

**Right-wing populism in the European Union and the rise of Germany's
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Hungary's *Jobbik*.**



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BLHSAS001

A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Social Sciences in International Relations.

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2019

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the socio-political conditions that gave rise to right-wing populism (RWP) in Germany and Hungary. It ascertains reasons for increasing right-wing populist attitudes in these two countries by tracing the emergence of the German *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) and the Hungarian *Movement for a better Hungary* (Jobbik). The choice to compare these parties was influenced by considerations relating to their roles as main opposition parties in their respective countries' parliaments as well as the fact that they were catapulted to political prominence as right-wing populist parties in the aftermath of the refugee crisis of 2015. Examining the causes for the increase of RWP across Europe is indispensable for purposes of understanding the everchanging political landscape of the *European Union* (EU) and the continued threat RWP poses to liberal democratic values in that region. Furthermore, it is necessary to comprehend the undercurrents besetting the two societies' social fabrics and political nomenclatures as well as their roles in precipitating right-wing populist movements that have gone on to dominate their respective polities.

To unearth the circumstances behind the rise of RWP as a political phenomenon, the *Most Different Systems Design* will be utilized to identify factors which account for the success of the AfD and Jobbik in their respective countries. To carry out this task both the *Cultural Backlash Thesis* (CBT) and the *Economic Insecurity Perspective* (EIP) are employed as theoretical nodal points to ascertain each of the two countries' unique set of socio-political and socioeconomic circumstances that propelled right-wing parties to political prominence.

This thesis argues that both the CBT and EIP have been at the centre of why right-wing populism has been on the rise in the EU in recent times. Accounting for the exponential rise of Jobbik and the AfD is the exploitation of growing nationalist sentiments by both parties fuelled by fear of the loss of traditional norms and values since the refugee crisis. By focusing on traditional values and their countries' cultural identities, the two right-wing populist parties inadvertently exclude minority groups on a continued basis. Furthermore, this study claims that while cultural discontents account for the rise of both parties, economic grievances are only applicable in Jobbik's case alone. This is due to the fact that Germany suffers from less economic difficulties as EU's strongest economy, whereas Hungary's own has been performing below par, which has been aggravated by high levels of corruption in the public sector. Hence, Jobbik's rise has been aided by economic and cultural frustrations as a result of the so-called foreign infiltration whereas the AfD's is attributed to growing cultural and nationalist grievances gaining a foothold in Germany.

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List of acronyms

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
APP	Austrian People's Party
CBT	Cultural Backlash Thesis
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSU	Christian Social Union
DC	Democratic Coalition
EEC	European Economic Community
EIP	Economic Insecurity Perspective
EPE	European Parliamentary Elections
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
Fidesz	Hungarian Civic Alliance
FN	Front National
FPA	Freedom Party of Austria
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GMM	Grievance Mobilization Models
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom
IS	Islamic State
Jobbik	Movement for a better Hungary
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Community
LMP	Politics Can Be Different
LWP	Left-wing populism
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
MNOÖ	National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Design
MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP	National Democratic Party of Germany
PiS	Law and Justice
PVV	Party for Freedom
RWP	Right-wing populism
RWPP	Right-wing populist party
SD	Sweden Democrats
SJI	Social Justice Index
SPD	Social Democratic Party
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

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Chapter I

Unearthing the circumstances behind the rise of right-wing populism in Germany and Hungary

1.1 Introduction

As a result of the rise and spread of right-wing populist movements, Europe has experienced a political upheaval in recent years. According to Vehrkamp & Merkel (2018), this development does not only pose a threat to the political stability of the European Union (EU), it also constitutes an existential danger to the organisation's liberal democracy. Although the rise of right-wing populism (RWP) is not a new phenomenon since it already entered the public discourse in the mid-1980s, its evolution has reached a new high in recent years. For the first time in the EU's history, a right-wing populist party (RWPP) came into power in 2000 when the *Freedom Party of Austria* (FPA) built a coalition with the *Austrian People's Party* (APP) after becoming the second strongest party in Austria's national elections in the previous year. Regarded as exceptionally scandalous by many political pundits, RWP was soon classified as potentially harmful for the stability of social cohesion and political steadiness in the EU (Fallend, Habersack & Heinisch, 2018; Laczynski, 2017).

In 2014, European RWP reached its height at the *European Parliamentary Elections* (EPE) where RWPPs achieved record results for the first time since they came to vogue (Hillebrand, 2015). In both national and international elections, the parties were able to double their share of votes within the past 50 years. At the same time, they managed to triple their share of seats. Populist leaders of these parties were able to successfully challenge mainstream parties and to alter the direction of political competition in the EU. Even in states with a limited amount of populist representatives in the parliament, RWPPs have the potential to put pressure on the ruling elite, policy agendas and public discourse. In the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, the *United Kingdom Independence Party* (UKIP) was able to generate public support for the country to leave the EU. Consequently, a referendum took place in 2016 that resulted in favour of the *Brexit* (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Besides, RWPPs also gained on popularity in countries such as Italy (*Lega*) and Sweden (*Sweden Democrats* (SD)) (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018).

RWPPs pose a significant danger to the current democratic order and the freedom of speech (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2017). Due to their emphasis on nationalism and politico-

economic isolation, they have the potential to severely impact the political stability of states and the quality of their international relations (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). RWPPs manipulate political debates and influence public discourse in their favour by spreading prejudices, breaking taboos, using emotionally-charged and provocative language, to mention but a few. Thus, they tend to cause divisions in the society and intensify the chances for conflict (Hartleb, 2017). Furthermore, RWPPs tend to discriminate against minorities that fall outside the mainstream of societies, for instance, Muslims and refugees. (Müller, 2016). Next to that, the rise of RWP can also lead to the decline of economic growth rates (Eckert & Zschäpitz, 2016). According to the *European Central Bank*, the increasing popularity of right-wing movements may result in the delay of important finance and structural reforms. Hence, the stability of the financial market and the *Eurozone* are at risk (Eckert & Zschäpitz, 2016).

Despite the potential dangers RWP poses to liberal democracy, previous research lacks cross-national comparative analyses ascertaining its causes in the EU. Due to the increasing success and persistence of European RWPPs, it is indispensable to examine the reasons for their popularity. In this regard, this thesis compares the German RWPP *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) with the Hungarian party *Movement for a better Hungary* (Jobbik). It is important to investigate the structural and foundational underpinnings the two RWPPs share to identify the key common denominator responsible for their rise and popularity.

1.2 Problem statement

RWP is a pan-European phenomenon that affects the entire EU. Impacted by various crises and political upheavals which confronted the EU in recent years, the public discourse shifted to the political right allowing for the increasing success of RWPPs. Despite the vast amount of literature looking at RWP and its causes, reasons for its popularity across Europe remain unclear. Research does not only lack a focus on specific RWPPs and former communist countries, it also lacks a comparative analysis between the West and East. This has proven problematic as these countries differ in terms of their historical and cultural backgrounds. A comparison between right-wing populist movements of different societal and political contexts is indispensable to comprehend the parties' unifying origins and the changes in the social nomenclature that gave rise to them.

Germany, one of the EU's founding members and most powerful nations, was considered immune to RWP until the formation of the AfD in 2013. Nevertheless, the party quickly gained on popularity and became the country's main opposition party in 2017 (Bax,

2018) In contrast to that, Hungary, that merely joined the EU in 2004, is governed by the RWPP *Hungarian Civic Alliance* (Fidesz) since 2010 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018a). Even though Hungary is ruled by a RWPP for around nine years, Jobbik, a party more radical than Fidesz, is gaining on public support. As the AfD in Germany, it is the country's main opposition party. Thus, RWP is deeply ingrained in the social and political fabrics of Hungary whereas it is regarded as new phenomenon in Germany.

Although the two nations are impacted by different historical, cultural and economic circumstances, they are both confronted with the rising success of RWP and its societal consequences. Since RWP poses a sincere threat to liberal democracy by undermining libertarian ideals of equality, freedom of choice, social cohesion and economic development, this thesis intends to investigate the underlying reasons for its success.

1.3 Aim and significance of the thesis

Rising RWP poses a danger to liberal democracies and economic progress. To identify the sources of its increasing popularity across the EU is relevant to avoid both interstate as well as intrastate socio-political and politico-economic tensions. Since the research field of European RWP lacks a systematic comparative analysis that focuses on its causes, it is important to analyse the unifying reasons for its success in the EU. To examine the complexities of the issue and to investigate its origins, it is inevitable to compare different RWPPs and the social as well as economic conditions that have propelled them. At this juncture, countries from Eastern and Western Europe need to be analysed to identify patterns that apply to all EU member states. Since Germany differs significantly from Hungary regarding its historical, cultural and political background, RWPPs of both countries are selected for purposes of drawing parallels. Comparing the main opposition parties of the two countries, the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik, assists in identifying common factors that account for the success of RWP across Europe. This is indispensable to understand its spread and to highlight the potential consequences on social cohesion in the two societies. It assists in unearthing the circumstances behind the rise of RWP and in describing the extent to which cultural and economic considerations impact right-wing populist attitudes.

The political context of RWP will be examined by focusing on current trends regarding right-wing attitudes, changes in the social fabric and non-partisan ideological orientations. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to consider the causes that underpin the rise and spread of RWP in Germany and Hungary.

1.4 Research question(s)

The objective of this thesis is to answer the following main research question:

1. *What accounts for the rise of right-wing populist parties in Germany and Hungary?*

To narrow down the scope of this thesis, the main research question is subdivided into two sub-research questions. This is necessary to further comprehend the popularity of RWP in Germany and Hungary and to understand how the rise of the AfD and Jobbik impacts the social fabric and political customs of these two societies.

2. *What explains the popularity of the AfD and Jobbik within in the wider body politic in Germany and Hungary?*
3. *To what extent is the rise of the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik a result of cultural and economic discontentment?*

1.5 Hypothesis

This thesis argues that both cultural and economic aspects affect the rise of the AfD and Jobbik at varying degrees. Whilst cultural and economic cleavages account for the Hungarian case, anti-immigrant reverberations (and less so economic grievances) apply for Germany. Hence, cultural concerns resulting from the fear of foreign infiltration, which was exacerbated by the refugee crisis in 2015, and the anxiety of losing traditional values are affecting the voting behaviour of both the German and Hungarian electorate. By directly addressing cultural deprivations in their policy statements, the AfD and Jobbik were able to gain political popularity in their respective societies. In addition, also economic factors have the potential to determine the popularity of RWPPs. Whilst Germany possesses the EU's biggest economy and a strong labour market, Hungary struggles under a weak economic performance that is impaired with a high corruption rate and social injustices. On this account, economic grievances are wide-spread across the Hungarian population which is why Jobbik's policies, in contrast to the AfD's, focus on economic aspects in the same way as on cultural grievances. Hence, this thesis argues that both economic and cultural deprivations are decisive for Jobbik's popularity whereas cultural concerns determine the AfD's success. To conclude, both the *Cultural*

Backlash Thesis (CBT) and the *Economic Insecurity Perspective* (EIP) can account for the rising popularity of RWP across the EU.

1.6 Conceptualizing right-wing populism

To examine the rising popularity of the AfD and Jobbik it is essential to conceptualize and define the meaning of populism, RWP in particular, as it appears in the EU. The term *populism* derives from the Latin word *populus* which means nation or population (Hartleb, 2017). From an ideological perspective, populism refers to a set of ideas that dovetail with traditional notions of democracy (of greater societal participation in decision making processes), its methods and procedures (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). It is a thin ideology which regards the “society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the positively characterized ‘virtuous people’ versus the negatively connoted ‘corrupt elite’, and which postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people” (Manucci & Weber, 2017: 314). Thus, populism operates vertical by standing in opposition to the ruling class and horizontal by segregating itself from other groups. Populists claim to know and to represent the will of the people (Hartleb, 2017). Their ideology is based on a romantic transfiguration of society. A mythos which consists of fiction rather than facts. Its counterfactual assumption is that the society is a homogenous construction which acts ethically (Hillje, 2017).

Populism as ideology is never only anti-educational or opportunistic. It articulates an unease regarding the actual societal condition which can be based on legitimate reasons. Hence, by its existence, it provokes political consequences and adjustment reactions (Decker, 2004). On this account, populism consists of three dimensions: anti-establishment, pro-sovereignty of the people and anti-pluralism (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). It is characterized by the regress to common sense arguments, the fondness for radical and simple solutions for complicated problems as well as by conspiracy theories and enemy concepts. Furthermore, it is provocative and emotional, utilizes biologicistic and violent metaphors, and creates subjective fears (Decker, 2004).

Due to its distinguishing orientation, populism needs to be subdivided into *left-wing populism* (LWP) and *right-wing populism* (RWP). LWP aims to increase the economic participation of deprived population strata and welcomes everyone who shares its point of view. It approaches the elite in the name of disenfranchised groups to achieve social equality. RWP, on the other hand, excludes people who fall outside the mainstream of society. It claims to represent the interests of the efficient native society by accusing the ruling elite to prioritize

minority groups. Minorities can be different assemblies, for example, immigrants, refugees or religious groups. Hence, while LWP is inclusive, RWP is exclusive (Bax, 2018). Due to its wide scope, RWP needs to be narrowed down in temporal, regional and material respect (Decker, 2004).

This thesis focuses on the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik, the main opposition parties in their respective countries. Both do not only exclude minority groups but also stress nationalist stances. Hence, their policy statements correspond with the given definition.

1.7 The European Union

After World War II, Europe found itself in an exceptional historical situation which was characterized by the political and economic demise of the European states, the lack of interstate relations and the uprising hostility towards the Soviet Union (Weidenfeld, 2013). To secure freedom and to avoid the resurrection of nationalism, which was regarded as one of the major causes of conflict, the *European Coal and Steel Community* was established in 1950 by Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. It served as the precursor for the *European Economic Community* (EEC) which is based on the *Treaty of Rome* and facilitated a shared trade market. The EEC was soon joined by Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Subsequently, the *Single European Act* was developed in 1986 to enable free trade across European borders. It later culminated in the creation of a single market. With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, not only was Germany reunified but most European countries began to cooperate closely (European Union, 2019a).

Against this backdrop, the head of governments of the twelve EEC member states established the *Maastricht Treaty* which came into effect in 1993. The treaty represents the foundation of the EU. It is based on three pillars: the European community, judicial coalition, and a common foreign and security policy (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Currently the EU consists of 28 member states which include the UK. Its main objective is the preservation and promotion of peace and security as well as the elimination of discriminatory trade patterns. It was created with the express aim to promote political governance in Europe. Furthermore, the EU supports both globalization and modern technology. It established a monetary and economic union that fosters the Euro as currency. The EU's values comprise equality, human rights and dignity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law (European Union, 2019b). Although all member states cooperate with each other and have codified their national laws under European law, they maintain full sovereignty over their respective territories (Weidenfeld, 2013).

1.8 Literature review on the rise of right-wing populism in the European Union

As stated before, RWPPs have been on the rise since the 1980s. First regarded as short-term protest phenomenon, the parties have proven endurance and modified the political landscape of the EU. To gain an overview of the research field, a comprehensive literature review is necessary. It assists in illustrating and evaluating available information about the subject under investigation. The literature review aims to analyse and compare previous studies. At this juncture, it pays attention to existing knowledge about the rise and causes of RWP in the EU and Germany and Hungary in particular.

1.8.1 Literature on economic impacts regarding the rise of right-wing populism in Europe

In his account for the causes of RWP, Petersen (2018) places great importance on economic considerations such as globalization, cross-border movements of goods and services, as well as the transfer of technological advancement. He claims that unemployment and economic uncertainty significantly impact the election behaviour of affected people. By analysing 220 regions in 26 European countries between 2000 and 2017, the scholar identified that an increasing unemployment rate is directly associated with the rise of RWP and a decreased faith in democratic institutions. Furthermore, he investigated that economic deprivation causes RWP. Due to the growing worldwide interconnectedness and new means of technology, both the production factors and the exchange of products modified. To stay competitive, companies must reduce their manufacturing costs by, for instance, replacing employees with machines or relocating to low-income countries. Thus, employees who are affected by the consequences of globalisation turn to RWPPs to secure their prosperity.

