“Let’s Smash the Idols!” Kemal Pilavoğlu’s Sufi Pan-Islamism in Republican Turkey

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Abstract

This dissertation is a case-study of a Tijaniyya organization in Turkey and its Turkish founder, Kemal Pilavoğlu (1906-1977), who established the order in or around 1931. The Tijaniyya is a Sufi order from north Africa, founded by Abu al-ʿAbbâs Ahmad ibn Mahammad al-Tijânî (1737–1815) between 1781-1785. This case-study is grounded in Itzchak Weismann's theory that Sufism in general has played an important role in the Muslim world's response to modernity. This theory underpins the argument that those "Islamists" who continue to be revered as Sufi heroes in Turkey, such as Said Nursi and Necep Fazıl Kisakürek, have drawn on the Ottoman past and the legacy of Islam in their dialogical responses to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's state-led reform project of modernization during the establishment of Republican Turkey. These Sufi "Islamist" responses to the Kemalist project of forced cultural change, which have been dubbed "Neo-Ottoman" by Hakan Yavuz, successfully resurrected an idealized notion of Ottoman tradition, history, and culture as part of their vision to re-Islamicize Turkish society. Although Pilavoğlu was similarly opposed to Kemalism and the super-imposition of westernization, this dissertation proposes that he did not sufficiently draw upon the Ottoman past in his dialogical response to the rapid modernization of Turkish society vis-à-vis super-imposed European systems of nation-building. Pilavoğlu, in contrast to "Neo-Ottoman" responses, sought to portray a universal notion of Islamic identity which did not vernacularize Islam as an Ottoman-cum-Turkish dimension of cultural identity. Hagiographies written by Pilavoğlu's followers form the data which inform the narrative for this case-study, and a selection of Pilavoğlu's discursive responses from his extensive body of written work are the focus for analysis. This dissertation also includes summary translations of an assortment of these primary source materials, which have until now not been translated into English.

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Herkese, çok müteşekkirim, çok teşekkür ederim.

Language and Conventions

Commonly used Arabic terms which are in mainstream usage in English appear in their conventionally accepted spellings; for example, terms such as Qur'an, sharia, Sufi, etc. Terms which are less mainstreamed in English will generally appear in their Turkish equivalent. For example, the term *ezan* is used to refer to the Arabic call to prayer, which often appears in Islamic Studies content with typical limited Arabic transliteration as *adhan*. Similarly, the Turkish term *tarikat (*plural: *tarikatlar*) is used to refer to *tariqa* (plural: *turuq*).

The exception to this use of Turkish renderings for Islamic terms applies primarily to the use of the names of Sufi organizations, because in some cases the Turkish rendering of an order's name makes it somewhat unintelligible with its limited Arabic transliteration. For example, the Turkish rendering of *Khalwati* is *Halveti*. Most importantly for this dissertation, for instance, is the Turkish rendering *Ticani* for *Tijani*. The appellation *Tijani / Tijaniyya* is used throughout this dissertation except when quoting Turkish sources. However, the appellation *Nakşibendi* is used throughout this dissertation, due somewhat to the intelligibility of this Turkish rendering with the Arabic *Naqshbandi*, but also because of the pervasiveness of *Nakşibendi* in English sources about Turkish *Nakşibendi* Sufi organizations.

For each summary translation in this dissertation, the preface of each book is translated in full, which is clearly marked at the beginning of the summary. After this, each summary is a mixture of direct quotations from the source, and a synopsis of its content. These synopses are not exhaustive. When direct/full translations of a section of text are included within a synopsis, these are offset according to conventional formatting standards for in-text quotations.

Dates are provided in common era (CE), unless it appears in a direct quotation which uses the *hijra* (AH) calendar.

Chapter 1
Introduction

In 1942, Kemal Pilavoğlu, along with several other Turkish Tijanis, were tried in court for the spurious crime of "attempting to establish a *tarikat*." Around the same time, the group had begun to make headlines for publicly reciting the *ezan* (*adhan*, Muslim call to prayer) in Arabic, defying the law in republican Turkey at the time requiring its recitation in Turkish. They performed these recitations in various locations throughout Anatolia, but probably the most famous of these protests was when they recited the Arabic *ezan* during a parliamentary session in Ankara in 1949, for which several Tijanis were arrested. The group's true claim to fame, however, came between 1950 and 1951, when reports from across Anatolia began to appear of statues of Atatürk being decapitated and smashed.

All these incidents were viewed by the Turkish state and depicted in pro-Kemalist press as reactionary events and in contravention to the nation's values. In response, Law 5816 was ratified in 1951 by the ruling authorities, which prohibited crimes against Atatürk, including defacing a statue, bust, or portrait of him; incurring prison sentences for its violation.[1] In 1952, following a lengthy trial covered by the Turkish press,[2] Pilavoğlu, along with 74 Tijani *müritler* (disciples, or followers) were convicted of issuing statements and committing deeds against secularism and Atatürk, and for *tarikatçılık* (sectarianism, or denominationalism). The latter was a common charge leveled against those involved in protesting the Turkish call to prayer, which at the time was a popular form of protest among those opposed to the "Turkification" of Islam in Republican Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is undeniably described as the founder of Republican Turkey. His legacy still prevails in twenty-first century Turkey, but it has steadily diminished as the nation's history advances. The Republic's founding philosophy when it was instilled by Atatürk was based on a radical form of Jacobin secularism,[3] an aim of which was to remove religion from the public sphere. Atatürk's laicism, or "Kemalism," has since become largely obsolete, and has been reformulated using remnants of the Ottoman past. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), for instance, legitimizes its political program via what Hakan Yavuz in his book *Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of neo-Ottomanism* describes as an "Islamic-cum-nationalist system." The AKP has achieved this by criticizing the Kemalist system for participating in the oppression of Turkish Muslim identity, and by invoking a nostalgia for an idealized Ottoman past. Likewise, it has not been uncommon for Turkey's conservative "Islamist" historians and journalists to frame Atatürk's project of Republicanization as a "Western plot." Indeed, by the 1990s, Kemalism was viewed even by liberal and some left-wing parties as an "…authoritarian modernization project that was the main obstacle to Turkey's democratization."[4]

Nevertheless, undier Article 301 of the Turkish penal code it remains a crime to denigrate the Turkish Nation and its heroes, the State of the Turkish Republic and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and the judicial institutions of the State. Atatürk is still considered by the Republic to be one of its foremost heroes, and so publicly insulting his memory and legacy is punishable by imprisonment for terms of six months up to two years. At the time of the inception of the Republic of Turkey, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha (who would later take the surname name Atatürk) was a household name throughout the Muslim world. He was the leader of the successful Turkish War for Independence against the victors of World War One, after which the Allied powers were forced to abandon their plot to continue expanding their project of territorial mandates in former Ottoman territories. Mustafa Kemal had successfully established an independent Muslim nation amidst the domination of Christian powers in a war that had been originally portrayed as a *jihad* against Western imperialism. He became a role model for leaders and intellectuals across a wide spectrum; he had earned the respect of socialists, anti-imperialist activists such as the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Punjabi-cum-Pakistani and anti-western Muslim poet, Muhammad Iqbal, among others.[5]

Official historiographies of the Turkish War of Independence cite nationalism as the primary ideological motivation which inspired the resistance. Contrary to this official story, Şükrü Hanioğlu argues in her book, *Atatürk: An Intellectual History*, that it is apparent that Islam was a key motivator. Mustafa Kemal was not only aware of the motivational aspect of Islam but used it to his advantage. As he garnered early support for the resistance movement, Mustafa Kemal did not defend his position based on national unity. Instead, he undermined the Ottoman imperial authorities by invoking the Qur'an, accusing them of corruption: "O believers! Do not proceed in any matter before a decree from Allah and His Messenger. And fear Allah. Surely Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing."[6] Şerif Mardin in his book *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey* similarly notes Mustafa Kemal's awareness of and readiness to manipulate the centrality of Islam was a way of cultivating a new Turkish national consciousness:

> there is no doubt that Mustafa Kemal was interested in using Islam as a fulcrum for a project of civil participation… in his statements in the early 1920s, [he] never failed to praise both Islam and the potentialities of the Turkish people.[7]

As mentioned, the struggle for independence was originally portrayed as a *jihad*. This was another part of Mustafa Kemal's strategic effort for maintaining the support of the Khilafat movement in central Asia and India, which had already donated significant funds to the war effort with the understanding that part of the struggle was to protect the Ottoman Caliphate from western inculcation.[8] Gareth Jenkins in his book *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* Similarly attests that Mustafa Kemal had "…no

hesitation in instrumentalizing Islam in pursuit of his short-term goals… Muslim clergy and leaders of the *tariqah*, played a critical role in organizing and recruiting volunteers [to fight in the resistance]."[9]

Cognizant of the central role of Islam in the consciousness of most Muslim Ottoman subjects, Mustafa Kemal strategically cultivated relations with Sufi shaykhs as he garnered support for his resistance movement against the encroachment of Allied imperialism. He was equally aware of the position of the Sufi *tarikat* (plural: *tarikatlar*) as a primary institution of social authority and a source of cohesion among Muslims in the Empire. However, there is little doubt that his approach to Sufi shaykhs was also a deliberate strategy to subvert his ultra-exclusionary objectives of establishing an ethnically Turkish nation; the majority of whose citizens were, and remained, Muslim. This also despite the fact that a significant proportion of Ottoman Muslims were not ethnically Turkish.

Mustafa Kemal envisioned a disruption of the Ottoman narrative which would euthanize "the sick man of Europe," and replace it with a nation-state modeled on a secular, Western framework. In his vision, adopted from Emile Durkheim's notion of a "civic religion" grounded in scientism, history, and language, Turkish nationalism would naturally replace religion.[10] In the new Turkish republic, this would be achieved by drastically reimagining Islam as a distinctly Turkish tradition, purged of its Arab origins and influence. He seemed to believe that it was this "Arab faith" which was the primary obstacle in developing national feelings of enthusiasm for the nation, because accepting Muhammad's message required the suppression of identity in order to fully commit to the exaltation of a monotheistic, but ultimately culturally Arab creed of Allah. As Hanioğlu explains, "Like Durkheim, Mustafa Kemal thought that nationalism, through which secular citizens practice a cult of the state, would perform the function of the sacred."[11] As part of his aim of creating a national consciousness, a considerable portion of his project was an extensive set of policies of reform which would erase the Ottoman legacy and establish in its place a modern, secular, yet utterly Turkish nation. Attempts at increasing religious homogeneity in the emerging Republic were undertaken in the form of expulsion of non-Muslims from Anatolia, population exchanges with several of the former Ottoman territories (such as Greece) and forced relocations of Muslims from these areas into Anatolia. The new Republic was then saddled with the task of how to transform a community of Muslims, many of whom did not even speak the same language, into a nation.[12]

The material aspects of daily life such as food and drink, clothing, and entertainment were refocused using European substitutions or altered habits. For instance, Atatürk personally oversaw the introduction of a variety of new art forms and schools of artistic thought, including the performing arts, in an effort to move away from traditional Ottoman-Islamic art forms such as calligraphy, tiling, architecture, etc. For example, in 1923, he declared that the Islamic prohibition against sculpture was obsolete, announcing that development of this art form comprised "one of the components of progress."[13] Clothing, perhaps the most external material marker of religion in the Ottoman Empire, was also

reformed; for instance, the Hat Law of 1925 enforced the wearing of hats with brims, or "western-style" hats, instead of the fez and turbans. Restrictions around wearing the veil in designated public locations were also introduced. It began to appear as though the political and social centrality of Islam was being dismembered. However, these policies of reform ultimately overlooked a more significant problem, described by Mardin as "[a problem of] understanding the relation between the structure the Republic had inherited and the system it wanted to install."[14]

In 1924, the Ottoman royal family was expelled,[15] the caliphate was abolished, the ulama were removed from their judicial and educational functions, the office of *Şeyhülislam* (the chief grand *Mufti*, or jurist)[16] was eliminated, and sharia-based law systems were removed from civil codes. This left the Sufi *tarikatlar* as the only Muslim organizations with any influence in Turkish society. In 1925, the *tarikatlar* led the first armed uprising against these Republican reforms, known as the Shaykh Said rebellion, which was met with a powerful crackdown on all centers of opposition to the Kemalist regime. Later that same year, the *tarikatlar* were closed, their activities were banned, and *türbeler* (tombs of religious figures) and shrines, and sites of religious pilgrimage—the latter a common practice in Sufism-- were closed. Mustafa Kemal declared that the outlawing of *tarikatlar* was necessary "…in order to prove that our nation as a whole was no primitive nation, filled with superstitions and prejudices."[17]

The following year, Mustafa Kemal commissioned the erection of statues and busts of his own likeness in prominent locations throughout the young Republic, in a flagrant rejection of strictures around any form of iconoclasm in Islam. The first statue of his likeness was erected in 1926 just beyond the gardens of Topkapı Palace, "…depicting him looking toward Anatolia while turning his back on the former imperial palace."[18] Ironically, the Kemalist slogan during these years was "Let's Smash the Idols!" This motto was in reference to ridding Republican society of the "idols" of Islam in order to, as Feroz Ahmad puts it in *The Making of Modern Turkey*, "create a more suitable social environment for a modern society to flourish."[19] By 1928, all constitutional references to Islam had been removed, replaced by a version of the Swiss civil code.

That same year, the "iconoclastic" use of Arabic script for writing Ottoman Turkish, which had been in use for nearly 700 years, was replaced with a Latin 29-letter Turkish alphabet, in order to further detach the nation from Islamic influence. Concurrent with Latinization was the establishment of the *Türk Dil Kurumu* (TDK, Turkish Language Association) in 1932. The primary aim of the TDK was to replace Arabic and Persian loanwords, which often accounted for the majority of vocabulary in Ottoman Turkish (as much as ninety percent in some texts). In many cases, it was not only words that were borrowed, but also the grammatical systems of Arabic and Persian; in some texts, full sentences or sections in Arabic, Persian, or both, were fully integrated into the Turkish Ottoman syntactic structure. The "purification" efforts of the TDK, which substituted Arabic and Persian words for words of Turkic origin, and created

Turkish neologisms where terminology was perceived as lacking, effectively shifted the language to the extent that contemporary Turkish is almost unintelligible with its Ottoman ancestor. Nevertheless, the shift has been inconsistent in many areas. For instance, in juridical and administrative usage, Arabic terminology is still abundantly represented. Similarly, Arabic, as the language of the Qur'an, was never fully expunged from liturgical practice.[20] However, in 1928 it became required by law to deliver the Friday *hutbe* (*khuṭbah*, sermon) in Turkish. On the 1 Feburary 1932, the first Turkish *ezan* was recited, violating the unanimous Hanafi position (the predominant school of jurisprudence to which the Ottoman ulama subscribed), requiring that the delivery of *hutbeler* and prayers, including the *ezan*, be delivered in Arabic. The translation of the *ezan* was so thoroughly "Turkish" that the *takbir* had been translated from its universal *Allahu Akbar* to *Tanrı Uludur*, replacing the Arabic word for God with the Turkic word of Central Asian origin for a pre-Islamic sky god, *Tanrı*.

Despite the pervasiveness of these and many other extensive reforms, which were all designed to remove the memory of the Ottoman legacy from the consciousness of the infant Republic, the role of religion in communal and social life did not ebb with the official recession of Islam in the rising tide of the top-down implementation of secularism. While the Kemalist regime seemed to believe that the creation of a secular class of Turks would propel the nation into modernity, the majority of Turks remained largely (although not entirely) unaffected by Kemalist *laiklik* (secularism). Similarly, Kemalism, or the political spectrum of ideologies of westernization which have been inspired by the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, did not successfully obliterate the *tarikatlar*. Certainly, the residue of the social framework of these organizations, which had been operating as central sources of the practical and ideological integration of socio-cultural systems of Ottoman Muslims,[21] was largely disregarded by Kemalist reforms.

These Sufi organizations, which were so deeply entangled in the fabric of Turkish spiritual and social consciousness, continued to operate clandestinely, notwithstanding the Sufi-led resistance movements which continued to punctuate the 1930s and 40s following the Shaykh Said rebellion in 1925. Indeed, the *tarikatlar* were the primary facilitators of the reemergence of Islam in the political sphere following World War Two and the end of the one-party period of Kemalist rule.

Rationale

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a case-study of one of these *tarikatlar*. Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu is credited with establishing a Tijani Sufi *tarikat* in or around 1931 in Ankara. The Tijaniyya is a globally distributed Sufi network with *zawiya*-s (*tekkeler*, or lodges/establishments) across the world. Algerian in its origin, the Tijaniyya was founded between 1781-1785 by Abu al-ʿAbbâs Ahmad ibn Mahammad al-Tijânî (1737–1815). According to Jamil Abun-Nasr's polemic survey, *The Tijaniyya*, and

Zachary Wright's more recent monograph, *Realizing Islam: The Tijaniyya in North Africa and the Eighteenth-Century Muslim World*, the network is still successful in its native Maghreb region, and has become most widespread in West Africa. The organization is particularly prominent in Chad, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and northern Nigeria.[22] From its inception, the organization has been able to easily adjust to new political situations, which has contributed to its long-term success and tenacity, which allows the organization to continue to flourish.

Most surveys of Sufism typically present the Tijaniyya as an 'African' *tarikat*. The narratives of the spread of the order often emphasize its north African birth begotten by Shaykh Ahmad al-Tijani. For instance, Jean-Louis Triaud and David Robinson's edited book *La Tijâniyya: Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique* is still probably the most important collection of essays entirely devoted to the history of the order. The book provides rich insights into Tijani history in Africa, and even its title and scope reinforce the image of an inherent 'Africanness' of the Tijaniyya.[23] Likewise, while Jillali El Adnani's *La Tijâniyya, 1781-1881: les origines d'une confrérie religieuse au Maghreb* focuses specifically on the network's early history, its organizational structure, doctrines and precepts, and does not attempt to broaden the scope of the Tijaniyya's distribution beyond its African origins.[24]

However, the Tijani network was not curtailed on the shores of the Mediterranean. Tijani affiliations have played an active, public role in a variety of contexts; in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Anatolia, particularly in the early years following the end of Ottoman rule in these areas. For instance, the Syrian leader of the first Palestinian revolt, 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam (d. 1935) was informed by Tijani doctrine.[25] In Albania, the spread of the Tijaniyya, Nathalie Clayer argues, was related to the interference by the state in religious affairs, which resulted in a religious surge of energy that could not be contained by the authorities.[26]

A defining characteristic of the Tijani *tarikat* is its religious exclusivity, which non-Tijani Muslims in many contexts have commonly received with intolerance. This is likely due mainly to the Tijani prerogative of "superiority" over other *tarikatlar*, which is intensified by the requirement that affiliation with other *tarikatlar* must be relinquished once initiated into the Tijaniyya. This exclusivity is further informed by the belief in the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*, or a universal path on which a shaykh's authority runs in parallel with saints and the Prophet Muhammad. The *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* is not a physical Sufi organization but is a metaphorical method of approach which includes a diverse set of teachings and litanies which are designed to foster a direct intimacy between the aspirant and the Prophet. Another aspect of Tijani belief which contributes to their prerogative of superiority is the Tijani conviction that Ahmad al-Tijani is the *Khātim al-Walāya*, or seal of the saints. As with other Sufi orders, the aim of the Tijaniyya in their actions has been, and remains, to demonstrate the conformity of their rituals and beliefs to the precepts of the sharia. In the Tijani tradition, this aim to demonstrate conformity

is compounded by the role of the shaykh, which requires that his every utterance should be interpreted as conforming in some sense to the sharia, regardless of how incongruous the interpretations of these utterances may be.

Literature Review

There are no comprehensive studies in English or in Turkish about the Turkish Tijaniyya, Kemal Pilavoğlu, or their activism in the 1950s; this dissertation is the first extensive study in this regard. In English, passing references to their activities form small notes of larger discussions about the re-emergence of Islam following the end of the one-party period in Republican Turkey. These references, most of which were published within a few years of their activist responses, often depict the Tijanis and their activism as reactionary outbursts contrary to the ideals of modernity. Jenkins presents a more updated, though no more detailed depiction. He spends only a paragraph discussing the organization, describing the *tarikat* as a "religious order" which was rigorously pursued by the Democrat Parti (DP, Democrat Party), the first political opposition to the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party), as the party began to revise Atatürk's secularizing reforms following the 1950 national elections. Jenkins notes:

> …in response to the attacks by the *Ticani* [on statues and busts of Atatürk], on 27 July 1951 the DP passed Law No. 5816 on Crimes against Atatürk, which provided prison sentences of up to three years for denigrating Atatürk's memory and up to five years for defacing a statue, bust or portrait of him.[27]

Mardin's acknowledgement of Turkish Tijanis is similarly minor. He includes a brief mention of their more well-known activities in his description of a what he categorizes as the second in a series of developments following the liberalization of religious policies in the 1940s, the first of which was the rise in criticism towards the laicism of the CHP. As part of the second development, which he mentions was the reappearance of religious groups "loosely labeled as *tarika*s", Mardin notes the following about Tijani involvement:

> [In the 1940s the Tidjani order] specialized in smashing busts of Atatürk… During its early spread in North Africa, it had assumed special characteristics, such as a 'revulsion against asceticism'… [and possessed] little in their method and training that the old Sufis would have regarded as mystical …barely comparable with institutions that went by that name [Tidjani] at an earlier time.[28]

Interestingly, Mardin's brief note on the Tijaniyya appears together with what he describes as "Another movement, more difficult to categorize", referring to Bediüzzaman Said Nursi's Nurcu movement.

Emile Marmorstein devotes more attention to their activism in his 1952 article "Religious Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East" but concludes that they were "merely the 'shock troops' of a larger movement… the other orders [of Sufism being] …larger and more influential."[29] Bernard Lewis in his 1952 paper "Islamic Revival in Turkey" briefly explains, "the Tijanis have been most active [in 1951], and it is they that have become associated, in the public mind, with the most extreme and thoroughgoing form of religious reaction."[30] In his 1954 paper, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," Howard Reed describes Pilavoğlu and the *tarikat* in similar terms, describing the Turkish Tijanis as "the most notorious among reactionary movements," who were against the various secularist restrictions limiting Islam in the public sphere. Reed also curiously asserts that Pilavoğlu "tried to use the ignorant zeal of his adherents for his own questionable material and political ends," with no follow-up explanation about the exact details of what comprised these ends.[31]

Abun-Nasr in *The Tijaniyya*, also turns fleetingly to Turkey. He begins by asserting that the Tijaniyya "attracted much attention in the middle of the twentieth century by its opposition to the reforms of Atatürk." He explains that Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) may have been initiated into the Tijaniyya by Muhammad bin al-Mukhtar, a widely traveled Tijani from Shinqit in Mauritania, while being received by the Sultan in Istanbul. Describing a "major episode… in which the Tijanis were deeply involved," Abun-Nasr cites the same abovementioned article from Reed, explaining a "[Tijani] campaign against public monuments of living creatures… [during which they were] asserting that such images were prohibited by Islam." The only additional information Abun-Nasr offers is from a letter that he received from the Dean of the Divinity Faculty at the University of Ankara in 1961, who explained that Pilavoğlu "…tried to win the support of its [the *tarikat*'s] members in becoming elected to the National Assembly." Abun-Nasr concludes the section by suggesting that "the movement which Pilavoğlu led seems to have died out with his imprisonment."[32]

The situation in Turkish scholarship on Pilavoğlu's Tijaniyya is largely the same in content and even outlook. For example, Mustafa Tekin's entry on "Ticanîlik," (Tijaniism) (Political Thought in Modern Turkey) appears under the sub-heading "İrtica Nedir?" (What is Reaction[ary]?).[33] The entry provides a summary of the origins of the Tijaniyya, as well as a brief explanation of the organization's activities in Turkey. The latter includes a description of the aforementioned 1897 meeting between Muhammad ibn al-Mukhtar and Sultan Abdülhamid II, and then recounts several incidents of the illegal recitation of the *ezan* in Arabic in the 1940s by Tijani *müritler*. Surprisingly, the entry makes no mention of the desecration of statues of Atatürk in the early 1950s. In keeping with the abovementioned remarks on the Tijaniyya from scholars in English, Tekin concludes the three-page entry with the "çok tepkisel yönleri öne çıkan bir hareket olduğu anlaşılmaktadır" (it is understood that this is a very reactive movement whose [reactive attributes] are prominent."[34]

There are only two academic studies devoted to Pilavoğlu in Turkish. The first is an undergraduate thesis submitted to the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University in 2005 by İklima Gençdoğan, titled; "Son Devir Mutasavvıflarından: Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı ve Tasavvuf Anlayışı" (Sufis of the Last Era: Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu's Life and Sufi Understanding),[35] and Abdukaydr Abdikamit Uulu's master's thesis titled; "Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı ve Tasavvufi Görüşleri" (Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu's Life and Sufi Views).[36]

Gençdoğan's study draws heavily, and often verbatim on two hagiographies of Pilavoğlu's life. The first hagiography is titled, *Fet'hi Rabbânî.* It is primarily a translation of Muhammad ibn 'Abdallāh at-Tisfāwī's *The Divine Opening: A Handbook on the Rules & Etiquettes of the Tariqa Tijaniyya*. *The Divine Opening* is a seminal book in the Tijani tradition, detailing such central doctrines as the Seal of Saints, and the emphasis on the concept of a *Quṭb* (axial sainthood) in Tijani belief. Following the final chapter of the *Divine Opening* translation in *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, a *silsila* (chain of transmission) of the Tijaniyya, with Pilavoğlu at the end of the chain, is included. Gençdoğan reproduces this *silsila* in its entirety in his thesis.

Uulu's thesis recounts the same history of the Tijaniyya and the leadership of Shaykh Ahmad Al-Tijani from their north African origins, but in a great deal more detail than Gençdoğan's treatment. Uulu also includes detailed discussions of Tijani doctrines, litanies, and an explanation of the general structure of the organization. However, when Uulu turns his attention to Pilavoğlu's life and Tijanis in Turkey, he ultimately reproduces the same *silsila* from *Fet'hi Rabbânî.*

In Gençdoğan's thesis, the *silisla* is followed by a brief explanation of how the Tijaniyya first found its way to Istanbul, and ultimately to Pilavoğlu.[37] As he recounts these details and discusses Pilavoğlu's leadership, Gençdoğan makes use of a second hagiography, titled *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı 1906-1977*. This is the most recently published hagiography, with an edition released in 2013, although the first edition was published at least as early as 2005 according to Gençdoğan's citations.[38] The author of this hagiography, Muzaffer Yıldız, is Pilavoğlu's son-in-law, who married Pilavoğlu's daughter Neriman.[39] By far the most comprehensive of the three known hagiographies on Pilavoğlu, Yıldız's account provides a detailed, and at times mundane account of Pilavoğlu's life beginning with his birth, concluding with his illness and death. This book also discusses Pilavoğlu's ancestry and the origin of the name *Pilavoğlu*.

Significantly, in *Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı*, author Yıldız claims that Pilavoğlu's ancestry is traced to one of seven descendants of Muhammad, who came from Medina to Ankara during a famine in the 16th century. Uulu includes a reference to Gençdoğan's thesis—nowhere does Uulu make use of or seem to be aware of Yıldız's hagiography-- for information on the origin of the name *Pilavoğlu*. However, Uulu's research does include a 2019 interview with Selahaddin Altunbaş, a grandson of Pilavoğlu's who lives in

Ankara. The information from the interview corroborates much of the information available elsewhere about Pilavoğlu, but it does not appear to include additional insights about his life.

The third and oldest hagiography (at least by publication date), which does not appear in the abovementioned academic theses, is titled *Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti* (*Who was Pilavoğlu? The Perfect Preferred Prayer, the Salatul Fatihi and its Virtues).* [40] This two-part book was written by Eyyüb Çakır, a loyal follower of Pilavoğlu who attempted to continue Pilavoğlu's leadership after his death with a small group of Pilavoğlu's devoted *müritler*.

All three hagiographies are two-part books, each including a section dedicated to devotional guidelines for Tijani adepts. At the end of *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı*, Pilavoğlu's own explanations of the *Salatul Fatihi* and the *Jawaratul Kemal* are included. The *Jawaratul Kemal* or "Jewel of Perfection," is one of the two central devotional prayers of the Tijaniyya. In Tijani tradition, it is believed that literal light is associated with the other devotional prayer, the *Salatul Fatihi* or the "perfect and preferred prayer," because when this prayer was delivered from heaven-- not to Ahmad al-Tijani, but to an earlier Egyptian Sufi, Shaykh Muhammad al-Bakri (1492-1545) -- it was on a tablet of light which could be read from every angle. According to Abun-Nasr, "The Prophet, however, is said to have informed Ahmad al-Tijani of its [the *Salatul Fatihi*] great efficacy in the remission of sins, and assigned it as part of the Tijani *wird* [litany]."[41] The benefits of reciting this prayer, it is believed, exponentially outstrip any other litanies. Çakır, by including a translation and explanation of several central dimensions of Tijani doctrine and practice, seems to be trying to underpin the significance of Pilavoğlu's leadership as the transmitter of such exceptional benefits previously little known to other Turkish Sufis. Likewise, the translator/author of *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, by choosing to first include a translation of the fundamental Tijani text of *The Divine Opening* similarly draws attention to Pilavoğlu's leadership and emphasizes his claim of authority within the Tijaniyya community in Turkey.

Another Turkish biographical source which is not a hagiography but provides some first-hand information about Pilavoğlu, is the book *Saatçi Musa*. The book is a biography of Musa "Saatçi" Çağıl by Asım Öz published in 2010. A few pages of the book include an interview with Çağıl, who spent time in prison with Pilavoğlu and a handful of the latter's Tijani *müritler*. The interview provides non-hagiographical details of portions of Pilavoğlu's life, including crucial insights about Pilavoğlu's activism, his alleged involvement with the CHP and the DP, and the fate of the Tijaniyya order following his death.[42] Detailed summary translations of the three hagiographies; *Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti*, *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, and *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun hayatı 1906-1977*, have been included at the end of this dissertation.

Other, minor details of Pilavoğlu's life are available elsewhere, such as on a handful of Turkish websites about the Tijaniyya in Turkey. Generally, these sites draw on the hagiographies mentioned here.

If they do not directly draw on these texts, often the source(s) of these websites have obtained informal statements from his living family members who remain active participants in the Tijani community in Ankara. As noted with Uulu's interview, in most cases, the content of these statements can be corroborated with the objective details from the hagiographies.

Primary Sources and Analytical Focus

Pilavoğlu's own extensive, mostly self-published work contains no auto-biographical information, and similarly provides little self-reflexive narrative information or discussions about the aspects of his personal interest in the Tijaniyya doctrines as a source for an "Islamist" project. The majority of his writing can be broadly divided into two main categories: devotional treatises and leaflets concerning social elements of Islam which he found important; and discursive responses to the context in which Pilavoğlu was living and writing. Pilavoğlu's aim in much of his work was to argue in favor of the restoration of the position of Islam to its former role as a primary framework of society. Pilavoğlu's response, like many around the same time, emphasized a worldview which was critical of the super-imposition of secular values, and was firmly situated within an Islamic framework.

In his devotional works such as *Kendini Bil* (Know Yourself), he directly addresses his audience, urging them to walk on the "true path" of Islam.[43] He weaves into these works a common thread of several universal Islamic concepts; often referring to the importance of treading the path of *tawhid* (Indivisible Oneness of God) and advocating a message of Islam as an essential, primordial truth that all people have the potential to recognize and undertake. In another characteristic example, his devotional work *Müsülman Kızın Din Kitabı* ([The] Muslim Girl's Religion Book), is something of an "instructional manual" for Muslim women. In the book, he covers things like the importance of keeping track of one's menstrual cycle, including details about the duration, and even the color of menstrual discharge, and warnings about refraining from intercourse with one's husband while blood is still present.[44] Much of this book, which is a typical feature in his devotional (or, in this case, didactic) works, is interspersed with verses from the Qur'an and prayers which include explanations about when best to recite these. In these devotional and didactic works, his intended audience appears to be ordinary, conservative Turks who are already secure in their devotion to Islam, and perhaps intent on intensifying their piety. Considering these likely intended aims, these works are generally devoid of polemical discussions espousing a blueprint for forming an alternative reality to elitist Republican secular nationalist narratives. Moreover, these works do not generally include discursive engagements with or any basic focus on what Pilavoğlu considered the problematic aspects of secularism for Islamic practice in their focus on pietistic enhancement of daily life.

The other major category of Pilavoğlu's work is his discursive responses to the context in which Pilavoğlu was writing. These form the analytical focus of this dissertation. In these works, Pilavoğlu sought to portray a notion of Islamic identity which did not vernacularize Islam as an Ottoman-cum-Turkish dimension of cultural identity. These discursive responses tend to focus on a message of Islam as an essential, primordial truth—yet which is firmly situated in its Arab origins-- which all humans have the potential to understand. While this message is certainly a representation of the core tenets of Islam in general, this thesis will demonstrate that it was not a sufficiently relatable past in which emerging Turkish national identity could take refuge and use to resist the Kemalist notion of what Turkey should have become. Detailed summary translations of two comprehensive examples of these works, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına Kadar Hayatı ve Hatıraları* (*The Messenger's Forty years of Life and Memories*);[45] and *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor* (Jesus Foretells Muhammad);[46] are included at the end of this dissertation.

Theoretical Framework

Itzchak Weismann in *The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition*, asserts that Sufism in general has played an important role in the Muslim world's response to modernity.[47] He argues that the Naqshbandi tradition in particular has demonstrated "remarkable adaptability in the contemporary era of globalization."[48] Despite this particularity, he acknowledges that the adaptation of the Naqshbandiyya forms a portion of the wider context of the institutionalization and popularization of Sufism in the history of Islam.[49] Since its inception in the thirteenth century, the Naqshbandi tradition has continued to grow and spread in its own right, but has also given rise to a number of major offshoots, including; "…diverse modern Islamic movements such as the Jadidi trend in the Muslim lands under Russian rule, the Ulama Council in colonial and postcolonial India, and the Salvation Party in Turkey."[50] Weismann attributes the *tarikat*'s success in part to its distinct features which set it apart from other Sufi traditions. For instance, the concept of *khalwat dar anjuman,* or solitude in the crowd, implies that a spiritual master should be compelled to participate in the social and political affairs of the community. When the Naqshbandiyya was consolidated in the fifteenth century, it was this principle, of solitude in the crowd, that inextricably bound the *tarikat* with politics.

Weismann provides no specific definition of "modernity" in *The Naqshbandiyya.* He also does not engage specifically with this term, which would suggest that his interests do not lie in fleshing out this concept, but in exploring the ability of Sufism to adapt to rapid changes that no doubt impacted the development of the Naqshbandi tradition and its offshoots over several centuries. Similarly, it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake an in-depth critique of Weismann's use of the term "modernity." Nevertheless, Weismann certainly presents the relationship between the Naqshbandi tradition-- and

Sufism in general-- and modernity as beginning in a particular time, which is decidedly the 19th century. Weismann's first contextual mention of modernity is in relation to the British conquest of Delhi in 1803. Master Ghulam 'Ali of the Mujaddidiyya, an offshoot of the Naqshbandiyya which eventually all but superseded all Naqshbandi lines in the Indian subcontinent, refused to associate with the "infidel government or employment in its service."[51] According to Weismann, 'Ali instead concentrated his efforts on reinvigorating the orthodoxy of the Mujaddidiyya, which included developing a more pan-Islamic (and thus less Indian) identity, which specifically included association with Muslim communities of Central and Western Asia. As a result of this, one of the disciples he attracted was the Kurdish Shaykh Khalid, "…who integrated the renewed spiritual message from India with the quest for modernity in the Ottoman state."[52] In this example, the assumption is that, at least in the Muslim world, a period of modernization was initiated in the nineteenth century.

In the Ottoman context, the quest for modernity has often been connected with the Empire's period of decline. This period, which is more accurately called "the period of reform and transformation," was punctuated by several Ottoman military defeats by European powers at the turn of the eighteenth century. Towards the end of this period, the concept of modernity also became bound up with the initiation of nationalist movements, and the idea of nation-states, throughout the Empire.[53] Thus, although modernity and the process of modernization have often been equated with westernization, "modernity" should more broadly be understood as a process or period of rapid change which was taking place on a global scale which often coincided with the European age of colonization and the development of nationalist movements. When considering why modernity has been equated with western culture, Charles Taylor's theory of alternative modernities in his paper "Two Theories of Modernity," provides an innovative understanding of this conflation.[54]

Taylor's general definition of culture is important for understanding why concepts of modernity become entangled with specific cultures. Culture, he argues, is "…a plurality…each of which has a language and a set of practices that define specific understandings of personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, goods and bads, virtues and vices, and the like."[55] Taylor asserts that in the cultural theory of modernity, modernity is itself a new form of culture, which can be contrasted with all others, including its own predecessor cultures or civilizations. In this theory, a culture—such as the culture of modernity--might be viewed as one among others, which may be a recent acquisition among civilizations.[56] Because of this, it is not surprising that the first accounts of the process of modernity, or "revolutionary change" as Taylor puts it, were of the cultural sort. This was caused, as Taylor says:

> …[by] the belief that modernity comes from one single universally applicable operation [which] imposes a falsely uniform pattern on the multiple encounters of non-Western cultures with the exigencies of science, technology, and industrialization.[57]

When culture, as in the case of Turkish nationalism, is associated with the nation or the state, this can lead to a differentiation between "us" and "them." In this way, it is possible to see how the culture of modernity is not seen as one among others, but it is somehow separate and potentially more highly venerated in the sense that ideas such as "we" are modern whereas "they" are not might begin to develop. Pursuant to this, Taylor argues that modernity is separated in the context of evaluative explanations of culture, precisely because of the tendency to want to glorify or vilify the notion of modernity. In contrast to this, Taylor suggests that an "acultural" theory of modernity is one in which operations of modernization are culture neutral. The latter was not the case for the initial modernization process in Republican Turkey.[58]

Thus, while the Kemalist project of modernization super-imposed western cultural conceptual frameworks of modernity, nevertheless "modernization" as a process which continued to adapt as the nation matured, can be understood as a general course of change or newness which has been occasionally bound up with imperialist motives, including those of the Kemalist regime. Furthermore, an overlying implication of Weismann's study, which is especially crucial to this dissertation, is that the success of Sufism in general is inextricably linked to its ability to respond to the implications of modernity. The continuation of Sufi traditions depends upon the ability of *tarikatlar* to combine a renewed spiritual message with the inevitable rise of modernization.

Sufism and Orthodoxy

A common accusation of Sufism is that it exists in opposition to the *Sunnah* (the traditions and intentions of Muhammad) and orthodoxy in Islam. However, as Wright asserts in *On the Path of the Prophet*, Sufism, often also described as the esoteric dimension of Islam, is on the contrary a fulfilment of Islamic law.[59] The *tarikat*, which is the Turkish rendering of the Arabic *ṭarīqah* (plural*: ṭuruq)*, literally means "path" or "method," and is the broadest term which denotes a Sufi organization, often referred to as a "brotherhood." The term *tarikat* is also a foundational aspect of Sufism in the sense that the concept of a "path" is a metaphor for this quest, or method for finding God. The confines of this path are delineated by the *sharia*, or Islamic law. A sincere traveler on this path strives to adhere to the precepts of sharia in order to realize *ḥaqīqa*, or the Divine Truth. Thus, the *ṭarīqah*, sharia, and *ḥaqīqa* are intimately linked co-determinants which form the essential basis of Sufism.

Some of Islam's most eminent jurists, Wright points out, have been well-known Sufis. In Wright's view, this is an indication that there is an essential connection between sharia and mysticism. Indeed, membership in a Sufi order has rarely been a reason for a person to separate themselves from Islamic "orthodoxy." Vincent Cornell, in *Realm of the Saint* makes a similar assertion, arguing that for orthodox mystics, a Sufi is a sincere Muslim dedicated to the highest ideals of the faith.[60] What separates

a Sufi from other Muslims is not the doctrines of the former, but the extent of piety. Sufism, Cornell argues, is drawn into the fold of normative Islam by linking the practices of mystics directly to those of the Prophet and *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* ("the pious predecessors," or first three generations of Muslims following Muhammad), the original transmitters of the *Sunnah*. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to recount a detailed history of Sufism.[61] However, it is important to note that in the history of its development, Sufism was more often than not responsible for defining Islamic orthodoxy in the pre-modern period of Islam. As the trajectory of Sufism advanced, this has continued to be the case. As Weismann succinctly explains:

> …the major preoccupation of its [Sufism's] masters was rather to demonstrate the conformity of their mystical teachings and practices to the precepts of Islamic law—the shari'a. From their point of view, the urge for social and political activism was thus embedded in a general orthodox framework…. [modern Sufi thinkers] may be regarded as seeking, each in his own peculiar way, to re-establish the balance between the two elements of orthodoxy and activism in the face of the radically altered environment of modernity.

Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori in *Muslim Politics* argue that the dominant theories of modernity and modernization in the twentieth century have assumed that (especially, but not exclusively) Muslim religious movements, practices, and their resultant identities were increasingly sidelined in the wake of the rising nation state. In these theories, the only religious survivors in the inevitable wave of national identity were "…religious intellectuals and leaders who attached themselves to the nation-state."[62] The issue with this assumption, according to Eickelman and Piscatori, is that the role of religion in the public sphere, including its social and communal value, certainly never receded. Instead, the role of religion in the Muslim world has adapted to the changes ushered in by the nation-state, developing in ways that are all but overlooked by Western observers and by Muslims themselves.[63]

Another issue that Eickelman and Piscatori identify in the same dominant theories of modernity and modernization is the sharp contrast that is constructed between modernity and tradition. This contrast, which places tradition in opposition to modernity and processes of modernization, results in the misunderstanding of the deep-rooted social functions of tradition. They address the depth of this misunderstanding, arguing that "Traditional… religious networks may …facilitate development, and social and political changes are often made possible because they are cast in terms of the traditional framework."[64] The reason for this is that there is palpable power which resides in the control of cultural institutions, which typically include religion. Thus, tradition and its leaders are potentially powerful sources for revolutionary changes in a society.[65] In this way, the basis of successful political influence is based on persuasion, as opposed to the exercise of force. Weismann alludes to a similar idea regarding influence based on persuasion in his observation that many Sufi masters set up lodges with the aim of

catering to the spiritual and material needs of various levels of society. As a result, they often attracted the support of local rulers.[66]

In his book *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk*, Gavin Brockett suggests that scholars of development and modernization theories after 1945 identified Turkey as the ideal example of a modern, secular country. Secularization in these theories was an integral aspect of modernization.[67] Carter Findley similarly attests to this notion in his book *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*. Findley's theory is that the scholarly study of Ottoman and Turkish modernity was launched by a cluster of works published between 1959 and 1964. Among them, Bernard Lewis' *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, a work still commonly referenced in the study of modern Turkey, has had a significant impact on scholarship, politics, and even the general public in their ideas about the formation of the Turkish nation-state.[68] Lewis' book, like the other works from this period, reflected the modernization theory of the time, explicitly or implicitly. The common assumption among them was their teleological vision of an upward march from Islamic empire to secular republic.

"Islamism" and Neo-Ottomanism

Islamists who continue to be revered as Sufi heroes in Turkey, such as Necip Fazıl Kisakürek and Kadir Mısıroğlu, who President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan describes, respectively, as his "muse" and "favorite historian," have drawn upon the memory of the Ottoman past and Islam to create oppositional responses which have resisted the state-led reform projects of Kemalism, and criticized westernization efforts as a destructive project of European ambition and power.[69] Although Pilavoğlu was similarly opposed to Kemalism and the encroachment of westernization, it is the primary aim of this dissertation to propose that he did not sufficiently draw upon the Ottoman past in his dialogical response to the rapid modernization of Turkish society vis-à-vis super-imposed European systems of nation-building. According to Yavuz in *Nostalgia for the Empire*, those Islamist responses to the Kemalist project of forced cultural change that have been successful, which he describes as neo-Ottoman, have understood that Ottoman tradition, history, and culture, were "…a veiled but not always subtle form of striving to re-Islamicize society and the state. [They found] …a close affinity between the desire to Islamicize the state and the nostalgic resurrection of Ottoman heritage."[70] Mardin makes a similar assertion when he argues that the missing component of Turkish Jacobin-Republican secular cultural values was "…the sense of an organic community that could be derived from the blend of old folk themes and religion."[71] In contrast, Pilavoğlu sought to portray a notion of Islamic identity which did not vernacularize Islam as an Ottoman-cum-Turkish dimension of cultural identity.

"Islamism" is a controversial term which is often fraught with conflicting definitions depending on subjective variables such as the context in which it is used, and a writer's motivation and worldview

when invoking this concept. Anwar Alam in his paper "Islam and post-Modernism: Locating the Rise of Islamism in Turkey" helpfully suggests that Islamism, in a Turkish context at least, is the idea that Islam is a significant dimension of popular traditions which act as a political discourse (such as socialism, liberalism, etc.) which attempts to center Islam firmly within the political order.[72] In this context, it is additionally helpful to draw on Graham Fuller's assertion in *The Future of Political Islam*, that for many, Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and "Islamists" are those who seek to implement this idea in some fashion.[73] In Turkey, Islamism can be further understood as a "counter attack" against the Kemalist project of modernization and the vested interests of the secular elite.[74] It is worth emphasizing that the concept of Islamism in general cannot, nor should be disentangled from particular contexts. In his paper, "Political Islam: Image and Reality" Mohammed Ayoob succinctly notes on this point that "no two Islamisms are alike because they are determined by the contexts within which they operate."[75] Thus, without grounding a definition of Islamism within a specific context, general definitions of this concept are insufficient, and indeed inappropriate for explaining and analyzing political activities undertaken in the name of or under the premise of Islam. Therefore, the definition of Islamism in the scope of this dissertation is specific to the context of Turkey, but also to somewhat particular to the present discussion.

Analytical Focus

Even a brief glimpse of Pilavoğlu's works leaves little room for doubt that many are discursive Islamist responses to the context in which Pilavoğlu was writing. The Turkish intellectual landscape from post-World War I into the 1960s was on the one hand dominated by the enforcement of European values and a secular-minded outlook, in a concerted effort to forget the Ottoman past and strive towards a new secular, western, but also distinctly Turkish national identity. On the other hand, were the developing responses which issued from the pain of the stinging wound left by the dismemberment of Islam from its central role in the Ottoman public sphere. The latter responses, which were often informed by Sufi worldviews, in many cases sought to restore the patterns of human relations that were derived from Islamic values and rooted in the Ottoman experience, which were deliberately suppressed during the process of nation-building under Kemalist republican reforms.[76] As Mardin suggests:

> [these were responses to the loss of] an Ottoman culture [which] overlapped with a spare but deeply anchored Islamic faith… [the loss of] the[se] combinations and permutations… of a late Ottoman Islamic 'civil society'… underscore the wide extent of social change during the republican era and the confusion it caused.[77]

A significant dimension of Pilavoğlu's aim in his writing was similar in that he clearly hoped to restore the position of Islam to its former role as a primary framework of society. Pilavoğlu's response, like many

of these, emphasized a worldview which was critical of the super-imposition of secular values, and was firmly situated within an Islamic framework. All of these responses are an illustration of Weismann's theory that Sufism has played an important role in the Muslim response to modernity to the extent that each, including Pilavoğlu's, sought to restore the balance between orthodoxy and activism in the face of the profoundly altered environment of modernity.[78] Pilavoğlu, also like many others of his time, embraced the use of the latest technologies for communication available at the time, including the extensive use of print media in the form of pamphlets, newspapers, leaflets, and books written in Latinized Turkish (as opposed to Ottoman) to distribute his message. Pilavoğlu even recorded sermons, recitations of poetry, recitations of passages from the Qur'an, and dreamed of establishing his own Muslim radio station in an effort to spread his message more widely.[79] However, unlike some of the more successful responses to the Kemalist project, which effectively rooted notions of Turkish national identity within an Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Pilavoğlu's response, which is evident in his body of work, emphasized a pan-Islamic and characteristically Tijani worldview which overlooked the important dimension of Turkish-Ottoman identity. Pilavoğlu's method of approach is additionally an illustration of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* in the sense that he strives towards a direct intimacy between the Prophet and tends to de-emphasize the prominence of *madhahib* (streams of Jurisprudence).

This dissertation will consider how Pilavoğlu's own *madhahib*, or *madhab* (singular) can be understood not so literally as a de-emphasis on Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali reasoning in order to perform Islam successfully (although this was true of his Islamic worldview), but as a metaphor for the "way to act" in response to Republican secular aggression. The "*madhab*" in this sense is symbolic of neo-Ottomanism, which advanced notions of Turkish national identity informed by Ottoman-Islamic heritage. Since Pilavoğlu did not sufficiently emphasize this neo-Ottoman "madhab," his response was ultimately not successful in comparison to other neo-Ottoman activists around the same time, such as Necip Fazıl Kisakürek, and Said Nursi and the Nurcu movement.

Outline of Chapters

Chapter 2 of this dissertation is an overview of the Tijaniyya Sufi order, including a brief history of its development since its inception in the eighteenth century in the Maghreb, followed by a look at the Tijaniyya in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to providing important background information of the Tijaniyya, the chapter explores the political engagement of the organization during its development in the Maghreb region and later expansion into sub-Saharan Africa, both of which were characterized by the organization's rapid adaptation to the shift in political authority in the wake of colonial inculcation in a variety of contexts. The wide variation in the Tijani political engagement in these various settings demonstrates Weismann's theory that Sufism in general has been able to adapt to the pace of

modernization, which in many contexts has been driven by the encroachment of European colonization. This chapter also provides crucial details about several central doctrinal aspects of Tijani tradition, such as the role of the conceptual idea of *Tariqa Muhammadiyya.* This is important for understanding key dimensions of Pilavoğlu's worldview, including his emphasis on pan-Islamism.

Chapter 3 is an overview of Sufi involvement in the politics of the Ottoman Empire and the shift in this involvement as a result of the establishment of republican Turkey. The chapter focuses primarily on the Ottoman period of reform and transformation, the *Tanzimat,* and the decisive final years of the Empire, which saw Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's accession to power and the foundation of the Republic. A condensed section of "Ottoman Origins" gives way to a more extensive discussion on Sufism during the Ottoman period of reform and transformation, the *Tanzimat,* the years leading up to the transition to a republic, and finally, the reactions of Sufi *tarikatlar* to the legal ban on their organizations and activities during the first years of the republican era. The chapter is intended to briefly demonstrate how Turkish nationalist models remained bound up with Sufism despite its official suppression by the Kemalist regime as a threat to the realization of a modern nation-state. This discussion is important for understanding the extent to which Sufism has informed formations of identity for Turkish Muslims.

Chapter 4 continues to build on the background information from Chapter 3 in an account of Kemal Pilavoğlu's life and how he established the Tijaniyya in Turkey. This largely descriptive narrative is constructed from details drawn from the abovementioned hagiographies and biographical material about Pilavoğlu's life and legacy. The narrative is underscored by additional details which clarify the context of the time in which Pilavoğlu and the Tijaniyya were publicly active, from approximately the 1940s into the 1960s. In this chapter, Weismann's assertion, that Muslim hagiography tends to depict its figures as they ought to have been at the expense of a true account of these figures, provides a useful foundation for engaging with some of the claims made by Pilavoğlu's hagiographers and the Republican media at the time of Tijani public activism.

Chapter 5 is an overview and analysis of Pilavoğlu's dialogical responses to Kemalist reforms. The aim of this chapter is to present examples of Pilavoğlu's Islamist response and discern the extent to which this differed from those "Neo-Ottoman" Islamist responses which were ultimately more successful than Pilavoğlu's decidedly pan-Islamist vision. The two main figures who form the basis for this comparison are Nacip Fazıl Kisakürek and Said Nursi and the Nurcu movement. This chapter draws on the two aforementioned summary translations of Pilavoğlu's work, *The Messenger's Forty years of Life and Memories* and *Jesus Foretells Muhammad,* to provide context for analysis. The chapter builds on Richard Raskin's claim in *The Functional Analysis of Art*, that art fulfills certain functional requirements of a society to the extent that art plays a part in social life as a whole.[80] This is underscored by the notion that literature in particular has been an instrument for the preservation, transmission, and idealization of

the Ottoman Legacy. Because of this, Ottoman history was imbued in the collective emotional consciousness of Turks long before it was conceived of as an analytical structure for building intellectual formations. Official Republican historiography, in contrast to this, presented the Ottoman past as a distant narrative with no relevance to or implications for the present. However, successful neo-Ottoman responses to Kemalist reforms, like those of Kisakürek and Nursi, have come to terms with the dominant secularist discourse that modernization reforms were defended as some sort of solution to the Ottoman tradition and "backward" Islamic practices. Typically, they have achieved this through the common view that the past can be restored with the help of Islam which is informed by the Ottoman legacy.

Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to summary translations of the three aforementioned hagiographies of Pilavoğlu, and then summary translations of the two selected works used for analysis in Chapter 5. Pilavoğlu's writing has until now not been translated into English, so these summary translations are a unique contribution to a study of Tijaniyya networks and the broader study of pan-Islamist activism.

These summary translations are followed by Chapter 8, a brief conclusion which includes some reflections related to the research that was undertaken for this study, an overview of some of the limitations involved in the research process, as well as suggestions for future research related to this dissertation.

Chapter 2
The Tijaniyya: Diverse Contexts, Diverse Political Engagements

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the rise of the Wahhabiyya was an exception in the context of reform and revival movements in Islam; the great majority of revival movements were, in fact, Sufi.[1] In the midst of these revivals, the emergence of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* was one such decisive rejection of the accusation that Sufism had departed from Islamic orthodoxy.[2] The concept of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* is the entry point for the aim of this chapter, which is to discuss the development of the Tijaniyya order from its inception in the Maghreb to its rapid expansion. By exploring the development of the Tijaniyya, its doctrinal structure, and the order's socio-political involvement in a variety of contexts during their formative period, this chapter will demonstrate that, from the inception of the Tijaniyya, its political engagement has been characterized by the *tarikat*'s ability to rapidly adapt to the demands of shifting political authority across diverse circumstances as a method for sustainability. This supports Weismann's notion that during the rise of modernity, Sufism in general has demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in the face of rapid changes spurred on by the growing presence of European colonization in a variety of contexts.

Concurrent with the inclination to adjust to the varying demands of shifting political authority, the Tijaniyya has also often been at the forefront of Islamic renewal in general since its inception. This is important when considering the positionality of the Tijaniyya in Kemal Pilavoğlu's aims when he attempted to challenge the strictly enforced secularization project of early republican Turkey. Pilavoğlu, in keeping with the Tijani vision of Sufi Islamic renewal, aimed at renewing the message of Islam under the Tijani *nom de guerre*. However, his polemical—when not confrontational—approach was a stark departure from the characteristic adaptive attitude of the Tijaniyya. The Turkish context is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

The *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*

The *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* is not a Sufi order in the organizational sense of taking membership and maintaining affiliation. As noted in the introduction, the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* is a method of approach which includes a set of diverse teachings and litanies which are designed to foster a direct intimacy between the aspirant and the Prophet Muhammad. While grounded in a conception of the "reality of the Prophet" (*haqiqa Muhammadiyya*) as the first and fullest manifestation of God that can be traced back to esoteric and metaphysical Sufism, this method also entails an emphasis on the external Sunna of the Prophet. At the same time, it de-emphasizes the prominence of the *madhahib* (literally, "ways to act"), or

adherence to a specific school of jurisprudence. The concept of *haqiqa*, which as mentioned, are Divine Truths that are uncovered through communion with God and often manifested in the form of dreams or waking visions of the Prophet, is another central element. Finally, the restriction of a disciple to membership in one *tarikat* (as opposed to multiple affiliations, a common pattern in the previous history of Sufism) is also a feature of this phenomenon.[3] Although these ideas appear alternately in the history of Sufi orders much earlier than the eighteenth century, such as in the practices of the Shadhiliyya and the Jazuliyya in Morocco,[4] it became a discernible phenomenon in the eighteenth century. By the end of the century, ideas relating to the notion of a *Tariqa Muhamadiyya* had spread throughout the Muslim world, radiating from its development in north Africa, to west Africa, Egypt, and on to India.[5] At the same time, European colonization had infiltrated in mostly the same areas.

Sufi Revival and Renewal

The resurgence of the influence Sufism in the nineteenth century was part of a larger Islamic revival across much of the Muslim world. In many contexts, this resurgence was a response to the encroachment of colonial penetration. Sufi orders in particular were commonly seen as potential templates for what Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori describe in *Muslim Politics* as "transregional political action" which threatened European colonial rule in the Muslim world.[6] Indeed, as Wright points out, Muslim scholars who identified with the ideologies of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* contributed to a reinvigoration of Muslim societies and institutions, spreading Islam among Christians and, in Africa, practitioners of indigenous traditions, and often leading resistance movements against European imperialist projects.[7] Wright, drawing on Peter Gran,[8] notes that this was concurrent with the emergence of a new class of Muslim "merchant-scholars" who were frequently involved with the flourishing Sufi networks of the time, and were also responsible for instigating the emergence of a distinct secular culture in much of the Muslim world.

This was certainly the case in the Maghreb region, where the French had intruded so effectively that it was impossible for Sufi leadership to remain indifferent to the tides of imperialism. The French colonists quickly recognized the influence of Sufi orders, wasting no time in cultivating relations with those that would cooperate, while simultaneously suppressing those which opposed them. Jamil Abun-Nasr in his book *The Tijaniyya* claims that a dimension of Islamic revival was vested in the French interest in those Sufi orders which cooperated with their authority; this "gave them [the tariqas] a new lease of life and further added to their prestige by forcing them to become either allies or adversaries."[9] It was during this period of French colonial intrusion that the Tijaniyya order blossomed and flourished.

Today, the Tijaniyya is a global Sufi network with *zawiyas*[10] across the world. Algerian in its origin, a unique characteristic of the Tijaniyya is the religious exclusivity of the organization, which in

part stems from the common occurrence that non-Tijani Muslims tend to receive Tijani beliefs and rituals with little tolerance. This intolerance is often attributed to the fact that many of the books about Tijani beliefs and rituals, written by members of the Tijaniyya, include replies to criticisms which were often themselves stereotyped.[11] Indeed, many educated Muslims have rejected the beliefs and practices of the Tijaniyya as "…alien to the religion of Islam; [asserting] …that the Tijanis have created a religion of their own."[12] Nevertheless, as with other Sufi orders, the aim of the Tijaniyya in their actions has been, and remains, to demonstrate the conformity of their rituals and beliefs to the precepts of the sharia. In the Tijani tradition, this aim to demonstrate conformity is compounded by the role of the shaykh, which requires that his every utterance should be interpreted as conforming in some sense to the sharia, regardless of how incongruous the interpretations of these utterances may be.[13]

It is tempting to conclude, like Abun-Nasr, that Tijani political involvement from their inception has been characterized by a disposition of cooperation with and adjustment to ruling political authorities. He suggests that an inclination towards cooperation set the Tijaniyya apart from other orders when French rule had firmly established itself in the Maghreb. As noted, he argues that this is indicated by the fact that the Tijaniyya continued to flourish under French colonial rule, while other orders all but disappeared in comparison.[14] This is accurate only to the extent that the Tijaniyya were able to adapt to the encroaching political authority in many contexts as a method for sustaining the *tarikat*, and thus cultivated a characteristic of cooperation with political authority in some colonial contexts perhaps more effectively than other *tarikatlar*.

In Wright's view, European colonialists had "…no taste for the delicately nuanced Islamic legal tradition," and certainly even less for the intangible concepts that had become characteristic of Sufism in general. Wright asserts that this is reflected in the tendencies of even some recent studies of Sufism, including Abun-Nasr's, to lump together the eighteenth century Sufi revivalists with what he describes as "…upstart reformers who departed from the tradition of benign Sufism and combined Sufi tariqa organization with Wahhabi style reactionism to resist European colonial incursion."[15] For instance, Mawlay Sulayman (r. 1792 to 1822), the Sultan of Morocco, lovingly received the Tijaniyya due to his attraction to the *tarikat*'s firm focus on sharia and advocacy for the centrality of the precepts of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*. His reforms, which were aimed at restraining the influence of popular Sufism in the country, were strikingly similar to the Wahhabi agenda in some ways. However, the Sultan's reforms are more accurately described as an intellectual enhancement of Islamic tradition which strengthened the connection between sharia and mysticism through the use of the existing preference for the Maliki school of jurisprudence and the established structural features of *tarikat*-based Sufism. This, as opposed to radical redefinitions (or elimination) of these elements, as in Wahhabism. Nevertheless, the subsequent Salafi movement of the twentieth century claimed Mawlay Sulayman as the country's first Salafi.[16]

In another criticism of Abun-Nasr's study of the Tijaniyya, Wright accuses Abun-Nasr of marginalizing the cosmopolitan, scholarly characteristics which defined not only the Tijaniyya in general, but the founder of the order in particular. What's more, Wright contends, Abun-Nasr problematically attempts to separate the Tijaniyya from the broader *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* phenomenon. Indeed, Abun-Nasr claims that "…the doctrines which they [the Tijaniyya] preached… were no longer suited to modern times."[17] Wright is further critical of Abun-Nasr's "generalist claim" that the Tijaniyya was an example of Sufism's "incompatibility with modern, postcolonial Muslim rationalized sensibilities",[18] arguing that Abun-Nasr provides a limited depiction of Tijani intellectual contributions to eighteenth century Sufi revivalism. It is Wright's contention, which is likewise advanced in this chapter, that the Tijaniyya is more correctly described as a movement of Islamic renewal in a time of uncertainty. [19] The latter, as this chapter demonstrates, is also a more accurate depiction of the *tarikat*'s diverse political engagement.

In Paul Heck's edited volume *Sufism and Politics: the Power of Spirituality*, the book broadly draws attention to the impact of modernization and its reforms on Sufi organizations in a variety of contexts. One common feature throughout the wide variety of case-studies covered in the book remains the Sufi ability to not only adapt but also thrive in diverse situations. In each context covered in the book, Sufi organizations negotiate their own methods of retaining political, social, and even spiritual influence in the shadow of the rise of the modern nation state.[20]

For instance, in Rüdiger Seesemann's discussion of Sudan in *Sufism and Politics*, he explores the factionalization within the local Sudanese Tijaniyya, the dominant *tarikat* in the region, the fracturing of which was a result of 'Umar al-Bashir's "Islamist" policy[21] following victory in the 1989 military coup d'état of extending support to those Sufi *tarikatlar* who endorsed the government's so-called "Islamic project." The government accused those who refused to comply of being guilty of dissonance. Nevertheless, al-Bashir was ultimately unsuccessful in exploiting the Tijani faction which received his support during the government attempts to put an end to the crisis in Darfur.[22] Indeed, the Tijaniyya remains among the dominant Sufi organizations in the western part of the country.[23] The Sudanese case is just one illustration of the complex and diverse political engagement of Sufis, and specifically the Tijaniyya's organizational ability to adapt in a variety of contexts.

In a Muslim world commonly depicted as "…on the verge of being torn apart by radical ideological movements,"[24] the Tijaniyya is an example of vibrancy and of Islamic traditionalism. These attributes are evident in its origins alone, having emerged from Fez, which Cornell describes as "one of the most important crucibles of Islamic mysticism" and the political, social, and intellectual center of learning in the western Maghreb.[25] In contrast to the stifling atmosphere of Fez that Abun-Nasr describes,[26] the religious and intellectual movements from Morocco and the Maghreb in general instigated what Cornell depicts as "tides of intellectual and cultural influence" which flowed towards the East. The

latter understanding of Fez and the Maghreb as a cradle of intellectual and cultural influence, according to Cornell, was subverted by scholarship which has been politically supportive of projects of colonization in the region. He cites the influential work *La Religion Musulmane en Berbérie* by Alfred Bel,[27] explaining that Bel's purpose in this book was to "…explicate North African Islam for colonial officials" who were unlikely to be sympathetic to the religious traditions of their subjects.[28] Similar to Cornell's argument, Wright asserts that in contrast to earlier claims of stagnation in the eighteenth-century Islamic world, the Tijaniyya emerged in the midst of a vibrant, intellectual vitality, which he contends was not only a time of culmination of the first millennium of Islamic history, but laid the foundations for a variety of dynamic aspects in Islam during the modern period.[29] When considering Abun-Nasr's position in light of these contentions, there is still no doubt that the Tijaniyya's relationship with colonial authority has been punctuated by the various tendencies to cooperate with ruling authorities in some contexts, however; Abun-Nasr fails to observe that it is more extensively an illustration of the *tarikat*'s ability to rapidly adjust to the changing political circumstances wrought by the imposition of equally varying implementations of colonization. Abun-Nasr contends, for instance:

> The subservience of the Tijanis to French colonial policy in Algeria and Tunisia during the second half of the 19th century was so complete… that [the] director of the Department of Native Affairs in Algeria… considered it desirable to help the Tijaniyya order in becoming a national church for the country.[30]

At the same time, in Algeria the Tijaniyya resisted the Ottoman authorities. Al-Tijani had been banished from Tlemsen by Muhammad b. 'Uthman (1766-1791), the Turkish Bey of Algiers for allegedly engaging in illicit activities such as "counterfeiting coins and… manufacturing elixir." When he arrived in Fez, al-Tijani informed the sultan that he had emigrated "…because of the oppression of the Turks and their injustice."[31]

Even in Al-Tijani's own time, adaptation to diverse circumstances was already a feature of Tijani engagement with the authorities. For example, his close association with the Moroccan sultan, who had helped the former establish his position, was met with hostility by the local educated elite. Despite his condemnation of associating with the government as "corrupting religion," Al-Tijani was compelled to be "…drawn into association with the Moroccan ruling class by force of circumstances."[32] The establishment of the French protectorate of Morocco in 1912 was met with refusal to cooperate by the Tijaniyya, which was by then well-established in the region. According to Abun-Nasr, the colonial authorities responded by enlisting the support of 'Ain Madi's shaykhs to pacify the local Tijaniyya.[33]

In Tunisia, the Tijaniyya, which was independently introduced in the nineteenth century, the order initially vied for position against the existing Sufi orders in the region, the Qadiriyya and the Rahmaniyya. 'Ali b. Ghadhahim, the Tijani *muqaddam* of the local Tunisian Majr community, was

selected by local rulers as the leader of the 1864 rebellion against the Tunisian authorities. Oddly, Abun-Nasr concludes that the Tijaniyya in this context does not seem to have taken an active part in the rebellion. At the same time, he explains that Ghadhahim was granted refuge by the French in Algeria, who negotiated a pardon from Tunis on his behalf. Ghadhahim was found dead in his prison cell after being incarcerated for eighteen months, "…believed at the time… [that he was] murdered by agents of the [Tunisian] Bey." [34]

Thus, Abun-Nasr's problematic contention that the Tijaniyya's involvement with political authority was characterized by the *tarikat*'s cooperation, adjustment, and even subservience to the inculcating colonial rulers depicts the *tarikat*'s political policies only to the extent that they recognized the need to adapt in order to survive the crushing weight of European imperialism, and so may have cooperated, adjusted, and even submitted, depending on the political context. However, the Tijaniyya was also known for resisting political authorities in certain contexts, and so it remains difficult, if not tending towards Orientalist, to categorize their political engagement as a common thread or noticeable pattern of behavior. [35]

It is worth reiterating that colonization has often been mistakenly bound up with the influx of modernity. Instead, as noted in the introduction to this dissertation, modernity, or the process of modernization, should rather be understood as a process or period of rapid change which was taking place on a global scale which often coincided with the European age of colonization. Thus, "modernization" can be understood as a general course of change or newness which is occasionally bound up with imperial motives. In the context of Sufism, and specifically the Tijaniyya in their political engagement, this "response to modernity" is illustrated by the *tarikat*'s ability to adapt to new and diverse political circumstances, including an array of responses from cooperating with to rebelling against colonial adversaries.

