

GREENE'S RESOURCE
THEORY OF SINGLE-
PARTY DOMINANCE

Resources: a Force for Dominance or Party Erosion?

By Heidi Emberland Ulla

**A Theory Testing Case study using the African National
Congress (ANC) as a case**

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree Master of Politics

In Political Science

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2019

COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: *Date: 29/01/2019*

Word Count: 27 384 (Excluding Cover, Acronyms, Abstract, and Bibliography)

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Anthony Butler, for his patience, guidance and motivation throughout this research study. Thank you for creating a space in which I could develop and explore my own path, all the while steering me in the right direction whenever I needed it.

Second, this journey would not have been possible without the unconditional support of my parents, Berit Emberland and Pål Ulla. I would also like to thank my friends in both Norway and South Africa. To my friends in Norway, thank you for enduring my never-ending talks about South Africa. Special thanks are warranted to my long-term friends who have always been by my side despite the physical distance between us. To the friends that I have made in South Africa, internationals and locals alike, I would not be the person I am today without your wisdom, encouragement, love, and reassurance. To my dear South African friends, without your open-mindedness and welcoming attitudes Cape Town would not be the home it is today. To my beloved international friends, in the process of adapting to our new life we have shared feelings of pleasure and frustration countless times. Together, all of you have helped me navigate my place in a new country, and for that, I am endlessly grateful.

Abbreviations

ANC: African National Congress

BEE: Black Economic Empowerment

BB-BEE: Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa group

COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions

DPS: Dominant Party System

DTI: Department of Trade and Industry

ESKOM: South African Electricity Public Utility

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GEAR: Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme

GNU: Government of National Unity

IFP: Inkatha Freedom Party

IPO: Initial Public Offering

MK: uMkhonto we Sizwe

NEF: National Empowerment Fund

NGP: New Growth Path

NMOS: The National Macro Organisation of State Steering Committee

NP: National Party

NUMSA: The National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAC: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania

PAN: National Action Party

PARI: The Public Affairs Research Institute

PIC: Public Investment Corporation

PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party

RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme

SAA: South African Airways

SACP: South African Communist Party

SAFTU: South African Federation of Trade Unions

SOE: State-owned Enterprises

SPD: Single-party dominance

UK: United Kingdom

US: United States

Abstract

Single-party dominance (SPD) is a phenomenon that has puzzled many scholars within the field of political science, as it does not fit into the standard dichotomy of democracy versus dictatorship. Kenneth Greene's Resource Theory seeks to explain prolonged electoral dominance in these systems by looking at resource asymmetries between the governing party and the opposition. Greene applies his theory to democratic and non-democratic SPD systems alike. In order to expand knowledge in the field of SPD research, this thesis has provided a critical analysis of Greene's theory using South Africa under the ANC within the timeframe of 1994 to February 2018 as an illustrative case.

The thesis concluded that the Resource Theory could not be used for explaining ANC dominance, and indicated that resources have a limited power to explain SPD. As such, the aim of the thesis is to uncover theoretical weaknesses of the theory. Firstly, it is argued that the theory is weakened by the use of subjective and sometimes arbitrary concepts which hamper testability. The main theoretical flaw identified is Greene's assumptions of the nature of such systems, in which he sees the dominant party as one unit. I argue in this research that this assumption renders the theory unable to predict the consequences of factionalisation within the dominant party. Three main factors are identified to justify why resources have limited explanatory power. Firstly, factionalisation leads to intra-party competition for state resources, and these factions become dependent on a steady stream of resources to sustain themselves. This competition can become so fierce that the economy suffers. When resources become less available, these conflicts intensify. Consequently, the dominant party starts deteriorating from within and misconduct can no longer be concealed from the public. As the government becomes less responsive in terms of providing

public goods in combination with increased public awareness, voter dissatisfaction also intensifies. This eventually leads citizens to abandon their allegiance to the party. The research study shows that resources are not independent from external and internal environments, indicating that asymmetric resource advantages alone cannot explain why these systems exist over longer periods of time.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| TABLE OF FIGURES | 10 |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH STUDY | 11 |
| 1.1 INTRODUCTION | 11 |
| 1.2 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 12 |
| 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS | 22 |
| 1.4 OBJECTIVES AND RELEVANCE OF STUDY | 22 |
| 1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY..... | 23 |
| 1.6 LIMITATIONS | 24 |
| 1.7 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY | 25 |
| CHAPTER 2: KENNETH GREENE’S RESOURCE THEORY | 27 |
| 2.1 INTRODUCTION..... | 27 |
| 2.2 RESOURCE THEORY: CORE TENETS..... | 28 |
| 2.2.1 <i>Control Over the State Apparatus</i> | 28 |
| 2.2.2 <i>The Control of National Resources</i> | 29 |
| 2.2.3 <i>Clientelism, Patronage and Corruption as Enabling Single Party Dominance</i> | 31 |
| 2.3 THE ROLE OF POLICY APPEALS | 34 |
| 2.4 COST OF PARTICIPATION | 35 |
| 2.5 GREENE’S RESOURCE THEORY ON WHY DOMINANCE ENDS..... | 37 |
| 2.6 CONCLUSION..... | 38 |
| CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF POLICY APPEALS IN SUSTAINING DOMINANCE | 40 |
| 3.1 INTRODUCTION..... | 40 |
| 3.2 GREENE’S POLICY APPEALS ASSUMPTIONS | 41 |

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 3.3 THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) AND MAINTAINING PARTY DOMINANCE..... | 42 |
| 3.3.1 African National Congress (ANC) Electoral Dominance | 42 |
| 3.3.2 The Historical Legacy of the ANC's 'Broad Church' | 44 |
| 3.3.3 Defining Policy Preferences in a Changing Society..... | 45 |
| 3.3.4 ANC's Policy Shifts Following the Transition | 47 |
| 3.4 CONSTRAINTS, CHANGING ENVIRONMENT AND PARTY FRAGMENTATION | 50 |
| 3.5 CONCLUSION..... | 56 |
| CHAPTER 4: PATRONAGE EMPLOYMENT AND SINGLE PARTY DOMINANCE | 60 |
| 4.1 INTRODUCTION | 60 |
| 4.2 POLITICAL PATRONAGE..... | 61 |
| 4.2.1 Defining Patronage Contracts..... | 61 |
| 4.2.2 The Power of Controlling Patronage Positions..... | 63 |
| 4.3 PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA..... | 64 |
| 4.4 UNIONS AND SUSTAINING PARTY DOMINANCE | 70 |
| 4.4.1 Congress of South African Trade Unions | 71 |
| 4.4.2 Benefits from Union-Party Partnership | 73 |
| 4.5 THE COST OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND UNION COOPERATION | 75 |
| 4.6 CONCLUSION..... | 80 |
| CHAPTER 5: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES..... | 82 |
| 5.1 INTRODUCTION..... | 82 |
| 5.2 CONTROL OVER SOES AND PARTY DOMINANCE | 82 |
| 5.3 THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA | 84 |
| 5.3.1 South Africa SOEs in Historic Perspective | 84 |
| 5.3.2 The Mbeki Administration's Relationship with SOEs..... | 85 |
| 5.3.3 Control of SOEs Under the Zuma Administration | 88 |
| 5.3.4 Corruption Under Mbeki and Zuma..... | 89 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| 5.4 THE USE OF STATE RESOURCES FOR PARTY BENEFITS | 94 |
| 5.4.1 <i>Resources and Electoral Dominance</i> | 96 |
| 5.5 CONCLUSION..... | 102 |
| CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION OF THESIS | 106 |
| 6.1 REVISITING THE PROBLEM STATEMENT..... | 106 |
| 6.2 FINDINGS..... | 107 |
| 6.4 EXPLAINING ANC DOMINANCE..... | 110 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 111 |

Table of Figures

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 1 ANC Election Results..... | 43 |
| Figure 2: Public sector employment- indices..... | 66 |
| Figure 3: Public sector employment (%ch y/y) | 67 |
| Figure 4: Wage developments in public and private sector (%ch y/y) | 77 |

Chapter 1: Introduction to Research Study

1.1 Introduction

Single-party dominance (SPD) is a phenomenon that has puzzled many scholars. As proclaimed by T.J. Pempel, “What makes long-term rule by a single political party [...] an enticing puzzle is not just that it is rare but that it is not supposed to happen. And the puzzle becomes more tantalizing the longer the period of uninterrupted single-party rule lasts (1990:5)”. Many scholars have focused on the causes and consequences of such systems (Brooks, 2004:1, Schleiter and Voznaya, 2014:675, Lodge, 1999:1, Forestiere and Allen, 2011:381, Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005:238). Kenneth F. Green proposes a theory to explain why certain parties persist in power for decades, as well as their eventual demise (2007a:3).

Greene argues that existing theories within the rational choice paradigm overpredict opposition party competitiveness and that are unable to explain why SPD exists. Greene’s (2007a:3-5) Resource Theory, derived from a rational choice model, aims to fill the gap in existing rational choice theories. At the core of his theory lies the notion that a dominant party’s advantages are twofold, the first being that dominant parties enjoy considerable resources advantages, which raises the cost of participation for opposition parties (Greene, 2007a:3-5) . His initial work focused on Mexico’s dominant party authoritarian regime, but he later argued that the fundamental elements of the theory could be extended to all dominant party regimes, authoritarian and democratic alike (Greene, 2010a:45).

Published in 2010, Greene stated that South Africa, under the ANC, had just become dominant as the party had reached the four-election threshold (2010a:23, 50-51). For those parties that had not yet reached the longevity threshold to be considered dominant, but encompass all the other

characteristics, Greene uses the term “proto-dominant party system” (2010a:23, 50-51). However, he asserts that his theory would most probably become applicable to South Africa (*Ibid*).

This thesis will take the form of a theory-testing case study, using the South African case under the ANC from the transition from authoritarianism in 1994 to the end of former President Zuma’s second term in 2018. The aim of this thesis is to assess the validity of Greene’s Resource Theory in the South African context.

1.2 Preliminary Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

As stated in the opening quote of this chapter, one-party dominance is not supposed to exist at all (Pempel, 1990:5), and its existence was often disregarded in early political science literature. For example, studies which classify regimes within the dichotomy of ‘democracies’ or ‘dictatorships’, tend to not recognise SPD regimes (Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix, 2003). Among those scholars who recognise SPD systems, they disagree upon a range of issues. Firstly, scholars disagree upon the operationalisation of the term. Moreover in studies devoted to the topic of SPDs, there is little consensus on what causes and sustains and them, and their effects on democratic consolidation.

In defining SPD systems, there needs to be a differentiation between SPD systems and one-party authoritarian regimes. For Pempel (1990:1) the vital distinction is the character of their democratic components, such as freedom of political association, free electoral competition and ‘relatively’ open information systems (*Ibid*). Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes (1974:593) argue that the distinction lies in two basic criteria of contestation and participation, as set out by Robert A. Dahl who stated, “since it is more than one party to compete, it is certainly democratic in the procedural sense. And since [...] it mobilizes the modal citizens of a society, it can be said to be substantively democratic as well” (1986:5). However, Pempel (1990:1) claims that these systems are stark

deviations from the expected norm of competitive democracy as they exhibit a lack of alternation of power over extensive time periods. For Greene (2010a:20) dominant party systems present a special type of system, as most nations across the world either fall into the category of fully competitive democracies where the rotation of power happens on a regular basis or fully closed authoritarian regimes where undemocratic tools guarantee that turnover does not happen. The third category, which is less common, is a dominant party system where a party stays in government for two to seven decades, where officeholders do not win by outcome-changing electoral fraud (*Ibid*).

SPD systems baffle scholars for a number of reasons. As Scheiner asserts, even in times of considerable dissatisfaction towards the ruling party there can still be cases where opposition parties do not win elections (2006:13). Often the election outcome is predicted before election day, which leads Greene to ask why these systems have opposition parties at all, instead of turning into authoritarian one-party regimes (2007a:3).

A number of scholars consider SPD systems to be a distinct category unsuitable within the democracy-authoritarian dichotomy. However, these scholars represent different views on the definitions and operationalisation of the term. Vagueness and sometimes arbitrary definitions have come under criticism by some scholars (Bogaards, 2004:192; Caulier and Dumont, 2005:2; Dunleavy, 2005:3-6). The origin of the term was first coined by Maurice Duverger (1963:308-9), according to whom:

“[A] party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch [...] Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength: it is also linked with belief. A dominant party is that which public opinion *believes* to be dominant.”

Those who adhere to the teachings of Duverger (1964:308) agree with his emphasis on ideological domination, but they take his starting point and add an electoral component. Duverger saw dominance not just as the strength of a certain party, but its influence as well. Pempel (1990:6) adds that the party is able to dictate the policy sphere and takes a privileged position as norm-setter, and its position is recognised by all the political parties and the general public. Giliomee and Simkins (1999:4) point to how the party is able to shape both society and the political system through its privileged position. Forestiere and Allen (2011:381) argue that the fusion of the party and the state allows the party to establish certain ideas within the political sphere, which sets the agenda for political action and solutions. The ideas of the party become social norms, which become increasingly entrenched and immutable over time.

The opponents of definitions such as Duverger's not only resist operationalisation, but also have a strong tendency to mix *descriptive* indicators of SPD itself with indicators of its presumed causes or effects, hence they preclude the testing of related casual hypotheses (Schneider and Abdedi, 2006:2). To escape this problem, more recent literature has held consensus on a 'generic' definition - in a dominant party regime, one and the same party controls government over an extended period of time, whether alone or as the most powerful party of a coalition (Schneider and Abdedi, 2006:2; Boucek, 1998:103; Cox, 1998:238; Weaver and Rockman, 1993:20).

Greene's (2010a:22) definition of SPD systems is found within the more 'generic' category. He provides us with a set of rules to distinguish dominant party systems from those with more regular democratic turnover in government, and from those where electoral dominance is epiphenomenal because fully closed authoritarian rule makes turnover through elections impossible. For him, "dominant party systems are polities with meaningful elections in which one party maintains the

ability to determine social choice through government policy for at least 20 consecutive years or four consecutive elections”. Meaningful elections, according to his definition, are when opposition parties are permitted to contest for power, and where there is an absence of outcome-changing fraud without which another party would have won the election (*Ibid*).

The temporal criteria laid out by Greene and other scholars do, however, raise some concerns. Different scholars have widely diverging temporal cut-off points. O’Leary’s (1994:4) argues that for a party to be classified as a SPD system, a party would need to be in office for ten years, whereas for Blondel (1968) it is twenty years. Pempel’s (1990:1-2) threshold is “three to five decades”, whilst Dunleavy’s assertion that it is ten, twelve, or more successive governments (2005: 7). Bogaard (2004:175) and Sartori (1976:196,199) argue for a minimum of three consecutive terms. These discrepancies also leave us with the question of an appropriate threshold as countries have different electoral systems and election cycles. Another key issue is whether dominance ends if the dominant party loses an election. Sartori (1976:196) argues that dominance ends after one electoral defeat, while Pempel (1990:335) and others allow for occasional and short absences from power that are followed by the party’s rejuvenation and another longer period of dominance, as in the case of Sweden’s Social Democrats (Schneider and Abedi, 2006:13). One of the major concerns with the varying definitions of temporal dominance is the possibility of setting the criteria for one’s own researchable purposes. For instance, Schneider and Abedi critique O’Leary’s definition for being solely motivated by labelling the British Conservatives after 1979 as dominant, without providing a sufficient theoretical rationale or empirical grounding (2006:13).

Greene argues that one may use the same logic to explain the persistence of authoritarian and democratic one-party dominance systems (2007a:259). The focus of Greene’s early work was dominant party authoritarian regimes in Mexico. In his later work he claimed that the theory works

for both democratic and authoritarian SPD systems (2010a:45). Both categories of dominant party gain control over the legislature and executive branches for many years, even though they hold regular and at least partially free and fair elections, where contending parties may compete for all elected posts. The difference is that democratic SPD systems tend to not apply authoritarian controls and are more likely to ensure that the surrounding freedoms are commensurate with democracy, as with the operation of electoral institutions (*Ibid*).

Beyond the debates surrounding definition and operationalisation are the debates concerning the causes of these systems, as well as their consequences for democracy. In terms of the consequences, Brooks (2004:1) expresses concern about how dominant party systems affect the 'quality' of democracy and democratic consolidation. When a party faces little prospect of electoral defeat, there is potential for a decline in government response to public opinion, loss of accountability and the overall erosion of democratic principles and the development of authoritarian methods of rule (*Ibid*). Schleiter and Voznaya (2014:675) contend that a competitive party system helps curb corruption since it enables opposition parties to inform the electorate about corruption and provide them with a viable alternative to the dishonest incumbent. Suttner (2006:277) and Lodge (1999: 10), however, are wary of the conclusion that dominant party systems hamper democracy. Suttner (2006:277) critiques the tendency of some scholars to make alarming predictions of some countries all the while dismissing them in others, and this reflects the scholars' ideological position rather than scholarship. For instance, few scholars have posed that the dominance of the Swedish Social Democrats was a major threat to democracy, while it is raised as problematic in Africa. For some scholars dominant parties are even desirable in some contexts. For example, Arian and Barnes perceive dominant parties as possible democratic forces

of stability in post-conflict societies (1974:592). For instance, The Indian Congress has at times been brought up as an example of this (Reddy, 2014:100).

This thesis is most concerned with the factors that sustain one-party dominance. As Greene's theory will be elaborated upon in detail in the next chapter, this literature review will only present it briefly. Greene's (2007:33) theory is about a dominant party's persistence and failure rather than the causation of dominance. He argues that there is a difference between the forces that cause one party dominance and the forces that sustain the system. For Greene, dominant party rule is sustained by the inherent "unfairness" of these systems as the dominant party is wealthier than the opposition, making opposition parties unable to compete (Greene, 2007a:5, 33). Another view, which does not directly oppose Greene's argument but cannot explain long-term dominance as argued by Greene (2010a:50-51), is the role of liberation legacies. Duverger's (1954:308) definition of party dominance, emphasises ideological domination, which led several scholars to argue that the definition included the cause of dominance (Schneider and Abdedi, 2006:2). For example, Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013:11) contend that in the context of Africa a number of the dominant parties were at the forefront of mobilising liberation struggles, and their liberation credentials, benefitted the dominant party in terms of votes. As such, the ideological position of the governing party is a cause of dominance.

Greene recognises that former liberation movement dominant parties reap the benefits of positive public opinion due to the symbolic effect, but argues that this is not sustainable (2010a:50-51). Eventually, he argues that citizens will cast their votes based on performance rather than on historical legacy, albeit the timing will differ between countries (*Ibid*). Forestiere and Allen (2011:381) present a different view, arguing that liberation credentials alter the political system. They call this 'cognitive locks', in which the privileged position of the party leads to a fusion of

the party and the state, thereby leading to the dominant party's ideas and practices becoming the norm in society. Over time, all political actors, as well as the majority of the population, accept these as the rule, and they become more entrenched and more challenging to undo (*Ibid*). For instance, Suttner argues that the prolonged rule of the Swedish Social Democrats has cemented the idea that a large welfare state with extensive benefits and high tax levels is the only suitable path for the country, and after their loss only minor modifications have been implemented (2003:283).

While many scholars have concurred with a SPD puzzle, some have argued that these systems are different in an African context. Since the beginning of the 1990s, many African nations have adopted democratic rule, and many of these states have turned into dominant systems, which have lasted over extended periods of time (Doorenspleet and Nizjink, 2013:1; O'Brien; 2003:220, Bogaards, 2004:172). These scholars maintain that there is a high number of African countries with one-party dominant systems when compared to more established democracies (*Ibid*). The scholarly debates of African dominant systems often revolve around 'African uniqueness', assumed causes and consequences (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005:400; Gilimoe and Simkins, 1991:1).

Mozaffar and Scarritt's (2005:399) claim that there is an 'African puzzle'. They state that Africa is unusual from a global perspective due to the overlapping of two characteristics: low ethno-political fragmentation and high volatility in the political system. Their work examines elections in 34 African countries between 1980 and 2000 to assess how ethno-political cleavages and electoral institutions interact to determine party system size. They conclude that high levels of ethno-political fragmentation are likely to increase the number of political parties, while district magnitude reduces the number of effective electoral and legislative parties in Africa (Mozaffar

and Scarritt, 2005:238; 384). These findings contradict previous research on party systems conducted in other places in the world, which demonstrates that ethnic fragmentation and district magnitude both increase party system size (Duverger, 1954; Powell, 1982; Riker, 1982; Neto and Cox, 1997).

These authors argue that voting behaviour in Africa is fundamentally different from the rest of the world. Van de Walle claims that one specific feature of many African countries is the combination of political competition which exists alongside widespread clientelism, poor developmental performance, and programmatically weak parties (2003:297). Kitschelt and Wilkinson define clientelism as the “direct exchange of citizen’s vote in return for direct payment or continuing access to employment, goods and services” (2007: 2). This has led a number of scholars to assume that voters in new democracies vote based on ethnic factors (Burnell, 2001:34; Nugent, 2001:2; Posner, 2005:217) or entrenched clientelistic networks (Vincete and Wantchekon, 2010:16), as opposed to the effectiveness of politicians to deliver collective or public goods.

In explaining what Mozaffar and Scarritt call the ‘African puzzle’ (2005:238,384) the authors argue that it is strategic choice, structured by the institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes in the formation and development of political parties, that explains contemporary single party dominance in post-colonial Africa. The authors state that the political restrictions present under authoritarian regimes produce information deficits concerning electoral mobilisation, strategic coordination and collective action that typically attend party formation and coalition-building. Under these constraints, political parties tend to rely on presidential elections and ethno-political cleavages to sustain their support, instead of electoral coalition-building. For Mozaffar and Scarrit, this leads to the entry of many short-lived political parties, and the electoral and legislative

dominance of a small number of large parties. This can result in low party system fragmentation and high levels of volatility (2005:399).

However, Mozaffar and Scarrit's position has been challenged based on their study's methodology and their conclusions. Bogaards (2008:125-130) argues that even though there are many instances of SPD in Africa, the notion that Africa is characterised by high volatility is flawed. He claims that the average level of electoral volatility is comparable to that seen in Latin America and Eastern Europe. As Mozaffar and Scarritt do not include regime type as a variable, the authors do not differentiate between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Therefore, Bogaards asserts that the volatility scores are higher than if they had only examined democratic states (2008:125-130). As such, although the volatility score is higher than that found in Western Europe, Africa is not "remarkable" when compared to other new democracies (*Ibid*).

