CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN KENYA, 1963-1995

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Arts in the department of Politics, University of Cape Town.

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January, 1999

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank all the people without whose help this work would never have been realised. My supervisor, Professor Temu for his patience and timely encouragement. Professor Mamdani, for his unconscious help, without whose words I would have turned back.

To my colleagues and friends, thank you, Friedericka Boge, Wanjiru Mukoma, Gerhard Tripp, Yazir Henry, Caroline and Garth, Godfrey Mutisya, Crystal Janeckee, Wanjira Hirst, Angelikka Kioi, Mary-Christine Mbithe and Celestine Nyamu.

To my family. My parents, Mr. and Mrs. Mulli. To, Raymond and Elizabeth-Jane, Rita and Peter, Thomas, Marie, Joan, Gabriel, Michael and Adele. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

DEDICATION

FOR

O. L. QUEEN OF PEACE

PREFACE

This thesis set to find out how the Kenyan government has maintained control over the military. The research was based on existing secondary data not primary sources. In chapter one, the problem being investigated was outlined as well as a literature review. This chapter is important in that it exposes to the reader the literature in the field and shows the niche that this thesis fills. The second chapter, looks at the means used by the Kenyan government in controlling its military. The significance of this chapter is that it highlights the civil -military relationship tracing this relationship back to the colonial era. Outlining the theoretical background, the chapter shows the various methods used by the Kenyan government to maintain control. Chapter three is an assessment of the social-political arena in Kenya. This chapter is important in that it shows how the social-political background plays an important part in this control. In the last chapter we look at the prospects for continued civilian control in Kenya. This chapter raises important issues to be considered as we look at civilian control of the military in Kenya.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

The 1960s saw a steady process of decolonisation taking place in the African continent. This euphoria of freedom and self-rule was to be destroyed by a phenomenon that introduced a system of government change by military *coup d'état.* Seizure of power through "the barrel of a gun" seemed to be the one recourse that citizens and especially the military junta saw to oust elected governments from power. Since the 1960s, Africa has gone through over three decades of *coups* and counter-*coups.* A glance at the continent (See map over leaf), will show that 65 per cent of the countries have undergone a violent change of government through a military *coup d'état*.

The focus of this thesis is, however, on the 35 per cent countries that have not undergone a change of government through a military *coup d'état*, but have sustained rule of a civilian government. Rather than undertaking a survey of all of them, this thesis shall focus on Kenya as a case study hoping that by understanding the particular, we shall understand the general better. Although they vary in stability with some, like Tanzania, Malawi, Swaziland, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal, being more stable than Kenya, Cameroon and Zambia, they have all escaped military *coups* for over thirty years. How they have done so is the problem we shall address.


A violent continent
SENEGAL
THE GAMBIA
1994
GUINEA
1984
GUINEA-BISSAU 1980
SIERRA LEONE
1967
1968
1992
LIBERIA
1980
1990
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA
1966
1972
1978
1979
1981
TOGO
1963
1967
EQ GUINEA
1979
CAMERO
GABON
1964
1968
1976
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
CABINDA (To Angola)
ZAIRE
1965
RWANDA
1994
BURUNDI
1966
1969
1976
1987
1996
KENYA
TANZANIA
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
MALAWI
MOZAMBIQUE
ZIMBABWE
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
1986
1991
SOUTH AFRICA
SEYCHELLES
1977
COMOROS
1975
1978
1989
MADAGASCAR
1972
MAURITIUS
DJIBOUTI
CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE
More than one violent change
One violent change
Peaceful change
No change
Source: Africa Institute of South Africa
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km
800

In this chapter, we shall also have a literature review showing what has been done on this subject illustrating how various themes will contribute to the thesis. And also showing what contribution this thesis is making to the field.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Theories on military *coups d'état* have tended to highlight factors that enable military interventions to occur, focusing on either socio-economic factors or problems within the military itself. Contextual (socio-economic) factors include economic malaise, political corruption and social class cleavages. Scholars who have attributed *coup* proneness to factors inherent in the military argue that *coups* occur because of a lack of material goods unobtainable to military officers, as well as a thirst for power.

As recently as 1996, scholars continued to attribute military *coups* to the countries' socio-economic structure. In "Civil-military relations and the consolidation of democracy", Huntington (1996:2) lists four challenges to a healthy democracy:

- the continuing potential for military intervention in new democracies;
- military bodies that are influential even after withdrawal from the political arena, e.g. South America, Brazil, Chile, and Nicaragua;
- defining the role of the military in the spread of democracy and declining security threats; and
- change in the relationship between military and society leading to down-sizing.

Focus should be drawn here to the first challenge, where this scholar is saying that military intervention is still a threat in developing countries, Cilliers (1996:1) agrees with this when he writes:

> Civilian control of the armed forces is the end result of a complex interaction among various factors including formal legal contracts, a strong civil society and the nature of the armed forces. In the absence of many of these institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, the prospects for civilian control of the military are not bright.

While the high incidence of military regimes, *coups*, civil-military strife and attempted takeovers have rendered this focus necessary, it has deflected attention from the fact that a number of states have proven to be immune to the *coup* epidemic. Scholars like Cilliers and Huntington have ignored the existence of civilian governments in some parts of Africa with similar social, economic and political constraints as the ones that have fallen under military rule. These civilian governments have not only survived for a period of about 30 years, but some (like Kenya and Zambia) have managed to undergo successful change in government peacefully and constitutionally with no evidence of diminishing civilian control (Goldsworthy 1986). Listed in order of attainment of independence, they include: Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Senegal (all 1960); Tanzania (1961); Kenya (1963); Malawi and Zambia (both 1964); The Gambia (1965); Botswana and Lesotho (both 1966); Swaziland (1968); and Zimbabwe (1983). Thus the problem which this thesis shall investigate is how Kenya has maintained civilian control over its military in the period between 1963 and 1995.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Regarding the literature on civilian control, we find that scholars have not really focused on this subject. Literature on this subject is scant, and even scantier on civilian control in Africa. As Decalo says:

> If there is a virtual voluminous, though sharply contradictory literature on sources of instability in Africa, there is virtually an academic void and lack of attention to the reverse condition. Indeed, only Goldsworthy (1981 and 1986), seems to have left an incisive imprint in what regretfully to this day is the rather unexplored territory of the stable civilian regime in Africa.

The review of literature is a critical assessment of scholars' work on this subject, showing how this thesis contributes to this body of work. The system employed here is by briefly outlining what the work is about after which a critique is given. The first study of sustained civilian control of the military in Africa known to this writer appeared in 1981. In his article entitled "Civilian control of the military in black Africa", David Goldsworthy explores the conditions and techniques of maintaining control in several African countries.

This scholar introduces the article by justifying the need to carry out the study. He argues that countries which have avoided military *coups*, merit a study as much as those that have experienced military *coups*.

Goldsworthy then explains that the characteristics given for *coup* proneness, such as underdevelopment, economic stagnation, ethnic and regional tensions, are also evident in non-*coup* states. *Coup* literature – continues this author – firstly does not explain incidences of non-*coup* occurrences. Secondly, this literature ignores the fact

that there is a move towards civilianisation even in countries that have been under military control. Thirdly, he argues that once *coups* have taken place, there have been fewer incidences of counter-*coups* – an issue which has again been ignored. He ends his criticism by saying that explanations of *coups* in Africa have finally been reduced to a taxonomy of factors responsible for *coups*.

Goldsworthy continues to outline his basic theory. He gives two scenarios where, in the first case, he says that the military officers do not intervene because they lack volition to do so. The second scenario is where the officers do not intervene because it does not occur to the military officer that he should intervene. Thus, following Huntington's thesis, Goldsworthy argues that civilian control lies in the minds of the officer. Huntington refers to subjective and objective control. Where subjective control is found, the lines between the military and government interests are porous. Objective control, on the other hand, occurs when the military and the government have clearly defined boundaries. In this latter case, it does not **occur** to the military to intervene, while in the former, the military does not get the **opportunity** to intervene.

Goldsworthy divides civilian control into conditions and techniques that enable civilian control of the military. He explains that certain conditions occur in society which enable civilian control to maintain itself, and in the second case, there are techniques that the government applies to ensure control. In discussing societal conditions, Goldsworthy highlights two factors: **effectiveness** and **legitimacy** of government. Arguing that without both legitimacy and effectiveness, a government is not likely to maintain control.

the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This by implication means that the military cannot embark on a mission without the knowledge of the president.

Goldsworthy's outline of various methods is commendable. The weakness of his article appears in the second section where he seeks to apply these methods to some Anglophone countries (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Francophone countries (Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal), Lusophone countries (Angola and Mozambique) and states without armies – so the factors are applied to police (The Gambia and Lesotho). In tabular form, Goldsworthy examines what methods have been applied in the various countries. The weakness is that he simply checks the application of the methods without going into detail of specifically how the method is applied in the particular country. This is a rather narrow way of examination. Making the article rather sketchy and the analysis of the countries not at all rigorous.

Goldsworthy has followed the exploration of the subject with a second article (written in 1986), dealing with the role of leadership in civilian control of the military, following on Jackson and Rosberg's theory of personal rule in African politics. Developed in the post-colonial era, this system is rooted in the colonial era. Here political power is concentrated in the hands of the president. This rule is systematic as opposed to personalised rule which is arbitrary. Civilian control of the military in such a country, argues Goldsworthy, occurs as a result of the control that the leader exercises over the political and social arena. Goldsworthy gives an example of Kenyatta where he argues that this president had such control over the social and political arena, that it was not likely that the military would have risen against him.

The shortcoming of this work is that he overemphasises the role of the leader to the exclusion of any other means of civilian control. Other means here would include the co-operation of the society with the president, for instance, such that the society allows the president to exercise control over them. It is my understanding that a leader, no matter how powerful, cannot control (oppress) a people without their own co-operation. Thus Goldsworthy, by saying that Kenyatta was powerful and not showing why people obeyed him, is rather short-sighted. This thesis will seek to show that civil society in Kenya has also benefited from the strong presidency and as such has allowed the system to prevail.

These article-based studies are followed by the publication of a book in 1992, edited by Constantine Danopoulos and entitled *Civilian rule in the developing world*, embodying case studies of civilian rule in third world countries. They include Asian countries (Sri-Lanka, India, Malaysia and the Philippines), one South American country (Guyana), one Caribbean island (Jamaica), two Middle Eastern countries (Jordan and Saudi Arabia), one North African country (Morocco), and four countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia). This is a positive approach in that each country is looked at individually, thus giving us an insight into each country.

For the purpose of this thesis, the first chapter is significant. In its introduction, this chapter looks at and defines civilian control. It defines this as the subordination of military point of view to the political (1992:3). This definition is only useful up to a point. The definition does not consider the fact that civilian control is not the same in developed countries as in less developed countries. This thesis shall argue that

social, economic and political conditions are different in the two sets of countries (developed and less developed countries). It thus follows that the instruments of control available to the governments in these two sets of countries are different. Danopoulos ignores this fact. Thus, even though his subsequent analysis shows an awareness of the particularity of these less developed countries' socio-economic and political structures, he does not emphasise the fact that their system of civilian control will be different. This scholar, after adopting the definition given by Von Clausewitz, differentiates between two sets of countries: those with the government in control and those having the military in control (praetorian). This, we argue, is a very broad generalisation and not useful for the purpose of this thesis. Which will give a further sub division between those developed and less developed countries.

Danopoulos also introduces the concept of value congruency. For civilian control to take place, he explains, it is necessary that there be a congruency of values among the political and military élite on issues such as "governing, conflict resolution and leadership selection, foreign and security policy goals and ways of generating and distributing wealth" (Danopoulos 1992:4). Value congruency, explains Danopoulos, leads to legitimacy of government and once the government has legitimacy, it follows that there will be stability, owing to the fact that the government enjoys a broad consensus from the society. The existence of durable value congruency in less developed countries is dependent on the socio-political setting. Danopoulos then gives the general socio-political setting of these countries against which the government carries out civilian control.

These two themes – value congruency and the significance of the country's socio-political setting – will prove to be important in our analysis. This thesis shall seek to argue that the government of the day has often shared the same values with the military. The government has attempted to ensure this sharing of values by selecting military personnel from the same ethnic group as they are (the government). On the second theme, it shall be illustrated how the government of the day has sought to please certain sections of civil society and by so doing, ensured that they have impacted positively on the socio-political setting, enabling stability and ultimately civilian control of the military.

