of 4,731,200 acres - a total of 800 grants relating to 6,653,921 acres which lay between the Fish and the Kei Rivers. Yet, in his despatch of 9 June 1836 D'Urban assured Glenelg:

> ....I should never have presumed to grant any of these lands [in the new province] in His Majesty's name, until I should have known whether it was His Majesty's pleasure to possess or not the territory in which they were situated; neither have I granted any, having returned to all the numerous memorials for grants in that country the same answer, namely, "that they could not be entertained until His Majesty's pleasure should be known". 3

The Governor was technically correct, and would have been able to defend himself in the event of any enquiry into the matter; but at the same time he was running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, observing the letter of the law by returning all petitions for land grants while leaving the impression with the petitioners that he was quite ready to grant their requests. If there had been no restraint from London, the Province

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[1] June 10. D'Urban Papers.

[2] IBB VII,538, p.432.

[3] D'Urban Papers, and IBB XLIII,503, p.70.

of Queen Adelaide would have been quickly dotted with colonial farms.

While he was entertaining plans for white settlements on Xhosa lands, and while he was directing a further extension of the colony into the area north of the Stormberg range where Boer farmers had already settled, Sir Benjamin was learning that the lands allotted to the tribes were too small for their minimal needs. He therefore extended the boundaries set by the September treaties, and reported to Glenelg that the enlargement gave "very great satisfaction and content" to all the tribes. When Smith allowed Maqoma to move west over the Keiskamma, however, D'Urban sharply rebuked him and obliged him to revoke the permit. It thus became clear to the chiefs that they would not regain the land on which their hearts were set--the Neutral Territory--but were condemned to see it occupied by whites and Fingos. They had caused drastic modifications in D'Urban's peace plans of August and September, but failure to recover the coveted section between the Keiskamma and the Kat Rivers left them dissatisfied.

D'Urban told Glenelg by despatch on February 6 that "perfect tranquillity" prevailed in the new province, "as well as along the old border, and that all measures" which he had set on foot were proceeding prosperously. Harry Smith capped the report a little later by informing his master, "Everybody is happy".[1]

III. MISSIONS AND THE PEACE

1. Wesleyans and the September Policy. In view of the ardent desire for peace it was only to be expected that the Wesleyan missionaries would welcome its arrival. They believed they were its initiators, and they had taken a lively interest in its attainment. During the preliminary negotiations D'Urban had kept in touch with Shepstone, informing him of the terms that were being worked out and regretting that the missionary's duties would keep him from attending the meetings and helping the Governor meet the Xhosa chiefs.[2] On the day after the sign-

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, p.7 and Smith to D'Urban, April 12. Theal, Records PQA.II, p.506.

[2] D'Urban to Shepstone, Sept.11. D'Urban Papers.

ing of the treaty, Sir Benjamin received a letter from Boyce which must have expressed the Society's warm approval of the peace terms, for the Governor replied:

> It is indeed well for the Colonists, that a Body so immeasurably beyond all suspicion, and therefore carrying such just weight in the mind of Government, as well as of the public, as the Wesleyan Methodist Society - have espoused their cause, and I hail it, as holding forth a hope, of at least a fair investigation and that we may be convicted before we are condemned.1

From this it would appear that the missionaries gave immediate support to the September policy, even as they had done to the proclamation in May. There was a significant difference in their own involvement, however. The earlier settlement had implied the failure of their endeavours; its successor leaned heavily on missionary organization and depended in a large measure on the tranquillizing influence of Christian teaching for the ultimate pacification of the tribes. After the September treaties the chiefs had been appointed principal magistrates over their own peoples, subject to the control of British agents. In addition, commissioners were assigned to each tribal group to supervise the operation of the treaty provisions and to serve as liason between the Xhosa and the Europeans. According to Boyce, "at the special request of the Chiefs, the Missionaries with whom they had been previously connected, were placed on this Commission, the details of which would have been difficult to carry into effect without their assistance."[2] In this instance, therefore, the missionaries could be regarded as natives' representatives, enjoying the confidence of both sides but charged with the special task of guarding Xhosa interests.

To the Wesleyans, it may be remembered, this was not a novel duty. They had been sharing in the care of the Fingos on the Clusie since May 15. At first this had been done out of compassion for the homeless people and as a gesture of helpfulness toward the Governor. The course of the war prevented them from serving on their chosen stations and they were glad to have a field of service open on the threshold of the colony. They believed that work among the displaced Fingos would prove fruitful,

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[1] Sept.19. Ibid.

[2] Notes, p.33.

and at a district meeting on July 7 they had officially approved of Ayliff's accepting a commissionership among the Fingos and of Shepstone's appointment to Phatho's people at Wesleyville--both positions being honorary, without any salary from the Government. But the Fingo experiment failed to gain the support of those it was designed to help, and the people scattered, weakening the settlement and frustrating the well-intentioned efforts of the European commissioners.[1] D'Urban blamed this in part on Ayliff who, it appeared, had suddenly left his charge and thereby prejudiced the success of the scheme.[2] The whole blame for failure could not be placed on Ayliff's shoulders, however. The Fingo seemed by nature to be a restless individual: Smith later grumbled--"A Jew is a sedentary being compared to this most extraordinary and wandering race."[3] Ayliff found that his congregation was diminishing, and believed that a large number of his flock had entered colonial service.[4] Then, in mid-November, there came a pressing invitation from the Gcaleka chief, Rili, for the missionary to resume work at Butterworth. In language that must have tugged at the missionary's heart, the chief wrote:

> Teacher, why do you cast me off? Why do you leave me in the time of my trouble? Return again - forget the past. Hintsa's conduct toward you we all disapproved of. We all knew that he was doing wrong; but because he was the great Captain, we were afraid to speak. If any of us had said, "Hintsa, why do you injure the Teacher?" we should have been killed. Hintsa is now dead; he died through his own folly. It is true your place is burnt; but you can make other houses. The place was not burnt in time of war; war was over when it was burnt, and we were all returning to our places. Some vile fellow has done it: some one man must have blowed the fire-brand into a flame, and have put the flame into the thatch of your house. Come back and ask us for that man. When I was a boy you were with me, and were then my friend: when I was circumcised and became a Captain, you then gave me a word; now that I am alone, I want you to return to be my father, and to help me to keep the word you gave.5

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[1] Supra, pp.294-298.

[2] D'Urban to J.M. Bowker, Oct. 2 regrets Ayliff's absence, but Bowker to D'Urban (Nov.10) announces that the missionary had by then returned and settled among the Fingos with his family. D'Urban Papers.

[3] Smith to D'Urban, 25 May 1836. Theal, Records PQA II, p.594.

[4] Confirmation of this was given by Shepstone in July 1836 when the Fingos were returning to the Clusie area and providing him with a congregation of about 150 each Sunday. WMM 1837, p.64.

[5] WMM 1836, p.679.

Through the welter of self-defence there gleamed the genuine desire for Ayliff's return, and Ayliff could be pardoned for wanting to respond to the appeal. He showed the letter to Colonel Smith who urged him to go;[1] but D'Urban wished him to remain with the Fingos, and complained to Smith when the missionary laid plans for removal without informing him of his intentions.

The Missionary Committee met and instructed Ayliff to return to Butterworth. A Methodist convoy then left Fort Peddie on March 29 and reached the mission site on April 9. Negotiations with Kili secured reasonable terms for the re-opening of the station, with the result that Ayliff was soon building up the mission that war had destroyed. He then awoke to his duty toward the Governor, and wrote to D'Urban belatedly informing him of his move to Butterworth, a move of which the Governor was very well aware.[2]

About the same time that Ayliff was writing to Sir Benjamin the latter was exchanging with Smith some severe criticisms of the Methodist worker who, while not pledged to promote the political aims cherished by the government, could with advantage have pursued his missionary projects more circumspectly. Smith, in his choleric manner, complained:

> I have reason to apprehend that that consummate fool and timid man Mr. Ayliff is doing much mischief to shake the confidence with which Kreli looked up to me,...
> He is so timid, the pusillanimous creature; he is afraid to assert an honest opinion, so shuffles into agreeing with their opinion.... No calculation can be made upon a fool, but our interest is to keep him in his place by good humour, Krili in his by fear and equity. [3]

In more temperate but no less damaging language, D'Urban responded:

> Mr. Ayliff was a very improper person to send to Butterworth - imbecile, timorous and weak. Mr. Boyce and Mr. Palmer both described him thus to me, and said that he was unfit for any post of trial. He had even abandoned the Fingoes on the Iquorra with whom he had volunteered to remain, although close to a military post, and with Bowker to give him countenance; and to that abandonment may be attributed the desertion of many of them at the period. I was well aware of his unfitness for Butterworth and disliked the arrangement excessively, but I did not think it expedient or judicious to interfere with the

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, Nov. 17 (quoted by Slee, Albany Methodism, p.47), Ayliff, 14 July 1836, in WMM 1836, p.944.

[2] R. Haddy, 28 April 1836. WMM 1837, pp.941-943.

[3] Smith to D'Urban, June 2. Theal, Records PQA II, p.609.

> domestic concerns of the Wesleyan managers. Nor indeed did I feel myself competent to oppose any impediment to the distribution of their missionaries which they had thought fit to make.
> It can't be helped now - unless Mr. Boyce can be induced to make some change.1

The unprepossessing picture of Ayliff conveyed by these extracts, authenticated by fellow-missionaries as one of the writers claimed, might help to explain not only the partial failure of the Fingo settlement (in the Neutral Territory) but also some of the alarmism that flowed from Butterworth during the early stages of the previous year's hostilities. They do at least suggest caution in accepting Ayliff's judgments in secular affairs. At the same time they revealed Sir Benjamin's reticence to meddle with a missionary society's administration[2] and his trust in Boyce's acumen. He need not have been too anxious over the welfare of the Fingos, since the Wesleyans were no less eager than he to care for them. When Ayliff left the Clusie, Shepstone kept a watchful eye on the settlement from his new station on the Bika, only five miles away; and the missionary committee shortly appointed Garner (Warner?) for full-time service with the Fingos, so they were not as neglected as D'Urban in his more harassed moments may have believed.

Extended consideration has been given to Ayliff and his relation to the Fingos for two reasons; the issue was of vital concern to the Wesleyans in the context of the war, and it was part of an experiment in administration, a pilot scheme on which D'Urban based his solution to the problem of tribal management under the September treaties. He could not claim that his ideas were original since both Philip and Boyce had earlier recommended the appointment of agents for the guidance of the tribes, but he was the first to translate theory into fact. This work ante-dated the peace terms of September 17. The appointment of Bowker, Ayliff, Halifax, and Moultrie to the first Fingo settlement was gazetted on July 13; that of Currie, Shepstone, William Bowker, and Forbes to the Gqunukwebi on July 14; and that of Armstrong, Thompson and Minto to

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[1] D'Urban to Smith, June 10, D'Urban Papers.

[2] He adopted a similar attitude towards G.M.S. affairs in June 1836. D'Urban to Smith, June 10. Ibid.

the Tyhume Fingos came on July 29; and that of Southey, Boyce, and Kidd to the friendly portion of the Ndlambe was made public on August 6.[1] This plan, tried out on friendly groups, was utilized in a larger way after peace had been made. A series of government notices, dated from November 16 onwards, confirmed the earlier appointments and announced additional commissionerships until all of the Ciskeian tribes were covered. In each case a missionary was associated with secular officials in the hope that christianizing of the natives would promote their pacification. The Wesleyans played a prominent part in these plans because of their numerous interests in the various peoples, but the Glasgow missionaries and Brownlee also made their contributions as religious instructors to the Ngqika and Ntinde respectively.

Although the missionaries' services were in all cases gratuitous, the plan to make them government officials, in harness with paid agents of the secular authority, was open to serious objection. D'Urban was endeavouring, consciously or otherwise, to profit from a union of church and state and to employ the church for political ends. Had he ears to hear, history would have told him how unsatisfactory such a partnership would prove to be. The church had a full-time spiritual task to perform, which task would be hindered by involvement in secular responsibilities. The native would find it difficult if not impossible to distinguish between the church and the state it served, and in his eyes the church would be but an agent of the encroaching white man's government. It can be convincingly argued that it would have been better for the mission societies to have pledged their co-operation with the government's philanthropic ambitions while keeping their hands clean from any taint of secularism or union with the state, no matter how pure their motives might have been.[2]

But D'Urban was immersed in the immediate problems that confronted

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[1] Grahamstown Journal, July 23, July 30, Aug. 6 respectively.

[2] Some of the missionaries, notably Chalmers, Laing and Brownlee, saw the issues clearly and declined government support and appointment. W. Govan, Memorials of the Missionary Career of the Rev. James Laing (Glasgow, 1875), p.53.

him and had little inclination to pause while history read him her lessons. He needed help, and some well-qualified men, the missionaries, lay close at hand. Due to the war, they were largely unemployed. Had they been engrossed in the many cares of directing an active mission, they might not so readily have fallen for the lure of prestige as government officers: but they were anxious to be employed about their own clerical business and saw the Governor's requests as means to their spiritual ends, so accepted the proffered posts without serious misgivings.

Some of the missionaries entertained doubts about other aspects of their relationship to government policy in the new territory, however. The cautious Brownlee, returning to his station on the banks of the Buffalo in August, hesitated to build in the vicinity of King William's Town because such action would have spelt approval of the annexation. He foresaw that acceptance of government grants would identify him with the British occupation in the eyes of the Ntinde, and he wished to keep clear of such compromising associations. But such a neutral stand became difficult to maintain in view of the unequivocal claim, expressed by Smith, that since all land in the new province belonged to the King, the missionaries would have to apply for grants before re-opening their stations. The missionaries, said Smith with unconscious irony, had no more right to the land than had the Kaffirs, not pausing to consider how strong were the "Kaffirs'" claims.[1] Some of the missionaries, notably those of the C.M.S., contested that interpretation, and objected to applying for a grant for that which they had previously held from the chief on whose land their mission had stood. Their position was weakened, however, by the attitude adopted by the Methodists and quoted by D'Urban in support of his policy:

> The Wesleyan Mission are aware of these Principles (application to H.M. for land grants), which are unquestionable, and have accordingly applied for grants in the usual way upon either bank of the Keiskama.2

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, 3 Jan. 1836. Theal, Records PQA I, p.269.

[2] D'Urban to Smith, 15 Jan. D'Urban Papers.

Such compliance was not difficult for the Wesleyans since "upon either bank of the Keiskama" they were dealing with the Gqunukwebi; but it was a different matter for the G.M.S. who were having to tread delicately with the more hostile Ngqika. Their influence over Maqoma and his followers would be drastically reduced by open subservience to the conquering power. As late as mid-April, therefore, Chalmers was thanking D'Urban for land grants received, but was rejecting them as being prejudicial to the mission work he was endeavouring to do.[1] Upon request he elaborated on his position, but there is no record to show how the impasse was finally solved.

2. Missionaries Return. Some clergyman had left their missions with great reluctance and were ready to return at the earliest possible moment. The Transkeian Wesleyans, for instance, only reached Grahamstown on May 18, but by the 29th Davis was saying: "Every missionary in the colony is anxiously looking forward to the time when, through peace being restored, he will be enabled to return to his station".[2] Those words were written in the hopeful light that shone from the May proclamation when none knew the many weeks that would have to pass before nominal peace was effected. But the intervening time was not wasted. The Methodists busied themselves in translation of the Scriptures and in revision of translations they had already made, in addition to serving their Albany congregations. These satisfying occupations however, did not extinguish the desire to be with the people and in the place where they felt called to serve, and they, in common with their fellow missionaries, were poised on the frontier awaiting official permission to return.

In early July Chalmers and Kayser, to take examples from extant correspondence, were both asking that they be allowed to go back to their missions--Chumie and Knapp's Hope, and D'Urban was willing to grant Kayser's petition while being reluctant to accede to Chalmers's request. Even then,

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[1] Chalmers to D'Urban, 2 April. C.O. 454, Letters Received, No. 95.

[2] WMM 1835, p.709.

[3] C.O. 433, Nos. 34 and 38, July 2 and 9.

official wheels moved slowly and Kayser on November 23 was still writing for the permit that had not been issued. A note in D'Urban's own hand bade the secretary to "write a very civil letter" asking for information concerning the mission he proposed to serve.[1] By that time, the climate of opinion had changed and the government was keen to have mission assistance in reconciling the Khosa to its policies. Harry Smith had already told his chief; "I should be glad to see all Missionaries back again, and allow me to pray your Excellency to throw no impediment in the way of any one", and giving as his reason the belief that any clergyman who was prevented from returning would become "a conceived (convinced?) Martyr,... more injurious absent than present."[2] But before D'Urban received the last piece of wisdom he was writing to his deputy, saying:

> I shall cause letters to be written to the Missionaries that they may return - but that they must report themselves to you - and receive your directions - in certain matters - and that they must also apply to me for grants (seeing that the Country is now His Majesty's) of such land as they wish to occupy for their station establishments.[3]

By November 17 the letters were supposed to have been written, yet it was January 8 of the following year before John Bell, the Governor's secretary in Cape Town, wrote to Kayser and told him that the way was clear for his return. Dilatoriness was no less endemic to colonial officialdom than it is to its successors!

To James Read, D'Urban doggedly refused permission for return to Kat River, believing him, mainly on the strength of his connections with Philip, to be persistently disloyal to the administration. But to the Wesleyans, the Governor extended a helping hand, encouraging all their men, with the exception of Ayliff, to take up the threads of their previous work with the minimum delay. Both Sir Benjamin and Smith had definite ideas as to the type of missionary they would welcome, and it would seem that the Methodists conformed more closely to that type than did the ministers of other denominations. When Smith embarked on "rulership" of

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[1] Ibid, Letter 90.

[2] Nov. 3 and 11. Theal, Records PQA I, pp. 123, 149.

[3] To Smith from Uitenhage, Nov. 10. D'Urban Papers.

the Xhosa tribes after the September treaties, he instructed the Governor concerning the stamp of missionary he would welcome in the new province:

> In the selection of men of holy callings, those of active and industrious habits are to be preferred, who would enforce the strict observance of the Sabbath, while the six days in the week are occupied in useful lessons of industry to men, women, and children. Your fanatical preacher is to be avoided, as much as a temperate religion is to be courted.
> ... if ... I am fortunate enough to have Missionaries, moderate Theologists, and practically good and industrious...

then, he would be able to reclaim the Xhosa, or rather, reform them.[1] It must have been with some surprise that he found Maqoma cherishing similar notions about the kind of teacher the Ngqika were prepared to welcome: "We wish for Missionaries, but not for one who prays more than one day in several, but who would teach us to be useful to each other."[2] And there was the missionary's problem neatly implied: how to impart spiritual knowledge, in which few were naturally interested, while satisfying the wide-spread desire for material progress. It is a perennial problem, for it is true that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God", and it remains unsolved even in the late twentieth century. We should not therefore be surprised that in 1835, with Christian missions still in their infancy, while a mission philosophy was still to be worked out, the workers in Kaffraria were not always wise in their approach to those whom they wished to convert. That they did not gain the complete support of the secular authorities is still less surprising since their objectives were not those of the state. The missionary movement was launched and sustained by the evangelical fervour that placed its prime emphasis on the spirit. The missionary was dedicated to the task of saving men's souls, of persuading the non-Christian to seek the kingdom of God and His righteousness irrespective of his physical circumstances. The state's prime interest lay in political and social stability, with the opportunities for material progress that such conditions would provide, and it was inevitable that secular and spiritual aims should sometimes clash. Experience garnered from the passage of a further

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[1] Sept. 22. Theal, Records PQA I, pp. 2, 3.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, Sept. 27. Ibid, p.17.

one and a quarter centuries has not eliminated all points of conflict between the two realms, so the earlier protagonists may be forgiven some differences of opinion.

D'Urban, as a Christian administrator, gave qualified assent to the missionaries' other-wordly designs, provided that they co-operated in his paternal plans for the civilization of the Xhosa. He, with shades of Philip looming over his shoulder, welcomed "Christian missionaries - not political agitators" and was convinced that the Methodist group conformed to his specifications. His movements since arriving in Grahamstown on January 20 had brought the Wesleyan workers into close contact with him, and he came to admire their sterling qualities. He had, moreover, received considerable unsolicited help from Boyce who proved intensely sympathetic to his own problems and was prepared to offer practical aid in unusual forms. On 12 October the missionary sent him a document entitled: "Skeleton of a Plan for the arrangement of Facts calculated to exhibit the true state of Colonial Affairs to uninformed and prejudiced persons in England, addressed to His Excellency Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Governor of the Cape".[1] The length of the title foreshadowed the length of the document which had three main sections, "Causes of the Kafir Irruption", "The War", and "Future Arrangements to prevent War", which, in turn, contained many subdivisions expressed in note form. The causes of the irruption were listed under six heads, and covered the land problem, the unsatisfactory administration of the frontier, the ill-chosen defenceless frontier line, governmental ignorance of Kaffraria, failure to anticipate the war, and the immediate causes of invasion which were blamed on Fairbairn and Philip. The second section dealt with the colonial counter-invasion, and covered the object of the war, its conduct, and its expensive difficulties. The remainder of the document considered the nature of the peace treaties, the need for a British-controlled barrier between the Colony and Kaffraria, plans for civilizing the Xhosa, and the alternatives con-

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[1] Theal, Records PQA I, pp.62-69.

sequent upon a rejection of D'Urban's system. These latter were declared to be an exterminating war that would probably spread as far as Natal, or the abandonment of Albany with a possible retreat to the Cape.

The "Skeleton of a Plan", outlined above, was an amazing contribution to come gratuitously from the hand of a missionary, but there is no record of D'Urban's protesting against its presentation. A clerical ally in his inevitable dispute with the Colonial Office was too valuable to be turned away: he was rather to be appreciated and utilized. Boyce was therefore strongly recommended to Smith on more than one occasion--"Mr. Boyce you will find a very able man--one of education - and knowledge of the world - and well acquainted with all the tribes of the lower Buffalo."[1] Boyce returned the compliment by urging the retention of Smith at King William's Town when D'Urban was thinking of recalling him to Cape Town.[2] Smith, for his part, did not immediately appreciate Boyce's gifts. He numbered him among "these dormant Commissioners" and asked Sir Benjamin "to induce Messrs. Boyce and Co. to move; it is evident if perpetual motion cannot be attained by any mechanical operations, its reverse is by some people perfectly acquired." But that was before the two had met. A little later he was writing, "Mr. Boyce arrived on Friday. I like him exceedingly"; and eight days later, "Mr. Boyce is most valuable to me."[3] These were illustrations of Smith's ebullience, however, for on the following day he was recording his disillusionment:

> ... he is fanatical, and more full of dragooning our new subjects into this and that than a hundred soldiers. No matter whether Priest, Prelate, Parson, Curate, Bishop, Archbishop, Wesleyan, London, or Glasgow, by heavens the man of the Gospel is a most worldly fellow. I will make him useful, however, be assured, while I have everything my own way; but I confess I expected a more practical man in Mr. Boyce.[4]

Such a letter possibly revealed more of Smith than it did of Boyce, par-

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[1] Sept. 30. D'Urban Papers.

[2] Boyce to D'Urban, Oct. 18, and D'Urban's reply, Nov. 11. Ibid.

[3] Smith to D'Urban, Oct. 13, 18, 26. Ibid.

