

THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GARMENT MANUFACTURING

INDUSTRY : 1968 - 1986

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by

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ABSTRACT

Industrial Relations theory presents a dualism of approaches to explanation, that is of Subjective and Objective paradigms of explanation. Utilising Giddensian Structuration theory, a Structuration theory of industrial relations is developed and utilised to bridge the epistemological divide. Structuration theory is then utilised to establish the ontological character of collective bargaining for three regions of the South African Garment Manufacturing Industry. This 'character' is shown to be encapsulated in the notion of maintaining a high level of managerial prerogative. The managerial prerogative has been maintained and perpetuated by the lack of militancy on the part of the Unions, and an explanation of the observed lack of militancy is provided by the examination of action around the bargaining in the respective industrial councils.

INTRODUCTION

"The theoretical and ontological assumptions of the system and ethnomethodological approaches are unbridgeable in any conventional industrial relations paradigm" (1)

Explanation in the social sciences presents an epistemological divide, a dualism of subjective-objective explanatory systems. Industrial Relations as a field of study identified with the social sciences presents a similar epistemological divide; this thesis suggests a 'Structuration' theory of industrial relations, based on the work of Anthony Giddens, aimed at bridging the epistemological divide.

The first chapter reviews explanation in industrial relations, identifies consensus of the existence of the 'epistemological divide', the dominance of Dunlopian systems theory, and provides a critique of Dunlop whilst at the same time suggesting the retention of aspects of Dunlop's model of explanation.

Chapter Two introduces the reader to collective bargaining in South Africa. A review of the historical conditions of collective bargaining is provided and particular attention is paid to the Industrial Conciliation Act and its various amendments. The political context is supplemented with a description of the economic context and the growth of the garment industry is also provided. This allows for a discussion of collective bargaining in the garment industry and the issue of an observed lack of militancy is established.

Chapter Three is devoted to the explanation and development of a 'Structuration' theory. Structure is reformulated to be prior to 'Form' and is out of time and space, and is characterised as Rules and Resources. Rules can be classified as rules of Signification and rules of Legitimation, and resources by way of facilities of Domination. The identification of Structure - in terms of Signification, Domination and Legitimation provide a cross-sectional description of an action context, the longitudinal understanding is to be found in the modalities of structuration. These are identified as the individual's 'interpretive scheme', the 'facility' through which control over resources is exercised and norms which are exhibited in interaction, power and sanctions respectively. Structure, as reformulated, is a core feature of the knowledge of social action held by the social actor. At the same time it is external to the actor and as will be argued, represents a duality thus bridging the epistemological divide. An evaluation/critique of structuration theory is also provided and the point is made that (at very least), it provides a means of describing the ontological character of social action, in this case of collective bargaining in the clothing industry.

The presentation of a duality of structure will have methodological issues and these are dealt with in Chapter Four. In the development of a structuration theory of industrial relations, Giddens' psychology of the social actor is argued to present epistemological problems which structuration theory wishes to overcome. In attempting to maintain the integrity of the duality at the psychological level, Kelly's Personal Construct theory is substituted. Construct theory fits in easily to the other principles of

structuration theory and provides a ready mechanism for classifying the interpretive scheme of the actor. Structure can then be identified from 'form' of social action as well as the interpretive scheme (constructs) of the actors; it must be emphasized, however, that this separation is for analytical purposes only. The duality of structure requires such a proviso but also means that structure deduced from these sources must be identical.

In introducing Personal Construct theory as a psychological mechanism which contributes to the understanding of the reasons for the lack of militancy, it became necessary to review social psychological contributions to the understanding of collective bargaining. Such a review is also provided in Chapter Four.

The purpose of Chapters Five, Six and Seven is to present data which are utilised to describe the structure of each region. The identification of such structure then represents an explanation of action in each region. Each chapter has two major sections, that of Part A, which presents data on 'Form', and Part B, which presents data utilised to establish the 'interpretive scheme' of the social actors; structure - as reformulated - is described in the concluding section of each of the regional chapters.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven establish the ontological character of collective bargaining in each region. This character is then examined and an explanation of the lack of militancy is arrived at from regional data. Each chapter also contains a structuration theory explanation of the lack of militancy in the regional union(s) and addresses (again in structuration theory terms) how such behaviour was sustained over the review period of this thesis.

In Chapter Eight the threads of the debates as found in Chapters Four, Five and Six and Seven are drawn together and an explanation of action in the Garment Manufacturing Industry of South Africa is provided.

The thesis, it is suggested, contributes in three significant ways. Firstly, it proposes a model of explanation aimed at making one of the dualism of explanatory positions found in industrial relations theory, and allows the establishing of the ontological character of social action, and secondly, it presents recent data on action in the Garment Manufacturing industry of South Africa which has not previously been available; and finally, it provides an explanation of the 'essential nature' of collective bargaining in the Garment Manufacturing industry, i.e. the maintenance of a high level of managerial prerogative and the concomitant lack of militancy on the part of the regional unions.

Reference

1. Poole, Michael Theories of Trade Unionism, a Sociology of Industrial Relations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984 (Revised edition), p.40.

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CHAPTER 1

THE DUALISM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS1.1 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS - THE BEGINNINGS

The treatment of labour by classical economists can be viewed as the spur that laid the foundations to what is today referred to as the discipline of industrial relations. Labour was conceptualised as 'merely' one of the factors of production and is subject to the general laws of economics as any of the other factors (1).

The first major critique of this approach came from Marx who argued against what he called "commodity fetishism" (2). Kochan (3) argues that Marxism "provided an entirely different set of normative assumptions". Firstly, labour should not "be expected to live with the consequences of the market economy", secondly, within capitalist society conflicts of interest were class based, thirdly, negotiations between labour and management were but short term ameliorations and fourthly, it was only with the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and the substitution with a socialist society that the conflict would be resolved. Marx also gave a centrality of importance to labour in the historical analysis of societies and in so doing elevated it from 'merely' another commodity. In addition, as Keat and Urry (4) clarify, Marx noted the interrelatedness of social phenomena as well as "things", thus "It is the relations between the central social constituents that determine the functions that things perform within that mode". Keat and Urry further point to Marx's rejection of the argument for "natural economic laws which are applicable to all societies" (5). There are no general laws of economic life which are independent of given historical structures.

Unlike Marx, Sidney and Beatrice Webb (6a & 6b) did not see the revolutionary breakdown of capitalist society as a necessary condition to the problems of labour, rather, the formation of trade unions was viewed as an appropriate and desirable mechanism to redress the power imbalance with employers. The publications of "A History of Trade Unionism" and "Industrial Democracy" in 1896 and 1897 respectively have, particularly in Britain, been widely praised. Allen (7) says "There was in a sense no trade union history until they wrote it"; Bain and Clegg (8) - referring to the latter publication - call it industrial relations' "major and perhaps only classic".

The contribution by the Webbs lies in at least three areas (9), firstly - like Marx - their normative framework helped "challenge the arguments of the classical economic theorists", secondly "they were the first to develop a theory of trade unionism and collective bargaining as rational strategies for dealing with the unequal bargaining powers between workers and employers" and thirdly, "they emphasised the importance of empirical research". It can be added that the Webbs in their advocacy of labour laws to ease the plight of 19th century British labour, adopted a social activist position.

In America, the challenge to the deterministic economics of the classicists took the form of institutionalist economics led largely by J.R. Commons and the so-called "Wisconsin Idea" (10). American institutionalists maintained the inductive empiricism of the Webbs and equally carried their research activities into policy. Like Marx and the Webbs, Commons and his followers believed that the workforce were unfairly placed in relation to employers and that special treatment was required. Unlike Marx, however, the institutionalists did not see the cause of this

imbalance in the capitalist system but rather in an inherent conflict of interest between workers and employers. The solution therefore lay in "union-management accommodation and periodic conflict resolution, all strategies for working within the capitalist system" (11).

The empiricist tradition of the Webbs was also maintained and pursued in Britain. Jackson (12) comments that "much of the early writing" placed "considerable emphasis on 'institutional' and 'factual' recordings of industrial relations' issues, "in the main they produced 'guide books' to current practice rather than theories and explanations" (13). The "empirical temper" (14) of British academia is well represented in industrial relations and easily identified in what is referred to as the "Oxford Group" (15). Turner (16) says of them,

"The 'Oxford Line' might be described as combining an industrious extension of established avenues of enquiry and particularly a meticulous pursuit of institutional detail, a preference for the short-term rule of thumb over the broader generalisation, a rather low awareness of those disciplines - in ascending order, of sociology, statistics and economics - which may illuminate the field with normative observations, and a variety of propagandist mini-reformism which insists partly in leading people boldly in the direction they appear to be going anyway".

The implied criticism of a lack of theorising is, as Jackson notes "a little unfair" as Clegg, Flanders and Fox have all made "important contributions to industrial relations theory (17); Clegg on industrial democracy, Fox's unitarist and pluralist frames of reference and Flanders has extended the debate on systems theory to the British condition.

Whilst the institutionalist theme represents a major contribution to the origins of industrial relations, an additional and equally important theme is to be found in the writings on trade unionism. Perlman (18) identified five approaches to the theory of trade unions;

- (i) As moral institutions
- (ii) Part of a revolutionary tradition
- (iii) Psychological interpretations
- (iv) Economic institutions
- (v) Political institutions

Each of these approaches had, in turn, a particular academic discipline that could account for their perspective on the growth, function and purpose of unions, these were (respectively) the Protestant Christian Socialist and Roman Catholic Christian social movements, the Marxian social movement, the environmental psychology discipline, neo-classical economics and lastly, a jurisprudential history discipline (19).

The content, then of early industrial relations investigations was therefore centred on trade unionism and the dominant methodological approach was that of induction with a strong empiricist flavour. For this reason, if no other, the arrival of Dunlop's systems theory of industrial relations has been categorised as a "watershed" (20). For Jackson (21), "Dunlop's work has had a tremendous impact. It has dominated industrial relations research for the past decade and has been used as a starting point by most influential commentators".

Dunlop (22) in criticising the institutionalist positions, says "Facts have outrun ideas. Integrating theory has lagged far behind expanding experience." The many worlds of industrial relations have been changing more rapidly than the ideas to interpret, to

explain and to relate them". Whilst not denigrating the role of "detailed studies", Dunlop states that his "present interest is in a level of generality greater than that achieved in studies of particular industries or countries. But it is not nearly so broad as a general theory of all social action" (23).

In the preface to "Industrial Relations Systems", Dunlop says that the purpose of the text is

- (i) To present "a general theory of industrial relations; it seeks to provide tools of analysis to interpret and to gain understanding of the widest possible range of industrial relations facts and practices".
- (ii) "to illustrate a type of research and inquiry which may well provide a basis for a number of further volumes of comparative studies of industrial relations among different countries and industries"
- (iii) "an attempt to make one world of direct experience in industrial relations and the realm of ideas" (24)

Whilst accepting the ambitious nature of the project, subsequent commentators have credited Dunlop with

- (i) "It provided a way of broadening the subject area previously considered by industrial relations writers" (25)
- (ii) "It gave commentators the opportunity to claim that industrial relations was a discipline in its own right" (26)
- (iii) "by virtue of being so set apart from the dominant concerns (empiricism), his ideas were inevitably to be acclaimed when attention ultimately quickened in the theoretical analysis of the contours of trade union and labour movements" (27)

- (iv) Providing, at very least, an "heuristic device" (28)
- (v) Focusing attention on the generation of a body of theory specific to industrial relations (29)

While Dunlop's systems theory of industrial relations has had a major impact, it has also been subjected to close scrutiny which has generated much criticism, yet as Jackson (30) notes "it would be fair to argue that the systems approach probably remains the most influential in industrial relations".

1.2

DUNLOP'S SYSTEMS THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Dunlop (31) identifies the explanandum of industrial relations' systems, "The central task of a theory of industrial relations is to explain why particular rules are established in particular industrial relations systems and how and why they change in response to changes affecting the system". The focus of the theory is the "complex rules to govern the work place and work community" (32).

Dunlop identifies "three groups of actors:

- (i) Workers and their organisations
- (ii) Managers and their organisations
- (iii) Governmental agencies concerned with the work place and the work community" (33)

These actors, Dunlop says, "are regarded as confronting an environmental context at any one time. The environment is comprised of three interrelated contexts: the technology, the market or budgetary constraints and the power relations and statuses of the actors". Dunlop continues, "The system is bound together by an ideology or understandings shared by all the actors"(34).

Prior to addressing the criticisms and 'renovations' of systems theory the following points, drawn from Dunlop, need to be made -

- 1) "The generalised framework" is, according to Dunlop, applicable to "three broad areas of industrial relations experience",
 - (a) "industrial relations within an enterprise industry or other segment of a country and to comparisons among such sectors"
 - (b) "Industrial relations within a country as a whole and to comparisons among countries", and
 - (c) "industrial relations in the course of economic development" (35)

In making the above points Dunlop is suggesting that his schema is an appropriate analytical tool at a variety of levels of analysis and also that it is appropriate in terms of longitudinal investigations.

- 2) Dunlop acknowledges his Parsonian foundations by referring to Parsons & Smelser's (36) depiction of the economic system as a subsystem of the more general total social system. Dunlop says,

"Nonetheless, the analogy of economics, an economic system, and the relations between the economic aspects of behaviour and the totality of social action is suggestive for organising insights and observations about industrial relations aspects of behaviour in industrial society" (37)

- 3) Causation for the emergence of "a distinctive group of workers and managers" is firmly rooted in the existence of "industrial society" irrespective of the "political-form"-such industrial societies may represent. The "more traditional Marxian and Webbsian versions of the structural origins of trade unions" (38) are supplanted by a notion of systemic necessity.

- 4) Dunlop(39) in clarifying what is meant by an industrial relations systems (IRS) notes the following characteristics:
 - (a) The IRS "is to be viewed as an analytical subsystem of an industrial society on the same logical plane as an economic system". It (the IRS) is not "coterminus" with the economic system but a degree of "overlap" is possible.
 - (b) The IRS is also not a "subsidiary part" of an economic system and therefore the analytical tools of economics are "not likely to be entirely suitable to another different analytical subsystem of society".
 - (c) There are relationships and boundaries between the wider society and an IRS, as such an analysis of an IRS must "make some assumptions about the rest of the social system".
 - (d) The IRS is a logical abstraction. "Neither an economic system nor an industrial relations system is designed simply to describe in factual terms the real world of time and space. Both are abstractions designed to highlight relationships and to focus attention upon critical variables and to formulate propositions for historical inquiry and statistical testing".

(e) Furthermore, Dunlop's conceptualisation of the IRS means that a distinctive subject matter has been delineated and that (for Dunlop) the separate analytical problems can be identified as,

(i) "the relation of the industrial relations system to the society as a whole"

(ii) "the relation of the industrial relations system to the subsystem known as the economic system", and

(iii) "the inner structure and characteristics of the industrial relations subsystem itself".

5) Dunlop's(41) analysis of power, like his understanding of the emergence of "group(s) of workers and managers", is considerably different to earlier labour theory. Dunlop views power as being both external and internal to the IRS. In discussing the "locus and distribution of power" he specifically excludes from the discussion the "distribution of power within the industrial relations system" which is represented by "the relative bargaining powers among the actors, or their controls over the processes of interaction or rule setting".

Power as in the wider society does not determine the behaviour of the actors, rather "it is a context which helps to structure the industrial relations system itself".

- 6) For Dunlop the "network or web or rules" refers to
- (a) "procedures for establishing rules"
 - (b) their substantive character, and
 - (c) "procedures for deciding their application to particular situations"

The above, in turn, are "the centre of attention in an industrial relations system". Further, these rules are not arrived at in isolation but "in the context of the industrial relations system taken as a whole", consequently some "rules will be more closely related to the technical and market or budgetary constraints, while other rules will be more directly related to the distribution of power in the larger society".

- 7) Dunlop also envisages the emergence of a "special group of experts or professionals" due to the complexity of the "rules required in the operation of an industrial society". In fact the emergence of this group (in any of the hierarchies) may generate a communication problem between such experts and "the lay members of their own hierarchy". It is also possible that these experts will play a stabilising role "and bind the actors closer together. The resort to a study by experts is an established method of reducing, at least for a period, tensions that arise among the actors"(41).

- 8) In dealing with "an ideology or a set of ideas and beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to bind or to integrate the system together as an entity", Dunlop(42) makes the following points

- (a) Because the ideology "defines the ideas which each actor holds towards the place and function of the others, it is necessary, for a stable system, that there be some "congruence or compatibility among these views and the rest of the system".
 - (b) "The ideology of an industrial relations system must be distinguished from the ideology of the larger society. It is, however, to be expected that "it will be similar or at least compatible in the developed industrial society". During the process of industrialisation, "there may be marked differences" between the actors of the industrial relations system and "other segments of the larger society". Change in the ideologies or other aspects of the subsystem can be sourced in the process of industrialisation.
 - (c) Dunlop warns against viewing the term ideology as a formalised, highly articulated "body of ideas", the actors, he says, "may hold ideas that are to a degree inconsistent or lack precision". Against this Dunlop suggests, that the actors "tend to develop or adopt intellectuals, publicists, or other specialists concerned with articulating systematically and making some form of order out of the discrete ideas of the principal actors".
- 9) As noted in point (1) above Dunlop believes that analysis by systems theory can take place at a number of levels, national, regional, industrial, enterprise and so on, and in so doing he points out the following(43)

- (a) "The smaller the unit to which the term is applied, the larger the context, and in general the larger the influence of givens outside the system".
- (b) Industrial relations systems that are part of a national industrial relations system may not reflect "the features that are ordinarily regarded as distinctive to a national system". Such national features "do not all enter equally into each industrial relations system within its borders".
- (c) Thus "international comparisons may be less fruitful, or even misleading, if confined solely to countrywide systems. It is essential to examine for comparable sectors and industries the component industrial relations system in the various countries".

1.3 SYSTEMS THEORY - A CRITIQUE

Poole (44) presents a comprehensive review of the critical literature, which he classifies into (i) Substantive and (ii) Theoretical Criticisms. Poole's (slightly revised) approach will be pursued in the following section.

1.3.1 Substantive Issues

1.3.1.1 The completeness of the Elements of the System

Banks (45) suggests that there exists a critical weakness in systems theory in that Dunlop has omitted from the category of actors the owners of industrial property. As such, Dunlop "fails to recognise the importance of profits for negotiations" (46) and "what happens to profit is related to who owns the enterprise" (47). Flowing from this criticism Banks argues firstly the amendment of "managers" as a category of actors, to directors and their representatives in supervision. Secondly, the contexts should be enlarged to four in number so as to be able to include "the system of property ownership which decides who is to direct operations" (48).

In addition it would seem logical that, particularly as the level of analysis moves from National to Enterprise, the actors will increasingly look to events in comparable units for guidance in their interactions. The post World War II experiences of Germany and Japan highlight this point at a national level whilst the experience of the British steelworkers in 1980 and the later coalminers' strike would doubtless have had an influence on the activities of other British unions. Associations of Unions disseminate information which is likely to influence member unions. These networks (including those of managers/owners and the state) should, logically, also be included in the structure of systems theory.

Banks (49) implies an additional criticism when he argues "Dunlop's actors are not persons", the actors are dealt with "as a 'class' of role players".

1.3.1.2 The sub-institutional level of analysis

Poole (50) suggests that this class of criticism can be further categorised into (a) Behavioural variables (lack of), (b) Personality and (c) Unstructured relationships.

(a) Behavioural variables

Bain and Clegg (51) argue that if Dunlop is attempting a full explanation of industrial relations behaviour and it's causes, then the behavioural variables cannot be excluded. Banks' call for greater attention to be given to behavioural variables is further support for Bain and Clegg's position.

Margerison (52) proposed a rejection of a structuralist-functionalist approach in favour of a behavioural science appraisal of industrial relations. In fact Margerison feels that the

conservative implications of systems theory are such that the theory cannot be amended without significant changes to the theory itself. However, Jackson (53) notes "such views are not widespread and have been condemned by the majority of writers".

Bain and Clegg (54) whilst agreeing that behavioural variables are lacking in systems theory, believe that such variables can be incorporated into the theory, arguing, "If these factors are formally introduced into the systems concept, then there is no reason why it should emphasize structural variables at the expense of behavioural variables, structured relationships at the expense of unstructured relationships, the institutions and rules of job regulation at the expense of the process of job regulation, or conflict resolution at the expense of conflict generation. In short, if these refinements are made to the Dunlop-Flanders approach, then the subject of industrial relations may be defined as the study of all aspects of job regulation - the making and administering of the rules which regulate employment relationships - regardless of whether these are seen as being formal or informal, structured or unstructured".

(b) Personality

Poole (55) refers specifically to the work of Shimmin and Singh (56) who, in identifying the issue, say "personality, motivation status and small group interaction have no place in the Dunlop system". Blain and Gennard (57) are however credited with a proposition which would overcome this objection, thus Blain and Gennard suggest that personality can influence rules through its effect on the process whereby rules are established.

(c) Unstructured Relationships

Poole (58) in reviewing the work of Bain and Clegg, Brown, Flanders, and Goodman notes that "the lack of an adequate conceptual analysis of unstructured relationships remains a problem". The issue revolves around the "mechanistic propositions which underpin structural functionalist models" and an examination of interpretive and reflexive procedures in interaction processes". Poole (59) concludes, "the theoretical and ontological assumptions of the system and ethnomethodological approaches are unbridgeable in any conventional industrial relations paradigm". This thesis hopes to address just that issue.

1.3.1.3 Rule Making and Rule Interpretation

Poole (60) says that "scholars have introduced several valuable refinements which have particularly revolved around the distinction between rule making and rule interpretation". The role of power "in the formulation and implementation of rules has been explicitly acknowledged rather than being lodged in the wider environmental context". This 'class' of criticism is more a response to the lack of a full expose by Dunlop than errors of omission and/or rejection.

1.3.1.4 Processes in the Industrial Relations System

The lack of emphasis on process in labour/management relationships can be seen to be rooted in the structuralist/functionalist approach to social phenomena; the behavioural variables (as noted above) get little or no attention, as Poole (61) points out, "the inadequate treatment of process in union/management relationships has been one of the traditional objections to the model of the industrial relations system".

Nevertheless, as Wood et al. (62) argue, a distinction must be drawn between changes in the rule-making process and movements in the other independent variables. Poole (63) draws attention to a potential pitfall in the possible exclusive utilisation of the process variable to the exclusion of "structural exigencies" and warns that, while its identification has been a valuable contribution, it "should not signal an equally 'one-sided' examination in which the role of social structure in shaping the 'contexts' is omitted entirely".

1.3.1.5 Conflict, change, ideology, instability and power

Hymen (64) focusses much of his criticism on the conservative nature of systems theory, equally, defining the subject matter in terms of rules and regulations is problematic. "The implication is that what industrial relations is all about is the maintenance of stability and regularity in industry". (65).

Dunlop (66) avoids, rather than dismisses, the notion of power within the industrial relations system, "the concern is not with the distribution of power within the industrial relations system, the relative bargaining powers among the actors, or their controls over the processes of interaction or rule setting" (67). The implication being that Dunlop acknowledges the existence of power within the system but does not allocate to such a variable a degree of explanatory force as the critics would have, Eldridge (68) does have a point, however, when he suggests, "in sociology, the sources of conflict and co-operation, order and instability must have an equally valid claim to problem status". The emphasis in Dunlop's work has been on stability rather than giving like attention to conflict and change, the "conservative implications" are unacceptable to Bain and Clegg (69). Poole (70)

comments "it was still the continuation of harmonious relationships which had problematic status in the Dunlopian and Parsonian formulations".

While power is dealt with as external, as part of the context, ideology is seen to be internal but "can be expected to be similar or at least compatible (to the "ideology of the larger society) in developed industrial society" (71). It is in this relationship that Dunlop sees possibilities for change, "in the absence of a general consistency of the two ideologies, changes may be expected in the ideologies or in the other facets of the industrial relations system"(72). Dunlop does not, however, enlarge on this observation, and thus the criticism of an over emphasis on the issue of stability.

Poole observes that an adequate treatment of ideology must go beyond the restricted role - to "bind the system together" - and should "explicitly countenance its role as both the reflection and harbinger of change and be traced explicitly to the patterning of outlook and perception amongst actors in the 'larger society' as well as in the workplace itself" (73).

1.3.2 Theoretical Critiques

Poole (74) in his review of the critical literature points out that the "structuralist-functionalist interpretation of social systems" has been subjected to wide ranging criticism, and that such criticism can be categorised as

- (1) "the teleological nature of explanation
- (2) "the generation of untestable hypotheses"
- (3) "the demand for a level of scientific enquiry which has not yet emerged in the social sciences"
- (4) "the problems entailed in the comparison of diverse institutional types" (75)

1.3.2.1 The Teleological Nature of Explanation

The Functionalist approach to society is charged with explaining social phenomena such that effects become causes, thus in Dunlop's work the objective of the industrial relations system was the "survival and/or the stability of the system itself" (76). Various attempts to 'rescue' the thesis can be found in Craig (77) and Singh (78) both of whom introduce the notion of open systems, "To this end a dynamic open system model was adopted to isolate the main environmental systems (social, political, economic and legal) and to incorporate a 'feedback loop' to accommodate multi-causal processes of change" (79). However, the issue of "indiscriminate multi-causality" (80) still remains a theoretical problem.

Blain and Gennard (81) suggest that primacy of system stability as explanatory focus be supplanted by a focus on the "rules of the industrial relations system" as the prime dependent variable, which is to be explained in terms of the actors, technology, market factors, power and status, and ideology.

Poole (82) notes a continuing difficulty with Dunlop's thesis which relates to the claim of equal status to that of the economic system. In accepting a Parsonian theoretical position it is difficult to accept Dunlop's argument that the industrial relations system is on the same logical plane as the economic system, as Parsons (83) argues that any social system is made up of only four functional subsystems, viz. Economic, Political, Integrative and Pattern-maintenance.

1.3.2.2 The Generation of Testable Hypotheses

Poole (84) supports the argument that adequate models depend upon the specification of input and output variables (or independent and dependent variables), and the tracing of interrelationships between the relevant variables. Heneman (85) has argued the

necessity for a more structured approach to theorising in industrial relations and suggests the model of science as found in the natural sciences. Blain and Gennard (86) believe that with some alterations, hypotheses can be generated from Dunlops approach and present a series of formulae to support their contention.

1.3.2.3 Levels and Modes of Theorising

Debate surrounding the level of theory that the Dunlopian model can claim has been substantial. Several authors - "Gill, Hill & Thurley, Hyman, Singh and even up to a point Bain & Clegg", (87) - allocate taxonomic status. Wood et. al. argue that the theory should be seen as a "categorical system" which is at a more advanced level of theorising than "ad hoc classificatory systems" (88).

Following Heneman's (89) suggestions on different levels of theorising Wood et. al. (90) believe that the Dunlopian model can be seen as "a conceptual system or logical abstraction" but not as a "theoretical system" (i.e. generating laws) or an "empirical theoretical system" (which allows for empirical predictions).

Poole (91) refers to a suggestion by Goodman et. al. (92) that if the definition of the industrial relations system was amended to be "a rule-making action system in relation to behaviour in the production system" then it would be possible to generate "a central core for conceptual and empirical analysis, rather than simply an ad hoc and unconnected schema as with the taxonomic or heuristic device" (93).

1.3.2.4 Comparisons of diverse types of Institutions

Poole's classification of the critical literature ends with a discussion of the charge that the Dunlopian framework inhibits "adequate comparison of diverse trade union movements". This, Poole (94) argues, is a position "not easy to sustain" as both the Dunlop formulation and "the many refinements" can accommodate such analyses.

1.3.3 Social Action Approaches

The response to the functionalist approach is to be found in the Social Action approach (95). This response has in fact been a reaction to three central criticisms of the functionalist approach, viz. the role of structure, the lack of attention to behavioural variables and the question of change or systemic stability. If anything, the Social Action protagonists have committed a similar error in focusing exclusively on the actor, ignoring the possible influence of the stage setting.

Voluntarist

Silverman (96) has contrasted the two approaches, the systems approach, he says, treats "behaviour as a reflection of the characteristics of a social system containing a series of impersonal processes which are external to actors and constrain them", on the other hand the social action approach focuses on the impact of human behaviour on society's structures. Social action, for Goldthorpe et. al. (97) attends to the meaning that actors associate with work activity. Jackson (98) notes that the social action approach can be seen as "the opposite side of the coin to the systems approach" and "at one extreme the emphasis placed on individual meaning can be such that the approach moves very close to ethnomethodology and phenomenology".

Banks suggests that a solution to this dichotomy is to develop a step-by-step or incremental model, in which the environment is seen as a constraint to behaviour but that actors will exercise their behaviour which will affect the environment, which will change and will consequently influence the views held by the actors whose interpretations will lead subsequently to different behavioural responses, thus over time change will occur that is a function of both the structure and the actor. The problem, "in brief, is to devise a theory which will indicate just how much of history is determined by processes beyond human control and how much is consciously willed" (103).

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CHAPTER 2

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY2.1.1 The Nature of Collective Bargaining

The term collective bargaining was first utilised by the Webbs (1) and was directed at describing the negotiations conducted by trade unions and management which dealt with pay and conditions of employment. In addition they identified two further categories of trade union activity: those of (a) mutual insurance and (b) political lobbying for legislation beneficial to their members interests.

Collective bargaining was seen by the Webbs as an acceptable, albeit transitory (2) mechanism whereby the power of employers could be contained. Over time, however, the trade union and the working class would become more influential and their terms and conditions of employment would be attained more from a social setting which supported these rights than from their industrial power to force such issues from management. Collective bargaining and the redressing of the balance of power were then seen as legitimate, but rather than requiring the overthrow of the social order there would be a natural development in which the wider social fabric would adjust to accommodate the working classes' legitimate needs.

Flanders (3) has taken issue with the Webbs' view of the nature of collective bargaining, arguing that the Webbs' viewed collective bargaining as an aggregation of individual bargaining, whereas Flanders' view of collective bargaining is that it regulates but does not replace individual bargaining. The differences between individual and collective bargaining are said to be the following (4)

- (a) Individual bargaining concerns the buying and selling of a commodity. Collective bargaining, however, does not involve any exchange, rather the conditions under which such exchanges can take place are delineated.
- (b) Collective bargaining deals in broad terms and individual bargaining in specifics, thus collective bargaining sets minimum conditions but individual identifies specific conditions.
- (c) Collective bargaining is argued to be more of a political activity and individual that of economic or market activity. Flanders argues that because of the continuity of the relationship, a strike or lockout can be viewed as "a diplomatic use of power" (5) and as such this describes a political character of collective bargaining not to be found in the buying and selling of labour characteristic of individual bargaining.
- (d) Again collective bargaining in accepting the continuity of the relationship and its political character will involve factors not found in individual bargaining, thus collective bargaining often involves the use of professional negotiators.
- (e) Lastly, Flanders argues that collective bargaining as opposed to individual bargaining is not restricted to purely economic issues.

Fox (6) has criticised Flanders' position. Firstly, Fox argues that Flanders' definition of individual bargaining assumes an "act of exchange" (7), and to attempt a differentiation because one activity ends in a contract and the other in rule making is erroneous as neither bargain necessarily ends in agreement.

Secondly, conceiving collective bargaining as a political activity and therefore dissimilar to individual bargaining ignores the "disparity of power" (8) between the two activities. Thirdly, the distinction Flanders offers in terms of individual and collective refusal to conclude a contract revolves again around the 'disparity of power'; whilst on the individual level the reaction of leaving an employer is the only practical response to the problem whereas the collective refusal might have the expectation that the deployment of sufficient power might realise their expectations, this is not a necessary result of the exercise of such power and might lead to a similar reaction as witnessed with an individual refusal to finalise a contract.

Lastly, Fox argues that Flanders has not sufficiently argued his depiction of collective bargaining and trade unionism as political rather than an economic activity. The reasoning is that the workforce is just as interested in management issues as they are in economic issues. Fox (9), however, suggests "that the intensity of conviction many trade unionists appear to invest in pay claims" means that the issue of downgrading the economic role should at very least be left open.

Chamberlain and Kuhn (10) argue that three functions of collective bargaining may be identified. Firstly, a market or economic function which delineates the terms and conditions under which current and future employees "will continue to be supplied to a company" (11). Secondly, there is a governmental function which reflects the political dimension of collective bargaining, thus (12) "The content of collective bargaining is concerned as much with procedural issues and the distribution of power and authority as it is with substantive issues and the distribution of money".

Lastly, Chamberlain and Kuhn (13) argue a decision making function, "which allows workers, through their union representatives, to participate in the determination of policies which guide and rule their working lives".

These conceptions of collective bargaining recognise, at least implicitly, the existence of industrial conflict, and understanding the nature of collective bargaining in relation to industrial conflict adds a further dimension to understanding the function of collective bargaining.

Interpretations of conflict present the range of theoretical approaches to industrial relations. Conflict from a radical/Marxist perspective is inherent in the productive process found in capitalist society. Allen (14) describes industrial relations as occurring "within a dynamic conflict situation which is permanent and unalterable so long as the structure of society remains unaltered". Further, capital and labour are "engaged in a perpetual conflict over the distribution of revenue" (15).

Jackson argues that one of the major problems facing the radical perspective of industrial conflict "is not why it occurs but why it occurs so infrequently" (16). Part of the explanation is sourced in the depiction of structural arrangements which constrain social action. Additionally, the notion of 'consciousness' is of great importance to understand (the lack of) industrial conflict. Hyman (17) argues that what is needed is to bring these two streams of thought together,

"A static or a one-way analysis necessarily distorts social reality, and is therefore an inadequate basis for understanding industrial behaviour or predicting its development. The greatest potential for further progress in the sociology of industrial conflict (and the same is indeed true of sociology in general) must be in the elaboration of a dialectical approach".

Whilst a dialectical approach may hold promise for the understanding of industrial conflict the notion of the 'institutionalisation of conflict' has received much attention. Collective bargaining mechanisms can be viewed as a means to institutionalise conflict and can be interpreted as maintaining the interests of a dominant elite class or as a legitimate means of dealing with competing interests. C. Wright Mills (18) dealing with American unions contributions to the institutionalising of conflict, makes the following points, firstly, unions were formed as an organisational counter balance to the development of the business corporation. The next development phase saw employers forming trade associations over large geographical areas forcing national bargaining by the unions. Over time this led to the centralisation of employer and employee organisations. The third phase was characterised by the entry of the state into disputes between capital and labour. The final phase is arrived at as union leaders now face having to address political questions whilst being really only prepared for short term pragmatic labour/management questions. Consequently,

"the labour leaders allow their unions to evolve into institutions which integrate the industrial worker into a political economy that is changing from laissez faire to monopoly and to state capitalism with many corporate features" (19).

A question remains as to why the rank-and-file membership allow such institutionalisation to proceed, and much of the answer lies in the explanation of the formation of states of consciousness which accept the legitimacy of the relationship. In Marxist terms this would be a false consciousness. Allen (20) describes British trade unions as capable of a more militant posture after 'resocialisation', but currently "though many pay lip-service to socialist aims, they accept the capitalist system largely for what it is".

In contrast, Fox (21) has suggested that authority is seen as legitimated power, the employee accepts the legitimacy of command in the employer. Coser (22) argues that conflict can be functional - as opposed to the Human Relations School which sees conflict as an aberration - it can assist in developing group cohesiveness, it can act as a safety valve allowing stress to be channelled and thereby contributing to the survival of the group. Lastly, it may have a boundary making function which sets margins to behaviour.

Jackson (23) argues that collective bargaining provides a mechanism which keeps industrial conflict within acceptable limits and as such reflects a "normative system". Harbison's (24) view that collective bargaining provides a drainage channel for worker frustrations adds to the characterisation of collective bargaining as a mechanism which provides an avenue of dealing with issues which might disrupt the social fabric. Again Dubin (25) suggests,

"As collective bargaining becomes an established feature of our society, both sides come to recognise that each conflict-created disorder is inevitably succeeded by a re-established order and that permanently disruptive disorder may materially impede the resolution of the conflict".

On a similar theme Dahrendorf (26) argues that through collective bargaining "the frozen fruits of industrial conflict are thawed" and because of regular management and labour negotiations "gradual changes of social structure replace the tendency toward revolutionary explosions and civil war".

2.1.2 The Forms of Collective Bargaining

The variety of guises taken by collective bargaining in industrial society suggest to many authors (Hyman (27), Clegg (28)) that their explanation must be sourced in the context in which the machinery operates. Blanpain (29) says, "The phenomena of collective bargaining cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account the cultural and historical environment in which the system has its roots".

The variations observed across national boundaries do not stop there. Salamon (30) shows that the variety of collective bargaining arrangements in Britain can be derived from four aspects:

- (i) Collective bargaining may be conducted at different levels, "ranging from national or industry level, through regional or district level to the organisational level" (31)
- (ii) There is "variation in the coverage of bargaining units" (32)
- (iii) There may be varying degrees of formality associated with the bargaining activity, from highly specific written agreements to informal understandings.
- (iv) There may also be variations in terms of the scope of matters dealt with by the agreement, from wages to "managerial issues" (33)

Beal and Wickersham's (34) 1967 review of variations in national bargaining arrangements adopts a systems perspective, arguing that such machinery was largely the product of the industrial relations system, itself in turn a product of the wider social system.

Jackson (35) comments "that collective bargaining can best be viewed in a historical perspective as the outcome of the interaction of social and economic conditions and the motives and perceptions of individuals. Social and economic conditions limit the action and influence the attitude and perceptions of individuals at any particular point in time. However, the individual retains a degree of 'non-determinancy' through which he contributes uniquely to the creation of social conditions of the future which will in turn limit but not completely constrain the action of others".

The preceding review of collective bargaining provides a framework within which an understanding of the South African experience can be placed. The multiplicity of types of bargaining relationships - particularly post-Wiehahn - and the context within which such relationships are started, develop and change, provide direction for any understanding of the phenomena of collective bargaining in South Africa.

2.2 Collective Bargaining in South Africa

The Industrial Conciliation Act (I.C.A.) of 1924 was the key structural feature of South African industrial relations until the changes to the act based on the Wiehahn Commission's report. Jones (36) observes that while the Acts 'formal' intention was that of "making provision for the prevention and settlement of disputes between workers and employers" it also had two political objectives. Firstly, that of "providing

preferential employment opportunities to white workers as opposed to blacks", and secondly, to "appease white workers and muster electoral support for the Smuts Government".

Williams (37) suggests that the I.C.A. follows logically from the objectives of craft unions, specifically those on the Rand gold mines. Trade Unionism in South Africa grew "among the industrial craft workers with common interests" (38), and whilst there were unions in the Cape and Natal, the emerging dominance of the mining industry meant that "the form of trade unionism on the Rand become the dominant force in trade union politics and leadership in the country" (39).

Craft unions were able to secure the economic privilege for their members by control of access to craft skills. However, unions "embracing more complex occupational mixtures" (40) were less able to control competition and as these were composed of white workers the maintenance of their "socio-economic privilege, their elite skills and income" was to be achieved by the exclusion of the black worker.

Lever (41) shows that the I.C.A. was essentially a compromise between organised business and organised labour imposed by the state which had representatives of both groups in the government of the day. The solution to the industrial unrest lay in the "encouragement of joint monopolies of employers and employees to regulate wage competition and to institutionalise collective bargaining" (42).

The racial nature of industrial relations was further entrenched with the passing of the Wage Act (1925) to provide a measure of protection for 'civilised labour' not covered by the Industrial Conciliation Act (I.C.A.). Williams, however, notes that economic

conditions had changed and unionism amongst whites had increased rapidly so that by the "late 1930's the greatest needs for white semi-skilled labour had been taken care of" to such an extent that the Wage Act could be amended in 1937 to remove the requirement that a Wage Board should "recommend a 'civilised' wage in its determinations" (43).

Davies (44) then arrives at the conclusion that the I.C.A. "is, like all labour legislation in South Africa an instrument of the classes of property owners in the society". Lewis (45) argues

"The I.C.A. did no more than draw the ring within which the registered unions (largely white) and employers (representing national manufacturing capital) could fight it out without resorting to strike action".

Noting the change in the industrial infrastructure - i.e. the growth of secondary industry by 1930, Lewis (46) argues that it was "bound to influence the working class response"; this heralds the phase of 'New Unionism'.

Lewis (47) shows that the new unions had an industrial rather than craft nature and were typically representative of unskilled (poor) white workers. They were not racially biased, "the incidence of joint strike action by black and white workers seemed to substantiate this view". Furthermore, Lewis (48) argues

"Despite the backwardness of white workers there is evidence of genuine inter-racial solidarity. This showed itself in terms of trade union organisation when garment, leather, furniture, and canvas unions dropped their colour bar against coloured and indians".

The exclusion of Africans from the official bargaining mechanisms led to the start of 'parallel' unions (Lewis, 49), an intermittent feature of South African industrial relations for many decades. The rise of the new unions "revived the technique of industrial militancy". In addition, these industrial unions - at this time in their history - were greatly influenced by 'the Left'. Lewis (50) shows that "These unions were to provide the backbone of the Left within the trade union movement".

In the 1930's then one can observe the collective bargaining arrangements developing a character which was to dominate South African industrial relations. The Industrial Council system operated with white organised (some 'mixed' unions) labour, excluded black unions, and participants reflected the conservative-radical political continuum although this aspect was soon to be repressed by state action. State action in turn attempted to limit the role of black unions (Maree, 51).

The racial character of the Industrial system was further entrenched with the coming to power of the National Party in 1948. Webster (52) argues that the Smuts government's attempt in 1947 to provide some recognition to African trade unions "drew only lukewarm support from industry and no support at all from other fractions in the power bloc". The National Party took a far more 'offensive' approach which, whilst not prohibiting African unions, set up a three tier system which led the Minister of Labour to observe, "If that machinery is effective and successful, the Natives will have no interest in trade unions and trade unions will probably die a natural death" (53).

The three tier system consisted of works committees elected by workers (i.e. black) to conduct 'in plant' bargaining; the second level was represented by regional labour committees staffed by employees of the Department of Labour, and finally, the Central Native Labour Board.

The Works Committee system does not appear to have been taken seriously by either employees, employers or the state. Horner (54) shows that there were only 24 such committees by 1965 in the whole of South Africa. This observation applies just as much to the 2nd and 3rd tier arrangements as to the works committee system.

In further attempts to protect white workers, the government restricted the formation of any further 'mixed unions'. Again, further restrictions were placed on existing 'mixed unions' which would affect the organising ability of these unions, thus separate branches and meetings had to be created for 'white' and 'coloured' members. The National Executive had to be white and other than office bearers "no one could attend a branch meeting other than his own" (55). A further attack took the form of the extension of job reservation.

The direction of industrial relations by the state (56) took the form of direct intervention through the amendments to the I.C. Act (1956) but also through less obviously direct legislation. Acts such as the Suppression of Communism, the Black Labour Act, the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act and the Physical Planning and Resources Acts all contributed to the difficulties experienced by Africans in their attempts to organise. Jones (57), quoting the Wiehahn Commission (Part 1, 1979, p.15), shows that in early 1978 there were only 27 black unions representing some 70,000 black workers.

The suppression of unionism amongst Africans in the 1950 and 1960 decades, whilst intended to secure the position of the white worker, could not be sustained. Crankshaw (58) argues that "dramatic shifts in the nature of the labour market coupled with aggressive state policies that undermined the mixed unions began to erode the basis of craft union strategies of exclusion during the 1950's". The wages of skilled white workers were undercut and the erosion of their position was continued in the 1960's "by the economic boom" (59). The state now found itself in a dilemma in that their white (skilled) labour constituency required further exclusion of cheap black labour, but at the same time the state was under pressure from capital to ease restrictions on black employment. Davies (60) shows how employers began to view the exclusion politics as a threat to their productive capacity, thus job reservation was for industrialists a mechanism which would "seriously impede the mechanisation of production and thereby the process of capital accumulation" (61).

Nattras and Ardington (62) show that whilst National Party legislation as well as "the racial divisions within labour and the influx control measures creating a docile labour supply served the objectives of private enterprise", the economic development meant unacceptable restrictions on business to meet its objectives. The support by capital of the state began then not to serve the interests of employers. Pressure from capital was then exerted on both the state and white artisan trade unions for the removal of restrictions on the training and employment of African labour (63).

The progression of collective bargaining at the industrial council level continued. Nattras and Ardington (64) show that in 1970 there were some 102

industrial councils which generated 898 agreements, covering some 934,000 employees of all races, and labour relations were essentially non-confrontational.

The Durban strikes of 1973 can be seen as the spur to the eventual opening up of the Industrial Conciliation Act in that African trade unions were allowed to enter the official (i.e. Industrial Council) bargaining system. The Works and Liaison Committee system (as introduced through the Bantu Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1974) can best be viewed as a partial and transitory amelioration of African trade union requirements, which were met by the 1979 amendments to the I.C. Act and more fully by the 1981 Labour Relations Act. This introduced a new era in collective bargaining arrangements in South Africa.

Collective bargaining now reflected a (potentially) non-racial character and the start of (effective) plant-level bargaining.

The new bargaining arrangements led, according to Bendix (65), to "a more forthright questioning of the relevance and role of industrial councils. Further, he suggests

"For the first time the realisation has dawned that numerous councils had assumed the role more of administrative bodies than hard and tough negotiating parties, that they had developed into not only employee, but also employer-protective bodies and that above all, councils were not representative" (66).

In contrast, plant-level negotiations seems "to be progressing. No fewer than 50 new agreements (reported in 1983) and if the established figure of 300 agreements at the end of 1982 is accepted" (67), then some 350 agreements are in operation

covering an estimated 100,000 workers. Horwitz (68) writing in 1987 is able to show 800 recognition agreements and a union membership of 1.9 million workers in 1985.

The preference for plant level bargaining is to be gleaned from the objections levelled at industrial councils. Bonner and Webster (69) argue that the Wiehahn Commission was "faced with three broad dilemmas". Firstly, the failure of the "state's and managements' alternative to trade unions for Africans - the Committee System". Secondly, "growing international pressure" against the apartheid policy and lastly, white labour's "growing awareness that the future lies with the black labour force". These factors, Bonner and Webster argue, meant that Wiehahn's task was "to restructure industrial relations with a view to incorporating and controlling the African worker. Industrial councils were perceived by 'militant' unions "with scepticism and feared co-option into the statutory bargaining system" (70). Morris (71) suggests seven additional reasons for the rejection of industrial councils, all of which can be subsumed "into three principles which became the hallmark of the new independent trade union movement:

Non-racialism
Worker control
shopfloor, plant-based organisation"

The reasons Morris puts forward are as follows:

- (i) The industrial council system was perceived as "fundamentally racist and bureaucratic"
- (ii) The system contained the "twin dangers of potentially co-opting them and alienating them from their worker constituency"

- (iii) The "white racist craft unions" were "locked in a cosy relationship with the state (via the labour department) at the economic and political expense of the unskilled black workers"
- (iv) Industrial councils were perceived to support "despotic labour practices" and as such led to "undermining their own rank-and-file plant-based disciplinary and grievance procedures"
- (v) "Workers saw the industrial councils as management dominated"
- (vi) There was a perceived unfairness in having deductions made from wages "with seemingly little benefit to them"
- (vii) Lastly, Morris argues that at this stage these unions were "numerically small, regionally based and by no means representative (even at the regional level) of the industry they were operating in".

Much of these criticisms could be levelled at the clothing industry's industrial councils. The labour force was (by 1980) essentially drawn from the politically disenfranchised, was semi-skilled at best and female on top of it, yet labour relations had (till 1986) been very 'stable'. Nicol (72) quotes the Cape Underwear strike as the first successful strike in the clothing industry in 67 years. What accounts for this apparent calm, and what reasons can be identified to explain the collective bargaining activities pre- and post-Wiehahn?

Some of the answers may be gleaned from the reasons given by militant unions for registering and joining industrial councils. Toerien (73) suggests two reasons for an apparent reversal of a non-registration policy. Firstly, it is suggested that "employers and the state are pushing for deregulation of large

sectors of the economy". This means "the removal of legislation which guarantees minimum wages, benefits and working conditions". Deregulation also implies different wage levels in different parts of the country. Furthermore, "where several industrial councils exist in the same industry bosses have used this to pay different wage rates". In response then the unions are seeking to "establish or entrench national industrial bargaining and thus secure uniform regulation of wages and conditions nationally:.

Secondly, "The struggle for industrial councils is also a consequence of the consolidation of COSATU affiliates into thirteen industrial unions and similar initiatives by some NACTU affiliates and independent unions". The mergers now mean that unions can widen their action and can "engage the employers in the battle over conditions and wages in whole sectors and industries". Morris (74) in his discussion of the policy change by the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) suggests that the "membership grew phenomenally" which "threw up new organisational priorities which in turn led to a strategic shift on the issue of participation in the industrial council".

The problem facing MAWU was "to devise a new strategy which maintained the organisational strengths of shop floor unionism while still confronting the new problems being encountered" (i.e. the need for "a sense of national organisational and structural unity").

Morris shows how after further mergers MAWU became NUMSA (National Union of Metal Workers of S.A.). The increased size and dominant (union) position now held on the industrial council led to a reformulation of policy in regard to the council system and the maintenance of the system was adopted as policy.

Morris suggests that a three tier strategy can be detected, thus the industrial council will be used "for national industrial wage bargaining", plant level bargaining to resolve local issues and therefore maintaining shop steward structures, and thirdly, "company level bargaining will be used for issues other than wages, to strengthen the centralised unity of the union, ensure a coherence and uniformity between plants of the same company and deflect factory demands for wage bargaining at plant level onto company level bargaining over other substantive issues.

The observations of Morris and Toerien suggest that organisational growth is causally related to the participation on industrial councils and that various negotiating benefits exist. It is then difficult to understand criticisms of older unions (specifically in the clothing industry) for joining industrial councils for much the same reasons albeit under different historical conditions. Criticism of the negotiating behaviour and/or the outcomes of bargaining in established industries is not necessarily then exempted from critique merely because they joined industrial councils (in some cases) decades before the Labour Relations Act and the policy revisions reported above. There is as Lewis (75) suggests "a marked lack of analysis of registered trade unions in contemporary literature in South Africa". An analysis of collective bargaining in the clothing industry of South Africa will make a contribution to limiting this position.

In an article entitled "Garment and Textile Giant" (76) the South African Labour Bulletin correspondent (unnamed) reports on the merging of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWUSA) - affiliated to COSATU and the independent Garment and

Allied Workers Union (GAWU). It is suggested in the article that a "new militancy among coloured and indian workers "has been achieved". GAWU should not be categorised as "conservative because of its dormant past". Reference is made to GAWU's Living Wage Campaign and a strike at the Rex Trueform factory "where 2000 downed tools for three weeks. This was the first major strike in the Western Cape..". The article also identifies "a militant shop-steward leadership" which has been able to "mobilise the latent militancy of its constituency more effectively than most would have expected, given its conservative past". In Natal GAWU "has succeeded in mobilising indian women workers into militant struggles". ACTWUSA, the other element in the merger "also had conservative traditions".

Explanation of the reasons for the apparent lack of militancy are varied, but certainly one of the problems facing any analysis of action in industrial councils has been the difficulty of getting access to data. The lack of industry data has meant that those analyses of the industry which do exist are based on limited information, and whilst such data might be necessary to arriving at an explanation (typically of the 'lack of militancy') but, as shown earlier, (Hyman (77), Jackson (78)) must (logically) mean that such data is not sufficient to the explanation. Nicol's (79) thesis is something of an exception in that he focuses on the leadership role of the Union secretary to account (amongst other things) for the lack of militancy, thus

"There is a striking continuity in leadership style... The leaders are remote from their membership, are protected in office by a rigid and undemocratic constitution and are intolerant of dissent. They rely on the employers' aid in stifling opposition. They retain an aversion to any involvement in politics".

Nicol's study, however, stops in 1939 and since then there has been little in the way of explanation of the lack of militancy in the clothing industry. Maree (80) describes attempts by an Action Committee to unseat the union secretary and argues that the union's constitution represents 'democracy' problems which complicate the dismissing of a union official (i.e. the secretary) which in turn must increase his influence on the decision-making process in the union.

Gool (81) suggests that the failure of a strike (Cape Underwear) and the failure of CLOWU (Clothing Workers Union) is related to the issue of trade union democracy and in this case "the answer lies in the atomisation of the productive process".

It is not sufficient, Gool argues, to explain the relationship between the union and its members "by a 'lack of militancy' or controls imposed by the 'hierarchical' and 'patriarchal' structures of families reproduced in the workplace", rather "The ability of the Garment Workers Union to exercise political control over its membership rests on the nature of the industry". The nature of the industry refers to the size and geographical distribution of factories, which being small and widely distributed impedes the formation of worker solidarity which allows the union to "permeate the industry with an ideology of benefits and economism" (82).

The charge of a 'lack of militancy' on the part of unions in the clothing industry needs to be specified. Maree argues "liberal pluralism ascribes a valid and justifiable role to trade unions participating in decision making with management over their own working lives, thereby curtailing managerial prerogatives" (83). Whilst the "frontier of control has only partially been advanced for workers" it is wrong "to interpret this as only being advantageous to

management" as it in fact "represents a retreat for management to safer grounds given the advance of working class strength in the workplace" (84).

In its most absolute form the managerial prerogative would mean maintaining all decision making authority over all aspects of employment. Collective bargaining which then achieves some limits to such authority may be the result of the parties agreeing the reasonableness of the issue - i.e. not requiring distributive bargaining, or may well be the result of distributive bargaining. In this sense militancy then deals not only with the pushing back of the 'frontiers of control', but also the nature of the bargaining over issues which both parties bargain over.

Militancy can be reflected in the issues bargained over and the level of conflict the parties are willing to exercise in the achievement of new objectives. In a sense then, militancy has a substantive and procedural character. It is this view of militancy which will be utilised in addressing its character in the clothing industry of South Africa for the review period.

This thesis describes the ontological character of collective bargaining in the clothing industry of South Africa for the period 1968 to 1986.

Structuration theory is described by Cohen (85) as a theory which "illuminates the constitution of social life". The nature of collective bargaining in the clothing industry will be shown as one in which the managerial prerogative is not influenced in terms of any widening of issues to bargain about. The bargaining issues are restricted to wage levels and contributions to funds. This is not to say that gains in these areas were not achieved by the unions concerned, even though these elements did not keep pace with inflation. Phelps Brown (86) in a major

study of the economic consequences of collective bargaining argues two conditions under which collective bargaining can have positive results. Firstly, what he refers to as the 'impact effect' which is when a newly formed union (operating in a context in which it can control the supply of labour and there is a demand for such labour) is able to achieve an initial advantage which they may be able to protect thereafter; and, secondly, what he refers to as the 'ratchet effect', which refers to the unionised workers ability to more readily resist wage cuts than the non-unionised workers. It is then possible that the regional unions involved in collective bargaining in the clothing industry did, in effect, achieve some control over managerial decision making in respect of wages and benefits derived from funds. Certainly it will be shown that a great deal of "conviction, effort and feeling" (87) went into the negotiations dealing with these items, albeit a narrow and static range of bargaining issues.

The identification of the nature of collective bargaining raises the question of how and why this characterisation was perpetuated. It will be shown that the arguments developed by Maree, Gool and Nicol (discussed earlier) are all relevant. However, what needs to be added is a discussion on the value placed on the industrial council system by the parties to it, an understanding of the importance attached by union leaders to the objective of insuring stable and growing employment and, lastly, the apparent lack of any pressure being exerted on union officials by the rank and file membership. It will be argued that there is evidence to suggest an instrumental orientation on the part of the mass membership, although care is exercised in ascribing the direction of causality generating the behaviour patterns used to

arrive at that conclusion. In this way a multi-factorial explanation provides the understanding to the question of the 'lack of militancy' in the clothing industry.

A feature of the wider South African industrial relations system which is of particular importance relates to the role adopted by (especially) emerging black trade unions. The contrast with the more established unions, such as those dealt with in this thesis is marked and the apparent continuity of these differences - over the review period of this thesis - further emphasises the criticism levelled at the various garment industry unions, i.e. their lack of militancy.

In discussing the road to political liberation Cohen and Cobbett (88) identify a number of "Struggles", one of which is to be found in the labour arena.

Lambert and Webster (89), writing in 1988 argue that the high levels of social conflict experienced in South Africa "during the past three years" reflects the mobilisation of "oppressed classes around the common goal of a non-racial democratic state" in which the "working class has begun to play a central and, at times, leading role in these struggles" (90).

The working class, however, reflects fissures in terms of their perception of their role in relationship to the goal of a 'non-racial democratic state', thus Webster (91) and Lambert and Webster (92) show three forms of unionism in South Africa (i.e. in the non-racial trade union movement). There are the "orthodox or collective bargaining unions" and the "political or social movement unionism" (93), the latter grouping can be further characterised in terms

of their shop floor activity, thus 'political' unionism which links "factory based production politics" with "community and state power issues" (94) can be contrasted with 'populist' unions which downplay factory floor issues and "places in its stead a political engagement that only serves to dissipate shop floor struggles" (95).

The analysis provided by Lambert and Webster is important to this thesis in that the garment manufacturing unions can be firmly placed in what have been described as the orthodox unions. Their affiliation to TUCSA further reinforces their conservative image and contributes to understanding their activities. It will become evident in this thesis that the unions' perception of their role was restricted to a narrow range of economic benefits and the maintenance of employment (and, where possible, the growth of employment opportunities). There are, in fact, a number of instances in which the leadership of the unions are recorded rejecting any political engagement. This non-engagement then represents one dimension of the apparent lack of militancy on the part of the regional unions. Other dimensions include the narrow range of bargaining issues with which the garment unions concerned themselves.

This is not to say that the garment unions were unaware of the activities of the 'populist' or 'political' unions. Evidence of this awareness will be found in all the regions dealt with in this thesis. In the Transvaal an attempt is made to utilise activities by 'militant' unions to obtain better conditions of employment, and in both the Cape and Natal newer and more militant unions are seen as a threat to the continued existence of those (established) regional unions. In structuration theory terms 'reflexive monitoring' is a very evident feature of this aspect of regional bargaining in the garment industry.

The political context whilst significant to the understanding of South African collective bargaining cannot fully account for the nature of such bargaining. A further contextual variable, that of the economic context, needs to be understood in terms of its likely influence on collective bargaining.

2.3 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The Nedbank Group suggests that "Economic statistics are usually easier to interpret if placed in the context of shorter and longer-term trends and helps in the "development of a moving picture"(96). In examining post second world war South Africa they segment the economic history into 5 periods.

a) 1946 - 1954

Consumer demand was strong and derived from war time savings, demobilisation, a flow of capital from Britain, the devaluation of sterling and the S.A. unit and finally the effect of the Korean War.

On joining G.A.T.T. South Africa introduced "selective import controls ... as part of the package". The opening of new goldfields and public sector investment in iron and steel production and the initiation of the petrol from coal project (SASOL) further augmented "consumption demand". G.D.P. expanded "in real terms by 4.7 per cent on average per year" (97).

b) 1955 - 1962

This period reflects a slowing of the pace of economic growth, consumer spending "increased by only 2.9 per cent" (98). Private and public sector fixed investment also reflected the slowing down of economic activity. This phase is also marked by low inflation - prices increased by only 1.5% per annum on average and "the average annual gain in real gross domestic product of 4.6% clearly was below the potential of the country" (99).

Political tensions led to an erosion of economic confidence which "was expressed from 1959 onwards in large capital outflows. The Sharpeville shock, for which the period is generally remembered, was a culmination and crystallization of events rather than their cause" (100).

c) 1963 - 1970

This phase was one of boom conditions, South Africa's external political position had been clarified - no longer a member of the commonwealth - and internally the Government's determination and ability to maintain control had been clearly shown. Controls over capital movement were introduced (in 1961) but non-resident investors had mechanisms to allow the movement of their capital.

Real fixed investment in public corporations (17.1% aver.), the private sector (11.2% aver.) and public authorities (9.8% aver.) showed marked levels of growth and over this period real gross domestic product increased by 6% on average each year.

The devaluation of sterling in 1967 led to "widespread currency uncertainty" which "triggered a demand for gold" (101) which in turn led to the (effective) end of a fixed price for an ounce of gold and in so doing led to "a huge net capital inflow into South Africa" (102). This inflow was "held largely in financial circulation and fuelled the great share market (boom)" (103).

d) 1970 - 1976

The Nedbank Group argue that whilst initially in this period the economy continued to boom, the period was marked by sharply rising imports and weakening exports resulting in the (then) largest deficit on the current account of the balance of payments (in relation to gross domestic product).

Inflation was the highest it had been in some 20 years, "it was also a period of rapid relative growth in public sector spending and investment, large budget deficits and inflationary financing of those deficits" (104). Private sector financing was just less than half what it had been in the 1960's and even a brief boom in 1973 and part of 1974 did not stop the economy entering "its first real post-war recession" (105).

e) 1976 - 1982

For the Nedbank Group it is the "reappraisal of the role of government and the public sector" and the "tightening of economic policy" that provide the logic for selecting 1976 as the start of the fifth phase. The government now began 'withdrawing' from the economy and "the reliance on bank credit and foreign borrowings to finance budget deficits was broken and 'financial discipline' became the watchword".

The period 1977-82 is characterised by the Nedbank Group as "the longest post-war boom" derived largely from private sector investment, culminating "in real growth rates of almost eight and five percent in 1980 and 1981". Whilst the observation about Government economic policy may be tenable, a number of economic statistics do not support the contention of a boom over the whole of this period, thus

Gross Domestic fixed Investment fell from R14817m in 1976 to R13830 (1977), to R13440 (1978) before increasing to R13945m (1979), R16378m (1980), R17757m (1981); in fact 1982 shows a marginal decrease (to R17238) but the beginning of a downturn in fixed investment. Table 1 below indicates the downward trend.

TABLE 1

Gross Domestic Fixed Investment - at constant prices
(1980), Average Figs. Rm

1982	-	17238
1983	-	16417
1984	-	16102
1985	-	15142
1986	-	12470

(106)

Whilst Government expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product decreased from 29.52% in 1978 to 22.79% in 1981, it has shown an upward trend from 24.19% (1982) to 28.22% in 1986.

Real Gross Domestic Product at factor incomes at constant (1980) prices shows a -0.8% change in 1982 over 1981 and a -2.4% change 1983 over 1982. The G.D.P. for 1984 showed a +5.1% change over 1983 before falling in 1985 by -0.6% over 1984, (107). The South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Review (108) states "the modest economic recovery that had commenced in the third quarter of 1985 ... faltered in the first quarter of 1986 (and) regained upward momentum in the third quarter of 1986".

The National Manpower Commission's 1986 report on "Certain aspects of strikes in the R.S.A." (RP 113/1986) suggests that "Downswing" phases of the Trade Cycle (from 1960 to 1984) occurred during

- | | |
|----------------|---------------|
| (i) 1960-1962 | (v) 1974-1978 |
| (ii) 1965 | (vi) 1982 |
| (iii) 1967 | (vii) 1984 |
| (iv) 1970-1972 | |

(109)

If we combine the analyses of (i) The Nedbank Group (ii) Central Statistical Services (iii) the National Manpower Commission and the S.A. Reserve Bank, the following table can be constructed in an attempt to establish levels of consensus of the economic cycles for South Africa over the review period, i.e. 1968 - 1986.

The Standard Bank Data Base provides an "Employment Index" (1980=100) which reinforces the picture presented in the previous table, thus

1975 = 216.4	1981 = 135.9
1976 = 153.1	1982 = 104.0
1977 = 76.2	1983 = 61.0
1978 = 69.8	1984 = 67.6
1979 = 76.4	1985 = 35.7
1980 = 100.0	1986 = 27.7

Whilst many additional economic activity indicators could be referenced, the purpose of providing a broad description of economic activity in South Africa for the period 1968-86 has been met from the above statistics. Thus (in broad terms) it can be taken that 1968/69/70/71 were largely years of strong economic activity, 1972/73 reflected less activity with 1974 reflecting an increase in activity over the previous year. The period 1975-1978 is to be taken as a down-swing in economic activity with increased activity in 1979 and the boom ending in 1981. Negative changes in 1982/83 reflect something of a recession with 1984 showing more positive levels of activity in comparison with 1983. The years 1985/6 tend to reflect dormant/declining economic activity.