The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World

As mentioned in the introduction, the Tijaniyya *tarikat* was founded by Abu al-ʿAbbâs Ahmad ibn Mahammad at-Tijânî (referred to henceforth as either Al-Tijani or Shaykh Tijani), in North Africa at the end of the 18th century. Al-Tijani was born in 'Ain Madhi, in modern-day Algeria in 1735. His father, Muhammad al-Mukhtar bin Ahmad bin Mahmad bin Sālim was an educated man who was a teacher in 'Ain Madhi. The appellation *Tijani* comes from the name of an Algerian Berber community near Tlemcen, called Tijan, and Tijana. Thus, the appellation "Tijânî" comes from the name of the Berbers in the area. Al-Tijani's father Muhammad married a woman from among the inhabitants there, who belonged to these Tijan Berbers.[36]

Already well-grounded with a solid religious education by the age of 7, at the age of 21 al-Tijani was drawn to the Sufi path. Between 1757-1758 he travelled to Fez, which as noted was an important cultural hub and center of religious learning. By the time al-Tijani arrived there, the far Maghreb was already well established as among the most important hubs of Islamic mysticism.[37] Religious and intellectual movements radiated from the region, resulting in a noticeable influence on intellectual and cultural patterns in the eastern regions of the Muslim world. These movements "…often created ebb tides of intellectual and cultural influence that flowed toward the East."[38]

After a period of study, al-Tijani returned to Algeria where he joined three *tarikatlar*, namely the Qadiriyya, the Nasiriyya, and the *tarikat* of Ahmad al-Habib b. Muhammad. He spent five years in the *zawiya* of Sidi 'Abdul-Qadir b. Muhammad in the village of al-Abiad. Around the same time, while on hajj he was also initiated into the Khalwatiyya order in Azwawi near Algiers. In the Hijaz region of the Arabian Peninsula, al-Tijani met the chief of the Sammaniyya branch of the Khalwatiyya, 'Abdul-Karim al-Samman, who allegedly informed the former that he would become a dominant *qutb*, or head of the veiled hierarchy of Muslims saints (*awliya'*). During his return home, al-Tijani was authorized to preach for the Khalwatiyya order during his stop in Egypt, by Mahmud al-Kurdi (d. 1780).[39]

Al-Tijani then settled in Sidi Abi Samghun, an oasis about 120km south of al-Bayadh in Algeria before his eventual emigration to Fez. It was in Sidi Abi Samghun that he announced to his followers that the Prophet had appeared to him in daylight and assigned him the *wird* (litanies) of his order. This is considered the beginning of the Tijaniyya as an autonomous *tarikat*.[40]

Abun-Nasr alleges that it was after he founded the order that Shaykh al-Tijani assumed the title of *sharif*, claiming a lineage which traced his ancestry to al-Hasan, the son of 'Ali b. Abi Talib, the Prophet's cousin, and Fatima, the Prophet's daughter. Abun-Nasr also asserts that histories tracing al-Tijani have shown that this lineage is suspect, not only because none of his ancestors claimed the title of *sharif*, but also that he acquired the name of Tijani by marriage. He points out that a *sharif* would not relinquish his name to acquire that of his wife's family, in addition to the fact that none of al-Tijani's ancestors claimed to be a *sharif*.[41]

Abun-Nasr's doubts about Al-Tijani's claim of sharifism are reminiscent of Cornell's summary of Bel's description of maraboutism, which asserts that it was not uncommon for *murābiṭ*, or *marabouts*, to ascribe false prophetic lineages to themselves, "…[replacing] a paradigm of holiness based on asceticism and heroic virtue with one that was based on genealogy alone."[42] Crucially, Cornell points out that Bel's paradigm was heavily influenced by his political agenda, which was to explicate North African Islam for colonial authorities who were more concerned with countering the influence of Islamic reformists in Algeria than they were with understanding "…the religion of their native subjects."[43] Cornell clarifies that when the paradigms of Moroccan sainthood were formulated, including the rise of sharifism, descent

from the Prophet was ultimately insignificant; "it was more important for a saint to be a person of knowledge than a person of power. Knowledge itself [was considered] power." Cornell's reasoning is that if Sufi shaykhs could claim *both* Prophetic inheritance and knowledge, they had the advantage of being both holy by birth and by attribution.[44] In any case, Wright has also pointed out that in defending the sharifian ancestry of al-Tijani, the contemporary Moroccan government's designated body for confirming sharifian lineages has certified the Shaykh's sharifian status as genuine.[45]

Based on some of his statements, Shaykh al-Tijani is considered the *Khātim al-Walāya*, or seal of the saints by members of the *tarikat*.[46] This is also one of the reasons that Tijanis claim a kind of "superiority" over other *tarikatlar*, so much so that, as noted earlier, affiliation with other *tarikatlar* is banned once initiated into the Tijaniyya. This exclusivity is partially derived from the understanding that the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* is a universal path on which a shaykh's authority runs in parallel with the saint and the Prophet.[47] In general, the saint symbolizes all the dimensions of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*. Cornell suggests that Moroccan shaykhs in particular managed to strike a balance between the social and religious dimensions of the Prophetic archetypes of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* paradigm and manifest these characteristics within a single persona. He also asserts that this is what made these shaykhs influential in political affairs. It is worth noting that veneration of saints was not a heterodox phenomenon. Cornell explains that this practice was validated by mainstream Sufism and revalidated by most jurists, so it should be seen as a "normal" aspect of premodern Islam not only in the Maghreb, but in other contexts further east, at least as far as Khurasan.[48]

By the time he had arrived in Fez, Shaykh Tijani's reputation as a scholar blessed with religious charisma preceded him. Because of this, his presence in the city had implications in the politico-religious establishment. Sufi traditions were already closely associated with the cosmopolitanism of the commercial and political centers of the western Maghreb, including Fez.[49] By the end of the 18th century, the Sufi orders in general across North Africa had been completely accepted as part of society and occupied important social and political roles across the region.[50] However, because the French colonial authorities had grown concerned about the influence of Islamic reformists in Algeria, they attempted to distinguish the "…supposedly sober, authoritarian, and culturally alien ethos of classical Islam"[51] from the more syncretic Sufi practices which had developed across the North African Mediterranean. However, for orthodox mystics, a Sufi was no less or different than those dedicated to the highest ideals of the faith.

Adaptability: The Key to Success

The Tijaniyya were able to maintain their position amid the establishment of French rule since they were able to adapt to the new political situations wrought by colonization more effectively than other orders. Indeed, they continued to flourish while other orders completely disappeared.[52] Abun-Nasr contends that

some of their motivation was driven by the desire to continue their influence over their followers. In each case, the Tijaniyya, which had emerged in the context of the vibrancy of 18th century Sufi revivalism, was characterized by "…a remarkable enthusiasm and conviction to define one of the more important movements of Islamic renewal."[53] The organization's political engagement, however, is not as easily characterizable.

In Algeria, the Tijaniyya had realized the benefit of cultivating a favorable relationship with the European political authorities and was one of the first Sufi orders to cooperate with the French in the country. At the same time, the Ottoman authorities in Algeria were apprehensive of independent-minded scholars such as Shakyh Tijani, especially when he and others like him began to attract large followings which could pose a threat to the central government in Algiers. In Ain Madi, the jurists of the Tijajna community had formed an alliance with the Ottoman government, which incited hostility against the influence of Shakyh Tijani, who was perceived by both (the Tijaina and the Ottomans) to be a potential usurper of the traditional patterns of ascendence. Wright asserts that the Ottoman apprehension of Shaykh Tijani should be understood in the context of what he describes as "the Ottoman period of decline," which was already underway by the eighteenth century.[54]

The Ottoman government in Algiers had attempted to strengthen its weakening hold on the inland oases in an attempt to generate greater tax revenue. Already viewed with suspicion by locals, this Ottoman redoubling of strength was met with opposition by many rural Sufis and contributed to a rise in tensions with the Ottoman authorities. Although Wright acknowledges the problem of describing the Tijani engagement with colonial authorities as somehow universal, he nevertheless retains the idea that there is a detectable common thread in Tijani political engagement because, Wright asserts, Tijanis cultivated close relations with the Ottomans in other contexts:

> …this stance against the Turks in Algeria seems to have been somewhat exaggerated by writers such as Abun-Nasr who are intent on demonstrating the easy subservience of Sufi orders to the non-Muslim colonial powers, which is contrasted with their rebellion against indigenous Muslim state-building… If the divide between Shaykh Tijani and the Turkish authorities was indeed so wide, then it likewise becomes difficult to understand the close relationship of several later Tijani scholars and the Turkish governments in various places.[55]

In Morocco (although not an Ottoman example), Tijani engagement with Muslim authorities certainly was very different. The Tijaniyya was more associated with the sultanate of Morocco, having been well received by the Sultan, than any other Sufi order until the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. Sultan Mawlay Sulayman helped Ahmad al-Tijani establish his position as a shaykh when the latter took up residence in Fez, and even furnished al-Tijani with a house. However, the local inhabitants tried to prevent its construction, motivated by their hostility towards al-Tijani and his followers. When the

French protectorate was established, the Tijaniyya did not equally yield to their authority as they had in Algeria. Indeed, the French authorities in Morocco soon became distrustful of the Tijani *zawiya* leaders because of the latter's unwillingness to cooperate. Abun-Nasr, intent on illustrating a common method for success, contends that it was precisely this distance from French authority in Morocco which enabled the Tijaniyya to more effectively adjust to the new circumstances following independence from the French.[56] This inclination accurately reflects Gran's contention, that Sufi orders in general "…mirrored the processes of social change,"[57] but does not equally illustrate a noticeable pattern of political engagement as Abun-Nasr concludes:

> The most salient aspects of the history of the Tijaniyya order in the Maghrib are the cooperation of most of its chiefs with the French.

In Tunisia, the situation was again different, and still more complicated. The Tijani opposition in Tatawin in the south of Tunisia to the more established Rahmaniyya and Qadiriyya orders in the area, were loyal to the French, but decidedly anti-Ottoman and opposed to the ruling Bey in Tunis. In Tunis, however, the urban religious establishments, with close ties to the ruling Bey, maintained close relations with the urban Tijaniyya. Although still formally under Ottoman authority in the nineteenth century, the local Tunisian authorities mostly operated autonomously from the Porte. Officially the Tunisian Bey was an Ottoman representative, but also intent on independent rule. Concurrently, the Bey had come under the impression that the encroaching French protectorate would enable him to ultimately discard Ottoman authority.[58] As mentioned, the Tijani *muqqadam* Ghadhahim, who had led a rebellion against the Bey, was at first assisted by the French. The French had hoped to exploit his leadership as part of their effort to oust the Ottoman authorities. However, the French ultimately withdrew their support of Ghadhahim, having realized that alienating the Bey would complicate their campaign against the Ottomans. As mentioned, Ghadhahim was thus left to meet his end at the hands of the local Tunisian authority.[59] Abun-Nasr, however, asserts only that:

> …the French authorities in Tunisia had made [use] of the shaikhs… in Tunisian politics, [which] led several Tijanis to seek a lucrative career in acting as political agents to the French.[60]

Abun-Nasr, and Wright to a small extent, seem to similarly draw the assumption that there was a pattern in the political behavior of the Tijaniyya in north Africa. Although it can be said that the Tijaniyya have undoubtedly engaged in political activism in various contexts in the Maghreb, the Tijaniyya as an organization does not function as a political category. Indeed, even brief summaries of these differing contexts illustrate that Tijani political engagement with colonial authorities in general was different in the various contexts of north Africa (and certainly elsewhere in Africa, as will be discussed below). In Algeria cooperation with the French was spurred on by the presence of Ottoman authority. In Morocco, however, refusal to cooperate with the French was informed by close ties with the Sultanate. In Tunisia,

the situation was split between French loyalty and anti-Ottoman sentiments in the south, and urban support for the Bey in Tunis. This differed still from the relationship between the Tijaniyya and the Ottoman government in Istanbul.

Ibrahim al-Riyahi (1767-1850), known as Brahim Riahi in his native Tunisia, was a Tijani, prominent intellectual figure, and an instigator of change amidst the Tunisian Bey's efforts to achieve autonomous rule from the Ottomans. In 1838, Riahi, having established his diplomatic reputation during a previous mission to Morocco, was delegated again by the Bey for another diplomatic mission to Istanbul. His task was, according to Andrea Brigaglia in his paper "Shaykh Ibrahim al-Riyahi (1767-1850): A Mufti and a Mystic in Husaynid Tunisia," to obtain "exoneration of Tunis from an annual tribute and for the recognition of the partial autonomy of the regency."[61] During his audience with the Sultan, instead of bowing—as was the custom—Riahi recited *ayet* 26 from Surah al-Sad.[62] Immediately following this, he also recited a poem praising the Sultan and the accomplishments of the Ottoman dynasty. Only after this, according to Brigaglia, did Riahi make the appointed request on behalf of the Tunisian Bey, which was granted.[63]

In another example, in 1897, Muhammad ibn al-Mukhtar (Wad al-'Aliyya) met with Sultan Abdülhamid II. Already a patron of the Shadhiliyya, Qadiriyya, and Naqshbandiyya, Abdülhamid reportedly took the Tijaniyya *wird* from al-Mukhtar after he was well-received by the Sultan.[64] Abun-Nasr concludes that patronage of the Tijaniyya, already widespread in Africa, might have been considered useful by the Sultan "…for his work of Islamic propaganda" to join the order.[65] In contrast, Wright concludes that it is more likely that Tijani apprehension of Ottoman authority was characteristic of an unease towards political authority in general. In the case of Ottoman authority, Wright suggests that this apprehension was exacerbated by "Turkish corruption and heavy-handedness in Algeria,"[66] but was not on the whole indicative of an irreconcilable animosity with the Ottoman government.

Wright asserts that under the leadership of Shakyh Tijani's son, Muhammad al-Saghir (d. 1883), the Tijaniyya in Algeria around the same time had been framed by the growing Salafi and Arab nationalist discourses as exploiting the turmoil caused by the French occupation of Algeria following the collapse of Ottoman authority, as part of an attempt to establish an independent Tijani state. The *tarikat*, Wright contends, was also accused of supporting French authority in opposition to the Algerian jihad of Emir 'Abd al-Qadir.[67] This gives some credence to Abun-Nasr's claim, mentioned earlier, that the Tijaniyya adjusted more easily to the new French authorities than other orders, the latter more typically condemning association with government authorities. However, again Abun-Nasr's claim is premised on the assumption that the Tijaniyya's ability to flourish socially can be attributed to the order's desire for control over their followers (he lists no other social reason), and their ability to cooperate with political

authorities in certain contexts. In this way, Abun-Nasr overlooks any other socio-religious explanations for the success of the Tijaniyya.

Wright, although taking a critical position in his explanation for Tijani success in the Maghreb region, draws a similarly over-generalized conclusion that Tijani political engagement was characteristically apprehensive of political authority in general. In both cases, a more reasonable conclusion of Tijani engagement in the Maghreb is that the organization has played a diverse political role in the societies where the order has spread, which is an illustration of Weismann's theory that Sufism has played a role in Islam's response to modernity to the extent that the wide variety of Tijani engagements represents the organization's adaptability to the rapid shifts in authority, which were introduced in equally different contexts of colonial imposition. As mentioned, European colonial imposition has been understood to coincide with (albeit mistakenly) the influx of modernity.

Beyond the Maghreb

The Tijaniyya temporarily succeeded in establishing a Tijani state in sub-Saharan Africa, which they never truly achieved in the Maghreb. However, their history in west Africa is similarly punctuated by diverse political engagement and the ability to adapt to the processes of change. For instance, in Senegal the French authorities, after killing al-Hajj Umar in battle in 1864, succeeded in concluding a treaty with the emerging Tijani state in 1866. This event is widely seen as a renunciation of the *jihad* that Hajj 'Umar Tall had started. What followed is mostly amicable relations between the French and Hajj 'Umar's successor, Ahmadu Tall. In 1903, Massina fell to direct administration under the French, and the Tijani state was suppressed. Following further French conquest of territory in west Africa that had been ruled by Tijanis, several of Hajj 'Umar's descendants emigrated to Mecca in fear of French reprisal, while other members of his family relocated to Nigeria.[68]

When the Tijaniyya stepped into the political arena of Senegal in the 1930s, they were in some ways cooperative with the French authorities, as indicated by their support for the Senegalese deputy, Galandou Diouf, in the French National Assembly.[69] In return for Tijani support, Diouf regularly intervened with the French authorities on their behalf.

When a dissident movement sprang from the Tijaniyya in west Africa, called the Hamalliyya (after its leader Shaykh Hamallah), with the aim of restoring Tijani rituals to what they believed to have been the original practice of Shaykh Tijani, a campaign against French rule was subsequently initiated. Apart from the obvious reason of the threat to its authority, French leadership was opposed to the movement because it endangered the position of those Tijani leaders who were loyal to the French and who were representatives of the corresponding social order of French hegemony. The success of the Hamalliyya in the 1920s can be attributed to the fact that it predominantly appealed to socially

marginalized tribes along the Maurtanian coast and the Mauritanian-Sudanese border, who saw the movement as a means of social emancipation. The mainline Tijani order in the French-controlled Sudan at the time was largely bound up with Fulani ethnicity, and in Senegal mostly associated with the educated.[70]

In 1925 Shaykh Hamallah was arrested by the French authorities following a spate of conflict between the Hamallis and (other) Tijanis. The Shaykh was later exiled in response to the ongoing conflict which continued even after his imprisonment. Shaykh Hamallah's status with the French authorities was temporarily improved when a great-nephew of Hajj 'Umar, Tierno Bokar, joined the movement in 1937.[71] According to Louis Brenner, the highly politicized competition between the Hamalliyya and the Tijaniyya led to Bokar's ostracization from the leadership of Bandiagara; "…that is by his own [Umarian] family."[72] Brenner further specifies that this account of Bokar's life was likely embellished as propaganda, but it remains that the dispute between the Hamalliyya and the Tijaniyya was politically significant due at least to the former's appeal among socially marginalized people. The political collaboration of the Tijaniyya in some contexts with the French authorities, and in Senegal their association with educated classes, seems a plausible enough source to ignite social discontent and subsequent political conflict. Hamallah would eventually die under French incarceration in 1942 while serving a 10-year sentence in France as a result of renewed conflict between the Hamallis and their pro-French opponents in the Tijaniyya. The disputes with the Hamalliyya indicate that Tijani involvement with political authorities was established enough to result in dissent and conflict.

French apprehension over the Hamalliyya extended to the growing influence of the Niassene branch of the Tijaniyya in west Africa. Drawing on their experience of often-fraught engagements in the Maghreb region with the Tijaniyya, the French authorities in Senegal and the surrounds approached Ibrahim Niasse and his followers with trepidation. The Tijani Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975), who claimed to be the *qutb* of his time, became an international figure after World War Two following public recognition of his status by several prominent Nigerian and Ghanaian scholars and political figures; among the most notable was the Emir of Kano.[73] According to Wright in his paper "Islam and Decolonization in Africa: the political engagement of a West African Muslim community," Shaykh Niasse, like other religious figures of his time, "could not avoid professing his loyalty to the colonial regime." However, as mentioned; the French remained wary of his influence despite a variety of affirmations of loyalty. As Wright asserts:

> Colonial surveillance of Shaykh Ibrahim… was obsessed with [his] contacts with other Muslim leaders and the possibility of a grassroots pan-Islamic movement based on Sufi affiliation… attempts were [even] made at joint British-French surveillance… Whatever the pronouncements of Shaykh Ibrahim in the colonial archive, internal sources [from his following] make a case for

> the community's uncompromising disavowal of colonial rule. …the Shaykh had ordered them [his companions] to pray against colonial occupation."[74]

When colonial occupation came to an end in Senegal, Shaykh Niasse supported a Muslim political agenda. Wright asserts that this is indicative of the possibility that he did not view a western-style secular government as an ideal towards which the decolonization process should move. At the same time, Wright claims that the Shaykh did not view "Muslim and modern rational identity as mutually exclusive." [75] Indeed, this was no doubt equally received as a threat by the post-colonial Senegalese state, who also harbored mistrust towards Niasse. Wright contends that the Shaykh's activities continued to be monitored by the Senegalese government, even using wiretaps and internal spies from among his followers.[76] Wright explores in great depth how Shaykh Niasse's "spiritual jihad against colonial power" was part of a larger project of political engagement aimed at articulating an Islamic vision of African liberation during the time of decolonization in several contexts, especially in west Africa. This dimension of his analysis is helpful for understanding the broader context of Tijani involvement in politics in the region but is otherwise beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Shaykh Niasse's influence elsewhere in west Africa is at least as significant as his impact in his native Senegal and is another indication of the diverse and adaptive tendencies of Tijani political engagement. Brigaglia in his paper, "The Sultan, the Sardauna and the Sufi: Politics and Inter-Tariqa Conflict in Northern Nigeria, 1956-1965," asserts that the dominant presence of the Tijaniyya, in addition to equally dominant Qadiriyya in Nigeria, is "evidence that the political powers still reckon the Sufi orders as central actors in the religious sphere and as vital interlocutors for the implementation of their public policies."[77] After the first Sokoto crisis, during which Sultan Abubakar III razed Tijani *zawiya*-s in the Province as part of an attempt to curb Tijani expansion following the visits of Algerian Sidi Benomar and Shaykh Niasse, the latter's influence continued to grow with the expansion of the *Fayda* revivalist network of the Tijaniyya and was "followed with apprehension by the political leadership of Shehu's Caliphate."[78] Brigaglia contends that the growth of this revivalism was closely associated with the goal of obtaining autonomy from Kano. The effects of the *Fayda* revival quickly spread across northern Nigeria and beyond.

When the second Sokoto crisis erupted, the Caliphate was embroiled in a debate over religious affiliation, divided between the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya. Brigaglia explains that according to some accounts, the Northern Peoples' Progressive Union (NEPU), which during the Cold War had established closer ties with the Eastern-bloc and non-aligned countries, in contrast to the decidedly pro-western Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), deliberately sent its members to pose as Tijanis in Zamfara in Sokoto Province with the aim of inciting a religious crisis.[79] It was this second Sokoto crisis which, Brigaglia contends, allowed the NEPU to claim that "their party represented a more genuine, trans-territorial and

endangered Tijani identity than those of the Tijaniyya leaders who had chosen to side with the NPC." In response, Shaykh Niasse sent a letter to the Tijanis in Nigeria, entreating them to "be patient and refrain from reacting" to the repercussions following this second Sokoto crisis. According to Brigaglia, it was the competition between the NEPU and the NPC which is widely understood to be the source of the second Sokoto crisis' Tijani-Qadiri riots of 1956.[80]

Years later, in the early 1960s, the deposition by Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Kano, of the Emir Sanusi in Kano who was also a zealous supporter of the Tijaniyya, was closely followed by a ban on Shaykh Niasse from entering Nigeria. Brigaglia contends that the latter event was part of an attempt to curb Niasse's political influence in the country after the NPC's influence in the north of Nigeria collapsed following Sanusi's deposition. As a result of Bello's actions, his administration was thrust into what Brigaglia describes as "the muddled waters of post-colonial politics."[81]

By the 1970s, the emergence in Nigeria of the anti-Sufi activism of Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992) and the Yan-Izala movement permanently altered the political landscape of Nigeria, but at the same time prompted the cultivation of more amicable relations between the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya.[82] Brigaglia concludes with the caution that Sufi orders in Nigeria—an assertion which can extend to a variety of political contexts-- were "not the mere 'super structure' of political groups," but that *tarikat* affiliations were mutually exclusive from partisan politics. [83]

The embroilment of the Tijaniyya in Nigerian politics is still more complex and expansive than these brief examples,[84] not least of which is the fact that Niasse's branch of the Tijaniyya, the *Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya* has become not only the most dominant branch of the Tijaniyya in Nigeria and west Africa, but the entire world. Indeed, Niasse's decidedly (though perhaps occasionally ambivalent) anti-colonial tendency also contributed to a friendly relationship with the Ghanaian anti-colonial icon and first Prime Minister of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah (1901-1972). Wright's assertion is a helpful encapsulation of the extent of his influence:

> Shaykh Ibrahim's practical ideology of political engagement coupled with the regular interactions of his diverse followers throughout Africa and beyond make the 'Community of the Flood' a prime example of a transnational network so important for understanding contemporary Africa.[85]

Conclusion

Abun-Nasr concludes that the Tijani *modi operandi* of cooperation, especially with colonial authorities, are what enabled the networks to survive, because during the time of Tijani establishment and growth, "the French… were the political masters of the society."[86] Abun-Nasr's conclusion about the spread of the Tijaniyya ultimately falls under the second of two major polemics, both articulated by Wright, that have

insufficiently categorized the *tarikat*, as well as other orders associated with the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya* paradigm:

> Either the order is described, by those of the 'Neo-Sufi' consensus, as one of reactionary, messianic Jihad against the European colonial mission or it becomes, amidst Arab nationalist… constructions, the collaborator with the infidel who betrayed the Arab nation to the European occupiers.[87]

Wright concludes that because the Tijaniyya has simultaneously been described according to both polemics, this in itself is a clear indication of the *tarikat*'s complex societal integration. This conclusion corroborates the supposition in this chapter, that a unique feature of the Tijaniyya is the organization's ability to rapidly adjust to the shifting currents of diverse political authorities, as demonstrated in a variety of contexts mentioned in this chapter from north and sub-Saharan Africa. Not only has this ability to adjust sustained the *tarikat* and placed it at the forefront of Islamic renewal movements, but it also is an indication that the Tijaniyya upholds Weismann's theory that Sufism has been able to adapt to meet the demands of the inculcation of modernization.

In Chapter 4, the positionality of the Tijaniyya's characteristic of adaptability in terms of Weismann's theory will be considered in the context of Kemal Pilavoğlu's attempts to challenge the strictly enforced secularization project of early republican Turkey. Although Pilavoğlu maintained the Tijani vision of Islamic renewal, his polemical approach was a departure from the *tarikat*'s characteristic political adaptability in the face of the demands wrought by Turkey's project of modernization. Prior to this discussion, the following chapter explores the extent to which Sufism in general was involved in the politics of the Ottoman period, leading up to the transition to republican Turkey. The chapter ultimately illustrates that Sufism in the Ottoman context was, on the whole, able to accommodate itself in order to adapt to the demands of the shifting political dynamics of Ottoman-cum-republican Turkey, and thus preserve its positions even at the highest levels. As will be shown, specific configurations of ideology, discourse, and power, however, prevented the Tijani community, established in Turkey by Pilavoğlu, to flourish in the same way.

Chapter 3
Sufism in the Ottoman Empire and the Early Republic

Throughout its Ottoman history, Sufism has exerted a noticeable influence over Muslim subjects of the Empire. For instance, in Hamid Algar's historical survey of the Naqshbandiyya (henceforth Nakşibendi), he asserts that the Order has played "a role of cardinal importance in the spiritual and religious lives of the Turkish people."[1] At the end of the Ottoman period, the influence of Sufism took a decisive turn when the Nakşibendi expressed hostility towards the emerging Turkish republican regime when they (members of the Nakşibendi) sought the restoration of the Caliphate.[2] In 1925, the new Turkish state enacted a legal ban on all Sufi orders and their institutions under the premise that in order to succeed, Turkish nationalist discourse would have to rid itself of the legacy binding it to the "East" and to Islam.[3]

The intimacy between Sufism and the State from the Ottoman period until the present has been in many ways premised on the belief that Sufi shaykhs have understood their position to be protectors of society and tradition.[4] One famous example is the appointment in the 17th century of a well-known Sufi, Zekeriyazade Yahya Efendi (d. 1644), as the *Şeyhülislam* at the same time as the importance (and by extension the political power) of the position increased. In Algar's words, the role of the Shaykh was "…to protect the Muslims from the evil of oppressors, and for the sake of this we [as shaykhs] must traffic with kings and conquer their souls."[5] A similar argument is made by John Curry and Erik Ohlander in *Sufism and Society: Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World*, that a major goal of Sufi leaders, especially in the formative period of Sufi history, was to shift "hierarchies of spiritual legitimacy" away from political leaders towards individuals and local Sufi groups, which was achieved by placing emphasis on the esoteric superiority of Sufi spirituality.[6]

Although official Ottoman historiographies have regularly positioned the "Sunni orthodoxy" claimed by the state as something distinct from Sufism, this chapter will demonstrate that it is more accurate to say that Sufism was the official Sunni Islam of the Porte in the sense that the complex overlap of Sufism with the Ottoman state's claims of orthodoxy are knitted so tightly together, they are impossible to unravel. Dina Le Gall in *Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450-1700* identifies a similar complexity in the relationship between Sufism and orthodoxy in Ottoman contexts, describing the interactions between these concepts as a "subtle but continuous dynamism that went into articulation of the law over generations." De Gall also asserts that that there has been a "pattern of biases" in Sufi, Ottoman, and Islamic historiography that have obscured our understanding of organized Sufism, and the relationship between Sufism and Islamic orthodoxy. She attributes this to "nineteenth century modes of thinking… [which have depicted Sufism] as inherently antithetical to Islamic orthodoxy."[7]

There are endless examples of patronage of *tarikatlar* by the sultans, of powerful officials who were also Sufi masters, state-sponsored construction of *türbeler* for Sufi saints, and appointments of Sufi shaykhs in prominent teaching positions at madrasas. One differentiation that *can* be made, and is indeed important to note, is between the popular Islam of Ottoman subjects-- which was often more heterodox in practice in the sense that traditions were syncretic and adapted from indigenous, often localized Turkic religious practices[8]-- and an interpretation of Islam influenced more strongly by government policies which were largely controlled by the ulama and other ruling authorities. The latter was the "orthodoxy" so often claimed by the State.

The history of the relationship between Sufism and Ottoman-cum-Republican political authority is long, complex, and at times a tangled web of elaborate interpersonal, spiritual relationships imbued with political affiliation. What's more, this history is in many aspects a subject still very much in need of deep investigation.[9] However, it is not pertinent here to survey in detail the entire chronology of the first six centuries of the political involvement of Sufism with the Ottoman State. Likewise, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to attempt to engage extensively with the complexity of the interactions between secularism, religion, and the project of modernization wrought by Turkish republican authorities.[10]

The focus of this chapter is primarily on the late Ottoman period, especially the events which led up to the *Tanzimat*, the *Tanzimat* period itself, and the years leading up to the revolution of the Republic. The tail end of the *Tanzimat* is especially significant for this dissertation because the events during this time sowed the seeds for the Turkish nationalist models that were enacted by the early republican regime. These models remained inextricably bound up with Sufism, whether it was because it was rejected as a threat to the modernization of the young Republic, or because it was an integral dimension of Turkish cultural identity, and thus a vital element in the construction of a viable nationalist identity. The official establishment of the Republic oversaw the legal enactment of bans on the operation of Sufi orders during the development of Turkish nationalism and the rise of the secular Republic.

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to briefly demonstrate the extent to which Sufism has been involved in the politics of the later Ottoman period, leading up to the transition to republican Turkey, in order to provide adequate background information to underpin the study of Pilavoğlu and his Tijani organization. A condensed section of "Ottoman Origins" gives way to a discussion about Sufism during the Ottoman period of reform and transformation, then the *Tanzimat*, followed by the years that led up to the transition to a republic, and finally; the reaction of Sufi *tarikatlar* to the legal ban on their organizations and activities during the republican era.

Ottoman Origins

As mentioned, an exhaustive history of Sufism in the first six centuries of the Ottoman Empire is not prudent, nor even particularly relevant for this dissertation. As such, this section on Ottoman Origins provides only a few brief examples of the role that Sufism has played throughout Ottoman political history. No specific criteria for selection of the examples for this short survey were applied, except to select examples which are well-documented events in Ottoman history. The choice of famous examples also serves to further emphasize the general pervasiveness of Sufism in Ottoman-Turkish political consciousness. In other words, the influence of Sufism has often been obvious, despite the fact that, as noted, this is a subject still largely wanting for deep investigation.

The existence of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire is traceable to the origins of the formation of the Empire. As early as the ninth century, the Oghuz Turks began to embrace Islam.[11] In the eleventh century, a clan of Oghuz Turks, better known as the *Seljuks*, expanded their influence from Persia into Anatolia, establishing a Muslim presence there. The Seljuk dynasty eventually gave way to the Ottoman dynasty in the thirteenth century.

Like many communities that come to embrace a new religion, the Oghuz Turks retained many of their pre-Islamic traditions.[12] For instance, ceremonial *dhikr* (a devotional remembrance during which prayers are recited, often repeatedly) was adjusted to incorporate the ritual dances of so-called "shamanistic" Turks. Beliefs such as reincarnation or metempsychosis that featured in the legends that surrounded the life of Ahmed Yasawi,[13] a twelfth century Turkic poet and founder of the Yasawiyya Sufi order,[14] are examples of pre-Islamic traditions that may have been partially retained in the conversion process. As the Oghuz Turks gradually moved westward between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and closer to the heartlands of Islam, these traditions crystalized and influenced the formation of other dervish orders such as the Qalandariyya and the Haydariyya.[15]

In the legend of the accession of the first Sultan of the Empire, Osman Bey[16] had a dream while staying in the home of the Sufi Shaykh Edebali, who the former had been visiting regularly, owing to his piety. According to the legend, Shaykh Edebali interpreted Osman's dream to be an indication of the power and glory of the latter's posterity.[17] After a series of military victories and the decline of Seljuk power, Osman successfully expanded his territory, which is widely understood to be the founding of the Ottoman Empire. Weismann suggests that the introduction of the Naqshbandiyya, or Nakşibendi *tarikat* in western Asia was intimately connected with the process of early Ottoman statecraft. A significant dimension of this process was "…the search for an orthodox alternative to the unruly dervish fraternities that had accompanied the conquest of Anatolia." [18]

The expansion of the Baktashiyya, or Bektaşi order into Anatolia reached the second Ottoman sultan, Osman I (d. 1326). He traveled to meet the founder, Haji Bektaş Veli (d. 1271), and subsequently

became a member of the order. By the mid-fourteenth century, the Bektaşi order had become the official religious practice of the Janissaries shortly after this elite military corps was founded. The corps was comprised of Christian adolescent boys who were kidnapped primarily from the Balkan region under the *devşirme* (literally, "to recruit," or "to lift") system. Under this system, the boys were forcibly converted to Islam and were forbidden to marry as part of their requirement to be completely loyal to the reigning Sultan. Janissaries were understood to be slaves of the Sultanate but were paid a salary and occupied some of the highest offices of the State. The personal guard of the Sultan was even comprised of Janissaries. According to Kadir Üstün, the close affiliation between the Bektaşi *tarikat* and the Janissaries was due to the original practice of the latter's close associations across Anatolia with local Turkish families as part of the *devşirme* practice of conversion during Janissary training, which required language[19] and religious training. It was due to this association that Janissaries tended towards "popular religion," which according to Üstün was often Bektaşi tradition.[20]

At the turn of the fourteenth century, the Empire came under serious threat by the conqueror Tamerlane, but under Mehmed I (r. 1413-1421) was re-united "with Sufi help," according to Godfrey Goodwin. At the same time, Mehmed I also was faced with a revolt against the Ottoman state in 1416 led by Shaykh Bedreddin Mahmud Bin Israel Bin Abdulaziz (d. 1420). A well-known mystic, jurist, and religious scholar, Ottoman authorities perceived Shaykh Bedreddin's revolt against the Sultanate as a subversion of the state-sanctioned Sunni Islam, mainly due to his ideas about religious syncretism. [21]

In a legend about the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in 1463 in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Nakşibendi-s are said to have taken part in the Ottoman takeover. The story alleges that their first lodge was established in what is now Sarajevo. The same anecdote asserts that the Balkan Nakşibendi-s may have been commissioned by the rulers, who supported them with endowments and property, to take up the struggle against purportedly unorthodox dervishes.[22]

In the fifteenth century, Sultan Mehmed II joined the Bektaşi order after inviting Shaykh Balım Sultan (d. 1517) to Topkapı palace as his guest.[23] Balım was the second major shaykh in the history of the order and known for consolidating the *tarikat* and incorporating additional systematic structure into the organization. The first permanent center of Nakşibendi establishment was endowed by Mehmed II (r-1451-1481) shortly following this meeting. The Nakşibendi *tarikat*, already established in Bursa, expanded into Constantinople to coincide with the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453. By the seventeenth century, the organization counted twelve active lodges between the two cities.[24]

Murad III (r. 1574-1595) was a well-known disciple of Sufism. According to Weismann, he may have also been initiated as a Nakşibendi by Ahmad Sadiq Taşkandi, "…scion of a venerable *sayyid* family from Bukhara… who spread the [Nakşibendi] brotherhood in the Arab lands, particularly Damascus and Jerusalem… [and authorized] the first known treatise on the Naqshbandi lineage in

Arabic."[25] Murad III is also known to have endowed the first Turkish translation of the *Rashahat*, a Persian document which discusses the Nakşibendi masters of central Asia.

Between 1516-1517, the *Hijaz* region located on the Arabian Peninsula, which is also the area where the holiest sites of Islam are located, was successfully annexed by the Ottomans. Following this conquest, the number of Arab religious scholars and bureaucrats significantly increased within the Empire, likely due to the addition of Muslim Arabs in the Hijaz to the population. Ottoman administration simultaneously became more standardized, but also more Islamicized in the sense that the terminology used in official documents was increasingly in Arabic.[26] At the same time, the Muslim population of the Empire was also increased by conversions of non-Muslim subjects to Islam.

Jenkins suggests that the internal consolidation of political and administrative entities in the Empire and the addition of the *Hijaz* region to Ottoman territory (and by extension, increase in Muslim population) were significant factors which triggered the *kızılbaşı* revolts. The *kızılbaşı* were one of the prominent Turkic nomadic groups among the supporters of the Safavids. They wore tall red hats with twelve folds to indicate their devotion to the twelve imams of Shia Islam. In Turkish, the name *kızılbaşı* means "redhead" (kızıl; red baş; head).

The Safavid dynasty, which originated in the Safaviyya *tarikat*, ruled over the region of Persia from 1501- 1736. The founders claimed to be *sayyids,* or direct descendants of Muhammad, through a direct ancestral link to Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet.[27] As the Safaviyya developed, it became associated with the Imamiyya, which is the largest branch of Shi'ism. When the Safavids declared Shi'ism as the state religion, may *tarikatlar* across central Asia openly declared their Shi'i position. The rise of Safavid power, the declaration of Shi'a Islam as the state religion, and the recruitment of the Turkic tribes of Anatolia on behalf of Safavid aims were perceived as a threat by the Ottomans. These perceptions were not unfounded; it was the Safavids who instigated a series of revolts among Ottoman subjects who sympathized with *kızılbaşı* ideology. [28]

Similar to Le Gall's claims that the subversion of Sufi, and Ottoman historiographies have obscured our understanding of organized Sufism, Albert Doja asserts that Ottoman historiography has attempted to suppress the plurality of political and ideological forces at play against the Safavids. According to Doja's view, it was mainly tribal rivalries that divided the Turkic populations of Anatolia, which had persisted since the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Doja explains:

> …on the one hand, [were] the partisans of the Ottoman House and, on the other, hybrid warrior-dervish figures (*Ghazi*), mobilized by one or another factions, of whom one finds traces in sources as diverse as census registers to Ottoman and Byzantine chronicles and hagiographical legends. In particular, the name of Kizilbash appeared for the partisans of the Safavids. This anarchistic movement, whose majority was formed by the Turcoman tribes coming from eastern

> Anatolia, was transformed into a politico religious force which the Safavids made an instrument of their policy.[29]

The *Kızılbaşı* revolts lasted for twenty years, and culminated in a decisive Ottoman victory in the battle of Çaldıran in August 1514.[30] Jenkins argues that this period of revolt is what "…accelerated the securitization of religious belief and deepened the identification of the Ottoman state with Sunni Islam."[31] Despite the growing influence of Sunni orthodoxy at the official level, Jenkins also notes that rural Ottoman territories during this time continued to practice more localized belief systems which evolved "…within a rough Islamic framework."[32] This increasing identification of the Ottoman state with orthodox Sunni principles at the time no doubt intensified the existing conflict over territory with the Safavid Shiites by adding an ideological dimension, as Sunni orthodoxy became an increasing sign of political loyalty to the Ottoman state.[33]

In Jenkins' view, the *kızılbaşı* revolts seem to have had little impact on the political loyalty of the Bektaşi *tarikat* to Ottoman rule. As mentioned, the Bektaşi order was already firmly embedded in the structures of the Ottoman state, which allowed for the potential to dictate the religious framework of Ottoman Islam. Crucially, the Bektaşi order was also widely understood to be the closest to the *kızılbaşı* in their practices and beliefs. Even today, the Bektaşi *tarikat* is erroneously regarded as synonymous with Alevism, or a syncretic tradition of Sufism professing to be followers of Ali, the twelve imams, and Haji Bektaşi Veli. Despite the connection to Veli, Alevism is widely considered distinct from both Bektaşism and Shi'ism. Alevism is distinct from the former because although Bektaşism is named for Veli, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was Balım Sultan who consolidated the *tarikat* and incorporated additional systematic structure into the tradition in the early sixteenth century. It is distinct from the latter because Alevis do not generally follow the common Shi'i practice of *taqlid*,[34] or the practice of conforming to the teachings of a *mujtahid*, a qualified (often juristic) expert.

The Bektaşi order remained loyal to Ottoman rule not only throughout the period of *kızılbaşı* revolts, and indeed continued to flourish despite the ongoing persecution of the former well into the 17th century.[35] One possible explanation that Jenkins offers is that the Bektaşi *tarikat* was instrumentalized by the Ottoman government in order to assimilate the *kızılbaşı*, distance them politically from the Safavids, and thereby incorporate them into the loyal Bektaşi order. Barkey proposes a similar theory, arguing that the State "…not only used rebels in their ongoing process of consolidation, but also actively incorporated them into strategies of centralization."[36] Notably, this loyalty would undergo a decisive turning point during the period of transformation and modernization of the Empire.

Crystallization of "Ottoman"

In Ottoman records, the territories of the Empire are referred to as "the lands of Islam," and Ottoman armies as "the soldiers of Islam." Beginning with Mehmed II (r.1444-1446; 1451-1481) in the mid-fifteenth century, the Ottoman Sultan was also the ruling Caliph of the Muslim world. By 1517, the Ottoman Sultan was conventionally viewed as the leader and supreme representative of Islam on earth. By extension, the *reaya* (literally; subject[s]) first identified themselves according to their religious identity (e.g. Muslim, Christian, Jewish)—ethnicities were secondary markers. Before the consolidation of the Caliphate, the term "Ottoman" was used mainly in reference to the ruling dynasty.[37] However, "Ottoman" came to be interchangeable and synonymous with "Muslim" as the state continued to consolidate its institutions along more traditional Islamic lines. This conflation most likely arose due to the implementation of the classical Islamic theory of social division into two major tiers; the *askeri* (literally; military), which was an exclusively Muslim ruling class, and *reaya*.[38]

A single Islamic trajectory along with strict application of sharia law would have been difficult to impose equally upon all Ottoman subjects. Even so, the sultanate maintained an official sharia-based system of orthodoxy after the consolidation of the Caliphate in the 16th century. The system was supplemented with *örfî* (literally; conventional or customary law) commands issued by the sultan. Obviously, the latter were not always strictly in adherence with traditional sharia code, but they were rarely in violation of it either.[39] By the accession of Süleyman I (r.1520-1566), this statutory tandem was conventionally accepted, and was known as *din-ü devlet* (religion and state).[40] Because of this approach to sharia implementation, heterodox dervishes, the Shi'ite minority, and the *dhimmi* (Christians and Jews) were increasingly overlooked at the official level. During the late Ottoman period, this would eventually incline the officially ignored Muslim groups into an oppositional role in the religious politics of the Empire.[41]

Increasing Islamization at the official level also resulted in a shift in certain social dynamics in the Empire. The residential areas of Ottoman cities became more definitively separated into Muslim and non-Muslim neighborhoods, which compounded the distinctness of religious identity. At the same time, representatives of the government aligned their behavior more and more according to sharia emphases on modesty and privacy, which meant that they seldom made public appearances in residential areas. In turn, this solidified the role of local community leaders and clergy becoming intermediaries between their communities and official authorities.[42] In many cases, these local leaders were also leaders of *tarikatlar*. Thus, while the official Islam of the Empire, which was controlled by the ulama, and as mentioned, professed orthodoxy according to Sunni doctrines (which, nevertheless, were in many cases interpreted through leaders appointed from officially-sanctioned Sufi orders) practiced by the ulama, the Muslim

reaya continued to be influenced by local *tarikatlar*, which remained "…repositories of heterodox, and arguably syncretic, beliefs and practices throughout the Ottoman period."[43]

It follows from this that those networks of *tarikatlar* practicing popular, more syncretic forms of Islam which were not necessarily controlled by the state—and in some cases, viewed as potentially politically subversive structures[44]-- were frequently present at the ordinary level where the omnipotent Ottoman rulers hardly penetrated. These organizations frequently provided educational institutions at basic levels, and established centers for cultural and religious training. Additionally, local *tarikatlar* often controlled charitable foundations that provided social assistance. Thus, it was often these local *tarikatlar* who were involved with the mundane problems of individuals and served as the dominant spiritual vehicles which offered a set of normative principles for individuals to deal with daily life. For most of the population, religion was a means for structuring one's life, a source of comfort, and a center of moral inspiration. For the ruling elite, religion was a matter related to the legitimacy of the state. Thus, the function of Sufism for the subjects of the Empire was a fundamental aspect of routine life. Throughout the Ottoman period, local *tarikatlar* remained firmly embedded in the social fixtures of the empire's Muslim subjects, in spite of the deepening divide between the syncretic practices of Ottoman subjects, and the Sunni orthodoxy of the State.[45]

Transformation and 'Modernization'

A variety of factors led to noticeable changes in the political and social structure of the Empire in the seventeenth century. Among them were decisive military defeats coupled with the ongoing need to compete with the Hapsburg and Safavid empires, the changing structure of the sultanate,[46] inflation, unprecedented population growth,[47] and the ensuing Celalî rebellions.[48]

Although the Celalî rebellions are widely understood to have been originally instigated by an Alevi named Shaykh Celal as a religious revolt against the prevailing Sunni state ideology, the subsequent rebellions under this designation from the sixteenth into the seventeenth century are not attributed to the original Shaykh Celal. Furthermore, the subsequent revolts are also often categorized as largely motivated by responses to the variety of aforementioned crises within the Empire, as opposed to strictly religious ideology. Nevertheless, the response by the Ottoman government to suppress the rebellions, was at least partially sectarian in its approach, according to some sources, because Alevis, Bektaşis, and Shi'ites were targeted during deadly crackdowns of unrest.[49] For instance, Doja points out that beginning with reign of Selim I (r. 1512-1520):

> Ottoman Sultans… launched forth to persecute heterodox Shiite elements, it was not because they had suddenly discovered their vocation as defenders of orthodox Sunnite Islam but rather because they saw in these elements a danger to the political and economic integrity of the empire.[50]

The politicized nature of Ottoman crackdowns on so-called "heterodoxy" was due to the perceived threat of rebel groups to the central authority of the State. According to Ocak's analysis, there is an important distinction between rebellion (*isyan*) and revolt (*kıyam*). The former referred to armed movements which emerged in response to oppression by the State. The latter referred to armed uprisings which were not prompted by the injustice of oppression from the Ottoman authorities but had "a direct political aim with an ideological background and messianic inspiration."[51]

Kıyams, which were largely led by Sufi groups, denied the legitimacy of the ruling Ottoman dynasty, and rejected the religious authority of the sultan. The aim of these *kıyams* was not to demand state reforms, but to initiate alternative centers of power vis-à-vis imagery of the impending arrival of the *mahdi* (messiah). The ruling authorities interpreted these as a revolt against the State ideology and its "true orthodox religion."[52] Not only were the Sufi instigators swiftly executed, but Ottoman intellectuals were compelled by the authorities to build counterarguments against the ideologies which had spurred unrest and led to these *kıyams.* Gündoğdu cautions against viewing all the upheavals of the Celalî rebellions in this way, noting the complexity and intricacy of Ottoman rebellions. Nevertheless, this unrest is a clear illustration of a growing dynamic of opposition to the State by Sufi organizations. At the same time, these upheavals did not signal the beginning of a massive social revolution, either. As Gündoğdu observes, the Ottoman Empire did not undergo a permanent subversion of its essential ruling structure as a result of events such as the Celalî rebellions, or the other dimensions of social and economic shifts into the seventeenth century.[53]

The ongoing growth of the political influence of the Janissary corps since their first rebellion against the sultanate in the early seventeenth century led to the deposing of several sultans. In 1730, the Patrona rebellion resulted in the abdication of Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730), who the Corps had themselves appointed as sultan. The official narratives from Ottoman historiographies claim that the Janissaries purposely hindered government efforts to modernize the military as part of their political aims. According to this view, this was indicated by their increasing failures on the battlefield. More likely is that the government was no longer able to use the Corps as it pleased.[54] Üstün suggests that this lack of control likely coincided with the Ottoman government's willingness to modernize the military.[55] Doja similarly argues that it was the recurring conflict with the Janissaries itself that was one of the major causes of erosion of Ottoman political influence, noting; "…the prevalence of heterodoxy in religion, much of it due to [Bektaşi] dervish influence… threatened to undermine both orthodox faith and Ottoman authority."[56]

As the seventeenth century came to an end, it was the ulama who most strongly opposed the government's call for modernization measures aligned with the European changes underway at the time. Much of the ulama's opposition was due to the erosion of their influence over pious foundations.[57]

According to Jenkins, the ulama increasingly overlooked practical issues of political restructuring, instead becoming more focused on Islam. They advocated the idea that; "…[the Empire] needed to regain divine favor by returning to what was increasingly seen as the golden age of Süleyman I."[58] As the ulama's resistance to change intensified, their influence began to shift from an engaged parastatal to what Jenkins calls "…its [the State's] conservative Islamic conscience."[59]

Jenkins describes the results of the ulama's resistance to innovation as "an intellectual sclerosis" which was successful in the sense that the Ottomans succeeded in isolating themselves from the technological advances, economic expansion, and intellectual flourish taking place in Europe. A decisive example of this isolation was the conservative opposition to the printing press. Even after the first press in Arabic script was introduced in Istanbul in 1727, it was only allowed to operate on the condition that the Qur'an, hadith, and any works on *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), or anything else dealing with theology, were not printed.[60]

As the gap continued to widen between the Ottomans and European powers, the former's influence across its vast territories began to erode. The third Ottoman-Russian war ended with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which again altered the relationship between the Ottoman state and Islam. The treaty confirmed the loss of Crimea, which was the first major Ottoman territory with a Muslim-majority to become separate from the Empire. The treaty also stipulated the Ottoman sultan's spiritual authority as caliph in Crimea, which created a new distinction between spiritual and political authority.[61]

Ottoman military success had long been believed to be proof of divine favor. This fact was increasingly instrumentalized in an effort to stabilize the Empire's Muslim population as demands for internal reform strengthened, and the first murmurs of nationalist movements within its territories reached the ears of the Ottoman authorities. As calls for innovation and reform burgeoned, the suggestion of restructuring the Janissary corps to incorporate recent advances in European military technologies and planning gained traction.

The loss of de facto control of Egypt (occupied by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798) was a pivotal marker of waning Ottoman influence; it was the first time since the Crusades that Europeans had seized control of Muslim heartlands. British intervention to expel the French from Egypt was considered conclusive proof that the Ottoman military was weakening.[62]

Shortly before the French took over control of Egypt, Selim III (r. 1789-1807) had attempted to establish a *Nizâm-ı Cedîd*, or a New Order modern military, which was trained according to European methods. Importantly, they were also conscripted from native-born Muslims. This was due not only to the decline and abolishment in the early eighteenth century of the *devşirme* system, but also Selim III's attempt to reduce the size and the influence of the *askeri* class, and thus by extension, the Janissaries. Part

of his attempt included the establishment of new military, naval, and engineering schools, all of which were overseen by French counsel and instruction.[63]

Unsurprisingly, the creation of the *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* sowed the seeds of resentment among the Janissaries. In 1807, Selim III was forced by the Janissaries to abdicate, replaced by his cousin Mustafa IV (r. 1807-1808). The *Nizâm-ı Cedîd* collapsed in the wake of violent protests, instigated by the Janissaries, in Istanbul. Mustafa was also shortly thereafter removed, replaced by his brother Mahmud II (r. 1808-39), who continued Selim's attempts to establish a new military. However, he was repeatedly forced to back down in response to revolts by the Janissaries.

It is worth reiterating that an important dimension of Janissary influence was the fact that they had maintained a long-standing coalition with the ulama. According to Jenkins, this relationship had grown tenuous since clashes had occurred between the Janissaries and students of theology in the streets of Istanbul. In 1826, when Mahmud II announced another plan to establish a modern military, to which the Janissaries responded by mutinying, this time the ulama did not intercede with their usual support. This abandonment was likely because the privileges historically afforded to the ulama by the Ottoman authorities were at risk if the government was to implement wider modernization reforms.

As mentioned, the Janissaries also maintained a long, close association with the *Bektaşi tarikat.* There were growing suspicions among the ulama that the Bektaşi *tarikatlar* were Christian sympathizers. This was indicated by outrage among Muslims over reports of atrocities committed by insurgents against local Muslims during the Greek rebellion. This suspicion was compounded by the likelihood that the ulama had increasingly been brought under the influence of the "…hardline orthodox teachings of the Khalidi branch of the *Naqshbandi tariqah*,"[64] Which, according to Jenkins' view, would have further distanced the sympathy of the ulama from the perceived syncretic outlook of the Bektaşi-affiliated Janissaries.

Üstün's view does not contest Jenkins but points out that there is no decisive reason to explain the supposed deterioration of the Janissaries. According to Üstün's conclusion, official Ottoman historiographies have depicted the Corps as a monolithic military organization devoid of profound, complex relations with various social groups in Ottoman society. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to recount the nuances of these relations, but what's important to acknowledge is that the Janissaries clearly maintained complex, strong ties across various facets of Ottoman society.[65] Because of this, their destruction was a major turning point in the period of transformation and modernization of the Empire.[66]

The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 was called the *Vaka-i Hayriye* (Auspicious Event) in official Ottoman accounts. Üstün explains that this was the official name of the event because it was believed that the State had taken decisive action against opposition to their project of modernization.[67]

Üstün suggests that, realistically, the Janissaries were "…representing the social unrest against the new reform measures motivated by their social, cultural, and religious affiliations."[68]

As part of this decisive action, according to Üstün the Ottoman government defended a *fatwa* (a legal ruling) issued by the *Şeyhülislam*, which was depicted by the government as representative of the opinion of Islam, to exile Haydar Baba, an Iranian Bektaşi who was residing in the 99th regiment of the Janissary corps. When he was accused by the *Şeyhülislam* of being a spy for Persia (with which the Ottomans were currently at war), several high-ranking Janissaries contested the accusation, arguing that Haydar Baba's origin and the war with Persia, were insufficient reasons for expulsion. Üstün draws the following conclusion about the threat of Haydar Baba's expulsion:

> The Ottoman government may have taken this step in order to decrease the importance of the Bektaşi order for the Janissaries as well as to abate the power of the Janissaries by dividing them. More importantly, the analysis of this document [*hatt-ı hümayun* 17078][69] demonstrates the apparent profound ties between the Bektaşi order and the Janissaries.[70]

In June 1826, the Janissaries barricaded themselves in their barracks in Istanbul. Mahmud II's troops responded with artillery fire, which ignited the barracks, killing thousands of Janissaries. Surviving corpsmen were either exiled or executed, and the Janissaries were formally abolished. The Bektaşi order was also outlawed, and its most prominent members were executed. Several of their lodges in Istanbul were destroyed, and their property transferred to other *tarikatlar*, primarily to the Nakşibendi.[71] The outlawing of the Bektaşi order by the Ottoman authorities was largely motivated by the "profound organic relationship" with the Janissaries.

In a *hatt-ı hümayun* issued in 1826 which detailed the terms of the dissolution of the Bektaşi *tarikat*, the author of the document claims that the authorities were incapable of preventing "Bektaşi mischief" which contravened the sultan's orders. According to Üstün's summary of the same document, the State often relied on "…Sunni groups" in its attempt to terminate the Bektaşi *tarikat* by using the former as a source of information. The government also took measures to ensure that these "Sunni groups" ideologically sided with Ottoman authority.[72]

The "Bektaşi mischief" which occurred was in response to another *fatwa* issued by the *Şeyhülislam*, which was not widely accepted, justifying the abolition of the Janissaries for religious reasons. Üstün concludes that the lack of acceptance of the *fatwa* indicates that Ottoman subjects did not largely support the attempt to dissolve the Bektaşi *tarikat*, and the "Sunni groups" mentioned in the *hatt-ı hümayun* were likely limited to groups directly affiliated with the government.[73] In the imperial decree officially disbanding the Janissaries, Mahmud II declared that the dissolution of the corps was necessary to "revive the religion and the *Shari'a* of the Prophet."[74]

The primary reason for the dissolution of the Bektaşi *tarikat* was probably because of their relationship with the Janissaries and not as much because of religious zeal of Sunni orthodoxy. The latter is cited in Ottoman records as the reason behind the decision.[75] In all likelihood, if the Bektaşi *tarikat* had not collaborated with the Janissaries, the government probably would not have targeted the organization. However, ongoing efforts of modernization by the authorities included the centralization of political power, so probably the dissolution of the Bektaşi *tarikat* was due to the perceived political threat of the organization.[76]

In the same year, Mahmud II established the *Nezaret-i Evkaf*, or the ministry of religious foundations. This organization took over control of all the religious foundations, as well as the assets and revenues associated with them, that had previously been run by the ulama. The only foundations that remained under the ulama's control were a few which oversaw Mecca and Medina. The establishment of the *Nezaret-i Evkaf* restructured the control of the ulama, effectively removing their autonomy, thus incorporating them into the centralized apparatus of the State.

In 1833 Mahmud II established a new Translation Bureau, which instructed new bureaucrats in French, which was also taught in the new *rüşdiye*, or non-religious, state-run schools (established in 1838), which admitted Muslim and non-Muslim students. Knowledge of French soon became a requirement for advancement in the Ottoman military and bureaucracy. The increased use of French coincidentally allowed the Ottoman elite to consume European intellectual trends because they were able to read material that was not translated into Turkish.

Mahmud II also introduced some of the first clothing reforms, including a ban on the turban in favor of the fez. Not long after the ban, he was required to grant special dispensation for the ulama, allowing them to retain their traditional robes and turbans, which made them a visible symbol of religious conservatism. Their resistance to the early clothing reforms further underscored the ulama's opposition to Mahmud's attempt to modernize the Empire, but also their slow atrophy from relevance in the affairs of the State.[77]

According to Weismann, Mahmud II's early reform efforts were often supported by the Khalidis, a major branch of the Nakşibendi *tarikat*. As noted, their orthodoxy had already been increasingly influencing the ulama since the dissolution of the Janissaries. They had also been supporting Ottoman officials in their attempts to recalibrate the Empire on its trajectory of reform, when the order bonded with local Mujaddidiyya in Istanbul in their mutual interests to re-establish law and order in the Ottoman provinces. The Mujaddiddiya had acquired "palpable political influence" in central Asia in parallel to the rise of the Mangit Dynasty of Bukhara.[78] Mahmud's implementation of various social reforms was the prelude to the period of even more extensive measures of restructuring, and what were perceived as efforts to modernize the Empire in the period known as the *Tanzimat*. However, when Ottoman reform

efforts began to look westward as these reforms advanced, the Khalidis in their orthodoxy did not likewise turn their heads.

The *Tanzimat* and Late Ottoman Period

In 1839, the Ottoman Empire introduced a series of extensive reforms, collectively known as the *Tanzimat.* or literally; "reorganization." This new series of reforms was an intensification of the effort to modernize and restructure the Empire in an attempt to emerge from the growing shadow of the continuing loss of territory and the increasing economic and political presence of Europe. When Mahmud II died in 1839, his son Abdülmecit (r. 1839-1861) succeeded him. During the same year, the sixteen-year-old sultan pledged to introduce an extensive program of administrative reforms, reading from the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*, or the "Supreme edict of the Rose Garden."

Orientalist historiography has often depicted implementation of the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif* as all but abandoning Islamic political principles for a westernized, namely French model of governance.[79] According to this view, the reforms considerably lessened the place of Islam in the Ottoman system, thereby initiating the first significant separation of religion from politics in the Empire. Nevertheless, the language of the edict suggests that the Empire's internal perception of decline since the 18th century was largely attributed to ongoing failures to abide by Qur'anic principles and the sharia, and not because of a lack of alignment with western political models.

Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the bureaucrat to whom the drafting of the edict is credited, served as the Ottoman ambassador to Paris and London. Without a doubt this brought him in close contact with the highest-ranking political figures in western Europe, which would have allowed him to observe the functioning of European political systems. At the same time, it is misleading to claim not only that Mustafa Reşid Paşa was the sole drafter of the edict, but also that Islamic principles were abandoned in its drafting and implementation. The assumption as part of this view is that sultan Abdülmecit was a passive participant in the drafting and implementation of the edict. Whether it was due to his young age, or disposition as a ruler, which differed from his father Mahmud's affection for power;[80] Abdülmecit endeavored to be regarded as a virtuous ruler "…[who] worked to rectify malpractices and to uproot …oppression and abuses of power."[81]

Abdülmecit had been tutored as a youth by a Khalidi master, Şehri Hafiz. This coincided with the attraction of many Ottoman bureaucrats to the orthodoxy of the Khalidi *tarikat*. Even Abdülmecit's mother, Bezmi-Alem, was a follower of Muhammad Jan, an Indian Nakşibendi shaykh who had settled in Istanbul.[82] When he ascended the throne, Abdülmecit appointed Şehri Hafiz as the *mufti* of the Imperial Guard. Weismann confirms that this "Naqshbandi-inspired orthodoxy" stood behind the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*. This edict is often noted as the official beginning of the *Tanzimat.*

According to Jenkins, prior to the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*, legislative functions were generally vested solely in the authority of the sultan, which is in keeping with the claim that Mahmud II had sought to increase the power of the sultanate.[83] After the edict was issued, the concept of statute law was introduced, which meant that law could exist independent of the person of the sultan. Thus, the sultan became responsible for enforcing statute law and therefore, in theory the sultan also became subservient to this new structure. It was only much later, in the decades following the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*, that a handful of Ottoman bureaucrats who were graduates of the French-inspired *rüşdiye* system undertook endeavors to align the Ottoman legislative system more closely with western European systems. They believed that by doing this, they were repelling the encroaching ambitions of European powers in the Empire.[84]

A *hatt-ı hümayun* issued in 1856 by these Ottoman bureaucrats committed the government to removing distinctions and designations in law based on religion, language, and race. It also proposed that jurisdiction of legal disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims should be presided over by new mixed tribunals of Muslim and non-Muslim judges, which would effectively dismantle the authority of sharia courts. By 1858, most of the remaining punishments for criminal offences under sharia law were abolished under the new Imperial Penal Code, also based heavily on French laws.[85] These measures would lay the groundwork for the development of Ottomanism, or the notion that all Ottoman subjects were equal before the law. In 1869, the Ottoman Nationality Law was ratified, which established a common Ottoman citizenship which was not stratified according to ethnicity or religion.

Muslim Ottomans had long dominated the economic landscape of the Empire, enjoying substantial tax privileges owing to their confessional status.[86] However, the increasing penetration of capitalism, European trade and commerce, and the abolition of Ottoman protective tariffs[87] fueled the growing sectarianism between Muslims and the Ottoman, ethnically European Christians.[88] The latter had also in many cases obtained foreign citizenship to evade Ottoman taxes and acquire foreign protection.[89] According to Şükrü Hanioğlu, this led to the coining of the adage, "non-Muslims have European protectors; we have no protector but God," which was frequently used by Ottoman Muslim press in the late 19th Century.[90]

Yavuz suggests that it was the Nakşibendi *tarikat* in particular that offered a "leadership and organizational vehicle for political independence and economic revival for political independence and the economic revival of the Muslim community."[91] According to this view, not only did the Nakşibendi *tarikat* confront the infiltration of capitalist and modernist ideas by establishing its own competing network against these reforms, they also constantly engaged in protest against the policies of westernization advocating reforms which integrated European values into the legal framework of Ottoman governance.[92] For instance, in 1859, resentment over these reforms resulted in an uprising

known as the Kuleli incident, which was led by a Nakşibendi madrasa teacher and member of the ulama named Shaykh Ahmad.[93] The primary objection was the introduction of legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. Most of those involved in plotting the protest were members of the ulama. In response to their uprising, the Ottoman authorities implemented a variety of measures to prevent a recurrence, which included imposing new taxes on mosques and *tarikat* lodges. Yavuz proposes that one of the ways in which Muslim subjects reacted to the encroaching European penetration was to redefine society in terms of Islamic concepts,[94] which would also explain the popularity during Abdülhamid II's rein of his pan-Islamist reinvention of Ottomanism.

Pan-Islamism, Constitutionalism, Ethnic Nationalism

During the reign of Abdülaziz I (r. 1861-1876), the governor of Tripoli and an influential Ottoman official, Mahmud Nedim Paşa, believed that the ideology of Ottomanism was creating a rift between the Sultan and his Muslim subjects, since it was becoming a source of political legitimacy for the Sultan outside the confines of Islam.[95] Nedim was mistrustful of the ulama, believing many of them to be fanatics. Because of this mistrust, he attempted to repair the bond between the Sultan and his Muslim subjects by building relations with Sufi shaykhs. When Nedim was eventually promoted to the position of Grand Vizier in 1871, he invited Shaykh Zafir b. Muhammad al-Madani (d. 1905), whose father was associated with the Shadhiliyya and founded the Darqawiyya *tarikat*,[96] to visit Istanbul.[97] After Nedim Paşa became Grand Vizier once again in 1875, he again invited Shaykh Zafir al-Madani to Istanbul. The latter would go on to develop a close relationship with prince Abdülhamid, who would eventually accede the throne as Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909). After his accession, the Sultan built a zawiya[98] for Shaykh Zafir al-Madani near Yıldız Palace in Istanbul.[99] Al-Madani's main work, *An-Nur As Sati* (the Brilliant Light), provided the ideological foundation for much of Abdülhamid's pan-Islamist policy. Abdülhamid II became a patron not only of the Shadhiliyya, but also the Qadiriyya order. Both were popular in many provinces during the late Ottoman period.[100] The Nakşibendi and Sanusi *tarikatlar* also received his patronage. Abdülhamid II's patronage of all these *tarikatlar* formed a major part of his pan-Islamist response to *Tanzimat* reforms.

To strengthen his basis of control, Abdülhamid aggressively instrumentalized Islam, using his spiritual position as caliph to claim authority over the entire Muslim world as part of his policy of pan-Islamism. Widely described as a defensive ideology, pan-Islamism was intended as a method of unification against increasing European encroachment in the Empire.[101] The policy was widely understood to be successful among the Empire's Muslim population. Jenkins succinctly summarizes Abdülhamid's realization of the potential power of *tarikatlar*, rather than the ulama, in his effort to reestablish authority vis-à-vis this policy:

> Abdülhamid realized that the key to creating a domestic Islamist powerbase lay in forging closer links not so much with the ulama, but with the *tarikatlar*; particularly those whose esoteric teachings were closest to orthodox Sunni theology, such as the Nakşibendi. …there seems little doubt that in the late nineteenth century they played an important—and, compared with the ulama, probably pre-eminent—role in the religious lives of the Ottoman masses, particularly outside the main urban areas. During Abdülhamid's reign the *tarikatlar* appear to have flourished both relative to the ulama and in absolute terms, attracting more members and increasing the number of their lodges.[102]

Another part of Abdülhamid's pan-Islamist strategy was to exploit the popularity of the *tarikatlar* among Ottoman Muslim subjects and use their position to disseminate propaganda which defended his legitimacy as caliph. He also took advantage of the position of shaykhs in Muslim communities in Ottoman provinces, cultivating favorable relations with them in order to strengthen ties between the Porte and Muslims who had grown disconcerted by the shifting social dynamics in what remained of Ottoman territory. He even appointed Shaykh Abdul Huda al-Sayyadi of the Rifaiyah *tarikat* to serve as a nominal head of all *tarikat* shaykhs. Shaykh Sayyadi published over 200 books which were largely devoted to defending Abdülhamid's absolute rule and legitimacy as caliph of all Muslims.[103]

The loss of territory following the Treaty of Berlin[104] had reduced the Ottoman population by about 20 percent, which was comprised predominantly of eastern European Christians. The remaining communities of Christians (and to a lesser extent, Jews) were dispersed among the significant Muslim majority across the remaining provinces. Jenkins suggests that this interspersion increased the likelihood of "inter-communal tensions and violence."[105]

The shift of religious demographic was a major factor which impelled Abdülhamid II to attempt to revive the idea of Ottomanism as a supranational identity for Muslim subjects.[106] His revived version of Ottomanism was a central feature of his pan-Islamist policy, which included the conviction that Islam was the undisputable way to propel the Ottoman Empire into the modern era without abandoning "Ottoman authenticity," which was inextricably linked to Islam.[107] Weismann suggests that Khalidi influence was evident in Abdülhamid's conviction in the sense that the *tarikat* had adjusted its practices in order to turn the organization into "…an effective socio-religious movement, whose aim was to support the Ottoman government effort to modernize while keeping it within the bounds of the shari'a in the service of the Muslim community."[108] The focus on Muslim subjects under this policy continued to exacerbate the rivalries between Muslims and non-Muslims.[109]

Encouragement of this version of Ottomanism, which under Abdülhamid II sought to craft a consciousness of an Ottoman-Muslim identity[110] was at least partially in response to the early nationalist movements of (mainly non-Muslim) ethnic and religious minorities within the Empire. As noted,

historically these groups were subject to different laws than their Muslim counterparts as part of their confessional status, but under Ottomanism, generally these laws were repealed. The major ethnic and religious groups of the Empire were plagued by increasingly bitter rivalries. Ottomanism had aimed at alleviating some of this growing resentment; subjects were requested to subsume their ethnic, sectarian affiliations under a new identity as Ottomans.[111] However, nationalist revolts in Herzegovina and Bosnia, followed by the Russian-Ottoman war (1877-78) all but destroyed this theoretically cosmopolitan concept of Ottomanism.

