

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

**A STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
NATIONAL PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980's
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
PROFESSOR DAVID WELSH, SUPERVISOR**

BY

CHRISTINE HUNSAKER

RONDEBOSCH, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SEPTEMBER 1991

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1992

DECLARATION

No portion of this work has been submitted by this writer in support of an application for another degree or qualification from this or any other University or other institution of learning.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	-	African National Congress
Arm Scor	-	Armaments Corporation of South Africa
AWB	-	Afrikaner Resistance Movement
BLS	-	Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
CAAA	-	Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
CP	-	Conservative Party, SA
COSATU	-	Congress of South African Trade Unions
EEC	-	European Economic Community
EC	-	European Community
FOSATU	-	Federation of South African Trade Unions
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
HNP	-	Herstigte Nasionale Party, SA
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
Mossgas	-	Mossel Bay liquid fuel/gasfield project, SA
MPLA	-	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAACP	-	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP	-	National Party, SA
NSC	-	National Security Council, USA
NSSM 39	-	National Security Study Memorandum 39, USA
OPEC	-	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PFP	-	Progressive Federal Party, SA
SA	-	South Africa
SAA	-	South African Airways
SACP	-	South African Communist Party
SASOL	-	South African fuel project: oil-from-coal plants
SWAPO	-	South West Africa People's Organization
UN	-	United Nations
UNITA	-	Angolan rebel force

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to represent, as clearly as it is possible, South Africa's National Party perceptions on United States foreign policy in the 1980s. The primary area of focus is the policy switch from constructive engagement to punitive sanctions in the mid-1980s and the circumstances to which they have given rise. The following is a brief summary and the contents of the dissertation.

The dissertation will give a complete and formal statement in chapter two on U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa since approximately World War Two. The dissertation will provide a clear definition and understanding of economic sanctions in chapter three and touch on the current on-going sanctions debate in South Africa. The core of the dissertation is displayed in chapter four which is a presentation of field data collected from personal interviews with a third of the National Party caucus. This displays the National Party's perceptions on U.S. foreign policy. Following, chapter five presents alternative views to those held by the NP on the same issues discussed in chapter four. The final chapter makes an attempt at some conclusions based on the data presented in the dissertation.

This study is important because it maintains that the data and questions presented in this dissertation offer interview material that has been little studied in the past, thus the findings have the virtue of freshness and uniqueness.

CHAPTER ONE

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

A complex variety of factors make up the ruling National Party's perceptions of the aims behind the United States foreign policy toward South Africa. During the 1980s this area of U.S. foreign policy was of great importance to almost all South Africans as well as to many individuals and organizations in the United States. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the perceptions which have underlain and influenced an aspect of white South Africa's responses to the foreign policy approaches of the U.S. in the 1980s. By examining the National Party's responses both to the policy of constructive engagement and the 1986 switch to punitive sanctions this dissertation aims to deepen the understanding of NP Parliamentarians' perception of U.S. foreign policy.

This study will assume that relations between the United States and South Africa have intensified since the Second World War and more particularly over the past twenty years. The intensification of relations has been brought about by a wide and complex array of inter-related forces. These, among others, include:

- I. The developing economic, political and social circumstances in South Africa and the needs to which they have given rise;
- II. The relations of South Africa with other states and territories in Southern Africa;
- III. The developing social concerns which have occurred in the United States and which have, by comparative association, spilled over into US/South African relations;

- IV. The amount of influence carried by different policy approaches of previous and current U.S. presidential administrations;
- V. The shifting bilateral economic and political strategic interests of the United States and;
- VI. The changing patterns of economic and political values in the international sphere.

These concerns have contributed to an alternating U.S. agenda towards South Africa. While an outline of developments in post-World War II relations between the U.S. and South Africa is provided, an intensive examination of relations between the two countries is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, the chapters of this work that focus on U.S. policy toward South Africa specifically deal with the period of constructive engagement during the first Reagan Administration until the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in the middle of Reagan's second term in 1986.

As CAAA remained in place until July 1991 the year 1986 may not, at first glance, appear to be the logical cut-off point for this dissertation. However, the core of this work consists of material gathered from a representative sample of NP parliamentarians during May and June of 1990. At this time they were asked to cast their minds back over the era of constructive engagement and the break with that policy in 1986.

By 1991 U.S.-imposed sanctions were in the process of being removed as South Africa appeared to be moving toward an acceptance of a democratic constitution. Nevertheless, in 1986 the initial imposition of sanctions marked an important turning-point in US/South African relations, producing reactions in South Africa which have ranged from outright opposition to cooperation.

This dissertation endeavors to shed light on some of these responses. Thus, the central tasks of this work are firstly, the determination of National Party politicians' perceptions of the motives behind U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa during the 1980s and secondly, an interpretation of such perceptions.

The attempt to interpret perception inevitably leads one into a Pandora's Box of problems. To begin with, as we will discuss later, the term perception itself is an ambiguous one, difficult to define, nearly impossible to pinpoint. How do we know whether someone is sharing his/her honest perception of an event with us or is merely telling us what he/she wants us to believe? Moreover, how do we know whether a person's perception of an event represents reality or rather a distortion of it? In other words, how do we distinguish fact from fantasy?

Nonetheless, despite these serious difficulties in dealing with perception, the fact remains that people's stated perceptions --- real or otherwise --- often reveal a great deal about the context in which they operate. As such, perceptions cannot be dismissed merely because they are difficult to grasp. Rather the student of politics must make a concerted effort at perception analysis through a careful delineation of the field of inquiry.

Toward this end, this dissertation, while acknowledging the array of possible idiosyncratic explanations for NP perceptions, sets forth three general hypotheses concerning these perceptions. Hypothesis one operates from the assumption that the change in U.S. policy signalled by CAAA was perceived in an almost exclusively negative light by NP parliamentarians. It states that:

National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy of sanctions to be motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the United States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and interests of South Africa as a whole, white population included.

Hypothesis two, on the other hand, assumes a more positive perception of U.S. intent on the part of NP politicians. It states that:

National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a sincere desire to ensure not only fundamental change in the South African social formation but also a significant political and economic role for whites as well as non-whites.

Finally, hypothesis three states that:

U.S. imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, played a marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South African government to make fundamental changes.

Through extensive interviews with Parliamentary members of the National Party this thesis sets forth to determine which of the first two hypotheses more accurately reflects NP perceptions. In other words it attempts to understand the relationship between the two hypothetical statements and reality. Moreover, the third hypothesis seeks to build on the first two hypotheses, thus making a significant contribution to the sanctions debate on the extent to which sanctions contributed to the process of fundamental change that South Africa is currently undergoing.

The central methodological requirement of this dissertation clearly then is the determination of National Party perceptions of both the objectives and motivations of US foreign policy. The research procedure carried out toward this end are as follows:

- Research and analysis was made of the official reports, public speeches, and academic literature containing the stated responses of NP Parliamentarians to US foreign policy in order to provide an informed framework for an interview format.
- An interview questionnaire consisting of 20 questions was designed to elicit NP perception of US foreign policy both before and after CAAA.
- Standard and structured interviews were conducted with a random sample of 1/3 of all National Party members of Parliament during a two-month period in 1990.

- Likewise standard and structured interviews were also conducted with selected key policy-makers in order to obtain a sample of contrasting viewpoints.
- Interview responses were collated to reflect NP perceptions.
- Results were assessed in relation to the two working hypothesis posited at the outset of this study.

At this point some of the unavoidable limitations of this dissertation should be noted. To begin with, since one is dealing with recent circumstances, primary archival sources have not always been available. Additionally, as the writer of this dissertation is a foreign student and does not speak Afrikaans a language barrier has in certain instances existed. Lastly, as the data collected in this dissertation are rich, it provides for numerous avenues of analysis which, unfortunately, cannot all be explored within the confines of a master's dissertation.

This dissertation has assumed that NP Parliamentarians' responses to U.S. foreign policy are shaped by perceptions of their environment. Thus, it is necessary at the outset of this work to understand precisely what is and is not meant by the term perception as well as to determine the salient factors influencing NP perception. As such, the remainder of this introductory chapter will focus on clarification of the central terminology and approaches employed in this study.

A review of the process of perception analysis as it applies to the South African political context will be provided before a closer look is taken at one of the most important factors motivating NP perceptions, namely Afrikaner nationalism. Lastly, this chapter will conclude by suggesting that it is this domestic factor which in many ways has shaped NP Party perceptions of US foreign policy during the 1980's.

1.1 PERCEPTION

The study of relations between the United States and South Africa must, by definition, make reference to the behavior of these two states. Put another way, it must come to terms with the behavior of the individual decision makers who act on behalf of their respective governments.

Embarking on an inquiry into the causes and consequences of human behavior might at first seem beyond the realm of the student of politics. Yet, as Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi have noted in their recent study of international relations theory, disciplines are rarely self-contained in the social sciences. Indeed, the study of international relations between states now incorporates several subjects including economics, sociology and psychology, to name a few.¹

Dealing as it does with the process of human thought-formation the study of perception is closely linked with the study of psychology in particular. Indeed, perception analysis is one of the many multi-disciplinary approaches to international relations which has emerged from the behaviorist movement of the 1960's. As Herbert C. Kelman notes:

"Psychologists and social scientists in related fields have increasingly addressed themselves to matters of policy in the field of international relations: They have questioned some of the psychological assumptions underlying various approaches to foreign policy and have developed policy recommendations based, at least in part, on psychological considerations."²

Before one can discuss the actual process of perception-formation, the term perception itself needs to be analyzed. One inevitably encounters many difficulties in attempting to come to terms with the concept perception. As the word perception is

is often incorrectly used as a synonym for a number of other terms including attitudes, values, and beliefs, we will first distinguish it from these terms before providing a precise definition. Thereafter, we will move on to a discussion of the 'level of analysis' problem with regard to perception.

1.1.1 Perception: What it is Not

Perhaps the best way to unravel what perception is, is to look at what it is not. As noted above, terms such as attitude, value and belief are often confused with the word perception. While these terms are, in fact, closely linked to the meaning of perception subtle, yet important, distinctions set them apart from it.

Attitudes deal with our opinions or feelings about certain things. As K. J. Holsti tells us an attitude "can be conceived as a general evaluative proposition about some object, fact or condition...."³ When we speak of a person's attitude toward something we are generally referring to how he or she feels about it --- positive or negative, good or bad. Thus the statement 'John has a good attitude toward his work' implies that John has positive feelings about the project he is doing.

Established attitudes help form the perceptions a policy-maker may have of a particular situation. Indeed, as Kelman notes, attitude is a characteristic of perception -- the "general affective orientation toward an object is what the term attitude usually refers to."⁴ With regard to the international arena Holsti says that:

"...attitudes may have important effects on how policy-makers react to actions, signals, and demands of other states, perceive the intentions of other governments, and define their own objectives towards others."⁵

In other words, one's perceptions of an international event are likely to be affected by one's initial attitudes toward it.

Like attitudes, values help determine one's perceptions. However, while attitudes towards things can be a function of either past or present circumstances, values are usually derived from one's background. According to Holsti, values: "are the result of upbringing, political socialization in various group contexts, indoctrination, and personal experience." As such, values often "serve as standard against which our own actions and those of others are judged and are thus the bases of many of our attitudes...." and by extension our perceptions.⁶

Beliefs, on the other hand, are different from both attitudes and values. Whereas attitudes are ways of thinking which affect our values or principles, beliefs are things thought to be true. Thus, beliefs deal with explicit assumptions of truth rather than implicit thoughts or judgements. As Holsti states, "beliefs can be defined as propositions that policy-makers hold to be true, even if they cannot be verified."⁷

Our beliefs --- the things we assume to be true --- often precede and influence our perceptions. As with our attitudes and values our beliefs represent one of the many psychological components we bring to the perception-forming process. Having shown what perception is not, the next logical step for this chapter then becomes to demonstrate what it is.

1.1.2 Defining Perception

Perception can probably best be described in terms of the evaluation individuals regularly make of their environment. Indeed, perception refers to the process whereby

one interprets events on the basis of attitudes, values and beliefs. Holsti refers to perceptions as images which shape individuals' "actions and reactions" to their environment. As Holsti explains, images are:

"individuals' perceptions of an object, fact or condition; their evaluation of that object, fact or condition in terms of its goodness or badness, friendliness or hostility, or value; and the meaning ascribed to, or deduced from that object, fact or condition".⁸

It is from this definition that the term perception will be understood, and it will be used in this way throughout the dissertation.

1.1.3 Perception: The Problems of Image, Reality and Levels of Analysis

As mentioned earlier, perception analysis inevitably confronts the student of politics with a number of serious empirical problems. To begin with, a discrepancy often exists between what is real and what is perceived as being real. Images of situations can frequently be different from reality itself.

As Harold and Margaret Sprout argue:

"One can distinguish two kinds of psychological events. . . On the one hand, individuals may perceive what does not exist or may fail to perceive what does exist. On the other hand, since what is perceived is interpreted in the light of past experience, individuals with different backgrounds may interpret quite differently the same perceived objects or events."⁹

Thus, according to Holsti, one's image of reality is frequently distorted by the particular attitudes, values, beliefs or faulty expectations one brings to a situation. While individuals are constantly barraged by an assortment of input from their environment they actually only respond to or see a minute part of it. When presented

with new messages, most individuals engage in a complex screening process whereby they either only respond to the parts "relevant to a particular situation" or "'see' only information that conforms to their values, beliefs or expectations." Thus, as Holsti notes, "There are both physical and psychological factors that can distort the information upon which policy maker's images of reality are based."¹⁰

Another problem frequently encountered when dealing with perception entails levels of analysis. In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis argues that in order to determine the relationship between perception and the decision-making process of a state one must first locate the appropriate level for analysis. Such identification helps one to decide why "all states of the same kind [i.e. with the same internal characteristics and politics] [don't] behave the same way in the same objective situation..."¹¹

Jervis contends that there are four main levels of analysis to be considered when dealing with perception: the level of decision-making, of the bureaucracy, of the nature of the state and the working of domestic politics, and finally of international environment.¹²

No one level of analysis is necessarily more important than the others. Rather, depending on the area of perception one is analyzing, they are all of potential significant value. The central task for the student of perception then is the determination of the level best suited to the issue one is dealing with and the answers one seeks.¹³ In order to determine which level of analysis is most appropriate for our study of National Party perceptions of US foreign policy a brief discussion of each level will now follow.

The decision-making level in perception analysis focuses on the nature of the individual. In essence it attempts to determine the relationship between the perceptions of the individual government official and his or her effect on the policies of a state. Thus, as the Sprouts have noted, the starting point for analysis at this level is the determination of ". . .the policy-maker's mental image of the environment or situation."¹⁴

The bureaucratic level, on the other hand, explores the way in which an individual's perceptions are influenced by his or her role in a bureaucracy. As Jervis explains, it assumes firstly that "bureaucrats' policy preferences are determined by their positions in government", and secondly that "states' policies are formed by bureaucratic bargains and routines."¹⁵

Analysis at the bureaucratic level attempts to ascertain the way in which group or departmental membership in a government bureaucracy impinges upon the autonomy of individual perception. Unlike the decision-making level, the bureaucratic level tends to focus on "group think" rather than on individual idiosyncracies.

Both the decision-making and bureaucratic levels of analysis look, at least in part, to the manner in which the perceptions of people --- acting in either an individual or bureaucratic capacity --- affect the policies of a state. At the level of state and domestic politics, however, the focus shifts to the way in which the internal characteristics of a state actually shape the perceptions of decision-makers. This level of analysis posits that "variations in decision-makers' policies may [either] be accounted for by variations in social and economic structure and domestic politics of the states they are serving," or in "a state's geographical position, its traditions, its national style, or the consequences, often unintended, of domestic conflicts."¹⁶

Meanwhile, the international level looks to the way that the international environment can and often does play a key role in perception-formation. As Hedley Bull has shown, we now live in a international states system, one in which the actions of any one member state have the potential to influence the actions of all others.¹⁷ Thus, analysts of perceptions at the international level seek to determine the way in international conditions affect the perceptions of decision makers and influence policy outcomes.¹⁸ At this point we must now identify the levels of analysis most appropriate to our study of National Party perceptions of US foreign policy. This is necessary in order to determine the key variables influencing such perceptions. This chapter will argue that the key to identifying National Party perceptions of US foreign policy lies in understanding the interaction between the domestic and international levels of analysis. However, before demonstrating the centrality of these levels, it will first show why the decision-making and bureaucratic levels of analysis are of tangential importance to this study.

Even the briefest look at the foreign policy-making process in South Africa reveals the inapplicability of the decision-making level of analysis to this study. As we know, the decision-making level essentially deals with the way in which differences in individual personalities and backgrounds affect the actual foreign policy of a state.

If we look at the way in which foreign policy is both controlled and made in South Africa, however, we find that the focus of this study, the backbench members of the National Party caucus, play little or no effective role in the foreign policy process. In his work The Diplomacy of Isolation, Deon Geldenhuys notes that it is the State President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and senior officials at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs who are largely responsible for South African foreign policy rather than the House of Assembly in which the National Party has a majority.¹⁹

Thus, as in most Western democracies, foreign policy is almost exclusively the prerogative of the executive branch of government rather than the legislative one.²⁰ In comparison with other comparable political bodies such as the British Parliament, however, the South African legislature or more specifically the House of Assembly is particularly weak. Whereas in Britain the government routinely submits to Parliament White Papers on foreign policy which often become the topic of lively debate, in South Africa, due to the State's inordinate preoccupation with secrecy, this is not often the case.

It is also important to note that South Africa's foreign policy, especially in relation to its neighboring states, has often been intertwined with military and intelligence considerations, resulting in some degree of conflict among different bureaucratic actors. Again, however, noting the secrecy of such matters, it is difficult for one to obtain conclusive data.

Moreover, as Geldenhuys explains, the "the National Party's numerical superiority in the House of Assembly constitutes a material constraint" on the parliament's role in the foreign policy-making process. To a greater degree than other parliamentary parties such as the British Conservative Party, the NP incorporates an unusually cohesive group of politicians with similar goals and ideals. Indeed, since the Conservative Party split with the NP in 1982 over P.W. Botha's apparent move away from apartheid, as a group, the National Party has shown little overt sign of internal conflict or opposition to the Party leadership. The consensus between the majority

party in the House of Assembly and those members of the executive responsible for policy effectively shifts debate on foreign policy issues.

In agreement with this, in interviews conducted with Donald B. Sole and Herbert Beukes²¹ --- both former senior officials of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, who have both served as Ambassador to the U.S. --- it was noted that there were times, in the late 1960s, after Mr. B.J. Vorster had become Prime Minister, when NP backbenchers (and at least one Cabinet-Minister) did show some restiveness at foreign policy initiatives. In seeking to open up more diplomatic ties with black Africa. Vorster found that he had to tread carefully, since the small but vocal 'verkrampste' element in the caucus objected vehemently, among other things, to the possibility that black diplomats would have to be accorded equality of status with whites.

While the caucus itself clearly plays no direct role in foreign policy-making it does, nevertheless, represent the State President's power-base, and he and his ministers have to be mindful of caucus sensitivities and carry them along with their decisions. As far as it is known, this presented no problems at any time or on any issue concerning foreign policy per se during the 1980s. Particularly after 1986, U.S. foreign policy had, if anything, a unifying effect on the NP as a whole, since it was totally opposed to sanctions. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to assume that the backbenchers interviewed differed in no significant sense in their perception of U.S. policy from members of the Cabinet and their deputies. The latter, however, would certainly have possessed more information about the damage (especially concerning unemployment) done by sanctions, since this was kept secret.

Additionally, the National Party members of Parliament thus, are shut out of the foreign policy making process altogether. Within Parliament the National Party caucus is divided up into a range of study groups that correspond broadly with the ministerial portfolios, including Foreign Affairs. Members of the NP foreign affairs study group do enjoy regular briefings by officials, however, caucus members as such have virtually no effect on the making of foreign policy. Indeed as Geldenhuys has argued, "it is little more than a forum for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to explain government policies and actions and to mobilize support, if necessary."²²

Having established that the National Party caucus has virtually no role in the foreign policy-making process it should now be clearer why the level of bureaucracy, like the level of decision-making, is of limited value to our study. To begin with NP Parliamentarians are members of a political party and not of a bureaucracy per se. Moreover, unlike the State President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, they have little or no contact with the foreign policy-making bureaucracy. Thus, their limited role in foreign policy-making effectively negates the usefulness of the bureaucratic level of analysis.

At this point it should now be evident that National Party perceptions are not an independent variable affecting South African foreign policy. Rather, as we will see, they represent a dependent variable which is, arguably, affected by factors in the external environment, both domestic and international. As such, it behooves us to turn to the domestic and international levels of analysis as they apply to this study.

As stated earlier the domestic level of analysis looks to the effect which the internal characteristics of a state may have on the perceptions of actors within the

state. Due to the unique and internationally condemned policy of apartheid, it would seem of particular importance, in the case of South Africa, to understand the central force or forces shaping the domestic context in which NP politicians operate.

1.2 THE NP IN ITS DOMESTIC CONTEXT

Without doubt, the ideology of apartheid has, since 1948, played a large role in shaping the attitudes, values and beliefs of NP parliamentarians. These attitudes, values and beliefs at the domestic level have influenced NP perceptions of international relations between the US and South Africa during the 1980s. In attempting to come to terms with the South African domestic arena one can not ignore the relationship between Afrikaner nationalism, apartheid, and the National Party.

By most accounts, it would seem that Afrikaner nationalism has been a central domestic factor in South Africa --- a factor which has fueled the rise of the National Party since it came to dominate South African politics. Indeed, the election of 1948 which brought the NP to power has been interpreted as a victory of Afrikaner nationalism which has, until recently, been inextricably linked with the ideology of apartheid.

Historically, the NP was the political arm of Afrikaner nationalism. As Lawrence Schlemmer has argued, in contemporary discourse the "National Party is frequently referred to as the party of Afrikaner nationalism".²³ Traditionally, the National Party has propagated the ideology of apartheid in the name of Afrikaner nationalism as a tool for Afrikaner minority control. As Hermann Giliomee has argued,

"The political order which the NP constructed after 1948 was aimed at enhancing Afrikaner nationalism by entrenching white political control in South Africa. Through apartheid, Afrikaners governed not only themselves, but also all other groups in the society."²⁴

Nationalism may be defined as an expression of group identity that is usually based upon (putative) common descent, common language and religion, and a common territory. Afrikaner nationalism, in particular, is rooted deeply in an association between a strong ethnic group affiliation and a particular territorial environment. Its traditional strength came, in part, from the ability of Afrikaner leaders to play upon a widespread fear among Afrikaners of a loss of their status as the dominant group and of their country.

Thus, traditionally, Afrikaner leaders, predominantly from the National Party, have been able to mobilize political support under a banner of nationalist identification. By presenting itself as the party of the Afrikaner nation, the National Party managed to unite a disparate group of Afrikaners with a wide variety of class interests around the common cause of national survival.²⁵

Since the late 1960s, however, this Afrikaner coalition has gradually been subject to increasing strain as the NP's primary support-base diversified and Afrikaners became even less cohesive as an ethnic group. From the early 1970s the NP has been moving away from the use of Afrikaner nationalism as the sole driving force of its appeal and has been consciously striving to broaden its base by incorporating English-speaking whites.

The establishment of the HNP in 1969 and, especially, the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982 sheared away substantial numbers of its traditional Afrikaner supporters, largely working-, lower-middle-class, and poorer farmers. To interpret the split

exclusively in class terms is inadequate, but it is true that through the 1980s the NP increasingly became a middle-class party. The binding force of its traditional ethnic glue declined and it became more responsive to the interests of business.

Moreover, beginning with P.W. Botha's becoming Prime Minister in 1978, the NP began a slow, halting process of reform, that involved an incremental abandonment of some of apartheid's ideological and institutional pillars. Nevertheless, the reform was regarded as too slow and insignificant by some international policy-makers and of course, by all but the most pliant of internal black political leaders. This caused growing international isolation (stemming from previous multilateral arms/oil embargos of the 1960s and 70s) and a steady intensification of the imposition of sanctions from the international community in the 1980s.

Indeed, by 1990, the NP had broken completely with its narrow ethnic pool; and the leading figures now spoke of 'one undivided nation in a undivided South Africa' and anticipated the adoption of a new constitution 'which will in all respects complete the broadening of our Nationhood to comprise all South Africans irrespective of race or ethnic origin.'²⁶

Nonetheless, while noting that the National Party has been in a rapid process of transition away from apartheid, traditional Afrikaner nationalism remains a force in South African politics. Despite the fact that the CP has largely taken over the symbols of traditional Afrikaner nationalism and claims today to represent a majority of Afrikaans-speakers, NP perceptions remain strongly motivated by the nationalist backgrounds of many members.

Exactly 80% of those interviewed for this study speak Afrikaans as a first language (Figure 4). Although the interviews were conducted during May/June 1990 -

-- more just a little over three months after State President F.W. de Klerk's major reform speech of 2 February 1990 --- it is reasonable to assume that most of the respondents remained, in varying extents, conditioned by the NP's ideological legacy. Thus it is important to bear in mind the domestic setting that forms the environmental basis contributing to the perceptions of NP parliamentarians.

However, as this study concentrates on NP perceptions of US foreign policy, the international level of analysis must not be forgotten. Clearly, the increasing isolation of South Africa by the international community has affected NP perceptions. Whether it has **actually changed** these perceptions is a separate issue. The extent to which shifts in US foreign policy, specifically speaking, the move to punitive sanctions, have actually changed perceptions within South Africa toward apartheid is a subject of current debate. The debate is lively and likely to continue for much time to come.

The purpose of this dissertation is not to resolve this argument per se but rather, as stated earlier, to determine what precisely NP perceptions were toward US foreign policy in the 1980s. It is hoped that in so doing, this dissertation, will help identify whether US policy toward South Africa during this time led to more positive and cooperative relations between the two states or whether it resulted in more negative and conflictual ones.

Ultimately this dissertation aims to make a significant contribution toward a better understanding of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy in general and of U.S. foreign policy in particular. It is to a historical overview of US foreign policy that we now turn.

1.3 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. In 1987 Viotti and Kauppi wrote: "Given the tremendous diversity and complexity of what is studied, it is not too surprising that there is a multiplicity of views concerning how one studies international relations. The possible avenues go well beyond the realms of history and political science. They now include economics, psychology, social psychology, sociology and anthropology." See: Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 1.

2. Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior, (USA: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson Publishers, 1966), p.3

3. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 321.

4. Kelman, International Behavior, p. 25.

5. Ibid.

6. Holsti, International Politics, p. 322.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., pp. 319 & 320.

9. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 48.

10. Holsti, International Politics, p. 320.

11. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 15.

12. Ibid.

13. As Jervis states: "It is unlikely that there is a single answer to the question of which level is most important. Rather than one level containing the variables that are most significant for all problems, the importance of each level may vary from one issue to another. Furthermore, which level of analysis is the most important maybe determined by how rich and detailed an answer we are seeking." Ibid., pp. 16-17.

14. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), p. 124.

15. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 24 & 25.

16. Ibid., pp. 21 & 22.

17. See Hedley Bull, The Expansion of International Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) especially chapter one and The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

18. Holsti, International Politics, p.347.

19. Geldenhuys's work is the most comprehensive study in this area and provides a clear understanding of the route to foreign-policy decision making in South Africa. Even though it was written before the engagement of South Africa's Tri-Cameral parliament in 1984, it is still relevant as fundamentally not much has changed. See: Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984).

20. For a complete discussion of the bias toward executive control of foreign policy see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

21. Private interviews were held with Herbert Beukes on 19 November 1991, and Donald B. Sole on 29 November 1991, concerning the issues of this dissertation.

22. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.59.

23. Lawrence Schlemmer in Peter Berger and Bobby Godsell, eds., A Future South Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities, (Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1988) p. 25.

24. Ibid.

25. The preceding argument is provided by the analysis of Hermann Giliomee. In The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, Giliomee has argued:

"Ethnic identification occurs most strongly where a collection of individuals come to consider themselves communally deprived and believe that mobilization as a group would improve their position or where persons seek to protect the privileges they share with others against those who do not have them or whom they are exploiting collectively. The Afrikaner's have known all these: the gradual awakening of ethnic consciousness, the leaders who fostered or fragmented it, the bitterness of being a despised minority, and at present, the challenges to the privileges they enjoy as the dominant group in a deeply divided society."

See: Hermann Giliomee in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1979), pp. 83 & 84.

26. Dr. G. van N. Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development, Hansard, South African House of Assembly Debates, 5 February 1990, columns. 62-61.

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

"It's always been recognized in this country that the executive is more or less entrusted with foreign policy because you can't run foreign policy with legislation."

President Ronald Reagan, 1981.

2.1 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

In order to explain United States interests in South Africa and give a brief history of United States foreign policy toward South Africa since approximately the ending of the Second World War, it is first necessary to explain the factors and influences that led to the formation of United States foreign policy.

In a world of independent and sovereign nations, national self-interest is the major cause of such foreign policy involvement. The United States does not operate in a vacuum. It is said that the United States "must take into account [its own] national goals and supply the means of attaining them. It must consider [its own] immediate needs as well as [its] long-range interests; [its] adversaries as well as [its] allies; [its] strategic requirements as well as [its] political ideals."¹ Or simply put, the success of any policy will depend on the ability of the political leaders to weigh 'means' (using available resources and policy instruments) with 'ends' (the goal to be achieved). The best scenario for any policy requires the 'means' to fit with the 'ends'.

For any goal to be met, political leaders must have access to the necessary policy instruments and resources, therefore, when the availability of the 'means' become scarce or are not functional, the 'ends' fall short or are not met at all, thus the policy fails.

The people who constitute the national government, whether they are elected or appointed, set out to accomplish certain foreign policy tasks. As Burns, Peltason and Cronin point out, these functionaries use policy instruments, (i.e.: bargaining or negotiation, persuasion or propaganda, economic assistance or pressures, the threat or actual use of armed force), to the best of their ability to "determine the basic objectives vital to national interests and to devise programs to achieve these objectives".²

The central purpose of United States foreign policy has been throughout history and continues to be the preservation and the security of U.S. for its people. Secondary are those policies which protect United States interests.

2.1.1 The Constitution

The United States Constitution sets the responsibility of making United States foreign policy at the national level of government. The first three articles of the U.S. Constitution set forth the power given to the national government, dividing it among the three competing institutional branches, namely, the legislative (Article I.), the executive (Article II.), and the judicial (Article III.). These three branches of the U.S. government provide a balance of power, thus limiting one specific branch from having too much power in any specific area. This is often called the system of checks and balances. Although the Constitution is not explicitly clear on the exact divisions of

power given to the specific institutions when it comes to foreign policy, it does give some specific allocations which are tricky to understand and often create debate, usually between and within the legislative and executive branches. As said by Kegley and Wittkopf,

"The Constitution - often regarded as an open invitation for struggle between the executive and legislative branches of government - is not sufficient in itself to explain the distribution of decision-making authority over foreign affairs."³

It thus becomes necessary to look more closely at the three branches of the U.S. government and the powers given to them.

i. The Power of Congress

The powers of Congress (the legislative branch) are outlined in Article I. of the U.S. Constitution. Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives, being two separate bodies performing different but linked tasks. Article I., Section 8., sets down some Congressional duties in foreign policy:

"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, . . . ;"⁴

And Article I., Section 10., states:

"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; . .

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay and Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."⁵

Thus Congress seems to enjoy some authority in making foreign policy through its powers regarding treaties, defense, war and money. But in reality, "as an institution Congress is poorly equipped to compete effectively with the executive when it comes to outlining the basic features of America's conduct abroad".⁶ There are linked factors to explain this, they are (1) parochialism: of members of Congress who are more geared toward and interested in the limited area of domestic politics. This is particularly true of members of the House of Representatives where re-election (every two years) depends on satisfying the constituent voters at home rather than becoming preoccupied with global affairs; (2) Organizational weaknesses: which refers to the simple fact that with the size and structure of Congress, its power and responsibility are fragmented. This, creates a "frustrating" relationship between the executive and legislative bodies where not one individual is able to speak on behalf of the whole institution.⁷

Moreover, Congress has a problem with secrecy which is not usually found in the executive branch. Due to the more open and public processes of Congress, it becomes easier for information to leak, unlike the office of the president where "executive privilege" is used to conceal information.⁸

The last factor explaining why Congress is poorly equipped is (3) Lack of Expertise: this refers to the lack of access Congress as a whole has to the flow of information and available resources on the international level necessary for making foreign policy decisions. Such access is limited usually to the executive branch organizations, i.e.: the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency.

Therefore, it can be said that Congress plays a definite but diffuse role in the formulation of foreign policy. It is more or less a 'watch dog' in opposing or supporting a policy but it lacks initiative in the actual making of a policy. Or as better explained by Hilsman, it becomes clear that "Congress - subtly and indirectly, but nevertheless effectively - plays a decisive role in setting the tone of many policies and the limits on many others".⁹

ii The Power of the President

When one observes the foreign policy actions of the United States, the President is the most visible actor. Whereas James Wilson says this is especially true because foreign policy making "depends" on the President's "beliefs and skills and on those of his chief advisers."¹⁰

Executive domination over the construction and formulation of foreign policy seems to be a fact in most nations and the U.S. is no exception. But the Constitution of the United States is vague in its references to the official role of the President in foreign affairs. More specifically, as said by Kegley and Wittkopf, the President is granted very few powers.