Also, Cuperus (2015) investigated that European RWP is a revolt of human beings who feel uncared for. From his perspective, it is not a movement of the poor, but a phenomenon driven by the lower middle-class who feels economically pressurized by globalization. He claims that European RWP originates from socio-economic fears. Since internationalisation is regarded as a threat for employment security, people begin to strive for political alternatives to safeguard their economic interests. Next to that, the scholar examined that mainstream parties directly contribute to the rise of RWP since they are no longer considered as able to guarantee

economic security. Against this backdrop, the lower middle-class feels politically alienated which is why it turns to anti-establishment parties which operate as representative of the nation.

In the same vein, Kuleba and Mühlhausen (2015) argue that a confluence of factors have contributed to the rise of European RWP. Similar to the other scholars in this field, the researchers found that RWP gained on popularity because of globalization and its associated consequences. In the EU, the financial crisis of 2008 played a significant role since it revealed the global speculation culture, corruption and social injustices to the public. Hence, people began to be weary of political elites. Not only did established parties lose the trust of their supporters, the concept of democracy also began to be questioned by the populace. To make matters worse, the mainstream parties lived in denial without understanding the seriousness of the situation which is why RWPPs were able to exploit existing economic grievances. By portraying both globalization and the ruling elite as guilty for newly developed discontents, they became attractive for civilians.

In addition, Wehr (2015) asserts that the EU itself exacerbated the financial crisis. Due to the organisation's comprehensive body of legislation, its member states are not only compelled to subordinate their national laws under European law, their coalition is also impacted by interstate competition because the EU is lacking clear leadership. Besides, Wehr (2015) argues that the civilian population regards the Eastern European expansion of the EU, which began in 2004, as critical. For the first time in the organisation's history, economically weak countries joined. Consequently, incomprehension on the part of the Western society and a desire for more nationalism developed. Thus, RWPPs became attractive because they portrayed themselves as the people's representatives that address their economic needs and concerns.

1.8.2 Literature on the influence of cultural grievances regarding the spread of right-wing populism in Europe

The assumption that the financial crisis of 2008 accelerated the success of European RWPPs is shared by Busch, Bischoff and Funke (2018). They argue that in the course of the worldwide economic crisis, that affected the entire EU, economic and social inequalities both between and within the member states led to an increased political instability. According to them, the following *Euro Crisis* is considered as a crisis of European solidarity since it made the Eurozone appear as a fragile political construct. However, the scholars claim that the scepticism towards political regimes also significantly increased with the refugee crisis in 2015. Unable

to find a solution to which all EU states agreed to, the refugee crisis developed into a European crisis of humanitarianism and morality. Thus, the authors say that the interplay of the crises of previous years accelerated the economic and social destabilisation of the European society. The EU seems unable to deal with the aberration, disappointment and uncertainty of the civic population. Its politicians fail to understand the needs of the society and to develop sustainable solutions to current issues. Hence, people began to plead for a political turn which is why anti-establishment parties gained on power.

Next to that, Bax (2018) identified a cultural split across the EU which divides rich countries in the West, for instance Germany and Sweden, from their poorer counterparts in the East, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary. While cultural diversity is considered as enriching in Western Europe, it is regarded as existential threat for the labour market and social state in the East. In accordance with Bax's (2018) research, RWP adheres to an ethnic homogenous illusion which defines identity in terms of religion and nationalism in the East. Although, for example, Roma are a long-established ethnic minority group in Eastern Europe, they are not socially tolerated. Discrimination and exclusion are the norm. In opposition to that, Western RWPPs are more antipathic towards Muslims because they are considered as a security danger. Immigrants, who are not of the Islamic faith, are regarded as beneficial if they strengthen the local labour market and adapt Europe's cultural identity. Furthermore, due to historical events, open antisemitism is avoided in the West. While Judaism is still regarded as critical in the East, Western RWPPs trivialize the holocaust and try to attract Jews by demonstrating solidarity with Israel.

In contrast to the other researchers, Muis and Immerzeel (2017) argue that both economic and cultural discontentment fosters the rise of RWP. According to their research, European RWP is based on the demand-side as well as supply-side of RWPPs: While the first focuses on the grievances of the population, the latter is directed towards political confinements and opportunities. With the aid of a literature review, the scholars investigated that the two approaches are complementing each other which is why the success of RWPPs is related to their ability to address both sides. Hence, Muis and Immerzeel (2017: 912) claim that the rise of RWP is related to societal discrepancies whereat the "protest is not 'unideological', but clearly directed against policies concerning immigration, integration and law and order". In compliance with their findings, supporters of anti-establishment parties are often lacking political preferences and values. They are regarded as alienated and non-rational (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Also Laczynski (2017) claims that both economic and cultural grievances foster RWP. In regard to his research, the success of RWPPs depends on their ability to revolt against the ruling elite, to represent themselves as ambassadors of the society and to utilize existing fears. At this juncture, he asserts that especially the application of fear is decisive since it motivates people to advocate for a political turn. Because RWPPs are considered as representatives of the population that address existing issues, they emphasize available fears in their favour. According to Laczynski's (2017) findings, right-wing populists base their political agenda on four types of fears: The fear of elites who merely focus on their own welfare and for that matter forget about the needs of the people. The fear of refugees who portray a danger to national identities and the security sector. The fear of a decreasing living standard due to globalization. And the fear of modernity that endangers the social order and therewith traditional norms. Hence, anti-establishment parties are successful because they directly capture and approach the anxieties of the population.

1.8.3 Literature on the increasing popularity of the German party *Alternative für Deutschland*

Despite a widespread expansion in the whole of Europe, RWP has not gained a foothold in Germany until the national elections in 2017. According to Bax (2018), populist movements are not accepted amid the majority of the population since they tend to discriminate specific groups of people. Due to the country's past and experience under Adolf Hitler that led to the demise of its first democracy, RWP is regarded as divisive. With the foundation of the AfD, however, a political party established which, for the first time since the 1950s, released political space to the *Christian Democratic Union's* (CDU) right.

In compliance with Lees' (2018) research, the AfD's nationwide success in 2017 portrays a significant change in the German party system. Since the RWPP became Germany's main opposition party, it is not only able to influence the daily tasks of the government in its favour, but also disrupts its centripetal and stable polity. The scholar argues that the AfD's popularity is based on its distinct political message that criticises the country's society that supports "the redistribution of power resources across the political system" Lees (2018: 297). Furthermore, Lees (2018) claims that the AfD was able to increase its support by creating a division between the ruling elite and the nation and by excluding minority groups such as Muslims. Hence, it exploited the society's disenchantment with politics which resulted from previous crises that hit the EU: Although "the Euro crisis provided the initial mobilizing

impetus for the AfD's development, [...] it was the migrant crisis of 2015 that drove its radicalization" and made its rising popularity possible (Lees, 2018: 307).

Even though Klein, Heckert and Peper (2018) agree with Lees (2018) that the refugee crisis determined the increasing success of the AfD, the researchers investigated that also the foundation background of the party is decisive. According to their study, the AfD differs from other German right-wing parties insofar as it was founded as *laissez-fair* party. Thus, due to its former civic stance, it is regarded as more respectable than other right-wing parties. Against this backdrop, it was able to not only attract support from people of the political right, but also from people of the political centre and left. Moreover, the scholars argue that Angela Merkel is responsible for the AfD's rising popularity as well. Their findings show that Merkel's asylum and open-border policies directly contributed the party's nationalist stance. By criticising the government's welcome culture, the AfD was able to address the anxieties of Germans who fear the loss of traditional customs and values.

To conclude, Klein, Heckert and Peper (2018) as well as Lees (2018) claim that the refugee crisis of 2015 was decisive for the AfD's increasing popularity. Furthermore, they state that the party's former economic stance sustainably impacted its appearance which is why its support base, in contrast to other German right-wing parties, is constantly expanding. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned research does not clarify to what extent cultural and economic discontents directly impact the increasing popularity of RWP in Germany. The exact reasons for the AfD's political prominence are unclear.

1.8.4 Literature on right-wing populism in Hungary and the success of Jobbik

According to Becker (2010), Hungary's political system sustainably changed in 2010 when, for the first time since the end of communism in 1989, a RWPP gained a two-third majority in the national elections. With the aid of street politics, the conservative party Fidesz was able to address the political grievances of the population. Its success was based on both the financial crisis and national sentiments. In compliance with Becker (2010: 29), "a concern over the social decline of the Hungarian middle and lower classes" paved "the way for the rise of the populist right". Next to that, due to the increase of cultural grievances against minority groups like, for instance, Roma, the right-wing Jobbik gained on popularity as well. In virtue of the scholar's results, the party is most successful in regions with high Roma populations which indicates that its popularity also results from cultural grievances and antipathies towards minority groups.

Jobbik is considered as radical branch of the ruling party Fidesz whose success is based on both socio-economic discontents and cultural concerns (Becker, 2010).

Kim (2016) also states that Jobbik's popularity is based on economic and cultural reasons. Since the RWPP "staged high profile and aggressive demonstrations against the established government, corrupt elites, and harsh austerity measures" (Kim, 2016: 349) during the financial crisis in 2008, economic policies bolstered its popularity. Moreover, Jobbik's cultural stance towards Roma and Jews positively influences its success. By substituting an extreme ethno-nationalism and by emphasizing the distinct features of being Hungarian, the party addresses deep-rooted xenophobic attitudes of Hungary's society. Nevertheless, Jobbik's popularity is also a consequence of its youth approach (Kim, 2016). With the aid of *Social Media*, it was able to create "a vibrant youthful sub-culture primarily based on a community of web users" (Kim, 2016: 351). Hence, it is very popular among people aged between 18 and 30 years. By being active on *Social Media*, Jobbik directly communicates with its target groups and transmits a sense of political proximity. It creates a feeling of social belonging that, in turn, results in the institutionalization of support. Thus, it differs from Fidesz because it successfully established an online platform that represents the interests of its target groups (Kim, 2016).

Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that the rise of RWP in Hungary results from economic and cultural grievances. In addition, *Social Media* play a decisive role regarding the increasing success of Jobbik. Nonetheless, although various researchers examined cultural and economic variables, they have not compared Jobbik with a RWPP of another country. Hence, contrasting Jobbik with the AfD is essential for purposes of drawing parallels and for investigating overall reasons for the increasing success of RWP in the EU.

1.9 Theoretical framework

This thesis draws on the *Cultural Backlash Thesis* (CBT) and *Economic Insecurity Perspective* (EIP) to account for the rise of right-wing populist movements such as the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik. Owing to Germany and Hungary's disparate social and economic conditions, using the two theories is important to identify the underlying reasons for the increasing popularity of RWP in the EU. Although one theory provides better account for the circumstances that gave rise to RWPPs in one country than the other, applying the two theories predisposes the thesis to unleash more nuanced comparisons that highlight the differences in the social and political nomenclatures besetting fabrics of the two societies. Since the AfD and Jobbik place their emphases on cultural and economic aspects in divergent ways, the policy

dispositions of the two parties may serve as a reflection of the cleavages that the two societies are grappling with.

1.9.1 Cultural Backlash Thesis

According to the CBT, the support of populism is regarded as a social psychological phenomenon. It reflects a nostalgic response to the value change which impacted the cultures of Western societies beginning in the 1980s (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). After World War II, Europeans began to take their lives for granted due to the development of welfare states, the freedom between industrialized countries and the economic growth. Hence, instead of worrying about security issues, people started to stress their free choice. An intergenerational transformation from materialist to post-materialist norms took place. Anti-war movements were founded, gender as well as race equality were promoted and minority groups, like for instance the *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer* (LGBTQ) community, were tolerated (Inglehart, 2018).

At the same time, however, an atmosphere of alienation developed because of the increasing number of refugees and immigrants (Inglehart, 2018). Since the end of the twentieth century, the EU must deal with a growing rate of foreigners who, in most cases, do not only fail to integrate into the labour market but are also unwilling to adapt Western values (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Consequently, EU member states such as Germany and Hungary are confronted by tensions between value systems that regard pluralism as cultural enrichment and world views which consider the same phenomenon as decadence and menace of traditions (Rippl & Seipel, 2018). The antipathy towards foreigners intensified with the refugee crisis in 2015. Due to Merkel's humanitarian attitude and open-border policy, Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state. Increasing xenophobic attitudes among Germany's society were exploited by the AfD that began to agitate against refugees, foreigners and the Islam (Busch, Bischoff & Funke, 2018). However, Merkel's welcome-culture was not only criticised by many Germans but by diverse international politicians as well (Hartleb, 2017). Viktor Orbán, Hungary's head of government, for instance, calls the refugee crisis a German problem. From his perspective, Merkel's policies endangered the European solidarity which is why it is Germany's duty to solve the crisis alone (Leggewie, 2017). Also, Jobbik militates against refugees and emphasizes the importance of protecting Hungary's traditional norms (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). Hence, both the AfD and Jobbik represent nationalist views by excluding people of different cultures.

In compliance with the CBT, cultural and nationalist factors, like the attitudes towards foreigners and feminism, impact the affinity to RWPPs (Tutic & von Hermanni, 2018). Culturally motivated xenophobic attitudes and a hostility towards strangers are rising in both Germany and Hungary (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016) which is why the CBT is applicable to both countries. Due to the increasing global interconnectedness, the German and Hungarian populations fear the loss of traditional values and moral menace. Especially people of the older generation and those who are less secured in society, such as the unemployed and the less educated, are afraid of losing familiar norms (Inglehart, 2018). In particular “white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies” tend to lend their support to RWPPs (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 29). With this in mind, this theory claims that RWPPs such as the AfD and Jobbik are mainly supported by traditionalists who feel incumbent to protect those norms and values they consider sacrosanct to their ways of life. Both parties use cultural grievances in their advantage. They capitalize on the political climate that serves as fertile ground for right-wing and discriminatory attitudes to simmer. In other words, the rise of RWP can be closely linked to fears arising from cultural changes in society.

1.9.2 Economic Insecurity Perspective

In contrast to the CBT, the EIP argues that the rise of RWP is associated with economic rather than cultural discontentment. According to Inglehart and Norris (2016: 12), RWP is “a product of growing income inequality, grievances among the losers from global markets, disaffection with mainstream centre-left parties, and loss of faith in the capacity of the mainstream parties to respond to these concerns”. Due to both the technological revolution and globalization, economic competition increases which is why the number of human beings who possess the necessary knowledge for the modifying labour market declines (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016). The transformation of the workforce is accompanied by austerity policies, the depletion of the welfare state, the decrease of prosperity and the global interconnectedness (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). While the service sector increased, the demand for old-fashioned manufacturing industries declined. Owing to the technological automation that introduced new means of travel, communication and production, companies began to relocate and to enter the global market. Therefore, industries are getting privatized and the international competition grows. Especially within the EU, internationalization plays a central role due to the rise of interstate movements (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Thus, employment

opportunities for low-skilled and less educated people are vanishing. The gap between the high- and low-income class is expanding (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016).

Specifically Hungary, the third most corrupted country in the EU, is negatively affected by these economic developments (Transparency International, 2019). While Germany possesses the EU's biggest economy (Zolling, 2017) which boasts a strong labour market access and a low unemployment rate, its Eastern counterpart suffers from labour shortages and social exclusion (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). In light of this, the population of the latter is more likely to develop economic grievances which in turn impact electoral behaviour and political decision making. Jobbik systematically exploits the economic deprivations of the Hungarian society by emphasizing existing nuisances. It does not only hold Hungary's government responsible for social injustices and unemployment, but also indicates how economic challenges can be solved (Jobbik, 2019a). In contrast to that, the AfD hardly addresses economic grievances in its policy statement. It rather promotes a welcome culture for new born Germans to strengthen the country's workforce (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

Nevertheless, in compliance with the results of the *European Social Survey*, "a statistically and economically significant relationship between regional unemployment and a decline in trust toward the European Parliament and national parliaments" exists (Algan, et al., 2017: 312). From this it follows that growing RWP is correlated to economic downturns. The rise of RWPPs is congruent to the increase of inequality (Inglehart, 2018). Hence, from an economic-oriented perspective, economic deprivation and social disparity have an impact on the spread of RWP. Because less-educated people are most affected by economic insecurity due to the lack of necessary skills for employment, they fear a loss of status (Rippl & Seipel, 2018).