A substantial dimension of Abdülhamid's pan-Islamist policy involved courting of those *tarikatlar* that were most closely aligned with the state's notion of Sunni orthodoxy. This generally alienated the more heterodox *tarikatlar*. In particular, the Bektaşi *tarikat*, which had not been annihilated after being legally banned in 1826, did not receive Abdülhamid's patronage. Despite this exclusion and their extra-judicial operation, the *tarikat* had not only recovered from the blow of a legal ban, but even entered a period of renewed popularity in the late nineteenth century. Doja suggests that this was because the Bektaşi *tarikat* had forged links with members of the Ottoman elite, receiving their support. Notably, "…between 1869-1876 there was an unprecedented burst of open Bektaşi publicity which would never have been allowed unless they were receiving protection in high places of authority."[112] At the same time, the *tarikat* had also been cultivating relations with the *İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Unity Society, or İOC), which was the forerunner for the movement known as the Young Turks. The organization also established relations with a small association that had first formed in Paris in the 1890s, the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (İTC) known in English as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).[113]

Abdülhamid's increasingly absolutist policies put an end to the First Constitutional Era in 1878. This end included suspension of the constitution and dissolution of the Ottoman parliament, effectively restoring his absolute monarchy. This was despite his having signed the 1876 constitution himself. His primary justification for restoring the sultanate was that there had been an increase in social unrest due to the encroaching European influence in Ottoman affairs.[114]

In 1896, the İTC believed that they had attracted enough support from political dissidents in exile in Europe and from the Ottoman bureaucracy to stage a coup to depose Abdülhamid. The coup attempt was foiled by Abdülhamid's secret police, who arrested the conspirators and sent many into exile. This failure led to a shift in leadership in the İTC, which strengthened the influence of Ahmet Rıza, a prominent member and a staunch follower of Auguste Comte's philosophy, which underpinned the ideology of the Young Turk movement. Comte argued that religion was a stage in the progression of human development which would eventually be superseded by progress in science. Hence, Rıza included the term "progress" (*terraki*) in the İTC's name. According to Jenkins, despite this ideology:

> … [the İTC did not] have any hesitation in instrumentalizing Islam for propaganda purposes… in 1896 the İTC published a series of *fatwas* against absolutism issued by different *sheikhulislams*… There is even evidence to suggest that …the *Mevlevi* [Sufi] lodges in Constantinople were involved in the failed coup attempt.[115]

Mardin similarly argues that the Young Turks appreciated the mobilizing potential of pan-Islam:

> …there did exist many cynical notables [within the Young Turks] who were ready to use Islam for their won narrow political purposes… The Young Turks did appreciate the mobilizing dimension of pan-Islam and had no qualms in using them, but they were not ready to share power with groups which had a deeper commitment than their own to Islam, and used it to shape their own model of an ideal society.[116]

The balance of power continued to shift in the İTC in the years following the failed deposition of Abdülhamid II; the organization became increasingly dominated by Turkish nationalists, who had been turning their focus towards the ethnic fragmentation which was on the rise among Muslim subjects. Rıza in particular began to replace the terms "Ottomanist" and "Ottomanism" with "Turkish" and "Turkishness."

Among these rising nationalists was Ziya Gökalp, described by Mardin as the "Idealogue of the Young Turks",[117] who at the time he joined the İTC, was a young student in İstanbul, "…led by a similar sensitivity towards the decline of their ambient [Ottoman] culture."[118] Among Gökalp's goals was to render Islam more intelligible to Turkish-speaking Muslims. Mardin asserts that Gökalp partially drew his inspiration from "mystic-Sufi origins", hoping to replace the Muslim belief in the promise of reward in paradise in the afterlife with what Mardin describes as "an internalized ethic" inclined towards pro-Turkification.[119] Eventually, versions of these ideas would coalesce into the ethnic nationalism of pan-Turkism, which is widely understood to have developed in coincidence with other forms of ethnic nationalism on the rise around the same time in Europe, such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. As Mardin succinctly explains:

> There is, then, a politicizing and ideologizing of Islam [as an Ottoman answer to Russia's sponsoring of pan-Slavism] which emerges as we proceed along the nineteenth century in response to political developments.[120]

Abdülhamid II's project of extensive military reforms also inadvertently fostered the growth of Turkic ethnic nationalism. As part of his efforts, he appointed the Prussian General Colmar Freiherr von der Golz to oversee military training of the Ottoman army. Many young Turkish officers were profoundly influenced by von der Golz's 1883 treatise *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms), in which he advocated for a militarized society which amalgamated military and civilian life in order to reshape society and create a strong nation.

The Young Turks and Counter-Revolution

By the dawn of the twentieth century, several clandestine organizations within the revamped Ottoman military had been formed, such as the *Vatan ve Hürriyet* (Fatherland and Freedom), which soon merged with the İTC. The aim of most of these, including the *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti* (OHC, Ottoman Freedom Society), established in Salonica in 1906, was to transform "…the ailing empire into a vigorous, modern state."[121]

In 1907, the OHC merged with the İTC, the former assuming the latter's name, although it was the leadership of the OHC that largely assumed control. The organization vowed to prevent any further penetration from western Europe in the Empire, and to reverse the reforms of the *Tanzimat*, followed by reimplementation of the sharia to its full extent. In 1908, the İTC issued a public ultimatum to Abdülhamid which demanded restoration of the 1876 constitution. This was followed by a similar demand by Major Ahmet Niyazi in Macedonia, who was backed by approximately 200 followers. Niyazi released a manifesto also demanding restoration of the 1876 constitution. In July 1908, Abdülhamid acquiesced, and the Young Turks succeeded.

In the months following the successful Young Turk Revolution and the restoration of the constitution, the Empire lost more territory than it had during twenty-five years of absolutist rule under Abdülhamid II; Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria obtained legal independence, and Crete announced its unification with the Kingdom of Greece. Nevertheless, the sultan was still recognized as the spiritual authority of Muslims in these now-former territories.[122]

It remained a common belief among the Muslim subjects that the attempts to introduce westernizing reforms had led to the decline of the Empire. In October of 1908, Kör Ali, the muezzin of a mosque in the Fatih neighborhood of Istanbul led a group of followers to Yıldız Palace, where they demanded the end to constitutional rule. Elsewhere in Istanbul, madrasa students, as well as members of *tarikatlar* and lower-ranking ulama demanded the closure of *meyhaneler* (literally; "wine houses") and theaters, as well as the tightening of restrictions on the public movement of women and the banning of images in newspapers.[123]

In early 1909, supporters of the Nakşibendi shaykh Derviş Vahdeti established the *İttihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti* (Society for Muslim Unity, İMC) as part of their propaganda campaign against the Young Turks. According to Jenkins, among others, the İMC's aims included: the protection and promotion of the sharia, the liberation of Muslims from tyranny of non-Muslim oppression all over the world, and a more widespread application of the Islamic principle of *shura* (governance through consultation). In the view of the İMC, *shura* implied consultation with the ulama.[124]

Feroz Ahmad points out another dimension of the İMC's propaganda, which included courting disgruntled military members. The İMC described the military as part of a co-profession with the ulama, united in the task of defending Islam and by extension, the sharia. In April of 1909, madrasa students, members of the ulama, and these disgruntled military troops took to the streets of Istanbul in an alliance with the Nakşibendi *tarikat.*[125] Ahmad's analysis is that Islam provided the "rhetorical ammunition" that the İMC used to attack the Young Turks. The platform for this attack was Shaykh Derviş Vahdeti's newspaper, *Volkan* (Volcano). According to Ahmad, the initial position of *Volkan* had espoused a primarily liberal, humanistic tone which was supportive of constitutional rule, claiming that the constitution was "the guardian of the sharia."[126] Vahdeti's own outlook originally mirrored that of *Volkan,* but after establishing the İMC, the publication adopted what Ahmad describes as "Islamist polemics," which denounced the Young Turks, accusing them of being freemasons.[127]

This accusation was not unfounded; Doja claims that part of the successful recovery of Bektaşi *tarikat*, and their ability to regain their political influence was due to their affiliation with the "Franc-masonry" and the Young Turks. According to Doja:

> The Bektashis started again to exercise a considerable influence over the laymen affiliated to them, which only strengthened their heterodox and non-conformist cleavage. …they gradually drew closer to the Freemasons, with whom many upper-class Bektashis shared a common ground of liberalism, non-conformism, and anticlericalism. …the Bektashis came to play the role of an enlightened intelligentsia, open to progressive ideas. Coming from the intellectual and liberal elite, they …played in the Ottoman Empire a role similar to that of Freemasonry in the European reformist movements. Many were indeed among the prominent personalities of the time who were at once Bektashis, Freemasons, and Young-Turks.[128]

Hanioğlu argues that the Young Turk Revolution had provided an unexpected opportunity to re-militarize the ailing Empire because Young Turk leadership was comprised of many senior military officers. At the time of the counterrevolution of 1909, it had already become a common belief among the senior officer corps that it was the duty of the Ottoman military to transform the empire into the "Nation in Arms" that they had been inspired by Golz's treatise. The forging of this nation would require an ideological framework that would strengthen the relationship between the ruling elite and the masses; only a state with a strong national identity would be capable of fielding a strong military. Among those who held this view, it was also a common belief that the veneration of the sultan was a betrayal of the concept of a "Nation in Arms," which was ironic because, as noted; it had been the sultan who had initiated the military reforms which had popularized this concept among the military elite.[129]

In Jenkins' view, the counterrevolution of 1909 had a lasting impact on subsequent generations of Turkish secularists, who have tried to represent the insurrection as, "…a simple confrontation between the

forces of progress and Islamic fundamentalism."[130] According to this view, religion no doubt was a source of unity for the soldiers, religious activists, and madrasa students who were involved. At the same time, the event was also a ruse for an anti-İTC dimension.

Following the counterrevolution, martial law was declared, two courts-martial were formed, and close to eighty dissidents, including Derviş Vahdeti, were tried and hanged by the military units who were loyal to the new constitutional regime. Not long after the counterrevolution of 1909, Abdülhamid II was also deposed and exiled to Salonica, which was upheld by a *fatwa* issued by the *Şeyhülislam*. Abdülhamid's brother, Mehmed V (r. 1909-1918), ascended the throne. The military became a political power in its own right because of the successful suppression of the insurrection, and although many young officers remained active as Young Turks, senior commanders were often wary of the organization. The idea began to develop that the military performed a "guardianship role" and did not attempt to assume direct control of the government.[131]

After the insurrection, the Young Turks became increasingly authoritarian. They began to view Ottomanism as virtually synonymous with "Turkishness," and by extension, that Islam and Turkic ethnicity and culture were inextricably linked as a single concept. A law backed by the organization passed in parliament in 1909 which outlawed political organizations which included names of national groups, which forced the closure of many Albanian, Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Kurdish organizations. Nevertheless, the *Türk Derneği* (Turkish Association) remained open with the justification that *Türk* had no political connotations, only cultural. At the same time, the Young Turks ensured that their policies were underpinned by Islamic legitimacy; the *Şeyhülislam* was given a seat in the Council of Ministers. [132]

It would be an oversimplified inference to suppose that the Nakşibendi s were universally aligned with anti-Young Turk ideology, or that the Bektaşis were universally pro-Young Turk. For instance, Musa Kazım Efendi, who served twice as *Şeyhülislam* under the Young Turks, was a well-known Nakşibendi.[133] While the Nakşibendi 's unequivocally orthodox bent first meant adherence to Islamic tradition, what had clearly become the organization's activist position entailed accommodation to the shifting political circumstances.[134] A similar accommodation had clearly occurred with the revival of the Bektaşi *tarikat*; the organization's growing relationship with freemasonry, for instance illustrates that their penchant for heterodoxy remained, which is what fostered their accommodation to the new political circumstances in the Empire. Mardin's assertion about the restructuring of *tarikatlar* to accommodate the shifting political circumstances under the Young Turks goes even further, suggesting that *tarikatlar* were ultimately responsible for the rise of nationalism:

> …the direction of *tarika*s …towards a refocusing and restructuring of the social action of the community… [was] very roughly similar to the restructuring as social action in Calvinistic

communities. However, what *tarika*s have been able to achieve in the Muslim world with their redefinition of the focus for the energy of the community has been primary political. They appear today to have been architects of protonationalism in Muslim countries.

Empire to Republic, *Gazi* to Atatürk

Under Mehmed V's rule, all the remaining territory of the Empire in North Africa was lost. This was shortly followed by the loss of the European territories after the first Balkan War (1912-1913), except for a small portion of land on the western isthmus of Istanbul.

In July 1914, the Ottoman government signed a treaty of alliance with Germany. The former had been hesitant to enter into conflict without alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. The lieutenant colonel and military attaché to Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, Mustafa Kemal, attempted to negotiate with the Bulgarian authorities to persuade them to join an alliance with the Ottoman military. The Ottomans officially declared war in November of the same year, when Mehmed V declared *jihad* against the Entente Powers.[135] The declaration of war was upheld by a *fatwa* issued by the *Şeyhülislam.*

Although official historiographies claim that early narratives of Turkish nationalism were the primary motivation of Ottoman troops who entered the conflict, Jenkins more accurately claims that "…there is no doubt that Islam played a much greater role in motivating the troops and maintaining morale." Ottoman troops are known to have charged into battle shouting "Allahu Akbar!," and "Allah! Allah!" Several *tarikatlar* are also known to have established their own military units comprised of volunteers from their orders. [136]

The Young Turks, suspicious of these religious dimensions, began to reduce the influence of the ulama and the sharia. The control of sharia courts was transferred from the *Şeyhülislam* and from *qadis* to the Ministry of Justice. Not long after, the *Şeyhülislam* was removed entirely from the Council of Ministers, reducing the position to a strictly dignitary one. They also continued to curtail the authority of the sultan.

Colonel Mustafa Kemal, among other military achievements had halted Allied offensives in the Dardanelles and at Gallipoli. Shortly before the end of the War, he was bestowed the title of *Gazi*[137] because of these victories,[138] and was praised for his success by prince Vahdeddin, who would accede as the Sultan Mehmed VI (r. 1918-1922). In the year of his accession, Mehmed VI personally appointed Mustafa Kemal as his aide-de-camp, and the commander of the Seventh Army in Syria.

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was divvied up among the victorious Allies, reducing Ottoman territory to the approximate borders of the current Republic of Turkey. The treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920, proposed further reductions, relinquishing much of western Anatolia to Greece, and creating an Armenian state in the east.[139] Mustafa Kemal, who had failed to secure a position in the

government, left Istanbul and was serving as military inspector of the Ottoman forces in northeast Anatolia. There were reports of intercommunal fighting in the region which was sparked by resistance to encroaching Allied military occupation. Mustafa Kemal's charge was to disarm the resistance. However, within a few weeks he joined the resistance, soon establishing himself as one of its leaders.

Similar to the claims that the primary motivation driving Ottoman troops who entered the conflict during World War I was a developing sense of Turkish nationalism, official Republican historiographies typically claim that the ideological force which motivated resistance fighters was nationalism. Jenkins points out that during the battle of Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal had witnessed first-hand this motivating power of Islam. Jenkins, quoting a letter written by Mustafa Kemal in 1915, describes how the soldiers under his command exploited "…their [the soldiers'] private beliefs [which] make it easier to carry out orders which send them to their death. They see: …victory for the faith or martyrdom."

Hagiographical accounts of his involvement often exaggerate Mustafa Kemal's contribution to the early formation of the resistance to Allied occupation of Anatolia. Nevertheless, it is likely that, considering his heretofore list of military achievements, Mustafa Kemal played an instrumental role in streamlining the resistance and shaping them into an effective military force. In 1920, the resistance forces quashed Armenian aspirations for an independent state in eastern Anatolia. Then in 1922, Smyrna, now İzmir, was recaptured from Greece during the *Büyük Taarruz* (Great Attack/Offensive). The battle ended the war. The resistance was victorious, and the Turkish republic was born.

Hanioğlu points out that the resistance conflict in Anatolia was depicted by the command of Mustafa Kemal as a *jihad* which would free the "…caliph-sultan from the hands of Christian crusaders." There is little doubt that Mustafa Kemal had understood that delivering a narrower nationalist or ethnic message would have not only failed to elicit the support of Kurdish Muslims in Anatolia, but it would have also alienated Soviet leaders, "who viewed pan-Turkism as a major threat to the Bolshevization of Central Asia and the Caucasus."[140]

Many historical accounts of the development of Turkish nationalism[141] point to the idea that the resistance struggle that had given birth to republican Turkey, which would come to be known as the Turkish war of independence, "…was imbued with the Islamic spirit… but [the] secularist militancy of the Kemalist ruling elite had spread the fundamentally wrong image that all nationalists [had] lost touch with the religion of their people."[142] Moreover, although Mustafa Kemal was compelled to utilize Islamic rhetoric, it was most probably a deliberate strategy to subvert the ultra-exclusionary objective of establishing an ethnically Turkish (the vast majority of who were, and remained Muslim) nation.

From the very outset of the resistance movement, Mustafa Kemal had cultivated alliances with Sufi shaykhs, repeatedly assuring them of his loyalty to the caliphate. For instance, in 1919 in Sivas, he declared that "Turks and Kurds will continue to live together as brothers around the institution of the

caliphate."[143] Indeed, the functioning "supra-tribal network[s]"[144] which were able to transcend growing ethnic sectarianism in Anatolia were the *tarikatlar*. In the same way, the foremost dimension of self-identity was still religion, which as noted, for Ottoman Muslim subjects was most typically derived from the syncretic traditions of folk Islam.[145] Mardin expresses this clearly when he points out, "For all of them [Muslims], the religious dimension of an emplotment of the self was a resource of inestimable value to establish moorings for the self."[146]

Attempts at increasing religious homogeneity in the emerging Republic were undertaken in the form of expulsion of non-Muslims from Anatolia, population exchanges with several of the now-former Ottoman territories (such as Greece), and forced relocations of Muslims from these areas into Anatolia. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this dimension of the Kemalist quest for nationalism, but it is important to note that the infant republic was now saddled with the task of how to transform a community of Muslims, many of whom did not even speak the same language, into a nation.[147]

Owing to Mustafa Kemal's awareness of the inescapable social importance of Islam, state control over religion would need to be asserted. In what was described as "elevating religion above the political arena,"[148] a detailed list of reforms was proposed during a 1924 meeting of the Republican People's Party (CHP), the party founded by Mustafa Kemal following victory at İzmir the previous year. Despite his repeated vows of loyalty to the caliphate, it was abolished, along with the office of *Şeyhülislam*. All members of the Ottoman royal family were expelled, *madrasas* which provided religious education were closed, and sharia courts were completely abolished in exchange for a unified judicial system with secular laws and judges.[149]

Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal's new regime still paid lip service to its devotion to Islam by affirming its place as the state religion of the Turkish republic in the constitution.[150] Mardin asserts that it was a common belief among local leadership at the time of the birth of the Republic that the "courageous general" Mustafa Kemal not only intended to protect the sultanate, but "refurbish the prestige of Islam."[151] However, by 1928 the affirmation in the constitution that Islam was the religion of the state was erased, followed by further amendments removing all references to religion. There is little doubt that the abolition of the caliphate triggered a sense of loss for a valuable living symbol of the Muslim population. As a result of these aggressive measures at secularization, the *tarikatlar* were the only remaining influential religious organizations in Turkish society, however; it was also from this moment that the *tarikatlar* no longer formed a decisive link between the subjects-- now citizens of the young Republic—and the authorities.

It was the Nakşibendi *tarikat* who undertook the first uprising against secular reforms in February 1925, under the command of Shaykh Said. He issued a *fatwa* declaring a *jihad* against the new secular authorities, appealing to all Turks "…without distinction of confession or tariqah."[152] The revolt was

ultimately unsuccessful, seeing the rebels captured by government troops by March 1925. Shaykh Said was found guilty of insurrection and was publicly hanged, along with forty-six of his disciples, in June 1925. Although the revolt was swiftly quelled, this prompted a crackdown on opposition to the Kemalist regime, and a formal ban was issued against all *tarikatlar* across Turkey. This ban included the outlawing of the orders themselves, closure of all *tekkes* (lodges), and an injunction against the use of all titles, roles, activities, and clothing associated with *tarikatlar*. Access to *türbes* (tombs) and shrines for Muslim saints was also closed. Mustafa Kemal justified this by claiming:

> …the revolution… [we are] accomplishing is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society entirely modern and completely civilized in spirt and form… Turkey cannot be the land of sheikhs, dervishes, disciples, and lay brothers. The straightest, truest Way is the way of civilization.[153]

Once again, official historiographies of the implementation of secular reforms claim that secular ideology was embraced with enthusiasm. However, in reality the majority of the population remained relatively indifferent to most of the reforms, retaining most of their local religious traditions, especially given that the laws were difficult to enforce in rural areas. However, there were still occasional outbreaks of violence. For instance, in 1930, Dervish Mehmet Giritli[154] led an uprising against secular reforms in what would become known as the Menemen incident. The incident began when Dervish Mehmet Giritli declared that he was the *Mahdi*, or Islamic Messiah. On 23 December 1930 Giritli entered the town of Menemen, declaring an Islamic revolution and restoration of the sharia. Rallying the support of around 100 sympathizers, they lynched and beheaded the commanding officer of the military squad, Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, who had been deployed to quell the rioting. The mob placed his severed head on a pole with a green flag and paraded it around the town. Bekçi Hasan and Bekçi Şevki were also killed by the demonstrators. Two of the rioters were killed, and the rest either wounded or arrested. Twenty-nine members of the mob were eventually hanged, and another forty-three sentenced to between one to twenty-four years. Several others were acquitted. The Kemalist regime claimed that the incident was an example of the intentions of religious opposition to secular reforms.

Another significant dimension of Mustafa Kemal's secular reforms was aimed at "purifying" Turkish culture in order to form a national culture purged of the influences of "Arab domination."[155] In 1928, the use of Arabic script was abolished in exchange for an adapted Latin alphabet. Jenkins observes that the abandonment of Arabic script:

> …implicitly secularized the language; particularly for the illiterate masses for whom all writing, whether in Turkish or the Arabic of the Qur'an, had previous looked the same… Most [of the literate population] had learned to read and write in primary schools, where they were taught Arabic and the Arabic script… which could be used to read Turkish… literacy and learning were

> so closely associated with Islam as to be inseparable from it… the new script severed the last connection between sacred and secular learning.[156]

In the same year, imams across the country were ordered to deliver their Friday sermons in Turkish (traditionally given in Arabic), and any public readings of the Qur'an during services in mosques was required to be in Turkish. Finally, a "Turkified" translation in 1932 of the *ezan* (*adhan,* or call to prayer) into Turkish, even replaced the word "Allah" with *Tanrı*, a word of Central Asian origin that had been used to describe a pre-Islamic sky god. In keeping with Gökalp's view that Turkey's progress entailed a combination of "Turkification" and "Islamization", it was believed by many ruling authorities that the use of Turkish in worship would make the word of God more accessible to Turks, which would in turn lead to the elimination of superstitious beliefs obstructing the progress of modernization. Through this Turkification of religion, the true essence of Islam would be revealed.[157] Mardin suggests that this project of Turkification had an enormous influence in promoting an understanding of a nationalist-Islamic synthesis in Turkey.[158]

There are several examples of resistance to and protest against the translation of the *ezan.*[159] For instance, when Mustafa Kemal was informed of the Bursa incident,[160] during which the *ezan* was recited in Arabic at the Ulu mosque, he explained that it was a language issue, and not based on religion. The incident was subsequently depicted in the press as a "reactionary event against the Turkish *ezan*."[161] Reports of politicians expressing their support for the Turkish *ezan* were published in the headlines of newspapers across the country. There were a number of similar incidents across Turkey throughout the 1930s and 40s, which would result in dozens of arrests for breaking the ban on the call to prayer in Arabic.

Conclusion

The legacy of Islam in the Ottoman Empire was a multi-functional system in which morals, ideologies, power, and cultural personality existed. Mustafa Kemal, who would become Atatürk (literally; "Father Turk") in 1934 under his enactment of the Turkish Surname Law (discussed in detail in the next chapter), seemed to view religion as an impediment in the realization of a Turkish republic. Therefore, in order to succeed, he upbraided the deep underpinnings of Ottoman Islam, or at least Islam that he could see which figured prominently in Ottoman politics. However, he largely overlooked the religion of the masses, and failed to impose his methods upon the position of Islam in the daily lives of Turkish citizens, who were also expected to develop a Turkish national identity which would enhance their feelings of attachment to the political community. However, this idea largely failed to take root, along with his hope that nationalism would supplant religion naturally.

An overview of the extent to which Sufism has been involved in the politics of the Ottoman period, leading up to the transition to republican Turkey has been but briefly demonstrated. The true extent of this involvement, in all of its nuances and complexity, would not only be impossible to document in quantitative terms, but is beyond the scope of this chapter, so only a few well-documented examples of the depth of this entanglement were explored here. Ultimately, what can be observed is that Sufism on the whole has been able to successfully accommodate itself in order to adapt to the demands of the shifting political dynamics of Ottoman-cum-Republican Turkey, and retain a foothold in the highest echelons of the system. It was in this atmosphere when the Tijaniyya emerged in the public sphere in Turkey. The following chapter is a biography of the Tijani founder in Turkey. The chapter will pay special attention to the way in which the relationship between Sufism and the Ottoman-cum-Republican state shaped the dynamics of Tijani activism in Turkey.

Chapter 4
Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğu and the Tijaniyya

The previous chapter suggested that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk viewed Islam as an Arab faith and a vehicle for Arab domination, which endangered his vision of a nation-state founded on ethno-nationalist principles inspired by the frameworks of European nation-building. He envisioned a republic with borders drawn using the political boundaries of nationalism, not religion. As mentioned, under Atatürk's reforms the caliphate was abolished, Turkish *hutbeler* (sermons) and Qur'ans appeared, and the *ezan* was recited in Turkish. These were a few among an ambitious project of reforms aimed at a "Turkified" vision of a modern nation-state, all of which were legally enforced. Contrary to the idea that secularism constitutes a separation between religion and state, Atatürk's secular reforms more precisely sought state control over religion. Influenced in part by Gökalp's view that social life should be national in content but Islamic in form,[1] Atatürk strongly believed that "…Islam should be purified and raised from the political situation in which it has been put for centuries,"[2] both referring to the aim of Turkifying Islam by purging it of its Arab attributes and its Ottoman past.

As noted, official historiographies of the early years of the Turkish Republic depict a narrative in which Kemalist secular ideology was embraced with enthusiasm. Realistically, most citizens of the new Republic were mostly indifferent to the top-down reforms aimed at modernizing the infant nation via the super-imposition of Western cultural frameworks. Nevertheless, the Kemalist regime's aggressive reforms during a period of one-party rule (1923-1945) under the CHP, at least superficially, and indeed temporarily succeeded in "…dress[ing] up this [Turkish] nation in European clothes," to use Yavuz's description from *Nostalgia for the Empire.*[3] For a moment, it appeared that Turkey had severed ties with the *ummah* (the Muslim world, community, or community of believers). However, almost immediately, the Republican policy of forgetting the Ottoman past and relegating Islam to the private sphere in exchange for a new national, secular, Western, but uniquely Turkish identity triggered a backlash in response to a growing sense of exile from Islam. Yavuz quotes Mehmed Zahid Kotku, the most prominent Nakşibendi shaykh of the Republican period, who asserts that "The core identity and character of this wounded nation (yaralı millet) is Islam… [the] main heritage is Islam…"[4] In 1946, Celâl Bayar, with Adnan Menderes, founded the moderately right-wing Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, or DP), which was the first opposition party to occupy a seat of power, successfully defeating the CHP in the 1950 elections. The DP's accession is not only generally understood as the end of the one-party period of Turkish politics, but also what largely facilitated the resurgence of popular Islam in Turkey.

The Turkish war for Independence shifted the dynamics of a history of cooperation, underscored primarily by the official ban in 1925 of all Sufi orders in the new Republic. This ban would be followed by a period of violent and sometimes deadly protests instigated by dervishes from various *tarikatlar*, who were often seeking to restore the political presence of Islam, and indeed the influence of Sufism, in the fledgling Republic. The Turkish Tijaniyya was one of these *tarikatlar* that participated in such protests, however; they did not adequately adjust to the strict secularist limitations of the Turkish state, and so did not continue flourishing. While their protests certainly disseminated similar critical responses to the Turkish secularization project, the Tijaniyya in Turkey failed to integrate the same pragmatic approach and adjust their practices in comparison to networks which continued to thrive, such as the Nakşibendi or the Nurcular. This led to an ultimate lack of success for the Tijaniyya in comparison to those networks able to rapidly adjust to the constraints of the new secular regime.

In this way, the case of the Turkish Tijaniyya represents a departure from the more well-documented studies of Tijani networks elsewhere, especially of those in Africa. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tijani organizations in Africa appeared to practice diverse political engagement, which often included the ability to rapidly adjust to the shifting demands of the ruling political authorities. This disposition of the Tijaniyya is not dissimilar to that of many of the larger Sufi networks during the Ottoman period in the sense that the latter also had a long history of cooperation with or adjustment to the demands of the ruling Ottoman authorities. In addition to this, the Ottoman *tarikatlar* were known in many cases to exercise a great degree of influence in Ottoman politics.

Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, who is credited with establishing a Tijani network some time in or around 1930, placed a great deal of emphasis on a pan-Islamic—and indeed, characteristically Tijani—worldview instead of a more "neo-Ottoman" worldview which sufficiently integrated a Turkified notion of Islam. This choice of a "neo-Ottoman" worldview was often common among public intellectuals and Sufi leaders who sought to strike a balance between their cultural and religious identities. Mardin, for instance, asserts that religiously active Nakşibendi shaykhs often used the discourse of Republican intellectuals to promote their own Islamic ends.[5] However, Pilavoğlu's extreme focus on a universal, as opposed to distinctly Turkish Islam, was ultimately the undoing of the Tijaniyya in comparison to many other Sufi Islamist responses to Republican reforms. The concept of "neo-Ottoman" and its role in public intellectual engagement is discussed more specifically in the next chapter.

Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu's life provides a backdrop for understanding the context in which he and his Tijani following were prompted to engage in political activism and discursive responses to Kemalism. This chapter is an account of Pilavoğlu's life and how he is believed by his followers to have established the Tijaniyya in Turkey. This story is constructed through an examination of hagiographies and other biographical material written about Pilavoğlu. This narrative gives way to a discussion of how

the Tijaniyya issued an activist response to the aggressive secularization policies of early republican Turkey. This response, although not the beginning or only form of their activism, was most famously issued when Tijani members decapitated statues of Atatürk throughout Anatolia between 1950 and 1951. Prior to this "claim to fame," which indeed cemented in Turkish memory the idea that Tijanis were anti-nationalist and anti-Kemalist, in 1949 two Tijani *müritler* (disciples, or followers) were arrested for reciting the *ezan* in Arabic when parliament was in session in Ankara. Not long after these protest recitations, in 1950 the *ezan* in Arabic was reinstated. In 1951, after several statues of Atatürk were decapitated, Kemal Pilavoğlu, along with several Tijanis were given long prison sentences for "sacrilege against Atatürk."

Hagiography, Authority, Truth

Cornell asserts that the use of biographies as sources of social history is relatively new, but not an unheard-of approach in the field of Islamic Studies. So-called "Western rationalism," he argues, has often led contemporary Islamicists and social scientists to doubt whether the figures (usually saints) described in sacred biographies are actual, historical people. Notwithstanding indisputable proof that Kemal Pilavoğlu was certainly a real person, which at the very least can be proved by the existence of his grave in Ankara, it is an uncorroborated assumption that the information contained in the hagiographical literature about his life is merely an expression of what Cornell describes as "ideal sainthood," as opposed to representations of a real person. Cornell proposes that historians who assess the stories told by others should instead assume that their informants are relaying the truth as they saw it. In this way, historians can better maintain the integrity of their beliefs when they write about their informants.[6]

In contrast to this, Weismann asserts that Muslim hagiographies often depict their figures as they ought to have been, at the expense of describing who they truly were. A master's divine wisdom and miraculous deeds, Weismann claims, are often brought to the fore at the expense of their daily conduct, social relations, and even their economic bases.[7] Weismann's notion applies to both extremes of the depictions of Pilavoğlu: on the one hand are adulatory hagiographies that depict a pious, charismatic, and often sincere man who occasionally performed miraculous (though certainly not impossible) feats; and on the other are the disparaging depictions of Pilavoğlu and Turkish Tijanis in general, the latter usually narrated by secular authorities. Considering the latter, for instance: in a 1949 newspaper headline published in *Cumhuriyet,* "İki meczub dün Mecliste arabca ezan okudular" (Two *meczub* recited the Arabic call to prayer in Parliament yesterday),[8] *meczub* in the corresponding article refers to the two Tijani activists who illegally recited the Arabic call to prayer.

The *Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary*'s second definition of *meczub*, a cognate from the Arabic word of the same meaning, is specified as the mystical definition; "[someone] attracted

by divine grace and entirely given to piety and contemplation; obsessed by divine love." Importantly, the *first* definition listed, and specified as the colloquial usage of *meczub,* in the *Redhouse Dictionary* is simply "crazy, insane."[9] Similarly, a variety of digital Turkish dictionaries, such as *Seslisözlük* define *meczub* as an Ottoman word whose modern Turkish synonyms include *deli* (crazy, mad, insane), *divane* (lunatic, crazy), and *mecnun* (crazy, love-crazed).[10]

In another 1951 headline from *Milliyet* newspaper, "Ticani yobazlarını bütün yurt nefretle tel'in ediyor" (The whole country condemns [the] *Ticani* bigots/fanatics with hatred), Tijanis are even more pointedly accused of *yobazlık* (bigotry, fanaticism).[11] In both *Redhouse* and *Seslisözlük*, the definition of *Ticani* includes similarly pejorative connotations. *Seslisözlük*'s first definition of *Ticani* is "yobazlık (bigotry, fanaticism), gericilik (reactionism, obscurantism)," and secondly as "Kuzey Afrika'da kurulmuş bir tarikat ve bu tarikattan olan kimse" (A *tarikat* established in North Africa and those who are [members] of this *tarikat*).[12] The *Redhouse's* first definition of *Ticani* is an "adherent of a dervish order founded in North Africa." The second definition is "a reactionary, fanatical person."[13] Even the term *tarikatçılik*, of which the literal translation is best rendered as "dervishism," can also mean sectarianism of or relating to the *tarikatlar*. Another common translation of *tarikatçılık* is "denominationalism." *Seslisözlük* even includes the translation "cult." Indeed, *tarikatçılik* was a common charge brought against those involved in protesting the Turkish call to prayer and was among the charges brought against Pilavoğlu and other Tijani activists.

An important observation that can be made about the connotations of terms such as *meczub, Ticani, tarikatçı(lık)*, all of which include innocuous definitions relating to esoteric or heightened religious devotion, is that hostility towards religion has been embedded in the very language of republican Turkey. In this way, an instance such as *Cumhuriyet's* description of the two Tijanis as *meczub*, or *Milliyet's* accusation of *yobazlık*, depicts the Tijaniyya as they "ought to have been" from the perspective of the secular authorities: a reactionary religious organization which endangered the secular vision of the Republic. In these examples, the perceived negative traits are brought to the fore by *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* at the expense of a more accurate image of Tijani activists.

An example of embedded meaning associated with both the terms *ticani* and *meczub* (often spelled *meczup* in later Turkish iterations) appears in a 1966 *Akis* article titled, "Bunlar Meczup! Ya, cüretleri?" (These *Meczup*! [Are they] Audacious?) by editor Metin Toker. In the article, Toker criticizes the Adalet Partisi (AP) government and Süleyman Demirel's administration, accusing them of "using religion as a weapon against communism," which he claims, continues to result in reactionary responses by the populous, such as attacks on statues of Atatürk. Referring to a recent attack on a statue of Atatürk in İzmir, the culprit of which is not known, Toker invokes the name *ticanî* as a way of illustrating the

nature of responses as noticeably reactionary against the government's measures to contain the spread of communism, saying:

> Türkiyede ne zaman bir iktidar bu usullere başvurduysa adı ticanî veya nurcu olan bir takım çember sakallılar kendileri asıl hedefi teşkil eden Atatürkten hınçlarını çıkarma saatinin nihayet geldiğini daima sanmışlardır.
>
> Whenever a government resorted to these methods [instrumentalizing religion] in Turkey, a group of circle-bearded people,[14] whose name was Tijani or Nurcu, always thought that the time had finally come to vent their grudges against Atatürk, which was their main goal.[15]

The article's aim, which is not directly concerned with Tijani political activism, is to frame the AP as "an unfortunate political establishment" which has digressed in their aims. The invocation of *Ticanî* (and noticeably, *Nurcu* along with it) appears to be a something of a euphemism for any so-called reactionary opposed to Kemalist suppression of religion.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider in detail the impact of embedding pejorative meaning in terminology that also carry religious connotations in Turkish. It is likewise beyond the scope of analysis in this dissertation to consider in depth the evolution in the use of these words in the Turkish press. Nevertheless, the above examples do help illustrate that the binding up of meaning with specific religious ideas in common terminology has been beneficial to the Kemalist argument that religious belief and practice obstruct the state's progress towards modernization.

Bernard Lewis' observation in his short 1952 paper "Islamic Revival in Turkey," reflects this attitude, that religious belief in Turkey at the time, as instigated by the Tijaniyya in particular, was at odds with the process of modernization:

> During the past year [1951] it is the Tijanis that have been most active, and it is they that have become associated, in the public mind, with the most extreme and thoroughgoing form of religious reaction. …It [the Tijaniyya] was founded at the end of the eighteenth century in North Africa, and became prominent with a fanatical campaign of proselytization in Tropical Africa.[16]

Weismann's notion that hagiographies are depictions of Sufi masters as they ought to have been can in turn be envisioned alongside Cornell's suggestion that hagiographers in their adulations relay the truth as the narrators saw it. In other words, the way something ought to be is directly correlated with the outlook of the transmitter. For instance, as noted, this applies to the outlook of the Turkish state and its affiliates, such as *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, which was founded in 1924 by a close confidant of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). The newspaper for decades was known for its hard-line Kemalist-secularist bent. The protest actions reported in the abovementioned headline of two Tijanis reading the call to prayer in Arabic, is an example of an event which was no doubt viewed as particularly extreme or "the most notorious."[17] This sort of sentiment was not uncommon among the ruling authorities during the early years of the Republic;

as noted, secular-minded Turks, and indeed the narrative of the state, tended to view religion, and religious belief, as hindrances in the quest for modernization and the ultimate realization of secular republicanism. In this way, the depiction of Pilavoğlu by secular-minded media can be understood according to Weismann's claim, where certain deeds—in this case, supposedly reactionary, fanatical, or even crazy and bigoted ones—are brought to the fore at the expense of other dimensions of conduct.

Eickelman and Piscatori similarly assert that the line between the objective and perceived past depends on the construction, dissemination, and acceptance of the authority transmitting a narrative. They argue that the past of occurred events exists mostly as a pool of resources which can be drawn from as a way of sanctioning present practices.[18] Thus, whether hagiographies should be understood as relaying subjective truth, or that they often depict their subjects as they ought to have been, depends on the source and their potential motives. In this way, the adulatory hagiographies of Pilavoğlu, when contrasted with their Kemalist state media counterparts, offer a spectrum of insights from a variety of perspectives that are shaped by the locative of the sources. Hagiographies of Pilavoğlu originate from believers and what appear to be loyal followers who viewed or still view him as the founder of their community and their spiritual leader, whereas criticisms of the Tijaniyya seem to favor worldviews informed by secular, sometimes aggressively Kemalist values, which forcibly relegated religion to the private sphere and understood Islam as a hindrance to the project of modernization. By unpacking some of these views, a balance can be struck and a reasonable understanding of Pilavoğlu and Turkish Tijani activism can be achieved.

Hagiography and Perspective

The biographical literature of Pilavoğlu was all published posthumously. All draw to some extent on first-hand interactions with Pilavoğlu, whether through interviews with Pilavoğlu himself, his immediate family, or through accounts of his life from those who knew him well. The oldest hagiography by publication date is titled *Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti* (*Who was Pilavoğlu? The Perfect Preferred Prayer, the Salatul Fatihi and its Virtues).* This two-part book was written by Eyyüb Çakır. Although the first date of publication in the title page is 1978, the dates given within the text (often at the end of a section) range from 1986-2007. A statement obtained informally from one of Pilavoğu's grandsons clarifies Çakır's relationship with Pilavoğlu:

> Bağlı Bir insan fakat dedemin vefatından sonra Ankara'nın çubuk ilcesinde kendisini sevenlerle bir gurup oluşturmuş, yasayıp vefat etmiş Temsil eden bir insan olmasa da sevdiğini beyan etmiş.[19]

> Çakır was a loyal person, but after my grandfather's passing, he formed a group with [those closest to him][20] in a district of Ankara and then passed away [on 7 July 2010]. Although he is not a representative [of the Tijaniyya], he declared that he loved Pilavoğlu.

Very likely inspired by the tradition of *manakib*, or the broad Islamic tradition of laudatory biography, Çakır depicts Pilavoğlu certainly as he ought to have been, repeatedly emphasizing his meritorious attributes and pious character. Not forgetting the undisputable facts of Pilavoğlu's life, these events are often directly correlated with his piety, which underscore his mastery and exceptional character. Whether in subtle devotion to or the result of being familiar with Pilavoğlu's works, Çakır's writing style and structure also tend to emulate that of Pilavoğlu's. This is evident in the similar styles of poetry present in the writings of both, as well as the way in which the poems are interspersed into the text. For instance, both use a similar construction of semi-rhyming couplets followed by a repeating refrain in each stanza. This is the case when comparing Çakır's "Seyyidimiz Hâtemül Evliyâ Şiir" and Pilavoğlu's "Hakka Kulluk Yolu Resûlün Yoludur."[21] Both poems are comprised of five stanzas of four lines each, and both use a mixture of rhyming schemes, including end, identical, and/or monorhymes, and a repeating refrain in each stanza. Both writers typically use a free verse metric construction, with no discernible regularity in meter length. Although in content their poetry appears to be inspired by the *kaside* (*qaṣīda*) tradition of poetry, which are odes or panegyrics usually written in praise of religious figures or temporal leaders, their irregularity in meter length is a departure from the established convention in *kaside* where the meter length remains regular once it is established in a poem. Also, in keeping with the trajectory of the tradition following the end of the Ottoman Empire, both Çakır and Pilavoğlu employ considerably less rigorous and formal overall structures in their poems than traditional Ottoman *kaside*, although the laudatory, ode-like qualities of this tradition are retained.

Çakır's emulation of Pilavoğlu is also noticeable in the former's use of language, which regularly demonstrates not only a purposeful inclination towards the use of Arabic-origin words in a similar way as Pilavoğlu's writing, but also the use of entire grammatical constructions from Arabic. This is particularly apparent in the second, non-hagiographical portion of Çakır's book, *Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti*. This second portion of the book does not focus on Pilavoğlu's life. It details the doctrines and provides explanations of the Tijaniyya path. Çakır's motivation for compiling his biography of Pilavoğlu in a single volume with a comprehensive guide to the methods of the Tijaniyya is not made explicit. However, one of Çakır's assertions in the hagiography portion of the text is that it is part of faith to love Pilavoğlu. Thus, from this perspective, it stands to reason that a deeper understanding of Pilavoğlu's life would thus be helpful for deepening one's faith while taking up the Tijaniyya path.

Çakır's writing contains many errors in grammar and spelling. A clear example of such errors appears in a quote from Çakır included later in this chapter, "CHP'nin, kominizm yeşile bürünerek

Türkiye'ye girmişdır sözlerine", which is not only grammatically difficult to make sense of (rendered in translation in this chapter as "The CHP's words of communism, dressed in green, entered Turkey"), but also contains spelling errors; "kominizm", for instance, is spelled "komünizm" in modern Turkish, and "girmişdır" is correctly spelled "girmiştir". One plausible explanation for these errors is that Çakır was educated prior to 1929. As discussed in the previous chapter, not only was Ottoman script replaced by the Latin-based Turkish alphabet, but the language itself was purposely changed to shift it away from Arabic and Persian influences. As noted, it is widely documented that the legacy of this language reform was so effective that "Ottoman Turkish" is often not mutually intelligible with so-called "modern Turkish."[22] As such, it is entirely possible that Çakır, and others of his generation, including Pilavoğlu whose publications also include regular errors in grammar and spelling (some of which are noted in this dissertation in endnotes), might have committed linguistic errors when writing in Latinized Turkish, which was, strictly speaking, not truly their first language.

The second hagiography in terms of publication chronology is not unlike Çakır's combination of a biography of Pilavoğlu with a collation of central features of Tijani doctrine. The first portion of *Fet'hi Rabbânî* (The Divine Opening) is an abridged translation of Muhammad ibn 'Abdallāh at-Tisfāwī's *The Divine Opening: A Handbook on the Rules & Etiquettes of the Tariqa Tijaniyya*, which as mentioned in the introduction is a seminal book in the Tijani tradition, detailing several central doctrines of the Tijaniyya. Although no translator is credited in the book, there are a few indications throughout that he was affiliated with Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, the publishing company run first by Pilavoğlu, and later by a few of his Tijani followers. The *mukaddime* (preface, or introduction) of the book includes an explanation, written in first-person, sub-titled "Why I am affiliated with the *Ticani Tarikat.*"[23] In this explanation, no affiliation with Pilavoğlu is mentioned. However, the unnamed translator/author explains that he was granted *icazet* (*ijazah*, permission) to join the *tarikat* by Mukaddimi Elhacı Muhammedil Hâşimî, or Alfā Hāshim Muḥammad al-Hāshimī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd Tāl. Alfā Hāshim was a nephew of al-Hajj Umar Tal. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Tal had initiated a *jihad* as part of an attempt to establish a Tijani state in the Senegambia region but was killed by French authorities in 1864. Alfā Hāshim, who was a well-known and respected Tijani leader in his own right, held *icazet* granted by his father (it was also granted by a cousin, Ahmad al-Kabir), who was a *muqaddam* (representative) of Muhammad al-Shinqiti (d. 1830). Al-Shinqiti was a direct disciple of Shaykh Tijani.[24] Alfā Hāshim appears in the *silsila* immediately before Abdülkadir Medeni, who, according to all three hagiographies of Pilavoğlu, granted *icazet* to Pilavoğlu. Further details about the *silsila* are discussed later in this chapter.

In the same section of the book which includes the *silsila*, titled; "Ticânî Tarikatı Hakkında Bizi Tenvir Edermisiniz? (Can you describe the Tijani *Tarikat* to Us?)," there are several interjections in the section that appear in bold font and are often, but not always, enclosed in parenthesis. Many of these

observations are written in the first-person (*ben*), which is a noticeable shift from the rest of the text, which is rendered in the third-person objective perspective. Occasionally in the same section, the text is also interspersed with comments in the first-person plural (*biz*), indicating that the translator/author was likely a member of, or at least on friendly terms with the community led by Pilavoğlu. A final indication that the translator/author was directly affiliated with Pilavoğlu is at the end of the book, which includes an interview with Pilavoğlu.[25]

It is certainly possible that the interview was from a separate source, and merely collated by the editor of the book, and thus not written or conducted by the translator/author. Indeed, in the subsequent hagiographies (mentioned below), portions of this interview appear almost verbatim, and are not credited as having been taken from *Fet'hi Rabbânî.* In any case, whoever it was who made the decision to combine a translation of the *Handbook on the Rules & Etiquettes of the Tariqa Tijaniyya* with a *silsila* culminating in an interview with Pilavoğlu about how he established the Tijaniyya in Turkey, certainly wanted to draw attention to Pilavoğlu's leadership of the organization.

İklima Gençdoğan's 2005 undergraduate thesis from Ankara University, titled "Son Devir Mutasavvıvlarından Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı Ve Tasavvuf Anlayışı (The Life and Sufi Understanding of Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, One of the Sufis of the Last Age)"[26] contains no details of Pilavoğlu's life not found elsewhere. Most of the biographical content in this source is drawn from the other hagiographies, often copied verbatim and only occasionally cited. For instance, the *silsila* from *Fet'hi Rabbânî* is reproduced in its entirety. Gençdoğan also extensively draws from Muzaffer Yıldız's hagiography, again often reproducing entire portions of text in verbatim, such as the origin of the name *Pilavoğlu*, and the circumstances of Pilavoğlu's death. Despite the scarce originality of this source, it still offers a few helpful details, such as indicating an earlier date of publication for Muzaffer Yıldız's hagiography than the edition that was available and used for this dissertation. As noted in the introduction, Abdukaydr Abdikamit Uulu's master's thesis is similarly scarce in its originality about details of Pilavoğlu's life.

As was also mentioned in the introduction, although originally published at least as early as 2005 according to Gençdoğan's citations, *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı 1906-1977* is the most recently published hagiography, with an edition released in 2013.[27] This text is by far the most comprehensive of the three, rich in personal details about Pilavoğlu's character not contained elsewhere. This book also discusses Pilavoğlu's ancestry and the origin of the name *Pilavoğlu*. Yıldız's account is particularly useful because it not only depicts Pilavoğlu in an adulatory manner, drawing attention to his superior level of piety, his natural charisma, general ability to influence others, and expansive knowledge, but it also includes accounts of Pilavoğlu from his family and close friends. In these accounts are details of some of the more ordinary dimensions of Pilavoğlu's existence, but these prove invaluable for piecing

together a more detailed comprehension of the context in which Pilavoğlu lived. For instance, there are details about Pilavoğlu's interactions with the local Greek community of Bozcaada, which indicate much about the financial situation of Pilavoğlu's network. These details also provide much insight when considering the potential motives, and perhaps even the target audiences of Pilavoğlu's publications, which were at least partially (if not often) aimed at non-Muslims. These publications and their motives are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Yıldız also includes details about the establishment of Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, the publishing firm in Ankara, which was responsible for printing and distributing Pilavoğlu's writing, and at the time this dissertation was completed, remained open for business in the same location. Similarly, Yıldız draws attention to articles published in *İlahi Işık: Hakkın Dostu – Haksızın Düşmanı* (Divine Light: Friend of Right, Enemy of Wrong) a newspaper launched by the *tarikat* in 1966. Most of the newspaper, released every fifteen days, was written by Pilavoğlu himself. The content, according to Yıldız, often elicited backlash from the (non-Tijani) Muslim community. This provides some insight into how Pilavoğlu and his community of followers were perceived by outsiders and can often be corroborated using other sources, such as the newspapers already mentioned in this chapter. Also present in Yıldız's hagiography are accounts of Pilavoğlu's embarkment on Hajj in 1950 with an entourage of family and friends, which inadvertently provides evidence about Pilavoğlu's command of Arabic and his largely self-taught religious training. At the end of the book, Pilavoğlu's explanations of the *Salatul Fatihi* and the *Jawaratul Kemal* are included, which are likely similar in intention to Çakır and the translator/author of *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, of drawing attention to Pilavoğlu's leadership and emphasizing his claim of authority within the Tijaniyya community in Turkey.

Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, another biographical source which is not a hagiography but provides some first-hand information of time spent with Pilavoğlu, is the biography of Musa "Saatçi" Çağıl, titled *Saatçi Musa*, by Asım Öz published in 2010. In 1952, Çağıl was part of a conspiracy to assassinate Ahmet Emin Yalman, a journalist educated in Europe who later became the first professor of sociology at Istanbul University in 1914. Yalman was also the founder and editor in chief of the nationalist newspaper *Vatan,* which initially supported the Kemalist project of secularization. The newspaper was shut down in 1925 after it began to openly support the short-lived opposition, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party), which was also shut down in the wake of the Shaykh Said Rebellion. *Vatan* was re-launched in 1940, once again in opposition to the Kemalist CHP.[28]

Çağıl, who was sentenced to twelve years in prison for his involvement in the conspiracy against Yalman, was incarcerated for nine years, part of which was in Ankara. Çağıl's accomplice, Hüseyin Üzmez, who shot Yalman (in the stomach, and the hand, not fatally), served ten out of his twenty-four-

year sentence. Osman Yüksel and Necip Fazıl Kisakürek also served sentences for their involvement. After Çağıl's release, he settled in Ankara, and opened a watch repair shop in the early 1960s. His shop later became a "…quarry of nationalist and conservative thought," frequented by well-known conservatives and Islamists such as Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, Necip Fazıl Kisakürek, and Abdullah Gül, among others. [29]

Çağıl met Pilavoğlu while they were both incarcerated in Ankara in the early 1950s. In Öz's biography, Çağıl provides valuable insights about Pilavoğlu from a non-devotional, and at times critical perspective. For instance, he describes Pilavoğlu's books as "uyku kitapları gibi" and "kitabun nevm," or "books for sleep."[30] Çağıl also crucially provides an additional perspective about public accusations that Pilavoğlu and his Tijani followers were "crazy," responding in detail to Öz's pointed question in an interview, "Bunlar [Ticaniler] deli mi peki? (Are these [Tijanis] crazy?)."[31] Çağıl's account is also a valuable source of corroboration for many of the details in the hagiographical accounts of Pilavoğlu, including suspicions of political affiliations with the CHP and its subsequent political parties. Perhaps most importantly, Çağıl's perspective is useful because he appears to have been on mostly amicable terms with Pilavoğlu, which is apparent from his descriptions of their time together. At the same time, Çağıl's perspective is distinctly free from the adulation in other first-hand accounts, which offers something of a more realistic, albeit anecdotal depiction of Pilavoğlu as a person.

Early Life

Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu was born in Ankara in 1906, in the neighborhood of Hamamönü (literally; "the area around the *hammam*"). A target of contemporary urban renewal projects aimed at "Ottomanizing" the landscape for the purpose of generating revenue, Hamamönü is a neighbourhood in the pre-Republican, late Ottoman area of Ankara. An often-overlooked aspect of Ankara is that although the city has been continuously inhabited since at least since the Stone Age, its role in Ottoman history is relatively minor. Until just after World War I, the city had a population of approximately 28,000, roughly thirty percent of which was Christian. It bore little distinction from the collection of small provincial towns throughout Anatolia. In 1920, Atatürk established the headquarters of his resistance movement, in the city which was then known as Angora. After the Turkish War of Independence ended in 1923, Angora became the capital of the new republic, replacing Istanbul. It was shortly thereafter renamed Ankara by Atatürk. By 1924, the city's population had grown to around 34,000. By 1950, the population had burgeoned to close to 500,000. Ankara is now Turkey's second-largest city, behind Istanbul. The rapid growth of Ankara after the establishment of the Republic was mostly the result of migration of inhabitants from rural Anatolia to the city. The cultural changes underway during Ankara's rapid development and

population growth where mostly a combination of industrialization and immigration. It was in this context where Pilavoğlu's ambitions began to take shape.

The accounts of Pilavoğlu's life contain only minimal details of his formative years. Nevertheless, the brief details which are present clearly illustrate that he had a religious upbringing. From a young age, Pilavoğlu's grandfather and father undertook his religious instruction. According to a memory from Pilavoğlu's father relayed by Yıldız in *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı*, he recalls that by the age of 5 or 6, Pilavoğlu was already reciting passages from the Qur'an, "hiç şaşırmadan ezbere aynen tekrar ediyor" (without any doubt repeating [the passages] by heart).[32] Pilavoğlu's father describes him as a quiet child who kept to himself, and only played with the neighborhood children occasionally. Pilavoğlu maintained a keen interest in religious matters during his youth and was known to engage in controversial discussions with a level of nuance that at times surprised even his teachers.[33] He completed his primary, elementary, and high school education in Ankara.

Hafiz Ahmet Efendi, Pilavoğlu's father, and Sare Hanım, his mother, were both born in Ankara. His paternal uncle, Abidin Efendi, was a mufti in the city. His grandfather was Hacı[34] Hafiz Seyid Mehmet Effendi. During the Ottoman era, most Muslim Ottomans carried titles such as "Efendi" or "Hanım," as in the case of Pilavoğlu's father and mother, respectively. These titles, such as "Pasha," "Hoca," "Bey," "Hanım," "Efendi," etc., either defined a formal profession (such as Pasha, Hoca, etc.) or one's informal status within the society (such as Bey, Hanım, Efendi, etc.). "Efendi" and "Hanım" were gendered titles (male and female, respectively) which typically indicated that an individual was formally educated.

In 1934, the Republican "Surname Law" (*Soyadı Kanunu*) enforced not only the use of official surnames but also stipulated that citizens must chose Turkish names. Until it was repealed in 2013, in Turkey the eldest male was the head of household and the law appointed him to choose a surname. In his absence, death, or mental incapacitation, the wife would do so. This law was modelled on a 1926 fascist Italianization law aimed at restoring German, Slovene, and Croat surnames to their "original" Italian form. The 1934 Turkish law stipulated that family names, which should be hereditary, should be Turkish (as opposed to Arabic, Persian, etc.). Before the enforcement of this law, it was not uncommon for families in urban centers to have names by which they were known locally.

Yıldız provides one of two explanations for the surname *Pilavoğlu*, which is reproduced by Gençdoğan and Uulu. The explanations are identical. In Gençdoğan's thesis, the explanation appears in a sub-section of the first chapter of his thesis titled, "Bu Aileye Neden 'Pilavoğlu' Denmiştir? (Why was this family called 'Pilavoğlu')?"[35] Gençdoğan relays that "His [Pilavoğlu's] father Hafiz Ahmet explained the reason they were called 'Pilavoğlu'":

> In the sixteenth century, seven relatives of the Prophet came from Medina Munawwarah to Ankara. Historically, Ankara was called Engürü. There was dreadful a famine in the city [Engürü]. The Prophet's relatives stayed for three months; they could not bear the famine. Four of them returned to Medina, two went to Bolu,[36] finally settling in Taşköprü, and one remained in Ankara. [Still] in the time of the famine, the one who remained in Ankara set up a stall in the Thursday market in Hamamönü district, cooking and distributing *pilav* to the people. The people who came to the market started to address him as "Pilavoğlullan." They won the love of the people and the name 'Pilavoğlu' remained since then.[37]

When considering Ahmet Effendi's claims about the origin of the family ancestry, most studies on famine in the Ottoman Empire focus more heavily on the 19th century. However, there is evidence to suggest there were large-scale famines between 1580-1630. In many cases, these famines also caused large-scale migrations.[38] Thus, the claim of migration from Medina to Ankara is possible.

The claim of descent from among the relatives of the Prophet Muhammad is at first reminiscent of Bel's description of maraboutic practice, mentioned in Chapter 2, that religious leaders were known to ascribe prophetic lineage to cultivate an image of holiness. In a broader context, claims of Prophetic descent have always been common throughout the Muslim world, and descendants of the Prophet have long been accorded special status. In the Ottoman Empire, official registers were typically kept to formally recognize *seyyid/şerif* or *sadat/eşraf*, the honorific title given to acknowledged descendants. In Ottoman territories, false claims of Prophetic descent began as early as the sixteenth century, which continued to increase with the advance of time. Hülya Canbakal in her article, "The Ottoman State and Descendants of the Prophet in Anatolia and the Balkans (c. 1500-1700),"[39] explains that Ottoman subjects who claimed descent from Muhammad are known to have illicitly purchased, or sometimes stolen certificates confirming "seyyidship," while others bribed officials to obtain the status, or simply forged their genealogies. According to Ottoman authorities, Canbakal explains, the practice of *teseyyüd*, (literally; 'to feign nobility or self-ennoblement') was:

> …a unilateral phenomenon, a transgression by ordinary people… [which] emerged as a strategy of defense and resistance because, paradoxically, the state officially granted certain privileges and immunities to sadat.[40]

Since the Ottoman authorities granted tax breaks to *eşraf*, the status became useful for evading tax collectors. Canbakal notes that communities in Anatolia who claimed "seyyidship" since the sixteenth century often did so when approached by tax collectors, which, she adds, was also the case in the Arab regions of the Empire.[41] After the establishment of the Republic, those who held the title *eşraf* played a role in generating a sense of unity, a renewed locus of authority and bulwark against the breakdown of tribal hierarchy, and a source of what Canbakal describes as "tribal genealogy" in the shadow of the

structural transformations underway during the period of Kemalist reforms.[42] Whether Pilavoğlu's lineage was genuinely connected to the Prophet is ultimately unimportant. The claim still served the purpose of not only cultivating an image of holiness, and thus, an idea of how Pilavoğlu "ought to have been," but perhaps more crucially a sense of unity around a particularly Islamic identity that was at risk of being quashed by the enforcement of the new, distinctly Turkish national identity in the wake of Ottoman-cum-Muslim demise.

In his youth, Pilavoğlu sometimes helped his father working in the family-owned *Han* located near the old *atpazar* (horse bazaar) in the Altındağ area of Ankara. The "Tarihi Pilavoğlu Han Çarşısı" (Historical Pilavoğlu Inn and Bazaar) is an Ottoman-era Inn and marketplace still in operation in the vicinity. Built between the 16th or 17th century, it was a mixed-use facility, serving as an inn and a location for trade. In the first decades of the twentieth century, from the collapse of the Empire into the early years of the Republican era, the Inn, according to several sources was used as a makeshift prison, reserved for women and children.[43] Land registry records dated 1924-1936 confirm that a plot inside of the Pilavoğlu Han was owned by "Pilavzade Ahme ef. Emine vesaire" (Son of Pilav,[44] Ahme effendi, Emine, and so on). The records specify that the ownership was dispersed over one plot and included two *dükkan* (shops), one of which was a masonry.[45] There is little doubt that the "Ahme Effendi" mentioned in the registry record is Hafiz Ahmet Effendi, Pilavoğlu's father. This can confirm that the patronym "Pilavoğlu" was probably in use, at least informally, by Ahmet Effendi prior to the 1934 surname law, and so his explanation as recounted by Yıldız, that patrons of the bazaar had been addressing him as "Pilavoğlullan" can be corroborated.

In a newspaper article published in *Vatan* in 1943, relayed by Yıldız, Pilavoğlu is described as a wealthy man, and a *Han Dükkan sahibi* (shop, or business owner).[46] Pilavoğlu is quoted in the newspaper as claiming it was a profession which he had acquired "…yalan, söylememeyi birinci planda tutmak itibariyle kendisine meslek ittihaz edinmiş ([because the *tarikat*] prioritizes not telling lies, he has procured [this] profession)." Pilavoğlu's statement does not mention that his ownership of what was likely a family business was probably inherited, however; his assertion suggests that he financially supported the activities and needs of the *tarikat*.[47] Perhaps more significantly, his statement may have been an attempt to dispel the notion that law practice (the study of which he ultimately did not complete) is often viewed as "professional lying."

After completing his education, according to Çakır's account in *Pilavoğlu Kimdir?* Pilavoğlu enrolled in the Faculty of Law at Istanbul University, and in 1931 "…tahsilini yarıda bırakarak ana yurdu olan güzel Ankara'ya dönmüş" (…left his education and returned to his motherland, beautiful Ankara). [48] Çakır more than once specifies that Pilavoğlu attended Istanbul University, which is likewise claimed by Gençdoğan. However, Yıldız's account specifies that he enrolled in the Faculty of Law at Ankara

University. None of the hagiographies or other accounts of Pilavoğlu's life provide a date of enrolment.[49] However, in Yıldız's account, Pilavoğlu himself is quoted as claiming to have studied Law at Ankara University at the same time as Adnan Menderes, who graduated from the institution in 1935. This would mean that if Pilavoğlu indeed attended the university, he most certainly enrolled at the tail end of the 1920s, if he left his studies in 1931. According to Gençdoğan and Yıldız's accounts, Pilavoğlu was incredibly successful during his first year but abandoned his studies in his final year, the date of which is also not clearly specified in any accounts of his life, but it can be assumed that this departure was between 1930 and 1931 based on the details of his activities following this. Nevertheless, Yıldız concludes that Pilavoğlu's departure from his studies must have been an auspicious sign.[50]

Less optimistic than Yıldız's auspicious observation, Pilavoğlu's father had encouraged him to become a civil servant. After learning of his son's departure from law school, Ahmet Effendi went secretly to Hüseyingazi mountain with some of his friends to perform *namaz* and *zikr*.[51] Yıldız notes that in the years that the *ezan* was publicly recited in Turkish, Pilavoğlu's father and his friends continued to recite it in Arabic.[52] It is worth mentioning that located on the summit of Hüseyin Gazi mountain in the Southeast of Ankara is a Bektaşi *tekke*, or lodge, built in the thirteenth century, and closed in 1925 as part of the crackdown on Sufi establishments. At the time Pilavoğlu's father and his cohorts were patronizing it (before it was forcibly closed), the *tekke* was a functioning Bektaşi lodge. The site is also widely claimed to be where Hüseyin Gazi is buried.[53]

Not long after abandoning his studies in law, Pilavoğlu met Abdülkadir Havari Medeni in Istanbul. Medeni was the shaykh who, according to all accounts of Pilavoğlu's life, initiated him into the Tijaniyya, and partially granted him *icazet* to transmit the Tijani message. In a 1952 interview with one of Pilavoğlu's followers, Kamil Tınal, which appears in Yıldız's account, Pilavoğlu was asked to explain how and where he obtained his "…almighty knowledge and wisdom."[54] Yıldız quotes Pilavoğlu, who explains:

> In 1931, one of the descendants of Zubayr ibn al-Awam[55] who was a Medinan [and possessed] almighty wisdom and knowledge of Sufism, and the manager of the Arif Hikment Library, came to Istanbul. While Istanbul's famous ulama and Sufis were visiting him, one of his relatives took me on the appointed day [the Medinan named Abdülkadir Havari Medeni] spoke.

Just pages later, Yıldız quotes from a statement that Pilavoğlu gave to the police when he and 24 others were arrested in 1943. The statement, which according to Yıldız appeared in an article published on 24 July 1943 in *Ulus* newspaper, quotes Pilavoğlu as saying "In 1926, I met a famous member of the ulama Abdülkadir Havari Medeni during a visit to Istanbul." In the same statement, Pilavoğlu claims that Medeni died not long after their meeting, which he kept secret for several years while he engaged in studies of books of *tafsir*, and of al-Bukhari's hadith collection, etc.[56] Çakır's account also mentions that

Pilavoğlu met Medeni in 1931 (1926 is not mentioned) but does not include the claims that the meeting was secret, or that Medeni died soon after. However, Çakır does emphasize repeatedly that Pilavoğlu had no teacher and did not study under a master; that his wisdom was miraculously bestowed upon him.[57] Pilavoğlu himself, as quoted by Yıldız, confirms that his knowledge was not largely procured under the tutelage of a shaykh:

> I asked Medeni, 'milletime nasıl faydalı olabilirim? (How I could be useful to my *millet*?)'[58] Medeni advised me to follow the *Sunnah*, to fear God, practice mindfulness of God in my work, and to pray a lot. Medeni died shortly after the meeting, which I kept secret for several years while I studied tafsir, al-Buhari, hadith, and had no association with the *tarikat*, didn't bother anyone, and remained distant during the rise of communism and fascism.[59]

The time discrepancy between 1926 and 1931 could potentially be explained by considering Pilavoğlu's claim that he kept his meeting with Medeni secret for several years. However, in *Fet'hi Rabbânî*[60] Pilavoğlu specifies that he met Medeni while he was in the last year of studying law, on "7 Teşrin 1931 Perşembe." *Teşrin* can be either October or November, but the 7th of October in 1931 on the Gregorian Calendar was a Wednesday, and the 7th of November 1931 was a Saturday. *Perşembe* means Thursday. Notwithstanding this minor mistake, this provides something of an explanation for the discrepancy between 1926 and 1931, because in Yıldız's account, Pilavoğlu explains that he had received a prior spiritual sign while he was in Istanbul. Although his explanation does not specifically mention Medeni, it certainly alludes to a premonition about meeting "such a person" as Medeni. In this way, it is possible that 1926 was the year of his "spiritual sign," and 1931 was the year of the in-person meeting, as described by Pilavoğlu:

> I had received a spiritual sign earlier in Istanbul; I was hoping that I would encounter [such a] person in Istanbul. One night in Ankara, I encountered the Esteemed Prophet.[61] After we performed the prayer of the Prophet, we came across this radiant holy light [and] I grew closer to this enlightenment [and] felt peace in the Prophet. I will not [be able to] explain here the endless delight and religious signs [but I can] speak about what I remembered. He smiled and presented to me many good tidings and recited to me every type of mystery of this business. (From his excellency Mehmed Haşım, assistant to the shaykh of the *tekke*, by whom I became linked to the chain [of transmission] and aligned to the Silsila). He preached to us a summary of the testaments of the path[s] of *taqwa* of all of the saints and prophets. From the upper echelons of the ranks of the three *tarikatlar*, the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, [and] Tijaniyya this person had dressed me [in] the mantle of Tijaniism.[62]

In *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, the final chapter's *silsila* which terminates with Pilavoğlu is followed by an explanation of how the Tijaniyya found its way to Istanbul and to Pilavoğlu.[63] As mentioned, the translator/author explains that Pilavoğlu was granted *icazet* to join the *tarikat* by Alfā Hāshim, who appears in the *silsila* immediately before Abdūlkadir Medeni, who as mentioned granted *icazet* to Pilavoğlu.

The *silsila* provided in *Fet'hi Rabbânî* resembles most standard Tijani *silsila*-s, but with a few noticeable anomalies. Perhaps the most noticeable is that the Tijaniyya does not typically use what might be considered by other Sufi organizations to be "proper" *silsila*-s. This is because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Shaykh Tijani received the *silsila* directly from the Prophet. Because of this, a standard Tijani *silsila* traces its transmission from, for instance; ending with Kemal Pilavoğlu, who received *icazet* from Abdülkadir Medeni, and so on until Shaykh Tijani, who received the transmission directly from Muhammad. In *Fet'hi Rabbânî,* the *silsila* begins with Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, and traces transmission to Shaykh Tijani in what appears to be a *silsila* for the Khalwatiyya order. As mentioned in Chapter 2, prior to establishing the Tijaniyya, Shaykh Tijani had received *icazet* for the Khalwatiyya. Providing this *silsila* in *Fet'hi Rabbânî* is understandable in the sense that the Khalwatiyya was already long-established and well-known in the Ottoman Empire and republican Turkey, by the time that Pilavoğlu met Medeni. However, the Tijaniyya was largely unknown by comparison. Thus, a possible explanation for the author/translator of *Fet'hi Rabbânî* providing the Khalwatiyya *silsila* is that a transmission which appeared to cut out several steps between Shaykh Tijani and Muhammad might have appeared strange to Pilavoğlu's growing community of followers. It is possible then, that to avoid confusion, the compiler of the *silsila* in *Fet'hi Rabbânî* provided the Khalwatiyya affiliation, which included a connection to Shaykh al-Tijani.

