

# **COLLABORATION AT THE CROSSROADS**

**The Enabling of Large-Scale Cross-Sector Collaborative  
Developments**

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## **COLLABORATION AT THE CROSSROADS : THE ENABLING OF LARGE-SCALE CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENTS**

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MAY 2014

### **ABSTRACT**

This thesis identifies a key to achieving success in large-scale cross-sector collaborations. Surveys of such collaborations, involving multiple and opposing stakeholders in achieving shared objectives, indicate that they invariably fail. I examine a successful case, and demonstrate that the gap between failure and success is created by underestimating both incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity; and the gap is filled by a few diverse, dedicated activists – Enablers – and the mandates which help to empower them.

The literature review engages with four fields of study. ‘Community participation’ theory promotes the exercise of popular agency in development, arguing for less state control and the right of civil society groups to get involved in what affects them. ‘Collaborative governance’ argues for government to actively involve other stakeholders in matters of common interest. The ‘participative sphere’ endeavours to demystify behaviour and power within different degrees of collaboration. The ultimate challenge is ‘cross-sector collaboration’, in which shared power between multiple parties in separate sectors is attempted, but seldom yields success. A false assumption that collaborations curb turbulence and can be managed by their stakeholders is, however, apparent.

In this thesis I examine an ambitious housing project, the ‘iSLP’, during South Africa’s tortuous transition. It began as an attempt to develop land from which sixty thousand people had been violently displaced to thirty locations. Stakeholders comprised those communities, warlords, apartheid government agencies, recently unbanned political parties and civic movements, municipalities and local industrialists. From conception the collaboration was undermined by private developers luring a succession of stakeholders into potentially profitable alliances. However the collaboration survived four years of transitional governmental paralysis and was rewarded with an enhanced mandate and guaranteed finance – only to come under attack again from different quarters. Ultimately the iSLP met its objective of housing over 32 000 families in fully-equipped suburbs.

Through an intensive analysis of project archival materials, particularly of actual participation in collaborative processes, the critical role of a few people emerged. Extensive interviews with them and reflection on my own participation in the project confirmed their unique and un-theorised role, contributing critically to improving planning and coordination of cross-sector collaborations.

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## ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
BLA	Black Local Authority
CCT	City of Cape Town
City	City of Cape Town - municipality
CTC	Crossroads Town Council
CPA	Cape Provincial Administration
ECD	Early Childhood Development
HDA	Hostel Dwellers Association, also called 'Umzamo'
Ikapa	Ikapa Town Council
iSLP	Integrated Serviced Land Project (see also SLP)
Khay TC	Khayelitsha Town Council (officially Lingeletu West Town Council)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NP	National Party
PIA	Philippi Industrialists Association
PAC	Pan African Congress
PPC	Peninsular Peoples' Compact
Province	Provincial government (CPA until 1994)
PSC	Private sector consortium
Rands	South African currency
RDC	Residents' Development Committee
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSC	Regional Services Council
SANCO	South African National Civics Organisation
SLP	Preliminary name for iSLP
UDF	United Democratic Front
UF	Urban Foundation
WCCA	Western Cape Civics Association
WCCDC	Western Cape Community Development Company
WCUSA	Western Cape United Squatters Association
WECCO	Western Cape Community Organisation

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Many have learned that when operating in a constantly changing environment credit is seldom given to those who have quietly and carefully held and steered the wheel. Furthermore, in the hurly-burly of a large-scale cross-sector collaborative development, it is prudent to stay under the radar. So there we shall stay. But there would not have been a project to study without the enthusiastic contribution of people such as:

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
## 1

## Introduction: Arguing for the viability of cross-sector collaboration

### How I got here

This thesis is set against the background of a very dismal history of influx control, urban segregation and discrimination in the provision of housing opportunities in South Africa, and in Cape Town in particular. As an introduction to this chapter the reader is referred to a brief history of housing provision for black people that I have compiled (see **Annexure F**). Furthermore, to facilitate a grasp the of location of all that follows, here is a map of the project as it eventually appeared in 2000. A larger representation be found in **Annexure A**.

**Map 1. The iSLP indicating the location of projects. March 2000**



In the spirit of Arthur Ransome's "We Didn't Mean to Go to Sea", this thesis was not part of the plan for how I would bring to a close my lengthy involvement in 'housing for the poor' in South Africa. But an opportunity had arisen for me to return to university for an inter-disciplinary masters degree, and one thing led to another. I contemplated reading what had been written about experiences similar to mine to see what interesting things I would learn. It took quite a long time to discover the field of theory in which my experience lay – for thirty years I had been unaware that I had actually been practicing 'cross-sector collaboration'. That literature rang all sorts of familiar bells and I found it quite comforting to find a theoretical home – even if, as it warned, it was regarded as the most unpopular, difficult and unsuccessful method of synergistic development.

However I had been involved in a very large and conflict-ridden project that had actually been successful, and I was challenged to find out where the disjuncture lay between the insoluble terrors expressed in what I was reading and the achievements that I had witnessed. That sent me back into a world which I thought had been left behind for good: my project files, a library of 250 lever-arch files which I had sorted into thirty large packing cases and delivered to the government archives. Incorporated in the arrangement was a provision that I could access them at any time, in case an old issue should ever be queried. I had never anticipated borrowing nearly half of them back for a period of years so that I could discover what it was that the scholars had missed, and support it with hard evidence.

The project was occasionally re-named but is remembered as the 'iSLP' - the Integrated Serviced Land Project. It was an attempt to develop land on which waves of violence had displaced sixty thousand people to thirty locations. Other stakeholders were the resident warlords, agencies of the apartheid government, recently legitimised political parties and civic movements, municipalities and local industrialists. From conception the collaboration was undermined by private developers luring a succession of stakeholders into potentially profitable alliances. However the collaboration held through the four years of transitional governmental paralysis and was rewarded by the approval of a much-expanded project and all the necessary funds – only to come under attack from a series of new forces. Ultimately the iSLP met its objective of housing over 32 000 families in fully-equipped suburbs.

This thesis studies the effectiveness of large scale cross-sector collaborative development project in the social sphere from an institutional perspective using invited spaces: opportunities and venues provided by a sponsor. My main empirical resource is a unique and extensive documentary archive of the entire fifteen-year project, the compilation of which had been substantially my responsibility. The description of the project is drawn exclusively from this archive and from interviews of persons whom I selected, the implications of which for the thesis methodology are presented in Chapter 3. My research question was “What factors enabled this project to succeed despite substantial evidence that such projects offer very little chance of success?” The lacuna that I explored in the literature was exposed by the case study and was created by two false assumptions in the literature: that the environmental turbulence that typically accompanies the need for such a project will diminish on the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration, and that the parties represented in the collaboration will have the capacity to manage and sustain the collaboration in addition to their own institutions and careers.

As a consequence this thesis excludes from its purview a detailed examination of the forces that attempted to create ‘invented spaces’ as alternatives to the invited space created as the cross-sector collaboration for this project. Writing about the collaboration from an institutional perspective I have written of such attempts as challenges and threats and provided detailed accounts of how they were manifested from the perspective of the invited spaces, but I have not attempted to gain a deep understanding of their organisations and motivations. That was difficult enough to assay at the time, twenty years ago, let alone now, long after those parties disbanded. Such perspectives would be extremely interesting, and worthy of further research, but they are peripheral to this study.

This thesis is also by its nature far more of an in-depth case study than a comparative study. The literature that particularly frames the research question reflects very broad surveys of cross-sector collaborations in which the success of each project had been gauged not by some independent standard but by the assessment of the promoters of each project as to whether the collaboration had met its objectives. Similarly, therefore, the premise on which this thesis was launched was that the objectives of the collaboration had been fulfilled by the project process and affirmed by the project’s sponsors and is demonstrated by documentary evidence in the thesis, both as goals and results. I have also explained, where appropriate, the meaning of some of the critical terms.

The most significant aspect of this research, however, has been the revelation of an entire cadre of under-theorised people – the Enablers, people who behind the scenes make cross-sector collaboration work in the project studied here. It was almost like discovering a long-lost tribe, except that they are so few, and so different from each other. They did not have a word to describe themselves, so I have called them ‘Enablers’. But I also had to discover what had kept them hidden – and by going back and forth between the literature and the files I am persuaded that researchers must have underestimated the incessant strife, contestation and violence – ‘turmoil’, in a nutshell – that accompanies every phase of a cross-sector collaboration; and that they also overestimated the ability of the stakeholders to manage the process themselves. Consequently scholars were not looking for Enablers because they did not realise that they were necessary. Furthermore, most stakeholders who might be interviewed would assume through their ignorance of the bigger picture that the collaborating institutions were more involved and effective than this thesis demonstrates.

The Enablers in the iSLP came from an assortment of backgrounds and occupied a variety of voluntary or institutional positions but their Enabling functions, either formal or informal, added another layer of diversity to their lives. Through the functions that they performed – such as patron, chair, host, facilitator, coordinator, bridge-builder, innovator, planner, project manager or steadfast encourager - they quietly pulled, pushed, corralled and guided the stakeholders and hundreds of other role-players into adopting and applying principles, formulating and approving projects and then collaboratively planning and delivering. They served for different durations and were never in the public spotlight. The iSLP was undertaken for the benefit of tens of thousands of households who had suffered intolerably and a prime objective of the participative process was that they would proudly regard the project as their own achievement.

I should also explain that this story is not about me, although I was there and witnessed much of it. This thesis is to promote the value of large scale cross-sector collaboration as a vehicle for development in extremely difficult circumstances and to explain how it can be quietly reinforced, defended and sustained for as long as necessary by just a few dedicated people. I am privileged to have the opportunity to tell the story of a remarkable project during a unique period in South Africa’s history, in unprecedented detail. If by drawing attention to the critical roles that Enablers play behind the scenes in large complex projects this thesis might improve the possibilities of success for future

generations of cross-sector collaborators it would be all the more worthwhile.

### **The Literature**

This thesis is located within the field of ‘cross-sector collaboration’, defined as “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities and capabilities by organisations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organisations in one sector separately” (Bryson *et al.* 2006. p 44). They proceed to explain that such a process is only embarked upon when all else has failed - and “the normal expectation should be that success will be very difficult to achieve” (*ibid.* p. 44).

However, in this thesis we shall venture into even more daunting territory: large-scale cross-sector collaborative development in South Africa, in which a chronic and possibly violent social crisis has to be addressed through the delivery of a range of goods and services in a manner that is acceptable to a large and diverse number of participating stakeholders, many of whom are mutually antagonistic, for an extended period. Furthermore, the nature of such a crisis is such that its successful resolution is absolutely imperative for society.

The focus of the thesis is a paradox that is apparent within the literature of cross-sector collaboration: it is an ultimately unavoidable process in which success is imperative yet extremely difficult to achieve. Is there any basis upon which the prospects for a successful cross-sector collaboration could be significantly improved?

The key is to discover who or what makes cross-sector collaborations actually work. The literature is not clear on this point. There is mention of facilitators of various sorts being required from time to time, leaving an implied assumption that the stakeholders are capable and available to manage the collaboration themselves. The literature also comments about the environmental turbulence that must be managed as a ‘starting condition’ and in doing so implies that the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration will substantially settle the turbulence, enabling a constructive process to proceed. In reality, as this thesis will demonstrate, ‘turbulence’ in the form of constant change in the political and social environment and assaults upon the collaborative process are likely to be incessant – and one of the consequences will be the incapacity and even disinclination of

stakeholders, as organisations and individuals, to devote the time and talent required to manage the collaboration themselves. This thesis argues that the key to success for a cross-sector collaboration is a few diversely positioned people of differing backgrounds and perspectives who share a common belief in and devotion to the collaboration, which they express in an assortment of ways. Their reasons for doing what they do are primarily individual and personal, and their ability to achieve success rests on their acquisition of a few influential mandates. I argue here that we can conceptualise these individuals as Enablers, and understand their critical roles as binders, levers and defenders, the key to holding together and making effective collaboration in this type of complex, conflict-plagued context.

In the field of collaborative endeavour John Gaventa has proposed some ‘key challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> century’, four of which provide useful signposts for this analysis. The first is “the construction of new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions – especially those of government – which affect their lives”. (Gaventa. 2004. p 25-34). These relate to the intersection of civil society and state-based approaches, how such spaces work and the way in which power is manifested within and through them – which is the subject matter of this thesis. His second challenge is to engage in approaches by both civil society and institutions of the state to focus on their intersection. The thesis draws on useful analytical assessments by drilling into the literature from those two standpoints (‘community participation’ and ‘collaborative governance’), exploring their junction in the ‘participative sphere’ and then moving into the daunting places of cross-sector collaboration.

There it engages with Gaventa’s further challenges to explore how collaborative spaces actually work, for whom and with what social justice outcomes – and to analyse the powers involved in the creation of spaces, the places and levels of engagement, and the degree of visibility of power within them. These issues are the essence of this thesis, and raise questions about what exactly is happening in a large-scale cross-sector collaborative development, how visible is it all, and who is interested in what. The simple answer is that such a complex process, within such a volatile context, is likely to be legible only in part from almost any perspective. For example, as will be described in the iSLP case study, it was years before the affected communities realised that they were being falsely represented, and the surrounding residents of greater Cape Town never registered that the

most radical housing project ever attempted in the country was taking place under their noses. Even the Enablers, when interviewed for this thesis, occasionally said, “I didn’t know that was happening.”

My journey towards understanding collaborative development began at the conventional starting point of ‘community participation’ – the exercise of popular agency in relation to development (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). But on whose initiative and for whose purposes is development undertaken? Turner and Fichter (1972) were among the first to extol the benefits of individual control over the housing process. The battle for community control of development, for the expression of individual and local initiative and for a reduction in government interference was joined by many, from Ward (in Turner, 1976) to Hamdi (2004) and beyond. However it is relatively easy for the state to respond symbolically to these pressures, inviting participation but actually applying co-option, as reflected in criticisms by such as MirafTAB (2004) and books of that era that decried the ‘tyranny of participation’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

But there is also a need to understand the chasm of scale between the needs of the individual or neighbourhood and those perceived by government to be its responsibility. Cornwall (2004), Cleaver (2004), Bénit-Gbaffou (2008), and Bebbington (2004) reflect on the intricacies and nuances of negotiating within that space, pointing out pitfalls, teasing the helpful from the unhelpful, and recognising that systems are not simply good or bad but usually create some opportunities for relationship building, formally or otherwise. Within the South African context in particular, Robbins (2008) helpfully demonstrates that it is not only the state which can seem duplicitous in its negotiations – citizens constantly exercise rights and obligations in multiple directions. These insights into the hard realities of participative development helped to motivate a deeper dig into the nature of participation in the empirical research from which this thesis is constructed.

The target is then approached from the other side, by giving consideration to theories of ‘collaborative governance’, which centre upon government initiatives to involve other parties and, by implication, other sectors in the planning and implementation of initiatives in which there is a shared interest. Arguably the most significant expression of this approach at scale has been the ‘Local Agenda 21’ participative programme for sustainable development inaugurated by the United Nations Earth summit in 1992 and

implemented from 1996. The collaborative processes that its promoters recommended (ICLEI, 1996) are remarkable for the naivety with which they ignored the likelihood of possible complications and contestation. Experience proved otherwise and ten years later Ansell and Gash (2008) researched 137 cases of collaborative governance and reported on being overwhelmed by their complexity. They constructed a model for a collaborative governance process and described ten conditions for success, which contribute to the analysis within this thesis.

Meanwhile considerable discourse was being generated within the ‘new South Africa’ regarding the implementation of a ‘developmental state’ and, in particular, the enabling of ‘developmental local government’ which is required by the country’s Constitution, “to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government” (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec 152). There was an obvious opportunity for promoting a new model and practice of governance and a raft of literature ensued, including volumes by Parnell et al (2002), van Donk et al 2006 and Pieterse (2008). The revision of national housing policy (Department of Housing, 2004) was widely trumpeted, but there was also much criticism of the neglect of informal settlements, particularly by Abbott (2002) and Huchzermeyer (2004, 2006 and 2011). On the ground change in many places was slow and the challenges still faced by Capetonians ten years after democracy are documented by Besteman (2008) and Oldfield (2000 and 2005), the cynicism of its ‘World City’ institutions are captured by McDonald (2008) and the prospects for improvement presented by Swilling (2010). Although most of these were published too late to have any direct influence on the iSLP they seldom attempt to document or grapple creatively and experientially with the practical realities of negotiating and implementing change collaboratively, across sectors and at scale. This is the lacuna that this thesis will address.

The focus of the literature review then moves from community- or state-based approaches into the ‘the participative sphere’ which accommodates their interface. This is more useful territory and is where Gaventa directs his primary challenge. These are spaces of contestation and collaboration, “into which heterogeneous participants bring diverse interpretations of participation and democracy and divergent agendas” (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). There is great comfort in finding some literature that resonates with one’s practical experience! Cornwall’s earlier comment that “Spaces created with one purpose in

mind may be used by those who engage in them for something quite different” (Cornwall, 2004) foreshadows much of the narrative recorded here from Chapters 5 in which some of the stakeholders appropriate the space created by and for the iSLP to promote an alternative or opposing agenda.

One of the vibrant schools within the participative sphere is that of participatory research and planning, which has an abundance of literature, offering techniques with names such as Action Planning, Participatory Rapid Appraisal, Planning for Real and ‘toolkits’ of methods to enable researchers and planners to address all sorts of circumstances, particularly at the grassroots. Inspiring case studies abound, but their relevance to the iSLP was at the micro level in the implementation phase, when each individual housing project had to be separately planned in a participative manner – the detail of which is not recorded in this thesis. Nevertheless, homage must be paid here to the influence in my life of pioneers like Turner and Fichter (1972), Schumacher (1973), Keyes (1983), Payne (1984), Anzorena (1985), Hamdi (1991) and Gibson (1994) - and of the organisations and newsletters that spread the word, such as the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, The Urban Edge, Habitat International Coalition, Neighbourhood Initiatives Foundation and Slum Dwellers International, all of which provided perspective to the minds of those who eventually enabled the iSLP. But, as Flyvbjerg (2004) emphasises, planning must engage with all of the complexities of the context for it to be relevant and implementable, and for that reason this thesis is primarily placed at the macro organisational level, which had to be settled before individual projects could proceed.

My consideration of the participative sphere concludes with a tabulation of nine degrees of participation, from manipulative state control to (possibly over-ambitious) community or civil society control, informed by analyses by Anzorena and Poussard (1985), Arnstein (1969) and Hamdi and Majale (2004), as an aid to understanding the powers at play within any collaborative space. It serves to call into question the precise nature of any arrangement between parties to give clarity to roles and expectations. In the middle of this spectrum of approaches, is a relatively thinly populated platform where power is equalised across the inclusive range of stakeholders. This is the little bridge that leads from the rationalities of the participative sphere, in which the controlling party is usually visible, into the scary world of cross-sector collaboration, in which control is

somehow shared between parties that have probably never worked together.

Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) have extensively researched the literature on cross-sector collaboration and their analysis and conclusions are particularly pertinent to this thesis. They offer plenty of advice but are not very encouraging, emphasising firstly that stakeholders only choose this mode when attempts to apply the alternatives have failed – it is the antithesis of a preferred option; and secondly that having embarked upon a cross-sector collaboration the reasonable expectation should be that success will be extremely difficult to achieve. Yet in their analysis they fail to grapple with the contradiction between success as the imperative that ultimately provokes cross-sector collaboration and the unlikelihood of achieving success as a consequence. Their assessment is that parties ‘fail’ into cross-sector collaboration when all other options have been eliminated and that ultimate failure is to be expected. There is a significant conceptual gap, which they acknowledge with concern. By comparing their commentary with the experience of success in the iSLP this thesis will identify at least part of that gap and contribute to making cross-sector collaboration a more viable last resort.

In this thesis I engage this area of the literature, arguing for the conceptualisation of Enablers, as the key to what made the possible the success of a particularly large and complex project. I document and analyse this argument through detailed research into fluctuating dynamics within and around the project and the extent and consistency with which the expansive invitations to participate in decision-making forums were actually taken up. Perhaps it takes a practitioner to know where to look and to understand the complex layers of events and processes, as well as their implications. In doing so this thesis demonstrates that turbulence and disruption are likely to be far more persistent than as they have been theorised – conceivably never-ending – and that the capacity (ability, availability and will) of stakeholders to themselves manage and direct a cross-sector collaboration has been almost silently, but completely incorrectly, assumed. Had researchers identified these two contextual realities they would have naturally asked about whom it was that the stakeholders depended upon for results, and they would probably have had to audit the minutes and attendance registers from all the meetings to find the answer. The ‘gap’ comprises an assortment of diverse people from contrasting backgrounds and occupying very different positions who quietly, unpretentiously and often informally ensure that the collaboration is sustained and succeeds. Through this thesis analysis I conceptualise these

people as Enablers.

### **The empirical research**

The empirical research upon which this thesis is constructed is located within South Africa's low cost housing sector and involves an examination of the intimate workings of the largest integrated urban development project to span the country's complex transition from apartheid to democracy. This project, originally named the Serviced Land Project ('iSLP'), not only survived unceasing conflict and change but succeeded in delivering upon its wide-ranging objectives, all in cross-sector collaboration mode. Over a period of fifteen years it transformed a violence-ridden array of informal settlements into fully-serviced suburbs with subsidised dwellings for over 32 000 households, supported by a full range of schools, clinics, libraries, recreation areas and capacity-building programmes.

The project was conceived as the last resort to address an incessant and violent crisis in and around a place called Crossroads, within Cape Town. For years the informal settlement of Crossroads had oscillated between being an exclusive place of privilege and a bloody, burning battleground, both with the complicity of the state (Cole, 1987). The consequences amounted to sixty thousand displaced people in thirty temporary settlements, warlords in supreme control of Crossroads and a confused and ill-equipped state apparatus. Then came the unbanning of the liberation movements and a huge escalation of hopes and fears, followed by a long interregnum of negotiation in which it was impossible to obtain approval for the kind of multi-year programme that would be required.

In 1990, with Crossroads still in flames and no idea of how long the national resolution would take, collaboration was the only possibility for the considerable number of stakeholders: government at provincial, local, city and regional levels; recently unbanned political parties; autocratic squatter groups, old and emerging democratic civic groups; and business interests. For each of them the resolution of the Crossroads crisis was politically or socially imperative. However its ambitious development programme also fuelled the profiteering ambitions of private sector developers, who engaged in a lengthy and tortuous battle for control through a succession of alliances. Eventually a new government decided to support the project and magnify its scope, endowing it with 'presidential project' status and making available sufficient finance. But no sooner had implementation begun than new

waves of opponents appeared, this time from within government. Ultimately, however, with grassroots communities collaborating with government and consultants in individual project committees, the project was completed and all the objectives were met.

The entry point for the empirical research was undoubtedly my intimate knowledge of the project's proceedings over fifteen years and of the contents of the iSLP Project Coordinator's records. In 1992, shortly after the collaboration had been convened I began assisting the facilitator, mainly by drafting proposals and documenting the process, but when implementation began I supervised the participative housing process and ultimately coordinated the entire project. However, it was only in revisiting the project records, and in particular by investigating exactly how the collaboration's inclusiveness was actually manifested in multiple forums, that it became evident that although many people participated very few actively held it together. 'Enablers' is an apt word for them, and because they were so different in almost every respect seven Enablers were interviewed to establish not so much what they did, which was already documented, but why they went out of their way to make the impossible possible.

As a result the case study that has been compiled here is far more about people, their personalities and how they responded to the threats and opportunities of their time and place, than it is about the technical and financial aspects of a huge and complex project. The era within which they enabled the iSLP was an ever-twisting rollercoaster of political and economic contestation in a country whose mechanics and structures were being reviewed and replaced – accompanied by violent demonstrations. The place on which the Enablers focused – Crossroads - was an iconic symbol of oppression, which still exploded into violence periodically. The turmoil persisted through the project process – something unrecorded by researchers. Also generally unrealised was that the people who would be expected to lead the collaboration – the managers, directors and chairpersons of stakeholder organisations – were preoccupied with keeping their own ships afloat and securing their own careers: 'Struggle' veterans were angling for jobs and apartheid beneficiaries were anxious to preserve theirs. Without Enablers there was actually no chance of success. They also needed to be vested with particular authority from time to time through mandates to inaugurate or terminate processes; approvals of principles, plans and budgets; and the availability of all the necessary land and money to complete the project.

The argument of this thesis is that a cross-sector collaboration should expect to suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, and that the stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration themselves. Success therefore depends on the existence and activities of Enablers – people who are not only the designated patrons or champions or just ad hoc facilitators, conflict-resolvers or blockade-breakers. They are likely to have a wide assortment of backgrounds, positions and motivations but they share a dedication to the achievement of the collaboration’s goals and ensure that the mandates and resources to make that possible are specified, acquired and applied. The task of an Enabler transcends that of a ‘job’ or even a role to fulfil – they are unselfishly providing support to a critical social cause, knowing that if the collaboration fails there will not be another chance. Furthermore, they do this during a period of social and political upheaval when most people are either opportunity hunting or staying out of harm’s way. Their contribution is also without any public recognition. My argument is that they are the special ingredient without whom a large-scale cross-sector collaboration is doomed to failure.

### **Thesis Outline**

In this thesis I first locate cross-sector collaboration as a field of theory (Chapter 2) and then, after explaining my methodology (Chapter 3), introduce the iSLP as a cross-sector collaboration (Chapters 4 – 11). I then contrast the theorised conditions for success with the evidence of success provided by the iSLP (Chapter 12) and ultimately present an argument which addresses the gap between the two (Chapter 13).

In Chapter 2 I explore the literary terrain of community involvement in development, searching for something that reflects my experience at a large scale in a constantly changing and often hostile environment to see what I can learn. I begin on emotionally comfortable ground, in the principled pages of ‘community participation’ – but it is not always very practical. I then discover ‘collaborative governance’, which looks a lot like local housing policy, but which is not really very participative. So I wander into the ‘participative sphere’ which seems to be populated by much more pragmatic people, who explain in various ways that things are seldom what they seem. But I am looking for serious and inclusive and large scale development praxis within a cauldron of change and

am pointed to the last platform on the station, which is labelled ‘cross-sector collaboration’. There I find familiarity and reassurance that my experience in the field was not unique, however I learn that very few trains that leave this platform ever arrive at the projected destination... Yet the train that I travelled on some years ago did arrive – a little overdue, but at the right place, and with all its carriages attached and ticket-holders on board.

In Chapter 3 I explain what steps I took to revisit my experience, unearth the records of that long, convoluted development project, confirm that it actually was a cross-sector collaboration and then begin digging for evidence of what actually happened that contributed to its success. Changing the metaphor, rather like looking for the ‘black box’ after an aircraft has disappeared from the radar screens. It was a long process – I wrote and re-wrote the history, wondering how much I needed to include. Then one day I decided to plot the attendance record of each person attending a series of 36 policy committee meetings. The result was illuminating. I analysed other meetings and found the same kind of result – and the proceedings of these committees became the substance of the record that I compiled.

Chapter 4 paints the background to the Crossroads crisis, which had roots that far pre-dated apartheid policy. It explains how this tiny triangle of land became a unique area of privilege, then exploitation, then warfare and utter chaos. It also explains about all the people who were hurt and dispossessed by what transpired, about a confused and desperate government that ultimately abdicated responsibility to a completely unprepared provincial department. This chapter is also important because it situates each of the Enablers in its history and introduces them into the story as real people with real reasons for making a real difference for good. In the narrative they have each been given a symbolic name to make them more easily recognisable through the case study and to not distract from a story that is already complicated. Similarly, some of the characters who worked hard to *disable* the iSLP have been similarly re-named, and although their backgrounds remain largely mysterious the roles that they played in the iSLP are instructive. In the very few places in which the Author appears within the following chapters it is as *the Scribe*. The chapter ends at a pivotal point where people in power decide to share their biggest problems with their opponents.

Chapter 5 introduces the radical collaborative proposal, crafted and approved by

Enablers, based upon inclusivity, equality, consensus-building and transparency. It also reveals that almost immediately a counter-proposal was conceived by members of the apartheid era old guard that were located within government, the private sector, ex-politicians a group of co-opted autocratic informal settlement leaders. These were the disablers, who for the next four years tried through ever-changing alliances and structures to wrest control of the project for their own ends. But the collaboration is inaugurated and a policy committee is established, in duplicate because some parties refuse to sit with others. The Enablers manage them in parallel, with the aid of a devoted volunteer, and a technical committee begins to research the demand for housing and the availability of resources.

Chapter 6 describes how for the next two years the project ingredients - objectives, operating principles, sub-projects and land – are gradually and deliberately assembled. Whilst this is underway in collaborative mode, Crossroads demands to be dealt with separately, the association of informal settlement leaders walks out and stays away for a year – as does the African National Congress (ANC), which also creates a national civic association which attempts to subsume all the local groupings. Enabling all of this under the umbrella of a weak transitional government is a challenge indeed.

In Chapter 7 the opposition makes its first move, disguised as a non-profit company created to run the entire project, and calls for the immediate replacement of the iSLP's facilitator, and not for the last time. The policy committee learns that the company is actually a cartel of consultants and contractors, who will use their informal settlement associates as facilitators, and responds by drafting rules for private sector involvement in the project. Violence is rampant across the country and is never absent from the iSLP project area, which also witnesses some land invasions. The iSLP is the only cross-sector collaboration in the development field, and its Enablers start establishing local community development committees, to the fury of stakeholder groups that are not as representative of communities as they purport. A new alliance springs up, backed by the same interests, and its demand for the right to develop the first large project is rebuffed. The Enablers doggedly maintain progress, now holding public workshops which unanimously approved to the iSLP Principles. The first national democratic election was held in April 1994, but instead of bringing immediate relief to the iSLP it prompted a furious final takeover bid by the cartel in conjunction with all the 'community organisations' in the policy committee who by now were widely discredited. The process was brought to a halt.

In Chapter 8 the new national government steps in and not only endorses the iSLP and all its principles as good practice but greatly multiplies its size and, after the Enablers compile an enlarged business plan, makes it the flagship of its national Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and guarantees the provision of all the required funds. Collaboration is now to be primarily effected at the level of individual projects, with communities represented by development committees. It was the end of a four year policy-making phase, filled with meetings at which the Enablers were by far the most consistent attendees. Implementation commences in earnest in Chapter 9, but is immediately interrupted by the new RDP department which insists that the development committees be replaced by its own invention – RDP Forums. In the event it is the same committed community members who attend meetings... and the national RDP ministry was disbanded after two years. The iSLP continues, but local government is undergoing complete restructuring which renders it unable to fulfil its role of upgrading informal settlements in the iSLP, whilst provincial government is very keen to divest itself of housing functions, including the iSLP, but may not do so. Instead the iSLP is increasingly driven by consultants and community leaders, facilitated by Enablers in various ways.

Chapter 10 describes the nature of the 250 different projects or programmes that the iSLP comprised and the way in which the collaboration was sustained until the project's completion in 2005. In Chapter 11 the circumstances within which the entire project was conducted is summarised in terms of interminable complexity and the incapacity of the stakeholders to manage such a process. It is argued that these two factors are not evidenced by the collaboration literature, and that together they frame the gap in the literature which is filled by this thesis.

The story contained within Chapters 5 – 11 demonstrates that the kinds of social crises that necessitate a cross-sector collaboration are associated with vectors of turmoil that both transcend and infiltrate the project – probably for its whole lifetime. This presents a daunting project for any kind of process management: the client is indistinct, constantly morphing and unstable; the environment is unpredictable and insecure; and the required decisions and resources cannot be scheduled because the authority is not yet in place. But the objective is clear and success is imperative. There is only one way of holding such a structure in tension and in motion: people are needed to hold the centre, to keep some

components together, to monitor and maintain every connection, and to keep it moving and in the right direction. Furthermore, those people should operate quietly and unobtrusively, because there are others in and around the project who do want to be seen and heard. Those who make the difference are the Enablers – they do not actually bear that name, that is just who they are, but with a capital ‘E’.

Chapter 12 describes the indispensable functions performed by the Enablers in the iSLP and the mandates which authorised them. These are then compared with the references that are made in the literature to such functions and significant differences in the nature of these functions are highlighted. The success of the iSLP is ascribed substantially to the Enablers, and this is contrasted with the failure of the literature to offer anything but the slightest hope of success. It is therefore argued that the nature and functions of the Enablers, and the characteristics of the mandates that they obtain, is a key to success in cross-sector collaboration, and that this constitutes a gap in the literature.

Chapter 13 begins by presenting the argument of this thesis and then proposes ways in which its findings can be integrated into the models of cross-sector collaboration and collaborative governance that were referenced in Chapter 2. Furthermore a structure is offered for the creation of an Enablement Plan to address circumstances that may warrant cross-sector collaboration. The thesis concludes with a re-summary of the argument: that the likelihood of success in a cross-sector collaboration can be enhanced by anticipating incessant turbulence, acknowledging the incapacity of the stakeholders, recognising the value of a diversity of Enablers and ensuring that they are provided with the necessary mandates and resources.

References to all literature cited are in the Bibliography, but references to documents within the iSLP archive and to the interviews that were conducted are by endnotes, which are listed in the Notes and References section.

### *The Annexures*

The body of the thesis is supplemented by six diverse annexures. Annexure A contains reprints of maps of the iSLP project, dated 1995 and 2000. Annexure B contains all the tables, most of which provide the detail which substantiates the arguments that have been presented. Of particular significance are the tabulations that quantify and analyse the

attendance by participants at meetings of the collaboration, and highlight two opposing achievements: the breadth of inclusivity and the narrowness of consistency achieved. This research was pivotal in identifying the Enabler function – which could then be explored in much more personal depth through interviews. Thus Annexure B is very much part of the thesis and has been dislocated from the body only for convenience.

Annexures C and D are a by-product of the thesis and contribute to everyday practice and policy-making. Annexure C is a collection of the main lessons learned by Enablers in the iSLP and is an abridged version of a longer list. These main lessons have been annotated to indicate whether I consider that they are generally applicable to the enabling of collaborations or that they are primarily appropriate in a cross-sector collaborative endeavour. Annexure D is an Enabler's Manual, which I have written as a very detailed handbook for practitioners, presented in a more expanded form than the Enablement Plan within Chapter 13. Annexure E is an abridged list of the iSLP's capacity-building programmes, offered to provide some flavour to that spectrum of the project's deliverables. Finally Annexure F, as has been mentioned, comprises the pre-history of Chapter 4, which offers the reader a greater sense of the housing deprivation suffered by black people since Cape Town was founded, and a valuable introduction to the context of this thesis. It has only been appended in order to restrict the focus of the thesis to empirical material that has actually been researched.

### **Some Issues of Terminology**

South Africa's social history is dominated by issues of 'race', the classification of which was, particularly under apartheid legislation, based upon four primary descriptors: Indian, white, coloured and black, with enormous implications for every person within a very segregated and discriminatory society. In the historical sections of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 11) the use of some of this terminology is unavoidable, with 'black' denoting indigenous Bantu-speaking peoples; and 'coloured' referring to people of 'mixed race', predominantly consequent upon the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by Europeans from 1652. Coloured people comprised the largest segment of Cape Town's population until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the black population overtook them.

An explanation of my use of the term ‘community’ is also required. I realise that the term is used in all sorts of ways that imply or infer qualities that are not demonstrated or explicit. In this thesis I require a term to denote the entire population of a specific location, and the most common and recognizable term used in the South African context is ‘community’ – for example, ‘the Crossroads community’ or ‘community of Crossroads’. My usage of the term is not to suggest that any particular community is internally cohesive or similar to any other. I also use the terms ‘community organisation’ or ‘community representatives’ simply as concepts, at face value, unless I indicate otherwise. ‘Communities’ within the ambit of this thesis are to be regarded generally as intended beneficiaries of the project, although sometimes I use the term ‘beneficiary communities’ to refer to those communities which have been allocated a quota of beneficiaries for a particular project within the iSLP. I only use the single word ‘beneficiary’ to denote a person who has been selected out of a community to be the beneficiary of a new house.

### **The Prize**

As I write these words more than eight years has passed since the completion of the iSLP. Eight years is a long time within a constantly changing system, which is what South Africans have experienced since the mid-1980s. Virtually none of the politicians, councillors, community leaders and ‘community organisations’ who played a significant role in the iSLP is still active in such positions. Very few of the officials are still in place although most of the consultant project managers are still in practice, now in senior positions within their firms. The iSLP is very seldom referred to in public, because already a new generation is overwhelmed by the urgency of new policies and programmes, new challenges and new ideas – without realising that there was a time of greater chaos, greater difficulty, that became addressed and reversed by using unnatural, unpopular, inconvenient techniques. In a rapidly transmogrifying society the iSLP is already ancient history, the protagonists and antagonists are of another age – but history has a habit of repeating itself, and whilst I would not wish another Crossroads on Cape Town or anywhere else I need only read my newspaper to notice the tell-tale signs at hot spots all over the world: persistent turbulence, government and other stakeholders who are inadequate to the task, a reluctance to collaborate across sectors, and approaching the place of last resort.

Finally I feel very privileged to have had the opportunity to research within the field

of collaborative development in all its aspects. My greatest satisfaction, however, comes from having been in practice, deep in the engine room and right at the cutting edge, where bullets sometimes ricochet and where I was once held hostage, and then to find that I have learned things that could inform and better prepare the next generation of practitioners. It has also been a pleasure to write up the case study, and to realise how few practitioners get to do that – perhaps because they are too busy or their objectivity is questioned – and instead the job gets done, if at all, by people who might not recognise the limits to their comprehension. The really first prize, however, would be if something in my work inspired a few more people of all sorts to become Enablers. It is not a profession or even a trade, but combines an attitude that is not rocked by any amount of turbulence, a function that is not fazed by the failure of the more obvious functionary, and a commitment that lasts for as long as it is needed. Perhaps the reason for the existence of the gap that I found is that it is defined far more by personal practice than project process – and will not be noticed by a systems approach to development. On the other hand the reason for the existence of Enablers is very clear: in an unpredictable, volatile world institutions and their personnel are preoccupied with their own survival. If there is cross-sector work to be done it will be accomplished mainly by those who are neither bound by sectors nor bend under pressure but are committed to building and empowering strategic relationships for good.

But first we must get to the theory, which is the subject of Chapter 2.

## 2

### **Expecting failure: Arguments about the practicalities of collaborative development**


“A first key challenge for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the construction of new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions – especially those of government - which affect their lives.” John Gaventa, 2004. p.25.

This chapter explores the realm of participation and collaboration theory in the context of development, especially in response to social crisis. It establishes a viewing platform for considering the iSLP in the chapters beyond. In the process it endeavours to drill into the detail of who is able to do what when normal processes come to a standstill; to examine how complexity should be viewed, grappled with and even embraced; and to raise questions about whether any environmental turbulence must be eliminated as a pre-condition or accommodated and driven through.

The argument presented in this chapter is that neither bottom-up community participation nor top-down collaborative governance are adequate theoretical frameworks for practically enabling multiple parties to deal with complex realities; that a more helpful paradigm is a ‘participative sphere’ containing multiple models of collaborative spaces in which intersections, motivations, perspectives and strategies are seldom simple or clear; and that a particularly challenging model, only embarked upon when alternatives have been exhausted, is cross-sector collaboration, in which success is extremely unlikely, even with the best of intentions and the aid of independent facilitators from time to time. The argument exposes a gap between this very pessimistic theory of cross-sector collaboration and the evidence of a successful large-scale cross-sector collaborative development that was located within a very complex and volatile environment. This thesis will demonstrate that the gap is shaped by two false assumptions – that turbulence is temporary and stakeholders have the capacity to collaborate – and that the gap is filled by a small cadre of diverse activists: the Enablers.

#### **Participative development – a literature review**

This thesis is about the practicalities of dissimilar and even opposing parties working together to successfully address critical social crises, such a severe lack of housing, in an unstable and uncertain environment. This chapter explores arguments related to the practicalities of working together by engaging with various bodies of literature through a process illustrated in **Fig 1** overleaf.

**Fig. 1 Literature Review: Flow Chart**

This survey begins at ‘A’ by disaggregating the challenge posed by Gaventa in his own terms. From there the survey engages with two well established schools of theory which approach the subject from opposite perspectives. The first is ‘community participation’ (‘B’), generally representing community initiative, although some (*e.g.* Mirafteb, 2004; Rahnema, 2010) regard it as an originally virtuous grassroots-based concept that has been hi-jacked by the state and thereafter sustained by

prostitute intermediaries. Those who adopt a more pragmatic stance (*e.g.* Cleaver, 2004; Robbins, 2008) emphasise the value of even the subtle improvements in power and position that can be achieved by individuals or structures. The second school (*e.g.* Ansell and Gash, 2008; Thomson and Perry, 2006) is ‘collaborative governance’ (‘C’), which takes a state-based perspective of the same arena but questions whether it can successfully hi-jack or co-opt communities and squeeze them into a collaborative mould – or whether the building of collaborations is much more difficult.

A further school (‘D’) has emerged around the ‘participative sphere’ (*e.g.* Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Bebbington, 2004) in which the parties engage, and from there the survey moves to the field of ‘cross-sector collaboration’ (‘E’) (*e.g.* Bryson *et al.*, 2006), which studies the implications and dynamics of collaborations that are not necessarily an initiative of either government or communities but within society in general, represented by various sectors. The survey concludes (‘F’) with a summary of whom the literature (including Huxham and Vangen, 2007) identifies as the key role players.

#### **A. The Challenge : Recognising ‘working together’ as an imperative but asking Who? Where? and How?**

Gaventa’s primary challenge for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, quoted at the head of the chapter, is pronounced to a world of increasingly formidable social problems that are progressively beyond the means of individual agencies to successfully address – but for which collaboration often proves perplexing. Within this rather anguished landscape he has identified “six challenges which point to the importance and potential for assessing the transformative possibilities of citizen engagement with local governance ...” (Gaventa, 2004. p.25)

The 1st challenge is a general one: to replace popular distrust and disillusionment in increasingly unresponsive, corrupt and oligarchically-managed governments in both North and South by creating “new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions”. (*ibid.* p.25)

This leads to the 2nd challenge, which requires ”working both sides of the equation – that is, going beyond ‘civil society’ or ‘state-based’ approaches, to focus on their intersection, through new forms of participation, responsiveness and accountability” (*ibid.* p.27). This requires a strengthening of both the process of citizen participation and of the accountability and responsiveness of the institutions. He quotes Heller (2001) in calling for a balanced view which recognises the tensions between the need for representative working institutions *and* the need for mobilised demand-making

civil society, and proposes that the solution is not found in the separation of the civil society and good governance agendas but in their interface. The identification and management of such interfaces and of all the intersections that they contain foreshadows ‘D’ and ‘E’ below and raises questions about who is capable of such management.

Gaventa’s 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> challenges are for a re-conceptualisation of participation as a right of citizenship and for the extension of such rights to ensure a much richer participative democracy. Whilst the validity of these arguments is appreciated this thesis does not address the issue of the right to participate but focuses on the practicalities of participation.

Skipping to his 5th challenge, it is that, “While the creation of new spaces for participatory governance holds out the possibility for transformative change, far more needs to be learned about how such spaces work, for whom, and with what social justice outcomes. In general, however, while there is some evidence of both the pro-poor development outcomes and the positive ‘democracy’-building outcomes of participatory governance, these exist only under certain conditions ... For example, there is evidence that democratic decentralization simply opens up space for the empowerment of local elites, not for consideration of the voices and interests of the more marginalised” (Gaventa, 2004. p.31). Questions of representation and accountability are, as demonstrated in Chapters 5-10, a recurring theme in collaborative development.

Gaventa’s 6th and final challenge is that “Power analysis is [thus] critical to understanding the extent to which new spaces for participatory governance can be used for transformative engagement, or whether they are more likely to be instruments for reinforcing domination and control” (*ibid.* p.34). He proposes that “we need to look more closely at three differing continuums of power, if we are to assess the transformative possibility of political space. These involve (i) how spaces for participation are created; (ii) the places and levels of engagement; and (iii) the degree of visibility of power within them” (*ibid.* p.34). He goes on to suggest a continuum of spaces which include closed spaces, invited spaces and claimed/created spaces; an understanding of the contestation for locating/placing participation; and an examination of how the dynamics of power shape the inclusiveness of participation within each – whether the participation is visible (presumed open); hidden (reserved for a privileged few); or rendered invisible through the internalisation of dominating values, ideologies and forms of behaviour.

He claims that “in any given issue or conflict, there is no single strategy or entry point for participation. Much depends on navigating the intersection of the relationships, which in turn create

new boundaries of possibility for action and engagement... The politics of intersection is also about identity, and understanding which identities actors use in which spaces to construct their own legitimacy to represent others, or how they perceive the identities and legitimacy of others who speak on their behalf. We need to continually unpack this question of representation, legitimacy and identity at the intersections of spaces and places, in order to understand more fully the possibilities of deeper forms of participatory governance” (*ibid.* p.38).

South Africa’s history of spatial segregation, the reservation of places on a racial basis and inadequate representation of groups created a complex tapestry of powerful memories, influences and dynamics that a political transformation could not simply replace. In such circumstances, Gaventa comments, “it is no wonder, then, that the dynamics of participation in newly emerging democratic spaces are subject to all sorts of imperfections, manipulations and abuse” (*ibid.* p.38).

For example, the iSLP case study presented in Chapters 5-10 was a participative housing project riddled with intrigues, masquerades, power plays, subterfuges and ambushes. Yet it survived repeated hijacking attempts and prevailed for a sustained and intense period of fourteen years through South Africa’s tumultuous shift to democracy, ultimately achieving its objectives. My analysis responds to Gaventa’s 5<sup>th</sup> challenge to investigate how participatory spaces actually work, and draws some conclusions in Chapters 11 and 12. But there are underlying factors at work – collaborating institutions and individuals carry complex and conflicting assumptions, expectations, motivations and allegiances – and to engage with them we shall now explore other fields of literature.

**B. Community Participation : widely acknowledged as good practice but much easier said than done.**

Participation theory is essentially about the exercise of popular agency in relation to development (Hickey and Mohan, 2004(i)). However the identity and motivation of the initiator of the process is likely to determine the nature of participation. Is it the populace who organises itself to engage in development for its own benefit? Is it institutions of government who motivate the populace to collaborate in development for their mutual benefit? Or are third parties involved who might motivate, organise or even seek to represent the populace; or who might act as agents of government to engage and equip the populace – and perhaps for a more complex set of benefits?

As we shall see, the iSLP was created primarily a response to housing delivery failure. There

are two opposed perspectives on who is responsible for housing the poor. In the one corner is John Turner, who declared that, “When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contribution to the design, construction or management of their housing, both the process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being. When people have no control over, nor responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, on the other hand, dwelling environments may instead become a barrier to personal fulfilment and a burden on the economy” (Turner and Fichter, 1972, quoted in Turner, 1988. p. 15). In the other corner is UN-HABITAT urging government to be the main housing resource provider, empowered by strong political will, although involving communities and other supporting actors in the process, viz: “Partnerships cannot replace government. Partnerships should be subsumed under representative democratic systems” (UN-HABITAT, 2003. p. 184). Such a view renders structure and control pre-eminent over process.

Nabeel Hamdi questions “How much structure will be needed before the structure itself inhibits permanent freedom, gets in the way of progress, destroys the very system which it designed to serve, and becomes self-serving? At what point does it disable the natural process of emergence, with all its novelty and creativity?” (Hamdi, 2004. p.xviii). As recorded in Annexure A, government in South Africa had long ago problematised the urban black population and reserved the provision of any solutions to itself. To such an approach Colin Ward comments, “The moment that housing, a universal human activity, becomes defined as a problem, a housing industry is born, with an army of experts, bureaucrats and researchers whose existence is a guarantee that the problem won’t go away” (Turner, 1976. Introduction). Turner, Hamdi and Ward argue that housing is best created by the people who need it – and that if government has to be involved it should be in a participative or even partnering mode as a supporter and enabler but not as controller. A memorable image was once provided to the author when visiting Tony Gibson of the Neighbourhood Initiatives Foundation: when the Foundation invites residents and municipal officials to an introductory planning workshop for a particular neighbourhood the officials are presented with a cup of tea on arrival, shown a chair against the wall, and requested to only engage in the discussion when asked a specific question by the facilitator (see also in Gibson, 1994). Such measures are needed to tip the balance of power – in the iSLP community leaders were invited to interview and select technical consultants.

Although lauded and promoted, community participation has become rather a battleground. Faranak Miraftab reflects that the international development literature and practice of recent years reflect the popularity of the closely related discourses of community participation, empowerment and social capital, and wryly comments that these were “once the subversive, emancipatory tools of activists, but have now become tools of the trade for governments as well as for international

financial establishments such as the World Bank” (Miraftab, 2004. p. 239). This argument is that the original object of empowering the people has been replaced by the enablement of government through the exploitation of people, using the same techniques and terminology that was intended for their emancipation. Hence book titles such as *Participation: the new tyranny?* (Cooke and Kothary, 2001) and *Participation: from tyranny to transformation?* (Hickey and Mohan, 2004).

Andrea Cornwall adds to this debate, explaining that: “At a very basic level, discourses of participation make available particular subject positions for participants to take up, bounding the possibilities for agency as well as for inclusion. Being constructed, for example, as ‘beneficiaries’, ‘clients’ or ‘citizens’ influences what people are perceived to be able to contribute or entitled to know or decide, as well as the perceived obligations of those who seek to involve them” (Cornwall, 2004. p. 83). So, for example, people categorised as beneficiaries of a housing project might only be consulted about the *product* – and excluded from deliberations about the process, even though they might have been hoping from some employment in it. Similarly, it may be erroneously assumed that ‘community members’ are unable to understand and discuss technical aspects of a development process simply because they might lack some formal education. Cornwall also points out that the way people speak is also used to define them and to trigger attitudes that obstruct dialogue and relationship-building.

So although, as we shall see, the iSLP Policy Committee was established on the basis of equal status for all parties preconceived attitudes and perceptions could no more be wished away than the huge disparities in understanding and perspective. Frances Cleaver claims that duality is inherent in these social processes: “In normative attempts to find transformatory prospects in the politics of participation and representation, we tend to look at social processes and highlight the potential of the bits that we like: the transformation rather than the tyranny, the solidarity rather than the conflict, articulation rather than mutedness, the enablement of agency rather than the constraint of structure. In thinking through participation, we do ourselves no favours in wishing away the potentially negative aspects of representation. Our challenge is to use an understanding of the dynamic nature of such duality to identify opportunities for change. However, we have to reconcile ourselves to these only ever being partial, intermittent, involving winners and losers, not entirely controllable or predictable. Recognizing the limits of the makeability of social life is as important to achieving something in development as over-optimistic faith in the possibilities of participatory politics” (Cleaver, 2004. p.276). This is a good characterisation of ‘Enablers’, as I shall reveal in Chapter 12.

By way of example in the South African context, Claire B nit-Gbaffou introduced a special edition of *Transformation* devoted to “deepening understanding, at the local level, between social movements and the political system” through “institutional participatory mechanisms (*i.e.* those organised by the state – ward committees, ad hoc participatory or development forums, integrated development planning processes, *etc.*)” (B nit-Gbaffou, 2008. p. i). Most papers concluded that the mechanisms do not work properly in practice and lead residents to resort to other modes of expression. Some went further and averred that in the process these dysfunctional institutions disempowered other non-institutional forms of residents’ participation. But there were others which pointed out how even dysfunctional participatory platforms were used beneficially by community groups – *e.g.* to raise their profile, to mobilise members and to obtain strategic information about the structure and operation of local government. It would seem that if ‘participation’ is viewed creatively, opportunistically and unboundedly by residents it can be life-giving, however stultifying the institutional framework may be.

Invitees can choose whether to participate and whether or how to negotiate the terms of their participation. The motivations are diverse. Anthony Bebbington writes, “The tense interface between theory and practice, thought and action, has never been far from the surface in discussions of participatory development. Participation helps unite people who share commitments to more equitable and humane forms of social and political economic organisation but who differ greatly on strategy; some are more reformist; others are deeply sceptical that reform can make much difference; some are more forgiving of people who work, live and seek reform within dominant institutions that otherwise tend to impose agendas and so foster exclusion, while others see Machiavellian intent everywhere they look; some see the need to theorize strategy carefully, others view abstraction as a tyranny that obstructs change-orientated action and once again privileges elite forms of knowledge” (Bebbington, 2004. p. 278). As we shall see, even the Enablers in the iSLP became involved for diverse reasons and applied diverse attitudes and perspectives to their tasks.

However it is not only the spaces, places and dynamics of participation that have to be understood – there are the cultures and norms of the different groups of roleplayers, many of which might not be appreciated within the relationship. Cleaver (2004) identifies three key factors which both enable and *constrain* the exercise of agency and therefore shape citizenship: moral understandings of action (*e.g.* respect to elders, or to the powerful) and the unconscious motivation of many acts; the complexity of both individual and collective identities (the moral norms of decision-making are deeply psychologically and socially embedded and often elude conscious scrutiny and discourse); and the (often unequal) interdependence involved in the exercise of rights

and livelihood interests (rights do not exist in a vacuum but are embedded in social relations).

Probably the most bewildering factor for a housing policy-maker or practitioner in South Africa is the unpredictability of how intended beneficiaries and their representatives will engage with the process. In relation to experiences within the iSLP I found Steven Robbins' analysis particularly illuminating: "Individuals have multiple rights and obligations – re: traditional leaders, clan members, patron-client relations, religious affiliation, etc." (Robbins, 2008. p. 6). "What appears to be an autonomous, rights-bearing citizen in one setting may, in another context, morph into an 'ethnic' subject invoking indigenous values" (*ibid.* p. 12). "... As a consequence the urban and rural poor in South Africa, as well as elsewhere in the developing world, commit enormous resources and energy to ensuring the social reproduction of kinship, clientship, clan and neighbourhood ties and networks. Given prevailing conditions of jobless growth and structural unemployment it is not surprising that these social bonds are seldom sacrificed for the elusive dream of 'suburban bliss' with its normative model of the nuclear family, private property and individual, bourgeois subjectivity" (*ibid.* p. 22).

Robbins avers that "the 'popular classes' are not only 'target populations' and 'docile bodies' shaped by, and susceptible to, modern state discourses of development and governmentality; instead they often straddle multiple political discourses and logics in their strategic and situated encounters with the modern state, donor agencies, NGOs and other sites of power" (*ibid.* p. 15.) "The poor need multiple strategies – often deployed opportunistically" (*ibid.* p.6). Thus "in postcolonial settings such as South Africa, NGOs and social movement activists increasingly recognise the strategic value of engaging with both liberal 'rights talk' and communal forms of mobilisation" (*ibid.* p. 12). "For most South Africans, claiming rights is not necessarily incompatible with claiming communitarian identities and cultural and group rights. Both of these purportedly antagonistic and oppositional political logics can be asserted by the same actors simultaneously, or deployed separately depending on the specific contexts and audiences" (*ibid.* p. 16). Such an environment makes the work of managing projects or processes extremely difficult. Non-compliance may become the norm, leaving Enablers with no option but to drive the process pragmatically in generally the agreed direction.

The context in which South African NGOs found themselves in the early 1990's is well illustrated in the iSLP case study, especially Chapters 5-7. Robbins comments: "The South African liberation struggle, for example, produced thousands of working class activists who, through their involvement in anti-apartheid activism, were inducted into civil society, and later became significant players in big business and the post-apartheid state" (*ibid.* p. 16). However, there were many who were not as fortunate, for "with the arrival of democracy in 1994, many highly effective grassroots

activists were unable to convert their political skills and credentials into the forms of cultural capital required by the new bureaucratic state” (*ibid.* p. 16). Such hopes and fears were powerful threads within the tapestry of ‘community representatives’ involved in the early years of the iSLP – see Chapters 5-7.

‘Community participation’ is invariably recommended as essential practice for creating synergy and achieving satisfactory results in social projects such as sub-economic housing. In practice, however, it is complicated by a myriad of factors, not the least of which is the variation in participants, their backgrounds, the frameworks and mandates from which they operate, the resources that they are willing to invest and their expectations, both as individuals and as representatives of a constituency. A real problem is that participation or ‘working together’ cannot be built from only one side. We need to look at the other side of the engagement – collaborative governance.

### **C. Collaborative Governance : an institutional approach to working together**

The community participation literature, with its focus on community interests in engagement with the state, is mirrored by a public affairs literature on collaborative governance which has a focus on what government needs to do in order to effectively engage with other parties. The imperative to collaborate, not least in countries of the north, has been described as resulting from devolution, rapid technological change, scarce resources and rising organisational interdependencies (Thomson and Perry, 2006).

#### *The Local Agenda 21 model*

One significant early influence in this movement, particularly aimed at local government, was the ‘sustainable development’ challenge articulated in the 1992 United Nations Earth Summit as a quest for a “global action plan for sustainable development”. Code-named Agenda 21, it called upon local authorities in every country to establish their own Local Agenda 21 and promoted a partnership approach to service provision that would balance economic, community and ecological development. “Balancing the diverse interests of business, the environment and community development requires partnerships. This is especially true in today’s environment of rapid urbanisation and globalisation. The pressures facing local communities today make it increasingly difficult for any one institution to single-handedly develop, supply and maintain an essential service. Traditional service roles (of government, the private sector, community organisations, trade unions, neighbours and families) are rapidly changing due to fiscal constraints, constitutional and legal reforms, resource scarcity and ecological concerns, globalisation of economies and market liberalisation, changing values and

social norms, and demographic pressures” (ICLEI, 1996. p. 13)).


The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide from which the above quotation is drawn went on to describe 6 basic steps that a municipality would need to take in order to construct and support an effective partnership:

- Step 1 Determine the scope of the planning exercise and define goals and objectives – in consultation with stakeholders after a preliminary educational campaign to generate public interest and support.
- Step 2 Create or designate a Stakeholder Group to coordinate and guide the overall planning effort, and to integrate the results of discussions, research and planning into an Action Plan(s).
- Step 3 Establish distinct Working Group structures under the supervision of the Stakeholder Group, each with responsibility for a distinct issue or planning task.
- Step 4 Identify appropriate partners to participate in the Stakeholder Group and its Working Groups.
- Step 5 Establish the terms of reference for the activities of each group, which includes defining the relationship between stakeholder planning and statutory processes, such as official development plans.
- Step 6 Develop a common Community Vision to guide the entire planning process.

(*ibid.* p. 15)

The logic was represented schematically as shown in **Fig 2** below:

**Fig. 2 ‘General Partnership Model for sustainable development planning’** [*ibid.* p. 19]



In this model the Municipality establishes the Stakeholder Group, which may comprise, in addition to the Municipality, service agencies, NGOs, CBOs, trade unions, universities, private businesses, professional associations and under-represented groups – and provides it with a formal planning mandate. To enable the process the municipality creates an internal Interdepartmental Committee and helps the Stakeholder Group to establish a Planning Team, and to create however many working groups may be required.

Through this structure the Stakeholder Group is mandated to provide and oversee policy and management for the planning process, to establish and oversee working groups, develop the Community Vision, engage in public consultation and establish planning priorities, negotiate consensus positions and recommend actions, review action plans and integrate the plans of different actors, and liaise with and provide reports to the municipality. By these means the Stakeholder Group provides a public profile, offers public accessibility and generates legitimacy for the municipal planning process.

The Interdepartmental Committee liaises between the Municipality and the Stakeholder Group, provides ideas and information, reviews action strategies and proposals and integrates stakeholder planning decisions with formal planning processes. The Planning Team provides staff support to the Stakeholder Group, administers the planning effort, provides technical and research support, engages in problem solving and trouble-shooting and monitors and evaluates outcomes.

The Working Groups may be composed of service providers, service users, service funders and affected parties - and could comprise, as illustrated in **Fig 2**:

A Planning Team, which analyses problems and opportunities; proposes action options, targets and triggers; and prepares draft action plans;

An Implementation Group, which negotiates implementation partnerships, mobilises resources, institutes projects and programmes, and documents activities; and

A Monitoring and Evaluation Group, which develops indicators, monitors impacts and changing conditions, analyses outcomes and reports on findings.

It is noteworthy that 5 of the 6 steps promoted in the Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide and listed earlier address only the institutional arrangement. There was no hint of the complications that may arise, let alone advice on how to address them. As will become evident, collaborations are invariably complex.

*Collaborative governance in the new South Africa*

South Africa's new Constitution states that the object of local government is to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the provision of services to them in a sustainable manner; to promote social and economic development and a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec. 152). The manner in which this last directive has been implemented is of relevance to this thesis. The basic structural instruments for enabling community involvement in municipal affairs are Ward Committees and then Sub-Councils for groups of municipal wards. Provisions for these are made in the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, which declares that a Ward Committee shall be chaired by the Ward Councillor, comprise not more than ten persons and have no authority or decision-making capacity (Schmidt, 2008. p. 114). Such a committee would offer very limited scope and capacity as an instrument for real public involvement in a development project – information sharing and consultation would be the limit of its ability. It begs the question of how government would collaborate with communities in housing development projects.

In terms of the South African Constitution, everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing and the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right (Republic of South Africa, 1996. Sec. 26). Funds for the subsidising of public housing programmes are allocated at national level and policies for their administration are established by the national Department of Housing. Responsibility for implementation was devolved initially to provincial Departments of Housing (under which the iSLP was initiated in 1991) but after the first local government elections (in 1996) the Housing Act of 1997 (Republic of South Africa, 1997) set in train an increasing devolution of housing responsibilities to local government, requiring that every municipality shall ensure that the inhabitants under its jurisdiction have access to housing on a progressive basis (*ibid.* Sec 9.1.(a)(i)) and that any municipality may participate in an approved housing programme by, inter alia, “facilitating and supporting the participation of other role players in the housing development process” (*ibid.* Sec 9.2(a)(vi)) There is provision for municipalities to approve housing programmes themselves, but accreditation, which comes in three levels, is reluctantly granted and by March 2011 Cape Town, generally regarded as the most efficient municipality in the country, had only acquired Level 2 authority, with financial responsibility reserved by the provincial government (City of Cape Town, 2011).

Housing Policy introduced by the new democratic government in 1994 made community

involvement through a ‘social compact’ a prerequisite for the approval, and therefore subsidising, of any project. However, for the first decade of democracy the philosophy of governance was New Public Management, which promoted regulatory local government and the privatisation of public services (Pieterse, 2002. p. 8). No instructions were given as to how social compacts should be constructed or adjudicated, and in that immediate post-apartheid environment of privatisation and focus on delivery lip service was often paid to them in practice – compacts were, after all, voluntary in nature (Menguelé et al, 2008. p. 195). 1994 was when the iSLP began implementation, with a philosophy in which social compacts were far more than obligatory – they constituted the entire framework of the project.

In fact the application of New Public Management and its ‘regulatory state’ philosophy diminished the capacity of government to a concerning degree, particularly at the local level (Pieterse, 2008. p. 4), and so was replaced in 2004 by the philosophy of the Developmental State, and in particular Developmental Local Government, in which government is expected to drive development. It may do so in partnership with a community-based organisation, if such body is legally competent to enter into such an agreement. (Republic of South Africa, 2000. Section 76(b)). That implies a much more formal and exclusive arrangement than a social compact involving affected community members. Therefore the revision of the National Housing Policy – the much-vaunted ‘Breaking New Ground’ document - made reference to community participation but described it in terms of a large scale ‘listening campaign’ by politicians and a communications campaign driven by a cadre of community development workers (Department of Housing, 2004. Section 8). That was to be the extent of community participation in development. In fact the state’s ‘Flagship Project’, called the N2 Gateway, which is mentioned as a postscript in Chapter 11, was altogether devoid of community involvement in an extraordinary re-enactment of apartheid-era top-down development.


For all practical purposes the upgrading of informal settlements by collaborative means has become optional in South Africa. In spite of much groundwork in promoting participative development here by experts such as Lalith Lankatilleke (1989 and 1995), John Abbott (1996), and the ongoing influence of the Slum Dwellers International movement (Bolnick and Patel, 1994) results have been few and small scale. Government policy is reflected in the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme published in 2007, which declares: “This Programme is premised upon extensive and active community participation. Funding is accordingly made available to support the social processes. Community participation should be undertaken through Ward Committees with ongoing effort in promoting and ensuring the inclusion of key stakeholders and vulnerable groups in

the process. The municipality must demonstrate effective interactive community participation” (Department of Housing 2007, Part 3. P.15). A national assessment of sixteen pilot projects within this programme (Department of Housing, 2009) reported very little compliance with the programme prescripts. Such a lack of enthusiasm and integrity in applying participative practices have been well documented by Huchzermeyer (2001-2011) and Kahn and Thring (2003), but it should be expected that collaboration under government control will not be rigorous unless there is no alternative way to achieve delivery, which was where government found itself in the Crossroads crisis back in 1990, as will become evident in Chapter 4.

*Collaboration is more complex and cyclical*

In looking more broadly at the practical application of collaborative governance, Chris Ansell and Alison Gash researched 137 cases across a range of policy sectors to identify critical variables that could determine success – i.e. “to transform adversarial relationships into cooperative ones” (Ansell and Gash, 2008. p. 547). They define collaborative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets” (*ibid.* p. 533).