"The president's preeminent position in the foreign affairs government derives in part from the authority granted him in the Constitution. It also follows from

the combination of judicial interpretation , legislative acquiescence, personal assertiveness, and custom and tradition that have transformed an otherwise coequal branch of the federal government into the most powerful office in the world."¹¹

Article II, Section 2., of the United States Constitution outlines the specific duties of the office of the president on foreign policy matters:

"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;. . .

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,. . . "¹²

These limited powers, together combined with events and various interpretations over time, have contributed to the vast authority the executive has over foreign policy, most of which has been acquired by the President himself, assuming power and authority which is more or less implied rather than written.

The President maintains such a high level of control over foreign policy because of the size and capabilities of government institutions headed by the executive. Some 50 government agencies are involved with foreign policy making, the President relies on all of them "from time to time to furnish advice and make decisions."¹³

The President has the Department of State to advise and help formulate foreign policy. Because the main goal of U.S. foreign policy is the security of America, the President often seeks the advice of those in charge of the military and defence organizations. Due to the constant need of high-level, current and concise foreign policy intelligence which is necessary in a very complex global system, the President keeps in close contact with the six U.S. intelligence agencies. The best known and most

frequently used is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The President also relies heavily on the National Security Council, for coordination and organization of the officials and agencies involved with foreign, military, economic, fiscal and internal security policies that affect United States national security and interests.

The resources available to the President to make effective and efficient foreign policy decisions are substantial. Aside from implied or written Constitutional guidelines set for the President or the amount of advice he receives, at the end of any foreign policy venture, whether it succeeded or failed, the President's reputation is what stands to gain or lose.

iii. The Power of the Judiciary

The domination over foreign policy rests with the executive branch, which knows that the legislative branch has the power and authority to intervene if it so desires. Thus, the third branch of the Federal Government, the Judicial, would seem and does play a lesser role in foreign affairs. One of the most significant role of the judiciary is the power to decide the constitutionality of acts of Congress and the executive branch, by means of what is called judicial review. For the most part, however, the judicial system's role in foreign policy is to keep a watchful eye that the interpretation of the Constitution is not abused. Actual policy-making is only enjoyed by the courts when "they reinterpret the law or the Constitution in significant ways, extend the reach of existing laws to cover matters not previously thought to be covered, or design remedies for problems that involve the judges acting in administrative or legislative ways."¹⁴ Such actions put the courts in a most powerful situation.

Article III., Section 2., of the United States Constitution outlines the power of the Judicial branch:

"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. . ."¹⁵

Therefore, the role of the Judicial branch in foreign affairs can be very significant, especially when an interpretation of the constitution is necessary.

iv. The Power of Public Opinion

There are both intricate and trivial factors that evoke and stimulate foreign policy which are not contemplated by the Constitution. One of these factors is public opinion. Different issues stimulate different responses from the public. There can be said to be three general groups within the public. Firstly, the mass public, (including of 75% of the adult population) which knows very little about foreign affairs despite importance of the subject. Second, the attentive public (including 10% of the population) maintains an active interest in foreign affairs. Lastly, the opinion makers and smallest public, whose job is to transmit information and judgements on foreign affairs and mobilizing support in the other two publics.¹⁶

The American public typically shows a lack of interest in foreign affairs usually because such issues are more remote and complicated than routine everyday domestic issues, which play a more important role in the day to day lives of most Americans. Most Americans, support the President in foreign affairs "largely on practical grounds" unlike "members of the political elite [who] tend to be well informed, [and] give much less support to the president. . ."17 Such a practical approach on behalf of the mass public only picks up motivation for concern and becomes fueled "when American soldiers, especially drafted soldiers, are being killed".18

The public does, however, have the definite ability to change minds and influence policy makers. Through interest groups, grass roots and private organizations, plus other associations the public can and has exercised a substantial amount of influence. Very few policy makers ignore the power of the public and all Presidents, according to Roger Hilsman, value "the possible reaction of the mass public [when] shaping their policies".19

The way in which public opinion mobilized power, from the grass-roots organizations like churches, unions, civil and human rights groups, university campuses and other interest groups, on the South African issue in the 1980s was of significant importance to the outcome of U.S. policy. The South African issue went against the common trend in foreign policy-making in the U.S., particularly in so far as the year 1986 and CAAA is concerned. It was an example of a groundswell of public opinion, acting on legislator conscience, that inflicted a humiliating defeat on Reagan. It will be shown later in this chapter how public opinion and the strong tendency for Americans, especially blacks, to see South Africa as an extension of the civil rights issue was of meaningful relevance to the outcome of U.S. policy toward South Africa.

2.2 U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA

For at least the past two decades the United States, has had a significant interest in the Southern African region and more particularly in South Africa. This interest has varied in intensity from administration to administration. A more detailed look at various administration policy approaches will be provided later in this chapter. For now it is important to identify some of those interests.

During the 1980's under President Ronald Reagan, United States policy toward South Africa and the region, was viewed through the lens of the East/West Cold War. The perceived threat of Soviet expansion in the area enhanced the assumed strategic importance of South Africa, thought by some to be a key anti-communist state. The door of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa did not hinge solely on the strategic significance, but all other interests could, to a certain degree, be viewed as secondary. These non-strategic interests were: ending apartheid by eradicating human rights abuses and promoting political freedom, thereby minimizing the possibilities of instability and violence; the enhancement and development of western-oriented economic and political structures, thus protecting United States trade and investment; working toward improved and positive relationships with the Front-Line States (Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania) in order to exert some influence and to provide stability; and finally, trying to minimize the possibility that the racial conflict in South Africa could exacerbate racial tensions in the United States. A thorough look at these interests will be provided later in this chapter.

2.2.1 Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of South Africa has often been said to be the main factor in determining U.S. policy toward South Africa. There are several key resources that South Africa either owns or controls that make this the case, particularly in the 1980's under the Reagan administration. The arguments that support this opinion are four-fold. First, the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope are of 'geo-political' importance to the West. Second, South Africa is against Soviet/Cuban interference in southern Africa. Third, South Africa maintains the strongest military in southern Africa. And lastly, Western access South Africa's mineral wealth is a main factor.²⁰

The assumed 'geo-political' importance and available access of the Cape Sea Route was and continues to be important to the U.S. This argument stems from a contention that the Cape route is actually threatened by aggressive states wanting to achieve a strategic advance by controlling the sea-lanes around the Cape. The U.S. Government however, has declared that "the apparent consensus among U.S. defense planners is that these sea-lanes are under minimal threat. . ."21

Some argue that the most important factor concerning the Cape sea route is to allow goods, and mainly oil, to round the tip for access to Europe and the U.S. Since the 1960's, according to Larry Bowman, use of the sea lane around the Cape has increased due to the "the expansion of world trade and the vast growth of imports,...., [and] the growing use of oil supertankers that are too large to use the Suez Canal...."22 It is the maintenance of this access that is of concern.

Conservatives often maintained that South Africa was a defender of Western interests and a staunch opponent of communism, curbing the Soviet threat in the

southern African region, both of which considerations were held to be of importance in protecting U.S. interests. The importance of reducing violence in the southern African region remained an issue, therefore it was necessary to maintain correct, if not necessarily cordial, relations with South Africa, especially due to the wars being fought in Mozambique and Angola, the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980, and the possibility of the eventual freedom of Namibia. All of these events on South Africa's borders created the possibility of Soviet interference, given the Soviets' proclivity in the Brezhnev era to fish in troubled waters. Thus if Soviet influence and regional instability were to increase, U.S. access to the Cape Sea Route and the supply of valuable minerals could be jeopardized, especially if South Africa were to be transformed into "a close ally or satellite of the Soviet Union."²³ Later in this chapter we will see that such a perception on the part of Reagan and his advisers proved a catalyst for the constructive engagement policy.

Accepting South Africa as a regional power was viewed by some as another means of protecting U.S. interests by providing stability. As the strongest military power in the southern African region, with "advanced equipment and sophisticated facilities," according to Bowman, "this would be beneficial to the West in times of hostility or war."²⁴

Probably the major factor that keeps South Africa on the priority list when it comes to U.S. interests in southern Africa, is her mineral wealth. According to Giliomee, "One of the most important strategic determinants in international relations is the availability of strategic minerals."²⁵ Notably this is true of U.S. relations, however the U.S. is not alone on its dependency on the mineral trade it has with South Africa. Robert Price explains that the U.S. along with its western allies of Western Europe and

Japan rely on "a variety of mineral resources that are essential to the production and process of highly industrialized economies."²⁶

South Africa, along with Zimbabwe, Zambia and Zaire, in the southern African region are endowed with a vast amount of mineral wealth. These countries can account for a superior quantity of the world's known stockpile of minerals and can make available and produce meaningful contributions to this stockpile of minerals if necessary. Due to the limited availability around the world, United States relies on having access to these minerals (Appendix A), not only for economic reasons, but mostly for the purpose of national defense. As claimed by the U.S. government,

"The United States imports more than 50 percent of its needs for over two dozen minerals deemed of either "strategic" or "critical" importance to U.S. national defense. Three at the top of the list - - chromium, manganese, and platinum - - are obtained in large part from South Africa, and much of a fourth (cobalt) is exported from land locked countries in the region through South Africa's transport system and ports."²⁷

It can be concluded that the strategic importance of South Africa to the United States has had a significant amount of influence on foreign policy decisions, especially in the 1980's, for the reasons mentioned above. Successive U.S. administrations have believed that the U.S. cannot afford to lose its access to the valuable resources that only South Africa can provide. Recognition of United States strategic interests provide insight into policy decisions that have been made by several U.S. administrations over the past 30 years. The next paragraphs give a background of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa.

2.3 BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

United States/South African relations seemed to have intensified since 1945 and more particularly over the past approximately twenty years. Intensification of relations has been brought about by a wide and complex array of inter-related forces. These have, among others, included:

- I. The developing economic, political and social circumstances in South Africa and the needs to which they have given rise;
- II. The relations of South Africa with other states and territories in Southern Africa;
- III. The developing social concerns which have occurred in the United States and which have, by comparative association, spilled over into US/South African relations;
- IV. The amount of influence carried by different policy approaches of previous and current U.S. presidential administrations;
- V. The shifting bilateral economic and political strategic interests of the United States and;
- VI. The changing patterns of economic and political values in the international sphere.

These concerns have contributed to an alternating U.S. agenda towards South Africa, promoted through bilateral and multilateral channels. However, this body of foreign policy has not always been clear, has often lacked direction and has at best has been caught up in what would seem a conceptual morass.

Following the end of World War Two, the United States pursued a policy that expressed "the refusal to make a major political commitment on any African issue".²⁸ This situation began to change in 1950, reflecting an increasing recognition that Africa was loosening its ties with Europe. Whereas before this time, particularly before

independence of Ghana in 1957, African relations were treated as just an extension of European relations. Moreover, "American membership in the United Nations compelled it to take positions on resolutions dealing with South Africa", whereas previously, "relations with South Africa were an aspect of relations with Britain and the British Commonwealth, of which South Africa was an independent member."²⁹

The following sections in this chapter provide brief overviews of the policies toward South Africa held by the seven post World War Two presidential administrations that preceded the Reagan administration. This will be necessary to form a background, whilst looking for foreign policy continuity and change, which will provide for a better understanding of the evolution, formation and condition of U.S./South African relations when Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1980.

2.3.1 The Truman Administration (1945 - 53)

President Harry Truman's approach to U.S./South African relations could be characterized as one of limited involvement. However, several key events in South African history took place during his era that are worthy of being addressed. But for the most part, as stated by Thomas Karis, the developments during Truman's presidency "seemed too remote to attract much attention".³⁰

The election in 1948 of the Malan Government and the National Party led to the implementation of the "apartheid" ideology, which massively increased racial segregation. In 1949, the major black political movement, the African National Congress (ANC), implemented a new strategy involving boycotts, strikes and civil-disobedience.

While the implementation of racist policies was transforming South Africa, the Truman Administration and U.S. foreign policy was increasingly concerned with the Cold War. The U.S. relationship with South Africa is best explained in South Africa: Time Running Out,

"The Malan government volunteered its support in the fight against world wide communism. The United States gratefully accepted its contribution of an air crew for the Berlin airlift and a fighter squadron for the war in Korea but ignored Malan's efforts to have South Africa included as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's southern flank or to establish a South Atlantic equivalent of NATO. . . . During Harry Truman's presidency, South Africa was to all intents and purposes just another friendly country so far as America's bilateral relations with it were concerned."³¹

One of the most prominent trend-setting events that would continue for many years after the Truman Presidency, occurred in 1952: "apartheid" came onto the UN General Assembly agenda as a major item. At the time the United States was not particularly interested in domestic politics within South Africa, but it was becoming more sensitive about its own racial problems, which caused it to abstain from the vote. This led to UN condemnation of U.S. racism and anger by the UN at the U.S. for its failure to act on South African apartheid.

3.2.2 The Eisenhower Administration (1953 - 61)

The Eisenhower administration's views on South Africa were characterized by big words but a lack of willingness to act. Several events and attitudes can be seen as of critical importance in understanding the U.S./South African relationship in this era. In the first term of the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. refused to get involved in UN anti-apartheid debate. Open relations between the U.S. and South Africa led to

a working bi-lateral ten-year agreement that established an atomic energy program in 1957. Furthermore, during Eisenhower's second term, the U.S. for the first time, after many years of failing to vote, supported a mild UN General Assembly anti-apartheid resolution. On August 20, 1958, the United States established a Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department. In addition, the Bureau contributed specialist expertise on African issues, which dovetailed with growing domestic concern about racial issues. Thus, increased racial tension in the United States indirectly led to a stronger condemnation of South Africa's policies after the Sharpeville killings in 1960. Notwithstanding these developments, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles advised the Eisenhower administration to be aware of African nationalism and cautioned about the possibility of Soviet expansionism.

In the first term of the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. supported South African arguments that the UN was pushing for "unjustifiable intervention in the domestic affairs of a member. [When] No threat to international peace existed." The South African Government's domestic legislation was seen as unlikely "to impair friendly relations among nations."³² This was known as the "domestic jurisdiction" argument, referring to the view that the domestic affairs of a country are not the business of the UN. It was therefore stressed that "the United States does not regard the perpetuation of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa as the proper means of dealing with the situation."³³ It was stressed that the United States should adopt a method in which a constructive approach to problems of human rights is parallel to the perspective of the world wide human-rights situation.³⁴ This policy approach subsequently led the United States to

abstain from all votes pertaining to anti-apartheid resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly.

The racial issue in the U.S. was generating increasingly severe tensions and inevitably this was in conflict with the developing U.S. approach to international human rights. U.S. considerations concerning the Cold War were one factor that made the U.S. more embarrassed about its own human rights record. A key U.S. example of this was the 1954 Supreme Court decision in **Brown v. Board of Education** which declared that " 'separate' could not be 'equal' [which] set American racial policy irreversibly on a path opposite to that taken by Pretoria."³⁵ However, the U.S. continued to support rather right-wing dictatorships in pursuit of cold-war gains, regardless of the domestic politics at home.

Eisenhower's second term brought a change of stance in its role in the United Nations concerning the South African racial issue. For the first time in six years the U.S. changed its vote of abstention on the apartheid issue in the UN General Assembly in October 1958. The U.S. voted "alongside the Soviet Union and against Britain and France" whereas the U.S. "abandoned the 'domestic jurisdiction' argument and [accepted] a watered-down resolution that omitted 'condemnation'."³⁶

Never before had the United States realized the explosive environment brewing in South Africa. Its concerns were heightened by the Sharpeville disaster that occurred on March 21, 1960. Sharpeville "shook Washington as had no previous South African event...."³⁷ In response, the U.S. State Department commented:

"The United States deplors violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa."³⁸

However much hope and sincere comment was given by the U.S. government over the Sharpeville shooting incident and other issues pertaining to human rights violations, U.S. foreign policy in the Eisenhower era nevertheless was concerned most with not upsetting South Africa, which "was one more ally in the struggle against international communism."³⁹ It was John Foster Dulles, who was responsible for this foreign policy perception. Secretary of State Dulles, according to Emerson and Nielsen, "perceived African nationalism as a tool of Moscow's creation rather than a natural out-growth of the colonial experience". Dulles believed "that Soviet leaders supported nationalism as a strategy to absorb colonial peoples in pursuit of their goal of world conquest."⁴⁰

In summary, even though the Eisenhower administration set the trend for voting against apartheid in the UN General Assembly, and deplored the Sharpeville killings, "in an era of containment South Africa's friendship was of more enduring concern than the policy of separate development or apartheid".⁴¹

2.3.3 The Kennedy Administration (1961 - 1963)

The Kennedy administration neither paid much attention to nor neglected South Africa. U.S./South African relations reflected continuity with the Eisenhower era.

President Kennedy expressed a "desire" to see the problems of South Africa rectified to help the "victims of apartheid", but maintained that the problem within South Africa could not be cured by "punitive" measures and that change could only come from within. The role played by the U.S. in South Africa, as President Kennedy argued "should be, not punitive action against a recalcitrant government, but the

welfare of apartheid's unfortunate victims themselves. . . . Only the Government of the Union of South Africa itself, of its own free will, can lead the way to a peaceful solution."⁴²

In an event that took place during Kennedy's presidency but only became effective on 1 January 1964, the United States, following the lead of a unanimous UN resolution, implemented an arms embargo against South Africa. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that "When the question of apartheid in South Africa comes up at the U.N., we have no hesitation in declaring our unalterable opposition to that policy. We in the United States think that apartheid is wrong and harmful."⁴³ That is why, said Williams, the United States "voted 'Yes' to the Security Council resolution condemning the policy of apartheid and calling upon states to stop the sale and equipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."⁴⁴

However, the negative message of the arms embargo did not hinder United States cooperation, trade and investment in South Africa. As noted by Thomas Karis,

"With regard to investment and trade, The United States officially gave neither encouragement nor discouragementNevertheless, encouragement was hardly necessary in a growing economy based on cheap and tractable labor and yielding exceptionally high profits. The American economic stake in South Africa grew"⁴⁵

The theory of the possibilities of communism in the region also still remained a reality and seemed to have had some effect on the decision-making process throughout the Kennedy years. This attitude is best summed up by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, J. Wayne Fredericks, who said that "apartheid [could] lead only to tragedy in South Africa - to an eventual eruption that will have

serious consequences for all its peoples, including an invitation to Communist penetration."⁴⁶

The short period of time occupied by the Kennedy administration brought the first negative economic/military measure toward South Africa over the issue of apartheid. The fact that it was draped in UN clothing allowed the United States to maintain close ties with South Africa while at the same time being on record as stating opposition to apartheid.

2.3.4 The Johnson Administration (1963 - 69)

Most accounts of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa agree that essentially similar approaches were pursued in the J. F. Kennedy and L. B. Johnson administrations. Understanding this, it becomes important to note that the Johnson administration maintained the Kennedy policy of "neither encouraging or discouraging" bilateral relations with South Africa. And despite of dominance of the Vietnam War on the policy-making agenda, it is true that Kennedy's policy toward South Africa was reinforced and enhanced by Johnson administration and its willingness to demand compliance with the arms embargo. As stated by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, the U.S. will "not sell to South Africa any arms, ammunition, military equipment or materials for their manufacture and maintenance,"⁴⁷ thus supposedly discouraging the enforcement of apartheid.

While admitting that U.S. relations with South Africa were contradictory, in that both countries "enjoy mutually beneficial relations. . .in several fields," but that "the racial policies of the Republic [of South Africa] impose severe restraints on these

relations"⁴⁸, according to Williams, the United States still maintained, as in the Kennedy years, that it was not willing to implement a stricter U.N. policy like sanctions.⁴⁹

In this section, however, it becomes important to mention several watershed events that happened during the Johnson years that indicated a slight hardening of attitudes. In 1964, a second economic message came from the United States. The United States Export-Import Bank halted loans with the intention of hindering trade between the two countries. As Karis points out,

"...for the first time except for the arms embargo the United States took economic action to show its disfavor when it stopped the Export-Import Bank in 1964 from extending direct loans to South African buyers of American goods."⁵⁰

The issues of South Africa's occupation of South West Africa (Namibia) took on new importance during the Johnson years. The United States's "UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg took a leading role in drafting a General Assembly resolution condemning South Africa for its continuing control over South-West Africa and asking the Security Council to take "effective measures" to bring about self-determination in the territory."⁵¹

In 1967, the 1957 atomic energy agreement that was signed in the Eisenhower era was secretly renewed for another ten years. But probably the most important event of 1967 was the U.S. decision to stop U.S. naval ships visiting South African ports. It arose out of an incident involving the U.S.S. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whereby the carrier would not permit its crew to go ashore. The result of this event was that in future U.S. naval ships were permitted to call in South African ports only in emergencies.⁵²

Even though the overall policy attitudes and approaches of the Johnson administration toward South Africa were not made different from the previous administrations', key events made the Johnson era one of importance. Those key events being: the recognition that there were contradictory aspects to U.S. policy; the rise of the Namibian issue to the forefront; the stopping of loans by the U.S. Export-Import Bank; and the discontinuation of the U.S. Navy's use of South African ports.

2.3.5 The Nixon Administration (1969 - 74)

With the election of President Nixon to the White House, a whole new policy strategy for southern Africa was initiated. Nixon's policy shift was a personal and moral conviction that effectively aided the racial-conservative politics in southern Africa. Nixon, rhetorically at any rate, opposed apartheid, and essentially his policy approach not to apply pressure on white-controlled governments Nixon did this by propagating new policies of containment, as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had used the same personal and moral convictions to foster policies that were intended to protect human rights and political freedoms.

It became President Nixon's goal to rebuild the National Security Council (NSC) which had been established in 1947 under President Truman. Nixon believed that the role of the NSC had diminished under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The President's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, was to be the key man in reaching this goal.

Kissinger prepared National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) which became the written set principles for making foreign policy for the southern African

region. NSSM 39 was one of eighty-five such reports which were intended to evaluate U.S. policy worldwide and which aimed also at rebuilding the role of the NSC. NSSM 39 was purported to be a 'realistic' attempt to reconstruct and transform U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa.

NSSM 39 proposed policy options for the southern African region and "Kissinger chose the one that subordinated African rights and moral issues to U.S. economic and geo-political interests".⁵³ NSSM 39, option two, propounded a policy approach that sought to enhance a relationship built on friendship and communication with the white-controlled and colonial governments of the region and deprecated the rhetorically anti-apartheid stance of the previous administrations. "It was decided" according to George Hauer, "that the former Kennedy and Johnson policies of verbal attacks on apartheid should be played down and a program of increased communication substituted on the theory that friendly persuasion rather than constant condemnation would be more likely to make the Southern African white-minority governments modify their racial policies."⁵⁴

Confirmation of this significant shift in U.S. government attitudes and policies toward South Africa under the Nixon administration became evident when military equipment, which was considered in the "grey-area" of the arms embargo (1962) and restricted under Kennedy and Johnson, reached South Africa. Credit that was supposedly tied up in the 1964 decision for U.S. Export-Import Bank to halt trade with South Africa was relaxed; Washington and Pretoria extended and exchanged invitations for official visits; the strong condemnation of the South African government was toned down.

The Nixon policy was finally challenged in 1971 when the Congressional Black Caucus doubled its size after the 1970 Congressional elections. These congressmen began to express anger at the U.S. policy toward South Africa. They organized a caucus that met with the President in March 1971. The caucus recommended that President Nixon "isolate" South Africa by "developing disincentives... to discourage the expansion of further private American investment there."⁵⁵

However persuasive the Congressional Black Caucus may have been, the response from President Nixon was not to change his policy, and he continued to implement the policies recommended by NSSM 39. As President Nixon previously stated, U.S. policy should maintain its current path:

"The interests of the white regimes themselves surely dictate change. The United States believes that the outside world can and should use its contacts with southern Africa to promote and speed that change. We do not, therefore, believe the isolation of the white regimes serves African interests, or our own, or that of ultimate justice."⁵⁶

Thus, it can be seen that the Nixon years can be viewed in the context of the Cold War and a policy of containment giving way to the flexibility and relaxation of many restricting measures which were continuing to pressure the white regimes of southern Africa. Option 2. of NSSM 39 stated:

"The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. . . . We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies. . . . We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible - albeit small and gradual - moderation of white policies. With out openly taking a position undermining the UK and the UN on Rhodesia, we would be more flexible in our attitude toward the Smith regime."⁵⁷

The end of the Nixon years left many decisions to be faced by Kissinger and his successor, Gerald Ford. But, as for Nixon, his thoughts and actions toward the southern African region were to serve U.S. interests at the lowest possible expense, while maintaining key allies at a time when limiting Soviet influence was crucial.

2.3.6 The Ford Administration (1974 - 77)

The short occupation of the White House by the Ford administration witnessed several key events that would not only change the "old-order" of the southern African regions politics, but would also serve as a turning point in southern African/U.S. relations. Even though Kissinger was to maintain his containment policy, Option 2 of NSSM 39 would be undermined by four key events.

First, in 1973 OPEC forced the petroleum prices up and linked to this was an Arab-launched oil boycott during the Arab-Israeli war. This made the U.S. more aware of how vulnerable and dependent its interests were on the oil- and other resource-producing countries. Within this context came a heightened appreciation of the need for South African minerals. U.S.- perceived interests were thus inevitably tied to political and economic stability of those countries with which it traded.

Secondly, in 1974 a military coup in Portugal, led to the speedy collapse of the Portuguese empire which later led to the independence of Angola and Mozambique. This independence, occurring amidst civil war and violence, saw the installation of governments that were committed to Marxist/Leninist doctrines.

Thirdly, in 1976 political violence was erupting in South Africa's largest township of Soweto and elsewhere, creating doubts about the country's stability.

Lastly, Cuba and the Soviet Union came to the aid of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) by assisting in establishing a Marxist-type government in Angola.

These events, according to Robert Price, "drew Southern Africa into the vortex of international tension and propelled it to a top position on the U.S. foreign policy agenda".⁵⁸ Kissinger saw the Angolan situation in terms of the bigger picture involving the conflict situation of East v. West. He thought that the only way to halt Soviet expansionism in the southern African region was to provide military assistance to those who were against the MPLA. The emotional baggage being carried by the U.S. after the Vietnam war limited Kissinger's capacity to influence the situation. In January 1976, the U.S. Congress passed the Clark Amendment which forbade the president to provide direct or indirect military assistance to Angolan factions.⁵⁹

The Ford administration followed the Kissinger lead in analyzing and reviewing the situation and events in southern Africa. Even though Kissinger assisted in pressuring the Smith government in Rhodesia into supporting an agreement to negotiate a transition to majority rule, supported the 1966 UN decision which terminated the South African mandate over Namibia, and spoke out about South African racial issues and apartheid, he nevertheless maintained that containment of Soviet expansion by "economic progress" and paying attention to the "political challenges of the continent, particularly the issue of southern Africa", was in need of "urgent attention" by the "World community". "The primary motivation and goal of U.S. policy [under Ford-Kissinger]", according to Price, was the containment of "the Soviet Union,... the same as it had been during the Angolan civil war."⁶⁰

2.3.7 The Carter Administration (1977 - 1981)

The Carter administration provided "a pronounced shift in spirit from that of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years".⁶¹ Carter felt the need to revert to the views of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, in terms of which African nationalism was regarded as the crucial political force in southern Africa, rather than communist expansionism that was viewed as the central force during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years. Carter imposed changes both in policy and in style. His strong convictions about human rights and sympathy for the disenfranchised people of southern Africa gave him an understanding that his predecessors had lacked.

The adoption of this new policy soon led to worsening relations between South Africa and the U.S. Whereas the previous administrations had viewed Pretoria as an ally against communism which effectively shielded the South African government against any criticism of its policies, Carter's views on human rights led to increasingly strong verbal attacks on the South African government. This is particularly true of an incident where, according to Price, a "leading spokesman pointedly criticized the apartheid regime and called for the introduction of majority rule in South Africa."⁶² The most notable incident was in May 1977 when Vice President Walter Mondale met with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna. As explained by Gwendolen Carter,

"During that meeting Vice President Mondale addressed Prime Minister Vorster with no uncertainty about the American goal of full political participation by all South Africans. While it was after the meeting that Mondale affirmed that his words meant "one man, one vote," there had never been any doubt about his basic meaning, nor Vorster's strong reaction against it. . ."⁶³

Although the Carter administration's message was loud and clear about its dislike of South African internal policies, it nevertheless continued to oppose any negative economic measures like disinvestment and sanctions. It still maintained the view that economic relations between the U.S. and South Africa could foster positive change.

This line of thinking adopted by the Carter administration paralleled that of the U.S. business community in South Africa and the U.S. Throughout the late 1970's and into the 1980's came several attempts by various international business communities to ameliorate the political situation in South Africa. These attempts were made by pressure groups in Western countries which traded with South Africa, in an attempt to make firms operating in the Republic take the initiative in dismantling apartheid by laying down "codes of conduct" which business organizations should adopt. Such codes have been tried by the British, the EEC, Dr. Leon Sullivan of the United States, the South African Council of Churches, the Urban Foundation and other employer groups in South Africa.⁶⁴

One of the best known multilateral efforts by the United States business community to bring about positive change in South Africa was the corporate code of conduct known as the Sullivan Principles. Rev. Dr. Leon Sullivan was the author of this first United States code of employment practice for foreign companies operating in South Africa.

In January 1976 Leon Sullivan approached 15 business leaders who represented major U.S. companies, "reminding them of the moral implication that required men of conscience in a Judeo-Christian culture to take a stand on what was morally right"

in the ongoing "crisis" in South Africa. He urged them to "join together" and take a "first step" thereby setting an example in the international business community.⁶⁵

Sullivan's main goal was "to make American business truly a positive force for change in South Africa". Dr. Sullivan thought that rather than encouraging the negative step of withdrawing American capital, it would be more effective to "take a positive stance and call for American companies in South Africa to recognize the same working conditions they employ in America".⁶⁶ As stated by D.R. Weedon in discussing the evolution of the Sullivan Principles, "the program", by using American companies as instruments of change, "could make a meaningful contribution to bring an end to apartheid".⁶⁷

The Sullivan Signatories program was subscribed to by about 200 of the 275 American companies then operating in South Africa. As stated by Alison Cooper of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, the Sullivan Principles were voluntary and called for signatory companies to strive at achieving several principles that would improve the work place for disadvantaged workers. (Appendix B)

It is very difficult to evaluate the success of the Sullivan Code. However, did the codes prove to be of any help in the South African situation, and did they do what they set out to do, namely, "make American Business truly a positive force for change"? It is important to target the positive aspects.

Clearly President Reagan and Crocker saw some merit in the Sullivan Principles since he incorporated them in his September 1985 executive order. The executive order denied trade assistance to United States companies doing business in South Africa if they did not apply the Sullivan Principles. Title II of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which provides for United States economic assistance to South Africa,

contains "a suggested code of conduct (similar to the Sullivan Principles) for US companies to use when employing South Africans."⁶⁸

The codes were helpful in improving "the life of the workers".⁶⁹ As Christopher Coker put it, "The influence which they [the multinational companies, employing between 200,000 and 315,000 black workers] are able to bring to bear on labor practices in general - and those relating to black workers in particular - should not, therefore, be undervalued or ignored. . .".⁷⁰ The codes were also effective at influencing and providing access to upward mobility within companies, raising morale and stimulating the establishment and progress of unions.

Even though the Sullivan Principles were written with the good intention of facilitating peaceful change in South Africa, there were several problems and many criticisms. This would lead one to believe that the end result of the Sullivan effort never reached the sought-after goal of being a major force for change in ending apartheid. Davenport maintains, that "the codes did not remove apartheid root and branch, and it would have been surprising had they done so."⁷¹

One of the major criticisms of the Sullivan Principles came from the international corporations themselves. They found the Sullivan Principles to be prescriptive in that they, firstly, tried to prescribe or dictate the internal policy of the corporation, and in light of this, hostile attitudes to outside intrusion developed. Secondly, the principles were often regarded by some as a means of staving off future sanctions legislation. Davenport goes on to say that "firms often resented the intrusion into their privacy, while hostile labor critics were quick to argue that the real intention of the codes was to forestall more drastic international action rather than to promote real change in the apartheid system."⁷² Another major critic of the Sullivan Principles

was found within the ranks of South African trade unions. In the beginning the unions had a positive attitude toward the principles and viewed them as stepping stone in the negotiating process, but later they failed to meet the unions needs. Hilary Joffe says that FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions), COSATU's (Congress of South African Trade Unions) predecessor, utilized the codes "as a form of pressure on Multinational employers to recognize and negotiate with black unions".⁷³ In the end the unions rejected the principles as irrelevant.

It is also very important to note that not every American company recognized the Sullivan Principles and by no means all joined the effort to implement the principles. "The corporate behavior of foreign multi-nationals" did not display much social responsibility, and their weak "efforts only became noticeable as a minority of them reluctantly embraced the Sullivan Code".⁷⁴ This argument is supported in a speech given by Sullivan:

"In America, of the approximately 300 multi-national corporations doing business in South Africa, 140 have signed the principles, employing 80% of the American company South African-based work force. The remaining 160 companies have not as yet become signators."⁷⁵

Of the "minority" that did participate in the adoption of the Sullivan Principles, their actions were quite contradictory to the suggested actions of Sullivan and sometimes such contradictory actions were displayed harsh outcomes. An example of this is noted by Shridath Ramphal, claiming that "foreign and South African firms that declare themselves concerned about the sanctions-induced job losses, nevertheless, seem quite happy to sack workers by the thousands if they strike".⁷⁶ Thus it is evident that corporations were not so much concerned with advancing the position of the black

man, but rather with what was best for company interests. Whether these actions were moral or not would seem of a secondary concern.