[4] Oct. 27. Ibid.

ticularly in view of the former's virtual retraction of his harsher judgments on receipt of a mild remonstrance from D'Urban who wrote:

> I regret to see that you are getting a little dissatisfied with Mr. Boyce. Think twice before you cast him off, for he is in many ways far too valuable to be lightly put aside.1

D'Urban's counsel was not wasted. Within a week a repentant colonel was confessing:

> There was a mist between Mr. Boyce and me, which mutual candour speedily dispelled; and I may say we have a sincere regard for each other, at least, so I feel, and so says his letter to me. Would to God I had only a few such men. He is a most excellent man of business, honest, frank, and energetic. 2

The conversion was not complete, however. The day came, some six months later, when Methodist opposition to some of his policies, the exact nature of which is difficult to determine, sparked off another anti-Boyce tirade:

> We shall very soon have the whole of the Wesleyans root and branch in opposition, or I am much mistaken. Our worthy friend Boyce is a most restless, turbulent little fellow, without the slightest command over himself; and he lets out his denunciations without reserve, let them alight where they may. I am wonderfully well with the Corps Parsonique everywhere; but I expect as much mercy from a Kaffir in war as from the quill of one of these Gentry if you stole a sermon.3

It seems probable that Smith and the missionary were too much alike in temperament for them to work peaceably together or for either consistently to admire the other's good qualities. D'Urban, with his greater placidity, was better able to take a balanced view of Boyce and utilise his abilities and his position as secretary of the Wesleyan organization in his pacification of the Xhosa country. That he valued his co-operation was evident from a broken sentence in his letter of November 7 - "I will pray you to write to me <u>direct</u> and Confidentially - whenever you judge it expedient -". Boyce was interested enough in the political scene, and ardent enough in the promotion of his Society's interests, to accept that invitation in the months that followed. Although Haddy, as chairman of the missionary committee, was nominal leader of the Methodists during the

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[1] Nov.3. <u>D'Urban Papers</u>.

[2] Nov.10. Theal, <u>Records PQA</u> I, p.149.

[3] To D'Urban, 2 May 1836. Theal, <u>Records PQA</u> II, p.567.

absence of their superintendent, Shaw, his patent distaste for correspondence left Secretary Boyce to do most of the necessary writing of letters. This led the authorities to regard Boyce as the head and to work through him in matters relating to the Wesleyans. Little harm came of the arrangement, apart from encouraging the secretary's rather exaggerated sense of his own importance, since Methodist policy required committee decisions on all major issues.

At a meeting of their committee on October 8, the members resolved that Shepstone should open a new station on the Bika to care for Phatho's tribe west of the Keiskamma, and that Boyce take over Wesleyville as the centre for work among the Gqunukwebi who lived between the Keiskamma and the Buffalo. In addition they authorized Boyce to promise to Mhala, the Ndlambe chief, that they would provide a missionary for his people, but giving no indication if the station for such a worker would be at Mount Coke or on a fresh site that would bridge the gap between the Buffalo and the Kei. Unfortunately their vision exceeded their resources, and at the end of the year they had regretfully to inform Colonel Smith that their funds would not permit them to fulfil their plan. It then appeared that the G.M.S. would endeavour to supply a missionary for Mhala, much to Smith's satisfaction since he wanted each major tribe or section of a tribe to have a resident missionary in its midst.[1] Without direct interference in a society's domestic affairs, the Governor and his second-in-command managed to keep a close watch on appointments and to ensure that these, in general, met with their approval. Except in their refusal to permit Read's return, however, they never vetoed a move, preferring to influence the mission committees by means of counsel rather than of force.

3. Peace in the Transkei. The Governor showed a very lively interest, as well he might, in developments beyond the Kei. The peace made with Hintsa could never have been much more than a scrap of paper, in spite of Rili's pledge to honour its terms. In no detail was this more

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, Dec. 29. Theal, Records PQA I, p.263.

apparent than in respect of the 25,000 cattle the Gcaleka had undertaken to deliver to the colony. As the months passed by without bringing the promised herds D'Urban recognized that there was little chance of their ever appearing.[1] Making a choice out of a necessity he therefore advanced the radical idea that land be substituted for cattle. In view of the situation of the suggested territory--on either side of the road to Butterworth--it is tempting to wonder if the exchange were originally suggested by one of the Methodist missionaries; but since there is no evidence on the point, it can be no more than a speculation. D'Urban in making the proposal to Smith on October 28, treated as his own the idea of releasing Hili from the obligation to pay cattle and demanding of him the cession of a strip of land, on each side of the road that led up from the Kei to the mission at Butterworth and on to Hintsa's kraal. It was a queer suggestion. If it had been realized it would have been the source of endless trouble, an enclave embedded in essentially hostile territory. Fortunately, the scheme was revoked by Glenelg on August 2, 1836, without its having had the time to engender mischief. But at first it smoothly went ahead. A mission from Hili and his uncle Mhukru appeared in King William's Town on December 11 and explained how shortage of cattle rendered it impossible for them to fulfil the original agreement and how they were willing to cede to His Majesty the designated tract of country. It is difficult to see how the cession could have benefitted the Europeans in any useful degree: it was too distant to be of value to the Colony, and could only have served to alienate the Gcaleka from the mission that was thus isolated within itsnarrow confines. The deal must surely be reckoned as one of Sir Benjamin's mistakes.

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[1] D'Urban Papers. Yet on Nov.10, while dissuading Smith from waging war on Hili for the sake of "a phantom", D'Urban authorized him to threaten the chief with war if he did not produce the cattle. Ibid. The injustice of such an attitude became apparent a few weeks later when Capt. Delancey passed through Hili's territory and reported: "I was astonished at the small number of cattle, taking into consideration the large tract of territory, and the number of inhabitants: nor did I see one colonial head amongst those I remarked." LDB XLIII.503, p.17. This should be recalled when considering the fine imposed on Hintsa (Supra, pp.265, 282, 283).

There were explosive possibilities enough in the Transkei without the introduction of alien causes of friction. While the Gcaleka were bound to the colony by the tenuous threads of Hintsa's treaty, they were in constant danger of an attack from Faku, the Mpondo chief who was also at variance with the Thembu regent, Fadana. The pacific, restraining influence of the missionaries had been absent from the area since the end of April, and D'Urban was anxious that they should return and employ their prestige in the restoration of tranquillity. He therefore welcomed the news given by Smith on November 3 that Palmer and Davis had arrived in King William's Town, presumably to make arrangements for going back to their stations of Morley and Clarkebury respectively. Smith was preparing letters to Fadana and Faku and was glad to have the missionaries' opinion of the approach he had made. D'Urban went further, for on hearing of the missionaries' plans he enlisted Palmer as his unofficial representative, through the agency of Boyce, and authorized him to speak on his, the Governor's behalf.[1] He sent twenty tiger (leopard?) skins for distribution among the Transkeian chiefs, apparently in response to an earlier suggestion of Palmer's; and gave him carte blanche to give the chiefs whatever assurances he deemed to be best.

> Whatever engagements he may see fit to make on my Part - I will fulfil. It is very important that we should maintain a good understanding with, and acquire a Salutary Influence over these Chiefs, - in the spirit of which position, I am prepared to act - in whatever way Mr. Palmer who knows them well, may think best fitted for the object.

Harry Smith, with his customary impetuous judgment, formed a less favourable opinion of both Palmer and Davis after conversing with them, mainly, it would seem because they were so devoted to their missionary calling as to be disinterested in his administrative or political aims.

> It is considered travelling expands the intellect, but their case is a different one. They appear to me so absorbed in the great desire to re-establish their Mission Stations, that all other considerations must in their view fall to the ground.2

He found that Palmer and Captain Gardiner who, with Fynn, had been at Faku's were "much at variance", and that this had made the two ministers

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[1] D'Urban to Boyce, Nov. 7. D'Urban Papers.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, Nov. 30. Theal, Records PQA I, pp.218, 219.

reticent to express their opinions; but "after an hour's hammering at them" Smith ascertained that Fynn was "a greater ass and Don Quixote than one could possibly conceive" and that he was probably doing more harm than good at Faku's where he was still detained. These discoveries led Smith to revise his unfavourable opinion of the Methodists and to recognize their usefulness in Transkeian affairs.

The need for a fact-finding and peace-making mission across the Kei soon presented the government with an opportunity to profit from Wesleyan knowledge of the area. During the month of December D'Urban and Smith discussed the sending of an "embassy" under Captain P. Delancey of the 75th Regiment to treat with Fadana and Faku. The Governor thought that Palmer, who was "no ordinary man" and who had "great influence with Faku and much knowledge of the people", should accompany the mission; but Smith, while conceding that Palmer was "a most excellent man", maintained that he was "of high prejudices and feelings," forming "an opinion on slight grounds". He therefore advanced the claims of Boyce for membership in the party, saying that he was "most desirous to go," and adding, "He was Fakoo's Missionary for three years, and possesses more influence over him than any other person. His going will ensure Fynn's return, whereas was [sic] Mr. Palmer to go, the scene of dissension would assuredly be reacted to our prejudice." The colonel hoped that his superior would waive any objections he might have and approve of his sending Boyce, "who as a Politician exceeds by far Mr. Palmer".[1] On the grounds of political acumen, Smith's preference for Boyce was sound, sound enough to win D'Urban to his way of thinking by January 15. Yet, when the embassy left eight days later, it was Palmer who accompanied it. There is no correspondence to reveal the reason for the change: it may have been settled by the Methodists who took some time deciding the placement of their missionaries, at one time planning to appoint Boyce to Buntingville then assigning him to Wesleyville, leaving Palmer as the senior

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[1] D'Urban to Smith, Dec. 26. D'Urban Papers; Smith to D'Urban 3 Jan. 1836. Theal, Records PQA I, p.268.

man east of the Kei, and therefore the best suited to go with the peace mission.[1]

It was January 23 before Delancey assembled his party at Fort Warden above the west bank of the Kei. He then had under his command 110 men: 7 officers and Palmer, 2 sergeants, 71 other ranks, and 8 servants, with 78 horses between them.[2] The journey undertaken proved to be a tour of Wesleyan missions in the Transkei. Delancey met Rili, his councillors and 800 followers at Butterworth on the 25th and gained their consent to the cession of land which the chief's mother, Nomsa, was already calling the "Land of God". Thence, accompanied by two of Rili's councillors, the party travelled to Clarkebury and were welcomed at the mission house by Fadana at the head of 700 Thembu. Conversations confirmed the chief's desire to be considered an ally of the British, and his wish for the return of Davis as his missionary. He also furnished two prominent men to see the embassage on its next stage which lay through Morley, where the mission stood in ruins but where Palmer preached to 600 members of his old congregation. Buntingville was reached on February 5. Faku came out with his entourage and 1,200 of his people to give a regal welcome to the visitors. When politics were later discussed he agreed to co-operate with Fadana, Rili, and Bhukru in the interests of peace, and to produce evidence that Ncaphayi, who had been the frequent source of trouble for many years, had acknowledged himself to be his (Faku's) subject and ally. The Mpondo spoke highly of the Methodist assistant, Tainton, who had remained with him when Satchell left, and also praised Henry Fynn who had been with him as "King's Resident", thus somewhat confounding Smith's earlier gloomy appraisal of Fynn's usefulness. Tainton averred that Delancey's arrival had prevented the outbreak of war between Faku and Fadana, and expressed the hope that such embassies would become annual affairs.

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, 3 and 28 Jan. 1836. Theal, Records PQA I, p.268; II, p.412.

[2] The story of the mission is given in IBB XLIII.503, pp.14-17, where are found D'Urban's report to Glenelg, March 16, Delancey's to Smith, Feb. 21, and Smith's to D'Urban, Feb. 20.

The trip, which ended in Grahamstown on February 17, served to stabilize the political situation north-east of the Kei. Although some of its results would doubtless have been reaped without Wesleyan aid, its smooth progress was, in a considerable measure, due to the fact that it utilized Wesleyan bases and profited from Wesleyan goodwill. Delancey acknowledged his dependence on Palmer and

> called the marked attention of the deputy quartermaster-general (Smith) to the kind offices, and invaluable assistance afforded him by the Rev. J.(S.) Palmer, Wesleyan Missionary, who was good enough to accompany the embassy. Being personally acquainted with the native tribes, their manners and customs, his influence among them has been highly beneficial to the events of the moment, and will hereafter tend to cement that union of feeling upon which turns their prospect of civilization.1

When news of the successful mission reached D'Urban, he too joined in thanking Palmer for his contribution. After expressions of gratitude and assurances of personal prayer for the success of his mission work, he added:

> You will much oblige me if, at your leisure, you will now and then write to me, of your welfare, and of the state of things around you - which will ever be matter of deep interest to me - and I need not, I trust, assure you, that I shall always be ready to give the most prompt attention to any suggestions of yours.2

In this letter, as in similar notes to Boyce during this period, there was that genuine personal note of appreciation that distinguishes so much of Sir Benjamin's correspondence. In spite of his high office and the many responsibilities that thronged his desk, he made time to give that winsome individual touch to his communications that must have often won their recipients' allegiance.

In the case of the Wesleyans the Governor had every incentive for seeking to retain their loyalty, for they had become key men in the maintenance of his policies. Since Boyce's approach at the end of the previous March he had drawn increasingly on their support in securing his objectives. Moreover, he found the Methodists appreciative of his general policies, in contrast to other missionaries who were sometimes critical. This was not altogether an arbitrary abandonment of Philip's

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[1] General Orders, Smith, Feb. 17. IBB XLIII.503, p.17.

[2] D'Urban to Palmer, March 4. D'Urban Papers.

counsel in favour of those whom Professor Macmillan calls "his new advisers the Wesleyan missionaries", for since Philip left the frontier in October 1834 he had been out of personal touch with the Governor, other than by letter, and just did not possess the experience in Xhosa affairs that the Methodists enjoyed by virtue of their years of labour between the Fish and the Mzimvubu Rivers. Neither were Philip's colleagues, whether L.M.S. or G.M.S., able to fill the rôle assumed by the Wesleyans. Their sphere of experience was much more limited than those who manned Shaw's chain of stations. They must have known quite a bookful about the Ngqika; but that tribe, important though it was, was only one among the many that were embroiled in the frontier war and events were always impingeing on areas beyond the ken of the non-Wesleyans. Furthermore, it must be recognized that the stature of the missionaries themselves inevitably led D'Urban to lean heavily on the Methodists. Good as the L.M.S. and G.M.S. men morally were, not one of their number stood out in leadership or showed compelling initiative in the crisis days of the war. Even "that dry old Parson, Mr. Brownlee", as Smith described him, was temperamentally unfitted for the post filled by the Wesleyans. He, with a reticence that many would have done well to emulate, kept quiet and concentrated on his spiritual mission, working for the despised Ntinde people on whose territory King William's Town was established. He was geographically nearer to Smith than were any other of the missionaries, but he did not use his proximity for any political ends. When, therefore, the Governor and his aides needed reliable guidance on Xhosa affairs on both sides of the Kei, it was natural for them to turn to the other missionary body that was so well-equipped to give it. The Methodists had more than ten year's experience of Kaffraria behind them; they had shown themselves capable of negotiating with six different tribes and of rendering acceptable service under conditions that would have daunted small-calibred men. The sum of their knowledge of the tribes with whom they had worked must have far outweighed that which D'Urban could have gained from any other sources, not excluding

the traders whose knowledge could rarely have been as broad as that of the missionaries. In addition, it was conceded that the missionaries, in spite of their failings, possessed an integrity and an altruism that lent unique value to their counsel. At the same time their humanity made them liable to error; their judgment was not infallible, and with the purest of intentions they were capable of supporting faulty policies. And some of them, more than others, were subject to that common frailty - an exaggerated sense of their own importance. But, search as a critic might, it was hard or impossible to convict the Methodists of playing a political game in any help they rendered the administration. They might have been wiser to have entirely eschewed politics, but they could not be justly accused of assisting in secular affairs for ulterior ends. They believed they were helping both the Xhosa and the European in whatever help they gave.

But such analytical thoughts were far from the minds of D'Urban and Smith in the early months of 1836. They were bent on administering the September treaties and on preserving the status quo in the Transkei, and saw in the Wesleyan ministers acceptable agents whose credentials would reflect favourably on those whom they served. There was, then, nothing sinister in the official appreciation of Palmer's contribution to the Delagoey embassy: it was an expression of genuine satisfaction in the faithful performance of an unpaid task. No less innocent was D'Urban's employment of Theophilus Shepstone as government interpreter. The nineteen-year old son of the missionary had interpreted for D'Urban during the negotiations with Hintsa in April and May. "He was the only interpreter we had," said Harry Smith, "who could convey your [our?] meaning in the Kaffir idiom and in conformity to [sic] their usages and knowledge of men and things".[1] In the subsequent drawn-out negotiations with the tribes, he became increasingly valuable, and after the September agreements, Smith wanted the young man permanently by his side. "His

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[1] Autobiography, p.394.

ability as an interpreter renders him invaluable...Nothing could compensate for his loss," he declared to D'Urban in applying for an increase in the interpreter's salary.[1] The Governor replied that he had "all along intended Shepstone to have a salary of £200 a year", and that the young man could stay with Smith for as long as he had need of him.[2]

IV. THE RENOUNCEMENT

1. Dilatory Despatches. There was much to commend in the administration of the new province. D'Urban, through Smith, had developed a paternal despotism that promised stability, freedom from fear, and some material benefits under the pax britannica. Yet, in reality, he was building a fine house on unstable foundations; wherefore the house was due to collapse. The structure was based on an annexation that was not only difficult to justify, but was unauthorized, with little prospect of being approved by the home government. The average administrator would have moved heaven and earth to gain confirmation of what he considered to be a wise move, but not so Sir Benjamin D'Urban. He not only failed to carry his home government with him, but he neglected to do so. Had he judiciously and promptly kept the Colonial Office informed of his moves there was a reasonable chance that it would have approved the main features of his revised measures; but he proved himself neither judicious nor prompt in his dealings with superior officials.

During the first six months of the war he sent four despatches to London - January 5 and 30, February 28, and March 19. At the close of that period he addressed to Aberdeen the long despatch of June 19, together with 22 enclosures which supported his account of the war. But the main news--the May proclamation--was already six weeks old when the despatch was written, though it was sufficiently important to have merited much earlier telling. It reached London on September 11, just

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[1] 16 Jan. 1836. Theal, Records POA I, p.303.

[2] Jan. 29, Feb. 26, D'Urban Papers.

six days before its contents were out-dated by the September treaties. There is evidence to suggest that if the Governor had meticulously seized every opportunity to inform London of the developing scene that they would have followed his moves more understandingly and would have given him at least some of the support he failed to receive.[1] But as in May, so in September: he allowed more than a month (Sept.17 - Oct. 22) to pass before reporting the steps he had taken, even when they concerned such radical changes as those involved in the September as against the May policies. As a result, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was left to study the official account of the war in the light of the May annexation which D'Urban himself had abandoned. There is ample evidence[2] to prove that Glenelg made a most careful personal study of the mass of documents[3] and still awaited further news that would help him and his secretaries to arrive at firm judgments on South African issues. But he waited more than three months before sending off his famous--or notorious--despatch of December 26, and then left the door open for modification of his views on receipt of later information.[4]

Few documents connected with South African history have been so reviled as Secretary Glenelg's despatch. It aroused great bitterness in the minds of D'Urban and Smith, it made the colonists furious, and it

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[1]The June 19 despatch was sent by the hand of Lt. G. de la Poer Beresford who left Table Bay on June 28, arrived at Dartmouth on Sept. 9, and reached London at 6 a.m. Friday, Sept.11. His first reports to D'Urban (D'Urban Papers, Letters to D'Urban, 12 Sept. 1835 to 10 May 1836) gave optimistic accounts of the reception of D'Urban's news, but by Nov. 3 he began to have doubts, and by Dec. 8 feared that "the Radical Saints" would strongly influence Glenelg's decision. Yet he still maintained: "I have no doubt that the Colonial Office will confirm the main part of your measures especially those regarding the New Territory."

[2]Beresford's letters confirm this point, as does Roxborough's painstaking study of the writing of Glenelg's despatch (Colonial Policy, pp.110-136)

[3]They occupy 43 closely-printed foolscap pages in IBB XXXIX.279.

[4]Macmillan BBB, pp.131 ff., and Roxborough, Colonial Policy, examine the background to the writing of the despatch, and Cory III, pp.271 ff. acknowledges the difficulties arising from D'Urban's failure to give adequate and timely information. Roxborough (p.183) allows that the Secretary, before sending his despatch, may have seen the Grahamstown Journal, Sept. 24, containing the terms of the Sept. Treaties, but rightly enquires if Glenelg were supposed to take account of newspaper reports in the absence of official word from the Governor.

has been condemned by many writers of history. Yet it was a masterly document.[1]

In restrained, dignified language that often attained the level of literature, the Secretary carefully covered the vexed topic of European-Xhosa relations from pre-D'Urban times until the date of the June despatch. After acknowledging receipt of the despatch, he added his own meed of praise for what Aberdeen had already described as "prompt and energetic measures" against the invasion. He then turned "to the more difficult office of considering the origin, the progress, and the results of your [D'Urban's] hostilities with the Caffre tribes". There he found himself hampered by

> the want of sufficient official information for the guidance of His Majesty's Government on this occasion. With the most ample details of all your military operations, you have not combined any clear and comprehensive explanation of the causes which provoked the irruption of the Caffres into the colony.

Some of what was lacking he ascribed to the Governor's pressures of duties, but after vainly waiting for supplementary information he was "at last reluctantly compelled, in the deficiency of official intelligence, to draw ... [his] conclusions from less authentic sources of information". He felt sure that D'Urban would give him credit for having studied all documents, official and otherwise, "with a predisposition, arising alike from duty and inclination, in favour of the measures adopted by ... [D'Urban], and by the various officers" who had preceded him. Such study led him to admit Sir Benjamin's duty to halt the invasion and to prevent its repetition, but he seriously questioned the Governor's claim that the Xhosa attack was "unprovoked aggression" and asked if it were rather not due to "such wrongs as afforded them a legitimate cause of war?" If the tribes had suffered "intolerable wrongs" these should have been remedied after the colonial victory instead of being followed by the expulsion of the Xhosa from their homelands.

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[1] Adverse comment on the despatch is so common, and its faults have been so thoroughly canvassed, that attention to its many excellencies is overdue. The best corrective to negative criticism is a study of the document in IBB XXXIX.279, pp.59-73. It is too long for reproduction here or in an appendix.

The Secretary also wondered if the British campaign could not have been more limited in its range and briefer in its duration. Then followed a passage which, while partially absolving D'Urban, gave deep umbrage to colonial officials and people alike:

> I am constrained to admit, that in the conduct which was pursued towards the Caffre nation by the colonists, and the public authorities of the colony, through a long series of years, and which the short period of your administration could not have enabled you to correct, the Caffres had ample justification of the war into which they rushed with such fatal imprudence...

Xhosa justification was based on two grounds: the unsatisfactory nature of the 1819 treaty with Ngqika, and the injustices stemming from the commando system; but in his desire to defend the aborigines, Glenelg made exaggerated claims in their favour. "The Caffres," he decided, "were unavoidably converted by them (commandos) into a nation of depredators"— a demonstrably false conclusion, since cattle-rustling and allied activities were the cause rather than the effect of colonial commandos. But, without wishing to condone all Xhosa conduct, Lord Glenelg believed that "they had the perfect right to hazard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain".

This grave conclusion, he knew, would be contested by D'Urban who would assert that he had begun negotiations with the chiefs for a settlement of their grievances. This introduced the controversial topic of Dr. Philip's being the Governor's agent during visits to the frontier in 1834--a question that is possibly insoluble at this date--and D'Urban's use of the terms "irreclaimable savages" and "wolves" in speaking of the invading tribes. The Secretary regretted the use of such expressions in an official despatch, and rejected their validity by reference to positive results accruing from missionary work, and to some L.M.S. and C.M.S. sympathy with the Xhosa cause. Wesleyan support for D'Urban he discounted on the strength of Shrewsbury's unfortunate letter to Harry Smith.[1]

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[1] Supra, pp.209,210, and infra, pp.362-364.