Another possible explanation for this unusual construction of the *silsila* is that the record was simply incorrectly recorded. Since Tijani *silsila*-s might appear to be "incomplete" -- because, as mentioned; they typically trace transmission back from Shakyh Tijani directly to Muhammad—when Pilavoğlu was granted *icazet*, the *silsila* was "completed" by the compiler, who was perhaps not accustomed to the Tijani method of *silsila*-s. Somewhat related to this is the final possibility, that Pilavoğlu may not have truly been granted *icazet*, but only met briefly with Medeni. The details of their meeting are discussed in greater detail below, but as it pertains to the construction of the *silsila* in *Fet'hi Rabbânî*; a mere brief meeting with Medeni—a plausible possibility because, as it will be made clear, none of the hagiographies discuss multiple meetings between the two men—could have provoked a later attempt by Pilavoğlu's hagiographer to create a *silsila* which established a clear link with the Tijani network, which could have been reconstructed using the limited, yet present Tijani literature available in Turkey at the time.

Following Medeni's name in the *silsila,* which appears as "Abdül Kadir Havvâri Velmedeni," is an explanation that the Tijaniyya first came to Turkey during the First World War. "İzmirli Necati" (literally; Necati of Izmir, or Izmiri Necati) started a *tekke* in Eyyüb in İstanbul, but no dates are provided. The explanation specifies that some treatises were generated about the Tijaniyya, but it did not develop in Istanbul because Necati left for Fez due to a lack of membership.

According to Çakır, Medeni was immediately attracted to Pilavoğlu and initiated him as a *mürşid* (spiritual teacher) shortly after they met. Pilavoğlu was so beloved by Medeni, Çakır claims, that the latter was compelled to authorize the completion of Pilavoğlu's initiation, because he had been shown a sign of the holiness of Pilavoğlu. The text describes the day that Medeni initiated Pilavoğlu to the rank of shaykh: "Medeni pointed his finger at Pilavoğlu, saying; 'Behold, this is your shaykh.'"[64] Admirers, followers, and even critics of Pilavoğlu often addressed him as Shaykh; the title appears before his name in many publications about him, including in the press.[65] However, Yıldız relays an interview in which Pilavoğlu is asked about claims that he had been affiliated with the Nakşibendi *tarikat*. Pilavoğlu explains, "I was not educated in a shaykh's training. The Messenger of God educated me with his training, I was needed."[66] Thus, although the question is specifically about a possible Nakşibendi affiliation, and is thus an interesting insight in its own right, it can be inferred that the rank of shaykh was possibly not one formally confirmed, but perhaps something of an honorary title that Pilavoğlu earned through charismatic admiration.

The final paragraph of *Fet'hi Rabbânî* explains that while on hajj, Shaykh İdris al-Iraqi (d. 2009) of the Tijaniyya *tekke* in Fez reconfirmed permission to operate a Tijani *tekke* in Turkey. Shaykh İdris, according to the text, also bestowed upon Pilavoğlu and his followers more complete knowledge of the Tijani *wird-s* (litanies). Although *Fet'hi Rabbânî* does not specify the year of the encounter with Shaykh İdris, Yıldız's account contains a detailed explanation of Pilavoğlu's embarkment on hajj in September 1950, "with 21 friends and *ihvanlar* (brethren, or coreligionists)," as well as his wife and three children.[67]

The Picture of Piety, or the Fanatical Scourge of Nationalism?

At the age of 36, Pilavoğlu married Emire Hanımefendi in 1942. Emire was the daughter of İsmail Şereren Bey, an appellate court clerk. They had a son named Ahmet, and two daughters named Şayeste and Neriman. Like the scant details of his early life, only brief details of Pilavoğlu's personal life appear in any of the hagiographical accounts. Yıldız's account includes a short section titled, "Şayeste Altınbaş's Memories of M. Kemal Pilavoğlu's private life on the Island [Bozcaada]," in which his daughter Şayeste Altınbaş describes Pilavoğlu as a strict, pious man devoted to and adamant about prayer. Every day began with morning prayer, followed by Qur'an lessons, delivered by Pilavoğlu himself. He often advised his family and co-religionists to pray before doing anything, and it was important to him to maintain a

peaceful family environment without gossip. According to Altınbaş, he also insisted on silence while he was writing, and warned everyone not to disturb him, otherwise, she says; he would become enraged.[68]

Pilavoğlu clearly attached great importance to both education and piety, which often, if not continuously overlapped for him. He had an extensive library with thousands of books, as well as subscriptions to a few foreign magazines, and he read the newspaper daily. According to Yıldız, he even had ambitions of establishing an Islamic radio station to be able to reach Muslims across the world. Indicative of the importance he attached to piety and education as an important culmination, Yıldız recounts when one of his fellow Tijanis told Pilavoğlu that he wanted to send his son to an *İmam Hatip* school, Pilavoğlu replied:

> İmam Hatip [schools] are useful in our homeland. More pious Muslim doctors, judges, and engineers would be very useful; if possible [encourage] your son to [become] a doctor.[69]

İmam Hatip schools were originally secondary education institutions established to train government-employed imams after the abolishment of *madrasas* (Islamic theologically based schools) in 1924 under the Unification of Education Act. Under Atatürk's reforms, all education was brought under the control of the Ministry of Education. İmam Hatip schools were then closed in 1930. Religious education was again reinstated in 1948, and in 1951 seven new İmam Hatip schools were established by the DP under Adnan Menderes. Under the National Basic Education Law ratified following the 1971 military coup, İmam Hatip schools were defined as vocational schools where students trained to become imams, or preachers. The number of new schools has continued to grow since the 1970s. [70] Indeed, in keeping with Pilavoğlu's hope, İmam Hatip schools have increasingly been aimed at educating an Islamically-minded population who "…fully internalize the conservative Islamic moral system"[71] since the reinstatement of religious education.

Çakır provides the most comprehensive description of Pilavoğlu's piety. For instance, he explains that he undertook fasting during optional, but recommended times during *Rajab, Shaʿbān,* and *Shawwal*,[72] on Mondays and Thursdays, for *Dhu al-Hijjah*,[73] and often undertook longer fasts during other times. Always fingering *tesbih* (prayer beads),[74] Çakır recounts that Pilavoğlu would always add two *rakats* to obligatory prayers.[75] Dedicating much of his time to prayer and writing, Pilavoğlu ate and slept very little according to Çakır, and advised others to cultivate the same discipline.

Çağıl's recollections depict a similarly pious man. He recalls that in prison, Pilavoğlu, who he describes as "…çok saf bir adamdı (a very ingenuous/pure man)," and the other incarcerated Tijanis never complained despite their poor treatment by the prison staff, who physically and verbally abused them. The guards, observing their intensely pietistic habits and unusual *dhikrs*, called Pilavoğlu and his followers *deli* (crazy), and "…Hüseyin'in uydurması," or "corruptions of Husayn," no doubt alluding to their behaviour as reminiscent of the martyr and grandson of Muhammad, Husayn ibn Ali ibn Abu Talib,

who was beheaded at the battle of Karbala because of his refusal to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the successor to the Umayyad dynasty. In Çağıl's words:

> Alışılmış olanın dışına yaklaşımları vardı ama bu onları deli olarak adlandırmayı gerektirmez.
>
> They [the incarcerated Tijanis] had an unusual approach but this does not require calling them crazy.[76]

In a 1956 letter to one of his coreligionists written from prison, relayed by Yıldız, Pilavoğlu further demonstrates his pietistic view of the miseries of incarceration, saying:

> All these miseries [of prison] are enhancing our spirituality. …God bestows blessing after blessing. We have gotten rid of the bad habits of our souls, [and] rejected cruelty by having been subjected to it. No matter how hard one is, unless they are subjected to such cruelty, they too would not become sharper as a result [of being subjected to such harshness] … If God loves a servant, the Lord blesses them with troubles.[77]

Çakır, when responding to criticisms of Pilavoğlu, in a decidedly adulatory declaration asserts that Pilavoğlu always maintained his sincerity (*sâdık*) in the face of criticism, and that his followers remained faithful to him despite facing the same criticism:[78]

> I would like to announce to the Muslim world that he [Pilavoğlu] is a great human and an exemplary Muslim[79] [because] of his desire to defend his position… I wrote this as a bestowal and a gift to those whose hearts burn with love for Allah and the Prophet.[80]

These many defences against criticism suggest that Pilavoğlu often seemed to be the subject of controversy. In another instance, Yıldız refers to an article which appeared in the *tarikat*'s newspaper, *İlahi Işık* (Divine Light), published on 1 April 1968, titled "O teachers, dervishes come to the path of the Prophet." The article, according to Yıldız, provoked claims that Pilavoğlu's followers and members of the *tarikat* were fanatics and reactionaries, and false adherents to the *tarikat*. Yıldız provides a summary of the article:

> …Some dervishes and religious men who wrote treatises memorize these [treatises instead of] the Qur'an, [but this] cannot be [a replacement for] the Qur'an and *tafsir*. …O Muslim scholars, while there are shaykhs [who] are the Messenger of Allah, he is the greatest guide to humanity, do not be distracted [by] the famous name of another.

Yıldız does not include any additional discussion about why the article provoked accusations of fanaticism and reactionism from Pilavoğlu's critics, except to say that Pilavoğlu often met with religious scholars, teachers, and state-appointed heads of religious affairs of the time. Some of these people expressed admiration for Pilavoğlu's knowledge and charismatic personality, Yıldız says; while others were not as attracted to Pilavoğlu and kept their distance.[81] Nevertheless, Pilavoğlu was regularly

criticized by scholars and teachers. Their accusations were that he did not attend *madrasa*, and possessed insufficient knowledge of Arabic, specifically accusing him of having not memorized the "nasara yansuruyu," or the basic rules of Arabic grammar. For these reasons, Yıldız explains, Pilavoğlu was judged by his critics to be unqualified to perform *ijtihad* (independent reasoning in jurisprudence), or issue *fatwas* (legal rulings).[82]

Later in his account, Yıldız describes Pilavoğlu's meeting with a Tijani shaykh while on hajj in 1950. The shaykh is not named by Yıldız, but it can be inferred that this is the same Shaykh İdris of Fez mentioned in *Fet'hi Rabbânî* (mentioned above). During the meeting, Pilavoğlu's command of Arabic is again questioned, this time by Shaykh İdris. Pilavoğlu's explanation was, "Arapçayı bilirim ama söylemeye emir yok (I know Arabic, but do not [have] command of speaking)." The Shaykh then requested that Pilavoğlu lead the congregational prayer. In a miraculous transition, after the prayer Pilavoğlu was able to read from the Qur'an with an "Arab accent" (*Arap şivesi*).[83] Although he does not similarly mention his miraculous mastery of Arabic, Çakır does attest to the profundity of Pilavoğlu's many sacred gifts, asserting that they were largely disregarded, even by those who knew him.[84] In a final attestation to his piety, Yıldız recounts that even in his final hours before death, Pilavoğlu insisted on praying even as he struggled to roll up the sleeves of his pyjamas as he recited the morning call to prayer.[85]

Allahu Akbar, not *Tanrı Uludur*

As noted in the previous chapter, in 1932 the *ezan* was translated into Turkish, which replaced the Arabic version and was legally enforced. The translation was so involved that even the word "Allah" was replaced with the Turkic-origin word *Tanrı*. As mentioned, many protests erupted in response to this translation. Viewed by the State and depicted in pro-Kemalist press as reactionary events, dozens of "impromptu muezzins" were arrested for breaking the ban on the Arabic call to prayer throughout the 1930s and 40s.

By 1942, Pilavoğlu had gathered a considerable following. A few sources from the early the 1950s provide estimates of Tijani membership, which vary widely. Emile Marmorstein in his 1952 paper, "Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East" estimates membership anywhere from 8,000 to as many as 100,000. Lewis generously estimates there were as many as 40,000 members. An article in *Cumhuriyet* from 1950 reports that there were at least 30,000 members in and around Ankara. However, as Marmorstein most plausibly suggests, these numbers likely included those who were sympathetic to their cause but were not initiated into the Tijaniyya *tarikat*.[86] Considering that the widespread protests of the Turkish *ezan* included many Sufis from a variety of *tarikatlar*, there were indeed likely thousands of sympathizers. As for full membership in the Tijaniyya, at the height of his following Pilavoğlu probably

had at most several hundred *müritler*, a rough estimate which includes the families of the *müritler* who were directly affiliated with him. In 2016, those who self-identified as Tijanis in Ankara, and who expressed direct affiliation with or were part of Pilavoğlu's family, estimated membership to be at most 500. Again, this estimate included their families and friends who self-identified as Tijani.[87]

That year, in 1942 Sadık Çakırtepe was the first of Pilavoğlu's *müritler* to recite the *ezan* in Arabic following the Friday sermon at the Zincirli mosque in Ankara. He was joined in his recitation by another man at the mosque, Yusuf Özcan. They were soon stopped by several gendarmes. The two men were then beaten by the gendarmes, and again by the police who arrived later. When they were tried in court for the incident, they were asked why they recited the Arabic *ezan*. Yıldız relays Özcan's response, who said: "Muslims have recited the same call for 1300-some years. To change the way it is read is to become an enemy of the Prophet and the Qur'an." According to Yıldız, the presiding judge heard this response and released them both without charge, responding: "If there were 100 people as brave as you, religion would not be a mysterious enigma [of mystics]." Yıldız asserts that the judge was subsequently deposed by the CHP.[88]

Similar protests undertaken by Pilavoğlu's followers regularly punctuated the newspaper headlines in the eight years following the incident in the Zincirli mosque in many locations throughout Turkey. Istanbul, Ankara, Erzurum, and Diyarbakır, are among the cities listed by Yıldız. Reports of these protests, many of which were carried out while parliament was in session, peppered the headlines of many different newspapers. For instance, a 1949 headline from *Cumhuriyet* "The *ezan* incident in Parliament, a coordinated effort! Members of the Tijani *tarikat*, who are supporters of the Arabic *ezan*, embark on a crazy show." It is worth mentioning that this article also incorrectly explains that the Tijaniyya was founded by Libyan "Şeyh Ahmed Ticani," and was imported to Turkey from *Trablusgarb*, or Tripolitania, one of the administrative divisions of Italian Libya.[89]

Neither newspaper headlines nor any of the biographical literature mention that Pilavoğlu himself was ever among the reciters of the *ezan*. However, he certainly participated in his share of court appearances for a variety of infractions related to the legal constraints placed around the operation of *tarikatlar*. In an incident in 1943, Pilavoğlu, with 24 *arkadaş* (friends) were subpoenaed for attempting to establish a *tarikat*. They were tried according to article 667 of the penal code, which dealt with infractions against the legal closures of *tekkeler*. A report of the trial was published in *Ulus* newspaper. Yıldız's summary of the article includes a portion of Pilavoğlu's testimony during the trial, who said "…I wanted to be useful to my nation, my country, I wanted to act with the morality of the Prophet."[90]

In another incident, when Pilavoğlu and his entourage returned to Ankara from hajj in 1950, he resumed his regular activities of attending meetings, engaging in religious discussions, and participating in *dhikrs*. Yıldız explains that these gatherings would often grow very loud "…due to the exuberance of

the participants, chanting *Lailaheillah*." From time to time, they were taken into police custody and interrogated about their rituals. As if to illustrate how effective the rejection of religion had been by the State, Yıldız relays one episode during a court appearance for one of these infractions, where the judge had to ask the President of Religious Affairs if he was willing to teach him the meaning of *Lailaheillah*.[91]

In another hearing, the judge subpoenaed a doctor as an expert witness to conduct a psychological evaluation of Pilavoğlu. Yıldız recounts the doctor's testimony; "Although Pilavoğlu was one of the best students in school, he could have been in a better position; possibly there is madness in this, that he abandoned this potential."[92] The judge ordered Pilavoğlu to remain under medical observation for three months. The analysis culled from this observation was conducted by a different doctor in Istanbul. According Yıldız's account, the doctor expressed astonishment at Pilavoğlu's level of religious knowledge relative to his age (at the time, he was 45). According to Yıldız, and as reported in the press, the doctors' reports concluded that Pilavoğlu was in good psychological health.[93] As mentioned earlier, Çağıl, who spent time in prison with Pilavoğlu in Ankara, responded extensively to alarmist accusations that Tijanis were crazy. He quotes an anecdote from a book written by Hüseyn Üzmez, another inmate, who believed that the Tijanis who shared the prison with them were, indeed, irrational:

> 'There was also one Kemal Pilavoğlu in the prison. According to some, he was [an] imposter, a liar, and immoral; according to others he was an almighty saint… Wearing baggy trousers, dishevelled, bearded types. Skullcaps and fur caps on their heads, rawhide sandals on their feet. Strangely clad people tucked into wool socks that reached up to their knees. Middle Anatolian people. Most of them have the nickname "deli" [crazy] before their name. Deli Sadık, Deli Yusuf, Deli Mevlut… craziness is like a title for them. The prison administration [who gave them these nicknames] was very hard on them.'[94]

Çağıl goes on to explain that, despite the charges of *tarikatçılık* of which Pilavoğlu and the other Tijanis in the prison had been convicted, the understanding of the Tijanis in the 1950s was "…çok net değildi" (not very clear). In a decidedly apologetic manner Çağıl elaborates that clarity, especially relating to their unusual *dhikrs*, came after the 1960s, with the release of Pilavoğlu's books.[95]

Yıldız likewise draws attention to the devotional distinctiveness of Tijani *dhikrs*, explaining that devotees came to Hamamönü from all over Turkey to meet with Pilavoğlu and his close co-religionist, Ömer Yıldız. Often, after dinner and tea together, many of these visitors would remain, and they would all perform *dhikr* together. Pilavoğlu in his book *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk* (Sufism and Morality), explains that only those with the greatest depth of pious devotion can fully understand that what appears to be strange behavior taking place during a Tijani *dhikr*, is actually an indication of full submission to God. Many people cannot be convinced to fully submit, he argues, because they lack sufficient trust in the Oneness of God.[96]

As if anticipating the scepticism of his readers, immediately following his summary of Pilavoğlu's impassioned explanation of *dhikr* practice, Yıldız addresses the widespread media reports from the early 1950s, that Tijanis attempted to break statues and busts of Atatürk, clarifying:

> Yes, a few *müridler* have attempted to break busts and statues, with only thoughts of themselves. [These actions] are of no interest to Kemal Pilavoğlu and the *tarikat*.[97]

Marmorstein provides a helpful illustration of the unclear, and decidedly alarmist understanding of "…the red-bearded Tijanis" among secular-minded onlookers of the time. He levels a variety of accusations against Pilavoğlu and the Tijaniyya. Some of the more inflammatory of these include accusations that the *tarikat* was "…deceiving innocent citizens for financial gain and promoting the political interests of certain individuals under the guise of religion"; and that there was " …a connexion between the smuggling of Nazim Hikmet behind the iron curtain and the proclamations issued by the Tijanis and their line of action [of breaking statutes]";[98] and finally that "…many of the leaders had obtained medical reports of insanity in order to enter asylums rather than prison… Other writers cast doubt on their financial aims, their sanity, and their patriotism."[99]

Marmorstein's list of accusations is particularly interesting when considering Yıldız's account of when Pilavoğlu was subjected to a court-ordered psychological evaluation. On the one hand is the possibility, as Marmorstein suggests, that Pilavoğlu had purposely attempted to obtain a psychological evaluation. Perhaps Yıldız might have cast the situation as a triumph and an ideal outcome, in the sense that Pilavoğlu was declared sane after three months of observation, thus proving that the court was wrong to evaluate him in the first place because they could not prove anything apart from his exceptional level of religious knowledge. On the other hand, is the possibility that Pilavoğlu was subjected to a psychological evaluation *precisely because* of the pejorative ideas already associated with *tarikatlar* in general as backward, reactionary, and counter-productive to the project of secularization. Marmorstein, for instance, quoting from a handful of newspaper headlines, asserts that "… [the Tijaniyya] were opposed to 'everything new and civilized in the country' and, 'to modern living methods as well as everything Turkish'."[100] Thus, it is equally possible that the State was biased against so-called "reactionary" *tarikat* members. In this way, Marmorstein's accusations represent the perspective of the State and how the secular authorities viewed the Tijaniyya.

"Let's Smash the Idols!"

In 1949, an amendment to the Turkish Penal Code (article 163) introduced prison terms of two to seven years for "forming an organization or indulging in propaganda activities that sought the establishment of a government based on religious principles."[101] Not long after, the elections of 1950 marked a significant easing of the aggressive secularization measures that had characterized the nation-building efforts during

the one-party period. This relaxation was likely instigated by the mounting pressure of growing public discontent with the CHP, who were increasingly viewed as "anti-Islamic." Already by 1947-- only two years after the end of the one-party period-- restrictions on religious education were relaxed by conservatives within the CHP under the premise that Islam could "…serve as a force for social cohesion and as a bulwark against the spread of communism."[102] The educational reforms were accompanied by an easing of the restrictions on religious instruction that was not controlled by the state. *Tarikatlar* that had been providing clandestine Qur'an classes resurfaced and were able to conduct their activities openly once again. Çağıl explains that with the easing of restrictions on religious activities, the Tijaniyya, who were among the *tarikatlar* who returned to their activities, re-emerged with slogans such as, "The Turkish call to prayer is blasphemy," "secularism is ungodly," "Atatürk is the antichrist," and "statues are idols."[103]

When asked by Öz whether the Tijaniyya under Pilavoğlu had any political connections, Çağıl explains that "Bunlar [Ticaniler] DP'yi destekliyorlar. Ama bu konuda inanması güç iddialar da var." (They [Tijanis] are connected to the DP. But there are also some hard to believe claims).[104] Çağıl goes on to explain that with the approval of Atatürk's successor, İsmet İnönü, Pilavoğlu and a group of his *müritler* were made members of the party, and organized meetings at which they produced propaganda. In another claim by the historian, author, poet, and playwright İsmet Bozdağ, whose plays were broadcast on Ankara Radio in the 1940s, Pilavoğlu was involved with the CHP in 1950. Çağıl relays Bozdağ's claims about the 1950 elections:

> Pilavoğlu diye bir adam CHP'nin Ankara adayıydı, kazanamadı, ondan sonra Pilavoğlu'nun müritler Atatürk'un heykellerine saldırdılar. Heykellerini kırıyorlardı. Ticaniler deniyor onlara... İnönü, DP için, 'Bunlar dayanamazlar, bunlar devleti idare edemez'… CHP kendi adamı olan Pilavoğlu'na 'Hadi harekete geç' diyor'… 'bütün Atatürk heykellerini kırıyor. Bu ve buna benzer yaklaşımlar üzerinden onun CHP ile ilişkileri abartılıyor biraz.
>
> A man named Pilavoğlu was the CHP's Ankara candidate, he did not win, after that Pilavoğlu's disciples attacked statues of Atatürk. They broke the statues. They were calling them [the culprits] Tijanis… İnönü, in the interest of the DP, said 'they can't stand it, that they can't control the state'…The CHP said to its man Pilavoğlu, 'let's take action'… 'break all the Atatürk statues.' His [Pilavoğlu's] relations with the CHP [have been] somewhat exaggerated because of this and [other] similar actions.[105]

In his survey of the Tijaniyya, Abun-Nasr quotes a letter that he received from Nashaat Chaghati, the Dean of the Divinity Faculty at the University of Ankara in 1961, who explained that Pilavoğlu "…tried to win the support of its members in becoming elected to the National Assembly."[106] Çakır, in contrast,

asserts that reports which claimed Pilavoğlu was affiliated with the CHP, or any other political party, were wrong and false. Çakır explains that although Pilavoğlu was approached by and met with members of certain political parties, Pilavoğlu never became a member of any of these nor was he affiliated with them. Çakır theorizes that these rumours exposed the ulterior motives of the CHP, which was to damage Pilavoğlu's reputation. In 1966, a court hearing was held in Ankara between Pilavoğlu and the CHP. Çakır, further criticizing the aims of the CHP, asserts:

> CHP'nin, kominizm yeşile bürünerek Türkiye'ye girmişdır sözlerine [sic].
> The CHP's words of communism, dressed in green, entered Turkey.[107]

Green, especially as a color in standards, banners, and other symbols relating to political contexts, is strongly associated with and widely understood to symbolize Islam. In this way, it is plausible that Çakır was accusing the CHP of using Islamic rhetoric to hide their true communist agenda, which was to discredit Pilavoğlu. Çakır goes on to explain that the CHP published these claims against Pilavoğlu in several newspapers, and the lawsuit was filed. During a 1966 trial, Çakır relays that the Judge asked Pilavoğlu: "Kemal Bey, can you prove that the CHP is introducing communism to Turkey?" To which Pilavoğlu answered, "Yes, in the Treaty of Lausanne, it is recorded in so-and-so file, recorded under so-and-so number." Çakır attests that the judge acquitted Pilavoğlu upon hearing this answer. Belabouring his point, Çakır explains that although Atatürk had banned communist activities in Turkey, "[but] by the hand of the CHP [communism was] once again established." He continues, opining that communism is an enemy of both wealth and religion, and it would be unquestionably wrong, and a serious mistake for a religious man such as Pilavoğlu to fall in with such ilk. Çakır contends that, instead of tripping down the path of communism, Pilavoğlu, who was a true leader and *mürşid* was good for the nation, country, and for those close to him, because he preached the path of servitude to Allah. Çakır continues, reasoning that if Pilavoğlu was truly affiliated with the CHP, in his many publications he would have probably mentioned it somewhere. Even if people do not reveal their preferences and likes, Çakır contends, even these people probably write it down in a notebook. He theorizes:

> For this reason, I gather; if Master [Pilavoğlu] were inclined to a certain [political] party, or to the CHP, wouldn't [he] give the same advice to those he loved [?]… As one of his closest and most beloved, I hold a mirror to the coming pages of history in the brightest and simplest way.[108]

Çakır's analysis may be correct to the extent that Pilavoğlu was not officially affiliated with a certain political party, but Pilavoğlu certainly produced his fair share of political commentary. The titles alone of his writing about the political atmosphere of the years following the period of single-party rule are indicative of Pilavoğlu's broader political outlook, though perhaps clarify little about the possibility of any particular political connections. For instance, his book *Komünizme Hücum!* (Attack on Communism!)

was first published in 1949. The central argument of the book, according to Yıldız, is that "Komünistlik dini ve milli kültürün en büyük düşmanıdır" (The Communist religion and national[ist] culture are the biggest enemies).[109] The cover features a picture of the hammer and sickle of communism with a human skull in the middle, which are struck out with a large, red X. Hand-written text, recognizable as Atatürk's handwriting (if only because it bears Atatürk's signature) appears next to the image, saying:

> Şurası unutulmamalıdır ki Türk aleminin en büyük düşmanı Komünistliktir!... Her göründüğü yerde ezilmeli.
>
> It should not be forgotten that the biggest enemy of the Turkish world is Communism!... Everywhere it is seen, it should be crushed.[110]

In the book Pilavoğlu avows that Atatürk never understood secularism in the form of atheism. Atatürk was aware, according to Pilavoğlu, that religion was embedded in the fabric of the Turkish nation, and was the enemy of fanaticism, superstition, and communism. Yıldız explains that the book was withdrawn from the market by both The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the CHP.[111] It can be inferred that the alleged redaction by the USSR is related to later efforts by Pilavoğlu's son-in-law, Mehmet Altınbaş, who attempted to publish Pilavoğlu's books in the local languages in Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Crimea, Azerbaijan, and other Turkic republics, which, Yıldız asserts, "…was followed with interest by these people who spent years under the influence of Communism."[112] No additional explanation of an outcome of whether these publications were indeed successfully translated and released for publication is provided.

At the height of McCarthyism in the 1950s, anti-communist rhetoric, and with it, accusations of communist activity, were central features of Western-bloc politics. As part of Atatürk's project of westernization, the CHP was closely aligned with these policies. A position of anti-communism was deemed equally crucial for the survival of the nation by the DP and was made into a government policy as a strategy to oppress opposition parties. Indeed, it was not uncommon for both the CHP and the DP to accuse one another of entertaining communist motives. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the frameworks of Turkish anti-communist propaganda in this period, but Lewis succinctly articulates how accusations of communist affiliation were rampant at the time in general. These typically cut across political boundaries, and targeted almost any group that appeared to be a threat:

> The accusation is often made, in secularist quarters, that the revival, at least on the level of popular, dervish religion, is inspired by Communist agitators.[113]

Lewis' perspective is inadvertently helpful, because he also reproduces the same alarmist anti-communist sentiments in his own analysis, asserting that the *tarikatlar* were indeed engaged in "…a form of primitive religious communism which clever propagandists might exploit for political ends."[114] However, his assertion suggests the possibility that political parties such as the CHP and the DP were truly "clever

propagandists" out to exploit "religious communism." This in turn gives weight to the possibility that Pilavoğlu and the Tijaniyya were courted by political parties as a way of garnering support against their opposition, even if this courtship never amounted to a full-blown affiliation.

The reasonably universal rejection of communism was successful in Turkey in the sense that communism has never become an especially popular political platform in the history of the Republican era. Related to this, it was, in addition to accusing *any* group which threatened the status quo of communist motives, also popular to associate communism with atheism and political instability.[115] In this way, Pilavoğlu's argument in *Komünizme Hücum* that the "communist religion" is the biggest enemy still does not reveal much about a particular political affiliation, because as mentioned, both the DP and the CHP made this argument. However, his accusation that nationalist culture is the enemy is significant for illustrating how he placed more emphasis on a pan-Islamic vision, as opposed to a Turkified or even neo-Ottoman notion of Islam. His emphasis on this vision will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Again, Çakır's assertion that Pilavoğlu was not affiliated with the CHP—or probably any political party—because "a religious man such as Pilavoğlu [would not] fall in with such ilk" was likely true. Pilavoğlu probably rejected *all* political affiliations, due mostly to his rejection of nationalism in favor of a pan-Islamic vision of Islam. Accusations that Pilavoğlu was connected to the CHP and the DP also suggest that, in the same way that it was not uncommon for opposing political parties to accuse one another of entertaining communist motives, Pilavoğlu's critics may have accused him of ulterior political connections simply as a way of further discrediting him.

Çağıl explains that two of Pilavoğlu's closest followers, Sefer Yıldız and Ömer Yıldız, met with members of the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, or MNP), a short-lived center-right Islamist party founded by Necmettin Erbakan, which had developed from within the DP and emerged as a distinct political party in 1970. The MNP's Islamist policies emphasized nationalist, spiritual development with a strong focus on ideas about Islamic morality and virtue. Çağıl asserts that Sefer Yıldız and Ömer Yıldız were invited to the party, but never joined. The party was dissolved in 1971.

When the DP won the 1950 elections, Adnan Menderes, one of the founders of the DP, was appointed prime minister. A cornerstone of his campaign was aimed at restoring the Arabic *ezan*. After he was appointed, he re-opened mosques and *türbeler* of religious figures. However, he also restored images of Atatürk on bank notes, overriding a law that an incumbent president's image would appear on banknotes, which had been changed in 1938 when İnönü became president. Menderes' moves elicited criticism from the CHP, who said that he had instrumentalized Islam for political gain. Importantly, in Yıldız's account, Pilavoğlu, who as mentioned claimed to have known Menderes personally, articulates a similar view of the latter's political agenda, when asked about the Nurcu movement, saying:

> I believe that when it's sunny, there is no view of the stars. The Nurcus thought they would establish a sharia state. [Adnan] Menderes was my classmate in the Ankara law school faculty. He [Menderes] turned a blind eye [to the Nurcu goals] in order to benefit from them.[116]

The Nurcu, or Nur movement, was a movement inspired by the corpus of works, *Risale-i Nur*, written by Said Nursi. Their central idea was that the Qur'an is a living document which requires ongoing interpretation. The movement, like Pilavoğlu and the Tijaniyya, also rejected Turkish nationalism, although the Nurcus specified that this rejection was on the grounds that nationalism is harmful and dangerous. The tenets of the Nurcu movement include support for restoration of the caliphate, sultanate, and implementation of sharia. The next chapter will discuss the Nurcu movement in this regard in more detail.

According to Çağıl, the number of broken statues of Atatürk increased after the 1950 elections, along with the number of CHP protests condemning the protestors and the DP government. In the end, Çağıl explains, president Celâl Bayar, who had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a staunch Kemalist, and one of four founders of the DP, saw a "golden opportunity," and ratified law 5816, which protects the memory and legacy of Atatürk.[117] Marmorstein attests to the subsequent Tijani flouting of this law, explaining:

> …the government introduced… exemplary penalties on all who should venture to insult the memory of Atatürk, but this had little immediate effect… [In June 1951] the head of a marble statue of Atatürk in the Park of the Republic at Turgutlu was severed and… another standing in front of the officers' club in Ankara was the victim of a similar 'outrage'.[118]

In a lecture titled, "Ticaniler ve Kemal Pilavoğlu'na Dâir (About Tijanis and Kemal Pilavoğlu)" delivered by Kadir Mısıroğlu and uploaded on his YouTube channel in 2018, Mısıroğlu provides an explanation of the Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk (5816). Mısıroğlu was also convicted and served time in prison for violating this law in the 1970s, for remarks in his book *Lausanne Zafer veya Hezimet* (Lausanne, Victory or Servitude). A version of this law, Mısıroğlu explains, remains in today's Turkish Penal Code (under Article 301), and was originally enacted as a direct result of the desecration of statues of Atatürk by Tijanis in the 1950s. Like Çağıl, Mısıroğlu also asserts that Pilavoğlu was affiliated with the CHP.[119]

According to Marmorstein, Pilavoğlu and over 100 followers were arrested for these incidents, of desecrating statues of Atatürk. However, according to both Yıldız and Çağıl only 75 people including Pilavoğlu were arrested for the same incidents. The charges, according to Yıldız, were for "issuing statements and committing deeds against secularism and for *tarikatçılık*," which is also confirmed by Lewis, in "Islamic Revival in Turkey."[120] In a trial which continued for two years, the defendants were prosecuted under several articles of the penal code, including 163/4-5, 173/70, 74, 31, 33, and 677. The

court's statement in accordance with these articles found them guilty of being contrary to secularism (and thus, the legacy of Atatürk), the establishment, its organization, and administration, as well as the administration of society. They were also accused of producing propaganda designed to influence the social, political, and legal orders of the state. Pilavoğlu was individually, and additionally accused of attempting to establish his personal religious influence by using the title *mürşid*. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, a fine of 15,000 liras, five years of which would be served in exile in Bozcaada, and five under probation.[121] Çağıl's account, which chronologically aligns with Yıldız's, states that on the 5 March 1952, Pilavoğlu and 74 *müritler* were convicted in the Ankara Criminal Court. Çağıl recounts that when he first met Pilavoğlu in prison, he learned that Pilavoğlu's charge was, "Atatürk'e hakaret ediyor. Tarikatçılık yapıyor" (he [Pilavoğlu] insults Atatürk. He engages in *tarikatçılık*).[122]

In 1953 Pilavoğlu and Ömer Yıldız together submitted an appeal of their sentence. They claimed that during their hearing in 1950, there was no mention by the court of charges for performance of religious ceremonies and rituals; the crime of *tarikatçılık.* They premised their appeal on the claim that the police had intimidated them at the time of incarceration, and they were coerced into providing statements. Their appeal also alleged that since their original charges were only for using the titles *shaykh* and *mürşid,* the terms of their prison sentences were too heavy. Pilavoğlu's testified during the appeal:

> My only intention is to win God's approval [and] be useful to my *millet* (nation). I am very devoted to the Prophet, and I wanted to explain the morality of the Prophet to my fellow citizens.[123]

Bozcaada

In 1958, Pilavoğlu, along with several other incarcerated Tijani *müritler,* were sent to Bozcaada to serve out the remainder of their sentences in exile. Bozcaada, known in Greek as Tenedos, at the time was still a majority population of Greek Christians. Upon arrival, the group hired a house in the Muslim neighborhood of the island, not far from the mosque. After just three days, they moved to a larger three storey house in the Greek neighborhood, with an extensive garden, a large library, and a spacious office. Çağıl describes the house as a twenty-room villa. Pilavoğlu would remain there, with his wife Emine and their three children, who joined him not long after his arrival in 1958, until 1974.[124]

Çağıl claims that within a short time, Pilavoğlu and his Tijani *müritler* would begin to influence the island's economy, and with it the local people. Yıldız similarly attests that Pilavoğlu was well-respected, and the Greek residents placed "endless trust in him." They would take him at his word, Yıldız asserts, when dealing with any business. Demonstrating this charismatic influence, Yıldız narrates an instance of a Greek man named Sokrat, who would visit Pilavoğlu often, and sometime after these visits, Sokrat converted to Islam. In another encounter, the local Christian priest visited Pilavoğlu in 1969, after

news of the Apollo moon landing. The priest asked him, "Master, do you believe this?" Pilavoğlu showed the priest photographs of the moon. After their meeting, the priest was amazed that he had not believed the news. Yıldız narrates that the photographs of the moon and space adorned the walls of Pilavoğlu's house for some time after this.[125]

Yıldız additionally claims that Pilavoğlu was responsible for implementing much of the modern infrastructure established in the 1960s on the island; he had roads and fountains built, and mosques repaired. He commissioned a modern bakery, bought up vineyards and gardens, and established modern farms that grew vegetables and fruits for the people of the island, and funded the construction of production facilities to meet the demand for milk, yogurt, etc. Yıldız asserts that Pilavoğlu was a "…leader in many business areas for the island amongst people who only dealt with grapes and wine."[126] Çağıl similarly mentions that Pilavoğlu's economic ventures included a bakery, a butcher, and a patisserie.[127]

When Pilavoğlu, and his Tijani *müritler* first arrived on the island, cultivation of grapes and wine production were still the dominant local industry. Vineyards have existed on Bozcaada since Antiquity, persisting through the Ottoman period of control, and even today is still one of the major wine-producing regions in Turkey. Before 1923, wine production was exclusive to the Greek population. Since 1923, Turkish domestic wine production has been on the rise. The Turkish population soon learned from the Greeks on the island how to manufacture wine. Not long after the 1960 military coup, Yıldız claims that the grapes in the vineyards were not being sold to the winemakers on the island because of transportation difficulties. The grape farmers, Yıldız asserts, asked Pilavoğlu what they should do.[128] Çağıl similarly asserts that around the same time, Pilavoğlu told those farmers who gave their grapes to the winemakers that they would "cehennemde cayır cayır yanacak" (burn in hell), and so they began to destroy their grape vineyards.[129]

In 1964, as part of a wider retaliatory measure by the Turkish government in reaction to atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, under the Turkish Law on Land Expropriation (6830) the lands of Greek farmers were seized on Bozcaada. Greeks or the Rum Orthodox, who as mentioned had until then been the majority of the population on Bozcaada, had been exempted from the compulsory population exchange with Greece of 1923. Due to the expiration in September 1964 of the 1930 Greek-Turkish convention, remaining Rum Orthodox communities, including that on Bozcaada, were forcibly expelled. The properties of the affected were confiscated by the government, sold by owners at low prices to their Turkish neighbors, or simply abandoned. At the same time, the government began to transfer convicts from the Turkish mainland to what Yannas describes as "open farm prisons" on what had become nationalized lands.[130]

Çağıl and Yıldız both mention a series of newspaper articles published in 1968 by *Cumhuriyet*, titled "Üzüm, Şarap, Ve Effendi." The title of one article, from 2 October 1968, "Bozcaada, Ticanilerin dergahı oluyor (Bozcaada becomes the dervish lodge of the Tijanis)," attests to the growing influence of the organization on the island. [131] Yıldız explains that the *Cumhuriyet* articles discussed how Pilavoğlu bought many vineyards that had since been put up for sale by the Greeks on the island, hoping to turn them into wheat fields or vegetable patches to prevent further wine production. [132] Whether or not Çağıl and Yıldız purposefully overlooked the true depth of ethnically motivated land expropriations on Bozcaada in conjunction with the 1964 contentions over Cyprus, both narratives ultimately avoid the situational reality that faced Pilavoğlu; he and his *müritler* exiled to Bozcaada were most certainly among the convicts sent to the "open farm prisons". At the same time, he no doubt had some experience in business, given his background as a *dükkan sahibi* from his days at the Pilavoğlu Han. Therefore, it is plausible that Pilavoğlu made the most of his situation, and as a business-minded man who found himself in a convenient situation, saw the potential to invest in the local infrastructure. In any case, Yıldız and even Çağıl to some extent, appear to have been depicting Pilavoğlu as he "ought to have been" in this situation.

In 1969, Pilavoğlu published a 31-page leaflet titled, *Her Kötülüğün Anası Şarap* (*Wine, the Mother of all Evil*), in which he reproaches those who make and distribute wine. He argues that winemakers are guilty of committing the worst evil to humanity, because, he claims, wine opens the door to evil. His stated aim in publishing this leaflet was to protect people from this "mother of all evil" by sharing with them verses from the Qur'an about wine.[133] Considering that Bozcaada remains as one of the foremost regions of wine production in Turkey, the success of his message, and as such Pilavoğlu's influence, seems to have receded with his departure from the island.

Back to Ankara, into Obscurity?

Pilavoğlu left Bozcaada and returned to Ankara in 1974. There is no explicit information available about the reason for his return, but both Çakır and Yıldız's accounts indicate that it was at least partially, if not largely due to the onset of diabetes and the sharp decline in his health. Nevertheless, from 1931 until 1976, Pilavoğlu produced more than 200 publications in the form of books and leaflets, most of the newspaper articles for *İlahi Işık*, as well as hundreds of letters during his incarceration and later exile. Yıldız explains that a selection of the letters was later collated into a book by some of his *ihvanlar*; "bütün insanların istifade edebileceği değerli birer vesika olarak kabul etmişlerdir" ([because they] accepted these valuable documents [as something] from which all people could benefit), though no title for this publication is provided in his explanation.[134] At least fifty of Pilavoğlu's works were published posthumously. Indeed, a brief glimpse at online booksellers who deal in out-of-print works like

kitapyurdu and *nadirkitap* confirm that the first editions of many of Pilavoğlu's works were initially published after 1976.[135]

Çakır affectionately points out that much Pilavoğlu's body of work was not written in the comfort of his home, but while Pilavoğlu was in prison, during times when he faced legal actions against him, and while his health declined, all while the families of his children turned against him as rifts developed in his community of followers.[136] Çağıl similarly explains that following his death in 1977, Pilavoğlu's *müritler* split into two groups, who became embroiled in a dispute over the inheritance of Pilavoğlu's estate. Çağıl asserts, "…hiçbir şey kalmadı. Tütkendi gitti. …Özden tarikatı çıktı" (there was nothing left. It went up in smoke. The *tarikat* lost its essence). For a short time, some of Pilavoğlu's followers published a magazine titled *Kurtuluş* (*Salvation*), but this too disappeared "…saman alevi gibi kaybolup gitti" (like straw, went up in flame[s]).[137] Abun-Nasr similarly claims that "the movement which he [Pilavoğlu] led seems to have died out with his imprisonment."[138] Both Çağıl and Abun-Nasr are correct about the trajectory of the Tijaniyya following Pilavoğlu's imprisonment and death to the extent that these events seem to have effectively slowed the momentum of Tijani activism to a halt. However, Pilavoğlu's motivation for writing—and by extension, his vision of Islam—did not equally dissipate. This, notwithstanding the ongoing shift in political dynamics that also gradually allowed Islam to re-enter the public sphere of Turkey.

Both assumptions of the Tijani disappearance following Pilavoğlu's imprisonment, and death are incorrect to the extent that the movement never died out entirely. The most basic evidence of this is that new editions of Pilavoğlu's works continued to be published long after his death. As mentioned, as of 2016, for instance, Pilavoğlu Kitabevi was still operational in Ankara. More significantly, Pilavoğlu still retains a small following in Ankara, albeit mostly (if not entirely) among his direct descendants and family friends. The latter are mostly from among Pilavoğlu's original *müritler* and their families. This group continues to hold Tijani gatherings in their own homes, as well as in a small *tekke* and makeshift museum in the Altındağ area of Ankara. In the small museum, many of Pilavoğlu's books are displayed in glass cabinets, along with a few of his personal effects, including clothing, hats, shoes, and an animal-skin *seccade* (prayer rug).

İlahi Işık, though defunct as a newspaper in 1973, remains nominally operational in Altındağ as a publisher. Their emblem, a green seal which depicts a leafy wreath surrounding an image of the Ka'ba in the background with an image of an open book with a quill pen poised above it in the foreground, is the same which appears on many of Pilavoğlu's publications as early as the 1960s. *İlahi Işık* has a Facebook page, the full title of which is "İlahi Işık Yayınları İlim ve Kültür Merkezi Derneği" and is listed by Facebook as a religious organization. The page provides the physical address of the organization in Altındağ. There is also a domain name, but when this thesis was completed, it expired.[139] When the

Facebook page was last accessed in September 2020, there were 40 followers. The most recent post at the time was in April of the same year, which was a greeting for *Berat Kandili*, the holiday celebrated on the fifteenth night of Sha'ban, the eight month of the Muslim calendar.[140] The majority of the posts on the page, dating back several years, are similar in content.

In other social media presence, two Instagram pages bear Pilavoğlu's name and are clearly devoted to his memory. The first, with the handle *@pilavogluyayinevi*, includes in the "bio" of the page the description:

> Master Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu's corpus; the author's seminal Islamic *tafsir* publications. 'Read'! To awaken aspiring young writers upon the path.[141]

The posts from *@pilavogluyayinevi* are pictures of copies of Pilavoğlu's books and leaflets. For instance, there are images of the covers of his books *Kendini Bil,* and *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk,* among many others. In another image is the front page of an issue of *İlahi Işık* from 1967. Some of the pictures are close-ups of a single page from a particular book. Still other images are of a bookmark with a stylized portrait of Pilavoğlu holding an open book, which appears above a quote from Pilavoğlu. The bookmark is laid over text from one of Pilavoğlu's books. Each bookmark bears a different quote. For example, "âlim olduğunuz kadar da âmil olunuz" (you as a scholar are as accurate as your purpose).[142] In another post with the same image, of a bookmark laid over text, a sound recording with subtitles accompanies the recording and image. The recording is of Pilavoğlu reciting *Al-Fatiha*, the first chapter of the Qur'an. The caption for the post says, "Teravih Namazından Bir Kesit. Üstad Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun kendi kıldırdığı teravih namazından bir kesit" (A part of the *Tarawih* prayer. Performed by Master Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu himself).[143] The date of the original recording is not provided, however; an unmistakeably Turkish accent can be discerned in the pronunciation of the Arabic, which could indicate minimal or no training in *tajwid,* or the set of rules for the accurate, and ideally nuanced pronunciation of Qur'anic Arabic according to traditional methods of recitation. This, in contrast to Yıldız's previously mentioned explanation of the miraculous transformation that after reciting the communal prayer at the behest of Shaykh Idris of Fez on hajj in 1950, Pilavoğlu was able to read from the Qur'an with an "Arab accent" (*Arap şivesi*).

The second Instagram account that bears Pilavoğlu's name is *@pilavogluesans,* the page for a business of the same name, *Pilavoğlu Esans*. The "bio" of the page includes the business' website, and the description:

> Every bottle, every incense burner, every decoration, every dealer… These are all shown as a separate picture that are each part of a whole, in an effort to present a more complete picture [of our items] …[144]

The images on the page feature interior shots of each of the four shop locations in the Hacıbayram, Sakarya, Barbaros, and Beypazarı neighborhoods of Ankara. Other images feature close-ups of perfume and incense bottles, elaborate *tasbih*, ornaments with Arabic calligraphy bearing the names of Allah, Muhammad, the *al-Fatiha*, etc. The captions for many of the images include quotations attributed to Pilavoğlu. The logo of the business, which is Pilavoğlu's signature, appears in the corner of most of the images. On the website for Pilavoğlu Esans, their products can be purchased, including a line of scents called "Kemalat Koleksiyonu" (the Kemal Collection).[145] Both Instagram accounts, *@pilavogluesans* and *@pilavogluyayinevi*, post new content only on Fridays, often including "Cuma Mubarak" (Blessed Friday/holy day) as part of the caption.

Conclusion

The social media accounts that bear Pilavoğlu's name illustrate that his memory is alive and well but has taken on a very different character since the days that his name appeared in newspaper headlines about the latest Tijani recitation of the Arabic *ezan,* or the most recent court appearance. Though his books and portraits are proudly displayed and are still lovingly read in the homes and the communal spaces of the small Tijani community in Ankara, his legacy in the wider context of Turkish politics and nationalist discourse, seems to be gathering dust on the shelves of the national archives in Ankara and Istanbul, where a few of his books are indexed.

Without a doubt, Tijani activists issued memorable responses to the early republican project of westernization deployed via European secular values. There is also no denying that Tijani activists can be credited as contributing towards the restoration of the *ezan* in Arabic. However, it appears that the more memorable dimension of their legacy, though perhaps not what they intended, is that the outspoken reactions against Atatürk in the form of desecrating statues of his likeness are still occasionally invoked in discussions of the Law Concerning Crimes Committed Against Atatürk. Although Turkey's relationship with Kemalism has shifted considerably since the days of Pilavoğlu's publications and of Tijani activism, the association of *Ticani* with *tarikatçılık* can still be seen. Some of this residual association can be attributed to the strength of the original project of secular reforms which began under Kemalism and persisted even as opposition parties like the DP fostered a resurgence of Islamic practice in the country. When Tijanis of the 1950s were accused of *tarikatçılık* and the name *Ticani* became associated with "reactionaries" this became "true" to those who believed in the value of Kemalism. Even those who perhaps agree with the activism of the Tijaniyya, and indeed even participated in protests for similar reasons as Pilavoğlu, such as Musa "Saatçı" Çağıl and Kadir Mısıroğlu, even these like-minded activists seem to believe that the group maintained political connections with one or more parties at the height of their activities, and as such perhaps cultivated sinister motives.

Notwithstanding the scepticism around the unintended legacy of public images of the Tijaniyya, Pilavoğlu, as the leader of the organization in Ankara, ultimately failed, or perhaps overlooked a crucial adjustment to his message which was required for the survival and growth of the *tarikat*: the adaptation of a "neo-Ottoman" idea of Islam, which merged a distinctly Turkish nationalist identity with an Islamic one. As the next chapter will demonstrate, Pilavoğlu's books focused primarily on a pan-Islamic, universal notion of Muslim identity that did not sufficiently include the Ottoman legacy or a Turkish idea of Muslim identity. Because of this, the Tijaniyya ultimately failed to succeed in comparison to other Sufi networks similarly subjected to the pressure of the aggressive nationalist project of secular Kemalism.

Chapter 5
Analysis: Neo-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Success, and Failure

When Kemal Pilavoğlu was asked what his advice was before leaving this world, he responded that his testaments are written in his books. He advised people to read them, and "…continue on the path of Allah and the Messenger."[1] Pilavoğlu wrote prolifically until the end of his life. He wrote hundreds of works, ranging from treatise-like leaflets of a few dozen pages to extensive books of several hundred. He also curated and wrote most of the content for *İlahi Işık* (Divine Light), a fortnightly newspaper published by his Tijani *tarikat* from 1966 to 1974. After his death, his writing was mostly, if not entirely published by İlahi Işık Pilavoğlu Kitabevi. This name appears alternately in Pilavoğlu's publications either by this full name, or with the partial affiliation "Pilavoğlu Kitabevi." A year after Pilavoğlu's death in 1978, two of his *ihvanlar*, Yusuf Özcan and Osman Karapınar, became business partners and opened a location for "Pilavoğlu Kitabevi" in the vicinity of Hacıbayram Mosque, in the Altındağ area of Ankara. Still in operation as of 2016, the shop sells mostly Pilavoğlu's books, along with a few other publications, including copies of the Qur'an, and other religious texts. Before the opening of this shop, Pilavoğlu largely oversaw the publication process himself, often taking his manuscripts to various printers in Istanbul or Ankara. In these earlier volumes, a "public and wholesale" post office box address for the Altındağ area of Ankara is the only detail pertaining to publication information. His works, regardless of length and form, tend to focus on a message that presents Islam as an essential, primordial truth which is clearly situated in its Arab origins. This message, potentially open to all who are ready to tread this "true path," is certainly representative of some of the foundational elements of Islam in general. It was not, however, a sufficiently relevant past from which emerging Turkish national identity could draw, and in turn use to resist the Kemalist idealism of how Turkey should have developed.

The aim of this chapter is to consider how Pilavoğlu's dialogical response to Kemalist reforms and the enforced westernization of Republican Turkey differed from those whose responses were ultimately more successful. While Pilavoğlu's response equally illustrates Weismann's notion that Sufism has played a critical role in Islam's response to modernity, his response, though in many ways similar, was ultimately less successful than other so-called Islamists of the time, most probably because of Pilavoğlu's emphasis a pan-Islamic worldview. In contrast, others more successfully integrated idealized notions of the Ottoman legacy, which Mardin calls "a form of Ottomanism"[2] and which Yavuz calls "neo-Ottomanism." This has ultimately been the primary marker of successful intellectual influence of Islam in

the Turkish public sphere. The first portion of this chapter will engage with the development of this concept of "neo-Ottoman" as a way of unpacking the nuances of successful Islamist responses to Kemalism and the enforcement of secularism in the Turkish Republic, which will then form the basis for a comparison with Pilavoğlu's decidedly pan-Islamic response, illustrated in his writing, which ultimately did not integrate the same distinctly Turkish-Ottomanist dimension.

When it was Ottomanism

Chapter 3 made it clear that "Ottomanism" was the idea originally developed during the *Tanzimat* period that all Ottoman subjects, regardless of ethnicity or religion, were equal before the law. However, the rhetoric of equality and the growing assertiveness of Ottoman Christians had caused resentment among the conservative Muslim population of the second constitutional period. Ottomanism, as Yavuz notes, "…threatened the status of the Muslims as the dominant community, and engendered strong conservative reactions."[3] Some of the leading opponents of the initial project of Ottomanism were well-known Sufis. For example, the Khalidi scholar Ahmad al-Sulaymani was the leader of the "Society of Zealots" which was accused of "…hatching a conspiracy against the government" in opposition to the civil and political equality extended to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. Weismann describes another instance when Nakşibendi-Khalidi master and loyalist of Abdülhamid II Ahmed Ziyauddin Gümüşhanevi established his *tekke* directly opposite the Porte in defiance of the westernizing efforts of Ottoman authorities. His loyalty, according to Weismann, garnered favor with Abdülhamid, and he was often invited to spend time with the Sultan and Ottoman officials who became his followers.[4]

Abdülhamid II, the last sultan to effectively rule over the Empire, implemented a popular reinvention of Ottomanism as part of his pan-Islamist reforms, which were aimed at unifying the Muslim population and defending the Empire against the growing encroachment of European powers. As noted in Chapter 3, Abdülhamid's primary strategy for strengthening this unifying ideology of his own brand of Ottomanism was to forge close links with those *tarikatlar* whose teachings were most aligned with orthodox Sunni theology, such as the Nakşibendi *tarikat*. He had crucially realized that *tarikatlar* in general played the largest role in the religious lives of Ottoman Muslims. He especially took advantage of the social position of shaykhs in the Muslim community. His aim was to build amicable relationships with them as a way of fostering greater unity between the Porte and Ottoman Muslims in an effort to dissolve the resentment that had grown as a result of the changing social dynamics across Ottoman territories due to territorial losses and European infiltration in a number of contexts. Abdülhamid had also realized that earlier notions of Ottomanism were largely unsuccessful because the State had always promoted the superiority of Islam over other religions, and so the concept had never sufficiently developed the idea of full political rights of the heterogeneous (non-Muslim) Ottoman public. As Yavuz explains, "…the

[initial] project of Ottomanism, as an attempt to modernize state institutions, adopt the European legal system, and construct a new Ottoman identity, failed." The concept of Ottomanism was not entirely lost, but ultimately underwent many adaptations in its definition which was often redefined according to the context, sometimes denying that ethnic identity should be a dimension of nationalism. [5]

It was only in the late 19th century that the Ottoman Empire was framed as a "Turkish Empire" by Ottoman intellectuals. Yavuz explains that the most ardent supporters of an "Ottoman nation" were from among the Young Ottomans, such as Namık Kemal. These intellectuals insisted on the inherently Turkish characteristics of the Ottoman state, and often equated "Turk" with "Ottoman." For instance, Yavuz notes Namık Kemal's influential, voluminous history of the Ottoman Empire, in which he used the terms "Ottoman" and "Turk" interchangeably.[6] As Mardin points out, at the same time many Young Ottomans came to the realization that the "thrust of reform" was directed towards the creation of a nation-state.[7]

As the idea of Ottomanism continued to advance and adapt to the growing influence of nationalist movements and European interventions in the Empire, it began to coalesce more clearly into a Turkish ethno-nationalist ideology, especially in the wake of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Ottoman military defeats in the Balkans, which brought an end to Ottoman hegemony in Eastern Europe, spurred on this entirely different meaning of Ottomanism, which also significantly influenced the Young Turk notions of politics, homeland, loyalty, and political community.[8]

As part of this development of a Turkic ethno-nationalist meaning of Ottomanism, Islam continued to feature as a source of political solidarity and legitimacy for halting and reversing the perceived disintegration of the Ottoman state and society. Described by Yavuz as the "building blocks of Ottoman society," the *cemaatlar* (Muslim religious communities) also continued to exert considerable influence over Ottoman Muslim society.[9] Concurrently, it was the educated Ottoman elite, such as Young Ottomans like Namık Kemal, as opposed to the conservative scholars of Islam who most appealed to Ottoman Muslim subjects. As noted in Chapter 3, such intellectuals were also often members of Sufi orders who increasingly espoused an ethno-nationalist Muslim ideology, viewing Ottomanism as virtually synonymous with "Turkishness," and by extension, that Islam and Turkic ethnicity and culture were inextricably linked as a single concept. For instance, Musa Kazim, a freemason and one of the founders of a pro-Young Turk Nakşibendi -Khalidi association, was known for his reformist inclinations in education.[10] He also served two terms (of four in total) as the *Şeyhülislam* under the Young Turks and believed that Islam was responsible for the creation of one of the most advanced civilizations ever.[11] It were these sorts of so-called Islamists who Yavuz argues often stressed the Islamic component of Ottoman tradition, and who "…closely entangled processes of Islamization of nationalism… and nationalization of Islam."[12] At the same time, they debated how to reconcile the encroachment of Western reforms with the role of Islam in the project of modernization, an issue which has persisted into

contemporary Turkish politics. Mardin succinctly articulates the magnitude of confronting Islam's embedded role in Ottoman society:

> The young revolutionaries of the 1900s were faced with religion under all of these headings: as a strongly anchored basis of community, as a philosophy and worldview that seemed to perform more substantive functions than ideas usually did, as one of the social and economic bases of power in the provinces, and as a state institution and ideology.[13]

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Brigadier General Mustafa Kemal (who would later become Atatürk), who was one of the first members of the CUP (which was a smaller organization within the broader Young Turk movement), organized and led an armed resistance against the proposed terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, an event which would become known as the Turkish War for Independence. Although it was ultimately never implemented, the Treaty continues to inform Turkish political thinking and relations with European powers. Yavuz asserts that the proposed partition of Anatolia under the terms of the treaty is the root of Turkey's "profound sense of insecurity" which has slowly grown over centuries of Western interference in Turkish affairs in the form of capitulations, the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans, the post-war partition of Anatolia, and the forced deportation of Muslims from the Balkans and the Caucasus following the Ottoman loss of these territories. This loss of territory and weakening of state power are what constitute Turkey's "Sèvres Syndrome," which is aptly defined by Yavuz:

> The Sèvres Syndrome stands for the deep sense of Turkish insecurity over great powers' desire to weaken and divide Turkey. For these reasons, any foreign power's call for minority rights is regarded as a ploy to weaken or divide the country… [the Sèvres Treaty] constituted the key framework for coding how the Turkish state and the public interpret certain foreign relations ventures in and around Turkey.[14]

Indeed, even as recently as 2019, President Erdoğan, when commenting on Turkey's renewed military strength as part of its foreign policy in the Mediterranean region declared the Treaty of Sèvres finally overturned.[15] In this way, the Ottoman Empire and its heiress, Republican Turkey, have always seemed to be "at the gates" of Europe in some capacity, whether in the form of detrimental losses of territory in Eastern Europe, the advance of European powers in the remaining Ottoman territories, or the post-Ottoman system, which is often considered commensurate with the loss of Islam. These losses have also triggered a cultural phenomenon of nostalgia, Yavuz asserts, "…for a more powerful, religious, and prosperous Turkey… [this nostalgia] …has been instrumental in shaping the political discourse in the conservative circles of Turkey."[16]

Republican Wounds, Ottoman Remedies

Chapters 3 and 4 made it clear that Islam in general and often Sufism in particular were perceived by Atatürk and Kemalists to be a threat to the Turkish secularization project. Mardin likewise asserts that it was Atatürk's conviction that "Islam was one of the primary causes for the 'backwardness' of the Ottoman Empire."[17] As such, a significant part of the policies of Republican reforms were aimed at expunging these and other elements of Ottoman civilization in order to build their idea of a modern nation. Everything from food and drink, clothing, social habits, to education and writing were targeted as inhibitive aspects of the Ottoman legacy that needed to be forgotten to successfully assume a secularized, Western, yet Turkish national identity. Nevertheless, the remnants of the Ottoman legacy have remained at the core of Turkish society and continued to shape the country's political and social landscapes.

Although the Jacobin-style secularism and the heavy-handed approaches of Kemalism were rendered somewhat obsolete in the decades following Turkey's one-party period, Yavuz asserts that there nevertheless persists a sense in conservative Muslim circles in the country of a lingering political nostalgia, which he describes as a "…deep feeling of exile that one is not at home due to the reforms of Kemalism."[18] Mardin similarly mentions "an ideological nostalgia [that penetrated the early Republican era] created by the new memory of this 'loose'… social-organizational style", referring to the earlier Ottoman systems of diffuse lineage between the political and social in bureaucratic hegemony. This ideological nostalgia, Mardin argues, was created because of the oversight by Republican ideology in its failure to understand the relation between the societal and political structures it had inherited, and the system it wanted to implement.[19]

The myriad of forced cultural changes wrought by Kemalist nation-building triggered a longing for the memory of the Ottoman Empire and has led to the discovery of "Ottomanism" as a diagnostic of power. This nostalgia, Yavuz argues, is the direct result of the rapid top-down modernization of Turkish society during the early formation of the Republic. It entails a sentiment of Islamic solidarity and the shared memory of the Ottoman Empire, which have also served as coping mechanisms for losses of these at the hands of Kemalist reforms. Yavuz claims, "The Turks are nostalgic because they feel that their cultural and civilizational home consists of both Islam and the Ottoman Empire."[20] This nostalgia for the Ottoman past is simultaneously bound up with utopian rhetoric and a movement aimed at returning to an idealized cosmopolitan community where nationalism did not monopolize identity.[21] This "neo-Ottomanism" initially developed as an idealized appraisal of the past that was neatly contrasted with a negative assessment of forced cultural changes under Republican reforms.

Yavuz explains that it is Sufi mystics who have largely engaged with this "…ongoing exhumation of their buried [Ottoman] past and tradition. They deliberately and patiently bring these fragments together to understand themselves and… their modernity."[22] Weismann similarly argues that Sufi masters have, since the 20th century and into the present developed an array of tactics for dealing with the

challenges of modernity. These have typically involved collaboration with the dominant forces of the time, such as the rise of the nation-state and the hegemony of western culture. Yavuz asserts that it was the writing of Nakşibendi and other "neo-Sufi" orders that provided the most important contributions to the reconstruction of the Ottoman legacy in response to the deliberate suppression of the memory of Ottoman civilization as part of the project of secular reforms in the context of Kemalism. This Ottoman reconstruction served as a primary counter-identity to the enforced ethno-nationalist secularism implemented by Atatürk and strictly enforced during the period of one-party rule under the CHP.[23] This is also indicative of Weismann's additional claim that while *tarikatlar* like the Nakşibendi espoused an emphatic orthodox outlook committed to Islamic tradition, at the same time their histories of activism have often involved accommodation to radically new circumstances—such as French colonial authority, as in the Tijani case in North Africa—or Turkish Republican rule in the present case.[24] They engaged in the endeavor to preserve the Islamic, Sufi tradition to the extent that, according to Weismann, they were compelled to:

> …take part in the hegemonic Western-dominated discourse and to collaborate with [the] government… some adepts… who were more attentive to changes… moved to reimagine Islam in the light of modern ideals and models.[25]

It is equally important to consider Yavuz's assertion that the conservative and Islamic-oriented segments of Turkish society have concealed their weaknesses behind intellectual thought and its corresponding processes by politicizing Ottoman history, especially the late Ottoman period. He argues that this group, comprised of Sufi leaders, poets, and intellectuals, have treated the Ottoman state as a model in which Islam and a nation-state successfully coexisted, and have argued that Islam enhanced the Ottoman state power.[26] Often, this group's interest in Ottoman language, culture, and ideas views these as tools which can be used to repair the damage of the Republican modernization project. Importantly, the past that these proponents of neo-Ottomanism attempt to conjure has never truly existed, "…and in fact was 'invented' as a 'reaction' to Western-oriented modernization projects."[27] Nevertheless, this mystification of the Ottoman legacy has offered a sufficient framework of intellectual and discursive tools with which they have resisted the Kemalist worldview since the single-party period, and which continues into the present.

Healing the Republican Scars

Richard Raskin in his book *The Functional Analysis of Art* argues that myth is primarily concerned with striking a balance between the functional requirements of a society and the psychological needs of individuals.[28] These functional requirements are every feature of culture, past or present, which can be explained with reference to the essential biological needs of human beings. Almost any recurring activity serves these functional requirements to the extent that they play a part in social life as a whole. The

contribution that these functions make is the maintenance of the structural continuity of a society. In order to maintain this continuity, Raskin posits that there is a possible "conservative bias… built into the practice of explaining any existing cultural process" which fulfills individual needs and social requirements. If all cultural processes are understood as tending towards the construction, or maintenance of psychological and social equilibrium, this means that there is no room left for change. However, societies can be susceptible to changes in outlook and behavior through the impact of art. In this way, the artist is potentially an agent for social change.[29]

According to Raskin, the creative process that an artist undergoes can be understood as a "ludic activity" in the sense that the process provides the artist with a sense of power, mastery and freedom. The creative process also enables an artist to harness control over the ego, and thus over particular experiences. This allows the artist to "…liquidate anxiety associated with them [these experiences]." The public's experience of art is similarly ludic in the sense that it is not a passive process, but involves "…interpreting symbolic statements, looking for patterns, subsequently verbalizing judgements of the work… etc." Raskin proposes that the ways in which the consumers of art identify with the art—and by extension, the artist—provide a potential basis for vicarious experience in which the artist originally engaged while producing the art. At the same time, the artist is also subject to what Raskin calls "role-expectations," which is when the artist seeks to derive their own gratification from their relationship with the public. Art and artists, among other dimensions of culture such as public issues, people, organizations, and social movements, are conferred status and bestowed prestige mainly through mass media. This enhances and legitimizes the status and authority of these dimensions to the public. [30]

Yavuz makes a similar assertion about the potential influence of literature, arguing that this form of art in its various forms has been the most prominent vehicle for preserving, transmitting, and reconfiguring the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Collective remembrance is contained and deployed through the production of monuments, paintings, the fine arts, and especially writing and poetry. Poetry in particular, according to Yavuz, was the major form of literature throughout the Ottoman centuries and remains much more prominent in Turkey today than in most Western countries. Both poets and novelists in Turkey have created and disseminated ideas, and shaped the practices and norms of social, political, and cultural issues. Novels have become similarly important literary vehicles in Turkey where meaning is created and shared through stories. Historical fiction specifically "…provides a space to explore both continuity and change in modern Turkey." The Turkish novel became a method for agency of cultural transformation, and a tool for invoking new political consciousness.[31]

Yavuz argues that novels, along with their writers have offered convincing narratives of the way in which conservative Islamic thinkers and nationalists have reimagined Turkey's present by drawing on the Ottoman past. Using lessons from this past, writers have shed light on the challenges that the country

has faced since its inception. They have also grappled with the difficulties that have come with these challenges. As a result, Turkey's post-Ottoman writers have formed an "…epistemic community with their own distinctive voices that cultivate politically important fictions shaping the larger debates in Turkish society." Yavuz goes on to explain that for the first thirty years of the Republic's history, the state cast the Ottoman past in contradistinction to the Republic, as the "other." However, historical novels published in the early years of Republican rule, Yavuz claims, "not only challenged official interpretations of Ottoman history but also instilled a new pride in the Ottoman past." Novels from the likes of Ahmet Refik Altınay (d. 1937) popularized Ottoman history, transforming it into what Yavuz describes as a "visceral nationalistic 'feeling' that has socially and politically shaped the distinctive tone of the present." Ottoman history, as a result, was incorporated into the emotional consciousness of Turks before it was sufficiently presented as an analytical structure for supporting intellectual formations. In contrast, Republican historiography had dispassionately presented Ottoman history as a distant set of events which had no implications in the present.[32]

At the same time, it is widely argued that the Turkish novel from the time of its introduction during the *Tanzimat* until the republican era was used as a didactic tool meant to familiarize Turks with the values of Western modernity, thereby perpetuating the attitude that borrowing from the West was necessary for progress. Nevertheless, some reformist thinking has advocated the possibility of facing "both directions" at the same time, and in this way ultimately restore the former grandeur of the Ottoman golden age.[33] For instance, Ahmet Evin in his book *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel* points out that the history of Turkish literature from the republican era to the present has followed a path which parallels Turkish political history, which has revealed a kind of dichotomy between Turkish culture and the Western example. However, this trajectory took a decisive turn following the military coups of 1971 and 1980, when the genre underwent a diversification in themes as part of an effort to accommodate new social issues and situations.[34]

Yavuz divides Turkish literature into three major groups who have engaged with the Ottoman past. The first group of poets and writers, including Yahya Kemal Beyatlı (d. 1958), Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar (d. 1962), and Orhan Pamuk (b. 1952), have focused on the consequences of westernizing reforms since the *Tanzimat* period, concluding that ongoing reforms since this time have given rise to a "split identity" which represents East and West differently, ultimately resulting in a "crisis of self." The second group of writers includes Necip Fazıl Kisakürek (d. 1983), Nurettin Topcu (d. 1975), and Seyyid Ahmet Arvasi (d. 1988). This group focuses more firmly on Ottoman language, practices, and ideas as tools with which the project of modernization can be countered. They deploy a mystified rendition of Ottomanism in their attack on the westernization reforms initiated during the *Tanzimat* and aggressively implemented by the Kemalist regime. The third group is comprised of Sufi leaders, poets and intellectuals

inspired by Sufism and who cultivated close ties with *tarikatlar* such as the Nakşibendi, Rifa'i, and the Nur movement of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. This group envisions the Ottoman state as an ideal model where the framework of Islam coincided with and enhanced the power of the nation-state.[35]

Although each group has enacted their engagements with the consequences of top down Kemalist reforms differently, all of them draw to varying extents on the memory of the Ottoman past as part of their oppositional responses, which can generally be considered forms of neo-Ottomanism. They have equally looked to tradition as "…a guide for comprehending what is 'new' in modernity" as a way of coming to terms with the dominant Kemalist discourse that modernization was justified in opposition to Ottoman tradition and Islamic practices. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore in detail each category of literature which Yavuz sets out, but it is pertinent to focus on a selection of examples from the second and third group, who seem to believe that the past can be restored with the help of Islam.[36]

Neo-Ottoman

Conservative Muslim writers in particular began to issue responses which drew on an idealized notion of the Ottoman past in order to cope with the alienation and traumatic loss of spiritual identity. Many, but not all of these responses critiqued the excessiveness of Kemalism and began to demand that Islam be recognized and restored as a constitutive element of Turkishness. Those that demanded this reimagined the Ottoman past as an Islamic past, often foregrounded by Sufism and its so-called syncretic attributes. This, in contrast to the Arab and Persian narratives of the Wahhabis and the Ayatollahs elsewhere in the Muslim world, who many neo-Ottomanists believed advanced a negative image of Islam as an ideology.

