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MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE
CASES OF NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE, 1989-1999

BY

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Supervisor's Approval of Submission of Dissertation for Examination

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Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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CONTENTS

Abstract **ii**

Abbreviations **iii**

Introduction **1**

PART ONE: POST CONFLICT-ELECTIONS 5

Chapter One: Objectives and Preconditions of Post Conflict-Elections **7**

Chapter Two: The Electoral Process **19**

Chapter Three: Campaigning and Voting **33**

PART TWO: THE SECOND GENERAL ELECTIONS 55

Chapter Four: Electoral Administration Preparations **55**

Chapter Five: Pre-Electoral Activities **61**

Chapter Six: Campaigning and Voting **71**

Chapter Seven: General Conclusion **88**

Bibliography **94**

ABSTRACT

This dissertation essentially examines the context and the conduct of elections held in the southern African region, particularly in Namibia and Mozambique between 1989 and 1999. These elections crystallized a wider process of democratization during the last decade, in which attempts were made to shift from various forms of authoritarian rule (colonial or racial oligarchies, military regimes, one-party states, or presidential rule) to pluralist parliamentary politics.

Southern Africa apparently holds some of the best examples of the realizations of liberal democracy in the period between 1989 and 1999 in the region. The cases are of particular interest because in the states, the incumbent governing parties were constituted from the liberation movements that led the countries to liberation from colonial, colonial-settler and racially oppressive systems. This affected not only the durability of these governments, but also their operations in dealing with the defense and the growth of political power. The two states have also been closely observed through the holding of the first multiparty elections by the United Nations.

This study is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the post-conflict elections. In this case the international community has assisted Namibia and Mozambique in various ways. The second part focuses on the electoral management in both states, with particular emphasis on the running of the second multiparty general elections.

ABREVIATIONS

A G:	Administrator-General
A. P:	Patriotic Alliance
AWEPA:	Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Africa
C.C.M:	Mozambique Christian Council
C.C.N:	Council of Churches of Namibia
C.D.Es:	District Electoral Commission
C.F.C	Cease Fire Commission
CNE:	National Elections Commission
COMPOL:	Commissioner of Police
CORE:	Commission of Reintegration
D.C.N:	Democratic Coalition of Namibia
D.T.A:	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
E.C:	Electoral Commission
E.I.S.A:	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
F.U.MO:	Mozambique Front Union
Frelimo:	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
G.P.A:	General Peace Agreement
M.A.G:	Monitor Action Group
N.B.C:	Namibian Broadcasting Corporation
N.N.D.P:	Namibia National Democratic Party
O.T.N:	Organization of Mozambican Worker
ONUMOZ:	United Nations Organization for Mozambique
P.C.N:	National Conventional Party
P.R.D:	Democratic Renovation Party
P.R.M:	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
P.R:	Proportional Representation
PADECO:	Democratic congress Party
PADEMO:	Democratic Party of Mozambique
PALMO:	Liberal Party of Mozambique
PIMO:	Independent Party of Mozambique
PLAN:	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
R. M:	Mozambique Radio

R.R.R:	Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction
Renamo:	Resistance National of Mozambique
Renamo-UE:	Renamo Electoral Union
S.R:	Special Representative
SADC:	Southern Africa Development Community
SADF:	South African Defense Force
SOL:	Social Liberal Democratic Party
STAE:	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
SWABC:	South West African Broadcasting Corporation
SWANU:	South West African National Union
SWAPO:	South West African Peoples Organization
SWAPOL:	South West African Police
SWATF:	South West African Territory Force
TVM:	Television of Mozambique
U.D.F:	United Democratic Front
U.D:	Democratic Union
UMO:	Democratic Union of the Opposition
UN:	United Nations
UNAMO:	Mozambique National Union
UNCIVPOL:	United Nations Civil Police
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNOHHAC:	United Nations Organization of Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNTAG:	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
W.R.P:	Workers Revolutionary party.

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War has heralded the emergence of a new era. It is a time in which a series of intense protracted conflicts in the Southern African region have been terminated and peace agreements brokered. After years, and in some cases decades of wars, there are now new possibilities for democratization, democratic consolidation and peace. Since the end of the Cold War, interest in the concept of democratization has been revived with it being interpreted from political, social and cultural.¹

It is in this context of conceptualizing democracy that the process of democratic transition requires greater attention. In general, democratization, this can be defined as a transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes. However, by distinguishing between electoral and liberal democracy, a distinction must be made between a first transition from authoritarianism towards the installation of a democratically elected government by founding elections and a second transitional process towards a consolidated and institutionalized democracy.²

Given the endurance of colonial rule in Southern Africa, much of the region has only gained experience with the administration of multiparty elections over the course of democratic transitions in the last decade of the twentieth century. Many of these elections have been held in post-conflict societies with the assistance, supervision or some times direct control of the international community. The basic principle that government should be chosen by the ballot, not the bullet, has become enshrined as an emerging right in international law.

In post-conflict societies, competitive elections have become one of the instruments used not only to promote democracy but also to attempt to consolidate a fragile peace. In such

¹ Lamb, G: *Demilitarization and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: A Survey of the Literature*. p. 1

² Andrea E, O: Mozambique the Permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism? In: *African Review* Vol. 10 No 1, 2001. p. 4

cases, elections provide an inevitable means for jump-starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for conferring legitimacy upon the new political order. For all of these reasons, elections have become a central political mechanism for choosing governments and thus a central aspect of the process of democratization.³

Without reinvestigating the vast body of literature on democratization and elections, and without questioning the importance of the place of elections in democratization, this study seeks to offer more than just an account of what happened in two Southern African states, Namibia and Mozambique, from 1989 to 1999.

The year 1989 was a historic and eventful milestone for Namibia. The final stage of decolonization in Africa was at last to be played out. A cease-fire beginning in April heralded the end of the long drawn-out war that had been waged by fighters of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to dislodge the occupying South African security forces. The United Nations, which had been passing resolutions challenging South African overrule and been acting to assert its own trusteeship, finally would establish a presence in the country to oversee a transition to peace and eventually, in 1990, to full independence. The culmination of this process would be the first fully open elections in Namibia, in November 1989, to choose an assembly that would write a constitution for the country. The elections and the work of the Constituent Assembly (AC) in turn would set the main parameters for the post independence political system; they would shape the party system and the legal framework of the state structures.⁴

In Mozambique, the adoption of political reforms began when Frelimo's Central Committee agreed on a new constitution in 1990. Two years later, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) provided the key step that made the introduction of multiparty politics

³ Reilly, B: *International Electoral Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned*. In: *Working Paper No. 17*, 2003. p. 9

⁴ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 1

an actual possibility. The GPA was an agreement between the top leadership of the two sides, Frelimo and Renamo which, from the start, marginalized every other voice, notably those of the unnamed political oppositions. The GPA entrenched the key principles for co-operation between Frelimo and Renamo and the institutionalization of multiparty democracy in Mozambique.⁵ The implementation of most of the key provisions of the GPA was placed in the hands of the United Nations, which was called upon to facilitate the process of demilitarization and the movement to democracy. The country's first pluralist elections, held in 1994, established a formally competitive system, which opened the political arena to Renamo.⁶

In both states the immediate political outcome was the establishment of a governing party faced with a significant opposition, a constitution, and for the moment, political practices that guarantee pluralist competition. This case study examines essentially the election management machinery of Namibia and Mozambique with special reference to the political, legal and administrative framework in which the Presidential and National Assembly elections were held. An attempt will also be made to determine whether there exist in Namibia and Mozambique certain elements which are universally recognized as essential to the promotion of effective pluralism and honest political competition, because elections are now part of the processes that constitute action for the achievement and the retention of political power in Southern Africa.

Namibia and Mozambique were chosen for this study because the incumbent governing parties were constituted by the liberation movements that led them to liberation from colonial, colonial-settler and racially oppressive systems. Established in Dar es-Salaam in 1962, SWAPO and Frelimo were forged by the anti-colonial war fought against South Africa and Portugal. At the beginning of the liberation struggle the Republic of Zambia was a budding infrastructure, from which SWAPO and Frelimo established a guerrilla

⁵ Alden, C: The United Nations Elections and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.31, No. 1, 1995. p. 65

⁶ Giovanni M, C: Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Party System. In: Working Paper No 23, 2003. p. 1

network.⁷ In both states the principal problems confronting UNTAG and ONUMOZ were the long delay in the initial deployment of the peace-keeping contingents. It was both the former liberation movements that won the first and the second general elections.⁸ Using a comparative approach to elections in Namibia and Mozambique, this study is divided in two parts: the first examines the post-conflict elections, and the second deals with the post democratic elections.

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⁷ Booyesen, S: Liberation Meets Liberal Democracy: A Framework for the Comparison of Action to Contest and Retain Political Power in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. p.2

⁸ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995. p. 5

PART ONE: POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

This part will explore the post-conflict elections in Namibia 1989 and Mozambique 1994. Elections after conflict are fundamentally different from those organized under normal circumstances. Post-conflict elections are designed to facilitate, or to symbolize, an end to intrastate conflicts. The decision to hold elections is negotiated at the time of a peace accord. The purpose of such post-conflict elections is a dual one: like all elections, they seek to install a legitimate, democratic government; in addition, they also attempt to consolidate fragile peace agreements into a lasting peace under a democratic system.

Most post-conflict elections occur after the negotiation of peace accords that involve most, if not all, the parties to the conflict. The peace accords afford a major role to external actors (either an international organization or a group of nations), often involving the deployment of military or police forces to the country emerging from the conflict. The external actors generally themselves commit to assuming a major role in administering, supervising, observing, funding, and otherwise supporting the elections. Finally, the elections often take place while reconstruction efforts are still in their infancy, refugees and internally displaced persons have not returned to their original places of residence, and land mines are still laid and make travel difficult in certain regions of the country.⁹

Namibia and Mozambique had a post-conflictual past because the elections were held in the aftermath of violent internal conflict. Despite negotiations and signing of a peace accord, post-conflict societies remain highly fragmented, polarized, and prone to violence.

⁹ Krishima, K: Post conflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance. p. 5

Deep political cleavages between the warring groups have not yet been bridged, nor have the various factions come to share the same a genuine commitment to democracy and reconciliation. In spite of the fragile nature of the states, elections were held with considerable assistance from the United Nations and other International Organizations

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CHAPTER ONE: OBJECTIVES AND PRECONDITIONS OF POST-CONFLICT

ELECTIONS

1.1 THE OBJECTIVES OF POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS

At the end of a civil war, there tends to be a consensus among the conflicting political parties, many civil society organizations, and particularly the international community, that the country should have democratic systems to select a new government or constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. The most obvious objective of post-conflict elections is to transfer power to a democratic government that enjoys national and international legitimacy and is able to start rebuilding the country. The principle is that people should choose their governments through free and fair elections¹⁰

The second objective of post-conflict elections is to initiate and consolidate the democratization process in the country. At least in public discourse, elections are viewed not as one-time events but as a first step toward nurturing democratic institutions after the war.

The third objective of post-conflict elections is to promote reconciliation between the parties that were formerly at war with each other. Post-conflict elections are supposed to transform a violent conflict into a non-violent one. They are expected to enable the former warring parties to pursue their conflicting ideologies and programs in a peaceful fashion. Elections give all factions an opportunity to present their agendas to the citizens' debate with their opponents, and mobilize public opinion to capture political power. Like other elements of democratic system, elections contribute to the institutionalization of a conflict resolution mechanism in the body politic.¹¹

¹⁰ Krishima, K: Post conflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance. p. 6

¹¹ Ibid. p. 9

1.2 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES

In many post-conflict countries, the international community maintains multinational peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations to monitor a cease-fire and to prevent the renewal of hostilities. These forces are crucial to successful elections. Their presence gives a sense of security to the citizenry and a moderating influence upon those who may not be reconciled to a peaceful settlement. They also provide a wide range of support services for post conflict elections, to their efficient transformation, communication, and other logistic facilities.¹²

UNTAG, launched in Namibia in April 1989, was the first United Nations multifunctional peace-support operation. The deployment followed the signature of the Brazzaville Protocol by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, stipulating that Namibia would become a fully sovereign country and free and fair elections for a constituent assembly would be held. The mandate of the UNTAG was threefold, as is typical for a multifunctional peace-support operation: firstly, the main military tasks consisted of verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces, verifying of the cease-fire and monitoring of the cantonment. Secondly, the civilian mandate contained three main elements: the establishment of regional and district offices for explanation and assistance of internal reconciliation, the supervision of the civil administration reform process, and, most importantly, organization and supervision of the electoral process. Thirdly, the police component of the mandate consisted of the supervision of the local police. UNTAG was withdrawn in March 1990 after having completed its mandate.¹³

ONUMOZ has been the most modern multifunctional peace-support operation launched. It was established to facilitate the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, signed on 4 October 1992 in Rome by the president of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of the Resistance National Mozambique (Renamo). Again, the mandate was

¹² Ibid. p. 9

¹³ Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 63

threefold: the military mandate consisted primarily of the monitoring the cease-fire, the cantonment of the forces, and their demobilization. The most important tasks of the civilian component were the monitoring of the entire electoral process and the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. The police unit supervised the performance of the local police. After free and fair presidential and legislative elections in October 1994, and the installation of Mozambique's new Parliament and the inauguration of the President of Mozambique in early December, ONUMOZ was withdrawn at the end of January 1995.¹⁴

1.3 CREATING POLITICAL PREREQUISITES

Competitive elections require a set of minimal conditions, such as freedom of expression, movement and organization, existence of political parties that can field candidates and mount election campaigns; and physical security to the people. Probably the most important role of the international community in post-conflict elections is helping the country to develop a legal and institutional electoral infrastructure. Three areas have been targeted: the establishment of independent election commissions, the organization of rudimentary administrative structures that can manage logistical tasks; and the strengthening of indigenous civil society organizations capable of undertaking voter education and monitoring elections.¹⁵ In their activities, the UN-peacekeeping forces are supposed to ensure that all these minimal conditions prevail.

However, one of the major constraints facing UNTAG in Namibia, was the fact that the Special Representative of UNTAG lacked the authority to enforce his recommendations. The power to implement decisions lay entirely with the Administrator-General, to whom the SR would have to make submissions.¹⁶ Thus, in effect, the UN plan did not provide for UNTAG assuming control of Namibia. No interim government was to oversee the transitional process in Namibia; instead an Administrator- General (AG) would replace the dissolved Transitional Government of National Unity, which had been in office since

¹⁴ Alden, C: The United Nations and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1995. p. 69

¹⁵ Krishna, K: Post conflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance. p. 10

1985.¹⁷ Although South Africa was to have no military control in Namibia, the South Africa appointed Administrator- General (AG) Louis Pienaar, retained full administrative control of the country during transition, subject to the supervision of the SR. The AG's power were extensive, including primary responsibility for law and order via command of SWAPOL (South West Africa Police) and drafting all legislation relevant to the transitional process and conducting elections.¹⁸

Thus, the AG, due to his contact with the local institutions and oppressive structures put in place by the South Africans, could provide South Africa with major opportunities to influence the outcome of election. However, an argument was made that this could be countered by the fact that the SR had the power to declare the elections free and fair at every stage of the transition process, but nevertheless, the AG was responsible for the implementation of all legislation relating to the transition. Thus the SR would have been placed in a position were he would continually have to negotiate with the AG in order to achieve any reforms to legislation.¹⁹

In Mozambique by contrast, there were many dangers. The price of peace implied a dramatic contraction of state power, already in crisis, which limited the ability to govern, that is, to forecast events, take initiatives and measures to solve the country's problems, and guarantee basic living conditions for citizens. Principally, the state, because of the demobilization (necessary for the success of the peace process and uncontrollable in any case found that its ability to ensure law and order and repress crime was worryingly reduced.²⁰

¹⁶ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? Namibian Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 57

¹⁷ Saunders, C: *Transition in Namibia 1989-1990, and the South Africa case*. p. 17

¹⁸ Hearn, R: *UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience*. p. 64

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 64

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 65

Renamo's project of affirming itself as a counter-power, which was clear in the stance taken by the organization immediately after signing the peace accord, was also affected. The management of the political and administrative power which Renamo had exercised until then in the areas under its influence began to conflict with the functions of the government, recognized in the accord. This brought Renamo under criticism and pressure from ONUMOZ and sectors of the international community.²¹

Renamo expected, and wanted, special rights over the areas under its influence; it wanted a share in taxes and fees raised and in investments undertaken there, but the limits imposed by the peace accord made that illegal. Although Renamo to some extent persisted with these aims, it brought it under easy and effective criticism from the government and under strong international pressure. Once Renamo was transformed from a military organization into Renamo-Party, with pluralism in the country's political life ensured, and with the tactical alternative of a military option defeated, the minimum conditions envisaged in Rome for pushing ahead with preparing the elections and with the election campaign itself now existed. The imminent competition for power made a new dynamic appear. Since the start of implementing the peace accord, Frelimo had maintained its traditional strategy based on strengthening the elements bringing society together.²²

1.4 REPATRIATION PROGRAM

The ongoing war in Namibia and in Mozambique had resulted in significant displacement, as people were forced to leave their respective countries. In Namibia, many people had left the country to join the resistance movement, SWAPO or were refugees, the majority was living in Angola and Zambia. However the liberation war had seen people dispersed all over the world, many living in exile for decades.²³ Mozambique emerged in October 1992 from a sixteen-year civil war that has displaced 4 million

²¹ Ibid. p. 94

²² Ibid. p. 95

²³ Hearn Roger, G: The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation in Namibia. p. 206

Mozambicans and 1.7million who had fled to flee to neighboring countries. War ravaged Mozambique's infrastructure and economy leaving the country divided and in ruins.²⁴The return of refugees was seen as critical under the terms of the UN settlement plan for Namibia and Mozambique. A major duty of the UN in facilitating the return of the refugees was to ensure that conditions within Namibia and Mozambique were conducive to their safe return.