TABLE 2

	NEDBANK	C. S. S. *	N. M. C.	S. A. RESERVE BANK
1963-70 (Boom)		1968=+4.3	1967 downswing	
1970-76 (poor Econ. growth)		1969=+6.1	1970-72 downswing	
1976-82 (decr. in Gov. spending)		1970=+5.2		
Note: "The post W.W.II period (showed) eleven cyclical upswings with an average duration of 24 months"		1971=+5.4		
		1972=+2.2		
		1973=+3.4		
		1974=+6.9	1974-78 downswing	
		1975=+2.4		
		1976=+1.7		
		1977=+0.1		
		1978=+2.8		
		1979=+3.4		
		1980=+5.5		
		1981=+4.5		
		1982=-0.8	1982 downswing	
		1983=-2.4		
		1984=+5.1	1984 downswing	
		1985=+0.6		

Modest economic recovery in 3rd Quarter 1985, faltered in 1st quarter 1986 but regained momentum in 3rd Q of 1986

*Percentage change in G.D.P. over previous year - at factor incomes at constant (1980) prices

2.3.1 STRIKES

This section is included to provide some understanding of strike activity in South Africa over the review period of this thesis. Strikes are an extreme representation of conflict in industrial relations and can be taken as a measure of militancy, be that for what Lambert and Webster (110) have called orthodox or political union objectives. These macro statistics again re-inforce the depiction of the garment unions as non-militant. Further, the State's response - particularly in the declaration of a State of Emergency - will be 'reflexively monitored' and may well contribute to the continuity of the garment unions' bargaining behaviour, i.e. the observed lack of militancy.

In a National Manpower Commission report (111) certain statistics on strikes in S.A. are presented:

TABLE 3

Year	No. of Strikes	No. of Employees
1968	56	1953
1969	78	4439
1970	76	4168
1971	69	4451
1972	71	9224
1973	370	98378
1974	384	59244
1975	274	23323
1976	245	28013
1977	90	15304
1978	106	14160
1979	101	22803
1980	207	61785
1981	342	92842
1982	394	141571
1983	336	64469
1984	469	181942
1985	389	239816
1986	793	424390

TABLE 4

	White		Coloured		Asian		Black	
	No. of Strikers (1000 's)	Econ. Active No. of Strikers (1000's)	No. of Strikers (1000's)	Econ. Active No. of Strikers (1000's)	No. of Strikers (1000's)	Econ. Active No. of Strikers (1000's)	No. of Strikers (1000's)	Econ. Active No. of Strikers (1000's)
1980	-	1911	15041	888	202	256	56542	5504
1981	-	1947	6271	915	1865	263	84706	5456
1982	-	1987	17920	954	1170	270	122481	5516
1983	11	2028	1415	987	1712	285	61331	5655
1984	16	2062	5304	1010	1725	289	174897	6087
1985	9	2110	12883	1042	1879	298	225045	6308
1986	255	x	13944	x	1416	x	408775	x

1980/85 Data (103)

1986 Data (104)

x N/A - Total Econ. Active = 8,693

Two periods stand out, viz. 1973/76 and 1980 to date. The 1973 period started in Natal and culminated in 1976 with riots in Soweto. The current phase is due primarily to the legalisation of Black trade unions and the increase in their activities. Table 4 below provides a racial breakdown of striking employees and numbers of economically active (excluding Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei on their being classified as Independent States), for the years 1980-86.

Table 4 reflects not only the racial breakdown of strike participation but as proportions of the economically active it is evident just what a dominant position is taken by Blacks in strikes over the period.

An N.M.C. report (114) on geographical regions and strike activity is presented in Table 5 below for the years 1980-85.

TABLE 5

	Cape Peninsula		Durban		Rand		Total	
	Strikes	No. of Emes.	Strikes	No. of Emes.	Strikes	No. of Emes.	Strikes	No. of Emes.
1980	21	3432	39	8729	19	11027	207	61785
1981	5	2628	57	12702	52	13718	342	92842
1982	5	1170	46	11153	189	45631	394	141571
1983	10	1034	60	10990	116	22108	336	64469
1984	31	6254	83	21600	136	46550	469	181942
1985	11	2755	53	15619	102	56517	389	239816

The Durban and Witwatersrand are geographical areas that reflect (relatively) high strike activity and that such activity is largely to be found amongst black employees. The garment manufacturing industry in the Western Cape (i.e. Cape Peninsula) is

overwhelmingly coloured and in Natal it is largely asian, the Transvaal region (i.e. Witwatersrand) is predominantly black. These regional characteristics will influence the behaviour of unions, irrespective of colour, and even strikes in different regions are likely to influence the behaviour of members and officials of employee groups, employer groups and the state.

2.3.2 THE GROWTH OF THE GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

It will be shown that a major concern expressed by the leadership of the regional unions is the stability and growth of employment in the garment industry and whilst employment costs will be one factor influencing such growth and stability, other factors over which labour has little control also need explication. In structuration theory terms 'distant' contexts can constrain action which can be seen in the garment industry in terms of (at least) the State's action in terms of tariff protection afforded the textile industry.

In addition, the garment unions dealt with in this thesis have a long history of dealing with management and the growth in employment over this period is likely to affirm their commitment to such a goal and so, again, in structuration theory terms display the continuity of action.

In April 1982 the Director of the National Clothing Federation of South Africa (N.C.F.) submitted a "Memorandum of Reply" (M.o.R.) to the Steenkamp Committee of Enquiry into the Clothing and Textile Industries, in which reference is made to the beginnings of the Industry.

The memorandum quotes Dr. H.A.F. Barker's text, "The Economics of the Wholesale Clothing Industry of South Africa" which dates the start of the Industry as 1907. In dealing with the industry Barker covers the years 1907-57 and divides the 50 years "into four main periods of development: 1907 to 1929/32, 1932 to 1939, 1939 to 1948 and 1948 to 1957".

While no statistics were available "for (the) clothing industry as distinct from tailoring and dressmaking"(115) prior to 1933/4, employers in the Cape and Transvaal had formed employer associations. Unions equally had emerged and together with the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act the necessary ingredients for an 'organised' industry existed.

In 1933/34 there were 14276 employees in the clothing industry "mainly engaged in men's and boy's outerware, shirts, pyjamas and underwear" (116). By 1938/39 employment levels had moved up to 18,250 but "only about 10% by value of the production was women's wear" (117). The 2nd World War saw a 50% rise in employment levels (to 27,383) and women's wear now accounted for some 30% of production.

In analysing the role of tariff protection on the growth of the industry the 'Memorandum' says that "whether the growth of the men's wear industry during the inter-war years was due to the increase in the duty on such garments or whether the industry grew and because it existed, had to be protected against foreign competition is impossible to say"(118). However, the M.o.R. notes that "by 1945/46 employment in the clothing industry had risen to 30 321 and the women's wear industry was well established"(119). In 1945 the National Co-ordinating Council for the Clothing Industry (forerunner of the N.C.F.) was founded "expressly for the purpose of applying for

increased duties on clothing to protect the progress which had been made during the war period"(120). Following representations to the Board of Trade and Industries, "the clothing industry entered the three year period between the end of the war and the imposition of import control with protective duties of 25% on men's wear and shirts and 15% on other clothing supplemented by alternative specific duties on certain garments"(121). (Note: It took some 3 years for the tariff applied for to be approved - and in some cases such as duty on women's woven dresses only implemented in 1955). The industry continued to grow and by 1948/49 there were 40,625 employees in the industry.

Tariff protection has been a major concern to the Employer in the clothing industry, as can be seen in the statement that "material costs comprises some 55% of average clothing industry selling prices compared to 20% in the case of labour"(122). Import control was introduced in 1948 and the "irregular sequence of measures of restriction and relaxation tended to bring about disturbances in both production and demand, frustration of management and losses in manufacturing efficiency"(123). Relations with the Textile Industry have been strained in the past though the M.o.R. notes "that the quality of local textiles has improved in recent years"(124). These three elements take up a great deal of attention by employers and their association. A review of the N.C.F's Annual Reports gives a good guide to the degree of concern. The M.o.R. observes that neither import substitution nor export sales made significant contributions to the growth of the industry which by 1954 had "87% of the local market for clothing". Furthermore, growth was "almost entirely due to the expansion of the local market which was reserved for the industry by import control"(125).

Table 6 presents a comparison of various growth rates between clothing and manufacturing and highlights the comparatively slower (and more volatile) growth of the clothing industry.

TABLE 6

GROWTH RATES - CLOTHING AND MANUFACTURING

	Percentage Change				
	1970-1975	1975-1978	1978-1981	1980-1985	1984-1985
<u>Clothing</u>					
Unit Labour Costs	10.6	5.6	1.3	9.3	22.2
Real Earnings Per Employee	1.0	-2.3	-0.8	-0.1	-8.9
Earnings per employee	10.5	8.6	13.1	12.1	5.9
Labour Productivity	-0.1	2.8	11.7	2.5	-13.4
Number of Employees	4.9	0.2	2.3	1.8	-0.0
Real Output	4.8	3.0	14.3	4.4	-13.4

Manufacturing

Real Output	6.1	1.5	8.3	3.6	-5.2
Number of Employees	4.2	0.0	3.5	1.7	-3.2
Labour Productivity	1.9	1.4	4.6	1.9	-2.2
Earnings per Employee	11.8	12.3	17.4	14.4	11.7
Real Earnings per Employee	2.3	1.1	2.9	2.0	-3.9
Unit Labour Costs	9.8	10.8	12.1	12.3	14.1

Production prices for clothing (1980=100) increased from 70.9 in 1975 to 195.2 in 1986 representing an increase of 2.75 times (127) whereas production prices for consumer goods rose from 55.3 to 216.6 for the same period representing an increase of 3.9 times. The consumer price index for the same period rose from 56.6 to 228.4 representing a 4.04 times increase (128). While this performance is admirable the M.o.R. suggests that the growth has not been smooth, "in the boom period between 1963 and 1969 growth averaged 8.2% per annum, whereas from 1969 to 1975 it was only 1.8% and in 1977 there was actually a contraction instead of growth"(129). It was only by the end of 1978 that the production index regained its 1976 level (M.o.R. uses 1975 = 100). Rapid growth is again evident in the period 1979-81 with a decline in production from 1982 to 1986. The Standard Bank Data Base (1980 = 100) also reflects this decline in clothing production, thus the 1986 index is 79.1 which is just above 1978 (76.4) but below 1979 (85.1).

2.3.3 EARNINGS PATTERNS

Unions do not operate in isolation of their environment and will be acutely aware of employment conditions in other sectors of the economy, particularly those in their geographical area of operation. This is confirmed in the regional analyses provided later in this thesis and this section is included to provide some empirical substance showing the relationship of earnings between 'clothing' and 'manufacturing'.

The N.P.I. provide data on "Earnings Per Employee - Rands per annum" and a comparison is made below between the clothing industry and the manufacturing sector as a whole. The inflation rates are calculated from the Standard Bank Data Base.

TABLE 7

EARNINGS PER EMPLOYEE (ALL EMPLOYEES)

Year	Clothing % Incr.		Manufacturing % Incr.		Rates of Inflation (%)			
					Nat.	C.T.	W'Rand	Dbn
1968	811	-0.15	1238	7.0	1.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
1969	813	0.2	1270	2.58	3	N/A	N/A	N/A
1970	864	6.3	1385	9.06	5.2	N/A	N/A	N/A
1971	931	7.75	1515	9.39	6.1	N/A	N/A	N/A
1972	1026	10.2	1601	5.68	6.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
1973	1153	12.4	1807	12.87	9.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
1974	1255	8.85	2089	15.61	11.7	N/A	N/A	N/A
1975	1417	12.9	2439	16.75	13.5	N/A	N/A	N/A
1976	1605	13.27	2804	14.97	11.1	6.45	6.9	6.09
1977	1716	6.92	3110	10.91	11.3	10.87	11.3	11.48
1978	1823	6.24	3470	11.58	10.9	10.49	11.76	10.73
1979	1992	9.33	3959	14.09	13.2	12.41	13.64	13.18
1980	2282	14.56	4683	18.29	13.8	12.61	14.29	14.16
1981	2627	15.12	5594	19.45	15.2	14.80	16.2	14.4
1982	3257	23.98	6651	18.90	14.7	11.74	13.86	16.08
1983	3818	17.2	7527	13.17	12.3	11.91	12.17	12.88
1984	4403	15.3	8535	13.39	11.7	12.0	11.32	12.03
1985	4662	5.88	9531	11.67	16.2	16.04	16.04	17.33
1986	5566	19.39	11054	15.98	19.6	17.7	19.5	15.33

(130)

(Note 1986 figures for "Earnings Per Employee" were calculated from the Standard Bank Data Base)

Before drawing any conclusions from the tables the following points need to be made

- 1) That the method of compilation of the statistics has remained largely the same and that any error - i.e. discrepancies with industrial council figures - is consistent.
- 2) It is to be born in mind that Clothing Industry employees are overwhelmingly female and the degree of female employment in the manufacturing sector is likely to be much lower. Any remuneration discrimination based on sex may well represent part of the reason for differences in salary and wages of employees between 'Manufacturing' and 'Clothing'.
- 3) In the M.o.R. (1982) it is estimated (based on Transvaal data) that skilled workers represent 9.6% of the workforce, semi-skilled represent 62.4% and unskilled 28%. This breakdown is unknown for the manufacturing sector.

The rather obvious conclusion is that earnings in the clothing industry are considerably lower than that of the 'Manufacturing' industry.

SUMMARY

The review of action in the previous contexts provides macro data on events thought likely to influence activity in bargaining behaviour in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal regions of the South African Clothing Industry. The review - to re-emphasize - is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather the intention is to provide a broad overview of the contexts thought to be of significance.

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CHAPTER 3

THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS3.1 INTRODUCTION

In meeting the challenge of Banks (1) and in addressing Poole's (2) observation on the divide in industrial relations theory, it becomes necessary to amalgamate Social Action and functional approaches to the subject matter. Thus it is in these two apparently divergent notions of societal phenomena that a new approach to their explication can be sought. Giddens's (3) structuration theory provides such a vehicle.

Dunlop's Systems theory is destined by its functionalist nature to specify an explanandum - the "web of rules" or "the rule making system" (4), and a causal variable - (the interaction of the actors in an environment) are identified. The positivist format of the theory has been influential in terms of firstly outlining the territorial prerogatives of analysts and secondly, of suggesting the possibility of general laws of industrial relations. There can be little argument over just what the subject matter of industrial relations is, provided it is accepted that, firstly, there can be, as Heneman (5) and others (6) suggest different levels of analysis (i.e. National, Enterprise etc.); secondly, that the boundaries of the subject matter are logical abstractions; thirdly, that the contexts (social, political, technical and economic) avoid substantivist positions. The issue of the possibility of general laws of social practice raises a core distinction between functionalist/structuralist and hermeneutic approaches to the theorising about society.

Hermeneutic (subjectivist, interpretive social action) approaches to social theory "are founded, as it were, on the imperialism of the subject" (7) and society is 'merely' a product of the diversity of human nature. Human nature in turn is thought to be active, purposeful, self- and socially creative. It is in this depiction of human nature that the possibility of general laws a la positivism are rejected, together with methodological approaches originating in the natural sciences.

Keat and Urry (8) distinguish what might be viewed as 'strict' and 'loose' positivism (Positivism and Realism in their terms) in which the only real methodological difference lies in the degree of observability of the 'explanans' - apart from such an adjustment the overall methodological approach remains the same. An additional distinction lies in the purpose of establishing relationships identified by such a methodology. 'Strict' positivism seeks to establish the regularity (and occurrence) of such relationships (only), whilst the Realist seeks to do just that they also seek an explanation of why those relationships are what they are. It is in this notion of the regularity of relationships, a mechanical repetitiveness, that sees the epistemological break with the social action approach to explanation in the Social Sciences. If man is viewed as "a purposive agent" who has "reasons for his or her activities" (9) then it is difficult to conceive of the subject matter in the same way as the subject matter of the natural sciences. Man is then not predictable in the sense of the natural sciences in that the repetitiveness of relationships is not to be found in human action as it is in the natural sciences. The explanans in the natural sciences cannot 'decide' to change its relationships in the way that humans can decide to change their relationships. Equally important to the social action argument is the notion of 'a double

hermeneutic' - the act of studying natural phenomena does not change the phenomena under study, but the results of social studies are likely to effect change on the relationships under examination. It is in the diversity of behaviour and apparent lack of a mechanical repetitive form to such behaviour that social action theory rejects the possibility of establishing general laws of the nature of society. Structuration theory accepts a repetitiveness of human behaviour - 'recursiveness' - but adds to this the idea of feedback which is monitored by the agent and such monitoring, as we shall see later, accounts for the possibility of behaviour change, a possibility not to be found in natural phenomena. Structuration theory does not accept the possibility of general laws of society. "There are no universal laws in the social sciences and there will not be any"(10).

Neither the positivistic implications of functionalism nor its rejection by interpretive sociologies detracts or requires alteration to the focus of study in industrial relations, nor is it necessary to adjust the elements as identified by Dunlop. What is necessary is to incorporate both theoretical positions with differing emphasis and notions of explanation, it is necessary, as Giddens notes, to propose a "duality of structure" to supplant the dualism of subject and object inherent in these competing theoretical positions. "The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality" (11).

In accepting the elements of Dunlop's thesis - if not the explanatory methodology - caution needs to be expressed firstly, about substantivist positions being taken in terms of his contextual depiction of the political, technical and economic environment and secondly, of the industrial relations arena as being "an analytical subsystem of an industrial society on

the same logical plane as an economic system" (12). Societal totalities cannot be neatly demarcated nor is it necessary in "the illumination of concrete processes of social life" (13) to depict a hierarchy of contexts. In allocating the industrial relations subsystem the same (logical) status as the economic system, Dunlop is in fact implying that his thesis requires a non-subordinate position relative to the economic and in so doing removes a necessarily dominant role from the economic context in the understanding of industrial relations. Structuration theory utilises these contextual notions but without the presumption of "concrete institutional differentiation" (14). Equally, it places no hierarchical significance on any of these logical abstractions; they are dealt with as different threads in the societal backdrop, related, interwoven and interacting, and which can only be identified in abstraction.

The substantivist notions implicit in such terms as the 'economic', 'political', 'social' environments must be understood as abstractions. The empirical data associated with these environments is often presented in reified form, as a constraint on human behaviour and with deterministic characteristics that ignores (or forgets) the fact that such data is no more than a numerical (and convenient) representation of human behaviour, an aggregation of what is taken to be similar behaviour. It is self-evident that these 'environments' would not exist without interacting humans, where such interaction is similar over time and space it gives systemic form and can be classified as a particular system.

Dunlop (15) suggests that industrial relations as an action context should be viewed as on a similar plane as that of the other (major) contexts and that, as such, it is likely to require different tools and techniques of study to the other contexts. This argument is problematic in that the context focus is ill-defined and is taken as social action. The status of a particular action context vis-a-vis other action contexts is unlikely to determine the study methods; the subject matter is therefore more likely to influence methodological issues and since industrial relations is taken to be a form of social action, the study of such action will be influenced by the premises held by the researcher. No special status for the study of industrial relations can be claimed solely on the basis of its hierarchical relationship with other action contexts or because of its focus of attention. This is not to say that studying what is termed industrial relations is of no importance; rather it is the results of studies and the interest of students of industrial relations and the wider society that will award status.

Industrial relations then is an action context whose focus of attention lies in "social practices ordered across space and time"(16). These social practices revolve essentially around three actors/collectivities, i.e. Management, Unions and State, and can take place at different levels, thus

- (i) Individual
- (ii) Group
- (iii) Organisation
- (iv) Sub-National
- (v) National
- (vi) Supra-National (17)

In identifying the action context of industrial relations it is of importance to make some observations as to the nature of such contexts.

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The social agent is taken to be 'knowledgeable' by which is meant that the actor has an understanding of his/her actions, and draws upon such knowledge in the exercise of every day activities. This "knowledgeability" is maintained by "monitoring" the world around, and as such action contexts such as industrial relations cannot be viewed in isolation of other - more distant - action contexts. This does not exclude the possibility that agents will reify such contexts over which they have little or no control. In fact "reification of social relations" forms an important role of ideology in social action (18).

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The action contexts of a social entity are integrated through relationships of reciprocity between actors or collectivities of the action contexts and extended through time-space. This negates the structuralists' deterministic view of context but also refutes interpretive positions that ignore the influence of reciprocal relationships.

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Ch. 10

It is important here, not to conceive of the industrial relations system as, in a sense, isolated from other segments of a particular society. Such a characterisation would not be able to accept the multiple 'positioning' of the social agent; the roles that agents are associated with will have multiple interest areas, thus the factory worker might well have a concern with education for their children, taxation, sport and so on, they will participate in a number of systems within a social totality.

In introducing the notion of 'system', 'systemic' or 'systemness' into structuration theory, it is important to emphasize the different usage to that found in functionalist expositions. System (etc.) in structuration theory refers to similarities of behaviours over time in a given totality. It is the apparent fixity of social practices that is seen as systemness. System, in structuration theory, carries none of the causal force for explanation found in functionalist writings, as the social practices that produce systemness are constituted by knowledgeable actors who recursively monitor their and others' behaviour (expecting similar monitoring by other agents) and who draw on rules and resources (structure) in the production and reproduction of those actions which give rise to the systemic form of social practices - the duality of structure.

System in structuration theory refers essentially to durable social practices. It is their continuity in discernably similar format that imbues such practices with systemness. It is then possible to say that those systems have structure, by which is meant that rules and resources are recursively implicated in their durability. Such rules and resources are "out of time-space" in its "instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces" (19). The rules and resources are utilised by (knowledgeable) agents who in their utilisation of such rules and resources produce and reproduce the structure, the durability and continuity of such practices, then giving a systemness to those practices. Of equal importance in the production and reproduction of social practices are the notions of firstly, 'knowledgeable' agents, secondly their ability to monitor their behaviour (and that of others); thirdly, the expectation that others monitor behaviour in a similar fashion, and fourthly, there is the notion of 'unintended' consequences.

The exclusion of these elements to the explication of social relations would inevitably lead to a static model, one which is patently untenable. The mechanisms for achieving systemness can be depicted in, firstly, "where interdependence is conceived of as a homeostatic process akin to mechanisms of self-regulation operating within an organism", provided "it is acknowledged that the 'looseness' of most social systems makes the organic parallel a very remote one and that this relatively mechanised mode of system reproduction is not the only one found in human societies". Secondly, Giddens suggests that integration ("reciprocity of practices [of autonomy and dependence]") is a further mechanism involved in social reproduction and implicated in the "systemness" of social practices, thus system integration is "reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-space" (20). Institutions, in turn, are (particular) social practices that "have the greatest time-space extension" (21). Within social totalities, this quality of institutions, i.e. their continuity over time, also lends systemic form to societies.

It is by way of the above conceptualisation of systemness that a reformulation of the Dunlop thesis can be arrived at, and in so doing bridge the functionalist/social action epistemological divide.

3.2 A STRUCTURATION THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

A structuration theory of Industrial Relations in proposing a duality as opposed to form or experience in industrial relations requires clarification on

- (i) The Actor
- (ii) Structure and Structuration

It needs to be emphasized firstly that the explication of these aspects can only be separated for purposes of analysis, and secondly that any analyses must accept the continuity of social life. Thus analysis can be carried out on both a cross-sectional and longitudinal basis but such separation will most likely serve different purposes.

3.2.1 The Actor

In Giddens's psychology of the social actor two ideas are of crucial importance to the structuration thesis

- (a) The Stratification Model
- (b) Levels of Consciousness

(a) The Stratification Model

The actor has three "embedded" (i.e. innate) processes which are

- (i) Reflexive monitoring
- (ii) Rationalization of action
- (iii) Motivation of action

The actor is conceived of as able to monitor his/her action, that of others and expects them to exercise similar behaviour. This monitoring of action allows the actor to "maintain a continuing 'theoretical understanding' of the grounds of their activity" - the Rationalisation of Action.

In the process of experience the social agent acquires knowledge about how to be a competent social agent. This knowledge (essentially rules and resources, i.e. structure) is drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social relations. However, the agent monitors his/her behaviour and that of others - expecting them to do likewise - and such monitoring

further contributes to the possibility of change to social relations, and therefore structure, although much of social life is conceptualized as routine and repetitive.

In explaining the "dazzling variety of procedures and tactics" used by agents, Giddens suggests that those which are "probably particularly significant are those involved in the sustaining of ontological security" (22).

Ontological security is dealt with by Giddens by reference to psychoanalytical theory and particularly the work of Erikson and Sullivan. Whilst recognising epistemological issues involved in psychoanalytical theory Giddens nevertheless pursues such a course in an attempt to relate the psychological level of explanation with the sociological level. Explanation in psychology reflects similar disputes as that found in sociology. Deterministic explanations of human behaviour can be contrasted against humanistic explanations; whilst not arguing the superiority of one style or argument over another, nor deprecating the pursuit of an ultimate explanation it is suggested that the presentation of an explanation of individual behaviour is so fraught with issues of faith that progress at the sociological level may be distracted.

George Kelly's construct theory (23) provides a model of individual behaviour that specifically attempts to avoid much of the epistemological debate referring to the essential nature of man. Construct theory in turn allows the analyst to conceive of the social agent along (mostly) similar lines as those conceived of by Giddens, at the same time avoiding any ontological debate.

Construct theory holds that the individual anticipates events, thus the fundamental postulate is

"A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the way in which he anticipates events" (24).

In experiencing events in the world the individual will be aware of similarities and dissimilarities which will have meaning for the individual. In the construing of similarity and contrast, constructs are formed and this knowledge the individual utilises in construing future (similar) events and thus in orienting behaviour.

Constructs exhibit certain characteristics.

- (i) Constructs have both a range of convenience and a focus of convenience; the range of convenience referring to all those events for which it would have use, and the focus of convenience refers to particular events in which it is applied.
- (ii) Constructs can be core - basic to the individual's functioning - or peripheral, those which are readily modifiable without modifying core constructs.
- (iii) They may be permeable or impermeable, this referring to the ease with which new elements are admitted to the range of convenience.
- (iv) Some constructs are tight or loose referring here to the degree of unvarying expectations or construing of events.

Giddens characterizes knowledge on differing levels of consciousness, of particular importance is that of practical consciousness which has similarities with the Freudian semi-consciousness and refers essentially to that knowledge (constructs) utilised in a routine

and 'unthinking' way, an element of habit is involved in understanding the practical unconscious. Discursive consciousness refers to that level of consciousness which is characterised by the ease of giving reasons for action. Neither of these levels of consciousness detract from construct theory. Motivation in structuration theory refers to a "potential for action" and is only involved in action in "relatively unusual circumstances, situations which in some way break with the routine" (25).

It is possible then to conceive of the social agent as having a construct matrix developed in interaction and such knowledge is drawn upon in interaction. The agent recursively and reflexively monitors events and expects others to do the same, such monitoring allows for the possible adjustment of the individual construct system and thus behaviour and the structure of social systems. The reality of unintended consequences of intentional acts will in turn be subject to monitoring and adjustments made. The choice of behaviour (i.e. the adjustment) may well relate to Giddens's suggestion of maintaining ontological security, but as has been argued this level of explanation is fraught with a myriad of epistemological problems.

The 'knowledge' (construct matrix) drawn upon by the actor in the production and reproduction of action has 'Rules' as a central feature. Knowledge of 'rules' of social action is a key aspect of the social agent and are essential to the ability of the actor to 'carry on' in any social context. Rules are not to be conceived of as somehow external to the individual and therefore as a determining force over which the actor has little or no control. All relationships have a degree of reciprocity, of autonomy and dependence and

the rules of these relationships - whilst varying in degrees of formality and direct actor control - is integral to the ability of the actor to maintain and change such relationships.

'Rules' can be viewed as

"techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (26)

'Rules' as will be seen in the later discussion of 'structure' form an integral part to a re-conceptualization of the idea of 'structure'. Rules are central to the constitution of meaning in social relations and in their legitimation by way of norms and sanctions.

Rules "relevant to general questions of social analysis" (27) have the following main characteristics:

Intensive	:	Shallow
Tacit	:	Discursive
Informal	:	Formalised
Weakly sanctioned	:	Strongly sanctioned

By 'intensive' is meant those rules which are "constantly invoked in the course of day-to-day life" (28). The other characterizations of rules is self-explanatory.

Industrial relations systems will reflect such rules (and sanctions), from formalised rules of law such as "Mitbestimmung" in Germany or the "Trade Union and Labour Relations Act" of Britain in the mid-1970's. Equally rules in the workplace based on seniority may be formally agreed to by Management and Unions

although not passed as Law in a Parliament. Informal rules revolving around work allocation may in turn exist in varying degrees in different organisations, together with a variety of other rules of varying degrees of formality.

(b) Levels of Consciousness

The representation of the knowledge of social actors as a construct matrix is well suited to Giddens's presentation of different levels of consciousness.

Giddens argues 3 such levels.

- (i) Discursive consciousness
- (ii) Practical consciousness, and
- (iii) The Unconsciousness

Discursive consciousness refers to that which can readily be talked about. There is indeed no barrier between it and 'Practical consciousness', the distinction simply being between "what can be said and what is characteristically simply done"(29). There is no rigid bar between these levels though such barriers (largely repression) do exist between the discursive level and the unconscious.

The notion of practical consciousness is of central importance to a structuration theory of industrial relations as it introduces the notion of the 'Routinization' of social action.

Much of social action is recursive and routine. The knowledge actors draw upon is largely to be found at the level of practical consciousness and the repetitiveness of action has a routine representation.

Whilst much of social action is routine and recursive, action in one context may have unintended consequences in that context or other contexts somewhat removed in time and space, which in turn can be monitored and can constitute the conditions for further action in the original context.

The routinization of action has further relevance in that it recreates the conditions in which the appropriate action will be reproduced, so providing a continuity of action with the appearance of "form" so important to Structuralist-Functionalist understanding of social action.

3.2.2 Structure and Structuration

Structure refers to 'rules and resources' in Structuration Theory, but because 'rules' are inherently transformational, social entities can best be characterised as reflecting structuring properties, these properties in turn allow "the 'binding' of time-space in social systems", and "make it possible for discernably similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space which lend them 'systemic' form" (30). The most enduring structural properties Giddens refers to as structural principles and enduring social practices are referred to as institutions.

Giddens also distinguishes 'Structure' from 'Structures'. Structures (plural) are "isolable sets of rules and resources" (31) and furthermore refers to "relations of transformation and mediation which are the 'circuit switches' underlying observed conditions of system reproduction" (32). Structure(s) is then reconceptualised in structuration theory and is prior to 'form'. It is also "out of time-space" in that structure now exists "only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (33).

Structure, as formulated by Giddens, is the "very core of that 'knowledgeability' which specifically characterizes the human agent" (34); the structural properties ('rules and resources') are then both "medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise" (35), and in this way the duality of structure (as reformulated) is achieved.

Rules can be divided into those of signification and legitimation. Signification refers to rules of 'meaning constitution' and is evident in communication in interaction. Communication as conceived of here is more than 'just' what is intended by the actor. A theory of coding should focus on meaning generation as found in the "ordering of social practices" (36). In institutionalised collective bargaining "modes of discourse" will be evident which are recursively implicated in the continuity of the institution, i.e. the production and reproduction of relations. This equally applies to unions, federations of unions, employer associations, shop steward committees and so on. The modes of discourse and symbolic order are "a major institutional locus of ideology" (37), though in structuration theory ideology is not of a particular type, rather ideology refers to the "asymmetries of domination which connect signification to the legitimation of sectional interests" (38).

Legitimation cannot be understood independently of signification and domination other than analytically and refers to the theory of normative regulation. Norms are to be understood in terms of reciprocal relations, as rights and obligations expected by participants. Interpretations of norms which emphasize an 'internalization' of societal norms are to be avoided as they do not account for a knowledgeable social actor, who in this characterization becomes a reflection of those norms, mechanical and determined. Such an interpretation

"masks the fact that the normative elements of social systems are contingent claims which have to be sustained and 'made to count' through the effective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters. "Normative sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination, and the relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various sorts other than expressions of the commitments those norms supposedly engender" (39).

Collective bargaining represents numerous instances of normative sanctions, of expectations of rights and obligations thus the notion of 'bargaining in good faith' has, for example, the implication of a willingness to (at least) attempt the settlement of an issue or series of issues. Agreements arrived at are often couched in the language of rights and obligations and consequences of breaches of such agreement. Even the individual 'contract of employment' has these features and while the examples given have a 'formalised' character this is not a necessary condition for their existence.

Resources as conceived of in structuration theory are intimately involved in the structural feature known as domination. Domination is inherent in the social condition, in human action. Domination "depends on the mobilization of two distinguishable types of resource" (40). Allocative resources refers to "forms of transformative capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena" (41). Authoritative resources, similarly, but "command over persons or actors" (42).

Some authoritative resources do have a material existence which on the surface might be seen to be contradictory in that Structuration theory argues that structure does not reflect such. However, the

transformational character of resources is only evident when linked to the "instantiation of that of codes and normative sanctions", (43) i.e. signification and legitimation.


Power in this conceptualisation of social processes is not a resource, rather power characterizes all action and resources are "media through which power is exercised" (44). Giddens further argues, "Power within social systems which enjoy some continuity over time and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors. This is what I call the dialectic of control in social systems" (45).

The study of industrial relations can, as has been noted in Chapter 1, focus on different levels of interaction and at each level relationships of autonomy and dependence will be observed, power is inherent, in all these relationships and as such is not 'external' to either agents or collectivities but rather is expressed in the usage of resources in sustaining these relationships.

Collective bargaining in industrial relations can be conceived of as sets of transformative relations between collectivities which in themselves can (will) reflect institutional features. Institutionalised collective bargaining will reflect the structural features of signification, domination and legitimation, this structure can be identified by 'holding still' the system and is a valid exercise in itself. What is of importance as well, is to examine the duree, the continuity of the system (or

institution) so as to explicate not only the pattern but the dynamic which sees changing patterns. It is in the nature of the agent and the modalities of structuration that the key to the dynamic (as well as the pattern) lies.

In linking the agent to structural features Giddens uses what he refers to as "modalities of structuration" as depicted below:



Interpretive schemes are, for Giddens, "modes of typification incorporated within actors' stocks of knowledge (and are) applied reflexively in the sustaining of communication" (47).

The Modalities of Structuration

Structuration refers to the "Conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures and therefore the reproduction of social systems" (48). The vehicles involved in structuration are as follows.

What Giddens calls an "interpretive scheme" and what this thesis refers to as a construct matrix, is seen as the modality of signification which is evidenced in interaction by way of communication. In communication the rules of meaning are evidenced, in addition norms which are the modalities of the rules of legitimation will be expressed in interaction through appropriate sanctions. Signification and legitimation need to be seen, in a sense, as different sides to the same coin.

Control over resources (domination) will be exercised through a variety of facilities. Parliaments can be viewed as one such facility exercising control over both kinds of resources. This thesis will identify a number of such facilities specific to the industrial relations context of the South African garment manufacturing industry.

3.3 STRUCTURATION THEORY - A CRITIQUE

The presentation of a structuration theory of industrial relations to provide an analysis of collective bargaining in the South African garment manufacturing industry requires a review of critical commentary on structuration theory.

In suggesting that social scientists are greatly concerned with the "rapid social, political and economic change" evident in societies, Held and Thompson (49) argue that whilst aspects of past contributions "remain relevant today" other of their ideas have been "eclipsed both by intellectual criticism and by the course of events". It is thus necessary "for the ongoing renewal and imaginative reconstruction of concepts, assumptions and approaches". In this endeavour Held and Thompson refer to Giddens "as a figure of major significance" (50). Clark (51) in identifying Giddens's "international reputation - not just in the world of sociology, but in the world of social theory more generally" says that in "The Constitution of Society" (52) Giddens "has attempted to establish a new kind of social theory by synthesizing concepts, approaches and insights from a wide range of social science and related disciplines" (53). To this could be added the observation that Giddens's reformulation of the notion of structure represents something of a paradigm shift in that the epistemological divide between objectivist

and subjectivist approaches is claimed to have been bridged. This description of the significance of 'structuration theory' then presents difficulties in attempting any critical assessment of 'structuration theory' largely due to the wide ranging nature of the debate around 'structuration theory'. Clark (54) in reviewing the critique offered in a text he (Clark 55) edited suggests that "the main criticisms tend to revolve around three interrelated issues: the low level of original primary empirical research reported in them; the general absence of quantitative data and techniques of social research (whether primary or secondary); the lack of systematic cross reference between theoretical debate and empirical research". Again, it should be noted that Giddens's theory "aims to shift the emphasis of social theory away from a focus on epistemological questions - can a theory be verified or falsified as a set of empirically tested explanatory propositions of a generalized kind? - to a focus on ontological questions - what is the nature of human being and doing?"(56). The ontological issue is also identified by Ira Cohen (57 and 58) as a major consideration in the evaluation of structuration theory.

The attention to ontological issues does not mean that structuration theory therefore will "stand apart from the concerns of social science at large", rather, there is a reciprocal relationship between subject matter and methodological principles but "neither domain can be reduced to the other without residuum, and each must be granted a degree of autonomy if imagination and insight are to thrive" (60). The main purpose of social theory is then "to inform theories of substantive structures and social processes and to serve the prosecution of empirical research" (61).

Stinchcombe (62) is not as convinced by structuration theory believing that it does not deal in empirically specified concepts. It has failed "to provide variables describing milieux that will explain such dependent variables as (those required to deal with the example used in the critique of structuration theory)". Stinchcombe is suggesting that the construction of theory should start with empirically identified concepts rather than - as he suggests of structuration theory - with ontological postulates" (63). Cohen rejects the criticism saying that it is understood that "ontology provides the conceptual resources for social enquiry, the end remains knowledge which manifests as much empirical fidelity as possible to social life" (64).

Gregson (65) is also critical of the usefulness of structuration theory for empirical research. She argues that "we can label structuration theory a second-order theory: its concerns are not with theorizing the unique (i.e. with explaining the events or contingencies of particular periods or places) but with conceptualizing the general constituents of human society (i.e. agency, structure, time, space, power ...)" (66), and such 'conceptualisations' lack "the degree of specification required for empirical work" (67).

It can, however, be argued that there is the case to be made of "the relative autonomy of theory and research" (68), thus the development of theory can proceed "on its own terms and cannot be expected to be linked at every point to empirical considerations" (69). It is accepted (by Giddens) that structuration theory is "at a high level of abstraction. But even the most abstract concepts interlace or can be connected with more specific ones. This is true of the notions of structuration theory as of any other generalized standpoint in the social sciences" (70).

The issue of usefulness and research can also be seen in Bernstein's (71) review of structuration theory as critical theory, for Bernstein (72) "we discover not only ambiguity and vagueness but conflicting and even contradictory claims" in Giddens's treatment of social science as critique. In his reply to Bernstein, Giddens (73) identifies four levels of critique. They are, "intellectual critique", "practical critique", "ideological critique" and "moral critique".

Intellectual critique refers to the process/activity whereby "any and all theories, concepts and findings brought forward are open to critical dissection and assessment" (74). Practical critique in turn refers to a "technological view of social science knowledge" in that such knowledge can lead to "practical interventions in social life" (75). Nevertheless, for Giddens it is important to emphasize "the routine incorporation of social science theories, concepts and findings back into the universe of events they were developed to describe or explain" (76).

Ideological critique refers to the analysis "of conditions under which modes of signification or discourse are incorporated with exploitive systems of domination" (77).

This critique is largely analytical and will have some bearing on 'practical critique' in that ideology may well guide intervention strategies identified by various interest groups. Lastly, moral critique is a legitimate role for the social scientist; that is the making of moral criticisms of states of affairs. However, such critique is only defensible if there is a merging of factual and evaluative claims. This Giddens describes as "contingent moral rationalism" (78). It is thus evident that structuration theory is not in any way restricted in its critical role irrespective of the level of critique.

There are two further critiques directed at the 'elements' of structuration theory (as opposed to what may be termed - and dealt with later - criticisms of application) these relate to the observations of Bauman (79), Thompson (80) and Archer (81). Bauman questions the emphasis Giddens places on the social actor with the consequent failure to deal with networks of interdependencies and as such structuration theory - at best - needs further treatment. Giddens suggests that he in fact does allow for 'interdependencies' in the way that structuration theory conceptualises the notion of system, pointing out that it refers "to the patterning of social interaction and social relationships across time and space" (82).

Thompson directs his attention at structuration theory's reformulation of structure in terms of rules and resources. It is the notion of 'Rules' which is particularly troublesome to Thompson which he sees as being of a "loose and abstract character" (83). Thompson also suggests that in attempting to identify 'rules', one first has to identify certain structural features, thus suggesting that their structural character goes beyond a description of rules. Giddens's reply to the criticism is to clarify 'rules' as 'formulae' which are drawn upon by social actors, "they specify 'generalizable procedures' or if one prefers, conventions, which agents follow" (84). The utilisation of Kelly's construct theory in this thesis is a means of identifying sets of 'rules' drawn upon in a particular action context.

Archer argues, "The notion of duality transcends each dichotomy by making the two elements mutually constitutive, but the lightness of this mutual constitution prevents examination of the interplay" (85). Archer's critique argues for the maintenance

of the distinction of 'structure' and 'action' and misses the argument that Giddensian formulated 'structure' is prior to form, i.e. structure in the sense that Archer uses the term.

The range of criticism referred to thus far may be classed (broadly) as having been directed firstly at the "elements" of structuration theory and, secondly, to its relation to research and social critique. There is a third class of critique which for want of a better description will be referred to as 'applications'; this classification of criticism is presented very tentatively and should be viewed more as a convenient way of presenting debates surrounding structuration theory than any attempt to draw conclusions from such a classification. Furthermore, the groupings should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as interlinked. The fourth class of critique can be viewed as defences of competing theoretical positions.

The debate in terms of what is called 'applications' revolves around Giddens's explication of the nation state, and argue that the explanation given by Giddens is deficient in terms of his treatment of the significance of the 'middle class' (Urry (86)) 'gender relations' (Murgatroyd (87)) and 'violence' (Breuilly (88)). The debate around these concepts is more a call for their greater status in the explication of change and the development of the 'nation state' than the rejection of structuration theory.

There are in turn a number of 'defences' of theoretical positions which are threatened by structuration theory. Coser (89) believes that the most important contribution Giddens makes in relation to Marxism is distinction between allocative and authoritative resources, the former referring to

domination over material resources (largely the focus of Marxian analysis), and the latter referring to domination over people, an area neglected by Marx. Bottomore (90), however, remains unconvinced that a "heavily revised Marxist theory" would not match or be superior to structuration theory.

Munch (91) in his defense of Parsonian sociology advocates eclecticism but retains a positivist view of sociology which does not address the Giddensian critique of positivism, and in turn does not critique structuration theory. Hermeneutics is in turn defended. Hekman (92) claims that Giddens retains "the dichotomies on which Enlightenment thought rests" and will therefore be "unable to surmount the 'problems' of objectivity, subjectivity, critique and a host of others" (93). It is only in the "Gadamerian/post-modern transcendence of epistemology that those problems can be understood to be psuedo-problems" (94).

In summary it can be stated that the critique of structuration theory is wide-ranging largely because it presents a closely argued radical shift in social theory, drawing on contributions from the three main explanatory perspectives in social theory, i.e. Positivist, 'Marxian' and Subjectivist models of explanation. It is furthermore problematic in that its focus is ontological rather than epistemological which draws criticism about its research, practical and critical contribution to social life. The criticisms dealt with in this section whilst not exhaustive are representative of the range of opposition. Support for structuration theory is in turn widespread (95), and the debate continues.

This thesis will utilise structuration theory as a mechanism for establishing the ontological character of collective bargaining in the South African clothing industry, and utilise such a characterisation as the starting point for a critical analysis of the observed lack of militancy and the maintenance of a substantial level of managerial decision making over conditions of employment.

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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY4.1 THE DUALITY OF STRUCTURE

Structuration theory claims a duality emerges with the reconceptualization of the notion of 'Structure' and such a claim presents methodological issues.

Burrell and Morgan (1) present an analytical scheme for "analysing assumptions about the nature of social science". The subjectivist/objectivist approaches are seen to be identifiable in terms of assumptions made in relation to four criteria. Their scheme is presented below -

Subjectivist Approach to Social Science		Objectivist Approach to Social Science
Nominalism	1. ONTOLOGY	Realism
Anti-Positivism	2. EPISTEMOLOGY	Positivism
Voluntarism	3. HUMAN NATURE	Determinism
Ideographic	4. METHODOLOGY	Nomothetic

Burrell and Morgan's description of subjectivist/objectivist approaches can be encapsulated (simply) as follows; subjectivist approaches reject the proposition of an objective external reality which will constrain and determine the actions of the individual, it rejects the possibility of causal relations and the possibility of general laws of social action all of which centres on the key assumption of the voluntarist nature of man. The voluntarist position has many facets but revolves essentially around the notion of 'free-will' or 'non-determined choice' as the central defining characteristic of the human being. Objectivist approaches are then the opposite of that which describes the subjectivist. One additional aspect of clarification of the objectivist position needs to be

made; in establishing the causes of action the objectivist may look to variables either external or internal to the social actor. Behaviourism suggests external causes whilst the Freudian Id can be viewed as an internal causal variable.

The duality of structure as proposed by Giddens rests on the characterization of structure. Social systems have a *duree*, a continuity of action that transcends the individual actor. Such social totalities - rather obviously - exist prior to the individual, during the individual's life-span and continue after the exiting of the individual. In this sense then structure is marked by the "absence of the subject" (2). Equally, the agent enters a social milieu and acquires knowledge of social life which in interaction is maintained through the process of "rationalization of action" and "reflexive monitoring" (3). The knowledge that the actor has and maintains is that of rules and resources - the structuring properties of a social entity. Structure then is both internal and external but it exists only "in its instantiations and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (4). Structure then does not have an existence that is independent of all actors of a given social entity and cannot be directly observed as can phenomena in the natural sciences. Evidence of structure will therefore need to be sought in essentially surrogate measures.

The possibility of establishing general laws of social science is rejected by Giddens,

"There are no universal laws in the social sciences and there will not be any ... because ... the causal conditions about human social conduct are inherently unstable in respect of the very knowledge (or beliefs) that actors have about the circumstances of their own action" (5).

The basis for the rejection of universal laws lies in Giddens's understanding of the human agent, thus the stratification model is such that a "hermeneutic starting point is accepted" (6). The depiction of the social agent as having the embedded processes of 'reflexive monitoring' and the 'rationalisation of action' and motivation-viewed as a "potential for action" (7), but with little "direct purchase on action" (8) but for unusual circumstances - is seen to be (by Giddens) a sufficient characterization of the individual to arrive at a hermeneutic conclusion.

In addition to the stratification model Giddens introduces the notion of 'ontological security' which is the expression of "an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines" (9). Giddens suggest that the psychological origins are to be found "in basic anxiety-controlling mechanisms ... hierarchically organised as components of personality" (10). The generation of trust in others represents the initial building block of the basic security system and "depends substantially upon predictable and caring routines established by parental figures" (11). This characterization of ontological security can be interpreted as environmentally determined and as such argues against the hermeneutic starting-point.

Ontological security is also portrayed as being implicated in a "dazzling variety of procedures and tactics" (12); it is suggested that those 'procedures and tactics' which sustain ontological security have a particular significance for the "structuring qualities of rules" (13). The danger exists here that the notion of ontological security may be taken as a causal variable and as such the 'hermeneutic starting-point' can be questioned.

A key facet of a voluntarist position lies in the idea of individual uniqueness. The stratification model deals with embedded processes but not with individual differences, and whilst such processes can be viewed as a necessary condition they do not also represent a sufficient condition for a hermeneutic conclusion. In turn, the basic security system of Giddens's can be viewed as environmentally directed if not determined. The hermeneutic base (starting-point) has not been established beyond all doubt.

Prediction is a central aspect of what are called general laws of science. Prediction in turn can be absolute or probabalistic, which are, in Keat and Urry's (1982) terms, sourced in the hypothetico-deductive and inductive-statistical modes of investigation in the natural sciences. Without entering the philosophical debate surrounding these methods, it can be argued that absolute predictions of social action present a range of problems on which social science has not established any widespread consensus in terms of solutions.

Structuration theory suggests that much of social action is 'routine', 'recursive' and 'repetitive' but that such action is 'monitored' and 'rationalised'. In addition the introduction of unintended consequences of intentional acts being fed back to the actor for subsequent monitoring and rationalization of that action, in a particular action context, may be influenced by more distant contexts complicates probabalistic prediction to the point of impossibility. Furthermore, the likelihood of varying valences being attached to events by the social actor make prediction an unattainable objective for social theory. The recursive nature of social action might well tempt the analyst into probabalistic predictions,

but the potentially vast array of conditional statements supporting such predictions will at very least limit the predictions to narrow and closely defined action contexts, and thus dispensing with the possibility of general laws of social action.

Giddens holds no objection to any method of analysis,

"I do not believe that there is anything in either the logic or substance of structuration theory which would somehow prohibit the use of some specific research technique"(14).

In Burrell and Morgan's terms, nomothetic methodologies are designed to "focus upon the process of testing hypothesis in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour"(15) and as such equates to the ends to which data collection is aimed, i.e. the establishment of general laws. Explanation for Giddens "is contextual, the clearing up of queries" (16). Furthermore, "Most 'why' questions do not need a generalisation to answer them, nor do the answers logically imply that there must be some generalisation lurking around which could be invoked to back up the answers" (17). There can therefore be no restriction on the method of research given the proviso of the aims of the analyst.

Classifying structuration theory in terms of Burrell and Morgan's criteria suggests that the theory leans heavily towards a subjectivist approach to social science. The duality of structure essentially bridges only one of the subjectivist/objectivist distinguishing criteria - that of the nominalist/realist positions, the introduction of Kelly's personal construct theory allows the retention of the duality.

4.2 OPERATIONALISING STRUCTURATION THEORY

In the foregoing discussion of the duality of structuration theory, the issue of 'methodology' raises the question of what data is to be collected as evidence of the duality and how that answers 'why' questions as related to the context of analysis. The following discussion helps to clarify both the direction and kind of data to be collected in the explanation of social conduct.

The contextual focus of explanation in this thesis is (broadly) the Garment Manufacturing Industry of South Africa (G.M.S.A.). In turn the G.M.S.A. consists of (formally) autonomous regions: those of the Cape, Transvaal and Natal. It is at these regions and by means of industrial councils that our attention can be focused on the activity referred to as collective bargaining. The industrial councils represent "sets of transformative relations organised as properties of social systems" (18). They can also be viewed as a system in that they represent "reproduced relations between actors or collectivities organised as regular social practices" (19). The industrial councils referred to in this thesis have been in existence since the 1930's and have exhibited similar practices over the years, and can therefore be referred to as institutions. The similarity of practices is readily observable in the activities undertaken by way of the industrial councils. A history of industrial council activities shows not only the continuity of collective bargaining in the minutes of the respective councils, but also in the formalisation of the results of such bargaining in their publication in government gazettes. Furthermore, publications by industrial councils and the minutes of various meetings of the collectivities involved in the industrial councils, are further evidence of the continuity of practices. Industrial councils also manage aspects of the

agreements reached by management and union(s). Thus provident and medical benefit funds are (amongst others) evidence of a continuity of action. Similarly, the content of the negotiations - in the sense of categories of bargaining issues - have remained substantially the same, as can be evidenced in the minutes of industrial councils and in government gazette publications.

The similarity of action presupposes structure, thus,

"Structure thus refers, in social analysis, to the structuring properties [rules and resources] allowing the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernably similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systemic' form" (20).

The identification of structure can be found in the knowledge held by the actor and in social practices. The knowledge held by actors is identifiable at two levels of consciousness, specifically that of discursive and practical consciousness.

"we can say that an awareness of social rules, expressed first and foremost in practical consciousness is the very core of that 'knowledgeability' which specifically characterizes human agents" (21).

Establishing the make-up of the practical conscious might, initially, suggest a restriction of methodological techniques to those involving some 'interrogation' of the actor. However, it can be argued that 'what is said' (i.e. at the discursive level) can also be taken to be interpretable to

establish knowledge held at the level of practical consciousness. Also, that which is simply done can be seen as a reflection of knowledge held in the practical consciousness.

Kelly's construct theory allows the analyst a mechanism for establishing constructs held by the individual. The original approach to construct elicitation involved person-to-person interrogative approaches, but knowledge of the nature of constructs allows for the analysis of recorded statements and the identification of appropriate constructs. Utilising construct theory it is then feasible to establish the structural properties held by the knowledgeable actor at the level of the practical conscious. Furthermore, constructs held by the actor make up the 'interpretive scheme' which in structuration theory represents the modality of "signification" as found in interaction. The identification of constructs - relevant to a field of action - then allow for the establishing of the rules of which the actor is knowledgeable, and so provides evidence of structure.

The industrial councils of the Cape, Transvaal and Natal provided access to the minutes of all meetings. These minutes recorded the discussions between representatives of the respective union and management representatives. On occasions - i.e. where they occurred - statements from state representatives were also recorded. The minutes of meetings held by the union, e.g. shop steward meetings, annual general meetings and exco meetings were also made available. Similarly, equivalent management association minutes were also made available where they existed. Lastly, what may be termed official publications were also available for analysis. Thus in the Cape and Transvaal the industrial councils produced an annual report detailing services provided; the Natal union produced an annual report not only on Union activities

but also on services provided (to their members) by the industrial council of Natal. Additionally, the National Clothing Manufacturers Association (N.C.M.A.) made available their annual report as well as copies of a newsletter circulated to their membership.

Given an 18 year review period, i.e. 1968 to 1986, the above sources of discursive knowledge represented a mass of data for which some focus was required. The focus of the thesis is the social practice of collective bargaining at the level of the industrial council - and in the clothing industry of South Africa. For this reason analytical activity was focused on the minutes of the various councils dealing with bargaining activity and on the minutes of the collectivities participating in such bargaining and specifically the minutes of such meetings at which either preparations for negotiations were discussed, or where feedback on progress or results were given and/or discussed. The restriction of the field of analysis never-the-less presented difficulties in analysis and the presentation of evidence to support conclusions.

Table 1 to this section of the thesis represents the method of summarising (and analysing) the minutes of the negotiations. The 'back' of the document was divided into two sections, that of 'management' and that of 'union'. Each line of the minutes of the negotiations (i.e. as recorded by the secretaries of the respective industrial councils) was analysed for underlying constructs and where found the relevant statement and line in which it could be found was recorded. Evidence supporting the constructs identified was also drawn from minutes of meetings of the collectivities dealing with negotiations. This evidence is not reflected in Table 1, but is fully referenced when presented in support of arguing a

CAPE Region

YEAR + DATE 19-9-73 Meeting No 2 p91.

TABLE 1

MANAGEMENT	LANGUAGE (KIND + FREQUENCY)	Language
<p>INTEGRATIVE</p> <p>1-13 CHM NTRD TO UNION</p> <p>44/45 to EMRS</p> <p>52/55 to EMRS</p> <p>56/58 Secy clarificatn</p> <p>59/60 UNION PRODS</p> <p>61/63 Sec. Confm</p> <p>64 Union apas</p> <p>83 - adjourn</p> <p>84/7 return to EMRS</p> <p>113/6 No agree in 5th again</p> <p>122/6 - Blalw</p> <p>127/29 consider</p>	<p>18/109 the employers side had extended their offer to the full extent of c.k's mandate</p> <p>88/89 "Employers' mandate" was complete, finished with the last offer</p> <p>100 "I should not see it as way clear"</p> <p>108/110 "unless agreement was reached at the present meeting, the C.A.T. R. will withdraw all offers that had been made"</p> <p>179 "the employers side appreciated the employees point of view"</p>	
<p>DISTRIBUTIVE</p> <p>46/51 interjection</p> <p>89/110 withdrawal no accept</p>	<p>11/12 "We cannot accept the offer"</p> <p>153/55 the 183/5 "what has been any</p> <p>Admissibility of employers' giving 15% straight off the net instead of waiting for another two years</p>	
<p>INTRASTRUCTURAL STRUCTURING</p> <p>30/32</p> <p>5/67 look after bank</p> <p>15/8</p>	<p>41 "the meeting, were 'admonish' on the question of"</p> <p>80/81 "Union asked that the employers consider raising their offer"</p>	
<p>INTRASTRUCTURAL STRUCTURING</p> <p>57/40 Chm comment on inter area comp. + advertisement</p> <p>56/8 refer to C.O.E. argument in previous meeting 173/4 response</p> <p>174/82 response, 207/19 response: 200 adj: 216/223</p> <p>INION Chm notes imparts: No Negotiation till 7.01.</p>	<p>14/43 - Union, same starting rate male/female; 15% now + 1% (work in after 2 yrs; 15 min tea break. 65/80 wage proposals for male female</p> <p>ISSUE & MOVEMENT SUPERVISORS; 10% extra for sample machinist; set leader allowance + unskilled labour + Watchman want 18.30 not 15.18; 89/110 agree 15 min; agree starting rate same for male + female; reject mach wage but female want up to 16.00; reject 5% for P.D.V. fund. 179/84 refer of Central Labour Board; labour board wants C.O.E. inc. for Blacks. (200) = adjourn. 211/5 the accept 12 1/2% for all categories other than Mach = 15% + 2% in 3rd yr, qualified = not less than 16.00.</p>	
<p>INTEGRATIVE</p> <p>14/43</p> <p>111/12 reject new offer</p>	<p>14/43 - Union reject previous offers submit offer - NOG at quiet general meeting "it's packed to capacity" 117/21 Union raises issue of off-site workers; 15% can suggest male issue is mach. Chm will look at issue as soon as agreement on mach. 141/55 Union response to about is one of financial hardship. Loss of money for bus. Hardship argument presented in support of union claims and that employees would totally reject (8/106) unless offer</p>	
<p>UTILITARIAN STRUCTURING</p> <p>17/21</p> <p>38/38</p> <p>41/55 response to Chairman.</p> <p>68/72</p> <p>15/8</p> <p>13/194</p> <p>19/206</p>	<p>14/43 - Union reject previous offers submit offer - NOG at quiet general meeting "it's packed to capacity" 117/21 Union raises issue of off-site workers; 15% can suggest male issue is mach. Chm will look at issue as soon as agreement on mach. 141/55 Union response to about is one of financial hardship. Loss of money for bus. Hardship argument presented in support of union claims and that employees would totally reject (8/106) unless offer</p>	

particular position - specifically in those parts of the thesis dealing with each region's constitution of meaning.

The practice of bargaining also relates to substantive issues and these in turn allow for interpretation to arrive at an understanding of the knowledge held by actors. Two sections on Table 1 were intended to capture these substantive issues. Firstly, that section headed 'Core Bargaining - Issue and Movement' was designed to summarise what was being negotiated, what the starting positions of the collectivities were and any changes in those positions with the progress of the bargaining activity. Secondly, that section headed 'Bargaining Themes' was designed to capture the arguments presented by each party. The first section did not function particularly well as starting positions and movement were inadequately recorded for thesis purposes. The second section was able to capture the thrust of the respective party's argument and therefore lent support to the identification of constructs.

A further section on Table 1 is headed 'Language (Kind and Frequency)' - this section, it was hoped, would reflect levels of intensity of emotion as associated with particular issues. However, the method of recording minutes did not allow such feelings to be clearly evidenced.

The identification of constructs then is the means chosen to establish knowledge held by the actor at the level of Practical consciousness. It should be added that construct theory avoids any ontological debate about the 'nature of man' and as has been argued earlier is able to support the contention of a duality.

The second approach to identification of structure is by interpretation of social practices, thus Giddens states:

"the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise" (22).

Further,

"the rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction" (23).

Lastly,

"Structure, as recursively organised sets of rules and resources, is out of time and space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces" (24).

It is evident from the above that the identification of structure is possible by way of analysing social action.

Social practices in the garment industry of the three regions were empirically established by analysis of documentation found largely within industrial councils, and the following description of research activity represents the mode of identifying such practices which in turn after analysis will identify structure. It should be born in mind that the identification of structural properties is (finally) based on both an analysis of action and knowledge held at the level of practical consciousness. The structural properties identified must (logically) be identical - the duality of structure.

Social conduct in the different regions can be classified as the immediate context of collective bargaining as well as more 'distant' contexts. These contexts are not to be viewed as distinct other than analytically. There exist relations of autonomy and dependence which allows for systemic integration, nor should they be solely viewed as a constraint on action as structure must be viewed as "both constraining and enabling" (25).

4.3 BARGAINING ACTION

Table 1 reflects an analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising Walton and McKersie's Behavioural Theory of Bargaining. Walton and McKersie focus on collective bargaining as a rule making process which is presented as a goal directed activity, "a set of instrumental acts which can be more or less intelligently conceived and more or less expertly executed" (26).

Walton and McKersie (27) suggest that bargaining behaviour can be classified four ways, i.e. there are four bargaining behaviours. These are -

- (a) Distributive
- (b) Integrative
- (c) Attitudinal Structuring
- (d) Intra-Organisational

Each with its own "internal logics" and its "own identifiable set of instrumental acts or tactics" (28).

(a) Distributive Bargaining

A hypothetical construct referring to those activities instrumental to the attainment of one party's goals when they are in basic conflict with those of the other party. The function is to solve pure conflicts of interest - "bargaining" in the usual sense of the word. Goal conflict can be based around a variety of values and the allocation of various resources - thus,

the process is not concerned solely with economic conflict; it may relate to power or status problems also. In terms of game theory, distributive bargaining is a fixed-sum game - one party's gain is a loss to the other.

(b) Integrative Bargaining

Refers to those activities instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict between the parties. These objectives define an area of common concern; a problem that by its nature permits solutions that benefit both parties, or at least, the gains of one side do not represent equal sacrifices by the other. In game theory terms - a variable-sum game.

(c) Attitudinal Structuring

Another major function of negotiations is influencing the relationships between the parties - for example, friendliness or hostility, competitiveness or co-operation, trust and respect. Existing relationships are obviously influenced by enduring structural factors, (technology, market, basic ideologies etc.) but negotiators often seek to produce attitudinal change during the interaction.

Attitudinal structuring refers to those activities instrumental to "the attainment of desired relationship patterns between parties". Unlike distributive/integrative bargaining which are joint decision-making processes, attitudinal structuring is a socio-emotional interpersonal process.

(d) Intra-organizational Bargaining

Unlike the three processes already discussed, intra-organizational bargaining refers to the activities taking place within the parties and not between them. It refers to consensus-seeking behaviour - those activities that structure the relationships between negotiators and those they represent.

Table 1 reflects on the left hand side four management and four union squares. Each square was used to record behaviour as categorised by Walton and McKersie. Each line of the minutes of the negotiations was classified by behaviour type and by source, i.e. management or union. The behaviour was recorded by line so that the extent of particular behaviours could be measured. It was then a relatively simple matter to computerise the information and different presentations/arrangements of the data could be made. This aspect of the analysis of action proved to be useful support for the contention that much of social practice is recursive - patterns of bargaining behaviour could be established.

Collective bargaining behaviour was also recorded in terms of the number of times it occurred, the number of meetings over which each bargaining process was carried. The length of time each meeting took is reflected in the number of lines of minutes and lastly the results of each exercise can be seen in changes to what can globally be described as 'conditions of employment'.

The changes in minimum wages, contributions and benefits of various (managed) funds (e.g. provident, medical benefits), training and qualification requirements and so on are all to be found in industrial council documentation and/or government gazette publications, all of which acted as source material in establishing kind and quantity of bargaining conduct.

4.4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In utilising Walton & McKersie's behavioural theory of bargaining, the question is raised as to whether different 'psychologies' of collective bargaining might not provide a more fruitful mechanism. Walker (29) notes the importance attached by industrial relations practitioners on psychological factors and that they (the psychological factors) are "also often referred to in the scientific literature on industrial relations" (30). Nevertheless, whilst a "psychology of industrial relations exists" psychologists have "contributed very little". The result is that the treatment of psychological factors consists mostly of ad hoc postulations almost at a common sense level, rather than operationally measurable concepts articulated with the body of psychological theory" (31).

In an attempt to address this deficiency, Magenau and Pruitt (32) after reviewing the literature on negotiations argue that four questions "about the outcome of negotiations have dominated (past) research" (33).

- (i) What determines the likelihood of reaching agreement in negotiation?
 - (ii) What determines the speed at which agreement will be reached?
 - (iii) Under what circumstances will one party do substantially better than the other?
 - (iv) Under what circumstances will the parties be able to find and adopt integrative solutions
- (34).

Magenau and Pruitt argue that their analysis of the literature shows that scholars "have attempted to account for the location of the average demand made during negotiation and the aspirations and limits underlying this demand" (35).