Nacip Fazıl Kisakürek is an example of one of these neo-Ottoman writers, from Yavuz's second category of neo-Ottomanists. Kisakürek was born in Istanbul in 1909. Described by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as his "muse" and "…a guide for himself and future generations," Kisakürek pursued his education in France, having received scholarships from the Republican government as part of their effort to create a new secular, educated class of Turkish citizens.[37] While he was there, he was exposed to the work of Louis Massignon on mysticism and Sufism and the philosophy of Henri Bergson.[38] "Bergsonism," Michelangelo Guida explains, appealed to many Turkish conservative intellectuals at the time because it provided "…a sort of alternative to Western modernization without losing 'Oriental' spirituality."[39] Upon return to Turkey, Kisakürek met the Nakşibendi Shaykh Abdulkadir Arvasi (d. 1943). Not long after, in 1934 he took the *wird* of the *tarikat*, and joined the circle of Shaykh Arvasi's followers, described by Guida as "conservative, Turkish Islamists." Shaykh Arvasi had until the closure of Sufi establishments in 1925 presided over the Kaşgarî *Dergâhı* (Kaşgarî Sufi lodge) in the Eyüp district of Istanbul. After being implicated for involvement in the Menemen incident in 1930, Arvasi was exiled to Izmir.

Kisakürek translated a selection of Shaykh Arvasi's works from Ottoman into Latinized Turkish, and in 1974 published his own book on the *silsila* that connected Arvasi to the Prophet Muhammad. In the same year, he also published an autobiography that focused on his relationship with Shaykh Arvasi. Perhaps most significantly, Kisakürek also established the journal *Büyük Doğu* (Great East), the central purpose of which, according to Yavuz, was to synthesize Islamism, Turkish nationalism, and conservativism. Mardin attests to this, describing Kısakürek's initial spiritual direction in the journal as one that "…exuded a pan-Asian, 'nativist' flavor and was made public in his magazine *Büyük Doğu*."[40] Guida asserts that it was this journal which made Kısakürek the dominant conservative voice in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 70s.[41] Yavuz similarly describes Kısakürek's work in *Büyük Doğu* as "…instrumental in creating an ideology of resentment and a sense of victimhood due to Westernizing reforms."[42] In 1938, Kısakürek was even asked to rewrite the national anthem.[43]

A central feature of Kisakürek's neo-Ottoman Islamism was the argument that the useful aspects of western ideologies and values which had given rise to western political hegemony were already inherent in Islam. He also argued that the enthusiasm for communism which arose in the 1960s in Turkey was a result of the anti-Islam policies of Kemalist authoritarian rule. Kemalism in his view had failed to present a coherent ideology, and so both communism and Islam were viable alternatives. Kisakürek's ideology was underscored by an emphasis on an Islamic spirit which reconciled the perceived inequality between the categories of East and West. He positioned Turkey's historical Ottoman experience in Islamic terms and was critical of Arab-centric understandings of Islam espoused by Wahhabi and Salafi Islamist thinkers.[44] Mardin articulates this in what he calls his "capsule evaluation" of Kisakürek's role in Turkish intellectual history, asserting that "…he [Kisakürek] promoted the theme of the centrality of Islam for Turkish culture."[45]

At the same time, Kisakürek also argued that westernization had caused Turkish Muslim society to lose its connection to the Ottoman past. Kemalism, he believed, deliberately cut ties with Ottoman language, morality, and memory, which effectively destroyed "…the inner spiritual power of the Turkish nation."[46] He also believed that the Kemalist de-Islamization of Turkey could be reversed through a Turkish-Islamic synthesis. According to Yavuz, Kisakürek's worldview was characterized by the contrast between East and West, where East represents the mystical and spiritual, while the West embodies rationality, mechanization of daily life, and destruction. Burhanettin Duran and Cemil Aydın in their 2013 article on Modern Islamist Thought similarly claim that Kisakürek's ideological basis was based on "…Eurocentric fables about the origins of global modernity," combined with Islam-versus-West civilizational discourse.[47] These ideas are reflected in Kisakürek's poetry, which according to Yavuz regularly emphasized the idea of a spiritual void in the midst of a rapidly changing society which had not come to terms with the Ottoman collapse. His ideas often vacillated between Ottoman Islamism and

Turkish nationalism, which Yavuz asserts has played a central role in the nationalization of Islam, and successfully articulated Turkey's Ottoman past and ongoing nationalist mission in Islamic terms.[48] In 1944, and again in 1946, Kisakürek was prosecuted and subsequently convicted of insulting Turkishness. After a few years in prison, he was among the first political prisoners to be released in 1950 in the wake of the 1950 elections, which as mentioned in Chapter 4, marked a significant easing of Kemalist secularization reforms which had characterized the one-party period. Mardin asserts that the pattern of Kisakürek's life is "no different from that of many men of literature who led their chariot to the fortunes of the Turkish Republic."[49]

The Nurcu, or Nur movement is another example of among the most successful neo-Ottoman responses to the impact of Kemalist modernization reforms, from Yavuz's third category of neo-Ottomanists. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the movement was inspired by the corpus of works, *Risale-i Nur*, written by Said Nursi. Their central idea was that the Qur'an is a living document which requires ongoing interpretation. Weismann asserts that the movement is "…the most powerful faith movement in contemporary Turkey… [and] Said Nursi (d. 1960), one of the most original and innovative Islamic thinkers in the country."[50] Mardin likewise describes Nursi as "…an idealogue into whose preachings an infrastructural change, the 'mobilization of the periphery', breathed new life."[51]

Nursi was raised in a Sufi environment and studied under local Nakşibendi -Khalidi masters. He initially supported Atatürk, having espoused the ideas of constitutionalism during the reign of Abdülhamid II. Atatürk even offered him the position of Minister of Religious Affairs. However, he soon became critical of the authoritarianism and staunchly secular policies of Atatürk's Republic, and in 1923 relocated to Van. It was there where he became familiar with contemporary scholarship and developed the desire to "…enlighten the masses in these new fields of learning, but also to demonstrate the truths of religion in the face of modernity." Leaving politics behind, he devoted his energy to *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis), hoping to "return God to the public sphere." Nursi was arrested several times, often tried according to false accusations such as involvement in the Shaykh Said rebellion, conspiring to establish a Sufi organization (which, as noted, had been made illegal in 1925), and declaring himself the *Mahdi*. As a result, he spent much of his life in prison and exile. [52]

Yavuz asserts that the Nurcu movement marked a shift from *tekke*-based engagement to text-based Islamic discourse. Mardin likewise asserts that Nursi was not trying to establish a new *tarikat*, but rather to encourage faith.[53] Nursi's aim was to mobilize Muslims as individuals who comprised a community, as opposed to members of a political order. Mardin contends:

> The printed word, i.e. Said's *Risale*, thus took over from the traditional pattern of charismatic leader.[54]

This was part of a wider phenomenon of the development of print culture, in conjunction with rising literacy rates which began to play an increasingly critical role in the negotiation of Turkish identity, which gathered strength as the one-party period came to an end. Print in general had quickly become an accessible platform for expressing a wider variety of perspectives, as opposed to the means for imposing a narrow ideology under the authority of the CHP during the one-party period.[55] Indeed, the *Risale-i Nur* attempted to prove that the Qur'an not only predicted modern technological innovations but is compatible with modern science. The work was banned by the CHP, because the argument of the compatibility of Islam and modern science contradicted many of the assertions made by the Kemalists as part of the Kemalist *Türk Tarih Tezi,* or Turkish History Thesis, which depicted traditional practices of Islam, and many of its core beliefs as "old" and therefore in opposition to anything "modern."[56]

Nursi recognized the influence of this rise in print culture and was able to transform his growing movement into what Weismann describes as a "mass religious movement."[57] Nursi took up the Nakşibendi tradition of renewal and employed the increasingly widespread method of print, telling Turks "…not only what they should do, but, more important, who they are: Muslim by faith and Ottoman by memory."[58] Mardin notes that Said drew on both the Qur'an and "residues of Anatolian mysticism as a transformational medium" as a way of not only establishing a connection with popular religion, but also to appeal to people of the "folk variety" of Islam , and bring them closer to a belief centered more firmly on the unicity of God; in an effort to "shift the dead weight of traditional Islamic orthodoxy", and align more closely with modern western European ideas about the laws of nature.[59] Nursi, Mardin argues, was seeking support among those who had remained unconvinced by the discourses of the Kemalist modernist elite, and who:

> took their value cues from… the so-called 'unbounded sea of the şeriat'… Facing them was another team which took its values from the sultanic practice… The boundaries of these two groups were the very product of Ottoman social organization. …[Nursi] was fastening onto a fund of cultural resources—the religious idiom—which had an important place in the Ottoman everyday, but also enriching it to fit the requirements of a modern society. …[B]y concentrating on the religious component of the everyday life of Ottomans and modern Turks he was able to bring it out with a new form, a collective identity who we could describe as populistic in mode.[60]

According to Yavuz, Nursi emphasized the role of Islamic, Ottoman memory as a method for resisting the oppressive policies of the Kemalist state in their effort to erase the past. The overarching aim of his body of work was to emphasize Ottoman history as a unifying force for Muslim religious and historical consciousness. At the same time, Nursi rejected both the Ottomanization and Turkification of Islam on the grounds that these crystallized Islamic traditions, which he believed should be flexible and dynamic.

He similarly rejected ethno-nationalism in favor of a more universal Muslim identity, because he argued that Islam is irreducible, and cannot be bound up with a single nation or its history. Mardin notes that Nursi's concerns did demonstrate a level of focus on a distinct Kurdish identity, but that he also "expressed the conviction that all ethnic groups in the Empire could collaborate as Ottomans." Ultimately, Nursi considered nationalism to be outdated, and Islam to be the vital source for unifying people.[61] Still, he equated the defense of the Ottoman Empire as part of defending Islam, arguing that the Empire was sustained for so long because Ottoman Sultans were just rulers who upheld Islamic principles.[62] During the Cold War, the movement decisively defended the convergence of nationalism and Islam by drawing on the narrative of Ottoman history in their anti-communist stance.

Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938) is perhaps the most prominent follower of the Nur movement since its inception, but who ultimately belongs to a different generation of Islamist responses in a vastly different context from those of Pilavoğlu, Kisakürek, and Nursi. Nevertheless, he is worth briefly mentioning as a way of illustrating the continued success of those who have been able to envision an idealized notion of the Ottoman past as a way of underscoring an engagement with the legacy of Kemalism. Yavuz, quoting Latif Erdoğan's biography of Gülen, *Fethulla Gülen Hocaefendi* iterates that Gülen's worldview was largely informed by Sufism, Sufi leaders, and Nursi's writing. He discovered Nursi's writings in 1958, which instigated his ideological shift from a localized Islamic identity to a cosmopolitan, discursive conceptualization of Islam. This concept of Islam, which percolates into Gülen's network of followers, is "…conditioned by the experiences of the Ottoman state and the reforms of the Republic of Turkey." Gülen has expressed admiration for both the Ottoman Sultans and Atatürk, in a fusion of religio-nationalist ideas which are joined via historical memory and deployed as a method for dealing with the alienation caused by the suppression of the Ottoman legacy. His admiration of Atatürk in particular is perhaps attributable to Gülen's criticisms, similar to those of Kisakürek's, of the Arab and Persian understandings of Islam. Atatürk was critical of Arab-centric traditions in Islam, arguing that it was an Arab faith and a vehicle for Arab domination.[63] Gülen similarly accuses Arabs of reducing Islam to an ideology in their collaboration against the Ottoman Empire, which is what resulted in a negative image of the tradition. However, unlike Atatürk, Gülen sufficiently responded to the "crises of modernity" felt by many Anatolian Turks by inspiring a movement which emphasizes an idealized Ottoman memory of greatness, Turkic-Islamic nationalism, and modern education, which has resulted in the construction of a national Islam informed by the Ottoman legacy. Crucially, the Gülen movement also advocates a Muslim project which affirms, instead of struggles against the tide of modernity, responding to its challenges by cultivating "…conscious actors who are armed with religious and secular knowledge."[64]

Necip Fazıl Kisakürek, Said Nursi and the Nur movement, and to some extent Fethullah Gülen and the Gülen movement are just a few examples of neo-Ottomanist responses to the enforced nationalist narrative of Kemalist Republican Turkey. Each of these, which are clearly informed by Sufi discourse, have drawn on the Ottoman legacy in their criticisms of the Republican secular elite and Kemalism in order to articulate an alternative vision of the present. Each has in their own way formulated a discursive response to the westernizing reforms which were initiated in the late Ottoman period and persisted into the Republican era, borne from the loss of Islam. The common thread which weaves each of these unique, though related neo-Ottoman conservative Islamist responses is the desire to restore the Islamic values and conservative Turkish culture of their Ottoman past.

The cure is more Ottoman!

A significant dimension of Kemal Pilavoğlu's aim in his prolific writing was in many ways very similar to the neo-Ottoman responses to Kemalist reforms discussed above. Pilavoğlu, like these neo-Ottomanists, envisioned the position of Islam as the weft which would re-weave the warped fabric of secular Republican society. However, unlike those neo-Ottomans who envisioned an idealized version of the Ottoman legacy as an "Islamic past" which provided an alternative vision of a Turkish state and underpinned a viable identity vis-à-vis the nation's Ottoman-cum-Islamic past, Pilavoğlu envisioned a pan-Islamic identity which integrated the essential concepts of Islam informed primarily by Muhammad's life, the *Rashidun* Caliphate, and Islam as a continuation of monotheistic revelation and as a reflection of the *Tariqa Muhamadiyya.* Like those successful neo-Ottomans, Pilavoğlu responded extensively to his immediate political and social context, which demonstrates Weismann's theory that Sufism in general has been able to adapt to the rapid changes wrought by modernity in the sense that Pilavoğlu attempted to engage with the rapidly changing circumstances of his surroundings. Pilavoğlu's methods were also decidedly modern; his enthusiastic embrace of new forms of print culture, along with his prolific publication activities, all of which are written in Latinized Turkish, are alone testament to this. However, his dialogical responses to the hegemony of secular politics which were issued from within an Islamic framework, were not equally informed by the Ottoman legacy to the same extent as the responses of Kisakürek, Nursi and the Nurcu movement.

The most basic dimensions of Pilavoğlu's life which illustrate the dynamics that informed his worldview are also similar to many of those neo-Ottomans discussed by Yavuz. For instance, like Kisakürek, Pilavoğlu was born in the wake of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1919), was educated in the midst of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and began to develop his worldview during the foundation of republican Turkey in 1923. Like Kisakürek's discipleship of the Nakşibendi Shaykh Abdülkadir Arvasi, which culminated in his initiation in 1934, Pilavoğlu was similarly influenced by and

took the *wird* from the Tijani master Abdülkadir Medeni in or around 1931. As their ideologies developed, Pilavoğlu, Kisakürek, and Nursi were all imprisoned or internally exiled for "insulting Turkishness." However, there is little evidence indicating that Pilavoğlu was formally, or willingly exposed to or pursued the study of western scholarship, philosophy, or western views of Islam to the same extent as intellectuals such as Kisakürek and Nursi.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, although Pilavoğlu attended the Law School at the University of Ankara for a few years. However, his religious knowledge was largely self-accumulated through personal study, having received almost no formal guidance from a shaykh. The same appears to be true of his knowledge of western scholarship, which would suggest that a significant point of departure between Pilavoğlu, and Nursi and Kisakürek, is that the latter were much more familiar with the intellectual development of secularism during the interwar and postwar periods in Turkey. Mardin provides a helpful illustration of this familiarity:

> …he [Kisakürek] lived his entire life in an identifiably a la franca setting of Western furnishings, clothes, and books… In retrospective evaluation of these influences, however, he shows a fierce anti-Western reaction.[65]

Mardin goes on to explain that Kisakürek's reaction, not unlike responses to the inculcation of western ideas in a variety of contexts beyond Turkey was, "…a disgust with ideas unrelated to their own cultural fund."[66] As mentioned, a central feature of Kisakürek's Islamism was the argument that the useful aspects of those ideologies and values which had given rise to western political hegemony were already inherent in Islam. At the same time, Mardin argues, Kisakürek's criticism of Turkish republican ideology was forged in a genuinely Western mode.[67] Indeed, activist discourse usually requires sufficient familiarity with opposing discourses in order to react confidently against them, and so Mardin's paradoxical supposition that Kisakürek was critical of western ideology, yet formed his response using frameworks drawn from it, is plausible to the extent that perhaps Kisakürek may have realized the effectiveness of understanding western ideologies as a way of identifying potential weaknesses within these systems.

Nursi demonstrated similar familiarity with western ideologies in the sense that he was familiar with and actively engaged in what Mardin describes as, "so-called 'modern arguments' concerning nature, philosophy, etc.".[68] This was also one of the key components of Nursi's success; he was able to show that the Qur'an and so-called modern science were not incompatible. Mardin even suggests that it was Nursi's conviction that the development of Western science allowed Western civilization to outstrip its Islamic counterpart.[69] Even long before the introduction of Atatürk's Jacobin-style secular reforms, Nursi's involvement with the Young Turks in 1909 contributed to his understanding of what he found to be the more useful elements of western ideology:

> [Nursi] pointed out … that at a time like the one he was living through [the Young Turk Revolution], marked as it was by increased skepticism, asserting the truth of Islam was no longer sufficient to impress people.[70]

Nursi also believed, however, that the failure of the Young Turks was caused by the inability to incorporate Islam into their ideology.

Pilavoğlu was similarly progressive in his methods for issuing his response in the sense that as mentioned, he embraced not only Latinized Turkish, but also willingly embraced the use of the printed word as his primary method of engagement. For instance, not unlike Nursi's *Risale,* Pilavoğlu's abundance of printed materials appear to be similarly poised to take over the traditional pattern of charismatic leadership of Sufi *tarikatlar*; when the shaykh was the primary means of access to the teachings of the *tarikat.* However, Pilavoğlu's writings are, in comparison to Nursi's, superficial in terms of the former's comprehension of and engagement with western ideologies. One of the more comprehensive examples of this is in Pilavoğlu's book *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına Kadar Hayatı ve Hatıraları* (The Messenger's Forty years of Life and Memories). The primary aim of the book, stated by Pilavoğlu in the introduction is:

> …an account of Muhammad's birth, childhood, characteristics, and his forty years of life. At the same time, [the book] examines the claims made by European and Islamic scholars about Muhammad's subtleties [and] his desire to teach humanity with love.[71]

The first section of the book is titled, "Western Scholars' statements about the Messenger Muhammad," in which he names a variety of so-called western writers and politicians, among them Bernard Shaw; Baron Rowland Allanson-Winn Headley (known as Shaikh Rahmatullah al-Farooq, after he converted to Islam); "Kenbiriç Üniversitesi Arabiyat Profesörü (a professor of Arabic at Cambridge University)." No name is provided for this Cambridge professor in the book, but it is possibly either Marmaduke William Pickthall, or Abdullah "Professor Leon" Quilliam. Thomas Carlyle and John Davenport are also named; and "Bir İngiliz Başvekilinin Avam Kamarasında (A deputy in the British House of Commons). Again, no name is provided for this political deputy. The John Davenport Pilavoğlu makes reference to is most likely the British critic and book reviewer (1908-1966) who wrote for two prominent British newspapers *The Observer* and *The Spectator,* but again this is not clear, and the text provides no further details. Following each name, a brief statement attributed to each about their own relationship with Islam, or their outlook on the tradition, is provided. For example, in a statement attributed to John Davenport:

> The unity brought by Prophet Muhammed defeated the Byzantine Empire within thirty years. It brought the Iranian Khosrow the truth. [It] conquered Syria and Egypt. Conquest from the Atlas [sea] to the Caspian Sea. All of these vicinities for twelve centuries have been dominated by Muhammadanism. However, Muhammadanism also departed from the regions of Spain and

> Northern [boreal] Asia, [and] spread into Africa… The Hero[ic] Prophet was a true prophet. His genius beat Zarathustrianism… Ancient Rome quivered and Eastern Rome, that is, Constantinople, was captured.

Pilavoğlu then responds to this quotation with his own observation, saying:

> Muslims captured 36,000 cities, towns, and castles in twelve years… The true path to gain world liberty was agreed upon this truth, and that it would spread across the earth. Don't these words, from the mouths of the greatest scholars, who at one time—God forbid—called Muhammad a liar, make you think a little?[72]

Pilavoğlu's only response to his own query is in the form of another quotation attributed to "A deputy in the British House of Commons," who says simply, "So long as the earth endures, the Qur'an will unite us in peace and prosperity." Pilavoğlu's brief conclusion in this section is that the Deputy's words should be applauded as the beginning of a larger trend of truth. Presumably, Pilavoğlu is referring to the truth of the message of Islam.[73]

The next section provides a similar, somewhat more extensive summary of a speech attributed to an "English Princess Shawwal," about why she became Muslim. There are no further details about the identity of this "Princess," but the speech is likely derived from the work of Zainab Cobbold (1867-1963), who converted to Islam around 1912 and is known for being the first British woman to embark on the hajj of her own volition in 1933. Her conversion, and especially her travels in the Hijaz, were widely publicized worldwide in her lifetime.

These two sections of the book, "Western Scholars' statements about the Messenger Muhammad" and the summary of "Princess Shawwal's" speech, appear over just six pages at the beginning of the book, which is over 250 pages in length. The only analysis or engagement with these six pages from Pilavoğlu, is in the form of the brief remarks that appear following the names of the "Western Scholars' statements" already mentioned above. The summary of "Princess Shawwal's" speech is written in the first-person, from the perspective of "Shawwal." The only commentary following this summary is a brief refrain composed by Pilavoğlu, titled "Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'a":

> For years and years, human beings were plunged into oppression.
> Overwhelmed by the cruelty, the harsh cruelty
> You were the guide and the freedom of right
> The deeds of the oppressors were crushed and diminished
>
> You are a soldier who is unique in the victory of the strife
> You are the last beautiful messenger of Allah.[74]

No doubt, the refrain elegantly encapsulates Pilavoğlu's view of the imminent message of Islam and creates an optimal pretext for mobilizing his audience to use their faith as a method for withstanding the inevitability of western encroachments. However, he ultimately offers no such equally sophisticated analysis about or suggestions for how this message might be engaged to effectively undermine, or at least accommodate the encroachment of western ideology and its concomitant secularization of the Turkish republic. As Mardin argues, prior to the Republican era, religion as an ideology had long since acquired noticeable importance in the Ottoman period during the push for modernization. This, he suggests, was exemplified by the importance attributed to Islam by the Young Ottomans:

> These young intellectuals… [were] widely read in western sources… [however] Islam was the mold in which Islamic-Ottoman social personality had crystallized… [and which] could not be neglected in a new political theory."

Instead, in *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına* Pilavoğlu moves on to a summary of the *Jahiliyyah* period of pre-Islamic Arabia, a detailed narrative of Muhammad's birth, childhood, and personal characteristics. These narratives are all underpinned by a strong emphasis on the Islamic doctrine of *tawhid*, or Divine Oneness. The resounding message is that by understanding Muhammad's life, one will be better equipped to advance steadily on the path of Allah and the Prophet. Pilavoğlu also builds upon this narrative to advocate the idea that there is a primordial concept of Divine Oneness which is present in all religious traditions. From this promise of an essential message, he moves on to a discursive discussion of accusations leveled against Islam and the Muslim world throughout much of European history, beginning from the early years of Islam. He asserts that some of the disputes between Muslims and Christians have arisen because of the latter's belief that Jesus was, and is God. He mentions a number of what he calls the "false inventions" in Christian belief, such as Jesus being the Messiah.[75] Throughout this discussion, he reiterates the notion of an essential Divine Truth as a way of illustrating that *tawhid*, the Oneness of God, has been relentlessly disrupted in Christianity.

Picking up the familiar threads of the accusation that Christianity has strayed from the path of monotheism, he also argues that the notion of *tawhid* was initially present in Christianity but has been corrupted.[76] This happened, he asserts, primarily because of the digression of Christianity vis-à-vis the doctrine of the Trinity. He equates the corruption of the message of *tawhid* in Christianity with similar digressions within Islam, such as ʿAbdullah ibn Sabaʾ al-Ḥimyarī's denial that Ali had been killed in the battle of the Camel but had ascended to heaven instead.[77] He then provides a surprising explanation for the origin of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, claiming:

> The Trinity played an important role in the Indian Religions, in other words, the idea of three in one, [and] one in three, they introduced this doctrine of numbering in this blessed religion.

A likely explanation for this odd assertion is that the concept of *Trimūrti* in Hinduism is sometimes referred to as the "Hindu Trinity." *Trimūrti* is the idea that the Supreme Beings of the universe exist in a triple deity which personifies the functions of creation, maintenance, and destruction of the universe. Typically, this tripartite deity is embodied in the deities Brahma (creator), Vishnu (preserver), and Shiva (destroyer), although the specific deities assigned to each role vary according to the Hindu denomination. Although this bears some resemblance to the Christian doctrine of Trinity, which asserts that there is One God, but which is embodied in three coeternal and co-substantial forms; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, it is unlikely that there is a connection between this and the concept of *Trimūrti*. This is not least of all because the Christian ratification of belief in a triune God arose in a localized context, in the early Christology movements of the tradition as a way of clarifying the relationship between Jesus and the son of God as non-subordinate to God as Father. It is not relevant to discuss the origin of the concept of *Trimūrti* in greater depth, but it is worth noting that although there is a significant history of contact between Christianity and Hinduism (primarily because of British colonization), this history did not largely result in significant mutual understandings or influence between these traditions.[78]

The Trinity developed as a way of emphasizing the unity of the concepts of the son of God and God as Father, which was first agreed upon during the first councils of Nicaea in 325 CE, and Constantinople in 381 CE.[79] Pilavoğlu explains that the development of the Trinity is the main reason that today's Christianity is completely separate from the message that Jesus originally preached. According to the Qur'an, he points out, Jesus was a prophet like other prophets. His message, Pilavoğlu asserts, was the same as the one given to Moses, and like all the other prophets, Jesus also foretold the coming of Muhammad. Proof of this, Pilavoğlu explains, appears in *Surah al-Imran*, which mentions Jesus.[80] He devotes considerable space to this discussion of Jesus. At the same time, he develops, at great length, the assertion that European understandings of Islam may look like "the guesswork of ignorance,"[81] but European thinkers have throughout history deliberately depicted Muhammad, and by extension Islam, in a negative light. As mentioned, he often returns to what he describes as the "universal nature" of Islam. His conception is effectively encapsulated in the following:

> Then I understood why Islam is more universal than all other religions. Islam, with a very liberal mentality, recognizes all the prophets. This tolerance does not exist in other religions.[82]

Noticeably, in this book he devotes almost no attention to Islam in an Ottoman context. He does not, for instance, point out the relative tolerance of Ottoman authorities towards Jewish and Christian subjects, in comparison to the intolerance of crusaders and the expulsion policies of Christian empires. He mentions only that Arabic script was perfected by the Ottomans in Istanbul. He refers merely to the use of Arabic for writing the Qur'an and spends no time discussing how an augmented Arabic *abjad* served as the writing system for Ottoman Turkish for the duration of Ottoman Empirical rule and was replaced by Latin

script as part of Republican westernization reforms. A reason for this could be that his initial aim in this book is focused on elucidating the early history and development of Islam, and so it is not relevant to discuss the arrival of Islam in Anatolia or its spread in other Ottoman regions, not least of all because this only happened later in Islam's history.

However, in a section of the book where he discusses *esatir* (fables, or fairy tales), he makes the point that humans have always devised fairy tales as a way of explaining the unknown, which he asserts began happening after the unity of humankind digressed from an original belief in a universal One God. Once again ideally poised to engage with the encroachment of European secularist ideology as the ultimate digression from belief in God, instead Pilavoğlu primarily contextualizes his assertions about *esatir* using the example of the *Jahiliyya* period in pre-Islamic Arabia. Referring vaguely to Ibn Ishaq (only citing his name, and not his relevant work),[83] Pilavoğlu explains that although the "Houses of Ishmael" practiced some of the precepts of Abraham's traditions, over time they plunged into idolatry. He explains that the Arabs were persuaded to forget about the "divinity of idolatry" during Muhammad's preaching; his message destroyed their superstitions and their deities, and restored belief in the unity of One God. He clarifies that these sorts of stories are not expressions of truth, but instead ideas invented by people to deal with the unknown.[84] As part of this discussion, he points out that the ancient Turks had similar ideas of the Divine in the sense that their mythology described a dual, or binary *Tanrı* (god) split between the earth and the sky, which simultaneously inhabited everything, thus imbuing things like animals and plants with a Divine Essence. He reasons that this Divine Essence is evidence of a primordial belief in the Oneness of God in the sense that humans recognized this essence in all things and assigned divinity to them. The idea of One God was merely latent, he argues, because knowledge of this idea had merely been lost over time because of enmity and the rise of sectarianism.[85]

He briefly addresses the issue of "Eski Türk Dini" (Ancient Turkish Religion) elsewhere in his work, such as in his book *Mukayeseli: Hak Dini ve Bâtıl Dinler* (Comparison: The True Religion and False Religions) in a chapter titled, "Şamanizm – Eski Türk Dini (Shamanism—the Religion of the Ancient Turks)." However, in the chapter, he does not attempt to draw the same connection between Turkish shamanism and a primordial belief in a Divine Essence. Instead, he categorizes the Ancient Turkic traditions as among the "false religions," ultimately rejecting leftover practices from Turkish shamanism as contrary to the principles of Islam.[86]

Jenkins explains that at the time it was first formulated, the Turkish History Thesis asserted that before the introduction of Islam, Turks had separated religion and state, and that combining these was among the worst of the numerous mistakes made by the Ottoman sultans, because the combination of religion and state prevented the success of national development. The Thesis emphasized the pre-Islamic origins of modern Turks, which was part of an attempt to stress the idea that Islam was integrated much

later into Turkish culture and had "…become clothed [in Turkish culture] but… had never been integrated, much less absorbed or subsumed." This attempt to separate Islam from a "purely Turkish" identity was connected to the decolonization of the Turkish language, derived from Atatürk's view that Turkish had been infiltrated by words of foreign origin. As mentioned, this extended to the translation of the *ezan* into Turkish, which included the replacement of Allah with the Turkic-origin term *Tanrı*. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Atatürk no doubt had realized that literacy in the Ottoman Empire was intimately bound up with Islam, and so Latinizing the language and purging from it the Arabic influences effectively severed this connection.[87]

Pilavoğlu's rejection of the Turkic *Tanrı* could be understood as a criticism of the Republican vendetta against Islam, and an articulation of his resentment of the State's western invasion on so many fronts. However, without any clear discussion from Pilavoğlu to this effect, this remains a mere supposition, inferred from Pilavoğlu's willingness to mention the Turkic *Tanrı*. He makes no direct assertions in his writings against specific components of republican nationalist policies such as the Turkish History Thesis. Nevertheless, not unlike Kisakürek, Pilavoğlu's engagement is a kind of "metaphorical bullet" that he was trying to use against the secular Kemalist system in the sense that he was attempting to illustrate that Islam's inevitable truth would resurface; in *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına* he suggests that there is growing evidence of the imminent return and eventual victory of Islam, which is already happening among those Europeans who have already realized Islam's truth and embraced it, such as "Princess Shawwal." However, unlike Kisakürek, Pilavoğlu's main source of legitimization of the Islamic message as a way of life and as a source of hope for the future, at least in *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına,* is firmly focused on the early Arab history of Islam. Importantly, Yavuz asserts that Turkish Islamists such as Kisakürek have rarely looked to the period of Arab caliphs, instead preferring memories from the Ottoman era as the main legitimizer of the Islamic way of life. [88] As mentioned, Kisakürek was critical of Arab-centric understandings of Islam.

Certainly, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına* is only one example which illustrates Pilavoğlu's interest in the Arab origins of Islam from among his large body of work. However, even a brief survey of the titles of his books and leaflets are no reassurance of his engagement elsewhere with the Islamic virtues of the Ottoman Empire as a central legitimizer of his ideas about an Islamic way of life and as an ideal model for life in the present. Indeed, in the midst of titles such as *Hazreti Ali Diyor ki* (His excellence Ali Says); *Kur'an-ı Kerîme Göre Benî Isrâil* (The Children of Israel According to the Qur'an); *Resûlullah'ın Mübarek Hille-i Şerifi (*The Blessed Calligraphic Ornaments of the Messenger); *Kırk Hadisi Şerif ve Şehri* (The Forty Hadith Sharif and Commentary); *Namazda Okunan Kısa Sûrelerin Mânâ ve Esrarı* (The Meaning and Mystery of the Short Surahs Read in Prayer), *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor* (Jesus Foretells Muhammad); *Ah Kerbelâ!* (Oh, Karbala!); only *Osmanlı Tarihine Umûmî bir*

bakış (an Overview of Ottoman History) and *Ankara'nın Tarihi Halleri* (The Historical Situations of Ankara) clearly deal with the Ottoman Empire and the Anatolian context. Out of approximately 225 titles, more than thirty-five of them deal directly with Muhammad, and approximately ten more are about Muhammad's family and the *Rashidun* Caliphs. Many also deal with the prophets of Islam before Muhammad.

İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor (Jesus Foretells Muhammad), is a piece in his larger collection dedicated to the prophets of Islam (Adam, Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, David, etc.) who he asserts foretold the coming of Muhammad. Pilavoğlu's aim in *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor* is to bring clarity to the figure of Jesus and how he is an essential link in the chain of transmission of Divine Oneness, in an ultimate effort to prove how Jesus was an intermediary prophet in the final revelation which culminated in Muhammad's transmission of God's message. Much of the book is devoted to an explication of this continuity with Muhammad, who was the Seal of Prophets, and who transmitted the final revelation of the same message that Jesus delivered before him. While espousing the role of Jesus as a forerunner of Muhammad, he takes up a similar argument as the one in *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, discussing a series of what he portrays as misunderstandings in the early Church that caused Christianity to deviate from the path of Divine Oneness, again taking aim at the doctrine of the Trinity. He ambitiously attempts to discredit the entire New Testament by arguing that it has been corrupted by mistakes in translation, which he argues are often because Christian communities have rendered Hebrew and Greek texts into translations which translators (namely, church authorities) thought would be comforting to its readership, sacrificing the essential message of Divine Oneness in the process. Somewhat damaging his credibility, however, in *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor*, he premises a portion of his assertions about the corruption of Jesus' message on a common misunderstanding that the canonization of the New Testament was an outcome of the first council of Nicaea. In his explanation, he asserts that "…today's gospels are a history of Jesus and contain many verses from the original Hebrew… while translating these verses from Hebrew into Greek, many errors can be seen." He claims that Emperor Constantine destroyed 60 of the 64 gospels that were dissimilar. The remaining four, which were identical, he explains, are when today's Bibles appeared.[89] However, Pilavoğlu's explanation is incorrect; by the time the council of Nicaea convened, the text of the New Testament was already largely collated.

He also makes several mistakes when citing New Testament verses with the aim of illustrating the continuity of the Abrahamic traditions and to further support his claim that Jesus foretold the coming of Muhammad. These mistakes are relatively minor—usually an incorrectly cited verse or set of verses—and do not significantly deter from the logic of his assertions about the digression of Christianity from the intention of *tawhid*, or from the content of the verses he mentions. These mistakes do however potentially

damage his credibility in the eyes of a discerning reader. Notwithstanding these technicalities, Pilavoğlu's arguments appear to be aimed at disparaging Christianity as having lost its way, but also may have been an attempt to create a sense of belonging in his own community to the extent that he seems to be "preaching to the choir" of his devoted followers. The latter motive is evident in the amount of space he devotes to asserting that Islam is the culmination of the Abrahamic traditions and Muslims are all the better for remaining on this path of truth.

Pilavoğlu's extensive engagement with Christianity can be at least partially attributed to his immediate context during his exile in Bozcaada. As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the time of Pilavoğlu's arrival on the island in 1958, the population was still mostly Christian Greeks. As noted, he interacted often with the community on a number of levels; economically, interpersonally, and even politically to some extent. The latter is most evident, for instance in his 1969 leaflet, *Her Kötülüğün Anası Şarap* (*Wine, the Mother of all Evil*), in which he vociferously condemns makers and distributors of wine, who in the first years of his exile, were still largely Greek (and thus, Christian).

His dialogical engagements with Christianity may have also been in response to his perception of the encroachment of a Christian worldview which threatened to eclipse Islam. Considering that Kemalism had sought to construct a nationalist identity by drawing heavily on European frameworks, a logical connection between the Europeanization of the young Republic and the encroachment of a Christian worldview is obvious. Indeed, Yavuz asserts that for many, Greek heritage, Roman law, and Christianity define the content of European identity.[90] Hanioğlu notes a similar belief espoused by Lloyd George when expressing the likelihood of Greek victory during the Turkish War for Independence, which, incidentally; had originally been presented as "…an Islamic struggle against Western imperialism":

> The Greeks are the people of the future in the Eastern Mediterranean… They represent Christian civilization against Turkish barbarism.[91]

Pilavoğlu's potential perception of the encroachment of a Christian worldview would have been easily exacerbated by the replacement of many symbols of Islam with Christian equivalents, such as the move to the Gregorian calendar in 1925, and the replacement of Friday with Sunday as the weekly holiday in 1935. These reforms, and Pilavoğlu's immediate surroundings in Bozcaada—which was quite literally dominated by Christians in his first years there—no doubt weighed heavily on his consciousness.

In the wider Turkish context, full-blown anti-Christian prejudice was also common. For instance, in the 1950s the DP exploited this prejudice to boost its domestic standing. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot movement for the unification of British Cyprus with mainland Greece, which was gaining strength, was opposed by Turkish Cypriots, but also by nationalists in Turkey. Adnan Menderes and the DP backed the establishment of Kıbrıs Türk'tur Cemiyeti (KTC, or Cyprus is Turkish Association) to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the Greek unification movement. In 1955, this mobilization

culminated in a pogrom of non-Muslim Turks in Istanbul. A handful of non-Muslims were killed, and hundreds more injured. Thousands of properties were damaged or destroyed, including non-Muslim businesses, residences, schools, and churches. Jenkins asserts that the primary criterion used to identify targets was religion; the Greek Orthodox community in particular suffered the most under these attacks. The KTC was immediately shut down, and many of its members were tried for crimes including theft, looting, and destruction of property. In 1957, all of those tried were acquitted for "lack of evidence." By the time the acquittals were ruled, Jenkins asserts that the focus of Turkish domestic politics had moved on.[92]

Add a Dash of Collusion for Success

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the DP's win in the 1950 elections is widely considered to be a turning point in the facilitation of the resurgence of popular Islam in Turkey. The Party had successfully portrayed an image of being "a party of the people, willing and able to respond not just to the material but also to the spiritual needs of the masses."[93] As noted, one of the first acts of the DP after the election was to restore the recitation of the *ezan* in Arabic. At the same time, Menderes also pledged that the government would maintain those Kemalist reforms which had been internalized by the Turkish public, thus signaling the emergence of a nationalist identity that had begun to negotiate a greater balance between Islamic spirit and secularist principles.

As noted, The DP's easing of restrictions in a variety of contexts extended to the restoration of *tarikat* operations. As part of the DP's political strategy, they also actively courted Islamists who had amassed large popular followings, among them Nursi. When they came to power, the DP announced amnesty of many political prisoners, as part of which Nursi was released, and he quickly became an open supporter of the DP. When the 1954 elections were announced, he instructed his followers to vote for the DP "in the interests of the Qur'an."[94] Nursi's strategic attachment to the DP was not an unprecedented move. Starting from the very inception of the Republic, Yavuz explains:

> The Nakşibendi orders adapted themselves to the new conditions of the secular Republic by nesting themselves in different state agencies and remaining loyal to the state and supporting the modernization, but not Westernization, of the state… Their operational code was flexible enough to work with the secularizing state and support the nation's economic development as long as they were allowed to maintain their spiritual functions within the society… Moreover, these Islamically conscious leaders and activists hid under the guise of Turkish nationalism by stressing the Islamic traits of the Ottoman Empire and… the Ottoman origins of the Turkish nation… Sufi orders used Ottoman-based Turkish nationalism as a shield for preserving and perpetuating

> Ottoman-Islamic memories… the Nakşibendi order… played a crucial role in the formation of pro-Islamic parties.[95]

Mardin makes a similar assertion, confirming the flexibility of *tarikatlar* to work with the secularizing state:

> Although the Republican era placed obstacles to the discourse of *tarikat* by proscribing organized Islamic activity, since the 1950s persons emerging from the ranks of the religiously active Nakşibendi sheikhs… have used the discourse of Republican intellectuals to promote Islamic ends.[96]

The previous chapter made it clear that Pilavoğlu, like Nursi, was wooed by at least one political party. As noted, several sources variously claimed that Pilavoğlu was affiliated with the CHP, the DP, or both. However, hagiographer Çakır denied any possible political affiliation, asserting that these were rumors spread by the CHP to damage Pilavoğlu's reputation. The situation was further exacerbated in a 1966 court case between the CHP and Pilavoğlu, where the latter was somewhat miraculously acquitted after the judge heard his testimony, during which Pilavoğlu accused the CHP of having a communist agenda. In any case, his body of work contains few, if any indications of a specific political affiliation, except to reject both communism and Turkish nationalism.

Perhaps the strongest indication of Pilavoğlu's distaste for collaboration with the inevitability of Turkish nationalism as a method for the survival of his network appears in his 1949 book *Komünizme Hücum!* (Attack on Communism!), the main argument of which asserts that nationalist culture (along with communism) was the biggest enemy. While rejections of communism were all the rage across the political spectrum at the time, his rejection of nationalism was in contrast to many Sufis who remain Islamist heroes in Turkey. Weismann explains that since the 1960s, Nurcu leaders have collaborated with the state "…against both communism and radical Islam. They have absorbed the modern discourses of democracy… and are at the forefront of efforts at interfaith dialogue." Indeed, much later, Gülen similarly advanced as part of his worldview "state-centric Turkish nationalism."[97] As mentioned above, Kisakürek too, constantly vacillated between Islamism and Turkish nationalism in his writing. In contrast, Pilavoğlu's message was solely pro-Islam, and perhaps just not "Turkish" enough.

It is important to acknowledge that would be difficult to successfully conclude that Nursi was an advocate of the same "state centric Turkish nationalism" associated with Kisakürek, if not least of all because Nursi's concerns, as mentioned, appear to have been at least moderately focused on a distinctly Kurdish identity (being Kurdish himself). As Mardin notes, Nursi "simultaneously [with his assertions about Kurdish identity] expressed the conviction that all ethnic groups in the Empire could collaborate as Ottomans." The true nationality for Nursi was not Turkish, nor was it even Kurdish or Arab; it was Islam.[98] However, it is equally difficult to claim that Nursi was inflexible in his engagement with

imminent westernization under Kemalism. Unlike Pilavoğlu, who as discussed, attempted to engage with western ideologies via a variety of what might be considered more classical Islamic theological arguments used to refute the doubts of unbelievers, Mardin argues that by the time of the Republican era, Nursi was already convinced that these classical arguments were worthless, and that "a study of secular sciences (funûn) was necessary to refurbish these arguments." It was Nursi's experience with these so-called "secular sciences" which also prompted him to understand that his teachings about Islam should be deployed in the "…manner most appropriate to the understanding of that century", which meant leaving behind detailed theological investigations in favor of winning over the hearts of people and replacing the "thrill that the Sufi spoke of as love for God."[99] By contrast, Pilavoğlu remained attached to that thrill, and as this chapter has demonstrated, persisted in his detailed theological investigations.

The Proof is Even in the Poetry

Pilavoğlu, like Kisakürek, composed hundreds of poems. Pilavoğlu's poetry, as noted in the previous chapter, was clearly inspired by a variety of Ottoman poetic traditions, especially *manakib* and *kaside*. It is difficult to find a poem of his which is not related to Muhammad in some way, even if it is indirectly; such as in "Medine'ye Selâm (Salam/Greetings to Medina),"[100] or "Yermük Muhârebesi" (The Battle of Yarmouk)."[101] The few poems that address other topics, such as "Hakkın İndinde Din Islâm Dinidir (In the [eyes] of Truth, Islam is THE Religion), or "Ömrünü İlim Yoluna Ver (Give your Life to the Path of *İlm* [religious knowledge])," remain firmly fixed on the core aspects of Islam, with little—apart from, perhaps, the language in which they are composed-- to situate them in a noticeably Turkish cultural context. Much of the poetry Pilavoğlu references in his work is equally focused on similar core concepts in Islam, such as praise of the Prophet and his Companions. For instance, in *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, although he occasionally references the work of Ottoman poets such as the Nakşibendi Osman Kemalî (1862-1954), the selections typically deal with the same topics (the Prophet, his Companions, etc.), and do not follow with commentary or interpretations that indicate nostalgia for Ottoman literary traditions. Instead, his motives remain focused on veneration of the Prophet, or topics which directly contribute to this veneration. The poem he attributes to Kemalî for instance, is titled "Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'a."[102] The selections from other poets, who are Arabs, further reflect this preference for praise of Muhammad, his family, the *Rashidun* caliphs, and essential dimensions of Islam such as *tawhid*. Three untitled couplets attributed to Ibn Najjār al-Baghdādi (d. 1245 CE), for example, are a eulogy (*vasıf*) of Muhammad.[103] In contrast, Kisakürek's poetry focuses more firmly on the pressing concern of coming to terms with the two conflicting worldviews of East and West at play in Turkish national consciousness. Yavuz describes Kisakürek's poetry as an antidote to this conflict:

> His [Kisakürek's] poetry often emphasized themes of aimlessness and the spiritual void in a rapidly transforming society that had yet to come fully to grips with the collapse of the old empire. [he]…saw a rejuvenating form of Muslim spirituality and solidarity as the antidote to Turkey's deracinating and alienating embrace of Westernization… By stressing both [Islamism and Turkish nationalism] he played an essential role in the nationalization of Islam.[104]

It would be misleading to conclude that Pilavoğlu did not equally see the potential of Islam to be a rejuvenating form of spirituality and solidarity, and as the antidote to the estrangement caused by Republican enthusiasm for secularism and the aggressive pursuit of Westernization. If anything, his focus on the more essential features of Islam in his poetry illustrates a desire to represent the tradition as a concept which anyone can take up. No doubt, his anti-nationalism was motivated by similar reasoning: perhaps he was aware that vernacularizing Islam in a Turkish "neo-Ottoman" nationalist context, would cause the tradition to de-emphasize those features that make it universally appealing. Indeed, Pilavoğlu's method of approach to poetry is ultimately another illustration of the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*, and as such includes a de-emphasis on the prominence of a symbolic neo-Ottoman "way to act" which required striking a balance between Islamic identity and Turkish nationalism to be successful.

Conclusion

The neo-Ottoman responses of Kisakürek, Nursi and the Nur movement are examples of successful Islamist responses to the top-down Kemalist secular reforms and aggressive enforcement of a project of Westernization in early republican Turkey. These responses each contain their own dimensions of nuance, and so cannot be essentialized as some sort of unified response to the resentment and alienation caused by the upbraiding of Islam as a central feature of human relations in the Ottoman Empire. However, these responses do exhibit certain common features to the extent that each successfully integrated idealized notions of the Ottoman legacy as a way of vernacularizing Islam as an Ottoman-cum-Turkish dimension of cultural identity and demonstrated flexibility in the face of the imminent encroachment of westernization.

Kemal Pilavoğlu's life and body of work in many respects closely resemble those of neo-Ottomans such as Kisakürek and Nursi. Pilavoğlu, like these contemporary Turkish, Sufi heroes, witnessed the same defining features of Turkish Republican history, experienced the iron fist of Republican secular laws against "insulting Turkishness" in the form of repeated arrests, court appearances, and an extended period of exile. He also recognized the importance of the rise in print culture as a medium for deploying his activism and understood that Westernization is inextricably bound up with Christian frameworks. However, as he treaded the Tijani path and issued his response to both his

immediate, predominantly Christian surroundings and to the wider context of secularism and the encroachment of Westernization, his pan-Islamic vision, which was informed by the *Tariqa Muhammadiyya*, was ultimately lacking in the same level of regard for the Ottoman legacy that characterizes those successful writers who have striven to cope with the loss of the Ottoman Empire by exhuming the Turkish nation's past as a way of engaging with the present. At a time when Turkish Islamic intellectuals associated the revival of Islam and Sufism with the construction of an idealized Ottoman cultural legacy, Pilavoğlu's Tijaniyya did not fit into the dominant discourse because of his focus on a Sufi pan-Islamic vision which did not sufficiently include the same uniquely Turkish iteration of Muslim culture.

Chapter 6
Summary Translations: The Hagiographies
Part I: *Fet'hi Rabbânî*

Publication Details

Mehmedi Ibni Abdullahittantavi, *Fet'hi Rabbânî* / The Divine Opening (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 1990).

ISBN: none.

Paperback, 104 pages; Thermal binding with staples.

Appearance, Cover pages, table of contents, index

The book's cover is a lithographic print on coated (non-gloss) tagboard. The cover is decorated with a border with a flower and vine design, reminiscent of *İznik* tiles, surrounding an orange background. The title and author's name are printed in maroon letters on the orange background, and the outer border (outside of the floral border) is white. On the spine, the date, title, and author are printed in maroon. The back cover is white, and on the bottom right-hand corner is the word *Hediyesi* (gift/present of) with a blank line. On page 2, there is a note entirely in capital letters, which is attributed to "Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu." This note appears above the publication details:

> The head of the *tarikat* endears himself
> The Dervish is not one [who has] self-loathing
> Love is the foundation of the *tarikat*
> Without this foundation you cannot rightly guide others
> The pinnacle of creation, you are beloved by the creator.

--

The *Basmalah* appears on page 3, first in Arabic with *ḥarakāt* (vowel markers), then transliterated into Latin Turkish script. An introduction, appearing as a single sentence and without a heading follows, which entreats the reader to turn away from the path of Satan, and towards the light of Allah and of Allah's *evliya* (saint[s]).[1] The reader is promised to find well-deserved happiness upon receiving the joyful tidings they will find in the Qur'an. A few *ayets* (62-64) from *Surah Yunus* are provided in Arabic, followed by a transliteration, and then a Turkish translation. This is followed by an explanation (*manası*), in Turkish, of the verses. In the same paragraph, a *Hadisi Kudsî* (Hadith Qudsi)[2] in Turkish, warning against enmity of saints, follows the explanation of the verses. Still in the same paragraph, the author

introduces "…en yakını evliyâ ullahın efendisi Ahmed Tîcanî (the closest saint to God, master Ahmed Tijani)."[3]

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The table of contents on page five is a list which provides a one-sentence explanation for each chapter (*bap*). The one-sentence explanations of each chapter are not repeated as titles at the beginning of each corresponding chapter in the body of the book.

Mukaddime[4] (Preface/Introduction):

The introduction is the translator/author's brief explanation of "why I am affiliated with the Ticani *tarikat*."[5] This introduction includes a description of the experiences that led him to the Tijaniyya. He was studying at al-Azhar in Egypt when "the first dream came to him." He had a second dream after reading *Surah Yā Sīn* and deciding to become a *hafiz.* In the second dream, he tried to purchase honey from a member of the Tijani *tarikat*, who refused to take his money. Still dreaming, he met shaykh Mehmed,[6] with whom he exchanged greetings, recounted his experience with the honey, and then asked him about the *tarikat,* informing the Shaykh that he wanted to be initiated to the *tarikat*. He awoke with joy, and three days later he had a third dream.

In the third dream, he was performing ablutions at the mosque in his hometown, where he saw Hacı Ömeril Ukbânî and Hacı Beşiriz'zeytūnî. From his hometown, he returned to Egypt with his father. Together they undertook a pilgrimage to Husayn's tomb.[7] Following the pilgrimage, the translator/author was given permission to join the tarikat by Mukaddimi Elhacı Muhammedil Hâşimî. Shortly thereafter, his father joined. On 27 Ramazan 1325 AH (October 1907), the translator/author became a *muqaddam.*

Birinci Bap (Chapter 1)

"Şeyhimizin Tarifi" (Our Shaykh's description)

This chapter is a description of Ahmad al-Tijani's birth, background, and ancestral lineage. Also included is a description of his undertaking of the hajj in 1186 AH (1772 CE), and *icazet* (*ijazah,* literally; "permission") in the same year. Next are the details about al-Tijani's growth into a shakyh of his own *tarikat,* until his death. There is also a description of his two sons, and their untimely deaths.[8]

Ikinci Bap

"Tarikatımıza vaki olan tenkitlere cevap" (Answers to the criticisms of our *tarikat*).

This chapter discusses the legitimacy of the Tijaniyya in terms of its orthodoxy, saying;

> Our Shaykh has taken the *tarikat* from the Messenger of Allah. We respond to objections that deny it [the Tijani *tarikat*]. Sahih Bukhari, [Sahih] Muslim, Abu Dawud, Abu Hurairah, [and] the Hadith narrated [the] hadith sharif.[9]

Üçüncü Bap

"Müridin Nefsiyle, şeyhiyle, ihvâniyla, tarzı hareketi, edep ve terbiyesi ve mukaddimin sıfat ve vazifesi," (Etiquette and training of the soul of the *murid*, [his/her] shaykh, brethren, and the divine attributes and obligations of the *muqaddam*)

This chapter discusses the initiation and learning process of a *mürit* (aspirant). The chapter also explains the *âdâbı* (etiquette of interaction) within the *tarikat*, between the *muqaddam*, the shaykh, and the *mürit*-(s).

Dördüncü Bap

"Ahmed ibni Muhammedit'ticâni Tarikatının şartları ve delilleri" (Conditions and Arguments of Ahmed ibn Muhammed Tijani's *tarikat*)

This chapter explains the forty conditions of the Tijaniyya, which are derived from the Qur'an, the *Sunnah*, arguments from mystical Sufi books,[10] and legal justifications.[11] A brief explanation of each of the conditions follows. For example, condition seven[12] in the "twenty virtuous conditions to the individual" begins with a brief explanation, then a transliteration of *Surah at-Tawbah*, 119. Condition seven, and a translation of Hadith 121, titled "Hadisi Şerif":

> Avoid lies, speak the truth. Religion, mind, honor, bravery, and perfection: [these concepts] are associated [with speaking the truth]. The glorious Sura at-Tawbah, 119.
>
> [Hadith sharif]: 'Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to Paradise. And a man keeps on telling the truth until he becomes a truthful person. Falsehood leads to al-Fujur (wickedness, evil-doing), and al-Fujur (wickedness) leads to the hell fire, and a man may keep on telling lies till he is written before Allah, a liar.'[13]

Beşinci Bap

"Virdin elfâzı ve vazifenin – zikrin şartları ve vakıtları ve buna taallük eden ahkâm" (The rules[14] of the *wird* and your duty—the conditions and times for *dhikr* and its corresponding requirements)

This chapter is comprised of descriptions of rules and requirements for how to perform the *Salatul Fatihi* prayer, *dhikr,* Friday, morning, and evening prayers, etc. The number of repetitions for each are provided in detail.

Altıncı Bap

This chapter provides explanations (*manası*) of the rules and regulations in more detail. For example, the *Salatul Fatihi* is repeated in this chapter, then, detailed explanations of the meaning are divided up into phrases. For example, an explanation for "Allâhümme" clarifies that this means "Yâ Allah,"[15] and that this term forms part of the recitation of the 99 divine attributes of God.

Yedinci Bap

"Şeyhimizin Kerâmetleri" (the Miracles of our Shaykh)

A *kerâmet* is a miracle that is performed through the agency of a saint/power of sanctity by which miracles are worked. A *mûcize* is also a miracle, but specifically associated with Prophets. Many *kerâmet* were performed by Ahmed Tijani, who had four dreams before receiving the authority of sainthood. This chapter also discusses "Kutupluk makâmu verildi" (When [the status of] *quṭb*[16] was bestowed).

Sekizinci Bap

"Lazime ezkar[17] ve Tîcâni müntesiplerinin fazîletleri hakkında" (About the required litanies and virtues of Tijani followers)

This chapter explains why the *tarikat* has been called "Tîcâniye, Ahmediye, Muhammediye, İbrâhimiye, Hanefiye Tesmiye." At the end of this chapter, a note in bold entreats the reader to take notice:
Now, in this book are errors and shortcomings that will be seen. These should be met with pardon and forgiveness; we pray that our effort will be welcomed in heaven [because] this book is for the sake of God, and for the benefit of its students. I wish them to benefit from Allah Almighty.[18]

Ticânî Tarikatı Hakkında Bizi Tenvir Edermisiniz?

(Can you describe the Tijani *tarikat* to us?)

This section explains that "all *tarikatlar* are attributed to the Prophet via a chain."[19] An explanation about how the transmission of *icazet* works in the context of this chain is included. Receipt of *icazet*, or initiation into the *tarikat*, cannot be granted by reading books or independent study, but the aspirant becomes bound to the *tarikat* by being added to this chain, thus forming a direct link with Muhammad. Then, the *Silsila,* organized numerically, is provided:

1. Hazreti Ali'ye (d. 661)[20]
2. O da[21] Oğlu Hazreti Hasan (d. 670)
3. Hasan Basriye (d. 728)
4. Habibi Acemiye (Habib ibn Muhammad al-'Ajami al-Basri, d. 738)
5. Dâvudu Taiyiye (d. 777-782)
6. Marufu Kerhiye (d. 815-820)
7. Sırrı Sakatiye (d. 867)
8. Cüneydi Bağdadiye (d. 910)

[He] inculcated various branches [which were] divided by several senior caliphs; Kadrilik, Rufâilik, Mevlevilik, Halvetilik, [he] did not depart from the[ir] path.[22] The disciples [who descended from] Cüneydi Bağdadiye,

9. Ebu Ali Ahmede,
10. Ebu Abdullaha,
11. Kâdi Vecibeddine,
12. Mehmedil Bekriye – 994 [AH][23]
13. Ömer Bekriye,
14. Ebu Necib Sühreverdiye (Abū al-Najīb Abd al-Qādir Suhrawardī, d. 1168)
15. Kutbeddine,
16. Rukneddine,
17. Tebrizli Şahabeddini Şiraziye,
18. Seyyidi Cemaleddini Tebriziye,
19. İbrahim Zaidi Geylaniye,
20. Sadeddini Kazganiye,
21. Ahi Muhammede,
22. Ömer Halvetiye, (Umar al-Khalwati, d. ca. 1397)

Inspired the Halvetiyya (Khalwatiyya). This *tarikat* is distinct for its practice of spiritual retreat.[24]

23. Mehmed Emreye,
24. İzzeddini Halvetiye
25. Sadreddine,
26. Halveti;

He is considered the second alim (scholar) and founder of the Halvetiyye, a virtuous, perfect person, a descendant of our Master Prophet.

27. Yahya'I Baküviye (d. 862)

Inspired one of two branches [of the Khalwatiyya], the Gülşeni branch which emerged in Egypt. With others from Erzincan[25] vis-à-vis Mehmed Bahaddin.

28. Cemaleddini Halvetiye,
29. İzzedini Tokatiye,
30. the third founder of the Halvetiyye, Şabani Veliye.

The followers of Şabani in Kastamonu[26] remain a source of great benefit to this day.

31. Muhiddini Kastamoniye,
32. Ömeri Fuâdiye,
33. Çorumlu İsmaile,
34. Alaeddine[27]
35. Halepli Mustafaya, (Mustafa Na'īmā, d. 1716),
36. Abdullatife[28]
37. Mustafa Bekriye,
38. İskenderiyeli Mehmede (Ibn Ata Allah al-Iskandari al-Shādhilī, d. 1310)
39. Mahmudil Kürdiye (d. 1663-1664)[29]

    The *alim* of the time, who is considered among the virtuous saints.

40. the founder of the Tijani *tarikat*, Ahmedi Ticâni.

    It appears that by chain and inculcation, authority was bestowed by the masters [upon Ahmed Tijani] which caused the establishment of the Tijani *tarikat*.

A history of Ahmed al-Tijani's life is repeated here, in a typical hagiographical fashion. For example, "Allah has such servants that nothing deters them from their remembrance of the Divine."[30]

41. Allâme Alel Havâri (Al-Khalifah Ali Harazim b. al-'Arabi Barradah al-Fasi, d. 1856)

    Organized this *tarikat*. He is the author of Jawāhir al Ma'ānī.[31] The first editions [of this book, from which] detailed information [can be obtained] about this *tarikat*, can be found in the Mürünbulak printing house in Egypt.

42. Seyyidil Mehmedil Kebir (d. 1827)[32]
43. Seyyidil Mehmedil Habib (d. 1853)[33]
44. Seyyidil Mehmedil Mūrşiye, (Muhammad al-Mishri, d. 1978)
45. Seyyidi el Aliyyü Ettamasi ('Ali al-Tammasini, d. 1845)
46. Mehmedil Hâşimi Konyevi (d. 1931-1932)[34]
47. Abdül Kadir Havvâri Velmedeni. (d. ca. 1931)

    In a book called *Our Turkey* from the Khalwatiyya, there is information relating to the Tijaniyya. [This is] Feliyeli Ahmed Hilmi's book of *tasavvuf* (Sufism) [written in] Arabic. Praised as a very practical, open *tarikat* in his book, the *pir* named Afsun

Mehmed Ali Aynibek Hacıbayram declares during his examination of Sufism the benefits of the development of the spread of the Tijaniyya, which in a short amount of time spread to a large part of the Islamic world. Today the Tijaniyya is in Fez, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Sudan, Egypt, the Hijaz, Syria, and Turkey.

Included under number 47 is a section organized by *Sual* (question) and *Cevap* (answer):
SUAL: How did the Tijani *tarikat* come to Turkey?

CEVAP: The Tijaniyya first came to Turkey during the First World War, [the *tarikat*] entered via a person from İzmir named Necati. A *tekke* was founded in Eyyūb in İstanbul. Some treatises were generated about the Tijaniyya, but it did not develop in Istanbul because he [Necati] went to Fez, and [because of] a lack of membership. Later, in 1351 AH (1931/32), a member of the Hijaz Ulama, the Medinan Sufi Abdulkâdir Havvâri came to Istanbul. He was sent by the famous Heavenly Companions [he was] one of [their] descendants, the person named Zūbeyir İbni Avvâmil Havvâri (Zubayr ibn al-Awam). Our Prophet commanded Zūbeyir **(Every prophet has a disciple/apostle. My apostle was also named Zūbeyir İbni Avvâmil Havvâridir).**[35] Thus, Havvâri remained the surname of [his] descendants. One of Zūbeyir İbni Havvâri's descendants is Abdūlkadir Havvari. A friend of the Bahaddin Ulama of al-Azhar, he was born in Medina. Possessing knowledge and wisdom with a highly refined Sufi sentiment, he gained fame in the Muslim world. This renowned person was the chief of the Şeyhul İslâm Arif Hikmet Library. [Arif Hikmet was] a famous *şeyhülislam* of the Ottoman Empire.
He [Arif Hikmet] was Bosnia-Herzegovinian. [And] a scholarly, virtuous, poetic person. The large [Şeyhul İslâm Arif Hikmet] library, founded in Medina, [also] had pious foundations (*vakıflar*) in a few places in Istanbul. Due to this connection, he [Havvâri Velmedeni] settled down in Istanbul. He would visit Istanbul's famous ulama and Sufis.

SUAL: Master, how did you meet with his excellency Abdūlkadir Medeni, and how did you receive *icazet* for the Tijani *tarikat* [?] [W]e would be glad if you enlighten us with [this information].

48. Elhac Mehmed Kemal Pilavoğlu, Ankaravi:
CEVABEN: [I was] born in Ankara in 1906 AD. While I was in the last year of studying law, on Thursday 7 October 1931[36] I wanted to pay a visit to this person [Abdūlkadir Medeni, who] welcomed me with a great show of politeness. What was the purpose of our visit?. I asked everything about being a good servant of the *ummah*. He [Abdülkadir Medeni] declared to me that before everything else, a person must know how to be a good servant [and then when] he

[becomes] morally observant, he will be a servant of the righteous. He then told me that I will gain true knowledge [which] will flow forth from the heart [and] I will become an enlightened Ahmedi,[37] and with this enlightenment I will become a complete human.

I had received a spiritual sign earlier in Istanbul; I was hoping that I would encounter [such a] person in Istanbul. One night in Ankara, I encountered the Esteemed Prophet [in a dream]. After we performed the prayer of blessings on the Prophet, we came across this radiant holy light[38] [and] I grew closer[39] to this enlightenment [and] felt peace in the Prophet.[40] I will not [be able to] explain here the endless delight and religious signs, [but I can] speak about what I remembered. He smiled and presented to me many good tidings and explained to me all the mysteries of this affair. (from his excellency Mehmed Haşım, assistant to the shaykh of the tekke,[41] by whom I became linked to the chain [of transmission] and aligned to the *silsila*). He preached to us a summary of the testaments of the path[s] of *taqwa* [i.e. the Sufi orders] of all of the saints and prophets. From the upper echelons of the ranks of the three *tarikatlar*; the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, [and] Tijaniyya, this person [Mehmed Haşım] had dressed me [in] the mantle of Tijaniism. As a matter of fact, these are the most important *tarikatlar* the world over. [Even] the Jew himself declared to the Prophet [his] great fondness for this *tarikat* [then the Jew said]; 'I would like to enter this tarikat and receive its blessings', and he pledged to me that he would never to take another path.

The narrative continues for several sentences, discussing the imperfections of humans, and that God bestows special knowledge about these faults on those deemed worthy of this knowledge. It continues to switch between the first-person singular (*ben*), first-person plural (*biz*), and third-person objective (*o-*). For instance, interspersed in the third-person discussion of the imperfections of humans the following interjection in first-person appears:

I received endless benefits from the *tarikat* while I was making endless mistakes.

This portion of the text concludes with a cautionary reminder:

On this path there are negative rumors and propaganda, [but] as an *ârif*[42] said (no damage is done to our caravan from this pack of dogs), with these doctrines [of our path] our caravan continues. How happy are those who participate.

The final paragraph of the book explains that on hajj, Shaykh İdris of the *tekke* in Fez[43] ultimately confirmed the permission of the *tarikat* (to Pilavoğlu), officially connecting it to the *silsila* of the Tijaniyya. The last line of the text is one final entreaty to the reader:

The beloved *quṭb*, Ahmed Tijani, longs for us [to join him] in his mosque, let our souls seize his beloved affection.

After this, a note appears in italic font, which is attributed to the publisher (Pilavoğlu Kitabevi):

> NOTE: The *Silsila* of the Tijani *tarikat* with the path of the *silsila* of the Prophet is constant and the *silsila* list on the history of Sufism and the book was obtained from Ramah;[44] the names could be before and after; if this [is the case] forgive us…

Chapter 6
Summary Translations: The Hagiographies

Part II: *Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti*

Publication Details

Eyyüb Çakır*, Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti/ Who was Pilavoğlu? The perfect preferred prayer, the Salatul Fatihi and its Virtues* (Ankara: 2nd edition, 2009, reprint of 1978 edition).

ISBN: none.

Paperback, section 1: 48 pages; section 2: 98 pages. Thermal binding.

Appearance, Cover pages, table of contents, index

On the cover is a color photograph of a small bunch of light pink roses at the top of the page, which fades into a solid green background. On the back cover is a list of other works by the author, including two titles which were forthcoming at the time of publication.

The book is divided into two sections. Pages 1-48 are *Pilavoğlu Kimdir?* The first section has no table of contents. The Table of Contents (*içindekiler*) for the second section appears on the page immediately following page 48 of the first section, and again at the end of the book. The pages re-start at 1, after a title page for *Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti*.

Önsöz (Preface), (p. 2)

An abbreviated timeline of Pilavoğlu's life begins with his year of birth, when he began primary school (1913), when he entered law school in Istanbul (no date), when he returned to Ankara (1931), and his production of over 200 publications up to 1976, and death in 1977. Throughout, Çakır reverently describes Pilavoğlu. For instance:

> Just as the sun shines on the earth, Pilavoğlu's holiness illuminated the darkness in the hearts [of his followers] with light from the knowledge he received from the Prophet.[1]

Giriş (Introduction), p. 4.

The introduction appears to be inspired by the tradition of *Manakib*.[2] For example, in the first paragraph, Pilavoğlu is described using many positive traits, most of which are directly correlated with his piety, which underscores his mastery:

> Here we will have limits when depicting the great abilities of the great master Kemal Pilavoğlu, [however] by mentioning some of his goodness and superiority, [and] by describing the sublime virtues of [this] honorable master [while at the same time] mentioning virtues of Allah and the Messenger, [and by] explaining his [Pilavoğlu's] distinct arguments, I would like to announce to the Muslim world that he is a great human and an exemplary Muslim[3] [because] of his desire to defend his position… I wrote this as a bestowal and a gift to those whose hearts burn with love for Allah and the Prophet.

Pilavoğlu Kimdir? (Who was Pilavoğlu?) pp. 7-41

This section begins with another timeline of Pilavoğlu's life, starting with his birth, replete with adulation. For instance, the author describes Pilavoğlu's father:

> …the purest and most mature person of the time, [the] honorable Ahmed Pilavoğlu was [Kemal's] father and was a noble person of [his] time.[4]

His is mother is described similarly:

> [Kemal's mother was also] honorable, and among the moral and virtuous women… the most chaste and gentle woman.[5]

Throughout the section is similar adulatory affection, with adjectives such as *sevgili* (e.g. "sevgili genç Pilavoğlu" [dear young Pilavoğlu]). In the account of his youth, *muhterem* (honorable, often appearing upper-cased) is used. The description of his biological lifespan is equally obsequious:

> …the lifespan of his Holiness [was a] blessed seventy years. [6]

Pilavoğlu's initial exposure, conversion to, and alleged appointment as a shaykh of the Tijaniyya is also described. While he was in Istanbul in 1931, he met "a famous member of the ulama,"[7] Abdulkadir Medenî. Medenî is described:

> …this person from among the great honorable shaykhs, was the influential chief[8] of the Nakşibendi , Qadiri, and Tijani *tarikatlar*.

According to the text, Medenî was immediately attracted to Pilavoğlu. Not long after meeting him, Medenî initiated Pilavoğlu to the rank of *mürşid.* Pilavoğlu was so beloved by Medenî, that the latter was soon compelled to authorize the completion of Pilavoğlu's initiation,[9] because he had been shown a sign of the holiness of Pilavoğlu.[10] On the day that Medenî initiated Pilavoğlu to the rank of shaykh, Medenî pointed his finger at Pilavoğlu, saying; "Behold, this is your shaykh."[11] The author emphasizes repeatedly

that Pilavoğlu had no teacher and did not study under a master, but his wisdom was miraculously bestowed upon him:

> Young Pilavoğlu did not have a teacher. He received the light of his wisdom from the light of the Prophet. …he had no teacher and did not take courses from a master.[12]

From 1931-1976, Pilavoğlu produced more than 200 publications despite facing various oppressions. At least fifty of Pilavoğlu's works were published posthumously. Many of these were not written in the comfort of his home, but while Pilavoğlu was in prison, when he faced legal action, while his health declined from the onset of diabetes, all while the families of his children turned against him as rifts developed in his community of followers. The author emphasizes that Pilavoğlu maintained his sincerity (*sâdık*) in the face of criticism, and that his followers remained faithful to him despite facing the same criticism. The author explains that Pilavoğlu would recount to his followers stories of the great transmitters of Islam from the Qur'an, and the attacks that these masters endured.[13]

Pilavoğlu Hazretlerine Has Bağzı Hususlar (Some special considerations about his holiness Pilavoğlu) pp. 19-20

This section describes Pilavoğlu's more extreme pietistic habits, explaining that he "never stopped writing," often staying up all night to do so. He would always fast during the recommended times for *Rajab, Saʿbān,* and *Shawwal*, on Mondays and Thursdays, for *Dhu al-Hijjah*, and hold long fasts during other times. Always busy with *tasbih* (rosary, or prayer beads), he would always add two *rakats* (cycles of prayer) to the obligatory prayers. According to the text, Pilavoğlu ate and slept very little, and advised others to do the same. Following afternoon prayers, he would visit the *dergâh* (the establishment of the *tarikat*). The section concludes with a detailed physical description of Pilavoğlu, describing everything from his countenance and hair to his size and body build.[14]

Muhterem Pilavoğlu Hazretlerine Muhtelif Bakışlar (Various views on [his] Revered Holiness Pilavoğlu) pp. 21-24

This section describes the mounting insincerity among Pilavoğlu's followers:

> …the fire that burned in their hearts was not [for] Allah and the Prophet, but [this ignorant group's] desire for property, rank, position…[15]

This disingenuous attitude contributed to the deteriorating health of Pilavoğlu when he grew ill near the end of his life. The primary intention of these dissenters was to depict Pilavoğlu as negatively as possible, but ultimately, "their black hearts and black gazes"[16] could not cloud Pilavoğlu's purity, of which they were jealous.

Pek Muhterem Kemal Pilavoğlunu Kimler Bildi? (Who Knew about the Very Revered Pilavoğlu?) pp. 25-29

This section claims that, "…those deprived of the honor of knowing our revered master could not understand and know his great value."[17] This is also a decisive summary of the entire section, which describes in depth Pilavoğlu's many great manifestations (*tecelli*).[18] The depth of Pilavoğlu's sacred gifts were largely disregarded, even by those who knew him. For example:

> While various miracles (*mûcize ve kerâmetler*)[19] appeared in [Pilavoğlu's] great guidance which proved the unity of the Divine, they said [it was] magic, they did not believe in the great manifestations of omnipotent power. [20]

Pilavoğlu ne idi, ne oldu? (What was Pilavoğlu, what happened?) pp. 29-31

This section describes Pilavoğlu's charisma and natural talent for leadership:

> Pilavoğlu's blessed glances or any conversation or any other compliments would penetrate the hearts of [his] students, [and] the light of guidance would manifest in their heart of hearts.[21]

Ah Pilavoğlu, Ah! (Oh Pilavoğlu, Oh!) pp. 31-35

This section, written in the first-person (*ben*), expands on the author's profound love and admiration for Pilavoğlu. The author explains that Pilavoğlu's reciprocation of this platonic love is what ultimately led the former to know God more fully.

Pilavoğlu'nu Niçin Seviyorum? (Why do I love Pilavoğlu?) pp. 35-37

The author again explains his love and reverence for Pilavoğlu, establishing that this is for the sake of God:

> I love Pilavoğlu for the sake of God. The religion of Islam [is] that one loves for [the sake of] Allah, and also for [this reason] dislikes things. [22]

Pilavoğlu Hazretlerini Sevmek İymandanmıdır? (Is it [part of the] faith to love his holiness Pilavoğlu?) pp. 37-41

This section begins by answering the question in the title:

> Yes, to love every Muslim elder and show them suitable love and respect is to possess the divine light of faith. …Here on this path to love the great servant [of God] Master Pilavoğlu is also to possess the divine light of faith. [23]

This section discusses the public suspicions that Pilavoğlu was affiliated with or interested in certain political parties, asserting that these reports are wrong and false. Although Pilavoğlu met with members

of certain political parties who came to see him, Pilavoğlu was never affiliated with nor ever became a member of any. There were suspicions that Pilavoğlu was affiliated with the CHP, but the author explains that this report exposes the ulterior motive of the CHP to damage Pilavoğlu's reputation. In 1966, a court hearing for a lawsuit took place in Ankara between Pilavoğlu and the CHP. Related to this lawsuit, the author says, "CHP'nin, kominizm yeşile bürünerek Türkiye'ye girmişdır sözlerine (The CHP disguised their words [of] communism in green,[24] but communism could not be disguised as Islam to Turkey)." The CHP published these claims in newspapers, and the lawsuit was filed. Pilavoğlu and the CHP met in court:

> The Judge asked [Pilavoğlu],
>
> > 'Kemal Bey, can you prove that the CHP is introducing communism to Turkey?'
>
> He answered,
>
> > 'Yes, in the Treaty of Lausanne, it is recorded in so-and-so file, recorded under so-and-so number'.
>
> By giving this answer, Master [Pilavoğlu] was acquitted.

Atatürk had banned communist activities in Turkey, [but] by the hand of the CHP [it was] once again established. Their activities continued.[25] İsmet İnönü became affiliated with the CHP, and more recently (in the 1970s) Bülent Ecevit also joined the party.[26] The author opines that the communist regime is an enemy of both wealth and religion, and it is absolutely false and wrong for a religious man to commit such a mistake as to fall in with such ilk. The author contends that instead of the path of communism, as a true *mürşid* (spiritual leader), Pilavoğlu was a good person for the nation, country, and for those close to him; he recommended the path of servitude to Allah. Then, the author reasons that if the words attributed to Pilavoğlu were true (about affiliation with the CHP), in his many publications he would have probably mentioned this. Even if people do not reveal their preferences and likes, the author reasons that they probably write it down in a notebook. He concludes:

> For this reason, I gather; if Master [Pilavoğlu] were inclined to a certain [political] party, or to the CHP, wouldn't [he] give the same advice those he loved [?]… As one of his closest and most beloved, I hold a mirror to the coming pages of history in the brightest and simplest way.[27]

Poetry

A poem titled, "İbretle Bakan Gözlere" (Look Upon the Lessons of this Leader), appears on page 1.[28] The poem is about Pilavoğlu, as indicated in the first verse of the last stanza:

> [Here is] A lively book based on the speech of Pilavoğlu

Pages 42-48 include five poems, titled; “Hakkın Sevgili Dostu” (Dear Friend of Righteousness[29]); “Mürşidi Âzam Pilavoğlu’na” (To Pilavoğlu, the Greatest Spiritual Teacher); “Canımın İçinde Bircan[30] Olan Pilavoğlu’na” (To Pilavoğlu, who is my dearest beloved); “Hak Dostuna” (To You, Righteous Friend); Pilavoğlu. In “Hakkın Sevgili Dostu,” the meters are irregular: 12/12/12/10 syllables in the first stanza, 15/14/18/10 in the second, and so on. The couplets in this poem use a mixture of rhyming schemes, including end and identical rhymes. For instance, the first couplet of the sixth stanza includes an end rhyme:

> Güzel numûnesin numûne her fazîlet de
> İnsan Hakka yakın olur islam böyüklerini sevmekle

Most of the other stanzas include identical rhymes, such as this couplet from the final stanza:

> Seni medhe âcizdır âcız miskin Eyyüb
> Bana hayat verdin hayat Hak sevgisine erişdirüb

In each poem, the author uses the second-person singular form *sen* (you) when referring to Pilavoğlu, instead of second-person plural, *siz.* The former is the familiar, intimate form in Turkish, approximately equivalent to the now-archaic second-person singular *thou* in English. This use of *sen* shows that he either knew Pilavoğlu well, and/or the author viewed his relationship with Pilavoğlu as intimate enough to use the familiar form.

An internal cover page separates this section from the next.

Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti

BİSMİLLÂHİRRAHMÂNİRRAHİM appears above the title. The author’s name (Eyyüb Çakır) appears on the page, and the dates of printing (1978, 2009) and the location (Ankara) appear below it. On the following page is a note explaining that his first edition of this book was “weak,” so it has been revised. He advises readers to dismiss the first edition in favor of this second one.

Önsöz (Preface) p. 1.

Amellerin Kiymetini Artıran Tek Şey Saygı ve Sevgidır. (The Only Thing That Increases the Value of Actions is Respect and Love).

All things have a foundation; that the foundation of worship is respect and love, and there is no value in those deeds performed without this. Respect is the greatest virtue of every *mümin* (believer, or the

faithful). This underpins the entire preface, which is peppered with assertions about respect in a religious context. For instance:

> Respect is the vessel of religion. [31]

The value of your deeds depends [on] your respect and love for the Messenger of Allah. [32]

On the following page, a poem about respect, titled simply "ŞİİR" (poem) appears. The poem's refrain is every last line of six stanzas, each with two couplets, the first rhymed and the second unrhymed:

> Oh human, in all your tasks be respectful, respectful. [33]

Seyyidim Ahmed Tîcâni Hazretlerinin İslam Âlemindeki Seyhatları (My Master his Holiness *Sayyid* Ahmad Tijani's Travels in the Muslim World) p. 9-13

This section is an overview of al-Tijani's travels, but only briefly narrates his actual physical movements. The adulatory overview is a theological timeline of al-Tijani's experiences which contributed to the eventual founding of the Tijaniyya. For instance, al-Tijani's wakeful encounter with the Prophet is described, couched in an extravagant adulation of al-Tijani's position as "…en yakın ve en sevimli olanıdırki… makâmı yüksek evliyâlar… (the closest and dearest of the saints)."[34]

Seyyidim Ahmed Tîcâni Hazrelerinin[35] Resûlü Ekrem Seyyidimizle Olan Görüşmeleri (My Master his Holiness *Sayyid* Ahmad Tijani's Discussions with the Messenger)

A series of questions is posed by al-Tijani to the Prophet, most of which deal with details of specific litanies and doctrines within Tijani practice. For example, Al-Tijani asks the Prophet:

> O Prophet, [concerning] the *Salatul Fatihi* does [reciting this] sacred prayer separately for 600,000 [times] are 70,000 winged angels manifested? Do the merits [of reciting] the sacred *tesbih* prayers pertain to bringing about [these benefits]?

The Prophet responds:

> Yes, [when] the *Salatul Fatihi* is read one time, 70,000 winged angels manifest. And the rewards brought about by these sacred *tesbih* prayers are written in the notebook of deeds. [36]

The *wirds* (litanies) of the members of the Tijaniyya are unmatched by other *tarikatlar*. The number of recitations of the *wirds* is revisited several times in the text, emphasizing the immense blessings and unimaginable virtues of reciting *Salatul Fatihi* in particular.

A "brief explanation of *Salatul Fatihi*"[37] begins by drawing attention to the difference between it and other *Salavâtı şerifeler* (sacred prayers). Noted several times is that a single recitation of the former is equivalent to 6,000 repetitions of the latter. Several timelines and accompanying calculations appear, many of which are well into the millions. The reader is implored to overcome their blindness and focus on

the truth: “God made you a treasure of endless value. Know the value of [this] treasure you own and let [this gift] not be one that comes and goes.”[38]

NOT-) (NOTE) pp. 31-34

The virtues of reciting the *Salatul Fatihi* is reiterated. The author explains that he was well-educated and learned all this information from his (other) *Sayyid*, Kemal Pilavoğlu, expressing his gratefulness for having had access to such a blessed, noteworthy person.

Bismillâhirrahmânirrâhym, Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Mânâsı (In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful: The perfect preferred prayer, the *Salatul Fatihi* and its Meaning) pp. 35-38

The full *Salatul Fatihi* appears, transliterated into Latin script and then divvied up into phrases. Each phrase is provided in transliterated Arabic in bold font, then translated into Turkish, followed by an explanation of its meaning. The explanation for the first phrase of the prayer includes a translation of the entire prayer:

> O God! You are most glorious God, perform *salat* for our beloved Master and *Sayyid* [the] servant and Messenger, peace be upon him, in a manner befitting to [such] saints. [39]

In this example, an Arabic transliteration (in bold) appears followed by the Turkish translation. The next phrase of the prayer, “Muhammedinil Fâtihi Limâ Uğliga,” (the opener of what is closed), appears in a new paragraph following this, again in bold, with its own accompanying explanation. The explanations of the individual phrases appear purposely repetitive; the focus is perpetually on elucidating the immense depth of the *Salatul Fatihi’*s spiritual implications. This repetition is in keeping with the spirit of the prayer itself, in the sense that the benefits of its copious recitation are incomprehensible.

A poem comprised of four stanzas each with two couplets titled “Salavâtı Fâtih” appears after the date. A mixture of rhyming schemes, including end and identical rhymes, are used. Addressing the reader, the poem declares that reading/recitation of the *Salatul Fatihi* is filled with *nur* and that the prayer will set its reciters upon the right path (*hakk yol*).[40]

Salavâtı Fâtihin Fezâili Hakkında Ufak bir Îzah (A few remarks about the virtues of the *Salatul Fatihi*)

The next several sections discuss the importance of first understanding the path of the Tijaniyya before proceeding down it. Understanding this path requires a deep understanding of the *Salatul Fatihi*. Part of achieving this foundational understanding is to realize the complete authority of the Shaykh, as noted by the author:

With this path there is full legitimacy in my *Sayyid.* [41]

There is considerable elaboration on the exponential benefits of reciting the *Salatul Fatihi* multiple times in comparison to other prayers. Again, the explanations include detailed breakdowns of specific numbers of recitations. For instance, the author specifies that one recitation of the *Salatul Fatihi* is equivalent to 6,000 recitations of *tesbih* and other *dhikr* prayers. Another section explains how the *Eshâbül* (companions) of the *Fatihi* are understood to be at a relatively higher level in proximity to God in comparison to others in terms of their knowledge of God. The author explains that if the knowledge of humankind, jinns, and saints are compared, the rankings of these are known only to God. If this knowledge is then compared to the knowledge contained in the *Salatul Fatihi* it is like "…denizden bir katra mesâbesinde kalır. (…[humankind's knowledge is] one drop from the sea [in comparison])."[42] This is in reference to the descriptions in the Qur'an of God's endless and mysterious knowledge.[43] The author elaborates that all worldly positions and rankings, …"like handfuls of sugar thrown into an endless sea, will dissolve on the Day of Judgement."[44]

The exponential benefits of reciting the *Salatul Fatihi* multiple times in comparison to other prayers is emphasized at great length. The author reiterates in several ways, for instance, that one recitation of the *Salatul Fatihi* is equivalent to 6,000 recitations of *tesbih* and other *dhikr* prayers.

Fena Fillah[45] (Annihilation in God) pp. 95-96

This section is an explanation of the Sufi doctrine of *fanāʾ*, or "to die before death," which is a widespread Sufi doctrine (not unique to the Tijaniyya) of belief in the idea of the deconstruction of the ego (which "dies") as part of the recognition of the radical unity of God and all existence, including the self. There are three stages of *Fanāʾ; Fena Fillah* (the annihilation in God) is the third and final stage. The author explains that the final stage of *fenâfillah*[46] is a holy rank:

> The churning of the sea is reminiscent of the obfuscation that keeps the heart far away from everything [that distracts from unity with God]. [47]

Şiir (p. 97)

This poem, by the author, is comprised of five stanzas each with two couplets, concludes this section, the only title of which is "Şiir." A mixture of rhyming schemes, including end and identical rhymes, is used. The message of the poem is the annihilation of the self on the path of Divine knowledge, which is illustrated in the poem's refrain:

> In the Love of the Truth the self becomes ephemeral.[48]

Seyyidimiz Hâtemül Evliyâ Şiir (Poem [about] Our *Sayyid* the Seal of Saints) (p. 98)

This poem concludes the book.

Seyyidim şânı yücedır şahı evliyâ,
Allah nâil eylemişdır cümle makamlara,
Allah mazhar eylemişdır her türlü atâlara,
Evliyâlar seyyididır benim Dostum

My sayyid is honorable, exhalted, noble, saint,
Allah bestows all these positions,
Allah manifests in all types of ancestors,
The sayyid *of the saints is my friend,*

Hiç bir kimse temsil edemez seni vilâyetde,
Allah seni üstün kılmış hertürlü[1] niğmetlerde,
Cümle evliyâlar âciz kaldı heb seni bilmekde,
Evliyâlar seyyididır benim dostum

Nobody can represent your nearness to God,
God made you superior in all types of blessings,
All the saints are at a loss in all your knowledge
The sayyid *of the saints is my friend*

Senin fazlını kabül eylemişdır heb velîler,
Sen hâtemül evliyâsın hepisi seni heb bildiler,
Senden feyiz almakdadır cümle velîler
Evliyâlar seyyididır benim Dostum

Your virtue was approved by all saints
You are the seal of saints they all knew you
From you all the saints obtained enlightenment
The sayyid *of the saints is my friend*

Allah seni üstün eylemiş cümle niğmetlerde,
Şanını yüce eylemişdır cümle makam ve mertebelerde,
Seni reis eylemişdır Allah heb cümle velîlere,
Evliyâlar seyyididır benim Dostum

God made you superior in all blessings
Your honor is exalted among all muqaddams and in all hierarchies
God has made you chief among all saints
The sayyid *of the saints is my friend*

Sana saygı ve hürmet ederim her an dâimâ,
Seni bana nasib eden Hâlıkıma şükrederim dâimâ,
Rabbım beni ihvan eyledi senin gibi bir dostuna,
Evliyâlar seyyididır benim dostum

I respect and revere you every moment always
My Creator who sent you to me I thank always
My Lord made me a brother in God to a friend like you
The sayyid *of the saints is my friend*

Chapter 6
Summary Translations: The Hagiographies
Part III: *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı 1906-1977*

Publication Details

Muzaffer Yıldız, *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı 1906-1977* / The Life of Haji Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, 1906-1977 (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2013).

ISBN: On the publication page, there is a typographical error, which refers to an "IBN" number. The number is 978-605-61940-2-3. The same number appears on the back cover with a barcode (also numbered, with the same number), which is correctly referred to as "ISBN."
Paperback, 103 pages. Thermal binding.

Appearance, Cover pages, table of contents, index

The front cover is maroon. An image on the front cover is a lighter maroon "watermark" seal, with a wreath slightly opened at the top. Inside of the wreath is a quill pen poised over an open book. In the background is an image of the Ka'ba and the complex of Al-Haram mosque in Mecca. The title is written in plain gold font. On back cover is a color photograph of Pilavoğlu's grave with the caption, "Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Ankara Cebeci Asri Mezarlığındaki Kabri" (Tomb of Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu in Cebeci Asri Cemetery, Ankara).[1]

Önsöz (Preface)

Elhâc M. Kemal Pilavoğlu made a name for himself in the Islamic world in the last century. He was one of the prominent shaykhs of the Tijani *tarikat*, and a great religious leader. His life, his views on religion, the *tarikat*, and other social issues appear in his articles and books from the 1940s until his death. Dozens of articles have appeared in newspapers and magazines written both in favor of and against him.

As those who knew him closely, we wanted to summarize and introduce his life. It is not possible for us to introduce and explain him here properly, but those who want to see his perspective on events and understand his books, articles and the answers he gave to questions in the newspaper *İlahi Işık* (Divine Light) can get an idea by reading his books.

--

Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu was born in Ankara, in Hamamönü in 1906. His father and mother, hafiz Ahmet Efendi, and Sare Hanım, were both from Ankara. His paternal uncle, Abidin Efendi, was a *mufti* in the city. His grandfather was Hacı hafiz Seyid Mehmet Effendi. From a young age, his grandfather and father undertook Pilavoğlu's religious instruction, and by the age of 5 or 6 he was reciting passages from the Qur'an, "hiç şaşırmadan ezbere aynen tekrar ediyor" (without any doubt repeating [the passages] by heart).[2] He maintained a keen interest in religious matters during his youth and was known to engage in controversial discussions with a level of nuance that at times surprised even his teachers.[3]

Pilavoğlu enrolled in the Faculty of Law at Istanbul University after finishing school in Ankara. Pilavoğlu was incredibly successful during his first years of study but abandoned them in his final year: "bu kadar başarılı bir talebenin son sınıfta okulu bırakmasını anlamak zordur (it is difficult to understand why such a successful student would abandon his studies in the final year)." Pilavoğlu's departure from his studies must have been an auspicious sign.[4] Pilavoğlu's father had encouraged him to become a civil servant. When Pilavoğlu informed his father that he had abandoned his law studies, Ahmet Efendi went secretly to Hüseyingazi mountain with some of his friends to perform *namaz* and *zikr*.[5] In the years that the *ezan* was publicly recited in Turkish, Ahmet Efendi and his friends continued to recite it in Arabic.[6] This is followed by a discussion of Pilavoğlu's education related to his religious authority, and command of Arabic:

> Some scholars and teachers criticized Pilavoğlu, saying; 'He did not study at madrasa, he did not memorize the 'nasara yansuruyu,'[7] he did not have [knowledge of] Arabic, how can he learn and perform *ijtihad*[8] with only the knowledge of Sufism?'[9] Kamil Tınal, who was uncomfortable with these criticisms, asked Pilavoğlu in 1952, 'My master, I do not appreciate these types of words that people say about you, however I am also astonished by your *fatwa*-s and *ijtihad*, please could you explain how and where you obtained this almighty knowledge and wisdom?'[10]

Pilavoğlu's answer:

> In 1931, one of the descendants of Zubayr ibn al-Awam[11] who was a Medinan [and possessed] almighty wisdom and knowledge of Sufism, and the manager of the Arif Hikment Library, came to Istanbul. While Istanbul's famous ulama and Sufis were visiting him, one of his relatives took me on the appointed day [when the Medinan] spoke. He [the Medinan] bestowed on me great love and after a while saw talent in me, after that I saw pressure to acquiesce to the family of the Tijaniyya *tarikat* with *icazet*, his apparent knowledge and capacity in Sufism gained fame in the eastern and western world…[12]

The text moves on to Pilavoğlu's description of his book *Tasavvuf ve Ahlak:* [13]

> The foundation of the *tarikat* is self-love. The people who hate themselves are not on the Sufi path. Love is the essence of the *tarikat*. You cannot be initiated [on the Sufi path without] enough of this essence. May you love the beloved created.[14]

An interview with Pilavoğlu is then included. He responds to accusations made by the public in response to an article from 1 April 1968, published in the *tarikat*'s newspaper *İlahi Işık* (Divine Light).[15] The article, titled, "O teachers, dervishes come to the path of the Prophet" provoked claims that Pilavoğlu's followers are fanatics and reactionaries, and false adherents to the *tarikat*. A summary of the article is provided:

> Where are you going after leaving the path of the Messenger of Allah? The One who has mercy on the worlds, who gives the gift of divine light to the worlds, your interpretation of the Qur'an by other paths will never agree with the Qur'an, none of the 'people of the book' can be compared to the endless wisdom [of the Qur'an] …In this religion, there is no real, true guide [except] the Messenger of Allah… Some dervishes and religious men who wrote treatises memorize these [instead of] the Qur'an, [but this] cannot be [a replacement for] the Qur'an and *tafsir*. …O Muslim scholars, while there are shaykhs [who] are messengers of Allah, he [Muhammad] is the greatest guide to humanity, do not be absorbed [in] the famous name of another.[16]

Pilavoğlu is then asked about claims that he had been affiliated with the Nakşibendi :

> I was not educated in a shaykh's training. The Messenger of God educated me with his training, I was needed [by the community].

The next question asks Pilavoğlu about another article in the same issue of *İlahi Işık,* in which an explanation of a *Hadith Sharif* was written:

> The one who sees the most pious[17] dream is the one who says the truest word, pious dreams are a type of message to people.

The interviewer explains that Pilavoğlu met with religious scholars, teachers, and state-appointed heads of religious affairs of the time. Some of these people expressed admiration for Pilavoğlu's knowledge and charismatic personality. Others were not as attracted to him and kept their distance.[18] The interviewer refers again to *Tasavvuf ve Ahlak,* quoting from the book:

> Those who have studied [Islamic] science and spiritual knowledge without knowing their soul plunge [suddenly] into certain claims. The people with such claims are drifting [in the direction of] Nimrod....[19] Many scholars and shaykhs, immersed in praise from their students, become arrogant and are led to believe that they are true *murids*, they fall into the pit of heresy [because] they are veiled from the truth.[20]

In 1943, Pilavoğlu, with 24 of his friends were subpoenaed in court for attempting to establish a *tarikat*. They were tried according to article 667 of the Penal Code, which dealt with violations of *zawiya* and *tekke* closures. A report of the trial was published in *Ulus* newspaper. A summary of the article includes a portion of Pilavoğlu's testimony during the trial, saying:

> …I wanted to be useful to my nation, my country, I wanted to act with the morality of the Prophet.[21]

A summary of the statement that Pilavoğlu gave to the police at the time of arrest (prior the appearance in court):

> In 1926, I met a famous member of the ulama Abdülkadir Havari Medeni during a visit to Istanbul.[22] I was visiting one of the Beirut scholars, when he told me to meet with this person [who had come] from Mecca named Abdülkadir. I was curious, so I went to the Hagia Sophia to see him.[23] During the meeting, I asked Medeni, How I could be useful to my *millet*?[24] Medeni advised me to follow the *Sunnah*, to fear God, practice mindfulness of God in my work, and to pray a lot. Medeni died shortly after the meeting, which I kept secret for several years while I studied *tafsir*, al-Buhari, hadith, and had no association with the *tarikat*, didn't bother anyone, and remained distant during the rise of communism and fascism.[25]

The following section summarizes another newspaper article published in *Vatan*, also in 1943. The newspaper describes Pilavoğlu as a wealthy man who owns a commercial shop, a profession which he had acquired to "support and keep the *tarikat* honestly."[26] The article goes on to describe the same court appearance described in the *Ulus* newspaper article, but with different details, such as when the judge asked Pilavoğlu how he obtained *icazet* for the Tijaniyya, which Pilavoğlu described in detail, reiterating that he received it from Medeni.

The next section describes the first of several public recitations of the *ezan* in Arabic in 1942. Sadık Çakırtepe was the first of Pilavoğlu's *mūridler* (followers/disciples) to recite the *ezan* in Arabic following the Friday sermon at the Zincirli mosque in Ankara. Çakırtepe was joined in his recitation by Yusuf Özcan. Several gendarmes shortly arrived to stop them. Çakırtepe and Özcan were beaten by the gendarmes as well as the police that arrived later. When they were tried in court for the incident, they were asked why they recited the Arabic *ezan*. Özcan responded:

> Muslims have recited the same call for 1300-some years. To change the way it is read is to become an enemy of the Prophet and the Qur'an.

The judge overseeing the proceedings heard this response and released them without charge, saying: Well done, Yusuf Effendi. If there were 100 people as brave as you, religion would not be a mysterious enigma [of mystics].[27]

According to the author, the judge was subsequently deposed by the CHP.[28] Similar protests undertaken by Pilavoğlu's followers punctuated the newspaper headlines in the eight years (1941-1950) around the time of the incident in the Zincirli mosque.[29] The author describes many of these protests which took place in many locations throughout Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, etc.). The subsequent arrests of the Tijani culprits appeared in headlines of many different newspapers. Some recitations of the *ezan* in Arabic were carried out during sessions in Parliament. Towards the end of these descriptions, the author refers to a statement given by Pilavoğlu in *İlahi Işık* regarding the word *Tanrı:*

> The [one] called *Tanrı* is not from the essence of the Qur'an, it is given to tangible figures, this would be splitting in two the god of the sky; actually, the Divine One cannot be called in [this] way.[30]

Pilavoğlu lived not far from his close coreligionist named Ömer Yıldız in Ankara. People came from various towns and villages all over Turkey to meet with them and engage in discussion. Pilavoğlu would offer tea to his visitors when they came to his office, sometimes inviting them to share dinner. Often after these dinners, a small group would perform *zikr* together. The author quotes extensively from *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk* about the passion entailed in performing *zikr*, highlighting the depth of pious devotion required to elicit such passion, which many people fail to grasp because they cannot be convinced to fully submit to the will of God. In the final paragraph, the author acknowledges the widespread reports in newspapers that Tijanis attempted to break statues and busts of Atatürk:

> Yes, a few *müridler* have attempted to break busts and statues, with only thoughts of themselves. [These actions] are of no interest to Kemal Pilavoğlu and the *tarikat*… It is unimaginable that a man who has published close to 200 books and hundreds of newspaper articles could be behind such actions.[31]

Hacc'a Gidişi (Going on Hajj) pp. 23-33

Pilavoğlu embarked on hajj on 2 September 1950, with 21 friends, *ihvanlar* (brethren, or coreligionists), and his wife and children. Details including how Pilavoğlu travelled to Istanbul, and the name of the ferry his party boarded in Eminönü are included. The same day he arrived in Istanbul the party attended Friday prayers at the Eyüp Sultan mosque. The *türbe* (tomb) of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari[32] in the Eyüp Sultan mosque complex had been closed for 28 years but reopened on the day of their visit. The party travelled by ship to Jeddah. During their journey, Pilavoğlu worked on a book titled *Muhiddini Arabi'den* (*From Muhiddin Ibn Arabi)*. This book is about the Andalusian ulama, who revered Ibn Arabi as "sahili bulunmayan bir deniz…" (a sea that does not find a shore).[33]

Hac Hakkındaki Görüşleri (Opinions on the Hajj) pp. 24-25

This section describes Pilavoğlu's book, *Hac Rehberi*. This book discusses the centrality of Mecca in worship and devotion, and "burası tecelliyatı ilahiyenin makarrı merkezidir (here [Mecca] is the capital center of Divine manifestation." This section also describes Pilavoğlu's meeting with a Tijani shaykh while in the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia.[34] During the meeting, Pilavoğlu's command of Arabic was questioned by the shaykh, to which Pilavoğlu responded: "Arapçayı bilirim ama söylemeye emir yok" (I know Arabic, but do not [have] command [of] speaking).[35] The shaykh requested that Pilavoğlu lead the congregational prayer, and then after the prayer Pilavoğlu could read from the Qur'an with an Arab accent.

Hac Dönüşü (Return from Hajj) pp. 25-27

Pilavoğlu's activities resumed after completing the hajj; he attended meetings and engaged in religious discussions, *zikr,* etc. These meetings occasionally grew very loud due to the exuberance of the participants, chanting *Lailaheillah*. Sometimes they were taken to police stations and interrogated about their rituals. In one court appearance, the judge asked the President of Religious Affairs if he was willing to teach him the meaning of *Lailaheillah*.[36] The author describes a series of other court cases related to the group's religious activities. During one hearing, the judge subpoenaed a doctor to the court as an expert witness to assess Pilavoğlu's mental state. The doctor testified:

> Although Pilavoğlu was one of the best students in school, he could have been in a better position; possibly there is madness in this? He abandoned this potential.[37]

The court ruled that Pilavoğlu would remain under observation for three months to monitor his mental state. The analysis culled from this observation from another expert in Istanbul only expressed astonishment at Pilavoğlu's level of religious knowledge relative to his age (45). The reports of the doctors concluded that Pilavoğlu was in good health.

Tarikatçılıkla Suçlanması (Accusations of Being in favor of the Reestablishment of *Tarikatlar*) pp. 27-29

On the 22 June 1951, Pilavoğlu was arrested, along with dozens of fellow Tijanis, for "issuing statements and committing deeds against secularism and for *tarikatçılık."* The trial continued for two years. They were tried under many articles of the Penal Code, including article 677. The court's statement in accordance with these articles found Pilavoğlu, along with 74 others, guilty of being in contrary to secularism, the establishment, its organization, and administration, as well as the administration of society. They were also accused of producing propaganda designed to influence social, political, and legal orders of the state. Pilavoğlu was specifically accused of attempting to establish his personal religious

influence by using the title *mürşid*. Pilavoğlu was sentenced to a fine of 15,000 lira and ten years in prison; five years of which would be served in exile in Bozcaada, and five under probation.[38]

Temyiz (Appeal) p. 29

In 1953, Pilavoğlu and Ömer Yıldız submitted an appeal of their sentence on the grounds that their imprisonment in Ankara was carried out according to incorrect charges. They claimed that during the 1950 hearing, the court made no mention of its decision regarding the performance of religious ceremonies and rituals. The defendants claimed they were intimidated by the police at the time of incarceration and forced to provide statements. They also alleged that originally, they were charged only for using the titles "shaykh" and *mürşid,* and so the terms of their prison sentences were too heavy for only this crime. According to the author, Pilavoğlu testified during the appeal:

> My only intention is to win God's approval [and] be useful to my *millet*. I am very devoted to the Prophet, and I wanted to explain the morality of the Prophet to my fellow citizens.[39]

During Pilavoğlu's time in prison, the author asserts, the other Tijanis did not abandon him. They paid him regular visits and wrote to him regularly. They often described their problems in their letters, asking for his advice on both spiritual and profane issues. Pilavoğlu responded to hundreds of letters during his incarceration. In one 1956 letter, he says:

> All these miseries [of prison] are enhancing our spirituality. …God bestows blessing after blessing. We have gotten rid of the bad habits of our souls, [and] rejected cruelty by having been subjected to it. No matter how hard one is, unless they are subjected to such cruelty, they too would not become sharper as a result [of being subjected to such harshness] … If God loves a servant, the Lord blesses them with troubles. [40]

The author notes that 42 of the letters written by Pilavoğlu from prison to his coreligionists were printed in book form. The preface to this book is included, which explains that the letters were written to comrades, friends, and coreligionists.

Bozcaada'ya Gidişi (Going to Bozcaada) pp. 33-40

Under police supervision, Pilavoğlu with several Tijanis were sent to Bozcaada in 1958, where he would remain until 1974. Upon arrival, they hired a house near the mosque where most of the Muslim community resided. After three days, they moved to a larger three-storey house with a garden in the Greek neighborhood, which the author describes in detail. Pilavoğlu's wife and children joined him from Ankara after some time. His coreligionists did not abandon him on Bozcaada but continued to pay him visits. In the first few years, they were questioned by the authorities about why they came, how long, and where they would stay. Pilavoğlu continued to write prolifically while he was there. He was well-

respected among the Greeks, who had endless trust in him. They would take him at his word when dealing with any business. In one instance, a Greek named Sokrat would visit Pilavoğlu often. Much later, Sokrat embraced Islam because of these visits.[41]

The local priest came to Pilavoğlu in 1969 after news of the Apollo moon landing. The priest asked him, "Master, do you believe this?" Pilavoğlu showed him photographs of the moon, and then the priest was amazed that he had not believed it. Color photographs of the moon and space adorned the walls of the master's house for a while.

In 1968, Pilavoğlu bought many vineyards that had been put up for sale by the Greeks on the island. He also had many services established on the island; he had roads and fountains built, and mosques repaired. He commissioned a modern bakery, community gardens, and established modern farms that grew produce for the people of the island, and commissioned facilities to meet the demand for milk, yogurt, etc. He was a great leader in many business areas for the island amongst people who only dealt with grapes and wine. Some of the grapes in the vineyards were not sold to the winemakers on the island because of the transportation difficulties or not being sold. The grape farmers asked him, "what should we do?"

The next paragraph describes one day when Pilavoğlu and some *müridler* were in his office, discussing their thoughts on the Nurcu movement. In Pilavoğlu's view:

> I believe that when it's sunny, there is no view of the stars. The Nurcus thought they would establish a sharia state. [Adnan] Menderes was my classmate in the Ankara law school faculty. He [Menderes] turned a blind eye [to their goals] to benefit from them.[42]

Ankara'ya Dönüşü (Return to Ankara) p. 40

In 1974, Pilavoğlu returned to Ankara, where he continued to write and publish. His coreligionists remained faithful to him in good days, bad days, sickness, and health. On 2 October 1977, Pilavoğlu was buried with the prayers and *takbir* of his family and dear coreligionists. Even after death, they still did not abandon him, and continue to recite the *Fatiha* and visit his grave.[43] This section is concluded with the salutation, "Ruhuna El Fatiha."

Babası Hafız Ahmet Efendi Kendilerine Pilavoğlu Denmesinin Sebebini şöyle anlatır ([Pilavoğlu's] father Hafız Ahmet Efendi the reason for being called Pilavoğlu) p. 42

400 years ago (sometime in the early to mid-16th century), seven descendants of the Prophet came from Medina to Ankara, during a time of famine. They stayed there for three months. However, they could not bear the famine, so four of them returned to Medina, two went to Bolu,[44] finally settling in Taşköprü, and one remained in Ankara. Still in the time of famine, the one who remained in Ankara set up a stall in the

Thursday market in Hamamönü district, cooking and distributing *pilav*[45] to the people. The people who came to the market started to address him as Pilavoğlu.[46]

Evliği (Marriage) p. 42-43

In 1942, at the age of 36, Pilavoğlu married Emire Hanımefendi, the daughter of İsmail Efendi, the chief clerk in the court of appeals. They had a son named Ahmet, and two daughters named Şayeste and Neriman. With love, respect, and esteem for her husband, Emire patiently endured Pilavoğlu's incarceration without complaint. For 15 years on Bozcaada, she prepared breakfast, lunch, and dinner and performed the most important occupation of motherhood. Although she occasionally had help at home, the responsibility rested on her shoulders. She was a mother to all the Tijani brethren. On 14 September 2012, she passed away.

Kızı Şayeste Altınbaş'ın M. Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Ada'daki Özel Hayatına Ait Hatıraları (His Daugther Şayeste Altınbaş's Memories of M. Kemal Pilavoğlu's private life on the Island) pp. 44-46

One of Altınbaş's strongest memories of her father was his strictness around and devotion to prayer. She remembers that he would advise his family and brethren to pray before anything else. He was devoted to prayers from dawn until dusk. Each day began with the morning prayer, followed by daily memorization lessons given by Pilavoğlu. Then, Pilavoğlu and his fellow Tijanis would have soup for breakfast, often joined by other guests. Sometimes the local Greek priest would join them. Pilavoğlu greeted him respectfully, and they would sit together and engage in discussion. A peaceful family environment without gossip was very important to Pilavoğlu. He also insisted on silence while he was writing, and warned everyone not to disturb him, otherwise he would become enraged. Altınbaş says that her father was a well-respected member of the community in Bozcaada, and people would often approach him for advice. She recalls an instance shortly before he died, he was asked:

> Master, what is your advice to us after you leave this world?

Pilavoğlu responded:

> My advice and testaments are written in my books. Read my books and continue on the path of Allah and the Messenger.[47]

İlime ve Eğitime Verdiği Önem (The importance given to [Religious] Knowledge and Education)[48] 46-47

This section describes Pilavoğlu's views about *ilim* (religious knowledge). Pilavoğlu says:

To know the truth about everything depends on [one's] ilim. … hearts that do not find life with ilim can be judged to be dead. The knowledge of God is endless… Those who say 'I know everything' are the worst kufr (nonbelievers).

Pilavoğlu attached great importance to education, hoping that young people would cultivate a desire to learn piety and culture. He had an extensive library with thousands of books, as well as subscriptions to foreign magazines. He read the newspaper daily. He aimed to establish an Islamic radio station to reach Muslims across the world. One day, one of his fellow Tijanis told Pilavoğlu that he wanted to send his son to an *İmam Hatip* school.[49] Pilavoğlu replied:

> İmam Hatip [schools] are useful in our homeland. But to have more pious Muslim doctors, judges, and engineers would be even more useful; if possible [encourage] your son to [become] a doctor.

Kur'an-ı Kerim Hakkındaki Not'ları (Notes about the Glorious Qur'an) pp. 47-50

The author summarizes sections from some of Pilavoğlu's books and his articles in *İlahi Işık*, and what Pilavoğlu describes as "the European darkness of ignorance." The latter refers to the need to bring the "Divine light of Islam" to the region. Once the message of Islam reached them, Europeans would be inclined to "abandon their idols and kneel before Allah."[50] Pilavoğlu concluded that the reason Islam had not been taken up by Europeans was because of poor translations of the Qur'an and Islamic texts. In one of his works called *Kur'an-ı Kerim İnsanlara Ne Öğretiyor* (*What People Learn from the Qur'an*), Pilavoğlu includes the view of Tevfik Nahas, who according to Pilavoğlu was president of Al-Azhar University's association of professors:

> We are examining translations of the Qur'an in foreign languages. We have come across many errors that completely change the meaning in these translations, [some of which] are well-known in the world, like Palmer's.[51]

Pilavoğlu further notes that many Turkish translations of the Qu'ran are equally rife with errors. The author includes a selection of quotes showing that Pilavoğlu clearly believed "the language of Islam is Arabic" and "the message of Islam was transmitted in Arabic,"[52] and so it is a mistake to separate the meaning from the words of the Qur'an by attempting to translate them. Pilavoğlu also bemoaned those Muslim scholars who cited work of "foreign orientalist Christian" scholars of Islam. When asked by the *Mufti* of Bozcaada his thoughts on Islamic philosophy, Pilavoğlu responded:

> In Islam there is no philosophy. There is the Prophet, four Caliphs, [and] the companions of the Prophet. They were immaculate people who did not philosophize. They were committed to the purity of Islam.[53]

Namaz Hususundaki Âdetleri (Practices Regarding Prayer) pp. 50-52

This section describes Pilavoğlu's response to a question about how to worship the Prophet, and how to perform *namaz.* There are many specific recommendations, including which portions of the Qur'an to read as part of optional (but recommended) supplements to each of the daily prayers. For instance, he advises that *Surah Al-Layla* is read before one's morning prayers.[54] Also included are recommendations for the number of *rakats* (the cycles of prescribed movements and words while performing *namaz*) that can be optionally added to the required amount for each daily prayer, and for adding optional practices into one's Friday and holiday prayers.

Oruç Hususundaki Adetleri[55] (Practices Regarding Fasting) 52-53

This section describes Pilavoğlu's recommendations about optional fasting[56] during the times in the three months (*Rajab, Saʿbān,* and *Shawwal)* when fasting is recommended (but optional), optional fasting on Mondays and Thursdays, for *Dhu al-Hijjah,* and long fasts during other times.[57]

Hediyeleşmesi (His [Pilavoğlu's] Gifting) p. 53

This section says that receiving and giving gifts is a good practice which fosters intimacy and generates conversation. The author describes a time on Bozcaada when a soccer team was visiting the island. They told Pilavoğlu about an upcoming match and asked him to pray for them. After chatting with them for a while, Pilavoğlu gifted them a camera.

Eserleri (His [Pilavoğlu's] Works) 53-57

Pilavoğlu's biggest activity was writing religious articles and publishing books. His first attempt became the famous book called *Din Rehberi* (Guide to Religion). The Head of Religious Affairs wanted to print this book, but Pilavoğlu refused, and had it printed himself in Istanbul. In 1949 *İbretler Hikmetler* (Lessons of Wisdom) was printed. A lawyer from Ankara named Nesimi Aktürk sent Pilavoğlu a favorable review of the book, saying:

> Kemal Pilavoğlu belongs to an ancient, honorable, virtuous, and religiously knowledgeable Ankara family. In his works every composition powerful meaning is conveyed by this young scholar… above all, his concise wisdom from books about *fiqh,* followed by his concise and cautionary *Komünizme Hücume* is a timely masterpiece.[58]

Komünizme Hücume was published in 1949 but was withdrawn from the market by Soviet Russia and the CHP. Pilavoğlu argues in the book that "Komünistlik dini ve milli kültürün en büyük düşmanıdır" (Communist religion and nationalist culture are the biggest enemies)."[59] On the cover of the book is a quote, written in Atatürk's handwriting:

> Şurası unutulmamalıdır ki Türk aleminin en büyük düşmanı Komünistliktir!
>
> It should not be forgotten that the biggest enemy of the Turkish world is Communism!... It must be crushed wherever it appears.[60]

In the book Pilavoğlu asserts that Atatürk never understood secularism as a form of atheism. Atatürk knew that religion is part of the nation, and he was the enemy of fanaticism, superstition, and communism. In the following paragraph, the author explains that in 1951, at the age of 45 Pilavoğlu had already produced more than ten works.

The author quotes from *İlahi Işık*, recounting how Pilavoğlu had sent copies of *Din Rehberi* and *Ahlak-ı Peygamberi* (*Ethics of the Prophet*) to Dayfullah, a relative of King Abdullah, who "received them with great joy" and sent his congratulations, telling Pilavoğlu that he would have the works published in Arabic.[61]

In 1978, H. Yusuf Özcan and Osman Karapınar partnered up to open a shop called "Pilavoğlu Kitabevi" in the vicinity of Hacıbayram Mosque in Ankara, selling mostly Pilavoğlu's books. More recently Pilavoğlu's son-in-law, Mehmet Altınbaş had Pilavoğlu's books printed in the local languages in Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Crimea, Azerbaijan, and other Turkic republics, which was followed with interest by these people who spent years under the influence of communism.

In 1966, *İlahi Işık* was launched. Most of the newspaper, released every fifteen days, was written by Pilavoğlu. On the front page of the first issue was the headline "Niçin Çıkıyoruz (Why we Emerge)" accompanied by an explanation of the newspaper's aim:

> [To] inform and endear humankind to Muhammad, who was born as a Divine Light. If the true face of His Divine Light is known and loved, the truth of Islam can be understood.[62]

The articles in the newspaper, which continued publication until 1974, often aroused large repercussions and reactions. Pilavoğlu continued to publish, ignoring these reactions. The author asserts that after a short time these negative reactions came to an end, because it became apparent that his writings were based on Qur'anic verses and *hadith sharif* (Muhammad's own words). The newspaper included a "question and answer" section, where Muslims and non-Muslims from all over Europe and America would send their questions which Pilavoğlu would answer by drawing from the Qur'an and hadith. This caused a backlash from other Muslim communities and other *tarikatlar*. These answers were clear and simple, far from demagoguery.

Vefatı (His [Pilavoğlu's] Demise) pp 57-58

A few months after some time in the hospital, Pilavoğlu died in his home in Ankara in 1977, due to complications from diabetes. In his final hours, he struggled to even roll up the sleeves of his pyjamas as he recited the call to prayer but insisted on praying. That evening, he took his last breaths. Yusuf,[63] along

with other Tijanis recited the *Janazah* (funeral) prayer for Pilavoğlu in his house. This section is concluded with the salutation, "Ruhuna El Fatiha."

The next pages (60-64) are selections from Pilavoğlu's explanations of the *Salatul Fatihi* and the *Jawaratul Kemal*.[64] Resembling Pilavoğlu's own explanations throughout his works, the prayers are broken down phrase-by-phrase, first appearing in Arabic transliterated in Latin script with a Turkish translation, followed by an explanation.

On pages 65-67 an index is provided, which lists words that are uncommon in modern Turkish. Most of the words, directly from Arabic, are listed on the left, with a modern Turkish definition or equivalent listed on the right. For example, the word *icazet* (*ijazah*) appears on the left, with the Turkish term *izin vermek* (to give permission). The following page is a title page for *Gazete Küpürleri* (Newspaper Clippings), on pages 70-87. The section includes grayscale photographs of newspaper headlines from 1932-1968, arranged chronologically. Some of the headlines are referred to in the author's discussion. Pages 90-103 includes a series of grayscale photographs of Pilavoğlu from many periods in his life, from 1951 to the early 1970s.

Chapter 7
Summary Translations: Pilavoğlu's Works
Part I: *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına Kadar Hayatı ve Hatıraları*

Publication Details

Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına Kadar Hayatı ve Hatıraları* / *The Messenger's Forty years of Life and Memories* (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 3rd edition, 2010, reprint of 1961).

ISBN: 978-6054292-19-6

Paperback, 272 pages. Thermal binding.

Appearance, Cover pages, table of contents, index

The front cover is a color photograph of Al-Masjid an-Nabawi (the Prophet's Mosque) in Medina. A description of the cover image is not included anywhere in the book, but the mosque is unmistakeably identifiable because of the signature green dome over Muhammad's tomb. On the back cover appears a poem titled, "Örnek Resûl varken / Başka örnek aranmaz" (When there is the example of the Prophet / No other example is required).

The Table of Contents (*içindekiler*) appears at the end of the book (pp. 263-265), followed by a numbered list of "Müellifin Çıkan Eserleri (Works of the Author)" (pp. 266-272), with 196 titles. Inside the book, the offset print crop formatting mark is partially visible and legible.

Önsöz (Preface), p. 3

This book is an account of Muhammad's birth, childhood, characteristics, and his forty years of life. At the same time, the book examines the claims made by European and Islamic scholars about Muhammad's subtleties and his desire to teach humanity with love. There is no doubt that future generations will submit to this knowledge. Every face of society will find happiness and peace through familiarity with this knowledge. Because of this, they who possess this knowledge will be well-known and well-liked members of society.

The Messenger Muhammad is the greatest example for all people. True Islam cannot be understood without knowing this. This remains on the lips and within the hearts of believers. This profound example is the greatest service which informs humanity in every respect. Simple minds, narrow in their thinking, no doubt will fail to reach this truth. Arbitrary or subjective ideas found on a

superstitious path lead to tyranny. The greatest blessing would be to offer this objective knowledge of Muhammad, and to present these results of scientific research.[1]

This book is to enlighten its readers with all the objective knowledge (*ilm*), and to clarify the truth. Blessed and happy are those who know this and love him Muhammad.[2]

8 May 1961| İmroz

Poetry

On page 4, there are two short poems inspired by *Divan* poetic structure.[3] Sixty-one similar poems appear throughout the entire book, all with the same heading; "MUHAMMED ALEYHİSSELAM'A."[4] These appear somewhere in nearly every section, and sometimes more than once. There are three poems (pp. 123, 164, 182-183) with only slight variations to this title: BEYİT MUHAMMED ALEYHİSSELAM'A, MUHAMMED ALEYHİSSELAM'A İLTİCA, and PEYGAMBERİMİZ. There is no specific placement for these metres within the text. Some of them appear at the end of a section, and some appear interspersed in the prose. The length of the poems varies from one line to as long as twenty-four. For example:

MUHAMMED ALİYHİSSELAM'A[5]
Yanan kalbe devâsın sen
Bulunmaz bir şifâsın sen
Muazzam bir dehâsın sen
Habibi kibriyâsın sen (Sallahu Aleyhi Vesellem)

MUHAMMED ALEYHİSSELÂM'A
Cehil kaldırdın, neşri envar eyledin
Dini hak talim edip verdin kalplere safâ
Evvelinin ahirinin İlmîni ihya eyledin
Merhaba ey Fahri âlem Muhammed Mustafa
(Sallallahu Aleyhi Vessellem)

Batı Bilginlerinin Muhammed Aleyhisselâm Hakkındaki Beyanları (Western Scholars' statements about the Messenger Muhammed) pp. 12-14

This section begins with a list of several "Western Scholars," each followed by a brief explanation by Pilavoğlu about their statements on or relationship to Islam.

English writer Bernard Shaw, said this about the Messenger Muhammad:

> I have studied this wonder. Europe will beget a religion for a thousand years. I predict[6] this will be Islam. Because Europe has not found a religion with substance that will satisfy the soul. The religion that combines this substance with [the needs of] the soul is the religion of Muhammad, which is Islam.

One of the British Lords, Headly,[7] said after he accepted Islam:

> After seeing the simple and enlightened path of Islam, I became like a man finding the light of day in the darkness.

A Professor of Arabic at Cambridge University:

> The Prophet Muhammad's (Peace be Upon Him) call to jihad is right and true. This invitation [to jihad] is not sent by a servant. This invitation is sent by Allah alone, who is unique in everything.

British Bernard Shaw wrote in an article:

> In the next century, Europe will perhaps come to appreciate this religion more due to its usefulness when it comes to dealing with problems. Take my predictions seriously. Many British and people from other European countries have already found (literally; entered) the religion of Muhammad. Thus, I can say that Europe has begun to Islamize.

Thomas Carlyle[8] in his Book of Heroes:

> Muhammad was a calm and tremendous soul. Indeed, he was one of those sincere people. Allah created him to be sincere. While [other] people were busy debating over details, he [Muhammed] discovered the truth within his own spirit. The words of this person are direct and natural. They should not listen to anything else. Because there is nothing else.

John Davenport,[9] the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur'an:

> The unity brought by Prophet Muhammad defeated the Byzantine Empire within thirty years. It brought the Iranian Khosrow to the truth.[10] [It] conquered Syria and Egypt. Conquest from the Atlas [sea] to the Caspian Sea. All these vicinities for twelve centuries have been dominated by Muhammedanism. However, Muhammedanism[11] also departed from the regions of Spain and Northern/boreal Asia, [and] spread into Africa.

The Hero[ic] Prophet was a true prophet. His genius beat Zarathustrianism.[12] The conquering of India prevailed over the religion of Brahma. Even the religion of Buddha was defeated. The Orient[13] was subverted at every level. All of Africa from Egypt to Gibraltar was touched by Rome's hand. Ancient

Rome quivered and Eastern Rome,[14] that is; Constantinople, was captured.[15] Muslims captured[16] 36,000 cities, towns, and castles[17] in twelve years. They built 400,000 mosques there. From Alexandria to Tangier all of Africa has been illuminated with Prophet Muhammed's blessed light.[18] All the people from these places are like stars that day after day continue to radiate this virtuous light. The true path to gain world liberty was going to be to agree upon this truth and that it would spread across the earth. Don't these words, from the mouths of the greatest scholars, who at one time—God forbid—called Muhammed a liar, make you think a little?

A British Deputy in the House of Commons:

So long as the earth endures, the Qur'an will unite us in peace and prosperity.

His [the Deputy's] words should be applauded as the start of such a trend, [because] civilization is a product of the importance given to liberty and truth.

İngiliz Prenseslerinden Savvak İsmindeki bir Hanımın Müslümanlığı Kabul Ettikten sonra Londra Radyosunda Dünyaya <<Niçin Müslüman Oldum?>> Konuşmasının Özeti (Princess by the name of Shawwal On London Radio to the World: "Why did I Become Muslim?" Summary of her Speech)

This is a summary of a speech given by an "English Princess" about why she embraced Islam. The speech is undated and does not include any citations or references to outside or original sources. The speech is written in the first-person, from the perspective of "Shawwal," or Lady Evelyn Cobbold, who later became Zainab Cobbold.[19]

"Shawwal" discusses her transition to Islam from a Christian background. She explains that she has examined all religions, beginning with Christianity, and "…learned quite a bit about the religion of Buddha."[20] After slowly investigating still other traditions, none attracted her attention. She found Islam to be the most attractive, saying that she "admired the grandeur of this religion."[21]

"Shawwal" describes her religious background, explaining that she was never particularly enthusiastic about Christianity. She found Protestantism to be "soulless and without truth," and so abandoned it for Catholicism. This sect did not allay her doubt and hesitation, no matter how adamant the priests were. She had doubts about the idea of Jesus as savior, and the idea that he was some sort of "super-human" phenomenon. The Pope couldn't give her answers, but she didn't dare ask. She was afraid she would be called a heretic.[22]

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On the following two pages (18-19) first appears *ayet* 128 from *Surah at-Tawbah*. The verse is printed in Arabic, then transliterated, followed by an explanation in Turkish of the verse, which draws attention to

the message of truth delivered by Muhammad, his compassion for his community, and his sorrow over their sins.

On the next page is an image of a *Hilye-i Şerîf* in its standard layout: The *Basmalah* appears at the top, and the round seals of the *Rashidun* caliphs[23] appear in four corners surrounding the "belly" of the image which contains the main text, which is a description of Muhammad attributed to Ali. Below this "belly" is the "belt," in which appears *ayet* 107 of *Surah al-Anbiya'*.[24] Finally, at the bottom of the image is the "skirt," which is the conclusion of the text in the "belly."[25] The image is in Arabic with *ḥarakāt.* The next page is a translation in Turkish of the text. The next few pages are selections of *kaside* (odes in classical Arab style). For instance, there are four lines attributed to M. Nûri, a short poem of three stanzas of four lines each attributed to İbni Neccar,[26] and another longer poem, titled "Âşıkım Dostlar" (My Beloved Friends) of seven stanzas of four lines each, attributed to Ferâhi Fahri. A short list of footnotes accompanying these poems is labelled *lügatçe* (dictionary), with either a Turkish equivalent of words which appear in the poem, or a short explanation in Turkish. For instance, the phrase *Sana dehan,* in the poem attributed to İbni Neccar, appears with the corresponding term *ağız. Dehan*, or mouth, is from Persian, and *ağız* is the Turkish synonym.[27]

On the next page is another, oval-shaped seal in Arabic, with Muhammad written in calligraphy in the middle. Surrounding the name is a short verse, also in Arabic. Below the image is a transliteration, followed by a translation in Turkish, saying "Muhammad, you are the harbinger/ nobody can replace you/ you are the most intrepid of the prophets/ you have been given the keys to Divine victory/ wherever you turn you are aided by God."[28] On the next page is a selection from a poem titled "Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'a," attributed to Osman Kemalî.[29] The text is again accompanied by footnotes which provide Turkish explanations of the (mostly) Persian terms in the poem.

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Ecdadı (Muhammad's Ancestors), etcetera. 32-126

This section is an explanation of the Prophet Muhammad's ancestry, beginning with the lineage of his father Abdullah. A detailed account of Muhammad's entire life covers nearly the next 100 pages. Included in this are details such as Muhammad's lineage traced back to İsmâil (Ishmael) and İbrâhim (Abraham)[30] which also includes a detailed retelling of the events around the life of İsmâil. A family tree is provided, with Haşım[31] at the top, and the Prophet Muhammad's children at the bottom.[32] Details about Muhammad's mother, Âmine Abdullah,[33] Muhammad's birth and childhood, and an explanation of "The Reason Muhammad is an Orphan,"[34] are followed by two sections (separated chronologically by year; 577-579 CE; 579-595 CE) discussing Muhammad's childhood spent with his uncle Abdülmuttalib.[35] The next sections[36] discuss when Muhammad began work as a merchant with his uncle, including travel to

Yemen, his experience sheep herding,[37] and a section called "Muhammad's surrender to solemn oaths at the age of 22."

The narrative continues with details of Muhammad's marriage to his first wife Hatice,[38] when Muhammad took Ali[39] into his home to raise him when the latter was five years old, Muhammad's involvement in repairing the Ka'ba in 605 CE, the story of when Muhammad heard a speech given by Kusibni Said[40] during the annual Ukaz fair held in Mecca, and a description of when Muhammad began to pray inside the cave known as Hira and received the first revelations from God. A section in the form of a question titled, "What were the characteristics of those who loved Muhammad so much?" discusses Muhammad's family members, Hatice and Ebû Bekir,[41] and their relationship with Muhammad. The next section describes Muhammad's *yüksek seciyesi* (high morals), that allowed him to save humanity from their downfall, followed by two sections that list the names and appellations, and then "Other Names" of Muhammad that appear in the Qur'an. Many of the items on the lists include the corresponding *ayet* in which the name, appellation, or attribute appears.

The next section is again in the form of a question; "Why did they not love [or] know Muhammad?" A list of five reasons with corresponding explanations is provided. For example, the first reason is; "Riyaset sevdası idi (It was a love of power [among the Quraysh])."[42]

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'a Dūşman Olanlar, Onu Bilmek İstemeyenlerdir (Those who are enemies of Muhammad are those who do not want to know him) pp. 126-153

Pity upon those who think hostile words about Muhammad. There is no truth to the claims levelled against Muhammad, as well as against various aspects of Islamic tradition. For instance is the accusation that even the soundest hadith was called a fairy tale.[43] They instead gave great importance to those false hadith that served them. Also are those dissenters in Muhammad's own time.

Europeans are ignorant of and hostile to the early history of Islam. For instance, old Christian poets thought Muslims worshipped idols.[44] Many Europeans, such as Voltaire, Europe's most famous thinker, could not understand Muhammad.[45] Voltaire described Islam as a "false religion," declaring that "…those who call it [Islam] a religion are ignorant and untrustworthy."[46] Some common depictions of the European understanding of the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem. Bernard Shaw explains:

> The medieval priests of Europe, in their ignorance and fanaticism, portrayed Muslimness in the darkest colors… they hated Muhammad and accused him of being a fraud, that he was Satan, [and] the antichrist.[47]

The European depiction of Islam is false and ignorant. *Ayet* 213 from *Surah al-Baqara*[48] confirms this. Pilavoğlu concludes:

> Then I understood why Islam is more universal than all other religions. Islam, with a very liberal mentality, recognizes all the prophets. This tolerance does not exist in other religions.[49]

Although these European understandings of Islam may look like the "guesswork of ignorance," in fact these ideas were by design in the sense that European thinkers deliberately depicted Muhammad and Islam in a negative light, even fabricating hadiths:

> …the enemies [of Muhammad, the Europeans] took fabricated hadiths supported by the Jews… they tried to poison people with [these] stories. [50]

As the tyranny of the Church eroded, more free-thinking people began to seek the truth. These people would come to know Muhammad as a prophet and the bearer of universal truth, and that those who have already realized this have written about it.

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Tebligatına kadar Mekke Tevdihi Teslise, Muhtelif Putperestliğe Dönmesi Sebepleri (Until Muhammad's message of Unity [of God came] to Mecca, the various reasons for reverting to Paganism) pp. 154-159

All the prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, have preached the unity of God, according to *ayet* 213 from *Surah al-Baqara*. The essential truths (of the Unity of God) that have been obfuscated by the enmities among humans that have arisen because of arrogance and envy, is what has caused the divisions of faith into various sects. Before this division, humans all knew about and believed in the Divine Oneness of God in a single, universal faith. This idea is contextualized in the *Jahiliyyah* ("Age of Ignorance," or pre-Islamic Arabia) period in Arabia, where polytheistic beliefs, including ritual worship of idols, were prevalent.

İbni İshak[51] claimed that every house in Mecca had its own unique idol. Although the "Houses of Ishmael" practiced some of the precepts of Abraham's traditions, over time they too plunged into idolatry. The Arabs eventually forgot about the divinity of idolatry during Muhammad's preaching. His message destroyed their superstitions and their deities restored belief in the unity of God; they were informed of this truth by Muhammad.

Araplarda Esatiri Evvelinin Zuhuru (Evidence in Arab Mythology) pp. 160-161

People often turn to *esatir* (fables or fairy tales) in the face of the unknown. In the mythology of "Indian sources," it was believed that the world was a round hill set upon the backs of four elephants who rode atop a gigantic sea turtle swimming in an endless sea. These sorts of stories are not expressions of truth, but instead ideas invented by people to deal with the unknown. The Christian belief in the Trinity[52] is an example of the influence of the same sort of *eski felsefelerin* (old philosophies) which encroach on the Unity of God.

The ancient Turks had similar ideas of the Divine in the sense that their mythology described a dual, or binary *Tanrı* (god) split between the earth and the sky, which simultaneously inhabited everything, thus imbuing things like animals and plants with a Divine essence. This Divine essence is evidence of a primordial belief in the Oneness of God. Humans recognized this essence in all things and assigned divinity to them, which suggests that the idea of One God was merely latent, because knowledge of this idea had been lost over time because of enmity and the rise of sectarianism amongst humans.

Maddı Havassın Vasıl Olmadığı Mânevî Âlemler (The Joining of the Physical and Spiritual Worlds) pp. 162-164

This section begins by asking a series of questions about the inherent knowledge of sentient beings, such as bees and ants. For instance, "[arılar birer mühendis] Bu ilmîni nereden almış? (Where did [ants] acquire this knowledge [of becoming engineers]?)."[53] Knowledge of the physical world and our surroundings that can be obtained via the five senses, is not the only knowledge, and indeed this is not the only world which can be perceived. Celâleddini Rumi[54] explains that there are five senses beyond these five physical ones, which he calls *bedeni hisler* (body senses). Those senses beyond are the *rûhu hisler* (soul/spirit senses). It is with the latter *ilâhî* (divine) senses that humans have the capability to worship God and cultivate proximity to the Divine. If God could be known through bodily senses alone, even oxen and donkeys would have knowledge of God.

The appearance of prophets in the physical world in dreams, inspirations, revelations, and miracles demonstrates their existence. However, just as the sun can be seen with the eyes, and the scent of flowers can be understood by the nose, the sincere and righteous do not understand and believe in prophets in this way. Those deprived of faith search for these miracles, and thus are not true believers (in God). They are supporters of magic. For instance, the Pharaoh, deprived of true faith, witnessed the staff of Moses swallow the snakes of his magicians, still did not believe (in God). Only those who could see with the *nur* (divine light) of guidance truly believed in the messages of the prophets.

Rüyalar – İlhamlar – Misâl – Âlemleri (Dreams – Revelations – Examples – the Realms [of these]) pp.165-169

The non-physical senses allow humans to cultivate knowledge of God without the need for physical proof. Several references to verses from the Qur'an, and a few hadiths are included as justification. For instance, these three hadiths from imam Gazâli provide warnings against physical proofs of the Divine:[55]

1. Accepting outward/visual appearance as proof of the heavenly realm.
2. This apparition/occurrence is represented according to its visibility.
3. These visual occurrences usually have other explanations.

Celâleddini Rumi says:

> …to see with the eyes increases love. Love increases the sincerity of the heart. In this way, the senses can perceive great truths of the spiritual realm. One who discovers [this meaning in] the Qur'an and hadith has discovered how to learn the truth. Just as an explorer who examines the physical world reaches the truth, one who looks inward will find the truth of the spiritual realm. [56]

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Hususi Hayatına Umumi bir Bakış (A General Overview of the Prophet Muhammad's Personal Life) pp. 170-173

Muhammad always wore clean clothes. These were not new clothes, but he strictly observed cleanliness. He never wore red or yellow-colored silk clothes. Men generally should not be seen wearing these things. He mostly liked to wear white and/or green clothes, but would wear clothes of all colors (black, red, green, and yellow). Following this description, many more stories related to Muhammad's views on clothing, including when the Prophet was given some clothes and wanted to give them away, are included. Also discussed are details which describe the ideal way of getting dressed. Included are descriptions of food and drink that Muhammad consumed, as well as many of his daily habits. Details such as how many sips of water are ideal to consume are included. The reason for recounting these sorts of details is to strive to go about daily life just as Muhammad and the other four major prophets; their lives are the greatest guides.[57]

İnnerresûle Linûrihi Yestezaü Bihi Ve Sarimü Min Süyufüllahü Meslulin pp. 174-175

This section's title first appears in Arabic script, then a transliteration. The lines are attributed to Kabibni Züheyr.[58] Following the transliteration, the "manayı latifi (pleasant meaning)" of the text is provided, saying; "The Prophet is a torch that illuminates the world." A couplet from the famous *kaside* called "Banentı Suat" is included. A summary of the story of what led Züheyr to produce this poem follows.[59] This *kaside* is still considered a masterpiece of Arabic poetry.

Bir Rüya Âleminin Hidâyet Vesilesi (The Means of Guidance of the World of Dreams) pp. 176-178

This section is about a dream that causes a missionary named Fano to become Muslim. In the dream, he sees Muhammad, and comes to embrace Islam. European and American "İncil vâizleri" (literally; Bible preachers, or missionaries) used to go all over the world to convert Muslims, Zoroastrians, and Jews to Christianity. The book of Matthew says, "Do not get any gold or silver or copper to take with you in your belts-bag for the journey or extra shirt or sandals or a staff, for the worker is worth his keep."[60] Following

this is the story of a missionary named Fano, who went to Africa with the aim of "spreading the healing" of Christianity:

> One day, Fano had a dream. In the dream, on the banks of a river located in a large green valley, he came upon a date palm tree. A group of men, women, and children were sitting beneath date palm and olive trees, having fun. They were all European, and most of them English. They appeared to be on vacation or celebrating a holiday.
>
> Amongst the greenery of the right bank of the river, Fano was astonished when the people suddenly ended their songs, [put down] their instruments, and stopped dancing. An exciting stillness spread [amongst them] as he approached them.
>
> 'What's the matter?' He asked them.
>
> A feeling of magnitude and greatness of the [coming] event left everyone in deep amazement. The astonishment spread [through them] with the speed of electricity.
>
> 'Is a King coming?' He thought to himself, 'Has a grand event been organized?'
>
> No, word had spread: His Holiness Muhammad (PBUH), was coming. The founder of Islam, the world's greatest prophet, walked slowly along the riverbank. He had come. As he passed by this crowd, who was affiliated with another prophet, he looked at them with a compassionate smile, [and] everyone looked back in reverence and astonishment. Standing like an orphan amongst this crowd was Fano, who approached the side of the road where the Prophet would pass and assumed a respectful posture. His Holiness Muhammad (PBUH) approached the place where Fano stood, [and he] paused for a moment. Fano's entire body was shaking, his heart beat with excitement. With everyone watching, Muhammad's eyes, shining with divine light, met Fano's gaze. [Muhammad] turned his face, which shined with the luminous fire of divine love, to Fano, who was enraptured. Without saying a word, [Muhammad] took the blessed staff [he carried] in his hands and touched Fano on the shoulder, ordering him to be rewarded. Then the missionary [Fano] awoke.

Pilavoğlu's explanation of the dream's meaning:

> Muhammad [instilled] his favor on Fano's heart. When his [Muhammad's] staff touched Fano's shoulder, an ecstatic love [manifested] inside of him. Hatred and grudges against Islam suddenly dissolved with Muhammad's luminous glance. His love [for the Prophet] was instilled in his heart. Thus, this light was the light of Islam.

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ı Çok Seven Ebûzer Gıfariye Ait Bir Hatıra (A Memory from ʾAbū Ḏarr al-Ghifārī al-Kinānī, who loved Muhammad very much) pp. 179-183

This section is about Abu Dhar, who was either the fourth or fifth convert to Islam and emphasizes his profound love for Muhammad. For example: "Hiçbir kâlem onun bu halini, bu aşkını ifade edemezdi. (No pen could express this situation, this love.)"[61] Abu Dhar converted to Islam immediately, and then ran to the Ka'bah (at the time of the story, it was still a pagan temple) to publicly declare his faith. Muhammad told him to return to his clan, the Banu Gifar,[62] to teach his people about Islam.

According to this retelling of the story, all the members of his tribe enthusiastically embraced Islam. Abu Dhar was so pleased that he fell, prostrate on the ground, then raised his hands to the sky in praise; he had achieved salvation. Following this narrative are three lines from Sadii Şirazi's[63] poem "Balaghul Ula Bi Kamalihi," first provided in Arabic, then transliterated, with an explanation in Turkish. A poem by Pilavoğlu titled "Peygamberimiz (Our Prophet)" appears after the selection from Şirazi. The poem is comprised of nine quatrains, each with rhyming couplets.[64]

Resûlleri Anlamak Nasıl Olur? (How to Understand the Messenger) pp. 184-187

Prophets are perfect/complete people who are "officers of justice." It is not always easy to discern a true prophet; in the same way that the image of a virtuous person and of a bad person can resemble each other, the only way to distinguish gold from an imitation is to assay it with a touchstone. This metaphor of assaying gold to determine its purity to explain how to identify prophets is used repeatedly. There are five qualities of a prophet. The qualities are as follows:

1. Prophets are discerning, emotionally perceptive, very intelligent, and strong.
2. They are champions of truth; eminently truthful.
3. Prophets are endowed with trustworthiness; there is no deceptiveness in them. Every prophet informs people of God's word to the letter with no deception.
4. Prophets are endowed with resoluteness of character.
5. Prophets are endowed with chastity and virtue; they are far from all sins, big and small.[65]

İbni Kaldun[66] says that although people are "one in kind," each are distinguished by their unique senses. The senses of the prophets are distinguished by their angelic, even divine qualities. When it comes to sorcerers (e.g. false prophets) are three types of these:

1. They perform with miraculous influence. Philosophers call this "magic."
2. They use talismans.
3. They have influence over imaginary forces.

These false prophets influence the imagination with several forces and can manifest things that don't really exist. Philosophers call this "hocus pocus."[67] Magicians/sorcerers existed among the ancient

Babylonians, Chaldeans, Syrians, and Egyptians. Today these magicians/sorcerers exist primarily among those who occupy important positions. Concerning the societies that believe in, or are influenced by magic:

> Austrians fear magic more than anything. If they get sick, they think evil has possessed their soul. However, they believe they can be saved through the work of sorcery. They say that if they do not summon the magician, the unseen evil will kill them. For this reason, an Austrian might suppose they would die without the help of the magician. The magician will seek revenge. The sight of lightning, thunder, rain, etc., they attribute these to magic. In most of the oceanic islands, the practice of medicine is related to magic. Africans have great respect for sorcerers. They cure ailments [ranging] from bad news to drought. Amulets and talismans are used [in these practices] because the locals [Africans] believe in envy, the evil eye, etc. When the Spanish invaded Africa, the sorcery there intrigued them [the Spanish]. Ancient Egyptian scriptures show that there was a great respect for magic; magicians had their own monuments. The most advanced nation in sorcery were the Chaldeans. The ancient Babylonians and the Greeks also believed in magic. Muslims also took magic from the Jews, the Syrians, and Iranians. Whereas [true] Muslims violently rejected magic.

Not every wonder is a miracle, and that true miracles only come from wise, prophetic people. Abu Bakr did not need to witness a miracle before believing in Muhammad. Abdi ibn Hâtem, the leader of the Tayy,[68] his greatest miracle was his humility. The personality of Muhammad, who conquered the hearts of millions, was certainly a miracle. The inviting voice of God is also a miracle that will live forever.

Biz Müslümanlar İsâ Aleyhisselâm'I Tanıyıp Hürmet Ederken, Hıristiyanlar Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ı Niçin Tanıyıp Hürmet Etmiyorlar (Why do we Muslims Know [and] Respect Jesus, while Christians do not know [or] Respect Muhammad?) pp. 188-194

Since the first day of Islam, Jesus has always been treated with kindness and viewed with reverence. In the Qur'an, there are five things conveyed with blessings, and one of them was Jesus. In the time of the Prophet, the Christians and Zoroastrians were at war, there was a great excitement in Mecca. Muslims wanted Christians, who were people of the book, to achieve victory. During this time, the relationship between Muslims and Christians was completely different. In contrast to the respectful view of Jesus in Islam, Christians have written terrible things about the Prophet Muhammad, saying that "history is witness to this." Where did this hostility come from?[69] This hostility emanates from church indoctrination, which has spread its influence all over Europe and to American schools; they intentionally have no desire to understand Muhammad. While mosques were being destroyed in European areas, churches were being built in Muslim ones. This continues for several paragraphs.

Several *ayet* in the Qur'an mention Jesus. Answers about him can be found in *Surah al-Ma'idah*, such as:

> They have certainly disbelieved who say that Allah is Christ, the son of Mary. Say, 'Then who could prevent Allah at all if He had intended to destroy Christ, the son of Mary, or his mother or everyone on the earth?' And to Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them. He creates what He wills, and Allah is over all things competent.[70]

Some of the disputes between Muslims and Christians have arisen because of the latter's belief that Jesus was/is God. Some of the "false inventions" of Christian belief, are the belief in Jesus being the Messiah. Those who believe in Moses but deny Jesus offend Moses, and those who believe in Jesus but deny Muhammad offend Jesus. Thus, they find themselves in a conundrum, having denied all the prophets that God sent as a great blessing to the people. Muhammad (PBUH) is human. He was sent only to reveal the unity of God and to show the path of worship. This means that Muhammad is telling believers that he is human like them, that he is only acting on behalf of God (as opposed to acting *as* God). This is *şirk* (ascribing partners or equals to God), which God does not accept. *Şirk* is explained in *Surah al-Ikhlas*.[71] The first four *ayets* of *al-Ikhlas*[72] appear in the text in Arabic a transliteration, explanation, and interpretation.

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ı Tasdik ve Tebşir eden Dini Hanif Nedir? (What was the Orthodox Religion that Approved and Brought Glad Tidings of Muhammad?) Pp. 198-203

Hanif (piety, orthodoxy) is the inclination away from indecency. Several *ayets* from many *surahs* support this explanation (*Ar-Rum, al-An'am, An-Nisa, Al-'Imran*, etc.). İbni İshak says that the ideas of *hanif* also prevent people from worshipping idols.[73] İbni İshak's emphasizes that ongoing praise must be extended to God for blessing humankind with the knowledge of *hanif*, and that *hanif* itself should be a reminder that God's judgement is unmatched and above everything, and nothing can be hidden from God, and this judgement.

Hakikat Yolcusuna Hitap <<Mevlânâ'nın Kıssası>> An Address to the Traveller [on the Path] of Truth <<The Story of Mevlana [Rumi] >> pp. 204-211

Ey hakikat yolcusu!.. Her şeyi erbabından öğren… Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ı sen güzel ağızlardan işit.[74]
O truth seeker! Learn everything from [an] expert… Hear [about] Muhammad from beautiful mouths.

Following this entreaty is a selection from Rumi's *Masnavi-ye-Ma'navi*[75] beginning with the platitude, "Vaktile…" (Once upon a time, In the days of yore, etc.). The story begins with "an evil Jewish *padişah* (king, sovereign)" who was the only enemy of Jesus and those who followed him. The Jewish king denied Jesus' sovereignty[76] although he acknowledged the message of Moses. A *vezir* (vizier, or

minister/advisor) of the king explains that Christians conceal their beliefs out of fear of persecution, but that they remain devoted to their faith. Together, the *vezir* and the king hatch a plan to trick the Christians. The *vezir* explains to the king that he will pose as a Christian to gain their trust. To achieve this, the *vezir* convinced the king to maim him and then expel him from the king's court. The *vezir* would sow dissent amongst the Christians, with the goal that they would descend into sectarian groups. The plan mostly succeeded, except for one group who clung to the name "Ahmet" in the Bible, carrying the name in their hearts and on their faces:

> O people! Those who are dedicated to the name Ahmet (PBUH), of course their souls will be saved. It is certain that he [Muhammad] will intercede on behalf of these souls.

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Tarif ve Kur'ânın Beyan Ettiği Hazreti İsâ ile Bugünkü Hıristiyanlığın Alakası[77] Yoktur (Muhammad's [PBUH] Description and The Qur'an's Declaration [that] Jesus and Christianity today have no Connection). pp 212-226

According to the Qur'an, Jesus was a prophet like other prophets. His message, which he was sent to confirm was the same as the one given to Moses. Like all the other prophets, Jesus also foretold the coming of Muhammad. Proof of this assertion appears in *Surah al-Imran, ayet* 50.[78] Thus, Jesus declared that belief in God is the true path. The "Indian religions" played an important role in the development of the Trinity doctrine:

> The Trinity played an important role in the Indian Religions, in other words, the idea of three in one, [and] one in three, they introduced this doctrine of numbering in this blessed religion.[79]

This is the main reason that today's Christianity is completely separate from the message that Jesus originally preached. *Tafsir* from Fahri Râzi[80] related to *ayet* 50 of *Surah al-Imran*, provides more in-depth explanation of why this *ayet* is understood to refer to Jesus. Râzi's *tafsir* also confirms that the verse excludes the notion that Jesus considered himself a deity and the son of God, which is another reason that Jesus' original message is different from today's Christian beliefs. Jesus was part of the succession of prophets to receive God's message and did not come to cancel or change the messages of preceding ones, but to "…invite people to the most beautiful, pious ethics."[81]

Some of the larger events in the development and early history of Christianity are summarized which is meant to illustrate the digression of Christians throughout the tradition's history from Jesus' original message (to spread the message of belief in one God). This is underpinned by *ayet* 4 of *Surah al-Imran*.[82] The collation of the New Testament took place following Jesus' death. This is a problem in terms of delivering God's message via prophetic revelation, because the gospels were written about Jesus (as opposed to transmitted directly by him, as in the case of Muhammad, for instance) from the removed perspectives of those who often didn't know Jesus personally, such as the apostle Paul. Because of this

indirect transmission, it is not possible that these posthumous gospels are compatible with the messages transmitted by other prophets, who always confirm the books preceding their prophecy. In other words, because the New Testament (especially the gospels) came *after* Jesus' prophetic message, they cannot by this standard be considered part of it.

The hypostatic union is the belief in the union of Christ's humanity and divinity in one individual existence.[83] Heraclius failed to restore harmony in the Christian world in the wake of a deepening schism between the western (Latin) church and the eastern (Greek) because the latter rejected this "Calcedonian creed" which asserted that there were two natures in the incarnation of Christ. The periods of iconoclast controversy in the church[84] led up to the great schism of 1054, resulting in the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic differentiation. Christian assemblies in İznik, Ayasloğ,[85] and Kadiköy further transformed Christianity into a "paternal religion" not related to the original religion of Jesus.

The reverence for Jesus in this "paternal Christianity" is similar to the reverence for Ali among the followers of İbni Sebe.[86] Just as the Christians introduced the Trinity, the, "Hindistan, Mısır akidesi (the creed of India [and] Egypt),"[87] İbni Sebe also wanted to make a Trinity for Ali. İbni Sebe believed that Ali was not murdered. It was a devil impersonating Ali who was killed. Just as the Christians declared that Jesus would return at the End of Days, İbni Sebe preached that Ali would return and fill the world with justice. Just as the Christians established the papacy, the men of İbni Sebe also established a paternalist position. Just as the Christians viewed the heart's intention and its prayers as sufficient, the followers of İbni Sebe moved away from *wudu* (ritual ablution) and *namaz* (ritual prayers), thinking that conversations with a *mürşid* (spiritual guide) are sufficient. İbni Sebe's preaching, as with Christianity, will be judged, as it says in *ayet* 23 of *Surah al-Anbya*, "He cannot be questioned about what He does, but they will 'all' be questioned."[88]

This section ends with a couplet in Arabic attributed to Ali Şazeli.[89] A translation, followed by an explanation, the latter which points out that Muhammad was a human, but not like one you (addressed to the reader) know. Muhammad is "like a ruby among stones."[90]

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Tebliğatı Zamanında Kadar Şairler Ve Şiirlere Verilen Ehemmiyet (The Importance given to Poets and Poems at the time of Muhammad's [PBUH] Message) pp. 228-230

Since the dark ages, poets have played an important role in the Arab world. Most of Arab history since the *Jahiliyya* can be found in their poems. *Kaside* is an ode form of poetry, and is often a panegyric, written in praise of a subject, with seven couplets.[91] After the development of *kaside,* "…muallakarlar gelirdi (The Suspended Odes in the Ka'ba would come)."[92] According to Cevdet Paşa's book,[93] the most esteemed of the seven Suspended Odes was written by Emrül Kays.[94] Despite the fact that Kays'

Suspended Ode could never be compared to the Qur'an, his sister removed his poetry from all of its places and destroyed it all. There was no room for its survival, and it was all removed overnight. *Surah al-Yasin, ayet* 69, says:

> And in no way did We teach him [The Prophet] poetry; and in no way does it behove him.
>
> Decidedly [this revelation] it is nothing [else] except a Remembrance and an evident Qur'an.

The Qur'an is superior in all aspects, possesses more eloquence than all the Arab poets achieved over centuries. The *nur* which radiates from these poets fades in comparison to the *talik* (eloquence) of the shortest *ayet*.[95]

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Zamanı Saâdetlerinde Arap Yazısı ne Halde İdi? (In the Felicitous time of Muhammad, what was the Status of the Arabic Script?) Pp. 231-234

This section describes the history of Arabic writing. The first person to "write right to left," was from the Tayy community of Arabs. The derivation of Arabic from the Nabatean and Syriac abjads of 22 letters were used to denote 28 phonemes. The combining of *lam*[96] with an *elif*,[97] makes the abjad 29:

> The abjad consisted of (28) letters. It is 29 when a lam is added to the alif to form [the word] la, it was 29.[98]

Although this Syriac script changed over time under the influence of the Arabs, today's Arabic retains its essential features. By Muhammad's time, the Quraysh were writing with this system, who passed it down. This system is what was used to write down the revelations given to Muhammad. In the Battle of Badr, 70 people were captured, and later saved by ransoming their property. Those who could not pay a ransom were saved by teaching their captors how to read. However, reading the text of the Qur'an without error was a challenge. The Muslims, being very sensitive about this issue, tried to change the letters so they could be read more easily. Ebû Esved[99] made several changes to the system and was ultimately responsible for creating a codified text which removed any doubts about the language and messages in the Qur'an. The Kufic script of Arabic, developed in Kufa, was used to write the Qur'an, but this script style was less practical for everyday writing. The abjad was further codified when Islam reached Baghdad. After the collapse of Baghdad, the Arabic script further evolved in Egypt. From Egypt, it was perfected by the Ottomans in Istanbul, because of their spread over three continents. The Ottomans Şeyhzade Hamdullah and Hafiz Osman[100] perfected the Ottoman script. Qur'ans written in their writing have been duplicated in photographs. The Arabic writing system has gone through a great evolution. Especially after the birth of Islam, to be able to read the Qur'an with precision has become standard.

Sonsöz (Epilogue) pp. 235- 237

God has only one religion; the essence of all holy books is monotheism. All the prophets repeated and confirmed this message of one God, who has no partner(s) and is unique in Divine Oneness. Some of the major prophets associated with this message and the Abrahamic traditions, include Adam, Noah, Eber, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad.[101] The Qur'an, the Torah, the Psalms, and the Bible all convey this message.

The meticulous investigations of Niyoton [Isaac Newton], Kiyon, and [Richard] Porson,[102] have determined that the "problem of three" (i.e. the Trinity) is fabricated. Kalmet (Father Clement of Rome)[103] attested that there is no such verse in the old copies of the Bible. *Ayet* 75 of *Surah al-Ma'ida*,[104] addresses both Christians and Jews. Buhari[105] says:

> We hereby conclude these blessed words of Muhammed. O Lord, if you punish them, [it is because] they are your creatures. I say, you are Almighty and Supreme if you destroy them.[106]

İlave: Kitapta İsmi Geçen Bazı Mühim Kimselerin Tarihçeleri (Postscript: The Histories of some of the Important People Named in this Book) 238-234

Muhammad's age when each of his children were born is specified, and their years of birth and death are given in this section. The women in Muhammad's immediate family included: Âmine (mother), Süveybe and Hâlime (his wet nurses), Hatice (his first wife), [107] and Kasım, Zeynep, Rukiyye, Ümmü Gülsüm, and Fatıma (his daughters).[108]

Betül is a name given to women who are moral and follow the right path, who are obedient servants of God. Mary (mother of Jesus) can be characterized as *betül*. Fatima died on the third Tuesday of Ramadan, in 11 AH (632 CE). Muhammad, who was between 28-29 years old at the time, had five children; three boys, and two girls, who all died as infants. Hasan and Huseyin (Muhammad's grandsons)[109] went on to gain prominence in the history of Islam, spreading its message across the world through their descendants. In Europe, the decline of the Roman Empire had led to fragmented feudal lordships who "…vahşet hayatı yaşıyordu (were living a life of savagery)."[110]

Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'ın Tebliği Sırasında Dünya Haritası (A map of the World during [the time] of Muhammad's [PBUH] Message) pp. 245-248

With the exception of America and Australia, the historical events related to Muhammad's message took place on three continents. Arabia was in the middle of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Byzantine Empire ruled in Northern Syria. Emperor Heraclius ruled the Christian Byzantine Empire.[111] In Iran, east of Arabia, was the Sasanian Empire, which was the largest empire of the time. Iran practiced Zoroastrianism, which was without texts.[112] The Kingdom of Egypt was Christian, which he asserts was

under Byzantine rule from time to time. Ethiopia was also Christian. To the south, Yemen was sometimes occupied by Ethiopian armies, and at other times in the hands of Iranians.

In the Year of the Elephant, the Abyssinian King stormed the Ka'ba with an army of elephants, with the intention to destroy it. The lead elephant refused to enter the city. God sent a flock of birds that destroyed the invaders. The details of this event are not mentioned (only referenced indirectly) in *Surah al-Fil* because at the time of Muhammad's birth, the people of Mecca were familiar with this recent event.

Not long after, the Iranians invaded Yemen, and the latter became Iranian territory. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians were all present in the area. Meanwhile, the largest rival state were the Byzantines. Between 628-629 CE, the Christians (i.e. the Byzantines) again clashed with the Iranians. Heraclius, the victorious commander of the Christian armies, came to Jerusalem following this battle. Muhammad wrote him a letter, inviting Heraclius to embrace Islam. However, in 637, Heraclius' army was defeated by Umar's forces, ending Byzantine rule in Syria. He bid goodbye to Syria, and retreated to Antakya.[113] After that, a faithful army of Islam, which sprang from the desert, changed the maps and razed the territories of the Sassanids and the Kaysers.[114]

Arapça Na'ti Resûl ve Onun Tercümesi Essubhu Beda Min Ta'atihi (The Arabic poem in praise of the Prophet, "Essubhu Beda Min Ta'atihi," and its Translation), pp. 249-250

This section is a translation into Turkish of Hassan ibn Thabit's famous poem, "As subhu bada min tala'atihi." Each line of the poem is transliterated, followed by its translation in Turkish, line-by-line (as opposed to the entire transliteration first, and then the entire translation following). At the bottom of the final page of the section, a *lügatçe* (dictionary), is included. Notably, the *lügatçe* is not for terms which appeared in ibn Thabit's poem, but for terms used in Pilavoğlu's own "Muhammed Aleyhisselâm'a" refrain, which appears at the end of this section, and is comprised of eight lines, but with no separate stanzas or couplets.

Meşhur Kasideyi Muhammediyenin Arapçadan Türkçeye Tercümesi (Translation of the Famous *Kaside* Muhammadiyya) pp. 251-254

The title is slightly misleading in this section, because it is not a translation of the "Muhammadan Ode," but a reference to Züheyr's "Bānat Suʿād."[115] The text of the section is not arranged in meters, but is a list of sixteen items, each beginning with "Muhammed Aleyhisselâm." Each item describes an attribute of Muhammad in one, or sometimes two sentences. For example, item seven:

The tribe from which Muhammad emerged is the best community of creation. [116]

This section ends with six couplets titled, "Kanunu Sultan Süleyman'ın Münacatı ('The Lawgiver' Sultan Suleyman's Supplication [to God])."

Âlimler İnsanları Nasıl Şaşırtıyorlar (How Scholars Surprise People) pp. 255- 262

People are diverse in their emotions and intelligence, which leads to different styles of interpretation. With the influence of various views, truth is essentially defeated as it takes on a different nature, color, and shape. Because of this illness of giving truth a different tone, most of the scholars who came after the prophets strayed from the path of truth without knowing they were leaving. Each time a prophet arrived to deliver the message of God the people denied the prophet's truth. Had they known the preceding prophets they would no doubt see that it was necessary for them to accept the message of those prophets who came later:

> I wonder, how and in what way, these scholars[117] deceived people by distorting the statements of the prophets.[118]

Seven major deceptions have happened throughout history. For example, the first major deception that happens is the result of arrogance which arises from the pride of having acquired knowledge. However, true knowledge lies in humility. Even when these arrogant men meet prophets, they retain the same disposition. The parable of the blind men and an elephant illustrates this point.[119] Each blind man feels a different part of the elephant's body, and then describes the elephant based on only the part they each felt. They each become distrustful of the other because of such differing views of the elephant. The moral is that people claim truth based on a limited understanding, while at the same time ignoring ideas which may be equally true. In the same way, helpless people are deceived by rabbis and priests.

The remaining six items are described alternately as *hastalık* (illness, disease, etc.) or *şaşkınlık* (bewilderment, stupidity). *Şaşkınlık* in particular is related to the idea that "küfür zulmetidir (non-belief is cruel)."[120] This section, and the book, ends with the assertion:

> Rewarded are we who have the most love for the greatest guide and the most blessings to those who pass it on![121]

Chapter 7
Summary Translations: Pilavoğlu's Works
Part II: *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor*

Publication Details

Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor* / *Jesus Foretells*[1] *Muhammad* (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2nd edition, 2004).

ISBN: None

Paperback, 32 pages. Saddle stitch staple binding.

Appearance, Cover pages, table of contents, index

The front cover has a digital color image of a globe against a blue background, with Europe and North Africa at the center. At the top of the globe is a depiction of a white flash of light. On the back cover is a poem titled, "Nebilerin Şahı Resul'e" / "To the Messenger, King of the Prophets."

The Table of Contents (*içindekiler*) appears at the end of the book (p. 27). There is no index. On pp. 28-32 is a list of Pilavoğlu's other works. The list includes 225 items.

***Önsöz* (Preface) pp. 5-6**

This book repeats the good news[2] of the truth which the Christian world is still unaware. These truths [appear] in *ayet* 6 of *Surah as-Saf* in the Glorious Qur'an, when Jesus (PBUH) comes to address his people:

> And remember when Jesus, son of Mary, said, 'O children of Israel! I am truly Allah's messenger to you, confirming the Torah which came before me, and giving good news of a messenger after me whose name will be Aḥmad.' Yet when the Prophet came to them with clear proofs, they said, 'This is pure magic.'[3]

Although Jesus for his entire life informed people of these glad tidings, few have heard this message. Those who knew the truth acknowledged the Messenger of Allah the moment they knew and saw this message. Millions of people who did not know the truth were heedless and dismissed it.

Not knowing this great blessing is the biggest disappointment. It is the worst ingratitude not to know or try to get to know a person like Muhammad, about whom all the prophets preached. God (praise be to Allah) sent him as a Divine mercy to the world. God created these people the prophets out of love and affection.

The prophet Moses, like Jesus, foretold to his people the coming of the Messenger of Allah and all the other prophets; they gave their message of God, in Divine mercy, to the world. In a covenant with God all the prophets promised to deliver this good news to their people.

In this book, we declare these eternal testaments according to the Holy Qur'an. By seeing and perceiving the primary truth of Jesus, we will know the Message of the Messenger Muhammad. With reference to the Bible, we will present this truth to humanity as a blessing. Success [comes] from God.

This section is signed by the author: ELHAC Muhammed Kemal Pilavoğlu.[4]

Poetry

On page 10, at the end of the first section, titled "Ahdi Ezel," are four lines, titled only *Beyit* (couplet). The only other poetry in the book is the poem which appears on the back cover.

Ahdi Ezel (Eternal Covenant) pp. 7-10

All humans need to know the eternal covenant, because before all human souls came to this world, they made a covenant with God in the spirit world. The Qur'an reveals this testament in *Surah al-A'raf, ayet* 172. The verse appears in Arabic, then transliterated:

> And [mention] when your Lord took from the children of Adam - from their loins - their descendants and made them testify of themselves, [saying to them], 'Am I not your Lord?' They said, 'Yes, we have testified.' [This] - lest you should say on the day of Resurrection, 'Indeed, we were of this unaware.'[5]

An explanation of the verse follows a translation, saying that God's purpose in asking "Am I not your Lord?" is to test the loyalty of humanity to God. Those who have borne witness and confessed their loyalty have upheld this covenant. All the prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, have declared this covenant. Although Jesus declared this same eternal covenant to his people, they strayed from the Oneness of God towards the Trinity. In this way, they moved away from the religion brought by Jesus, and their beliefs took another shape. Since the true religions follow this covenantal path, it can be seen how far Christianity of today has strayed from the truth. Today's Christians have strayed away from this direction, of the eternal covenant. This book invites them to the Oneness of God. Jesus, like other prophets, declared to the sons of Israel that a messenger named Ahmed would come. Prophets, scholars, and people all accepted the unity of God in the spirit world and promised to follow the path of God with an eternal covenant.

Beyit (Couplet)

In the eternal spirit of convivial meeting, 'Am I not your Lord?'.

The atheists said, NO. ENOUGH, I said.

O Lord make apparent to me your concealed elements.

My dear I am afflicted with the perfection of God, I said.

İncildeki Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeleyen Ayeti Kerimeler (The Blessed Verses in the Bible that Foretell [the coming of] Muhammad PBUH) pp. 11-14

The Bible of today is not the true Bible that was sent down to Jesus. Jesus and his people spoke Hebrew.[6] *Ayet* 4 of *Surah Ibrahim,*[7] clarifies that God's message is sent in the language of the people to which it is delivered. The Bibles of today are not the original Bible, having been written afterwards, from Greek Bibles. By being translated into another language, it is not free of mistakes. The fact that today's Bibles are full of translations indicates that they are not Jesus' real Bible.

The writers of the Bible recorded the *silsila* from David, "son of so-and-so" to Jesus. Today's gospels are a history of Jesus and contain many verses from the original Hebrew. However, while translating these verses from Hebrew into Greek, many errors can be seen. At the first council of Nicaea, emperor Constantine destroyed 60 of the 64 gospels that were dissimilar. The remaining four, which were identical, are when today's Bibles appeared.[8] Today's bibles also include the letters in which Paul included several statements from the apostles of Jesus. Whereas in the Qur'an, only the word of God is declared in the book of God. Chapter 14:16 of the book of John says:

> And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever. [9]

This is the same message found in the Qur'an; that the messenger of God, named Ahmad, was given this message in the form of the Qur'an.[10] The Hebrew and Syrian term *paraklit* is rendered as *Ahmad,* or *Muhammad,* in Arabic.[11] The name Muhammad is mentioned only four times in the Qur'an, which underscores how precious it is to mention this name. Jesus, like other prophets, invited people to a union with God. The *paraklit* announces to you the correct path by declaring the *akide* (creed) of Oneness of God. The Greeks took this word (of the Bible) from Hebrew, they accumulated additional words. English translations of the Bible were rendered in ways that were comforting to their own people.

İncilin Âmâli Resulünde; Resulüllah'ın Geleceğini Müjdeleyen iki Ayet (The Bible's Acts of the Apostles; Two Verses Foretelling the Coming of the Messenger of Allah) pp. 15-17

This section focuses on two verses from the book of Acts in the Bible. The first addresses the people of Moses, saying:

> For Moses said, 'The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me from among your own people; you must listen to everything he tells you'.[12]

Verse 37[13] of the book of Acts says:

> The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me [Moses] from among you, from your fellow Israelites. You must listen to him.[14]

Examination of these Bible verses indicates that the prophet of which Moses speaks is Muhammad, not Jesus. The first proof of this is that Jesus is not like Moses in any way. However, Muhammad is like Moses. Moses was the protector and master of Divine Law, and a warrior, whereas Jesus was not. Muhammad, like Moses, was also protector and master of Divine Law and a warrior. Muhammad was, in addition to this a chief commander of his army. Muhammad, again like Moses, removed all laws that came before him and replaced them with a new set of laws. Muhammad renewed and completed the blessings of these laws. In these ways, Jesus cannot be compared to Muhammad. Christians also call Jesus the son of God, which means that Jesus is not like Moses. The Desert of Paran is one of the places the Israelites spent part of their forty years after the Exodus from Egypt. The mountains of Paran are the same that envelop Mecca. On the day of the city's conquest by Muhammad's forces, they entered the city from these mountains.

İncildeki Melekütü Semavat da Resulüllah'ın Müjdesidir (The Biblical Kingdom of Heaven was also [part] of the Messenger of Allah's Good News) pp. 18- 20

In the tenth chapter of Matthew, called on his twelve disciples to disperse, and to go out and spread the message about the *Melekütü Semavat* (Kingdom of Heaven). Christian scholars have interpreted the concept of the Kingdom of Heaven as a promise to bring the entire world salvation in the form of a messiah. However, the "Kingdom of Heaven" actually refers to the emergence of a forthcoming set of sharia. French bibles use the phrase "Revayun desiyu" (*Royaume des Cieux*),[15] asserting that this divine *hükümet ve saltanat* (government and sultanate)[16] is sometimes tenaciously translated as *melekütü mülkü* (God's divine kingdom/dominion). *Surah al-An'am, ayet* 75 to illustrates this:

Thus, did we show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens and the earth that he be one of those who have Faith with certainty.[17]

This verse illustrates that the phrase *melekütü semavat* (Kingdom of the Heaven) conveys the meaning akin to *hükümranlık* (sovereignty or dominion) of a sultanate. Thus, *melekütü* (kingdom) means "bringing the eternal reign of divine shariah."[18] The book of Matthew, verse 43 of chapter 21 says:

> [Jesus said to them] 'Therefore I tell you that the kingdom of God will be taken away from you and given to a people who will produce its fruit'.[19]

To which community will the kingdom of God be given once it is taken away from the *nasara* (Nazarenes)?[20] The community is the one to which the sharia of God was revealed later; Muhammad's

community. “Mahsulünü vermek” (literally; to give [ie produce] product) means to follow God’s commands, and use these commands to rule.

Yuhanna İncilindeki Tebşirat Müjde (The Good News in the [Book of] John in the Bible) pp. 21-23

John chapter 15, verse 16 and 17 says:[21]

> If you love me, keep my commands. And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever— the Spirit of truth. The world cannot accept him because it neither sees him nor knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you.

John chapter 14:26, 30; Chapter 15: 26; Chapter 16: 7-15; all show that the person declared in this Bible, is the Prophet named Ahmet, who was given the good news in *Surah as-Saf*. The attributes of the prophet are given in the Bible:

1. Moses declared that this future prophet would come from one of our brothers of Israel. Although some Christians call this Jesus, the brothers of Israel are from Ishmael.[22] Muhammad was descended from Ishmael, Jesus was not.
2. The creed of Divine Oneness that Jesus declared will be forgotten. The prophet who will come will remember and inform people. Even though Jesus declared the Unity of God, Christians who came later gravitated towards the creed of the Trinity, revering it and continuing on this path. Muhammad, who came later, renewed the forgotten message and led the people to the religion of Divine Oneness.
3. The Messenger of God, who was foretold, will complete what Jesus left undone, and inform about the truth of everything. *Ayet* 3 of Surah al-Ma’idah says: “This day I have perfected for you your religion and I have bestowed upon you my favor.”[23] The principles of the entire religion have been completed, and the truth of everything about it has been given to the people.
4. The Messenger of God would acknowledge Jesus, and bear witness to him. The truth behind the fabrications about what was done to Jesus by the Jews and other later fabrications would be given (by the Messenger).
5. The Heralded Prophet did not say anything on his own, it is declared that he said only what he heard from God. This is also true of Muhammad.[24]

All the attributes that the Bible attributed to Jesus all existed in Muhammad, also. *Sahih hadith* says: “I am the Good News [brought] by my brother Jesus.”[25]

Resulüllah’ın İncildeki Müjdesini Bilen Hrıstiyanların İslam Olması (The Conversion to Islam of Christians who know the Good News of the Messenger of God [Muhammad]) pp. 24-26

Ayet 20 of *Surah al-An'am* and *ayet* 146 of *Surah al-Baqarah*[26] both illustrate how those who know the truth of God recognize the qualities of God's Messenger in the same way they would recognize their own children. However, some of these people have inhibited this truth due to arrogance. People like Bahira[27] and Nastura knew this.[28] According to a hadith from al-Bukhari about when Ebu Sufyan[29] taught others about the significance of Muhammad:

> I was waiting for the appearance of this prophet. I was not expecting him to come from Arabia. He said it would be possible to visit him [and] I would pour water on his feet.[30]

Muhammad's letters to the Muqawqis of Egypt and the king of Ethiopia entreated each leader to embrace Islam, according to the same enlightened words of Jesus.[31] Guidance comes from God, so in light of this guidance, it is the duty of every human to be able to see and hear the truth and follow its path. Guided with this vision, the Good News of Muhammad can be known. Ego, wealth, and blindness hinder the vision of this truth. When all these truths are mentioned, all the Biblical verses seen here bear witness that Jesus foretold the coming of Muhammad. *Ayet* 28 and 29 from *Surah al-Fath,* says; "And God is a sufficient witness. Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah."[32]

Conclusion

The political engagement of the Tijaniyya network in a variety of contexts exhibits no common thread or a particular disposition of a Tijani approach to politics. Instead, the only conclusion that can be drawn about Tijani political engagement is that it is as diverse as the contexts in which Tijanis have been and remain active, since their inception into the present. The case of the Tijaniyya in Turkey is a clear illustration of this diversity. At the same time, it can be concluded that the diversity of Tijani political engagement is an illustration of Weismann's theory that Sufism in general has played an important role in Islam's response to modernity. In the context of the Tijaniyya, this response to modernity is deployed primarily through the ability to rapidly adapt to a variety of contexts, and indeed often flourish in the face of imperialist policies of colonization which have been entangled with the rise of modernity.

Sufi political involvement during the Ottoman Empire, especially by the late Ottoman period was deeply entrenched at every possible level of Ottoman politics. In the wake of Atatürk's ambitious project of westernization vis-à-vis a secularized framework of nationalism rose a few Sufi Islamist responses intent on repositioning Islam as a primary social framework. The activism of Kemal Pilavoğlu, including his written dialogical responses and the outspoken activism of his Tijani organization, were among these Islamist responses. Pilavoğlu's dialogical response issued in his written body of work, while equally Islamist in its own right, was less successful in comparison to other Turkish Islamists of his time because he emphasized a decidedly pan-Islamic worldview in his writing. More successful Islamist responses, such as those issued by Said Nursi and Necep Fazıl Kisakürek, have integrated different, though perceptible forms of neo-Ottomanism in their public engagement and have thus succeeded in garnering much greater influence in the Turkish public sphere.

Ultimately, this dissertation has offered a novel contribution to the field of Ottoman and Turkish Studies because although the topic of neo-Ottomanism is an already significant and fast-expanding subject of academic inquiry, so far studies of "failed" Islamist responses to Kemalist republican reforms are not yet a significant dimension of it. In addition to this, a collated narrative and analysis of Pilavoğlu's life, activism, and legacy has until now not been produced in English or in Turkish. Similarly, Pilavoğlu's body of work has not been previously translated into English and has also not yet been a dedicated subject of an extensive academic study.

Recommendations for Future Research

This dissertation is the potential initiation of a much more extensive project to document and study Kemal Pilavoğlu's Tijani organization, but also the Tijani network in general. In 2016, I traveled to Ankara and

met with several individuals who identified as Tijanis and followers of Pilavoğlu, including one of his grandsons. This engagement was limited in scope for several reasons. Firstly, I was put in touch with and subsequently met in person members of the organization within a very short span of time. Although I had prepared a set of questions prior to this meeting and arranged a few informal interviews with known Tijanis in Ankara, this rapid development left little time to prepare a more comprehensive plan of approach for engaging with more members of the community.

Another potential limitation in this initial fieldwork was the fact that I was an unmarried female traveling alone to meet this conservative community. I do not intend to imply that I felt less welcomed, or that the Tijanis I met with were hesitant to interact because of my gender or marital status. Indeed, with every introduction, I was repeatedly welcomed with enthusiasm and excitement and I never suspected that information was being withheld due to my status or gender. I likewise never felt as though I was an imposing outsider encroaching on a secretive community, though at times some individuals were hesitant to answer my questions. The latter hesitation could have been for an infinite variety of reasons, such as individual notions of privacy around religious belief, or my own language mistakes when communicating in Turkish. Nevertheless, much of the interest in my presence was often focused on my marital status, and questions about why I was traveling alone, or interest in my personal religious beliefs and relationship with Islam. In some cases, this curiosity about my presence in and of itself also tended to eclipse the true purpose of my visit, which was to discuss Pilavoğlu's life, legacy, and activism with his remaining community. This focus on my person also very likely filtered the decisions about which of Pilavoğlu's sources I received from the community.

When I visited the Pilavoğlu Kitabevi shop location in Ankara, I requested to purchase copies of Pilavoğlu's entire body of work. The Tijani *mürid* in the shop, as well as my primary contact, generously declined my offer, and very kindly insisted on gifting me a selection of sources instead. This was a gracious gesture, and I will always be grateful for this, because it is these primary sources which have formed the core data of this dissertation and have allowed me to complete this project. I was gifted as part of this gesture the three hagiographies of Pilavoğlu, which were crucial for constructing a cohesive narrative of his life. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the decision to bestow this gift meant that the selection of sources was determined for me, because the book vendor took it upon himself to decide on the books to be given. In this way, it is entirely possible that I received a subjective understanding of Pilavoğlu's body of work, and which is incomplete. For example, during the gifting process the titles given to me with the most palpable enthusiasm were *Müsülman Kızın Din Kitabı* ([The] Muslim Girl's Religion Book) and *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'ı Müjdeliyor* (Jesus Foretells Muhammad). Considering this, a possible focus for future study could be a more extensive procurement and study of a larger survey of Pilavoğlu's writing. The trajectory of this larger study could

itself take a number of directions. For instance, since many of Pilavoğlu's books were considered by him and his community to be works of *tafsir*, a focus for future study could be about Qur'anic exegesis in Pilavoğlu's work.

Another possible area of further study could be an in-depth project of more prolonged fieldwork with the Tijani community in Ankara. This would enhance the breadth of understanding of the figure of Pilavoğlu and his continued role in the community as a charismatic influence. There are a few members of his original organization still living, and so formal, comprehensive interviews with these Tijanis would add a new dimension of insight into the history and activism of the group. Although I met with many of these people informally, I had not at the time considered, and thus not prepared to undertake long-term fieldwork for this purpose. As part of such further fieldwork, Pilavoğlu's family could again be invaluable contributors, as they were for this dissertation. During my visit in 2016, his family members were enthusiastic about my project, and so there is a plausible potential for future collaboration.

Still another possible direction for additional study could be to survey in more detail the media coverage of the Tijaniyya and Pilavoğlu in Turkish newspapers from around the time of their activism, but also in contemporary Turkish media which invoke the name *Ticani*. This could be expanded to look at the connection (or lack thereof), with other Tijani communities beyond Ankara, such as the Tijani community in Bursa. Ahmet Şahin Uçar, the Tijani Shaykh of the community in Bursa, seems to maintain much stronger ties to the global Tijani network than the Ankara organization which is affiliated with Pilavoğlu. Uçar maintains a strong social media presence on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, and has his own website[1] and YouTube channel, "Ârifane Sohbetler," with nearly 11,000 subscribers as of January 2021.[2]

A final possible trajectory for future research would reach far beyond a Turkish context and look more broadly at the way in which African Islam has dispersed beyond the Continent through the lens of the Tijaniyya network. As mentioned in the introduction, there are many Tijani organizations beyond Africa, and at the time this dissertation was completed, there was no comprehensive survey of this transnational network. This would entail a larger project which would likely require the involvement of many researchers familiar with the extra-African locations of Tijani organizations. In the end, this dissertation is the initiation of a significant potential for further research about what is currently largely unstudied topic.

Appendices and Notes

Notes for Chapter 1

[1] Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* (Palgrave Macmillian, 2008) p. 120.
[2] "Ticanilerin duruşması dün Ankarada başladı", *Milliyet,* 5 March, 1952.
[3] "The Jacobins" was a political club involved the French Revolution. The anti-royalist club grew into an extensive republican movement in the country, and were known for their record of violence, leading to the Jacobin period of governance being known as the "Reign of Terror." The term still denotes extensive government intervention, and even moderate authoritarianism, as a way of transforming society.
[4] Hakan Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire:The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism* (Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 49, 50.
[5] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual History* (Princeton University Press, 2011). p. 129, 132.
[6] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 49:6, quran.com.
[7] Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey* (Syracuse University Press, 2006). p. 279, 282.
[8] Hanioğlu, pp. 103-104.
[9] Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey,* p. 84.
[10] Hanioğlu, p. 179.
[11] Hanioğlu, p. 181.
[12] Many Ottoman Muslims spoke languages other than Turkish, such as Kurdish, Greek, or Laz. Even amongst speakers of Turkish, there was wide regional variation of dialects as well as differences among social classes. For instance, more educated Ottoman Muslims were known for peppering their speech, and more so their writings, with vocabulary or even entire grammatical constructions from Arabic and Persian. See: Jenkins, p. 90.
[13] Hanioğlu, p. 184; Duygu Köksal, "Art and Power in Turkey: Culture, Aesthetics and Nationalism During the Single Party Era." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 31 (2004): 91–119.
[14] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. xiv.
[15] Sultan Mehmet Vahdeddin and his family received safe passage under British authority out of Istanbul on 16 November 1922. They departed on the British warship *HMS Malaya* on 17 November 1922.
[16] From the Arabic *Shaykh al-Islām*, which was originally a general term used as an honorific title for noteworthy Islamic scholars. In the Ottoman Empire, the *Şeyhülislam* was the highest-ranking member of the ulama, and had the power to anoint new sultans. He also issued binding *fatwas* on behalf of the Empire.
[17] Jenkins, pp. 96, 98.
[18] Hanioğlu, p. 184.
[19] Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (Routledge, 1993). P. 79.
[20] Korkut Buğday, *An Introduction to Literary Ottoman* (Routledge, 2014).
[21] Mardin, *Religion Society and Modernity*, p. xiv-xv.
[22] Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya: A Sufi Order in the Modern World* (Oxford University Press, 1965); Zachary Valentine Wright, *Realizing Islam: The Tijaniyya in North Africa and the Eighteenth Century Muslim World* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2020).
[23] Jean-Louis Triaud, and David Robinson, David, (eds.). *La Tijâniyya: Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique*, (Paris: Karthala, 2000).
[24] Jillali El Adnani, *La Tijâniyya, 1781-1881: les origines d'une confrérie religieuse au Maghreb* (Marsam Editions, 2007).
[25] A. Schleifer, "Izz al-Din al-Qassam: Preacher and Mujahid" in Edmund Burke II (ed.). *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East* (University of California Press), pp. 164-178.
[26] Nathalie Clayer, "The Tijaniyya: Reformism and Islamic Revival in Interwar Albania", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29, 4 (2009): 483-493.
[27] Jenkins, p. 120.
[28] Mardin, "Religion in Modern Turkey" in *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey,* pp. 235-236.
[29] Emile Marmorstein, "Religious Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East" *International Affairs* 28, 3 (1952): 344-359.

[30] Bernard Lewis, "Islamic revival in Turkey." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* (1952): 38-48, p. 43.
[31] Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in secular Turkey." *Middle East Journal* 8, 3 (1954): 267-282, p. 274.
[32] Abun-Nasr, pp. 161-162.
[33] Tekin, "Ticanîlik", pp. 260-263.
[34] Tekin, p. 263.
[35] İklima Gençdoğan, "Son Devir Mutasavvıflarından: Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı ve Tasavvuf Anlayışı" Undergraduate Thesis, Department of Primary Education, Religious Culture, and Moral Education in the Faculty of Divinity (Ankara University, 2005).
[36] Abdukadyr Abdikamit Uulu, "Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı ve Tasavvufi Görüşleri", Master's Thesis, Department of Islamic Foundational Science, Faculty of Social Science (Necmettin Erbakan University, 2019).
[37] Mehmedi Ibini Abdullahittantavi, *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 1990).
[38] Muzaffer Yıldız, *Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı 1906-1977* / The life of Haji Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, 1906-1977 (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2013).
[39] This information was obtained as part of an informal conversation with Pilavoğlu's grandson (the nephew of Yıldız) using a social media instant messaging service. 21 January 2020.
[40] Eyyüb Çakır, *Pilavoğlu Kimdir? Hâzâ Efdalüs Salavat, Salavâtı Fâtih ve Fazileti* (Ankara: 1978, 2009).
[41] Abun-Nasr, p. 51.
[42] Asım Öz, *Saatçi Musa* (Ankara: Beyan Yayınları, 2010).
[43] Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Kendini Bil* (Ankara: undated).
[44] Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu*, Müsülman Kızın Din Kitabı*, 10th Edition (Ankara: Zembil Basım Yayın Lt. şti., 2011).
[45] Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu*, Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına Kadar Hayatı ve Hatıraları*, 3rd Edition (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2010, reprint of 1961).
[46] Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *İsa Aleyhisselam Muhammed Aleyhisselam'I Müjdeliyor / Jesus Foretells Muhammad*, 2nd edition (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2004).
[47] Itzchak Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition* (Routledge, 2007). p. xii.
[48] Weismann, p. xii.
[49] Weismann, p. 3.
[50] Weismann, p. 1.
[51] Weismann, p. 67
[52] Weismann, p. 67.
[53] See for instance, Tamer Balcı, "Ottoman Balkan Heritage and the Construction of Turkish National Identity," *Journal of Ottoman Legacy Studies (JOLS)*, 1, 1 (2014): 60-70; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2004); and Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey.*
[54] Charles Taylor, "Two theories of modernity." *Hastings Center Report* 25, 2 (1995): 24-33.
[55] Taylor, p. 24.
[56] Taylor, p. 25.
[57] Taylor, p. 28.
[58] Taylor, p. 30. For a more extensive consideration of Taylor's "Two Theories of Modernity" in a Turkish context, see: Cathlene Elizabeth Dollar. "Identity Formation in the Novel: Orientalism, Modernity and Orhan Pamuk." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015.
[59] Zachary Valentine Wright, *On the Path of The Prophet: Shaykh Ahmad Tijani and The Tariqa Muhamaddiya* (Atlanta: the African American Islamic Institute, 2005). P. 79.
[60] Vincent Cornell, *Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism*, (University of Texas Press, 1998).
[61] For a general overview of Sufism see: William C. Chittick, *Sufism. A Beginner's Guide*, (Oxford, 2000).
[62] Eickelman and Piscatori, p. xiii.
[63] Eickelman and Piscatori, p. 9.
[64] Eickelman and Piscatori, p. 25.
[65] Eickelman and Piscatori, p. 25.
[66] Weismann, p. 6.
[67] Gavin Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk: Provincial Newspapers and the Negotiation of a Muslim National Identity* (University of Texas Press, 2011).

[68] Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History 1789-2007* (Yale University Press, 2010).
[69] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 50.
[70] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire,* p. 41.
[71] Mardin, *Religion Society and Modernity*, p. 253.
[72] Anwar Alam, "Islam and Post-Modernism: Locating the Rise of Islamism in Turkey" *Journal of Islamic Studies* 20, 3 (2009): 352-375.
[73] Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (Palgrave Macmillian, 2003).
[74] Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, p. 35.
[75] Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality", *World Policy Journal,* 21, 3 (2004): 1-14, p. 1.
[76] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 4, 12.
[77] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey*, p. 280.
[78] Weismann, p. 2.
[79] Yıldız, p. 47; Pilavoğlu Yayınevi, @pilavogluyayinevi. Profile. *Instagram* post 28 August 2020. Last accessed 4 January 2021. https://www.instagram.com/tv/CEb3rgkhU6R/?igshid=xwkreefltbhg.
[80] Richard Raskin, *The Functional Analysis of Art: An Approach to the Social and Psychological Functions of Literature, Painting and Film* (Arkona: University of California Press, 1983).

Notes for Chapter 2

[1] Weismann, p. 8. The term "Wahhabism" is seen as derogatory by its adherents, who call themselves *Salafiyya.* These names are not, however interchangeable in a historical sense; Wahhabism began in the 18th century in the Najd region of modern-day Saudi Arabia. Salafism developed in the 19th century at al-Azhar University in Egypt as a response to European imperialist policies.
[2] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 2.
[3] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 9.
[4] Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*.
[5] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 10.
[6] ; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2004). P. 72.
[7] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. xiv.
[8] Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), cited in Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet*, pp. 4-5.
[9] Abun-Nasr, p. 1.
[10] Literally; a "circle" or "group"; the term *zawiya* is roughly equivalent to *tekke*, the Turkish term for a Sufi lodge or residence. A *zawiya* or a *tekke* is where the majority of activities related to a *tarikat* occur.
[11] Abun-Nasr, p. 163.
[12] Abun-Nasr, p. 27.
[13] Abun-Nasr, p. 27.
[14] Abun-Nasr, p. 12.
[15] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 3.
[16] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 75.
[17] Abun-Nasr, p. 14.
[18] Wright, *Realizing Islam,* p. 9.
[19] Wright, *Realizing Islam,* p. 9.
[20] Paul L. Heck, *Sufism And Politics: The Power of Spirituality* (Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007).
[21] "Islamism" in the Sudanese context differs from the Turkish context. In Sudan, the concept of "Islamism" is rooted in Hassan al-Banna's teachings, which informed the development of the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the 1989 coup, many members of al-Bashir's government were known members of the movement, which defined "Islamism" in the Sudanese context as a set of "'intellectual, spiritual, and cultural values [which spring] from… subservience to one God' wherein the state and its religious and Islamic affiliations are endorsed as a religious obligation." This governing doctrine, according to Abdullahi Gallab, is deeply rooted in Sayyid Qutb's concept of the radical sovereignty of God, which is considered to be the only legitimate polity in this context. The primary objective of Islamist policy in Sudan was a top-down Islamization of society, which was deployed via the

institutionalization of Islamic law throughout the country. The dominant Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan has been the subject of intense criticism for a variety of human rights policies, links to terrorist groups, and the wars in Darfur and the southern part of the country. See: Abdullahi A. Gallab, *The first Islamist republic: Development and disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008).
[22] Rüdiger Seesemann, "Between Sufism and Islamism: the Tijâniyya and Islamist rule in the Sudan" in *Sufism And Politics: The Power of Spirituality*.
[23]Rüdiger Seesemann, "The History of the Tijaniyya and the Issue of Tarbiya in Darfur (Sudan)." in La *Tijâniyya.* Pp. 393-437.
[24] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* pp. 22-23.
[25] Cornell, p. xxiv.
[26] Abun-Nasr, p. 22.
[27] Alfred Bel, *La Religioin musulmane en Berbérie* (Paris, 1938).
[28] Cornell, *Realm of the Saint,* p. xxvi.
[29] Wright, *Realizing Islam,* p. 4.
[30] Abun-Nasr, p. 58.
[31] Abun-Nasr, p. 20.
[32] Abun-Nasr, pp. 93-94.
[33] Abun-Nasr, p. 96.
[34] Abun-Nasr, pp. 84-85, 88.
[35] This is in the sense of Edward Said's contention that a common aim of Orientalist scholars has often been to render the so-called East "less fearsome to the West." Indeed, Abun-Nasr's intention to depict Tijani political engagement with colonial authorities as a detectable pattern of behavior, and thus something which can be neatly categorized, is evocative of such Orientalist aims that Said discusses at length. See: Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1994). p. 60; Wright, *Realizing Islam,* introduction.
[36] Abun-Nasr, pp. 15-16.
[37] Cornell, p. xxiv.
[38] Cornell, p. xxiv.
[39] Abun-Nasr, pp. 17-19; Wright, *Realizing Islam,* pp. 7-8.
[40] Abun-Nasr, p. 20; Wright, *Realizing Islam,* p. 8.
[41] Abun-Nasr, pp. 15-16.
[42] Cornell, p. xxvi.
[43] Cornell, p. xxvi.
[44] Cornell, pp. 114, 260.
[45] Wright, *Realizing Islam,* introduction.
[46] Refer to Cornell's discussion of the term "saint", pp.x-xliii.
[47] Cornell, p. 157.
[48] Cornell, pp. 30, 94.
[49] Cornell, p. 104.
[50] Abun-Nasr, pp. 2, 3.
[51] Cornell, p. xxvi.
[52] Abun-Nasr, p. 11.
[53] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 22.
[54] Chapter 3 of this dissertation engages with the notion of "Ottoman decline" as an obsolete understanding of what is more accurately described as the "period of reform and transformation."
[55] Wright, pp. 65-66.
[56] Abun-Nasr, p. 97.
[57] Gran as quoted by Wright in *On the Path of the Prophet,* pp. 4-5.
[58] Abun-Nasr, pp. 82-88.
[59] Abdeljelil Temimi, "Considérations nouvelles sur la révolutlon d'Ali ben Gadehem." *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 7, no. 1 (1970): 171-185.
[60] Abun-Nasr, *The Tijaniyya,* p. 91.
[61] Andrea Brigaglia, "Shaykh Ibrahim al-Riyahi (1767-1850): A Mufti and a Mystic in Husaynid Tunisia," *Annual Review of Islam in Africa*, 12.1 (2014), pp. 91-99, p. 98.
[62] "[We said], 'O David, indeed We have made you a successor upon the earth, so judge between the people in truth and do not follow [your own] desire, as it will lead you astray from the way of Allah.' Indeed, those who go astray

from the way of Allah will have a severe punishment for having forgotten the Day of Account." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 38:26 quran.com.
[63] Brigaglia, "Shaykh Ibrahim al-Riyahi," p. 98.
[64] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 66; Abun-Nasr, p. 161; Mustafa Tekin, "Ticanîlik", in Murat Gültekingil, Tanıl Bora (eds.). *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Vol. 6* (Istanbul, 2005). p. 261.
[65] Abun-Nasr, p. 161.
[66] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 66.
[67] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 168.
[68] David Robinson, *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Clarendon Press, 1985).
[69] Abun-Nasr, p. 148.
[70] Abun-Nasr, pp. 147-154.
[71] Louis Brenner, "The Sufi Teaching of Tierno Bokar Salif Tall," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 8, 3 (1976): 208-226.
[72] Brenner, p. 209.
[73] Zachary Valentine Wright, "Islam and Decolonization in Africa: the political engagement of a West African Muslim community." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 46, 2 (2013): 205-227.
[74] Wright, "Islam and Decolonization", p. 212.
[75] Wright, "Islam and Decolonization", p. 215.
[76] Wright, "Islam and Decolonization", p. 217.
[77] Andrea Brigaglia, " The Sultan, the Sardauna and the Sufi: Politics and Inter-Tariqa Conflict in Northern Nigeria, 1956-1965." *The: The BUK Journal of History,* forthcoming. p. 2 of document.
[78] Brigaglia, "The Sultan", p. 4.
[79] Brigaglia, "The Sultan", p. 7.
[80] Brigaglia, "The Sultan", pp. 8-9, 12.
[81] Brigaglia, "The Sultan", p. 16.
[82] Ramzi ben Amara, *The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Genesis, Fragmentation, and Revival* (Göttingen: Göttingen University Press, 2020).
[83] Brigaglia, "The Sultan", p. 19
[84] See for instance: Sani Yakubu Adam, "Politics and Sufism in Nigeria: The Salgawa and the Political History of Kano State, Northern Nigeria 1950-2011" *Journal for Islamic Studies* 36, no. 1 (2017): 140-172.
[85] Wright, "Islam and Decolonization", p. 227.
[86] Abun-Nasr, p. 14.
[87] Wright, *On the Path of the Prophet,* p. 165.

Notes for Chapter 3

[1] Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance." *Studia Islamica* (1976): 123-152. P. 140.
[2] Algar, p. 141.
[3] Sadeq Rahimi, "Intimate Exteriority: Sufi Space as Sanctuary for Injured Subjectivities in Turkey." *Journal of Religion and Health* 46, 3 (2007): 409-421.
[4] Robert W. Olson and William F. Tucker, "The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925): A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism", *Die Welt des Islams,* 18, 3/4 (1978): 195-211. P. 198.
[5] Algar, p. 138.
[6] John Curry and Erik Ohlander, "Introduction" in *Sufism and Society: Arrangements of the Mystical in the Muslim World, 1200-1800* (Routledge, 2012).
[7] Dina Le Gall, *Culture of Sufism, A: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450-1700* (New York: SUNY Press, 2005). p. 6, 5.
[8] Often described as "folk Islam" in many sources.

[9] Curry and Ohlander; Le Gall, *Culture of Sufism*, "Introduction."
[10] For an in-depth discussion on the complex, often paradoxical relationship between Islam, secularism, and the process of modernization, see: Nurullah Ardiç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century: The Caliphate and Middle Eastern modernization in the early 20th century* (London: Routledge, 2012).
[11] Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).
[12] Algar argues that the Islamic world has regarded Sufism as "a refuge for pre-Islamic sentiments… a stronghold of Turkish folk-culture" (p. 124). He attributes this understanding of Sufism to a largely nationalist motive; a narrative of history which has been "reformulated" for the purpose of creating a concept of national identity. This is not untrue, but what Algar does not discuss is the fact that this so-called "folk Islam" was also viewed as a threat to the success of Turkish nationalist identity during the early years of the Republic. In the following chapter, this will be dealt with in more depth.
[13] *Yesevi* in the Turkish Rendering.
[14]Fahir Iz; Tofigh Hashempour Sobhani and Suheyl Umar, "Aḥmad Yasawī", in: *Encyclopaedia Islamica*, edited by Wilferd Madelung and, Farhad Daftary. Accessed 8 March 2018 http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-9831_isla_COM_0229, First published online: 2008. For a more contextual discussion of cultural traditions which were adapted and/or retained in pre-Islamic Turkic central Asia during the conversion process, see; Stephanie Honchell, "Sufis, Sea Monsters, and Miraculous Circumcisions: Comparative Conversion Narratives and Popular Memories of Islamization" in Stephanie Honchell and Joseph Roberts, eds. Muslim Worlds, Asian Contexts: Sources for the Study of Islam in Asia (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, forthcoming).
[15]H.T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World* (University of South Carolina Press, 1993).
[16] Literally, "chief" or "lord." In Osman I's time, beys were the "chiefs" of territories (sometimes understood as principalities) that in some cases were loyal to the Seljuks. In Osman I's case, he inherited the position of bey from his father, who pledged his allegiance to the Seljuk Sultanate.
[17] Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: the story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923* (John Murray, 2006).
[18] Weismann, p. 44.
[19] The first language of many Christians was often not Turkish. Thus, when the *devşirme* system was still in place, most Janissary recruits had to learn Turkish as part of their training.
[20] Kadir Üstün, "Rethinking *Vaka-İ Hayriye* (The Auspicious Event): Elimination of The Janissaries on the Path to Modernization", Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2002. p. 38.
[21] Godfrey Goodwin, "Introduction," in *The Janissaries* (London: Saqi Books, 2013).
[22] Goodwin, p. 78.
[23] Norris, p. 91.
[24] Weismann, p. 45.
[25] Weismann, p. 47.
[26] Jenkins, p. 35.
[27] This ancestral claim has often been questioned; the founding rulers of the dynasty were most likely ethnically Kurdish, whereas Muhammad and Ali were Arabs. The Safavid dynasty regularly intermarried with Turkic, Circassian, Georgian, and Greek nobility.
[28] Le Gall explores in detail the role of the Nakşibendi in the battle against the Safavids and kızılbaş in Chapter 6 of *A Culture of Sufism*.
[29] Albert Doja, "A Political History of Bektashim from Ottoman Anatolia to Contemporary Turkey", *Journal of Church and State* 48 (2006): 423-450. p. 432.
[30] Also commonly spelled "Chaldiran."
[31] Jenkins, p. 38.
[32] Jenkins, p. 39.
[33] Jenkins, p. 37. The suppression of the *kızılbaşı* revolts resulted in an enduring legacy which is still a palpable dimension of modern Turkish culture. The descendants of the *kızılbaşı* are generally referred to as Alevis today.
[34] This is in itself distinct from the Sunni practice of *taqlid*, which, although it is also based on conforming to expert leadership, places greater emphasis on inquiry and consensus and less on the vested authority of the leader(s).
[35] Jenkins, p. 40.
[36] Birol Gündoğdu, "Problems in the interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions in the Early Modern Period: An Analysis and Evaluation of Existing Literature on the Ottoman Rebellions between 1550 and 1821", *the Journal of Ottoman*

Studies, 1,1 (2018): 459-485, p. 471. Gündoğdu ultimately criticizes Barkey's theory as overly generalized, excluding important exceptions and ignoring the complex and multifaceted nature of Ottoman rebellions during the period in question. Nevertheless, Gündoğdu's criticism does not extend to Barkey's supposition that the Ottoman authorities instrumentalized rebel groups for the purpose of political consolidation, and so for the purpose of the present discussion, Barkey's theory is sufficient.

[37] Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey."

[38] Until the late sixteenth century, *reaya* became eligible, to the distress of some of the ruling class, for military service.

[39] As noted in the introduction, the Ottoman legal system followed Hanafi jurisprudence, however; this was not universally applied throughout the Empire. In the predominantly Arab provinces, court cases could be heard by non-Hanafi *qadis* (judges) under the supervision of a Hanafi *qadi.*

[40] Jenkins, pp. 40-41.

[41] Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion Politics, and Literature in a Secular State* (I.B. Tauris & Co., 1995).

[42] Jenkins, p. 43.

[43] Jenkins, p. 43.

[44] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity*, p. 227-228.

[45] Mardin discusses the social, cultural, and educational engagement of *tarikatlar* with local communities extensively in Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (New York: SUNY Press, 1989). [ebook]; and in *Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey*.

[46] Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (University of California, Davis: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See: Chapters 2 and 3. The Janissaries had acquired such a level of influence that they were able to dictate palace policy, to the extent where they successfully staged coups in order to remove the reigning sultan. Another significant political shift was the abolishment of the practice of open succession through fratricide by Ahmed I (r.1603-1617). His brother Mustafa I succeeded him, which was part of a larger crisis of succession. The practice of fratricide was replaced by lifetime confinement of the sultan's brothers in the harem of the palace.

[47] Oktay Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th Centuries: the 'Demographic Crisis' Reconsidered", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, 2 (2004): 183-205.

[48] The first in the series of revolts was in 1519. The final rebellion, led by 'Celali' Hasan Pasha, was suppressed in 1659. Notably, Hasan Pasha attempted to overthrow the Janissary-controlled government, which executed Osman II in 1622, after his attempt to quell their growing influence. See: Oktay Özel, "Banditry, State and Economy: On the Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia", in *IXth Congress of Economic and Social History of Turkey, Dubrovnik,* 20-23 August 2001, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2005). Pp. 65-74.

[49] Hava Selcuk, "The Jelali Abaza Hasan Rebellion and its Reflections on Kayseri", *Turkish Studies International Periodical For the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic* 3/4 (2008): 664-685.

[50] Doja, p. 434.

[51] The quote is from Gündoğdu's translated summary of Ocak's argument from, "Problems in the interpretations of Ottoman Rebellions", p. 472. See: Ahmed Yaşar Ocak, "Kutb ve isyan: Osmanlı Mehdici (Mesiyanik) hareketlerinin ideolojik arkaplanı üzerine bazı düşünceler" *Toplum ve Bilim* 83 (2000): 48-57.

[52] Gündoğdu, p. 473.

[53] Gündoğdu, p. 474.

[54] Üstün.

[55] Üstün, p. 8.

[56] Doja, p. 441.

[57] Doja, p. 443.

[58] Jenıins, p. 44.

[59] Jenkins, p. 48.

[60] Jenkins, p. 45.

[61] Jenkins, pp. 45-46.

[62] Jenkins, p. 47.

[63] Jenkins, p. 47.

[64] Jenkins' summary of Butrus Abu-Manneh's argument from, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (1826-1876)* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2001). In Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 229.

[65] Üstün explores this in detail in Rethinking *Vaka-İ Hayriye.*

[66] Üstün, p. 2.
[67] Even Bernard Lewis' account of the event reflects this view. See: Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1961).
[68] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* p. 12.
[69] These are official documents issued by either the sultan himself or another high-ranking official, including the *şeyhülislam.*
[70] Üstün, p. 43.
[71] Jenkins, p. 48.
[72] Üstün, p. 39.
[73] Üstün, p. 39.
[74] Jenkins' quote of the decree, p. 48.
[75] Üstün, p. 40.
[76] Jenkins also confirms this theory of political motivation, but he places greater emphasis on the reduction of the ulama's power, for similar reasons. p. 50.
[77] Jenkins.
[78] Weismann, p. 79.
[79] Tapper.
[80] Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", *Die Welt des Islams* 34, 2 (1994): 173-203.
[81] Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", p. 182.
[82] Weismann, p. 91; Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", p. 184.
[83] Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript."
[84] Jenkins.
[85] Jenkins, p. 51-53.
[86] Jenkins, p. 28.
[87] The Treaty of Balta Limanı was signed between the British and the Ottomans in 1838, but the latter would not feel the effects for several years. Shortly after the Treaty was signed, European imports into the Empire exponentially outstripped its exports, which understandably crippled the Ottoman industry.
[88] Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements", p. 132.
[89]. On the topic of the so-called European "other", see also: Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements", p. 132-133.
[90] Hanioğlu, p. 27
[91] Hanioğlu.
[92] Hanioğlu. Ali Pasha served as Grand Vizier for a short stint in 1852, a post which he would intermittently take up four more times during his career. His most significant achievement was the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, which extended equality in education, government posts, and civil equality to subjects of all faiths. He also played a decisive role in the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, which was seen as an achievement of *Tanzimat* foreign policy. As noted, the Crimean War is often viewed as a decisive turning-point which initiated the rise of nationalist movements across many Ottoman provinces.

