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Reconceptualising South Africa's International Identity:

Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World

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Personal Note

This paper is the end result of a year's study of South Africa's foreign policy. In May 1994 Richard Calland and I spent a week in Pretoria interviewing members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Our paper, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World", was published through the University of the Western Cape's Centre for Southern African Studies, and I owe our advisor and mentor Peter Vale a special thanks for helping me to think critically about South Africa's regional role.

A second round of interviews in November with members of Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs allowed me another look inside the policy framework, and confirmed my suspicion that policy 'information' on foreign affairs has not yet found clear channels between government branches in the new South Africa.

I was extremely fortunate to corner Robert Schrire, who became my advisor for this paper, and am especially thankful for our conversations and his stimulating insights into the world beyond Southern Africa.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my family, especially my parents, for giving me the opportunity to witness a remarkable year in South Africa.

Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy in a Post-Cold War World

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Introduction

With the ending of the apartheid regime and the transition to power of a government of national unity, South Africa is now a legitimate member of the international community. It has joined the Organisation of African Unity, the British Commonwealth, and the Southern African Development Community, and it is busily fostering trade links with Europe, North America, the Far East, and Latin America. Its diplomats have worked to mediate conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, and its president is widely seen as an international statesman and a moral leader of almost unprecedented repute. Yet the new government continues to operate within South Africa's traditional international paradigm and has not yet developed a unique global role that reflects the country's internal "negotiated revolution".

As a result, substantial challenges face efforts to forge a new South African approach to the world. From outside the country, forces unleashed by the fall of communism and the rise of a truly global marketplace mark a volatile and uncertain transition in world history. From the inside, political transition has sparked a redefinition of what it means to be South African, but thuis has not been reflected in new policies. The Foreign Ministry is widely recognised as a bastion of old-guard stalwarts; the ANC and NP have done little to reconcile their past international experiences; and the information flow on international political and economic trends has barely improved since April 1994, leaving interest groups and private citizens in the new democracy generally uninformed and

therefore unable to help pressure policy.

The result is a foreign policy over the past year that has had little vision and few cohesive threads, and has left a score of unresolved issues. The 'new' South Africa's relations with Cuba and China, its policies on illegal immigration, and regional development plans are all issues that require visionary, decisive leadership but for which none has yet been provided. What energy or vision, for example, has South Africa brought to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since it joined last August? In the global peacekeeping debate, and again with Cuba and China, South Africa has made little effort to recognise more pro-active roles for which it is well equipped. Why is it not asserting itself? Who actually is in charge of its foreign policy?

Few thus would deny that a paralysis has settled in on South African foreign policy. A recent analysis in the Weekly Mail lamented, "We are not consistent. We have not formulated clear principles. The formulators of our foreign policy do not consult with the people. The new appointments to our foreign ministry complain of being sidelined. There is no clear break with the past".

At the core of this inaction is the fact that policy makers have failed to reconceptualise the way international issues are seen and policy is made. The world has changed and South Africa has changed, both dramatically; yet Cold War debates still divide the policy framework, old style security thinking still dominates higher ranks, and most importantly, the growing interlinkages between domestic and foreign policies in a post-Cold War world have gone largely unheeded.

It is thus appropriate to sound a note of urgency: change and uncertainty in the world and dramatic transformation at home combine to make this an inopportune, even dangerous, time to have a directionless foreign policy. The broad purpose of this paper is to identify the salient external and internal factors that will

drive a new South African approach to the world. The first chapter presents a synthesis of dominant global trends, and sets them against the backdrop of major structural changes in international relations. The second chapter discusses change in South Africa in relation to world changes, new state objectives and shifting interest groups, and considers these implications for three major foreign policy areas. The third chapter looks at the policy framework and the ability of policy makers to conceptualise these dual changes and to formulate effective policies. The final chapter offers a 'road map' of policy options towards a true post-apartheid, post-Cold War foreign policy.

CHAPTER I

Some Trends in the New World Order

I. Interpreting the post-Cold War World

World politics have gone through significant changes since the Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989 and the Cold War came to an end. Geo-political power blocs have ceased to dominate international relations and the position of nation-states in the international system as traditionally understood is increasingly the subject of debate. Transnational forces are more and more at the core of the international landscape and there is little doubt that the world is a more complex place than it was 50 or even 20 years ago. "Democracy", Larry Diamond writes, "has won the great ideological struggle of the Cold War" and the "extinction of global communism has created an epochal opportunity to restructure world politics".[1]

This 'extinction' though, has left open a door to uncertainty. Most observers agree that a new understanding of the world needs to be articulated. But there is disagreement as to what exactly needs to be understood, or more precisely, what it is that should be included, or not, in such an understanding. Are states still the fundamental actors in global politics? Where do the changing movements of capital and people fit into this understanding? What about the 'global economic community'? And what of the world's

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[1]Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", Foreign Policy, Summer 1992; p. 25.

growing inequalities, both in and between societies? Though most would concur with Diamond that the fall of communism has produced "a multipolar, fluid, and volatile world in which regimes, ideologies, identities and national boundaries will experience vigorous change and contestation", what is less clear is how dramatic our current juncture actually is.[2] After all, fluidity and changing identities have to some extent always characterised international relations.

II. Major Global Trends

One commentator writes that "everyone with an interest in international affairs must be aware that broad, global forces for change are bearing down upon humankind in both rich and poor societies alike".[3] What are these forces, what changes in world politics do they signal, and what kind of new world are they shaping?

1. The Widespread Acceptance of Democracy

Democracy and democratic principles have gained unprecedented exposure and acceptance in recent years. Freedom House rated 75 countries as politically "free" at the end of 1991, 10 more than a year earlier and nearly twice as many since 1971.[4] With the fall of international communism, democracy is increasingly the most attractive option for societies in transition. The values of political, economic and civil freedom are rapidly becoming the internationally accepted as "correct".

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[2] ibid., p. 25.

[3] Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", The New York Review, Feb. 11, 1993; p. 32. Condensed from Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, Random House, 1993.

[4] Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", 1992; p. 25.

Democracy, many argue, should be supported for its moral and intellectual qualifications. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset in their work on developing countries maintain:

> "If there were many undemocratic governments (now and in the past) committed to serving collective goals, rather than the interests of the rulers, and ready to respect human rights we might find these questions (criticisms) more difficult to answer. However, no undemocratic regime meets these two requirements, and even those that began with a strong ideological commitment to the collectivity and a professed sensitivity to human rights became increasingly narrow, autocratic and repressive".[5]

On practical grounds also, democracy is in vogue. With the current trend toward political freedom and basic civil liberties, non-democratic regimes are increasingly marginalised by the world political economy. Ultimately, democracy is desired for itself. "Throughout the world", Diamond argues, "people have come through bitter experience, to a new appreciation of political freedom and constitutionalism as ends in themselves".[6]

But this 'democratic moment' does not appear to be the "end of history". Other alternatives - authoritarianism, Islamic fundamentalism, ultranationalism - still attract. Moreover, the roots of democracy in much of the world are alarmingly shallow, and many new "democracies" sustain only rudimentary institutions. Elected officials often lack effective control over the civil service and the military. Legal and judicial systems are weak and lack training, resources and authority. And fundamentally, civil societies in new democracies are notoriously weak, often in confusion and disarray following a transition. Absent in many cases is a shared commitment to democracy by the elites and citizens, a variety of autonomous civic organisations and civil groups, and an independent pluralist media, which together comprise the

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[5] Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries, Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990; p. 3.

[6] Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", 1992; p. 26.

infrastructural backbone of a democracy.[7] Democracy as an ideal may have been victorious but democracy as a viable system is far from a universal reality.

Of the more than 40 countries that have made democratic transitions since 1973, only a handful, among them Greece, Portugal and Spain, can be described as stable and fully consolidated.[8] About one third have experienced "either the complete breakdown of democracy or substantial deterioration of civil liberties and peaceful electoral competition".[9]

Democracy in much of the world is threatened by economic and social crisis. In Africa these crises are acute. According to the World Bank, every region of the world is likely to experience a reduction in poverty by the year 2000, except Africa. Interweaving combinations of overpopulation, poor productivity, political instability and military conflict, superimposed on a colonial legacy that has never really been shaken, plague the continent. Africa's population growth, for example, at about 2.6% in the 1960's, rose to over 3% by the late 1980's, entailing a doubling in size every 22 years, giving it the highest growth rate of any region in the world. This trend, furthermore is unlikely to be reversed, as it was in the Far East, in the short or medium term. Social and cultural attitudes toward family size remain deeply embedded, and according to one poll of African women, "desired family size" ranges from five to nine children.[10]

The experiences of two African countries, which at one time appeared to be the continent's democratic beacons, indicate how unstable democratic institutions can be in countries facing severe economic and social problems; and, in turn, show just how fragile

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[7] ibid., p. 26.

[8] ibid., p. 26.

[9] ibid., p.26.

[10] Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", 1993; p. 40.

are claims that democracy's recent push forward is irreversible. The story of Nigeria's First and Second Republics are textbook examples of how bloated bureaucracy, unaccountable government, and corruption can doom democracy. Both of the military coups that toppled Nigeria' republics, the first in 1966 and the second in 1983, were precipitated by an array of power abuses by the government that centred on corruption and repression of the opposition. From 1979 to 1983, "scandals involving billions of dollars dominated the headlines".[11] Ranging from illicit auctions and fraudulent import-export transactions, there was a sense that "politics was out of control".[12] Although corruption exists in all forms of government, democracy, particularly in its infancy, makes it less easily disguised and thus more politically explosive.

Zimbabwe's experience is not dissimilar. Corruption is prevalent and, as in Nigeria, this has weakened grassroots confidence in the democratic system. ZANU(PF) has ruled Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 and has dominated a political culture that, "despite its appreciation in principle for democratic institutions, bears the scars of the intolerant, violent and commandist culture of the liberation struggle".[13] President Mugabe has led the country steadily away from functioning democracy, systematically repressing opposition from the Matabeleland crisis in 1982-83, through a decade (1980-1990) of emergency powers, to the current dominance, as the April 1995 elections showed, of a de facto one-party state.

Many have argued that the West's insistence on democracy in the Third World has obscured the real needs of developing countries. Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Quan Yew (1950-1990), who oversaw his country's shift from poverty to prosperity, sometimes with an iron-grip, recently gave this advice to African leaders: Do not "follow mindlessly the present politically correct and

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[11] George B.N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992; p. 250.

[12] ibid., p. 250.

[13] Sithole in Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1990; p. 18.

stridently advocated view that democracy is the precondition for economic development...What is necessary for growth and progress is good government, one that is honest and effective and works for the benefit of the people. This includes the pursuit of national interest regardless of theories or ideologies".[14]

Nominally this is good advice. But the alternatives to democracy lead overwhelmingly to disaster, especially, the record shows, in Africa. What is clear at this turning point is that each country's democratic development, with its inevitable coughs and hiccups, has unique dynamics and requirements which cannot be moulded to a universal model. In particular, the 'second liberation' of Africa will largely depend on how well new efforts at democracy reach the core of African experiences.[15]

The Declining Influence of the State

Individual states are wielding diminishing influence on the international stage. Goods and services, crime and disease, information and capital, all cross borders more frequently and rapidly than ever before, making the world a smaller place and breaking down barriers between people.

Some observers say that we are entering a "postmodern" era of international politics. Columbia University's John Ruggie suggests that new "institutional, juridical and spatial complexes" are replacing the traditional state-oriented understanding of international relations.[16] Others like Robert Kaplan see postmodernism as the 'globalisation' of problems like AIDS, global

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[14] Lee Quan Yew, "Lessons for Africa in Asian Success Story", Weekend Argus, January 14, 1995; p. 17.

[15] Larry Diamond, "The New Wind", Africa Report, Sept./Oct. 1994; p. 51.

[16] John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations", International Organization, 47, 1, Winter 1993, p. 140.

warming, and the transnational drug trade.[17] Whether or not postmodernism matures into a theory of international relations, one of its most important messages is abundantly clear: the state's monopoly on international relations is being destroyed.