Their model of collaborative governance is much more complex, cyclical and iterative, in which the institutional arrangement (which dominated the Agenda 21 model) is only one of the contributors to the outcomes. The primary influence is the composition of the starting conditions: power asymmetries, incentives and constraints, and the degree of existing trust between the parties (organisations and individuals). Another influence is the nature and extent of facilitative leadership that is brought to bear, perhaps from a number of quarters. Then comes the institutional design, which must respond to and complement the first two influences – and be flexible. All of these contribute to the collaborative process, which is not linear but cyclical, deepening and strengthening in engagement, activities, trust and delivery with every revolution. This is not the usual *modus operandi* of either government or the private sector. The model that Ansell and Gash constructed is presented diagrammatically in **Fig 3** overleaf, in which the figures in parentheses refer to the “conditions for success” which are outlined thereafter.

**Fig 3 A Model of Collaborative Governance** (Ansell and Gash, 2008)

On the basis of this framework Ansell and Gash synthesised a 'Contingency Theory of Collaborative Governance' which can be of real practical advantage in establishing collaborations, trouble-shooting those that already exist and for learning from those that have ended. They concluded with the following 10 key conditions for success, which lie within the starting conditions, facilitative leadership and collaborative process elements of the above diagram. They are numerically referenced in parentheses in the diagram.

### Starting Conditions

1. If there are significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders, such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders.

2. If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, then collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly interdependent.
3. If interdependence is conditional upon the collaborative forum being an exclusive venue, then sponsors must be willing to do the advance work of getting alternative forums (courts, legislators and executives) to respect and honour the outcomes of the collaborative process.
4. If there is a prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders then collaborative governance is unlikely to succeed unless a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders or (b) positive steps are taken to remediate the low levels of trust and social capital among the stakeholders.

#### Facilitative Leadership

5. Where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust.
6. Where power distribution is more asymmetric or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong 'organic' leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. 'Organic' leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances.

#### The Collaborative Process

7. If the prehistory is highly antagonistic, then policy makers or stakeholders should budget time for effective remedial trust building. If they cannot justify the necessary time and cost, then they should not embark on a collaborative strategy.
8. Even when collaborative governance is mandated, achieving 'buy in' is still an essential aspect of the collaborative process.
9. Collaborative governance strategies are particularly suited for situations that require ongoing cooperation.
10. If prior antagonism is high and a long-term commitment to trust building is necessary, then intermediate outcomes that produce small wins are particularly crucial. If, under these circumstances, stakeholders or policy makers cannot anticipate these small wins, then they should probably not embark on a collaborative path.

(*ibid.* p. 551-561).

Their deconstruction of collaborative governance responds to questions raised by Gaventa, Cornwall and others about interfaces, intersections, spaces, places and visibility. The concepts of community participation and collaborative governance are both premised on the ability to build trusting relationships between stakeholders in order to achieve shared goals. The threats to such a process, suggest Ansell and Gash, are antagonisms, mistrust, power imbalances and unequal access to resources. Among their remedies are deliberate investments in empowerment, over-representation, trust building, shared ownership and small wins and the involvement of three possible intermediaries: sponsors, an honest broker or a strong organic leader. A sponsor is a patron who creates the opportunity, an honest broker is able to build inter-relationships and strong organic leaders draw participants to themselves and to their espoused goal. This thesis will raise the possibility of there being other facilitators whose profile is far less prominent than their influence. The discourse leads naturally to this place of engagement – the ‘participative sphere’.

**D. The Participative Sphere : the meeting ground between government, communities and other stakeholders which itself becomes an institution.**

Andrea Cornwall and Vera Coelho suggest that rather than locating institutions of participation within either the state or the public sphere “they constitute a distinct arena at the interface of state and society, what we term here the ‘participatory sphere’. The institutions of this sphere have a semi-autonomous existence, outside and apart from the institutions of formal politics, bureaucracy and everyday associational life, although they are often threaded through with preoccupations and positions formed in them. As arenas in which the boundaries of the technical and the political come to be negotiated, they serve as an entirely different kind of interface with policy processes than other avenues through which citizens can articulate their demands – such as protest, petitioning, lobbying and direct action – or indeed organise to satisfy their own needs. These are spaces of contestation as well as collaboration, into which heterogeneous participants bring diverse interpretations of participation and democracy and divergent agendas. As such, they are crucibles for a new politics of public policy” (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007. p. 1).

These ‘institutions’ in the ‘participatory sphere’ referred to above may be established either by statute or regulation, such as for participatory budgeting or advisory boards for health or education purposes, or they may be created voluntarily as a pragmatic or tactical response to a problem that has defeated unilateral approaches. The case studied in the following chapters is located in the latter paradigm, and is about voluntary partnerships created out of necessity by government and others. Many of the principles are common to both models, however, because the existence of a law does

not ensure the fulfilment of its spirit and neither does a voluntary relationship exclude the possibility of powerful mutual commitment.

The case study in Chapters 5-11 demonstrates how the intentionally virtuous creation of participatory space can also be the unconscious and naive creation of a window of opportunity for exploitation; how the need for such space reflects a lack of relationship and familiarity, which will also makes it difficult for parties to test each other's legitimacy and mandates without betraying distrust; how precious any meeting space is within a divided society and the difficulties involved in sustaining it; and the possibility of participants playing by their own rules and towards undisclosed goals.

### *Collaborations of different and changing perspectives*

Cornwall highlights the fluid nature of participation: "Discourses of participation might be viewed, following Foucault, less as a singular, coherent, set of ideas or prescriptions, but as a configuration of strategies and practices on constantly shifting ground. They may be at one time oppositional and at another conducive to the interventions of particular kinds of agents, whether states or supra-national institutions. Spaces produced by hegemonic authorities can be filled with those with alternative visions, whose involvement transforms their possibilities. Spaces created with one purpose in mind may be used by those who engage in them for something quite different. Efforts to control outcomes can only be partial, and the impotence of initiating agencies to direct or close down emergent processes is part of their inherent dynamism. Factoring in the agency of those who are invited to take up, or come to inhabit, spaces suggests that nothing can be prejudged" (Cornwall, 2004. p. 81). Thus in the iSLP, as will become evident, the fact that diverse parties agreed to collaborate did not imply that they would act in any particular way. Each had its own motives and agenda – and some viewed the project as a means to various ends. She quotes Scott (1986) in explaining how what people appear to be doing masks the subtle tactics with which they subvert the strategies of the powerful – and in the iSLP this was evident not only within community groups but within government and through their liaisons with external agents.

The significance of context is emphasised by Bent Flyvbjerg in his reflections on phronetic planning research: "What Bourdieu (1990, p. 9) calls the 'feel for the game' is central to all human action of any complexity, including planning, and it enables an infinite number of 'moves' to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations, which no rule-maker, however complex the rule, can foresee. Therefore, the judgement, which is central to *phronesis* and praxis, is always context dependent. The minutiae, practices and concrete cases that lie at the heart of phronetic

planning research must be seen in their proper contexts; both the small, local context, which gives phenomena their immediate meaning, and the larger, international and global context in which phenomena can be appreciated for their general and conceptual significance” (Flyvbjerg, 2004. p. 298). This imperative to thoroughly understand the context foreshadows the assertion that I shall make in Chapter 11 that the ‘gap’ which this thesis addresses has been framed by an inadequate appreciation of contextual complexities and incapacities.

Another determining factor in evaluating participative initiatives is the analyst’s perspective. By way of example, Majid Rahnema, after tracing the history of ‘participation’ in development from the late 1950s and how participation came to be embraced by governments and development institutions to meet their own political and economic agendas, then questions the bona fides of the ‘community empowerment’ (e.g. Participatory Action Research) counter-movement. In this Rahnema focuses on the role of the “non-professional grassroots-oriented intermediary” hired by the development project “to do away with subject-object relationships and to replace the alien authority of the outsider with a ‘co-actor’ whose role was to intervene, primarily, as a catalyst in an endogenous process of self-regeneration.” (Rahnema, 2010. p. 136). This aroused my interest, because there was a team of facilitators in the iSLP with precisely such a function.

Rahnema’s assessment is that “In reality, however, the change agent often ended up exceeding his role as a catalyst beyond all recognition. Acting, in most cases, as a *promoter* or professional of participation, rather than a sensitive party to a process of mutual learning, he became sometimes a militant ideologue, sometimes a self-appointed authority on people’s needs and strategies to meet them, and often a ‘barefoot developer’ lacking the professional competence of the expert. Few were actors generally seeking to learn from the people how they defined and perceived change, and how they thought to bring it about. The change, of which they considered themselves to be the agents, was only the projection of a predefined ideal of change, often highly affected by their own perception of the world and their own ideological inclinations” (ibid. p. 136). Rahnema could have been writing about the iSLP – we actually called our team members “development facilitators” because they were required to involve communities in driving development – not just to facilitate discussions.

Rahnema continues: “With a few exceptions, due to the personal qualities of the mediators, the new instrumentalities of participation served to promote a kind of ‘fast food’ or do-it-yourself development, made out of the same old ingredients. On the other hand, the very patients who were encouraged to go back to their self-care traditions became dependent on the new breed of barefoot

specialists, either parachuted in from abroad or trained on the spot. In short, more refined and deceitful means of action and persuasion came to be added to the paraphernalia of development institutions” (ibid. p. 136). There may be some validity in such criticism – but does Rahnema have a constructive alternative? He then confesses to the dilemma of being unable to reconcile “two facts: that no form of social interaction or participation can ever be meaningful and liberating, unless the participating individuals act as free and unbiased human beings; and that all societies hitherto have developed commonly accepted creeds (religions, ideologies, traditions, *etc.*), which, in turn, condition and help produce inwardly unfree and biased persons” (ibid. p. 139). He therefore concludes his essay by moving ‘beyond participation’ to extol the virtues of ‘self discovery’ and ‘inner freedom’ and to suggest that macro-changes (presumably what others term ‘development’) are less the product of macro-plans than of a myriad un-planned micro-changes.

### *Degrees of participation*

The value of being able to follow Rahnema’s logic through to its rather metaphysical end is that it reveals the perspective from which his views are made – a benefit that is not extended by all scholars. His perspective illustrates what a value-laden concept ‘community participation’ is, and signals that underlying every evaluation of its theory or practice is a particular combination of values, motives and objectives that may be undisclosed. Similarly, it should be expected that actors in a participative process also have their own values, motives and objectives that may be undeclared, disguised or denied. Therefore an appraisal of participation requires a declaration not only of context and perspective but a recognition of the type or degree of participative process that is sought or practiced. For this reason a range of participation modes is presented in **Table 1** (see Annexure A p. A1) which has been extrapolated by the author from the works of Anzorena and Poussard (1985), Arnstein (1969) and Hamdi and Majale (2004).

The array of nine degrees of participation in Table 1 has government control at the top (1) and community control at the bottom (9), with a band of particularly collaborative practices in the middle (4 – 7). The models can also be distinguished by whether they use community participation as a means to achieve some other goal or whether participation is an end in itself – *i.e.* that a participative or collaborative society is the desired end state and that whatever products are delivered along the way are simply outputs. The means/end division lies between types 5 and 6: types 1 – 5 are typically used for projects, for which participation is a means; and in 6 – 9 the focus is less upon the project and more upon the recognition of community structures as a responsible and accountable element of society.

The implications of engaging within the middle band (4 – 7) of collaborative practices, where diverse stakeholders are involved but none is dominant, must be examined, because the whole objective here is for the parties to find value in their differences, pool their resources and work together. Such a deliberative act moves our debate deeper into the participative sphere to a particularly challenging mode of operation in which the stakes are high and danger abounds. It is the realm of cross-sector collaboration.


### E. Cross-Sector Collaboration

A body of scholarship which has a focus on the mechanics and nuances of collaboration without presuming that the initiative is being taken by any particular party is represented by the literature on cross-sector collaborations. John Bryson, Barbara Crosby and Melissa Middleton Stone (2006) have reported that “people who want to tackle tough social problems and achieve beneficial community outcomes are beginning to understand that multiple sectors of a democratic society – business, nonprofits and philanthropies, the media, the community and government – must collaborate to deal effectively and humanely with the challenge” (p. 44). They define “cross-sector collaboration as the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities and capabilities by organisations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organisations in one sector separately” (*ibid.* p. 44). One of their conclusions from “an extensive review of the literature on collaboration” is that “organisational participants in effective cross-sector collaborations typically have to *fail* (sic) into their role in the collaboration. In other words, organisations will only collaborate when they cannot get what they want without collaborating” (*ibid.* p. 45). They also refer to ‘environmental turbulence’ – “increased environmental complexity, such that the ‘ground is in motion’”, quoting Emery and Trist (1965) - as a likely characteristic of the presenting problems – along with failure of a particular sector (e.g. government) to solve a public problem. This exactly reflects experiences in the creation of the iSLP – voluntary collaboration motivated by societal imperatives and the failure of the public sector, not by regulation or philosophy.

In their paper, Bryson and his colleagues have developed a slightly more complicated framework for understanding cross-sector collaborations, in which the initial conditions are paramount in directly determining the structure and governance, process and outcomes – but that the process and structure are also constantly impacted by constraints emanating from the type of collaboration that is attempted, power imbalances and any competing structural logics. They also recognise that the structure and governance arrangements are both formal and informal (the latter was specifically excluded by Ansell and Gash). The result is shown in **Fig. 4** overleaf, which

suggests a churning process, constantly monitored and adjusted with various inputs and influences – and yielding a variety of outputs from time to time.

**Fig 4. A Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaborations** (Bryson et al., 2006)



From this analytical framework Bryson and his colleagues have deduced “22 propositions related to collaboration outcomes and success” – with the caveat that “the variables referenced in these propositions may lead directly to success, but they are more likely to be inter-related with, moderated by, or mediated by other variables; embedded in fairly complicated feedback loops; and change over time” (*ibid.* p. 52). The usefulness of these propositions is that they are presented not as conclusions but as indicators in a very complex and shifting terrain and provide very helpful tools for analysis. “To say that cross-sector collaborations are complex entities that defy easy generalisation is an understatement” (*ibid.* p. 52), they remark, and their final Proposition 22 sums it up neatly: “The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations” (*ibid.* p. 52).

## *22 Propositions related to collaboration outcomes and success*

As with Ansell and Gash's conclusions these propositions are grouped – in this case under initial conditions, process components, structure and governance, the contingencies and constraints that affect these, and outcomes and accountability. Here they are:

### Initial Conditions

1. Like all inter-organisational relationships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to form in turbulent environments. In particular, the formation and sustainability of cross-sector collaborations are affected by driving and constraining forces in the competitive and institutional environments.
2. Public policy makers are most likely to try cross-sector collaboration when they believe the separate efforts of different sectors to address a public problem have failed or are likely to fail, and the actual or potential failures cannot be fixed by the sectors acting alone.
3. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when one or more linking mechanisms, such as powerful sponsors, general agreement on the problem, or existing networks, are in place at the time of their initial formation.

### Process Components

4. The form and content of a collaboration's initial agreements, as well as the processes used to formulate them, affect the outcome of the collaboration's work.
5. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to succeed when they have committed sponsors and effective champions at many levels who provide formal and informal leadership.
6. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they establish – with both internal and external stakeholders – the legitimacy of collaboration as a form of organising, as a separate entity, and as a source of trusted interaction among members.
7. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when trust-building activities (such as nurturing cross-sectoral and cross-cultural understanding) are continuous.
8. Because conflict is common in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when partners use resources and tactics to equalise power and manage conflict effectively.
9. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they combine deliberate and emergent planning; deliberate planning is emphasised more in mandated collaborations and emergent planning is emphasised more in non-mandated collaborations.
10. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when their planning makes use of stakeholder analyses, emphasises responsiveness to key stakeholders, uses the process to build

trust and the capacity to manage conflict, and builds on distinctive competencies of the collaborators.

#### Structure and Governance

11. Collaborative structure is influenced by environmental factors such as system stability and the collaboration's strategic purpose.
12. Collaborative structure is likely to change over time because of ambiguity of membership and complexity in local environments.
13. Collaboration structure and the nature of the tasks performed at the client level are likely to influence a collaboration's overall effectiveness.
14. Formal and informal governing mechanisms are likely to influence collaboration effectiveness.

#### *Contingencies and Constraints Affecting Process, Structure and Governance*

15. Collaborations involving system-level planning activities are likely to involve the most negotiation, followed by collaborations focused on administrative-level partnerships and service delivery partnerships.
16. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when they build in resources and tactics for dealing with power imbalances and shocks.
17. Competing institutional logics are likely within cross-sector collaborations and may significantly influence the extent to which collaborations can agree on essential elements of process, structure, governance and desired outcomes.

#### Outcomes and Accountability

18. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they build on individuals' and organisations' self-interests and each sector's characteristic strengths while finding ways to minimise, overcome or compensate for each sector's characteristic weaknesses.
19. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they produce positive first, second and third order effects.
20. Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they are resilient and engage in regular reassessments.
21. Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to be successful when they have an accountability system that tracks inputs, processes and outcomes; use a variety of methods for gathering, interpreting and using data; and use a results management system that is built on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies.

22. The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations.

(Bryson *et al*, 2006. p. 46-52).

This analysis by Bryson *et al* ventures into the territory of Gaventa's 2<sup>nd</sup> challenge: "to go beyond civil society or state-based approaches to focus on their intersection – through new forms of participation, responsiveness and accountability" (Gaventa, 2004. p. 27) – and in Chapter 10 the 22 Propositions will be combined with Ansell and Gash's Contingency Theory to create a platform for comprehending the scope of what in this thesis are referred to as Enabler functions.

#### **F. Key Actors: Who or what keeps collaborations going?.**

Ansell and Gash identified 'facilitative leadership' as "a critical ingredient in bringing parties to the table and for steering them through the rough patches of the collaborative process... Although "unassisted" negotiations are sometimes possible, the literature overwhelmingly finds that facilitative leadership is important for bringing stakeholders together and getting them to engage each other in a collaborative spirit" (Ansell and Gash, 2008. p. 12). They then quote Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) in suggesting that three increasing degrees of intervention can be applied: facilitation, mediation and nonbinding arbitration (in which the arbitrator offers a solution).

They emphasise that leadership is crucial for setting and maintaining clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating dialogue, and exploring mutual gains; for embracing, empowering and involving stakeholders and then mobilising them to move forward (Vangen and Huxham, 2003); for acting as a steward of the process, focused on promoting and safeguarding the process rather than taking action as an individual leader (Chrislip and Larson, 1994); for providing adequate management of the collaborative process, maintaining 'technical credibility', and ensuring that the collaboration is empowered to make credible and convincing decisions that are acceptable to all (Ryan, 2001). Ansell and Gash suggest that collaborative leaders must have the skills to promote broad and active participation, ensure broad-based influence and control, facilitate productive group dynamics and extend the scope of the process. Furthermore, there may be more than one person exercising leadership of a collaboration, formally or informally (Lasker and Weiss, 2001). Huxham and Vangen (2000) emphasise that collaborative leadership is likely to be time, resource and skill intensive.

From where are such leaders drawn? Ansell and Gash place their greatest emphasis on the

work that is required to empower weaker stakeholders and to ensure a balance of power within a collaboration. They recommend that where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust, who might be a professional mediator. On the other hand, they suggest, where power distribution or incentives to participate are more unequal collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong leader who emerges from the community of stakeholders. The view of Bryson, Crosby and Stone (2006) is that success depends on leadership of many different kinds, and they highlight leadership roles such as sponsors, champions, boundary spanners and facilitators. They also quote Huxham and Vangen (2005), who argue that leadership, in the sense of ‘what makes things happen’, also occurs through structures and processes. It should be noted that all of these analyses focus on the performance of ‘functions’ by ‘leaders’. In my analysis of the iSLP I found that the key to success lay in people who were not necessarily leaders and whose roles exceeded their official functions. They are Enablers, whom I introduce in Chapter 4 and whose activities constitute an important focus of this thesis.

#### *Roles in preparing for a collaboration*

For the preparatory phase of a collaboration the literature suggests that: a brokering organisation or a legitimate convenor can facilitate collaboration formation (Gray, 1989; Waddock, 1986); powerful sponsors or brokering organisations draw attention to an important public problem and accord it legitimacy within a stakeholder group (Crosby and Bryson, 2005); and convenors (e.g. a mayor), who are often recognised as boundary-spanning leaders with credibility in multiple arenas touched by the problem (Kastan 2000), can draw together an initial set of stakeholders (Gray, 1989). They also highlight the role that prior relationships between individuals in different parties play in judging the trustworthiness or legitimacy of key stakeholders.

#### *Roles in the collaborative process*

Then within the collaborative process itself, Bryson and his colleagues focus on six components: forging initial agreements, building leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict and planning. On the first point they arrive at the simple proposition that “the form and content of a collaboration’s initial agreements, as well as the processes used to formulate them, affect the outcomes of the collaboration’s work” (Bryson *et al*, 2006. p. 47). Curiously, they make no mention of a need for any kind of facilitator here. With regard to the building of leadership, however, the authors state that collaborations provide multiple roles for formal and informal leaders of committees, projects, work groups, etc. whom, in order to be effective, require formal and

informal authority, vision, long-term commitment to the collaboration, integrity and relational and political skills (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Gray, 1989; Waddock, 1986). They identify two key leadership roles, provided by ‘sponsors’ and ‘champions’. They describe sponsors as individuals who have considerable prestige, authority and access to resources that they can use on behalf of the collaboration, even if they are not involved in the day-to-day collaborative work; and champions are people who focus intently on keeping the collaboration going and use process skills to help the collaboration accomplish its goals.

Their focus on ‘building legitimacy’ is apt: “When a newly organised entity is a network of organisations, not a single organisation, how does the network gain legitimacy to begin with? A network of collaborators is not automatically regarded by others – insiders or outsiders – as a legitimate organisational entity because it is less understandable and recognisable than more traditional and conventional forms, such as bureaucratic structures” (Bryson *et al*, 2006. p. 47). Bryson and his colleagues make no mention of the need for particular roles here, whereas they could be essential. The same comment applies regarding the building of trust between the parties – it is possible that individually the participants see no reason to trust their counterparts, needing some kind of agent to ensure that it is nurtured to a constructive level, even if it is not declared publicly.

To manage conflict Bryson *et al* recommend in their paper that because conflict is common in partnerships, cross-sector collaborations are more likely to succeed when partners use resources and tactics to equalise power and manage conflict effectively. They do not elaborate on the techniques that might be used and whether any third parties might be required. Their final comment on the collaboration process is to identify two alternative planning approaches for a collaboration: deliberate, step-by-step planning on the basis of agreed goals – or an emergent planning process, in which a clear understanding of mission, goals, roles and action steps emerges over time. The notion that each of these would require an enabling function, the first to ensure good order and the second to keep the relationship going until something tangible appeared, is not addressed by the authors.

### *Collaboration structures*

In considering the structure and governance of collaborations Bryson and his colleagues make the point that “structures are likely to be dynamic because of the ambiguity and complexity that is inherent in collaborations (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). Ambiguity rises from many features of membership, including perceptions of who belongs to a collaboration, what these members actually represent (themselves, their organisations, or a particular identity group), and turnover among members. Membership turnover may be especially important when powerful players such as top

elected officials leave, join, or alter their level of collaboration (Crosby and Bryson, 2005; Kastan, 2000). This ambiguity is further exacerbated by hierarchies of collaborations in which individuals or organisations are often members of multiple and overlapping partnerships. For self-governing partnerships (Provan and Kenis, 2005) in particular, structures may begin to blur among these interrelated, multiple partnerships” (Bryson *et al*, 2006. p. 49). This description gets right to the heart of the challenge: cross-sector collaborations are complex, ambiguous and only partly legible or comprehensible to most of the people who are within and around them – yet they are indispensable. It must be apparent that the possibility of the participants (who are each committed to their own organisations) being able to manage, secure and sustain such a process, especially at scale, for any length of time must be remote. Someone and/or something would have to do it for them. The authors stop short of mentioning this.

The 18<sup>th</sup> proposition tabled by Bryson *et al* is that “Cross-sector collaborations are most likely to create public value when they build on individuals’ and organisations’ self-interests and each sector’s characteristic strengths while finding ways to minimise, overcome, or compensate for each sector’s characteristic weaknesses” (*ibid.* p. 51). This suggests a space that is filled with the strengths, weaknesses and resource contributions of its participants. That may, however, be unrealistic – a collaboration may be less of a ‘filled space’ populated by the parties and more like a ‘managed framework’ to which the parties contribute positively or negatively, often temporarily or intermittently. The statistics of attendance at iSLP committee meetings attest to that (see Tables 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 14 in Annexure B). There may be a false assumption that a collaboration is the sum of its parts; it may be more of a no-man’s-land where the territories of its parts meet but where precious few care to venture. As we shall see, those precious ones are the Enablers.

The extent to which cross-sector collaboration theory provides an adequate framework for explaining or interrogating the iSLP is open to question. The presenting problem in this case had multiple elements, each with long, tangled roots – and all infused with powerful emotions. There was a local issue to be addressed, but it was intimately interrelated with wider issues, and all within an ever-changing and volatile context. The definition of stakeholders was difficult and the verification of their credentials impossible. The requirement for patience, tolerance and compromise would never be articulated but progress and pragmatism would be prioritised, aided by the occasional tactical intervention. The notion of a model process, with blueprints such as those that have been illustrated in this chapter, could also be questioned: a model might be a synthetic illusion that leads collaborations onto the rocks. Perhaps all that should be prescribed is a range of stakeholders and a shared objective, which they must then find ways of achieving using their relationships and

resources, probably without much regard for rules. The creation of an alternative paradigm for development, especially if it involves inflexible institutions and hardened attitudes, will always be a challenge. Success might have to depend upon a few people who share a vision, but not much else.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the literature concerning collaborative development from ‘community participation’ to ‘cross-sector collaboration’. The argument that has emerged is that of all collaborative modes cross-sector collaboration is the most difficult, only embarked upon in turbulent circumstances and only as a last resort, and is so complex that there is very little chance of success. By extension this must apply even more so to large-scale cross-sector collaborative development initiatives. It is likely that the hyper-complexity also makes individual cases extremely difficult to understand, let alone analyse – and therefore very difficult to accurately synthesise. However this review has been illuminated by scholars who have not only argued for community participation or collaborative government, or have highlighted the complications involved in the participative sphere, but have ventured into the jungle of cross-sector collaboration to document and try to comprehend what goes on there. Their analysis is acknowledged to be incomplete: Bryson and his colleagues end their paper with an agenda for further research and an expression of concern that the substantial challenges to researching this subject “must be met or else effectively addressing the major public problems that confront us will be unlikely, and some of the most important opportunities for creating public value will be missed” (Bryson et al. 2006. p. 52).

So there is an acknowledged deficiency in the theory – perhaps more of a hole than a gap, and the closing of it is very much in the public interest. This thesis will contribute to this process by not only analysing the context, structure and process of a case in considerable detail and with some ‘insider’ perspective, but by finding that hidden in the heart of a successful project are a few radical but quiet activists – whom I call the Enablers.

In Chapter 3 I describe my methodology, in terms of the paradigm that I chose, how it was applied and the resources I employed.

### 3

## **Methodology: comparing theory with practice and finding the people who made the difference**

The previous chapter described my search for a literature which meshed with my experience over many years in the iSLP housing project. A bit like Goldilocks in her attempts to find the perfect porridge, I found that ‘community participation’ was a bit too one-sided, ‘collaborative governance’ rather too full of theory and policies, the ‘participative sphere’ promisingly inclusive and then came the discovery of ‘cross-sector collaboration’ that was very close to perfect, but it left one unsatisfied. The fairytale metaphor disappoints because not only did the inevitable unexpected 4th stakeholder creep in, but there was no happy ending: ‘cross-sector collaborations are unlikely to succeed’, I read. Yet I had participated in a huge one that was every bit as dreadful as the others, but we had succeeded, and I wanted to know why. Perhaps we had done something differently, or perhaps the researchers had been looking in the wrong places. In this chapter I describe the methodology that I employed, first describing the paradigm and then the actual practise.

### **The Methodological Paradigm**

I have explained the context my position, perspective and motivation with regard to this thesis in Chapter 1. This has perforce framed my methodology – with the result that I have employed the case study method (a single case study), a single archive, a very open style of interview and have predominantly used narrative in presenting evidence. I discuss these below, together with my appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses associated with them.

#### *The use of the Case Study method.*

One of my motivations for investigating and reporting on the iSLP in such depth is that there are so few detailed case studies available of large, socially complex development projects. I also had the advantage of unique personal in-depth knowledge both of the project in its fullest extent and of the contents of the only extensive archive. However, one of the constraints that such an exercise immediately introduces is that effective comparison

with other projects is only possible if the same depth of information is available and if it is both compatible and comparable. Exploring that was beyond the scope of my resources.

An explanation of the value or merit of a single case study, particularly as a basis for abstracting general principles, is therefore warranted. I have drawn particularly on Flyvbjerg (2006), who expounds the value of case studies in providing “context-dependent knowledge and experience (which) are at the very heart of expert activity” (p 223). Furthermore, he challenges the ability of social science to produce general, context-independent theory, and concludes that “Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals.” (p 225).

In my literature search I have drawn upon a predictive theory about cross-sector collaboration that was culled from multiple cases and concluded with a general principle that success is likely to be elusive. This thesis takes a single, very detailed case study of such a collaboration that was successful and is able to demonstrate both limiting and enabling factors neither of which were perceived in the literature. In Flyvbjerg’s view, “One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development *via* generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the ‘force of example’ is underestimated.” (p 228). Rather than enter this debate myself I would prefer to have my single case study stand on its own merits, in the belief that there is real value to be found in it.

#### *The use of a single archive.*

The use of a single archive can so obviously be criticised as a subjective, partisan source. It warrants a careful explanation, validation and justification. A feature of the project is that it encompassed a wide variety and large number of stakeholders, many of them competing with each other for influence in obtaining access to resources: housing, associated services and facilities, and the contracts and jobs that delivery would require. The project was also of an extended duration (fifteen years in all), in which the involvement of very few individual stakeholders was maintained: key people relocated, lost their positions or their lives, and institutions of all kinds came and went – mainly as a product of South Africa’s huge, multi-faceted national transition in the 1990s. Consequently almost all archives and institutional memories of the project are fragmentary. As a prime example, the

responsibilities for the project within the two institutional sponsors/clients of the project – the provincial government and the municipality – were so disparately allocated, and to departments whose personnel, premises and (in the case of local government) organisational structures changed so much, that they eventually had no comprehensive record of their own. I have, incidentally, some concern about the welfare of the archives that I used after I have returned them to their government repository.

The other collaborators in the project were ‘community organisations’ that no longer exist in the area and members of local communities which were with very few exceptions transmogrified through the project as individuals gained access to improved housing in a variety of projects. As a result the few organised sets of archives on the project that were created were by consultants, and only with respect to the specific components of the project for which they had been contracted – typically one phase of one of the twenty housing projects, or one of some sixty community facilities. The only exception was one team of consultants that was involved in the project from start to end, initially conceptualising and facilitating the collaboration and then co-ordinating the entire project. Theirs are the only archives that encompass the whole project. Their contents were selected primarily in order to closely monitor every aspect of the process required to define and then achieve a large set of objectives through collaborative means. Consequently as an archive of the project it is unique and unparalleled in extent. It has never before been researched or written up, and only portion of it has been drawn upon here: the records and associated reports and correspondence of all the meetings of all the committees, except those of individual projects, from when a collaboration was first considered in 1990 to its conclusion in 2005. The study, recording and analysis of this archive ineluctably constitute the fundamental empirical research in this thesis.

*The structure and style of interviews.*

The context and objective determined the nature of the interview process, which is explained as follows. It was the evidence contained within the archive which, upon analysis, revealed a very small number of individual participants amongst many whose consistent application and role made a significant contribution to success. I then made the decision to interview them, not so much to verify what they had done, for that was known from the record and from my personal witness, but to discover why they had done it, why they had committed so much to such a an unconventional and energy-sapping enterprise. In

other words the interviews were primarily to give colour, to bring life, to the personalities whom the record had highlighted as enablers.

Therefore the interviews were open-ended, unstructured and conversational, held at each interviewee's home or office as a pre-arranged appointment. In each case I obtained permission to digitally record the conversation. I introduced the topic by explaining my research and my findings of these few people who had invested more in crucial stages of the development process than anyone else. Some were surprised to discover that. I reminded them of a little of their role, just to jog their memory, and then invited them to tell me how and why they got involved in the iSLP. I encouraged them to reminisce about the tensions and pressures of the time, within the project, within the institutions that they represented and in the socio-political milieu in which it all took place. I asked them about their backgrounds – what shaped them to become the people they were, and particularly to develop the perspective, values or passion that was required for their role in the iSLP.

These interviews each took about ninety minutes, although one person was interviewed twice in order to complete the story, and one interview was spread over about five hours in order to include a meal and some refreshments at my host's insistence. I transcribed the entire conversations myself, thereby creating seven personal records to work from. To these I added some biographical detail of a late colleague whom I had known well, and of a senior politician drawn from a brief public record of his career. I shall return to these people, the Enablers, below, but must conclude here by reflecting that however fascinating and significant the story of the iSLP might be from a development, social or political viewpoint it is the candid glimpses of the circumstances of the enablers that brings it to life. That has been the benefit of seven very different conversations with seven very different people who for different periods of time had a shared conviction of the absolute necessity for the iSLP to succeed. No scientific validity is claimed for the interview record, or for the parts of it that I used in the final document – I simply used it as a palette from which to tint an important part of the narrative with a representation of its true colours.

*The predominant use of narrative in presenting evidence.*

The empirical subject matter of this thesis, although in some respects substantial is in other respects exclusive, narrow and restricted. The environment in which it is located is replete with complexities and contestation, and there is consequently a great deal about the

context, its nuances and influences, that is not reported on or even investigated here. The reason is that this thesis deliberately follows the perspective of an institutionally initiated, facilitated and driven collaborative project, in consequence of which other contemporary events and trajectories are relevant only to the extent that they affect the project's progress.

This approach can be illustrated with reference to the value of a 'project' for any person or group whose objective is delivery, which begins simply as a shared set of goals, develops into a business plan then becomes an approved and funded project and must then be implemented to its completion and conclusion. The creation, defence and completion of the project become the sole means of achieving the goals, and this is the perspective through which everything else is viewed. This is the perspective from which this thesis has been written: not as an objective view from the outside of whether anything about the project was right or wrong, but as an objective view as possible from the inside of what was it about this project that enabled it to succeed. This requires a holistic view of the project, and because of its length and circuitous journey a longitudinal view of its entire life is most useful, and that is best expressed as a narrative.

#### *The diagrammatic representation of power*

The thesis is visually illustrated with tables, maps and figures – which include diagrams depicting the relationships between the parties over time, which I have termed 'relational maps'. These are quite simplistic and lack much by way of nuance, depth and analysis. I acknowledge this, in the same way that I acknowledge that the thesis as a whole is limited by not addressing holistically or in depth the nature and merits of external factors that had an influence on the project and its process. The relational maps attempt only to show visually which parties were involved and 'on whose side' at particular moments in time, without explaining why that was so. I did explore the possibility of creating more sophisticated representations by reading Clarke's *Situational Analysis: Grounded theory After the Postmodern Turn*, but realised that the kind of data necessary for such an exercise was not available to me. I therefore used a simple, generic term (relational maps) and desisted from including Clarke in my bibliography so as not to give a false impression.

#### *The representation of 'the Enablers'*

The existence of a small number of consistent participants in the process was a finding of the analysis. I concluded that collectively, although they as individuals were mostly

unconnected to each other, they were an un-theorised group. In the light of their individual roles as consistent levers in the process I gave them a group appellation which well fits their effect and which has not to my knowledge been used for another purpose in this field. I then set about theorizing them in terms of their characteristics and the mandates with which they were empowered. Thus within the boundaries of this project and case study they as a group were retrospectively shown to have had a critical role in ensuring success – and on those grounds the concept of ‘Enablers’ was also applied to offer a model and templates that could be used to assemble a cadre of enablers during the establishment of a cross-sector collaborative project.

The concluding argument of the thesis is that cross-sector collaborators should expect to encounter incessant turbulence and contestation and that they will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration - and that therefore success will depend on the existence and activities of Enablers. That, I contend, has been demonstrated in the iSLP and its wider applicability in other projects remains to be tested. To aid such a process a number of ways of applying the argument are offered: an Enablement Plan, the modification of two existing theoretical frameworks, a catalogue of Lessons Learned, an Enablers Manual and some suggestions for further research.

I chose not to reveal the names of the Enablers, but to give each a *nom de guerre* which would acknowledge my recognition of their role, and in some cases their history. I realise that this thesis begs questions about the Enablers of the iSLP and who they were, but the purpose of the thesis is primarily to reveal that there is an ‘enabling’ function to be performed in a successful cross-sector collaboration, not to stereotype the Enabler function with descriptions of those who made a difference in the iSLP. I want to give readers just enough stimulation to seek or recognise enablers in their own contexts without confusing them by presenting detailed ‘models’ for which they are unable to find a match.

I have therefore summarising the assets that the enablers brought to the project, and listed the main lessons that they learned. However I have chosen not to reveal more of their personal lives because each one of them is and has always been quite a private person, no matter whether they have ever been employed in a public function, and I suspect that that is one of the qualities that made them so valuable to the project. I acknowledge that implied in my treatment of them is a respect for their integrity, and thus a desire not to invade their

privacy any more than I have, which is open to challenge. The point is that the story is not about them as persons, but about the application of some of their attributes to a particular endeavour. I have, on a point of ethics, obtained their permission to use the information that they shared with me, their appreciation of anonymity and a *nom de guerre*, and their approval of the manner in which I have recorded the contexts in which I have presented them.

### **My Involvement**

The seeds of my interest in collaborative development were sown in 1970 when I read Constantine Doxiadis calling for ordinary people to wrestle with big urban problems (Doxiadis, 1969), and I became a devotee of ‘community participation’ when Jorge Anzorena sent me a signed copy of his book (Anzorena, 1985) and placed me on the mailing list for his voluminous quarterly newsletters from the Philippines (Anzorena, 1996). Because I had not received any academic training in planning or development I was not provided with opportunities to put these ideas into practice myself, but my career led me into management and consulting positions where I could at least ask pointed questions of the professionals who reported to me and slip phrases into policy documents that would require collaboration to be practiced in research, planning or implementation – and, if possible, in all three.

My career had begun in the real estate investment arm of a large insurance company in Cape Town, after which I pioneered a movement to encourage people to exercise their faith at work in the city centre, before being appointed regional Director of the Urban Foundation in Durban – an influential, although in some circles controversial, NGO during the last days of apartheid – and there I became involved in the upgrading of informal settlements. One of my associates was a person who will be introduced in Chapter 4 as *the Democrat*, and a few years later, after we had both become consultants in a very sparse but needy field, he invited me to join him back in Cape Town to assist him in facilitating what would become the iSLP.

I arrived in April 1992, about eighteen months into the collaboration, and until the end of 1994 I stayed very much in the background, was invited to attend very few of the thirty six meetings of the Policy Committee, and was able to establish friendships with only

junior officials and technical consultants. Therefore although I was at the hub of the activity I was personally and emotionally detached from the passionate drama and anguish that characterised much of the process in those years. But I made it my business to understand what has happening and what would be required next to keep the process going, and to articulate that by drafting policies, programmes, resolutions and correspondence for submission to and approval by others. In this respect I ultimately prepared the entire business plan that was approved by national government and wrote every progress report and submission. I was also determined from the start to compile a comprehensive and accessible record of the whole process, as a defensive measure in a very fraught environment as much as for posterity. I remember the moment when I asked *the Democrat* if I could amalgamate our two small, precious, personal sets of files. I had to promise that I would not rationalise the records by removing any of his indecipherable notes. When the project ended in 2005 our files had multiplied into a library of 250 lever arch files, which I indexed and deposited in the government archives.

### **The iSLP Project Coordinator's Records**

Because these records have played such a critical role in this thesis I shall explain what they contain. They were begun in the days of paper records, and they contain the originals of every notice of meeting, agenda and minutes of every meeting that the facilitator – later project coordinator – attended from 1990 to 2005. These comprised the meetings in which the project was mooted, the meetings of both parallel policy committees (explained in Chapter 5), the technical committee, project management committee, coordination committee and team leaders meeting – all of which related to the project as a whole. There was also a note of every important discussion that took place, particularly between those whom I shall refer to as the Enablers. Faxes were used extensively, especially in the first years, and all of them, both in and out, are there – although the type within many of those created before the introduction of plain paper faxes has faded.

The eventual approval of the iSLP in late 1994 (see Chapter 8) spawned about 250 projects: first serviced sites; then housing, schools, clinics libraries, community halls, markets, sportsfields and ECD centres; and then capacity-building projects for the new residents. The records for the overall arrangements and approvals necessary for all of these are included, whereas the detailed information for the planning and implementing of each

project were kept by their separate project managers – officials and consultants. This library was the product of a deliberate attempt to record and safeguard as much detail as possible about the arrangements, approvals and obligations involved in the overall project, and it included monthly status reports with respect to project progress and expenditure.

It is also worth mentioning that records alone, however comprehensive, are unable to provide an outsider with an understanding of such a project. On two occasions during the life of the iSLP attempts were made to evaluate the project, the first by a multidisciplinary team from an international accounting firm and the second by a researcher from a state agency. Neither was remotely able to grasp the sense and dynamics of the project and were reduced to picking on some individual issues and reporting on them sagely. Their conclusions and recommendations were disconnected to the realities of the whole and they were actually of no value whatever to those managing the project or those to whom they were accountable. It was a lesson that evaluators parachuted in are no match for an ever-present iterative process of monitoring, evaluating and adjusting – which can only work if it is a management function anyway. In a cross-sector collaboration the threat of a riot or a bullet is a much sharper modifier of management behaviour than the considered advice of an alien consultant. I make this comment to suggest that the perspective of practitioners who have pursued a lengthy, sensitive and risky cross-sector collaborative process is multidimensional and uniquely valuable – and although it has to be balanced against their subjectivity, the direct translation of their experience into the literature should be encouraged. I thus declare my position and perspective in crafting this thesis – but I have taken great care to tell the story in the chapters that follow in a manner that is fully authenticated in the files that I have referenced – and it has been endorsed by the Enablers.

In September 1993 I became responsible for organising the involvement of the thirty grassroots communities in planning the housing projects, and employed a team of facilitators who spoke the lingua franca, isiXhosa, and who proceeded to educate community representatives in housing development and to facilitate the creation of project committees. Over the next five years, as the capacity of government diminished as a product of New Public Management policies and restructuring, I assumed greater responsibility for coordinating the housing programmes. In 1998 *the Democrat* chose to retire and for the last six years of its life I was the iSLP Coordinator, with high level oversight for the 250 projects and programmes within it. Very sadly, *the Democrat* did not

live to see the project completed. The relevance of these details is that they demonstrate that from 1990 until about 1997, which is the main focus of the empirical research in this thesis, my knowledge of the project far exceeded my personal influence, responsibility or strategic relationships. This is not at all a story about me and my role, but the fact that I saw so much of it happen makes the telling of it possible. I have that unique privilege, and responsibility.

I was therefore able to regain access to a superb set of records with which I was thoroughly familiar and study the records of the early years quite dispassionately. I 'borrowed back' fifteen of the twenty-seven packing cases of files and was very grateful to be provided with sufficient shelf space at the university. Every committee created within the iSLP has its own file, in one or more volumes, every housing and community facilities project has its own set of files, some containing six to eight huge volumes. There are also files for particular submissions, reports, budgets and approvals. They are all in chronological order but have not yet been indexed – perhaps they never will...

I recognised my style and even my favourite font in the policy documents, but the minutes of the two Policy Committees and of the later Steering Committee had been written by *the Democrat's* secretary – and they proved to be rich in information. On the one hand they told the convoluted story of the collaborative process, augmented by notes and correspondence; but they also contained details of attendance at meetings which I could tabulate and analyse. As much as the qualitative data revealed about tactics and manipulations, the quantitative data that I uncovered helped to define something that I had never consciously contemplated: the consistent and indispensable attendance of a very small number of roleplayers, whom I have therefore called 'Enablers'.

### **Interviewing the Enablers**

I was able to contact most of the main Enablers, all but one now very differently occupied. Most of them were surprised to know how influential they had been. Part of that was modesty, but I also had the advantage of having revisited and reflected upon the various records of past events and documented the history. My interviews with the Enablers were not structured, but were entirely recorded and transcribed. I did not want to know what they did in the iSLP – of that I was well informed from the documents in addition to my first

hand experience. My interest was in why they got involved and what lay in their backgrounds that enabled and motivated them to play such significant yet differing roles in a very unusual and often unpopular process. I was not on familiar terms with all of them, and I had no foreknowledge about what their answers would be. All agreed readily, and each opened their hearts and memories according to their own personality.

I was astonished by the differences in their backgrounds and in the opposing roads that they had travelled before intersecting at the Crossroads. Nobody could be but struck by the incidents that changed lives, polarised people, and shaped men and women for service usually at a later, appointed time. Afrikaner veterans, struggle veterans, socially-minded housewives, faithful people watching for a sign, professionals working for a new order, and people just minding their own business until history and reality gatecrash their lunch time constitutional. You will meet them in Chapter 4. These interviews, and the conversations and insights that they produced shaped this dissertation, highlighting the individuality, devotion and sacrifice of enablement and the stark silence within the collaboration literature about their pivotal contribution. I have, however, renamed each of the Enablers to respect their own peace and to maintain focus on the principles and the theory. They have also read and approved my text.

Therefore not only did the Enablers as a concept provide me with the opportunity of crafting a thesis, but their stories, even simply their presence at and around the Crossroads - which coincides symbolically with Gaventa's focus on a collaboration's intersections - breathed life into the writing and re-writing of it all, from beginning to end. For, on reflection, what kept me in the development field for so many years was its human drama - something that is not often captured in the literature. Those whom I interviewed represent a much wider community of Enablers - including the community leaders who caught the vision, the facilitators who helped them to apply it and the project managers who guarded and guided the processes in the field.

### **Conclusion**

I have described here how I used the extensive library of files on the iSLP to trace the narrative of the project, particularly for the first six years; then analysed attendance at every meeting of the overall collaboration to document the actual participation of each party and

person and thereby discovered how narrow was the consistency of attendance despite the apparent breadth of commitment. I therefore called these people the Enablers, and was intrigued by their diversity. So I set about interviewing those whom I could still find in order to learn why they made such a committed contribution – what were their backgrounds and motivations. The outcome was a large canvass full of drama and intrigue, held together, directed and mobilised by the personal interest of a few very diverse individuals. Had they not played their role the iSLP process would undoubtedly have collapsed long before the new government came to power.

The Enablers are the missing ingredient in cross-sector collaboration literature. It is true that the literature references functions such as patron or champion or facilitator, but the literature fails to describe the motivation and commitment that is required of them for success to be achieved. It also understates the persistently unstable contexts within which such collaborations must operate, and by implication overstates the capacity of the stakeholders to manage the process themselves. Some Enablers may be functionaries within stakeholder groups, but what makes them Enablers lies within individual life stories.

Chapter 4 will reveal how extremely distressing was the historical background to the iSLP and how a resolution by conventional means became increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible. The chapter will also introduce the Enablers in person, pointing out the nature of their backgrounds that empowered them to swim against the tide and in due course motivated them to believe that the iSLP was worth the sacrifice of commitment.

Thereafter Chapters 5 to 7 will explain and analyse what actually happened in the policy-making phase of the iSLP: an orderly progression of collaborative structures and processes, countered by a furious succession of ambushes, contrary alliances and hijacking attempts. Chapters 8 to 10 describe the terms upon which the project was eventually approved and how it was implemented through local collaborations, again not without some opposition. Chapter 11 highlights the features of the project which frame the gap in theory: incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity; and Chapter 12 fills the gap by theorising the Enablers and the mandates which help to empower them. Finally Chapter 13 crystallises the argument of this thesis and suggests how it can be applied.

## 4

## **Towards the Crossroads: A history of the crisis and an introduction to the Enablers**

This thesis is about the use of cross-sector collaboration to address major social issues. The issues that ultimately gave rise to the iSLP were three hundred years in the making. Racial segregation, discrimination and oppression in South Africa began well before the invention of apartheid, and the place where it began and where over time prejudice against ‘black’ people ran deepest and longest, is Cape Town, where this story is located. The dreadful background is important, for the narrative in this Chapter spans only some sixteen years from some of the worst scenes from apartheid in 1974 to just after the capitulation of the apartheid government. I have therefore also documented the prior history of housing provision for black residents of Cape Town until 1974 in order to paint a fuller picture of the context upon which my thesis has been built, and it is appended here as **Annexure F**.


This Chapter describes how the compression of those multiple discriminatory attitudes, policies and actions eventually erupted as a violent social crisis at a place called Crossroads. There a minor relaxation of state control had triggered an overwhelming demand for space in a tiny triangle of land. Unscrupulous profiteers took control, who in turn were aided and abetted by an unscrupulous government in a violent scandal which forced sixty thousand people to flee their flimsy shanties and made Crossroads a globally recognised icon of apartheid callousness. However over the next fifteen years apartheid proved to be no match for either urbanisation or the forces for change and whilst the government tottered towards repentance the Crossroads crisis festered into a volatile stalemate. Fortunately there was a small number of quite diverse people who shared a belief that Crossroads and all that it symbolised could be redeemed. They are introduced in this chapter as the Enablers, because they will have an influence for good out of all proportion to their status or experience.

### **Housing at the Crossroads**

In 1974 a few shacks were erected next to a crossroads in a triangle of unused land to the

east of Nyanga bounded by Lansdowne and Klipfontein Roads and Mahobe Drive (see **Map 2** below). They were constructed by people who were told by unspecified ‘white men’ that they could no longer stay on Brown’s Farm in nearby Philippi. When asked where they should go, they were told “to the Crossroads”. Around the Easter weekend of the following year many more people arrived at Crossroads, swelling the number of dwellings to around 1 100 by August 1975. At first the settlement was tolerated by the authorities as a temporary camp. By 1977 it had 18 000 inhabitants. (Terreblanche, 2002. p. 185).

## Map 2. Crossroads 1974



In 1977 an amendment to the Illegal Squatting Act empowered Bantu Affairs officials to demolish shacks without a court order. They wasted no time and demolished the squatter areas of Unibel and Modderdam near the airport. KTC, located west of Nyanga, was tolerated, but Crossroads was the next target. However the women of Crossroads, supported by the Black Sash and other civil society organisations, mounted a ‘Save Crossroads’ campaign and in 1978 won a declaration by the Cape Supreme Court that Crossroads was an ‘emergency camp’ and that the state must supply water taps and remove refuse and night-soil for the payment by residents of a nominal fee (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999. p. 182-185). News of this victory, combined with persistent urbanisation, prompted a proliferation of shack settlements in the vicinity of Crossroads and in open spaces within

the townships of Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu (see Map 1 in **Annexure F** p. F7).

In 1979 Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana formed a group of Crossroads men into a Residents' Committee and, as reported by the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry, "turned Crossroads into his personal fiefdom, raising numerous taxes by means of which he could reward himself and his male enforcers with salaries and 'community cars'". (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999. p. 215). In May of that year, as a result of negotiations that included the Urban Foundation, Dr. Piet Koornhof, national Minister of Co-operation and Development, made an exclusive concession to Crossroads – that its residents would be enumerated and that those who wished to stay and who qualified in terms of certain criteria would be granted temporary urban rights and be provided with formal housing in an area between Nyanga and Guguletu. <sup>1</sup> As a result of this unprecedented decision the demand for space in Crossroads, associated with an implied right to 'stake a claim' for a house, became immense. Ngxobongwana and his deputy controlled the 'housing lists', charging residents to have their names included. <sup>2</sup>

### *Introducing the Veteran*

*The Veteran* made the acquaintance of Johnson Ngxobongwana soon after minister Koornhof's concession to Crossroads. He had joined the underground movement of the ANC military wing *Mkonto we Sizwe* (MK) soon after the ANC's banning in 1960 and for many years was actively involved in clandestinely moving people, arms and food parcels in and out of Cape Town on instructions of the external ANC structures. He lived in a local township, and in spite of the general mutual antagonism between residents of townships and informal settlements he maintained good relationships with some of the warlords because dense informal settlements such as Lusaka and Nyanga Bush (see **Map 3** below) were ideal places for hiding MK personnel.

Over the next few years, in response to an ANC 'Programme of Action' that civic associations be created that were not overtly political, he and others canvassed in the townships for the creation of the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). By 1982 there were about 32 such civic organisations in Cape Town, (Bickford-Smith et al, 199. p. 208) with the WCCA representing black communities as one of three

‘umbrella’ organisations. One of the instructions that *the Veteran* had received from his handlers in the ANC in Exile was to get close to Johnson Ngxobongwana, the Crossroads warlord, and draw him and his people into the Western Cape Civics. He responded by spending entire days with Ngxobongwana, having his meals with him, and eventually inducing him to become chairperson of the WCCA and to bring many of his followers with him.<sup>3</sup>

Koornhof’s promised housing project for Crossroads residents, ‘New Crossroads’ was located a kilometre away and its first phase of about 1 100 houses was completed in 1981. However in 1983 the government announced a new grand plan: all black people who had the right to stay in the Cape Peninsula would be housed in a huge new ‘city’ on the urban edge to be named Khayelitsha (‘New Place’) - and the estimated 100 000 ‘illegals’ in Cape Town would be returned to their homelands. Khayelitsha was to be built on a 3 220 hectare site in the south-west of the Cape Flats that had been personally selected from a helicopter by Prime Minister PW Botha.<sup>4</sup> By the end of that year the land intended for Phases 2 and 3 of New Crossroads had been appropriated by the residents of the ‘KTC squatter camp’ that had existed in the vicinity since the early 1970s, and who needed room for expansion (Readers Digest, 1994. p. 428).<sup>5</sup>

### Introducing *the Urban Planner*

He had been born in Cape Town but spent his childhood in Johannesburg and then Nairobi, where his secondary school became increasingly multi-racial during his time there. After returning to South Africa he studies at Rhodes and Cape Town Universities and became a town planner for the Cape Divisional Council, under whose jurisdiction was Crossroads and much of the Philippi area to its south. He had become particularly well acquainted with the new Philippi industrial area and its old landmark – an almost derelict cement factory on Lansdowne road. It was there that he gathered with his wife and many others one day in 1980 to celebrate the opening of a clinic.

A few months earlier he had been one of thousands of Christians from across the denominations to attend the South African Christian Leadership Assembly in Pretoria in order to seek God’s guidance regarding the parlous state of the nation. They had each been challenged to personally make a difference, and there Dr Ivan


Toms had felt called to establish a clinic to serve Crossroads – which was now being opened and dedicated. *The Urban Planner* had been challenged to pray more fervently for the country, and in particular to pray not just for peace but for justice. Through the months and years that followed he keenly followed the events at Crossroads, praying for a breakthrough.<sup>6</sup>

Tensions within a grossly overcrowded Crossroads escalated and at the end of 1983 it exploded in violence, when some of Ngxobongwana's old supporters turned against him. The bloody clashes spilled over into nearby areas such as KTC. Ngxobongwana's supporters identified themselves by wearing pieces of white cloth, and became known as the '*witdoeke*'. (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999. p. 215).

The political sweetener offered to black people for the 'separate development' of Khayelitsha in 1984 was the offer of 99-year leasehold property rights to its residents and the abolition of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. Although the state announced that Khayelitsha would comprise 120 000 brick houses, only 14% of the 450 000 people who actually settled in Khayelitsha over the next six years were accommodated in small core houses (built with cement blocks), 54% in shanties on individually serviced sites, and 32% in informal settlements with shared services. A lack of job creation produced an unemployment rate of 80%. (*ibid p. 212*).

The government intended that the first residents of Khayelitsha be drawn from Crossroads, but it faced considerable resistance and insistence from the residents that Koornhof's promise to provide housing nearby be honoured. The population of the Crossroads triangle continued to grow, creating four distinct settlements: "Old Crossroads" in the eastern corner; whilst in the western sector were the satellite areas of "Nyanga Extension" in the north, "Nyanga Bush" in the centre, and "Portland Cement" in the south, as illustrated in **Map 3** below. (*ibid p. 212*).

## Map 3. Crossroads 1983: The 4 Settlements



### Reinforcement and reaction

On the national stage in 1983 the government was approving its highly controversial tricameral constitution, creating separate houses of parliament for the white, coloured and Indian racial groups and reinforcing the ‘homeland’ policy for black people - the affairs of black urban dwellers would be managed by white lawmakers. With most political parties still banned, leaders of civic organisations across the country launched the United Democratic Front (UDF) which rapidly grew into a powerful mass movement of some 600 organisations (including trade unions) and 3 million people. (Readers Digest, 1994. p. 474-477). One of these organisations was the Western Cape Civic Association, whose chairman, Johnson Ngxobongwana, was publicly hailed as the leading opponent of forced removals to Khayelitsha.<sup>7</sup>

### Introducing *the Community Planner*

The Community Planner was one of the helpers at the launch of the UDF. As a white man he had not been able to find a political home in opposition to the government, and he was under the impression that the organisations affiliated to the

UDF were all either black consciousness groups or women's movements. The UDF itself was a conglomeration of organisations, so unless one was in an organisation there was no way of being involved in 'the struggle'. Therefore he and his white comrades had volunteered their services to the United Women's Congress to help with the launch of the UDF. Through this exposure they made such an impression that they were allowed to form one of the only three UDF Branches – and he was elected chair of the Claremont Branch.

His political baptism had occurred in 1972 when he had witnessed at close hand a brutal attack by riot police on peaceful demonstrators outside and within St George's Cathedral. He began reading alternative literature, some of it on anarchism, and studied - working his way through a BA by correspondence. While employed by a town planning firm he won a bursary to the University of Cape Town to study town planning during 1979-80. There he was exposed to Marxism and was an active member of a reading group on Marx until 1983, when the UDF was formed and his politics began to take a practical turn.<sup>8</sup> It was not long before he found ways to employ his planning skills to advise and help civic organisations.

The Urban Foundation (UF) had been established in 1977 by concerned South African business leaders to investigate and test viable alternatives to government policy and practice that would improve the quality of life of urban Africans. Its focus areas were urbanisation, housing, education and small business development. The UF's financial sponsors straddled the conventional English/Afrikaans and white political party divisions and its chief executive was a Supreme Court judge – from an esteemed and socially responsible Afrikaner family. The UF had garnered very strong support amongst moderate leaders of all races, but was regarded with suspicion by the political left who reckoned that it was too close to both government and business and from those in the government establishment who still believed that planning and development was their unique prerogative. The UF's Cape Town office took a particular interest in Crossroads, which had by then achieved international repute as a symbol of resistance to apartheid laws.<sup>9</sup> In 1985 the UF, after wide-ranging consultations with the various squatter leaders and their committees, proposed reducing the housing density in Crossroads by a third and then upgrading the whole area in situ.

### Urban war declared

Johnson Ngxobongwana, who had not participated in most of the negotiations with the UF because of imprisonment, refused to contemplate a reduction of a third of his support base (and income) and accused the leaders of the satellite camps of having settled their supporters on his land. Furthermore groups affiliated to the UDF were established in Crossroads in 1985 and challenged Ngxobongwana's regime. This initiated and ignited a succession of violent conflicts between Ngxobongwana's *witdoeke* and the UDF's 'comrades'. The police blamed the youth (*i.e.* the comrades) who were based in the satellite areas, and commended Ngxobongwana for keeping his area under control. The police also recommended against the UF's upgrading proposals on the grounds that in situ development would take too long and would create a product that would not satisfy its 'security requirements'. On 17 May 1986 the state's intentions became dreadfully clear - the security forces sealed off Crossroads, and until 12 June allowed the *witdoeke* to set fire to all the shanty settlements around Old Crossroads, displacing about 60 000 people. The detail of the Crossroads saga to this date was well captured by Josette Cole (Cole, 1986).

*The Veteran* recalls that just before this 'war' broke out in Crossroads he was instructed by his handlers to drive 1 000 kms to Bloemfontein to collect a 'parcel'. Almost half way there, at Beaufort-West, he came across a huge military convoy heading for Cape Town. He alerted his comrades, went on to run his errand and then returned without stopping and immediately went to Crossroads. There he found utter devastation and from Guguletu alone 18 of the locally trained MK cadres had lost their lives. "After the enemy had destroyed whatever they could at Crossroads they came to KTC, and they knew we had externally-trained people here – and it was a terrible fight. I remember one woman comrade who was trained outside of the country – she was short, big and vicious and was armed with an AK – who was eventually shot through the head from a helicopter."<sup>10</sup>

The refugees included a group which settled in Miller's Camp, south of Klipfontein Road; some which settled in 'Black City' on the west side of Mahobe Drive opposite the Crossroads municipal buildings; and a group which settled on Brown's Farm. Under such fraught circumstances the UF withdrew from Crossroads.<sup>11 12</sup>

### Introducing *the Democrat*

He was a small, quiet, determined man – who described himself simply as ‘a democrat’. He confessed to being a very private person, and his language was often unusually old-fashioned – he never ‘made a date’ with anyone, but he would ‘procure an appointment’. He was raised in a public-spirited family and principles and ethics in public life were extremely important to him. He was a professional quantity surveyor but in 1982 made a radical career change and joined the Urban Foundation, which he regarded as presenting a creative and pragmatic opportunity to make a difference in a very unjust country. He joined the UF as its Regional Director in Cape Town, where he began turning himself into a specialist at combining technical expertise with community participation.

In the midst of huge public and international outrage at the Crossroads violence one of the more constructive responses was by *the Community Planner* and some fellow town planners. They decided to petition the government to desist from using violence as a planning tool – as it had just done at Crossroads. More than 150 professionals in the built environment field signed the petition, to which the government gave no response. However the initiators of the petition decided to invite all of its signatories to some meetings in order to inform them about what was happening – consciousness-raising, to use the phrase that was popular at the time. Some of them were already advising civic groups on planning issues in a voluntary capacity, but as the requests for advice grew it became obvious that an NGO should be created for this purpose. They created the Development Action Group (DAG) which offered training and mentoring to planners who wished to serve communities and offered introductions to situations where their expertise could be applied.<sup>13</sup>

Mr Ngxobongwana, who had been in voluntary exile in Transkei for most of 1986,<sup>14</sup> had achieved control of Crossroads. On his return he set about reorganising his leadership, and in the process instituted disciplinary proceedings against some of his followers. One of these responded by leaving Crossroads and forming, with leaders of other informal settlements, the Western Cape Squatters Association, with the exclusive purpose of undermining the leadership of Crossroads and Khayelitsha. Although the Association only lasted a year, it demonstrated a different organisational model and was immediately succeeded by the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), whose leadership now included a former lieutenant of Nxobongwana, Jeffrey Nongwe. The aim of WCUSA

was to promote development in the black communities and negotiations with local and provincial authorities. At the same time Ngxobongwana was being wooed by organs of the government to become the first mayor of Crossroads.<sup>15</sup>

In 1986 the national government acknowledged the inevitability of urbanisation and repealed its influx control legislation, but by then the situation in and around Crossroads had become chaotic. There was no effective local authority in the area so the provincial government had to take charge – and because there was no democratic urban black representation the only people with whom government could parley were the squatter leaders. Businesses in the Philippi Industrial Area, just south of Crossroads, found themselves in a war zone - isolated, impotent, increasingly victims of crime, violence and land invasion, and lacking any effective recourse.

#### Introducing *the Defender*

She had been born and raised in Brazil, but married a Capetonian in 1961 and settled in one of Cape Town's oldest and most sought-after 'leafy suburbs'. She had no family history of social or political awareness or activism, but in 1962 she decided to do some voluntary work and drove a van, delivering meals to poor coloured families on the Cape Flats. A year later she was introduced to the work of the Black Sash by a friend and joined the movement. One of her reasons for joining was that in Brazil the government fought mass illiteracy by establishing night schools all over the country whereas the South African government was closing down night schools on the grounds that they were subversive. Another factor that stirred her into action was that she had encountered some of the tragic consequences of the Group Areas Act.

*The Defender* recalls that in the 1960's the Black Sash believed that if only people in power could be shown the evidence of the destructive nature of their policies they would change them. She would therefore join fact-finding missions to migrant labour hostels and then seek appointments with cabinet ministers to explain the implications of government policy and make recommendations for how it should be changed. She would join a team attending a Group Areas Hearing at which it was determined where people may live. Black Sash members, all perfectly attired with hats and gloves as well as their black sashes, would make formal protests at the

hearings, which were always ignored. By the end of that decade the Black Sash realised that reason would not prevail but continued employing demonstration as a strategy, in addition to running their advice offices to guide victims of apartheid. They mounted silent demonstrations at significant locations and events, such as the route used for the opening of parliament – and she reflects on how they learned to encapsulate the essence of their protest in just four words on a placard. She clearly remembers the demonstrations at St George’s cathedral in 1972 (in which *the Community Planner* had first encountered the state’s brutality).

She was well aware of her lack of knowledge and understanding of the complexities of both housing problems and inter-community tensions and politics. They were also limitations to the capacity of the Black Sash – she recalls the organisation having to decline a rare invitation to monitor a local government election in Crossroads because they lacked the necessary resources or knowledge. “We felt very bad,” she recalls, “because obviously there was need for an impartial agency to be present.” There was also a period when she was obliged to chair weekly meetings of all the different squatter groups that were threatened with bulldozing and eviction, and who accused each other of corruption and taking sides. “Those meetings were terrible...there was huge mistrust and anxiety – they didn’t know whether to accept the bona fides of the lawyers who were trying to help them, whether the government was telling the truth, whom to believe – it was a terrible time.” In 1986, at the height of the Crossroads conflagration, *the Defender* was elected national president of the Black Sash for a four-year term.<sup>16</sup>

In the early 1980s the government had made a policy change to allow black people who possessed Section 10 rights to elect their own ‘community councils’ in urban black townships. Such ‘Black Local Authorities’ (BLAs) could eventually replace the BAABs and, so the convoluted thinking went, these new structures could eventually be tied to Bantustans. (Terreblanche, 2002. p. 332). However, when the tricameral parliament was established in 1984 it excluded urban black persons from the franchise, which accentuated the incongruity of the BLAs, which therefore acquired very little popular support and their councillors were widely regarded as ‘sell-outs’. Nevertheless in 1987 Crossroads was declared a BLA, and Ngxobongwana was appointed its first mayor.