Fuad Pasha, among other roles, served as Grand Vizier twice between 1861 and 1866. He was known for his prominent role in *Tanzimat* reforms and was a strong advocate of European-style modernization with a known preference for a civil code inspired by the French model. He believed that giving non-Muslim subjects equal rights under the *Millet* system would curb their nationalist, separatist inclinations. He was a strong advocate of the concept of Ottomanism.

Ali and Fuad Pasha were among the bureaucrats who drafted the aforementioned 1856 hatt-ı hümayun which removed distinctions and designations in Ottoman law based on religion, language, and race.
[93] Baki Tezcan, "Lost in historiography: an essay on the reasons for the absence of a history of limited government in the early Modern Ottoman Empire." *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, 3 (2009): 477-505. P. 480 See also: Jenkins, p. 53. On the Nakşibendi affiliation of Shaykh Ahmad, see: Uluğ İğdemir, *Kuleli Vakası Hakkında Bir Araştırma* (Ankara: TKK, 1937).
[94] Hakan Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements", in *Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity* (Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1999), p. 133.
[95] Rashed Chowdhury, "Pan-Islamism and Modernisation During the Reign of Sultan Abdűlhamid II, 1876-1909", PhD thesis (McGill University, 2011), p. 126.
[96] Bradford G. Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 155-156.

[97] Chowdhury, “Pan-Islamism and Modernisation”, p. 125.
[98] Shaykh Zafir al-Madani’s tomb is next to the Ertuğrul Tekke Mosque in Istanbul. The mosque was commissioned by Sultan Abdűlhamid II and dedicated to the Shadhiliyya.
[99] Chowdhury, p. 127; Martin, p. 156.
[100] Chowdhury, pp. 162-163.
[101] See, for instance: "Pan-Islamism." in *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito. [Oxford Islamic Studies Online], http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819 (accessed 01-Jul-2020).
[102] Jenkins, p. 60.
[103] Jenkins, p. 60.
[104] Following the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, the Treaty of Berlin was signed between Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, on 13 July 1878. Russia’s aim was to regain Balkan territory which was lost during the Crimean War (1853-1856). The war which broke out in 1877 was instigated by emerging Balkan nationalist movements.
[105] Jenkins, p. 60.
[106] Jenkins, p. 27.
[107] Chowdhury, p. 164.
[108] Weismann, p. 90.
[109] Hanioğlu, p. 27.
[110] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity*, p. 231-232.
[111] Hanioğlu, p. 26.
[112] Doja, p. 444.
[113] Jenkins, p. 65; Doja, pp. 444-445.
[114] The 1876 constitution was drawn up by Armenian Krikor Odian.
[115] Jenkins, p. 66.
[116] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 84.
[117] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 144.
[118] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 29.
[119] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 144.
[120] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 122.
[121] Jenkins, p. 68.
[122] Jenkins, pp. 70-71.
[123] Feroz Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 27, 1 (1991): 3-21. p. 5.
[124] Jenkins, p. 71; Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, p. 5.
[125] The order was largely involved in the counter-revolution of April 13th, 1909 that reinstalled the constitutional rule of the Sultanate. See also: Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, p. 5.
[126] Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, pp. 4-5.
[127] Ahmad, “Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey”, pp. 4-5.
[128] Doja, p. 443.
[129] Hanioğlu, pp. 38-39.
[130] Jenkins, p. 72.
[131] Jenkins, p. 73.
[132] Jenkins, p. 74.
[133] Weismann, p. 93. Weismann identifies Musa Efendi as specifically Khalidi, however; other sources name him as Nakşbendi. See, for instance: Ferhat Koca, “MÛSÂ KÂZIM EFENDİ”, *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2006). Accessed 31 July 2020. https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/musa-kazim-efendi.
[134] Weismann.
[135] Hanioğlu, p. 72.
[136] Jenkins, , p. 77.
[137] Originally referring to participants in battles against non-Muslims for the expansion of Muslim territory, as well as participants of battles in which Muhammad personally participated, *Gazi* in the Ottoman context was a title bestowed for wars of conquest, given to military officers of high rank, who distinguished themselves in the field against non-Muslim enemies.
[138]Hanioğlu, p. 77.
[139] Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*; Jenkins, p. 83.
[140] Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*, p. 105.

[141] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" in İrvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.) *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* (Oxford University Press, 1987). 218-235; İlker Aytürk, "Nationalism and Islam in Cold War Turkey, 1944-69" *Middle Eastern Studies,* 50, 5 (2014): 693-719; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, "The Turkish Republic", in *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (*Cambridge University Press, 1977). 373-437; Talip Kucukcan, "Sacralization of the State and Secular Nationalism: Foundations of Civil Religion in Turkey." *George Washington International Law Review* 41, 4 (2010): 963-983.
[142] Aytürk, p. 693.
[143] As quoted in Jenkins, p. 89, from David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*: *Third Edition* (I.B. Tauris, 2007).
[144] Jenkins, p. 89.
[145] As noted, "folk Islam" is a concept often interchangeable or synonymous with Sufism. Some scholars have come to describe Alevism as part of Turkish "folk Islam", but this dimension of the concept of "folk Islam" is beyond the scope of this paper.
[146] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* p. 257.
[147] Many Ottoman Muslims spoke languages other than Turkish, such as Kurdish, Greek, or Laz. Even amongst speakers of Turkish, there was wide regional variation of dialects as well as differences among social classes. For instance, more educated Ottoman Muslims were known for peppering their speech, and more so their writings, with vocabulary or even entire grammatical constructions from Arabic and Persian. See Jenkins, , p. 90.
[148] Jenkins, p. 92.
[149] Jenkins, p. 93.
[150] Section 1, article 2 of the 1924 constitution not only cited the religion of the Turkish State to be Islam, but also cited Turkish as its official language. See: Edward Mead Earle, "The new constitution of Turkey." *Political Science Quarterly* 40, 1 (1925): 73-100.
[151] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 278, 282.
[152] Jenkins, p. 93.
[153] As quoted in Rahimi, "Intimate Exteriority", p. 413, from Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).
[154] He is also referred to as *Giritli Mehmet* (Mehmet the Cretan), and Dervish Mehmet.
[155] Hanioğlu, pp. 131-132.
[156] Jenkins, p. 99.
[157] Umut Azak, "Secularism in Turkey as a Nationalist Search for Vernacular Islam: the Ban on the Call to Prayer in Arabic (1932-1950)." *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Mediterranee,* 124 (2008): 161-179.
[158] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* p. 279.
[159] Azak, p. 173.
[160] Azak, p. 173.
[161] Azak, p. 174.

Notes for Chapter 4

[1] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* p. 233.
[2] Azak, p. 162.
[3] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 19.
[4] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 18.
[5] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* p. 270.
[6] Cornell, pp. xl, xliii.
[7] Weismann.
[8] "İki meczub dün Mecliste arabca ezan okudular", *Cumhuriyet,* 5 February, 1949.
[9] "Meczub"; "Mecnun" in *Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary,* seventeenth edition (Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 1999).
[10] "Meczub", *Seslisözlük,* last accessed on 17 December 2020. https://www.seslisozluk.net/en/what-is-the-meaning-of-meczub/. See also: *Osmanlıca Türkçe Sözlük,* https://www.osmanlicaturkce.com/?k=meczub&t=%40; and *Langenscheidt,* https://en.langenscheidt.com/turkish-german/meczup.

[11] "Ticani yobazlarını bütün yurt nefretle tel'in ediyor", *Milliyet*, 20 June 1951.
[12] "Ticani" *Seslisözlük*, last accessed on 17 December 2020. https://www.seslisozluk.net/en/what-is-the-meaning-of-ticani/
[13] "Ticanî" in *Redhouse Turkish/Ottoman-English Dictionary*, seventeenth edition (Istanbul: SEV Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 1999).
[14] A "circle beard" refers to the practice of trimming/shaving the mustache, and sometimes the upper cheeks, but retaining a beard which extends from the sideburns and grows on the chin, creating a "circle" shape. This appearance of the beard for Muslim men is widely understood to refer to the hadith from Sahih Bukhari Volume 7, Book 72, Hadith Number 781, narrated By Ibn 'Umar: "Allah's Apostle said, 'Cut the moustaches short and leave the beard (as it is).'" *Hadith Collection*, https://hadithcollection.com/sahihbukhari/sahih-bukhari-book-72-dress/sahih-bukhari-volume-007-book-072-hadith-number-781. Last accessed 24 February 2022. Interestingly, some scholars have asserted that the beard became associated with a generalized threat to authority, but also to the West in particular, in Turkey. Indeed, from 1980 male university students in Turkey were prohibited from wearing beards. According to Delaney, growing a beard in this context was interpreted as a threat to the authority of the secular state. See: Carol Delaney. "Untangling the meanings of hair in Turkish society." *Anthropological Quarterly* (1994): 159-172, p. 158.
[15] Metin Toker, "Bunlar Meczup! Ya, cüretleri", *Akis*, 16 April, 1966. Last accessed 25 April, 2022. https://www.gastearsivi.com/gazete/akis/1966-04-16/5
[16] Bernard Lewis, "Islamic revival in Turkey" p. 43.
[17] Marmorstein.
[18] Eickelman and Piscatori, p. 29.
[19] Part of an informal conversation using a social media instant messaging service. 21 January 2020.
[20] A more literal translation would render this phrase "he formed himself a group with his most liked/beloved"
[21] For the full poem, refer to the summary translation later in this thesis. See: Çakır, p. 98; Elhâc Mehmed Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk* (Ankara, undated, Pilavoğlu Kitabevi). Back cover.
[22] See, for instance: İlker Aytürk. "The First Episode of Language Reform in Republican Turkey: The Language Council from 1926 to 1931." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 18,3 (2008): 275-293.
[23] *Fet'hi Rabbânî,* p. 5.
[24] Rüdiger Seesemann, "Alfā Hāshim" *Encyclopedia of Islam*, (2010): 77-79.
[25] *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, p. 94.
[26] Gençdoğan, p. 16.
[26] A city not far from Ankara.
[27] Yıldız
[28] Öz.
[29] "Saatçi Musa Çağıl", *Biyografya beta*, last accessed on 26 December 2020, https://www.biyografya.com/biyografi/24322.
[30] Öz, p. 116.
[31] Öz, p. 112.
[32] Yıldız, p. 4.
[33] Yıldız, p. 4.
[34] The Turkish rendering of the title "Hajji", given to those who have completed the Hajj pilgrimage.
[35] Gençdoğan, p. 16.
[36] A city not far from Ankara.
[37] Yıldız, p. 42 reiterates the same information.
[38] Semih Çelik, "Coping with Famines in Ottoman Anatolia (1650-1850)" in Dijkman, Jessica, and Bas van Leeuwen, eds. *An Economic History of Famine Resilience* (London: Routledge, 2019).
[39] Hülya Canbakal. "The Ottoman State and Descendants of the Prophet in Anatolia and the Balkans (c. 1500-1700)." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 52, no. 3 (2009): 542-578.
[40] Canbakal, pp. 543-544.
[41] Canbakal, p. 563.
[42] Canbakal. p. 565
[43] Ziya Dinç, XVI. "Yüzyilda Osmanli Devleti'nde Çarşi'nin Kent Hayatina Etkisi: Ankara Örneği", unpublished paper uploaded to *Academia.edu*. Last accessed on 18 December 2020. P. 185. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/31502494/XVI._YUZYILDA_OSMANLI_DEVLETINDE_CARSININ_KENT_HAYATINA_ETKISI___ANKARA_ORNEGI.pdf?1373010494=&response-content-

disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DXVI_YUZYILDA_OSMANLI_DEVLETI_NDE_CARSI_N.pdf&Expires=1608287459&Signature=Y2PGclKuHD5wqLq2dpv2V-YmRbyNNKBy6eI1FmxpxtG3nRcHD6du-P8CNNPXBHfZIwYPhdbi4ngZL12YfUwGxYXdaWa1nsJ5Nh3G0pb9N94Lmu8Q6pHvo41JVyd4v2gjks6nsyONBBLctT0jkIKYLVtkeIaBasr5TFPdJ-YSSPR6eBA-SCqCJNwY-~3YkBSzoVbD96mk9osMldATxCIASykWIcxANC2llfwPmsJrxcoCNCpk5mq9SuRRhGTKOUeRH-wqJ7HgXveM2UtUNHL7SqVqhV5XM5MksXGYSPC2LloBC6NMfjps2homsIqCnwZVjYcA96GoYxVBRoIjqDsnvA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA.

[44] *Zade* is a synonym of *oğlu*, which both mean "son of."

[45] Zeynep Çakir, Güliz Gökçe, Bilgin Altinöz, and Burcu H. Özüduru. "Ankara Hanlar Bölgesi'nin Mekansal Gelişimi Ve Bugünkü Kullanici Profilinin Değerlendirilmesi." *TÜBA-KED Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi Kültür Envanteri Dergisi* 20 (2020): 175-201.

[46] *Han* is derived from the Persian word for shop, inn, store, etc. *Dükkan* is derived from the Arabic word with the same general meaning. The newspaper may have used both terms to clarify the meaning.

[47] Yıldız, p. 13.

[48] Çakır, p. 2.

[49] "Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu", *Biyografi.info*, last accessed on 16 December 2020. https://www.biyografi.info/kisi/mehmet-kemal-pilavoglu; Kenan Ergen, "M. Kemal Pilavoğlu'nun Hayatı", *Güncelankara*, 15 November 2011. Last accessed on 16 December 2020. https://www.guncelankara.com/m-kemal-pilavoglu%E2%80%99nun-hayati.html

[50] Yıldız uses the word "manevi" to explain Pilavoğlu's abandonment of his studies. "Manevi" literally means "spiritual", so Yıldız's explanation could also be translated as, "it [Pilavoğlu abandoning his studies] must have been a spiritual sign." p. 5.

[51] *Namaz* is the Turkish word for *salah*, the obligatory daily prayers for Muslims. *Zikr* is the Turkish rendering of *dhikr*, or "remembrance" of God. It is a common understanding among Sufis that *dhikr* is a way to gain spiritual enlightenment, and [closer] proximity to God.

[52] Yıldız, p. 6.

[53] In Turkish folklore, Hüseyin Gazi is the father of Battal Gazi, who is known to have been responsible for spreading Islam in Anatolia. The story is often used to emphasize the presence of Islam in Anatolia even before the Battle of Manzikert, which saw the defeat of the Byzantines by the Seljuks and was a decisive turning point for the Turkification of Anatolia. The story of Battal Gazi is based on the real-life 8th century Umayyad military leader Abdallah al-Battal, who participated in several campaigns against the Byzantine Empire. For a detailed discussion about the Shrine itself, see: Hüseyin Türk, "Alawi Syncretism: Beliefs and Traditions in the Shrine of Hüseyin Gazi," *Journal of Religious Culture*, 69, 2004, pp. 1-20.

[54] Yıldız, p. 7.

[55] Zubayr ibnAl-Awam (594–656 CE) was a cousin and companion of the Prophet Muhammad, and one of the first converts to Islam.

[56] Yıldız, pp. 12-13.

[57] Çakır, p. 12.

[58] The term "millet" literally means people, nation, folk, etc. However, its connotation in relation to the Ottoman *Millet* system which separated subjects into legal groupings according to confessional status seems important in this context, since it is likely that Pilavoğlu was asking particularly about his religious community.

[59] Yıldız, pp. 12-13.

[60] *Fet'hi Rabbânî*, pp. 102-103.

[61] In the text, no mention of this encounter happening during a dream (rüya, or hayal) is made.

[62] *Fet'hi Rabbânî,* pp. 102-103

[63] *Fet'hi Rabbânî,* p. 5.

[64] Çakır, p. 10.

[65] For example, Adviye Fenik, "Ticani tarikatı şeyhi dün tevkif edildi: Kemal Pilavoğlu, Müridlerine C.H.F.ye girmelerini tavsiye etmiş, Dünkü duruşmada tarikatın halifesinin de tevkifine karar verildi", *Zafer*, 20 April 150. Last accessed on 26 April, 2022. <https://www.gastearsivi.com/en/gazete/zafer/1950-04-20/1>; "Ticani Şeyhi Kemal Pilavoğlu Mahkum Oldu", *Milliyet*, 3 May 1952. Last accessed 27 April, 2022. <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/>

[66] Yıldız, p. 9.

[67] Yıldız, p. 23.

[68] Yıldız, pp. 44-46.

[69] Yıldız, p. 47.
[70] Mehmet Tarhan, "Religious Education in Turkey: A socio-historical study of the Imam Hatip schools", PhD dissertation, Temple University, 1997.
[71] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 181.
[72] *Rajab* is the seventh month in the Hijri calendar, one of the four sacred months. *Shaʿbān* is the eighth month in the Hijri calendar. It is optional but encouraged to fast on designated days during these months. *Shawwal* is the month after Ramadan, during which a recommended fast to make up for any days not fasted during Ramadan can be undertaken. Separate from this is a recommended fast on any six days during the month of *Shawwal*.
[73] *Dhu al-Hijjah* is the twelfth month of the Hijri calendar, and the month of Hajj. According to hadith tradition, fasting for the first nine days of the month is encouraged. Fasting on these nine days is considered the equivalent of one year of fasting for each day.
[74] *Tasbih* is a form of *dhikr* which involves the recitation of *Subḥānallāh* a certain number of times, which is counted using prayer beads, which are also called *tespih* (spelled *tesbih* in the text) in Turkish.
[75] The adding of two *rakats* to the set amount for each daily prayer is known as the Sunnah prayer, of which there are several types.
[76] Öz, p. 112.
[77] Yıldız, p. 32.
[78] Çakır, p. 19.
[79] The text says literally, "an honorable, great master of/in the Islamic world."
[80] Çakır, p 4
[81] Yıldız, p. 11.
[82] Yıldız, p. 7.
[83] Yıldız, p. 25.
[84] Çakır, p. 25.
[85] Yıldız, pp. 57-58.
[86] Marmorstein; Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", p. 43.; "Ankara Ticanilerin çıkardığı hâdisler", *Cumhuriyet* 12 April 1950.
[87] These estimates are largely anecdotal and were obtained in Ankara in 2016 during a series of informal interviews and meetings with self-identified members of the Tijani community in the city, many of whom were members of Pilavoğlu's immediate and extended family.
[88] Yıldız, p. 15.
[89] "Meclisindeki ezan hâdisesi, tertib eseri! Arabca ezana taraftar olan Ticani tarikati mensublarının giriştikleri mecnunane gösteri" *Cumhuriyet*, 6 February 1949. Tripolitania was one of three administrative divisions of Italian Libya but was relinquished in 1947 following the Paris Peace Treaty.
[90] Yıldız, p. 12.
[91] *Lailaheillah* is the spelling used in Yıldız's text for lā ʾilāha ʾillā -llāhu (There is no god but God). This is the first portion of the *shahada*, the Muslim testament of faith. Yıldız, p.25.
[92] Yıldız, p. 26.
[93] Yıldız, p. 26; "Pilavoğlu deli değil", *Milliyet*, 9 July 1951.
[94] Çağıl, as quoted in Öz, pp. 112-13.
[95] Öz, p. 115.
[96] Elhâc Mehmed Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk* (Ankara, undated, Pilavoğlu Kitabevi). This explanation is also summarized by Yıldız, p. 21.
[97] Yıldız, pp. 20-21.
[98] Nâzım Hikmet Ran was a poet, playwright, novelist, and director, and a leader in the Turkish avant-garde movement. He was arrested many times for his political beliefs and spent a considerable amount of time in prison and exile. In 1949, a group of intellectuals and artists including Pablo Picasso and Jean-Paul Sartre campaigned for his release from prison. His work was banned in Turkey from 1938-1965.
[99] Marmorstein, Pp. 346, 347.
[100] Marmorstein, p. 347.
[101] Jenkins, pp. 115-116.
[102] Jenkins, p. 115.
[103] Öz, p. 108.
[104] Öz, p. 110.
[105] Çağıl, quoted by Öz, p. 111.

[106] Abun-Nasr, p. 161.
[107] Refer to the earlier acknowledgement, discussed on p. 78 of this thesis, about Çakır's spelling and grammar errors.
[108] Çakır, p. 41.
[109] Yıldız, p. 54.
[110] Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Komünizme Hücum!* (Ankara, 1949). Image and text summary: *Nadir Kitap*, "Komünizme Hücum!" https://www.nadirkitap.com/komunizme-hucum-kemal-pilavoglu-kitap1415565.html last accessed on 1 January 2021.
[111] Yıldız, p. 54.
[112] Yıldız, p. 56.
[113] Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey" p. 47.
[114] Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", p. 47.
[115] Güven Gürkan Öztan and Elif Çağli Kaynak, "Anti-Communism in Turkish Education and Childhood In The 1950s." *Beyond Modernization* (2020): 101-128. P. 101.
[116] P. 39. Adnan Menderes graduated from the Law School of Ankara in 1935.
[117] Çağıl, quoted by Öz, pp. 110-112.
[118] Marmorstein,
[119] Kadir Mısıroğlu, "Ticaniler ve Kemal Pilavoğlu'na Dâir", 2 January 2019. YouTube video, 20:14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtvfucCJBxc
[120] Lewis, "Islamic revival in Turkey", p. 43.
[121] Yıldız, p. 29.
[122] Çağıl, quoted by Öz, p. 114.
[123] Yıldız. p. 30.
[124] Yıldız. p. 36.
[125] Yıldız. p. 36.
[126] Yıldız. p. 37
[127] Yıldız, p. 115.
[128] Yıldız. p. 37.
[129] Yıldız, p. 115.
[130] Prodromos Yannas, "The Human Rights condition of the Rum Orthodox", in Zehra F.K. ed., *Human Rights in Turkey*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (2007). pp. 57-71.
[131] "Bozcaada, Ticanilerin dergahı oluyor" *Cumhuriyet*, 2 October 1968; Yıldız, p. 115.
[132] Yıldız, p. 37.
[133] Elhac Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Her Kötülüğün Anası Şarap* (Ankara: 1969).
[134] Yıldız. p. 33.
[135] *Kitapyurdu*, last accessed on 3 January 2021. https://www.kitapyurdu.com/; *Nadirkitap*, last accessed on 3 January 2021. https://www.nadirkitap.com/
[136] Çakır, pp. 13-14.
[137] Çağıl, as quoted in Öz, p. 116.
[138] Abun-Nasr, p. 162.
[139] The domain is listed as follows but was expired as of 4 January 2021: http://ilahiisik.org.tr/; İlahi Işık, Community Page. *Facebook*, Last accessed 6 September 2020. https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Religious-Organization/%C4%B0lahi-I%C5%9F%C4%B1k-Yay%C4%B1nlar%C4%B1-%C4%B0lim-ve-K%C3%BClt%C3%BCr-Merkezi-Derne%C4%9Fi-307430203289021/>. Last accessed 6 September 2020.
[140] The night is understood in Sunni tradition as the time when the coming year will be determined by God's will, and when prayers are offered for God's forgiveness of the sins of deceased ancestors.
[141] Pilavoğlu Yayınevi, @pilavogluyayinevi Profile. *Instagram*, Last accessed 4 January 2021. https://instagram.com/pilavogluyayinevi?igshid=1nqdwbqemf35g.
[142] Pilavoğlu Yayınevi, @pilavogluyayinevi. Profile. *Instagram* post 4 September 2020. Last accessed 4 January 2021. https://www.instagram.com/p/CEtJ2G4hWux/?igshid=12fk9d0i8kotf.
[143] Pilavoğlu Yayınevi, @pilavogluyayinevi. Profile. *Instagram* post 28 August 2020. Last accessed 4 January 2021. https://www.instagram.com/tv/CEb3rgkhU6R/?igshid=xwkreefltbhg.
[144] Pilavoğlu Esans @pilavogluesans. Profile. *Instagram*, Last accessed 4 January 2021. *https://instagram.com/pilavogluesans?igshid=1quhq56ymvo1c*

[145] *Pilavoğlu Esans*, 2018. Last Accessed on 4 January 2021. https://www.pilavoglu-esans.com/.

Notes for Chapter 5

[1] Yıldız, p. 46.
[2] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 29.
[3] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 35.
[4] Weismann, pp. 91-92.
[5] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 33.
[6] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 35.
[7] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, pp. 116-122.
[8] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 35, 36.
[9] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 40.
[10] Erik Jan Zürcher, "Young Turk Governance in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War." *Middle Eastern Studies* 55, 6 (2019): 897-913.
[11] Weismann, p. 94.
[12] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 55.
[13] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 201.
[14] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 37.
[15] Lars Haugom, "Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan: A change in international Orientation?" *Comparative Strategy* 38, 3 (2019): 206-223.
[16] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 19.
[17] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 233.
[18] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 21.
[19] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. xiv.
[20] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 25.
[21] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 7.
[22] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 27.
[23] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 12.
[24] Weismann, p. 132.
[25] Weismann, p. 132.
[26] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 70.
[27] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 65.
[28] Raskin.
[29] Raskin, p. 60.
[30] Raskin, p. 75, 78.
[31] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 68, 80.
[32] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 68-69.
[33] Erdağ Göknar, *Orhan Pamuk, Secularism, and Blasphemy: The Politics of the Turkish Novel* (London: Routledge, 2013); Ilter Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey" in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*. Edited by Richard Tapper. (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., School of Oriental and African Studies, 1995): pp. 31-55; Ahmet Evin, *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel*. (Minneapolis: Bibloteca Islamica, 1983).
[34] Evin, pp. 98; 95.
[35] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 69-70.
[36] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 70-71.
[37] Burhanettin Duran, and Cemil Aydın. "Competing Occidentalisms of Modern Islamist Thought: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu on Christianity, the West and Modernity." *The Muslim World* 103, 4 (2013): 479-500.
[38] Michelangelo Guida, "Nurettin Topçu and Nacip Fazıl Kisakürek: Stories of 'Conversion' and Activism in Republican Turkey," *Journal for Islamic Studies* 34 (2014): 98-117.
[39] Michelangelo Guida, "NurettinTopçu: The Reinvention of Islamism in Republican Turkey." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 12, 2 (2013): p. 99.
[40] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 247.

[41] Guida, "Stories of 'Conversion' and Activism", p. 103, 104.
[42] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 85.
[43] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 250.
[44] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 87.
[45] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 250.
[46] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire,* p. 87.
[47] Duran, and Aydın, p. 499.
[48] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 86, 87.
[49] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Modernity*, p. 246
[50] Weismann, p. 156.
[51] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Change*, p. 222.
[52] Weismann, pp. 156-157.
[53] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Change,* p. 96.
[54] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Change,* p. 181.
[55] Brockett.
[56] The Turkish History Thesis was part of Atatürk's attempt to create a distinctly Turkish history for the Republic which was separated from Islamic history. See: Jenkins, pp. 100-101.
[57] Weismann, p. 157.
[58] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 102.
[59] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Change,* p. 175.
[60] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Change*, p. 212-219.
[61] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* p. 35; 173.
[62] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, pp. 102-103.
[63] Hanioğlu, pp. 131-132.
[64] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 104.
[65] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Change,* p. 247-250.
[66] Mardin mentions, among others, Ali Shariati, and Sayyid Qutb, *Religion, Society and Change,* p. 254.
[67] Mardin, *Religion, Society and Change*, p. 250.
[68] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 213.
[69] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 203.
[70] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 81.
[71] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*.
[72] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 13.
[73] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 14.
[74] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 17.
[75] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 191.
[76] See: Al-Ma'idah, *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 5:72-75, quran.com
[77] This digression is clearly equally aimed at Shiism, which according to Sunni myths, was created by ʿAbdullah ibn Sabaʾ al-Ḥimyarī (a Jewish convert to Islam) with the goal of corrupting Islam from within. Al-Ḥimyarī denied that Ali, the fourth caliph after Muhammad's death, had been killed in the Battle of the Camel. He also preached that Ali was God incarnate, that he had ascended to heaven, and that he would return in imminent occultation, or raj'a. This is the (Shia) belief in a "hidden imam", or the imam of the era, who is in hiding but will emerge to claim authority and guide the community.
[78] Shivesh Chandra Thakur. *Christian and Hindu Ethics, Vol. 1* (Routledge, 2019).
[79] Franz Dünzl. *A Brief History of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Church* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007).
[80] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 212.
[81] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 153.
[82] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına* p. 141.
[83] Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Yasār ibn Khiyār orally collated the traditions about the life of Muhammad, which are known as *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* (*The Life of the Messenger of God*).
[84] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, pp. 154-159.
[85] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, pp. 160-161.
[86] Elhâc Mehmet Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Mukayeseli: Hak Dini ve Bâtıl Dinler* (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 2nd edition: 1991 reprint of 1961).
[87] Jenkins, pp. 101-102.

[88] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 128.
[89] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, pp. 11-14.
[90] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire*, p. 189.
[91] Hanioğlu, p. 123.
[92] Jenkins, pp. 121-122.
[93] Jenkins, p. 121.
[94] Jenkins, pp. 119-120.
[95] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire,* p. 132
[96] Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Change,* p. 270
[97] Weismann, p. 159.
[98] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 35; 99.
[99] Mardin, *Religion and Social Change*, p. 77.
[100] This poem appears on the back cover of *Muhammed Aleyhisselâmın Ahlâkı ve Âdetleri* (Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 3rd edition, 1979 reprint of 1949).
[101] Pilavoğlu, *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk*, p. 478.
[102] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına*, p. 28
[103] Pilavoğlu, *Resûlullah'ın Kırk Yaşına,* p. 25.
[104] Yavuz, *Nostalgia for the Empire,* p. 86.

Notes for Chapter 6: Part I

[1] The term for "saint" in Turkish is *evliya,* a direct cognate of the Arabic word; أولياء, awliyā.
[2] These are the category of hadiths, the words of which are attributed directly to Muhammad.
[3] P. 4.
[4] In addition to the religious title of *Muqaddam, mukaddeme*, from Ottoman Turkish, can mean "introduction" or "preface." It would not be surprising if the translator chose this term on purpose, as opposed to *önsöz*, which is the Turkish (i.e. not derived from Arabic or Persian) word for "introduction."
[5] P. 5.
[6] Şeyh Mehmed is clearly a reference to Ahmad al-Tijani. *Mehmed* in Turkish is one of the more common renderings of the Arabic *Muhammad*, and *Ahmed* is very widely understood to derive from the same root as Muhammad. Indeed, a common interpretation of verse 6 in *Surah as-Saf* in the Qur'an, where Jesus mentions a messenger named Ahmad, is that Jesus was foretelling the coming of Muhammad. See: *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 61:6, quran.com.
[7] Probably al-Husayn mosque and tomb complex in Cairo.
[8] P. 15.
[9] P. 16
[10] The term used in the text is *sofi*.
[11] The term used in the text is *müstenidâtı*.
[12] P. 32.
[13] Sahih al-Bukhari, *Al-Adab al-Aufrad*, Hadith 121.
[14] *Elfâz* (Ottoman) is the plural form of *lâfız*, which means word, law, letter, etc.
[15] Yā signals the vocative case in Arabic, typically seen when directly addressing a person.
[16] A *quṭb* is the "axis" in Sufism, sometimes also known as an "axial saint" in English. *Quṭb* is used for a saint who is deemed to be the greatest of the time, hence, "Axis of the age." See: Cornell, *Realm of the Saint*.
[17] *Ezkar* (Ottoman) is the plural of *zikr*, or *dhikr*.
[18] P. 93.
[19] P. 94.
[20] The dates of death are not provided by the translator/author, so several have been added here, but not exhaustively. Some of the original Arabic names are provided in this list when the name is somewhat incomplete or otherwise unintelligible. Not all the individuals are identifiable, because no additional information or commentary about the *silsila* are provided in the original text.

[21] This phrase literally means "he/she too/also" and appears before almost all of the names in the *silsila*.
[22] The text specifies only "… bu zatın yolundan ayrılmadır."
[23] 1586 CE. This date is provided in the text.
[24] This explanation is included with Halvetiye's name.
[25] The capital of Erzincan Province in eastern Turkey, not far from Erzurum and Sivas.
[26] The capital of Kastamonu Province in north central Turkey.
[27] The identity of this 'Ala' al-Din is unclear.
[28] The identity of this Abd al-Latif is unclear.
[29] Mahmud al-Kurdi, a Khalwati shaykh, was one of al-Tijani's shaykhs. Prior to the establishment of the Tijaniyya, the link to al-Kurdi was important. However, when Shaykh Tijani received his vision of the Prophet and received the *wird* of the Tijaniyya, Tijani *silsila*-s shifted to a lineage which links Shaykh Tijani directly to the Prophet, and not through al-Kurdi.
[30] The term used in the text is *zikr*, but it is clearly used in the broader sense of dedication to God, and not just the recitation of litanies; "…Allah'ın zikrinden alıkoymaz." P. 99.
[31] *Jawāhir al-Maʿānī* is a seminal book in the Tijani tradition, detailing such central doctrines as the Seal of Saints, and the concept of a *quṭb* (axial saint) in the tradition. See: Al-Khalifah Ali Harazim b. al-'Arabi Barradah al-Fasi, *Precious Meanings & Attainment of Hopes: From the Outpouring of Sidi Abu al-ʿAbbas al Tijani, Volume I*. Translated by Talut b. Sulaiman Dawood al-Tijani (Atlanta: Fayda Books, 2020).
[32] Shaykh al-Tijani's eldest son, who was killed in an uprising against Ottoman authorities in Algeria.
[33] Shaykh al-Tijani's younger son, also known as Muhammad al-Saghir (i.e. "the younger).
[34] The addition of "Konyevi" here is odd, because if this is Muhammad al-Hashimi, or Alfā Hāshim Muḥammad al-Hāshimī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd Tāl, he is the well-known west African Tijani scholar, who was not known to have visited Turkey, and especially not lived or settled in Konya. Another possibility is that this is another Konya-based recipient of the *silsila* from 'Ali al-Tammasini.
[35] In the text, this sentence appears in bold font, in parenthesis. It seems to be a note by the author/translator of the book to clarify his own position within the Tijaniyya.
[36] The text cites "7 Teşrin 1931 Perşembe." *Teşrin* can be either October or November, but the 7th of October in 1931 on the Gregorian Calendar was a Wednesday, and the 7th of November 1931 was a Saturday. *Perşembe* is the word for Thursday, which is derived from the Persian word for Thursday, but the mistake is not explained by a transition in the convention for the names of the days of the week, because it happens that even if the narrator was mixing naming conventions, the days of the week are aligned across Abrahamic traditions (i.e. that there are seven days in a week). It is worth noting that the *Rumi takvim*, or Gregorian calendar, was adopted by the Ottoman Authorities in 1917, but the Hijri calendar remained in use for religious purposes. In 1926, the Hijri calendar was abandoned as part of Atatürk's reforms. Nevertheless, it was only in 1945 that the names of four months that occur in pairs in the Arabic naming system (Teşrin-i Evvel, Teşrin-i Sânî and Kânûn-ı Evvel, Kânûn-ı Sânî) were changed to Turkish names Ekim, Kasım, Aralık and Ocak.
[37] In other words, a member of the Tijaniyya.
[38] The term that appears in the text is *Nür*, and is capitalized.
[39] The verb that appears in the text is *seyir etmek*, which can mean "to make spiritual progress", but this is an odd construction in English. Typically, speaking about mystical experiences in English connotes proximity to the Divine, thus; "growing closer to this enlightenment" seems to be a more natural rendering.
[40] The verb that appears in the text is *duymak*, which means to hear, bear, know, feel.
[41] Mehmed Haşım's name is followed by the title *Pire* in the text, which is a title given to the assistant to the shaykh of a *tekke*, who on occasion will act on behalf of the shaykh.
[42] A sage, but more specifically; one who has attained true knowledge of God.
[43] This is most likely Shaykh Idris al-Iraqi (d. 2009), who was the imam and *Muqaddam* of the Grand Zawiyah of Sidi Ahmad Tijani (RA) in Fez for forty years. See Sidi Idris b. Muhammad al-Iraqi, *Acts of Devotion: Recommended Acts for Every Month of the Islamic Year*. Translated by Talut Dawood (Imam Ghazali Institute, 2018).
[44] It is not clarified in the text, but this probably refers to *Kitāb Rimāḥ Ḥizb Al-Raḥīm* written by the west African Tijani scholar al-Hajj 'Umar al-Futi, or the "scholar, mystic, religious combatant, founder and leader of a state, [who] is considered to be one of the most remarkable and important and remarkable personalities in ninenteenth century west African Islam," known more famously as al-Hajj Umar. See: Bernd Radtke. "Studies on the Sources of the *Kitāb Rimāḥ Ḥizb Al-Raḥīm* Of Al-Ḥājj ʿumar" *Sudanic Africa* 6 (1995): 73-113. p. 73.

Notes for Chapter 6, Part II

[1] P. 3.
[2] *Manakib* is a broad tradition in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish literature which is devoted to hagiography, or biographical narratives of a praising/flattering nature. Typically, these kinds of works depict the subject as they ought to have been, by emphasizing details such as their remarkable deeds and meritorious attributes. The aim is often to depict the subject as a morally positive figure, based on (the aforementioned) remarkable and meritorious qualities.
[3] The text says literally, "an honorable, great master of/in the Islamic world."
[4] p. 7.
[5] p. 7.
[6] p. 10.
[7] p. 10.
[8] The term used in the text is *âlî* which literally means; technical, or instrumental. However, describing Medenî as the "technical chief" or even the "instrumental" one in this context has an odd connotation in English. These terms, especially the former, connote that he ascended to the position because of circumstance, as opposed to being appointed or chosen because of his authority and experience as a member of the ulama. Thus, "influential chief" seems more fitting.
[9] In the text, the phrase "mezun buyurmak" is the phrase which is used. *Mezun* means to graduate, authorize, diplomaed, etc. *Buyurmak* means to order, decree, and can mean to ordain.
[10] p. 10.
[11] p. 10.
[12] p. 12.
[13] pp. 16-19.
[14] p. 20.
[15] p. 21.
[16] p. 23.
[17] p. 25.
[18] The term *tecelli* is used repeatedly throughout this section. Literally, the term means "manifestation", but its more specific meaning, and indeed is likely the intended connotation of the text, is: a manifestation of God's grace together with a perception thereof by the devoted, or simply; a manifestation of an attribute of God. The *Redhouse Dictionary* definition of the term also specifies that *tecelli* can refer to the Transfiguration of Christ.
[19] The text uses the terms *kerâmet* and *mûcize*. The former more specifically refers to a miracle that is performed through the agency of a saint/power of sanctity by which miracles are worked. A *mûcize* is also a miracle, but specifically associated with Prophets. This use of both terms appears elsewhere in the primary texts of Pilavoğlu. See for instance, *Fet'hi Rabbânî*.
[20] p. 25.
[21] P. 30
[22] p. 35.
[23] pp. 37-38.
[24] Green has a variety of associations in Islam. There are several references to the color in the Qur'an. See for instance: 55:76; 76:21. Green was also the dynastic color of the Fatimids and remains as a color symbolizing Islam in many contemporary national flags (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, etc.). This allusion to green by the author is made all the stronger because of the strong association of communism with the color red, which is the opposite of green on the color spectrum.
[25] p. 40.
[26] Bülent Ecevit first became a member of Turkish parliament in 1957. He was the leader of the CHP from 1972-1980. It is worth noting that he formed a coalition with the Islamist Millî Selâmet Partisi (National Salvation Party, or MSP) in 1974. In 1989, he became leader of the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, or DSP). Then, he served as Prime Minister of Turkey from 1999-2002.
[27] p. 41.

[28] "Bakan" is a neologism in Turkish. In other words, this term was introduced during the language reform period. The term most commonly translates as minister, or state secretary. However, it can also refer to an attendant or an overseer in a more general sense. The verbal noun *bakan* in modern Turkish refers to seeing or glaring, based on the verb *bakmak*, to look, see, stare, etc. For instance, "dik dik bakan" means unwinking or glaring. "Bakan kimse" can mean provider, beholder, or tender (as in one who tends to something). The Ottoman equivalent for *bakan* is *nâzır*, which also means minister. A possible explanation for his word-choice is that by the time he composed the poem in 1978, the term *nâzır* (a reasonable Ottoman equivalent term) had mostly fallen out of use. Turks born before the 1940s tend(ed) to use more Arabic-origin words, whereas those born later took up the "Turkified" vocabulary of modern Turkish.
[29] A more literal translation is "Dear Friend [who is] Right." Obviously, a person "who is right" in English means something different (i.e. one who is correct, or the opposite of wrong). Thus, a more accurate, although less literal translation into English is "righteous", due to the connotation that "being righteous" is a state of being or a quality in English and is often used to evoke religious overtones (purity, holiness, uprightness, etc.).
[30] *Bircan* is typically a unisex given name in Turkish, with a variety of meanings such has congenial, affable, beloved, etc. Although in English "dearest beloved" often has romantic connotations, Turkish usages of affectionate terms such as this are akin to the use of *habib* (beloved, dear, etc.) in Arabic.
[31] p. 3.
[32] p. 5.
[33] p. 8.
[34] p. 11.
[35] This spelling error appears in the text.
[36] p. 15
[37] p. 28
[38] p. 31.
[39] p. 35.
[40] p. 38.
[41] p. 41.
[42] p. 59.
[43] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 17:85, 18:109; 31:27, quran.com.
[44] p. 60.
[45] Sometimes written as one word, *fenafillâh*, is the Ottoman Turkish rendering of the Arabic *Fanāʾ*.
[46] This is one of the spellings used by the author.
[47] p. 95.
[48] p. 97.

Notes for Chapter 6: Part III

[1] Cebeci Asri Cemetery was the first modern burial location in Ankara. Many of Turkey's prominent figures are buried there. The digital record of Pilavoğlu's grave lists his birth year as 1904. This is more than likely a mistake, because a number of sources claim he was born in 1906.
[2] p. 4.
[3] p. 4.
[4] Yıldız uses the word "manevi" to explain Pilavoğlu's abandonment of his studies. "Manevi" literally means "spiritual", so Yıldız's explanation could also be translated as, "it [Pilavoğlu abandoning his studies] must have been a spiritual sign."
[5] *Namaz* is the Turkish word for *salah*, the obligatory daily prayers for Muslims. *Zikr* is the Turkish rendering of *dhikr*, or "remembrance" of God. It is a common understanding among Sufis that *dhikr* is a way to gain spiritual enlightenment, and [closer] proximity to God.
[6] p. 6.
[7] Basic rules of Arabic grammar.

[8] *Ijtihad* is the practice of independent reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence, which requires expertise in Arabic, theology, revealed texts, and the principles of *fiqh* (jurisprudence).
[9] pp. 6-7.
[10] P. 7.
[11] Zubayr ibn Al-Awam (594–656 CE) was a cousin and companion of the Prophet Muhammad, and one of the first converts to Islam.
[12] P. 7.
[13] Elhac Mehmed Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Tasavvuf ve Ahlâk*, Ankara: Pilavoğlu Kitabevi, 1985.
[14] P. 9-10
[15] This is the same name of a publisher located in the district of Altındağ in Ankara. Their emblem is the same which appears in many of Pilavoğlu's publications, which is a "seal." The border of the seal is a leafy wreath, surrounding an image of the Ka'ba behind an image of a large open book. A quill pen is poised over the book. Color images of this seal are usually green. On the publisher's facebook page, the address of the publisher, along with a web address, appears below the seal. The domain name is expired. <http://ilahiisik.org.tr/> The publisher's image appears on their facebook page, with posts as recent as 7 April 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Religious-Organization/%C4%B0lahi-I%C5%9F%C4%B1k-Yay%C4%B1nlar%C4%B1-%C4%B0lim-ve-K%C3%BClt%C3%BCr-Merkezi-Derne%C4%9Fi-307430203289021/>. Last accessed 6 September 2020.
[16] P. 9.
[17] The term used in the text is *sadık*, which literally means; faithful, devoted, devout, etc. However, describing a dream as a "faithful" or "devout" dream in English connotes more of an idea of loyalty than a religiously-imbued message.
[18] P. 11.
[19] In Islamic tradition King Nimrod is often referenced as a tyrant who competes with the power of God. In the Qur'an, it is a common interpretation that Nimrod (who is not called by name in the Qur'an) argued with Abraham, which resulted in the former exiling the latter. See: Q. 2:258.
[20] Pp. 11-12.
[21] P. 12.
[22] Medeni's name is variously 'Turkified' as: Abdül Kadir Havvâri Velmedeni in *Fet'hi Rabbânî;* in *Pilavoğu Kimdir?* It appears as: Abdulkadir Medenî.
[23] At the time, the Hagia Sophia was still operating as a mosque. It was closed in 1931 and reopened as a museum in 1935 as part of the republican secularization program. In 2020 its status was reinstated as a mosque.
[24] The term "millet" literally means people, nation, folk, etc. However, its connotation in relation to the Ottoman *Millet* system which separated subjects into legal groupings according to confessional status seems important in this context, since it is likely that Pilavoğlu was asking particularly about his religious community.
[25] Pp. 12- 13.
[26] The phrase used in the text is "Han Dūkkan sahibi." *Han* can mean inn, caravansaray, commercial building, etc. *Han sahibi* specifically means "a man of property" or simply "owner" or "landlord." Earlier in the text it is mentioned that his family owned an inn in Ankara.
[27] The phrase in the text is "…din elden gizmezdi." The *Redhouse Dictionary*'s definition of *gizem* specifies that this is a neologism, which can mean mystery, mystic, mysticism, mystical, etc.
[28] 15.
[29] A 1949 headline from *Cumhuriyet* "Meclisindeki ezan hâdisesi, tertib eseri! Arabca ezana taraftar olan Ticani tarikati mensublarının giriştikleri mecnunane gösteri" (6 February 1949). Another from *Hürriyet* in 1950, "Ankara Adliyesinde bir hâdise: Ticani tarikatli mensupları adliye koridorlarını sararak şeylerinin muhakemesinin görülmesine mâni oldular" (12 April 1950).
[30] The phrase used to describe God in this instance is "Zatı Celaliye." Which more specifically means "Individual [who is] Glorious."
[31] Pp. 20-21.
[32] Abu Ayyub al-Ansari (d.674 CE) was a close companion of the prophet Muhammad. He is a prominent figure in the early history of Islam. His dying request was to be buried in Constantinople.
[33] P. 23.
[34] No name is provided in the text for this shaykh, but this is probably the same, Idris al-Iraqi of Fez, named in *Fet'hi Rabbânî.*
[35] P. 24.
[36] P. 25.

[37] P. 26.
[38] P. 29.
[39] P. 30.
[40] P. 32.
[41] P. 36.
[42] Adnan Menderes graduated from the Law School of Ankara in 1935.
[43] The *takbir* is the phrase "Allahu Akbar." In the context of prayer following death, it forms part of the funerary rituals and burial customs. Also part of customs surrounding the deceased is the recitation of the first chapter of the Qur'an on their behalf when visiting their graves. A reminder to mourners is often printed on Turkish headstones; *Ruhuna Fatiha* (recite *al-Fatiha*).
[44] A city not far from Ankara.
[45] A rice dish where the rice is seasoned and cooked in broth, mixed with vegetables and sometimes meat. The dish is specific because of the technique used; the rice is pre-rinsed before cooking to ensure that the rice grains don't stick together.
[46] P. 42.
[47] P. 46.
[48] In modern Turkish, the word *ilim* typically means "science" or "theoretical knowledge" but carries a strong religious connotation.
[49] Imam Hatip schools were secondary education institutions established to train government-employed imams after the abolishment of madrasas (Islamic theologically based schools) in 1924 under the Unification of Education Act under Atatürks reforms, which brought all education under the control of the Ministry of Education. Imam Hatip schools were then closed in 1930, religious education was reinstated in 1948, and in 1951 seven new Imam Hatip schools were established by the Democrat Party (DP) under Menderes. Under the National Basic Education Law ratified following the 1971 military coup, Imam Hatip schools were defined as vocational schools where students trained to become preachers. The number of new schools continued to grow in the 1970s. See: Mehmet Tarhan, "Religious Education in Turkey: A socio-historical study of the Imam Hatip schools", PhD dissertation, Temple University, 1997.
[50] P. 48.
[51] Edward Henry Palmer's English translation of the Qur'an was published in 1880. Many scholars since then have reproached his translation, noting a number of serious mistakes and a lack of comprehension in his translation.
[52] P. 49
[53] . 50.
[54] This is known as the *Tahajjud* prayer, or sometimes called the "night prayer." These terms do not appear in the text. Traditions surrounding this prayer suggest that it be performed after *Isha*, the nighttime obligatory prayer, but before *Fajr*, the morning obligatory prayer.
[55] This spelling, inconsistent with the previous heading, Âdetleri, appears in the text.
[56] Over and above the obligatory fasting for Ramadan.
[57] See *Pilavoğlu Kimdir* for a more detailed description of these fasting practices.
[58] P. 54.
[59] P. 54.
[60] P. 54.
[61] Pp. 54-55.
[62] P. 56.
[63] Yusuf Özcan, one of the partners who opened the "Pilavoğlu Kitabevi" print shop.
[64] *Jawaratul Kemal*, or Jewel of Perfection, along with the *Salatul Fatihi*, are two of the central devotional prayers of the Tijaniyya.

Notes for Chapter 7: Part I

[1] This paragraph appears twice in the preface. It's unclear whether it is a misprint or for emphasis.
[2] p. 3.
[3] Divan poetry was written in Ottoman Turkish and made extensive use of Arabic and Persian words.

[4] Twice these titles appear with spelling errors. One on page 4; "ALİYHİSSELAM'A", and another on page 211; ALEYHİSSELA'A. Note that the example included from page 4 (Yanan kalbe devâsın sen/ Bulunmaz bir şifâsın sen…) includes the title as it appears, with the spelling error.
[5] Twice these titles appear with spelling errors. One on page 4; "ALİYHİSSELAM'A", and another on page 211; ALEYHİSSELA'A. The example included here from page 4 includes the title as it is reproduced here, with the spelling error.
[6] The word/phrase used in the text is *görüyorum.* Literally, "I see."
[7] Spelled "Herdley" in the text.
[8] Spelled "Karlay" in the text.
[9] Spelled "Jon Devenport" in the text.
[10] *Kisrâ* in the original text. Khosrow II was the last Sasanian king of Iran before the Arab-Muslim conquest, which began five years after his execution.
[11] *Müsülmanlık* in the text.
[12] *Zerdüşlük* in the text.
[13] The term *Şark* appears in the text.
[14] "Nihayetyeni Romayı" in the text. Literally, "final/terminal Rome", is Constantine's Rome.
[15] The verb used in the text is *zapt etmek*, which can mean; to seize, capture, govern, contain.
[16] Again, *zapt etmek* is used.
[17] *Kale* is used in the text.
[18] *Güneş* is used in the text.
[19] There are several indications in the speech that the identity of "Shawwal" is Zainab Cobbold. The first indication of "Shawwal" being Zainab Cobbold is the timeframe. She converted to Islam around 1912 and is known for being the first British woman to go on hajj of her own volition in 1933. Marcia Hermansen suggests that Cobbold's claim to have been the first European woman to perform hajj is unlikely, because there are several accounts from European women who performed hajj that predate Cobbold's. According to Hermansen, Cobbold may have been the first to perform hajj without being accompanied by her husband and to write about it. Her conversion, and especially her travels in the Hijaz, were widely publicized worldwide.

Another indication that "Shawwal" is Cobbold is the portion of the speech where she describes her religious education as a child. In the speech, doubt clouds her mind during her lessons with a priest who, again in the speech, was appointed by her father as her teacher.As a child, Cobbold spent winters in Algeria under the care of Muslim nannies. According to Cobbold, she considered herself to be Muslim from a young age, but only articulated this during a meeting with the Pope. The speech summary does not clearly suggest that "Shawwal" viewed herself as a Muslim in light of the doubts she felt during her religious instruction as a child. However, the fact that the speech includes details from "Shawwal's" childhood which she already has doubts about her faith is a good sign that this is Cobbold; a significant dimension of Cobbold's own account of her conversion to Islam includes her exposure to the tradition from a young age.

The final indication that "Shawwal" is Zainab Cobbold is that she was closely associated with several of the other converts that Pilavoğlu includes in the preceding section. Cobbold was an active member of the Woking mosque, along with other prominent members including Lord Headley and Marmaduke Pickthall. Although she died approximately 30 years after Headley and Pickthall, all three members of the "old guard" of the Woking community reached the height of their publicity in the 1930s.
See: Marcia Hermansen. "Roads to Mecca: Conversion Narratives of European and Euro-American Muslims." The Muslim World 89, 1 (1999): 56-89.
[20] P. 15.
[21] The term *azamet* is used in the text.
[22] The term used in the text is *kâfir*. In this part of the text, "Shawwal" is still talking about her doubts as a Christian. In Christianity, "infidel" has been used historically to refer to people actively opposed to Christianity. This is distinct from a "heretic", which is generally understood to be one who has fallen away from true doctrine because they have denied the divinity of Jesus. Thus, in this context, "heretic" seems to be a more nuanced translation, because "Shawwal" in this stage of her faith journey is discussing her doubts from within a Christian framework, as opposed to contrasting her doubt in Christianity with her faith in Islam.
[23] The Rashidun are the first four caliphs following the death of Muhammad; Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali.
[24] "And we have not sent you, O [Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 21:107, quran.com.

[25] For details about the Ottoman Hilya tradition, see: Süleyman Berk, "Tasarimi ve Metniyle Farkli bir Baski Hilye-İ Şerîfe." *Dini Araştırmalar* 20, 51 (2017): 169-186; and: Gülnihal Küpelı, "Notes on the formation of hilya design: Calligraphy-illumination interaction and numeral symbolism." *Kafkas Universitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitu* (2019): 155-176.
[26] Ibn Najjār al-Baghdādi (d. 1245 CE). He was an accomplished hadith scholar, known for his prolific writing in history and literature, and lifelong devotion to scholarship and teaching.
[27] P. 25.
[28] P. 27.
[29] Osman Kemalî (1862-1954) was a Nakşbendi poet who was blinded by smallpox as a child and initially impacted his ability to study the Qur'an. His poetry is still well-known in Turkey.
[30] In the Hebrew Bible and the Qur'an, Ishmael is the first-born son of Abraham. Ishmael is considered to be the ancestor of the Ishmaelites and the patriarch of Qaydār, which is considered by some to be the genealogical line of Muhammad.
[31] Hāshim ibn ʿAbd Manāf was the great-grandfather of the Prophet Muhammad, and the progenitor of the Hashemite clan of the Quraysh, who historically controlled Mecca and the Ka'ba.
[32] P. 38.
[33] ʾĀmna ʾibnat Wahb.
[34] Pp. 61-63.
[35] ʾAbū Ṭālib ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib.
[36] Pp.64-72.
[37] This period of Muhammad's life is not well-documented, so the exact dates (and thus ages) of events in his life are widely debated.
[38] Khadījah bint Khuwaylid.
[39] ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib was a cousin and the son-in-law of Muhammad, and also ruled as the fourth caliph following the latter's death.
[40] Qays ibn Sa'd was a famous orator and poet who had begun to advise the Arabs of the Hijaz region to believe in the coming of a prophet.
[41] Abū Bakr 'Abdullāh ibn Uthmān was a companion and the father-in-law of the Prophet (the father of Aisha).
[42] P. 123.
[43] P. 126.
[44] P. 134.
[45] P. 135.
[46] P. 140.
[47] P. 139.
[48] "Humankind was [of] one religion [before their deviation]; then Allah sent the prophets as bringers of good tidings and warners and sent down with them the Scripture in truth to judge between the people concerning that in which they differed. And none differed over the Scripture except those who were given it - after the clear proofs came to them - out of jealous animosity among themselves. And Allah guided those who believed to the truth concerning that over which they had differed, by His permission. And Allah guides whom He wills to a straight path." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 2:213, quran.com.

[49] P. 141.
[50] P. 153.
[51] Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Yasār ibn Khiyār orally collated the traditions about the life of Muhammad, which are known as *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh*, "The Life of the Messenger of God."
[52] The doctrine of the Trinity is belief that God is One, but manifests in three co-substantial beings; the Father, the Son (Jesus Christ), and the Holy Spirit. It is believed that these three beings are distinct but are simultaneously a single essence or nature.
[53] P. 162.
[54] Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī.
[55] The only attribution in the text for these ahadith is "from imam Gazâli", p. 169.
[56] P. 169.
[57] This "imitation of Muhammad" is a typical feature of Sunni piety.
[58] Ka'b ibn Zuhayr.

[59] Zuhayr's qasida "Bānat Suʿād" was the first *qasidat al-madh*, or poem praising the Prophet. For a translation and summary of the narrative this poem, see: of Michael A. Sells, and M. J. Sells. "Bānat Suʿād": Translation and Introduction." *Journal of Arabic Literature* 21, no. 2 (1990): 140-54.
[60] *The Bible.* New International Version, Matthew 9-10, biblegateway.com. In the text, Matthew 10-12 is provided as the citation.
[61] P. 180.
[62] One of the Arab communities in the Hijaz region.
[63] Abū-Muhammad Muslih al-Dīn bin Abdallāh Shīrāzī (d. 1291-1294), one of the most renown poets and writers of classical Persian literature.
[64] Pp. 182-183.
[65] P. 186.
[66] Abū Zayd 'Abd ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Khaldūn al-Ḥaḍramī (d. 1406).
[67] The term used in the text is *hokkabazlık*, which literally means juggling, illusionism, dishonesty, or sleight of hand.
[68] Originating from Yemen, this Arab community migrated to the northern mountainous region of the Arabian Peninsula, and later established relations with the Sassanid Persian and Byzantine empires. At the end of the 6th century, one of the community's branches, of which Abdi ibn Hatem was a member, converted to Christianity. Ibn Hatem was a companion of Muhammad for twenty years before converting to Islam.
[69] P. 189.
[70] P. 191. *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 5:17, quran.com
[71] P. 195
[72] "Say, 'He is Allah, [who is] One, Allah, the Eternal Refuge. He neither begets nor is born, Nor is there to Him any equivalent.'" *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 112:1-4, quran.com.
[73] P. 199.
[74] P. 204.
[75] Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī's epic poem, written over six volumes. The story of the Jewish king and the vizier appears in Book 3. The *Masnavi* is widely considered among the most influential works of Sufism.
[76] Probably an allusion to the Christian concept of the Kingdom of God from the Christian New Testament, of which Jesus is believed to be the human embodiment.
[77] The use of the Arabic term *alaka* as opposed to *ilişki* (relation[ship], correlation, connection, etc.) or *bağlantı* (connection), both Turkic, may be a subtle allusion to *Surah al-'Alaq*, the 96th chapter of the Qur'an, and believed to be Muhammad's first revelation.
[78] "And I [Jesus] will confirm the Torah revealed before me and legalize some of what had been forbidden to you. I have come to you with a sign from your Lord, so be mindful of Allah and obey me." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 3:50, quran.com. Although Jesus is not mentioned by name in this verse, it is widely interpreted as being from his perspective.
[79] P. 212.
[80] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE) was an Arab theologian, scholar, and polymath. He is often referred to as "Sultan of the Theologians."
[81] P. 214.
[82] "Previously, as a guide for people, and also revealed the Standard 'to distinguish between right and wrong'. Surely those who reject Allah's revelations will suffer a severe torment. For Allah is Almighty, capable of punishment." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 3:4, quran.com.
[83] Part of this belief further asserts that Jesus was both God and man, and thus both perfectly divine and perfectly human.
[84] 8th-9th century, this is not specified in the text.
[85] From the Greek *Agios Theologos*, the earlier name of the town now named Selçuk, just north of Ephesus.
[86] ʿAbdullah ibn Sabaʾ al-Ḥimyarī.
[87] P. 225.
[88] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 21:23, quran.com.
[89] Abū al-Hasan ash-Shādhilī, an influential Moroccan scholar and the founder of the Shahdiliyya *tarikat*.
[90] P. 227.
[91] This is the minimum typical number of couplets in classical forms of *kaside*, which can sometimes be more than 100 lines.

[92] Muʿallaqāt is a group of seven long Arabic poems, traditionally understood to have been hung on the Ka'ba. They are widely considered a primary source for the development of Arabic poetry.
[93] Ahmed Cevdet Paşa was an Ottoman scholar, bureaucrat, and intellectual. He was the head of the commission that codified Islamic law for the first time in the *Mecelle*, or the Ottoman sharia-based civil code in the late 19th and early twentieth century. The creation of the *Mecelle* was in response to the westernization of Ottoman laws.
[94] ʾImruʾ al-Qays Junduḥ ibn Ḥujr al-Kindīy (d. c. 561-565 CE). He is one of the most widely-known pre-Islamic Arab poets, His tomb is located in Hızırlık, Ankara.
[95] *Talik* more specifically refers to the poetic technique of making the meaning of the first line of a poem depend on what follows in the rest of the poem.
[96] *Lam* is the twenty-third letter of the Arabic abjad.
[97] *Elif*, or *alif*, is the first character of the Arabic abjad.
[98] لا, or lā, meaning "no" or "not."
[99] ʾAbū al-ʾAswad al-Duʾalīy was a companion of Ali, and is commonly referred to as "the Father of Arabic Grammar."
[100] With encouragement from Bayezid II, court calligrapher Sheikh Hamdullah (d. 1520) developed a new Arabic script. It is sometimes suggested that the new script was symbolic of the Sultan's desire to establish a new empire and dynasty. Hafiz Osman (d. 1698), a tutor of multiple sultans, later improved and standardized the script. He also developed the layout of the *hilye* page design. Notably, both scribes were Sufis.
[101] Oddly, Abraham is not listed.
[102] The name Kiyon is unidentifiable.
[103] It's not quite clear from the text, but this is most likely the Apostolic Father Clement of Rome (d. c. 99 CE), who is believed to have author the first epistle of Clement, which deals with the removal of several early church leaders.
[104] "The Messiah, son of Mary, was no more than a messenger. 'Many' messengers had come and gone before him. His mother was a woman of truth. They both ate food. See how We make the signs clear to them, yet see how they are deluded 'from the truth'!." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 5:75, quran.com.
[105] Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī (d. 870).
[106] Pp. 236-237.
[107] Notably, the wives Muhammad married after Khadija, including Maria al-Qibtiyya and Aisha bint Abu Bakr, are not included.
[108] Thuwaybah; Halimah al-Sa'diyah; Khadījah bint Khuwaylid; Qasim; Zainab; Ruqayyah; Umm Kulthum; Fatimah.
[109] Al-Ḥasan ibn Alīy ibn Abī Ṭālib; Al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlīy ibn ʾAbī Ṭālib. They were the sons of Fatimah and Ali.
[110] P. 245.
[111] Heraclius ruled from Constantinople, which is not mentioned in the text.
[112] This is false. The central text of Zoroastrianism is called the *Avesta*, collated and rescinded by the Sasanians. However, the original copy of the text was lost. The oldest surviving manuscript, which is understood to be a summary of the original text, was produced in 1323 CE. Nevertheless, there is certainly a Zoroastrian textual canon. Nevertheless, Pilavoğlu's claim could be explained via the reasoning that because the later summary of the text was only a summary of a much more substantial original, it is not sufficient to be considered a central scripture. At the same time, it is also possible that Pilavoğlu may have simply been unfamiliar with the Zoroastrian tradition and thus was not aware of the tradition's scripture.
[113] Antakya is the capital of Hatay province in modern-day Turkey. It is partially situated on the site of ancient Antioch. It was ecclesiastically significant in the Byzantine Empire.
[114] Literally a Caesar or an emperor, no doubt a reference to European monarchs and the Holy Roman Emperors.
[115] See: Sells, "Bānat Suʿād."
[116] The text refers specifically to *madar*, which is an alternate spelling of *mader*, which means motherly, or matrilineal. Muhammad's descent from Abraham is traced through his maternity.
[117] Although the word *ulema* is used in the text, Pilavoğlu's statement is more of a general accusation of the scholars of Abrahamic traditions, and not only the scholars of Islam, the ulama. Thus, it seems appropriate to render *ulema* as the general term "scholar" in this context.
[118] P. 255.
[119] Interestingly, the earliest records of this parable appear in Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain texts. In Rumi's retelling of the parable in his *Masnavi*, the elephant is brought to the blind men by Hindus. Although this detail is not included in Pilavoğlu's own retelling, it is likely that this dimension of the story (that truth was obscured by Hindu claims) was not lost on him.

[120] P. 261.
[121] P. 262.

Notes for Chapter 7: Part II

[1] The term *müjdeleyici* is provided as the Turkish translation of بشیرا (Bashīrān), which means "bringer of glad tidings, messenger, herald, harbinger, etc."
[2] The term used in the text is *müjde.*
[3] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 61:6, quran.com.
[4] It is worth noting that here, Pilavoğlu has "unTurkified" his own name.
[5] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 7:172, quran.com.
[6] The *lingua franca* of Judea in the first century CE was Aramaic. Likewise, the communities where Jesus spent most of his time were also primarily Aramaic-speaking. However, the Jewish Bible texts were largely written in Hebrew, with only a few sections written in Aramaic, which is likely why Pilavoğlu makes this claim. The Christian New Testament itself, particularly in the Gospel of John, more than once conflate Hebrew and Aramaic, making Pilavoğlu's mistake all the more understandable.
[7] "We have not sent a messenger except in the language of his people to clarify ˹the message˺ for them. Then Allah leaves whoever He wills to stray and guides whoever He wills. And He is the Almighty, All-Wise." *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 14:4, quran.com.
[8] It is a common misconception that the Christian New Testament was canonized at the first council of Nicaea, but there is no record of any discussion of the biblical canon. Although not yet complete, canonization of the Bible had already largely developed by the time the council convened.
[9] Pilavoğlu uses the term "paraclete" (the Holy Spirit in Christianity) in his translation of the verse from John. *The Bible*, New International Version, John 14:16, biblehub.com.
[10] "And remember when Jesus, son of Mary, said, 'O children of Israel! I am truly Allah's messenger to you, confirming the Torah which came before me, and giving good news of a messenger after me whose name will be Aḥmad.' Yet when the Prophet came to them with clear proofs, they said, 'This is pure magic.'" *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 61:6, quran.com.
[11] This is a common, but not universal interpretation of Q. 61:6.
[12] This section mistakenly identifies the verse as "Âmâli Resul dördüncü bap 22. Ayetinde (the 22nd verse of the fourth chapter [in] the Acts of the Apostles)." It is the third chapter of Acts: *The Bible*, New International Version, Acts 3:22, biblehub.com
[13] Chapter 3 of the Book of Acts only has 26 verses. Chapter 4 of Acts does have 37 verses, but it is not the verse that is being quoted. Acts 4:37 is: "[Barnabas] sold a field he owned and brought the money and put it at the apostles' feet." *The Bible*, New International Version.
[14] The verse is not from the Book of Acts. It is from Deuteronomy: *The Bible*, New International Version, Deuteronomy 18:15, biblehub.com
[15] "Royaume des Cieux" is French, meaning "Kingdom of Heaven."
[16] P. 18.
[17] *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, 6:75, quran.com.
[18] P. 19.
[19] *The Bible*, New International Version, Matthew 21:43, biblehub.com.
[20] The Nazarenes were an early sect in the first century CE, before Christianity had fully separated from Judaism.
[21] The verse that Pilavoğlu actually quotes is again from John 14:15-17. *The Bible*, New International Version, John 14:15-17, biblehub.com.
[22] Pilavoğlu's reasoning here is likely very literal in the sense that Ishmael was the brother of Isaac, who was the father of Jacob (later renamed Israel and was the patriarch of the 12 nations of Israel). Thus, the coming prophet would be descended from the "brother" (i.e. Ishmael) as opposed to, perhaps the "children of Israel" (i.e. the descendants of Jacob's sons). Ishmael also had twelve sons, but neither in Islamic nor Christian tradition are these descendants considered part of "Israel."
[23] P. 23.

[24] It is not entirely clear who the *Müjdelenen Resulün* (the Heralded Prophet) is here, but the emphasis is clearly on the fact that each prophet brought the message of the Divine Oneness of God, and it was human innovation (as opposed to the meddling of the prophets themselves) that corrupted this message of Unity.
[25] This is only a portion of the full hadith, "I am the prayer of my ancestor Abraham, the Good News brought by my brother Jesus, and the Dream of Amine."
[26] "Those to whom We gave the Scripture recognize him 'to be a true prophet' as they recognize their own children. Those who have ruined themselves will never believe"; "Those We have given the Scripture recognize this 'Prophet' as they recognize their own children. Yet a group of them hides the truth knowingly." 6:20, 2:146, *The Noble Qur'an*, Sahih International translation, quran.com.
[27] In Islamic tradition Bahira, who was a Mandaen (sometimes called the "Christians of John") monk who foretold to a young Muhammad his future as a prophet. Some interpretations of the term "Sabian" in the Qur'an equate this tradition with Mandaenism.
[28] Nestorius (d. c. 450 CE) was a theologian and archbishop of Constantinople in the 5th century CE. He is known in part for his rejection of belief in Mary as the mother of God, and inclination towards prosopon, which is in contrast to the common Christian idea of a hypostatic union (the unification of divine and human natures) in the figure of Christ.
[29] Abū Sufyān ibn Harb (d. c. 653 CE) was among the main opposition leaders against Muhammad in the Meccan army at the battle of Uhud and the battle of the Trench. However, he was among the first to convert when Muhammad entered Mecca. After Muhammad's death, he played a decisive role in the defeat of the Byzantines at the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE.
[30] P. 25.
[31] P. 25.
[32] P. 26. See: *Surah al-Fath*, 28-29. *The Noble Qur'an*, 48:28-29, Sahih International translation, quran.com.

Notes for Conclusion

[1] Ârifane. https://arifane.org/. Last Accessed 16 February 2021.
[2] Ahmet Şahin Uçar. *Ârifane Sohbetler* [Channel]. YouTube.
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