A further example of the failure of the Sullivan Principles comes from the Sixth Report on the Signatory Companies, prepared by Arthur D. Little Company. This company was responsible for monitoring adherence to the principles. Its 1982 report noted:

- fewer companies were willing to report on their activities than in the preceding three years (nearly one-fourth failed to file the required compliance questionnaires);
- of those who filed reports more than one-third received failing grades for non-compliance with the affirmative action principles;
- twenty-nine signatory companies (more than any previous year) dropped out of the program;
- the proportion of blacks in supervisory and skilled positions declined since the last reporting period;
- and due to continued inequality in training and pay scales, the already wide wage gap between white and black employees is growing.⁷⁷

On 3 June 1987, Rev. Leon Sullivan announced that his principles had failed to end apartheid, and that more drastic measures were necessary. Upon revoking the Sullivan Principles, he called for all U.S. companies to withdraw from South Africa, and for a total U.S. economic embargo against South Africa.

However, the Sullivan approach still carried some influence. In both of President Reagan's executive orders of 1985 and 1986, and in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 there are specific employment guidelines based upon the Sullivan Principles. When Rev. Sullivan withdrew support for his principles, the State Department, beginning on 15 February 1987, enforced the requirement that any U.S. company employing more than 25 people in South Africa must register with the State

Department and maintain records of its implementation of the guidelines. Failure to comply with the requirements outlined by the State Department could result in severe penalties.

There are a few differences between the State Department's Principles and the Sullivan Principles, but both sets are essentially similar.

Even though the employment practices stemming from Sullivan continued on into the 1980s, the late 1970s still held events of importance. In August 1977, perhaps the most serious blow to South African/U.S. relations came when the Soviet Union informed the United States that Soviet intelligence had detected an alleged atomic test site in the Kalahari Desert. The U.S. confirmed the allegation and pressed the South African government for assurance that the site would not be used. The message hit the South African government hard. This was particularly true, as noted in South Africa: Time Running Out, that it was clear that the U.S. "and its allies were willing to collaborate with the Soviet Union against South Africa".⁷⁸

To fuel the fire of the Kalahari Desert episode and provide more leverage for foreign criticism, on 12 September 1977, "black consciousness" and anti-apartheid opposition leader Steve Biko was killed while being detained by South African police.

On 4 November 1977, the United States supported a UN Security Council resolution which again tightened the pressure on the South African government to change its ways. The resolution made the 1963 voluntary arms embargo mandatory. Secretary of State Cyrus E. Vance, speaking on behalf of the U.S. government's attitude toward the arms embargo, stated that "we, and indeed almost the whole world, have believed that it is necessary to take action as a result of those steps, and therefore, at the United Nations, we have supported a mandatory arms embargo to

reflect the international⁷⁹ disapproval of internal South African disregard for human rights.

The slowly mounting pressure on the South African government was accompanied by harsher verbal condemnations by several officials of the Carter administration. Various statements by some officials like Vice President Walter Mondale and Andrew Young, were used by the South African government spokesmen to whip up xenophobic resentment at 'foreign meddling'. Carter's strong attitudes and actions on human rights actually strengthened the Vorster government. Pauline Baker notes, ". . . Vorster won a historic landslide victory by attacking the U.S. President Jimmy Carter for his criticism of Pretoria."⁸⁰

The above events accelerated the decline in the U.S. relationship with South Africa. Moreover, the Carter administration also set as another of its goals for the region settlements of the Namibian and Rhodesian conflicts. In this area of focus the Carter administration's approach was very different from that of previous administrations in that it sought help from the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) in solving the region's problems.

In September of 1978, this change in style led to the UN Security Resolution 435, which was influenced by the Carter administration and backed and assisted by the Western Contact Group (members being U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, and West Germany), which was to assist in the transition to independence for Namibia.

Looking back at the Carter years, it could be said that the administration's approach was "accommodationist", meaning that it was willing to accommodate the transfer of power to radical leadership in southern Africa, which to some, was not in American interests. It has even been said that this willingness by Carter to put African

interests above U.S. interests is one of many decisions that possibly contributed to his loss of the White House in 1980. Regardless, however, if this is the case or not, according to Price, the "accommodationist" approach was based on three assumptions followed by the Carter administration: "that nationalist change in Southern Africa, even when it brought to power "Marxist" parties associated with the Soviet Union, did not necessarily threaten the interests of the United States; that, therefore, Southern Africa could and should be insulated from East-West competition and conflict; and that the only way in which American influence and interests in Southern Africa could be maintained and extended was for the United States to identify itself with the aspirations of the African states in the region."⁸¹

The Carter administration's rhetoric contributed little to the dismantling of apartheid. Indeed the essence of Carter's policy approach, apart from strong verbal attacks on South Africa, was substantially similar to that followed by previous administrations.

2.4 THE REAGAN YEARS - THE FIRST TERM AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, the United States's foreign policy toward South Africa did not change so much from that of previous Kissinger-influenced administrations of Nixon and Ford, as take on a new dimension.

Largely under the guidance of Chester Crocker, an academic from Georgetown University who became Assistant Secretary of State to Africa, the Reagan administration developed a "different and highly controversial"⁸² new policy that not

only aggravated racial tensions in the U.S., but later led to the embarrassment of the administration by providing ground for a veto over-ride and, according to many, the acknowledgment of a failed southern African policy. This policy was called constructive engagement.

The President "justified" his new policy, according to Pauline Baker, not only by criticizing the Carter Administration's "confrontational" approach to the southern African region and the apartheid government, but by also claiming leverage with the National Party for having a shared understanding of conservative policy.⁸³

This regional policy advocated by Chester Crocker and adopted by the Reagan Administration, was to "seek constructive change away from apartheid and toward a system based on the consent of the governed".⁸⁴ The way they sought to achieve this goal was to impress upon United States policy-makers the importance of understanding "South African politics and the insecurities of the white minority population".⁸⁵

In Crocker's landmark article in the Winter 1980/81 edition of Foreign Affairs, titled, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", he argues the need for a new South African policy. He displays dissatisfaction with past U.S. policy toward South Africa, in that it has lacked "organization" in the formulation of both 'pro' and 'anti' policies and that the "contrasts in policy from one U.S. administration to the next has left South Africa with "false signals and the creation of unreal expectations".⁸⁶ Thus, he implied that a policy like constructive engagement "was never seriously attempted" by previous administrations.⁸⁷

In outlining the "fundamental goal" of constructive engagement, Crocker says that the United States policy should have a common belief and understanding not only about basic issues in South Africa, but about general American objectives and interests

necessary in making efficient and effective foreign policy in the southern African region. Thus the U.S. and South Africa must maintain a "friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage."⁸⁸

Crocker goes on to say that the objective of constructive engagement "should be to foster and support" peaceful change toward a nonracial system", while keeping in mind "the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the process".⁸⁹ Failure to do this, says Crocker, will bring inevitable damage to United States interests in South Africa and in the region.

Speaking to a Congressional Subcommittee, Crocker stressed that United States interests are "best served by an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth, which alone can nurture modern African economic and political institutions".⁹⁰ Crocker's testimony also outlined specific areas of focus in attaining these objectives while safeguarding U.S. interests. They include: (a) strengthening communication between the Southern African countries to decrease tensions and improve security, while bringing about and fostering peaceful change; (b) aiding and solving the issue of Namibian independence; (c) seeking constructive change to ending apartheid; (d) enhancing relations and promoting "democratic institutions" encompassing all social, political and economic structures.

In a paper by Crocker titled, "South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping with Vulnerability", he addresses the probability of a conflict situation in South Africa between blacks who are fighting the system and whites who are trying to maintain it. He stresses that political awareness, unity and an "unprecedented degree of determination" and optimism among black communities could lead to violence, while white opinion supports the maintenance of order in all circumstances. To understand

the situation, Crocker maintains that the "challenge to the system" will not "decline or disappear" but rather, it is hoped, that "over time, depending on the results of various forms of political conflict of this sort, a clearer pattern of leadership and organization may emerge. . . ."91

The following is an analysis of the policy of constructive engagement. There has been considerable controversy about it --- some categorically declare it to have been a failure; others maintain that it achieved a certain degree of success. There are many questions to be raised and specific elements explored. Therefore, the aim of the following paragraphs is to explore these approaches, questions and elements.

2.4.1 Constructive Engagement's Policy Success

One of the major misconceptions concerning the policy of constructive engagement is that it was a regional policy geared to solving the problems of the southern African region and not merely a policy for South Africa alone. If one is to evaluate the success of constructive engagement, one must examine regional developments and not focus exclusively on the specifics of the internal politics of South Africa.

Defenders of constructive engagement claim as its most notable regional success the independence of Namibia, Africa's last colony. Moreover, other key events, according to Crocker, stemmed from Namibian independence.⁹² Firstly, Cuban and South African soldiers left Angola and Namibia, thus ending the civil war that had raged in Angola since its independence in 1975. Additionally, Cuban President, Fidel Castro, accepted a U.S.-designed peace plan and agreed to "exit from Angola". Lastly,

the Soviet Union accepted a new approach to the southern African region, demonstrating that "Soviets have abandoned their previous course of obstructing Western initiatives and exploiting conflicts in the region".⁹³

The positive outcome of the Namibian question also seemed to have also trickled into other troubled areas of the region such as Mozambique where attempts at a cease-fire have shown encouraging developments. Thus, the accomplishment of "the Namibia-Angola settlement of 1988", Crocker states, is perhaps "the best opportunity that regional leaders have ever had to build a constructive future."⁹⁴

While constructive engagement achieved some success in the regional context, it was the internal situation in South Africa which was the dominant issue. Constructive engagement would be judged a success or a failure in the light of what happened in South Africa. The rationale behind constructive engagement was the belief that only South Africans could resolve their internal conflict. Constructive engagement, by taking some of the international heat off South Africa, it was reasoned, gave the South African political leadership additional space for reform. Such reforms as it were to make, moreover, would be rewarded by U.S. approbation and encouragement.

The Reagan administration took office in P.W. Botha's third year as Prime Minister. In his earlier years Botha had made some significant changes to what many had considered to be pillars of the apartheid order. For example in 1979 Botha's verligte Minister of Labor, Mr. Fanie Botha, was allowed to pilot through Parliament legislation that recognized for the first time black trade unions. While it may have been intended as a control measure, since independent black unions had burgeoned in the 1970s, the new-found recognition legitimated and consolidated a powerful new force

in South Africa, giving black workers (that is those fortunate to have jobs) major leverage in industrial relations.

Right down until 1986 Botha continued with a reform program of sorts. The program included: 'Petty' apartheid was steadily abolished; job reservation and related measures that discriminated on a racial basis in the labor market were removed; the legislation prohibiting mixed marriages and sexual relations across the color line was repealed; and recognition was accorded to the fact that urban blacks were not as previous apartheid theorists had maintained, 'temporary sojourners'. Perhaps most important of all Botha, in 1986, abandoned the 'separate nations' thesis (which was essentially the ideological core of apartheid) and accepted the principle of a common South African citizenship. In the same year influx control was abolished.⁹⁵

A far more controversial reform was the introduction of the Tricameral Parliament in 1984, which gave parliamentary representation to the Indians and Coloreds in separate chambers, but excluded blacks, who, according to the NP, were separately catered for by the political structures in the homelands.

The Tricameral Parliament was the center-piece of P.W. Botha's administration, and its repercussions were of immense significance: (1) led to the breakaway of the CP in 1982; (2) precipitated massive demonstrations on a countrywide basis, extensive violence in 1984-86, culminating in a State of Emergency.

As implied in the U.S. policy, constructive engagement cordially welcomed those reforms that were palpably moves away from discrimination and thus was ambivalent about the Tricameral Parliament: 'The U.S. government said that while it condemned apartheid and the denial of fundamental rights to South Africa's black majority population, the issue was how to encourage practical steps away from the apartheid

system. The 66% 'yes' vote in the referendum among white voters was a reflection of the growing consensus within the electorate of the need to move towards more representative participation in the country's political process. It was the U.S. government's hope that the South African government would use its mandate to address the problem of political rights for the South African black majority.⁹⁶

If this was criticism, it was criticism of a very muted kind, designed evidently not to offend P.W. Botha, but rather to encourage him to proceed further along the path of reform.

An assessment of whether constructive engagement helped along such reforms went as far as P.W. Botha was prepared to accept remains a matter of controversy. According to past South African Ambassador to the U.S. and former senior Foreign Affairs Official, Herbert Beukes, 'constructive engagement was a profound policy that was helpful in stabilizing the South African situation'. However, P.W. Botha was 'greatly influenced by individuals and not by American policy'. For the most part, P.W. Botha was generally 'anti-American'.⁹⁷

Perhaps, as a U.S. diplomat claimed at the time, quiet U.S. diplomacy discouraged even stronger measures against the rising tide of protest, but in December 1984 P.W. Botha repudiated suggestions that American pressure had led to the release of certain detainees, saying that, 'no quiet diplomacy or hard shouting' would keep South Africans from taking the path of justice and that South Africa would make its own decisions. The South Africa Institute of Race Relations in a 1984 survey noted 'that it was very unlikely that P.W. Botha would have responded in any fundamentally different way whether constructive engagement was or was not U.S. policy'.⁹⁸ 'Constitutionalisation' of apartheid in terms of the Tricameral Parliament and strong-

arm measures taken by the Botha government during 1984-86 to deal with protest deeply violated American sensitivities about human rights. Moreover, another point to consider when assessing P.W. Botha's reform program is that the apparatus of 'draconian security laws' was left intact and, indeed, the security system was dramatically tightened up. The abuse of civil rights that was inherent in this approach was peculiarly offensive to almost all Americans and, certainly, persuaded a number of wavering members of the Congress to come down ultimately on the side of the sanction drivers in support of CAAA.

Late 1984 saw the inception of a country-wide protest in the U.S. against apartheid --- a major cause of constructive engagement's downfall.

2.4.2 Analysis Outlining the Failure of Constructive Engagement

Because what was to follow the strategy of constructive engagement was such a drastic shift of policy gears, constructive engagement has often been viewed as a failed policy. There are several key events that led to this change.

There can be little doubt that after the sharp criticism of the Carter administration, P. W. Botha's National Party government breathed a sigh of relief at the prospect of a "constructive" diplomatic relationship with the United States and the newly elected Reagan administration. As stated by Ungar and Vale, "The Botha government" misread the policy of constructive engagement as signalling a return to the days when the South African white regime could get away with portraying itself as a protector of the Western way of life, a bastion of freedom, decency and economic

development at the tip of a continent afflicted by tyranny, chaos and abject poverty - above all, a bulwark against communism."⁹⁹

An indication of the Botha government's inability to read the signals coming from Washington is evident when a sanctions warning reached the South African Ambassador to the U.S. from thirty five conservative House of Representatives Republicans threatening sanctions against South Africa in December 1984. The letter stated:

"Events of recent weeks in South Africa have raised serious questions about your government's willingness to move more progressively and aggressively toward real human rights reforms. With this letter we wish to make clear that we view the violence in your country and the questions raised by it with alarm. Furthermore we want you to know that we are prepared to pursue policy changes relative to South Africa's relationships with the United States if the situation does not improve. . . . We are looking for an immediate end to the violence in South Africa accompanied by a demonstrated sense of urgency about ending apartheid. If such actions are not forthcoming, we are prepared to recommend that the U.S. government take the following two steps: (1) Curtail new American investment in South Africa unless certain economic and civil rights guarantees for all persons are in place. (2) Organize international diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa."¹⁰⁰

With hindsight, it may be stated that even though the South African government was moving in a direction that signified change, it failed to recognize the growing power of the Congress and the increased salience of the South African issue among the American public. Past South African Ambassador to Washington, Brand Fourie notes, "Many South Africans underestimated the danger of sanctions and other forms of disinvestment".¹⁰¹ "Botha and his closest allies", according to Crocker, "badly misjudged what would be required" for the success of constructive engagement.¹⁰²

Thus, it was this underestimation, and not the outright rejection of reform, by the South African government and its failure to produce enough "goods" in the form

of political change, that led in the longer term to the decline leading to the fall of constructive engagement.¹⁰³

Whether it was the outrage at the sluggish reform pace of the Botha government that brought a change in policy is a different debate altogether. What is important is that some critics have argued that there were several flaws in the ways in which constructive engagement was implemented. The following paragraphs try to identify these flaws.

First, from the beginning constructive engagement was problematic in that the "American practice of attempting to reform the South African system" was "working entirely within [the South African system] and honoring its rules", so that U.S. policy attention was on a small faction rather than the majority of the population. "The problem" according to Ungar and Vale in 1986, was that constructive engagement "relies almost entirely on white led change,...and ignores the needs, the politics and the passions of the black majority in South Africa."¹⁰⁴

Secondly, many South African black political activists became increasingly disillusioned with what they construed as the U.S. government's pandering to Pretoria. This inevitably, according to Pauline Baker, "branded the United States as an enemy in the eyes of the majority of the population"¹⁰⁵, for which Christopher Coker blames the U.S. government for not having the insight to recognize the need for a shorter time frame to implement change.¹⁰⁶

The revelation of "a fundamental sympathy for the South African government and scant understanding of black sentiment" ¹⁰⁷ not only hardened black attitudes toward the United States and its southern African policies but also caused yet a third problem. The U.S. policy of constructive engagement allegedly displayed a disregard

for many of the fundamental elements the U.S. claims to seek to uphold in world order, of which the most important is respect for human rights. As stated by long time South African critic and 1984 Nobel Peace prize winner, Archbishop Desmond Tutu,

"It is such a system that the "constructive engagement" policy followed by the current administration of this land has helped to continue, a system which cares nothing about even the most elementary human rights. I hope one day that the United States, this great country, will recover and be true to its tradition to side with those who seek justice, democracy, peace and equity."¹⁰⁸

William Foltz backs up this argument by stating that no administration can avoid to recognize "symbolic" relationship between South African and the U.S.'s domestic racial problems.¹⁰⁹

A fourth flaw in constructive engagement was its preoccupation with cold-war considerations. According to Ungar and Vale, "the Reagan Administration viewed the problems of southern Africa in the context of East-West relations". Admittedly Soviet influence in the region may have been of concern to American interests, but the US "must resist the ever present temptation to use southern Africa as a place to score points in the East-West struggle"¹¹⁰ which ultimately would seem to choke the "voice" of American "principles" and reduce any policy's credibility.

Whether these criticisms of constructive engagement are valid will remain a controversial issue in scholarly debates for some time to come.

By the beginning of 1985 there were clear indications that constructive engagement had run out of steam. Relations between South Africa and the U.S. deteriorated, as was shown by the U.S. decision to recall its ambassador to protest Pretoria's aggression on neighboring countries in June 1985. In July a major development occurred when the Chase Manhattan Bank refused to roll over South

African loans. Other foreign banks followed in September. This was a decision that was motivated primarily by market considerations but it was a highly significant signal to foreign investors that South Africa had, by now, become a high-risk country. Moreover, although the Chase Manhattan decision was not formally part of a sanctions package it certainly accelerated the move towards the adoption of sanctions.

On the 21 July 1985, after hundreds of deaths as a result of conflict and violence in South African townships, the South African Government imposed a State of Emergency in specific areas of the country. Such an action was a complete negation of constructive engagement's goal of curbing violence and "fostering peaceful change". The following year on 12 June (four months before the U.S. Congress passed the CAAA over President Reagan's veto) the South African Government placed the entire country under a State of Emergency.

With the inevitable signs of a financial crisis on the horizon, State President P.W. Botha, on 15 August 1985, delivered a speech which further discouraged and undermined any positive progress that may have come from constructive engagement. This address, known as the "Rubicon" speech, rejected the move toward reform, except on his own limited terms. It was also an explicit and vehement rejection of foreign interference. Thus the "Rubicon" speech totally rejected and abandoned what Chester Crocker termed "pursu[ing] [U.S.] varied interests in a full and friendly relationship" while "steering" around the "danger" of "violence".¹¹¹

In an address before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, just one day after P.W. Botha's "Rubicon" speech, Crocker, still insisted that the US had "an important role to play"¹¹² by sticking to its foreign policy.

"Irrespective of how South Africa will be run - and by whom - damaging its economy now will not only stunt economic growth but will also ultimately stunt the lives of this and coming generations of young South Africans."¹¹³

Even though some important aspects of apartheid were changing, Crocker's sincere efforts were pushing against a mountain that would not move as long as President Botha was still in power. Botha had not the slightest intention of giving in to international pressure, or even more, of being perceived by his domestic opponents as bowing to such pressure. Aside from all of this Crocker still clung to the view that apartheid was indeed "eroding", "being challenged" and "being dismantled."¹¹⁴ He ended his address saying,

"We consider yesterday's speech [the "Rubicon"] to be an important statement in that it discussed some issues that are at the core of the problem of apartheid. At the same time, the speech written in the code language of a foreign culture within a polarized society - is not easily interpreted and raises many questions. . . . What must be emphasized is that a speech such as this is but an element of an ongoing process."¹¹⁵

Crocker did not mention the policy phrase "constructive engagement". Perhaps he too was finally recognizing its failure within South Africa and perhaps that a policy shift was required. But what he did stress was the basic fundamental principle that underlay the constructive engagement policy: that of still using "tools of influence", "remaining builders", "avoiding coercion" and keeping "communication" lines open. Why after the policy had so palpably failed did Crocker still cling to it?

2.4.3 Post-1986 Reagan Policy

After the enactment in 1986 of CAAA the Reagan administration obliged to implement its provisions, despite the administration's continuing belief that the best approach to the southern African region was by method of a constructive approach.

As Secretary of State Shultz put, shortly after the CAAA became law:

"You don't just throw up your hands and say "I don't like it. I'm leaving." You stay there. You are, if I may use the term, engaged. So this is our policy -- to be engaged, and engaged with everybody, and we hope our actions will be constructive."¹¹⁶

The CAAA remained in force for three years after Reagan left office; the following paragraphs explain the Reagan administration's post-CAAA approach to southern Africa and more particularly South Africa.

During the last years of the Reagan presidency, the South African issue lost some of the significance it had acquired by the mid-80s as a domestic political concern in the U.S. The reasons for this, according to Pauline Baker, are two-fold: Firstly, American public opinion has a "short attention span for specific foreign affairs topics", and most importantly, the South African government was successful "in crushing internal dissent and muzzling local and foreign media".¹¹⁷ In Reagan's second term the media coverage of political violence and unrest in South Africa was so limited that the U.S. public saw very little. Moreover, with the CAAA in place, many believed that the South African issue had been effectively dealt with and was, for the time being, off the agenda.

After 1986 the Reagan administration hoped that the South African issue would quiet down so that the rancorous debates of the early 1980s would not be repeated.

By this time, the administration also softened its line on the ANC (which Reagan had previously called a 'terrorist' organization). This change was signified by a meeting in January 1987 between Secretary Shultz and Oliver Tambo, the then-president of the ANC. In 75 years, as noted by Baker, this "was the first encounter the ANC had with a U.S. official".¹¹⁸

This among other things led the administration to search for new policies in a continuing effort to solve the region's problems.

In retrospect Chester Crocker has noted, "the strategy of engagement in southern Africa problem-solving --- with all its risks --- worked better than I had imagined it could".¹¹⁹ If anything, the 1980s did one thing for U.S./South Africa relations: the U.S. became more involved in and aware of the events of the South African region than it had ever done in history.

The following chapter explores the South African sanctions debate, as well as provides an analysis of U.S.-initiated sanctions.

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73. Hilary Joffe, Sanctions Against Apartheid, ed. Mark Orkin, (Claremont, SA: David Philip, 1989), p.57.
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75. Leon Sullivan, in a speech titled "The Role of Multinational Corporations in South Africa", The Alfred and Winifred Hoernle Memorial Lecture, University of the Witwatersrand, 4 September 1980.
76. Ramphal, South Africa: Sanctions Report, p.27.
77. Arthur D. Little Company, The Sullivan Principles, the Sixth Report, (1982).
78. South Africa: Time Running Out, p. 358.

79. Reply by the Secretary of State (Vance) to a Question Asked at a news Conference November 2, 1977. Department of State Press release 497. Nov 2, 1977; Source: Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1977, pp. 715 -716.

80. Pauline H. Baker, "The Afrikaner Angst", Foreign Policy 69: (Winter 1987-88), p.65.

81. Price, International Politics in Southern Africa, p.52.

82. Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, p. 3.

83. *Ibid*, 3 & 4.

84. United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, An Update of Constructive Engagement in south Africa ([Washington, D.C.]: "Current Policy", No. 619, September 1984), p. 2.

85. Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, p. 8.

86. Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs 59: Winter 1980/81), p. 326.

87. *Ibid*.

88. *Ibid*, p. 324.

89. *Ibid*.

90. Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State Crocker Before Congressional Subcommittee on Africa. February 15, 1983. "Developments in southern Africa: Mid-term Assessment of Constructive Engagement", p. 3.

91. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping with Vulnerability", The Washington Papers, 9 (1981) p. 18.

92. Chester Crocker, "Southern Africa: Eight Years Later", Foreign Affairs, 1989, p. 147.

93. *Ibid*., p.148

94. *Ibid*., p.151.

95. For a fuller list of reforms in P.W. Botha's era, See: Andre' E.A.M. Thomashausen, The Dismantling of Apartheid --- The Balance of Reforms 1978 - 1988, (Bureau of Information, Pretoria, 1988).

96. See: South African Institute of Race Relations: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983 (Johannesburg, 1984), p.91.

97. Information obtained from a personal interview with Mr. Herbert Beukes, 19 November 1991.

98. South Africa Institute of Race Relations: Race Relations Survey 1984 (Johannesburg, 1985), p.861.

99.Ibid, p. 239.

100.P.Baker, South Africa Time Running Out, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, pp. 125 & 126.

101.Brand Fourie, Brandpunte, (Johannesburg: Tafelberg Publishers, 1991), p. 82

102.Chester Crocker, "Southern Africa: Eight Years Later", Foreign Affairs, 1990, p. 156.

103. In an interview with Donald Sole, a former South African Ambassador to the U.S., he maintained that constructive engagement was a policy that combined a "carrot-and-stick" approach. The South African government, however, was insufficiently responsive to the "carrot" side of the policy in that its willingness to push for more fundamental change was limited.

104.Ungar and Vale, "Why Constructive Engagement Failed", p. 235.

105.Baker, "Facing up to Apartheid", p. 50.

106.Coker, Constructive Engagement and Its Critics, p. 187.

107.Baker, "Facing up to Apartheid", p. 57.

108.Bishop Desmond Tutu, "The United States and South Africa: Human Rights and American Policy", Columbia Human Rights Law Review 17 (Fall, 1985): p. 10.

109.William J. Foltz, "United States Policy toward South Africa: Is One Possible?", in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p.38.

110.Ungar and Vale, "Why Constructive Engagement Failed", p. 240.

111.Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change" p. 324 & 325.

112.United States State Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, "US policy and South Africa: address by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker)". ([Washington, D.C.]: Current Policy , No. 732, August 1985), p. 343.

113.Ibid, p. 344.

114.Ibid, p. 345.

115.Ibid, p. 346.

116."Shultz Calls U.S. Policy Unchanged," Washington Post, 11 January 1987, in Baker South Africa Time Running Out, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, p.49.

117.Baker, South Africa Time Running Out, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, p.47.

118.Ibid.

119.Crocker, "Southern Africa: Eight Years Later", p.148.

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter 3

SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the idea and possible threat of economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa was not a new or unrealistic phenomenon, whether imposed multi-laterally through the United Nations or applied bi-laterally by individual states. It is also true that economic sanctions have been utilized by many nations throughout history as a foreign policy weapon to achieve various goals. (See Appendix C) Therefore, the South African situation, as a sanctions target, was not an isolated one.

The aim of this chapter is to try to provide, as clearly as possible, a definition and understanding of economic sanctions, as seen in the case of U.S. foreign policy regarding South Africa. The question concerning why the United States opted for the sanctions choice will be addressed. Also, a complete statement of the United States' efforts to implement sanctions will be given, followed by facts and arguments surrounding the impact of economic sanctions.

David Baldwin in his book, Economic Statecraft (1985), provides a comprehensive perspective on the "general nature" and "implications" of international economic policies that are likely to influence foreign policy-making. Baldwin defines statecraft by saying, "among students of foreign policy and international politics the

term is sometimes used to encompass the whole foreign-policy making process, but more often it refers to the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goals".¹ He goes on to say that in order to study statecraft one must, "consider the instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to exercise power, i.e., to get others to do what they would not otherwise do".²

Baldwin emphasizes the need for policy-makers to make decisions based on the various policy choices and alternatives available to them in order to produce the most cost-efficient foreign policy. This often results in a comparative analysis "about the costs and benefits of their perceived alternatives."³

The concept of economic statecraft, as illustrated and defined by Baldwin, is deliberately broad in the sense that it encompasses many specific forms of economic leverage (which he terms sanctions), be they either positive or negative. Such broadness is necessary "as it must be if it is to subsume all of the economic means by which foreign policy makers might try to influence other international actors".⁴ The following data (See: Tables 3.1 and 3.2), as presented by Baldwin, illustrate the alternative choices for either negative sanctions (based on attempts to threaten or punish), or positive sanctions (based on promising or providing rewards).

TABLE 3.1
Examples of Economic Statecraft: Negative Sanctions

TRADE	CAPITAL
EMBARGO: prohibition on exports; ban on all trade	FREEZING ASSETS: impounding assets, denying access to bank accounts or other financial assets owned by target country
BOYCOTT: prohibition on imports	CONTROLS ON IMPORT OR EXPORT: restriction on who can transfer how much capital for what purposes in and out of a country
TARIFF INCREASE: increase in taxes on imports from target state(s)	AID SUSPENSION: the reduction, termination, or slow-down of aid transfers
TARIFF DISCRIMINATION: imports from target countries treated less favorably than those from other countries	EXPROPRIATION: seizing ownership of property belonging to target state
WITHDRAW OF "MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT": ceasing to treat imports from a country as favorably as similar imports from any other country are treated	WITHHOLDING DUES TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: nonpayment, late payment, or reduced payment of financial obligations agreed to in the past
BLACKLIST: ban on doing business with firms that trade with the target country	TAXATION: assets of target state may be taxed in a discriminatory manner
QUOTAS (import or export): quantitative restriction on particular imports or exports	THREATS OF THE ABOVE*
LICENSE DENIAL (import or export): refusing permission to import/export goods	
DUMPING: deliberate sale of exports at prices below cost of production	
PRECLUSIVE BUYING: purchase of a commodity in order to deny it to the target country	
THREATS OF THE ABOVE*	

* use of any of the above techniques is conditional upon certain kinds of behavior by the target

TABLE 3.2
Examples of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions

TRADE	CAPITAL
TARIFF DISCRIMINATION: import duties favoring imports from target state(s)	PROVIDING AID: extension or continuation of aid via bilateral or multilateral channels in the form of grants or loans
GRANTING "MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT": promising to treat imports from target state as favorably as imports of similar products from any other source	INVESTMENT GUARANTEES: governmental insurance against some of the risks of private foreign investors
TARIFF REDUCTION: lowering of tariffs in general or on particular products	ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE CAPITAL EXPORTS OR IMPORTS: variety of incentives to import or export capital
DIRECT PURCHASE: payment for service or goods	TAXATION: especially favorable taxation of foreign capital investment
SUBSIDIES TO EXPORTS OR IMPORTS: exports to or imports from the target state may be subsidized	PROMISES OF THE ABOVE*
GRANTING LICENSES (import or export): permission to import or export particular goods	
PROMISES OF THE ABOVE*	

* use of any of the above techniques is conditional upon certain kinds of behavior by the target

Source for Tables 3.1 and 3.2: David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 41 & 42.

Baldwin gives three reasons for combining these ideas to think in terms of the "broad concept" which constitutes economic statecraft. They are: (1) because others think in terms of statecraft; (2) because economic techniques are peculiar; and (3) because other techniques of statecraft are treated at this level of generality.⁵

For the purposes of this dissertation, only negative sanctions will be dealt with. There are three common meanings for the term 'economic sanction' according to

Baldwin. The first refers to "the use of economic measures to enforce international law. The second refers to the types of values that are intended to be reduced or augmented in the target state. And the third usage corresponds to the concept of economic techniques of statecraft. . . ."6 However, Baldwin questions the use of the term 'economic sanction' and would rather avoid it, as the term is ambiguous and "used in so many different ways."<7

3.1.1 Defining Economic Sanctions

Although the term "economic sanction" has become a "catch-all" phrase applicable to many forms of economic foreign policy, it can be more specifically defined. It can stand as an individual concept, but whether or not it encapsulates other elements of Baldwin's statecraft is a different argument. What becomes important is that a clear understanding of the term is obtained. The following are definitions presented by three different authors.

"When economic measures are used as sanctions" according to Margaret Doxey, "the objective should be to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not conform to accepted norms of international conduct." 8 In agreement with this, Robin Renwick says "sanctions may be defined in legal terms as the penalty imposed to ensure compliance with a law."<9 When using contemporary international discourse, Renwick continues by stating that "sanctions are conceived essentially as the imposition of economic penalties to bring about a change in the political behavior of the country against which they are directed."<10

However, a definition that is more appropriate to the use of economic sanctions applied through multilateral channels is advanced by Dauodi and Dajani. In the event of "breach of international law", punitive sanctions are "initiated by a number of international actors, particularly a world organization such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, against one or more states for violating a universally approved charter. . . ."11

The first two definitions help to explain the "economic sanctions" route taken by the United States in 1986 in its foreign policy approach toward South Africa; while the latter definition more effectively explains U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa prior to 1986.