### Disintegration and decentralisation

During 1988, in yet another change in national policy, a start was made to transfer the responsibility for the affairs of the urban black population from national government departments and their Development Boards to its Provincial Administrators. The challenge in Cape Town was daunting – the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) had never been responsible for the administration of the extensive and complex business of ‘Black Affairs’, and had no employees with the required experience. Included in this transfer was Crossroads, which had been the responsibility of the Board, the police and the army – but not the province. Black Local Authorities in general and Crossroads in particular were veritable ‘hot potatoes’ which very few provincial officials or politicians wished to handle. The CPA urgently created a Community Services Branch, and appointed as its Director responsible for Black affairs in the Western Cape a very experienced official from the disbanded Bantu Administration Board: *the Wrestler*.

#### Introducing *the Wrestler*

*The Wrestler* had very little idea of what he had let himself in for. He had been grateful for the offer of promotion and for a transfer out of an oppressively managed department in the Eastern Cape, but it had been twenty years since he had worked in Cape Town, and then it had been the coloureds that he had been administering. “Some of them very beautiful, too, but of course you weren’t allowed to look at a coloured girl in those days. A pity...”, muses *the Wrestler*, now in his retirement and the apartheid prohibition on crossing the colour bar long dead. He had been in Black Administration ever since, like his father before him – Native Affairs, Bantu Affairs, Bantu Administration then Bantu Development. Between them they had spent 75 years in the service.

As Secretary of the Native Resettlement Board in the mid-1950s his father had helped to implement apartheid’s first large-scale forced removal of an urban black community from Sophiatown, on the instructions of Dr Verwoerd. The residents’ homes, to which they had legal title, were razed by the State and the people trucked to Meadowlands in Soweto. Sophiatown was redeveloped for sub-economic white families and the suburb cynically re-named *Triomf*. Twenty years later *the Wrestler* himself had been exposed to some tragic events – whilst working for the West Rand

Administration Board he had been in Soweto on June 16<sup>th</sup> 1976 when schoolchildren began their protest against the detested Bantu Education system. He witnessed much of what became the Soweto Revolt, in which hundreds lost their lives and which is regarded by many as the tipping point in the struggle against apartheid. He was seconded to help his Chief Director prepare evidence for the official Commission of Enquiry. With sadness he recalls the police and army chiefs telling him that although they were able to keep on shooting only he and his colleagues could bring about peace. “They were really terrible times”, he reflected, and would prefer not to talk about them.

And now back in Cape Town in the year 1988 he found that his new employer, the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), was completely and utterly ignorant of Black Affairs. Nor could he find anyone in the CPA who was remotely interested in or sympathetic to what was involved in administering an increasingly discredited and dysfunctional Black Local Authorities system. “They didn’t have a clue – not a clue!”

But *the Wrestler* was no stranger to handicaps. At the age of two he had contracted polio and consequently suffered a shortened leg. “My whole life I had to *get along* on a piston-and-a half, not two pistons. I think that had a lot to do with shaping my willpower and for enabling me to understand what it is to be less fortunate than other people.” His early years had been spent in a rural area of the Eastern Cape, where he had learnt to speak fluent *isiXhosa* but at the age of six he began to attend the Hope Training Home for polio victims, located in Johannesburg. There he realised how greater were the disabilities of others, and learned how important was will power. Years later, on arrival at Stellenbosch University, he quickly realised that not being a rugby player was in danger of becoming another handicap so he resolved to take up wrestling ... and rose to become South African Middleweight Champion. “Sheer determination!” he reflects, “and in later life that was important.”

*The Wrestler’s* regional office was established in a suburb of Cape Town and staffed with personnel from the disbanded Development Board. His team felt alienated by the management and administration in the CPA head office. Out in the

field it proved very difficult to maintain viable local authorities and for six years, 1988-94, he had the added workload of having to personally govern four of them, over 400 kilometres apart. In that role the full authority, powers and functions of the local council were vested in him. “A fearsome responsibility,” he reflects. “You’ve got to have balls of steel to last.” And in addition there was Crossroads, in circumstances beyond anything he had ever encountered.<sup>17</sup>

In the late 1980’s some advocacy work by the Development Action Group brought *the Community Planner* into contact with *the Wrestler* – “It was funny”, the former recalls, “We were total adversaries, and I knew that he sat on security committees that probably had my name on all sorts of lists. But that was just the role-play that one went through while wearing those hats – what I did know about him was that he was somebody with whom you could engage in good faith.”<sup>18</sup>

In 1989 *the Veteran* was detained without trial in Cape Town’s Polsmoor prison for a year under the ‘State of Emergency’ laws. It was his third spell behind bars. Meanwhile a young planner in the CPA began turning his mind towards Crossroads...

### *Introducing the Provincial Planner*


Educated at an English-speaking school and then at the University of Cape Town he had just qualified as a town planner and had recently joined the Provincial Administration, an institution that was staffed overwhelmingly with Afrikaans speakers and National Party supporters. Sadly, he was no more welcomed into the CPA than *the Wrestler* had been: “I was told that I spoke the wrong language, had my account at the wrong bank, had been to the wrong university and had the wrong surname! My profile did not match what was desired at any level – I was simply tolerated.” His job for the first two years was to consider plans submitted by developers of leisure resorts, but then in 1989 he was asked to focus on areas covered by Act No 4 of 1984 – urban land designated to be developed for occupation by black people.

His first challenge was to create a Crossroads Structure Plan. It was soon apparent that the triangle of land known as Crossroads could not possibly accommodate all the people who claimed a right to live there – so the objective expanded to ‘a

Crossroads and Environs Structure Plan’ because much more land in the vicinity would be required. He remembers beginning with a map which was only A4 in size on which Crossroads was drawn in the middle with the N2 highway nearby, onto which he and his colleagues then drew the outer perimeter of all the available land that was broadly contiguous with Crossroads. It included areas of Philippi, Delft and Mfuleni – and took into account a possible future expansion of the airport, as shown diagrammatically in Map 3 below.<sup>19</sup>

As had been intended, the scorched earth destruction within Crossroads had created space for some formal development, and the first phase of 800 contractor-built houses on the western edge of the triangle had been completed. But so few Crossroads residents could afford to buy them that many were sold to outsiders and some sites remained unsold for many years. When construction began on Phase 2, to provide 874 houses to the north of Phase 1, 1401 households were relocated from that area to a ‘transit camp’ across Klipfontein Road called “Boystown” (see **Map 4** below). Priority in the housing waiting list was promised to those who fulfilled three requirements: residents of Boystown, *bona fide* inhabitants of Crossroads, and up to date with their payment of service charges.<sup>20</sup>

Map 4. “Crossroads & Environs” 1989



In February 1990 the first twenty of the Phase 2 houses became available<sup>21</sup> and were offered at a monthly rental of 55 Rands. No applications were received from Boystown, and once again they were made available more widely. The people of Boystown were left feeling betrayed on the sidelines in their informal settlement, which more than doubled in size to 2 400 households over the next two years.<sup>22</sup> In Crossroads the mayhem continued, in which Ngxobongwana was ousted as mayor of Crossroads by Jeffrey Nongwe. Violence erupted between the two factions and in September Ngxobongwana fled with his followers over the N2 highway into the southern edge of the Driftsands Nature Reserve.<sup>23</sup>

### **A glimmer of hope**

The opening of parliament on 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1990 brought *the Defender* and her Black Sash colleagues out on to the streets again with their sashes and placards, never imagining that President de Klerk was about to announce the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations and the imminent release from prison of Nelson Mandela. FW de Klerk's momentous speech was the death knell for all the apartheid legislation, functions and apparatus, including the tricameral parliamentary system which had excluded the majority black population from representation. The House of Representatives (for Coloureds) and the House of Delegates (for Indians) each had extensive administrations, including housing functions, which would have to be dismantled and assimilated into whatever government structures were to follow.

#### ***Introducing the Strategist***

As a young man he had decided that rather than follow his father's interest in politics he would join the civil service as a town planner. He prided himself on "serving the government of the day" and had established a reputation for addressing issues with expertise and integrity. His career had taken him from the national Department of Community Development, where he was the Deputy Town Planner in 1974, involved with the development of Mitchell's Plain as a new town for coloured people, to the top housing position in the administration of the coloured parliament - the House of Representatives. There he had introduced a holistic approach to housing in areas such as Delft and Blue Downs, incorporating assisted self-building schemes with technical resource centres, ensuring the provision of all the necessary community facilities, involving the private sector in joint ventures

and providing a professional social service to support vulnerable households. He believed that big problems deserved big solutions and was not afraid to innovate.

Two months after Nelson Mandela's release *the Strategist* transferred to the Cape Provincial Administration on promotion to lead the Community Services Branch, with four gigantic responsibilities: the administration and development urban black settlements; the welfare of the urban black population; all spatial planning functions in the Province; and the oversight of all local government institutions. *The Wrestler* was one of his three first line managers for Black affairs. *The Provincial Planner* was a junior planner, three tiers below. Not only had *the Strategist* inherited a large team of personnel from diverse backgrounds – he had also inherited the problem of Crossroads, its warlords and the incessant conflict there. He had never dealt with warlords before, or even with black communities.

*The Strategist* realised that although his predecessor had negotiated the funds to build the 'white houses' in Crossroads nobody had considered how they would be allocated. "And it was war! I realised that we cannot go on like this, fighting about resources. Khayelitsha was running alright, but in these older areas nothing was happening – they had suddenly made this small injection of housing but there was no holistic plan. We needed to provide some hope and get a plan on the table, even if it was going to take time."

*The Strategist* still had to work out how to deal with Crossroads. He recounts that when employed by the House of Representatives he had been kept well informed and advised by the National Intelligence Service. "They told us that we had to adapt, without telling us what to do. They provided very good briefings, including reports on their research on the realities of urbanisation. Their message was that we had to adapt and in particular we had to consult and involve people – it wasn't easy, but we had to do it."


### *Introducing the Sponsor*

In the years preceding South Africa's first democratic government 1994 state rule was centralised, aided by provincial administrations, each with an executive council which was chaired by the Administrator of the Province. Provincial governments, led by Premiers, were introduced in 1994. *The Sponsor* was Administrator of the

Cape Province from 1989-1994. He was a lawyer by training but had established himself very successfully as an executive in wine and wheat co-operative movements. He entered politics in 1972, first as a town councillor in Paarl, then as a member of the Cape Provincial Council, and in 1981 made it his occupation with a seat in parliament. From 1986 to 1989 he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – a very delicate job in those last years of State President PW Botha’s reign – and in the subsequent reorganisation he was appointed Provincial Administrator. (The O’Malley Archives). *The Strategist* comments: “We were lucky to have *the Sponsor* – you could speak to him and convince him of things. He was a people person, a Christian with good values, and if you came to him with the right kind of message he was willing to adapt”.

At this time it was not State policy to build houses in urban areas for black people. The tricameral administrations had housing policies for coloured and Indian persons that provided subsidised home loans plus advice and training for self-builders, but the State’s policy for urban Africans was to create only serviced sites, which were then leased at an income-related rent. The tenants could build whatever they could afford, but they did not own the land and were not given access to loans, so most dwellings were informal shacks. The few formal houses that had previously been built in New Crossroads, Khayelitsha and Crossroads had been political initiatives and were exceptions to the rule.

## Map 5. Cape Town: Black Townships as at 1990



Crossroads had become the iconic contemporary example of the South African's government's absolute determination to apply its apartheid policies to the urban African population. Its control of Crossroads had been achieved only by joining forces with similarly autocratic and repressive leaders, and by doing so it had magnified opposition within the country and internationally. There was nothing constructive to show for all the energy expended except a few unaffordable houses, some cleared, scorched land and a tiny local authority run by white officials with a warlord as mayor and his henchmen as councillors. Meanwhile urbanisation had not abated – and in the 16 years since it was first occupied Crossroads had generated immensely more problems than it had solved. An estimated sixty thousand people were now struggling to survive in or around Crossroads with inadequate access to basic facilities.

As regional director of the Urban Foundation in Cape Town through most of the 1980s *the Democrat* had wanted to properly consolidate the settlement of Crossroads in a participative manner, starting with an infrastructure programme, but it had been thwarted by the politics of the time. He had since resigned from the Urban Foundation and become a consultant in the facilitation of community involvement in development – and in that capacity *the Strategist* had employed him to do some work with rural coloured communities in the Northern Cape for the House of Representatives. Now, in 1990, *the Democrat* was busy coordinating community participation in 100 housing projects across the country which were being financed by the Independent Development Trust.





With adaptation as an imperative, but confronted by the multiple challenges of outdated attitudes and practices within government and of building real relationships with legitimate black leadership, *the Strategist* invited *the Democrat* to a discussion on Crossroads in October 1990.

### **The Crossroads stakeholders**

This story has identified many parties and individuals who have featured in the Crossroads crisis at some stage. Thus far the main actors have been broadly 'government' and 'community', and from time to time organisations in the 'private sector' and 'civil society' played a role. However, many of the organisational structures and leading actors in the


Crossroads saga changed over the period 1974-1990, and to prepare for what lies ahead it would be wise to pause in 1990 and record what forces were at work in Crossroads at that stage. Relational maps are an attempt to record who the main actors are at any time and the nature of their inter-relationships. The key to the symbols used in the relational maps within this thesis are shown in **Fig 5** below:

### Fig 5. Relational Maps: Key to Symbols

- Strong relationships 
- Associations 
- Strong opposition 
- Mutual distrust 

By this means the forces at work in Crossroads in the early part of 1990 can be represented as shown in **Fig 6** overleaf:

Fig 6. Crossroads 1990: Forces at Work



## KEY

<b>UDF</b>	United Democratic Front	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc
<b>Ikapa</b>	Ikapa Town Council	<b>Khayelitsha</b>	Lingeletu West Town Council

The right hand side of **Fig 6** shows the State's establishment: responsibility had been delegated to the provincial government, which also administered the Black Local Authorities – and shown here is the Crossroads Town Council and its neighbouring Ikapa Town Council (for the old 'townships' of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) and the Council for the massive new 'city' of Khayelitsha. The leadership of the Crossroads remnant had been co-opted into the Crossroads Town Council with first Ngxobongwana and then Nongwe as Mayor. And Nongwe was an office-bearer in WCUSA – the association of squatter leaders.

Crossroads was not the only squatter settlement with autocratic leaders – a number of the groups who had entered Crossroads and later fled as refugees into previously uninhabited areas were led by autocrats, and these also joined WCUSA.

However, those refugees who settled in open spaces within existing formal townships and within hostel complexes relied on support from the leaders of their

neighbourhood, most of whom were associated with civic movements and therefore with the United Democratic Front. They were implacably opposed to the State and all its repressive manifestations and to any allies of the State, whom they regarded as 'sell-outs'.

Between all of these refugee settlements was a cautious, competitive relationship. They each wanted to receive priority in any possible housing project and were willing to fight for it. It was reputedly also common practice for settlement leaders to extract tribute from their followers for protection, access to resources and for being placed on an unofficial waiting list for a site or house in a probably fictitious new project.

In addition to these rather obvious and high profile actors in the Crossroads drama there were a number of other parties who had an interest in the restoration of peace and development in Crossroads and in how the 30 unserved refugee settlements would be provided with something better. These included the other local authorities in Cape Town from whom any responsibility for African housing had been removed by the State decades before. The principal of these was the City of Cape Town, containing most of the city's businesses, and which had a long history of opposition to apartheid. The metropolitan area of Cape Town contained over 50 local authorities, and should apartheid fall local government would have to be rationalised and the City would have a major role to play. The City Council was very concerned about the ongoing violence and disruption in Crossroads yet had neither a mandate nor the capacity to intervene. There was also the Western Cape Regional Services Council which was responsible for metropolitan planning and the provision of bulk services and on which the local authorities were represented, but had no authority to intervene in crossroads either.

Business interests in Philippi, bordering Crossroads, had been badly disadvantaged by the violence and arson. Some had abandoned the area and those remaining were very concerned at the inability of government to bring stability. Organised business was unable to exert leverage in such a localised crisis and its main instrument for creating such change, the Urban Foundation, had been rebuffed in Crossroads.

Some civil society organisations, including welfare and faith-based groups, had been very active in and around Crossroads, providing emergency goods and services, legal and other specialist advice and humanitarian aid for various lengths of time. In the course

of their work such people would have gained a deep insight into detailed aspects of the crisis, and be acutely aware of the damage that had been inflicted and its causes. The extent to which such organisations might be able to contribute to creating a development programme would require careful consideration, for some were more reactive than pro-active in nature and had tightly prescribed areas of interest.

Leaders of neighbouring black communities were very concerned at the spread of violence from Crossroads and the pressures being put on their own areas by the influxes of Crossroads refugees. These leaders needed development for their own people, many of whom were living in overcrowded houses and hostels, and their compassion towards the refugees was mixed with the fear that these ‘outsiders’ or ‘latecomers’ might somehow be given priority in development over those who had been suffering in Cape Town for a far longer time.

Also waiting in the wings were other parties who were keen to benefit from any housing development – the service providers: consultants, contractors and materials suppliers. Over previous years the CPA had developed a reputation for awarding contracts to political supporters. These same beneficiaries were waiting for more. On the other hand those firms that had been excluded were waiting for political change and wanted to be first in the queue when the dispensation changed. But there was another huge group of people waiting for their turn – those who had been denied any opportunity for advancement and profit-making simply because of the colour of their skin – and they were determined not to be left out again.

Trust is usually in short supply in such crises, but in spite of opposing parties and philosophies it is possible that some individuals from opposing camps have a friendly or working relationship. They may have worked with each other long ago, or found themselves sitting side by side on a journey sometime and struck up a conversation, or perhaps are aware that they think more broadly or creatively than their job allows them to act. These are potential Enablers: bridge-builders, facilitators, deal brokers and conflict defusers whose contribution can be of great value. This case study has already revealed that there were potentially significant pre-existing relationships between *the Strategist* and *the Democrat*, and between *the Community Planner* and *the Wrestler*. *The Veteran* had a very broad span of connections. The Enablers include four town planners who shared an ethical

code – three of whom had attended the same town planning school. And as will be revealed in the next chapter, although *the Defender* publicly opposed the government she was held in high esteem by *the Sponsor*.

Contrarily cross-party relationships might be used for personal advantage or an illicit or hidden purpose that is contrary to the public interest. The possibility of large-scale development can tempt opportunists to grasp control of resources, and a careful watch should be kept on the formation of any strategic alliances that are for such purposes.

The accumulated indignities of racial discrimination, segregation and oppression had reached an awful, fiery conclusion in Crossroads. Development was necessary but no longer possible, a mighty government apparatus had stumbled to a useless, incompetent, halt. There were no alternative institutions or procedures. But there were some potential Enablers who could bring some alternative attitudes, values and approaches to the table, and an opportunity had been created by *the Strategist* for *the Democrat* to suggest some radical alternatives to conventional state practice.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has explained how accumulated layers of racial segregation, discrimination and law-making in South Africa eventually erupted in a place called Crossroads, producing unmanageable waves of chaos and violence which rendered the place undevelopable. The argument presented by this chapter is that Crossroads became a candidate for cross-sector collaboration because of the extreme turbulence of its environment and the inability of any party to unilaterally, or even bilaterally, resolve the social crisis. The contribution of this chapter to the main argument of this thesis is to reveal the stage upon which the empirical drama of this thesis will be played, and to introduce the characters who will carry the plot through to its successful conclusion.

Chapter 5 introduces the terms of the proposal to collaborate and the process whereby Enablers canvassed its acceptability among stakeholders and presently launched the cross-sector collaboration. But a counter-plot emerges which will eventually fuel the argument that collaborations are incessantly complex..

## 5

## Collaboration conceptualised and contested: Enablers and Disablers take the stage

“Intersection is about people and ways of doing things coming down to a crossroads, not knowing what else is going to be there, and no one being able to completely dominate what takes place there, since there are many different ways to get there and get out. Whatever happens, people coming to the crossroads are changed” (Simone, 2010. P. 191)

Chapter 4 verified the argument that only when an institution has exhausted all of its own resources might it venture towards the last resort of seeking advice from an implacable opponent. Such circumstances also provide opportunities for creative, thoughtful officials to explore radical alternatives. In this Chapter we learn that *the Democrat's* proposal prioritises the victims, flattens the organisational pyramid almost to the horizontal and requires every stakeholder group to be included. *The Strategist* believes in it, *the Sponsor* endorses it and the canvassing begins. However not everyone is a believer, for ‘development’ also signals possibilities for power, influence and profits – and in a combination of opportunism and protectionism an alternative proposal is secretly hatched by members of an exclusive ‘old guard’; politicians, officials, consultants, contractors and their surrogate and rather suspect ‘squatter leaders’.

Nevertheless *the Sponsor* and *the Strategist* proceed deliberately, following *the Democrat's* proposal. All the stakeholders profess interest and the parties begin meeting in two parallel policy committees, because some local authorities have legal standing but no popular credibility. The Technical Committee is established and determines that the needs are far in excess of resources. It is a challenging but promising start.

### A Proposal to Collaborate

The meeting to which *the Strategist* invited *the Democrat* was held on 22 October 1990. Officials reported that the remains of shacks destroyed in the latest violence in Crossroads would be cleared away that day, which would make about 10 hectares available for

development provided that the 17–20 households still living in that area could be relocated. Although the government (and new Crossroads Mayor Jeffrey Nongwe) was keen to develop and formalise any available land in Crossroads it was obvious to *the Strategist* that the new political climate would require a more inclusively participative process. *The Democrat* was invited to propose a framework strategy for how the development of Crossroads might be attempted.<sup>24</sup>

He responded on 5 November with a radically different development proposal which was not driven by an imperative to develop the crossroads triangle but by an obligation to meet the needs of every community that could claim a right to benefit from and be involved in a Crossroads-based development initiative. Technically therefore, a comprehensive social and physical assessment of demand and supply was required; new principles would be required for prioritising communities and projects, ensuring that participative processes are applied, allocating sites and compensating people who may be disadvantaged; improved standards for infrastructure and services would have to be prescribed; and systems to ensuring effective communication between all stakeholders would be essential.

To guide and manage the development process *the Democrat* proposed the creation of Policy and Technical Committees, each containing representatives of the affected political parties, community organisations, informal settlements and government structures – on an inclusive basis. He recommended that *the Sponsor*, as the most senior statesman in the region, should be the convenor or patron of the process, but that the Policy Committee should be chaired by an independent person of public stature. Furthermore, integrity in the participative planning process would have to be assured for the non-government parties to invest in sustained involvement, and therefore the CPA would have to be an equal player with all the other parties involved in the process and be without a casting vote. Decisions would be made by consensus. Lastly, *the Democrat* commented that although the Black Local Authorities had a statutory role to play in the process their (unrepresentative) councillors would not be recognised by the ‘non-statutory’ groups – so that there might have to be two policy committees.<sup>25</sup>

Such a project would require much more land than was available in Crossroads. Therefore a critical issue was whether the technical analysis should be incorporated in a proposed metropolitan land planning exercise or undertaken separately. Although he

considered that a metropolitan framework would be ideal *the Democrat* doubted very much if it could be mobilised quickly enough to respond to the needs of the greater Crossroads crisis. He therefore recommended that the technical team focus on the project's needs but include among its members the planners who would ultimately drive any metropolitan planning initiative.

*The Strategist* decided to test the responsiveness of the town planning fraternity and immediately sent out an invitation to participate in an exploratory discussion on the establishment of a group to consider the issues of urbanisation in greater Cape Town. It was addressed to twelve planning and development professionals in provincial and local government, academia and civil society, but in their private capacities.<sup>26</sup> However the politics of planning made such a meeting impossible and it never took place.<sup>27</sup> It was apparent that there could be no short cut in metropolitan planning – there were too many structures involved (more than 50 local authorities in greater Cape Town at that stage) and too many issues to address.

*The Democrat's* proposal was discussed and amended in a series of meetings with officials in November,<sup>28</sup> and then presented to *the Sponsor* early in December, who recognised that not only was it politically imperative to resolve the Crossroads crisis but that the circumstances demanded a completely unorthodox approach. After ensuring that he would have the cooperation of the Chairman of the Regional Services Council, Piet Loubser, he approved the proposal in principal. *The Democrat* began canvassing support for the process in February 1991.<sup>29</sup>

On 7 March 1991 *the Democrat* reported to the CPA that the response from parties (including WCUSA) had so far been positive. He was encouraged to “get the ball rolling... especially as winter is approaching”.<sup>30</sup> CPA officials were hoping for implementation in Crossroads at a very early stage.<sup>31</sup> So far the ANC, the Pan African Congress (PAC), the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), the City of Cape Town (CCT) and the Western Cape Regional Services Council (RSC) had been canvassed. He had learned that talks were underway in the ANC to create a national association of civic movements, but that for the time being the political party and the Civics would have separate representation.<sup>32</sup>

During this process some of the parties made it clear that they would not be willing to negotiate with the Black Local Authorities, and particularly their unrepresentative councillors. It was therefore proposed, with the approval of *the Sponsor*, to organise the policy-making process into two separate but parallel committees. One, the 'local authority group', would contain representatives of the existing local authorities that had statutory jurisdiction in the project area, whereas the 'extra-parliamentary group' would contain representatives of community groups and the un-banned political parties. In addition the Provincial Administration, Regional Services Council and Cape Town City Council (which at that stage was not responsible for any of the project area) would be represented on both groups. The local authority group would be chaired by the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for Community Services in the Province, who would also represent the interests of that group at meetings of the extra-parliamentary group. *The Sponsor* would chair the latter group until an independent chairperson was appointed. The Policy Committees would be served by a Technical Committee of officials and consultants of the participating parties.<sup>33</sup>

The creation of extensive spatial plans over areas controlled by different authorities was a particular challenge. The RSC was a tier of government established nationally in 1985 with responsibilities that included financing and developing regional infrastructure and metropolitan planning. The process of creating a Metropolitan Spatial Development Plan for Cape Town over a 10 year period proved to be very complicated and has been separately documented by Vanessa Watson (2002). One of the early approaches attempted by the RSC was to commission sub-regional structure plans for the city on the assumption that when combined they would yield a metropolitan plan. (*ibid* p. 28). One of these was a structure plan for the Metropolitan South-East, which included Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain, Philippi and Crossroads, which would also require public participation. In April 1991 questions were raised by a number of town planners within government, private practice and NGOs about how to integrate this macro-planning process with the proposed development initiative for Crossroads.<sup>34 35</sup>

*The Strategist* and *the Democrat* met on 15 April and agreed to propose that each party on the Policy Committee be represented by two councillors or political figures and supported by one (non-voting) official. It was also proposed that the appointment of any required consultants would be made by the CPA, but only on the recommendation of the

Policy Committee. It was agreed that *the Democrat* would draft the invitations, the agenda, an introductory speech for *the Sponsor*, brief notes on the agenda items for *the Sponsor* as chairman, and a press release for consideration at the first meeting. *The Democrat* would also provide secretarial services for both Policy Committees.<sup>36</sup>

### **Some implications of the proposal**

*The Democrat's* proposed process was very simple: an appraisal of demand and of how to balance it with supply; the definition of principles and standards; and the assurance of real participation and effective communication. His recommended structure was also simple: a high-level political patron, a policy-making committee with an independent chairperson, and a technical committee in support. Involvement in the policy-making process would be for political parties (especially essential for those recently un-banned), organisations representing the stakeholder communities, and relevant government structures. A radical but essential recommendation was that all parties have equal value, and that the CPA would only make decisions regarding the project, including the choice of consultants, on the recommendation of the policy-making body. The separation of Black Local Authorities from the main Policy Committee must have been a bitter pill for their councillors and officials to swallow, but their illegitimacy was so widely recognised that a compromise was unthinkable. One of the greatest challenges to be faced in the project was to achieve 'real participation and effective communication'. Some more of the implications of the proposal are explored below.

#### *The change in scope*

The early change in scope of the project is significant. Some CPA officials had defined the objective as the development of the physical area of Crossroads for its current residents. A critical ingredient for them was their close relationship with the *witdoeke* leadership of Crossroads, forged in a number of government-supported conflicts. This group believed that the issue was technical and that development could be re-started by procedurally terminating the violence and simply relocating some households. But a group of planners within the CPA had begun thinking about the Crossroads issue more generally and were formulating ideas about 'Crossroads and its environs'. The introduction of a consultant who had been involved in the history of the area, but who was unable to ignore the immensely controversial history of Crossroads and the claims and interests of many parties, averred

that the technical approach was no longer feasible. He argued that the perpetuation of development driven by patronage and violence would be increasingly unacceptable in a democratising society and insisted that the focus must be changed to the many people who had invested in Crossroads, most of whom had lost dwellings, possessions and family members in the conflict and were now living in a variety of locations in the district. The fault line between these two approaches would become one of the defining characteristics of the road ahead.

The claims of ‘communities’ to participate in the project was not difficult to validate because it had been the regularisation of Crossroads that had attracted squatters out of the ‘bush’ and into Crossroads. Subsequently it was the Crossroads violence that had dispersed them into vacant areas within adjacent townships. Virtually every informal settlement within Philippi, Nyanga and Guguletu had its origin in Crossroads. Furthermore, community leaders who were canvassed about the proposal appealed for the needs of homeless households in nearby townships to not be ignored so it was decided to also accommodate some residents of backyard shacks as well as the overflow from an anticipated upgrade of government-owned hostels.

#### *Parallel Policy Committees*

The proposal to establish two policy committees combined a commitment to inclusivity combined with a pragmatic recognition that apartheid’s puppet Black Local Authorities were of doubtful legitimacy. It was, however, necessary to recognise the *de jure* local authorities and ensure that their officials were informed and consulted by the provincial authority – the CPA. There was also the need and opportunity to engage the most powerful local authority in the region, the City of Cape Town, in the contemporary realities of development for black communities for the first time since the Bantu Administration Boards had taken control of ‘locations’ in 1973. (Bickford-Smith *et al*, 1999. p. 174).

A related complication was that there were more than 50 local government institutions in metropolitan Cape Town. Their rationalisation was imperative. However the problem extended across the country, and was of such a huge scale that its resolution was postponed until after the national political transformation had been achieved. Whilst the restructuring of local government had little manifestation until 1994 it had a very drawn-out disruptive effect on the project environment thereafter and its implications were

considerable for the officials involved.

*Political influences and personal interests*

Politics was a powerful factor in this case study. Political movements are framed with principles and objectives and are motivated by issues of power and control. Under oppressive political systems the opposition may have to be fragmented in order to survive, yet require unity in order to demonstrate some order and consistency. From 1983 until 1990 the many political movements which identified with any of the banned political parties, and particularly within the Western Cape, associated themselves with the United Democratic Front (UDF), as mentioned in Chapter 4. When *the Democrat* began canvassing for support the main UDF-affiliated organisations active within the project area were the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), the Western Cape United Civic Association (WCUCA), the Western Cape United Independent Civic Congress (WCUICC) and the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA). Each had their own territory, leadership and agenda. In a separate stable was the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA or WECUSA), whose members were not the squatters, but the self-made leaders of their settlements, who justified their style with reference to traditional autocratic tribal chieftainship, not democracy.

All of these leaders found themselves on the cusp of a new dispensation in 1990, in which the organisations that had been their passion would be redundant. Their personal ambitions and careers would have to be re-fashioned along an unprecedented choice of channels: political, business, administration, academic, etc. They would soon discover that there was no guarantee of loyalty or reward for past service. There would be intense competition, exacerbated by the return home of political exiles who had been living in completely different contexts. They would each have to look after their own interests.

At this stage, however, the nature of politics and political alignments in South Africa was very uncertain and fluid – and would remain so for at least a decade. It was advisable, therefore, to structure the process along lines of local representation rather than national politics, and to expect and accommodate changes in political organisations and liaisons. This proved to be very challenging in a period of constant and rather unpredictable change.

The way South Africa would be governed in future would also have a significant impact on the public service. The CPA and the BLAs were packed with white supporters of the old regime. Transformation would certainly involve not only major structural re-engineering, but a multiracial approach to employment that would involve widespread replacements of personnel. Therefore participation by this key segment in the Policy Committee included some anxiety about the application of ‘revolutionary’ participative development practices and fears that some of their careers might be prematurely terminated.

*Disempowerment for empowerment*

Although no legally incorporated institution in the public or private sector may delegate its statutory authority or responsibilities to a non-statutory experimental committee it can refer issues or proposals to the committee and allow the committee to make recommendations. The willingness of powerful participants to respect others and share decision-making processes with them is fundamental to a successful collaboration.


The decision-making process to be followed in this project was crucial. ‘Consensus’ is a rather vague term implying general or widespread agreement, yet it does not mean unanimity. Its significance is in the attitude or intent that it portrays. No party was to be given a casting vote. Neither would decisions be put to the vote and given to the majority. ‘Consensus’ was part of the language used in South Africa for the negotiation of its reconstruction from apartheid to democracy. Consensus decision-making was a founding principle. As time went on, in the national negotiations and then in this project, as discussions became more focused and contested, it became necessary to progress to a requirement for ‘sufficient consensus’ – when there is sufficient agreement for a course of action to be actually followed.

The CPA had agreed to make a number of very significant changes in its practice. It would no longer deal exclusively with Mr Nongwe on Crossroads affairs but would promote all-inclusive participation venture in an urban area. It was prepared to relegate the Black Local Authorities to a subsidiary role relative to community organisations, and it would plan on the basis of community needs rather than government edict. By being willing to equally partner all others in the Policy Committee it would submit to the Policy Committee regarding, for example, appointments of consultants. Nevertheless *the Sponsor*,

the Administrator of the Cape Province, would be Patron of the project and personally support and protect the initiative.

That level of commitment was essential for the proposal to have a chance of success. It was no guarantee, however, for the stakes were high and opposition could come from anywhere. As **Fig 7** below shows, however, a useful and unprecedented group of stakeholders had declared their interest by April 1991.

**Fig 7. iSLP Stakeholders : April 1991**



**KEY**

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress	<b>RSC</b>	Regional Services Council
<b>CPA</b>	Cape Provincial Administration	<b>WCCA</b>	Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>PAC</b>	Pan African Congress	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc

There was, however, some risk attached. *The Democrat's* proposal was indeed radical, completely counter to the culture and experience of most of the existing government and its development agents, and vulnerable to criticism of being naive, idealistic, socialist, impracticable, foolhardy and downright dangerous. He had no personal track record of actually managing large-scale participative development – he was being driven by principle, by theory and perhaps by some emotion, having been angered by the earlier rejection of the Urban Foundation proposal. Unbeknown to him his initiative was already being undermined within the CPA and beyond. The stage was set for what would become a long and intense drama.

### **An immediate counter-proposal**

*The Democrat's* development proposal was not the only one being considered within the CPA. A letter had been sent to the MEC on 14 December 1990 from the Khayelitsha Committee of WCUSA, signed by its Director: Development and Housing, who shall be referred to here as *the Headman*. The letter began, "As the formal and legal representatives of the Squatter Communities in the Western Cape, the joint committees of WCUSA, representing amongst others the following towns viz. Khayelitsha, Philippi, Crossroads, Miller's Camp, KTC, Browns Farm and Nyanga Bush and the country areas within its jurisdiction, have now decided to approach you on the following issues..." These included the transfer of land to 'the Squatters', engagement with all actors in the housing process and access to finance for the supply of infrastructure. WCUSA claimed to have the "sole mandate on behalf of the total Squatter Community", would insist on utilising technical experts selected and appointed by itself, and warned that "Squatters will not participate in any projects unless they are fully and totally involved as set out above". WCUSA demanded of the CPA that all red tape be removed in interactions between government and WCUSA and that "all negotiations between the two parties be treated with the greatest degree of confidentiality to ensure efficiency and direction and to develop an environment of mutual trust."<sup>37</sup>


A letter in similar vein was sent by *the Headman* to *the Strategist* on 7 February 1991, referring to "our previous discussions relating to this issue" and claiming to have "the final mandate to interact with yourselves on behalf of the Squatter Community" in order to gain access to land and infrastructure. He appended a list of the land that WCUSA had provisionally identified, amounting to "approximately 2 500 hectares and therefore 70 000 erven", and also the original letter that had been sent to the MEC. He referred to the proposed policy committee, and said that it must be formed speedily for the benefit "of other disadvantaged communities". However, the WCUSA initiatives were in place and ready for implementation. Urgent action was called for, but on condition that WCUSA be involved at all levels of decision-making, that its consultants and advisors (which shall be referred to here as the Private Sector Consortium - PSC) be utilised and that all other "planning for Squatter towns be put on hold until WCUSA's representatives can get involved". It was not until 8 April that *the Democrat* had first sight of this correspondence.<sup>38</sup>

WCUSA had also engaged with the Crossroads authorities: on 11 February at the Crossroads Town Office a delegation from WCUSA had met with the Town Clerk. *The Headman* told him that WCUSA was “a sub-structure of the African National Congress and operates under the auspices of the United Democratic Front.” WCUSA required “to be included in all planning and development of black areas on a partnership basis ... and that the community ... have taken over the decision-making functions in this respect. The roles are reversed.” He referred to funds available from government, resources to which WCUSA itself had access, and that it was also in liaison with the Independent Development Trust,<sup>39</sup> “... which brings us closer to the funding aspects of development”.<sup>40</sup> *The Headman* followed this up with a letter to the Town Clerk, in which he stated that “WCUSA is now in the process of mobilising the communities to occupy the existing unutilised infrastructure”, and after listing WCUSA’s development objectives reaffirmed that it had appointed specific consulting engineers and project coordinators to do all the planning, designing and project supervision.<sup>41</sup>

Contrarily, in mid-April *the Headman* told *the Democrat* that WCUSA was in conflict with both the ANC and the Civics movement, and that WCUSA would have difficulty in sitting around the same table as them in a discussion of the development of Crossroads. When they spoke again on 23 April 1991 *the Headman* did not raise the matter again, but reported that the WCUSA committee was very suspicious that CPA’s intention to install bulk services in Section 1 on the west side of Crossroads might be to allow Ngxobongwana and his followers back into that area from their refuge in Driftsands.<sup>42</sup>

**Fig 8** overleaf depicts the relationships at this stage – even before the Policy Committee has been convened.

Fig 8. The Forces at Work: April 1991

**KEY**

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress	<b>PSC</b>	Private Sector Consortium
<b>CCT</b>	City of Cape Town	<b>RSC</b>	Regional Services Council
<b>CPA</b>	Cape Provincial Administration	<b>WCCA</b>	Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>HDA</b>	Hostel Dwellers' Association	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc
<b>PAC</b>	Pan African Congress		

*The background to the counter-proposal*

In Chapter 4 WCUSA was described as a structure created to defend the interests of the informal settlement warlords from the democratising influence of the UDF which had spread from the townships to parts of Crossroads. But now WCUSA was clearly on the attack, with a new spokesperson, *the Headman*, who was apparently based in Khayelitsha. What had changed the nature of WCUSA, why was its Khayelitsha branch interested in this Crossroads-centred project, how could they have appointed a team of professionals and who was *the Headman*?

The roots of this proposal lay in an opportunistic relationship that had been created a year before in response to a new national housing initiative. The Independent Development Trust (IDT) had been formed in 1990 with a R2 billion grant from the government with the objective of breaking the deadlock in housing delivery. The IDT offered to finance projects

that could deliver serviced sites at speed but also with the beneficiary community fully involved in the process. Proposals came in from all over the country, and just over a hundred of them were chosen, one of which was for 4 000 sites in Khayalitsha. The promoter was a firm of civil engineering consultants, the community partner was WCUSA, and the facilitator was *the Headman*. Their project was not very successful and provided very little community participation, but it provided *the Headman* with more housing development experience than anyone within WCUSA or amongst community leadership in the region.

Of added significance was the fact that the leader of the consortium (the PSC) had very strong links with the old guard in the National Party and that *the Headman* was an enigmatic, shady but highly articulate character with access to unusual resources, who was widely believed to be somehow a member of one of the State's many secret services. As a consequence he made outrageous claims about his organisation's mandates and abilities and with the PSC's financial and administrative backing he made audacious demands of the Provincial officials. *The Headman* and his associates apparently received a private supply of information on *the Democrat's* proposals from within the CPA long before any organisation was canvassed for support and they had every intention of capturing the whole initiative for themselves. Large scale developments benefit not only the end-users – they can be very lucrative for people and organisations within the supply chain.

#### *Evaluating the counter-proposal*

A sober appraisal of WCUSA's proposal was immediately complicated by the nature of its demands and assertions: that it was to be the only representatives of squatter communities generally, implying that no other organisations would have a valid claim; that it was a "substructure of the ANC and operating under the auspices of the UDF"; that it required an exclusive and confidential relationship with the CPA, implying that no other elements of government would have a say; and that "the roles are reversed" between WCUSA and the CPA and that WCUSA would make all the decisions, implying that WCUSA had a more valid mandate than government and demanded corresponding authority. Although these claims were spurious, to say the least, the circumstances in the country were such that nobody dare challenge them or alienate any segment of the 'squatter' community lest votes be lost or violence ensue. For the four year transition from apartheid to democracy most people with handles on power walked on eggs.

Whereas WCUSA claimed to be the legitimate heir of authority in black development in the Western Cape there were other parties, both within the CPA and in society generally who looked forward to an inclusive democratic order – not simply a switch from one autocracy to another. This was part of a huge and tortuous national debate, and here it was being mirrored at grassroots project level. Furthermore, the national and grassroots discourse were each so intense and consuming that they were practically unconnected. Democratic and autocratic movements were both fighting for control of the future. This project was beginning to reveal conflicts between ideologies of development, all mixed up with personal, party and corporate ambitions and fears regarding future livelihoods, in a somehow reconfigured South Africa.


The validity of WCUSA's claimed mandates was highly questionable. One of the difficulties with addressing large scale social crises and uncertainty is that trust is in very short supply, everywhere. Mandates are given and assumed and traded speculatively. Whoever might provide a benefit can be granted a mandate to see what can be made of it. If it is questioned or tested nobody knows how to verify the mandate or whether it will be altered tomorrow. This is a characteristic of a turbulent society. Under these circumstances it is probably advisable not to seek proof of a mandate, for some 'evidence' will surely be provided. It would probably be wiser to assume that none of the parties has a watertight mandate and to therefore ignore the issue altogether at first, accepting stakeholders at face value, trusting that the truth will eventually emerge. If stakeholders have been excluded they will find ways to make themselves known, and receive an invitation to replace any imposters.

The other obvious aspect of this proposal was that WCUSA was not acting alone. It had already appointed the PSC to plan, design and supervise the implementation of projects, pre-empting any adjudication or accountability regarding procurement. They had their eyes on land in Khayelitsha which might be immediately available to government, but would be of no interest to communities that had fought to stay closer to town. Ultimately, however, WCUSA's approach was consistent with how the apartheid government had operated, particularly in its dealings with the affairs of urban Black people: through exclusive relationships and secret, autocratic processes. This was ultimately revealed to be an initiative of South Africa's old guard – politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats and puppet community leaders – with WCUSA possibly being little more than a 'front'.

### The launch: April – July 1991

Towards the end of April 1991 *the Sponsor* sent out letters entitled ‘Squatter Communities of Crossroads and Environs: Proposed Planning Initiative’, containing invitations to one of two meetings to be held on 8 May.<sup>43</sup> Each meeting was destined to become a ‘Policy Committee’, with one containing representatives of the ANC, PAC, WCUSA, the various Civics, Hostel Dwellers Association (HDA), City of Cape Town (CCT), Regional Services Council (RSC) and CPA; and the other the ‘local authorities group’ of CPA, RSC, CCT and the Black Local Authorities of Crossroads and Ikapa. A few months later a request from the Khayelitsha authority for observer status was accepted.<sup>44</sup> The resulting configuration is shown in **Fig 9** below:

Fig 9. iSLP Parallel Committees: July 1991



#### KEY

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress	<b>PAC</b>	Pan African Congress
<b>CCT</b>	City of Cape Town	<b>RSC</b>	Regional Services Council
<b>CPA</b>	Cape Provincial Administration	<b>WCCA</b>	Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>HDA</b>	Hostel Dwellers' Association	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc

Procedurally the extra-parliamentary group drove the policy-making process, meeting virtually every month with the local authority group convening with the same agenda very soon afterwards, more for information and consultation than decision-making. For this

reason in the continuing narrative the extra-parliamentary group is referred to as the Policy Committee and the local authority group is only mentioned in the event of something significant occurring within it. Whereas the Policy Committee met 36 times until July 1994 the local authority group was relatively short-lived, meeting only 13 times until November 1992, after which officials of the BLAs attended the Policy Committee.

Both committees met and agreed to embark on a process to:

- quantify the demand for housing
- identify suitable land
- choose appropriate processes for consultation, participation and communication
- consider more appropriate standards of products and services
- establish interim controls as may be required
- generate proposals to secure funding

They also resolved to review all planning in and around the existing informal settlements – and to use this unique coalition to motivate for the establishment of a planning forum with legitimacy to develop a metropolitan structure plan (five of the fifteen attendees at the ‘extra parliamentary’ meeting were professional town planners). No representatives of the Civics movements arrived, however, and representatives of the ANC and PAC reported that their parties had not yet decided on their delegates. *The Democrat* was unanimously approved as the facilitator of the process, to be remunerated by the CPA, and it was agreed to seek an independent chairperson from an agreed short list.<sup>45</sup> The third meeting of the Policy Committee on 17 June was well attended by community representatives: 8 from WCUSA, 3 from the Western Cape Civics Association (WCCA), 2 from the Western Cape Hostel Dwellers Association (WCHDA) and 1 from the Western Cape United Interim Civic Committee (WCUICC) – but no delegates yet of the ANC or PAC. One of the decisions of the meeting was to appoint communications consultants.<sup>46</sup>

#### *Reflecting upon the start*

The Policy Committee had been inaugurated with the agreement of all, and by the fourth meeting all the parties were attending, with a chairperson, facilitator, host, some consultant specialists and a patron watching in the background. Each organisation represented on the Policy Committee was entitled to send two delegates. The appearance of 8 WCUSA

representatives at the third meeting was an obvious show of force timed for the first appearance of the Civics' representatives because the other 35 meetings of the Policy Committee were never attended by more than 3 delegates. The Civics made a late start but their attendance thereafter was sustained, which is more than could be said for WCUSA.

### *Demand and supply*

The first meeting of the Technical Committee was held on 20 May 1991 and on 17 June it reported to the Policy Committee that CPA officials had estimated that for the 56 000 households without formal housing in the project area 24 000 could be accommodated in vacant areas within the existing townships and that large tracts of land would have to be found to provide the other 32 000 sites.<sup>47</sup> The details are summarised in **Table 2** (see Annexure B. p. B1).

This was a very early and rough estimate, but it provided some indication of the kinds of numbers involved and the area of land to be acquired. In the years ahead there would be many changes: the hostels would be addressed in a completely separate project, the number of households living in informal settlements and backyard shacks would escalate, the development of areas within local authorities would be delayed by their slow re-organisation, and substantially more land would have to be acquired in Weltevreden Valley and Southern Delft. But all that was yet to come... It is purely coincidental that the project eventually accommodated just over 32 000 households.

The scale or scope of the project was determined principally by the amount of vacant land that could be acquired, and then developed collaboratively to avoid disruptive land invasions. Major tracts were needed. There were only two possibilities south of the N2 highway: Philippi East, which was the most central, being immediately south of Crossroads and east of Browns Farm; and Weltevreden Valley (now called Samora Machel), which was relatively remote in the south-west corner of Philippi West, isolated by the railway system. Although access to 390 ha in Philippi East was very beneficial, the advantage was seriously eroded as a result of it being promised for Crossroads by agreement between the CPA and Nongwe, who regarded the whole of Philippi East as his own territory.

The Technical Committee needed to begin the planning process. Fortuitously a regional planning conference was held that month in the nearby town of Caledon, where

representatives of the ANC and community structures demanded that the RSC abandon its sector planning approach, begin work on an overall plan for a post-apartheid Cape Town and instruct its consultants to search for developable land. (Watson, 2002. p. 38). As a result the large scale planning for this project was undertaken through the creation of individual structure plans for the developable areas of Crossroads, Philippi East, Philippi West (Browns Farm) and Weltevreden Valley. The first of these to be tackled was Philippi East, undertaken by the same consultants that had been appointed by the RSC for the south-east structure plan.

#### *The role of consultants*

The SLP's first consultants also had a critical role to play. The town planners had the privilege and opportunity of creating the first post-apartheid structure plans and of identifying all the parcels of land that might be used, including some that had been 'buffer strips' which racially segregated areas. The civil and electrical engineers were taking advantage of the opportunity to create and apply new standards for a new era of development. They and their counterparts within government were all young professionals, longing to break out of the old restrictive paradigms. The communication consultant was tri-lingual, well acquainted with the history and politics of the project area and an accomplished journalist. Her role proved to be catalytic, as the next chapter will reveal, because she wanted to communicate news of the SLP from the Policy Committee to the grassroots communities whereas there were some parties who wanted to control all communications to their (alleged) constituencies.

#### *Finding a suitable chair*

The selection of an independent chairperson for such a controversial project within such a polarised society was not easy. A number of nominees were investigated and discarded because of objections from one side or another. However, one day *the Defender* received a surprising request to visit *the Sponsor*, who asked her to consider taking the chair of the policy Committee. They had never met before, *the Defender* had never been involved in a development project and was very nervous about helping a government that she opposed, but the country was in transition, brave people were needed, and she felt obligated to help communities whose suffering she had witnessed at first hand. They were both taking a risk in trusting each other, but *the Sponsor* appealed to her faith, which he shared as a Christian.

On 22 July 1991 *the Defender* was appointed chairperson by the Policy Committee, in a voluntary capacity.<sup>48</sup>

She recalls, “The whole thing was very daunting. Absolutely terrifying! I think that the CPA people were very nervous of me. They could have only have known of me as an opponent of everything that they did, and they must have wondered what ulterior motive I might have had. I think that were I a man with that background there would have been far more hostility, but given where a lot of those people come from they were very courteous. They were incredibly nice to me. They did their very best to make the job easy, they probably reigned themselves in quite a bit – which they probably had to do anyway, just because this was such an important forum for them to be able to do their work. And I guess the same thing applied to me – it was important for me to do my best to know what was going on in order for me to be able to do my job. I never had the sense that they were undermining me or keeping information from me – although I must say that I don’t know that I had full trust in them. I think that that had to come gradually – I began to trust them.”<sup>49</sup> *The Sponsor*, remaining as the project’s patron, attended *the Defender*’s first meeting and then left her to chair the proceedings.

### **Conclusion**

Chapter 5 has demonstrated that although evidently irreconcilable differences between parties had necessitated the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration there was an additional cross-cleavage between persons of various parties who favoured either a democratic or autocratic approach to development. The argument of this chapter is that not only are the ‘presenting problems’ of Crossroads complex but as soon as a real possibility of development is mooted a new set of contests relating to development practice commence. The contribution of this chapter to the thesis is to introduce a disturbing and persistent cross-current that demonstrates that an agreement by different sectors to collaborate is no guarantee of an end to conflict. Nevertheless the collaboration was inaugurated with the formation of policy committees, objectives were agreed upon, a technical committee began to tackle a research agenda and an independent chairperson was appointed. The structures were in place, the stakeholders were participating and the process was gaining momentum.

In Chapter 6 the foundations crack. The main stakeholder is distracted by the persistent problem of Crossroads itself, the most dangerous stakeholder walks out, for a year, and the ANC representation disappears. This generates an argument that stakeholders as individuals, organisations and sectors are too preoccupied with their own circumstances to also manage a cross-sector collaboration.

## 6

### **Conflict and Incapacity: Framing a gap which only Enablers can fill**

It is not long after the collaboration has been launched before the Province is obliged to continue trying to develop the Crossroads triangle – but that explodes yet again. Then the squatter leaders walk out of the policy committee and the ANC introduces its own creation: a national civic organisation. Land within the project area is invaded and becomes irrecoverable. The whole country is an uneasy, sometimes violent transition. But - the project slowly moves ahead, assembling information, consolidating the collaboration and awaiting the culmination of national negotiations so that decisions can be made and resources become available. The arguments presented by this chapter are that in the kinds of conditions that necessitate a cross-sector collaboration incessant interference in the process is likely; and that stakeholders will be so preoccupied that they have insufficient capacity to manage the collaborative process.

#### **The Crossroads sideshow: July 1991 – February 1992**

At the same July Policy Committee meeting the CPA disclosed that it had acquired 390 hectares of land in Philippi East, primarily to accommodate the overflow from Crossroads, for which it had made a commitment to the Crossroads community prior to the start of the new initiative. This was the first indication to the Policy Committee that although the CPA recognised that the greater project was needed for the dispersed communities it retained almost a separate responsibility and obligation to develop Crossroads and cater for its residents as soon as possible. It was as though the CPA hoped that the creation of the Policy Committee might relieve it of pressure for large-scale development and enable it to get on with addressing whatever Crossroads would require. The Policy Committee was still in a very formative stage and had little option but to accept the CPA's report.<sup>50</sup>

The aggravations intensified: *the Headman* had somehow learned that the Central Energy Fund had money available for housing projects and on 7 August he requested *the Strategist* to apply for them in conjunction with WCUSA. Two days later *the Headman*, in

a long letter to *the Sponsor*, complained about the lack of progress and blamed officials.<sup>51</sup> Over the next week *the Democrat* was drawn into discussions with the CPA, the town clerks of Ikapa and Crossroads, various squatter leaders, *the Headman* and a gentleman who was investigating the circumstances in Crossroads on behalf of the ANC nationally. A complex picture emerged, in which it was clear that WCUSA did not represent all squatter leaders and, furthermore, that within Crossroads there were two ANC branches, violently opposed to each other: the *Buntubakhe* branch of ‘urban’ settlers based in the *Unathi* area of ‘white houses’, led by Depoutch (‘Whitey’) Elese, and Nongwe’s branch that operated under a more rural and traditional kind of regime in Old Crossroads. Jeffrey Nongwe was simultaneously mayor of Crossroads, chairman of the Crossroads branch of the ANC and chairman of WCUSA.<sup>52</sup> White officials of Black Local Authorities, having to negotiate such complexities as well as the demands of unrepresentative councillors and opposing civic movements, reported that they were under immense strain.<sup>53</sup>


On 26 August the Policy Committee was informed that WCUSA had arranged to meet *the Sponsor* the following day,<sup>54</sup> and it was subsequently reported to the local authorities’ group that the CPA and WCUSA “had gained an improved understanding of each other”.<sup>55</sup> In a strategic response the Policy Committee, on the recommendation of the communication consultant,<sup>56</sup> changed the name of the project from the ‘Crossroads and Environs Project’ to the ‘Serviced Land Project’ (SLP – and later iSLP). The name change removed attention from Crossroads and whatever the government and warlords were planning there, and subtly detached the project as a whole from the clasp of the Crossroads leaders. Instead it created a clear focus of providing multiple communities with serviced residential sites, which was the national housing policy for black urban dwellers at the time.

In February 1992 the CPA, without consulting the Policy Committee, made a commitment to WCUSA that for any area in which the community was represented by WCUSA the Province would not advertise or award any tenders without WCUSA’s prior approval.<sup>57</sup> It was a strange decision, but illustrated the conflicting nature of CPA’s relationships and something of the political pressures that were at play. The land that Ngxobongwana and his followers had vacated in Crossroads when they had fled to Driftsands was the eastern extremity (Phase 4) so it was decided by the CPA to develop that area of Crossroads next, commencing in June 1992.<sup>58</sup>

The Crossroads leaders and CPA officials decided that all remaining residents of Phase 4, plus those located on a water and sewerage servitude through the adjoining proposed Phase 3, would be relocated to a “transit camp” in Philippi East (see **Map 6** overleaf). The transit camp comprised 765 small temporary sites, each provided with a bucket latrine and shared access to water: 1 standpipe per 10 households. It was intended that these people would return to Crossroads Phase 4 as soon as it had been developed. The first households to relocate from Crossroads were under the impression that they would only be in the transit camp for 3 months. When that proved not to be so the movement of people to the transit camp slowed to a trickle, and retarded progress in the Phase 4 project.<sup>59</sup>

At the same time the CPA had decided to rapidly develop a portion of Philippi East to the south of the transit camp named ‘Farm 682’ by providing 698 permanent serviced sites to accommodate Ngxobongwana and his followers, who could then vacate their informal settlement in the Driftsands nature reserve. However, politics intervened in a novel way. In preparation for a democratic election the National Party in the Western Cape needed to find itself a black constituency. So in a remarkably swift series of events Ngxobongwana became a member of the National Party and was appointed to the provincial legislature, in exchange for which his community were permitted to stay in the Driftsands Nature Reserve (See **Map 6** overleaf) where a 500-site fully serviced township would be provided for them. Farm 682, which Nongwe insisted be called ‘Lower Crossroads’, was then offered to the residents of the transit camp. However they were determined to return to Phase 4 of Crossroads, and declined the invitation. Instead, agreement was reached to use Lower Crossroads as a roll-over facility for the upgrading of Phase 3 of Crossroads.<sup>60</sup>

## Map 6. 1992: Crossroads, Philippi East & Driftsands



### *The complexities emerge*

It is noteworthy that nobody in the Policy Committee confronted the WCUSA leadership with the fact that it was not as representative as it claimed, and neither was the ANC was asked to explain two opposing committees in Crossroads. The object of the SLP was to build a coalition during a time in the country's history where all constituencies and allegiances were being reformulated. Most organisations were trying to change in some way and in the process made claims and allegations that needed to be understood in context. Coalitions are not built by challenging and embarrassing each other, but through tolerance and the cultivation of empathy and understanding. Furthermore, at this tender stage in the process the risk of an alienated party undermining the whole initiative was very real – so every effort was made to keep everyone on board, on the basis that the longer people work together the more likely is it that trust and relationships will grow.

Within the Policy Committee it had become apparent that the major un-banned political parties, the ANC and PAC, would not be major players in the project after all. The PAC communicated that although in support of the SLP it had made a general decision not to negotiate with government agencies and therefore withdrew from the Policy Committee.

It continued to be supplied with minutes of Policy Committee meetings.<sup>61</sup> For its part the ANC was preoccupied with building its own constituency and resolving conflicts between civic and squatter groups in the region. Its representative on the Policy Committee, *the Community Planner*, found it very difficult to persuade the party's regional executive to pay attention to development issues. Although he played a strategic role in the SLP he had many other responsibilities and attended less than 40% of the Policy Committee meetings.<sup>62</sup> The ANC took a very careful line in the SLP because it hoped to build for itself a national federation of civic organisations, but did not want to alienate any of them (including WCUSA) in the meantime. The National Party was in power, and so was represented in the SLP by the provincial administration, the chairman of the RSC and the officials of the BLAs. The white political opposition to the government was represented on the Policy Committee by two widely respected councillors within the City of Cape Town, which had a long liberal tradition.

WCUSA's primary constituency comprised the shack lords, who were opposed to the civic movements that had sought representation in their informal settlements on the ticket of 'democracy'. The lines were drawn between old men and young men, between informal settlements and townships, between traditional and modern – and much blood had already flowed. One of the real problems was that allegiances were going to be re-drawn along party lines – so both sides wanted to be associated with the parties and the parties wanted to be associated with both sides. These contradictions were highlighted in Crossroads, in which the shack lord Nongwe and the former freedom fighter Elese each controlled an ANC branch but were sworn enemies. The supreme irony was in Ngxobongwana being co-opted by the National Party, given a seat in the provincial government and provided with a fully serviced township for himself and his exiles in, of all places, a proclaimed nature reserve. The plot thickens – recent research has indicated that the Driftsands nature reserve was proclaimed in 1983 (the year the UDF was inaugurated) not to preserve nature but to preserve strategically located land for use by the military or police in the event of Crossroads getting out of hand. Unsurprisingly, the Driftsands community resented having a National Party leader, and chased Ngxobongwana out of the area a few months later.

There was another problem in Crossroads: it now contained vacant land and unless a development process was quickly initiated there it would be re-invaded and war would

break out again. The SLP Policy Committee had first to concentrate on establishing broad principles and not rush into project management, so the CPA was given the green light to proceed as best it might in Crossroads despite the distastefulness of Crossroads politics. From here onwards the CPA had to collaborate in broad coalition building within the SLP whilst simultaneously addressing the immediate Crossroads issues on its own. Furthermore in the months ahead the House of Representatives (the Coloured parliament) would be dismantled and its officials incorporated into the CPA – which would then have to internally integrate some quite diverse development philosophies.

### **The second year of policy-making: June 1992 – June 1993**

The Policy Committee meeting on 1 June 1992 was dominated by a debate on the communication of information about the SLP to communities. The essence of the problem was that WCUSA wanted to control all communication to squatter communities and had refused to endorse the mass circulation of a pamphlet about the SLP because it did not want its name linked with the other parties in the project. However leaders of some communities, such as KTC, had requested that they be directly informed rather than through WCUSA. WCUSA's representatives in the meeting included *the Headman* and Mr Nongwe. *The Headman* refused to discuss the matter in the committee and declared that he had arranged an alternative meeting with the CPA, but *the Strategist* insisted that it was necessary to discuss principles such as this within the Policy Committee. The Civics and the City of Cape Town argued in favour of the publication and distribution of the pamphlet. *The Headman* thereupon announced that WCUSA was withdrawing from the committee – and its representatives promptly left the room. The CPA undertook to try to negotiate their return.<sup>63</sup>

*The Wrestler* met with *the Headman* and wrote to him on the 16<sup>th</sup> July confirming that *the Headman* had stated that WCUSA had discontinued its involvement in the SLP and any engagement with the SLP's consultants. Furthermore, *the Headman* had declared that direct liaison between WCUSA and CPA with respect to Khayelitsha and Crossroads would remain undisturbed, and a meeting between those two parties should be held to discuss whether their present agreement should be amended in any way.

Around this time the ANC announced that the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) had been formed and its regional manager began attending the Policy Committee meetings on 17 August. SANCO's establishment had been controversial: the logic was unclear – civic movements were distinctly local and different, so how could they be nationally organised? There had also been criticism of manipulation in the election of office bearers, particularly in the Cape. *The Veteran*, now chairman of WCCA, was one of many who were less than enthusiastic about joining SANCO, and signed himself in to the Policy Committee cautiously as 'WCCA and SANCO'. Six months later he reverted to 'WCCA', and after another two months his affiliation was noted as 'Guguletu Civic'. **Figs 10 and 11** overleaf show how the SLP was structured at that stage.<sup>64</sup>

Fig 10. iSLP Parallel Committees : August 1992





Fig 11. Competing Collaborations & their Facilitators: August 1992



KEY

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>ANC</b> African National Congress      | <b>PSC</b> Private Sector Consortium              |
| <b>CCT</b> City of Cape Town              | <b>RSC</b> Regional Services Council              |
| <b>CPA</b> Cape Provincial Administration | <b>SANCO</b> SA National Civics Organisation      |
| <b>HDA</b> Hostel Dwellers' Association   | <b>WCCA</b> Western Cape Civics' Association      |
| <b>PIA</b> Philippi Industrialists Assoc  | <b>WCUSA</b> Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc |

*The Wrestler's* letter to *the Headman* of 16<sup>th</sup> July, mentioned above, was tabled at the Policy Committee on 17 August and prompted great concern at the potential for conflict in the event of WCUSA maintaining its stance. *The Community Planner* threatened that the ANC would have to review its participation in the Policy Committee if WCUSA was not involved, perhaps to encourage everyone to get WCUSA back to the table. It was decided to invite WCUSA to state the terms upon which it would be willing to participate in the SLP, and to continue to provide it with all SLP documents, including the proposed principles for land and site allocation and institutional arrangements which had just been tabled.<sup>65</sup> A week later *the Strategist* reported to the Local Authority Policy Committee that he had held more than one meeting with WCUSA to try to resolve the issue, but without success.<sup>66</sup>

During September and October 1992 policy proposals for land and site allocation, institutional arrangements, recommended densities, planning principles and levels of service were presented to all the organisations in the Policy Committee – and received substantial support, except from the absent WCUSA. A very successful full day workshop had been held to canvass the support of about 120 SANCO representatives, facilitated by *the Democrat* and the communication consultant. On 26 November *the Defender* reported that she and representatives of the CPA had met the members of the WCUSA executive who had decided that their interests would be better served through direct negotiations with the CPA. No comments on the SLP proposals had yet been received from WCUSA.<sup>67</sup> As the Policy Committee moved into 1993 it focused on finalising the policy proposals in the form of 'the SLP Principles' and on considering draft structure plans for Philippi East and Driftsands.<sup>68</sup> Significantly, a change in the SLP's structure occurred as 1993 dawned – there was no sense in perpetuating the Local Authority Group parallel policy committee. It never met again and thereafter the senior officials of Crossroads and Ikapa local authorities were invited to attend meetings of the remaining SLP Policy Committee.