Decalo (1989) in his article explores the question of civilian control of the military. His article surveys control of the military in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, Swaziland, Zambia and Tanzania. Here Samuel Decalo explains why these countries have succeeded in maintaining civilian control. He argues that in spite of their economic, environmental, ethnic and ideological diversities, they have common features between them, which helps to explain their success in maintaining civilian control. These are:

- preferential treatment of the armed forces;
- the erection of special units to monitor insurrection in the military;
- the appointment of personnel close to the president in key command positions in the military;
- the retention of expatriates in the officer corps to check uprisings in the military;
- insulating the army from grievances in society;
- providing officers with material comforts to ensure their continued support for the government; and

- external support from outside powers for the government.

Decalo collapses conditions used to enable civilian control in these countries into one mode, leading to over-generalisations, which is a shortcoming. However, he not only added to studies on civilian control, but has helped to clarify some key ideas on the subject. For instance, he gives a good point of focus when looking at the question of civilian control by explaining that **political subordination** of the military to the government is what is important as opposed to **general systematic** stability, arguing that most of these countries normally have socio-political tension as part of their political life. This is a very useful definition for analytical purposes.

Turning to the specific case of Kenya, two key studies need to be mentioned, one by Tamarkin, "The roots of political stability in Kenya" (1978), the other by Cobie Harris "Persistence and fragility of civilian rule in Kenya" (1992). Tamarkin explores the question of stability in Kenya and not civilian control of the military. For our purpose, the article is important because it touches on the question of civilian control. In this article, Tamarkin agrees with Goldsworthy (1986) that, indeed, we have a personal rule system in Kenya. But he differs from Goldsworthy in that he attributes Kenya's stability to the institution of the presidency as opposed to the person of the president (Kenyatta).

Tamarkin criticises scholars who have attributed political stability in Kenya to Kenyatta's personality, particularly his charismatic personality. Tamarkin argues that Kenyatta's leadership technique left him little time to be seriously involved in the affairs of the country. Furthermore, he was not involved in the day-to-day running of

the country. Tamarkin argues further by saying that there were other important leaders besides Kenyatta who commanded respect in the country. He identifies leaders like Oginga Odinga and J M Kariuki. In the Luo community, Oginga had a higher standing than Kenyatta did. And after Tom Mboya's death, these feelings of support for Oginga became distinct anti-Kenyatta feelings. Even among the Kikuyu, Kenyatta came under attack. His own tribesmen, led by J M Kariuki, openly criticised Kenyatta and accused him of murder.

Tamarkin then sets out to illustrate how Kenya under Kenyatta was a prime example of regime-building. Kenyatta, he explains, held the reins of power firmly in his hands by controlling decision-making and suppressing any opposition, apparent or potential.

In connection with this, we may cite the example of parliament, which he bypassed, using instead a group of advisors made up of civil servants, relatives, ministers and friends all from the Kiambu section of the Kikuyu tribe. The legislative arm of parliament, was far from acting as a check on the executive, headed by Kenyatta. The question arises, how was the president able to enact decisions made? Kenyatta ruled through the administration. This is especially evident in the fact that, during Kenyatta's time, the provincial administrators were very powerful actors in the political arena.

Both the political parties and trade unions were also systematically emasculated. In the case of the former, Tamarkin traces their demise back to the period following independence when after some wrangling Kenya African National Union (KANU) absorbed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) merged in 1964. Kenyatta then proceeded to ignore party channels to the extent that, in the final analysis, the party as

a tool for political action faded into the background. Trade unions fell under a similar fate where all trade unions were brought under the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). Finally, Tamarkin makes the interesting point that Kenyatta's regime was supported and "buttressed" by a "group of African capitalists involved in trade, transport, farming and other branches of the economic spectrum, who owe their wealth to government assistance and protection" (1978:311).

Tamarkin's analysis of Kenyatta's regime-building and ultimate control of the social arena is very comprehensive, and is useful in understanding stability in Kenya, and will be used as an analysis tool in this thesis. His shortcoming is in the cursory attention he gives to the importance of controlling the military. Tamarkin, in referring to the military, simply states that placing Kikuyus in prominent positions has guaranteed control. This analysis is incomplete, however, in that it can surely be argued that the government must do more within the military to ensure control. Thus, while very good, Tamarkin's analysis is rather lopsided.

In his article on "Persistence and fragility of civilian rule in Kenya", Cobie Harris (1992) traces the antecedents of civilian control to the colonial period, citing the use of the military which was set up by the British to suppress internal uprising against the colonial government, among others. He argues that the colonial military and the police were inherited unmodified by Kenyan rulers at independence, together with the belief that the use of military force to defend the power of the leaders was legitimate.

This thesis will illustrate how Harris' reasoning is fallacious in that the government of the day in Kenya has succeeded in maintaining civilian control by **not** using their military to buttress their power, but rather have focused political competition within the social political arena and not by use of military force

Starting from the premise that the colonial system which independent rulers inherited, was unstable, Harris maintains that Kenya's political stability after independence lay in the nature of Kenyan society and its leadership. In this regard, he states that Kenyatta's "charismatic leadership has been a strong contributing factor to its stability". However, he maintains that since civilian rule in Kenya has continued even long after Kenyatta's presidency, other factors such as the rise of the bourgeoisie and corporatism have contributed to this stability.

In looking at the society, Harris identifies two factors, agricultural commercialisation and urbanisation, and corporatism. In the case of the former, Harris uses Moore's thesis on the "Social origins of dictatorship and democracy" to trace the rise of an African bourgeoisie in Kenya. This was a class which benefited from the agricultural system and later joined the civil service so that they had a stake in the continued stability in the country and thus would not want to destabilise the system. In the case of corporatism, Harris explains how the government has incorporated the trade unions under an umbrella body, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU), which is then used by the government to ensure that control is maintained over labour.

The question that must be addressed, is what contribution is this thesis making to this body of literature. First of all, as has been emphasised by scholars over and over, there is indeed a dearth of literature on civilian control of the military (in Africa); thus this thesis is a contribution to this field.

Secondly, when addressing the future of civilian rule, Danopoulos (1992) explains that with the rise of democracy in developing countries, the question of civilian control over the military will become increasingly important. Danopoulos further argues that, with the failure of military regimes, there is likely to be an upsurge of governments to be overthrown. This thesis will thus provide lessons on how these countries, trying to maintain civilian control or overcome military rule, may succeed. Not that Kenya is the best example, but Kenya can perhaps simply provide important lessons or insights on the question of civilian control.

This thesis may also contribute something to the theory of civilian control. The above scholars have tended to emphasise either the methods and means the government uses within the military to maintain control, or the importance of control over the societal setting. In the specific example of civilian control of the military in Kenya undertaken in this thesis, I will argue that one or the other of these two sets of factors is not enough. Both factors have to be considered. Two scholars, Tamarkin (1989) and Danopoulos (1992) mention this, but their final analyses do not rigorously show how the means are applied as in the case of Tamarkin. In the case of Danopoulos, his use of method and means looks at other countries and merely mentions Kenya. In the next chapter, we address ourselves to these above-mentioned themes.

CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNMENT MEANS EMPLOYED TO CONTROL THE MILITARY IN KENYA

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the government and its military forces is not always smooth. At times, the military may try to overpower the government. In this chapter, we shall examine why the military tries to rout out its government. Using Kenya as a case study, we shall highlight the methods the government uses to ensure it is not overthrown.

THE KENYAN MILITARY

Like other institutions in Kenya (for instance the administration), the military was a creation of the British colonialists. The creation of the colonial army dates back to the existence of British administration in the East and Central African regions. From 1 January 1902, armies were raised in each individual territory (Bartlett 1956). The troops were the Central Africa Regiment (originally the African Rifles), the Uganda Rifles and the East African Regiment. Apart from these, there were the Indian contingents and some groups in British Somaliland. These troops were reorganised in 1908 and renamed the King's African Rifles (KAR).

The King's African Rifles played a key role in the establishment of British rule in Africa. Recruitment into the Rifles was not voluntary, nor were the soldiers mercenaries, rather they were recruited through conscription. Once in camp, they were subjected to propaganda which saw them become loyal committed, gallant and able "British" soldiers (Okete 1969).

The British conscripted selectively choosing from those tribes that they saw as peaceable like the Kambas and Kalenjins, as opposed to the perceived violent tribes like the Kikuyu. This set a pattern for the post-colonial military where the principle of recruitment from ethnic groups has continued.

The KAR fought in both the First, 1914-1919, and Second, 1939-1945, World Wars. In the former they fought in German East Africa and helped to conquer Tanganyika. They joined the latter and fought on the side of the British in several war zones especially in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. The British colonial government mounted vigorous propaganda to persuade the Africans to join the war. The main weapon of propaganda was the claim that fighting the Germans meant "freedom, peace and security of their land" for them and their people. German victory, on the other hand, meant enslavement, oppression and poverty for Africans (Okete 1969:422).

This involvement of African soldiers in external wars[1] had the effect of changing their perceptions. The soldier came to see himself as a modern man who had different loyalties and defended larger units than the tribe. Some began to see themselves as defenders of territorial, national and even continental freedom (Okete 1969). This

perception has been carried on to the post-colonial military which sees its duty primarily outside the country's borders.

The KAR excelled in the second world war in their service, according to a General Slim:

> The 11th EA division had the honour of achieving what up until then had been considered impossible. It was thought that no major formation could move or fight in the worst possible jungle country through a monsoon, they did it (Okete 1969:423).

The other side of this glowing report was not so shiny, though. The harsh conditions under which they were fighting made them question the propaganda they were being fed. Their meeting with other troops, especially the Indians, made them realise that they were fighting not for themselves but so that "King George could get more land" (Okete 1969:423). Despite their intensive training or indoctrination, they continued to feel antipathy towards the British army and the colonial government. If the army appeared neutral it was only on the surface. On the contrary it was torn by tensions between the British officer corps and African rank and file. While the former were naturally loyal to the colonial government, the latter were resentful of the British corps. These tensions were carried to the post colonial period whose government inherited the army and its structures.

The KAR was therefore not a neutral force, simply carrying out their duties at the orders of the British. No, this Army was politically aware and wanted to benefit from their military experience. The fact that military training taught obedience to the Army's

[1] The period we are concentrating on here is the second world war, because it was this period when the soldiers were exposed and started to agitate for freedom.

men, officers and government, the rank and file servicemen (Africans) resented their officers. This military was therefore not a neutral professional military, but one that was politicised. The trend has continued to the present day where the military is not neutral and insulated from society. Rather, it too is affected by tension in society.

In the period after independence in 1963, the post-colonial Kenyan Army was created by combining three battalions from the King's African Rifles (the 3rd and 5th) and by fusing the 11th with the Kenyan Regiment (Kaplan in Harris 1992). The leadership of the Army fell to British expatriates.

The relationship of the military to the new government was not and has not always been smooth. The tension between the government and military in post-colonial Kenya can best be illustrated by two incidents: an attempted mutiny in 1964 and an attempted *coup* in 1982.

The mutiny actually started in Tanzania on the night of 21 January1964. The mutineers initially asked for two specific demands. They wanted 35 British officers removed and more pay. The mutiny extended to Uganda where the demands were more or less the same, i.e. Africanisation and more pay. From Uganda the mutiny extended to Kenya. The mutinies did not all happen in one day but over a period of three days. Although the mutiny started in Tanzania on 21 January, it was not until the 24th that the two Kenyan barracks – one in Lanet, Nakuru, the other in Langata, Nairobi – mutinied. But by then the appeal sent out by the three East African presidents to the British was answered and so the mutiny was put down by the British. It is significant to note that Kenyatta addressed only one of their demands – more pay – while ignoring the other –

Africanisation, which would have meant introduction of Africans into the higher ranks. Obviously, he was reluctant to do this after they proved to be so rebellious. The expatriates, on the other hand, owed him for their positions and were likely to be more loyal. These foreigners also adhered to the principle of rule by a civilian government and so would most likely not overthrow him.