3.1.2 The Assumptions Underlying Sanctions

When a state or an international organization looks at the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on a targeted state, it does not necessarily imply that economic sanctions as the ideal policy choice: it may mean that sanctions are the best or most promising alternative among the choices available. Governments, when "deciding to impose economic sanctions" in response to an "international crisis", according to Renwick, can choose between three broad policy options: "(a) to do nothing; (b) to consider taking some form of military action; (c) to seek to impose economic penalties."12

It is necessary to look briefly at some of the major assumptions concerning economic sanctions that a government or an international organization will weigh up before it makes the decision to impose economic sanctions.

i. Limitations

The use of sanctions as a foreign policy choice suggests several limitations, primarily because not all sanctions are successful when it comes to changing the internal affairs of the target country. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott list four of the major limitations on the use of sanctions:

"One reason for failure is plain: the sanctions imposed may simply be inadequate to achieve the objectives sought - the goals may be too elusive, the means too gentle, or cooperation from other countries, when needed, too tepid.

A second reason for failure is that sanctions may create their own antidotes. In particular, economic sanctions may unify the target country both in support of the government and in search of commercial alternatives.

A third reason for the unsuccessful application of economic pressure is that sanctions may prompt powerful allies of the target country to lend support, largely offsetting whatever deprivation results from the sanctions themselves.

A fourth reason for failure is that economic sanctions create their own backlash, abroad and at home."¹³

Doxey shares this view, claiming that the chance for successful sanctions is reduced when states whose co-operation is required to strengthen sanctions are not willing to participate fully, thus "without universality of application, vulnerability to external economic pressure is drastically lessened".¹⁴ Moreover, it is difficult to police the sanction environment in that alternative markets and sources of supply become available. Sanction-busting actions are channelled through third states or friendly allies that may offer up loans, credits, gifts or even lines of transport to replace those affected by sanctions.¹⁵

To monitor and ensure that a state's sanctions policy is having the maximum effect on the target state often becomes very difficult. Every state realizes that, when choosing to use economic sanctions as a possible foreign policy choice, it is a fact that

there are endless possibilities for the target country to evade sanctions by various means, illegal or otherwise.¹⁶

3.2 WHY SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE?

There are many reasons for choosing an economic route in foreign policy. Perhaps understanding one of the most basic reasons lies in understanding humanity itself. The need and desire for states or leaders of states to influence or to exert some control over one another has been said to have been part of human nature and a normal process in any society or social organization. "Human beings" according to Baldwin, "are political animals" who need to influence one another and "as states continue to exist, statesmen will make influence attempts."¹⁷

Perhaps a second reason, other than the human desire to influence, is the need by the sender country to coerce and to interfere in the internal affairs of the target country. "Sanctions are part and parcel of international diplomacy," according to Hufbauer and Schott. Furthermore, they go on to say that sanctions are an economic instrument used "to coerce a target government into particular avenues of response."¹⁸

However, the most cogent reasons for using economic sanctions are given by

Merle Lipton:

"This tendency to resort to sanctions has been strengthened by the search for alternatives to war in the nuclear age, as well as by long-term economic and technological changes affecting the international system. Increasing economic interdependence and the communications revolution are creating a 'global society', in which the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, between national sovereignty and legitimate international concerns, is being challenged. These changes have created increasing awareness of what is

happening in other countries. Meanwhile, the conviction that outsiders have the right and duty to intervene is strengthened by the belief that such sanctions are likely to be more effective than hitherto."¹⁹

In addition to these general reasons for applying sanctions, the United States had three additional motivations. Firstly, due to United States sensitivity regarding racial injustice, sanctions can be an effective tool to express disagreement where fundamental racial equality and human rights are not being upheld. This is particularly the case with U.S. sanctions against South Africa. As Doxey has explained, African countries and the United States have established a certain level of "unacceptability of racial discrimination against blacks." This abhorrence of racial discrimination "gathers additional moral force and provides one of the few issues on which political consensus had been attainable at the United Nations. . . . [Therefore], sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa derive status and credibility from their relation to a universal norm."²⁰

A second reason derives from the high esteem the United States holds for its own political system. Many Americans see their own system as the most democratic and moral design available in the world to represent those people subject to what is seen as an unjust system. Such is "the belief of many Americans that their system and values are model for the rest of the world, and their convictions that they have a leading role to play in reshaping that world in their own image. Economic sanctions provide a weapon that seems well-suited for this purpose."²¹ This idea is closely linked to the fact that the United States is a world power and can, if it so desires, influence other states in the global arena to comply with U.S. ideals and goals. This is because, according to Hufbauer and Schott, it is large countries that "pursue an active

foreign policy. . . ." But more specifically, sanctions "have been used by big powers - precisely because they are big and can seek to influence events on a global scale." ²²

The third and the most concrete reason for the United States' decision to implement sanctions is as stated above --- is because the United States is a world power, it can impose meaningful sanctions with little financial cost to itself. This is explained by Merle Lipton:

"The United States accounts for about a quarter of the world's gross product. . . . Thus in applying economic sanctions the United States can expect to have a significant economic impact on others at relatively smaller cost to itself."²³

Because the sanctions debate is often viewed through cost/benefit eyes, U.S. policy-makers can both seek benefits from the imposition of economic sanctions and try to remedy a situation. Often the cost is greater if a state fails to act. However, the actual success or failure of the sanction policy will usually bring little or no cost to the country imposing it. " 'Demonstration of resolve'", as stated by Hufbauer and Schott, "has often supplied the driving force behind the imposition of sanctions." They note that this is the case especially for the U.S. "which frequently has deployed sanctions to try to assert its leadership in world affairs."²⁴ Although United States administrations often impose sanctions to register strong disagreement with international "misdeeds", in effect they realize that influencing the behavior will often bring insignificant change, if any. The reason for this according to Hufbauer and Schott, is because "sanctions often are imposed because the cost of inaction - in lost confidence at home and abroad in the ability or willingness of the US to act - is seen as greater than the cost of the sanctions."²⁵ It may also be the case that the imposition of sanctions is a purely symbolic gesture that 'sends a message' to the target state.

It must also be stated that there were many times recently before the 1986 sanctions were implemented against South Africa where the U.S. sought to influence other countries by opting for the sanctions weapon. Most notably sanctions were used against Nicaragua and Iran in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, perhaps it can be stated that as sanctions were increasingly resorted to, the more feasible their application became in the South African situation.

The above paragraphs give some indication why the United States acted the way it did toward South Africa in the mid-1980's, when United States foreign policy started to move away from constructive engagement. The following section seeks to explain the United States foreign policy shift toward economic sanctions.

3.3 MOVE TOWARD SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS IN THE MID-1980'S

3.3.1 Reagan Sanctions and Executive Action

Reagan's second term, and more specifically 1985, witnessed swift changes to the policy of constructive engagement. In both the United States Senate and House of Representatives punitive economic legislation was pending that sought to impose a series of strict punishments on South Africa.

The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 (House Resolution 1460) and Senate Bill (S. 995) both encouraged South Africa to abandon apartheid policies.²⁶ The Senate-House Conference provided a joint version of H.R. 1460 and S. 995 and the bill was

titled the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1985. This bill never became law due to legislative delays and the President's unwillingness to accept it.

On September 9, 1985, President Reagan issued an Executive Order (No. 12532) against South Africa which would impose limited sanctions. Reagan thought his Executive Order would further U.S. objectives. He stressed a need for uniformity of U.S. policy toward South Africa, and admitted that if the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1985 were to cross his desk for signature into law, he would certainly veto it. As stated by President Reagan in September 1985:

"I believe the measures I am announcing here today will best advance our goals. If the Congress sends me the present bill as reported by the Conference Committee, I would have to veto it. That need not happen. I want to work with the Congress to advance bipartisan support for America's policy toward South Africa. That is why I have put forward this Executive Order today."²⁷

Reagan's Executive order²⁸ was not merely designed to improve the situation in South Africa or even to improve U.S./South African relations, but, rather, it attempted to pre-empt the possibility of stricter sanctions legislation by Congress. As understood by President Reagan, such legislation could deeply undermine any progress made by the constructive engagement policy of his first term.

A second Executive Order (No. 12535) on South Africa was signed by President Reagan on October 1, 1985. The import of Krugerrands into the United States was prohibited by this order and both Executive Orders (No. 12532 and No. 12535) were extended in September of 1986.

The implementation of the Executive Orders was the cause of much debate and triggered opposition from all sides. "While it represented an attempt at compromise," according to Pauline Baker, "the president's executive order[s] pleased neither the left

nor the right."²⁹ The executive order made those on the left angry as it undermined stricter punitive sanctions, while on the other side, "hard-line conservatives believed Reagan's willingness to adopt limited sanctions would tilt the United States toward South African black radicals and play into the hands of the Soviet Union."³⁰

Even though President Reagan maintained that his Executive Order approach was the best method of nudging South Africa toward peaceful change, this direction would soon be changed.

3.3.2 Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986.

It became clear in 1986 that stiffer sanctions against South Africa were becoming a reality and could not be stopped. The purpose of the president's executive orders had been to deter comprehensive sanctions, but instead of stopping sanctions, they only fueled the debate. According to Baker, "the question was no-longer whether sanctions would be imposed, but rather which sanctions would be the most effective."³¹

The sanctions campaign had been gathering momentum since the 1970s. As disenchantment with constructive engagement grew so also did pressure for stronger action. The sanctions campaign developed from grass-roots base of churches, civil rights groups, various African lobbies and anti-apartheid groups and in colleges and universities. By 1985-6 the sanctions campaign had a substantial U.S.-wide support-base. As illustrated by Baker, it is important to understand the intensity of this debate:

"The political dynamics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States were not limited to black activism. The crisis in South Africa touched American of all colors and reached into corporate boardrooms, local legislatures, city councils, campuses, churches, and labor unions. The anti-apartheid campaign rekindled a collective spirit of social activism that had been dormant since the 1960s. Roman Catholic bishops, the major Protestant churches, and the

National Council of Churches, to which most mainline Protestant and Orthodox churches belong, issued statements in favor of sanctions. Leaders of the country's largest civil rights organizations, labor unions, women's associations and Jewish groups added their voices, including Coretta Scott King, Benjamin Hooks from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), John Jacob from the National Urban League, Elanor Smeal from the National Organization of Women, Henry Siegman from the American Jewish Congress, and the presidents of the largest AFL-CIO-affiliated unions. . . . Campus activism sharpened the debate . . . as did a growth in the Congressional Black Congress."³²

The more the South African sanctions question became debated, the more momentum it gained as being a major issue among legislative leaders in Washington. A widespread feeling in Congress was that the minor sanctions provided in President Reagan's Executive orders were not sufficient to induce change in South Africa. As the violence grew and a country-wide state of emergency was imposed increasing numbers in Congress felt impelled to adopt tougher measures against South Africa. The campaign for sanctions had by now developed a momentum and a depth of support that increasing numbers of legislators who may previously have been relatively unconcerned about South Africa or were hesitant about the wisdom of sanctions, now felt obliged to make a stand.

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act or CAAA (Public Legislation 99-440) of 1986 was the result of this Congressional response. The CAAA was vetoed by President Reagan on the 26 September 1986. The House of Representatives overrode President Reagan's veto on 29 September by a vote of 313 to 83; the Senate overrode the veto on 2 October 1986, by a vote of 78 to 21; the bill became law on the same day.

The purpose of the sanctions was to persuade the South African government to move more quickly towards a negotiated end to the apartheid system and the unrest

in South Africa. The CAAA (Appendix D) had three primary stipulations: (1) it imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy on apartheid; and (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. The CAAA remained in force until recently when President George Bush formally lifted the sanctions legislation on 10 July 1991. President Bush felt that the South African government had met the five provisions (Appendix D) for lifting sanctions.

3.4 THE ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

Even though the CAAA has been revoked by the United States Government, many state and local governments in the United States along with private businesses still enforce sanctions against South Africa. Many other states were also allies in joining the sanctions effort against South Africa (Appendix E). Approximately, twenty four of South Africa's key trading partners implemented similar legislation while the European Community (EC) imposed its own sanctions. Much of that legislation has been relaxed, lifted or is in the process of being withdrawn.

Economic sanctions, whether specifically dealing with disinvestment, trade, or international finance are all separate but linked. It can be said that some have had significant impact while others have been counterproductive. What is essential is to note is that not all economic pressure on South Africa was imposed in emulation of the CAAA, but rather the CAAA can be said to have influenced specific actions on business, trade, or lending. The 'demonstration effect' of U.S.-imposed sanctions was considerable, given its standing as a dominant power in the West, plus the threat clause

in the CAAA to sanction states that undercut the U.S. position by moving in to fill the trade opportunities that opened up.

The scope of the sanctions activity was very extensive. It covered many U.S. states, counties, businesses, and universities. Major companies like Coca-Cola, IBM, Ford, and General Motors, equaling 179 in total, either sold or closed their businesses in South Africa. Moreover, in the U.S. alone, some 23 states, plus the Virgin Islands, 19 counties and 79 have, in one form or another, imposed sanctions. Since the end of the 1970s more than 85 U.S. colleges and universities have either partially or totally divested.³³ Much of this sanctions activity was not included in the CAAA but were individual pieces of legislation, or action initiated by grassroots communities, businesses, churches, and universities.

3.4.1 The Economic Impact of Sanctions

The CAAA, along with other sanctions measures, is said to have effected South Africa in many different ways. There continues to be a vigorous debate about whether sanctions have been successful in achieving their attended goals or have had a counterproductive impact on South Africa. As explained by Janice Love, evaluating the impact of sanctions is a difficult task because sanctions' success is "minimized by seemingly dispassionate analysts but overrated by those committed to punishing the target."³⁴ Similarly, Merle Lipton adds:

". . .the effect of disinvestment confirms the world wide experience that sanctions create both gainers and losers and that it is difficult to shape them so that their costs fall primarily on their intended targets."³⁵

Steven Lewis, Jr., says that "discussions of economic pressure/ sanctions as a policy tool used by foreign governments to promote change in South Africa have been blurred by several factors:

- A failure to distinguish clearly the specific measures being discussed and the processes by which they are supposed to affect economic developments, influence political behavior, and hence promote political change.
- Extravagant claims concerning both the successes and the failures of past attempts to use economic pressures.
- A tendency on part of both proponents and opponents of sanctions to mix and confuse arguments about the morality of sanctions with arguments concerning their efficacy.
- A failure to relate arguments about economic pressure to other processes at work in South Africa and to take into account the country's economic structure and history.
- A curious and inconsistent materialism that causes advocates on the extremes of the sanctions debate to argue that individuals who share their beliefs would not change their values or their behavior on the basis of economic considerations such as loss of income, but that their opponents can be forced through economic pressure to either change their minds or lose their will to resist.¹³⁶

Keeping the above arguments in mind, the following paragraphs seek to explain some of the various consequences of sanctions and their various effects on the economic and political environments of South Africa.

Firstly, it is important to note that the economic impact of sanctions can be analyzed by determining possible consequences of disinvestment, some possible repercussions of financial sanctions on South Africa, and some possible implications of trade sanctions. The second point to note is that disinvestment, financial sanctions and trade sanctions had various effects on economic growth, employment, and income.

3.4.2 Disinvestment

The idea behind the implementation of sanctions was to "raise the cost" of maintaining the system of apartheid. These sanctions, according to Merle Lipton, "focused on securing **disinvestment** - the withdrawal from South Africa of foreign companies with direct equity investments".³⁷

The present United States Ambassador to South Africa William L. Swing admitted that U.S. "investment has fallen from about 360 companies down to about 100. We've dropped from about \$4 billion (about R11.2 billion) equity investment to about \$1.5 billion (about R4.2 billion)."³⁸ In relation to European companies, Lipton said, a "higher proportion of [those who are disinvesting are] US companies."³⁹

Bankorp's Chief Executive, Chris J Van Wyk, said that:

"the effects of disinvestment are more difficult to quantify than those of trade and financial sanctions. . . . Disinvestment has a negative short-term psychological impact, and a negative long-term impact on technology and skill transfers, as well as on the general interaction between South African business and leading business corporations in the international sphere. It does not create drastic unemployment, but reduces many of the social development and community programmes sponsored by multinationals for the benefit of black people."⁴⁰

U.S. Direct Investments in South Africa have been on the decline. Table 3.3 below shows the value of U.S. direct investments in South Africa which stood at \$1.6 billion in 1987.

TABLE 3.3
U.S. Direct Investments in South Africa Year-end Position, 1982-87
 (billions of dollars)

YEAR	VALUE
1982	\$2.3
1983	2.0
1984	1.5
1985	1.2
1986	1.6
1987	1.5
1988	1.3

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business. August 1986, June 1987, June 1988 in William H. Cooper, "Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on the United States", Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, January 16, 1990, p. 4.

The decline in U.S. investment, implies several disadvantages and cannot merely be seen as a step in a positive direction. As Merle Lipton states,

"The impact of sanctions has been most marked in relation to capital outflows. Yet although sanctions 'worked' in the sense of stimulating significant disinvestment from South Africa, the effects of this have been ambiguous. Disinvestment has not noticeably impeded the functioning of the South African economy; it has produced wind-fall gains for some rich whites; disadvantages for some blacks; and losses for foreign investors - although it has also been a blow to business confidence."⁴¹

When companies disinvest it is inevitable that a number of jobs will go with them. It has been argued by the National Party government that sanctions have caused and would continue to cause blacks to lose their jobs. According to Ronald Bethlehem, a recession in the early 1980s has brought a 'total employment decline which in return has "produced an increase in unemployment."⁴²

It is, however, difficult to establish conclusively that U.S.-imposed sanctions alone have caused job losses for blacks. Probably sanctions were a contributory factor,

but there is doubt if it is methodologically possible to factor out the precise contribution of sanctions. According to Congressional statistics, it has been estimated that "U.S. sanctions alone would result in over 600,000 unemployed, and the loss of jobs to these workers would mean the 3.1 million of their dependents would also be affected."⁴³ However these statistics are hard to confirm or refute as it is difficult to establish exactly how many black workers were affected by sanctions. The difficult part is identifying the impact attributable to sanctions and the impact of the decline of investor (both foreign and domestic) confidence in the South African economy. In terms of job losses the latter was a far more significant factor.

What is important is that there is clear distinction between (a) damaging the economy - which sanctions are bound to do, (b) nudging or pushing the rulers in a politically acceptable direction. Whether sanctions intend to do one but also do the other or visa versa, shows that there is proof that there is no guarantee of effectively hitting the desired target.

3.4.3 Trade Sanctions

South Africa, like most states in the global arena, have many items to trade on international markets. (See Appendix F and G) One must understand trade as a fairly straightforward process, according to Richard Moorsom whereas trade is one "activity in an integrated economic system."⁴⁴ Thus trade volume has the ability to influence international capital flows, financial transactions, exchange rates or bans on investment and loan finance.

U.S. trade with South Africa from 1984 to 1989 is shown below in Table 3.4 The CAAA has had a major impact on U.S. imports from South Africa. It is apparent that at least 50% of the decline in U.S. imports from South Africa is due to the embargoes under the CAAA.

TABLE 3.4
U.S. Trade with South Africa, 1984-89
 (billions of dollars)

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989*
U.S. Exports	2.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.7	1.2
U.S. Imports	2.5	2.1	2.4	1.3	1.6	1.2
U.S. Balance	-0.2	-0.9	-1.2	-0.0	0.1	0.0

* January - September^f

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, TradeNet Computerized Data Retrieval System. Exports are total exports valued on a f.a.s. basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis. in William H. Cooper, "Sanctions Against South Africa: Impact on the United States", Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, January 16, 1990, p. 6.

When the U.S. trade sanctions became policy, the South African market became open for new trade to replace the declining U.S. trade. To discourage other major Western nations (Appendix H) benefiting from U.S. disinvestment and trade sanctions against South Africa, Section 402 - 3 of the CAAA (see Appendix D) outlines the provisions for retaliation. After 1986, according to Lipton, all of South Africa's top trading partners were "trying to keep out of the hot seat of being the top trading partner."⁴⁵

To sum up the debate surrounding trade sanctions, Merle Lipton gives five lessons of previous cases of sanctions that are applicable to South Africa:

- "- Sanctions tend to 'bite at first, but then trade, like a river, flows round the obstacles erected against it. Sanctions continue to impose some costs, but these act more as a discriminatory tariff on trade than as barrier to it.
- The impact of sanctions is greatly affected by conditions in international trading markets; indeed these have, to date had more impact on the performance of the South African economy than sanctions.
- The efficacy of sanctions has been reduced by their uneven adoption and enforcement. But attempts to multilateralise sanctions are likely to lead to friction between the United States and many of its Asian and European allies.
- The efficacy of sanctions has also been reduced by political pressures from vested interests. These have ensured that the minerals and metals which comprise two-thirds of South Africa's exports have been largely exempted from sanctions. Instead, protectionist pressures have secured the sanctioning of less vital exports such as textiles and clothing, agricultural products and uranium.
- A sanctions-busting industry has emerged, with profits for a growing group of middlemen and camouflage industries in many countries."⁴⁶

3.4.4 Financial Sanctions

Historically, South Africa has always relied on an inflow of capital during periods of growth where it was easy to detect a pattern in the balance of payments. According to Alan Hirsch, economic problems that South Africa has experienced in the past --- caused by international oil price increases of the late 1970s coupled with political violence and disinvestment --- have led South Africa into a recession.⁴⁷ These factors, among others, have limited the amount of capital inflow coming into South Africa thus exacerbating economic problems as a consequence.

With this historical perspective against the backdrop of mass political unrest and violence in South Africa, the first onslaught of financial pressure came when Chase Manhattan Bank refused to roll over loans to South Africa on 31 July 1985. On 4

September foreign banks followed, contributing to, and setting off, a financial crisis in South Africa. Lipton explains:

"This precipitated a liquidity crisis, forcing South Africa to declare a partial moratorium on its debt payments in September 1985. South Africa's subsequent problems in rescheduling its debts and acquiring new capital inflows and the negative-to-low growth rates of 1985/86, led to the belief that South Africa was undergoing a "sanctions-induced economic crisis" and that this offered a major source of leverage over the South African government."⁴⁸

This belief was strengthened by Gerhard de Kock, the past governor of the Reserve Bank:

". . .without sanctions the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) would have been 4% to 5% annually, but the growth rate rose from 1% in 1986 to a high of 3% in 1988, then fell to 1.5% in the first quarter of 1989. Inflation in April 1989 was 14%, slightly less than a high of 16.1% in 1987, and the value of the rand in August 1989 was \$.36, little more than the low point of \$.35 in August 1985 after foreign creditors refused to roll over South Africa's debt."⁴⁹

Merle Lipton, however, argues that de Kock's conclusions place too much emphasis on the impact of sanctions per se, and too little on market trends and political assumptions and forecasts.⁵⁰

It becomes obvious that South Africa's slow growth rate and debt problems are due to a combination of factors and not merely due to sanctions alone. Whether or not these factors are linked to disinvestment, trade or financial sanctions (all of which are economically linked) which cause pressure on the government, it is in practice impossible to distinguish 'market' decisions from decisions that embody a fear of future punitive sanctions. Due to a history of numerous external elements and market forces, sanctions have perhaps received added success.⁵¹

But the fact that sanctions have made some impact cannot be denied. It is clear that "sanctions have contributed to the country's economic stagnation", as stated by Ronald Bethlehem. This he says has led to an unavoidably political restructuring of the country.⁵²

3.4.5 Political Impact

Noting the above arguments, it is true that a number of factors have contributed to the impact of sanctions. Likewise, elements of the political sphere cannot be omitted when discussing the possible influence of sanctions. Even though results are not conclusive and nearly impossible to pinpoint at this stage, some broad statements about this highly debated issue can be made.

Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of sanction debate was the hardening of white attitudes towards the U.S. as will become apparent when the survey data are presented. Many South African government officials were angered and disconcerted at the U.S. action especially when the government considered itself in a process of reform. This hardening of attitudes also displayed outrage and irritation at U.S. interference in the South African domestic situation. This criticism of the U.S. became one of the key issues on the NP platform for the 1987 election. Similarly, the CP who would later become the NP's official opposition, also used the issues of sanctions and reform in the same election to suggest that the NP was capitulating to international pressure.⁵³

It has also been argued that sanctions were politically dynamic enough to influence white South African attitudes in a variety of ways. While it was evident that

sanctions split white attitudes toward the government and reform, sanctions also became a warning signal to whites of international rejection of South Africa's domestic racial policies. The isolation imposed by the sports boycott is an example of this. Following this precedent pro-sanctions lobbies argue that severance of sporting ties has put pressure on whites. The imposition of a comprehensive sports boycott resulted in the near-total sporting isolation of South Africa. Most of the major white-controlled sports unions reacted to the boycott by taking steps to desegregate sports. Pro-sanction groups in the U.S. and elsewhere seized upon this precedent as an argument about the analogous shifts economic sanctions might cause. Sanctions also heightened white attitudes of distrust and anger at the international community.

Likewise for the blacks, some viewed sanctions as a point of solidarity --- because sanctions brought hope of forcing change --- in assisting the struggle against apartheid. Whether or not most blacks support sanctions because of the issue of 'job loss', the sanction issue gave a boost of support to anti-government groups and the majority of the disenfranchised population in that for once, unlike previous years, the international community was seen to be finally identifying with the struggle.

Nonetheless, as opinion polls have consistently shown, a majority of blacks opposed sanctions if they were going to entail extensive job-losses. But, it is certainly true that major organizations like the ANC and UDF and high-profile individuals like Bishop Tutu supported sanctions.

It is clear that no pro-sanctions group believed that sanctions alone would topple the system, but that sanctions would be a marginal increment to other sources of pressure, mostly from domestic sources that would force the South African government to the bargaining table. This argument is put forward by William Minter

and Elizabeth Schmidt. They view the South African sanctions situation through the lens of the past sanctions experience weathered by the illegal Rhodesia Front government. Their conviction is that sanctions were intended to help at the margins, for example, to give an extra bite to other forms of opposition/resistance.⁵⁴

In its official response to sanctions, the NP government has argued that the changes initiated during 1990 were not the result of sanctions. On the contrary, their argument is that sanctions delayed the reform process. The evolution of a more just and democratic system has been slowed due to the difficulties that South Africa experienced through international sanctions and isolation. In an interview, State President F.W. De Klerk acknowledged that sanctions had hurt South Africa. In a comment responding to the question: What role did sanctions play in your perceptions? Mr De Klerk said:

"Their economic impact is that while we've learned to live with them and while they didn't succeed to bring us to our knees, they did and do impede the sort of growth rate we need to address, in all spheres, the challenges we face in South Africa. Social and economic and human development, housing, education, all require a growth rate in the vicinity of five percent per year. Sanctions without question prevented us from meeting these urgent needs. So sanctions have hurt us and are hurting each and every citizen."⁵⁵

Similarly, President De Klerk commented, at the time of the Inkatha-gate scandal in mid-1991 --- in fact during his TV statement/press interview --- that 'we were being strangled by sanctions'.

Another NP opinion states that it was not sanctions at all that brought change, but rather that apartheid was no longer capable of enforcement. According to Leon Wessels --- Minister of Local Government, National Housing and Public Works --- a leading verligte and former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'sanctions were not the

reason why the government was striving for a just and democratic South Africa, rather it was the fact that apartheid had failed.⁵⁶

It is clearly evident that the sanctions issue, whether viewed in regard to its political or economic impact, remains a contentious issue. The following chapters will discuss more thoroughly how members of the ruling National Party perceived the reasons underlying the imposition of sanctions, and what they believe the outcome will be. Questions concerning the political effect of sanctions will be considered in the conclusion in the light of the data.

The exact political effect of sanctions in promoting change in South Africa will remain a contentious issue for some time to come. The following chapter aims to make a contribution to the debate by attempting empirically to ascertain how U.S. measures impacted on individual legislators of the ruling National Party.

3.5 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 1985, p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 9.

3. Ibid., p. 15.

4. Ibid., p. 40.

5. Ibid., p. 65.

6. Ibid., pp. 35 & 36.

7. Ibid., p. 36

8. Margaret P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 9.

9. Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, 1981), p.2.
10. Renwick, Economic Sanctions, p.2.
11. M.S. Dauodi and M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 8.
12. Renwick, Economic Sanctions, p. 1.
13. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, "Economic Sanctions in Support of Foreign Policy Goals", in Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., October 1983, Vol. 6., pp. 11 & 12.
14. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, p.90.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 114.
17. Baldwin, Statecraft, p. 27
18. Hufbauer and Schott, "Economic Sanctions in support of foreign policy goals", p. 10.
19. Merle Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", Discussion Paper No. 1, Center for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance, London School of Economics, Spring 1991., p.1.
20. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, pp. 126 & 127.
21. Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p.1.
22. Hufbauer and Schott, "Economic Sanctions in support of Foreign policy Goals", p.10.
23. Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", p.1.
24. Hufbauer and Schott, "Economic Sanctions in support of Foreign Policy Goals", p.10.
25. Ibid.
26. Brenda Branaman explains:
 "H.R. 1460 was introduced March 7, 1985; it was referred to the Committees on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, on Foreign Affairs and on Rules. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported to the House [of Representatives] with an amendment (H.Rept. 99-76, part I) on May 9, 1985. the Rules Committee reported to the House [of Representatives] (H. Rept. 99-76, part II) on May 9, 1985. The bill passed the House [of Representatives], amended, on June 5, 1985. It passed the Senate on July 11, 1985, in lieu of S.995 but with the language of S. 995 substituted for the House [of Representatives] language. A Conference report (H. Rept. 99-242) was filed on August 1, 1985. The House [of Representatives] agreed to the conference report on the same day. Action was delayed in the Senate by the threat of a filibuster. Three cloture votes on September 9, 11, and 12, 1985, in the Senate failed to force a Senate vote on the conference report."

See: Brenda M. Branaman, "Sanctions Against South Africa: Activities of the 99th Congress", Congressional Research Service, LOC, February 13, 1987, (Report No. 87-200 F), p. 8.

27. Remarks by President Reagan, September 9, 1985, "United States and South Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977 - 1985". United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. (Doc. 174). pp. 357 -358.

28. The limited sanction provided in the Executive order outlined the following provisions:

"It banned new loans except those for education, housing, or health facilities open to all races; -- It banned the export of computers, computer software, and computer technology to apartheid implementing offices of the South African government; -- It banned nuclear-related exports defined as goods and technology that would be used in nuclear production or utilization facilities. Export of such goods would be allowed if they are needed for health and safety or international safeguard programs; -- It implemented U.N. Security Council Resolution 558 banning the import of arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa; -- It ordered an end to trade assistance to U.S. companies doing business in South Africa if they do not apply the Sullivan principles; -- It directed all U.S. agencies with activities in South Africa to assist black-owned businesses; -- It ordered U.S. Officials to consult with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on a U.S. prohibitions of Krugerrand sales; -- It ordered a study of the feasibility of minting U.S. gold coins; -- It established an "advisory committee" to recommend ways to encourage peaceful change in South Africa; --It provided for increased funds for scholarships to black South Africans and for grants to human rights organizations in South Africa, including legal assistance for political prisoners."

See: Brenda M. Branaman, "Sanctions Against South Africa", pp. 12 & 13.

29. Pauline H. Baker, South African Time Running Out. The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, (U.S.A.: The Ford Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association, 1989), p. 40.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid, p. 43.

32. Ibid, p. 32.

33. A thorough report on sanctions has been compiled in South Africa: The Sanctions Report, by Joseph Hanlon, ed. from which the following information was collected:

". . . 179 companies have sold or closed down their South African operation over the past five years. Companies involved include Coca-Cola, IBM, Ford, and General Motors. In addition, 23 states and the Virgin Islands, 19 counties and 79 cities have sold stock in, withdrawn funds from (in the case of banks) and/or banned purchases from companies involved in South Africa. . . . Since 1977, 46 colleges and universities have totally divested and 43 have partially divested from South Africa."

See: Sandra Ferguson and Peter Sluiter, "Sanctions Directory", in Joseph Hanlon, ed., South Africa: The Sanctions Report, Documents & Statistics, (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990), p.69.

34. Janice Love, "Potential Impact of Economic Sanctions Against South Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26, I, (1988), p. 19.