CPA officials continued a separate dialogue with WCUSA, the highlight of which was a two-day residential workshop at a Stellenbosch conference centre in March 1993. The workshop began with each party stating its position on the SLP, in which WCUSA insisted on controlling development on land that it claimed to 'occupy'. With regard to the SLP policy proposals, WCUSA made some requests for relatively small amendments, but the workshop was concluded before consideration was given to most of the institutional

arrangements, the proposed implementation structure and the structure plan proposals. WCUSA ended the meeting in an ambiguous manner by confirming its willingness to engage with the CPA, recommending that a structure be established to improve communication and co-operation between parties in the SLP, reporting that the WCUSA executive had decided to reconsider their position regarding participation within the SLP structure – and then stating that “WCUSA’s involvement in the SLP and relationship with SANCO will be dealt with on a political level”. The workshop agenda was not completed, and it was agreed to meet again.<sup>69</sup> The ANC, for its part, adopted the view that the issues now being discussed in the SLP were matters for the Civics, and did not require the ANC’s presence. Whether the ANC would return to the Policy Committee, it stated, depended upon its discussions with WCUSA, which were yet to take place.<sup>70</sup> *The Democrat*, meanwhile, had learned that WCUSA had chosen to interpret the ANC’s absence from Policy Committee meetings since its own withdrawal as support for WCUSA’s position.<sup>71</sup>

In Crossroads Mr Nongwe was impatient to get Phase 3 going, but on 18 May 1993 he was refused permission by the CPA to start resettling people from Phase 3 to Lower Crossroads.<sup>72</sup> Although some approved relocations did commence towards the month end, Nongwe decided to take matters into his own hands and on 31 May most of the informal settlement on phase 3 of Crossroads was torched and razed to the ground. The inhabitants fled and within 10 days the only dwellings left in Crossroads were those of Nongwe’s faction, in the areas planned as Section 4 of Phase 3. The rest looked like a wasteland. Most of the refugees fled to Lower Crossroads, where the first 200 households from the Phase 3 development process had already taken occupation, and quickly filled all available spaces. Others took refuge on the sports field corner site of Philippi East, in the N2 road reserve and elsewhere. Once again the development of Crossroads had come to a blazing, devastating halt. Subsequently these events became the subject of a national enquiry by the Goldstone Commission into acts of public violence.<sup>73</sup>

The CPA reported continuous difficulty in persuading WCUSA to attend a second workshop. It was also apparent that there still were strong conservative political influences within the CPA that were against the open-ended approach of the SLP. *The Strategist* decided to bring the matter to a head by proposing to the Policy Committee in June 1993 that the CPA manage the project, using *the Wrestler* as manager and their civil engineering consultants as technical coordinators. The response was predictable: the City of Cape Town

and SANCO objected on the grounds that the SLP was jointly owned by all parties and that it would be unacceptable for its implementation to be driven by the CPA. *The Strategist* countered that CPA had statutory responsibility for the project and was footing the bill. It was agreed to create a sub-committee to explore the matter – which proceeded to recommend that *the Democrat's* firm be appointed to coordinate the project. He would report to a CPA Project Management Committee, and the Policy Committee's function during the project's implementation would be to monitor the application of the SLP Principles.

The Policy Committee also heard news of the first land invasion within its area of interest – Mr Thabo Memane had led an illegal occupation of the privately-owned cement factory site, and 800 shacks had been very quickly erected. Memane, previously a lieutenant of a faction leader in neighbouring Brown's Farm, was not affiliated to WCUSA. Nor was this the first land invasion that he had masterminded. Although the land owner, Anglo Alpha Cement, had obtained an eviction order the sheriff of the court was unable to execute it because of the danger of violence. Negotiations at a political level were attempted but were ineffective.<sup>74</sup> The fact that it had taken place on private land lessened its direct threat to the SLP, but the inability to counteract it sent a warning signal to everyone - all vacant land should be regarded as vulnerable.

Meanwhile members of the Policy Committee were investigating possible sources of finance for the SLP. The size and scale of the project required a multi-year funding commitment whereas the financial allocations by central government to the CPA were being made simply on the basis of a bulk annual allocation, with no regard to the budgets and requirements of individual projects. Long-term dedicated funding was required for the SLP to provide assurance to all communities that the entire project had been approved and financed and that there was a programme that would eventually accommodate everyone. Enquiries were being made to the RSC (primarily for bulk infrastructure)<sup>75</sup>, the National Housing Commission which was busy considering the introduction of a national housing subsidy policy and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which could provide loans. However, the possibility of a bulk dedicated allocation of project finance would have to await the resolution of the political transition.<sup>76</sup>

*Not everyone is single-minded*

Between 1992 and 1993 South Africa was in the midst of a tumultuous transition that touched every aspect of national life. It was the worst possible time to attempt a local cross-sector collaboration, but there was a crisis to address, and many people considered that collaboration was the only way. However not all parties had collaborative development on their minds: WCUSA and its PSC allies wanted full control of the project, and had significant support from an 'old guard' within the National Party and CPA. The ANC was working towards gaining control of the whole country at the polls, and one of its strategies was to capture the entire countrywide civic constituency by creating its own national 'civics' organisation, SANCO. At the same time it needed votes from informal settlements and did not want to alienate the shack lords and lose their allegiance to, say, the PAC. The PAC had taken quite an exclusive stance and by deciding not to sit around a table with government in any way placed its party in danger of being sidelined. Significantly, the Policy Committee through its facilitator kept them all fully informed with minutes and other documentation – they might try to wander away from the SLP but the SLP would not be letting them go.

Representatives of government also had plenty of other things to do. It is interesting to analyse the attendance at meetings over the life of a committee, because such meetings are the heart of activity in a cross-sector collaboration. The Local Authority Group met on 13 occasions over eighteen months before it was disbanded, and comprised politicians (including councillors), officials, members of the Philippi Industrialists Association and consultants/facilitators. The frequency of their attendance is revealed in **Table 3** (See Annexure B. p. B2). Although 46 persons attended the meetings at some stage, only 5 of them attended more than 75% of the meetings. They were *the Strategist* and his political boss in the CPA who chaired the meetings, an official from Crossroads, the SLP's town planning consultant and *the Democrat*, who was the only one to attend all meetings. However they could not have constituted a credible committee on their own. There was a supportive and well-informed ring of 11 others around them (who attended more than 50% of meetings), then 7 others in reserve and 23 completely nominal members.

The number of people who attended each of the 13 meetings on behalf of each group is shown in **Table 4** (See Annexure B. p. B2). This table demonstrates the degree of commitment of each group to these meetings. They were clearly of the greatest interest and

importance to the CPA and to the facilitators and consultants whom it had employed, followed closely by Crossroads and Ikapa local authorities, which were the most directly affected participants. In spite of Table 5 showing that there were only 5 consistent attendees, the right hand column of Table 6 shows that the meetings were numerically well attended, except for some towards the end, with an average attendance of 16. Although it was a substantially different group of people meeting each time they were almost all officials in responsible positions, and were committed by the decisions made. Importantly, each of the parties was invited to every meeting and received all the documentation and minutes and was thereby bound into the process. Each party decided whether it would be represented at each meeting and by whom.

This 'Local Authority Group' successfully met a short term political need in the SLP during the first stages of transition from apartheid. As the SLP story proceeds the attendance of other committees in the SLP will be similarly analysed.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the two year period from July 1991 to June 2003 and explained how the collaboration was structured and commenced work. One argument presented by this chapter is that every stakeholder has a multiple agenda and is also busy with other activities – and that whilst the collaboration was undeniably important it was not the only topic of importance for the participants – as sectors, parties and individuals. Furthermore, within a national interregnum of indeterminate length, many of the participants were keeping an eye open for opportunities or threats that could affect their own fortunes. The other argument proposed here is that circumstances that require cross-sector collaboration are by nature turbulent and are likely to remain so. It is not insignificant that many of the difficulties encountered were generated by the stakeholders themselves. This chapter contributes to the main argument of the thesis by using these two un-theorised elements of stakeholder incapacity and interminable turbulence to frame the gap in the literature that the Enablers will fill.

In Chapter 7 as the collaborative process gains pace the opposition will assume a more institutional profile, induce more iSLP stakeholders to join its campaign, change its composition and form and attack repetitively with increasing fury

## 7

**Enabling progress: Creating synergy within conflict**

In this chapter the arguments that frame the gap are strengthened as a determined opposition tries every possible manoeuvre to wrest control of the SLP, while the national transition drags on – requiring a National Peace Committee to try to limit violence and lawlessness. The SLP is relatively a model of order in a sea of chaos, but it remains without the resources necessary for implementation.

Ultimately those opposed to collaborative development induce every ‘community organisation’ within the Policy Committee to join their ranks and the project is virtually brought to a halt. Meanwhile, however, *the Democrat’s* community facilitators have been helping grassroots community leaders to understand the process of development and this produces the first project committee. Furthermore, these leaders begin questioning who is representing them on the SLP Policy Committee.

**The temperature rises: June – December 1993**

On 25 June 1993 *the Democrat* and *the Strategist* received a faxed letter from the firm of consultants that led the PSC announcing that it was establishing, together with WCUSA, SANCO and the African Bank, a not-for-gain company to develop projects within the framework of the SLP. It was to be named the Western Cape Community Development Company (WCCDC), and the letter requested that the PSC be invited to future meetings of the SLP.<sup>77</sup> On 9 July *the Headman* wrote to *the Strategist*, stating that in WCUSA’s view *the Democrat* was not a suitable project manager and that the present SLP consulting team had concluded their brief by identifying the project. He stated that implementation would now be done by the affected communities and referred to the formation of WCCDC.<sup>78</sup> At its meeting on 12 July the Policy Committee resolved to invite the PSC and WCUSA to a special meeting at which the WCCDC proposal would be presented.

At the same meeting a director of the company owning the disused cement factory whose land had been invaded, this time speaking as a member of the Philippi Industrialists’

Association, reported that businesses in Philippi had been under siege, some employees had been killed on business premises and there had been community protests against the establishment of a satellite police station on Stock Road. He reported hostile acts against his company, which appeared to be related to the fact that it had leased office space to WCUSA, and therefore the company had given WCUSA notice to vacate the premises. The Policy Committee noted that the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry into violence in Crossroads was then underway, to which both *the Democrat* and CPA's project managers in Crossroads would give evidence.

*The Strategist* expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of progress towards implementation of the SLP. He recommended that no more time be lost in waiting for consensus on outstanding issues and that implementation should go ahead on the basis of the agreements that had already been finalised. Any outstanding issues could be addressed at the level of individual project committees, where there would be full community participation and the facility to resolve disputes. He recommended that only major problems of a general nature should be referred to the Policy Committee, which would not get involved in issues affecting individual projects. This was approved.<sup>79</sup>

WCUSA attended the Policy Committee on 26 July after a 13 month absence in order to participate in the presentation of the WCCDC proposal. In the presentation it became apparent that contractors as well as consultants for the proposed projects had already been selected and that WCCDC did not intend putting any of the work out to tender. Furthermore, the representatives of WCUSA and SANCO would be relied upon to manage all processes involving communities, regardless of the dangers of hegemony and patronage. *The Strategist* asked why a housing utility (not-for-gain) company was being formed. He also expressed surprise that SANCO and WCUSA had become bedfellows in WCCDC, and wondered if their officials were going to be paid in the process. The leader of the PSC acknowledged that they would be paid, asserting that their proposal would be far more effective and practicable than the project committee system proposed by the SLP. The Policy Committee responded by appointing a sub-committee to formulate guidelines and a code of conduct for the involvement of developers.<sup>80</sup>


*The Community Planner* reappeared at the Policy Committee meeting to hear the WCCDC proposal and announced that the ANC would begin to play a more active role in

the SLP. He accepted nomination to the sub-committee to consider a code of conduct, and was able to share the philosophy of the National Housing Forum, that was busy formulating a new national housing policy. The other members of the sub-committee were the *grande dame* of housing in the City, Alderman Eulalie Stott, *the Strategist*, SANCO's regional manager and *the Democrat*. Their recommended Code of Conduct for Developers was crisply worded, and stated that no entity may be involved in both planning and implementation, there must be a separation of function between consultants and contractors, consultants must be appointed by public authorities on the basis of equitable distribution of work and affirmative action, and that construction work must be made available to all interested parties by being put out to tender. Furthermore, developers must not be perceived to "own" any particular (community) grouping or organisation, and accountability and transparency must be evident at all levels of the implementation process. On the other hand parties should not be required to accommodate risks that they are not used to managing (*i.e.* political risks of any sort).

The sub-committee also recommended principles to which any housing utility company involved in the SLP must comply, which particularly concerned conflicts of interests of directors and the difference between such not-for-gain companies and private sector operations. Finally it was recommended that the involvement of any such developer in the SLP be governed by a contract with the public authority that bound the developer to these principles and to those of the SLP as a whole. Obviously, it would not be acceptable for any such developer to also sit on the SLP Policy Committee, whose future function would be to monitor progress.<sup>81</sup> The recommendations were sent to the Policy Committee members.

At that stage the inter-relationships between the stakeholders was as shown in **Fig 12** overleaf.

**Fig 12. Competing Collaborations & their Facilitators: July 1993**



**KEY**

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress	<b>PSC</b>	Private Sector Consortium
<b>CCT</b>	City of Cape Town	<b>RSC</b>	Regional Services Council
<b>CPA</b>	Cape Provincial Administration	<b>SANCO</b>	SA National Civics Organisation
<b>HDA</b>	Hostel Dwellers' Association	<b>WCCA</b>	Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>PIA</b>	Philippi Industrialists Assoc	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc

The Policy Committee met on 9 August 1993, with *the Sponsor* present, and formally adopted the SLP Principles which thereby brought the SLP's policy phase to a close. The implementation phase, in which each project was organised by its own project committee, had already begun, under the oversight of a Project Management Committee comprising CPA officials and *the Democrat*. The country was still in turmoil, however, and project development was far from easy. Tensions in areas under the jurisdiction of Ikapa and Crossroads Town Councils had brought many local authority projects there to a standstill. The only exceptions were the electrification of Crossroads phase 1, the delivery of serviced sites in Browns Farm and a township development in Driftsands.

*The Democrat* reported that the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry was considering recommending that all developments in the Crossroads area should be undertaken in terms of the SLP Principles; and that the Regional Peace Committee had already made a similar

recommendation, calling for a consultative forum to be established before any further projects were initiated. WCUSA announced that it had decided to rejoin the Policy Committee. On the recommendation of *the Community Planner* it was agreed that each party and their technical advisors would study the recommended Code of Conduct for Developers, and each obtain a mandate before bringing a response to the Policy Committee. In the meantime there had been no progress in resolving the land invasion of the cement factory.<sup>82</sup>

Although *The Sponsor* had announced the completion of the policy phase, which enabled the CPA to appoint *the Democrat* to coordinate the implementation phase and to facilitate the creation of grassroots Residents' Development Committees, the Policy Committee was not actually terminated. The reason was to keep the parties meeting – communication is the simplest means of achieving some mutual accountability. Furthermore, the SLP had become a battle ground between participative principles and non-sense action, but neither side had access to the necessary political support and/or financial resources because the national negotiations had not yet been resolved. The battle for the SLP would have to continue until a new political authority with the associated finance was established in the country. Another factor was that the SLP Policy Committee had increasingly become viewed by some influential non-participants as the only vehicle in the region that was able to manage such tensions, and its termination would have unnecessarily jettisoned a unique resource.

The Policy Committee meeting of 13 September 1993 was the first of the SLP's implementation phase, but *the Democrat*, in his first "Project Co-ordinator's Report" reported that most of the existing project activity in the area had been suspended pending consultation with the affected communities and the establishment of Residents' Development Committees. Peace Committees were very involved across South Africa in endeavouring to stabilise communities and resolve local conflicts as the country took the difficult steps towards democracy, and the SLP area was one of the tensest areas in Cape Town. It was agreed, however, to at least commence the bulk earthworks (soil preparation) process for Philippi East and Weltevreden Valley, for which community consultation might not be necessary. A number of participants failed to report back on the Code of Conduct for Developers, and so it was agreed that all parties would provide their responses to *the*

*Democrat* before the next meeting.<sup>83</sup>

On 21 September WCUSA and the CPA met again in Stellenbosch to continue their interrupted workshop about the SLP Principles, which had already been formally adopted by the other members of the Policy Committee. The meeting started poorly, with the ‘points of agreement’ summarised by *the Strategist* being challenged by WCUSA, and *the Headman* stating that WCUSA no longer understood or accepted CPA’s role in the development process. The proposed institutional arrangements were presented by the CPA and accepted by WCUSA, except that it had serious reservations about a proposal that implementation would include extensive community consultation in sector (area) forums and social compacts at project level. This was left unresolved and was postponed to yet another workshop, as was any discussion about the proposed Driftsands and Philippi East structure plans.<sup>84</sup>

WCUSA was not represented at a special meeting of the Policy Committee on 11 October but a delegation of 30 SANCO representatives made a surprise appearance. They made it clear to the Policy Committee that they affirmed the SLP, stressed the importance of directly involving the various communities represented by SANCO and challenged the degree of community support claimed by some other role-players in the process. They agreed to attend the community caucus that the SLP had scheduled for 23 October in Guguletu.<sup>85</sup>

During the course of the next month the housing crisis in Cape Town was compounded by the organised illegal occupation of newly-built houses in Tafelsig (Delft) and Mitchell’s Plain. Neither of these was in the SLP project area, and both were within Coloured group areas in terms of the existing legislation. However, the issue was placed on the SLP Policy Committee’s agenda for 15 November, partly because the SLP was the only multi-stakeholder housing forum in the region and partly out of anxiety because the SLP had still to test its effectiveness at project or ‘grassroots’ level. A debate ensued about whether community participation in the SLP should be structured only at project level or also at one or more higher levels where any practical policy issues that required broad agreement could be discussed. There was, after all, no functioning representative local government at that time. It was decided to avoid creating additional layers of responsibility, but that a way must be found to obtain broad community agreement on, for example, the

prioritisation of projects. SANCO was gently rebuked for having virtually taking over the previous meeting.<sup>86</sup>

*The contest for Weltevreden Valley*

Weltevreden Valley is located in the south-west corner of Philippi, bounded by major dual carriageway road routes to the south and west, the city-Khayelitsha railway line to the north, and to the east a former railway police hostel complex and a tiny suburb called “The Leagues”. It is some 145 hectares in extent and in 1994 was a wilderness of dunes and depressions, except for an old occupied farm house and small stand of eucalyptus trees near its centre. The land comprised a number of properties owned by the government, railways, a housing utility company and private interests. It was anticipated by the CPA that the entire area could be acquired and that an integrated township could be created by the SLP containing about 4 200 residential sites.<sup>87</sup> This area of Philippi had been completely isolated from the action around Crossroads, and was thus spared all the competing land claims that characterised the development of Philippi East and Browns Farm. The only inhabitants of Weltevreden Valley lived in a small and politically insignificant informal settlement named Samora Machel in the north-west edge of the site. This was the first greenfields project which the SLP was able to pursue and therefore the Province began appointing consultants to compile a Local Structure Plan which would also provide enough data for the bulk earthworks to be designed. Communities within the SLP were invited to indicate whether they were interested in participating in the project.

However, at the November 15 Policy Committee meeting *the Strategist* reported that unbeknown to him a member of his Branch of the CPA had written a letter to the WCCDC stating that it was the CPA’s intention to make Weltevreden Valley (a key SLP greenfields project) available to a developer who could utilise finance for the establishment of a township, and that the residents would then be able to access the extensive sports facilities contained in the neighbouring hostel complex that the CPA was about to acquire. The writer had further expressed the hope that his letter would help WCCDC obtain the necessary finance from the National Energy Fund (which was selling off some of the State’s oil reserves that had been established under apartheid to counter possible sanctions).<sup>88</sup> *The Strategist* retracted the letter. Once again, WCUSA was not present at the meeting, and approval of the Code of Conduct by both WCUSA and SANCO remained outstanding. Meanwhile, *the Strategist* in his new role as Project Coordinator had

appointed his first Black development facilitators, who had begun to engage with representatives of the 30 different communities within the SLP project area.<sup>89</sup>

*The local government factor*

The special meeting of the Project Committee on 11 October was to receive a presentation by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) about the degree of progress locally in the transformation of local government. Nationally, said the spokesman, local government was characterised by political collapse, financial failure, service deterioration, general stagnation and inability to deal with problems of urbanisation and transition. He recommended that the many fragmented local government structures in Cape Town should be replaced with one metropolitan structure with one tax base, and went on to describe the terms of reference of the Metropolitan Negotiating Forum which had been launched in the city in September.

The Policy Committee's decision that implementation commence with communities participating in their own projects heralded the nominal start of the implementation phase, but there were still obstacles to overcome. The first was that most of the land parcels that had been identified for the benefit of specific single communities were owned by local authorities which lacked the capacity to develop them. The process of rationalising local government in Cape Town had lagged behind both the national transformation process as well as the transformation introduced at a more local scale by the Serviced Land Project. All of the existing residential settlements within the SLP project area were under the jurisdiction of local authorities which would not be able to play their role in implementation without a transformation of local government attitudes, priorities and capacity.

Although the implementation of the SLP began in 1993 the first non-racial local government elections occurred only in late 1996 and the consolidation of local government into one metropolitan authority had to wait until 2000. This delay, coupled with inexorable urbanisation, meant that by 2010 metropolitan Cape Town had become overwhelmed by the proliferation of informal settlements and a huge housing backlog, despite the best intentions of the SLP. The disconnection between national, provincial and local government rates of transformation, particularly in Cape Town because of its unique political mix and dynamics, ultimately proved to be the greatest factor in diminishing the

effectiveness of the SLP. In the Policy Committee the CPA had probably done the best that it could by ensuring the involvement in the SLP of the RSC, (the original) Cape Town municipality and the Black Local Authorities, but the powers and machinery required to transform local government were not within its control.

*The implications of the WCCDC proposal*

The CPA had no option but to patiently drive the SLP initiative through the lingering vacuum of political authority and financial decision-making in the country. The private sector was not so constrained, and the PSC contrived to construct a quicker avenue to political support and access to finance. It reckoned that if it could woo SANCO into the PSC's alliance with WCUSA it would automatically receive ANC support, and if it also could attract some interest by a financier it could make an irresistible challenge for the whole SLP. In reality the proposal was infused with autocracy and patronage – it was a package deal of pre-selected private firms employing 'community leaders' to deliver beneficiaries to the construction process, with no community participation in the planning and implementation process at all. However, the ANC immediately returned to the Policy Committee with a commitment to be more involved in the project. Its change of heart about leaving the project to the community organisations was undoubtedly motivated by concerns that SANCO leaders were being led by pecuniary interests. Although the Policy Committee was unable to reject outright the approach from its two major community participants without destroying itself, it could get back into policy-making mode and debate the principles applicable to the involvement of private sector organisations.

The lines were being re-drawn within the SLP – the ANC was now quietly becoming an 'establishment' actor, in opposition to the persistent attempts to hijack the project. On the strength of that support the SLP Principles had been declared 'accepted' by the provincial government without WCUSA's support. Furthermore, not only had some civic organisations such as WCCA distanced themselves from SANCO, but grassroots communities began to demand direct representation because SANCO was incapable of authentically representing them. Therefore *the Democrat* was given the go ahead by the CPA to appoint his own isiXhosa-speaking team to facilitate community participation at the local level through the establishment of Residents Development Committees. These RDCs were invited to participate in the development process for Weltevreden Valley – the very project that WCCDC wished to implement.

The bid by WCCDC prompted the creation of a new policy document to provide an agreed set of terms by which the private sector could be involved as a developer in the SLP and uphold the SLP Principles. It should have been natural for the ‘community organisations’ to agree to this code of conduct for the ANC representative on the Policy Committee had played a major role in drafting it and it was designed principally to protect the rights of communities. However, the policy prohibited private sector developers from doing whatever they liked, but and the leadership of SANCO and WCUSA now had vested interests in a private sector initiative, so they never approved the policy. Ultimately the policy was adopted by the government for application in the SLP. In reality, however, there was little chance that any private developer would be willing to take the risks that such a participative project required.

At issue was the management of risk. Cross-sector collaboration involves political risks and financial risks. The public sector is able to accommodate both kinds of risk because it is politically controlled, legally responsible for addressing social issues and financially adaptable. The private sector is unable to control political risks and is geared to manage financial risks only in a free market, not in circumstances where the market is politically and restrictively defined. Therefore in a participative and highly politicised housing development project such as the SLP the private sector could not possibly take on the overall development risk, and could only provide functions for which the risk could be prescribed and the liability limited. Thus private sector service providers could offer a defined process or product only on condition that government either provided specified political elements or financially underwrote their attempted compliance by the contractor. That is a complicated system to manage and likely to be expensive.

Over the succeeding years many private sector project managers, consultants and contractors would be involved in the SLP, all on contract to provincial or local government. A few failed to take the political implications seriously, either by trying to cut corners in the required participative procedures or by assuming that other parties would willingly relieve them of their responsibilities or sort out their problems. But only one private sector *developer* was ever involved, who in the project’s latter years successfully constructed the ultimate 6 000-house phase of Delft – but as a ‘turn-key’ project on vacant land, in which it had complete control of every aspect of the process except the identification of

beneficiaries.


Within the Policy Committee the Philippi Industrialists' Association had contributed a politically and ideologically non-aligned private sector perspective, but its representatives were all from one small beleaguered area, which had now experienced not only invasion but violence and vandalism. As their assets in Philippi remorselessly devalued they gradually lost interest in the SLP – and large scale industry in the area has never recovered.

### **The plot thickens: January – May 1994**

In January 1994 a new association emerged called the Western Cape Community Organisation (WECCO), with seven founding movements, only two of which were involved in the SLP: WCUSA and the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). SANCO was not included, demonstrating the antipathy of civic organisations at the time towards SANCO's unrepresentative leadership.

Within the SLP project area WECCO claimed to represent township dwellers, those informal settlements that were still controlled by warlords, and a Coloured constituency which sought benefits in the development of Delft South. SANCO represented hostel dwellers and those informal settlements whose leaders espoused a more democratic kind of leadership.

*The Veteran* was prominent in WECCO and was appointed as its chairman. However he soon began to realise that he was in danger of being manipulated by unknown people who had financed WECCO's lavish launch and provided offices and inducements at a time when all civic leaders were wondering how to create a livelihood in the forthcoming dispensation.<sup>90</sup> The SLP was now structured as shown in **Fig 13** overleaf:

**Fig 13. Competing Collaborations & Facilitators:****KEY**

<b>ANC</b> African National Congress	<b>SANCO</b> SA National Civics Organisation
<b>CCT</b> City of Cape Town	<b>WCCA</b> Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>CPA</b> Cape Provincial Administration	<b>WCCDC</b> W Cape Community Development Co
<b>HDA</b> Hostel Dwellers' Association	<b>WECCO</b> W Cape Community Organisation
<b>PSC</b> Private Sector Consortium	<b>WCUSA</b> Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc
<b>RSC</b> Regional Services Council	

Later that month SANCO and WECCO each hosted a workshop at which delegates were invited by the Project Coordinator to prioritise projects for implementation and communities for receipt of housing, all within the SLP. Every SLP community was represented at one or both workshops and a consensus was achieved, which was reported to the Policy Committee on 24 January. Of the 32 listed projects it was agreed to give immediate priority to the following: Crossroads 3 & 4, Philippi East 2 & 3, Weltevreden Valley 1 & 2, Millers Camp 3 & 4, Black City, KTC 2 & 3, Browns Farm, New Rest / Kanana, the remainder of Tambo Square and Delft South. The result of the other prioritisation exercise was a ranking communities led by Old Crossroads, Millers Camp/Lusaka, Black City, KTC, Browns Farm and New Rest / Kanana. The agreed next steps were to obtain clarity on the terms of the new national subsidy policy, apply for the substantial funds that the SLP would require, and establish the individual project

committees.<sup>91</sup> Within a week the Project Coordinator was reporting that some project committees had made a good start but that there was a lingering standoff between factions within Browns Farm and in Millers Camp there was a leadership vacuum. The tenders for earthworks in Philippi East had been received and work began on a structure plan for Weltevreden Valley.

In an encouraging move the United Nations Housing organisation, UN-Habitat, expressed interest in the SLP and sent a delegation from Nairobi to undertake a week-long survey. The team considered that the SLP's combination of complexity and size was unprecedented in their experience although the SLP's principles and guidelines corresponded fully with their own Community Development Programme. They affirmed the development process that was now underway.<sup>92</sup>


SANCO was still keen to broaden its representation in the Policy Committee to enable its member communities to enjoy more direct representation, but the Policy Committee was unable to contemplate adding forty or more delegates to its membership – so it was agreed to grant SANCO two more seats. Neither SANCO nor WECCO had yet responded on the proposed Code of Conduct for Developers.<sup>93</sup> In Crossroads Mr Nongwe expressed his anger at *the Democrat's* insistence that the development of Phases 3 and 4 of Crossroads include the involvement of the Boystown Committee in order to avoid the outbreak of violence between the two communities.<sup>94</sup>

To the Policy Committee meeting on 14 March 1994 *the Democrat* explained the SLP community participation strategy: that each community was being encouraged to form a Residents Development Committee (RDC) that might even include community members who were not already part of the existing local leadership but had useful skills. The representatives of SANCO and WECCO objected that their civic structures were being sidelined and undermined and demanded that they be represented on every RDC. *The Democrat* reminded them that the SLP Principles had been accepted by their own representatives and that his facilitators did not prescribe to communities whom they should include in their RDCs. In the ensuing discussion *the Headman* pointed out that WCUSA had not agreed to the Principles. *The Strategist* therefore enquired whether the community organisations wanted a different approach to community participation or whether there should be a moratorium on development until after the April national election. SANCO

wanted to consider the matter and indicated that it would call *the Democrat* to a meeting within a fortnight.<sup>95</sup> Such a meeting did not eventuate. *The Strategist's* invitation to the organisations to either propose an alternative process or request a moratorium on development was a brave move which called their bluff – they were unable to propose an alternative method of community participation and dared not stop any project because of the inevitably angry reaction from the intended beneficiary communities.

In March 1994 there was a flurry of discussions resulting in reconciliation between the Civics and SANCO, leading to *the Veteran* writing as Chairman of WECCO to the CPA to report that SANCO had “reconfirmed their support” of WECCO’s proposal to develop Weltevreden Valley and to ask to whom “the letters of support and application should be addressed” and “at your soonest convenience, but not later than 25 March 1994, for a meeting to be arranged between yourselves, WECCO, SANCO and the developing team”.<sup>96</sup> It now appeared that WECCO, ostensibly simply an association of community organisations, was proposing to develop Weltevreden Valley – the same area that the PSC’s proposed utility company, WCCDC, wished to develop. This was unlikely to be a coincidence. *The Strategist* instructed his deputy to inform WECCO that the matter would be discussed by the SLP Policy Committee on 11 April, and that no purpose would be served by having discussions outside of that forum. All documentation should be sent to *the Democrat* in his role as secretary of the Policy Committee.<sup>97</sup>

Relationships within the SLP now resembled **Fig 14** overleaf:

**Fig 14. Competing Collaborations & Facilitators:****KEY**

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress	<b>SANCO</b>	SA National Civics Organisation
<b>CCT</b>	City of Cape Town	<b>WCCA</b>	Western Cape Civics' Association
<b>CPA</b>	Cape Provincial Administration	<b>WCCDC</b>	W Cape Community Development Co
<b>HDA</b>	Hostel Dwellers' Association	<b>WECCO</b>	W Cape Community Organisation
<b>PSC</b>	Private Sector Consortium	<b>WCUSA</b>	Western Cape United Squatters' Assoc
<b>RSC</b>	Regional Services Council		

In a wide-ranging report written on 23 March *the Democrat* recorded that it had not yet proved possible to create a Project Committee for Philippi East, where the bulk earthworks contract was ready to commence. There were two reasons for this: On the one hand Nongwe regarded the whole of Philippi East as his own to allocate; and on the other hand leaders of the factions in Browns Farm, whose people were to be among the beneficiaries of Philippi East, were not talking to each other because some of them had occupied more than their agreed number of sites in Village 4a of Browns Farm.<sup>98</sup> On 25 March *the Democrat* commented in a report to *the Defender* that there was clearly a bid still being made by the PSC to develop Weltevreden Valley, for which WECCO was “collecting names” (*i.e.* selling places on a housing waiting list) and that the SLP was regarded by these parties as being ‘in the way’ of the development. He had agreed with *the Strategist* that Weltevreden Valley be placed on the Agenda of the next Policy Committee meeting.<sup>99</sup>

On 29 March 1994 the Western Cape Regional Peace Committee, established in 1991 by a multi-stakeholder National Peace Accord, (Readers Digest, 1994. p. 511), called a Special Executive Committee Meeting just to discuss the potential for conflict over the development of Weltevreden Valley. In an accompanying memorandum it was explained that its Crossroads Crisis Sub-Committee had recognised that the SLP was the 'primary development forum in the area' and had therefore co-opted a representative of the SLP onto the committee. Furthermore, the Crossroads Crisis Sub-Committee had assumed a monitoring function of all development taking place in the SLP area. The memo expressed concern that a utility company consisting of a consortium of developers and consultants was seeking to develop the area privately, that sites in this undeveloped area had already been sold or allocated to 4 000 people and that pressure was now being brought to bear on the CPA to make the land available and on the Regional Housing Board to provide funding. It pointed out that WECCO, although a participant in the SLP, was in support of the private initiative and that accusations had been made that sites had been sold to WECCO members. Concern was expressed that if the issue was not addressed it could lead to conflict between civic bodies and the collapse of the SLP.<sup>100</sup>

Agreement was reached with the Peace Committee that the SLP Policy Committee would discuss the matter first.<sup>101</sup> Its agenda for the meeting on 11 April included the proposed Code of Conduct for Developers and an Application for Development of Weltevreden Valley by the WCCDC. Distributed with the agenda was the development proposal, with an unexpected covering letter from the same CPA official who had earlier encouraged the PSC and been repudiated by *the Strategist*, which explained that the attached proposal had been presented to the (national) Department of Local Government and National Housing by a legal firm on behalf of WCCDC, and that the Director-General of that Department had referred it to the CPA for submission to the Regional Housing Board. The official asked *the Democrat* to have the iSLP Policy Committee evaluate the application in terms of the Code of Conduct on 11 April, and then to advise him of the Policy Committee's view so that the proposal could be forwarded to the Regional Housing Board together with the SLP Policy Committee's comments.<sup>102</sup> Everyone in the Policy Committee recognised the name of the legal firm as being associated with a former senior National Party politician. (Readers Digest, 1994. P. 475, 491). This looked very much like a tactical manoeuvre by members and associates of the apartheid old guard. However

Regional Housing Boards were newly created institutions and were not yet operational.

The application was for WCCDC to develop 6 000 serviced sites, and as a second phase to build houses on them. 5 250 of these would be in Weltevreden Valley, and the balance would be created through the upgrading of areas in Nyanga and Guguletu vacated by the Weltevreden Valley beneficiaries. Training, job creation programmes and labour-intensive construction were envisaged, as well as access to the community facilities in the former Railway Police hostel that had been acquired by the CPA. It also stated that the project would be managed by the ‘Regional and Local Social Compacts’ consisting of leading members of the communities involved, the Local Authority and the PSC. Elsewhere the application stated that the project managers would report to the ‘Local and Regional Social Compact’, but nowhere did it state how such compact would be structured. It was stated that the project was being sponsored individually and mutually ‘by the affected local community leadership and their regional structures, namely SANCO, WCUSA and WCCA’. The document had apparently been written prior to the creation of WECCO.

The Policy Committee meeting on 11 April was well attended , and included the leaders of WCUSA, SANCO and the hostels upgrade project as well as *the Veteran* representing WECCO. The town clerks of Ikapa and Crossroads had been invited. The Code of Conduct produced some discussion on wording, but as the broad principles were not disputed a sub-committee of *the Democrat* plus representatives of the CPA, ANC, SANCO, WCUSA and the hostels project were delegated to re-word the document. With regard to the WCCDC proposal *the Strategist* pointed out that the CPA had committed itself to the joint venture approach of the SLP and would therefore not make an independent bilateral decision regarding land availability. The proposal regarding community participation was also problematic because on the basis of the SLP Principles *the Democrat’s* team had facilitated the establishment of RDCs in communities and was running training programmes on the development process.

Representatives of SANCO, WECCO, WCUSA and the hostel dwellers vociferously complained that the SLP processes were undermining their organisations and that RDCs were illegitimate ‘puppet’ structures. The chairman of SANCO claimed that the Policy Committee was only an interim structure and that “communities should be enabled

to prepare applications, raise finance and appoint their own consultants”, but *the Veteran* argued that the RDCs provided useful links to communities and should not be disbanded. It was decided to appoint a sub-committee comprising representatives of the community organisations and the SLP Coordinator to either design a strategy within the existing SLP policy principles or to revert to the Policy Committee with an alternative recommendation. There was no time left to discuss the WCCDC proposal further and it was held over until the next meeting on 9 May.<sup>103</sup>

On 27 April 1994 the whole of South Africa went to the polls for the first time ever. The world’s newest democracy had been born. But on 5 May *the Democrat* expressed great concern privately to *the Strategist* that the civic structures involved in the SLP were not representative of communities or in touch with the ‘grass roots’ – and that their leaders had become gate-keepers. His field workers had discovered that the communities that WCCDC claimed to have consulted had not been consulted at all. *The Democrat* argued that the 15 RDCs that had been created and trained were far more representative of their communities than any of the structures in WCCDC and he suggested that consideration be given to creating a committee of representatives of the RDCs who could represent communities in the SLP. The civic structures could be consulted if necessary, perhaps to address disputes. Alternatively if the real motivation of those on the Policy Committee was to find employment any of them could seek to become involved in development projects in their personal capacity.<sup>104</sup>

Amongst the many changes brought about upon South Africa’s transition to democracy in April 1994 was the conversion of provincial administrations to provincial governments. Centrally appointed Administrators and their Executive Committees were replaced by elected politicians and from these Premiers and Ministers were appointed by the majority party. The first democratic government began as a ‘government of national unity’, a deliberate attempt to unify the country. The Housing Minister in the Western Cape was Gerald Morkel, who assumed the role of *the Sponsor* of the SLP.

#### *About subterfuges, deceptions and manipulations*

It was to be expected in South Africa under apartheid that any initiative that was potentially contrary to government policy would be infiltrated by persons from some secret service establishment. Because ‘development’ had been an instrument of oppression (‘separate

development' was a pillar of apartheid policy) the development field was as likely to be populated with spies, informers and *agents provocateur* as any other. Such highly trained operators are virtually impossible to detect and perilous to investigate. But over time repetitively suspicious activities do not go unnoticed and the testimonies of people who encounter their strangeness coincide – and an uncomfortable consensus is reached that clandestine forces have been at work. They were perceived to be burrowing beneath the SLP from time to time, but nobody could tell precisely what they were doing or on whose behalf they acted.

It is worth mentioning this here because for a social crisis to reach the stage where a cross-sector collaboration is the last resort it is probable that the opposing forces which have hitherto failed to work together have employed espionage and deception against each other. If one party to the collaboration has been a militaristic oppressor then this is not only likely but inevitable. The fact that a collaboration is being initiated is unlikely to signal an end to this activity. Even if one arm of the government is no longer involved others might continue, and a change in policy could release hoards of brilliant spies and manipulators, ready to be employed by whoever will pay them. One must not be naive.

#### *Risky exercises for right reasons*

The SLP workshops which were held for the constituencies of WECCO in December 1993 and for SANCO in January 2004 drew representatives of virtually all the communities in the SLP. The meetings were given a list of 32 potential projects, each rated with regard to development readiness (with regard to planning and raising finance), and a list of 23 eligible communities. Delegates were asked to prioritise the entries on each list “A”, “B” or “C” with regard to urgency. The exercise was risky, because the responses were unpredictable, but not only did each workshop result in almost complete agreement but there was considerable congruence between the two sets of results. The Policy Committee treated the outcomes as recommendations, which it promptly approved. This demonstrated the value of real community involvement and that consultation with a large number of competing communities was feasible. It was apparent that local community leaders were not only well informed about regional issues but sensitive to the different needs and possibilities that existed.

Similarly it is noteworthy that *the Strategist* and his colleagues continued to meet

with WCUSA and later with WECCO when those organisations were at odds with the Policy Committee. It exemplified doing everything possible to maintain good relationships with parties that had excluded themselves from the mainstream and had the potential to act explosively. On the other hand well-meaning friendly organisations can also damage the process, particularly if they feel the urge to intervene in matters which they do not fully understand. The Peace Committee was well within its rights to want to take action regarding Weltevreden Valley, but it was not qualified to act in the best interests of the SLP. It was therefore essential that *the Democrat* ensure that the Policy Committee pre-empt the Peace Committee.


Appreciation of the SLP, whether from an international authority such as UN-Habitat or from local community bodies representing grassroots interests, provided objective validation of the integrity of the process and also invited ongoing relationships. Not only were these endorsements valuable references, but officials of UN-Habitat expressed ongoing support by providing good advice and capacity-building materials - and community leaders became co-workers with the SLP facilitators in ensuring the success of the project committees on which delivery of the SLP was based.

#### **The last throw of the dice: May – June 1994**

The Policy Committee reconvened on 13 May and was informed that subsequent to the previous meeting SANCO, WCUSA and WCCA had decided to form yet another entity: the Peninsular People's Compact (PPC), "which will facilitate the functioning of regional compacts and ensure adequate consultation". (The new terminology reflected the requirement in the newly-announced National Housing Policy that any housing project must have a 'social compact' to qualify for state subsidies.) They reported that their sub-committee appointed at the previous Policy Committee meeting had not finalised its proposals regarding the SLP, but that in the light of national political changes a complete restructuring of the SLP would now be necessary. Reference was made to a meeting that they had held with the CPA, from which they awaited a response.

*The Strategist* responded that no restructuring of the SLP could be undertaken by bilateral negotiations and proposed a more inclusive discussion. The leaders of the civic structures, who began referring to themselves as the Task Team, caucused for 20 minutes and then announced that they required more time to develop a proposal for restructuring the

SLP. Their immediate attention would be given to building the capacity of the PPC, and in the meantime they required all SLP project activity to cease. They planned a community workshop on 5 June, which they requested the CPA to pay for. The iSLP now resembled **Fig 15** below:



'Task Team' members were particularly upset with the fact that the development process still involved the RDCs, and objected very strongly to the SLP coordination team's continued involvement with communities. It was decided to form a sub-committee of the Policy Committee of four representatives of the Task Team and four from the CPA, RSC and City of Cape Town, chaired by *the Defender*, to discuss any proposals on re-structuring the SLP and redefining roles. *The Democrat* would attend meetings of the sub-committee as an advisor only when requested. It was also decided to arrange a meeting between the Task Team and the Project Management Committee (to whom *the Democrat* as Project

Coordinator reported) to discuss which activities should be put on hold. *The Democrat* agreed to cancel all community meetings that had been arranged until a way ahead had been agreed.

The next surprise was that the representative of SANCO stated that it would be inappropriate to discuss the WCCDC Weltevreden Valley application because it was now outdated and “should be declared null and void”. It was agreed that only the applicant could withdraw it, but there was no interest in taking it further at that stage. Furthermore, *the Strategist* reminded the meeting that the CPA had, at the Policy Committee’s request, withdrawn its letter of support to WCCDC regarding a land availability agreement – and without access to the land the proposal could not go ahead. There had also been no further progress towards reaching agreement on the Code of Conduct.

#### *Residents’ committees react*

Before that meeting ended *the Defender* reported that she had received a letter from the leadership of the Samora Machel informal settlement, which was located on the Weltevreden Valley site. They had an RDC and expressed appreciation for the community-based approach. They were also members of SANCO and had heard that there was a proposal to develop Weltevreden Valley, yet they had never been consulted. They therefore requested representation on the Policy Committee. The SANCO representatives agreed to follow the matter up.<sup>105</sup>

On 17 May the Project Management Committee met with the Task Team, who this time asked to be referred to as ‘representatives of the PPC’. *The Defender* attended. *The Democrat* reported in detail on the status of each of seventeen projects and was given the go-ahead to proceed with all of them except Crossroads (because Nongwe complained that *the Democrat* was divisive) and Philippi East (where the creation of a project committee had been bedevilled by differences between SANCO and WCUSA factions).<sup>106</sup>

On 23 May *the Democrat* reported to *the Strategist* that in cancelling the scheduled community meetings it had been necessary to inform the RDCs of the reason. Their angry response demonstrated that grassroots community leaders knew nothing of the proposal to form a new organisation between existing community organisations. Leaders of the KTC settlement had briefed the Legal Resources Centre on the matter and leaders of three

informal settlements in Nyanga had asked the Development Action Group for help. News of all this dissatisfaction had reached the Regional Peace Committee, which expressed great concern that developments could once again fall into the hands of Mr Nongwe and *the Headman*. The Regional Peace Executive decided to request the national and provincial ministers of housing (Messrs Slovo and Morkel) to defer any decision on transferring control of the SLP until an investigation had been held into the entire affair and the communities had been consulted.

On 26 May 1994 representatives of the Residents Development Committees of KTC, Mkonto Square, Mpinga Square, Mpetha Square, Black City and Millers Camp (all Nyanga), New Rest, Pholla Park and Fezeka (all Guguletu) as well as Samora Machel passed a resolution to mandate the Province to apply to the Provincial Housing Board for the funds to develop Weltevreden Valley. Later they were joined by the residents of Mahobe Drive, Kalanyoni, Barcelona and Kanana, and thereby the Weltevreden Valley Project Committee comprised representatives of thirteen communities and the Provincial Housing Department.<sup>107</sup>

### *Stalemate*

On 2 June the sub-committee that had been commissioned by the Policy Committee to review the structure of the SLP met and proposed that the ‘community-based organisations’ should in future be represented on the Project Management Committee, or on a new project management structure in the event of a re-structuring. However, it was noted that the PPC had not yet provided any details on its own structure and proposed role, its proposals for the implementation and management structures of the SLP, how it intended community-based organisations to be involved with RDCs, or its proposals on affirmative action in the implementation and management of the SLP. *The Strategist* also reported that the CPA was unable to finance the PPC’s workshop planned for 5 June.<sup>108</sup>

*The Democrat* had also learned that efforts were being made by the PSC to incorporate additional construction companies. He ventured to suggest that three of the four big greenfields sites in the SLP might be made available for development by the private sector, but only on certain conditions. These were that they complied with structure plans, created project committees that included the RDCs and fully involved them in the project, ensured that the site allocation criteria was pre-determined by the project committee, that

labour-based methods were used, employment offered to community members, and that the developers submit their projects to monitoring by the SLP to ensure compliance.<sup>109</sup> On 7 June the SLP Project Management Committee recommended to the Policy Committee that developers be given the opportunity to submit development proposals to project committees for the development of the SLP greenfields projects (Southern Delft, Weltevreden Valley and Philippi East) or phases thereof, but only after a social compact had been formed and the preliminary town planning and engineering report had been completed, for which they would have engaged the necessary consultants. Furthermore, compliance with the SLP Principles and subjection to the monitoring of the SLP Project Coordinator was required.<sup>110</sup>

When the Policy Committee met on 13 June it was addressed by the SLP's new patron, Provincial Minister of Housing, Gerald Morkel, who expressed concern at the recently-announced findings of the Goldstone Commission into the 1993 violence in Crossroads and at allegations of potential private interests in the SLP. He reminded the committee that the objective was to produce affordable housing through an inclusive and transparent process. The leaders of SANCO, WCUSA and the Hostel Dwellers arrived late and missed the Minister's address. They could provide no details about the existence or role of the Task Team, perhaps because the PPC's workshop had not taken place on 5 June. *The Strategist* was blamed for not having financed it, but he responded that he had not received the motivation that he had requested. Again the suspension of activity in projects was mooted, but without any decision. PPC members refused to provide support for an application to the Regional Housing Board for bridging finance for the SLP until they had 'engaged in further discussions'. They complained that *the Democrat* was divisive, but when asked to put the grievances in writing *the Veteran* cannily responded that community organisations "lacked the necessary infrastructure" to do that. The meeting was adjourned until 23 June.<sup>111</sup>

On 20-23 June faxes were sent by SANCO, WCCA and WECCO to the other members of the Policy Committee asking for the removal of *the Democrat* as Project Coordinator and for his replacement by their own representatives.<sup>112</sup> It also transpired that the PPC and PSC had surreptitiously submitted an application to the Regional Housing Board for the right to develop 10 000 sites within the SLP.<sup>113</sup> The Policy Committee meeting scheduled for 23 June<sup>114</sup> attracted an attendance of 33 people with 7 apologies, but

still yielded no proposals for the re-structuring of the SLP – just the faxes calling for *the Democrat's* replacement, which were tabled by *the Defender* in the Chair. *The Democrat* excused himself from the meeting. The Town Manager of Crossroads asked “whether it would be permissible for the Policy Committee to ‘test’ the constituencies to ascertain whether the current proposals had been arrived at through a consultative process”, and was met by a storm of protest from ‘community structures’. Before a way ahead could be agreed the community organisations held a caucus meeting, as a result of which the Policy Committee decided once again to establish a sub-committee, with the task of putting forward concrete proposals regarding the restructuring of both the Policy and Project Management Committees and concerning the role in the SLP of *the Democrat's* firm.<sup>115</sup>

### *Into a new dispensation*

These two months since the creation of the ‘new South Africa’ had been full of furious attempts by some parties to wrest control of the SLP from the main government actor. Their desperation was because the provincial government was now legitimate – it was product of democracy, part of a new national government and it therefore suddenly had real power and authority.

The repeated creation of sub-committees and unending tolerance by the authorities of patently bogus “community representatives” must be viewed in the light of what was being played out on the national stage. The first quarter of 1994 was the last lap of a very fraught national negotiating process, with threats from the traditionally Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party to withdraw altogether and a constant threat of violence from right wing white organisations. During the process of transition the government was unable to be decisive about a local project like the SLP. Private sector bounty hunters had everything to play for – within a limited window of opportunity until government settled down. Ambitious civic leaders had their future careers to fight for, and in this interregnum they could posture and pronounce as much as they liked, in the hope of attracting the attention of the new raft of national leaders. Civil servants and consultants had to build and maintain relationships with everyone because nobody knew what would be required to avoid a foreshortened career.

For these reasons the self-styled ‘community representatives’ were asserting themselves in the Policy Committee, frequently rearranging and renaming themselves to

appear impressive, yet when invited or challenged they were unable to demonstrate any strategy or organisational substance. But when they insisted that all SLP community meetings must cease there was an angry reaction from the grassroots, coupled with a warning about possible violence from the Regional Peace Committee. For on the ground the SLP had been steadily growing in substance with the creation of an increasing number of RDCs whose members were gaining confidence and asking questions about who was representing them in the Policy Committee. 13 RDCs, each representing a community/settlement, had become members of the SLP's first green fields project committee. The catalyst for this transformation was *the Democrat's* team of isiXhosa-speaking facilitators, communication specialists and programme managers that he had established to enable participative development at the local project level. All of these new participants, those within communities and those employed by the SLP Coordinator, constituted the new generation of Enablers in the SLP. The life of the Policy Committee had been extended because of delays on the national stage but now there was not real government and in the SLP a growing degree of real community involvement and a swing in impetus from 'top-down' to 'bottom-up'.

The SLP was on a knife-edge. Many of the collaborators were now sitting on the fence with a foot in each camp and ready to jump to wherever the money and job prospects would appear. However they had focussed so much on their personal agendas that they failed to notice that the people whom they have been purporting to represent were beginning to speak for themselves. There was also a new government in power, at last, which was searching for good models of democratic development.

### **Conclusion**

The narrative in this chapter covered the turbulent twelve months until June 1994, in which the competition for control of the iSLP became increasingly convoluted and furious, but at the same time local leaders were becoming aware that they were being misrepresented. The contestation brought the collaboration to a virtual standstill. The argument of this chapter is that there is a limit to what Enablers of a cross-sector collaboration can achieve on their own – in spite of all their endeavours the collaborative process had been brought to a halt. Its contribution to the thesis as a whole is to introduce the necessity of mandates to empower the Enablers. Chapter 8 describes how the iSLP process came to the attention of

the new national government which provided a mandate beyond anything that either the needy communities or the Enablers expected.

## 8

## **Empowering Enablers: Putting principles to work in trustworthy hands**

In this chapter we find the integrity of the SLP's process being validated by the new national and provincial government, and the project's opponents castigated in the press by local community leaders. Not only was the project endorsed and its promoters affirmed, but they were invited to scale up the project to provide a great deal more than serviced land. Implementation was to be managed at the level of individual projects in conjunction with community representatives, and the whole process was to be coordinated in accordance with the originally-agreed principles. The Policy Committee was abolished, to be replaced by more appropriate high level representative institutions.

### **The interregnum is over**

On 30 June *the Strategist* and some of his colleagues briefed Billy Cobbett, the Director-General of the Department of Housing, and followed it up with some background documents.<sup>116</sup> Cobbett also received a delegation of some Policy Committee members led by the veteran housing champion Alderman Eulalie Stott. On 3 July *the Community Planner* and *the Democrat* sent him their own analysis of the situation in the SLP. In this report they pointed out the mutual hostility between WCUSA, SANCO and WCCA that had existed in the policy phase of the SLP, but which had evaporated in the implementation phase when they joined forces with the private sector consortium and proposed to take over the SLP. There was also evidence that the leaders of these "community organisations" had neither sought nor received mandates for these actions from their purported constituents – yet they had entered into an agreement creating the PPC, signed on 13 June in the offices of the PSC's lawyers.

In their report *the Community Planner* and *the Democrat* stated that whereas the PPC claimed to be a "social compact" the evidence from Peace Committee community workers as well as from the RDCs indicated that it comprised only a small group of individuals. Cobbett was also told that the PSC, in association with WCUSA, had

previously received funding from the Independent Development Trust to develop 4 000 sites in Khayelitsha, which project had eventually dissolved into violence after all allocations were controlled by *the Headman*. *The Community Planner* and *the Democrat* suspected that the consortium was now planning to use the PPC as a front to achieve a huge amount of publicly-funded work for a single group of consultants in a consortium with a small group of contractors. The PPC had already proposed themselves as community facilitators in projects outside of the SLP for a 3% fee. They reminded Cobbett that the term “rent a community” was becoming increasingly familiar in the development field in South Africa, and he recommended that it become national policy that project proposals be only invited from the private sector after the establishment of a community compact, an agreement on site allocation criteria and the satisfaction of bulk infrastructure requirements.<sup>117</sup>

The Ministers of the Western Cape Provincial Government were briefed about the SLP on 11 and 19 July. All the weekend newspapers on 16/17 July carried stories of how the PPC and compact aimed to take over the SLP and remove *the Democrat*, and the rejection of these attempts by local community leadership.<sup>118</sup> On 14 July *the Defender* wrote personally to Policy Committee members inviting them to a meeting on 26 July at 11h00, with a reminder that each party was limited to two delegates.<sup>119</sup> She followed it with a letter on 22 July, explaining that the implementation of the SLP had been the subject of discussion by the Executive Committee of the Regional Government, and that this and the possible re-structuring of the SLP would be the focus of the Policy Committee meeting, which would be addressed by Minister Morkel.<sup>120</sup> At 14h37 on the day before the scheduled meeting *the Democrat* received a fax from the PPC requesting that the Policy Committee meeting be cancelled and that instead a meeting of the restructuring sub-committee be convened as a matter of urgency.<sup>121</sup> At 08h18 on 26 July *the Defender* faxed the PPC urging their attendance at the morning’s Policy Committee meeting to hear the views of the government.<sup>122</sup> When the meeting commenced there was only one item on the agenda: “Re-structuring of the Serviced Land Project – The Hon. Minister of Housing.”<sup>123</sup>

Minister Morkel read from a prepared statement and reported that both the Provincial Executive and the national Minister of Housing regarded the SLP as one of the highest national priorities and that finance would be sought for it from the national Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Implementation of the SLP had been

frustrated by the actions of representatives of community organisations. It had therefore been decided that the provincial government would execute the project in terms of the agreed SLP Principles and with participation and empowerment of communities on an individual project basis – expressed through their active representation on project committees and thus involvement in the whole planning and delivery process, and by the design and implementation of programmes that would inform beneficiaries and promote the establishment of a strong social fabric within the suburbs and neighbourhoods that would be created. The Policy Committee was abolished with immediate effect, and replaced by a committee chaired by Minister Morkel to resolve issues, to which community organisations would be invited. The national Department of Housing would be invited to have a representative on the Project Management Committee, which would continue to be responsible for implementation, with assistance from *the Democrat's* firm in coordination and facilitation. The project would be linked to the national RDP programme through the national Department of Housing. Proposals from developers would be considered by the relevant Residents' Development Committees and the Provincial Administration, but only after the preliminary stages of the project process (*per* previous recommendations) had been completed. Finally he paid tribute to all the excellent work that had been done, and particularly thanked *the Defender* for her outstanding contribution in the chair.<sup>124</sup> The SLP Policy Committee never met again.

### **A “Special Integrated Presidential Project” of the RDP**

The first documentation about the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) arrived in the iSLP Coordinator's office on 5 August 1994, with a request to attend a meeting of the National Urban Development Task Team in Pretoria on the 9<sup>th</sup>. The papers included a proposal in the form of a memorandum from the RDP Minister Without Portfolio, Jay Naidoo, that the RDP Fund should be used to leverage a shift in priorities within the budgets of national line departments as well as provincial and local authorities and to kick-start special projects and programmes to initiate development. Applications for integrated projects were to be submitted by such departments and authorities, and must include an allocation in their budgets for capacity building for both “government RDP structures” and community development organisations.<sup>125</sup>

At the meeting on 9 August it was announced that “The Serviced Land Project in

the Cape Flats” was one of 6 key urban renewal focus areas that had emerged.<sup>126</sup> On 24 August it was learned that the SLP had in principle been selected to be one of these six “Presidential Projects” of the RDP.<sup>127</sup>

The SLP coordinators compiled a comprehensive business plan on the basis of a fully integrated project, which would provide not only housing (within the terms of the national housing subsidy policy) but all the community facilities necessary in new suburbs, plus provision for capacity building programmes. This was all to be undertaken within the 5-year objective of the RDP, with a budget of almost R1,2 billion, half of which was requested from RDP funds. It was dated 23 November 1994, considered by the national RDP Committee on 15 December and thereafter approved by Minister Naidoo with an allocation of finance of R592 075 000.<sup>128 129</sup> The name “Serviced Land Project” now seemed very incongruous because the project would provide a great deal more than serviced land – but it transpired that nobody who had been involved in the project wanted to change the name. So it was renamed the “Integrated Serviced Land Project”, abbreviated “iSLP” – “i” being the appropriate *isiXhosa* prefix.

Sadly, Housing Minister Joe Slovo died of cancer in January 1995. He had championed the introduction of a national housing policy based on an incremental approach, starting with a very small dwelling which could be extended. It was on this basis that the iSLP began implementation – a modest grant was to be used first to provide a serviced site and the remaining funds would finance a dwelling. His successors were otherwise inclined, and in later years introduced larger subsidies and minimum sizes for houses and attempted, seldom successfully, to reserve the whole subsidy for the house on the basis of the local authority paying for the creation of serviced sites.<sup>130</sup> It so happened that from 1994 state-subsidised houses became associated in the public mind with the RDP, and since then all houses that have been financed only with state subsidies have been colloquially termed “RDP houses”.

The iSLP Business Plan was for the development of new suburbs on large tracts of ‘greenfields’ land owned by the Province (particularly Delft South, Philippi East and Weltevreden Valley) and for the upgrading of informal settlements that existed on land that was, or would become, owned by local authorities. The beneficiaries would be drawn from informal settlements and backyard shacks in existing townships – and part of the plan was

that the greenfields sites would be used for the relocation of informal settlement residents so that the cleared informal settlements could be developed and formalised by the local authority. What happened, however, was that large scale delivery forged ahead on the greenfields sites while the local authorities went through years of re-structuring accompanied by diminishing political will, inadequate policies and insufficient resources to either protect or upgrade their informal settlements. As a result the greenfields projects accommodated a continuous stream informal settlements' residents, whose places were taken by others. At the end of the project there were actually more households living in informal settlements within the project area than there had been at the start.

### *The iSLP Business Plan*

After receiving indications from the national Department of Housing that the project was to be recommended for inclusion in the Reconstruction and Development Programme the facilitation team had to urgently compile a comprehensive business plan. The iSLP Principles, including technical standards, were already documented, but no budgets had yet been prepared because nobody had yet known whether or not the project would be limited to the creation of serviced sites. The RDP brief was that 'integrated urban development' was required, meaning suburbs containing streets, houses, schools, libraries, community halls, sports fields, playgrounds, health facilities, early childhood centres and sites for businesses and religious purposes – and that the programme must incorporate capacity-building opportunities for the new residents.

The starting point was to list every parcel of land that had been identified by the iSLP's Technical Committee, dividing the large areas into phases of around 22 hectares. There were more than sixty of these, each to be treated as an individual project. Then the number of residential sites that could be achieved within each project was calculated, using a target ratio of 45 sites per hectare of gross vacant land, in compliance with the iSLP's planning guidelines. Each serviced site and house would have to be financed from the state housing subsidy for low income earners, which had recently been announced, so the housing budget for each project was the product of the number of sites multiplied by the subsidy, plus the cost of the bulk and link infrastructure as estimated by the engineers in the Technical Committee.

A map of iSLP projects indicating the estimated number of households that were to live in each was then discussed separately with officials of the provincial departments of Education, Health and Libraries and of the local government agencies that would be responsible for facilities and amenities. This was to establish what kinds of facilities should be provided within each project and the estimated cost of each. The expectation was that if the SLP was approved the national Treasury would cover 50% of the capital cost of such facilities, with the balance and the operating costs being for the account of the relevant government department. The budget for schools was calculated on the basis of a primary school for every 1 000 households and a secondary school for every 2 000 households, but the capacity of existing schools in the proximity had to be also taken into account, and it was decided to extend some of these as part of the SLP. The schools budget was therefore based on the number of primary or secondary classrooms to be built, with an added factor to provide the other necessary facilities such as offices, ablutions and assembly halls. All the other facilities were planned carefully on the same basis and then priced and programmed by the responsible department.

The national RDP was intended to be a 5 year programme, so this substantial list of projects with their budgets (including cost escalations over time) had to be phased over that period. The resulting budget for the entire iSLP was 1.2 billion Rands, of which half was sought from the national Treasury, on the basis of commitments made by the Western Cape Provincial Government, the Regional Services Council and the City of Cape Town to provide the balance. In fact the provincial contribution, which included all the housing subsidies (which amounted to more than half of the total iSLP budget) was all derived from the central government's -allocations to its departments and thence to the provinces.

The purpose of the iSLP Business Plan was to define the objectives, principles and components of the project and to secure the necessary overall funding. Over time some of the detail changed, particularly with regard to timing and phasing, but access to the Treasury money was secured and each of the many iterations of the iSLP budget was formally approved by the provincial government. Furthermore, as soon as each capital project or capacity-building programme was formulated it was submitted to the provincial government for approval and later formally signed off when it had been completed. By the completion of the iSLP it had comprised about 150 capital projects and 75 capacity-building programmes.

In the long implementation process the approved iSLP Business Plan remained the only authorised framework for the project, and the iSLP Principles took on an untouchable, inviolable role, and could be raised as a banner at any time in defence of the founding values and decisions of the project. During a period of unprecedented change and administrative turmoil in government it was invaluable to have a set of principles that had been approved by all parties and at the highest level and which were effectively unchangeable.

### *The iSLP Principles*

The eventual recommendation for state funding was framed in terms of the iSLP Principles, which had been approved early in the process by all of the parties except WCUSA, and in particular had been endorsed by grassroots leaders at local workshops. These lay at the core of the iSLP's mandate. Over the succeeding years the first line of defence against any challenge to the project was whether the iSLP Principles would be compromised. Their wording was kept short and simple and began with the following Aim and Objectives:

#### Aim of the iSLP

The Integrated Serviced Land Project is primarily for the benefit of low-income families living in Crossroads and the surrounding informal settlements and in backyards and overcrowded hostels in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu who do not have secure rights to serviced land. The project will also be accessible to persons who are on the housing waiting lists held by local authorities in the metropolitan area. The iSLP's aim is to enable low income families to participate fully in the planning and implementation of a process that will create access to serviced residential plots with secure tenure; and housing, education, health, employment and other resources so that a process of incremental and sustainable holistic development can take place in these communities.

#### Objectives for the implementation of the iSLP

The objectives are to:

Structure the project appropriately under the authority of the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape.

Assist communities within the project area to establish inclusive, development-

orientated committees.

Identify potential projects.

Facilitate the establishment of a Project Committee in respect of each project to oversee planning and management, such committee to comprise representatives of community committees, the public authority, a private developer (if involved) and the iSLP Project Coordinator, with consultants in attendance.

Programme the completion of the iSLP within five years so that all potential beneficiaries can have a realistic expectation of a material improvement in their circumstances within that time frame.

Facilitate the provision of educational, health and other resources required for the development of communities.

Facilitate and promote the consolidation of communities.

Equip communities through training and capacity-building programmes so that they can participate fully in the planning and implementation of projects and programmes.

Optimise skills generation and job creation, including the use of labour intensive techniques, in all projects and programmes.

Optimise the communities' access to all appropriate resources, including technical advice, project facilitation and conflict resolution.