While the scholars mentioned above state that voting behaviour is different in Africa, this view has, itself been challenged. While many scholars have claimed that ethnicity and clientelism determine voting patterns on the continent, instead of the effectiveness of politicians in delivering collective or public goods, Weghorst and Lindberg argue there is little evidence for this (2013:717). Elections in a number of new African democracies have been shown to be increasingly competitive. Even in a SPD where one party continues to stay in power, there is a high turn-over in government positions. One example provided by the authors shows that the re-election rate of legislative seat holders is often above 50 per cent. As such, these authors argue that these findings are incompatible with ethnic and clientelistic explanations of voting behaviour (*Ibid*). In sum, clientelism alone cannot explain electoral outcomes and voting patterns in Africa are not significantly different from elsewhere. As in other places, voters in Africa judge their representatives on their ability to provide public goods, implement policies and foster economic

growth. In addition to the measures of direct performance by the incumbent, other factors that are standard in the literature on voting in established democracies, such as partisanship, level of education, and access to information all play a role (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013:730). Likewise, Suttner argues that the idea that Africans are more likely to base their vote on ethnicity over performance, is based upon racist perceptions of Africans within academia, and is simply untrue (2003:282). In the case of the ANC in South Africa, he argues that the citizens might at times be very dissatisfied with the pace of transformation, but there is an acceptance and understanding that these changes take time (*Ibid*).

Patronage is central to Greene's SPD theory. He dismisses Mozzafar and Scarritt's (2005:384) argument that the persistence of dominant parties is due to irrationality as a consequence of information deficits. Unlike those arguing that dominant parties in Africa are fundamentally different from elsewhere, Greene (2010:25) maintains that all dominant parties rely on patrimonial exchanges to sustain themselves. Incumbency advantages affect opposition parties' competitiveness in a number of ways, where the use of patronage is essential. His approach operates within a framework of rational choice theory, where macro-economic conditions and individual rationality interact (Greene, 2007a:5). Greene noted gaps in literature explaining DPSs, as standard theories of party competition tended to ignore resource asymmetries in these systems. As such, standard rational choice theories of party competition cannot account for the rationality of voter patterns in dominant parties, as the rules of the game are fundamentally different (Greene, 2007a: 20,30). In sum, according to Greene, clientelistic exchanges are not a specific feature of African dominant party systems, but a necessary component of all dominant parties' continued existence.

1.3 Research Questions

The aim of this study is to evaluate Greene's Resource Theory, by using South Africa under the ANC (April 1994- February 2018) as a case. The evaluation aims to contribute to theoretical improvements of SPD theory. The study will therefore be guided by the following focal research question:

To what extent can Greene's resource theory help to explain one-party dominance? In order to answer the main research question, two sub-questions will guide the research:

- A) To what extent does resource advantage help to understand the ANC's electoral dominance?
- B) How does Greene's theory address intra-party competition and the potential consequences thereof?

1.4 Objectives and Relevance of Study

As Pempel (1990:5) noted, one-party dominance represents a deviation from the norms of political parties, as most parties will fall operate in the context of either a democracy or dictatorship. As the literature review shows, there is little consensus as to why these systems exist, their consequences, what sustains them, and why they eventually break down. This necessitates improving upon existing theories, as well as establishing new ones. As Greene (2010a:20) argues, standard theories of party competition within the field of political science fall short in explaining the existence of one-party dominance, how they are sustained and why they eventually break down (*Ibid*).

In Greene's research, he found South Africa under the ANC to be a deviant case, and he argues that it is very likely that the deviation is due to the ANC being a young dominant party (2010a). He states that we will have to observe a number of developments, which will be extensively

discussed throughout this thesis, in order for the ANC to remain the governing party (2010a: 50). Seeing that the ANC remains the governing party of South Africa as of 2019, I find it justified to reassess his theory. The aim of the thesis, is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the theory and to contribute to the field of dominant party research.

1.5 Research Design and Methodology

For the purposes of assessing Greene's Resource Theory, one-party dominance under ANC rule from 1994 to February 2018 will be used as an illustrative case. It is a theory-confirming research project using South Africa as a case study. The research employs qualitative and supplementary quantitative data using a case study research design to address the research questions. I make use of explanatory research, which means "examining the reasons for, or associations between, what exists" (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:27). Greene's Resource Theory is the object of research; but I engage supplementary theories within political science literature. These supplementary theories will be used to critically analyse Greene's theory. This approach will aid the research study to answer the main research question by taking a number of considerations into account.

Yin writes that case studies explore a phenomenon, describe a situation, or test explanations (Yin, 1981:97). A case study design can utilise both qualitative and quantitative data, however, it is more often related to qualitative research because it generates extensive in depth information on one particular case (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:64).

Lijphart's identifies six different types of case studies, four of which are used for theory-building (1971, 691-693). Within these, we find the theory-confirming or theory-infirming case study, which analyses a single case within the framework of established generalisations. Theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies are implicitly comparative analyses. They focus on

one particular case out of a large number of cases and the theoretical framework is applied to analyse the theory (Lijphart, 1971:691-693). Greene asserts that all dominant party systems that adhere to his definition of dominance will be able to be explained using Resource Theory, including South Africa under the ANC. This is why the research uses the ANC as its case to test the theoretical framework.

1.6 Limitations

Studying one-party dominance is hampered by a lack of consensus on the meaning of the term. Scholarly debates concerning thresholds for the required share of votes or years a party needs to be in power for it to be considered a dominant party are unsettled. As my research centres on Greene's Resource Theory, I utilise his definition of one party dominance.

Secondly, a number of concepts such as *patronage*, *clientelism*, and *corruption* are employed differently when used by different academics, and could potentially provide difficulty. These concepts will be explained in the following chapter. The concepts are clarified to show how the terms also overlap in meaning and inter-link. Beyond the challenges of conceptualisation and overlapping of themes, a third constraint is the available data available to test Greene's theory against a case study to address the research question. Since many of the key themes of this thesis are related to unlawful governmental behaviour, there is a high level of secrecy. This is especially true when it comes to the topics of patronage employment (chapter 4) and State-owned Enterprises (chapter 5). This has direct consequences for giving precise assessments of the scale of corruption; nonetheless, the available literature is sufficient for assessing the overall trends.

1.7 Outline of the Research study

Chapter two establishes the foundations for the research study by presenting the core tenets of Kenneth Greene's Resource Theory. The reader will be introduced to variety of terms within political science which will be briefly discussed, such as clientelism, patronage, and the median voter theory. The aim of this chapter is, however, not to provide an in-depth analysis of the theory as this will be covered in the remaining chapters. Instead, the chapter seeks to provide a thorough understanding of the theory.

Chapter three analyses the Resource Theory's assumptions on policy appeals and whether there is value in explaining sustained one-party dominance. The chapter will be based on the theoretical framework set out in chapter two. This will be applied to the ANC as a governing party, with the importance of the party's origin as a liberation movement also considered. Historical events and developments will be discussed in relation to each presidency: Mandela's, Mbeki's and Zuma's. The chapter will elaborate upon the usefulness and applicability of a range of theoretical concepts within political science and their potential consequences for the Resource Theory. Moreover, the chapter will provide the necessary background knowledge of the ANC which will lay the foundation for the rest of the thesis.

Chapter four analyses public sector patronage employment and control over labour unions for electoral dominance. Political science theories on patronage contracts will be presented, including the Resource Theory. The following section on the South African public sector will be guided by both quantitative data from the South African Reserve bank, as well as qualitative data to address the level of public sector politicisation. The role of labour unions will be discussed more generally, although the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will be given special attention due to its historic alliance with the ANC and its role as the biggest labour union in the country.

The final section will be devoted to the potential negative implications of the public sector and labour unions on electoral dominance.

Chapter five analyses the final and most important component of the Resource Theory: the diversion of public funds for political partisan purposes. Furthermore, the use of patronage employment as a means to financial gain will be a central theme. As such, the chapter aims to extend the argument from the previous chapter. State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) are used as a proxy for the magnitude of state control of the economy, as proposed by Greene. A historical background of how SOEs and procurement policies have been used as a political tool for upholding elite interests will be provided. Furthermore, the chapter will explain how institutional frameworks and regulations affect the role of the state. It will be argued that country-specific institutional choices within a context of seeming liberalisation uphold state control of the economy. The latter part of the chapter will be devoted to how the ANC has both benefited from and been severely disadvantaged by the use of patronage employment and the diversion of public funds. This will be discussed in relation to Greene's theory, in which theoretical weaknesses will be identified.

Chapter six offers a final analysis and conclusions on the explanatory power of resources for prolonged dominant party rule. The findings of each chapter are incorporated and used as the basis for the identification of theoretical weaknesses. The final section provides a short elaboration on areas for further research.

Chapter 2: Kenneth Greene's Resource Theory

2.1 Introduction

As stated by Jonathan Kirshner (2003:645):

“Money is everything. Money is nothing. Money is what you think it is. Money is power. Money is politics. Individually these statements underscore why monetary phenomena have such a strong formative influence on the nature of contemporary politics”.

As money is at the core of a well-run political system, Butler (2010:237) argues that the connection between politics and money poses complex challenges for democracies around the world. Money is an essential part of politics as democratic parties need to organise and educate citizens, develop public policy, as well as run campaigns to win elections. Moreover, in countries where there is asymmetrical access to private and public resources, the dominant party may be able to secure an undesirable stranglehold over electoral politics (*Ibid*). Throughout Kenneth Greene's academic career, one of his major interests has been the political consequences of asymmetric resource advantages in dominant party states and he contends that the combination of a politically controlled public sector and the use of public resources for partisan purposes sustains dominance. While uneven access to resources affects politics, these effects are not always straightforward. This chapter presents the key components and arguments of Greene's Resource Theory, which lays the basis for the following chapters.

2.2 Resource Theory: Core Tenets

The basis of Greene's Resource Theory is how dominant parties' resource advantages make opposition parties unable to compete. Hence, he argues that there is a positive correlation between resources and dominance (Greene, 2007a:5, 259; 2010a:20). While the ruling party in fully competitive democracies can yield incumbency advantages through extra fundraising capacity and the perquisites of office, which helps them achieve the goal of re-election, in SPD these advantages are so unfairly high that we can think of them as hyper-incumbency advantages (Greene, 2010a:25-26). He argues that with less expectation for rotation in government it changes the rules of the game in significant ways. In fully competitive democracies the alternation of power diminishes the politicians' wish to systematically skew the competition to their advantage, unless there is the possibility of creating a cartel-like agreement with the opposition. On the other hand, the absence of rotation in SPD produces quasi-permanent resource asymmetries between those in power and those not and hence, these asymmetries go unchallenged. With few hindrances to the incumbent using funds at their sole discretion, public money may be diverted for party-building and perennial campaigning (*Ibid*). In addition, he argues that contrary to fully democratic regimes, within a SPD paradigm, advantages are party-specific rather than individual-specific, hence benefiting all members of the dominant party above all those in the opposition (Greene, 2010a:25-26). In sum, the core of his argument is that dominant parties continue to win due to their advantage that tilts the playing-field in their favour, thereby making elections biased (Greene, 2007a:259).

2.2.1 Control Over the State Apparatus

In Greene's (2010a:25-26) work, control of the government apparatus is viewed as a cornerstone for the dominant party to enrich itself; however, this necessitates a politically controlled public bureaucracy. In these systems there tends to be an emphasis on political connections rather than

merit within all spheres of government (*Ibid*). Central to this claim the term “gatekeepers”, which can be summed up in Aidt’s (2016:44) definition of gatekeepers: government officials and politicians who regulate those who can gain access to rents. Greene (2010a:25-16) states that bureaucrats are less likely to take on the role of gatekeepers to the public budget within in a context where the ‘party’ has been fused with the state, as this creates an acceptable setting for the incumbent to divert public resources for partisan political purposes. In sum, having a political controlled bureaucracy is essential for obtaining resources (*Ibid*).

2.2.2 The Control of National Resources

Greene (2010a:25) argues that money is at the core of a number of activities that ensure the dominant party has already won before the polls even open. The party can use politicised public resources, as dominant parties can approve targeted legislation to distribute resources to their constituencies. There are five sources of illicit public resources that play a major role in skewing the political playing field, Greene argues (*Ibid*).

1) One of the most vital sources is the diversion of funds from the budgets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are usually located in strategic industries such as energy, telecommunications, manufacturing and transport. These large companies become easy targets for the extraction of funds without the information being made public. Individuals can be both high-level political appointees as well as directors within the company. Moreover, their finances tend to be hidden from the public eye and transfers from the state are both numerous and hard to track. As there is a high level of secrecy, the incumbent can amass public funds for partisan use and purchase political support (Greene, 2007a:40).

- 2) Money can be channelled to the dominant party directly from the public budget through secret line items controlled by the executive branch and hidden legislative allocations that only legislators from the dominant party can access.
- 3) Public sector employment is another major source of patronage. Large numbers of employment opportunities can be given to supporters and withheld from opponents.
- 4) The centrality of the state in the economy encourages businesses to exchange kickbacks and sometimes illicit campaign contributions for economic protection (Greene, 2007a:40).
- 5) Large amounts of non-convertible administrative state resources are made available by public employees. Some examples of such resources are office supplies, vehicles, phones, and postage, which aid informing, persuading, and mobilising supporters. Greene argues that these five sources of resources transform public agencies into campaign headquarters (2007a:40).

Apart from public funds, private party financing also plays a vital role in maintaining party dominance (Greene, 2010a:26-27). Private donors are most likely to donate after making strategic calculations based on whatever generates the most personal benefits at the lowest cost. Moreover, the nature of SPD alters what is rational for those donors. In fully competitive democracies, the rotation of power encourages donors to spread their donations among many parties, even those unlikely to win, as long as costs of doing so are small. In dominant systems, physical or economic reprisal from the dominant party for supporting the opposition may be high and it is thus irrational for donors to give significant backing to opposition parties (Greene, 2010a:26-27). Moreover, while public party financing schemes have the potential to level the political playing field, the dominant party will make sure these are ineffective. Unless external forces have weakened the

incumbent, campaign finance regulations will be either minimal, non-existent, or favour the governing party (*Ibid*).

2.2.3 Clientelism, Patronage and Corruption as Enabling Single Party Dominance

As stated earlier, clientelism is defined as the direct exchange between citizens' votes and direct payment or continuing admission to jobs, goods and services (Kitschelt and Wilkionson, 2007:2).

Patronage is viewed by many scholars as a sub-category of clientelism. Wade defines patronage as "moneyless corruption": it is where political authority figures insert friends, family members and/or political supporters into public jobs (1985:470). Personal connections are at the core of this system, as the person in question would not have access to the position without them. More explicitly, patronage can be seen as the power to control appointments to office or the right to privileges. This definition excludes the exchange of goods and services, and explicitly focuses on employment and privileges within the working sphere. While Greene uses the term patronage in his work, the operationalisation is very similar to the way that 'clientelism' is used. He describes patronage as a "vote-buying strategy that involves office-holders' targeted and partisan distribution of public resources for electoral support" (Greene, 2007a:40). In his definition, patronage is not only restricted to public resources but encompasses all public resources, broadly defined including patronage employment (*Ibid*). With these small but distinct differences in terminology, I use the terms 'clientelism' and 'patronage' interchangeably. Unless clearly stated, I regard both clientelism and patronage as including all three components of goods, services and employment in exchange for citizens' votes or other forms of political/party loyalty.

Another important differentiation is 'corruption' versus 'clientelism/patronage' (Singer, 2009:2). While clientelism and corruption overlap, they are not identical. Corruption is understood to be the misuse of public office for private benefit. Many forms of corruption cannot be considered

clientelism. One example might be when a politician moves funds from the public budget into his/her own pocket for the sole purpose of enriching him/herself (Singer: 2009: 2). The exchange component is missing in this case and is therefore not equivalent to clientelism. Furthermore, while vote-buying and patronage-hiring may be unlawful, and are thus corrupt, other forms of clientelism are not considered illegal. Officeholders who assist individuals to obtain welfare benefits to which the person is not entitled are engaging in corrupt behaviour; assisting qualified individuals to receive benefits in the hopes of gaining their loyalty is not necessarily engaging in corruption. In other words, patron-client relationships are not necessarily corrupt, and corruption does not necessarily involve a patron-client relationship (Singer, 2009:2).

Greene's (2007a:40) argument that patronage leads to electoral support has a counter-intuitive feel to it, as one might wonder why citizens would not only tolerate clientelism and the often accompanied corruption, but also show support, albeit indirectly, for such action by casting their votes for a party that engages in exchanges like this. To grapple with Greene's logic, De La O argues that perceived high levels of corruption amongst public officials make citizens more likely to conclude that there is widespread selling of votes in their community, and they are thus more willing to sell their own votes (2015:181). Her findings illuminate how citizens become more tolerant of government misconduct enabling public officials to strengthen their clientelistic networks. While perceived corruption may have a negative effect on citizens' satisfaction with the political system and the political institutions, it does not necessarily discourage them from voting for the party providing patronage goods (*Ibid*). On the contrary, Martin and Solomon argue that uncontrollable spoils from state coffers increase voter dissatisfaction of the ruling party, resulting in electoral decay (2016:21-29). The following chapters will explore these debates further.

Another vital consideration is why citizens would uphold their part of the ‘deal’ by actually voting for the dominant party after they have already received the ‘benefit’ (Oliveros, 2017:37). The effectiveness of patronage is thus linked to compliance and scholars present different views. Scholars who adhere to an instrumentalist theory of clientelism argue that there needs to be sufficient monitoring of vote choices and the threat of sanctioning voters for non-compliance. As the distribution of benefits happens before election day, ‘clients’ are able to withhold their part of the ‘deal’ after receiving the payoff (*Ibid*). Therefore, from an instrumentalist framework, the patron must credibly threaten to withdraw subsequent benefits from individual voters who do not go through with their part of the deal. Oliveros argues that in practise, this would be impossible as the ‘patrons’ do not know which individuals did not vote for them, and hence, they cannot know which voters to sanction (2017:37). While, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Beatriz Magoloni and Berry R. Weingast reason that the incumbent can withhold funds from constituencies and since the opposition does not have the same amount of funds, citizens respond to that threat by voting for the dominant party (2003:11). They argue that this was the case in Mexico and helped sustain PRI rule (*Ibid*).

On the other hand, Greene and Lawson (2014:62-63) argue for a norm-based approach to clientelism. They contend that there must be a psychological mechanism of reciprocal obligation. Specifically, they argue that the receipt of gifts, favours, services, or protection creates feelings of indebtedness and gratitude among voters, who, under certain conditions, spontaneously support their political patrons. For Greene and Lawson reciprocity is a fundamental element of human social interaction, and they argues that this element is universal (Greene and Lawson, 2014:62-63). While cultural differences can affect the expression of reciprocal standards, humans across

the globe recognise norms of reciprocity at a very young age, and can therefore be considered 'hard-wired', they argue (*Ibid*).

Nevertheless, they argue that there are limitations of the power of obligation to ensure compliance (Lawson and Greene, 2014:64). To begin with, the value of a vote may vary across individuals, as wealthier citizens or citizens with intense partisan preferences will invoke a higher patronage cost for the incumbent. Furthermore, obligations stemming from reciprocity are bound to conflict with other obligations that could decrease the likelihood of compliance, for instance, the degree to which voters have embedded civic norms and respect for the law or for the representative institutions. In sum, voters become 'clients' when the demands of reciprocity outweigh other considerations (*Ibid*).

2.3 The Role of Policy Appeals

Greene (2007a:46) recognizes that patronage is itself is not sufficient to persuade voters, especially if the dominant party is completely out of touch with its people. Hence, he argues that the dominant party must be ideologically aligned with that of a large portion of the population (Greene, 2007a:45). In this regard, Greene adhered to the median voter theory within the rational choice paradigm (*Ibid*). Within this school of thought, it is believed that politicians are rationally self-interested actors and thus will try to locate which policies appeal to the median voter (Westley and Calagno: 2004:7). The median voter model states that politicians will in order to maximize their vote share present policies that appear as centrist or "middle of the road" as possible (*Ibid*). As such, the party will be able to attract those located slightly to the left and the right, while parties located on the extremes on either side of the spectrum entice less voters (Westley and Calagno: 2004:7). While the advantage of the median voter theory is that it is firmly based in theory, it has been argued that it is severely disadvantaged in terms of testability (Branko: 2010:5). For a number

of reasons which will be elaborated upon in the following chapter, identifying the median voter might be an impossible task (*Ibid*).

While Greene (2007a:45) reasons that the dominant party will locate itself close to the median voter, he also states that these policies can, at times, be unpragmatic; however, it heightens the dominant party's legitimacy amongst the population and lowers the costs of patronage. Although dominant parties have little power to lessen abstention due to indifference towards their policy offers, abstention due to alienation can be controlled. However, both the indifferent voter and the voter who has been alienated might choose not to cast a vote because of the assumption that the dominant party will win. Hence, they see little reason to vote for an opposition party either (Greene, 2007a:46). While the dominant party has significant room to manoeuvre, unpopular policies may make patronage advantages unable to compensate for lost utility on policy, leading to a decreased number of votes. Nevertheless, Greene (2007a:46) argues that patronage is such a powerful tool that it is possible for the dominant party to win even if the opposition parties pursue the best strategies available to them.

2.4 Cost of Participation

Although, the role of opposition parties are beyond the scope of this thesis, for a comprehensive understanding of the Resource Theory the theoretical foundations must be presented. Greene (2010a: 28) argues that resource asymmetries in SPD systems disrupt the partisan playing field which reduces opposition parties to inefficient 'vote gatherers'. On an individual level, running for office or being involved as a political activist involves personal costs. In this regard, the political system affects these costs. In fully competitive democracies, the costs are similar regardless of which political party one is representing, namely time and energy. In DPS, on the other hand, costs are asymmetrical and affect members of the opposition differently. For example,

activists involved in an opposing party pay great opportunity costs, as they tend to sacrifice stipends and material benefits related to the ruling party's "old boys'" network (Greene, 2010a:27-28).