Nonetheless, the state is far from irrelevant. As one analyst points out: "Only the state can defend corporate interests in international negotiations over trade, investment, and market access...If the existence of the state is in doubt, just ask the depositors of BCCI in some fifty countries who woke up one morning to find their accounts frozen".[18] Indeed, states still dominate the international system and are the only actors capable of legitimising changes including pacts, treaties and economic arrangements. Another form of organisation has yet to challenge the state and empirical evidence shows, as Ethan Kapstein argues, that many firms "continue to value their national identity, since only the state can assist them in international negotiations over such issues as market access and regulation".[19] People also continue to "need a sovereign state of their own to cling to as children do a teddy bear".[20] National politicians do the same: "They welcome, in theory, the new open-market consensus across the world. They balk, in practice, at what it means for their own roles".[21]

But, unquestionably, the state's dominance is declining. An

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[17] Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet", Atlantic Monthly, February 1994.

[18] Ethan Kapstein, "We are US: The myth of the multinational", The National Interest, Winter 1991/1992; pp. 55 and 61.

[19] Ethan Kapstein, letter to the editor, "Territoriality and Who is "US"?", International Organization, 47, 3, Summer 1993; p. 502.

[20] Nico Colchester, "The slow death of the nation-state", The Economist, Special issue, "The world in 1995", January 1995; p. 15.

[21] ibid., p. 15.

alternative has not yet emerged, and the state may find various ways of adapting, but many other forces now affect transnational, cross-cultural relations. Paul Kennedy puts it best when he says that "these various trends from global warming to twenty-four-hour-a-day trading are transnational in character, crossing borders all over our planet, affecting local communities and distant societies at the same time, and reminding us that the earth, for all of its divisions, is a single unit.[22]

2. The Global Market Economy

A second important trend is the emergence of a global market economy. Trade and investment issues are filling the agendas of most countries' foreign relations and are creating new links between peoples and societies. The fall of communism, and with it the declining risk of warfare between the world's major states, has given new emphasis to economic relations. Economic power is now the 'big stick' brandished on the international stage; and interdependence gives this stick its sting.

At the forefront of these trends is the extraordinary capacity of technology to transform economic and political relationships. "New technologies", one commentator writes, are challenging traditional assumptions about the way we make, trade, and even grow things".[23] Technology has, another says,

> inexorably generated the phenomenon of 'globalization', that is the linkage of common human interests over the whole planet, an now also over outer space.[24]

Communication systems, the latest computer software, transportation

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[22] Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", 1993; p. 32.

[23] ibid., p. 32.

[24] Ghita Ionescu, Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statesmanship of Adenauer, de Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan and Gorbachev, Harlow, England: Longman Group, 1991; p. 4.

innovations, all affect the daily transactions of billions of people worldwide. An immediate "and almost universal result" of these technological advances has been to "unify national markets for all other goods and services".[25] Producers now produce not for a single national market but for a global market and new means of communication allow buyers and sellers to access information on world market trends. It is likely that the capacity of countries to tap into this quickly moving world of technology will largely determine their global position in the coming decades.

This accelerating rate of technological change is linked to several other factors, which together herald a structural change in the world political economy: the "internationalisation of production" and the spread of manufacturing industry to several newly industrialised countries (NIC's); increased capital mobility, which has made this dispersion easier and quicker; and a change in the "structure" of power which benefits those with know-how and access to 'information'. Together these have made transnational communication fast, cheap and effective and have raised global awareness of the benefits of the market economy.[26] Says Susan Strange:

> "These common roots have resulted, at the same time and in many countries, in the demand for democratic government and for the economic flexibility that is impossible in a command economy".[27]

But these trends in the world economy will mean different things to different states. For industrialised economies like the United States, Japan, the EU and the Asian Tigers, technological advance will bolster and perhaps increase their economic superiority. With their funds for research and development, their high education levels, and their head start, they may prove uncatchable for at

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[25] Susan Strange, States and Markets, London: Pinter Publishers, 1988; p. 127.

[26] ibid., p. 127.

[27] Susan Strange, "States, Firms, and Diplomacy", International Affairs, January 1992; p. 2.

least several decades. For those countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet bloc that are still struggling to develop and to sustain nascent political transitions, the global economy will provide few bonuses.

With the demise of geo-political alliances, developing countries will probably find it more difficult than in the past to win friends and garner international support. With the major criterion in relations between states and people now shifting to economic and trade issues, poorer countries may have less and less to offer their partners in a world without competing ideologies - and thus will be increasingly left to themselves to "catch up". A few observations confirm this likelihood. First, one cannot really talk of a dual global economy anymore, divided between developed and developing countries. With the rise of the NIC's and several other countries including Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey, there are an increasing number of shades to the world economic hierarchy. These changes have complicated North-South relations, with the so-called Third World no longer a front of developing countries lined up against the rich ones. Writes one scholar, "developing countries are now acutely aware that they are competing against each other, the laggards desperately trying to catch up with the successful newly industrialized countries".[28]

Another illustration sharpens this picture. In the 1960's, South Korea had a per capita GNP exactly the same as Ghana's ($230). Both had experienced several decades or more of colonial rule, and possessed a primarily agrarian economy. Yet today South Korea is entering the ranks of the rich nations, its GNP per capita ten to twelve times that of Ghana's, which remains mired in one of the world's most poverty-stricken regions. With countries like South Korea trickling into the ranks of the rich, fully developed countries may not any time soon be "forced" to deal with the poorest countries on their terms, as had once been hoped. "It is no accident", concludes Strange, "that the 'dependency school'

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[28] ibid., p. 4.

writers of the 1970's have lost so much of their audience".[29]

Differentiation in the global economy is also sharpened by the formation of regional trading blocks. With the most advanced states forming joint economic arrangements - NAFTA, the EC, and ASEAN - the poorest nations may find it even more difficult to break out of their developing quagmire. Even the newly created International Trade Organisation (ITO) is seen to mostly benefit advanced countries.

The rise of a global market economy is linked to the spread of democracy and a growing respect worldwide for economic, political and social freedom. But like the democratic movement, the global marketplace will mean different things to different countries, and its benefits will be spread unevenly. It remains to be seen whether the poorest countries will achieve *any* gain in absolute terms. What is clear though, is that new trends in the world economy favor those countries that are already high in the pecking order.

International Power in the Information Age

As the spread of democracy and the market economy suggest, power on the international stage is changing. Military might no longer carries the same influence that it used to. As the threat of warfare between the major states declines, the high cost of military readiness and deployment among the advanced countries is less and less necessary on the scale it was during the Cold War. International political issues are increasingly tied to economic factors.

At the heart of this change is what some call the Information

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[29] ibid., p. 4.

Revolution.[30] Just as factory production and the spread of electricity and chemistry twice revolutionised trade and commerce in the past two hundred years, so in the past few decades has the spread and use of 'information'. Computers, telecommunications, satellites all transmit the latest information to anyone, anywhere who can use it and who knows what to do with it - in a world dominated by economies and trade, 'knowledge' rather than military brawn may be the surest way to wield 'power'. "Power", writes Susan Strange, is even passing to the "information rich" instead of the "capital-rich". "Indeed", she says, "it is information that unlocks the door giving access to credit, not the mere possession and accumulation of capital in whatever form".[31]

Economic and political implications follow from these changes in the 'power structure'. Economically, white-collar service jobs have replaced manufacturing jobs the way manufacturing jobs once replaced those in agriculture. This is most apparent in the U.S. where by 1984, 72% of people employed outside agriculture were in service jobs as compared to 62% in 1960. Even more telling is that between 1982-1984, 69% of new jobs created in the U.S. were in service industries.[32] Though it is true that most of these new service jobs have been in low-paying occupations like fast-foods, retail, and tourism, the overall trend is unmistakeable. Firms are now spending more and more on service and information related hardware to keep apace, large non-information firms are diversifying into the information sector and perhaps most important, as one analyst says, "the value to a firm of its employees in service jobs is enhanced at the expense of its old industrial workers".[33]

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[30] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound To Lead, Harper Collins Publishers, 1990; p. 8.

[31] Strange, States and Markets, 1988; p. 134.

[32] ibid., p. 128.

[33] ibid., p. 128; Strange suggests the large American aircraft manufacturers, Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnel Douglas as examples.

Politically, technological innovations have centralised power in big transnational corporations (TNC's) that have the ability and financing to 'internationalise' information. TNC's, entrepreneurs, and the businesspeople of the international marketplace are the immediate beneficiaries of the 'Information Revolution'. They increasingly wield power over markets and firms in less advanced countries and often over weak governments themselves. In fact, the extraordinary influence of TNC's, Susan Strange argues, has helped reconsolidate international power in the United States where 40% of the world's largest TNC's are headquartered.

> Washington may have lost some of its authority over the US-based transnationals, but their managers still carry US passports, can be subpoenaed in US courts, and in war or national emergency would obey Washington first. Meanwhile, the US government has gained new authority over a great many foreign corporations operating inside the United States. All of them are acutely aware that the US market is the biggest prize.[34]

When measured against its predominance in the "knowledge structure", argues Strange, "any loss of American capability in industrial manufacturing is trivial and unimportant".[35]

As with the state system, the change in international power has a lot to do with the growing complexity of world politics. Military might may still be important but it is now one of many power sources, and increasingly is not the most effective. International political issues today rarely place one state against another; they are rather issues "in which all states try to control nonstate transnational actors".[36] As Joseph Nye says:

> new power sources, such as the capacity for effective communication and for developing and using multilateral institutions, may prove more relevant. Moreover, cooperation will often be required from small, weak states not fully capable of managing their own domestic drug, health, or

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[34] ibid., p. 131.

[35] ibid., p. 133.

[36] Nye, Bound to Lead, 1990, p. 186.

ecological problems.[37]

Regardless though of the trend toward multilateralism, it is clear that those societies, whether American, Asian or European, that are well placed to offer their citizens advanced education and training in new technologies will become, or remain, the primary nodes of global influence. Consider that for every million citizens in Japan, there are 3,548 scientists and engineers, in the United States, 2,685, but in Africa only 54 per million.[38] This supports, sadly, the cliche that already advanced societies will advance more rapidly and disadvantaged societies will fall further behind.

3. The Changing Pattern of Global Conflict

A third major trend is the changing pattern of global conflict. Wars between states are now rare, in part because economic power, as exemplified by Japan's ascendence, is now a more effective and lasting means of achieving national objectives than military power.[39] "Territorial aggression", one observer puts it, "is no longer a cost effective way to acquire wealth". In addition, international norms have changed heavily against military force. "The ideology that saw virtue, nobility, and glory in war, has all but disappeared in the advanced industrialised countries".[40]

What has risen however, is the frequency of wars within states - intrastate conflict. Throughout the "zone of conflict", which includes the former Soviet bloc, most of sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Latin America and South Asia, state governments are being increasingly challenged, often violently, by their own citizens. Government corruption, economic and social crises, scarcity of

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[37] ibid., p. 187.

[38] Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", 1993; p. 40.

[39] Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict", Foreign Policy, Fall 1994; p. 4.

[40] ibid., p. 4.

common resources, environmental deterioration, have all led, often in combination, to intractable internal conflict. Writes Gareth Evans, Australia's Foreign Minister and a member of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, "economic decline has hastened the process of national disintegration, and vice versa. The combination has led in extreme cases to the "failed state" syndrome evident in Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere".[41]

In one view, the "zone of conflict" is entering an "epoch of themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, (and) nebulous and anarchic regionalisms".[42] Crime, lawlessness, and the general breakdown of government, the author says, are what makes West Africa a "natural point of departure" for his report on the planet's political character in the twenty-first century.

In Africa and other parts of the former colonial world, intrastate conflict is a function of the global divide between developed and developing worlds. Fledgling governments are faced with lingering colonial legacies that include artificial geographical boundaries, poor education, training, and productive capacities, and are often forced to make severe economic tradeoffs to remain afloat in the international economy. The downward economic spiral faced by many poor countries is directly linked to an increase in internal strife. In almost every case of major intrastate violence, from the former Soviet republics to Rwanda, ethnic and religious conflict has been associated with "significant periods of declining per capita gross national product, the rise of demagogic politics, and the intensification of chauvinistic myth making".[43] With the economic decline of many struggling states, Evans says, "there is little evidence that violent intrastate conflict is likely to

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[41] ibid., p. 4.