Raise the necessary finance.

Ensure the maintenance of infrastructure and service delivery within the iSLP Project Area, and that the communities pay for services received.

These were followed by a list of the responsibilities of each of the parties involved in the iSLP's implementation, principles for allocating access to land for each community and then principles for identifying beneficiaries within each community.

The iSLP Principles also included a range of 'approved development techniques' and guidelines on densities, planning principles and levels of service. These latter documents had been researched and developed by the Technical Committee, comprising mainly professional planners and engineers, which took the opportunity provided by the dawn of a new political era to create a new suite of planning and design principles to replace protocols that were either too demeaning for communities or unnecessarily expensive and wasteful of resources. Specifications for roads, pavements, vehicle access, site sizes and

reticulation of water, sanitation, electricity and public transport were all reviewed – and new guidelines for upgrading informal settlements were incorporated. These were all negotiated with the authorities and officially approved. The considerable amount of finance that was reserved for the iSLP became an added incentive for applying these new ideas.

*The transformation in status*

In the space of a few weeks the fortunes of the iSLP had changed from being under total siege to being selected to be the new government's biggest demonstration project of good practice. The credibility of the opposition was ultimately challenged by grassroots community representatives who found their voice in the Residents Development Committees. The last straw had been the revelation that the founding memorandum of the Peninsular Peoples Compact had been signed in the offices of the Private Sector Consortium's legal advisors.

A crucial factor in the evolving tale of this project was the state of health of democracy in South Africa during this preliminary period. 'Community Participation' in development is a democratic ideal, but South Africa was far from a democracy. The prospect of a democratic future had been inspired by the release and unbanning of political opponents of the apartheid government, but the whole society had lived within an autocracy for decades, and the black community had been its prime victim for generations. The involvement of black people in government programmes had been characterised by manipulation, force or patronage. People had developed skills for administering that but there was very little experience in real participative development. Even people like *the Democrat* and *the Strategist* were leading a democratic process more from principle than from experience – although they both were well acquainted with the weaknesses of alternative processes. Nor were the community leaders operating out of a rich history of successful democratic activism – successful activists had been imprisoned and since their release had been engaged at the national rather than local level.

Another factor in the iSLP drama was the pecuniary motivation of the actors. Civil servants were remunerated regularly and although their future was uncertain under a changed dispensation their financial interests were being represented (and ultimately safeguarded) in the national negotiations. The consultants involved in the process were also remunerated for the services that they rendered. Although nobody was specifically looking

after their interests in the negotiations they knew that there was a lack of skills in the country and that they could position themselves to be engaged in any development opportunity that would probably follow independence. However, with very few exceptions the services provided by representatives of Civics and other community organisations were not remunerated in any way, and there was a real danger that they never would be. Their personal hopes and dreams of life in a new and different South Africa were becoming increasingly close to either realisation or evaporation. There were good grounds for anxiety and desperation.

One might also reflect upon the wisdom of commencing a development process by discussing high-level principles and objectives and therefore needing to engage ‘communities’ through agents who could operate effectively at that level. The consequence would be rather a ‘top-down’ process based on the belief or assumption that these were actually agents of the community and could therefore provide a ‘bottom-up’ balance. At some stage any false assumptions or deceptions would be exposed. Should more representative role-players have been chosen? At the start of the iSLP there were no others, and had they existed they would have demanded participation. Alternatively, could the nature of the role-players have been better understood from the start – after all, it was well known that the WCUSA-PSC association had failed to deliver in the IDT project in Khayelitsha? An inclusive approach to membership of the Policy Committee was adopted on the principle that to leave out a party would be to invite resentment and therefore conflict. Therefore the exclusion of a party, particularly an apparently significant role-player such as WCUSA, whatever its track record, could not be contemplated. The possibility of a counter-proposal out of WCUSA’s association with the PSC might have been anticipated – but actually it arrived before the Policy Committee had even convened.

The fact that the whole country was under a tumultuous political transition and that the attention of respected politicians was on national complications was a real disadvantage for the iSLP. There was nobody who could call the Policy Committee members to order except *the Defender*, who was a very faithful and even-handed chairperson but had no actual authority. And there was no way of propelling the project out of consultative mode into delivery because the necessary multi-year budgets were not yet available. The policy phase was a tedious and unsatisfactory consultative process in which unqualified persons acted as proxy for community representation, yet it was indispensable. Encounters with

representatives of grassroots communities, both in the two big iSLP workshops and in the creation of RDCs and project committees, were the highlights of the process and a vital encouragement to those who were leading it.

#### *Collaborating through conflict and constant change*

The iSLP was created as an experimental collaboration in a situation fraught with conflict and distrust, neither of which can be eliminated easily. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first few years of the iSLP's approach to Crossroads were characterised by no reduction in contestation although for most of the time its form was not as violent as it had been.

At this moment of project approval it can be interesting to reflect upon some of the main actions and counter-actions that had taken place around Crossroads over the previous two decades. **Table 5** (see Annexure B. p. B3-5) presents a very condensed timetable of these events.

#### *Participation in the Policy Committee*

The SLP Policy Committee meetings were intense and frequent: 36 meetings within 39 months attended by 12 broad groups, many of which were suspicious of, and in some cases hostile to, each other. At various times 83 people attended these meetings, but it is illuminating to analyse attendance in the same way as was done for its Local Authority counterpart (in Tables 3 and 4), as shown in **Table 6** (See Annexure B. p. B5).

The effectiveness of this committee rested on the 6 people who attended more than 75% of the meetings. Two of them, *the Strategist* and *the Democrat* – the initiator and the facilitator – were also numbered among the 5 on whom the Local Authority meetings depended. In addition each had a chairperson, so that apart from those who were obliged to be there sustained attendance was provided only by 3 people in the Policy Committee (*the Veteran* and Zoli Malindi of the Civics and *the Urban Planner* of the RSC) and 2 in the Local Authority meeting – a Crossroads official and the SLP's planning consultant.

Just as striking is the fact that of all those who ever presented themselves at Policy Committee meetings only 15% attended more than 50% of the meetings, and almost 70% attended no more than 25% of the meetings. The Local Authority meeting was much better attended: 35% of the members attended more than half of the meetings, but then it was

populated mainly by officials and their managers and political heads.

This clearly indicates that real commitment to the process was limited to the initiator, the facilitator, the chairpersons and the Civic movement – with strong support from the Regional Services Council in which metropolitan policy was vested. The political parties had bigger fish to fry in the national debates and WCUSA had an alternative agenda. The inescapable conclusion must be that during the policy-making process this project was driven by very few people. How was that possible?

**Table 7** (See Annexure B. p. B6) is a record of attendance at the extra-parliamentary Policy Committee. It shows how many of the 36 meetings each group attended or failed to attend; and the range and average of the number of their representatives at meetings. It shows that the CPA, in whose offices the meetings were held, was always present, with very regular support from the Chairperson (*the Defender*, who actually only missed one meeting after her appointment as chair), the RSC, the Civics and the Facilitator/Coordinator (*the Democrat*). A factor which contributed to the Civics' good attendance was that transport was provided to enable the 'community organisations' to attend meetings, organised by the facilitator and at CPA's expense. At the other end of the spectrum neither political party (ANC or PAC) could be relied upon to attend, and the interest of the Philippi Industrialists was topical – as was also the required attendance of BLA officials and technical consultants. WCUSA attended less than half the meetings. But the lower right hand cells of the table show that meetings were well attended by 12-41 people, with an average of 19. On the two occasions when only 12 people attended they nevertheless represented 6 and 9 diverse groups. Of the 12 groups (in which all the Civics, hostel dwellers and SANCO together comprise only 1) an average of 8 and a minimum of 6 attended throughout. This illustrates the need for committed Enablers – in particular a host, chairperson, facilitator and communicator as well as some strong well-placed supporters across the spectrum of stakeholders.

The above analysis of attendance has only been possible because a detailed attendance register was completed at every meeting of the iSLP Policy Committees. This required attendees to write their name clearly, state whom they represented and provide a signature. This was all faithfully transcribed in the minutes of each meeting. One of the extra advantages that this provided in the iSLP was to indicate changes in allegiances over

time, especially with the different civic organisations moving into and out of SANCO, WCCDC, WECCO and the PPC.

### **The Enablers thus far**

This is an opportune moment to consider the roles of the principal Enablers during the policy-making phase of the iSLP.

*The Sponsor* in his position as Administrator of the Cape played decisive roles in launching the process, proposing that *the Defender* chair the Policy Committee and later determining the end of the policy phase and start of implementation. His role in sponsoring the initiative and supporting it thereafter was indispensable. Otherwise he stayed away from Policy Committee meetings, and so wisely avoided involvement in any debates which might have compromised his role as patron. As a ‘higher authority’ who only visited the Policy Committee when necessary he proved to be a very valuable Enabler. His successor played a critical role in negotiating the approval of the iSLP by the national and provincial governments and in ultimately calling the bluff of the ‘community organisations’ and terminating the life of the Policy Committee. Thereafter, as will be demonstrated, his continued involvement was required.

*The Defender* as chairperson of the Policy Committee was independent, fair and gracious, although anxious that this delicate and risky process might fail. She felt out of her depth, knowing little about housing development, but was supported by the officials and respected by all but the brashest members. She was not involved in the ultimate discussions with the national government and so when the Policy Committee was dissolved she feared that it had all come to nothing. In fact the opposite was true, but by that time her considerable dedication and expertise had drawn her into new fields – first as the Provincial Electoral Officer for the country’s first democratic election and then as a Commissioner in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. To have a chairperson of such stature to help enable the iSLP was a huge advantage.

*The Strategist* was a long term professional civil servant and town planner, a quiet and thoughtful man, who in his pivotal position as the senior official addressing the crisis had

demonstrated a very enlightened and pragmatic approach in initiating and guiding the iSLP. In maintaining the process despite all the frustrations and provocations he was supported and encouraged not only by his direct political superiors but by members of the state's Intelligence Directorate which had been advocating adaptation for years.

*The Democrat* was driven by a personal mission to improve Crossroads and not only conceptualised the process but offered to facilitate its application. That function had strategic, communication and administrative components and had to be performed with rigor, integrity and consistency in order to hold such an incompatible group of stakeholders together. His was also a position of weakness and vulnerability, because although he had considerable responsibility there was no authority attached. He was the most visible defender of the process and therefore came under personal attack from those who wanted to change it – and at times he felt completely isolated. On the other hand it is evident from interviews recorded later that participants were so aware of the challenges within their own parties and those presented by their opponents that the facilitator became almost invisible, particularly as his function at policy Committee meetings was to be 'in attendance', not to chair them. His role during the first four years of the iSLP was very demanding but completely indispensable.

*The Community Planner*, held the connection with the ANC, which was slack most of the time but was activated when politically necessary, like when the self-styled community organisations aggressively sided with the Private Sector Consortium, and supremely when the new government was in power and he was able to draw the iSLP to the attention of the national Ministry of Housing.

*The Wrestler*, as the CPA's Regional Director and the Administrator of all the Black Local Authorities in the Western Cape, played a pivotal role in guiding those local authority officials and councillors who were involved in the SLP and in helping the CPA to come to terms with the new challenges of managing African urban issues.

*The Veteran*, who represented the Western Cape Civics Association, was a veteran civic leader and although he was carried through the roller coaster of community responses and reactions to the SLP in the Policy Committee he attended meetings consistently and constructively – and uniquely as a community leader stayed involved until the very end of

the project.

*The Urban Planner* was Chief Planner of the Western Cape Regional Services Council and consistently attended the meetings of the SLP Policy Committee and Technical Committee. He ensured that the planning processes were integrated and that the RSC's management was constantly briefed on the iSLP and prepared to eventually play its part in financing the extensive bulk infrastructure that the iSLP would require.

*The Provincial Planner* was the CPA's planner responsible for the iSLP area, commissioned the planning of all the new suburbs which eventually comprised the bulk of the iSLP's product. This required the application of all the iSLP's novel standards and he eventually became the promoter of a creative new paradigm of double-storey housing in the project.

*The Scribe*, who drafted all of the pivotal policy documents, reports, business plans, programme frameworks, presentations and critical correspondence and took responsibility for record-keeping for the life of the project.

Other Enablers were consultants who were contracted to serve the iSLP policy-making process for a relatively short period of time, but provided specialised input on communications, town planning and civil engineering standards which promoted a significant change in attitude and practice.

### **Reflecting on the various sides to the story**

The story of the iSLP so far appears to be dominated by two opposing forces. One force pursued a democratic, inclusive process for addressing the housing problem in and around Crossroads whereas the other pursued a technically driven, exclusive process. From one perspective the storyline could be perceived as a transparent, 'straight line' logical development process that was attacked by a parasitic process that inhabited it and then wound around it with the intention of usurping its authority, claiming legitimacy and appropriating its financial benefits by delivering the required product without complying with the desired process. However the champions of the second process regarded their own approach as conventional, logical and practical and the opposition's as idealistic, unrealisable and focussed on process without being able to deliver product. The drivers of

each force viewed themselves as virtuous and the others as perverse. Evidently various parties can work towards the same goal but be in pursuit of different prizes. In this case a huge housing project was viewed by some as a potential financial bonanza and by others as an instrument of social redemption. Yet such a binary appraisal is too simplistic, for the stakeholders were diverse and their tensions and inclinations multi-directional and fluid.

Within this overall drama there were a host of minor contests for territory and patronage, some of them violent and some merely stubborn and obstructive, which are not recorded here in any detail. They were specific to communities or areas of land and sometimes just involved one very local group in opposition to another. Each case involved opposing perspectives, perceptions and perhaps even world views. As a result the story of the iSLP and its components would be told quite differently by many of the myriad roleplayers. Such is life. The version in this thesis is from the perspective of a person at the hub of the project through almost its whole existence, who happened to be part of the diverse team that won approval for the project proposal and then drove it to its conclusion.

### **Conclusion**

Chapter 8 has shown how the approval and financing of a considerably expanded collaborative project brought the policy-making phase of the project to an end and thereby terminated the influence of opponents who had bedevilled the process. Also revealed was the broad extent of participation that the project had enjoyed, yet the small number of people who actually made a difference either by the consistency and integrity of their participation or by the leverage that they employed on behalf of the SLP at strategic moments. Thus the argument of this chapter is to highlight the crucial contribution made by Enablers and mandates. The contribution that this chapter makes to the thesis as a whole is to argue that cross-sector collaboration is not simply an iterative process but is an incessantly complex, demanding vehicle to drive on a long, difficult journey, which must be fuelled by powerful mandates and steered by a few strategically located Enablers.

Chapter 9 describes how the project was restructured in order for the mandates to be implemented, but also how the political and institutional environment continued to change, producing unexpected waves of opposition and of weakness that had to be overcome for the objectives to be achieved.

## 9

### **Enabling at scale: Applying mandates to multiply collaborations**

In this Chapter we find that although the iSLP Business Plan explained what would be provided, where, by whom and when, it failed to anticipate the territorial warfare which would be instituted by its new sponsor: those managing the Reconstruction and Development Programme nationally and provincially. It also failed to account for how long it would be before local government could actively support the iSLP. And nobody could predict what political changes would take place at every level of government in the first years of the 'new South Africa'. In its favour, however, the iSLP had principles, programmes and finance approved by the highest authority in the land. It is argued that these mandates, and the actions of the Enablers, would power the project to its completion.

When the project moved into the Implementation Phase the need arose for new structures that would provide community representation at all levels of the iSLP, management for individual projects, further policy-making if required and coordination for the iSLP as a whole. This chapter explains the convoluted process of gradually structuring implementation and policy-making in the simplest and most pragmatic manner. This involved limiting dependence upon politicians, compensating for a weakening bureaucracy by employing consultants, and engaging beneficiary communities in the development process to as great a degree as possible. And through all of this was the necessity to constantly increase the scale of the operation until all communities and all resources had been accounted for. The term 'at scale' when used in this thesis always refers to or implies the largest scale required at the time to achieve the project's objectives.

#### **Community representation**

In his statement at the final Policy Committee meeting on 26 July 1994 Provincial Housing Minister Gerald Morkel had stated that communities would henceforth be involved through their Residents Development Committees (RDCs) at project level and that any other issues would be resolved by a new committee chaired by himself, to which community organisations would be invited. He had explained that the project would be linked to the

Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) at national level through the national Department of Housing.<sup>131</sup>

It soon became apparent, however, that the national RDP office had done more than create a portfolio of initiatives – it had created RDP establishments within provincial Economic Affairs Departments, which regarded RDP projects with a proprietary interest. Furthermore, they initiated the creation of ‘RDP Forums’ within communities whose task it was to ensure that RDP projects were as community-based as possible. At a meeting of provincial Housing and RDP personnel held on 5 September 1994 the latter announced that 20 RDP Forums had already been established in the Cape Peninsular, that one of their functions was to create a 5 year programme “and the iSLP represents a major part of their task”. Within communities these RDP Forums were challenging the legitimacy of the iSLP’s RDCs, and the RDP managers complained that “there were lots of problems on grassroots level that could jeopardise the project”. The iSLP team responded on 22 September with the suggestion that as their Residents Development Committees (RDCs) had been well established and trained before RDP Forums had even been mooted they should drive the iSLP projects and the RDP Forums be used to drive other RDP projects.<sup>132</sup> These were the first salvos in a new battle for the iSLP. It was decided to convene a meeting of the RDCs and RDP Forums that had been established within the iSLP project area.<sup>133</sup>

A meeting was convened for 16 November at Uluntu Centre in Guguletu. Invitations were sent by Minister Morkel to ten community forums or organisations, to the 20 iSLP RDCs and to members of the provincial government and the SLP management structures. Morkel had a prepared speech and proposed terms of reference for an iSLP Consultative Committee – which “would enable the Minister to obtain the views of participating communities on matters of community concern relating to the implementation of the iSLP. The Minister will determine appropriate actions after consultation”.<sup>134</sup> At the meeting he additionally proposed that an ombudsman be appointed to specifically deal with any complaints about the iSLP. The meeting was conducted by a panel sitting at a table facing all the delegates, who sat in rows – very different from any iSLP Policy Committee meeting. The atmosphere was rather tense, no decisions were made, no minutes were typed up and distributed, and matters were left with an intention that a follow-up meeting be held early in 1995, after communities had decided how they would be represented.<sup>135</sup>

The circumstances were further complicated by the introduction of a drawn out process of restructuring for local authorities which began with ‘pre-interim’ structures from early 1994 until the first local authority elections in May 1996 (for Cape Town). These located the iSLP across 5 local authorities, some with councillors who had never heard of the project. In the ‘interim phase’ which followed until the second election in December 2000 the iSLP straddled 2 reconfigured local authorities with elected councillors, of which those in one local authority included many who were familiar with the iSLP whereas the project was virtually unknown in the other. Only in January 2001 did the whole metropolitan area fall under the jurisdiction of a reconfigured City of Cape Town. (McDonald, 2008. p. 99-134).

When in December 1994 the iSLP Business Plan was approved and its status as a Presidential RDP Project confirmed by the national cabinet the conflict at community level between RDCs and RDP Forums intensified, with the latter becoming very powerful local influences. It became impossible to get all the parties together. By the end of July 1995 only two effective RDCs remained and the RDP Forums had become very antagonistic towards the iSLP. *The Democrat* wrote to the Province that with the virtual collapse of the RDCs, the hostility of the RDP forums and the failure of many new councillors in the five interim local authorities to support the project, the whole basis on which the project was to be managed had become unachievable. He recommended that a comprehensive audit of community representation in the project be undertaken and requested high level political intervention to resolve the confusion.

As a result a workshop was held on 29 August in Guguletu attended by 81 people and addressed by Provincial Ministers Morkel (Housing) and Nissen (Economic Affairs and RDP) as well as representatives of the national and provincial RDP offices. It was evident that the SLP had become an object of political territoriality – and Nissen proposed that in addition to local RDP Forums there be an RDP Forum at local government (metro) level and a “Super RDP Forum” specifically to bring the RDP Forums within the iSLP project area together. RDP functionaries were clearly disappointed that the RDP funds for the SLP were being channelled through the national and provincial Housing departments rather than their own – and asked that at least the non-housing elements be managed by the provincial RDP office. Minister Morkel replied that the national cabinet had decided that the Special Integrated Presidential Projects would be located in their dominant line

functions – Housing in the case of the iSLP.

No representatives of the Crossroads and Philippi communities had attended the workshop, and they refused to participate in the “Coordinating RDP Forum” that was thereafter established to represent all communities in the iSLP. The politicians eventually decided to have another attempt at launching an ‘iSLP Consultative Committee’, comprising all the members of the provincial cabinet, 4 councillors from each of the relevant local authorities, 4 representatives of the Coordinating RDP Forum, and 2 representatives each from Crossroads, Philippi and Delft. The purpose was to enable communities to advise the ministers responsible for Housing and the RDP, to consider the annual iSLP Business Plan, to monitor progress and performance and to promote communication. However the launch on 12 December was so poorly attended that it was postponed.<sup>136</sup> Eventually a workshop was held on 20 January 1996 at which it was proposed that the iSLP have the following structures:

A Project Committee for each housing project, in which beneficiary communities would be represented

A Consultative Forum of community representatives

A Steering Committee that would comprise politicians plus four representatives of the Consultative Forum; and

A Coordinating Committee containing officials of all the relevant line functions in provincial and local government.<sup>137</sup>

The new strategy was agreed at a well-attended meeting on 3<sup>rd</sup> February, followed by a celebratory braaivleis (barbecue).<sup>138</sup> Over the following months these committees were established, mainly successfully, as described hereafter. However, in June 1996, just as community representatives in the iSLP established a collective identity, the national government replaced its RDP policy with the GEAR policy (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), which resulted in the disbanding of the RDP ministry and offices. (Sparks, 2003. p. 191-193). There had been growing criticism of the RDP’s needs-based approach and of its poor delivery, in a campaign led by Trevor Manuel who was then Minister of Trade and Industry and who emphasised the need for a high-growth economic policy.<sup>139</sup> Fortunately, the iSLP had performed relatively well, and an audit commissioned by Minister Naidoo in February of that year had reported that the Western Cape (*i.e.* the iSLP) was at least one year ahead in delivery compared to other provinces. The national

government's financial commitment to the iSLP was re-confirmed.

### **Institutional arrangements**

Over the life of the iSLP, through either its policy-generation or implementation phases, a total of thirteen different standing committees were required. They were for policy-making, community involvement, coordination or project management. The range is illustrated in **Table 8** (see Annexure B. p. B6), which demonstrates that structures must be functional and not outlive their usefulness. Those that functioned during the implementation phase are explained below.

#### *Residents Development Committees*

Residents Development Committees (RDCs) were the real drivers of community involvement in the iSLP. They provided a forum within each community or settlement, of which there were around 30 in the iSLP, where residents who had a real interest in development could discuss needs and priorities, share experiences and opportunities, and also receive training in development procedures. RDCs were established in almost every community with the help of the iSLP Project Coordinator's team of facilitators. At the start of the iSLP's Implementation Phase in 1993 the Project Coordinator provided training in development procedures for RDC members, but after the creation of Project Committees, to which RDCs sent representatives, the training became very practical and was achieved in discussions and workshops about real projects.

The creation of RDCs also provided opportunities for leaders who were more interested in development than power and politics to get involved in the iSLP. One of the characteristics of the society that the iSLP was addressing is that those traditionally and formally regarded and respected as 'elders' are men, whereas women are typically better than men at understanding the needs and practicalities of community life. The creation of RDCs could therefore be used by the iSLP facilitators to encourage the involvement of men, women and youth, and the representation and affirmation of as many different existing groups within the community as possible. The imposition of RDP Forums on the iSLP made no real difference – once the politicians had lost interest in the grassroots activities it was the same RDC members who were involved, just under a new name, be it

as an RDP Forum or as a ‘SANCO’ (e.g. Browns Farm SANCO).

### *The Project Committees*

The crucial institutional structures for the implementation of the iSLP were project committees – one for each project. The creation and maintenance of each project committee was the responsibility of the particular project manager and it comprised representatives of those communities that had been allocated a quota of houses in the project, plus officials and the technical consultants. Community involvement was taken seriously because it was understood that without community support any project could be halted by protest action of some kind. The facilitation of community involvement was provided by a team that was managed by the iSLP project coordinator. These facilitators were each allocated a portfolio of projects, and it was their responsibility to optimise the attendance of community representatives, to facilitate their involvement in the process and to facilitate the resolution of any misunderstandings or disputes. It was crucial that these facilitators understood the development process and all its imperatives – they were not only communicators, translators and mediators, for they were responsible for helping all the parties, particularly communities, to achieve their development objectives.

Every project committee was founded on the basis of a simple ‘terms of reference’ document which stated the project’s objectives, the qualifications for membership of that committee, the frequency of meetings and venue and the election of office-bearers. The ideal was to have a community member in the chair, helped where necessary by the designated project facilitator who was on the staff of the iSLP Coordinator. Where in some cases the community representatives asked the facilitator to chair the meetings this was accepted – the process of capacity building cannot be prescribed. Discussions in the vernacular were encouraged in order to optimise community ownership, and if necessary the facilitator would translate for the benefit of the project manager, officials and consultants who were not fluent in the community’s home language (*isiXhosa*).

It was the project manager’s responsibility to record decisions that were critical to the planning and implementation of the project, but the secretary would typically record the transactions in a minute book and the facilitator would produce brief minutes which would be confirmed at the next meeting. A notable number of community representatives in iSLP

project committees obtained a good grounding in the development process and went on to become councillors or officials for the local authority. The iSLP was a great place of learning for everyone involved, whatever their function or status.

Project committees usually met frequently during the planning process, interspersed with workshops when required. When implementation was underway they met regularly to receive progress reports and then as required to deal with any crises or disputes and to manage the beneficiary identification process. A key person in the implementation of each project was the Community Liaison Officer (CLO), a person nominated by the community representatives on the project committee and then appointed (and remunerated) by the contractor to organise and administer the labour to be drawn from the local community. Sometimes two CLOs were appointed. Although they were accountable to both the contractor and the community leadership the system generally worked well.

The process of beneficiary identification was based on the iSLP Principles and required the leadership of each community to create a list of potential beneficiaries, in priority order and slightly in excess of the available places. This would then be advertised publicly on a local notice board with an invitation for residents to tender corrections and objections. Any received would be dealt with under the oversight of the iSLP project facilitator in an effort to ensure fair dealing. The list would usually comprise residents in the order in which they settled in their existing location, taken from the register that had been kept by the leadership. Identity numbers would then be added and the list sent to the project manager, who would have the ID numbers checked against the national database to ensure that the resident was not disqualified from obtaining a housing subsidy. The project manager would then send the resident either an invitation to complete the application process or a letter stating that the applicant was ineligible. The project facilitator was responsible for ensuring the delivery of all correspondence between the project manager and applicants because there were no postal addresses in informal settlements.

The most productive factor in the iSLP was the high level of community involvement at an intensely practical level within the project committees. Furthermore it was noticeably the same Project Committee members who represented RDCs before the crisis and RDP Forums after the crisis. The crisis had not been over 'participation' but over bureaucratic territory, and it was evident throughout the life of the iSLP that people who

attended and were influential in project committee meetings were generally much more engaged than those who enjoyed positions of power, even though elected politicians were always entitled to attend.

#### *Contestation within Project Committees*

Most of the contestation that took place at project committee level was between communities or leadership factions and was about access to housing in that project. The Consultative Forum (see below), comprising only community representatives, had compiled the quota allocations on the basis of equity rather than on any kind of prioritisation – and certainly not on patronage. The most highly contested areas in the early stages of the iSLP's implementation were Crossroads, Browns Farm and Philippi East. The first two contained multiple factions competing for territory and influence – very much as a carry-over from the days of 'warlord' control. Although Philippi East was regarded by Jeffrey Nongwe of Crossroads as an extension of his domain, the leaders of the residents of the first phase of Philippi East set themselves up as gatekeepers and physically prevented any further development until they could get their way by having their own lodgers housed. The old adage, "possession is nine-tenths of the law", held true, particularly where land was in short supply – and eventually compromises had to be made.

A similar circumstance occurred when people from Browns Farm invaded private land (the old cement factory) resisting attempts by the sheriff and police to move them, and in Delft when a major invasion of uncompleted houses in Delft took place. In both cases compromises eventually had to be made – it was impossible to completely reverse large-scale illegal activity. This on its own is a powerful reason for seeking optimum community participation – and with it peer accountability – because legal processes may be impotent. The history of the iSLP project area had been blighted by violence, the wounds from which were still raw, so everything possible was done to prevent it from re-igniting in any form. In these cases it ultimately became pointless to resolutely stand on principles that could not be enforced. If the land was not developed it would be invaded – so rather develop it under the best terms that can be negotiated and save it from a chaotic fate.

There was always a faction that resisted development in Boystown, which was originally a phase of the Crossroads project. If a community is in occupation and demands the impossible nothing can be done, excluding the use of extreme force. The leadership of

Boystown wanted more than the housing subsidy could offer and by holding out for that they denied themselves any benefits of development. At one stage it was thought that agreement had been reached on a development strategy but as soon as the contractor established a yard on site it came under rifle fire and was set alight. Violence was never far below the surface in the iSLP. At one stage in the development of Crossroads it was reported that a gunfight broke out across the site between competing factions at 11 o'clock each morning. From time to time people who were involved in the project were robbed, shot at or even murdered in places such as Crossroads and Browns Farm. Violence between local taxi (minibus) operators was commonplace. The transition to democracy and the rule of law in one of the most dangerous areas of the country was a messy business. The iSLP manifested a brave attempt to build trust constructively in a highly charged environment, and there was constantly the need to simply achieve the best possible result, taking all factors into account.

The iSLP Business Plan listed 31 communities or groups that would benefit from the project. This was reduced by 5 over time: 3 became clients of a separate Hostel Upgrade Project, Boystown failed to benefit because its leaders refused to be part of the project and Driftsands (Sikumbule) was developed separately by the provincial government. The iSLP Consultative Forum had considered the quotas of housing opportunities to be allocated to each community. After a few amalgamations the list was finalised as that shown in **Table 9** (See Annexure B. p. B7]. In this table every community, living either in informal settlements or in shacks in backyards in townships, is listed in the left hand column, and the projects to which they were given access are shown across the top. The total number of sites allocated by this means was 29 785. The iSLP also catered for households who had already received serviced sites by organising the construction of their dwelling. Thus the total number of households accommodated by the project eventually reached almost 32 500.

#### *The Consultative Forum*

At the first meetings of the Consultative Forum on 17 February and 2 March 1996 it was agreed to hold a weekend workshop in order to foster a full understanding of national housing policy and the iSLP. In response to a report that all existing project committees had ceased to function because of the re-structuring it was resolved that officials and consultants must manage the projects until the project committees were re-established. The

national Director-General of Housing, Billy Cobbett, had agreed to address the workshop, which was to be held in a suburban hotel from Friday to Sunday 8-10 March.<sup>140</sup> 41 community members attended, participated thoroughly in the discussions and formally accepted the Consultative Forum's terms of reference.<sup>141</sup> The Consultative Forum dealt with policy issues at the community level and could make recommendations to the Steering Committee, to which it sent four representatives. The Forum successfully and amicably allocated quotas of sites within projects to the various communities and agreed on the procedures to be followed for identifying beneficiaries to fill those quotas.<sup>142</sup> The project committees were revived, with no changes in membership.

Meanwhile in May 1996 Cape Town experienced its first ever democratic local government elections. Some of the most experienced community leaders within the iSLP Consultative Forum were elected as municipal councillors, particularly within the Central sub-district, which had been won by the ANC. For some months these councillors continued to attend Consultative Forum meetings, but then began to question its legitimacy now that there were legally elected representatives of the communities within government, whereas the members of RDP Forums were not. They demanded that the Consultative Forum be disbanded, and after February 1997 it only met once again. There had been 14 regular meetings of the Consultative Forum from its launch in February 1996 to its final meeting in March 1998, including a bus tour of iSLP projects, although at only 12 of these meetings was the attendance properly recorded. The iSLP had lost a very vibrant and valuable committee, which within its short life it had made a considerable and lasting contribution. Its champion was *the Veteran*, one of the iSLP's original Enablers, who before his election as a city councillor was chosen to chair the iSLP Consultative Forum, which he did so until its last meeting. **Table 10** (See Annexure B. p. B8) provides an analysis of the frequency with which individuals attended forum meetings.

The impression given by Table 10 is that attendance was poor, primarily because only 1% of all attendees attend more than 75% of meetings and another 10% attended more than half of the meetings. However, this forum was created for communities to make policy recommendations about aspects of the iSLP that mattered to them through group representation – not necessarily by the same individuals at every meeting. **Table 11** (See Annexure B. p. B9) shows the involvement of groups – particularly as communities.

Table 11 demonstrates the degree of commitment of each group to these meetings. The most striking features are that on average 73% (8.8 / 12) of groups attended every meeting, with an average total attendance per meeting of 32. If allowance is made for the councillors' absence after they had settled into office, and for the very late involvement of the Marcus Garvey community, the attendance rate improves even more. Officials of national government were only involved in the very early stages, to resolve the confusion created by the RDP Forums. This was a very successful structure – the members enjoyed participating and applied their minds to the issues.

Meetings of the iSLP Consultative Forum differed from those of the earlier iSLP Policy Committee in a number of significant ways. This was a meeting of only the community stakeholders in the iSLP, not of all stakeholders – consequently members were able to be much more frank with each other than they would have been with all the government agencies and politicians present. Furthermore, meetings were conducted in the vernacular, with a chairman and deputy chairman appointed from their number, and an expert black facilitator from the iSLP Coordinator's team. Only crucial information was translated into English for the benefit of support personnel. Whereas the Policy Committee had met in the grand provincial government building in central Cape Town, meetings of the Consultative Forum were held in local community halls that were easily accessible to the members, and at suitable times such as evenings and weekends. And as a contribution to the local economy refreshments and transport were supplied by local small contractors and paid for out of the iSLP Project Coordination budget.

#### *The Steering Committee*

Meanwhile, the first meeting of the iSLP's new council of politicians, the iSLP Steering Committee, had been called for 26 February 1996. It was very poorly attended – apart from Minister Morkel there were only two councillors present and the Consultative Forum had not yet decided who should represent it at the Steering Committee.<sup>143</sup> At the next meeting of the Steering Committee on 25 March, subsequent to the Consultative Forum weekend workshop, Morkel was joined by two Ikapa councillors and three Consultative Forum representatives and the meeting confirmed the land and site allocation policies that had been recommended by the Consultative Forum.<sup>144</sup> At the end of March Gerald Morkel was

replaced as provincial housing minister by Cecil Herandien, who had no prior knowledge of the iSLP.

At Minister Herandien's first Steering Committee meeting on 22 April all the local authorities except one were represented, and discussion was confined to the reports of progress in the Consultative Forum.<sup>145</sup> The following month brought the first democratic local authority elections, with reconfigured municipalities that placed the iSLP across the Central Sub-Structure and the Tygerberg Sub-structure. The latter was responsible for Delft and the former was responsible for all other iSLP areas. The Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) was responsible only for the financing of bulk infrastructure for the project. Whilst these Councils were taking their time to appoint their representatives to the Steering Committee a crisis developed in Delft. The iSLP site allocation rules for Delft required that half of the houses in each phase be allocated to residents of the iSLP project area and half to a waiting list of predominantly coloured people, managed by the Tygerberg sub-structure. Now the first group of houses were almost ready for occupation but the local authority had not yet allocated its share. Houses standing empty, particularly in Delft, would be very vulnerable to illegal occupation and very difficult to protect.

The next meeting on 26 August was attended by Councillors nominated by the Central and Tygerberg substructures. The election had put the ANC in power in the Central sub-structure and the New National Party (NNP) in Tygerberg.<sup>146</sup> At the following meeting the Tygerberg councillor announced that as far as he was concerned any decisions regarding Delft would have to be ratified by the City of Tygerberg. He questioned the authority of the Steering Committee to take decisions on areas that were within a local authority's jurisdiction and also challenged the validity of the iSLP Principles and structures, including the decision that housing in Delft be allocated 50/50 between the (black) iSLP communities who were located in the other local authority and predominantly coloured people allocated by Tygerberg from an inherited waiting list.<sup>147</sup>

When the Steering Committee met on 18 November 1996 the councillor voiced further concerns about the iSLP site allocation policy and said that Tygerberg was drafting proposals for an integrated waiting list based not upon race but on length of stay in the metropole and area of preference.<sup>148</sup> The crisis dragged on. The Steering Committee met only infrequently and no progress was being made to resolve the impasse politically behind

the scenes. At the next meeting on 24 February 1997 it was reported that Tygerberg was creating its own waiting list and wanted all remaining sites in Delft to be placed under its control. The Minister left the meeting in despair and it was subsequently proposed that the issue be referred to the Centre for Conflict Resolution for mediation.<sup>149</sup> Month by month thereafter the scheduled meetings of the Steering Committee were postponed because no agreement had been reached.

On 17 November 1997, a year later, Minister Herandien called a meeting of the iSLP Steering Committee and announced that because of the deadlock he had drafted a proposal to the Provincial Cabinet that responsibility for the iSLP be split between the local authorities of Cape Town and Tygerberg.<sup>150</sup> The Provincial Cabinet had reaffirmed the iSLP Principles and Tygerberg had to abide by the allocation agreements. However, the portion of Delft that had not yet been developed was transferred from the Province to Tygerberg, which was required to develop it for housing in terms of the iSLP Principles. The Steering Committee did not meet again.

It had been handicapped from the start by a change in chairman, from Minister Gerald Morkel to his successor, Cecil Herandien, who had far less experience of politics and circumstances in Cape Town. Furthermore the Steering Committee became crippled by changes in the structure and politics of local government which immediately created stresses between the two sub-structures involved in the iSLP and between each of them and the provincial government. They were competing for power over the iSLP: the Tygerberg sub-structure wanted complete control over everything in Southern Delft, which was the only developable area of the iSLP within its jurisdiction, and then the Cape Town sub-structure, sensing that the Province was losing the political will to manage the iSLP, began to seek control over the entire remainder of the project. In fact the provincial Housing Department did not have the right, nor did the local authorities have the capacity, to make a transfer of the whole project effective. The Housing Department was the custodian and implementer of this integrated project on behalf of the national government, and could not just abdicate its responsibilities in favour of local authorities that lacked the necessary authority or resources. As a result the iSLP Steering Committee met infrequently and was of very little value to the project, which is reflected in the poor attendance and general disinterest indicated in **Table 12** (See Annexure. p. B9).

The main participants in the Steering Committee were the chairperson, the iSLP Manager within the provincial Housing Department and the iSLP Coordinator, who each attended all 8 meetings. *The Veteran*, who was chairperson of the Consultative Forum and who had also participated actively in the Policy Committee, attended 5 meetings. Representation by the 'pre-interim' local authorities in the 3 meetings held before the 1996 election was very limited. However, of the 5 meetings which were held after the 1996 local authority elections the councillors representing the Tygerberg and Central substructures each attended 4.

The terms of reference of the Steering Committee required that all the provincial ministers be members. The ministries of education, health, social welfare, public works and even safety and security had a stake and a vested interest in the success of the project and their participation would strengthen the political weight within the iSLP across party, race and gender lines. However, only the Housing Minister ever attended the Steering Committee, as convenor and chairman, without any support from his colleagues. The best that any of them did was on rare occasions to send an official to represent them – which was a waste of everybody's time because officials had other iSLP structures to cater for their management and coordination needs.

After the demise of the Steering Committee policy issues were simply referred to the most effective policy-making body or person within the responsible government structure. Within the provincial government the official responsible for the iSLP had some delegated authority, otherwise the matter was referred to the Minister of Housing and sometimes to the provincial cabinet. Within local government structures there was also an official with responsibilities for parts of the iSLP, then an Executive Councillor and a Housing Committee of politicians to whom matters could be referred.

In fact, however, most of the high level policy decisions required for the iSLP had already been taken (or were deemed to have been taken) by the Policy Committee, incorporated in the iSLP Business Plan and approved by the national cabinet. Thereafter lower levels of politicians or officials slowed up the process at their peril because the project, programme and budget had been approved at the highest level in the land. It was of huge benefit to have obtained approval of so much detailed documentation at the start of the project's implementation.

### **Inescapable overall responsibilities**

In terms of South Africa's new Constitution, promulgated in 1996, provincial governments were obliged to assign to local governments any matter that could be most effectively administered locally. Likewise local governments were obliged to participate in national and provincial development programmes. The Western Cape provincial government regarded housing delivery as a local government function and began to devolve its responsibilities in this regard. By the end of 1997 the Provincial Government began dismantling its dedicated iSLP management team and contracting an increasing amount of the work to project management consultants. In the national Department of Housing Billy Cobbett was no longer the Director General and had accepted an appointment in Cape Town's Central Sub-Structure, which he then proposed should take over responsibility for every aspect of the iSLP that was within its geographical jurisdiction. Over the next few months Cobbett discovered that he had overestimated the capacity of his local authority and underestimated the size and complexity of the iSLP. It was not a practical proposition to split and share responsibility for the iSLP – instead responsibility for overall management was increasingly shifted to the iSLP Project Coordinator.

There had also been a long series of decisions that ensured consistency in oversight and organisation of the iSLP, through the appointment, extension and, when necessary, expansion of the brief of the project coordinators. This ensured continuity from the original proposal by *the Democrat* in 1990 to the final report submitted in 2005. *The Democrat* began as an individual consultant and gradually built a team and then a company to coordinate the project. When *the Democrat* retired in 1998 the coordination team stayed intact and accepted greater day-to-day responsibility for managing the project as a whole as the provincial housing capacity was reduced. Such a consistent facilitating and coordination function was probably an indispensable factor in the project's completion, let alone success.

### **The Management and Coordination of the iSLP**

The overall management and coordination of the iSLP was the responsibility of the provincial Housing Department. As has been related, when in 1990 it began to explore the possibility of a collaborative approach to the problem it was very short of personnel who had experience in that approach, and particularly of partnering with black communities.

The Department established an “SLP Project Management Committee” and engaged consultants to facilitate the collaboration and coordinate the sensitive process. However as soon as implementation began intensive management and administration would be required, as the Department would have to commission the surveyors, planners and engineers, then put the actual construction out to tender and eventually organise the transfer and occupation of homes. Fortuitously the dismantling of the tri-cameral parliament in 1993-94 enabled housing officials of the erstwhile House of Representatives to transfer into the Western Cape Provincial Housing Department. They brought a wealth of experience in housing management and marketing, and this enabled the creation within the Department of an entire directorate devoted to the management of the iSLP.

Led by an experience project manager, the provincial team comprised a very capable group of planners, engineers, an architect, accountants and ‘marketing’ specialists (who dealt with beneficiary identification through to property transfer and occupation). They were responsible for getting the massive ‘greenfields’ tracts of land through all the legal, planning and design processes and into construction. Most of them were particularly comfortable to be developing in the southern portion of Delft, because they had been involved in creating all of its previous phases. This team worked in parallel with that of the iSLP Project Coordinator, *the Democrat*, who was responsible for the overall coordination of the iSLP, including budgeting, monitoring and reporting; facilitating the collaboration of all the communities, institutions and departments; ensuring that all the committees were established and maintained; and managing all communication on the project. This consultancy dedicated itself to these functions until the completion of the iSLP in 2005, and accepted no other work during this period.

The housing development environment for the iSLP was characterised by a low cost housing sector controlled by government, which provided the finance, the policies and land; and a housing delivery process strongly influenced by politics in many forms and across a broad spectrum, from communities controlled by tyrants to more democratic models, and through municipal politics to provincial and even national political influences. Responsibility for ensuring the actual on-the-ground delivery of housing rested not with government, but primarily with the private sector and, to a small extent, with community-based NGO-linked initiatives. The intended beneficiaries of housing in the iSLP were predominantly poor - 93% of beneficiaries in the iSLP had declared household incomes of

less than 1 500 Rands (about US\$200) per month.

The development of vacant sites within existing townships and the upgrading of informal settlements, all of which were on the iSLP's agenda, was a local authority responsibility – and these institutions were embroiled in such a complex transformation that the creation of a team (or even a committee) of municipal officials to address iSLP projects was impractical. Therefore in 1994 when the iSLP directorate was established by the provincial Housing Department its iSLP Project Management Committee was replaced by an iSLP Departmental Coordinating Committee, which included municipal officials and the iSLP Project Coordinator in its membership. This committee met weekly.

The township development process was a necessary precursor to all the other construction that would be required, comprising not only houses, but schools, clinics, libraries, sports fields, community halls and early childhood resource centres. Once each township had been developed with roads, water, sewerage, electricity and demarcated plots the sites for community facilities could be handed over to the relevant provincial department or local authority. They would then commence planning, have their proposed iSLP project approved by the Housing Department on the recommendation of the iSLP Project Coordinator, and then proceed with procurement and construction. To coordinate the activities of the wide range of government departments which had contributed components of the Business Plan, an iSLP Coordinating Committee was created in 1994, which met monthly. This committee continued to meet until 2005, although for the last few years it met quarterly – under the chairmanship of *the Wrestler*.

By 1996 the greenfields projects had progressed to the stage where serviced sites were being produced in Delft South and Weltevreden Valley, and development in Philippi East, Crossroads, Heinz Park and Browns Farm was getting underway. The responsibility for day-to-day management was stretching the capacity of the iSLP Directorate. Furthermore, although it was not yet apparent to everyone, new senior management within Province was reviewing its deep involvement in housing implementation and preferring to see the Province as resource-provider, with local authorities as implementers. The legislation was also changing, requiring much higher standards of financial management by officials, with daunting penalties for transgressions. Mixed up in all of this was a national public sector transformation process containing clear racial, gender and political themes, in

which provincial posts were re-advertised and early retirement packages were offered to and accepted by many experienced white officials. Under the circumstances the Department decided to invite tenders from substantial and experienced civil engineering firms to provide project management services to the Department for the iSLP. They would be required to take responsibility for the entire housing process in one or more greenfields projects right through to the occupation of dwellings and securing of ownership for beneficiaries (per the rules of the national housing subsidy policy). Four firms were appointed. The iSLP Departmental Coordinating Committee was re-named the iSLP Team Leaders Meeting, which now included the four new project managers.

As might be expected, the iSLP directorate within the provincial Department of Housing began to disintegrate as its members found more favourable employment in other departments and in local government. Furthermore, as noted above, the Province attempted to devolve responsibility for the iSLP to local government institutions, but which proved to be only possible to a limited extent. Municipal officials responsible for the areas that were heavily occupied as informal settlements were unable to manage their upgrading without help, so they also appointed consultant project managers. The issue of governmental jurisdiction within the iSLP project area ballooned in complexity. For the final few pre-democracy years all African urban residential areas had been under the authority of the provincial government, but from 1994 responsibility was dissipated across half a dozen rather ineffective pre-interim structures. From 1996 it was divided between two much more powerful sub-structures which were politically at odds with each other and resented the peculiar authority that the Province had over the iSLP. When the Province began reducing the human resources that it had applied to the project the viability and sustainability of the iSLP came to depend increasingly on relationships and less on authority. At national level interest in the project almost vanished after the demise of the RDP, and the only 'live' contact between the project and the national Department of Housing was to organise the flow of funds. Comprehensive project reports were sent faithfully to Pretoria every month until 2005, but evinced very little response.

Another factor that affected the iSLP was that few senior politicians stayed in one job for long. Political support is crucial for creating and sustaining an innovative and participative social project. But during the iSLP's lifespan the political actors in national, provincial and local government kept changing, and at the same time that the structures of

government were being constantly transformed. Within Cape Town and the Western Cape province the political parties holding power also kept changing – and not only after elections because politicians would ‘cross the floor’ mid-term and change the balance of power. Furthermore the effectiveness of political representation for most of the iSLP’s beneficiaries fluctuated because although political parties moved in and out of power they continued to be racially aligned. As time went on in the iSLP every fresh new wave of politicians showed less interest in the project - they each wanted to create and champion their own causes, not have to make speeches in support of a project associated with an opponent or predecessor. How was it possible for the iSLP to be sustained by such unreliable political support?

The answer lay in the nature of what had been agreed by the national Cabinet and Treasury when they approved the iSLP Business Plan in 1994: they endorsed all of the iSLP Principles, provided 50% of the budget with the balance committed by the provincial government, and they named it a ‘Presidential Project’ – the President being Mandela. Those resolutions and associations were so powerful that they just had to be implemented with consistency and vigorously propagated and defended when necessary. Under conditions of tumultuous change, particularly in the public sector, it required an independent Project Coordinator to keep in touch with every facet of the project from beginning to end, and to not be afraid to gently but seriously call anyone to account for their performance along the way. By the end of 1998 the consulting role of the iSLP Project Coordinator had been extended to include a great deal of the administrative oversight that had until then been provided by the provincial team, including taking the chair in the weekly Team Leaders Meeting and being the spokesman for the iSLP generally.

The role of a few Enablers is the common unbroken thread through the entire iSLP saga, coupled with the mandates which were eventually granted to empower them. All of the committees which were created were essential as a matter of principle, but whenever they failed the Enablers found other ways of obtaining the necessary binding decisions. Progress was assured as long as the Business Plan was enforced, the necessary money secured and people of good will were available to implement the project in a collaborative manner. The various elements that were delivered are explained in Chapter 10.

## Conclusion

This chapter has explained the institutional arrangements that were made for the implementation phase of the iSLP and how some were more successful than others – because of competing interests or changes in government structures, politics and personnel. The argument presented in this chapter is that the power invested in the project’s mandates, if wielded judiciously by the iSLP’s Enablers, was able to trump any new attempt or threat to oppose, undermine or divert the project. The contribution that this chapter makes to the thesis is to demonstrate that the four focal points of the thesis - incessant complexity, incapacity of the participants, need for Enablers and necessity of mandates - apply just as much in the implementation process as in policy-making.

Chapter 10 explains what was actually delivered in the iSLP and how its implementation was phased.

## 10

### **Enabling development: driving implementation wherever resources are available**

The creation of residential areas provided the framework for all physical development within the iSLP, and their occupation prompted the introduction of capacity-building programmes to equip and empower the new settlers. By outlining the process, products and programme this chapter substantiates the extent, complexity and success of the iSLP as a cross-sector collaboration and re-emphasises the vital role of Enablers and mandates. It also reveals the extent to which all these lessons were applied thereafter.

#### **The Housing Programme**

Most of the iSLP was concerned with the development of new residential areas. Once the roads and utilities had been installed houses, schools, clinics, community halls, sports fields, libraries and early childhood resource centres could be constructed. When the residents had taken occupation capacity-building programmes could be planned and implemented. The availability of finance was seldom a problem, and projects were tailored to the quantum of available funds.

The ability to initiate housing projects was determined principally by the willingness and readiness of local communities to participate in project committees. Where there were conflicts between communities or leaders, or territorial claims that were groundless or counter to the iSLP Principles, nothing could happen until the disputes had been resolved. Sometimes conflicts broke out in the middle of the development process, halting work on occasions. As has been mentioned there was also the inability of local government structures to engage with the informal settlement upgrading components of the iSLP, and the re-structuring of local government placed serious limitations on the number of housing projects that could be managed on municipal land.

As a result the implementation timetable was determined by what was practicable at any time. The process in each case began with negotiations to create a project committee

containing adequate community representation. This was followed by the participatory planning process. Then, after the necessary planning and project approvals, the infrastructure was installed (often requiring preliminary earthworks to shape the land) and the houses were constructed. Simultaneously the beneficiaries were identified, their eligibility for housing subsidies was verified and the applications processed. Before taking occupation of a dwelling a beneficiary would attend a presentation on home ownership and what that entailed. South Africa's housing subsidy policy since independence has provided households which have very limited incomes with ownership of a dwelling on a serviced site without having to make any contribution to the capital cost. The provision of the subsidy was rooted in the need to counter the deeply discriminatory policies recounted in Chapter 2 – it was a political imperative, and the iSLP was one of the first projects to apply it at scale. The housing subsidy was the primary means by which the residential projects in the iSLP were financed. The policy has been controversial in some ways and has been mismanaged in some areas of the country but in the iSLP quality of construction was not sacrificed to increase house size or profit – every effort was made to make the best use of the available money.

**Table 13** (See Annexure B. p. B10] shows how each housing project was phased over time – starting with negotiations for land and community involvement, then moving into a planning phase before proceeding to the construction of infrastructure and then dwellings. The table indicates the years covered by each phase in each project and is annotated with explanations of the process that occurred within them.

### **The planning and delivery of Community Facilities**

It was the housing project committees which laid the platform for the development of all the other facilities that an integrated project requires. The scale and rate of delivery of the housing and facilities in the iSLP overall is shown in **Table 14** (See Annexure B. p. B11]. The operation of a project committee for every housing project was described in the previous chapter. Although the intention was that there be a project committee for the planning and implementation of all the other components of the iSLP the reality was that the human resources required to manage such an intense participative process for 150 capital projects were not available, either from government or communities. Furthermore, as has been explained, work only started on community facilities after the housing project

committees had already been meeting for many months and had witnessed the development of the serviced sites on which the facilities would stand. The communities' priority was housing, and they wanted to be involved in its development. The building of other facilities was not as 'close to home' and there were specialist architects who knew all about how to best design clinics, schools and libraries. In their construction the community hoped to be allocated some jobs and given some training, so this was made a condition of all contracts, and a Community Liaison Officer was appointed for each project to efficiently manage that process.

### **Provision of Capacity Building Resources**

Every aspect of the collaborative process was designed not only to benefit those who would be physically accommodated but to inspire and liberate everyone involved. For all the different role-players had been tainted and moulded by an oppressive and discriminatory system of government but involvement in the iSLP enabled them to explore how to work and build together. Every committee was a crucible in which changes took place in understanding, attitudes and values – leading to improvements in policy and practice.

The iSLP was structured as a capacity-building process. The housing elements constituted a huge capacity-building machine, incorporating the development of a multitude of skills that produced everything from construction labourers to novice city councillors. Furthermore, because the iSLP was by far the biggest project in the region for many years, the participatory practices that it required infected the development industry in the entire region and set the benchmark for 'good practice' in a country that was rapidly democratising.

In addition to this general process, however, a budget of 10 million Rands was allocated to finance particular capacity-building programmes that would enable the residents of iSLP projects to make the most of the opportunities before them. In order to ensure that such programmes would be appropriate and effective an invitation was made by the iSLP Project Coordinator to all government departments that were engaging with iSLP residents to add a capacity-building component to their projects and nominate capacity-building initiatives for the award of grants. Each was also invited to supply a representative to join a committee that would adjudicate all the nominations and make recommendations

to the province to release the funds.

The resulting 55 capacity building projects offered a great variety of skills training to the people of the iSLP. They included initiatives to improve income-generating capacity through the acquisition of skills in building, business and financial management, proposal writing, fundraising, handcrafts, and information technology. Opportunities to improve social capital were created through conflict resolution training, the building of organisational skills to assist with the improved running of school and pre-school governing bodies, the provision of peace training for adolescents, leadership training for sports structures; and a range of life skills for volunteers, from dealing with children to those assisting in health related issues. Most of the programmes were provided by NGOs.

The diversity of the iSLP's major capacity building programmes is noteworthy, and a selection is summarised in **Annexure E**.<sup>151</sup>

### **Practical participation**

'Community participation' must always be qualified by its extent. In simple terms there are two phases in the housing development process: planning and implementation, between which is usually a moment of project approval when financial resources are allocated. There is merit in making the planning phase as participatory and comprehensive as possible, because after project approval any delays and changes will cost money, which on a fixed budget (or subsidy) will reduce the value of the eventual product. Community interest in the iSLP's implementation phase was primarily in obtaining a house, employment opportunities and in monitoring progress. Any crises, such as delays in getting implementation started or labour disputes that jeopardised progress and delivery, tended to threaten the position of project committee members in the eyes of their constituencies. In one or two cases it provoked communities to replace their representatives causing the whole sense of partnership and trust in the project committee to be weakened and set back.

Therefore in the iSLP, although the Province chose the project managers, it was the community representatives on the project committees who selected the planning and engineering consultants for their projects after receiving presentations from and interviewing a panel nominated by the Province. Although the Province made the

appointments in every case it was in response to recommendations made by the community representatives. This simple exercise in participation contributed substantially to achieving community ownership of the process.

The next step was also vitally important: the newly appointed town planning consultants did not commence by bringing proposals to the project committee but discussed with the committee what the planning parameters should be: site shapes and sizes, vehicle access, house orientation, public facilities and their location, etc. The committee would go and look at the site, and some took a bus tour to see how a variety of existing projects had been planned. After a number of meetings and workshops the consultants were given a mandate by the Project Committee to draft plans and designs, which were submitted for discussion. Care was taken to achieve a high level of understanding by community representatives, and after having made a thorough, respectful and thoughtful start the consultants were in every case asked by the community representatives to finalise their plans and get implementation started as soon as possible. Project committees typically met for workshops at weekends and for meetings in late afternoons so that working members could attend. Meetings were only held during business hours in cases where it was verified that community representatives were able to attend. Often the iSLP project facilitators provided transport for the community members.

Project committee members were required by their own structures to report back to and consult with their constituencies on a regular basis, usually at weekends. The culture within the communities required representatives to be mandated by their constituents before attending meetings, and access to housing was such an important item on the residents' agenda that report backs were unavoidable. The main issues were those of principle, process and product – and the main concerns were “How can I get a house?”, “What kind of house can I get?” and “What jobs are on offer?” The beneficiary identification process within each community required the approval of the community as a whole and its implementation had to be transparent, fair and responsive to challenges. It was very important for community representatives to have something to show, and therefore they shared with the technical team and public authorities a desire for urgent action, and it became a process of real mutual supportive process.

Community participation at the level of individuals had to be limited because of the

scale of the project. Individual community members, once they had been identified as potential beneficiaries by a community-driven process, were invited by the project manager to visit the project office to complete subsidy application forms and deeds of sale and to participate in an educational process about home ownership and maintenance. If a variety of house types were available a choice could be made but unfortunately the pace of construction and logistical constraints made it impracticable to also offer beneficiaries a choice of site. They were given a few days notice of when their house would be ready and when they were required to take occupation. Houses could not be left unoccupied because of the real danger of illegal occupation or vandalism. The housing delivery process and the numbers involved made it impossible to have all these meetings at weekends, so employed beneficiaries were obliged to take time off work in order to visit the project office. They also had to make their own arrangements for relocating their possessions to their house.

Attempts were made to create some housing options using contractors from the community. However, the very limited size of the subsidy remaining after paying for the development of serviced sites, the fast rate of delivery of houses that was required and the inexperience of small contractors in costing and management reduced such possibilities to a minimum. The most successful of such exercises was the Delft Leyden turnkey project in which the developer employed and supervised local subcontractors to deliver a prescribed range of houses.

### **Collaborative decision-making**

The decision to manage the iSLP at the level of individual projects was crucial. On that basis the main actors in the drama were those who would have to live with the consequences. In politically stable communities developmentally-orientated community members were appointed to project committees and they worked together through the planning process to achieve good results. In conflict-ridden communities the politicians or strong men held on to all the power and development was hamstrung.

It is worth re-emphasising the immense value of unequivocal decisions on major policies: the iSLP Principles in the Business Plan, and later the allocation principles and quotas recommended by the Consultative Forum and approved by the Steering Committee. These created a clear and unambiguous framework within which the whole project could be

managed as pragmatically as might be necessary.

The national Cabinet's approval of the project as a whole and its allocation of half of all the financial requirements on clear conditions provided authority, resources and leverage. To this was later added the authority for the provincial Treasury to hold and disburse the funds. In a long term project committed and sustained responsibility and ownership is vital for success.

How did the project survive such irregular patterns of attendance at important meetings? It is evident from the analyses of all the iSLP structures that the project was empowered by the substantial grassroots involvement and support in the Project Committees combined with the dedicated facilitation, guidance and leverage provided by a small number of Enablers. The iSLP was also driven by some undisputed values, a huge need for housing and a unique and substantial source of funds. Once project implementation began nobody would dare call for any suspension or termination, and so while debates might rage at policy level the delivery process churned on, supported by project committees.

### **Communicating development**

It was at first assumed by the iSLP Coordinator that implementation should be accompanied by a publicity campaign through the mainstream media – newspaper, radio and television. It quickly became apparent that major newspapers did not regard development projects, even on such a large scale, newsworthy unless there was some kind of sensational scandal to report. It was therefore decided to focus the whole communication effort upon the intended beneficiaries of the iSLP, almost all of whom lived in the clearly defined iSLP project area, and to provide useful information about the project and illustrated stories about community achievements. So the iSLP published its own quarterly newspaper and distributed 30 000 copies to schools, libraries and shops throughout the project area, where they could be collected by residents. At first it was issued in 3 languages (isiXhosa, Afrikaans and English) which were published in separate editions, but at the request of schools in the area which were utilising the newspaper to teach English it was eventually published in English with just a few articles in *isiXhosa*.

A very popular publication was the annual iSLP wall calendar, full of scenes and people from the project in full colour, which was delivered to every household each December. Web sites only became conventional late in the life of the iSLP, by which time there was so much information that could have been uploaded that it was rather impractical. The iSLP web site was, however, of some use to researchers and although it was not updated after August 2004 it might still be accessible at <http://www.islp.org.za/>.

The spoken word was a vital means of communicating to and within the beneficiary communities. Furthermore, the common language was isiXhosa – one of the three ‘official languages’ used in the Western Cape. The six facilitators employed by the iSLP Coordinator played an invaluable and indispensable role in this regard, for not only did they ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of all communications between beneficiary communities and project managers but they built strong and interdependent relationships between all these actors. This was before the proliferation of mobile phones, so one of the most effective ways of getting the word out to a large audience was through radio. The leader of the facilitators established a good relationship with a government isiXhosa radio stations and arranged to be interviewed and to engage in chat shows with listener participation when there was a need. This was a good way to correct misunderstandings, diffuse erroneous rumours, and build relationships by associating a warm voice and friendly personality with a very large project.

### **Post mortem**

By the time the iSLP came to an end in March 2005 most of the personalities whose names have populated this case study had moved on with their lives and careers and had lost touch with the day-to-day operation of this interesting collaboration. Some had entered politics or government or become consultants, others had retired and some, including *the Democrat*, had taken leave of this world. Organisations that had dominated the business of the Policy Committee disappeared – community structures established during the ‘struggle’ for democracy had been replaced by legalised political parties and were no longer able to raise funds. All the organs of government experienced rolling re-structuring, especially in local authorities, and of course all of the politicians changed place, at least every five years as elections took place. The beneficiaries of the iSLP, who must have numbered well over 150 000 people, considering not only the housing but public facilities that served much

broader communities, were getting on with their lives – finding work, going to school, incrementally improving their dwellings. At the end the iSLP Coordinator simply ensured that each of the more than 200 projects had been signed off and accounted for and then invited the remaining stalwarts to a celebratory meal and an opportunity to share their appreciation of each other and of their experiences in the iSLP.

So there were no public closing events, press conferences or speeches by politicians – and that was the way that the iSLP had always been conducted: quietly, and with as little fuss as possible. The objective was to design and build houses and schools and communities, not build reputations and public images. As a consequence very few people outside of the project area knew that the biggest and longest-running housing project in the country was in Cape Town. That was perhaps unfortunate, but otherwise the iSLP might have become much more of a ‘political football’ than it was.

When the iSLP ended there were only two housing projects in the approved Business Plan that had not been started: the development within the township of Langa of the buffer strip and some infill sites, and the development of Boystown. Both of these were sites of chronic political contestation. Langa, the oldest black township in Cape Town, had been a stronghold of the Pan African Congress Party, but whose members had for decades been at odds with the growing number of hostel dwellers in the area. Then when the buffer strip between Langa and the bordering highways was invaded in December 1994 to create the informal settlement of Joe Slovo the three-way stand-off between ‘residents’, hostel dwellers and ‘latecomers’ rendered collaborative discussion about future development impossible. In Boystown there was a long-standing feud between its leadership and that of Crossroads, followed by a feud between the long-standing city councillor and his followers and a succession of rival groups. The Boystown contests were often expressed through the barrel of a gun. When it ultimately became possible for an iSLP housing project to be run there the contractor’s site office came under fire on the first day and he withdrew his team immediately.

Fortuitously a new major housing project to upgrade informal settlements along the N2 highway had been launched in late 2004, which planned to include Joe Slovo and Boystown, as well as New Rest where an experimental in situ upgrading project had been begun but was moving slowly, so responsibility for their development was transferred from

the iSLP to the ‘N2 Gateway’ project. In some ways the N2 Gateway was the natural successor to the iSLP – it was a high profile national ‘flagship’ project championed very personally by a new national minister of housing. But there the resemblance ended, because this was a government that believed that it knew what communities wanted and therefore saw no need for participative, *let alone* collaborative, development. Secondly, no time was to be lost in getting underway with construction, so there was no consultative policy-making phase and the procurement of consultants and contractors was short-circuited and fast-tracked as much as possible. The fifteen years of iSLP experience was offered, but declined. The project promoters sought publicity and got it, and it was not long before the process began to go badly wrong.