The reason Greene (2010a:28) provides for this is that the deep asymmetries and unlikelihood of rotation of power have certain consequences for opposition formation and composition. If we take the assumption that politicians' primary goal is to win office, opposition parties should not exist. It is therefore a conundrum that they do. Greene reasons that potential activists recognise the opportunity costs, but those who greatly disapproves of the status quo is willing to make sacrifices for the sake of fighting for their beliefs (*Ibid*). Greene asserts that there is a small subset of politicians who value ideology over winning office, which explains why opposition parties form (2007a:5). Supporting this view, Harmel and Janda assert that all political parties have a number of aims, but that each party has a 'primary goal', which varies among parties and even within parties across time (1994:265). However, often, these individuals are deeply opposed to the ruling party, and locate themselves at the fringes of the political spectrum as niche parties, and are also bound to be irreconcilable with the preferences of the median voter, Greene argues (2007a:5; 2010a:28; 2011:401). As the costs of being involved with an opposition party rise, the opposition parties themselves tend to radicalise even more as well as to decrease in size (Greene: 2007a:5; 2010a:28; 2011:401). In the case of Mexico, Greene (2007a: 177) reasons that until the mid-1990s, National Action Party (PAN) took a rightwing pro-market position, while Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) adopted a leftwing pro-state position, consequently being unaligned with the centrist preferences of the median voter. Greene further states that this heavy reliance on ideology can hamper intra-party co-operation and strategy, as well as make opposition parties unable to co-ordinate amongst each other (2007a:60).

Greene also argues that opposition parties can be short on financial and human capital, compared to the ruling party, as they have significantly less access state resources and their lack of political power discourages private donors from providing funding (2007a:59). Consequently, they may be priced out of the media market, creating a situation where voters are less aware of them (Greene, 2007a:59). If a challenger party is to communicate with the citizens at all, it must often take the form of an organisation that relies on volunteers to perform its daily tasks (*Ibid*). In sum, according to Greene, the strategies of opposition parties to gain power can often be futile as their resource poverty makes it almost impossible to win an election. The opposition becomes out-competed through advertising, out-staffed in canvassing and out-spent on patronage (*Ibid*).

It is however important to note that different electoral systems reward smaller opposition parties differently. For instance, in proportional representation systems, such as in South Africa, smaller opposition parties may still get a seat in parliament and thus a paying job. Consequently, opportunity costs differ between the different systems.

2.5 Greene's Resource Theory on Why Dominance Ends

To explain what terminates dominance, Greene (2007a:6) sees the opposition party change in response to a decreasing resource advantage of the incumbent following changes in the external environment, such as prolonged economic stagnation. Magaloni (2006:1) presents a similar theory of PRI dominance and downfall to Greene, the main difference being the catalyst of decline. She regards increased voter dissatisfaction in the face of economic crisis as the ultimate cause of dominant party decline. Although Greene (2007a:8) acknowledges that economic crisis increases voter dissatisfaction, he argues that it is not voter dissatisfaction in the face of economic crisis that terminates dominant party rule. Rather, it is the opposition parties' ability to take advantage of this dissatisfaction that brings about the end (Greene, 2007a:8).

For Greene (2007a:8) this occurs when the dominant party has lost a significant amount of its advantages. External influences shape the character of opposition parties, and newcomers are more likely to be moderate due to changed external environments. However, the parties themselves are slow to change (Greene, 2007a:63). Co-ordination issues may persist even when the resource advantages of the dominant party have started to diminish. Greene therefore claims that opposition parties will see extensive generational conflicts within the party between the newcomers, who are more ideologically moderate, and the more ideologically extreme older generation. In a context in which the dominant party's advantages diminish in a linear manner over time, for example through transitions from state-led to market-led economic development, those who have been involved with the party from its inception or over an extended period of time will hamper a transformation of the party into a centrist organization (*Ibid*). Greene (2007a:62) claims that the very process of opposition party building in SPD creates path-dependent inflexibilities in opposition party organisation, which becomes challenging to resolve. Greene asserts that often, the dominant party might be sustained for a period even after the mechanism that ensures its dominance has weakened (2007a:62). Supporting Greene's argument, Harmel and Janda (1994:270) maintain that parties are naturally resistant to change, and in parties where the dominant group regards policy purity to be of higher importance than winning votes or gaining access to benefits of office, electoral failures and exclusion from government will not affect the party in a significant way.

2.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to explicate Greene's Resource Theory, which will be analysed in the following chapters to test the validity of the Theory. This thesis seeks to answer whether his theory can explain single party dominance. In sum, the Resource Theory incorporates macro-economic factors as well as individual rationality to explain single party dominance in democratic

states. He proposes a positive correlation between control over resources and continued electoral dominance, arguing that if a dominant party has unrestricted access to and usage of public resources it may use these resources for party-building and buying loyalty. For him, in these situations, opposition parties have limited means to challenge the incumbent. On the other hand, his theory claims that dominant parties will eventually lose when their resource advantages diminish, allowing opposition parties to become more competitive, and gain the opportunity to potentially defeat the incumbent.

The following chapters cover three distinct elements of the Resource Theory, namely policy appeals, patronage employment, and State-Owned-enterprises (SOEs), which are conceptualised as a proxy for resources available to the ruling party, as proposed by Greene. Greene proposes that each of these variables prove a strong positive correlation between control over resources and the continuation of electoral dominance. The final chapter assesses the validity of the relationship.

Chapter 3: The Role of Policy Appeals in Sustaining Dominance

3.1 Introduction

Former leader of the ANC, Oliver Reginald Tambo, stated:

“All revolutions are about state power. Ours is no exception. The slogan ‘power to the people’ means one thing and one thing only. It means we seek to destroy the power of the apartheid tyranny and replace it with popular power with a government whose authority derives from the will of all our people both black and white” (1984:4).

The ANC was founded in 1912, making it one of the oldest liberation movements in the world. It is also the latest movement to attain its primary goal, namely to win political power (Wallerstein, 1996:2694). Greene (2010b:247) proposes that dominant parties seek to skew the partisan playing field in order to sustain their power, but maintains that policy appeals are significant strategies to sustain the dominance and support of a single party within both an authoritarian and democratic context. Greene (2010b:247) claims that often, the dominant party will take a centrist position on policy to attract maximum vote counts and lessen patronage costs. By definition, centrist parties are parties that occupy left-right positions close to the median voter position (Ezrow, 2008:207). However, for Greene, resources are the main contributing factor to SPD, which provides the party with considerable space to manoeuvre in terms of policy appeals.

While some scholars have strongly argued that the legacy of a liberation movement is an explanatory factor for sustained dominance, Greene (2010a:50) argues that the dominant party will

continue to face new social issues that face the younger generation. Hence, liberation movement legacy may play a significant role in the initial period of dominance, but cannot sustain dominance indefinitely (Greene, 2010a:50).

Through an analysis of Greene's argument regarding the role of policy appeals in sustaining dominance, I argue that the theory is to a large degree guided by ambiguous concepts impeding testability. As many of the assumptions are dependent on the resource argument, few conclusions can be made on how policy appeals effect electoral dominance. As such, I review these assumptions in relation to the ANC. The final section of the chapter seeks to address potential theoretical weaknesses, as well as important background knowledge of the ANC.

3.2 Greene's Policy Appeals Assumptions

Briefly summarized from the previous chapter, Kenneth Greene (2007a:46) argues that dominant parties will take a centrist stand as this represents the preferences of the median voter. The model citizens of society are thus its firmest base of support, and the party spreads out widely from there to encompass as many people as possible. Policy appeals are important in two vital ways. Firstly, placing itself near the centre of the political spectrum heightens the dominant party's legitimacy in terms of reflecting voters' preferences. Secondly, this lowers the costs of patronage (*Ibid*). When a dominant party moves too far from 'the centre', it may discourage voters from voting for it, either by abstaining from voting or casting his/her vote for an opposition party. Nevertheless, patronage remains a powerful tool where the dominant party may be able to move quite far away from 'the centre' without significant decrease in electoral support (*Ibid*).

Greene (2010a:50-51) does not completely disregard the importance of historical and symbolic legacies, but he does contend that they have an expiry date. Dominant parties which have emerged

in the aftermath of past political conflict, civil war or authoritarian rule may become a symbol for national unity (*Ibid*), as in the case of Botswana and South Africa (Karume, 2008:12). Despite this, Greene asserts that eventually citizens will judge the dominant party based on performance rather than on its historical legacy, thus a combination of resource advantages and policies vital for re-election (2010a:50-51). The precise timing however will depend on each individual country case. He states that in some cases a resource advantage in combination with ‘acceptable’ policy appeals will be vital for the dominant party’s continuation of power early in its tenure, while in other countries, this happens later. In sum, although the party’s liberation legacy might have catalysed the initial party victory, this will eventually diminish. He further argues that in-depth country specific research is best suited for determining when this happens in that particular country. However, by his definition a party is only dominant after the four-election or 20 years threshold, making this the cut-off point for liberation legacies (2010a:50-51).

3.3 The African National Congress (ANC) and Maintaining Party Dominance

3.3.1 African National Congress (ANC) Electoral Dominance

As Figure 1 reflects, the ANC has received a stable share of the votes in all past elections (Beresford, 2015:2). Until the 2009 elections, the margin of victory increased with each election, with the 2004 elections giving the ANC its biggest stronghold. However, 2014 witnessed the ANC’s weakest election results, both in terms of absolute percentage of votes being won and the smallest margin of victory. Having said this, the 2014 election results were not much lower for the ANC than what occurred in the 1994 elections. In conclusion, ANC dominance has remained stable. Schultz-Herzenberg highlights that while the ANC received fewer votes than ever before the 2014 elections, as of 2014 the party still controlled eight out of nine provinces and the opposition posed little threat to ANC dominance (2014:1). However, as of 2019 the party does not

have the same stronghold (Desai and Vahed, 2017:41). In the 2016 municipal elections the ANC received only 55 per cent of the votes, which is the first time the party had received less than 60 per cent (Desai and Vahed, 2017:41). Furthermore, it was the first time the ANC had lost control over the major economic hubs, Pretoria and Johannesburg, as well as the historically ANC-loyal Nelson Mandela Bay (*Ibid*). By Greene’s (2010a:23, 50-51) conceptualization South Africa under the ANC went from a proto-dominant party system to a SPD system after 2009 as it surpassed the four election threshold. As such, ANC was no longer in the “liberation legacy stage”.

| Election year | ANC vote share shown in percentage | Margin of victory | Biggest opposition party vote share shown in percentage | Name of biggest opposition party | Increase/decrease From last election |
|---------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1994 | 62.65 | 42.26 | 20.39 | National Party (NP) | Not applicable |
| 1999 | 66.33 | 56.74 | 9.56 | Democratic Party (DP) | + 3.83 |
| 2004 | 69.69 | 57.32 | 12.37 | Democratic Alliance (DA) | +3.36 |
| 2009 | 65.9 | 49.2 | 16.7 | Democratic Alliance (DA) | -3.79 |
| 2014 | 62.15 | 39.92 | 22.23 | Democratic Alliance (DA) | -3.75 |

Figure 1 ANC Election Results

The aim of the following sections is two-fold. The main objective is to elaborate upon the usefulness and applicability of a number of key concepts, as well as how these components interact, shaping the theory as a whole. This will be done by discussing these variables within a framework of the ANC. The reader will be guided through the history of the ANC from being a liberation movement to present day ANC. Historic events and developments will be linked to each

president from Mandela to Zuma. The second aim of the chapter is to provide the fundamental knowledge of the party which will be of importance throughout the thesis.

3.3.2 The Historical Legacy of the ANC's 'Broad Church'

The struggle for democracy was fought by numerous anti-apartheid organisations all of which represented different ideas about what a post-apartheid South Africa should look like (Johnson, 2003: 322). However, ANC's racially inclusive orientation and long institutional history created a pool of adaptive capabilities that enabled it to contain internal factional conflict and out-compete its rivals (Reddy, 2014: 103). Compared to other liberation groups the ANC followed a more inclusive ideology and proved more open to negotiations with the apartheid regime (*Ibid*). The ANC proved institutionally stronger than rival organisations, which were either unable to adapt or remained internally coherent (Butler, 2012:20). Moreover, one of ANC's advantages has been its capability for self-investigation and reflectiveness (*Ibid*).

The ANC, influenced by the SACP's two-stage revolution theory, was open to abandoning some of its more radical socialist demands and negotiate the terms of a liberal democracy, while other liberation movements would not (Hart, 2007:88). For example, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), formed by a group of former ANC-Africanists in 1959, stated that it would only be willing to negotiate with the apartheid regime if land redistribution was made a priority (Bavusile Maaba, 2001:421, 430). The PAC saw the ANC as too moderate in its approach to the struggle and in terms of economic and racial policy (*Ibid*). The ANC on the other hand, started the negotiations with the former regime with more moderate demands, in which the question of land was left untouched (Suttner, 2006:293).

3.3.3 Defining Policy Preferences in a Changing Society

The struggle against apartheid provided common cause among liberation groups, which allowed for people with different ideological, inter-generational and organisational stances to unite to fight a common enemy (Suttner, 2003:177). The ANC's membership figures grew rapidly: less than a year after its unbanning in 1990, half a million people joined. Once elected to power, one of its main tasks was to appeal to new constituencies, while simultaneously retaining its support base (Gumede, 2007:xi). The move from a liberation movement to a mass movement, which occurred with the unbanning of the party, created a situation where the already contested 'core values' of the party became increasingly disputed. Another challenge the ANC faced was to modernise apartheid South Africa's isolated economy (*Ibid*).

For Greene, policy appeals contribute to a dominant party's longevity and he argues that a dominant party will pursue policies preferred by the median voter (2007a:46). However, the 'median voter' model has been critiqued, as it is not entirely clear who the 'median voter' is in many circumstances (Branko, 2010:5). Black (1948:12) argues that it is only possible to locate a 'median voter' within a framework of one policy. However, as governments have a manifold of policies, in addition to there being many variables which affect one's policy preferences: individuals' preferences seldom overlap (Congleton, 2002:1). This led Roger D. Congleton (2002:5-6) to state that the 'median voter' does not exist.

Furthermore, Congleton (2002:5-6) asserts the properties of 'median' implies that public policies remain constant over time, even when citizens experience drastic changes in their personal and external environments. Meaning that increases in the dispersion of voter preferences, in which voters move further to the fringes of the political spectrum, will have little, if any effect on policy unless increased dispersion also affects the median of the distribution of voter ideal points (*Ibid*).

As such, the policy preferences of the median voter tend to remain more stable, than if an average was used as a measurement (Congleton, 2002:5-6). This is problematic in societies undergoing significant social-economic alterations (*Ibid*). Hence, the ‘median voter’s’ preferences within a South African context is almost impossible to identify correctly, and even more so as the country has undergone significant changes over the last decades.

Furthermore, the idea of a median voter might prove especially problematic in a South African setting due to a number of reasons. The highly racialized legacy of Apartheid with segregation of the races might be one of them. The ANC won the election in 1994 with the promise to radically transform society both in terms of race and class. For this reason, race policy and economic redistribution was an issue of contention. The legacy of systematic racial categorization and discrimination under the apartheid regime caused racialized income inequality and opportunities (Seekings, 2008:1). Race remains an important social concept in South African society and politics. At the transition the minority white South African population remained hugely advantaged compared to black population and race continues to be a relevant social category towards creating an economic environment that is representative of the population (Southall, 2004:2). Secondly, both between and within these racial groups there are large differences in terms of class effects interests (*Ibid*). Over the last decades, class interests have arguably become more at odds with each other, due to rapid changes in class structures (*Ibid*). As such, while we can argue that the average South African citizen is a within the category of those who were historically disadvantaged, defining the ‘median citizen’ of South Africa in terms of policy is challenging.

Moreover, Greene (2010a:50-51) denotes less attention to policies for sustaining dominance than resources. In his theory, the dominant party can move quite far from the median voter without losing support. As such, he argues that resources in combination with “acceptable” policy appeals

sustain resources. As with the median voter theory, this creates challenges in terms of defining what is considered “acceptable” due to the subjective nature of the term. Additionally, his statements about liberation legacies as a cause for dominance complicates things further (*Ibid*). These considerations, both separately and combined, makes it difficult to make any clear statements about the relationship between policies and electoral dominance. As such, the theory is lacking in testability on the effects of policy appeals on sustained dominance.

Although, we cannot make any precise judgment on this relationship, a discussion around whether the policy assumptions of the theory seem reasonable. As stated earlier, I find the median voter theory problematic to employ, and therefore propose that it is more meaningful to look at whether the ANC has been successful in obtaining a catch-all character. This term is however not ideal as it has also come under criticism for its ambiguity (Krouwel, 2003:27). Nonetheless, I find it more acceptable as it does not require an identification of one type of citizen. The basic characteristics of the catch-all party is a party spreads across many different sections of society to attract the maximum number of votes (Krouwel, 2003:27). As stated earlier, four of the main challenges facing the ANC was how to appeal to new constituencies, promote economic growth, transform society, and retain support from its original constituencies (Gumede, 2007:xi). As such, diverse policies had to be implemented to appeal to many different voters. This required a delicate balancing act between welfareism, neo-liberal policies, and socialist rhetoric.

3.3.4 ANC’s Policy Shifts Following the Transition

This section will provide an outline of ANC’s policy stance as a party in government; this information will be used as backdrop for the subsequent analytical section. The main shift in economic policy following the transition was from the more socialist agenda of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) towards a neo-liberal approach under Mandela, which

continued under Mbeki (Binns and Robinson, 2002:26). In 1997, Mbeki ratified Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, without much consultation. The GEAR policy was to promote economic growth, defined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and put social welfare policies in the backseat, albeit not entirely ignored (*Ibid*). Gumede (2007:54, 107) states that Mbeki believed that the only way forward was to secure stable economic fundamentals quickly. Mandela backed Mbeki in his State of the Nation address some months later, proclaiming that market-friendly policies were the only route to sustainable development (*Ibid*).

Mbeki's foremost contribution as the president was his management of the economy in which the country experienced an average growth rate of 4-5 per cent per annum, and his policies contributed to a development of a rapidly expanding black middle class (Renwick, 2018:12). One central part of the GEAR strategy was the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy, which aided a relocation of wealth to the expanding black middle class, and particularly the political elements within it. Through the use of equity schemes the country saw the rise of a new professional class (*Ibid*). For Gumede (2008:265), the Mbeki-driven modernization reforms expanded the party's support base to include the black and white middle class and groups that had not previously supported the ANC. While the ANC government has embraced neo-liberalism, it has also implemented policies directed towards those most unfortunate in society. South Africa has an extensive welfare state, compared to other middle-income countries, with considerable social grants and provision (Sevenhuijsen, Bozalek, et al, 2003:302). For instance, Seekings and Moore's research (2014:427) states that almost one-third of all adults and minors receive a social grant each month. As such, Butler maintains that in the course of democratisation, the ANC's catch-all character has meant that it is able to provide fertile ground for foreign investment, but also concentrate on standard issues such as health and education (2005:729, 779).

The neo-liberal policies under Mbeki disgruntled those who had hoped for more radical changes (Gumede, 2007:54, 107). Mbeki's strategy for handling the 'most radical' forces of the ANC alliance was to listen attentively without making assurances, while at the same time constructing a perception of agreement (*Ibid*). Over time, the once fairly contained tensions within the ANC under Mandela, become more evident under Mbeki and Zuma (Reddy, 2014:105). Zuma had been able to rally a peculiar left-populist coalition of dissatisfied grassroots activists, unemployed youth, socialists, trade unionists, veteran guerrilla fighters, women's lobbies, evangelicals, and black business tycoons (Gumede: 2007:265). According to Beresford (2009:406), the "leftist" factions in the ANC and its alliance partners perceived Zuma as a man who was more in touch with the lives of the 'everyday workers' and someone who was more willing to listen to their grievances than Mbeki (*Ibid*).

Hence, economic policy within the ANC took another turn. In November of 2010, the Zuma-led administration announced a new strategy: the 'New Growth Path' (NGP) (Beresford, 2009:406). Increased employment, rather than only economic growth, was the main aim of the policy, as illustrated by its goal of creating 5 million new jobs by 2020 (Hurt, 2017: 298). De Jager (2009:285) believes that the Polokwane conference, in which Mbeki was forced to step down as the president of the ANC, signified a return to a more socialist agenda, which had been abandoned with GEAR. However, little progress was made towards achieving this goal, as unemployment rates increased under Zuma's presidency (Kantor, 2017:105-106). While many had hoped that Zuma would usher new life into the party and reconnect the party to the people, implementation and evidence is lacking (Booyesen, 2011:8). As such, Southall (2014:53) maintains that the ANC has moved away from its socialist goal consistently. Likewise, Renwick (2018:69) states it was very clear under Mbeki who was in control of the economic policies, while Zuma never showed

much interest in policy. These views articulate that the ANC's initial stance regarding the party's role as the 'people's party' has pursued growth-oriented rather than people-oriented development strategies.

3.4 Constraints, Changing Environment and Party Fragmentation

As seen in the previous section, the ANC has consistently moved away from its socialist mandate post 1994. Even though, it is arguable that both Mandela and Mbeki were never ideologically located on the left and more aligned with a neo-liberal school of thought, this section will explore potential internal and external forces that affect policy. This move in which ideology seemingly plays a lesser role is reflected in David White's (2011:660) work. He argues that the dominant party must change the tactics used prior to its first victory, and through a path of reinvention to ensure the widest possible constituency (*Ibid*). A common technique is thus to move away from a rigid ideological position, to become a catch-all party reflecting the preferences from many sectors of society (White, 2011:660). White's work on SPD in Russia draws on many of the same arguments as Greene (2007a, 2010a): he argues that ideological flexibility, access to state resources, and the ability to mobilize key socio-economic groups sustains United Russia's dominance (*Ibid*, 655). Furthermore, like Greene, he reasons that the advantageous position over opposition parties has a number of consequences such as uncompetitive policy appeals (Greene, 2007a:46, White, 2011:550). A more subtle resemblance between the two is that they share the underlying assumption that long-term dominant parties are unrestricted (*Ibid*).

Although, dominant parties might be relatively advantaged over the opposition, I argue that an overemphasis on these advantages might overshadow how the dominant party is restricted, and consequently the theory as a whole. Certainly, Greene (2007a:39) would argue that the ANC was more restricted in its initial years as a ruling party, as it classified as a governing party in a fully

competitive democracy. Its resource advantage over the opposition would not be as extensive. Nonetheless, he states that it would have an upper hand in terms of having access to perquisites of office and added fundraising capacity (*Ibid*). While the initial advantages are relatively small, he reasons they often ensure re-election. Moreover, he reasons that former liberation movement parties in government are initially advantaged by their historical importance (2010a:50). Lastly, as dominance is further cemented, a politically controlled bureaucracy and extensive resources at hand, within a context where the party as a whole benefits from diversion of public funds, opposition parties are unable to compete (Greene, 2007a:39).

Certainly, the ANC was restricted in a magnitude of ways after the transition. It is however, challenging to predict at what pace this was starting to diminish, as argued by Greene. Yet, it is arguable that limited political control in early ANC rule is not unrelated to ANC of today. These early challenges are also necessary to mention for the reader for a more comprehensive understanding of the party in the subsequent chapters.