[42] Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", 1994; p. 72.

[43] Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict, 1994; p. 5.

decrease of its own accord in the near or mid-term future".[44]

One final observation helps explain the rise of intrastate conflict: about 40% of the world's states have five or more sizable ethnic populations; merely 20% are relatively ethnically homogenous.[45] The artificial boundaries in much of the post-colonial world make 'nation-state' a curious term. Long-standing political communities are divided by often arbitrary boundaries, making multistate nations and multination states more prevalent than nation-states.[46]

One vision of a world no longer dominated by nation-states is the rise of conflict between major civilizations. In a bold article, "The Clash of Civilizations", Samuel Huntington argues that competing civilizations - Western, Japanese, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African - will form the new fault lines of global conflict.[47] As nation-states fade away, the argument goes, civilizations will come in greater contact with one another, breeding resentment and antagonism and leading to hostility. "Culture, not class, ideology or even nationality will differentiate the contending power blocs of the future".[48]

But Huntington's theory raises more questions than it answers. Why would different cultural values necessarily lead to political and military confrontation? Or, how likely would it be for long-time enemies like Iraq, Iran and Syria to unite against the West? Huntington's argument is only a slightly disguised form of political realism; for him, states have been replaced by

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[44] ibid., p. 5.

[45] ibid., p. 5.

[46] ibid., p. 5.

[47] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

[48] Richard Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington", Foreign Policy, Fall 1994; p. 114.

civilizations which engage, as states once did, in a struggle for power, each trying to advance its own interests in an anarchic setting.[49] With transnational forces binding people across the globe in various complex ways, sweeping generalizations about wars between civilizations may be imprecise. Conflict in the future will probably have more diffuse origins than in the past; and if the global economy continues to grow, leaving many behind, economic decay may become a more frequent catalyst for conflict.

New Approaches to Security

These changing patterns of global conflict are inspiring new approaches to security. Kaplan's 'epoch of themeless juxtapositions' suggests a world in which the "complexity and fluidity of economic, political, and social forces transcend traditional nation-state based paradigms".[50] Put simply, Cold War ideas about protecting the physical and political integrity of states are becoming obsolete.

Increasing transnational crime, lawlessness, refugee flows, drug-running, etc., as well as cross-border trade and investment, means that security may be more multi-dimensional in character than in the past. International security now demands attention "not only to political and diplomatic issues but also to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, and human rights abuses".[51] The U.N.'s founders, for instance, envisioned a system of 'collective security', in which the member body of nations acted as a deterrent to aggression by any other state. In recent years this emphasis on deterrence has shifted to prevention; in short, Gareth Evans says, "achieving security with others, not against

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[49] ibid., p. 115.

[50] Richard Calland and David Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World", Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Working Paper Series, No. 38, October 1994; p. 3.

[51] Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict", 1994; p. 7.

them".[52]

Linked to this movement toward a more cooperative, comprehensive approach to international security is new thinking on who or what exactly needs protection. "Security", Evans suggests, "is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defense of the territorial integrity of states".[53] In this view, threats to 'human security', which is violated on a huge scale in intrastate conflict', can be deemed an 'international security issue' by a body such as the U.N. Former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar was among the first to express this view when he remarked in 1991 that the traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty needed to be reassessed in light of "the shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents".[54]

As the international uncertainty over the conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia shows, practical applications of this thinking have been difficult. What is clear is that transnational forces are making states and peoples view their security in less unilateral terms.

The case of West African refugee movements illustrates, in an extreme way, the collapse of nation-state borders. "There is no place on the planet where political maps are so deceptive - where, in fact, they tell such lies - as in West Africa", writes Robert Kaplan.[55] Governments in the region are only marginally in control of what is happening in each state. About 400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced, 280,000 have fled to neighbouring Guineau, 100,000 have fled to Liberia, even as 400,000 Liberians

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[52] ibid., p. 7.

[53] ibid., p. 9.

[54] ibid., p. 8.

[55] Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", 1994; p. 46.

have fled to Sierra Leone. With an additional 600,000 Liberians in Guineau and 250,000 in the Ivory Coast, the borders dividing these countries, says Kaplan, "have become largely meaningless".[56] Even for richer societies in North America and Europe, migrant flows pose social, political and economic problems. They reinforce the idea that "we are all in it together", and ultimately that richer countries ignore poorer ones at their own peril.

III. Concluding Thoughts

With international power now more diffuse competition among states and regions will be ruthless. Ironically, at the same time that political pluralism and technology are binding distant peoples together, the market economy is creating fierce competition and divisions between them. South Africa has little control over these forces, or over the rules that govern world trade, and like other weak states it will thus have to compete or fall further behind. Where in the past geo-political alliances provided them with military and economic protection, poor countries will now be increasingly left on their own to develop and secure themselves, even as the richer countries with their technological headstart, higher educational levels and stable political economies push further ahead.

But all is not lost for weak states. Constraining as it sometimes is, the global economy also provides openings and opportunities. Taking advantage of these may require making tradeoffs - supporting some industries at the expense of others, welcoming foreigners at the expense of locals, for example - but states like South Korea and Singapore, and to a degree, Brazil and Mexico, show that progress can be made. Ultimately, the bottom line for any development success may be something as simple - and elusive - as

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[56] ibid., p. 46.

Lee Quan Yew's notion of "good government".

Above all, transnational forces are re-arranging the way we think about the world. The end of the Cold War, the rise of the global marketplace, and new patterns of conflict all herald a new era in global politics - one in which interdependence reigns, however unclearly. For the policy maker, this points - crucially and inexorably - toward a greater linkage between foreign and domestic affairs.

CHAPTER II

A Menu of Critical Choices

I. The "Double Whammy"

As these global forces of change bear down upon South Africa, what are the country's options? What kind of identities will it seek on the global, continental and regional stages? What state objectives will it pursue? Which interests and pressure groups will come to bear on foreign policy? How will policy makers balance these competing interests?

As South Africa moves through its early stages of domestic transition, these are the questions that confront policy makers as they decide which face - or faces - to put on South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. This chapter seeks to provide a framework for understanding which interests and objectives will influence foreign policy making on several key issues. It is based on the recognition that foreign policy makers face a "double whammy" in coming to terms with the transformations underway in both the world and in South Africa.[57] "The implications of either transformation,

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[57] Roger Southall, "The New South Africa in the New World Order: Beyond the double whammy", Third World Quarterly, Vol 15, No 1, 1994. Though Southall's initial comparison was made before South Africa's April elections and refers to the difficulty of assessing "the causes, depth, and likely outcomes of the internal changes", the comparison still maintains its poignance in the early stages of the government of national unity.

taken alone", Roger Southall says, "are themselves subject to enormous controversy and debate; taken together, they plunge the unfortunate analyst into the midst of an earthquake, struggling to negotiate a route towards a safe destination when both walls and floor are moving..".[58]

II. State Objectives and Competing Interests

With the end of minority rule in South Africa, the government is finally a legitimate actor. It is now in a position to pursue, for the first time, truly 'national' goals.

The April 1994 mandate however, offers little more direction than 'reconstruction and development'. Such vague and long-term goals require specific policies, and these in turn are fought over by competing interests. As is the nature of a democracy, these conflicts will prevent the state from always pursuing consistent policies. Trade liberalisation have different consequences for consumers and producers; Armscor will advocate a different kind of regional security from former ANC exiles; trade unions will resist privatisation while international investors will resist nationalisation; some will vehemently oppose relations with Cuba while others will equally strongly support them.

"Like most societies in this time of global transition", writes Peter Vale, "South Africa has not a single, but multiple personality traits - many old, just as many new - to the identity it seeks".[59] These traits will be competing with one another for dominance. Will South Africa turn primarily towards Europe and the West or will it now face toward its own continent? Will its First World standards shine through or will it slip into Third World stagnation? Will it become an international tourist destination or

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[58] ibid., p. 121.

[59] Peter Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness: South Africa and Regional Security in the mid-1990's", Report, Chr. Michelson Institut, Bergen Norway, November 1994; p. 2.

a hub for the transnational drug trade and crime?

Most indications suggest that the new South Africa will be a mix, as Vale suggests, of many, not always compatible, characteristics. The real question it seems is how these various traits will be organised - and understood - by those charged with creating a new South African approach to the world.

So far, little ordering has been done. The government's indecision over the "two Chinas" issue, discussed later, is a case in point. In large measure, post-apartheid foreign policy has reflected the confusion that South Africans feel about their collective identity, and this highlights an important assumption in this paper: that real debates about foreign policy - framed in a post-apartheid, post-Cold War, even postmodern, matrix - have yet to begin. How, for example, is one to understand the foreign policy of a country

> which, at one and the same time, is committed to controlling arms but whose only competitive edge, so its people are being told, seems to be in the weapons industry?...or which relied on its neighbours to deliver it from oppression but threatens to turn on an electric fence to keep them out?".[60]

In common with other countries in the midst of dramatic transformations, South Africa is struggling to escape the legacy of its past. Policy and policy thinking will not always be quick to change, especially in the absence of strong guiding visions. Security issues, regional development, and links with the global economy will arguably be the major areas of importance, and debate, in South Africa's foreign policy. How these issues are approached and which interests emerge will largely determine the direction, and vision, of post-apartheid foreign policy.

III. What Kind of Security and for Whom?

As the previous chapter suggests, different patterns at work in the

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[60] ibid., p. 2.

world are challenging traditional thinking about 'security'. Especially in the developing world, security now depends as much on the socio-economic and political stability of societies as on the absence of external dangers.

This does not mean however, that traditional security dilemmas have altogether disappeared or that conventional forces are unnecessary. In some respects, a 'middle power' like South Africa may have a greater defence burden than in the past. In the post bi-polar world, small and medium powers are no longer 'free riders' on the backs of larger ones. They will be left increasingly to fend for themselves in a world where enemies and friends are less certain. For such states, weighing guns against butter may now be more difficult than it was during the Cold War. It is no longer clear what kind of defence resources are needed and what conventional systems are appropriate. In South Africa, for example, what are the social welfare tradeoffs of the cost of four navy patrol corvettes at about R2.5 billion? The response of a Defence Ministry spokesperson indicates the uncertainty of the times:

> If we look at it in the short term, of course we should go for houses. But if we look at the long term, security is important.[61]

Security against whom or what? When?

Nonetheless, with the demise of the strategic issues of the Cold War, and the declining frequency of wars between states, threats to human and national security will be more and more linked to the consequences of social and economic decay. The new array of destabilising forces are transnational in character: crime, disease, drug rings, gun-running, terrorism, and the like defy political and national borders. These new threats to security represent the dark side of a world hurtling toward greater interdependencies. The probles of one country thus become also the

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[61] "Modise's gunboats are heading for rough seas", The Weekly Mail, January 13, 1995; p. 3.

problems of its neighbours.

This concept of security has particular relevance for South Africa. None of its neighbours are hostile and its own citizens no longer fear a repressive, authoritarian state. Now, human life and effective government are most threatened by illegal immigration, weapons proliferation, the rapid spread of crime, the drug trade, AIDS, environmental stress, and general social and economic instability both at home and in neighbouring states. Understanding security in these terms requires recognising that "internal and external sources of insecurity are inextricably bound-up; disentangling them is impossible".[62]

Appreciating this, it would seem, is a major departure from traditional security thinking in South Africa. As Peter Vale suggests, the post-apartheid security culture still sees the region in 'onslaught' terms, as something to be kept at arms length.[63] The DFA, according to most indications, remains largely "statist", understanding international and particularly regional issues as interactions between states, rather than between people. More crucially, the Defence Ministry appears even more 'old guard'. The new Minister, Joe Modise, is seen as a 'hawk' and as Africa Confidential recently reported, "is fast becoming as effective an advocate for the military as former defence minister Magnus Malan".[64] 'Hawkish' thinking appears to bode poorly for any attempt to confront South Africa's, and the region's, security needs. "Creating real security", Vale says, "relies less and less on the traditional apparatus of war and more and more on the many faces of exchange and interchange. No longer are arms or alms necessary: communality of purpose promises a great deal more".[65]

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[62] Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 16.