The United Nations plan for Namibia stated that the exile should be able to return without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. There as set out in the settlement plan for Namibia, a number of conditions had to be met before the repatriation program could commence. Given the immense powers maintained by the Administrator-General in the area of administering the territory during the transition period, most of the reforms could only be implemented through his office. This (like so many other aspects of the UN operation) resulted in the need for extensive and painstaking negotiations between the offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General.²⁵

One of the most critical aspects for ensuring of the returnees was the introduction of a general amnesty so as to ensure that those activities committed during the liberation struggle would not result in the arrest of returning exiles. However the Administrator General attempted to make a distinction between common law and political offences, which have potentially resulted in prosecution for those charged with common law offences.²⁶

Other issues arose at this time, intensifying negotiations and adding to the delays in starting the repatriation program. First were the discriminatory and repressive laws still in place in Namibia, which could have been used for the purposes of intimidation. A second issue was related to the question of nationality. Under R435 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was required to register Namibian refugees before

²⁴ Turner Michael, J. Sue, N. & Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's vote for Democratic governance. In: Post conflict elections, Democratization and International Assistance. p. 153

²⁵ Hearn Roger, G: The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation in Namibia. p. 208

the repatriation commenced. The Administrator General expressed concern that those returning were in fact Namibians; he therefore attempted to make the forwarding of all registration forms to Windhoek a requirement for repatriation. The UNHCR stated that this was not usual practice and that it would lead to major delays in the exiles return.²⁷

This intransigence ultimately paid off when the Administrator General and the South African authorities finally acquiesced to the UN's demands, with the South African President signing a proclamation on 6 June repealing all apartheid legislation and providing for a general amnesty for Namibian guerrillas. This paved the way for the return of the more than 42,000 refugees and exiles. In Namibia, the UNHCR worked in conjunction with the Council of Churches of Namibia (CCN) to repatriate exiled Namibians located primarily in Angola and Zambia, although there were others from 44 different countries. The CCN, had been approached by the UN Special Representative for Namibia in 1978 to assist with the repatriation, provided most of the facilities and staffing for the program, which was named the Coordinating Committee for Repatriation, Resettlement and Reconstruction (RRR). A number of other international organizations were involved in the resettlement program, including the world Food Program, the World Health Organization and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.²⁸

In Mozambique, the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992 and the opening up of districts that Renamo had controlled or held under siege prompted the spontaneous return of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees. The decision to establish a humanitarian assistance component to ONUMOZ was supported by the Mozambican parties and was approved by the international community. In July 1992, the joint request of the Government and Renamo that the United Nations coordinated the provision of humanitarian assistance became an integral part of the final peace accord. Subsequently, the Security Council, in its Resolution 797 (1992), endorsed the inclusion of the coordination of humanitarian assistance operation within the overall mandate of

²⁶ Ibid. p. 207

²⁷ Ibid. p. 209

²⁸ Ibid. p. 211

ONUMOZ, as delineated in the UN report for the humanitarian emergency was mobilized by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.²⁹

The key agency involved in the humanitarian effort was UNOHAC. It was formally established at the International Donors Conference in December 1992 in terms of the Declaration on Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance signed by the Government and Renamo earlier in the year.³⁰ Repatriating refugees and internally displaced persons was another high priority of the humanitarian assistance programme. With over one million Mozambicans outside the country, there were fears that the onset of peace would bring an uncontrolled influx of “returnees” putting a tremendous strain on the already stretched capacity of existing resources and institutions designed to cope with emergency situations.³¹

In carrying out its mandate, UNOHAC sought to utilize the range of development and refugees support agencies, which traditionally worked in the field of humanitarian assistance. Refugee’s resettlement was the first priority of the humanitarian assistance programme. Mozambican refugees had settled in large numbers in Malawi (1,058,500), Zimbabwe (137,900), Zambia (25,400), Swaziland (24,000), Tanzania (20,000) and South Africa (250,000), The UNHCR, as well as a plethora of NGO’s had invested millions of dollars in creating refugees camps.³²

1.5 DELIMITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT OF COMBATANTS.

In the Namibian case, the UN mission’s involvement in demilitarization was conceived wholly in terms of short-term objectives, that is to say, the demobilization and disarmament of combatants. No provisions for reintegration of former soldiers were

²⁹ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992- 1995. p. 47

³⁰ Alden, C: The United Nations, Elections and Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique. In: War and Peace in Mozambique, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1995. p. 75

³¹ Ibid. p. 74

³² Ibid. p. 76

introduced in the programme. The first aspect of the UNTAG role in demilitarization centred around the supervision of the confinement and withdrawal of South African troops from the territory and the concomitant repatriation of SWAPO guerrillas from their bases in southern Angola and Zambia.³³ The second aspect of UNTAG's role in demilitarization was the monitoring of the Namibian police and those elements of the SADF which had taken up civilian functions during the transition period. Complicating the situation further was the incorporation of the notorious counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet (Crowbar) into the SWAPOL. With SWAPOL given the principal role in maintaining law and order during the transitional period.³⁴

The implementation of the demilitarization programme was subject to the problems and constraints facing UNTAG. UNTAG peacekeeping troops were decreased from 7,000 to 4,650. Moreover, only 1,000 of these troops were on the ground by the 1 April lacking much needed equipment such as mine-protected vehicles.³⁵ The first and dangerous crisis came in the early days of the UN mission with the unexpected infiltration of hundreds of SWAPO guerrillas from their bases over the border. Immediately SWAPOL and koevoet forces engaged the PLAN fighters.³⁶ These events resulted in threats of South Africa demanding the suspension of the peace process, withdrawing from the Tripartite Agreement and the cancellation of the implementation of 435, if these PLAN forces were not driven back over the border. South Africa also threatened to remobilize the SADF in Namibia if the PLAN insurgents were not dealt with properly.³⁷

Another issue, which clouded the demilitarization process, was the incorporation of the Koevoet into the police force. Most reported cases of intimidation and human rights abuse in the Ovambo areas came from SWAPOL and Koevoet.³⁸ Much of the formal disarmament and demobilization process was effectively run outside of the UNTAG

³³ Alden, C: *The UN's experience of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration in Southern Africa*. p. 2

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 5

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 4

³⁶ Hearn, R: *The UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience*. p. 91

³⁷ Nujoma, S: *Where Others Wavered*. p. 396

³⁸ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 94

framework with the UN playing the role of observer or monitor. In the case of SWAPO, disarmament took place in Angola and Zambia followed by registration of repatriated refugees, inclusive of former guerrillas, at selected Assembly Areas over a seven-day period.³⁹ The SWATF disbanded in advance of the UNTAG mission and, though its arms were stored on South African military bases, the UN had difficulty gaining access to these facilities to verify their contents.⁴⁰ The demobilization of Koevoet was made a week before the elections.⁴¹

The demilitarization programme in Mozambique, in contrast to the Namibian examples, adopted an approach which deliberately sought to link short-term objectives with long-term goals. ONUMOZ put together a coordinated effort, which rivaled UNTAG in size but far exceeded it in breadth. The demilitarization programme employed by ONUMOZ sought to integrate the international community's efforts in supporting short and long-term demilitarization. Short-term components included the monitoring of the cease-fire and the supervision of the demobilization of combatants. Long-term components focused on the projects, which targeted ex-combatants, including provisions for two-year subsidy, job referral and training programmes.⁴²

Monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, a condition Renamo had insisted upon at Rome, was the first task of the UN demilitarization programme in Mozambique. It was decided to bring 7,500 UN peacekeeping troops into the country to monitor their departure and take up positions along the transport corridors. The Cease Fire Commission (CCF), composed of Mozambican parties, representatives of the international and members of ONUMOZ, worked to ensure that peace was maintained in the rest of the territory. The terms of the Commission were specific: It was to investigate allegations brought to it of violations of the cease-fire agreement signed in Rome.

³⁹ Alden, C: *The UN's Experience of Democratization, Disarmament, and Integration in Southern Africa*. p. 6

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p.32

⁴¹ Hearn, R: *The UN Peacekeeping in Action: The Namibian Experience*. p. 193

⁴² Alden, C: p. 13

The demobilization of combatants formed the second part of ONUMOZ's involvement in demilitarization. A specialized unit attached to the mission planned and implemented demobilization. A team of four UN personnel was assigned to each of the 49 Assembly-Areas where they were to oversee the process, including the registration of combatants, disarmament, the selection of soldiers for the new army and formal demobilization. The last short-term component of demilitarization was the creation of a new national army. It was initially envisaged that the new army could consist of 30,000 soldiers, equally divided between former Government and former Renamo troops and trained by the British, French and Portuguese.⁴³

The long-term component of demilitarization, namely the Information Referral Service (IRS) and the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), fell under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC). These latter measures were to be integrated into the actions taken by the Commission of Reintegration (CORE), the institution established by the Rome Agreement to direct the process of reintegrating soldiers and refugees into the civilian life. The IRS was conceived as a mechanism for providing demobilized soldiers with access to information on the job market as well as basic information on aspect of the reintegration programme.⁴⁴

The initial step in implementing the demilitarization programme was to bring in the UN-peacekeeping forces to monitor the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops. Despite delays that held up their introduction until August 1993, a total of 6,000 peacekeepers were finally put into place. Concurrent with the introduction of UN troops was the monitoring of the cease-fire between the Government and Renamo by the CCF.⁴⁵ The next phase of demilitarization, the demobilization of Government and Renamo troops, proved to be exceedingly problematic. After negotiations between the SR and the two sides, the remaining 14 assembly areas were opened and became operational on 21 February 1994. The process then moved ahead. By mid-April 1994, more than

⁴³ Ibid. p. 13

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 14

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 15

49,000 soldiers had reported to assembly areas for cantonment, of which some 34,000 were from the Government and more, 14,000 were from Renamo.⁴⁶

On 5 May 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it urged the parties to meet the target dates of 1 June for completion of the assembly of forces and 15 July for the end of demobilization. But on 15 August, all assembly areas were officially closed to new entrants, and the 3,723 troops remaining at the assembly points on that day were quickly demobilized or recruited into the reconstituted Mozambican Defence Force. By late November 1994, demobilization accounted a total of 57,540 Government and 20,538 Renamo soldiers, a total of 78, 078. These had been drawn from a total of 91,691 registered.⁴⁷

Demobilization, reintegration of former combatants and humanitarian assistance in both countries was slow to begin and, once under way, fraught with risks and danger, but it was ultimately successful. This reduced the potential for electoral losers to use unhappy and unemployed ex-combatants to destabilize the post-election period.

⁴⁶ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995. p. 40

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 41

CHAPTER TWO: THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

This chapter will explore the involvement of UNTAG and ONUMOZ in assisting and supervising the pre- electoral process, and the elections at its different stages. The chapter will then consider the criteria and values which inform how these bodies function as well as the various measures which have been adopted to promote fair conduct.

2.1 REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

In Namibia, the draft Registration of Voter Proclamation by the Administrator General was published on 24th April 1989 and opened to public comment. Taking these comments into account, the Administrator General and UN Special Representative negotiated the text of the Proclamation which was promulgated on 30th June 1989. The principal registration issue was whether individuals not born in Namibia but who had lived there for time would be allowed to register and vote. SWAPO was concerned that many whites whose only connection with the territory was that they had been assigned to it by the South African administration would vote and distort the outcome.⁴⁸

The compromise reached was that four years of “ordinary” residence before registration was required and that those who had entered Namibia as South African government servants had to submit a confirmed statement that they intended to remain in the country after independence.⁴⁹ The voting right of second-generation refugees was assured by providing an unconditional right for all person born in Namibia and their children to register (this also included those born within the territory to parents in South African government service).⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 117

⁴⁹ Hearn, Roger, G: *The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation in Namibia*. p. 226

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 227

Without too much controversy, the legal age for voting was set at 18. Original set from 3 July to 16 September 1989, the registration period was extended to 23 September at the request of Special Representative. A total of 701,482 voters were registered.⁵¹

While this may show the success of the process, other factors could have played a part in this higher than expected figure. Most significant was the registration of people living outside Namibia. This included around 10,000 people living in South Africa, who were encouraged to travel by bus to the border with Namibia and register. A large number of people in Angola and Zambia also registered to vote. While there were criticisms by SWAPO that these people were often brought into vote for the DTA, the real benefits went to SWAPO, which managed to capture most of these included votes from Angola and Zambia. Other issues were raised regarding problems with the registration process. These including the difficulties experienced by residents of Walvis Bay, who were not allowed to register within this territory which South Africa still saw as a part of its republic.⁵²

In Mozambique, ONUMOZ played a crucial role in coping with the logistical problems of the voter registration process. However, not all problems could be resolved, which had negative repercussions on the registration of voters and on monitoring the process in difficult access areas, particularly in central Mozambique, Renamo's stronghold. ONUMOZ performed three tasks in the subject area of voter registration: technical assistance, provision of security for registration teams, and monitoring and verification.⁵³

The first function, technical assistance, was performed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The most important technical assistance was transport. After the CNE had established 1600 registration brigade, the UNDP helped to carry them to all parts of the country, and provided them with camping equipment and food.

⁵¹ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? The Namibia Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 158

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 186

The second function, provision of security for the registration teams was performed by the UNCIVPOL contingent. It was added to ONUMOZ's functions because registration teams were hesitant to enter Renamo areas without protection. The third function, monitoring and verification, was performed by 148 officers of ONUMOZ's electoral division who were stationed through the country and carried out investigations independently from the CNE.⁵⁴

The registration process started well in the north and in the south of the country, but was initially very slow in the difficult access areas of central Mozambique. By providing security for the registration teams, UNCIVPOL succeeded in speeding up voter registration in Renamo territories to a considerable degree. Logistical difficulties to enter difficult access areas in central Mozambique, however, could never be completely overcome. The only practical means to reach these areas were helicopters, and maintaining supplies for the registration teams was a constant logistical challenge. Due to these difficulties, some Renamo areas remained excluded from voter registration during the entire process.⁵⁵

The estimated number of eligible voter in Mozambique was 7,850,850. On 15 August, the envisaged last day of registration, 5,636,000 voters had been registered. Due to the problems of getting into Renamo areas, and the high number of demobilized soldiers and refugees returning to their home areas, registration remained incomplete. Therefore, the National Assembly twice decided to extend the registration process. By 20 August 1994, 6,034,066 voters had been registered. By 2 September, the final deadline, 6,363,311 had been registered. Although only 81 per cent of the estimated number of eligible voters had registered, the process was regarded as complete. Registration brigades worked with integrity and dedication to ensure that all those who wanted to register and could do so in

⁵³ Turner, Michael, J. Nelson, S. Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's Voter for Democratic Governance. In: *Post conflict Elections Democratization and International Assistance*. p. 156

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 157

⁵⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development: *From Bullets to Ballots Mozambique's vote for democratic governance*. p. 8

a free and open atmosphere. Staff generally followed the rules, ensuring the fairness of the registration process.⁵⁶

2.2 SUMMARY

In both states, UNTAG and ONUMOZ played an important role in overcoming socio-political problems that related to the registration of voters, however certain aspects that related to the registration process were raised. The following line highlights the similar problem of ineffectiveness and effectiveness of UNTAG and ONUMOZ in the registration of voters:

In Namibia, the issue of Walvis Bay, which remained South African territory, regarding the right to register based on birth or residence was solved by tacit agreement. Whilst no registration took place within the enclave, persons claiming the right to register could do so in any town in Namibia.⁵⁷

In Mozambique, the country was still physically divided between Frelimo and Renamo affiliations. Voter registration was disadvantageous to Renamo. It was in the difficult access areas of central Mozambique, Renamo's stronghold, (Sofala and Zambezia) where voter registration could not completely overcome logistical difficulties. However, Renamo did not formally protest against the result of the registration process. Logistical difficulties, caused by insufficient resources, also affected the ability of the ONUMOZ to monitor and verify the process.⁵⁸

Some cases of human rights abuse occurred during the registration period, in both countries. In Namibia, most reported cases of intimidation were in the Owambo-dominated north where ex-Koevoet members, often wearing DTA colours or hired as DTA party organizers, continued to terrorize and intimidate SWAPO supporters. Koevoet

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 9

⁵⁷ Lionel, C: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p.124

⁵⁸ Jacobson, R: *Gender and Democratization: The Mozambican Election of 1994*. p. 7

elements in SWAPOL did continue to engage in what amounted to counterinsurgency operations, teams taking off in their Casspir vehicles on patrols, presumably of surveillance but with intimidatory impact. Another case of intimidation occurred at Osifo center of registration near Ruacana, where the Koevoet using Casspirs to block SWAPO supporters vehicles en route to register. However the assassination of Anton Lubowski, the leading white member in SWAPO, in September 1989 was the most important case of human rights abuse.⁵⁹

In Mozambique, UNCIPOL had the mandate to independently investigate the performance of the PRM (Police of the Republic Of Mozambique) and the Renamo Police. Five sets of serious human rights violations were observed: detention of persons without legal reason, detention of accused persons for more than the legal period, use of excessive force, torture and even killing detainees. These gross human rights violations were reported to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) and UNCIPOL, but these commissions persistently failed to take action.⁶⁰

Necessary documentation that a prospective voter should have, (identity document or a birth certificate) showing that he/she was born in Namibia or Mozambique was not easy for many Namibians and Mozambicans living in the rural areas, where illiteracy was at its highest, and where modern communications and transport were least developed. Producing a proof was very difficult. At the end of the registration process in Namibia, UNTAG concluded that no significant number of eligible voters had been denied access to registration.