When the ANC won office, it did not automatically translate into hegemonic political power for a number of reasons explained below. Firstly, one argument applicable both early ANC rule, but throughout ANC rule as well is presented by Suttner. He argues that the ruling party faces a multiplicity of interests from different economic actors, both domestic and international, which restricts what the party is able to accomplish (2006:293). Macro-economic policies are not independent from external pressure from big businesses and can affect the extent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which is necessary to grow South Africa's economy (*Ibid*). In essence, capital retains massive power, not due to the voting power of capitalists, but rather due to their economic significance (Seekings and Nattrass, 2002:4). In the age of globalisation, capital is more mobile

and can easily be relocated to a different country. Hence, before policies are decided upon, national governments must take into consideration the interests of capital (*Ibid*).

For instance, the political influence of white capital remained post-1994 (Southall, 2008:8). Mandela had built close friendships with two of the most powerful white business elites, Harry Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert (Renwick, 2018:7). The Oppenheimer family, the former owners of the De Beers diamond company and the mining company Anglo American, even provided Mandela with economic advisors (Onishi and Gebrekidan, 2018). Having once endorsed the nationalisation of the economy, the ANC shifted towards more pro-business policies. According to Renwick (2018:7) Mandela redirected most of the responsibility for economic policies to his deputy, Thabo Mbeki.

Secondly, diverse interests are also located within the dominant party. While prior to becoming a governing party, the ANC had endorsed a socialist approach, as articulated in the Freedom Charter and The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Renwick, 2018:5). However, the ANC's policy stance both prior to and following 1994 was never clear-cut and has always been contested. Renwick (2018:5) argues that while Mandela obtained for a short period of time membership of the SACP by the virtue of his leadership in the military wing of the ANC, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), his views were not aligned with communism. Mandela's main guiding principle was 'one person, one vote' (*Ibid*). This leads to one particular issue within the Resource Theory that will be of importance throughout this thesis: defining the dominant party and its interests.

Greene (2010a:25-26) sees the dominant party as one unified actor, based on his assumption that benefits are party-specific rather than individual-specific within a SPD context. This emphasis on the dominant party as unified does not account for the possibility of intra-party competition.

Greene addresses intra-party competition in the former-dominant parties in a collaboration with Hector Ibarra-Rueda (2014:29). However, this work only recognises intra-party competition in oppositional parties thus speaks about it indirectly. The two authors claim that former-dominant parties experience factionalism and intra-party conflict because of the loss of the concentrated power vested in the chief executive (*Ibid*). This indicates a view the chief executive is an important for maintaining order, albeit not synonyms with the party in itself, due to Greene's assumption of the party being one unit.

The statement that the party is one unified actor ignore a number of potential inferences on policy decisions and how policies are communicated. While factionalism has always been a part of the ANC, it has arguably not vanished after the party obtained dominance status in 2009. While the ANC has been plagued with factionalism since the 1930s, at the very least, and Butler (2012:6) believes that the ANC's current fissures represent more than a continuation, or resurgence, of enduring and familiar historical divisions. Reddy states that intra-party tensions were fairly well constrained under Mandela, but the party has undergone significant changes in the past two decades, which has revealed the high level of intra-party factionalisation (Reddy, 2014:105). These changes will be elaborated upon below.

In terms of policy, the ANC is often vague on its stance and how to get there. Suttner (2006:291, 292) argues that to deal with factionalism, consensus-building is necessary feature of dominant parties as well as maintaining room for debates (Suttner, 2006:291-292). Consensus is, however, not synonymous with agreement, which means the party expresses what is common between the different actors and disagreements are left out of the consensus (*Ibid*). This view is confirmed by Lodge (2004:19), stating that Intra-party factionalisation manifests itself through ambiguous policy stances. Furthermore, it also manifests itself through the use of liberation discourses.

The ANC often relies on liberation discourses for justifying its rule, as the ANC proclaims it is the guardian of a radical transformation project (Friedman, 1999:110). The ANC regularly endorses the self-image of a movement devoted to revolutionary struggle to remake society, as opposed to a ‘conventional’ political party (Beresford *et. Al*, 2018:1234). ANC policy documents and official discourse imply that the struggle did not end with the fall of the apartheid regime and it is the duty of the ANC to safeguard the country against any forces that try to hamper the national transformation project (*Ibid*). The 1969 document “Strategy and Tactics of the ANC” contains that the ANC’s mandate was “earned in the crucible of struggle and the battles for social transformation”, as well as “the ANC currently remains the only primary force capable of driving the project of social transformation” (ANC, 1969). More recent ANC literature confirms that it continues to position itself as the only legitimate guardian of radical social transformation of the ‘national project’ (Schrire, 2001:138). In 2012, the ANC published a document titled “the second transition”, which stated that it would take 50 to 100 years to reach a new era of industrialisation and development, and that it was necessary for the ANC to oversee the process (ANC, 2012:37). Another example is demonstrated by former President Zuma’s statement that the party is destined to govern ‘until Jesus returns’, implying that the party is mandated by God (Beresford *et al.*, 2018:1234).

While these discourses have their function in claiming legitimacy, they also mirrors conflict within the party. For Butler (2012:6) one can understand both the unity and conflict in the ANC by looking at how it communicates its own history. On the one hand, the ANC has been able to sustain and proclaim a fairly coherent and consensual grand narrative; competing narratives between factions on who is entitled to rule based on liberation credentials have become more apparent over the years (*Ibid*). While these dialogues may provide vital ideological functions, they are vague on the details

of the party's actual policy stance and its preferred method of achieving its goals (Lodge, 2004:1,19).

Post-apartheid South Africa experienced a renewed process of class formation, which affected the internal unity of the ANC (*Ibid*). Much of the current ANC leadership is involved in the accumulation of wealth on an unprecedented scale and the interests of this new 'empowered' diverges sharply from those of ordinary members. At the same time, the black middle class has expanded through access to education, business opportunity and public sector employment (Butler, 2012:6). These classes, which are making their way to economically well-off positions, co-exist uncomfortably with a growing mass membership still experiencing economic marginalisation (Butler, 2012:6).

As the modern day ANC has to appeal to a broader spectrum of interests, ANC's history as a liberation movement guides its conceptualisation of its role as a political party. This has, and still does to some degree benefit the party in a number ways as argued by Greene. Firstly, the characterisation of the party as a liberation movement, and not merely a political party, allows the ANC to embrace much broader constituencies than social-cleavage-based political parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Lodge, 2004:19). It also grants the ability to maintain close ties with different kinds of civil society structures (*Ibid*). For example, Benit-Gbaffou (2012:12) states that as a mass party the ANC continues to have a heavy presence in civil society in urban low-income neighbourhoods. The party focuses on maintaining its mass support amongst its popular constituencies, and this is where local ANC branches play a significant role. These party branches create a space where people can express their local concerns. As such, the party's historical significance allows for structures where it can be informed on local matters, as well the opportunity to diffuse tension when necessary by attending to these matters (*Ibid*). ANC's longstanding

connection with the people is a fundamental source of its strength and identity (Yung, 2014:140). The capability of critical introspective analysis, has to some degree remained with the ANC, argues Yung. Furthermore, in a context of increased social protest it must constantly work out how to re-connect with 'the people' (*Ibid*).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented Greene's assumptions regarding the role of policy appeals and the liberation legacy in maintaining party dominance. The chapter began with an overview of the level of ANC electoral dominance, which remained fairly stable in the first decade of democracy but decreased to an all-time low under President Zuma.

In terms of explaining the relation between policy and electoral dominance, Greene argued that dominant parties make policy appeals that reflect the median voter's preferences in order to maximise their vote share. This is based upon the median voter theory within a rational choice framework. While the theory is firmly based in theory, several scholars have argued that it lacks testability. Firstly, it is unclear who represents the median voter is as there are many social markers that can influence individuals' policy preferences on various policy issues. Secondly, the properties of 'median' as a measure suggests that these preferences remain relatively constant over time, even when society changes at a rapid rate. The diversity of South African society also poses significant challenges in determining who is the median voter. In addition, South African society has changed drastically over the last few decades in terms of class formation, thus resulting in interests that are more diverse.

While the term catch-all party has also been critiqued for its ambiguity, I argue that this term is more suitable than defining a median voter. However, these subjective terms are not optimal for

making conclusive statements about how policies interact with electoral dominance. The catch-all party concept denotes whether the ANC has been effective in attracting voters across many sectors of society.

There were four main challenges in early ANC rule, namely how to appeal to those who had not previously supported the ANC, how to promote economic growth, transform society, and maintain the support from its old constituencies. In terms of economic policy, the ANC shifted from the socialist agenda of the RDP towards a neo-liberal approach, which was continued under Mbeki. Under his leadership the economy saw an average growth rate of 4-5 per cent per year, and the rise of a new black professional class was developing at a rapid pace. Although the ANC had embraced a neo-liberal approach, welfare policies aimed at helping the most disadvantaged in society were also being implemented. As such, it is arguable that the ANC was fairly successful in adopting a catch-all character during its early period in power, as the party adopted pro-business policies, but also focused on common issues such as health and education. However, the neo-liberal policies of Mbeki were not well received by the more left-wing factions within the ANC and he was replaced by former president Zuma. Zuma proved himself to only be socialist in rhetoric, and not in practice. In essence, the ‘party of the people’ pursued growth-orientated rather than people-orientated development strategies. It obtained its best election results in 2004 (69.69 per cent) under the neo-liberal Mbeki, and its lowest in 2014 (62.15 per cent) under the socialist-rhetoric Zuma.

Moreover, while the Resource Theory states that policy appeals play a role in sustaining electoral dominance, they are given less importance than resources. Greene states that resources in combination with “acceptable” policy appeals sustain dominance. As such, he believes that the dominant party has significant space to manoeuvre without losing support. He further argues that

policy appeals are important for legitimacy amongst the population and for lowering the cost of patronage. As with his use of the median, Greene's theory also leaves us with the question of what are considered "acceptable" policies. However, this is further complicated by his stance on liberation legacies. While he recognises the role of a liberation legacy as a cause of dominance, he contends that this variable will eventually have less of an effect on allegiance. He states that the effects of liberation credentials on dominance will differ between each country, but that the absolute cut-off point is when the dominant party has reached the four-election or 20-year threshold. The theory's vagueness regarding the role of policy appeals further hampers testability.

Some other concerns arise with his overemphasis on the sovereignty of the dominant party. His theory presents a dichotomy, in which opposition parties are restricted in terms of policies available to them while the dominant party can choose freely. On the other hand, this only applies to dominant parties that have been in power for an extended period of time. Greene recognises that the ANC was restricted during its early period of governance, but it still enjoyed an advantage over the opposition through the perquisites of office. Without taking into consideration the size and level of control of the public sector, which is a necessary precondition for access to resources, we cannot know at what stage of ANC rule the party was unrestricted in terms of policy appeals.

The last section has highlighted a number of potential theoretical weaknesses beyond the issue of the usage of vague concepts. First, I argued that the sovereignty of the dominant party is exaggerated, as the theory focuses on the position of the dominant party in relation to the opposition. However, in the age of globalisation, capital has immense power. Even if wealthy domestic and international companies abstain from funding the opposition, capital can easily be relocated to other countries. Therefore, the dominant party is not entirely free to choose whatever policy it likes without the economy being affected. Secondly, Greene regards the dominant party

as one unified actor. Consequently, he dismisses factionalisation within the party, which can affect which policies are implemented, how they are communicated, and the complexities of liberation legacy discourses.

The following chapter will take Greene's argument one-step further by looking at patronage employment in the public sector and the role of labour unions in sustaining dominance. The main focus will be on the size and level of the politicisation of the public sector, which is a pre-condition for access to state resources.

Chapter 4: Patronage Employment and Single Party Dominance

4.1 Introduction

“Party government isn’t organized for efficiency, not to serve the people. It is organized to provide jobs for the boys.” Syracuse Herland (1913:8)

The previous chapter examined Greene’s (2007a:46) predictions around policy appeals as a strategy to maintain dominance by the dominant party. The main findings were that the theory was severely disadvantaged in terms of testability due to the use of subjective or imprecise measures. This chapter focuses on another aspect of Greene’s resource Theory - the significance of public sector employment and unions for sustaining dominance (2007b:20; 2010a:25-26).

Issues related to patronage employment and resources are interrelated. To operationalise control of resources in the next chapter I use state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) as a proxy. Consequently, some topics which could have been covered within the framework of patronage employment will intentionally be left to the next chapter. To compensate for this limitation, the final chapter will piece all the components together.

The first section of this chapter sets out a theoretical framework of patronage networks, comprised of Greene’s assumptions, as well as considerations from other scholars. Through an analysis of public sector employment under ANC I investigate the correlation between increased public sector employment and electoral dominance. The third section of this chapter will discuss potential

theoretical weaknesses and their consequences for our findings. Lastly, the role of unions for dominance will be examined.

4.2 Political Patronage

4.2.1 Defining Patronage Contracts

Conceptually, patronage systems in public services entails contracts between superiors and multiple subordinates, where there is expected reciprocity between public sector employees in return for forms of loyalty (Grindle, 2012:27). Often, in addition to performing their regular jobs, recipients of patronage jobs are expected to provide political services for the incumbent who provided them with the job. Patronage employment thus offers incumbents a powerful tool, which takes the form of an unlimited army of ‘political workers’. According to Oliveros (2017:30) there is an unwritten understanding that the citizen who receives a government job is expected to fulfil his/her part of the agreement upon being employed.

Grindle (2012:28) asserts that to understand patronage systems it is useful to compare them to their antithesis, namely a career civil service system. Within a career civil service system, the majority of non-elected public sector positions are selected through a process of credentialing based on education, examination, or some other test of merit. Career advancements are based on a regularised demonstration of merit to counter malfeasance in office. In these systems, the employee executes his/her obligations to the state or the service, not to the patron, and the rules of the game are kept formal and objective through regulations and procedures. In a patronage system, on the other hand, power is located at the top and flows downward, while the loyalty flows upward. In addition, the loyalty is personal and defined from above. In sum, the contract involves a mutual commitment to the goals of the patron, be it the king, the president, a parliamentary leader, mayor, union boss and so on (*Ibid*). The nature of the contract is such that the law cannot be used to

enforce it, although the contract is understood by all parties involved (Grindle, 2012:27-28; Oliveros, 2017:30). Oliveros (2017:30) argues that it is conceivable that public employees under patronage contracts deliver free and vital political services to their employers. It is contested as to why the 'client' continues to comply (Oliveros, 2017:30; Robinson and Verdier, 2013:261-267). There is debate as to why an employee would carry out particular services after having already received the benefits of office and Oliveros suggests that it would not be in the interest of the incumbent to hire someone who would not uphold his/her part of the bargain and thus 'waste' the position (2017:30).

There are three major theoretical frameworks to explain continued compliance with patron/clientelistic relationships. From an instrumentalist viewpoint, Robinson and Verdier (2013:62-63) argue that employment in the public bureaucracy are reversible and a patronage job may be withdrawn, which in turn secures compliance. The same logic applies to voting behaviour in which the incumbent can argue that particular services and benefits will disappear if the party loses.

Another reason is based on reciprocity, which denotes a physiological explanation of indebtedness that the clients feel (Oliveros, 2017:30). For Greene and Lawson (2014:62-63) this equates to a norm-based clientelism evident in voting behaviour. Voters, they say, uphold their part of the 'contract' due to feelings of indebtedness and gratitude similar to if they had received a gift, favour, service or protection (*Ibid*).

Greene (2010a:25-26) advances a different rationale to explain adherence to patronage employment contracts. He argues that employees do not provide political services solely due to feelings of indebtedness, but also because their interests are aligned with the governing party, which allows for unrestricted access to the state coffers. This is based on the assumption that

benefits within a SPD system benefit all members of the party (*Ibid*). Oliveros (2017:32) adds to this by arguing that the deal becomes self-enforcing, as victories for the patron also benefit the client. This does not mean that the fear of punishment or feelings of reciprocity are never present in clientelistic contracts, or that they have no purpose. Instead, they are not necessary features of these arrangements (*Ibid*).

4.2.2 The Power of Controlling Patronage Positions

In current discourse patronage employment is often regarded as related to corruption and incompetence. Hence, it is often overlooked as a flexible means of managing power, which has been used both historically to achieve a wide range of goals (Grindle, 2012:41). Patronage systems have shown to be resilient, primarily due to their usefulness in securing the objectives of those in power. These objectives may range from reinforcing absolutist rule, creating capable nations, safeguarding the hegemony of class elites, securing access to private wealth and power, defining the prosperity of political parties, and promoting substantial policy changes (*Ibid*).

As bureaucrats have access to large amounts of resources, which can be used for political and personal gain, appointments based on personal connections are essential so that politicians may use these resources for patronage (Muller, 2007:257). Politicians can demand favours more easily when positions are based on close connections, and these connections in turn provide the politicians with the resources they need (*Ibid*). Likewise, Kopecky et al (2008:7) contend that without the control of state agencies, it cannot give advantages to specific constituencies through the allocation of resources nor can it access public resources to advance private interests.

In Greene's (2007a:40) theory, dominant parties secure monopolistic access to public resources which they may exchange for patronage goods (2007a:40). These patronage goods can range from positions in government, access to certain welfare benefits, and campaign handouts, such as food

parcels and material goods (Booyesen, 2014:24). However, in order for the incumbent to access these public funds, the public bureaucracy must be politically controlled (Greene, 2010a:25-26). Greene's argument has a number of overlapping components. Firstly, public sector employment is a major source of patronage as it provides the incumbent with large numbers of job opportunities to distribute relative to those available to the opposition (Greene, 2007a:40). Greene asserts that the ability of the dominant party to hand out patronage jobs secures an increased number of votes on election day. The second benefit is the availability of human capital relative to how much the opposition can access. Due to the dominant party's resource advantage it can access paid professional party personnel, whereas resource-poor parties have to rely on volunteers as both candidates and activists. They have few material benefits at their disposal to offer supporters (Greene, 2007a:304).

Furthermore, large amounts of non-convertible administrative state resources are made available to the dominant party by public employees. Some examples of such resources are office supplies, vehicles, mobile phones, and postage (Greene, 2007a:40). For instance, in the case of Russia, there was a strategy change in 2003 aimed at increasing political control over the governors (Reuter and Remington: 2008:502). This was done after a realization that the party was in need of the governors' substantial administrative resources prior to the 2003 elections (*Ibid*). The resources may provide the incumbent with an advantage for informing, persuading, and mobilising public support. Public sector employees may also, themselves, be used to cajole party support (Greene, 2007a: 40).

4.3 Public Sector Employment in South Africa

A core tenet of Greene's (2007a:40) theory is that public sector employment provides a key source of patronage. Control over public sector employment provides the dominant party with jobs to

distribute, which according to Greene, generates increased votes on election day. Moreover, as will be the theme in the subsequent chapter is the necessity of large politically controlled bureaucracy for the dominant party to access resources (*Ibid*). It should however be stated that large public sectors can also be found in fully competitive democracies. As such, Greene does not state that a large public sector creates SPD systems, rather it is a necessity for dominance (2007a:40). As such, the degree of political control plays a significant role. Therefore, we should expect a positive relationship where a dominant party holds political control over a larger public service and an increased shares of votes for that party. Before exploring the degree of politicisation of South Africa's public bureaucracy, developments in size will be deliberated upon.

According to research by Borat and his colleagues the public sector has seen the greatest expansion of job creation since 2004 (2016:18). In 2001, the public sector encompassed 17 per cent of all employment and in 2016 accounted for had 22.5 per cent of employment. In 2008, 2.16 million people were employed by the state, which increased to 2.69 million in 2014, demonstrating an upsurge of more than half a million jobs over a six-year period (*Ibid*). The public sector encompasses employment in government at the national, provincial and local levels, as well as in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The majority of employment is found within government, as opposed to employment in SOEs: 88 per cent of public sector employment is found within the first category (Borat *et. al*, 2016:18). Comparatively, Franks stated as of 2014 South Africa had three times more public sector employees than either Brazil or Russia, which are two of South Africa's BRICS partners; and slightly smaller than the United Kingdom and the United States (2014:55).

However, the ANC appeared to reach its peak in terms of electoral dominance in 2004, after which there was a decline. It is however important to note that the public sector also encompasses non-ANC staff. Early in ANC tenure, the public sector still encompassed civil servants from the old

regime (Suttner, 2008:279). On the other hand, this also applies later in ANC rule, albeit for a different reason. Post the 2006 municipal elections the ANC was not in control of four of South Africa’s eight metropolitan areas- Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Johannesburg (Schreiber, 2018:34). As such, the public service encompasses ANC and non-ANC public servants. Nonetheless, the ANC still had electoral stronghold, indicating that the expansion in size of the public sector has not translated into increased votes for the ANC. An overview of public sector expansion can be seen in the tables below.




Figure 2: Public sector employment- indices

(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank)




Figure 3: Public sector employment (%ch y/y)

(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank)

Naidoo (2018:5) argues that developments within South Africa’s government administration can be divided into three sub-periods according to the different presidencies: the Mandela era, the Mbeki era, and lastly the Zuma era, which had varying effects on the relationship between the ANC and the public bureaucracy.

Chipkin and Swilling (2018:14) state that the ANC inherited an uncoordinated and broken administrative system from the Nationalist Party (NP). When the ANC gained political power, there were fourteen separate and parallel administrations, each with its own government and government departments in the Bantustans, in addition to the racialised administrations of the tricameral system at the national level (*Ibid*). This resulted in a lack of political control, which was seen as a major obstacle to transformation. However, the ANC believed, and rightfully so, that resistance to implementation of the RDP by apartheid-era public servants was likely, therefore

maximising political control over government administrations was regarded as essential. Moreover, transformation of the apartheid institutions extended from provincial and local administrations, to the judiciary, parliament and the executive, if the ANC were to deliver its promise of an equal deracialised society (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:14).

Naidoo's research (2018:2-4) shows that there was public sector growth, but also a fluctuating number of departments and entities under Mandela until, 1999/2000, which was partly a result of the testing of different institutional arrangements. The highest number of government departments and entities reached was thirty, and at the end of Mandela's term the number was just under thirty. Overall, Naidoo concludes that there was an incremental expansion of the national machinery when the need to undo apartheid structures was considered (2018:13). On the other hand, electoral dominance increased significantly from the 1994 elections to the 1999 elections, showing an increase from 62.65 per cent to 66.33 per cent. In fact, the 1999 elections were the ANC's second biggest electoral victory, following the 2004 elections. As the ANC was still trying to cement political control over the public bureaucracy, there are few indications that the size of the public bureaucracy caused this increase (*Ibid*). Political control over the public bureaucracy was limited under Mandela, yet the ANC received a similar vote share in 1994 and 2014. These figures suggest that the increasing size of the public bureaucracy did not influence electoral dominance significantly.