[63] ibid., p. 23.

[64] Africa Confidential, 1994, Vol. 17, No. 5, reported in Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 24.

[65] Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 33.

Several sets of statistics show how intertwined are the region's countries (and peoples) and their security needs. At the core of the regionwide security dilemma is socio-economic decay: this, ultimately, is why new visions about security must begin with development. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to have the highest incidence of poverty in the world by the year 2000. Related to this is the increase in HIV infection, which already threatens to overwhelm health services not just in South Africa, but in the whole sub-continent, as the infections of the 1980s translate into full-blown illnesses in the 1990s.[66] At least 250,000 South Africans were HIV positive by the end of 1992[67]; 311,000 according to other reports.[68] In four Southern African countries - Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - almost one-fifth of the populations are estimated to be HIV positive.[69] In the context of migration flows and population growth the possibilities are horrific.

Population growth continues to increase sharply, particularly in urban areas and, the AIDS epidemic notwithstanding, the youthful profile of demographics in Southern African means that scarce resources will be stretched to - and beyond - their limits as the millennium approaches. South Africa has a current population growth rate of approximately 2.2%: at this rate, its population by the year 2000 is projected to have increased to about 47 million from about 38 million at present.[70]

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[66] Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 4.

[67] J.N. Garba (ed.), Towards Sustainable Peace and Stability in Southern Africa, New York: Institute of International Education, 1994; p. 30.

[68] Alan Whiteside, "Aids and its impact on the economic, social and political environment", in Minnie Venter (ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1994; p. 237.

[69] ibid., p. 237.

[70] ibid., p. 238.

Urbanisation is another powerful force at work changing the sub-continent. In 1960 only one town in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, had a population of more than one million people. By 1980 there were fourteen, and it is estimated that by the year 2000 there will be 45.[71] Social problems - crime; poverty; homelessness - will grow with these figures.

(Post)Modern Security Problems: Illegal Immigration

Two problems in particular connect these trends, sharpening the security - and security thinking - crisis facing South Africa and the region. One is illegal immigration. As the region's obvious 'honeypot', South Africa is a magnet for the region's swelling underclass. In July 1994 Finance Week claimed that "hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants" were working in South Africa.[72] In September 1994, the Financial Mail revealed more startling statistics: that 5-8% of South Africa's population is made up of illegals, and it could cost more than R210m, a tenth of the entire amount budgeted for the RDP, "just to house, educate, police and give medical care to only one sector of the problem: the illegal Mozambicans".[73] They are estimated to number anywhere from 500,000 to two million.[74]

South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad observed matter of factly, "given that our borders are so big, we will not be able to prevent it".[75] And yet, the cost of repatriating those that are caught (80,000 in 1993)was expected to reach R120m for 1994, "and

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[71] David Dewar, "Urbanisation patterns and policies in Southern Africa", in Venter (ed.), 1994; p. 279.

[72] Finance Week, July 7-11, 1994; p. 22.

[73] "No Turn of the Tide", Financial Mail, September 9, 1994; p. 22.

[74] ibid., p. 22.

[75] Interview in the Sunday Times, June 19, 1994.

"could reach R500m a year by the end of the century".[76]

This produces very difficult questions about whose security and whose region is at stake. Can South Africa be secure, through any means, in a decaying region? What do 'stringent influx control', an electric fence, and commando-style border patrols say about the 'new', open and democratic South Africa? Says Deputy President Thabo Mbeki of the growing xenophobia toward illegal immigrants:

> You cannot deal with the future of the Southern African region on this kind of identification. Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana and the other countries to which we fled in the 1960's did not call us illegal aliens. We must ask ourselves what we as South Africans can do, so that they can say "I'm going home".[77]

In this vein, the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme states:

> in the long run sustainable reconstruction and development in South Africa requires sustainable reconstruction and development in Southern Africa as a whole. Otherwise, the region will face continued high unemployment and underemployment, leading to labour migration and brain drain to the more industrialised areas. The democratic government must negotiate with neighbouring countries to forge an equitable and mutually beneficial programme of increasing cooperation, coordination and integration appropriate to the conditions of the region.[78]

Yet, noble posturing toward the region will not alleviate South Africa's immediate dilemmas. There is a significant time lag between the spontaneous crises that regional decay is now bringing to South Africa, and the amount of time it will take to make those homes - whether in Angola, Mozambique or Zambia - worth returning to. Changed thinking is a start, and a major one; but that will not ease the agony of making decisions in the short-term. How, for

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[76] ibid., p. 22.

[77] The Star, October 13, 1994; in Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 37.

[78] African National Congress, Reconstruction and Development Programme, Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994; p. 116.

example, do unemployed South Africans feel about losing job opportunities to non-South Africans? Do they feel a regional 'kinship'? Where is the line between generosity and pragmatic policy? Is "good welfare for all", as Bill Sass of the Institute for Defence Policy argues, only possible if the country is "secure, safe and stable"?[79]

Crime, Drugs and Guns

A second issue that illustrates why fresh thinking on security is so important is the vicious crime-drugs-guns circle. One newspaper reported in January 1995 that "South Africa is facing a total onslaught by ruthless crime syndicates which is threatening to sweep the country over the brink into anarchy".[80] A related article in the same paper claimed that "Cape Town is a springboard for international drug trafficking" and that the city "is regarded as the mandrax consumer capital of the world".[81]

Lawlessness and drug trafficking, not surprisingly, are connected with illegal immigration, which brings home the full meaning of a borderless region facing difficult times. One police colonel estimates that 14% of general crime involves illegal aliens.[82] "Their shadowy status", writes the Financial Mail, "makes them ideal lackeys for crime syndicates" like the Chinese triads, who are estimated to have an annual turnover in South Africa of R200m.[83]

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[79] Bill Sass, "A Security Policy", Indicator SA, Spring 1994; p. 20.

[80] "Big time crime moves in", The Argus, January 25, 1995.

[81] "Cape Town springboard for world drug traffic", The Argus, January 25, 1995.

[82] "No Turn of the Tide", Financial Mail, p. 22.

[83] ibid., p. 22.

Gun running and weapon proliferation in the region complete this grim circle. The region's many bloody conflicts saw weapons pour in from outside sponsors; as economies and societies now lie battered, weapons are sold to those who are desperate enough to use them, and ex-combatants often turn, for lack of other opportunities, to crime. And yet, arms continue to be manufactured in South Africa and are sold with the apparent consent of the government.

At the centre of this debate is Armscor. Can the government of the new' South Africa, after what the country has fought to overcome, condone or turn a blind eye to weapons manufacturing and trade? The government of national unity has decided, as a guideline to arms exports, to consider "whether the armaments could be used to suppress the local population, minorities or be used by insurgents".[84] What is <u>really</u> required, offers The Sowetan, "is a serious national debate on whether this country, after all that is has gone through, should be selling arms at all".

<u>The Weekly Mail</u> had this to say:

> One can reasonably ask whether the board of Armscor, and other top officials steeped in the "total onslaught" culture, should continue to bear the awesome responsibility of regulating South Africa's arms industry.[85]

In fact, a confidential memorandum released in December, showed just how extensive Armscor's range of clients has been, from military dictatorships like Haiti, to countries on the brink of civil war such as Somalia and Sudan, and to Warsaw Pact countries. It even supplied <u>both</u> sides of the civil conflict in Burma.[86] The document, according to one international affairs specialist, "is

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[84] "Storm over SA arms to Yemen", <u>The Weekly Mail</u>, September 23, 1994; p. 2.

[85] <u>The Weekly Mail</u>, October 7, 1994: in Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 31.

[86] "The Alice in Wonderland Memo", <u>The Weekly Mail</u>, December 2, 1994; p. 2.

an embarrassment to Armscor and, indeed, to Foreign Affairs. It seems to reveal a lack of geographical understanding and of politics".[87]

Yet curtailing Armscor's activities, as many would suggest, will not be easy. Both old style security thinking and powerful economic interests stand in the way. Take an Armscor advertisement for example: "The bee has a sting for its protection. South Africa has one too. Armscor: Creating wealth. Protecting the nation". As a large employer and an exporter, Armscor's value to the economy cannot be dismissed lightly. Reflecting the difficulty these trade-offs present, an ANC Department of Economic Planning report says:

> The future of the arms industry is not a foregone conclusion. At the end of the day all the arguments about cost-benefit analysis, the impact on trade and international relations, and the effect on the moral fibre of our nation will play an equally decisive role in the direction that we as a nation choose. Do we support an arms industry because it says it can create wealth and thus provide finance for social programs or do we spend money directly on the urgently needed social programs? This dilemma is yet to be resolved".[88]

Whichever way this debate tilts, one conclusion can probably be made: until the major economic and political interests begin to see the country's and the region's security as inextricably linked and socio-economically bound, effective security will be elusive.

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[87] ibid., p. 2.

[88] African National Congress, "The Armaments Industry - A Cost-Benefit Analysis - A Discussion Document", 1994; in Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 26.

IV. South Africa and the Region: "Us and Them" or "Us and Us"?

It is no surprise that regional issues will be framed by development needs, nor that South Africa's transition is seen as a great impetus to resolving common problems. Nonetheless, regional matters in the post-apartheid era will be delicate. Many different visions of South Africa's regional role have been aired, reflecting various internal and external interests. Some advocate a laissez-faire, market economy approach to regional development; others support full regional economic integration; some favor political integration ahead of economic; and some would just as soon "get our own house in order first". Given the range of these positions, as well as its historical and emotional ties to the region, South Africa will thus have to be nimble in its approach to its neighbours.

Some in the region are already wondering aloud about a new age of hegemony in Southern Africa, dawning with a rejuvenated market economy south of the Limpopo. Their anxiety is fully justified. South Africa's population is about one-third of the region's; South Africa produces 75% of the region's GNP, and its per capita GNP is almost two-and-a-half times that of the regional mean. By way of individual comparison, South Africa's economy is twenty five times larger than Tanzania's; its GNP per capita is US $2560 compared to Mozambique's $80 and Malawi's $230 - while only two countries, Namibia and Botswana, have figures above $1000.[89]

The dangers of 'bigism' are at least recognised by South Africa's policy makers. Isolating itself from the region is widely seen as a 'non-option', given South Africa's obvious interlinkages with its neighbours. And there is widespread acknowledgement that it is not

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[89] Venter (ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, 1994; p. 304.

enough either for South Africa's wealth to merely 'trickle down' to the region. The ANC in particular has shown appreciation of these fears, declaring its intention

> to renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region. (South Africa) should resist all pressure to become the "regional power" at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent; instead, it should seek to become part of a movement to create a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence.[90]

But progress has stalled at the acknowledgement that action, of some kind, is required. There has been relatively little movement, for instance, toward a concrete regional development plan. At the heart of this inaction (on the South African side), it seems, is uncertainty as to what role the South African state should play in regional development. Should it push for greater economic integration among the region's countries? Or should its thrust be more political, in search of common understandings between regional leaders? Which methods will lead to more successful regional development, and greater prosperity and security for South Africa? And which is possible given the available resources?

Regional Organisations

Already there exist several regional organisations whose primary purposes focus on economic cooperation. The Preferential Trade Area (PTA), now called COMESA (Community of Eastern and Southern Africa) was formed in 1982 among nineteen states as a first step toward the creation of a common market. It has been weakened immeasurably however, by its unwieldy size; a lack of common interest; a lack of flexibility and breadth; a lack of firm timetables; and the non-enforceability of commitments.[91] The Southern African Customs Union

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[90] African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa", Johannesburg: ANC Department of International Affairs, 1993; p. 11.

[91] Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 13.