From this mutiny we learn several things about the mutiny itself and its relationship to the new government. First of all, it should be noted as significant that the three armies mutinied – one after another true, but in solidarity. This action can be seen as an indication of the sense of oneness that the soldiers shared, having served in the same military. Thus we see a military (Kenyan) which has not transferred loyalties to the new nation, but rather still seemed to have territorial loyalties.

Secondly, this military was still very highly politicised. Evidence of this is in the nature of their first demands, when they asked for further Africanisation of the military. Obviously, the Army still fed the fires of anti-colonialism and did not want to be ordered about by white officers now that the country was independent. Finally, their second demand (a higher wage) shows how the Army perceived itself, and that is as a job. Their action was not anti-government *per se,* but was more trade-unionist in nature.

Despite its failure, the incident obviously shook the regime and president Kenyatta moved fast to put controls in place that would ensure control of his government over the military. Kenyatta was successful in maintaining control, and apart from an alleged

coup plot in 1971, his period as a president never again experienced overt actions from the military. The military was to remain quiet until 1982.

In August 1982, five years after president Kenyatta's death and 18 years after the first mutiny, the armed forces tried to take over the government. At around 02h00 on 1 August 1982, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the Kenyan Air Force mutinied and took over Kenya's major airport in Nairobi, the Central Bank of Kenya and the Voice of Kenya radio station, from which they immediately began broadcasting anti-government speeches. The Air Force officers also went to the University and tried to enlist the support of the students and succeeded. (This success is probably because university students have always been traditionally anti-regime.)

The Air Force, however, had not enlisted the help of the Army (or Navy), perhaps due to a lack of solidarity or poor planning. In any case, this was to be their downfall. Led by General Mohamoud Mohammed, the Army put down the insurgents. President Moi disbanded the entire air force consisting of 3,000 personnel, commissioned General Mohammed to create a new air force, and closed Nairobi University for almost a year.

The most significant aspect of this *coup* attempt is that it was carried out by a section of the military, the Air Force, and put down by the Army, another section of the military. This attempted *coup* can be attributed to several factors.

The first of these is the difference in perception between the two groups of people. This difference could have been as a result of the difference in education levels. The Army was primarily made up of officers who had not attained high educational training.

The Air Force, on the other hand, had recruited university students (owing to the acquisition of new equipment that needed better trained individuals). These students were ex-university students first and military men second. Thus, the latter had not sufficiently imbibed military ideology but still subscribed to Mao Tse Tung's adage that power comes through the barrel of a gun, picked up from their university days (Harris 1992). This difference will thus explain why there was an attempted *coup* in the first place and, in the second place, why the Army did not help the perpetrators and in fact put them down. It can further be hypothesised that the Army had had longer training and as such had perhaps absorbed civilian supremacy doctrine, as opposed to the newer Air Force members who still carried other ideologies with them into the military. This hypothesis can be supported by the fact that the Army did not keep power for itself, but instead gave power back to the civilian government where it obviously felt power lay.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

DEFINITION

Civilian control of the military refers to the ability of the government to control the military. The military here refers to the armed forces, the navy and the air force. This definition does not mean that there can be no disagreement between the two. Disagreement may occur, but the key idea here is that in this event the military will comply with the government's view. Danopoulos puts this very aptly and for this reason an extensive quotation is used:

> When we speak of civilian or governmental control of the military or "subordination of the military point of view to the political", as General Karl Maria Von Clausewitz would have it, we are not referring to a situation where the military is not a player in the political arena, and has no influence on decision making regarding the politics of state

> security and wealth allocation. To the contrary modern militaries are well organised, politically and socially conscious entities capable and willing to be significant players in the political area, like all other major social groups. The distinction between civilian controlled governments and praetorian regimes then, lies in the methods and means employed by the armed forces to promote their views, and the degree to which soldiers are willing to accept and implement the final decisions of the civilian authorities (Danapoulos 1992:3).

The extent to which the soldiers will yield to the government depends on the degree of the latter's control over the former. The two are mutually dependent and control emerges as they interrelate. How are they inter-dependent? The government depends on the military to maintain internal order and for protection of its territorial integrity. The military on its part depends on the government for its physical situation. Civilian control is not a sharply focused event, but rather a set of relationships, lacking sharpness and distinction, a series of interactions between the military and government (Welch 1976). While some countries have more or less emerged triumphant in this tug of war, others (precisely less developed countries) are still trying to attain supremacy. In reference to this, Baynham writes: "Civilian control may be conceptualised in terms of how the regime mobilises resources to protect themselves from their own security forces" (in Batchelor 1990:6). The degree of civilian control varies, with complete control on the one hand, and overthrow on the other. Thus, when we refer to civilian control in this thesis, we are not looking at one sharp historic event when the government attained civilian control, rather we are looking at the series of interactions between the government and the military, and the government and civil society. Why we should have civilian control is the issue we turn to.

THE NEED FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL

The need for civilian control of the military is peculiar to the modern state as we know it. In the modern state, this relationship dates back to the creation of an officer corps in

twentieth century Europe.[2] Defence of the political entity can take place in roughly two ways: negotiation and diplomacy, and through armed conflicts. While the former actions lie in the arms of the political actors themselves, armed conflict has necessitated setting up a separate body of armed men. Tension arises when this group of professional armed men feel they are better able to defend/run the polity than the civilian government. Their danger is that much more real, simply because they are trained and armed. And every government in power is ever aware of this danger and always seeks to assert control over the military. Thus Huntington has written: "The problem of the modern state is the relation of the expert to the politician" (in Albright 1980:554)

Traditionally, the government has tried to assert control by limiting the duties of the military. The military is thus excluded from three areas (Kemp and Hudley 1992):

- doing routine police work;
- running courts; and
- making policy.

While in Europe the military's role is de-emphasised in civil society, in the case of Africa, as has been explained elsewhere (page 1), the military has emerged as a threat, hence the need to control the military.

Wilkin explains that, in the interaction between the government and the military, the relationship is not clearly smooth especially at the inception stage. At this stage, the

[2] Before the creation of an officer corps, rulers had to hire mercenaries to defend their polity. Mercenaries were often unreliable and gave their loyalty to the highest bidder. It was not until the 1900s

likelihood of being overpowered by the military is ever-present. This precariousness continues until the government reaches an optimum level after which the possibility of being overthrown is reduced. In the case of Kenya, for example, we see how, in 1964, one year after attaining independence in 1963, as Kenyatta's government was consolidating its power, it was threatened by the military which mutinied. After the mutiny was put down, it would be 18 years before another attempt would be made by the military to overthrow Moi's government in 1982. The relationship between the military and the government can thus be seen to go through several stages. These stages occur in the life span of a country's political history. This history is defined not so much in change of leadership as in change of political system. (History is normally traced back to the "infancy" of the nation.)

Liebenow (1985) subdivides these stages. The first stage is the traditional model stage. During this time, he explains, civilian control is complete and absolute. The reason for this is that the ruling élite also make up the military, so to go against the élite would naturally be to go against themselves. A good example of this is nineteenth century Great Britain, where we see that members of the royal family were closely related to the military officer corps. The congruency of values between the two acted as a check on the military (Janowitz 1964).

In the present era, the modern state has aspired to civilian supremacy or liberal model. This model sees attainment of civilian supremacy through a system of education which upholds this idea. This is the "comfortable" situation where the military is satisfied by

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that a permanent body of armed men, swearing allegiance to one ruler, was set up.

having only a limited influence.[3] And esteem for civil institutions[4] is high. For this reason, direct military intervention is rare (Finer 1962). In totalitarian states, the civilian government penetrates the military in two ways, by using ideology or personnel. In the case of the former, the military is indoctrinated with an ideology that encourages civilian supremacy. In the case of the latter, personnel are introduced into the military and are used as spies to report any plots to oust the government. This may also involve control through the party.

Liebenow (1985) articulates an in-between stage of civilian rule and military rule which he calls the Watchdog and the Balance Wheel models. In the case of the former, the military takes over the state apparatus for a limited time. This can be found, for instance, in cases where elections are pending, and the military creates stability while the country is in a process of transition to civilian rule. The military also ensures that the elections are "free and fair", and afterwards hand over power back to the civilians. In the Balance Wheel model, there is much more penetrated intervention in political affairs. It is usually found in the liberal-democratic and communist regimes. In such societies, the political culture is high and civilian attachment to civilian institutions is higher than the above one. Here the military hijacks state power, it commandeers the means of violence in the country, but leaves the running of other institutions, like the bureaucracy, to the civilians.

[3] According to Goldsworthy levels of military influence vary from "military influence" (e.g. in budget formulation), "military pressure" (which may imply a blackmail power over some decisions like getting arms), "military displacement" of one set of civilians for another, and military "supplantment", leading to full military rule (with or without civilian help) (Goldworthy:1981, 52). Welch (1976), places levels of influence along a continuum:
Military influence --- Military participation --- Military control ---Military control
(Civilian control) (With partners) (Without partners)

The extreme stage of the Balance Wheel and the Watchdog models is the Direct Rule stage. In this model, the military takes over the actual running of the government. Military officers occupy important positions in government like the presidency and have membership of the cabinet. A variation of this model is the Social Transformation model where the military makes a complete break with past values and institutions and creates a state based on military traditions. Nwabuzor (1985) refers to this as Direct Military influence. Here, the military attempts to influence the politics of a country. It does this either directly by the utterances or actions it takes, or covertly. The latter is found in Latin America, for instance, where the military, although not directly in power, still plays a (covert) role in the political process. This is evident in the:

- near absence of criticism of the military by the civilian government;
- appointment of a civilian, known to be friendly to the military, as the head of the Department of Defence; and
- great care taken to ensure that the military does not receive any budget cuts and also that they receive a large proportion of the budget to spend on their needs (Finer 1962).

It should be noted that attempts to participate in the civilian arena do not only come from the military. An invitation to participate may come from the civilian rulers, in the hope that the military will act as a prop to keep them in power (Welch 1976).

[4] Finer defines civil institutions as a set of procedures and organs recognised as duty worthy by a wide consensus in society. Here civil associations and parties are strong and numerous and there are agreed on rules for the transfer of power, whose supreme authority is not challenged.

Finer (1962), in writing about this last stage, refers to "displacement" or "supplantment" of the military. The military may attempt control behind the scenes by relying on trusted allies in the civilian government to see to their interests. The military may alternatively try to rule by filling influential positions with military officers. An extreme form of military rule is the Atavistic Model where the military actually decides to rule and not through the administration.

Where along this continuum of civilian control can Kenya be placed? Kenya, I think, would be best placed in the liberal model but with some reservation. While the principle of civilian supremacy has been upheld, it has also been threatened. A good illustration of this contradiction is how, during the 1982 *coup* attempt, the armed forces helped to put down the *coup* and returned power to the hands of the civilian government. So, the fact that we have faced military *coup* attempts makes one cautious to say outright that we have the liberal model in Kenya. However, this is the model that best describes Kenya's civil military arena from the ones outlined above

METHODS OF CONTROL

In developed countries, the walls between the military and civilian government are clearly definable. The military is a professional one and, as such, does not think to intervene (Finer 1962). The rules of governance in these countries are clear-cut and effective, hence enabling civilian control. Civilian control over the military takes place in two ways: the professionalism of the armed forces and by constitutional means.

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The idea of a professional military has been forwarded by Huntington (1957), where he asserts that the military officer in Western societies meets the ideal characteristics

(Louscher 1991:2). The implication here is that the professionalism of the military acts as a constraint. Finer (1962), in referring to this, explains that the military has internalised the idea of civilian supremacy.

In what way does military professionalism act as a check? This takes place in three ways (Batchelor 1990:8):

- The military may have an attitude of being politically neutral. If the military is politically neutral, it is implied that they share the same values as the political élite and so they will not overthrow the military.
- The military may also not be aware of their power and so they will not intervene. The military does not see its role as being essentially political. In this case, they have internalised civilian supremacy.
- The military may see itself as a supporter of the governing body or at one with the state.

In this section, it emerges that the military in developed countries, by being professional, acts as a check on itself. The government may also take certain actions to enable it to maintain control in these countries. These will be arrived at through constitutional means.

CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

This means of control is often associated with democratic regimes. Here civilian control is exercised through a formal set of rules, which outlines the functions of the military and the conditions under which it may exercise power (Janowitz 1964:3).

CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS

This means of control is often associated with democratic regimes. Here civilian control is exercised through a formal set of rules, which outlines the functions of the military and the conditions under which it may exercise power (Janowitz 1964:3).