The N2 Gateway will no doubt provide a huge and fascinating case study, although it will probably require a lot of unravelling to discover exactly what has happened. The only reason why it is worthy of mention here is that the people who drove it chose deliberately to ignore the many lessons that had been learned by so many people who were involved in the operation of the iSLP. The explanations are probably numerous, but at the root of them is a single cause: the iSLP was a cross-sector collaboration and that is never the preference of any party (least of all a government, and even more so a new minister). Cross-sector collaboration really is the last resort. As will be demonstrated in Part 2 cross-sector collaborations are appropriate for turbulent situations where every other kind of development arrangement has proved impossible, and they are only undertaken with great difficulty. So any politician or leader who believes that the environment is not particularly turbulent and that all that is needed is more determined autocracy in project development is unlikely to be remotely interested in what was learned from an old project that was birthed in the dying days of a bygone era. In the event the turbulence returned and every kind of development device is being tried except cross-sector collaboration, but its time will surely come again.

### **Conclusion**

Chapter 10 has quantified the deliverables of the iSLP and described some key processes.. The argument presented in this brief chapter is that although this cross-sector collaboration involved a very complex and lengthy process it was able to successfully deliver a huge spectrum and volume of products, in a coordinated manner. The contribution of this chapter

to the overall thesis is to validate the case study as a genuine but successful cross-sector collaboration.

The previous seven chapters have described how a large, multi-dimensional project was created on and around a site of chronic chaos, anarchy and anger – and how, after coping with endless attempts to take over control, the sustained, principled, collaborative process of formulating a development project was rewarded with approval and resources. Chapter 11 begins to contrast the literature with the experience of the iSLP and argues that the difference – the keys to success – are framed by the recognition that a cross-sector collaboration is likely to be plagued by incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity.

## 11

## **Framing the gap: Unremitting contextual turbulence and stakeholder incapacity**

The argument of this thesis has two parts. The first is that a cross-sector collaboration should expect to suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, and that the stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration themselves. This is the subject of this chapter and frames the gap within the existing literature. Furthermore these factors are likely to count in good measure for the poor expectation of success in cross-sector collaboration. The second part of the argument relates to what fills the gap: that success depends upon the existence and activities of Enablers – diversely located and motivated activists, with a shared dedication to the collaboration’s objectives – and the mandates which empower them. That will be presented subsequently, in Chapter 12.

This Chapter presents the first part of the argument in two sections: turbulence and incapacity. Critically, these are both presented as ‘initial conditions’ in the literature (Bryson et al, 2006 - their first two ‘Propositions’: p. 46), but their persistence has not been declared.

### **Complexity and turbulence : Multi-dimensional and omnipresent**

Bryson and his colleagues concluded that collaboration only becomes an option in a very turbulent environment and is only chosen as a last resort. They emphasise the complexity and extreme difficulty of cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al, 2006), and Ansell and Gash commented on their own research, “as we proceeded, we were overwhelmed by the complexity of the collaborative process” (Ansell and Gash, 2008. p 7). The literature on community participation and collaborative governance provides hardly a hint of complexities at that scale, and where references are made it is typically about the pre-existence of fraught relationships between the intended collaborators. It is implied that the very establishment of a cross-sector collaboration is likely to significantly diminish the level of complexity, turbulence and violence. - although Bryson *et al* do mention

continuing constraints.

Such collaboration in the field of large-scale housing provision for the poor, for example, implies not only persuading government, communities/civil society and the private sector to work together on a shared objective but achieving coherence and synergy *within* each of those sectors. That, in a volatile, constantly changing environment, is a major task which will require sustained attention from conception to project completion. But these institutional issues contain only part of the complexity, for a major project itself generates a host of expectations, possibilities and fears which, within a socio-political cauldron, are able to foment a completely new set of tensions, subterfuges, splits, alliances and battles for control of resources in every dimension of the project. The iSLP case study demonstrates that this incessant complexity can be manifested in the following ways:

*Long memories and wounded hearts*

First there was a centuries-old and deeply hurtful history of abuse, discrimination and exclusion suffered by people of colour, particularly Black people, in the Cape that reached its climax in the 1970's and 80's under apartheid. On top of that, within the case study area, were layers of aggression, resistance, promise, betrayal, deception, violence and dislocation that affected wave after wave of people who tried to make their home on a triangle of land called Crossroads. Warlords emerged and engaged in deadly inter-territorial battles and burning of homes, watched by a heartless state. Some thirty satellite settlements of refugees resulted, creating multiple polarities and opposing allegiances that rendered inappropriate any broad concept of "community". A combination of old, deep scars and un-healed open wounds ensured a lingering lack of trust between the victims and the oppressors and between democratic and autocratic leadership groups within communities. Very little is possible in a collaboration without trust.

*A paralysing interregnum*

On the national stage the apartheid state surrendered in February 1990 in the hope that it would not be too late for South Africans of all colours to begin constructing democracy. The transition took more than four years, during which time government was in a maintenance mode, without the policies and resources necessary to begin development in a different way. At the same time recently unbanned community organisations and political parties were finding their feet and organising their constituencies. Then it took another six

years for local government to undergo a massive reconstruction, which severely limited its contribution. While in this limbo there was no shortage of spurious developers tempting stakeholders with an easier and lucrative option. Patience in a crisis does not come naturally.

### *Constant change*

Change takes place in increments and waves and was unremitting in the iSLP. The main changes that impacted on the iSLP year by year from 1991 to 2005 are indicated in **Table 15** (See Annexure B. p B12). They included incessant changes in the nature of government structures, particularly at local government level, but also in the second tier of government; and frequent changes in political parties, politicians and officials in local and provincial government – and in policies and procedures. There was also a steady decline in the capacity of the public service, caused by a reduction both in experienced personnel and in delegated authority. Although the national government generously provided nearly R600 million of RDP funds for the iSLP, government at any tier was not naturally organised to deliver large fully integrated human settlements. There was no constant political champion available for the entirety of the iSLP, leaving the field clear for politicians to make unrealistic promises with regard to the iSLP's products and programmes with impunity.

### *Territoriality*

'Turf wars' bedevilled the iSLP. Within government here were administrative territorial battles between long-term incumbents and functionaries who have been recruited to fulfil new mandates – e.g. the disinterest that *the Wrestler* discovered within his own organisation; the stresses between the old guard in the provincial government and the inflow of officials from the dismantling of the House of Representatives who had completely different experience and philosophy; much later came the attempts by the RDP ministry to wrest control of the project from the Housing ministry; and after that were the attempts by local authority structures to take control of part or all of the iSLP from the provincial government.

Cultural territoriality within and between government administrations was manifest – e.g. the cool reception which *the Provincial Planner* received when he began work for the provincial government because he was not an Afrikaner; and the long-standing enmity between that institution and the liberal City of Cape Town. There were also technical

boundaries with regard to priorities and process, typically between systems-oriented engineers and process-oriented participatory planners and facilitators – e.g. the technical resistance to *the Democrat's* proposals. Political territorialism was rife – the narrative is riddled with political confrontations: e.g. state support of the authoritarian *Witdoeke* against the pro-democracy ‘Comrades’ in the Crossroads war; the conservative provincial bureaucracy against the liberalism of *the Democrat, the Defender and the Community Planner*; old guard autocrats in the private and public sectors supporting WCUSA in a bid to run the iSLP in discredited ways; the division of Crossroads into two violently-opposed ANC branches; and years of contestation between ‘civic’ and ‘warlord’ leaders of informal settlements.

Running at a deep level were rights and claims to land: the root of the whole problem was the historically deliberate inadequate allocation of urban land to Blacks, let alone inadequate development. The original approval of Crossroads as a settlement area made it a unique focus of demand – and a unique opportunity for patronage, which was exploited without regard to life and property. Even after the iSLP began leaders would claim exclusive rights to huge areas of land, prevent other communities from gaining access, and charge their own people to be placed on their unauthorised ‘waiting lists’.

Territoriality begins at the individual level with personal space and functional turf – and a person may have more than one function within a collaboration – e.g. a professional engineer, an official and a member of a particular committee or team. Then there is institutional territory and sector/group territory – and within them department or group territory - all of which are associated with real or perceived or potential rights and benefits. In an unstable, transforming landscape ‘territory’ is not only of huge interest to most actors, but is a minefield over which battles are constantly fought.

### *Incessant Contestation*

The iSLP became not only an instrument with which to right the wrongs of the past, but through which a few sought to access power and profits. The collaboration had not even been launched when it became a battleground for control of the development process and of the financial rewards that could be reaped. The careful building of ‘shared objectives’ with many stakeholders and the assembly of priorities, policies and institutional arrangements were shadowed by dogged and convoluted struggles for control of the

process and ultimately of the resources. Within the collaboration alliances were assembled, dissolved, reconstructed and camouflaged. Principles were propounded, argued, communicated and submitted for approval only to be stalled by opportunists hoping to achieve something more lucrative. Some participants disappeared, sometimes for months, and suddenly reappeared and had a lot to say. Much purported representation of ‘communities’ was left unchallenged and unproven in order not to rock the boat. The development environment was hazardous, ever-changing and unpredictable – and it stayed that way for the next fourteen years until the project was completed.

#### *Development cartels*

Exclusive arrangements had been fostered under National Party government to enhance and protect the status of the Afrikaner business community and when they became threatened in the transition to democracy attempts were made to build new cabals with Black groups that would be presumably supported by an incoming government. The iSLP carried the biggest bounty of any housing project in the country, for in the delivery of all its 32 000 houses and everything else suppliers of goods and services would receive a total of 1.2 billion Rands (US\$333 million in 1994) – well worth fighting for and vitally important to protect, because the use of small and local contractors was part of its development agenda. This battle for control of the project infected the entire policy phase of the iSLP and paralysed it on occasions.

#### *Fear*

Civil servants in provincial and local government were afraid of losing jobs, position and influence during what became a long and uncertain transition; and on the other hand civic leaders who had been denied opportunities (and in most cases, education) were afraid that their hopes for jobs in the new dispensation would not materialise, fuelled in part by the superior attitudes and expectations adopted by ‘freedom fighters’ who returned from exile. There was plenty of fear within communities as well, for even until the late 1990s there were areas of the iSLP that were, in the last resort, ruled with firearms – Crossroads, Boystown, Browns Farm and Delft were particularly dangerous areas.

#### *Violence*

The war in Crossroads lasted for ten years, from 1983-1993 and displaced an estimated 60 000 people. Faction fighting continued between groups in Crossroads and neighbouring

Boystown. Taxi wars erupted sporadically. Local political assassinations were frequent and armed robberies and vehicle hijackings commonplace. Firearms were plentiful. Desperate times produce desperate actions, and they are extremely difficult to curtail.

### *Invasion*

The iSLP was fundamentally about access to land and ultimately to housing, and there was nothing that violated a careful consultative development process more than an anarchic invasion of developable land or newly-completed houses. It is a sobering fact that both attempts to invade land during the iSLP's tenure were successful: the invasion of the cement factory land in Philippi and the invasion of many new houses in Delft – the danger of violent repercussions were considered by the Police to be too great for them to enforce evictions. Furthermore, because of the limited ability of local authorities to control and upgrade informal settlements, there is little doubt that at least half of the 23 000 households from informal settlements that were housed in iSLP green fields projects were promptly succeeded by at least that many families who obtained 'informal access' to the places that they had vacated.

In conclusion, contemporary literature on power analysis in the participative sphere is a little too tame to be helpful for contending with the vehemence and unscrupulousness within large-scale cross-sector collaboration. The extent of the conflict and contestation - multiple parties, hidden agendas, surprise tactics from all sides, gate-keeping, arson and murder - are likely to render rather inadequate many of the academic debates about the location, visibility of interactions and the point at which interests intersect. Cross-sector collaboration should not be regarded as a stable negotiating space but as a mobile, volatile battleground which is driven through ever-changing terrain towards a desired objective whilst the participants battle each other (and potential hijackers) over whatever they believe is worth fighting for.

### **Incapacity: incapable or distracted stakeholders**

The literature apparently, by omission, assumes that when stakeholders have exhausted their individual means of addressing a burning issue and realise that they should work together they will be naturally able to collaborate effectively to achieve the objective (viz: Bryson *et al's* Proposition No. 6), if necessary with some temporary external facilitation.

However, the narrative in Chapters 4 - 10 demonstrated that the size, complexity and uniqueness of a challenge such as that presented by the iSLP requires an abnormal application of some unusually versatile and resilient personnel as well as more than sufficient capital to cover project requirements. It is a matter of capacity – and in this thesis the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘incapacity’ are used relatively to denote the ability of a party to absorb and undertake additional responsibilities required by the collaboration. In the absence of very capable external support each sector would have to dedicate some of its ablest employees to an obviously risky venture within unknown terrain. The important point being made is that it is unlikely that any stakeholder organisation or employee would make such a commitment – they have businesses to run and careers and ambitions to pursue. The demands of the collaboration would considerably exceed the extent to which they can invest time and expertise in the process, and it would have to be augmented with exceptional mandates and the provision of considerable finance precisely when required.

The incapacity, or perhaps skewed capacity, of the collaborators would not be the only hindrance. The environment within which each stakeholder organisation is endeavouring to run its day-to-day business is likely to be in turmoil. ‘Business as usual’ would probably be only a fond memory for many, replaced by a hiatus in government, an absence of leaders as they are called into higher level negotiations and consultations around much bigger agendas, a reduction in the maintenance of law and order, and a contradictory environment of insecurity and opportunism. Nobody, in 1990 South Africa, knew what the future might hold and how long it would be before stability was established – except that what used to be termed ‘stability’ was unlikely to be restored. As a result it was difficult for many people to be single-minded – those who possessed jobs and responsibilities had to keep an eye open for alternatives, and most of those who volunteered hoped that it might lead to something remunerative but kept an eye out for alternatives just in case.

The provincial government, which was the principal public sector actor, was torn between its old political commitment to develop Crossroads and its realisation that it could no longer develop exclusively – yet neither was within its capacity, for Crossroads was a war zone and the state had no experience of inclusive participative development. The leaders of communities, whether organised into civics or associations of informal settlement strongmen, wanted development and would have liked to control it, but had no skills or experience in that field whatsoever. Neither did they have money with which to

buy skills. But consultants and contractors had money and promises with which to buy the support of community leaders, and in this way synergies were fashioned and re-fashioned which existed partly inside and partly outside of the iSLP collaboration and were thus incongruous with the objectives, principles and values of the iSLP and could not be entertained.

The following examples demonstrate more explicitly the inability of the iSLP stakeholders to establish and sustain the collaborative process on their own.

#### *Provincial and National Government*

The provincial Community Services Branch and its Housing Department initiated, hosted and exercised overall responsibility for the iSLP. However it was not until the project had been approved in 1994 that it was able to devote personnel to the project, but almost all of them came from the disbanded House of Representatives, where they had served only Coloured people, who had a very different culture, history and language from most iSLP residents and where a different housing policy had been applied. Within four years this team had been disbanded as the Province attempted to shed its direct housing activities, and almost the entire team relocated to other departments or to local authorities. Their functions were replaced by consultants. The iSLP continued for seven years beyond that, until 2005.

Furthermore, during the life of the iSLP there was a succession of seven provincial housing ministers. They represented various political parties, and had they not all been held responsible for the iSLP on account of the 1994 national cabinet approval and treasury allocation of effectively the full budget there would have been a steadily diminishing number of reasons for them to maintain their support.

At the national level, the Minister of Housing who had taken the decisive act of supporting the iSLP process against the pressure of the private sector consortium in 1994, and recommended the approval of the iSLP business plan to cabinet, died soon afterwards. The national Reconstruction and Development Programme, with its own Minister Without Portfolio, was launched with much fanfare in 1994, threw its weight around in the iSLP area for two years, and was then summarily disbanded in a cabinet coup. Throughout the 15 year life of the iSLP not only did political parties come and go but politicians ‘crossed the floor’ from time to time to change the balance of power - yet politicians accrued to

themselves ever-increasing power over government administrators. Eventually the capacity of government fell to such a level that delivery of development was almost completely dependent upon consultants. By the time the iSLP had completed its work in 2005 there was a national Housing Minister in power who was not remotely interested in collaborating with communities – by that stage the ruling party claimed to know exactly what people wanted and would endeavour by all means to deliver it without any consultation.

#### *Local government*

When the iSLP Policy Committee was inaugurated in 1991 the local authorities responsible for the project area were apartheid era structures with unrepresentative councillors who were widely regarded as ‘sell-outs’ by the residents. Consequently they were excluded from the main iSLP negotiating forums and confined to meeting in a parallel committee which was short-lived. Although the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Regional Services Council were included in the Policy Committee they were there to provide executive support, not delivery. From 1994 to 2000 the number of local government structures in South Africa was drastically reduced and even where continued employment was secured the number of senior positions was greatly diminished. Morale plummeted. The transformation continued as the preponderance of White males in senior positions was reduced and as politicians took increasing control over government affairs at all levels. As recorded a number of times in the case study, local government was so incapacitated through the 1990s that it was unable to upgrade or replace informal settlements in the iSLP project area, with the result that they multiplied in spite of the delivery of over 32 000 houses.

#### *Community representation*

In 1990 Black communities looked to the unbanned political parties for leadership, whilst at the same time those parties were doing everything in their power to gather all leadership and influence to themselves. However, whilst communities were looking forward to development and jobs the parties were working towards winning an eventual election and gaining real power. So although the two parties who would represent the bulk of iSLP residents were invited to join the process the Pan African Congress declined because it did not have the capacity and the ANC sent a nominee – a non-politician, *the Community Planner*, who attended meetings of the Policy Committee in a voluntary capacity.

The remaining 'community organisations' comprised civics associations, the hostel dwellers' association and squatter leaders, some of whom were represented by WCUSA – three groups that were diametrically opposed to each other in terms of community politics. A year after the iSLP Policy Committee was created the ANC established the South African National Civics Association (SANCO), which it hoped would supersede all of these groups and win their membership to the party. Between them they had no capability in housing or community development – except WCUSA's nefarious link to the private sector consortium, which eventually became shared with the other organisations in turn and ultimately altogether. The strategy failed and within a few years none of these organisations formally existed.

### **Conclusion**

The argument presented by this chapter is that incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity are substantially un-theorised realities in cross-sector collaboration, giving rise to an indistinct and hopeless prognosis for such collaborations. The literature gives the impression that turbulence will be dealt with substantially by the creation of a cross-sector collaboration and that a collaboration can be managed effectively by the stakeholders. But it has been demonstrated that the turbulent circumstances which warrant cross-sector collaboration are unlikely to abate and the possibilities of assembling a dedicated and devoted team of collaboration managers from the parties themselves is likely to be remote. It is consequently argued that incessant turbulence and stakeholder incapacity actually frame a gap in the literature.

This gap between the required and available management and facilitation resources must be filled by Enablers, and the mandates necessary to empower them, as will be explained in Chapter 12.

## 12

### **Filling the gap: The few Enablers and their powerful mandates**

‘Cross-sector collaboration is increasingly assumed to be both necessary and desirable as a strategy for addressing many of society’s most difficult public challenges... but the research evidence indicates that it is hardly easy’.  
Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006. p 44.

This thesis provides some responses to Gaventa’s 5<sup>th</sup> challenge that “far more needs to be learned about how new spaces for participatory governance work, for whom and with what social justice outcomes” (Gaventa, 2004. p 31). In Chapters 5 – 10 I have engaged with his 6<sup>th</sup> challenge, by applying power analysis (including relationship maps) to understand the extent to which the spaces created in the iSLP were used by different parties for transformative engagement or for the purpose of control. In Chapter 11 I ventured that it has been falsely assumed that the creation of a collaborative space reduces turbulence and that such space is substantially manageable by the stakeholders themselves. Instead I have argued that such incessant turbulence and the incapacity of stakeholders should be expected: and that they frame the missing key to a greater possibility of achieving success in cross-sector collaborations. This key comprises the Enablers – diversely located and motivated activists who share a dedication to enabling the achievement of the collaboration’s goals – and the mandates with which they are empowered. This is the argument presented by this Chapter.

#### **The Work within a Cross-Sector Collaboration**

In the last part (‘F’) of the literature review in Chapter 2 I explored the roles that the literature had identified as being useful in the processes of collaboration. Not surprisingly a general need for leadership is expressed, and a range of functions were identified, such as sponsors, champions, boundary spanners, facilitators, brokers and convenors. Some of these would be part of stakeholder organisations and some would be professionals who are contracted in to broker deals or break deadlocks. All these functions express capability – yet, quoting Bryson and his colleagues again, “the normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations” (Bryson et al, 2006. p. 52).

In another step towards understanding the kind of work that is required in a cross-sector collaboration I have combined the 22 Propositions emanating from Bryson *et al*'s research into cross-sector collaboration with the 10 articles of Ansell and Gash's Contingency Theory for collaborative governance that were described in Chapter 2. To achieve this I have translated the information that they contain into the 'circumstances' that they describe and the 'work required' to address them. The result is a formidable list of 34 kinds of work, categorised into the different phases, beginning with the Presenting Problems, leading to the Initiation, creation of Institutional Arrangements, then the Participative Process, and finally Outcomes and Accountability. These can be grouped in order to consider the circumstances implied in their analysis and therefore to identify the kind of work that would be required to address them. The product of this synthesis is an extensive tabulation, **Table 16** (See Annexure B. p. B13 - 15).

Table 16 lists 34 kinds of work that are likely to be required to survey the circumstances, initiate collaboration, create an appropriate structure, manage its creative processes and ensure delivery of the required outcomes. The range of tasks is so demanding in its breadth and complexity as to render a summary here impractical – but the table demonstrates that a collaboration is an unusual construction, probably an unnatural one, the operation of which presents considerable challenges. The nature and volume of the work, and the context in which it must be performed, does not fit into simple, conventional functional categories and is likely to require more than part-time, intermittently employed personnel. It is also extremely unlikely that these responsibilities as a whole could be effectively fulfilled by any qualified employees of stakeholder groups who have their own jobs, careers and institutional agendas to pursue at the same time. Some of them could certainly provide occasional help, support and encouragement – but not full time engagement. This chapter probes how this complex and demanding work can be done successfully.

### **The Gap in the theory**

There is acknowledgement within the literature that 'facilitative leadership' is a critically important ingredient in the collaboration process, particularly with regard to "bringing the parties to the table" and then "steering them through the rough patches of the collaborative process" (Ansell and Gash, 2007. p 12). However, their recommended interventions of

facilitation, mediation and nonbinding arbitration are rather inadequate for the kind of jungle conflict found in cross-sector collaboration. Bryson *et al* (2006) are more realistic about the complexity and difficulty of cross-sector collaboration but their brief endorsement of “sponsors, champions, boundary-spanners and facilitators” (p 52) resonates more with a kind of courtly diplomacy than with countering the kind of frequently transmogrifying opposition in sustained guerrilla warfare that was demonstrated in the iSLP.

Bryson and his colleagues have concluded that cross-sector collaboration is the last resort within the spectrum of cooperative initiatives and is unlikely to be successful. However the evidence from the iSLP case study and the deductions of Table 16 made by extending their arguments and those of Ansell and Gash one step further, suggest that the unusual work that is required cannot be described or structured in a usual way. The iSLP cannot be regarded as a unique event - contemporary demands for a change of order in society, for justice and an end to discrimination, are likely to be accompanied by demands for democracy and involvement. Dignity is bestowed by a collaborative process of delivery more than by delivery alone. Large scale cross-sector collaboration is intrinsically difficult because it is only chosen in extreme circumstances and it is unnatural - in the sense of being a hybrid: a forced, manipulated and experimental creation, conceived in an uncomfortable amalgam of social responsibility, institutional incapacity, undefined opportunity and considerable risk. It is not, however, impossible, as the iSLP has demonstrated.

People are required to establish and then hold fast a centre or hub in which the common objective resides, identify potential collaborators by sector and organisation and then secure and sustain collaborators' commitment and effective representation within effective collaboration structures. Thereafter they must monitor and respond constructively to inter- and intra-sector strengths and weaknesses; to the creation, fragmentation and dissolution of alliances that may affect the collaboration; and to changes in participating personnel over time and minimise any negative effect on the collaboration. It is then essential to monitor and promote the efficiency and effectiveness of every step of the policy-making, planning, approval, procurement, delivery and completion processes; optimise the integrity of representation in the collaboration; and ensure the transparency of the process and supply of necessary information to every constituency. These are radical roles, requiring people of

peculiar ability and commitment within the participating sectors, at the hub, across all potential fault lines and guarding and maintaining every bridge.

The investigation of what made the difference in the iSLP and enabled it to be successful led not to ‘functions’ or ‘work’ but to people – people with particular backgrounds, personalities and motivations. The introduction to each of Enablers that I have provided in Chapter 4 describes and explains them far more accurately than my attempt to categorise them functionally (into sponsors, champions, levers, etc.) in Chapter 8. The personalities themselves were far greater than any position that they held or service that they rendered. In the iSLP the Enablers were a ‘type’ more than they were even a ‘cadre’ because they were not an organised band. Nor did they have a name or a special title – the term ‘Enablers’ is my fabrication, a retrospective classification. We live in an organised world where unless someone is a functionary they are considered to lack function. That kind of categorisation cannot accommodate real, whole people – especially people who are passionate and generous. Like Enablers. Boxes – even matrices – cannot be used to describe people who must think and move ‘outside of the box’ and cross barriers, and not on some esoteric whim but to engage with the real world and make a real difference.

### **Enablers: diverse activists whose motivations intersect**

The people who made the iSLP possible are referred to in this thesis as Enablers because they made possible what was hitherto impossible - and which was nevertheless very difficult. They had to be unconventional, creative, radical and totally convinced that the iSLP process was imperative and indispensable. They comprised a diverse assortment: a senior politician who broke the apartheid stereotype by inviting the president of a liberal women’s protest movement to chair the iSLP Policy Committee, who responded by volunteering out of duty but with trepidation; the senior provincial official responsible for development who horrified many of his colleagues by appointing an avowed opponent of the government as a consultant to facilitate and then coordinate the process; the head of the province’s regional office who was determined to break out of the institutional straight jacket and make a way to deal constructively with the Crossroads crisis; a community leader who had spent years as a trade union activist, civic leader and clandestine freedom fighter, who knew that change would need patience and commitment and was dedicated to

collaborative problem solving; four town planners, located in different institutions, who were convinced of the merits of cross-sector collaborative development and longed for an opportunity to practice it in South Africa; and later a diverse group of civil engineering project managers engaging deliberately with the community representatives in of their project committees.

The Enablers in the iSLP came from an assortment of backgrounds and occupied a variety of institutional positions but their Enabling functions, either formal or informal, added another layer of diversity to their lives. Through the functions that they performed - whether as patron, chair, host, facilitator, coordinator, bridge-builder, innovator, planner, project manager or steadfast encourager - they pulled, pushed, corralled and guided the stakeholders and hundreds of other role-players into adopting and applying principles, formulating and approving projects and then collaboratively planning and delivering. They served for different durations and were never in the public spotlight. The iSLP was undertaken for the benefit of tens of thousands of households who had suffered intolerably and a prime objective of the participative process was that they would proudly regard the project as their own achievement.

*The mind of an Enabler: attitudes, values and principles*

The structural integrity and effectiveness of a cross-sector collaboration rests upon an appropriate and comprehensive policy framework. However, policies cannot be just plucked out of the air or borrowed from other applications – they have to be constructed out of more deeply embedded elements otherwise they will be swept away by the issues of the day.

Policies are built upon Principles.

Principles are built upon Values.

Values - if we are honest and really intend abiding by them - are built upon Attitudes.

A fundamental and common characteristic of Enablers of any cross-sector collaboration is the set of attitudes and values that they hold. This is what enables them as individuals and makes cross-sector collaboration possible through them.

In embarking upon a complex and perhaps lengthy collaboration it is worth carefully considering what attitudes are likely to be required. From such a frame of reference values can be constructed. Values lie at the heart of a respectful, thoughtful society, and at this point suggested values must be correlated with the principal values of the society and any discrepancies ironed out. Then a verified set of values should be applied in two ways: to refer back to attitudes, which makes it possible to recognise deviant, destructive attitudes for what they are, and to modify them if possible; and also to move forward by using the values as a platform for creating the principles that will guide every aspect of the collaboration.

Attitudes that are likely to undermine collaborative efforts are those which discriminate prejudicially between the various groups or people who might have a shared interest in a particular issue or project by, for example,

- Believing or implying or acting as though we are more important, able, responsible, resourceful, ethical or accountable than they are;
- by assuming that our perspective or opinion is more valid or correct than theirs;
- by considering it unnecessary to try to empathise with other parties and to understand and respect their culture, world view and perspective.

At the heart of the success of the iSLP was the fact that there were a group of Enablers from completely different backgrounds, some of whom were diametrically opposed to each other politically, but who all shared the same strong attitudes, values and principles. Because they were each in very different roles (community workers, politicians, NGO workers, officials in professional and managerial roles, and consultants) the practical manifestations of those attitudes, values and principles was quite different – but they were all pointed in the same direction and in the iSLP they found a common cause that they each strongly believed in.

Attitudes, values and principles constantly influence and feed back to each other: principles that work well in practice generate convictions which can become concretised as values and reflected as attitudes. There is therefore great value in Enablers of cross-sector collaborations developing a good understanding of the attitudes, values and principles that will be required, and how they inter-relate. **Table 17** (See Annexure B. p B16 - 18) suggests the kinds of attitudes, values and principles that are likely to apply to the

circumstances that give rise to the need for a large-scale cross-sector collaborative development.

The qualities, skills and competencies that the Enablers brought to the iSLP could be summarised in the following way. They brought a contrasting mix of idealism (variously a product of youth, liberal philosophy and inexperience) and pragmatism (variously a product of long and sometimes traumatic experience, disappointment and frustration). They were thoughtful, strategic thinkers and respectful of different perspectives. They were quiet, modest people, avoiding the limelight. They were both creative and empathetic – an essential combination for finding acceptable ways forward in a diverse collaboration. And each of them located themselves seriously within their professional disciplines – deliberately broadening that discipline’s boundaries, not breaking them down in order to become a different kind of functionary. The use of the term ‘Enabler’ denotes more of a quality than a function. As has already been mentioned, they possessed a common conviction that the concept of the iSLP was the only possible way to address a very serious problem – and some devoted themselves to it out of duty, some because of their faith, and some because engaging in this mode of development was their passion. A number of the practical wisdoms that they introduced to the project are included in the ‘Lessons Learned’ reproduced in **Annexure C**.

#### *The work of an Enabler*

In order to understand what is required of the Enablers, particularly in a collaboration to address large scale social issues such as housing provision for poor and marginalised communities, the nature of what is to be enabled must be understood. Firstly the identity of all parties interested in solving this problem must be established - and whether they would consider defining the problem together and then working together to solve it. The extent of polarisation is likely to be such that this first step is already beyond the individual ability of any of those parties. Enablers will be required.


Enablers are required to establish a coalition around a hub and then to develop a collaboration to drive a suite of initiatives that will achieve the required result. The collaboration must not only be constructed but held together, both inter-sector and intra-sector, for every institution involved in socio-political issues within a changing context is

likely to be fragile and vulnerable, suggesting both danger and opportunity. The hub must be well-defined, then inhabited by Enablers with formal functions of patron, chairperson and facilitator who can hold the centre steadfast. The hub must be consolidated with mandates and defended by Enablers who are in key positions within the sectors - who each tie their sector to the hub and use their boundary-spanning relationships to lock all the sectors into a circumference.


In due course the planning and delivery processes have to be driven, and these require Enablers who know what is needed but are committed to doing them collaboratively and therefore probably unconventionally. Over all this the entire collaborative enterprise must be comprehensively coordinated and supervised by a dedicated Enabler, probably with a team. All of this must be carefully constructed in multiple dimensions step by step.

A two dimensional representation is shown in **Fig 16** overleaf, which offers a way of thinking about the operation of a cross-sector collaboration and constitutes a template for an overall Relational Map.

**Fig 16 A Relational Map template for large-scale cross-sector collaborations**



**KEY to the symbols used in Fig 16.** [Each of these is explained in more detail overleaf. The numerals in the boxes relate to the 6 elements of an Enablement Plan described in Chapter 13.]



*The commitment of an Enabler*

The Relational Map template in Fig 16 is an attempt to show how all the fixed and moving parts of a cross-sector collaboration are related and strengthened. There are no rules for how the sectors (denoted by arcs), parties (shown as circles) and their representatives might behave – they are likely to be unstable and unpredictable. The Enablers (denoted by stars in Fig 16), on the other hand, are dedicated to the achievement of the shared objective. Those within sectors are shown as Key Enablers (stars within arrows), some of whom may have a personal relationship with a Key Enabler in another sector and so are referred to as boundary-spanners (linked stars). Enablers who are not formal stakeholders but use their relationships with different sectors in support of the collaboration are termed 3<sup>rd</sup> party boundary spanners (a star on a link). These are all individuals who choose their own tactics, who may come and go because of the nature of their employment, who might only be available for part of the project period, and who might even exercise their Enabler role clandestinely. It may be that few, if any of them, will actually be called ‘Enablers’ – it is their personal commitment that is crucial.

Enablers bring additional influence to bear simply through their relationships, particularly when they have developed some trust, however slim, between sectors. A cross-sector collaboration provides many opportunities for even entrenched opponents who have even a little respect or reluctant admiration of each other to enjoy a unique opportunity to pool their resources and counteract their weaknesses by enabling a really worthwhile collaboration to succeed. One of the simplest methods of building cross-sector relationships is to arrange meetings and events in ways that encourage social interaction. Creating a central place for refreshments or meals during meetings or arranging informal gatherings, such as to celebrate small achievements, create natural opportunities for participants to meet each other across sector boundaries.

The hub (at the centre of Fig 16) is occupied by Enablers fulfilling the functions of patron, chairperson and facilitator and is the repository of all of the collaboration’s principles and agreements. It stays at the centre of the collaboration. In Chapters 5 - 8 *the Defender* provided an excellent example of ‘holding the hub’ – despite the fact that she knew nothing about development and had never met most of the people there she attended and chaired all but one of her 33 Policy Committee meetings, as a woman in a predominantly and traditionally male field - and as a volunteer. The hub was

institutionalised in her during the policy-making phase. The hub is the anchor and must not move.

The coordinator of a collaboration (the unconnected, multidirectional symbol in Fig 16) is the Enabler who keeps the hub and all the collaboration linkages working together and constantly monitors every aspect of planning and implementation, and particularly the status of inter-relationships and involvement. The coordinator must have real affection for the collaborative exercise, and have respect and intentionally empathise with all of the participants – otherwise the task will prove impossible. The coordinator should be in place for the duration of the collaborative project. ‘Coordination’ in this context includes and is greater than ‘facilitation’ – coordination is more permanent, multifaceted, responsible and accountable. The hub and the coordinator must always be accessible, available and utterly dependable.

By this means such a cross-sector collaboration is able to become something much greater and more effective than the aggregate of whatever could be created by the individual participants – which is entirely necessary. Once the shared objective has been validated and the principles have been formulated participating organisations and/or their representatives are likely to come and go for all sorts of reasons that may or may not have a direct connection to the collaboration, but the collaborative project must be pursued relentlessly. Participants in the iSLP demonstrated a propensity for intermittent and unexplained attendance and for constructing other alliances in opposition to the iSLP whilst simultaneously urging the iSLP process to continue. In a large and long-term collaborative project judgements frequently have to be made about the significance of participants’ attitudes and actions – for which the perspectives of the Enablers and the authoritative guidance provided by the mandates are of great value.

There was a widespread sense of ‘calling’ amongst the Enablers in the iSLP, something that is often in evidence within trying, challenging, possibly dangerous but socially imperative projects. It adds a higher purpose to work, a greater tolerance of difficulty and failure, and requires a relatively un-material dimension of reward.

The only still unexplained symbols in Fig 16 are the mandates (indicated by squares). There are three of them, indicating that the mandates comprise instructions,

approvals and resources. It is the mandates which, when added to the personal commitment of the Enablers, empower them to propel a collaboration to success. They accompany the Enablers in filling the gap in the theory, and are discussed below.

### **Empowering mandates: inaugurating, confirming and authorising**

Responsibility without authority is ineffective. Enablers require powerful mandates which prevent them from being pushed off course by the vicissitudes of the collaborative struggle, and which act as levers to further strengthen the collaboration. By assuming that leadership is only provided either by participants operating in terms of their organisational mandates or by facilitators commissioned to address a specified issue the literature fails to emphasise the mandates that are vital requirements of the cross-sector collaboration as a whole. It is very unlikely that a cross-sector collaboration will itself be endowed with any authority – because it is not an institution. Authority has to be provided externally, by one or more of the participating organisations or by an altogether separate institution. It is therefore necessary to anticipate the various authorisations that are likely to be required, from where they must be sought and at what point in the process – and to build these into the collaboration programme.

The iSLP contained five major mandates which empowered and advanced the whole process by providing the means and authority for all the necessary steps – as well as powerful levers for the Enablers. These mandates comprised:

- the initial commission from the political patron;
- the formal approval of the iSLP Principles;
- the termination by decree of a Policy Committee that had outlived its usefulness;
- the approval of the iSLP Business Plan by the national cabinet; and
- the securing of the entire budget, with half paid in advance into a dedicated account.

Mandates such as these can be grouped, as indicated in Fig 18, into instructions, approvals and resources.

#### *Instructions*

The key instructions given in the iSLP were from *the Sponsor* to *the Strategist* and thereby to *the Democrat* to first of all canvass support from all stakeholders for a cross-sector

collaboration based on a specified proposed set of principles, which were radically different from anything that the government had applied previously. This mandate was more than an invitation – it was a firm expression of intent to operate inclusively and on equal terms to address a major social crisis. The credibility of the invitation rested upon the authority of the signatory (the head of government in the province) and the integrity of the messenger, *the Democrat*, who had offered himself to facilitate such an uncertain process. The next instruction was to inaugurate the process on the basis of those terms – to deliver carefully worded invitations to a meeting convened by *the Sponsor*, who knew that he would be an unacceptable chairperson for carrying the process forward. Once the Policy Committee had been convened they issued instructions to their Technical Committee, comprising a research agenda.

Another vital field of ‘instructions’ were the conditions that were contained in the national Housing Policy which was finalised in 1993 and implemented in 1994. This was the first non-racial housing policy in South Africa’s history, and its great significance was that it not only provided for the delivery of better housing products for the poor but it required the implementation of a participative process. No project could be approved without verifying the existence of a ‘social compact’ between the developer (usually a government department or agency) and the community from which the beneficiaries were to be drawn. These parameters, incorporating the subsidy limit for various income groups, became the framework within which members of the iSLP’s project committees could identify affordable housing options and make appropriate choices. The major reason why the policy phase of the iSLP had been so drawn out was that there was no money available for development until the promulgation of the Housing Policy which had to await the inauguration of the new political dispensation.

A ‘higher’ field of instructions was incorporated in the inclusion of the iSLP as a ‘Special Integrated Presidential programme of the Reconstruction and Development Programme’ in December 1994. This meant that the iSLP would not just be treated as a collection of housing projects, each of which could apply for housing subsidies, but that it would be regarded as a development of new suburbs and communities, with each suburb provided with a full range of community facilities, including schools, libraries and halls, and each newly settled community supported with a range of ‘capacity building’ programmes.

The other instructions that had to be issued were briefs to consultants, which had to be worded very carefully to accurately represent the unconventional nature of the collaborative process. Misleading briefs could derail the process, and Enablers within and external to government facilitated the drafting of these. In a highly contested environment in which great flexibility would be constantly required it was essential that contracts were designed to fulfil their objectives and to be completely practicable by service providers and manageable by their clients.

There were three characteristics of the way consultants were selected and briefed that were unconventional. The first was that the town planning and engineering consultants for the major housing projects were selected by the particular project committee from a panel of three consultants from each discipline. Each panel been nominated by an inclusive list of consultants – not standard practice under the previous regime – and each consulting firm was required to make a presentation to a project committee. The community representatives within the project committees were then given freedom to interrogate the consultants and to recommend the appointment of one – which was then fulfilled by the relevant government agency.

The second unconventional feature was that those consultants were required to embark on a participatory planning process with the members of their project committee – and particularly with the community representatives. The terms of this process were set out in a substantial manual entitled, “Integrated Serviced Land Project Guidelines on The Participative Development Process”, and it was one of the functions of the iSLP Project Coordinator’s facilitators to ensure that the consultants followed the guidelines in every housing project.

The third unconventional aspect of consultants’ briefs was that when the housing departments within provincial and local government no longer had the human resources necessary to manage projects they appointed four civil engineering companies to each manage a group of projects and required them, in addition to conducting the process with the involvement of the community in a project committee, to ensure that beneficiaries were fairly identified, properly informed about their rights and obligations as new homeowners, and given legal title to their home when they took occupation. This was revolutionary

within the local engineering profession, and some firms established new departments that specialised in these aspects of holistic housing delivery.

### *Approvals*

An unconventional approach like a cross-sector collaboration is like a journey up an untested rock face – every time a further position is achieved it must be hammered into place, to prevent the process from slipping back and to provide a firm platform for moving ahead. To fulfil that it was necessary that approvals be in writing, accurate and unambiguous and confirmed by the necessary authority. The basic steps of approval in the iSLP were resolutions of committees as recorded in minutes which were circulated well in advance of the next meeting and confirmed or corrected there. To optimise the accuracy and effectiveness of minutes in the iSLP every effort was made to draft and distribute them within 24 hours of each meeting.

In order to achieve approvals that would specify precisely what the Enablers believed was necessary for the success of the collaboration it was necessary for Enablers to draft the proposals for consideration by the appropriate committee or authority. This would comprise a draft resolution and a detailed motivation – which would be for the benefit of all committee members but for the proposer and chairperson. With a great assortment of stakeholders it would have been very easy for inappropriate or unhelpful decisions to be taken, and this had to be obviated by all means. The ultimate action in this regard was the compilation of the very substantial and comprehensive iSLP Business Plan which was approved ultimately by the national Cabinet. It documented every objective, principle, programme and budget that would apply to and authorise what eventually became 250 projects or programmes. Accuracy was essential, because mistakes were irredeemable.

### *Resources*

The iSLP needed access to land, the commitment of many government departments and agencies and a great deal of money. To obtain public land agreement was needed for the transfer of land from one ministry to another and funds were required to purchase private land. Until the approval of the project in 1994 the process within government had been driven exclusively by Housing functionaries. The national government then called for the iSLP Business Plan to be drafted in conjunction with the departments of education, health, social services, police and the local authorities, incorporating their existing plans wherever

possible, with the inducement that half of the capital costs would be provided from a special iSLP budget. The huge project budget was approved with half funded by the national treasury, matched by commitments from the provincial government and local authorities. The leverage was immensely effective, and overnight the iSLP became the biggest multi-department, multi-stakeholder project in the land – and awarded the cachet of President Nelson Mandela.

Effective, comprehensive mandates are fundamental; the need for them must be anticipated, specified and programmed in advance; and then they must be protected, affirmed, defended whenever necessary and applied to the greatest advantage for the collaboration. It was these mandates that were reported against at the completion of the project. They are a vital component of a successful process, particularly in such a turbulent environment.

### **Conclusion**

Whereas Chapter 11 argued that there is a gap in the collaboration theory that is framed by inadequate appreciation of ongoing environmental turbulence and stakeholder incapacity, Chapter 12 has argued that the gap can be filled by Enablers – people of diverse backgrounds, positions and motivations who share a common personal commitment to achieving the objectives of the collaboration - and the mandates which empower them. By this means the prospects for success, so negatively portrayed in the literature, can be improved significantly. Chapter 13 first summarises the argument of this thesis and then demonstrates how it can be applied by the construction of an Enablement Plan and by adding the main contributions of this thesis to two process models from the literature.

## 13

### **The Argument and its application: Raising confidence in the last resort**

This final chapter presents the argument of this thesis: that there is a gap in the literature which is framed and filled by a combination of four factors. The frame is constructed from both an inadequate appreciation of how incessantly turbulent is the environment in which such collaborations are pursued and by the extent to which participating stakeholders are unable to apply the requisite human resources to drive such a collaboration themselves. The gap is filled by an appreciation of the involvement of Enablers and of the mandates required by them to achieve the collaboration's objective. It is therefore argued that Enablers, adequately mandated can make the difference between failure and success in a cross-sector collaboration.

After formally stating the argument of this thesis three ways will be offered whereby it can be applied: through the use of an Enablement Plan; by the modification of Bryson et al's cross-sector collaboration framework; and by the modification of Ansell and Gash's Model of Collaborative Governance.

### **The Journey**

This thesis was fashioned to take up Gaventa's call for new relationships to be constructed between ordinary people and the institutions which affect their lives, and I then used four of his six Challenges to frame the literature review. This requires new relationships; a focus on the intersection of civil society and state-based approaches; analyses of spaces, how they function and whom they benefit; and to undertake power analyses that will reveal the true purpose and effect of such spaces. (Gaventa, 2004. p 25-38). The project that I examined was certainly an experiment in constructing new relationships between different and opposing parties, and the narrative tracked the ebb and flow of influences wrestling for control of the project. However, it is not practicable to undertake power analysis, such as grounded theory, long after the event. So whilst I have 'unpacked' a large, complex project and demonstrated who took sides from time to time I was unable to respond adequately to

the detail that Gaventa requires. This needs to be researched intensely from conception in a contemporary project.

The literature then moved into the debate as to whether developments such as housing project should be community-based or government-driven, with Ward (1976), Turner (1988), Gibson (1994), and Hamdi (2004) all promoting community ownership of development processes. Invariably, however, it is government who takes the initiative, provides land and money and then demands that it be managed by institutions that will be accountable. I quoted UN-HABITAT (2003) as defending that position, and the reality – certainly as illustrated by the iSLP – is that a pragmatic response to the debate is to compromise by allowing the state to control but insisting that it manage the process as a collaboration, and at as many levels as possible.

It may often be easy to play lip service to such an objective, but not in an environment such as South Africa's four-year transition in which government was not all-powerful and had frozen funds for development whereas the influence of opposition groups had never been greater. Therefore from the start of the iSLP it was clear that a mode somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between community control and state control (see Table 1) would have to be found. As a result communities could not just be regarded as 'beneficiaries' a concern expressed by Cornwall (2004), but had to be involved in everything from policy-making, town planning, employment in construction, the identification of beneficiaries and personally choosing housing options.

The comments by Cleaver (2004) about the importance of recognizing the limits of the makeability of social life resonated strongly as a pragmatic approach to collaborative development. Bénit-Gbaffou (2008), Bebbington (2004) and Robbins (2008) all described how messy community involvement in development actually is because no development processes is completely satisfactory and actors have multiple allegiances to fulfil. Development is messy, and muddling on in the right direction is for everyone an art. Within the iSLP the application of community participation principles was a requirement of town planning, engineering and project management professionals, and described for them in a manual. As they implemented the prescribed participation processes they learned to listen to and respect their counterparts, to the extent that they were able to share responsibility for the process and discuss and resolve challenges together.

Moving on in the literature search it was then interesting to study models in the collaborative governance literature and to see how they evolved from the rigidly-structured Agenda 21 type (ICLEI, 1996) to something far more flexible and responsive as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008). They recognised that collaborations of different parties, even if led and controlled by institutions, are fraught with challenges and complications and that instead of being designed like an institutionalised organisation chart it is a churning process that is required - that is complex, cyclical and iterative.

The body of theory on the participatory sphere is particularly helpful in this regard, because this locates the focus of the interactive space neither in the state nor in, for example, communities, but in a distinct arena of interface, in which occur both contestation and collaboration. (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Whilst such spaces may be located in intermediate institutions, perhaps tailor-made, they need not be – as was the case with the iSLP. Here the space was a project and process, defined by objectives, principles, temporary structures and a succession of meetings, to which all parties with a direct interest were invited. And without becoming an institution it survived and delivered on its goals – in fact over time its locus of power moved away from government and was distributed to over two hundred subsidiary projects and a coordinating hub. The sensitivity and flexibility that was then required and practised is reflected by Cornwall (2004) and Flyvbjerg (2004), who paint a picture of this sphere of different kinds of engagement for different purposes at different times. A representation of the participation options as a spectrum has been gathered from various sources into Table 1, which is a useful gauge because of its simplicity, but the modes that are available mid-way between the poles of state and community control are more spherical and plastic than modular and prescriptive. And of the options and combinations that can be created in this participative sphere cross-sector collaboration is the last resort. (Bryson et al. 2006). This was the location of the iSLP, whose diverse and opposing stakeholders had reached the point of realising that no party, or sector of parties, had any chance of being able to successfully address the challenge alone.

This thesis has therefore explored the field of cross-sector collaboration, and in particular the reasons why the chances of success are reported by the literature to be so remote. The research for this thesis was motivated by my having participated in a successful cross-

sector collaboration that was undertaken in very challenging circumstances. My investigation took me into an extensive library of project records, then deep into an analysis of actual participation in a very inclusive process. It was there that I found the key to success: a few very diverse people who made a great deal of difference. I documented the project narrative, taking note of their individual involvements, and then, curious to discover what had motivated each of them to operate so unconventionally, I interviewed them.

It was the interviews that brought this exercise to life and brought the term 'Enablers' to mind. They were very different people and they still are, but the arresting factor in each of their stories was that they had gone against the grain or changed direction as a deliberate and principled act of will. And these new trajectories intersected in the iSLP, for long enough in each case to make a profound difference – collectively the difference between failure and success. Significantly, they did not form a team. There were enough teams battling it out in the iSLP already, and teams have turf. They worked as individuals in an interrelated way. Their contribution received no recognition or acclaim, partly because that was a territory of its own and partly because not many people knew who was actually driving the iSLP – keeping it on the rails.

The mandates that were granted to the iSLP – unprecedented in scope and finance in that era and ever since in South Africa – were awarded in the terms of the Business Plan, but with the confidence that there was actually a viable, inclusive collaboration that was in sound hands. Names would have been mentioned, eyes would have connected and heads would have nodded. It was the Enablers who were being entrusted with the resources, because it was they whose commitment and trustworthiness in the tumultuous policy-making phase was evident in the attendance records.

This spreads the domain of large-scale cross-sector collaborative housing development across many fields: politics, sociology, history, urban geography, project management, construction, town planning, civil engineering, collaboration management, development anthropology, law and perhaps into applied psychology and religion. The point is that the essence of success lies not in professions, functions or fields of study but in individual people. You have to dig to find them because they are not waving a flag.

## **The Argument**

The argument of this thesis is that a cross-sector collaboration should expect to suffer incessant turbulence and contestation, both around it and within, and that the stakeholders will be too preoccupied with their own affairs to manage the collaboration themselves. Success therefore depends on the existence and activities of Enablers – people who are not only the designated patrons or champions or just ad hoc facilitators, conflict-resolvers or blockade-breakers. They are likely to have a wide assortment of backgrounds, positions and motivations but they share a dedication to the achievement of the collaboration’s goals and ensure that the mandates and to make that possible are specified, acquired and applied. Such mandates comprise instructions, approvals and resources.

The task of an Enabler transcends that of a ‘job’ or even a role to fulfil – they are unselfishly providing support to a critical social cause, knowing that if the collaboration fails there will not be another chance. Furthermore, they do this during a period of social and political upheaval when most people are either opportunity hunting or staying out of harm’s way. Their contribution is also without any public recognition. My argument is that they are the special ingredient without whom a large-scale cross-sector collaboration is doomed to failure.

### **Ways of applying the argument**

The analysis developed through this thesis suggests three ways in which theory of collaborative development, particularly that which must be exercised across sectors, can be enhanced. The first applies ‘Enabler thinking’ to the planning, facilitation and coordination of cross-sector collaborations by means of what I have termed an Enablement Plan. The second is a modification of the Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaborations that was developed by Bryson and his colleagues. And the third moves a step back in complexity to provide some feedback to the Participative Sphere into which flow both community participation and collaborative governance theory and to the Model of Collaborative Governance formulated by Ansell and Gash. Thereafter some suggestions for further research have been offered.

### **An Enablement Plan**

In the narrative of the iSLP Relational Maps were used to illustrate the nature of relationships between the different parties that were engaged in or with the collaboration. A Relational Map can include whatever information is relevant, represented in whatever way is meaningful for the users. The establishment of a cross-sector collaboration can also be formulated and planned by building up a whole map piece by piece. As the responsibility for this will always fall to Enablers, a useful term for this product is an Enablement Plan. Its components may also be viewed as a box of tools that can be used along the way by Enablers to fine tune, detect weaknesses and effect repairs.

An Enablement Plan can be constructed using the six building blocks which are numbered in the Key of the Relational Map shown in Fig. 16 in Chapter 12. These comprise the following fundamental tasks:

1. Define the hub. What does it contain? Values, principles, objectives, resolutions, commitments to contribute, mandates, resources, personnel *etc.* These must all be embedded in the hub through confirmed written minutes, correspondence and contracts..
2. Define the participating parties and sectors. Some sectors may be more clearly defined than others. Are some sectors excluded? Identify key persons and their strengths and weaknesses. It may be unclear as to which sectors some parties belong. Identify the persons most committed to the hub as potential Enablers.
3. Identify the cross-sector boundary-spanning relationships – and not just at senior level because all relationships can be levers.
4. Identify what processes will drive the project and who are or should become the key drivers.
5. Identify the vital decisions that will be required to mandate and empower the process.
6. Appoint a coordinator and/or facilitator for the whole enterprise.

Out of the experience of the iSLP the contents of these six elements can be revealed, and in so doing they demonstrate the extent and texture of the Enabling functions that are required

to assemble the cross-sector collaboration and maintain it successfully. They amount to a great many functions, and perhaps only a few will be achievable right at the start of the process. What is important is that the Enablers, and particularly those in the ‘coordinator’ or ‘facilitator’ role, have a real plan which they are assembling all the time – and the earlier that they can think and act about these issues the better. The detailed elements of an Enablement Plan are listed below.

#### 1. Define the hub

The hub is the heart of the cross-sector collaboration in which the following are gradually accumulated, documented, lodged, safeguarded and managed by dedicated Enablers:

The problem statement

The mandate to investigate the possibility of a collaboration

The shared objective

The mandate to establish a collaboration

The list of parties to the collaboration and their sectors

Evidence of the commitment of each party to the collaboration and the appointment of its representatives

The agreed programme

Resources acquired for the work of the collaboration – *e.g.* land, finance, dedicated personnel

The authorised budget

Agreed principles (addressed in the next section of this chapter)

Briefs for work required by the collaboration

Information gathered and shared

Resolutions adopted by the collaboration

The approved Business Plan

Mandates / approvals acquired by the collaboration

Mandates given by the collaboration for the creation of committees, task groups, *etc.*

Mandates given by the collaboration to participating parties to act on the collaboration’s behalf

Mandates given by the collaboration to individuals to serve the collaboration

Minutes of meetings

Reports, including progress reports

Communications on behalf of the collaboration to specific or general audiences

Matters under discussion within the collaboration but not yet resolved

## 2. Define the participating parties and sectors

This is a process which warrants the application of a great deal of consideration, discussion and research, to carefully build up the following:

List of parties which have a direct responsibility for or interest in addressing the problem statement, with details of such responsibility of interest

A profile of each party, identifying its constituency, function, history, influence and vulnerability

Knowledge of factions or fragmentation within each party, particularly those which might threaten its commitment to the collaboration

Information on the contribution that each party can make to the work of the collaboration

Categorisation of such parties into sectors

Identification of the leading party in each sector

List of parties invited to join the collaboration

List of parties that have agreed to join the collaboration

Key persons in each party, their strengths, weaknesses and commitment to the collaboration

Key persons in each sector, their strengths, weaknesses and commitment to the collaboration

Enthusiastic collaborators within each party

Enablers within each sector

## 3. Identify the cross-sector boundary-spanning relationships

A successful cross-sector collaboration requires that every participating sector, organisation and person is not only connected to the hub in some real way, but is tied in some formal or informal way to one or more people within other sectors. These are ‘boundary-spanning’ relationships and they create some cross-accountability which can provide vital stability to the process over its bumpy journey. The process calls for the following steps:

Identify participants in the collaboration who have a good relationship with others in the collaboration who are located in a different sector.

Encourage such relationships to work in support of the collaboration as Enablers, at least to build the cross-sector integrity of the collaboration but also to leverage, strengthen and

promote specific initiatives.

Identify participants in the collaboration who have a particularly strong relationship with others in the collaboration who are located in a different party within their own sector, and encourage such relationships to work in support of the collaboration as Enablers, at least to build the intra-sector integrity of the collaboration but also to leverage, strengthen and promote specific initiatives.

Identify participants in the collaboration who do not get on well with each other, and take steps to prevent their personal animosity from derailing the collaboration process in any way - as well as steps to find ways of getting them to work together for the sake of the collaboration.

Identify parties outside of the collaboration who have good relationships with opposing parties or participants within the collaboration, who could be persuaded to exert influence on them for the benefit of the collaboration.

#### 4. Identify the driving processes and key drivers

The purpose of a collaborative development is to move the participants together towards an objective and to deliver things along the way. It is a vehicle that must be driven. It is therefore necessary to:

Identify what unconventional, abnormal or innovative processes will be required to drive the initiatives within the collaboration - recognising that a cross-sector collaboration is not an expression of 'business as usual'.

Identify what decisions will be required to enable those processes and where such decisions will have to be formulated and authorised.

Identify the key persons who will have to drive such processes and any support that they will require for that purpose.

#### 5. Identify the required mandates

Collaboration vehicles and their drivers must be mandated and empowered, so identify what radical decisions, taken by whom, will be required to authorise and resource the process, such as:

An instruction to investigate the need and feasibility of a cross-sector collaboration

An invitation to parties to collaborate

Terms of reference of all the structures (*e.g.* committees) within a collaboration

Approval of the collaboration's principles

Initiation and termination of processes

Censure of an inappropriate action

Approval of collaboration or project business plans

Allocation and dedication of resources to the collaboration e.g. land, finance, personnel

Certification that a mandate has been fulfilled

Care must also be taken to arrange for knowledgeable people to draft the documents that must be approved – they must be comprehensive, unambiguous and precisely serve the purpose for which they are required.

#### 6. Appoint a Coordinator of the collaboration

However collaborative every element of the process may be there must be ‘single point responsibility’ for coordinating and/or facilitating the whole enterprise. Furthermore the coordinator must be appointed for the entire duration of the project to ensure that at least one person has the comprehensive knowledge and institutional memory necessary to keep the process intact, to develop integrity and respect within and for the process, and to be able to discern fact from fiction and truth from lies. These duties, very simply stated, are to:

Keep the collaboration together

Keep the collaboration moving towards its objective

Anticipate and avoid hazards, or at least ameliorate their effect

Strengthen weaknesses and gaps

Consolidate strengths

Defend the collaboration against attack

Evidently no cross-sector collaboration is identical to another, so the Enablement Plan described above should, as mentioned earlier, be regarded as a box of tools (or even a check list) more than a blueprint. Any of the many elements within each of the six ‘building blocks’ can be contemplated, investigated, applied to a set of circumstances and evaluated. As part of an Enabler’s function is to train one’s mind to think creatively and constructively about how to deal with complexity, simply interrogating each of these items is likely to be a good investment. To this end I have used the material gathered in this thesis to create two resources for reference by practitioners who may be confronted by circumstances for which a cross-sector collaboration is indeed the last resort. The first is a brief catalogue of lessons learned by Enablers in the iSLP, annotated to indicate whether


they are of broad or restricted application, and it constitutes **Annexure C** to this thesis. The second is a very practical Enabler's Manual, which includes guidelines and templates for practitioners, and is presented as **Annexure D**.

### **Feeding back into Cross-Sector Collaboration theory**

The insights drawn from Chapters 5 - 10 can be used to supplement the Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaboration postulated by Bryson and his colleagues and referred to in Chapter 2. Their extensive analysis can be enhanced by overlaying each of the four factors that were described in Chapters 11 and 12 to demonstrate that throughout the process each of them is likely to be relevant. Firstly, turbulence and change should be expected within the general environment and be reflected in multiple agendas, instability and manoeuvring within the project throughout its lifespan. Secondly, there should be an explicit recognition that the collaborating parties are very unlikely to be able to hold it together, equip it and drive it on their own without putting their own organisations and the careers of their most capable personnel at risk. Thirdly, and in consequence of the first two factors, the indispensability of Enablers must be recognised, the first component of which are strategically located activists who are dedicated to the cause, some of whom are located within the participating organisations and some in and around the hub of the collaboration. They must understand the environment and the times and be very capable, influential and able to sustain their influence. Finally, the process must be authorised and empowered by a carefully planned and articulated progression of mandates, comprising significant authorisations and the dedication of the required resources.

On this basis Bryson et al's 'Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaboration' could be modified as shown in **Fig 17** overleaf.

**Fig 17. A Modified Framework for Understanding Cross-Sector Collaborations**  
After Bryson *et al.* 2006. The Author's modifications are indicated by and within dashes.



The modifications of Bryson *et al.*'s 'Framework' in diagrammatic form are indicated by and within dashed lines in Fig. 17 above. Prominent arrows to question prevailing conditions throughout the process have been added, as well as a hub that is visible to and accessible by all the parties and various Enablers ('E') located in strategic positions. Empowering mandates are included as ingredients of the 'Structure and Governance' box.

Two sections have been added: one that explains and responds to 'Prevailing Conditions' and includes the themes on complexity and incapacity; and one on 'Enablement' which explains the roles required of Enablers and of mandates, the latter of which can be included in the existing 'Structure and Governance' section. The 'Prevailing

Conditions' section would provide warnings of the possibility that some of what already appear as 'Initial Conditions' may persist and even deteriorate, particularly if these conditions are environmental and not under control of the collaboration. Any notion that a chronically turbulent environment will be changed by the initiation of a cross-sector collaboration may be very optimistic, so a realistic assessment and forecast of prevailing conditions (at least a 'SWOT analysis') within and around the collaboration and the also within each sector and participating organisation is well advised. Its purpose would be to soberly appraise the difficulties that may be encountered and gauge the ability of the participating organisations to run the collaboration.

### **Feeding back into the participative sphere**

The second contribution that can be made to the literature is in relation to the 'participative sphere', to which both community participation and collaborative governance discourses are connected, as I explained in Chapter 2. In the light of the iSLP both of the latter two bodies of theory appear rather simplistic because of the apparently small scale and binary nature of the circumstances that they address. One of the consequences of such paradigms is a tendency to be so wary of the motives and actions of a single opposing party that one fails to detect the enemy within, and to be so defensive of one's rights that one's wrongs and weaknesses go ignored. The iSLP provides examples of duplicity within both community organisations and government. It encourages a careful analysis of the possible agendas of each sector, participating organisation and participant – not in order to police them, for that would be impossible, or even to censure them, for that might embarrass or anger them into leaving – but to be able to anticipate and compensate for their actions.


Elucidation of the complexity within the iSLP may encourage theorists in the participative sphere to take their skills into cross-sector collaboration territory, or simply to examine their existing paradigms for signs of multiple agendas, internal fractures and unexpected alliances that might challenge their binary constructs. Therefore it would be helpful if Gaventa's 6<sup>th</sup> challenge - to undertake a power analysis of spaces, places, visibility and intersections - were extended to cover the abuse by any party or person of the privilege of accessing the participatory space for their own ends. Perhaps a 7<sup>th</sup> challenge would be appropriate: to thoroughly interrogate the possible hazards and demands of a collaborative process and therefore identify precise requirements for its enablement by

individuals and mandates.

Such a contribution to the participative sphere discourse could feed back to its community participation and collaborative governance tributaries. The need for Enablers is often treated with disdain in the community participation school and given a part-time role in collaborative governance. One constructive contribution would be a general cautionary note on how easily opportunities for ‘community participation’ can be misappropriated, abused, distorted and neglected by those who are ostensibly or purportedly community leaders – especially during times of change and disorganisation. Another would be to modify Ansell and Gash’s Model of Collaborative Governance which was discussed in Chapter 2 to call attention to the relevance of the four factors (turbulence, incapacity, Enablers and their mandates), again within dashed lines, as shown in **Fig. 18** overleaf.

**Fig 18. A Modified Model of Collaborative Governance**

After Ansell and Gash, 2007. The Author's modifications are indicated by and within dashes.



In Fig. 18 the main addition to the original model is a box that requires an interrogation of the 'Prevailing Conditions' throughout the life of the initiative. If the environment is likely to be unstable or volatile and if any collaborating organisation or its members are lacking in strength, commitment or integrity it should be anticipated and catered for by ensuring that the process is adequately enabled. In the original diagram a box labelled 'Facilitative Leadership' was an external resource with an arrow into the 'Collaborative Process' box. Fig. 18 brings the former box in to take central place in the collaborative process, so that it provides the hub and all the parties are held to it along the dotted arrows by Enablers

located both at the hub and in the participating organisations. Furthermore a box has been added that indicates ‘Enabling Mandates’ as an external resource. This requires the proponents of the collaboration to consider what are the most critical authorisations and resource allocations required for the collaboration and to describe, schedule and prepare to negotiate for them.

### **Suggestions for further research**

The subject matter of this thesis can provoke many questions about a great variety of topics – within the literature, within the project that I have researched and within the environment in which project was pursued. I would not be surprised if the reader has already compiled a list of questions to consider researching. Furthermore, I am well aware that I have undertaken this research from an internal and quite narrow position which for those reasons would be regarded as subjective and biased. Yet I found myself in a unique position to tell the story, and as a development practitioner I regarded that as worth doing. I did not expect to find that there was not a body of theory to explain its success – and that revelation led to the thesis. I am confident that there are many other related research topics that will yield as much surprise and satisfaction and so I offer below some suggestions for further research. I also hope that this thesis will generate some diversity of interest, because the more diverse perspectives that are expressed on the many processes involved in a cross-sector collaboration the better. I also hope that my work will prompt theoreticians to engage more with development practitioners, not only to share the fruits of their scholarship but to listen to and learn from practitioners so that they may collaboratively create more effective approaches to challenges.