(SACU) (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) has been described by Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside as the "obvious starting point" for the region to build on its strengths.[92] In this vein, suggests the African Development Bank, SACU should be redesigned to accommodate a wider common market or free trade area in the region.[93] In practice however, SACU has provided South African producers captive markets in other member countries, benefitting disproportionately the would-be hegemon. Even Maasdorp and Whiteside concede that any "deepening" of SACU's capacities toward a common market could not be extended beyond the present membership.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is seen by most as the best positioned organisation to lead regional development. Yet, it has been relatively ineffective in the past, when it was primarily an economic support system among the Frontline States, against a dominant South Africa. Its transition to a post-apartheid raison d'etre also has been slow, and, here too, dominated by indecision as to what methodology should drive regional cooperation. As one analysis observes, "the evidence suggests that none of the regional organisations, as currently constituted, are sufficiently equipped to deal with the problems of the region".[94]

Furthermore, prevailing opinion and indeed, worldwide evidence suggests that

> only countries which are at roughly similar levels of industrial development, have competitive industrial sectors and have potential to develop complementary industrial sectors, should join together in an economic integration

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[92] Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, Rethinking Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Trade and Investment. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1993; p. 41.

[93] African Development Bank Report on "Economic Integration in Southern Africa", Abidjan, 1993.

[94] Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa, and the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 17.

arrangement.[95]

Even in the European Community, whose member states all enjoy similar levels of economic development and political maturity, the creation of a single market and currency has been lengthy and problematic. Tom Ostergaard offers one assessment of why economic integration would be particularly difficult in Southern Africa:

> as the economies are overwhelmingly geared to supplying raw materials to overseas markets, the current economic interaction among the countries of the region is frivolous. Furthermore, the countries are generally poor, the economies stagnant, and class formation is limited. Finally, many of the countries are undergoing political crises and the states are still pre-occupied with nation-building.[96]

What then are the alternatives to economic integration? The economies of Angola and Mozambique lie devastated after decades of war, Zambia and Zimbabwe are struggling with adjustment programs, and Malawi's economy is reeling from years of uneven development and government neglect. Making these homes worth living in will depend heavily on material upliftment. What will tie these and other countries together with South Africa in working toward equitable regionwide development?

More Substantial Political Cooperation?

As a partial answer, there appears to be growing awareness that more substantial political cooperation in the region is needed to guide development initiatives. SADC itself recognises the need for regional political cooperation beyond, or as a foundation for, economic development. Its 1992 Windhoek Declaration outlined a renewed set of objectives:

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[95] Gavin Maasdorp, "A New Community of Nations", Indicator SA, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1992.

[96] Tom Ostergaard, "Integration - What Relevance for Southern Africa" in B. Oden (ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993; p. 27.

> common economic, political, and social value systems...enhancing..democracy and good governance, respect for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and alleviation of poverty...and the strengthening (of) regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.[97]

The arguments for greater regional political cooperation, for "building a coherent regional spirit" on which to base development initiatives, are convincing. The political systems of the region are generally rudimentary and unstable; most regional governments do not enjoy entrenched norms of transparency and accountability, and many are plagued by corruption. Political instability, as witnessed elsewhere in Africa and in Latin America, bodes poorly for equitable development. As Diamond, Linz and Lipset remind us, "democracy may be recommended not only on moral grounds but as ultimately facilitating systemic stability, which in turn facilitates economic growth".[98] "Democracy", one member of the DFA said appositely, "cultivates similar ways of thinking about things".[99]

Facilitating the spread and maturity of regional democracy may therefore be a good starting point for South Africa. A recent study of regional issues concluded that "upon such a foundation important initiatives (economic, among others) may be placed".[100] At the very least, political agreements will have to be reached if the doubts in the region about South Africa's post-apartheid intentions are to be alleviated. A key to this approach for South Africa will be developing a sense of "followership" in the region through policy

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[97] Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community, August 1992 (adopted at the SADC Summit, Windhoek).

[98] Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries, 1990; p. 5.

[99] Interviews at the DFA, May 1994.

[100] Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 12.

options "which allow South Africa to lead without dominating".[101]

Several possibilities present themselves. One suggestion is that South Africa can provide direction in the region by creating a "new morality" based on sensitivity to the needs of other countries.[102] This is based partially on the recognition that apartheid underdeveloped not only South Africa but also the region. In the past, the region's destabilising forces originated in South Africa; now, there is opportunity for constructive forces to emanate from the country. This might be advanced by initiating a regional security regime, beginning with a body to monitor gun-running and the arms trade; and a regionwide Court of Human Rights which would help create a culture of human rights in the region and promote common standards and values among member countries.[103]

Another suggestion is that South Africa can lead a drive towards a renewed SADC, proposing an additional political tier to the organisation - in effect, giving economic development a guiding political hand. Ultimately, given the clear need for regional development amidst vastly unequal economies and significant political instability, steps toward political cooperation among the region's leaders - even their parliamentarians - could prove to be an indispensable foundation.

As with security issues, regional cooperation will be framed by the extent to which South African policy recognises the region's complex interlinkages. Mozambique's development woes have been, and will continue to be, problematic for South Africa in many policy areas: foreign policy to be sure, but also in domestic areas like education, health, housing, and policing. Zimbabwe's struggling democracy will not only force malcontents southward but will also create political friction between a decreasingly accountable

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[101] ibid., p. 21.

[102] Interview, Dr. Robert Davies, MP (ANC), August 3, 1994.

[103] See Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern World" for additional policy options.

government there and South Africa's new democracy. And as long as Angola's conflict lasts, meaningful regionwide development will be put on hold.

Ultimately, the key to approaching regional policy is the idea that foreign and domestic policies are increasingly linked. South Africa's regional development strategies - or lack thereof - will profoundly affect its ability to deliver effective education, health care and housing to its own citizens. Seeing the region in these terms, it may turn out, is among the wisest interpretations of the country's 'national objectives'.

V. Fashioning a Global Identity: What Kind of Links?

As South Africa creates its regional policy it will also be fashioning a new global image, albeit under very different terms. On the global stage South Africa will be the junior partner in most relationships, an aspiring but struggling 'middle power' in a world economy dominated by heavyweights. It will need therefore, to proceed carefully and with even greater circumspection than in the region: at the region's crossroads South Africa will be in a position to call the shots, whereas the global transition is being managed by others and South Africa will wield relatively little leverage.

With the shift in international power away from the geo-political and the military, economic decisions on the global stage are increasingly important for any country and are more and more part of foreign policy. 'Maximising global linkages' for a country like South Africa is now primarily an economic endeavour.

An ANC foreign policy discussion paper acknowledges that

> trade and investment issues should be a cornerstone of our foreign policy...Gaining access to international know-how and new technology through participating in global trading and investment becomes a primary goal of our diplomacy".[104]

But for a middle or small power, the post bi-polar world is a tougher place than its predecessor. Whereas in the past, political alliance often brought economic favors, today's global marketplace gives no such rewards. Ten years ago, for example, a democratic South Africa might have been rewarded with favorable market conditions for its goods in western countries. Today, it will be

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[104] African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa", October 1993; p. 19.

granted few favors as it competes in a ruthless global economy with other emerging markets.

Defining an appropriate role for the state in faciltating global links will thus be critical. What level of government involvement is desirable and from whose point of view? Excessive state regulation, national ownership, and huge state bureaucracies, for instance, are well known for driving away international participation. On the other hand, the free market, when left alone, is a notably poor distributor of resources. The ANC argues that:

> reconstruction and development will be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in combination will lead to sustainable growth.[105]

Where, as a leader and an enabler, does the state intervene - to ensure positive global linkages and to minimise negative ones - and how does it do it?

As with security issues and regional development, making the most of global economic links will be complicated by the lingering uncertainties of domestic and global transition. What role will the state settle into? Which issues will help define the country's global links? What interests will emerge? A summary outline is provided below:

* Courting foreign investment and establishing appropriate guidelines for foreign firms operating in South Africa will be one such defining issue. The hostility that greeted transnational companies in many host companies in the 1970's and 1980's is now seen to have been excessive and mistaken.[106] Foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely acknowledged as a critical part of any

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[105] African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994; p. 78.

[106] Xavier Carim, "Some Trends in Foreign Direct Investment: Implications for South Africa", Working Paper Series, June 1994, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape; p. 2.

developing country's growth. A paper prepared by the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations summarises current attitudes toward TNC's and FDI:

> not many developing countries would now see the activities of TNC's as a threat to their sovereignty. (Some) countries..have been able to take advantage of TNC investment to increase employment, exports and government revenues, to improve living standards, and even to enhance their own national economic power. In particular, TNC inward investment, correctly handled, has proven to be an effective way of enhancing domestic management capacity and technological skills.[107]

Yet, 'correctly handling' TNC's and investment is not always, or ever, straightforward. Foreign investors are usually not beholden to any of the host country's national objectives and their profits are not always profits for the host country. They are usually opposed by a variety of domestic interest groups, especially trade unions. And lately, especially within the Uruguay Round of the GATT, TNC's have increased their efforts to restrict access to their technology, protecting their "intellectual property", and reflecting their desire "to exploit the fruits of their research and development more effectively".[108] The often competing goals of foreign investors and the host country suggest, one analyst says, the need for a "pragmatic and nuanced approach which recognises the diverse impact of TNC's on the host country and one that promotes active bargaining - and regulation of - TNC's to improve benefits for the host nation".[109]

Such a strategy could include arrangements concerning tax breaks, exchange controls, and in general an investor-friendly, stable macroeconomy provided by the host country; in return for labor training programmes, partnerships and joint ventures with black

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[107] ibid., p. 3.

[108] Alan Hirsch, "How to Attract Foreign Investment", Trade Policy Monitoring Project, University of Cape Town, May 1993; p. 3.

[109] Carim, "Some Trends in Foreign Direct Investment: Implications for South Africa", 1994; p. 5.

businesses, and in-country research and development sites offered by the international investor. It may also include such tradeoffs as assuring a foreign investor minimal trade union activity in a particular sector in return for a sizeable investment. Above all, the state should balance its role as the custodian of national objectives with the need to attract capital and investment through a market-friendly economy.

In short, economic benefit is now the most important criterion in attracting foreign investment. In a world free of cumbersome geo-political alliances, international investors have a far more expansive array of investment options, and emerging markets are now in greater competition for a limited amount of capital. This reality highlights the importance of a transparent and friendly investor policy, on top of a growing economy - as Heinz CEO and Argus newspaper magnate Tony O'Reilly observes, nobody yet is "breaking his neck to invest in South Africa. However noble they are, they have to protect their bottom line".[110]

* It is equally, if not more, important, as Theodore Moran's work on TNC's in Chile shows, to analyse external linkages

> as the outcome of the interplay of domestic groups trying to maximize their own particular interests as well as the larger national interest.[111]

It is no surprise, for example, that the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) vehemently opposes "the current trend of dogmatic adherence to rapid unplanned trade liberalisation" as it does also the "sale of any state assets which would impact negatively on the RDP".[112] Its continuing commitment to national

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[110] David Weld, "SA will determine its own future", Cape Times, October 10, 1994.

[111] Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974; p. 154.

[112] Sam Shilowa, Cosatu General Secretary, "RDP is the base", Finance Week, January 5-11, 1995; p. 11.

ownership however, pits it against a strong ANC-led faction in government which is increasingly serious about privatisation. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki revealed plans in mid-February for the partial privatisation, or "re-organisation" of state assets.[113] Equally predictable in this framework of competing domestic interests, is the general business view that, as Robert Schrire puts it, "if the Government is to deliver its promises to its key constituencies, it has to be fully incorporated into the global political economy".[114]

These contending viewpoints highlight what political analyst Steven Friedman suggests will become the new "order of the day": deals cut outside parliament made by the ANC, not with other political parties, but with important interest groups and most of all with organised business.[115] As the Financial Mail paraphrases, "these interest groups were phantoms at the Kempton Park opera, since only politicians came on stage there. But behind them are ranged the foreign industrialists who are potential investors in South Africa".[116]

Yet, the outcomes of these deals and contests will likely remain uncertain in the near future as interests adapt to the new domestic order and dividing lines on many issues are blurred. It is still often difficult to distinguish between rhetoric and substance, especially within the business, government, labor triangle. For example, few would actually advocate what Cosatu calls 'rapid unplanned' trade liberalisation. But what about 'slow, planned trade liberalisation', or the sale of state assets which impacts

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[113] Weekend Argus Business, "Its 'Go' for State sell-offs", February 18, 1995; p. 1.