- 35.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p. 7.
- 36.Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), pp.97 & 98.
- 37.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p.7.
- 38.Shaun Johnson, "How life goes with a Swing", The Argus, 20 June 1991, [Spectrum], p. 23.
- 39.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p. 7.
- 40.Symposium Speech delivered by Dr. Chris J Van Wyk, Chief Executive: Bankorp, "South African and the International Community: The effect of sanctions and Disinvestment on the South African Economy", 2 November 1989, Vall Triangle Technikon, Vanderbijlpark.
- 41.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", pp. 31 & 32.
- 42.Ronald Bethlehem, "South Africa's imperative for growth", in Stanley Mogoba, John Kane-Berman, Ronnie Bethlehem eds., Sanctions and the Alternatives, (Braamfontein: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1988),p. 7.
- 43.Brenda M. Branaman, "South Africa: U.S. Policy after Sanctions", Congressional Research Issue Brief, January 19, 1990, p.8.
- 44.Richard Moorsom, "Foreign trade and Sanctions", in Mark Orkin ed., Sanctions Against Apartheid, (Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 1989), p. 253.
- 45.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p. 14.
- 46.Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", p. 17.
47. As explained by Hirsch,
 "in the late 1970's the economic difficulties brought about by the first oil-price rise, combined with the political turmoil of the Soweto uprising, began to discourage investors. The South Africa economy experienced negative growth in 1977 and 1978. The second international oil crisis helped rocket the price of gold in 1979 and 1980, and temporarily relieved the pressure. But in 1983 the loosening of exchange controls by the South African government coincided with another South African recession and disinvestment escalated."
- See: Alan Hirsch, "Sanctions, loans and the South African economy", in Mark Orkin ed., Sanctions Against Apartheid, (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1989), p. 271.
- 48.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p. 8.
- 49.Gerhard de Kock quoted in Brenda M Branaman, "South Africa: U.S. Policy After Sanctions", Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, January 19, 1990, p. 8.
- 50.Lipton, "Challenge of Sanctions", p.9.
51. As the U.S. Ambassador has stated:
 "The stagnation in South Africa's economy results from a history of structural problems, including an absence of skilled labor; high tax rates required to pay for apartheid's overhead costs; a concentration of economic power in large conglomerates and the

government's over-reliance on a protectionist trade policy; and financial sanctions that limited access to foreign capital markets."

See: "A Time of Optimism: United States Ambassador William Lacy Swing takes a look at developments in S.A.", Tribute, 1991, p. ?.

52. Ronald W. Bethlehem, "The need for change in the South African economy", in D.J. van Vuuren, N.E. Wiehahn, N.J. Rhodie, M. Wiechers, eds., South Africa in the Nineties, (Pretoria: HSRC publishers, 1991), p. 400.

53. For an in-depth discussion see: Branaman, "South Africa: U.S. Policy After Sanctions", pp. 5 & 6.

54. William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, "When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Re-examined", African Affairs 87: (April 1988), p. 209.

55. Arnaud de Borchgrave, ed. exclusive interview with State President F.W. De Klerk, "The Mandate for a 'New Society'", Insight, 2 July 1990, p. 37.

56. Die Burger, 20 November 1991

CHAPTER FOUR

Chapter 4

NATIONAL PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s

The purpose of this chapter is to present the core of the research field data. The following is a series of responses obtained from personal interviews with the sample amounting to third of the National Party caucus. This chapter will present National Party perceptions of United States foreign policy and of its objectives and motivations.

4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research procedure was that all National Party (NP) Members of Parliament (MP's) were approached by post asking for their cooperation with this research project. Out of the 102 NP parliamentarians, 35 were available for personal interviews in May and June of 1990 (Appendix I). The State President, Ministers, and most Deputy Ministers were unavailable due to complicated schedules.

In addition, a select group of officials of the South African foreign affairs department who have had a particular concern with United States/South African foreign policy were interviewed. To obtain the opposition point of view, interviewing was done with Conservative Party (CP) MPs. Also interviewed, were present members of the United States State Department, and past U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Herman Nickel, who was ambassador during the time-period being analyzed. However, these

interviews are intended to provide a contrast with the perceptions of those held by the NP. The core of this study focuses specifically on the 35 NP parliamentarians' perceptions.

The interviews were conducted at times convenient to the individual's schedules. The respondents were assured of confidentiality and every effort was made to limit interviews to 30 minutes. Each respondent was given a fact sheet of material containing those issues to be discussed in advance, and each individual was asked the same questions. A standard structured interview schedule was used for all interviews and the response of each respondent was entered on a separate data sheet. To facilitate accuracy in recording responses, a tape recorder was used during each interview. The direct quotations used in this chapter remain unedited except for a few minor stylistic changes to improve clarity. It is hoped that actual NP perceptions are presented as clearly as possible.

The interviews were conducted in English, due to the writer's inability to speak Afrikaans. The Afrikaans-speaking respondents were both gracious and generous in agreeing to speak English.

4.2 PERSONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING RESPONDENTS

To gain an understanding of the type of NP Members of Parliament interviewed the following pie charts depict levels education, age, language and gender, and indicate the types of constituencies represented (Figure 1 - 5).

The interview schedule contained two distinct parts asking questions parallel to the two prominent foreign policy approaches adopted by the United States in the 1980's. The first part of the interview schedule explores NP parliamentary responses to President Reagan's foreign policy approach of constructive engagement (most prominently from 1980 - 1985), while the second part explores NP parliamentarians' responses to the foreign policy switch from constructive engagement to punitive sanction measures known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 through July 10, 1991, enacted by the U.S. Congress over the veto of President Reagan. Both parts of the interview schedule sought to extract NP perceptions, understanding and underlying motives of the two different policies.




Figure 1: Is your constituency mostly representative of:
(n = 16)




Figure 2: Level of Education.
(n = 20)




Figure 3: Age
(n = 20)




Figure 4: Language
(n = 20)



Figure 5: Gender

4.3 PRESENTATION OF THE DATA - PART I: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

When asked if over the past the past ten years if United States/South African relations have been fairly cooperative, the following responses were obtained:

"I would say fairly, with emphasis on fairly."

"I don't think so, that's a personal opinion."

"No. I feel that America to put it bluntly has been putting its nose into our affairs and they've been interfering in a way which we did not appreciate."

"No, I wouldn't say they've been cooperative. On the contrary, I think America has been the bully boy."

"No. There are a few things that I think stimulated that sort of a view. The first is that we are exposed to media coverage and not involved in direct discussions. And the perception that you get from the general media is that they don't really appreciate the problems in South Africa. You feel pressurized, you feel neglected with appreciation of the fact there are problems in South Africa that we in all sincerity try to resolve. But people don't seem to recognize that, and we've been exposed to sanctions and the worst part is economic sanctions. Our solution within South Africa lies within the economic environment. If we can stimulate our economy, create job opportunities, give people the opportunity to work for a living."

"I think in some fields yes, but I don't think that the media permitted the cooperation to be as good as it could be which I think is a pity. And I also think that a lot of other things stopped the relations from really developing. But out of the constructive engagement program came a lot of good... But a lot of good came out of it and I am really grateful also to the Reagan Administration. for a lot of things that they [did] so, ..."

"I would say there was involvement from both sides on different levels, but once again my perceptions sometimes that in general, the United States because it's big, it's got its own agenda. I believe [the U.S.] will have a more powerful side of the coin to decide on issues. I would say and in relationships as such [between the U.S. and South Africa] will be more ruled by them than us."

"Yes, I would like to agree to a certain extent. I think fairly cooperative but up to the end of the Reagan Administration I would say that it was not so clearly spelled out what constructive engagement really meant. But I'm pretty sure, we in South Africa experienced the cooperative from the Reagan side, and from our side as well. Of course there were always talks between Chester Crocker and the government."

"Yes - One will have difficulty if you speak about U.S. relations. I must say in my opinion that it is very difficult to evaluate at particular times, especially lately, what U.S. relations is and to describe it as fairly cooperative. At particular stages I would say yes. At other stages I'm uncertain to say if it was cooperative."

"Yes, with of course some reservations I should say that on the diplomatic level I think we've been in constant contact with one another. I think that I can answer that in the affirmative. Ordinary, openly, I think the ordinary voter actually didn't get any real impression about the cooperativeness of the relations between South Africa and

America. That's what I should say, but I believe on the diplomatic level, at least that level, we cooperated fairly well, that's what I should say."

"I think more cooperative at the earlier part of the ten years than at the present."

A total of 20 Parliamentarians responded to this question by offering some comment. The remainder did so by simply just stating 'yes' or 'no', seven of whom answered yes, while only two said no.

The following themes of NP perceptions become evident:

- * the majority of those who responded agreed that US/SA relations were fairly cooperative, of which several put emphasis on 'fairly';
- * that the U.S. is perceived as interfering;
- * that the media played a key role in shaping U.S. perceptions of South Africa;
- * that South Africa has felt pressured and neglected;
- * that South Africa is grateful to the Reagan Administration for its policy of constructive engagement;
- * that the U.S., due to its size and economic capabilities, is seen to have an upper hand in the relationship;
- * and that the first part of the ten years were more cooperative than the last part.

The following pie chart depicts the response to the question which asked if respondents believed that constructive engagement was effective. Four choices were given: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. Of the number that responded (n=20 at the bottom of chart) 85% agreed and 15% disagreed, while no one either strongly agreed or disagreed.




Figure 6: Do You Believe Constructive Engagement was effective United States foreign policy?
(n = 20)

When asked what they believed motivated the US Administration to develop its policy of constructive engagement, the following are a representative sample of some of the responses that were obtained:

"Obviously the US feels itself an important player in the world stage that in terms of the continuation of the rivalry with the Soviet Union it was important that the US. play a role in Southern Africa. Therefore, to achieve stability and democracy within South Africa, the US felt it had to have a direct say on the development of South African policy. The US made it clear that it would do what it could to encourage South Africa to take steps to lead it to greater democratization."

"Well I presume they tried to find cooperation with South Africa and a solution to our specific problems... I [am not] a student of that specific field, [in] that I really made such a thorough investigation of all the motives. But in my opinion the most important was to find a settlement for the constitutional problems in Namibia."

"[As far as motivation for constructive engagement] The US only [have] had their own interests in mind. They saw that they couldn't get any foothold into Africa as they would [have] liked to and they started to impose constructive engagement to please their own people in their Senate and while at the same time [they] were trying to please the people in Southern Africa [to avoid not] having any say in the region."

"We need trading partners like America needs trading partners... America needs our chrome etc., it needs our precious metals, it needs our gold. We're too far away from the market place for fresh produce so it is mainly raw materials."

"Yes, I believe that the Democrats [under Carter] had adopted a policy for purposes of the US to appease the African countries in the Third World and in so doing, really estranged themselves from South Africa and really began the whole process of economic boycott and sanctions. It was therefore with a great deal of relief and anticipation that we came to the era of Ronald Reagan when he introduced through his [Secretary] of State the Constructive Engagement policy toward South Africa. In so doing, he indicated very clearly in the beginning that his intentions were that [the US] should rather effect change through negotiation and dialogue and dealing with South Africa, rather than a policy which was totally opposed, a policy of isolation followed by the previous administration."

"Well, I personally believe that the motive was an honest one, one aimed at upliftment of the quality of living of our colored communities. As it was evidenced in the emphasis on the Sullivan Code."

"Well as I always understood it, there were two schools of thought and that the policy of constructive engagement was actually a compromise against sanction drivers."

"I think the US or at least some organizations or some people in the US use South Africa as a motive for their internal political situation because they have a large number of black people. They try to use South Africa for their own purpose. I think one of the reasons for this constructive engagement is to try and find a way around the anti-apartheid lobbies, to try and get them to be not so [drastic] and not so radical against South Africa."

"Yes, I think it's difficult for me to interpret your government's policy. But I would say that constructive engagement was a good policy. I have no doubt in my mind that change in South Africa can only be brought about when there is progress and when we are dealing with a real economically sound society. I would say that the Reagan administration understood this and that they felt that by following this policy they would encourage change."

"..., but in general I have the impression that the major reason why the US administration developed this policy, is because the US administration realized years ago that South Africa is the strong base of Southern Africa. There is no sense in trying to pull down South Africa, South Africa should rather be supported and thereby increasing the western democratic base in the whole of Southern Africa. I think that is the main reason why the US decided on this policy."

"Well basically I think they switched to constructive engagement because it was realized by the US that the previous policy especially under the Carter administration was not that successful and they felt it might be better to try and persuade and work along with the South African Government than to be just pure opposition in everything."

"To be able to ignore the problem and to satisfy both sides, the opposition [in the US] and South Africa at once without having to do a lot."

"I think they had some sort of idea of [our] problems and they were very honest in trying to help us."

"I don't think it's easy to just make almost a blunt statement about it. One would have to define how I perceive constructive engagement. Because I know that I was in the US in 1988 and I know the constructive engagement, the term was totally out. It was a negative phrase. So as far as I'm concerned, one would have to define constructive engagement first of all. Perhaps Mr. Reagan had good intentions when he came up with the idea of constructive engagement and as I see the word constructive engagement, the concept of constructive, then, it was a question of becoming involved in a constructive way. The way they applied sanctions and disinvestment was as far as I'm concerned, totally destructive and our black people are paying the price today. So as far as I'm concerned, there was no constructive engagement."

"Well I think it's also in the interest of the United States and the Western World to have a stable solid pro-western government in South Africa. And I think maybe that was one of the main reasons, not because they like us, but because we can be of use to them."

"Frankly, because [the U.S.] has a long nose and likes to have its beak in everybody's business, but over and above that I think it had certain reservations about what would happen to our mineral wealth, if it didn't become involved."

"Yes, I think the US Government thought that constructive engagement will give them 'a say' in the policy making process of the Republic of South Africa. The reason ... is because when they found out that with guys like Wolpe and Dellums around, the sanction campaign in Trans-Africa going around there in the United States, it's not really convenient back home to be seen to be very involved where they must take the part of the underdog. And you know it as a Yankee, that the Yanks back the underdog. Now the only hope I have for the future is that we now become the underdog!!!... So I think what motivated them was perhaps primarily what they saw as, to have 'a say' in policy making, to influence processes and also to hurt when they wanted to hurt. But also to pat us on the shoulder: 'well done guys.' ...I guess overall, it was motivated by, I think and pardon me for being frank with you, but motivated typically because of American style and tradition."

"Well from what I have gathered, I wasn't really in politics at that stage but we followed what's happening. I would say that Americans like all countries throughout the world have a tendency to care for people in the [under] privileged situation and I believe because of this, because of the history of America they felt themselves fit to try and become

engaged in the South African situation. I believe that was the biggest motivation. I've asked many Americans, 'Why are you really involved in the South African situation?' And that was mostly their reply."

"Well it's really perhaps the same issues that motivated them in the course that they're embarked on at the moment. I think it's purely domestic issues. I think their first thought was 'get in because we don't want to make an enemy of South Africa'. The only way we can justify our presence there is upliftment, persuasion to change their wicked racial ways. [It was] at a time when the black politicians in America put tremendous pressure [on the Reagan government] as far as I [perceive it]. The administration wanted to [enforce constructive engagement] and move away from a fiercer policy, [i.e. as Carter's policy]. So, the same basic feeling that we've got to engage South Africa somehow, a stick policy rather than a carrot one. A watershed or certainly in my view of it, certainly in terms of my experience of it, was when Leon Sullivan decided that he really couldn't be seen constructively engaging. He had to join the other side. There was tremendous pressure to do the opposite."

Of the 34 responses obtained on NP perceptions of the motivating factors that led the United States to develop its policy of constructive engagement, the following themes became evident:

- * that South Africa was perceived as an issue in the Cold War struggle between East v. West and therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South Africa for the sake of its mineral wealth;
- * that there was confusion and uncertainty about whether sanctions were the consequence of constructive engagement's failure. There was also confusion about who initiated/promoted the sanctions policy, some even believing that President Reagan himself was responsible;
- * that the constructive engagement policy was developed to find a solution to the Namibian situation;
- * that the purpose of constructive engagement was an honest attempt to encourage upliftment and democracy;
- * that constructive engagement brought a welcome change from the attitudes of the Carter administration, which had been unsuccessful in its efforts to promote change in South Africa;

- * that constructive engagement derived from a strong tendency in U.S. historical tradition to wish to bestow upon other states the blessings of American-style institutions;
- * that the U.S. was often perceived as interfering in South Africa's internal affairs;
- * and that the U.S. developed the constructive engagement policy to please both South Africa and anti-South Africa people in Washington for the purpose of heading off the pro-sanctions lobby.

When asked what elements of the policy of constructive engagement NP found to be 'positive', the following are some of the prominent responses:

"The most important factor here is that this was not a punitive type of policy, but one which aimed at empowering black people within South Africa to play a role in a future South Africa encouraged by rewarding the South African government for its movements toward democracy."

"Of course from our point of view, we did not in fact accept any principle in terms of which our policy in this country would be dictated to by outside agencies. In other words, as South Africans, we have always believed they must solve their problems themselves, but the situation is quite clear, where as before we were placed in a total position of isolation under Jimmy Carter, we were very happy to know that America was turning around and at least prepared to talk to us, to do business with us. And so to encourage us to make changes which otherwise would have been purely cosmetic."

"Well, I would say that American politicians did try to facilitate talks through various agencies between various South Africans to bring opposing views together etc, I would regard that as a bit of a positive input."

"No, I don't want to say no element positively contributed toward solving some internal problem in South Africa, ... Politically, I don't think so. [However], I think that in the field of labor relations in SA, the US attitude certainly contributed positively. Secondly the US involvement in Angola [was] at times negative as far as South Africa is concerned, but at times also positive as far as Dr. Savimbi is concerned. I think also [the US] had an influence as to the present attitude taken by our government. Those are two issues that I would like to identify at this stage."

"That there wasn't outright confrontation and that we seemed to have had the sympathy of the president, although we didn't have the sympathy of the people or the Congress of America."

"Well, the fact that... your president tried to prevent further sanctions and further disinvestment at a certain stage."

"We thought that, especially the economic side, tried to help us to build the country, to create jobs. You see the NP over a long time, never perceived the NP policy as being a really racist policy. When I look back on it I'm inclined to see it a bit different. But during that time, [I saw it as] actually a policy of evolving and building up something. [In the beginning], with the strong third world element, ... and the white people being a first world element of the population, [it was difficult for the white people to] try to establish themselves and then help the other part of the population to come along. So I think from that point of view, I think that the constructive engagement policy to a certain extent supported that."

"Well, the fact that there was somebody in the administration that said 'look we're prepared to give you a chance and not impose sanctions'."

The following themes became evident in NP perceptions of positive elements displayed about the constructive engagement policy:

- * that constructive engagement was not punitive in its approach;
- * that the US was perceived as adopting a different approach from that of the Carter era;
- * that President Reagan displayed real interest in the South African reform process;
- * that constructive engagement provided for open communication and negotiation on differences between the U.S and South Africa;
- * that constructive engagement embodied a positive attitude toward labor relations and assisted in resolving the Angolan/Namibian situation;
- * that constructive engagement influenced the attitudes of the South African government;
- * that constructive engagement displayed sympathy from President Reagan in that the President was anti-sanctions and was willing to give South Africa, by its own volition, a chance to reform;

- * and that constructive engagement helped South Africa's efforts to overcome poverty.

When asked what elements of the policy of constructive engagement the National Party found to be 'negative', the following are some of the common responses:

"Firstly, the very fact that a foreign power felt that it had to play a role in the internal developments of South Africa itself. This was resented by a number of people. It was resented even more as constructive development gave way to punitive measures. But under constructive engagement there was underlying resentment to the overweening role of a Superpower, particularly at the time when South Africa felt that it was taking steps which were in any case being dictated by internal activities."

"The point is, if you're not constructively engaged with dealing with people, although we still have vocal contact with the United States, but you never get to the root cause of what the problem is and you couldn't help the country with solutions to the problem, if you don't have constructive engagement.

"I mean this is just crazy that the US would say that by sanctions they would solve our problems, we've got to solve our own problems. They can't solve our problems. And also the people that it hurts most, I would say are blacks, the 'have not's'. So if they were hoping to hurt the 'haves', they did it the wrong way."

"The tendency to be a little prescriptive. As we saw it was all very well to have a policy of constructive engagement, but we did not appreciate America, which is very powerful, the most powerful state in the world, endeavoring by constructive engagement to determine our internal policies for us. To that extent it was possibly negative. The other aspect was that in spite of the fact they indicated constructive engagement the policy as it developed, didn't produce the fruits we expected it would develop. Because of the internal criticism of that policy in America itself. The Democratic Party's overall majority in the [Congress], obviously in a way [tied] President Reagan's hands to really go forward with his policy of constructive engagement and it was a limiting factor which he was up against."

"Yes. I think to the extent it was obvious to me and us that the eventual aim of the US was not that honest all the way."

"Well on the negative side I would say there is a wrong perception of the political situation in South Africa. On the one hand, perhaps the perception that by constructive engagement as it is put, the political policy of South Africa can be influenced in a way to conform with the political ideas of the US. A wrong perception that the old, shall I say, Verwoerdian apartheid as it is considered is still applicable in South Africa and that discrimination on the basis of race and color is still rife in SA. I regard that as negative motivation for the policy."

"Well in a way it affected our autonomy with our friends overseas. It's always been our policy that we're autonomous. And in a way we considered it as interference in our internal affairs and in a way it was an indirect refusal of acceptance of our bona fides."

"I think the negative contribution is basically that the US being as powerful as it is economically, militarily-wise etc., has the attitude that everyone else in the world must think as the Americans do and therefore they try to often persuade people, or put pressure on them to persuade them which is very difficult for smaller countries to resist."

"(A) That it was merely a moral standpoint which had no economic or strategic advantage for us and (B) that it definitely didn't carry the support of the American people or the Congress with it or even the Senate."

"The prescriptive ones. In all fairness, I listen to congressmen in the United States, I told you previously, I did spend under the IVP program a couple of days at Capitol Hill, and they haven't got the faintest idea as to what's going on in South Africa. NOT THE FAINTEST IDEA. Secondly, the fact that they run away from their own problems. I want to mention two to you. (1st) While I was there they tackled me on education and it so happened that very night there was a program going on one of the [T.V.] channels of the Japanese invasion into the US, and they also touched on education. And it was claimed on television, I don't believe it up to this day, that four out of five [US] children leaving school are illiterate. I challenge Congressmen on this thing in the US and they all agreed. Let's say two out of five, now for the world leader to admit, for a politician of the world leader to admit that two out of five children are totally illiterate, means that they've got problems back home.

Now what I found negative was the total ignorance of what was going on in South Africa. And also the absolutely, I wouldn't like to put it this strong, but the arrogance, the absolute arrogance: 'We know everything, what the hell do you know?' We went through this in the mid-West, we went through this in the South etc. And look at Mississippi Burning, and look at Driving Miss Daisy, you know, look at all these things. In fact a black politician [in the US], I wouldn't like to name him, was totally astonished when I told him I watch the Bill Cosby Show, in South Africa and I like it! I said, 'But you go to hell, whether you believe me or not, do you want to know what happened in episode

seven? I can tell you' This guy said, 'Well my eye!'. I said 'Well my bloody eye!' So that's what I found so negative.

(2nd) What I also experienced negative was the influence the lobbyists have on decision-making. In all fairness, [shrug], people that are hurting their own people. ...for instance Tutu. I'm not attacking Bishop Tutu this morning, let's call a spade a spade, the fact of the matter is, Tutu collected, I was told by Mr. Brooks, that Tutu went there [to the US] and collected a million dollars for Tutu on a Sunday morning after Church. OK? To do what? Some kind of struggle? - super! Now he gets back to this country and calls on the children to stay away from school. But his own children are in private schools, so their education goes on. But he's hurting the very people HE claimed to help. And the absolute arrogance of some [U.S.] decision makers not to accept that as a fact. So a lot of negative elements, but I think you've heard a lot."

"We actually to my knowledge never found anything to be so negative that it should be mentioned."

"That's a little bit more difficult one. I think that America views to a large extent the whole question of majoritarianism as the fulfilment of democracy. I think we have a different approach towards democracy. I think that maybe they think once there is going to be a black majority government, that the black majority government is still going to pursue the values of democracy, [i.e.,] freedom of speech, freedom of movement and you know what I mean, all of the bill of Rights that any country usually has. I should say that there is a wrong perception in America, namely that our hesitancy to yield to the claims for majority government is that we are actually not in favor of democracy. But our point of view is, and this is something that the Americans must really comprehend in my opinion is that, I'm not so concerned about who is going to be the government, but how this country is going to be governed. Unfortunately we are part of Africa and we have the experience of the African continent concerning democracy and I think that a negative aspect is that America departs from this point, namely that they think once there is a simple majority system in South Africa that will still be democracy and I think that is the negative aspect."

The following themes become evident in NP perception of negative elements displayed about the constructive engagement policy:

- * that a number of South African people resented the U.S. interfering in their internal affairs;
- * that there was a feeling of resentment that constructive engagement gave way to sanctions;

- * that constructive engagement had prescriptive tendencies;
- * that the aim of US foreign policy was not honest in its approach;
- * that the US had the wrong perception of the South African political situation and in some respects Americans were totally ignorant;
- * that constructive engagement affected South Africa's autonomous relationship with its overseas friends;
- * that constructive engagement didn't carry the support of the US people or Congress;
- * that the US instead of concentrating so much on South Africa should focus on its own problems at home;
- * and that the US approach to democracy was totally different from South Africa's.

The following pie chart displays the result to the question asked: Is your attitude toward the policy of constructive engagement performance positive, negative or other? Out of the 34 that answered, 76% agreed to a positive attitude, 9% thought the policy was negative, while 5% were neutral in their response.




Figure 7: What is your attitude toward the policy of Constructive Engagement?

(n = 34)

When asked if they saw the rationality behind the United States decision for the policy of constructive engagement, all 35 answered yes.

4.4 PRESENTATION OF DATA - PART II: SANCTIONS

When asked if they viewed the Western world as being sensitive to the South African situation, the following responses were obtained:

"Well it depends what one understands by the Western world. Personally I don't think that the United States is as sensitive to South Africa's situation as the case with Europe."

"Not in full perspective, no."

"I don't think so, the reason for it being, I don't think they understand the situation completely. I do understand that they do get a lot of information from different people and they must weigh that. [The sensitivity] might [come from some] people who are more willing to work and care and approach the situation rationally. They won't try and just get the power and misuse the situation. Now, [on the other hand] the people who are not in the position of having power are very set with their ideas [of] what they want and how they feel. I don't think that they are sensitive enough and in that way I think they are really creating problems rather than to really give help. In some ways, once again the person must always say this is only one side of the coin because there are people that are sensitive. There are people like Mrs. Thatcher that I think really care. [It] might be because of some involvement in the past in some other way. I think there are people on the other hand that are sensitive in the way that they really feel or care for people. But to put it into perspective, its quite a problem."

"Yes, but not sensitive in the way that I would prefer them to be sensitive. Sensitive from their own interest point of view."

"It seems that they take quite a lot of note of what's happening here for different reasons. Whether that is sensitive in the positive sense that they really care for South Africa, I don't know. If I can say that sometimes it does appear that they act more in self-interest than to really care for the people of South Africa."

"Well, I think they are now. I think there has been an exponential growth in their sensitivity towards the South African situation in the last five years."

Of the remaining 14 responses to this question, 13 said simply yes, while there was only one respondent that said 'no'.

The following themes were evident in the NP perception of whether they view the Western World as sensitive to the South African situation:

- * that the U.S. is not as sensitive as Europe;
- * that the U.S. is not sensitive to the South African situation because they don't understand it;
- * that there are two different types of sensitivity at hand: one with a sensitivity abhorring racism, and the other meaning sensitive in that there is sympathy for the South Africa government.

The following are some of the most prominent responses obtained when asked if United States sanctions policies had any direct effect on their constituencies:

"Yes. I would say that there has been a resentment that has grown amongst the people who are in my constituency towards the US and a growing belief that the US was playing to an internal audience rather than to promote the interests of democracy in South Africa."

"The extent that they had directly on the constituency was in the Tygerberg hospital where certain instruments which [are] to be used for sick people and that sort of thing were not at all available from the US and had to be bought from other countries at extremely high costs."

"Well this is one of those vague questions, yes and no. Where it has had an effect is that certain companies, we had one or two American Companies still in East London and the positive side of that is they have an agreement, the Sullivan Principles. But on the negative side is that quite a few companies actually pulled out of South Africa. [It's a] matter how you look at it, it affects Johannesburg, it affects East London. So it's all a monetary thing."

"Yes it has. To an extent, negative, to an extent positive. It forced us to look for other markets. It forced us to upgrade our overseas marketing expertise, which was positive. But negative was that it had the marginal negative effect on income, especially as far as fruit concentrates were concerned."

"Yes. I would say especially now with the MOSSGAS project. I would say that it indeed had an effect in as much as of course we depended to a large extent on overseas technology for the development of this

project and obviously there must have been in many respects a detrimental effect. And also, of course in my constituency being as I said, farming is one of the pillars of the economic infrastructure and farming everything that is imported, if you can import it, farming implements and things like that, you have a problem as far as that is concerned. It had a detrimental effect."

"Yes it did have. My constituency depends entirely on exports and we export to 25 countries. And I was involved in setting up alternative systems and schemes, and dealing with the States. It had a cost effect. We could still go on because the sanctions didn't exclude us totally. We were just required to get a 35% added value in another foreign country. So we could go on in lieu of the States but it cost us a lot of money."

"Yes it has hurt us. My constituency is an exporter of fruit and fruit juices. One of my constituents actually on a experimental consignment was stopped on the high seas and his freight alone was a loss of R35,000, apart from the value of the product."

"No. We actually, my constituency specifically, benefited from sanctions being adopted against SA because, I won't say sanctions since 1986, but sanctions such as the Arms Embargo actually stimulated events in my constituency because two of the major ARMSCOR industries are located within Brentwood constituency. Atlas, and the arms industries actually boomed on account of the arms embargo. If there wasn't an arms embargo, there wouldn't have been an arms industry in South Africa."

"No. It has on the black township next to my constituency - most definitely Yes. Because a lot of companies withdrew from our Isando/Spartain, its the largest industrial area in the country in one specific area and in one municipality as well. A lot of them lost their jobs because of the withdrawal. The effect was not on white people at which it was directed. Because it directly influence the black people."

"I would say yes because the black townships Crossroads/Khayalitsha are slap bang in the middle of my constituency and I could see the poverty, and it's there to see everyday - the hunger, those conditions that those people live in - and sanctions had a very direct influence on their lifestyle, on their quality of life. It was there for me to see, and it's still there."

"In a sense yes, but not to a very large extent but it has a very negative effect on the black community surrounding the new constituency around Port Elizabeth as a whole."

"Yes. In our constituency we've got one of three integrated steel works and that specific works relied very heavily on exports. And when sanctions came about we had certain constraints in getting steel in the American market."

"Well the direct effect it had on my constituency was first, for starters, my constituents telling me, 'you're telling us that we have to reform so as not to be isolated and what are we getting in exchange for the reforms? ...so we can't trust the Yanks'. They told that to me. They say it to me and its not nice for you to hear this, but I'm giving you an absolutely objective opinion. The effect it had was the Conservative Party almost doubled their votes in my constituency. The fact of the matter is where they just in 1987 polled 2900 votes they polled 4000 in this election that just passed [1989]. I also polled more votes but with much more effort and much more money and much more everything. The fact of the matter is this, the average [white] South African, the average constituent in my constituency doesn't believe that we have to reform so as to be accommodated and to be in the world ranks again. It had a negative effect on my constituency."

"Well in a sense yes, because one part of my constituency is a fruit growing area and well we stopped exporting fruit to Canada and the US. So in that sense yes."

"In a sense it might have hardened attitudes of white people at a particular stage against change. Whether thinking that we are doing the right things just to meet this attitude from the outside world, [brought the attitude] so why must we do the right things? Which is not a thinking that I am agreeing with but it had that effect to a certain extent."

"Yes, Yes there are some members or many members in my constituency who really don't trust the Americans unfortunately. And it's very difficult to explain these things because they think that any nation who applies sanctions to South Africa must have some kind of a concealed purpose. The concealed purpose that they see here is that through sanctions, they would like to force us to yield to a black majority government according to the African style. It is very difficult to influence your voters to the contrary because if I tell them, that's not the real issue. It's very difficult for me as a representative to have great success convincing my people that the American, why they apply sanctions is that they would like to have a fair and equitable situation in South Africa, they just don't believe that. They think that America, by doing this, will force South Africa to surrender this country to simple majority government as they say according to the African style. It's difficult to convince them because of the fact that our conservative opposition is very successful in attacking the Americans because of sanctions and that definitely influences the voters in my constituency."

"Well my constituents are white employees basically, and certainly there have been layoffs. I don't think it's had a major effect but its contributed to the general economic recession that they are certainly experiencing."

Only nine out of 35 NP parliamentarians held the perception that United States sanctions policies had had absolutely no direct effect on their constituencies. Of the rest that responded, there was definitely a consensus that sanctions had some, either positive or negative effect on their constituencies. The following themes are evident:

- * that it has caused a rising attitude of resentment among (white) people in South Africa towards the United States;
- * that sanctions have made certain imports unavailable and the alternatives have been costly;
- * that it has had a financial effect on the South African economy;
- * that it caused exporters to look for alternative overseas markets;
- * that it stimulated South African technological advancement in many fields and brought new industry such as MOSSGAS, SASOL and ARMSCOR;
- * that sanctions measures affected many black townships that suffered job losses due to disinvestment;
- * that it hardened white attitudes which bolstered Conservative Party support in many constituencies;
- * and that sanctions measures contributed to the general economic recession.

The following pie chart depicts the NP perceptions held about whether or not South Africa would have to yield to pressure due to United States sanctions. Of the 33 that answered, 21% agreed that yes, eventually South Africa would have to yield to pressure, while 64% answered no, that they had confidence that South Africa could follow its own course and 15% were uncertain.




Figure 8: When you think about sanctions, do you feel that sooner or later South Africa will have to yield to pressure?

(n = 33)

When asked if they saw the rationality behind the U.S. decision to implement sanctions, the following are the most prominent NP responses:

"No - well yes, I don't regard it as rational to implement sanctions against this country, but if they want to try to impress or try to rally the black vote within the US behind a certain party well then it's rational - - this is the thing to do."