This theory is based on the time-honoured distinction between "military" affairs and "political" matters (Welch 1979:6). The armed forces are perceived as being tools or instruments of the government, thus their subordination is a logical and forgone conclusion. The president acts as the commander of the military and the civil government is always in command, so long as the president is drawn from the civil side. He also creates a Ministry of Defence under which the military falls.

The powers attributed to the legislature also act as controls. Their tools include investigative ability and the right to declare war (reserved for the elected assemblies) or a state of emergency. They are also responsible for general budgetary supervision (Danopoulos 1992; Welch 1976).

In less developed countries, Kenya, for instance, where politics is less institutionalised, the military and the state have an amorphous division. Control is of the subjective kind in this case (Huntington 1957).

GOVERNMENT'S SUBJECTIVE CONTROL IN KENYA

Subjective control arises when the boundaries between the military and the civilian governments are weak or non-existent (Huntington in Goldsworthy 1981). This form of control appears in the absence of a professional military. The association of ties between the military and the ruling élite establishes control. The ruling élite and the

military share the same values, explains Goldsworthy (1981), thus making control possible. Apart from this, the government may also use specific means to enforce control.

When referring to porous (or non-existent) boundaries between the military and the government, we mean that the ruling élite of which the government consists, does not allow the military to function as a separate entity. The government has a large say about what goes on within the military. And in the process, the government implements strategies or structures that ensure its continued stay in power. Any opponents, like the propagators of the 1982 *coup,* are dealt with very harshly. For example, some ringleaders of the 1982 *coup* were actually detained without trial by the Moi government.

These carrot and stick measures are not peculiar to post-colonial Kenya. These were rooted in and adopted from the methods propagated in the colonial military (more precisely, the colonial army, since there was no air force or navy). We now turn to these methods.

ASCRIPTIVE MANIPULATION

Ascriptive manipulation refers to the engineering of the composition of the military based on their class or ethnic group. In Kenya, this has happened in the military using the ethnic group. This is a subjective means of control and, according to Goldsworthy (1981), the most widely used device. It is practised in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Guyana and Kenya. Dating back to the nineteenth century, this process attempts to attain a class and ethnic congruence between the military and the

others. Welch (1976) refers to this as control by trying to integrate the military with societal forces. This is based on three factors. Firstly, it includes control based on promoting officers who share similar backgrounds with the ruling élite, thus ensuring subordination. The second system is where recruitment is based on the same ethnic groups. A third system is that of a "nation at arms". Here, most of the population receives military training. The government tries to attain security by getting the participation of the whole population in the military. To this end, the government taps the entire eligible population and gives them military training. The duties or roles of the individuals are juxtaposed and, depending on the need, citizens may act as soldiers or civilians. The government in these countries encourages military training along with civic education. The socio-political system is such that, in times of conflict, the population lends the military support.

Kenyatta, like the British colonialists, recruited personnel into the military based on their ethnicity. Kenyatta recruited Kikuyu from his own ethnic community group into the Army to ensure that the Army was dominated by people of his own ethnic group who would be loyal to his rule. He not only recruited them to the officer corps, but also added Kikuyus to the lower ranks to compose 23 per cent of the military. Not surprisingly, this pattern was extended to other arms of the state security, including the General Service Unit (GSU), the praetorian guard of the state.

Manipulation of the service units so that they became predominantly, although not entirely, Kikuyu created division in the military along ethnic lines. It served to ensure that Kenyatta was assured of the support of his ethnic group within the military,

should it revolt. Support of other ethnic groups acted as a defence against his own ethnic group in case of doubt about the latter's loyalty.

When Moi came to power, he maintained the same principle by turning to his ethnic group, as Kenyatta had before him. For Moi this involved the dilution of Kikuyu power in the military. Moi did this by incrementally removing Kikuyus from the highest ranks. After his coming into power, General Mulinge (a Kamba) was promoted to become the Chief of the General Staff. Lieutenant-General J M Sawe, a Kalenjin, became Army commander, with a Somali, Major-General M Mohammed as his deputy. By 1979, only one year after his ascent to power, two top Kikuyu Army officers had been sacked in mysterious circumstances; two were retired and Ben Gethii, head of the GSU, was transferred to the police and the GSU was subsequently headed by a European and a Meru. The shooting to death of Lieutenant-Colonel C Kunyihia in January 1995, aroused further suspicions.

In recent years, the Luos in the Army have been complaining that they have been sidelined. This marginalisation began after the attempted *coup* in 1982, ~~and~~ it is possible that the Moi regime has not forgotten that the *coup* was led by a Luo. Kikuyus, Merus and Embus who have previously occupied prominent positions have also complained of being sidelined. According to the opposition parties, Luos and Kikuyus have been excluded from key positions that involve logistics and decision-making.

Africa Watch (1995) reported that President Moi had given Kalenjins prominent positions in the military over the years. Thus, a survey in 1995 showed the officer corps in the Kenyan Army to be made up of:

- Chief of General Staff Mahamoud Mohammed (promoted to this position after helping to put down the attempted *coup* in 1982) – a Kenyan Somali;
- Lieutenant-General Daude Tonje, deputy Army commander – from Moi's Tugen tribe;
- Major-General Stephen K Kipsaita, commander at the Kahawa garrison in the capital – also a Tugen;
- Major-General Lazarus Sumbeiyo, Director of Intelligence in the president's office – a Kalenjin;
- Major-General Chelagat, Chief of Staff at the Defence Headquarters – a Kalenjin; and
- Major-General A K arap Cheruiyot, commandant of the Armed Forces training college at Lanet – a Kalenjin.

Other high profile generals include:

- Major-General Leshan – a Masaai;
- Major-General Agoi – a Luhya;
- Major-General Barrack O Onyango, assigned to set up a national defence college – a Luo and
- Major-General Opande who has served in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Namibia and Liberia for the last two years and is highly respected – a Luo.

Apart from the regular military force, the governments may set up an alternative force which is not part of the military.[5] In a sense, these units break the military's monopoly over the means of violence. These forces also act as the agents for repressing domestic violence instead of the military. In Kenya, the presence of the General Service Unit (GSU), as alluded to above, has acted as a check on any actions that the Army might want to take against the government. The GSU has often been referred to as the "praetorian guard of the regime". This unit is very well armed and it has been rumoured that they are just as well equipped as the Army. As an emergency force, the GSU was a well trained and equipped force since Kenyatta's days. They carry light weapons and as a unit, is modelled after the Special Service Unit (SAS) in Britain, a force used for fighting "anti-government forces and carrying out counter insurgency operations" (*Africa Watch* 1995). The GSU was and has been used against demonstrating university students, illegal squatters and elsewhere where a show of force is deemed necessary. Heavily dominated by the Kikuyu, the GSU served as a check as well as a balance on the military in Kenyatta's time.

USE OF FOREIGN PATRONS AND PAY-OFFS

Another interesting method used to control the military was foreign patronage. As was noted earlier, faced with mutiny in 1964, Kenyatta sought the help of the outgoing British colonial power to suppress the military. Since then, Kenyatta maintained close ties with the British military. The British established a military base in Kenya and,

[5] While successful in some cases like Kenya's General Service Unit (GSU), these can also backfire, as in the case of Ghana, with the President's Own Guard (POGR). This may happen because the main military may fear for its own survival as a profession. Wilkin (1983) argues that the process is a fragile one, where the moment of establishing the guard is delicate, but once the military does not object at this initial stage, it is unlikely that they will interfere. Danopoulos (1992) adds that, in some cases, the government tries to maintain units of military aside under separate command and by so doing, they ensure that the military is not an overly powerful force.

recently after the 1982 *coup* attempt, president Moi invited the United States to set up an air force base in Mombasa (Nwabuzor and Mueller 1985). The tangible presence of foreign bases and forces in Kenya is meant to act as a deterrent for any subversive action on the part of the Kenyan military. Welch (1976) has warned against the danger of having an external patron, since it gives the military access to arms and funds outside of budgetary constraints, making it possible for the army to behave and axt as it wishes. There is also the danger that, as the military becomes a modernised force through foreign patronage, it becomes more powerful than the government and as such a threat.

The government may also "bribe" the military into submission. For example, immediately after the 1964 mutiny, Kenyatta's government raised the salaries of the officers, thereby meeting one of the two demands of the mutineers. Although this is a risky tool to use, owing to the fact that meeting the officers demands may only whet their appetites, while others who are left out may become disgruntled, we have seen the continued use of this tool during the Moi era.

In the Moi regime after the attempted *coup*, General Mohammed was given material benefits and is quite a wealthy man, owning a lot of property in Kenya. It is said, for instance, that he owns 450 town houses near the Kenyatta Hospital. Other benefits of the military have been shops offering imported subsidised goods in the military barracks. Living allowances for unmarried officers and housing allowances for married

government tries to maintain units of military aside under separate command and by so doing, they ensure that the military is not an overly powerful force.

officers enable them to live in high cost areas. These have served to restrain officers from acting against the president for fear of losing these material benefits.

FORMAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS

In Kenya, the law is also used as a means of control. There exists a distinction between "military" affairs and "political" matters. The armed forces are perceived as being tools or instruments of the government, thus their subordination is a logical and forgone conclusion. The president acts as the commander of the military (even though he is a civilian) and for this reason, the president carries the title "commander-in-chief of the armed forces".

The powers of the legislature also act as controls. Their tools include investigative ability and the right to declare war — reserved for the elected assembly – as well as the right to declare a state of emergency. The right to approve budgets can also act as a check since no military mission can go on without a budget so to speak. This use of a legal and constitutional means extends to having a Ministry of Defence.

These legal means actually play a very important role in the creation of a professional military where the government will not have to use the other means. Once the military has internalised these, the government will not have to "buy them out", or even ethnically manipulate them for fear of being overthrown. Indeed, this is the situation that all new democracies aspire to, where their own militaries see a *coup* on their part as an illegal act and so desist from carrying one out.

OTHER MEANS

The armed forces have been kept separate and not co-opted into the ruling party. There has also been no permeation of actors in the civil political arena into the military, in that opposition leaders or even leaders in government have never looked to the military sphere to garner support. There seems to be an agreement among the competitors that this is one institution that should be kept firmly under government control.

This chapter cannot be concluded without mentioning the civilian Kenyan's perception of the military and, in turn, the military's perception of civil society. The military in Kenya has often been isolated from internal politics. Where a show of force has been necessary (for instance a demonstration), riot police (GSU) or the administrative police have been used. The military is not mentioned in politics and are out of sight, except on public holidays when they will march in the parade over which the president officiates. On the occasions when they have appeared, it has been made perfectly clear that their role is for defence against outside foes. Because of this mutual isolation, it can be argued that civilians will not think of asking the military to interfere in politics. The military, in turn, will not think to interfere in politics, having never been invited to do so.

A system of ascription used during the colonial era and in former British colonies is that of separation from the social forces. Since the colonial era, attempts to control the military by separating them from the social forces have often been made. This often involved recruiting the military from areas untouched by political fervour. In the

post-colonial period, this separation from the social forces has involved rotation of units, as well as isolating the military from society. This separation is often difficult to achieve due to the porous nature of the walls between the military and the society. Nevertheless, it is a method which civilian governments have tried to use (Welch 1976).

The rationale here is that the military should be separate from the social forces. Thus, members of the military are recruited and sent on duty to an area that is far away from their place of origin. It is assumed that by doing this, they will be able to carry out their duty without a sentimental attachment, and they will therefore carry it out efficiently and obediently. This process has also seen the isolation from the military, especially during the colonial era, of groups that are identified as being "politically conscious".

The area of action that the Kenyan military covers, is significant. In Kenya since the period before independence, the north-eastern region bordering Somalia has been a trouble spot, with Somalia claiming this region as part of the greater Somalia. Consequently, Somali *shiftas* (raiders) have raided the area stealing livestock. This area has thus always been a high security zone. Thus, the Kenyan military has always been directed towards an external threat. Welch explains that it is important that the military is used for the purpose for which it was intended, that is, combating external threats. Involving the military in domestic issues opens the state up to intervention from the military.[6] It can therefore be argued that, by utilising the military

[6] Goldsworthy (1981), points out the difficulty in adhering to this, and that the same countries do face some threats internally that are genuine threats to the state, for instance, secession attempts. Some governments (e.g. Tanzania) have tried to involve the military in local development projects to stop them from sitting idle in the barracks. This is not without risks, however, seeing that the military could object to what it sees as being a demeaning role.

for an external function for which they have been set up, the military takes on some semblance of being a professional military and as such is subject to civilian control. And, as if aware of the importance of maintaining the status quo, the military in Kenya has often been stationed along the borders of Sudan and Somalia. The presence of hostile neighbours is an important factor in Kenyan security, and the importance of the military as a defender of the nation from outside invasion has risen subsequently.

CONCLUSION

The chapter began by looking at the Kenyan military. We traced its history and found that the military was used as a political tool of the government since its inception during colonialism. We also saw how precarious the relationship between the military and the government has been, highlighting two incidents: the 1964 mutiny and the 1982 *coup* attempt.

After giving the definition and degrees of control, the methods used by the government to control the military where then outlined. It was found that the government ethnically manipulates the military to its own advantage. Secondly, the government tries to exclude the military from the socio-political arena by using a para-military force, the GSU, to carry out its suppression acts. Thirdly, it was argued that the government uses foreign patronage, as well as "bribes" to ensure its continued stay in power.

It was also found that the constitution legally places power solely in the hands of the civilian authorities over the military. This legal allowance may act as deterrent, and the physical separation between the military and civil society acts as a check.

In the next chapter, we look at how the government has to influence the socio-political arena to its own advantage.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS BEHIND CIVILIAN CONTROL IN KENYA

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, we saw how the government has ensured control and put into place structures that have seen its continued stay in power. In this chapter, we shift the debate from the military to the socio-political arena. Here the argument is made that the other part of the government's control over the military is in the control the government exercises over civil society: "At the most basic level the chief condition of civilian control has nothing directly to do with the military at all. It is the existence of civil institutions which are both legitimate and effective" (Goldsworthy 1981:55).

Thus far, a lot has been said on the question of control, precisely, on government exerting control over other groups. It was alluded to earlier that the government, no matter how powerful, cannot just **control** groups in society without the groups' compliance. How does the government therefore achieve this? The answer lies in the legitimacy of the government in question. Groups in society, including the military, will readily obey a government that they perceive as legitimate.

Legitimacy is defined as the extent to which the government is perceived as the rightful ruler of the country. Legitimacy is in turn dependent on the extent to which the

government is able to maintain social order, meet social demands and distribute values – in other words, the effectiveness of government (Luckham 1971; Goldsworthy 1981). To carry out these demands, the government needs a strong institutional base from which to act. When we talk about an institutional base, we are referring to the basic institutions in a country, that is, the administration, the police force, the school system, and so on. If these institutions are well developed, then it is likely that the citizens will perceive their government as being legitimate and effective and hence we have stability.

The difficulty arises when the government does not have strong institutions, as in less developed countries. Here the government, in the process of acquiring these institutions, will have shaky legitimacy and civilian control as such, is precarious. In the case of Kenya, the reason why the Army returned power to the government in 1982, was because they perceived this government as the legitimate power. But there was a second section, the air force, who instigated the *coup*. This is because the country's institutions are not strong. For instance, resources such as education and employment are limited. The result is that a section of the population enjoys the benefits of these while another does not. And it is from the latter group that instability in the country arises. In the event of a military *coup,* it is this group that would act as a support base for the military. The military is not an isolated group insulated from the rest of society. Very often tension in society will have an echoing tension in the military. Thus it follows that, if part of the society is dissatisfied, so is part of the military. It is from this dissatisfied section of the military that the government of the day needs to protect itself. Nonetheless, the question of the legitimacy of a government remains important.

In regard to this legitimacy, Welch (1976) puts this very aptly:

> Political legitimacy is the most crucial factor affecting the likelihood of military intervention. Where public support for civilian institutions is strong, military participation in politics is unlikely to extend to overthrow and outright supplement of civil authorities. Where public support is weak, expansion of the military's political role seems probable. Military intervention is primarily a characteristic of a certain kind of political system, rather than an outgrowth of the personnel, ethics or organisational imperatives of the military institution itself. For this reason, strategies for establishing civilian control that focus on reforming the armed forces are likely to fail unless they are accompanied by effective measures to strengthen civilian political institutions.

In Kenya, the government has attempted to create a political system that discourages military participation. The government acquired support by trying to satisfy a significant section of the population. Having established the need for strong institutions and in view of the fact that the institutions in less developed countries, while somewhat stable, are not entirely so, how do countries like Kenya maintain effective governance? It shall be argued that, in a bid to attain both legitimacy and effective governance, the regime in power has taken three steps. One, it has strengthened the institution of the presidency to such an extent that the president has not been seriously challenged to oust him from power. This power has enabled him to extend a lot of control over the socio-political arena. Two, the president, well aware that he needs a support base, has identified and provides services to certain groups in society who support the regime in turn. Thirdly, the government, by using both constitutional and other means, has suppressed major opposition from groups like labour. In this way, the regime ensures its stay in power.

It can be argued, and rightly so, that by using these non-constitutional means, and considering that the country has limited resources and cannot therefore keep up this

system of rewarding supporters and punishing opponents, the government is in danger. This point is precisely the reason why the regime's control is precarious as has been argued previously. We now turn to these three factors.

CONTROL OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ARENA

Three things must be understood about Kenya's socio-political sphere if one is to understand how and why presidents Kenyatta and Moi have managed to exert so much control over this area, and put down any significant opposition. The country has a **personal rule** system, the country has a **divided society** (into classes and ethnic groups), and **tribalism** is still a factor in this country.

A personal rule system is one where the person of the president or leader has a defining role in the nature of politics in the country. The system is not dependent on a particular leader, but power is rather vested in the **office of the president as an institution,** to the extent that any person occupying the position of president has power due to his position. This power is overarching, and even though there is a parliament and constitution in place, the president can very often bypass these.

Created in the post-colonial state, this system is rooted in the colonial era. The colonial state was not founded on norms and values governing local populations. It was an imposed system. And since it was imposed, a show and use of force were vital to make it work. Thus the colonial state was basically a military-administrative unit (Chazan *et al.* 1992). The colonial agency was authoritarian and dominant in nature, bent on remaining in power rather than seeking legitimacy. When the

decolonisation period came, it was done hastily with little preparation on the part of both those handing over and those receiving power. The implication of this on governance was that no changes were made to the administrative model, but it was simply transferred dominant as it was. The more accommodating Westminster model of governance might have been agreed upon on paper but essentially the message that had come across to the leaders, who were novices at running a country, was that the use of force in governing was a legitimate tool. Thus in the period after independence, political structures (since they were the inherited ones) were not based on the country's political culture.

In the first years following independence, the African leaders found themselves without too much power. Indeed, they had a structure of control but they lacked a power base from where they could effectively establish and pursue governance (Chazan *et al.* 1992). Faced with an uncertain legitimacy, high demands, meagre resources and very high expectations, leaders adopted a system of governance that was both authoritarian and repressive (Chazan et al. 1992). In reference to this, Goldsworthy explains that:

> Without established institutions to govern by, politicians were left with the task of governing with their personal power and authority. In this system where politics depends on the person rather than the institutions, a system of politics based on the person and not institutions has emerged. It is this system which is called personal rule ... A non institutionalised politics is a personalised politics (1986:101).

Politics in this system is characterised by a lack of rules and regulations. Politics is seen as "a dirty game". There are no rules and coercion is used to the players' advantage. The political arena is likened to the royal court of Machiavelli: intrigue and a struggle for power are keys and the prince (read "president") has to establish his

position by a combination of skills, willpower and *fortuna* (Harris 1992; Goldsworthy 1986).

Though it may appear disorganised, personal rule is systematic on two levels. The first level is the formal functional level, where political processes, stability and security, and the provision of goods and services and other material rewards are performed – albeit less efficient than a system where politics is institutionalised. The second level is, in an operational sense, a system of relations. There exists a system of patron-client relationships linking politicians to their supporters (who make up a section of civil society). Political actors are linked to their rivals by the need for "rational self-interest" (Goldsworthy 1986:101), and although they are rivals, they co-operate on certain issues (like not including the military in politics) with the understanding that such actions are to their detriment. Thus through such relations, political order has been attained without the complete suppression of politics.

Because of the unstable nature of these politics, no position is ever certain. Those not in power will try to secure power, while those in power will try to suppress them: "Clientelism, factionalism, plots, purges and succession are rife" (Goldsworthy 1986:103). And because rules and regulations are not institutionalised this instability is likely to continue (Harris 1992). It should be noted that in such a system, the government **is** the president and for this reason, they are used interchangeably in the thesis.

The second system is the emergence of a society divided into class and along ethnic lines. The creation of an indigenous bourgeoisie[7] emerged when white settlers occupied certain areas of central Kenya by pushing out some. The reaction of the local people was one of either collaboration or resentment. In the former, we had chiefs and home guards that benefited in various ways. This included owning land, through corrupt means like land-grabbing. They also took advantage of opportunities offered by colonial rule and educated their children in schools like Alliance and Mang'u high schools, as well as government schools like Kakamega, Kagumo and Kabaa high schools. Apart from owning land, these collaborators also benefited by getting jobs as junior clerks in the colonial administration and appointments as chiefs. On the side, in these rural areas among the local populations were people who had been pushed out of their land and had never owned land – the landless or *ahoi* with no land of their own. The *ahoi* were forced to be squatters on the edges of white-owned farms and by the 1930s, they were a considerable number. But as their numbers grew and with the emergency the settlers sought to have them removed and sent back to the reserves. This action by the colonial government saw the landless retire to join forest fighters (Mau Mau). Groups with different interests emerged, there were those who, as beneficiaries of colonial rule, would continue to be more so, when and if colonialism ended. On the other side was the Mau Mau and landless who would need to get land from the former group to have their demand satisfied. Thus their demand for land, by its very nature, made them political opponents (Mutisya 1997).

[7] The political processes surrounding the emergence of classes in Kenya, and the rise of Kenyatta to the presidency are complex and voluminous. This section and the one on Moi will not involve the reader in various debates – since this is not the aim of the thesis – but will simply seek to highlight those aspects relevant to the argument being forwarded in this thesis.

In the urban area, a parallel crisis was emerging. Decrease in wages as a result of the depression saw two strikes carried out, one in 1939 and a second one in January 1947 organised by the African Workers Federation (AWF). This latter group was absorbed by the political action group of 40, whose leadership was not very educated. Also organising areas politically against colonisation in the urban parts was a group made up of educated people who were members of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). This was a privileged class who had a higher education level (some even educated in Europe), as opposed to the local workers. The educated élite included Daniel Arap Moi (later vice-president), Charles Njonjo (first attorney-general in post-colonial Kenya; yet later the powerful minister of Constitutional Affairs) and Simon Nyachae (a former permanent secretary). As can be seen, this colonial élite inherited powerful positions in government in post-colonial Kenya.

Like in rural areas, the educated and non-educated were antagonistic classes, in that the former group (made up of poor workers) wanted to change the system so that there would be equitable distribution of resources. The rich élite saw themselves taking the places of the white colonialists, but not changing the status quo.

As these groups were agitating for independence, it became increasingly obvious to the European industrialists that they would need to co-operate if their economic system and benefits were to continue after independence. These industrialists were willing to abandon the settlers as partners and instead work with the new African leaders to maintain the economic status quo, i.e. private enterprise (Leys 1975).

The question that these foreign industrialists (collaborating with the British government) addressed was which group would best serve their purpose. To this end, a system of collaboration was set up between the educated élite making up two major political parties, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Having been educated in Western ideology (the majority in these parties), this group was conditioned to accept a system of private enterprise as opposed to blanket nationalisation of white-owned properties (Leys 1975). It can further be argued that these élite saw themselves getting the benefits previously reserved for the whites and, as such, were willing to maintain the status quo. The less privileged poor and landless were not incorporated into government. Rather, they were to be the beneficiaries of a carefully orchestrated move to ensure that they got something, but were not the ultimate controllers.