[114] Robert Schrire, "Bumbling Along", Indicator SA, Spring 1994; p. 10.

[115] Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1995.

[116] Radford Jordan, "Charisma is not vision", Financial Mail, February 3, 1995; p. 47.

positively, rather than negatively, on the RDP? Such policies are widely seen as 'pragmatic' and Cosatu will not likely so strongly oppose them - especially when they are offered by its erstwhile ANC allies in government. Meanwhile, Deputy President Mbeki has added a populist tinge to privatisation, in effect covering his 'left' flank by suggesting methods which "could also facilitate the empowerment of disadvantaged sectors":

> Companies need not just be sold off to the highest bidder. Eastern Europe has shown how such sales can be used as a populist exercise. Shares could be reserved, say, for black insurance companies or trade-union pension funds, or sold directly to individual small investors.[117]

The underlying point is that dividing lines on many domestic contests have not yet solidified, something many foreign investors say must happen before they enter the market. Lingering domestic uncertainty thus can forestall investment (and along with it consistent economic growth), a possibility that further underscores the interlinkage of domestic and foreign affairs.

* Creating a transparent trade regime that enhances the flow of capital, technology and skills will be another key issue. In terms of South Africa's offer to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), it is committed to reducing tariff barriers to no more than 30%, or a third of present levels.[118] This, Anglo American Executive Director Bobby Godsell acknowledges, "poses probably the most fundamental competitiveness challenge industry here has faced this century".[119]

It will be a challenge to more than just industry. As the country opens up to the world economy, uncompetitive firms will no longer survive as they once did. Some South Africans will lose jobs, others will find jobs harder to come by. Business and trade unions

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[117] The Economist, "For Sale", November 5, 1995; p. 45.

[118] Bobby Godsell, "New Challenges", Indicator SA, Spring, 1994; p. 17.

[119] ibid., p. 17.

will see tariff reductions differently, as in general will the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'; joining the world economy may be seen in some quarters as a sell-out to 'the people'. But, the head of the World Bank mission in South Africa, Isaac Sam, put it this way:

> openness transmits technology and generates economic growth among nations. Many developing nations have been successful at borrowing proven technology and exploiting linkages with more advanced industrial countries to become major players in world markets....In fact, the supply of new technology for industrializing countries is largely determined by the degree to which they are integrated with the global economy.[120]

Maximising Global Linkages

Early experience in the post bi-polar world indicates that most developing countries should expect to "pull themselves up by their own bootstraps". Advanced countries are now competing with each other economically more fiercely than before, and with geo-politics no longer a top issue poorer countries will be left to develop on their own.

As South Africa begins its process of 'reconstruction and development' its economy has very little 'fresh' capital and it is competing for international investment with other emerging markets. It must seek to provide, much as countries like Singapore did and Thailand and Vietnam are now doing, a friendly environment for international investors and traders. Throughout this process, the state will need to define guidelines and balance competing interest groups both within the country and outside it. Crucially, the swift movement of the global market economy, the interlinkage between domestic and foreign policies, and its position as a semi-developed country in a tougher world, all mean that South Africa cannot afford missed chances to link with the global network.

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[120] Isaac Sam, "The New Partnership", speech before the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) July 1993.

CHAPTER III

The Policy Framework

I. Defining the Policy Framework

Policy outcomes, especially in a democracy, are always subject to the imprecise and often unpredictable dynamics of policy making structures. Arnold Wolfers notes that, "emotions and subconscious impulses are involved no less than rational calculations, theories about the outside world no less than images of other actors, stereotypes and myths and obsessions no less than reasoned expectations and creative hypotheses".[121]

A 'government of national unity' in particular gives rise to an exceptionally wide range of emotions, impulses, stereotypes and obsessions. Where else could long-time apartheid stalwarts be running government departments alongside former exiles? So, it makes sense to ask: How well equipped is South Africa's foreign policy framework to deal with the "double whammy"? What are the prospects of a coherent foreign policy emerging?

But before these questions can be answered, the 'policy framework'

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[121] Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; p. 43.

itself must be defined and another round of question must be asked. In a more interdependent, interconnected world, foreign policy has moved away from the realm of politics and traditional diplomacy toward economic, environmental, social and other various issues that now connect people and states more than before. South Africa's new Labour Minister, for example, is vitally involved in foreign policy, as is the Minister of Trade and Industry. The Eastern Transvaal Premier recently held talks with the Mozambican government in an effort to stem the immigration tide from that country across his province's borders. What is now left for a Department of Foreign Affairs is a smaller slice of the foreign policy pie.

How are the activities of various departments that participate in foreign policy to be coordinated? How will different interests be accommodated and prioritised. As with previous chapters, this one does not attempt answers. Its purpose is to provide policy makers and analysts with a menu of choices. The last chapter discussed three major policy issues. This chapter presents the parameters in which foreign policy debates and key decisions on these and other issues will be played out and considers the prospects for a coherent policy emerging.

II. Foreign Policy and Civil Society

In many democracies, an important part of such a policy framework is the various pressure groups outside the state that represent well-informed segments of society and which lobby for specific policies. Consider, for example, the role of The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) or Randall Robinson's Transafrica in swaying the United States government to impose sanctions on South Africa. As is the benefit of a vibrant civil society, pressure groups can often bring their interests to bear on policymaking.

In South Africa however, civil society is rebuilding and interest

groups are still defining their priorities as the political landscape stabilises. Though it is clear that interests have changed and re-ordered, it is unclear which will now be pre-eminent. In the past white interests came before black, capital came before labour, and agriculture was given preference to industry. Now, though organised labor may have far more influence on policy than before, as do 'black interests' in general, most groups have been slow to perceive exactly where their interests lie and how to most effectively organise around key issues.

Cosatu provides a good example. It is opposed to "rapid unplanned trade liberalisation", but where does it stand on gradually reducing barriers, slowly joining the world economy, and gaining international technology, all of which are widely seen as necessary steps if a growing economy is to be achieved and popular demands are to be met? As with the wider ANC alliance, Cosatu is struggling to redefine its liberation movement ethos to fit a more responsible society-building role; and as with its former allies now in government it is also struggling to maintain and redefine its constituency. Business interests, meanwhile, have maintained much of their influence by aligning themselves with segments of the ANC ruling elite.

In short, though the terrain on foreign policy issues is now contested, as in other policy areas, by a new range of public concerns, it is far from clear that those interests which are 'newly empowered' will emerge victorious. South African politics remains very fluid: positions are forming and reforming, new lines are being drawn and new interests are emerging. It takes time for public groups to acclimate to a changed and still uncertain political arena, to perceive where their interests are, and to apply pressure for specific policies.

These transitional bumps in the road are made acute by the fact that no clear mandate exists on foreign policy issues. Unlike housing, education or health care, where the livelihood of millions of South Africans depends on government delivery, foreign policy

decisions contain few direct, tangible influences. This is combined with the fact that international issues over the past five decades found very little interest or understanding among the South African public. The narrow limits of apartheid defined and dominated South Africa's worldview, its advocates defending the system to the world, and its opponents mobilizing international opinion against it. Only a very small cadre of individuals - some in government and the liberation movements, and the others, a limited group of academics and a segment of the media - were thinking about international issues, and then only as these issues were defined by the struggle to either defend or end apartheid. Outside of these efforts, relatively little thought was generated about world affairs. As Peter Vale says, "understanding and interpreting the world are not established South African pastimes".[122]

This paucity of thinking on international affairs bodes poorly for widespread societal debate and public scrutiny of policy making. It means that until such education and media efforts can heighten public awareness, foreign policy debates will take place primarily within the confines of the state.

III. Transition and the Department of Foreign Affairs

Within the state, the DFA will be one player among several conducting foreign policy. Foreign policy issues, more than before, now encompass the activities of many different departments, and segments within them, and a wider range of competing interests will thus be brought to the fore. The Department of Defence, for instance, will be more likely to advocate a hard-line approach to regional issues, while Foreign Affairs may take a broader view. Likewise, the Labor Ministry will see investment issues and tradeoffs differently than the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In the context of South Africa's fluid political landscape, many of these positions and interests are still unclear. The ability of the

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[122] Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers, and Leanness", 1994; p. 8.

DFA therefore, to adapt to a new, more consultative, delierative role will be a crucial element in the emergence of coherent policy.

This transition will depend heavily on itsability to merge into its new ranks opposing international traditions - the "upstairs" and the "downstairs" of South Africa's international experience.[123] In the apartheid era, while the government was conducting official - upstairs - foreign policy, the liberation movements, notably the ANC and the PAC, conducted their own form of international relations, the downstairs, specifically geared to sway international opinion against the apartheid government. Two separate foreign policies were in motion, each with divergent methodologies emanating from vastly different 'South African' experiences. Official policy used closed-door, behind-the-scenes, and almost exclusively bi-lateral strategies; while the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, practised an open and multilateral approach. Government policy was staunchly anti-communist; "downstairs" policy found its most reliable allies in the Marxist-Leninist world.

The dual process of South Africa's diplomatic history has been masked, Peter Vale suggests, by the conventional understanding that foreign relations is mostly about governments - in fact, "it is chiefly about relations between people".[124] As these two traditions now merge under the provisions of South Africa's interim constitution, which preserves the continuation of public servant posts, each brings to the table vastly different world views, methodologies and histories. The level of consensus that is achieved between them therefore, will determine the DFA's ability to reconceptualise South Africa's foreign relations. It is important therefore, to briefly describe each of them.

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[123] Peter Vale, "Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs", 1993, unpublished mimeo.

[124] ibid., p. 3.

The Upstairs

Upstairs foreign relations was increasingly imprisoned by the domestic policy of apartheid. The South African state's well-documented drift toward diplomatic isolation was inevitable as the National Party government steadily lost international recognition.[125] As a consequence it rarely had the opportunity to practice multilateral diplomacy. Though it maintained bilateral links with twenty countries, the intensity and warmth of these were mixed.[126] Relations with other pariah states, Chile and Israel for example, were warm, as they were with Taiwan. With the West, "upstairs" South Africa had an increasingly fractious relationship. Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain saw South Africa to varying degrees as a buffer against the southward expansion of Marxism. But it is likely that "upstairs" policy makers overemphasised, or overplayed, South Africa's strategic value to the West. Much was made for example of the supposed importance of South African minerals, of the Cape sea route, and of the government's zealous anti-communism. In varying degrees at various times, these were important to the West; but leveraging these factors could not sustain a working relationship with the West as the deteriorating public situation became highly publicised.

By the mid-1980's public opinion in the United States became the driving force behind the imposition of US sanctions against South Africa; and by 1989, twenty-seven percent of Britons boycotted all South African goods.[127] South Africa became the most isolated country on earth and the circles of "upstairs" foreign policy closed steadily inward. Downstairs diplomacy, as will be seen, can be credited with much of the leg-work around the drive for sanctions.

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[125] ibid., p. 4.

[126] ibid., p. 4.

[127] ibid., p. 3.

African region, was no less narrow in focus, though it was more adventurist and indeed, militarist. Bi-lateral non-aggression pacts were made with Mozambique and Swaziland; the only other official relationship was with Malawi's dictator Kamuzu Banda.[128] From the mid-1970's onward, "the conduct of regional policy was the domain of South Africa's powerful military".[129] The concept of "forward-defence" lay behind what became known, infamously, as "Total Strategy" - a response to the alleged communist, "total", onslaught against South Africa being launched from neighbouring countries with the aid of northern benefactors. The result, Peter Vale writes, was that "by the mid-1980's, the distinction between "hawks" and "doves" in the making of regional policy had largely disappeared...security issues began to crowd South Africa's foreign policy agenda".[130] All part of Total Strategy were South Africa's support of Renamo in Mozambique, its 'reconnaissance' forays into Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and its military involvement in the Angolan conflict.