1.9.3 The salience of the *Cultural Backlash Thesis* and the *Economic Insecurity Perspective* as theoretical points of departure

Because the German and Hungarian societies distinguish from each other, the use of both theories is indispensable to ascertain the success of the AfD and Jobbik against the economic and socio-political conditions that propelled them. Whilst Hungary is confronted by various economic and cultural issues, Germany is mainly challenged by cultural concerns resulting from mass immigration although economic fears exist as well. According to the European Parliament (2019a), Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU

member state between 2013 and 2018. In 2016 alone, 745,155 displaced persons requested asylum. Thus, 59 percent of all applications which were made in the EU in 2016 took place within the country. Since most of these refugees do not only follow the Islam, a minority religious group in Germany, but also possess a different cultural background and value system, xenophobe, anti-Semitic and chauvinistic perspectives, arising from the fear of the unknown, are spreading across the country (Schellenberg, 2013a).

Cultural and nationalist aspects also play a role in Hungary: Due to its unique political fabric, the country is considered as one of the most xenophobic nations in the EU (Buring, 2016). Furthermore, discriminating views against, among other things, the LGBTQ and Jews, are wide-spread and emphasized by parties like Jobbik (Human Rights First, 2015). Nonetheless, the Hungarian party centres its manifesto not only on cultural but also on economic aspects. Because of Hungary's weak economy which is further degraded by governmental corruption, many economic discontents exist among the population. Thus, by approaching economic concerns, Jobbik is able to augment its popularity among the electorate (Jobbik, 2019a).

Although Germany and Hungary are united in their struggle against the increasing popularity of RWP, their political backgrounds and developments differ. The examination of the CBT and EIP in relation to the AfD and Jobbik's success is indispensable because the theories address diverse grievances that can be found in both countries. Notwithstanding that the CBT and EIP apply to the nations in different ways, their evaluation is necessary to descry the causes of RWP.

1.10 Methodology

The objective of this section is to introduce the methodological framework which carries the thesis. First, the qualitative method of comparison is ascertained to structure the research design. Next to that, the relevance of the *Most Different Systems Design* (MDSD) is elucidated which is utilized to disclose the complexities of European RWP. Subsequently, the explication of the selection bias follows since selecting and applying eligible cases is indispensable to generate enough empirical data to answer the research question. Moreover, the material used for the analysis is specified. In summary, the purpose of this section is to introduce the method used to identify the causes of the AfD and Jobbik's success. It aims to guide the structure and implementation of the research.

1.10.1 The comparative approach as analytical tool

Since the rise of RWP is a transnational European political entity, evidence about its causes can be best extracted with the aid of a comparative analysis that is a case study in approach (Decker, 2004). The qualitative method of comparison is a comparative examination of an empirical phenomenon that aims to verify and establish theories about given contexts. In political science, comparisons are utilized to investigate differences as well as commonalities between diverse cases, to indicate specific features and aberrations, to discover functional equivalents, to make predictions and to find solutions to concrete issues (Lauth, Pickel & Pickel, 2014). Hence, comparisons assist in addressing complex causalities and in understanding the relationship between different factors that impact the political landscape (Lim, 2010).

To answer the research questions, the MDSD will be employed. It assists in comparing “countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome” (Landman, 2000: 27). It aims to identify similarities between diverging cases to explain a specific phenomenon which is why it is based on the *method of agreement* (Lauth, Pickel & Pickel, 2014). A different method to the MDSD is the *Most Similar Systems Design* (MSSD). It compares cases that share similar features and common political outcomes. Thus, the MSSD targets to identify diverging factors between related cases to declare why they are not congruent (Dickovick & Eastwood, 2016). While it is the MSSD’s objective to investigate differences between selected cases, the MDSD intends to identify similarities. Since the rise of RWP is a pan-European phenomenon and both Germany’s historical as well as political background differs significantly from the one of Hungary, the MDSD is most appropriate for this thesis. It assists in explaining the causes of RWP in both countries and in identifying the features which the AfD and Jobbik share.

1.10.2 Selection bias

Since the case selection determines the findings of a study and the answers to the research question, it is crucial to select eligible parties. Otherwise, issues of interference are likely (Landman, 2000). Because the MDSD focuses on the comparison of countries that do not share any features apart from their political outcome, parties which distinguish significantly in their

composition must be chosen (Lim, 2010). The dependent variable, the rise of RWP, which results from the explanatory factor is decisive for the selection.

Unlike previous literature, this thesis is focusing on two RWPPs, the AfD (Germany) and Jobbik (Hungary), to identify the causes of RWP in the said countries. The parties were intentionally chosen because of their foundation background, political agendas and group of supporters since these factors differ from each other. While RWP has been an integral part of Hungarian politics since 2010 (when Fidesz entered the parliament with a two-thirds majority) (Bax, 2018), Germany only began to grapple with the same issue when the AfD entered the parliament in 2017 (Bax, 2018). Against this backdrop, Jobbik's initial situation significantly distinguishes from the one of the AfD: Whereas the AfD is the only RWPP in the German parliament, Jobbik is inferior to the RWPP Fidesz. Hence, unlike the AfD, Jobbik does not possess the unique selling point of RWP on a national scale.

Similarly, the two opposition parties have different ideological backgrounds. Jobbik was founded as a *Conservative Youth Community* by patriotic students in 1999. Their aim was it to establish a non-partisan organisation of like-minded students who are not only disappointed by the ruling government but also by the right-wing parties which existed at that time (Jobbik, 2016). In 2003, the movement transformed into the political party Jobbik. The party has gained notoriety for its xenophobic attitude, hostility towards the LGBTQ community, and anti-Roma sentiments (Human Rights First, 2015). In contrast to Jobbik, the AfD was formed in 2013 by conservatives who disagreed with Merkel's politics. Unlike in Hungary, the founding members of the AfD were no students but mainly economic experts and former politicians of Germany's mainstream parties (Bax, 2018). Owing to their disdain for the CDU's centrist direction, they created public unease about the EU, its structure, the Eurozone and "Germany's role as its political anchor and paymaster" (Lees, 2018: 299). In the course of the refugee crisis in 2015, the party revised its agenda and began to militate against refugees and Germany's open border policy (Zolling, 2017). Today, the AfD emphasizes cultural primacy, rejects the Islam, advocates an anti-immigration policy and promotes the traditional family model (Chase, 2017).

In opposition to Jobbik which is considered as most popular party among university and college students (Pirro & Róna, 2018), the majority of AfD supporters belongs to the low-income class (Bax, 2018). Nevertheless, although Jobbik and the AfD have different contextual and foundational backgrounds, they contribute to the rise of RWP in the EU. Both parties successfully participated in their previous national elections and became the main opposition

parties of their respective parliaments. At this juncture, the parties are selected for this thesis due to their diverging features but shared success.

Since this thesis is merely focusing on the AfD and Jobbik, it is anchored by a cross-national comparative approach which gives detailed insights into the impacts, forms and origins of European RWP. Its level of abstraction is minimised due to its small scope. It allows for an in-depth research under scrutiny. Political outcomes that result from focused comparisons are configurative (Landman, 2000).

1.10.3 Data analysis and material

To ensure a structured and systematic analysis, it is indispensable to define themes which guide the comparison. At this juncture, it is important to analyse topics that do not only cover a big scope but also permit a detailed examination to find similarities between the AfD and Jobbik that explain their common success. The structural conditions of both countries are examined and put into relation to the social fabric and the policy statements of the selected parties. This assists in investigating whether cultural or economic grievances foster the popularity of the AfD and Jobbik. The longitudinal analysis focuses on developments after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Data will be collected from previous elections results, election forecasts, research studies, opinion surveys and policy stances of the parties under investigation. Therefore, the material of this thesis is based on secondary sources.

Before comparing the AfD and Jobbik, the two RWPPs will be analysed separately. This is essential to investigate the reasons for RWP in Germany and Hungary and to identify which features the AfD and Jobbik have in common. Therefore, it is important to not only analyse the political appearances and agendas of the parties but also to comprehend public grievances and attitudes to retrace voting behaviours.

1.11 Limitations of the thesis

A limitation of this thesis is its limited range. Due to the small number of cases, it merely focuses on two parties of two EU member states. Hence, its findings are not representative and applicable for the whole of Europe. Furthermore, the study is based on a limited timeframe. Developments before 1989, such as the two World Wars and their immediate consequences, are not considered even though these might have had a significant impact on Europe's political landscape and thus offer explanations for the popularity of RWPPs. Besides, the thesis is

merely based on secondary sources. Therefore, the limitations of the primary research studies apply. Due to missing fieldwork, the study depends on existing opinion surveys, electoral forecasts and other desktop materials. Hence, the validity of the sources could not be individually verified.

Chapter II

Right-wing populism and the rise of the *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany

2.1 Background

The *Federal Republic of Germany* (FRG), one of the founding members of the EU, has a unique history. Formed in 1871 as *German Empire*, it became the *Weimar Republic* in 1918, and the *Third Reich* in 1933 under Adolf Hitler, before it was divided into the FRG and the *German Democratic Republic* (GDR) in 1949. While the FRG became a federal state, the GDR was transformed into a communist central state influenced by the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the FRG reunited with the GDR to become the Germany we know today. It is a nation with many different tribes that have existed throughout the course of the country's long and eventful history (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Further, Germany is the European Union's most populous nation, with a population of approximately 82.6 million people (status: 2017) who live within a geographic area of 357,050 square kilometres (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018b).

Despite the country's experience with right-wing totalitarianism and a history of political systems that saw the country divided between East and West, Germany after the unification in 1989, has evolved into a federal democratic state that holds general elections every four years (Hartmann, 2013). According to Freedom House (2019a), the FRG possesses a dynamic society and political culture in which both civil freedoms and political rights are ensured. Its constitution is liberal and serves as a necessary bulwark to prevent the country from slipping back into totalitarianism. Despite all these positive developments in the nation's polity, right-wing populism has crept up, emerging as a threat that could soon threaten the good work done since reunification.

This chapter seeks to examine the reasons that led to the increasing support for RWP in Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It argues that cultural and nationalistic factors stemming from the fear of refugees remain key considerations to the rising popularity of the AfD on the political landscape of modern-day Germany. The AfD's rise in Germany stands in contrast to Hungary's Jobbik, whose popularity has been attributed to rising cultural and/or nationalist as well as economic grievances (See Chapter III).

Against this backdrop, this chapter will be answering the following questions: How did cultural factors impact the rise of the AfD in Germany? Do economic aspects influence the

AfD's increasing support? How did the social fabric and political configuration of modern-day Germany foster right-wing sentiments that propelled the AfD's rise to political prominence?

Whilst this chapter argues that cultural grievances have provided fertile ground for the spread of RWP in Germany, it does not ignore arguments advanced in favour of economic developments to account for the changes in the orientation of the country's polity. This is indispensable since, according to the EIP, economic discontents might not only be decisive but are also directly related to cultural grievances (Algan, et al., 2017). Furthermore, Germany's political landscape on a national and European level is scrutinized to put political developments into context. Also important, the role of the media and their power to influence public perceptions, and thus the AfD's electoral performances will be elucidated upon. All structural conditions of modern-day Germany are considered against the changes in the country's social fabric, the popularity of right-wing politics and the AfD's policy stances for richer understanding of the changing political dynamics. Although the former GDR states still differ from their Western counterparts in terms of the level of economic development and political attitudes, the post-1989 German society remains united and cohesive, and governed by one federal constitution which allows for equal participation in the nation's politics by all citizens.

2.2 The rise of right-wing populist sentiments and their increasing influence on national politics

Angela Merkel has been Germany's head of state since 2005 having come from the *Christian Democratic Union* (CDU), which forms a governing coalition with the *Social Democratic Party* (SPD) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018b). Although Germany is, in comparison to Hungary (see Chapter III), ruled by a coalition of its mainstream parties since 2013, it is characterized by a broad political landscape. Next to the governing parties, four other parties are represented in the parliament: the AfD, the *Greens*, the *Free Democratic Party* (FDP) and the *Left*. Moreover, various smaller parties exist which form part of both the sixteen state parliaments and the European parliament (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2019).

Germany possesses a vibrant subculture with various networks that are, among others, controlled by neo-Nazis (Schellenberg, 2013b). The networks are regarded as national resistances which unite radical right groups against perceived state repression. One of Germany's most popular right-wing extremist parties is the *National Democratic Party of Germany* (NDP) which was founded in 1964 by former Nazis. It is particularly successful in rural areas and aims to attract students by advertising its policies in front of schools. Similarly,

also radical elitist right-wing parties have a long tradition in Germany. Parties like the *Republican* intend to act as a bridge between conservative perspectives and extreme neo-Nazi ideologies. Nevertheless, none of these parties were able to sustainably influence Germany's political landscape which is why they are regarded as unimportant on the national level. Hence, the *Republican* was only able to win 7.1 percent of the votes in the 1989 European Parliamentary Elections (Schellenberg, 2013b).

In Germany, right-wing parties always struggled to be accepted as credible due to their bad reputation. The country's constitution does not only undermine *National Socialism* but also defines its democracy as free and defensive. Thus, attacks against its democracy are prevented to ensure that Germany does not repeat its *Nationalist Socialist* history. Nonetheless, despite the lack of political power and representation, an increase of right-wing populist attitudes in rural Germany's everyday culture are noticed in recent years (Schellenberg, 2013b).

The AfD was founded in 2013 amid the *Euro Crisis* as a liberal anti-Euro-party. In 2015, it transformed into an orthodox RWPP in the course of the refugee crisis (Hartleb, 2017; Klose & Patzelt, 2017). According to the preamble of its official policy statement, the AfD was established by various German citizens with different historical, political and educational backgrounds as well as experiences. They regarded the creation of the party as necessary because they were convinced that Germany's population has the right for a political alternative. An alternative to the allegedly unacceptable behaviour of the political elite that does not only break the law and operates irresponsibly but also violates democratic rights. Furthermore, they founded the AfD to avoid the re-emergence of old prejudices and hostilities which reportedly stem from the Euro rescue fund. The AfD supports the promotion of direct democracy, the division of power, the rule of law, federalism, subsidiarity, a social market economy, family rights and the conservation of the German culture. In remembrance of Germany's revolutions of 1848 and 1989, it is the AfD's objective to accomplish national unity in liberty and to develop a Europe of democratic states that are sovereign and have a right to self-determination. The party intends to preserve a peaceful, democratic and sovereign nation-state of the German people which fosters Christian culture, the German language and traditions (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Apart from that, in comparison to Germany's mainstream parties, the AfD is regarded as a forerunner in approaching Russia. Its members did not only meet Putin's advisors, but also sympathise with his desire to transform Russia into a powerful nation-state. At this juncture, they criticize EU-sanctions towards the country and acknowledge both the Crimea-annexation and Russia's military operations in Syria (Reimon & Zelechowski, 2017).

It is suspicious that since the AfD's foundation in 2013, Germany has been ruled by a coalition between the CDU and the SPD. Hence, no major political changes took place since its creation. Moreover, despite the AfD's assumptions, around one third of Germany's population trusts in the country's mainstream parties. Their trust even increased from 22 percent in spring 2016 to 31 percent in autumn 2018 (Statista, 2018). Nevertheless, the AfD is the first RWPP that made it into the German parliament since 1989. This does not only indicate existing political grievances and a lack of representation by the established parties, but it also demonstrates that right-wing attitudes became acceptable on a national level. Moreover, it signals the wish for a political change and that the party successfully addresses the population when criticising the country's current politics. Although all parties of Germany's parliament are unwilling to cooperate with the AfD due to its radical right stance, its potential to sustainably influence the nation's political landscape is conspicuous since it became the main opposition party in 2017 (Lees, 2018).