A key feature of this colonial economy was its monopolistic nature. The settlers monopolised huge tracts of land in the Rift Valley. While some of this land was previously unoccupied, local people were pushed out of other portions. Settlers monopolised both the land and the growing of cash crops. The selling and marketing of this agricultural produce were also under a monopoly system. So we find the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) distributed grain, while the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) controlled the settlers' dairy produce (Leys 1975). Through these companies, the government bought and distributed the farmers' produce. This state-aided monopoly system of distribution of agricultural produce was to continue in the period after independence.[8] For the purpose of this discussion, we see the creation of a group of people dependent upon the state for the continued survival of their

[8] For a complete analysis of the emergence of a monopoly, the reader is referred to Leys (1975).

economy and, as such, would go against the government. In fact, their continued survival was directly dependent on this government.

As the government changed hands, so did the running of the economy (although with foreign aid playing a big part). Four things happened: there was a strong move towards Africanisation of the civil service, taking over settler agriculture, replacing Asian commercial bourgeoisie, and a move to work in European multinational corporations. All this were with the view to compete with international capital through new investment and purchase of farms (Leonard in Barkan 1984).

Of these four mentioned processes, two were most significant. One was **the transfer of White Highlands to the Africans** through settlement schemes where the poor landless were placed, and by buying farms in the White Highlands which fell in the hands of the élite and those in power (Leys 1975). The second process was the **incorporation of African staff into the civil service and private sector**. In the civil service, there was a split between the junior and senior staff (Leonard in Barkan 1984). In the private sector, the division occurred between the clerical and managerial sectors. These divisions were accompanied by material benefits as one moved higher up the ladder.

An important pattern emerged where the society became divided into the "haves" and the "have nots". The have nots were incorporated into land schemes and given jobs in the civil service. For this reason, there was no overt opposition to the leaders from civil society. Thus there was no conducive environment through which the military

could be encouraged to take over the government. Within this division of society into classes, tribalism exists as a third factor.

Tribalism does not refer to the mere existence of different people or groups in society. Rather, tribalism "consists in the fact that people identify other exploited people as the source of their insecurity and frustrations, rather than their common exploiters" (Leys 1975:199). Tribalism arose when colonial creation brought about colonial regimes that channelled all political and economic dealings along tribal lines through the local chiefs. Against this background, communities saw themselves getting benefits at the expense of other groups and vice versa. The chiefs, in turn, saw their role as that of getting resources for their people.

Due to their proximity to the capitalist economy, the Kikuyus in Kenya had the benefit of early mission education and an understanding of capitalism. As such, this tribe was the first to be incorporated into the European capitalist system by being employed as wage labourers. This early awareness of the Kikuyu ensured that they were quick in reaping benefits from the new government. Other tribes were slower in catching up. Thus a pattern appeared in the Kenyan social framework where those who held high positions in the civil service were also Kikuyu. Added to this was the fact that the president at independence – Kenyatta – was a Kikuyu.

It would be simple to analyse relations through the tribal lens. But this would be deceptive. To this complex network was added the fact that, although Kikuyus featured prominently, they did not play an exclusive role. But the *modus operandi* was to garner support through tribal backing. And as a reward for backing one's tribe, they

got material benefits. To sum up, is tribalism important in analysing this arena? Yes, but to use only tribalism would give us an incomplete picture.

The implications for civilian control of the government are that groups did not see the "barrel of the gun" as their tool for access to resources. They saw the class or tribal factor as their means of acquiring resources and these were used, and violence (the military) sidelined.

PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ARENA

Constitutionally, the president has certain powers which are not unlimited. The Kenyan president is both head of state and head of the executive. The president, not the cabinet, holds the power in the executive. He appoints the vice-president and ministers and has the power to remove them according to his whim. The duty of the cabinet is to aid and advise but he is not obliged to follow their advice. Power to check actions of the president does not lie in the hands of the cabinet but in parliament. The Kenyan constitution recognises the supremacy of parliament, but this is curtailed by the fact that the president has the power to "dissolve, summon and prorogue parliament" (Tamarkin 1978:302). An additional power that the president has is the power to detain any person at will without giving them a trial.[9]

Outside the constitution, Kenyan presidents have sought to expand their powers by ensuring that they control various groups in society and suppressing opposition. This

[9] While the constitution allows some rights, such as visiting rights and gazetting of one's detention, as well as having one's case reviewed regularly, a detainee may not hold a public address and his freedom of movement is curtailed. He may also be detained indefinitely, despite the fact that his case is regularly reviewed. This latter makes detention an especially powerful tool for silencing one's critics.

systematic control was adopted from British rule by Kenyatta, and continued after his death by Moi. In a political system where personal rule is adhered to and the society is divided, the president's task of power acquisition is made possible. The president using his power (allowed him by the personal rule system), uses groups to buttress his power, and plays them against each other, therefore ensuring ultimate control. This happened with Kenyatta, as well as with Moi.

In 1960, a year before Kenyatta was released from prison, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) transformed itself into the Kenya African Union (with James Gichuru as president who later handed power Kenyatta). Following his release from prison, Kenyatta faced great competition over the leadership of the party. In 1963, just before independence, his opponents accepted his leadership out of fear that the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the party in the opposition, would win the election scheduled to take place in the same year. His rise to power can be traced to this period of intense struggle and competition for the leadership of KANU, a competition out of which KANU emerged as the sole party and in which individuals were not allowed to speak out leaving Kenyatta supreme.

Formed in 1960 after a conference in Limuru, KANU was a party made up of petty bourgeois organisers and representatives from unions, ethnic associations and urban welfare associations. Their coming together was not based on ideology, but just to get independence (Anyang' Nyong'o 1978), and the roles they would occupy after independence. Since certain communities feared being left out of the independence (and power) process, the formation of KADU soon followed. Like KANU, it was brought together for strategic reasons in a bid to acquire political

power. It has been argued that KANU was a conservative party predominately made up of big tribes like the Kikuyu, Dholuos and Akamba, while KADU had a more socialist tendency and was a coalition of small tribes, like the Kalenjin and Taita (Leys 1978). However, this was not the case. There were individuals from the bigger tribes in KADU, like Masinde Muliro who was a Luhyia. Both parties also had their share of conservatives and socialists. The difference between them was not ideological, but rather a means of getting involved in the political process. The political platform advocated by the two parties was the main difference between them. Regarding the land question, KANU proposed the release of land to market forces, after the exit of white settlers. KADU, on the other hand, favoured a federal system where land issues would be tackled at the regional level.

In 1963, KANU won the elections with the majority of votes and with KADU making up the opposition in parliament. It was now that the differences in KANU began to surface. On the one hand was Jaramogi Oginga and on the other Tom Mboya, both advocating two different strategies of development. The former leaned towards socialism while the latter advocated a free market economy in Kenya. Thus the two factions within KANU began to court KADU, vying for its vote in parliament. They were successful, for in 1964 as noted above, KADU members crossed the floor to join KANU, bringing an end to opposition in parliament. The significance of this was two-fold: KANU emerged as a single party in Kenya and the absence of opposition in parliament left Kenyatta, the president of KANU, in the supreme position.

KANU continued to be inflexible. Not only was it intolerant of ideological differences within the party, but it made non-Kikuyu leaders with a strong ethnic base

uncomfortable. The net result of this was that some of the leaders walked out. An example of this was Paul Ngei, a leading KANU member from the Akamba ethnic group who walked out of KANU along with other Kamba members to form his own party APP (All People's Party – which later dissolved voluntarily). Oginga Odinga, the vice-president and leading member of KANU with a strong Luo ethnic base, could only tolerate the market-oriented ideological stance of the party until 1966. In the same year, with his feet strongly anchored in the Luo, but also including the other leaders with socialist leanings like him, he broke away from the party and founded the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU). The KPU was only short-lived as Kenyatta turned KANU against his opponents. In 1969, only three years after its formation, the KPU was banned.

In the years that followed, Kenyatta used the party less and less as a political tool. Tamarkin (1978:306) suggests that Kenyatta ignored the party because his early days, in KANU did not encourage him to turn KANU into the "backbone of his regime". For instance, he was unable to control the militant faction of the Kikuyu prior to KAU's transformation into KANU. His efforts to unite KANU and KADU after his release from prison were very frustrating because KADU accused him of tribalism.

Despite its lack of political activity (there were no KANU rallies or recruitment drives), KANU served the Kenyatta regime as a source of ideological legitimacy. Kenyatta argued that the government was a KANU offspring and as such deserved unswerving respect (*Africa Confidential* in Tamarkin:1978). The existence of KANU as the only ruling party served to keep even the members who held political positions in check in that competitors for a position as a member of parliament or even municipal bodies

needed to be KANU members. If a member proved to be too outspoken, he was threatened with expulsion which saw him fall immediately in line. In referring to this, Tamarkin (1978:309) writes:

> In 1975, when after Kariuki's murder many MPs and even ministers openly criticised the government party discipline was tightened. A meeting of KANU branch chairmen resolved in September 1975 that MPs who deviate from KANU policy (namely, government policy) would have to resign from parliament.

What are the wider implications of this on the maintenance of security in Kenya? The absence of opposition and the repression of party members implied that there was no likelihood of any organised opposition to remove the president from power. For civilian control of the military this means that the government's power was perceived as the legitimate one and, as such, there was no conducive environment to allow a military take-over. But suppression of the party was only the beginning. Kenyatta would do more. Personalities who were perceived by Kenyatta as being threatening in any way were effectively silenced. Two exemplary cases were J M Kariuki and Tom Mboya.

Tom Mboya was the secretary-general of KANU, the ruling party. As the secretary-general of the party, his position was second in importance to Kenyatta, the president of the party. In this position, Mboya was the envy of people who were close to the president's faction, leaders who felt just as qualified to succeed Kenyatta (Anyang' Nyong'o 1989). Mboya seemed to have raised the ire of both the president and his close associates, when he was upheld as "the man most likely to succeed Kenyatta" by the Western press. His view that civil servants should not be engaged in business, since this could compromise their positions, was hated by politicians

seeing him as a deterrent to their amassing wealth. In the light of this, Mboya was assassinated by a man who pleaded drunkenness. However, it has been found by Goldsworthy (in Anyang' Nyongo 1989) that the assassination was masterminded by people close to the president.

The case of J M Kariuki was more blatantly obvious, a move to silence a critic of the president. As opposed to Mboya who was a potential threat, Kariuki openly criticised Kenyatta and his cohorts. Former Mau Mau activist and detainee, Kariuki, a successful businessman, was the assistant minister for Wildlife and Tourism. Kariuki came from Nyeri and not Gatundu (like Kenyatta). Thus, he never saw himself as being fully accepted by Kenyatta and his cohorts. Kariuki had ambitious hopes, however, and was aspiring for the presidential position, argues Anyang' Nyong'o (1989), although having been a Mau Mau, there is a strong likelihood that he sincerely believed in advocating advancement for the poor man – creating a welfare state in the image conceived by the Mau Mau. In any case, Kariuki began criticising the government over continued landlessness in the country, and especially the Central Province (from where Kenyatta and those around him hailed). In referring to them, Kariuki (Tamarkin 1978:312) said that:

> A small but powerful group, a greedy self-seeking elite in the form of politicians, civil servants and businessmen, has steadily but very surely monopolised the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of the people.

These and other such statements gave Kariuki a popular following in the country. Lest stirring the hornet's nest (of landless people) should result in the hornets rising through political organisation, Kariuki was assassinated on 2 March 1975. An investigative committee was set up but did not bring the president or his men to

book. Instead, the president became even more authoritarian and "washed" the committee's report detaining some key members (Anyang' Nyong'o; 1989).

The two assassinations left little doubt to the critics of the president what was in store for them were they to persist in criticising Kenyatta's government. Kenyatta stamped his authority over the political arena in Kenya, leaving little political space for others to rise to power so long as he was still the president. In the process, there was little space through which protests could result in the overthrow of his government.

However, suppression alone is not and cannot be sufficient. A system had to be set up through which civil society can **benefit from the system**, and by so doing allow their continued suppression. The benefits they get act as a diffusion to any resentment they may have towards the government, while also ensuring that they do not rise up against the government in mass riots. At the same time, these benefits/access to resources provide legitimacy for the government which they see as capable of providing in their needs. And as argued elsewhere, a legitimate government is one likely to maintain civilian control. Kenyatta was aware of this and of the need for a support base among the masses. He turned to the civil service and provincial administration.