The Downstairs

It is a misconception - indeed, a gross oversight - to conclude that the state's history is the extent of South Africa's international experience. "Downstairs" diplomacy, writes one historian, "has a long, enduring history (which) is as old as that of the South African state; and in certain respects it has been a more successful history".[131] In 1909 a delegation from the Cape Colony and Natal visited London to protest the exclusion of the country's majority in the soon to be formed Union of South Africa; another delegation visited London in 1914 to protest the passing of the Land Act; and at Versailles, representatives of South

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[128] ibid., p. 4.

[129] ibid., p. 5.

[130] ibid., p. 5.

[131] Colin Bundy in Peter Vale, ibid., p. 5.

Africa's disenfranchised sought to "reverse the entire trend of Native policy".[132] By the end of World War II

> the formation of the United Nations and the deepening movement towards decolonisation placed the downstairs tradition on two tracks: internal resistance and external support. They were to feed upon each other in a dramatic fashion and would come to combine elements of political pressure, boycott, and a war of national liberation".[133]

Most important, downstairs links with Africa were extensive. In 1960 the ANC established an external mission in Lesotho, the PAC one in Tanzania. Throughout the following decades downstairs exiles resided in guerilla camps and operated from missions all over Southern Africa; indeed, not an easy contribution for many home governments to make, especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe, when "upstairs" South Africa was so determined to prevent guerilla activity in the region.[134]

Downstairs diplomacy found its most significant achievements ironically, in the very West whose values the upstairs claimed to be defending. By the mid-1980's South Africa's exiled leadership enjoyed what amounted to a government-in-exile status in Europe and North America. The Anti-Apartheid Movement was a strident voice in every major Western capital. In the US, by 1991 "30 states, 120 cities and 150 universities had passed sanctions laws against South Africa".[135] One ANC leader remarked of these successes that, "we were never isolated, we could go almost anywhere; it was Pretoria that was shut out.[136]

At the core of these different diplomatic histories are vastly different approaches to the world. As the cancer of apartheid grew,

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[132] ibid., p. 5.

[133] ibid., p. 6.

[134] ibid., p. 7

[135] ibid., p. 7.

[136] ibid., p. 7.

the two fell more clearly on opposite sides of the historical process: the upstairs fervently, and finally frantically, trying to stem the rise of international opinion and action against apartheid; the downstairs marching inexorably forward in swaying international thinking. Upstairs policy gradually developed an insularism that increased with South Africa's pariah status. Foreign policy became a method of defence; security issues dominated strategy; and a 'beggar thy neighbours' approach was adopted, both economically and militarily, to ensure South African dominance in the region. Downstairs policy on the other hand developed an open approach; its cause became an international cause and it sought wide audiences; and there was a feeling that history would, in time, reward its efforts.

Merging these traditions therefore presents several practical problems. For one, South Africa's interim constitution is ambiguous about the reorganisation of the civil service. Clearly, effective new policies cannot be implemented by an unchanged civil service; at the same time, the interim Constitution provides for serving public servants to continue in employment until such laws passed under the new Parliament change their status.[137] Most departments are therefore integrating new public servants with the old. At the DFA, for example, though 310 members of the ANC's DIA were to have been integrated within several months of the May 1994 inauguration, this process has proved far slower than expected.[138]

Furthermore, neither tradition has really come to terms with the significant changes in the world in the past five years. Understanding global trends was secondary to the intense dynamics of 'negotiating the revolution'. For most of the early 1990's, both sides used foreign policy, sanctions in particular, as a pawn in

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[137] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 236: "Transitional Arrangements: Public Administration".

[138] I was given this figure during a private interview at the DFA in May 1994; several months later, only a handful ANC DIA members had been integrated.

the domestic game. Peter Vale suggests that "both the upstairs and the downstairs were impoverished by their peculiar understandings of international relations and the unique ways in which they were forced to operate". The upstairs of course was bound more tightly by its excessively inward view; but the downstairs also was heavily focused on issues that concerned the immediate dismntling of apartheid. Even its more open approach provided its diplomats only limited multilateral experience.

IV. Some Defining Issues

Several specific policy issues highlight the emotional and conceptual gaps between these merging traditions. Regional policy is one. Given their vastly divergent approaches to the region in the past, the degree to which the upstairs and downstairs can reach consensus regarding South Africa's neighbours will be critical. Clearly, regional policy is of special concern for the ANC. A foreign policy discussion paper says:

> we have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid...The region sustained us during our struggle and our destiny is intertwined with the region; our peoples belong with each other. Southern Africa is, therefore, a pillar upon which South Africa's foreign policy rests.[139]

The extent therefore, to which it can convince other elements of the foreign policy structure to follow its lead will be decisive.

At a theoretical level there is some basis for optimism. Upstairs remnants at the DFA have been candid about the need to develop the region, some speaking of the need to hold "talk-shops aimed at developing better channels of communication", others of creating

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[139] African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa", October 1993; p. 10.

"a more results-oriented form of regional multilateralism".[140] In Parliament as well, members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs across the politial spectrum appear committed to the idea of regional development.[141]

In practice however, differences will arise. The upstairs portion of the DFA is more likely to advocate a cautious approach in the region, taking time to "get our own house in order first". It may also be more apt to resist forms of integration which would contractually bind South Africa, preferring instead a more laissez-faire approach. This may be at odds with more activist downstairs proposals. But even the ANC is unsure, as a whole, what level of involvement and which methods are appropriate. As in other policy areas, there is a noticeable split in the organisation between "pragmatists" and "idealists", between those who see scarce resources as a limitation and those who see them as an inconvenience. Thus, the most noticeable aspect of the 'new' Soth Africa's regional policy, unfortunately, is a lack of vision from any section of the policy community.

Illegal immigration will be another sensitive issue. The upstairs will be less inclined to see security in the inclusive, "us and us", manner of the term, and will likely push, as was suggested at the DFA, for more "stringent influx control".[142] Because of its historic links with the region, the downstairs will be less willing to act strongly against illegal immigration. This raises important questions. How will policy makers weigh long-term goals like regional development with short-term ones like stemming crime and a rising underclass that come from an underdeveloped region? How will the ANC balance its emotional sentiments with the practicalities of scarce resources and the responsibilities of governing?

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[140] Interviews, DFA, May 1994.

[141] Interviews, Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 1994.

[142] Interview, DFA, May 1994.

Other issues will also test the coherence of the policy framework. South Africa's relations with Cuba, for one, has become the emotional bellwether for upstairs/downstairs relations. Does the new South Africa see Castro as an historic ally who made a valuable contribution to the fight against apartheid, and on these grounds support Cuba against the US blockade of the island? Or, does South Africa sympathise with Cuba but be careful not to antagonise the United States? How does South Africa weigh offending the United States against offending Cuba? The prevailing downstairs view appears to be that

> South Africa should certainly stand by Cuba for old time's sake, out of an honorable acknowledgement of the immense contribution Cubans made to the struggle against apartheid. Morality, after all, should be a part foreign policy.[143]

But how far can morality take a foreign policy, especially in a post-Cold War, economically-driven world? Similarly, how should South Africa approach the delicate issue of relations with China and Taiwan? Here, China demands that South Africa sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan if it wants to establish them with China. The lines on this issue are also drawn: the National Party is against breaking ties with Taiwan[144], with whom South Africa's trade was valued at R4.2billion in 1993 compared to R1.6billion with China[145]; while the ANC alliance appears to lean toward China. A document circulating in the foreign ministry earlier this year apparently showed "a clear and decisive swing away from Taipei"[146], but this is in spite of a major Taiwanese effort - a "big sell" involving paid trips and gifts for South African parliamentarians

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[143] Jeremy Cronin, SACP Central Committee and ANC National Executive, "Morality is an integral part of a foreign policy", The Star, August 1994.

[144] "official National Party view", interview with B.L. Geldenhuys, MP (NP), Foreign Affairs Committee, November 3, 1994.

[145] Gaye Davis, "MP's feted with Taiwan holidays", The Weekly Mail, February 3, 1994; p. 4. Statistics released by the Commissioner of Customs and Excise.

[146] Peter Vale, "A diplomatic dilemma: One China or the other?", The Weekly Mail, February 10, 1995; p. 28.

- to ensure its relationship with South Africa.[147] According to one SACP member, resolving the matter

> could only be through recognising China and maintaining a relationship with Taiwan on a largely economic basis...It would be a coup for Taiwan if it succeeded in getting dual recognition or continued recognition.[148]

Again, is there a 'moral' approach? How much can intense lobbying, both internal and external, shift preferences?

Yet consensus on other issues may be a beacon for those in which the battle lines are still drawn. Consider the rapprochement over attitudes toward international financial institutions. As it has in domestic economics, the ANC has greatly moderated its view of international capital, reflecting new measures of pragmatism. As one member (DP) of the Foreign Affairs Committee said of his colleagues, "we have starting point differences rather than finishing point differences..the reality of capital flow in our world necessitates a certain friendliness to market conditions".[149] South Africa has not, for example, joined Zimbabwe's harsh criticisms of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.[150]

This apparent consensus on a major policy issue is a positive indication that a coherent foreign policy framework may be emerging. But these are still early days. As intense exchanges on other issues like Cuba show, the upstairs and downstairs can still be miles apart. This highlights the reality that debates beyond the Cold War, apartheid-era matrix are still to come.

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[147] Davis, "MPs feted with Taiwan holidays", p. 4.

[148] Raymond Suttner, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, in Davis, "MP's feted with Taiwan holidays"; p. 4.

[149] Interview, Colin Eglin MP (DP), November 4, 1994.

[150] Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe blasted the institutions in a speech before the South African Parliament last year and urged South African to join Zimbabwe's criticism.

V. Concluding Thoughts on the Policy Framework

The jury on the emergence of an effective policy framework therefore, is still out. Public interests have not yet organised around specific issues to pressure state policy. As such, most debates will be left to government bureaucrats, themselves competing on new and still uncertain terrain. As Robert Schrire says, "public policy is rarely, if ever, based exclusively upon technocratic expertise and theoretical knowledge. Objectives such as getting re-elected, rewarding allies and punishing opponents are often more important in shaping policy than 'neutral' (economic) objectives".[151]

Bureaucracies - and bureaucratic thinking - change slowly and South Africa's is no exception. New thinking may be optimal, but this will take time, and will be opposed by entrenched, protected interests; in the short term then, the ability of contending groups within the policy making structure to reach consensus and compromise on major issues will be of paramount importance. There are already indications - general agreement on the need for regional development and for international (institutional) financial assistance are examples - that such agreement can be reached.

More fundamentally, conceptual gaps between the "upstairs" and "downstairs" will only be resolved when foreign relations and the diplomatic service are de-politicized. To this end, an independent, non-partisan diplomatic training course or school should be established whose purpose would be to recruit South Africans of all backgrounds and prepare them for international service based on a

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[151] Robert Schrire, Wealth or Poverty: Critical Choices for South Africa, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992; p. 7.

carefully constructed curriculum of the 'South African experience'.[152] Clearly, merging these traditions will only make real progress when their respective visions of South Africa and the world look more like one another, and this ultimately depends on the long-term levelling of the country's socio-economic inequalities. In the medium term such a school would help rationalise and re-structure the way South Africa's international leaders think about their country and the world.

In the immediate term, policy makers should understand that foreign policy is a broader, and less easily managed undertaking than in the past - a collective public and private endeavor over which it has less and less direct control. Its crucial role will be as a coordinator and as a leader, providing both a direction and transparent policies for other actors to follow.

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[152] Such a school was originally proposed at a 1992 conference, "South Africa and the World: A New Vision" convened by the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Southern African Studies of the University of the Western Cape.