In Mozambique, Mozambican migrant workers, returning refugees, and demobilized soldiers did not get access to a registration post. As a result, no arrangements could be made for registration and voting at Mozambican embassies or through other accredited channels. This effectively excluded the entire category of male migrant workers in South

⁵⁹ Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 125

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 8

Africa and other neighbouring countries. In this context ONUMOZ did not attempt to resolve these issues as they arose.⁶¹

2.3 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

An electoral system refers to a method that a given country adopts for choosing national leaders. It encompasses administrative, procedural and institutional mechanisms that govern election process. In Mozambique and Namibia, the constitutions and electoral laws defined procedures, rules and regulations governing elections.⁶² In Namibia, one election was held and SWAPO and South Africa only accepted the proportional representation electoral system. In Mozambique, all political parties agreed also with proportional representation. The systems of proportional representation are designed to produce elected assemblies in which the share of the popular vote received by each competing party is reflected in the share of the seats won by that party in the assembly.⁶³

In Mozambique two elections were held, presidential and parliamentary elections. For the presidential elections the system was: Absolute Majority (or “first past the post). The candidate who receives more than half of the validly cast votes is elected. If no candidate obtains the absolute a majority of votes, a second ballot will be held (between the 7th and 21st day after the publication of the results of the first ballot), in which only the candidates with the highest number of votes compete. In the run-off election, the candidate with the majority of votes is elected.⁶⁴

2.4 SUMMARY

In Namibia, election to the Assembly would be on the basis of proportional representation, with seventy-two seats to be filled. These seats would be allocated to

⁶¹ Martinho, C, Malan, M: Anomalies and Acquiescence: The Mozambican Peace Process Revisited. In: *African Security Review* Vol 7 No 4, 1998. p. 4

⁶² Jackson, R. & Jackson, D: *A Comparative Introduction to Political Science*. p. 371

⁶³ Mtshana, M: *Comparative Electoral System and Political Consequences: Option for Namibia*. p. 27

⁶⁴ Mazula, B: The electoral legislation. In: *Mozambique Elections, Democracy, and Development*, p. 137

parties by dividing the total number of votes cast by seventy-two to determine the quota for one candidate. In Mozambique, for the presidential election, the candidate with majority of votes is elected. For the National Assembly election, the electoral system adopted was that of proportional representation through party lists, and votes were converted into parliamentary seats through the Hondt method. At stake in the election of the Assembly of the Republic were 250 seats in single chamber. The distribution of seats contested in each provincial constituency was determined not by the population density of each province, but by the number of voters who registered there.

2.5 REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

As it had already been agreed that there would be a system of proportional representation for Namibia's independence elections, a list of political parties had to be produced prior to the election. The Administrator General and Special Representative negotiated the text of the registration of political organizations proclamation and the agreement on related procedures, which were published in September 1989. The principal issue regarded the requirement that each party applying to register would have to deposit R 10,000, which would be returned to any party winning at least one seat in the Constituent Assembly, and nominations signed by two thousand registered voters who supported the party's application to be registered.⁶⁵

Ten parties and alliances, registered for the election of November 1989, four (apart from the DTA), were fronts or alliances. In addition to SWAPO a further three parties which had existed for some time also registered: Action Christian National, the election front of the National Party. CAN was founded in 1989, but the National Party (SWA) was founded in 1924.⁶⁵ Christian Democratic Action (CDA) founded in 1982 and led by Peter Kalangula, a chairman of the executive committee of the Ovambo Legislative Assembly (1982-89). From 1980 to 1982, Kalangula was president of the DTA. SWAPO-Democratic (SWAPO-D), founded in 1978 by former SWAPO member, and led by

⁶⁵ Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 127

Andreas Shipanga, a founder member of SWAPO. In addition to these longer-established parties, the Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP), founded in 1989, also registered for the election. Proclamation AG 49 of 13 October, stated that each party or alliance should provide the chief electoral officer with a list of at least twenty-four candidates, arranged in order of preference for appointment to the Constituent Assembly.⁶⁶

In Mozambique, time for the presentation of candidatures, the CNE decided to set up an ad hoc committee, charged with receiving and registering nomination papers and organizing them for eventual analysis. The committee, chaired by Commissioner Manuel Frank, subdivided into two sub-committees, one each for presidential and legislative candidatures, each composed of three CNE members and one STAE official. The ad hoc committee established a system of shifts, involving all CNE members and some STAE officials, which permitted round-the-clock work on the reception, registration and organization of nomination papers. In that way, candidates were informed of whatever irregularities were discovered in their documentation and given the five-day statutory deadline to correct the anomalies.

In a CNE communiqué on the nominations process (containing information on deadlines and procedures to follow), a provisional distribution of parliamentary seats was provided, pending the conclusion of voter registration, to enable parties and alliances to propose appropriate numbers of candidates in their list. Despite the fact that relevant deadlines are clearly stipulated in the Electoral Law and that the CNE communiqué further highlighted the admissible period for the presentation of candidatures, most parties and candidates submitted their nomination papers at the very end of the period, thus creating a pile-up of work for the CNE.⁶⁷

Nomination for the office of president, was reserved for every citizen with original nationality, aged 35 years or over who is duly registered as voter, is eligible for the office

⁶⁶ Ibid. p: 167

⁶⁷ Ibid. p : 168

of President of the Republic, exceptions: Citizens who have been affected by any of the common incapacities (e.g. having been sentenced to imprisonment for certain crimes etc.) and who have not resided ordinarily in the national territory for at least six months prior to the elections date are not eligible. The legally constituted political parties and coalitions of parties with the support of at least 10,000 electors may present the nominations for the office of President. It may also be presented by groups of electors, with a minimum of 10,000 signatures.

For parliamentary elections, all registered Mozambican citizens (who have not been affected by common incapacities) were eligible to stand for the Assembly of the republic, with a few exceptions: magistrates of the judiciary or the department of Public Prosecution, professional army and militarized personnel and career diplomats were not eligible if they are still on active duty. The mandate of Deputy was incompatible with the functions of member of government and with paid employment by foreign states or international organizations.⁶⁸

By 1 September 1994, the day before the deadline for the submission of presidential nomination papers, only three candidatures had been presented. The remaining ten came in on the last day. The first party lists for the legislative elections started coming in the afternoon of September 2, less than an hour from the deadline, which meant that reception of papers continued until 2:30 a.m.⁶⁹

Among the thirteen nominations submitted, the CNE rejected the proposed candidature of Neves Pinto Serrano, proposed by PPLM, as it did not meet the conditions stipulated in articles 184-186 of the electoral law. The following candidatures had been registered: Maximo Diogo Jose Dias, Carlos Jose Maria Jeque, Casimiro Miguel Nhamithambo, Mario Fernando Carlos Machele, Carlos Alexandre dos Reis, Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, Jacob Neves Salomao Sibindy, Padimbe Mahose Kamati Andrea, Domingos

⁶⁸ Krennerich, M: Mozambique multi-party elections. In: *Elections in Africa*. p. 649

⁶⁹ National Elections Commission final report: context of the First Multiparty General Elections in Mozambique. p. 27

Antonio Mascarenhas Arouca, Vasco Campira Momboya Alfzema, Wehia Monakacho Ripua and Joaquim Alberto Chissano.

Following the verification of proposed candidatures for the legislative election, the following party lists were accepted: AP (Coligacao Alianca Patriotica), FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique), FUMO/PCD (Frente Unida de Mocambique, and Partido de Convergencia Democratico), PACODE (Partido de Congresso Democratico), PADEMO (Partido Democratico de Mocambique), PCN (Partido de Convencao Nacional), PIMO (Partido Independente de Mocambique), PPPM (Partido de Progresso do Povo de Mocambique), PRD (Partido Renovador Democratico), PT (Partido Trabalhista), RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana), SOL (Partido Social Liberal e Democratico), UNAMO (Uniao Nacional Mocambicana), UD (Uniao Democratico).⁷⁰

2.6 SUMMARY

In Namibia, ten political parties and alliances have been registered, but it was clear to all observers that SWAPO and the DTA were the front-runners in the 1989 election. Mozambicans had 12 presidential candidates, 14 competing parties and alliances from which to choose. These numbers did not, however, represent a flourishing culture of political opposition. Before the campaign, the only names familiar to the population were those of Joaquim Chissano/Frelimo and Afonso Dhlakama/ Renamo. The reasons for the multiplicity of parties and candidates are partly historical, dating back to pre-independence times, but were also linked to the fact that the international community had funds available for new political parties.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 26

2.7 VOTER EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

Voter education campaigns were aimed at stimulating the citizenry's participation in the elections. It was important to establish confidence in the prospects for reclaiming national dignity, developing a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation. Hence, the campaign sought to promote confidence in the electoral process and in the organs responsible for its conduct, their independence from the state and political parties and to create a climate conducive to informed participation in the process. As a basic component of free and fair elections, voter education is ensuring that not only do voters understand how to vote, but they also have a broad understanding of their political and civil rights.⁷¹

As a result, voter education not only spreads a message about democratic rights, it also seeks to build organizational capacity and train people with new skills. It can also play a role in conscientising citizens of the rights of various groups in their country, and the role that such groups can play in support of democracy and diversity. Various types of media were used throughout the voter education campaign, including printed material, television, radio, and theatre.⁷²

Clearly, in a non-literate society, with limited access to aural and visual media, a major role existed for UNTAG and for the different political parties to increase the level of voter awareness in Namibia, particularly given the high rate of illiteracy, around 60%. The UNTAG acknowledged that the success of operation depended on the acceptance and the support of the population in Namibia. The SR described three key phases of the activity. Initially, the program focused on an explanation of the Resolution 435, UNTAG's role in the transition process, and above all trying to associate UNTAG with free and fair elections. Beginning mid July 1989, the program moved to providing an explanation of the electoral process including how to register and vote. A Code of conduct was also publicized along with a campaign against intimidation and coercion.⁷³

⁷¹ Pottie, D: *Electoral Management in Southern Africa*. p. 4

⁷² Ibid. p. 5

⁷³ Hearn, Roger, G: *The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation to Namibia*. p. 232

As the operation progressed, UNTAG's voter education program intensified. It pressed the South West Africa Broadcast Corporation (SWABC) radio network to allow it air time to make relevant broadcast to familiarize people with democracy concepts. Broadcasts were made in 10 different languages. A series of advertisements were also placed in local papers, stressing an individual's right to vote for which every party they wished and highlighting the privacy of a person's vote. A number of multilingual pamphlets, badges and stickers were also produced regarding all aspects of voter education. In fact, by the time the UNTAG operation was completed over half a million items had been distributed throughout Namibia.⁷⁴

Given Mozambique's high illiteracy rate (67 percent) and the lack of previous experience with democratic, multiparty elections, voter education preoccupied the technical secretariat and the international community. With assistance from UNDP advisers and the American-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Technical secretariat conducted a comprehensive voter education program to increase knowledge and build trust in the elections. Consequently, voter education campaigns, including those conducted by churches and other civil-society organizations, linked elections with peace. With the country polarized between Renamo and Frelimo, voter education also emphasized that elections would provide choices and that the vote was secret.⁷⁵

Voter education was divided into five phases: namely: promotion of the image of the CNE and its organs; mobilization for the electoral process, democracy and civic rights; participation in polling; acceptance of the results. The CNE coordinated their diverse initiatives, in conformity with the law, and to avoid duplication of the efforts and confusion among the populace. Various types of media were used throughout the country. The subjects covered were, respectively, voter registration, civic rights, and voting; cartoons strips, with the central theme "every one has to participate". Some of the

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 233

⁷⁵ Juarez de Maia, G: Civic education in the Mozambican elections. In: Mozambique Elections Democracy and Development. p. 159

materials did not match the quality expected, and the contractors delivered some, well after the agreed dates. Nevertheless, they widely distributed through schools, work places, and at important junctures, such as 21 October, which was declared as the National Civic Education day. The impact of this massive civic education effort can, perhaps best be measured by the massive voter turnout on polling days.⁷⁶

2.8 SUMMARY

The voter education campaign was the largest and most concentrated act of social communication in Namibian and Mozambican history, and it was carried out over an extremely short space of time. UNTAG and ONUMOZ tried to bring in both countries the most correct and objective information possible as to what the elections would be. Most of the material was in print form or carried on radio and television. Little was likely to reach the illiterate rural masses. While the primary responsibility for voter education might seem to rest with the political parties, their efforts varied greatly.

In Namibia, during the period of voter education the party such as the DTA, assisted by the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC), and the newspapers that opposed SWAPO, had portrayed UNTAG as an organization that favoured the cause of SWAPO. The SWABC never broadcast a statement issued by SWAPO. Nor had any SWAPO official, or supporter speaking for the organization, ever appeared on, or been interviewed on, the SWABC. Only attacks and commentaries on SWAPO were broadcast, without the right of reply being granted to the organization. Thus, the SWABC and the news papers did not play an important role in terms of voter education. For many Namibians who relied on the SWABC and the DTA-controlled newspapers, the image of SWAPO was one which was created and manipulated entirely by these sources.⁷⁷

But given the scarcity of these media forms, UNTAG personnel initiated a series of communications through churches, community leaders (such as headmen or schools) and

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 160

⁷⁷ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? The Namibian Independence Process, 1989-1990*. p. 114

the different political parties. Namibia has an extremely high rate of church attendance. In the northern areas of the country, where television was almost unheard and radios were few and far between, the church was the most important forum of discussion and education. In isolated communities, the church is often the only area where members of the public gather in a large number. UNTAG personnel used the church as means of communication. There was really good cooperation and coordination between the church and UNTAG. UNTAG was successful because of the involvement of the church in the electoral procedures.⁷⁸

In Mozambique, Radio Mozambique (RM) historically had been a government station, loyal to the Frelimo party and critical of Renamo. During the period of voter education, RM did not provide the Mozambican with important information concerning voter education. This bias carried over into the early part of the campaign, when RM broadcast more news about Frelimo than Renamo and the minor parties.⁷⁹ Bias in RM programming contributed to Afonso Dhlakama's belief that Renamo needed its own station. Renamo's radio station was forthcoming in 1994 from the German Foreign Ministry. Unable during the voter education campaign to turn their own radio station into anything other than a propaganda tool for their party, filling its air time with little other than denunciations against Frelimo and long interviews with Afonso Dhlakama.⁸⁰ The serious lack of civic education meant that voters as well as political parties were confused; some Renamo areas remained excluded from voter education during the entire process. However Renamo did not formally protest or initiate its own educational campaign.

The CNE during the period of voter education placed an obligation of neutrality on those people doing civic education (voter education agents). They needed to stress the right of the voter to choose between the qualities and programmes of the competitors without indicating their own personal position. However this neutrality had complex implication

⁷⁸ Hearn George, R: *The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation to Namibia*. p. 234

⁸⁰ *Mozambique Freedom of Expression and the Vote for Peace*. p. 10

in terms of Mozambique's recent history of conflict. Despite their formal autonomy from the party, they often continued to be regarded as identified with Frelimo or Renamo.

During the campaign there were several incidents pitting voter education agents against people who knew nothing about the CNE's activities. In some cases the agents were tied up and beaten because they were believed to represent the other party. This was because during simulated voting exercises, they would wear T-shirts with the insignia of "Frelimo party or Renamo party," to illustrate the role of monitors at the polling station. Since they were in zones under the strong influence of a particular party, they were beaten. When they finally managed to explain that they were from the CNE, and the function they were playing, they had already received a good thrashing.⁸¹

The Technical Secretariat for election administration did not really play its role in terms of voter education. The secretariat was far more politicized; it also suffered from a lack of professional experience, poor management, and frequent absences. This lack of institutional capacity created many avoidable problems, including strikes by electoral workers and voter education agents for back pay. These factors reduced the election machineries ability to function properly.⁸²

⁸¹ Juarez de Maria, G: Civic education in the Mozambican elections. In: Mozambique Election Democracy and Development. p.153

⁸² Ibid. p. 154

CHAPTER THREE: CAMPAIGNING AND VOTING

3.1 CAMPAIGNING

Few weeks of elections campaigning allowed voters to hear politicians defend their records, criticize those of their opponents and propose policies for the future. A campaign opens the pores of a political system and an election provides the parties with the electorate's verdict on the past and preferences for the future. In the event, the campaign presented two modes which can be distinguished as: the "official" comprising published policy documents, prepared statements and advertisements in the press, radio and television, and the "popular" covering the actual contact with the electorate in meetings and through word of mouth.⁸³

In Namibia, the campaign had started informally; it intensified with the registration of political parties. UNTAG's task was to provide a level playing field, ensure that government action did not favour or prejudice any party, and that the interaction of parties would not lead to behaviour jeopardizing a peaceful and informative campaign. A Code of conduct prohibiting violence and unfair election practices was signed by all parties and, although not legally enforceable, contributed greatly to creating an atmosphere in which free and fair elections could be held.⁸⁴

In Mozambique, the electoral law laid down the obligation to conduct the campaign ethically, forbidding "appeals to disorder or insurrection, or incitements to hatred, violence or war". The electoral law had envisaged a campaign period of 45 days, but delays in previous procedures led to this being shortened, beginning on 22 September and ending two days before the election. Of course, the parties had already been stating their positions prior to this to this date but from then, a range of conditions came into operation: principally freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and

⁸³ Kavanagh, D: *Elections Campaigning in the New Marketing of Politics*. p. 12

⁸⁴ Hearn Roger, G: *The Effectiveness of the UNTAG Operation to Namibia*, p. 242

demonstration, equal opportunities for all candidates in terms of access to the radio and television⁸⁵

It is also important to note that SWAPO, DTA, Frelimo and Renamo were the main political parties in Namibia and Mozambique during the first multi-party elections. In this case, most attention will be given to the policies and manifestos, which were presented by DTA, SWAPO, Renamo and Frelimo during the election campaign because these parties were always the acknowledged forerunners in the election. Between them, they gained sixty- two of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly, and 241 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly.

In general political campaigning in Namibia and Mozambique was a colourful business. All the registered parties produced T-shirts in party colours and flags that were flown from rooftops and from trees, so some supporters even had special outfits in party colours for wearing to rallies and political occasions.