#### **Some topics for exploration in and around the iSLP:**

The ways in which a particular community was involved in the project.

The inside story of the groups who wanted to gain control of the iSLP.

The influences within and by the Urban Foundation.

Changes in the ability of government to manage and coordinate development.

The impact of the ‘transitional period’ in South Africa on development.

The impact of the ‘transitional period’ in South Africa on local community representation.

The nature and dynamics of community representation in development projects.

The strengths and weaknesses of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

The strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in managing and coordinating development.

Ways and means of measuring success in multi-faceted development projects.

The effects of development projects on ‘beneficiary communities’.

The basis upon which new housing is made available in housing projects.

The most important features of effective community involvement in development projects.

What has happened to the houses and their occupants within a section of the iSLP over 20 years?

What has been the extent and effect of property ownership provided under the iSLP?

How have the buildings constructed by the iSLP performed?

What is the extent of local entrepreneurship in iSLP areas?

### **Some wider and more general questions**

Why was the funding and institutional arrangement for large-scale integrated development only available in this country under the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994-96) – and what has been the effect on urban development since?

How can cross-sector collaboration become less of a last resort or a mode that parties ‘fail into’ – and instead become a mode to promote and aspire to?

What trade-offs should parties engaged in a collaboration anticipate having to make?

The primacy of ‘product’ or ‘process’ is a long-standing debate in development – but does the concept and implication of a ‘project’, with accompanying principles, values and deliverables, occupy higher ground?

It was impossible to undertake an effective power analysis of the iSLP retrospectively. Find a project that is in the process of conception, offer a neutral service like facilitation, translation or minute taking which will permit presence at all meetings, and rigorously plot what happens. The process may take longer than expected.

Take a multi-participant project and research the different attitudes and values that are manifested within the various individuals or groups.

I have suggested that development under complex conditions is an art. Track and analyse the flexibility that is exercised and the compromises that are made in a development

project, the reasons for them and the affect on both the parties and the product.

### **In conclusion ...**

Where society is in crisis and transformation has become irresistible but conventional institutionally-driven development practices are no longer possible the need for large-scale cross-sector collaborative development is likely to arise. There is little within the literature on participation and collaborative governance to alert or prepare the policy-maker or practitioner to the acute challenges that may lie ahead and to the remedies that can be applied. The literature on cross-sector collaboration is much more cautionary, but on the other hand it provides insufficient guidelines for how success might be achieved. This thesis addresses the needs of practitioners, policy-makers and academics to understand how the prospects for such an essential instrument can be improved. My argument is that there are four factors that are underplayed or ignored in the literature, two of which frame a gap - which is filled by the two others.

In the first place this thesis has warned that the turbulence and even violence that drive the stakeholders to collaborate as a last resort are unlikely to abate. There is an assumption in the literature that the establishment and implementation of a collaboration will address the turbulence. However, those involved in creating synergy and development within a fraught and transitioning society have to cope not only with the crisis that is the focus of their endeavours, which may take an age to subdue, but with ongoing exogenous and turbulence which is completely beyond their control. They are also likely to face, as the iSLP case has demonstrated, fierce contestation between the stakeholders and the making and breaking of alliances that are designed to capture control of the initiative for spurious ends. In this respect, engaging in such activity may be likened to fighting a battle within a war. The importance of this point is that participants, and Enablers in particular, must go into a cross-sector collaboration ready and equipped for a drawn out, messy, complicated, convoluted struggle – on a platform that is likely to be rocked in different ways at different times by different people, interminably. To underestimate this factor is to be seriously under-prepared.

In the second place this thesis asserts that under the sort of conditions that necessitate the establishment of a cross-sector collaboration, particularly at a large scale for

development purposes, it should not be assumed that the stakeholders themselves will be able to adequately dedicate to the task personnel with the necessary skills. In such circumstances organisations are likely to have difficulty pursuing their own agendas, let alone being able to release talented staff to engage in a completely hybrid and experimental venture – however important it may be. Furthermore, in times of considerable change everyone becomes super-alert to fluctuations, opportunities, vulnerabilities and dangers – and the most unlikely choice by an ambitious, able employee would be to accept deployment out on a limb in some experimental expedition with a bunch of strangers, including opponents. The literature is silent on this issue, except to mention that an independent facilitator may be required from time to time – thereby assuming that most, if not all of the time, the collaboration is managed by stakeholders. That is a manifestly unrealistic proposition. What will be required is a very unusual but quite intentional mix of human resources, characterised by some vital similarities as well as some very strong differences – which leads to the third factor.

Thirdly, to have any chance of success a cross-sector collaboration requires an assortment of Enablers, fulfilling a variety of roles in different ways and for different periods, but sharing a commitment to a common goal and a determination to see it achieved. On the one hand there must be people within the collaborating organisations who passionately believe in the cause and in the process to be adopted. They are unable or unwilling to sacrifice their careers to work in the collaboration full-time, but they recognise that within their positions they can help the collaboration – and their values are such that they will do that even if they get transferred out of direct engagement with the process. Amongst these people will be some whose values and consequent actions have endeared them somewhat to one or more individuals within other stakeholder organisations, enabling them to be bridge-builders to some extent – even if it is just the facility to reach out, make a contact, and know that it will be reciprocated. Then, because the stakeholder institutions themselves have been part of the problem, there will be concerned, committed, external parties or people who see the germ of a cross-sector collaboration as a seed that is eminently worth watering – and they contribute resources, probably pro bono. In addition, particularly if the task is a large-scale one, full-time expert personnel will be required to fulfil particular functions – perhaps facilitation or coordination – on a contracted, sustained basis. They would have to be appointed by one party for practical reasons, but it would have to be on the recommendation of all stakeholders and with accountability to them all as well.

These functions are unconventional from an institutional perspective, but illustrate the kinds of applications that are necessary to achieve organic adaptations in a society under stress.

In the fourth place this thesis has demonstrated that at some strategic stages in the process Enablers will require more than their passion, goodwill, talents and relationships. They will require powerful interventions, mandates, vested authority and effective leverage. Persons of undisputed authority must inaugurate, terminate, approve and empower at a few very significant moments in a collaboration's life. These are not routine actions, which should be regarded as management or committee functions, but rare very high-level decisions that are virtually irreversible because of their stature. Through such mandates the Enablers, on account of their commitment and integrity, are entrusted with the instruments necessary to drive the process unceasingly until all the objectives have been achieved. Because of the complexity of the exercise small compromises on standards, programmes, process and budget will inevitably have to be made occasionally – but the mandates, and the way that they are implemented by those who grant them, also provide the delegated authority for making such approvals along the way.

To sum up, the evidence within literature is that cross-sector collaboration is only chosen to address social crises as a last resort, by which time the environment is likely to be turbulent, requiring a process which is so complex that it offers very little chance of success. This thesis demonstrates that the possibility of achieving success can be improved by recognising that the turbulence is likely to be long lasting and must be continuously managed and counterbalanced; that the stakeholders will be unable to organise and manage the collaborative process out of their own human resources; and that the actions and interactions of a few diversely positioned but dedicated Enablers will be crucial, in combination with the award of some powerful mandates.

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## NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE ISLP ARCHIVES AND INTERVIEWS WITH ENABLERS

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<sup>1</sup> “Goldstone Crossroads Report” – Report to the Commission of Inquiry regarding the prevention of public violence and intimidation by the committee investigating public violence and intimidation at Crossroads during March/June 1993. Para 3.1.8; and Evidence of Mr F du Toit Para 11.

<sup>2</sup> Goldstone Report Para 3.1.10.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with *the Veteran*, 12.4.10.

<sup>4</sup> Appleton CS (1993). Submission to the Goldstone Commission. pp 4.

<sup>5</sup> Goldstone Report Para 3.1.13,14.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with *the Urban Planner*, 25.3.10.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with *the Veteran*, 12.4.10.

<sup>8</sup> Interview with *the Community Planner*, 18.5.10

<sup>9</sup> Appleton CS (1993). pp1&3.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with *the Veteran*, 12.4.10

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Appleton CS (1993). pp7

<sup>13</sup> Interview with *the Community Planner*, 18.5.10

<sup>14</sup> “Goldstone” Para 3.1.19.

<sup>15</sup> “Goldstone” Paras 3.1.19, 20.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with *the Defender*, 24.3.10

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- <sup>17</sup> Interview with *the Wrestler*, 29.5.10
- <sup>18</sup> Interview with *the Community Planner*, 18.5.10
- <sup>19</sup> Interview with *the Provincial Planner*, 09.4.10
- <sup>20</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's archives: Report on "Current CPA Projects" dd 9.8.93.
- <sup>21</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, Crossroads Town Committee report dd 27.02.90.
- <sup>22</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's archives: Report on "Current CPA Projects" dd 9.8.93.
- <sup>23</sup> "Goldstone" du Toit evidence Para 43.
- <sup>24</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, Agenda, Notes and Minutes for meeting dd 22.10.90.
- <sup>25</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, proposal letter dd 05.11.90.
- <sup>26</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, fax dd 07.11.90.
- <sup>27</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, fax dd 14.11.90.
- <sup>28</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, minutes dd 09.11.90; letter dd 13.11.90; & minutes dd 28.11.90.
- <sup>29</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, follow-up letters dd 28.02.91 -.
- <sup>30</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, minutes dd 07.03.91.
- <sup>31</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, minutes dd 02.04.91
- <sup>32</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, memorandum dd 13.02.91
- <sup>33</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, note for the record dd 08.04.91 & letter dd 12.04.91.

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- <sup>34</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, fax dd 07.04.91.
- <sup>35</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, note for the record dd 12.04.91.
- <sup>36</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, note for the record dd 15.04.91.
- <sup>37</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, letter dd 14.12.90.
- <sup>38</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, letter dd 07.02.91.
- <sup>39</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, copy of WCUSA's application to the IDT, with a note estimating the date as January 1991.
- <sup>40</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, Minutes dd 11.02.91.
- <sup>41</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, letter dd 14.03.91.
- <sup>42</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, record of telephone conversation dd 2.04.91.
- <sup>43</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Pre-Policy Committee, copies of the Administrator's Correspondence dd 25.04.91– 02.05.91.
- <sup>44</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Correspondence dd 04.07.91.
- <sup>45</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 08.05.91.
- <sup>46</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 19.06.91.
- <sup>47</sup> Note: It is salutary to reflect that when the iSLP closed in March 2005 although 32 500 homes had been delivered, the number of homeless in the south-eastern metro had increased significantly.
- <sup>48</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 22.07.91.
- <sup>49</sup> Interview with *the Defender*, 24.3.10

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- <sup>50</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Agenda (+Annexure) & Minute dd 22.07.91.
- <sup>51</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Correspondence dd 07 & 09.08.91.
- <sup>52</sup> "Goldstone" Paras 3.1.24.
- <sup>53</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Notes dd 12-21.08.91.
- <sup>54</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 26.08.91.
- <sup>55</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 18.09.91.
- <sup>56</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 23.09.91.
- <sup>57</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's archives: Report on "Current CPA Projects" dd 09.08.93.
- <sup>58</sup> "Goldstone" du Toit evidence Para 46.
- <sup>59</sup> *ibid* Para 50
- <sup>60</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 03.02.92.
- <sup>61</sup> *ibid*
- <sup>62</sup> Interview with *the Community Planner*, 18.5.10
- <sup>63</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 01.06.92.
- <sup>64</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 17.08.92 – 15.05.93.
- <sup>65</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 17.08.92.
- <sup>66</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minute dd 24.08.92.
- <sup>67</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 26.11.92
- <sup>68</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 18.02.93
- <sup>69</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 11&12.03.93. It was

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later reported that WCUSA had not confirmed their endorsement of the minutes of this workshop with the CPA.

<sup>70</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 28.09.92 & 20.10.92.

<sup>71</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 22.03.93

<sup>72</sup> "Goldstone" du Toit evidence Para 48

<sup>73</sup> Goldstone Report (1993)

<sup>74</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 17.05.93, 14.06.93 & 27.06.93

<sup>75</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Memo dd 06.08.93

<sup>76</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 14.06.93.

<sup>77</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Correspondence dd 25.06.93.

<sup>78</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Correspondence dd 09.07.93.

<sup>79</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 12.07.93.

<sup>80</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 26.07.93.

<sup>81</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Correspondence & attachment dd 04.08.93.

<sup>82</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 1, Minutes dd 09.08.93.

<sup>83</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 13.09.93.

<sup>84</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 27.09.93.

<sup>85</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 11.10.93

<sup>86</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 15.11.93.

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- <sup>87</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Weltevreden Valley 1, Project proposal 28.10.94
- <sup>88</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Agenda & documents for mtg. dd  
11.04.94
- <sup>89</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 15.11.93.
- <sup>90</sup> Interview with *the Veteran*. 12.04.10
- <sup>91</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 24.01.94.
- <sup>92</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Report dd 01.02.94.
- <sup>93</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 14.02.94
- <sup>94</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Note 08.03.94.
- <sup>95</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 14.03.94
- <sup>96</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 22.03.94
- <sup>97</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 25.03.94
- <sup>98</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Report dd 23.03.94
- <sup>99</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 25.03.94
- <sup>100</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Notice of meeting dd 29.03.94
- <sup>101</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 31.03.94
- <sup>102</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Agenda & documents for mtg. dd  
11.04.94
- <sup>103</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 11.04.94
- <sup>104</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 05.05.94
- <sup>105</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 13.05.94

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- <sup>106</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 17.05.94, attached to Agenda for mtg. dd 13.06.94.
- <sup>107</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Weltevreden Valley 1, document dd 11.7.94.
- <sup>108</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 02.06.94, attached to Agenda for mtg. dd 13.06.94
- <sup>109</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 23.05.94
- <sup>110</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Annexure C to Agenda for mtg. dd 13.06.94
- <sup>111</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 13.06.94
- <sup>112</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letters dd 20,21&23.06.94
- <sup>113</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 30.06.94, Attachment pp 3.
- <sup>114</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Agenda for mtg. dd 23.06.94
- <sup>115</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 23.06.94
- <sup>116</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 30.06.94.
- <sup>117</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 03.07.94.
- <sup>118</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Reports in *Weekend Argus, Times on Sunday* and *Sunday Times* dd 16-17.07.94
- <sup>119</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 14.07.94
- <sup>120</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Letter dd 22.07.94.
- <sup>121</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Facsimile dd 25.07.94

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- <sup>122</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Facsimile dd 26.07.94.
- <sup>123</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Agenda for mtg dd 26.07.94.
- <sup>124</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Statement dd 26.07.94.
- <sup>125</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File:RDP 1, Memo dd 07.06.94
- <sup>126</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Minutes dd 09.08.94.
- <sup>127</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Letter dd 24.08.94.
- <sup>128</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Memo dd 17.02.95.
- <sup>129</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Letter dd 20.12.94.
- <sup>130</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Sunday Times dd 16.07.95 – and subsequent Annual circulars from the Provincial Department of Housing about changes in housing subsidy policy.
- <sup>131</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Statement dd 26.07.94.
- <sup>132</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Minutes dd 22.09.94.
- <sup>133</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Policy Committee 2, Minutes dd 05.09.94.
- <sup>134</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, Memo dd 14.11.94.
- <sup>135</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, handwritten minutes dd 16.11.94.
- <sup>136</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, letter dd 11.01.96.
- <sup>137</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, letter dd 22.01.96
- <sup>138</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, minutes dd 03.02.96.
- <sup>139</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: RDP 2, Weekly Mail & Guardian dd 29.09.95.
- <sup>140</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, minutes dd 17.02.96 & 02.03.96.

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<sup>141</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, minutes dd 09.03.96.

<sup>142</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Consultative Forum, minutes dd 23.03.96–19.10.96.

<sup>143</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 26.02.96.

<sup>144</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 25.03.96.

<sup>145</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 22.04.96.

<sup>146</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 26.08.96.

<sup>147</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 13.09.96.

<sup>148</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 18.11.96.

<sup>149</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 24.02.97.

<sup>150</sup> iSLP Project Coordinator's File: Steering Committee, minutes dd 17.11.97

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid*

## **ANNEXURE A**


### **MAPS OF THE INTEGRATED SERVICED LAND PROJECT (iSLP)**

#### **Contents**

Map of the iSLP projects published in November 1995

Map of the iSLP projects published in March 2000

# THE INTEGRATED SERVICED LAND PROJECT: NOVEMBER 1995



	Study area boundary
	Area boundaries
	Railway lines

## PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE ISLP ARE: (SHOWING NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS)

- UPGRADING INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS**
- Crossroads (1706)
  - Browns Farm (3011)
  - Millers Camp 3&4 (254)
  - Mpinga Square (38)
  - Black City (102)
  - Kanana (140)
  - Langa (729)
  - Boys Town (770)
  - KTC 2B2 & 3 (543)
  - Mpetha Square (981)
  - Mkhonto Square (200)
  - New Rest (450)
  - Polla Park (400)

- NEW PROJECTS**
- Southern Delft (12 596)
  - Philippi East (3 896)
  - Weltevreden Valley (3000)
  - Heinz Park 2 (526)

- SERVICED SITES AWAITING CONSOLIDATION**
- Driftsands (500)
  - Browns Farm (3 222)
  - Heinz Park (374)
  - Millers Camp (434)
  - Lower Crossroads (698)
  - Tambo Square (650)
  - KTC (1 277)

- PRIVATE DEVELOPMENTS**
- Victoria Mxenge
  - Klipfontein Glebe

- COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL**
- Philippi Regional Centre


- RESIDENTIAL UNITS**
- New Developments 24 764
  - Upgraded Areas 7 301

- FACILITIES PLANNED:**
- Primary school classrooms - 427
  - Secondary school classrooms - 276
  - Hospitals - 1 Community Hospital with 200 beds
  - Community Health Clinics - 2 to be upgraded, 4 to be built, one including a Maternity and Obstetrics Unit and an Ambulance Service.
  - Libraries - 4
  - Community halls - 35
  - Sportsfields - 35

- EMPLOYMENT CREATED DURING DEVELOPMENT SO FAR  
(PERSON DAYS)**
- KTC - 14 540
  - Guguletu - 2 184
  - Weltevreden Valley - 3 408
  - Tambo Square - 250
  - Browns Farm - 1335

- SKILLS TRAINING PROVIDED (PERSON DAYS)**
- KTC - 495
  - Guguletu - 1 845
  - Weltevreden Valley - 61
  - Tambo Square - 480
  - Browns Farm - 258

# THE INTEGRATED SERVICED LAND PROJECT: MARCH 2000



## ANNEXURE B

## TABLES

Table 1 Degrees of participation and their characteristics. [Ref: Page 38]

#	Type	Comment	Participants
1	Manipulation	Any 'participation' is only used to indoctrinate.	Government. Client community.
2	Information	Stakeholders are informed about their options, rights and responsibilities – but it is one-way communication with no channels for feedback or negotiation.	Government.. Client community.
3	Consultation	Two-way communication, with opportunity given to offer suggestions or express concerns, but with no assurance given that such responses will be used at all or as intended.	Government. Client community. Maybe other interested or affected parties.
4	Consensus-building	Stakeholders interact in order to understand each other and arrive at negotiated positions which the entire group can tolerate. However, vulnerable individuals or groups tend to remain silent or passively agree.	Government. Partner community.
5	Decision-making	Consensus is acted upon through collective decisions, marking the beginning of shared responsibilities for outcomes.	Government. Partner community. Maybe other involved parties.
6	Risk-sharing	This requires mutual accountability, so the mix of beneficial, harmful and natural consequences are shared – and not typically borne by the community.	Government. Partner community. Maybe other involved parties.
7	Partnership	This adds to Degrees 4-6 the element of mutual respect and a committed relationship.	Government. Partner community. Maybe other involved parties.
8	Self-management	This gives the community majority representation in decision-making processes and the community becomes the locus of power and responsibility.	Community as principal partner. Government. Maybe other involved parties.
9	Community control	The community takes sole responsibility for planning, policy-making and managing a programme, with help from others when requested.	Community as principal. Other parties on request of the community

Table 2. Demand and supply of residential sites: estimate by CPA in May 1991 [Ref: p. 94]

Locality	Demand (households)	Developable land (sites)	Shortage of sites
<b>Existing residential areas</b>			
Informal settlements	23 655	10 453	13 202
Hostels	16 509	923	15 586
Township backyard dwellers	15 861	0	15 861
<b>Unoccupied areas</b>			
Surrounding townships	0	2 854	-2 854
Browns Farm (Philippi West)	0	2 300	-2 300
Philippi East	0	7 800	-7 800
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>56 025</b>	<b>24 330</b>	<b>31 695</b>

**Table 3. Meetings of the Local Authority Grouping May 1991 – November 1992:  
Consistency of attendance at the 13 meetings by individuals within each group  
[Ref: p. 107]**

Group	Frequency of attendance by individuals				Total
	>75%	51-75%	26-50%	<26%	
Cape Provincial Admin.	2	4	0	5	11
Regional Services Council	0	1	2	1	4
City of Cape Town	0	0	1	3	4
Crossroads Town Council	1	2	1	4	8
Ikapa Town Council	0	1	2	1	4
Khayelitsha Council	0	1	1	3	5
Philippi Industrialists Ass.				2	2
Consultants / Facilitators	2	2	0	4	8
<b>Number of attendees</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>% of attendees</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 4. Meetings of the Local Authority Grouping May 1991 – November 1992:  
Attendance at the 13 meetings by each group, and the number of their representatives  
[Ref: p.107]**

Meeting No.	PARTICIPATING GROUP								Groups per meeting	Persons per meeting
	Provincial Government	Regional Services Council	City of Cape Town	Crossroads Town Council	Ikapa Town Council	Khayelitsha Town Council	Philippi Industrialist Association	Facilitator & Consultants		
1	6	2		4	3			1	5	16
2	4	1	1	5	2			1	6	14
3	5	2		4	3	2		5	6	21
4	6	1	1	5	1	2		3	7	19
5	4	2	2	4	1			4	6	17
6	5	2	1	4	2	2		4	7	20
7	6		1	4	2	2		4	6	19
8	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	4	8	19
9	6				1	2		3	4	12
10	3	1			1			4	4	9
11	3		2	3	1	2		3	6	13
12	5	2		4	2	2		3	6	20
13	2			2		2		4	4	10
<b>Meetings missed</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>Av:16</b>

**Table 5. Actions and counter-actions around Crossroads and the SLP: 1974-94**

[Ref: p. 144]

Yr	ACTION / COUNTER-ACTION	BY	MOTIVATION	OUTCOME
1974-78	Crossroads: rapid occupation	Homeless	Desperation	Tacit permission
	Passivity	Govt.	Convenience	
1977	Planned demolition of Crossroads	Govt.	Control	Judicial order pro Cross-roads
	Application for court order against demolitions	Women residents supported by NGOs	Defence against government	
1979-83	Alternative project: New Crossroads	Minister Koornhof	Generate goodwill	Project stopped after Phase 1
	Grand Alternative: Khayelitsha	President PW Botha	Segregation	
1983	Proposed removal to Khayelitsha	Government	Formalisation	Chaos, displacement
	Faction fighting	Warlords	Control	
1983	Creation of Tricameral Parliament	Government	Pseudo democracy	Real grass-roots opposition
	Creation of UDF	Community orgs.	Democratisation	
1985	Proposed In situ upgrade of Crossroads	Urban Foundation	Improve quality of life	Urban Foundation withdrew
	Proposal rejected	Police, warlords	Control	
1985	Creation of Crossroads UDF branch	Liberation movement	Democratisation	Puppet councillors
	Creation of Black Local Authorities	Government	Pseudo democracy	
1985	Violent Democratisation	Civics	Anti traditional leaders and National Party	Chaos
	Violent authoritarian-ism	Warlords, supported by government	Control	
1988	Dismantling of Bantu Administration Boards	Central Government	Inability to control urbanisation and Black Affairs	Divided administration
	Resistance to administering black people	Provincial officials	Racism; no experience	
1990	Development of Old Crossroads	Government	Formalisation	Cross-roads a no man's land
	Disruption	Warlords	Competing for territory	
1990	Unbanning of ANC etc.	State President	Peace and growth	Highly contested transfer of power
	Rejection and undermining of change	Privileged of all races	Fear of loss and of retribution	

Yr	ACTION / COUNTER-ACTION	BY	MOTIVATION	OUTCOME
1990	Invite facilitator to advise on development process for Crossroads	New provincial senior mgmt.	Innovation and democratic development	Competing tactics for Cross-roads from the very start
	Promote a warlord-based alternative	'Old order' officials and consultants	Loss of control of development process	
1990	Collaboration proposals	Facilitator	Inclusive, consultative	Support for collaboration by <i>the Sponsor</i>
	Demand for exclusive rights to land and contracts	Private sector / warlord compact	Control by conservative groups	
1991	Canvass all stakeholders to participate in collaboration	Facilitator	Mandated by <i>the Sponsor</i>	<i>The Sponsor</i> launches the collaborative project
	Agreed to participate in collaboration	Warlords	To be informed and to build alliances	
1992	Centralised communication with all communities	Facilitator & communication consultant	Uniform message, delivery and process	WCUSA walked out and stayed away for a year
	Demand that warlords control all communication to informal settlements	Warlords (WCUSA)	Control and patronage	
1993	SLP Principles tabled	Facilitator	Foundation for the project	SLP Principals agreed by Administrator
	Ambivalent response	WCUSA	Pursuing opposing agenda	
1993	Refusal to allow Crossroads leaders to re-settle residents	Provincial officials	Re-settlement area and programme not yet ready	Chaos in Cross-roads again.
	Phase 3 of Crossroads torched	Crossroads warlords	Secure control of development	
1993-94	Multiple manoeuvres to obtain control of the SLP	'Community orgs and private sector consortium	Gain control of expected resources before national settlement	Project moves ahead intermittently
	SLP Residents Development Committees created and start to development	Grassroots communities, govt. and SLP Coordinator	Demonstrate delivery, gain momentum and expose un-representative organisations	
1994	'Community organisations' Exposed	Grassroots communities	Communities had not mandated 'Community organisations'	End of Policy Committee and approval of iSLP Business Plan
	New national government briefed on SLP	Members of SLP Policy Committee and Provincial government	Pecuniary interests of opposing parties exposed	

Yr	ACTION / COUNTER-ACTION	BY	MOTIVATION	OUTCOME
1994	Dismantling of Tricameral administrations	Central Govt	Racist, undemocratic	Stress in Govt. and early retirements
	Resentment of change and influx of personnel	Conservative white officials	Loss of influence and prospects	

**Table 6. Meetings of the Policy Committee (Extra-parliamentary Grouping) May 1991 – July 1994: consistency of attendance at the 36 meetings by individuals within each group [Ref: p 144]**

Group	Frequency of attendance by individuals				Total
	>75%	51-75%	26-50%	<26%	
Chairperson	1				1
Provincial Government	1	1	3	10	15
Regional Svcs Council	1	2		1	4
City of Cape Town			4	6	10
ANC			1		1
PAC				3	3
WCUSA			2	7	9
Civics etc.	2	2	2	14	20
Black Local Authorities			1	4	5
Philippi Industrialists				4	4
Facilitator / Coordinator	1			3	4
Consultants		2		5	7
<b>Number of attendees</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>% of attendees</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>69%</b>	

**Table 7. Meetings of the Policy Committee (Extra-parliamentary Grouping) May 1991 – July 1994: attendance at the 36 meetings by each group, and the number of their representatives [Ref: p 145]**

Group (12)	Attendance at 36 meetings		Representatives present per mtg.	
	Present	Absent	Range	Average
Chairperson	32	4	0-1	0.9
Provincial Government	36	0	2-6	3,7
Regional Svcs Council	35	1	0-4	2.0
City of Cape Town	30	6	0-6	1.7
ANC	14	22	0-1	0.4
PAC	6	30	0-2	0.2
WCUSA	21	15	0-8	1.5
Civics etc.	34	2	0-14	4.7
Black Local Authorities	4	32	0-3	0.5
Philippi Industrialists	10	26	0-2	0.4
Facilitator / Coordinator	34	2	0-3	1.1
Consultants	22	14	0-4	1.4
<b>Range Meetings / Group</b>	<b>6-36</b>			
<b>Average Meetings / Group</b>	<b>23</b>			
<b>Range Groups / meeting</b>	<b>6-11</b>	<b>Reps/ Mtg:</b>	<b>12-41</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Average Groups / meeting</b>	<b>8</b>			

**Table 8. Institutional arrangements during the iSLP [Ref: p. 154]**

PHASE	POLICY - MAKING	IMPLEMENTATION
	May91–Aug93	Aug93–Mar05
<b>POLICY STRUCTURES</b>		
Extra–Parliamentary Policy Committee	May 91 – Jul 94	
Local Authorities Policy Group	May 91 – Nov 92	
Steering Committee		Feb 96 - Nov 97
City of Cape Town Steering Committee		Sept 99 - Sept 00
<b>COMMUNITY STRUCTURES</b>		
Consultative Forum		Feb 96 - Feb 97
Residents Development Committees		Feb 94 - Jul 95
RDP Forums		Aug 95 - Mar 05
<b>COORDINATION STRUCTURES</b>		
Technical Committee	May 91 - Nov 92	
Coordinating Committee		Sept 94 - N ov 04
<b>MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES</b>		
CPA Project Mgmt Committee		Aug 93 - Sep 94
Provincial Departmental Coordinating Committee		Sept 94 – Jul 96
Housing Team Leaders Meeting		Feb 95 - Mar 05
Project Committees		May 94 - Mar 05

**Table 9. Numbers of residents of informal settlements and townships who were accommodated in iSLP projects [Ref: p 158]**

AREAS	PROJECTS									
	WV	DS	DL	XR	PE	HP	BF	KTC	MC	TOT
<b>INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS</b>										
BARCELONA / EUROPE		500								500
BLACK CITY	200	300	76							576
BROWNS FARM	200				1048		3060			4308
CROSSROADS				2109	454					2563
GXA-GXA	100									100
HEINZ PARK						634				634
KANANA	200									200
KTC	600	214	661		75			692		2242
JOE SLOVO		200	1307		454					1961
LOWER C'ROADS CAMP					809					809
LOWER C'ROADS LODGERS					893					893
MAHOBE DRIVE	200	10								210
MARCUS GARVEY					100					100
MILLERS CAMP	100	300	336						104	840
MKHONTO SQUARE	100	160	210							470
MPETHA SQUARE	100	400								500
MPINGA SQUARE		280								280
NEW REST	200									1350
PHOLLA PARK	100	486	327							913
SAMORA MACHEL	1847									1847
TAMBO SQUARE			66							66
KALANYONI		60								60
VIETNAM					1283					1283
<b>Total</b>	<b>3947</b>	<b>2910</b>	<b>2983</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>5116</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>3060</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>21555</b>
<b>TOWNSHIPS</b>										
GUBULETY BACKYARDS			218		150					368
LANGA BACKYARDS	120		109							229
NEW C'ROADS BACKYARDS	25				102					127
NYANGA BACKYARDS	80		214		133					427
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>		<b>541</b>		<b>385</b>					<b>1151</b>
<b>Municipal Waiting List - Delft</b>		<b>3277</b>	<b>3802</b>							<b>7079</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4172</b>	<b>6187</b>	<b>7326</b>	<b>2109</b>	<b>5501</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>3060</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>29785</b>

**KEY TO PROJECTS**

WV Weltevreden Valley

DL Delft Leyden

PE Philippi East

BF Browns Farm

KTC KTC

DS Delft South

XR Crossroads

HP Heinz Park

MC Millers Camp

**Table 10. Meetings of the Consultative Forum Feb 1996 – March 1998: attendance by individuals at 12 regular meetings. [Ref: p 159].**

Group	Frequency of attendance by individuals				Total
	>75%	51-75%	26-50%	<26%	
<b>Councillors</b>			4	5	9
<b>Community</b>					
Crossroads		2		6	8
Samora Machel			2	5	7
Nyanga		1	1	5	7
KTC			2	2	4
Lusaka			2	8	10
Lower Crossroads	1	2	1	4	8
Guguletu		3	1	4	8
New Crossroads		3	1	2	6
Langa		3	1	2	6
Delft		1	1	5	7
Philippi		2	2	3	7
Marcus Garvey				2	2
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>89</b>
<i>% of attend.</i>	<i>1%</i>	<i>19%</i>	<i>20%</i>	<i>60%</i>	<i>100%</i>
Nat. Officials				3	3
Provincial officials			1	6	7
Municipal officials			1	7	8
iSLP Coordinator		2	3	5	10
<b>Sub-Total</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28</b>
<i>% of attend.</i>		<i>7%</i>	<i>18%</i>	<i>75%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>117</b>
<i>% of attend.</i>	<i>1%</i>	<i>16%</i>	<i>20%</i>	<i>63%</i>	<i>100%</i>

**Table 11. Meetings of the iSLP Consultative Forum Feb 1996 – March 1998: attendance at the 12 meetings by each group, and the number of their representatives [Ref: p 159]**

Group (17)	Attendance at 12 meetings		Representatives present per meeting	
	Present	Absent	Range	Average
<b>Councillors</b>	7	5	0-6	2.2
Crossroads	10	2	0-6	2.6
Samora Machel	7	5	0-4	1.6
Nyanga	8	4	0-4	1.5
KTC	10	2	0-3	1.3
Lusaka	9	3	0-4	1.7
Lower Crossroads	11	1	0-6	3.3
Guguletu	12	0	2-4	3.0
New Crossroads	11	1	0-4	2.5
Langa	9	3	0-4	1.9
Delft	10	2	0-4	2.1
Philippi	12	0	1-4	2.5
Marcus Garvey	1	11	0-2	0.2
Nat. officials	2	10	0-2	0.3
Provincial officials	11	1	0-3	1.3
Municipal officials	10	2	0-4	1.4
iSLP Coordinator	10	2	0-5	2.9
<b>Range Meetings/Group</b>	<b>1-12</b>			
<b>Average Meetings/Group</b>	<b>8.8</b>			
<b>Additional analysis from detailed data:</b>				
<b>Range Groups/meeting</b>	<b>8-16</b>	<b>Reps/ Meeting:</b>	<b>13-54</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Average Groups/meeting</b>	<b>12</b>			

**Table 12. Meetings of the iSLP Steering Committee February 1996 – November 1997: attendance by individuals at the 8 meetings. [Ref: p 162]**

Group	Frequency of attendance by individuals				Total
	>75%	51-75%	26-50%	<26%	
Chair (CPA)		1		1	2
Other Ministers					0
<b>Councillors representing:</b>					
Cape Metro			1	4	5
Ikapa Town				2	2
Crossroads					0
Melton Rose				1	1
Tygerberg			1	2	3
Central (Cape Town)			1	1	2
Consultative Forum		1	3	3	7
Officials	1			7	8
iSLP Coordinator	1			1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>32</b>
<i>% of attendees</i>	<i>6%</i>	<i>6%</i>	<i>19%</i>	<i>69%</i>	<i>100%</i>

**Table 13. iSLP housing project activity timetable : periods in which negotiation, planning, provision of infrastructure and building of housing took place. [Ref: p 171]**

	Project	Units	Negotiate	Plan	Infrastructure	Housing
1	Weltevreden Valley 1 & 2	2205	1994	1994	1995	1996-98
2	Weltevreden Valley 3 & 4	1347		1996-97	1998	1999-01
3	Weltevreden Valley high dens.	620		1999	2000	2001-02
4	Delft South 1 & 2	2000		1994	1995	1996-97
5	Delft South 3-6	3747	1994	1995-96	1997-98	1999-00
6	Delft South high density	440		2000-01	2002	2003
7	Delft Central 'Leyden'	6317	1999	2000	2001	2002-03
8	Philippi East 2-4	3696	1994-95	1996	1997-98	1999-02
9	Philippi East 'K'	850	1994-95	1996	1997-99	2000-02
10	Philippi East high density	958		1998-99		2000
11	Crossroads 4	604	1994	1995	1996-97	1998-99
12	Crossroads 3	1505	1994-95	1996-97	1998-99	2000-02
13	Crossroads 5 (Boystown)	0	1994-96 1998-04	1997		
14	KTC 2b1	383	1994-95	1996	1997-98	2002-04
15	KTC 2b2	304	1997-98	1999	2000	2002-04
16	Heinz Park 2 & 3	634	1994-96	1997	1998-99	2000-02
17	Browns Farm 3-5	3060	1994-95	1996-98	1999-00	2001-02
18	Millers Camp (Lusaka)	104	1994	1995	1996-97	
19	New Rest	1150	1994-99	2000-01	2002-04	
20	Victoria Mxenge	148	1994	1994	1995-96	1997-02
	<b>Total</b>	<b>30072</b>				

**Notes to Table 13**

	Project	Notes
1	Weltevreden Valley 1 and 2	Fast start, but rapid housing construction blocked by City
2	Weltevreden Valley 3 and 4	Process slowed by Samora Machel influx and City housing policy
3	Weltevreden Valley high density	Creative design, progressed well
4	Delft South 1 & 2	Community participation impractical; house choices reduced
5	Delft South 3 – 6	Huge delays because of protests and house invasions
6	Delft South high density	Small precincts, progressed well
7	Delft "Leyden"	Highly efficient turnkey contract with local subcontractors
8	Philippi East 2 – 4	Delayed start because of local politics and gate-keeping by Lower Crossroads; and then frustrated by City's housing policy
9	Philippi East "K"	Complicated by negotiations with Rastafarians and City housing policy
10	Phil East high density	Design was constricted by being confined to original transit camp site
11	Crossroads 4	Process obstructed by conflict
12	Crossroads 3	Process obstructed by conflict
13	Crossroads 5: Boystown	Conflict and changing demands resulted in project being aborted
14	KTC 2b1	Delays in reforming local government and in renegotiating house funding
15	KTC 2b2	Delays in reforming local government and in renegotiating house funding
16	Heinz Park 2 & 3	Difficulties in establishing effective community participation
17	Browns Farm 3 - 5	Very contested territory and land densely squatted upon
18	Millers Camp / Lusaka 4	Disagreements within community delayed a tiny project
19	New Rest	Political interference delayed this project so was not completed by iSLP
20	Victoria Mxenge (CBO)	This project was completely built by a community-based organisation, with access to the iSLP budget
<b>Tot</b>	30 072 was the target number of sites. It includes sites in New Rest that were not completed by the iSLP and excludes houses that were built by the iSLP on previously serviced sites. Actually built totals were 29 217 serviced sites and 32 484 houses.	

**Table 14. Cumulative number of Physical Resources provided in the iSLP [As at March of each year.] [Ref: p 171]**

<b>Completed by</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Serviced sites	9 200	16 300	20 457	29 200	29 217
Houses	4 300	15 900	23 000	32 000	32 484
Classrooms	443	506	630	725	788
Clinics	2	9	13	16	16
Halls	1	8	11	11	11
Sports fields		4	5	6	8
Swimming pool			1	1	1
Libraries		3	3	4	4
ECD centres				5	6
Spent Rmillion	R365	R658	R864	R1 105	R1 158

**Table 15 iSLP time chart [Ref: p 183]**

<b>National and Local events</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>Events in the iSLP</b>
Nelson Mandela released from prison. Political parties unbanned	1990	Provincial government explores whether there is broad interest in an inclusive approach to housing.
Tricameral system of government. CODESA committed to parliamentary democracy in a unitary state.	1991	iSLP Policy Committee established of equal parties. Served by iSLP Technical Committee
National negotiations collapse. Much violence. Administrators appointed to manage local authorities in black areas	1992	Demand and supply researched. Project objectives and parameters negotiated.
National negotiations succeed. In informal settlements civic organisations challenge warlords.	1993	iSLP objectives, Principles and parameters defined. Implementation of housing process begins.
First national election. Government of National Unity. Tricameral system disbanded.	1994	Attempted hijack of the project foiled. iSLP re-defined as an integrated project, selected as a Presidential RDP project.
Transitional Local Councils established with appointed members.	1995	RDP funding starts to flow to the iSLP. Planning for all projects and programmes underway.
First local authority elections. Many long-standing civil servants take early retirement.	1996	First serviced sites are completed. House building begins.
Responsibility for housing delivery devolved from provincial to local government, but disputed as an unfunded mandate.	1997	Delivery of school facilities begins. Housing delivery accelerates.
Western Cape Provincial Government dismantles its dedicated iSLP directorate. City fails to take over iSLP.	1998	Capacity building programmes begin. Construction of other facilities begins.
National election increases ANC majority but creates NP/DP coalition in the Western Cape.	1999	Accelerating delivery across a broad front. Research into early childhood needs begins.
Unicity elections won by DA (NP/DP). Endless re-structuring of Cape Town organisation continues.	2000	First medium density double-storey housing delivered. Early childhood development strategy agreed upon.
NP leaves DA to partner ANC in national and provincial government. Increase in hi-jacking and violence within iSLP project area.	2001	ECD consortium appointed. Intensive delivery, including 50 capacity building programmes.
Major changes in national housing policy paralyse housing delivery. NP/ANC hold city.	2002	First "turnkey" housing project begins. First in-situ informal settlement upgrade begins.
Cape Town has executive mayor. Decision-making centralised and slowed.	2003	Delft Leyden turnkey project successfully completed at high speed.
Provincial election won by ANC. NP disbands. N2 Gateway project includes undeveloped portions of iSLP.	2004	Most projects and programmes completed. Outstanding housing projects transferred to "N2 Gateway"
	2005	iSLP ends on 31 March.

**Table 16. The circumstances within cross-sector collaborations and the work they require [Ref: p 192]** Note: within the references (“REF”) column, ‘B...’ refers to one of Bryson *et al*’s numbered propositions and ‘A...’ refers to one of the ten Articles of Ansell and Gash’s Contingency Theory.

#	REF	CIRCUMSTANCES	WORK REQUIRED
<b>PRESENTING PROBLEMS</b>			
1	B1	Turbulence – crises, volatility, violence.	Minimise violence and loss
2	B2	Sector failure – incapacity, incompetence, communication failure, inadequate resources, lack of political will.	Acknowledgement of failure and of inability by each stakeholder to correct it.
<b>INITIATION STAGE</b>			
3	B	No common agreement on ‘the problem’ or a ‘solution’.	Canvass stakeholders to establish a simple shared objective.
4	A1	Power imbalances.	Design and implement strategy to empower and ensure the representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders
5	A1	Resource imbalances.	Identify ways to share control over resources to be used in the collaboration.
6	A4 A7	Distrust.	Positive steps are taken to increase levels of trust and social capital between stakeholders.
7	B1	Anti-collaboration constraining forces.	Identify and understand these contrary forces and their origins/motivation so that they can be addressed effectively.
8	B1	Pro-collaboration driving forces.	Identify these and how they can be augmented and improved.
9	A4	Prehistory of conflict between parties and/or individuals.	Promote a high degree of interdependence.
10	B3	Prehistory of synergy or empathy between parties and/or individuals.	Identify existing linkages, powerful potential sponsors, areas of agreement – and utilise them constructively, formally or informally, visibly or not.
11	A2	Availability of alternatives to collaboration.	Stakeholders must acknowledge their interdependence, making collaboration the only possible option.
12	B A5 A6	There is need of a Convenor (at least initially) and a Leader and/or Facilitator (on a sustained basis).	These indispensable roles require at least a sponsor/patron, a leader/chair who might be a leading participant or an honest broker, and possibly a facilitator. A large project will require tiers of leaders/chairs and facilitators.
<b>INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS</b>			
13	A A8	Membership : without inclusive participation the endeavour will be vulnerable to attack by those excluded.	All stakeholders must be invited to join the collaboration, without exception – and encouraged to stay in to maximise ownership.
14	A3	Unless an exclusive forum is created and protected disaffected parties will use alternatives.	Attempts to create or join alternative initiatives must be discouraged and thwarted. Sponsors must persuade possible alternative forums to prefer and respect the collaboration.
15	A	The need for clear ground rules.	Design and agree a simple, unambiguous, uncontroversial set of rules for starting off.

#	REF	CIRCUMSTANCES	WORK REQUIRED
16	A	A lack of transparency, candour or disclosure between parties.	Ensure that everything about the collaboration is visible and well-documented; and actively promote transparency by the parties of their own agendas, structures, strengths and weaknesses.
17	B14	Lack of formal or informal structures for engagement.	Formal structures must follow an entire logic and cater for protocols; but there must be informal (possibly illegible) mechanisms that monitor, anticipate, protect and correct.
18	B11	Confusion about how to configure a hybrid organisational structure.	Structure must be tailor-made to suit participating and environmental systems and the strategic purpose.
19	B	Confusion about how such a structure should interface with or accommodate governance requirements.	Systems to comply with governance requirements must be incorporated in the linkages and protocols between the collaboration and participating organisations.
20	B12	Structural inflexibility restricts the accommodation of changes in membership and environment over time.	There must be a facility to adapt the structure and process from time to time to accommodate changing circumstances without abrogating the project principles and objectives.
21	B13	Collaborations organised from the top down do not guarantee delivery to the grassroots.	The structure must be designed to work from the bottom up.
<b>THE PARTICIPATIVE PROCESS</b>			
22	B4	Without comprehensive initial agreements a collaboration has no foundation.	Agreements must be compiled from first principles with full consultation and then iteratively discussed and approved by all parties.
23	B5	The need for formal and informal leadership and facilitation.	Recognise, activate and nurture the functions and strategies of sponsors, champions and other enablers, formally and informally, in key positions, forums, processes and sectors.
24	B6	The need to widely legitimise collaboration as a form of organising, as a separate entity, and as a source of trusted interaction among parties.	Promote and extol by all means the virtues and fruits of collaboration – as a concept and as a practical and fruitful instrument.
25	B7 A7 B17	Competing institutional logics combined with lack of trust may render the collaborative process impossible.	Allocate sustained time, money and expertise to nurture cross-sector, cross-institutional and cross-cultural understanding and trust-building.
26	B8 B16	Power inequalities, conflicts and shocks should be regarded as a constant threat.	Use resources and tactics to equalise power and manage conflicts.
27	B9	Deliberate planning (follows a development logic) and emergent planning (exploring needs and opportunities incrementally) are opposing philosophies that could be insisted upon by different parties.	Participative planning requires training, organisation and management, for deliberate and emergent modes used in combination.
28	B15 A10	System-level planning activities require time-consuming negotiation which can frustrate a collaboration.	Collaborations for service delivery and administrative improvements may provide quicker results. Early wins must be prioritised and programmed in the midst of participative processes that will require lengthy negotiations and approvals.

#	REF	CIRCUMSTANCES	WORK REQUIRED
29	B10	Professionals tend to regard planning as their domain and exclude other stakeholders from the process.	Participative planning must be fully collaborative, not simply consultative, and respond to stakeholders' needs, priorities and desire to participate, share and learn.
<b>OUTCOMES and ACCOUNTABILITY</b>			
30	B18	The danger of weak parties failing to achieve delivery to their constituencies.	Optimise the creation of public value by building on each participant's interests and strengths and by minimising or compensating for their weaknesses.
31	B19	The propensity for a collaboration to become an expensive 'white elephant'.	Optimise the public value of a collaboration by fulfilling its mandate, inspiring the creation of parallel initiatives, and spawning replications at scale elsewhere – by deliberately and creatively interpreting and communicating the value and lessons learnt to carefully identified audiences through selected actors and media.
32	B20	The danger of losing focus and relevance over time.	The processes and outcomes must be accurately monitored, evaluated, reported upon and reviewed on a regular basis in order for the collaboration to stay necessary and relevant.
33	B21	The danger of any sense or practice of accountability diminishing over time because of changes in politics, policies or personnel.	Facilitate the achievement of success with an accountability system that tracks inputs, processes and outcomes; uses a variety of processes for gathering, processing and using data; and uses a results management system that is built on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies.
34	B22	"The normal expectation ought to be that success will be very difficult to achieve in cross-sector collaborations."	Welcome the difficulties, learn from the failures and celebrate the successes. Be willing and able to accommodate and manage failure if it is unavoidable, and limit the fallout.

**Table 17. Appropriate attitudes, values and principles for a cross-sector collaborative project [Ref: p 196]**

<b>Issue : PROJECT DEADLOCK</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	If we can't do it our way maybe other interested parties have different approaches and possibilities.
<b>Values</b>	There is more than one way to do anything. It is worth exploring various possible development strategies.
<b>Principles</b>	Every effort must be made to identify and establish a workable strategy that will fulfil the objectives.
<b>Issue : RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELIVERY.</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Perhaps other parties can share responsibility for ensuring a good outcome.
<b>Values</b>	Responsibility can be shared between diverse stakeholders.
<b>Principles</b>	Share involvement and responsibility with parties which share the objective.
<b>Issue : THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY.</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	We could involve others in exercising that authority without abdicating our responsibility.
<b>Values</b>	The responsible exercise of authority includes consultation with stakeholders with mandates or relevant expertise.
<b>Principles</b>	Stakeholders hold various kinds of authority and must consult with each other before making decisions which affect each other.
<b>Issue : ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Different parties will account to different constituencies for outcomes of the same project process.
<b>Values</b>	Each party's accountability should be recognised, respected and encouraged.
<b>Principles</b>	All parties must consult with and account to their constituencies.
<b>Issue : LIMITED RESOURCES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Resource limitations within an unsuccessful development paradigm may disappear if a more promising paradigm is created.
<b>Values</b>	The involvement of other parties may provide or leverage access to resources that are not hitherto available.
<b>Principles</b>	A holistic, inclusive approach to development adds security to resource providers.
<b>Issue : CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Different kinds of contributions can be made by different kinds of stakeholders.
<b>Values</b>	Every interested party should be able to demonstrate how it can add value to the process.
<b>Principles</b>	Each party to a collaboration must declare the nature of its interest and of its proposed contribution to the process.
<b>Issue : OPPOSITION</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Opponents are often created by exclusion and discrimination. Inclusion and respect can create valuable associations.
<b>Values</b>	It is wiser to engage an opponent within a consultative process than further alienate the party by exclusion.
<b>Principles</b>	Participation of stakeholders within a collaborative process must be always inclusive, even if parties exclude themselves.

<b>Issue : ALIENATION</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Alienated parties can always be reached through intermediaries
<b>Values</b>	A collaboration should include all stakeholders.
<b>Principles</b>	Every effort must be taken to make every stakeholder welcome and appreciated.
<b>Issue : DISTRUST</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Distrust may be the product of a paradigm more than a characteristic of the people or parties. If the paradigm is changed trust can be built.
<b>Values</b>	Distrust should be recognised as a natural product of exclusionary development practices.
<b>Principles</b>	The gradual reduction of distrust between parties will be a bi-product and indicator of success in collaboration.
<b>Issue : CULTURAL DIFFERENCES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Different cultures should be respected, not ranked, and cultures working together can enhance both.
<b>Values</b>	Respect for the different cultures represented in a collaboration, and determination to optimise the combination of benefits that they offer.
<b>Principles</b>	Differences in culture among participants is appreciated and must enhance the project.
<b>Issue : LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Project development processes can use multiple languages in parallel.
<b>Values</b>	It is useful to have a standard language for project documents but by using interpreters any language can be used in discussions.
<b>Principles</b>	Participants may use their home language in discussion. Project documents will be in ..... language.
<b>Issue : DIFFERENCES IN VALUES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Project beneficiaries will only appreciate that which they value, which values must therefore be understood by other parties.
<b>Values</b>	We desire all participants to add value and all project beneficiaries to receive what they perceive as value.
<b>Principles</b>	Care must be taken to ensure that all beneficiaries of the project perceive real value in what they receive.
<b>Issue : PRIORITIES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Understanding and combining each other's priorities consolidates a relationship.
<b>Values</b>	Priorities are subjective and project priorities must represent the consensus of all stakeholders.
<b>Principles</b>	Project priorities must be a synthesis of those proposed by all stakeholders.
<b>Issue : COLLABORATION</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Collaboration is a multi-party, multi-process initiative - not unilateral alliance building or mediation or conflict resolution.
<b>Values</b>	Collaboration involves all participants in the building and application of directed working relationships.
<b>Principles</b>	Collaboration must be driven and sustained by the co-responsibility of participants.

<b>Issue : COLLABORATION SKILLS and EFFORT</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Any existing inter-party relationships can be built upon; and augmented by using independent facilitators.
<b>Values</b>	Building trust, integrity and resilient personal inter-relationships make for an effective collaboration.
<b>Principles</b>	Attention must be given to building trust, integrity and personal relationships between parties in a collaboration.
<b>Issue : THE NATURE OF ACTORS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	Public, private and social sectors have different strengths and ways of operating. By agreeing and focusing on one shared objective the most useful of these can be combined.
<b>Values</b>	Different sectors should use collaborations as an opportunity to learn helpful perspectives, skills and techniques from each other.
<b>Principles</b>	The involvement of different sectors enriches a collaborative process and its individual participants.
<b>Issue : THE INTEGRITY OF EACH PARTY</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	A collaboration is not an amalgamation of parties, but a project-specific association of independent parties.
<b>Values</b>	No party in a collaboration is expected to sacrifice its identity or integrity by participating.
<b>Principles</b>	Participating parties preserve their own identity and integrity whilst collaborating.
<b>Issue : PROJECT OBJECTIVES</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	A problem or project has many facets, and many interested and affected parties each with their own perspective and hopes. Our own objectives are unlikely to be as generally beneficial as they could be.
<b>Values</b>	We respect and value the interests of all stakeholders in formulating project objectives.
<b>Principles</b>	The objectives of the project shall reflect the best interests of all stakeholders, and particularly the project's clients.
<b>Issue : PROJECT'S CLIENTS</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	These are the people and parties who will use, manage, maintain and pay for the project deliverables over their life span.
<b>Values</b>	The project's clients are all those who will have a direct involvement in the use of the deliverables.
<b>Principles</b>	All parties who will have a direct involvement in the use of the project's deliverables shall be regarded as the project's clients.
<b>Issue : PROJECT DESIGN</b>	
<b>Appropriate attitude</b>	The design process is not just a technical or professional function but can creatively involve persons from all client groups.
<b>Values</b>	Project design is the responsibility of all the parties involved in a project and is not the exclusive domain of technical experts.
<b>Principles</b>	The project design shall involve and respond to the needs and best interests of the project clients.

## ANNEXURE C

### SOME LESSONS LEARNED BY ENABLERS OF THE iSLP

The experience of managing and enabling the iSLP provided many lessons for the benefit of future policy-makers and practitioners. Amongst these lessons are a number that are particularly for Enablers. Fifteen of these are listed below, each with a note as to whether they are likely to be helpful for general application in enabling a collaboration or more particularly for enabling a cross-sector collaboration.

***Lesson 1 Some first steps towards understanding a chronic social crisis [General application]***

First identify the presenting problems – but don't try to solve them, because they are superficial. Then consider what the underlying problems might be – but don't try to solve them either because they probably are only symptoms. Thereafter dig deeper to find the real foundational problems – such as attitudes and policies.

Begin thinking of some principles that might create a better foundation.

*Example:*

In the iSLP *the Democrat* had a very different perspective on the problem from the officials who simply wanted to put infrastructure into Crossroads. And his perspective was quite superficial compared to that of the many communities who had become victims of the endless violence. *The Wrestler, the Defender* and *the Community Planner* also had deeply-etched perspectives drawn from their considerable experience in the field.

***Lesson 2 Be prepared to redefine the Project crisis [General application]***

A common mistake is to presume that the project has already been correctly defined, and that all that is required is to accomplish it in a slightly different way, or with a somewhat different group of participants. Stakeholders may have different views about what is required, and those who claim to have most experience may be lacking perspective. Be sure to review the definition of the project.

*Example:*

The ambit of the project in the case study began as 'Crossroads', then was expanded under

the influence of *the Provincial Planner* to ‘Crossroads and Environs’, then depoliticised on the advice of the Communications Consultant to “Serviced Land Project”, then it shed its hostel upgrading component which became a separate project, and finally it was greatly enlarged into the “Integrated Serviced Land Project”.

***Lesson 3 Creative participation crisis [General application]***

‘Inclusive and equal participation’ usually requires the involvement of all stakeholders or role-players on an equal basis around the same table. That is a challenge for any party that has been acting in a superior manner because of its power and/or resources. It can be no less challenging for any party that has historically been dominated, oppressed or patronised by others. Creative thinking may be required to ensure that everyone can be fully and effectively involved. So if some of the parties cannot tolerate each other, let them work in separate groups together with those parties that are accepted by all – until relationships or circumstances have undergone the necessary changes.

*Example:*

*The Sponsor* and *the Strategist* demonstrated considerable courage and faith in the process when they accepted that the Provincial Government would have as much say as any other party in the Policy Committee – especially as some of the participating parties had very questionable mandates and motives. But it made the collaboration possible, and shared the responsibility equally for everything that happened. *The Provincial Planner* and his engineering counterparts also made a bold step in allowing community leaders to interview a panel of consultants and recommend appointments – which the government then confirmed. In a stroke a strong relationship was established between all the parties involved in the planning of a project.

***Lesson 4 Anticipate and accommodate constant and unpredictable change [Particularly applicable in a cross-sector collaboration]***

Experience has shown that cross-sector collaboration is only chosen in times of turbulence and only as a last resort (see Chapter 3). Turbulence implies complex changes in direction and thrust of powerful forces and therefore it should be anticipated that the project will have to be steered and driven through a constantly changing environment. For the objectives to be reached the project leadership must be focused, determined and extremely adaptable.

*Example:*

When WCUSA walked out of the Policy Committee the collaborative process did not falter, while *the Strategist* and his management team did their best to negotiate their return. When WCUSA did return it was with a renewed takeover bid, but again the Policy Committee steadily continued, simply dealing with each issue as it arose.

***Lesson 5 In a turbulent social environment do not take claims of stakeholders' 'mandates' too seriously [Particularly applicable in a cross-sector collaboration]***

It can be tempting to recognise stakeholders' claims to hold mandates on behalf of others, especially if they relate to large or diverse groups. Mandates are often contrived and are very difficult to satisfactorily verify. Rather avoid giving exclusive recognition to monopolies and cartels by working with as many stakeholder organisations as possible, which will compete with and correct each other.

*Example:*

The Enablers in the iSLP were well aware that organisations in the Policy Committee were not actually mandated – there was no evidence that many of the participants represented anybody but themselves. But the Enablers did not demand accountability, because it would have broken the collaboration and there were no replacement organisations at that stage. When grassroots organisations built up strength they were able to challenge the charlatans on their own. There was also the factor that until 1994 none of the government institutions in South Africa could claim to have a proper mandate either as black people were disenfranchised.

***Lesson 6 Tolerate shows of force, demonstrations, protests and outbursts [Particularly applicable in a cross-sector collaboration]***

Protests and exhibitions, whether they are friendly or aggressive, are an indispensable part of encounters, and are therefore to be expected in collaborations, at least in the early stages when parties need to establish an identity and find their voice. So they should be quietly appreciated and the minimum of offence should be taken unless they are physically violent or personally abusive. Parties must learn to listen to each other, and whereas some participants will be able to eloquently articulate their points with the spoken word others may need to sing, dance, shout, arrive in numbers or have time to caucus. Everyone is engaging in an innovative mutual learning process. Enablers must help others to interpret what is happening,

to ‘read between the lines’, and to respond empathetically, respectfully and constructively.

*Example:*

Noisy and occasionally violent public protests were very common in South Africa, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. Many protests were enlivened by singing, dancing and intimidating gestures. In a divided society, there were some people who not only were never part of a protest, but never even saw one except on television or in newspaper photographs. The Enablers, however, each in their own way, had become familiar with public demonstrations and had grown to recognise and respect them as a form of communication and outlet for frustrations and anger. Enablers in public service were accustomed to being the target of demonstrations, some of the Enablers participated themselves in protests, and *the Democrat* and his facilitators deliberately based themselves in areas of contestation – not in some quiet secluded office.

***Lesson 7 Attempt to appreciate the problems and perspectives of each participant, without necessarily claiming to understand them crisis [General application]***

In a critical, turbulent social crisis every participating entity is likely to have its own unique problems to deal with and unique perspectives on what any new initiative is about, what its role should be and the degree to which its own objectives might be satisfied. Furthermore, every participating person has their own personality, perspectives and preoccupations. A primary objective is to build trust – an appreciation of each other and of what each could contribute. Conversations should not be limited to formal meetings – informal chats uncover common interests and create opportunities for building relationships, however slight, which can be built upon to everyone’s advantage. Do not be too quick to claim an understanding, however, because people’s cultures, histories and ways of seeing, thinking and speaking may differ greatly. Be content to keep listening, learning and respecting.

*Example:*

Tracking *the Veteran’s* affiliations during the course of the iSLP is illuminating. His involvement in the project was one of the most consistent and long-lived. But he began as a civic leader within the UDF until it was disbanded; when SANCO was established he was obliged to associate himself with it but became increasingly uncomfortable and re-established his Western Cape Civic Association identity; later he joined forces with WCUSA and others

in the creation of WECCO and was appointed its chairman, only to realise that he had been duped; he then became caught up in the Peninsular People's Compact which was then publicly discredited by the grassroots community leaders. He re-emerged in the iSLP and was elected by those grassroots leaders as Chairman of their iSLP Consultative Forum, until he was elected as a City Councillor. Therefore, although he participated from a number of different positions, some apparently contradictory, *the Veteran* as a person was an Enabler of the iSLP process and project. It was unnecessary to question his moves and the motives behind them within the context of a country and society in turmoil – all that was important was to keep his relationship with other Enablers strong.

***Lesson 8 Sign-off achievements crisis [General application]***

In a complex and convoluted process there can be great advantage in formally recognising completed events, 'milestones', which will prohibit any participant from re-instituting old debates and allow the whole process to move forward. All participants must be invited to witness the signing-off event – but consideration should also be given to inviting representatives of a broader public and the media as witnesses. The signing off must be recorded within formal minutes so that there is an authoritative record for future reference.

*Example:*

*The Sponsor*, in Chapter 7, made a very rare appearance in the Policy Committee simply to affirm that the SLP Principles had been adopted and to announce that the end of the policy phase and the commencement of the implementation phase. In a way it was a public ceremony, witnessed and recorded in the minutes. It was significant for two reasons: Not every party in the Policy Committee had approved the iSLP Principles – WCUSA had not – but this was a way of taking a decision without actually telling WCUSA that their delaying tactics would no longer be tolerated. This announcement did not terminate the Policy Committee (that came later), because the Policy Committee was still the only manifestation of the collaboration, but by starting the implementation phase (even though there was not yet any project funding available) it authorised *the Democrat* to appoint facilitators who would work with grassroots leaders to establish the residents Development Committees which eventually became the prime means of collaboration for the entire implementation process.

***Lesson 9 Create local development committees as early in the process as possible [General application]***

The greatest hindrance to participative development is self-appointed, unrepresentative community spokespersons. Self-proclaimed 'representatives' who have strong personalities, are erudite, have some knowledge of development processes and claim associations with influential persons or organisations should be treated with suspicion until their *bona fides* have been verified by others - the community, in particular - and demonstrated by their actions. The greatest assets in participative development are small localised development committees that comprise publicly elected representatives of communities from which project beneficiaries are to be drawn. The sooner these development committees can be established, and linked into the fabric of the project process through facilitation and training, the better.

*Example:*

At the time when the Policy Committee was being assembled, the communities who were meant to be involved were still organised in clandestine ways because the apartheid government had been very quick to label any local gathering as political and seditious, to arrest attendees and hold them in prison without trial. The unbanning of political parties eliminated that danger but did not immediately provide replacement structures – and in any event, should local representative structures have party affiliations? So it was impossible to have grassroots participation at the start of the iSLP. However after 1994, it became easy to populate project committees for housing development, and they were so successful that such structures were hardly required for the next phases of development: community facilities and capacity building processes. As *the Democrat's* facilitators discovered, local, legitimate community leaders were just waiting to be included in local development committees.

***Lesson 10 How to prevent the process from breaking down before it is concluded crisis [General application]***

A controversial process to address a major social crisis can be sustained for a lengthy period if there is a committed host, a dedicated and impartial chairperson, an able facilitator and communicator, a few more committed Enablers often working behind the scenes – and a sustained attitude of inclusion of all stakeholders. On this basis the scheduled meetings will always be held and people will be obliged to attend, if only to keep an eye on their opposition.

*Example:*

In the iSLP the process of convening Policy Committee meetings was driven inexorably and

persistently by the host (*the Strategist*), the chairperson (*the Defender*) and the facilitator (*the Democrat*) – such that 36 meetings were convened within 38 months. Each meeting presented challenges, with regards to who might attend and what might they say or do, and very little could be done to ‘oil the waters’ in advance because there was so much contestation, and its form kept changing. It was their dogged commitment to the principles and process that had been agreed at the start which held it all together all the time. Such unwavering commitment is indispensable. It is also likely to be exhausting. Remember, also, that *the Defender* was an unremunerated volunteer, fulfilling a very costly role.

***Lesson 11 Document everything and have the record formally approved crisis [General application]***

The facilitator or coordinator of a collaborative project has a huge administrative responsibility to feed every aspect of the process with documentation of a high quality that accurately expresses the intention of meetings both in advance (notices and agendas) and retrospectively (minutes) and which also informs the process of policy making, programming, budgeting, monitoring and reporting. The decisions made at meetings are not just the product of the decision-makers – they are primarily formulated by ‘backroom’ people who think about an objective, how to construct a strategy that will achieve it, and then translate that into a readable, unambiguous, polished document that is ready for approval. There is often only one chance for a document to be tabled, so do not present rough drafts because they might be approved by mistake and become a headache for those who have to implement them. Ensure that all minutes, policy documents and reports are formally approved or endorsed so that they can be referred to later – they are the foundations and cornerstones of a strong, adaptable development.