An efficient administrative network was a significant legacy of British colonialism. Kenyatta chose this as the agency best able to offer him an "effective professional and loyal power structure available to enhance his position as head of the executive" (Tamarkin 1978:306). It has been further suggested (Leys 1975; Tamarkin 1978) that

using the administration was convenient, since it would provide continuity in the economic system and allay the fears of white settlers who were reluctant to stay on by encouraging the path of economic development started by the colonialists, that is, capitalism. Capitalism could best flourish under this administrative network. While the two latter reasons – settler security and economy – may be applicable, the overriding reason remains that this was the system best able to serve Kenyatta's interests.

Through the provincial administration, Kenyatta made his writ known throughout the country. Provincial commissioners (PCs), district commissioners (DCs) and chiefs were controlled and supervised by the permanent secretary in the office at the president who was (and is) also head of the administration. These were presidential appointments and they depended upon the president for their continued stay in power. To this end, the provincial administration mobilised support for the president by getting involved in local politics (Tamarkin 1978). Kenyatta supported this by saying that they are "KANU civil servants" (Tamarkin 1978:307).

Added to this appointment factor was the tribal factor. Kenyatta reached out to his fellow Kikuyus for support. Kikuyus held prominent positions both in the administration and civil service. In 1970, for instance, of the 22 permanent secretarial positions, nine were held by Kikuyu. In the same period, four of the seven PCs were also Kikuyus. By having Kikuyus in these positions, Kenyatta ensured that a large percentage of the administration, who saw him as "their man", supported him.

Civil servants further benefited from the system by being allowed to engage in business. After the death of Tom Mboya, who opposed such a move (arguing that it would compromise the state), the Ndegwa Commission was set up. This commission sanctioned civil servants to engage in business. Thus there were civil servants who, "[i]n addition to barber shops and shoe-shine business also want to own tea kiosks in the streets. The very same civil servants want to own farms" (Githii in Tamarkin 1978:307).

With vested interests in such a system, groups in civil society were (and are) not likely to oppose the president nor engage in activities likely to upset the status quo. No wonder Kenyatta was supported by the administration as well as the civil society.

The death of Kenyatta in August 1978, and subsequent ascent of vice-president Daniel Arap Moi to power brought a change of players but not of the game. There was change in form but not in the structure of the state (Ajulu in Mutisya 1997). Like Kenyatta, Moi has been operating under a personal rule system that saw him as the controlling actor in the political arena. Kenyatta's actions and setting up of a system that had kept him in power for 15 years saw the informal institutionalisation of this system. When Moi came into power, he simply had to make sure that the system worked for him.

Moi's entrance into politics was in the period before decolonisation in 1963. But his self-effacing personality made him an easily ignored person (Throup 1992). When Moi became president, he did not have the automatic legitimacy that was granted to Kenyatta (since Kenyatta was the first president). Moi's political manoeuvrings have

thus tended to be very subtle so as to be almost overlooked. Nonetheless, the consolidation of his power after Kenyatta's death and his continued survival have indeed revealed him to be a shrewd politician.

Moi's first clever move was in securing for himself the vice-presidency in 1966, a move that was indeed admirable if one considers the competition for this position. He attained this position when he helped Kenyatta with the Rift Valley land question. Moi had become prominent by mobilising the Tugen (Moi is Tugen) in Southern Baringo to secure the transfer of the Lembus forest and the Essageni Salient of settler farms for Tugen settlement at the expense of the Nandi and Elgeyo. From here they continued expanding. In the 1960s, the expansion south by the Tugen overflowed into Northern Nakuru district – Kikuyu territory. This threatened conflict between the Tugen and the Kikuyu. To avoid this potential conflict, Kenyatta diverted Moi's attention to the Western parts – to Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu urban centres – which are more ethnically heterogeneous. This was also the area that the Luhyas, headed by Masinde Muliro, wanted to dominate. Nonetheless, Moi was convinced by Kenyatta that these were softer targets and it is to this area that the Tugens and other Kalenjin groups moved. In return for the acquisition of this land, Moi and other Kalenjin followers were to support Kenyatta against anti-Kikuyu elements within KADU. This split in KADU between Moi and Muliro paved the way for KADU's absorption into KANU (Throup 1992). And it was for these manoeuvrings that Moi was rewarded with the vice-presidency.

Despite various manoeuvres by the Kikuyu élite, Moi remained in this position until Kenyatta's death in 1978. The most significant of the attempts to move Moi out was

the "change the constitution movement" led by Dixon Kimani. This move aimed to prevent Moi from automatically succeeding Kenyatta in the event that the president should die. Moi survived this, through the intervention of Njonjo. In a move that Kenyatta endorsed, Njonjo released a statement that said it was treasonable to even think of the president as dead. Moi's method of retaining power was similar to that used by Kenyatta. Firstly, he ensured that he received no significant threat to his presidency and, secondly, he promoted groups of people with vested interests to act as a support base.

The most significant challenge to Moi's position as a successor to Kenyatta came from the élite who had previously supported Kenyatta. His survival was dependent upon the support of one man – Charles Njonjo. Njonjo rallied strongly behind Moi and ensured that he continued to stay in power. Indeed, in late 1978, Njonjo claimed to have "uncovered a plot" to assassinate Moi, the vice-president and himself (Currie and Ray 1984). Implicated were Dixon Kimani and his cohorts and the Rift Valley police commander. The Kikuyu, Embu, Meru association was subsequently banned. More importantly, Njonjo had established himself firmly behind Moi. It has been argued that he hoped to be next in command to the president (Currie and Ray 1978). Others argued that Njonjo saw Moi as a passing cloud and, as such, would later replace him (Karimi and Ochieng 1980). However, this claim is not easily proven. What is clear, is that Njonjo was openly behind Moi. By mid-1982, backed by both the judiciary and his political network, as well as having the confidence of the president, Njonjo was a very powerful man, presenting himself as the defender of Kenyan stability and independence (Currie and Ray 1978).

And here is where Moi showed his hand. In a move reminiscent of the purge of J M Kariuki and Tom Mboya, Moi set out to remove Njonjo. In order for Moi to have control of the political arena, it was necessary for this control to be complete and to be seen to be emanating from him and not backed by another person. Njonjo had to go. In a carefully orchestrated move, Njonjo was branded a traitor and was expelled from parliament. Individuals perceived as a threat to the system were also dealt with accordingly. Oginga Odinga and George Moseti Anyona who sought to register the Kenya Socialist Alliance (KASA), an opposition party in 1982, were detained. A motion was rushed through parliament which saw Kenya as a *de jure* party state. In a Madaraka day address to the nation on 1 June 1982, he said:

> I want to make it clear that we shall not allow a few individuals who regard themselves as revolutionaries promoting foreign ideologies to disrupt our education and training programme (Morton 1998:185).

Students and the intelligentsia were also detained in the ensuing crackdown. Leading academics included Gutto, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Willy Mutunga, Micere Mugo, Al Amin Mazrui, Mukaru Nga'nga and Katama Mkangi.

Moi now needed a support base separate from the one Kenyatta had built up. For this, Moi turned to the KANU party. Moi made KANU a mass-based party, adopting a populist and nationalist style as opposed to Kenyatta's more élitist style of governance. Moi launched a KANU recruitment drive at a time when 22,12 per cent of Kenyans over 18 were KANU members (Currie and Ray 1984).

As president of KANU, Moi had power which further increased when Kenya became a *de jure* party state, further ensuring KANU's power. For the purpose of this

discussion, KANU's growing prominence is important in that Moi was seeking to gain control. It was clear to him that former supporters of Kenyatta were too power hungry to support him. Thus, he needed to secure support from another source. This left the party, the structure to which he turned. The need for support was necessary if we bear in mind that with no support, he was not likely to survive for long. As part of propagating party ideology, *The Kenya Times,* a KANU newspaper was launched.

Moi also created his own insider group by getting rid of the old group that was loyal to Kenyatta and creating his own power base, while also appealing to the masses. He did this by distancing himself from the former "big people" in the old regime. For instance, the press no longer reported who accompanied the president on his tours (Currie and Ray 1984). Moi assured the public of a more open regime to end corruption and reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. He would abolish land buying companies that had become associated with extortion from small-scale farmers (Currie and Ray 1984).

This "open" style of Moi's was quite deceptive, however. His main interest was in recruiting the petty bourgeoisie – the middle and large-size farmers, professionals and business community. The urban and rural poor were not his target. Like Kenyatta, Moi also had to reward his bourgeoisie supporters. Unlike Kenyatta, though, he did not have vacant spaces in the civil service waiting to be filled. The Kenyan economy was only so big (and Kalenjins are not the Kikuyu) (Throup 1992). It was much harder to apportion resources for them. Thus, Moi came under a lot of criticism, most especially, but not only from the Kikuyu who were unhappy about the diversion of resources from them.

To reward his supporters, Moi had little choice but to "loot" the "looter" (Ajulu in Mutisya 1997:23). Moi targeted the parastatal sector, as well as the banking, insurance and financial sectors. In these he placed Kalenjins and their supporters. Andrew Ngumba's Rural and Urban Credit Finance bank, for instance, collapsed. Positions were granted to his cohorts. The inner cabinet consisted of Isaac Salaat (Moi's former body guard); an assistant minister in the office of the president; Aaron Kandie (a Tugen) appointed as director of personnel; Nicholas Biwott (Moi's former political secretary); Henry Kosgei; Jonathan Ng'eno; Henry Cheboiwo (Moi's henchman in Northern Baringo and a Tugen); Edward Kiptanui and Stanley Metto. In the civil service, just like Kenyatta, Moi made parastatal appointments of individuals who would support him. Thus, Taita Towett replaced Eliud Mathu as the head of Kenya Airways, Vincent arap Too of the Grain Growers Co-operative supervises the remnants of the collapsed KFA, Udi Gecaga (Kenyatta's former son-in-law) was replaced as the chairman of Lonrho (Kenya) in 1979 by Mark arap Too.

The composition of the government also changed dramatically to reflect the change of regime. While only two Kalenjins were appointed to the position of cabinet ministers (Henry Kosgei and Dr Jonathan Ng'eno), six Kalenjins were made assistant ministers: Arap Kisiero, Francis Lotodo, Stanley Kiptoo Metto, Edward Kiptanui, Charles Murgor and Isaac Salaat. Other non-Kalenjins were also rewarded in their capacity as the president's supporters. These included people like Elijah Mwangale and Moses Mudavadi, Moi's brother-in-law.

Through a series of carrot and stick measures, we have seen, Moi retain control over the socio-political arena. This has not been easy, since it has necessitated his

antagonising other groups. For this reason, his control has been precarious. For the purpose of our argument, it has only proven that for continued civilian control it is necessary that the socio-political arena is stable. If this is not the case, then civilian control is harder. Though precarious, Moi has continued to stay in control.

CONTROL OF LABOUR

Since independence, it has been evident that a real threat to state control has been labour or rather labour's ability to organise around trade unions and form united opposition. Indeed, as a potential power base, the section of labour which is unionisable, can be a real threat if unhappy. Considering that resources are limited, labour is under real threat of cut-backs or lay-offs. This makes them ever volatile and the need to control labour more pressing. Trade unions are also a potential power base and, as such, the government in both the Moi regime and the Kenyatta regime has taken steps to neutralise them. Tamarkin (1978:308) explains that:

> In developing countries not endowed with organisational structures, and leadership cadres, trade unions could indeed become formidable power bases. In addition to this trade unions deal with vital existential interests which could turn the trade movements into a highly effective agency for political mobilisation.

Unionisation began with Asian construction workers under the leadership of Markhan Singh, expanding to African unionisation by 1950. Trade unions in Kenya operated under very restrictive colonial laws. In the period after independence, these unions operated under a political-legal framework, which was still restrictive (Chege 1987). Under the guidance of Tom Mboya, the minister of Labour at the time, steps were taken to curtail labour's activities and power. Chege (1987) outlines three major steps.

The first step was the creation of a single trade union federation subservient to what Mboya and the capitalist-minded wing of the ruling party (KANU) saw as the appropriate development path (Chege 1987). The two parties were Mboya's Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) and the Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC) led by Dennis Akumu and Ochola Mak' Anyango, both in the socialist wing of the party. The two parties were divided ideologically. Mboya's school (supported by Kenyatta) advocated a development policy favouring rapid economic growth within a market framework and with a labour movement causing minimum disruption, while the other party (KAWC) sought immediate and tangible gains for labour and greater state ownership of productive enterprises (Chege 1987). A war of words between the two parties culminated in the dissolution of both parties and the formation of a government controlled Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). It would represent all unions in industry.

While all officers of the registered trade unions could vote for the COTU executive, the president of the republic was given the right to appoint the three top COTU executives from the list of poll winners. Further reforms in 1965 saw the "disallowance" of trade unions' affiliation to international labour unions.

The second aspect of state control over labour activities consisted of a series of "tripartite agreements". Unemployment had been temporarily eased by the so-called tripartite agreements adopted in February 1964 proposed by Labour minister Tom Mboya. Under this agreement, all private employers would increase their work force by 10 per cent and central and local government by 15 per cent. In addition to this, workers accepted a twelve month wage standstill and a ban on strikes. Under this

agreement, 40,000 jobs were created. In doing this, the government was hoping to stop the squatter problem that was becoming a threat to stability by the unemployed roaming around the Rift Valley (Leys 1975:232). In 1970, another tripartite agreement was signed. This one was modelled after the first one in 1964-5. This agreement was implemented differently in that Form Four school leavers were registered separately and all were placed in jobs. Through these agreements, the government has contained the tension between the educated class and foreign capital by ensuring that the former were given jobs.

The third aspect of control was the no strike clause, enacted in 1965. This took the form of the 1965 *Trade Disputes Act*. Like the colonial labour laws, this act forbade strikes of the essential services, as well as sympathy strikes. Resolution of grievances by unions was done through the minister of Labour where, should he not act, the matter was taken to the industrial court. Non-essential services were also limited in the articulation of their grievances. Here again the minister of Labour plays a dominant role. He is empowered to appoint a "board of enquiry" to investigate the reasons for the industrial dispute and to recommend disputes for reconciliation to the industrial court. The minister has the power to declare strikes and threatened work stoppages illegal until the full arbitration mechanism is exhausted (Leys 1975).

Through the industrial court, government control has been total. The court is presided over by a judge appointed from the ranks of the judiciary. The minister of Labour nominates two appointees, one from the labour movement and the other from the employer's side.

Thus, trade unions have not offered a very secure political base which could be used against the government. Tamarkin (1978) argues that this contributes to their inability to form an organised party to the loose organisation of the trade union movement. Further fragmentation is brought about by the patron-client relationships at the centre, and tribal rivalries add further to this disunity. These structures put in place during Kenyatta's rule have prevailed even after his death. Like Kenyatta, Moi has kept a tight grip over labour. In opening the Tom Mboya college in Kisumu in 1983, he said:

> ... It would be counter productive if this college were to be used as a centre for training in foreign ideologies. There would be no point in placing emphasis here on the traditional militant demands of trade unions ... wage increase can only be earned and justified by a rise in productivity ... (in Currie and Ray 1984:585).

By this control, both the presidents have ensured non-opposition and ultimately civilian control over the military.

CONCLUSION

Coup literature maintains that the socio-political atmosphere in a country is a contributing factor in military intervention (Luckham 1988). For this reason it has been argued in this chapter that, for effective civilian control, the government should ensure that it has secured control over the socio-political arena.

In the case of Kenya, it was seen that a personal rule system prevails. Because of this system, the president has been able to have a strong influence in the socio-political arena. The socio-economic context against which this kind of politics takes place was then examined. The key idea was to highlight the fragmented nature of

Kenya's civil society, where we saw the emergence and maintenance of groups who have different interests. Into this debate the tribal factor was introduced to show that it too plays a role in creating the fragmentation of society.

It was then argued that both Kenyatta and Moi have used different groups to act as their support base, rewarding them for their support. This reward has been in the form of positions in the civil service and parastatals, as well as government protection of their interests. In the face of opposition, both presidents have been very forceful in putting it down, suppressing personalities and party politics (in the case of Kenyatta).

Finally, both presidents identified labour as the group most likely to oppose them successfully. Through a series of agreements, labour has been emasculated so that it has not been able to organise opposition. By effecting control over the socio-political arena, the government has indirectly maintained control over the military.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION – THE PRECARIOUS CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN KENYA

INTRODUCTION

The government of Kenya has managed to hold its military under control. This hold has been precarious though, and only time will tell for how long it will last.

CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

In the period following independence, African leaders had to contend with the knowledge that their greatest threat was from within, the military. Various reasons where given for this trend by political scientists. Most attribute military *coups d'état* to the nature and weakness of the new African states.

Scholars like Zolberg (1968) explained that structures like the administration and communication network were very weak. Demands on these governments to provide goods and services were very high. Failure to meet these resulted in the governments losing legitimacy in the society. Into this "power vacuum" stepped the military.

Scholars are deeply divided over the reasons why the military steps in.[10] The first group of scholars argued that the military stepped in because they genuinely felt that they could run the country, and that the military saw themselves as modernisers. The second group of scholars countered this, saying that when the military intervened, they did so out of greed, and they saw the acquisition of power as a means to the end of acquiring wealth.

These scholars agreed that this trend which started in the 1960s would continue and that most African countries would experience military takeovers. What Zolberg and these other *coup* theorists did not explain, was why some countries with similar social and political backgrounds as the *coup* states did not undergo a military *coup d'état*. Could it be that in these non-*coup* states the leaders of government had implemented a system which kept their militaries at bay? This is the question that this thesis set out to answer.

The case study undertaken, was that of Kenya as it had experienced two attempted threats of overthrow from the military, but still the government emerged the winner. In fact, in the case of 1982, it is the military (army) which put down the attempted *coup* and handed power back to the government.

A literature review of scholars' work on the subject revealed that it has received scant attention. Indeed, even less attention has been paid to the question of civilian control of the military in Kenya specifically. Hence, the relevance of this thesis was highlighted. The argument was further made that these scholars have tended to

[10] Luckham (1988) gives a very good analysis of these factors and the reader is referred to this as further reading.

agree that, for sustained civilian control, it was necessary for the government to impact upon the military and manoeuvre the forces such that they (the forces) would not rebel. Other scholars argued that sustained civilian control was dependent on how the leaders in government had control over the soci0-political arena. This thesis argued that government actions in both the military and social political arena where necessary if one was to understand civilian control of the military in Kenya.

An assessment of the Kenyan military revealed that, from its colonial days, this military has been highly political. This was especially seen in the manner of recruitment that was done based on the docility of the ethnic group. The colonialists sought to achieve obedience based on ethnicity as opposed to attaining obedience by training the officers. When the Kenyatta government took over, the recruitment of officers based on ethnic groups was seen to continue. Assuming that his own fellow Kikuyu would be more loyal to him, he recruited these heavily but not predominately into the military. Moi, taking his cue from Kenyatta, proceeded to recruit Kalenjins into the military.

Apart from the military the general service unit (GSU), a para-military force, was set up. These would be sent when a show of force heavier than that of the police was called for. Like the military, the GSU was heavily dominated by Kikuyus and Kalenjins, respectively, during the Kenyatta and Moi eras.

The Kenyan government has also maintained close ties with Western powers whose presence has helped to buttress their power. Kenyatta relied on the British, while Moi allowed the United States to set up a military base in Mombasa. The presence of

these foreign powers was and is a silent message to the military that they will not get far if they think of overthrowing the government. Apart from this, the government has tried to coax the military into submission by offering them benefits such as cheap housing, good salaries and cheaper shopping facilities.

Under the constitution, the military has also been rendered subordinate to the government where, the president of the day is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Within the government, the military is placed under the Ministry of Defence. These measures are concrete indications for the military that it is indeed subordinate to the civilian government.

Finally, it was seen that the separation of the military force as a political institution from the rest of civil society has contributed to the subordination of the military. The military is not included in political debates and for the most part is ignored. Even within civil society the military is not addressed or invited to join debates. The military's points of operation (to keep away Somali raiders) have also been a contributing factor towards the military being excluded from the civil arena. This exclusion from civil affairs has been important in that the military has not thought to intervene in government. Where they have done so, a section of the military has discouraged them, treating them as misguided individuals.

Kenya's socio-political context was then examined. The underlying argument was that certain socio-political situations allow the military to intervene or take over.
The nature of politics in Kenya is heavily dependent on the person of the president, Ultimately, he controls the socio-political and economic arena. The implications for

this are that he will not allow the socio-political situation to be such that the military may be invited to take over.

Through a series of carrot and stick measures, both Kenyatta and Moi rewarded supporters and chastised opponents to maintain control. Labour has also been heavily limited to stop their opposition. In this way, the government has managed ultimately to control its military.

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED CIVILIAN CONTROL

The government's continued use of subjective means to control the military, as opposed to using professional means, has contributed greatly to the precariousness of this balance. In view of this, the question is what the possibility is that the military is well on the way of being professionalised and, as such, will no longer pose a threat to the government. This question would have demanded an immediate yes. However, the 1982 *coup* attempt raises some doubts. The question can perhaps be safely answered by saying that the longer the military stays out of politics, the less their chance becomes to intervene. Just as it might be said that once they have intervened, and the longer they stay in power, the harder it is to push them out (as Nigerians have found out).

It can be further said that, in Kenya, where change in government has been carried out democratically by elections (however controversial), this may be seen as the legitimate means of government and not overthrow of government, thus decreasing the possibility that the armed forces might interfere.

This thesis has merely explained how control has thus far been maintained in Kenya. It must be borne in mind, however, that the process has not been smooth. The future, like all things political, is not easily predictable.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As has been evident to the reader, this thesis is heavily reliant upon secondary data. Due to limitations of time and space, the thesis could not include the results of interviews.

Thus, further research should be aimed at this source. Interviews should be carried out with military officers to get their perspective on a civilian government's control over them. The researcher should be warned, however, that the military in Kenya, like in most countries, is a highly sensitive security matter and, for this reason, the research should be approached with caution.

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The author discusses the various ways in which the literature has discussed maintenance of civilian control. In developed countries this is secured by the professionalisation of the military and by constitutional means. But in Kenya there is greater overlap between civilian and military spheres - so there is need for a series of interventions by the civilian government to maintain its hegemony: including Ascriptive manipulation (use of ethnicity) - author offers interesting analysis in the Kenyan case. Plus use of foreign patrons and pay offs, plus other means, notably setting up the GSU v the army.

Ch3 examines the nature of civilian politics in Kenya. It offers a competent and interesting discussion of the diverse ways in which Kenyatta then Moi have maintained their rule. It is a sensible review touching upon most features, and stressing the different methods utilised by the two presidents. The key point that is argued is that the presidents *have* secured civilian bases and hence control over the socio-political arena, supplemented by direct controls over potential competitor sites of power (such as trade unions).

The conclusion is a decent summary of the argument - but stressing that civilian control remains fragile.

The thesis is based entirely upon secondary literature which is acceptable at this level. But importantly it demonstrates that the student is capable of going beyond this point.

However, there are quite a number of typographical problems that need correction.

P1. Available, not obtainable.
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6. Constraints.
7. L4. Checks the application
7. Middle paragraph on presidential rule is a grammatical muddle.
Last para: what is Cupertino?
8. Para3, l.2. It defines...
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Last para: not ensured, but a govt. has attempted to ensure....
12. Para2. Close caps after wrangling. I would say KADU was absorbed!
13. Middle para. Fallacious in that.....
17. What vast Germany territory was conquered during the 2nd WW?
18. Para 2. Indians, not Indian's
18. Para 3. Sentence beginnning "the fact that' is a muddle. ~~not corrected.~~ correct the whole para
19. Para 3. British, not the British soldiers. Were likely, not where likely. not corrected.
21. Comma after army. not corrected
22. Subheading DEFINITION
Army, not armed forces
23. Do you mean 19th Century Europe by 1900 Europe?
30. Foregone
Para3: comma after countries
31. What is Moscos? not explained.
32. Para2 The shooting...
3. It is possible...
1 own, not won
33 Africa Watch President Moi ?? not corrected. ?

36. First para is a grammatical muddle
39. Bottom line military as a defender.... invasion has risen....
42. In the event of a military coup
43. Welch...
Enabled him to extend
48. This colonial elite
53. Leaving, not living.
54. New sentence after case.
65. Parastatal; and not sand; Urban

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Roger Southall,
Department of Political Studies,
Rhodes University.

2.00