2.3 Divergent EU sentiments in Germany and the AfD's political presence

Even though Germany's prosperity and security are inextricably linked to the success of the EU, anti-EU sentiments exist in the country (Leggewie, 2017). Since the AfD was founded to oppose Germany's membership of the EU, it views the regional organisation with scepticism. According to it, the sovereignty of the German people is a fallacy as per the terms of the *Schengen* (1985), *Maastricht* (1992) and *Lisbon* (2007) treaties all of which prove that Germany has lost control of its internal affairs to the European Union (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). The AfD opposes the EU morphing into a centralist federal state and rejects the idea of the *United States of Europe*. Instead, it is for the EU returning to its original ways as an economic community with shared interests comprised of sovereign and loosely connected states. If it is not possible to put these fundamental reforms into practice, the AfD wants Germany to either leave or to completely dissolve the EU. Hence, in contrast to Jobbik (see Chapter III), the AfD does not regard Germany's economic success tied to its membership to the EU. Additionally, the party objects foreign paternalism and demands to end the 'experiment' of the Euro (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). According to it, the Euro endangers the peaceful coexistence of the nations. The currency fosters jealousy, tensions and disputes since it forces crisis-hit countries to follow an austerity policy to remain competitive. At this juncture, the AfD argues that Germany needs to end its Euro rescue policies because its

citizens are not responsible for the financial problems of other EU member states (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

The AfD's perspective regarding the EU is not a full reflection of general sentiments of the German society. Most Germans believe that issues such as unemployment, the promotion of freedom and democracy, and the protection of external borders need to gain more attention at the European Union level. People who are 55 years of age or older are more sceptical of the EU than the younger generation (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). While this is the case, the vast majority of Germany hold opposing views: In 2018, 81 percent Germans supported their country's membership (Schulmeister, et al., 2018). These are nine percent more than in 2014 (European Parliament, 2015). Furthermore, 66 percent of all citizens argued that Germany benefits from being part of the EU in 2016, 76 percent in 2018 (Schulmeister, et al., 2018). Around 78 percent consider their national interests as protected (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018).

Hence, an increasing acknowledgement towards the EU is evident which is why most Germans disagree with the AfD's conviction that the EU needs to be fundamentally reformed. Instead, they appreciate the EU's values. Germans cherish the free movement of travellers which gives them not only the chance to visit other member states without a visa but also to work and study there (Schulmeister, et al., 2017).

In the main, the majority of the German society disagrees with the AfD's policies concerning the EU. Anti-EU sentiments seem unlikely to foster RWP in the country due to the organization's popularity amongst most of the population. It is only those marginal European grievances among the said population group that have given rise to the AfD in the first place.

2.4 Complex socioeconomic conditions and German society's attitudes towards immigrants

The rise of the AfD on the political scene is as complex as the nature of socioeconomic circumstances that have confronted Germany in recent times. Despite it being a wealthy society, Germany does not have a perfect socioeconomic score that is devoid of undercurrents of social discontents. Since its reunification in 1989, Germany transformed into an economic powerhouse that possesses the EU's strongest economy (Zolling, 2017). According to the *Index of Economic Freedom* (IEF), Germany is considered as a mostly free country, ranking 24th in the world and 14th in Europe (Index of Economic Freedom, 2019). The competitiveness of its economy cannot be doubted, including business and investment freedoms and entrepreneurial

drive that can be rivalled by few in the EU (The Heritage Foundation, 2019a). The minimum wage per hour, which was implemented in 2015, is constantly rising. Germany supports global commerce and offers a wide range of up-to-date, well-functioning services in its financial sector (The Heritage Foundation, 2019a).

In this context, as the *Corruption Perception Index* (CPI) identifies, Germany is regarded as almost corrupt free. In 2018, it was recognized as the world's 11th and the region's (Western Europe and the EU) 8th corruption freest country. Germany's government supports anti-corruption implementations which is why it established an institutional and regulatory framework. Hence, authorities have the power to not only detect but also to prevent and tackle corrupt acts (Pawelke & Mendes, 2017). The strength of its economy has enabled the country to perform well in the *Social Justice Index* (SJI) overall. With 6.71 points, Germany ranks on the 7th position within the EU and it is placed in the top ten in four out of six categories (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). It does not only possess the organisation's second-best health system but also labour market access with the second lowest unemployment rate. In addition, discrimination is relatively low within the wider German society and social cohesion remains intact. In spite of this, immigrants face injustices relating to lack of educational and employment opportunities, an unsurprising reality as the country scores poorly in the EU for educational justice (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). Due to the increasing number of foreigners who are seeking employment as well as education since the refugee crisis in 2015, reforms are necessary if the country aims to achieve broad-based integration (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). This vision remains a pie in the sky as some quarters of the German society – particularly the less educated – view the so-called foreign infiltration as a potential threat to economic security (Busch, Bischoff & Funke, 2018).

Nevertheless, compared to Jobbik (see Chapter III), the AfD's success is not based on economic discontents. It can be said that the party's popularity sparked in 2017 two years after it became a fully-fledged right-wing populist party following the adoption of nationalist stances that sought to galvanise society against refugees. This shift in approach facilitated its entry into the German parliament for the first time in 2017 (Cantow, Fehndrich & Zicht, 2017). Furthermore, the AfD hardly touches economic grievances in its policy statements. Even though the party advocates for a minimum wage and a guaranteed minimal pension for all workers (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016), it lacks strategies that aim to foster economic development. The AfD has neither plans regarding the creation and security of labour nor does it show intentions to reduce existing social inequalities such as the access to education (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

2.5 Cultural concerns and the fear of foreign infiltration

Although Germany is generally tolerant of people from different backgrounds, the country is not spared of people with xenophobic, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic and chauvinistic views (Schellenberg, 2013a). Since today's FRG was merely reunified in 1989, political attitudes between East and West Germany differ with the former more intolerant to immigrants. Many people from the former GDR are still dealing with economic and social challenges which are in many ways a consequence of communist rule. Due to transculturation and the transformation of values after the end of the Cold War, East Germans tend to be more sceptical towards globalization and migration than their Western counterparts (Schellenberg, 2013a). They regard immigrants as more problematic. Even though less people in East Germany have an immigration background, more human beings fear foreign infiltration. Not only was the movement *Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident* founded in Dresden in 2014, also mass demonstrations against Merkel and her refugee policies were first organized in the East in 2015 (Ruhstorfer, 2017; Zolling, 2017).

Nevertheless, due to the increasing number of immigrants and the various terrorist attacks which hit the EU since 2015, people in the West became critical towards cultural changes and foreign merits as well. During the past few years, a *Social-Darwinist discourse* established which defames minority groups. This development was already induced in 2010 when the former SPD politician Thilo Sarrazin published the book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany is abolishing itself). Despite its critical assumptions which define human beings in relation to their intellectual skills, ethnicity, religion and value for society, it became Germany's most successful political book in one decade (Schellenberg, 2013b).

This development was compounded by the refugee crisis. Between 2013 and 2018, Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state. While the amount of applications constantly increased, it reached its peak in 2016 with 745,155 requests. Thus, 59 percent of all applications which were made in the EU in 2016 took place in the country (European Parliament, 2019a). Due to the high rate of foreigners entering Germany, many locals fear an increase of domestic terrorism. Six out of ten Germans are concerned about the rise of immigrant related crimes and three out of ten that cultural diversity results in a declining living standard. According to 67 percent of the population, the EU must take more action to handle the refugee crisis (Poushter, 2016).

Due to the refugee crisis and the increasing number of foreigners entering Germany, the AfD began to adopt more anti-immigration stances in 2015, as shown in the previous

section. For the party, multiculturalism is a danger for the continuation of the nation as a culturally cohesive society which is why the German culture must be preserved (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

The AfD argues that foreigners merely migrate into Germany's social system and low wage sector to exploit the nation's prosperity (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). The AfD believes in the modification of European law to regain Germany's national sovereignty and to prevent a mass immigration (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). It regards the EU's protection of Europe's external borders as insufficient for the protection of the country's borders (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Although the party supports freedom of religion, it has a disdain against the Islam which is, as it believes, a danger against democracy, German law and Jewish-Christian culture (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

Germany has an ageing problem, a challenge which has prompted political parties (with the exception of the AfD) to be in support of the immigration of qualified personnel to work in the industry (Schellenberg, 2013b). The AfD, on the contrary, claims that the birth rates of native Germans need to rise. According to the party, recent years demonstrated that immigrants, Muslims in particular, lack quality education that corresponds to the German standard and economy. To make matters worse, the birth rates of Muslims are higher than the ones of Germans which is why the ethnic-cultural alteration of the society gets intensified and the overall level of education decreases. In compliance with the AfD, the attempt to compensate for labour shortages with more immigration is dangerous because of the unwillingness of many to integrate which is why parallel societies develop (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Thus, the RWPP campaigns for a welcome culture for both new-born and unborn Germans, not foreigners. (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Next to that, the AfD aims to end the emigration of qualified Germans. Instead emigrants need to be motivated to return (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016).

Nevertheless, although right-wing populist attitudes and hostilities towards immigrants are wide-spread in Germany, RWPPs are regarded as unacceptable by many due to their connection to Nazism. Many citizens support a pluralist democracy because of the country's history. People do not only accuse radical groups of the right spectrum but also anti-immigration parties like the AfD whose politicians have been accused of committing anti-Semitic offences (Schellenberg, 2013b). AfD politicians such as Alexander Gauland have trivialized the time of the *National Socialism*, arguing that Adolf Hitler and the *National Socialists* are merely "bird shit" in 1,000 years of successful German history. Although he admits that the country is responsible for the time between 1933 and 1945, he emphasizes that

its glorious existence lasted longer than “damn twelve years” (Fiedler, 2018). Besides, he demands that Germany’s population should be proud of the achievements of German soldiers in both World Wars and that the time under Hitler is inconsequential to Germany (Fiedler, 2018).

Although RWPPs lack credibility among most Germans, the AfD is able to address cultural grievances deriving from the refugee crisis. The high rate of foreigners entering the country since 2015 resulted in both security-related concerns and the fear of losing traditional values. As Jobbik in Hungary (see Chapter III), the AfD exploits existing anxieties in its favour by approaching cultural discontents in its policy statement. The 2017 national elections as well as the electoral forecasts beginning in 2013 confirm this assumption. Not only did the party’s popularity significantly increase with the beginning of the refugee crisis, the AfD also managed to enter the German parliament for the first time in 2017 as main opposition party. Thus, cultural grievances bolstered the AfD’s rise to prominence.

2.6 Zooming in further on the AfD’s rising popularity

In Germany, national elections take place in a four-year cycle. Hence, the AfD competed in two elections for the Bundestag since its foundation. Whilst it received 4.7 percent of all votes in 2013, its support increased by 12.6 percent in 2017 (Cantow, Fehndrich & Zicht, 2017). Thus, as Jobbik in Hungary (see Chapter III), the AfD is currently Germany’s main opposition party. Also, on a European level it was able to improve its electoral performance. While the party got 7.05 percent in the 2014 EPE, it augmented to 10.97 percent in 2019 (Cantow, Fehndrich & Zicht, 2019). Nevertheless, it received less votes compared to the national elections in 2017 and was outvoted by the *Greens* in 2019. Hence, it became Germany’s fourth strongest party on a European level. The election result might be connected to the fact that the AfD is neglecting the climate change (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). This is insofar problematic as the climate is dominating Germany’s public discourse since at least the *Fridays For Future* demonstrations which were initiated by the Swede Greta Thunberg in 2018 (Axel Springer SE, 2019a).

The findings of the election results, however, do not give reliable information about the AfD’s continuous performance. Rather they provide an overview of the party’s popularity at one moment in time. Against this backdrop, all election forecasts at a national level between 2013, the year the party was founded, and 2018 were analysed.




Figure 1: Electoral forecasts AfD (Zicht & Cantow, 2019)

As Figure 1 demonstrates, the AfD was able to expand its electoral support since its foundation. It continuously increased with one exemption: In 2017, its overall percentage dropped from 11.79 to 10.04. This is significant as it represents the year the national elections took place in which the AfD received 12.6 percent. The overall picture illustrates an upward trend. Its biggest improvement occurred from 2015 to 2016 when Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state. Hence, its success is most likely related to the refugee crisis and the cultural grievances that followed. With 14.21 percent of potential votes in 2018, the AfD was able to increase its popularity significantly compared to 2013 when it merely received 3.44 percent (Zicht & Cantow, 2019). The significant gain of endorsement indicates future success.

Figure 1 illustrates that economic factors are unlikely to determine the AfD's success since the party increased its popularity after it transformed from an anti-Euro to an anti-immigration party in 2015. This assumption is confirmed by Figure 2 which indicates the number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants entering Germany between 2013 and 2018.




Figure 2: Immigration into Germany: Number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants from 2013 until 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a, Statista 2019)

As Figure 2 demonstrates, the number of immigrants constantly increased from 2013 until it reached its summit in 2015 with more than 2 million people moving to Germany. It sharply increased from 2014 to 2015 due to the beginning of the refugee crisis. Subsequently, the rate of foreigners entering the country decreased slightly, still being above 2014 numbers. Thus, the number of migrants rose in previous years. This statistic does, however, not clarify whether the immigrants are permanently residing in Germany or whether they are merely coming for a temporary stay. Furthermore, it does not indicate how many foreigners left Germany at the same time. The immigrants shown in the figure include EU-nationals, refugees and people originating from outside the EU (Statista, 2019).

As the number of immigrants, also the amount of asylum seekers persistently increased since 2013. Nevertheless, it reached its peak one year later in 2016 when Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state with 745,155 requests (European Parliament, 2019a). In contrast to the immigrants, the number of asylum seekers merely includes people who are non-EU-nationals with the majority originating from Islamic countries. Besides, it only comprises displaced persons who apply for asylum not all refugees who have been recognized in the host country as such. Since the rate of immigrants entering Germany decreased from 2015 onwards whilst the number of asylum seekers increased until

2016, it can be concluded that the percentage of non-EU nationals moving to the Western European country augmented.

In contrast to the number of immigrants and asylum seekers, the rate of refugees that are recognized in Germany is still rising. Since 2013, more refugees are entering the country every year. Most of them are Muslims originating from countries outside the EU. Thus, due to this positive trend, it can be assumed that the number of refugees did not reach its peak yet. However, even though the number of refugees is constantly rising, Figure 2 depicts that less people are applying for asylum (European Parliament, 2019a).

Figure 2 illustrates that the AfD's success is mainly based on the refugee crisis rather than on immigrants in general. The party's popularity significantly increased in 2016 when the number of asylum applications reached its summit. Furthermore, its continuous support results from the constantly augmenting numbers of refugees entering the nation. Hence, the AfD's focus on Muslims and non-Europeans bolstered its prominence. Because Germany was directly impacted by the refugee crisis, the AfD was able to address the cultural grievances of concerned people (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Whilst around 80 percent of Germans are afraid of losing their country's national identity and culture, 44 percent believe that too many foreigners live in the country (Hetzler, 2015). From this it follows that existing cultural discontents, not economic concerns, are decisive for the AfD's increasing popularity.

Besides, media directly influence the AfD's electoral performances. Although mass media have been capitalizing on the offensive utterance of the AfD in their reporting, they have been an indispensable tool for its success (Bax, 2018). Especially television talk shows made the party popular. Although these shows are limited in terms of form and content, they reach millions of recipients and assist in inadvertently spreading the AfD's political stances (Kemper, 2013). Moreover, the RWPP is able to enhance its image with the aid of *Social Media*. Not only does it possess various *Facebook*-Accounts, it is also active on *Twitter*, *Instagram* and *YouTube* (Alternative für Deutschland, 2019)

In 2018, three of ten eligible voters had a populist attitude in Germany. Hence, as the AfD's success shows, the country's climate is increasingly becoming nationalistic (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). When analysing the social profile of Germans who support the AfD, it is important to note that they originate from all social classes. Regarding the level of education and income, they tend to be either above or underneath German average. Thus, their economic situation is not decisive (Decker, 2006). People with radical right attitudes support the AfD because of its far-right ideology and voters of the political centre due to its populist stance

(Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Every fourth supporter of the party and 77 percent of non-voters regard it as extremely right (Wagner, 2018).