Serious questions were raised concerning the relative weights of the attack and counter-attack, and the "inequality of the contest" between primitive and civilized combatants; but Glenelg acknowledged the incomplete nature of his information and expressed his willingness to revise judgments on receipt of additional suasive intelligence from the Cape. Until such news reached him, however, he was reluctantly obliged to leave much responsibility on D'Urban's shoulders. But, in view of the declared British policy of avoiding further territorial extensions, there were certain steps he could authorize even then. Retention of the Neutral Territory was not just, but he recognized that relinquishment was difficult. Possession of the land between the Keiskamma and the Kei was to be renounced by the end of 1836, which gave the Governor about nine months for adjustment after receipt of the instructions. A Lieutenant-Governor was to be appointed for the eastern districts, while a civil governor and government agent were to care for Kaffraria. Existing relations with the chiefs were to be superseded by nine-point treaties which sought to guard the interests of both sides. Finally, D'Urban was instructed to conclude the war at the earliest possible moment, if hostilities had not already ceased; and he was warned against any actions that would lead to extermination of the aborigines. A courteous, amicable closing paragraph, containing additional encouragement for the sending of further reports, brought to its end a memorable document.

It may have been argued that although Glenelg's decision was right it was hardly expedient, and that it would have been wiser for him to have accepted D'Urban's system and to have made it work for the benefit of all. If the Secretary had known of the modification in the Governor's plan, that might have been a reasonable expectation, but he did not know until it was too late for him to adapt his ideas to D'Urban's.

Ever since he had proclaimed the formation of the new province in May, Sir Benjamin had been expecting an adverse reception of his plans,

though he hoped that the September modifications would disarm criticism and earn the approval even of "the Saints"--the philanthropic party in England. He should not therefore have been surprised nor unduly shaken by Glenelg's judgment which was, perforce, based on the harsh decisions taken in May. The fact is, however, that the arrival of the despatch in Cape Town on 21 March 1836 robbed the Governor of the hopes he had been cherishing underneath his fears, and his reactions were all the more bitter. Then, within two days, he showed that he was capable of speed in correspondence. He sent a brief reply to the Secretary, acknowledging his despatch, expressing "deep regret" at the disapproval of his measures (which he himself had in substance abandoned in September), foreseeing "the ruin of the frontier provinces of Albany and Somerset," but "suspending the execution of the instructions" in case news of his September treaties (given in despatches of November 7 and 12, and received in London on January 29) should have changed Glenelg's views.[1] Two weeks then passed by before he shared some of the Colonial Office's judgments with Smith in King William's Town. In a letter marked "Very secret and confidential" he sent a few extracts for Smith's "private eye" that he might see "the bias - the reasoning - the intentions...of the minister".[2] A week later he was writing of "my Lord Glenelg's ravings - at once fanatic and imbecile",[3] and from then his rancour deepened until it degenerated into a one-sided vendetta for the disparagement of Glenelg and the justification of D'Urban. He accepted Beresford's conclusion that the Secretary's object was to "throw as much responsibility upon" him (D'Urban) "and to keep as little himself as might be practicable."[4]

When he did hear from Glenelg in reply to his own despatches of November 7 and 12, he found the response "most Jesuitical and mystifying", "a Delphic sort of oracle" which he needed to study several times in order to ascertain the noble lord's meaning.[5] He suspected Glenelg of

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[1] D'Urban to Glenelg, 23 March 1836. IBB XLIII.503, p.19.

[2] D'Urban to Smith, April 8. D'Urban Papers.

[3] Ibid. April 15.

[4] Ibid. May 6.

[5] Ibid., May 29.

playing a cunning game whereby D'Urban would be hoisted with his own petard; and failed to realize that much of the mystification in London was due to his own failure to supply the Colonial Office with the information it was seeking. He believed the minister to be "under the influence at once of his own morbid sanctity and of the Party who predominate over him [the philanthropists]".[1] He became incapable of taking Glenelg's words at their official face value: he read every despatch through lenses of suspicion which distorted the plain intent and made it increasingly improbable that agreement between himself and the Secretary of State would ever be reached. In this attitude he enjoyed the loyal support of Smith who had apparently hoped for a more favourable response from England since as late as February he had dared to prophesy to D'Urban: "Your policy will be the admiration of the Saints, and will be approved by all."[2] His lamentation was all the louder, therefore, when, in a letter dated March 25, the Governor informed him of the tenor of the long-awaited despatch from Glenelg. Smith was "positively paralysed", though able to express his horror of the "canting ultra-Philanthropists" and "their d----d Jesuitical procedure". The Minister's communication was "sneaking, covering, crouching, and submissive to party spirit and Ghostly Comfort"; it was the product of the "Saints" who were sending "the most civilized nation to the Gates of Hell". He accused the author of sacrificing the Colony and hurling the officers of the British army to the Devil, if, in so doing, he could add to his own credit.[3]

In more sober language, the Legislative Council in Cape Town recorded its "unqualified approval of all those measures which were adopted and carried into effect in repelling the late Caffre invasions", and its belief that the consistent following up of D'Urban's September

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[1] D'Urban to Smith, June 3. D'Urban Papers.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, Feb. 28. Theal, Records PQA II, p.416.

[3] Smith to D'Urban, 3 April, 17,25. Ibid., pp.486,532,545. There is much more in similar vein, but the above is a fair, and surely a sufficient sample.

treaties would ensure mutual prosperity to the colonists and the tribes.[1] The Wesleyans gave little if any written approval at this juncture. Such was hardly needed, for they had promoted the peace and were in favour of its general provisions. Their defence of D'Urban's system became more vocal, however, when its abandonment became known. At home the City merchants saw Glenelg and pleaded for the adoption of D'Urban's plans as the only means of placing "the Eastern Provinces on a footing of security".[2] The Governor was thus not without his champions on several fronts, but his most effective advocate--himself--was unfortunately silent when he should have been responding to the Secretary of State's repeated appeals by placing in his hands the fullest possible information concerning the September policy--its inception, implementation, and encouraging beginning.

Even if the initial delay in telling the Government about the drastic modification of the May proclamation be ignored, it might reasonably have been expected that D'Urban would have collected explanatory and palliatory information with the least possible delay. Had he done this, Glenelg's requests could have been answered immediately, while failure in this respect involved still further loss of time. When at last the material was mustered and the <u>apologia</u> was written they were kept in cold storage for a further six months. The despatch dated June 9 with its 18 enclosures, was held back until it could accompany that of November 11 (with 4 enclosures) and another dated December 5. The three despatches occupying 215 Blue Book pages, reached the Secretary of State on 8 March 1837.[3] The volume of the documents was enough to make an official stagger: the tone of those sections that D'Urban himself had dictated was guaranteed to anatagonize all but his most ardent advocates. Interpolated between justifiable defence of his actions and dignified explanations of his policy there appeared samples of bitter

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[1] <u>IBB XLIII.503</u>, p.53.

[2] Beresford to D'Urban, 22 Sept. 1835. <u>D'Urban Papers</u>.

[3] <u>IBB XLIII.503</u>, pp.54-269.

irony, biting sarcasm, and provocative under-statement. The June document stands as the testament of a sorely disappointed man who made no diplomatic attempt to disguise his wounded feelings. He had taken the trouble to ask his colonial secretary, Colonel Bird, for an opinion on the tenor of his reply to Glenelg without receiving the warning that should most certainly have been given. Bird gloried in "this inimitable despatch" and congratulated D'Urban upon its composition.[1] The wisest counsel came too late, long after D'Urban's indiscretions had played their part in securing his dismissal. Then, on 16 August 1837, his friend, Sir Henry Taylor, wrote from London saying:

> I must freely own to you my dear D'Urban, with all the candour of an old and sincere friend that the tone and expressions of that Despatch surprised me and I could with difficulty believe that you could have been persuaded to adopt such in <u>any</u> Communication, much less in one addressed to such high Official Authority.2

But Sir Henry was closing the stable door after the horse had gone, when even D'Urban himself could not undo the damage done by his impolitic words. Boyce could speak of "the apparent carelessness, observable in the wording of many of His Excellency's public despatches, and proclamations, and their consequent ambiguity of meaning", ascribing them to pressure of business and overwork, and maintaining that Sir Benjamin had been condemned for a few hasty expressions[3]--but the defence is not valid, for the offending despatch was kept in hand for six months, and its infelicities could have been so easily removed had its author so desired. Nor were the hasty expressions few: rather were they many, skilfully woven into the warp and woof of the despatch. On receipt of such a document a high official had only one course open to him in respect of its sender. That course D'Urban obliged Glenelg to take.

2. <u>Toward Renunciation</u>. The Secretary of State's first communication with D'Urban on the subject of the new province spoke of the annexation as "a measure, from which it is not impossible that you may be called upon to recede".[4] Subsequent messages reinforced that early

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[1]Bird to D'Urban, 9 June 1936. Theal, <u>Records PQA</u> II, p.644.

[2]<u>D'Urban Papers</u>.

[3]<u>Notes</u>, p.22.

[4]Despatch, 20 Oct. 1835. <u>IBB XLIII.503</u>, p.1.

warning. In his December despatch the Minister advised that the land beyond the Keiskamma was to be relinquished by the end of 1836, so D'Urban had a full nine months in which to fulfil the instructions. But the Governor kept hoping that news of his September treaties would change Colonial Office views on the question and enable him to continue with his administrative experiment beyond the Fish River. He therefore postponed abandonment of the province throughout the middle of 1836, and at the end of August was informing Glenelg of his intention to wait a little longer in case his lordship's final decision should be more favourable.[1] By December 2, however, even D'Urban's natural reluctance to relinquish the province on which he had set so much store could find no grounds for its retention, and in a letter loaded with aspersions, he announced "the execution of" his "Lordship's deliberately-projected renunciation of the acquired territory..." as his "Lordship had originally designed and announced, by the end of the present year 1836".[2] By December 5, the renouncement was in full swing. In a generous-spirited despatch dated December 31 Glenelg expressed regret at having to promote a policy of which D'Urban did not approve, and he exonerated him from blame for the postponement of abandonment.[3]

The British withdrawal from what had been for so short a time known as the Province of Queen Adelaide came as no surprise to many people in South Africa. The possibility of the move had been discussed for nearly a year and a half. As early as July 1835 Frederick Rex had written to his father, saying: " ... it is generally supposed that owing to the late change of Ministry this Province is not likely to be retained nor the Governor's doings here approved."[4] In February 1836, the Commercial Advertiser in Cape Town was spreading the rumour that the Fish River country was going to be returned to the tribes; two months later the Grahamstown Journal could not "believe anything so monstrous" as revo-

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[1]Despatch, Aug. 23. IBR XLIII.503, p.21. [2]Ibid., p.44.

[3]Ibid., pp.41,42. [4]Long, Index, p.173.

cation.[1] At the end of May Smith could write: "None of the people of this neighbourhood [King William's Town] have an idea that the province may be given up"; but within five days he was having to eat his words since news of his going and Stockenstrom's appointment as Lieutenant Governor had spread even among the Xhosa tribes.[2] The Colonel claimed that dismay at the prospect of abandonment was so great that he could easily produce an impressive protest from all sections of the population:

> I will 'au secret' get up Meetings throughout the Frontier, Colonists, British and Dutch, Hottentots, the whole of our New Subjects in one unanimous acclamation, to memorialize your Excellency that affairs remain as at present constituted. I am mistaken too if I cannot get all the powerful London, Glasgow, and Wesleyan Missionaries to join me, either collectively or individually, to state their opinion on the expediency and rapid improvement derived already from the system pursued, and the inevitable ruin which must ensue if the contrary course be adopted. All this would render your Excellency's responsibility as light as a feather; and if the anticipated good should not be realized, all will have a share in the judgment of error. Rely upon it, Governor, this is a safe line to pursue; trust to my discretion in bringing such matters about; only say the word.[3]

The word was not spoken. It is possible that D'Urban did not trust his representative's discretion, for no such unanimous protest was prepared. Lesser declarations of regret at the proposed renunciation of the province did come from several sources, however. Smith was the recipient of two of these from Methodist missionaries, each of whom wrote in a private capacity. The first was Ayliff who, writing from Butterworth on July 4, said:

> My opinion is that should the Home Government not confirm the measures of our Governor in the retention of the new province, that whatsoever other plans they may adopt, things will revert back to their old state of insecurity in the colony; the inhabitants of the new province will be thrown into a state of the greatest possible confusion, and the progress of civilization and Christianity greatly retarded. Yea, I moreover believe, that if the new province is not retained, that Albany, for what it is worth might be given up to the Caffres.
>
> As a missionary I should be willing to stand the chances of labouring among the Caffres, should such a calamitous circumstance take place; but as a father of a large family I should feel in justice bound to them to seek some other country for their future settlement.[4]

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[1] Issues March 31, April 7.

[2] Smith to D'Urban, 30 May, 4 June. Theal, Records PQA II, pp.605,618.

[3] June 6. Theal, Records PQA II, p.629.

[4] IBB XLIII.503, p.267.

The second, and more ambitious letter, came from Boyce who on July 23 addressed Smith from Wesleyville:[1]

> My dear Sir,
>
> Should the abandonment of the new province be really determined upon, you would do me a great favour if you would give me timely information, as in that case I must make some inquiries as to whom I am to look for the protection of this place, which is exposed to the enmity of the large portion of Slambie's tribe concerned in the war. Our position is rather peculiar, as our stations this side the Kye were considered by the insurgent chiefs as decidedly and actively opposed to their cause; and there are now residing here several individuals who, should the province be given up, must seek personal safety and security of property within the boundaries of the colony. You know well that the power of Pato, Umkye and Nonube, even if their people were unanimous, would be no defence when opposed to the superior chiefs, even of the Slambie tribe only. Though I have no fears for myself personally, yet as I do fear for some of the people here, I wish to have the opportunity of sending them away before the troops withdraw; for I anticipate great evils to the well-meaning and quiet portion of the population of this country when that event takes place.
>
> The moral effect of the measure will be most disastrous, both to Caffreland and the colony. What confidence can any well-disposed Caffre chief feel at any future period in the promises of the colonial government, and who will fear its threats? Explain the matter as you may, you will only make bad worse, by confirming the suspicions already entertained by some of the chiefs, that the colonial government does not possess the confidence of its superiors in England; and if this notion should be fully believed, what control can the colonial government exercise over them, and how can it effectually protect the colony?
>
> The injury inflicted upon the Caffres by the contemplated measure will be equally great. At present violence is unknown this side of the Kye, and every man is beginning to feel security of person and property. Even the chiefs, though they may naturally feel at times sore when they see the abuses of their power corrected, yet dread the withdrawal of the British troops, as then they know that old jealousies would revive among themselves, and the petty contests be removed, which would produce no small degree of distress, at this time especially, when they have not recovered from the wasteful consumption and enormous loss of cattle by sickness, etc., during the war with the colony.
>
> As a question of humanity there can be but one opinion. The retention of the new province is the only measure which can prevent the extinction of the Caffre race, because it is theonly human means which can raise them in the scale of being. They must become a civilized people, or else share the fate of all semi-barbarous races. They are exposed to more powerful tribes beyond them, who never wait for just causes of war, and to the colonists, whom they are sure to furnish with just reasons for punishing them, as no chief can restrain his people from plundering the colony, unless supported by the colonial government. Once the Caffres have been saved from their Fetcani enemies by the colonial government, in 1828; and once they have been spared the infliction of the vengeance their unprovoked attack upon the colony deserved. But will the colonial government ever interfere again to preserve a people so ungrateful? And will there be no bounds to its forbearance, a forbearance exercised at the expense of the suffering colonists, and only justified by the reasonable prospect which the new arrangements held forth of future security? I know nothing of the humanity which would screen irreclaimable rogues for a season at the expense

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[1] Ibid.

> of the community at large, who in the end must suffer the natural consequences of a taste for predatory excursion into the colony. I have no symphathy for the lawless prerogatives of Caffre chiefs, and care not how soon they are reduced to the condition of private gentlemen. But I do feel for the people who under the protection of British Law would rapidly improve and become a barrier to the colony against the tribes beyond; but who, if thrown back to suffer under the evils of their political and social system, are sure, a few years hence, to be only known as a people once powerful, but gradually wasting away.
>
> I am aware that Christianity would do something to prevent these anticipated evils; but its present influence is confined to a few individuals, and before it has a fair chance of bearing upon the community at large, that community will, I fear, cease to exist. God works by human instrumentality, and the protection of British laws would afford Christianity an opportunity of exercising its influence to a degree and extent which, under any other circumstances, it will not possess.
>
> Now I must conclude,,and with many thanks for past kindnesses,
>
> I remain, etc.
>
> (Signed) W.B. Boyce, Missionary with the tribe of T'Slambie.

Although this letter only bore the signature of Boyce, it ably expressed colonial opinion as to the results that would follow a British withdrawal from Queen Adelaide Province. As became a missionary, the writer stressed the probable effects of abandonment on the tribes themselves, making several points that were beyond reasonable dispute. Removal of British military and civil supervision was likely to lead to a return of violence and insecurity, of inter-tribal warfare, of predatory expeditions over the frontier, and abuse of power by the chiefs; but most observers would agree that Boyce's expectations of the early extinction of the Xhosa tribes were unduly pessimistic. His thinking, however, was in harmony with local Methodist opinion, even with that of Shaw who wrote that:

> the arrangement which Sir Benjamin D'Urban had made at the conclusion of the war, for the pacification and future protection and safety of the country, had been inconsiderately overruled and set aside by the Secretary of State for the Colonies; [1]

There is no doubt that such opinion was honestly held; but it is no less clear that it overlooked some vital aspects of the renunciation of the province. It failed to question the justice of the seizure, and did not pause to consider the difficulty in which Glenelg was placed by D'Urban's failure to give him the relevant facts within an appropriate

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[1] SMM, p.160.

time. Judgments were expressed as if the only points at issue were the rights and wrongs of retaining a prosperous province where justice was being meted out to all.

A glance at other angles of Wesleyan reaction to Glenelg's policy is necessary for an understanding of the missionaries' attitude in 1836 and later. In his December despatch, the Minister referred to the Wesleyans' address to D'Urban on June 2,[1] and commented:

> Whatever might be my own opinion of the tone and character of that address, and of the topics which its authors have selected, I should not scruple to allow to their declarations all the weight due to the sacred office they sustain, if I had not found amongst the enclosures in your despatch of the 19th of June, Mr. Shrewsbury's letter of the 10th [actually, the 16th] of January 1835. After the perusal of that document, I must plainly say that I cannot attach the slightest value to that gentleman's judgment on the present occasion.

In view of the severe opinions expressed by Shrewsbury, Glenelg's comment was both moderate and valid. He went on to express the hope "that the highly respectable body [the W.M.M.S.]" would "promptly disavow all participation in the opinions which he [Shrewsbury] has recorded". This, as has already been related,[2] the Society's officials were prompt to do, to Glenelg's satisfaction, but the official exposure of Shrewsbury's indiscretion must inevitably have cast an unfavourable reflection on his immediate colleagues in the Albany District. They made no recorded attempt to defend the obnoxious letter which was possibly unknown to them prior to the publication of the December despatch. Shrewsbury had left the Colony in June 1835; the Society's leaders had condemned his views; no good would have been served by crossing swords with Glenelg on the issue: it was unwise to hold an inquest on an episode that were better buried. Moreover, both D'Urban and Glenelg had published other judgments that called for consideration by the missionaries. Some of D'Urban's remarks and the Wesleyan responses have been dealt with earlier.[3] It remains only to add that the Governor, in his despatch of

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[1] Supra, pp.298,299.

[2] Supra, pp.210-212.

[3] Supra, pp.300-302.

9 June 1836, wrote:

> I believe I may safely affirm that, judging by their fruits, the united labours of all the missions in Caffreland, for so many years, had not succeeded in making twenty Christian Caffre converts; probably not half that number.1

No missionary could have been expected to endorse so inaccurate a statement. The statistical records of the W.M.M.S., to say nothing of those of the other societies, denied the dreary analysis. In 1834 the six Wesleyan stations reported a total membership of 142 converts. Even had considerations of quality decimated their numbers, the residue would still have contradicted D'Urban's sweeping pessimism--and there was no evidence to justify so drastic a reduction in effective membership figures. The workers, therefore, had ample grounds for rejecting Sir Benjamin's estimate of the efficacy of their missionary endeavours.

Glenelg's indictment was not so easily dismissed. He, on the strength of the enclosures in D'Urban's despatch of 19 June 1835, and possibly assisted by unofficial though not necessarily unreliable reports from other sources, had concluded that the Methodists in South Africa had given the Governor their unqualified support, while the L.M.S. and C.M.S. had seriously questioned his policy. A careful study of Glenelg's despatch might have suggested that the Wesleyans were reading more into the official words than was intended, and that they were unduly sensitive regarding their reputation. But they were in no mood to give the Minister the benefit of any doubt: they believed him to be under the influence of Dr. Philip and his supporters, and therefore prejudiced against their own society. From the meeting at Morley, 13 May 1837,[2] they issued a statement, declaring:

> By whom he was so grossly deceived, is a question which the Wesleyan Missionaries have a right to propose, and some apology is due them from His Lordship on account of the prejudicial impressions excited against them, however, unintentionally, by the misstatement in the despatch dated 26th December 1835. It is to be hoped that the candour of the noble lord, will readily grant that redress which is justly due, and thus preclude the necessity of further reference to this painful subject. 3

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, p.60.

[2] Supra, pp. 301, 302.

[3] Shaw, Defence, pp.65,66. The same document (pp.66-70) lists the opinions of missionaries from five other Societies - Anglican, C.M.S., L.M.S., Baptist, and Moravian - who agreed with Methodist opinion concerning the Xhosa tribes as initiators of the war.

Unknown to them at the time, the "noble lord" had already made his amende honorable in a despatch to D'Urban, dated 1 May 1837. After citing the Society's repudiation of Shrewsbury's sentiments, he concluded:

> I should not be only prompt, but anxious, to recall any expressions reflecting injuriously on a society of Christians whose labours it is alike impossible to requite or adequately to acknowledge.[1]

These gracious words, coming from so high a source, should have compensated for any traducement that the original despatch was supposed to have implied, and should have mollified the Methodists' adverse judgment concerning the Secretary's decisions. Their spokesman did indeed acknowledge the existence of the apology, but more by way of triumph than appreciation. The Albany missionaries continued to regret London's policy and the renunciation of Queen Adelaide province.[2]

With the exchange of official and unofficial news concerning the future of the province, it was not surprising that the people whom it most closely affected should also hear of an impending change. The Gqunukwebi chief, Phatho, who had much to lose by a reversal of the September treaties, was alarmed in the middle of May by rumours of abandonment, fearing that he would lose his recently regained land and be overwhelmed by aggressive, vengeful neighbours. According to the Grahamstown Journal of May 26, he manifested "an anxious desire to proceed to England, in order to plead his own cause with the home government". Fortunately, he was dissuaded, either by counsel or by circumstance, from undertaking so useless a mission.

Persistent rumours of British withdrawal also alarmed other sections of the Xhosa people, mainly on three scores. Some of them had possibly become attached to Smith's colourful personality;[3] they were unsettled

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, p.276. [2] Boyce, Notes, 64.

[3] For British reports on Xhosa reactions see letters to D'Urban from five resident agents, July 22-28. R. Southey reported that the people were crying "on account of Col. Smith, because we hear he is going to be taken away from us;...We cannot let Col. Smith go away." IBB XLIII.503, p.37. This was not necessarily a true expression of Xhosa sentiment, however. Boyce, with more plausibility, wrote of Smith's "extensive personal influence and the terror and respect which his character inspires" as "an enemy in the field and as a friend in time of peace." To D'Urban, Oct.18. Theal PQA I, p.79.

by the vacillation in English policy;[1] and they feared a return to inter-tribal warfare and a resumption of oppressive practices by the chiefs.[2] Most Europeans shared their fears and wished that D'Urban's policy would continue. Smith believed that ten years of British tutelage would have christianized the tribes and trained them in peaceful co-existence.[3] Then, at the other end of the scale, showing how mixed were the reactions, was Boyce's belief that many of the people cherished extravagant hopes from the sudden reversal; to the unsophisticated tribesman it looked as if war paid good dividends, and he was encouraged in his aggressive habits.[4]

3. The Renunciation. Lord Glenelg's alternative to D'Urban's annexation of land up to the Kei had been tentatively outlined in his December despatch. There was to be a Lieutenant Governor of the eastern districts assisted by a Civil Commissioner and Government Agents for dealing with the Xhosa people, and treaties were to be made with each of the tribes. The first step towards fulfilling this plan was made public with the arrival of the appointed Lieutenant Governor, Andries Stockenstrom, in Table Bay on Sunday July 3, 1836. Due to an outbreak of smallpox, the new official was obliged to remain about the Lord William Bentinck until July 23, and did not leave Cape Town for the frontier until August 17, and only arrived in Grahamstown on September 3. The despatches he brought from London gave D'Urban no comfort; there was no clear-cut instruction either to retain or abandon the new province. The two officers therefore agreed to retain the province until direct orders reached them for its abandonment. But the day after Stockenstrom left Cape Town the Governor revoked martial

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[1] Smith to D'Urban, June 4. "Ah, this is the manner in which the English have always treated us. They never adhere to any system..." Theal, Records PQA II, p.618.

[2] R. Southey to D'Urban, July 22. IBB XLIII.503, p.37. Smith to D'Urban July 28. Theal, Records PQA II, pp.744,745.

[3] Autobiography, p.456.

[4] Notes, p.74.

law which had been in force in Adelaide since 16 June 1835, leaving Stockenstrom to begin his duties without the legal power and military force with which to administer the province.[1] From then on three contrary European policies were at work in the territory. The Lieutenant Governor endeavoured to realize Glenelg's instructions in the light of his own findings on the frontier; D'Urban, through his many sympathizers, tried to salvage as much of his system as could be saved in the debacle; while over the disintegrating scene there hovered the spirit of a remote and, through no fault of his own, mal-informed Secretary of State who, for good or ill, had the last word on the fate of the province. Under such circumstances, conflict between opposing policies was inevitable. Within the first month of his administration, Stockenstrom had effected the abandonment of the most easterly forts of Warden, Wellington, Beresford, and Murray, as initial steps in the relinquishment of the territory.[2] In the letter to Somerset in which he gave orders for the withdrawal, he revealed the line to which he was intending to retire, saying: "The jungles of the Great Fish River must for a long period to come continue our weakest and most vulnerable point..."[3] Yet, on December 30 D'Urban was writing to Somerset and claiming that he was only then aware that Stockenstrom intended to withdraw over the Keiskamma and make the Fish River the colonial boundary. Such lack of co-operation between the two chief officers of the Colony--and this was only one of many instances--could not but breed confusion and serve to sabotage any good that either was trying to do.

On August 12, D'Urban had declared to Smith: "I will neither abandon the people, or the province, until I am forced [?] to do so by final and irresistible orders..."[4] He then waited in vain for more

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[1] It is difficult to clear D'Urban of the charge of duplicity in this instance since he consulted the Cape Town judiciary at least one week prior to promulgating the revocation (D'Urban to Smith, Aug.12), and could have discussed the matter with Stockenstrom before the latter's departure from the Cape.

[2] These moves were under-written by D'Urban who had issued instructions to Smith, as early As Aug. 5, to effect these very withdrawals.

[3] Sept. 17. Theal, Records POAIII, p.800.

[4] D'Urban Papers.

definite instructions, and when these did not arrive, he wrote to Stockenstrom on October 13 and ordered him to renounce "His Majesty's Sovereignty and possession of the New Province bounded by the Keiskama and the Kye [the delimitations were significant!] by the end of the year".[1] The Lieutenant Governor was to prepare treaties as the Secretary of State had directed, and to provide for and secure the protection of the colonial border (presumably along the Keiskamma), the safety of the missionaries remaining beyond the Keiskamma, the welfare of those tribes and individuals who had been helpful during the late war, and, at the same time he was to promote peace and good understanding with the native tribes. That programme was outlined on October 13. It was December 5 before it was put into operation and treaties were made with Sandile (through his mother, Sutu), Maqoma, Tyhali, Botumane, and Nqeno.[2] A proclamation of 2 February 1837 completed the formalities: the two-stage D'Urban policy, initiated on 10 May 1835, came to an end, and the Stockenstrom system began.

The Lieutenant Governor's measures brought no startling innovations to the government of Xhosa country. Before D'Urban arrived in Cape Town to take up his duties, the Colonial Office had provided written instructions for his conduct toward the native tribes beyond the border, and he was encouraged to cultivate the friendship of the chiefs and to make treaties with them where conditions were favourable to such diplomacy.[3] The Governor himself had belatedly fulfilled part of those instructions in September 1835; Glenelg had required the making of treaties as part of his recommendations, and the most politically active of the Wesleyans had suggested something similar in his letter to D'Urban in March 1835.[4] After the Stockenstrom treaties had been published, Boyce claimed that they were "based in principle and in some cases in detail, upon the recommendations contained" in his letter, and declared that admirers of

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, p.44.

[2] Theal, Records PQA III, pp.959,976. A similar agreement was reached with the Fingos on Dec.10 (p.990).

[3] Stanley to D'Urban, 27 Nov. 1833. IBB XXXIX.50.252, pp.64,65.

[4] Supra, pp.222-225.

the new system ought to acknowledge the source on which it was based- the writings of a Wesleyan missionary![1] But it was possible to exaggerate Stockenstrom's indebtedness to earlier students of frontier problems: common conclusions could be reached without slavish dependence on another's theory. The problems were too well-known to be the preserve of one school of thought; and solutions must have been suggested by many amateur politicians in addition to Boyce. The Lieutenant Governor probably had a wide pool of advice from which to draw his policy, in addition to which he had his own considerable experience of frontier affairs. Boyce should therefore not have been certain that his "Remarks" to D'Urban were the basis of so much of Stockenstrom's approach to governance of the Xhosa tribes.

In any case, the missionary was so critical of the system that he could have felt very little pride in considering himself its part-author. He was convinced of "the inability of the Chiefs unassisted, to compel their people to comply with the treaty;" and "the serious consequences which would result from any attempt to enforce compliance." He believed that no chief would, of his own accord, detect or punish offences against other tribes or nations, "thus, in his political relationship with the colony, he is comparatively powerless for any good."[2] Such comment pointed out the greatest weakness in the Stockenstrom scheme - excessive dependence on the authority of the chiefs which was not designed to bear all the weight suddenly and artificially placed upon it. This gave Boyce grounds for preferring the D'Urban policy but in stating his preference he ignored the shaky foundation on which D'Urban had built, and failed to give Stockenstrom credit for tackling a difficult job with inadequate means at his disposal.

By the time the Lieutenant Governor had launched his system it was too late to hope for a return to D'Urban methods. The war was over. Opportunities for winning the peace had been neglected. The Colonial

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[1] Notes, p.76. Boyce mistakenly gives the year of his "Remarks" as 1834.

[2] Ibid. pp.53, 54.

Office, working in partial darkness, had made its decision. In a despatch dated 1 May 1837, Glenelg replied to D'Urban's of June 9, November 3, and December 5 of the previous year. In generous-spirited phrases he retracted some of his severer early judgments and gave the Governor and his subordinates as much credit as possible. But he also firmly defended his own major decisions while refusing to accept all the responsibility D'Urban had tried to throw upon him. He regretted that the acrimonious passages in the Governor's official correspondence had ever been penned. They revealed the impossibility of his working with D'Urban: "You will, therefore, consider yourself as holding the government of the colony only until you shall be relieved by a successor".[1]

D'Urban had been weighed in the balances used by the Colonial Office, and had been found wanting. His days were therefore numbered, but they were none the less mourned by the community of Wesleyan workers in Albany and beyond.

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[1] IBB XLIII.503, pp.269-278.

CHAPTER VII

RECOVERY, RECKONING, AND REFLECTION

I. RECOVERY

1. Recuperation and Advance. Each of the three missionary societies operating beyond the colonial border had incurred heavy losses during the war. The L.M.S. and G.M.S. suffered damage at Chumie and Burnshill, while Lovedale and Pirie were burned: the Wesleyans had had two chapels burned in Albany—at Port Frances and Wesley Mount—while Bathurst chapel was plundered and damaged. At Wesleyville and Mount Coke ten buildings were destroyed, and the stations at Butterworth and Morley were both ruined. Only Clarkebury and Buntingville were preserved intact. Before their final figures were available the W.M.M.S. had written to the Governor and given him a preliminary view of the damage they had sustained, but when they had had time to evaluate their losses they set them at £4,761.[1] In relation to their resources this was a great sum, and as the Committee considered it they were convinced they had valid grounds for claiming compensation. Boyce maintained that they had

> peculiar claims on the justice of the British Government arising from the fact that their stations were destroyed by the enemy in consequence of the open and avowed opposition of the Wesleyan Missions, and their Kaffir converts and friends to the war.[2]

But that claim needed some modification in view of the fact that the L.M.S. and G.M.S. also had similar losses which they did not attempt to blame on their own attitude to the hostilities but accepted as a concomitant of war. Boyce's further point, that their peace efforts had saved the government thousands of pounds by shortening the war, also called for dilution since those efforts were only one of several factors that led to peace. He was on surer ground when he pointed out that Wesleyville had been finally aban-

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[1] MM 1835; Slee, Albany Methodism, p.45. [2] Notes, p.xxx.

doned on orders from the colonial authorities that the Gqunukwebi might concentrate their forces and thus secure Lower Albany. The missionary's forensic skill bore little fruit, however. There was no government compensation, and the mission had to solve its own financial crises consequent upon the war. Uncertainty regarding the future made the committee cautious, and they refrained from capital expenditure until they could gauge their resources more clearly. Natural disasters also made their task heavier, for Albany suffered from a fever epidemic, a drought, an invasion of locusts, and storms in which thousands of sheep and cattle were lost.[1] The missionaries therefore faced a discouraging future.

Yet there was a bright side to the picture. The Xhosa chiefs and their people were eager for the ministers' return, and there were requests for missionaries at five new places. At the same time the clergy were prepared to collaborate with the government for the civilizing of the native, and the government was ready to utilize missions to that end. Smith took an interest in the re-opening of stations, encouraged attendance at school and at church services, and was genuinely pleased when the enrolments grew. There were, then, many inducements for building up what had been broken down and ensuring that missions' contributions to Kaffraria would be greater in the future than in the past.

As early as March 1835 the Wesleyans, assembled in their 11th annual district meeting, had looked forward to the re-establishment of Wesleyville and Mount Coke as soon as conditions permitted. But, on evacuation from Wesleyville Phatho had settled west of the Keiskamma, on the Bika,[2] and there had the services of a missionary almost without a break throughout the protracted hostilities. When, therefore, the missionary committee came

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[1] W.J.Davis, Salem, 21 Oct. 1835. WMM 1836, p.230.

[2] Such is the correct spelling of the name of the stream, but the Methodists gave the name of Beka to their mission, and it is so spelled in the following pages.

to study the re-opening of their work some three weeks after peace had been signed, it was to the Bika that their thoughts first went. Shepstone was appointed to serve with Phatho and to build up the new station about a dozen miles south-east of the site of Fort Peddie in the old Neutral Territory. The move appeared a good one: an initial congregation of 40 grew to around 170 within a few months, Phatho occasionally attended the meetings (though he never became a Christian), and a strong work developed. Differences between the brother chiefs led Kama to break away from Phatho to establish his own branch of the tribe at Newtondale, 12 miles south of Beka, nearer the Fish River. Since he was a Christian and desired to evangelize all his people he asked for a missionary, but none was available so he and his son, William Shaw Kama who had been educated at Salem, did what they could to fill the missionary's place. Phatho's refusal to leave his Christian brother in peace led Kama to pull up his stakes for a removal to North Thembuland in 1838, and there, 11 years later, Shepstone followed as his long-desired missionary.[1]

The same meeting that voted Shepstone to Beka appointed Boyce to Wesleyville and authorized him to promise a missionary to Mhala. But Wesleyville's best days lay in the past. The removal of Phatho and Kama had taken the heart out of the district, and the remnant of the Gqumukwebi who stayed around the old mission were not those who had shown a strong interest in Christianity. Membership of the mission stood at 66 in 1834; by 1837 it had fallen to 10, and it remained at 12 for several years. The station had served a good purpose: the fortunes of war and shifts of population prevented a continuance of its primacy.

Mount Coke's initial recovery was even slower than Wesleyville's. The mission was eventually rebuilt by Boyce, but the response from the Ndlambe people was disappointing. A membership of 7 in 1834 had dropped to 6 by 1838; but this gloomy picture was somewhat offset by the fact that

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[1] Whiteside, History, p.210.

twelve sons of chiefs were being educated at the mission school. Perseverance proved profitable in that station, for it survived when Wesleyville closed down, and has continued to occupy a useful place in Wesleyan work in Kaffraria until the present day.

Mission effort in the Gqumukwebi and Ndlambe tribes was not all discouragement, however. By 1838 the Methodists had 250 pupils in their four schools among those peoples, and a combined average congregation of 600 attending their meetings. Such work was too good to abandon: it represented progress after the upheavals of the 1835 war. It also provided a base on which to build another work, that among the migrant Fingos whose fortunes have already been briefly studied in connection with Ayliff's moves.[1] The nucleus of a mission station was set up at Fort Peddie, and was supervised by Shepstone from Beka; but later Boyce made it the centre of his circuit, and it flourished with the increased attention it then received. By 1838 there were 108 pupils in its school, 150 attending divine service, and 20 communicant members on its books—and this in spite of the shifting nature of the surrounding population.

Before leaving the frontier region, some attention must be paid to the work in Albany on which so much of the work among the indigenous peoples depended. A vigorous ministry among the Europeans, Hottentots, and Xhosa people had been carried on throughout the war so that, in spite of disturbances, the Methodist churches held their ground. When hostilities were over, Grahamstown found itself with a greatly increased native population, with the result that church attendances grew rapidly, and the Methodist chapel had congregations of from three to four hundred each Sunday. The local leaders had planned to sell their old chapel and build a new one, but to cope with the additional interests they decided to buy the original building for £250 and use it for native congregations, while going ahead

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[1] Supra, pp.294-298.

with their plans for a new European church. In July 1837, Grahamstown experienced a genuine spiritual revival. The chapel was crowded for week-night prayer meetings; 50 people professed conversion in 10 days, and within six weeks 300 new members, mostly young men and women, were added to the church in an orderly manner, much to the town's astonishment.[1] This spiritual fervour and numerical growth had a direct effect on work beyond the frontier for they led to increased interest in and support for missions to the Kaffrarian tribes.

Although the Wesleyans carefully refrained from trespassing on the preserves of other missions, they were ready, as far as their resources would permit, to answer any call on their ministry where a need existed. Shaw had first preached at Fort Beaufort on his way to Wesleyville in 1823, but ten years passed before the church gave regular attention to the garrison families there by arranging for the Grahamstown minister to visit the Fort once a month. During the war, the increase in population warranted closer supervision, and in 1837 a young minister was appointed to the district. Port Elizabeth had been deliberately avoided in the early days because a minister of the Anglican church was stationed in the town and Bethelsdorp was near enough to care for the normal needs of a small place. But by 1832 the leaders were calling for a missionary to serve the Algoa Bay area. Their pleas were not successful, and the best they could do in 1837 was to include the growing port on their quarterly preaching plan. Then, in 1838, they were able to appoint a full-time minister to the district and lay the foundations of a strong work there. In that same year the bounds of their parish were pushed many miles to the north by a request for them to begin work in Colesberg; while the Boers' appeal for a missionary to accompany the trekkers opened almost illimitable vistas to the denomination, vistas that could not be explored due to lack of men and means.[2]

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[1] Shaw and Mrs. Shaw, 28 July and 18 Aug. 1837. WMM 1838, p.66; Whiteside, History, p.111.

[2] ADM 1837.

The visit paid to the Transkei by Davis and Palmer during November 1835 and Delancey's expedition at the end of January[1] prepared the way for a re-opening of the most distant Wesleyan stations. The superintendent, Haddy, left Grahamstown on March 29, travelled to King William's Town by way of the Beka mission, enjoyed Smith's hospitality, and with Davis, Palmer, Ayliff, and Cameron made ready to cross the Kei. A message to Rili asking for a specific invitation to return brought only an equivocal reply; but when the convoy moved on they were given a welcome to Gcalekaland. They left Ayliff and his large family at Butterworth beside the gloomy ruins of the first station, but had the satisfaction of knowing that Rili and his mother Nomsa were favourable to the mission and were affording it their protection. At Clarkebury, after an absence of almost a year, Davis confirmed what he had discovered on his flying visit in November—"Everything connected with the Mission house and garden we found just in the state in which we left it". Nothing had been stolen, two sacks of corn were intact although the local people had been very short of food. Even the fences had been kept in repair by friendly natives who were eagerly awaiting the missionary's return.[2] With some reason, Davis gave credit to Fadana and his subjects for their care of the property, and felt that it reflected favourably on the Thembu attitude toward the mission. Greater encouragement came from the news that since the missionary's departure in May of the previous year, the children, who had previously learned to read, had regularly met for Sunday worship. This was remarkable conduct for so young a Christian community. The early work had not been fruitless.

Although the mission home at Morley had been destroyed, Palmer found the chapel, without its doors and windows, still standing, and there he made his home on returning to his old charge. At such a time it was the mission-

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[1] Supra, pp.344-346.

[2] Davis, 8 Dec. 1835 and 12 May 1836. WMM 1836, pp.305,786. Ibid., p.609, quoting Gardiner's findings in July 1835.

aries' wives who displayed the most heroic qualities: they cheerfully lived under primitive conditions, in the open air, or in make-shift accommodation, supplying their husbands' needs, caring for broods of children, and attending to the many extra-domestic duties inseparable from a pioneer mission life. At Morley, Mrs. Palmer had some incentive for any sacrifice she made for she found that the children they had left at the time of their evacuation could still read, and before a good congregation on the first Sunday of their return twenty of her pupils stood up and read from the hymnbook and liturgy—much to the surprise of the assembled chiefs.[1] Conditions at Buntingville when the new recruit, James Cameron, rode into its precincts, were not comparable with those at its sister missions since it was the only one of the six that had not been entirely abandoned by its white staff. The artisan Tainton had remained at his post and enabled the mission programme to continue with the property in good repair. No spectacular growth in membership was recorded, neither could it have been expected, but ground gained had been held, and the incoming director was not obliged to clear away the ruins of former work but could carry on from where his predecessor had left off.

Each of the Transkeian missions made gratifying strides after the war. The quickest recovery was at Butterworth. The Gcaleka appeared to bear no grudge on account of Hintsa's death but to take their cue from his great wife, Nomsa, who regularly attended the mission services. The Fingo migration made little apparent difference to the district: the home tribe rapidly increased in numbers and from 1837 the mission village grew quickly. Two of Hintsa's brothers, who between them governed the greater part of the tribe, clamoured for missionaries at their own kraals. This set a pattern for succeeding years, and Butterworth became the mother of many sub-stations which were directed by native catechists.[2]

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[1] Palmer, May 16. WMM 1836, p.787. [2] Slee, Albany Methodism, p.82.

W.J. Davis did not long enjoy his return to Clarkebury owing to his wife's poor health, but in the twelve months he spent with Fadana he saw rapid progress within the mission. A brick mission house and a wattle dwelling for the catechist were built on the station, and the Thembu moved closer to the missionary as they saw him respected by their chief and head men. Outside of the mission advance was more difficult, owing to friction between the neighbouring tribes; but the Thembu people themselves welcomed the Christian minister and gave him the freedom of their country. His nearest missionary neighbour, Palmer, returned to a surprisingly prosperous station. After its slow beginnings under Mdepa, and in spite of the frequent upheavals due to inter-tribal warfare, Morley became one of the brightest spots on the Wesleyan landscape. Its school became the largest east of the Keiskamma, 430 pupils being enrolled by 1838; and more than 500 people attended the weekly services. Its church membership of 36 was the highest of all the Kaffrarian missions.[1] Nevertheless, it was continually plagued by local strife, and the station barely escaped a second destruction.

In Cameron, the most distant of the missions found a thoughtful director who surveyed Buntingville with an intelligent eye. "The fact must not be disguised," he wrote, "whatever may be the result, that this Mission has not in the five years produced as many converts to Christianity." In view of Boyce's earlier report that the 1834 membership stood at 11, and the fact that by 1838 it had risen to 17, this judgment may be put down to the clean sweep of a new broom, so long as such an interpretation does not obscure the inherent difficulties of work in Pondoland. As Cameron remarked, Faku was averse to the religion that threatened his pet vices, although he protected the missionary who preached against them. The chief, it was judged,

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[1] Information for post-war Clarkebury, Morley, and Buntingville is drawn from WMM 1836, pp.785-7, 869-72; 1837, p.942; Whiteside, History, pp.211-13. The best statistical picture is that given in Appendix VI (A), being Boyce's summary for all stations for 1838.

endured rather than enjoyed such preaching.[1] In spite of such discouragement, however, Buntingville, sometimes known by its Mpondo name of Emampondweni, filled a strategic position in the Methodist master plan, and could not be written off as a loss at any stage.

2. Progress in Education and Translation. The Wesleyans had been conscious of the need for schools and had done their best to meet the need even in the early days of their missions; but their corps of workers was so small and distributed over so many missions that no missionary had had time for regular teaching or for adequately supervising the efforts of others. After the war, however, with increased facilities and a larger staff they gave education a central place in their mission programme. Schoolmasters, with a salary of £30 per annum and family allowances, were appointed to all stations. Native converts who had passed through one of the mission schools or, in some cases, had received a little superior education in the Colony, were trained to teach their own people. The need for such training had been foreseen before the war, but plans to provide it were interrupted by hostilities. With the restoration of relative calm, however, a normal school, the Watson Institution, was established and a supply of teachers gradually began to flow into Kaffraria. In this way a sound school system developed, and by 1838 station directors were being asked to render detailed reports of the schools attached to their missions.[2]

On his return from England, Shaw found a quasi-educational problem demanding his attention. Natives who had attached themselves to the mission headquarters in Grahamstown began to regret their urbanization and to long for land and cattle. To meet the need, Shaw bought 6,000 acres near Salem and there founded "Farmerfield" as a "school of industry". For a rent of

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[1] WMI 1836, pp.871,872.

[2] A summary report of school enrolments is included in the figures given in Appendix VI(A).

one pound per year the head of a family obtained a site for his house, land for cultivation, and grazing rights for a recognized number of cattle and small stock. In this way the church controlled admissions and gained some returns for its large investment, while the tenants enjoyed schooling facilities and rudimentary training in agriculture and industry. "This scheme", reported Shaw, "was completely successful."[1] Almost immediately after founding this institution, the superintendent's eyes turned northwards in response to the needs of the emancipated negroes (as the Methodists described the ex-slaves who were mainly, if not entirely, of non-Xhosa origin, having been imported from other parts of Africa) whose apprenticeship ended on 1 December 1838. The Society authorized him to buy a group of four farms near the source of the Black Kei, north of the Winterberg Mountains. The land cost £600, and covered 4,000 acres. On it a mixed mission, "Haslope Hills", was set up in September 1839, under Ayliff, to care for the liberated slaves, Malays, Bushmen, Fingos, and Thembu who had drifted into the remote area.[2] The Methodists were enlarging both the character and the geographical range of their mission work.

A retarding factor in the early school work had been the missionaries' efforts to impart their instruction through the medium of English, but when they abandoned that policy their educational work produced encouraging results. The change was not difficult to effect since most of their workers proved to be capable linguists, and some were brilliant. Shaw quickly learned to use the Dutch he had studied in England and on the voyage to Algoa Bay; most of his colleagues came to use Dutch as their second language; and before they became proficient in Xhosa they effected translations of the Scriptures with the help of an interpreter whose only means of communicating with them was "barbarous Dutch". An increasing knowledge of Xhosa, however, relieved them of dependence on so frail a linguistic reed. The speed with which the incoming missionaries acquired a working knowledge of

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[1] SMM, pp.290-93.

[2] ADM 1839; SMM, p.299.

the language varied considerably. Boyce probably made the most rapid progress among the early recruits, though he insisted on the thoroughness of Shaw's grasp of the language. Six months after entering Kaffraria Dugmore was able to understand and use the language for preaching, but his boyhood had been spent in the Colony so he must have had an initial advantage. But no matter what his individual skill, each minister endeavoured to learn the tongue so that he could address the people in their own language. When a working knowledge of it had been secured, it was almost immediately harnessed to the task of translating portions of the Bible. Journals and letters for the years 1829-33 are liberally sprinkled with references to the translation of the Scriptures. At first such work was done in collaboration with the L.M.S. and G.M.S. missionaries who had embarked on the translation of the New Testament, leaving the W.M.M.S. to concentrate on the Old; but by 1833 it became evident that if they wanted to have the complete Bible in Xhosa within a short space of time the Wesleyans would have to complete their own version in its entirety since the other bodies were working at a slower pace.[1] In the area of hymnody, too, the Methodists blazed a new trail. Boyce gratefully made note of the young Shepstone's having translated six of Wesley's hymns into metred Xhosa, and expressed the hope that within a year, he would have completed enough to spare them "the disgust of singing in our congregations those dismal trite ditties, originally compiled by the Scottish missionaries".[2]

A productive partnership had sprung up between the bachelor Boyce and the 15-year old Shepstone. The boy had spent about eight years among the tribes when he went to stay with the missionary in 1831, and was artlessly fluent in Xhosa. He was therefore able to assist Boyce in his efforts to master the language while having his education advanced by the older man. It was during their collaboration at Buntingville that Boyce discovered the principle of the "euphonic concord" which appeared to the early philologists to be the key to unlock the mysteries of the Bantu tongues.[3] The discovery

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[1] ADM 1830, 1831, 1832. [2] 6 March 1832. WMM 1832, p.664. [3] Ibid.

marked the beginning of what might be termed the scientific study of Xhosa—the missionaries were no longer blindly trying to acquire a language of whose workings they were ignorant: instead, they unravelled its highly developed grammar and worked with their eyes open.

Although the first printed portions of the Scriptures in Xhosa came from the Chumie (C.M.S.) press, and were followed by hymns and catechisms, it was not long before the Wesleyans gained the lead, especially after they had secured type for their own press in Grahamstown in 1833. When Boyce went to England in 1834 he approached the British and Foreign Bible Society for help in the production of the complete Bible in Xhosa, and on his being made superintendent of printing on his return, the presses set to work and by 1836 had printed 4,500 portions of Scripture. Two years later the complete Xhosa Bible was ready in manuscript form, but did not appear in print until 1846.

The translator's art was exercised not only on the sacred text, for the missionaries saw the need for helping others swiftly to learn the language they had so painfully acquired. Shaw had collected material for a Xhosa grammar and a spelling book; he had carried work on a dictionary as far as "D"; but the impetus for completing these aids came with the arrival of Boyce and his acquisition of the language under Shepstone's tutelage. Work on the grammar was finished toward the end of 1832, and it became the first book to be published by the Mission Press in Grahamstown. Two other first editions followed in 1836—Dugmore's Kaffir Dictionary, and the Society's Xhosa Hymnbook—while a church periodical, Umshumayali Wendeba (The News Teller) was published in 1838. Davis, who had not revealed strong literary interests, made unspectacular but practical contributions by translating school books (unspecified) and preparing "Progressive Exercises in the Kaffir Language".[1] Thus, during the first decade and a half of their ministry beyond the Fish and the Kei Rivers, the Wesleyans laid the foundations for a Xhosa literature and made it easier for other white men to acquire the language of the several branches of the Southern Nguni tribes

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[1] Davis, 12 May 1836. WMM 1836, pp.786,787. Slee, Albany Methodism, pp.121-130, has a useful though sometimes inaccurate section concerning the linguistic work of the Methodist missionaries.

with whom they had to deal.

3. Continued Progress. It was 1823 when Shaw began to forge his chain of stations fromAlbany to Natal, yet with the return of nominal peace and the re-opening of stations in 1836, the chain still failed to reach its desired end. From 1830 the District Meeting annually laid plans for entering Natal, men were called for, men were appointed, but for more than a decade Natal lay just beyong the Society's reach. In the post-war years official policy favoured a gradual lessening of the gap by the establishment of intermediate missions rather than its annihilation by one great stride. Shaw's own long stay in England (1833-37) had aroused a practical interest in the South African field, and when he returned to Grahamstown he brought recruits and the promise of others to follow.[1] These reinforcements, together with an increase in the number of trained native helpers, enabled the leaders to fill in the gaps between missions and extend their frontier further eastward. The Wesleyan Methodist Centenary celebrations in 1839 yielded a crop of eleven new missionaries for Kaffraria, and made possible the fulfilment of many long-delayed ambitions. A second mission, Umvani, was set up south of the present Queenstown for Thembuland; Beecham Wood was opened among the Velelo near the mouth of the Mbhashe River; Shawbury was established in response to the repeated appeals of Ncaphayi for a mission among his people, the Bhaca; and when Faku moved east of the Mzimvubu, Palmerton was founded to serve him and those who had moved with him. Finally, in 1842 Archbell, a veteran with Bechuanaland experience, was sent to Port Natal, and Shaw's cherished dream of an unbroken chain of stations between that spot and Albany was at last realized—nineteen years after the first link had been forged.[2] Such progress, within six or seven years of the signing of the September treaties, belied D'Urban's claim that all mission work among the Xhosa and neighbouring tribes had miserably failed. Advance would not have been possible, even with

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[1] Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. Wm. Shaw, pp.179,180.

[2] Kaffrarian advance, it should be remembered, went hand in hand with progress on other fronts, notably in Namaqualand, Bechuanaland, and north of the Orange River. The Wesleyans cast their nets wide.

the most generous support from British Methodists, if the tribes themselves had not accepted, and in some cases, clamoured for the missionaries' settlement among them.

When Shaw, at the close of his long missionary career, looked back on the growth of the organization for which he had been so largely responsible, he had a clear concept of what he hoped it would eventually become. "I trust," he wrote in 1860, that "the Wesleyan Missions will stand forth in their full proportion, and with a well defined and complete system of discipline, as the Methodist Church of Southern Africa."[1] Had he been able to see a century ahead, he would have had the satisfaction of finding his hopes amply fulfilled. The Church which in 1838 was operating in four sprawling areas, loosely defined as Albany, Kaffraria, Bechuana Country, and Cape District (which included Namaqualand), came to embrace all the present Republic of South Africa under eight districts: Cape of Good Hope, Grahamstown, Queenstown, Clarkebury, Kimberley and Bloemfontein, Natal, Southern Transvaal, and Northern Transvaal.[2] The 1961 report recorded a total membership (of all races) of 325,931 with a further 491,961 adherents making a grand total of 817,892 who worshipped in 2,905 churches and 3,930 other buildings. The congregations were served by 613 ordained ministers, 392 evangelists, 7 deaconesses, and 27,678 class leaders other than ministers. A study of the sections that include the area formerly covered by the Albany and Kaffraria Districts, reveals remarkable growth: but statistical comparisons are not practicable because of alterations in organizational structures.[3] Enough can be perceived, however, to demonstrate that the foundations laid by Shaw and his colleagues have been able to take all that succeeding generations have erected upon them. The Methodist Church is today the strongest of all Christian missionary institutions in South Africa.

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[1] MTL, p.236.

[2] Minutes of the Seventy-Ninth Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa (1961) (Cape Town, 1961), p.30.

[3] Some idea of Methodist expansion may be gained from the relevant 1961 figures given in Appendix VI(B).

II. RECKONING

1. Wesleyan Retrospection. A well-defined war, terminated by a treaty between intelligently consenting parties, would have enabled the Methodists to put the war behind them and to pour all their energies into reconstruction. In material matters they succeeded in doing just that; but the ill-defined conclusion to hostilities, the protracted exchanges between the colonial and home governments which postponed a final settlement, and the post-mortems conducted by rival schools of thought prevented the missionaries from writing finis to their judgments on the war and its aftermath.

Unknown to its participants the Sixth Frontier War was destined to hold the attention of several different classes of commentators for some years to come. D'Urban brooded over the causes, conduct, and outcome of the struggle long after his dismissal;[1] Smith devoted more than 150 pages of his Autobiography to the war and its settlement; the Aborigines Committee examined 39 witnesses, 24 of whom dealt exclusively with the Cape Colony and largely with causes of the 1834 invasion and its sequel; while many amateur politicians in South Africa and England published their convictions concerning the struggle.

Among the unofficial judges of the management of frontier affairs the Wesleyans came to occupy a conspicuous place by virtue of several related factors. First came their large mission commitments in Kaffraria. By 1834 their work was greater in extent and capacity than that of the three other societies (L.M.S., G.M.S., and Moravian) who also served Xhosa tribes. In particular, their ministry among the Gqunukwebi and Ndlambe gave them a

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[1] After effecting abandonment D'Urban spent much time in assembling documents and private letters bearing on his 1835 policies. In March 1839 he wrote to Col. Smith, then in England, asking him to distribute 24 copies of a pamphlet that sought to vindicate his (D'urban's) actions. Recipients were prominent public figures, civil and military, among whom was the Duke of Wellington. In 1845 D'Urban was still receiving replies from such overtures. From Grahamstown, 12 Sept. 1845, there came a letter from Wm. Shaw in which he expressed approval of D'Urban's handling of the frontier war. D'Urban Papers.

specially lively interest in all that affected the border area, while their several churches among the Albany settlers bound them closely to the colonial cause. In addition to these prime stakes other stimuli urged them to express their views on the hotly debated issues. D'Urban had consulted and had used them both during and after the war; the inclusion of Shrewsbury's letter in the Governor's despatch of 19 June 1835 had led to adverse comment in Glenelg's reply of 26 December[1] and had placed a weapon in the hands of the critics of Wesleyanism; and unfavourable, though not necessarily accurate comparison with the attitudes of L.M.S. and G.M.S. missionaries had set the Methodists in a bad light with Britain's evangelicals. Under such circumstances it was not surprising that the Wesleyans undertook to explain their policies to an eager public in the Colony and in the British Isles. The explanation developed into a defence, and the defence came to embrace not only their own missions but also colonial government policy on the eastern frontier.

It must be recognized, however, that there was no uniform Wesleyan policy on the issues connected with the war. In fact, at least three strata of opinion were discernible: the official, headquarters' view as enunciated by one of the society's secretaries, John Beecham; the pro-colonial concept expressed by Boyce; and the rather less emphatic judgment recorded by Shaw. The first formed part of a larger responsibility that dealt with many other countries besides South Africa; the second sprang from the mind of a missionary who obviously enjoyed dabbling in politics; while the third came from an experienced worker who voiced many of his opinions during a long stay in England (1833-37).

Beecham's views were aired before the Aborigines Committee. There he protested against the occupation of that part of the Neutral Territory that had belonged to the Gqumkwebi, and stated that his society had signified to His Majesty's Government that

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[1] Supra. p.362.

they would not be consenting parties to any other plan than one which would give back the lands beyond the Fish River (the former boundary of the colony) to the Caffre tribes, and those who, like the Fingoes, had become incorporated with them.[1]

He denied that the Shrewsbury letter[2] represented Methodist sentiment and claimed that its harshness had been exaggerated. The Wesleyan missionaries, he maintained, did not give blanket approval to D'Urban's procedures, especially in respect of land disposal, but questioned decisions that were unjust to the tribes.[3] He then commented on the government's frontier policy which he considered to be "very defective and injurious".[4] Believing that the outbreak of war demonstrated the need of a better system, he submitted a few suggestions on the subject. These included strict justice towards the Xhosa people, recognition of the equal rights of settler and native, compensation for loss of lands by a communication of the blessings of civilization and Christianity, adequate but not excessive punishment for depredations, written and intelligible treaties with all chiefs rather than an agreement with one, prompt administration of law by a Lieutenant-Governor at Grahamstown, and a steady adherence to whatever equable policy was ultimately adopted.

The church leader strongly criticized acts of Parliament which disposed of lands to colonists as if the aboriginal inhabitants did not exist, and asked how the wrongs that had already been committed could be rectified.

In our national character, by our legislative acts, we have wronged the aborigines of our colonies; justice requires that we make reparation in the character in which we inflicted the wrong; and I therefore give it as my deliberate and fixed opinion, that we are required to make, out of our national funds, a suitable provision for promoting their religious and moral instruction.[5]

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[1] IBB VII.538, p.497.

[2] Supra, pp.209,210.

[3] Beecham was here ignoring the unqualified welcome initially given to D'Urban's May and September treaties, and basing his judgments on his missionaries' later criticisms of the Governor's land policies.

[4] IBB VII.538, pp.508,509.

[5] Ibid., p.516.

It is questionable whether the Khosa tribes would have been favourably impressed by the proposed compensation which would have appeared to benefit missions more than themselves; but Beecham's suggestions were a great advance over most contemporary solutions to colonial border problems, and they were certainly more liberal than those held by his society's representatives in South Africa. This difference could be explained by his world outlook, his detachment from the local scene, his proximity to Exeter Hall and the Colonial Office, and his susceptibility to the evangelical, philanthropical influences that emanated from London.

Boyce had expressed his views at an early stage in the war[1] and had enjoyed his excursion into politics sufficiently to pay several return visits into that field. His signature was on the Wesleyan address to D'Urban on 2 June 1835; it was he who approached the Governor concerning peace overtures in late July; his was the letter of July 28 which outlined the Methodist proposals on peace-making, his was the journal that recorded the Wesleyan attempt to persuade the tribes to sue for peace, and his were the proposals for persuading English public opinion to favour D'Urban's settlement.[2] Boyce drew up the Albany Methodists' reply on 13 May 1837 to attacks that were made upon them as a consequence of Shrewsbury's much-criticized letter;[3] and it was Boyce who so thoroughly examined the war in his book Notes on South African Affairs. Here then was a man who enjoyed writing and whose compunctions about the ethics of a missionary's meddling in politics were easily overridden. He excused his entrance into the controversial field on the pleas of defence and ensuring that justice was done to the maligned colonists, but the fact remained that his society preached "the inexpedience of Missionary interference in questions of a

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[1] 31 March 1835. Supra, pp.222-225.

[2] Supra, pp.307-312.

[3] Shaw, Defence, p.64.

purely political nature",[1] and that on those grounds it was hostile to Philip when he raised his voice on behalf of the Bantu whom he considered to have been wrongly treated.

The Wesleyan writer, with the tacit if not the official approval of his fellow-missionaries, delved deeply into the causes of the war. He granted that the legal western boundary of Xhosa territory, since Van Plettenberg's declaration of 1778, lay on the Great Fish River, and that the natives had been driven "from their ancient and lawful possessions".[2] He acknowledged that within the previous thirty years the Xhosa had nearly trebled their numbers and the number of their cattle and would therefore need more rather than less land. He believed in "the right of the population to the full and free occupancy of their lands, undisturbed by grant to European settlers", but knew that the right had been ignored by white authority. He understood the colonial predicament that resulted from having too small a population in too large an area, but deplored the attempted remedies which only led to further expansion and an intensification of the problem. He joined other commentators in condemning the expulsion of the Ngqika from the Kat River lands, maintaining that it was an unjust and unwise punishment for sporadic cattle raids. On the first page of his Notes he approvingly quoted from the Aborigines Committee report:

> ...we, without hesitation, name its [the war's] real, though perhaps remote cause;—it was the systematic forgetfulness of the principles of justice in our treatment of the native possessors of the soil.

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[1] Shaw, Defence, p.62. Whatever may have been the official Methodist view on the matter of intrusion into politics, the Colonial Office formed its own estimate of the Society's fulfilment of its own ideals. James Stephen, in a letter to Russell dated 16 Sept. 1839, "gave it as his opinion that a suggestion to them [the Methodists] of 'the propriety of onjoining on their Missionaries greater forbearance on questions foreign to the immediate objects of their mission', would have little effect. 'They are a body with whom, as far as my experience goes, such counsels would not be very persuasive, especially since of late years they have learnt to form a very high and, I believe, a very exaggerated estimate of their influence on political affairs.'" J. Roxborough, Colonial Policy, p.216.

[2] The summary of Boyce's views is drawn mainly from his Notes, which represented his considered opinion on the war and its issues.

A little later he expressed a similar judgment in his own words:

> ... to a system of territorial aggression, pursued from the earliest periods, and carried on by the Dutch and English Colonial Governments (sanctioned of course by their superiors in Europe), we owe the Kaffir war.[1]

He was ready to excuse Xhosa incursions upon the Colony as being stimulated by "the moral, political, and social conditions of the Kaffir tribes", and insisted that "we must not pass judgment upon such a people according to the strict rules of Christian morality". In addition he agreed that "the total want of plan and system which characterized our border policy previous to the war" was sufficient "to account for the existence of considerable excitement and irritation in Kaffirland".[2]

Yet, in spite of such sympathetic admissions he condemned the outbreak of war and wholeheartedly approved of D'Urban's measures which out-heroded Herod in depriving the African population of their lands. When Glenelg reversed the Governor's decisions Boyce deplored the move, regretting the breakdown of the D'Urban system and the restoration of the chiefs' power.[3] He foresaw in the "weak and timorous frontier policy" associated with the Stockenstrom regime the seeds of another war when the Gqunukwebi would have returned to their old predatory habits and have joined their neighbours in attacks on the Colony.[4]

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[1] Notes, p.28. [2] Ibid., pp.27,28.

[3] In his Memoir of the Rev. Wm. Shaw (p.178), published in 1874, Boyce found satisfaction in the thought that after nearly 20 years of frontier conflict following Glenelg's reversal of D'Urban's system, a return to D'Urban's methods brought comparative peace. He failed to acknowledge, however, that D'Urban's September policy resulted from expediency rather than choice, and that Glenelg's plan had fine ideals which were hindered by ignorance of the true situation on the frontier and by complications arising from D'Urban's system.

[4] In this respect Boyce was, unhappily, prophetic, for in 1851 Phatho and his people fought against the colonists. The Methodist author Whiteside, wrote: " [Phatho] would, doubtless, always have been neutral, but for the arrogance of a British officer, who, at the close of the war, taunted Pato [sic] as a coward for not having joined his tribe against the colony. Pato's savage nature was aroused, and in a fury he retorted: 'You shall not have to say that of me next time'. In future wars he was the colony's bitterest foe, and the patient work of the missionary was undone by the blatant folly of a military fop". History, p.199. Whiteside undoubtedly places too much weight on the incident, but it serves to stress the eventual change in Gqunukwebi loyalties and their turning from missionary tutelage.

He would have liked to see Phatho's tribe received as British subjects from which a militia could be formed to supplement troops in guarding the border, for he believed that until Xhosa habits changed a strong military force would be required on the frontier, and wanted this to be under the direction of a Lieutenant-Governor possessed of both civil and military powers. Eventually, he hoped, the Colony would be granted self-government and be able to manage its affairs realistically, without interference from a distant and biased home government.

When an explanation is sought for this pro-colonial outlook as opposed to a staunch defence of Xhosa interests such as might have been expected of a missionary, one comes face to face with the peculiarity of Methodism's position astride the frontier in those days. Its ministers served both black and white congregations and could, without great difficulty, see border problems from both points of view. But in the war the initial attack had come from the Ngqika-Ndlambe tribesmen. This, technically, made them the aggressors and tended to draw Wesleyan sympathies away from those who had taken the law into their own hands. Only a few of the invaders could have been mission adherents from Mount Coke, while almost the entire Gqunukwebi tribe chose to be loyal to the Colony. The early ravages of the attackers also alienated missionary opinion, helping to blur the outline of the real wrongs from which they had suffered and to place the colonists in the position of unoffending victims of unprovoked barbarism.

To confirm the pro-colonial trend there came accusations from home concerning colonial inhumanity in dealings with the border tribes. But many of the accused were members of the Methodist Church in Albany, and most of the remainder were potential members, so what could the missionaries do but pay special attention to the defence of their parishioners? On the surface, such defence was not difficult for the average settler was a humane person of liberal views who prior to the war, had harboured no strong animosity against his Xhosa neighbours. Boyce and his colleagues could, therefore, protest

the colonists' innocence with a disarming appeal to fact and lay all the blame for wrong policies at the door of earlier, unnamed colonial governments who were prompted by their powerful but unwise home government, until "the whole body of Wesleyan Missionaries, though not personally interested, felt ashamed of the English Government, and of the English name".[1] The missionaries also distinguished between the settlers and the founders of the Colony who pursued "the unjust system of European colonization"; but did not stay to explain how the settlers could be absolved from responsibility when they voluntarily enjoyed the fruits of the founders' acts without protest against the earlier system and without noticeably seeking to improve on it. At no stage did the settlers publicly defend the aborigines' rights against an encroaching white civilization. The only occasion on which they became vocal was when the home government, through Glenelg, obliged the local authorities to act in favour of the Xhosa to the detriment of settler interests. Then the colonists and the colonial government, in the person of D'Urban, made common cause against the Colonial Office, with the approval and support of the Methodists in South Africa. There was thus some justification in an opponent's reference to "that very suspicious friendship which ... existed between the tyrannical party in the colony and the Wesleyan Missionaries";[2] though, it must be confessed, the vituperative quality of the opposition reflected favourably on the judicial calm of the Wesleyans. But, leaving ill-mannered criticism aside, the fact remains that the Methodists upheld D'Urban and decried Glenelg at a time when the former was trying to subjugate the tribes and the latter was trying to preserve their independence and their inheritance.[3]

Boyce was probably too near the events on which he was adjudicating to

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[1] Boyce, Memoir of the Rev. Wm. Shaw, p.176.

[2] Justus, an opponent of the Wesleyans, quoted by Shaw, Defence, p.xv.

[3] It was not until two years after the war, in 1837, that the Methodists cautiously suggested that they might not have been in complete agreement with all of D'Urban's policies. Shaw, Defence, pp.61,62.

see them in their true perspective. His view was so foreshortened that on the crucial issue of land he could make the following observation:

> ... the whole of the Kaffir territory added by Sir Benjamin D'Urban to the colony, was within a short period after the pacification of September 1835, restored by him to the native tribes; and not one acre was granted, or any right of occupation by settlers, reserved by the Colonial Government.[1]

The fault of having annexed a huge slice of territory is transmuted into a virtue when, under Colonial Office compulsion, the land is returned to its rightful owners! What ethical gymnastics! They do at least admit, by inference, that the original annexation was wrong; but they afford little credit to D'Urban's administration. Neither do the facts concerning land grants to settlers, for it was only the lack of the British Government's consent that prevented the allocation of extensive grants to the land-hungry colonists.[2] But Boyce had so identified himself with the colonial cause that he could not perceive the inconsistencies in his judgments on Kaffrarian issues. Furthermore, the annexation of aborigines' land did not distress him: he could view it with equanimity, believing that the benefits of Christian civilization amply compensated for the loss of territorial independence. Indeed, for him and his fellows, British occupation of the lands where they were working was all to be desired in the interests of mission consolidation and advance. The flag and the Gospel were to be partners in the task of christianizing Africa.

But though Boyce confidently spoke on behalf of Methodist missionaries in Albany and Kaffraria, it should be remembered that, except when he wrote on behalf of his colleagues, his was not the official voice of Methodism. His principal work, Notes on South African Affairs received no official blessing but, on the contrary, was modified before publication and then appeared as an expression of his views only, as Shaw was at pains to explain to Beecham:

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[1] Notes, p.48.

[2] Supra., pp. 325-328.

> He [Boyce] gave me leave to take liberty with his manuscript and I have availed myself of it to a considerable extent, striking out or altering many passages which were perhaps too strong or at least would have given the enemy an occasion over us.—I could not prevent the publication and I therefore thought it best to agree to it and thus exercise a degree of control over it which Boyce cheerfully conceded to me.[1]

The justifiable inference from that letter is that Shaw would have prevented the publication of Notes had he been able to do so, but, failing that drastic action, he toned down its strongest passages so that the resultant book presented only a softened version of Boyce's opinions on the South African scene. This is tantamount to disapproval of Boyce's fervour and an intimation that the true Wesleyan position was more moderate than his pages would suggest.

Where, then, might an acceptable outline of the Methodist position be found? There was no official statement of policy since, in theory, the society did not concern itself with political issues, but the views of the man who guided the destinies of Methodist missions in Kaffraria for forty years could surely be taken as a trustworthy expression of the denomination's attitude to the problems on the eastern frontier. On this basis, Shaw's statements may be treated with respect; but it should be remembered that he probably stood half-way between the liberal views of the home committee and the extreme colonialism of Boyce. His own sanctified common sense prevented him from adopting extravagant attitudes and led him along the via media.

But Shaw and his associates largely viewed the 1835 war from the vantage ground of Wesleyville, and the angle of view affected their appraisal of the war's major issues. While they tried to be wide-minded and to compass the whole scene on both sides of the Fish River, they not unnaturally found themselves looking at the Xhosa section through Gqunukwe i glasses. This distorted their outlook. The Gqunukwebi had cause for complaint against the Colony in the annexation of land at the lower end of the Neutral Territory, but they had not suffered such intense irritations as had been meted out to the Ngqika and Ndlambe. They hoped to gain from an alliance with the Colony,

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[1] Letter of 1 Feb. 1839, quoted by Roxborough, Colonial Policy, p.228.

first by the recovery of their land, and second by protection from the uncomfortable pressures of their neighbours. Anyone who sympathized with Phatho, then, would tend to minimize the weight of Xhosa grievances and to enlarge on the heinousness of their attack on Albany. This was unfortunate since the larger issues of the war belonged to the Ngqika and Ndlambe. Those who in any way underrated the provocations to which the northern tribes had been subjected were bound to end with an unbalanced view of the conflict, and to clash with other observers who championed Maqoma and his allies at the expense of the Colony.

The difference between W.M.M.S. and L.M.S. attitudes toward the frontier problem stemmed from the differences in the nature and locale of their mission work. The W.M.M.S. operated on both sides of the border, among Europeans and Bantu; the L.M.S. restricted its work to the Hottentot and Xhosa people and had no direct stake in the white communities. The Wesleyans had cast their net wide and were on their way to Natal; the L.M.S. had largely concentrated on the relatively small area between the Kat and Keiskamma Rivers, the focal region in the prolonged frontier disturbances. Given these differences, a divergence in outlook was probably inevitable.[1] The discord was exacerbated by Wesleyan support of D'Urban's policies and L.M.S. agreement with Glenelg. Add the clash of personalities, illustrated in the persons of Boyce and Philip, and there was ample material for dissension between two societies who were each trying to help the Xhosa tribes. In the verbal and written exchanges that arose after the war Shaw carried his points with a firm dignity, but there was no basic difference between him and Boyce when it came to disagreement with the L.M.S. over British policy in Kaffraria. Any variance was one of degree rather than of kind, and was

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[1] There is little evidence, however, for Macmillan's claim that the Wesleyans were "somewhat aloof from their brethren". (BRB, p.191). Relations between missionaries of different societies were extremely cordial, though Methodist strength would give its men a somewhat commanding position in any communal gathering. In their attitude to the war, the Kaffrarian missionaries were remarkably united. It was Philip's activities and Wesleyan disagreement with them that emphasized L.M.S. and W.M.M.S. differences.

revealed by moderate as opposed to extreme expression of opinion.

Shaw's temperament and Christian philosophy made it congenial for him to fulfil his society's instructions that its representatives were to be "the friends of all, and enemies of none". When it came to post-war issues he claimed that his group of missionaries subscribed to the watchword of "the most numerous and respectable class of British settlers, ... 'Justice to the Kafirs, Security to the Colony'".[1] His record proves that he tried to help both classes while it also illustrates the difficulty encountered even by a good man in his efforts to be impartial. He condemned the injustice of the colonial border policy and the violence employed by the Xhosa warriors when they rebelled against that policy; yet he absolved the settlers from participating in the one or provoking the other by placing them in a moral vacuum whereby they bore no responsibility for frontier affairs, even after fourteen years of residence in Albany. In his readiness to blame earlier administrations he failed to perceive that D'Urban's solutions to border issues, supported as they were by the majority of colonists and by the Wesleyan missionaries, were no less unjust to the native tribes than the remedies attempted by the Governor's predecessors.

When asked by the Aborigines Committee for his suggestions concerning the government of tribal territories, Shaw recommended what was then known as the "Indian System", which allowed internal authority to the chiefs under the general supervision of British rule.[2] He raised no objection to colonization, provided that the natives were not deprived of all rights in the soil. He believed "there should be ample reserves of lands of average value made for them in all parts of a territory, which is governed by our colonial rulers, and generally occupied by our colonists". Native lands

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[1] Defence, p.xvi.

[2] IMB VII.533, p.58. Since Dr. Philip made similar recommendations (see Macmillan, SRB, p.124), the two missionary-statesmen were not as far apart as they imagined themselves to be.

should be safeguarded until their owners could assume full responsibility for them in the face of colonial conditions. Large communities of indigenous people and the placement of friendly groups near hostile tribes were to be avoided, however. Rather, colonial towns and native reserves were better intermingled so that each could assist in the other's development.[1]

As Shaw looked into the future he saw imperial growth:

> By the joint operation of a variety of causes, it seems to be more than probable that the British Government will at length, however unwillingly, be constrained to take upon itself the conservation of the peace and happiness of all who dwell betwixt the Cape and the tropic of Capricorn. Hence I think I see the steady growth of British power like a majestic tree spreading forth its branches far and wide, and thus affording shade and shelter under which white and black,—all varieties and tribes of men in Southern Africa,—may repose in peace and safety, and enjoyment.

After which, in a prophetic declaration, he predicted: "Then shall be seen the rise of a South African Empire".[2] And there was no protest at such a prospect. The Methodist missionary believed that the spread of British rule would produce peace and a climate favourable to missions. He left condemnation of colonization to the Little Englanders at home.

2. Appraisal. There was, then, an unresolved difference of opinion and emphasis in the views expressed by three levels of Methodist thought. The London committee member defended the aborigine, the subordinate missionary was so concerned with defending the colonist that he missed the just claims of the aborigine, while the administrative head in Albany and Kaffraria tried to strike a fair mean but weighed the balance down heavily in favour of settler at the expense of the aborigine. At the time, Boyce's view was taken to represent Methodist opinion, but when the worst of the battle-dust had settled, it was Shaw's more moderate judgment that spoke on behalf of his church. The esteem accorded the man still lends an aura

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[1] S&M. pp.147,148.

[2] From a speech given at Grahamstown, 10 may 1844. R. Godlonton, Memorials of British Settlers of South Africa (Grahamstown, 1844), pp.32,33.

of liberality to his convictions, but it is questionable whether his spiritual descendants still subscribe to his conclusions concerning the morality of the 1835 war.

It is possible that the Wesleyans would have emerged more quietly from the post-war period had it not been for two closely-related factors, the first being the fertility of Boyce's pen, the second being the belligerent reaction of Philip and his followers to Wesleyan support of D'Urban's policies. The spate of words from both sides provoked official responses from D'Urban and Glenelg and served to place the two mission societies on opposite sides of the political fence. Hypothetical though the thought may be, it is tempting to believe that had Shaw been in Grahamstown during the war and its immediate aftermath his reticence would have spared his church some of the embarrassments that resulted from its entrance into the political arena.

But when once the Methodists were committed to the course of self-expression in respect of the war, it is difficult to see how they could have adopted any very different course from the one they took, without their being endowed with a superhuman lack of bias. Their double-barrelled outlook, based on the view from both Grahamstown and Wesleyville, made it hard for them to be actively sympathetic with the Ngqika cause in spite of their efforts to see the Xhosa point of view. The combined weight of their European and Bantu work held them to the colonial cause. And here, mention must again be made of the absence in Wesleyan records of the period of any reference to Ndlambe participation in the invasion of the Colony and its implications for the mission work done from Mount Coke. Such silence may have been accidental; but it should have been remedied by a frank facing of the fact that Mount Coke had failed to gain the allegiance of the Ndlambe to the extent that Wesleyville had held that of the Gqunukwebi. A comparison between Mount Coke and Chumie, Burnshill, and Pirie would have revealed many similarities in their residents' reactions to the war, and might have drawn the Methodists still closer to their L.M.S. and G.M.S. colleagues, and would

have given them a clearer grasp of the Ngqika-Ndlambe outlook on the frontier question and the war. But there is no evidence that the Wesleyans seriously attempted this exercise. They rather tended to rest on the relative success of Wesleyville and Gqumahwebi adherence to the Colony[1] while ignoring the implications arising from the difficulties at Mount Coke.

From a distance it is not difficult to recognize the missionaries' failure to sit back and assess the war's morality. But in 1835 they were closely involved in the conflict, personally to the point of discomfort, and professionally in the disruption of their work, making it hard for them to adopt a detached position. Some might insist that as missionaries they should have stood unflinchingly for Xhosa rights against all colonial pressure, to which a partial answer would be that they believed they were taking that very stand and were convinced of their own impartial justice. A fuller reply would take account of human frailty, not expecting complete detachment in those who were so closely concerned in issues which even historians find hard to evaluate. It would also allow for the difficulty inherent in the Wesleyan position astride the frontier, and realize that the wisdom of Solomon and the judgment of Daniel would be strained before either could adjudicate between the two races for whom the missionaries were working. The Methodists attempted to keep the balance between white and black: if they erred in favour of the white, that was understandable in view of their own origin and the weight of their European interests. The London Society, working no less earnestly in a narrower field, tended to err no less strongly in the interests of the Xhosa.

A more serious indictment against the Wesleyans is based on their failure, when once they had committed themselves to political comment, to protest against the contemporary colonial policies that were unjust to the Xhosa tribes. Having prided themselves on a wide knowledge of the indi-

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[1] Shaw before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII.538, pp.56,61; Boyce Notes, pp.11,12.

genous peoples, they should have been clear-sighted in respect of their interests and have sprung to their defence, or at least have refrained from acquiescing in flagrant injustice. This they did not manage. They, doubtless subconsciously, made expedience the yardstick and yielded to the temptation to regard might as right in the extension of the Colony.

The later observer may feel that the Methodists would have been wiser to eschew politics entirely and to concentrate on the spiritual aspect of their mission. There was much to recommend such a course, both scripturally and pragmatically, but it was a difficult one for them to pursue in view of their commitments on both sides of the border, and their need for giving some reply to their detractors. Nevertheless, they could have avoided much criticism and have done no less good if their spokesmen had said or written less.

Yet, when such strictures have been made, there still remains the hard core of accomplishment which must neither be ignored nor glossed over. For more than fourteen years Methodist ministers had faithfully served the British settlers and those who joined them on the eastern frontier. Their service was not always appreciated, but they undoubtedly filled a need by supplying spiritual leadership where there would otherwise have been little or none; and they provided the first elements for a system of education in Albany. Three years after their arrival in Salem they pressed beyond the border and began to serve a Xhosa people by whom they were welcomed. At personal sacrifice and their society's expense they freely offered the tribes two priceless gifts—religion and civilization. The latter would have crossed the Fish River and have spread among the kraals even had there been no missionary, but it is arguable that the missionary was the least offensive purveyor of the white man's way of life. As for his religion, it furnished so many of the best elements in his civilization that to remove it from what the white man had to offer the black and still have a worthwhile gift would have been as feasible as taking hydrogen out of water and still expecting to have a

refreshing drink to offer a thirsty traveller.

The Wesleyans never faced that dilemma. Their faith commanded them to preach the Gospel to every nation, kindred, tongue, and people. The world was their parish. Kaffraria was just one small section of their global responsibility which they had no intention of neglecting. Under Shaw's impelling leadership, they carried their deepest convictions and highest ideals first to the Gqumukwebi, then to the Ndlambe, Gcaleka, Bomvana, Thembu, and Mpondo tribes within the remarkably short space of seven years (1823-30). This was done, except in the doubtful case of Hintsa, with the consent and co-operation of the chiefs who, for mixed reasons, were anxious to have missionaries beside them. Then, with persuasion as the only major weapon in their armoury, they had sought to win primitive peoples to what is generally acknowledged to be a superior way of life. Against great odds they had planted seeds of Christianity in soil where it has since multiplied a thousandfold and more. In so doing, they took to their parishioners, with the consent of some and the disapproval of others, similar benefits to those that have followed in the wake of Christian missions in other countries—the dynamic and solace of a living faith, a high morality, an elevation of the status of womanhood, the rudiments of education and hygiene, and an introduction to a wider world which, in spite of some things that were harmful, had much good to offer an emergent people. And in those days there were no other agencies than Christian missions that were equipped or were willing to undertake such work. This record of simultaneous service on both sides of the troubled frontier must not then be lost to view under an overlay of criticism concerning Methodist attitudes toward the war and its settlement. It is too valuable to be dismissed: it must be placed to the credit of the society whose representatives proved fallible in other respects.

III. REFLECTION

Although this study has been primarily concerned with the establishment of Wesleyan missions beyond the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony and their

relation to the war that overtook them, the merits of that war are not dependent on the attitude adopted by those missions. More potent forces—the colonial government, the compressed tribes, the British government, the colonists—shaped the course of the war and decided its issues, and on them fell the major responsibilities of the struggle. The missions were caught up in the rôle of implicated spectators, vitally interested in the contest but unable to exert a decisive influence over its outcome. Judgment cannot therefore be limited to the small part they played in the drama. Whatever the assessment of Wesleyan attitudes, the observer must needs formulate his own estimate of the complex scene in an endeavour to achieve that which eluded the contemporary Methodists—an unbiased evaluation of the situation. This must be attempted in spite of a recognition of the difficulty, if not the impossibility of attaining complete objectivity in so vexed a subject as the clash of white and black in one of South Africa's small but significant frontier wars.[1]

Several well-defined schools of thought have expressed themselves respecting the racial clashes, in a frontier setting, during the fourth decade of the nineteenth century. The most voluminous, and for long the most influential, was that enshrined in Sir George Cory's The Rise of South Africa which was itself an elaboration of G.M.Theal's interpretation of South African history. The pro-colonial bias was so strong as to disqualify Cory's work as serious history and to reduce it to little more than an interestingly-written apologia for D'Urban and the colonists. The close similarity between Cory's outlook and that of the Wesleyans involves the

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[1] "Full objectivity, however, is an ideal toward which we are constantly striving, but which we can never reach. The social scientist, too, is a part of the culture in which he lives, and he never succeeds in freeing himself entirely from dependence on the dominant preconceptions and biases of his environment." But "the awareness of bias is a most important general protection." Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York, 1944), pp.1035,1036. Myrdal's approach to the American problem, and especially his study on bias (Appendix II, pp.1035-1064) provide a most helpful model for those who study the South African scene.

latter in the discredit now accorded to Cory by reputable historians. A counterbalance to such colonialism was provided by W.M.Macmillan in Bantu, Boer, and Briton, but the monograph leaned heavily in the other direction in its effort to justify Dr.John Philip, the defender of the Hottentot and Xhosa cause, that it probably gained sympathisers for the Colony. The serious student, however, will seek to retain the weighty elements of justice in Macmillan's approach while allowing for excessive advocacy of Philip. He will possibly be helped to achieve this desirable balance by a study of C.E.G.Schutte's thesis: Dr.John Philip's Observations Regarding the Hottentots of South Africa,[1] a study that is far more biased in favour of the colonists than is the case with Macmillan and the coloured races. Schutte wanted to be scientific in his approach to the Hottentot and, incidentally, the Xhosa problem, but failed to observe the standards he demanded of Philip. He sided with Cory and viewed any defence of the Hottentot-Xhosa cause as a product of the misguided philanthropy emanating from Exeter Hall, the headquarters of evangelical humanitarianism. He dismissed the virtual extermination of the Hottentot with the amoral explanation that "in the struggle for existence which ensued [in the wake of European civilization] , he was found unfit to survive", and comforted himself with the observation that "the weaker are doomed to perish"! "Civilized mankind, in his onward march, cannot afford to have compassion on men who inhabit the earth fruitlessly", he went on to observe,[2] thereby parting company with those who entertain a Christian philosophy of history. His thesis found no room for a Hottentot or Xhosa point of view, and showed no concern with the legitimate grievances of the dispossessed. Such an approach has little chance of gaining the respect of those who are genuinely interested in an objective analysis of historical situations: it rather alienates their

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[1] Archives Year Book for South African History, 3rd year (1940) Part I, pp.89-253.

[2] Ibid., pp.151,233,234.

sympathies from the writer's cause. In this case, Dr. Philip, the Hottentots, and the Khosa benefit from Schutte's misanthropy.

In a class by itself there stands Nosipho Majeke's The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest,[1] the product of a growing African awareness of history and its relevancy to current problems in Africa. Such a work would ordinarily be welcomed by those who want to learn the African point of view, but the book's immaturity and its bitter cynicism tend to estrange the reader. To accept Majeke means to tolerate, among many intolerables, Tshaka's cruelties, the slave trade (since the author castigates those who were instrumental in its suppression), witchcraft, and "eating up". The writer's acerbity bedevils his (or her) own purpose and makes the book a weak advocate of a questionable cause. Consideration of the book's probable origins in communistic philosophy may help to temper harsh judgments as to its contents, but still leaves an open field for the writing of a scholarly book on the eastern frontier that will take cognizance of the African viewpoint.

If, then, none of these views is entirely acceptable, what can be offered in their stead?

The historian whose horizons are bounded by materialism legitimately arrives at materialistic conclusions. But the writer who believes that history's deepest questions are finally soluble only by reference to spiritual values will wish to probe beyond the strictly political issues, and pose other considerations arising from the war. He may well begin by questioning the morality of a colonialism that involves the taking of others' land, the imposition of a highly developed civilization upon a primitive people, and the extension of civilization by any other than persuasive means. He would demand an effective consideration of the aboriginal point of view, not merely for the Khosa's own good, but as a guarantee of the aborigine's freedom to accept or reject the white man's way of life. He would question the morality

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[1] Written in 1952, and published by the Society of Young Africans [n.d.].

of mounting a full-scale expedition against Kaffraria and penetration as far as the Mbhashe, and would challenge the facile condemnation of Hintsa and regret the pressure exerted against him. The annexation up to the Kei he would view as an unsatisfactory solution to the frontier problem, indeed, as no solution at all since it enlarged the Colony's territory and thereby aggravated the difficulty of control, and since it merely pushed the frontier question further east to come against similar perplexities with the Transkeian tribes, perplexities that would not be automatically solved by the easier defensibility of the Kei boundary. Furthermore, the two-stage conclusion of the war by the May and September treaties would be seen as an extension of its main cause, colonialism. And the paternal despotism ordained by D'Urban and operated by Smith, benevolent and well-intentioned though it undoubtedly was, could not be endorsed because it deprived the tribes of their most precious possession, liberty, and because, no matter how pure the planners' intentions, the system worked for the benefit of the whites at the expense of the blacks and against the will of the conquered. The argument that conquest has always followed that pattern is realistic but useless when it comes to assessing the morality of the plan. And, finally, Glenelg's directives would be recognized as an attempt, faulty but sincere, to apply Christian, philanthropic principles to Britain's relations with native tribes, and as such would be treated with the respect that it undoubtedly merited but rarely if ever received.

But the wise observer will acknowledge that there is no completely adequate answer to the problems raised by the frontier war of 1835. There can be convictions and sincere expression of opinion, but the irreconcilables are too strong to permit a neat conclusion to the whole matter. He will bear in mind the fallibility of human judgment, his inability to be sure that he has rightly assessed the actions of any man. He will be humble in his approach to history, showing a readiness to confess the faults of a past generation, seeing in them his own possible failures. Unable to rectify

the mistakes of his predecessors, he will demonstrate a willingness to learn from their errors and to extend their successes. A study of the past will then benefit the future. Did not Croce say that all history is contemporary history?

And what part will be assigned to missions under such a concept? The New Testament contains an authoritative answer to that critical question. In a world where might was equated with right, where brutal injustice was commonplace, where minorities were ruthlessly oppressed, and where genocide went almost unnoted—in such a world the early Christian Church, a missionary church, went quietly about its prime task of directing men to Him who could save them from the sin that caused their troubles. The Founder of the Church explained: "My kingdom is not of this world: if My kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight" (John 18:36), and thereby gave Christianity its non-political ethos. The missionary who would conform to his Master's pattern will personally promote justice and protest against its neglect, but will dedicate his principal energies to effecting a transformation, by spiritual means, in the fount of human woe—the human heart.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF XHOSA PROPER NOUNS

In the early nineteenth century the philology of African tongues used in Kaffraria was in a rudimentary state. Spelling was experimental rather than scientific and, as a result, names assumed a variety of forms. In this thesis, thanks to guidance from Professor M.Wilson and Dr.A.C.Jordan, an effort has been made to attain a consistency of spelling according to current philological standards. Since, to the layman's eye, such spelling often represents a startling departure from the customary form, a Glossary has been prepared to relate the adopted spelling to the earlier-known forms. In quotation, of course, the original style is retained.

Adopted Spelling	Variant Form(s)
Bhaca	Baca
Bhukru	Buku
Bika	Beka, which is retained for the Wesleyan mission, though not for the stream near which it stood.
Bomvana	Mambookie, as the tribe was generally known in the 1830s.
Botomane	Botman, Botumane
Fadana	Vadana
Gankca	Ganja
Gcaleka	Galeka
Gqunukwebi	Generally referred to s "Congo's tribe" in Wesleyan literature. The Xhosa name was rarely used.
Gwalana	Gualana
Gwanga	Guanga
Hintsa	Hinza, Hintza
Inthaba yendoda	Tabindoda
Kei	Gnee, Kye, Kaye
Keiskamma	Keiskama
Khethani	Cetani
Kungwa	Congo

Maqoma	Macomo
Mathole	Amatola
Matiwane	Matiwana
Mbhashe	Bashee
Mbholompo	Mbolompo
Mbo	Fingo (see Mfengu below)
Mdepha	Dapa, Depa
Mdushane	Dushane
Mfecane	Fetcane, Fitcane, and, at times, Mantatee
Mfengu	Ethnically, the Mbo; but generally known as Fingos (spelt "Fingoes" in the 1830s).
Mhala	Umhala
Mngazi	Umgazi
Mpondo	Pondo
Mqhayi	Umkye, Umgai
Mthatha	Umtata
Myeki	Umyeki
Mzimkhulu	Umzimkulu, Umzimkooloo
Mzimvubu	Umzimvubu, Umzimvooboo
Ncaphayi	Capaai, Ncapi
Ndlambe	Illambi, Ndhlambi, Slambie, T'slambi
Ngcwanguba	Cwanguba
Ngqika	Gaika
Nkqetho	Ceto, Nqeto
Nomsa	Nonsa
Nqeno	Eno
Ntinde	Tinde
Nyaluza	Jalousa, Yalousa
Phatho	Pato
Qwabe	Gwabe
Rili	Kreli, Sarili
Thembu	Tembu. Generally known to early Wesleyans as Tambookie.
Thuthula	Tutula

Tshaka	Chaka
Tshatshu	Tsatsu, T'zatzoe
Tsholomnqa	Chalumna
Tyhali	Tyali, often anglicized as "Charlie".
Tyhume	Chumie, which spelling is retained for the mission.
Vusani	Vosani
Xhosa	Kosa, Xosa. As explained in the Preface "Xhosa" is now preferred to "Caffre", "Kaffir", or "Kafir".
Xhoxho	Xoxo

APPENDIX II

ORIGIN OF THE GQUNUKWEBI

Toward the close of the seventeenth century the Transkei coast between the Mzimvubu and the Mthatha Rivers became the cradle of an offshoot of the Xhosa people.[1] The Xhosa, under their chief Tshiwo, had as neighbours the Gqunuqwa clan of Hottentots who occupied the westward littoral between the Mthatha and the Mbhashe. One of Tshiwo's councillors, Kwane by name, held the office of executioner, but instead of killing the wizards who were handed to him for punishment Kwane confiscated their cattle on behalf of his chief while sparing the lives of the condemned men and hiding them and their families in the inaccessible coastal country. The reprieved men intermarried with their Hottentot neighbours. They also, under Kwane's leadership, built themselves into a formidable fighting force. The day came when Tshiwo was hard pressed by his enemies and welcomed the unexpected help of Kwane's hidden band. After the ensuing victory, when the story of his councillor's deception came to light, Tshiwo accepted the situation, pardoned Kwane, and made him chief of the newly formed clan. This, according to J.H.Soga,[2] is a

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[1] For the presence of Xhosa people on the Transkei coast by 1686, see M. Wilson, "The Early History of the Transkei and Ciskei", in African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1959, p.178.

[2] J.H.Soga, The South Eastern Bantu, pp.116-119. A similar story is told by Cowper Rose, "Four Years in Southern Africa" (London, 1829), pp.148-150.

true account of the origin of the Gqunukwebi.

The Xhosa historian goes on to say:

> On account of its peculiar origin, while allowed to live alongside of, and on friendly terms with, the Xosa tribe, the Ama-Gqunukwebi tribe had always been regarded as of alien origin. Nor has it ever had a place assigned to it within the body of the Xosa tribe.

He adds that the clan or tribe was one of the first to move westwards during the days of Palo, Tshiwo's successor, which would bring it into the Ciskei during the first quarter of the eighteenth century and make its mixed people relatively old inhabitants of the land between the Buffalo and the Great Fish Rivers.

There is a school of thought that believes that the most significant gains made by missions have been among the hybrid groups, the outcasts, the rejects.[1] From one point of view this is a serious charge: it implies that Christianity is only readily successful with the socially unacceptable who have little to lose and something to gain by adopting an alien religion. From another angle the charge is irrelevant since Christianity has no mandate for evaluating its converts according to their social standing but rather stresses that all men are of equal value in the sight of God. The Christian Church recognizes, however, that its teachings make a stronger initial appeal to the outcasts than to those who are temporally satisfied, though it has no intention of limiting its ministry to the former or avoiding the latter. It also finds some consolation in history. It can look back to the middle of the first century A.D. and recall that similar judgments were expressed about the Church in those days: some critics then believed that Christians were drawn from "the offscourings of the earth"; but time confuted the critic as the Church drew members from all classes into her capacious bosom.

Fortunately, the record of Methodist progress in Kaffraria robs the charge of much of its force. The hybrid Gqunukwebi were by no means the only tribal group to respond to the missionaries' message. Other stations soon outstripped Wesleyville in the winning of converts. By the time the period covered in this

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[1] W.B.Campbell, The South African Frontier, 1865-1885 (unpublished doctoral thesis, 1954) pp.63,64, affords an example of that thinking. Similar thoughts have been verbally expressed by contemporary historians to the author of this present thesis.

study drew to its close (1838), Butterworth, Morley, Clarkebury, and Buntingville were all reaping larger harvests than was Wesleyville. The survival of Clarkebury and the disappearance of Wesleyville possibly provide an effective answer to the religio-sociological question raised by consideration of the origin of the Gqunukwebi.

APPENDIX III

WESLEYAN MISSIONS IN CAFFRARIA

(1829-30)

Extracts from a Report submitted to Government by William Shaw (C.O. 381, Letter 51)

	Estimated No. in Tribe	Attending Services	Communicants	Schools	Attending	Preachers	Assistants	Date Established
Missions								
Wesleyville	8,000	150	31	1	106	1	1	1824
Mount Coke	8,000	100	13	1	42	1	1	1825
Butterworth	16,000	80	16	1	17	1	1	1827
Clarkebury	18,000	r e c e n t				1	1	1830
Morley	15,000	100	5	recent		1	1	1829
Buntingville	20,000	r e c e n t				1	1	1830

APPENDIX IV

ORIGIN OF THE FINGOS

According to John Ayliff,[1] the Wesleyan missionary who spent longer with the Fingos than did any of his contemporaries, the people who came to be known as the Fingos originally came from a land called Embo that lay below the Drakensberg in the Buffalo valley. The tribe, probably related to the Zulu, numbered about 250,000 and was one of the largest in what we now call Natal, but was divided into many clans such as the Hlubi, Zizi, and Mbele.[2] Early in the nineteenth century internal strife broke down the potential strength of the tribe and made it a relatively easy prey first to attacks by Tshaka's Zulu, and then by the Ngwane under Matiwane who were themselves under pressure from Tshaka. Under the second assault they broke and fled in two main sections, the larger pushing into Basutoland where, as Hlubi, they were finally crushed by Matiwane on the Caledon River, near Maseru, in 1825; while the smaller fled south through Pondoland into Thembu and Gcaleka country where, under the name of Fingos, and no later than 1828, they came to the attention of white traders and missionaries.[3] In spite of their wanderings these people preserved the names of their clans and loyalty to their own groups and kept the clues that enabled literate historians to trace the story that might otherwise have been lost.

As they came into Hintsa's country the fugitives were asked, "Who are you? What do you want?" to which they replied: "Siyam Fenguza"-- "We seek service," or "We are destitute". This reply was adapted for use as a name for the strangers, and they became known as the Amafengu, that is, "hungry people who seek work".[4] This appellative was in turn corrupted by the Euro-

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[1] J.Ayliff and J.Whiteside, History of the Abambo, pp.1-4.

[2] Cory, III, p.160.

[3] J.H.Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu, pp.412-413, which is in essential agreement with Ayliff here.

[4] Quoted from Ayliff, op.cit. p.15. The correct modern form of the name would be Mfengu, but the more widely known Fingo is retained here.

pean into Fingo, by which term the people are still known today. But there is little doubt that the name to which they best lay legitimate claim is Mbo, connected as it is with their place of origin (Embo), and signifying "People from the East".

The Cape Colony had a relatively early introduction to these expatriates. William Shaw met a Fingo at Wesleyville in 1825 and employed him as a servant,[1] while on 5 October 1826 W.R.Thomson reported having seen the rara avis at Chumie Mission: but they do not appear to have been generally known among the colonists until 1829.[2] The Wesleyan meeting with them at Butterworth in 1827 must therefore be reckoned as being a very early contact.

When discovered around the mission, the Fingos were in an abject state. They had been welcomed by the Transkeian chiefs as additions to their roll of dependents, and in anticipation of their increasing the wealth and power of their protectors. Among the Thembu, this attitude endured, but with the Gcaleka a note of jealousy was very soon heard. "The Gcaleka," observes Frank Brownlee in a rather unscientific manner, "is careless, thriftless, quick-tempered, proud, and brave; the Fingo is plodding, calculating, acquisitive, and cold blooded."[3] The historian Theal appropriates these very words and enlarges on them: "At first despised by the Xhosas on account of their miserable condition, the Fingoes soon became detested owing to their talents in overreaching."[4] The picture painted by John Ayliff, taken from a slightly different angle, depicted the displaced people in a more favourable position:

> The Fingoes were generally employed by the indolent Gcalekas as cattle herds, milkers, builders of their huts and cattle kraals, and tillers of their corn lands. The wages they received for their labour was the milk of the cows lent them for the purpose. Occasionally, they received an ox hide or a goat skin to make a kaross, with which to cover the body by day, and in which to sleep at night.[5]

Gradually, the status of the intruders improved. "They were in possession of tracts of land of considerable extent, they were under the government of their own captains, and they were not prevented from carrying arms."[6] But

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[1] Supra, p.56.

[2] C. Brownlee, Reminiscences, p.84.

[3] F.Brownlee, Transkeian Native Territories, p.3.

[4] Theal IV, p.26.

[5] J. Ayliff, op.cit., p.18.

[6] Theal IV, p.26.

their success was also their undoing. Their hosts resented their prosperity and adopted repressive attitudes. The Fingos became still more the drudges of Hintsa and his people; they were often ill-treated and had no redress. "Subsequently they were no better than slaves to the Kaffirs," is a footnote to Shrewsbury's account of their standing among the Gcaleka;[1] and when D'Urban took them to his heart in 1835 he confidently but mistakenly described them as the oppressed slaves of Hintsa, which was an over-hasty analysis of their situation. Oppressed they were--all reliable writers agree on that score--but they were never the property of the Gcaleka, and could not correctly be called slaves.[2] Neither should too great a stress be placed on Hintsa's query: "Are they not my dogs?" for the term "dog" was not always derogatory in Xhosa speech.[3] There is, nonetheless, no doubt that their position was unenviable and that they must have welcomed the missionaries as their protectors if not their deliverers. Then, both their physical condition and their temperament conspired to make them responsive to Christian teaching: they were not only needy, but appeared to the missionaries to be less sceptical than the average Xhosa, albeit rather more superstitious.[4] These factors possibly made them more malleable than the Gcaleka, who seem to have been inherently impermeable to the influence of the Gospel. Against such a background Wesleyan-Fingo relations can be more easily understood, and D'Urban's intervention be correctly evaluated.

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, p.236.

[2] Theal IV, p.26; Cory III, p.164; J. Ayliff, op.cit., pp.18,19; Macmillan, BSB, p.112.

[3] When Shrewsbury gave Hintsa a present of beads for his daughter's wedding, the chief called himself the missionary's "Hound". This was in keeping with Xhosa custom, and did not signify subjection. All councillors were "hounds" of their chief. Mem. Shrewsbury, p.275.

[4] Kay, Butterworth, 8 August 1830, WMM 1831, p.502.

APPENDIX V

THE 1828 EXPEDITION

Shortly before the British settlers arrived at the Cape in 1820, critical events were taking place further up the eastern seaboard of Africa. In Zululand, Dingiswayo's successor, Tshaka, was beginning the violent career that changed the shape of so much history in the sub-continent. His military reforms stimulated the martial spirit of his people, and made them willing instruments of aggression upon neighbouring tribes. The Mfecane, or "crushing", was launched on the destructive course that obliterated some peoples, decimated others, and drove still others into migratory movements whose chain reactions were communicated far into Cape Colony.

So great was the terror inspired by Tshaka's name that most of the fleeing tribes who trespassed into the Basutoland-Transkeian districts were themselves at first described as his troops, or Zulus, though they were actually the victims of those forces.[1] When the error became known, they were more accurately named Fitcani, Fetcane, Fecane, and eventually Mfecane, the "desolators" or "marauders". These in turn put other peoples in motion who, entering the Colony in the Graaff Reinet-Somerset East area, were known as the Mantatees.[2]

Some of the earliest effects of the Mfecane were felt by the Thembu about 1822 when they were driven across the Mbhashe and settled around the western sources of the Kei, where Queenstown and Cathcart now stand, a country that "was then a wilderness covered with game, and occupied only by small wandering groups of Bushmen".[3] The invaders were then uncomfortably close to more powerful and warlike Xhosa forces, and in 1823 were confronted by a con-

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[1] It was not until late in 1828, for instance, that Shrewsbury discovered that those who attacked the Transkeian tribes were not Tshaka's impis, but were the Ngwane under Matiwane who had been driven from their own territory by the Zulu.

[2] Cory II, pp.230,231,236,237.

[3] Cory II, p.236.

federation of warriors drawn from Hintsa's, Nyaluza's, and Ndlambe's subjects. This triple alliance defeated the Mfecane (Ngwane) and gave the Xhosa tribes an appreciable respite until 1827. Even so, the Thembu were molested, and in 1825 they fled into the Colony where they clashed with Maqoma and his Ngqika and earned somewhat unmerited puhishment for the latter.[1] In the following year, 1826, there were further border disturbances, and Col.Somerset was sent to investigate the situation that had built up south of the Stormberg Mountains between the Klaas Smits and White Kei rivers, while Major Andrews reconnoitred into Orange River territory. Neither expedition yielded definitive results, but each served to illustrate the potential dangers that lurked beyond the colonial boundaries.[2]

In July 1827, Landdrost Mackay of Somerset East received news of further inroads on the Thembu by the Mfecane who were advancing from the Zwart Kei, north of the Winterberg and Mathole mountains, towards the Tyhume, and driving the local Xhosa befors them into the Colony. Mackay investigated the report and found not only that it was true, but that he could not depend on the Xhosa to stem the invasion. Though Nqeno and Botomane were preparing to join Hintsa in an effort to repulse the invaders, the main body of the Ngqika were offering no effective resistance, and it became clear that the Europeans would have to provide their own defence in case of an Mfecane break-through. Col.Somerset and Major Dundas, appointed to put the frontier in a state of readiness, issued a call to commando duty and met with a good response from burghers and settlers. A colonial force went in search of the invaders, but before the men could go into action the immadiate danger had passed, the Mfecane retired, and by August 21 Davis could record in his journal that the expedition had been and returned, and there was, at that time, no clash between the colonists and the invaders.[3] The Mfecane operation, which was largely a cattle-finding expedition, reduced itself to a probe which, having met opposition, retracted and sent out its antennae elsewhere, notably, further east in

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[1] BBB, p.69. [2] Cory II, p.345.

[3] Ibid., pp.346-349; WMM 1828, p.203.

the Mthatha valley, some eleven months later.

The news passed on by Landdrost Mackay, however, proved sufficiently alarming to alert the whole eastern frontier of the Cape. Since regular troops were insufficient to man the whole line from Somerset East to the sea along the Great Fish River, colonists were called on to fill the gaps. The same news also drew the acting-governor, Lt.Gen.Bourke, to Albany.[1] By September 1 he had reached Grahamstown, and either through his officials or through personal appeals led the Thembu eventually to leave the Somerset East district and return to their own country. Thus, in various ways, was the unprepared Colony spared the horrors of invasion. But it was by then abundantly clear that what took place in distant Zululand was having very unpleasant effects on the open eastern frontier of the Cape. The Europeans could not afford to sit in splendid isolation and pursue a policy of non-intervention. Whether they wished it or not they had become a part of the African scene, and were last in a long line of skittles, the first of which, knocked down by Tshaka, sent all its fellows tumbling over, one after the other.

The astute Tshaka, who was doubtless well-informed on the progress of the many tribes whom he had dispossessed, must have sized up the situations he had created and judged it time to come to terms with a rival whose power he had not yet been able to gauge, for there arrived at Port Elizabeth on 4 May 1823 an embassy from the Zulu monarch, headed by Lt.King.[2] It virtually asked that the British should strike a bargain with him, permitting him to retain what he had already conquered, and telling him whether they favoured the annihilation or preservation of the remainder of the Xhosa tribes that lay between him and the Fish River. The Albany officials bungled the reception and treatment of the Zulu embassy, and by the time they had arranged a reply to Tshaka's overtures other serious situations had developed beyond the Kei which

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[1] Rumour had it that the Governor was going to take up residence at Grahamstown, "which, I doubt not, will be a great good, both to the civil and religious parts of the community." J.Davis, Journal, 21 Aug. 1827., WMM 1828,p.203

[2] Bourke to Huskisson, 28 Aug. 1828, mentioned that he had reason to believe that Englishmen in Port Natal had encouraged Tshaka to hope that the Colonial Government would favour his plundering the Xhosa and driving them in upon the Colony. The Englishman Fynn was reported to be fighting for the "Zoolahs" against the "Kaffirs", while one or two other Englishmen shared in the plunder gained from such operations. IBB XXXIX. 50.252., p.25.

demanded firmer action than the sending of a diplomatic mission.

The Ngwane, having tried and failed in their advance toward the Great Fish River, built up a pressure in Basutoland that demanded an outlet, especially since Tshaka was maintaining his pressure against them from the northeast. When they could no longer contain their numbers and their energies they burst into the basins of the Mthatha and Mzimvubu and made war with the Thembu and Mpondo whom they found there. Cory, on evidence that is very slight if not non-existent, attributed this new invasion directly to Tshaka and accused him of breaking the terms of his own embassy, saying, "the bloodthirsty savage did not wait two moons", referring to the two months the king had allowed for the return of his ambassadors.[1] It is more probable, however, that this attack was sponsored by Matiwane rather than by his more powerful rival, in which case, Tshaka did not directly enter the picture in this instance. Be that as it may, the Transkeian tribes thought that Tshaka's fury was being unleashed against them and, in a note of desperation, appealed to the Colonial government for aid against the invaders. Their plea was supported by Shrewsbury who, without losing a day, sent the following letter to Major Dundas who was still Civil Commissioner for Albany:

Butterworth, June 12th, 1828

> Sir,--Having late last evening received information from various quarters, and officially from the chief Hintsa, that Chaka is advancing I conceive it my duty as a British subject to put you in possession of that information, that the Colonists may be neither alarmed by exaggerated reports that may reach them, nor be surprised by any sudden approach of an enemy not to be despised. Chaka has now crossed the river Zimvubu distant from the mission about 150 miles, as we are distant from Grahamstown about 200 miles. He is approaching with a very numerous body of men, divided into eight companies, each of which is supposed to be two or three thousand, and the whole population before him is described as being in motion, the Chief, Maxabisa, who lived beyond Faku and near the river Zimvubu, having been routed by the troops of Chaka. The avowed object of Chaka is to reach Hintsa as early as possible.
>
> Yours, W.J.Shrewsbury

This temperate and factual letter served to arouse the authorities. The news reached Bourke and his council who decided that for safety's sake Tshaka should be contained within his existent boundaries, either by agreement, or, if

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[1] Cory II, p.354.

necessary, by the colonial government's support of the tribes whom Tshaka was seeking to exterminate. Col. Somerset, as commandant on the frontier, dealt with the border chiefs and encouraged them to prepare their defences and to stand firm, while Major Dundas, as civil commissioner, instructed the burghers in their duties. But it was at this critical juncture that the mutual antipathy of the two military men erupted and led Dundas to resign his post rather than continue in a position that, from a military point of view, was subordinate to Somerset. He therefore stood aside, and his place was taken by Capt. Duncan Campbell. This left Dundas free to undertake a task for which he was well fitted. A further letter arrived from Shrewsbury on July 2 which told of Faku's defeat by the Mfecane.[1] It was vital that the invaders should not be left unchecked or unaware of British interest in the integrity of the peoples who lay between the Kei and the Mzimvubu. Dundas, in a military capacity, was appointed to make contact with Tshaka, as most still supposed the aggressor to be, and to impress upon him that British policy was to be friends with all the tribes and not to permit the annihilation of the weak by the strong. A few British settlers, including four members of the Bowker family, and a greater number of Dutch burghers, 49 men in all, were assigned to Dundas, and left the Colony with him on July 5. They travelled via Kaffir Drift, Wesleyville, Mount Coke, and Butterworth where they were reinforced by a body of Gcaleka, and together they penetrated beyond the Mthatha into Mpondo country, as far as the Mzimvubu. There they found ample corroboration of Shrewsbury's news about Faku's defeat: the chief was destitute; he and his followers were having difficulty in finding enough food to keep themselves alive. Since there was little the Europeans could do to help the sufferers, they turned northwestwards to aid Vusani and his Thembu who were in danger of being overwhelmed as Faku had been.

On July 25, on the western sources of the Mthatha, Dundas joined forces with some 6,000 Thembu but found them strangely unwilling to fight. When

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[1] According to Shrewsbury, the Mfecane had originally intended to fall first on Hintsa, but had cancelled that plan and had concentrated on Faku. 30 Sept. 1828, WMM 1829, p.268.

they faced the Ngwane on the following day, it was the white men who had to take the initiative, and it was their shots that put the enemy to flight, killed about seventy of the Ngwane, and ensured the recovery of the 20-25,000 cattle which the Thembu promptly but ungratefully whisked out of sight into safety.[1] Major Dundas judged that his commission had accomplished all that it could reasonably be expected to do, so he turned round and headed for Grahamstown.[2]

No one contemporary account gives the complete picture of the subsequent train of events,[3] but a collation of the main sources reveals the following story:

When Hintsa joined Vusani in appealing to the British, he left his colleague, aided by a token force of Gcaleka, to bear the brunt of any Mfecane assault while he sent his "war-cry" among the clans, calling them to assemble at his kraal for an attack on the advancing enemy. Some of those who responded to this summons formed the body of warriors whom the Revs. Shaw, Young, and Davis met on the banks of the Kei when they were on their way to the dedication of the Butterworth chapel in the third week of June; while others were numbered among those who streamed past the chapel on the day of its dedication, June 22nd. The assembling of the Gcaleka army took several weeks and was not complete on July 28 when Hintsa's participants in the British-Thembu defeat of the Mfecane returned to report to their chief near Butterworth, and to confirm that the dreaded enemy was not Tshaka but Matiwane, and that the body defeated by Dundas was only the vanguard—the main force was still advancing upon the allies. If there were any deliberate delay in the face of this alarming information it was justified by the news that Hintsa and his missionary received

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[1] Dundas, reporting to Somerset, 1 Aug. 1828. Enclosure No.1, Bourke to Huskisson, 26 Aug. 1828. IBB XXXIX, 50.252., p.26.

[2] In spite of apparent ingratitude, the Thembu did appreciate British help, for Vusani is reported as saying: "From this day every Englishman who comes to my country shall be my brother, and I will encourage my people to trade with them." Dundas to Lt.Col.Bell, 15 Aug. 1828, Ibid., p.32.

[3] IBB XXXIX, 50.252, pp.21-25 contains the relevant official documents connected with the Ngwane advance and defeat, Oct. 1827 to Aug. 1828.

~~received~~ on Saturday, August 2 when two British officers arrived at the mission and announced that the Government was sending a strong mixed force of troops and Boers, some 800 in all, under Col.Somerset to check the Mfecane advance. The prospect of such solid support led Hintsa to abandon his plan of retirement over the Kei, and to await the British expedition.[1] Some twelve days later the colonel himself appeared with a party of troops, and was soon followed by the balance of the Boer commando who were fully ready to oppose, as they then supposed, Tshaka's warriors.

The size of this expeditionary force was a measure of the seriousness with which the colonial authorities viewed the threat that appeared far beyond their eastern border. They had concluded that prevention was better than any belated cure, and were set on halting the so-called Zulu before they came anywhere near the Colony, or before they had set in motion an irresistible wave of fugitives that would have broken over Albany. The heads of those that planned the expedition were probably calm enough, but there is no doubt that the average inhabitant of Grahamstown and her neighbours could hardly have been more alarmed if Tshaka himself had been on the Keiskamma! Kay's journal for July 15 tells of great alarm in the Eastern Province because of the rumour of the advance of a large body of native warriors, and reports that considerable numbers of colonists were being placed under arms by the government. By July 30 Shaw had received news from Shrewsbury at Butterworth, and had immediately sent Roberts, the schoolmaster, to help evacuate the missionary and his family should that prove necessary. Roberts went no further than Mount Coke where he heard of the Mfecane retreat before Dundas and Vusani. The Gqunukwebi chiefs, however, proceeded with the call-up of their fighting men, and had assembled over 1,000 warriors when the return of the Dundas party convinced them that such preparations were no longer necessary.

The European military, however, were not so easily persuaded to abandon their plans, and having assembled a large body of soldiers began the

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[1]Shrewsbury to Somerset, Butterworth, 12 Aug. 1828.

march towards the Kei. But they went no further than the Buffalo, then turned back, presumably because of the news that complete victory over the enemy had already been gained by Somerset and his troops.

While this alarm, fomented by ignorance of the true state of affairs, was running through Albany, events had been moving to a decision beyond the Mbhashe river. Some time after August 14 Somerset 's full commando had assembled at Butterworth, and was ready to accompany Hintsa's forces in an effort to find and engage the enemy. The mixed body of Europeans and Xhosa warriors advanced north-eastward and joined the Thembu army, bringing the total force to about 16,000, before approaching the Mfecane encampment. At Mbholompo, not far from where Umtata now stands, they came upon the foe, and attacked at dawn on August 27, while most of the enemy were still asleep. As was the case a month earlier, the Xhosa held back and left the initial moves to the Europeans. These, when they had failed to persuade their partners to join in open battle, discharged their muskets into the Ngwane hordes who, terrified by the unaccustomed noise, smoke, and destructive power of firearms, fled in disorder. At this, Hintsa's and Vusani's men lost their reluctance to fight and rushed in upon the fleeing foe, slaughtering right and left. Accounts of the battle lead one to conclude that the allies had fallen upon a tribe in domestic array rather than in battle formation, for women and children were mixed up with the warriors. Several hundred of the men were killed, while captive women and children were treated with great cruelty by the opposing tribes. This "led Col.Somerset, who had given orders that the women should be treated with humanity, to suspend the action, and punish the Caffres themselves, six of whom were shot before they ceased their barbarities." Somerset urged Hintsa and Vusani to treat their captives kindly, but they answered that Tshaka killed their women and children, so they were obliged to do the same. The British commander replied: "Then you must fight the enemy yourselves. If you will not show mercy to the vanquished, I will march my troops back again, and you shall have no help from me." This threat brought them into line, and some, though not all, of the

captives were saved.[1]

This Monday morning engagement had repercussions that sounded far beyond the Mthatha. The pro-Xhosa party among the Europeans, at the time of the 1835 war, seized upon the fight as an illustration of the brutal way in which the colonists mowed down well-nigh defenceless Africans, and they approvingly quoted Stephen Kay's second-hand account of the action as support for their contentions. In reply their opponents called upon Major Dundas, Col.Wade, W.J.Shrewsbury, W.Shaw, and W.B.Boyce to testify to the humanity with which the British had conducted the hostilities.[2] The world was thus furnished the spectacle of Wesleyans sitting on both sides of the fence in a dispute that carried distinct moral overtones. In view of later and more serious contentions over the Sixth Frontier War it is desirable to arrive at an impartial judgment of the 1828 Expedition and Methodist attitudes toward it.

Stephen Kay had come out from England in 1820, and for ten years worked for the WMMS in the Colony, in Bechuanaland, and in what was then known as Caffraria. Small, therefore, are the grounds for Cory's comment concerning "the Rev.S.Kay whose acquaintance with Kaffirland seems scarcely to have been of that intimate nature which entitled him to speak with authority."[3] Kay actually spent two years (1825-27) as director of Mount Coke mission, and supervised Butterworth from January to August 1830, so had first-hand knowledge of Kaffraria at the time of the 1828 affray. Sir George nods badly, moreover, when he brings in Boyce to offset Kay's remarks, and refers to him as "the resident missionary at Butterworth". The fact is that Boyce did not arrive in Africa until 1830, nearly eighteen months after the expedition, and never served as resident missionary at Butterworth. It

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[1] Mem. Shrewsbury, pp.299,300. The preceeding composite narrative is based upon WMM 1829, pp.268,349,566,567; SMM, p.491; Mem.Shrewsbury, pp.292-300; J.H.Soga, South-Eastern Bantu, p.300; Kay, Travels, pp.329-331; Cory II, pp.252-363.

[2] Dundas in a letter of 17 March 1834, produced by Col.Wade before the Aborigines Committee, IBB VII, 538, pp.295,296; Col.Wade, Ibid., pp.394, 410,411; SMM, p.524; Shaw, Defence, pp.26-28.

[3] Cory II, p.364, Footnote.

would seem, then, that Kay was in a better position to comment on Butterworth affairs than was Boyce. On his (Kay's) leaving the Cape for England in February 1831, he gathered his notes and impressions of the "Character, Customs, and Moral Condition of the Tribes inhabiting that portion of Southern Africa [Caffraria]" into a book that gained some notoriety--Travels and Researches in Caffraria, issued in London in 1833 by John Mason, the Methodist publisher. A reviewer in the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine for 1833 said: "We are pleased to have the opportunity of recording our general approbation of the spirit and exertion of our author's performance. ... Mr. Kay's volume reflects great credit upon his judgment and research."[1] This, of course, was a literary appraisal, for the reviewer was in no position to assess the accuracy of the author's comments on Kaffraria. Three years later, when the WMMS was aware of the antagonism aroused by Kay's work, Beecham, secretary of the Society, made a more cautious statement when speaking before the Aborigines Committee. In response to a question, he said: "It [Travels] has been very well received generally by our Society"; but he was careful to state that it was not an official publication.[2] Study of the offending volume shows that for 240 pages the writer produced a typical early nineteenth-century book of missionary travels, and proved himself a careful observer of African customs, and a lively reporter of the colonial scene, though over-dependent on the biased pages of Thompson's Travels, Barrow's An Autobiographical Memoir, and Bannister's Humane Policy. If his book had closed at the end of ~~the~~ chapter nine there would have been few if any complaints levelled against him, but in chapter ten he plunged head-

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[1] WMM 1833, p.793.

[2] IBB VII.538, p.499. In view of the criticisms levelled against the Aborigines Committee, it may be here observed that in the session of 21 April 1837, Kay was severely grilled by Mr. Bagshaw who proved himself just as pro-colonial as Buxton and his friends were accused of being pro-African. Bagshaw was the stout defender of Dundas, Somerset, and the colonists against Philippine attacks. In Kay's defence it should be noted that when called, he made thoughtful recommendations concerning a more acceptable frontier policy and that his suggestions, while generous to the Xhosa point of view, were similar to those advanced by many other amateur politicians of the period. IBB VII.425, pp.74,75,83.

first into the pool of controversy that John Philip's Researches in South Africa had so thoroughly stirred up in 1828, only five years earlier. Within the confines of some twenty-six pages he brought up the principal bones of contention between the humanitarian and utilitarian schools of thought in respect of Southern Africa, and indicted "the unrighteous conduct of colonists", but, as a careful reading reveals, within the context of "the oppression and tragic scenes of former days"(italics supplied).[1] Then he turned to pursue the history of Methodist expansion in Kaffraria, with special reference to the establishment of Butterworth among Hintsa's tribe. One is tempted to conclude that for a few pages he essayed to emulate Dr.Philip: if that was so, the effort was unsustained, and he soon returned to innocent narrative.

But by page 329 he had, perforce, to deal with the 1828 Expedition since it impinged on the Butterworth story, and in doing so he aroused the ire of the colonists, the militarists, their supporters in the 1830s, and their apologists in later times. Cory quotes disapprovingly from Kay's account of the dawn attack by Somerset's men, but fails to note that Kay claimed to be reporting what an eye-witness said to him:

> A respectable British officer, whom duty required to be on the spot, candidly declared to the author, that it was 'one of the most disgraceful and cold-blooded acts to which the English soldier had ever been rendered accessory.'[2]

It is extremely unlikely that a missionary who had given ten years' devoted service in South Africa would fabricate a statement that could, under the given circumstances, have been plausibly made. Furthermore, he claimed that he was not dependent on the evidence of one spectator only, but that the tenor of his report could be "confirmed by more than fifty eye-witnesses" --a bold but credible claim in view of the more than eight hundred Europeans

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[1] Kay, Travels, p.241.

[2] Ibid., p.331, and quoted in a footnote by Cory (II, p.364).

who took part in the attack.[1] The one man who could have authoritatively denied the implications of Kay's narrative--Colonel Henry Somerset, in charge of the expedition, and the one who presumably gave the order for his men to fire upon the Mfecane--kept silent. The defence came mainly from others who were not present on the fateful morning, and they indignantly protected Somerset from charges which Kay did not actually lay against him. The missionary's strictures were directed against the manner of the attack--"while the greater part of the people were still asleep, the rushing of horses, the clashing of spears, and the horrid roar of musketry poured in upon them on every side." He went into harrowing details, describing the havoc wrought among the Ngwane by the hail of musket balls, and the still greater slaughter which ensued when Vusani's and Hintsa's men, assured of victory, rushed on the retreating enemy and added atrocities to the toll of death that firearms and assegai had already taken. Kay, however, was careful to exonerate Somerset from all responsibility for Thembu and Gcalecka conduct, and paid full tribute to his efforts to prevent the barbarities that had been committed under the shelter of British power.

On the other side, there was confusion between the small initial investigation by Dundas and the expedition under Somerset. This led to a refutation by Dundas of charges that Kay never made against him,[2] and to a distorted defence of British intervention in 1828. Dundas appealed to the spoken and written testimony of Shrewsbury, "an upright and honourable gentleman" who accompanied Dundas to the scene of his clash with the Ngwane, and who thanked the major for "the humanity displayed in effecting a great good without unnecessary loss of life," which is valid evidence for Dundas but useless for the later operation under Somerset. Shaw virtually repudiated Kay's Travels, while quoting it to prove (pace Dr.Philip) that all

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[1]The fact that Stockenstrom supported Kay's account of the engagement (Cory II, loc.cit.) may not be persuasive testimony to those who see little that is trustworthy in Stockenstrom, but it does show that Kay was not alone in his judgments.

[2]Letter from Dundas, 17 March 1834, submitted to the Aborigines Committee by Col.Wade. IBB VII. 538, pp.295,296.

Wesleyans did not eulogize Henry Somerset:[1] but he soberly defended colonial interference in native affairs as being "dictated by motives of policy and humanity.

> It had no aggressive object in view. It was designed to be defensive and conservative of the peace of Kaffraria, no less than to secure the safety of the colonial boundary. The troops marched back to the Colony, after performing this service, without taking away from the natives either ox or cow, or anything whatever: and it was at the time a subject of frequent remark throughout Kaffraria, that the English must be a good nation; for other conquerors would never have left the country without carrying away a large booty in cattle. With a solitary exception [that of Kay], the Missionaries resident in the country at the time and long afterwards, together with the native Chiefs, united in opinion that, but for this interference of the British forces, the whole of the Abatembu and most of the Amaxosa tribes would have been conquered, while the seat of war must have been transferred to the districts lying within the Colonial boundaries.[2]

Few would quarrel with such a balanced view of the purpose of the expedition and its fulfilment, but Shaw avoided the very point on which Kay focused his attention--the conduct of the attack--so the two judgments are complementary rather than contradictory, and are not mutually exclusive.

Shrewsbury, writing some two months after the engagement, provided a contemporary basis for Shaw's conclusions. After confirming that Somerset had made Hintsa and Vusani pledge not to kill their prisoners but to treat all with humanity, especially the women and children--a pledge that was but poorly observed by the two chiefs--he went on to relate:

> Almost the first news I heard after the contest was ended, was from a Caffre who was driving a poor pregnant woman before him.--'This,' said he, 'is one of them; but Somerset gave out his word that we were not to kill the women.' I ransomed the poor creature from the Caffre for two cows, and immediately gave her her liberty. The grateful feellings of the creature quite overcame her; she called me her father and her only friend, and refusing to be conveyed to her own people, she chose to tarry in my habitation. Another thing which has much astonished the Caffres is the strict justice observed in the British army. Everything that was required was paid for, and not a single beast was stolen. ... A subordinate Chief remarked ... 'I have never seen such a righteous nation!'[3]

While, on the one hand, it might be felt that a Gcaleka's experience of other nations was distinctly limited, and on the other that commandation

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[1] Shaw, Defence, p.27. [2] SMM, p.524.

[3] Shrewsbury, Butterworth, 30 Sept. 1828. WMM 1829, p.351.

of the expedition's post-victory conduct was gratifying, it will also be recognized that there was still room for Kay's interpretation of the actual engagement within the framework of the wider verdict expressed by his fellow-missionaries. In that case, Col.Wade's unfavourable comparison of Kay with Shrewsbury and Boyce[1] loses much of its validity. The Wesleyans may then be left to their differing viewpoints without one's dubbing either side a liar.

Before leaving the subject of the Mfecane, note should be taken of Tshaka's second embassy under John Cane who had by then spent four years in Natal. This mission, travelling overland, passed through Butterworth on 29 September 1828, and was hospitably and helpfully received by Shrewsbury.[2]

> It had authority to state that Chaka will cease to war: that he requests two things,--that his people shall be allowed to trade through Hintsa's country, to fairs on the British frontier; and that King George [the Fourth] would send him one of those men who teach the people about God--a Missionary.[3]

The embassy reached Grahamstown on October 8, but its mission was nullified by the news that soon followed it from Natal--Tshaka had been murdered since his ambassadors had left his kraal. The Zulu king could no longer terrify his subjects and neighbours, but the effect of his ferocious policy outlived him in chain reactions that troubled the sub-continent for more than a decade after his death. Large areas of land were devastated and populations were drastically reduced. Methodist missionaries, engaged on reconnaisance, had difficulty in finding the people they were seeking and frequently commented on the fewness of the inhabitants. They sometimes passed through sections that would have been reckoned as empty by a mere passer-by, but which proved to be populated, the people having merely gone into hiding in the remoter parts of the country to escape the attentions of

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[1] IBB VII, 538, p.410.

[2] Enclosure No.2, Sir Lowry Cole to Sir George Murray, 31 Jan. 1829. IBB XXXIX, 50.252., p.37.

[3] Shrewsbury, Butterworth, 30 Sept. 1828, WMI 1829, p.269.

any possible marauders.[1] This did not automatically place their patrimony in the land-grabbers' market, however. It is cruel and ironical reasoning which says that because a people has been decimated its territory is legitimately open for foreign occupation. On that basis much of Germany would have been available for colonisation by Africans after the Thirty Years' War!

Although Tshaka's expansion fell short of the Cape Colony, the effects of his push were felt on the Eastern Frontier after the 1827-28 scares. The border tribes were subjected to pressures on two fronts, from the Colony on the west, and the Mfecane on the north and east.[2] This twofold pressure threatened to compress the Ngqika and Ndlambe against the Gcaleka, Thembu, and Mpondo. Such pressure was bound to result in an explosion. In 1834, aided by European irritations, it led to the Sixth Frontier War. The Gqunukwebi escaped serious involvement thanks partly to their relatively isolated coastal position, partly to their own self-interests which allied them to the Colony, and partly to the moral stiffening that came from their acceptance of Wesleyan missionary tutelage.

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[1] Shaw, 27 June 1828, WTM 1829, pp.563-5; SMM, p.521.

[2] Macmillan, BBB, pp.15-19,69.

APPENDIX VI

(A) TABULAR VIEW OF WESLEYAN MISSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA (as at December 1838) (Boyce, Notes, App., xxxii)

Stations	Missionaries	Salaried Agents	Gratuitous Teachers	Pupils in School	Attending on Ministry	Communicants Members	Population around Mission
Albany							
Grahamstown Dist.	2	1	60	707	1,490	472	...
Salem District	1	.	6	110	300	86	...
Bathurst Dist.	.	1	10	143	340	121	...
Ft.Beaufort Dist.	1	1	7	58	170	47	...
Total in Albany	4	3	83	1,018	2,300	726	15,000
Kaffraria							
Newtondale	1	1	2	40	100	10	
Beka	1	1	2	90	200	12	10,000
Wesleyville	1	1	2	70	150	12	
Ft.Peddie	.	1	4	108	250	20	1,000
Mount Coke	1	2	1	50	150	6	15,000
Butterworth	1	1	2	79	300	24	50,000
Clarkebury	.	2	1	86	200	28	75,000
Morley	1	3	2	430	550	36	
Buntingville	1	2	2	113	420	17	50,000
Total in Kaff'ria	7	14	18	1,066	2,320	165	201,000
Albany	4	3	83	1,018	2,300	726	15,000
Kaffraria	7	14	18	1,066	2,320	165	201,000
Bechuanaland	4	7	10	400	2,250	250	35,000
Cape District incl.Namaqu'd	6	5	60	1,002	2,050	217	40,000
Total	21	29	171	3,486	8,920	1,358	291,000

(B) EXTRACTS FROM THE 1961 REPORT OF THE METHODIST CHURCH OF SOUTH AFRICA

Drawn from Minutes of the Seventy-Ninth Annual Conference of the Methodist Church of South Africa (1961) (Cape Town, 1961), pp.23-30.

1. Grahamstown District (25 Circuits)

	European	African	Coloured
Junior Class	57	14,004	856
On Trial	330	11,909	254
Members	6,075	16,938	1,720

2. Queenstown District (35 Circuits)

Junior	42	25,665	10
On Trial	341	11,677	115
Members	5,148	26,186	914

3. Clarkebury District (46 Circuits)

Junior Class	39	50,851	285
On Trial	33	38,159	150
Members	938	44,755	326

General Schedule (8 Districts)

Churches	2,905	Church Members(1960)	325,931
Preaching Places	3,930	Ceased to be	7,047
Ministers	613	On Trial for Members	129,365
Deaconesses	7	Junior Class	162,317
Evangelists	392	Approx. no. of Adherents, including Members and Scholars	817,892
Class Leaders other than Ministers	27,678		

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D'Urban Papers; Government Archives, Cape Town.

This wealth of material includes Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter books (private, colonial, civil, and military), his general military orders, letters to Sir Andries Stockenstrom, Lt.Col.Smith's despatch book, drafts of D'Urban's despatches to Lord Glenelg, contemporary newspapers, and several contemporary maps. Although G.M.Theal made some selective use of these Papers (particularly in his Records of the Province of Queen Adelaide), and W.M.Macmillan drew on their contents, their potential as historical source material is by no means exhausted. Other major studies lie in embryo within the collection.

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
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
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
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MAP A
Great Namaqualand
Bechuanaland
Little Namaqualand
Basutoland
Kuruman
Latakoo
c. 220 miles
Orange R.
Vaal R.
Modder R.
Riet R.
Caledon R.
Buffels R.
Olifants R.
Gt. Berg R.
Leliefontein
Colesburg
Port Natal
c. 70 miles
Mzimkulu R.
Shawbury
Palmerton
Buntingville
Clarkebury
New
Old
Morley
Mzimvubu R.
Mthatha R.
Mbhashe R.
Kei R.
White Kei R.
Beecham Wood
Butterworth
Imvani
Shiloh
Chumie
Kar R.
Keenap R.
Mount Coke
Brownlee's Stn.
Wesleyville
GRAHAMSTOWN
Bathurst
Theopolis
Enon
Keiskamma R.
Great Fish R.
Bushman's R.
Sundays R.
Algoa Bay
Gamtoos R.
Uitenhage
Bethelsdorp
Graaff Reinet
Cradock
Somerset East
Beaufort West
Clanwilliam
Worcester
Table Bay
CAPE TOWN
Wynberg
Simonstown
False Bay
Swellendam
George
Mossel Bay
Gouritz R.
Breede R.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
CAPE COLONY
c. 1830
Mission Stations
W.M.M.S. Wesleyville+
Others Bethelsdorp+
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100 150


MAP B


Colesburg
Renosterberg
Stormberg Spruit
Great Fish R.
Bamboesberg
Stormberg
Drakensberg
Kraai R.
Tina R.
Mfecane
Port Natal c. 60 miles
Mzimkhulu R.
Bhaca
Mzimvubu R.
Shawbury
Tsitsa R.
Palmerton
Nguane
Matiwane Mts.
Mpondo
Mbholompo
Faku's Kraal
Buntingville
Mzimvubu R.
Mpondo
Mngazi R.
Xuka R.
Clarkebury
Thembu
Tsomo R.
Fadana's Kraal
Old Morley
Mdepha's Kraal
New Bomvana
Mthatha R.
Beecham Wood
Colossa R.
Velelo
Transkei
Mbhashe R.
White Kei R.
Klaas Smits R.
Haslope Hills
Imvani
Kei R.
Cradock
Graaff Reinet
Bankberg
Great Brounjhs Hoogte
Tarka R.
Black Kei R.
Klipplaats R.
Shiloh
Kaffraria
Fingos
Gcaleka
Hintsa's Kraal
Gt. Winterberg
Flandberg
Kat River Settlement
Matthole Mts.
Ciskei
Butterworth
Gcuwa
Province of Queen Adelaide
Somerset East
Burnshill
Chumie
Pirie
Ngqika
Ntinde
Brownlee's Stn.
Kei R.
Kat R.
Keiskamma R.
Neutral Territory
Sundays R.
Mount Coke
Gonubie R.
Nahoon R.
Buffalo R. (Conya)
Wesleyville
Cape Colony
Albany
Ngqika
Tshalomnqa R.
Keiskamma R.
Grahamstown
Bushmans R.
Assegai Bush R.
Seven Fountains
Salem
Bika R.
Clumber
Bathurst
Great Fish R.
Enon
Farmerfield
Theopolis
Port Frances
Zuurveld
Koucie R.
Kariega R.
Bushman's R.
Indian Ocean
Uitenhage
Sundays R.
Sneartkops R.
Bethelsdorp
Gamtoos R.
Port Elizabeth
Algoa Bay
The Eastern Frontier c. 1835
Colonial Boundary, pre-1819
Colonial Boundary, post-1819
Albany Boundary
Neutral Territory
Tribal Areas Ngqika
Prov. of Queen Adelaide
Mission Stations
W.M.M.S.
Wesleyville
Others
Bethelsdorp
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100

MAP B


Colesburg
Renosterberg
Stormberg Spruit
Great Fish R.
Bamboesberg
Stormberg
Drakensberg
Kraai R.
Tina R.
Mfecane
Port Natal c. 60 miles
Mzimkhulu R.
Bhaca
Mzimvubu R.
Shawbury
Tsitsa R.
Palmerton
Nguane
Matiwane Mts.
Mpondo
Mbholompo
Faku's Kraal
Buntingville
Mzimvubu R.
Mpondo
Mngazi R.
Xuka R.
Clarkebury
Thembu
Tsomo R.
Fadana's Kraal
Old Morley
Mdepha's Kraal
New Bomvana
Mthatha R.
Beecham Wood
Colossa R.
Velelo
Transkei
Mbhashe R.
White Kei R.
Klaas Smits R.
Haslope Hills
Imvani
Kei R.
Cradock
Graaff Reinet
Bankberg
Great Brounjhs Hoogte
Tarka R.
Black Kei R.
Klipplaats R.
Shiloh
Kaffraria
Fingos
Gcaleka
Hintsa's Kraal
Gt. Winterberg
Flandberg
Kat River Settlement
Matthole Mts.
Ciskei
Butterworth
Gcuwa
Province of Queen Adelaide
Somerset East
Burnshill
Chumie
Pirie
Ngqika
Ntinde
Brownlee's Stn.
Kei R.
Kat R.
Keiskamma R.
Neutral Territory
Sundays R.
Mount Coke
Gonubie R.
Nahoon R.
Buffalo R. (Conya)
Wesleyville
Cape Colony
Albany
Ngqika
Tshalomnqa R.
Keiskamma R.
Grahamstown
Bushmans R.
Assegai Bush R.
Seven Fountains
Salem
Bika R.
Clumber
Bathurst
Great Fish R.
Enon
Farmerfield
Theopolis
Port Frances
Zuurveld
Koucie R.
Kariega R.
Bushman's R.
Indian Ocean
Uitenhage
Sundays R.
Sneartkops R.
Bethelsdorp
Gamtoos R.
Port Elizabeth
Algoa Bay
The Eastern Frontier c. 1835
Colonial Boundary, pre-1819
Colonial Boundary, post-1819
Albany Boundary
Neutral Territory
Tribal Areas Ngqika
Prov. of Queen Adelaide
Mission Stations
W.M.M.S.
Wesleyville
Others
Bethelsdorp
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100

MAP C



THE EASTERN FRONTIER
TO ILLUSTRATE THE 1834/5 WAR

Neutral Territory Boundary (between Great Fish and Keiskamma Rivers)

Xhosa Invasion — Colonial Counter Invasion

Forts ..... Ft. Beaufort

Mission Stations

W.M.M.S. ..... Wesleyville — Others ..... Bethelsdorp

Scale of Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50

B.E.S.