This section compares SWAPO and Frelimo on the one hand and DTA and Renamo on the other. One major emphasis in SWAPO's campaign strategy, as in Frelimo's, was to promote major rallies featuring national leaders, mobilizing mass attendance from locals, and bringing in supporters from afar. At this first rally Nujoma stated the theme of "Reconciliation", which was to be such a main plank throughout SWAPO's political campaigning, urging white Namibians not to leave the country and stating clearly that "SWAPO has no intention of imposing one-party political system against the will of the people"⁸⁶

Frelimo's rallies were planned well in advance with the help of a Brazilian public relations company and other foreign advisors. At different rallies Chissano, leader of Frelimo presented himself as the man who achieved a peace accord to end the war with Renamo. He ridiculed Renamo's claim to have forced him into democracy. Again Chissano said that the real cause of economic problems was not mismanagement but that

⁸⁵ Jacobson, R: *Gender and Democratization: The Mozambican Election of 1994*. p. 10

⁸⁶ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? Namibia Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 168

Renamo had destroyed the local sugar mill and other industries. Renamo destruction had prevented Frelimo to develop the country, he said.⁸⁷

Nujoma's speech about "Reconciliation" was amongst the most public and frequently repeated themes during the SWAPO election campaign. It was aimed in the first place to whites, who were assured that SWAPO had fought against a system, not individuals, and that whites should not leave Namibia but remain to help build the new nation and country. The policy about reconciliation was regarded as imperative in view of the polarization imposed on the Namibian people by the apartheid government. Distrust, suspicion, and fear were some of the ugly features of Namibian society. Communities have been set against each other; tribe against tribe, race against race, etc...The SWAPO's policy of national reconciliation was aimed, therefore, at healing these wounds of Namibia.⁸⁸

National reconciliation was not a moral ideal, but also a practical matter, as Nujoma implied when he addressed a meeting in Ovambo on 7 October 1989. With strong antipathies existing towards the police and ex-Koevoet members, entailing potential for conflict and disturbance of public order, Nujoma addressed himself directly to these people. Koevoet members were invited to join SWAPO and help build up Namibia. He stated: The police were referred to as 'no longer the enemies of the Namibian people' but rather as 'our own Namibian police for the future'.⁸⁹

SWAPO and Frelimo promised reconciliation, reconstruction, renewal, changes in health, education, and the economy to right the wrongs of the past and bring about a fair distribution of resources and facilities. Frelimo references to the term "Reconciliation" in the campaign speeches of official spokespersons seem less common than more general appeals for peace and justice.⁹⁰ Given Namibia's high level of illiteracy, SWAPO's policy about education was ambiguous; Nujoma made a lot of criticisms about "Bantu

⁸⁷ Report of AWEPA's observation of the Mozambique Election of 1994. p. 11

⁸⁸ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 159

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 160

education”, which was imposed on the Namibian people by the apartheid government, but he did not provide any explanation concerning the transformation of the current school structures and educational contents, and create a democratic education, favouring equality of opportunities for all citizens to participate in the economic, civic and cultural life of the country⁹¹

Frelimo, in its programme for government presented to the Mozambican electorate, declared that education is a fundamental right of every citizen, and it’s the central instrument for improving living conditions and for raising the technical and scientific level of the workers. It also stated that education is the basic means for acquiring the knowledge needed for understanding and intervention in the tasks of national development, in the struggle for peace, national reconciliation and solidarity.⁹²

The DTA began the election campaign of 1989 with the decided disadvantage of being blamed for the many deficiencies and inequalities that existed in Namibia. DTA’s central message seemed to be to project an image of a patron sufficiently experienced in government and with enough access to resources to be trusted with people’s security and welfare.⁹³ One of Renamo’s strongest campaigning points, particularly emphasized by Dhlakama, was that Renamo had fought and won not just for democracy but for the rights of northern majority ethnic groups such as the Macua of Namupula province not to be exploited by the southerners, who dominated Frelimo.⁹⁴ Renamo and the DTA’s main planks were to denigrate Frelimo and SWAPO rather than to present any alternative platform.

In general, the DTA directed its political attacks at the following features: SWAPO’s proclivities for socialism, which was portrayed as a failed and ruinous system; the human rights record of SWAPO, most especially the detainee issue, to present SWAPO as an

⁹⁰ Jacobson, R: *Gender and Democratization: The Mozambican Election of 1994*. p. 11

⁹¹ Namibia Civic and Voter Education Campaign-Chronology of Elections in Namibia. p. 2

⁹² Manuel, G: *Democracy and Education in Mozambique*. In: Mozambique Election Democracy and Development. p. 303

⁹³ Cliffe, L: The Transition to Independence in Namibia. p. 160

organization with no respect of human rights; SWAPO's "undemocratic record" not only in respect of atrocities against its own members, but also the failure of the organization to hold a party congress for over twenty years, and its ambiguity on multi-party democracy. The SWAPO leadership was portrayed as living in luxury abroad, ignorant of the actual conditions in Namibia, while their followers languished in refugee camps or were betrayed by unfulfilled promises of educational and training opportunities.⁹⁵

Renamo attacked Southern domination and promised a better sharing of power among ethnic groups, which it mentioned by name. Specifically, in his speeches, Dhlakama never talked about "Mozambicans" but always called people in the bush by their ethnic designation. He said Frelimo's bad policies and misgovernment were responsible for nation's ills. The Renamo leader during the elections campaigns made a number of claims of fraud and threats to withdraw during the campaign and promised to paralyze the country in less than 24 hours. Possible action was spelled out by "imparcial", a Maputo daily newsletter considered very close to Renamo.⁹⁶

Speaking about education, Renamo presented a programme to the Mozambican electorate with the following characteristics: to eradicate illiteracy, by encouraging the creation of night schools, to introduce curriculum reforms, incorporating concepts of democracy into the teaching programmes, and to correct the existing distortions and imbalance particularly between the middle and higher levels.⁹⁷ The above were some of the charges aimed at SWAPO and Frelimo by DTA and Renamo politicians during the elections campaign. Attacks, accusations, and insinuations against SWAPO and Frelimo comprised the substantial portion of DTA and Renamo's election platforms.

⁹⁴ Cahen, M: Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique. p. 8

⁹⁵ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? Namibian Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 175

⁹⁶ Report of AWEPA's observation of the Mozambican Electoral Process 1989-1990. p. 24

⁹⁷ Manuel, G: Democracy and Education in Mozambique. In: *Mozambique Election, Democracy and Development*. p. 311

3.2 SUMMARY

In a non-literate society like Namibia and Mozambique, the impact of the printed word during the electoral campaign was obviously limited. The newspapers (daily and weekly) were concentrated in the urban areas. However, the arrival of the multi-party system found Mozambican and Namibian print journalists, without the necessary training and experience to carry out independent, critical coverage of the electoral campaign so that the overall level of reporting was low. The national press has always shown a strong urban bias. Journalists related more to the urban and peri-urban context which represented a “modern” view of Mozambique and Namibia rather than the less accessible rural areas. The principal means used by all parties in the “popular” campaign was to hold public meetings. These meetings addressed by the presidential candidates attracted the audiences. Generally, the practice in meetings was to present the candidates in terms of the big man who could take on the problems of his dependents and solve them, rather than the mandated representatives of a political party. The broad electorate was not much interested in economic policy, although a majority of Mozambicans and Namibians being poor, unemployed or underemployed, and undereducated or illiterate, the campaigns were very much interested in promises of improvement in material circumstances and economic opportunities.

All parties promised large scale improvement and investment in health and education, without acknowledging the constraint on public spending which the World Bank and IMF would demand to any new government. Statements on education were equally grandiose and unrealistic.

In Mozambique, the electoral campaign was overwhelmingly peaceful; there was nevertheless a level of intolerance of the opposition being showed particularly, but not only, by Frelimo.⁹⁸ In Namibia, the election campaign was marred by incidents of violence and intimidation. But most cases of intimidation were in the Ovambo-dominated

⁹⁸ Ibid. p.13

north against SWAPOL and especially Koevoet. There were also allegations that the DTA members and ex-Koevoet would often work together in acts of intimidation and brutalization of SWAPO supporters. This situation was exacerbated by UNTAG's inability to act against and investigate these incidents.⁹⁹

3.3 VOTING

In Namibia, in accordance with UNSCR 435 an election for the Constituent Assembly was held from 7 to 11 November 1989. This was just over seven months after the implementation of 435 on 1 April 1989. Ten parties/ alliances contested the election, with SWAPO and the DTA as the acknowledged front-runners.

Since the disastrous events of April that year, significant changes were made in relation to UNTAG. The original CIVPOL component of 360 had been increased to 1000 by August 1989, as a result of the realization by the UN that it needed to significantly increase its 'electoral presence' during the crucial election period.¹⁰⁰ There was also a huge influx of international observer missions to aid UNTAG during the elections. This resulted in dramatic improvement in stability with few reported incidents of intimidation or violence in the last month before the elections.¹⁰¹ Thus UNTAG had finally succeeded, at least in the latter stages of the electoral process, in establishing a climate for free and fair elections. The election itself went by with little or no incidents.

Counting commenced on 13 November at 23 different locations and the final results were available on 14 November 1989. 97 % of the 701 483 registered voters had cast their vote and only 1.4 % of ballots were declared invalid. SWAPO won 57.3% of the total vote and was the leading or second party in 15 out of the 25 electoral districts. In Ovamboland, SWAPO won 92%, whilst in the rest of the country it won 48%.¹⁰² These results clearly confirmed the extent of SWAPO support within the country. The remarkably high turnout

⁹⁹ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 135

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 136

¹⁰¹ Hearn Roger, G: *The Effectiveness of UNTAG Operation to Namibia*. p. 202

and the SWAPO majority, although it failed to gain the two-thirds majority, seemed to have silenced the critics of UNTAG and 435 in terms of the free and fairness of the elections. Ahtisaari indeed proclaimed them free and fair.¹⁰³

In Mozambique, the month before the elections, tensions mounted. Electoral workers threatened to strike over salaries. The Renamo candidate, Dhlakama, accused Frelimo of planning massive electoral fraud. He announced he would not accept the results if he lost several key provinces. The Association of Demobilized Soldiers threatened to disrupt the elections unless they received money. The police demanded extra pay for guarding the polling sites and ballot boxes. Private security services proliferated. Directly violating the peace agreement, the government transferred a significant amount of arms and men from the military to the police. All these issues raised concerns of an Angolan-style end to the electoral process. To keep the process from deteriorating further, the UN secretary general announced that the essential conditions for the holding of free and fair elections had been met. The Security Council said it would endorse the results if UNOMOZ declared the elections free and fair. This was supported by a communiqué from a summit meeting of the leaders of the former so-called Frontline States.¹⁰⁴

On the first day of the election, voters arrived at the designated polling stations from dawn onwards. Most were not aware that Renamo had in fact withdrawn from the election, alleging that the “minimum conditions for the realization of free and fair elections” had not been created. In the event, voting went on through the country, because the notoriously poor nature of Mozambique’s communications actually helped. It prevented most voters from knowing about Renamo’s action.¹⁰⁵ Most dramatically, the boycott had no visible effect on voters. Except in the few areas tightly controlled by Renamo.¹⁰⁶ Finally on Friday morning Renamo agreed to tell its party monitors to return, Dhlakama went on the radio to announce Renamo’s return to the election (and to use the

¹⁰² Nujoma, S: *Where Others Wavered*, p. 423

¹⁰³ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*, p. 159

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development: *from Bullets to Ballots Mozambique’s Vote for Democracy Governance, Electoral Assistance to post conflict Societies*, p. 9

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* p. 10

live broadcast to urge people to vote for him, in violation of a ban on campaigning during the voting period).

By 31 October, ONUMOZ was able to declare the polling successful. It noted some 87% of the registered voters had cast their ballots. On November, the Special Representative issued a preliminary statement asserting that Mozambique's first multi-party elections had been conducted peacefully, in a well-organized manner and without any major irregularities or incidents. He added that United Nations observation did not report any claim of fraud or intimidation, or any pattern of incidents that could affect the credibility of the elections. He promised to make an official pronouncement regarding the freedom and fairness of the entire electoral process following the completion of the count.¹⁰⁷

When the results were finally declared on 18 November 1994, they showed that in the presidential election 87.8% of the registered electorate voted. 5.7% of the ballots cast were blank, and 2.76% were invalid. In parliamentary elections, 87.8% of the registered electorate voted: 8.46% of these votes were blank and 3.2% were invalid. Declaring the election results, the CNE Chairman Brazao Mazula said that Joaquim Chissano had received 53.30% of the votes in the presidential election, while Afonso Dhlakama had received 33.73%. In the legislative election, Frelimo won 44.33% of the votes, giving it 129 seats, while Renamo received 37.78%, giving it 112 seats.

The three-party coalition, UD, received 5.15% of the votes, entitling it to nine seats in the Assembly. On 19 November, in Maputo, the Special representative welcomed the results with a formal declaration that the elections had been free and fair.¹⁰³ He said that although problems had occurred, no event or series of events could affect the overall credibility of the elections. Both the OAU and the European Union also declared the elections to be free and fair. The observation mission of the European Union, which, with its member States, defrayed about 80% of the costs of the elections, expressed

¹⁰⁶ Report of AWEPA's observation of the Mozambican electoral process 1992- 1994. p. 25

¹⁰⁷ The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995. p. 63

satisfaction that the results announced were correct and reflected the true outcome of the ballot.¹⁰⁸

3.4 SUMMARY

Ultimately the United Nations role in the elections process was successful. UNTAG and UNOMOZ's most notable success, to which the many other observers contributed, was to ensure that the actual casting of votes went ahead with only minor infringements and complaints and was substantially fair in the sense of allowing no significant distortion. This achievement owed much to the large number and experience of the election supervisors. Most voters understood not only how to cast a ballot, but also the political dynamics between the political parties. They voted according to what they perceived to be their best interests.¹⁰⁹

In Namibia, UNTAG's role in the election process was successful, because it succeeded to handle the disbandment of the Koevoet and some of the ethnic battalions. This reduced the level of intimidation and the majority of people felt comfortable to vote. From the small number of spoilt vote it could be assumed that people understood how to vote and that the voting procedure was not excessively confusing, thus to a successful campaign of voter education on the part of UNTAG and the different political parties. The techniques used by UNTAG to inform the population about different aspects of the electoral process, appeared to be effective in this regard. UNTAG's Information Program played a critical role in educating the population about UNTAG's role, the elections and the transition to independence. This was especially important given the bias and misinformation emanating from the SWABC.¹¹⁰

However, the negative factors that featured in this part of the UNTAG operation needed to be raised. The Special Representative was criticized for not tackling the Administrator

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 64

¹⁰⁹ Tuener Machael, J. Sue, N. Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's Vote for Democratic Governance. In: Post conflict Elections, Democratizations and International Assistance. p. 173

General in more confrontational manner. Some even raised the intervention of the UN Secretary General as a display of impatience at the Special Representative for not bringing about changes to the electoral laws. In the end the Special Representative's approach was based on the fact that he had to agree or to negotiate steadily reforms. Hence the SP had considerable power over the AG; this could be enhanced further by direct contact with the South Africans or with pressure from the Security Council. A problem with this approach was that the reforms occurred, in the case of the electoral laws, only three weeks before the elections.¹¹¹

In Mozambique, ONUMOZ and other International organizations managed to transform Renamo from a politico-military group to a political party capable of undertaking a national electoral campaign and serving in the assembly. This transformation was a key to the success of the peace process.¹¹²

The UN Special Representative in Mozambique, Aldo-Ajello stated that the success of ONUMOZ was due to the will of the people to end a war which had been characterized by a strong violence against the people. The population was the weakest party in the conflict. Civil society was undermined to the extent where it was unable to undertake actions with considerable impact on the course of the war. Tired of dying, the maiming, and the other deprivations of war, the people were prepared to accept anything, provided it would be an alternative to violence, economic decline, destruction of the social fabric, and the fear of going back to war led the civil population to take reconciliation measures even before the ceasefire was in place.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the people of Mozambique generally responded far more favourably than the government to the ONUMOZ presence in their country. ONUMOZ proved to be more than simply a symbol of the silencing of the guns. It facilitated the reunification of thousands of formerly separated families. The

¹¹⁰Hearn Roger, G: The Effectiveness of UNTAG Operation in Namibia. p. 206

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 207

humanitarian assistance component of the mission went beyond conventional emergency relief activities, by also providing support for, among others agricultural production, road rehabilitation, water supply, health and education. By mid-1994, ONUMOZ had assisted in resurrecting or establishing 750 primary schools, 250 health centres and 200 wells.

The people of Mozambique had lost all trust in the warring parties' capacity to provide for their future well-being and to provide resources for their basic immediate needs. Demobilized soldiers from both parties, and displaced people from different political affiliations, all came together to receive aid with a unifying identity: that of the needy, the deprived, and the hungry. He also recognized that the electoral process was marred by procedural problems, most caused by logistical difficulties or lack of training, but found no major irregularities that would have affected the outcome of the vote.¹¹³

In analyzing the range of civic education activities during the Namibian and Mozambican elections, we can conclude that the participation of the public was conscious and that they understood the real value of their role in the process. But in terms of ballots cast which were declared invalid or blank, we can note that the Namibian population did understand very well the electoral process much more than the Mozambican people.