Chapter IV

Reconceptualising South Africa's Foreign Relations: Prospects for the Future

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I. Facing the Challenge

Two highly unusual and simultaneous events combine to make the final years of the twentieth century a particularly challenging period for South African foreign policy. The country's own negotiated revolution and the disintegration of the global bi-polar system have completely altered the context in which foreign policy is debated and indeed made. As traditional assumptions about South Africa and the world crumble away however, new parameters have been slow to emerge. Foreign policy debates in the 'new' South Africa have not yet moved into a post-apartheid, post-Cold War arena; the country's "upstairs" and "downstairs" traditions have not yet synthesised, let alone reconciled, their past experiences; and key public interests have not yet been pulled into the policy or 'information' realm.

As this paper has repeatedly argued, charting new territory for South Africa's foreign policy requires understanding the most important implications of both domestic and global change. How policy makers understand these dual transitions ultimately affects the options they perceive and the decisions they make. This concluding chapter summarises these changes and their implications and outlines several policies that will help build a reconceptualisation of South Africa's foreign policy.

Adapting to Global Trends

New trends in the world have changed the way states and people interact. Liberal political and economic values have spread rapidly and have helped create the global marketplace, where goods, services and information are exchanged with growing ease. At the same time, new transnational security issues are replacing traditional state-centred paradigms. Thus, even as some forces are binding people together in unprecedented ways, others are fragmenting states and societies.

For weak states, a rapidly changing and still uncertain world is a frightening place. The world economy in general, and tariff and trade rules and investment standards in particular, are governed by others, and states like South Africa will have little recourse on such issues but to adapt to global trends. In addition, with end of superpower competition, individual states in the developing world will be increasingly self-reliant in meeting defence requirements. For some states, often undemocratic ones, this will mean larger defense budgets. For many other states, including South Africa, political and social pressure against increasing defense expenditures means that security will have to be ensured in alternative, less costly ways.

With these trends in the political and economic make-up of the world, most states will have to 're-invent' their foreign policies. The rise of economic and information-based power means that efficiency and productivity, rather than military brawn, will characterise tomorrow's successful societies. And because new security threats are predominantly transnational in character, individual states, on their own, will be less able to neutralise them. These changes should translate into the following policies for South Africa:

* active participation in international disarmament and non-proliferation talks, including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty;

* efforts to strengthen international law and the World Court of Justice;

* efforts to increase the UN's peacekeeping capacity, with a view in particular to giving it more military capabilities.

These options allow South Africa to seek security collectively and minimise defense costs. President Mandela's moral leadership gives South Africa an opportunity to act with greater force and conviction than its status as a weak 'middle power' would otherwise allow it. Furthermore, foreign policy should explicitly recognise the economic power of private citizens, corporations, and non-governmental agencies in the world marketplace by:

* empowering domestic firms and individuals to tap into the global marketplace, as well as allowing international actors to operate efficiently in the domestic market;

* reducing barriers to international business transactions. The scrapping of the dual currency system is a positive signal, and should be followed by the gradual dismantling of exchange controls;

* considering creative ways of making South Africa an attractive investment location for foreign funds. Seeking ways to minimise labour disputes and strike activity, perhaps in sectors specially pin-pointed for foreign investment, are short-term measures while improving productivity and training opportunities are important longer term goals.

Amidst the uncertainty of global transition, it is clear that states and peoples will be increasingly connected, in both positive and negative ways, to their international surroundings. Understanding these linkages is a critical step toward re-inventing South Africa's foreign policy.

Building a Regional Foundation

Regional relations will prove to be the most important - and so far have been the most vexing - aspect of South Africa's new foreign policy. One year ago, South Africa's re-entry into the international community was met with a great deal of enthusiasm in the region, mixed with a small dose of fear that South Africa would unfairly dominate regional relations. Unfortunately, pandering to these concerns has led to inaction at a time when the region has been crying out for leadership and vision. What, for example, has happened to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since South Africa joined the organisation with great fanfare last August? And what progress has been made on illegal immigration, unarguably one of South Africa's and the region's greatest problems? Policy makers must recognise that South Africa has a unique opportunity to operate with flexibility and vision in the region. Unlike its position on the global stage, South Africa can call the shots here. It is therefore incumbent upon the government of national unity to develop a suitably visionary regional policy - one that moves beyond the (sadly) often hollow calls for greater 'regional cooperation'. Such a policy should be based on the following principles:

* That security in the region is inextricably linked to development. A decaying region will place huge burdens on the livelihoods of South Africans;

* That regional, not national, solutions should therefore be sought for major problems which countries of the region share, including crime, the drug-trade, gun-smuggling, and poverty and underdevelopment;

* That regional political cooperation - an 'aligning of mindsets' - is a critical foundation for these solutions, yet one that will be hollow without concrete mechanisms to alleviate real problems. Harmonising regional labor laws; coordinating regional energy needs and goals; building a

regional peacekeeping force; and protecting the region's natural resources are all initiatives that need consideration;

* That governments should not dominate regional development initiatives but rather provide a framework within which private enterprise can operate. Regional governments should pave the way by reducing transaction barriers, minimising regulations and providing clear signals about the goals they envision;

* That the region can make unique contributions to global debates on issues ranging from investment in developing economies and nature and wildlife conservation to preserving traditional forms of art and culture;

* That the region as a whole, not simply South Africa, should be seen as a bridge to the rest of the continent;

* That an adequate regional policy will be driven only by reconceptualising relationships between the region's states and their people; the role of government; and the meaning and methods of security.

These principles will be tested on several issues, perhaps notably on illegal immigration. Another test may come on the fate of a regional electricity grid which was recently proposed at a sub-Saharan Oil and Minerals conference in Johannesburg. How fully policy makers envision the connection between regional electrification, development, and security; and in what ways they facilitate the operation of groups like Southern African Development through Electrification (Sadelec) will indicate the degree to which policy makers envision the interlinkages of a post-Cold War, post-apartheid region.

Integrating Domestic Characteristics

Forging a new international identity will also require new thinking about South Africa. As in the world around it, South Africa's political landscape is being transformed. Old assumptions no longer work. But new paradigms have been slow to emerge and foreign policy is caught, momentarily, in a void between the old and the new. This void is characterised, above all, by a society struggling to find common ground among its many components.

To recall, domestic transition has been simultaneously dramatic and minimal. The change in government and executive leadership, the style and composition of Parliament, upliftment policies for the poor and previously disenfranchised, and society's new openness, are all major departures from the past. Yet, many other aspects of political society haven't changed. The civil service has remained intact, business and the private sector remain enormously powerful, and lifestyles for the well-off have generally been unaffected by political change. That change has not come to all areas of South African life equally, or at all, is neither entirely bad nor good; it means simply that South Africa remains a land of many differences, and therefore of many competing interests. As UWC professor Peter Vale reminds us, "South Africa has not a single, but multiple personality traits to the identity it seeks".

Yet these traits require a basic level of cohesion and this, to simplify, is what post-apartheid foreign relations have so far lacked. The ANC and NP international traditions operate in completely different worlds; government, business and labor share few visions about South Africa and the world; and public interests remain largely uniformed and uninterested in international affairs. Erecting a 'big tent' under which all the various actors involved in foreign relations recognise similar points of reference, share similar assumptions, and are privy to the same information would therefore be the goals of the following:

* The appointment of a National Foreign Relations Council,

headed by a Presidential Advisor, in the President's Office whose mandate would be to a.) coordinate foreign relations activities among various government departments, and b.) to serve as an in-house 'think-tank' for government foreign policy and strategy. Based on the US model, the appointment of such a Council would be the first step in reconceptualising foreign policy making as a much broader, far-reaching undertaking than in the past. The Council would be more flexible and multidisciplinary than the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and would enable the country, via the President's office, to respond effectively to rapid changes in the world.

Several elements of the current policy framework highlight the need for a more flexible, accountable strategising body. First, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is widely seen to oversee the country's foreign policy, though behind closed doors. The Council would recognise that quick responses are best formed under the more extensive reaches of the (Deputy) President's Office (as opposed to the DFA), but that these policies must be accountable to the public. Such a Council would formalise the role of the President's Office in foreign policy, thereby opening the door to public scrutiny.

Furthermore, the current juncture requires a complete reconceptualisation of South Africa's international identity, a task the DFA has so far undertaken with little enthusiasm. Part of the Council's mandate would be to develop new strategies, principles and guidelines for South Africa's foreign relations, an undertaking for which the DFA, to be fair, is simply too unwieldy.

* An information campaign to educate South Africans on global political and economic trends as well as on their own government's foreign policy. The campaign would be two-pronged: first, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) should be reformulated as an information and

policy monitoring centre. Because it has traditionally been excluded from policy circles SAIIA has developed an insular approach to South Africa's foreign relations; a restructuring of the Institute should broaden its focus and give it a greater policy orientation. Much like the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) acts as a link between the democratic process and the public by monitoring government policy, a renewed SAIIA would bridge a similar gap between international information and the South African public. Second, the government itself should also routinely brief key decision makers and opinion formers in the media, in labor, and in business through either newsletters or press conferences concerning the state's foreign policy.

At the core of providing information about foreign policy and international affairs is the understanding that global events in so many ways affect daily, domestic lives. In a smaller, ever-interlinked world, re-educating South Africans about the world outside may be as important an endeavor as IDASA's mission to bring democracy to the people.

* The establishment of a university-level school for international and diplomatic training. It would specifically recruit students from all South African backgrounds and its curriculum would allow students to study and train overseas. Such a school would seek to provide South Africa's future international leaders similar training and an opportunity to weave together many different 'South African experiences'.

Foreign policy in South Africa suffers most from the limited circle of strategists and interests that influence policy. Unlike almost all other government departments in the 'new' South Africa, foreign policy has not yet become a public concern, and therefore the full breadth of South Africa's characteristics are not brought to bear on policy. Forging a new and truly South African international identity will thus only occur when new mechanisms are created to widen the scope of foreign relations and the reach of international

information.

South Africa: A Natural Peacebroker

As policy makers seek stable ground amidst the shifting terrain, a natural step would be to consider South Africa's unique capacities for contribution in a 'new world order'. Above all, South Africa's transition has been hailed as a victory of rational moderation over skewed extremism. Negotiation, compromise and consensus building have been the hallmarks of a remarkable 'revolution', and have made South Africa a beacon of hope for democracy and economic revival in a world full of democratic and development failures. This standing, enhanced by the near universal respect in which the world holds its leader, provides South Africa a natural platform as a broker of international peace and goodwill.

Policy makers should thus consider creating a permanent team of mediation experts made up of peace monitors, domestic activists, and community leaders to be sent to world trouble spots, particularly in Africa. With grass-roots experience in South Africa, such a team may be more appropriate and effective for conflicts like Rwanda than high-powered, Western-oriented diplomatic missions.

As it has already done to some effect in Angola and Mozambique therefore, South Africa should continue to imbue old rivalries with fresh thinking. By pushing the right diplomatic buttons, South Africa should seek to maintain relations with Taiwan and establish them with Beijing. It should press Cuba on human rights, and urge dialogue with the United States, even while it opposes the US embargo. In the Middle East, South Africa should seek full diplomatic and economic relationships with both Israel and surrounding Arab states. In sum, South Africa has a vested interest in not choosing sides in the world's diplomatic arguments; but instead of passively playing the middle-of-the-road, South Africa has a unique opportunity to influence positive outcomes. Its own

transcendence of past differences carries enormous weight on the world stage, for the time being, and policy makers should use this dwindling asset to South Africa's, and the world's, benefit.

Concluding Remarks

Recognising the opportunities that await a new foreign policy requires vision. Creating appropriate policy responses demands political will. It is perhaps understandable that these together have not yet permeated the policy framework, for the new South Africa's first year had more urgent requirements. But the grace period is drawing to a close. In a world where foreign and domestic affairs are so closely linked, South Africa cannot afford to keep blindly feeling its way through international relations.

Like all other policy areas in the new South Africa, foreign policy suffers from the legacy of the past. Decisive, visionary action will only occur when fresh thinking about a 'new' South Africa in a 'new' world rises to challenge old routines and old mechanisms. This paper has sought to make a contribution towards this reconceptualisation.

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