2.7 Conclusion

The AfD's success is based on various developments within the German social fabric. The party successfully exploits the fears of the German population around immigration and the potential cultural changes it brings to the contemporary German society. Despite its xenophobic attitudes, its electoral performance, with a significant increase in 2016 when most applications for asylum were made, demonstrates that many Germans are attracted more by its nationalistic stance rather than other considerations such as economic grievances which are absent from the party's policy stances.

Nonetheless, the RWPP's political understanding is characterized by several notable contradictions. On the one hand the AfD states that the climate change is a myth and that renewable energy is unnecessary and on the other one it emphasizes the importance of environmental protection (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). It positions itself as a representative of the people that argues against the ruling elite. The phrasing of the AfD's policy statement depicts that the party does not fear the use of offensive phrases like 'the Islam does not belong to Germany'. Hereby, it is suspicious how often the Islam is mentioned in the manifesto while other from Christianity distinguishing religions are not stated. Hence, various statements, as for example that the Islam is not compatible with Christian traditions, are insofar questionable as also other persuasions exist. Muslims are not only accused of a low level of education, an unwillingness to integrate and an inability to adapt to Western cultures, but also of portraying a security threat.

The AfD distinguishes between the nation and the ruling elite since the latter is responsible for all existing grievances. It fancies itself as the custodian of German interests and thus feels morally incumbent to assume the role of 'protecting' Germany from foreign meddling and its potential to intrude and harm its sovereignty and culture. For the AfD, multiculturalism and European paternalism are destructive to the German way of life and certain quarters of the population are weary of this intrusion, and so significant is their concern that the said party ended up entering parliament as the main opposition party following the 2017 elections.

The RWPP is not wholly opposed to the EU, but it wants the institution to transform into an economic community of independent member states that have respect for each other's

sovereignty. It wants the EU to concentrate on the economic aspects of regional integration and not to act as a political superstructure that imposes its rules and laws over the individual member states. In the main, it is keen to facilitate Germany's exit from the EU provided that it does not reform and consider the possibility of becoming less politically intrusive in the internal affairs of individual member states. The AfD does not countenance cultural integration, nor does it appreciate the idea of German borders being opened for the exploitation by refugees. It is important to take note also, that Germany's position as the economic powerhouse of Europe fuelled anti-immigrant sentiments as well as right-wing populism during the refugee crisis of 2015. These sentiments look set to continue as long as the AfD views the EU and refugees as the problem.

Chapter III

Right-wing populism in Hungary and the rise of Jobbik

3.1 Background

In contrast to Germany, Hungary joined the EU in 2004 (Szegö, 2005). Whilst Germany has more diverse radical and cultural demographic, Hungary's society remained homogenous throughout its history (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Hungarians, who are also called *europæi di case* (Latin for Europeans by chance), originate from former Asian war and nomadic people (Hauszmann, 2004). While the country's territory was ruled by *Ottomans* in the 16th and 17th century, Hungary was part of the *Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy* from 1867 until 1918 (Taschen Atlas, 2007). In 1949, the nation transformed into a republic under a totalitarian one-party system before it became part of the Soviet Union in 1956. After the fall of the iron curtain in 1989, Hungary retransformed into a republic which was followed by the adoption of a new constitution (Szegö, 2005). The country has a population of about 9.79 million people (status: 2017) that are spread over 93,028 square kilometres. From this it follows that eight times more people live in Germany although its area is merely 75 percent bigger (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018a).

As a parliamentary democracy Hungary is considered to be enjoying a modicum of political freedoms although the country has been experiencing a downward trend recently. Right-wing populist parties dominate the political landscape of Hungary, with Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, a RWPP itself, at the helm of government. Since Fidesz's victory in 2010, both the opposition and parts of the civil society have felt intimidation from the new government, which resulted in a significant reduction of political dissent (Freedom House, 2019b). Even though Hungary has been governed by a RWPP since 2010, the country's opposition party Jobbik began to gain popularity since its founding in 2003, only becoming the main opposition party in 2018. Thus, it seems like right-wing populists do not only dominate the political landscape of modern-day Hungary, they have also become an insidious feature of its social fabric.

This chapter investigates the socio-political conditions behind the rise of RWP in Hungary. It argues that, compared to Germany's AfD, cultural and economic discontents have been integral to Jobbik's popularity. The chapter aims to answer the following questions: What role did economic and cultural concerns play in Jobbik's rise to political prominence? Which

social conditions directly impact the party's success? How do the social fabric and political configuration of Hungary foster Jobbik's popularity?

Whilst it is argued that mainly cultural aspects foster the rise of RWP in Germany, in Hungary's case, and Jobbik to be specific, both cultural and economic grievances have been equally decisive in the rise of right-wing populism. Against this backdrop, not only will the country's political landscape and stance towards the EU be analysed, but also its economic and cultural challenges. Moreover, both Jobbik's media usage and electoral performance are examined for richer understanding of the party's popularity and the media's – particularly *Social Media* – role in that regard. As in Chapter II, the structural conditions that underlie shifts in the country's social fabric will be put within the political nomenclature of modern-day Hungary. A similar attempt will be made in the case of Jobbik as the chapter undertakes to decipher the meaning behind the party's political utterances and the extent to which they either feed into or reflect the preponderance of RWP in Hungary.

3.2 Lacking confidence in political leadership and the rise of Jobbik

Since 2010, Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) is head of Hungary's government. Although the country is ruled by one party in lieu of a coalition, its opposition consists of six different parties and one independent delegate. As the AfD in Germany, Jobbik is the main opposition party in the country's parliament, followed by the *Hungarian Socialist Party* (MSZP) in terms of popularity. The other represented parties are the *Democratic Coalition* (DC), the *Politics Can Be Different* (IMP), the *Together* and the *National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary* (MNOÖ) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018a). Hence, like Germany, Hungary is a multi-party democracy that reflects the country's diversity of political views.

Compared to Germany, RWP is deep-rooted in Hungary. Far-right groups came immediately into existence after the end of communism. Since they were able to gain foreign support, they represent the origins of Western fascist organisations (Kovács, 2013). In the case of Hungary, the year 2006 was watershed for RWP when the former social-democratic prime minister Gyurcsány admitted that he only won the previous elections by lying to the population. Various street protests were organized, and right-wing extremism gained on popularity. When Orbán received a two-thirds majority in the national elections in 2010, he began to retransform the state: Not only did he, among other things, establish a new media law but also changed the constitution to ensure his power. For instance, Orbán disempowered the constitutional court

(Hartleb, 2017). Due to its anti-democratic political stance, Fidesz was suspended from the *European People's Party* (EPP) in March 2019 (Beckmann, 2019).

However, Jobbik's roots are firmly embedded in Christian student activism of a conservative kind before transforming into a fully-fledged political party in 2003 (Human Rights First, 2015). Founded as response to the lack of the perceived neglect of Hungary's national interests by existing political parties, Jobbik sought to be the champion of social justice as well as the preservation of national values and the Hungarian way of life (Jobbik, 2003). With its radical, populist and divisive ideological disposition, the party has managed to gain popularity amongst young voters, a reality that is set to increase yet further. It is no surprise that the relationship between Fidesz and Jobbik has become adversarial with the latter accusing Fidesz of deliberately abusing its power to weaken the strength of opposition parties as well as creating a hostile political environment for parties that are intent on challenging its popularity and decisions (Bayer, 2017).

The challenges relating to attempts by the ruling party to curtail opposition parties have added to the trust deficit in the country's political institutions already plaguing the Hungarian society dating back to the end of the Cold War when the then socialist government was found guilty of corruption and falsehood (Leggewie, 2017). Currently only a meagre 17 percent of Hungarians trust their political parties while 78 percent have lost trust in them. Thus, despite Fidesz's re-elections since 2010, the majority of Hungarians have no confidence in it (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Compared to Germany's AfD (as shown in Chapter II), Jobbik experienced different governments since its foundation and is part of the parliament for a longer time. However, although it also is the country's main opposition party, it lacks the AfD's unique selling point. While the latter is the only RWPP in the German parliament, Hungary is ruled by the RWPP Fidesz. Nonetheless, Jobbik benefits from the more populist stance of its society. Whilst most Germans regard RWP as critical, it has become part and parcel of Hungary's political landscape which is why its citizens are less hampered to declare their support.

3.3 The role of the European Union

Unlike the AfD (see Chapter II), Jobbik does not only harbour negative sentiments towards the EU since Hungary economically benefits from its membership. Although Hungary's leader Orbán criticizes the EU and has little regard for its laws (Leggewie, 2017), many Hungarians are in support of the organisation (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). Due to the

economic benefits Hungary stands to gain by remaining in the EU, the support of Hungary's population increased exponentially from 44 percent in 2014 to 79 percent in 2018 (European Parliament, 2015; Schulmeister, et al., 2018).

Be that as it may, Hungarians also view the EU with scepticism. More than 50 percent consider EU actions regarding migration challenges, terrorism and protection of outer borders as insufficient (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). Moreover, seven out of ten people want the EU to intervene more against tax fraud, unemployment, terrorism and environmental pollution. While no significant differences between the genders exists, the age and occupation of Hungarians seem decisive. Citizens between 15 and 24 years of age as well as house-persons are most likely to regard EU measures as sufficient (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018).

Although Jobbik supports the idea of the EU as an alliance of free countries, it criticizes that Hungary's membership did not fulfil previous expectations. The country, as other Eastern nations, joined under unequal terms due social and economic disparities. Hungary's economy depends on the EU's assistance because of the organisation's bureaucracy. Furthermore, Jobbik claims that the EU is divided by various conflicts: the refugee crisis, a decreasing living standard in the East and security issues in the West. Europe's leaders are considered as unable to solve existing problems and to establish a union of sociality, safety, Christianity and humanity. Hence, a radical modification is necessary to secure the EU from failing which is why its politicians must return to its founding goals. Jobbik advocates for a democratic EU that creates positive peace, acknowledges individual accountability and addresses economic issues (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019).

Nevertheless, even though Jobbik negatively evaluates some EU actions and structures, it is not as critical as the AfD. The party supports Hungary's membership since the country financially benefits from it. Due to various monetary funds, the Eastern European nation can diminish economic struggles and foster technological innovations. By having a positive stance towards the EU, Jobbik reflects the attitude of its country's wider society which is why it can address its concerns and hopes in this regard.

3.4 Weak economy, corruption and Jobbik's solutions-based approach

In comparison to Germany (see Chapter II), Hungary's economic performance is weak. According to the *Index of Economic Freedom*, the Eastern European country's economy is the 64th freest worldwide as a result of which it ranks above global average. However, within Europe the country is ranked 31st. Thus, its economic freedom lies below European average.

Hungary's economic growth is determined by its construction industry, exports and domestic demand. Although its economy is modifying towards a market-driven approach and even though its unemployment rate is low, it is challenged by, among other things, poverty and labour shortages. Moreover, the Hungarian government is increasingly becoming interventionist (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b). For instance, it "plans to use sectoral taxes to manage the budget deficit and public debt to avoid renewed European Union sanctions under the EU's excessive-deficit procedure" (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b). Its judiciary is limited, and its independence is at risk. Moreover, the public sector is plagued by cronyism, the government has been accused of granting privileges to specific economic allies and state institutions are not willing to bring to book officials who have behaved unscrupulously (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b).

As in the IEF, Hungary is ranked on the 64th position worldwide in the *Corruption Perception Index*. It is placed on the bottom of the region – only surpassed by Bulgaria and Greece. Although its ranking improved from 2017 until 2018, it worsened from 2012 onwards. Rising corruption in government represents the decline of democracy and the limited space for independent media and the society. Hence, not only the *Central European University* but also the *Open Society Foundation* were expelled out of the country. Further, basic civil rights are also under threat. For example, support for immigrants by civilians has been made illegal and foreign funded non-governmental organisations have also been restricted. Due to systematic violations of law, the country became subject of EU procedures which can result in the withdraw of the country's voting rights (Transparency International, 2019).

Also, within the *Social Justice Index*, Hungary performs below European average. It is placed on the 22nd position in the EU with an overall score of 5.18 points. In three of the six analysed categories the country is found among the last five. Hungary's labour market, which experienced significant improvements during the past few years, ranks 13th in the EU. The overall unemployment rate is steadily decreasing. Nonetheless, the substantial increase of employment is mostly achieved by a rising number of citizens operating abroad. In addition, controversial public-work agendas were introduced which, for instance, force welfare recipients to do roadworks to receive financial assistance. Because educated people tend to leave the country, labour shortages are becoming the norm. One of the major policy issues Hungary is confronted with is the combat of discrimination and social inclusion. Within the EU, it is only ranked 25 in this category. Its government, for example, denies the integration of non-Christians and non-Europeans since these are considered as a threat for Hungary's culture and national identity (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017).

As the findings of the indices indicate, Hungary performs worse than Germany in all categories. The Western European country (see Chapter II) does not only possess the EU's strongest economy, it also characterized by economic freedom and a low corruption rate. Although, according to the SJI, some social injustices exist, Germany enjoys social cohesion and a lower level of discrimination compared to Hungary. Hence, economic grievances are more likely to occur among the Hungarian population due to the country's weak performance in the abovementioned indices.

Jobbik has made these undercurrents part of its manifesto and offers solutions to solve them. It intends to both repeal political immunity to end corruption and to introduce stricter punishments for economic offences. Due to a decrease in the number of businesses, Jobbik aims to establish small and medium-sized enterprises. Those can both assist people living in rural areas and strengthen the nation's economy. For this case, the party plans the development of a *State Guarantee Facility*, factoring and leasing companies and a bank. Besides, it aims to undermine land speculation. Rather, it plans to create a legislation regarding land protection to realise a land ownership construct which is based on family farms. While Fidesz promotes the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* (TTIP) without disclosing detailed information about the negotiations, Jobbik views it with scepticism. The party regards TTIP as a threat to Hungary's food security and economy. Moreover, it is unwilling to support an agreement that subverts the country's sovereignty (Jobbik, 2019a).

Since Hungary's wages are among the lowest in the EU, the competitiveness of its economy has been on the decline. Jobbik wants Hungary to become a member of the *European Public Prosecutor's Office* to end and reveal the misuse of funds (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). It plans to establish an independent and transparent system of tenders to "allow potential EU funded projects to be determined based on real and local demands rather than central government directives" (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019: 20). At the same time, the party aims to strengthen Hungary's integration policy by fostering native talents and creativity as well as supporting local enterprises (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). Against this backdrop, in contrast to the AfD, Jobbik adopts a solutions-based approach to problems facing Hungary and advocates for a stronger coalition with EU institutions to improve Hungary's economic performance. It addresses existing economic grievances which shows that its popularity is based on its economic approaches. Hence, Jobbik exploits discontents to attract supporters.

3.5 Xenophobia and anti-Roma attitudes

As in Germany (see Chapter II), xenophobic attitudes are on the rise in Hungary. These are, however, more deep-rooted, distinct and directed into various directions. Hungarians tend to not only directly discriminate against people of different nationalities and religions but also long-established minority groups like the Roma. Despite their long-standing presence, Roma are considered as social outsiders who follow immoral customs. Prejudices are continuously on the increase, making it difficult for minorities to be integrated into society (Ljujic, 2012). Against this backdrop, merely 36 percent of all non-Roma Hungarians think that Roma-specific policies for social inclusion should be established (Bíró-Nagy & Laki, 2018). Due to the unwillingness to integrate this minority group, many Roma suffer from unemployment, inadequate housing, poverty and diseases (Ljujic, 2012).

Even though Jobbik claims to be in support of ethnic minorities living in Hungary, when they live in accordance with the country's law, the party merely addresses one group in its manifesto: The Roma who are referred to as 'Gypsy people', which is a racist slur. Despite Jobbik's argument that 'Gypsies' have to understand that they do not face restrictions and penalties just because they belong to that specific ethnic group, it states that development funds for Roma need to end since these merely benefit different activists, foundations and 'Gypsy organisations'. Besides, the elimination of 'Gypsy' crime is indispensable no matter the means. Particular state-owned schools for 'Gypsy' children must be built that focus on adaptability issues and special education. Jobbik aims to establish a concept that is based on employment rather than social benefits because, in compliance with its perspective, 'Gypsies' do not need confirmative action but the opportunity of social integration (Jobbik, 2019a). According to Jobbik (2019b), its "party's programme is the only one that urges cooperation instead of increasing ethnic separation and divide." This statement is insofar contradictory as the party insults Roma by calling them 'Gypsy'. It directly connects the minority group with crime and the inability of social adaptation.

However, Hungarians do not only tend to discriminate Roma, also other minorities are facing discrimination: Hungary is one of the most xenophobic countries in the EU (Buring, 2016). The negative perspectives among its population regarding foreigners is connected to the country's historical background. Since the nation was isolated for many years, people fear marginalisation when integrating people from other regions (Buring, 2016). Almost eight out of ten Hungarians are afraid of immigrant related crime. Seven out of ten fear people from Iraq and Syria most since they are considered as a bigger threat than refugees from other states

(Poushter, 2016). Jobbik adapts this perspective by supporting the control of the EU's external borders. According to the party's policy stance, all member states are responsible to assist in establishing a sufficient border guard. This is important to protect the EU's values and cultures. Since Hungary neither colonized countries of other continents nor aimed to be a cross-continental power, it should not be forced to grant asylum. Due to the fact that most refugees leave their home because of the political mistakes of their former colonizers, Jobbik claims that Hungary is not accountable for displaced persons (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019).

Since its foundation, Jobbik was involved in various xenophobic scandals. The party does not only favour the Islam over Judaism, it also follows an antisemitic stance combined with Nazi rhetoric and racist statements. Jobbik creates an atmosphere of fear by stating that Hungary's economy gets destroyed by Jewish bankers and that foreign Jews are buying the country's land. The party accuses Israel of turning Hungary into a colony. Even within the parliament, Jobbik members have expressed views that are anti-Semitic. In 2014, for instance, Tibor Agoston called the Holocaust 'Holoscam' (Human Rights First, 2015). One year later, Lajos Rig stated that Roma are the Jews secret weapon to steal Hungary from the 'real Hungarians'. Furthermore, he has a tattoo saying, 'my honour is called loyalty'. This is insofar problematic as it depicts the slogan of the former *National Socialist* organisation *Schutzstaffel*. In Germany the use of this sentence is considered to be illegal and hate speech. Also an email by Gergely Kulcsár, member of the parliament for Jobbik, was published in which he boasted about spitting on a Holocaust memorial. Also, public statements against Roma are common. Tamás Sneider, Jobbik's president since 2018, offended Orbán as a 'Gypsy' when he was still vice-president of the parliament. In this connection he also stressed the importance of radical groups like the extremist *Betayársereg*. According to him, these groups are indispensable because they do the work the government fails to do. *Betayársereg* is inculpated of organizing riots in Roma villages and of throwing stones on Roma people (Simon, 2015).

Hungarians do not only fear foreign infiltration in the form of immigrants and refugees but are also discriminating local minority groups like the Roma. Due to Hungary's historical background, its population is a mostly homogenous group that is afraid of both the loss of its culture and foreign domination. As the AfD, Jobbik capitalises on these fears to achieve its political goals: It directly addresses the society's discontents and offers opportunities to avoid heteronomy. At this juncture, it can be argued that cultural aspects are benefitting Jobbik's popularity.

3.6 *Social Media* and grassroots actions as critical success factors

In contrast to Germany, Hungary's press freedom is regulated and under the thumb of government restrictions. According to *Reporters Without Borders*, the Eastern European country is ranked on the 87th position worldwide, 74 places underneath its Western counterpart. Hungary's media landscape significantly modified under Orbán's rule becoming increasingly monopolistic. The government is progressively controlling the nation's media institutions. Whilst some outlets lost their editorial independence due to political harassments and censorship, others had to close or were bought by pro-government investors. Fidesz did not only establish own radio and television channels but also created news websites and newspapers. It almost owns all regional print media (*Reporters Without Borders*, 2019). Also, Jobbik states that Hungarian media are not only censored but under the control of the government; as a result, fake news and the repression of dissent have become a norm. Against this backdrop, the party argues that Hungary cannot be considered as a democratic state (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, 2019).

Since Hungary's traditional media are regarded as Fidesz's mouthpiece (Karl, 2017a), Jobbik uses *Social Media* to spread its perspectives and news. As the AfD, the party owns *Facebook*, *Twitter*, *Instagram* and *YouTube* accounts and cooperates with different online networks. Its usage is more interactive rather than hierarchical. Jobbik constantly communicates with its followers and motivates them to share publications. Thereby, it directly approaches digital natives which provide explanation for its success among young voters (Karl, 2017b). Furthermore, Jobbik focuses on grassroots politics next to its online presence. It, for example, cooperates with various nationalist rock bands like *Kárpátia* to attract young people (Petsinis, 2016). By organizing an annual *Mayfest* since 2007, the party accomplished to build a symbiosis between Hungary's identity music bands and the right-wing nationalist subculture. The *Mayfests* are an important event for the right-wing extremist scene. They combine political speeches with various leisure activities. Jobbik's involvement increased its popularity because it assists in attracting both moderate pagan-nationalist and authoritarian-racist groups. Besides, the party also arranges periodic festivals and commemorations, and publicly patrols Hungary's border fence (Karl, 2017a). Jobbik arranges youth camps and forums. It organises community events, prints leaflets and represents itself at university festivals (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Thus, it "has made substantial investments to rejuvenate the Hungarian far right, not only at the ideological [...] but also at the organisational level" (Pirro & Róna, 2018: 10).

Moreover, Jobbik adopted a new communication and sales strategy in 2013. The so called ‘cuteness-campaign’ aims to change the party’s image from one of the EU’s most extreme parties to a mainstream party (Györi, 2017). Since Jobbik was considered as unacceptable for many Hungarians, its chances to govern the country were slim, requiring the adoption of a more moderate stance became indispensable (Györi, 2016). For instance, it distanced itself from its previous support of the *Magyar Gárda* (Hungarian Guard) which aimed to police Roma (Kim, 2016). Although the guard was forbidden by law in 2009 (Langebach & Speit, 2013), it sustainably impacted Jobbik’s media presence (Varga, 2014). Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that Jobbik only changed its communication strategy, not its ideals (Györi, 2016).

Despite various media restrictions that impede Jobbik’s publicity, it can successfully sell its policies with the aid of *Social Media* and grassroot actions. It directly addresses its supporters and communicates with them on an interactive level. Thus, its popularity is fostered by both its target-driven media usage and organisation of public events.

3.7 Jobbik’s electoral success

As in Germany (see Chapter II), national elections take place every four years in Hungary. Hence, since its foundation, Jobbik took part in four elections. Its electoral performances are indicated and compared with those of the ruling party Fidesz in Figure 3.




Figure 3: National election results Jobbik and Fidesz (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2019; Norsk senter for forskningsdata, 2019)

As Figure 3 illustrates, Jobbik was able to significantly improve its electoral performance since its first elections in 2006, where it only received 2.2 percent. Due to a 5 percent threshold, the party was not able to enter the parliament before 2010. Here, it won 16.67 percent of all votes, more than seven times as many as in 2006 (Norsk senter for forskningsdata, 2019). Four years later it managed to increase its popularity by 3.79 percent. However, while the party received 20.2 percent of all votes in 2014, it was merely supported by 19.1 percent in 2018. Nevertheless, despite the slight decrease in electoral support, Jobbik became Hungary's second strongest party. While it was outvoted by Fidesz and the *Hungarian Socialist Party* in 2014 and 2010, merely Fidesz received more support in 2018. Thus, although Jobbik lost 1.1 percent of votes, it gained national popularity to become Hungary's main opposition party (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2019).

As Jobbik, Fidesz was able to significantly increase its support from 2006 to 2010 when it became Hungary's ruling party. Nevertheless, although its electoral outcomes are constantly higher than the ones of Jobbik, its popularity decreased after 2010. Despite a slight increase in the 2018 elections, it was not able to repeat or surpass the electoral success of 2010. Thus, as Figure 3 indicates, whilst Fidesz's success decreased in 2014, Jobbik's augmented. In 2018, however, the opposite happened when Fidesz's share of elections saw an increase while Jobbik's declined. This is insofar suspicious since the refugee crisis took place between the

national elections of 2014 and 2018. Thus, this indicates that the ruling party addressed cultural grievances resulting from the refugee crisis in a more consistent way. In contrast to that, the financial crisis of 2008 bolstered the prominence of both parties since their popularity improved thereafter. Hence, while Fidesz was able to sustainably utilize both the refugee and financial crises in its favour, Jobbik merely benefitted from the latter in the long-term.

Nevertheless, Jobbik is not popular at national levels alone but also at a European level. In 2009, when the party took place at the EPE for the first time, it received 14.77 percent of all votes. Hence, it became Hungary’s second strongest party after Fidesz. It was able to sustain its success in 2014. With 14.67 percent, its performance remained stable (European Parliament, 2019b). However, despite Jobbik’s strong performance in all previous elections, the results of the 2019 EPE illustrate a significant backward trend: The party only received 6.41 percent of all votes. Hence, while it became Hungary’s second strongest party in 2018, it was outvoted by four parties during the European Parliamentary Elections in 2019; namely, Fidesz, the DC, *Momentum* and a coalition of the MSZP and the *Dialogue for Hungary* (European Parliament, 2019c).

To comprehend Jobbik’s popularity its continuous performance needs to be examined. Due to data unavailability, the analysis of Jobbik’s forecasts begins in 2010. As in Chapter II, it ends in 2018. The findings are summarized in Figure 3:




Figure 4: Electoral forecasts Jobbik (Közüvéleménykutatók.hu, 2019)

As the diagram demonstrates, Jobbik’s electoral forecasts are characterized by various fluctuations. In contrast to the AfD’s (see Chapter II), no positive trend is visible. While the party increased its popularity between 2010 and 2012, it decreased in 2013. Despite a rise in 2014 and 2015, it began to steadily diminish since 2016. In 2018, merely 15.6 percent of Hungary’s population supported the party, 9 percent less than in 2015 when it reached its peak. Although Figure 4 indicates that the 2008 financial crisis and Jobbik’s modified communication strategy increased its popularity in 2013, it is clear that its support began to decrease after the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. Thus, Jobbik either did not pay enough attention to the handling of displaced persons, did not make its radical stances clear enough or it simply could not be differentiated from those of other parties. Without a doubt, the party did not exploit the immigration crisis as effectively as the AfD (Közüvéleménykutatók.hu, 2019). A clear backward trend is visible which shows Jobbik’s weak performance in the 2019 EPE.

To comprehend whether Jobbik’s electoral performance is related to cultural discontents stemming from the number of people moving to Hungary, Figure 4 illustrates the rate of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers entering the country between 2010 and 2018. Data for previous years are not available.




Figure 5: Immigration into Hungary: Number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants from 2010 until 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019)

As Figure 5 demonstrates, the number of immigrants moving to Hungary remained relatively stable from 2010 to 2016. From 2017 onwards, however, it began to increase. As in Germany (see Chapter II), estimates do not indicate whether the immigrants are permanently or temporarily moving to the Eastern European nation. Moreover, they do not demonstrate the proportion of EU-nationals and non-EU-nationals (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019). It is clear that the number of immigrants increased at the same time the amount of asylum seekers decreased. Figure 5 indicates a sharp rise of applications for asylum in 2014, reaching its peak in 2015. In comparison to immigrants, asylum seekers merely include people who are not originating from EU member states (European Parliament, 2019).

Similarly, the number of refugees that are recognized by Hungary is consistently below the number of both asylum seekers and immigrants. Hence, although the Eastern European nation has external EU-borders and is because of this one of the first European countries refugees can reach, only a small percentage of them decides to stay. Furthermore, it is noticeable that neither significant decreases nor increases took place during the analysed timeframe. Rather, the number of displaced persons entering Hungary remained stable between 2010 and 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a).

As Figure 4 indicates, Jobbik was most popular in 2015, the year Hungary received most applications of asylum. Thus, it can be assumed that the party was able to directly address grievances resulting from the number of asylum seekers. Nonetheless, due to its decrease in popularity thereafter, Jobbik was unable to utilize the consequences of the crisis long-term political appeal. Furthermore, its increased support since 2010 indicates that the party sustainably approached economic concerns resulting from the financial crisis of 2008. Whilst economic uncertainties and financial insecurity are the biggest fears of Jobbik voters (Boros & Laki, 2018), two out of ten also regard foreign religions (and their cultures) threatening to Hungary's national identity (Boros, 2017). An increasing rate of foreigners can not only lead to the decline of traditional merits but can also result in increased competition for economic resources and job opportunities between immigrants and the locals. Nevertheless, even though more people decided to migrate to Hungary from 2017 onwards, Jobbik's popularity has declined. Thus, it can be assumed that the party does not address grievances resulting from general immigration. Instead, based on its policy statements, it mainly focuses on existing economic grievances resulting from the failures of previous governments and cultural concerns stemming from local minority groups.

Jobbik's support base differs from the one of the AfD (see Chapter II). While RWP is a new political phenomenon in Germany, it has long been a part of Hungary's modern politics.

In comparison to the AfD, Jobbik is most favoured by young voters. Against this backdrop, the age is decisive for its popularity. In 2017, 23 percent of all Hungarians aged 30 or younger supported the party (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Jobbik attracts teenagers of all social backgrounds who aim to figure out their place in Hungary's political landscape and society at-large. They are mostly male and not part of other organisations (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Among all voters, especially internet users of the younger generation are overrepresented (Kim, 2016). Besides, electoral support for the party transcends classes with both the elite and the working class voting for it during elections. It is only in Budapest that the intellectual elite is underrepresented (Boros, 2016). Furthermore, Jobbik receives support from Hungary's middle class across the country although it is most successful in the peripheries (Mares & Havlík, 2016). While almost every third Hungarian (28 percent) considers Jobbik as trustworthy ruling party, 53 percent are not so convinced, especially people older than 60 years of age (Boros & Laki, 2018).

3.8 Concluding remarks: The importance of economic and cultural aspects

Jobbik is part of Hungary's parliament since 2010. Its success is based on both Hungary's social fabric and structural conditions which are in favour of RWP. Even though the country is ruled by the RWPP Fidesz since 2010, Jobbik was able to constantly increase its electoral success which is why it became Hungary's second strongest and therewith main opposition party in 2018. Despite a backward trend regarding its share of votes, it can attract a wide support base. With the aid of *Social Media* and grassroot actions, it successfully addresses its target group. In comparison to the AfD (see Chapter II), Jobbik's support base consists of the younger generation and many first-time voters. As the majority of Hungarians, the party is in favour of the EU. Nevertheless, Hungary is not only characterized by a weak and corrupted economy but also by social injustices. At this juncture, Jobbik is able to exploit economic grievances. It addresses existing discontents and offers potential solutions to diminish these.

Next to that, the country's population is regarded as more xenophobic than Germany's. Not only are immigrants and refugees unwelcome, also local minority groups like Roma and Jews are facing discrimination. Due to Hungary's isolated history, its people are afraid of foreign domination and the loss of cultures which is why its people aim to protect traditional values and customs. Jobbik directly approaches cultural grievances in its manifesto and provides potential implementations which intend to solve existing challenges. Thus, the party does not only exploit the Hungarian society's economic grievances but also its cultural frustrations. Addressing wide-spread fears accounts for Jobbik's success. Nevertheless, it is

clear that the party's election forecast results declined after the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015 since it gave Jobbik the chance to further spread xenophobic views to attract supporters in the long-term.

As the AfD's, Jobbik's stances and utterances are fraught by contradictions: While Jobbik describes Hungary as welcoming and multicultural state, it does not want to grant asylum to refugees. Moreover, even though it claims that minorities within Hungary must be protected, it discriminates Roma at the same time. The party does not only utilize the name 'Gypsy', an offensive and racist slur, when talking about Roma but also incriminates them of various issues. No other minorities are affronted in its manifesto although some of Jobbik's politicians showed contemptuous attitudes towards, for instance, Jews in the past.

Chapter IV

Analysis and interpretation of findings: Underlying reasons for the AfD and Jobbik's success

4.1 Introduction

To make sense of the reasons that have propelled the rise of RWP in Germany and Hungary, and to investigate the existential features the AfD and Jobbik have in common, it is essential to compare the structural make-ups of the two societies. Furthermore, it is important to examine the political appearances and agendas of the selected parties in relation to the given social conditions and political configurations. Against this background, it is the aim of this chapter to identify the causes for the AfD and Jobbik's increasing success. It intends to answer the following questions: How do the structural conditions of Germany differ from those of Hungary? To what extent do the AfD and Jobbik resemble each other in relation to their ideologies and electoral success? Do economic or cultural considerations provide definite explanations for the rise of RWP in Germany and Hungary?

Since this thesis argues that cultural aspects are decisive for the AfD's success while both economic and cultural factors determine Jobbik's popularity, this chapter compares existing social and political grievances underlying the two countries. First, the impacts of economic grievances will be analysed before Germany and Hungary's cultural challenges are examined. Second, the policy statements of the two RWPPs are compared and put into analytical perspective. Lastly, the AfD and Jobbik's communication strategies and electoral performances are put into comparative perspective.

4.2 The impact of economic grievances

The rise of RWP in democracies has been perceived to be a symptom of pre-existing social grievances (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Hence, economic deprivations can provide fertile ground for right-wing populist attitudes. As investigated in Chapter II and Chapter III, economic discontents exist in both Germany and Hungary. However, whilst Germany is regarded as the EU's strongest economy, Hungary is characterized by a weak economic performance and a lack of economic freedom. Its judiciary is not only threatened to lose its independence due to government meddling, its economy is also challenged by labour shortages

and a litany of social challenges. Hungary's struggles regarding economic discrimination and social exclusion are unique despite the fact that Germany also faces challenges relating to economic injustices, its society benefits from a strong labour market.

Against this backdrop, merely Jobbik's policy preoccupations centre around economic factors. The Hungarian party exploits economic grievances by making the ruling government responsible for economic injustices and by emphasizing its ability to improve Hungary's economic performance. It offers various concepts that aim to alter the country's economic system and to create employment. Jobbik, for example, intends to create small and medium sized enterprises in rural areas. Although the AfD also addresses economic aspects in its policy statements through its advocacy for a minimum wage, it has scant interest in addressing the social injustices bedevilling Germany. As a result, it is not surprising that economic discontents receive attention only when they are linked to immigration. Hence, as a solution for rising labour shortages in Germany, the AfD advocates increasing fertility for the intake of immigrants. Although it is plausible that the party does not base its policies on economic grievances due to Germany's strong economy, it prevents the AfD from sustainably attracting supporters who harbour economic discontents. Even though the country performs well economically, economic frustrations do exist due to employment and education injustices. From this it follows that economic aspects are not decisive for the AfD's success since its electoral performance has been on upward trajectory despite not exploiting people's economic frustrations. In essence, whilst economic grievances are behind Jobbik's popularity, the AfD's electoral appeal has been enhanced by the party's exploitation of cultural grievances among Germans.

4.3 Cultural challenges and prejudices

As shown in Chapter II and Chapter III, cultural grievances impact the rise of RWP in Germany and Hungary. Both the AfD and Jobbik address public frustrations which result from concerns relating to immigration. Whilst the AfD merely criticises Muslims in its policy statements, Jobbik mainly focuses on Roma, one of Europe's largest minority groups. Hence, in contrast to the AfD, Jobbik does not base its antipathy towards a religious group but against ethnicity. Nevertheless, even though this makes it seem like Muslims are most unfavoured in Germany and Roma in Hungary, a study by the Pew Research Center (2016) discovered the opposite:

Table 1: Negative attitudes towards Muslims, Roma and Jews

	Muslims	Roma	Jews
Germany	29%	40%	5%
Hungary	72%	64%	32%
EU average	43%	48%	16%

Source: Pew Research Center (2016)

As Table 1 demonstrates, xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants are more common in Hungary than in Germany. In comparison to the EU average, the antipathy of Germany's society to minority groups is less whereas it is bigger in Hungary. It is clear that Roma are regarded as more unfavourable than Muslims in Germany since political debates and the AfD's policy statement mainly focus on the Islam. However, it reflects the EU average which also regards Roma as *persona non gratae*. Moreover, it is noticeable that Muslims are more unwelcome than Roma among the Hungarian population which is reflected in Jobbik not taking aim at the Islam in its manifestos. This finding may result from the fact that 76 percent of Hungary's population claim that Muslims aim to be distinct. Only 16 percent think that they are willing to adapt to national customs. In Germany, on the other hand, every third person regards Muslims as ready to integrate (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016). Nevertheless, the citizens of both countries share similar sentiments about Jews. Even though six times more Hungarians view them with scepticism, Jews are overall the most welcome minority group (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016).

The fact that the AfD mainly focuses on Muslims and Jobbik on Roma might also be related to the refugee crisis. Whilst Figure 6 illustrates the number of refugees seeking hostage in Germany and Hungary, Figure 7 indicates the amount of asylum applications in the selected countries between 2013 and 2018. The statistics begin in 2013 since this is the year the AfD was founded. Statistics regarding general immigration are not illustrated since, as investigated in Chapter II and Chapter III, the number refugees and asylum seekers are decisive for the AfD and Jobbik's success.




Figure 6: Number of refugees entering Germany and Hungary (European Parliament, 2019a)




Figure 7: Number of asylum applications in Germany and Hungary (European Parliament, 2019a)

As Figure 6 illustrates, significantly more refugees entered Germany between 2013 and 2018. Besides, while the rate of refugees coming to Germany is consistently increasing, it remains relatively stable in Hungary. This corresponds with the patterns in Figure 7 which demonstrates

that more people applied for asylum in the Western European country. Whilst Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state in 2016 when it reached its summit, the quantity of applications in Hungary already peaked in 2015. Hence, the number of displaced persons who aimed to immigrate into Hungary decreased after 2015, one year earlier than in Germany.

Nevertheless, although less displaced persons enter and apply for asylum in Hungary, Hungarians view refugees with more scepticism than Germans. While six out of ten Germans are concerned about the rise of immigrant-related crimes, almost eight out of ten Hungarians share similar fears. Thus, most citizens fear that the risk of domestic terrorism increases with a growing number of refugees. Only a minority of the population in both countries claims that cultural diversity and immigration reduce the living standard of the indigenes, i.e. 31 percent in Germany and 41 percent in Hungary (Poushter, 2016).

As the foregoing, xenophobic attitudes towards Muslim, Roma and Jews still exist in both countries. Islamophobic attitudes increased during the refugee crisis. Whilst the AfD directly addressed this phenomenon in its policies, Jobbik did not. Rather, the focus was kept on Roma even though the Hungarian population demonstrated an aversion towards Islam. This might explain why the AfD increased its share of votes during the refugee crisis whereas Jobbik suffered reduction in electoral support. In this regard, the AfD was more successful than its Eastern counterpart in addressing cultural grievances resulting from the growing number of refugees. However, this does not indicate that cultural grievances do not play a role for the success of Hungary's Jobbik. Instead it indicates that the right-wing party did not adequately deal with the question of Muslim refugees. As per the above-mentioned survey, more Hungarians than Germans hold prejudices against foreigners. Hence, cultural aspects continue to shape the public discourse and political decision-making in Germany and Hungary. They have the potential to increase the popularity and success of RWPPs in both countries.

4.4 Policy statements to approach discontents

It is indispensable to individually analyse and compare the policy statements of the AfD and Jobbik to comprehend their success since they shed light into the parties' aims, ideological underpinnings and principles. They depict how they view themselves, what their official objectives are and which grievances the RWPPs give most attention to. Furthermore, they illustrate on which aspects the parties base their popularity. As the previous chapters depict,

various commonalities and differences between the manifestos of the AfD and Jobbik exist. Although some assertions appear similar, they exhibit differing ideological underpinnings.

Table 2: Comparison of the political agendas

AfD	Jobbik
Differences	
Opposes Germany's membership of the EU	Pro-EU
Anti-Islam	Anti-Roma
Espouses anti-refugee sentiments due to security, economic and cultural considerations	Opposes granting asylum to displaced persons due to historical and cultural considerations
Prioritises a national and European frontier defence	Calls for efficient border control of the EU's external borders
In denial of the climate change	Acknowledgment of the climate change
Supportive of Germany strengthening relations with Russia	Supports strengthening Hungary's relationship with Germany, Turkey and Russia
Promotes fertility as an antidote to labour shortages	Supports creation of attractive economic for retention of scarce skills
Pro-media regulation and surveillance	Pro-media freedom
Hyper critical of government and less solutions oriented	Provides solutions to Hungary's cultural and economic grievances
Commonalities	
Excessive and radical political messages	
Regard themselves as custodians of national interests	
Place disproportionate importance on protection of national sovereignty	
Emphasis on the preservation of native cultures and traditions	

Sources: Alternative für Deutschland (2016); Jobbik (2019a); Jobbik (2019b)

As Table 2 demonstrates, the policies of the AfD and Jobbik share more discrepancies than they do commonalities. While the AfD views the EU with scepticism by stating that it would facilitate Germany's exit from it if the institution does not make significant policy changes, Jobbik holds more positive sentiments towards the regional organisation. It supports Hungary's

membership because the country depends on it. Since the majority of both populations acknowledge their nation's membership in the EU, Jobbik's perspective corresponds to the attitude of the Hungarian society.

Next to that, the parties' antipathy towards minority groups differ. The AfD clearly states that the Islam does not belong to Germany and that most Muslims are unwilling to integrate (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Jobbik, on the contrary, criticizes Roma rather than any religious group. Despite its intention to support minorities, it openly declares its aversion against the tribe. This finding is suspicious since most Germans are more antipathetic towards Roma and Hungarians towards Muslims.

Although both RWPPs regard immigration as problematic, their stances differ. According to the AfD, refugees, particularly Muslims, portray a national security risk and a danger for traditional values. Furthermore, they are less educated than natives and not eligible for the labour market. Most of them want to live on the cost of the government. Jobbik, on the other hand, refuses to grant asylum for displaced persons due to cultural reasons and because Hungary never colonized other countries. Although the parties agree that the external borders of the EU need to be controlled. While this seems to be sufficient for Jobbik since Hungary possesses external borders, the AfD considers it as inadequate measure. Because Germany is a popular destination for refugees, the party regards the additional protection of its national borders as indispensable.

Another significant difference is that only Jobbik admits the existence of the climate change (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). Even though both parties consider the protection of the environment as important, the AfD does not believe that the climate change is a man-made phenomenon. Its denialism led to its outvoting by the *Greens* in the 2019 EPE. Besides, the foreign policies of the RWPPs differ in their intensity. Whilst the AfD openly declares its support for Russia, Jobbik aims to intensify its relations to Russia, Germany and Turkey. To fill labour shortages which exist in both countries, the AfD plans to increase the birth rate of Germans by promising financial compensation. Jobbik, on the other hand, intends to make Hungary more attractive for locals to avoid a brain-drain. Therefore, the party states concrete plans with the express purpose to diminish economic grievances.

The biggest difference between the two parties is, however, their capability to offer solutions to the problems they identify. The AfD's political statement is characterized by a lot of criticism that exposes the alleged failings of established parties. Ideas to solve abovementioned issues are rare and generalized, and economic grievances in particular are hardly addressed. Although Jobbik attacks mainstream parties as well, it directly approaches

deprivations by offering possible ways to solve them. It, for instance, plans to establish enterprises that aim to support people living in rural areas (Jobbik, 2019a). Hence, in contrast to the AfD, Jobbik addresses public grievances by not only identifying them but also by suggesting potential solutions for their elimination.

Nonetheless, the two parties also agree on some points. They do not only make use of excessively radical utterances that seem to mirror the concerns of the population but also share their right-wing populist stances. Both parties clearly differentiate between the ruling elite and the people, foster national sovereignty, criticise corruption and aim to strengthen local customs, cultures and values. Thus, they aim to represent their respective population by addressing public grievances and by making the government responsible for existing discontents.

From this it follows that the AfD approaches existing challenges in a different manner than Jobbik. It does not only neglect the truth about the climate change being man-made but also puts less emphasis on existing economic concerns. Instead its policy statement is characterized by being critical towards established parties and foreigners. The party portrays itself as superior and emphasizes the special features of being German. Cultural aspects clearly dominate its agenda. In contrast to that, Jobbik addresses both cultural and economic discontents to a similar extent. Thus, its policies focus on various grievances and possible ways to solve them. Moreover, as the AfD, it criticises mainstream parties and immigrants. Against this backdrop, while the two parties clearly have different economic policy positions, they share similar stances regarding cultural sentiments.

4.5 Communication strategy, *Social Media* and electoral success

Without media, the AfD and Jobbik would be unable to sell their policies on a wide scale. Against this backdrop, communication is decisive for their popularity and therewith success. Figure 8 compares all elections results of the two parties between 2013 and 2019. Whilst N1 stands for *national elections 1*, N2 accounts for *national elections 2*. Thus, in the case of Germany the N1 took place in 2013 and the N2 in 2017. In Hungary, N1 represents 2014 and N2 2018.




Figure 8: Compared electoral success between 2013 and 2019

As Figure 8 illustrates, the electoral success of the two RWPPs has been different since 2013. While the AfD was able to augment its share of votes from 2013 until 2017, with a sharp increase in 2017, its support declined thereafter. In the 2019 EPE, it received 1.63 percent less than in the previous elections. Thus, the AfD had its best results in 2017 when it became Germany's third strongest and at the same time main opposition party. The course of the AfD's graph and the high ascent from 2014 to 2017 indicates that the refugee crisis played a significant role in the AfD's popularity. After Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state in 2016, the party successfully addressed cultural grievances and was able to almost double its share of votes.

Jobbik, on the other hand, lost on popularity since the national elections in 2014. Although these took place in the same year as the 2014 EPE, it received 5.53 percent more on a national level despite its positive stance towards the EU. Four years later, Jobbik increased its share of votes again. Even though it was not able to repeat its success from N1, it became Hungary's second strongest and therewith main opposition party with 19.1 percent. Hence, the refugee crisis did not sustainably increase Jobbik's popularity. Instead its support diminished compared to the national elections in 2014. From this it follows that the party was not able to successfully address cultural grievances resulting from the immigration crisis in the long-term. It did in the short-term as its election forecasts (see Chapter III) demonstrate. Jobbik's downward trend continued in the 2019 *European Parliamentary Elections* in which it received

its worst results in the observed timeframe and less percent than the AfD. Jobbik is constantly performing better on a national than on an international level.

In summary, Jobbik was more successful than its German counterpart in three out of four analysed elections. The AfD merely outvoted Jobbik in the 2019 EPE. While an overall positive trend is detectable for the AfD, despite the weak performance on a European level in 2019, Jobbik's trajectory is more negative since its results worsened since 2015.

4.6 Conclusion

Not only do the policy statements of the AfD and Jobbik differ, the structural conditions and social reverberations of Germany and Hungary are also divergent. Thus, although RWP gained in popularity in the two countries since 1989, its causes are different. Whilst Germany developed into Europe's economic powerhouse since its reunification, Hungary is struggling under a weak economy which is further weakened by high levels of corruption. The Western European country performs better in all analysed indices: the IEF, CPI and SJI. Even though it is challenged by social injustices, less economic discontents than in Hungary exist. This is reflected in the AfD and Jobbik's manifestos. While the AfD hardly focuses on economic development, Jobbik does not only state various grievances but also offers potential solutions to strengthen Hungary's economy. From this it follows that economic challenges are more decisive for the rise of RWP in Hungary than in Germany.