3.5 ELECTION OUTCOME

In Namibia, the first multi-party election under UNTAG marked the end of the long liberation struggle (105 years of colonial rule) and the implementation of Resolution 435. By achieving the peaceful solution of the Namibia dispute, the United Nations enhanced its own reputation as a world organization and a champion for world peace. Moreover, it firmly established its role as the defender of the rights of self-determination for peoples

¹¹² Michael Turner, J. Sue, N and Kimberly Mahling, C: Mozambique's Vote for Democratic Governance. In: *Post conflict elections, Democratizations and International Assistance*. p. 172

¹¹³ Martinho, C. Malan, M: Anomalies and Acquiescence: The Mozambican Peace Process Revisited. In: *African Security Review* Vol & No 4, 1998. p. 6

and territories under foreign and colonial rule. However, it was clear that a measure of 'ethnic' loyalty was reflected in the results of the ballot.¹¹⁴

SWAPO's strength was overwhelmingly in Ovamboland, which alone contributed 57.8 percent of its vote and where its appeal successfully reached all areas, social strata, and classes. Kavango was another area of large support, where SWAPO got more than 50 percent. SWAPO also got majority support in centers of organized labor, the mines, and the major towns. A large proportion of Owambo-speakers voted for SWAPO, but SWAPO's victory at the polls could not be exclusively ascribed to this factor.¹¹⁵

An argument was made that SWAPO was the vanguard of the liberation struggle during the period 1961-1989. This role was recognized internationally as well as by the majority of Namibians, particularly the Owambos, who bore the brunt of South Africa military power and made most sacrifices during the aforesaid period. The international solidarity behind SWAPO amongst member of the General Assembly of the UN; its recognition by the latter as the "authentic representative of the people of Namibia" and having at its disposal a trained military force, gave it influence, power and finance which were insurmountable obstacles for any Namibian political opponent.¹¹⁶

The Owambo population was the majority ethnic group. The vast majority of Owambo voters voted and would continue to vote in the foreseeable future, for a party which is regarded as the authentic Owambo party and for leaders regarded as the authentic Owambo leaders. The support of most of the member churches forming the Council of Churches, but particularly the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia with Bishop Dumeni at its head played a significant part in the SWAPO victory.¹¹⁷

The DTA had the advantage of at least a decade of being at the helm of the interim government or at least sharing in it with South Africa. This gave it the opportunity to

¹¹⁴ O'Linn, B. *Namibia the Sacred Trust of Civilization Ideal and Reality*. p. 342

¹¹⁵ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? The Namibian Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 185

¹¹⁶ O'Linn, B: *Namibia the Sacred trust of Civilization Ideal and Reality*. p. 351

develop leaders and to sustain them and their parties with taxpayers money, taxpayers in Namibia as well as South Africa and with the support of the powerful Security Forces and the government's propaganda machine.¹¹⁸

This party had an established press and newspaper, also the technical skills to run an effective election machine and the funds, mostly from South Africa to finance it. With the factors abovementioned in its favour the DTA did as well as could be expected but had to be satisfied with the second prize, being the aim of at least preventing SWAPO from attaining a two-thirds majority. But it was clear that the DTA would never again in future elections have the abovementioned advantages and its fragile alliance would not stand the test of time.¹¹⁹

The DTA did well in the central and southern areas of Namibia, producing substantial majorities in most of the towns and their neighboring rural. The DTA had been an alliance of parties since its founding, each member party representing a 'population group' e.g. Hereros, Nama, Whites. Nevertheless, the DTA's election platform advocated a united and undivided Namibia, with no hint of provisions for 'group rights' or ethnic governments. The DTA mobilized ethnically at the leadership level, by allocating positions on the central committee with an eye to ethnic support.¹²⁰

Many people supported the DTA because they did not want Wambo influence to spread. This could spread in various ways- for instance, by domination of the civil service, thus squeezing out others who had benefited in the past. Support for the DTA in the election of 1989 may possibly be interpreted as reflecting 'ethnic consciousnesses, based on historical experiences, access to resources, and regional affiliations, rather than a strong formal on ethnic separateness.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Ibid. p. 352

¹¹⁸ Ibid. p. 353

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 354

¹²⁰ Cliffe, L: *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. p. 189

¹²¹ Harlech-Jones, B: *A New Thing? The Namibian Independence Process 1989-1990*. p. 176

In Mozambique, the elections transformed the country from a one party state to a democratically elected multiparty government with broad-based legitimacy. It ended 16 years of brutal civil war and turned the warring factions from settling disputes by force to battling with words. The ethnic factor also played an important role in the elections result. These elections ended in victory for both parties, Frelimo won the presidential and legislative elections in a process accepted by the international community. Renamo, “defeated,” won a stunning victory in legitimizing itself: the ‘bandits’ proved that they represented almost four out of ten Mozambicans and the majority in the most populous provinces.¹²²

The first point to note is that Frelimo won a crushing victory in the four Southern provinces. Such a massive vote means that there were not really any political currents: it is the community as such that has reacted. As a result, despite the fact that the Southern provinces (accept the capital) have only a modest demographic weight, Frelimo won about 45 per cent of its total national vote in this region.¹²³

A second point has to do with Renamo’s landslide victory in Sofala province, its absolute majority in Manica and Zambezia provinces, and its plurality in Tete and Nampula province. Renamo secured victories in the most populous provinces. All were areas where the resistance had been active in the civil war.¹²⁴

A third point concerns the three provinces where the anti-colonial armed struggle was particularly intense. In Tete Renamo won, coming just short of an absolute majority. In the far Northern Provinces Cabo Delgado and Nissa, by contrast, Frelimo booked a clear but not overwhelming victory. Generally we can detect a very important pattern: Renamo

¹²² U.S. Agency for International Development: From Bullets to Ballots, Mozambique’s Vote for Democratic Governance. p. 11

¹²³ De Brito, L: An Ethnic Factor in the Vote? In: Mozambique Election, Democracy and Development. p. 476

¹²⁴ Cahen, M: Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique. p.8

was much weaker where it lost than Frelimo was where it lost. Renamo was virtually excluded from some areas, while Frelimo was present almost everywhere.¹²⁵

On the ethnic level, Frelimo benefited much more from the ethnic vote than Renamo. We can say that the Shangaan, Ronga and Tsua ethnic groups voted for Frelimo as communities: Frelimo's scores in the areas where it predominates varied from 78 to 82 percent. Renamo even in the districts where it won rarely attained such results: 54 to 77 percent, i.e. usually below 75 percent. While the numerically modest Ndaou group seems to have voted massively for Renamo, it would be completely false to say that the Makhuwas as such voted Renamo, and this is the largest ethnic group. By contrast the Senas, supposedly anti-Vandau and therefore pro-Frelimo, in reality voted in majority for the ex-rebels. It was the regional factor, not the ethnic factor that worked in Renamo's favour.¹²⁶

Speculation was widespread that the Democratic-Union's gains resulted from the party's placement on the legislative ballot corresponding to Chissano's position on the presidential ballot. Although Renamo complained of fraud and discrimination throughout the process (with the deliberate intent, some believe, of discrediting the entire process), the party agreed to abide by the results. It claimed credit for forcing the first democratic multiparty elections and for bringing democracy to Mozambique.¹²⁷

In the dominant democratic theory of today, the vote occupies a central place, and elections are the foundations on which the entire political edifice of democracy rests. According to this conception, it is through elections that citizens express their will, by periodically choosing their representatives and rulers. The vote is therefore personal act of the citizen-elect, which express his will. The international community stated that people voted from fear. People did not want to further provoke a return to war by denying power to a party that had been fighting for so long a time, and a party that was likely to

¹²⁵ Ibid. p. 9

¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 10

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 11

go back to war if it lost dismally, thus causing more suffering again, so people have long memories of this. The vote was not as such a reflection of the will of the people, but a vote out of fear.¹²⁸

This assessment, made by an international observer, was true throughout the country. Mozambicans living in the bush and villages, who had been the main victims of the conflict, as well as some of the most cosmopolitan residents of the cities, were afraid of provoking with their votes, a situation that would mean a return to war. Afonso Dhlakama's repeated threats to withdraw from the peace process, to boycott the elections and to ignore the results set the tone. His army's dilatory demobilization, its hesitation to hand over weapons and communications equipment and to identify arms caches, and its persistent restriction on access to some of its areas gave substance to those fears.¹²⁹

One of the things proven by this election result was the bipolarization of Mozambican political life, confirmed again by the fact that no other political force obtained a majority of the votes in any of the 148 districts that comprise the 11 constituencies. The trend resulting from these elections is towards the establishment of a de facto two party system. This is not surprising, since it fits in well with the spirit of the General Peace Agreement, which had already relegated all the other nascent political forces to a secondary role.¹³⁰

As in the case of differing voting behaviour between urban and rural zones, here too explanation for the regional voting patterns should be sought in the country's recent history. It should be noted that the majority of Frelimo's main historic leaders and many of its cadres come from the southern provinces, with certainly helped the population of these provinces to identify with this party. It was in the two provinces of the far north, in the so-called "liberated areas", that the struggle for independence was waged for the longest time, and where Frelimo's politico-military presence was at its strongest.

¹²⁸ Mozambique Freedom of Expression and the vote for peace. p. 12

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 13

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 448

Frelimo's best electoral results came precisely from the districts of Maputo (with the exception of Matutuine, where Renamo had a very strong military presence in the closing years of the war), most districts of Gaza, and the Mueda plateau, one of the Frelimo's historical cradles, which gave Frelimo many of its fighters and military cadres.¹³¹

During the liberation struggle, many Frelimo cadres from the central provinces were expelled or left the movement. Furthermore, the colonial authorities undertook a series of activities trying to halt the advance of Frelimo's guerrilla army into the center of the country, particularly through the training of special military units consisting essentially of Mozambican soldiers recruited locally. With independence, Frelimo's distrust of the population of these areas was further increased thanks to the war unleashed by the Rhodesian regime, which was later extended and Mozambicanized with the formation of the Mozambique national resistance (MNR, later Renamo)

After independence, and particularly in recent years, Frelimo has come under strong criticism for marginalizing, or not giving sufficient national importance, to cadres from these regions. In general, there is a feeling among the elites of the center that Frelimo has marginalized them, and they were demanding a more balanced share-out of power. It is also significant that the great majority of the leaders of the small parties that formed after 1990 (and of some that existed previously) come from these provinces. Some were former members of Frelimo.¹³²

The vote in support of Renamo, whose historic birthplace is precisely in the central region, where it scored its best election results (in Manica, Sofala and parts of Zambezia), thus expressed a feeling, shared by the people and the local elites, of exclusion, marginalization, from the Frelimo state.¹³³

¹³¹ De Brito, L: Voting behaviour in Mozambique first multi-party election. In: Mozambique election. Democracy and Development. p. 446

¹³² Ibid. p. 471

3.6 CONCLUSION

Namibia and Mozambique's first-multi party election took place under very difficult circumstances, and all Namibians and Mozambicans deserved high praise for its success. These elections were the culmination of a major success story in wider peacekeeping in Southern Africa under UNTAG and ONUMOZ auspices. Namibia and Mozambique's peace process has subsequently been cited as a model UN peacekeeping operation which could be adapted to post-conflict situations elsewhere. The post-conflict peace process was made possible by a mutually hurting stalemate. Neither the warring parties nor the population could afford the material and human costs of continuing the war.

Neutral organizations and individuals played important roles through the process from the initial negotiations of the peace agreement through to the announcement of the official results. The presence of international observers and experts, and their willingness to get more involved, ensured that the administration continued to carry out the elections. Their presence and active participation also limited the possibilities for systemic fraud. Both voters and election staff were impressive in their commitment to voting and ensuring that everyone could vote.

A striking feature of the two elections was that in both countries the voters or the parties did not in their campaign discuss the issue of which party would best govern the country. The political parties put more emphasis on their plans to win the election, and conduct the campaign more on a basis of issues.

In Namibia and Mozambique, the broad electorate was not much interested in economic policy, although a majority of Namibians and Mozambicans being poor, unemployed or underemployed, and undereducated or illiterate. The voters were very much interested in promises of improvement in the material circumstances and economic opportunities.

¹³³ Ibid. p. 472

Newly emerging opposition parties were often suspicious vis-à-vis the government or the ruling party, and the population insecure.

In Namibia, a factor that could have seen the entire UN operation to Namibia end in failure was the delay in UNTAG's deployment. The UN's failure to prevent and respond to the fighting that broke out at the start of the operation was the most negative aspect of the operation, losing the UN significant credibility. The language also was seen as a major problem for UNTAG personnel, in particular, communication in local indigenous languages. It appears that it took some time before the UN was able to gain access to translators. The former leader of the DTA, Dirk Mudge, raised this issue. He believed that UNTAG could have been improved if it had included more personnel with some background and understanding of the conditions in Namibia, including people knowledgeable in languages.

In Mozambique, one of the most problems was the lack of understanding at all levels of the electoral process. It was not just that few ordinary people really understood either the basis role of an election or the mechanics of voting; even the parties and candidates themselves often had only an insufficient notion of what was going on. Many party officials and candidates had not read the electoral law and were frequently surprised. For example, by the documents that had to be presented by candidates, by various deadlines, and by the fact that some parties would not be the same number of places from the top of the list in all provinces. Even Frelimo and Renamo made mistakes in these matters.

The small parties of the unnamed opposition seemed to assume that political parties were leaders who collected money from the international community; there seemed to be no sense that political parties elsewhere in the world depend on their own members for resources and organizing. The nature of the peace process gave an advantage to the two-armed parties. The party in government has an advantage in any election, while Renamo gained substantial amounts of money and assistance from the international community. By contrast, assistance to the unarmed opposition was tiny and tardy. But election can be 'fair' without having the parties to be equal; 'fairness' relates to equality of opportunity.

And the small parties were simply too disorganized to make effective use of the opportunities available for campaigning.

Another failure was the very high rate of blank and invalid votes, a mark not only of the lack of civic education, but also of the often poor or arrogant explanations given by polling station staff on the voting days. The weaknesses of civic education extended to the monitors, who often seemed not to understand the process any better than the voters. And their own training was limited, so that they did not clearly understand their role. More monitors, especially for the small parties, were only present because they were paid. Monitors should be members of parties who work at polling stations to defend the interests of their parties. The elections showed that a democratic exercise in Mozambique and Namibia was possible, but the leading positions of Frelimo and Renamo, SWAPO and DTA, in national politics were convincingly confirmed.

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PART TWO: THE SECOND GENERAL ELECTIONS 1994-1999

CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION PREPARATIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the context and the conduct of the second multiparty democratic elections in Namibia and Mozambique. These elections crystallized a wider process of democratic consolidation that has been occurring within the last decade of the twentieth century. Although elections constitute one of only several parameters that constitute a democratic society, they reflect the work of several process that have occurring over a period of time and at different levels of society. Often these democratic processes are uneven, rough, and difficult. These elections represents the first experience in Southern Africa of a repeat multiparty election five years after the original internationally organized one and the first general election under the sole responsibility of Mozambican and Namibian authorities, without major international assistance. The first major test of Namibia and Mozambique young democracy came with elections for regional councils and local authorities.

In Namibia, the election was held between 30 November and 3 December 1992. The elections were reported to have been largely free of intimidation and their conduct appears to have exemplary, with no specific complaints of polling irregularities. This was the opinion of the independent foreign observers. Absolute majorities were won by SWAPO in 32 local authority areas, by the DTA in eleven, and the UDF in the two local authority areas. The 1992 regional council and local authority elections were the first elections to be held in an independent Namibia. They were conducted by Namibians without outside assistance.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ University of Namibia: A Study of Voting Behaviour in the 1992 Namibian Regional and Local Government election. p. 9

However, Mozambique's democratic record received its first setback with the local elections in 1998, opposition parties' boycotted municipal elections in protest over election administration issues and alleged fraud. Renamo initially claimed there were problems with the electoral law, and later that there was fraud in the voter registration process and other aspects of the election administration. None of the opposition parties managed to register their candidates in time or fulfill all the requirements necessary to field candidates in all races. As a result, Frelimo ran unopposed in 81 percent of the municipal assembly races and in 58 percent of the mayoral contests.

The low turnout appeared to result from a combination of several factors, including the Renamo boycott, voter apathy, unfamiliarity with the new municipal governments, and dissatisfaction with the government performance. Finally, conduct of the elections was marred by strong accusations of irregularities, including ballot box-stuffing, and the election administration in general was severely criticized from all quarters. The victory of Frelimo mayors in all communities consolidated existing power structures at the local level and added to the growing alienation between the political leadership and its support bases.¹³⁵ Clearly Mozambique did not pass the first litmus test of democratization at the level of local government.

4.2 NAMIBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS

The formal integration into Namibia of the deep-water port of Walvis Bay was widely welcomed. By the time of the 1994 Presidential and National Elections, a culture of reconciliation, social harmony and tolerance was well established. Progress had been made in raising living standards and considerable efforts had been made to stimulate investment and in particular to attract foreign investment.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Andrea, E, O: Mozambique the Permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism? In: *African Security Review* Vol. 10, No. 1, 2001. p. 14

¹³⁶ Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Namibia 7-8 December 1994. p: 5

In Mozambique, the second Presidential and National assembly took place in a social, economic and political context significantly different from the one that surrounded the first elections in 1994. It has been widely said of the 1994 elections that Mozambique was dying and the people voted to ensure that the peace secured in Rome had come home to stay. Five years later, the war spectre seems to have significantly disappeared from the daily concerns of most people. Although the destruction and violence of war is still in people's memories, and is still a recurrent theme in political speeches, other issues have assumed greater relevance, mainly social and economic ones. A political analyst Eduardo Siteo stated that, the biggest prevailing threat to the political stability in the country is the state of poverty suffered by most of the population.¹³⁷

4.3 ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT

The literature on elections in Southern Africa suggests that the nature of organizational structures for administering the electoral process is a decisive factor in determining whether elections will be of high quality and add legitimacy to democratic process or not. The presence of an independent electoral commission, with autonomous funding, appointment and organization procedures is here considered a key factor.

In Namibia, The Electoral Commission (E.C) was established to oversee all state elections in the country. The E.C was five-man commission chaired by a judge of Supreme Court, Mr. G J C. Strydom (Chairperson) and four members: Dr. K G Abrahams, Ms. I Murangi, Mr. M. Neib and Mr. M L Shipanga, appointed by the president of the Republic. The E.C operated totally independently from any Government institution, although it was accountable to the head of state. The duties and functions of the Commission was to supervise and control the registration of voters; the preparing,

¹³⁷ EISA Bulletin: Mozambique Election update 1999, No 1, September 1999. p: 1

publication and maintenance of national voters' register, the registration of political parties; and the conducting of elections.¹³⁸

The secretary of the Commission is the Director of Elections (Prof. G K H Totemeyer). The Directorate of Elections operates as a division within the Prime Minister's Office; the Director is required to exercise and to perform the functions of the office subject to the direction and control of the Commission. The names of these members were gazetted on 26 October 1992 (Proclamation 44 of 1992). The Commission has not changed its composition since its inauguration.¹³⁹

In Mozambique, after the miserable 1998 municipal elections which were marred by low turnout and Renamo's boycott, the major parties worked together to forge a new consensus election law, which was approved in December 1998. Given the controversies surrounding the voters list from the 1998 elections, a new registration was mandated, and all sides stressed the importance of having credible observers present during the registration exercise.¹⁴⁰

The National Assembly passed a new electoral law (No. 3/99), which preserved the position of the CNE as the authority charged with the responsibility to undertake the supervision of the electoral process. This provides that the CNE is an autonomous body and is independent of all state authorities. A separate law (No. 4/99) made the provision for a restructured CNE and sets out its functions. It comprised 17 members, including its president (Reverend Jamisse Taimo, a Methodist pastor and rector of the High Institute for International Relations) appointed by the President of the Republic; eight members representing Frelimo; six representing Renamo; one representing the Democratic Union;

¹³⁸ National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: Comments on the Namibian Presidential and National Assembly Elections. p. 2

¹³⁹ Totemeyer, G K G: *Elections in Namibia*. p. 15

¹⁴⁰ The Carter Center: Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique. p. 10

and one member appointed by the Government. Each Commissioner was assigned responsibility for a specific areas of the Commission's work.¹⁴¹

The CNE was structured at both the provincial and district levels where it is represented by Provincial Electoral Commissions (CPEs) and District Electoral Commissions (CDEs) in their respective areas to ensure that the electoral process, including the registration of voters, take place under conditions of complete freedom and transparency. In carrying out its function of supervising the electoral process a permanent body known as the technical Secretariat for the Administration of elections, which the director-general heads, assisted the CNE. One of the most important functions of the STAE during the electoral process was to organize the registration of voters, and Antonio Carrasco was appointed as the new director general.¹⁴²

4.4 SUMMARY

The conduct of the Electoral Commission became a matter of debate and controversy in both states during the election and after. The issue that really called into question the Commission's independence and neutrality was the 'running mate' issue, because the composition of the commission and the appointment of its members were not established on impartial lines.

In Namibia, the criteria according to which the above members of the Electoral Commission were appointed by the president are unknown. Their party-political affiliations are also not known. They do, however, represent five different professions: the law, teaching, medicine, business, and the Public Service. All are Namibian citizens, as is required by the Act, including the Secretary of the Commission; it also happens that each member originates from a different language group in Namibia. The fact that the members were appointed by the president and answerable to him is continuously giving

¹⁴¹ Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Mozambique, December 1999. p. 8

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 9

the opposition a reason to argue that the E C was not independent body but represent the interests of the ruling party.¹⁴³ Under this procedure of appointment, the opposition political parties argued that SWAPO could mismanage the elections.

In Mozambique, the president of the CNE was appointed by the president of Republic, but the reason why he was selected by the head of state is also not known by the Mozambican population. After the failure of the 1998 local government elections, debate around the rules of democracy procedure gradually came to dominate public discourse in Mozambique. Actors from political parties, foreign agencies and from civil society were mobilized to become more involved in the running of the 1999 elections. The electoral law was changed to once again incorporate all parties represented in the national assembly in CNE and STAE at national, provincial and district level. The parties also agreed to conduct a completely new voter exercise in order to eliminate doubts about the trustworthiness of the existing registry.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Soiri, I: SWAPO Wins, Apathy Rules the Namibia 1998 Local Authority Elections. In: Multi- Party Elections in Africa. p. 189

¹⁴⁴ Patrick, B: Counting Ballots in Mozambique: A case study of the 1999 Elections. p. 2

CHAPTER FIVE: PRE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES

5.1 ELECTORAL SYSTEM

In a democratic society, the choice of electoral system is important because it influences the outcomes of elections. They are the most manipulative instruments because they determine how elections are won and lost. Democratic society calls for an open and accountable electoral system. All people in society must claim ownership of the electoral system and take responsibility for ensuring its openness and transparency. For the 1994 elections Namibia opted for two methods, namely the proportional representative (PR) for the National Assembly and the plurality method for the presidential election because two elections were held in the country.¹⁴⁵

The Mozambican electoral system for parliamentary elections was a party-list proportional representation. There were 11 constituencies, corresponding to the ten provinces in the country and the city of Maputo. The Electoral law adopted plurality method for the presidential elections.¹⁴⁶

5.2 SUMMARY

Two elections were held in Namibia and Mozambique, for the presidential elections both states applied the plurality method or the first-past-the-post method. The winner must obtain more than 50% of the popular valid votes, including the null and void votes. The proportional method was applied for the parliamentary elections. Namibia decided on the list system. Each participating party can nominate as many candidates as there are seats available (72) in the National Assembly, but must nominate a minimum of 24 candidates. When all the votes are counted, each party receives the percentage of seats equal to the percentage of votes that it has secured at the polls.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Totemeyer, G, K, H: *Elections in Namibia*. p. 14

¹⁴⁶ SADC Parliamentary Forum: *Election Observation mission in Mozambique 1999*. p: 10

Mozambican electoral system for parliamentary elections was a party-list proportional representation one. But votes were converted into parliamentary seats through the Hondt method. At stake in the election of the National Assembly of the Republic were 250 seats in a single chamber. The distribution of seats contested in each provincial constituency was determined not by the population density of each province, but by the number of voters who registered there.¹⁴⁸

5.3 REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

The purpose of the registration of voters is to enable the officials of elections to compile registers of those persons who, in terms of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, qualify as eligible voters in any elections. Building on lessons learned during the local and regional elections in 1992 and 1998 election officials worked to strengthen the electoral process.

In Namibia, the voter registration process was simplified because the directorate of elections was able to use the registration list from 1992 as the base.¹⁴⁹ The directorate made substantial efforts to register all qualified voters and update the voter rolls. Registration officials were given strict orders not to register any person other than a Namibian citizen for these particular elections. This was necessitated by the fact that, for the purpose of the 1989 independent elections, everyone born in Namibia, irrespective of their domicile at the time of the elections, could register.¹⁵⁰

To qualify as eligible, a voter must be a Namibian either by birth, descent, marriage or naturalization. He or she must have reached the age of 18 years. All prospective voters were required to identify themselves by means of a photograph on some form of official document such as the officially issued Identity Document (ID), a driver's license, or any

¹⁴⁷ Totemeyer, G, K, H. p. 13

¹⁴⁸ Da Silva, V: A summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999. In: *Journal of African Elections*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001. p. 98

¹⁴⁹ Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Namibia 7-8 December 1994. p: 9

official permit.¹⁵¹ When the register was finally published on 1 December 1994, the number of registered voters stood at 654,189, which was judged to be about 89 per cent of the total number of eligible persons (788,382). The shortfall from the 750,000 who had registered for the 1989 independence elections was explained by the director of elections in terms of the large number of South Africans and other foreigners who had been able to vote in 1989.¹⁵²

In Mozambique, the National Election Commission had set the period between 20 July and 17 September as the registration period. The elementary stages of the registration process were conducted in a smooth manner with more than half of the potential voters having registered by 23 August 1999. The voting population in 1999 was assumed to be approximately 8.3 million. A total of 7 099 105 people registered for the 1999 elections (85.5% of the eligible population) compared to 6.1 million people (78%) in the 1994 elections. This increase in registration figures affected the number of parliamentary seats allocated to each province.¹⁵³

The registration exercise was observed by 3,520 local observers from the Forum for Civic Education and the Mozambican Association for Democratic Development. International observers, from institutions such as the US-based Carter Center and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), also observed the registration process. However, the registration process faced a number of problems which led Renamo to state that the extension of the period of registration process was necessary because of the nature of the country's infrastructure; lack of transportation and communication facilities would make it difficult for Commission workers to reach remote areas in time.¹⁵⁴

Registrants also cited long distances between registration posts as a hardship in many areas. Carter' observers also reported unclear roles of party agents at some registration

¹⁵⁰ Totemeyer, G, K, H: *Elections in Namibia*. p. 21

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* p: 22

¹⁵² *Ibid.* p. 33

¹⁵³ Da Silva, V: A Summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999. In: *Journal of African Elections* Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001. p. 99

posts, as well as an inconsistent police presence at the posts. Finally, the team noted concern about the work conditions of brigade members, many of whom reported that they routinely worked entire days without food or rest.¹⁵⁵ International observer missions and local observers, however, declared at the end of process that there was no systematic occurrence of the above problems and in most cases, the registration staff effectively managed the issues that rose.

5.4 SUMMARY

The registration of eligible voters is certainly one of the most important steps in the preparation of an election in order to ensure a minimum of fairness and transparency. Both states did not have a permanent and continually updated roll of voters but had to create this prior to every election.

In Namibia, there was a lack of understanding of the registration process by some officials, and the Directorate promptly responded to these problems by extending the registration period for one week to accommodate those who had been unable to register and to address other issues. Certain other voters failed to be registered for a different reason. Despite all the information disseminated by the Directorate of Elections, the media and political parties, many voters were under the impression that they could still vote with the voter registration cards issued to them during the UN-supervised elections in 1989. Many of these voters only realized too late that this was a false assumption.¹⁵⁶

A factor which contributed too many problems was the unavailability of proper 'official maps indicating the constituencies' exact borderlines. Particularly in the North, where the location of a road may change with the season, the borderlines became vague. Beacons indicating borderlines were never erected. In some cases, voters were mistakenly registered in a constituency neighboring to the one where they actually resided. In the

¹⁵⁴ Senzo, N: Mozambique prepares for the elections. In: *Conflict Trends* --No. 3/1999. p: 2

¹⁵⁵ The Carter Center: Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique. p. 11

¹⁵⁶ Totemeyer, G K H: *Elections in Namibia*. p. 34

apartheid era, certain areas in towns and villages had formerly been designated as the black residential zones; the concept of a constituency was totally unknown.¹⁵⁷

According to the leader of the Monitor Action Group (MAG), Mr. Koos Pretorius, at least 50% of Namibia's white inhabitants failed to be registered, thus seemingly showing a disinterest in political participation.¹⁵⁸

In Mozambique, by contrast the National Elections Commission (CNE) did not agree to the proposal for the extension the registration period requested by Renamo and other opposition parties. The Commission maintained that the extension of the registration period would mean that the election would not be held on 3 and 4 December 1999.

Another controversy arose when Renamo rejected a draft bill that stipulates that all citizens who turned 18 years of age on Election Day should be allowed to register as voters. This proposed bill contradicted the registration legislation that stipulates that only citizens who turn 18 on the last day of registration (in this case 17 September 1999) are eligible to register as voters. This viewpoint of Renamo was that the alteration of the legislation at this stage will disorganize the entire process leading up to the election.¹⁵⁹ Emigrants have their right to vote stipulated in the Constitution. But the CNE decided that the registration would not be extended abroad because the conditions had not been met. Nobody can vote without having been registered and, so, as in 1994 the immigrants could not vote.

Mozambique's record in this regard since the 1994 elections has been constantly bad and there was no improvement for the 1999 multiparty election. Inevitably, the outcome of this complex process, the consolidated voters roll, was full of irregularities, a selection of which included the following: people's names were sometimes misspelt, so that they were denied the right to vote on election day. Some people's names appeared up four

¹⁵⁷ National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: Comments on the Namibian Presidential and National Assembly Elections. p. 5

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 7

times on the same roll, thereby arousing suspicions that they could vote as many times. Some people who moved to another house and asked to be transferred to their new constituency, appeared on both rolls, while others did not appear where they expected to be. Sometime, entire blocks were registered in the wrong constituencies. These few examples of irregularities serve to underline the fact that the voters roll was certainly a failure.¹⁶⁰

5.5 REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

In any elections, political parties are the most important players. Electoral authorities recognize this and therefore ensure that all political parties are registered. The process of registration is organized in such a way that ensures participation. Once the party has complied with all provisions of the Act of election or electoral laws, the Director will submit its application to the Electoral Commission for approval. A certificate of registration is then issued by the Director of Elections. A political party whose application has been refused by the Commission may appeal to the High Court.¹⁶¹

In Namibia, eight political parties contested this election: SWAPO, Democratic Coalition of Namibia (a new group of disaffected DTA and CAN), DTA of Namibia, Federal Convention of Namibia, Monitor Action Group, SWANU of Namibia, United Democratic Front, and Worker Revolutionary Party. Only two parties, the DTA of Namibia and the SWAPO Party of Namibia nominated candidates for the presidential elections: the DTA of Namibia Mr. M. Muyongo, and SWAPO, Dr S. Nujoma.¹⁶²

In Mozambique, the following parties and coalitions were confirmed by the CNE as having fulfilled all the legal requirements to stand for the Presidential and National Assembly election after a number of party splits, and the formation and the collapse of electoral alliance: Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo), Liberal Party of

¹⁵⁹ Senzo, N: Mozambique prepares for the elections. In: Conflict Trends-No.3/1999. p. 3

¹⁶⁰ Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. p. 14

¹⁶¹ Patrick, B: Counting Ballots in Mozambique: A case study of the 1999 elections. In: Journal of African Elections. Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002. p. 4

Mozambique (Palmo), Freedom Front of Mozambique (Frefmo), Labour Party (PT), Green Party of Mozambique (PVM), Democratic Party of Mozambique (Padelimo), Party for Liberal Progress of Mozambique (PPLM), Liberal Social Party (Sol), Partido Nacional Dos Operarios e Camponeses (Panacoa), Partido de Ampliacao Social e Soberania de Mocambique (Pasamo), Democratic Union (UD), Democratic Union of the Opposition (Umo) and Renamo-Electoral Union (Renamo-UE). Joaquim Chissano, incumbent and head of the ruling Frelimo Party, and Dhlakama, leader of the main opposition party, Renamo, were the only presidential candidates.¹⁶³

5.6 SUMMARY

In Namibia, eight parties contested the elections, but the main battle was always between SWAPO and DTA. The number of smaller parties was reduced to just six, who between them obtained just 5.25% of the vote and a mere four seats.¹⁶⁴ In Mozambique by contrast, twelve political parties contested the 1999 presidential and parliamentary election, but Frelimo and Renamo were the two major organizations recognized. Ten small parties formed an electoral coalition with Renamo as the Renamo-Electoral Union, and Renamo was undoubtedly the main partner. Renamo-Electoral Union endorsed Afonso Dhlakama as its presidential candidate. All coalition members used the flag and symbols of Renamo in their electoral campaigning in exchange for the inclusion of their leaders in Renamo's parliamentary electoral lists.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Cliffe, L. Pankhurst, D: The 1989 Elections and the Decolonization of Namibia. In: Voting for Democracy Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa. p. 81

¹⁶³ Da Silva, V: A Summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999. In: Journal of African Elections, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2001. p. 100

¹⁶⁴ Cliffe, L. Pankhurst, D: The 1989 Elections and the Decolonization of Namibia. In: Voting for Democracy Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa. p. 31

¹⁶⁵ Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. p. 25

5.7 VOTER EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION

Educating voters about how to cast their vote and what their vote means is one of the most important functions of the electoral authorities, political parties, and the media, in any election. Among the information that needed to be conveyed to the public or the voters was the following: how and where to register and to inspect the voters' roll, how to make a complaint about the voters' roll, what was this election for-who was being elected, what were the constituency boundaries, where to vote and how to vote.¹⁶⁶

In Namibia, the directorate of election with the co-operation of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (radio and television), the Namibia Institute for Democracy, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the University of Namibia, the European Union and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of the United States had mounted an extensive voter education campaign around the main towns of the country. Political party agents also played an important and generally non-controversial role in assisting with education of voters. Even in the more isolated areas when asked whether voters understood the process, the agents of all parties were assured about the way they performed their duty.¹⁶⁷

The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), as the public broadcasting organization provided an active and unbiased role in educating voters about their rights, duties and obligations vis-à-vis the electioneering process. During the voter education campaign, the NBC radio broadcasted in nine languages to 95% of the population on FM and was therefore perhaps the most important media entity in the country, with unparalleled reach. Both main political parties told electoral authorities and the international observers that they especially appreciated the NBC's language services which, in the north for instance, enabled them to get their message across to a much wider audience.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶The Media Monitoring Project: Election 2000: The media war, Zimbabwe. p. 20

¹⁶⁷ Totemeyer, G, K, H: Elections in Namibia. p. 78

¹⁶⁸ Commonwealth Observation Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections. p.12

In Mozambique, civic education was initiated by the CNE and the STAE, and undertaken by various Mozambican NGOs, such as the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM), the Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTN) and the Forum of Civic Education (FECIV). Together they took the initiative to be actively involved in voter education and information. Workshops were organized for civic educationalists, and scheduled its programmes so that people were taught, first, how and why to register, and later, how and why to vote. Information was passed on through newspapers and posters, by radio-where drama, music, discussion, poetry and prayer were used to convey these and other messages about the democratic process.¹⁶⁹

A small human rights network, (Mozambican League of Human Rights), relying heavily upon rural clerics, did civic education work in the countryside. While civic education was incomplete, the staff at polling stations made up for it on election day by explaining to people how to vote.¹⁷⁰ Radio Mozambique (RM) and Television of Mozambique (TVM) were during the period of civic education the primary medium for disseminating information in the country and the STAE's educational guidelines were established to ensure equal access for all the political organizations and a code of conduct was set up for its speakers. However, several other media houses were accused of biased coverage of the electoral matters.¹⁷¹

5.8 SUMMARY

In Namibia, voter education was to encourage the public to vote by reiterating the importance of individual participation in democracy. This led all the electoral bodies to be involved in the production of radio talk shows, dramas, public service announcements and posters. Namibia has also been praised for being one of the few countries in Africa where the media is allowed to operate with genuine freedom. The Namibia Broadcasting

¹⁶⁹ Mozambique Election update 99 No 4. p. 37

¹⁷⁰ Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. p. 3

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p.4

Corporation (NBC) decided to play an active role in nurturing Namibia's emerging democracy.¹⁷²

An agreement was reached that the National Democratic Institute of the United States would sponsor all voter education activities, this contributed to the Directorate, political parties and different Namibians organizations, to once again inform people about their democratic right to vote for the party and presidential candidate of their choice. There was broad agreement after the elections that voters were much better informed during the 1994 elections than in 1992, as demonstrated by the small number of spoiled ballots.¹⁷³

In Mozambique by contrast, the 1999 elections demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of voters knew how to vote. Many still had difficulties following the voting procedures and did not yet understand the meaning of the elections in the national political system and the CNE recognized that there were between 300,000 and 400,000 spoilt votes. The voter education programme for the 1999 elections was conducted in the form of a campaign because three of the international NGOs that had actively supported voter education in Mozambique, the Democratic Institute (NDI), European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA), and the Frederick Ebert Foundation, ended their support.¹⁷⁴

The voter education carried out in 1999 by the CNE, the STAE, and the Mozambican NGOs was conducted over a short period and not in a more sustained fashion. The media gave special attention to the 1999 electoral campaign, Carter center, in its report on the electoral preparation, praised the Radio Mozambique and Television of Mozambique. It showed some improvement in the balance and impartiality of its coverage compared with 1994.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Totemeyer, G, K, H: *Elections in Namibia*. p. 125

¹⁷³ National Institute for international affairs: Comments on the Namibia Presidential and National Assembly Elections. p. 4

¹⁷⁴ Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. p. 24

¹⁷⁵ The carter Center: Observing the 1999 elections in Mozambique. p. 16

CHAPTER SIX: CAMPAIGNING AND VOTING

6.1 CAMPAIGNING

Electoral campaigns are the competitive efforts by candidates and political parties to win voter support in the period preceding an election. Candidates use a variety of techniques to reach the voters, from public appearances and rallies to the use of mass media advertising. In the campaign, candidates work to get their messages out and to encourage voters to turn out and vote for them or their party. There are several campaign issues that can affect the freeness and fairness of the election. These include the timing of the campaign, ability to campaign, security for participants, and access to media.¹⁷⁶

In Namibia, the campaign for votes certainly reflected the shortage of party funds, sometimes their almost complete absence. Meetings were few and far between and lightly attended. Apart from some small and badly positioned sign-boards, there were virtually no election posters. Party information was mainly restricted to short radio and television 'spots' after the news every night for several weeks. Political advertisements were placed in the press, but their reach, like that of television, was mainly limited. The entire campaign period had been characterized by a calm and peaceful atmosphere, even in areas dominated by one political party or the other.¹⁷⁷

In Mozambique by contrast, during the 1999 general elections, opposition parties once again remained dependent upon external sources of funding, as in 1994. This included both promised funds from government and supplemental funding from international donors. The provision of campaign funds by both the government and donors suffered considerable delays. The delays contributed to the slow start-up of opposition parties' campaigns, as these parties had practically no alternative sources of support. Funding for the smaller parties also was delayed by problems in their candidate lists and the

¹⁷⁶ Nelson, S: Administration and Cost of Elections a Project. p. 1

¹⁷⁷ Weiland, H: Landslide Victory for SWAPO in 1994: Many New Seats but Few New Voters. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No.5, 1995. p.350

additional time required of the CNE to verify these lists. With about two weeks remaining in the campaign, the CNE distributed funds to the parties. Since the delays were not widely explained, they fostered accusations against the CNE and its status as a nonpartisan institution.¹⁷⁸

The opposition parties argued that these delays tended to work to the benefit of the ruling Frelimo party, which obtained an unfair advantage. Frelimo countered that their party had mobilized support and campaign contributions and that opposition parties could have done the same. Although there were complaints and widespread evidence of Frelimo using government resources and personnel in their campaign, no formal complaints were submitted by the parties or other appropriate authorities. The opposition parties mostly were disorganized and relied heavily on donor-provided campaign support. In spite of the late disbursement of campaign funds, most parties campaigned quite actively and peacefully. However, campaign rhetoric between the two major parties was quite negative.¹⁷⁹

6.2 SUMMARY

In both states a recurrent problem in election campaigns seemed to be the lack of separation between the incumbent party and the state apparatus itself. Incumbency has obvious practical advantages in any electoral contest and in newly democratized African states the incumbent party has not shed away of using state resources to their own advantage. The advantage of incumbency has contributed to keeping the previous state-carrying party continuing in power, as in Namibia and Mozambique. SWAPO and Frelimo were accused by the opposition parties of using of the state resources in their own campaign, for instance by using government vehicles, or by unclear separation between state funds and political party funds.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ The Carter Center observing the 1999 elections in Mozambique. p.14

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 15

¹⁸⁰ Rakner, L and Svasand: Multiparty Elections in Africa's New Democracies. p. 10

The biggest weakness of the opposition in Namibia and Mozambique was that they were regional, at best, and tribal in orientation. Their hope was to unify their organizations. But because of their fundamental structures, they have consistently been unable to come together. In Namibia, the DTA had been an alliance of parties since its founding, each member party representing a 'population group', e.g. Hereros, Namas, and Whites. In Mozambique, some political analysts viewed Renamo as a mirror-image Ndau/Sena alliance of the central region.¹⁸¹

The consequence of the weakness of the opposition parties is that they are not likely to become institutionalized as organizations. When political parties do not institutionalize it means that it's impossible to evaluate parties on the basis of its past performance. They rest on the particularistic links between big men, or patrons, and their constituent communities. These parties did not care very much about presenting clearly distinguishable policy. For example the functioning of Renamo has remained almost totally in the hands of its president and closed to either external or internal analysis.

Dhlakama himself embodies the core of the party, the unifying centre of a network of different groups who hardly communicate to each other. Groups such as the "Resistance" fighters who were in the bush; those from the cities, who had either been clandestinely active until 1992 or joined the party at the time; the former expatriates, also known as the 'Lisbon group', who supported the guerrillas from abroad; and the demobilized soldiers as well as those who joined the new Mozambican army (FADM), who still see Renamo as their political referent. Internal rules have little relevance to the working of the party. While party congresses should be organized every two years, for example, none was held since 1994. In 1999 the re-structuring of the party was again marred by confusion and over-concentration of power and, once again, the personal whims of the party leader overruled formal regulations.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p. 11

¹⁸² Giovanni M, C: Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Party System. In: Working Paper No. 23, 2003. p. 14

6.3 ELECTORAL ISSUES

None of the parties seemed to have any coherent, readily available document on policy and programmes in both states. The only way to gather the main policy objective of the parties was through fragments of public interviews and pronouncements during the campaign. For all the parties engaged in the elections, there were hardly any difference between the aims and policies. The international observers stated that in both states most of the political parties lacked the ability to express in which direction they wanted Namibia and Mozambique to move. They failed to explain why their political party was different from others and therefore what was the reason for them to exist. In the absence of real issues, the campaign was reduced to sloganeering, 'logoism', provocative insults, and sometime violence. Differences were clear in party logos, symbols and clichés. Party-logos were everywhere, on caps, T-shirts, flags and cloths.¹⁸³

Political parties should spend time to reflect on what exactly it is they stand for and how they differ from others. This could then be couched in an ideological statement that clearly specifies the party's perspective and vision on life in Mozambique and Namibia, which markedly different from other parties. Foremost among the national issues that formed part of their agenda was the need to develop the economy, and eradicate poverty. They clearly had difficulties when it came to articulating their overall vision for the nation. They were preoccupied with securing the short-term survival and economic interests of their constituencies. As such, they had rarely been concerned about the medium and long-term goals of national development, such as capacity-building, sustainable development and population and environmental quality.¹⁸⁴

The two general elections in both states confirmed SWAPO and Frelimo as the countries, ruling parties and DTA and Renamo as the major credible opposition parties. Again a

¹⁸³ Nelson, S: Administration and Cost of Elections Project. p. 6

¹⁸⁴ Electoral Supervisory Commission/Legal Resources Foundation, The Conduct of General Elections in Zimbabwe. p. 6

comparison of SWAPO and Frelimo on the other hand and DTA and Renamo on the other.

SWAPO had free rein to campaign on a record of achievement as both a national liberation movement and as a government: campaign speeches emphasized the positive results of the government's policy of national reconciliation as well as its commitment to democracy, and further stressed the need to consolidate these gains made since independence. SWAPO found itself in a position to emphasize the success of its economic policies (industrial development and export promotion) and the improvement it had brought to the standard of living, in particular to social services such as health, housing and education. The SWAPO leader mentioned the reintegration of Walvis Bay and the offshore islands into Namibia and the construction of two important transnational roads, the Trans-Kalahari and the Trans-Caprivi highways. The campaigning also focused on job creation as the top priority for the coming years as well as pledging further support to new infrastructural programmes, particularly housing, electricity and water.¹⁸⁵

Joaquim Chissano leader of Frelimo, by contrast started his campaign by listing Frelimo's achievements over the past five years, promised more reconstruction and progress in the next five and insisted that Frelimo was the party of peace and prosperity while Renamo would turn the country back and lacked the ability to keep Mozambique the fastest-growing country in the region. He implied several times that Renamo was a party of war and destruction while Frelimo was the party of national unity. Chissano claimed that in the five years this country has developed roads, schools, hospitals, water supply and electricity. But most important of all we have achieved 10 percent economic growth with the lowest inflation rate in SADC.¹⁸⁶

The next five years we concentrate on combating the causes of our people's poverty. We will try to end illiteracy with adult education and unemployment by creating more jobs. We will provide better health for everyone. In 1994, our average life expectancy was only

¹⁸⁵ Totemeyer, G, K, H: *Elections in Namibia*. p.190

¹⁸⁶ The Carter Center: *Observing the 1999 Election in Mozambique*. p. 22

39, by 1999 it had reached 42 and we will do the things that are needed to raise it to the level of developed countries, said Chissano. Again Frelimo leader promised to fight disease and child mortality through better health and clean water; increase the number of schools until education is compulsory; develop the electrical system for the entire country, much of which remains to be electrified; assess a workable tax system to pay for better life combat crime, murder, corruption, bribery, drug abuse and domestic violence by empowering the police and law enforcement agencies. For this to happen we need peace and stability. No one must allow Renamo to start the war again.¹⁸⁷

The ability to freely participate in the electoral campaign is a key election integrity issue. Opposition candidates must be able to circulate freely among their supporters and publicize their political platforms. Voters must be able to attend rallies, and other political events, without interference and without fear. They must also have free access to political information so they can make an informed choice when voting. A free and fair campaign is dependent on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association.¹⁸⁸

In Namibia, the DTA was totally unable to articulate and publicize any programme, as Du Pisani pointed out, that the party remained lumbered with an old identity, finding it impossible to overcome its image of complicity with a colonial power. The net result was that the opposition more or less failed to come up with new ideas and policies, having projected instead a diffuse and negative image of being anti-SWAPO.¹⁸⁹

As might be expected, the opposition exaggerated the Government's shortcomings over the previous five years, attacking corruption in the ruling party, nepotism in the civil service, and the President's alleged smug authoritarian style. Yet it was unable to turn any of its criticisms in such a way as to put those in power on the defensive. The argument that aroused considerable interest was the 'danger' of a two-thirds majority, which would allow SWAPO to amend the constitution against the wishes of the

¹⁸⁷ McCullum, H: Elections '99: Large Rallies Mark End of Official Mozambique Campaign. In: *Sustainable Democracy*. p. 3

¹⁸⁸ Nelson, S: Administration and Cost of Elections Project. p. 3

opposition. But only a small group of educated voters realized that this might constitute a threat to democracy.¹⁹⁰

Like the party campaign Mishake Muyongo, leader of the DTA failed to point to any of the DTA's achievements. Instead, he chose to aggressively attack Sam Nujoma as a person, in a manner that can only be regarded as a breach of fair play. At one point Muyongo referred to Nujoma as a "dictator in waiting", and the danger of him becoming a "life president" if he managed to poll a two-thirds majority. Another occasion of desperate attack occurred in a nationally-broadcast television interview, when he even compared Nujoma to Hitler, "if he had been a white man".¹⁹¹

The Renamo campaign rested on the plank of the need for change. The Renamo party was conceived to bring a new prosperous and free democratic era to post-colonial Mozambique. An era of democratic principles and good governance which prioritizes human rights and individual liberty founded on a market economy; where the state is the referee under the rule of law; where there is a strong sustainable private sector. Dhlakama said at one of the Renamo rally that Frelimo has been in power too long; it is time for a change. Frelimo was attacked by the Renamo leader for its monopolization of the political power for its centralizing and undemocratic attitudes, and for the alleged manipulation of election results.¹⁹²

There has now been ten years of multi-party experience in Mozambique and the whole country has built a capacity and a will to strive for peace, development and political stability. However this capacity has not been truly harnessed by the present government. Frelimo has failed in Mozambique, failed to lower inequality, failed to reduce social exclusion and intolerance and fundamentally failed to make the achievements needed to further consolidate peace and democracy in Mozambique. The government and Frelimo

¹⁸⁹ Totemeyer, G, K, H: Elections in Namibia. p. 190

¹⁹⁰ Weiland, H: Landslide Victory for SWAPO in 1994: Many New Seats But Few New Voters. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33 No. 4 1995, p.351

¹⁹¹ Totemeyer, G, K, H: Elections in Namibia. p. 191

¹⁹² Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin. 23- 17 December 1999. p. 3

are corrupt and their officials have been harassing Renamo since the election call was made.¹⁹³

Dhlakama claimed that “Renamo will win, and I will win the presidency”. He roared but we have much to overcome. The state and Frelimo have been one for too long. They have abused their power and kept the opposition from receiving enough funds to campaign. We believed that it is urgent that we all unite around a program, which provides an alternative political agenda defining priorities, objectives and strategies and we delivered a peaceful change. Renamo was awarded of its political responsibilities for Mozambique and its people and invited all Mozambicans to join Renamo in order to build a country that will be free, prosperous and based on the rule of law. Dhlakama committed himself on behalf of Renamo to accepting the results of the election, claiming that Renamo was a party of peace and that it would never return to war. His speech made few concrete promises except to continue Mozambique’s economic growth. He concentrated on Frelimo’s mistakes, corruption and Mozambique’s need for change.¹⁹⁴

6.4 SUMMARY

In Namibia, the entire campaign period, had been characterized by a calm and peaceful atmosphere, even in areas dominated by one political party or another. Political party rallies in most parts of the country had been properly supervised and orderly by the electoral body. In general the level of activity during the period of campaign was relatively modest and certain political parties complained that shortages of campaign funds had been a major constraint in getting their message across to the people of Namibia.

These issues were largely absent from the coverage of the public campaign: management of the economy, land reform, living standards and unemployment, health, housing and social services, education and crime. Both the governing party and the opposition parties

¹⁹³ Mozambique Election Update 99 No 4 December 1999. p. 39

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. p.38

campaigned essentially on SWAPO's record in government. SWAPO for its part emphasized the success of its economic policies, and improvements in standards of living over the past five years. It promised to make job creation a top priority for the next five years. The DTA and the smaller opposition parties for their part sought to persuade the electorate that the government in power had not done enough and, increasingly, as the elections approached, to question the integrity of the government and its commitment on certain issues.¹⁹⁵

In Mozambique by contrast, while the 1994 was the reconciliation election, in 1999 the two main parties were more openly critical of each other during the campaign, and talked more about war. Frelimo for the first time referred to the war and said Renamo killed people; it claimed success in post-war reconstruction and general economic growth. Frelimo charged that Renamo parliamentarians were deliberately preventing progress without offering alternatives.

Some go so far as to accuse Renamo of lacking political legitimacy since it has not held a party congress in over five years to approve its leadership or set policies. Its decision to join in a coalition of ten small parties was taken by small elite around Dhlakama and other long time Renamo members of the Assembly had to be removed from the proportional representation list in order to accommodate the new coalition members. The decisions on who was removed were taken by Dhlakama and six other senior Renamo leaders. The outcome has caused serious dissension among some party members.¹⁹⁶

Renamo put great emphasis on the need for a change away from what it claimed was Frelimo corruption and abuse of power, and Frelimo's failure to support the north and the rural areas. In general, the campaign was quite negative, with parties stressing that the other people were bad rather than making positive claims of what they would do if elected. In spite of the late disbursement of campaign funds, most parties campaigned

¹⁹⁵ Totemeyer, G, K, H: Elections in Namibia. p. 188

¹⁹⁶ The Carter Center: Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique. p. 20

quite actively and peacefully. Campaigns were carried out mostly in provincial and district capitals, reducing rural voters' exposure to the parties' campaign messages.¹⁹⁷

6.5 VOTING

This chapter covers polling on the elections days, the counting procedures, and the announcement of the result by the Election Directorate. It also analyzes in some detail the results of the elections.

In Namibia, the directorate of elections did an excellent job in organizing as many as 750 polling stations across the whole country. The rush to vote was so high on the first day which had been declared a national holiday. The atmosphere around all polling stations in the country was peaceful, and there were few substantiated reports of intimidation or misconduct. At most polling stations the mood of the Namibian people was quiet, even subdued, and without exception orderly and relaxed.

There were no serious incidents even in the locations with a high percentage of illiterates, since adequately trained election officers were able to keep voters moving through the polling booths fairly quickly. Apart from few irregularities, both the casting and counting of votes proceeded without any major problems, fraud or political party protests, a view substantiated by the various groups of official observers from the Commonwealth, the Association of western European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), and several governments, who together visited several hundred polling stations.¹⁹⁸

In Mozambique by contrast, on December 1999 Mozambicans went to the poll for the second time. The second general elections drew unusually high praise from both national and international observers. Since there was relatively high turnout on December 3, turnout on December 4 was lower. In most localities, observers reported that between

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p. 20

¹⁹⁸ Weiland, H: Landslide Victory for SWAPO in 1994: Many Seats but Few New Votes. In: Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1995. p.351

70% to 80% of registered voters had voted by the end of the second day. On the second day the CNE announced that logistical problems in delivering materials had led to the late openings at some 77 polling stations in Zambesia, as a result, voting was extended to third day in all stations through out the country.