*Example:*

In the iSLP, *the Scribe*, as an assistant to *the Democrat*, took responsibility for assuming that all of the information needed for effective process facilitation, and later project coordination, was properly and accurately recorded and stored systematically so that it could be easily recovered. *The Scribe* also drafted all the proposals that were put to the policy Committee to ensure that they were unambiguous, and drafted many of the critically important letters or invitations that had to be sent from time to time to promote the project – to the extent sometimes of drafting a letter for one party and later, in response to a request from another party, drafting an appropriate reply.

***Lesson 12 Understand and respect historical conflicts but focus on building a better future crisis [General application]***

The objective of a cross-sector collaboration is not to resolve differences and conflicts that are rooted in history but to respect them and create a new ethical paradigm on which a just future can be built.

*Example:*

The Policy Committee of the iSLP was not established to adjudicate past actions or to resolve long-standing disputes. The past was implicitly recognised but it was never all owed to dominate proceedings. The new government, faith groups and civil society could deal with justice, reconciliation and restitution issues if they wished, but the sole purpose of the iSLP was to design and drive a vehicle that would take all the affected communities into a new and improved housing dispensation. All the Enablers were committed to achieving that.

***Lesson 13 Empower communities by involving men, women and youth in committees crisis [General application]***

Ensure that men are not allowed to dominate committees which have been established to represent the whole community and to enable development. Women have an especially good record as powerful initiators and motivators of development and this capacity must be appreciated, harnessed and expressed in any development project.

*Example:*

It is traditional among some cultures to allow or expect the men to lead, to make decisions on behalf of everyone else, and to speak on their behalf as well. There were very, very few women on the Policy Committee of the iSLP. The rare exceptions included the chairperson (*the Defender*) and the Communications Consultant (whose appointment was relatively short). *The Democrat's* facilitators included women, and they were in the vanguard of making sure that grassroots women were consulted in the planning processes and that every Residents' Development Committee and Project Committee had a good representation of women and youth. As time went on such provisions were written into the draft terms of reference that were used to establish such structures.

***Lesson 14 Not ‘the developer’s meeting’ but ‘the community’s meeting’, not your project, but theirs crisis [General application]***

If the community owns the project they will contribute generously and energetically to its success, and long after the officials, consultants and contractors have left the site they will still be enthusiastically improving and maintaining whatever assets the project delivered. It all starts with enabling communities to take ownership of the forums which mean most to them: the committees which discuss and decide on the details of their part of the project. Therefore those meetings must be structured primarily for their benefit, in ways that will maximise their involvement. Location, language, timing, procedure, control, record-keeping should all be as they would like it. If they need encouraging to take the initiative then be sure to encourage them to speak up, engage the officials and professionals, elect a chairperson from their own number, set the agenda, decide on the refreshments, etc. Participants will never forget meetings that were theirs, and what they achieved. The facilitators must work out a way for the supporting officials and others to be adequately informed, and for suitable minutes to be kept of the decisions taken.

***Example:***

Because there are three official languages in the Western Cape, participants in the Policy Committee could speak in the language of their choice and have it translated by a formal or informal interpreter. In general, however, those discussions were conducted in English, although that was the ‘first language’ of relatively few participants. At grassroots level many people were not confident in English and so the vernacular isiXhosa was used by the leaders and facilitators. These people constituted the majority at Project Committees as well, so most of the business there was conducted in isiXhosa, and only the critically important elements were translated for the benefit of the officials and consultants who were in attendance.

***Lesson 15 Affirm local community leaders as Enablers of the project crisis [General application]***

A large development project provides the opportunity to create forums in which community leaders who are not politicians but who are respected for their wisdom, experience and service can be recognised, affirmed and consulted on significant matters. These people become the real Enablers at local level. Politicians do not generally provide consistently good and sustained leadership for development projects. If the grassroots leaders are allowed to

consider policy issues their recommendations are likely to be appreciated by the politicians, who will endorse them with confidence.

*Example:*

Remember that nobody was actually called “an Enabler” in the iSLP. It is a function that is being recognised in this thesis and highlighted by a few examples – but the reality is that in such a large project there were many Enablers at many levels, characterised by their committed exertion to ‘make it happen’. In every Project Committee there were characters who could be relied upon to attend, to ask questions that would yield more clarification for everyone, who would roundly endorse what they regarded as good practice, and pragmatically tell the consultants and officials when to speed up and when to slow down. Men and women, some of them real ‘elders’ and some of them inspired youngsters – together pulled the project through to its successful conclusion without receiving any special benefit or praise at all.

The above fifteen lessons fall far short of all the lessons learnt by Enablers during the course of the iSLP, but they highlight some particularly important generic issues. Rather than attempt to list all the experience acquired from one project a ‘Manual for Enablers’ has been compiled as **Annexure D** to this thesis, to which the Reader is referred.

# ANNEXURE D

## AN ENABLER'S MANUAL

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## **INTRODUCTION - THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT**

This Manual is designed to enable persons to approach the possibility of creating a cross-sector collaborative development in a careful, logical manner. The emphasis here is on the conceptualisation, design, structure and overall planning of the collaboration, rather than on the planning and implementation of its project components.

These are tools to assist the practitioner to design and manage an effective collaborative process. If that is done properly it will establish a strong and durable foundation for the planning and implementation of projects and programmes.

### **The 14 Stages in a Collaborative Development Process.**

**STAGE 1 – PROBLEM STATEMENT** Consider the circumstances and problems that lead you to believe that a collaborative project might be necessary.

**STAGE 2 – CONCEPTUALISATION** Develop an idea yourself of how a collaborative development might be created.

**STAGE 3 – EXECUTIVE SUPPORT** Obtain support for your concept from political and administrative superiors, and a mandate to canvass support more widely.

**STAGE 4 – CANVASSING SUPPORT** Canvass the perspective of each party and the basis on which they would consider participating in a collaborative development.

**STAGE 5 – INVITATION** Negotiate with all parties a few basic principles as a mutually acceptable basis for an invitation to collaborate – and deliver such invitations on behalf of the patron.

**STAGE 6 – INAUGURATION** Organise the event, chaired by the patron, who seeks formal agreement on the objective of the collaboration, the basic principles of procedure and willingness to proceed to Stage 7.

**STAGE 7 – ESTABLISHMENT** Obtain agreement on the principles which will be used to anchor and guide the process towards achieving the agreed objective; on terms of reference for one or more committees; and on the initial research to be commissioned.

**STAGE 8 – RESEARCH** Collaboratively research, analyse and report on key unknowns and their implications; achieve agreement on project content.

**STAGE 9 – BUSINESS PLANNING** Prepare a comprehensive Business Plan as an instrument to obtain the support and resources required to conduct detailed planning and implementation.

**STAGE 10 – OBTAINING RESOURCES** Obtain approval of the Business Plan by political, financial and other authorities, and an assurance that all the necessary resources will be made available.

**STAGE 11 – PLANNING OF PROJECTS** Collaboratively plan individual projects in detail for use in obtaining an allocation of resources and as a basis for procurement and contracts.

**STAGE 12 – PROJECT APPROVALS** Obtain approval of each project and access to resources as they are required.

**STAGE 13 – IMPLEMENTATION** Collaborative implementation of individual projects according to approved plans; and coordinated implementation of the project as a whole.

**STAGE 14 – COMPLETION** Achieve certified completion of every aspect of the project in terms of original approved plans and authorised amendments.

These stages are explained in detail in the pages that follow.

## THE PROCESS OF CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT

### THE STEPS WITHIN EACH STAGE OF THE PROCESS

The **Notes** referred to below can be found after the details of Stage 14.

#### **STAGE 1 – PROBLEM STATEMENT**

Consider the circumstances and problems that lead you to believe that a collaborative project might be necessary. Begin this process without delay.

##### **Step**

- 1 Do some very careful research on the background to the problem. (**Note 1**)
- 2 Jot down a few ideas for what should be the objective of this particular development.
- 3 List what you consider to be the main problems associated with this challenge.
- 4 List any other complicating circumstances that would have to be taken into account.
- 5 List what you think are the resource constraints, in terms of available will, expertise, personnel, finance, materials, land, official policies, etc.
- 6 State why you believe that such a development cannot be successfully undertaken by your own organisation.
- 7 Consider the possibility of it being achieved by specific other organisations, stating their strengths and weaknesses, and coming to a conclusion.
- 8 State why you think that a collaborative development provides the only or best chance of success.
- 9 Compile all of the above into a 'Problem Statement', containing first of all your responses to Steps 1-7, each with its own heading and paragraph. Then leave a few lines and add as a last paragraph, entitled 'Conclusion', your response to Step 8.
- 10 Share your Problem Statement with your colleagues and superior and request their comments, corrections and additions and invite discussion on the subject.
- 11 In the light of their responses first revise the document excluding the Conclusion. Do this carefully, including further discussion if necessary, so that the final result will be a fair expression of your organisation's assessment of the problem.
- 12 Then, on the basis of that write a new Conclusion. You should then consider the comments that you received about your original Conclusion and see whether any criticisms are still justified on the basis of your revised document. If they are, you should amend your new Conclusion accordingly. If the criticisms are invalid, they may indicate that there is opposition to your strategy. If so discuss this possibility with your superior, who may be able to reduce the risk of the exercise being undermined from within.
- 13 Identify, from these first discussions within your organisation, whom your allies are likely to be and the various roles that they could fulfil as internal Enablers of the project, such as: patron, champion, host, chairperson, secretary, administrator, bridge-builders, technical facilitators, community facilitators, interpreters. (**Note 2**)
- 14 The revised Problem Statement now represents a perspective that enjoys broad support within your organisation. However, before any action is taken Stage 2 must be carefully worked through, so obtain assurance from your superior that no other action will be taken prematurely.

**STAGE 2 – CONCEPTUALISATION**

Develop an idea yourself of how a collaborative development might be created. This will give you a head start in thinking about these issues.

**Step**

- 1 List the probable stakeholders: organisations, groups and individuals who are likely to have a direct interest in a possible development, particularly if it is a collaboration – and state what their interest would be.
- 2 List possible supporters: any other parties whose involvement or support would help to achieve success.
- 3 List possible opponents: any organisations, groups and individuals who might be opposed to such a development.
- 4 Develop an idea of how a collaboration of all these parties could be created.
- 5 Consider what would be needed to attract all of these parties to an exploratory meeting.
- 6 Consider who would be the most suitable available person to canvass such support.
- 7 Consider what values will have to be applied to underpin a collaborative process.
- 8 Consider what attitudes will be required in to promote success.
- 9 Identify what existing attitudes will therefore have to be changed.
- 10 Draft some initial principles that could be adopted to guide the process.
- 11 Consider whom should adopt these principles, by what means and when.
- 12 Draft a clearly stated initial objective for the project.
- 13 List the items that should be addressed in a simple but effective inaugural meeting.
- 14 Consider in what language the inaugural meeting should be conducted, and whether translators will be required.
- 15 Identify suitable meeting venues which would be accessible, of an adequate size, have the required furniture and facilities, be dignified and regularly available.
- 16 Carefully consider how much time each of **Stages 3 to 10** may take and draft a programme, suggesting some key milestones.
- 17 Combine Steps 1-14 into a ‘Proposal for the Collaborative Development of .....’
- 18 On the basis of the Proposal draft a Canvassing Brief (**Note 3**) with a Draft Agenda for an Exploratory Meeting (**Note 4**) attached, which can be given to whoever is mandated to canvass support from the parties.

**STAGE 3 – EXECUTIVE SUPPORT**

Obtain support for your concept from political and administrative superiors and a mandate to canvass support more widely.

**Step**

- 1 Discuss your Proposal critically with your key internal allies (the initial internal Enablers identified in **Stage 1 Step 13**) and amend it as necessary.
- 2 Present the Proposal and Canvassing Brief to your superior and request a discussion about it, to be attended by as many of the internal Enablers as possible.
- 3 If your superior is in support of the process request that a senior executive within the organisation be approached to be the project Champion and to lead the quest for the necessary political support from the highest level. Thereafter the Champion must be kept fully informed about all aspects of the process.
- 4 The Champion obtains the appointment of a patron from among high level superiors.
- 5 Ensure that the presentations given to obtain executive support are of a high standard and that as a result a mandate is secured for canvassing interest in a collaborative development process from as many potential participants as possible.

- 6 Ensure that the executive approval is put in writing and that the wording of the Canvassing Brief (**Note 3**) is also approved.
- 7 Appoint the person chosen to canvass support (the Canvasser) and provide him/her with the Canvassing Brief and a signed document that provides evidence of their appointment.

#### **STAGE 4 – CANVASSING SUPPORT**

The Canvasser will obtain the perspective of every party and the basis on which they would consider participating in a collaborative development. The following tasks are primarily for the Canvasser.

##### **Step**

- 1 Draw a Relationship Map (**Note 5**) using all the names that you listed in **Stage 2 Steps 1 and 2** together with the name of your own organisation. This map will show the strength of relationship between the different parties and the extent to which one party may be able to influence another.
- 2 To the Relationship Map add the names that you listed in **Stage 2 Step 3** and indicate their relationships to the other parties.
- 3 To each organisation in the Relationship Map add the names of their key decision-makers and also the names of individuals in each organisation who have good relationships with individuals in other organisations in the Map. Any particularly bad relationships should also be indicated.
- 4 Use the Relationship Map to choose a starting point and a route for canvassing support for the collaboration proposal, and also for deciding at which points other people should be asked to assist in the canvassing, *e.g.* by providing introductions, attending presentations, hosting or arranging meetings. Use all of this to create a Canvassing Programme (**Note 6**).
- 5 Create a Canvassing Report Form (**Note 7**) which you will complete after each party has been approached.
- 6 Proceed to canvass support for the proposal, following the order of the Canvassing Programme, which can always be amended as you collect more information about parties and inter-relationships along the way. Complete a Canvassing Report form immediately after each meeting, to ensure that no information is lost.
- 7 After all parties have been canvassed meet with your superior and/or project Champion and some internal Enablers, give them copies of your Canvassing Reports, and discuss the response. Discuss whether any further negotiation is required – internally and/or with any of the canvassed parties and/or with any other parties – before concluding whether there is broad interest in holding a first exploratory meeting of all parties.

#### **STAGE 5 – INVITATION**

Negotiate with all parties a few basic principles as a mutually acceptable basis for an invitation to collaborate – and deliver such invitations on behalf of the patron. These tasks are primarily for the Canvasser.

##### **Step**

- 1 If it is required, conduct a final round of canvassing with some or all parties, seeking an agreed basis on which the process can be started. If there is enough support among the parties to make a collaboration possible it is worth considering inviting all those parties to a meeting – trusting that if they decide to continue meeting it is likely that any other parties will not want to be excluded and will join in.
- 2 Ask the Champion to obtain the agreement of the Patron that invitations can be issued

- in his/her name for a meeting at a suitable date and time at the proposed venue. Reserve the venue immediately and reserve the time in the Patron's diary
- 3 Draft a brief and simple Invitation (**Note 8**) to be issued by the Patron, separately addressed to each party that has been canvassed, requesting the pleasure of their attendance at a meeting to explore the possibility of creating a collaborative development of ....., which will be held at a specified place and time. The agreed Agenda for the Inaugural Meeting must be attached to each invitation. There should be some limit to the size of the delegation from each party, but there is usually an advantage in providing an opportunity to engage on the subject to more than just a couple of people in each party. Invitees should be requested to 'RSVP' and to indicate the size of their delegation in order to facilitate arrangements for the meeting.
  - 4 Invitations must be delivered, preferably by hand and by the Canvasser, and their receipt should be signed for so that there can be no doubt about whether they were delivered and received. If any invitations cannot be delivered by hand they must be sent by secure means and followed up with a phone call to confirm their arrival.
  - 5 Before the inaugural meeting the Canvasser should give a follow up call to the contact person in each party, confirming that they will be attending the meeting and ensuring that they know where the meeting is taking place and that they have the necessary transport. Transport, or a refund of the cost of transport, should be offered if it poses a problem.
  - 6 Establish a simple and effective procedure for providing transport or transport refunds. The use of locally available transport should be encouraged if it is efficient.

#### **STAGE 6 – INAUGURATION**

Organise the event, chaired by the Patron, who seeks formal agreement on the objective of the collaboration, the basic principles of procedure and a willingness to proceed to **Stage 7**.

##### **Step**

- 1 The venue was reserved in **Stage 5 Step 2**. Confirm the reservation and ensure that there will be adequate and appropriate seating and that all facilities are functioning. The seating format should be as close as possible to a 'round table', and unlike a classroom or court room.
- 2 Organise appropriate refreshments for the meeting, preferably arranged so that people can mix informally.
- 3 Brief the Champion thoroughly about the objectives of the Inaugural Meeting and the attendees, and about all the arrangements you have made. The Champion must then brief the Patron, who will chair the inaugural meeting. Together they will be responsible for ensuring the success of the meeting. It should be emphasised that the meeting is for the purpose of discussing only the items on the agenda that has been agreed by all parties. Any other issues should be left for future meetings, and used as an attraction for meeting again, and for everyone to prepare to discuss them then.
- 4 If you are going to use a translator/interpreter in the meeting be sure to brief him/her at the same time as the Champion is briefed, as it is essential that they both have the same objective and communicate the same message.
- 5 Ensure that the proceedings of the meeting will be accurately recorded in the agreed language. Appoint a proficient secretary who understands the context of the meeting and who is experienced in managing any recording or transcribing equipment to be used and then drafting accurate minutes.
- 6 Prepare a table sign for each party indicating its name on both sides, and allocate an equal amount of space at the table for each party to have at least two delegates sitting at the table, with their other delegates sitting behind them.

- 7 Prepare an Attendance List (**Note 9**) of parties and representatives, with space for additions to be made. Also prepare a standard blank Attendance Register (**Note 10**) for circulation during the meeting and at any future meetings, which will capture additional information that will be essential for the accurate administration of the process.
- 8 Prepare a reception table at the entrance to the venue, at which copies of the agenda are made available and where at least two copies of the Attendance List are placed to be ticked as people arrive. The reception table should be attended by at least two administrators who will ensure that everyone is welcomed, their presence recorded and given an agenda – without any lengthy queues forming.
- 7 Have another two or three administrators available to show delegates to their seats. If delegates are likely to have multiple home languages ensure that there are administrators present who speak their language and make them feel at home.
- 8 In Item 1 of the Draft Agenda the chairman will welcome everybody and explain the purpose of the meeting: to explore whether there is a common will to collaborate in order to address the challenge. Everyone present has agreed to come, so a common interest is assured. If the canvassing has been comprehensive with all preliminary issues having been clarified or negotiated this meeting should be a formality, and the chairperson should treat it with that expectation. The purpose of the meeting is simply to convene the process and get it moving forwards, not to resolve issues that will require research and deliberation later. Contentious issues must be noted and recorded in the minutes, and agreement sought that they will be addressed in later meetings – perhaps in specified stages of the process.
- 9 Item 2 of the Draft Agenda provides the opportunity for the leading representative of each organisation to briefly introduce their organisation and their delegates, explain the organisation’s function and constituency, state why they are interested in helping to address this challenge and declare what they would hope to contribute to a collaborative development process.
- 10 Item 3 of the Draft Agenda is to seek agreement on the general objective to be achieved. This should be kept simple and narrow at this stage, taking care not to raise any unrealistic expectations. There will be plenty of opportunity to refine it later. It can also be useful to agree on a title for the project, so that it can be easily and unambiguously referred to in future.
- 11 Item 4 of the Draft Agenda is a preliminary explanation of the development process that is likely to be required – viz: Stages 7-14 and the simple reason for each stage. It would also be helpful to provide some idea of how long each stage may take. Then focus on the content of Stages 7 and 8, and a proposal for how these should be addressed procedurally – and recommend that the meeting constitutes itself into a committee – perhaps a ‘Policy Committee’ in the first instance.
- 12 Item 5 of the Draft Agenda puts flesh onto the idea of creating a committee by agreeing to some important practical aspects – and lays the ground for Item 6.
- 13 Item 6 of the Draft Agenda then gets into more serious ‘housekeeping’ issues about how the meetings are to be chaired, administered, facilitated and recorded. The host organisation should try to avoid providing a chairperson itself in order to deliberately and visibly equalise power and influence; but on the other hand it must ensure that all the functions will be competently performed.
- 14 Finally (Item 6) the chairperson should summarise the resolutions taken and agreed actions; and the (Item 7) a date must be set for the next meeting.
- 15 Set a high administrative standard from the beginning by preparing minutes without delay that accurately record the attendance, resolutions and required actions and

distribute them to all participants while the meeting is still fresh in their minds – ideally within 48 hours. Also establish a procedure whereby a Notice of Meeting and its Agenda and all the required supporting papers (including proposals, information and reports) are received by all participants no less than 7 days before each meeting. Participants should never be expected to discuss an issue without having received a proposal or the relevant information in advance so that it can be carefully considered and discussed within each party beforehand.

- 16 Finalise the appointment of all the roleplayers as quickly as possible, so that they are each briefed and equipped well before the next meeting.

### **STAGE 7 – ESTABLISHMENT**

Obtain agreement on the values and principles which will be used to anchor and guide the process towards achieving the agreed objective; on terms of reference for one or more committees; and on the initial research to be commissioned.

#### **Step**

- 1 Prepare a proposal for the adoption of a few fundamental Values and Principles (**See Chapter 11**) on the basis of the broad objective agreed at the Inaugural meeting. Also prepare a Preliminary Project Programme (12-24 months) (**Note 11**) for consideration and adoption. Then identify the fundamental Research Questions (**Note 12**) that apply to this project and prepare a proposal for how and by whom such research should be commissioned and whether a Research Sub-Committee (**Note 13**) should be formed to supervise such process. The research must include all the information that will be required for the drafting of a comprehensive Business Plan. The research reports are likely to form the basis of discussion at a number of meetings. They must be sent to participants in advance, with the notice and agenda of the next meeting.
- 2 In order to build and maintain momentum in collaborative projects it is essential to have regular meetings, a regular flow of documentation to participants and regular progress reports, so that participants can report back confidently to their constituencies. Meetings must also be relevant, and therefore committees must be created for specific purposes when necessary. A Framework of Committees for a Collaboration is given below as **Note 14**. It would be constructive to propose draft Terms of Reference (**Note 15**) for each Committee before it is formed. These must be approved by all the participants and will guide the functioning of the Committee. It would also be wise to give the Committee a name, such as the ‘..... Policy Committee’, in order to distinguish it from other committees.
- 3 It is essential to enable every participating organisation to really participate – to speak on subjects that interest them and to engage in meaningful activities. It is just as important to allow participants to complain, object and propose alternatives – and for those to be as respected and seriously considered as any other. Involve participants in sub-committees and in the drafting of proposals as much as possible. This maximises transparency and mutual ownership of the whole process.

### **STAGE 8 – RESEARCH**

Collaboratively research, analyse and report on key unknowns and their implications; achieve agreement on project content.

#### **Step**

- 1 Convene the Research Committee, peruse the list of Research Questions and decide the order in which they must be addressed. Then decide how each item should be researched: by individuals or teams; and by committee members and their colleagues or by consultants – and if consultants are used who would contract, brief and

- remunerate them?
- 2 When each item of research has been completed a draft report must be presented to the Research Committee for detailed consideration and review – until it is in a form that can be confidently recommended to the Policy Committee for approval.
  - 3 Obtain the approval of each item of Research from the Policy Committee, which will then apply the information to its design of the overall project.

### **STAGE 9 – BUSINESS PLANNING**

Prepare a comprehensive Business Plan as an instrument to obtain the support and resources required to conduct detailed planning and implementation.

#### **Step**

- 1 Compile into a document information about the challenge that is being faced, the stakeholders and their interests, the participants in the collaboration, the terms of reference of their highest level committee, and the overall objective, values and principles that have been agreed upon.
- 2 Add details about the process that has taken place and is proposed and of the progress that has been made.
- 3 Present the proposed overall programme, with milestones showing what is to be achieved by when, and state which party or person has overall responsibility for each function.
- 4 Identify all the projects or activities that can be separately managed and accounted for, which will make up the whole project.
- 5 Create an outline programme and budget for each of these projects or activities, together with a consolidated programme and budget, and a consolidated forecast of the requirements pertaining to each type of resource.
- 6 State from where each resource will be sought.
- 7 Conclude with a request for access to the required resources – *e.g.* by a formal project approval or allocation of resources (*e.g.* finance, land).

### **STAGE 10 – OBTAINING RESOURCES**

Obtain approval of the Business Plan by political, financial and other authorities, and an assurance that all the necessary resources will be made available.

#### **Step**

- 1 Obtain detailed application requirements from potential resource providers and in drafting an application ensure that every one of those requirements is satisfied.
- 2 Find out what internal approval process is used by each resource provider, so that it will be possible to track progress and to also learn of and respond to any problems experienced.
- 3 Identify the key roleplayers within each organisation to which applications will be made, and make every effort to have each one briefed by a senior member of the collaboration before the application is submitted, so that they are expecting (and looking forward to) it.
- 4 Submit the application (including the Business Plan), delivering it by hand if possible, and inform the relevant role-players that it has been submitted and request reports on the application's progress through the approval system.
- 4 Respond immediately to any queries, negative feedback or mis-understandings.
- 5 If the application is declined establish the reason without delay and try to rectify the situation while the issue is still alive and current.
- 7 If the application is accepted express appreciation to all the roleplayers and then attend to whatever contracts the resource provider may require, and to accounting and

reporting procedures.

- 8 Remember that contracting with a resource provider brings a new party into the collaboration, and with it an assortment of new role-players and connections, some of whom are likely to have their own agendas and ambitions which could complicate the work of the collaboration. Prudence and caution are recommended.

### **STAGE 11 – PROJECTS PLANNING**

Collaboratively plan individual projects in detail to obtain an allocation of resources and as a basis for procurement and contracts. The steps will be similar to those required for the overall project in Stages 7, 8 and 9 above, but will require much greater detail in stakeholder involvement, planning, technical design and implementation.

### **STAGE 12 – PROJECTS APPROVAL**

Obtain approval of each project and access to resources as they are required, applying the steps used in Stage 10 of the overall project.

### **STAGE 13 – IMPLEMENTATION**

Collaborative implementation of individual projects according to approved plans; and coordinated implementation of the project as a whole. Remember that collaboration at the scale of local projects that directly affect beneficiaries is the most important of all if they are to perceive themselves as owners of the products.

### **STAGE 14 – COMPLETION**

Achieve certified completion of every aspect of the project in terms of original approved plans and authorised amendments.

#### **Step**

- 1 Learn from each resource provider or authority what its requirements are for certifying project completion, and agree upon an acceptable reporting format that will incorporate signatures by all responsible parties, including a representative of the resource provider or authority. This must include the requirements for certifying the completion of the entire project.
- 2 Brief project managers and project accountants on what is required and provide deadlines for providing the required information and certificates.
- 3 Compile and submit completion reports for each project in duplicate, and ensure that one copy of each is returned to you for the record, signed off by the resource provider or authority.
- 4 Compile and submit a completion report for the project as a whole, with an annexure listing all complete projects, what they delivered and when and by whom each completion report was signed off.

## NOTES

### **Note 1 BACKGROUND RESEARCH**

The histories of the stakeholders in the contemporary crisis, as well as the emotions and attitudes that have been fostered over time, must be at least taken seriously and respected. The wise aspiring Enabler will expect the roots of the crisis to be very complex, too complex to really understand, and will engage in much more listening than concluding. Furthermore, if the Enabler is a member of one of the stakeholder groups it is especially important (and difficult) to not assume that your perspective on history and on the current crisis is the ‘correct’ one. Instead, an Enabler might do much good by laying aside (but not denying) a personal historical perspective in order to help others to create a shared future.

To understand the roots of the crisis it is not necessary to become a history scholar – just do a bit of digging. Visit the library or archives and find the relevant histories and scan the newspapers for pictures and articles relating to particular events. Find some ordinary people who were spectators or victims at the time to tell their stories confidentially. Diverse stakeholders are likely to appreciate any trouble taken to understand ‘where they are coming from’, where they are at the moment, and the hopes and hindrances that they face for the future. The object at this stage is not to ‘solve the problem’ – but simply to become sensitive to the complexities, layers and dimensions of the crisis.

### **Note 2 ENABLERS**

Enablers are individuals who, because of their position and relationships, formal and informal, are able to influence attitudes and affairs in favour of a collaborative process.

The term ‘Enabler’ is a function, not a title. Some of these functions, such as patron, host, facilitator, chairperson and coordinator are formal and may be referred to in conversation or minutes. But others, such as initiators, bridge-builders, levers, friends, allies, associates and supporters may fulfil such functions very quietly and privately but be very influential and helpful in bringing an assortment of people together and then encouraging them to work together and move in the same direction.

Some Enablers will be participants in the collaboration, but others may not be participants yet may be able to influence, support and encourage particular participants because of their relationship to them or authority over them.

Enablers can be of any age or status, bearing in mind that the work of the collaboration will involve all sorts of people. So although the support of a powerful political leader would enable the work of the collaboration such support might be expressed only occasionally, whereas a good day-to-day working relationship between two field workers who are employed by opposing camps can be of huge benefit in the planning and implementation of the collaboration’s work.

Therefore those who are primarily responsible for constructing and driving a collaboration must identify potential Enablers, consult them and keep them well-informed to fuel their commitment to the collaboration, and not hesitate to ask them for help. The more that Enablers can be involved and included in the process, especially informally, the more they will be able to contribute as Enablers.

At the opposing end of the spectrum there may be ‘Disablers’: people who would like to disable and destroy the collaboration in whole or in part. The Enablers can help to identify such threats and to devise creative strategies to counteract them. If the collaboration has been created to address a critical social issue it is likely to have broad public and political support, within which there may be many potential Enablers who can help to diffuse opposition.

Read more about Enablers and enabling in **Chapter 11**.

Read the Lessons for Enablers within the Notes and References at the back of this book.

### **Note 3 CANVASSING BRIEF**

This is a document that specifies the terms which the proposing organisation offers to other parties as a basis for exploring the possibilities for collaborating to achieve a shared objective. It should also include a mandate for a specified person to represent the organisation in canvassing interest in the proposal.

The essence of a collaborative project is that all the parties are given equal status in the decision-making processes, although the functions that they perform are likely to differ considerably. The approach by the proposing organisation must therefore be made in the following spirit:

“There is widespread recognition that this particular [specified] set of problems must be addressed, but the members of my organisation have realised that they cannot achieve the required objective on their own. However there are other parties who could make valuable contributions to this process, and if we could all work together it might be possible to achieve success. Therefore we invite you to meet with us as equals to discuss the challenges that these problems present, define an objective that we can all share, and establish some acceptable principles that could guide a collaborative process. We are willing to host, administer and help to facilitate such a process and to contribute to the costs involved – but have no desire to dominate or control the initiative.

Our proposal is that we invite all parties who have a stake in this issue to attend a meeting at a convenient place and time, at which we can each register the nature of our interest and what we might be able to contribute, and together agree on the broad project purpose. We should also consider what initial steps have to be taken to plan a project and organise an effective basis for moving ahead. We can also discuss possibilities of inviting any other parties to join us. There will be some procedural issues about how future meetings should be chaired, conducted, administered and recorded. We therefore suggest that the following items would comprise a sufficient agenda for the exploratory meeting, which I am willing to convene and chair”.

**Note 4 DRAFT AGENDA FOR AN EXPLORATORY MEETING**

N.B. Only publish the bold print below – the remainder are explanations.

**Meeting to Explore the Creation of a Collaborative Development Process to Address the Challenge of .....**





**DRAFT AGENDA**

1. **Welcome and introduction to the purpose of the meeting** – the Chairperson
2. **Recognition of each party present** – a representative of each party introduces the party and its delegates, explains their interest in the challenge being faced and indicates what kind of contribution they might be able to make.
3. **Agreement on the general objective to be achieved** – recognising that the objective will be refined and detailed as time goes on.
4. **Consideration of the development process and the steps that should be anticipated** – an understandable presentation of what is likely to be required for effective policy-making, planning, resourcing and implementation; and for the participation of all interested and affected parties in the process - and a suggestion as to the nature of the first few steps. This must be discussed as a starting framework, not in detail, but with the objective of getting agreement to constitute a committee of representatives of all the organisations present and to agree on a proposed agenda for the next meeting.
5. **Meeting arrangements** – the venue, frequency, times and dates, language and translation issues, any transport issues, catering requirements, arrangements for delivering notices, agendas and minutes.
6. **The facilitation of meetings** – appointment of chairperson, secretary and administrator/facilitator, and the determination of how many delegates of each party may attend meetings. It may be wise to offer the possibility of an independent or rotating chairperson. It is recommended that a specific secretary and administrator/facilitator be agreed upon as soon as possible in order to anchor the essential administrative functions.
7. **Conclusion** - summary of resolutions that have been taken, and of actions that are to be taken before the next meeting – the chairperson and secretary.
8. **Date of next meeting** – confirmation of venue and time.

### Note 5 RELATIONAL MAP


Relational mapping attempts to illustrate who the main actors are at any time and to indicate which are associated with, related to or opposed to each other by the use of symbols. In situations where parties are polarised a Relational Map may be a useful tool for those who have to consider strategy. It may be helpful to use such diagrams to illustrate from time to time which parties are binding together or pulling apart, recognising also that alliances can also destroy a wider collaboration if they adopt a different agenda... Some symbols that can be used are shown below:

### Relational Maps: Key to Symbols

- Strong relationships 
- Loose Associations 
- Strong opposition 
- Mutual distrust 

As an illustration: In 1990 tensions were very high in and around the informal settlement of Crossroads, Cape Town. The above symbols were used to construct a Relationship Map in Chapter 4 which is reproduced below:

Fig 2. Crossroads 1990: Forces at Work





**Note 7 CANVASSING REPORT FORM**

Name of Organisation	
Nature and function of Organisation	
Senior representative's name phone numbers and e-mail addresses	
Date of meeting	
Present at meeting	
Initial reception received by us	
Their response to proposal	
Issues raised by them	
Their relationships to other parties	
Agreed actions by them	
Agreed actions by us	
Arrangements for next contact	

The above form is just a framework. Use a separate form for each organisation, and utilise as much space and as many lines as you require to capture as much information as possible.

**Note 8 INVITATION**

Invitations to the Inaugural Meeting should ideally be delivered by hand and by the Canvasser, thereby ensuring that the invitation reaches the right person with an explanation that it results from the earlier discussions. The invitation must be signed by the Patron, and printed on the Patron's stationery. The message should be brief, along lines such as those shown below:

The [Director]

Date.....  
 ..... (organisation)  
 ..... (address)

Dear .....

I have pleasure in inviting you and your colleagues to join me in a discussion to begin exploring the possibility of addressing the challenge of ..... in a collaborative manner.

The meeting will be held on ..... (date) at ..... (time) at ..... (venue).

A simple agenda accompanies this letter.

In order to ensure that there is room for everyone I request that each party limits their delegation to ..... (four?) people.

RSVP to ..... at tel:..... or  
 e-mail: ..... by 16h00 on ..... (date), kindly providing the names of your delegates.

I look forward to our meeting.

Yours sincerely,

..... (signature)

**[Remember to include the agenda!]**

**Note 9 ATTENDANCE LIST**

This is a list of all the parties expected to attend the meeting and the names of each party’s delegates, compiled from the responses received to the invitation. The parties must be listed in alphabetical order, with no suggestion of any hierarchy. The list will be used for the registration of all attendees as they come to the reception table inside the entrance to the venue (as described in **Stage 6** Step 8). Copies of this list must also be given to the Patron, Champion, Secretary and Interpreter, if any, before the meeting – and to the administrators to enable them to seat people without difficulty.

**EXPLORATORY MEETING ..... (date)**  
**ATTENDANCE LIST – IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF ORGANISATION**

**Each attendee is requested to initial this list next to his/her name. Replace or correct names if necessary.**

- ..... (organisation)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
  
- ..... (organisation)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
  
- ..... (organisation)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)
- ..... (delegate)

**Note 10 ATTENDANCE REGISTER**

This table is to be circulated during the meeting, for completion by every attendee, including administrators. This will be the formal record of attendance, attached to the minutes of the meeting, so make every effort to ensure that it is properly completed. The details of at least Organisation and Names will be recorded in the minutes of the meeting. It should be printed in ‘landscape’ to provide enough room.

..... **PROJECT**

**ATTENDANCE REGISTER**

Meeting held at ..... at .....h..... on ...../...../.....			
<b>NAME</b> (Please print)	<b>ORGANISATION</b>	<b>Tel/Cell</b>	<b>e-mail</b>

**Note 11 PRELIMINARY PROJECT PROGRAMME**

Some of the biggest challenges to be overcome in a cross-sector collaborative project are unrealistic expectations by participants about how quickly the process will take and what will be delivered. Once they have made incorrect or inappropriate statements or promises to their constituents about how and when they will benefit it is very difficult for them to withdraw them – and huge tensions are likely to result. To avoid such problems it is essential that participants be provided at the earliest opportunity with an idea of what has to be done and how long it might take.

Stages 7-14 of the project process provide a framework for this, and for the purposes of drawing up a Programme they can be re-named as Phases 1-8. What is required is a comprehensive but simple list of the required activities, how long each might take, and on that basis when they could be expected to start and end. Technical personnel can use sophisticated methods to draw programmes, e.g. using Gantt Charts and software such as MS Project, and should be encouraged to do so to ensure that all factors are taken into account. But it is important that all participants, many of whom may neither understand or need the technical details, receive regular up-dates of the project programme in a format that they can all understand and be able to communicate accurately to their constituencies.

The table overleaf provides an example of a basic Programme Outline that can be modified to suit circumstances but kept simple enough to be easily understood by all. Of course its contents must be changed to reflect the particular project and must be regularly updated and made available to all parties. It could be sophisticated by showing the start and end dates for each sub-phase, incorporating overleaps where they are expected; and it could be simplified for more general use by eliminating the sub-phase column and periods altogether.

### Sample Format for Preliminary Project Programme

<b>PHASE</b>		<b>SUB-PHASE</b>	<b>PERIOD</b>	<b>START-END</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Establish-ment</b>	Objective and Principles	4 weeks	
		Research topics	4 weeks	
<b>2</b>	<b>Research</b>	Identify target market	2 weeks	
		Group consultations	4 weeks	
		Establish demand/need	1 week	
		Prioritise issues	1 week	
		Seek resources	3 weeks	
		Rough estimates	1 week	
<b>3</b>	<b>Business planning</b>	Draft framework	2 weeks	
		Project programmes	1 week	
		Project spread sheets	2 weeks	
		Consolidated proposal	1 week	
<b>4</b>	<b>Approval of resources</b>	Preliminary adjudication	4 weeks	
		Executive approval	4 weeks	
<b>5</b>	<b>Detailed project planning</b>	Land survey	6 weeks	
		Prelim Town Planning	4 weeks	
		Prelim Engineering	4 weeks	
		Detailed Planning and Engineering designs and approvals	10 weeks	
		Annual industry holiday	4 weeks	
<b>6</b>	<b>Approval of individual projects</b>	Preliminary adjudication	3 weeks	
		Executive approval	3 weeks	
<b>7</b>	<b>Implem-entation</b>	Procurement / tenders	12 weeks	
		Bulk earthworks	16 weeks	
		Bulk/link services	12 weeks	
		Internal infrastructure	30 weeks	
		Superstructures – extra	10 weeks	
<b>8</b>	<b>Compl-etion</b>	All structures certified	2 weeks	
		Occupation	4 weeks	
		Tenure finalised	8 weeks	
<b>ENTIRE PROCESS</b>			<b>3 years &amp; 2 months</b>	

## Note 12 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

When any project process commences there are all sorts of unknown details – questions that have to be answered in order to make planning possible. Some parties in a collaboration may not realise the extent of the unknown factors, and it is really helpful for them and necessary for the process as a whole to take the trouble to list all the main questions that have to be asked. This will produce the Research Agenda that will have to be tackled by a team or committee created for that purpose.

For example, here are some quite general research questions that collaborators are likely to want answered:

**Identify the target market:** Who is to benefit from this project - generally and precisely?

The ‘general market’ might be people who live in a particular area, but the ‘precise market’ will require a detailed boundary of the area, details of any categories of people that will not be eligible and the required qualifications of people who are eligible. Details of the eligible residents will then be required: how many of them, their names, identity numbers, addresses and relevant details of their age, education level, sex, employment, skills, etc.

**Group consultations:** How will we involve the intended beneficiaries in the research?

This is usually a fundamentally important aspect of collaboration – to involve the beneficiaries themselves as much as possible in the research, and thereafter in also the planning and implementation. That can be achieved by a number of means, such as training teams of community researchers; interviewing residents in small groups; creating a questionnaire for every resident or person to respond to; and creating a number of discussion forums. The objective is two-fold: to obtain accurate information and to start getting beneficiaries involved, to the extent that it really becomes *their* project.

**Establish demand/need:** What do the various Stakeholders require from the project?

This will require accurate and inclusive research of all stakeholder groups, using a standard questionnaire, so that the responses can be aggregated and reported upon. In order to maximise stakeholder ownership they should be given as much freedom to express their own opinions and choices as possible.

**Prioritise issues:** In what order of importance or urgency should the requirements be met?

In order to get useful answers to this question the questionnaires must ask respondents to record their needs in order of importance. It is very possible that some of the needs might not be those for which the project was originally conceptualised. If these are a high priority serious attention must be given to accommodating them within the project. If this is not possible then every effort should be made to have those needs met in a different project, perhaps managed by completely different agencies in conjunction with the community representatives.

**Seek resources e.g. land:** How much of each resource is required, from where can it be acquired and upon what terms?

There is no point in starting to plan a project if some key resources are completely unavailable for any reason. List the major resources required, plus any special resources that may be in short supply, all with their detailed specifications– and then investigate how available they will be at the time when they are likely to be required for the project.

**Rough estimates:** What are the estimated total costs for various aspects of the project?

This information is required as early as possible in the process so that those who have responsibility for financing the project can obtain an idea of the likely costs involved and can begin to canvass possibilities for such funding.

### **Note 13 RESEARCH SUB-COMMITTEE**

This is a team of people who have the necessary skills to obtain the answers to the Research Questions by personal investigation, designing questionnaires and surveys, training researchers, managing the research process and controlling its quality and then analysing and reporting on the results. Such items should be recorded in the committee's terms of reference.

Care should be taken in choosing the committee members to allow each stakeholders to nominate a suitable person who can represent them. In a committee of mixed experiences and talents everyone will learn new facts, techniques and perspectives which will enrich the whole process. Parties that represent communities should be allowed to nominate specialists from their support NGOs if they wish – but that should preferably be as a supporter to a community person for whom committee membership will be a very enriching experience.

The Research Committee can, of course, be called by another name if it is desired. Its duration is likely to end as soon as it has submitted its final report on the Research Questions, but it will have played a very important role.

The nature of functions to be fulfilled by individuals will depend upon the work to be done, the skills required and the extent to which they can be fulfilled by employees of participants in the collaboration. Every function must have clear responsibilities, the required authority and real accountability.

The terms of reference for any such committee are outlined below in **Note 15**.

**Note 14 A FRAMEWORK OF COMMITTEES FOR A COLLABORATION**

For each function in the process of collaborative development the table below suggests a type of committee, the phases during which it should operate, to what the committee and its members should be accountable and for what it should responsible.

<b>FUNCTION</b>	<b>STRUCTURE</b>	
<b>Policy-making</b>	Structure name	<b>Steering Committee</b>
	Applicable phases	All
	Accountable to	Participating organisations
	Responsible for	Achieving overall objective
<b>Community Consultation</b>	Committee name	<b>Consultative Forum</b>
	Applicable phases	All
	Accountable to	Stakeholder communities
	Responsible for	Communication and consultation
<b>Investigation, Research and Overall Planning</b>	Committee name	<b>Technical Committee</b>
	Applicable phases	Preparatory phase
	Accountable to	Steering Committee
	Responsible for	Research, Technical guidelines and Framework Planning
<b>Professional Services oversight</b>	Committee name	<b>Technical Committee</b>
	Applicable phases	Planning; Implementation
	Accountable to	Steering Committee
	Responsible for	Commissioning and coordinating individual project professionals
<b>Collaborative Planning of Individual Projects</b>	Committee name	<b>Project Committees</b>
	Applicable phases	Planning
	Accountable to	Project stakeholders and Technical Committee
	Responsible for	Planning and designing one project collaboratively
<b>Implementation of Individual Projects</b>	Committee name	<b>Project Committees</b>
	Applicable phases	Implementation
	Accountable to	Project stakeholders and Technical Committee
	Responsible for	Implementing one project collaboratively
<b>Overall Co-ordination of All Projects</b>	Committee name	<b>Coordination Committee</b>
	Applicable phases	Planning; Implementation
	Accountable to	Steering Committee
	Responsible for	Coordinating the activities of the collaboration as a whole to achieve the overall objectives

**Note 15 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A COMMITTEE**

Every committee should have a ‘Terms of Reference’, which is a document which sets out the reason for the committee’s creation, its purpose, how its members are to be selected, and how it will function. A simple framework for a Terms of Reference is shown below:

**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE ..... COMMITTEE**

The parties who have signed this document have agreed to embark on the development of ..... and have therefore created the ..... Committee for the purpose of ..... for the development of .....

The membership of the Committee shall comprise two representatives from each of the following parties: .....  
.....

Decisions of the Committee shall be made by consensus.

A Chairperson for the Committee shall be appointed from time to time by the members.

The Committee shall appoint a Secretary, who shall make arrangements for meetings and provide the members with notices, agendas and minutes of meetings.

The Committee shall meet monthly, or as required by agreement of the members, or as decided by the Chairperson in response to a request by at least two members.

Signed at .....(place) on ..... (date) **[all members sign]**

## ANNEXURE E

### CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES IN THE iSLP

This annexure contains a brief summary of some of the 55 capacity-building programmes that were embarked upon in the iSLP, selected to provide an indication of the diversity of skills training that was offered. As explained in Chapter 10, these programmes were designed, requested and then managed by service departments within local and provincial government, usually with the aid of service providers such as NGOs.

**Peace Training in Schools** An initiative to combat the impact of violence in schools resulted in the establishment of Peace Clubs at sixteen iSLP schools. In these clubs strategies and plans were worked out to combat violence in schools and to devise ways of creating tolerance for diverse cultures. It was managed by the Department of Social Services.

**Babies Need Books** A literacy intervention programme in Guguletu, Crossroads and Browns Farm was aimed at breaking the cycle of deprivation in which illiterate parents compromise their children's ability to gain basic skills by not exposing them to books at an early stage. It encouraged parents to bring their nine-month-old babies to clinics where they were given a *first reader* starter pack. Included in the pack was a voucher to collect one book from participating libraries in the project.

**Network of Nutritional Services in Southern Delft** A network designed to improve the health status of people, especially pregnant mothers and children, and to equip beneficiary organisations with skills to be able to apply for nutritional development finance from the Department of Health.

**Home-Based Carer Training** – Provision of care and support to the sick and terminally ill through the training of home-based carers in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park.

**Community Health Worker Project** This raised awareness about issues of gender; developed leadership skills and inter-cultural understanding for the management of conflict by focusing on women in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi

East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park.

**Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses** An integrated strategy was designed and implemented to promote health in homes and in communities using media programmes and training in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park.

**Emergency Services Volunteers** Training was given in order to establish a capable volunteer paramedical corps in Browns Farm, Langa, Crossroads, Nyanga, Driftsands, Philippi East, Guguletu, Tambo Square and Polla Park.

**Training for the National Diploma in Emergency Medical Care Project** This was provided for 2 iSLP community members in each of Philippi East, Crossroads, Southern Delft, Guguletu and Langa.

**Information Technology (IT) Technician Training for Matriculated Youths** - IT skills were offered through an international course, and placement in jobs for youth from Philippi East, Crossroads, Southern Delft, Guguletu and Langa.

**Formation of Sports Structures** This programme established a stakeholders group and trained 3 groups from the target areas in sports leadership and general business skills, leading to better run sports clubs and employment opportunities in Guguletu, Langa Nyanga, Philippi East and Crossroads.

**Leadership Training of Volunteers for ‘Come and Play’ Programme** This provided skills to unemployed people to expand or revitalise existing programmes taking place in the community and build a strong, sustainable community-based volunteer group which can work with the ‘Come and Play’ programme to extend the City of Cape Town Administration’s Sport and Recreation development network in Guguletu, Philippi East, Browns Farm, Langa, Nyanga, Guguletu, Weltevreden Valley, KTC, Crossroads and Southern Delft.

**Certificate of Youth Trainers** – A training course was provided for a selected group of the ‘Come and Play’ volunteers to further their skills in working with young people.

**Training Volunteers Linked to TB/HIV Pilot Project** This programme offered improved HIV/AIDS/STD and TB care and referral in Langa. The project ensured continuity of care and increased access to voluntary counselling and testing. It also provided prophylactic therapy to HIV positive patients.

**Training Tenants in Business Management Skills at the SBDC Hive** This provided training for the transformation of the old small business ‘hive’ in Philippi East to become a catalyst for development of small business job creation.

**Residents’ Education in Council Services – ‘Masiphakameni’** – This programme enabled residents to understand the services provided by the City and to measure the impact of service delivery in Weltevreden Valley, Philippi East, KTC, Browns Farm and Millers Camp. The number and type of complaints were measured and the programme helped to increase payment levels

**Involvement of Local Communities in Management and Optimal Use of Public Facilities** This improved facility management by educating local community in the better utilisation of resources provided by the City in Weltevreden Valley, Philippi East, KTC, Browns Farm and Millers Camp.

**Arts and Cultural Baseline Survey** This survey identified programmes of interest to the community with a view to building capacity and developing the youth in Millers Camp, KTC, Philippi East, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa and Crossroads.

**Housing Resale Pamphlet** This pamphlet informed residents about proper sale procedures and to point out the disadvantages of selling their properties. This was issued throughout the iSLP.

**‘Masimanyane’ Peoples Housing Process** Technical support was provided in the form of the services of a Xhosa-speaking quantity surveyor to assist in the self-building project in Browns Farm, and the provision of training in bricklaying.

**Khanya Arts and Culture** This programme provided training in administration and management to ensure sustainability of community performing arts organisations in Philippi

East, Guguletu, Langa and Weltevreden Valley.

**Needs Assessment Workshop** This empowered community-based organisations to undertake a community profile and needs assessment in Weltevreden Valley and Brown's Farm.

**Community Based Organisation Training** Training was given in fund raising techniques and proposal writing. A mentorship period followed the training.

**'Qinga' Peoples Housing Process** This training helped people to build their own homes and to assist others in Heinz Park, Browns Farm, Lower Crossroads and Nyanga.

**Skills and Business Training** This programme provided economic empowerment through skills and business training.

**Basic Financial Record Keeping for Principals and Treasurers of Pre-schools** This programme promoted improved financial management of pre-schools in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi K.

**Basic Financial Record Keeping and Foundational Capacities for School Governing Bodies** Each of these courses comprised two phases, and improved the financial management of schools in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi K.

**Capacity Building for Adult Based Education and Training (ABET)** Management, business and administration programmes were provided at Community Learning Centres in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi East.

**ECD Needs Analysis** This programme analysed the needs of community pre-school teachers in Southern Delft, Browns Farm, Weltevreden Valley, Langa, Guguletu, Crossroads and Philippi.

**ECD Training of Pre-school Teachers** This training improved the standard of teaching in community pre-schools.

**Representative Council of Learners** This programme provided learners with skills necessary to usefully contribute to the governance of their schools through their Representative Council of Learners.

**Training of school caretakers** this programme improved the skills of school caretakers in order to better maintain the schools and thus be more cost effective.

**Buildsmart** A not-for-gain company was established to assist and support community builders.

**Building Environment Empowerment Project** This programme trained selected labourers in building skills and in labour and project supervision using Department of Works projects in the iSLP as the training ground.

**Procurement Management Programme** This provided emerging contractors with training for effective tendering for construction projects in Southern Delft.

**Establishment of Community Structures** This programme established representative community structures in Southern Delft, and included a team building retreat.

**Home Ownership Campaign** This educated residents about rights and obligations of home ownership in Southern Delft and Delft Leiden.

**Dispute Resolution Service** This enabled the Southern Delft community to establish an integrated dispute resolution service to serve the community and assist the local authority in this area.

**Leather craft and Sewing Skills** This was a training programme for a group in Southern Delft in order to develop useful and marketable skills - which included basic business skills to enable the participants to sell their wares more effectively.

## ANNEXURE F

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOUSING FOR BLACK PEOPLE IN CAPE TOWN UNTIL 1970

Discriminatory housing practices in Cape Town	F1
The first black townships	F2
Apartheid Cape Town	F4
The new enforcers	F7

This annexure offers a brief summary of the historical background to the iSLP case study as a prelude to the history of Crossroads recorded in Chapter 4. The reader would be wise to ponder and try to imagine a little of what the narrative represents in order to appreciate the strength of attitudes and emotions that were accumulating.

South Africa's social history is dominated by issues of 'race', the classification of which was, particularly under apartheid legislation, based upon four primary descriptors: Indian, white, coloured and black, with enormous implications for every person within a very segregated and discriminatory society.<sup>1</sup> In the historical sections of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 11) the use of some of this terminology is unavoidable, with 'black' denoting indigenous Bantu-speaking peoples; and 'coloured' referring to people of 'mixed race', predominantly consequent upon the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by Europeans from 1652. Coloured people comprised the largest segment of Cape Town's population until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the black population overtook them.

#### **Discriminatory housing practices in Cape Town**

When the Dutch began creating a permanent settlement near the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 the residents of the region were the *Khoikhoi*, nomadic herdsman who showed no interest in working for the settlers. Furthermore, the Dutch East India Company prohibited the slavery of local inhabitants and therefore imported slaves from countries that fringed the Indian Ocean, particularly Madagascar, East Africa, India and the East Indies. Slavery was the source of almost all 'labour' until the 1830s. Although the British, who governed the Cape from 1805, banned the slave trade in 1807, the practice was not abolished in its Cape Colony until 1834 after which freed slaves were required to work as 'apprentices' for another four

years. Consequently very few indigenous black people lived in Cape Town during the city's first 180 years.

Historical records suggest that it was only in the 1830s that the first black residents of the Eastern Cape began to move to Cape Town, some fleeing from the Frontier Wars in 1834-35. The first record of a settlement is of a small community of some 20 – 40 people who “lived in 6 or 8 huts ... near the foot of Table Mountain” in 1839<sup>ii</sup>. In the 1865 census, out of Cape Town's total population of 28 400<sup>iii</sup> there were about 700 black persons living in Cape Town, apart from those imprisoned on Robben Island<sup>iv</sup>. By 1900 of the city's total population of 160 000 there were about 1 500 black dock-workers living in the harbour barracks, plus 8 000 living in very overcrowded and unhygienic conditions in District Six who worked primarily as labourers but also as office messengers and cleaners.<sup>v</sup>

### **The first black townships**

By 1900 racial segregation was practiced in government hospitals and schools and by private employers. Fears of a “black invasion” circulated. The Prime Minister of the Cape, WP Schreiner, asserted that black people did not really belong in Cape Town, even though the city needed their labour. The idea of establishing ‘compounds’ of single quarters to control black workers, as had been done on the diamond and gold mines, was increasingly suggested<sup>vi</sup>, and in 1900 a government commission recommended that such a facility be established on *Uitvlugt*, a state farm near Maitland, about 8kms from the city centre.<sup>vii</sup>

An opportunity to implement this plan arose that year when bubonic plague broke out in Cape Town. It was carried by the rats that inhabited the hay that had been imported from Argentina to feed horses used by the British troops in the Boer War. Because black dock workers were the first to contract the deadly disease they were blamed for its transmission and health legislation was used to forcibly relocate black residents of District 6 to a barbed wire enclosed ‘native location’ at *Uitvlugt*, soon re-named Ndabeni. Accommodation there comprised five big corrugated iron huts, each sleeping 500 men, plus 615 unlined lean-to corrugated iron huts approximately 6m by 4m in floor area, each accommodating 8 people, together with a small number of tents. There was no privacy, cooking and ablution facilities were inadequate and there were initially no floors, resulting in flooding in winter. Rent of 10 shillings a month was charged.<sup>viii</sup>

In 1902 the Native Reserve Locations Act was passed by the Cape government, which empowered the state to force black urban dwellers to live in locations, excluding only domestic servants, registered voters (who were very few, because of the high income earning and property ownership qualifications) and those with special permission. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was established, followed rapidly by a string of legislation that controlled the accommodation and movement of black people. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 required that *all* black residents of urban areas throughout the country be segregated in locations and that controls be exercised over the movements of black people to towns and cities - "influx control" had arrived.<sup>ix</sup> Black urban work-seekers required a permit, which expired after a short period, after which the person could be ordered to leave town. An employer of a black person had to register the employment contract and pay a fee. Only black people who owned land, were on the voters role, or who were chiefs, clergymen, or (in some cases) teachers were exempt the registration provisions.<sup>x</sup> The Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act of 1937 specified that no black person could acquire land outside the rural reserves, except from another black person.<sup>xi</sup>

Labourers were much in demand in Cape Town during the First World War and Ndabeni grew rapidly. By 1920 it was indescribably filthy and derelict. It was transferred by the government to the Cape Town municipality, which soon came under pressure for the land to be used for industrial purposes as it adjoined the new 'garden city' of Pinelands. So in 1926 Ndabeni was closed down and its residents forcibly removed to a new township, Langa (meaning 'sun' - and also an abbreviation for Langalibalele, a *Hlubi* chief who had led an uprising against the British in Natal in 1875). Langa was designed for control by the authorities and migrant worker hostels were separated from each other by very high fences with only one point of access. Trading, gatherings, dances, *etc.* were all subject to the permission of the superintendent.<sup>xii</sup> By 1938 the housing in Langa was full, and the lack of housing for black urban dwellers in the Western Cape had become a social and political crisis. The government commissioned eight three-storey hostels in Langa, which were completed by 1945.<sup>xiii</sup>

Cape Town expanded through the creation of new local authorities which serviced suburbs but were not well-equipped to impose influx control measures. Consequently shantytowns of black (and coloured) people proliferated, particularly after the Second World

War was declared when the increased demand for labour in Cape Town resulted in a relaxation of the pass laws. After the war, however, influx control was re-imposed with a vengeance, including railway authorities in the Eastern Cape being authorised to prevent black persons from travelling to Cape Town and a requirement that Cape Town employers pay for their black employees to return to their rural homes at the end of their contracts.<sup>xiv</sup>

In 1948 the 'Old Location' of Nyanga ('moon') was opened and the first 210 four-roomed houses became available for a weekly rental of seven shillings and sixpence - fifteen times the going charge of sixpence for a shack in a shantytown<sup>xv</sup>. In that year about 80% of Cape Town's black population lived outside of the townships, mainly in shantytowns.<sup>xvi</sup>

### **Apartheid Cape Town**

In 1950 apartheid legislation began to be introduced by the recently-elected National Party government. This included the Population Registration Act, which officially divided South Africans into four racial groups and became the vehicle for implementing broad scale segregation, and the Group Areas Act, which was used to create racially-based residential areas, invariably requiring forced removals. The Group Areas Board designated group areas, and 'disqualified' people were given notice that they would be removed to alternative accommodation, whenever it should become available. In Cape Town it predominantly affected coloured people, but hundreds of black persons were also forcibly relocated. Barren 'buffer areas' were created to separate 'non-white' residential areas from white suburbs as well as highways.

In 1952 more racist legislation followed. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act required local authorities to set up emergency camps in which to control squatters, and authorised the demolition of shacks without offering alternative accommodation. The government refused to allow the Cape Town City Council to erect family housing in Langa and instead ordered it to build 70 more single sex barracks to cater for 17 000 male black migrant workers.<sup>xvii</sup> Further legislation permitted black men and women to stay only 3 days in an urban area seeking work. Only black males who could prove that they had been born in the urban area or had lived there continuously for at least 15 years, or had worked for one employer for 10 years, were given the right of permanent residence ('Section 10 status') - which they could share with their wives and children. Furthermore the Natives (Abolition of

Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act required every black man over the age of 16 to carry a reference book with a photograph - the hated '*dompas*'. Pass raids against 'illegals' became the order of the day, and those caught (who amounted to more than 18 000 men and 6 000 women just between 1954 and 1962) were 'endorsed out' of Cape Town<sup>xviii</sup> and returned to what the government termed their 'native reserves' or 'homelands' in the Eastern Cape, hundreds of kilometres away.

In 1954 Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, then Minister for Native Affairs, declared the Western Cape to be a 'Coloured Labour Preference Area'. No one could employ a black person if a coloured person was available to do the job. Influx control came to be applied more harshly in Cape Town than anywhere else in the country.<sup>xix</sup> The Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr Werner Eiselen, drew a line near the Fish River in the Eastern Cape and declared that only black people who possessed Section 10 rights would be allowed to live to the west of it.<sup>xx</sup> In 1958 the Native Affairs Department (NAD), which had become almost a 'state within a state', was re-named the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) as part of a centralising exercise to implement influx control more effectively than was being achieved by local authorities, some of which, like Cape Town and Johannesburg, were controlled by the opposition United Party and had not cooperated with the NAD. The BAD proceeded to engage in a long and protracted struggle to wrest control of 'native affairs' from local authorities.<sup>xxi</sup>


The second phase of Nyanga location had been completed in 1953, comprising 700 semi-detached family units for black households whose shacks had been demolished. Then in 1958 a new township was established at Nyanga West, which became known as Guguletu ('our pride'). All houses there were designed so that they could be converted into single quarters. For many families their 'home' comprised no more than one bed.<sup>xxii</sup> In 1959 Dr Verwoerd, now Prime Minister, announced that apartheid had been succeeded by the supposedly 'non-racist' policy of 'separate development' in terms of which black people would live in Bantustans and urbanisation would be stemmed.<sup>xxiii</sup> In 1960 the government infamously demonstrated its determination by shooting protesters at Sharpeville in the Witwatersrand, establishing a state of emergency, banning political parties whose members were predominantly non-white and jailing their leaders for long terms. Locally, the government divided the Cape Peninsula into two 'proclaimed areas' for the administration of black people. One included Nyanga and was administered by the Divisional Council and northern municipalities (all National Party controlled); and the other included Langa and

Guguletu and was administered by Cape Town Municipality (controlled by the opposition United Party). Black persons were supposed to work only within the proclaimed area in which their township was located, and had to obtain permission to visit family or friends in the other area.<sup>xxiv</sup> The persecution of black urban dwellers, even those with permits, was inexorable.

From 1965, as a strategy by government to interrupt employment service and avoid additional awards of permanent residence, Black persons in the Western Cape were required to return to their homeland at the end of each contract period and from there re-apply for their work. By the late 1960s those who were endorsed out of Cape Town were sent to ‘resettlement camps’ in the Eastern Cape, sometimes located near artificially-created, unsustainable industrial areas. Furthermore, the Bantu Affairs Department was given the right to remove anyone’s Section 10 rights if they were deemed to be ‘idle’ or ‘undesirable’. In spite of this, official figures show that the black population of Cape Town rose from approximately 70 000 in 1960 to 250 000 in 1974.<sup>xxv</sup>

Map 1 below shows in diagrammatic form the location of townships that had been constructed by 1960.

**Map 1. Cape Town: Black Townships  
Constructed between 1900-1960**



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- <sup>i</sup> Terreblanche S. 2002. *A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002*. University of Natal Press and KMM Review Publishing Co.Ltd. p. 333.
- <sup>ii</sup> Bickford-Smith, V, van Heyningen, E & Worden, N. 1998. *Cape Town: The Making of a City*. David Philip. Cape Town. p. 109.
- <sup>iii</sup> *ibid* p. 177.
- <sup>iv</sup> Field, S ed. 2001. *Lost Communities, Living Memories: Remembering Forced Removals in Cape Town*. Centre for Popular Memory, University of Cape Town. David Philip. Cape Town. p. 16.
- <sup>v</sup> *ibid* p. 16-17.
- <sup>vi</sup> *ibid* p. 17.
- <sup>vii</sup> Readers Digest. 1994. *Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story*. Cape Town: Readers Digest. p. 314.
- <sup>viii</sup> *Ibid* p. 314.
- <sup>ix</sup> Field, S ed. 2001. p 19.
- <sup>x</sup> Readers Digest. 1994. p 316.
- <sup>xi</sup> Bickford-Smith, V, van Heyningen, E & Worden, N (1999) *Cape Town in the twentieth century: An illustrated social history*. David Philip. Cape Town. p 124.
- <sup>xii</sup> *ibid* p. 87-88.
- <sup>xiii</sup> Field, S ed. (2001). p. 37.
- <sup>xiv</sup> *Ibid* p. 20-21.
- <sup>xv</sup> Bickford-Smith *et al* . 1999. p. 123.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Field, S ed. 2001. p. 21.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Readers Digest. 1994. p. 428.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Bickford-Smith *et al* . 1999. p. 174-175.

<sup>xix</sup> *Ibid* p. 175.

<sup>xx</sup> Readers Digest. 1994. p. 428.

<sup>xxi</sup> Terreblanche S. 2002. p. 240, 321

<sup>xxii</sup> Bickford-Smith *et al.* 1999. p. 177.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Terreblanche S. 2002. p. 321.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Bickford-Smith *et al.* 1999. p. 182.

<sup>xxv</sup> *Ibid* p. 182.