In addition four strategies are identified,

Strategy I, Break off negotiation

Strategy II, Concede

Strategy III, Persuade the other party to concede

Strategy IV, Co-ordinated movement towards mutually satisfactory ends

(It will be noted at this stage in the discussion the similarity Strategy III and IV have with Distributive and Integrative bargaining)

The factors influencing the choice of strategies can be grouped "under three main variables" (36). These are, firstly, "the strength of one's current demand; secondly, "the motive to reach agreement" and lastly, "trust, which is the expectation of co-operation from the other bargainer".

The concepts introduced above have subsequently been more fully developed by Pruitt and Rubin (37) who state,

"There are few books on the psychology of social conflict - and still fewer that draw heavily, as we do, on the sophisticated theories about social conflict to be found in other fields of social science, such as sociology, economics, management, industrial relations and international relations" (38).

Pruitt and Rubin (39) propose a 'strategic choice model based on a perceptual understanding of conflict rather than from a behavioural standpoint, and argue that any conflict situation represents at least one strategy from a possible five strategies.

Firstly, there is the strategy of 'Contending' which is the attempt to impose one's preferred solution on the other party. Secondly, there is 'Yielding' which as a strategic choice refers to the lowering of one party's aspirations. Thirdly, is a 'problem solving' strategy which is defined as "persuing an alternative that satisfies the aspirations on both sides" (40).

The fourth strategy refers to 'Withdrawing' which is described as "choosing to leave the scene of conflict, either physically or psychologically" (41). Lastly, there is the strategy of 'inaction'.

In addition to these strategic choices, the authors make the following points. It has to be accepted that the strategies are likely to be exercised in 'various combinations in different conflict situations, and that a distinction must be made in terms of strategy and tactics. Strategy "constitutes a set of (macroscopic) objectives and ends" and tactics "are the (relatively microscopic) means to these ends" (42).

Thirdly, the authors offer a further classification/grouping of the five strategies, viz. 'Contending', 'Yielding' and 'Problem Solving' are seen to be 'Coping' strategies "in the sense that each involves some relatively consistent, coherent effort to settle conflict" (43). The remaining strategies of 'Withdrawing' and 'Inaction' "are strategies of not coping but of pause or abandonment" (44).

There are a number of observations about this model which can be made at this point. The first is that all the strategies presented have been described in behavioural, rather than identifying psychological variables associated with such classes of behaviour. The psychological aspects underlying the behaviour will be dealt with later but it is useful to note at this stage the doubtfulness of Pruitt and Rubin to link their psychology of conflict to the strategic behaviours.

Pruitt and Rubin's distinction between strategy and tactic is also problematic in that their classification presents strategy in behavioural terms rather than in terms of 'objectives' and 'ends', which then confounds their use of their own definition of 'tactic'. Again, the strategies identified are very similar to those of Walton and McKersie. The difference appears to lie in the understanding in industrial relations (see Salamon (45), Chamberlain & Kuhn (46) and others) that the parties to collective bargaining accept the continuity of their relationship, thus, if - for industrial relations purposes - the 'withdrawing' strategy (and the 'inaction' strategy, given time constraints for all parties in collective bargaining) are consequently not options, then the so-called coping strategies are essentially a reformulation of Walton and McKersie's 'Behavioural theory of Bargaining' (47).

The 'psychological' content of Pruitt and Rubin's model is to be found in their description of a party's understanding of 'conflict'. This they define as the "perceived divergence of interest or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously" (48). This clash of interest has its roots in the notion of 'aspirations', which in turn can be viewed as "goals and standards" (49). Goals

refer to some end objective conceived more or less precisely and a standard is a "minimum level of achievement below which one views one's outcomes as inadequate" (50).

In linking the notion of aspirations to strategy the authors utilise "two theoretical notions about the determinants of choice of strategy, these are firstly, the 'dual concern model' which "traces strategic choice to the relative strength of concern about own and other's outcomes" and secondly, "the perceived feasibility perspective (which) attributes this choice to the perceived likelihood of success and the cost of enacting the various strategies" (51).

Without disputing the existence of the theoretical entities introduced by Pruitt and Rubin, they do present methodological problems for any psychological analysis of collective bargaining. Where - as in this thesis - the investigation is historical and longitudinal, one can only infer from (recorded) behaviours the psychological states referred to by Pruitt and Rubin. Furthermore, the 'two theoretical notions' are claimed to be related to the choice of strategy. It then becomes difficult from historical data to identify or distinguish these 'notions'.

In summary, the 'strategic choice model' of Pruitt and Rubin identifies the behaviours utilised by Walton and McKersie, but do not provide as thorough definitional statements of their behaviours, thus utilising their descriptions becomes even more problematic than the Walton and McKersie classification. Again, inferring the psychological notions introduced by Pruitt and Rubin from historical behavioural data poses problems. This is not to deny the salience of these concepts,

but rather their relationship with behaviour requires - methodologically - that the research activity be conducted at the time and place of the conflict event. The (methodological) choice of Walton and McKersie's model and construct theory remain appropriate to the analysis embarked on in this thesis.

4.5 'DISTANT' CONTEXTS

The action context of collective bargaining can be seen to be related/integrated with other action contexts and as has been shown this systemic integration reflects relations of autonomy and dependence. These relationships can be identified by way, firstly, of rules generated in one action context having application in another context - (and secondly) whilst this tends to give the impression of a position of dependence and constraint, those actors in the 'subordinate' position have "some resources" with which to "influence the activities of their superiors" (52). This Giddens refers to as the "dialectic of control". Methodologically this observation is important in that it is founded on the contention that power "characterizes not specific types of conduct but all action" (53). Power is inherent in all relationships, and as such cannot be viewed as a phenomena in some way to be acquired and exercised in the attainment of sectional interests; "Resources are the media through which power is exercised" (54).

Action in these distant contexts is also important as it is likely to be 'monitored' and incorporated into the body of knowledge held by the actor - again, this should not be construed as some form of environmental determinism as reciprocal relations of influence (the dialectic of control) negates such a contention. Nevertheless, as Giddens argues, control over distant contexts may be beyond the individual actor, nor does

it "compromise the possibility that actors' own theories of social systems which they help to constitute and reconstitute in their activities may reify those systems" (55).

The wider action context of collective bargaining in the garment industry can be described as the political, social and economic systems of the South African social totality, provided substantivist notions of these contexts are not interpreted too literally. In establishing both the rules generated (largely as canons of law) by these contexts and relationships of influence, various texts were consulted. Legislative action is readily identifiable from industrial relations texts. Additionally, reference was made to the Standard Bank Data Base (computerised economic data), the Nedbank Economic Review and the Bureau of Statistical Services.

In terms of relationships of influence exercised by parties to the bargaining process on the wider political, social and economic contexts, reference was made to industrial council records of participation in various commissions of enquiry and Wage Board enquiries. Equally independent (of the industrial councils) representations by management and unions to state bodies were also referenced. Both parties to industrial council agreements reflected membership of more encompassing bodies. The unions were members of the Trade Union Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) - for most of the review period - and Management were members of Chambers of Commerce as well as their own National body, i.e. the National Clothing Federation. These organisations would exercise influence on behalf of its members and, where available, reference was made to their documentation.

The action context over which the practice of collective bargaining appears to have more immediate control can be conceived of as the context in which their membership interact. It is the context of work with a specific focus on labour that is of importance to this thesis.

4.6 THE GARMENT INDUSTRY DATA BASE

Formal bureaucratic and legislative rules are easily identifiable by reference to industrial council documentation and government gazettes. The range of issues covered by these rules can be encapsulated in the notion of 'conditions of employment' and refer to such issues as minimum wage, contributions and benefits to/from funds (e.g. provident and medical), engagement/termination procedures, training and qualification period stipulations and the policing of agreements.

Practices in this context were established by reference to industrial council records, and union and management documentation.

The pattern of employment in the respective regions was established from provident fund records and records of employment, which had to be submitted by factories to their respective industrial councils.

Industrial councils for the regions recorded gross employment figures as well as male/female breakdowns and the total number of factories active in their area of operation. The Councils, however, did not (readily) provide the following data:

- (i) Age
- (ii) Employment levels by job category
- (iii) Frequency of entrance or exit from the industry (labour turnover)
- (iv) Movement between job categories

In an attempt to establish points (i) to (iv) above, detailed information was drawn from pension fund record cards of individual employees. A random sample of actual record cards were drawn and detail from them recorded. It is to be noted that all industrial councils kept two banks of records; firstly, those records of 'Active' workers, defined as either still employed in the industry or having worked in the industry in the past five years. A second bank reflected data on individuals who had worked in the industry but not in the last five years. (Note: the cut-off period of five years varied between regions but was never more than 5 years).

In the Cape a sample of 1000 'Active' and 1000 'Inactive' record cards were drawn and in Natal and the Transvaal 500 of each were drawn. Table 2 is the form used to extract data off the record cards. Such data was captured on computer and processed to provide the detail of employment patterns (over the review period) not readily available from council records.

When examining the employment detail of each region drawn from these records it might appear that the samples given are small in relation to the total number of record cards drawn for that region; for example, in the Natal section, Table 11 depicts the male/female breakdown of machinists over the review period. The total sample for this table ranges between 82(1968) and 192(1984). The reason for this is that such a table can only be constructed for a particular moment of that year. It was decided to select the 1st November of any year as the time point to reflect such structure. This date was selected (a) to provide comparative consistency and (b) as a point where employment was likely to be unaffected by

- (i) Seasonal demand for products
- (ii) Beginning of the year employment surges, and
- (iii) End of year decreases (for whatever reason) in employment

In addition, data recorded on the pension fund cards were unable to provide the raw material for certain analyses. The record cards reflected job title at employment, but did not record the individual's job title when leaving. This made it impossible to establish any promotional detail for the sample. Equally, whilst recording both the entry and exit wage rate, it became difficult to establish what proportion of the sample were paid more than the negotiated minimum wage (or less than).

The pension fund records nevertheless allowed for the establishment of

- (i) Age distribution by sex
- (ii) Number of entrances to the industry by age and the number of exits
- (iii) Employment by job category

Action in the garment industry cannot be confined to an analysis of employment patterns. The various funds which are administered by the industrial councils on behalf of the parties will also reflect action in the industry. For this reason reference was made to documentation dealing with these funds which recorded the volume and nature of action. Particular use was made of balance sheets and income statements of these funds as the financial detail encapsulates both the volume and nature of action associated with these funds. The subsequent analyses of these funds widens the description of action in the industry and thus allows for increasing the specificity of evidence of structure as conceived of in this thesis.

Further evidence of structure was obtained through an analysis of action in the collectivities represented in the context of collective bargaining. The minutes of meetings held by both union and management were analysed. In addition balance sheets and income

statements were referenced as (again) such documentation provides data on activities undertaken and measures of the volume of such activities. Financial statements referenced were solely drawn from Union organisations as no such (equivalent) documentation for the management associations existed.

The discussion so far presents a cross-sectional view of structure and requires explication of the dynamic of social action, in this thesis's terms 'Structuration'. The dynamic in structuration theory is to be found in the modalities of structuration which "serve to clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in interaction, relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural features" (56).

Rules can be classified into, firstly, those of signification and secondly, those of legitimation and can be derived from - in Giddens's terms - 'interpretive scheme(s)' and from 'Norms'. The identification of the constructs utilised in interaction in collective bargaining (Kelly's range/focus of convenience) provide the basis for establishing the rules of signification and legitimation. The third structural principle, that of domination, can readily be identified in the mechanisms which control both 'Allocative' and 'Authoritative' resources - "facility" in Giddens's terms. The data required to identify the structural principles in the garment industry is then drawn from the documentation already referred to and in the mechanisms of the industrial councils, as well as those mechanisms within these collectivities which form the parties to the negotiations.

An important proposition in structuration theory is that much of social action is 'recursive' and that action also reproduces the conditions that give rise

to such action (this is not a form of determinism because of the 'reflexive monitoring' of the 'knowledgeable agent'). The recursive nature of social action will be established by reference to minutes of negotiations, industrial council publications, financial reports of managed funds and similar documentation - where available - from the collectivities who are parties to the negotiations.

4.7 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

4.7.1 The Minutes

The Cape industrial council reflected 8 formal (in the sense of being in terms of the procedural requirements of the Industrial Conciliation Act) negotiations between 1969 and 1986, each negotiation usually consisted of 3 meetings and the number of lines (in total) of the minutes of these negotiations was 10 021. For the Transvaal a total of 10 122 lines were analysed for 7 negotiations which usually ran to at least three meetings. It should be noted that the 1974 negotiations were not recorded in the Transvaal minutes nor was the 1st meeting of the 1982 negotiations. The Natal minutes of negotiations were only available from 1974 and are marked by being considerably briefer than those of the Cape and the Transvaal. The Natal minutes reflected a total of 2 636 lines, 6 negotiations from 1974 to 1986 and usually with more meetings per negotiation than either the Transvaal or the Cape. Table 3 overpage reflects this detail.

Table 3 apart from identifying recursive behaviour is also instructive in respect of the notions of 'reflexive monitoring', the regionalization of action and the relationships with more distant action contexts. Negotiations in the different regions occur at different time points and are 'monitored' (as will be shown later) by actors, forms part of their 'knowledgeability' and is drawn upon in interaction.

TABLE 3

INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL NEGOTIATIONS

Year	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	(Total) No. of Meetings	Total Lines
CAPE	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	-	1	2	-	2	-	3	19	10 022
TVL	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	3	5	-	5	-	24	10 122
NATAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	-	3	-	-	5	-	6	-	6	29	2 636

The minutes of the Cape and Transvaal negotiations were taken by one secretary (to each council) over the review period, and if any bias existed it should at least be consistent over the period. However, it must be noted that the minutes were circulated to all members of negotiating teams and there were never any objections (to aspects of the minutes) recorded. The Cape and Transvaal minutes also reflect verbatim quotations which provided a basis for establishing constructs held by the negotiating parties.

The Natal minutes on the other hand, are much briefer and are generally a summary of the proceedings as conceived of by that council's secretary. Two secretaries were involved in keeping minutes over the review period. These minutes do at least provide detail on the substantive issues and provide some direction to an understanding of the constructs held. It should also be noted that objections to the content of the minutes were not found, suggesting that the parties were satisfied with the completeness and accuracy of the minutes.

4.7.2 Minimum Wages

The minimum wages for each region were recorded from the Government Gazettes published after each negotiation.

Job titles in each region changed over the review period, thus sex discrimination was abolished (legislatively) in 1981, new titles were added and others removed (over the review period). This then complicates the analyst's ability to compare minimum wages over the review period. It was nevertheless possible to compile wage curves for selected points over the review period and in so doing, show how the shape of the wage curve remained constant over the

period even though there was a widening of differentials within each curve - this due to the negotiating procedure (generally adhered to) of agreeing a single percentage increase for all employees per agreement.

4.7.3 Bargaining Behaviour (i.e. Walton and McKersie's model)
Classifying the 22 779 lines of the negotiations along Walton and McKersie's dimensions of bargaining behaviour present a few analytical problems.

Distributive bargaining is essentially reflective of saying "no" to the other party's proposals. However, the rejection of proposals can also be seen to have an 'attitudinal structuring' effect which complicates the process of classification. Subtle messages may be communicated in the manner in which a proposal is rejected; such subtleties are difficult, if not impossible, to discern in the minutes of the negotiations. The procedure followed to classify behaviour was then that all rejections of proposals were classified as Distributive Bargaining.

Where argument either for a party's proposals or for the rejection of the other side's proposals were given, these were classified as Attitudinal Structuring. Intra-organisational bargaining was only identifiable from the minutes in terms of recordings of breaks in the meetings for the parties to remove themselves for the purpose of 'caucusing', i.e. no content of such behaviour was recorded in the minutes of the negotiations. It will be seen in the discussions dealing with the specific regions that very little by way of Integrative Bargaining was readily identifiable, thus the essential character of bargaining in all three regions revolved around Distributive Bargaining and Attitudinal Structuring.

CONCLUSION

The methodological problems referred to above revolve around procedures used to establish 'structure' in terms of the 'knowledge' held by the actor. It must be borne in mind that these sources are part of the evidence utilised, and that activities undertaken represent an additional source of evidence, the data for which is much more absolute. It is from the interpretation of both these sources that structure in the garment industry will be established.

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CHAPTER 5

THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE CAPE GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this section evidence will be led in support of the argument of the duality of structure. Structure exists only in "its instantiations and as memory traces" (1). This reformulation of the notion of structure provides the opportunity to present data - separated for the purpose of presentation only - from observable patterns and from the "interpretive scheme" of the social actor. The research data drawn from the Cape region not only - it is argued - supports structuration theory's main contention, i.e. the duality of structure, but also supplies evidence in support of other propositions of the theory.

The Cape industrial council was some 34 years old at the start of the review period (i.e. 1968-1986) and had a history of bargaining and the administration of agreements. This pattern continued along recognizably similar lines and can be seen to represent institutionalised behaviour. The repetition or routinization of action is an important facet of structuration theory as "the moment of the production of action is also one of reproduction", also, "agents also reproduce the conditions that make such action possible" (2). Any suggestion in this depiction of a 'closed system' should be rejected as structuration theory firstly conceives of the social agent as a 'reflexively monitoring' being, and secondly "the flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by actors".

Observable action then is a readily identifiable indication of structure, the 'instantiations' of structure can then be collected and over a period of time will provide evidence of the nature of structure in the system under investigation. The set of data will still need interpretation to be able to specify the kind of structure peculiar to the area of study, i.e. rules and resources (and/or sets of transformative relations) need to be identified. The interpretation of action to establish structure can be supported by reference to the knowledge held by the actor and drawn upon in action.

The knowledge held by the actor provides an additional source of evidence for arguing a particular structure of a given action context. The identification of the kind of structure held by the knowledgeable agent should support interpretations of observable action. In structuration theory this would require some depiction of the individual's 'interpretive scheme'. This, it has been argued, can be profitably achieved by the application of Kelly's construct theory.

This section will then present data on "instantiations" and the "interpretive scheme" which will then be used to argue not only the duality of structure but also a particular kind of structure as well as supporting other propositions of structuration theory. Evidence will be provided under the headings of

- (1) The Growth of the Industrial Council
- (2) The Funds of the Council
- (3) The Parties to the Agreements
- (4) The Employment Form
- (5) The Wage Form

The evidence identifying structure by way of the knowledge held by the actor is drawn from statements made by actors. These statements are drawn from the minutes of the negotiations kept by the Council as well as from minutes of the respective collectivities when dealing with their membership. These statements are presented under the section headed "Interpretive Schemes" and are used to identify constructs drawn upon by the actors.

The identification of constructs and action (i.e. parts (1) to (5) above) provide the basis for arguing the duality of structure and further will be utilised to specify the particular type of structure in the Cape industry. This will be found in the final part of each regional analysis.

5.2 PART A - FORM

5.2.1 The Industrial Council (See Table 1)

In 1969 the Cape industrial council (C.I.C.) was 34 years old having been formed on the 28th May, 1935, and formally registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act on the 24th February, 1936. At that time there were 30 factories employing a mere 3500 workers (chairman's report 1985). Table 1 shows that by 1969 this had grown to 247 manufacturers and 35 200 workers, and that Council income had grown from 1512 (R3024) to R69 899 (Table 1 provides further detail). Since its inception 6 individuals had been chairman 7 times and were always drawn from the ranks of the employer association. The vice-chairman in turn had always come from the union delegation.

The number of manufacturers covered by the agreement increases from 247 (1969) to 325 (1976) then slips to 308, 300, and 307 in 1977, 1978 and 1979 respectively before regaining (bettering) the 1976 position (332 in 1980). The upward trend is maintained till 1982

TABLE 1
INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL (CAPE)

Year	Manuf Nos.	Empl. NOS.	Income	Expenditure	Surplus (Deficit)	Levy Rate per week	Arrear Wages Amount No. Emp.	Contingency Insolvencies	Fund Amount
1969	247	35200	69899	66983	2916	2c	4446	386	
1970	253	37743	78058	78611	(553)	2c on either side'	8083	504	
1971	259	39811	80676	79946	724	"	6068	420	
1972	284	40249	86529	81903	4626	"	13637	880	
1973	294	40870	90081	94303	(4222)	"	14388	673	
1974	316	43452	136160	112570	23590	Feb 1974 3c	8237	768	
1975	315	43568	141602	122163	19439	"	8865	703	
1976	325	46781	155373	141037	14336	"	25121	1022	996
1977	308	42326	149589	148959	630	"	48204	1578	19030
1978	300	44600	151278	156135	(4857)	"	22084	815	10547
1979	307	48243	157828	171969	(14141)	Still 3c	N/A	N/A	4378
1980	332	53421	186983	202088	(15105)	1/9/80 Up to 4c	N/A	N/A	2355
1981	377	58199	251197	242070	9127	13/12/81 Up to 6c	N/A	N/A	6168
1982	407	59324	393954	314870	79084		N/A	N/A	6238
1983	404	57866	373391	385827	(12436)		N/A	N/A	4888
1984	412	59825	391883	448138	(56255)	Dec 1984 from 6c to 9c	N/A	N/A	2947
1985	373	51286	518624	450212	68412		N/A	N/A	93344
1986	390	52105	481443	485974	(4531)	13/12/86 to 11c "On either side"	N/A	N/A	28265

(407), decreases in 1983 (404), increases in 1984 (412). There is a substantial decrease in 1985 (9.5%) to 373 manufacturers but some optimism is reflected in 1986 with an increase to 390 employers although still below the peak of 1984.

The growth pattern of the number of people employed in the Cape industry reflects (as might be expected) the change in the growth of manufacturers. From 1969 to 1976 employment grew some 33% from 35200 to 46781, but then declined in 1977 and 1978 before rising to 48243 employees in 1979. Employment then peaked in 1984 at 59324 (70% higher than 1968) with 1983 showing a 2.5% drop in employment. The years 1985 and 1986 show a large drop in employment from the peak year of 1984, although 1986 reflects a marginal increase over 1985. The decrease in employment, 1985 over 1984 was 14.3% and 1986 over 1984 was 12.9%.

Table 1 also reflects changes (negotiated) in the contribution rate of the parties to the negotiations, moving from 2c per individual covered by the agreement and paid by both the employee and the employer, to 11c per individual. It can be seen that when the council's expenses exceed revenue the response of the parties is to increase the levy. In addition, the council provided protection to employees by way of seeing that 'Arrear Wages' were not lost to wage earners - reporting on this item ceased in 1979.

A 'Contingency Fund' was negotiated by the parties and implemented in 1976; this required of manufacturers a levy (per employee) which then acted as a reserve to ensure that employees of an insolvent company received the remuneration due to them. Table 1 also provides details on the number of insolvencies, the number of wage earners affected and the amount involved.

5.2.2 The Funds of the Industrial Council

5.2.2.1 The Provident Fund (See Table 2)

In May 1969 the provident fund was 16 years old and as can be seen from Table 2 had assets of R2.375m, an income of R228,800 and claims against the fund had amounted to R115 898,53. Contributions to the fund were determined as follows, equal contribution from both employer and employee, the size of the contribution being dependent on the wage paid/received, i.e. less than R13.18 per week meant a 13c p.w. contribution (group I) and a wage of greater than R13.18 (group II) necessitated a contribution of 15c p.w. These weekly contributions were the result of negotiations that took place in 1969 and were implemented in January of 1970.

Not only were contributions to the fund increased, but increased benefits were also agreed to by the parties to the agreement after the funds actuaries had concurred, thus the 'Death Benefit' was improved by the provision of a stipulation that the deceased's nominee receive an additional R200,00 immediately, "as many cases have occurred where there is not enough money in the family to bury the deceased" (1969 "Report by the Chairman of the Provident Fund Management Committee"). In addition, "It has also been decided to reduce the waiting period before which Withdrawal Benefits can be paid from 2 years to 1 year".

The provident fund utilised its assets to provide benefits to contributors in the form of housing loans. The 'Home Ownership Scheme' was introduced in 1958 and by 1969, "193 contributors had received financial assistance from the Fund to purchase or build their own homes" (1969 "Report by the Chairman of the Provident Fund Management Committee"). Table 2 provides further details about the growth of this benefit.

TABLE 2

Year	Income R's	Claims	Asset	Contributions		Housing Loans	
				Employers	Employees	No.	Amount
1969	228,800	N/A 115898.53	2,375,080	Group I=8c Group II=10c	Group I=8c Group II=10c	12	21,943
1970	363,657	N/A 194289.39	2,701,580	Group I=13c Group II=15c	Group I=13c Group II=15c	27	75,094
1971	404,462	N/A 185581.35	3,126,080	Ditto	Ditto	27	100,097
1972	435,654	N/A 184941.52	3,638,910	Ditto	Ditto	25	116,390
1973	454,097	N/A 210634.86	4,143,605	Ditto	Ditto	22	119,165
1974	497,124	N/A 237416.71	4,823,702	Ditto	Ditto	42	270,564
1975	516,462	N/A 227844.03	5,495,389	Ditto	Ditto	45	249,982
1976	618,907	N/A 295025.17	6,302,678	Groups Dropped 20c	20c	63	300,000
1977	741,339	N/A 330987.20	7,309,138	Ditto	Ditto	49	297,986

TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

1978	752,004	N/A 318583.85	8,421,820	Ditto	Ditto	82	299,999	Voluntary Scheme launched 1/9/79 ACC/CONTR=40761)ACTIVE INV. =43145)1390
1979	1,211,854	4139 337754.72	10,029,982	25c	25c	126	445,150	
1980	1,938,932	3230 353964.09	12,548,760	30c	50c	229	450,000	ACC.CONTR=95818)ACTIVE INV. =137255)2080
1981	2,306,464	3904 513230.95	15,639,516	Ditto	Ditto	143	700,000	ACC.CONTR=132505)ACTIVE INV. =274700)2621
1982	2,533,228	4728 867614.34	19,427,809	50c	50c	79	999,942	ACC.CONTR=439281)ACTIVE INV. =464347)2790
1983	2,924,185	6439 867614.34	24,279,949	60c	60c	57	758,660	ACC.CONTR=567594)ACTIVE INV. =698500)3177
1984	3,649,927	7772 1,099833.87	30,009,345	70c	70c	81	1,000,000	ACC.CONTR=820411)ACTIVE INV. =1065000)4372
1985	3,865,600	9515 1,571748.35	36,755,595	80c	80c	218	1,500,000	ACC.CONTR=1095645)ACTIVE INV. =1575300)5294
1986	4,093,134	11323 2,074811.94	43,569,639	1.00	1.00	346	1,500,000	ACC.CONTR=1460858)ACTIVE INV. =2113202)6053

The provident fund income is a reflection of the changes in the combinations of investment income, subscriptions and the growth in employment. The parties to the negotiations reflect a desire to maintain (at least) the assets of the fund.

Contributions have increased between some 10 to 12 times; the level of employment (whilst fluctuating) has increased around 1,48 times (1986 over 1969); and assets have grown some 18 times.

In addition the fund has utilised (part of) its funds to the benefit of wage earners in that a 'Housing Loans Scheme' was introduced in 1958. The amount available for such loans was controlled by the registrar of finances. A 'Voluntary Provident Fund' was introduced in 1979, and Table 2 reflects 'Contributions Received', 'Investments' and 'Active Contributors'.

5.2.2.2 Sick Fund (See Table 3)

The sick fund "came of age" in 1969, having been formed on the 1st October 1948 with a panel of 11 doctors. In 1969 the sick fund had a panel of 35 doctors and provided benefits to members through (i) a Gynaecological Clinic (ii) an Ante-Natal clinic and (iii) an Ophthalmic Clinic. By 1986 these services had been improved by the formation of Dental Clinics, and the appointment of a full-time doctor (1974). In addition the fund provided sick pay benefits, i.e. where an employee is off from work due to illness for more than a specified period of time, the subsequent loss of wages are (partially) made up from the sick fund. In 1970 (Table 4) the fund paid out R120 588 in sick pay benefits and by 1986 this figure had grown to R2 387 648. The quality of benefits had improved as well, thus in 1974 sick pay benefits had been increased by 10% and again in 1984 such benefits

TABLE 3

CAPE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL - SICK FUND SERVICES

Year	Subscription Rate	No. of Panel Doctors	Consultations	No. of items Dispensed	Flu Project	
1969	Range from 8c-17c ea.	35	N/R	N/R		
1970	Range from 8c-17c ea.	38	136864	N/A	93 firms participate (Bal 4491) Cost carried by fund & firm	
1971	N/R	38	On average 10,706 p.m	On average 18,281 p.m	N/R	
1972		51	132707	234953		Dental Clinic opened 1/3/72 increase in Benefits
1973		67 surgeries	149900	278200	135 firms participate 16700 vaccines R40,000 extra cost to Fund	Fund now 25 yrs @ 1/10/73 Feb 1973 flu outbreak unseasonal 16,662 days sick pay
1974	Incr. of 3c-Feb 74 1c-15/5/74	67 surgeries	N/R	N/R	33 factories 5600 members	2nd Dental Clinic opened Full time G.P. appointed Sick Pay Benefits up 10% Doctor appointed in country areas
1975		43 doctors 70 surgeries	157906	295606	N/R	G.P. seen by 4044 members
1976	5c up	53 doctors 62 surgeries	170300	N/R	180 firms 21890 members	Surplus R72,000 Intention to cut contribution groups to 2

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

1977		N/R	163125	N/R	N/R	2 rates introduced New method for calc. Sick Benefit Payments G.P. saw 5562
1978		50 doctors 65 surgeries	166000	342000	N/R	G.P. saw 5800
1979	April 79 one rate @ 23c & 5c 1/4/80	49 doctors 61 surgeries	N/R	N/R	N/R	
1980	15/12/80 up 5c	48 doctors 65 surgeries	199960	407000	N/R	G.P. saw 8460
1981		56 doctors 64 surgeries	215553	N/R	N/R	
1982	13/12/82 from 33c to 42c	49 doctors 61 surgeries	243475	493325		G.P. saw 11682 Outbreak of conjunctivitis - extra cost R170,000 - now deficit of R150,000 Improved benefits and ceiling rate up to R600 per month. Previous agreement had not taken ceiling rate into account
1983		63 doctors 72 surgeries	219611	455435		1/8/83 doctors tariff fees increase 17% G.P. saw 10152
1984	1/2/84 up 8c to 50c 13/12/8 up to 90c	68 doctors 73 surgeries	241994	488800		Improved benefits. Sick Pay now 65% of wage. Ceiling now R156.00 p.w. and waiting period down to 5 weeks. G.P. saw 10728
1985		70 doctors 79 surgeries				G.P. saw 9602
1986	1/2/86 from 90c to R1.05 R1.35 @ 13/12/86	N/R	232984	476320		G.P. saw 9178

were increased to 65% of wages. The fund had also on a number of occasions in conjunction with employers, carried out influenza vaccination programmes. Table 3, provides further detail.

In 1969 there was one panel doctor for every 1000 employees. By 1985 this figure was 732 which represents an improvement in terms of accessibility. Panel doctors were consulted 136,864 times in 1970 representing 3602 consultations per doctor and 3.63 consultations per employee. In 1986 these figures were 3328 consultations (using 1985 number of doctors) and some 4.5 consultations per employee. In addition Table 3 reflects an increasing usage of the council's full-time doctor.

Sick-pay benefits in cash benefit and days are reflected in the table below.

TABLE 4

Year	Cash Benefit	Days Benefit	Cash Benefit per day
1970	120,588	99,939	R1.21
1971	116,403	89,163	1.31
1972	126,450	91,790	1.38
1973	160,850	106,420	1.51
1974	198,175	113,970	1.74
1975	202,060	108,132	1.87
1976	248,400	117,800	2.11
1977	240,270	98,270	2.45
1978	235,217	111,782	2.10
1979	293,000	118,159	2.48
1980	358,477	131,183	2.73
1981	433,876	140,150	3.10
1982	666,808	198,198	3.36
1983	695,218	156,145	4.45
1984	1,258,689	195,625	6.43
1985	1,989,814	224,211	8.87
1986	2,387,648	239,332	9.98

Taking inflation into account the cash benefit per day should be R8.13 to remain equivalent to 1970, thus the per day cash benefit of the sick fund as at 1986 was 22.7% above comparable 1970 figures indicating an increase in real terms in respect of this benefit. In addition it needs to be born in mind that sick pay benefits were amended in 1974 and 1984.

5.2.2.3 Training Fund (Table 5)

In the 1969 'Chairman's Report' the labour position in the Cape is highlighted, "The scarcity of trained staff is the most serious limitation to the rate of development of the clothing industry in the Western Cape". The lack of skilled workers and the flow of school-leavers entering the labour market (inadequate) then represent the reasons for the establishment of a training centre to address labour shortages, particularly machinists. To this end the 'Training Fund Agreement' was negotiated by the parties to the 'Main Agreement' and it was decided that a contribution of 1c per employee would be made by the parties to the agreement.

In setting up the training centre the industrial council "has agreed to make a contribution to the cost" and from the Commissioner for Coloured Affairs "a grant of R10 000 has been made available". Table 5 provides data on the kind and quantity of training undertaken by the industry until the training centre was taken over by the National Clothing Federation - an employers body.

The chairman's reports for the years 1970 to mid 1977 reflect (also) efforts to attract and hold trainees in the industry, thus the "subsistence grant" moves up from R6,00 per week to R13,81 per week (i.e. the minimum starting wage) by 1977, a deferred bonus scheme was also tried as a way to minimise terminations after training and by classifying the

TABLE 5

TRAINING FUND

Year	Levy	Machinists			Instructors/tresses				
		En-rolled	Discon- tinued	Failed	Passed	En-rolled	Discon- tinued		Failed
1970	1c ea. per Eme.	500	84	23	393	19	0		19
1971		301	82	31	188	38	0	2	36
1972		350	94	27	229	20	1	1	18
1973		361	85	35	241	11	0	0	11
1974	2c ea Feb 1974	439	93	39	307			No report	
1975		468	113	39	316			No report	
1976		543	121	69	353			No report	
1977	1/7 NTB=10c from Employers only	342	45	14	283			No report	

Note attempt to raise flow of trainees. R6 subsistence allowance for pre-factory training, R10 deferred bonus if still with company after 10 wks. Note also recruitment patterns up Jan/Feb trickle Nov/Dec. Tight labour conditions over past 3 yrs "the past year has probably been the worst in the history of the Cape Clothing Industry" [target of 500 & 60, not met]

Investigating additional training programmes

Trainees to be paid R8 p.a. ex Training Fund - on unpaid leave from factory therefore many agreement deductions inapplicable

Special course "Reece Buttonhole machine", 37 enrolled (subs. allowance up R12) 37 successful - Training course for supervisors for 1976

"Reece" training 6 enrolled, 6 successful. Supervisors 10 in 10 success [National Training Board proposed]

Subs All: = R13.87 (min. starting wage in industry) 6 supervisors trained, 11 machinists successfully retrained

1978 C.I.T.B. No report
 1979 C.I.T.B. No statistics
 1980 C.I.T.B. List of Training Courses and Trainees
 1981 No report
 1982 No report
 1983 C.I.T.B. trained 597 people and new premises
 1984 C.I.T.B. trained over 600 people - Supervisory and Middle Management
 1985 No report
 1986 No report

payment to trainees as a "subsistence allowance" as opposed to "earnings" various deductions are avoided so making training more attractive to both employer and the trainee. Thus, "No Industrial Council Levies need be paid while employees attend the Training Centre", "No Training Fund contributions need be paid while employees attend the Training Centre", and employers would have to contribute the employee's share of contributions to the sick fund.

5.2.2.4 Exemption Committee

This is the only committee chaired by a union representative and its purpose is largely to deliberate and approve or reject applications for exemptions from the negotiated wage structure as per the agreement.

In the "Report by the Chairman of the Exemption Committee" (1971) it is stated that while some applications are based on arguments of lower productivity due to mental or physical handicaps of the employee "the majority involve the question of experience". The chairman clarifies by saying that the experience of "for example, a Grade II employee, must be taken into consideration for wage purposes, if that employee is transferred to another operation in the same category" then it is such transfers that constitute the bulk of applications for exemption. Table 6 reflects the Committee's action over the analysis period.

TABLE 6

EXEMPTION COMMITTEE
(Essentially Wage Exemption)

Year	Applications	Approved as is	Refused	Authorised at higher than proposed wage
1986	151	145	4	2
1985	188	184	3	1
1984	155	152	1	2
1983	130	126	1	3
1982	111	108	1	2
1981	119	112	2	5
1980	127	127	0	0
1979	102	101	0	1
1978	132	124	2	6
1977	131	126	1	4
1976	85	81	2	2
1975	69	63	3	3
1974	77	68	5	4
1973	69	67	2	0
1972	89	87	2	0
1971	92	88	4	0
1970	92	87	5	0
1969	76	71	5	0

5.2.3 The Parties to the Agreement

5.2.3.1 The Garment Workers Union of the Western Cape

The Garment Workers Union of the Western Cape (G.W.U.) was registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (now Labour Relations Act) in August of 1927, making it 41 years old at the start of the review period and nearly 60 years old at the end of the period.

Financial Data (see Table 7)

An examination of the Financial Data shows that the surplus to income ratio starts a dramatic slide in 1977, the explanation of which lies in the expenditure pattern of the union. Up to 1976 the relationship of income to expenditure was such that the surplus for a given year ranged between a low of 46% and a high of 66%. With the exception of 1970 and 1973 (an increase in membership fees) the percentage increase in expenditure was consistently above the percentage increase in income. However, these changes were such

as to keep the surplus to income ratio within the range mentioned. From 1978 through to 1985 only two years (1980/81) show an expenditure increase of less than 22% and in 5 of the 8 years the expenditure increased at a higher rate than did income which is reflected in the surplus to income ratio decline to a range of -4.5% to 12.8%.

An examination of the expenditure patterns for the years 1978 to 1985 reveals those expenditure items which contributed proportionately more to the annual increase in expenditure.

- 5.2.3.1a The 37.9% increase in expenditure (1976 over 1975) was largely due to the holding of a ballot and increased shop steward meetings (attendance fees rose from R3408 to R11890) In addition funeral and distress assistance rose from R9610 to R17730.
- 5.2.3.1b 1978 expenditure rose some 22% due to increases in pension fund contributions (76%), 'Meeting Expenses' (34%), 'Conference Expenses' (194% - includes an I.L.O. conference in Geneva and an International Garment Workers Federation conference in Israel for a total cost of R13982), 'Bursary Grants' (36% - about R2000) and 'Distress Payments' (25% - also R2000).
- 5.2.3.1c The increase in expenditure for 1979 was largely due to the introduction of the union newspaper called "Clothesline", the nett cost for the year being R50,499. In addition a ballot was conducted at a cost of R12,025 which had not taken place the previous year. Affiliation to the International Garment Workers Union increased 90% to R7640 and 'Conference Expenses' rose to R20,743 (48%).

TABLE 7

Year	Income	Expenditure	Surplus (Deficit)*	Accumulated Assets	Surplus over Income %	Year on Year % Increase	
						Income %	% Expend.
1969	161,410	85,491	75,919	1,052,785	47.0	-	-
1970	207,174	100,075	107,099	1,157,607	51.7	28.4	17.1
1971	231,458	112,672	118,786	1,273,926	51.3	11.7	12.6
1972	256,189	135,734	120,455	1,392,133	47.0	10.7	20.5
1973	467,370	156,149	311,222	1,697,500	66.6	82.4	15.0
1974	508,941	176,721	332,220	2,028,673	65.3	8.9	13.2
1975	482,403	196,429	285,975	2,299,786	59.3	5.2-	11.2
1976	503,659	270,798	232,861	2,449,122	46.2	4.4	37.9
1977	482,892	279,689	203,203	2,634,306	42.1	4.1-	3.3
1978	505,602	341,471	164,131	2,772,588	32.5	4.7	22.1
1979	542,714	473,260	69,455	2,821,138	12.8	7.3	38.6
1980	584,950	545,375	39,575	2,862,587	6.8	7.8	15.2
1981	653,021	625,190	27,831	2,883,219	4.3	11.6	14.6
1982	883,225	809,212	74,013	2,957,706	8.4	35.3	29.4
1983	1,094,457	999,274	95,182	2,999,376	8.7	23.9	23.5
1984	1,219,745	1,274,911	(55,166)	2,928,772	4.5-	11.4	27.6
1985	1,863,803	1,641,397	222,405	3,010,277	11.9	52.8	28.7
1986#	807,820	905,304	(97,483)	2,899,443			

* Acc Funds balancing figure is Surplus/(Deficit) from Property Income

6 months only

`Travelling and Motor' expenses rose 74% (to R11,706) and `Distress Payments' rose 44% to R14,488. Salaries and Contributions increased by 17% to R203,009.50 (from R172,452).

5.2.3.1d In 1982 the increase in expenditure can be ascribed to

- (1) Salaries and Contributions (27% to R382,480),
- (2) Clothesline (90% to R109,131)
- (3) Meeting expenses (35% to R63,805)
- (4) TUCSA affiliation fees (46% to R42,392)
- (5) Travelling and motor expenses (143% to R28,108)
- (6) Retirement benefit fund (58% to R20,500).

It should be noted that conference costs were cut from R35,156 (1981) to R20,048.

5.2.3.1e The 23.5% increase in total expenditure in 1983 is largely attributed to

- (1) Clothesline (52% to R165,699)
 - (2) Salaries and contributions (27% to R485,068)
 - (3) Conference fees (61% to R32,246)
 - (4) Bursary grants (70% to R12,625)
 - (5) Distress payments (90% to R29,275)
- and lastly an increase of 148% (from R20,500 to R50,900) to the retirement benefit fund.

5.2.3.1f The major contributors to the 1984 expenditure increase of 27.6% can be found in the following items. `Salaries and Contributions' 23% (to R598,284), `Meeting Expenses' 34% (to R77,996), `Affiliation Fees' 44% (to R67,994) and `Conference Expenses' 132% (to R74,891).

5.2.3.1g The increase of 28.7% in 1985 expenditure can largely be ascribed to the following increases.

- `Salary and Contributions' 24% (to R739,806),
- `Pension and Provident Fund' 36% (to R42,470),
- `Meeting Expenses' 27% (to R99,286), `Affiliation Fees' 29% (to R87,991), `Travelling and Motor Expenses' 44% (to R48,475). In addition
- `Bursaries' increased by 46% (to R24,140),
- `Distress Payments' 181% (to R98,466), `Legal Expenses' 244% (to R24,855), `Retirement Benefits' 160% (to R140,285) and lastly shop steward training programmes were introduced at a cost of R25,701.

5.2.3.2 The Cape Clothing Manufacturer's Association

No balance sheets or income statements were available but minutes to annual reports were available. These sources only occasionally referred to the financial status of the association and as such no longitudinal analysis was possible. These sources will however be more fully utilised when dealing with the (later) section on the constitution of meaning in the Cape system of industrial relations.

5.2.4 Employment Form

As noted in Table 1 the gross level of employment in the Cape is essentially a picture of a growing industry, certainly up to 1984. Over the 18 year review period total employment has increased some 45%.

The following statistics are drawn from data taken from provident fund cards which were randomly selected (see Methodology section) and unless otherwise stated reflect the position as at the 30th November of any year.

5.2.4.1 By SexTABLE 8

Year	Number		Percentage	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
1968	101	35	74.3	25.7
1969	109	40	73.2	26.8
1970	110	42	72.3	27.7
1971	114	41	73.5	26.5
1972	133	41	76.4	23.6
1973	148	42	77.9	22.1
1974	170	49	77.6	22.4
1975	169	51	76.8	23.2
1976	204	54	79.1	20.9
1977	220	62	78.0	22.0
1978	230	70	76.7	23.3
1979	292	68	81.1	18.9
1980	367	80	82.1	17.9
1981	493	95	83.8	16.2
1982	568	112	83.5	16.5
1983	630	113	84.8	15.2
1984	737	122	85.8	14.2
1985	692	111	86.2	13.8
1986	780	118	91.9	8.1

The pattern is evident, employment is increasingly female.

5.2.4.2 Job Category

An analysis of the job categories held by employees in the industry indicates that the single largest category is that of machinist and that it is occupied by females.

Table 9 reflects the job category "Machinist" in relation to total employment and female employment.

TABLE 9

	1968	1971	1974	1977	1980	1983	1986
Mach. as % of total Empl.	35.3	34.8	38.4	39.7	37.4	35.7	38.9
Mach. as % of female Empl.	47.5	47.4	49.4	50.9	45.5	42.1	44.7

The next largest category of employment is initially that of "Clerk" but this changes to "Cleaner" by 1977 and remains so over the balance of the review period. In neither case do the numbers in these categories represent more than 10% of total employment.

5.2.4.3 AgeTABLE 10a - FEMALE

Year	Age Un-known	<20	%	21 <30	%	31 <40	%	41 <50	%	>50	%	Total
1968	2	16	15.8	41	40.6	23	22.8	14	13.9	5	5.0	101
1971	2	36	31.6	29	25.4	22	19.3	18	15.8	7	6.1	114
1974	3	56	32.9	58	34.1	23	13.5	20	11.8	10	5.9	170
1977	4	50	22.7	86	39.1	47	21.4	22	10.0	11	5.0	220
1980	4	109	29.7	155	42.2	62	16.9	23	6.3	14	3.8	367
1983	3	180	28.6	264	41.9	112	17.8	47	7.5	24	3.8	630
1986	5	81	10.4	419	53.7	166	21.3	76	9.7	33	4.2	780

TABLE 10b - MALE

Year	Age Un-known	<20	%	21 <30	%	31 <40	%	41 <50	%	>50	%	Total
1968	1	5	14.3	9	25.7	9	25.7	8	22.9	3	8.6	35
1971	0	8	19.5	13	31.7	5	12.2	9	22.0	6	14.6	41
1974	1	8	16.3	15	30.6	10	20.4	8	16.3	7	14.3	49
1977	0	9	14.5	25	40.3	12	19.4	7	11.3	9	14.5	62
1980	0	12	15.0	34	42.5	13	16.3	9	11.3	12	15.0	80
1983	0	22	19.5	34	30.1	31	27.4	13	11.5	13	11.5	113
1986	0	16	13.6	45	38.1	26	22.0	16	13.6	15	12.7	118

The above tables represent a male/female age distribution over the review period.

The female pattern of employment allows a number of observations.

(a) It is essentially a 'young' female labour force.

Over the review period only 1971 shows more than 20% of female employment to be over 40 years of age, with that figure dropping to around 10% in the 1980's. In addition it can be seen that around 60% of female labour is 30 years or younger.

(b) The years 1977 and 1986 represent economic low points, and it can be seen how the "<20 years" group decreases suggesting that employers are not taking on 'learners', but rather focus on trained workers, thus both "21<30" and "31<40" age groups show increases for 1977 and 1986. Because the total size of the sample from which these figures have been derived increases, it can be suggested that people not employed (but trained) were drawn back into the industry, for whatever reason, returning to work is a feature of those years. Trained, but unemployed females, then made themselves available to the opportunities offered.

The 'male' age patterns are reasonably constant from one year to the next and presents something of a normal distribution curve. Some 50% of males are 30 or younger and about 30% are 41 or older.

5.2.4.4 (a) Labour Turnover

In the chairman's report of 1970 reference is made to a labour turnover survey conducted by the Industrial Council. Of the questionnaires mailed (253) 123 responses were received (49% of all employers employing 61.6% of the labour force) which indicated that 50.4% of employers experienced labour turnover rates between 0% and 24%, 36% had a labour turnover figure of between 25% and 50% and the balance (13%) reported labour turnover as greater than 50%. No other factory specific detail was available. However, industry level patterns could be established by the use of provident fund data.

One of the functions carried out by the administrators of the provident fund is to record the number of notifications of engagements and terminations to the fund, and to indicate the number of new entrants to the fund. Membership of the fund is a condition of employment and therefore reflects entry and exit levels in the industry. The table below is drawn up from industrial council documentation. Note it is not possible to tell from the documentation how many people left the industry in a particular year because "Engagements" could be made up from people who had left the industry in a previous year as well as people moving from one manufacturer to another in the same year. The table does, however, show how many people as a percentage of the total labour force resigned from a (any) factory in a given year. It also reflects a similar percentage of "New Entrants", those never before employed in the industry. Given the

provisos mentioned it can be seen that the rate of terminations appears high - it can be stated that on average - with the exception of 1969, 1978, 1979 and 1980 - 7 out of 10 employees left an employer in any one year.

The engagement and termination numbers are also a reflection of economic activity in the industry. The period 1977-79 shows lower terminations and engagements suggesting a slowing down of manufacturing activity and again an increase in activity starting in 1980 and stopping in 1982, the increase in terminations might suggest increased competition for labour which might affect actual wages. The increases in new entrants also indicates increased activity during the years 1980-82.

TABLE 11

ENTRANCES AND EXITS

Year	Total Work Force	No. of Terminations	%	No. of Engagements	%	New Entrants	%
1969	35200	22341	63.5	27091	77.0	4250	12.1
1970	37743	27565	73.0	29887	79.2	6364	16.9
1971	39811	32442	81.5	32686	82.1	6809	17.1
1972	40249	32875	81.7	34788	86.4	6760	16.8
1973	40870	33200	81.2	34500	84.4	6948	17.0
1974	43452	34600	79.6	37182	85.6	6905	15.9
1975	43568	37896	87.0	37366	85.8	7141	16.4
1976	46781	37821	80.8	41680	89.1	7219	15.4
1977	42326	32691	77.2	27453	64.9	7918	18.7
1978	44600	27359	61.3	30326	68.0	5620	12.6
1979	48243	30216	62.6	33261	68.9	9493	19.7
1980	53421	35378	66.2	41217	77.2	15318	28.7
1981	58199	44401	76.3	49179	84.5	19222	33.0
1982	59324	55566	93.7	56504	95.2	20392	34.4
1983	57866	44312	76.6	42586	73.6	11259	19.5
1984	59825	44085	73.7	46164	77.2	12883	21.5
1985	51286	40643	79.2	32416	63.2	7413	14.5
1986	52105	24748	47.5	25854	49.6	5362	10.3

5.2.4.4 (b) No. of Entrances/EngagementsTABLE 12

Year	Number of Entrances (all Employees)												Total
	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5	%	>5	%	
1968	58	42.6	33	24.3	22	16.2	16	11.8	2	1.5	5	3.7	136
1971	54	34.8	48	31.0	25	16.1	15	9.7	7	4.5	6	3.9	155
1974	76	34.7	47	21.5	42	19.2	26	11.9	13	5.9	15	6.8	219
1977	77	27.3	65	23.1	61	21.6	33	11.7	16	5.7	30	10.6	282
1980	153	34.2	130	29.1	59	13.2	41	9.2	27	6.0	37	8.3	447
1983	204	27.5	216	29.1	147	19.8	68	9.2	45	6.1	63	8.5	743
1986	231	25.7	209	23.3	154	17.2	120	13.4	71	7.9	113	12.6	898

Table 12 above is drawn from the provident fund record cards; all employees who were employed on the 30th November of a particular year were analysed in terms of the number of times they had been employed, where the period of unemployment (in the garment industry) was greater than one month. It was assumed that a period of more than one month represented a withdrawal from the industry and that less than one month meant a 'factory change'.

If the cases of 3 or more entrances are examined in Table 12, the following is evident

1968 = 33.2%

1971 = 34.2%

1974 = 43.8%

1977 = 49.6%

1980 = 36.7%

1983 = 43.6%

1986 = 51.1%

It is thus evident that a large section of the labour force moves in and out of employment. The years 1974, 1977, 1983 and 1986 are low points in the economic cycle suggesting that:

- (a) More experienced workers (i.e. those with more exits and entrances) return to employment possibly to supplement household income which might be suffering because the main breadwinner is feeling the effects of an economic downturn.
- (b) Equally, employers are less likely to be willing to invest in training and would attempt firstly to retain experienced workers and secondly, if recruiting, would be more likely to take on experienced workers.

The above comments need to be reviewed (also) in relation to the age profile of the workforce as presented in Tables 10a and 10b. Both these sets of data suggest that the movement in and out of the industry happen over a (relatively) short period, i.e. most (female) employees do not work after 40 years of age; therefore the entrances and exits take place over about 20 years. The data suggests an economic instrumentality on the part of the employers and employees.

5.2.5 The Wage Form

Wage rates were negotiated by employers and employees at industrial council level 9 times between 1969 and 1986.

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Meetings</u>
1969	3
1972	2
1975	3
1978	3
1981	1 (Extra-Ordinary)
1981	1
1982	2
1984	3
1986	3

At each of these meetings wages were negotiated upwards (at least in nominal terms) and this section will focus on these changes.

Reviewing the pattern of negotiated wages (i.e. minimum wages) presents a number of analytical problems - even though these problems are the result of negotiations by the parties. Over the review period 54 job titles can be identified (other than 'Learner' sub categories) of which relatively few are retained in their original form which then complicates comparison over the review period. These problems may be classified as follows:

5.2.5.1 De-Sexing of Jobs

The negotiations indicate that sex discrimination was done away with in 1980, this due to legislation. Thus by 1983 the job title of "Grade I employee female" had disappeared.

5.2.5.2 New Jobs Created

Other than new positions arising from point 5.2.5.1 above, a variety of new posts enter into the negotiations over the review period, e.g. those of "Pattern maker", "Tracer" and "Clothing Machine Mechanic".

5.2.5.3 The elimination of posts

Apart from the de-sexing of jobs, some posts were eliminated from the bargaining, e.g. "Messenger and/or Errand Boy", both "Traveller" male and female.

5.2.5.4 Possible Administrative Anomalies

By this is meant that some jobs appear in Gazetted Agreements then subsequently disappear and are then to be found in later Gazettes, e.g. "Unskilled Labour" and "Despatch Packer" do not appear in the Gazettes of 9/1/76 and 23/3/79 but do appear in previous as well as subsequent gazettes.

Given the above issues it is not possible to compare (many) jobs across the review period. However, the following analysis has been carried out.

Wage rates were drawn from 6 time periods spanning the review period and are presented in Table 13. The Table reflects job titles that are numbered 1 to 54 and their wage movement can be traced through the 6 agreements. Bearing in mind that the wages are arranged in descending order of value, the appropriate wage rate for a particular job title can be established by finding the job number which is recorded next to the relevant wage rate as negotiated for a given point in time.


Reviewing Table 13 it can be noted that the ranking (by wage rate) of jobs changes over the review period for some posts, for example a "Cutter" (Job No. 4) is ranked 7th at the first, second and third review point, drops to the 8th position at the fourth review point, then jumps to the fourth position at the fifth review point before dropping back to the 6th position at the sixth review point. However, when the negotiated wages are plotted on a graph the shape of the curve is retained although the differentials at the top end of the wage rates widens as is shown in Graph 1 presented on page 138, this being due to percentage increases being negotiated rather than absolute amounts.

In terms of keeping pace with the consumer price index (index of inflation) the minimum wage rates indicate a decrease in purchasing power. The period 1976 to 1986 (wage rates effective 6/2/87) have been used to compare changes in wage rates had they kept pace with inflation (to equate 1976 wages to those of 1986 - the 1976 rates were inflated by the consumer price index, an inflator index of 4.069 was utilised).

TABLE 13
Cape Minimum Wages (Hierarchially arranged)
JOB TITLE

	A	B	C	D	E	F
	05/04/67 13/05/67- 12/12/67	22/12/72 29/12/72- 12/12/74	09/01/76 15/01/76- 12/06/77	>13/12/80	01/07/83 01/07/83- 12/12/83	06/02/86
1 Head Cutter	34.65	44.50	56.30	82.60	123.00	187.00
2 Pattern Maker	29.67	44.50	56.30	82.60	123.00	187.00
3 Pattern Grader	28.86	34.40	43.50	82.60	96.00	187.00
4 Cutter	26.69	34.24	43.25	82.60	92.50	187.00
5 Interlining Cutter, Trimmer, Tie Cutter	26.69	34.20	43.25	63.80	79.50	148.00
6 Layer-Up	26.69	34.20	43.25	63.45	70.00	143.00
7 Clicker - Qualified	25.42	32.75	41.50	63.45	70.00	124.00
8 Tracer - Qualified	24.94	28.50	31.60	60.85	70.00	114.50
9 Female Presser (Automatic Press)	24.07	25.00	31.60	52.80	70.00	114.50
10 Female Presser	19.61	25.00	31.60	46.30	70.00	114.50
11 Female Underpresser	19.61	25.00	31.60	46.30	70.00	111.50
12 Grade I Employee, Male	19.61	24.40	31.40	46.30	69.00	111.50
13 If Advanced To Learner Supervisor	18.68	23.90	30.75	46.30	69.00	111.50
14 If Adv From Set Leader To Lrnr Super	17.33	22.45	28.95	46.05	64.00	108.50
15 Grade II Employee, Male	17.33	22.45	28.95	47.15	62.00	101.00
16 If Advanced To Grade I Employee, Male	16.01	22.45	28.95	42.45	54.00	98.50
17 Grade C Employee - Qualified	16.01	21.75	28.00	42.45	53.00	92.50
18 Grade I Employee, Female	13.45	20.60	26.50	42.45	53.00	91.50
19 If Advanced To Learner Supervisor	12.70	19.40	25.00	38.85	51.50	84.50
20 If Adv From Set Leader To Lrnr super	12.67	17.45	22.50	38.85	48.00	84.50
21 Grade II Employee, Female	12.00	17.25	22.50	38.85	48.00	83.00
22 Operator of Measuring Passing Machine	12.00	17.25	22.45	36.65	47.00	81.00
23 Messenger and/or Errand Boy	12.00	15.54	20.50	32.90	44.50	81.00
24 Underpresser	10.62	15.54	20.50	32.55	43.00	76.00
25 If Advanced To Learner Presser	10.62	15.54	20.00	32.55	43.00	75.00
26 Underpresser (Male)	10.42	13.80	20.00	30.00	40.00	72.00
27 If advanced to learner presser (male)	10.19	13.60	17.25	30.00	40.00	72.00
28 Clothing Machine Mechanic	10.02	13.60	17.25	30.00	40.00	69.50
29 Clothing Technician - Qualified	10.00	13.50	16.75	25.65	31.00	69.00
30 Clerical employees (male)	10.00	13.50	16.75	25.30	31.00	69.00
31 Clerical employees (female)	9.42	13.40	16.75	25.30	31.00	69.00
32 Factory Clerk (Male)	9.12	12.90	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
33 Factory Clerk (Female)	9.12	12.90	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
34 Traveller, Male	9.02	12.90	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
35 Traveller, Female	8.12	12.20	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
36 Grade B Clerk - Male	8.12	12.20	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
37 Grade B Clerk - Female	8.07	11.75	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
38 Boiler Attendant	8.07	11.75	15.12	25.20	30.00	69.00
39 Belt Boy		10.50		22.15		
40 Despatch Packer						
41 Assistant Despatch Packer						
42 Foreman or Male Supervisor						
43 Forewoman or Female Supervisor						
44 Unskilled Labourer						
45 Driver Up to 3,000 lbs						
46 Driver 3,000 to 6,000 lbs						
47 Driver >6,000 lbs						
48 Traveller's Driver						
49 Watchman or Carotakar						
50 Tea Girl						
51 General Worker						
52 Gen worker Male, 18 & >						
53 Gen worker Male under 18						

Graph 1 - Cape Gazetted Rates (Minimum Wages)



This graph shows comparison of the gazetted rates for Cape workers 1967-86.
For ABCDEF See Table 13

Selecting a sample of jobs whose job title has remained the same (assuming similar job content), the following becomes apparent:

TABLE 14

Job Title	1976 Rate (From 15/1/76)	Actual 1986 Rate (From 1/7/86)	1986 Inflated Rate	
Head Cutter	56.30	176.00	229.08	(53.08)
Pattern Maker	56.30	176.00	229.08	(53.08)
Pattern Grader	43.50	139.00	177.00	(38.00)
Interlining Cutter, Trimmer, Tie Cutter	26.50	91.00	107.83	(16.83)
Clicker	28.00	94.00	113.93	(19.93)
Layer-Up	17.25	69.00	70.19	(1.19)

The above calculation indicates that wages have not kept pace with inflation. Machinists represent the greatest employment category in the industry and were initially titled grade I female and grade I male. After de-sexing of jobs all machinists were titled grade B employees. In 1976 grade I females earned R20.50 and by end December of 1986 the negotiated wage was R83.00 per week. Applying the inflator it can be seen that the 1986 equivalent should be R83.41, a loss of R0.43 per week. It would appear that machinists have kept pace with inflation, the reason for this comes from the de-sexing of jobs in the industry. The female machinist post has been merged with that of the male machinist, the new wage resulting in (female) machinists just staying in line with the rate of inflation. It will be noted that if the male machinist rate of 1976 were inflated by the C.P.I. the 1986 equivalent would have been R44.76 higher than the negotiated (de-sexed) machinist rate of R83.00. It can then be argued that minimum wages for female machinists (only) have kept pace with inflation.

This is further substantiated by reference to Table 10 in Chapter 4 on page 103. In this table the average earnings per employee are provided together with the average percentage increase.

Average Wages - Clothing Industry

		1986	1976	1969
	Nominal	5566	1605	813
(Real)	1986 Equivalent	5566	1256	643
	Gain(Loss)	0	(349)	(170)
			(-21.7%)	(-20.9%)

Deflating the 1986 figure to 1976 and 1969 equivalents it is evident how poorly wages have done in relation to inflation.

Examining similar figures for the manufacturing industry (see Table 10, Chapter 4, page 103) it can be seen that that industry's average earnings per employee have done considerably better than the clothing industry in terms of inflation, viz.

Average Wages - Manufacturing

		1986	1976	1969
	Nominal	11054	2804	1270
(Real)	1986 Equivalent	11054	2495	1276
	Gain(Loss)		(309)	+6
			(-11.0%)	(+0.5%)

The discussion so far has focussed on the wage form as negotiated, and it must be noted the wages refer to minimum wages. The possibility exists that wages

above the minimum rate are paid. Establishing the degree of such practices proved to be impossible. It was hoped that data collected from a random selection of provident cards would provide workable data. However, the only absolute wage figures recorded were those reflecting the engagement rate and the termination rate of individuals.

To establish whether employees were paid more than the negotiated minimum from provident fund records it would require -

- (a) The selection of a particular date
- (b) Collecting all engagements and terminations of that date
- (c) Comparing their engagement/termination rate for their job category against the minimum rate for that job category at that point in time.

This approach was complicated by the possibility that the individuals might, during the course of employment have changed their job category without changing factory. Such a change would not have been recorded on the provident fund cards. Such a possibility requires the removal of 'Terminations' from any calculation and the balance of data (i.e. engagements) was deemed insufficient to arrive at any certainty of conclusion.

5.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME

Introduction

Reporting on the 1969 negotiations the Chairman of the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association (C.C.M.A.) said in his Report for 1969/70,

"While the increases granted in the new Agreement constituted the largest percentage increase granted in the history of the Industrial Council, it was considered by the Association in general meeting that the negotiations had been carried out in a spirit of co-operation by both parties and had produced a result which was warranted and which could be of benefit to both employers and employees."

The 1969 negotiations began on the 15th October of that year and were spread over three meetings culminating in a new agreement being arrived at on the 29th October, 1969. In arguing their cases either for or against specific increases, the parties adopt either a "Hardship" or a "Competitive" position, i.e. union argues hardship and employers argue Competitiveness.

'Hardship' for the Unions takes the form of rises in the cost of living and reference is made to the Economic Development Plan (State originated), there is reference to wages paid in the Cape in other economic sectors, and the point is made that transport costs for workers have increased.

'Competitive' for employers means that if Cape employment costs largely exceed other regions (i.e. Tvl. and Natal) the Cape industry will become uncompetitive and will not be able to supply jobs for a growing coloured population. In addition the argument is presented that increases (in employment costs) increase the attractiveness of relocating to 'Border' regions as a strategy to maintain competitiveness.

The introduction of these two notions of 'Hardship' and 'Competitiveness' can be seen as a simple means of classifying constructs utilised by the parties to the negotiating process. They represent a description of the construct matrix the actors draw upon (recursively as will be shown) during the negotiations. The negotiations in the Cape which constitute the review period begin on the 15th October 1969 and the last meeting takes place on the 7th November 1986, making a total of 19 meetings which, if the lines of the minutes recording the proceedings of the negotiations are added together, a total of 10,021 lines will be arrived at. It becomes impossible to record in this thesis all those lines and thus the substantiation of, firstly, the construct matrix and secondly, the constituent constructs can only be presented by selecting statements made by the parties to the agreement. Statements from the minutes will be supported by other statements drawn from the minutes of meetings restricted to members of a particular party's constituency in an attempt to substantiate the identification of the constructs utilised in negotiations.

5.3.1 1969 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 15TH OCTOBER 1969 - 580 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
118/120	"There was no doubt in his mind that some of these areas were expanding to a far greater extent than the Cape area and the reason for this was the lower wage structure".
145/150	"The employers could not run their factories without the labour force, but at the same time the workers could not earn their living without the Employers. This was a combination which his side did not want to see destroyed by asking for impossible conditions or rates of pay beyond the reach of the industry in comparison with conditions and pay rates applicable in other areas".
327/8	"He was afraid that the industry might go there (Border areas) because the concessions offered by the Government were tremendous".
521/23	"If every other manufacturer throughout the country paid R15.00 per week he would not be so concerned. However, inter-area competition could not be overlooked."

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
13/16	"The local industry had gone from strength to strength and enormous profits were being made by the manufacturers. The workers should therefore reap some benefit from the profits made by the industry"
282/87	"he referred to the increase in the C.O.L. which he claimed had increased by 26.5% over the past 6 years and by 100% since 1950. He contended that the increases which had been granted over the past eleven years had not compensated the workers adequately for the rise in living costs. The cost of transport had increased considerably"

- 298/300 "he said some qualified machinists had left the Clothing Industry to work as seamstresses in the Furniture Industry starting at R17.50 p.w. progressing to R18.20, R18.90 and finally to R19.60 per week".
- 418/421 "One of the workers with four children pointed out that she earned R2.40 per day as a qualified machinist and after meeting her daily transport expenses and paying for the care of her children, the amount remaining for meat, vegetables etc. was only 32 cents".
- 542/45 "Workers wanted to give their children a decent education but this was not possible as they could not afford to do so".

MEETING NO. 2 - 22ND OCTOBER 1969 - 372 LINES

EMPLOYERS

- | <u>Line</u> | <u>Quote</u> |
|-------------|---|
| 166/172 | "In addition the Industry had to justify any increase to Government. If it applied for an increase in tariffs for instance, it would have a difficult task to explain to the Board of Trade that it required further protection when it had just conceded an increase in wages of over 10%. Such factors indirectly affected the Trade Union, as it was only by the employers keeping their factories going that employment could be supplied". |
| 322/28 | "He asked the Union side to take heed that within a period of 5 years the Peninsula would have a surplus of coloured labour because there were very few industries being established in the Cape. If the Union put the Cape Clothing Industry at a disadvantage in relation to clothing manufacturers in other parts of S.A. it would result in some factories moving or in expansion ceasing in the Cape". |

330/33 "If every manufacturer in S.A. paid R20.00 p.w. it would be possible for Cape manufacturers to pay this rate. Inter-area competition had (increased) and wage rates obtaining in other areas had to be taken into account".

UNIONLine Quote

117/119 Thus the overall rise in wages necessary if the workers are to be compensated so as to retain the standard of living and to raise their standard of living by 2.6% p.a. comes to 13.8% up to December 1969."

130/32 "considered in the light of current events and profits made, the employees felt that they were not getting a fair share of the profits".

308/09 "If the industry paid a decent wage, not a single machinist should be getting less than between R14 and R15 per week".

319 "it was very hard to come out on R12 per week".

MEETING NO. 3 - 29TH OCTOBER 1969 - 212 LINESEMPLOYERSLine Quote

42/44 "the Natal agreement would be revised in about 2 years time when the wages prescribed would probably be raised for that area bringing them closer to parity with local wages".

UNIONLine Quote

19/21 "so as to retain their standard of living and to raise their standard of living by 2.6% per annum amounted to 13.8% for the next 3 years. Hence the Union's request was not unreasonable".

5.3.2 1972 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 29TH AUGUST 1972 - 637 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
92/3	"felt that the starting rate in the Industry was too low to attract the type of labour required in the Clothing Industry"
138/40	"employers acknowledged the rise in C.O.L. - felt something should be done to compensate their workers in this respect".
167/70	"Many factories were moving to Border areas and wage differences between areas such as the Cape, the Transvaal and Natal and Border areas was becoming even greater".
327/331	"employers had to be competitive in relation to clothing manufacturers elsewhere in South Africa ... in some cases the Cape was paying 15% to 20% higher than the Transvaal. This placed the Cape at a serious disadvantage".
457/58	"because as [Union Reps] had said it was his job to see that we are both in business next year and the year after'".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
353	"he wished to make it quite clear we are not here to kill the industry. Let us be honest with ourselves. We are here to preserve the industry'".
379/82	"... had stated that certain increases [C.O.L. related] were beyond the control of employers but the other side should appreciate that this was the only platform that we could come to'. The workers were going to be the ones to suffer ...".
395/96	"He drew attention to the high wages paid to female machinists in the furniture manufacturing industry".
577/78	"in other industries workers belonging to provident funds received a far greater dividend'".

MEETING NO. 2 - 19TH SEPTEMBER 1972 - 516 LINES

No quotations.

Supporting Statements(1) Employers

In the "Report on the C.C.M.A. for the year 1971/72" no comment can be found that reflects employer constructs applicable to negotiations. However, at the annual general meeting of the 28th October, 1971, the chairman is critical of State actions which are seen to impact on labour productivity. Specifically, the chairman is critical of housing and transport.

White housing schemes get "pavements and drainage" but for "our workers" these facilities "come later, much later". Referring to the Minister's statement that "resettled" workers could or should be considered for transport subsidies, the chairman suggests that since government moved them, "Government should accordingly subsidise the transport arrangements". Further, the Chairman argues, "There is thus a real connection between productivity and transportation and a real need for Government and local authorities to work closely to ensure the basic environmental and economic requirements are satisfactorily fulfilled so that workers get to work on time and in fact to ensure that they get to the factories at all".

(2) Union

At a general meeting on the 12th June, 1972, the chairman presents the wage rates to be proposed to employers, these are "unanimously carried". A further series of meetings were held at which feedback on the progress of negotiations was provided and officials given a mandate to, "obtain the best possible offer for the workers".

At a general meeting held on the 23rd November, 1972, the meeting was informed of the arguments presented by each side at the negotiations. A representative at the negotiations indicates the difficulty of the negotiations and compliments the union negotiator on his achievements. The meeting is told how the employers threatened to withdraw their offer which then would have necessitated an Industrial Tribunal to settle. Thus, had the union not accepted, "the workers would have lost everything and the agreement would have expired". The motion accepting the new agreement was "Unanimously Agreed".

The meeting also agrees to support the Trades Union Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) in its efforts to get the government to "allow African workers to be organised into Trade Unions". In addition the chairman reports on the union's attendance at the 1st World Conference of the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation which is an affiliate of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.). The chairman lists the 8 objectives of the Federation one of which is "That Politics not interfere in Trade Union affairs".

EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS (1973 and 1974)

1973

(1) Employers

In a circular to members the C.C.M.A. dated 7th May 1973, the C.C.M.A. gives notice of a meeting to consider a letter (d.d. 26.4.73) from the union for a wage adjustment because increases granted at the previous negotiations, "have been surpassed by the increased cost of living of which increases in transport had taken a considerable share of the increase granted". The letter from the Union also quotes a recent Wage Board investigation into "unskilled workers". The letter states that "the speakers thereat quoted the low wages

paid in the Clothing Industry" and the union wants increases before wage board recommendations "are published as it may be embarrassing to the Clothing Employers for the wages paid to their workers in the Western Province".

In the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1972/3 it is stated, "The Association was not unsympathetic to the workers proposals and computed that the workers had had to face a 4.1% increase in the cost of living in the few months since the current Agreement had been negotiated". Further, "However, it was the opinion of the meeting ... that as a quid pro quo for a mid-term increase in wages the Trade Union should endeavour to assist in reducing the extremely high rate of absenteeism which the industry was currently facing".

In addition it was recorded that, "On the question of labourers the Employers were particularly sympathetic and the opportunity was taken to eliminate some anomolous job classifications and to re-align others where duties were similar to those of labourers in the industry".

(2) Union

No reference to this mid-term bargaining was found in union documents.

1974

(1) Employers

Virtually a year later the employers call a general meeting for the 5th March 1974, to consider a request by the union for an increase. The minutes of that meeting record, "Considerable discussion then ensued with the concensus of opinion being that a special increase in minimum wage rates was warranted in view of the spiralling living cost and the need to maintain a satisfied and contented workforce".

Later that year in the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1973/4' it states that even before the Union's request for an increase "the Association of its own volition had been giving consideration to the question of the impact of the sharply increasing cost of living on worker's pay packets".

In the chairman's address at the annual general meeting of the Association (20/11/74) he suggests that, "our workers compared very favourably" with what he had seen in Europe and the United Kingdom and that the problem of productivity was sourced in the "inadequate transport system, housing and education facilities available to our labour". In addition, "the transport expense that the worker has to bear in relation to her wage, is completely out of proportion to that of her counterpart overseas".

(2)

Union

The letter the union sent to employers asks for a "substantial increase" because of the "spiralling cost of living". The letter also suggests that if the increase is granted no further requests will be made during the current agreement and that this would "help Employers with their costings".

At a meeting of shop stewards (19/3/74) advising them of the successful outcome (a 10% increase) of the request for an increase, it is recorded that a member of the audience, "expressed thanks to the officials for the 'great work' on behalf of all the shop-stewards of the Trade Union. The chairman remarked that most of the thanks should go to the secretary for his endeavours. "The members present showed their appreciation by handclapping".

At the same meeting it is pointed out that the agreement still has 15 months to run and that the 10% increase would be "eaten up", the secretary was then

asked "to help workers in this respect". In addition the minutes record the secretary comparing aspects of conditions of employment between the Cape, Transvaal and Natal and suggests that the Cape is better off.

5.3.3 1975 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 3RD SEPTEMBER 1975 - 517 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
213/14	The principle factor in his view was "What are our competitors paying in other parts of the country?"
215/17	"Employers wanted the industry to remain in the Western Cape but "we don't want to outsell ourselves by having wages at higher rates than those rates payable in other areas".
301/4	"Local manufacturers had to face competition from manufacturers in Natal and elsewhere, and another aspect was the distance between the Cape and its main market in the North"

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
21/22	"It was common knowledge that the cost of living had risen considerably".
44/47	"It was the moral duty of the Employers' Organisations and of the Trade Union to ensure that the drain of employees from the Clothing Industry did not occur".
48/49	"the garment workers are amongst the lowest paid workers in the country".
162/63	"He emphasized that "the real wages in the paypacket are of importance to us on the T.U. side".
271/84	"He mentioned that the Transvaal were due to negotiate next year and in this area the starting rate was already R12 p.w. His side was emphatic - the Cape should not be less.

- 286/87 "the majority of employers in Natal started their new entrants at R12 although the prescribed minimum was R11.10 p.w.
- 328/30 "workers were ... going all out to build up the industry and to increase the profits of the employers'. Employers were not in the industry to make a loss. They were in business to make profits. He maintained that if employers made profits, the workers were entitled to get a fair share of such profits".
- 374/5 "The Union was trying to protect workers who had built up the industry".

MEETING NO. 2 - 2ND OCTOBER 1975 - 509 LINES

EMPLOYERS

- | <u>Line</u> | <u>Quote</u> |
|-------------|--|
| 252/3 | "Why should we pay R12 when other areas get away with less'". |
| 268/69 | "anything that the other areas offer we shall offer. We shall not go below them'". |
| 310/11 | "He appealed to the Union to keep the Cape Clothing Industry going'. Manufacturers had to take into account inter-area competition". |
| 317/20 | "He ... appealed to the Trade Union side to keep as many jobs as possible in the Cape. Don't push us out of Cape Town'. He claimed the manufacturers had been as fair as they possibly could be ..". |

UNION

- | <u>Line</u> | <u>Quote</u> |
|-------------|--|
| 214/17 | "... the minimum wage proposed for a machinist ... was identical to the wage proposed for a general worker. Machinists were adamant that their duties were more strenuous and they should get more than a labourer". |
| 245 | "in many instances they [machinists] were the sole breadwinners". |

MEETING NO. 3 - 28TH OCTOBER 1975 - 250 LINES

No quotations.

Supporting Statements(1) Employers

A joint meeting of C.C.M.A. and Cape Knitting Industry Association took place on 7th August 1975 at which the union proposals for the new agreement were discussed. The minutes only record that "considerable discussion then took place" and that the "views of the meeting" were conveyed to the executive but no mention of what those views were is made. At the 50th annual general meeting (17/11/75) the agreement is "ratified and accepted".

(2) Union

The union meetings are equally sparse in terms of statements dealing with the wage negotiations of 1975. On the 8/10/75 at a meeting of shop stewards and 'Branch' and 'Central Executive' committees progress on wage negotiations is noted. At a later meeting (3/11/75) of this group, disappointment in the new agreement is expressed but it is understood that it must be accepted.

Extra-ordinary Negotiations

At the 51st annual general meeting of the C.C.M.A. unrecorded discussion and agreement took place on an interim 5% increase in wages. Equally sparsely recorded is notice of the increase in the minutes of a shop steward and 'Branch' and 'Central Executive' Committee meeting (8/11/76) of the union.

5.3.4 1978 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 12TH OCTOBER 1978 - 1045 LINES

This meeting is largely taken up by the Union presenting the detail of its proposals and a rejection of the C.C.M.A.'s counter proposals. The union negotiator, however, says he takes exception to the (Mgt.) view that the union shows "a lack of appreciation" for the employer's position as he had been attacked after the last agreement and felt that "some support should have come from the Employers".

From line 78 to 212 a variety of figures on the consumer price index are quoted together with 4% general sales tax, which it is argued, leads to increased worker hardship. From line 777 to 887 hardship issues relating to food, rent, transport and creche increases (in costs) are re-introduced. In this meeting 58% of all the lines of the minutes are taken up by the union argument and only some 24% by employers and revolves largely around the clarification of bargaining position.

EMPLOYERS

No quotes.

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
412/13	"85% of these people are one week away from starvation".
474	"He contended that if wage increases had kept pace with the rise in the C.O.L. the average machinist today should have been receiving in the vicinity of R38 per week'".

MEETING NO. 2 - 1ST NOVEMBER 1978 - 794 LINES

This meeting too is largely taken up with clarifying proposals/demands. In addition a 'Black Labour Officer' (state official) and some black workers present their views on wage increases. Their views are recorded though not debated as they are not formally (cannot be) part of the industrial council.

EMPLOYERSLines Quote

- 625/8 "He then referred to the 2-3 year duration of the proposed agreement and said it was absolutely essential for the stability of the industry to know what the future wage rates were going to be for costing purposes"
- 631/32 "it was desirable to have a stable industry, to have stable prices and in order to contract it was essential to have an agreement of 3 years duration".

UNIONLines Quote

- 323/7 "'Yet the people in the industry - the bulk of the workers sitting at the machines and who were the backbone of the industry, were not even considered for a pension fund'. He thought it was a disgrace that workers were not considered for another 5c per week'".

MEETING NO. 3 - 13TH NOVEMBER 1978 - 490 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
161/4	"The Cape Manufacturers paid higher wages ... than their counterparts in other areas of the Republic".
165	"He mentioned the drop in employment in the Transvaal".
196/7	"He expressed the opinion that manufacturers in the Cape `were pricing themselves out of business'".
199/202	"... prices quoted by a clothing manufacturer in the Border areas which were considerably lower than the prices which a leading local manufacturer could match".
202/3	"He posed the question `What are we trying to do - to kill the clothing industry in the Cape?'".

UNION

In this meeting the union strategy was to present their proposals and reject employer offers until they believed that they had got as much as they could get, therefore the constructs are implicit i.e. economic gains and the maintenance of the industrial council as an appropriate means of bargaining and achieving (economic) objectives.

Supporting Statements

- (1) Employers
No documents were found to contain construct related statements dealing with the 1978 negotiations.
- (2) Union
Union proposals for the negotiations were discussed on the 21/8/78 at a shop steward and `Branch' and `Central Executive' committee meeting but no detail of such discussions were available.

5.3.5 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS (1979, 1980 AND 1981)1979

The employers association received a letter from the union (d.d. 15/8/79) in which a request for an interim increase was made. The reasons given all relate to an increase in the cost of living. The union suggest that this increase has been in the order of 14-15%. Rentals, parafin and bus fares have all increased, "meat is now considered a luxury" and Saturday overtime has become "uneconomical" (to the workers).

It is recorded in the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1978/79 that the meeting convened to discuss the union letter was "well attended" and that it was unanimously decided to view with sympathy the request of the union and to recognize the needs of the employees by bringing forward half of the 10% wage increase due in December to the first pay week in October". It was also recorded that this decision "was warmly appreciated by the trade union as an indication of the concern of the employers for the well being of their employees". Furthermore, the union "expressed awareness" that the increase was an unplanned increase in employer costs and "a direct charge on employer profits for that period".

1980

A letter dated 28/4/1980 was received by the C.C.M.A. from the union asking for an interim increase. The 7% due in December (as per current agreement) to be brought forward and increased to at least 10% due to "the ever spiralling cost of living". The letter also refers to the Natal agreement where female machinists earn R28.75 vs. the Cape wage of R28.50. In addition Natal wages (for female machinists) are due to go up to R33.00 in July. The union want R33.00 for (Cape) female machinists and at least 10% for other categories. No record of the ensuing debate was available but reference was made to the event in the 'Report on the C.C.M.A. for the Year 1979/80'. The 'Report' records a meeting on the 26th May 1980 at which these proposals were discussed. It notes that

although the meeting was disrupted by reports of "work stoppages taking place at various factories", it was agreed that a special increase in wages of 10% would be introduced from 1/7/1980.

It was also agreed that a further increase (no size mentioned) would be granted on 1/4/81 as a bridging increase between then and the end of the current agreement i.e. December 1981. Initially the Union accepted the bridging proposal but later advised that they wished to "hold out for more money and the increase payable from an earlier date". It is recorded that "after considerable discussion" and "albeit with some reluctance" the association agreed to bring forward the April increase (i.e. 1/4/81) to be included in the 1980/81 holiday pay (i.e. the industry closes for part of December and January of each year) and that female machinists move up to R34.50 per week and "like percentage increase for other categories of workers".

1981

In the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the Year 1980/81 it is noted that whilst the union had agreed not to request any further interim increases in 1981, it had in fact done so. There had been "a large measure of sympathy for their approach in this regard arising from the continuing high level of inflation". This led to a 7.5% increase in July 1981.

In the chairman's report (25/11/81) he notes that the "Government has chosen a path of industrial enfranchisement ... The initiative is praiseworthy". Further, "But its natural result need not be inevitable confrontation. Sound industrial relations founded on good human relations need be the order of our day".

The chairman also notes "Our industrial council here, and the parties to it, have an enviable reputation. We must strongly oppose any attempt to disrupt it and continue to give support to its constituent parts".

5.3.6 1981 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 7TH MAY 1981 - 114 LINES(1) Extra-Ordinary Negotiations

In the minutes of the industrial council of 7th May 1981 an extra-ordinary "plea for wage adjustments" is made by the union in the form of a letter to employers. The theme of the letter is one of worker hardship due to "spiralling costs". Employers had agreed to a 7.5% increase "across the board" after "deep consideration".

EMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
59/61	"... the manufacturers felt they had a duty to sustain the spirit of understanding and insight between the manufacturers and the Union".
84/91	"He continued by saying that his association wished to express appreciation to the trade union for the role it had played in building the industry. In spite (sic) of interests which might conflict from time to time and matters that had been discussed seriously we believe that we should tackle the opportunities and the challenges of the future together'". "He said it was in that spirit, over and above all other considerations that the Union's request had been accepted and supported by the C.C.M.A.".

UNIONS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
17/19	"I think that employers are fully aware of the plight of workers who find it hard to keep up with spiralling costs of all commodities such as rentals, food, etc.".
71/72	" ... no one more than I am more pleased to know that the manufacturers have captured the overseas markets".

- 105/7 "the Council was one of the largest councils in South Africa and 'we are proud of that'. It was not the Unions' policy to threaten and demand, nor 'to call wild cat strikes'".
- 108/109 "The Union was proud to work through the Industrial Council and firmly believed in the Industrial Council system."

(2) Negotiations for extension of Agreement

The industrial council met on the 1st October 1981 to negotiate an extension of the current agreement so as to have enough time for the parties to "de-sex" the job categories in that agreement as required by recently promulgated legislation. The union are willing to agree to an extension provided certain adjustments are made to wage levels. It is to agree these that the council met.

MEETING NO. 1 - 1ST OCTOBER 1981 - 248 LINES

EMPLOYERS

- | <u>Line</u> | <u>Quote</u> |
|-------------|--|
| 51 | "There was 'strong competition from within our own country' ..." |
| 59/60 | "It was the joint responsibility of employers and employees to ensure that 'we have a viable and stable industry here in Cape Town'". |
| 62/66 | "Unless the local industry was in a position to compete fairly and effectively not only with imported products but more importantly with products manufactured in other areas within South Africa, 'our industry is going to stagnate with a resultant drop in employment opportunities and all the hardships that it is going to bring'". |
| 70/72 | "It should be borne in mind what had happened in the ladies stocking industry in the Cape. The industry had disappeared because of competition from the Border areas". |

UNIONLinesQuote

- 85/88 "His side wanted to keep the industry going in the Cape'. It was the objective of his Union to preserve and strengthen the industry. On the other hand the Union considered that there should be a fair and decent reward for people that had contributed to building up the Industry".
- 89/90 "He said that if he went to workers with the employers' present offer it would lead to disruption in the Industry".
- 93/95 "His Union was subjected to criticism not only from the media but also other trade unions. He said 'unless we get a reasonable wage we are going to be highly criticised by outside bodies'".

Supporting Statements

The chairman's report to union members for the year ending 1981 provides no information on this set of negotiations and the 'Report of the C.C.M.A. for the Year 1980/81' tends to detail the results rather than providing evidence in support of various constructs.

It is, however, recorded that the request for an interim increase was viewed with "a large measure of sympathy for their approach in this regard arising from the continuing high level of inflation". Also, in relation to the (continuing) problems of absenteeism and labour turnover, "It is hoped that the majority of employers are beginning to realise that it is not possible to build into the wage agreement punitive factors to reduce these vexing problems and that the reduction of the rate of labour turnover and absenteeism is wholly a matter within the control or otherwise of management of factories".

5.3.7 1982 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 28TH OCTOBER 1982 - 648 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
518	"The Industry was entering a period of decline".
526/30	"It was a matter of pride and tradition that the Association anticipated and recognised the needs of the Industry's workforce. However, the Association (C.C.M.A.) would fail the Industry and all who were part of it if recognition was not taken of the negative changes in marketing conditions".
533/4	" ... but he shared with many others a serious concern to maintain stability and growth in the Industry".
547/8	"The Association would preserve the substance and spirit of the longstanding relationship between the G.W.U. of the Western Cape and the Association ...".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
561	"The Union was mindful (sic) of the pressures from outside...".
578/80	"There were many workers who had worked for years with an inadequate wage, and without the workers there would not be an industry".
603/4	"... making a serious appeal to prevent outsiders from playing on something like this'".
28/31	"The Union ... was not trying to put the Industry out of existence. The Industry was as beneficial to the worker as to the employer, and the employer had to rely on the workers to build the Industry".
12/13	"... the proposals were based on the conditions of the workers living in various areas, the cost of housing, increases in rentals, lighting and various other things".

MEETING NO. 2 - 10TH NOVEMBER 1982 - 420 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
13	"Shrinkage in forward order books".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
69/70	"He was alarmed by the number of people who were not entering the Industry 'because of wages'".
76/7	"There was the threat of outsiders causing agitation amongst a certain section of the population and if this developed in the Cape there would be no end of trouble.".
79/82	"A wage of R50 was reduced by expenses for transport, rent, lighting and other costs and workers entered supermarkets with only a proportion of the R50 which did not buy very much".

Supporting Statements

Whilst not many statements are quoted above for these negotiations, a review of the minutes of the negotiations indicates that the union's bargaining theme is one of "hardship" and "comparative equity". Lines 62 to 99 compare Durban (Natal) rates to those of the Cape and reference is made to cost of living increases. Management argue that the Cape is in a different position to the Transvaal and Natal because of high absenteeism in the Cape. Management attempt to counter the unions comparative argument which suggests that the Cape is worse off.

In the chairmam's Report to the C.C.M.A. (d.d. 2/12/82) it is reported,

- (a) "Bargaining was prolonged and arduous".
- (b) Association representatives "were seeking restraint in wage escalation while the G.W.U. strongly advanced claims for substantial increases".

- (c) "It is necessary to mention that the Industrial Council was an acceptable and effective forum during recent and past negotiations".

The union's chairman's address for 1982 was unavailable.

5.3.8 1984 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 22ND AUGUST 1984 - 763 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
465/6	"The growing problem now was clothing from other areas, e.g. imports and 'homelands'". [i.e. their relatively lower cost]
500	"It was not possible to negotiate at an Industry level for problems in a particular factory".
511/3	"said the real issue before the Council was whether, in present circumstances, the local manufacturers would be able to retain their markets and whether there would be growth".
524/6	"The effect of that [Article 19 of GATT] was that we may not unreasonably control or prevent imports into this country ... That was a danger the Industry had not faced before".
535/7	"They [retailers] were very tough and some came to manufacturers saying 'we can place an order but at last year's prices'".
549/51	"He wanted to emphasise that Employers' Associations 'would not hide behind this or any other factors and would not be insensitive to the real needs and some of the problems that everybody in inflationary times faces'".
598/9	"It was, therefore, clear that the parties had to negotiate on the basis of ability of the Industry to pay".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
31/33	"... he said it was not the Union's intention to disrupt or destroy the Industry. The Union had always negotiated in the full knowledge that the employees wanted an industry and secure employment".
40/42	"... the local Union realised that low Natal wages were a threat to the Industry in Cape Town". The Union was `working on the other areas as well in order to bring up the wage structures in those areas'".
74/5	"Rentals had been increased and the rise in G.S.T. to 10% had affected the position of workers".
413/6	"The main objective of the Union was to maintain the workforce in a healthy and happy state and this objective was to the benefit of the Industry as a whole".
447/8	"He said `workers had not got their fair share of the productivity increase however low productivity in the industry might have been'".
464/5	"The Union considered wages had to be increased drastically `not only to get even with the cost of living, but to get back to square one'".
753/4	"A worker who had recently retired had received less than R2000, although she had completed over 40 years service in the industry". [from the Provident Fund]

MEETING NO. 2 - 28TH AUGUST 1984 - 180 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
31/3	"The employers side had to bear in mind that what they gave by way of wage increases they would be able to get part of such increases back from their customers".
34/8	"The Industry was moving into a situation where the demand in the Industry is going to drop" ... "everyone is worried about it".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
119	"In the Transvaal they got one day more than the Cape" [i.e. paid holiday].
124/5	"the Union felt the Provident Fund is a moral obligation on the employer'".

This meeting is only a record of Agreements reached by a "Negotiations Committee", the minutes of which do not appear in the Minute Book of the Industrial Council. It is, however, recorded that a request by the Union that there be no press release before it had had its "special report-back meeting", was agreed.

Supporting Statements

The 'Report on the C.C.M.A. for the year 1983/4' records that the negotiations were "protracted and tough". It also records that employers had been asked to "bring forward and enhance" the automatic increase of July 1984, this "sparked, no doubt" by cost of living increases, "and pamphlet pressure applied by the United Democratic Front". The association had agreed to both the bringing forward and to giving an (additional) increase.

At a general meeting of the union (25/8/84) it was "proposed that the secretary proceed to negotiate for the best possible offer he can get from the employers". This, it is recorded, was "Unanimously adopted and overwhelmingly carried".

5.3.9 1986 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 16TH OCTOBER 1986 - 768 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
47/51	"Sanctions meant loss of markets for exporters in South Africa and the TBVC countries. The local industry must expect competition as these manufacturers attempt to enter local domestic markets".
62/3	"he said the negotiations should proceed from a platform of common interest".
480/1	"The employers were faced with a situation [closed shop] where the closed shop was not in its interests".
698/702	"said he took it that the Union appreciated the fact that if one reduced the hours of work one reduced the throughput of the factory and therefore the ability of the Employer to pay".
740/1	" ... the Union should bear in mind the cost factor".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
118/20	"The Union, however, represented its members who were themselves experiencing difficult economic conditions and whose living standards were deteriorating".
412/15	" ... stated that the Union saw the closed shop as another essential protection ... of its members benefits and services, which were of great benefit to employers as well".

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
675/6	"said that employees wages had fallen 'a bit behind'. The inflation rate was in the region of 20%".
695	"The lack of transport and the need to live far away ... were all contributing factors for a reduction in working hours".
723/4	"He added that Labour Day had been granted to employees in the Clothing Industry in Durban".

MEETING NO. 2 - 27TH OCTOBER 1986 - 557 LINES

This meeting taken up with presenting and rejecting proposals/demands and therefore little in the way of construct supporting statements.

MEETING NO. 3 - 7TH NOVEMBER 1986 - 455 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
171/2	"The granting of maternity leave was not a universally accepted practice".
224/5	"said employers were interested in the cost of employing labour".
228/9	"so that ... the employers would know what the full implications would be regarding the cost of labour".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
166	"that all it wanted was job protection for pregnant workers".
	<u>Note</u> - nowhere in this meeting are the traditional arguements about C.O.L. or competing recorded. The wage issue is settled very quickly in this meeting. The meeting is characterised by proposals accepted/rejected or withdrawn. Sometimes an "if you withdraw A, I'll withdraw B", e.g. maternity leave, suspension without pay and the Labour Day issue which was not resolved in the minutes.

Supporting Statements

Little by way of supporting statements can be found in either union or employer records. All that could be found was a statement in the Report of the C.C.M.A. for the year 1985/86 saying, "The negotiations were more difficult and more protracted than they have tended to be in the past".

5.4 CONSTRUCTS OF THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS

5.4.1 Management

The more significant constructs drawn upon by management in the negotiation setting can be deduced by the statements presented in the previous section and are listed as follows:

- (a) Ability to compete - going out of business
- (b) High Cape wages - difficult to compete
- (c) Inability to compete - decline in Cape industry
- (d) Fair wages - industry growth
- (e) Necessity for Industrial Council Bargaining - lack of stability in Industry

The statements presented earlier can be summarised to argue that employers whilst accepting the role of the Union to achieve economic objectives for its members believes that they can only provide jobs and increased economic benefits if they can compete against other regional and international producers. A sympathy towards the workforce is often expressed particularly in relation to increased costs of living. This, however, is tempered with the perceived need to remain competitive and in the Cape.

It is evident from the statements given and a review of the minutes of the bargaining just how aware the employers association are of wage (employment) costs in Natal and Transvaal. The economic benefits offered to companies to relocate to 'Border areas' are also seen as a threat to the Cape employers' ability to compete in the local market.

Construct Commonality

Both parties appear to agree that the industrial council is the appropriate mechanism for bargaining and for the management of the industry's provision of (additional to employer and union) services to the workforce (i.e. provident, sick fund, housing, etc.). It also represents a means of ensuring minimum standards (of benefits) to the workforce. There also appears to be agreement that profitable manufacturers are of importance for a stable and growing industry. Agreement exists too that the workforce should - as far as possible - be fairly remunerated and that they (the workforce) should not suffer cost of living increases.

Routinization of Bargaining Behaviour

An important part of structuration theory is the suggestion that much of social behaviour is repetitive and routinized. The routinized behaviour is at a level of 'practical consciousness' and as such this is not wholly applicable to the bargaining context. However, it will be shown below that the bargaining behaviour in the Cape industry is repetitive in not only what is said (see previous section on Constructs) but is also repetitive in how it is said.

The minutes of the negotiations were classified in terms of Walton and McKersie's behavioural theory of bargaining (see Methodology Section) on a line by line basis. The pattern across the meetings that took place over the review period are now presented to illustrate the repetitive behaviour.

Table 15 (on page 210) records the date of the meeting, the number of lines of minutes; then Management (M) and Union (N) behaviour - degree of, as a percentage - as per Walton and McKersie, thus

- $M_1 + N_1 =$ Integrative bargaining
 $M_2 + N_2 =$ Distributive bargaining
 $M_3 + N_3 =$ Attitudinal structuring
 $M_4 + N_4 =$ Intra-organisational bargaining

Just scanning the table shows that in the 'first meetings' the Union presents its arguments for adjustments (i.e. mostly attitudinal structuring - 'Equity' and 'Hardship' themes) which are rejected by management ('distributive' bargaining) and their counter argument (competitiveness) is maintained. The 'second meetings' are characterised by nearly equivalent degrees of attitudinal structuring and distributive behaviour. The 'third meetings' indicate a return to attitudinal structuring by both parties.

The three graphs presented (see Graphs 2, 3 and 4) are a pictorial representation of Table 15 and reinforce the recursive nature of bargaining behaviour in the Cape.

Summary

The union's prime concern can be described as one of a concern in 'direct' economic benefits, i.e. wages and fringe benefits. No attempt to attain 'job control' benefits was evidenced in the minutes of the negotiations, e.g. redundancy payments, regulation and control of job content training specifications. It would seem that the union accepted employers' right to "hire and fire" and to make changes to job content without reference to the union other than adjusting pay rates.


TABLE 15

Percentages of Bargaining Behaviour - Cape


Date	Meet -ing Total No Lines	Percentage of Total Lines								Chair man		
		Employer				Union						
		M1	M2	M3	M4	N1	N2	N3	N4			
15 10 69	1	580	1	16	27	0	0	2	37	0	17	100
29 8 72	1	637	3	7	32	0	0	1	36	0	20	99
3 9 75	1	547	0	13	13	0	0	6	48	0	20	100
12 10 78	1	1045	0	11	13	0	0	20	38	0	18	100
1 10 81	1	248	2	19	24	0	0	7	17	0	31	100
28 10 82	1	648	4	23	20	0	0	9	20	0	25	101
22 8 84	1	763	2	1	34	0	0	23	17	0	22	99
16 10 86	1	768	0	1	37	0	0	9	21	0	32	100
22 10 69	2	372	0	12	20	1	0	2	43	0	22	100
19 9 72	2	546	0	10	8	0	0	15	23	0	44	100
2 10 75	2	509	0	25	16	0	0	12	17	0	30	100
1 11 78	2	794	0	4	11	0	0	15	10	0	60	100
10 11 82	2	420	1	26	11	0	0	13	17	0	31	99
28 8 84	2	180	0	24	20	0	0	13	17	0	26	100
27 10 86	2	557	6	15	26	0	0	15	17	0	22	101
29 10 69	3	212	12	19	12	0	1	8	18	0	30	100
28 10 75	3	250	2	6	9	0	0	5	36	0	42	100
13 11 78	3	490	0	9	13	0	0	5	4	0	69	100
7 11 86	3	455	0	3	37	0	0	6	18	0	37	101

Graph 2 - Cape Industrial Council


Percentages - First Meeting



Graph 3 - Cape Industrial Council
Percentages - Second Meeting



Graph 4 - Cape Industrial Council Percentages - Third Meeting



It must, however, be pointed out that the Cape industry between 1968 and 1986 was essentially a growing industry and as such redundancy as an issue had not been much in evidence until around 1986.

In addition, the minutes of the negotiations do not record any 'political' issue as part of the negotiations. The union is a-political.

5.5 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE CAPE GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

An analysis of action in the Cape system of industrial relations (at the industrial council level) suggests that the prime rule of signification is bound up in the containment of employment costs and the consequent ability of employers to remain competitive. Associated with the ability to remain competitive is the rule of ensuring a growing level of employment. This in turn can be viewed as an implicit sanction in that if employment costs make employers uncompetitive, manufacturers will withdraw from the Cape region.

Identification of rules of signification and legitimation cannot be isolated and presented as if they were unconnected with other (possible less prominent) rules. Thus, while suggesting the above prime rule of signification, it is as well to specify associated rules. The containment of employment costs also implies a growing - in terms of employment - industry, in that firstly it may well attract additional factors, and secondly will act as a disincentive to current manufacturers to relocate to other - lower labour cost - areas. Rules of signification can also be identified in the issues about which bargaining takes place. It will be noted that substantive issues focus solely on material rewards. A growing industry also needs to attract and hold labour and thus wages need to serve such purpose. The industrial council is also seen as the appropriate vehicle for managing labour

relations (the minimum benefits aspect). For employers an agreement provides a degree of cost certainty over the period of the agreement; in addition, it also means a common base from which all employers must operate. For the union it is important in that the agreement covers all its members and the union does not have to bargain with individual manufacturers. The industrial council also administers funds on behalf of the parties and ensures contributions not just to the funds but also that union contributions are paid. The industrial council also enforces through its inspectors the conditions of the agreement.

Rules of signification can also be identified in the type of funds administered by the industrial council, and in such activities undertaken by the exemptions committee. All can be taken as having meaning for the parties to the negotiations. In turn the mechanisms whereby these funds (and activities) are administered are facilities through which the rules of signification and legitimation are focused.

Rules of legitimation are arrived at by identifying - in interaction - forms of sanctions exercised by the parties, more easily by interpretation of what action is likely when rules of signification are under siege. The most clearly identifiable rule of legitimation lies in the possibility of a declining industry either through the relocation of firms or general economic decline. The maintenance of the industry (and growth) requires norms which attempt to balance increasing benefits for labour, the ability to attract new labour and the ability to compete.

Action in support of this depiction of structure in the Cape region can be identified in terms of (i) Contributions to (a) the Industrial Council and (b) the negotiated funds, and (ii) Wage patterns and (iii) Negotiation behaviour.

Contributions to the administration of the industrial council increase from 2c to 11c per employee for both employers and employees over the review period, and remains below the rate of inflation over the period. The growing level of employment in the industry contributes to the containment of this cost as economics of scale are likely to have been realised. A review of Table 1 shows that the parties response to a deficit in the cost of administering the agreements was one of increasing the rate of contributions. This suggests that the parties view the functioning of the administration in a positive light. This can be interpreted as a rule of signification. The rule of legitimation is implicit in the effect on the parties abilities to achieve their collectively specific objectives. For employers, the industrial council represents (amongst others) a means of controlling industry employment costs which has implications in terms of inter-firm and inter-regional competition. For the union, the industrial council means (amongst others) a way of ensuring (through a closed-shop mechanism) their subscription cash-flow and thereby funds needed for its activities.

Contributions to the negotiated funds indicate that the provident fund contributions have in fact exceeded the rate of inflation over the review period. An analysis of Table 2 suggests that the rate of increase has not been to the satisfaction of the Union. In 1980 the employee's contribution moves up disproportionately to that of employer's and remains so for 1981. Only after the economic boom year of 1981 does the subscription pattern revert to the historical practice of like rates for both parties. In addition the launching of a voluntary scheme in 1979 (i.e. only employees contribute) is further evidence of union dissatisfaction with rates of subscription. It is interesting to note that proportionately few of the workforce participated in the scheme.

Whilst the contributions to the provident fund bettered the rate of inflation, as a proportion of wages (for female machinists) there has been an increase of just over 20%. Thus, in 1976 a female machinist's minimum wage was R20.50 and contributions by both parties were 20c each, i.e. some 1%. By 1986 the minimum wage was R83.00 and the contribution R1.00 or 1.2% of the wage. As will be seen later the wage of the machinist has not quite kept up with inflation which contributes to the 20% (proportional) increase in contribution rates.

Contributions to the sick fund have also bettered the rate of inflation. Reviewing Table 3 it can be shown that had the 8c or 17c contribution rate (of 1969) just kept pace with inflation their 1986 equivalents would be R0.55 and R1.18 respectively. Actual 1986 contributions were R1.05 moving up to R1.35 at the end of 1986.

The training fund which was started in 1970 in response to a labour shortage has contributions by both parties at 1c each at the start of the fund, and moves up to 2c each until the fund is taken over by the National Clothing Federation and moves out of the ambit of the industrial council. The fact that both parties contribute to this fund indicates the importance associated with a growing industry.

The wage pattern in the Cape region, unlike contributions to funds, is such that wages generally have not kept pace with inflation and specifically the largest category of employment (female machinists) are marginally below the rate of inflation when comparing 1968 and 1986 figures (see Table 13).

The major element of employment costs will be the wage element. Action in the Cape region shows that employers have been able to contain minimum wages below the rate of inflation. Controlling the rate of increase to minimum wage rates can be seen in relation to the manufacturer's ability to

compete against other firms in the Cape region as well as against those in other producing regions. This is achieved by way of industrial council agreements, and represents structure in the Cape industry.

Negotiations over the review period occurred formally 8 times and extra-ordinary adjustments to agreements occurred 6 times in 1973, 1974, 1975, 1979, 1980 and 1981, all of which were procedurally and substantively similar. Substantive issues negotiated revolve around allocative resources, specifically wages and fringe benefits. The analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising the Walton and McKersie model is a further indication of the similarity of bargaining from one negotiation to the next. The similarity of action is important not just for the identification of 'systemness' but also in terms of the structuration thesis that the moment of action is also one of reproduction of the "conditions that make such action possible". This is simply demonstrated in the similarity of (repetitive) bargaining behaviour.

The similarity of negotiation issues evident in action, should be complimented by examining what issues were not negotiated by the parties as this too represents possible rules of signification and legitimation. The negotiated agreements reflect no issue which might suggest that the Union is attempting to curtail managerial authority over the workforce in the factory; there is evidence in the agreements of negotiation having taken place about the prescription of duties and responsibilities of specific jobs and the periods of traineeship required by different jobs, but managerial decision-making in terms of hiring, firing, redundancy and promotion are all left to the discretion of the manufacturer. This, together with negotiation of minimum wages, suggests that freedom of decision-making for the manufacturer can be viewed as a structural feature of the Cape industry (i.e. a rule of signification and by implication legitimation).

The portrayal of action as repetitive or recursive and as reproducing the conditions implicated in such action might be interpreted as a deterministic characterization of action. Structuration theory argues that

- (i) Reflexive monitoring
- (ii) Unintended consequences of intentional acts
- (iii) Significantly placed actors, and
- (iv) Events in other action contexts may constrain and or enable action in the context under examination are integral aspects of understanding social action and therefore the logical impossibility of a deterministic portrayal of social action.

The minutes of negotiations contain much evidence of reflexive monitoring on the part of employers. Manufacturers continually express an awareness of economic and competitive conditions, but this concern dominates the knowledge they have of economic position of the workforce, expressed as "a sympathy with" on a number of occasions. The number of extra-ordinary negotiations and their results (especially 1979, 1980 and 1981) indicate employers acceptance of the workforce's (economic) difficulties, but it should be noted that employers' attempt to bring forward already negotiated wages rather than agreeing increases over and above the negotiated wages, although on occasions negotiated wage increases were both brought forward and increased (see "Report on the C.C.M.A." 1983/4 and 1987 extra-ordinary negotiations).

Employers are also cognisant of labour turnover, absenteeism and labour shortages. In early negotiations manufacturers suggest that the Union has a role to play in minimising labour turnover and absenteeism, and whilst the chairman of the C.C.M.A. in his 1980/81 report argues that manufacturers have to address these problems in their factories, the issue of labour turnover and absenteeism is still presented (in 1982 negotiations) as a reason why Cape wages cannot be the same as those of Natal and the Transvaal.

The introduction of a training fund is the result of employers experiencing labour shortages and is further evidence of 'reflexive monitoring' and reflective of their 'need' to remain in the industry. In the 1971/72 C.C.M.A. report, the chairman is critical of government policy of Group Areas and resettling workers. The State suggestion that "resettled" workers should be considered for transport subsidies is rejected by employers saying that the State moved them, therefore the State "should accordingly subsidise the transport arrangements".

The Union reflects a continuing awareness of economic conditions particularly cost of living indicators, and these are recursively referred to in negotiations. In the 1980's, after amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act the union reflects an awareness of "outside bodies" (see meeting No. 1, 1981; also meeting No. 1, 1982). The union is also very aware of employment conditions in the Natal and Transvaal garment manufacturing regions as well as other industries. Information on their practices is used by the Union to justify their demands.

The identification of issues involved in reflexive monitoring are also indicative of rules of signification. In turn these issues suggest that unions hold beliefs surrounding the equitableness of their remuneration by way of comparing their position with that of other regions and industries. Similarly, employers hold dearly the equitableness of their ability to compete with other regions and importers. Legitimation is bound up with the equitableness as viewed by both parties.

Given the intention of manufacturers to contain the employment costs in the Cape region, it can be argued that the employment patterns observed in the region are the unintended consequences of such acts. Labour is essentially female, less than 40 years of age, reflecting high levels of labour turnover (only less than 60% p.a. in 1986 - see Table 11), with an increasing - and significant - proportion reflecting 3

or more employment periods in the industry. This volatility in the labour force will have a negative effect on productivity in the industry. Employer responses to these issues have largely been restricted to the introduction of attendance bonuses and trying to persuade the union to address the issue. The employment pattern is also suggestive of a different aspect of structuration theory, namely, the dialectic of control.

Structuration theory argues that those in subordinate position always have some resources to influence the conduct of their putative superiors. It is possible to interpret the employment patterns as evidence of employees adopting an instrumental approach to employment in the industry.

Employees, it is suggested, view (in general terms) employment as short-term and serving a specific purpose. The nature of the production process would support this approach as skills learnt (particularly those of the machinists) are stable over time, and readily picked up after absence from employment.

The possibility of an instrumental view of employment further suggests that the influence of the rank and file membership of the Union is less likely to exert great influence on the actions of the shop stewards and union executive. This position is supported by reviewing the support the Executive Committee get from shop stewards when meetings dealing with negotiations are held.

The role of "strategically placed actors [who] seek reflexively to regulate the overall conditions of system reproduction either to keep things as they are or to change them" (4) is evident in the Cape region. At a special general meeting of the union (29/5/1969), the secretary of the union states, "we must be realistic about our demands". At a general meeting held on the 23rd November, 1972, the meeting is told that had the union not accepted the agreement they would "have lost everything". At the same meeting the union's affiliation to the I.C.F.T.U. is referred to and the point is made, "that politics not interfere in Trade Union affairs";

again this is indicative of rules of signification and legitimation. Further support for this aspect of structuration theory lies in the similarity (recursive action) of demands presented by the Union at each negotiation. This recursive behaviour is evidence of the Union executive keeping "things the same".

An analysis of the union's financial statements also provides evidence of "strategically placed" actors keeping "things the same", as well as the recursive nature of much of the union's activities. The union is reliant on its membership subscriptions (and investment income) as well as the administrative arm of the industrial council to secure the funds required by the activities it engages upon, and this dependence is likely to influence the actions of its leadership. This observation contributes also to understanding of union officials emphasizing the importance of a growing industry and the role of the industrial council. It is also then likely to temper union demands particularly with the acceptance of the linkage between employment costs and the state of employment.

Direct evidence of the chairman and executive committee of the C.C.M.A. was not readily available, but it is reasonable to assume that in preparation for negotiations these actors would influence decisions. Likewise, the employers response to "extra-ordinary" negotiations is likely to be influenced by these "strategically placed" actors.

It can be observed that the elimination of wage discrimination based on gender is sourced in the political arena and has an impact on minimum wages. It has been argued that the de-sexing of jobs in the industry was a major factor in keeping female machinists' minimum wage virtually in line with the rate of inflation, i.e. 1986 rates vs. 1969 rates. The Group Areas Act and the "resettling" of much of the workforce in turn is seen to impact on the industry. Council in turn is not docile to these events, and through dealings with various State departments and participating commissions of enquiry

(see Wiehahn) seeks to influence actors in that action context. Furthermore, council through the provident fund seeks to assist in the provision of housing for its workforce whilst securing the fund's investments.

Structure in the Cape region has been identified by analysis of behaviour and the 'interpretive schemes' of the actors. Structure can be described as serving the sectional interests of the employer group and reflects the prime rule (feature) of maintaining the competitive ability of employers. Implicated in the ability to compete is the understanding that labour needs to be attracted and kept, and that this issue is related to the overall cost of employment. There is agreement by the parties that a growing industry (in employment) is desirable and that the industrial council is an appropriate vehicle for both parties. These rules of signification and legitimation are focussed by way of the industrial council which is the facility through which control over authoritative and allocative resources are exercised, i.e. domination.

5.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CAPE REGION

The foregoing analysis utilising structuration theory provides a mechanism for arriving at a comprehensive understanding of the ontological character of collective bargaining in the Cape region. The identification of rules of signification and legitimation provide direction in understanding the "lack of militancy"(5) in the bargaining activity which is supported by the identification of resources of domination. The question remains as to how this state of affairs was able to be perpetuated over the review period.

The rules of signification (and legitimation) can be seen to support the maintenance of the industrial council as an appropriate mechanism for the (at least partial) satisfaction of the goals of the participants. The G.W.U. bargainers repeatedly state that they wish to maintain the industrial council. The benefits of the council to the G.W.U. are

similar to the three tier strategy Morris (6) identifies in NUMSA's reversal of a policy of rejecting participation on industrial councils, the difference being (partly) that the G.W.U. had established itself many decades prior to NUMSA and under contextual conditions which were very different, at least to the extent that in the 1930's the unions had no other option other than the industrial council mechanism for (official/legal) collective bargaining activities.

Morris's (7) analysis of NUMSA also suggests developmental phases leading to their participation on an industrial council. Firstly, the growth in union membership led to 'organisational priorities' which could be served better by council membership. A contributing factor would be the geographical distribution of factories making the organising activities of union officials more complex. The G.W.U. in the 1930's would have experienced similar problems which the establishment of an industrial council would have gone some way to alleviate. This is not to suggest as Allen (8) does that trade unions are a direct result of their environment, of which the labour market is the dominant factor, but with some influence being sourced in individual values and consciousness. Bain, Coates and Ellis (9) argue that union growth and its character should be viewed rather as a function of the unions ability to influence events particularly by way of influencing decisions which regulate work activities. For both NUMSA and the G.W.U. the industrial councils are mechanisms for exerting such influence. The choice of issues to which attention is/was directed may well be different because of the different material conditions and consciousness of the respective leadership cadre.

The Cape Industrial Council was 34 years old at the start of the review period of this thesis, and had by that time established through the Council a number of 'funds' which provided benefits to its membership, and had been established for some time and in so doing had built up financial reserves (particularly the Provident Fund) and routine expectations

about the usage of the benefits flowing from these funds. Whilst these funds are a benefit to the Union membership they are also something of a constraint on bargaining behaviour.

Thus in the pre-Wiehahn era there was little choice in terms of official collective bargaining and the threat of closure would represent a major problem for (especially) the Union. After the amendments to the I.C. Act and the emergence of an 'option' - i.e. plant level bargaining - the problem of the management of these funds would also emerge had the union decided to withdraw from industrial level bargaining. The funds then help to 'bind' the parties to the process of collective bargaining through the industrial council.

The funds are in turn at least a partial reflection of issues of concern to the parties. It can be argued that the economic character of these benefits together with the Union's stated apolitical stance represent a "business unionism" (10) in that "they concentrate on industrial and economic matters, and ignore broader political issues". The union not only expresses (repeatedly) its concern for the industry but also participates in the funding of the Training Fund which can be seen to be in the Union's interest in terms of a growing industry.

In terms of the Union's achievement of improvements to these funds, the earlier analysis suggests that there have been improvements. That these may not have been at the level desired by the Union is evidenced firstly in the degree of distributive bargaining and secondly in the specific case of introducing a voluntary contribution by union members to an adjunct fund to the Provident Fund. It should be noted also that a legal constraint existed over the amount of assets of the Provident Fund which could be employed in the provision of housing loans. A ceiling was stipulated by the Registrar of Financial Institutions, and there was a restriction on the fund in terms of where it could invest its assets, i.e. only in 'statutory investments'.

The funds then represent a benefit to the union membership but also act as a constraint in the sense that they are believed to be important, and their loss would complicate the Union's ability to function in what it considers an appropriate manner. The funds will contribute to building an awareness "of the collective bargaining relationship" itself "founded on their mutual dependence" (11).

The funds in turn represent resources which both facilitate and constrain members of the management association. The ability to attract labour in competition with other industries is of obvious importance to a growing clothing industry. Within the industry competition for, firstly, labour is equivalent in respect of these benefits and, secondly, the costs to individual managements is the same and this impacts on product competition. There is also the additional benefit in that plant administration is simplified as wage deductions are directed toward a single institution (i.e. the Council). Furthermore, the employers participate in the setting of the levels of contribution they make to council funds, thus with some funds (e.g. Provident and Medical) if their administration were independent of employers (i.e. not done by council) then the possibility exists that those fund administrators could prescribe contribution increases which may not be desirable from an employers perspective. The establishment of a voluntary contribution system in the Provident Fund is illustrative of this point.

The constraint aspect of the fund as far as employers are concerned lies, firstly, in the necessity to make contributions to the fund. Secondly, contributions to funds are part of the negotiating agenda and as such represent a constraint in that employers do not have 'carte blanche' authority over this aspect of the employment relationship.

The existence too of the Contingency Fund and the 'Arrear Wages' arrangements can be seen as a constraint on employers in that such arrangements will influence their cash flows and possibly their profitability.

This discussion of the funds makes it evident that both parties to the bargaining activity have an interest in the maintenance of the funds. This is not to suggest that these interests are similar. They are in fact competitive for employers increased costs represent a constraint on their ability to compete on a national basis whilst 'unsatisfactory' increases represent to the union an inability to meet the needs of their membership. The analysis of the minutes of the negotiations does not indicate a great deal of emphasis being placed on increases to the rates of contribution to the various funds (see Meeting No. 2 of 1984, Meeting No. 1 of 1984 and Meeting No. 2 of 1979), but this cannot necessarily be interpreted as a lack of concern on the part of the Union for this issue. The financial data on the funds provides evidence that there have been - albeit not necessarily at the level desired by the Union, or for that matter employers - increases in contributions and benefits. The analysis of the funds are important for an additional reason, in that they are reflective of the parties conception of what it is 'reasonable' to negotiate about, i.e. the purpose of funds reflect constructs held by the parties about what is and what is not the territory of (sole) managerial authority, and again reflective of the constructs held by the Union as to its appropriate field of interest.

Flanders (12) has argued that the main function of collective bargaining is political rather than economic, i.e. unions are more concerned with issues of management rather than with economic issues such as wages and benefits as generated by these funds. As will be seen in the discussion on wages, Fox's (13) observation that "the intensity of conviction, effort and feeling which many trade unionists appear to invest in pay claims" argues that Flanders's view cannot (in this case) be substantiated.

A review of the minutes of the negotiations highlights the dominant position of wage increases as the major substantive issue. Again the analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising

the Walton and McKersie model indicates the degree of conflict surrounding the issue. Virtually all negotiation can be classified (on the part of both parties) as being either 'attitudinal structuring' or 'distributive bargaining'. It is again difficult to describe the behaviour as 'posturing'; the number of meetings and their duration is suggestive of the seriousness with which the parties embark on the resolution of their differing interests.

That there are differing and competing interests is readily evident in the constructs utilised by the parties. Wage increases can influence the ability of Cape employers to compete with other production regions (nationally and internationally). At the same time the method of 'doing business' in the industry acts as an incentive to management to reach an agreement, particularly agreements which cover a period of more than one year. Production of garments is negotiated with retailers for future delivery, thus the establishment of certainty of (labour) costs at a future point will assist manufacturers in their negotiations with purchasers of their products. Point 5.2.5 of this chapter indicates the duration of the agreements, around 2 to 3 years (where no 'extra-ordinary' meetings took place) each. Wage negotiations through the industrial council is therefore attractive to employers in terms of being able to predict labour costs as well as providing a similar competitive base to employers covered by the agreement. It is further important in that their exercise of at least partial control over wages allows thereby some control of their ability to compete with manufacturers in other regions. The maintenance of the relationship with the Union via the industrial council mechanism is therefore of value to manufacturers.

The benefits of bargaining at the industrial council level (even though regional rather than national) as identified by both Toerien (14) and Morris (15) have relevance to the understanding of bargaining in the Cape clothing industry. Both identify the desirability (from a union perspective) of uniform wages and conditions of employment and the role of

industrial councils in achieving this objective. Whilst this objective is not recorded in the minutes of the Cape negotiations, it is reasonable to argue that such a lack of evidence in the minutes is the result of having achieved that objective many decades ago rather than the objective being of little relevance to the G.W.U. The union also has the benefit of being able to initiate wage demands on occasions other than at the formal re-negotiation of agreements (see e.g. the extra-ordinary negotiations of 1979, 1980 and 1981). This can be viewed as having administrative benefits to the Union in the sense that such action, in the absence of an industrial council would require additional union organisers, which would add to the costs of managing a union which in turn would limit the organisations efforts in other areas of importance to the union.

The issue of wage bargaining can, like the bargaining surrounding the funds of the Council, be seen to have benefits to both parties and thereby reinforcing perceptions of the mutual dependence of the relationship as identified earlier by Salamon (16).

There is a further issue which also will influence the parties understanding of the relationship, and this refers to the often stated desire (by the Union) to ensure a growing and stable industry in the Cape region. Employers typically use this Union position to argue the unreasonableness of wage (and other) demands suggesting that such demands will negatively influence their competitive ability and consequently make the option of relocating to 'border' areas that much more likely, with the result that employment opportunities will be adversely affected. This 'threat' has some substance in that the nature of production in the garment industry is reliant on semi-skilled and unskilled labour, and that training is relatively easily provided. Again, the Union, through the Consultative Committee (i.e. made up of the regional unions) will be aware of not only factories which have re-located (especially in the Transvaal), but also the incidence of new factories opening in the so-called 'border' areas.

The issue of a growing and stable industry is of importance to the Union in that such an industry can provide employment, an objective which has significance in terms of how the Union views its role. In addition a growing Union implies its increasing ability to meet not only wages and condition of employment objectives, but also to provide a greater and more substantive range of services to its members.

The Union's involvement in the establishment of a Training Fund - which is the most prominent example of integrative bargaining - can be seen as objective evidence of their concern for a growing industry; for employers the investment in such training is likely to provide more readily the supply of labour desired than the cost of relocation. Again, employers initiate changes to wage deductions to attract 'trainees' to the industry and for the same reason increase the starting rate (see Table 5).

The concept of the 'managerial prerogative' is also of relevance in understanding the interdependence of the collective bargaining relationship. In discussing the role of the state in different phases of industrial relations in Britain, Crouch (17) suggests that during the phase of "liberal collectivism" industrial relations is characterised by an acceptance of a trade unions' role to represent, organise and bargain with management through the collective bargaining process. At the same time, however, the "dominant interests of management are protected through the delineation of agreed rights and the maintenance of a boundary between the issues for collective bargaining and issues for determination by managerial prerogative" (18). The restricted nature of issues over which bargaining takes place in the Cape industry means that the scope for the exercise of managerial authority is hardly limited by the results of negotiations; the maintenance of these conditions has proved to be possible over the thesis review period through negotiations at the industrial council and is likely to be a further issue of value to employers, who would consequently protect the maintenance of the relationship.

The Union's view of its function as 'economic' rather than 'Flanders' (19) view of 'political' will then support the maintenance of bargaining which perpetuates the wide ranging authority of management over its members. In addition the history of collective bargaining in the industry is likely to contribute to this view of the Union, not only by the Union but also by employers. The limitations of the Industrial Conciliation Act would further have contributed to this view of the role and function of unions, i.e. one of a restricted economic bargaining function, i.e. its focus is not on plant level issues, and whilst not excluding 'political' issues does direct attention at 'economic' matters. It is important to note that the limited range of bargaining issues was a continuing feature of negotiations even after the amendment of the I.C. Act in 1979, and the very observable activities of other more militant unions also did not change this aspect of collective bargaining in the Cape industry.

The restricted range of bargaining issues then lends credence to the depiction of bargaining in the Cape Industrial Council as "conservative because of its dormant past" (20). The limited range of issues logically means that the likelihood of conflict is lessened.

Wages represent the dominant bargaining issue in the Cape Council and the analysis of the movement of wages in real terms provided earlier in this chapter shows that with the exception of female machinists (the dominant job category), wages have not kept pace with inflation, i.e. in terms of minimum wages. The containment of labour costs (and maintaining their pre-eminence as a bargaining issue) is reflective of the dominance of employer ends in the negotiating process, and this might (simplistically) be ascribed to the Union placing a greater value on the relationship fostered and maintained through bargaining in the Industrial Council. However, the Union (bargainers) do not do so in isolation and must take their constituency into account. This constituency shows little or no hostility

towards the Union either over the limited range of issues bargained over or the decline of their wages in real terms. In fact, some meetings between the Union executive and shop stewards reflects satisfaction with the achievements of Union representatives bargained outcomes (see Meeting No. 2, 1972; Extra-ordinary negotiations 1974 and Meeting No. 2, 1984). There are a number of observations which contribute to the understanding of why these conditions existed and were perpetuated. It is then not sufficient to argue that managerial dominance in terms of the outcomes of bargaining is (solely) explicable in terms of the value placed on the relationship by the Union executive.

Gool (21) and Maree (22) suggest that the issue of Union democracy contributes to lack of militancy, though they differ on the causes of the lack of democracy in the decision-making process. Nicol (23) and Maree (24) focus on the leadership of the G.W.U. whilst Gool identifies the "atomised" (25) nature of the productive process, i.e. small and widely dispersed factories which allows the Union hierarchy "to exercise political control over its membership" (26).

Evidence gleaned from (limited) minutes of meetings between shop stewards and the Union executive indicate support for the efforts of the Secretary both in formal negotiations and with the results of extra-ordinary negotiations. At the same time evidence exists to show that the Secretary does influence the expectations of shop stewards (see "Supporting Statements" 1969, 1972). However, there is little documentary evidence of the Secretary influencing (or not) the expectations and thereby controlling behaviour. It is evident, however, that even in the 1984 negotiations the shop stewards were prepared to delegate the authority to the Secretary to "negotiate the best possible offer he can get from the employers" (see "Supporting Statements", 1984 Negotiations).

In examining the financial statements of the Union it was noted that shop stewards are paid to attend meetings. Such payments could be seen as inducements to attend meetings, but

again could be seen as a means of constraining criticism. Data on the number of attendees and the number of meetings held in each financial year were not available, but it will be seen that the expenses involved in holding these meetings was considerable (by 1985 the represented nearly 6½% of annual expenditure).

There is also no evidence of a formal process in which the rank and file membership or even the shop stewards play a significant role in the formulation of (even a restricted set) demands to be negotiated with management. It is possible that this state of affairs existed because of the dispersed nature of the productive process and because of the status of the Union Secretary. However, the centrality of the wage issue to the membership cannot be underestimated and the possibility that the membership might be satisfied with wages needs to be explored.

The forthcoming argument has to be approached with great care as the evidence utilised to argue the significance of the proposition is one-sided in that it deduces subjective states from observable data. The argument would be more complete if subjective data had been available.

It can be argued that there is an instrumental approach to employment by labour in the clothing industry in the Cape. Goldthorpe et. al. (27) have argued the existence of an "instrumental orientation" in certain workers, whilst the notion was associated with 'affluent workers', the core of the argument referred to a diminished concern about work other than its ability to meet non-work (material) requirements. Again care must be taken in ascribing the direction of causality, thus Brown (28) notes that the Goldthorpe et. al. argument fails to show how the workplace experience can influence such orientations.

Given the above limitations, the following aspects, it is argued, lend support to an instrumental orientation in the rank-and-file being at least a contributory factor in the observed non-militancy of collective bargaining in the Cape Industrial Council.

The first point to be made is that the labour force is overwhelmingly female. Table 8 of this chapter shows that females represented 74.3% of the labour force in 1968 and that by 1986 this figure was virtually 92%, of which just under 50% were machinists (i.e. semi-skilled). It needs also to be noted (secondly) that the production process utilised in the manufacture of garments has remained labour intensive, and one in which the quality and quantity of skill requirements has remained static. That is to say, that there has been relatively little change in the process of manufacturing, which means that employees can readily exit the industry and return with little or no disruption to their ability to do the job.

Table 10a (of this chapter) shows (thirdly) that the age pattern of female employees is such that the vast majority leave the industry by the age of 40 years. Only in 1971 did the percentage of workers older than 40 top the 20% mark, and by 1986 only some 14% were older than 40. In fact the table shows that since 1974 at least 60% of the labour force was 30 years old or younger. The male 'age' profile in Table 10b reflects a more even distribution of employment.

Fourthly, the labour turnover statistics need to be read in conjunction with the age profile. Table 11 shows massive 'terminations' in the industry and these figures reflect not only withdrawals from the industry, but factory to factory movement. In 1982 there was one termination for virtually (93.7%) every employee in the industry, and only in one year (1986 - weak economic conditions) were the terminations less than 60% of total employment. Table 12 shows that a very large proportion (from a low of 33.2% in 1968 to a high of 51.1% in 1986) had on 3 or more occasions returned to the

industry. The Table also indicates a decreasing number of employees with only one entrance to the industry. Again there appears to be some relationship between low points in the economic cycle and 'returns' to the industry. Thus 1974, 1977 and 1983 are low points economically but reflect the highest number of employees with 3 or more 'entrances' to the industry. The figures are also reflective of employer unwillingness to employ new entrants requiring training - see also Table 11.

Interpreting these figures needs to be done with care in the sense that a number of competing interpretations can be reasonably presented. However, a tentative argument suggesting an instrumental orientation will be presented.

The data tends to suggest that females join the industry at around 20 years of age and leave the industry (for good) at around 40 years of age. During this period a significant number of them reflect multiple entrances and there is a great deal of inter-factory movement of labour in any one year. This, together with the relative ease with which one can regain the skills learnt whilst in employment suggest that employment is viewed as a means to supplement household income, whether it is the employee's household or some other household to which she contributes.

It is also possible that the inter-factory labour movement is reflective of the workforce having learnt this behaviour as a means of increasing their wage packet. Again, this may have been learnt as a result of frustration with the Union's efforts to effect a wage level which is perceived to be appropriate.

If the female employee does not view herself as the 'breadwinner', but rather as a 'homemaker', then the figures can be argued to make sense.

As suggested earlier by Brown, the direction of causality generating the instrumental orientation needs to be examined carefully. Thus, the work experience may (at least) contribute to such an orientation. Career opportunities in the sense of progression up a hierarchy of jobs - with a concomitant increase in benefits - is not a feature of employment in the clothing industry, which can act as a disincentive to continuing employment in the industry. In addition, employment opportunities in the Cape economy are likely to be restricted, which would influence re-entry decisions. Finality around this question is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the identification of these behaviours irrespective of their causes contributes to understanding the question of Union militancy.

These patterns of employment can readily be interpreted to mean that there is unlikely to be pressure from the rank-and-file membership on the Union executive to embark on activities which would reflect a more militant profile. This lack of pressure from below is in turn likely to be understood by the executive as approval of their actions, and so perpetuate their behaviour and understanding of their role in representing the Union.

It has been argued that both parties have a significant interest in maintaining the Industrial Council, and that the relationship of inter-dependence is accepted and understood by both parties. Nevertheless, employer interests dominate in that the Union executive are concerned to ensure a stable and growing employment, and understand that employment costs can negatively affect their employment objective. This understanding of the bargaining relationship is also related to the restricted range of bargaining issues but does not mean that bargaining was not intense (see the Walton and McKersie analysis). Again, this state of affairs will continue as there is little or no pressure from the rank-and-file to change past practices. This is not to deny, however, the salience of Gool, Nicol and Maree's analysis, rather in

combination, a more comprehensive explanation of collective bargaining in the Cape industry can be arrived at.

CONCLUSION

In structuration theory 'structure' is prior to form and is characterised by rules of signification and legitimation and resources of domination. Knowledgeable actors draw on structure in the production and reproduction of action - in this thesis that of collective bargaining. Section 5.5 of this chapter identifies the structure of collective bargaining in the Cape garment manufacturing industry and notes that the asymmetries of signification, legitimation and domination favour the sectional interest of employers. It will be this structure which the union (and employer) representatives draw on in the production and reproduction of collective bargaining action. It follows logically, that if the 'structure', which favours employers is utilised by the union leadership then their actions are unlikely to be 'militant'.

The continuity of the lack of militancy is readily explicable in structuration theory terms. Knowledgeable agents have 'interpretive schemes' - in which 'structure' can be found albeit at different levels of consciousness. These agents monitor the behaviour of others and can thereby adjust their own behaviour, and if this change is durable it then produces a different structure. A further source of change is to be found in the unintended consequences of intentional acts, a last possible source of change must also logically be found in any change in 'significantly placed actors', i.e. leadership of union (or employer) bodies.

In section 5.6 of this chapter a range of factors are identified as related to the observed continuity of a lack of militant action on the part of the union. They are all relevant. Their relevancy rests on the argument that either

do not facilitate a change in the leadership's 'interpretive scheme' or they represent means whereby the union leadership can maintain their 'interpretive scheme' and in so doing 'keep things as they are', i.e. in action they will draw upon structure (which favours employer interests) in the production and reproduction of collective bargaining action.

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CHAPTER 6

THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE TRANSVAAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Evidence of structure particular to the Transvaal region will be presented below under the headings

6.2 PART A - FORM

- 6.2.1 The Industrial Council
- 6.2.2 The Funds of the Council
- 6.2.3 The Parties to the Agreement
- 6.2.4 Employment Form
- 6.2.5 Wage Form

6.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME

The data presented under the above headings will then be drawn on to argue a particular description of structure in the Transvaal region. It will be shown that the nature of structure is inherent in all the data provided, which supports the contention of the duality of structure although argument on this particular issue will be left for the concluding chapter. In addition, the data will be used to highlight other aspects of structuration theory and in so doing its explanatory power.

6.4 Constructs

6.5 The Structure of Industrial Relations in the Transvaal Garment Manufacturing Industry

6.6 Collective Bargaining in the Transvaal Region

6.2 PART A - "FORM"6.2.1 The Industrial Council

The Industrial Council of the Transvaal (I.C.T.) has been in existence since 1933, although an initial attempt to establish a council was made in 1928. The Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association (T.C.M.A.) and the Garment Workers Union of South Africa (G.W.U. - S.A.) finalised negotiations on a "new constitution and agreement" and "the constitution was registered on the 29th November 1933 and the agreement was published in February 1934" (1983 Diary of I.C.T.).

It is from the parties to the agreement that funds are generated to administer the agreement and to fund benefits negotiated by the parties. The I.C.T. receives funds from both parties to the agreement and charges an administration fee for the management of the different funds of the council, and in addition will have interest revenue from accumulated funds. Table 1 reflects the changes in these elements as at the accounting year end for the review period, and it can be seen that with the exception of 1984/85 that the council has stayed largely within budget and has substantial accumulated funds. Contributions to council in 1968 are 4c and 11c per employee for employees and employers respectively. These change to 4c and 4c in 1972, move up to 7c each in 1978, to 10c each in 1982 and from 1983 to the end of the review period, the contribution was 14c each.

TABLE 1THE TRANSVAAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL

Year	Subscr. Income	Total Income	Expenses	Admin Fee	Excess/ (Loss)	Accum. Funds
1968	87179	90658	195641	99315	(5668)	105851
1969	87452	91748	204533	121661	8876	114727
1970	89311	95148	225047	124256	(5643)	109084
1971	90579	96084	247586	150737	(765)	108319
1972	88156	94981	253302	150492	(7829)	100490
1973	85738	98289	319668	233631	12252	112742
1974	87023	104987	321642	219809	3154	115896
1975	91586	109467	332752	223962	677	116573
1976	80279	95749	340361	224350	(20262)	96311
1977	99183	109196	370591	272487	11092	107403
1978	12833	152707	376010	261799	38496	145899
1979	126758	186405	417308	246055	15152	161051
1980	166848	211157	521343	299128	(11058)	149993
1981	103127	189987	541911	345366	(6558)	143435
1982	158993	323325	661441	340297	2181	145616
1983	181994	351971	755374	420232	16829	162445
1984	240567	352094	657172	461875	156797	319242
1985	205341	491544	854181	470070	107433	426675
1986	180105	399696	795739	450901	54858	481533

The financial status of the industrial council (as reflected in Table 1) indicates that the response to a loss is largely one of increasing the "Administration Fee". There also appears to be an attempt from 1982 to build up "Accumulated Funds". The "Administration Fee" is made up from fees charged against funds administered by the Industrial Council on behalf of the parties to the Agreement. The administration fee is never less than 50% of council expenses and gets as high as 74% in 1977.

6.2.2 The Industrial Council Funds

6.2.2.1 The Provident Fund

The provident fund was introduced in 1957 as a condition of employment having been initiated in 1951 as a voluntary fund and with an initial donation of R100,000 from the (T.C.M.A). In 1986 the accumulated assets of the fund totalled R24,453,162. Table 2 shows the growth of accumulated Assets and changes in the contribution rates. The fund, like its counterparts in the Cape and the Transvaal, is regularly submitted for (independent) actuarial evaluation and no critical reports on the Fund were to be found in the records of the Council.

A 'machinist' in 1972 contributed 10c per week to the provident fund and the employer 54c (total 64c). By 1986 the machinist's contribution is calculated as R1.80 with a like amount being contributed by the employer (Total R3.60). If inflation were taken into account the total contribution should be R3.86 to remain equivalent. Inflating the 1972 employers contribution by the inflation rate indicates that had such contribution kept pace with inflation their 1986 contribution would have been R3.25 per employee per week. It has then been the employees who have increased their contributions in an attempt to keep pace with inflation.

In the 1969 Diary of the I.C.T. mention is made of bonuses declared, thus 1962 = 3.5%, 1965 = 17.5% to all members with 10 years service and 1967 = 17.5% to 35% depending on length of service. 1967 also "saw the introduction of continuous membership", this being a benefit available to those with 10 or more years service who wish to maintain their membership whilst being unemployed, such an option would be available at a reduced rate of contribution.

6.2.2.2 The Medical Aid (Later Benefit) Society

While the first effort to establish an industrial council for the Transvaal collapsed, the 'Medical Aid Society' (M.A.S.) was maintained and thus celebrated its 50th year in 1978, by which time it had become known as the 'Medical Benefit Society' (M.B.S.) as in 1971 the M.A.S. had split into the M.B.S. and the 'Sick Pay Fund'. The financial history is provided in Table 3 and Tables 4a & b reflect the contribution rates over that period.

(To read Table 3 take 'Income' minus 'Benefits Paid', minus 'Expenditure' to arrive at 'Surplus/(Loss)' which is then added to or subtracted from the previous year's 'Accumulated Funds' to arrive at the current years 'Accumulated Funds')

In 1968 a female worker contributed either 21c or 26c (see Table 4a) and in 1986 the rate was 99c. Had the contribution kept pace with inflation the 1986 equivalents would have been R1.45 and R1.80 respectively. The employers contribution in 1968 was the same as the employees (see Table 4b) and in 1986 was 73c, so falling behind the rate of inflation.

TABLE 2

PROVIDENT FUND - ACCUMULATED ASSETS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Year	Accumulated Assets(Rs)	Employer Contrib.(p.w.)	Employee Contrib.(p.w.)
1986	24,453,162	For wage <R32, 70c deducted. Increase deduction by 10c for every R4 (or part) for wages >R32.00	
		10c for every R4 (or part) for wages >R32.00	
1985	21,766,209	Same as 1986	
1984	17,971,545	Same as 1986	
1983	13,903,805	Same as 1986	
1982	11,212,649	(up to)30.6.82 40c per worker	Wage rate 11.90-15.99 = 27c Wage rate >R16.00 = 54c
1981	10,124,758	From 1.7.80 to 30.6.81=37c From 1.7.81 to 30.6.82=40c	Same as 1982
1980	8,998,955	From 1.7.79 to 30.6.80=35c From 1.7.80 to 30.6.81=37c From 1.7.81 to 30.6.82=40c	Same as 1982
1979	8,076,477	30c per worker p.w.	Same as 1982
1978	7,694,557	30c per worker p.w.	Same as 1982
1977	7,209,398	Same as 1976	Same as 1972
1976	7,201,406	Same as 1975	Same as 1972
1975	N/A	15c per worker p.w.	Same as 1972
1974		Same as 1972	Same as 1972
1973		Same as 1972	Same as 1972
1972	N/A	10c per worker p.w.	From 7.50 to 12.49=27c From 12.50 up =54c
1971	N/A	Same as	Same as 1970
1970	3,905,186	7c per worker p.w.	From 6.00 to 12.49=27c From 12.50 up =54c
1969	3,593,659	Same as 1967	Same as 1967
1968	3,302,452	Same as 1967	Same as 1967
1967	N/A	5c per worker p.w.	Wage 6.00=11c Wage 6.00 to 11.50=27c Wage 11.50=54c

TABLE 3

MEDICAL BENEFIT SOCIETY
(after 1.7.71 - prior to this Medical Aid Society)

Year	Contrib.	Income	Interest	Benefits Paid	Expenditure	Expend. over Income	Acc. Funds at year end
1986	1100481	1183540	83059	1119688	120970	(57118)	645208
1985	962617	1098829	135212	1443300	115751	(160222)	702326
1984	1123468	1226389	102921	1022594	116277	87518	862548
1983	796402	912510	107952	867989	98529	(54008)	775030
1982	882910	1044213	103050	840570	75133	128510	829038
1981	872235	924199	48853	647362	77579	199258	700528
1980	773752	801728	26245	568176	60768	172784	501270
1979	657109	672145	14536	471865	50129	150151	328486
1978	575648	583641	6503	451075	49712	82854	178335
1977	502259	510204	7945	444353	52977	12874	95481
1976	431887	441237	9350	414022	41676	(14461)	82607
1975	418346	428683	10337	405527	41989	(18833)	97068
1974	346590	358780	12190	371494	40259	(52973)	115901
1973	291711	308302	15661	335711	52559	(79968)	168874
1972	294215	319494	15523	326002	21378	(32686)	248842
1971	149259	165421	7072	144844	9883	8714	281133*
1971	222579	239436	16857	162147	28454	(8841)	486622
1970	449547	499595	38163	455801	48986	32971	495463
1969	494551	528647	34096	399161	48693	80793	462492
1968	496255	522212	20260	379272	45106	97834	381699

*only for 6 months ended Dec. 1971

TABLE 4a

MEDICAL AID/BENEFIT SOCIETY (EMPLOYEES SCALE OF DEDUCTIONS)

Year	Male	Female
1967	Wage R5 to R10.50 = 21c R10.51 to R18.09 = 25c R18.10 up = 36c	Wage R5 to R10.50 = 21c R10.51 up = 26c
1968	Same as 1967	Same as 1967
1969	Same as 1967	Same as 1967
1970	Wage R6 to R11.50 = 21c R11.51 to R19.00 = 26c R19.01 up = 36c	Wage R6 to R11.50 = 21c R11.51 up = 26c
1971	Same as 1970	Same as 1970
1972	Wage R7.50 to R13.49=13c R13.50 up =14c	Male and female rate Male and female rate
1973	Same as 1972	Same as 1972
1974	Same as 1972	Same as 1972
1975	Wage R7.50 to R13.49=17c R13.50 up =18c	Male and female Male and female
1976	Wage R7.50 to R13.49=20c R13.50 up =21c	Male and female Male and female
1977	Same as 1976	Same as 1976
1978	Wage R7.50 to R15.99=32c R16.00 up =33c	Male and female Male and female
1979	Same as 1978	Same as 1978
1980	Wage R7.50 to R15.99=43c R16.00 up =52c	Male and female Male and female
1981	Same as R1980	Same as 1980
1982	Wage R11.90 to R15.99=43 R16.00 up =52	Male and female Male and female
1983	All pay 52c irrespective of sex or wage category	
1984	All pay 77c irrespective of sex or wage category	
1985	All pay 77c irrespective of sex or wage category	
1986	All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category	
1987	All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category	
1988	All pay 99c irrespective of sex or wage category	

TABLE 4bEMPLOYERS CONTRIBUTION

1967	16c per employee p.w. other than African males (11c each)
1968	20c per employee p.w. - African males stay 11c each
1969	Same as 1968
1970	Same as 1968
1971	Same as 1968
1972	Amount equal to Employees contribution
1973	Same as 1972
1974	Same as 1972
1975	Equal contribution
1976	Same as 1975
1977	Same as 1975
1978	Same as 1975
1979	Same as 1975
1980	Wage than R16.00 = 34c
	Wage than R16.00 = 36c
1981	Same as 1980
1982	Same as 1980
1983	36c per employee
1984	55c per employee
1985	55c per employee p.w. irrespective of sex, race or wage category
1986	73c per employee p.w. irrespective of sex, race or wage category

6.2.2.3 Sick Pay Fund

The medical aid society split in 1971 to introduce a separate Fund to ensure payment of a proportion of the employees wages when off sick. The sick fund was established as a separate fund on the 1st July 1971, with the transfer of R213,939 from the accumulated funds of the medical aid society. Table 5 reflects the financial status of the fund for the period 1971 to 1986 and Table 6 records the employer/employee contributions.

To read Table 5, two points should be noted,

- (i) Contributions and interest do not necessarily equal income, (minor amounts adjust the figures).
- (ii) Both 'Benefits Paid' and 'Expenditure' must be deducted from 'Income' to arrive at a figure which adjusts the previous years 'Accumulated Funds' to arrive at the 'Accumulated Funds' figure for the year under examination.

TABLE 5SICK PAY FUND

Year	Cont-rib.	Int-erest	Income	Benefits Paid	Ex-pend.	Excess Exp over income	Accumu-lated Funds
1986	126558	209460	336656	343738	50900	(57982)	1522599
1985	216808	299288	518234	335368	50830	132036	1580581
1984	253626	208641	462267	341430	52414	68423	1448545
1983	268417	175233	446000	342529	46200	57271	1380122
1982	400125	139418	567177	346522	37476	183179	1322851
1981	398910	92731	500723	275948	72348	152427	1139672
1980	349981	70218	423581	260518	54800	108263	987245
1979	434959	67069	504182	212104	45800	246278	878982
1978	538976	41904	585228	194997	73993	316238	632704
1977	484694	19581	507690	374081	61234	72375	316466
1976	442374	20355	463529	418555	50020	(5046)	244091
1975	425531	20301	448017	410311	50203	(12497)	249137
1974	341531	20866	363217	354066	49058	(39907)	261634
1973	224731	21766	247670	173429	51272	22969	301541
1972	214327	11818	230557	152325	37364	40868	278572
1971	114822	5626	122878	80381	18732	23765	237704

TABLE 6

SICK PAY FUND CONTRIBUTIONS

Year	Employees	Employers
1972	Wage R7.50 - R13.49 = 8c (M & F)* Wage R13.50 - R20.99 = 14c (M & F) Wage R20.99 = 24c (male only) Wage R20.99 = 14c (female only)	Wage= \leq R13.50 = 7c Wage $>$ R13.50 = 8c
1973	Same as 1972	Same as 1972
1974	Wage R7.50 - R13.49 = 13c (M & F) Wage R13.50 - R20.99 = 21c (M) Wage R21.00 = 31c (M) Wage R13.50 = 21c (F only)	Same as 1972
1975	Wage R7.50 - R13.49 = 17c (M & F) Wage R13.50 - R20.99 = 25c (M) Wage R20.99 = 35c (M) Wage R13.50 = 25c (F)	Wage= \leq R13.50 = 11c Wage $>$ R13.50 = 12c
1976	Same as 1975 but add 3c to contribution across the board	
1977	Same as 1975 (without any additions)	
1978	Wage R7.50 - R15.99 = 31c (M & F) Wage R16.00 and up = 39c (F) Wage R16.00 - R23.99 = 39c (M) Wage R24.00 up = 49c (M)	Wage= \leq R16.00 = 22c Wage $>$ R16.00 = 23c
1979	Same as 1978	
1980	All classes pay 20c each	
1981	Same as 1980	
1982	Same as 1980	
1983	Same as 1980	
1984	All classes pay 15c each	
1985	Same as 1984	
1986	All classes pay 10c each	

*(M & F = Male and Female)

In terms of 'benefits paid' this fund has seen payouts stay much the same - in nominal terms - since 1974, and at the same time 'Accumulated Funds' have (from 1976 to 1986) outpaced the rate of inflation, i.e. the 1976 inflation adjusted 1986 equivalent would be R993 206,00. This real growth in accumulated funds allows for three strategies

- 1) A decrease in subscription rates
- 2) An increase in benefits
- 3) A combination of (1) and (2)

An examination of Table 5 and 6 and the knowledge of a decline (generally) in total employment suggest that the third strategy was opted for with an emphasis on decreasing contributions.

In 1972 the average benefit to employees was R6.32; by 1980 this was R12.47 and in 1986 it was R25.04. Equally, contributions whilst initially increasing have been reduced.

6.2.2.4 Slack Pay Fund

The slack pay fund was started in 1954, "due to the then end of the post war boom" (I.C.T. Diary 1983), and due also to the "Loss of wages from the introduction of short-time in factories, which regrettably is an unavoidable evil in the clothing industry" (I.C.T. Diary 1967). Benefits to employees were paid "in respect of five complete days of short-time, continuous or occasional falling within a period of three months calculated from the first day of short-time". (I.C.T. Diary 1967)

The fund was able to "accumulate substantial funds" due to "the more favourable conditions that existed in the 1960's" (I.C.T. Diary 1983). The fund's financial history for 1968 to 1986 is provided in Table 7, and contributions to the fund are recorded in Table 8.

TABLE 7SLACK PAY FUND

Year	Contr. Rec'd	Contr by EmRs	Int- erest	Bene- fits Paid	Expend	Income over Expend.	Acc. Funds
1986	126371	42457	114149	241913	40256	808	774700
1985	1091	None	164531	404846	40156	(279380)	773892
1984	1440	None	137550	238199	40156	(139365)	1053272
1983	91037	5700	157584	517051	36528	(299258)	1192637
1982	2036	35525	161123	128060	31920	38704	1493096
1981	1678	17341	152525	39429	33451	98664	1453191
1980	1677	7925	97777	71518	26240	9621	1354527
1979	1518	4705	112848	108621	39733	(29283)	1344906
1978	1569	4925	130461	157962	21904	(42911)	1374189
1977	1611	10950	129547	188338	21904	(68134)	1417100
1976	1746	18450	128301	53240	18016	77241	1485234
1975	2130	13720	115466	54988	18016	58312	1407993
1974	24807	9275	103212	20504	17642	99148	1349681
1973	46486	10425	91146	39957	17792	90308	1250533
1972	48974	11721	83059	54083	14096	75575	1160225
1971	61580	13925	73175	21469	14096	113115	1084650
1970	71529	16630	60643	17809	11636	119357	971535
1969	136720	17045	47473	36754	11786	152698	852178
1968	149380	13095	41952	27497	10530	167000	699480

TABLE 8CONTRIBUTION RATES

Year	Employee	Employer
1968	Wage R13.42 = 6c Wage R13.42 = 8c	Equal contribution
1969	Wage R13.42 = 5c) 1c decrease goes Wage R13.42 = 7c) to Training Fund	Same as 1968 rate
1970	Same as 1969	
1971	Same as 1969	
1972	All classes pay 2c per week	Equal contribution
1973	Same as 1972	
1974	Same as 1972	
1975	Contributions done away with. (Not reinstated during remainder of review period. But note that in 1972 Employees Contribution drops between 3c and 5c but Training Fund Contributions increase by 3c)	

6.2.2.5 The Training Fund

1968 a training fund was established to provide monies for the development of a training centre at which workers could receive training. However, "It was soon realised that one Province alone could not afford the training" (I.C.T. Diary 1983). In 1978 "the purely Transvaal effort was taken over by the nationally constituted Training Board for the Clothing Industry" (I.C.T. Diary 1983). No financial or training activity data was available but Table 9 below reflects the contribution rates to the fund. (Note Training College opened 17th April 1969)

TABLE 9

TRAINING FUND CONTRIBUTIONS

1969 to 1971	Both parties contribute 1c per worker p.w.
1972 to 1974	Contributions increase to 4c each
1975 to 1977	Contributions increase to 6c each
1978	10c per employee per week (employer only)
1979	" " " " " "
1980	" " " " " "
1981	" " " " " "
1982	15c per employee per week
1983	" " " " " "
1984	" " " " " "
1985	25c per employee per week
1986	" " " " " "

6.2.2.6 Stabilisation Fund

Following on the establishment of the training fund, the 'Stabilisation Insurance Fund' and the 'Holiday Pay Fund' were established. The purpose of both funds was to protect wages, holiday pay and contributions to Council funds in cases of insolvency. For the stabilisation fund employers who were not members of the T.C.M.A. had to pay 25c per employee or must "provide an acceptable guarantee" (Various I.C.T. Diaries). The holiday pay fund required the employer to pay 8% of wages each week out of which year end holiday bonuses could be paid. Interest accruing to

this account was split as follows, 75% thereof was (proportionately) distributed to employers and 25% went to the council as a contribution to the costs of administering the funds. Table 10 below provides financial data on this fund.

TABLE 10STABILISATION FUND

Year	Benefits Paid	Contr. Rec'd	Rec'd from Insolvent Estates	Interest Received	Expenditure	Income over (Expen)	Accum. Funds
1986	116	215	29677	2693	2693	29776	70551
1985	119980	160131	-	18319	17695	40775	40775
1984	75542	54401	-	2012	1062	(20191)	Nil
1983	44453	26553	-	4794	4794	(17900)	20191
1982	25181	25815	-	5525	5525	634	38091
1981	16704	25656	-	2383	2383	8952	37457
1980	8644	16853	-	933	933	8209	28505
1979	7435	10441	-	968	968	3006	20296
1978	9478	10572	-	1296	960	1094	17290
1977	9060	12779	-	1296	960	3719	16196
1976	9966	9206	-	1238	1238	(760)	12477
1975	4759	8181	-	851	851	3422	13237
1974	4315	5827	-	802	802	1512	9815
1973	6048	5790	679	525	525	421	8303
1972	2507	4795	-	371	371	2288	7882
1971	207	3311	-	208	208	3104	5594
1970	476	3041	-	90	90	2565	2490
1969	3659	3584	-	15	15	(75)	(75)
1968	No figure						

6.2.3 THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT

6.2.3.1 The Garment Workers Union of South Africa (G.W.U. - S.A.)

The table below (Table 11) presents financial data over the period 1968 to 31st July 1985, the date at which the G.W.U.-S.A. became the National Union of Clothing Workers. The following points can be made

- (1) The data as of 31st July, 1985, is for 6 months. The other data reflects an accounting period of 12 months.
- (2) The financial data lends support to the contention that the Union (and the industry) present a picture of changing (declining) economic fortunes.
- (3) The financial data presented represents a consolidation of the various branches and head office of the union. These branches are given as follows
 - Head Office
 - 12 Transvaal Combined Branches
 - Germiston No. 1
 - East Rand No. 1
 - East London
 - Kimberley
 - Kingwilliamstown
 - Kroonstad
 - Port Elizabeth
- (4) After the merger with the N.U.C.W. only the Port Elizabeth branch retains the G.W.U.-S.A. name.
- (5) Subscription rate changes occurred in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1983 and 1985. (Detail can be found in Table 13).

It is only through these subscription rate changes that the union can continue to function given the decline in its membership as reflected in Table 11.

TABLE 11

SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA OF G.W.U.-S.A.
(as at 31st December. Figures are rounded)

Year	Income	Subscrip- tions	Expen- diture	(Deficit) /Surplus	Gratuity & Service Fund	Accumulated Funds
1968	130043	100584	130904	861	-	277735
1969	130462	102327	136149	(5687)	548	271500
1970	148392	116810	147677	715	1984	269931*
1971	139467	103834	135996	3471	1844	271558
1972	152226	111774	140107	12119	1688	281990
1973	158252	111458	162964	(4712)	1547	269095
1974	172860	118659	150315	22545	798	290841
1975	200042	123869	147058	52984	-	343826
1976	191317	121957	166955	24362	-	368188
1977	181740	110830	163959	17781	678	385291
1978	174814	101998	184909	(10095)	-	375196
1979	177841	112732	161912	15929	1440	400429**
1980	209237	125681	188523	20714	-	421143
1981	224430	129375	195711	28720	-	449863
1982	271319	149932	235782	35538	3484	481917
1983	307596	128524	242034	65563	-	547479
1984	287281	133780	787801	(500519)	-	494976***
1985	133520	76018	163072	(29551)	-	425425****

Notes

- * A payment of R300 to "Garment Workers Loan Fund" is recorded on the Balance Sheet.
- ** R10,000 is added to Acc. Funds and represents a refund of a loan made by the Union to the "Garment Workers Training College" and previously written off. Also an amount of R744 is added and is from the "Knitted Fabric Workers Union".
- *** The 1984 Reports are of interest as they reflect decisions of the G.W.U.-S.A. relative to their merger with the N.U.C.W. The difference between income and expenditure is some R500,000 which is accounted for on the income statement by (essentially) two items,
- (i) 'Employees Pension Fund contributions' - this item accounts for R353,804.34 (No such item on the 1983 income statement) and

- (ii) An increase in "Salaries and Bonuses" of R161,958.29 (from R117,515.76 to R279,474.05). This represents an increase of more than double the 1983 figure.

The above two items suggest that on taking the decision to merge with the N.U.C.W. it was also decided to utilise most of the Accumulated Funds of the G.W.U.-S.A. to provide Pension and Bonus benefits to employees of the G.W.U.-S.A.

It will also be noted that the 1984 'Accumulated Fund' figure stands in at R494,976 and this (given the above) is due to an injection of R450,000 from the National Union of Clothing Workers. This amount is reflected on the Balance Sheet as "Funds receivable re pending amalgamation with the National Union of Clothing Workers (S.A.)".

**** The 1985 Balance Sheet indicates a transfer of R40,000 from Accumulated Funds to an item titled "Lump sum payment to Legal Fund". Taken in conjunction with the 1984 deficit, this effectively wipes out the "Accumulated Funds" of the G.W.U.-S.A. built up over a period of 60 years.

TABLE 12

GARMENT WORKERS' UNION OF S.A. - DEDUCTIONS

1968	Wage < R6.00 = 19c) Male and Female Wage > R6.00 = 26c)
1969	Same as 1968
1970	All members 31c
1971	Same as 1970
1972	All members = 42c. Note: White members of East Rand pay extra 3c, White members of Germiston pay extra 5c
1973	Same as 1972
1974	Same as 1972 - Now Coloured members of East Rand and Germiston also pay extra 3c per week
1975	All members = 57c - An extra 5c and 3c respectively for Germiston and East Rand members.
1976	All members = 59c
1977	All members = 68c
1978	All members = 83c Only Coloured members of Germiston and East Rand pay extra 3c
1979	Germiston and East Rand Coloured members = 89c Rustenberg, Klerksdorp and Middleburg (all members = 72c All members in other areas = 86c
1980	Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.13c, 95c and 1.10c
1981	Same as 1980 but also collect for N.U.C.W. = 71c per member.
1982	Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.43, 1.25 and 1.40; N.U.C.W. = R1.20
1983	Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.53, 1.35 and 1.50; N.U.C.W. = R1.20
1984	Same classes and rates as 1979
1985	Classes same as 1979, rates = 1.67, 1.49 and 1.64 N.U.C.W. = R1.30
1986	Same as 1985

"Overseas Conference Expenses" prior to 1981. No "Overseas Conference" expenses were recorded for 1977, but this is more likely due to depressed economic conditions. With the exception of 1980 (and 1984/85 previously referred to) Salaries and Wages increase from one year to the next at 10% or less. The 1980 percentage increase was 14.8%.

6.2.3.2 The National Union of Garment Workers(S.A.)(N.U.G.W.)
The N.U.G.W. was for much of the review period unable to participate (legally) in the negotiations of agreements even though in 1968 african employment was some 56% of the total employment (moving up to 89% by 1986). Financial data on the N.U.G.W. is presented in Table 13 below.

TABLE 13

NATIONAL UNION OF CLOTHING WORKERS (S.A.)

Year	Total Income	Total Expenses	Net Income	Accumulated Funds	Subscription income
1968	N/A	N/A	N/A	48013	N/A
1969	55936	50678	5258	53271	52945
1970	71576	59737	11839	65110	66636
1971	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1972	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1973	127911	102407	25504	143925	
1974	154420	121922	32498	176423	122727
1975	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1976	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1977	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1978	228809	197132	31677	290999	151542
1979	229839	231410	(1571)	289428	146746
1980	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1981	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1982	555889	387716	168173	508991	385911
1983	543989	473430	70559	579550	329414
1984	578196	511387	66809	646359	309944
1985	662498	530783	131715	778074	418912

6.2.3.3 The Employers Association

The Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association (T.C.M.A.) is the organisation which represents employers on the Industrial Council. Their annual general meeting, and 'Presidential Reports' were examined but no financial detail was reported in any of those report. It is therefore not possible to present a similar financial picture of the organisation as that (previously) done for the Union.

6.2.4 Employment Form

TABLE 14

INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL FOR THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY (TVL)
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES/EMPLOYERS

No. of Employers	Date	Europeans		Coloureds		Africans		TOTAL
		M	F	M	F	M	F	
N/A	Feb 1968	232	1830	504	7991	3094	10405	24056
N/A	May 1969	212	1677	522	7806	3194	11471	24882
N/A	Nov 1970	200	1104	493	6134	3116	13859	24906
N/A	Aug 1971	202	1005	487	5947	3192	14840	25673
N/A	Jul 1972	209	910	459	5115	3082	14207	23982
N/A	Jul 1973	217	783	453	4813	2921	14503	23690
N/A	Jul 1974	215	762	466	4476	3053	16671	25643
N/A	Jul 1975	211	697	431	3846	2743	16674	24602
409	Jul 1976	188	620	445	3455	2532	16318	23558
379	Jul 1977	161	503	414	3273	2425	14314	21090
365	Jul 1978	142	458	366	3004	2257	13547	19774
358	Jul 1979	131	389	329	2686	2093	13869	19497
387	Aug 1980	125	350	328	2279	2036	15766	20884
399	Aug 1981	100	322	283	2188	2081	19090	24066
383	Aug 1982	96	232	246	1693	1806	17161	21234
Jan)386	Aug 1983	100	267	246	1764	1675	16830	20882
-	Aug 1984	88	245	232	1637	1629	15836	19667
Jun)372	Aug 1985	68	206	196	1395	1401	12854	15738
Aug)337	Aug 1986	56	159	155	1199	1194	10969	13730

Table 14 shows that the clothing industry in the Transvaal is essentially a shrinking industry. There were some fluctuations in the total employed between 1968 and 1974 but from then on - with the exception of the boom conditions of 1980/81 the industry has been in decline. Employment peaked at 25,643 in 1974, declined steadily till 1980/81 and then reflects a

sharp drop to 13,730 in 1986. In racial terms the composition of the labour force is such that european employment (female) drops over 10 times, coloured female some 7 times and their places (together with any employment growth) are taken by female blacks. It can be noted at this stage that the black labour force had no (direct) representation as a bargaining unit on the industrial council. Only the white union was legally allowed to negotiate until the amendment of the (then) Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956.

(Note: A request from the National Union of Clothing Workers for admission as a 'Party to the Council' is to be found in the council minutes of 21st May 1981, and they were admitted but with an initiation clause. It was only on the 24th January 1985 that the Constitution of the Council was amended to accept the N.U.C.W. as a part to the Council).

It can also be pointed out that the introduction of the Physical Planning and Resources Act on the 1st January 1968 also impacted on the potential growth of the industry. This act severely restricted an employers ability to replace white and coloured workers with black employees. This, together with the rise of "Border Areas", decentralisation benefits and "independent territories/homelands" contributed to the decline of the Transvaal industry.

Table 15 (drawn from a sample of provident fund record cards) provides an indication of the age pattern of employees (by sex) over the period 1968 to 1986. The figures suggest that there is a growing segment of the workforce that continues to work after 40 years of age. In 1968 some 4.2% of the sample were over 40 years of age (Note: 26.1% of sample were of unknown age) and by 1986 this had increased to 28.2% (with only 4.2% of unknown age). The increase in the age

of the work force and the decline in the numbers employed suggest that manufacturers are able to keep the more experienced work force in employment. This is supported by the relatively few young (trainee) workers to be found (in the later years) in the industry. There is a large increase in the category "20 < 30" in 1986 and given the low proportion of "<20" in all the previous years, it could be argued that the entry age of female workers in the Transvaal industry is higher than that of the Cape and Natal industries. The male age profile provides a similar picture of an aging workforce.

TABLE 15

AGE DISTRIBUTIONFEMALE

Year	Age= Unknown	<20	%	21- <30	%	31- <40	%	41- <50	%	>50	%	Total
1968	42	7	5.7	40	32.5	28	22.8	5	4.1	1	0.1	123
1971	61	9	5.6	49	30.4	30	18.6	11	6.8	1	0.1	161
1974	64	4	2.2	53	29.4	39	21.7	18	10.0	2	1.0	180
1977	53	6	3.8	30	18.8	43	26.9	24	15.0	4	2.5	160
1980	36	7	3.6	55	28.1	56	28.6	29	14.8	13	6.6	196
1983	24	13	4.6	98	34.9	73	26.0	49	17.4	24	8.5	281
1986	16	3	0.8	154	40.2	102	26.6	64	16.7	44	11.5	383

(Figs. rounded to one decimal point)

MALE

Year	Age= Unknown	<20	%	21- <30	%	31- <40	%	41- <50	%	>50	%	Total
1968	9	1	5.6	2	11.1	3	16.7	3	16.7	0	-	18
1971	9	0	-	2	10.5	2	10.5	3	15.8	3	15.8	19
1974	10	0	-	3	14.3	2	9.5	3	14.3	3	14.3	21
1977	10	1	4.5	2	9.0	4	18.2	2	9.0	3	13.6	22
1980	6	1	4.3		13.0	4	17.4	2	8.6	7	13.6	23
1983	7	1	2.9	11	31.4	5	14.3	4	11.4	7	20.0	35
1986	6	5	7.7	21	32.3	13	20.0	8	12.3	12	18.5	65

Table 16 provides data on employment by sex in the Transvaal industry, showing the industry to be overwhelmingly female. The male/female ratio is also quite stable over time. Machinists represent the greatest single job category followed by that of 'General Worker'. There is, however, a change in the employment pattern as over the review period the percentage of 'General Workers' (of total provident fund sample) increases from 20.6% (1968) to 32.1% (1986) and conversely the relative percentages for the machinist category are 42.6% and 33.3%.

Table 16

EMPLOYMENT PATTERN BY SEX

Year	Female	% of Sample	Male	% of Sample	Sample Total
1968	123	87.2	18	12.8	141
1969	134	88.2	18	11.8	152
1970	158	89.3	19	10.7	177
1971	161	89.4	19	10.6	180
1972	155	88.1	21	11.9	176
1973	159	86.9	24	13.1	183
1974	180	89.6	21	10.4	201
1975	176	88.4	23	11.6	199
1976	166	89.7	19	10.3	185
1977	160	87.9	22	12.1	182
1978	151	87.8	21	12.2	172
1979	170	89.0	21	11.0	191
1980	196	89.5	23	10.5	219
1981	223	91.0	22	9.0	245
1982	254	90.4	27	9.6	281
1983	281	88.9	35	11.1	316
1984	329	88.4	43	11.6	372
1985	341	86.8	52	13.2	393
1986	383	85.5	65	14.5	448

The Transvaal Industrial Council did not record total 'Entrants' and 'Exits' to the provident fund in a manner similar to the Cape provident fund and it is therefore not possible to reflect similar patterns. However, an analysis of the number of 'Entrances' is presented in Table 17 below. By 'Entrances' is meant the number of times a worker in the industry was employed, provided that there was at least a month's gap between leaving employment and being re-employed in the industry. It would appear that a significantly increasing proportion of the labour force reflect 4 or more 'Entrances' (i.e. In 1968 this segment represents 17.1% of the sample and in 1986 the comparable figure was 28.6%) which supports the idea of an aging workforce.

TABLE 17

NO. OF ENTRANCES TO INDUSTRY

Tot	Year	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5	%	>5	%
141	1968	58	(41.1)	40	(28.4)	19	(13.5)	9	(6.4)	9	(6.4)	6	(4.3)
180	1971	67	(37.2)	48	(26.7)	28	(15.6)	18	(10.0)	9	(5.0)	10	(5.6)
201	1974	67	(33.3)	50	(24.9)	35	(17.4)	17	(8.5)	13	(6.5)	19	(9.5)
182	1977	54	(29.7)	41	(22.5)	40	(22.0)	18	(9.9)	10	(5.5)	19	(10.4)
219	1980	66	(30.1)	49	(22.4)	33	(15.1)	26	(11.9)	15	(6.8)	30	(13.7)
316	1983	109	(34.5)	66	(20.9)	36	(11.4)	41	(13.0)	21	(6.6)	43	(13.6)
448	1986	186	(41.5)	77	(17.2)	57	(12.7)	48	(10.7)	24	(5.4)	56	(12.5)

SUMMARY

The Transvaal work force is essentially 'Black', female more likely to be less than 40 years of age (although an increasing proportion of the labour force is over 40 years), is employed either as a machinist or general worker and reflects a high degree of entrances and exits from the industry.

6.2.5 The Wage Form

Table 18 provides a picture of negotiated wages for job categories at various points of the review period.

The wage structure in the Transvaal review period reflects similar issues to that of the Cape in that Gazetted Agreements reflect the addition and deletion of job categories as well as the de-sexing of jobs.

In 1974 the Gazette reflects 4 classes of machinists. The distinction is made by job function and then by sex, thus both male and female workers have the same job descriptions but with different minimum wages. This distinction falls away in 1982 and the gazette (merely) reflects two classes of machinists. Sex as a classificatory mechanism has been dropped. By 1986 this distinction has been changed to reflect only one class of machinist. This then complicates the comparison of wages (for machinists) over the review period. In an attempt to compare the changes in wage rates to the rate of inflation, the agreement of 1974 has been selected as the starting point. The following figures apply

Date	1/1/75	1/1/80	1/1/83	31/12/86*
(Male)A	27.50	53.60	69.50	74.00
(Male)B	22.00	39.50	49.00	-
(Female)A	22.00	33.90	-	-
(Female)B	18.50	26.35	-	-

* Single rate - i.e. for all machinists

Using the Standard Bank Data Base Inflation Index it can be seen that

R27.50 on 1/1/75 equalled R127.05 on 31/12/86
 R22.00 on 1/1/75 equalled R101.64 on 31/12/86
 R18.50 on 1/1/75 equalled R85.47 on 31/12/86

TABLE 18
Transvaal Minimum Wages (Hierarchially arranged)

JOB TITLE	A 20/02/70	B 18/10/74 <01/01/75	C 21/09/79 <01/01/80	D 01/01/83	E 18/04/86	F 31/12/86
1 Pattern Maker/Grader Category A	23 42.00	23 70.00	23 95.10	23 167.00	23 231.00	23 244.20
2 Pattern Maker/Grader Category B	18 35.85	18 50.00	18 72.60	18 150.00	18 207.70	18 219.60
3 Male Marker-in, not interlinings & trims	1 30.85	1 42.50	1 60.70	1 106.50	1 140.40	1 156.90
4 Male Marker-in, not interlinings & trims	3 25.85	19 36.00	19 53.60	3 88.00	3 123.20	3 130.20
5 Marker-in, not interlinings & trims	31 25.00	3 36.00	3 50.10	31 85.00	31 119.00	31 125.80
6 Marker-in, not interlinings & trims	19 23.35	31 35.00	31 47.70	20 78.00	20 109.50	20 115.70
7 Marker-in/chopper interl & trims Cat-A...;	14 19.85	20 29.00	20 43.00	14 69.50	32 91.90	32 97.20
8 Marker-in/chopper interl & trims Cat B...;	15 19.85	5 28.00	14 39.50	32 65.00	9 87.80	9 92.80
9 Chopper-out, Male presser by hand cat A	20 19.85	14 27.50	5 39.50	9 62.00	37 85.10	37 90.00
10 Chopper-out, Male presser by hand cat B	22 17.50	9 23.00	32 33.90	21 60.00	36 78.30	36 82.80
11 Male Presser	32 17.50	32 23.00	29 33.90	37 60.00	14 70.00	14 74.00
12 Pressers - all others	5 16.85	22 22.00	15 33.90	10 58.00	26 70.00	26 74.00
13 Shaper	21 16.35	21 22.00	9 33.50	36 55.00	27 64.50	27 68.20
14 Grade A, Male Sewing Machinist (1)	37 16.00	29 22.00	22 32.80	11 52.50	12 59.00	12 62.00
15 Grade B, Male Sewing Machinist (1)	9 15.85	15 22.00	21 32.80	33 50.00	16 53.60	16 56.60
16 General Worker	17 15.85	10 21.00	10 32.80	15 49.00		
17 Grade A, Male Sewing Machinist (2)	25 15.00	37 20.00	37 30.60	25 47.00		
18 Foreman	36 14.45	11 19.00	11 29.00	24 45.00		
19 Forewoman	11 13.20	30 18.50	36 27.40	27 45.00		
20 Supervisor	33 12.25	25 18.00	25 26.70	38 45.00		
21 Checker	24 10.75	36 18.00	30 26.35	39 45.00		
22 Assistant to Supervisor	13 10.25	33 17.00	33 25.30	26 45.00		
23 Artisan	38 10.00	13 15.10	24 23.10	12 41.00		
24 Boiler Attendant	12 9.75	24 15.00	26 23.10	16 37.00		
25 Cloakroom Supervisor	16 9.25	38 15.00	12 22.60			
26 Watchman		39 15.00	27 22.00			
27 Labourer		26 15.00	38 22.00			
28 Grade B, Male Sewing Machinist (2)		27 14.50	39 22.00			
29 Female Sewing Machinist (Type A)		12 14.25	16 20.40			
30 Female Sewing Machinist (Type B)						
31 Clothing Machine Mechanic						
32 Factory Clerk &/ Despatch Clerk						
33 Despatch Packer						
34 Checker						
35 Assistant Supervisor						
36 Driver Up to 6,000 lbs						
37 Driver >6,000 lbs						
38 Part-time vehicle driver						
39 Scooter Driver						

Irrespective of the initial category of machinist, all have not had minimum wages keep pace with inflation. Whilst there have been changes to this job category which may make the comparison suspect, the following jobs have remained consistent (in terms of their gazetted description) and therefore more readily comparable,


	Wage 1/1/75	Wage 31/12/86	Inflation adjusted	Gain (Loss)
1. Artisan	70.00	244.20	323.40	(79.20)
2. Foreman	50.00	219.60	231.00	(11.40)
3. Clothing Mach Mechanic	35.00	125.80	161.70	(35.90)
4. Supervisor	29.00	115.70	133.98	(18.28)
5. Watchman	15.00	74.00	69.30	(4.70)
6. General worker	14.25	56.60	65.84	(9.24)
7. Driver(up to 6000 lbs)	18.00	82.80	83.16	(0.36)
8. Factory clerk	23.00	97.20	106.26	(9.06)

Table 18 also presents a hierarchical arrangement of the wages paid at five points of the review period, and the graph on page 222 presents a pictorial representation. (Note - to read Table 18 the reader will find a job number next to (abbreviated) job titles, these job numbers will be found in each column with the appropriate wage next to it, in this way the reader can trace - over time - any changes to a particular job.)

- (i) The simplification of the hierarchy of job titles - i.e. a decrease in the number thereof
- (ii) The introduction and elimination of certain job titles (from 1968 to 1986)
- (iii) A ranking of wages as an indication of importance of the jobs to the negotiators.

The artisan consistently is paid the most and likewise the general worker the least, and whilst some jobs change their hierarchical position from point to point, the graph overpage indicates that the shape of the pay curve has remained similar over the review period.

Graph 1 - Transvaal Gazetted Rates (Minimum Wages)



This graph shows comparison of the gazetted rates for Tv1 workers 1970-86. For ABCDEF see Table 18.

6.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME

The Negotiations and their Meaning Content

The Transvaal negotiations are similar to the Cape in their meaning content in that the themes of employers maintaining their competitive position and the employees arguing economic hardship are consistent over the years. The Transvaal, however, differs from the Cape in that the minutes of negotiations reflect a number of 'political' issues entering into debate between the parties. The union begins to feel that it should be more militant and employers believe that their relationship (with the union) is changing detrimentally. The negotiations are further complicated by an essentially minority union negotiating "on behalf of" the majority of workers. This is certainly true up until the 21st May, 1981, when the (black) N.U.C.W. is admitted to the council, albeit not as a full party to negotiations.

Unlike the Cape the Transvaal reflects a number of negotiations which were "informal" and as such no minutes were kept. The industry in the Transvaal was affected to a larger extent by various Acts of legislation, particularly the Physical Planning and Resources Act. Attempts by the State to promote the decentralization of industries and Job Reservation; these in turn affect the ability of employers to (in their eyes) remain competitive.

The meetings reported on here cover the period 14th March, 1968, to 23rd October, 1985. The total number of lines analysed are 10,122 which obviously excludes the 'informal' meetings.

6.3.1 1968 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 14TH MARCH, 1968 - 834 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
29/31	"Any agreement arrived at could not be in the interests of the employee only: it had to be in the interests of the Industry".
32/33	"Any agreement had to be based on what the Industry could stand".
783/85	"They were in competition with the other three Provinces, the uncontrolled areas and with Rhodesia and this had to limit them".
787/89	It was accepted that it was the Union's duty to keep the minimum as high as possible but any such minimum must allow the employers to stay in business".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
61/63	"asked the employers to sincerely believe that the Union had never been unmindful of the interests of the industry".
63/64	"Although they were opposing parties their interests were the same".

Note: This meeting reflects little or no bargaining as Employers are unprepared and the meeting is largely used to detail the Union's proposals.

MEETING NO. 2 - 2ND APRIL 1968 - 1145 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
344/47	"He appealed to the Union not to make refugees of the Tvl. employers, asking the Union not to make life intolerable for the manufacturers in the Tvl.".

EMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
267/71	"He said it had to be realised that the clothing industry was not working in a vacuum on an island. Clothing was an easily mobile commodity and if one had to go into any large store, one could find clothing from all four corners of the Republic and outside".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
804/8	"At that time employers and the workers stood together to help the industry remain in the Tvl., but now that the industry had pulled out of its decline, the workers were entitled to improvements in their wages and working conditions".
644/6	"The C.O.L. was continually going up and when workers buy their requirements they realise how difficult it is to make ends meet".
437/441	"The industry could not exist and at the same time pay wages which would enable workers to buy only the bare necessities of life. (Un. Rep.) said that if this position was to be maintained, the workers would just have to find other jobs where they could earn a decent living".

MEETING NO. 3 - 9TH APRIL, 1968 - 923 LINES

No quotes.

Supporting StatementsEmployers

At a General Meeting of the 25th April, 1968, the Chairman reports back to the membership on the negotiations and states, "The T.C.M.A. delegates had started negotiations with the Cape wage of R12.00 in mind".

In the Presidential Address of the 42nd Annual General Meeting of the T.C.M.A. (d.d. 21/11/68), the following comments can be found

- (1) Referring to the Wage Determination No. 297 it is stated "....the prescribed levels of wages, while showing an improvement, fall far short, I feel, of requirements for the removal of competitive wage advantage against the established clothing industry".
- (2) Referring to the Physical Planning and Resources Act it is noted that exemption from the provisions in respect of "Bantu females and juveniles" has been applied for, but such requests "have not been answered".

Union

No documentation on any Union meetings could be found.

6.3.2 1971 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 22ND FEBRUARY 1971 - 561 LINES

EMPLOYERS

Line Quote

- | | |
|--------|---|
| 495/98 | "The manufacturers had invested a tremendous amount of capital in the Industry and they were entitled to some return on this capital investment". |
| 493/94 | They fully appreciated the difficulties of the living conditions of the workers and they would do their utmost to try and alleviate this position". |
| 472/74 | "It was obvious that both the employers and employees wanted to reach a wage that would keep employees in the industry". |

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
435/6	"In the Leather Industry specialist machinists were paid R17.75 p.w. plus a 2.5% special bonus p.w".
382/4	"In Cape Town the wages for pattern makers and graders would be R39.53 in 1972. The present wage in the Tvl. was R30.85".
333/4	"In Cape Town the employers were paying a much higher contribution to the Prov. Fund".
236/7	"The Union realised that goals could not be achieved at one throw but advances could only be made step by step".
169/72	"Prof. v.d. Horst had said 'The sectional interests of organised labour and capital came to terms at the expense of powerless Africans'. Such an accusation will never be levelled against the G.W. Union".
153/55	"It was clear from statistics that the Africans were not getting a fair share of the wealth of the nation".
122/4	"The real drop in wages which workers will suffer by the time the new Agreement comes into operation will at least be 16.1%".

MEETING NO. 2 - 17TH MARCH 1971 - 601 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
20/21	"Both Cape and Natal have a 42½ hr. week as against 40 hrs. in the Tvl."
26/27	"In the Cape a maximum of 30c p.w. was paid, Natal 19c and in the Tvl. 39c" [This refers to employers contributions in respect of I.C. Med. Fund., Prov. Fund etc.]
29/35	"If the wages were reduced to hourly rates it would be found that the Cape rate would be 13.60 p.h., in Natal 13.17 an hour. The employers original proposal for the Tvl. was 13.20."
84/7	"He felt that at the outset there was one illusion that the Union must not suffer from and that was that the Transvaal was not in competition with any other area".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
141/2	"The increase in food alone had been 10.44% this year".
142/3	"The rents for coloured housing had increased very substantially".
158/60	"workers ... did not have the money to buy luxuries. Their main budget went into food, clothing and transport".
189/91	"The Union had done more to try to narrow the gap of competition between the coastal areas and the Transvaal than the employers".

MEETING NO. 3 - 18TH MARCH 1971 - 926 LINES

This meeting is taken up with discussion of employers proposals, the substantive detail is dealt with on a proposal - accept/reject - compromise - accept pattern with little in the way of explicit construct supporting statements.

Supporting Statements

In the presidential address of the T.C.M.A. dated 20th November, 1969, the following points are made

- (1) "... 1969 proved to be another frustrating year for industrialists, what with the abolition of resale price maintenance, the Physical Planning and Resources Utilisation Act of 1967 and impending legislation for simplification of customs tariff and much feared possible additional increases in customs duty ..."
- (2) Dissatisfaction with the Union is expressed for taking advantage of "full employment and manpower shortage" to approach employers offering to find them qualified workers provided they (the employers) "indicate in writing their willingness to employ the Union's skilled members at higher wages than recently agreed". The President states that such behaviour by the Union, "... breached the spirit if not the letter of the agreement and must be condemned in the strongest terms".

In his presidential address on the 19th November 1970, he states

- (1) The year has been "another frustrating one for industrialists - this time because they have been faced by serious labour problems arising from a general shortage of workers in our industry. This position has been aggravated in no small measure by restrictions placed on the employment of additional Bantu labour if only to fill the vacancies left by non-replaceable European and Coloured employees and without even meeting the expanding needs of our Industry".
- (2) "The denial of the use of Bantu labour ... puts a scarcity value on the employment of our existing labour and artificially causes an increase in wages" which the Unions are "not slow to exploit".

In the T.C.M.A. Annual Report for 1971 (dated 4/11/71) it is stated by the Chairman "we must face the fact that we are competing in a labour market against other industries and commerce for the critically short White and Coloured labour. I would venture to suggest that any further increases in wages which are not coupled with a corresponding increase in productivity would signal a mass migration of our factories to sites more economically viable". Furthermore, the Chairman notes "The Union, I regret to say, appear unable to see beyond the question of increased wages for its members without thought of a quid pro quo for the manufacturers".

Union

No Union documentation on meetings around this period could be found.

6.3.3 1974 NEGOTIATIONS

There are no minutes to these negotiations and therefore construct supporting statements cannot be presented.

At the time of these negotiations, council minutes record a disagreement between the secretary of the council and the Department of Labour (D.o.L.) representative (20/3/74). The issue revolved around the contention of the Department of Labour representative that the secretary had not acted properly in reporting what that representative saw as "a dispute involving Bantu workers". The secretary of the council had not viewed the issue in such light. The Department of Labour representative is reported to have

- (a) "indicated that no agreement of this Council would be published unless he (D.o.L. Repr.) approved of this agreement".
- (b) "accused him (Council Sec.) of undermining his (D.o.L. Rep's) authority and the Government policy".
- (c) "threatened to report him (Council Sec.) to the Minister of Labour for lack of co-operation in not reporting disputes to him (D.o.L. Rep.).

This event generated the following observations by members of the Council

- (i) "Negotiations would be considerably complicated if after agreement was reached there were further demands from the Bantu Labour Board".
- (ii) Union Repr. "said that Mr. (Council Sec.) had acted regularly and in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act".
- (iii) (Employers Repr.) "said that he agreed with (Employees Repr.)".
- (iv) (Employers Repr., referring to the D.o.L. Repr.) "had no right to interfere in any shape or form of the internal affairs of the industry".
- (v) (Employers Repr.) "that no agreement which was to be concluded between the G.W.U. and the T.C.M.A. would be published before Mr. (D.o.L Rep) consented to it, puts the T.C.M.A. in an impossible position".

This event is presented to show the solidarity of the parties to the agreement and to what they both see as undue interference. At a subsequent meeting (4/4/74) the members of the Council are advised that in response to the Council's letter to the Central Bantu Labour Board detailing the Council's position, the duties of the Bantu Labour Officers have been spelt out. The result is that negotiations will proceed as before.

The negotiations then proceed informally although in the minutes it is recorded that a (different) representative of the Central Bantu Labour Board indicated that the Government wanted a minimum wage of R14 for "the lowest category of worker". The minutes reflect some debate about whether this is a "qualified rate" or not. No finality about this is recorded in these or subsequent minutes.

At a council meeting on the 16th May 1974 it is reported that agreement has been reached and the employers' representative

states "Although the negotiations were tough, he had, at all times, found the Union to be most co-operative. He recorded his personal thanks for their understanding of the manufacturers' position".

In turn the union representative is quoted as follows

"She reiterated that although the negotiations were tough, a good atmosphere prevailed throughout, and she was grateful that the Union had been able to get reasonable concessions from the employers". In debate about the R14 minimum wage, the Union Representative points out that concessions of 30-40% had been got, and while the unqualified starting rate (for some job categories) was R10 "it could not be expected of the Union to press the employers for further substantial increases as they would also move to Babalegi" (i.e. a Border area where the wage rate was considerably less than those in the Transvaal).

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

In the presidential address of 22/11/73 the president states, "We in the Transvaal are in a cleft stick. White machinists have long since left the industry; Coloured machinists are fast being tempted away by commerce ... who will eventually denude our industry of coloureds, while the Physical Planning Act does not allow us to replace this lost labour with female Bantu labour available and legally in this area".

In the following year's presidential address the president mentions "cordial" discussions with the N.U.C.W. and states, "I can only state that our discussions with both White and Black Unions presented absolutely no problem to us; in fact, they were mainly responsible for the cordial and co-operative manner in which our actual negotiations were conducted".

Union

No minutes to any meetings could be found.

EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS - 31ST JULY 1975

A request for an interim increase is minuted on the above date with the G.W.U.-S.A. motivating such request by arguing that the previous "20% increase" did not "cover the increase in the Cost of Living allowance over the three years". The G.W.U.-S.A. present figures of what the wages "should have been" had the 'Cost of Living' been taken into account. They argue "Africans paid the highest prices for food items in view of the fact that they did not have supermarkets in their areas".

The employers response makes reference to competition from Natal and Cape industries and that employment in those areas is increasing, but declining in the Transvaal, suggesting that "it was the economic factor that must be considered". The minutes of 21st August 1975 record an offer from the T.C.M.A. for what amounts to a R1.00 attendance bonus, arguing that the economic situation is such that any increase must be tied to productivity.

6.3.4 1977 NEGOTIATIONS

These negotiations were again largely "informal", i.e. not minuted. In the minutes of 17th March 1977 it is noted that the parties "had had a great deal of informal negotiations", and whilst the Agreement was all but finalised, "the employers were not able to accede to the last 50c extra in respect of category (c) which the Union had asked for" and therefore request a postponement until "a mandate had been obtained from the general meeting" (of the T.C.M.A.).

One meeting of the council is held at which negotiations were recorded, this on the 31st March 1977.

MEETING NO. 1. - 31ST MARCH 1977 - 309 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
94/6	"With economic and bad business conditions they were finding it difficult to pay the present wages, besides what had been offered in the T.C.M.A.'s original proposals..."
104/6	"For the first 2 months of this year alone the Industry had paid over R30,000 in slack pay".
134/6	"the employers were begging the Union please to accept their proposals and have an industry, otherwise 20,000 workers would be faced with unemployment".
230/2	"In his opinion, with (sic) the workers there would be no industry and from the workers side - without the employers there would be no industry".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
64/65	The workers standard of living today was worse than it was in 1952, which was a very sorry reflection on the industry".
55/57	"... the Clothing Industry's wages were very sad and was lagging far behind industries like tobacco, furniture, leather, etc.".
46/48	"All these increases were affecting the workers and instead of the position improving it was becoming worse".
242/3	"It was therefore better for them to starve and not work than to work and starve".

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

In the Presidential Address of 17/11/77 the industry's problems are related and these revolve around essentially non-labour matters. Referring to the wage negotiations, the President notes, "I am pleased to say that the negotiations were conducted in a spirit of amity and understanding".

Union

At a joint (i.e. all races) annual general meeting, the secretary of the G.W.U.-S.A. says that "never in her 39 years in the industry" had the economy been so bad, and compares wages in the clothing industry to other sectors of the economy; "The leather workers only got an increase of 7½%, therefore the garment workers were better off than most other workers".

The secretary, furthermore, quotes "The Star" (daily newspaper) which reports, "the number of unemployed is 1.5 million".

6.3.5 1979 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 27TH FEBRUARY, 1979 - 245 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
193/7	"... he found no reference was made to the choatic (sic) state in which the clothing industry in the Tvl. found itself. This meeting would have to come down to the principle understanding that the industry could only afford a certain amount if an increase were granted in wages".
206/8	"... , but this industry must not be compared with other industries. This industry could only be compared with the clothing industry in the Cape and Natal".
213/14	"... on productivity, the workers in the Transvaal were lagging behind that of the workers in Cape Town and Durban".

UNIONLinesQuote

40/41

"The Union had always argued and wished to reiterate that the cost of living was higher for the lower income group than that ...".

119/22

"The Union's plea for a substantial increase in wages was due to the fact that

(a) Workers could not manage to exist on their present wages.

(b) Their standard of living instead of improving had deteriorated".

139/41

"... she informed the employers that her Union would not accept less than what the Cape had as a starting wage and the qualified wages must be much higher".

MEETING NO. 2. - 17TH APRIL 1979 - 372 LINESEMPLOYERSLinesQuote

35/38

"Over the last year, the Industry had a loss of 7197 employees. Coupled with this there were 17 factories who had gone insolvent yet barely any in the Cape and Natal".

48/52

"He consequently appealed to the Union's representatives to understand this position as he was aware and realised that wages had to be increased but any further increase would, from an economic point of view, kill the industry in the Transvaal".

67/68

"In fact, the wage paid in the Tvl. was more than that being paid in all other areas".

77/80

"... if one looked at the hourly rate paid in other areas, what incentive was there for employers to remain in business in the Transvaal Clothing Industry? The employers had now reached a stage where they must look at the economics".

122/4 "He said that it was the economic fact of life that in spite of the cost of living, the Transvaal at present was going through a tight squeeze more than other areas".

UNION

Lines

Quote

97/100 "The workers cost of living was rising all the time and if they did not keep up with the increase in the cost of living, garment workers already have never been able to maintain improved standard of living". (sic)

202/3 "Because of the inequality of the wage compared with the cost of living, most of the garment workers were still on or below the Poverty Datum Line".

Note:

This meeting is also characterised by the Union's threat/suggestion that a deadlock existed and that in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, arbitration or a strike are the only options. The Union prefers arbitration to strike action but would go on strike if employers "persist with their unreasonable offer".

MEETING NO. 3 - 13TH APRIL 1979 - 145 LINES

This meeting taken up largely around provident fund contributions, which employers will take back to a general meeting of the T.C.M.A. and discussion around definitions of 'lateness' and its determination of receipt of attendance bonuses or not. These issues are resolved at the 4th meeting which took place on the 8th May 1979 and covered 127 lines.

In terms of these negotiations it should be noted that the minutes of 29/8/79 record that the Central Black [changed from 'BANTU'] Labour Board (C.B.L.B.) had expressed dissatisfaction with the wage levels of two job categories and flowing from

this a T.C.M.A. deputation had met with the chairman of the C.B.L.B. resulting in the wage being increased from R12.00 per week to R13.00. The T.C.M.A. had rejected suggestions of back-pay, agreeing only to the new wage in the first week after the publication of the Agreement.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

In the president's address of 22/11/79 it is reported that the union had started with "a request ... for increases in wages of the order of 25% across the board". However, "The Union with due regard to the difficult economic conditions in our industry proved to be receptive to our pleas for a responsible approach to wage demands and in a spirit of co-operation agreed to accept ..."

Union

The union A.G.M. of 1979 only records the publication of the Agreement, no discussion minuted.

6.3.6 1980 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS

At a meeting of the industrial council on the 24th June 1980, it is reported that on the 17th June informal discussions had taken place to discuss a request for 5% 'now' and a further 5% in 1981.

In a meeting that takes up 250 lines of minutes, the union takes the first 103 lines to present its case and the argument revolves around the issue of economic hardship. The cost of living has increased and workers "cannot come out". Various authorities such as the Rand Daily Mail's 'Consumer Mail' and government statistics are referred to in their presentation. In addition, the union observe, "the mood of the workers was not good and the strikes in other industries appear to be contagious and as a result some of these strikes have been successful in obtaining increases".

Employers are warned that they will lose their white workers and "almost all their Coloured workers showing leadership qualities", and while they still had "the cream of Black workers" these too could be lost to the industry.

The union also points out that the "workers wanted 20%" and that it "had been a battle" to get 12½% accepted (as a request/demand) which if the employers did not accept then the matter would be referred to the Industrial Court.

The employers response revolves around the impact on their ability to compete and offer 2½% now and 5% in 1981.

At a further meeting (1st July) similar arguments are put forward with the union emphasizing its inability to "keep industrial peace". Agreement is eventually reached on 5% now and 5% in 1981.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

No reference to the above negotiations could be found in the presidential address of 13/11/1980.

Union

At a general meeting of the union (30/6/80) and referring to the 1979 negotiations, the secretary says that whilst she was not happy with the increases and whilst "the employers agreed that she had fully proved the workers' case they stated that they did not have the money to pay out extra increases".

The minutes also record debate about the union's letter to employers requesting a 12½% increase and that members "felt that if the employers refuse they would go on strike". The minutes also record members being cautioned (by the secretary) "they would have to make sacrifices and it would not be easy".

6.3.7 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS 1981

A request for a special increase was minuted on the 19/2/1981 based on the (economic) hardship that the workers experience. There is at this stage no threat of strike action and the Employer delegates agree to present and discuss the letter at a meeting of the T.C.M.A.

The debate on this issue continues in council on the 5th March, with employers unwilling to negotiate whilst workers are on strike at a particular factory. The union in stating its case add "there were people who were working amongst the workers of all industries. Their appeals were more militant and more revolutionary and perhaps that was where the union had missed out as far as the workers were concerned - the union was not militant enough to fight their case Perhaps she should have been more militant then the workers would have had more confidence in her today. ... the militant people were getting the ears of the workers more than the union".

The meeting continued the following day at which the Union reported that it had got the workers back to work and then presents its "hardship" case by reference to the consumer price index, university of the Witwatersrand figures and various specific item increases. Agreement on a special increase is arrived at on the 12th March, 1981, with all wages increasing by 11.5% with the exception of beginners, whose minimum wage is increased from R12.00 to R17.00 per week.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

The president does not refer to these negotiations but does note that, "our Transvaal Industry enjoys exemption in respect of the employment of Black women workers".

Union

On the 31st March, 1981, the president of the union addressed a meeting of shop stewards about the interim wage increase. The union is to ask for "a substantial increase in wages and fringe benefits". She points out that if 'deadlock' is reached the options are either a strike or arbitration, and suggests that the union might do well on wages under those conditions (i.e. arbitration) but "would loose (the) 40 hr. week". In addition she refers to "severe competition" from Babalegi and "Thaba Nchu (where) workers earn between R3.00 and R10.00 per week".

6.3.8 1982 NEGOTIATIONS

Prior to the start of these negotiations there is a great deal of dissatisfaction expressed at a council meeting dated 4th February, 1982. The issue revolves around the starting date for negotiations and an advert placed by the union in their paper dealing with the starting date of negotiations.

The employers do not want the negotiations publicised but the union rejects this saying that it has instructed its officials to keep members informed. A union delegate "advised employers that the workers were this time more militant and more determined than ever and even threatened to strike or go to the industrial council for arbitration. The worker's moods were in that state because one just had to look at the newspaper and see what the radical unions were getting".

The employers also do not wish to change the date on which to begin negotiations as they had to start up their own factories before doing T.C.M.A. work. In addition it is recorded, "the T.C.M.A. was there to negotiate with and was available to negotiate as from 1/4/82 to conclude an agreement for the first pay day of July 1982. If this was not acceptable as a prior condition to the negotiations, then he did not see much hope in even sitting around a negotiating table".

Agreement is eventually arrived at for negotiations to begin on the 29th March, 1982, and the union are requested to publish such and it was "requested that it should be ... without any emotive qualifications".

The union agrees to the employers request but pointed out that strikes were news and that workers read other papers in addition to the union's newspaper. "She said that the mood of the workers were completely different".

MEETING NO. 1 - 25TH MARCH 1982 - 497 LINES

EMPLOYER

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
403/5	"However when one looked at wages throughout the country it should be the same, even though in some areas the cost of living was higher than in others".
408/9	"... they had to take into account wages paid at the coastal areas".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
183/4	"The workers had barely managed to keep body and soul together".
189/90	"As we all know over the past year rents in Soweto increased 3 times".
203/5	"There is a big campaign amongst the workers that the minimum rate for Black workers should be R2.00 p.h. which means this is the amount fixed in workers minds for labourers".
223/4	"Most workers in the clothing industry are living in poverty, they struggle to provide the basic necessities of life".
235/7	"Workers wages should be linked to the Consumer Price Index and annually there should be a real wage increase adjustment".
302	"The Cape Town wages are above ours ...".

MEETING NO. 2 - 26TH MARCH 1982 - 428 LINESEMPLOYER

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
248/9	"... appealed to the Union to give the Employers in the Tvl. a chance to remain in Johannesburg".
231/5	"... said that of the 120 000 workers in South Africa only 26 000 enjoyed a 40 hr. week. In Atlantis the employers enjoyed the incentives (of decentralisation) and were refunded 50% of the weekly wage bill back from the Industrial Development Corporation".
224	"... but the Transvaal employers were paying more, yet they were one of only 2 industries that worked a 40 hr. week".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
72/75	"after work they had a duty to perform to their families, and the only bright light to them was that they stopped work before the other industries which gave them the opportunity to get home earlier".
93/5	"Although she was not averse to strike action she was averse to wild cat strikes".
137/8	"The Unions wanted an increase across the board for each and every worker that was a member of the Union".
153/5	".. she then quoted the comparison between the Cape wages and that of the Transvaal".

MEETING NO. 3 - 30TH MARCH 1982 - 332 LINESEMPLOYER

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
46/47	"... said that a bonus depended on the productivity and financial position of the firm".
52	"those workers who worked hard would receive a bonus".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
44/5	"said that 45% of the employers paid a bonus at the end of the year".
188/90	"The Unions would definitely need this time in view of the fact that FOSATO had their eyes on the clothing industry..".

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

In the presidential address of 11/11/82 it is observed that, "Negotiations were hampered by certain members who were forced to give increases through illegal strikes".

Union

No documentation for this year could be found.

6.3.9 1983 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 5TH SEPTEMBER 1983 - 256 LINESEMPLOYER

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
100/2	"... said that if a person opened a business and read all the by-laws attached, he would say that more money could be made by investing it in a building society".

- 120/22 "The main reason for this [businesses closing down] was that conditions in the Transvaal just made it impossible for any employer to run a business successfully".
- 199/200 "continuing (the employers repr.) said that the Unions must keep the employers competitive in order to give the members employment".

UNIONSLinesQuote

- 78/80 "A definite rule should be made otherwise a great deal of problems would be encountered as to what constituted ordinary dismissal and retrenchment".
- 92/3 "Failure to notify the Union concerned and to negotiate would be construed as an unfair labour practice".
- 94/96 "Continuing (the employees repr.) gave a lengthy report on how garment workers were suffering as a result of the low wages earned in the Clothing Industry".

MEETING NO. 2 - 7TH SEPTEMBER 1983 - 204 LINESEMPLOYERLinesQuote

- 171/2 "Said that these wages had been offered in an endeavour to try and remain competitive".

UNIONLinesQuote

- 50/1 "the Unions felt the workers must be safeguarded".
(this is a reference to retrenchment)

MEETING NO. 3 - 21ST SEPTEMBER 1983 - 203 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
99/102	"Manufacturers were finding it extremely difficult to compete internationally, unless the manufacturers become export oriented they were going to find themselves faced with the problem that they would be killing themselves off".
178/79	"If the Unions expected greater increases then they would certainly speed up the closure of a lot of factories".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
116/7	"The Clothing Industry was vulnerable all the time as it had strong opposition from Durban and Cape Town". [this used to support argument for older workers getting a long service bonus as they had made many sacrifices in terms of building up various funds and accepting lower wage increases when Tvl. wages were greater than Cape and Natal]
168/9	"... as it was the Unions were vulnerable to attacks all the time". [i.e. by others who may be more radical/aggressive, reference is made to articles in "The Sowetan"]
170/2	"The Unions have not been able to build up a decent standard of living for the garment workers; and they were furthermore not in a position to meet the inflation rate ... it would be impossible to sell the wage offered".

MEETING NO. 4 - 5TH OCTOBER 1983 - 103 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
88/89	"... the Government was making it more and more difficult to operate economically ...".

63/64 "... it was not a viable proposition for employers to work in Johannesburg".

UNION No quotes.

MEETING NO. 5 - 21ST OCTOBER 1983 - 309 LINES

No quotes.

In the meeting of the 21st October part of the meeting (lines 14 to 139, i.e. about 40%) is devoted to 'Unfair Labour Practices' (U.L.P.) (as specified in the Labour Relations Act) and whether the National Union of Clothing Workers was operating within the framework of the agreement.

The T.C.M.A. is very upset with the N.U.C.W.'s action involving U.L.P.'s and says that it has a mandate not to sign any new agreement "unless it was sure which direction the National Union was going". The T.C.M.A. representative addressed the G.W.U. representative saying that "this was a serious matter". The G.W.U. representative then "appealed to the National Union to assist in building up the industry and not to destroy it". The employers representative noted "the atmosphere at Council meetings were no longer the same ... in his opinion the parties were no longer working as a Council but were working separately". The debate finishes with "The National Union, he said, would respect the Agreement. However, if a complaint of unfair labour practice was received they would certainly raise it at Council level".

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

At a special general meeting of the T.C.M.A. on 20/10/83 to ratify the new agreement the chairman notes, "members should take note of the increased militancy of the N.U.C.W."

In his presidential address to the T.C.M.A. on the 21st November, 1983, the President says

"... I have to mention though that it was a most difficult round of negotiations. The extravagant claims made by the N.U.C.W. did not facilitate the speedy conclusion of the negotiations".

Union

No relevant documentation could be found.

6.3.10 1985 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 2ND OCTOBER 1985 - 619 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
146/7	"... the average wage was [for the Cape] close to the base line [i.e. the prescribed wage] whereas in the Transvaal the reverse applied".
460/4	"The employers had a major problem in trying to sell their merchandise, expanding their businesses and employing more people. They want to be equal with all other geographical areas in S.A. manufacturing clothing and failed to see why they should pay premium wages".
473/5	"The employers had appealed to the Union to take into account the competitive nature of the industry.
479/80	"said that the general public was buying garments made in other areas because they were cheaper".

UNION

<u>Lines</u>	<u>Quote</u>
301/3	"the petrol price had also gone up ... which would result in a general increase".

- 426/9 "If one looked at other industries it would be found that there was a move to provide for the future of workers in those particular industries. He actually felt that the contributions should be increased to 5%".
- 443/4 "said that possibly the employers were not aware of the atmosphere prevailing in the townships".
- 500/3 "She asked the employers what the Union should tell the workers as the cost of living had increase by 18% this year. If the employers wanted the workers to produce, then they must let them earn a living wage".

MEETING NO. 2 - 16TH OCTOBER 1985 - 612 LINES

EMPLOYER

- | <u>Lines</u> | <u>Quote</u> |
|--------------|---|
| 94/6 | "... that they want to improve the Transvaal Clothing Industry to be more competitive and ensure jobs for all". |
| 107/111 | "All the employers were asking was to be competitive with Durban and Cape Town employers. He therefore felt it very wrong for the Eastern Province Univ. too have presented analysis on wage structures for various industries and still compared it with that of the Clothing Industry". |
| 183/5 | "He asked the Union if they wanted a bigger industry in the Transvaal at a reasonable rate or no industry at a higher rate". |
| 196/9 | "The employers were already 5.6% less competitive and if they entertained the increase now requested they would be 10% less competitive". |

UNIONLinesQuote

23/25

"The workers were up in arms, they [National Executive Committee] themselves had mentioned the increase in the price of bread, the Putco busfares that were going to be increased by 20% ...".

73/4

"In the Transvaal Clothing Industry the real wage had declined by 25.2%".

138/39

"The children of today had to be educated and with that came the school fees, expensive uniforms etc.".

MEETING NO. 3 - 22ND OCTOBER 1985 - 240 LINESEMPLOYERSLinesQuote

109/10

"... the employers were not sufficiently competitive with the other areas ...".

66/67

"the sleeve setter in the Transvaal earned 40% more than its counterpart in the Cape".

49/51

"... they had warned that the Industry would find itself in trouble as it could not afford the current wages, let alone an increase in the wages".

UNIONLinesQuote

87/88

"... but those that were highly skilled were now being employed in the furniture industry making curtains".

70/71

"if (name of factory) closed down it would certainly not be because of one or two sleeve setters".

52/6

"... the Union could not be held responsible for the situation in the industry, particularly the closing down of so many factories. Factories were closing down when the starting wage was as little as R6.00 per week".

36/37 "... she was compelled to report that there had been a further increase in the price of bread".

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

In the annual report of the T.C.M.A. for 1985/6 it is reported that "Although production output declined by 45% during the past four years, employment only declined by 20% which shows the extent to which employers have been resisting retrenchment of employees". The report notes that, "This downward trend has been arrested and employment levels are again rising but not yet in the Transvaal".

In the presidential address at the 60th annual general meeting of the association (20/11/86) it is noted that the Union (N.U.C.W.) is about to affiliate with the National Union of Textile Workers and this, the President believes, will mean, "that employers should prepare themselves for a more militant approach by the Union".

Union

No documentation could be found.

SUMMARY

Table 19 (next page) provides an overall picture of the percentage of total lines (by Walton & McKersie's bargaining theory) of each meeting taken by the parties to the negotiations. This in turn has been presented in graph form to indicate the consistency of the behavioural patterns.

A review of Table 19 indicates that the 'first meetings' (up to 1979) are characterised by unions presenting their position and trying to persuade employers of its correctness (attitudinal structuring). The 'first meetings' of 1983 and 1985 indicate both sides attempting to persuade the other side of the 'rightness' of their position. There is an attempt also to develop integrative solutions.

TABLE 19

Percentages of Bargaining Behaviour - Transvaal

Date	Meet -ing Total No Lines		Percentage of Total Lines								Chair man	
			Employer				Union					
			M1	M2	M3	M4	N1	N2	N3	N4		
14 3 68	1	834	0	0	9	0	0	35	43	0	13	100
22 2 71	1	561	0	0	9	0	0	0	87	0	4	100
31 3 77	1	309	0	2	36	0	0	14	32	0	17	100
27 2 79	1	245	0	0	11	0	0	13	53	0	23	100
05 9 83	1	256	0	9	30	1	0	3	29	0	27	100
02 10 85	1	619	3	9	32	0	0	5	20	0	32	100
02 4 68	2	1145	11	0	24	0	0	0	56	0	10	100
17 3 71	2	601	0	3	27	0	0	14	35	0	20	100
17 4 79	2	372	0	10	37	0	0	11	19	0	23	100
25 3 82	2	497	0	5	12	0	0	10	43	0	29	100
07 9 83	2	204	0	2	20	0	0	19	38	0	22	100
16 10 85	2	612	0	6	23	0	0	10	24	0	36	100
09 4 68	3	923	2	5	14	0	3	10	39	0	27	100
18 3 71	3	926	1	20	14	0	0	20	21	0	24	100
18 4 79	3	145	0	12	10	0	3	26	23	0	27	100
26 3 82	3	428	0	0	30	0	0	13	55	0	3	100
21 9 83	3	203	0	2	22	0	0	4	40	0	33	100
22 10 85	3	240	0	4	23	0	0	3	30	0	40	100
08 5 79	4	127	6	21	9	0	0	13	12	0	39	100
30 3 82	4	332	0	20	25	0	0	37	10	0	8	100
05 10 83	4	103	0	5	35	0	0	15	34	0	12	100
22 10 85	4	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	100
21 10 83	5	309	0	8	10	0	0	1	12	0	69	100
23 10 85	5	97	0	9	41	0	0	11	21	0	18	100

The 'second meetings' of negotiations are similar but with more Employer usage of attitudinal structuring. The 'third meetings' for 1968 and 1971 are the last meetings for those negotiations and reflect some integrative bargaining. The balance of the 'third meetings' continue to reflect a greater usage of 'attitudinal structuring'. Integrative bargaining appears in both the 'third' and 'fourth' meetings of 1979. The 'fourth meetings' of 1979 and 1982 are marked by increased usage of distributive bargaining, and the dominant role of the chairman in the 'fourth meeting' of 1985.

Generally, the first two meetings are utilised by both parties for 'attitudinal structuring' and thereafter increasing usage of distributive bargaining.


A review of the bargaining behaviour shows that in the Transvaal the 'first' and 'second' meetings are dominated by attitudinal structuring by both parties. The 'third meetings' present a mixed picture, but if the negotiations move into a fourth meeting, the proportion of distributive bargaining is likely to increase. The 'fifth meetings' reflect an increased utilisation of attitudinal structuring on the part of the unions and similarly the employers in the fifth meeting also exhibits extensive attitudinal structuring behaviours.

The Transvaal negotiations reflect some attempts at integrative bargaining, particularly in the early years bargaining (1968/77/79) and generally this occurs in the 'third meeting' of a particular year's negotiations.


Table 19 also indicates that the 1982 negotiations were started (i.e. the first meeting) informally and the proceedings were not recorded in the minutes of the Council. Also of interest is the 'fourth meeting' of 1985 in which the Chairman dominated.

The behavioural patterns in Table 19 are presented in graphs 2 to 6.


Graph 2 - TVL Industrial Council Percentages - First Meeting




Graph 3 - TVL Industrial Council Percentages - Second Meeting



**Graph 6 - TVL Industrial Council
Percentages - Fifth Meeting**



Graph 5 - TVL Industrial Council Percentages - Fourth Meeting



6.4 CONSTRUCTS

The Transvaal Industrial Council reflects the knowledgeability of the negotiating collectivities. Employers stress the need for wage and benefit levels (i.e. employment costs) which will allow them to compete against other regions and imports. Reasonable wage levels for employers also means the continuation of, and growth of, the Transvaal industry.

The unions reflect a concern for the (economic) hardship of their members and, at least initially, accept the linkage of wages to the continuation of the industry. The core constructs can then be identified as

(a) Employers

Inability to compete - collapse of industry

(b) Union

Low wages - membership hardship

The minutes of the Transvaal negotiations also indicate a deterioration in the relationships between Employers and the Union. One of the issues highlighting this deterioration is the issue of "dismissals and Unfair Labour Practices" (see Meeting No. 1 - 1983 - Negotiations). The issue raises two points

- (1) It can be seen to be directed at an aspect of negotiations that have (traditionally) been the sole preserve of management, and
- (2) The possibility of (conflict) issues being removed from the domain of industrial council negotiations, i.e. by referring such issues to the Industrial Court as founded through the Labour Relations Act.

Employer reaction is marked and the degree of reaction is to be seen in the minutes of the 5th meeting of the 1983 negotiations. Subsequent statements by employers reflect their perception of a deteriorating relationship specifically with the N.U.C.W.

6.5 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE TRANSVAAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

6.5.1 Introduction

The prime rule of signification is initially jointly held by the parties to the Transvaal agreement. This rule can be described as being contained in the notion of 'ability to compete'. associated with this rule will be the need to have employment opportunities and a source of labour. Implicated in this prime rule are associated rules of signification relating to the fairness of minimum conditions of employment and the ability to attract labour. Legitimation is identified in the implications of likely events if the ability to compete is weakened. The industrial council, the funds it administers and the activities engaged upon through these facilities represent mechanisms of domination through which control over allocative and authoritative resources is exercised. By identifying the duality of structure an explanation of social practices in the Transvaal region is generated.

The decline of the industry, events in the wider industrial relations context and the emergence of different actors leads to an adjustment to the joint acceptance of the prime rule of signification, and by the end of the review period there is evidence of the union being more concerned with the improvement of conditions of employment than with attempts to secure long term employment. In addition, initially both parties accept - as a rule of signification - the relevance of the industrial council as the appropriate vehicle through which to manage certain labour/management affairs. This acceptance is under pressure - for similar reasons - by the end of the review period.

6.5.2 Structure

The control of employment costs in the Transvaal region can readily be seen in the movement of (i) contributions to the industrial council, (ii) contributions to the funds controlled by the industrial council and (iii) minimum (negotiated) wage rates. It will be shown that all these cost aspects have not kept pace with inflation (i.e. the consumer price index).

Contributions to the industrial council move from 4c and 11c for employee and employer (respectively) in 1968 to 14c each in 1986. Over the review period employers are able to decrease their (initially disproportionate) contribution rate, whilst the employees' contribution does not decrease. Had the 4c contribution kept pace with inflation the 1986 contribution would have been 27.7c, and whilst it could be argued that economies of scale could account for the containment of these contributions, the Transvaal industry is essentially an industry in decline (i.e. of employment).

Contributions to the provident fund provide further evidence of the containment of employment costs. Employers contribution rate in 1986 is just over half of what it would have been had it kept pace with inflation. Whilst the overall contributions to the fund have not entirely kept pace with inflation, it is the increase in employee contributions that have increased disproportionately. It needs to be noted that the contribution rates were different in 1968 - employers making a higher contribution - and the equalizing of the contribution rates could be interpreted as a 'rule of signification', i.e. equal contributions is seen as equitable by the parties to the agreement.

Contributions to the medical aid/benefit society have also not kept pace with inflation, and in addition employer contributions have decreased to below those of employees, i.e. employees contribute more than 50% of the total contribution. This contradicts the rule of equal contributions as suggested by contribution movements in the provident fund. Contribution rates to the sick pay fund have also not kept pace with inflation, and in fact have decreased in nominal terms. Had the average benefit received kept pace with inflation - and given the volume and kind of usage of the fund had stayed the same, then the 1986 average benefit should have been some R38.11 as opposed to R25.04. A further complicating issue in this calculation is that the sick pay benefit is based on the wage earned which also did not keep pace with inflation.

The training fund contributions are initially similar for both parties and have more than kept pace with the rate of inflation, this being the one and only fund to reflect such changes. It is reasonable to argue that the ability of employers to continue their operations new employees are required and as such will be willing to incur training costs in an attempt to secure a stream of applicants. The stabilisation fund is the only fund to which only employers make a contribution. This is not an additional employment cost but rather represents a spreading of a cost to be incurred.

The above analysis of changes to contribution rates together with the previously provided analysis of changes to minimum wage rates - i.e. that they have not kept pace with the rate of inflation, supports the contention of the prime rule of signification in the Transvaal industry is that of containing employment costs and the maintenance of the competitive position of Transvaal manufacturers.

This rule of Signification is focused by way of the industrial council which is therefore a facility of domination. Norms of legitimation are implicitly identifiable, i.e. higher employment costs affect levels of employment in the industry. In the Transvaal the decreasing levels of employment can be seen as confirmation (in the eyes of the parties to the negotiation) of the link between employment costs, competitive ability and levels of employment. This aspect will become more readily identifiable in the analysis of the actors' 'interpretive schemes'.

An analysis of the statements made by the parties to the Transvaal negotiations supports the contention that the prime rule of signification is that of keeping employers competitive, by controlling employment costs. This structure is maintained largely intact though with a deteriorating relationship until the 1985 negotiations when some evidence emerges of the Union rejecting the wage restraint/employment linkage.

The President's address of 22/11/79 to employers reflects the relationship between the T.C.M.A. and the union up to that date, i.e. the union "proved receptive to our pleas for a responsible approach to wage demands and in a spirit of co-operation agreed to accept ..." This date also marks the beginning of a deterioration of the relationship, because of a break in the acceptance of the wage rate/employment linkage.

The threat of strike action is raised in the 1980 extra-ordinary negotiations, an actual strike impedes the 1981 extra-ordinary negotiations and subsequent negotiations contain statements of the "changing mood" of the workforce. In addition, the Union representatives are continually aware of strikes in other industries and the wage increases these

are seen to have achieved. The addition of the N.U.C.W. (i.e. the black union) to the industrial council also contributes to the change in relationships. At the 5th meeting of the 1983 negotiations the G.W.U. "appealed to the National Union to assist in building up the industry and not to destroy it". At the same meeting an employer's representative notes the change in relationships, "the parties were no longer working as a council but working separately".

The 1983 negotiations are also important as they reflect for the first time an attempt by Unions to effect the ability of management to manage as they wish. The N.U.C.W. is reproached for its desire to utilise the Industrial Court in cases where it suspects an unfair labour practice. Such action removes control from industrial councils to a body independent of council, and therefore away from the (at least) potential influence of employers. The intentions of the N.U.C.W. are rejected by both employers and by the G.W.U., thus the implied sanction (of destroying the industry) indicates a rule of signification, i.e. that the industry finds solutions to industry issues.

The 1985 negotiations provide further evidence of the union's (N.U.C.W.) breaking of the wage/employment linkage (see meeting No. 3, 22nd October, 1985) when the union argues that it cannot "be held responsible for the situation in the industry, particularly the closing down of so many factories. Factories were closing down when the starting wage was as little as R6.00 per week". In this statement is the rejection of the employer position of the necessity for wages to be competitive to be able to stay in business and have increasing levels of employment. It can be suggested that the G.W.U. accepted a long term role of increasing wages and employment, where the N.U.C.W. is focussed on immediate improvements to

employment rewards. The demise of the G.W.U., the ascendance of the N.U.C.W. and the maintenance by employers of a 'high wage - uncompetitive' frame of reference must inevitably lead to deteriorating relationships between the parties, and the possible emergence of different structure to the industrial relations system in the Transvaal. Given the review period (1968 - 1986) of this thesis, it is not possible to identify with any certainty the quality of any new structure, should such occur, in the Transvaal industry. Such change as might occur must await further research prior to establishing any certainty of its description.

Action in the Transvaal industrial relations system also, as with other regions, provides support for other aspects of structuration theory.

Structuration theory argues that the production of action is at the same time one of reproduction, in that the conditions which allow for a particular kind of action are reproduced. Negotiations (formal) at council took place 7 times over the review period and this excludes informal (unrecorded) negotiations as well as "extra-ordinary" negotiations. The content of these negotiations all revolve around allocative resources with the exception of the 1983 negotiations at which the Union attempts to introduce some control over managerial decision making as to what "constituted ordinary dismissal and retrenchment". Nevertheless, the substance of negotiation items is restricted to allocative resources. Apart from agreeing the substance of particular job categories, there is no evidence of negotiations dealing with the exercise of managerial authority in the work place. This in turn can be taken as a rule of signification and closely associated with the prime rule of employers' ability to compete.

Reference to the analysis of bargaining behaviour utilising the Walton and McKersie model suggests the similarity of behaviour from one negotiation to the next. Thus, negotiations are procedurally and substantively similar over the review period, given the beginnings of the deterioration in employer/employee body relationships.

In arguing that action reproduces the conditions of action, the impression may be gained that structuration theory is deterministic and static. Such a view is to be rejected because the theory incorporates

- (i) the notion of 'reflexive monitoring'
- (ii) the issue of unintended consequences of intentional acts
- (iii) the influence of 'significantly placed' actors
- (iv) events in other action contexts which may constrain/enable action in the action context under consideration

Evidence of 'reflexive monitoring' is abundant in the minutes of the negotiations. All parties are aware of economic conditions and argue its impact on the ability to compete and the hardship employees experience. All parties reflect an awareness of the state of rewards in other garment manufacturing regions as well as in other industries. Employers are also aware of wages paid in areas falling under the Wage Act - see President's address 21/11/1968.

From 1980 onwards the Union(s) are particularly aware of the activities of other unions, especially strike activity and benefits which they perceive to have flowed from such strikes.

The Transvaal manufacturers express the intention of constraining employment costs so as to remain competitive. This act then, together with the impact of the Physical Planning Act of 1968, leads to recruitment problems for the manufacturers. The employment statistics for coloureds and whites show a rapid decline as these workers leave employment. The constraint of the Physical Planning Act which restricts the employment of blacks then leads to an inability of manufacturers to acquire labour. The response of employers is to start a Training Fund and it is noted in the President's (T.C.M.A.) address of 19th November, 1970, that "The denial of the use of Bantu labour ... puts a scarcity value on employment" which the Unions are "not slow to exploit"; both events are likely to increase employment costs.

The pattern of entrances and exits exhibited in the industry also suggest high levels of labour turnover, and whilst a proportion of such turnover might be employer initiated, the degree of entrances and exits suggest an instrumentality of employment for the workforce. This instability of employment in turn influences the cost of employment.

The events which are reflexively monitored are again evidence of rules of signification, that which is monitored and drawn on in interaction must be taken as having meaning for the actors concerned, and are in turn linked to the prime rule of signification, i.e. the ability to compete.

In an analysis of 'significantly' placed actors, further rules can be identified. Prior to the amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, the relationship between the T.C.M.A. and the G.W.U. of S.A. was - in the opinion of the T.C.M.A. - "most co-operative" (see council meeting 16th May, 1974).

The role of the Union leadership in developing and maintaining this relationship is important. In the 1971 negotiations, the Union negotiator accepts that the Union's "goals could not be achieved in one throw but advances could only be made step by step". At the May 16th, 1974, Council meeting the Union representative notes, "it could not be expected of the Union to press the employers for further substantial increases as they would also move to Babelegi".

At a joint annual general meeting of the G.W.U. of S.A. (1977) the secretary says "never in her 39 years in the industry" had the economy been worse. Comparisons with "the leather workers" are also used to get acceptance of that year's agreement.

The amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 sees the Secretary of the G.W.U. of S.A. playing a cautionary role in the face of increasing militancy. At the 1980 annual general meeting the secretary says that if strike action results from the employers rejection of their demand, "they would have to make sacrifices and it would not be easy". At a meeting of shop stewards on 31st March, 1981, the union president argues that rejection of their demands could lead to either arbitration or strike action. She suggests that whilst they might improve wages, it is possible that the union "would loose (the) 40 hour week". In addition she warns of increased competition from lower wage areas.

The inclusion of the National Union of Clothing Workers (N.U.C.W.) to the bargaining process is seen as marking the changing relationships between the parties. Council minutes are such that it appears that the G.W.U. of S.A. continued to be the Union spokesperson even though in terms of representation, the N.U.C.W. was the stronger. It must be added, however, that the N.U.C.W. was not a full member of council until the 24th January, 1985, when council's constitution is amended to read "7 delegates from each side, the Union delegation is made up of 3 from the G.W.U. of S.A.

and 4 from the N.U.C.W.". The G.W.U. withdraws from council as from the 1st August, 1985, when their amalgamation with the N.U.C.W. becomes official.

The change in relationships is essentially due to the N.U.C.W.'s action in relation to 'Unfair Labour Practices' and the Industrial Court and their rejection of the 'wage/competitive ability' linkage which employers hold and which was accepted by the G.W.U. of S.A. The leadership of the N.U.C.W. are then in structuration theory "significantly placed actors" who can change things - or keep things as they are.

The industrial relations system in the Transvaal is integrated through relations of autonomy and dependence with other action contexts in the South African social system. This in turn leads to the understanding of the constraining and enabling aspects of action in other contexts on the garment manufacturing industrial relations system - specifically the Transvaal system. The promulgation of the Physical Planning and Resources Act of 1968, limited the number of blacks employed in factories to the number employed on the 1st January, 1968 (i.e. in white areas). This action severely limited the ability of manufacturers in the Transvaal region (essentially the Witwatersrand area). At the same time the state announced benefits (to employers) to relocate to "Border" areas in an attempt to control the influx of blacks to urban industrial areas. In 1981 the president of the T.C.M.A. notes that the Transvaal region now "enjoys exemption in respect of the employment of black women workers".

In less 'distant contexts' the negotiations in the other regions of the garment industry act as both a constraint and facilitator of action, thus both parties use events in other regions to support their points of view. This also reinforces the structuration theory notion of 'reflexive monitoring'.

6.6 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE TRANSVAAL REGION

The previous analysis provides an understanding of the nature of collective bargaining in the Transvaal region, which in structuration theory terms can be argued to favour the sectional interests of employers, which in turn goes some way to explaining the perceived lack of militancy in the industry. How this was perpetuated - even with the entry of the N.U.G.W. to the bargaining forum needs to be dealt with. The analyses of Gool, Toerien, Maree and Nicol directed specifically at the Cape industry are arguably just as pertinent to the Transvaal industry, just as that of Morris's (1) analysis of NUMSA's change of policy toward industrial council membership, albeit that the Transvaal region does reflect differences.

The employment figures of the Transvaal region reflect a declining industry. Emdon identifies the effect of the "Physical Planning and Resources Act" (1967) as a major contributor to this decline, thus "The main victims of the Act have been numerous small and middle sized clothing firms in the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Vereeniging complex" (2). This Act restricted the number of African employees in any one firm to the number employed as at the 1st January, 1968. The withdrawal of white and coloured workers from the industry meant that they could not be replaced by African workers and thus affecting employers' ability to 'remain the same' let alone grow. In addition the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1946) restricted those legally allowed to live in white areas to a particular magisterial district and the definition of who could legally live in such areas had the intention of restricting the size of the black population in whole areas. This legislation - apart from other Apartheid legislation had particular consequences for the industry. It should also be noted that the creation of 'Border Areas' and the

incentives to relocate have particular pertinence in the Transvaal as, for example, factories in Johannesburg could easily be relocated to Babalegi without the relocation of (white) owners/managers. Table 14 indicates the decline in the number of employers and the numbers employed. Both parties to the agreements will be well aware of the decline of the industry.

Legislative constraints sourced in the I.C. Act will have a further impact on the ability of the G.W.U. - S.A. to operate and Gool's (3) argument of the "atomisation" of the production process all have implications for union democracy. The Transvaal region operated for a large part of the review period, with a 'parallel' union, the National Union of Garment Workers, who only in 1985 became a fully fledged party to the Council. The I.C. Act restricted the ability of the G.W.U. of S.A. to have multi-racial meetings (and membership) and (as with the Cape) required the Secretary to be white. This resulted in the ludicrous situation of a minor segment of the employees negotiating on behalf of the majority, which had little or no say in the formulation and acceptance/rejection of demands submitted to negotiation. Furthermore, the geographical distribution of factories would further complicate the ability of the Union secretariat to consult regularly with the rank-and-file membership as well as shop stewards.

The Union Secretary will also play a significant role in influencing the expectations of the membership of both the G.W.U. of S.A. and the N.U.G.W., certainly up to the point where the N.U.G.W. has - at least - a voice on the Council (i.e. 1981). The statements quoted earlier reflect an understanding of the role of the Union as one concerned with economic benefits for the membership. Again, this is a narrow view of both

benefits and strategies to acquire these ends. The (economic) concerns relate to wages, the benefits in the funds controlled by council and the provision of employment; if anything, the idea of keeping the workforce employed is a dominant construct which will contribute to constraining the range and substance of demands made to employers.

The suggestion that employment - as an issue - is in the forefront of the Secretary's mind can be seen in statements made at both Council meetings and to members (e.g. '1974 Negotiations' and 'Extra-ordinary Negotiations 1981'). The decline in the importance of this construct in the post-Wiehahn negotiations can be seen in the continuing threat of the G.W.U. of S.A. to become more 'militant'. The Secretary suggests to the employers that Union demands need to be met or - by implication - more militant (in the form of strikes) behaviour will be the order of the day. The evidence of the movement in wages suggest that employers did not believe in the possibility of such action, i.e. the continual decline (in real terms) of minimum wages.

The unwillingness of the Union to exhibit militant behaviour is also related to the desire to maintain the relationship, and the benefits, of industrial council bargaining discussed in the Cape region are no less applicable for the Transvaal region. As with the Cape region it can be suggested that on balance there was greater benefit to the Union in its membership than to employers and that an awareness of that would act as a further constraint on the Union's willingness to engage in 'distributive' tactics. The emergence of the N.U.G.W. as the dominant (later only) bargaining partner changes the relationship between employers and employees to the express dissatisfaction of employers. It appears essentially that a change in the leadership of the employees delegation to the

bargaining encounter is what generates the somewhat more militant behaviour amongst employees. Nevertheless, the issues bargained over do not change and the state of the managerial prerogative is maintained over the review period. Thus, there may well be something of an increase in the 'militancy' with which issues are addressed, but not in terms of a change in the range of issues addressed.

The importance of the relationship to both parties and the economic character of the issues negotiated over should not give the impression that the bargaining itself was not experienced as intense. The number of meetings, their duration and the analysis of them by way of Walton and McKersie's model show intense effort on the part of both parties to achieve their ends. As with the Cape region, the dominant behaviours exhibited are those of Attitudinal structuring and Distributive bargaining, thus what was bargained over was bargained intensively.

As with the Cape region, a contributory factor explaining the lack of 'militancy' - certainly up to the 1980's - must be the employment patterns, i.e. the number of 'entrances' (and exits) to the industry. Table 17 indicates that an increasing proportion of the labour force had 3 or more 'entrances'. In 1968 the proportion was 30.6% and by 1986 this figure was 43.3%, with a peak of 47.8% being evidenced in 1977. As with the Cape discussion it is difficult to see this pattern of employment providing any upward pressure on the Union executive to behave any differently from the way they did. It can be argued that it was more an awareness of other 'militant' unions' activities which contributed to a change of bargaining tactic (i.e. the observed success of strikes - militancy - amongst 'emerging' unions was used in an attempt to persuade employers on the equitableness of demands). In combination with an

awareness of emerging unions activities and the rise of the N.U.G.W. further contributed to the change in the employer/Union relationship in which the dominance of employer interests was challenged albeit on a limited range of issues, thus largely maintaining the employers far reaching managerial prerogative. The debate around the N.U.G.W's use of the Industrial Court generates a great deal of antipathy on the part of employers (see Meeting No. 5 - 1983 Negotiations), and whilst the Union backed down, subsequent comments by the Chairman of the T.C.M.A. identifies their perception of a rapidly deteriorating relationship.

The emergence of the N.U.G.W. as a major force (albeit not officially until 1985) will also account, partially, for the change in the employer/Union relationship; it can be suggested that just as Morris (4) argues that 'emerging' unions had to establish themselves, so the N.U.G.W. would need to be seen - by its membership and the wider union movement - to be doing 'something'. The 1983 negotiations and debate around the Union's treatment of 'Unfair Labour Practices' can be seen as an attempt to limit the managerial prerogatives of employers in the clothing industry. It nevertheless is the only evidence of broadening the negotiating issues from solely (narrow) economic issues.

In summary, the observed lack of militancy (though not at the level of the Cape region), can be identified in the understanding of the benefits of the relationship to both parties albeit more so for the union side. Contributing to the maintenance of this relationship will be the objective of maintaining employment in a declining industry, the threat of relocation, aspects of Apartheid legislation, the geographical distribution of employment and the role of the Secretary and the Union executive, as well as the pattern of entrances (exits) of labour to the

industry. The deterioration of the relationship sees signs of militancy increase as well as the threat of increased militancy and the emergence of the N.U.G.W. However, whilst the potential for conflict increases in the 1980's, there is little by way of inroads on employer interests to be observed. Costs of employment (i.e. in terms of minimum wages and contributions to the various funds) have not kept pace with inflation and nor has managerial authority over the workforce in the factory been affected.

CONCLUSION

Structure in the Transvaal region is identified in section 6.5 of this chapter, and is characterised as favouring the sectional interests of employers. Structure, in structuration theory, is drawn upon by knowledgeable actors in the production and reproduction of action. The Garment Workers Union of South Africa (G.W.U. of S.A.) in their collective bargaining encounter will draw upon the structure as identified earlier, and actions will therefore not be militant and will fit into Lambert and Webster's classification of "orthodox" unions (5).

The explanation for the continuity of this lack of militancy as provided in section 6.6 leads to a similar conclusion as that made about the similar phenomena in the Cape region. All the factors identified by Gool, Maree, Toerien and Morris as well as the argument tentatively presented concerning the probable lack of upward pressure on the union leadership all support the contention that the leadership was able, through its own actions or because its 'reflexive monitoring' establish no reasons to change, to keep its 'interpretive scheme' much the same over the review period. Furthermore, the leadership of the G.W.U of S.A. does not change over the review period although their position as the bargaining representative of workforce does change.

The change in representation comes right at the end of the review period, and whilst the beginnings of changes to the 'structure' of bargaining are seen (e.g. the issue of the use of the industrial court), these dissipate in the face of employer resistance and the threat of the collapse of the industrial council system. The union appears to revert back to the less militant posture of the G.W.U. of S.A.

CHAPTER 6 - REFERENCES

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CHAPTER 7

THE STRUCTURATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE NATAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING REGION7.1 INTRODUCTION

Evidence of the duality of structure in the Natal region will be presented along similar lines to that of the Cape and Transvaal. It must be reiterated that the administrative arrangements in each region varies, which means that certain information whilst available in one region, is not available in another. In the Cape region the provident fund could provide data on (total) labour turnover. Similar data was not available in Natal and sampling was utilised to provide an indication of the phenomena.

7.2 PART A - FORM

- 7.2.1 The Industrial Council
- 7.2.2 The Funds of Council
- 7.2.3 The Parties to the Agreement
- 7.2.4 Employment Form
- 7.2.5 The Wage Form

7.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME

- 7.4 Bargaining Behaviour
- 7.5 Constructs
- 7.6 The Structure of Industrial Relations in the Natal Garment Manufacturing Industry
- 7.7 Collective Bargaining in the Natal Region

7.2 PART A - FORM7.2.1 The Industrial Council

August 2, 1934, saw the birth of the Natal Garment Worker's Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) and one of its first activities was to give evidence at a Wage Board investigation conducted in December 1934. A publication to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Union reports, (Golden Jubilee Report - 1984) -

"The Union presented a strong case for improvement in the conditions of employment".

1935 saw the registration of the Natal Clothing Manufacturer's Association (N.C.M.A.) thus laying the foundations for the establishment of an Industrial Council. The 50th Anniversary publication notes that the formation of the N.C.M.A., "... resulted in a spirit of co-operation between Union and the Association". It is further reported that "the reputable employers" (i.e. the Association) assisted in cleaning up "the clothing industry of its unscrupulous employers".

Negotiations between the union and the N.C.M.A. were begun "towards the end of 1935" and "following months of negotiations the industrial council was registered and an agreement reached ..." The first agreement was published in 1936.

The Industry had grown from "around 2000 employees" (Golden Jubilee Report, 1984) to 37,833 in October of 1986, having peaked at 48,010 in December 1984.

TABLE 1

NATAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENTS 1967 - 1986

Year	Accum. Funds	Gross Income	Levies	Expend.	Excess/ (deficit)	Employment Levels
1986	69986	591829	232994	638032	(46203)	37833
1985	116189	539369	261077	581473	(42104)	45581
1984	158293	510738	313313	480801	29937	48010
1983	128356	463474	290633	388474	75000	42383
1982	53356	328286	182288	349500	(21214)	43819
1981	74570	280591	168842	270853	9738	44676
1980	64832	242739	151861	202904	39835	37475
1979	24997	177601	91267	186147	(8546)	34788
1978	33543	144061	60831	157651	(13590)	32506
1977	47133	137309	62647	143249	(5940)	30823
1976	53073	136373	65547	135464	909	33365
1975	52164	113698	58787	115732	(2034)	30785
1974	54198	101347	55140	103954	(2607)	29632
1973	56805	100360	54277	90855	9505	27934
1972	45922	91442	48249	83637	7805	25281
1971	38117	81254	43207	73970	7284	25286
1970	30832	68620	35573	62652	5968	23096
1969	24864	33772	22763	35948	(2176)	20531
1968	27041	28179	16712	35137	(6958)	17396
1967	33999	25646	15138	33343	(7697)	

TABLE 2

CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL

		Cents	
		EmR	Eme
1968	Wages <= 11.44	1	1
	> 11.44	2	2
1969	(from Dec) < 11.45	1	1
	>=11.45	3	3
1970-73 No change			
1974	All classes	2	2
1975-78 No change			
1979	(from September)	4	4
1980-81 No change			
1982-86 (from Dec)		7	7

It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that (direct) contributions to the industrial council were increased in 1969, 1979 and 1982 and that 'deficits' were recorded in 1967/69, 1974/75 (proportionately very small), again in 1977/78/79 and again in 1982 and finally in 1985/86. The response by both parties is such as to protect the (administrative) functioning of the council, by increasing contributions.

7.2.2 Industrial Council Funds

7.2.2.1 Sick Fund

The "Golden Jubilee Souvenir Brochure" (1984) records the Union in 1938 securing "the establishment of a joint contributory sick fund. Contribution was on the basis of 3d ("tickey") per week from each worker and the employers contributing the same amount for each of its workers". While at the same time noting the changes in contributions, "to keep abreast of inflation" the article states "But one thing for sure, this union has one of the most efficient and stable sick funds in the country". Table 3 reflects contribution rates over the review period. Using 6.92 (C.P.I. multiplier) to inflate the (end) 1968 contribution rate of 3c indicates that the real figure for 1986 should be 20.76c.

Table 4a provides financial detail of the sick fund over the review period. As would be expected, income has risen substantially as has expenditure.

The Natal council also operated a clinic, but data similar to that given for the Cape region was not available. However, Table 4b provides some data on the services provided through the medical aid fund, some of which would have been through the clinic.

TABLE 3CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SICK FUND

		Cents	
		EmR	Eme
1968	Wages < 5.99	3	3
	6.00 to 11.44	5	5
	> 11.44	8	8
1969	(from Dec) < 11.45	7	7
	> 11.45	13	13
1970-73 No change			
1974	All classes	10	10
1975-79 No change			
1980	All classes	15	15
1981 No change			
1982-86 (from Dec)	< or = R55	30	30
	> R55	50	50

The Natal sick benefit fund recorded deficits in 1968 and 1969, 1978 and 1979, 1981 and 1982 and again in 1986. Contributions to the fund were increased at the end of 1969, again in 1980 and lastly in December 1982, suggesting a protective response by employers and employees.

Unlike the Cape, it was not possible to establish the "days sick benefit" and therefore it is not possible to calculate the 'cash per day' (average) benefit, nor (obviously) to compare that to the rate of inflation over the review period (see Cape Section Table 4).

TABLE 4a

NATAL SICK BENEFIT FUND
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENTS

Year	Accum. Funds	Income	Levies	(Sick Pay Grant) Expend.	Excess/ (deficit)
1986	746357	1,518,880	1,449,951	(630984)	(154106)
1985	900463	1,798,287	1,724,528	1,672,986 (539896)	266389
1984	634074	1,588,768	1,537,665	1,531,898 (496451)	192419
1983	441655	1,354,356	1,339,668	1,396,349 (366155)	306310
1982	135345	694,836	677,337	1,048,046 (322996)	(146224)
1981	281569	651,122	629,595	841060 (249082)	(639)
1980	282208	577,748	558,852	651761 (214372)	46080
1979	236128	361,675	338,263	531668 (156605)	(51965)
1978	288093	325,752	300,578	413640 (121592)	(11085)
1977	299178	336,885	311,068	336837 (110533)	7007
1976	292172	353,605	324,230	329878 (136223)	8778
1975	283394	311,122	290,469	344827 (113459)	19376
1974	264018	295,823	277,617	291746 (122849)	4072
1973	259944	274,977	259,074	291751 (87445)	35876
1972	224068	250,617	237,390	239101 (81035)	37862
1971	186206	235,133	225,226	212755 (61645)	54376
1970	131830	209,050	201,946	180757 (55072)	42905
1969	88924	123,715	115,957	166145 (60691)	(31568)
1968	120493	111,139	102,271	155283 (39330)	(7475)
1967	127968	100,406	92,511	118614 (28681)	7502
				92904	

TABLE 4b

MEDICAL SERVICES SUPPLIED

	1970	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86
Sick Pay	55072	N/A	81035	N/A	122849	N/A	136223	116535	121592	156605	N/A	249082	332996	336115		559659	
Medicine Drugs & Dressings	28352	"	28329	"	51901	"	63946	65874	62463	83394	"	163633	210033	280532		415213	
Medical Treatment	49914	"	53875	"	57707	"	67965	67334	70752	82768	"	116838	151987	234320		300164	
Optical Treatment & Glasses	4641	"	5574	"	14133	"	8018	10341	11611	13512	"	19665	26967	33041		39855	
Gynaecolo gist & Prescrip.	705	"	1825	"	not recor- ded	"	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	"	N/R	N/R	N/R		N/R	
Dental Treatment	3599	"	4950	"	5213	"	5945	6631	6235	6273	"	8465	8734	9509		9431	
X-Rays	-	-	-	-	1893	"	2087	N/R	-	-	"	-	-	-			

7.2.2.2 Provident Fund

The 1970/71 Annual Report of the G.W.I.U. states, "The Industrial Council Provident Fund which was negotiated in 1959 by the Trade Union for the benefit of its members now has assets standing at R1,239,595".

Contribution rates to the fund are reflected in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PROVIDENT FUND

		Cents	
		EmR	Eme
1968	Wages < 11.44 > 11.44	5 8	5 13
1969	No change		
1970	No change		
1971	< 13.15 > 13.15	5 13	5 13
1972-79	No change		
1980	All classes	20	20
1981		25	25
1982	No change		
1983		40	40
1984-86		50	50

Contributions to the provident fund have increased from 5c or 8c from the employer or 5c/13c from the employee depending on the wage category, i.e. > or < than 11.44.

Those paying 5c in 1968 would, had their contributions (only) kept pace with inflation, pay 34.60c in 1986. Likewise, 8c translates into 55.36c and 13c becomes 89.96 cents. The actual payment of 50c in 1986 means that higher wage earners' contributions have not kept pace with inflation.

Evaluation of the provident fund is beyond the scope of this thesis as a full actuarial evaluation would be required prior to any conclusions being drawn. However, it can be observed that

- (i) 'Accummulated Assets' have increased nearly 20 times since 1968.
- (ii) Contributions have increased 10 times and
- (iii) Employment 2.1 times (1986). At peak employment 1984) the increase was 2.76 times.
- (iv) Actuarial evaluations were done from time to time and no record could be found of any dissatisfaction with the fund's performance.

Table 6 provides a financial history of the provident fund.

7.2.3 The Parties to the Agreement

7.2.3.1 Natal Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.)

The Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) was registered on the 20th September, 1934, and according to the Minister of Manpower (P.C. du Plessis) writing in the "Golden Jubilee - Souvenir Brochure" (1984) it was founded "during one of the worst economic depressions, when hope for the future seemed bleak". By 1984 the union had grown "to the second largest in the clothing industry ... with a membership of some 59,000 workers" (Souvenir Brochure - 1984). The union subscription of 9c in 1968 is the 1986 equivalent of 62.3c, some 12.7c below the actual contribution of 75c. The higher contribution, viz. 15c converts to about R1.04 (see Table 7).

TABLE 6

NATAL PROVIDENT FUND

Year	Accumul. Funds	Income	Contrib from	Interest	Expend.	Claims Paid	Retire ment	Death Benef.	Disabil. Benefits	With- draws	Admin. Expen.	Excess/ (deficit)	Housing Loans Appr
1986	17542343	3658835	1527521	2054814	2068144	1788914	349778	161344	589106	434623	279230	1590691	249826
1985	15951652	4070597	2110215	1960382	1189844	960361	349778	90351	359456	160776	229483	2880753	919370
1984	13070899	3697701	2269015	1428686	965719	715493	258848	94295	227186	135164	250226	2731982	550656
1983	10338917	2814853	1755664	1059189	804232	742448	202703	99371	323807	116567	61784	2010621	163266
1982	8328296	2017011	1168104	848907	837659	779567	247615	106748	317542	107662	58092	1179352	34295
1981	7148944	1602204	985487	616717	447369	392951	73175	65459	165614	88703	54418	1154835	19195
1980	5994109	1265579	773679	491900	411081	380346	71311	80842	140763	87430	30735	854498	16753
1979	5139611	976764	533315	443449	390431	362338	82800	53726	111199	114613	28093	586333	
1978	4553278	876349	469375	406974	352103	319821	78105	35896	110673	95147	32282	524246	
1977	4029032	830673	477606	353067	309311	289033	76156	31903	92847	88127	20278	521362	
1976	3507670	780038	502121	277917	178958	164296	31338	38296	47503	47159	14662	601080	
1975	2906590	672192	451629	220563	142239	112975	16733	23707	29875	42660	29264	529953	
1974	2376637	513198	349910	163288	85306	72437	11706	11123	12925	36683	12869	427892	
1973	1948745	343284	210460	132724	91411	78892	119596	9997	17837	31462	12519	251873	
1972	1696871	305920	191558	114362	66214	45220				23520	20994	239706	1400 (1972)
1971	1457165	276072	178869	97203	58502	46658				21287	11844	217570	1910
1970	1239595	290455	161606	78849	52377	41741				16025	10636	188078	2601
1969	1051517	207584	145020	62564	37284	28066				12451	9218	170300	401
1968	881217	194993	143710	51283	34287	22383				10222	11904	160706	-
1967	720511	154381	115090	39291	32046	23924				11789	8122	122335	-

In January of 1984 the Union set up an additional fund - the 'Help-U-Fund'. The Union's 1984/85 annual report states "our unemployed members will be assisted by the Garment Workers Help-U-Fund which will provide 25% of the member's wage and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (U.I.F.) will provide 45% of the members wage for a period of 6(six) months. In other words, our members will receive 70% of their wages for the first 2(two) months of unemployment".

This fund, the 'Help-U-Fund', it is reported (1985/86 Annual Report) had to close "because the payments were higher than the income".

Table 7 below reflects the membership dues for the review period.

TABLE 7

MEMBERSHIP DUES

1968	Wage < R6.00 = 9c p.w. (male and female) Wage = or > R6.00 = 15c p.w.
1969-73	No change
1974	All members = 15c p.w.
1975-76	No change
1977	All members = 21c p.w.
1978-80	No change
1981	All members = 30c p.w.
1982	No change
1983	All members = 65c p.w.
1984	All members = R1.00 p.w.
1985	All members additional 20c for 6 months to assist unemployed members
1986(20/1)	Special levy (i.e. 20c) extended for further 6 months
1986(1/6)	Special levy stopped, fees reduced to R0.75.

Table 8a provides some financial data on the union over the review period.

TABLE 8a

BALANCE SHEET & INCOME STATEMENTS - NATAL UNION

Year End	Income (Gross)	Subscriptions (Gross)	Transfer to Funeral & Welfare A/C	Expend. (Gross)	Excess of Income over Exp.	Accum. Assets
1971	137386	136591	31709	55168	36768	72590
1972	158512	157914	56758	64872	36892	248102
1973	199428	148751	50601	93556	55271	544959
1974	219788	168879	45267	115424	54097	599101
1975	227796	180068	46272	134281	47242	646343
1976	221705	189451	43127	136859	41718	615649
1977	233111	196236	45311	143500	44300	622701
1978	260967	230128	88891	152013	20063	617051
1979	310855	273436	102271	163382	45201	640878
1980	313457	285429	113258	182905	17295	658583
1981	383517	362229	155342	227765	410	658583
1982	619559	616204	188246	303745	127558	786141
1983	877574	849432	232901	658270	(13605)	772536
1984	1682270	1649352	287228	1389735	5307	777844
1985	2157941	2112355	560260= Help U Fund 895972	1384656	116073 Neg.	778089
1986	2135328	2070025	747765= Help U Fund 1014420	1169590	(48683)	729406

Reviewing the Income Statements of the union over the review period the following year on year observations can be made of the expenditure patterns. (Note: balance sheets and income statements were only available from 1971).

1971

Salaries at R18,745.69 represent the largest single item of expenditure (34%) (this of Net income i.e. after Transfers)

Conference and Organising Expenses (R9,182.60) were 16.6% of expenditure

Affiliation Fees (T.U.C.S.A.) were R6,707.99 or 12% of expenditure

Attendance Fees (R5,775.71) were 10.5% of expenditure
 Also it should be noted that the amounts of R31,709.40 (Funeral Benefits Account) and R13,740.74 ("Ex Gratia" Grant Account) were transferred (deducted) from Gross Income to arrive at (after adding "Entrance Fees" and "Interest") Net income

1972

Salaries are the largest item of expenditure at R24,416 an increase of 30% over 1971 and some 38% of total expenditure

Affiliation fees (to T.U.C.S.A. and I.T.G and L.W.F.) are the next biggest item at R7,025, about the same as 1971

Honoraria payments show a 177% increase on 1971 to R2,785

Transfers to the Funeral Benefits and Welfare grant accounts amounted to R39,599 and R17,159 respectively, increases over 1971 of 25% each.

1973

The major increase in expenditure in 1973 (as an increase over 1972 expenditure) was that of "Conference and Organising Expenses" which increased 365% to R10,498

Motor car "Allowances and Licences" more than doubled to R3,819

Salaries increased 57% to R38,375

Total 'Transfers' were R50,601, R35,303 and R15,298 to Funeral Benefits and Welfare Grant accounts respectively

Affiliation fees increased 32% to R9,249.00

1974

Salaries rise by 18.7% to R45,549

Attendance fees rise by some R5,500 to R10,014

Conference and Organising Expenses decrease some R3,000 to R7,426

A new item "Bonuses and Honoraria" amounts to R5,472; 'Honoraria' in 1973 was R1,028

Transfers to 'Funeral Benefit' account and 'Welfare Benefit' account amounted to R45,267 - R31,582 and R13,685 respectively.

1975

Transfers to 'Funeral' and 'Welfare' accounts decrease to R46,272 (R31,954 and R14,318)

Salaries rise to R50,413 - 10.7%

Attendance fees rise to R12,750 - from R10,014

'Bonuses' and 'Gratuities' amount to R12,045 (R4045 and R8000) - an increase of 120%

1976

The amounts transferred to "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts decreases to R43,127, R30,805 and R12,322 respectively

Salaries increase by about 9% to R54,920

Other than 'Motor Car Allowances' (which increases plus/minus 25% to R5,285) the other accounts show either a decrease or a marginal increase over the previous year

1977

The Transfer to "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts was much the same as 1976 - R3,265 and R19,945 respectively

Salaries increased by about 11% to R61,187

Conference and Organising Expenses dropped some R6,000 to R7,834

Motor Car Allowances increased some 50% to R5,945

Affiliation fees increased (in total) to R14,056 - an increase in the order of 21%

1978

Affiliation fees decrease to (in total) R11,960 as no fee is paid to the I.T.G and L.W.F., but the Union does join the Institute for Industrial Relations (R300.00)

Salaries increase some 10% to R67,782

All other expenses show a marginal increase

Transfers to "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts show a substantial increase to (in total) R88,891 - R38,223 and R50,667 respectively. This represents a virtual doubling of this item

1979

The "Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts again substantially increase in 1979 to a total of R102,271 or R42,112 and R60,159 respectively

Salaries only increase by some R250

Affiliation fees now reflect the I.T.G. and L.W.F. fees and the total moves up to R16,381 (37%)

Conference and Organising Expenses increase 74% to R14,871

Attendance fees decrease about R1,000 to R10,855

'Bonuses' and 'Honoraria' increase around 20% to R8,493 and R3,105 respectively

1980

Salaries increase plus/minus 14% to R77,438

"Funeral" and "Welfare" transfers are increased to R46,636 and R66,622 respectively

Conference and Organising Expenses increase about 37% to R20,032

1981

Total Affiliation fees are now recorded as R22,160 i.e. up 43% - largely due to an increase in fees to I.T.G. and L.W.F. and that such fees are paid every second year

Organising and Conference fees increase over 50% to R32,103

Attendance fees increase by some 61% to R18,668

Salaries increase some 5%

"Funeral" and "Welfare" accounts increase to R57,995 and R82,849 respectively and an additional amount of R14,498 is transferred to "G.W.I.U. Fund from 1962"

1982

"Funeral", "Welfare" and "1962 Fund" were increased to R69,105, R98,622 and R20,419 respectively representing an average increase of some 21%

Affiliation fees now total R24,572 and the I.T.G. and L.W.F. are now paid annually. This is about a 10% increase on 1981

Salaries jump to R121,341 - an increase of some 49%

Conference and Organising Expenses grow by around 13% to R37,074

Attendance Fees now amount to R24,148, a 29% increase
Bonuses and Honoraria amount to just under R16,000 and increased by 57.7%

1983

Transfers to "Funeral", "Welfare" and "1962 Fund" were R44,996, R137,506 and R50,405 respectively representing an average increase of 23.7%

Affiliation Fees were R31,972 (No figures for the I.T.G. and L.W.F.), a 30% increase

Conference and Organising Expenses rose to R68,149, being an increase of 84%

Bonuses and Honoraria increased some 22% to R19,531

A new expense is encountered in the form of "Insurance Premiums - Metropolitan Homes Trust Life" to the amount of R183,731

Salaries increase to R166,679 - an increase of 37%
 A Pension Fund for Union Staff was introduced and represents an expense of some R29,000
 Voucher Grants increase from R7,500 to R18,285

1984

Affiliation fees are about R4,700 higher at R36,775
 Attendance fees rise to R63,350 representing an increase of 65%
 Bonuses decrease by some R6,800 to R7,076, and no Honoraria fees were paid
 Conference and Organising fees amounted to R90,668 up some 33%
 Ex Gratia Grants rise from R6,610 to R17,763
 Insurance Premiums were paid to two companies on behalf of the membership and amounted to R743,812, an increase of R560,081 over 1983
 The maintenance of Office Equipment nearly doubled to R29,551
 Printing and Stationery increased just over R9,000 to R32,820
 Salaries moved from R166,679 to R219,634, an increase of 32%
 Voucher Grants more than doubled to R37,460
 There were no transfers to the 'Funeral Benefit' account but R287,228 was transferred to "Welfare" and "1962 Fund" (R191,485 and R95,743 respectively), an increase of 23%

1985

Transfers of R223,808, R111,904 and R560,260 were made to the "Welfare", "1962 Fund" and the (new) "Help-U-Fund" respectively
 Affiliation fees of R5,151 (I.T.G. and L.W.F.) R540 (Inst. of Industrial Relations) and R50,823 (T.U.C.S.A.) represented an increase of 54%
 Attendance fees increased some R20,000 to R83,733
 Bonuses were not paid but Honoraria represented R8,150 and had not been paid in 1984

Legal expenses increased from R2,400 to R10,468
 Salaries increased 49% to R327,098
 Pension Fund contributions increased some R27,000 to
 R66,945 (plus/minus 68%)
 Voucher grants stayed much the same (R37,037)
 Conference and Organising Expenses decrease some
 R35,000 to R54,843

1986

A total of R1,014,420 was transferred to 'Welfare',
 '1962 Fund' and the 'Help-U' Funds representing an
 increase of 13%
 The disbanding of T.U.C.S.A. results in affiliation
 fees dropping to R19,971, a decrease of some R36,500
 Attendance fees in turn decrease some R33,500 to
 R49,555
 Computer expenses go from zero to R12,000
 Conference and Organising Expenses increase by less
 than R4,000 to R58,652
 Insurance premiums (to Metropolitan Homes Trust)
 decrease nearly R100,000 to R467,571
 Legal expenses virtually double to R20,278
 Salaries decrease some R26,000 to R310,459
 Voucher grants amounted to R40,123

When reviewing the G.W.I.U. it was noted that
 transfers to various funds were made. These funds
 were established to provide various benefits to their
 membership. Table 7b below provides a summary of the
 transfers into the funds, the payments made and the
 accumulated funds.

TABLE 8b

Year	Welfare Grant			Funeral Benefits Account			1962 Fund		
	Acc. Funds	Income	Expend.	Acc. Funds	Income	Expend.	Acc. Funds	Income	Expend.
1971	7344.31	13861.72	8326.70	25418.60	31757.67	10345.00			
1972	N/A	18012.76	111837.44	74206.54	35644.27	12867.16			
1973	24552.68	13865.49	22625.55	96983.65	31597.85	17425.00			
1974 *	31921.59	14416.53	28298.54	111156.50	31953.90	27830.00			
1975	23282.41	14416.53	54339.74	115280.40	39541.27	43140.00			
1976	9500.40	(1)89050.79	53173.63	111681.67	41797.52	43120.00			
1977	44311.45	(2)54489.37	75731.78	110359.19	47274.48	50340.00			
1978	45627.19	(3)80959.49	85108.00	107293.67	51137.94	37590.00			
1979	50854.90	(4)86248.62	50900.00	120841.61	55923.86	57364.76			
1980	51995.52	71276.83	71000.00	128320.47	63554.73	58599.76			
1981	72372.35	87017.67	101700.00	140170.20	85786.26	68669.76			
1982	88390.02	106303.34	106730.00	167866.46	67720.39	62150.00	14510.97	14510.97	-
1983	92993.36	148122.62	156930.00	173436.85	(5)25647.95	65706.94	22729.69	22729.69	-
1984	134385.98	207453.73	119807.63	133377.86	(6) 6711.88	144371.70	37240.66	37240.66	-
1985	184909.71	306817.85	60297.62	(4281.96)	-	1800.00	93859.18	136466.91	96192.11
1986	371919.93	214547.82							

*1974 and 1973 Statements do not agree

- (1) Transfer of R72411.73 from Union's Accumulated Funds
- (2) Transfer of R37247.87 from Union's Accumulated Funds
- (3) Further transfer of R25712.23 from the Union's Accumulated Funds
- (4) Transfer of R21374.42 from the Union's Accumulated Funds
- (5) Interest only
- (6) Interest only

Table 8b reflects services provided by the union to its membership; the Welfare Account is interesting in that - up to 1982 - it paid out as grants most of what came into the Fund. In fact, the fund had to be supplemented by transfers of funds from the union's accumulated funds in the years 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979, a period of low economic activity.

The Funeral Benefit Fund also reflects the poor economic conditions of 1977/78/79 as in those years it is forced to draw upon reserves to supply benefits. This service/benefit is later taken over by a commercial organisation - Metropolitan Homes Trust.

7.2.3.2 Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association (N.C.M.A.)

TABLE 9

MEMBERSHIP DUES

1968-79	3c per week per employee
1980	1c per week per employee plus 10c per week per employee for Training Fund
1982(from 17/5)	Training Fund = 15c p.w. per employee
1982(from Dec)	N.C.M.A. membership = 2c
1983	N.C.M.A. membership = 3c
1984	No change
1985	Training Fund = 25c Membership = No change
1986	No change

No further financial detail on the N.C.M.A. was available.

7.2.4 Employment Form

The industrial council in Natal was formed in 1935 and "comprised approximately 2000 workers" (Garment Workers Industrial Union's Souvenir Brochure 1984) and the first agreement was published in 1936. By October 1986 total employment had grown to 37 833. Table 10 provides further detail.

White male and female employment drops around 10 times, coloured employment is effectively static as are the figures for asiatic males. Growth in the employment of asiatic females has increased some 2.7 times. In 1968 black female employees represented just more than 1% of total employment. By 1986 this figure was 21.8%, with 1980 and 1981 being the years reflecting the greater intake of female black labour.

Total employment from 1968 reflects a pattern of growth that until 1986 seems fairly resistant to economic downturns, thus the 1976/77/78 downturn is evidenced in a relatively small drop in employment of some 2 500 workers. Table 11 supports this proposal in that N.C.M.A. factories drop from 102 (Dec. 1976) to 88 (Dec. 1978). Non-N.C.M.A. factories conversely show an increase in numbers of factories and employment. Labour in Natal is largely (by 1986) female with about a 2:1 ratio between asian females and black females; asian males representing just less than 14% of total employment.

Table 12 was compiled from the sample drawn from the Natal provident fund records and indicates the changing male/female ratio as well as the rising percentage of the labour force taken up by female machinists. Likewise male machinists represent a declining proportion of the labour force. Machinists represent (generally) between 45 and 50 percent of the total labour force.

TABLE 10

"STATE OF INDUSTRY" - NATAL

Month Year	White		Coloureds		Asiatics		Black		Total		Grand Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
1.11.68	168	154	44	1975	6597	7631	642	185	7451	9945	17396
7.11.69	243	179	45	1872	7085	10179	736	192	8109	12422	20531
6.11.70	332	177	52	1999	7108	12205	883	340	8375	14721	23096
31.12.71	317	211	40	1911	6898	13932	1184	793	8439	16847	25286
31.12.72	339	190	31	1774	6709	14166	1229	843	8308	16973	25281
31.12.73	74	49	50	2044	6884	16566	1153	1114	8161	19773	27934
31.12.74	26	27	56	1739	6852	17887	1402	1643	8336	21296	29632
31.12.75	11	30	46	1854	6703	18588	1506	2047	8266	22519	30785
31.12.76	11	36	67	1822	6723	20066	1826	2814	8627	24738	33365
31.12.77	14	26	49	1532	6400	18694	1587	2521	8050	22773	30823
31.12.78	19	21	58	1566	6469	20005	1719	2649	8265	24241	32506
31.12.79	27	27	66	1750	6548	21280	1590	3500	8232	26556	34788
31.12.80	35	31	55	1755	6460	22691	822	5626	8490	29985	37475
31.12.81	27	27	67	1826	6485	24051	2083	10110	8629	36047	44676
31.12.82	31	30	67	1716	5887	23214	2008	10866	8013	35806	43819
31.12.83	27	35	67	1574	5746	22954	2060	9890	7915	34468	42383
31.12.84	19	19	59	1827	6066	24564	2381	13075	8525	39485	48010
31.12.85	(Total 14	38)	(Tot. 37	1785)	(Tot. 5220	27263)	(Tot. 2149	16495)	(Gr.Tot. 7418	45581)	45581
13.10.86	14	16	37	1432	20707	20707	8260	30415	30415	37833	37833

TABLE 11

N.C.M.A. MEMBERSHIP STATISTICS

Year	N.C.M.A.		Non-N.C.M.A.		Total Employment
	Factories	Empl.	Factories	Empl.	
Nov 68	75	13396	70	4000	17396
Nov 69	80	16330	76	4201	20531
Nov 70	83	17782	86	5288	23096
Dec 71	91	19129	90	6157	25286
Dec 72	88	18805	93	6476	25281
Dec 73	90	19675	113	8259	27934
Dec 74	89	21268	132	8364	29632
Dec 75	103	22898	122	7887	30785
Dec 76	102	24562	141	8803	33365
Dec 77	94	21352	142	9471	30823
Dec 78	88	22357	153	10149	32506
Dec 79	96	24119	162	10669	34788
Dec 80	115	26539	187	11936	37475
Dec 81	116	28411	246	16265	44676
Dec 82	141	27340	259	16479	43819
Dec 83	151	27037	259	15346	42383
Dec 84	166	31345	275	16665	48010
Dec 85	187	29703	270	15878	45581
Oct 86	132	21455	277	16378	37833

TABLE 12

MACHINISTS AS A % OF THE LABOUR FORCE

Year	Female		Male		Female Machinists		Male Machinists		Total sample	Machinists as % of total Sample
	Act. %	Act. %	Act. % of Total	Act. % of Total	Act. % of Total	Act. % of Total				
1968	42	51	40	49	25	30	13	16	82	46.3
1969	53	57	40	43	31	33	12	13	93	46.2
1970	64	60	42	40	33	31	12	11	106	42.5
1971	72	62	45	38	39	33	16	14	117	47.0
1972	79	66	41	34	35	29	11	9	120	38.3
1973	78	63	46	37	37	30	12	10	124	39.5
1974	88	67	44	33	51	39	15	11	132	50.0
1975	95	69	43	31	49	36	13	9	138	45.6
1976	103	68	49	32	58	38	16	11	152	48.7
1977	86	66	45	34	55	42	13	10	131	51.9
1978	92	68	44	32	56	41	12	9	136	50.0
1979	100	65	54	35	62	40	14	9	154	49.4
1980	114	70	48	30	66	41	11	7	162	47.5
1981	136	76	43	24	70	39	9	5	179	44.1
1982	145	81	33	19	78	44	7	4	178	47.8
1983	134	80	33	20	75	45	8	5	167	49.7
1984	154	80	38	20	82	43	7	4	192	46.4
1985	126	79	34	21	70	44	5	3	160	46.9
1986	109	80	27	20	59	43	6	4	136	47.8

Table 13 overpage provides an age distribution over the review period which suggests a number of features of employment in the Natal industry:

- (1) The pattern of employment for those who are less than 20 years of age can be seen as a reflection of economic cycles, with employment of (young) "learners" at a low in 1977 and 1986. The increase reflected in 1983 can be interpreted as following the more buoyant economic conditions of 1980/81/82.
- (2) The age group '20-30' declines from a high of 45.5% of the labour force in 1974 to a low of 32.1% in 1986. This together with the age group '30-40' remaining a relatively static proportion of the labour force and the increasing proportion of 40-50 year olds (and over 50's) indicates continuing membership of the industry and an ageing of the work force.
- (3) In 1968 nearly 62% of the labour force was less than 30 years old. By 1986 that figure was just less than 38%. In 1968 33.3% were older than 40, by 1986, 60.6% were older than 40.
- (4) The age distribution for males is reasonably spread across all age groups and presents much the same distribution over time. With the economic downturn of 1986 presenting a slightly different distribution.
- (5) With an ageing but nevertheless expanding level of employment in the industry comes the implication that an increasing number of (young) entrants must stay in the industry.

TABLE 13

NATAL AGE PATTERNFEMALE

Year	Unknown Age	<20	%	20- <30	%	30- <40	%	40- <50	%	>50	%	Total Sample
1968	2	9	21.4	17	40.5	10	23.8	4	9.5	0	-	42
1971	3	12	16.7	27	37.5	21	29.2	9	12.5	0	-	72
1974	2	12	13.6	40	45.5	21	23.9	11	12.5	2	2.2	88
1977	1	8	9.3	38	44.2	25	29.1	8	9.3	6	7.0	86
1980	2	11	9.6	39	34.2	37	32.5	20	17.5	5	4.4	114
1983	2	15	11.2	44	32.8	40	29.9	24	17.9	9	6.7	134
1986	2	6	5.5	35	32.1	29	26.6	28	25.7	9	8.3	109

MALE

Year	Unknown Age	<20	%	20- <30	%	30- <40	%	40- <50	%	>50	%	Total
1968	-	5	12.5	19	47.5	8	20.0	6	15.0	2	5.0	40
1971	1	5	11.1	20	44.4	12	26.7	4	8.9	3	6.7	45
1974	1	4	9.1	16	36.4	12	27.3	8	18.2	3	6.8	44
1977	1	5	11.1	15	33.3	10	22.2	11	24.4	3	6.7	45
1980	1	8	16.7	18	37.5	9	18.8	9	18.8	3	6.3	48
1983	1	4	12.1	9	27.3	10	30.3	6	18.2	3	9.1	33
1986	1	1	3.7	10	37.0	7	25.9	4	14.8	4	14.8	27

Table 14 over page provides a longitudinal analysis of the 'entrance patterns'. The following can be noted

- The proportion of new entrants has declined substantially
- With the exception of 1986, the proportion with '2' entrances is relatively stable at between 20-25%
- The proportion of the sample with '3' entrances has increased substantially
- The proportion of '4' and '5' entrances is reasonably stable
- As is the '>5' entrance category with the exception of 1983 and 1986 which suggests a rising trend

TABLE 14

INDUSTRY ENTRANCE PATTERNS

Year	No. of Entrances												Sample Total
	1	%	2	%	3	%	4	%	5	%	>5	%	
1968	32	39.0	19	23.2	8	9.8	5	6.1	4	4.9	14	17.1	82
1971	43	36.8	24	20.5	14	12.0	8	6.8	11	9.4	17	14.5	117
1974	42	31.8	33	25.0	18	13.6	11	8.3	9	6.8	19	14.4	132
1977	39	29.8	29	22.1	21	16.0	13	9.9	9	6.9	20	15.3	131
1980	47	29.0	33	20.3	24	14.8	16	9.9	14	8.6	28	17.3	162
1983	33	19.8	43	25.7	31	18.6	11	6.6	14	8.4	35	21.0	167
1986	25	18.4	21	15.4	27	19.9	14	10.3	8	5.9	41	30.1	136

Taken in conjunction with the age patterns reflected previously in Table 13, it can (broadly) be said that the labour pool is aging and the work force shows an (increasing) tendency to move in and out of the industry. The industry also seems unable (or unwilling) to attract younger workers into the industry.

7.2.5 Wage Form

As with the other geographical areas, the Natal industry negotiated wages (and other benefits) regularly over the review period. As with the other regions, the agreements after 1981 reflect a 'de-sexing' of jobs and there are jobs added and deleted from the agreement, thus the job title of "general worker" only appears in 1984 - the deletions are all a result of job de-sexing.

Tables 15a and 15b provide

- (a) A review of the usage of job titles.
- (b) A record of changes in hierarchical rankings enjoyed by each job title. A comparison of District I and II is provided as Table 16.
- (c) Changes (nominal) to the minimum wages as negotiated and as applied on the last day of December for the years stated.

TABLE 15a
 Natal Minimum Wages - District One
 (Hierarchy arranged)

JOB TITLE	1968	1972	1975	1978	1981	1984	1986
1 Head Cutter	1 30.00	1 36.00	7 49.95	1 61.20	1 82.60	7 137.50	7 174.00
2 Assistant Head Cutter	7 30.00	7 36.00	26 49.95	7 61.20	7 82.60	28 137.50	28 174.00
3 Cutter & Trimmer	26 30.00	26 36.00	1 49.94	26 61.20	26 82.60	1 126.50	1 160.00
4 Cutter First Grade (male & female)	27 25.00	27 30.00	27 41.85	27 51.25	27 69.20	14 100.00	14 126.50
5 Cutter Second Grade & Male Trimmer	2 23.00	2 27.60	2 38.65	2 47.35	2 63.95	2 99.00	2 125.00
6 Cutter Second Grade & Female Trimmer	14 21.65	14 26.00	14 36.45	14 44.65	14 60.30	34 95.00	34 120.00
7 Mechanics	29 20.20	29 24.25	29 34.10	29 41.75	29 56.35	13 80.00	13 101.00
8 Male Employees - all others	13 18.65	13 22.40	13 31.60	13 38.70	13 52.25	31 77.00	31 97.00
9 Female - shapers & basters	32 18.00	32 21.60	32 30.55	32 37.40	32 50.50	3 70.00	3 88.00
10 Female - all others	33 16.50	33 19.80	33 28.10	33 34.40	33 46.45	12 65.00	12 82.00
11 Driver Up to 1000 lbs	3 15.00	3 18.00	3 25.65	3 31.40	3 42.40	11 55.00	11 69.50
12 Driver From 1000 to 6000 lbs	17 15.00	17 18.00	17 25.65	17 31.40	17 42.40	19 55.00	19 74.50
13 Driver From 6000 to 10,000 lbs	12 13.45	12 16.15	12 23.15	12 28.35	12 38.25	21 45.00	21 61.00
14 Driver > 10,000 lbs	30 12.50	30 15.00	30 21.60	30 26.45	30 35.70	20 45.00	20 61.00
15 Driver Steam Wagon	11 11.45	11 13.75	11 19.95	11 24.45	11 33.00	24 45.00	24 61.00
16 Layer up	18 11.45	18 13.75	18 19.95	18 24.45	18 33.00		
17 Grade I Employee Male	20 9.25	20 11.10	20 16.35	20 20.05	21 27.05		
18 Grade I Employee, Female	25 9.25	25 11.10	25 16.35	25 20.05	20 27.05		
19 Grade I Employee	24 8.25	24 9.90	24 14.75	24 18.05	24 27.05		
20 Grade II Employee, Male & Female							
21 General Worker							
22 Boiler Attendant							
23 Belt Man							
24 Watchman							
25 Labourer							
26 Traveller Male							
27 Traveller Female							
28 Traveller							
29 Office/Clerical Employees - male							
30 Office/Clerical Employees - female							
31 Clerical Employee							
32 Foreman							
33 Forewoman							
34 Foreperson							

TABLE 16
 Natal Minimum Wage (Hicarc. Arranged)

JOB TITLE	A			B			C			D			E			F
	31/12/68			31/12/72			31/12/75			31/12/78			31/12/81			31/12/86
	Dist 1	Dist 2	% Inc	Dist 1	Dist 2	% Inc	Dist 1	Dist 2	% Inc	Dist 1	Dist 2	% Inc	Dist 1	Dist 2	% Inc	Dist 1
1 Head Outfitter	30.00	27.00	11.12	36.00	32.40	11.12	49.94	44.95	11.12	61.20	55.05	11.22	82.60	76.40	8.12	160.00
2 Assistant Head Outfitter	23.00	20.70	11.12	27.60	24.85	11.12	38.65	34.80	11.12	47.35	42.65	11.02	63.95	59.15	8.12	125.00
3 Outfitter & Trimmer	15.00	13.50	11.12	18.00	16.20	11.12	25.65	23.10	11.02	31.40	28.30	11.02	42.40	39.25	8.02	88.00
4 Outfitter First Grade (male & female)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
5 Outfitter Second Grade & Male Trimmer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
6 Outfitter Second Grade & Female Trimmer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
7 Mechanics	30.00	27.00	11.12	36.00	32.40	11.12	49.95	44.95	11.12	61.20	55.05	11.22	82.60	76.45	8.02	174.00
8 Male Employees - all others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
9 Female - sheppers & basters	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
10 Female - all others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
11 Driver Up to 1000 lbs	11.45	10.31	11.12	13.75	12.35	11.32	19.95	17.95	11.12	24.45	22.00	11.12	33.00	30.55	8.02	69.50
12 Driver From 1000 to 6000 lbs	13.45	12.11	11.12	16.15	14.55	11.02	23.15	20.85	11.02	28.35	25.55	11.02	38.25	35.40	8.12	82.00
13 Driver From 6000 to 10,000 lbs	18.65	16.79	11.12	22.40	20.15	11.22	31.60	28.45	11.12	38.70	34.85	11.02	52.25	48.35	8.12	101.00
14 Driver > 10,000 lbs	21.65	19.49	11.12	26.00	23.40	11.12	36.45	32.80	11.12	44.65	40.20	11.12	60.30	55.80	8.12	126.00
15 Driver Steam Wagon	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
16 Layer up	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
17 Grade I Employee Male	15.00	13.50	11.12	18.00	16.20	11.12	25.65	23.10	11.02	31.40	28.30	11.02	42.40	39.20	8.22	74.50
18 Grade I Employee, Female	11.45	10.30	11.22	13.75	12.35	11.32	19.95	17.95	11.12	24.45	22.00	11.12	33.00	30.55	8.02	61.00
19 Grade I Employee, Male & Female	9.25	8.33	11.02	11.10	10.00	11.02	16.35	14.75	10.82	20.05	18.05	11.12	27.05	25.05	8.02	61.00
20 General Worker	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
21 Boiler Attendant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
22 Boiler Man	8.25	7.45	10.72	9.90	8.95	10.62	14.75	13.30	10.92	18.05	16.30	10.72	27.05	25.05	8.02	61.00
24 Watchman	9.25	8.33	11.02	11.10	10.00	11.02	16.35	14.75	10.82	20.05	18.05	11.12	27.05	25.05	8.02	61.00
25 Labourer	30.00	30.00	0.02	36.00	36.00	0.02	49.95	49.95	0.02	61.20	61.20	0.02	82.60	76.40	8.12	174.00
26 Traveller Male	25.00	25.00	0.02	30.00	30.00	0.02	41.85	41.85	0.02	51.25	51.25	0.02	69.20	64.00	8.12	174.00
27 Traveller Female	20.20	20.20	0.02	24.25	24.25	0.02	34.10	34.10	0.02	41.75	41.75	0.02	56.35	52.15	8.12	174.00
29 Office/Clerical Employees - male	12.50	12.50	0.02	15.00	15.00	0.02	21.60	21.60	0.02	26.45	26.45	0.02	35.70	33.05	8.02	97.00
30 Office/Clerical Employees - female	18.00	16.20	11.12	21.60	19.45	11.12	30.55	27.50	11.12	37.40	33.70	11.02	50.50	46.70	8.12	97.00
31 Clerical Employee	16.50	14.85	11.12	19.80	17.80	11.22	28.10	25.30	11.12	34.40	31.00	11.02	46.45	43.00	8.02	120
32 Foreman																
33 Forewoman																
34 Foreperson																

From 1968 to 1981 the 'Head cutter', 'Mechanic' and 'Male Traveller' have the highest wage. This changes by 1984 with the 'Head Cutter' now the 2nd highest minimum wage. Likewise a 'Driver' (>10,000 lbs.) reflected the 4th highest wage until 1981, and by 1984 had moved up the rankings to third highest. This was due to the de-sexing of the 'Travellers' job title.

The de-sexing of 'Clerical Employee' is unlike that of other jobs that were de-sexed. It will be noted that the Male Clerical staff had a large differential compared to their female counterpart and that they (male) had a higher minimum wage to a 'Driver' (6,000 to 10,000 lbs.), but that after de-sexing that relationship changes.

Similarly, the 'Foreman/woman' had minimum wages that were less than that of a 'Driver' (6,000 to 10,000 lbs) from 1968 to 1981. By 1984 that relationship had changed.

The following positions have been selected to assess how minimum wages have changed in relation to the Consumer Price Index.

TABLE 17

	(Actual) 1968 Wage	(Actual) 1986 Wage	1986 (Real)	+(-)
Headcutter	30.00	160.00	207.60	(47.60)
Mechanic	30.00	174.00	207.60	(33.60)
Driver(1000-6000lbs)	13.45	82.00	93.07	(11.07)
6,000-10,000	18.65	101.00	129.06	(28.06)
>10,000 lbs	21.65	126.00	149.82	(23.82)
Grade I (Female)	11.45	74.50	79.23	(4.73)
Grade I (Male)	15.00	74.50	103.80	(29.30)
Grade II Employee	9.25	61.00	64.01	(3.01)
Traveller Male	30.00	174.00	207.60	(33.60)
Female	25.00	174.00	173.00	(1.00)
Foreman	18.00	120.00	124.56	(4.56)
Forewoman	16.50	120.00	114.18	5.82


The above shows that minimum wages in the Natal industry have not (with the exception of 'Forewoman') kept pace with inflation.

Machinists in Natal were referred to as "Grade 1 Male" or "Grade 1 Female" employees. The de-sexing of this job category led to a single job title of "Grade 1 Employee". It can be seen from Table 17 above that the bulk of the workforce (i.e. female machinists) have not kept up with the rate of inflation.

The Natal region also reflects a geographical wage distinction which is finally done away with in 1982. Over the review period the wage differential between District I and II starts at around 11% and decreases to about 8% at the end of 1981.


The following graphs depict the wage curves over time for both districts I and II and indicate that the overall shape of the curve stays (much) the same although there might be changes in the rank order of particular jobs.

Graph 2 - Natal District 2
(Minimum wages)



This graph shows comparison of the gazetted rates for Natal Dist 2 1968-81. For ABCDE See Table 15b.

Graph 1 - Natal District 1 (Minimum wages)



This graph shows comparison of the gazetted rates for Natal Dist 1 1972-86. For ABCDEFG See Table 15a

7.3 PART B - INTERPRETIVE SCHEME

The Negotiations and their Meaning Content

The Natal negotiations are characterised by many short meetings - short in the sense of the number of lines to the minutes of the negotiations. In addition, the brevity of the minutes means that there are fewer quotes (than Tvl. and Cape) to substantiate argument identifying the constructs utilised by the parties to the negotiations.

This region also reflects different events to the Cape and Tvl. regions, thus after the amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 which allowed for multi-racial unions the Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) finds itself under attack from a 'new' union and looks to employers (and the industrial council) to support it against the Textile Workers Union.

In addition, Natal wage structures have two districts which are treated differently (in terms of wages) in the early part of the review period. Like the Transvaal, the Natal employers are also very aware of competition from factories covered by a wage determination or in 'Homelands', both of which have lower wage structures than the Natal industrial council.

The constructs utilised in the negotiations are nevertheless (particularly) similar to those of the Cape. Like the Cape region, the Natal region indicates concerns by employers of their ability to compete, and the union is concerned with the effect of what are seen to be inadequate compensation levels for their membership. Again there is, dominantly, the acceptance of the need to grow the industry, or at very least maintain employment levels. The linkage between growth (especially employment), remuneration levels and competitive ability then represents (as in the Cape region) a core characteristic of the Natal region.

Support for this contention starts with the 1974 negotiations as no minutes for negotiations prior to 1974 could be found.

7.3.1 1974 NEGOTIATIONSMEETING NO. 1 - 13TH FEBRUARY 1974 - 187 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
41/43	"Employers found it difficult to work and control wages on a Consumer Price Index which could lead to uncertainty in their pricing".
51/54	"Employers could not agree to a reduction in the hours of work. Employers felt that if the Garment Workers Industrial Union wished to assist the employer in productivity then a reduction of working hours was definitely unacceptable (sic)".

UNION

No quotes. The meeting is recorded to indicate employers dealing point by point with the Union proposals and then presenting their counter proposals, therefore little in the way of construct evidence.

MEETING NO. 2 - 28TH FEBRUARY 1974 - 113 LINESEMPLOYERS

No quotes. The minutes record employers wanting to introduce an attendance bonus to minimise absenteeism and which would be (to them) a "major move" towards increased productivity. In response to the Union proposal that males and females received equal pay if in the same job category, employers argue that the higher rate of female absenteeism was the reason for wage scale differentiation.

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
62/63	"Female employees now asked for their scale also to be the same as for male employees".

MEETING NO. 3 - 19TH MARCH 1974 - 68 LINES

Proposals are presented by the N.C.M.A., the Union makes additional proposals (increased days leave and equal pay scales for male and female workers), which are rejected by employers. A Department of Labour representative addresses the Council on what the Department feels "Bantu labourers" should be paid, and is thanked by the chairman for his "guidance". Both parties are to consider the others proposals. No construct supporting quotations.

MEETING NO. 4 - 4TH APRIL 1974 - 80 LINES

No construct supporting evidence. The meeting records the Union rejecting the employers wage offer and proposing a different percentage increase which after adjourning, the employers accept. The union wants 15 paid days leave a year which is rejected by employers.

At a further meeting on 24th April 1974 the Agreement is formally detailed and agreed, both parties having received a mandate to do so by their members.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

No documentation appropriate to these negotiations could be found.

Union

The minutes of a Shop Steward meeting dated 24/9/1973 record the stewards being advised of the start of negotiations and also "requesting that members submit their suggestions to the Secretary". The same meeting records the comments of two shop stewards,

- 1) asks for an immediate increase "as it would be at least 7 months before the New Agreement is published".
- 2) a second wants, "not less than R25.00 for Grade 1, Males and Females".

At a Shop Steward meeting on the 26/3/74 debate is recorded on what is seen as a lack of protest from the Trade Union Council of S.A. (TUCSA) after the detention of 4 Unionists. A suggestion of disaffiliation is discussed and TUCSA officials argue that it (T.U.C.S.A.) is made up of 67 affiliated unions and that it must "go with majority decisions". An executive committee proposal to stay in TUCSA is then "unanimously carried".

The same meeting records discussion of the percentage increase to be settled on with employers (i.e. proposals at this stage). Two proposals are voted on, the amendment to the Executive proposal loses and the counting is disputed, the minutes record, "At this stage the meeting became extremely unruly with the majority of shop stewards and stewardesses walking out of the meeting".

The minutes of the industrial council of 10/12/74 record a union official reporting "certain agitation against the Garment Workers Industrial Union", he believed that "certain clergymen and politically motivated persons were visiting factories and addressing garment workers with the objective of undermining the G.W.I.U., operating unregistered benefit funds and to foster ideas regarding the G.W.I.U(s) restricted membership etc. ...". The union then asks employers to "assist by preventing such agitators entering their factories to address employees". The employers agree to a "circular letter be sent to all employers regarding this allegation and request that they report any incidents" to the secretary of the G.W.I.U.

7.3.2 1975 - EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS

In the minutes of the industrial council (d.d. 3/4/75) the union requests employers to bring forward the increase in wages due on 24/11/75 as "employees were finding hardships due to the rise in the cost of living". The N.C.M.A. agree to "consider the matter".

In the minutes of 29/5/75 the union refers to a council circular quoting the Prime Minister's appeal for wage restraint (for the whole economy) and suggests that inflation is the fault of Government which "had not taken adequate steps to curtail it". The union still wanted the November increase brought forward. The N.C.M.A. however "regretted it was unable to accede to the G.W.I.U's request" as they too were experiencing inflation related problems. Orders were down, material prices up and some factories had put "workers on short-time".

7.3.3 1976 EXTRA-ORDINARY NEGOTIATIONS

A request from the Union is recorded in the council minutes of 8/7/76 for the N.C.M.A. to "consider an allowance of one Rand or more ... until such time as a new Agreement was negotiated", this because "employees were feeling the pinch of ever increasing costs".

The minutes of 17/8/76 record the N.C.M.A's rejection of the request, "Assoc. could not accede to the request to give a C.O.L. allowance ... due to conditions pertaining to the industry at present which was aggravated by increasing absenteeism".

In the minutes of the N.C.M.A's annual general meeting of 1976 a letter from the executive director of the Natal Chamber of Industries makes comparisons of wages as covered by the 'Wage Determination 345 Certain Areas' and those of the Natal Industrial Council. Table 1 below presents these comparisons. To read the table the following must be born in mind,

- (1) The industrial council (I.C.) covers employers and employees in Durban (with a minor exclusion), Inanda, Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg and Lower Tugela.
- (2) The Wage Determination (W.D.) covers the rest of Natal.
- (3) The I.C. is made up of two districts.
 District I = Durban, Pinetown and Inanda.
 District II = Pietermaritzburg and Lower Tugela.

TABLE 18

Year	GRADE I - MALE			GRADE II - MALE			LABOURER - MALE		
	I.C.	W.D.	WDx100	I.C.	W.D.	WDx100	I.C.	W.D.	WDx100
1972	17.10	11.92	70%	10.55	7.26	69%	10.55	6.16	58%
1975	24.38	12.89	64%	15.55	7.92	51%	15.55	6.71	43%
	GRADE I - FEMALE			GRADE II - FEMALE			LABOURER - FEMALE		
1972	13.05	9.87	76%	10.55	7.26	69%	10.55	4.92	47%
1975	18.95	10.74	57%	15.55	7.92	51%	15.55	5.36	34%

The following quotations have been extracted from the letter.

- (1) "It will be seen that the differential between rates paid to Grade I and Grade II to employees in terms of the W.D. and I.C. respectively, which was of the order of 67/76% has declined to 51/57% by 1975. In fact during this period the C.P.I. had risen by 39.3% but minimum wages in terms of the W.D. had advanced by no more than 9%. Minimum wages in terms of the I.C. on the other hand increased by 42-47%".
- (2) "The Board [Wage Board] will surely appreciate the very major change being wrought in the competitive position of the two sectors ... and the Assoc. should ... appeal to the Board to effect a substantial adjustment in the new Wage Determination ...".

In the minutes of the executive committee (Exco) of the N.C.M.A. (d.d.3/6/76) debate on the forthcoming sitting of the Wage Board and the following quotes appertain,

- (1) "Mr. ... said that one had to concede the productivity of Africans in the outlying areas was lower. The differential in wages should be 20% and this is what the Assoc. should press for".
- (2) "Mr. ... observed that no-one paid anything like the wages laid down in the Determination. Everyone paid far in excess".
- (3) "The Chairman replied that one factory paid exactly the wages laid down".

The N.C.M.A. then agrees to make the following points to the Wage Board:

- (1) Five area differentials were not necessary, two would suffice.
- (2) The wage determination should not be more than 20% less than wages paid under the I.C. agreement.
- (3) Should the wage board reject the 'linkage' suggested in the 2nd point, the board would then be urged to review wages every 12 months for at least the next 3 years.

7.3.4 1977 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 15TH MARCH 1977 - 61 LINES

No quotations, but lines 39 to 52 read,

"Discussion took place on the following matters

- (1) N.C.M.A. suggest Union reconsider its proposals
- (2) G.W.I.U. request N.C.M.A. to present counter proposals
- (3) "Differential wages for male and female employees"
- (4) "Absenteeism. The effect of production, costing and the part it plays in these negotiations. Also what steps to be taken to combat it"
- (5) "Increase in the Consumer Price Index since May 1974 (35.4%)"
- (6) "Wage rates in other provinces"

MEETING NO. 2 - 17TH MARCH 1977 - 64 LINES

No quotations, merely a listing of the different parties proposals which revolve around wages, paid holidays and longer breaks.

MEETING NO. 3 - 14TH APRIL 1977 - 104 LINES

The minutes of the meeting state that the "following are some of the points which were reiterated and made by the parties". These points are presented below as they were recorded by the secretary of the I.C. but have been put under headings to identify the party making such points:

- (a) EMPLOYERS
- (i) "offer of increase was already beyond the means of employers"
- (ii) "recent budget had made economic position even more serious"
- (iii) "other industries had granted increases of less than 10%"
- (iv) "time had come to perhaps write in clause in Agreement whereby overtime should only be paid after an employee had completed his 42.5 hours a week"
- (v) "The 35% increase granted at last negotiations was because of the good economic climate prevailing at the time, but today's conditions are perhaps the worst South Africa has ever faced"
- (vi) "Employers have a moral obligation to workers to keep factories going to help workers have employment"
- (vii) "Higher wages will close many factories"
- (viii) "Manufacturers were 'running scared' of the future of the industry"
- (ix) "orders are being cancelled"
- (x) "any profits made at present or in the past are necessary to tie over a firm under present conditions and are also to protect the worker in his employment"

- (xi) "Lower rates of pay have always been paid in Natal as there is no market in Natal. Competition is strong from other provinces"
- (xii) "Some factories have stopped overtime completely"
- (xiii) "Short time is today most common"

(b) UNION

- (i) "Workers cannot live on present wages due to cost of living".
- (ii) "No Asiatic male can live and keep a family on R100 per month".
- (iii) "Only a living wage is asked for to cover food, transport and shelter".
- (iv) "There is no unemployment of highly skilled workers".
- (v) "Contented workers bring good production".
- (vi) "C.O.L. index had risen 49 points since last wage increase".
- (vii) "There was no evidence of factories closing down. In fact new factories were being registered".
- (viii) "A 30% increase would be considered even though such an increase was still not sufficient to satisfy the workers. However, representatives would try and persuade workers to accept any such offer from N.C.M.A."
- (ix) "Lower paid employees needed higher percentage wage increases to those earning good salaries".
- (x) "A shorter period of an Agreement".
- (xi) "There is no guarantee that there will be no reduction in staff and short time in the future".
- (xii) "It was not the wish of the Union to call mass general meetings of the workers to discuss these wage negotiations. It was considered preferable to come to a satisfactory conclusion through a smaller body such as shop stewards who represented the workers".

BANTU REGIONAL COMMITTEE FOR BANTU LABOUR REPRESENTATIVES

- (i) "Committees not satisfied with increase offered by N.C.M.A."
- (ii) "If absenteeism was major problem facing employers then perhaps the introduction of 'Attendance Bonuses' might be the answer".
- (iii) "Factories were closing and there is more and more unemployment".

DEPT. OF LABOUR REPRESENTATIVES

- (i) "A minimum wage of at least R18 per week for Labourers and Watchmen".
- (ii) "Learner period to be done away with and all labourers and watchmen over 18 years of age be paid basic wage of at least R18 per week".

MEETING NO. 4 - 10TH MAY 1977 - 77 LINES

No quotation.

MEETING NO. 5 - 27TH MAY 1977 - 59 LINES

The minutes record agreement on substantive issues "after lengthy discussion" but does not provide any description of such 'discussion' and therefore construct related quotations are not in evidence.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

At the Exco meeting dated 18/1/77 the Union's proposals are discussed essentially on an accept/reject basis. Three quotations are, however, appropriate

- (1) "Mr. ... said that the proposals under this head were most unreasonable as they did not come close to what was possible. For Grade I employees they were asking for R35 p.week. The Tvl. Union was asking for only R27.50 p.week. Should employers not just press for arbitration".

- (2) "Mr. ... said that employers should not be overawed by the proposals. The G.W.I.U. had a Provident Fund and they would not wish to jeopardise this through a breakdown in negotiations".
- (3) "Mr. ... said that the economic position was in favour of the employer party and that this should be played up".

In the annual report of the N.C.M.A's executive committee (d.d. 22/8/77) the chairman expresses the hope that following the N.C.M.A's submission to the industrial tribunal which met in Durban on the 21st of June, that job reservation determinations protecting white and coloured workers will be withdrawn.

The chairman also reports on poor economic conditions, suggests that employers have a responsibility to improve race relations and is critical of 'race' legislation in S.A. The chairman says,

"The law of separation of race groups within our factories is in microcosm a perpetuation and extension of most of our political problems and irritations, to say nothing of the cost of maintaining such facilities".

The Exco minutes of 19/9/77 report,

- (i) Differential rates for district II to be repealed.
- (ii) A proposal to include Umbumbulu, Umzinto and Port Shepstone in the scope of the agreement and that the "assistance of the Trade Union would be sought in the recruitment of employers in these areas".

Union

At a shop steward/ess meeting on the 22nd of March, 1977, discussion revolves around the percentage increase the negotiation committee should aim for. It is noted that the "Secretary urged shop stewards to have confidence in the Negotiation Committee and to give them full powers to negotiate. This was unanimously agreed to".

A special meeting of shop stewards/esses was called on the 5th May 1977 "to report on the outcome of our negotiations and the following statements are recorded in the minutes,

- (i) "the economic position in our country is so bad that we have to accept what the employers offer us".
- (ii) "He stated that members are aware of the situation in our country but our industry can boom at any time".

The union's annual report of 1976/77 makes further reference to the 1977 negotiations. In the president's address he notes

- (i) "the employers were very stubborn", and
- (ii) "we managed to convince them that our members need a living wage to cope with the ever increasing cost of living".
- (iii) "I would like to urge members to try and save as much as possible as our country is heading for a severe crisis. We must all live within our means".

7.3.5 1979 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 30TH AUGUST 1979 - 148 LINES

EMPLOYERS

Line Quote

- 36/37 "It was inevitable that wages had to be increased but they had to be realistic".
- 38/39 "For the past 3 years the manufacturers had absorbed rising costs of materials and production etc. but could not do so any longer".
- 55/56 "In return for better wages the employer expected better productivity and less absenteeism".

UNIONLine Quote

- 44/45 "... members were looking forward to a living wage".
- 46/47 "He asked for fair and reasonable consideration".
- 48/51 "He gave examples of employees difficulties due to increased transport costs and the general cost of living. He saw a bright future for the clothing industry as there was at present no unemployment and every month new factories were opening".
- 57/60 "... said that due to spiralling cost increases, the workers had suffered a monetary loss. He gave statistics and figures of subsistence living levels for Indian and Coloured people which were far higher than the income of Garment Workers".
- 70/2 "There was no attraction to the school leaver to join the Clothing Industry with its present wage rates".

In addition this meeting records input from the Durban Regional Black Labour Committee which lists its requests/demands for black workers in the industry and uses similar cost of living arguments to support their proposals.

MEETING NO. 2 - 4TH OCTOBER 1979 - 104 LINES

No quotations.

MEETING NO. 3 - 16TH OCTOBER 1979 - 153 LINES

No quotations.

The minutes record, "After lengthy discussions and adjournments for N.C.M.A. negotiations to consider matters the following agreements and rejections of the Proposals put forward in the G.W.I.U. Memorandum were made". A list of substantive issues then follows.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

At the annual general meeting of 27/9/79 the chairman makes the following statements,

- (1) "As you know, we are in the throes of a wage negotiation at present and I believe there is a real need for an immediate and fair increase on current wages and further increments to follow in June and again in January 1981. Continuing increases are inevitable and indeed justifiable. Let us gear ourselves to this reality and stop 'skrimping and scraping' and let us be more realistic in our pricing".
- (2) "Wage earners have to earn a 'living' and it is our responsibility to see that they earn it and indeed deserve it for honest, hard endeavour, by our providing better opportunities in our industry".

At a special general meeting (d.d. 27/9/79) a mandate was sought from N.C.M.A. members for the wage negotiations. It is recorded that one of those present "... said what the T.U. was suggesting was irresponsible. Natal should not go higher than the Cape and Transvaal".

After further discussion the chairman summarises, and the minutes record "The Chairman said that the Committee would then work on a maximum mandate of 20% in January possibly structured as 15% + 5% bonus. If the Committee were pushed he felt that they might have to accept 20%, with a second year increase of 10% plus bonus. There was no doubt that the workers were battling with heavy costs. AGREED".

Union

There are no records which reflect debate about the 1979 negotiations. However, at a 'Special Shop Steward/ess Meeting' on 21/1/79, the following comments are made in introducing "our Honourable Brother Gibson of the I.T.G. and L.W.F" (International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation)

Chairman of G.W.I.U.

"He added that we would like the support of the outside world as we are not politicians but workers. He added further that changes are coming and we must be ready for them".

Cape Union Secretary

"we own our own building and we are earning good wages".

and lastly

"He added that we must send delegates when there are conference[s] to convince other countries of what is really going on in S.A.". "Mrs. ..., Secretary of our Parallel Union, welcomed Mr. Gibson, adding that she is pleased that he has come to see for himself the true situation that exists in our country. Mrs. ... thanked the G.W.I.U. for assisting in organising the black workers, and expressed the hope that they will be able to join our Union in the near future".

7.3.6 THE NATIONAL UNION OF TEXTILE WORKERS (N.U.T.W.) AND THE PARTIES TO THE NATAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL

The Natal region reflects the emergence of a competing union after the amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, and as such reflects a different set of events to the Cape and Transvaal regions. The events surrounding this aspect of the Natal region are presented below as support not only of constructs utilised by the parties, but also to support such structuration concepts of 'regionalization' and 'monitoring'. The relationship to the theoretical model will be focussed on more fully later in this section.

THE N.U.T.W. AND THE PARTIES1980UNION

At a shop steward/ess meeting on 7/12/80 the secretary comments on new organisations, "which are suddenly taking a keen interest in the workers".

The chairman advises "workers must be very careful about which organisation they join as a lot of these organisations have ulterior motives, i.e. political, the workers' money etc."

The secretary of the union, furthermore, advises the meeting that the N.U.T.W. has applied to "cover textile and knitted clothing, although most of them are aware that we have to always take care of clothing workers". "... we have lodged an objection to the registration of this Union in respect of their application for knitted clothing".

EMPLOYERS

No reference to the N.U.T.W. was found in employer minutes for the year 1980.

1981

UNION

At a shop steward/ess meeting on the 28/6/81, the chairman advises that the union's objection to the registration of the N.U.T.W. is "ongoing". In addition it is announced that '4 African members will be elected' (to the Executive) as the Registrar (i.e. State authority) had accepted a change in the union's constitution and thus "we are now a mixed Union".

At a later (4/10/81) shop steward/ess meeting the chairman said, "He added that members must not listen to outside organisations but stand firm and show their solidarity to their organisation. He added that politics must not be embodied in the trade union movement and discrimination on race, colour or sex have been removed from the Act, and this is welcomed".

EMPLOYERS

In the chairman's report of the annual general meeting (10/8/81) it is suggested that the relationship of the N.C.M.A. with the G.W.I.U. is a long and valued relationship which should be maintained, "To this end the G.W.I.U. has been with us a long time; we have enjoyed amicable associations and it would be impossible to negotiate with more than one official body. It is for this reason therefore that that (sic) no other approaches from other organisations should be encouraged by members".

1982

Minutes for both Employers and Union record no debate about the N.U.T.W.

1983

UNION

At a shop steward/ess meeting (2/10/83) there is a debate about 'rival' unions and the chairman is recorded as, "He appealed to shop steward/esses to tell members not to join the rival union, nor go to them with problems as the rival unions are trying very hard to win our members, especially the African people who are easily mislead".

Furthermore, "He added the bosses are back to their mischief of bringing in other Unions so that we will be divided and confused and they are back to the old policy of throwing a bone so that the Unions can fight over this bone while they sit back and get fat".

Lastly, "Therefore, we must all stand together more united as a stronger force to fight all this ". "Shop Stewards applauded".

EMPLOYERS

At a meeting of Exco on the 17/5/83 concern is expressed about the possible breakdown of the industrial council system as 'non-party' trade unions are making approaches to "non members of the Association and establishing a situation of strength". It is then agreed to make a presentation on the matter to the forthcoming A.G.M.

The Exco minutes of 21/6/83 records discussion on an application to Party status by the N.U.T.W. It is agreed that a 5 man delegation should meet with the N.U.T.W. "to discuss their aims, objectives, Constitution, representativeness of the industry in order to assist the Association making its decision".

Further debate on the N.U.T.W's application is recorded in the Exco minutes of 17/10/83 and it was noted that the N.U.T.W. only had 252 members in an industry of 42 000 employees. This, it was felt, was not "reasonable representativeness".

It was further noted that all parties to the Agreement had to agree to any new party and that it was unlikely that the Union would agree to the N.U.T.W's application.

This rejection of the N.U.T.W's application is in fact recorded in the minutes of the following Exco meeting (d.d. 17/11/83).

1984

In 1984 the Union held two shop steward/ess meetings (1/4/84 and 27/5/84) at which the history and achievements of the union are detailed. The N.U.T.W. is seen as a threat and unity and solidarity are called for.

On Monday 11th June the union called for a mass meeting (at Curries Fountain) and feels that the turnout of "more than 30,000 clothing workers" means it was a successful event expressing the unity of the union (Annual Report 1984/85).

There is no further mention of inter-union rivalry in the shop steward meetings.

EMPLOYERS

On the 1st February 1984, the Exco minutes record a union (G.W.I.U.) change of rules, i.e. members cannot belong to more than one union. The Closed Shop arrangement then implies that a member who had dual membership either had to give up membership of the other union or accept being unemployed (at least by N.C.M.A. members).

It is also recorded that a secret ballot would be held at a particular Durban firm to determine support levels for the N.U.T.W. and the G.W.I.U. Should the N.U.T.W. have majority support then the firm (it is noted) was likely to resign from the Association. Were that to happen the N.C.M.A. would "press the Union" at council to grant exemption to that firm.

The issue of resignation or exemption is of importance to the N.C.M.A. as the industrial council system is based on the representativeness of the parties to the Agreement. It will be seen later on that representativeness of the N.C.M.A. is called into question by the State.

At the Exco meeting of 4/4/84 it is reported that the Industrial Council had to appear before the Industrial Court "to explain why it had not granted the exemption requested by the N.U.T.W.". It was noted that the current state of affairs was such that if the N.U.T.W. had majority representation in a particular firm, the only option for the N.C.M.A. member was to resign, "thereby threatening the representativeness of the Association" and leading to "the possible collapse of the I.C.".

Members were warned, "against precipitate action with the N.U.T.W." and, "it was also thought that the G.W.I.U. be made more aware of the developing situation".

1985

At the Exco meeting of the N.C.M.A. (d.d. 29/5/85) their policy toward the N.U.T.W. is finalised.

- (1) Association agrees to philosophy of "freedom of association".
- (2) Association would support exemptions from closed shop and stop order provisions - once N.U.T.W. shows majority representation.
- (3) Signed stop orders not enough proof - but will be the start to a secret ballot.

- (4) Both Unions get "reasonable access".
- (5) Ballots conducted by independent auditors. Unions permitted to nominate scrutineers to observe voting and counting - all three sign document saying voting fair.
- (6) If N.U.T.W. lose they won't be eligible for recognition there for at least 12 months.

At the same meeting the union (G.W.I.U.) had submitted a proposed agreement which would "interalia recognise the G.W.I.U. as the sole representative of employees in the industry, grant access to the union to meet its members on the factory premises, meet with the employer and shop stewards on a monthly basis, grant maternity leave to female employees and accept the disciplinary and grievance procedures laid down by the Union".

The meeting, however, agreed that "the Union be informed with regret that the Association was not prepared to enter into such an agreement".

No further mention of the N.U.T.W. is made over the balance of the review period.

7.3.7 1982 NEGOTIATIONS

At the A.G.M. of the N.C.M.A. the Chairman's report for 1981 (d.d. 10/8/81), it is observed that "the increasing wage scales have been encouraging. However, I must note at this stage that we must be prepared to increase wages even further by the middle of next year in order to hold the very strong and skilled Asiatic labour force".

The chairman states that asians are leaving the clothing industry for other - better paying - industries, and that a growing urban black population demands "urgent training and absorbtion into intensive labour operations such as ours".

relation to the chairman of the N.C.M.A's earlier (1981) statement and the activities of the N.U.T.W., although neither party is recorded as directly referring to these events in the 1982 minutes of negotiation.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTS

Employers

A special general meeting was held on 1/11/82 and by show of hands agreement is got from members to conclude the agreement. No debate recorded.

Union

At a shop steward/ess meeting held on the 28/3/82 it is minuted that, "The Secretary said an important point to bear in mind is that he, as Secretary of the Union can promise a lot and make wages sky high but we must be careful when we negotiate as we look at many things. We must make sure that our members are WORKING AND EARNING A FAIR WAGE because if we make wages sky high some employers may close their factories, and we may find that workers and their families can starve through unemployment. Have we as a Union done any good for our members if this situation arises? ..." "shop stewards applauded".

At a further meeting (d.d. 3/10/82) debate takes place on the current wage negotiations, the following statements are recorded,

- (1) "He added that workers will call for a strike and the workers in his factory will support this and the Executive Council will have a rough time controlling them".
- (2) "She added that factories can close but the workers want their money".
- (3) "He asked all shop stewards to follow him and call for strike action in their plants".
- (4) "She is proud to be a worker of ... but tomorrow she could lose her job, and she is prepared to stand to the bitter end with her fellow workers".

Addressing the shop steward/esses the chairman says "He appealed to shop stewards to have confidence and trust in their leaders and leave these matters in the hands of the Negotiating Committee and the Executive Council who are there to look after the interests of the organisation and workers".

Support (from the floor) for the union officials is recorded "He added, the workers want more money and they leave this matter to the Executive Council and Negotiations Committee as they know what they are doing". "Mrs. ... of ... said shop stewards and workers have confidence in the Chairman, Secretary, Organisers and Executive Council and the officials must not think otherwise".

At the last meeting of shop steward/esses in 1982 (5/12/82) the Chairman notes "that despite all these problems the negotiating team had done a good job".

No further debate on the 1982 negotiations is recorded.

7.3.8 1984 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 30TH AUGUST 1984 - 69 LINES

The minutes of this meeting, again, do not provide verbatim quotations but are rather a summary of what was said and recorded as such by the Secretary of the Council. The minutes do record the following which (at least) give an indication of the content of the debate.

- (1) "Comparisons were made with other provinces and neighbouring states, etc." [N.C.M.A. speaker]
- (2) It is recorded that the Union representative "replied and gave a very detailed description of the needs of the workers in support of the increase in wages asked for".
- (3) "After lengthy discussion" both parties agreed

- (i) Union would not "consider and prepare another schedule of wage rates" until N.C.M.A. counter proposals were received.
- (ii) N.C.M.A. "to prepare a schedule of new wage rates which it was prepared to offer".
"Agree date of next meeting and adjourn".

MEETING NO. 2 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1984 - 52 LINES

Again the meeting records no verbatim discussion, thus lines 38-40 state "Lengthy discussions were again held and speakers from both parties expressed their views. No progress was made in coming to any agreement on new wage rates".

The N.C.M.A. do, however, table a letter at the meeting which provides an indication of the constructs utilised by their negotiating team.

The letter states "we would like to recap salient and pertinent remarks made by the members of our negotiating committee at such meeting " [i.e. the 1st meeting of these negotiations]

- (1) Union proposals have not "taken into consideration present economic factors and realities".
- (2) Nor have they taken into account proposals made by "other Unions in South Africa". If they had they would have found such proposals "far more realistic" than those made by the Union.
- (3) The leaders of industry and commerce expect "a production depression worse than we have ever seen in this country". The number of jobs will be slashed.
- (4) Down-turn in trade affecting manufacturers throughout country and "budgets of major chains have been cut dramatically".

MEETING NO. 8 - 29TH NOVEMBER 1984 - 65 LINES

Again the Secretary summarises the discussions thus

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
9/11	The Union "reiterated and referred to expected increases to (sic) electricity, transport and rent".
30/36	The Union accept reluctantly with "extreme disappointment".
12/14	"N.C.M.A. also reiterated and spoke on the present unfavourable financial climate, referring to press reports of unemployment and the closure of many factories".

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSEmployers

The minutes of a special general meeting (d.d. 19/12/84) tell us that a comparative analysis of Cape and Natal wages were presented by the chairman (his analysis is not recorded) who "expressed the view that wage rates in this province had aligned themselves with Cape wages overall".

Union

At a shop steward/ess meeting held on the 30/9/84 to provide Union officials with bargaining guidelines, it is recorded that there was much debate about strike action. The following quotes clarify

- (1) "queried why can't we show our solidarity to the bosses by having a mass sit in at work or don't even go to work for 1 day". "Shop stewards applauded".
- (2) "She added if employers are not prepared to give us better wages, each and every worker must be prepared to strike". "Shop stewards applauded".

The meeting concludes with the chairman saying "we have made a note of all that has been said and we will tell this to the

N.C.M.A. spokesman. He asked shop stewards to leave this in the hands of the negotiating team and the executive council who will do the best they can".

The shop steward/ess meeting of 2/12/84 has little debate recorded on the negotiations other than a comment from the floor, "she congratulated the negotiating team and stated that at least they had achieved something".

7.3.9 1986 NEGOTIATIONS

MEETING NO. 1 - 8TH SEPTEMBER 1986 - 47 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
7/10	Union demands "were unrealistic in the present economic climate".
11/12	Employers believe "that the basis of life was to give and to take".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
16/17	"productivity was taken into account".

MEETING NO. 2 - 15TH SEPTEMBER 1986 - 133 LINES

No quotations.

MEETING NO. 3 - 16TH SEPTEMBER 1986 - 85 LINES

EMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
39/41	"The biggest competition facing the urban manufacturer comes from the rural areas where employees work up to 45 hours per week".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
35/36	"The shortening of working hours would thus be service to society". [this after arguing the travelling hardships experienced by workers]
28	"children are neglected as both parents usually work".
30	"A worker spends plus/minus 2 hours per day travelling to and from work".
33/34	"They arrive at work tired and hungry".

MEETING NO. 4 - 22ND SEPTEMBER 1986 - 138 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
29/30	"The viability and profitability of the urban manufacturer must be taken into account".
24/25	"... the biggest competition facing the urban manufacturers comes from the decentralised areas".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
12/15	"The N.C.M.A. offer of 7½ percent increase in wages does not take into account the losses sustained by workers as a result of inflation".
18/20	"... pointed out that a machinist on a rate of R74.50 per week fell below these [H. Subs. level and H. Effective level] levels".
36/38	"He asked the N.C.M.A. to assist the G.W.I.U. in penetrating these areas". [i.e. = 'Homelands']

MEETING NO. 5 - 1ST OCTOBER 1986 - 106 LINESEMPLOYERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
50/51	"Mr. ... pointed out that the manufacturers are also affected by all price increases. He added that nobody's wages kept pace with inflation".

UNION

<u>Line</u>	<u>Quote</u>
28/31	"Mr. ... pointed out that added to the current inflation rate, the price of bread has increased drastically from 1/10/86. These factors would add to the plight of the workers".
44/45	"The real wage of the machinist is now R32.00 per week".

MEETING NO. 6 - 9TH OCTOBER 1986 - 79 LINES

The meeting records, "after further discussion the N.C.M.A's wage offer was accepted". The meeting then confirms various elements of the new agreement.

SUPPORTING STATEMENTSUnion

No reference to these negotiations could be found in the minutes of the shop steward/ess meetings of 1986.

Employers

In the minutes of Exco (d.d. 24/11/86) the chairman reports that the industrial council is experiencing difficulties in getting the Minister of Manpower to publish the agreement because of the issue of 'representativeness'.

The N.C.M.A. had had discussions with the union on the possibility of excluding from the provisions of the agreement those manufacturers with less than 20 employees. This would eliminate 131 employers with a total work force of some 1200 workers and then of the balance of employers (278) the N.C.M.A. would have a 46% representation, i.e. 127. It is agreed to actively pursue the recruitment of new members.

No Exco annual report for 1986 was available for analysis.

7.4 BARGAINING BEHAVIOUR

Table 19 overpage provides an analysis of bargaining in terms of Walton & McKursie's theory of bargaining. It is presented to highlight the routinization of bargaining behaviour.

Table 19 allows for a number of observations on bargaining behaviour in the Natal region:

- (i) The apparent high degree of involvement of the chairman in the negotiations. This is a little misleading as the "Chairman" category is utilised to classify a variety of non-negotiating behaviours e.g. the 'fifth meeting' of the 1984 negotiations (d.d. 8/10/1984)(total lines = 50) the "Chairman" category is as follows

<u>Line</u>	<u>Summary</u>
1-3	Chairman introduces/brings the meeting to order
27	the minutes report "lengthy discussion followed on new wage rates"
32-50	Chairman suggests closing the meeting as N.C.M.A. delegates want to consult their Executive to get a further increase to their mandate and various Administrative issues are dealt with

The above is a fairly typical description of the chairman's role as well as the style of minute keeping which complicates the process of establishing the bargaining constructs employed by the parties to the negotiations.

- (ii) A pattern of bargaining behaviour can be discerned over the bargaining meetings, thus the 'first' meetings tend to be utilised by each side to "structure attitudes" and, in addition, employers utilise 'distributive bargaining'.

TABLE 19

Percentages of Bargaining Behaviour - Natal

Date	Meet -ing Total No Lines		Percentage of Total Lines								Chair man	
			Employer				Union					
			M1	M2	M3	M4	N1	N2	N3	N4		
13/02/74	1	187	0	40	21	0	0	0	12	0	28	101
15/03/77	1	61	0	13	7	0	0	0	5	0	75	100
30/08/79	1	148	0	0	28	0	0	4	28	0	40	100
17/08/82	1	85	0	7	34	0	0	0	32	0	27	100
30/08/84	1	69	0	4	6	0	0	0	3	0	87	100
08/09/86	1	47	0	17	19	0	0	11	38	0	15	100
28/02/74	2	113	0	0	27	0	0	19	17	0	37	100
17/03/77	2	64	0	23	17	0	0	16	3	0	41	100
04/10/79	2	104	0	21	18	0	0	21	6	0	34	100
30/09/82	2	53	0	26	17	0	0	0	4	0	53	100
30/09/84	2	52	0	12	23	0	0	8	0	0	58	101
15/09/86	2	133	0	23	17	0	0	5	26	0	29	100
19/03/74	3	68	0	25	6	0	0	12	4	0	53	100
14/04/77	3	104	0	14	27	0	0	5	3	0	51	100
16/10/79	3	153	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	96	100
05/10/82	3	54	0	24	20	0	0	15	6	0	35	100
11/09/84	3	61	0	23	8	0	0	0	13	0	56	100
16/09/86	3	85	0	5	18	0	0	8	47	0	22	100
04/04/74	4	80	0	5	0	0	0	11	6	0	78	100
10/05/77	4	77	0	13	25	0	0	17	17	0	29	101
14/10/82	4	81	0	15	10	0	0	11	9	0	56	101
17/09/84	4	109	0	4	16	0	0	20	4	0	57	101
22/09/86	4	138	0	0	22	0	3	6	20	0	50	101
27/05/77	5	59	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	66	100
21/10/82	5	148	0	8	14	0	0	10	14	0	55	101
08/10/84	5	50	0	2	12	0	0	8	29	0	49	100
01/10/86	5	106	0	17	29	0	0	11	22	0	21	100
18/10/84	6	68	0	24	12	0	0	25	16	0	24	101
09/10/86	6	79	0	28	9	0	0	11	8	0	44	100

The 'second meetings' indicate employers using distributive bargaining and attitudinal structuring in (virtually) equal parts. The union on the other hand reflects a predominance of distributive bargaining.

The 'third meeting' is similar to the 'second meeting'. The 'fourth meetings' are characterised by an increase in attitudinal structuring on the part of employers (and a decrease in distributive bargaining) and an increase on the part of the union in a reliance on distributive bargaining.

The 'fifth meetings' see both parties utilising distributive bargaining but with a greater reliance on attitudinal structuring.

The two 'sixth meetings' do not provide an adequate data base from which to draw conclusions, but it does appear as if there is a return to a dominance of distributive bargaining.


(iii) The data in Table 19 is presented in graphical form in Graphs 3 to 8.

7.5 THE CONSTRUCTS


The analysis of the statements of Part B of the Natal region identifies the constructs held in the interpretive schemes of the actors.

Employers like their counterparts in the Cape and Transvaal regions reflect a prime concern with an ability to compete which implies also that if unable to compete then they are unwilling to continue their membership of the Natal industry and that potential investors/participants in the Natal industry will not be attracted. Consequently a stagnant or declining industry is likely to result.


Graph 3 - Natal Industrial Council Percentages - First Meeting




Graph 4 - Natal Industrial Council Percentages - Second Meeting




Graph 5 - Natal Industrial Council Percentages - Third Meeting




Graph 6 - Natal Industrial Council Percentages - Fourth Meeting



Graph 7 - Natal Industrial Council Percentages - Fifth Meeting



**Graph 8 - Natal Industrial Council
Percentages - Sixth Meeting**



Implicated in the prime construct is the desire to have a growing industry and the necessity to have attractive conditions of employment. Without fair wages labour will not be attracted, which will then restrict the growth of the industry. Employers also accept the importance of the industrial council as the appropriate vehicle through which equal (minimum) conditions can be administered. Further, in terms of the issues over which bargaining and non-bargaining takes, or does not, take place, constructs can be identified. Bargaining issues are essentially material rewards, and issues of job control do not enter the bargaining arena, thus the construct encapsulating this position can be depicted as 'Managerial workplace control - inability to manage', which again will be linked to employers' views on their ability to compete.

The Union is primarily concerned with the improvement of material benefits for its membership, and accepts the wage level-ability to compete linkage. It too values a growing (in terms of employment) industry and the importance of the industrial council as a governance mechanism. The Union specifies its 'non-political' character, and does not focus on job control issues by implication, accepting the need for managerial freedom in issues other than those involved in conditions of employment bargaining as found in the negotiated agreements.

7.6 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NATAL GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

Structure "as recursively organised sets of rules and resources, is out of time and space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination and memory traces" (1). This conception of structure is readily identifiable from the interpretation of the data already provided.

Structure in the Natal region can be described as rules and resources which have the effect of securing a facet of the competitive ability of the employer group (i.e. employment costs). This contention will be supported by reference to the data provided earlier. The duality of structure will be evidenced both in its "instantiations" and the "interpretive schemes" held by the actors.

The Natal industrial relations system has as its centre piece the industrial council which negotiates agreements between the employer group and employee representatives. The council then represents a facility of domination in that through the negotiated agreements it exercises control over allocative and authoritative resources.

Rules of signification are identifiable in action as relating to the control over employment costs. Contributions to the funds managed by the council indicate firstly that both employers and employees contribute to these funds and that, secondly, these contributions have not kept pace with inflation for the largest employee category, i.e. female machinists who, together with male machinists, make up about 50% of the workforce.

Minimum wages negotiated also indicate the containment of employment costs. The comparison of minimum wages as given in Table 17 (p. 300) indicate the decline in real wages from 1968 to 1986. Whilst it was not possible to trace actual wages paid, it is still possible to argue that the payment of higher than minimum levels is a factory level decision which management would review in relation to their ability to remain competitive. The Natal region initially reflects two districts with different wage structures. These are merged in 1982, which is further evidence of employers controlling inter-firm (and inter-region) competition. The initial acceptance by the employer group of these regional wage differentials is based on the perception of lower levels of productivity, a further indication of employer concern with employment costs and their ability to compete.

The negotiated agreements are restricted to a narrow range of conditions of employment. No evidence was found that dealt with the managerial ability to "hire and fire", or redundancy. There is evidence that job descriptions were changed, i.e. some are done away with and others added, however the agreements show no restrictions on factory management to fluctuate employment levels. This freedom of action is further evidence of the significance to employers of the ability to contain labour costs and in so doing remain competitive.

The nature of the funds associated with the agreement are further evidence of rules of signification. Thus the purpose served by such funds can be taken to have meaning to the parties of the agreement. Rules of legitimation can be interpreted on the basis of what it would mean to the parties if such funds did not exist. Again, these funds can be viewed as facilities of domination in that through them control over allocative (specifically) and authoritative resources are exercised.

An analysis of the union's financial statements reflect a continuity of certain classes of action which are possible only because of the union's position in the industry (i.e. the representative body) and the flow of subscriptions (and interest). The cash flow of the union is directly related to the level of employment and thus union activity is greatly dependent on growth in the industry. Thus the continuation of union activity would be jeopardized if high wages led to stagnant or lower levels of employment, and whilst higher subscriptions might be called for, the likelihood exists that member dissatisfaction would arise from such action. Flowing from the above it is possible to view union activities as a further factor in the explanation of the quality of structure in the Natal region.

Rules of legitimation will be identifiable in action more by implication than by being directly observable, such rules however will be explicitly identified when the 'interpretive schemes' of the actors are analysed. The degree of distributive bargaining reflected in the analysis of bargaining behaviour by way of the Walton and McKersie model is taken to be evidence of sanctions exercised and an expression in interaction of rules of legitimation. In addition the growth in employment in the industry can be seen to be evidence of the 'correctness' of wage agreements and deviation from such methods and objectives would be detrimental to the continued growth - in employment - of the industry.

Structuration theory makes the point that action produces and reproduces the "conditions that make such action possible" (2). Over the review period (1968 - 1986) records of minutes of formal negotiations indicate that six negotiations took place (note - no minutes prior to 1974) and, in addition, informal approaches for wage adjustments were made (by the union) in 1975 and 1976. The action involved over this period of time is discernably similar and its continuity and repetition are a reflection of the systems structural properties (signification, domination and legitimation) binding action over time and space. It is these properties which identify the system of industrial relations in Natal.

Further evidence that supports the description of the structural properties of the Natal industrial relations system is to be found in the 'interpretive schemes' of the actors. An analysis of the minutes of negotiations and the minutes of meetings held by the bargaining collectivities identifies the constructs held by the actors. These constructs (rules) are the same as the rules identified in the earlier analysis of action.

Employers continually refer to the necessity to ensure manufacturers' ability to compete. Reference is made to employment cost levels in other regions as well as comparisons with employers covered by wage determinations (see N.C.M.A. annual general meeting 1976). The sanction to this rule lies in the explicit view that the industry, and hence employment, will decline if wages make the industry uncompetitive. This view of the need to compete seems to be accepted by the union. The special general meeting on the 5th May, 1977, is representative. Again, the shop steward/ess meeting of 28th March, 1982, reflects acceptance of the rule that high wages can lead to unemployment which is not in the interests of the membership.

Awareness of economic conditions is evident in the statements of both parties and issues monitored support the identification of the prime rule of signification. The extra-ordinary negotiations of 1975 and 1976 indicate the union's concern with the impact of inflation on wages and the employers rejection of interim adjustments is related to the maintenance of their ability to compete.

The monitoring of general economic conditions is accompanied by a continuing awareness by both parties of employment conditions in other regions. The union, apart from referring to wages in other regions, also identifies benefits received in other regions - see meeting No. 7, 6th November, 1984. Employers in turn compare demands made by the Union to rates of pay in other regions - see N.C.M.A. executive committee meeting of 18th January, 1977. Again, at a special general meeting of the employer body on the 19th December, 1984, the chairman "expressed the view that wage rates in this province had aligned themselves with Cape wages overall".

The prime rule of signification in the Natal industrial relations system is that of an ability to compete, which is contrasted with the rule of legitimation (i.e. sanction) that

lower levels of employment will be experienced if the ability of manufacturers to compete is affected. These rules find expression in the facility of the industrial council through which control over allocative and authoritative resources is exercised.

Structuration theory argues that the moment of action is also one of reproduction and is related to the repetitive nature of much of social action. Procedural and substantive issues involved in the Natal bargaining remains essentially the same over the review period which also needs to be seen in relation to bargaining activities that have gone before. The repetitive nature of social action needs to be seen in conjunction with

- (1) The idea of unintended consequences of intentional acts.
- (2) The role of 'significantly placed' actors who can influence conditions to either remain as they are or can (influence) change those conditions.
- (3) Events in other action contexts which can constrain/enable action in the system under investigation.

In the Natal region it is reasonable to argue that the unintended consequences of employment cost restraint lies in levels of absenteeism, labour turnover and the ability of employers to attract and retain skilled labour.

The minutes of industrial council negotiations reflect managerial concern with labour turnover, absenteeism and productivity. Employers argue that the male/female wage gap is because females exhibit higher rates of absenteeism (meeting No. 2, 1974). A review of Table 14 (of the Natal section) shows that between 28% and 46% of the sample had 4 or more entrances to the industry, which together with the (female) age profile (i.e. an aging labour force - see Table 12), suggests increasing employer difficulties in attracting and holding the workforce. This observation is reinforced by reference to the N.C.M.A. chairman's comments made at the 1981 annual general meeting, where he notes that "we must be

prepared to increase wages even further" so as to "hold the very strong and skilled Asiatic labour force". At the same meeting the need to train and absorb the "growing urban black population" is expressed by the chairman. The changing racial composition of the labour force is reflected in Table 10, and shows the surge in employment to be sourced in the growth in the black component. This represents further evidence of the prime rule of signification and by implication that of legitimation.

At the individual level of analysis the employment patterns referred to previously can also be seen as a reflection of how those thought to be in a subordinate position can influence the action of their putative superiors. Again, the constraining aspects of industrial council agreements can also be viewed as enabling in that an instrumental approach to employment in the industry can be interpreted from the employment pattern data.

The minutes of various meetings of the collectivities provide insights into the influence of 'significantly placed' actors, specifically the chairman of the parties to industrial council agreements. The chairman of the employer group is influential in persuading members to accept the need for wage increases as argued at the A.G.M. of 1979 and 1981. The union chairman is influential in convincing shop steward/esses of the need to balance high wages and employment for the union's membership (see 'Supporting Statements' to 1977 and 1982 negotiations). The chairman is also influential in keeping the Union from political activity (see the shop steward/ess meeting of 26/3/74); in addition the minutes of the industrial council of 10/12/74 requesting employers not to let "certain clergymen and politically motivated persons" address the workforce, and in so doing "undermining the G.W.I.U". Furthermore, the chairman in introducing "our Honourable Brother Gibson of the I.T.G. and L.W.F" (see 1979 negotiations) comments "we would like the support of the outside world as we are not politicians but workers". This represents further evidence of rules of signification and legitimation.

The events surrounding the attempt by the National Union of Textile Workers is further evidence of influence of 'significantly placed' actors. The Union's action is to protect its position by excluding the N.U.T.W. from the bargaining process and seeks (but fails to get) employer support, whilst at the same time influencing the membership of the union to accept the rejection strategy.

Action in more distant contexts is reflexively monitored and will constrain and facilitate action in the Natal region. Again, responses to action in distant contexts is instructive of structure in the Natal system of industrial relations. The awareness of events in the Cape and Transvaal regions of the industry play an important role in Natal relations, both parties utilising such action to serve their particular ends. Similarly, reference is made to conditions of employment in other industries suggesting a rule of signification which could be identified as 'comparable equity'.

Action, at the political level, is specifically identifiable in the legislative change to the Industrial Conciliation Act which allows for the inclusion of black unions in the formal negotiating process and the freeing of unions in terms of their racial composition. The Garment Workers Industrial Union of Natal welcomes the ability to represent all workers, and announced at a shop steward/ess meeting held on 28th June, 1981, that four African members will be elected to the union executive. The legislative change does, however, also represent a threat to the G.W.I.U. in the emergence of a competing union (the N.U.T.W.). Action on the part of the G.W.I.U. is directed at maintaining its position.

SUMMARY

Structure in the Natal system of industrial relations has been identified through analysis of action and the 'interpretive schemes' or 'memory traces' of the actors and such structure has been encapsulated in the idea of the maintenance of control over employment costs.

7.7

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NATAL REGION

Collective bargaining in the Natal region has been shown to favour the sectional interests of employers by utilising structuration theory. As with the Cape and Transvaal region, the perpetuation of this position is closely related to the issue of the lack of militancy which needs explanation.

The employer/union relationship had been in existence at the start of the review period for some 34 years, and the 50th Anniversary Publication of the Council suggests that the relationship got off to a good start in that the Employers Association (Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association - N.C.M.A.) helped to clean up "the clothing industry of its unscrupulous employers". Whilst it can be shown that unions had little alternative in their dealings with employers than to opt for operating in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, it is equally relevant to observe that by 1968 (and the end of the review period) both parties had good reason to retain their bargaining relationship as developed through the industrial council mechanism. As with the Cape and Transvaal regions the attraction of collective bargaining at industrial councils, as identified by Morris (3) are (at least) equally applicable to the Natal clothing industry.

The attraction to employers lies firstly in the management/control of labour costs and their relation to inter-firm and inter-regional competition and secondly, in the ability to control the substantive and procedural issues over which bargaining takes place, i.e. the protection of their 'right to manage' (managerial prerogative). Employers have been very successful in the control of employment costs. The preceding analysis of contributions to the various funds managed by the council and the negotiated minimum wages reflects the containment of these costs

to below the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. There are instances of where the N.C.M.A. appears to be willing to accede to increases beyond the C.P.I. rate (for that year), but this apparent altruistic intent needs to be tempered by the observation by the Chairman of the N.C.M.A. that these increases will bring Natal into line with the Cape and Transvaal. In other words, inter-regional competition will not be adversely affected.

Contributions to the Funds indicate the importance of cost control (and therefore competitive ability), but are further significant - just as in the Cape and Transvaal - in that by implication they are a statement of the acceptable (to employers) role of the union. The Natal region, as with the Cape and Transvaal, reflects a position in which the range of managerial decision making which affects labour is to a very large extent unaffected by collective bargaining. The only constraint on employers is in the area of material rewards, and these are restricted to minimum wages and contributions to funds. Even after the 1979 changes to the I.C. Act there is no evidence of any attempt to limit the authority of employers, something evident in the emerging unions. The relatively unfettered ability to manage is likely to be of value to employers, and having a forum at which control over the perpetuation of that ability must in turn be of value. The role of the I.C. Act which limits bargaining to wages and conditions of employment, which had historically been interpreted as referring to material issues (as opposed to "authoritative" (4) issues), needs to be emphasized in that the type of behaviour observed in councils became routinized.

The relationship is in turn of value to the union, certainly the most obvious value relates to the administration of benefits negotiated and affecting union activities. Gool's (5) observation of the widely dispersed (geographically) factories means that the collection of dues and the maintenance of funds is more effectively ensured by way of the industrial council. Without the cash flow the activities of the union could be severely hampered, and whilst in the post 1979 era of South African industrial relations this was not the only possible collection mechanism it had been the only option for some decades and had proved to be efficient. This benefit is further evidenced when the union introduced the "Help-U" fund, which though it did not last very long could more readily be implemented because of the council.

The union's ability to negotiate wages and conditions of employment across the industry has benefits in that if such negotiations were only carried out at plant level the resources that it applied to other activities would not be available for such activities. The 'Welfare Grant' and the 'Funeral Benefits Account' and the '1962 Fund' (see Table 8b), reflect some of these activities as well as being indicative of the union's view of its role as a union. This is re-inforced by examining entries on the union's 'Profit and Loss' account. Thus its 'Affiliation Fees' (to T.U.C.S.A. and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation - I.T.G. & L.W.F.), the attendance at 'Conferences' both local and international, the payments made to shop steward/esses to attend meetings, and so on. The continuing growth of employment means not only the continuity of these activities but also the possibility of expanding existing activities and the introduction of new services to their membership.

The emergence of the National Union of Textile Workers (N.U.T.W.) is further evidence of the unions view of its role, its relationship with employers and the importance of operating procedures of the council. The union's reaction to the possibility of a competing union (the N.U.T.W.) shows that it rejects the N.U.T.W. as they have "ulterior motives, i.e. political, the workers money etc." (see 7.3.6, 1980). The following year the union (G.W.I.U.) announces the merging of the G.W.I.U. and the african union, "we are now a mixed union", (see "Supporting Statements" - 1981 Negotiations). This could be seen as circumventing a criticism of the racial character of the G.W.I.U. Employers are also approached to assist in keeping out the N.U.T.W. and when this is rejected by the employers, the G.W.I.U. uses it as a further means to ensure the solidarity of its membership. The procedural regulations for membership of the council are such that all parties on council have to agree to any new membership arrangement, and thus the union can block the possibility of the N.U.T.W. on council. This is further evidence of the importance of the council to the functioning of the G.W.I.U.

The growth and stability of employment in the region is a matter which takes precedence in the consciousness of the union officials. It is often stated as such at union meetings (see 'Supporting Statements' - 1977 Negotiations, also 'Supporting Statements' - 1982 Negotiations). It can also be argued that such arguments presented by the union leadership are designed to temper the expectations of shop steward/esses and thereby making easier the task of the union's bargaining delegation, which has implications in terms of union democracy.

Union officials can also be seen to be influential in terms of the union's 'political' activities. There are a number of instances in which a 'political' role for the union is rejected by the executive (see 'Supporting Statements' - 1974 Negotiations, also 'Supporting Statements' - 1979 Negotiations). It needs to be kept in mind that the State's security apparatus had been utilised to suppress African unionism because of its "political" activity. The context of collective bargaining was not conducive to survival if such bargaining was viewed as 'political'.

Table 20 below reflects the number of meetings and the number of shop steward/esses present at these meetings; it is evident that the union holds quarterly meetings which appear to be well attended and reflect a growing number of shop steward/esses as a reflection of growing employment at these meetings. There is evidence that Union officials call for suggestions as to the quality and kind of demands at these meetings (they are nevertheless 'material' i.e. economic, in nature) and at least one meeting (see 'Supporting Statements - 1974 Negotiations) reflects a degree of unhappiness with the union position. From the available documentation it would, however, appear that the decision making in terms of reaching a settlement with the N.C.M.A. is left in the hands of the bargaining delegation and that - over the review period - there is at least acceptance of their bargaining achievements.

This characterisation of the bargaining relationship in the Natal region should not be taken as implying that there is little conviction on the part of the G.W.I.U.. Fox (6) notes that unionists invest an "intensity of conviction, effort and feeling" in negotiating pay claims and this observation is lent credence by reference to the degree of 'Attitudinal Structuring' and 'Distributive' behaviour provided earlier (see Table 19).

TABLE 20

SHOP STEWARD MEETINGS & NO. OF SHOP STEWARDS

1968	20.3.68(144)	19.6.68(150)	18.9.68(153)	4.12.68(157)
1969	19.3.69(132)	18.6.69(147)	17.9.69(149)	3.12.69(140)
1970	25.3.70(131)	30.6.70(138)	20.9.70(141)	1.12.70(155)
1971	30.3.71(158)	22.6.71(168)	28.9.71(157)	7.12.71(167)
1972	28.3.72(171)	20.6.72(103)	26.9.72(179)	5.12.72(195)
1973	27.3.73(196)	26.6.73(193)	24.9.73(191)	4.12.73(218)
1974	26.3.74(231)	23.7.74(230)	8.10.74(214)	3.12.74(206)
1975	25.3.75(208)	17.6.75(166)	30.9.75(216)	2.12.75(204)
1976	16.3.76(230)	27.6.76(175)	28.9.76(212)	12.12.76(172)
*1977	22.3.77(211)	5.5.77(220)		
*1978				
1979	21.1.79(?)			
1980	7.12.80(198)			
1981	12.4.81(174)	28.6.81(171)	4.10.81(186)	
1982	28.3.82(166)	27.6.82(201)	3.10.82(210)	5.12.82(286)
1983	27.3.83(255)	3.7.83(258)	2.10.83(267)	4.12.83(300)
1984	1.4.84(345)	8.8.84(485)	30.9.84(472)	2.12.84(381)
1985	24.3.85(417)	30.6.85(323)	29.9.85(388)	8.12.85(375)
1986	6.4.86(375)	6.6.86(369)	28.9.86(330)	

* Balance of 1977 and whole of 1978 records were untraceable.

Whilst there is some evidence of a willingness by shop steward/esses to go on strike (see 'Supporting Statements' - 1978 Negotiations) there is little to show any intention of the executive to exercise the option. This is true in terms of industrial council minutes, but might be because of the manner of recording the debate. However, there is also nothing in the N.C.M.A. minutes to suggest that bargaining even got close to arbitration let alone a strike.

In attempting to provide an understanding of the lack of militancy in the Natal industrial council, there is support for the arguments of Gool, Toerien, Nicol and Maree which revolve around the issue of union democracy. However, it will be argued - as in the Cape and Transvaal regions - that a contributing factor is an instrumental orientation on the part of the rank and file workforce.

Table 13 and 14 provide a profile of the worker as female and with multiple entrances (and exits) to the industry. In 1968, 38% reflected 3 or more entrances to the industry. By 1986 this figure almost doubled to 66%. These figures, taken with the age profile show (unlike the Cape) an aging labour force. This pattern suggests that employment is more a strategy to supplement household income than career oriented. Further, older females are likely to be more conservative (than younger females) in their dealings with 'authority', given their experiences as disadvantaged persons in an apartheid society. The labour profile shows a marked decline in '1st time' entrants and an increase in the age of the workforce shown shown in Table 13, and thus fewer young entrants will also contribute to the conservative nature of the workforce. In combination (i.e. age and entrances) the profile supports the 'instrumental' argument, but as identified in the Cape region, it is not suggested as conclusive. Finality on the question could be approached by further research to provide subjective data in support of the interpretation of employment patterns. Given this limitation it is reasonable to suggest that there is likely to be little upward pressure on shop stewards or union officials to change their behaviours/tactics in terms of collective bargaining. This then, together with the issues of the role of union leadership, the acceptance of the importance of the N.C.M.A./G.W.I.U. relationship, the view of the union of their role as a union and the political and economic context in which bargaining takes place provide an understanding of the observed lack of militancy and the perpetuation of such behaviour over the review period.

CONCLUSION

Like the Cape and Transvaal unions, the Garment Workers Industrial Union (G.W.I.U.) in Natal also draws on 'structure' in the production and reproduction of collective bargaining action. As with the Cape and Transvaal, the structure of collective bargaining in Natal has been identified as favouring the sectional interests of employers (see Section 7.6 of this chapter) and as with the Cape and Transvaal regions it is to be expected that the G.W.I.U's action will reflect a lack of militancy.

The arguments presented in the Cape and Transvaal chapters dealing with the explanation of the continuity of the lack of militancy are just as applicable to the Natal region, and will not be repeated here. It is suffice to say that the 'interpretive scheme' of the union leadership did not change and therefore the perpetuation of the structure utilised in action and the observed continuity of the bargaining action which produces and reproduces the structure of collective bargaining in the Natal region.

CHAPTER 7 - REFERENCES

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CHAPTER 8

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
IN THE S.A. GARMENT MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
1968 - 1986

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The garment industry in South Africa has three major centres of activity, namely Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. These centres have administrative arrangements known as industrial councils which were legislative creatures of political policy. It is the social practices of these Industrial Councils - with specific focus on Labour/Management relations - as ordered across time-space that is the focus of this section of the thesis. These units then provide the vehicle for the application of structuration theory to industrial relations.

8.2 INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS AS SYSTEMS

The labour/management relations observed at the level of industrial councils revolve essentially under the rubric of 'Conditions of Employment'. It is at industrial councils that minimum conditions of employment are bargained and then by way of publication in a government gazette become law. Each region negotiates its own conditions of employment and thus there will be regional differences to be found in these Agreements. The published conditions are applicable to all manufacturers of the relevant region whether or not they are a member of the (representative) manufacturers association. A "closed shop" condition was to be found in all three centres for most of the review period i.e. 1968 to 1986.

The industrial councils in the clothing (garment) manufacturing industry in South Africa are part of the system of industrial relations in South Africa. The relations between management, labour and the state

have been organised through the creation of industrial councils. Bargaining at this level has been in evidence since the introduction of the Industrial Conciliation Act (I.C. Act) in the 1920's. In the clothing industry the councils were formed in 1935, 1934 and 1933 for the Cape, Natal and Transvaal respectively, and discernably similar bargaining behaviour between management and unions has taken place over the 50 or so years which end the review period of this thesis. Collective bargaining at the industrial council level reflects a continuity of reproduced relations which 'stretch' across time and space and as such can be viewed as an institution.

Whilst industrial councils can be viewed as the product of the national political system, this must not be interpreted along the lines of structural determinism. Events in distant contexts are not just potential constraints on action but can also be seen as facilitators. Thus the Councils are integrated into the wider social system and such integration is marked by relations of autonomy and dependence. The industrial councils can be viewed as subordinate to the national political system but will be able to influence that system (i.e. the political). In the clothing industry such influence can be seen in the various commissions of enquiry to which it has supplied evidence, thus the Wiehahn and Rickert Commissions into labour received submissions from clothing manufacturers and unions. Equally, after the change in the I.C. Act in 1956, the ability of black unions to bargain formally at industrial councils was removed. This was accommodated by recognised unions negotiating on their behalf. Whilst not an ideal position it represents a strategy aimed (at least) as a partial circumvention of discriminatory legislation. Furthermore, no racial characteristics (formally) defined the conditions of employment gazetted into law; negotiations revolved around job

titles irrespective of the incumbent's race. This was not the case with sex discrimination which was only abolished in 1981 following state intervention through legislation.

Political action at the national level, specifically in the form of the Physical Planning and Resources Act (P.P.R. Act) and the Group Areas Act influenced relations at the industrial councils. The Transvaal industrial council records the concern of the management representatives. The Act is seen as a severe limitation on their ability to expand, in that coloured and white workers were not as available as in the past and government restrictions on the number of black employees consequently affected not only their ability to expand but also to maintain levels of production. This constraint on operations was used by management to argue wage restraint on the part of the union. Similarly, the creation of "Independent States", through the policy of separate development, and restrictions on the mobility of 'Non-White' workers operates as a constraint on action but is utilised in arguing against labour cost increases on the basis that such increases make relocation more attractive to manufacturers which would not serve the workforce.

The Group Areas Act had its greatest impact in the Cape with forced removals of much of the workforce, which in turn was utilised by the union to argue the fairness of a transport allowance and is also used to present reasons for lateness, absenteeism and an unwillingness to work overtime on Saturdays.

Giddens's notion of the 'Dialectic of Control' is also to be viewed in terms of 'networks' established by the parties to the negotiations. Through membership of Chambers of Industry and the Trade Union Council of South Africa the respective parties are able to exert some influence on (political) policy level decisions.

Bargaining relations between management and unions at industrial councils can also be viewed as institutionalised. Between the years 1968 and 1986, the Cape recorded 13 meetings to negotiate conditions of employment, the Transvaal recorded 11 and 8 were recorded in Natal from 1974 to 1986. Some of these meetings are classified as "Extra-Ordinary Meetings" as they are negotiations for interim adjustments to the prevailing agreement rather than the negotiations of a new agreement. Each agreement has a specified (and negotiated) period of time for which it is applicable. The Transvaal reflects three such extra-ordinary meetings, one each in 1975, 1980 and 1981. Natal shows two such meeting in 1975 and 1976 (one each year) and the Cape five, one each in 1973, 1974, 1979, 1980 and 1981. Again, these interim negotiations represent strategies adopted by one party, to the relationship to influence the other party and to change existing conditions. In addition the content and the process of negotiations reflects a continuity of discernably similar behaviour reinforcing the observation of their institutionalised character.

In summary, industrial councils can be seen as part of the national system of industrial relations and as institutions. Equally the reproduced bargaining relationships within the industrial council represent regional systems of industrial relations and such behaviour is regular, organised and discernably similar over time and space. As such it is intitutionalised.

8.3 THE AGENT

8.3.1 Monitoring

The minutes of the bargaining activity reflect a constant monitoring of a wide range of events by representatives of both parties.

In the Cape in virtually every negotiation, the Union deals with increases in the cost of living. This issue in turn is much in evidence in the Transvaal and Natal regions. The unions are then knowledgeable about economic issues which are seen to be of importance to maintaining and developing the standard of living of their membership. Not only do union representatives monitor the wider economic context but they are very aware of developments in other regions of the South African garment industry. There is, for example, continual reference in the Cape to higher wages paid in the Transvaal.

Equally, in the Transvaal reference is made to the Cape's 42 hour week versus their 40 hour week, by both management and the unions.

After the change to the Industrial Conciliation Act and the introduction of the Labour Relations Act of 1981 which legalised black union negotiations, the wider South African industrial relations context saw much activity in the formation and exercise of authority by black unions. Strike activity was particularly marked in the Transvaal and largely sourced in what have been termed "Emerging Unions". These activities were monitored by the Transvaal unions, thus, a union delegate stated in 1982 (4/2/82), "The workers' moods were in that state [i.e. militant] because one just had to look at the newspaper and see what the radical unions were getting" (see Transvaal Section, Part B, p.241).

Not only did the Transvaal unions monitor other unions' achievements in terms of improved benefits but the union was aware of the possibility that it may be a take-over target for one of the 'radical' unions (see Transvaal section, Part B, p.244). Similarly, in Natal the union closely monitored the activities of

the challenge from the National Union of Textile Workers and developed strategies designed to maintain their control over the workforce (see Natal Section, Part B - page 375).

There is further evidence of 'monitoring' activity when examining contributions to the various funds administered by the respective councils as well as the provision of additional services/benefits. Thus home loans from provident funds, increased sick pay benefits, additional clinics and improved medical aid benefits are all strategies implemented to meet perceived needs. Equally, trade union subscriptions/dues increased, and new activities entered into, be they the start of a Union 'Newsletter' ("Clothesline" in the Cape) or the "Help-U" fund in Natal; these then are the results (some of) of monitoring behaviour on the part of specific actors.

Employers are equally adept at monitoring behaviour. The threat of competition and productivity are continually raised in negotiations by employers in all three centres. Competition from the other centres from 'uncontrolled' areas (i.e. "Independent States", "Homelands", and areas falling under wage board determinations), "Rhodesia" and imports are given as reasons for not meeting union demands. Labour turnover and absenteeism also represent a continuing issue for employers and thus represents monitoring activity. In the Transvaal, employers express concern with what they see as a deteriorating relationship with (specifically) the National Union of Clothing Workers. In the chairman's address to the T.C.M.A. (20/10/83) he advises members to "take note of the increased militancy of the N.U.C.W."

In Natal and the Cape there is evidence of employers monitoring the "Cost of Living" in that they express a sympathy for the position of the workforce, (Natal: N.C.M.A. annual general meeting 27/9/79, also the annual general meeting of 10/8/81. In the Cape, 'Report of the C.C.M.A. 1972/73', special general meeting of 5/3/74, extra-ordinary negotiations of 1979.

Monitoring activity by the actors is self-evident and covers a wide range of issues deemed to be relevant to their relationships with each other, and is more immediate to the system of industrial relations. The state's monitoring activity appears to be more indirect in that it appears to monitor the national system more specifically although there is some direct intervention by state agents in one Transvaal negotiation (see Tvl. Section, 1974 Negotiations, page 231). Prior to the Labour Relations Act, state representatives are recorded to have made presentations on behalf of black workers to the respective councils for which they were thanked and then removed themselves from the proceedings. In the 1979 Transvaal negotiations (for example) the Central Black Labour Board (C.B.L.B.) representative expressed dissatisfaction with the wage levels of two job categories. This led to a meeting between the T.C.M.A. and the C.B.L.B. and resulted in wage level changes.

8.3.2 Knowledgeability/Rationalisation

By rationalisation is meant the continuing ("theoretical") understanding of the reasons for the activities undertaken by social actors. The constructs that actors draw on in day-to-day activities represent that "knowledgeability" the core of which is an awareness of social rules which will be more specifically referred to under the heading of "Structure" in this section of the thesis.

The bargaining activities of the parties to the Agreements in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal are underpinned by the constructs held by the respective collectivities.

Employers' core construct is one of "Ability to Compete - Withdraw from industry". In all negotiations the point is made that employers face competition from a number of sources and the implication - often left unstated - is that if employment costs increase too excessively either bankruptcy or relocation to lower labour cost areas will occur. Flowing from this construct is the idea that the industry (of a region) will collapse and unemployment of the Union's membership will occur.

The unions' core construct is that of "Fair Wages (in the broadest sense) - member hardship". The unions understanding of its activities centre on obtaining improved conditions of employment. Specifically this will be achieved through increased wages, the creation of new funds, the improvement of existing funds and the increase in benefits from those funds. The emphasis of union argument at negotiations is on the economic hardship experienced by its membership, the implication being that if such 'hardship' is not addressed by employers, the industry will wither and die as firstly current employees will look for alternative employment and replacements and additional workers will not be found.

In the Cape and Natal regions the unions also express agreement with employers that maintaining the industry is a desirable objective. As such this notion is bound up in the construct of "Fair Wages - member hardship" in that the continued development of the industry is seen as a source of employment and not just one of many alternatives. The contradiction for the union lies in accepting the logic of a growing

industry needing to be competitive. Part of the factors that will influence competitive ability lies in the 'wage' factor of product pricing given certain levels of profitability. The contradiction for employers lies in their ability to attract and hold labour at wage levels which are believed not to adversely affect desired levels of profitability. The bargaining process allows a form of accommodation of these contradictions, where such constructs as have been described are held by the parties to the negotiations.

In the Transvaal this situation holds for most of the review period but the union by 1985 had changed and rejected the link of wages to the closing of factories (see Transvaal section, Part B, p.300).

A review of the minutes to the negotiations identifies the grounds for the activities engaged upon by the parties to the negotiations. This knowledge is then drawn upon in interaction and evidenced in the strategies employed by the negotiators. The core constructs specifically in the Cape and Natal are resistant to change. The monitoring of events in those regions is such that no reason for changing the constructs is evident, whilst in the Transvaal there is evidence of a change by the union which no longer seems to place as great a value on the survival and growth of the industry. The events in the Transvaal (monitored) which were likely to have led to this change can be sourced - at least partially - in the emergence of the N.U.C.W. as the major union bargainer (the only one after the take-over of the G.W.U. of S.A.), the perceived success of 'radical' unions and the actual decline of clothing industry activity in the region. The Transvaal negotiations from 1979 exhibit a 'hardening' on the part of the union in the sense that the past joint concern for the industry is of waning interest to the union, to the extent that

the 1979 negotiations record for the first time (in the review period) a willingness to declare a 'deadlock' in the negotiations and a consequent preparedness to seek arbitration in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act.

One other construct held by both parties to agreements revolves around the acceptability of the industrial councils (I.C.) as the most appropriate forum for bargaining, the construct can be conceived of as

I.C. level bargaining - dissimilar conditions of
employment

Employers can be seen to view I.C. agreements as useful in that the minimum conditions are applicable to all manufacturers which (partially) orders competitive conditions. Unions in turn see that all workers in the industry have the same minimum conditions and in addition union administration - specifically the collection of dues - is considerably eased and Union activities are more easily initiated because of a smooth flow of funds.

The core construct identified can be seen in the substantive issues raised at negotiations. Unions have knowledge (and constantly monitor the environment) of a wide variety of issues ranging from actual wages to provident fund benefits, housing and transport problems and so on. Employers in turn act similarly and are aware of competition from many points, are concerned/aware of productivity, absenteeism and so on. Both parties monitor wider environments as well as can be seen by many references to other industries (their 'wages'), other ('radical') unions, to wage board determinations and so on. The actors in the garment industry then, are knowledgeable and continuously monitor their action context.

Furthermore, in those issues which are not part of bargaining constructs can also be identified. The emphasis in bargaining is on material rewards, and managerial action is left unconstrained in terms of decisions involved in such issues as 'hiring/firing', redundancy, promotion and the allocation of rewards beyond negotiated minimum levels; managerial freedom of action stays relatively unscathed and can also be seen in the light of the core construct "ability to compete".

8.4

ROUTINIZATION

Structuration theory contends that much of social action is routine/recursive. The routinization of action is important as this helps to construct the conditions for reproduced social action.

Bargaining at all three centres can be seen as recursive behaviour both procedurally and substantively. The procedure for formal bargaining begins some months prior to the expiry of an agreement. A series of meetings are held to negotiate over 'Conditions of Employment', agreement is reached, submitted to the relevant state department and gazetted into law. On those occasions when the union wanted an adjustment to a current agreement (i.e. 'extra-ordinary' negotiations), the agreed (implicitly) procedure was for the Union to write a letter which would be considered by the Employers' Association, possibly debated at Council and the decision would be gazetted or a "Gentleman's" agreement made whereby the decision though not immediately gazetted was implemented.

A feature of negotiations was that often bargaining continued after the expiry of the agreement that was being re-negotiated. Technically, at these time

points no rules bound unions or employers. This "technicality" was overcome by a "Gentleman's" agreement or by an application for an extension of the expiring agreement.

Substantive issues display a great deal of stability over the review period, if anything it is only the quantity of the issue that changes rather than any shift in the quality of issues negotiated over. The issues are nearly exclusively what structuration theory deems "allocative resources" about which more will be said when dealing with 'structure' later in this section.

At a different level of analysis, routinisation can be discerned by reviewing the financial statements of the councils, the funds they administer and those of the unions. The financial statements provide a method of classifying action and such action is recursively reported over the review period reinforcing the idea of a duree or continuity of (this kind of) social action. Equally, employment figures for the different regions give a picture of large numbers of people "going to work" each day, data provided on the form of employment (i.e. Age, Sex, Entrances and Absenteeism) also indicates not only 'form' changes but also the continuity of practice.

Routinization should not be viewed as in some way representing a fixed state. The very nature of the social agent as being 'knowledgeable' and maintaining a (reflexive) monitoring activity negates such a view. Again, the changes to the financial statements can be seen to represent decisions taken. These will be based on the knowledgeability of the decision maker as well as monitoring activity conducted.

Structuration theory also emphasizes the importance of 'significantly placed actors' who influence conditions such that they remain much the same or who attempt to change conditions. A review of minutes from meetings of employers and meetings of unions indicates the influence chairmen and secretaries play in presenting information and argument which will influence the knowledge content of their members. In Natal (for example) the employers' chairman argues the need for substantial wage increases, equally the secretary for the union argues the poor state of the economy to get membership ratification of a new agreement which does not meet with expectations, both succeed in persuading their membership of the correctness of their proposals.

8.5 STRUCTURE

Structure in structuration theory refers to both (i) rules and resources and (ii) sets of transformative relations. Structure then, is to be viewed in terms of the structuring properties "which make it possible for discernably similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systematic' form" (1).

8.5.1 Transformative Relations

The industrial relations system in the garment industry abounds with 'sets of transformative relations'. The industrial councils are a property of the system of industrial relations representing a set of transformative relations. The industrial council (in all regions) 'describes' the transformative relations between employers and union and the results of these relationships impact on the 'Conditions of Employment' as they affect those whom the parties represent. Industrial council relations 'transform' wages benefits/costs derived from membership of the industry, evidence of which can be seen in the changes to the minimum wages paid, to changes in contribution

to funds and to changes in benefits available from funds. The funds, like the industrial councils, are managed by employer and union representatives through a full-time council employee and can be characterised as sets of transformative relations.

Employers and unions in turn have what may be termed 'internal' transformative relations. Employers call annual general meetings and elect an executive committee to represent that body. There are, in addition, ordinary general meetings held at which decisions are taken which will transform members relationships with employees (it should be noted that 'labour' is one of a number of possible issues that are dealt with at such meetings and thus such practices are (potentially) 'transformative' in respect of a number of collectivities other than labour).

Unions regularly hold shop steward meetings as well as annual general meetings. These too are sets of transformative relations organised as properties of the union seen as a system, which (like the employers associations) is integrated through relations of autonomy and dependence with the wider - garment manufacturing - industrial relations system.

Transformative relations, as organised properties of the industrial relations system, with the state seem to be few, there are representations to wage boards when such boards are convened. Equally, when the state initiates commissions of enquiries, representations are made by both employers and unions but the occurrence of such relations are more a function of state initiative than either unions or employers. Nevertheless, it must be added that unions and employers through their national associations do have relations with the state which can be viewed as at least, potentially, transformative.

Both unions and employers have relationships between their respective regional organisations. The unions have a "Consultative Committee" at which information and experiences are shared. For employers the National Clothing Federation of S.A. serves a similar purpose.

The transformative relations then represent part of the properties of the industrial relations system through which "discernably similar social practices" are seen to exist over time and space and in so doing giving systematic form. It must, however, be emphasized that "structure exists as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (2).

8.5.2 Rules and Resources

8.5.2.1 Rules

'Rules' are to be viewed as "techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (3), and an awareness of rules "is the very core of that 'knowledgeability' which specifically characterizes human agents" (4). Rules, however, present something of an analytical problem.

Formulated rules are those which refer to those given "verbal expression as canons of law, bureaucratic rules, rules of games and so on" (5). They are as such codified interpretations of rules and are not to be taken as "exemplifying rules in general" (6). Most rules are only "tacitly grasped by actors" (7) and this then requires some interpretive licence on the part of the analyst. It becomes necessary to infer rules from what is recursively said and done by actors in the production and reproduction of social action.

Industrial relations in the garment industry readily reflects formulated rules. The Industrial Conciliation Act, Group Areas Act and the Physical Planning and Resources Act are just a few of the 'canons of law'. Bureaucratic rules abound in the administration of the various funds and the administration of agreements between employers and unions, e.g. sick fund benefits and closed shop rules.

Rules are also to be viewed as having close connections with sanctions and this can be viewed as an aid in identifying the 'tacitly grasped' rules.

The minutes of industrial council meetings that record the proceedings of negotiations for a new agreement or interim adjustments can be interpreted to reflect rules drawn upon by the actors in the production and reproduction of these relations. The agreements essentially deal with allocative resources and with the exception of the 'closed shop', the negotiated agreements reflect no attempt on the part of the unions to influence managerial control over authoritative resources. There is no evidence of unions attempting to negotiate conditions of redundancy, or any attempt to control definitions of job requirements. The 'managerial prerogative' of 'hiring and firing' is essentially left unaddressed with the exception of the Closed Shop rule - which only prescribes Union membership after employment. The unions do attempt to get qualification periods (i.e. from trainee to qualified) reduced but its intent is the faster acquisition of higher levels of wages.

It is then possible to argue that a tacitly held rule of negotiations is that 'job control' issues (see as an 'extreme' example the British Typographical Union of the early 1980's) do not form part of negotiations.

This will be commonly held and it is likely that strong sanctions would be invoked by employers should unions introduce such issues to the negotiations.

The often stated support, particularly in the Cape and Natal, for the council as the appropriate means of negotiating conditions of employment is also bound up with the notion that the industrial council is the appropriate vehicle for conflict handling. Employers in the Transvaal express a great deal of dissatisfaction with the N.U.C.W. when that union is seen to resort to utilising the Industrial Court as set up by the Labour Relations Act. This action is seen to be an attempt to resolve issues outside the industrial council and draws a negative response from employers. Employers invoke sanctions saying that it had a mandate not to sign any new agreement "until it was sure which direction the National Union was going" (see Transvaal section, Part B, p.297). The unstated rule being that labour issues in the industry are to be handled/resolved by the council.

Over the years 1968-1986 there is not one case of negotiations breaking down to the extent of the parties going to arbitration (in terms of the I.C. Act), or of official strike action being taken. Whilst the threat of 'deadlock' is raised in Transvaal negotiations, there appears to be a general reluctance to engage in such a strategy (see Transvaal section, Part B, p.287)(see also Cape section, Part B, p.183). Rules of conflict resolution appear to suggest that the council is deemed (by both parties) to be the appropriate vehicle. 'Illegal' strikes which occur in the Cape and Transvaal are illustrative when employers sanctioning behaviour is studied (see Cape section, Part B, p.194-95).

In addition, the constructs identified earlier suggest 'rules'; there are many references to, firstly, the need to maintain and grow the industry (particularly in the Cape and Natal and pre-1980 Transvaal); secondly, unions (specifically Natal and Cape) continually emphasize to their members the union's role in developing their industries. Interpreting these statements suggests that there exists some tacit rule of not pushing demands to the point where the existence and growth of the industry is threatened. Three points flow from this. Firstly, such an argument (in all three centres) is very much a strategy of employers. Secondly, the union bargainers have control of both allocative and authoritative resources associated with the administration of their union and experience benefits from such control (see the various income statements in respect of salaries/wages, motor cars, overseas trips, payment for shop steward meetings, provident/pension fund contributions, honoraria, etc.). Thirdly, there are also numerous references to the positive working relationship between employers and the union, largely an employers statement and to be found in the Cape and Natal with the T.C.M.A. reflecting a (perceived) sharp decline in their level of satisfaction with their (union) relations. These expressions, in turn, can be interpreted to suggest that Employers value the maintenance of 'good' relations with their union and as such there will be 'rules' which would avoid extreme confrontation leading to a deterioration in relations and to (perceived) disruptive behaviour on the part of their union. Flowing from this observation it can be argued that whilst the union might be seen in a subordinate position to employers (in terms of control over resources at the I.C. level), they possess the ability to influence employers' actions, i.e. those thought to be in a superior position. This is illustrative of the notion of the 'Dialectic of Control', of relations of

autonomy and dependence and consequent system integration. It also helps to clarify the concept of 'Power' in structuration theory as in these relations power is identified in interaction in 'resources' which act as its media.

It is self-evident that closely bound up in the 'rules' as portrayed above, will be the notion of 'sanction'. The threat of relocation and the decline of the industry act as breaks on Union action, whilst that of employee dissatisfaction and their unwillingness to accept employment can be seen as potential sanctions on employer action, which in turn can be 'used' by the parties to legitimate their action to their members.

It is also possible to speculate (albeit tentatively) that individual workers are aware (tacitly) of rules; the pattern of entrances, the largely female labour force, the age distributions all suggest an 'instrumental' approach to employment in the industry. Generally speaking, the industry is made up of female machinists who reflect multiple entrances into the industry and who (generally) leave the industry after reaching 40 years of age. These behaviour patterns suggest a particular 'knowledgeability' allowing the tentative conclusion that individuals view the prime purpose of employment as that of dealing with (relatively) short-term economic circumstances which they find themselves in. It is difficult to argue that the mass of the workforce have career aspirations associated with employment in the clothing industry. This characterisation of the labour force also holds important implications for understanding shop steward and union action.

It is likely, given this characterisation of the labour force, that unions will be more concerned about the remuneration of its membership rather than the longterm employment (career) prospects of the membership. Furthermore, because of the short-term perspective of the labour force (implied in the above characterisation) there is likely to be little in the way of upward pressure, i.e. from the rank-and-file to shop stewards to Union executive. The minutes of Union general meetings and shop steward meetings are essentially supportive of the action of their union executive's action. However, evidence for this interpretation is not substantial and represents a research avenue for future study.

8.5.2.2 Resources

Resources in structuration theory are classified as either allocative - those generating command over "objects, goods or material phenomena", or authoritative "generating command over persons or actors" (8). Resources can be viewed as forms of transformative capacity.

The industrial councils in their administration of an agreement exercises (delegated) control over both types of resources. Mechanisms in the form of 'Inspectors' monitor employer compliance of the wage and benefits negotiated by the parties and in their administration of the various funds ensure compliance to the (bureaucratic) rules and law. Equally, employers have control over allocative and authoritative resources (in the workplace) whilst the union essentially has authoritative control over its membership in so far that it is possible for the union to get its membership to pursue a range of activities, e.g. 'go slows', 'work-to-rule', 'strikes'.

Employers negotiate the distribution of allocative resources and are expected to ensure that their members abide by the agreed distribution. Employers also have control over the work force in the sense that they can 'hire-and-fire', promote, select, train and so on. As mentioned earlier a major facet of industrial relations in the clothing industry is the concentration of negotiating issues on allocative issues to the virtual exclusion of authoritative issues. 'Man' management practices are left to the discretion of Employers and are not dealt with by council.

Collective bargaining in industrial councils can be seen to be institutionalised and has a transformative capacity generating command essentially over 'objects, goods or material phenomena' as well as generating command over actors to comply with the agreements which in turn focus exclusively on objects, goods or material phenomena.

Structure can be viewed in the encapsulating notion of the prime rule of signification as 'an ability to compete'. The rule of legitimation associated therewith can in turn be encapsulated in the notion of 'collapse of the industry', and both are focused through the facility of respective industrial councils, i.e. the structural feature of domination.

8.6


STRUCTURATION

Structuration refers to the "Conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structure and therefore the reproduction of social systems" (9).

In the analysis of industrial relations in the garment industry a syntagmatic dimension is to be distinguished from the paradigmatic. A cross-sectional analysis will identify patterns of

action at a point in time and whilst of importance, a longitudinal analysis that provides understanding of the dynamic involved in the production and reproduction of social systems must also command attention.

In the analysis of the industrial relations system, entry at a particular moment will identify a particular structure. In this structure it is possible to identify three structural dimensions, those of signification, domination and legitimation, which in turn can only be separated for purposes of analysis. Signification and legitimation deal specifically with the notion of rules, and domination refers to resources. In introducing 'movement' into the analysis, the modalities of production and reproduction need to be identified. These (in structuration theory) are respectively, "interpretive schemes", "norms" and "facilities". Giddens's diagram clarifies,



(10)

The actors in the garment industry are 'knowledgeable' and monitor their action context. At the industrial council negotiations their 'interpretive schemes' have been identified using construct theory and it is evident how closely 'cost of living' factors are monitored, how the notion of employers' ability to 'compete' is an integral part of the employers interpretive scheme, how the Transvaal union is aware of 'more militant' workers, how the Natal union (and

the Cape) specifically reject 'political' issues from the concerns of the Union. How the Cape and Natal unions (and initially the Transvaal union) value the continuation and development of their industry. How the change in the Industrial Conciliation Act is monitored and together with the (proportional) decline of white and coloured workers in the Transvaal and the registration of the N.U.C.W. changes the relationships between the parties to the Transvaal union. In Natal the Labour Relations Act sees the union facing a challenge to its bargaining status which is 'monitored' by the union and strategies to fend off the challenge are initiated. The agents are knowledgeable and monitor their action context.

The rules associated with this knowledgeability have an additional characteristic intimately involved in the actors' interpretive schemes, and there are 'norms' which in interaction can be identified through sanctions applied. Sanctions at the industrial council level of analysis are more specifically a potential threat rather than actually implemented. However, in the Transvaal employers refuse to bargain until "illegal" strikes are stopped, but this is the only exercise of a sanction, but this in no way diminishes the parties respective knowledgeability of potential sanctions bound up in the relations between them.

The 'facilities' through which domination is exercised will be the industrial council and the funds which it administers on behalf of the parties.

Negotiations at the industrial council represent adjustments to resources controlled by employers and unions. Employers have control over both allocative and authoritative resources in terms of both the production units they represent and the control delegated by the membership of that collectivity. The

unions, in turn, are thought to have authoritative control in respect of their membership. This control in the garment industry is essentially related to the withholding of labour (a potential sanction). As already pointed out no union holds authoritative resources in terms of factory specific activity (i.e. job control). Such resources are held exclusively by employers.

The negotiations represent a specific kind of interaction and power-being inherent in all interaction - will be evidenced in these interactions. The industrial council is the facility by which domination, (i.e. the mobilisation of resources is expressed through power in interaction) is evidenced. The agreements reached by the parties can be viewed as the outcome of the interaction and will reflect the asymmetries of signification, domination and legitimation at the same time producing the conditions for reproduced relations between the collectivities.

The asymmetries of distribution of signification, domination and legitimation can be characterised as being biased towards the achievement of the (sectional) interests of employers. The structure of industrial relations in the garment industry thus cannot be characterised as corporatist (with the State as a 'sleeping' partner) nor is there any basis for suggesting a form of "joint management" of the industry. Control over allocative and authoritative resources lies in the hands of employers and the union's 'knowledgeability' excludes the possibility of action which might detract from the stability and growth of the industry. This is specifically true for the Cape and Natal region whilst there is some evidence of the link between union activity and the 'well-being' of the industry being at least severely strained in the Transvaal region.

8.7 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE S.A. CLOTHING
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

A review of the analyses of collective bargaining in the Cape, Transvaal and Natal industrial councils leads necessarily to the conclusion that the sectional interests of employers dominate proceedings. In all three provinces employers have been able to control labour costs such that wages and contributions to funds have been kept below the increase rate of the Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.). In addition, employers have at least kept the inter-provincial minimum wage rate differentials the same or, as in the case of Natal, allowed minimum wages to approach that of other regional competitors. Furthermore, bargaining in all three provinces has ensured the continuity of the practice of negotiating solely over 'material' rewards.

The achievements of employers contributes to the characterisation of the provincial unions as 'conservative' or 'lacking militancy'. A further element relating to their 'political' activity further classifies them as conservative; all three unions were affiliated to T.U.C.S.A. described by Natrass and Ardington (12) as a "middle of the road" grouping. All three unions disavow any political role and in Natal's case are actively hostile toward the National Union of Textile Workers attempt to represent clothing workers, warning their membership to beware of the N.U.T.W's political nature. A further factor adding to this description of the three unions relates to their never (over the review period) having pushed their demands either to the point of arbitration, or to the extent of a legal strike which, whilst difficult in terms of the I.C. Act, both before and after amendments to the I.C. Act, was possible.

This characterisation of the unions is not to be taken as suggesting that the unions did not display an "intensity of conviction, effort and feeling" (13) in bargaining. The analyses utilising Walton and McKersie's (14) model indicates the overwhelming reliance on 'distributive' and 'attitudinal structuring' behaviour, and whilst there might be some suggestion of posturing this must be doubted given the number and duration of meetings required prior to an agreement being reached. The available evidence (i.e. the minutes to the negotiations as well as Union and employer documentation reflecting feedback to their constituencies) suggests high levels of union commitment to their, albeit narrow, material objectives. There is no evidence of 'encroaching control' referred to by Hyman (15) to describe a union's role in limiting the power of employers.

Hyman (16) does, however, recognise that the role of unions is shaped significantly by the historical conditions in which it operates. It can then be argued that the political economy of South Africa was such that it limited the role of unions to a restricted range of activities. The conditions of interaction as stipulated under the I.C. Act, certainly up to 1979, was such that the Minister of Labour was empowered to decide whether or not to publish the (negotiated) Agreement and could thus refuse publication if elements of the Agreement conflicted with State political ideology. The threat by the State's representative at the Transvaal negotiations of 1974 is indicative of this possibility. Furthermore, the range of security legislation which had been utilised against African unionists and an awareness thereof would act as a further constraint on the activities of clothing unions.

The change in industrial relations legislation begun in 1979 does change - partially - the historical conditions under which collective bargaining could take place, and did introduce the phenomena of plant level bargaining, recognition agreements, grievance and disciplinary procedures, redundancy agreements, the concept of unfair labour practices, the Industrial Court and other features associated with this time period. However, there is essentially no evidence of these aspects in any of the industrial councils reviewed in this thesis. The possibility of incorporating at least some of these features did exist in terms of the legal arrangements prescribed by the amended I.C. Act (later the Labour Relations Act). The minutes of the Transvaal Council indicate strong resistance from employers at any suggestion of the use of the Industrial Court, whilst in Natal the G.W.I.U. resists the activities of an emerging union, the conservative nature of bargaining and the 'lack of militancy' is a continuing feature of all three regions even though contextual changes allowed the possibility of more militant action on the part of the three unions.

In addressing the reasons for the character of collective bargaining in all three regions, a number of factors will be identified as contributing to the understanding of the 'lack of militancy'. Firstly, over many decades and under constraining historical conditions, relationships were built around the regions respective industrial councils which were valued by the parties but which carried greater benefits to the union than employers. Secondly, there is the issue of the respective unions' relationship with their membership. These two factors are interwoven and neither can be said to be more significant than the other.

All three industrial councils had been in operation since at least the mid- 1930's, and had over a period of time established a number of funds, the nature of which provides some understanding of how the unions viewed their role as unions. Provident funds, Medical benefit/aid schemes and employee wage protection against 'slack time' (Transvaal only) and protection from insolvencies are common benefit mechanisms, flowing from these funds various other (associated) benefits are evident, thus the Provident funds provided loans for housing and in the Cape and Natal medical clinics were started to provide services to employees. The Training Fund in the Cape and Transvaal drew contributions from both employer and employee and can be taken as evidence of the Unions' concern for stable and growing employment.

The funds can be viewed as symbolic in that they identify aspects of conditions of employment considered important to the union, and if not important to employers (which is not suggested), they do at least represent an employer's view of their (the funds) reasonableness as a feature of conditions of employment. The bargaining relationship will have been influenced in turn by the perceived successes or failures in achieving objectives in regard to contributions and benefits. All three unions and employer bodies state a satisfaction with their relationship with each other over the greater part of the review period. It is only in the Transvaal that the relationship begins to deteriorate with the arrival of the National Union of Garment Workers, as initially a bargaining partner with the G.W.U. of S.A. and later as the only worker representative body.

As has been shown in the Cape region discussion on collective bargaining, the benefits of negotiating at the industrial council to employers revolve around their ability to control and predict labour costs and the maintenance of not just their regional inter-firm competition but also inter-regional competition. For all three unions (and the parallel unions in the Transvaal and Natal) their ability to effect those activities which are taken as important to the unions is very dependent on the 'guaranteed' cash flow; the industrial council also provides a vehicle for ensuring minimum levels of wages and conditions of employment across the whole industry. The absence of such an arrangement would have major organising implications for any union (see Morris's (17) reasoning for the N.U.M.S.A. policy change). Again, without the industrial council the unions' resources which are applied to non-organising activities would have to be applied to organising activities, thus impacting on their ability to conduct different activities (e.g. the G.W.I.U's Help-U Fund, the union newspapers in the Cape and Transvaal).

Gools' (18) observation of the "atomisation" of the productive process is also of relevance in understanding the 'value' of the council to union functioning. All three regions have many employers spread over a wide geographical area. In Natal the chairman of the N.C.M.A. observes in 1986 that some 131 out of 409 employers had less than 20 employees covered by the agreement. Morris's (19) reasons for the N.U.M.S.A. policy change (as reported in the Cape section) also include the difficulties generated by many employers spread over a wide geographical area.

The benefits derived by the union through the industrial councils can be seen to influence their willingness to maintain its existence. This can be seen not only in terms of the above mentioned benefits, but also in action taken, thus the unions (and employers) are willing to adjust contribution rates when industrial councils show recurring deficits from funding the councils administration of agreements. In addition, union secretaries make frequent reference to the high value they place on the industrial councils.

The value placed on the efficient functioning of industrial councils will act as a further constraint on unions in terms of the degree of conflict they are willing to endure in pursuit of their demands, as the implied threat of the collapse of the councils is evident in what would happen if no agreement was negotiated; and even if an agreement was negotiated, the possibility existed that the council system might collapse because of the relocation by employers to so called 'border' areas.

The constructs utilised in bargaining by the regional unions show a great concern for growing and stable employment. Relocation of factories because of an unsatisfactory agreement would not only affect the unions activities, but would negatively impact on employment levels in the region. It is only in the Transvaal in the later part of the review period where there is evidence of the diminishing influence of this objective of the union, and this in a region showing a long term decline in employment levels. The Natal and Cape unions use the growing and stable employment to justify their bargaining outcomes.

Maree (20) and Nicol (21) highlight the role of union leadership in relation to issues of union democracy and the lack of militancy. There is evidence drawn

from the minutes of union meetings of how the union officials do temper expectations particularly of shop stewards. This is particularly evident in Natal and the Cape union minutes, although Natal minutes do record the union officials calling for proposals (to be negotiated over) from shop stewards. What is particularly evident from the minutes is the support expressed by shop stewards for the efforts of the negotiating team, especially as in the Cape when an interim increase was negotiated. Of significance also is that there is no evidence of any attempt by the shop stewards to either widen the issues to be negotiated over or to insist on a strike in order to achieve their objectives. If anything, these meetings are characterised by the quote from a general meeting of the G.W.U. of the 12th June, 1972. After presenting what were to be the union demands to employers in the forthcoming negotiations, a mandate is given to the executive to "obtain the best possible offer for the workers" (see Cape Supporting Statements - 1972 Negotiations).

In addressing the question of the continuity of the bargaining behaviour of union representatives, it can be seen from the regional data that there is little or no pressure by rank and file members on shop stewards, and consequently on the leadership of the unions. Kaplan (22) in an interview conducted with the Deputy General Secretary of the N.U.G.W. shows that shop stewards were elected on the basis of one per a maximum of fifty workers, or one to a minimum of ten workers. There is no evidence from the other unions to suggest a different electoral format, and given the regional similarities it is likely that the other unions had similar election rules. This ratio is similar to that identified by Maree in his discussion on the rise of shop steward influence in British industrial relations of the 1960's and argues that,

"The pressure on shop stewards to be representative of a small number of members was therefore much higher than the pressure could be on more remote officials" (23). The ability of shop stewards to action their representativeness will take place through meetings with union officials. The evidence available to this research suggests that such meetings were not frequent. Table 20 of the Natal region indicates that shop stewards and union officials met some four times a year. Whilst data on the Cape and Transvaal regions was not available, it is likely that a similar pattern existed. It is unlikely, then, that the frequency of meetings was conducive to wide ranging and continuous debate about bargaining issues. It must, however, be pointed out that the union structure in the Cape and Transvaal indicates a number of branches which are likely to have had meetings. Again, the legal constraints of the I.C. Act would limit the ability of union officials to conduct frequent meetings with the membership, i.e. the restrictions in terms of the racial character of such meetings.

The lack of pressure on shop stewards to widen the bargaining issues is likely to be sourced in the suggestion of the "instrumental orientation" (24) identified in all three regions. The pattern of entrances to the different regional industries can be interpreted as representative of a 'short term' attitude toward employment, and as such is unlikely to result in pressure on the shop stewards to pursue a programme designed to encroach on managerial control in the workplace, provided the short term objectives of the workforce are met. In addition to the likely results of the workforce's entrance/exit patterns on shop steward behaviour, must be the issue of labour turnover. In all three regions labour turnover is

suggested to be unacceptably high (from the employer's perspective), but it is only in the Cape region that data was available to indicate the degree of such turnover and only for the industry as a whole.

Table 11 (Cape region) shows the level of labour turnover to range from a low of 61.3% to a high of 93.7% in any one year. This volume of inter-factory movement (and withdrawals from the industry) are not likely to develop long term relationships with shop stewards and will influence to degree of pressure experienced by shop stewards. In addition, if the shop stewards in turn reflect similar labour turnover, the continuity of representation is also likely to be adversely affected. Whilst empirical data is only available for the Cape region, the issue of labour turnover is to be found in the other regions and if their turnover is similar, the logic of the lack of pressure on shop stewards in the Cape region will be just as applicable in Natal and Transvaal.

The issue of labour turnover provides the possibility of a further interpretation in understanding of the lack of militancy. The rank and file membership may well believe that their material (wage) objectives cannot readily be achieved by the union (for whatever reason) and have 'discovered' that moving from one factory to another can raise their wages. The rate of turnover in the Cape region is closely related to the economic cycle, and the possibility exists that this serves as a mechanism to raise their wage rate. There is also evidence that the minimum wage rate as negotiated is not the actual wage paid (see Meeting No. 1, 1975, Cape Negotiations, "Supporting Statements" 1971, Transvaal Negotiations, Meeting No. 1, 1985, Transvaal Negotiations 1976, Extra-ordinary Negotiations Natal). The extent of this, however, is unknown as data kept by the industrial councils was inadequate to arrive at any finality about actual wages paid.

The interpretations placed on the regional patterns of entrances/exits from employment in the industry and the labour turnover data need to be treated with care in arriving at conclusions. The data can be viewed as objective empirical data which requires subjective data - drawn from the respective labour forces - before any finality of conclusion can be established. However, these (tentative) conclusions, together with the arguments concerning the relationships established through the industrial councils and their value to the negotiating parties, the role of the leadership of the unions, the 'atomisation' of production and the contextual factors provide a convincing explanation of the lack of militancy in the clothing manufacturing industry of South Africa.

CONCLUSION

The observed lack of militancy in the regional unions of the garment manufacturing industry can be understood in terms of the earlier discussion in this chapter on the 'structure' of collective bargaining in the industry, which was encapsulated in the idea of the maintenance of the managerial prerogative, i.e. favouring the sectional interests of employers. It is in structuration theory's conceptualisation of 'system' that the inevitability of the lack of militancy is to be evidenced.

Systems, in structuration theory, are characterised by a number of features; firstly, it is the continuity and durability of identifiably similar behaviour which allows the description of certain social practices as a 'system' to be arrived at, Secondly, systems have 'structure' which is drawn upon by knowledgeable actors for the production and reproduction of social practices (collective bargaining in this thesis).

Knowledgeable actors 'reflexively monitor' their environment which may constrain or facilitate their activities. Thirdly, systems reflect mechanisms of integration, i.e. reciprocity of practices of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities. Lastly, the boundaries of systems are not rigidly demarcated, thus 'distant contexts' can also constrain or facilitate action.

Collective bargaining in the South African garment industry can readily be described as a system (this has been shown in section 8.2 of this chapter) and the 'structure' of the system has been identified and argued to favour the sectional interests of employers (see section 8.5 of this chapter). It will be this structure which is drawn on in the production and reproduction of collective bargaining action, and not just by one party to the bargaining encounter. Thus the unions in their action will draw on the rules of signification and legitimation and the resources of domination, all of which have been shown to favour the sectional interests of employers. It follows therefore that their actions will lack militancy, given that militancy in this thesis is conceived of as not in the interest of employers (as clarified in Chapter 2, section 2.2).

The continuity of the lack of militancy over the review period is readily addressed by structuration theory's conception of change; structure exists as 'memory traces' in the interpretive scheme of knowledgeable actors who monitor the behaviour of others (and expect the same of their behaviour), and it is in this monitoring that changes may occur. It has also been argued in this thesis that construct theory can be utilised to understand particular 'interpretive schemes'. What is important is that

core constructs are difficult to change (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). The union leadership will monitor its environment as shown earlier in this chapter, and this introduces the possibility of change. Again, in structuration theory 'significantly placed actors' (for our purpose, union leadership) can keep things as they are or can introduce change.

With the exception of the later part of the Transvaal region, all unions had the same secretary although the various executives may have reflected membership changes, and furthermore, the analysis presented in this thesis suggest that a core construct (a rule of signification) embraces the importance placed by the Union leadership on the industrial council as the appropriate bargaining mechanism. The industrial council is also symbolic of what behaviours are considered reasonable, i.e. the structure of collective bargaining and will represent core constructs.

The preceding discussion argues that for a change in the 'structure' of collective bargaining a change of either (or both) the current leadership or a change in their 'interpretive scheme' is required, neither occurs in the industry over the review period.

The arguments Gool, Maree and Morris (see section 8.7 of this chapter) all can be understood in structuration theory's observation that 'significantly placed actors' (i.e. the leadership) can try and keep things as they are. Effectively this means the maintenance of the leaderships interpretive scheme and thus the continuity of drawing on structure (in the production and reproduction of action), which is characterised as favouring the sectional interests of employers. The argument added to those above which suggests a lack of pressure from rank-and-file

membership on the various union leaderships means that in the leaderships' 'reflexive monitoring' activities no reason for change in their 'interpretive schemes' will be encountered. In both cases the leadership will continue to draw on the 'rules and resources' (i.e. structure) of collective bargaining of their region and in so doing perpetuate the continuity of behaviours identified as lacking in militancy.

Structuration theory then provides a plausible explanation of the system of collective bargaining in the South African garment manufacturing industry and can draw together a variety of arguments to establish an equally plausible explanation of the continuity of action in the industry for the period 1968 - 1986.

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PRIMARY RESEARCH MATERIALCape Region

- (i) Minutes of the Cape Industrial Council.
- (ii) Minutes of the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association.
- (iii) Minutes of Shop Steward and Union Exco. Meetings.
- (iv) Industrial Council for Clothing Industry (Cape) - Annual Report.
- (v) Financial Reports of the Industrial Council (Cape).
- (vi) Financial Reports of Funds Administered by the Industrial Council for the Cape.
- (vii) Financial Reports of the Garment Workers Union (Cape).
- (viii) Pension Fund Records of Industrial Council of the Cape.
- (ix) Government Gazettes - Clothing Industry of the Cape, Main Agreement.

Transvaal Region

- (i) Minutes of the Transvaal Industrial Council.
- (ii) Minutes of the Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association.
- (iii) Transvaal Clothing Industry Diary.
- (iv) Industrial Council for Clothing Industry (Tvl) - Annual Report.
- (v) Financial Reports of the Industrial Council (Tvl).
- (vi) Financial Reports of Funds Administered by the Industrial Council for the Transvaal.
- (vii) Financial Reports of the Garment Workers Union (Tvl).
- (viii) Pension Fund Records of Industrial Council of the Transvaal.
- (ix) Government Gazettes - Clothing Industry of the Transvaal, Main Agreement.

Natal Region

- (i) Minutes of the Natal Industrial Council.
- (ii) Minutes of the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association.
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