On December 5, the Carter observers reported overwhelmingly that the voting process at the polls visited was orderly, tranquil, and efficient, with a few problems, and the initial assessment of the other observer missions was similarly positive.¹⁹⁹ The counting process at the polling station level began immediately after the stations were closed on the last day of voting in the presence of party representative and observers. Counting of presidential and parliamentary ballot papers was conducted separately, but the procedures were similar. One of the problems that occurred during the counting process was a lack of transparency throughout the entire electoral process, especially at the vote counting and tabulation stage.²⁰⁰

6.6 VOTER TURNOUT

Despite all of the issues discussed above, the total response was impressive for a second national democratic election. Voter turnout is only one measure amongst many of levels of democratic political participation by citizens. Namibian and Mozambican eligible voters had shown a great commitment to democratic practice by turning out in large numbers to cast their votes. The turnout was unprecedented in both states for the second democratic elections. The predicted voter apathy happily did not occur. But more effort needs to be put into educating citizens and encouraging them to participate in political life.

In Namibia 497,499 people voted in the National Assembly elections, and 497,508 in the presidential election; in each case this represented 76% of registered voters. The

¹⁹⁹ Da Silva, V: A Summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999. In: *Journal of African Elections*, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2001. p. 102

²⁰⁰ Berg, P: Counting Ballots in Mozambique: A case Study of the 1999 Elections. p. 7

announcements of the results were greeted with euphoria and resignation. SWAPO leader, Nujoma, was re-elected president and SWAPO had a two-thirds majority which could bring a constitutional amendment. The opposition complained about SWAPO's two-thirds majority and the dangers this could bring in Namibia's young democracy.²⁰¹

In Mozambique, the total number of voters in the presidential election was 4,934,352 and 4,935,532 in the National Assembly, this represented 74% of the registered voters who voted. Chissano, was re-elected President of the Republic and Frelimo consolidated its parliamentary majority by obtaining 133 seats and Renamo 117.²⁰² The Renamo-Electoral Union declared the results fraudulent and submitted a claim to the Supreme Court for a re-count of the ballots and requested the result of the election to be nullified. The Supreme Court responded in detail to each of the arguments raised by Renamo. It declared that the documentation provided by Renamo and the reasons contained in it were insufficient to nullify the election results or to justify a re-count of the ballots.²⁰³

The Renamo-Electoral Union threatened to install parallel governments in the provinces where it won a majority of parliamentary seats, namely, Manica, Nampula, Sofala, Tete and Zambezia. A number of the smaller political parties in the Renamo-Electoral Union did not support the parliamentary boycott. On 14 January 2000, Renamo reversed its boycott stance and all parliamentarians took their seats during the first sitting of the new parliament.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ The Commonwealth Observer Group: The Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Namibia. p. 14

²⁰² The Carter Center Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique. p. 23

²⁰³ Da Silva, V: A Summary of the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Mozambique, 1999. In: Journal of African Elections, Vol. 1 No. 1 May 2001. p. 106

6.7 COMMENTS ON THE ELECTIONS RESULTS

A preliminary analysis of the Namibian election results confirmed the trend revealed three years after independence in the regional elections of 1992. SWAPO has firmly established its leading role obtaining almost three-quarters of the ballots cast, and the opposition party has been badly mauled. Support for DTA, the strongest opposition party, which also put up Muyongo as its presidential candidate, fell from one-third of all votes in 1989 to one-fifth in 1994. And the smaller opposition parties fared even worse.²⁰⁵ The conclusion to be drawn from this is that falling voter turn-out has translated into a relative loss for the opposition and a relative gain for SWAPO. Between 1989 and 1994 the opposition lost approximately 160,000 votes. Three credible explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, each supported by various factors. All agree that the contemporary political map of Namibia is mainly the outcome of changes in turn-out of voters rather than party preference.²⁰⁶

Tens of thousands of eligible voters in the 1989 elections were not permanent residents of Namibia. In the 1989 elections, the opposition had the support of thousands of non-resident voters who were not eligible to vote in the later elections. This accounts for part of the losses suffered by the opposition, although most of those in Walvis Bay have since become resident voters.²⁰⁷

The voter turn-out among potential DTA supporters was much lower than among SWAPO supporters. The turn-out in 1994 was 21 per cent lower than 1989, 89 percent of eligible voters having been registered, as against 103 per cent at the time of independence. An analysis of voting patterns by region reveals that the turn-out in all DTA-dominated constituencies was lower than in SWAPO strongholds. In addition, the

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 107

²⁰⁵ Weiland, H: Landslide Victory for SWAPO in 1994: Many New Seats but Few New Votes. In: *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33 No 1995. p. 354

²⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 355

²⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 356

new electoral laws reserve the vote to Namibian citizens, which excludes more than one-third of all whites living in the country.

Clearly the drop in the total number of ballots cast has been largely at the expense of the DTA and other opposition parties. Although there had been talk of people abstaining as a protest against certain governmental policies, party loyalty was very much in evidence during the 1994 elections. Surveys by writ and author confirm that the number of SWAPO supporters abstaining was far lower than among opposition groups.²⁰⁸

Only a small number of 1989 DTA voters have become supporters of SWAPO since independence. SWAPO has gained some support at the expense of the DTA and the smaller parties, notably voters who were intimidated in 1989 by the Koevoet, by local headmen, or by white employers and farmers. These factors gave SWAPO a two-third majority in the National Assembly.²⁰⁹

In Mozambique, the distribution of votes in the 1999 elections repeated the pattern of the 1994 elections. The results of the December 1999 election apparently showed an even more two-party pattern than that of 1994, for neither the UD (Democratic Union), nor any other minor party or grouping attained the 5% threshold to qualify for a seat in Parliament. The main parties each had “sanctuaries” where in 1994 they won more than 75% of the vote. Frelimo’s coincided with the areas in the south from where many of the party’s historic leaders came, and the areas in the far north where the struggle for independence was waged for the longest, and where Frelimo established “liberated zones”.

Renamo’s coincided with the central regions where their military activities began, and from where many of their cadres were first drawn; a sense of marginalization from the Frelimo state afflicting those areas has translated into voter support for Renamo, as well as identification with the leadership. While holding ground in their “sanctuary” areas

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 357

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 355

identified from the 1994 election results, the two main parties made inroads into their opponents' areas outside them. It has been pointed out that in six provinces the party that was runner-up in 1994 gained seats in 1999. Only in Zambezia did the gap between the parties grow significantly. However, the much more populous Zambezia stands second only to Sofala Province as a "Sanctuary" of Renamo support. In addition, four non-Renamo political leaders stood on the joint Renamo-Electorate Union ticket, and the provincial gains may also reflect this fact.

While Renamo's strength still lies squarely in the central zone of the country (Manica, Sofala and Zambezia), and Frelimo's remains based in the south and in Cabo Delgado in the far north, three provinces in the centre and north are now closely balanced, with Renamo slightly ahead. Those three are Niassa, Tete and (large and important) Nampula. In fact, the two weightiest provinces in electoral terms demonstrated opposite trends in this last election as compared with 1994: Renamo gained further support in Zambezia but lost ground to Frelimo in Nampula.²¹⁰

Electoral competition in Mozambique also reflects the conflictual legacy of the regional divides that the country developed during its anti-colonial struggle and the subsequent civil war. The regional polarization of the Mozambican society is exposed by the results of the first two multiparty elections. In the 1999 elections, the geographical distribution of the seats won by the two major parties varied only marginally. With the exception of Niassa, the sole province where majority support shifted from one party to the other, election results confirmed the strong and stable regional roots of both Frelimo and Renamo. In most provinces, the dominance of the two main parties was so overwhelming that the environment was of political homogeneity, with a huge majority of the people living in the same area (a province or, even more, a district) voting in the same way in favour of one party or the other, so that the average Mozambican voter lives among and knows only people who support the same party and candidate.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Giovanni, M, C: Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo party system. In: *Working Paper No 23*, 2003. p. 1

²¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 9

Mozambique has a two-party system clearly centred on the competition between Frelimo and Renamo. Since the new constitution was adopted in 1990, a number of minor parties have sprung up, but they made few inroads into an electorate shaped and dominated by the Frelimo-Renamo cleavage, a deeply-rooted source of political identities generated by the country's past conflicts.²¹²

6.8 CONCLUSION

In both states the international observers were impressed with many aspects of the Namibian and Mozambican election process, including the level of civic involvement, public enthusiasm to participate in elections witnessed by the increased levels of voter registration, participation in political party activities, the commitment displayed by individual and election officials, and the generally safe conditions under which the voting was conducted. The observers concluded that the election process appeared to reflect a commitment toward democratic values and processes. But at the same time problems did occur during the run-up of elections:

In Namibia, a formal complaint was lodged with the High Court of Namibia by the DTA, charging that irregularities occurred in the elections, and asking that an independent audit be conducted of votes in certain regions and 90 ballot boxes that were returned unsealed. The complaint, which centered on four polling districts in three northern regions where the number of ballots cast exceeded the number registered voters, included affidavits alleging inconsistent practices throughout the voting and counting process.

In Mozambique by contrast, the credibility of the process was undermined by a series of technical problems that emerged during the tabulation of votes, which fueled political suspicions and split the CNE. The problem was compounded by a lack of transparency during the final stages of tabulation preceding the announcement of the official results, and by the limited technical monitoring capacity of the parties' agents and

²¹² Ibid. p. 16

representatives. Although Renamo rejected the results, the fact that it contested the final results through established legal channels, and that due procedure was followed in addressing Renamo's complaint, are positive signs of nascent democracy.

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CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION

In the course of the 1990s, elections came to be seen not just as a means of choosing representatives and changing governments, but as a form of conflict resolution. While there is no doubt that if well-designed and implemented elections can play this role. Elections in a post conflict setting are fundamentally different from those organized under normal circumstances. Post-conflict elections are designed to facilitate, or to symbolize, an end to intrastate conflicts, but post-transition second elections are designed to assess if the culture of democracy gathered strength and maturity in the post-conflict society.

Namibia and Mozambique were post-conflict societies because the first multiparty elections occurred after the negotiation of peace accords that involved most of the parties to the conflict. The case study of the above countries demonstrates that without substantial international assistance, elections would not materialize. The international community provided three types of assistance in all cases. First, it provided financial assistance for planning and holding elections. Second, and equally important, was technical assistance, which the countries desperately needed because of lack of experience and expertise.

Finally, the international community provided political assistance in restructuring political parties and strengthening organizations of civil society; at the same time, it enhanced the integrity of the electoral process and the credibility of its outcome by deploying international monitors. In a climate of deep mutual distrust and antagonism, the international presence helped prevent gross irregularities and widespread fraud. These elections were the culmination of a major success story in wider peacekeeping in Africa under United Nations auspices. Namibia and Mozambique's peace process has subsequently been cited as a model UN peacekeeping operation which could be adapted to post-conflict situations elsewhere.

UNTAG and ONUMOZ were blessed with adequate resources. Although money was surely wasted in places, it was at least available whenever needed to finance the peace process. Donor generosity was partly due to Mozambique's long term popularity with certain donors, particularly the Nordic countries, who supported the process as part of anti-apartheid efforts in Southern Africa. The cost of post-conflict elections has been exceptionally high, given the widespread poverty and paucity of resources in the countries. The cost of UNTAG and ONUMOZ and their peacekeeping-related operations was in the region of \$ 900 million, (UNTAG: \$ 416 000 000, ONUMOZ: \$ 510.252.500).

Similarly, UNTAG and ONUMOZ were essentially a political operation. Their basic mandate was to ensure free and fair elections could be held in Namibia and Mozambique. Creating the conditions for such elections required UNTAG and ONUMOZ to carry out a wide variety of tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by more traditional peacekeeping operation.

Above all, UNTAG and ONUMOZ had the political task of ensuring that a major change in political atmosphere took place so that there could be a free and fair campaign in a fully democratic climate. Numerous changes in law, attitude and society had to take place. Namibia and Mozambique had had no tradition of political democracy and had been subjected to a harsh and discrimination system of administration for long time. UNTAG and ONUMOZ task was to ensure that, despite this, the people of the country could feel sufficiently confident, free from intimidation from any quarter, and adequately informed, to exercise a free choice as regards their political future.

In achieving the political targets of the Namibian and Mozambican peace agreement, UNTAG and ONUMOZ were a remarkable success. As already noted, UNTAG was an essentially political operation whose central function was to create the conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Namibia, a territory which had endured more than a hundred years of colonial rule and had had no previous experience of such elections. All UNTAG's activities were designed to serve this central function; all were subordinate to it. UNTAG was, deeply involved in the whole political process of the Namibia's

transition from illegally occupied colony to sovereign and independent state. UNTAG thus had to play its part in monitoring and implementing a ceasefire, the withdrawal and demobilization of troops, monitoring a local police force, managing a political normalization process, supervising and controlling the resultant elections and assisting the transition to independence.

The foundation for the success of such operations remains, as ever, the full cooperation of the parties, the continuing support of the Security Council, and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources.

It is generally accepted that ONUMOZ was a successful political and humanitarian mission. Politically the leaders of the two Mozambican parties to the GPA remained committed to the end-state of the process, but they were helped along by a population tired by war and famine. While the electoral and, to some extent, political success of ONUMOZ cannot be denied, the neglect of military and security issues has already had significant negative consequences for the country and for the broader Southern African region. One of the pertinent lessons which have emerged from the ONUMOZ experience is that the military terms of any peace agreement need to be subjected to aggressive, intrusive outside oversight, rather than passive monitoring.

On the human side, the situation was so terrible that the will for peace among the population had created a basis for non-conflictual relations between the people and the peacekeepers. The leadership of the warring parties had frustrated the people of Mozambique to the extent that they needed to redirect their loyalties to other institutions which were able to solve their problems. Although there were some areas where local population were exploited or economies distorted, the humanitarian and peace building activities of ONUMOZ provided a very real source of hope.

Namibia's experience with the elections began with the UN-administered national elections in 1989 that led to Namibian independence. The 1989 elections were followed by Namibian run local and regional elections in 1992. As noted above, a number of

significant improvements have been made to Namibia's election system. Namibia's 1992 Electoral Act, together with the 1994 Electoral Amendment Act, compares with international electoral standards. These elections were a credit to the people of Namibia and demonstrate that in the short time since this country gained its independence in 1990 the culture of democracy has gathered strength and maturity.

Campaigning in the 1994 elections was characterized, according to international observers, by political maturity, tolerance and a culture of democratic practice. The international observers were impressed by the balanced news coverage of the state broadcaster, as well as SWAPO's recognition of the distinction between the state and government in its use of public resources and the absence of intimidation that characterized the 1989 elections. Election officers should be congratulated for their performance during the poll and the count. Their dedication and efficiency were critical to the success of the elections. The regular meetings of political parties with the directorate of elections promoted dialogue and helped to foster a constructive atmosphere.

The election procedures were widely understood and this would indicate that the voter education programmes conducted by election authorities and the political parties themselves were effective. The most serious criticism of the poll was expressed by the DTA leaders; they believed that voting figures in four northern Namibian constituencies were in excess of registration totals. The DTA's objection eventually resulted in litigation; the Court found that there may have been evidence of irregularities; it did not suggest that these might have been on a scale to substantially alter the outcome of the election.

Most observers and political analysts agreed with the directorate's contention that the surplus votes being placed in the wrong boxes and hence counted in with the ordinary votes in the constituencies concerned. The international observers also expressed satisfaction with the credibility and the integrity of the electoral process in general.

Mozambique's first multi-party elections in 1994 took place against three decades of war. With substantial international oversight through the United Nations, the 1994 elections returned the ruling Frelimo to power, although the former rebel movement Renamo surprised many observers with their strong showing at the polls. These elections were widely hailed as a vote for peace and reconciliation. The 1998 local elections demonstrated alarming weaknesses in Mozambique's democratization process. For one thing the decentralization of power to local government, which was to accompany the local government elections, did not take place.

Instead control over the local areas, including the appointment of municipal presidents, disbursement of money and the pace of change and development, was still directed by the central government. This led to tensions in local areas where the electorate raised questions over the value of their vote. These elections were less successful and marked by protests and a Renamo boycott over alleged irregularities in voter registration and only 15% of Mozambicans voted.

The problems encountered during the municipal elections of 1998 encouraged the Government to consider and propose changes to the legislation in preparation of the 1999 general elections. Some revisions of the law regarding voter registration took place to allow a new census, which was to be informatised in order to allow easy updates for use in all forthcoming elections. The legal framework put in for the 1999 general elections aimed at assuring free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in the context of consolidating peace, democracy and national unity in the country.

Analyzing the electoral management in the context of democratization it's important to note that the three multiparty electoral processes that the country went through were marked by an intensive institutional and legal dynamic. The CNE had a different formation and president for every election and STAE each time a new Director General. Each time it was necessary to promulgate a new electoral law, a new registration law and a new law for the CNE. The original decree on STAE (09/03/94) was revoked in 1995 and changed three times since.

The 1999 general elections were an important test of Mozambique's democratization, and more generally, of its transition from war to peace and national reconciliation. Technical preparations for the elections, including the registration process and poll worker training, were well-managed and implemented. Although there were problems during the campaign, including some serious incidents of violence and extended delays in the disbursement of campaign funds, the political parties campaigned widely. The elections themselves were peaceful and orderly with high voter turnout and results that revealed a tightly contested race between two strong parties and candidates.

Nevertheless, the credibility of the process was undermined by a series of technical problems that emerged during the vote counting at provincial and central level, which fueled political suspicions and split the CNE. The problem was compounded by a lack of transparency during the last stages of tabulation preceding the announcement of the official results, and by the limited technical capacity of the parties' agents and representatives. Opposition and some international observers claimed that access to the observation computer and hardware and software was limited or even denied, and the STAE blamed them for incompetence and breaching of their mandates.

The consequence was that Renamo-Electoral Union did not accept the results. All in all Mozambique's road to democracy has not been an easy one. The country still remains confronted by the ghosts of the civil war and any move toward consolidating democracy remains a long, slow, and sometimes even stagnant process. To this end the absence of a truth commission with no integration of the past has to some extent heightened the current tensions within the country.

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