Nonetheless, cultural aspects are playing a major role in both selected countries. Despite different emphases regarding unfavoured minorities and divergent public opinions, the AfD and Jobbik criticise foreign infiltration. The two parties clearly place emphasis on the importance of maintaining national identities and traditions. Although xenophobic attitudes are more widespread in Hungary, the AfD successfully addresses cultural concerns among the German population. In contrast to Jobbik, it utilized the refugee crisis for its benefit and significantly improved its electoral performance as a result. This was eased by the fact that Germany received more applications for asylum in 2016 than any other EU member state. Moreover, more refugees entered the nation than Hungary between 2013 and 2018. Hence, cultural aspects have become the major determinant factor behind the rise of RWP in both countries. The two parties disproportionately focus on cultural challenges confronting their respective society with policy utterances that promote flagrant discrimination against refugees and other minority groups.

Chapter V

Conclusion: Economic and cultural discontents and the rise of right-wing populism in Germany and Hungary

5.1 Introduction

Unearthing the circumstances behind European RWP and whether cultural or economic aspects foster it is indispensable to understand the AfD and Jobbik's success. Having said this, it was the aim of this thesis to decipher the causes of the rise of RWP in the EU, Germany and Hungary in particular, against the backdrop of the rise of right-wing populist parties in the European Union. With the aid of the comparative case study approach, it intended to investigate the reasons for the increasing popularity of the AfD of Germany and Jobbik of Hungary, the main opposition parties in the two countries' parliaments. Although Germany and Hungary have different historical and political backgrounds, both EU member states have been confronted with an increase of right-wing populist attitudes. As a result, the study analysed and contrasted the social, cultural and economic conditions of the two nations. It did not only focus on Germany and Hungary's social and political landscapes and the cultural and economic cleavages in these two societies, but also on their cultural and economic discontents. It also examined the two parties' electoral performance against the backdrop of media usage. To analyse their communication strategies is crucial because media have the power to directly impact public discourse and opinion building. All structural conditions were analysed in relation to the parties' policy statements in order to paint a full picture of the popularity of RWP.

This thesis argued that cultural aspects are decisive for the success of the AfD and Jobbik. Furthermore, also economic discontents fuelled by soaring levels of immigration have played an important factor behind the rise of RWPPs mainly in Hungary while playing a marginal role in Germany. While xenophobia has influence on the voting behaviour in both Germany and Hungary, it is only in the case of the latter that economic grievances have had a significant impact. Unlike Germany, EU's strongest economy, Hungary struggles under a weak economic performance, which has been made worse by the high levels of corruption plaguing the country. Hence, economic discontents seem only to have a bearing on the electoral success of Jobbik, while cultural grievances have influenced the success of both Jobbik and AfD during elections.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the scope of impact of the *Cultural Backlash Thesis* and the *Economic Insecurity Perspective* and to discuss the research findings. First, theoretical reflections will be analysed on a macrolevel to investigate the extent the two theories account for RWP in both Hungary and Germany against other experiences elsewhere in the EU. Hence, the section identifies whether one theory is supreme in the EU and if one has a deeper theoretical basis. Second, this chapter focuses on the theoretical implications at a microlevel. It examines the extent the CBT and EIP account for the rising popularity of the AfD and Jobbik. Similarities as well as differences between Germany and Hungary will be paid more attention. Subsequently, suggestions for further research are provided at the end.

5.2 Theoretical reflections and the rise of right-wing populism in the European Union

In the past few years Europe has faced increasing levels of RWPPs making RWP one of the EU's biggest challenges of the modern age. RWP has come not only to threaten liberal democracies in the EU member states, it has also come to threaten the Union as an institution. For instance, the RWPP *Lega* is part of the government in Italy, the *Sweden Democrats* (SD) received record results in the 2018 national elections in Sweden (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). At the same time, authoritarian demagogues are becoming increasingly popular in Eastern Europe. In Poland, for example, the ruling party *Law and Justice* (PiS) promotes conservative and totalitarian policies. Also, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia nationalistic parties are in power (Bax, 2018).

The rise of right-wing populism in Europe is reflected in the performance of right-wing populist parties during the European Parliamentary Elections. Since the European Parliamentary Elections of 2014, which saw the political undercurrents in Europe making significant shifts to the right, the EU has been under crisis mode that has continued to shake up the foundations of the organisation (Hetzer, 2015). It was manifested in the 2019 European Parliamentary Elections when EU-critical right-wing parties were able to outvote mainstream parties in countries like France and Great Britain (Axel Springer SE, 2019b). In accordance with the CBT and EIP, deep seated cultural and economic cleavages have been significant for the rising popularity of RWPPs across the EU. However, due to the member states' divergent structural conditions and the varying impacts of economic and cultural cleavages in each society, no single approach provides a sweeping account for the rise of RWP.

Driving the wave of populism in the EU is the fear of refugees who have been blamed for the socioeconomic and sociocultural challenges the region is grappling with (Wolf, 2017).

Estimates show that the people who vote for RWPPs (76 percent in France for *Front National* (FN), 69 percent in Austria for the FPA, 66 percent in Italy for *Lega*, 58 percent in Poland for PiS and 57 percent in the Netherlands for the *Party for Freedom* (PVV) have an aversion for globalisation as it spawns cultural and social changes that fly in the ways of traditional ways of society (Hartleb, 2017). The fear of the unknown and the fear of not being able to handle challenging situations impact Europe's electorate (Wolf, 2017). The rise of RWP identifies that these social changes are perceived as too fast by many citizens (Hartleb, 2017).

As shown elsewhere in the paper, the 2015 refugee crisis, which was precipitated by swathes of immigrants mainly from the Middle East and North Africa, had a direct effect on proliferation and dominance of RWPP in the EU. This conforms with the *Cultural Backlash Thesis* which states that the support of RWP is a social-psychological phenomenon that is fostered by modifying social conditions and value changes. Due to increasing migrant movements and the rising global interconnectedness, Europeans are concerned about the potential devastating effect of immigration on their cultures and national identities. RWPPs have exploited these dissatisfactions in society for their own narrow ends, relying on nationalistic messages that evoke nostalgic sentiments about Europe's 'illustrious' political and cultural history as well as the preservation of the sovereignty of EU member states. Nevertheless, cultural grievances are mostly combined with socio-economic anxieties that result from perceived economic disadvantages currently perpetuated by foreign infiltration. Thus, globalisation does not only endanger traditional norms, it is also considered to threaten the economic security of the EU's member states. As the refugee crisis spawned cultural grievances, the global financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the *Euro Crisis*, also increased economic concerns. Consequently, political instability developed due to economic and social inequalities both between and within the EU member states. The rise of right-wing populist attitudes resulting from economic insecurity conforms with the *Economic Insecurity Perspective* which states that the increasing popularity of RWP is correlated to economic downturns. Because social inequality can have a direct effect on the maturity of democracy, the rise of RWPPs can be proportioned to growing economic difficulties plaguing a nation. From this it follows that economic deprivation and social disparity determine the strength and longevity of RWP.

However, generalizations regarding whether the CBT and EIP are concomitant for the rise of RWP in the EU cannot be made. The organisation's member states do not only differ in terms of historical backgrounds, but also in relation to their economic performances and social nomenclatures. Furthermore, cultural diversity has a regional dimension as it is understood

differently in Eastern compared to Western Europe. Whilst cultural diversity is embraced as having an enriching effect on human coexistence in the latter, many Eastern European countries consider it as existential threat to their national identities and labour market. Thus, findings from the East cannot be applied blanketly to the West. Since the EU member states differ regarding their structural conditions, right-wing populist parties have been propelled by different social and political circumstances. Besides, the CBT must be viewed in relation to the EIP since both theories directly impact each other. Social division can deteriorate as a result of economic decline which can exacerbate tensions in society. The finance and refugee crises expedited the economic and social destabilisation of the European society. Against this backdrop, the extent to which the CBT and EIP account for the rise of RWP must be analysed within the individual contexts of the EU member states.

5.3 Theoretical implications regarding the increasing success of the German *Alternative für Deutschland* and the Hungarian Jobbik

Despite their EU membership and geographic location, Germany and Hungary exhibit stark differences in the realm of politics as well as in economic and sociocultural spheres. Whilst Hungary's society remained homogenous for most of its history, Germany is characterized by heterogeneity. Furthermore, while RWP is a deep-rooted phenomenon in the Eastern European country, the political orientation is still regarded as unacceptable by most Germans. Here, the AfD was the first RWP that entered the national parliament since the country's reunification in 1989. Nevertheless, although to different extents, the two nations are challenged by the rise of RWP. In both national parliaments the main opposition party is a RWP: The AfD in Germany since 2017 and Jobbik in Hungary since 2018. This thesis argued that cultural aspects are decisive for the success of the two analysed parties. Moreover, it claimed that economic factors play a determining role in engendering RWP in Hungary. With this in mind, both theoretical approaches account for the rise of RWPPs in both societies albeit in varying degrees.

Both the CBT and EIP can account for the increasing success of RWP in the EU and the rising popularity of the AfD and Jobbik. By analysing and comparing the two selected parties, this thesis investigated the factors needed to be put into account to identify the causes of the augmenting support of RWPPs. First, this study analysed the *political landscapes* of both Germany and Hungary. Here, it focused on the changing nature and the policies of the selected countries. Whilst Germany is ruled by a coalition of the CDU and SPD, the RWPP Fidesz is in power in Hungary. Hence, although both the AfD and Jobbik are the main opposition party of

their respective governments, the AfD possesses the unique selling point of being the only RWPP in the German parliament. Moreover, since Fidesz has been Hungary's ruling party since 2010, it can be assumed that RWP is deep-rooted in the Eastern nation.

Second, the thesis examined the *role of the EU* in the two countries. Thus, it investigated the AfD and Jobbik's policy stances regarding the EU and whether they are in favour of the organization or not. As the analysis of the parties' manifestos identified, both the AfD and Jobbik are sceptical towards the institution. However, while the German party would support its country's exit from the EU, its Hungarian counterpart values the socio-economic benefits of EU membership alone.

Third, the *economic grievances* existing in the two societies were analysed. In Germany, economic discontents are rare since the country possesses the EU's strongest economy. Even though social injustices are subjectively perceived by parts of the population, the nation performs well in all analysed indices. Hence, it is not only characterized by a high economic freedom and low corruption rate, but also by little objective social injustices. In comparison to that, economic grievances are common among the Hungarian population. Due to the weakness of the country's economy, the ebbing away of economic and rising levels of corruption in the public sector have added insult to a myriad of social injustices faced by its citizens. In EIP's traditions, globalization, increasing economic competition and growing income inequality have had a determinant effect on populist attitudes of the right-wing variety. Hence, economic downturns are associated with the rise of RWP. In this regard, the EIP accounts for Jobbik's increasing success since economic deprivation is popular among Hungarians. This assumption is further strengthened by the party's electoral performance which (as shown in Chapter III) significantly improved after the financial crisis of 2008. In the case of Germany, the EIP does not explain sufficiently enough the AfD's popularity since the party's appeal is not dependent on economic grievances. In contrast to Jobbik, the AfD does not centre its policy statements around economic factors but not nationalist and cultural sentiments. Furthermore, its electoral performance merely rose after it transformed from an anti-EU into an anti-immigration party.

Fourth, the thesis focused on *cultural aspects* as well as *nationalist grievances*. In accordance with the CBT, increasing RWP results from value changes that impact Western societies since the 1980s. It claims that cultural and nationalist factors propelled RWPPs which feed off the peoples' anxieties of losing their cultures and traditional values. As shown in Chapter II, Chapter III and Chapter IV, cultural deprivations are common among the German and Hungarian population. In both societies, minority groups face discrimination due to

divergent cultural beliefs. Whilst the AfD mainly argues against Muslims, Jobbik confronts Roma despite being a long-established minority group in Hungary. In the course of the 2015 refugee crisis, the antipathies of both populations towards foreigners increased. To protect Germany and Hungary's national identities and avoid a change of values, many people began to support RWPPs since they advocate for retention and preservation of domestic traditions. It can be said that the CBT offers a satisfactorily plausible account for the turn of events in Germany and Hungary regarding the emergence and spread of RWP in both societies.

Fifth, the *media usage* of the AfD and Jobbik are worth considering. As shown mainly in Chapter III, the parties' success is not only based on either economic or cultural factors, but also on their *Social Media* performances. Since, media have the power to impact the public discourse, both parties utilize online platforms to spread their ideologies. Here, they do not only have in common that they are more active on *Social Media* than other parties in their respective parliaments, they also share their stance about traditional media. According to the AfD and Jobbik, traditional media are subjective which is why news coverage is falsified and detrimental for their popularity

Sixth, the *electoral popularity* of the AfD and Jobbik was elucidated upon. This was indispensable to test preconceived ideas about the reasons for the parties' success. As election forecasts and results of the past elections showed, the AfD gained significant popularity after Germany got hit by the refugee crisis. Since Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state and since xenophobic attitudes have been on the rise, it can be concluded that cultural grievances have been at the epicentre of the party's electoral success as to assume the role of official opposition in parliament despite having had very marginal political influence before. Moreover, the fact that the AfD received less electoral support before it transformed from an economic-oriented into a populist-nationalist party in 2015, indicates that economic deprivations are not significant considerations behind its rising electoral appeal. In comparison to that, Jobbik was not able to expand its support after the refugee crisis in the long-term. Since the party's policies attend to both economic and cultural grievances in equal measure, it can be concluded that cultural concerns alone have not decisive for its popularity. Rather its policy focusses on economic and cultural grievances have been paramount. From this it follows that the CBT as well as the EIP account for the expanding popularity of Jobbik. Its manifestos do not place disproportionate focus on economic discontents alone, it also pays attention to cultural and nationalist creeping up within the social fabric. In EIP's traditions, economic grievances and social cleavages determine the degree of influence right-wing populist parties have. Moreover, in line with the CBT, an impending threat by exogenous

factors to the values and traditions of a society provide fertile ground for the proliferation and impact of right-wing populist attitudes. Since Germany's economy remains in a sound state, it is not surprising that the AfD has not placed its attention and energy on economic grievances (as they remain minimal), the EIP does not account for the party's rising popularity. On the CBT provides a satisfactory account for the party's success within the wider political landscape of Germany.

As this thesis investigated, both the CBT and EIP can account for the rising popularity of RWP across the EU albeit in varying degrees. Whether cultural or economic grievances have been decisive factors behind the popularity of RWPPs remains contingent on the individual social conditions and political nomenclatures of each member state. Whilst economically strong countries like Germany are mostly challenged by cultural conflicts, economically weaker nations such as Hungary are facing cultural and economic grievances in similar degrees. Despite the different political histories of the two countries, cultural cleavages in the two societies remain undeniably significant considerations for understanding the rise of RWP and relative success of right-wing populist parties such as Jobbik and the AfD that either fuel or feed off growing populist and right-wing sentiments. It is only in the case of Jobbik that economic cleavages become plausible determinants driving the party's appeal in Hungary and the increasingly hostile social fabric towards immigrants the party is exploiting for its narrow political gains.

5.4 Considerations for future research

Since the rise of RWP affects all European countries to some extent, the analysis of more nations is appropriate for further research to find similarities that apply to a broader scope. For instance, a South European or Scandinavian country would be adequate since Germany is located in Western and Hungary in Eastern Europe. By including more EU member states the analysis would not only focus on a greater area, but will also illustrate the influence of differing historical, cultural and economic contexts that propelled modern-day political developments. In addition, since RWP has become a global phenomenon, countries from other regions of the world can be studied in comparative perspective to the EU's experiences with right-wing populist parties for purposes of drawing parallels. Furthermore, the application of multiple research methods is advantageous to comprehend the motivations behind the support of RWPPs. For instance, focus group discussions as well as interviews with locals can prove helpful.

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