"Yes and No. I see the rationality yes in the sense that the specific policy I see is founded actually in internal political issues in the United States of America. You've got the very important black caucus. What I actually see is that during election times the black section of your population go to the polls in their droves [herds/flocks]. As to when it comes to the white part of your electorate they're very lethargic. It's very important I would say in terms of internal policy to have a policy toward SA as the good guys hammering us on the racial discrimination/ issues."

"From their point of view, once again, yes - from our point of view, no."

"Purely political - no rationale what so ever."

"No I really don't see that. But I can understand why they tried to do this. They want to be seen to be backing the underdog, to be helping the under-privileged and to be doing a lot of these little things, but that's besides the [point]."

"If I have to look from their point of view, how they see it, there might be some sense in it. But if I have to look from my side, not at all. Not at all because, what's happening as I've said in the previous question is that they are really hurting people. They are creating havoc. They are creating the ability to really create a revolution. They aren't helping us. If they want to create the negative they are succeeding, if that is their rationale behind everything."

"No I can't see it and yes I would like to elaborate on this because I don't believe sanctions [were] really created [for the] intervention by the [U.S.] government itself. It was mostly private companies except of course for the passing of the CAAA legislation. It was really organized by your bigger companies as well as petitions with political advantages. Political aspirations that make this type of decision and therefore, I oppose that totally! If you look at what's happening at the moment, then of course you can say, sanctions eventually had an influence on the reform process, but then of course on the other hand there are lots and lots of other [things] happening, like what was happening in East Bloc? What happened to Russia? What happened to communism? That also brought about a change in this country and made to open up new avenues."

"I would say yes, because I think that the American population [is] much more onto what you call human rights, than what we are. So from that point of view, I would say yes."

"If one understand the rationality of why they act in a particular way, if I may say with self interest as their main motivation, in the internal politics of the United States that has nothing to do with South Africa, then I understand it. But to say that I accept it, NO."

"It is very difficult to see the rationality in terms of our situation and normal considerations, but I presume it... The way I see it, it is very much related to American domestic politics and their guilt feelings."

Of the 21 NP parliamentarians that responded when asked if they saw the rationality behind the US decision to implement sanctions, six answered simply no, of those remaining, the following themes among NP perceptions were evident:

- * that the rationale was to serve internal political purposes in the United States;
- * that several respondents could understand the implementation of sanctions from a US perspective but not from a South African one;
- * that there was perhaps confusion on what factors caused the implementation of sanctions;
- * and that the US public is more aware of human rights than South Africa.

When NP parliamentarians were asked what they felt prompted the United States to introduce sanctions, the following are some of the most prominent responses:

"An internal pressure group growing amongst the black voters."

"I don't know the United States all that well but I would say it was pressure from a group of people and it's called the Jesse Jackson crowd. That group of people which I would say, [want] to appease the black American."

"I think it's wrong perceptions in the first instance. Also the perception that SA can in this way be, if not forced, then at least be induced to change to the idea to accept the ideas of the US. The US regards the position of SA of how the country should be governed. The idea that we may be induced into following their lead. Unfortunately as I have said, the wrong perception of our own position. Perception that we still stick to old, outdated apartheid ideology and that sort of thing. Perhaps even the humanistic or what ever you want to call it sort of attitude

towards the position of the blacks in South Africa. That they can be assisted by sanctions, [but] in actual fact they've been harmed most in that [the] economic development and growth in South Africa is retarded as a result of sanctions. [The blacks] are the people who suffer, because they are the people who lose their jobs as far as employment is concerned, they [are] hit hardest."

"I think that there are a certain political groups in the States which are over-reacting because of their own guilty conscience towards the black people in their own country. Because after so many years my experience in the States, the blacks are still the blacks in the country, part of the 3rd World to a great extent."

"I think two things. One was that the [idea] that it was possible that by applying sanctions... [that] they will just push over the so-called white minority regimes. That we will surrender to a black majority. The second one, I think many of the companies were a little bit worried that we are going to develop just into another African country. Because what is very interesting, not one company [which] is pulling out of South Africa is investing in Africa. They just pull out of Africa. So worrying that South Africa will eventually give into pressure, allow a so-called black majority to govern, become another African country and be just a banana republic."

"I think there might be several factors in this regard. I think there is a perception that the South African society is an unjust society. I think that motivated, to a large extent, the US to introduce sanctions. I think there could be, there is definitely a perception amongst people that there is an oppressed majority in this country. I also believe that apartheid to some people in the United States had become a business, and that by motivating sanctions they are keeping themselves in business. although I believe that some of their perceptions could have been justified, because they were perceptions, I also believe there are people whose motives are not so honest as they would like to be perceived."

"I think two-fold - the international climate has been created against the South African internal politics and of course also American internal politics itself, especially your black component of your society which politically can exert a certain pressure."

"Well I don't want to be nasty to your government, so, ... My personal view really is that countries who introduce sanctions against South Africa, all of them, the lot of them, are in this respect a lot of hypocrites - All of them who are involved in sanctions in SA are a lot of hypocrites. They should look at their own door first, and then look further afield. But, as I say, I don't want to be nasty toward your country but that is really my personal view."

"Can I be very honest? I think there may be a number of reasons why they wanted to introduce [sanctions]. First, I think the Americans have got a very big guilt complex about the way in which they handled their indigenous people. And this is now reflected in their policy. Secondly, they see again as the leading power they are very sensitive to any form of opposition and therefore they would like to sort of press their point of view on smaller groups. Thirdly, I think that there is motivation for and I think it is a good intention of the Americans, to try and be fair and in this respect where there are inequalities in the South African situation, there are those who are motivated by thinking that they are genuinely contributing towards getting a more fair and equal society."

"Definitely the policy of Apartheid and the fact that the majority of South Africans were not included in the political set up of this country."

"Fact is, they wanted to (a) hurt the South African economy, which they did, (b) they wanted to be seen to be on the side of the so-called oppressed people, (c) As I pointed out previously, they want to back the 'underdog' and the deprived of rights and privileges and (d) I think what really motivated them was the fact that a lot of ill-informed people eventually took a decision. [They] started lobbying [against] us, I'm not saying the entire Congress, I say a tiny little group started this and they are ill-informed and they succeeded through the media, to create a perception of South Africa which is a distorted picture. And they, I always find this interesting, very conveniently forget about the entire Africa. Conveniently they forget about that. I laugh!"

"Well, firstly, I think foreign policy is certainly based on the principle: '[Do] what is to my advantage as a country'. That was the first question to be asked by the United States government. 'Will it be to my advantage to introduce sanctions against South Africa, Yes or No?' I think they [the US] decided 'Yes', they're sensitive about South Africa that why we're going to change from constructive engagement towards sanctions. In a certain sense, I think the Black Lobby, the Black caucus perhaps, in Washington played a major role in introducing sanctions

against South Africa. And well at the time in 1986 things were not as good as it is now. And we had a very difficult period in our political history. We were about to change our leadership. We were a little bit uneasy within the National Party ranks about leadership, so it was a difficult time even in South Africa. There was no hope that we were going to have a bright future. Today, it's a lot better. So in '86, I can understand why they did it at that stage."

"It's a question of they want to improve the lives of the black people in South Africa in a way to force us to do more than we can do."

"Two reasons that I should say. The first one is the efforts by the anti-apartheid people in America, in Europe and I'll also include with that the ANC. Linked with this I should say the Americans became the easy victims of a wrong presentation in South Africa because they are highly motivated by the whole question of human rights."

"Well, I believe the average American or even the average politician is not so be-all and end-all as far as sanctions in South Africa. You've got a few that make it an issue. You've got it amongst your negroes in particular. Where you talk about the whites in the United States, i.e., the congressmen and senators and so on. They've got constituencies and I don't believe the problem between white and negro has really been solved in America. There is a lot of tension there still to complicate one another. [Politicians] say, 'well look, you know, we've got to sort out our brothers in the South and we think it's unfair'. Therefore, that was one major motivation on the part of the United States causing them to introduce sanctions against South Africa."

"Well, I suppose there is a certain amount of moral outrage at racism and discrimination. Which is shared by a majority of South Africans now. So, I think people agree with that. We're against discrimination, apartheid and so on. But I think it is underwritten by the fact that in America there is a huge guilt complex about what went before. For instance, there was no widespread slavery in South Africa and I was struck when I went to America and American blacks if they heard that you're a visiting white from South Africa, even if they didn't take in that you were from South Africa, they mentioned within ten minutes that their grandfathers were slaves or grandmothers or something. And I'd never been exposed to that and I think there is a huge guilt complex in America about the whole slavery issue and the treatment of the lynching, the whole treatment of blacks there which I actually think perhaps in many ways, more crass and worse than it is here. So now

that blacks are the minority in America that has to be protected and to be bolstered up. Ghettoes have to be done away with, it's a major political issue in American politics. We're an obvious whipping boy and I'm sure it is [part of the motivation]."

The following themes became evident in NP perceptions of the motivations which led the United States to introduce sanctions:

- * many NP parliamentarians held the perception that internal human rights and other groups, especially the black lobby with in the US was one of the most prominent motivating factors;
- * that the US has wrong perceptions about the South African situation;
- * that the sanction issue became a 'business' in the US and the sanction issue was motivated to make an easy 'buck' regardless of the implications for the South African situation;
- * that the US and others who implement sanctions are hypocrites;
- * that the US feels guilt for the way it treated its own black people, therefore, it tries to rectify this guilt by punishing South Africa;
- * that the US is motivated by thinking that it is genuinely contributing towards a democratic society;
- * that the international climate provided an atmosphere for change;
- * instability within the NP ranks due to the CP split and an unclear agenda motivated for sanctions;
- * that the US was outraged at racism and discrimination;
- * that South Africa became an easy target for the internal politics of the US.

The following eleven pie charts represent NP parliamentary perceptions of the importance of various reasons for which the United States introduced sanctions.




Figure 9: How important do you think pressure from the US business sector was influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?
(n = 34)




Figure 10: How important do you think a legacy of guilt from US human rights movements was in influencing the US decisions to introduce sanctions?
(n = 34)




Figure 11: How important do you think a sincere effort by US policy makers to bring about change in SA was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?
(n = 34)




Figure 12: How important do you think pressure from US blacks was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?
(n = 34)



Figure 13: How important do you think pressure from US human rights activists was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?
(n = 34)




Figure 14: Do you think US politicians saw SA as a vote catcher? How important was this view in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)




Figure 15: How important do you think the response to prominent black South Africans (eg. Tutu, ANC, etc.) was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)




Figure 16: How important do you think pressure from the UN was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)




Figure 17: How important do you think pressure from other Western nations was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)




Figure 18: How important do you think US response to concern displayed by the Front Line States was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)




Figure 19: How important do you think that failure/frustration with Constructive Engagement was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions?

(n = 34)

When NP parliamentarians were asked what they felt the US expected to achieve through the imposition of sanctions, the following are some of the prominent responses:

"Firstly, to quiet the strident voices coming within the United States. [Second] to show itself a leader in the human rights campaign, generally to satisfy the democracy drive that the US engaged in throughout the world and to achieve a stable position in South Africa in terms of competition with the Soviet Union at that time."

"Well I think they tried to find a solution to the constitutional problems of South Africa, but whether that would be successful, it hurt South Africa but, it doesn't bring about a solution."

"Heaven only knows, I don't! I assume that if the sanctions were in place because of a genuine motive to make things right in South Africa for South Africa, that what has happened recently would have taken the motivation completely away. But I don't believe there was a genuine reason for the imposition of sanctions. It was basically a reason imposed on Congress by the Democratic Party and their lobbyists in seeking to ensure the most votes for themselves. And it seems to that extent they were successful in obtaining a majority."

"The answer to that question would depend on how I value the main objective of the sanctions. There [are] many views that the US objective was the safeguarding of important strategic minerals? The question would have been to safeguard them for future access to those materials. Were [was] their major objective to assisting and establishing a stable long term government system? They would have expected to achieve that."

"What they expect to achieve is to change the government structure in SA, to a, what our State President has referred to as a simplistic one man one vote system, which would result in Black majority rule. A simplistic sort of approach to the SA situation of what is commonly regarded as a democratic model like in the US. The point that I'm trying to make is, so when I say, when I talk about a democracy, I want to get a point across that a democracy in one country doesn't correspond in all respects with a democracy in another country which is also a democracy. I mean you have all sorts of built-in qualifications to the concept of a democracy as meaning one man, one vote and each man's vote counting as much as the other man's in a popular sort of election, sort of thing.

"In replying to your question here, I think that there is a certain amount of, excuse me saying it, naivety in the US impression or their perception, a naivety in their perception that a democracy must correspond with the US model. And I think because we can't have a democracy on the same basis as the US in South Africa, as a result of the diversity of our population. They [the US] can't accept it. When you

argue with them they keep coming back to the American basis, that being the 'ideal', the 'model' that you have to aspire to and, sorry, I can't accommodate you. In replying to your question; They're trying to persuade us through constructive engagement to work towards this model. Now we're working towards a different model. A South Africa model, which will be as democratic as the American one, as democratic as the Swiss one, as democratic as the British one, but not the same as any of them, because of the peculiar circumstances of South Africa."

"I think the main reason is to try and satisfy their own black lobby, the human rights groups and trying to pressurize South Africa into doing the things the US wants them to do."

"They probably know, I don't."

"I think basically what they'd like to achieve is to weaken South Africa's economic position because I think they very well realize as we do with the typical example of Rhodesia where after a period you find that if your economy is not strong enough, that it is suffering, then obviously your ability to attend to some of the problems of pressures, whatever you'd like to call them is weakening. Take for instance, just the issue of housing. I mean, with a weak economy you cannot spend the same amounts on social upliftment, housing, education etc. and therefore that would lead to even more social pressure. I think that is very important. Another aspect which in my view is the US, you can see it from this Act [CAAA] the fact that it's a leading country in the world, it uses its position to isolate South Africa effectively and I think it is not so much American sanctions, because its relatively probably the first or second most important trading partner. But in itself, it's not that powerful to bring SA economically to its knees. But I think the fact that, for instance, the pressure put on Japan, just to give one example, where Japan said, 'now what? I can't get America to be cross with me and I'd rather abandon the profits I make there [in SA]'. I think that is what America tried to achieve. To isolate South Africa to a very large extent.

"The whole spirit of this legislation [the CAAA] is to find a non-violent solution."

"I think the US, when it comes to a sense of guilt looking at the past history of what took place in the US, I would say to them it's fairly important to be seen at the end of the day when a new dispensation is being introduced in terms of a constitution in SA they want to be seen as being on the right side."

"The US is not just one big body; a constituency that all agree on the same matter. There are different people which [with] different motivations. The ones who canvassed. ...they really created an industry, an apartheid industry. Obviously sheer impersonal gain as far as I'm concerned. I don't think they're really worried as to what they've achieved. It was a question of carrying on until they got a one man one

vote [system] and then got us out and then they wouldn't be interested in us anymore after that."

"In my view, this is a view that may change depending on what the US does. But in my view, all along sanctions were intended to bring about political change in this country of a nature, well, as we saw in the rest of Africa, a one man one vote system, a unitary system where we will have a black running the country eventually then, of course as you saw in Africa, the rest of Africa, as a dictator. This is what I felt, although the ideas behind imposing sanctions could have been sincere, that the people might have been sincere in wanting to bring about what was called a just and equitable society. That in the end, it would end up with us having a black dictator and this is something that I did not appreciate."

"I think that the Americans thought they would bring in sanctions, reduce the white government to its knees, make the country absolutely in a state of depression and then it could be handed over to black majority rule. This is what they're after, no more and no less. And then they would've ended up with another third world country in Africa. And then [third] they would've turned their back on it and walked away without giving it any assistance whatsoever, as is the history of Africa and America."

"That's a million dollar question - I would love to know myself. I can say a lot of things but it won't really help."

"[The] liberalization of the South African situation [and] freedom for the blacks."

"Well it's fairly plain to me that by putting pressure on the economics of a country, especially where you have a, sort of a part of a country like South Africa here where we've got quite high technology, and industry so we are actually very susceptible to the effect of sanctions. It must eventually have a very serious effect. On the other side of it we need much capital for building up and developing the country. So with sanctions, you cut that line of financing. I think it's actually a very effective situation."

"Well, I think they absolutely want a democracy in South Africa, a broadening of democracy in South Africa. I think that's what they want."

"I wonder how sincere they are about anything they want to achieve in relation to South Africa."

The following themes become evident in NP perceptions of what the US expects to achieve though the imposition of sanctions:

- * that the US wants to be seen as the international leader in the human rights effort;
- * that the US wants to find a solution to the constitutional problems in South Africa;
- * that there is evidence of self-interest among US politicians to utilize the South African issues for personal advantage;
- * that the US expected to safeguard important strategic minerals;
- * that the US sought to weaken the South African economy to effect political change;
- * that the US hoped to isolate South Africa from the international community;
- * that the US wanted to bring political change to a one-man, one-vote system or black majority rule;
- * and to bring democracy to South Africa.

The following pie charts represent NP parliamentary perceptions of intended effects of sanctions and their importance:

INTENDED EFFECT OF SANCTIONS




Figure 20: To send a message outlining US policy in disagreement with South African current political position.

(n = 34)




Figure 21: Affect white political thinking.

(n = 34)




Figure 22: Affect white political morale.

(n = 34)




Figure 23: Promote black upliftment.

(n = 34)




Figure 24: Wreck South African economy.

(n = 34)




Figure 25: Cause enough misery to start a revolution.

(n = 34)

When asked what effects do you believe sanctions have had on South Africa, the following NP parliamentary perceptions are contained in the most prominent responses:

"The first place has been to make the sanctions groupies more important so that you now have an anti-South African industry which is very hard to defeat. Secondly, it has caused resentment amongst most whites, and in the specific case, ... resentment against the US. There has been an effect upon sport but the US has certainly not been a major player in or sports activities abroad, therefore that was one of the lesser effects in the US itself. And I would say that in terms of morale it was the biggest blow to South Africa to have banks of the US pulling the mat out from under South Africa."

"Obviously it has hurt our economy, if we're talking money, rands and cents. In various ways, there are a lot of goods, articles, etc., we could export, not necessarily import, to the States. Let's take for example the Krugerrand. The USA was one of our largest purchasers of the Krugerrand, for example. But it has definitely hurt us financially, without a doubt. But it hasn't brought SA to its knees.

"If you talk about the actual perception of the South African towards an American, it's not bad as a person, but as a country, the effect on South Africans I pick up in the market place is, so what, whereas if they would've been allies of America, they now like Americans, as I said earlier, turned their back on us. So why should we be their buddy---bottom line? But it's definitely dampened the spirit of America being seen as the big western power and our friend. We've now learned that America is not our friend, because if they'd done their research properly and looked at the possibilities, other possibilities, I'm talking [about] the government without sanctions, I believe it would've been a lot more effective. [We] could have had , for example a lot better economy at the moment with a smaller disparity in wage-earning between white and black, which would have made the transition a lot easier. But as long as you keep the black man down on his knees where he is, and we have this disparity which is actually enormous in some aspects, and the only way to overcome that is job creation."

"They did have an effect. The main effect they had was to slow our growth rate in the economy. And in so doing they created many unemployed persons in the wake."

"It forced us [the South African government] to a major re-think on the issues on hand"

"Politically they have had the effect of making the government and the supporters of the government only more determined to overcome sanctions and not to be subjected by sanctions. On the other hand, as far as the blacks are concerned, perhaps it has given them some encouragement to, as they put it, to keep up the struggle for freedom.

A struggle that as far as we're [NP] concerned, there was no need for a struggle ... it was a struggle within the ranks of the white electorate, to convince the white electorate it was necessary to implement changes. There was no need for an armed struggle from the side of the blacks but anyway, in as much as they regard it as a struggle, alright there was encouragement for them which also had a negative effect in the form of needs of terrorism and that sort of thing. So one could say it [sanctions] incited the radical element in the black community.

"Economically, of course, it did have a very detrimental effect. Fortunately the SA economy was and is strong enough to withstand the pressure of sanctions. But still it harmed the economy and as I said previously it harmed the people that it was supposed to help and assist. It harmed them most in the way of job-creation, employment etc. [The economy] was negatively affected by the sanctions. SA needs growth to employ its people and if we're subjected to sanctions, then SA's economy can't grow, can't flourish and that means fewer jobs and more people unemployed. So in that way it did detrimentally affect the South African economy."

"I certainly believe to be quite honest with you, I think that sanctions have certainly been productive in outlining the realities of world perception about situations in SA. I think sanctions have had positive effects to a certain extent. On the realization that change has to be brought about quicker in this country. It also, I think to a certain extent, had an adverse effect on the economy of this country and, which concerns me most, it has certainly had a major adverse affect on the development of SA's economy which has delayed, to my way thinking the upliftment of the deprived parts of the population and in the final instance, although it has, I think, influenced and underlined the importance of reform in the country. I think it has had a major adverse effect on bringing about stability and progress in this country which I believe are of the utmost importance to really bring about reform in SA."

"In the first instance, a very irritating effect amongst white and black. It definitely did not have the positive results that the US administration may have had in mind. It's irritating white and blacks in South Africa. Whites because of obvious reasons and the blacks, especially the opinion-formers amongst the blacks, who realize that the effect of sanctions is certainly not in the interest of black people in SA. So [why] should the US penalize ... black people in South Africa in trying to convert the white electorate to another political line of thought? So it's certainly also an irritation for many blacks in South Africa."

"Well it retarded economic growth in this country definitely. Therefore also our ability to deal with the socio-economic issues.

"I think the SA economy is relatively large in African terms and diverse and in the sense I don't see the same can happen [as it did] in Rhodesia where you ground everything to a standstill. SA would be able to exist even if you continue sanctions for another 10 or more years,

since SA has been fairly effective in circumventing many of its sanction measures.

"I think the major thing, of course, is, where I think I've mentioned where you cut the potential economic growth. If I may just mention here in 1985 when the American banks wouldn't roll over the loans and still make capital available, I think it's like the individual who's not bankrupt but needs an overdraft to carry on activities at a certain level and now he's cut back, I think this sort of effect.

"I don't know whether this is an appropriate point, I would like to state that is about the double standards, selective morality. I think this is the one aspect that impressed me most if you go through this Act [CAAA]. I was aware but here again I came under the impression this selective morality, those things that America needs, those were excluded from [the CAAA]. And in other words, 'fine, I can pressurize you SA but I don't want any pressure for myself from that point of view'. And secondly, that I found only here, which the ethics of that [CAAA] can be questioned, the companies and American sectors are pressurized to do things in order to achieve what has been set as goals or objectives, irrespective of any law or legal requirement. I see that as openly disregarding and disobeying the local laws, no matter how reprehensible they may find them. I think that is an international behavior, whether you agree with the laws in a country, and if you make use of the hospitality of that country you abide by those laws. That was something astonishing I found."

"Well it has certainly had a very positive effect in the fact that we have to a great extent realized that we have to look after ourselves. We have built up a lot of industry that has achieved world recognition and I have to refer to ARMSCOR here as one specifically.

"The negative thing it has done is that it has amongst your ordinary man in the street it has brought sort of an almost, very negative, very negative feeling against the United States of America. As far as I'm concerned, these people are not going to prescribe to us any longer and whatever we do, we are easily blamed. That we are sort of handing over the United States. If we do anything, they see it as pressure from the United States.

"And of course, the third thing is that they [the US] have certainly been very much blamed for the poverty which still exists in our country, despite the fact that we've made mistakes in the past, everybody has, so has America, everybody else has. Now they've got a Constitution they're trying to push down upon us. But when we try to rectify the situation they withdrew money from South Africa, so that we couldn't build or strengthen our infrastructure to cope with the tremendous increase of the growth of the black population. At this stage we have the highest growth in schools. We have a compound 6% average since 1954 of children entering the education system, the black education system. No Western world can cope with that with sanctions and disinvestment. Obviously it's not possible for us to do so. So they [the US] have really only achieved to worsen the SA situation as far as the black people are concerned. The whites have not really suffered very much."

"They have certainly retarded our economic growth, no doubt about it. But not withstanding that, we are still not showing negative growth. We're showing a positive growth. Notwithstanding the great America and its sanctions. Because I don't believe America is the number one nation in the world to be quite frank. I believe she's got the skates underneath her."

"I think I've already referred to it, that it has brought about change, there is no doubt in my mind. But, as I've stated, it wasn't sanctions only. I believe that Sept./Oct. last year was actually the turning point, because of change in government, because of sanctions, because of the change in the East bloc in Europe. Because of a time of peace that arrived throughout the world. That's a perception, so I don't think that sanctions only [alone] played a role. But it played a role. If you tell me that it didn't play a role, then of course I don't think so."

"Precisely in that it was effective in the way it cut off our development."

"I think more than we're going to admit."

"Different effects. Especially sanctions on the more economic/financial side; the availability of loans; roll-over facilities of our loans. I think that had an effect that negatively affected growth in South Africa in a sense that although we still had a positive growth rate, we did not have the type of growth rate that we need to provide for all the needs of all the people in the country. Especially to provide all the people that are in need of jobs. So it had the effect on a lot of people without jobs and without the economic development that this country could have provided for them in a normal economic situation. That's the most important. There are other side factors in a sense it affected the views of white people [that enhanced] the growth of the right wing in this country. I think sanctions played a part in that and the polarization of black thinking in this country was supported by that."

"Well I don't think that they've wrecked our economy at all but I think it's made it more difficult to have a good standard of living and of course the lower end of the economic scale has suffered more than the people who have means. So you've had a lot of people rendered jobless through closures of factories which is the obvious one but doesn't affect large numbers of people if you look at it on a country-wide basis. I suppose it affects a fair number.

"But the general economic recession which we have had, to which sanctions have been a contributing factor has obviously caused a lot of misery in the economic brackets, in the lower income brackets and I think it's inhibited the growth of the country. I think the worst has been financial because we have to worry about our balance of payment to repay debt. I mean for a developing country it needs to produce vast amounts of housing and infrastructure constantly to be an exporter of capital which we have been is madness anyway. Nobody else does it, nobody else could. I mean its an indication of the innate health

of this economy. The intrinsic health of it is that we've been able to do this and still grow. That's quite extraordinary."

When looking at the NP's perceptions on what they believe were the effects of sanctions on South Africa, the following themes are evident:

- * sanctions made the pro-sanctions campaign hard to defeat and gave the blacks encouragement to keep up the struggle;
- * sanctions created anti-American attitudes and attitudes of resentment, especially amongst white people;
- * sanctions were a blow to white South African morale;
- * sanctions made South Africa more self-sufficient;
- * sanctions forced South Africa to lose billions of Rands;
- * sanctions rendered many South Africans jobless;
- * sanctions hurt the South African economy;
- * sanctions slowed the South African growth rate;
- * sanctions forced the South African government to re-evaluate the issues at hand;
- * the sanctions issue made the South African government more determined to survive and overcome sanctions;
- * sanctions outlined world views about South African politics;
- * sanctions delayed upliftment;
- * sanctions were seen by the South African government to have a double standard;
- * sanctions enhanced the growth of the political right wing;
- * and sanctions made it more difficult to obtain a good standard of living, especially for those at the lower end of the economic scale.

The following ten pie charts list several results that have been said to have been due to sanctions. NP perceptions depict what degree of influence sanctions have actually had on these results.




Figure 26: How much did the US sanctions influence the imposition of the State of Emergency?




Figure 27: How much did US sanctions influence the attitude: 'Resentment of foreign meddling?'
(n = 34)




Figure 28: How much did US sanctions influence the attitude: 'Black resolution to lose jobs rather than give up sanctions?'

(n = 34)




Figure 29: How much did US sanctions influence the shift to the Conservative Party in the 1989 elections?

(n = 34)




Figure 30: How much did US sanctions influence slower economic growth?

(n = 34)




Figure 31: How much did US sanctions influence rising unemployment?

(n = 34)




Figure 32: How much did US sanctions influence the re-evaluation on Homeland policies?

(n = 20)




Figure 33: How much did US sanctions influence the lifting of Influx Control?

(n = 19)




Figure 34: How much did US sanctions influence black impatience/violence?
(n = 20)




Figure 35: How much did US sanctions influence soul searching in South Africa?
(n = 20)

The following bar charts list the same results depicted in the pie charts above that have been said to have been due to sanctions. NP perceptions depict which groups would have made claims to the various results/statements listed.




Figure 36: Which groups would say that the imposition of the State of Emergency was as a result of US sanctions?




Figure 37: Which groups would agree to the resentment of foreign 'meddling' as a result of US sanctions?




Figure 38: Which groups would agree that blacks would rather lose their jobs than give up US sanctions?




Figure 39: Which groups would say that slower economic growth was a result of US sanctions?




Figure 40: Which groups would say that rising unemployment was a result of US sanctions?




Figure 41: Which groups would say that the shift to Conservative Party seats in the 1989 elections was the result of US sanctions/




Figure 42: Which group would say that the re-evaluation of Homeland policies was as a result of US sanctions?
(n = 20)




Figure 43: Which groups would say that the lifting of Influx Control was a result of US sanctions?
(n = 20)




Figure 44 Which groups would say that black impatience/violence was a result of US sanctions/
(n = 20)




Figure 45: Which groups would say that soul searching in South Africa was a result of US sanctions?
(n = 20)

The last set of bar charts ask NP perceptions on which of the future US action they would find helpful. (1 = Most Helpful - - - 5 = Not at all Helpful).

Would you find it helpful for the US to ...




Figure 46: ... ignore South Africa and do nothing?




Figure 48: ... increased diplomatic pressure on:




Figure 47: ... invest in black:




Figure 49: ... imposed other sanctions?




Figure 50: Would you find a Sullivan type of multi-lateral engagement helpful?

4.5 DISCUSSION

The results of the previous questions demonstrate the wide range of perceptions held by the National Party of U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s. As mentioned earlier, the various outcomes have produced responses in South Africa which have ranged from opposition to those of cooperation. Still it is important to keep in mind that the superficial face value of the response is not what is most significant, but rather often there are perceptions that are based on a deeper underlying understanding of the policy that are not verbally mentioned. Trying to accomplish a thorough analysis here, given the time frame and purpose of this dissertation is nearly impossible.

Thus, this section seeks to do one thing: give a broad interpretation of a selected part of the previous data. As it is not possible to unpack all of the data in this dissertation and the purpose is rather to display perceptions of the NP than to dissect them, this will be done by selecting three of the common themes that frequently occurred throughout the interview process.

The theme that the U.S. is perceived as interfering in the internal affairs of South Africa, is a response which was present in the answer to questions asked about constructive engagement and those concerning sanctions. As witnessed in the historical United States/South African relationships explored in previous chapters, the U.S., apart from verbal condemnation of apartheid, seldom if ever acted unilaterally against South Africa, and most U.S. punitive measures were taken jointly through the United Nations.

The unilateral attention given to South Africa by the U.S. in the 1980s intensified the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa. The U.S. bypassed the

UN unlike its actions in any previous measure. This action, especially in the 1986 sanctions, seemed the most efficient way for the U.S. to influence the situation in South Africa. According to Merle Lipton:

"This tendency to resort to sanctions has been strengthened by the search for alternatives to war in the nuclear age, as well as by long term economic and technological changes affecting the international system. Increasing economic interdependence and the communications revolution are creating a 'global society', in which the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, between national sovereignty and legitimate international concerns, is being challenged. These changes have created increasing awareness of what is happening in other countries. Meanwhile, the conviction that outsiders have the right and duty to intervene is strengthened by the belief that such sanctions are likely to be more effective than hitherto."¹

The perception that South Africa was an issue in the Cold War struggle between East and West and, therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South Africa for the sake of its mineral wealth. This perhaps led the South African government to believe it was merely an ally for strategic mineral purposes and for no other reason. The arguments that support this opinion are four-fold:

- "1. It is important geo-politically for the West to maintain control of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope;
2. South Africa is a bulwark against the Soviet/Cuban threat to Southern Africa;
3. South Africa is the dominant military power in Africa;
4. South Africa uniquely possesses key minerals that are increasingly critical to the economies of the industrial democracies. Assuring this continued access is thus seen as a central consideration in any policy formulation toward South Africa."²

The perceptions held by the NP parliamentarians concerning U.S. interference in South Africa could be linked to a third set of ideas. The policy approach of the Carter administration had been unsuccessful in its efforts to promote change in South Africa. Moreover, its attempts to promote change, Carter's policy was often prescriptive and confrontational on human rights issues. This is evident in the meeting between Mondale and Vorster in 1979. Thus the relationship between the Carter administration and the NP was strained.

It obvious from referring back to the data collected concerning NP perceptions, that they liked the interaction between the U.S. and South Africa, if the U.S. made few or no demands, other than verbal, to force political change. This is true particularly during constructive engagement where 85% agreed that constructive engagement was effective U.S. foreign policy (figure 6) and 76% held a positive attitude toward the policy of constructive engagement (figure 7).

When asked which of the following U.S. actions they would find helpful (figure 47), the NP respondents claimed that investment in Black housing, education, health and small business would indeed be helpful. They also agreed that diplomatic pressure would be helpful if exerted on the ANC (figure 48).