During the 'second era', under Mbeki's presidency, this size remained relatively unchanged with only moderate alterations to ministerial departments. For Naidoo (2018:16) this represented a consolidation of the changes made under Mandela.

In Greene's (2010a:25-26) Resource Theory, both the size of the public sector and political control over the state bureaucracy are essential for the maintenance of electoral dominance. Control over

the bureaucracy feeds client-patron relationships through a commonality of goals, which allows for a diversion of resources. As stated previously, party connection and loyalty determine employment opportunities (*Ibid*). As such, related to the size of the public bureaucracy is the extent to which the bureaucracy is politicised. Several scholars have argued that there was an increased level of public sector politicisation from the Mandela to the Mbeki eras. Peters and Pierre expressed concern about this increased politicisation of public sector employment, arguing that positions previously shielded from political interference had succumbed to political pressure and appointments (2004:288). A 2007 study centred on the political involvement of bureaucracies in twelve countries by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) addressed the politicisation of areas related to hiring, firing, promotion, transfer and performance assessment of public servants from 2000 to 2006. The research showed high political involvement in the South African bureaucracy, with only Italy and the United States being slightly more politicised (Matheson at al, 2007:5). As these two countries are not SPD systems, albeit Italy is a former SPD system which ended in 1992, stressed the fact that high levels of public sector politicisation is not just a characteristic of SPD systems.

The Zuma era ushered in the most changes to the South African public sector (Naidoo, 2018:24). When Zuma assumed the Presidency in 2009, the number of government departments and entities spiked. New departments were created, and existing ones split (*Ibid*). Despite the increase in under Zuma, the ANC's vote share dropped. In the 2009 elections, the ANC's share of votes had dropped by 3.79 per cent by the 2014 elections, this number had fallen another 3.75 per cent. The 2014 elections marked the lowest number of votes ever received by the ANC and is also the year with the highest levels of politicisation of the public sector recorded by the OECD. The overall picture of the recent developments is one of high political involvement in staff appointments, but

especially in senior public service staff, with significant control over promotion, transfer and performance (Cameron: 2010:696). This is contrary to ANC's early years of governance, as the government in its early years of governance did not necessarily hire card-carrying members of the ANC, but individuals with a shared vision of radical transformation (*Ibid*).

In the second wave of appointments, on the other hand, the ANC targeted card-carrying cadres for senior positions in the bureaucracy and was more overtly political. Cameron (2010:696) adds that in some cases ministers appoint staff at much lower levels as well. Beresford (2015:7) argues that there is a significant spoils system in South African politics, with a key feature being the distribution of patronage employment. He maintains that there are many examples of political appointments at all levels of public office that have been distributed on the basis of political loyalty rather than competence, be it provincial premiers, mayors or municipal managers, as well as examples of firing non-compliant individuals (*Ibid*).

The overall trends show an intensification of political control over the public sector in South Africa (Desai and Vahed, 2017:30). The following sections elaborate upon the role of unions for dominance. Both themes, public sector employment and labour unions are closely related to the misuse of state resources. However, for the sake of not repeating argument and limited scope of this thesis, the intersection between patronage employment and resources, and potential effects thereof will be extensively elaborated upon in the following chapter.

4.4 Unions and Sustaining Party Dominance

One related topic to public sector employment in Greene's theory (2010b:259) is the role of unions in sustaining party dominance, as he argued was a factor in sustaining the PRI's dominance in Mexico. Grindle (2012:30) explains this process using the examples from throughout Latin

America. She states that it was only Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil which recruited a noteworthy number of public sector employees through a structured career civil service system (Grindle, 2012:134). While recruitment to the public service is often done through patronage, tenure goes through collective bargaining agreements. Hence, while tenure is regulated through collective agreements, the way people obtain their employment in the first place indicates a commitment to the patron (*Ibid*).

In a similar way that public sector employment is leveraged for patronage, Greene argues that a relationship with unions also help the dominant party sustain its position (2007a:40). However, just as a large public sector does not indicate a patronage system, it should be made clear that cooperation between a political party and a labour union is not automatically a sign of a patronage system at work, as a manifold of labour parties across the world have close ties to an associated labour union (Haugsgjerd Allern et. al, 2010:2). As such, unions provide a number of benefits to the dominant party, which are not necessarily illegal, but contributes to electoral dominance, Greene argues (2007a:40). Unions provide a platform to publicise the party, by informing, persuading and mobilising potential support among citizens. As unions are mandated to negotiate with the government for better terms of employment for its members. As the dominant party can select from a large pool of activists for positions, dedicated activism can be rewarded thus limiting the chances of hiring individuals who are half-hearted about the cause of the patron. Lastly, union members provide the incumbent with votes on election day (*Ibid*).

4.4.1 Congress of South African Trade Unions

In South Africa, the ANC-aligned Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has been and still is the most influential workers' organisation, despite experiencing a decline in membership in recent years (Nkomo, 2016:6). Together with the South African Communist Party

(SACP), these groups form the Tripartite Alliance, albeit with the ANC at the helm (Southall, 2003: 61; Habib and Taylor, 2001:219).

Pillay (2006: 17) asserts that as early as 1994, union leaders were starting to become entangled in different neo-corporatist structures with the government and business, and in networks of patronage in all spheres of government - local, provincial and national. Nonetheless, Pillay (2006:17,164) emphasises that COSATU never yielded to the same extensive subordination to the ANC or the SACP as did the PRI in Mexico during the last century. However, over the years COSATU has moved towards a narrower, statist orientation, where the demands of the working class was mostly articulated through the state (*Ibid*). However, tensions are often high between the two, even to the point that COSATU members resort to mass action at times. Nevertheless, around election time COSATU has consistently supported the ANC (Pillay; 2006:167).

Although the ANC has been unable to retain full political control over the union, COSATU has often been at the mercy of the party (Bassett and Clarke, 2008: 791; Habib and Tylor, 2001: 219). Nonetheless, Gumede (2007:110) reasons that the presidents of the ANC are not able to do whatever they please without support from key figures within COSATU and the SACP. Patronage can be an effective mechanism to attain certain aims, as argued by Grindle (2012:280). For instance, in the case of passing the GEAR, Mbeki depended on support from key figures within the Alliance partners (Gumede, 2007: 100). By using patronage and promises of high office, he managed to persuade key COSATU and SACP representatives to come on board. Both Charles Nqakula and Mbhazima Shilowa, who initially opposed GEAR, turned into devoted defenders of the policy. In turn, Shilowa became Premier of Gauteng, and Nqakula was appointed to Mbeki's cabinet as the Safety and Security Minister (*Ibid*).

However, over the years COSATU has started to take a more critical stance towards ANC leadership. In addition, some key COSATU affiliates have left the union. In late 2011, COSATU's General Secretary Zwelinizma Vavi proclaimed that millions of South Africans were no better off financially than they had been before 1994 (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). Further tensions have surfaced since then. Consequently, in April 2017 some COSATU affiliates abandoned the union and created a new body, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) under the leadership of Vavi (*Ibid*). In addition, the National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), which had been banished from COSATU a few years before for its increasingly critical stance towards the COSATU leadership and the ANC, was welcomed into the new union along with its large membership base (*Ibid*).

4.4.2 Benefits from Union-Party Partnership

Greene (2007a:40) argues that the dominant party is advantaged through its ability to gain votes from union members. In a 2013 survey, Buhlungu and Ellis examined party support and affiliation amongst unionised Eskom workers (2013:301). The results showed steady support for the ANC a year prior to all the national elections. In the first two elections following the transition, just under 90 per cent of COSATU members stated that they were going to vote for the ANC; prior to the 2004 elections this had increased to 93 per cent; finally there was a small decline to 90 per cent in 2008. Likewise, Beresford's (2009:401) findings on party affiliation amongst Eskom workers with COSATU membership correspond with Buhlungu and Ellis's (2013:301), and show that a majority of respondents expressed strong support for the ANC, and in times of non-deliverance, problems were attributed to failings by individual leaders rather than resulting from the party itself. Moreover, a majority believed that ensuring representative leadership within the party would solve

most of the problems (Beresford, 2009:401). While this research was done on Eskom workers, these trends might reflect sentiment among COSATU-affiliated workers in that particular timeframe.

Historically, COSATU has provided the ANC with election campaign support through political, financial and logistical backing (Bassett and Clarke, 2008:791). Just a few examples include pamphlets published online in both 1999 and 2016 entitled ‘Why workers should vote the ANC’, as well as election posters encouraging people to vote for the ANC in the 2009 elections, and post-election declarations congratulating the ANC after emerging victorious in the local elections in 2014 (COSATU; 1999, 2009, 2014, 2016). However, COSATU’s power has decreased significantly over the years. The union is experiencing declining membership figures, especially since it gained a new competitor, the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) comprised of former COSATU affiliates (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). Because of decreasing union membership figures, is that the ANC has less to gain from COSATU support than before.

Even though there is nothing wrong about individuals leaving their work within the union for a government position, this has to be on the basis of competence. In a civil service system merit is the basis of employment. However, at times, some key union leaders have proven themselves accessible only to those who can provide patronage exchanges, in which prestigious positions in government have been exchanged for political support (Bassett and Clarke, 2008:79; Gumede, 2007:110). With increased voter dissatisfaction over continuous corruption scandals being uncovered, patronage exchanges between the patron and labour union leaders might decrease voter loyalty (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:9). This will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter.

In sum, the utility of COSTAU for the ANC has deteriorated over the years. COSATU's Membership figures have significantly decreased and a competing labour union has been formed by former-COSATU affiliates. It is however important to note that many labour unions across the globe have been affected by membership losses due to the changing economic environments (Behrens et al, 2004:3). Unions seem to be especially weaker in liberal market economies where welfare benefits play a lesser role (*Ibid*). As such, the following section will elaborate on the costs of public sector wages and work-related benefits of the South African public sector, as well as the role of the unions. The costs of corruption aided through the use of patronage within the party and in association with labour union leadership will be discussed in the following chapter.

4.5 The Cost of the Public Sector and Union Cooperation

The South African economy deteriorated under the Zuma administration (Karodia et al, 2016:52; Kane-Berman, 2016:1). This section analyses the direct costs associated with the public sector and unions' influence over regulations. As will be shown, public sector and labour unions significantly overlap due to the over-representativeness of public sector employees in labour union membership base, these two themes will be discussed in relation to each other.

Greene (2007a:40) sees patronage employment as a benefit to the dominant party because it provides employment opportunities, provides human capital, and as campaign outreach through non-convertible administrative resources of the state. Through these, the dominant party outcompetes the opposition in informing, persuading and mobilising support in which the party becomes highly effective at broadcasting its message. How the ANC has benefitted from control of the public sector is inseparable from resources, and therefore will be left to the following chapter. Nonetheless, the share size of the South African public sector makes it in fact the largest employment industry (Bhorat *et. al*, 2016:18; Franks, 2014:55). The second condition necessary

for extensive patronage employment is that the public sector is politically controlled. As presented earlier, OECD ranked South Africa as one of the countries with the highest level of political interference (Matheson *et. al*, 2007: 5). Furthermore, these trends have arguably become more apparent since then (Desai and Vahed, 2017:30). Even though the public sector also encompassed non-ANC personnel in areas controlled by the opposition, the ANC still has a stronghold. Thus provides credible evidence that the ANC has larger patronage employment opportunities to distribute than any of the opposition parties.

There are two discussions to consider. One is the fact that South Africa is a country where unemployment is high, and this has been the case for many years. Beresford (2015:2) highlights that the unemployment rate in the country has lingered around 25 per cent and remains amongst the highest in the world. In addition, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, which large part due to its high income inequality. As such, public sector employment is viewed as an avenue to rise out of unemployment. Cammack highlights that in areas with high poverty rates and limited job opportunities, a position within the state sector is one of the few paths towards obtaining an income, and thus is even more rewarding than in wealthier countries (2007:603).

Kantor (2017:50) also describes the attractiveness of public sector employment in South Africa, stating that the public sector provides an appealing mix of low risk (losing one's job) and return (employment). He argues that the public sector has higher wages than the private sector on average, as well as greater benefits for employees with similar qualifications. It is also deemed to be more protected from competition as there is only one government (Kantor, 2017:198). Lastly, as shown by Bosch (2006:22), wages for legislators, senior officials and managers have increased significantly more in the public sector than in the private sector since 2001. Looking at the data collected from the South African Reserve Bank, Kantor's argument of greater benefits in the public

sector than in the private sector, with all levels of government combined, proves to be valid after 2015. The chart is calculated in real terms, meaning that inflation has been considered. It shows us that public sector wages surpassed those of the private sector after 2015.




Figure 4: Wage developments in public and private sector (%ch y/y)

(Data collected from the South African Reserve Bank)

The primary task of unions is to fight for better wages and employment conditions for the workforce they represent (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2012:16-17; Kantor, 2017:104). However, for Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2012:16-17), it is important for unions to broaden their membership base beyond full-time workers in the formal for the government to take their demands seriously. This means that the power and success of a union is contingent on the union’s ability to fulfil its dual mandate of uniting a broad spectrum of workers as well as delivering increases in wages and improvements in other workplace-related conditions (Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2012:16-17). Kantor (2017:104-105) disagrees, stating that South African unions have no interest in expanding

into new sections of the labour market. In South Africa, he argues, the unions yield extraordinary legal powers over policies and regulations, and it is not entirely irrational for the unions to protect those already employed in the formal sector and consequently exclude those who are in the informal sector or are unemployed. He argues that unions are concerned with financial gains rather than increasing the number of jobs (*Ibid*). The main objective of the unions is to raise the total compensation paid to their members, which benefits both the unions themselves and their leaders (*Ibid*). This is done through seeking to extract the highest possible total compensation bill paid by employers, which sets the basis for membership fees. In addition, those who receive higher incomes may be more willing and able to pay their dues (Kantor, 2017:105, 114). Hence, Kantor asserts that unions will prefer to seek higher benefits for the 90 per cent or so of the members who retain their jobs, than expanding into new territory, which maximizes profits (*Ibid*).

Consequently, the composition of those who are unionised is affected. Kantor (2017:199) explains that the portion of private-sector workforce who is unionised has declined, primarily in the service sector. The public sector, with superior wages and benefits, by comparison, is almost completely unionised (*Ibid*). For instance, in 2013, the median wage for unionised workers was 129 per cent higher than for non-unionised workers (Sethlatswe, 2013:1). As unionised workers are more likely to be working in the public sector, there is a high overlapping of votes.

As such, the cost of each vote to the party may be high (Kantor, 2017:82). Kantor argues that the state is outspending on benefits for public sector employees who are protected through their union's powers, at all levels (*Ibid*). In addition, Seekings et al, (2015:112) adds that many COSATU trade unionists have become minister, members of parliament, municipal councillors, or government officials. As such, there has been significant pressure for more favourable benefits and wages, and much of this has translated into policies, particularly wage regulation. While this

can be seen as unproblematic in more equal society with fewer economic constraints, Kantor (2017:82) also asserts that this is the main threat to fiscal sustainability in South Africa. Similarly, Franks (2014:55) states that the government's state wage bill accounted for a substantial 11.5 per cent of GDP in 2014, and there was a looming crisis as unemployment was and is high, and the country has a relatively small tax base. Likewise, Kantor argues that in South Africa with staggering unemployment rates and public sector benefits through union legal powers, the number of jobs available is minimal (2017: 105-106). Karodia et. al (2016:52) argue that the high public sector wage bill also contributes to national debt. Moreover, as argued by Schreiber (2018:104), the politicisation of the public sector through the use of cadre deployment has also crippled the public sector by draining of expertise. As political connections have been at the centre of public sector employment contracts, the public sector encompassed millions of overpaid workers without the necessary skills for the job. Consequently, by 2016, the rapid expansion of the sector did not translate into significant improvements in productivity (Schreiber, 2018:104). As such, Kantor (2017:82) asserts that the money spent on public sector employees could have been allocated to poverty eradication programmes, housing, education, health, and other pressing issues. Amongst many other financial issues, the unemployment rate was on 26.7 per cent in 2016, an eight-year high (Marin and Solomon, 2016:21). These issues suggest that the size of the public sector with preferential treatment, is one factor contributing to the slow progress in improving the lives of ordinary South Africans.

As the economy has worsened over the years due to a number of factors, Desai and Vahed argue that the economic deterioration has catalysed dissatisfaction amongst the population (2017:33). One contributing factor to fiscal instability is the government's extensive public sector wage bill, leaving less resources are available for other pressing issues (*Ibid*). The poor service delivery is

most devastating for working families and the poor, who are more reliant on government services than the middle class and the wealthy (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:55). Moreover, unequal access to adequate health and education facilities replicates historical, racialised patterns of inequality (*Ibid*). As such, contrary to Greene's statement, an increase size of the public sector within a context of high inequality and few economic prospects might turn voters away from the ANC. Moreover, the reluctance of unions to expanding into the informal sector and part-time work might make trade union mobilisation and campaigning for the party limited to those already employed in the public sector, thus having a marginal effect.

Even so, the public sector cannot be deem the only contributing factor to fiscal instability. The following chapter will discuss the diversion of public funds. Related to this is the role of self-enrichment. As such, the following chapter will elaborated upon the consequences of publicly known extent of elite enrichment, in a context of destructive factionalism (Reddy, 2014:103), and a deteriorating economy.

4.6 Conclusion

The first section of this chapter presented the theoretical framework to understand patronage employment and unions. The Resource Theory regards compliance by the client in the client-patron relationship as natural due to an alignment of interests in which the blurring of lines between state and party benefits everyone in the party. This chapter has looked at the direct economic costs of the public sector and unions. As issues related to patronage employment and resources are interconnected, patronage employment in a context of the diversion of public funds will be explored in the following chapter.

This chapter confirmed an expansion of the South African public service, as well as its increased politicisation in favour of the ruling party. However, the public sector does not only encompass ANC-affiliated personnel. In early ANC rule, when there was little political control over the state bureaucracy, many public servants from the old regime kept their positions. In 2006 the ANC lost control over Cape Town, which was later followed by the loss of Pretoria, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay in 2016. Nonetheless, in the last national elections in 2014 the ANC was faced with its weakest election result. As such, prior to the 2016 municipal election, we can assume that a significant majority of public servants were ANC-aligned. Later, despite declining electoral support, there are few indications that an increase in the size of the public sector in combination with high political control has had an effect on electoral dominance. It should also be noted that these trends are not specific to SPD systems, as democracies such as Italy and the United States show similar trends. On the theme of labour unions, I have argued that COSATU's influence has decreased over the years, thus diminishing its utility for the ANC.

In the final section, it was argued that the public sector, protected by favourable wage and work-related benefits through the legal powers of the unions, is one of the major contributors to fiscal instability in South Africa. Furthermore, in a context of economic deterioration and increased public outcry, money spent on the public sector could be allocated to more pressing matters. In sum, I have argued that the cost of the public sector has an indirect effect on voter dissatisfaction towards the ruling party which will consequently lead to a decrease of votes on election day.

Chapter 5: State-Owned Enterprises

5.1 Introduction

“If I were the dictator for just six months everything would be sorted.” Former President Jacob Zuma, 2016 (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:96)

The previous chapter traced the development of the ANC’s control of the public sector and its electoral dominance. It showed that while the ANC’s control over the public sector has increased, it has not had the effect of increasing electoral dominance. Another factor affecting dominance, provided by Greene, is the ability of the party to leverage available resources and direct them to secure dominance. Greene asserts that the level of state participation within State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) can be seen as a proxy for the relative magnitude of patronage resources (2007a:20; 2010b:307). As patronage employment is essential component within this theme the argument from previous chapter will be further explored in this chapter. This chapter provides an overall judgement on the correlation between patronage employment, state-controlled resources and electoral dominance.

5.2 Control over SOEs and Party Dominance

A central part of Greene’s Resource Theory revolves around the illicit use of public resources for partisan aims (2010a:31). As such, he reasons that prospects for generating patronage are dependent on the size and level of politicisation of public sector. It is however almost impossible to measure its magnitude of resources for partisan purposes directly, as there are not reliable data available. Therefore, he the degree of state control over economy provides us with an indication

of the magnitude. His theory does not denote that all public sector resources are used for patronage for the ruling party, rather that the magnitude of state's control over the economy affect accessibility (*Ibid*). Within this argument, SOEs are used as a proxy for the relative magnitude of patronage resources over time, due to the economic significance of these companies (Greene, 2007b:20). These large companies are typically operating in strategic industries such as energy, telecommunications, manufacturing and transport. The argument is two-fold: state involvement in these companies means more resources are controlled by the ruling party, which also means more public sector jobs are available for partisan distribution and more state capacity to offer economic protection and favours for political support (Greene, 2007a:20). SOEs are therefore important to sustaining party dominance as they allow the dominant party to turn the state into the party's personal piggy bank.

Furthermore, these companies allow easy access to funds with little risk of public scrutiny (Greene, 2007a:40). One reason for this is that there is often a blurred line between the roles of directors and high-level political appointees, as in SOEs directors may assume both roles. Secondly, their finances tend to be hidden from public view and transfers from the national government are numerous and hard to track (*Ibid*).

Greene argues that privatisation measures will make the governing party less wealthy, and opposition parties can compete more fairly for votes (2007b:20, 33). He further argues that with the recent waves of privatisation in much of the developing world, dominant parties should become a less common phenomenon. In 2007, he predicted liberalisation would end SPD rule in a number of countries, including South Africa (Greene, 2007b:20, 33). Contrary to Greene's assessment of South Africa, it is arguable that the particular way privatisation was implemented did not lead decreased state control. These developments will be discussed below.

5.3 The Case of South Africa

5.3.1 South Africa SOEs in Historic Perspective

Over the last few years, the term ‘state capture’ has become a frequently used term to describe a political project by a well-organised network aimed at extracting large-scale state resources, with the use of SOEs being a central mechanism of obtaining the resources (Bhorat *et al.*, 2017:3). Chipkin and Swilling (2018:1-2) argue that what we refer to as ‘state capture’ is not a new phenomenon in South Africa, but rather a familiar and repeated pattern in its history of state formation. It can be seen as early as the invasion of the Dutch East India Company and the founding of the Cape Colony, through the era of Cecil Rhodes and later under the leadership of the apartheid regime. The apartheid regime was designed to benefit the minority white Afrikaner population in general, and a few powerful elites in particular, and control over SOEs were at the centre of that project (*Ibid*).

Due to this legacy, the ANC government inherited well over 300 SOEs and 50 per cent of South African fixed capital assets were under government control when the ANC took office in 1994 (Jerome, 2006:6). Furthermore, the private sector was controlled by a handful of companies, which operated in a loosely-regulated and inherently anti-competitive environment (Jerome, 2006: 6). They were used as platforms for employment and social benefits for the minority white population, created a support base among the white working class and Afrikaner business owners. Over the years, the apartheid regime came under constant criticism due to the inefficiency and recurrent capital losses of many of the country’s SOEs (*Ibid*). Hence, inefficient state control of SOEs is not new to South Africa.

Furthermore, throughout South African history, public procurement has been used as a political tool to reach certain social and economic aims (Chipkin and Swinlling, 2018:102). It was a

powerful tool in the creation of South Africa's racially exclusive 'developmental state' in the 1930s and later became a strategic platform of the apartheid project, specifically to benefit a class of Afrikaner (nationalist) capitalists over the English-speaking (imperialist) capitalists. The state could use its purchasing power and procurement contacts to redirect the market (*Ibid*).

Similarly, the redesigning of public procurement in the 1990s was based on the idea that the government's purchases of goods and services would incentivise the emergence of black-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (Freund, 2006:11). The concept of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which emerged in the early 1990s, was based on the idea that there was a need to increase black ownership of shares in major corporations, in response to structural racial injustices, with the state playing a significant role (Ponte et al, 2007:1; Jerome, 2006:7). While the need for economic redistribution and policies to address historic inequities are necessary, BEE has been subject to harsh criticism over the years for how it, like the NP's enrichment of white minority elite, operates to enrich a small black elite whilst keeping the exploitative relations of production intact. Bhorat et al, (2017:2) state that the use of procurement policies directed by arbitrary BBE claims have been essential for the diversion of public funds through the use of SOEs. A closer examination of the developments in SOE management under Mbeki and Zuma will be presented in the following section.

5.3.2 The Mbeki Administration's Relationship with SOEs

GEAR prescribed a complete privatisation of non-essential SOEs and a partial privatisation of others (Gumede, 2007:108). Devan Pillay (2011:69) claims that this made Mbeki more unpopular amongst certain factions of the ANC and its partners in the alliance. In March 2011, Zwelinzima Vavi, the General Secretary of COSATU, argued that there was a need for a much larger role of the state in sectors in which jobs could be created, including SOEs (Pillay, 2011:69). Jakkie Cillers

and Ciara Aucoin (2016:4) describe GEAR as essentially being a self-imposed structural adjustment programme. In fact, it did place South Africa on a rapid growth trajectory with increased improvements in productivity. Mbeki's determination to keeping the rand strong and attracting FDI did however come at the cost of not addressing many of South Africa's pressing development needs (Aucoin, 2016:4; Gumede, 2007:126). Based on these statements, Greene's argument that South Africa had taken a path towards increased privatisation and less state control. However, as will be argued, the ANC under Mbeki was centred more around restructuring rather than privatisation. Hence, the state still played a significant role in directing the economy.

Gumede (2007:128) argues that significant privatisation took place: from 1997 to 2004 eighteen SOEs were privatised. From these privatisations the government raised R26.8 billion, of which R12 billion was allocated towards the reduction of the national debt. However, An opposing view is presented by Rumney (2005:403) who argues that the privatisation of SOEs under Mbeki was restricted and slow. Picher (2012:245) agrees that steps towards privatisation were limited to a few SOEs and were conducted in a slow and calculated manner. She highlights that by 2003 the government had only sold around nine per cent of state assets. SOEs still owned 44 per cent of fixed capital assets, which amounted to fourteen per cent of GDP. The most significant SOEs were not privatised, such as electricity supply and generation, weapon production, telecommunications, and transport services. Instead, these were reconfigured to allow for closer connections with private investors in order to rationalise operations and form ties with historically disadvantaged firms, as well as to pacify trade unions and their industries. SOEs with high economic importance for the economy were protected from further privatisation (Pitcher, 2012:245).

Jerome (2006:1-2) argues that South Africa's methods of restructuring and privatisation under Mbeki's leadership was unconventional from a global perspective. The ANC under Mbeki's

leadership was sceptical of full privatisation and instead opted for partial privatisation by selling equity to 'strategic equity partners' and Black Empowerment groups all the while holding on to a majority interest (*Ibid*). Telkom, the Airports Company and South African Airways stand as examples of this practice under his leadership. Furthermore, the Mbeki government tended to prefer involving foreign investors, albeit only as minority partners (Jerome, 2006:1-2).

Horwitz and Currie (2007:459-460) argue that Mbeki's reluctance to transfer control from the presidency to external players had a number of consequences. Even in industries where the ANC had decided upon privatisation, such as the South African Telecommunications, the approach of privatisation did not translate into liberalisation and significant competition. In the case of Telkom, privatisation led to an entrenchment of the ANC's network operator, as the party had shares in the company. Therefore, the party had vested interests in the company's prosperity, and by avoiding liberalisation Telkom was shielded from competition (*Ibid*). Furthermore, they argue that the ANC displayed distrust for independent agencies, which has limited regulation and intensified the government's power (*Ibid*).

In sum, under Mbeki's presidency partial privatisation and limited state regulation opened the possibilities of accumulating wealth through foreign investment (Southall, 2007:222). In fact, purchases by foreign investors accounted for about 40 per cent of total profits from sales of SOEs, leading to a scenario where most of the beneficiaries of privatisation were foreign companies (Pitcher, 2012:245). Telkom, in particular contributed to this high amount, with American and Malaysian buyers. Furthermore, investors from the US, UK, France and Germany became strategic equity partners in telecommunications, in the defence industry and in the transport sector, and American investors bought tourist resorts (*Ibid*).

5.3.3 Control of SOEs Under the Zuma Administration

Renwick (2018: 169) state that when Mbeki resigned from the presidency, many were disappointed with the limited socio-economic transformation. While the country had seen a rapid development of a black middle class, the situation for the poor had not improved significantly (*Ibid*). This led to increased calls for a more radical economic transformation by the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) (*Ibid*). In a document published in 2011, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) stated that BEE considerations were often not taken into account in the state's procurement practices (DTI, 2011: 2). The earlier idea of privatising SOEs was discarded, as these companies were seen as key instruments implementing what was to be termed "radical economic transformation" (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:103).

On paper, radical economic transformation was a broad and comprehensive plan to form black-owned small and medium-sized enterprises and reform white businesses by adding requirements to employ black people and provide equal treatment (Blythe et al, 2018:7). The aim was to diminish the dependence on goodwill of white business owners by forcing structural changes (*Ibid*). In December 2011, the cabinet approved the Preferential Procurement Regulations to align with the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act, (No. 53 of 2003). This allowed the department to use R846 billion in public investment programmes to transform the economy (Bhorat et al, 2017:40). As of 2010/11, more than R200 billion of SOE expenditure had been leveraged in the interests of BEE. A considerable bulk of this money was in only two enterprises, Eskom and Transnet, which amounted to two-thirds of the total procurement expenditure of SOEs (*Ibid*).

Under Zuma's rule the procurement budget of the state grew exponentially (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:45). Over the past 20 years the value of goods and services purchased by the state, chiefly

from the private sector, has expanded to between R400 and R500 billion per annum. This reflects the near-complete outsourcing of the government's primary functions (Bhorat et al, 2017:12). Paradoxically, while the government has fewer functions, the state bureaucracy has swollen, as seen by the increased number of personnel, ministries, departments, agencies and entities (*Ibid*). Under Zuma the state has been turned into an enormous tender-generating machine (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:45). In work done for the Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI), Brunette and his colleagues label South Africa a 'contract state' as state capacity is measured through its ability to tap into and manage, through contractual relations, private sector capacities (2014:9). While this could be a system for allocating beneficial rents for development purposes, in practice this has granted multiple opportunities for entrenching clientelism and patronage networks dependent on the goodwill of decision-makers (Bhorat et al, 2017:12, Burnette et al, 2014:9).

In sum, restructuring throughout ANC rule has not translated into a smaller role of the state in the economy. In fact, it increased considerably under former president Zuma. The following section will take a closer look at corruption and patronage employment under the two presidents. While both precedencies will be covered, special attention will be devoted to Zuma's leadership, since electoral dominance has decreased under his rule and the extent of publically known corruption.

5.3.4 Corruption Under Mbeki and Zuma

The Resource Theory predicts that access to state resources, with SOEs being a proxy, helps the dominant party sustain itself (Greene, 2007a:20). Similarly, Southall (2007:222) argues that SOEs were an important instrument for cementing ANC power under the Mbeki Administration and that this bolstering was justified under the banner of promoting further opportunities for an expanding black middle class, extending black control over the economy and stimulating black empowerment. However, Saliem Fakir (2009:4) states that the focus on BEE as a tool for

transformation in the Mbeki administration did not transform SOEs into drivers for relocating economic power, as the main result was the handover of shares from the white economy to a limited number of people within the ANC cadre of black elites. Southall (2007:223) reasons that BEE even created hindrances to economic transformation, primarily by creating opportunities for corruption in BEE deals (*Ibid*).

Moreover, corruption was made possible as the partial privatisations lacked regulations. In addition, privatisation as set out by Mbeki was limited to non-core assets, which are relatively affordable for black investors although often in direct or indirect association with established corporations. These have frequently been supported by state-controlled finance organised by institutions like the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and National Empowerment Fund (NEF) (Southall, 2007:222). On the whole, this meant the selling off of the ‘family silver’ for foreign capital without any actual handover of economic resources to black people (Southall, 2007:222). While Telkom was a partial exception (the government still owns a 40 per cent share), overall there were no major allocations of resources to private hands (*Ibid*). As such, the liberalisation trends in South Africa described by Greene, is only reflected on the surface. Closer scrutiny shows high levels of state control in the economy.

Shortly after the announcement of GEAR, a number of key black individuals, many of whom had significant political connections, were appointed to leadership positions in the major SOEs and public financial institutions (Southall, 2007:223). For instance, in 1996 Saki Macozoma, a prominent member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee, stepped down from his position in Parliament and was appointed as Deputy Managing Director of Transnet. Later, in 1999, his deputy, Mafika Mkwazi, was awarded the position. In Telkom, Sizwe Nxasana held the position of CEO from 1990 to 2005 (*Ibid*).

Similarly, under the Zuma presidency there has been evidence of corruption where SOEs played a significant role. This has been coined ‘State Capture’ (Hart and Nassimbeni, 2018:6). Much of the evidence was brought to public view following the publication of the *The State Capture Report* by the former Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela (*Ibid*). The more than 350-page report asserted that corruption and personal enrichment are structural and extensive and documented the involvement of one prominent business family -the “Guptas” -in the appointment prominent positions (Wolf, 2017:2). This included ministerial positions and directorships of SOEs and led to the improper and corrupt awarding of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s business empire. Moreover, bribes have been wide-spread (*Ibid*).

For instance, former Deputy Minister of Finance, Mcebisi Jonas, claimed that one of the Gupta brothers had offered him the position of Minister of Finance. He also declared that Ajay Gupta had told him in the same meeting that the Gupta family had already accumulated R6 billion from state contacts, with the goal of increasing that amount to R8 billion (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:25). Shortly, after the publication of the report, an anonymous source leaked between 100,000 and 200,000 emails from the Gupta network (Wolf, 2017:3-4). This leak, which was given the name #GuptaLeaks, indicates that the State Capture Report had only scratched the surface of the extent of financial abuses by members of government. The emails revealed a far greater influence over cabinet and other appointments by the Guptas that had been in force since May 2009, or since Zuma became president. The Guptas bragged of their achievement of making Zuma’s son Duduzane a billionaire. They had also bought Zuma a R331 million mansion and helped his son buy a R18 million luxury apartment in Dubai. As for the Guptas themselves, state contracts had generated financial benefits that ran into billions of rand (*Ibid*).

Greene (2007a:20) argues that when the dominant party is able to divert large funds from SOEs, it the state may offer economic protection in exchange for political support. Based on the evidence provided regarding the Zuma-Gupta relation, this statement seems to be reflected in the South African case. Faull (2017:4) argues that business people and politicians linked to Gupta and Zuma networks have benefitted financially by acquiring political control. For instance, the Gupta-owned Oakbay Capital appointed British public relations firm Bell Pottinger to create defence tactics against state capture allegations to be used by the Zuma and Gupta families, in addition to those allied to them. Early in 2016, this British company's employees were writing speeches and arguments for the allies of the two families, which were then spread by Gupta-owned media outlets and twitter accounts to enforce the image that Zuma was being unfairly criticised by media. The price for the political support provided by the Bell Pottinger firm was over R1.5 million per month (*Ibid*).

Under Zuma, there was an extensive system of rewards and punishments, as proposed by Greene (2010a:25-26). Firstly, this necessitated centralized control of the president. After the 2014 elections, the president was able to increase his political control of the public bureaucracy (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:40). From 2014, the National Macro Organisation of State (NMOS) steering committee was to report directly to the president (Bhorat et al, 2017:17). This allowed the president to place loyal individuals where he needed them and control rent-seeking activities. As such, government ministers, acting in concert with private interests, received access to rent-seeking opportunities through blackmailing businesses. These were legitimised through regulatory instruments or policy decisions, albeit interpreted arbitrarily to favour particular interests (*Ibid*). These businesses were forced to accede to the demands of the government with the warning that they would lose a licence or not be rewarded a contract, or not have their contract renewed (Chipkin

and Swilling, 2018:40). Preferential treatment of a specific business, faction or group guided the decision-making process. Often, people within business had to commit to a number of financial and non-financial promises prior to deals being approved (*Ibid*). Desai and Vahed (2017:40) contend that the competition for who is rewarded tenders has become the main focus of all levels of government at the expense of adequate service delivery and job creation.

The use of rewards and punishment can also be seen in terms of SOEs. Eberhard and Godinho (2017:6) deduce that towards the end of the 2000s, the already-existing polarisation reached new heights as political interests increased on the boards and executive positions of SOEs in general, with Transnet and Eskom especially well-infiltrated. A possible indication that there may have been punishment for noncompliance is when the former Minister of Public Enterprises, Barbara Hogan, resisted the emerging trend of private wealth accumulation among leaders of SOEs. It is believed that Hogan stood in the way of Zuma's planned SOE board appointments as ANC structures were appointing loyal comrades to top Eskom positions. The minister was dismissed from her position 18 months later, and while we cannot know for certain, it is very likely that the dismissal was a direct punishment for engaging in gate-keeper politics (*Ibid*).

Hogan's replacement as Minister of Public Enterprises in November 2010 was Malusi Gigaba. In June 2011, Minister Gigaba undertook the most drastic board restructuring in Eskom's then history where only two non-executive board members kept their positions (Eberhard and Godinho, 2017:6). Additionally, many of Eskom's most respected executives resigned within this timeframe due to the negative shift in institutional culture and early outbreak of systematic fraud and political interference (*Ibid*). As Greene (2010b:259-260) illustrated in his study on SPD in Mexico, the PRI created a system where behaviour that favoured the Party was rewarded and resistance was penalised. One indication supporting the claim that appointments, promotions and dismissals are

decided based on compliance to patronage contracts by the client is the suspiciously high restructuring level of appointments in the face of lucrative deals (Eberhard and Godinho, 2017:6). In 2015, for example, the Eskom governance structures were compromised, as revealed by the high turnover, volatility, and tension within and across the board, executive and senior management. Furthermore, there is a significant time overlap between restructuring and conflict, and the most severe accusations of capture of Eskom leadership, procurement, and operations (*Ibid*).

5.4 The Use of State Resources for Party Benefits

One of the basic themes in Greene's work is the creation of a 'spoils' system whereby the interdependence between political and business elites are extensive. For him, this implies a widespread network of patronage. Greene assumes a link between the diversion of public funds for partisan use and the offering of financial benefits in exchange for political support, which in turn will translate into electoral dominance (Greene, 2007a:40).

Olver, Buthelezi and Brunette (2017:3-6) assert that state resources have been used to benefit the ANC in a number of ways. Firstly, in line with Greene's framework, the ANC benefits itself by denying other parties the same access to a range of state resources, as well as by using the administration as base for party political activities. Resources are being used in election campaigns including through the use of non-financial state assets like vehicles, buildings and staff. The party receives additional funding because of its control of the state apparatus, where these funds are collected through business interests, membership fees and assets raised by regional structures (*Ibid*).

In addition, the party places an obligation on their public representatives to donate to the party on a monthly basis (Olver et al., 2017:3-6). The ANC has been known to put a price on contact with government elites. For instance, the Progressive Business Forum created by the ANC overtly sells seats to events where delegates can meet those further up ‘the hierarchy’ and network for business opportunities (*Ibid*). The misuse of state resources and patronage employment are instruments, and the institutional capacity is intentionally destabilised for this purpose. This generates a malicious cycle in which the state is gradually and systematically weakened to achieve goals unrelated to the public interest and in which there is little difference between the party and the state (*Ibid*). Evidence suggests that large amounts of money have been channelled to the party for re-election purposes; for instance, there are allegations of Russian donations backing the ANC with funding for local government elections, which can explain how the ANC was able to obtain R1 billion for the election campaign (Bhorat *et al*, 2017:17). In exchange, Zuma and his allies committed themselves to the nuclear deal with the Russians without procedural public engagement (*Ibid*).

Booyesen (2014:24) states that at all levels of government, political leaders and officials have used their positions to benefit the party. For example, prior to the 2014 national and provincial elections, reports of state resources being used illicitly for ANC campaigning increased. There was evidence of the ANC supplying large amounts of campaign handouts to communities, including food parcels, blankets and bicycles, prior to campaign visits by the ANC leadership (*Ibid*). Certainly, the ANC has economic capacity to outcompete the opposition in terms of broadcasting their message, mobilize citizens and provide material gifts. Nonetheless, as will be argued in the next section: the use of public funds might under certain conditions may not be the catalysts of sustained electoral dominance, as proposed by Greene.

5.4.1 Resources and Electoral Dominance

While there is evidence of public resources being channelled to the ANC for re-election purposes, ANC dominance has decreased over the years. This section seeks to provide some potential explanations for these trends.

Firstly, I propose the same argument as presented in chapter three, namely his assumption that SPD systems are characterized by benefits being party-specific rather than individual-specific (Greene, 2007a:40). Consequently, the nature of the system means that everyone in the party benefits from raiding the assets of the state, where the party excels at patronage (Greene, 2007a:60). However, this assumption makes the Resource Theory unable to predict the potential damaging effects of resource competition within the dominant party.

Like Greene, Reddy (2014:104) argues that career politicians will seek entrance into the ruling party due to the predictability of election outcomes in DPS. However, while Greene sees this solely as benefitting the dominant party, Reddy's dismissal of the party as being one unified actor, might prove useful for explaining why state resources can have a negative effect on electoral dominance (2014:104). He states that the nature of SPD diminishes inter-party competition and relocates it within the dominant party, thus leading to factionalism (*Ibid*).

Although, under certain conditions, factionalism is not inherently destructive and in fact co-operative fractionalisation can promote broader consensus-building strategies in which various interests are advanced (Reddy, 2014:104). It does, however, have the potential to become highly destructive. Reddy argues that this is especially applicable to former liberation movements in government. For instance, the ANC as a liberation movement and its early tenure in office suggest that groups with different ideological stances could work towards a common goal of democracy for all (2014:104). In fact, Reddy states that under Mandela's rule the diversity of the ANC was

not believed to be problematic because the president's charisma and popularity allowed for a lessening of party-state tensions (*Ibid*). While state capture has been a part of ANC rule for a long time, the ANC has remained fairly functional and was hence easier to hide (Marin and Solomon, 2016:21).

Yet, when liberation movement parties have been in power for extended periods of time, degenerative factionalism can take over, where the factionalism becomes so destructive that it poses a real threat to the coherence and stability of the party (Reddy, 2014:102-104). This is seen in the range of developments from Mandela to Zuma in the continuous expansion of cabinet posts. As such, the expansion of the public sector might not be a sign of strength, but rather weakness. In effect, the conflict exists between elites in control of the machinery of the state and those in control of the party machine. This competition can become so sinister that the party deteriorates from within. In this case, factions are in hostile competition with each other over positions in government that allow for enrichment through the state coffers, although often disguised as ideological differences. Under president Mbeki, factional conflicts between the president and Zuma signified two different 'centres of power'. As many of the structures of the past were still intact, whereby the white elites sustained their monopoly in all spheres except political power, the factions competed over positions within the state for the accumulation of resources (*Ibid*).

Likewise, Netshitenzhe (2012:1) argues that within the ANC the party has fallen under 'sins of incumbency', in which intra-party patronage and corruption are embedded. In the chase for numbers, each delegate's vote comes with a price, and toxic leadership precipitates toxic members, in which financial and non-financial benefits determine the results. In sum, money has become the basis for obtaining leadership positions at all levels of government, and intra-party politics revolve around haggling for allegiance and assets, overshadowing anything programmatic or ideological

(*Ibid*). Michaela Elsbeth Martin and Hussain Solomon (2016:29) argue that there are several signs that self-enrichment politics are tearing the party apart. Under Zuma, the independent powers of the state have significantly decreased. A string of warlords and patronage lords are running the provinces, and below them a new class of businessmen and government managers collaborate on diverting as many state resources as possible. Competition has turned so sinister and money-driven that assassinations of political affiliates within the ANC have taken place (*Ibid*). Reddy (2014:103) states that widespread corruption becomes a norm, in which public resources are necessary tools for gathering support. Consequently, party leaders become dependent on a steady stream of resources to sustain and expand their networks, with factions entrenching themselves deeply in the party organisation, using their political power to win public office, amass resources, and make exchanges for support on the ground. As the state does not have infinite amounts of resources, clashes between factions escalate and at some point the system becomes unsustainable without dismantling the party organisation (*Ibid*).

But as Grindle (2010:28) states, patronage systems are often riddled with factions and conflict. The behaviour of many patronage-appointed officials corresponds with the stereotype of incompetence, corruption and bad governance that is often the presumed consequence of patronage, in which many public sector positions are filled by short-term unqualified personnel. In fact, these systems are often linked to dysfunctional public services, as the spoils of winning office or the cost of cementing political alliances take a toll (Grindle, 2012:29). Olver et al (2017:8) state that the party is in need of funds for a number of campaign activities, ranging from purchasing of merchandise, funding rallies and conferences, covering travel expenses, and paying for media coverage. However, these resources have become limited due to factionalism, as resources are channelled via factions rather via the party itself (*Ibid*).

Moreover, extensive spoils for self-enrichment often has had severe consequences for the economy. Martin and Solomon (2016:21) state as the South African economy has deteriorated over the years, and state capture can no longer be concealed. For instance, as of 2016, exports and commodity prices were decreasing and the rand was collapsing. In the first quarter of 2016 the economy shrank by 1.2 per cent, combined with an unemployment rate of 26.7 per cent – the highest in eight years. In addition, business confidence was lower than it had been for more than two decades (*Ibid*).

The country's SOEs were in no better condition than the economy as a whole. John Kane-Berman (2016:1) highlights the constantly published reports of financial catastrophe, corruption, bad governance, political interference, chaos, or sometimes all of the above, within these companies. Some of the largest SOEs, such as South African Airways (SAA) and Eskom, would not exist without government guarantees assisting them financially through loans. Kene-Berman (2016:5) argues that SOEs have become the playground of crony capitalism, which has led to a deterioration of their organisational integrity: they are financially broken and their corporate brands have shattered. SOEs have become an instrument to enrich the elites at the expense of the people. Those who benefit the most are chief executives, board members and politicians. The main beneficiaries of the spoils obtained through SOEs have been both local and foreign businesspeople (*Ibid*). Moreover, Chipkin and Swilling (2018:25) note that the vast amounts of financial resources obtained by foreign forces, such the Gupta family, have been moved offshore and contribute nothing to the South African economy.

These government guarantees are a threat to the state's own financial stability which is being meticulously checked by international credit rating agencies. Without a significant reduction of state debt, South Africa's credit rating will be downgraded to 'sub-investment', or 'junk', status.

One consequence may be an upsurge in borrowing costs, which will in turn limit the amount of resources available for social spending (Kane-Berman, 2016:1). Consequently, Martin and Solomon (2016:12) state that spoils of the state can be overlooked until they are so extensive that there is a complete deterioration of administrative control, party unity and provision of public goods. These trends were becoming more evident under Zuma, with the clear deterioration of the party's image from an external point of view, as well as internally (*Ibid*).

For these multiple reasons, voter dissatisfaction seems to have been increasing over the years, as seen by a growing domestic protest movement regarding service provision, labour issues, unemployment, university fees and staffing, as well as the anti-Zuma protests prior to Zuma's resignation (Cilliers and Aucoin, 2016:6). Many of these protests are directly linked to government performance. Lastly, Southall (2011:9) argues that the extent of exposure in the media is dependent on the prevailing balance of power within the governing party. While we do not know the full extent of dubious exchanges, Southall asserts that forms of corruption are often exposed as a result of intense factional clashes for resources. We can assume that the number of unrevealed corruption deals is high, but that increased disunity within the party will result in increased leakage to the public (Southall, 2011:9).

These vignettes have demonstrated that there has been a blurring between the party and state, where state resources have been used to aid enrichment of a few. However, this enrichment does not appear to be benefitted the party as whole. The South African case might indicate an interaction between three components. Firstly, the economy suffers from intra-party competition for resources, which also intensifies this competition, contributing to a further economic decline (Reddy, 2014:104). The third component, which is linked to the two first elements, is public scrutiny. Martin and Solomon (2016:21) argue that as the party becomes less functional it becomes

more difficult to hide corruption from the public. In sum, citizens may turn away from the party, either by voting for the opposition or abstaining from voting when the party is unable to provide public goods due to economic and administrative constraints stemming from obvious large-scale corruption (*Ibid*). Kane-Berman (2016:29) states that the extensive personal gain of top politicians and/or business elites has also led to increasing dissatisfaction amongst a growing number of ANC members, the SACP, and the COSATU leadership elites, as well as to the general public. He further argues that the malfeasance of state companies, notwithstanding the fact that the extent is unknown, may have been a cause of decreased electoral dominance in the latest local elections (*Ibid*). In sum, personal enrichment seems to override policies to reduce socio-economic grievances amongst the population. This has contributed to a culture of self-enrichment among members within the ANC that overrides party interests.

While Greene (2007a:259) maintains that his theory is applicable to both democratic and authoritarian SPD systems, the South African case indicate otherwise. The PRI in Mexico had one advantage that the ANC does not. The PRI had full control over the media Hallin (2000:85). Similar signs of attempted government control over media was starting to appear around 2010 in South Africa (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:2). For instance, a majority of members of Parliament from the ANC voted to pass the Protection of State Information Bill, which would give government officials the right to classify government information as ‘top secret’ to any information considered to be in the ‘national interest’ (Thomas and Sookrajowa, 2017:39). Bills are passed in the lower house of parliament comprising of ANC and opposition party representatives, and a two-third majority is required. However, it is based on a proportional representative formula that favours the ANC (*Ibid*). The Protection of State Information Bill would entail that journalists could be sentenced to prison for reporting on state issues (Chipkin and Swilling, 2018:2). However, unlike

Mexico, South Africa's judiciary is independent, and the bill was dropped as it was believed that the Constitutional Court would oppose the bill (*Ibid*). As such, the Resource Theory might not be as applicable to democratic SPD states.

Schreiber (2018:18) offers a similar explanation as has just been argued. He states that the combination of endemic corruption, rising crime rates, economic devastation, and the party's unwillingness to take accountability for Zuma's patronage network has progressively eroded electoral support since 2009, and in fact this trend has greatly intensified after the 2014 election (*Ibid*). Greene (2007a) argues that the opposition will not be able to capitalise on this dissatisfaction before the ruling party has lost its stronghold on the state machinery. However, this might not be reflected in the South African case. As has been extensively argued, the South African public sector show high levels of politicisation. Even though there have been no national elections after 2014, the local elections of 2016 give us an indication of voter loyalty. The local election results of 2016 provide show a strengthening of the opposition (Schreiber, 2018:37). As such, Greene's argument that a ruling party must lose significant control over the state apparatus and the economy in order for citizens to cast their votes for the opposition is arguable. In sum, a skewed electoral playing field in which the dominant party has a considerably larger resource advantage might have limited power to explain SPDs.

5.5 Conclusion

The case of ANC dominance in post-apartheid South Africa shows that there have been increased levels of diversion of public funds and a decrease of electoral support. In fact, the ANC has seen a steady, albeit relatively slow, erosion of its dominance.

In 2010, Greene predicted that the ANC would lose electoral support as the country had embarked on a path towards liberalisation. Economic theory states that the privatisation of an economy decreases state control of the economy. Although South Africa has taken steps towards the privatisation of non-core assets, it has been argued that the way in which privatisation has been implemented has not translated to less state control. Moreover, throughout South Africa's history SOEs have been a central political tool that benefit certain groups of people. A second instrument for amassing power and wealth has been the use of public procurement policies. In the apartheid era, SOEs and public procurement were used for the enrichment of white elites. Likewise, under the ANC BEE policies have been an essential strategy for diverting public funds through the use of SOEs. Due to BEE policies, the power vested in the president, and the lack of independent control systems, patronage employment and corruption have been able to go unchecked. Additionally, an extensive system of rewards and punishments has allowed for widespread corruption deals to take place both within government and on the boards of SOEs.

As predicted by Greene, the ANC's election campaigns have out-competed the opposition through the use of the state apparatus. The party is granted a range of financial resources ranging from non-financial state assets, funding from private business donors, and membership fees. The institutional capacity of the state has been intentionally weakened and destabilised for political partisan purposes. Although this thesis confirms Greene's claim that patronage employment and access to public funds benefit the dominant party over the opposition, it has been argued that resource advantages do not always translate into increased electoral dominance. In fact, resources might even decrease electoral dominance within certain contexts.

I have argued that the main theoretical weakness of the Resource Theory is found in the definition of the dominant party. By conceptualising the party as a unified unit in which all members of the

dominant party benefit equally, the theory does not sufficiently address the potential destructive effects of intra-party competition. While Greene argues that the nature of SPD systems minimises factionalism within the dominant party, I have argued that these systems transfer competition between parties to inside the dominant party. In particular, former liberation movements in government are more prone to factionalism, as the party encompasses many different groups of people.

Within the party, as seen in the case of the ANC, conflicts between elites in control of the machinery of the state and those in control of the party machine can become highly destructive. These have the potential to become so destructive, as argued in the case of South Africa, that the party is deteriorating from within. The competition over positions in government is a sign of this, an indication that an expansion of the public sector is a sign of weakness rather than of strength. As wide-spread corruption becomes the norm, politicians become more dependent on a constant stream of resources to maintain support from their constituencies.

Moreover, as seen in the case of South Africa, the constant need for resources and the breakdown of the country's SOEs have dire consequences for the economy as a whole. Therefore, this chapter has argued that there is an interaction between three components. Firstly, intra-party competition and self-enrichment have catastrophic effects on the economy, additionally economic decline works as a catalyst for further intra-party competition. The last factor, which is linked to the two first components, is public scrutiny. When party unity is destroyed or has become severely dysfunctional, it can no longer conceal the corruption from the public. Moreover, while Greene's claim that the Resource Theory is applicable to both democratic and authoritarian SPD systems, the South African case does not confirm this as the democratic elements within the country provide citizens with the knowledge of state corruption. In a context where the economy is in ruins, public

goods are for the most part not provided, and citizens are aware of the corruption within government, voter dissatisfaction is virtually inevitable which eventually leads citizens to break their allegiance to the party. As such, while resources might aid electoral dominance in certain contexts, it has also the potential to become the source of electoral decay for the party. In sum, there are few indications that asymmetrical access to resources between political parties in and of itself can explain party dominance.

Chapter 6: Conclusion of Thesis

“Domination takes the zest from political life, simultaneously bringing stability. The dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigour, its arteries harden. It would be possible to show that every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.” Duverger (1954:312).

6.1 Revisiting the Problem Statement

The purpose of this study has been to evaluate Greene’s Resource Theory using South Africa under the ANC as an illustrative case to contribute to the field of SPD research. The research topic was chosen due to the limited understanding of what sustains these systems. The final chapter will present the research findings and provide suggestions for further research.

The thesis began by presenting the reader with the theoretical foundations of Kenneth Greene’s Resource Theory that he developed based on research on the prolonged dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. The main assumptions in the theory were divided into three separate chapters: policy appeals, patronage employment and labour unions, and state-owned enterprises as proxy for the dominant party’s resource advantage. As these three themes do overlap to some extent, the chapter five encompassed how in reality patronage employment unfolds in relation to public resources. The research study was guided by one research question, and supplemented by two sub-questions:

To what extent can Greene’s resource theory help to explain one-party dominance?

- a) To what extent does resource advantage help us understand the ANC's electoral dominance?
- b) How does Greene's theory address intra-party competition and the potential consequences thereof?

These research questions were explored by using an analytical framework that problematised the imprecision of a number of theoretical concepts from political science used in the Resource Theory. The identification of theoretical weaknesses was used to explore alternative explanations for the electoral rise and later decline of the ANC. By doing so, overall judgement could be made on whether asymmetrical access to resources sustains dominance.

6.2 Findings

The first theoretical weaknesses were uncovered in chapter three on policy appeals, and these proved to be of relevance throughout the research study. The median voter theory was highlighted as problematic, due to its vagueness in terms of testability. I argued that the median voter exists only in theory but is impossible to identify. The properties of the median mean that preferences remain fairly stable over time even in cases where society is undergoing significant change. The catch-all party was identified as an alternative term, although this term is also hampered by its subjective nature. The field of political science is particularly challenged compared other research fields such as mathematics, due to the subjective nature of what one is trying to study. This subjectivity brought about further complications when examining Greene's claims about liberation legacies. In sum, both policy preferences of the median voter and liberation credentials cannot be measured.

Moreover, Greene's policy assumptions cannot be separated from control over the state apparatus and resources. Again, the theory presents the reader with arbitrary terms as he states that the dominant party must have "acceptable" policy appeals in combination with patronage resources. Although he states that the ruling party reaches dominant status after a four-election or 20-year mark, it is unclear at what point before that the dominant party has significant electoral advantage over the opposition, at which point the party can freely choose its policy stance. All these factors which have been discussed now contribute to the inability to make any conclusive statements of how politics affect SPD systems.

The final section on policy appeals went beyond the issues of imprecise theoretical terms and explored the potential weaknesses of a number of core assumptions. The main concern was the fundamental assumptions of the nature of SPD systems, in which the party is defined as one unit. Since the theory assumes that every member of the dominant party is driven by the same interests, it cannot account for intra-party competition and factionalisation. I argued that factionalisation has direct consequences on which policies are implemented, how they are communicated, as well as influencing liberation discourses. Moreover, seeing the dominant party as one unit proved to be a serious issue which persisted throughout the thesis.

The following chapter looked at the size and level of politicisation of the public sector, as well as the role of labour unions in sustaining dominance, in which the chapter found no relationship. As issues related to patronage employment are interconnected to the diversion of public funds and patronage activities, the scope of the chapter was limited to the associated direct economic costs. The main argument of chapter 4 was that the state outspending on the public sector that is protected by their unions has indirectly contributed to increased voter dissatisfaction. The enormous size of the public sector in combination with preferential wage and work-related benefits is one

contributing factor to fiscal instability, thus leaving fewer resources for other pressing matters. Moreover, COSATU has become less influential within society over the years, thereby contributing to its diminishing utility for the ANC.

The final chapter analysed the intersection between patronage employment and access to resources for political partisan purposes. It has been argued that South Africa's path towards liberalisation through the privatisation of SOEs has not led to a decreasing role of the state. In fact, through the use of procurement policies, lack of independent control systems, limited regulations, and vested centralised control of the presidency, restructuring is a more fitting term. In the later years, and especially under Zuma's leadership, widespread corruption has been uncovered. This has been possible because of the patronage employment system in which rewards and punishments played a significant role.

Although the ANC has a significant resource advantage due to its control of the state apparatus, I have argued that resources alone cannot explain SPD. In fact, within some contexts resources are potentially detrimental to electoral support. As in chapter 3, the conceptualisation of the party as one unit was found as the main theoretical weakness.

The Resource Theory is not able to account for intra-party competition and factionalisation within the dominant party, and how resources are a central element within this. It has been argued that the nature of SPD systems relocates political competition within the dominant party. Factionalism has the potential to become highly destructive, especially within former liberation movements, due to a multitude of interests being present. Factionalisation can become so destructive that the party deteriorates from within.

Hence, the interaction between three components has been identified to explain why resources have limited explanatory power for sustained dominance. Factionalisation leads to intra-party competition for resources, and these factions become dependent on a steady and increasing stream of resources to sustain their power. This can have catastrophic effects on the economy. Secondly, as these resources become less available, intra-party competition becomes even fiercer. Moreover, the party becomes unable to provide adequate service delivery and public goods. It has been claimed that the democratic elements within South Africa increase public awareness. As the economy shatters and the party deteriorates from within, the public becomes more aware of what is happening. Consequently, the misuse of public resources within the context explained above increases voter dissatisfaction and eventually electoral decay. These findings show that resources are not independent from the internal and external environments, indicating that resources in themselves cannot explain SPD.

6.4 Explaining ANC Dominance

This thesis has identified a number of potential weaknesses in Greene's theory, and to wit his theory has not been confirmed by the South African case. It is questionable whether resource advantages are the only explanatory factor for one-party dominance. In fact, resources might even have a negative effect on dominance under certain conditions. The main findings of this thesis indicate that the Resource Theory does not adequately acknowledge the consequences of the internal politics within the dominant party. This is rooted in the theory's assumptions of the nature of SPD systems, in which the dominant party is seen as a cohesive unit. By exploring how factionalisation manifests itself within the dominant party, and especially in former liberation movements, the thesis has identified how resources can decrease voter loyalty.

Bibliography

- Abedi, A., and Schneider, S. G. (2006) *Winning is Not Enough: A Reconceptualization of Single-Party Dominance in Established Democracies*, In annual meeting of the CPSA, pp. 1-21
- Aidt, T.S., (2016) 'Rent seeking and the economics of corruption', *Constitutional Political Economy*, volume 27, issue no, pp.142-157.
- ANC (1969) 'Strategy and Tactics of the ANC', *Morogoro Conference of the ANC, meeting at Morogoro, Tanzania, 25 April - 1 May 1969*, < <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/1969/strategy-tactics.htm> > [Last uploaded: 01/10/2018]
- ANC (2012) 'The second Transition? Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces of 2012', *Policy Conference Discussion Document (version 6)*, 27th of February, 2012, < <http://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/1824/9beed41e7e884d7792oda64ac1076076.pdf>> [Last uploaded: 15/10/2018]
- Arian, A., and Barnes, S. H. (1974) 'The dominant party system: A neglected model of democratic stability'. *The Journal of Politics*, volume 36, issue no. 3, Aug., 1974, pp. 592-614.

- Aucoin, C., and Cilliers, J. (2016) 'Rainbow at risk: Improving South Africa's prospects', *Public Affairs Research Institute*, Johannesburg, Policy Brief number 83, June, pp. 1-8
- Baregu, M., (2004) 'From liberation movements to ruling parties in southern Africa', in Landsberg, C. and Mackay, S. (eds), *Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The Search for Democratic Governance*, pp. 97-110.
- Bavusile Maaba, B., (2001) 'The archives of the Pan Africanist Congress and the Black consciousness-orientated movements', *History in Africa*, African Studies Association, Volume 28, pp. 417-438
- Bassett, C. and Clarke, M., (2008) 'The Zuma affair, labour and the future of democracy in South Africa'. *Third World Quarterly*, volume 29, issue no 4, pp.787-803.
- Beall, J., Gelb, S. and Hassim, S. (2005) 'Fragile stability: State and society in democratic South Africa'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, volume 31, issue no 4, pp.681-700.
- Bénit-Gbaffou, C. (2006) 'Holding local government accountable? Civil society, local councillors and decision-making in Johannesburg', University of the Witwatersrand, November, pp. 20-1.

Beresford, A., (2009) 'Comrades 'back on track'? The durability of the tripartite alliance in South Africa', *African Affairs*, volume 108, issue no, 1 July 2009, pp.391-412

Beresford, A. (2015) 'Power, Patronage and Gatekeeper Politics in South Africa', *African Affairs*, Volume 114, Issue no 455, 1 April 2015, Pp. 226–248

Beresford, A., Berry, M.E. and Mann, L. (2018) 'Liberation movements and stalled democratic transitions: reproducing power in Rwanda and South Africa through productive liminality'. *Journal of Democratization*, volume 25, issue no 7, 26 April, 2018, pp.1-20

Bhorat, H., Naidoo, K., Oosthuizen, M., & Pillay, K. (2016) 'Demographic, employment, and wage trends in South Africa', *Africa Growth Initiative*, volume 25, issue no 141, June 2016, pp. 1-39

Bhorat, H., Buthelezi, M., Chipkin, I., Duma, S., Mondi, L., Peter, C., Qobo, M., Swilling, M., Friedenstein, H., (2017) 'Betrayal of the promise: how South Africa is being stolen', *State Capacity Research Project*, pp. 1-66

Binns, T. and Robinson, R., (2002) 'Sustaining democracy in the 'new' South Africa', *Geography*, volume 97, issue no 1, 16 December 2002, pp.25-37

Black, D. (1948) 'On the Rational of Group Decision-making', *Journal of Political Economy*, volume 56, issue no 1, pp. 1-14

Blondel, J. (1968) 'Party systems and patterns of government in Western democracies', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, volume 1, issue no 2, June 1968, pp. 180-203

Blythe, J, Silver, J, Evans, L, Armitage, D, Bennett, J.N, Moore, M-L, Morrison, T. H, Brown, K, (2018) 'The dark side of transformation: Latent risks in contemporary sustainability discourse', *Antipode: a radical journal of geography*, July 2018, volume 50, issue no. 5, pp. 1-18

Bogaards, M. (2004) 'Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa', *European Journal of Political Research*, volume 43, issue no 2, pp. 25 February 2004, pp. 173-197

Boix, C. (2003) *Democracy and redistribution*, Cambridge University Press

Booyesen, S (2011) *The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power*, Wits University Press

Booyesen, S. (2014) 'Election 2014 and the ANC's Duet of Dominance and Decline', Special edition on South Africa's Election 2014, *Journal of African elections*, volume 14, issue no 1, pp. 7-34

Boucek, F. (1998) 'Electoral and parliamentary aspects of dominant party systems', in P. Penning and J. E. Lane (eds), *Comparing Party System Change*, Routledge Press, pp. 103-24

Branko, M. (2010) 'Four critiques for the redistribution hypothesis: an assessment', *Luxemburg Income Study (LIS)*, LIS Working Paper Series, issue no. 530, pp. 1-23

Brooks, H. (2004) 'The dominant-party system: challenges for South Africa's second decade of democracy', *Journal of African Elections*, vol. 3, issue no. 2, 25 October 2004, pp. 121-53

Brooks Yung, H. (2014) 'The idea of organizational renewal in the African National Congress', in Butler, A. (eds) *Remaking the ANC: Party Change in South Africa and The Global South*, Jacana Media, pp. 137-156

Brunette, R., Chipkin, I., Tshimomola, G., & Meny-Gibert, S. (2014) 'The contract state—Outsourcing and decentralisation in contemporary South Africa', *Public Affairs Research Institute*, May 2014, pp. 1-57

Buhlungu, S. and Tshoaedi, M., (2012) *COSATU's Contested Legacy: South African Trade Unions in the Second Decade of Democracy*, Human Sciences Research Council

Buhlungu, S and Ellis, S, (2012) 'The trade union movement and the Tripartite Alliance: a tangled history', in in Buhlungu, S. and Tshoaedi, M., (eds), *COSATU's Contested Legacy: South African Trade Unions in the Second Decade of Democracy*, Human Sciences Research Council, pp. 259-282

Burnell, P., (2001) 'Financial indiscipline in Zambia's Third Republic: The role of parliamentary scrutiny'. *Journal of Legislative Studies*, volume 7, issue no 3, September 2001, pp.34-64

Burnham, P., Lutz, K.G., Grant, W. and Layton-Henry, Z., (2008) *Research methods in politics*. Red Globe Press

Butler, A. (2005), 'How democratic is the African National Congress?', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, volume 31, issue no 4, December 2005, pp. 719-736

Butler, A. (2009). *Contemporary South Africa*, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan Press

Butler, A. ed., (2010) *Paying for Politics: party funding and political change in South Africa and the global South*, Jacana Media

Butler, Anthony (2012) *The Idea of the ANC*, Jacana Media

Butler, A. (2015), 'The Politics of Numbers: National membership growth and subnational power in the African National Congress', *Transformation: critical perspectives on Southern Africa*, volume 87, March 2015, pp. 13-31

Cameron, R., (2010) 'Redefining political-administrative relationships in South Africa', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, volume 76, issue no 4, December 2010, pp. 676-701

Cammack, D., (2007) 'The logic of African neopatrimonialism: What role for donors?', Blackwell Publishing, *Development policy review*, volume 25, issue no 5, 17 August 2007, pp.599-614

Caulier, J. F., & Dumont, P. (2005) 'Fragmentation as a Measure of Dominance: A Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test of Four Indices,'. In ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, April 2005, pp. 14-19

Cassim, R. (2006) 'Reflections in South Africa's first wave of economic reforms', in Padayachee, V. (eds) 2006. *The development decade?: Economic and social change in South Africa, 1994-2004*. Human Sciences Research Council Press

Chipkin, I., Swilling, M., Borhat, H., Buthelezi, S.D., Friedenstein, H., Mondi, L, Peter, C., Prins, N., Qobo, M., Jonas, M., and Haffejee, F. (2018) *Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture*, Wits University Press

Clark, W.R. and Golder, M., (2006) ‘Rehabilitating Duverger’s theory: Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws’, *Comparative Political Studies*, volume 39, issue no 6, pp. 679-708

Congleton, R.D., (2002) ‘The Median Voter Model’, *Center for study of Public Choice*, George Mason University, Virginia, U.S., February 2002, pp. 1-11

COSATU, (1999) ‘Why voters should vote for the ANC’, [Date viewed: 08/10/2018] <
<http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=2248>>

COSATU, (2009) ‘Election Poster 2009’, [Date viewed: 08/10/2018] <
<http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=970>>

COSATU, (2014) ‘Thousands of ANC members and supporters declares a decisive victory on May 7’. [Date Viewed: 08/10/18], <<http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=8719>>

COSATU, (2016) 'Why voters should vote ANC', [Date viewed: 08/10/18], <
<http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/promos/2016/cosatu-local-govt-elections-flyer.pdf> >

Clapham, C., (2012) 'From Liberation Movement to Government', *The Brenthurst Foundation*,
Discussion Paper 8, Oppenheimer & son (pty) Ltd

Cox, G. W. (1997) *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*,
Cambridge University Press

Dahl, R. A. (1986) *Democracy, liberty and equality*, Universitetsforlaget

Darracq, V., (2008) 'The African National Congress (ANC) organization at the grassroots', *African Affairs*, volume 107, issue no 429, pp.589-609

De la O, A.L., (2015) 'How Governmental Corruption Breeds Clientelism', In Domínguez, J.I., Greene,
K.F, Lawson, C.H., and Moreno, A. (eds) *Mexico's Evolving Democracy: A Comparative Study of
the 2012 Elections*, Johns Hopkins University press, pp. 200-226

De Jager, N. (2009) 'No 'New' ANC?', *South African Journal of Political Science*, volume 26, issue no 2, 15 December 2009, pp. 275-288

Desai, A., & Vahed, G. (2017) 'The Guptas, the Public Protector's Report and Capital Accumulation in South Africa', *Alternation Journal*, volume 24, issue no 1, pp. 26-49.

Diaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B. and Weingast, B.R., 2003. Tragic brilliance: Equilibrium hegemony and democratization in Mexico. *Hoover Institution, Stanford University*.

Dinkelman, T., (2011) 'The effects of rural electrification on employment: New evidence from South Africa', *American Economic Review*, volume 101, issue no 7, pp.3078-3108.

DTI, (2011) 'Leveraging public procurement' *Annual small business summit*, Department of Trade and Industry, 12th of October, 2011

Doorenspleet, R., & Nizjink, L. (2013) *One-party dominance in African democracies*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Dunleavy, P. (2005) 'Facing up to multi-party politics: how partisan dealignment and PR voting have fundamentally changed Britain's party systems'. *Parliamentary affairs*, volume 58, issue no 3, pp. 503-532

Duverger, M (1951) *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, Wiley Press

Eberhard, A and Godinho, C., (2017) 'Eskom Inquiry Booklet: A resource for Parliament's Public Enterprises Inquiry, Civil Society, Journalists & Engaged Citizens', University of Cape Town Graduate school of Business

Ellis, S. and Sechaba, T., (1992) *Comrades against apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in exile*. Indiana University Press.

Ezrow, L., (2008) 'On the inverse relationship between votes and proximity for niche parties', *European Journal of Political Research*, issue no. 47, pp. 206-220

Fakir, S. (2009) 'Caught between a rock and hard place: the state of play for South Africa's beleaguered development state', *Perspectives*, volume 3, issue no 9, pp. 1-10

Fanon, F. (1974) *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin Publishers

Faull, A., (2017) 'Who can stop the rot?'. *South African Crime Quarterly*, 61, pp.3-6

Forestiere, C., & Allen, C. S. (2011) 'The formation of cognitive locks in single party dominant regimes', *International Political Science Review*, volume 32, issue no 4, pp. 380-395

Franks, P.E., (2014) 'The crisis of the South African public service', *The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation*, volume 195, issue no 11, pp.48-56

Freund, M., (2006) 'State, capital and the emergence of a new power elite in South Africa: 'Black Economic empowerment' at national and local levels', *Review of African Political Economy*, Volume 34, issue no. 144, Class, Resistance & social transformation, pp. 1-30

Friedman, M., (1999) 'Effecting equality: translating commitment into policy and practice'. *Agenda*, volume 15, issue no 1, pp. 1-17

Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C.E.W. eds. (1999) *The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy*, Taylor & Francis

Giliomee, H., Myburgh, J. and Schlemmer, L., (2001) 'Dominant party rule, opposition parties and minorities in South Africa. *Democratization*, volume 8, issue 1, pp.161-182

Greene, K.F., (2007a) *Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective*.

Cambridge University Press

Greene, K.F., (2007b) *Creating Competition: Patronage Politics and the PRI's Demise*. Helen Kellogg

Institute for International Studies, Cambridge University Press

Greene, K.F. (2010a) 'Party finance and single-party dominance in Mexico and beyond', In Butler, A,

(eds), *Paying for politics: Party funding and political change in South Africa and the Global South*,

pp. 20-52

Greene, K.F (2010b) 'A Resource Theory of Single-Party Dominance', in Bogaards, M. and Boucek. F

(eds) *Dominant political parties and democracy: Concepts, measures, cases and comparisons*.

Routledge, pp. 245-275

Greene, K.F (2011) 'Campaign Persuasion and Nascent Partisanship in Mexico's New Democracy',

American Journal of Political Science, Volume 55, issue no. 2, April 2011, pp. 398–416

Greene, K.F, and Ibarra-Rueda, H. (2014) 'Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party: Reform and resurgence', in Butler, A. (eds) *Remaking the ANC: Party Change in South Africa and The Global South*, Jacana Media, pp. 29-51

Grindle, M.S., (2012) *Jobs for the Boys: Patronage and the State in Comparative Perspective*, Harvard University Press

Gumede, W.M. (2007) *Thabo Mbeki and the Struggle for the Soul of the ANC*, Cape Town, Zebra Books

Gumede, W.M., (2008) South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the difficulties of consolidating South Africa's democracy. *African Affairs*, volume 107, issue no 427, pp.261-271

Habib, A. and Taylor, R., (2001) 'Political alliances and parliamentary opposition post-apartheid South Africa'. *Democratization*, volume 8, issue no 1, pp 207-226

Hallin, D.C (2000) 'Media, political power, and democratization in Mexico', in Park, M.J. and Curran, J. (eds)., 2000. *De-Westernizing media studies*. Psychology Press, pp. 85-99

Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994) 'An integrated theory of party goals and party change', *Journal of theoretical politics*, volume 6, issue no 3, pp.259-287

Hart, G., and Nassimbeni, M., (2018) 'The value of information in South Africa's new democracy', *University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa, Library Management*, volume 39, issue no. 5, pp. 1-18

Haugsgjerd Allern, E., Aylott, N., Juul Christiansen, F., (2010) 'Scenes from a marriage: Social Democrats and trade unions in Scandinavia', *Center for Voting and Parties*, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

Horwitz, R.B. and Currie, W. (2007) 'Another instance where privatization trumped liberalization: The politics of telecommunications reform in South Africa—A ten-year retrospective', *Telecommunications Policy*, volume 31, issue no 8, pp 445-462

Hurt, S.R., (2017) 'What's left of 'the left' in post-apartheid South Africa?', *Capital & Class*, volume 41, issue no 2, pp.291-313

Olver, C., M. Buthelezi and R. Brunette (2017) 'Party Political Funding and the South African State'. Submission to the Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee on the Funding of Political Parties. Working Paper. Johannesburg: *Public Affairs Research Institute*, July 2017, pp. 1-17

Jerome, A., (2006) 'Privatization and regulation in South Africa: An evaluation', in Amann, E (eds), *Regulating development: evidence from Africa and Latin America*, Massachusetts, U.S.: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.179-197.

Johnson, K., (2003) 'Liberal or liberation framework? The contradictions of ANC rule in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, volume 21, issue no 2, pp.321-340

Kane-Berman, J. (2016) 'Privatization or bust', *South African Institute of Race Relations*, 20th of September, 2016, issue number 27, pp. 1-33

Kantor, B., (2017) *Get South Africa Growing*, Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers

Karodia, A.M., R., Soni, P., and David, J. E. (2016) 'Downgrade and junk status looms on the horizon for the South African Economy: Finance Minister in a no win situation as toxic politics takes center stage'. *International Journal of Accounting Research*, volume 42, issue no 3495, pp. 1-41

Karume, S. (2004) 'Party systems in SADC region: in defense of the dominant party system', *The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa*, Auckland Park, South Africa, Paper number 16, January 2004, pp. 1-24

Kelsall, T., (2011) 'Rethinking the Relationship between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa'. *IDS bulletin*, volume 42, issue no 2, pp.76-87.

Kirshner, J., (2003) 'Money is politics'. *Review of International Political Economy*, volume 10, issue no 4, pp.645-660

Kitschelt, H. and Wilkinson, S.I. eds., (2007) *Patrons, clients and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*, Cambridge University Press

Kopecky', P., Maria S., and G. Scherlis,. (2008) 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Party Patronage', Working Paper No. 25, *IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods*

Lannegren, O., & Ito, H. (2017) 'The End of the ANC Era: An Analysis of Corruption and Inequality in South Africa'. *Journal of Politics and law.*, volume 10, issue no , August 2017, pp. 55-59

Lawson, C. and Greene, K.F., (2014) 'Making clientelism work: How norms of reciprocity increase voter compliance'. *Comparative Politics*, volume 47, issue no 1, pp.61-85

Lijphart, A., (1971) 'Comparative politics and the comparative method', *American political science review*, volume 65, issue no 3, pp.682-693

Lodge, T., (2004) *The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa*. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, volume 42, issue no 2, pp.189-219

Lodge, T., (1999) 'Policy processes within the African National Congress and the tripartite alliance'. *South African Journal of Political Studies*, volume 26, issue no 1, pp. 5-32

Lodge, T., (2014) 'Neo-patrimonial politics in the ANC'. *African Affairs*, volume 113, issue no 450, pp.1-23.

Madonsela, T. (2016) 'State of Capture, Report No. 6 of 2016/17. Public Protector of South Africa', Available at: <http://www.da.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/State-of-Capture-14-October-2016.pdf>. [Accessed on 6th November 2016]

Magaloni, B., (2006) *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press

- Martin, M.E. and Solomon, H., (2016) ‘Understanding the phenomenon of “state capture” in South Africa’, *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, volume 5, issue no 1, pp.21-35
- Matheson A, Weber B, Manning N and Arnould E., (2007) ‘Study on the Political Involvement in Senior Staffing and on the Delineation of Responsibilities Between Ministers and Senior Civil Servants’, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance No 6. Paris, *OECD Publishing*
- Mozaffar, S. and Scarritt, J.R. (2005) The puzzle of African party systems. Sage Publications, *Party Politics*, volume 11, issue no 4, pp.399-421
- Mtimkulu, P.F.G., (2006) *The key to one-party dominance: a comparative analysis of selected states*, University of Johannesburg
- Muller, W. C.,. (2007) ‘Political Institutions and Linkage Strategies’, in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.), *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, Cambridge University Press, 251–76.
- Naidoo, V. (2018) ‘Machinery of Government change in South Africa’s Post-democratic Public Administration. Machinery of Govt’, Public Affairs Research Institute.

Neto, O.A. and Cox, G.W., (1997) 'Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties'. *American Journal of Political Science*, pp.149-174

Netshitenzhe, J. (2012) 'Competing identities of a national liberation movement and the challenges of incumbency'. *ANC Today*, volume 12, issue no

Nichter, S., (2008). 'Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot'. *American political science review*, volume 102, issue no 1, February 2008, pp.19-31

Nkomo, S., 2016. 'Majority of South Africans want a Workers' Party as Alternative to ANC'. *Afrobarometer*, Dispatch No. 73, 9 February 2016, pp 1-11

Nugent, P., (2001) 'Ethnicity as an explanatory factor in the Ghana 2000 elections', Cambridge University Press, *African Issues*, volume 29, issue no 1-2, pp.2-7

Obiyo, R., (2013) 'South Africa's Sarafina 2: ministerial responsibility to parliament revisited'. *AFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society*, volume 3, issue no 2, pp.39-69

O'Leary, B. (1994) 'Britain's Japanese question: 'Is there a dominant party?', In Margetts, H, and Smyth, G (eds), *Turning Japanese: Britain with a Permanent Party of Government*, Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 3-8

Oliveros, V., (2017) 'Voter Perceptions of Ballot Integrity and Clientelism, in Lupu, N., Oliveros, V., and Schiumerini, L. (eds), *Campaigns and Voters in Developing Democracies: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*', pp. 1-44

Onishi, N, and Gebrekidan, S (2018) 'In Gupta brother's rise and fall, a tale of a sullied A.N.C', *The New York Times*, 20th of December, 2018, < <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/22/world/africa/gupta-zuma-south-africa-corruption.html>> [Last uploaded: 22nd of December, 2018]

Ottaway, M., 1991. Liberation movements and transition to democracy: The case of the ANC. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, volume 29, issue no 1, pp.61-82

Pegels, A., (2010) 'Renewable energy in South Africa: Potentials, barriers and options for support'. *Energy policy*, volume 38, issue no 9, pp.4945-4954.

Pempel, T. J, (1990) *Uncommon democracies: The one-party dominant regimes* (Vol. 6), Cornell University Press

Peters BG and Pierre J (eds) (2004) *Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective*,
Routledge Publishers

Pillay, D., in Buhlungu, S., (2006) 'Cosatu, alliances and working-class politics'. Trade Unions and
Democracy: Cosatu workers political attitudes in South Africa', Human Sciences Research
Council Press, pp. 167-190

Pillay, D., (2011). 'The enduring embrace: COSATU and the Tripartite Alliance during the Zuma
era'. *Labour, Capital and Society*, pp. 56-79

Pillay, D., (2013) 'Between social movement and political unionism: Cosatu and democratic politics in
South Africa'. *Rethinking Development and Inequality*, volume 2, pp.10-27

Piper, L. and Anciano, F., (2015) 'Party over outsiders, centre over branch: How ANC dominance works
at the community level in South Africa', *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern
Africa*, volume 87, issue no 1, pp.72-94

Pitcher, A., (2012) 'Was privatisation necessary and did it work? The case of South Africa'. *Review of
African Political Economy*, 39(132), pp.243-260.

Ponte, S., Roberts, S. and Van Sittert, L., (2007) 'Black economic empowerment', business and the state in South Africa'. *Development and Change*, 38(5), pp.933-955.

Posner, D.N., (2005) *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press

Powell, G.B., (1982) *Contemporary democracies*, Harvard University Press

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). *Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990* (Vol. 3), Cambridge University Press

Reddy, T. (2014) 'Factional dynamics in the Indian National Congress and the African National Congress', in Butler, A. (eds) *Remaking the ANC: Party Change in South Africa and The Global South*. Jacana Media, pp. 101-120

Renwick, R. (2018) *How to steal a country: State capture and hopes for the future in South Africa*, Jacana Media

- Reuter, O. J., and Remington, T.F. (2008) 'Dominant party regimes and the commitment problem: the case of United Russia', *Comparative Political Studies*, volume 42, issue no. 501, 9th of December, 2008, pp. 501-526
- Riker, W.H., (1982) 'The two-party system and Duverger's law: an essay on the history of political science', *American Political Science Review*, volume 76, issue no 4, pp.753-766
- Robinson, J.A. and Verdier, T., (2013) 'The political economy of clientelism', *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, volume 115, issue no 2, pp. 260-291
- Rumney, R., (2005) 'Who owns South Africa: an analysis of state and private ownership patterns', in Daniel, J. Habib, A. and Southall, R (eds) *State Of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*. Cape Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council press, pp. 401-422
- Sartori, G. (1976) *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press
- Scheiner, E. (2006) *Democracy without competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a one-party dominant state*. Cambridge University Press

Schleiter, P. and Voznaya, A.M., (2014) 'Party system competitiveness and corruption'. *Party Politics*, volume 20, issue no 5, pp. 675-686

Schreiber, L., (2018) *Coalition Country: South Africa after the ANC*, NB Publishers

Schrire, R., (2001) 'The realities of opposition in South Africa: Legitimacy, strategies and consequences'. *Democratization*, volume 8, issue no 1, pp.135-148

Schulz-Herzenberg, C. (2009). 'Elections and accountability in South Africa'. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, June 2009, issue no 188, pp. 1-26

Schulz-Herzenberg, C., (2014) 'Voter participation in the South African elections of 2014', *Institute for Security Studies*, Policy brief 61, July 2014, pp. 1-8

Seekings, J., (2008) 'The continuing salience of race: Discrimination and diversity in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Volume 28, issue no 1, pp. February 2008, pp. 1-25

Seekings, J., and Moore, E., (2014) 'Kinship, market and state in the provision of care in South Africa', *Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft*, pp. 435-451

Seekings, J., and Nattrass, N., (2002) 'Class, Distribution and Redistribution in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa*, issue no 50, pp. 1-30

Sevenhuijsen, S., Bozalek, V., Gouws, A., & Minnaar-McDonald, M., (2003) South African Social Welfare Policy: An Analysis Using the Ethic of Care, *Critical Social Policy*, volume 23, issue no 3, pp. 299-321

Singer, M., (2009) *Buying voters with dirty money: The relationship between clientelism and corruption*, pp. 1-36

South African Reserve Bank (2018) 'South African Reserve Bank: annual report', RESBANK

Southall, R., (2007) 'Ten propositions about black economic empowerment in South Africa'. *Review of African Political Economy*, volume 34, issue no 111, pp. 67-84.

Southall, R. (2003) 'The state of party politics: struggles within the tripartite alliance and the decline of opposition', in Daniel, J., Habib, A. & Southall, R. (eds), *State of the nation: South Africa 2003-2004*, Human Sciences Research Council Press, 53-77

Southall, R. (2004) 'Political change and the black middle class in democratic South Africa', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Volume 38, issue no 3, pp. 521-542

Southall, R. (2011) 'Family and favour at the court of Jacob Zuma', *Review of African Political Economy*, volume 38, issue no 130, pp. 617-626

Southall, R., (2013) *Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press

Southall, R., (2014) 'Democracy at Risk? Politics and Governance under the ANC', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, volume 652, issue no 1, pp. 48-69

Southern, N. (2011) 'Political opposition and the challenges of a dominant party system: The Democratic Alliance in South Africa'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, volume 29, issue no 3, pp. 281-298

Spencer, L., Ritchie, J., Lewis, J. and Dillon, L., (2003) *Quality in qualitative evaluation: a framework for assessing research evidence*, National centre for Social research, pp. 1-20

Stokes, S.C., (2005) 'Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina'. *American Political Science Review*, volume 99, issue no 3, pp. 315-325

Suttner, R. (2003) 'Culture(s) of the African National Congress of South Africa: Imprint of exile experiences', in H. Melber (ed.), *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa*, Human Sciences Research Council Press, pp. 178-199

Suttner, R., (2004) 'Democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa: the advice of 'the experts''. *Current Sociology*, volume 52, issue no 52, pp.755-773

Suttner, R., (2006) 'Party dominance 'theory': of what value?' Routledge Publishers, *Politikon*, volume 33, issue no 3, pp.277-297

Tambo, O. (1984) 'Dream of total liberation of Africa is in sight- message of the National Executive Committee of the ANC on the 72nd anniversary of ANC by O.R Tambo, 8 January, 1984', African National Congress pamphlet, published 8th of January, 1984, <
<https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/dream-total-liberation-africa-sight-message-national-executive-committee-anc-72nd> > [Last uploaded: 18th of December, 2018]

Thomas, M.K.T, and Sookrajowa, S.S. (2017) 'The Media Appeals Tribunal and the Protection of Information Bill as challenges to freedom of expression and good governance in South Africa', *Africa Focus*, volume 30, issue no. 2, pp. 29-50

Tregenna, F., (2011) 'A new growth path for South Africa?', *Review of African Political Economy*, volume 38, issue no 130, pp.627-635

Van de Walle, N., (2003) 'Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa's emerging party systems', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, volume 41, issue no 2, June 2003, pp.297-321.

Vicente, P. and Wantchekon, L., (2010) 'Clientelism and Vote Buying: Lessons from Field Experiments in West Africa'. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Volume 25, issue no 2, 2009, pp. 292–305

Vureen, H. (2013) 'South Africa: Democracy, Corruption and Conflict Management', Conference paper, Centre for Development and Enterprise, pp. 1-36

Wade, R. (1985) 'The market for public office, or why India is not better at development'. Elsevier Ltd, *World Development*, Volume 13, Issue no 4, pp. 467-497

Wallerstein, I., (1996) 'The ANC and South Africa: Past and Future of Liberation Movements in World-System', *South African Review of Sociology*, Volume 31, Issue no 30, 28 September, 1996, pp. 2695-26999

Weaver, K. and Rockman, B (1993) 'Assessing the effects of institutions', in K. Weaver and B. Rockman (Eds.), *Do institutions matter?*, Brookings Institution, pp. 1-41

Weghorst, K.R. and Lindberg, S.I., (2013) 'What drives the swing voter in Africa?', *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume 57, issue no 3, pp.717-734

Westley, C., Calcagno, P.T. and Ault, R., (2004) 'Primary Election Systems and Candidate Deviation'. *Eastern Economic Journal*, 30(3), pp.365-376

White, D., (2011) 'Dominant party systems: a framework for conceptualizing opposition strategies in Russia'. *Democratization*, Volume 18, issue no 3, pp.655-681

Wolf, L. (2017). 'The remedial action of the" State of Capture', *Report in Perspective PER / PELJ* 2017, volume 20, July 2017, pp. 1.45

Yin, R.K., (1981) 'The case study crisis: Some answers', *Administrative science quarterly*, volume 26,
issue no 1, pp.58-65.