The majority of responses collected concerning the sanctions issue viewed the sanctions measures as negative, prescriptive and containing other motives rather than to help search for solutions to South Africa's internal problems.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this:

- (1) that the U.S. Congress thought the only way to influence the internal situation in South Africa was to implement sanctions;
- (3) that South Africa did play a role in the East v. West struggle, where keeping South Africa as a close ally was in U.S. interests;
- (4) that U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa under Carter was perceived by NP parliamentarians as negative;

- (5) that the NP parliamentarians interviewed, desire U.S. interaction but only when it does not dictate or punish;

The second key theme chosen for discussion, is the NP perception that the motives of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa were largely fueled by guilt from U.S. human rights movements (figure 10), pressure from American blacks (figure 12), pressure from U.S. human rights activists (figure 13), and the fact that United States politicians saw the South Africa issue as a vote-catcher (figure 14).

The goal for the policy of constructive engagement, as formulated by Chester Crocker, was the following:

"The emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship without constraint, embarrassment or political damage."³

The purpose of the sanctions legislation (CAAA) was to persuade the South African government to move more quickly towards a negotiated end to the apartheid system and the unrest in South Africa. The CAAA had three primary stipulations: (1) it imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy on apartheid; and (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. By contrast the study of NP perceptions indicate the following:

- (1) that there is a lack of trust and or understanding of the foreign policy goals issued by the United States or;
- (2) that the United States was considered unfair in its approach toward South Africa.

The third theme provides evidence that while most (64%) NP parliamentarians held the perception that South Africa could follow its own course rather than yielding

to sanctions pressure (figure 8), nearly all admitted that sanctions' measures have had some effect on bringing the current political changes to South Africa.

This brings to light the question of actual success of U.S. sanctions efforts implemented toward South Africa. Have sanction measures failed or succeeded in bringing about their desired goal? One opinion states:

"Sanctions have been instituted 155 times since World War I, but usually without much effect. Gary Hafbauer, professor of international finance at Georgetown University in Washington, calculates that only 30% of the restriction imposed during the past decade have had even a marginal effect in changing a target nations policies.

"Generally, either nations have been unwilling to impose sanctions severe enough to cripple the economy of an offending country or the restrictions have been widely evaded. The moral obloquy that proved so galling to white South African means nothing to dictators such as Saddam Hussein or Iraq and Deng Xiaoping of China, who are determined to maintain their power and to hell with world opinion. Some analysts suspect that even in South Africa, sanctions that devastated rather than only damaged the economy might have produced a laager backlash. For once, the U.S. and other nations imposed sanctions just strict enough to have the desired effect - but there is no guarantee they will get the calculation right next time."⁴

4.6 CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the data. One must keep in mind that crisp conclusions are not possible. The surface value of a particular set of perceptions often contains deep or underlying messages that must be decoded and analyzed. This must be done against the backdrop of other source material. Some very broad and general statements can be made about the data presented on the previous pages of text.

Firstly, it is easy to see that the NP had great hope for and felt positively about, the policy of constructive engagement, but were confused about what the policy actually sought to achieve.

Secondly, the overall NP perceptions toward the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and other sanctions were negative. They were seen as contributing to stress and contention in US/South African relations. However, all admitted that in one way or another that sanctions had had some effect on the current and recently past political changes in South Africa.

Thirdly, many times throughout the data it is recognized that many of the respondents sought to identify or ridicule similar problems in the United States rather than addressing the question at hand. Again, this must be more thoroughly analyzed, but can be seen as an admission of guilt or not wanting to accept the issues at hand.

4.7 NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Merle Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", Discussion Paper No. 1, Center for the Study of the South Africa Economy and International Finance, London School of Economics, Spring 1991., p.1.
2. Larry W. Bowman, "Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis", African Affairs 81: (April 1982), pp. 160, 161.
3. Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs 59: (Winter 1980/81), p.326.
4. Peter Hawthorne, Bruce W. Nelan and Christopher Ogden, "South Africa: Back in Play," Time International Magazine, 22 July 1991, 13.

CHAPTER FIVE

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The results and discussion presented in the previous chapters show a wide range of perceptions held by National Party parliamentarians concerning the objectives and motivations of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa in the 1980s. It is not possible to infer from the data a succinct and unified view on the effects of sanctions because the individuals interviewed had in most cases no clear-cut views. One's impression is of a considerable reluctance on their part to acknowledge that sanctions were a significant factor in causing the dramatic change in South Africa that was signalled by State President F.W. De Klerk's historic speech to Parliament on 2 February 1990.

Moreover, as this conclusion will show, statements by leading NP figures on the political effect of sanctions have been characterized by ambiguity and even contradictions. More extreme advocates of sanctions, on the one hand, are inclined to the view that sanctions were 'decisive' in causing the South African government to move boldly towards a non-racial democracy; opponents of sanctions, on the other hand, are inclined to be dismissive of any such claims and to assert instead that sanctions either played no role in causing the change or that they retarded it.

The causes of the change are a complex amalgam of different factors, including moral qualms, recognition of the unworkability of apartheid (and the neo-apartheid modifications introduced by P.W. Botha), as well as a sense that the world was a different place with the collapse of Marxist-Leninist states. Single-factor explanations

of apartheid's demise are inadequate. Accordingly, we may reject any attempted explanation of it as solely the result of sanctions.

It is methodologically impossible to factor out the precise political impact of sanctions, any more than their psychological impact can be isolated. We may assert confidently that while sanctions undoubtedly inflicted economic damage on the South African economy, they did not cripple it and neither did they force the government to its knees. To the extent that sanctions played a part in causing change it was probably a marginal one, but even this conclusion must be offered tentatively since even marginal impacts can be significant. As Minter and Schmidt argued, sanctions were intended to achieve marginal increase in the pressure on the South African government (see p.103).

The question of the impact of sanctions is likely to be debated at length in scholarly and political circles for years to come. Many concerns and questions are still unanswered and an attitude of ambivalence surrounds many key areas of debate. Moreover, much of the South African government's information on the effect of sanctions and what was said in Cabinet and elsewhere inside the state machine remains shrouded in secrecy. The conclusion, accordingly, must of necessity be appropriately modest, preventing such hard data as exist and drawing attention to issues that remain controversial.

This dissertation sought to explore the perceptions which have underlain and influenced an aspect of white South Africa's responses to the foreign policy approaches of the U.S. in the 1980s. By examining the National Party's responses both to the policy of constructive engagement and the 1986 switch to punitive sanctions this dissertation aimed at deepening one's understanding of NP parliamentarians' perception of U.S.

foreign policy. The data and questions presented in this dissertation offer interview material that has been little studied in the past, which give the findings the virtue of freshness and uniqueness.

As discussed in Chapter 1, studying perception presents a question of reality. Are the perceptions displayed by the NP parliamentarians a true picture of reality about U.S. foreign policy and sanctions in the 1980s or are they a distortion of it? In other words, in attempting to understand the relationship between the following hypothetical statements and NP perceptions of reality, one must understand the environment which the NP parliamentarian operates. Thus far in the previous chapters, the dissertation has, as much as it is possible, provided a discussion of this environment. However there are several possible myths and factors in the environment that could distort or alter the data. In this concluding chapter, some of these myths and factors will be discussed. The following presents a discussion of the hypotheses and the data of NP parliamentarian perceptions.

In Chapter 1, the dissertation, while acknowledging the array of possible idiosyncratic explanations for NP perceptions, offered three general hypotheses.

Hypothesis one operated from the assumption that the change in U.S. policy signalled by CAAA was perceived in an almost exclusively negative light by NP parliamentarians. It states that:

National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy of sanctions to be motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the United States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and interests of South Africa as a whole, white population included.

If we refer to the data presented in chapter four, U.S. initiatives were perceived in a negative light by NP parliamentarians particularly those responses that concerned the CAAA.

Firstly, however, it is necessary to restate the central objectives outlined in the CAAA: (1) it imposed sanctions against South Africa; (2) it put into law U.S. policy on apartheid; (3) it provided assistance to black South Africans. It also laid out criteria that, if met, would result in the lifting of sanctions.

Several sets of responses by NP parliamentarians suggest that in general NP perception of the U.S. CAAA policy tended to be emotional, rather than clinically dispassionate or analytical, suspecting that the policy had other motives than trying to improve the internal situation in South Africa. Such a perception was understandable in the light of the near-paranoid suspicion among whites of 'outside interference' in South Africa's domestic affairs.

Of the 21 NP parliamentarians that responded when asked if they saw the rationality behind the U.S. decision to implement sanctions, 29% answered simply no; among the remainder, the following themes were evident: that the rationale was to serve internal political purposes in the U.S.; that several respondents could understand the implementation of sanctions from a U.S. perspective but not from a South African one; that there was a degree of confusion concerning the exact reasons underlying the implementation of sanctions; and that the U.S. public is more aware of human rights than South Africa.

Many NP parliamentarians held the perception that coping with the demands of internal human rights and other groups, especially the black lobby within the U.S., was one of the most prominent motivating factors; that U.S. lawmakers held wrong

perceptions about the South African situation; that the sanctions issue became a 'business' in the U.S., affording a comfortable living to activists, who were in fact little concerned about the consequences of their demands for the South African situation; that the U.S. and others who implemented sanctions are hypocrites; that the U.S. feels guilt for the way it treated its own black people, therefore, it tries to atone for this guilt by punishing South Africa; and that the U.S. was outraged at racism and discrimination; and that South Africa became an easy target for the internal politics of the U.S.

NP parliamentary responses that display more 'favorable' perceptions are: that the U.S. is motivated by thinking that it is genuinely contributing towards a democratic society by implementing sanctions; that the international climate provided an atmosphere for change and that sanctions were an insignificant part of that process; there was instability within the NP ranks due to the CP split and an unclear agenda motivated for sanctions. It is evident from the majority of themes presented above that the U.S. is perceived in negative a light, supporting hypothesis one, whereas only a few represent data supporting hypothesis two. Also, in quantitative terms, the 'negatives' substantially outweigh the 'positives'.

To further this argument, figure 11 shows that only 9% of NP parliamentarians that U.S. policy-makers to be sincere when they introduced sanctions to bring about a change in South Africa. Additionally, figure 14 shows that 100% of NP parliamentarians perceived that using the South Africa issue as a 'vote-catcher' had some degree of importance on the U.S. policy-making agenda.

Thus, hypothesis one --- that National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a self-centered concern with the national interest of the

United States alone rather than by an awareness of and concern for the needs and interests of South Africa --- is substantially validated: The change in U.S. policy signalled by CAAA was perceived in a largely negative light.

Hypothesis two, on the other hand, assumes a more positive perception of U.S. intent on the part of NP politicians. It states that:

National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a sincere desire to ensure not only fundamental change in the South African social formation but also a significant political and economic role for whites as well as non-whites.

Several responses from NP parliamentarians reflect a positive perception of U.S. foreign policy. This is particularly true of Reagan's first term (ending in 1984) when constructive engagement was being implemented. As noted earlier, the fundamental goal of constructive engagement, according to Crocker, was "the emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship", accordingly the U.S. should foster and support "peaceful change toward a nonracial system".¹

Figure 6 shows that, 85% of NP parliamentarians agreed that constructive engagement was an effective policy. In addition, in figure 7, 76% of NP parliamentarians' perception had a positive attitude toward the policy of constructive engagement. These responses prove hypothesis two to be correct.

However, not all NP responses regarding constructive engagement were positive. Some NP parliamentarians allude to possible confusion over the policy, while others saw it as 'interference'.

The following themes among NP perceptions are evident in response to questions about what motivated the U.S. to develop its policy of constructive

engagement: that South Africa was perceived as an issue in the Cold War struggle between East and West and therefore, the U.S. maintained close ties with South Africa for the sake of its mineral wealth; that there was confusion and uncertainty about whether sanctions were the consequence of constructive engagement's failure. There was also confusion about who initiated/promoted the sanctions policy, some even believing that President Reagan himself was responsible; that the constructive engagement policy was developed to find a solution to the Namibian situation; that the purpose of constructive engagement was an honest attempt to encourage upliftment and democracy; that constructive engagement brought a welcome change from the attitudes of the Carter administration, which had been unsuccessful in its efforts to promote change in South Africa; that constructive engagement derived from a strong tendency in U.S. historical tradition to wish to bestow upon other states the blessing of American-style institutions; that the U.S. was often perceived as interfering in South Africa's internal affairs; and that the U.S. developed the constructive engagement policy to please both South African and anti-South Africa people in Washington for the purpose of heading off the pro-sanction lobby.

The data in chapter four suggest that while NP perceptions of constructive engagement were favorable to the positive, 'open communication' and 'negotiation' side of the policy, equally, they manifested 'resentment' at interference and 'prescriptive tendencies' from the U.S. Thus, hypothesis two --- that National Party politicians perceived U.S. foreign policy to be motivated by a sincere desire to ensure fundamental change in the South African social formation --- is correct in reflecting NP perceptions of some aspects of the U.S. policy of constructive engagement.

Before reviewing the data concerning hypothesis three, it is necessary to stand back and place the question of the political impact of sanctions in a wider context. The core of the dissertation has been a study of perceptions, and more specifically NP parliamentary perceptions of sanctions, but perceptions may not correspond with 'reality' (although reality to be sure, misperceptions of other states' policies and their impact are 'real' enough in international relations). Finally, hypothesis three states that:

U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, played a marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South African government to make fundamental changes.

Only nine out of 35 NP parliamentarians held the perception that United States sanctions policies had had absolutely no direct effect on their constituencies. Of the rest that responded, there was definitely a consensus that sanctions had some either positive or negative effect on their constituencies. Of the data collected, the following themes are evident: that it has caused a rising attitude of resentment among people in South Africa towards the U.S.; that sanctions have made certain imports unavailable and the alternatives have been costly; that it has had a financial effect on the South African economy; that it caused exporters to look for alternative overseas markets; that it stimulated South African technological advancement in many fields and brought new industry such as MOSSGAS, SASOL and ARMSCOR; that sanctions measures affected many black townships that suffered job losses due to disinvestment; that it hardened white attitudes which bolstered Conservative Party support in many constituencies; and that sanctions measures contributed to the general economic recession.

The question was raised whether or not South Africa would ever have to yield to pressure due to U.S. sanctions. (Figure 8.) The data presents the following results:

Of the 33 that answered, 21% agreed that yes, eventually South Africa would have to yield to pressure, while 64% answered no, that they had confidence that South Africa could follow its own course, and 15% were uncertain.

According to the data of NP parliamentary perceptions of the political, psychological, and economic effect U.S. sanctions have had on South Africa suggest the following conclusions: that sanctions made the pro-sanctions campaign hard to defeat and gave the blacks encouragement to keep up the 'struggle'; sanctions forced the South African government to re-evaluate the issues at hand; that sanctions underlined world hostility to South Africa's racial politics; that sanctions delayed upliftment; and that sanctions enhanced the growth of the political rightwing.

The specific perceptions obtained from NP parliamentarians about the psychological effect of sanctions state: that sanctions created anti-American attitudes and attitudes of resentment, especially amongst white people; and that sanctions were a blow to white South African morale, that the sanctions issue made the South African government more determined to survive and overcome sanctions.

The specific perceptions obtained from NP parliamentarians about the economic effect of sanctions state: that sanctions made South Africa more self-sufficient; that sanctions caused South Africa to lose billions of Rands; that sanctions rendered many South Africans jobless; that sanctions hurt the South African economy; that sanctions slowed the South African growth rate, and that sanctions made it more difficult to obtain a good standard of living, especially for those at the lower end of the economic scale.

Thus, hypothesis three --- U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, played a marginal, though significant role, in pressuring the South

African government to make fundamental changes --- is substantially validated: U.S.-imposed sanctions forced the South African government to re-evaluate the issues at hand.

In order to do this, the remainder of this concluding chapter seeks to explain certain myths and external events that could alter make a difference on NP perceptions held about the success of the sanctions debate (hypothesis three).

MYTHS and EXTERNAL FACTORS

The question to be raised here is how much of the change in South Africa since February 1990 is attributable to sanctions, and how much to other contingent factors occurring in the external environment during the mid-to-late 1980s? Two issues have previously been alluded to: Firstly, an event of much importance occurred July 1985 when Chase Manhattan Bank refused to roll over loans to South Africa. This set off a chain reaction followed by other international banks in September of the same year. How much of Chase Manhattan's decision was due to abhorrence of apartheid or was it rather the reaction to influences in the international market? Or, put another way, due to other pressures did the Bank foresee financial difficulty in having its loans to South Africa repaid and was the South African situation used as the reason for refusal? Chase Manhattan's chief executive office said in August, 1991 that its decision was taken purely on the basis of market considerations:

In 1985 we felt that the risk attached to political unrest and economic instability became too high for our investors. We decided to withdraw ... It was never the intention to facilitate change in South Africa with this decision. The decision was taken purely on account of what was in the interest of Chase and its assets.²

However, South Africa's inability to secure finance from abroad was not only due to sanctions but to a worldwide lack of investment capital. Merle Lipton states that South Africa was not alone in being unable to secure finance:

"The international debt crisis was, in part, the result of the drying up of the petro-dollars that flooded the world markets during the 1970s and of the subsequent worldwide shortage of investment capital that followed the collapse of oil prices during the early 1980s. Many developing countries, faced with soaring interest rates on their large debts and unable to secure new loans, found themselves being converted into net capital exporters."³

Secondly, to what extent was change in South Africa and the apparent effectiveness of sanctions a matter of a contingent historical event? South Africa, under the leadership of P.W. Botha, was a state that exemplified tunnel vision. Botha believed in the 'total onslaught' of Soviet influence in the region, and he maintained a strong 'anti-interference' stance, especially when pressured by the international community. This was seen very clearly in a speech by President Botha, in 1985, which displayed a hardening of attitudes toward international pressure.

"I have said on various occasions that I am not prepared to lead the Whites to abdication, but I warn that if injudicious elements abroad should have their way, they will unleash injudicious forces in this country and that will lead South Africa to only one thing. It will not only lead South Africa to poverty but to a blood-bath. If South Africa is plunged into a blood-bath, however, many people in this country will suffer. South Africa is so constituted that it could easily be turned into a blood-bath by any fool. . . . Consequently I hope that responsible leaders in the free world will themselves make a stand, as they have already started doing, to stop this fools errand the left-wing radicals have embarked upon."⁴

Only optimism of the most utopian kind could have predicted such a drastic shift in South African ideology in the short period since the Presidency of P.W. Botha. Assessing the precise impact of sanctions on South Africa's political leadership is made difficult by the fortuitous historical fact that P.W. Botha was laid low by a stroke early

in 1989 and thereafter faded from the political scene in a messy transition. Had this contingent event not happened, it is possible that Botha, a head-strong and intransigent man, would have remained in office for another term, adopting an even more defiant attitude to the outside world. This is obviously an hypothetical argument, but it surely complicates any simple view that sanctions 'were decisive' in forcing radical change on the South African government. As late as 1989, and even after De Klerk became Acting State President, there was general agreement among political analysts that fundamental change was not imminent. Some, indeed, spoke in terms of a twenty-year time-frame for such change.

A second contingent historical fact was the effect on the South African leadership of the collapse of communism, especially the way in which Marxist-Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe went-down like ninepins in 1989 and the USSR itself continued its decline. Many in leadership actually believed their own 'total onslaught' propaganda, and supposed that the ANC was little more than a client of the Kremlin. The collapse emboldened them. This was a major factor in promoting change, but it had nothing to do with sanctions.

A third event of watershed importance was that of the Namibian settlement. Even though it too had little or nothing to do with sanctions --- indeed, it could be seen more as a product of constructive engagement combined with a growing belief within the South African government that holding the line on Namibia/Angola was not worth the cost in terms of lives and military expenditure. The situation in Namibia demonstrated to the South African government that a negotiated transition to a free and fair democratic process was possible. Moreover, the strong showing of the anti-

SWAPO parties encouraged the NP to hope that it (and its allies) might achieve a comparable result, perhaps even victory, in future democratic elections in South Africa.

In analyzing the change in the South African government's policies, Pauline Baker states that the previous ideological 'myth' of white politics had been discredited:

"Of all the myths about white South Africans, none has been so widespread as the assumption of white intransigence, regardless of cost. This has often been described through the metaphor of the "laager," the circle of ox-drawn covered wagons used by eighteenth-century Afrikaner settlers during conflicts with Africans. Politically, the term has come to refer to a unique political mentality; it was thought that the ruling white regime, under pressure, would only harden its position further."⁵

This myth, claims Baker, "proved false, not only in the former British and Portuguese colonies, but in South Africa as well. Accumulated internal and external pressures forced the South African government to recalculate basic policies and principles that had been in force for 40 years."⁶ Even though the political approach that is still accepted by the CP supports the "laager" theory, the actual government ideology of the NP has changed significantly.

Baker's comments are partly right, but they are also irrelevant in a crucial respect. She is obviously correct in saying that pressures did not create greater cohesion in South Africa --- indeed, especially after the formation of the CP in 1982 and the mushroom-like growth of ultra-rightwing organizations in the 1980s. Intra-white political conflict has been more intense than at any time since the 1940s.

Sanctions were virtually unanimously opposed by whites of all political stripes (including liberal organizations like the PFP/DP and individual liberals like Alan Paton and Helen Suzman), although there were marked differences among the parties over

how best to respond to them. Surveys of white attitudes conducted on behalf of the South African Institute of International Affairs in 1989 and 1990 suggest a marked hardening of attitudes to foreign interference.⁷ H. Kotze' and E. Lourens correctly predicted in 1987 that the CP would be favored by 'a further deterioration of the South African economy with concomitant unemployment and a drop in living standards'.⁸

CP Members of Parliament were not interviewed in this survey but it is relevant to the point being made here to note the comment made to the writer by a senior CP parliamentarian. According to then (1990) CP information officer, Koos van der Merwe, 'sanctions have definitely strengthened the CP and it is impossible to measure the enormous success the CP has enjoyed due to sanctions'.⁹ It is not part of dissertation to discuss the prospects for the CP, but it is relevant to stress the relationship between worsening economic conditions and the strength of the rightwing backlash. Any 'balance-sheet' on the effects of sanctions has to include their contribution to the CP's growing strength and, hence, to complicating transition.

The general election of May 1987 was the first opportunity white voters had of expressing an opinion on sanctions. Since the election took place only a few months after the enactment of the CAAA, one would have expected 'outside pressure' to be a major issue in the campaign. This was not to be: no fewer than 58% of a sample of voters declared it to have played a small role or no role in voter perceptions of the issues.¹⁰ Much more significant were the issues of security and political reform. The relative lack of attention paid to sanctions was probably attributable to two factors: the violence that began to taper off only a matter of months before the election; and the fact that sanctions had, as yet, not begun to bite.

Baker makes no effort to isolate sanctions as a causal factor in explaining the change. She does however ignore the political repercussion of a contracting economy, which may yet thwart South Africa's quest for democracy. Just as Mao Zedong is reported to have replied, in answer to a question about the effects of the French Revolution, 'it's too soon to tell,' so with regard to sanctions. They may have played a marginal role in achieving change, but they may also prove to be a contributory factor to an uncontrollable economic decline that will make a South African democracy impossible.

Sanctions-busting and the drive towards for greater economic self-sufficiency became a common practice of the South African government during the sanctions era. There is much debate concerning some of the practices and projects adopted to alleviate sanction pressure. The Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr. Theo Alant, told the Free State National Party congress on 3 September 1991, that:

"With hindsight MOSSGAS was a bad investment, as very much more could have been done with the millions spent on that project."¹¹

Huge sums of money had been expended on efforts to circumvent what would probably have been the most damaging sanction of all, a comprehensive oil embargo. SASOL (an oil-from-coal plant) and MOSSGAS (an offshore natural gas installation), together with large amounts spent on stockpiling oil (and other strategic requirements), all represent huge expenditures of an essentially uneconomic nature. Recently, it was reported that MOSSGAS funding has risen to R12bn --- almost R5.5bn more than originally expected in 1987.¹²

By no means all of the economic adjustments initiated by the South African Government were necessarily unsuccessful. The ARMSCOR industry, for example, is

a case-in-point which has unquestionably brought substantial success to the South African government in its search for self-sufficiency in armaments. ARMSCOR's prowess has also made South Africa a not insignificant exporter of arms.

If it is acknowledged that sanctions have damaged South Africa's economy, perhaps one of the most significant questions to be asked are what is the long-term damaging effects of sanctions? It is an uncontested fact that sanctions slowed economic growth, brought higher unemployment and virtually stopped international economic investment. The argument that sanctions were significant, even decisive, in promoting change still has to reckon with the argument that sanctions, by contributing to the dramatic slowing-down of the economy in the 1980s, may yet have an indirect baneful effect on South Africa's capacity to sustain democratic institutions. State President, F.W. De Klerk notes that:

"As we near our political goals, several economic challenges face South Africa and the whole Southern African region. . . . For unless government can provide for the material needs of its people, create economic frame-works that bring opportunity and the prospect of a better life, it risks endangering the very democracy that it is building."¹³

And as stated Deputy Minister, Theo Alant,

"If we don't succeed in attracting massive foreign investment our economy will not reach its potential."¹⁴

It has now become a common place in the theory-building of transition to democracy that all of the recent successful transitions have taken place in growing economies. South Africa is seeking to incorporate a large new electorate, which will undoubtedly make huge demands on the Treasury, while its economy remains sluggish. There is general agreement that sanctions damage the economies of targeted states,

and South Africa has been no exception, but whether sanctions lead to benign outcomes for the politics of targeted states is altogether a different issue.

In November 1990 personal interviews were conducted with a sample of high ranking officials in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. (Appendix J) The Department of Foreign Affairs officials, who were interviewed for the purpose of obtaining a slightly different perspective, substantially shared the NP perceptions. With no exceptions, all believed that U.S. sanctions had some influence in deciding change, the degree to which it influenced such change will probable remain unknown and a topic for debate for some time. Additionally all officials opposed sanctions. The important conclusion to be drawn here is that the sanction issue has had a curious way of merging white decision-maker opinion.

The above paragraphs have sought to outline possible areas of thought which are significant in determining the outcome of the South African sanctions debate which have an inevitably effect on NP perception. These remarks are by no means conclusive in predicting the destiny of South African politics, but rather their purpose was to give a possible outline of key influences that could alter the future process undertaken by a new South Africa. The impact on inducing change in South Africa has and continues to inject more data into this debate.

Reverting to the three hypotheses, it is true that U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s has generated both positive and negative situations according to NP parliamentary perception. The political, psychological and economic impact of U.S.-imposed sanctions against South Africa is influenced many external and internal environmental factors, and it is unlikely that one can draw steadfast conclusions. However, as shown conclusively by the data, NP parliamentary perception almost unanimously have

shown that U.S.-imposed sanctions, together with those imposed by other states, did play a marginal, yet very significant role in pressuring the South African government to make fundamental changes, and 'evaluate the situation at hand'. This apparently paradoxical conclusion needs explanation. Sanctions were not the major factor causing the changes initiated by President F.W. de Klerk in February 1990. They were, however, an additional source of pressure on the South African government. The cumulative impact of these pressures on the South African government. The cumulative impact of these pressures from different sources persuaded de Klerk that fundamental change was necessary.

As stated earlier, this dissertation sought not to resolve the sanction debate *per se*, but rather to determine what precisely NP perceptions were toward U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s. It is hoped in doing so, this dissertation has helped to identify whether U.S. policy toward South Africa during this time led to more positive and cooperative relations between the two states or whether it resulted in more negative and conflictual ones. Ultimately, this dissertation sought to make a significant contribution toward a better understanding of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy in general and of U.S. foreign policy in particular.

5.1 NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs 59: Winter 1980/81, p.324.
2. Cited in Hermann Gilomee, "The last trek? Afrikaners in transition to democracy", South Africa International 22(3): January 1992, p.112.

3. Merle Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", Discussion Paper No. 1, Center for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance, London School of Economics, Spring 1991., p. 1.

4. Hansard, South Africa House of Assembly Debates, 31 January 1985, p. 312.

5. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa: Old Myths and New Realities", Current History, May, 1991, p. 197.

6. Ibid., p.199.

7. Surveys by the South African Institute of International Affairs recorded the following data:
 "The final statement on the sanctions issue read: 'The only way in which South Africa can in the long run avoid tougher economic sanctions is by granting equal political rights to Blacks'. In the 1986 survey, a majority of 54.3% supported this view. The level of support dropped to 41.5% in 1988. In this survey, 55% supported this view, while 43.7% disagreed. The level of support therefore, returned to much the same as that in the 1986 survey.

"Variation in white opinion on this issue is the result of many factors, such as the growth in political support of right-wing parties; marked socio-political polarization within the country, accompanied by a defiant mood against outside intervention and 'meddling'."

See: Andre' Du Pisani, South African Institute of International Affairs, 5: (May 1990), pp. 1-35.

8. H. Kotze' and E. Lourens, "Considering the swing to the Right --- Some thought on the 1987 election result in DJ van Vuuren, L Schlemmer, H.C. Marais and J. Latakomo, eds., South African Election 1987 (Pinetown: Owen Burgess Publishers, 1987), p. 370.

9. Conservative Party Information Officer, Koos van der Merwe, was personally interviewed by the writer at his home in Pretoria on 15 November 1990.

10. N.J. Rhodie and M.P. Couper, 'Whites' perceptions of the fundamental issues surrounding the election of 6 May 1987,' in van Vuuren, Schlemmer, Marais, Latakomo, eds., South African Elections 1987, p. 193.

11. Cape Times, (Cape Town), 4 September 1991.

12. Business Day, (Cape Town): 6 December 1991.

13. F.W. De Klerk, "South Africa Into the Future: Vision, Hope and Reality", The Southern Africa Policy Forum (1-6 April 1991): p.5.

14. Cape Times, (Cape Town), 4 September 1991.

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APPENDIX A

South Africa's * role in World mineral production, 1985.

Commodity	Unit	Production	World		Market Economies**	
			%	Rank	%	Rank
Alumino-silicates	kt	196	39	1	48	1
Antimony a	t	7 390	14	3	23	2
Asbestos	kt	164	4	5	10	4
Chrome ore	kt	3 340	32	1	49	1
Coal b	kt	173 500	5	5	11	2
Copper c	kt	195	2	11	3	9
Diamonds d	Kcar	10 206	16	4	19	3
Ferrochromium	t	856 989	28	1	37	1
Ferromanganese	kt	569	9	3	14	2
Ferrosilicon	kt	75	2	11	3	9
Fluorspar	kt	349	7	5	13	2
Gold	t	671	43	1	55	1
Iron ore	Mt	15	3	8	5	6
Lead c	kt	98	3	9	4	7
Manganese metal e	kt	32	54	1	60	1
Manganese ore	kt	3 600	15	2	28	1
Phosphate rock	kt	2 452	2	10	2	8
Platinum-group metals	kt	***	23	3	43	2
Silicon metal	kt	36	6	5	7	4
Silver c	t	208	2	13	2	10
Titanium minerals f	kt	326	18	3	20	3
Uranium c j	t	4 880	na	na	14	2
Vanadium g h	t	25 027	43	1	76	1
Vermiculite	kt	184	35	2	37	2
Zinc c	kt	97	1	15	2	11
Zirconium minerals j	t	160 533	20	2	23	2

Notes:

- * Excludes Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, Venda and South West Africa/Namibia
- ** Excluding centrally planned economies comprising Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany DR, Hungary, Kampuchea, Korea DPR, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Vietnam
- *** Classified

a - metal concentrate; b - bituminous and anthracite; c - contained metal; d - gem and industrial rough; e - electrolytic; f - metal content of minerals, excluding slag; g - contained

V₂O₅ ; h - includes Bophuthatswana; j - concentrate; na - not available.

Source: Minerals Bureau of South Africa, August 1987 in The Official Year Book of the Republic of South Africa, 1988 -89, 14th edition, (Pretoria: Bureau of Information, 1988-89) p. 314.

A P P E N D I X B

THE SULLIVAN PRINCIPLES:

Principle number 1: Non-segregation of the races in all eating and comfort and work facilities.

Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:

- Eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination.
- Remove all race designations signs.
- Desegregate all eating, comfort and work facilities.

Principle number 2: Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.

Each signator of the Statement of principles will proceed immediately to:

- Implement equal and fair terms and conditions of employment.
- Provide non-discriminatory eligibility for benefit plans. - Establish an appropriate and comprehensive procedure for handling and resolving individual employee complaints.
- Support the elimination of all industrial racial discriminatory laws which impede the implementation of equal and fair terms and conditions of employment, such as abolition of job reservations, job fragmentation, and apprenticeship restrictions for blacks and other non-whites.
- Support the elimination of discrimination against the rights of blacks to form or belong to government registered and unregistered unions and acknowledge generally the rights of blacks to form their own unions or be represented by trade unions which already exist.
- Secure rights of black workers to the freedom of association and assure protection against victimization while pursuing and after attaining these rights.
- Involve black workers or their representatives in the development of programs that address their educational and other needs and those of their dependents and the local community.

Principle number 3: Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time.

Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:

- Design and implement a wage and salary administration plan which is applied equally to all employees, regardless of race, who are performing equal or comparable work.
- Ensure an equitable system of job classification, including a review of the distinction between hourly and salaried classifications.
- Determine the extent upgrading of personnel and/or jobs in the upper echelons is needed, and accordingly implement programs to accomplish this objective in representative numbers, ensuring the employment of blacks and other non-whites at all levels of company operations.

- Assign equitable wage and salary ranges, the minimum of these to be well above the appropriate local minimum economic living level.

Principle number 4: Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs.

Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:

- Determine employee training needs and capabilities, and identify employees with potential for further advancement.
- Take advantage of existing outside training resources and activities, such as exchange programs, technical colleges, and similar institutions or programs.
- Support the development of outside training facilities, individually or collectively--including technical center, professional training exposure, correspondence and extension courses, as appropriate, for extensive training outreach.
- Initiate and expand inside training programs and facilities.

Principle number 5: Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions.

Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:

- Identify, actively recruit, train and develop a sufficient and significant number of blacks and other non-whites to assure that as quickly as possible their will be appropriate representation of blacks and other non-whites in the management group of each company at all levels of operations.
- Establish management development programs for blacks and other non-whites, as need, and improve existing programs and facilities for developing management skills of blacks and other non-whites.
- Identify and channel high management potential blacks and other non-white employees into management development programs.

Principle number 6: Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health facilities.

Each signator of the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to:

- Evaluate existing and/or develop programs, as appropriate, to address the specific needs of black and other non-white employees in the areas of housing, health care, transportation and recreation.

- Evaluate methods for utilizing existing, expanded or newly established in house medical facilities or other medical programs to improve medical care for all non-whites and their dependents.
- Participate in the development of programs that address the educational needs of employees, their dependents, and the local community. Both individual and collective programs should be considered, in addition to technical education, including such activities and literacy education, business training, direct assistance to local schools, contributions and scholarships.
- Support changes in influx control laws to provide for the right of black migrant workers to normal family life.
- Increase utilization of and assist in the development of black and other non-white owned and operated business enterprises including distributors, suppliers of goods and services and manufacturers.

Principle number 7: Increased dimensions of activities outside the work place.

- Use influence and support the unrestricted rights of black businesses to locate in the urban areas of the nation.
- Influence other companies in south Africa to follow the standards of equal rights principles.
- Support the freedom of Mobility of black workers to seek employment opportunities where ever they exist, and make possible provisions for adequate housing for families of employees within the proximity of workers' employment.
- Support the ending of all apartheid laws.

Source: Alison Cooper, U.S. and Canadian Business in South Africa 1987, (Washington, D.C.: South Africa Review Service), 1987, pp. 143-145.

APPENDIX C

Chronological summary of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals, 1914-1983

PRINCIPAL SENDER	TARGET COUNTRY	ACTIVE YEARS	GOALS OF SENDER COUNTRY
United Kingdom	Germany	1914 - 18	Military victory
United States	Japan	1917	Use shipping to help Allies in WWI
United Kingdom	USSR	1918 - 20	(1) Renew support for Allies in WWI (2) Destabilize Bolshevik regime
United Kingdom and League of Nations	Yugoslavia	1921	Block Yugoslav attempts to wrest territory from Albania; retain 1913 borders
League of Nations	Greece	1925	Withdraw from occupation of Bulgarian territory
League of Nations	Paraguay, Bolivia	1932 - 35	Settle the Chaco War
United Kingdom	USSR	1933	Release two British citizens
League of Nations	Italy	1935 - 36	Withdraw Italian troops from Ethiopia
United Kingdom and United States	Mexico	1938 - 47	Settle expropriation claims
Alliance Powers	Germany, later Japan	1939 - 45	Military victory
United States	Japan	1940 - 41	Withdraw from Southeast Asia
United States	Argentina	1944 - 47	(1) Remove Nazi influence (2) Destabilize Peron government
Arab League	Israel	1946 -	Create a homeland for Palestinians

United States	Netherlands	1948 - 49	Recognize Republic of Indonesia
India	Hyderabad	1948	Assimilate Hyderabad into India
USSR	United States, United Kingdom, and France	1948 - 49	(1) Prevent formation of a West German government (2) Assimilate West Berlin into East Germany
USSR	Yugoslavia	1948 - 55	(1) Rejoin Soviet camp (2) Destabilize Tito government
United States and COCOM	USSR and COMECON	1948 -	(1) Deny strategic materials (2) Impair Soviet military potential
West Germany	USSR	1949 - 69	Concessions on reunification
United States and CHINCOM	China	1949 - 70	(1) Retaliation for Communist takeover and subsequent assistance to North Korea (2) Deny strategic and other materials
United States	North Korea	1950 - 53	Withdraw attack on South Korea
United Kingdom and United States	Iran	1951 - 53	(1) Reverse the nationalization of oil facilities (2) Destabilize Mussadiq government
USSR	Australia	1954	Repatriate a Soviet defector
India	Goa	1954 - 61	Assimilate Goa into India

Spain	United Kingdom	1954 -	Gain sovereignty over Gibraltar
United States	Israel	1956 -	(1) Withdraw from Sinai (2) Implement UN Resolution 242; (3) Push Palestinian autonomy talks
United Arab Republic	United States and Europe	1956	Prompt Israel, UK, and France to withdraw from Sinai and Suez Canal
United States	United Kingdom and France	1956	Withdraw from Suez
United States	Laos	1956 - 62	(1) Destabilize Prince Souvanna Phouma government (2) Destabilize General Phoumi government (3) Prevent Communist takeover
Indonesia	Netherlands	1957 - 62	Control of West Irian
USSR	Finland	1958 - 59	Adopt pro-USSR policies
United States	North Vietnam, later Vietnam	1958 -	(1) Impede military effectiveness of North Vietnam (2) Retribution for aggression in South Vietnam
United States	Dominican Republic	1960 - 62	(1) Cease subversion in Venezuela (2) Destabilize Trujillo government

USSR	China	1960 -1970	(1)Retaliation for break with Soviet policy (2)Destabilize Mao government
United States	Cuba	1960 -	(1) Settle expropriation claims (2) Destabilize Castro government (3) Discourage Cuba from foreign military adventures
United States	Ceylon	1961 - 65	Settle Expropriation claims
USSR	Albania	1961 - 1982	(1)Retaliation for alliance with China (2) Destabilize Hoxha government
NATO Allies	East Germany	1961 - 62	Berlin Wall
United States	Brazil	1962 - 64	(1)Settle expropriation claims (2) Destabilize Goulart government
United Nations	South Africa	1962 -	(1) End Apartheid (2) Grant independence to Namibia
United States	United Arab Republic	1963 - 65	(1) Cease military activity in Yemen and Congo (2) Moderate anti-US rhetoric
Indonesia	Malaysia	1963 - 67	Promote "Crush Malaysia" campaign

United States	Indonesia	1963 - 66	(1)Cease "Crush Malaysia" campaign (2) Destabilize Sukarno government
African States	Portugal	1963 - 65	Leave Africa
United States	Chile	1965 - 66	Roll back copper price
United States	India	1965 - 67	Alter policy to favor agriculture
United Kingdom and United Nations	Rhodesia	1965 - 79	Majority rule by black Africans
United States	Arab League	1965 -	Stop US firms from implementing Arab boycott of Israel
USSR	Romania	1965	Reduce diplomatic openings to the West
Nigeria	Biafra	1967	End independence movement
United States	Peru	1968	Forgo aircraft purchases from France
United States	Peru	1968 - 74	Settle expropriation claims
United States	Brazil	1968 - 69	Restore democracy
United States	Chile	1970 - 73	(1)Settle expropriation claims (2) Destabilize Allende government
United States	India and Pakistan	1971	Cease fighting in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)

United States	Countries Supporting Int'l Terrorism	1972 -	Overview
United Kingdom and United States	Uganda	1972 - 79	(1)Retaliation for expelling Asians (2) Improve human rights (3) Destabilize Amin government
United States	Countries Violating Human Rights	1973 -	Overview
Arab League	United States and Netherlands	1973 - 74	(1)Retaliation for supporting Israel in October War (2) Restore pre-1967 Israeli borders
United States	South Korea	1973 - 77	Improve human rights
United States	Chile	1973 - 81	Improve human rights
United States	Turkey	1974 - 78	Withdraw turkish troops from Cyprus
Canada	India	1974 - 76	(1)Deter further nuclear explosions (2) Apply stricter nuclear safeguards
Canada	Pakistan	1974 - 76	(1)Apply stricter safeguards to nuclear power (2) Forgo nuclear power plant
United States and Canada	South Korea	1975 -76	Forgo nuclear reprocessing
United States	USSR	1975 -	Liberalize Jewish emigration
United States	Easter Europe	1975 -	Liberalize Jewish emigration

United States	South Africa	1975 -	(1) Adhere to nuclear safeguards (2) Advert explosion of nuclear device
United States	Cambodia	1975 -	(1) Retaliation for North Vietnamese aggression (2) Improve human rights
United States	Uruguay	1976 -	Improve human rights
United States	Taiwan	1976 - 77	Forego nuclear reprocessing
United States	Ethiopia	1976 -	(1) Settle expropriation claims (2) Improve human rights
United States	Paraguay	1977 -	Improve human rights
United States	Guatemala	1977 - 82	Improve human rights
United States	Argentina	1977 - 82	Improve human rights
Canada	Japan	1977 - 78	Adhere to nuclear safeguards
United States	Nicaragua	1977 - 79	(1) Destabilize Somoza government (2) Improve human rights
United States	El Salvador	1977 - 81	Improve human rights
China	Albania	1978 - 83	Retaliation for anti-Chinese rhetoric
United States	Brazil	1978 - 80	Adhere to nuclear safeguards
United States	Argentina	1978 - 80	Adhere to nuclear safeguards

United States	India	1978 - 80	Adhere to nuclear safeguards
United States	USSR	1978 -	Liberalize treatment of dissidents (e.g., Sharansky)
Arab League	Egypt	1978 -	Withdraw from Camp David process
China	Vietnam	1978 -	Withdraw troops from Cambodia
United States	Libya	1978 -	(1) Terminate support of international terrorism (2) Destabilize Qadhafi government
United States	Iran	1979 - 81	(1) Release hostages (2) Settle expropriation claims
United States	Pakistan	1979 - 80	Adhere to nuclear safeguards
Arab League	Canada	1979 - 80	Retaliation for planned move of Canadian Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
United States	USSR	1980 -	(1) Withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan (2) Impair Soviet military potential
United States	Iraq	1980 - 82	Terminate support of international terrorism
United States	Nicaragua	1981 -	(1) End support for El Salvador rebels (2) Destabilize Sandinista government

USSR	Poland	1981 - 82	Maintain internal discipline
United States	Poland	1981 -	(1) Lift martial law (2) Free dissidents (3) Resume talks with Solidarity
United States	USSR	1981 - 82	(1) Lift martial law in Poland (2) Cancel USSR-Europe pipeline project (3) Impair Soviet economic/Military potential
European Community	Turkey	1981 - 82	Restore Democracy
United Kingdom	Argentina	1982	Withdraw troops from Falkland Islands
Arab League	Zaire	1982	Withdraw recognition of Israel
Netherlands	Suriname	1982 -	(1) Improve human rights (2) Limit alliance with Cuba (3) Destabilize Bouterse government
South Africa	Lesotho	1982 -	Return refugees suspected of antistate activities
Australia	France	1983 -	Stop nuclear testing in the South Pacific

Source: Gary Clyde Haufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, "Economic Sanctions in support of Foreign policy goals", Institute for International Economics: Policy Analyses, Vol. 6, October 1983., pp. 14 - 22.

A P P E N D I X D

Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986

Title III contains immediate sanctions against South Africa. Five of these codify the provisions of the President's Executive orders of September 9 and October 1, 1985. There are 14 other sanctions in addition to these.

Section 301 - bans the importation of Kruggerrands other South African gold coins into the United States. The importation of Soviet gold coins into the United States is banned by title V, section 510.

Section 302 - bans the import into the United States of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and the manufacturing data for these weapons.

Section 303 - bans the import into the United States of products of South African parastatals except for agricultural products for 12 months after enactment and except for strategic materials for which there are no reliable suppliers.

Section 304 - bans the export of computer, computer software, and goods and technology to the South African military, police and other apartheid enforcing agencies. Computers may be exported only if there is an end use verification that they will not be diverted to prohibited agencies.

Section 305 - bans loans to the South African government or government-owned entities unless the loans are for educational, housing, and humanitarian purposes. Loans to the private sector are banned under section 310, which prohibits new investments in South Africa.

Section 306 - bans air transportation between the United States and South Africa via U.S. and South African aircraft 10 days after enactment and terminates a 1947 air travel agreement between the two countries. Emergency landings are allowed.

Section 307 - bans the export to South Africa of nuclear material, component parts, items, substances, or technical data. The exception is health and safety-related items such as pacemakers which contain small amounts of plutonium. This section provides for the ban to be lifted if South Africa becomes a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or maintains International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities.

Section 308 - prohibits U.S. banks from holding deposits of the South African government or parastatals except for diplomatic or consular purposes. This provision is effective 45 days after enactment.

Section 309 - bans the import of South African uranium ore, uranium oxide, coal, and textiles, effective 90 days after enactment.

Section 310 - prohibits new investment in South Africa, effective 45 days after enactment, but this does not apply to firms owned by black South Africans.

Section 313 - terminates the 1946 U.S. - South African treaty that prevents businesses from paying taxes on the same income to both countries.

Section 314 - prohibits U.S. Government agencies from contracting with South African parastatals for goods or services except for diplomatic and consular purposes.

Sections 315 & 316 - ban the use of U.S. Government funds to promote tourism in or to subsidize trade with South Africa.

Sections 317 & 318 - ban the export to South Africa of items on the U.S. munitions list except for items the President determines are being exported only for commercial purposes and will not be used by the South African military and police. The President is required to notify Congress of any sales allowed and Congress has 30 days to disapprove by joint resolution.

Section 319 - bans the importation into the United States of South African agricultural products, but title II, section, 212 allows the export of U.S. agricultural goods.

Section 320 - bans the importation of South African iron and steel into the United States.

Section 321 - bans the export of oil and petroleum products to South Africa.

Section 322 - prohibits U.S. agencies from cooperating, directly or indirectly, with the South Africa armed forces except activities for the purpose of collecting intelligence are allowed.

Section 323 - bans the importation of South African sugar and sugar-related products and transfers South Africa's part of the U.S. sugar import quota to the Philippines.

Future Sanctions

Title V provides for possible future sanctions. Title V. section 501 requires the President report to Congress one year after enactment and every year thereafter on the progress of the South African government in ending apartheid and establishing a nonracial democracy. If significant progress has not been made, he may recommend one or more of the following sanctions: a ban on the importation of diamonds from South Africa; a ban on the importation of strategic minerals; and a prohibition on U.S. military assistance to countries violating the international arms embargo against South Africa.

Provision for Termination of Sanctions

Section 311 provides for the termination of the immediate sanctions (under title III) or future sanction (under title V) if:

- (1) Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners are released,
- (2) the state of emergency is lifted and all detainees under the emergency are released
- (3) democratic political parties are unbanned,
- (4) the Group Areas, and Population Registration Acts are repealed, and
- (5) the South African government publicly commits itself to good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions.

The President may suspend or modify any of the sanctions if Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners are released and any three of the four remaining conditions are met. Congress may disapprove of any Presidential modification by joint resolution.

Reports To Congress

Title V, sections 502 - 509 requires the following reports to Congress on:

- Health conditions in the "homelands" of South Africa,
- Strategic minerals imported from South Africa,
- U.S. assistance in southern Africa and what steps can be taken to expand the trade, private investment and transport network of landlocked countries in that area, other industrialized democracies,
- Deposit accounts in U.S. banks held by South African nationals,
- Violations of the international arms embargo on South Africa imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 418,
- Communist activities in South Africa, and
- U.S. investigation of allegations that the ANC or other African opposition groups may have violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Multilateral Negotiations

Title IV, section 401 gives the President authority to negotiate international agreements imposing sanctions on South Africa with other countries, and he is required to report to Congress on the negotiations. The President is also given the power to modify U.S. sanctions to conform with such international agreements. Section 402 provides the President with the power to retaliate against foreign government if their policies allow their firms to take commercial advantage of prohibitions against U.S. firms selling their products in South Africa. Section 403 provides that any foreign company taking advantage of U.S. sanctions to supplant U.S. businesses in South Africa would be liable for damages in U.S. courts.

U.S. Policy on Apartheid

Title I sets forth U.S. policy on apartheid. Title III, section 312 explains U.S. policy toward violence or terrorism, including congressional views of the practice of "necklacing," a method by which some township blacks execute blacks to have cooperated with South African authorities. the victim's hands and feet are bound; then a gasoline-filled tire is placed around his neck and set afire.

Assistance to Black South Africans

Title II provides assistance to victims of apartheid.

Section 201 earmarks \$4 million annually for FY87, FY88, and FY89 for scholarships for black South Africans.

Section 202 provides \$1.5 million of the Human Rights Fund in FY86 and each year thereafter for nongovernmental organizations in South Africa promoting an end to apartheid. Of that amount \$500,000 is to be used for direct legal assistance and other activities which help political detainees, political prisoners and their families.

Section 203 provides that U.S. government agencies assist black-owned businesses in South Africa.

Section 204 requires the Export-Import Bank to encourage the use of its facilities by black South African businesses.

Section 205 requires U.S. Government agencies employing South Africans to follow the Sullivan Principles.

Section 206 provides that the U.S. Government lease or buy housing for its black South African employees and provides \$10 million for FY87 for the program.

Section 207 requires all U.S. companies with 25 or more employees in South Africa to implement the Sullivan Principles and provides that no U.S. assistance in export marketing be given to companies who do not implement the principles. Section 208 lists the seven Sullivan Principles which U.S. companies and the U.S. Government must follow and provides that the President may contract with private groups to assist him in monitoring the compliance with the principles.

Section 209 prohibits assistance to groups which have members who have violated human rights.

Section 210 authorizes the use of the African Emergency Reserve to meet food shortages in southern Africa.

Title V, section 511 earmarks \$40 million for FY87 and fiscal year thereafter for economic aid to disadvantaged South Africans. Of that amount \$3 million each year would be used for training of trade unionists. These funds cannot be used by organizations financed or controlled by the South African government.

State and Local Anti-Apartheid Laws

Title VI, section 606 gives state and local governments 90 days to bring their anti-apartheid laws into conformity with whatever the Federal Government does, or face the possible loss of Federal funds.

Source: Brenda M. Branaman, Analyst in African Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Sanctions Against South Africa: Activities of the 99th Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, February 13, 1987, pp. 14-20.

APPENDIX E

The following four tables represent sanctions against South Africa as of May 1989.

TABLE 1:

Sanctions against exports to South Africa

COUNTRIES	OIL	ARMA- MENTS	NUC- LEAR TECH.	COMP- UTERS	EXPORT CREDIT		GOVT. SALES
					GUARANT EED	NON- GUARAN TEED	
Argentina	PB						
Australia	NTB	TB	NTB	PB	TB		TB
Austria	PB	TB	PB	PB	TB		
Belgium	NTB	TB	PB	PB	PB		
Brazil	NTB	TB	TB				
Canada	VOL	TB	TB	TB	TB	PB	TB
Denmark	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Finland	NTB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
France	NTB	TB	TB	PB			
Greece	NTB	TB	TB	TB			
India	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Ireland	PB	TB	TB	PB	PB		
Israel	NTB	PB					
Italy	NTB	TB	TB	PB			
Japan		TB	TB	PB	TB		
Netherlands	PB	TB	TB	PB	TB		
New Zealand	VOL	TB	TB	PB	TB		
Norway	NTB	TB	TB	NTB	TB	TB	TB
Portugal	PB	TB	PB	PB			
Singapore	PB		TB				
Spain	PB	TB	PB	PB			
Sweden	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
UK	PB	NTB	PB	PB			
USA	NTB	TB	TB	PB	TB		
West Germany	VOL	TB	TB	PB	PB		

TB: Total Ban, NTB: Near Total Ban, PB: Partial Ban,
VOL: Voluntary.

TABLE 2: Sanctions against Imports from South Africa

COUNTRY	ARMS	Ag. Prod	COAL	IRON & STEEL	K.rands & Gold Coins	Uraniu m	Prod.o Parastatals	Govt
Aust-ralia	TB	TB	TB	NTB	TB	TB	PB	NTB
Austria	TB			NTB	NTB			
Belgium	TB			NTB	NTB			
Brazil	TB							
Canada	TB	TB	TB	TB	V/NTB	TB	PB	TB
Denmark	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Finland	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
France	TB		PB	NTB	TB			
Greece	TB			NTB	TB			
H/Kong				NTB	TB			
India	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Ireland	TB	PB	PB	NTB	TB			TB
Israel	PB			PB	PB			
Italy	TB			NTB	NTB			
Japan	TB	PB		NTB	V/NTB	PB		
Holland	TB		V/PB	NTB	NTB	TB		
New Zealand	TB	TB	TB	NTB	NTB	TB	PB	TB
Norway	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Port-ugal	TB			NTB	NTB			
Sing-apore	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Spain	TB			NTB	NTB			
Sweden	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
UK	TB		PB	NTB	NTB			
USA	TB	TB	TB	NTB	TB	NTB	NTB	PB
Germany	TB			NTB	NTB			

TB: Total Ban, NTB: Near Total Ban, PB: Partial Ban, V: Voluntary.

TABLE 3: Financial Sanctions

COUNTRY	BAN ON INVESTMENT	BAN ON GOVT. LOANS	BAN ON COMMERCIAL LOANS	TERMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT	BAN ON SAN INVESTMENT	BAN ON LEASING OF EQUIPMENT TO SUBSIDIARIES & LICENSEES	BAN ON TRANSFER OF PATENT & MANUFACTURE
Australia	V/TB	NTB	V/NTB	TB	NTB		
Austria	PB						
Belgium	V/PB		PROP				
Canada	V/TB	NTB	V/NTB	TB			
Denmark	NTB	NTB	NTB			TB	TB
Finland	NTB	NTB	NTB			TB	TB
France	PB						
Greece	PB						
Hong Kong	V/PB		V/PB				
India	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB
Ireland	PB		V/NTB				
Israel	PB	NTB					
Italy	PB	NTB	V/PB	TB			
Japan	TB	NTB	V/NTB				
Netherlands	PB	V/NTB	V/NTB				
New Zealand	V/PB	NTB	V/NTB	TB			
Norway	NTB	NTB	NTB			TB	TB
Portugal	PB						
Spain	PB			TB			
Sweden	NTB	NTB	NTB			TB	NTB
Switzerland		TB	PB				
UK	V/PB	PB					
USA	PB	NTB	NTB	TB	NTB		
West Germany	V/PB						

TB: Total Ban, NTB: Near Total Ban, PB: Partial Ban, V: Voluntary, PROP: Legislation proposed.

TABLE 4: Diplomatic and other non-trade sanctions

COUNTRIES	Restrictions on diplomatic relations	Visa Restrictions	Ban on military co-operation	Ban on tourism promotion	Ban on air links	Restrictions on sport ties	Cultural restrictions*	Ban on sea links	Code of Conduct for TNCs in SA	Trade missions
Argentina	NTB				TB					
Australia	PB	NTB	TB	VTB	TB	TB	NTB		VTB	
Austria	PB				PB	PB	PB			
Belgium	TB	NTB	TB			NTB	NTB		VTB	
Brazil					PB	TB	TB			
Canada	PB	NTB	TB	VTB	TB	TB	NTB		VTB	TB
Denmark	TB	NTB	TB	PB	TB	TB	TB			
Finland	NTB	TB	TB		TB	TB	TB	TB		
France	PB		TB			NTB	NTB		VTB	
Greece	PB		TB			PB	NTB			
Hong Kong	PB			VPB						
India	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB		
Ireland	NTB	PB	TB	VPB	TB	TB	NTB			TB
Israel				PB		PB	PB			
Italy	PB		TB			PB	PB		VTB	
Japan	NTB	NTB	TB	VPB	TB	VPB	VPB		VTB	
Holland	PB	PB	TB			PB	PB		PROP	
New Zealand	TB	TB	TB	VTB	TB	TB	NTB			TB
Norway	NTB	NTB	TB	TB	TB	TB	TB	PB		
Portugal	PB		TB			PB	PB			
Singapore	TB				TB	NTB	NTB			
S. Korea	TB				TB	TB	TB			TB
Spain	PB	PB	TB	PB	TB	NTB	NTB		VTB	
Sweden	NTB	TB	TB	VNTB	TB	NTB	NTB	VTB	TB	
UK	PB		TB	VNTB		PB	PB		VTB	PB
USA		PB	NTB	PB	TB				NTB	NTB
W. Germany	PB		TB			PB	PB			

* -includes cultural, academic and scientific links

TB: Total Ban, NTB: Near Total Ban, PB: Partial Ban, V: Voluntary, PROP: Legislation proposed.

Source: Sandra Ferguson and Peter Sluiter, "Existing Sanctions: Sanctions Directory", in Joseph Hanlon, ed., *South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat), pp. 5-9.

APPENDIX F

IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

I. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

A. Meat, fish & dairy products (edible)

1. Beef
2. Fish
3. Crustaceans

B. Fruit, vegetables & grain (edible crops, fresh or dried; oil & oilseeds)

1. Maize
2. Vegetables
3. Oranges
4. Grapefruit
5. Other citrus
6. Apples
7. Grapes
8. Raisens
9. Pears, avocados, mangoes etc.
10. Fruit & juices, tinned, frozen & preserved
11. Sugar & honey
12. Coffee & tea
13. Groundnuts & groundnut oil

C. Agricultural products related to clothing

1. Leather & cattle hides
2. Wool, wooltop, wool yarn, sheepskin
3. Furskins
4. Cotton & cotton yarn
5. Vegetable tanning extracts

D. Wood, pulp & paper

1. Pulp & pulpwood
2. Paper & paperboard
3. Swan wood, plywood etc.

E. Misc. agricultural products

1. Animal feed
2. Wine
3. Tobacco
4. Cut flowers

II. IRON, STEEL & RELATED GOODS

A. Iron ore & powder

- B. Ferro-alloys & ores for ferro-alloys
 - 1. Ferro-alloys (mainly ferrochrome)
 - 2. Manganese ore
 - 3. Chromium ore
 - 4. Molybdenum, tantalum, tungsten etc.
- C. Iron & steel
 - 1. Scrap
 - 2. Pig iron & ingots
 - 3. Bars, rods, angles, shapes
 - 4. Universald, plates, sheets
 - 5. Wire, not insulated
 - 6. Tubes & pipes
 - 7. Simple manufactures

III. PRECIOUS METALS & DIAMONDS

- A. Gold
- B. Diamonds & precious stones
- C. Platinum group metals
- D. Silver & precious metal ores, jewellery

IV. MINERAL FUELS

- A. Coal
- B. Petroleum

V. OTHER MINERALS

- A. Base Metals
 - 1. Copper
 - 2. Nickel
 - 3. Aluminium
 - 4. Lead
 - 5. Zinc
 - 6. Tin
- B. Radioactive materials & uranium
- C. Other non-metallic minerals
 - 1. Fertiliser
 - 2. Granite
 - 3. Asbestos
 - 4. Quartz, mica, feldspar

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Chemicals

1. Organic chemicals
2. Inorganic chemicals
3. Resins & plastics

B. Manufactured goods

1. Synthetic yarn
2. Cloth
3. Glass & glassware
4. Machinery
5. Electrical & electronic goods
6. Cars, trucks & parts
7. Furniture
8. Clothing & shoes

C. Misc. & Unspecified

Source: Richard Moorsom, "Technical notes on trade Statistics", in Joseph Hanlon, ed., South Africa: The Sanctions Report, Documents & Statistics, (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat), 1990, pp. 83 -85.

APPENDIX G

IMPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA

I. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

A. Agricultural products

1. Meat & fish
2. Cereals
3. Fruit & vegetables
4. Vegetables oils & animal fats
5. Coffee, tea, other non-alcoholic beverages
6. Alcoholic beverages
7. Tobacco & cigarettes
8. Paper & paperboard

II. MINERALS

A. Coal, petroleum & gas

B. Iron & Steel

1. Bars, rods, shapes, plates, sheets
2. Tubes & pipes

C. Other minerals

1. Fertilizer
2. Sulphur
3. Clay construction materials
4. Non-ferrous metals
5. Diamonds
6. Non-monetary gold

D. Chemicals

1. Organic chemicals
2. Inorganic chemicals
3. Medicinal & pharmaceutical products
4. Soap, cosmetics, perfumes
5. Resins & plastics
6. Synthetic rubber

III. MANUFACTURED GOODS

A. Clothing, textiles & related goods

1. Synthetic fibers & yarn
2. Fabrics
3. Clothing & Shoes

- B. Machinery & tools
 - 1. Hand & interchangeable tools
 - 2. Steam engines & boilers
 - 3. Electric motors & generators
 - 4. Textile & leather machinery
 - 5. Pulp & paper machinery
 - 6. Printing machinery
 - 7. Machine tools
 - 8. Metal-working machinery
 - 9. Heating & cooling equipment
 - 10. Pumps & compressors
 - 11. Mechanical handling equipment

- C. Vehicles & transport equipment
 - 1. Parts & accessories
 - 2. Internal combustion engines
 - 3. Tractors & moving farm machinery
 - 4. Construction vehicles & mining machinery
 - 5. Passenger cars
 - 6. Goods vehicles
 - 7. Aircraft

- D. Electrical & electronic goods
 - 1. Computers
 - 2. Computer parts
 - 3. Consumer electronics (TVs, radios, home appliances)
 - 4. Telephone equipment
 - 5. Electronic parts & components
 - 6. Electricity transmission equipment
 - 7. Medical electronics
 - 8. Electrical & electronic measuring equipment

- E. Other manufactured goods
 - 1. Glass & glassware
 - 2. Scientific & control instruments
 - 3. Photographic & cinematographic equipment
 - 4. Optical goods & watches
 - 5. Books & printed matter

- IV. UNSPECIFIED
 - A. Misc. & Unspecified

Source: Richard Moorsom, "Technical notes on trade Statistics" in Joseph Hanlon, ed., South Africa: The Sanctions Report, Documents and Statistics, (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat), 1990, pp. 85 - 87.

APPENDIX H

SOUTH AFRICA'S MAIN TRADING PARTNERS, 1985 - 88. (US\$M)

	1985	1986	1987	1988
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO:				
United States	1,374	1,965	1,272	1,445
Japan	1,279	1,826	2,214	1,777
United Kingdom	969	1,056	976	1,304
France	275	343	530	638
Germany	567	1,059	1,135	1,570
SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS FROM:				
United States	1,429	1,229	1,281	1,691
Japan	1,028	1,270	1,882	2,047
United Kingdom	1,256	1,279	1,556	1,911
France	428	412	467	575
Germany	1,729	1,951	2,548	3,332

Source: Financial Times, February 8, 1990 (based on IMF data), in Merle Lipton, "The Challenge of Sanctions", Discussion Paper No.1, Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance, London School of Economics, Spring 1991, p. 15.

APPENDIX I

The following is a chronological list of the National Party Members of Parliament who participated in the research process for this dissertation.

- Mr. G. Babb, 14 May 1990, Indirectly elected (Sec. 41(1)(c) of the Constitution).
Mr. I.J. Pretorius, 14 May 1990, Tygervallei.
Mr. C. Ackerman, 14 May 1990, Bellville.
Mr. Willem (Billy) Nel, 14 May 1990, East London City.
Mr. R.J. Radue, 14 May 1990, King William's Town.
Mr. MvS. Hamman, 14 May 1990, Ceres.
Dr. H.M.J. Van Rensburg, 15 May 1990, Mossel Bay.
Dr. F. Jacobsz, 15 May 1990, Helderberg.
Mr. A.J. De Jager, 17 May 1990, Oudtshoorn.
Mr. P.L. Mare', 17 May 1990, Nelspruit.
Mr. S.J. Schoeman, 21 May 1990, Sunnyside.
Mr. S.J. De Beer, 21 May 1990, Geduld.
Dr. P.J. Steenkamp, 29 May 1990, Umhlatuzana.
Mr. L. Le Grange, 29 May 1990, Potchefstroom.
Dr. A.J.G. Oosthuizen, 30 May 1990, Alberton.
Mr. D. Christophers, 4 June 1990, Germiston.
Mr. P.T. Steyn, 5 June 1990, Winburg.
Dr. B.L. Geldenhuys, 5 June 1990, Brentwood.
Mr. C.J.W. Badenhorst, 5 June 1990, East London North.
Dr. T.J. King, 5 June 1990, Kempton Park.
Mr. A.L. Jordaan, 8 June 1990, False Bay.
Mr. I. Louw, 8 June 1990, Newton Park.
Mr. A.G. Thompson, 11 June 1990, South Coast.
Comdt. A. Blaas, 13 June 1990, Newcastle.
Mr. G.C. Oosthuizen, 13 June 1990, Pretoria Central.
Mr. J.A. Marais, 13 June 1990, Port Natal.
Mr. A.T. (Tobie) Meyer, 13 June 1990, Cradock.
Mr. J.A. Jooste, 14 June 1990, DeAar.
Mr. P.G. Marais, 14 June 1990, Stellenbosch.
Mr. N.J.JvR. Koornhof, 14 June 1990, Swellendam.
Mr. W.D. Meyer, 15 June 1990, Humansdorp.
Mr. C.L. Fisser, 15 June 1990, Rissik.
Dr. F.J. Van Heerden, 19 June 1990, Durban Point.
Mr. J.C. Matthee, 19 June 1990, Durban Point.
Mrs. S.M. Camerer, 19 June 1990, Rosettenville.

APPENDIX J

Those who participated in structured research interviews from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 14 & 15 November 1990, in Pretoria.

Dr. Marc Burger
Chief Director, Financial Planning

Mr. Danie Fourie
Deputy Director

Mr. Andre Jaquet
Director, Namibia/Angola

Adv. Pieterse
Legal Advisor

Mr. L. Labuschagne
Director, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi