(Con)Formations of Inequality in the Emergent Non-Racial Democracy of South Africa: The Relationship between Economic Well-Being and Attitude to Race

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Abstract

This research investigates the relationship between economic well-being and attitudes to race amongst respondents who took part in a survey known as the Cape Area Study (CAS) in 2005. In this enquiry, economic well-being is measured in two ways, by (household) income level and living conditions, the latter by means of a Living Conditions Index (LCI), created by the author. The degree to which these two measures are able to explain variability in attitudes to race in the respondent sample is investigated. The specific aspect of attitude to race focused upon in this investigation is amenability to racial integration, and is measured by means of the Amenability to Racial Integration Index (ARII), also constructed by the author. Aside from the chief explanatory element of economic well-being, the degree of influence of other factors on attitude to race such as race, gender, age, education and employment status are also explored. Quantitative methodology is applied to the data for this purpose, specifically through the development of a multiple regression model. The main findings indicate that amenability to racial integration levels are found to be either non-existent, or fairly low with respect to the overall, combined ARII. Furthermore, economic well-being appears to wield a small degree of influence over amenability to racial integration. This degree of influence in turn appears to be dictated most consistently by racial factors, and to a much less visible, but perceptible, degree by 'class' factors. A degree of evidence is found to support the author's hypothesis that the lowest levels of amenability are likely to be tallied with the lowest levels of economic well-being; the middle-range levels of amenability with mid-range levels of economic well-being; and the highest levels of amenability with the highest levels of economic well-being. With regard to race, black respondents are found to be more disinclined to racial integration than either coloured or white respondents. Lastly, as age increases, amenability to racial integration on average decreases according to the data. The findings point to the need for urban planning and policy that is comprehensive of the relationship between socio-economic factors and attitude to race, is inclusive of people from different race and 'class' standpoints, and which unifies spatial, social, and economic factors. Moreover, it is suggested that mechanisms that address socio-economic inequality and poverty, and those which address racial attitudes must be combined, rather than treated as separate processes, if racial integration is to undergo consolidation in Cape Town.

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Introduction

The following research seeks to investigate the relationship between economic well-being and attitudes to race amongst a representative respondent sample of approximately 1200 adults who took part in a cross-sectional survey known as the Cape Area Study (CAS) in 2005. Broadly speaking, the survey asks the opinions of respondents on a range of social, economic and political issues. In this research, economic well-being is measured in two ways, by (household) income level and living conditions, the latter by means of a Living Conditions Index (LCI), created by the author. The main enquiry of this paper is to ascertain to what degree these two measures are able to explain variability in attitudes to race in the respondent sample. The specific aspect of attitude to race focused upon in this investigation is amenability to racial integration. This is measured by means of the Amenability to Racial Integration Index (ARII), also constructed by the author. It is important to emphasise from the outset that aim of this paper is not to explore general attitudes to race, or even the individual attitude to race variables that comprise the ARII to an extensive degree. Rather, the ARII as a composite whole in relation to economic well-being comprises the main enquiry. Aside from the chief explanatory element of economic well-being, the degree of influence of other factors on attitude to race such as race, gender, age, education and employment status are also explored. Quantitative methodology is applied to the data for this purpose, specifically through the development of a multiple regression model.

Background to the Research

The primary purpose and goal of the 'grand plan' of apartheid was to secure the economic dominance and power of the white minority in South Africa. The social engineering necessitated by such an objective was executed to establish a stable social hierarchy, which, once supported by a particular economic order, would give rise to a powerful mix: a socio-economic hierarchy 'naturalised' by the use of biological essentialist propaganda concerning a racial 'order', and entrenched by the day-to-day physical, cognitive and emotive associations made by people in the country between particular race groups and particular levels of economic well-being. The apartheid era,

characterised by obsessive classification and legally sanctioned segregation of races, produced a legacy of an entrenched socio-economic mould, which has by no means been eradicated in South Africa's current 'non-racial' democracy.

It is my suggestion that since the advent of 'non-racial' democracy, although the power dynamics in the relationship between race and economic well-being in the country have undergone shifts, the fundamental skeleton of the association between certain race groups with certain levels of economic well-being remains stubbornly visible in, for example, the racial wage hierarchy, with regard to access to services and housing, and to the naked eye. Thus, inequality in the country is characterised by particular formations that run along racial and 'class' lines, some of which still conform to apartheid configurations. If this potent visual-spatial-cognitive-emotive-socio-economic associative pattern were to be broken in a foundational sense, it would likely act as an encouraging element in the twin predicaments of poverty and inequality undergoing significant amelioration, as well as facilitate the process of racial integration in the country.

This dissertation moves in the relatively unexplored direction of connecting the relationship between race and economic well-being to racial attitudes, and, particularly, to level of amenability to racial integration. For attitude to race and amenability to racial integration are surely two key ingredients for a recipe that has the potential to rupture the cycle and entrenchment of destructive links between race and specific levels of socio-economic well-being in the country. I would suggest that these components were a critical part of the ultimate glue that held the apartheid reich in place for as long as it reigned, and that surely a transmutation of those same components that could potentially contribute to the glue that holds together the nemesis of apartheid's separate development: socio-economic racial integration. The latter, if realised fully, would necessarily include spatial/residential and social integration between different race groups in the country[1].

It is important to point out with regard to previous literature directly related to the research topic at hand, that there is not a great deal of it. Mostly, attitude to race has been explored as a separate phenomenon from factors concerning economic well-being. For this reason, much of the literature reviewed below spans topics that are

indirectly related to the central enquiry of this paper (although nonetheless relevant) - with an emphasis on those readings that bear the strongest links in this respect - and some which are directly related. As mentioned above, attitudes to race in general are not incorporated into the central investigation of this paper, and consequently do not receive a great degree of attention in this literature review. The aspect of racial integration that receives the most consideration in this respect is residential racial integration (and all the related forms of integration that may or not follow as a result, for example, social integration). Apart from being a personal interest, it is clearly a key factor in the wider subject of urban integration as a whole. Furthermore, since the respondent sample that concerns this enquiry is made up only of adults, child or teen related arenas of racial integration shall not be covered as extensively, the most obvious of these being South African schools. The site of tertiary institutions will only briefly be touched upon in terms of examples of segregation patterns there. Apart from South Africa, American literature is briefly reviewed in addition[2].

Literature Review

Definitions

The terms race[3], racism, prejudice, racialism / racialisation, desegregation, social integration and racial integration all feature in this paper in greater or lesser degrees. Since they all carry a certain amount of ambiguity, definitions of each are necessary. Omi and Winant define race as: "...a concept which signifies and symbolises social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies, and the selection of...particular human features for purposes of racial signification [as a]...social and historical process [with]...no biological basis" (2000:183). Darlene Pína (2001:327-8) writing for the *Handbook of Clinical Sociology*, delineates the terms 'racism' and 'prejudice' for the reader:

> Racism involves beliefs that abilities such as intelligence are predetermined by one's racial group membership and that people of particular racial groups are inferior (Lawson & Pillai, 1999). Racism exists when individuals of a dominant racial or ethnic group consciously or unconsciously hold prejudice and/or discriminate against people from a different racial or ethnic background. Prejudice is a negative attitude toward an entire category of people, and discrimination involves behavior that

excludes members of a group from certain rights, opportunities, or privileges (Schaefer, 1998). Individual's racist beliefs and actions may combine to create a pattern of institutionalized racism, where ostensibly neutral and objective standards, policies, and procedures are used to perpetuate a dominant group's power and control (Marger, 1991).

Two terms that are often confused / conflated in the South African context are 'racism' and 'racialism'. In his book *Why Race Matters in South Africa* Michael MacDonald differentiates between them:

Where racists must insist that their group deserves more power because it is better than others, racialists must insist only that groups, because they are *different*, require representation as groups...Of course, racist and racialist politics usually are joined in practice, with racists insisting on racially organized politics as a condition of their supremacy, and racialists insisting that their superiority be expressed through supremacy. But the difference between them is that *hierarchy* is the necessary organizing principle of racism, and *difference* may be the organizing principle of racialism (2006:107).

Charlotte Lemanski's definition of the terms 'desegregation' and 'social integration' are:

'Desegregation' is defined as the physical presence of different races in shared residential space (while recognising that residential is not the only sphere of desegregation), and 'social integration' in reference to micro-level relations between people of different races (2006c:3).

The distinction above relates to the distinction made by Swanson (an American writer) between studying integration as a demographic condition, as opposed to as a social condition, the latter of which focuses "upon the social interaction that does or does not occur between different racial groups", particularly those characterised by mutual and positive adjustments (2004:15). She refers to a number of U.S. writers[4] who suggest that:

...to be a truly integrated neighborhood the neighborhood must involve more than "a mere geographic mixing of races"...To be an integrated community by social condition means that people of different races interact in a variety of social conditions beyond simply just living by one another (2004:15).

This dissertation is in agreement with the definitions of racial integration as (residential) social integration by Lemanski and Swanson above, as opposed to mere

desegregation[5]. It is important to emphasise that this definition of racial integration differs from other related concepts / phenomena such as 'tolerance' or 'reconciliation', which certain previous research has centred on (for example, Gibson, 2004). On one side of the spectrum, a term such as 'racial tolerance' might be construed as an act underlain by residual prejudice or ill-feeling, akin perhaps to 'bearing with' racial difference. On the other side of that spectrum, 'racial reconciliation' might be seen to imply an initial act or process of admission of guilt, followed by one of forgiveness of past wrongs enacted in the name of apartheid. The term 'racial integration' is posed in this enquiry as lying somewhere between the two afore-mentioned terms. It is not perceived by the author to be necessarily emotionally laden; it is simply the racial, as well social, mixing of persons previously separated by powerful now visible, now invisible constructs. It represents, at its core, a connectedness between people of different race groups – whether thoroughly unprocessed cognitively, or born out of a conscious desire to bridge a racial divide. Rather than resembling anything akin to 'assimilation', the term 'racial integration' is intended to signify an act devoid of judgment of a racial 'other' as in any sense lesser than the 'self'[6].

The 'Non-Racial' Democracy of South Africa

Racial integration is an official governmental objective in the emergent South African democracy, as articulated not only in policy documents, public speeches and the like, but also through media campaigns. Outside of government, media advertising for a wide range of products has grabbed at this inclusive theme[7]. Racial integration is, in turn, part of the broader project of consolidating the 'non-racial' democracy of South Africa, and is marketed, along with related national projects such as 'transformation', in spite of the persistence of deeply entrenched urban racial (and 'class') segregation.

> Despite...socio-spatial urban divisions, the post-apartheid government stridently asserts a pro-integration message, encouraging all races jointly to build the new South Africa. Indeed, phrases such as 'Rainbow Nation' and the 'New South Africa' are part of the "psyche and everyday language of citizens" (Battersby, 2004a, p. 151), and media adverts[8] seeking to emphasise commonality for all South Africans...and encourage honour in nationality...are clearly harnessing this pro-integration sentiment (Lemanski, 2006a:419).

Despite South Africa's label as a 'non-racial' democracy, it is nonetheless still arranged along racial lines. In this respect, although the term 'non-racial democracy' will be used with reference to South Africa in this work, it is done so with a degree of personal doubt that such a democracy is even possible, since it implies complete denial of physical reality, given the fact that South Africans are unlikely to simply and literally stop seeing racial difference[9]. While such colour-blindness stridently contests every use of the notion, it quietly reserves the right to continue employing race as a safeguard to protect privilege (Erasmus, 2004:13). Rather, as Goldberg (2002) has suggested, it may be more accurate to make as ones goal a non-racist democracy, without losing sight of the fact that race and racism will always continue to be an issue of sorts, one that is better dealt with using accountability and responsibility, rather than blindness to it in the hope that it will disappear.

The democratic constitution of South Africa identifies 'non-racialism' as a founding value[10], however, MacDonald points out that non-racialism draws much of its meaning "from what it is not, from what it negates" (2006:93). First and foremost, non-racialism is not 'racialism', the latter term being one that, in the South African context, is used to denote either racism or racialism (ibid), according to the definitions of each described above. However, as MacDonald remarks, even if race groups are seen as inventions, as the dominant social constructionist paradigm in race theory currently asserts[11], once invented, "inventions do exist" (ibid:95). In other words, even if born from a social imagination, race is fully capable of being reified and effecting massive consequences politically, economically and socially. MacDonald asserts that the ANC[12] version of non-racialism:

> ...affirms specifically racial interests as it disclaims race and...deracialises the interests of blacks while racialising those of whites, [which] is very useful for a government making racialist appeals while professing the ideology of "non-racialism". It explains that blacks, even when acting racially, have progressed beyond race (MacDonald, 2006:123).

As Melissa Steyn points in her book on South African white identity, the "African National Congress's policy of non-racialism lends itself to strategic misinterpretation, making colorblindness a respectable option" (2001:166).

The Political Economy of South Africa

There exists a wealth of writing on the current state of the South African labour market, its political economy, the state of poverty and inequality in the country, and so forth. Thus, for the sake of brevity here, a series of quotes that set out the most important facts for the purposes of this dissertation will be quoted here. In his chapter entitled "The Political Economy of Identity Politics", MacDonald sketches the predicament of black poverty in South Africa:

> ...the number of Africans in the poorest or the richest quintiles was increasing before the ANC took power. Some were becoming comfortable (by the standards of South Africa), but 65% of Africans remained "poor" by the reckoning of the World Bank. "Despite [its] relative wealth, the experience of the majority of South African households is either one of outright poverty, or of continued vulnerability to becoming poor" (2006:135).

Leibbrandt et al. highlight changes in the dynamics of inequality in the country, which consists now of a combination between the weakening yet persistent racial wage hierarchy, together with an increase in socio-economic mobility amongst certain portions of the population, resulting in a degree of restructuring of the political economy:

> [Using 1996 and 2001 census data, an]...income-based analysis details increases in inequality and poverty at the national level. It also shows a persistent but changing population-group footprint in the structure of South African inequality and poverty. Inequality between population groups is still extremely high but continues a long-run decline in importance. The African group overwhelmingly dominates both the incidence and share of poverty. At the same time, the African group continues to increase its share in each of the top three income deciles. Inequality continues to widen within each group, evidencing something of the dynamism of post-apartheid South Africa (Leibbrandt et al, 2004:38).

Even considering this optimistic swing away from between-race inequality – given the country's history of unhealthy and undemocratic race-wage-occupation-status associations – Macdonald nonetheless remarks that since the time of the transition "poorer blacks actually experienced a decline in income" (2006:136). Similarly, Adhikari makes the important point that "there is a growing body of evidence that that the living standards of the Coloured proletariat have suffered significantly since the

early 1990s" (2005:180). Writing in *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006*, Moleke concludes that:

> It is clear that the labour market is far from being deracialised and concerns about the progress in this sphere are valid. While Africans have certainly advanced in the labour market, the fact that Africans constitute a large proportion of workers and are still concentrated in low-skilled and semi-skilled occupations is indeed a cause for concern. The labour market is still racially divided between whites in skilled occupations and management positions, and blacks concentrated in low- and semi-skilled occupations (2006:220).

MacDonald notes that, while pressuring for increased African representivity in institutions throughout South Africa is justified and appropriate, "enduring poverty and economic inequality mean that representativeness and black economic empowerment are not components of a larger transformation of the political economy. They are the transformation"[13] (2006:173). In this way: "Emphasizing racial identities represents poor Africans symbolically, while putting them off economically" (ibid:133). In his conclusion, he demonstrates the interconnections between the socio-economic, political and racial dynamics of the 'New South Africa':

> Racial groups legitimate democratic government; democratic government affirms equality under the law, which eventually justifies economic inequality as the result of the free play of capitalism; and state and capital confirm and materialize the importance of racial groups by applauding the black middle classes and nurturing black economic elites. The grounding of capitalism in democracy and democracy in racial nationalism contributes to one of the most striking features of post-apartheid South African politics. The political economy remains stable and the ANC remains invincible, even though the economic elites remain predominantly white and Africans remain mostly poor. Multiracialism, in the form of African economic elites that are promoted because of their race, counters the danger that racial identities and economic interests will reinforce and embitter each other and that society will be polarized between rich whites and poor Africans. The new African economic elites, in assuming the economic interests of established economic elites while retaining the racial identities they share with poor Africans, make cleavages cross-cutting, off-setting the tendency towards polarization. Under white supremacy, racialism polarized; under non-racial democracy, multiracialism mediates. But in both cases, racialism accommodates the imperatives of capital (2006:178-9).

Race Relations, Racial Attitudes and Racial Identities in Cape Town

Cape Town as a location is especially interesting to this topic particularly in terms of the inter-racial dynamics there as opposed to the rest of the country. Whereas in the rest of the country it may be easier to (incorrectly) define inter-racial relations in a binary (most commonly black-white) manner, the Western Cape, and more specifically Cape Town, is a clear example of the manifold dynamics of inter-racial tensions and trust that span across many different race groups, not just two. This is most clearly exemplified in coloured – black tension prominent there.

It is important at this point to alert the reader to the fact that, although previous literature and survey results that reflect national averages in the country will be considered to a degree in this paper, any pertaining specifically to the Western Cape, and especially Cape Town, will be afforded more attention. This is because of the unique character of racial group distribution in both of the latter settings, as compared with the rest of South Africa. Apart from the Western and Northern Cape Provinces, the rest of South Africa is characterised by a majority black[14] population. In the aforementioned provinces, however, the coloured population dominates. With the Cape Area Study 2005 based in the Western Cape, most of the respondent sample upon which the research in this dissertation is based consists of coloured people. A recent publication by Mohamed Adhikari draws together social, economic and political strands in order to contextualise coloured identity. In his book, *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community*, Adhikari sets out the origins and current population statistics of coloured people in South Africa:

> The Coloured people were descended largely from Cape slaves, the indigenous Khoisan population, and other black people who had been assimilated to Cape colonial society by the late nineteenth century. Since they are also partly descended from European settlers, Coloureds are popularly regarded as being of "mixed race" and have held an intermediate status in the South African hierarchy, distinct from the historically dominant white minority and the numerically preponderant African population... There has, moreover, been a marked regional concentration of Coloured people: approximately 90 percent of them live in the Western third of the country, with more than two-thirds residing in the Western Cape and over 40 percent in the greater Cape Town area (2005:2).

For this reason, any comparison drawn between South Africa as a whole and the Cape will be tentatively drawn; it also means that the findings of this paper will not be able to be generalised out to a national level. Adhikari argues that coloured identity comprises a stable core of key characteristics that, although not lacking fluidity, have anchored that identity through the period of white rule in South Africa until the present day (2005:xii). He lists these key components as:

> ...the Coloured people's assimilationism, which spurred hopes of future acceptance into the dominant society; their intermediate status in the dominant hierarchy, which generated fears they might lose their position of relative privilege and be relegated to the status of Africans; the negative connotations with which Coloured identity was imbued, especially the shame attached to their so-called racial hybridity; and finally, the marginality of the Coloured people, which caused them a great deal of frustration...[and which is] the most important of these attributes, as it placed severe limitations on possibilities for social and political action (2005:xii).

Even though the 1980s saw a prominent, rejectionist (of coloured identity itself) element emerge within the coloured population, a resurgence and reembracing of 'Colouredism' has followed, spurred partly by fear of black African majority rule, feelings of continued marginalisation, and the fresh possibility of asserting a specifically coloured political identity in the new 'non-racial' democracy (Adhikari, 2005:175-6). "It has become commonplace for Coloured people disaffected with the new South Africa to express their disgruntlement by lamenting that "first we were not white enough and now we are not black enough" " (ibid). This reawakening of an emphasis on coloured identity is sometimes done "in ways that are hostile Africans, and even, at times, flagrantly racist" (Adhikari, 2005:178).

> Indeed, a very common perception within the Coloured working classes, as well as among elements within the lower-middle-income group, is that they are worse off under the new dispensation than they were under apartheid. They cite shrinking employment opportunities especially as a result of affirmative action, escalating crime, deteriorating social services...among other reasons, to support the view that they were "better off under the white man" (Adhikari, 2005:180).

Adhikari points out that many would dismiss such animosity toward the new South Africa as a "product of irrational racism" (ibid). However, growing impoverishment amongst the coloured population, marked by a rationalisation of social services, a disproportionate rise in homicide crime amongst coloureds, and rising unemployment,

increased drug and alcohol abuse and gangsterism in coloured working-class areas, clearly demonstrates "some material basis to Coloured people's disenchantment with the new order and thus to their racial antagonisms towards Africans" (Adhikari, 2005:181). Lemanski points out that the coloured-black tension in the Western Cape can also be seen as the realisation of the apartheid 'divide and rule' strategy – whites from blacks, black tribe from black tribe, as well as blacks from coloureds (2006a:419). She refers to apartheid legislation which granted coloureds labour preference, effectively shutting black Africans out of Cape Town, with the black 'homelands / bantustans' a distance away, and limited urban black township space available, as exacerbating the situation (ibid). Thus, historically, Cape Town is "perceived as a coloured rather than Black African city (in addition to whites, who considered the city their cultural domain)" (ibid). What with increases in coloured-black tension accompanying recent growth in the black population there, desegregation between coloureds and blacks is being encouraged in the post-apartheid South Africa (along with the more obvious reconstructive measure of that between blacks and whites)[15] (ibid).

In a review of South Africa ten years after democracy, Daniel, Southall and Diepenaar assert that their finding that "attitudes towards the new democracy...[are] significantly racially skewed, with white South Africans having a considerably less favourable perspective than black South Africans" (2005:29) is not surprising, given the country's history of racial dominance. Steyn points out that the widespread feeling amongst whites of being 'marginalised' in the new South Africa, "can more accurately be termed relativization"[16] (2001:159).

Urban Segregation under Apartheid

The post World War 2 era saw Cape Town undergo radical changes as a result of the enforcement of spatial, social and economic apartheid legislation. Before that, even though the groundwork in certain respects had been laid by an essentially racially oppressive colonial order, the city had nonetheless contained pockets of relative racial integration. "Many people lived in mixed-race residential areas and the city enjoyed a relatively liberal reputation as a result" (Bickford-Smith et al., 1999; Wilkinson, 2000; paraphrased by Turok, 2001:2351). Despite this veneer of tolerance in Cape

Town, however, Oldfield summarises the realities of race and segregation in the urban South African context under apartheid:

> [Racial segregation] has been the distinctive feature through which communities and neighbourhoods in South African cities have been understood...Patterns of racial segregation have had a formative impact on urban economic, social and political form...Spatial laws such as the Group Areas Act in 1951 were promulgated to segregate urban areas according to [official racial]...classifications...Distinctions between...African, white, coloured and Indian space were enforced, often violently and with severe repercussions for the many communities at the mercy of the colonial[17]...and apartheid regimes (2004:190).

Ivan Turok rates three structural elements of cities as crucial to how "efficiently and equitably cities function", namely: employment, housing and the transport connections between them (2001:2350). Access to these critical resources affects living standards and is "competitively sought after" (ibid). In an article that focuses on Cape Town, he writes that during apartheid, such access was rigorously controlled to benefit whites and subjugate blacks (ibid). With black peripheral townships being denied commercial / retail development of any kind, vast differences between tax bases (with the tax bases of white areas being far greater, given the smaller populations and higher levels of commercial activity and wealth) and employment opportunities contributed to the "physical fragmentation" which arose between white suburbia and black townships, with black residents having to travel to white areas for daily consumerist purposes, as well as to secure employment (ibid). Limited opportunities for business persist even today in black township areas as a result (Barnes, 1998, cited in Oldfield, 2004:194). High standards of transport infrastructure, educational facilities, public services, employment, commercial and recreational facilities in white municipalities were a stark contrast to conditions in black townships (ibid).

> The townships lacked essential services and their infrastructure was not maintained. Constraints on land availability and house-building caused severe overcrowding. This brought overloaded facilities to collapse and damaged the environment (Turok, 2001:2351).

Urban Segregation in Post-Apartheid South Africa

In the current, post-apartheid urban context, Turok notes that the "evidence suggests that, while some progress is being made to extend public services to the historically neglected townships, the scale and character of investment differs markedly across the city, implying broad continuity with the past rather than any transformation" (2001:2350).

Upon calculating levels of segregation in South Africa between 1991 and 2001 using an index created by Duncan and Duncan in 1955 (Christopher, 2001:451), Christopher concludes that:

> Desegregation is taking place in South African cities, but it is progressing at a very slow pace and is both inter-group and place-specific...Segregation levels generally remained still close to the apartheid-era peak[18], but a slight decline was evident [between 1996 and 2001]....[It] is noticeable that whereas there was a long-term, well-funded, government programme to create the apartheid city, there has been no equivalent state intervention aimed at its undoing and the creation of a new specifically non-racial city. It would appear, therefore, that although the processes of desegregation will continue to operate, South African cities will remain highly segregated (Christopher, 2005:274).

In a similar study by Christopher on the period between 1991 and 1996, he had found that:

> [Desegregation trends] are not uniform with Whites remaining both more segregated and less open to change than the other groups. Africans have become more integrated, but the majority are constrained in their choice of residential options by the general levels of poverty. Asian and Coloured people have witnessed the greatest changes, with significant declines in segregation levels in the majority of cities as they begin to return to the areas from which they were forcibly removed in the previous 40 years (2001:449).

Thus, with no active measures taken to reverse the effects of apartheid spatial legislation, residential "integration...was essentially left to market forces...[The] vast majority of the African population was extremely poor and so unable to purchase property in the formerly White areas" (Christopher, 2001:454) This means that racial integration in former white housing suburbs is sluggish (ibid:455). Furthermore, Bremmer notes that: "Resistance to integration is still in evidence as witnessed by the

development of exclusionary 'gated' White suburbs" (1998, as paraphrased in Christopher, 2001:457). In contrast to these, the emergence of central city flats or apartment blocks (usually available for rental rather than purchase) are seen as the earliest breeches of the apartheid plan in the 1980s (Morris, 1994, as paraphrased in Christopher, 2001:455), with the effect that certain metropoles are now dominated by race groups other than white, and are termed by Guillaume (1997) as a "central African ghetto" (paraphrased in Christopher, 2001:455, also see Oldfield, 2004).

A correlation has been found in the U.S. between population growth and declining segregation levels; however, this correlation is clearly found to be dependent on economic growth and the subsequent movement of sections of the population to regions of opportunity (Christopher, 2001:458). In South Africa, the rate of population growth of urban centres between 1991 and 1996 was positively correlated with segregation level – reflecting a lack of comprehensive economic growth at the time, and the migration of poverty-stricken people from the rural areas into effectively segregated informal settlements on the urban margins (ibid). Even with the increase in black urban population, and the simultaneous decrease in white urban population between 1991 and 1996, most new housing schemes remained virtually exclusive, whether in the formal or informal sector (Christopher, 2001:459; Seekings, 2000:833).

Oldfield points out that the post-apartheid urban environment spans from re-segregation in previously 'grey', racially mixed areas, to other urban areas that have desegregated racially, but re-segregated along income and class lines. Indeed, the increasing emergence of polarisation in neighbourhoods demonstrates the mounting significance of class differentiation, and at times, a resultant reinterpretation of racial identities (Oldfield, 2004:190)[19]. As Lemanski points out:

> Clearly there are exceptions to this, in particular the migration of South Africa's growing black middle-class into residential areas previously reserved for whites (Saff, 1994, 1998). However, such trends only allow blacks with sufficient socio-economic credentials into 'white' spaces, rather than desegregating society and space for all (2006a:417).

Despite the above, Christopher points out that in the Western Cape levels of segregation amongst blacks are in fact lower than in certain other provinces

(2001:460). However, this can be attributed firstly to the scale of black migration to the province, after partial exclusion from it under apartheid, and secondly to "the lower priority accorded to the segregation of Africans from the numerically dominant Coloured population by White officials responsible for housing policy before 1994" (ibid). Furthermore, he found through his research that the coloured population in South Africa experienced the greatest fall in segregation levels between 1991 and 1996 (ibid). Within this picture, it should be noted that, previously, the coloured population "was significantly more segregated in the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape" than either the Free State or KwaZulu-Natal[20] (ibid:461). Higher levels of desegregation amongst coloureds (and Asians) than blacks in South Africa can partly be attributed to their "intermediate economic and social status between the other two groups, and hence integration into both", hence effectively escaping "the polarity of the black-white divide" (ibid:463).

> The chances for poor people to move close to the CBD, where the economic opportunities are located, are fewer in Cape Town than in other South African cities...The considerable amount of rental housing in smaller blocks in proximity to Cape Town's CBD remains out of reach of the low-income people wishing to escape from the periphery. Therefore, implicitly, the adopted planning approach in the MSDF [Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework] is to leave the marginalized where they are: at the fringes of the city. The plan is about bringing investment to the people instead of people to the investment...This appears to follow the logic of creating opportunities for the poor without limiting the rich. There are many indications that this approach is difficult to implement, and therefore will not help to narrow the disparities in Cape Town's living conditions (Haferburg, 2002:42).

The price of the economic imbalance and segregation described above by Haferburg has been the necessity of extensive physical mobility, with its consequent costs on "individuals, businesses and the environment through travelling time, congestion and pollution"[21] (Turok, 2001:2352). Other problems claimed to be associated with Cape Town's spatial divisions are the "social instability associated with concentrated poverty and lost investment and jobs as a result of crime and insecurity" (ibid:2371). Recognising that past policy and practice has resulted in a city with a structure and form that exacerbates poverty and inequality, is extremely inconvenient for many, and which uses resources inefficiently (Cape Town City Council, 1999; as cited in Turok, 2001:2354), certain legislation in the 1990s "actually sought to make it a legal requirement to pursue physically integrated urban development...[that entailed] less

sprawl... and less segregation within and between residential and economic areas" (Watson, 2000, as cited in Turok, 2001:2354). A broad city-wide concept plan toward this purpose was developed called the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework[22] (MSDF), which aimed to "create a more equitable and sustainable future...[which includes] using well-located vacant land to house poorer people (instead of siting them on the periphery); linking neighbourhoods together through nodes and corridors (instead of separating them via buffer strips and freeways); and promoting mixed-use, higher-density developments of residential, employment, retail and recreational land uses (rather than low-density, monofunctional suburbs and townships)"[23] (Turok, 2001:2354-5).

Racial Integration in Post-Apartheid South Africa

...towards the end of apartheid, Cape Town was South Africa's most segregated metropolis...The significance of this for post-apartheid Cape Town is immense; for so few current urbanites have "lived even part of their adult lives in racially and ethnically integrated communities"...that the potential for cross-race integration is severely constrained (Lemanski, 2006a:419; Christopher, 2001 referred to in quote)[24].

With reference to her qualitative study of communities in Delft South, Cape Town – "a desegregated low-income neighbourhood in Cape Town developed through the provision of state funded housing to families previously classified coloured and African" (Oldfield, 2004:189) – Oldfield points out that social categories such as race are embedded in and reified through particular everyday, social, economic and political practices (ibid:200). She makes important distinctions between differing levels of racial integration, contingent on different scales of the city-scape. According to her research, whilst racial integration was engendered at the micro- and intra-neighbourhood scale, on an urban scale, the location of the desegregated zone fails to challenge the city's racial geography (ibid). Since low-income housing developments by and large take form only in poorer areas in South Africa, such developments symbolise a prolongation of black and coloured residence in areas of poor service and peripheral to employment and amenities (ibid). Apartheid city segregation therefore finds its continuance in this "buffer area between economically marginilised coloured communities and still poorer African communities" (ibid).

Black and coloured residents in Delft South still generally travel to different parts of Cape Town to their respective places of employment (coloureds to previously white, predominantly Afrikaans-speaking areas, and blacks to metropolitan areas, and plush white suburbs) as a result of the entrenched patterns of different employment for coloureds and blacks according to apartheid legislation (which afforded coloured employees preferential treatment) (Oldfield, 2004:194-5). The social networks of the residents also differ according to their differing respective historical roots and location in the city, where their friends and families are frequently still located (ibid:195). Thus, economic and social networks – formal and informal - are largely conducted outside of the desegregated residential zone, and along divergent lines, particular to specific race groups due to patterns embedded during the apartheid era (ibid:195-6). In this way, the material constructs governing economic (and social) well-being in Cape Town act as socio-physical obstacles to the process of racial integration by keeping races to a large degree separate in their everyday lives.

Oldfield did, however, find a certain degree of genuine, social integration happening in Delft South, although generally centred around informal movements (in this case a social disobedience one), at times, formal social and political organisations, as well as around concerns about security (street committee activities and so forth) (Oldfield:2004:199). She concludes her study with her crucial observation:

> The significance and nature of race and its inter-penetration with place-based and urban identities therefore cannot be assumed. Instead, context and situation shape whether and to what degree race and place matter (ibid:200).

Lemanski studied similar situations to Oldfield, for example, she observed communities in the so-called Westlake development in Cape Town, where a low-income desegregated housing zone has been sited in close proximity to a wealthy white suburban gated area called Silvertree estate, as well as to a retail development. The mainly black and coloured Westlake residents were awarded the housing as replacement for their previous homes, which were demolished to facilitate a mixed-use land development, of which their new homes form a small component (Lemanski, 2006a:417). She "addresses 'integration' as a dynamic process, rather than 'being integrated' as a static outcome" (Lemanski, 2006a:418); particularly given the

multidimensional nature of community relations she sees integration as occurring on a continuum, with a maximum, ultimate 'integrated state' viewed as not necessarily achievable or measurable (ibid:432). Lemanski reports that novel experiences of social integration and racial desegregation in post-apartheid urban South Africa do exist, including co-existing peacefully in common physical space, active blending in social, economic, and to a lesser degree in political and cultural spaces, and the transcendence of apartheid histories and geographies through the creation of new localised identities (2006a:433). However, in the case of her research, acceptance into the respective desegregated space is contingent on the class – rather than race – of the newcomer, "thus failing to challenge the post-apartheid tendency for class (rather than race) to determine mixing" (ibid). The fact of Lemanski's Westlake example of social integration (albeit on a micro-scale, as similarly found to a much lesser degree by Oldfield) is attributed firstly to the unusual central (proximal to wealthy suburbs) rather than peripheral location of the low-cost desegregated housing suburb, and similar tenure histories of residents (which encourages local identity more so than if residents have been selected from diverse parts of the city) (2006a:433; 427). "This non-periphery location restricts ease of movement to distant former segregated areas and also improves local economic opportunities" (ibid:422). Furthermore, residents, regardless of race, are forced to make use of the same facilities, based on "proximity and affordability" (generally not the same facilities that the nearby wealthy whites would use, mind you), encouraging a greater degree of everyday social contact (ibid:427). Directly below, Lemanski cites the findings of Grant Saff, another prominent author in the desegregation / integration field, who has conducted research in Cape Town, among other areas:

> Such behaviour is congruent with Saff's concept of "deracialised space", where poor blacks successfully reside in close proximity to wealthy 'white' areas, dramatically altering the racial dynamics of space, but cannot access local 'white' facilities and are thus socially and "functionally" segregated (Saff, 1998; as cited by Lemanski, 2006a:423).

In Saff's research into black informal settlements on the boundaries of, or within, 'white' areas, black residents / 'squatters' were refused access to "the suburb's 'White' facilities...with White residents citing health concerns, fear of crime, property

values and environmental degradation (rather than race) as the reasons for rejection" (Lemanski, 2006b:401).

Lemanski notes that, in addition to socio-economic status contributing to a strong sense of community in Westlake Village, this is also

> overlaid by divisions based on a new criterion of socio-historic identity. Ironically, this returns Westlake to a situation in which one group is trying to 'belong' in another's space (as with blacks moving into 'white' middle-class residential areas and schools) (ibid:432).

Thus, whereas Oldfield's research found race to be the dominant determinant of residents' everyday activities, in Westlake, other factors (such as class and socio-historic identity) supersede race in this respect[25] (Lemanski, 2006a:418). Lemanski points to three criteria highlighted by Bakewell (2002) that appear to encourage diverse groups to integrate:

> ...first, a common livelihood (for example, professionals *or* manual labourers); secondly, sharing neighbourhood resources (such as schools); and, thirdly, for both groups to perceive benefits from relationships (Bakewell, 2002, as cited in Lemanski, 2006b:409).

In the U.S. literature, economic opportunity is also asserted as another crucial element for areas of potential integration (Neuman, 1994; as cited in Swanson, 2004:2), as well as the fact that prospects for stable integration are higher if integration "is accompanied by stability in property values" (Taub et al., 1984, as cited in Padín & Sullivan, 2003:7). It is ironic that in the South African context, prejudice (and possibly racism) on the part of whites contributes to a fear of property devaluing should dual race / class integration occur, and such perceptions may well lead to a realisation of that projection on the property market, effectively snuffing potential for racial integration before it has even had a chance to take root. Indeed, Lemanski points out that in the South African context "proximity to a poor (non-White) area lowers property values" (2006b:417). This reflects Turok's comment that: "Institutional practices and market forces are tending to reinforce spatial divisions rather than to assist urban integration" (2001:2371).

In contrast to South Africa, Lemanski cites evidence from gated communities adjacent to poor settlements in Chile that indicates "that both functional integration and positive images of one another *are* possible...and thus future mixed-use land developments incorporating low- and high-income housing in South Africa should be encouraged to design more inclusive spaces"[26] (2006b:415). Some of the positives pointed out in the Chilean situation are a seemingly mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between the poor and rich in terms of employment opportunities for the poor, a workforce for the wealthy, and the improvements and modernity brought to the poorer area due to proximity to the wealthy one (ibid:398). She concedes, however, that in Westlake, even if the high walls of the gated white area been absent, 'neighbourly' feelings between the wealthy and poor would still have been unlikely, given the level of negativity expressed by the former toward the latter, in the form of feelings of indifference and superiority (ibid:415). This reflects the more general finding that "middle-class residential areas in South Africa are strongly opposed to the residential proximity of their poorer citizens" (Lemanski, 2006b:401). Indeed, in the South African context, not only does the phenomenon of gated communities "imitate *apartheid*'s geography of exclusion rather than post-*apartheid* goals of urban integration and inclusion" (ibid:400), but has also been interpreted as "an abstention from civic engagement and responsibility" (ibid). Thus, because most policy attention has gone to preventing urban sprawl and spatial inequality at the city level, "the development of other urban phenomena (such as gated communities) that restrict micro-level desegregation and integration has been allowed to flourish" (ibid:402). Lemanski remarks that, indeed, Silvertree residents have only assented to living next to a low-cost housing area precisely because the walls and gates act as a barrier of safety and exclusion from their undesirable neighbours (ibid:416).

Lemanski concludes her similar research (in structure and findings) into a seaside suburb named Muizenberg[27] with her assertion that:

> [Much] of the theory assumes integration as the flipside to segregation and though this could be explained as a consequence of definitional differences, there does seem to be a general perception (particularly evident in policy-making) that integration is a robotic consequence of desegregation (or at least that the two are interdependent). This research disputes that perception...(Lemanski, 2006c:39)[28].

Thus, from the previous literature, persistent lines of disconnection are evident that have effectively replaced the blatant spatial apartheid of that era (even though this type has by no means disappeared altogether), and two types of such segregation are consistently identified. Both have been termed social apartheid, but where in one instance, this refers to how the social and functional networks of different race groups sharing living space diverge due to historically separate areas of familial/cultural origin, and in the other instance, the division occurs along the lines of social class, where racial integration with respect to social mixing between residents of different races is governed by preferential affinity for neighbours / residents of a similar socio-economic status (or 'class'). The first of the above two instances has been shown to occur either as a result of 'gating' lower income people out via high walls, security measures, and so forth, or simply by a conscious choice of residents to live their social lives in divergent areas outside of their residential area. The first of these therefore has overlaps with the 'social class' segregation pattern mentioned above, while the second has more to do with socio-historic location.

The Contact Hypothesis in the South African Context

The topic of the contact hypothesis is a point of commonality to a degree between the South African and American previous literature. The contact hypothesis is one of the most renowned theories in literature on racial prejudice[29]. Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi outline its logic:

> In its simplest form, this hypothesis states that interracial contact informs the participating members of each racial group that one race is inherently no better or worse than another; hence, contact acts to break down prejudice (2002:619).

The authors point out that urban researchers have tended to focus on the effects of neighbourhood contact, particularly due to its potential to "increase individual's tolerance of, or preference for, racially integrated neighbourhoods" (ibid). In a review by Don Foster of a number of South African studies on *Racialisation and the Micro-Ecology of Contact* which all use the contact hypothesis as a reference point in investigating "the notion of micro-segregation also known as petty apartheid" (Foster, 2005:495), he sets out the kind of micro-ecological interactional forms that would meet the optimal conditions proposed by contact hypothesis: "status equality,

common goals, co-operative interdependence and normative support" (ibid:498). These bear resemblance to Bakewell's criteria for integration set out above. However, Foster points out that despite persistent re-evaluation, perhaps the greatest downfall of the contact hypothesis has been "its neglect of the spatial dimension"[30] (Dixon, 2001; as cited by Foster, 2005:498). Nonetheless, he refers to a self-report study across 19 South African schools by Holtman et al., which found that:

> ...contact was the most important predictor of racial attitudes and prejudice. The greater the self-reported contact experiences, the lower the measures of prejudice. Contact in this study was more important than socio-economic status, levels of integration of the schools or measures of racial identification (Foster, 2005:500).

Results from the South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation on voluntary contact between races reported that:

> For both indices [of voluntary as well as involuntary contact], the reported results of little contact were highest for black and lowest for white respondents...perhaps not surprising when one considers the racial demographics and the continued de facto involuntary segregation of the townships and rural areas. Multiple inequalities and de facto spatial separation on a macro-scale appear to bedevil the opportunities for warm, open, equal encounters of the face-to-face voluntary variety (Foster, 2005:499).

Foster, drawing on explanatory strands from the works of Finchilescu, Schrieff, Durrheim and Dixon[31], invokes a 'relational model' for persistent informal segregation (a common finding amongst the authors reviewed by Foster) and integratory behaviour in which "racial representations are grounded in spatio-temporal interactions and relational forms"[32] (Foster, 2005:503): The findings by the authors cited by Foster may challenge the classical contact hypothesis in certain respects[33], most importantly in the "notion that it matters what bodies actually do in space and temporal sequences. This does not displace the importance of voice and meaning posited by social constructionism; it adds to it" (2005:503). Nevertheless, Foster concludes that the contact hypothesis "still suggests the possibility of positive social change" (ibid).

U.S. Literature Review

It is important to point out that this U.S. literature review will be used for comparative purposes with the South African context to a limited degree, given the vast differences between the two contexts in terms of certain crucial facts pertaining to race. Firstly, whereas demographically there has always only ever been a white minority within a black majority present in South Africa, whether during or post-apartheid, in the U.S., whites form a majority of the population, and blacks a minority. As Christopher points out, this makes "direct comparisons with the US tenuous" (2001:450), which are further weakened in the specific case of Cape Town, with its distinct identities of coloured and black – a distinction not made in the U.S. As Adhikari puts it:

> In South Africa, contrary to international usage, the term Coloured does not refer to black people in general. It instead alludes to a phenotypically varied social group of highly diverse cultural and geographical origins (2005:2).

It must also be emphasised that only black-white relations in context of racial integration in the U.S. will be considered here, since immigrants of, for example, Latino, Hispanic or Asian origin there each have a unique socio-historical context, which would become even harder to compare with any race group in the South African context.

Legal and widespread racial segregation and resultant residential organisation along racial lines was dominant in the U.S. from the early 1900's until 1968, when de jure segregation was abolished with the Fair Housing Act in that year (Timberlake, 2000:420). Despite this legislation, black-white spatial separation nonetheless persists (ibid), even though some scholars claim "the existence of stable racially and ethnically diverse urban communities is one of the best kept secrets of our nation"[34] (Nyden et al., 1997; as cited in Swanson, 2004:13). Swanson, in a conference paper that grapples with integration in America points out firstly that:

> Residential segregation by race remains high despite changes brought forth since the Civil Rights Movement nearly half a century ago. Most scholars agree that blacks have more choice in where they

live today...but they also note that discrimination persists alongside differential residential preferences between the races (2004:1).

Several writers report a general dearth of literature on racially integrated neighbourhoods in the U.S. (see, for example, Padín & Sullivan, 2004:3; Swanson, 2004:15). However, in reviewing the literature on residential preferences by race – which could be seen as a proxy measure for amenability to racial integration – Swanson outlines the trends of black and white respondents over the last two decades in this respect. Attitudinal research conducted in the 1990s (Massey & Denton, 1993) demonstrates a long-held unwillingness by whites to live "with anything but a token population of blacks" (clearly a problem if residential integration is the goal, as Swanson points out), whilst blacks displayed a strong preference for desegregation. Massey and Denton found white disinclination to integration to be connected to a belief that "having black neighbors undermines property values and reduces neighborhood safety" (1993:94, as quoted in Swanson, 2004:3); obvious parallels with the attitudes of South African whites can be drawn here (see above). Recent research, however, suggests that, whereas before black integration preference was for a half-black half-white situation, preference for a neighbourhood in which their own race group is in the majority appears to predominate now. Simultaneously, whites appear to be becoming increasingly tolerant of black presence in their communities, as far as attitudes go that is, yet this openness still does not override the persistent preference for a majority-white situation (Cashin, 2001:online, as cited by Swanson, 2004:4). Swanson remarks on the problematic lack of research into "how residential preferences by race vary depending upon the social class of the respondent...[particularly given that] it is only amongst the more affluent populations that a greater variety of residential choices become available[35]" (2004:4). The research in this dissertation addresses precisely that lack of research, however in a South African context.

Another important finding cited by Swanson is the persistence of racial residential segregation even amongst more affluent parts of the black population (Gates, 1992; Massey and Denton, 1993, as cited in Swanson, 2004:4), and therefore despite their rising class status as upwardly mobile blacks. She calls for future U.S. research to investigate textures inherent in the fact that "it is one thing to be poor, black and

residentially segregated, but it is a qualitatively and substantively different experience to be affluent, black and residentially segregated from whites" (2004:5). Alba et al. point out a significant qualifying detail in this respect, namely that residential conditions in affluent black neighbourhoods never meet the higher standards found in affluent white neighbourhoods as regards aspects such as crime level and so forth (as cited in Swanson, 2004:6). Swanson proposes that in contrast to extreme wealth in many majority-white communities and an absence of wealth in many majority-black communities, "racially integrated communities will fall somewhere in the middle of these extremes" (2004:16).

Swanson remarks that American residential segregation literature frequently attributes the stubbornness of such segregation to "racial discrimination and larger systemic inequalities[36]" (2004:8); it is seen as a social condition driven by white hostility and lender discrimination[37] (ibid:7). The culmination of all the above factors is that:

> Affluent blacks are increasingly identifying a "profound disillusionment with what they perceive as the failed promises of integration" and in some cases are opting to "create their own communities, thus forming the modern day middle-class black suburb" (Cashin, 2001:online, as quoted in Swanson, 2004:8).

Charles[38] describes certain important factors that seem to bode well for established integrated neighbourhoods. The criteria are: economic diversity amongst the residents, including different levels of income and occupations; good location; sites where inter-racial interaction can occur during daily life; and a strong community-based organisational culture committed to supporting diversity (2003:201). In addition, integration is more likely "in communities that are more distant from an area's central minority concentration" (ibid). These have clear intersections with those criteria which have been said to apply in the South African context by Bakewell above, apart from the contrast between Bakewell's advocacy of a common livelihood amongst diverse residents (Bakewell, 2002, as cited in Lemanski, 2006b:409), and Charles' encouragement of economic and occupational diversity amongst residents for integration to occur. Parallels with South Africa emerge with respect to deracialised, but socially segregated situations. In their study on seemingly integrated communities in Portland, Oregon, Padín and Sullivan found that:

residential contiguity and propinquity between Blacks and Whites does not, in and of itself, translate into integrated social networks...[demonstrating the contrast between] integration as a *demographic condition* and integration as a *social condition*...Blacks and Whites live largely separate and parallel lives in spite of shared residential space (2003:21).

The above findings have strong echoes, albeit amongst low-income coloured and black residents, in Oldfield's qualitative work in Delft South, Cape Town, discussed above[39]. Research into the applicability of the contact hypothesis by Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi on the 'Multicity Study of Urban Inequality' was (according to their estimation) the first to directly account for the endogeneity of contact (2002:633). They report that:

We find that neighbourhood contact affects the preferences of Whites only if this contact is with Blacks of about the same or higher social status, as measured by educational achievement. In contrast, neighbourhood contact affects the preferences of Blacks regardless of the relative social status of participating Whites. Nevertheless, contact has a much stronger effect (roughly double) if it is with Whites of roughly equal or higher status rather than with Whites of lower status (2002:633).

The above findings would appear to lend support to relationship investigated in this dissertation, namely, that between amenability to racial integration and economic well-being, since the latter is clearly connected to social status (or what some might call 'class'). Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi point to a debate, however, that in turn would seem to weaken the significance of economic well-being in how amenable an individual is to racial integration.

Thernstrom and Thernstrom (1997) and Patterson (1997) have argued that Black-White segregation is partly, if not largely, determined by the attitudes of Blacks and Whites. In Yinger's (1998) critique of this argument, he notes that this is misleading, because "racial attitudes themselves depend on residential integration – and hence on discrimination" (2002:633).

Although Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi tend towards viewing racial attitudes as chiefly endogenously determined, but affected by inter-racial (neighbourhood) contact, I would argue that, due to the significance of social status apparent in the contact interaction, economic well-being is a further important qualifying determinant of amenability to racial integration in this picture. Particularly in the case of South

Africa, the repercussions of this are that unless radical socio-economic inequality is addressed, the benefits of integrated neighbourhood zones will be dubious barring all the neighbourhood members being of the same or a similar level of economic well-being. Thus, in order to consolidate significant racial integration in South Africa, economic, social and spatial factors necessarily must be addressed in comprehensive, inclusive and unitary urban planning strategies. Opportunities for economic growth in integrated zones are essential to this picture.

Central Hypotheses

1. **Amongst the respondents to the Cape Area Study, attitudes to race are likely to be found to be a function of economic well-being, however there are likely to be variations as to the exact form that this function takes.**

2. **It is further hypothesised that the lowest levels of amenability to racial integration are likely to be tallied with those who firstly live in households with the lowest incomes, and secondly experience the poorest living conditions; the middle-range levels are likely to correspond with those respondents who live in households positioned within the middle income levels, and who experience 'average' living conditions; while the highest levels of amenability to racial integration are likely to correlate with those respondents whose household income levels are high, and who enjoy 'good' living conditions.**

I would suggest that the easier it is due to one's economic circumstances to 'blind' oneself to race differences, and choose not to deal with them in any tangible way, the easier it may be, in a blanketing fashion, to wholeheartedly 'approve' of racial integration, while never actually having to make any significant adjustments in one's life in order to encourage the integration process. On the other hand, if one's economic predicament is such that the racialised nature of inequality seems inescapably to pervade and haunt ones life and those who live around you, the concept of racial integration, particularly in its form as a trump card of government-speak, may rather become a concept that you question and doubt, due to the fact that it, along with many other socio-economic political promises to the citizens of a non-

racial democracy, have not been fulfilled. Indeed, in the latter case, the respondent's situation economically may appear no different or worse compared to prior to the advent of non-racial democratic rule.

Support for Hypothesis 2 above can be found in a U.S. study in which data were merged using the 1992-1994 Multicity Study of Urban Inequality and 1990 Census, in which Oliver and Wong found that:

> ...economic as well as racial contexts are important to consider. Both blacks and whites in low-status neighborhoods have more negative attitudes and perceive more competition with minorities than those in high status neighborhoods...These findings reflect the interaction between race, class and immigration in American society (2003:580).

In the context of Cape Town, the perception of such competition as pointed out above is not necessarily a minority-majority issue, since the two 'minorities' here are, on average, middle to upper class whites and poor blacks. Rather, the perception of competition is a dynamic inter-'class' as well as inter-racial issue, complicated by the legacy of labour laws which prioritised whites, and to a lesser degree coloureds, and current affirmative action laws which prioritise blacks and coloureds (and women). Thus, coloured people may feel threatened by black people, the latter now seen as receiving greater preference in the labour market than themselves, rather than whites during apartheid (Adhikari, 2005). The lower the level of economic well-being of the respective coloured community, the more exaggerated the sense of being threatened is likely to be. Also, coloured predominance as a majority demographically in Cape Town is fast becoming more of a coloured-black split in this sense (with whites remaining a minority), which is seen to add to a sense of feeling marginalised and threatened socio-economically (ibid). Black people in low-income communities are likely to feel threatened by both coloured and white people as a result of being historically positioned below both of those groups socio-economically. Whites, on the other hand, may feel threatened by both black and coloured people in terms of affirmative action laws, yet with their enduring grip in general terms on socio-economic wealth and power in the country, the grounds for such fears are to an extent questionable. All of these factors clearly work against the chances of all race groups

and 'classes' being open to integrating with one another residentially or socially in the urban Cape Town context[40].

Descriptive Hypothesis and Motivation

Omi and Winant summarise their view on recent academic and political debate around the nature of racism, and whether it is:

> ...primarily an ideological or structural phenomenon...[either] first and foremost a matter of beliefs and attitudes, doctrines and discourse, which only then give rise to unequal and unjust practices and structures...[or] primarily a matter of economic stratification, residential segregation, and other institutionalised forms of inequality which then give rise to ideologies of privilege.
>
> From the standpoint of racial formation [theory, the authors]....believe it is crucial to disrupt the fixity of these positions by simultaneously arguing that ideological beliefs have structural consequences, and that social structures give rise to beliefs. Racial ideology and social structure, therefore, mutually shape the nature of racism in a complex, dialectical, and overdetermined manner (2000:210-11).

Taking the above authors' point into account (it being one important point of many different theoretical standpoints on the concept and nature of race and the issue of racism), this research does not aim to 'pin down' the 'cause' of attitude to racial integration or of racism. Rather, it aims to investigate the nature of the relationship between ideology and social structure, between non-racist/racist attitudes and socio-economic stratification. It takes as its goal to interrogate the complexities and myriad conflicts and cooperations that the data may speak of in this respect.

Although, thus, this research will not take any particular position as to which of ideology or social structure should claim primacy as the origin of racism, this does not take away from the fact that the perpetual relational field between the two is cause enough to warrant diligent attention to its variations. My concern, therefore, is not with the precise causes of racial stratification, racism, or attitudes to race, but rather with the ramifications of all these forces, and with how their sets of consequences correlate with one another. For in turn, those repercussions are likely to effect different future paths for a nation, and in accordance, different paths that policy

should take in order to (hopefully) avoid the destructive effects thereof, and advance the encouraging ones.

Following from the above, the two central questions to be addressed in this research are:

Is the stratified nature of economic inequality a contributory factor in shaping attitudes towards racial integration? In what ways do race and economic well-being articulate with one another with respect to the relationship between economic well-being and attitude toward racial integration amongst the respondents of the Cape Area Study?

Thus, to sum up so far: by looking at the relationship between economic well-being and attitudes towards racial integration, I expect to find clues which reveal the degree to which persistent social stratification of the economy by race and gender in a non-racial democracy works against a seemingly fundamental premise and objective that such a democracy is built on: racial integration. In turn, the above relationship is likely to reveal something about how the interplay of social, political and economic factors unique to a South African context have worked to produce a democratic state able to effect tangible transformation, or one that has 'shed its skin', but retains the skeletal structure or arrangement of what went before.

Thus this dissertation is about a sample of citizens living in a heterogeneous non-racial democracy, the kinds of conflicts that characterise their lives in terms of their racial identity, their economic well-being or predicament, and their level of commitment to or rejection of racial integration. It should reveal varying patterns among respondents of optimism and disillusion with the key selling point of a non-racial democracy – that of racial integration.

Chapter 1

Economic Well-Being and Race in Cape Town

The question that this chapter addresses is: What is the relationship between economic wellbeing and race in Cape Town with respect to the CAS 2005 data? Two measures of economic well-being are developed, since different measures order people in different ways. Income is not, alone, a sufficient measure. The reliability and validity of income data is compromised by desirability bias, response inaccuracy / response bias and a suspicion of interviewer motives (see for example Warriner, 1991:253-255; van Goor & Stuiver, 1998:481-483; Kamo, 2000:460-461, 475; Nederhof, 1986:277-278, 282-283).

Furthermore, economic well-being measured by individual income alone restricts the sample size to only those who are currently employed – in the case of the CAS 2005 data, this is only 47% of the sample. This would limit classification of respondents in terms of economic well-being to this employed sub-sample alone (who are in fact privileged, in terms of employment, relative to, for example, poor, unemployed respondents in search of work), introducing sample selectivity bias into the research[41]. The problem then arises of how to classify the rest of the respondent sample in terms of economic well-being. Using household income, as opposed to respondent income, does solve this problem to a degree. Nevertheless, although almost the entire sample reported household income in the CAS 2005 data (79% of all respondents answered this question), other problems enter the picture when household income as opposed to individual (respondent) income is used.

Over and above sample size restriction, a crucial criticism of using individual incomes – whether used in their original form or as household income divided by household size - is that unless the respective survey collected data on intra-household transfers, one ends up with a measure of individual earnings not individual well-being. Crucially, inequality within households will not be encapsulated in a single 'household income' figure. Since household income is by definition a collective income representing a total amount made up of a certain number of contributions by various household members, one cannot tell from a single household income figure

the way in which the total income may be being earned or distributed by or amongst the different household members. If a breadwinner gives half of his or her earnings to a dependent with zero earnings, then the income of the latter is in fact the same as the breadwinner. Inevitably one is making assumptions about intra-household distribution if you use individual earnings alone as much as if you aggregate individuals into households: either you assume that there is no redistribution within households, in other words that no earnings are pooled, or you assume that all earnings are pooled (see Seekings & Nattrass, 2005:192-193)[42].

Before dealing with the interaction between race and economic well-being, a few basic descriptives concerning the CAS 2005 data will be outlined below.

Sampling and Weights

A set of weights[43] was used to adjust for race, gender and age[44], bringing the sample into line with the census data[45]. While the unequal distribution by race and gender is not necessarily ideal, it is not uncommon in socio-economic surveys in South Africa. Furthermore, in line with the fact that race is indeed unequally distributed in Cape Town, the CAS 2005 sampling distribution in terms of race is roughly reflective of this imbalance[46]. Table 1.1 below compares the race distribution for the Western Cape, Cape Town, and the CAS 2005 respondent sample, and lends validity to the sampling by race for the CAS 2005[47]. Seekings et. al. point out that:

> Sampling for CAS 2005 was designed to generate a representative sample of 1200 adults spread across metropolitan Cape Town. We used a two-stage cluster sample design....We anticipated different response rates in different kinds of areas, and therefore oversampled in some areas relative to others (2005:12).

Complications to do with sampling[48] included locating certain shack settlements, as well as negotiating access to gated communities. Contact rates were high in black areas, as had been expected, reasonable in coloured areas, whilst non-contact and refusal rates made white areas problematic and difficult for fieldworkers. The latter phenomenon is a recurring predicament in South Africa, prompting a suspicion on the part of Seekings et. al. that a truly representative survey sample of white South Africans may be unattainable. For these reasons, a "pure convenience" sample was

resorted to for white respondents, and Seekings et. al. therefore warn CAS 2005 users to treat the respective sub-sample with considerable caution (ibid:18). Furthermore, it is worth noting that the interview methodology of CAS 2005 for the most past entailed different race groups being matched with regard to interviewer-respondent pairs. Thus, black respondents were interviewed by black interviewers, coloured respondents were interviewed by coloured interviewers, while white respondents were the only exceptional group in this respect; they were interviewed by coloured interviewers mostly, with only a small proportion of pairs matched by race. All this will have clear implications for the results that come out of the white sample, with the obvious possibility of desirability bias on the part of the respondents. This will therefore need to be taken into consideration at the analysis stage[49].

Noting the skewed gender and age profiles, the authors conclude that:

> Overall, our sample seems to comprise too many people of the kinds more readily found at home by interviewers – ie. women and older people – but did not neglect working people and was not substantially out-of-line in terms of race (ibid:21).

Table 1.1. Comparative table of race distribution in the Western Cape, Cape Town, and the CAS 2005 respondent sample

Predominant Race Group of Enumeration Area	Western Cape, Census 2001*		Cape Town, 2001**	CAS 2005 Adults	
	Number	%	%	Number	%
Black	1 207 429	27	32	383	33
Coloured	2 438 976	54	48	529	45
White	832 901	18	19	258	22
Total	4 479 305	99	99	1170	100

* Source: Census 2001, Statistics South Africa, 2003:10, 12. The category 'Indian or Asian' has not been included here.

**Source: *Inequality and Diversity in Cape Town: An Introduction and User's Guide to the 2005 Cape Area Study*, Seekings et. al., 2005:5.

Labour Market Status, Participation and Unemployment Rates



Figure 1.1. Distribution of labour market status* amongst CAS 2005 respondents (n=1236)
* 'working all ages' includes self-employment[50]; 'resp unemp strict aged 18-64' = respondents unemployed according to the strict definition of unemployment, aged 18-64 years; 'resp unemp want work not looking aged 18-64' = unemployed respondents who want work, but are not looking for it, aged 16-64 years; 'resp not in labour force' = non-labour force participant respondents



Figure 1.2. Broad unemployment rates for respondents by race and gender

The participation rate for respondents is 72%. The strict unemployment rate is 26%, while the broad unemployment rate is 29%. Figure 1.2 above shows a higher broad unemployment for women overall, as well as within each racial sub-sample individually. Racial differences in turn are clear, with black respondents demonstrating by far the steepest broad unemployment rate, while coloured respondents occupy a middle position in the picture, and white respondents show the lowest rate of all the race groups.

Distribution of Income

Respondent Income

An overview of the apportionment of the employed respondent income earners (whether that is self-employment or waged employment) according to five income categories (which were provided as options to choose from in the individual income question in the CAS 2005 questionnaire[51]), shows that the majority of them earn between R1001 and R3000 per month. By race, the perseverance of the racial wage hierarchy characteristic of the Cape Town context is evident, with black respondents in general being the lowest earners, coloureds positioned mainly in the middle of the distribution, and whites earning the most on average. Disaggregation by gender reveals distinct gender differences, whereby women are shown to earn less than men overall. This is qualified in turn by race, according to the afore-mentioned hierarchical pattern, whereby within each race group individually, women in that group earn less overall than men. This places black women at the very bottom and white men at the top of the earnings ladder[52].

Household Income

As mentioned above, household income[53] will be used as the primary source of the first measure of economic well-being for the purposes of analysing the CAS 2005 data in this research. As will be shown below, it will be further modified into three major 'income levels' in order to facilitate certain methods of analysis.



Figure 1.3. Household income distribution of respondents (n=968)

The overall household income distribution pattern depicted in figure 1.3 above shows the majority of households positioned in the R1001 to R3000 monthly income category. The remaining income categories are fairly evenly distributed between households, except for the top category (more than 10000), which is considerably smaller than the others[54].

Household Income by Race



Figure 1.4. Household income distribution of respondents by race (household income per month)

Figure 1.4 above shows that the distribution of household income by race demonstrates a racial wage hierarchy typical of the Cape Town context, with black respondents in general being the lowest earners, coloureds positioned mainly in the middle of the distribution, and whites earning the most on average.



Figure 1.5. Distribution of Household Income (Per Month) by Employment Status
Note: 'working'=respondent employed (including waged or self-employment, whether full-time or part-time, and including those respondents on leave from work at the time of the survey); 'not working'=respondent unemployed or a non-labour-force participant.

Figure 1.5 above lends support to the assertion that a household that has even one employed member is less likely to experience dire poverty than one in which all members are unemployed or are non-labour-force participants (see for example Seekings, 2003:7). This is clear because the higher the income category, so the percentage of employed respondents within that income category increases. The extremes show at least a full 80% of respondents either unemployed or non-labour-force-participants in the lowest income category, or employed in the highest income category.

In order to lend further support to the above-mentioned evidence that the CAS 2005 respondent sample is indeed a representative sample of the location of Cape Town, certain comparisons will be drawn between the CAS 2005 data set and another

previous data set, namely the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) 2002 with regard to a few pertinent variables. It should be noted that whilst the CAS did not endeavour to collect good income data, the CAPS did, since it was more important in the latter case to do so.

Table 1.2. Comparison between the CAS 2005 and the CAPS 2002 regarding distributions of household income by race

Household Income (R per month)	Black %		Coloured %		White %		Total %	
	CAS 2005	CAPS 2002	CAS 2005	CAPS 2002	CAS 2005	CAPS 2002	CAS 2005	CAPS 2002
0 - 1000	34	33	15	9	2	3	20	15
1001 - 3000	42	47	26	34	5	7	28	32
3001 - 5000	19	12	27	25	21	9	23	17
5001 - 10000	4	6	26	23	33	27	19	19
More than 10000	1	2	7	9	39	54	11	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The above table 1.2 is a rough depiction of social mobility in Cape Town between 2002 and 2005. It is rough or approximate because these two data-sets are cross-sections using different samples and with different designs of their weights. If one compares the number of households positioned in each of the above respective cells (percentage households in each household income category by race), a rough similarity is evident, and consequently, the respondent sample of the CAS 2005 can be seen to be reasonably representative of Cape Town.

Income Level of Respondents according to Household Income

For the purposes of facilitating analysis of possible connections between attitude to race and economic well-being[55], the first measure of economic wellbeing – household income – will be divided into three groups, called income levels, namely: 1) lower 2)

middle and 3) upper income levels. The lower income level includes all respondents with a monthly household income of between 0 and 3000 rands, the middle category ranges between 3001 and 10 000 rands, while the upper category comprises income of above R 10 000.



Figure 1.6. Income level distribution of respondents, by race and total sample
Note: 1 = 'lower', 2 = 'middle', and 3 = 'upper'

Overall, figure 1.6 above shows that the majority of the sample is positioned in the lower income-level (48%), while a smaller but significant proportion is in the middle income-level bracket (41%). Only a small proportion (11%) show evidence of upper income-level household incomes. From figure 1.6 above, the household income of black respondents is by a clear majority positioned in the lower income level, and similarly in figure 1.7 below, the lower income-level category as a whole is shown to be dominated by black respondents. Amongst the coloured sub-sample, figure 1.6 above shows more of a balance between middle and lower income-levels, albeit with the scales tipped more towards middle income-levels. When viewing the middle-income category as a whole in figure 1.7 below, coloured respondents plainly dominate the category, with small, almost equally sized proportions of the black and white sub-samples sharing the rest of the category. A considerable amount of respondents in the white sub-sample are positioned in the middle income-level, with a significant number in the upper income-level. Figure 1.7 below, however, demonstrates clearly that the upper income-level category is a predominantly white one, with a minor coloured contingent present[56]. A striking detail in figure 1.6 is that

although the data shows a clear relationship between race and income, it is also evident that the members of each racial sub-sample span at least two if not three of the income categories. This enables an exploration of a possible relationship within racial groups between income and attitudes, as is conducted in chapter 2.



Figure 1.7. Income level distribution of respondents by race
Note: 1 = 'lower', 2 = 'middle', and 3 = 'upper'

Living Conditions

The second measure of economic well-being is living conditions, and toward this purpose, a living conditions index (LCI) has been created.

Structure and Scoring System of the Living Conditions Index

Due to the amount of detail and variation included in the CAS 2005 questionnaire, the CAS 2005 data contains a great deal of texture in terms of living conditions indicators. For this reason, I have to a large extent created a LCI unique to this data, based partly on broadly related previous indices[57], but also using practical creativity and common logic in order to maximise the degree of texture that it is able to measure.

The LCI is comprised of three sub-indexes, namely 1) condition of abode, 2) living conditions in environment surrounding abode, and 3) safety / security issues in house and neighbourhood/ward[58]. Suffice it to say that the overall scoring system for the LCI functions by means of a point system. Thus, the category 'poor' has a corresponding numerical value of 1 point, while the category 'average' earns 2 points, and lastly the 'good' category is awarded 3 points.

The questions upon which the respective LC (Living Conditions) sub-index sub-variables are based will have their response sets / answers formulated according to the LCI scoring system (details of each of these respective formulation processes will be provided in the respective description of each sub-variable). Then, by aggregating the point value on each of these in all three of the LC sub-indexes, a total score will be extracted for each respondent. This total will then be divided by the total number of LCI items or variables, giving each respondent a measure of whether their living conditions are poor, average or good (or whether they have a final score of 1, 2 or 3).

Living Conditions Abode Sub-Index



Figure 1.8. Distribution of LC abode sub-index amongst respondents by race and gender
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

Figure 1.8 above shows that the aggregate LC abode SI (sub-index) for the total sample consists of two almost equal proportions living in either 'poor' or 'average' conditions, and a quarter of the sample in 'good' conditions. In comparison, the respective race totals show that it is the black and white sub-samples that differ dramatically from the sample aggregate, with black respondents veering largely towards 'poor' living conditions, and whites leaning largely in the direction of 'good' living conditions. Although the majority of coloured respondents' score was 'average' (44%), a smaller but significant proportion of that sub-sample nonetheless is shown to experience 'poor' living conditions when it comes to their house (37% on average). Despite this, they show a higher likelihood of pushing up into the 'good' category than black respondents (even though there are relatively few such cases). The picture for white respondents in the abode sub-index is a stark contrast to either coloured or black respondents, in that a clear majority of them show 'good' abode conditions (about 64% on average), with about half as many living in 'average' house conditions. In contrast to black and coloured respondents, the numbers of whites living in an abode of 'poor' condition are negligible, and are a seeming inverse of the numbers of black respondents whose abode conditions can be considered 'good' - which are

minimal. When this picture is further disaggregated by gender, it becomes clear that, on average, black women show the poorest conditions when it comes to the abode in which they live. A large majority of black women (73%) live in a house that is of poor quality, with black men following behind this as the second-worst off in the context of their abode conditions (59% featuring in the 'poor' category).

Living Conditions Surroundings Sub-Index



Figure 1.9. Distribution of the LC surroundings sub-index by race and gender
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

The overall distribution of the LC surroundings sub-index in figure 1.9 indicates that, across the board, living conditions connected to a respondent's surroundings are clearly of a higher standard in general, when compared with the condition of the actual dwelling in which they live. That said, however, sizeable differences surface once the distribution is broken down by race. Black respondents appear to experience poor surroundings to the largest degree proportionately, while whites depict the opposite pattern, showing an extremely high level of 'good' surroundings. A negligible number of white or coloured respondents live in 'poor' surroundings. The coloured sub-sample live for the main part in 'average' surroundings, with a substantial proportion living in 'good' surroundings. Black women are still most likely out of any sub-sample to experience surroundings conditions that are 'poor', with black men following not too far behind. Despite this, the majority of the black

sub-sample experience 'average' conditions in terms of their surroundings, although black men show a greater likelihood of this than black women.

Living Conditions Security Sub-Index



Figure 1.10. Distribution of the LC security sub-index by race and gender
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

The most striking fact about the above distribution of the LC security sub-index as represented in figure 1.10 is that not one sub-sample showed a majority of respondents who felt that security conditions in their lives were 'good'. Either this means that security levels have been underestimated by certain respondents in the face perhaps of a soaring crime rate and the fear / anxiety generated around that, or it means that, precisely because of unmanageable levels of crime in the city, including an extremely high rape and murder level, any one person feeling that their security situation is 'good' has become close to an impossibility, or may at the least be considered ignorant in some way. Differences between both race and gender are far less pronounced in the case of the security sub-index than in other sub-indexes depicted above. Nonetheless, a higher proportion of black respondents than coloured respondents rate their security conditions as average, and in turn a larger majority of coloured people rate security conditions as average than amongst the white respondents. The minorities of respondents amongst the sub-samples who do rate security as 'good', as ordered from lowest to highest numbers of respondents, are

correspondingly black, coloured and white. Thus there is evidence that white respondents have the highest levels of security in their living conditions compared to the other two races. Significant gender differences are present in the black sub-sample, where black women appear more likely to consider their security situation as 'poor' than black men, and less likely to consider it 'average'.

Combined Living Conditions Index

The final or combined LCI is comprised of a combination of all the three sub-indexes depicted above. Distributions of the entire sample, by race, as well as by race and gender are provided below.



Figure 1.11. Distribution of the LC combined index by race
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

The distribution of the LC combined index for the total respondent sample, as depicted in figure 1.12 below portrays a substantial majority of the sample existing in 'average' living conditions, with two far smaller, almost equally sized proportions experiencing either 'poor' or 'good' living conditions. This composition changes quite drastically, however, when broken down race. Each of the three categories of the combined LCI, namely 'poor', 'average' and 'good' living conditions, are shown in figure 1.11 above to be dominated by one race group. The depiction is a clear

example of inequality in South Africa, and shows how stratification in Cape Town continues to be shaped along the lines of race. Black respondents make up a full 73% of the category of 'poor' living conditions, while 55% of the 'average' category comprises coloured respondents, and lastly, a hefty 71% of the 'good' category consists of white respondents. Conversely, although 28% of black respondents live in 'average' conditions, this sub-sample shows almost no likelihood of experiencing 'good' LC, suggesting that significant upward socio-economic mobility may be an unlikely occurrence amongst black respondents. On the other hand, although a minority of white respondents experience 'average' living conditions, this sub-sample is practically absent from the 'poor' LC category, which may point to downward socio-economic mobility for whites being an improbable scenario. Coloured respondents feature as small but significant minorities in both the 'poor' and 'good' categories (26% in each case), making this the only racial sub-sample that demonstrates potential for both downward and upward mobility from the 'average' position.

From a within-race perspective, although the black sub-sample dominates the 'poor' LC category overall (as shown in figure 1.11 above), it is shown in figure 1.12 below that there are similarly sized proportions within it that experience either 'average' or 'poor' living conditions, with the former category being the predominant one (57% as opposed to 41% in the latter category). This points to relatively low levels of intra-racial inequality as measured by living conditions amongst black respondents. However, the fact that they are living under almost equally 'poor' or 'average' conditions clearly does not make for a wholly desirable form of 'equality'. Thus, lower levels of inequality do not necessarily imply a positive set of circumstances; it depends entirely on which side of the distribution the sample is skewed towards – 'poor' or 'good' respectively. The coloured sub-sample demonstrates noticeably the highest levels of intra-racial inequality of all the racial groups in this context. Whilst 80% experience an 'average' set of LC, 11% fall into the 'poor' category. 'Good' LC are enjoyed by a meagre 9% of coloured respondents. In terms of levels of intra-racial inequality, white respondents depict a near inverse of the afore-mentioned black sub-sample scenario. Practically equal proportions of the white sub-sample are shown to live either in 'average' conditions (50%), or 'good' living conditions (49%).



Figure 1.12. Distribution of the LC combined index by race and gender
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

When viewing the LCI as a combined summation of all the afore-described sub-indexes, discernible gender differences emerge across and within all race groups as depicted in figure 1.12 above. Thus, aside from the super-operation of a racial hierarchy of LC as described above with reference to figures 1.11 and 1.12, within each racial sub-sample a hierarchy of men over women is observable, with men generally enjoying higher living conditions than women. A greater number of black women experience 'poor' LC (47%) than black men (34%), as do coloured women (14%) in relation to coloured men (7%). Thus, although coloured women may hold an advantage over black women in this category by being less likely to experience 'poor' LC, each of these groups of women are at a gendered disadvantage within their 'community' or 'neighbourhood'. The 'average' LC category, being one step up from 'poor' LC, shows black and coloured women again at a disadvantage compared to their respective male counterparts, except this time it is through a show of smaller, rather than greater, numbers of respondents. In other words, more black men (65% of that sub-sample) experience 'average' LC than black women (51%). Similarly, 77% of coloured women experience 'average' LC, while 85% of Coloured men do. Although white respondents only feature significantly in the 'average' and 'good' categories, gender differences are viewable in this sub-sample too. More white men

than women enjoy good LC, while more white women than men experience 'average' LC.

The line graph in figure 1.13 below with its decimal detail shows the distinct relief of living conditions in Cape Town, with well-marked stratification along the lines of race and gender.



Figure 1.13. Distribution of the LC combined index by race and gender
Note: 1 = 'poor', 2 = 'average', and 3 = 'good'

The correlation coefficients of income level, the LCI Combined Index, the LC Surroundings SI, and the LC Security SI are depicted in table 1.3 below. The LCI is correlated with income level in order to establish that they are not complete proxies for one another, but serve different purposes as measures of economic well being. The resultant correlation coefficient of .408, significant at the 1% level, tells us that these two measures are almost halfway between having no correlation at all, and being perfectly correlated. This makes intuitive sense, since each of these two variables clearly exerts some degree of influence on the other, although it could be suggested that, ultimately, income level is more of a determinant of living conditions than vice versa. For this reason, it is obvious that they will correlate to a degree, rather than be completely unrelated to one another, and that this correlation will be in a positive direction. In other words, as income level increases, so living conditions are likely to improve.

Income level and the LC surroundings SI are similarly shown to be somewhat related, while retaining a reasonable measure of independence from one another as variables. In other words, income is not the sole determinant of the kind of environment one lives in, but as income level increases, so the environment you live in is likely to be of a higher standard. The LC security and surroundings sub-indexes are shown to have a correlation coefficient of .308 – a figure that comes close to no correlation at all. This lends support to the fact that the combined LCI is made up of unique and independent elements that measure different factors in a respondent's living circumstance. It does, however, suggest that, as one's surroundings improve, so security levels are likely to increase somewhat. Of all the correlations below, the lowest coefficient is for that between income level and the LC security SI (.210), which demonstrates that income and security are by and large separate issues amongst the CAS 2005 respondents. This lends support to the fact that they are measured separately in this research, but nonetheless shows that as income increases, a respondent's level of security is likely to increase, but only minimally.

Table 1.3 Correlation of income level, the LCI Combined Index, LC Surroundings SI, and LC Security SI

Measure of Correlation / Association using Kendall's tau-b		
Independent Variables	Income Level by Household Income	LC Surroundings SI
LCI Combined Index	.405*** (*n*=936)	
LC Surroundings SI	.418*** (*n*=936)	
LC Security SI	.210*** (*n*=936)	.308*** (*n*=1192)

Notes: 1) * Significant at the 10% level. 2) ** Significant at the 5% level. 3) *** Significant at the 1% level. 4) 'LCI Combined Index refers to the Combined Living Conditions Index. 5) 'LC Surroundings SI' refers to the Living Conditions Surroundings Sub-Index. 6) 'LC Security SI' refers to the Living Conditions Security Sub-Index.

Conclusion

The formations of inequality in terms of economic well-being in Cape Town amongst the respondents of the CAS 2005, as depicted in chapter one by measures such as employment/unemployment rates, distribution of individual and household income, and a variety of living conditions indicators, certainly seem to conform to what appears as a deeply etched, at times rigid pattern of stratification along the lines of race, and to a lesser degree, along those of gender. This all too familiar syndrome of a South African racial hierarchy when it comes to wages, material comfort and quality of life does, however, show signs of change, in the form of rising intra-racial as opposed to inter-racial inequality. However, the degree to which micro / individual level gender differences according to, for example, income and standard of living, contribute to intra-racial inequality, and the degree to which meso-level, community / neighbourhood factors contribute, is difficult to tease out without further, extremely detailed data work that unpacks intra-household, gendered dynamics thoroughly, and may also necessitate a comprehensive investigation of occupational structure in terms of both race and gender.

Chapter 2

Attitudes to Race in Cape Town

The purpose of chapter 2 is to describe attitudes to race[59] in Cape Town according to the CAS 2005 respondent sample. More specifically, levels of amenability to racial integration will be investigated from a largely attitudinal, and partly behavioural, point of view. Toward this purpose, an 'Amenability to Racial Integration Index' (ARII) has been created by the author, which consists of indicators of / proxies for amenability to racial integration.

Attitude to Race Indicators

Apart from the overall enquiry of this research, namely, correlation between the ARII and two measures of economic well-being as outlined in the introduction, the ARII will itself be examined in relation to other, broader 'attitude to race' (AR) indicators. These indicators should be considered solely to do with attitudes to race, rather than as integral to the ARII. Thus the AR indicators will not form part of the core selection of data under analysis, but rather will be used firstly as framing elements in the research, and secondly as a means of modifying / qualifying certain ARII variables.

Racial Classification

The CAS 2005 questionnaire consisted of a number of questions that tested popular forms of racial classification[60]. Although the previous apartheid classification (F.5) is posed in the CAS 2005 as something from the past, many surveys, including the census, still employ the same racial categories when requesting respondents / citizens to racially categorise themselves. Therefore the manner in which the South African state racially classifies its citizens has not undergone massive change since the onset of the new dispensation[61]. Thus, the F.5 racial classification of the CAS 2005 will certainly be referred to in this paper as a previous apartheid classification, however, keeping in mind that as a state-sanctioned classification system, it is still largely operational.

Seekings et al. point out that the level of consistency is high between respondents' self-identification[62] and how they perceive other people to see them. It is also noted that there are almost no cases of complete disjunctures between any of the different dimensions of racial identity (2005:30). For example, "90 percent of respondents who consider themselves 'African' (and a higher percentage of those who consider themselves 'black') are regarded by other people as African or black (or both, given that this question allowed multiple responses, for example 'African' and 'black')" (2005:30-31). An example of the small minority of people who do differ between the various racial dimensions, as pointed out by Seekings et al., is that "one in ten respondents classified as 'coloured' under apartheid do not see themselves as white, black, African or coloured" (2005:30).

Crucially, what Seekings et al. (2005) found is that most of the CAS 2005 respondents are comfortable with racial classification as a process. The question F.5 racial classification (or previous apartheid classification as described above) has been chosen as the primary classification of race to be used in this research on the CAS 2005 data. It was selected for the sake of simplicity in terms of data analysis, given the low number of respondents that made use of the 'other' category on this question[63]. Justification for using F.5 lies in the fact that, as mentioned above, there is a high level of consistency between it and the other types of racial classification, as well as the fact that its categories still predominate in South African census officialdom today[64].

Amenability to Racial Integration Index

In order to enable the overall analysis of the relationship between the dependent variable in this research, namely, attitude to race (with a specific focus on amenability to racial integration), on the one hand, and the main independent variable, namely, economic well-being (measured by household income and living conditions), on the other hand, a composite index representing the dependent variable has been created, namely, the Amenability to Racial Integration Index (ARII). The ARII consists of 5 variables that are thought to either indicate, or act as a proxy for amenability to racial integration. These variables correspond with racial attitude question items in modules

F and D of the CAS 2005 questionnaire, entitled 'Race and Culture' and 'Civil Society' respectively. They span issues of inter-racial trust and ease, social life, and intimate relationships. With regard to the distribution of attitudes to race according to the ARII amongst the CAS 2005 respondents, it will be critical to ascertain whether it shows homogeneity or cleavages. In the latter case, along what lines do those cleavages run?

The ARII consists of the following 5 variables[65]:

1) Level of inter-racial trust
2) Level of inter-racial ease
3) Amenability to inter-racial friendship
4) Amenability to familial inter-racial marriage

    a) Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a coloured person by member of family
    b) Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a black/African person by member of family
    c) Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a white person by member of family
    d) Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a Indian person by member of family

5) Degree of racially integrated activity in respondent's social life

The above 5 components can be divided into two groups, with numbers 1 to 4 above being concerned with respondents' attitudes around certain aspects of racial integration, while number 5 is concerned with actual levels of racially integrated activity in certain aspects of the respondents' life. In other words, the ARII sets out to measure the level of amenability to racial integration in respondents firstly in an affective sense, and secondly in a behavioural sense[66].

Scoring System for the ARII

The scoring system of the ARII is constructed so that the higher the level or degree of inter-racial trust, inter-racial ease, amenability to inter-racial friendship, approval of inter-racial spousal partnerships, or racially integrated activity in respondent's life that an individual respondent shows, the higher the respondent's respective ARII score will be. Most of the questions that form the basis of the ARII variables are formulated according to a Likert response scale. Depending on the respective question, the number of response options along that scale spans between two and five. For the purposes of standardising the ARII, in a similar manner to how the living conditions index (LCI) in chapter 1 was standardised, the distribution of responses for each of the above-mentioned variables will be adapted to fit a three-point scale. This scale will consist of three possible values, with the following accompanying meanings / labels: 1) disinclined to racial integration, 2) evasive of racial integration, and 3) amenable to racial integration. This adaptation of each variable response scale to fit the ARII scale will be explained in detail with regard to each variable individually below in the section entitled "Distribution of Attitudes to Race according to the ARII".

In order to arrive at a final ARI Combined Index score, the ARII sub-scores for each variable above are aggregated, and then divided by the total number of ARII variables, which gives rise to a simple mean. This mean score of all the variables combined is what comprises a respondent's final ARI Combined Index score[67]. These final scores are rounded off in a conventional mathematical manner (i.e. any value above the .5 mark gets rounded up to the next whole number, while any value below the .5 mark gets rounded down to the next whole number, or to zero).

Whereas the reasoning behind labelling the ARII values '1' and '3' as 'disinclined' and 'amenable' respectively is fairly straightforward and obvious, the reasoning leading to the ARII value '2' being labelled 'evasive' is not as clear-cut. Typically, in any Likert response scale, there is a 'middle' category, which is often labelled/interpreted as holding a 'neutral' or 'indifferent' position, surrounded by other, more extreme opinions / attitudes in either direction (for example, negative and positive). In the case of the questions chosen for the purposes of the ARII, however,

to claim that the value '2' represented 'neutrality' would clearly be misinformed, since it is in effect made up of various statements or attitudes, none of which could be said to be 'neutral'. For example, with respect to the ARII 'inter-racial trust' variable (variable 1), where the question (D11.5) asks the respondent to say how many people from other racial groups can be trusted, the 'middle' category represents the response 'don't know enough about them to say'. With respect to the question upon which the 'level of inter-racial ease' variable is based, the respondent is asked to express agreement or disagreement with the statement:

You do *not* feel comfortable around people who are not ... [respondent's racial self-classification].

The 'middle' category in these cases corresponds with the response 'uncertain'. Another example of one such 'middle' category from module F, or the 'Race and Culture' module, regards the ARI 'inter-marriage' variable, and consists of the statement 'race is irrelevant'.

All of the above 'middle' category responses, I would suggest, represent an evasion of the issue at hand (namely, race relations / racial integration), rather than neutrality or indifference. When it comes to issues around race, particularly in a country such as South Africa with its history of apartheid, the existence of 'neutrality', 'indifference', or even 'uncertainty' with regard to race, could be said to be impossible. It is clear that in South Africa, race counts. It does so in multiple spheres of life and different settings – the description of income levels and living conditions in chapter 1 alone attest to this. Thus, for any respondent to claim that race is 'irrelevant' will in the case of this research be construed as an unwillingness to offer their 'true' opinion / attitude – whether this is a conscious or sub-conscious one. Even given the fact that 'class' or culture, say, may influence inter-racial interactions to a large degree as well, perceptions and reactions are nonetheless likely to be qualified by race in conjunction. It is hardly considered 'acceptable' in the South Africa ten years after the advent of our 'non-racial' democracy to express an opinion or attitude that amounts to racism of any kind. According to our constitution, it is illegal to discriminate against any person on the grounds of race (as well as other traits such as gender, disability, etc), apart from the instance of preferential treatment due to affirmative action. In terms of a

dominant moral code / discourse, you would not be considered a model, let alone 'good' or 'hip' South African citizen were you to express racist opinions. Thus, even though any one respondent may be aware that the survey results are strictly confidential in terms of individual identity, social desirability bias is likely to be operating to a large degree in responses to questions that directly address race issues[68].

Distribution of Attitudes to Race according to the ARII

ARII Inter-Racial Trust Variable and Attitude to Race (AR) Intra-Racial Trust Indicator

I would suggest that one possible element of amenability to racial integration is a reasonable level of trust of people from race groups other than one's own. Thus, for the purposes of this research, it will be presumed that a reasonable or high level of inter-racial trust serves as an indication of / proxy for amenability to racial integration, whereas a low or non-existent level of inter-racial trust signals a disinclination towards racial integration. Levels of intra-racial trust will be looked at in addition to this, specifically for the purposes of acting as a kind of yardstick by which to judge inter-racial trust levels by. The latter is thus an 'attitude to race' (AR) indicator, the criteria of which were outlined above.

The ARII inter-racial trust variable and the AR intra-racial trust indicator are based upon two questions from module D of the CAS 2005 (entitled "Civil Society"), namely, D.11.5 and D.11.4 respectively. In these questions, the respondent is asked:

Now, I want to ask you how much you trust different types of people. I am going to read a list of different groups of people. How many people in each of these categories can be trusted, in your opinion?

In the case of the of the ARII inter-racial trust variable, the category concerned is 'people from other racial groups'; and in that of the intra-racial trust variable, the category reads as 'people from your racial group'. Respondents were asked to answer using a scale of 1 to 5, which has in turn been scaled down to a three-point scale in

the case of the ARII inter-racial trust variable, where the ARII respondent scores on this variable represent the following responses: 1 (disinclined) = 'None/Almost none of them can be trusted' OR 'Very few of them can be trusted'; 2 (evasive) = 'I don't know enough about them to say'; 3 (amenable) = 'Some of them can be trusted' OR 'Most of them can be trusted'. In the case of the AR intra-racial trust variable, it is not formatted to fit the ARII, since clearly how one feels about members of your own racial group cannot be connected to one's amenability to racial integration, certainly not from an empirical point of view. Rather, this variable is brought in as a supplement to the ARII, but is still adapted to fit a three-point scale in its own right. This sequence runs as: 1 (distrustful) = 'None/Almost none of them can be trusted' OR 'Very few of them can be trusted'; 2 (evasive) = 'I don't know enough about them to say'; 3 (trustful) = 'Some of them can be trusted' OR 'Most of them can be trusted'[69].



Figure 2.1. Distributions of the ARII inter-racial trust variable, and the AR intra-racial trust indicator (all respondents)

Note: For the ARII inter-racial trust variable (to the left-hand-side of the x-axis), red = 'disinclined', yellow = 'evasive', and blue = 'amenable'

For the AR intra-racial trust indicator ((to the right-hand-side of the x-axis), red = 'trustful', yellow = 'evasive', and blue = 'distrustful'

Codes for numbers along the bottom of the x-axis: 1 = 'None/Almost none of them can be trusted', 2='Very few of them can be trusted', 3 = 'I don't know enough about them to say', 4= 'Some of them can be trusted', 5= 'Most of them can be trusted'

Figure 2.1 above contains the overall distributions of the ARII inter-racial trust variable and the AR intra-racial trust indicator before the original 5-point scale of each respective question (as outlined above) has been converted into a 3-point scale, the latter of which is shown instead by means of colour coding. This figure shows a majority of the overall respondent sample to be amenable to racial integration, however this majority is not an overwhelming one (52%). According to the AR intra-racial trust indicator, the proportion of respondents who are distrustful of people from their own race group is similar to the 'disinclined' level shown in the case of the ARII inter-racial trust sub-index, whereas the amount of 'evasive' responses is less than half of the latter (and as can be seen from figure 2.2 below, in the case of black respondents it is less by a third of the latter). This perhaps points to a higher degree of ease with responding to questions about one's own race group than those concerning race groups other than one's own; this is not a surprising finding. Significantly, levels of trustfulness are higher in the case of intra as opposed to inter-racial trust by 14%.



Figure 2.2. Distributions of the ARII inter-racial trust variable, and the AR intra-racial trust indicator, by race

Note: For the ARII inter-racial trust variable (to the left-hand-side of the x-axis), red = 'disinclined', yellow = 'evasive', and blue = 'amenable'

For the AR intra-racial trust indicator ((to the right-hand-side of the x-axis), red = 'trustful', yellow = 'evasive', and blue = 'distrustful'

By race, whilst coloured and black respondents show almost equal levels of disinclination to racial integration (about a third of each respective sub-sample), white respondents show the lowest levels in this respect (10%). Evasiveness of the issue of inter-racial trust appears ordered from highest to lowest levels starting with black respondents, then coloured, and lastly white. Levels of amenability to racial integration, on the other hand, slant in the opposite direction. When this distribution is disaggregated by gender, there are very few apparent differences. The first notable one is that, whereas 8% of white women were evasive on the issue, 17% of white men were. Secondly, all women show slightly higher levels of amenability to men; this is most pronounced in the case of the white sub-sample. Whereas 72% of white men were shown to be amenable to racial integration, 81% of white women were[70].

From figure 2.2 above, it is clear that the gap between intra as opposed to inter-racial trust is largest amongst black respondents, who are more likely to exhibit intra as opposed to inter-racial trust by 24 percentage points. Coloured respondents are more inclined in this respect by 10 percentage points, while white respondents are more likely to show intra rather than inter-racial trust by 7 percentage points only. Gender differences with regard to the AR intra-racial trust indicator are not very pronounced. Black women are shown to be slightly more likely to be distrustful of members of their own race group than Black men. Also, there is a higher level in general amongst female respondents of evasiveness on the issue than men, this difference being most pronounced between black women and men. Lastly, white women show slightly higher levels of intra-racial trust than white men.

From a between-race point of view, the above findings together lend support to hypothesis 2, as set out in the introduction, which theorises that respondents who are positioned in the lower income levels, and who experience poorer living conditions, are less likely to show amenability to racial integration, than those earning incomes in either the middle or higher brackets, and who experience average or good living conditions. Levels of amenability to racial integration according to the ARII inter-racial trust sub-index are ranked precisely in the order that the afore-mentioned hypothesis would have predicted, in other words, the lowest levels in this respect are tallied with those who, on average, firstly live in households with the lowest incomes, and secondly experience the poorest living conditions (the black sub-sample); the

middle-range levels correspond with those respondents who, on average, live in households positioned within the middle income levels, and who experience 'average' living conditions (the coloured sub-sample); while the highest levels correlate with those respondents whose household income levels are high, and who enjoy 'good' living conditions on average (the white sub-sample).

ARII Inter-Racial Ease Variable and ARII Amenability to Inter-Racial Friendship

The ARII inter-racial ease and ARII amenability to inter-racial friendship variables will be dealt with together since they are so similar in format as well as response distribution. These two ARII variables are based upon questions F.8 and F.9 respectively from the CAS 2005 questionnaire, which can be found in module F, entitled "Race and Culture".

In the afore-mentioned question F.8, the respondent is asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement:

You do *not* feel comfortable around people who are not ... [respondent's racial self-classification]

Question F.9, on the other hand, offers the following statement for agreement/disagreement:

You cannot imagine ever being friends with someone who is not ... [respondent's racial self-classification]

The response options for these questions consist of 'yes, agree', 'uncertain', and 'no, disagree'. They have been adapted to the ARII by assigning the first of these response options a score of '1' (disinclined), the second answer a '2' (evasive) and the third answer, a '3' (amenable).



Figure 2.3. Distribution ARII Inter-Racial Ease Variable, and ARII Amenability to Inter-Racial Friendship Variable, by race, and sample totals

Note: Red (1) = 'disinclined', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'amenable'

Figure 2.3 above shows that an overwhelming majority of all respondents seem to be amenable to racial integration according to both the measures of inter-racial ease and amenability to inter-racial friendship. Although amenability levels in both of these cases are greater overall as compared with the ARII inter-racial trust variable, the pattern of amenability levels is nonetheless similarly graded from a between-race perspective from lowest to highest as related to those respondents associated, on average, with the lowest to highest household income levels, and the poorest to good living conditions. This order, therefore, depicts the black sub-sample with the lowest amenability levels, coloured respondents with the middle level amenability levels, and the white sub-sample showing the highest amenability levels respectively for both ARII variables depicted in figure 2.3 above. Disinclination levels run correspondingly in the opposite formation, again in the case of both variables.

By race, however, the level of evasiveness is far higher amongst black sub-sample than either of the other two racial sub-samples. Also, the black sub-sample is 9% less likely to show amenability to racial integration with regard to inter-racial friendship as opposed to inter-racial ease, whereas coloured respondents are 8% more likely to do so in this respect. The latter difference could be attributed to key words in the respective questions. In question F.8, the statement contains the phrase 'do not feel

Lastly, looking at both ARII variables in this section, white respondents show the highest level of refusals of the entire sample, namely, 6% on inter-racial ease and 9% on level of amenability to inter-racial friendship, as opposed to 1% for the other two racial sub-samples. Given the context of the legacy of apartheid, which would logically sit heavier on the conscience of white people in South Africa relative to other race groups (clearly because of white privilege during apartheid at the expense of disadvantage for other race groups, most notably blacks), the results for this question may be especially vulnerable to desirability bias.

ARII Inter-Racial Marriage Variables (4 a-d below) and AR Intra-Racial Marriage Indicators

a) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a coloured person by member of family**
b) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a black/African person by member of family**
c) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a white person by member of family**
d) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a Indian person by member of family**

comfortable being around', which could be seen as a relatively direct experience to ask about, one which involves some kind of encounter between the respondent and a racial 'other'. Question F.9, on the other hand, contains the phrase 'cannot imagine ever being friends', which could be viewed as a more abstract question. Also, agreement with the latter statement implies a harsher form of disinclination to racial integration, in that it shows unwillingness to self-initiate a meaningful and lasting connection with someone from a racial group other than one's own. Agreement with the first statement, on the other hand, simply implies a level of comfort in situations that could possibly be beyond the respondent's direct control, such as standing in the queue at a supermarket, interacting with colleagues in their work environment, and so forth.

According to the above findings, black respondents are slightly more comfortable with involuntary inter-racial interaction, or are quicker to resign themselves to simply

comfortable being around', which could be seen as a relatively direct experience to ask about, one which involves some kind of encounter between the respondent and a racial 'other'. Question F.9, on the other hand, contains the phrase 'cannot imagine ever being friends', which could be viewed as a more abstract question. Also, agreement with the latter statement implies a harsher form of disinclination to racial integration, in that it shows unwillingness to self-initiate a meaningful and lasting connection with someone from a racial group other than one's own. Agreement with the first statement, on the other hand, simply implies a level of comfort in situations that could possibly be beyond the respondent's direct control, such as standing in the queue at a supermarket, interacting with colleagues in their work environment, and so forth.

According to the above findings, black respondents are slightly more comfortable with involuntary inter-racial interaction, or are quicker to resign themselves to simply being unobjectionable in those situations. Coloured respondents, however, seem slightly more amenable to voluntary, rather than unavoidable, interaction. This could possibly mean that, if allowed to choose friends from a particular race group, coloured respondents are willing to forge those ties. However, when that choice is removed from the picture, they are not as comfortable to bridge the race gap in any consequential manner. Therefore, black and coloured respondents both make a distinction between simply associating with someone of another race group either in passing or out of necessity, and actually embarking on a friendship with someone not of your race. Thus (logically) moving between the former and latter comprises a jump of sorts, according to these two sub-samples.

When the above results are disaggregated by gender for the ARII inter-racial ease variable, there are only slight differences worth noting[71]. Black women show somewhat higher levels of disinclination, and slightly lower levels of evasiveness as opposed to black men. Coloured women show slightly higher levels of disinclination, and somewhat lower levels of amenability than in the case of coloured men. A very similar pattern is revealed when the ARII amenability to inter-racial friendship variable is broken down by gender.

Lastly, looking at both ARII variables in this section, white respondents show the highest level of refusals of the entire sample, namely, 6% on inter-racial ease and 9% on level of amenability to inter-racial friendship, as opposed to 1% for the other two racial sub-samples. Given the context of the legacy of apartheid, which would logically sit heavier on the conscience of white people in South Africa relative to other race groups (clearly because of white privilege during apartheid at the expense of disadvantage for other race groups, most notably blacks), the results for this question may be especially vulnerable to desirability bias.

ARII Inter-Racial Marriage Variables (4 a-d below) and AR Intra-Racial Marriage Indicators

a) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a coloured person by member of family**
b) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a black/African person by member of family**
c) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a white person by member of family**
d) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a Indian person by member of family**

The ARII Inter-Racial Marriage Variables (variables 4 a-d as listed above) cover the level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial spousal partnerships amongst the CAS 2005 respondents, and is based on questions F.15-18 from module F ('Race and Culture' module) of that respective questionnaire. The interviewer was required to pose the questions preceded by the following run-up:

There is a lot of discussion nowadays about how people of different races and cultures are interacting. Can you tell us whether you would approve or disapprove of the following situations?

The following four scenarios followed this:

F.15 A member of your family married a Coloured person

F.16 A member of your family married a White person

F.17 A member of your family married a Black/African person

F.18 A member of your family married an Indian person

The response options provided were[72]:

1. Approve a lot	2. Approve a little	3. Disapprove a little	4. Disapprove a lot	5. Race is irrelevant

The scoring for each of the ARII inter-marriage variables was adapted by scaling the above five-point Likert scale down to a three-point one, as follows: 1 (disinclined) = 'Disapprove a little' OR 'Disapprove a lot'; 2 (evasive) = 'Race is irrelevant'; 3 (amenable) = 'Approve a lot' OR 'Approve a little'. It is important to note that each of the ARII inter-marriage variables does not include the race group asked about in the respective question. This is because responses to do with marriage to members of the respondent's own race group are clearly concerned with attitudes around intra, rather than inter-racial marriage, and it would therefore be inappropriate to incorporate them into the ARII. They are incorporated, however, as the AR intra-racial marriage indicators, as a reference point with which to compare ARII inter-racial marriage responses.



Figure 2.4. Distribution of the ARII inter-racial marriage variables, and AR intra-racial marriage indicators, by race

Note: Red (1) = 'disinclined', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'amenable', except in the case of the AR intra-racial marriage indicators, where Red (1) = 'disapprove', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'approve'

Key to X-Axis Labels: 'Intra-_ _ _' refers to level of approval/disapproval of intra-racial marriage of a family member (the AR intra-racial marriage indicators). All other labels refer to level of amenability/disinclination to inter-racial marriage. For example, 'Black-Coloured' refers to the black sub-sample's level of amenability/disinclination to inter-racial marriage of a family member to a coloured person, and so forth.

It is shown in figure 2.4 above that of all the racial sub-samples, the black sub-sample stands out as showing marked discernment between specific race groups when it comes to levels of approval / disapproval towards inter-racial familial marriage. Variability of these levels for the coloured and white sub-samples, on the other hand, is not as pronounced[73].

In terms of the distribution of intra-racial marriage approval / disapproval levels as depicted in figure 2.4 above, coloured respondents are clearly far more approving of intra-racial, rather than inter-racial, marriage of family members. They show a 68% approval rate for intra-racial marriage as opposed to an average approval/amenability rate of 52% regarding inter-racial marriage overall. Having said that, however, this is in fact the smallest such gap (16%) amongst all the racial sub-samples. Coloured, as well as white, respondents each show a fairly constant level of evasiveness with

regard to issues of inter-racial marriage throughout questions F.15 to F.18, with an average level of 36% and 51% respectively. When it comes to intra-racial marriage, white levels of evasiveness remain almost identical, while coloured levels decrease slightly to 30%. White respondents are also clearly more approving of intra, rather than inter-racial familial marriages; they jump from an average inter-racial marriage amenability level of 19% to an intra-racial marriage approval level of 50% - an increase of 31%. Black respondents contrast white and coloured ones in that their levels of evasiveness drop sharply between familial inter and intra-racial marriage from 19% to 6% - a decrease of 13%. Furthermore, their approval level for intra-racial marriage is a hefty 92% - up 55% from their average 37% amenability level to inter-racial marriage. This jump is the highest of all the race groups. Ordered from highest to lowest, disinclination levels with respect to familial inter-racial marriage spanned an average of 44% amongst black respondents, to 30% amongst white respondents, and lastly 12% in the coloured sub-sample. The difference between these and disapproval levels for intra-racial marriage are clearly considerable across all race groups, with the latter being much lower in all cases. There are no significant gender differences to be found in the distribution levels of approval / disapproval for intra-racial marriage.

To sum up the results of the ARII inter-racial marriage variables, amenability levels are highest amongst coloured respondents, followed by black respondents, while whites show the lowest levels of amenability. On the other hand, black respondents show the highest disinclination levels, followed by the white sub-sample, while coloured respondents hold the lowest position in this respect. Lastly, levels of evasiveness are highest amongst white respondents; the middle position in this instance is held by the coloured sub-sample, while black respondents show the lowest levels of evasiveness. Thus, whether amenable or disinclined to racial integration, the black sub-sample appear more ready to provide a direct, rather than indirect/evasive opinion as regards inter-racial marriage. Tension, in the form of either outright disinclination or a lack of amenability to racial integration with respect to inter-racial familial marriage, is most pronounced from the direction of coloured to black, from black towards white, white towards black, and black towards Indian.

With respect to amenability to racial integration as measured by approval/disapproval of inter-racial marriage, racial factors appeared to hold more influence than factors to do with socio-economic status. That coloured respondents appear to be most amenable in this sense may have something to do with their greater sense of familiarity with inter-racial unions since many coloured people themselves will have ancestry that includes black / white unions, amongst other racial elements of lineage (such as Asian). Such familiarity with 'mixed' heritage, even given the fact that it has been used in a derogatory sense throughout South Africa's history (Adhikari, 2005:xii), nonetheless may be acting here as a demystifying influence, rendering coloured people less closed to the idea of inter-marriage in the present. Nonetheless, this openness is qualified by the fact that, across all race groups, coloured respondents are the most disinclined to inter-marriage to a black person, providing further evidence of the widely documented coloured-black tension in Cape Town.

ARII Racially Integrated Activity Variable and AR Racially Integrated Friendships Indicator

The ARII racially integrated activity variable is constructed to measure the degree of racially integrated activity in respondent's life in social situations. The AR racially integrated friendships indicator is included in this section for descriptive and contextual purposes. The ARII racially integrated activity variable is based on question F.23 of the F module (entitled 'Race and Culture') of the CAS 2005 questionnaire. It reads as follows:

F.23 In the last seven days, have you spent a social evening or some free time with friends or acquaintances who are NOT... [respondent's racial self-classification], either at home, going out to eat, or at a community or religious gathering?

Respondents were required to give a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. These responses have been adapted for the purposes of the ARII as 'yes' = 'amenable' (and is assigned a corresponding score of 3), and 'no' = 'disinclined' (and is assigned a corresponding score of 1). The 'evasive' category for this variable is therefore absent. It is important to stipulate that this variable is an extremely crude measure of racially integrated

activity, particularly given the seven day limit, which is some respects may be reasonable, but in others, given the possibility that any one respondent's lifestyle may be pressured and deadline-oriented, means that a weekly social life may not always be possible, even if desired. Nonetheless, it is included as a raw indicator for the purposes of the ARII.



Figure 2.5. Distribution of ARII racially integrated activity variable by race, and total sample

Figure 2.5 above shows that the majority (74%) of the respondent sample as a whole did not report having engaged in racially integrated social activity within the last week, either in a domestic environment, a restaurant, or at a community / religious gathering. On the other hand, the fact that a quarter of the sample does report such activity shows at least a degree of amenability to racial integration in this sense. By race, the level of amenability to racial integration according to this variable is graded from lowest to highest beginning with the black, then coloured, then white sub-sample. This could clearly have something to do with the phenomenon of 'white guilt' in South Africa for apartheid discrimination. Namely, in order to compensate for such guilt, the likelihood is that white respondents may be more motivated to appear amenable to racial integration (social desirability bias) than non-white respondents, whether such a response reflects their 'truth', or whether it simply reflects paying lip service to a socially desirable political correctness. Aside from this, however, considering the fact that white South Africans are a minority in the country, it is logically feasible that they, more than any other race group, would be forced into

situations of racial integration, simply because other race groups are likely to dominate in number. This said, the predominant residential arrangement of whites in Cape Town could hardly be said to be conducive to racially integrated activity, given the prevalence of high security measures in largely white residential areas such as purpose-built security estates. Figure 2.5 above depicts Black respondents with the highest disinclination levels, followed by coloured, then white respondents[74].

The distribution of the ARII racially integrated activity variable is clearly the most skewed of all the ARII variables in the direction of 'disinclination'. One reason for this could be the fact that an 'evasive' category is entirely absent; another could be that it is based upon one of the most direct, experiential questions regarding the degree of racial integration in a respondent's life. It asks respondents to report the actual manifestation of racial integration in their (social) lives, rather than their attitude / opinion on the subject. Because this result is so skewed towards disinclination, and allows no option for evasion, as is allowed in all the other three major ARII variables above, it is shown below that its inclusion in the 'Combined ARII Index' in fact causes a skewing of the combined ARII in turn. In order to compensate for this, two alternatives are given for the combined ARII below, the first of which includes the ARII racially integrated activity variable, and a second that does not.

We turn now to the AR racially integrated friendships indicator, which is based on question F.19, which can be found in module F ('Race and Culture') of the CAS 2005 questionnaire, and reads as follows:

F.19 How many of your five closest friends are also … [respondent's racial self-classification] like you? If the respondent does not have five close friends, ask about his/her five closest acquaintances.

The response options provided were:

None of them

Some of them (i.e. 1 or 2)

Most of them (i.e. 3 or 4)

All of them[75]



Figure 2.6. Distribution of AR racially integrated friendships, by race, and total sample

Note: The question asked: How many of your five closest friends are also … [respondent's racial self-classification] like you?

Figure 2.6 above shows that half the number of white as opposed to black or coloured respondents report that all of their five closest friends (or acquaintances) are of the same race group. The 'most of them' category is most prominent amongst whites, then coloureds, and least of all amongst blacks.

The Combined ARII

As explained above, the first version of the combined ARII depicted below includes the ARII racially integrated activity variable, and a distinct skewing of the result in the direction of 'disinclination' results[76].

The Combined ARII: Alternative 1 (Between-Race)



Figure 2.7. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 1*, by race, and total sample
* Includes all 5 ARII variables as outlined above.

The most striking attribute of the distribution of alternative 1 of the ARI Combined Index for all respondents in figure 2.7 above, is the total absence of an 'amenable' category altogether, and a predominance of the 'evasive' category. By race, coloured and white respondents are shown to have the highest levels of evasiveness, while those of black respondents are lower in relation. Thus, as is depicted in other ARII instances above, black respondents are less evasive and more disinclined to racial integration than the other race groups.

When the above distribution is further disaggregated by gender in figure 2.8 below, it becomes apparent that overall, female disinclination to racial integration levels are slightly higher than male ones, while males are more likely to be evasive on the issue

than females. This is most pronounced in the case of coloured women in relation to coloured men.



Figure 2.8. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 1*, by race and gender

* Includes all 5 ARII variables as outlined above.

The Combined ARII: Alternative 2 (Between-Race)



Figure 2.9. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 2*, by race, and total sample

* Includes ARII variables 1-4, excludes ARII racially integrated activity variable (variable 5).

Once the ARII racially integrated activity variable is excluded from the ARI Combined Index, a somewhat different picture emerges (in figure 2.9 above); most

notably, the 'amenable' category becomes a visible feature of the distribution, albeit a relatively small part. The distribution is clearly dominated by the 'evasive' category, with the 'disinclined' category shown to be approximately double the size of the amenable one. Differences between race groups with regard to Alternative 2 above entail, firstly, a grading of the levels of evasiveness from lowest to highest in the order of black, then coloured, and then white respondents. Furthermore, black disinclination levels are significantly higher than either coloured or white levels. Of the latter two race groups, however, white respondents are shown in turn to have somewhat greater disinclination levels than coloured ones. While the degree of amenability to racial integration is highest amongst the coloured sub-sample, it is not a huge section of it, proportionally speaking. It is, nonetheless, about twice as large as those respective respondents from the white and black sub-samples.



Figure 2.10 Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 2*, by race and gender

* Includes ARII variables 1-4, excludes ARII racially integrated activity variable (variable 5).

The distribution of Alternative 2 is broken down by gender in figure 2.10 above, where it is shown that women overall are to a very small degree more disinclined to racial integration, and less evasive on the issue than men. By race, however, this effect is only apparent in the cases of coloured women in relation to coloured men, and white women in relation to white men. The degree of this discrepancy is more exaggerated in the case of coloured respondents, however.

The Combined ARII: Alternative 1 (Within-Race), by Income Level



Figure 2.11. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 1*, within-race, by income level

* Includes all 5 ARII variables as outlined above.

Note: ARI Combined Index categories are depicted along the x-axis, which in the case of Alternative 1 consist of either 'disinclined' or 'evasive'. Income level categories are depicted along the y-axis, where blue=lower, red=middle, and yellow=upper.

In figure 2.11 above it is shown that from a within-race perspective, income level appears to make a difference to how amenable coloured and white respondents are to racial integration (according to the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1), but not in the case of the black sub-sample. Within the coloured sub-sample, the 'disinclined' category contains more respondents who fall into the 'poor' income category than any other, while the 'evasive' category is dominated by those who show an 'average' income level. Within the white sub-sample, a similar pattern emerges, but this time with the 'disinclined' category dominated by a large majority of those respondents who have an 'average' income level, and a small minority who show 'good' income levels. The 'evasive' category shows a smaller majority of 'average' income level respondents, and a larger minority of 'good' income level respondents.

The Combined ARII: Alternative 2 (Within-Race), by Income Level



Figure 2.12. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 2*, within-race, by income level

* Includes ARII variables 1-4, excludes ARII racially integrated activity variable (variable 5).

Note: ARI Combined Index categories are depicted along the x-axis, which in the case of Alternative 2 consist of either 'disinclined', 'evasive' or 'amenable'. Income level categories are depicted along the y-axis, where blue=lower, red=middle, and yellow=upper.

It is shown in figure 2.12 above that income level does seem to influence the level of amenability to racial integration according to the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 within each racial sub-sample, however to the least degree amongst black respondents. In the latter case, both the 'disinclined' and 'evasive' categories are clearly dominated by those experiencing 'poor' income levels. The 'amenable' category, however, shows a doubling in the percentage of respondents from the 'average' income band. Within the coloured sub-sample, while 'poor' respondents appear most likely to be 'disinclined' to racial integration, respondents with an 'average' income level dominate the 'evasive' category, as well as making up an even larger majority in the 'amenable' category. Amongst white respondents, whilst every ARII category comprises a majority of 'average' income level respondents, that majority is by far largest in the 'disinclined' case, is smaller in the 'evasive' instance, and smaller still in the 'amenable' case. Simultaneously, the minority of white respondents who enjoy 'good' income levels grows in size from the 'disinclined'

through to the 'amenable' category, where it makes up almost half of the latter category.

The Combined ARII: Alternative 1 (Within-Race), by Living Conditions



Figure 2.13. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 1*, within-race, by living conditions

* Includes all 5 ARII variables as outlined above.

Note: ARI Combined Index categories are depicted along the x-axis, which in the case of Alternative 1 consist of either 'disinclined' or 'evasive'. Living conditions categories are depicted along the y-axis, where blue=poor, red=average, and yellow=good.

Figure 2.13 above shows that economic well-being as measured by living conditions appears to make almost no difference to how amenable black respondents are to racial integration as measured by alternative 1 of the ARII and taken from a within-race perspective. Somewhat more coloured respondents who experience 'average' living conditions are positioned in the 'evasive' as opposed to 'disinclined' ARII category. Amongst white respondents, those experiencing 'good' living conditions are more likely to score 'evasive' on the overall ARII, whilst those experiencing 'average' conditions are more visible in the 'disinclined ARII category.

The Combined ARII: Alternative 2 (Within-Race), by Living Conditions



Figure 2.14. Distribution of ARI Combined Index: Alternative 2*, within-race, by living conditions

* Includes ARII variables 1-4, excludes ARII racially integrated activity variable (variable 5).

Note: ARI Combined Index categories are depicted along the x-axis, which in the case of Alternative 2 consist of either 'disinclined', 'evasive' or 'amenable'. Living conditions categories are depicted along the y-axis, where blue=poor, red=average, and yellow=good.

As in figure 2.13 above, the living conditions of black respondents are shown in figure 2.14 to hold no sway over their ARII scores. Slightly more coloured respondents living in 'poor' conditions, and slightly less in 'average' conditions are positioned in the 'disinclined' as opposed to either the 'evasive' or 'amenable' ARII category. With respect to white respondents, the 'amenable' category is dominated by those respondents living in 'good' living conditions, whereas both the 'evasive' and 'disinclined' categories are dominated by those living in 'average' conditions.

Conclusion

Hypothesis 2 (set out in the introduction) concerned the possible relationship between amenability to racial integration and economic well-being amongst the CAS 2005 respondents, and proposed that: the lowest levels of amenability are likely to be tallied with those who firstly live in households with the lowest incomes, and secondly experience the poorest living conditions; the middle-range levels of amenability would likely correspond with those respondents who live in households positioned within the middle income levels, and who experience 'average' living conditions; while the highest levels of amenability would likely correlate with those respondents whose household income levels are high, and who enjoy 'good' living conditions. In light of the findings covered in chapter 2 as regards the micro-level, individual variables that comprise the ARII, and specifically with respect to the between-race distributions, the only ARII variables that do not lend weight to this hypothesis are the ARII inter-racial marriage variables.

However, staying with the between-race distributions, the overall combined indexes do not support the above hypothesis 2. Rather, in the case of the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1, coloured and white respondents show similar levels of 'evasiveness', with the former showing slightly higher levels than the latter. Black respondents show considerably lower levels of 'evasiveness', and therefore are considerably higher disinclination levels than the other two racial groups. This could be seen, therefore, as partial support for the above hypothesis 2. However, strictly speaking, a high disinclination level does not equal and is not the same as a low level of amenability, or vice versa. In the case of the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2, the central hypothesis 2 goes largely unsupported, where coloured respondents show the highest amenability levels, and the other two racial sub-samples display almost equal levels of it. Thus, the central hypothesis appears reasonably well supported at between-race, individual ARII variable level, but once considered as a combined index, the central assertion is no longer lent clear support.

From a within-race point of view, however, hypothesis 2 is lent far stronger support, where a clearer relationship between economic well-being and amenability to racial integration emerges, one that largely adheres to the pattern proposed in hypothesis 2.

This applies to the least degree, however, to the case of the black sub-sample, where no relationship between economic well-being and amenability to racial integration is evident as regards the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1, and where this relationship is only weakly evident in the case of Alternative 2. Within the coloured and white sub-samples, however, the afore-mentioned relationship is consistently evident in both alternatives of the Combined ARII, and runs according to the patterns predicted in hypothesis 2.

The findings of this chapter show that, to a small degree, women were likely to be less amenable to racial integration than men, with women scoring slightly lower overall with regard to the ARI Combined Indexes (alternatives 1 and 2). However, whether the respective differences between means are statistically significant or not is unable to be thoroughly tested at this point. This is because the current set of weights applied to the data, which are only preliminary, cannot be applied when employing such functions as a t-test for significant difference between means, given the current version of statistical software being used for this dissertation (STATA). In chapter 3, however, this test for the significance of gender in relation to the ARII will be undertaken as part of a multiple regression analysis (where the preliminary set of weights can be taken into account). Thus, in chapter 3, the empirical strength of the findings from chapters 1 and 2, and specifically the relationship between the chief variables representing attitude to race and economic well-being in this research will be investigated and assessed using a multiple regression analysis.

Chapter 3

Economic Well-Being and Attitude to Race

This third and final chapter consists of a multiple regression analysis[77] of the relationship between amenability to racial integration (the dependent variable) and economic well-being (the main independent variable). It is employed in order to determine the degree of influence that economic well-being exerts on the degree to which and manner in which the amenability to racial integration varies.

Multiple Regression Analysis

In addition to the main independent variable, namely economic well-being, other key explanatory variables will be factored in to the multiple regression model. These are race, gender, education level, age, and employment status, which were described with regard to the CAS 2005 respondents in chapter 1 and Appendix B.

For the purposes of multiple regression analysis, the 'education' variable consists of a combination of the 'secondary education' and 'record of tertiary education' sub-variables[78] set out in Appendix B. The relationship between age and amenability to racial integration in the CAS 2005 respondent sample is illustrated in figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. From this, it appears that, proportionally speaking, disinclination levels increase in the overall sample as age increases, and amenability levels decrease as age increases. Including age as an independent variable in the multiple regression process will help ascertain whether this pattern holds statistical significance or not[79].



Figure 3.1. Plotted relationship between age groups and ARI Combined Index Alternative 1

Note: ARII_com_1 = ARI Combined Index Alternative 1

Key to age groups in years of age: 1 = 18-34; 2 = 35-50; 3 = 51-66; 4 = 67-82;

5 = 83-98



Figure 3.2 Plotted relationship between age groups and ARI Combined Index Alternative 2

Note: ARII_com_2 = ARI Combined Index Alternative 2

Key to age groups in years of age: 1 = 18-34; 2 = 35-50; 3 = 51-66; 4 = 67-82;

5 = 83-98

The 'employment status' variable in the multiple regression model is a simple dummy variable, with its value equal to 1 if the respondent is employed (including waged or self-employment, whether full-time or part-time, and including those respondents on leave from work at the time of the survey), and equal to 0 if the respondent is unemployed or a non-labour force participant. 'Employment status' is included as an accompaniment to the economic well-being variables (income level and the LCI), due to its critical impact in a country where unemployment levels are severe, and where the difference between not having a job and having one could be dire poverty as opposed to keeping afloat financially. Thus, employment status is potentially a key determinant in a respondent's level of economic well-being, and that potential is seen as grounds for inclusion in the regression model in order to test its statistical significance as an aspect of economic well-being that could hold some sway over a respondent's amenability to racial integration[80].

The dependent variable, amenability to racial integration, is incorporated into the set of 7 regressions below in two forms. The first of these is the three-point ordinal scale of the ARI Combined Index, (1=disinclined, 2=evasive and 3=amenable), this scale being the predominant format in which the ARII was depicted throughout chapter 2[81]. The second form in which the dependent variable is incorporated into the multiple regressions is as each respondent's ARI Combined Index total score. The latter comprises each respondent's total aggregated ARI Combined Index score, prior to the division of that amount by the total number of variables involved, and consequent classification of it into the three respective ARII categories[82]. In this form, any one respondent's score forms a continuum with 'disinclined' lying at the bottom, and 'amenable' at the top. In the case of the Alternative 1 total (the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 consists of five ARII variables, as outlined in chapter 2), the possible range of scores lies between 0 and 15, while with regard to Alternative 2 (the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 consists of four ARII variables, also outlined in chapter 2), it lies between 0 and 12. Listing Alternative 1 first followed by Alternative 2, the respective mean values of the two alternatives are 11 and 9, the median values are 11.6 and 10, and the standard deviations are 2.2 and 2.1 respectively. This continuous, numeric form of the dependent variable, amenability to racial integration, is a form more suited to the process of multiple regression analysis, and indeed, does appear to highlight the significance of additional explanatory variables that, using the

ordinal form of the dependent variable, seemed to be somewhat masked with respect to any influence they may exert in how amenable a respondent is to racial integration. Thus regressions 3 and 7 below have been run using this ARI Combined Index Total Score, while regressions 1, 2, and 4 to 6 have been run using the three-point, ordinal version of it.

The Between-Race Multiple Regressions

Table 3.1. ARII Regression Results

	ARI Combined Index Alt 1		**ARII Total Alt 1**	**ARI Combined Index Alt 2**			**ARII Total Alt 2**
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Constant	**2*** [.1]	**2*** [.1]	**11*** [.5]	**2*** [.1]	**2*** [.1]	**2*** [.1]	**9*** [.5]
Age	**-.002**** [0]	**-.002***** [.001]	**-.009*** [.005]	**-.003***** [.001]	**-.004***** [.001]	**-0.003**** [.001]	**-.01**** [.004]
Gender	**-.03** [.03]	**-.04*** [.02]	**-.2** [.1]	**-.02** [.04]	**-.02** [.03]	**-.03** [.04]	**-.1** [.1]
Black	**-.2***** [.05]	**-.2***** [.04]	**-1**** [.3]	**-.1** [.07]	**-.1*** [.06]	**-.1**** [.07]	**-1**** [.3]
Coloured	**.02** [.04]	**.04** [.04]	**.4*** [.2]	**.2***** [.06]	**.2***** [.05]	**.2***** [.05]	**.4*** [.2]
Education	**-.02** [.02]	**.01** [.02]	**-.06** [.1]	**.02** [.03]	**.05**** [.02]	**.03** [.03]	**.01** [.1]
LCI	**.04** [.03]	**.03** [.03]	**.3**** [.2]	**.07*** [.04]	**.05** [.03]		**.3**** [.1]
Income Level	**.02** [.02]		**.3**** [.1]	**.06*** [.03]		**.07**** [.03]	**.3***** [.1]
Employment Status	**.02** [.03]	**.02** [.03]	**.05** [.2]	**.04** [.04]	**.06*** [.03]	**.03** [.04]	**.1** [.1]
n	870	1114	870	870	1114	870	870
R-squared	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.12
Prob>f	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: 1) Numbers in bold are the coefficients and are quantified according to the ARI Combined Index three-point ordinal scale in regressions 1, 2 and 4-6, and according to the

ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 total score which ranges from 1-15 in regression 3, and according to the ARI Combined index Alternative 2 total score which ranges from 1-12 in regression 7; numbers in square brackets are the Standard Error. All coefficients have been rounded up to the nearest whole number where possible. 2) * Significant at the 10% level. 3) ** Significant at the 5% level. 4) *** Significant at the 1% level. 5) Base for the gender variable is female. 6) Black & Coloured race variables have bases as respectively titled. 7) Income Level = household income level as set out in chapter 1, divided into 1. lower 2. middle and 3. upper income levels. Lower income level = all respondents with a household income of between 0 and 3000 rands; middle income level = household incomes between 3001 and 10 000 rands; upper income levels = all respondents with a household income of above R 10 000. 8) 'Employment status' is a dummy variable; where 1=respondent employed (including waged or self-employment, whether full-time or part-time, and including those respondents on leave from work at the time of the survey); 0=respondent unemployed or a non-labour-force participant.

The r-squared values noted beneath the regressions, once converted into a percentage, represent the total percentage of variability of the dependent variable that is accounted for by the influence of the group of independent variables in that particular regression. Of regressions 1 to 7, the r-squared values are by no means high (ranging between 7% and 12%), however the fact that the coefficient values of certain independent variables register as statistically significant is nonetheless an indication that those factors play a role in amenability to racial integration, albeit perhaps a minor one. Furthermore, with regard to all such statistically significant cases above, the standard error values for those coefficients are extremely small, which lends additional validity to those results. Simply put, the standard error provides the basis for a confidence interval for a prediction value concerning a particular variable based on the regression line. It is better to have a narrow, rather than wide, confidence interval, given that it dictates the range within which one can be confident, at a particular confidence level (for example, 95% level), that the true value of that prediction indeed lies there. As coefficient values and their implications are described below, the reader is asked to bear in mind that every other variable (other than that one having its coefficient analysed) in a particular model is said to be 'controlled for'. For the sake of brevity, the 'controlled' variables will not be listed in every case below.

From regression 1, which includes the full model of explanatory variables and uses the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 as the dependent variable, it would appear that race, and more specifically being black, as well as age are the only significant (partial) determinants of one's amenability to racial integration given that combination. The coefficient values tell us that being black reduces your amenability by .2 (given that the possible scale in this case runs from 0 to 3), on average, relative to coloured and white respondents, and that every year of age reduces amenability by .002. When 'income level' is removed from the above scenario in regression 2[83], only one other variable comes into significance, and only at the 10% level of confidence at that. This is the 'gender' variable, and its coefficient value tells us that being a woman reduces ones amenability to racial integration by .04 on the 3-point ARII scale. Regression 2 is the only instance in regressions 1-7 in which gender becomes even slightly significant. The reason for this is clearly that gender differences in the respondent sample are very slight, as can be gauged from figures 2.9 and 2.11 at the end of chapter 2[84]. It is important to note that any drop or increase in coefficient values in either regressions 1, 2 or 3, although reporting a respective drop or increase in racial integration amenability levels, nonetheless have as their upper limit 'evasiveness' rather than actual 'amenability' (since 'amenability' was absent altogether in the case of the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1).

Regression 3 uses the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 total (explained above), which forefronts additional variables as compared with regressions 1 and 2 – most probably due to the continuous form of the dependent variable in this case. The 'black' variable drops slightly in significance (from the 1% to the 5% level of significance), yet estimates a larger reduction in amenability levels as compared with regressions 1 and 2. In this case, being black means scoring a full point less than coloured or white respondents on amenability. Both the 'LCI' and 'income level' variables surface as significant influences on amenability levels. As set out above in chapter 1, both of these variables consist of a 3-point scale, running from 'poor' (1), to 'average' (2), to 'good' (3). The coefficient values for both of these variables in regression 3 report a .03 increase in amenability (in this case consisting of a total possible score range of 15 points in the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 total) for every 1-point increase on either 3-point scale. Thus, as one's living conditions or income level rise, so one is more likely, on average, to be 'evasive' of racial

integration than 'disinclined' to it. Thus, when a behavioural component is included in the ARII, along with the attitudinal elements, the variables that are shown to hold some sway over levels of amenability to racial integration are age, race, (specifically being black), living conditions and income levels. The r-squared value for regression 3 is the highest in terms of the three above Alternative 1 regressions, explaining 9% of variation in amenability to racial integration.

Regression 4, which depicts the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 as dependent variable, shows both the 'age' and 'coloured' variables as highly significant (both at the 1% level). In the case of alternative 2, of course, the distribution does include a proportion of respondents who are 'amenable' to racial integration, but comprises only attitudinal variables. Thus, the age coefficient in this case tells us that, for every additional year of age, it is likely that a respondent's score will be .003 further away from amenability on the 3-point scale of Alternative 2. Also, being coloured means that you are likely to score higher than either black or white respondents on the latter scale by .2[85].

In regression 5, where 'income level' is removed from its immediate forerunner's model, while the 'age' and 'coloured' coefficients give much the same information, it is the single occasion in which 'education' is shown to be significant in regressions 1 to 7. It's coefficient value reports that, as education level increases by one point (in the 3-point education scale detailed above), amenability to racial integration levels increase by .05 on the 3-point ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 scale. This could point to the fact that income level could be proxying for education level to a degree in the above regressions, since the elimination of the former from the regression model seemed to 'unmask' the influence of education on the ARII.

In regression 6, when the 'LCI' variable is removed from regression model 4, and 'income level' is again included, the 'age' and 'coloured' coefficients are almost exactly replicated, while the 'black' and 'income level' variables are highlighted as significant. According to this model, belonging to the black race group makes you more likely, on average, to score .1 less on the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 3-point scale. Also, with each point increase in the 3-point income level scale, a respondent is likely to score an average .07 points higher in amenability to racial

integration. Given that when the 'LCI' is excluded, 'income level' shows significance, yet when the situation is reversed, the 'LCI' shows no significance, could possibly intimate that while these two variables proxy in certain respects for one another, income level could be seen as the more powerful or 'trump' influence out of the two when it comes to ARII values.

Regression 7 sees the continuous, total score version of the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 being used, with its possible range of between 0 and 12 points. Of all those regressions above that incorporate the full model of independent variables, the seventh one displays the highest number of the latter that show significance. It also has the highest r-squared value of all the regressions - 12 % of variation in amenability to racial integration is explained by the regression 12 model[86]. Regression 7 results tell us that for every additional year of age, a respondent is likely to score .01 lower on their total ARII Alternative 2 score. Although seemingly small to begin with, this marks a greater decrease (in amenability levels), and therefore stronger leaning toward disinclination due to increase in age than as depicted in any of the other regressions. Being black in this instance puts you 1 point lower in terms of the ARII Alternative 2 total score than either of the other race groups, on average. The coloured variable in this instance is only significant at the 10% level[87]. The 'LCI' coefficient reports that for every additional point increase in living conditions, a respondent is likely to be .3 points higher on the Alternative 2 12-point continuum. Similarly, an increase from one income level to the next adds .3 points onto a respondent's amenability score, although 'income level' shows greater significance here.

Since income level is clearly a significant factor in amenability to racial integration from a between-race point of view, a multiple regression is included below to show certain key factors that, in turn, serve to determine the manner in which income level varies.

Table 3.2. Multiple Regression Results using Household Income and the LCI

	Household Income		**Living Conditions Combined Index**
	1	**2**	**3**
Constant	**2*** [.3]	**2*** [.3]	**2*** [.1]
Age	**.01** [.01]	**.03*** [.01]	**.002** [.005]
Age Squared	**-.0002** [0]	**-.0003*** [0]	**0** [0]
Gender			**-.07**** [.03]
Black	**-2*** [.1]	**-1.4*** [.1]	**-1*** [.05]
Coloured	**-1*** [.1]	**-1*** [.1]	**-.3*** [.05]
Education	**1*** [.05]	**.4*** [.05]	**.1*** [.02]
Employment Status	**1*** [.07]		**-.03** [.03]
Household Size	**.1*** [.02]	**.01** [.01]	**-.03*** [.007]
Number Employed in House		**1*** [.03]	
n	872	878	1114
R-squared	0.50	0.59	0.35
Prob>f	0	0	0

Notes: 1) Numbers in bold are the coefficients and are quantified according to the CAS 2005 Household Income question categories, i.e. 1=R0-1000; 2=R1001-3000; 3=R3001-5000;

4=R5001-10000; 5=above R10000; numbers in square brackets are the Standard Error. All coefficients have been rounded up to the nearest whole number where possible.
2) * Significant at the 10% level. 3) ** Significant at the 5% level. 4) *** Significant at the 1% level. 5) Base for the gender variable is female. 6) Black & Coloured race variables have bases as respectively titled. 7) 'Employment status' is a dummy variable; where 1=respondent employed (including waged or self-employment, whether full-time or part-time, and including those respondents on leave from work at the time of the survey); 0=respondent unemployed or a non-labour-force participant. 8) 'Household Size'=total number of household members per household. 9) 'Number Employed in House'=total number of employed household members per household.

Regression 1 above shows that, with regard to household income, being black means a likely decrease on average in household income, as compared with coloured and white respondents, by a full 2 income categories. Coloured respondents also show a disadvantage in this respect, although the decrease in their case is by 1 income category on average (and is most likely in relation mostly to white respondents). A year in education increases household income by 1 income category, as does being employed as opposed to unemployed. An increase in household size by one person minimally increases household income for that household. In regression 2, where 'employment status' is taken out, and 'number of employed in house' is included, 'household size' loses significance, and is trumped by 'number of employed in house'.

Regression 2 tells us that, for each additional employed household member, an increase in household income by 1 income category on average is experienced. The addition of this independent variable increases the explanatory power of the model (the r-squared value) from being able to explain 50% of the variability in household income, to 60% of this. Thus, although 'employment status' and 'number of employed in house' appear to be proxying for one another, the latter seems to wield more power in terms of influence on household income. 'Age' and 'age squared' show as significant in regression 2, and indicate that household income has a quadratic relation to age, in other words, that the former will begin at a certain point (at the beginning of a person's working life), will rise to a peak at some point during that person's working life, after which it will slump off as the person approaches old

age. Education shows a similar effect as in regression 1, except the increase in household income in this case is by less than half an income category, once 'number of employed in house' is factored in to the model.

Regression 3 shows that the LCI Combined Index, as the second measure of economic well-being amongst the CAS 2005 respondents, is in turn influenced in large part by the same factors as those which affect household income. However, these factors explain just over half the amount of variability in the LCI as they do in household income. Thus race, education and household size behave in similar ways as influencing factors with regard to the LCI as household income. Differences are also evident in that age and employment status show no significance in regression 3, while gender shows women at a disadvantage compared to men.

Within-Race Multiple Regressions

Separate regressions were run for each race group individually to ascertain whether a relationship between economic well-being and attitude to race existed from a within-race as opposed to between-race perspective, according to when either income levels or living conditions were used as the measure of economic well-being. These regressions are not tabulated because almost every one of them contained no significant correlation coefficients. The only significant results to come out of them were that, firstly, in the case of the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 and 2, as living conditions increase by 1 point on the Combined LCI, so a white respondent's ARII score is likely to increase by 1 point, on average. With respect to the ARII alternative 2, a white respondent's ARII score is shown to increase minimally as income level increases by one point. In the case of Alternative 2, as age increases, so a coloured respondent's ARII scores decrease minimally.

Conclusion

In chapter 3, it has been shown that race, age, and economic well-being according to the measures of income level and a living conditions index appear to wield fairly consistent influence – albeit a modest amount - in a respondent's level of amenability to racial integration. To a lesser degree, education seems to play a minor role under certain circumstances. The two economic well-being measures, income level and living conditions, are in turn partly determined by factors such as race, education, age and gender. Furthermore, number of employed persons per household is shown to exert crucial influence on household income variability. Alternatively, a proxy for number employed per household can be found in employment status of respondent and household size taken together, which appear, however, to play a more minor role in how household income varies. A full analysis of these results will be made in the concluding chapter, to follow.

Conclusion

In the concluding chapter, an outline of the main findings is provided, followed by analysis of them in relation to the central themes of this dissertation.

Summary of Findings

Economic Well-Being

A brief sketch is provided now of how the two measures of economic well-being – (household) income level and the LCI – compared with respect to the CAS 2005 respondents. Firstly, overall, income level was divided almost equally between 'poor' and 'average' levels (48% and 41% respectively), with a small proportion of the respondent sample enjoying a 'good' income level. The LCI, on the other hand, depicted a large majority living 'average' conditions (67%), with two much smaller proportions in either 'poor' or 'good' conditions. What this says is that, while a considerable proportion of respondents whose household income is very low still manage to live in 'average' conditions, almost no respondents positioned in the 'average' income level manage to enjoy 'good' living conditions.

Thus, through the lens of between-race inequality, the income levels as well as living conditions data (the latter in the form of the LCI) confirm a perseverant racial hierarchy, with black respondents dominating the 'poor' category, coloureds the 'average' category, and whites the 'good' income level. On the other hand, the black sub-sample shows the greatest amount of within-race inequality in terms of income level, with a large majority sitting in the 'poor' category and a small minority with an 'average' income level. The coloured and white sub-samples, however, both appear to show lower levels of within-race inequality than the black sub-sample. Approximately half of respondents in both the coloured and white sub-samples are positioned in the 'average' income level category, with the other most sizeable portions positioned in the 'poor' income level in the case of coloureds, and in the 'good' income level in the case of whites.

In contrast to this, according to the LCI, the coloured sub-sample demonstrates the highest level of within-race inequality, with 80% of its respondents experiencing

'average' living conditions, and two very small contingents experiencing either 'poor' or 'good' conditions. Roughly half of both the black and white sub-samples are positioned in the 'average' living conditions category (57% and 50% respectively), with virtually the remaining portions experiencing 'poor' living conditions in the case of blacks, and 'good' living conditions in the case of whites. This practically wipes out the existence of 'good' living conditions for blacks and 'poor' ones for whites amongst the CAS 2005 respondents. Thus, when comparing income level and the LCI as measures of economic well-being, only white respondents show clear similarities as regards between-race and within-race inequality in the case of both measures. However, the picture of within-race inequality shows marked differences between the two economic well-being measures with respect to the black and coloured sub-samples. This does serve to blur racially structured socio-economic stratification lines to a degree.

Race

That patterns of amenability to racial integration[88] amongst the CAS 2005 respondents vary to some degree according to race group has been demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3, both in graphic depictions of response distributions, as well as in a multiple regression analysis. In very general terms, black respondents are shown to score on average the lowest on amenability, coloured respondents the highest, while white respondents on average are positioned somewhere between the afore-mentioned two sets, or in certain circumstances are on equal footing with the black sub-sample. As regards the Combined ARI Indexes, including the behavioural-attitudinal as well as attitudinal-only alternatives, black respondents are shown to be the most disinclined, coloured respondents the most amenable, with white and coloured respondents showing similar levels of evasiveness, in both cases higher than those of black respondents. As has been made clear in the previous chapters, there is no one clear formula here; amenability to racial integration varies according to race in a dynamic and multi-faceted manner. Although chapter 2 partly entailed a detailed description of the response distributions of individual variables of the ARII according to race, it would be presumptuous and erroneous to pass judgment as to the possible reasons for variability in amenability to racial integration according to race *per se*. Although respondent's level of economic well-being certainly appears to play some

small role, other factors that cannot be accounted for, for example, in a multiple regression analysis, are also clearly at play. Theorisation around such elements, which may be psychological, social, personality-bound, to do with history, location, and so forth, will be suggested below to the degree to which the scope of this dissertation allows. However, the discussion below will focus mainly on whether those response sets depict an intersection of racial and socio-economic factors that resembles a certain hierarchical pattern or not.

Race, Economic Well-being, and Amenability to Racial Integration

The central hypotheses are revisited at this point, since level of support for / confutation of them is dealt with below. In the introduction it was proposed that:

1. **Amongst the respondents to the Cape Area Study, attitudes to race are likely to be found to be a function of economic well-being, however there are likely to be variations as to the exact form that this function takes.**

2. **It is further hypothesised that the lowest levels of amenability to racial integration are likely to be tallied with those who firstly live in households with the lowest incomes, and secondly experience the poorest living conditions; the middle-range levels are likely to correspond with those respondents who live in households positioned within the middle income levels, and who experience 'average' living conditions; while the highest levels of amenability to racial integration are likely to correlate with those respondents whose household income levels are high, and who enjoy 'good' living conditions.**

Given the findings of chapters 1, 2 and 3, attitudes to race, in the specific form of amenability to racial integration, do appear to be a function of economic well-being. This relationship varies, however, depending on which specific aspect of amenability to racial integration is being measured, as well as the manner in which both economic well-being and racial integration amenability are being measured. Thus Alternative Hypothesis 1 above can be accepted. Alternative Hypothesis 2, which proposes more specifically that low / middle / high levels of economic well-being will be tallied with

low / middle / high levels of amenability, can be accepted at a between-race, micro-variable level if one takes into account firstly the attitudinal variables concerned with inter-racial trust, ease, or friendship, and secondly the behavioural variable of integrated social behaviour, as self-standing, separate units. However, it does not hold at that level in terms of any of the inter-marriage sub-variables, or in terms of the inter-marriage variable overall. Thus, in the case of the micro-level inter-marriage variable, the null hypothesis must be accepted in terms of Hypothesis 2. Finally, as regards the ARII overall, including both alternatives of the combined ARI indexes, and from a between-race perspective, the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 2 must be accepted. In other words, the pattern of amenability to racial integration according to the Combined ARI Indexes amongst the CAS 2005 respondent sample does not show evidence that low / middle / high levels of amenability are tallied with low / middle / high levels of economic well-being.

However, the Alternative Hypothesis 2 can be accepted to a degree from a within-race, particularly distributional, perspective with respect to the ARI Combined Index, including alternatives 1 and 2. Thus, within certain of the racial groups, a positive relationship between level of economic well-being (measured either by income or living conditions) and level of amenability to racial integration is evident mainly from a distributional perspective, and in some instances when tested by multiple regression. This said, however, Hypothesis 2 cannot be completely accepted, since, in the case of the black sub-sample, and using income level as the measure of economic well-being, the tallying pattern is practically non-existent if the ARII includes behavioural as well as attitudinal indicators, and is only weakly present if the ARII includes only attitudinal variables. Furthermore, living conditions - as the second measure of economic well-being – appears to make no difference at all to the black sub-sample when it comes to amenability to racial integration. The second reason is that, when tested by a multiple regression analysis, the only significant relationship between economic well-being and amenability to racial integration is found amongst the white sub-sample, and shows a stronger association according to the measure of living conditions as opposed to income levels. In both cases, however, the relationship is a positive one. Furthermore, the significant relationship found according to living conditions exists whether the attitudinal or combined behavioural-attitudinal version

of the ARII is used, but only in the case of the latter version with respect to income levels.

Nonetheless, returning to a purely distributional sense, in the case of both the coloured and white sub-samples, the pattern predicted in Hypothesis 2 is consistently demonstrated, whether the ARII is comprised of attitudinal and behavioural elements, or only attitudinal indicators alone, and regardless of whether income or living conditions is the measure of economic well-being used. The underlying contradiction of between-race versus within-race socio-economic inequality that exists in the CAS 2005 sample is one possible contributory reason for the relative lack of evidential support for Hypothesis 2 to be found in the ARI Combined Indexes.

Gender

In chapter 1 it is shown that, amongst the 2005 CAS respondent sample, women are indeed found to be earning less than men overall (according to measures of individual income) but that amongst women themselves, inequality along the lines of race qualifies this picture according to the racial hierarchy described above. It is demonstrated in chapter 2 that, although women do score slightly lower overall in terms of amenability to racial integration, the respective gender difference is not statistically significant in the case of either ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 or 2.

Age

Age has also been shown to play a significant and consistent role in how amenable a respondent is to racial integration – as age increases, so amenability decreases. This finding is far more pronounced, however, from a between-race perspective. From a within-race perspective, the relationship between age and amenability to racial integration is a weaker one, only occurs in the case of amenability as measured by attitudes (not attitudes and behaviour combined), and only in the case of coloured respondents. The afore-mentioned general age finding could be seen to follow a fairly obvious line of logic. Those respondents who are closer to the experience of apartheid in years, particularly those who suffered atrocities (let alone direct discrimination) at the hands of the apartheid regime personally, or witnessed friends / loved ones doing so, are more likely to be less amenable to racial integration currently. I would suggest

that this would be due to the remains of a deep distrust of certain race groups who were most implicated in such prejudice and abuse. This finding could therefore be seen as a generational issue, and that the 'older' generation is possibly more reticent to forge ties across race. Similarly, in the case of whites, a heavier burden of guilt of being accomplice to apartheid, whether consciously or not, may rest on those closer in years to experiencing it first-hand. This could also be coupled with entrenched negative conditioning and stereotyping along racial lines, which would likely hinder amenability to racial integration due to the consequences thereof, namely: fear, insecurity, prejudice, and in the extreme, racism. On the other hand, and across all races, the 'younger' generation', and particularly the 'born-frees' as they are commonly labelled (those children born after the advent of the new democratic dispensation in South Africa, in other words, post-1994), seem, according to the CAS 2005 respondents, inherently more amenable to racial integration, perhaps for reasons such as being surrounded by the discourse of 'non-racialism' from birth, the fact that it is easier to move past an abhorrent, racialised past when that past is no longer imminent, and so forth.

Education

It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that economic well-being according to the measures of income level and a living conditions index appear to wield a small yet significant amount of reasonably consistent influence in a respondent's level of amenability to racial integration. Education seems to be more of an indirect influence on amenability – particularly in its profound impact on household income level, and to a lesser extent, on living conditions. In this sense, it is no wonder that it appears to proxy for income level in the multiple regression analysis in chapter 3, as the only occasion on which it became significant as an influencing factor on amenability to racial integration was when income level was removed from the equation.

Employment

In chapter 3, employment status and number of employed persons per household are both shown to hold sway over income level, but not over living conditions. Thus, although neither employment status nor number of employed persons per household seem to wield direct influence on how amenability to racial integration varies in the

multiple regression process, these factors could be seen to exert at least some indirect influence in this respect. This is due to the fact that they play a significant role in how household income varies, which in turn is shown to have a positive affect on amenability to racial integration.

Thus, to summarise, this research shows that economic well-being appears to wield a small degree of influence over amenability to racial integration, but most consistently and prominently from a between-race standpoint; from a within-race viewpoint, it appears to have a small (and statistically significant only in certain instances) effect that is qualified by which race group one belongs to, how economic well-being is measured (living conditions or income), as well as how amenability is measured (attitudinal or a combination of attitudinal and behavioural indicators). In other words, the inequality in economic well-being manifest between various race groups appears to be an influencing factor in how amenable those race groups are to integrating with race groups other than their own. However, the emergent or increasing inequality in levels of economic well-being within various race groups does not seem to affect as strongly how amenable different people are from within the same race group to integrating with people from other race groups, apart from in the case of white respondents, and more strongly so if economic well-being is measured by living conditions as opposed to income. The finding in this case – that for whites amenability increases as living conditions increase - holds regardless of whether amenability is measured by an attitudinal / behavioural combination, or attitudinal variables alone. In other words, differentiation around amenability to racial integration according to levels of economic well-being appears to run to a noticeable degree along racial cleavages, and to a much less visible, but perceptible, degree along 'class' cleavages, the latter pattern in turn qualified by race, as well as measure of both economic well-being and amenability to racial integration.

Discussion

What this research tells us is that if someone in South Africa is poor – in terms of their income level or living conditions – and / or black, they are likely to be less amenable to racial integration in terms of certain individual ingredients that would

seem to be important for the process of racial integration to occur at all. Thus, with respect to elements of inter-racial trust, ease, openness to inter-racial friendship, and racially integrated activity, those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder appear to be the most disenchanted with and least open to the notion of racial integration. In short, they do not appear to be buying the government-backed goal of 'social cohesion' implicit in the 'rainbow nation' ideal[89]. In terms of those same elements, people occupying the middle of the socio-economic ladder in turn demonstrate a more ambiguous sentiment, one with the potential to tip more towards amenability to racial integration, or towards disinclination. Those in the upper echelons of society are certainly saying that they are amenable to racial integration, but given the kinds of residential situations they live in, for example, security estates, the chances of them having to put their attitude into practice in their lived reality are small. Indeed, security estates can be seen as a defence against racial integration within classes as well as a feature that acts against inter-class contact[90]. Thus, when viewing certain micro-level indicators of openness to racial integration, race appears to intersect with 'class' factors, to the degree to which they intersect in a 'between-race' sense in South African society anyway.

The exception to the above logic which tallies amenability and economic well-being level, is that middle class suburbs are precisely the areas where one would expect that the market would result in some desegregation. The literature shows, however, that in most such cases, deracialisation characterised by a lack of socio-racial integration has resulted. In addition, this scenario often comprises black people moving into white areas (rather than the other way around), and only blacks with the prerequisite socio-economic status at that[91]. If racial integration is only given the space to happen in a middle class context, it is unlikely to filter out and become a societal-level phenomenon. This is due to, amongst other factors, restrictions on inter-class mobility as a result of set property values, and secondly the lack of evidence so far to suggest that middle-class suburban integration is characterised by social as well as racial integration – a necessary coupling if the consolidation of integration is to stand a chance. Clearly, wealthy people are hardly likely to move to areas below their 'class' level, such as townships. What is important, however, are the attitudes of individuals within various 'classes' to individuals of other race groups, and how open they are to meaningful interaction with one another. Similarly, openness within various race as

well as 'class' groups to people of other 'class' levels living nearby is also crucial, so that significant interaction across class as well as race boundaries is given a chance to grow. Thus the interaction between race and class in South Africa currently is a key contributory factor that holds racial integration in a position of ideal rather than reality. If connections between people, including social capital, commercial interactions and transactions, social relations and so forth are given the chance to occur across different classes as well as races, the consolidation of racial integration stands a fighting chance in the Cape Town urban context.

Considering that economic growth in South Africa – particularly over the last decade – has resulted in the level of inequality remaining reasonably unchanged, with signs of possible increase in terms of intra-racial inequality, it becomes clear that in order to lessen inequality levels, an array of tangible and targeted interventions are necessary. Racial inequality that characterises the socio-economic structure of a country - whether or not it is seen by the peoples of that country as the major cause of racism, a contributory factor to racism, or itself a result of ideological and regulatory forces inherent in a modern state – is at the least unlikely to improve race relations or levels of amenability to racial integration in that country. It is for this reason that, particularly in emergent so-called non-racial democracies, race and racism are issues that should be a foremost concern of policy-makers, in many different areas of policy.

No matter what the preference for economic system may be – capitalist, socialist, or other – it is my suggestion that in order to effect any change at all in terms of breaking the persistent racialised hierarchy of discrimination that still exists in South Africa (barring signs of slow change heralding an increase in intra-racial as opposed to inter-racial differences), such a transformation is surely going to be incomplete, stunted or perhaps wholly impossible, without an accompanying change in attitudes to race, and specifically, amenability to racial integration. To separate the two from one another as notions or strategies – change in racial attitude on the one hand, and transformation of the socio-economic hierarchy still predominantly associated with race on the other hand - is in many ways equivalent to proposing that the two processes can occur separately from one another. In the author's view, for any real progress to occur in breaking the perpetuation of inequality along lines that associate race with particular levels of economic well-being – surely the two processes

mentioned above must necessarily occur simultaneously, or else will the result not be simply more of what is: small, at worst, tokenistic, shifts occurring on the periphery, while the skeletal, fundamental structure and the patterns that hang off it remain much the same? Consequently, the kind of policy-making that is likely to have lasting, comprehensive and inclusive results with respect to the creation of employment, and the undoing of inequality and poverty, are policies which consciously synthesise the dual intentions of interrupting socio-economic disparity structured along racial lines, and of facilitating attitudinal shifts in the direction of increased amenability to racial integration.

Thus, this research lends support to those policies already in existence aimed at eradicating inequality and poverty, such as affirmative action and housing projects that serve to bring marginalised (and often unemployed) sections of the population closer to sources of employment. Policies aimed at the creation of employment and a solid skills base in the country are also plainly essential. Educational access is another important policy issue, and, whereas the current move to provide free schooling for all those who need it is clearly a step in the right direction in terms of the educational disparities which constitute a fundamental aspect of socio-economic inequality, the quality of that schooling in certain contexts (for example, low income areas) is still a problem in dire need of addressing[92]. An example of policy direction that is hotly debated currently is the growing urgency of introducing an all-encompassing grant (such as the proposed Basic Income Grant) to begin to alleviate gaping inequality.

Particularly if we are to ensure that income-based inequality is to continue its "long-run decline in importance", as quoted above from Leibbrandt et al (2004), the policy implications certainly do not include being too quick to declare, for example, South Africa's transformation process 'complete', and so doing away with any of the (often staunchly resisted) antidiscrimination policies and laws. Above all this applies to those politico-legal instruments that directly affect the economic playing field, such as labour laws and affirmative action, the latter being part of the overall move towards Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). In this light, on the one hand one can deduce from the above-mentioned patterns of intra-racial inequality, particularly amongst the coloured and black sub-samples, that at the higher echelons of those sub-samples, BEE is proving somewhat effective. However, the fact that only very small sections

of those two previously disadvantaged sub-samples appear to be benefiting to a substantial degree, in other words, managing to reach 'good' income levels and sets of living conditions, is, however, problematic. Coupled with this, the evidence of stubborn socio-economic stratification along racial lines, in other words, persistently high levels of between-race inequality in the sample, points to the fact that certain components of BEE that apply to the sections of society positioned in the 'poor' to 'average' levels of economic well-being are either not being adhered to in earnest or enough, such as affirmative action / employment equity.

Thus, the BEE codes of good practice, whether on a macro (for example, large corporations), or micro (for example, small and medium enterprises) scale, as well as the application of affirmative action in a host of other contexts will clearly require an extended period of implementation well into the future, if any substantial effect is to be gained. However, as Moleke notes:

> Equity legislation, while important in attempting to eliminate discrimination, can only resolve part of the problem as evidenced by the fact that the government sector as an employer has made significant progress in terms of redressing racial distributions while the private sector displays disturbingly slow progress. Current legislation does not address or deal with informal institutionalised discriminatory practices (2006:220).

In relation to the above, corporate reinvestment of funds that has social concern at its heart will be critical to achieving a real and lasting interruption of the twin evils of inequality and poverty in the country. For example, such reinvestment could be directed towards the funding of economic growth / commercial development in or proximal to mixed-use, housing developments with dual racial / income ('class') integration as their aim. Aside from benefiting economic growth in the country as a whole, such reinvestment would be serving to encourage racial and 'class' integration, which in turn will serve to stabilise democracy here. It is therefore my suggestion that the policies and legalities concerned with BEE should be regularly transformed, adapted and tailored in relation to and in dialogue with the dynamic and ever-changing socio-economic environment of the non-racial democracy, that ultimately, is still a very young entity.

The finding in the above research that that it is only when the behavioural component of the ARII is included in the combined index that there proves to be zero amenability to racial integration in Cape Town according to the CAS 2005 sample, is a disturbing one (albeit not altogether surprising), and one which renders even more urgent the addressing of issues around racial integration by policy-makers in the country. In other words, if one includes the element of whether people in fact 'do' racial integration in their social lives or not, the outlook for racial integration in Cape Town is indeed bleak. Although the contact theory was not empirically tested in this research, the findings can nonetheless be reflected in light of it. As outlined in the introduction, the contact theory is premised on the supposition that as levels of contact between people of different races increase, so levels of prejudice decrease; consequently, residential[93] racial integration is advocated as beneficial for race relations in general, and for the weakening of prejudice or racism specifically[94]. I would suggest that, given that in this research it is precisely if amenability to racial integration is premised (and only partially at that) on contact that amenability literally does not exist, the research findings would indirectly seem to lend support to the contact hypothesis.

In other words, if one only considers the attitudinal components collectively of the ARII, there is clearly a degree of openness to racial integration. Thus, one must ask the question, why is it that all those respondents who *are* amenable in this way do not seem to be putting that into practice? The clear answer from the previous literature is that there simply have not been and still are not enough locations where it is even possible in a physical sense for meaningful contact between different races to occur, in Cape Town moreso than many other urban centres in South Africa[95]. The clear indication that comes from this is that Cape Town is in dire need of spatial arenas that are conducive to such inter-racial contact. If there were more places like that, those positive and open attitudes (no matter how few in number) would at least stand a chance of growing into meaningful socio-racial interaction and integration. Even those with evasive attitudes could, given an environment encouraging of integration, be swayed in that direction.

Nevertheless, the fact that there is a high degree of ambivalence to racial integration in general in Cape Town poses a challenge to the goal of racial integration in the city.

This speaks to a point put forward by Swanson: "A major assumption underlying research on residential segregation is the unquestioned belief that residential integration is the solution to the nation's persistent residential segregation problem" (2004:11)[96]. Clearly, the answer is not to force racial integration upon people who do not want it. In addition to this, and according to this research, black people in Cape Town are more disinclined to it than any other race group, albeit less evasive of the issue in general. I would suggest that this necessitates the creation of various forums that enable discussion and debate around the issue amongst and across different race groups, in order to encourage mutually agreed upon solutions.

Turok refers to the Cape Town Unicity's plight for an integrated approach to the development and management of the city:

> It will...face difficult tensions arising from the divided geography of the city, between the demands of its main tax-base and formal economy on the one hand and the majority poor population on the other. Within the latter, the split between former Coloured and African areas is another difficulty. These deep divisions will require astute leadership with a strong, unified vision of the city to rise above competing claims by promoting common interests and offering something for everyone. It cannot be limited to a narrow agenda of increasing economic competitiveness, implying 'business as usual' in spatial terms and offering little by way of poverty relief. Nor can it be confined to fiscal redistribution to the south-east financed by higher property taxes in the well-off areas, since this would not generate sufficient resources or do so in a sustainable way, nor would it address the basic problems of economic and social segregation. It will need to incorporate a range of integrative devices – cultural, social, economic and spatial – including accelerated development in the areas that need it most (2001:2371).

He goes on to highlight two key recommendations in this respect: firstly, closer scrutiny in the supply of land across the city in order to curb uncontrolled and opportunistic development and regulate the location and character of new investment; secondly, a more robust approach towards development in the south-east[97], with the aim of altering its "dormitory" character by building a stronger economic and employment base (2001:2372). Turok's argument above speaks to a central premise of this dissertation: that the processes of economic racial integration and social racial integration need to be approached as a unified process with multiple points of interconnection, rather than as courses of development running parallel to one another in the hope that at some point they will meet. This research has shown that level of

economic well-being does make some difference to how amenable Capetonians are to racial integration. What are unable to be determined, due to its quantitative nature, are the precise reasons for that influence. It could be due to respondents exercising preferential amenability, conditional on the socio-economic status of the group of potential, imagined neighbours[98] – a likely scenario especially in the case of wealthier respondents, as well as those with an 'average' level of economic well-being.

It could also be due to the socio-economic circumstances that characterise a respondent's life, and how levels of satisfaction / dissatisfaction with that set of circumstances may lead on the one hand to the privilege of entertaining racial integration as a socio-politically correct notion, without ever having to actually be involved in it - as in the case of those experiencing a 'good' level of economic well-being, cut off from realities other than their own through security measures such as high walls and gates. On the other hand, it may lead to seeing it as a necessary step towards upward social mobility – a scenario perhaps most likely in the case of those experiencing an 'average' level of economic well-being, but may well apply to 'poor' individuals as well. Lastly, it may lead to viewing racial integration with disillusionment and wariness, as part of the 'rainbow nation' myth that is being paid considerable lip service, but not being implemented in any practical sense – a sentiment most probable amongst 'poor' respondents, for many of whom more than a decade of democracy has not served to alter their socio-economic circumstance as it was during apartheid to any life-altering degree.

Even taking into account the substantial differences between the American and South African contexts as outlined above, the finding that disillusioned affluent blacks in the U.S. are increasingly choosing to form majority black neighbourhoods, due to "what they perceive as the failed promises of integration" (Cashin, 2001:online, as quoted in Swanson, 2004:8), is a scenario that warrants heeding in a South African context. A sense of disillusionment with the promise of integration echoes a feeling common to many coloured people in South Africa (see Adhikari, 2005), as well as amongst the poor black majority here (see MacDonald, 2006); both sections of the population have suffered drops in their living conditions standards since the advent of the new dispensation, a selling card of which was the promise of racial integration, which in turn is occurring only to minimal degree[99]. If such disillusionment in the U.S. context

is increasingly leading to a retreat from previous amenability to racial integration (for elaboration on this see Kato, 2004:3), to a current preference for racially homogenous, or at least majority same-race neighbourhoods, this does not bode well for the South African situation. In the latter context, racial residential integration is happening at a snail's pace (thought to be the case in the U.S. as well by many scholars[100]), and in many cases leads to racial desegregation in a spatial sense, but not to racial integration in a social sense.

The lesson here is that if this pattern continues unchecked - through better thought-out urban planning and policy, for example – Cape Town (and perhaps South Africa in general) may see levels of amenability to (residential) racial integration drop even lower than they already are, and a rise in preference for racial residential segregation in its place. This would represent a return to the 'laager' mentality that a post-apartheid ideology patently opposes. This would clearly have dire consequences for integration in South Africa, and consequently for the stabilisation and consolidation of democracy here. This is not to say, however, that a preference for racial residential segregation or majority-race neighbourhoods is bad per se. Clearly, it would seem that cultural factors in the Cape Town context play a part in the generally low levels of amenability to racial integration.

Perhaps a major reason that (especially poor) black respondents are most disinclined in this sense has more to do with a reluctance to live in proximity to white or coloured cultural practices / values than with a prejudice that endures as a result of apartheid. This logic could alternatively operate in the direction of any one race group to another. However, due to the preference afforded coloured people during apartheid, the cultural gap between white and coloured people is generally smaller than between either white-black or coloured-black relations[101]. Nonetheless, despite the presence of coloured-black tension in the Cape, the fact that coloured respondents were shown to be generally most amenable to racial integration perhaps reflects a greater ease with the concept of integration due to their historical intermediary status between whites and blacks in Cape Town.

The fact that white respondents in the CAS 2005 show the highest levels of evasiveness around issues of race with respect to the ARII micro-level components is

not a surprising finding, given their historical implication in the workings of apartheid, whether they were directly or indirectly involved in it. One interpretation of these high levels of evasiveness can be extracted from a particular 'narrative' of white identity in post-apartheid South Africa put forward by Steyn, termed "A Whiter Shade of White" by her (2001:153). It regards a fairly wide circle of whites that claim that they are unracialised, and contend personal innocence:

> The story is told by left wing liberals who feel that they have never been implicated in the system and would also like to deemphasize group affiliation...There are obvious, self-serving reasons why it should suit whites in South Africa to be colorblind now that the politics in the country have changed. This is a tale of evasion (2001:153).

Given the multifaceted nature of how race affects amenability levels, any policy or debate forum that seeks to encourage racial integration in Cape Town will need to address the integration of different race groups in context-specific ways. Following from this, different 'classes' within various race groups should also be approached in ways that address their particular needs and that take into account their respective reported level of amenability to integration. Indeed, cultural factors could also be seen to be a motivating factor behind class segregation – people desiring the feeling of a 'community' of some sort around them, in this case one in which the point of commonality is level of economic well-being. However, the catch to this is that if one interprets 'class' in the context of residential/social segregation as a 'cultural group', it begs the question: whose 'culture' is considered the origin or ideal within that community? For example, if Euro-Western white culture is considered the blueprint of a middle or upper class 'culture', this would amount to assimilation of coloured or black culture into white culture, clearly a negative and regressive step in a postcolonial context of 'multiculturalism'. However, if the new 'culture' – whether lower, middle or upper 'class' - is effectively a fusion or hybridity of values and practices, where everyone is entitled to contribute to its texture, regardless of race, it could be seen to comprise a grouping that has a right to assert its identity as much as any other. The problem with this logic lies in where it leads: the assertion that segregation by class in South Africa is at the least better than segregation by race. This logic clearly simply replaces one form of radical inequality and separation for another, as other writers point out.

Lemanski signposts a way forward for urban integration in post-apartheid South Africa:

> [Two] key recommendations are offered for future mixed land use developments, now heavily promoted by the government: first, to ensure a more inclusive design for the housing development as a whole (for example, more accessibility between different land uses); and, secondly, to strive towards creating symbiotic functional integration between residential zones of differing income (and in South Africa that also means different races) (2006b:417).

Previous literature (as noted in the introduction) has demonstrated that racially integrated residential zones must necessarily include commercial spaces where economic growth is allowed to flourish, and which will act as cohesive arenas where residents of different races and income-levels are able to interact on a daily basis[102]. This type of contact has mostly been shown to have an encouraging effect on socio-racial integration, on condition that areas of wealth proximal to lower-income ones are not fortressed to such a degree as to rule out the possibility of interaction of the afore-mentioned nature to begin with.

Watson (2001:130) advocates a co-working between spatial and economic planners, in order to "develop an integrated understanding of the urban space-economy and to identify within this, potential public-led "urban transformation" projects", which should grow into public-private partnerships. She recommends that such projects should aim to address the spatial disparities of Cape Town, at first targeting the interstitial areas between wealthier and poorer parts of the city, since securing private investment in areas of extreme poverty is unlikely (ibid). She further emphasises that a dialogue between city-wide and local organisations and residents must take place for such projects, with issues of cultural specificity given priority (ibid). As she puts it:

> It is clear that the kinds of skills which planners are equipped with have to be broadened. There is a need to understand space, not as a determining variable, but as an integral part of social and economic forces, and as an element which will inevitably be shaped in various ways by the ebb and flow of social change (2001:130).

Toward this end, and rather than continuing on the path from apartheid city planning to the post-apartheid ethic of equality and erasure of difference, Watson advocates a move to planning which adds to concerns with equity, redistribution, accountability and environmental sustainability, a "concern with the recognition of difference" (2001:132).

In the previous literature, three of the key criteria purported to encourage residential racial integration are firstly for different race groups to perceive benefits from the potential relationship[103]; secondly, that economic opportunity be present on site of where integration is being promoted; and thirdly that meaningful contact between different races (and, as has been suggested by numerous urban theorists[104], between different 'classes') on a day-to-day living basis is able to take place. Given these criteria, I would suggest that, despite the fact that the relationship between economic well-being and amenability to racial integration is a shown to be a subtle one according to the research in this dissertation, it is nonetheless one that deserves attention, if racial integration is to be consolidated at a policy and everyday level in Cape Town. For different race groups in Cape Town (and indeed, in South Africa) to see benefit in relating to people from other race groups, radical inequalities in economic well-being levels will not bode well, unless, for example, ventures and developments that benefit both parties in terms of their relative states of economic well-being, are made possible. This in turn will serve to fulfil the criteria of economic opportunity, as well of meaningful, purposive contact between different race groups, and different 'classes'. In short, it will go some of way to answering the current call for 'symbiotic functional integration'[105] by urban theorists in the country.

As the broad ideological framework of South Africa, the ambiguity and blurriness of term 'non-racialism' is reflected in the lack of clarity around precisely how to implement 'non-racialism' at a policy level, as well as in lived reality. The reasons for the ANC's use of term were made clear in the introduction. In many respects, the term racial integration is the positive version of the inherently negative term '*non*-racial'; whereas the latter is defined by what it is not, the former redefines what could be. By perpetuating the deliberately equivocal ideology of 'non-racialism', without backing it with enough tangible, practical strategies for achieving it, the ANC government makes it easier for South Africans to remain blind to the realities of what racial

integration would mean, and begin to accept them. Despite the obvious necessity for the ANC to mediate between capital and the equality promised by democracy (but seldom delivered) with multiracialism (Macdonald, 2006), a strategy is required which has as its goal the realisation of non-racialism, or at least getting as close to that ideal as possible. A crucial part of such a strategy will be to make urban residential racial integration a priority, not merely as an agreeable-sounding piece of spin, but in the form of comprehensive, inclusive policies which take into account spatial, social and economic factors in a unitary manner. Such policies should be based on research into how these manifold factors interact in dynamic, regressive, constructive, destructive, and hopeful ways in the current post-apartheid urban arena.

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Endnotes

Notes from Introduction

1 This is not to say that attitudes to race necessarily lead to action (for example, integration), either at a personal or policy level. Rather, it is my suggestion that they may form a significant contributing factor to the eventuality of such action. In the same vein, people's spoken responses, such as those contained in survey data, may not necessarily reflect their true feelings or actions.

2 The U.S. was chosen for various reasons in this respect, firstly due to accessibility of publications, particularly on survey data connected to the central topic of this paper, as well as on racial attitudes and race relations in general there.

3 A unique attribute that the CAS 2005 data offered this enquiry was the inclusion of modules able to provide rich data on attitudes to race, as well as a module dedicated to household-level and individual-level data pertinent to a respondent's level of economic well-being. Thus, the relationship between official classification systems, voluntary self-identification, and attitudes to issues around race and culture can be explored at a deeper level in it than in many more conventional surveys (such as census, labour force surveys, and so forth).

4 Her references here are Ellen, 1998; Ellen, 2000; Helper, 1986; Molotch, 1972 and Saltman, 1990.

5 This distinction will receive further attention in the following section.

6 Regardless of theoretical notions of race, a patent reality of human existence is that people are inherently visual creatures – they are likely to 'see' race, either in a sociologically / politically conscious manner as a 'marker', which may or may not be consequently perceived as a social construct of sorts, or in an sub/unconscious manner as a 'fact' or biological essentialism. However, in either of these cases, to look at a person and recognise discern any particular colour/shade of skin need not necessarily be equal to judging them or discriminating against them in any way. In other words, neither need necessarily be by default associated or unassociated with racism, or therefore with resistance to racial integration.

7 By using this inclusive theme, advertisers for products that range from school stationary, to fashion stores, to banking, that effectively enlarge target markets and render various products in some way 'socially and politically conscious', and therefore presumably more appealing to a South African audience. Clearly this would be limited depending on the product being advertised, and does not preclude/deny the existence of companies/corporations/advertisers that are genuinely motivated by a social conscience in this respect.

8 The examples she gives here are Standard Banks's: "There's more holding us together than keeping us apart", and the widely punted 'Proudly South African' campaign.

9 My line of thought here is greatly influenced by David T. Goldberg's argument as posed in his book *The Racial State* (2002).

10 Republic of South Africa. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Pretoria:Government Printer, 1996), §1, 1 (b), as pointed out by MacDonald, 2006:92).

11 See for example, Omi & Winant, 2000; Adhikari, 2005; Distiller, & Steyn, 2004; Erasmus, 2005; and Gilroy, 2000.

12 MacDonald describes the current meaning of non-racialism for the ANC:

> "The ANC's non-racialism...affirms classically liberal democratic values (the primacy of individual merit, the right to self-definition, equal rights for all citizens) and rejects the right of the state to impose group identities on citizens...But the non-racial state does not challenge groups. It declares a common national citizenship above ethnic and racial groups, but does not aspire to abolish groups. "Non-racialism" posits political equality as a supreme value, assigns

communal identities to the private realm, and allows the public state to represent private interests and identities" (MacDonald, 2006:115).

[13] MacDonald asserts that racial solidarities are enlisted for election purposes – by the ANC and other political parties - despite the alleged 'non-racial' political structures in place in the country. He notes that the material interests of whites (at least of the rich ones) stand to gain from the ANC's highlighting of the representation of African identities (2006:133). He points out that: "Africanizing state leadership serves as the condition – the camouflage - for stabilizing the state, recognizing the power of business, and instating the material interests of prosperous South Africans (who are disproportionately white)" (2006:133).

[14] The term 'black' in this paper is intended to refer to any South African people of black African origin, and *not* (as is often assumed) to all non-white people in the country. Where the term 'African' is used in its place, it refers to the same concept, however is only used in that form when quoting or paraphrasing other authors' work. Thus, my personal interpretation of the term 'African' is as referring to any person who has originated on the African continent, regardless of race. The majority of black people in Cape Town are of isiXhosa descent; in turn, most of the black CAS 2005 respondents are from an isiXhosa cultural background. The term 'white' is used in this paper in reference to any South African people-respondents of European descent, but who do not identify themselves as 'coloured'. This is in line with the fact that during apartheid, a 'white' racial classification was defined as respresenting anyone of European descent, while simultaneously denying that coloured people in South Africa frequently contained European lineage in their ancestry line as well. In other words, if a South African person is of European descent, and self-classifies themself as 'white', or at least does not reject the census classification of themself as 'white', for the purposes of this paper, their racial classification is 'white'.

[15] According to country-wide research conducted in 2003 by the Human Sciences Research Council, and documented in the book *South African Social Attitudes: Changing Times, Diverse Voices*, attitudes around race relations appear to have softened since the 2001 round of their survey (Daniel, Southall & Dippenaar, 2006:37). The majority of respondents felt that race relations had improved, and a slight drop was evident in the number who thought they had grown worse (ibid). Most respondents reported that there were no racial groups that they did not like, with a 39% minority who answered that there were (ibid). Nationally, the white racial group was the most distrusted, except in the Western and Northern Cape provinces, where black people were the most distrusted (ibid). "Given the large coloured populations in these two provinces, what this probably represents is the continuing prejudice of many coloured people towards black Africans" (ibid).

[16] Steyn defines 'whiteness' in terms of race theory: ...whiteness has been theorized as the racial norm, the invisible center that deflects attention from itself by racializing the margins, and constructing them as the problem. Whiteness then believes in its own homogenous neutrality. Whites are described as generally unaware of their own racialization, unconscious of their privilege, or of how their implicit assumption of white entitlement are a consequence of certain historical relations, not something essential about whiteness itself (2001:162). She concludes with the important assertion that: "South African whites can play a part in creating a postcolonial South Africa only if they themselves, their own identities, become postcolonial spaces" (2001:170).

[17] This is a reference to the fact that racial segregation already existed under pre-apartheid colonial rule, prior to the official beginning of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (the latter signalling the end of colonialism in South Africa). For her full description of this, as well as of apartheid legislation related to dividing between rural and urban contests by race, see Oldfield, 2004:190.

[18] Elsewhere, Christopher notes that the "1991 census coincided with the peak of effective residential segregation" (2001:452).

[19] Her references in this section include Houssay-Holzschuch et al, 2000; Lohnert et al, 1998; Hart, 1996; and Saff, 1994, 1998, 2001.

[20] Two other provinces in South Africa where coloured people tended to reside, albeit to a far lesser degree than the Cape provinces.

[21] At the time of his publication, the "Cape Town CBD, together with the northern and southern arms, houses some 37 per cent of the population but contains over 80 per cent of all jobs in the CMA [Cape Metropolitan Area]" (Cape Metropolitan Council, 1996; as cited in Turok, 2001:2352). Consequently, current government-sponsored transport subsidies in fact serve to "sustain the city's polarisation and imbalances" (ibid).

[22] For a discussion of the MSDF's various successes and failures, an interested reader can refer to the detailed breakdown of these by Watson (2001) and Turok (2001).

[23] The MSDF "tends to be seen as a technocratic policy lacking immediate relevance...Nevertheless, it retains a special status as the only systematic...vision of what the city as a whole should become in the post-*apartheid* era" (Wilkinson, 2000; as cited by Turok, 2001:2355).

[24] As mentioned above, the previous literature available on (particularly residential) racial integration in Cape Town is not considerable in size. This section focuses, therefore, amongst others, on two writers whose anthropological – ethnographic studies of the topic display depth, detail and have bearing on the relationship between attitude to racial integration and level of economic well-being. Although there is no quantitative previous literature on precisely this dissertation topic, it is clear that taking qualitative research into account is essential to the topic. Even though Swanson discusses this in relation to American integration, I would suggest that her words have relevance to the South African context as well:

> Unfortunately little research exists that treats integration as a social condition because it is difficult to measure and characterize the attitudes and interactions amongst community residents with anything other than a small case-study approach...Yet it is precisely this research that is most needed because it is here where one can "shed light on the question of why the growth in stable, racially integrated neighborhoods has not been greater[24]" (2004:15).

That said, and in defence of the significance of quantitative enquiry, such as this dissertation, Pillay points out that "Public opinion and attitudinal research in South Africa is...able to provide policy-makers with insights into the values and attitudes of a broader range of South Africans, thereby indirectly extending the role of the 'public' in shaping policy" (2006:4).

[25] Also, in contrast to Oldfield's observations of 'active' forms of mixing, non-racial identities at Westlake are more 'passive', "based on who you are, rather than what you are doing" (Lemanski, 2006a:418).

[26] Seekings points out two recent settlements of such a dual class and racial contrast in Cape Town, constructed mainly for black people in previously high-income, predominantly white residential areas (2000:834). Both of them amount to a legal shack settlements, one being in Hout Bay, and known as 'Imizhamo Yethu' or 'Mandela Park'; the other is in Milnerton and is known as Marconi beam (ibid).

[27] The main findings of the Muizenberg research were that: "...[It] appears that on the whole, physical desegregation has not led to social integration in Muizenberg (despite pockets of social integration based on shared class), and although this confirms Turok's observation that the apartheid legacy is "embedded" in people's "institutional and social practices" to some extent (2001:2350), it is also important to note the significance of having *any* desegregated suburbs, something unimaginable in the hey-days of apartheid only a few decades ago..." (Lemanski, 2006c:39).

[28] The latter sentiment is echoed in the U.S. literature by Swanson, 2004:11.

[29] It should be noted that there exists a body of literature on in-group out-group preferences amongst racial groups, as well as one on national identity, consisting of the supra- and sub-identities of various types in any one nation. These topics are not covered in this literature review since they are only somewhat related to the topic at hand and exceed the scope of this dissertation, but could possibly provide a comparative base for the interested researcher in future enquiry.

[31] As Foster puts it: "When space is allowed to disappear so too do two other features integral to the analysis of space: bodies and temporal sequences. When bodily processes, space and temporal sequencing are faded into the background, then 'contact' just becomes an apparently neutral event, hollowed out from the very bodily practices which constitute it and which endow it with different meanings" (Foster, 2005:498).

[32] Amongst these, he reports results of Dixon et al.; Tredoux et al.; and Schrieff et al. on voluntary racial segregation on university campuses, where "Racialised categories intertwine with spatial arrangements of bodies to create differential comfort-zone places" (ibid:500) – a cause for concern about the ease of non-racialism in the 'born-frees' of South Africa (the generation born after the advent of the new dispensation).

[33] As he puts it: "...the disarmingly simple notion that it matters how we inter-relate in bodily practice, in place-identity or in meta-stereotypic imagination to others. It relocates the explanatory base to the interactional sphere" (ibid:502).

[34] For example, in a series of investigations on the public space of beaches in South Africa, Dixon & Durrheim (2003; 2004) found that "despite quite complex swirls of patterning in space and through time sequences, racialised segregation remained the norm" (Foster, 2005:495). In this beach research it was further found that: "Whites still carry a sense of entitlement to erstwhile 'whites-only' places, thus their sense of being displaced by desegregation. Blacks have a sense that whites still disparage them (meta-stereotypes at work) and that whites do not wish to share the new dispensation" (as described by Foster, 2005:503).

[35] Charles points out that, although fragile and sparse, "racially integrated neighborhoods are not, as once thought, inevitably doomed to rapid resegregation" (Ellen, 2000; as cited in Charles, 2003:200).

[36] Even though this last point in certain respects reflects the South African reality, desegregated low-income housing projects backed by government funds are an example of an exception to this predicament (see discussion of such projects above).

[37] Here she refers to Brooks, 1996 and Feagin and Sykes, 1994.

[38] Reference is made here by Swanson to Oliver and Shapiro, 1997. For discussion around continuing and increasing discriminatory practices in this respect from a multiethnic point of view in the U.S., see Charles, 2003.

[39] Charles refers heavily in this section to Ellen, 2000, and Nyden et al., 1998.

[40] A further point of similarity in both the case of Oldfield, as well as Lemanski's studies of 'integrated' communities in Cape Town, is contained in Padín and Sullivan's preliminary analysis that: "integrated social networks seem more likely to emerge around the meeting of common interests that are either local or commonly addressed locally, and collectively. This, we suspect, is why neighborhood organizations were far more integrated than any other networks" (2003:22).

[41] It is important to note that the examination of the link between economic well-being and racial attitudes to integration in this paper does not consider whether the proposed concept of integration is perceived by respondents as same-class, but cross-race, or cross-class, but same-race integration, or any other permutation of these factors. It is unfortunate that such a variable is unable to be explored, but at this point, the CAS 2005 data do not allow for such a detailed analysis of the specific topic of integration. Thus, while this is clearly an (important) qualifying factor in terms of how people feel about integration in South Africa, for the purposes of this paper, integration is investigated chiefly as an across-race issue, including whether that entails social as well as demographic integration or not. However, further consideration of this issue is contained later in the discussion section of the conclusion to this paper.

Notes from Chapter 1: Economic Well-Being and Race in Cape Town

[41] Furthermore, in the CAS 2005 data, 17% of the employed sub-sample did not answer the personal income question, restricting individual income information overall to 39% of the entire sample.

[42] Definitions of economic well-being using household income are therefore likely to underestimate, for example, gender dynamics within a household in terms of economic well-being, since it is highly probable that income discrepancies will be found to exist between the sexes in any one household. It follows that gendered power dynamics in relation to income in any in one household will also be hidden if household income is used as the sole variable for economic well-being (see for example Haddad & Kanbur, 1990:866-867, 879-880; Ferree & Hall, 1996:929, 931-933, 946; Seekings & Nattrass, 2005: 45, 48, 194-195).

[43] For a detailed breakdown of the respondent sample by race, gender, and education levels, see Appendix B.

[44] These were created by Professor Jeremy Seekings in February 2006.

[45] It is important to note that, due to the fact that this dissertation was written during and soon after the CAS 2005 survey was conducted, this set of weights is a preliminary set, with the result that certain calculations could not be carried out in this research due to an incompatibility of this (preliminary) set of weights with the statistical software employed for the purposes of data analysis (STATA). Exactly which calculations this concerns shall be made clear at a later point in the text.

[46] In the South African 2001 Census it is noted that "Black Africans constituted the vast majority of the population in all provinces except two, namely the Western Cape and the Northern Cape, where coloured people were in the majority" (Statistics South Africa, 2003:11).

[47] A comparison between the CAPS 2002 and CAS 2005 respondent samples by household income later in this chapter provides further affirmation that the CAS 2005 sample is reasonably representative of Cape Town's population.

[48] For further discussion / information on the sample and the fieldwork of the CAS 2005, the reader can refer to the CAS 2005 user's guide.

[49] For a detailed breakdown of the respondent sample by race, gender, and education levels, see Appendix B.

[50] The category of self-employment in the CAS 2005 data includes respondents working in the informal, as well as the formal sector of the labour market. However, detailed analysis of occupational data has not been attempted in this paper, despite the fact that it would have enabled a far more detailed 'class' analysis, including informal/formal sector dynamics amongst respondents. Thus the exact ratio within the 'self-employment' category of informal as opposed to formal sector workers is not possible to calculate at this point in the context of this dissertation.

[51] The same format was used for the household income question.

[52] For a detailed description of these distributions, including graphic depictions, see Appendix B.

[53] Although income cannot be used as the sole basis for classification of respondents according to class, since from an academic point of view, occupation is a necessary element in any empirical class analysis; levels of income can be seen as either partially involved in class classification processes, or as a closely related, companion phenomenon to occupation, one which will often reflect a similar structure of stratification as an occupational class structure. Seekings and Nattrass found that there was "very clearly a relation between class...and household income" (2005:253). Thus, in this paper, while the term 'class' will not be used as a matter of course, nor will income be used as a single factor that determines classification into various classes, indirect reference will be made to notions to do with class, inasmuch as income levels may hint at patterns connected to class analysis concepts.

[54] It is important to note that the respondent sample size is cut down in size with respect to the household income variable, since 13% of the sample refused to answer the household income question, and 8% gave the answer "don't know".

[55] It is important to note that since the CAS 2005 income data was reported in income bands, these data are not amenable to analysis in terms of certain widely used measures of inequality such as the Theil's index, Atkinson's index, or Gini coefficient. Although such measures would have ideally been included in this chapter, particularly in order to ascertain a measure of between-group as opposed to within-group inequality, they are not included for the reason given above.

[56] It is important to note that charting household income (income-level above) by race could be construed as erroneous, not to mention a symptom of "race-thinking" – in its inherent stereotyping of social/familial domestic structures. Depicting household income in terms of race operates on the presumption that each respondent 'belongs' or resides in an abode in which all other household members are of the same race as the respondent. While, in a country such as South Africa, that is statistically likely to be the case, it does not excuse such a practice, nor should it condone it. Rather, in this paper, this should be viewed as a necessary compromise in order to make sense of the income data in such a way that all respondents, rather than only the employed sub-sample, can be tracked in terms of income. On a related note, gender (or race by gender) breakdown of household income would be illogical, since, unless that breakdown was tracking the gender of the head of household, the gender of the respective respondent has no relevance in relation to the rest of the household members in terms of household income. This highlights yet again the limits of using household income as an explanatory variable – firstly it forces the researcher into racial generalisation, and secondly, it masks the distribution of income (and power) within any one household by gender (for further discussion on the drawbacks to using households as opposed to individuals for the purposes of inequality analysis in South Africa, see Seekings & Nattrass, 2005: 45, 192-195, 289).

[57] The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has created four composite indices of human development, which together have become a widely accepted system of measurement for human development from a global, regional and national point of view. One of these indices is the Human Development Index (HDI), which serves as an important reference point for this research into the CAS 2005 data, particularly since the UNDP HDI consists in part of various household level indicators. The Health Systems Trust (HST), an organisation based in South Africa, has drawn upon the framework of the HDI (as well as some of the other UNDP indices) for the purposes of measuring development in South Africa. For this reason, both the UNDP and HST have been drawn upon in this research into the CAS 2005, as a guideline for certain aspects of the LCI. The level of detail, however, in the case of either index mentioned above is not extensive. Certainly in the case of the UNDP HDI, this is understandable, since it is used primarily for the purposes of research that takes place (to as great a degree as possible) on a global scale, often with the goal of enabling eventual cross-country comparisons. Thus practical limitations such funding, as well the as the sheer scale of coordinating such massive projects clearly places limits on the amount of detail that can be feasibly probed in a survey questionnaire employed for such purposes.

[58] A detailed description of each of these, including how each was constructed, can be found in Appendix B.

Notes from Chapter 2: Attitudes to Race in Cape Town

[59] Given that the term 'attitude to race' could be interpreted either as meaning 'attitude to *race*' or 'attitude to *people* of a different racial group', it is important to specify here that this dissertation concerns itself only with the latter meaning of the term. In other words, although the CAS 2005 data would indeed allow for a degree of analysis of how people feel about race as a concept, I have not chosen to explore that issue in the context of this paper.

[60] In this respect, many questions were included, not just on self-identity but also on how respondents are seen by others, what respondents mean when they describe themselves as x or y, and so forth.

[51] This is explained in the Census in Brief 2001 document as follows: "Statistics South Africa continues to classify people by population group, in order to monitor progress in moving away from apartheid based discrimination of the past. However membership of a population group is now based on self-perception and self-classification, not on a legal definition. Five options were provided on the questionnaire. Black, African, Coloured, Indian or Asian, White, and Other....Responses in the category 'Other' were very few..." (Statistics South Africa, 2003:xii).

[52] For a fuller description of self / social identification by racial classification in the CAS 2005, see Appendix C.

[53] For the purposes of data analysis, the two usable racial classification questions are F.1 and F.5. Of these two questions, question F.5 featured the least use of the 'other' option by respondents, and since those who had chosen the 'other' option would have been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid over-complication, the respondent sample size would have been effectively lower if the question F.1 option were chosen. Higher, rather than lower, sample sizes are always preferred for data analysis, since the overall validity and reliability of any result tends to be stronger with higher sample sizes, as well as any justification for generalising findings out to the larger (city) population.

[54] This does not mean that the apartheid classification is considered to be an 'objective' one in any absolute or flawless sense, since in reality a 'purely' objective definition of anything is well-nigh impossible. Rather, it is used for the purposes of this enquiry in a qualified manner that takes account of the glaring and ironic reversion to apartheid tools of segregationist ideology. Whether this in itself serves to further entrench segregationist thinking about race ultimately falls within the realm of individual responsibility.

[55] One route for further research into the topic of attitudes to race would be to examine the correlations between the different measures of racial attitude used in this enquiry. This could be followed by a factor analysis of those variables. However, since the focus of this dissertation is on the relationship between one aspect of attitude to race – amenability to racial integration – and economic well-being, and not on attitude to race in general, this path is not followed here. For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that the ARII is measuring indicators of – proxies for amenability to racial integration: the measure itself (the ARII) is not the topic in question, and therefore extensive scrutiny of it as a gauge is not conducted here.

[56] Clearly, when taking into account all the possible biases that could be present in the responses obtained via survey questionnaire methodology, both the attitudinal, as well the behavioural information may or may not reflect any one respondent's 'truth'. However, for the purposes of carrying out this research on the CAS 2005 data, these answers will be taken as reflecting genuine responses, while taking into account and holding in mind various sets of questions where the risk of bias might be particularly high.

[57] If one chose to alter the manner in which a response distribution in this context is divided up, it would give rise to a different result in terms of a respondent's ARII score. For example, in a distribution scale of 1-12, one could include 5 in the 'disinclined' category, and 7 in the 'amenable' category. The difference when such a choice is made is dramatic, and in effect results in an almost 360 degree about turn (the differences between the two outcomes for the ARI Combined Indexes are listed as tables in Appendix C for any interested reader). For the author, using a simple mean feels closer to the raw 'truth' of respondent attitudes towards racial integration: whereas using the second method in effect seems equal to giving a considerable amount of leniency and leeway to respondents on either side of the fence. Also, the second method seems to be characterised by a far greater degree of manipulation of the results than when choosing the simple mean method.

[58] It is also important to point out that responses here could be influenced/skewed by specific experiences. For example, a respondent might have a multi-racial social circle, but may have recently, or repeatedly, been the victim of crimes committed by people from a specific racial group. This may result in a confused response, characterised by trust of their friends (of all races), yet simultaneous distrust of a specific race group (the perpetrators of the crimes). Questionnaire responses, which are generally and necessarily fairly simple, are unlikely to be able to capture the complexities of such people's feelings, which have been affected and

swayed by personal incidents (this point was brought to my attention in personal notes to me by an examiner, 2007).

The inter- and intra-racial trust variables, as well as the inter- and intra-racial marriage variables, are reported in this paper as absolute, rather than relative (i.e. one value that represents the difference between intra and inter-racial trust levels / approval/disapproval of marriage levels), values. It must be acknowledged that there might be a difference in the results, depending on whether absolute or relative measures / values are used, but that the choice of absolute values was preferred in the case of these data. The primary reason for the choice to use an absolute rather than a relative value here is that, when I did create a relative value (intra-racial minus inter-racial trust levels; incidentally, it does not matter which you minus from which, of course, each resultant distribution is simply an inverse of the other), the resultant distribution, which runs from +4 to −4, contained a high number of possible combinations of responses for each point in the distribution scale. When I attempted to sift out a method for in turn converting this scale into one that is compatible with the ARII, ie. 1=disinclined, 2=evasive, and 3=amenable, it is impossible to do without classifying each pair of responses case by case. In other words, for example, a '1' could be a '4' – '3', or it could be a '5' – '4', or it could be a '2' – '1'. In the first instance, that respondent was evasive on inter-racial trust, in the second instance, the respondent was amenable to it, in the third instance, the respondent is disinclined.

Thus, creating relative values for these two variables would have entailed taking each instance into account, in order to avoid ending up slotting a considerable proportion of respondents into one of my ARII categories that they did not in fact 'earn'. Also, if I were to do the same with my ARII inter-marriage variables, the number of possible combinations would be far greater for any one variable (since each of those contains four possible response sets, one for each race group). It would be erroneous on my part, in other words, to create a blanketing effect that blurred the results by conflating categories that are by definition categorical (although ordinal), and therefore discrete. Another important reason for my not wishing to use a relative value, is that the rest of my ARII variables are absolute values, and I wished to maintain a degree of uniformity and consistency for the purposes of incorporating all the separate variables into the final combined index.

It is important to note that, once these results are subjected to a multiple regression analysis later in Chapter 3, this gender difference in relation to amenability to racial integration levels is shown to be not statistically significant. For this reason, extensive theorisation around why there is a slight difference found would be thoroughly speculative, and could not be generalised out as a result that is representative of Cape Town as a whole. Such a discussion is therefore not attempted here.

See Appendix C for the graphic representation of this.

The 'refused' and 'don't know' responses have not been included in the distributions, since the total number of such responses was negligible.

For a fuller, more detailed description of the above results, see Appendix C.

It is important to note that 'disinclination' here does not necessarily denote a total lack of desire to interact with other racial groups. A respondent might be amenable to racial integration in theory or sentiment, but may find it difficult to meet / socialise with different racial groups in reality, given constraints such physical residential segregation of races in South Africa, inability to afford the costs of socialising in a central area, and so forth. However, in the case of the ARII Racially Integrated Activity variable, certain simplistic equations have been made for the sake of scientific simplicity, and in order to enable the eventual calculation of a combined ARII score. Thus, 'disinclination' in this case is equated with no or low levels of racially integrated activity, whilst amenability to racial integration is equated with actual interaction of a racially integrated nature. This kind of reasoning, which some might describe as deductive or reductive, is by no means ideal, but is employed as a conscious quantitative choice in order to make meaning of a large number of responses in a way that shows the response pattern in a simple, easily readable way.

This question, although a fairly direct measure of racially integrated activity in a respondent's life, proved impossible to adapt to the ARII, without causing an unreasonable amount of category conflation. In other words, aside from the fact that an 'evasive' category is completely absent – not a problem in and of itself – the only real option is then to class 'none of them' as 'amenable', and to lump 'some of them', 'most of them' and 'all of them' together as 'disinclined'. Apart from the fact that there are clear distinctions between the latter three categories, it seems ethically questionable to categorise someone as disinclined to racial integration who in fact has a degree of it in their lives. Thus, racial integration is clearly not an 'all or none' phenomenon or experience, but for the purposes of the social-scientific measurement of the ARII, it has unfortunately been posed as such in the formulation of certain of the above variables. However, in this instance, the compensatory level of inaccuracy toward this purpose is simply too high to include it in the ARII, and for this reason it is used merely for the purposes of description.

See section entitled "Scoring System for the ARII" above for details of how the ARI Combined Indexes (Alternatives 1 and 2) were calculated.

Notes from Chapter 3: Economic Well-Being and Attitude to Race

The STATA 'svy: regress' command (instead the plain 'regress' command) was used for the multiple regression analysis, which takes the estimation sample into account resulting from the afore-mentioned (chapter 1) application of a set of weights to the data-set.

The secondary education sub-variable has been scored as 'poor' if a respondent's secondary education level lies between 0 (no schooling) and grade 9, 'average' if it is at either grade 10 or 11, and 'good' if the respondent has completed their secondary schooling, and thus reached the level of grade 12. The 'record of tertiary education' sub-variable has been adapted for regression purposes by scoring a lack of tertiary education as 'poor', and presence of it as 'good'. The combined education variable comprises the aggregation of these two scores divided by two (the number of sub-variables involved) for each respondent, giving rise to a simple mean value of the combined education sub-variable scores. Its format is thus an ordinal scale with a range of possible values from one to three. This adaptation process was undertaken partly as a means of combining the secondary and tertiary education sub-variables into a single variable, and partly as a way of compensating for the fact that certain respondents have not completed their secondary education, or have a very low level of it, yet have also reported having tertiary level education. If tertiary education had been recorded in the conventional survey manner as having a value of '13' (i.e. one above the final secondary schooling grade 12), whether a respondent has no secondary schooling or has completed it, that respondent would be recorded automatically as '13' if they had a record of tertiary education at all. These two cases are clearly different, however, with the latter being a higher level of education overall than the former. Thus, in order to preserve as much detail as regards education level in this light, the above-explained adaptation process was used to construct an education variable for multiple regression purposes.

The figures below provide partial grounds for not including an 'age squared' variable in the regression models for the ARI Combined Indexes. An 'age squared' variable is normally included where there is a possibility of a quadratic relationship between age and the dependent variable in question, in other words, where the dependent value begins at a certain level, rises to a peak at some point in a life-cycle, and then tapers off again toward the latter end of a life-cycle. In this case, the age and age-squared variables together would serve as proxies for 'experience', and the signal for such a quadratic relationship in regression results would be that the 'age' coefficient would have a positive value, while the 'age-squared' variable a negative one, and both would be statistically significant. During the construction phase of the regression model below, an age-squared variable was indeed included to begin with, producing the consistent result that both variable coefficients registered as statistically insignificant. Once the 'age-squared' variable was removed, however, the 'age' coefficient showed as significant (the direction and degree to be described in full below). The 'adjusted R-squared' takes into account the complexity of the model relative to the complexity of the

data, so as to ensure that the coefficient of determination is actually reporting an increase in explanatory power, rather than simply the effect of adding additional explanatory variables to the regression model (Nattrass, lecture notes on regression, 2004:15). In the case of the above, the adjusted r-squared value rose as a result of the removal of the 'age-squared' variable, indicating that including 'age-squared' was in fact detracting from the explanatory power of the model. The above points indicate a clear linear relationship between age and the ARII, rather than a quadratic one. Under these circumstances, it is preferable to include the 'age' variable on its own in the regression model.

80 The reason that non-labour-force participants are included in the '0' value of the dummy variable, is firstly that, were only unemployed (broad definition) respondents included in this value, the respective number of observations for that regression would decrease considerably, causing the results to become less reliable. Secondly, given that certain non-labour-force participants are such due to disability, illness, old-age, being a caretaker, and so forth, the possibility follows that, as a non-labour-force participant, you could nonetheless be at a disadvantage as compared with the employed. In order to account for this possibility, they are included in the multiple regression equation in order to ascertain whether the general state of 'not working' (as opposed to only considering those officially 'unemployed') has any influence on amenability to racial integration.

81 It is important to note that performing multiple regression on ordinal data such as the ARI Combined Index is not necessarily ideal in terms of methodology. Multiple regression results are most accurate and revealing if the dependent variable consists of continuous, numeric data. Nonetheless, using ordinal data will still yield a raw indication of the intensity of influence that the independent variables may be exerting on the variability of the dependent variable.

82 This process is explained in detail in chapter 2 in the section entitled "Scoring System for the ARII".

83 Incidentally, a regression that excluded the I.C.I from the model of explanatory variables was run using the ARI Combined Index Alternative 1 as the dependent variable (as is the case above using the ARI Combined Index Alternative 2 as the dependent viable, or regression 6). Its results have not been listed, since it only produced one significant coefficient – that pertaining to belonging to the black race group – and was therefore not seen to add any new light on the subject matter.

84 Since the significance level of 'gender' here is so low, it would be dubious to theorise about the fact that it was the removal of 'income level' that triggered gender coming somewhat to the fore.

85 It is necessary at this point to refer to a slightly difficult issue to do with analysing the race dummies in the above regressions. Due to the frequently tiered formation of ARII values, as well as level of economic well-being in terms of race, where, in both afore-mentioned cases, black respondents show the lowest levels (of amenability to racial integration as well as economic well-being), coloured respondents are positioned in the middle, and whites show the highest levels (the majority of the graphic depictions along these lines in chapters 1 and 2 bear this out), interpreting the race dummy variable coefficients in the above regressions does become slightly tricky. This is not necessarily so as regards the black dummy variable, since comparing black respondents to coloured and white ones is a fairly logical process, facilitated by the fact that the black sub-sample often sits apart from the other two sub-samples in a structural sense. However, it is more difficult to compare the coloured sub-sample in a clear-cut way with the rest of the sample, when the latter is generally positioned to either side of the former in terms of ARII and economic well-being values. For example, in regression 4 above, it certainly makes sense to say that coloured respondents score, on average, .2 points above black respondents on the ARII, but to say the same about coloured as opposed to white respondents becomes problematical, given the regularity of the above-mentioned racial distribution.

86 Of course, Alternative 2 - whether the 3-point scale, or total score continuum – inherently displays greater variability than Alternative 1, simply because of the additional 'amenable' category in the former instance. It would seem to follow that increased variability in the

dependent variable would afford the multiple regression calculation more to report on. This, together with the above-mentioned suitability of continuous dependent variables to the multiple regression process could therefore be the reason for regression 7 yielding the highest r-squared and number of significant coefficient values using the full model.

[57] This may have something to do with the difficulty in interpreting the coloured coefficient in relation to the other race groups, as mentioned above.

Notes from Conclusion

[58] It is important to emphasise that any within-race as opposed to between-race analysis of the Amenability to Racial Integration Index (ARII) was only conducted on the index as a combined whole, including alternatives 1 and 2. Thus, any analysis of the micro-level, individual variables that go to make up the ARII should be read taking into account that it is only looking at between-race dynamics in this respect. Analysis of the Combined ARI Index, alternatives 1 and 2, on the other hand, will be looked at from both a between as well as within-race perspective.

[59] The author is not implying here, however, that black respondents necessarily choose to avoid racial integration. As has been pointed out earlier in this paper, since black respondents are on average associated with the lowest levels of socio-economic well-being, there may be little choice involved in the matter. This is because capacity for integration is limited by lack of opportunity due to elements such as residential geography (distance from other races) and lack of perceived commonality with other races (in spheres such as education, language and culture). The latter point was highlighted to me by Lemanski in personal feedback (2007).

[60] Seekings, 2006, personal correspondence.

[61] See for example Saff, 1994, 1998, as cited by Lemanski, 2006a:417, pointed out in the introduction.

[62] Ethical – ideological issues connected to education might also be implicated by the results of this research, such as the prioritisation of an overhaul of educational tools, particularly in the form of texts. This is with particular reference to how people from different racial and ethnic groups are portrayed in those texts pictorially, and the kinds of contexts they are depicted in with regard to, for example, their living environment, the occupation they are portrayed as involved in and the likely income level that would afford, and so forth. A call may consequently be triggered for policy-making that addresses negative racial stereotyping or racism at such a level within schooling.

[63] Residential racial integration is not the only type of racial integration advocated in this way: other spheres for it such as places of religious worship, educational institutions, and so forth are similarly proposed as important locations for integration to occur. This dissertation, however, focuses more on the residential sphere.

[64] See, for example, Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi, 2002; Foster, 2005.

[65] See for example Christopher, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Haferburg, 2002; Lemanski, 2006a.

[66] This type of quesitoning is echoed by Lemanski (as pointed out in the introduction), 2006c:39.

[67] The south-east sector of Cape Town is it's poorest sector in terms of income levels, and as a peri-urban urban area, depicts the lowest levels of development in the greater Cape Town region. It is populated mainly by black and coloured people.

[68] As is pointed out in the previous literature section of the introduction, socio-economic status of potential neighbours is shown to affect attitudes towards integrating with those neighbours (see for example, Lemanski, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Oldfield, 2004).

[69] There is also evidence of whites being disillusioned with the post-apartheid era, hence an increase in white emigration out of South Africa, and gated communities as a choice of residential living amongst certain whites (personal report to me by Lemanski, 2007).

See, for example, Swanson, 2004.

A further commonality in this sense is partly present in the form of a common language shared between whites and coloureds (Afrikaans).

See for example Neuman, 1994; as cited in Swanson, 2004:2.

See Bakewell, 2002, as quoted in Lemanski, 2006b:409.

See for example, Turok, 2001; and Lemanski, 2006c.

See Lemanski, 2006b:417.

Appendix A

The Cape Area Study 2005 Questionnaire: Modules D, F and G

Section D: Civil Society

D1	Here is a list of different kinds of organizations and groups **[show card].** Please look at the categories carefully. Can you please tell me whether you are a member or involved in any of these kinds of organisations?	D1.1 Do you participate in this kind of organization ?		D1.2 If yes, please tell me whether you are a leader, an active member, an inactive member or not a member but you take part in activities of this organization? **Only one answer possible**				D1.3 Do you contribute money to this organisation?	
		Yes	No	Leader	Active Member	Inactive Member	Only take part in activities but not a member	Yes	No
A	Religious organization, e.g. Church, Mosque, church choir, prayer group	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
B	Political party	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
C	Community-based group, e.g. neighbourhood watch or street committee	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
D	Sports club or recreational club, e.g. art, dancing, book or soccer club	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
E	A charity or volunteer organization	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
F	Trade Union	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
G	Human rights organization, e.g. TAC, Childline	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
H	Association for professionals, businessmen or traders	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
I	School-based committee or club, e.g. PTA or fund-raising committee	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
J	Other-**Specify:**	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2

If respondent answers No to all options in D.1, ie is not involved in any organization at all, skip to question D.6.

Skip this page if respondent is not involved in any organization or group

D.2	**Skip D.2 if only one group was mentioned in D.1.** Of the groups which you mentioned belonging to, which group is the most important to you? **If the respondent is unsure, ask: which one would you say takes up the most of your time?** **Please tick *one* only:**	Religious organization, e.g. Church, Mosque, church choir, prayer group	1
		Political party	2
		Community-based group, e.g. neighbourhood watch or street committee	3
		Sports club or recreational club, e.g. art, dancing, book or hockey, soccer club	4
		A charity or volunteer organization	5
		Trade Union	6
		Human rights organization, e.g. TAC, Childline	7
		Association for professionals, businessmen or traders	8
		School-based committee or club, e.g. PTA or fund-raising committee	10
		Other-**Specify:**	11

D.3	**Questions D.3 to D.5 refer to the most important organization or group mentioned by the respondent in D.1 or D.2.** In the past five years, has the number of people involved in or members of this group/ organisation declined, remained the same or increased?	Declined	1
		Remained the same	2
		Increased	3
		Don't know	99

Have any other members of this group or organization ever ...		Yes	No	Don't Know
D.4.1	Helped you get a place at school or college or university?	1	2	99
D.4.2	Helped you get a job?	1	2	99
D.4.3	Given or lent you money?	1	2	99
D.4.4	Helped you get medical care of any kind?	1	2	99
		The same	Different	Don't Know
D.5.1	Do most members of this group come from the same neighbourhood or do they come from different neighbourhoods?	1	2	99
D.5.2	Do most members of this group have about the same income or do they have very different incomes?	1	2	99
D.5.3	Do most members of this group have the same education or do they have different educations?	1	2	99
D.5.4	Are most members of this group in the same racial or population group, or do they come from different racial / population groups?	1	2	99

D.6 is only for respondents who are not involved in or a member of *any* of the organisations mentioned in D.1.
What is the most important reason why you are currently *not* involved in any organization or group? What is the second most important reason?
Show card.

	D6.1	D6.2
	1st Reason	2nd Reason
Not enough time or too busy or too tired	1	1
It is too expensive; I cannot afford it	2	2
I do not want to belong to any group	3	3
No facilities for these groups/organizations in my area or the facilities are poorly maintained	4	4
There is no need, I am satisfied with my current state of affairs	5	5
Other people are involved and dealing with the issues	6	6
I prefer to deal with issues that concern me on my own	7	7
I hope that government will tackle the problem	8	8
I do not like mixing and socializing with other people	10	10
It is not safe	11	11
I am not aware of any organisations to join	12	12
Other –**Specify:**	13	13
Don't Know	99	99

Ask everyone:

D.7	Now let us talk about voluntary work. In the last year, have you been a volunteer on any kind of project or made a contribution of any kind (time, money, clothes etc) for a charitable cause?	Yes	1 **Go to D.8**
		No	2 **Skip to D.9**
		Don't know	99 **Skip to D.9**

D.8	**If yes to D.7** What types of organizations have you helped? **Show card for D.8 or read list.** **Multiple options possible**	D.8.1	Religious organisation doing work for the poor	1
		D.8.2	An Old Age Home or Orphanage	1
		D.8.3	A learning centre	1
		D.8.4	A care-giving organisation (e.g. hospice or Nkosi's Haven)	1
		D.8.5	Local and International NGO projects	1
		D.8.6	A feeding scheme for the poor e.g. soup kitchen	1
		D.8.7	A government-driven community upliftment project	1
		D.8.8	Private individuals	1
		D.8.9	Other–**Specify:**	1
		D.8.10	Don't Know	99

			D.9.1	D.9.2
			1st reason	2nd reason
D.9	**If no to D.7**. Please read the options on this card. Which one of the following reasons best explain why you have not undertaken any volunteer or charity-related work? You can give up to three reasons. **Show card for D.9 or read list**.	I would like to volunteer, but I don't know which organisations to approach.	1	1
		I don't have transport to reach the organizations which I would like to support.	2	2
		I feel unsafe in the area where these organisations operate.	3	3
		It is the government's responsibility to help people in difficult circumstances, not mine.	4	4
		I don't have the relevant skills that organisations need.	5	5
		I can't afford to help other people because I'm facing difficult circumstances myself.	6	6
		I don't have the time, I'm too busy.	7	7
		I just do not want to.	8	8
		Other- **Specify:**	10	10
		Don't know	9	9

Ask everyone:		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
D.10	Do you agree or disagree with the statement that "generally speaking most people can be trusted"?	1	2	3	4	5	9

D.11 Now, I want to ask you how much you trust different types of people. I am going to read a list of different groups of people. How many people in each of these categories can be trusted, in your opinion? Please answer using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning almost none of them can be trusted and 5 meaning that most people in this group can be trusted. **Show card.**

		None/ Almost none of them can be trusted	Very few of them can be trusted	I don't know enough about them to say	Some of them can be trusted	Most of them can be trusted	Not Applicable
D.11.1	Nurses and Doctors	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.2	Politicians	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.3	Your colleagues at work (if you work)	1	2	3	4	5	Not Working 6
D.11.4	People from your racial group	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.5	People from other racial groups	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.6	Teachers	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.7	Policemen/women	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.8	People from your religious group	1	2	3	4	5	Not religious 7
D.11.9	People from other religious groups	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.10	Members of your family	1	2	3	4	5	
D.11.11	People who work in government offices, e.g. at the Department of Home Affairs	1	2	3	4	5	

For the following statements, would you say that you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with the sentiments expressed?		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
D.12	People in your area will generally help each other out	1	2	3	4	5	99
D.13	Most people who live in this neighbourhood can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	99
D.14	Residents in this area are alert and will generally look out for each other's security	1	2	3	4	5	99

D.15	For how long have you been living here, in this flat or house?	Less than one year	1
		Between 1 and 5 years	2
		Between 6 and 10 years	3
		More than 10 years	4
		Since I was born	5
		Don't know	99
D.16	For how long have you been living in this neighbourhood?	Less than one year	1
		Between 1 and 5 years	2
		Between 6 and 10 years	3
		More than 10 years	4
		Since I was born	5
		Don't know	99
D.17	How well do you know your neighbours? Do you know them well, a little or not at all?	I know them well	1
		I know them a little	2
		Not at all	3
		Don't know	99
D.18	Would you say the feeling or sense of togetherness in this neighbourhood is strong, weak or neither strong nor weak?	Strong	1
		Neither strong nor weak	2
		Weak	3
		Don't know	99

		Safe	Neither safe nor unsafe	unsafe	Don't know
D.19	Do you feel sate or unsafe in your own home?	1	2	3	99
D.20	Do you feel safe or unsafe walking in your neighbourhood during the day time?	1	2	3	99
D.21	Do you feel safe or unsafe walking in your neighbourhood after dark?	1	2	3	99

In some neighbourhoods there are problems. I shall read a list of problems. For each, can you please tell me how common it is in your neighbourhood. If it does happen often or sometimes, can you please tell me to whom or where you go to solve the problem.

D.22 D.23		D.22	D.23
		Has this ever been a problem in your area? **If Yes**: Is this *often* a problem in your area or *sometimes* a problem in your area? **Show card or read out options** **Circle one option only.**	**Only ask D.23 if respondent answered "yes, often" or "yes, sometimes" to D.22** To where do/would you go to solve this problem? **Show card or read out options** **Circle one option only.**
	1. Drunks or vagrants on the streets and beggars frequenting the area	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know

	2. Homes being broken into	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know
	3. Cars broken into or stolen	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know
	4. Poor recreational facilities (e.g. parks) or roads.	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know
	5. Gangs	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know
	6. Noisy neighbours or loud parties	1. Yes, Often 2. Yes, Sometimes 3. No 99. Don't know	1: your local councillor 2: the City Council 3: A relative or neighbour 4: A local organisation 5: police 6: armed response company 7: Solve it yourself 8: Do nothing 99: Don't know

D.24	Do any of the following groups of people help to keep your neighbourhood safe? **Show card or read list** **Multiple options possible**	D.24.1	Gangs	1
		D.24.2	People from your neighbourhood or a community / residents' association	1
		D.24.3	A security or armed response company	1
		D.24.4	Police	1
		D.24.5	Don't Know	99

People sometimes ask other people to help them with something. Do you have a neighbour that you can rely on to...		Yes	No	Don't Know
D.25.1	Help you by holding a ladder or moving furniture	1	2	99
D.25.2	Lend you R20 if you needed it	1	2	99
D.25.3	Lend you R200 if you really needed it	1	2	99
D.25.4	Spend time with you if you were feeling unhappy or need advice about an important issue	1	2	99
Do you have a family member or relative that you can rely on to...		Yes	No	Don't Know
D.26.1	Help you by holding a ladder or moving furniture	1	2	99
D.26.2	Lend you R20 if you needed it	1	2	99
D.26.3	Lend you R200 if you really needed it	1	2	99
D.26.4	Spend time with you if you were feeling unhappy or need advice about an important issue	1	2	99
Do you have a friend or work colleague that you can rely on to...		Yes	No	Don't Know
D.27.1	Help you by holding a ladder or moving furniture	1	2	99
D.27.2	Lend you R20 if you needed it	1	2	99
D.27.3	Lend you R200 if you really needed it	1	2	99
D.27.4	Spend time with you if you were feeling unhappy or need advice about an important issue	1	2	99

D.28	How often do members of this household sit together and discuss everyday things like work or school? Would you say it is often, sometimes or never?	Often	1
		Sometimes	2
		Never	3
		Don't know	99

Now, thinking of your immediate family, relatives, friends and neighbours:

D.29 D.30	Show card for responses	D.29 How often do you visit them or speak to them in person?	D.30 How often do you speak to them on the phone or email them?
	1. Immediate family members living outside this household (i.e. parents, siblings or children)	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know
	2. Other relatives living outside this household	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know
	3. Neighbours	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know
	4. Friends	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know	1. Every day 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a month 4. Rarely/Never 99. Don't Know

In some areas in Cape Town there are street committees or neighbourhood watches or other groups like these:

D.31	Is there such an organisation in your street?	Yes	1	**Go to D.32**
		No	2	**Skip to D.33**
		Don't know	99	**Skip to D.33**

D.32	Would you say the street committee is performing its job well or not well?	Well	1
		Not well	2
		Don't know	99

In many areas, there are 'civic organizations' or ratepayers associations for people who live in different areas: eg. Hout Bay Residents' Association

D.33	Is there such an organisation in your area?	Yes	1	**Go to D.34**
		No	2	**Skip to D.35**
		Don't know	99	**Skip to D.35**

D.34.	Would you say this organization is performing its job well or not well?	Well	1
		Not well	2
		Don't know	99

I'm going to read out a list of activities and I'd like to know how often you're involved in them.
Do you .... **(Read one alternative at a time)** .... very often, sometimes or never?

		Very often	Sometimes	Never	Don't know
D.35	Listen to the news on the radio?	1	2	4	99
D.36	Watch the news on TV?	1	2	4	99
D.37	Read about politics in the newspaper?	1	2	4	99
D.38	Chat about politics with friends or family?	1	2	4	99

Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have done any of them during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance? **Read out list**

		No, never	No, but would if had the chance	Yes	Don't know
D.39	Attended a community meeting	1	2	3	99
D.40	Got together with others to raise an issue	1	2	3	99
D.41	Taken part in a campaign, to raise money for a cause	1	2	3	99
D.42	Attended a demonstration or protest march	1	2	3	99
D.43	Signed a petition	1	2	3	99
D.44	Joined a boycott	1	2	3	99
D.45	Joined a strike	1	2	3	99

Module F: 'Race' and Culture

F.1	When you think about race, how do you classify yourself? **Do not read out options. Only one option possible. If 'other', specify clearly and fully.** **If respondent asks for a definition of race, say that "Race is defined in terms of what it means to you".**		African	1
			Coloured	2
			Indian	3
			White	4
			Black	5
			Other- **Specify:**	6
			Refused / I refuse to define myself in racial terms	98
			Don't Know	99
F.2	Please look at this show card. Which of these options best explains why you classified yourself as ... **[race in F1]?**. You can choose more than one option. **Use show card. Multiple mentions possible. If 'other', specify clearly and fully.**	F2.1	The previous (apartheid era) classifications.	1
		F2.2	Physical characteristics (such as skin colour)	1
		F2.3	The way society or other people see me	1
		F2.4	Heritage or family (grandparents, parents)	1
		F2.5	Culture	1
		F2.6	Other- **Specify:**	1
		F2.7	Refused / I do not define myself in racial terms	98
		F2.8	Don't Know	99
F.3	How do most other people see you? Do they see you as African, black, coloured, Indian, white or something else? **Multiple mentions possible. If 'other', specify clearly and fully.**	F.3.1	African	1
		F.3.2	Black	1
		F.3.3	Coloured	1
		F.3.4	Indian	1
		F.3.5	White	1
		F.3.6	Other- **Specify:**	1
		F.3.7	Refused	98
		F.3.8	Don't Know	99
F.4	Some people say they come from a certain culture. For example, someone might say "I am culturally Zulu" or "I am Muslim" or "I am an English-speaker". Please look at this list **[show card]** and tell me which of these best describes how you classify yourself culturally. **Use show card. Only one option allowed.** **If the respondent gives more than one option, ask him/her which is the most important.** **If respondent asks for a definition of culture, say that "Culture is defined in terms of what it means to you".**			

African	1	South African	27
Afrikaans-speaking	2	Tembu	28
Afrikaner	3	White	29
Bhaca	4	Xhosa	30
Black	5	Zulu	31
Catholic	6	Other- **Specify:**	32

European/Western	11
Hindu	12
Hlubi	13
Indian	14
Italian	15
Jewish	16
Liberal	17
Malay	18
Mfengu	20
Muslim	21
Pondo	22
Portuguese	23
Protestant	24
Rastafarian	25
Scottish	26

		Christian	7		
		Coloured	8	Refused	98
		English-speaking	10	Don't Know	99

F.5	How were you classified under the apartheid system? **If the person was too young, ask: How would you have been classified under the apartheid system?**	Black/African	1
		Coloured	2
		Indian	3
		White	4
		Other-**Specify:**	5
		Refused	98
		Don't know	99
F.6	People sometimes think of themselves as being in a class. Would you say that you are in the upper class, middle class, working class or lower class? **Only one option possible.** **If respondent asks for a definition of class, say that "Class is defined in terms of what it means to you".** **If the respondent does not understand the question, circle 95**	Upper class	1
		Middle class	2
		Working class	3
		Lower class	4
		Other - **Specify**:	5
		Respondent does not understand this question	95
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99

F.7 Sometimes we have preferences as to how you would like other people to see us. You have told us that you see yourself:

... in racial terms as ..... **[interviewer: write in race from F.1]**

... in cultural terms as ..... **[interviewer: write in culture from F.4]**

... in class terms as ..... **[interviewer: write in class from F.6]**

Which of these is most important to you? Which of these is the second most important to you? Which of these is the least important to you?

	F.7.1	F.7.2	F.7.3
	Most Important	Second Most Important	Least Important
Race	1	1	1
Culture	2	2	2
Class	3	3	3
Don't Know	99	99	99

Please tell me whether yoou agree or disagree with the following statements:		Yes, agree	Uncertain	No, disagree	Refuse	Don't Know
F.8	You do *not* feel comfortable around people who are not ... **[F.1- Race]**	1	2	3	98	99
F.9	You cannot imagine ever being friends with someone who is not ... **[F.1-Race]**	1	2	3	98	99
F.10	You do *not* feel comfortable around people who are not ...**[F4-Culture]**	1	2	3	98	99
F.11	You cannot imagine ever being friends with	1	2	3	98	99

	someone who is not ... **[F4-Culture]**					

F.12	If you have a husband or wife, boyfriend or girlfriend, would you say that he / she is white, black/African, Indian, coloured or something else? **Only one option possible. If 'other', specify clearly and fully.**	African	1
		Coloured	2
		Indian	3
		White	4
		Black	5
		Other-**Specify:**	6
		Does not have a husband / wife / boyfriend / girlfriend	97
		Refused	98
		Don't know	99

F.13	Is your husband or wife, boyfriend or girlfriend also ... **[F4-culture]**?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99

F.14	When you think of your ancestors, which would you say best describes them?: They were..... Use show card **Multiple options allowed.** **If respondent asks you to clarify 'ancestors', say "for example -your great grandparents".**	F.14.1	White	1
		F.14.2	European/Western	1
		F.14.3	African	1
		F.14.4	Black	1
		F.14.5	Indian	1
		F.14.6	Other Asian (Malay, Chinese)	1
		F.14.7	Coloured	1
		F.14.8	Khoi, San	1
		F.14.9	Xhosa	1
		F.14.10	Afrikaner	1
		F.14.11	Other-**Specify:**	1
		F.14.12	Refused	98
		F.14.13	Don't Know	99

Read Aloud. There is a lot of discussion nowadays about how people of different races and cultures are interacting. Can you tell us whether you would approve or disapprove of the following situations?

	Probe whether the respondent approves / disapproves a little or a lot.	Approve a lot	Approve a little	Disapprove a little	Disapprove a lot	Race is irrelevant	Refused	Don't Know
F.15	A member of your family married a Coloured person	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
F.16	A member of your family married a White person	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
F.17	A member of your family married a Black/African person	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
F.18	A member of your family married an Indian person	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

F.19	How many of your five closest friends are also ... **[F1-race]** like you? **If the respondent does not have five close friends, ask about his/her five closest acquaintances.**	None of them	0
		Some of them (i.e. 1 or 2)	1
		Most of them (i.e. 3 or 4)	2
		All of them	3
		Don't know	99
F.20	How many of your five closest friends are also ... **[F4-culture]** like you? **If the respondent does not have five close friends, ask about his/her five closest acquaintances.**	None of them	0
		Some of them (i.e. 1 or 2)	1
		Most of them (i.e. 3 or 4)	2
		All of them	3
		Don't know	99
F.21	How many of the five people with whom you work most closely are also ... **[F1-race]** like you? **If the respondent does not work, record as not applicable.**	None of them	0
		Some of them (i.e. 1 or 2)	1
		Most of them (i.e. 3 or 4)	2
		All of them	3
		Not applicable	97
		Don't know	99
F.22	How many of the five people with whom you work most closely are also ... **[F4-culture]** like you? **If the respondent does not work, record as 'not applicable'.**	None of them	0
		Some of them (i.e. 1 or 2)	1
		Most of them (i.e. 3 or 4)	2
		All of them	3
		Not applicable	97
		Don't know	99
F.23	In the last seven days, have you spent a social evening or some free time with friends or acquaintances who are NOT... **[F1-race]**, either at home, going out to eat, or at a community or religious gathering?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99
F.24	In the last seven days, have you spent a social evening or some free time with friends or acquaintances who are NOT... **[F4-culture]**, either at home, going out to eat, or at a community or religious gathering?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99
F.25	Do you think relations between people of different races in South Africa are better or worse than they were before 1994 or are they about the same?	Better now	1
		About the same	2
		Worse now	3
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99
F.26	Think about ten years from now, in 2015. Do you think relations between people of different races in South Africa will be better or worse in 2015 than they are now, or will they be about the same?	Better in future	1
		About the same	2
		Worse now	3
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99
F.27	In the past five years, since 2000, have you ever been treated worse than other people or benefited because you are ... **[F1- race]**?	Treated worse	1
		Benefited	2
		Both treated worse and benefited	3
		Neither	4
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99

F.28	In the past five years, since 2000, have you ever been treated worse than other people or benefited because of your language or religion?	Treated worse	1
		Benefited	2
		Both treated worse and benefited	3
		Neither	4
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99
F.29	In the past five years, since 2000, have you ever been treated worse than other people or benefited because you are a man/ woman?	Treated worse	1
		Benefited	2
		Both treated worse and benefited	3
		Neither	4
		Refused	98
		Don't Know	99

Some people experience discrimination. How often, if ever, have you had the following experiences?		Often	Some-times	Never	Refused	Don't know
F.30	How often, if ever, have you been treated with less respect than other people?	1	2	3	98	99
F.31	How often, if ever, have you been served less well than others in restaurants and shops?	1	2	3	98	99
F.32	How often, if ever, have people reacted to you as though they were afraid of you?	1	2	3	98	99
F.33	How often, if ever, have people reacted to you as though they were better than you?	1	2	3	98	99
F.34	How often, if ever, have you been watched or followed in shops?	1	2	3	98	99

F.35	Do you think that anyone who was born in Africa, whether they are black, coloured or white, should be allowed to call themselves an "African"?	Yes	1	**Skip to F.37**
		No	2	**Go to F.36**
		Refused	98	**Skip to F.37**
		Don't Know	99	**Skip to F.37**

F.36	**Only ask if respondent said No to F.35**: What kind of things do you think makes a person an African? **Multiple mentions possible**	F.35.1	Must be black	1
		F.35.2	Political involvement	1
		F.35.3	Ancestors must be from here / be buried here	1
		F.35.4	Must have suffered under apartheid	1
		F.35.5	Must live in South Africa	1
		F.35.6	Must identify with Africa	1
		F.35.7	Must identify him/herself as African	1
		F.35.8	Other- **Specify:**	1
		F.35.9	Refused	98
		F.35.10	Don't Know	99

The following are questions asking about you opinion on certain issues relevant to South Africa today. Please say whether you 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'neither agree/disagree', 'disagree' or 'strongly disagree'.

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
F.37	People of all races were victims of apartheid	1	2	3	4	5	99
F.38	In the new South Africa we do not talk about race issues enough	1	2	3	4	5	99
F.39	People should realize we are South Africans and stop thinking of themselves as Xhosas, Afrikaners or Zulu etc.	1	2	3	4	5	99

F.40 What is your skin colour? On a scale of 0 to 10, where *0* means *very pale* and *10* means *very dark*, please indicate your skin colour.
Show card. only one option possible

|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very pale very dark

refused to answer 98
don't know 99

Module G: Household Roster

LINE NUM-BER	NAME OF PERSON IN HOUSEHOLD	AGE	SEX		RELATIONSHIP TO RESPONDENT									
G.1	G.2	G.3	G.4		G.5	G.6	G.7			G.8			G.9	
	Beginning with the head of the household, can you please tell me the names of all of the people who **usually** live in this household. **SEE NOTE ON RIGHT**	How old is this person in years (at last birth-day)? OR In what year was he / she born?	Is this person male or female?		What is the relationship of this person to you? **SEE 'A' CODES**	**If age 7 or older:** What is the highest **grade** this person ever completed in **school** (only grades 0-12)?	**If age 15 or older:** Has this person ever studied at university, technicon or other institution of higher education?			**If age 7 or older:** Is this person currently attending school or any educational institution?			**If aged 7-18 and not attending school or any educational institution:** Why is this child *not* attending school or any educational institution? **SEE 'B' CODES**	
		Age or year	Male 1	Female 2			Yes	No	Don't know	Yes	No	Don't know		
1			1	2										
2			1	2										
3			1	2										
4			1	2										
5			1	2										
6			1	2										
7			1	2										
8			1	2										
9			1	2										
10			1	2										
11			1	2										
12			1	2										
13			1	2										
14			1	2										
15			1	2										

more than 15 people in this household, use a spare household roster

G.10	Do you have a close relationship with someone (husband/wife, not divorced, or boyfriend/girlfriend) who does ***not*** live in this household?	Yes	No
		1	2

If yes to G.10: please list below in line number 30 and ask all questions in the roster.

30														

Note for G.2: 'Usually lives here' means the person has lived here, under this roof, for more than fifteen of the last thirty days.

	B
	To be added

	B CODES FOR G.15
1	School expenses are too high
2	Needed to work
3	Needed to care for others at home
4	Ill or disabled
5	Became pregnant
6	Could not cope with shool work
7	Completed education
8	Expelled
99	Don't know

LINE NUMBER	NAME OF PERSON	WORK AND INCOME **Age 16 or older only**													
G.1	G.2	G.11	G.12			G.13	G.14	G.15	G.16						
	Copy names from G.2 on previous page. Ensure that the order is exactly the same	In the last 7 days, was this person working, on leave from work or not working? **Include self-employment as work.** If working, was it full-time or part-time? **Codes:** **1 full-time** **2 part-time** **3 on leave** **4 not working**	**If not working in last 7 days:** Does this person want work?			**If working in last 7 days:** What kind of work does this person do? **Write down occupation or job title. Record at least two words such as: Car salesperson, Office cleaner, Vegetable farmer, Primary school teacher, etc.**	**If currently working** What is the main business at this person's place of work? What are its main functions? **Main industry, economic activity, product or service of the employer or company: E.g. road construction, supermarket, police service, hairdressing, banking** **or activity of person if self-employed** **or PH private household**	**If currently working** What is the name of the business? **Record name of business** **or** **PH private household** **SE self-employed**	**Show card.** In the last month, what was this person's total salary/pay per month from all work? **Only include income from work (including overtime, allowances and bonus); record take home pay.** **If self-employed, include monthly income <u>after</u> expenses for business are deducted.** **Rand per month**						
			yes	no	Don't know				0-1000	1001-3000	3001-5000	5001-10000	More than 10000	Don't know
1			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
2			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
3			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
4			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
5			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
6			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
7			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
8			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
9			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
10			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
11			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
12			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
13			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
14			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
15			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9
30			1	2	9				1	2	3	4	5	9

LINE UMBER	NAME OF PERSON	GRANTS	In your home, who is (1) mainly responsible for each of the following activities, and (2) who is responsible if the first person cannot assist? **Record with a 1 the most responsible person** **Record with a 2 the alternative person**					
G.1	G.2	G.17	G.18		G.19		G.20	
	Copy names from G.2 on previous page. Ensure that the order is exactly the same	Who on this list receives any form of grant from the government? **If yes:** What kind of grant? **1 old-age pension** **2 disability grant** **3 child support grant** **4 other** **9 don't know** **Record in the line of the beneficiary**	Cooking, and cleaning		Earning money to support the household		Looking after children and looking after family members when they are sick	
			No one	97	No one	97	No one	97
			Don't know	99	Don't know	99	Don't know	99
1.								
2.								
3.								
4.								
5.								
6.								
7.								
8.								
9.								
10.								
11.								
12.								
13.								
14.								
15.								
30.								

G.21	**Show card.** About how much money does this household receive in total in a typical month from everybody? Please include all earnings, pensions, grants and money received from people not living in the household. Please answer using one of the categories on the card. **Interviewer: probe respondent for best guess.**	R 0 - 1000 per month	1
		R 1001 – 3000 per month	2
		R 3001 – 5000 per month	3
		R 5001 – 10000 per month	4
		More than R 10000 per month	5
		Refused	98
		Don't know	99
G.22	How many rooms are there in your house? Include any backyard rooms, but do *not* include kitchens, bathrooms, toilets or passages.	Number of rooms	
G.23	How many flush toilets are there in this house? Do *not* include toilets in the yard or garden.	Number of toilets	

G.24	Where were you born?	Cape Town	1	**Skip to G.26**
		Other Western Cape: in town	2	
		Other Western Cape: on a farm	3	
		Rural Eastern Cape	4	
		Other	5	
G.25	**Do not ask this question if the respondent was born in Cape Town.** When did you move to Cape Town?	Before 1960 / more than 45 years ago	1	
		In the 1960s / 35-45 years ago	2	
		In the 1970s / 25-35 years ago	3	
		In the 1980s / 15-25 years ago	4	
		In the 1990s / 5-15 years ago	5	
		Since 2000 / in the last 5 years	6	
		Don't know	99	

Ask every one.

G.26	Are you covered by medical aid?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Don't know	99
G.27	Do you contribute to a stokvel or burial society?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Don't know	99
G.28	Do you have a bank account?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Don't know	99
G.29	Do you receive alimony or any other regular payment or remittance from someone living outside the household?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Don't know	99

Interviewer: check whether the respondent is currently working (G.11 above)

If no, skip to G.37

Questions G.30 to G.36 are only for respondents who are working now (including self-employment):

G.30	Do you manage or supervise, or are you in charge of, other workers?	Yes	1
		No	2
		Don't know	99

Questions G.37 to G.40 are only for respondents who are *not* working now (including self-employment):

G.37	**Only if <u>not</u> working now.** Which of the following best describes you? **Read options.**	I am looking for work	1	**Go to G.38**
		I want work but am not looking for it	2	
		I do not want work because I am a student	3	**Go to module H**
		I do not want work because I am sick or disabled	4	
		I do not want work because I am looking after the house	5	
		I do not want work for any of the reasons above	6	

Only ask G.38 if respondent said 1 or 2 to G.37

G.38	If you are currently unemployed, for how long have you been unemployed? **Record number of years OR number of months** **Record 0 if less than 1 month** **Record 8 if not applicable, because not unemployed now**	G.38.2	Number of years	
		G.38.1	Number of months	
			Less than one month	0
			Not applicable because not unemployed now	97
G.39	**Only ask if respondent said 1 to G.37** If you are currently looking for work, for how long have you been looking? **Record number of years OR number of months** **Record 0 if less than 1 month** **Record 8 if not applicable, because not looking for work now**	G.39.1	Number of years	
		G.39.2	Number of months	
			Less than one month	0
			Not applicable because not looking for work now	97

G.40	**Only ask if respondent said 1 to G.37** How have you looked for work in the past month? **Show card** **More than one option allowed.**	G.40.1	Sought assistance from members of my household	1
		G.40.2	Sought assistance from relatives who are not in my household	1
		G.40.3	Sought assistance from friends who are not in my household	1
		G.40.4	Contacted an employment agency or trade union	1
		G.40.5	Enquired at workplaces, factories, homes, or other possible employers	1
		G.40.6	Placed or answered advertisement(s)	1
		G.40.7	Looked in newspapers, on noticeboards or on the internet	1
		G.40.8	Waited at a place where casual workers are hired	1
		G.40.10	Submitted/sent my CV to employers	1
		G.40.11	I tried to start your own business	1
		G.40.12	Looked for work in any other way (**specify**):	1

Appendix B

Reference for Chapter 1

Distribution of the Sample by Race and Gender



Figure 1.1. Distribution by race of the CAS 2005 respondent sample

In figure 1.1 above, it is shown that the largest race contingent in the sample is the coloured sub-sample (529 respondents), with the second-largest being the black sub-sample (383), and lastly the white sub-sample (258) is the smallest proportionally. An explanation of the source of the above race information will be dealt with in chapter 2 in a section on respondent racial classification[1].



Figure 1.2. Distribution by gender of the CAS 2005 respondent sample

Figure 1.2 above shows that the sample is somewhat skewed towards the female sex.

Distribution of the Sample by Age



Figure 1.3. Age distribution by race of the CAS 2005 respondent sample

The average age of respondents in the sample is 41 years.

Education

It is important to note that the 'education' independent sub-variable is being incorporated into this research for the purposes of describing the distribution of human capital within the respondent sample, and establishing how this relates to the central variables that the research is concerned with, namely, attitude to race and economic well-being.

Secondary Education



Figure 1.4. Distribution of level of education by race and gender

Figure 1.4 above shows that whereas the largest proportion of black women and men from this sample tend to have an education level of grade 12, that portion of the sub-sample is relatively small (32%). A smaller but significant proportion of each respective gender in the black sub-sample have an education level of grade 11 (16%). The rest of the sub-sample is characterised by small clumps of respondents whose attainment level is between grades 7 and 10, and a few that lie between no schooling and grade 6. A similar pattern can be detected amongst coloured men and women; however, the second most predominant grade attainment in this group is grade 10 (16% for women, 22% for men), rather than 11 (9% for both women and men). The white sub-sample differs markedly from the other two in that grade 12 is the overwhelmingly dominant level of attainment (79% of the sub-sample on average), with a far smaller proportion (11% of the sub-sample on average) grouped around the grade 10 level. Also, there are little to no white respondents with a grade attainment level of below grade 8. These results point to the legacy left from the inferior 'bantustan' education system forced upon black and coloured people during apartheid, as well as the converse privilege granted to white South Africans at the time of a superior, reserved education system, a situation that has not altogether been remedied, and which by definition, unfortunately, requires time to fully alter.

Record of Tertiary Education



Figure 1.5. Record of tertiary education amongst respondents by race and gender

Figure 1.5 above shows how 73% of the entire respondent sample has no record of tertiary education, whereas 27% of it has tertiary education of some kind. Clear disparities in record of tertiary education become apparent in the sample when viewed by race and gender. This is very likely the result of the separate and unequal streams of the South African education system during apartheid (as in the case of secondary education as afore-mentioned). According to figure 1.5 above, black women and men are almost equally as unlikely to have tertiary education of some kind; only 15% of the sub-sample on average report tertiary education experience. Coloured respondents showed only a slightly higher average in this regard, namely 20%. White respondents, conversely, showed the highest average of respondents with higher education, with men showing the highest average of the entire sample.

Labour Market Status

Distribution of Labour Market Status of Non-respondent Household Members



Figure 1.6. Distribution of labour market status* amongst non-respondents (n=3757)
* "working all ages" includes self-employment; "non-resp unemp broad aged 16-64" = non-respondents unemployed according to the broad definition of unemployment aged 16-64 years; "non-resp not in labour force 16-64" = non-respondent non-labour force participants, aged 16-64 years; "non-resp other child or old" = non-respondent non-labour force participants aged either under 16 years or over 64 years

Figure 1.6 above shows that with regard to both the percentage of those working (including all ages), as well as unemployed (using a broad definition of unemployment), the relevant figure is higher in the case of respondents than in the case of non-respondents[2]. On the other hand, the percentage of non-respondents who are non-labour-force participants is far higher than in the case of respondents – this is clearly due to the much wider age range of non-respondent household members than respondents, who were restricted to age 18 years and over.

Participation and Unemployment Rates

Participation rates and unemployment rates are similar for respondents and non-respondent household members. The participation rate is 72% for respondents, and 70% for non-respondents. The strict unemployment rate for respondents is 26%, while the broad unemployment rate in their case is 29%. For non-respondents, the broad unemployment rate is 30%.

Distribution of Income

Respondent Income



Figure 1.7. Income distribution of full-time employed respondents (n=393)

Table 1.7 above describes respondent income per month from all sources of employment, whether that is self-employment or waged employment. Firstly, an overview of the apportionment of these income earners according to five income categories (which were provided as options to choose from in the individual income question in the CAS 2005 questionnaire[3]) is given. Overall, the majority of the respondent sample who are employed in some way, earn between R1001 and R3000, with a smaller, but considerable, proportion following who earn between R3001 and R5000. Two other almost equally sized sections of the sample earn either between 0 and R1000, or between R5001 and R10 000. The smallest contingent is positioned in the top quintile, earning over R10 000. A rough calculation of mean earnings (given that the figures are already in categorised form due to the questionnaire format) reveals that, on average, respondents earn around R1 500 per month, which is also the median earnings amount.

Respondent Income by Race



Figure 1.8. Income distribution of full-time employed respondents by race (n=369)

When income distribution is disaggregated by race, the first notable characteristic is the perseverance of the racial wage hierarchy characteristic of the South African context. Figure 1.8 above shows the majority of black respondents straddled between the first and second income categories, with low numbers of the sub-sample pushing up into the higher categories. Coloured respondents are more evenly spread across all the categories, with the majority positioned in the 'R3001-R5000' category. Lastly, white respondents are clearly the most advantaged, with the largest contingent centered in the top income category.

Respondent Income by Gender



Figure 1.9. Income distribution of full-time employed respondents by gender (n=393)

Disaggregation of respondent income data by gender in figure 1.9 reveals distinct gender differences, whereby women are shown to dominate the lowest income category, while men prevail in the three highest income categories. The R1001 to R3001 income category, which as afore-mentioned is also the median individual income category, comprises the smallest gender gap, but contains a slightly higher proportion of men than women.

Interaction of Race and Gender in Respondent Income



Figure 1.10. Income distribution of full-time employed respondents by race and gender (*n*=369)

The interaction of race and gender in the respondent income distribution in Figure 1.10 above shows that black women are clearly the lowest earners in the employed sub-sample, with the majority of them earning somewhere between 1001 and 3000 rands per month, and another sizeable proportion earning between 0 and 1000 rands per month. Black employed men appear to have a relative advantage compared to this, with a larger contingent in the R1001 to R3000 bracket, and a far smaller proportion positioned in the lowest bracket.

The coloured sub-sample as a whole shows greater earning power than the black sub-sample. Coloured women, however, show less earning power when compared with coloured men, even though the discrepancy is not as great as that demonstrated between black women and men, and is slightly different in nature. The average number of coloured women represented in the two lowest earning brackets is higher than that of coloured men. Furthermore, coloured men make up a larger proportion of the sub-sample at the higher end of the income continuum than women – apart from in the uppermost earning bracket, where almost equal numbers of coloured men and women are represented, despite the fact that these figures are extremely low.

Looking at the employed sub-sample as a whole, white men are clearly the top earners. In the white sub-sample in turn, white men appear to have an advantage over white women, with the majority of white men earning above R10 000 per month, and the majority of white women earning between R5001 and R10 000 per month.

Part-time Respondent Income



Figure 1.11. Individual income distribution of part-time employed respondents (n=112)

The individual income distribution of part-time employed respondents differs from that of full-time employed respondents in a few respects. The size of the lowest income category for the part-time employed sub-sample (as shown in figure 1.11 above) is triple that of the full-time employed sub-sample. Also, whereas the second and fourth income categories for part-timers are similar in proportion to full-timers, the third and the highest income category are far smaller.



Figure 1.12. Income distribution of part-time employed respondents by race and gender (n=100)

Certain characteristics of the income distribution of part-time employed respondents by race and gender in figure 1.12 above are worth noting. Firstly, income figures are lower overall than those of respondents in full-time employment (a logical finding given the context of lesser work hours in total in part-time employment). Secondly, there are slightly more men than women in part-time employment (56% women and 64% men). Black women clearly dominate the R0-1000 income category, while coloured men are positioned mostly in the second income category. White respondents show greater income variation than the other race groups, and also earn the highest amounts. The total number of respondents in the part-time employed sub-sample of respondents is very low, however, and therefore analysis of the much smaller racial sub-samples within it becomes dubious.

Whether considering the entire sample, including all household members, or the respondent sample only, or the household members only, the ratio of full-time to part-time employed persons remains constant at approximately 80% full-time, and 20% part-time workers. For the purposes of describing income distribution, full-time and part-time employed respondents and non-respondents will be kept separate, since they

typically comprise considerably different working hours, hourly wage rates, levels of job security and stability, and occupational groups.

Household / Individual Income by Employment Status



Figure 1.13. Distribution of Respondent Household/Individual Income by Employment Status

An employed status appears to be associated with a higher household income, whereas an unemployed status appears to be associated in general with lower household incomes in figure 1.13 above.

Structure and Scoring System of the Living Conditions Index

The LCI is comprised of three sub-indexes, namely 1) condition of abode, 2) living conditions in environment surrounding abode, and 3) safety / security issues in house and neighborhood/ward. The overall scoring system for the LCI functions by means of a point system. Thus, the category 'poor' has a corresponding numerical value of 1 point, while the category 'average' earns 2 points, and lastly the 'good' category is awarded 3 points. Category '1' or 'poor' is taken to include all values equal to or between 0 and 1.74, '2' or 'average' includes all values equal to or between 1.75 and 2.74, and '3' or 'good' includes all values equal to or between 2.75 and 3. A respondent who has reached the three-quarter mark between whole index scores, therefore, is considered to be close enough to the next whole category (either 2 or 3)

in order to be 'rounded up' to it. Thus, rather than using a purely economic / mathematical convention here, whereby respondents with scores above a 0.5 mark would ordinarily be rounded up to the next whole number, a more subjective rule has been employed, one that I would suggest is more appropriate to a living conditions index scoring system. For example, a respondent who scores a 2.5 on overall living conditions is most certainly in an inferior position compared to one who scores 3. However, one that scores 2.75 clearly experiences living conditions that are closer to 3 or 'good' than 2 or 'average', and will accordingly be classified as a '3'. The only exception to this rule will be in the case of decimal scores that occur between 0 and 1. In this instance, since the implication is that such respondents are in fact extremely poor, such cases will be included in the '1' or 'poor' category of the LCI, rather than forming a new, extra category of '0'.

The questions upon which the respective LC (Living Conditions) sub-index sub-variables are based will have their response sets / answers formulated according to the LCI scoring system (details of each of these respective formulation processes will be provided in the respective description of each sub-variable). Then, by aggregating the point value on each of these in all three of the LC sub-indexes, a total score will be extracted for each respondent. This total will then be divided by the total number of LCI items or variables, giving each respondent a measure of whether their living conditions are poor, average or good (or whether they have a final score of 1, 2 or 3).

Condition of Abode

Most of the variables in the 'condition of abode' sub-index are self-explanatory, and the corresponding format that the respective original questions in the CAS 2005 questionnaire take either hardly had to be changed, or were readily adaptable to the format that my LCI takes. However, there are certain components in the 'condition of abode' sub-index that required a greater degree of adaptation in order to make sense in terms of the LCI. Each respective variable will be explained below. The LC abode sub-index comprises the combined LCI scores attained by respondents on all the 'condition of abode' variables listed below (4 in total).

i. Main Material of Walls of House

The 'main materials of walls of house' variable is coded as 'poor' living conditions if respondents reported living in a 'temporary shack' or 'permanent shack', and 'good' if their abode is a 'permanent building'. These questionnaire items, as well as those related to the next variable listed below ('main material of walls of house'), were answered by the interviewer rather than the respondent.

ii. Main Material of Roof of House

The 'main materials of roof of house' variable is coded as 'poor' living conditions if the roof consists of plastic, cardboard, or plywood, as well as if it is comprised of corrugated iron or zinc, and 'good' if it consists of either tiles or thatch.

iii. Number of Rooms in House

The wording of the survey question connected to the 'number of rooms in house' variable incorporated into my LCI stipulated certain criteria, and ran as follows: "How many rooms are there in your house? Include any backyard rooms, but do not include kitchens, bathrooms, toilets or passages." Clearly the number of rooms in a house must necessarily be related to the respective household size (the total number of household members per house, including the respondent) in order to interpret such information in the context of living conditions. There was no precedent as to how

such a relationship should be constructed, and after attempts to fit the 'number of rooms' variable into the predominant three-category Likert scale format of the LCI, namely, 1) poor, 2) average, and 3) good living conditions, formulation of an 'average' position in the scale proved illogical. Due to the either/or nature of the relationship between number of rooms and household size, the 'number of rooms' variable in effect is formulated either as 'poor', where the number of rooms in a house is less than the number of people in that house (or household size), or as 'good', where the where the number of rooms in a house is equal to or greater than the number of household members. The kind of judgment involved in forming an 'average' category for this variable becomes too subjective and complicated for the purposes of the LCI, since it would have to take into account the different relationships between all the household members involved in order to make sense. For example, it is generally acceptable for spousal partners to share one bedroom, whereas two teenage cousins of the opposite sex sharing a room would likely be considered unacceptable according to the social norms of many different cultural groupings. Although such a degree of detail in the LCI would be ideal, due to the constraints of scale and scope in this paper, the simplified version of this variable mentioned above will be used[4].

iv. Number of Toilets

The variable 'number of toilets' is used as a measure of sanitation in the LCI for the CAS 2005 data. Detail is included in this measure with respect to differences in degree of sanitation amongst those sections of the sample that do have sanitation. As in the case of the 'number of rooms' variable in my LCI, the 'number of toilets' variable is measured in terms of how it corresponds with household size. In my LCI, sanitation conditions are considered 'poor' if the respective household has either no toilet, or if the ratio of number of toilets to number of household members exceeds that of one toilet per every four household members. Sanitation conditions are considered 'average' if the aforementioned ratio is either 1:3 and 1:4. Lastly, they are considered good either if the number of toilets is equal to or greater than household size, or if the ratio of number of toilets to household size is 1:2.

It is important to note that while the majority of the sample (almost 60%) has one toilet in their house, the second largest proportion of the entire sample (21%, or, one fifth of the sample) has no toilet at all in their household, and clearly must make use of an outside toilet. This evidently does not indicate an acceptable level of sanitation for a sizeable section of this sample. Despite this, the median number of toilets in a household is 1. Of those who have no inside flush toilet, almost all (97%) are from within the black sub-sample, while coloured respondents on average have one toilet per household, and whites on average have two per household.

Living Conditions in Environment Surrounding Abode

All seven variables in the 'living conditions in environment surrounding abode' sub-index of the LCI required simply 'yes/no' answers in their original questionnaire format, and were answered by the interviewer. In the case of each variable, living condition is rated as either 'poor' or 'good' according to the response; the 'average' category is thus absent for the purposes of this sub-index. The seven components are listed below:

i. Tarred Streets
ii. State of Cleanliness of Streets
iii. Presence of Streetlights[5]
iv. Presence of Gardens
v. Condition/State of Gardens in Houses
vi. Level of Repair of Houses
vii. Poor Recreational Facilities/Roads

Clearly, in all cases apart from the last item, where a positive/affirmative response was made, the living conditions will be scored as 'good', and where a negative response has been given, the living conditions will be rated as 'poor'. This logic is reversed for the last item on the list above.

Safety / Security Issues in House and Neighborhood / Ward[6]

This sub-index consists of eight items, which are listed below:

i. Perception of Safety Level in Home[7]
ii. Perception of Safety Level on Foot in Neighborhood/Ward in Daytime
iii. Perception of Safety Level on Foot in Neighborhood/Ward at Night
iv. Presence of High Walls and/or Security Gates in Area
v. Frequency of Vagrancy in Area
vi. Frequency of House Break-ins in Area
vii. Frequency of Car Break-in/Theft in Area
viii. Gang Presence in Ward

In all the items above, a higher level of security/safety is taken to indicate better living conditions than areas with lower levels of security/safety. All the 'safety level perception' questions (items i, ii and iii in the list directly above) were measured according to the Likert scale responses 'safe', 'neither safe nor unsafe', and 'unsafe'. The presence of high walls / security gates (item iv above), which required a simple 'yes/no' answer, will be classed as 'good' living conditions if the answer was in the affirmative, since that would indicate a higher level of security than an area that has few high walls / security gates[8]. The questionnaire format of items v to viii above all conformed to the three-category Likert scale format, namely, 'yes, often', 'yes, sometimes', and 'no'. These answers clearly correspond with the 'poor', 'average', and 'good' scores in my LCI[9].

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1 For the moment, suffice it to say that the previous apartheid classification (question F.5) of race has been chosen as a basis to the race variable as the least complicated option in terms of quantitative analysis. The "other" category is not comprised of large numbers of respondents (36 in total), and the racial classification responses contained therein are by and large derogatory and racist terms. Given these two points, as well as the fact that my analysis is not focused on racial self-classification issues per se, the "other" category will be excluded from any analysis hereafter.

2 The term 'non-respondents' refers to household members who did not personally respond to the questionnaire, but about whom certain information was reported by the respondent, and recorded by the interviewer in the household roster module (module G).

3 The same format was used for the household income question.

[4] It is important to note that the lack of this kind of detail is detrimental to the accuracy of the distributional description of the data; however, this method at least ensures that any error made is on the side of caution rather than exaggeration. In other words, respondents may have been placed in the 'poor' category when they could possibly have been placed in the 'good' category, however, no respondent would have been placed in the 'good' category when in fact they belonged in the 'poor' category. Thus one could call the scoring on this particular variable a 'pro-poor' approach. Aside from all this, there would in any case be no way of measuring whether in fact one room was ample - even for a spousal couple - in terms of actual size, without actually measuring it physically, and perhaps even accompanying that measure with a photographic record. A one-room spacious loft in Cape Town city centre would be a far cry from a one-room shack comprised of plastic and cardboard in Khayalitsha, for example. Again, obtaining this level of detail is impossible at this point given the scope of this research paper, not to mention the extra labour in the field that would be required to take such measures.

[5] Street lighting is practically a given for Whites (89%) and Coloureds (96%) in the sample, whereas only two-thirds (61%) of the Black sub-sample have it. In the case of Whites here - in a counter-intuitive manner - it appears that there is less street lighting than in the case of the Coloured sub-sample. However, this is highly likely due to the fact that certain high income White areas, such as Constantia or Tokai, do not in fact have street lighting, and have a distinctly 'rich but rustic' feel (the decision to forgo streetlighting for this reason lies in the hands of the respective ratepayer's association for that area). This could be seen to be confirmed by the fact that, out of the 25 such cases in total involving white respondents, the majority of these occur in situations where household income is in the region of R5000 to more than R10 000, with only one occurring where household income is R1001 to R3000, while five cases are missing any income information whatsoever. Certain steps were taken to compensate for this situation: for all 18 observations that demonstrate the above conditions, as well as two such cases in the suburb of Pinelands, the LC surroundings sub-index score has been manually changed from '1' or 'poor' to '3' or 'good'. This is clearly in line with the fact that it would be generally incorrect to define living conditions in areas such as Tokai and Pinelands as 'poor', particularly in households where the household income is R 5000 or above.

[6] For the purposes of this research, a neighbourhood or ward are given the technical definition of a delineated area surrounding an abode.

[7] Even though this variable may be considered by some to refer to how safe a respondent feels with reference to other family or household members, and any potential threat of domestic abuse of whatever kind, such specificity was not in fact stipulated in the relevant question (see Appendix A for the full list of variables and the respective survey questions that they are based on). Rather, the question is more ambiguous, potentially referring to the above interpretation, as well as to a more general one of how safe or unsafe a respondent may feel in their home in the face of a threat outside of the household itself. A response according to either interpretation, however, is relevant to a respondent's living conditions, in that it indicates an important element of a respondent's psychological and emotional well-being connected to the level of fear/anxiety experienced in their domestic lives.

[8] This should not be taken to indicate that high walls or security gates should be seen as a positive element of living conditions per se; indeed, they are more an indication of a negative element of living conditions, in that their very necessity indicates an attempt to avoid the seemingly ever rising threat of crimes, violent or not. Not only that, the presence of such security measures has in certain cases, such as in extremely affluent (often White and sometimes gated/boomed off) areas, come to be identified with paranoia around physical association with people from 'lower' classes, isolationism and segregation along the lines of race and class. Such physical exclusivity could be seen as more reminiscent of apartheid segregated living areas, than the post-apartheid ideal of a nation coming together in reconciliation.

[9] However, one of this particular set could be regarded as ambiguous, namely item viii, 'gang presence in ward'. This is because, in certain circumstances, gangs may demonstrate a positive presence in a neighbourhood, insofar as they may act as an informal form of a

community-based 'neighbourhood watch' or 'street committee'. Of course, it is street justice that will be served in this respect, rather than a legally sanctioned form of justice born of a democratic political system. Nonetheless it may in fact serve to improve the safety and security of a particular community within a given area. For the purposes of this paper, however, and at the expense of an ideal degree of specificity, gang presence in a neighbourhood will be taken as indicative of poor living conditions, given the high degree of negative implications that gangs can exert upon a community, for example, crimes such as break-ins, theft, gang rape, murder, and so forth. Furthermore, in the context of South Africa, Cape Town is fairly notorious on the latter score, particularly in lower income areas.

Appendix C

Reference for Chapter 2

Self-Identity / Social Identity by Race

Racial Classification Questions in the CAS 2005

The CAS 2005 questionnaire consisted of a number of questions that tested popular forms of racial classification[1]. The first is question number A.13, located in the A module, and was required to be answered by the interviewer. The wording of this question was:

How would most people classify the racial or population group of the respondent?[2]

The second is question number F.1, contained in the F module, entitled "Race and Culture", and is worded as follows:

When you think about race, how do you classify yourself?

Upon asking this question, interviewers were instructed to inform any respondent who asked for a definition of race that:

Race is defined in terms of what it means to you.

This racial classification is based solely upon the respondent's judgment and personal view of which (if any) race group they identify with / belong to. These responses are modified further by a follow-up question, F.2, which enquires as to the reason for the respondent's racial self-classification, whether it be physical characteristics, a previous apartheid classification, and so forth. The third question is F.3, which asks:

How do most other people see you? Do they see you as African, black, coloured, Indian, white or something else?

Responses to this question provide clues as to the respondent's perceived social, rather than self, identity. The final racial classification question is F.5, and is worded as:

How were you classified under the apartheid system?

This is then qualified by the instruction:

If the person was too young, ask: How would you have been classified under the apartheid system?

Although the previous apartheid classification (F.5) is posed in the CAS 2005 as something from the past, many surveys, including the census, still employ the same racial categories when requesting respondents / citizens to racially categorise themselves. Therefore the manner in which the South African state racially classifies its citizens has not undergone massive change since the onset of the new dispensation[3]. Thus, the F.5 racial classification of the CAS 2005 will certainly be referred to in this paper as a previous apartheid classification, however, keeping in mind that as a state-sanctioned classification system, it is still largely operational.

As has already been pointed out by Seekings et al., the level of consistency between the above four dimensions of racial identity in the CAS 2005 is high (2005:29). In order to demonstrate this, Table 2.1 below compares respondent's apartheid classification with their self-classification of race[4]. It shows that the overwhelming majority of Black respondents self-classify themselves either into the category 'African' (53%) or black (43%); this indicates a 96% agreement rate with previous apartheid classifications in their case. The coloured and white sub-samples similarly show little diversion in this respect. It is interesting to note that only those respondents who self-classified as coloured, African or black had been classified as 'other' during apartheid, while none of the whites were, highlighting a system that

favoured whiteness as the mainstream convention or yardstick against which everything else was measured.

Table 2.1. Comparison of apartheid classification with self-classification of race

		Apartheid classification					
		African %	Coloured %	White %	Other %	Refuse %	Don't know %
Self-Classification	African	53	5	4	24	0	26
	Coloured	2	82	2	34	12	53
	White	0	0	83	0	22	0
	Black	43	1	0	18	0	8
	Other	1	10	7	24	13	13
	Refused	0	2	3	0	54	0
	Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Total n	391	528	257	36	10	15

It is important to note also that the responses connected to variables that concern racial identity – whether self, other or previous apartheid classification – will include a number of refusals to answer these questions. This answer is in effect an indication of conviction or belief in and of itself. This can be contrasted with, for example, refusal to answer an income question, which may be interpreted more as a simple unwillingness to disclose personal information. Indeed, in question F.1 the refusal option is worded:

Refused / I refuse to define myself in racial terms.

Overall, only 2% in all refused to answer the question or to define themselves in racial terms. Looking again at the total sample, only 7% of the total sample self-classified themselves into the 'other' category, effectively making use of the opportunity to detour completely from any previous apartheid classification.

Seekings et al. point out that the level of consistency is similarly high between respondents' self-identification and how they perceive other people to see them. It is also noted that there are almost no cases of complete disjunctures between any of the different dimensions of racial identity (2005:30). For example, "90 percent of respondents who consider themselves 'African' (and a higher percentage of those who consider themselves 'black') are regarded by other people as African or black (or both, given that this question allowed multiple responses, for example 'African' and 'black')" (2005:30-31). An example of the small minority of people who do differ between the various racial dimensions, as pointed out by Seekings et al., and which can be picked up from table 2.1 above, is that "one in ten respondents classified as 'coloured' under apartheid do not see themselves as white, black, African or coloured" (2005:30).

Reason for Particular Self-Classification

Firstly, 'culture' is the most popular reason given overall for racial self-classification. However, racial disaggregation reveals that by far the dominant sub-group giving this answer is the black sub-group, with the other two racial sub-groups reporting it to a far lesser degree. Black women, however, seem to place more importance on 'culture' in this regard when compared with black men, since the former were approximately twice as likely to give 'culture' as a reason as were the latter. Racial self-classification according to physical characteristics marks reasoning that is chosen in almost equal numbers by all the different race groups, and is also the second most popular reason chosen in this regard overall. In order of significance, coloured respondents appear to rate their 'previous apartheid classification' as the most significant one for self-classification, with 'heritage / family' as next in line, then 'physical characteristics', and with 'culture' and 'societal perception' being rated with the least intensity (although not insignificant), and at much the same level in terms of numbers. In terms of the black sub-sample, clearly the most significant factor in their racial self-classification decision, was 'culture', secondly, 'physical characteristics' are given some weight, as well as 'heritage / family'. White respondents showed most preference for 'physical characteristics' and 'heritage / family' as reasons for their choice. Also, across all the race groups, women appear to rate 'heritage/family' as significantly greater in importance than men.

Distribution ARII inter-racial ease variable, by race and gender



Figure 2.1. Distribution ARII inter-racial ease variable, by race and gender
Note: Red (1) = 'disinclined', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'amenable'

Attitude to Race (AR) Involvement in an Inter-Racial Partnership Indicator

Involvement or lack of involvement in an inter-racial spousal partnership is brought in at this point as an 'attitude to race' (AR) descriptive indicator. It is based on question F.12 of module F - the 'Race and Culture' module - of the CAS 2005, which reads as follows:

If you have a husband or wife, boyfriend or girlfriend, would you say that he / she is white, black/African, Indian, coloured or something else?

This indicator is depicted here in order to gain a concrete picture of the level of literal racial integration that is taking place within this respondent sample in an intimate sense. This type of domestic racial integration, at times referred to – controversially so – as 'miscegenation', is clearly a potentially powerful element in the broader process of racial integration, in the depth of commitment on a personal level to racial integration that it signals. Indeed, rather than representing even a commitment in this

respect, it points toward life decisions taken driven by motivation that moves beyond issues and concepts of racial separation. As many race theorists have pointed out, racial separation is itself illusory and based solely on a type of social and cultural engineering that has at its core the intent of preserving a particular set of cultural practices, as well as in certain cases, a particular gene pool, in its 'intact' or 'essential' form.

This is not to assert some kind of hierarchy around values or actions to do with racial integration; however, it does separate out attitude, word, and action. In other words, having an attitude or voicing an opinion that favours racial integration may not necessarily require a great deal of commitment in a concrete sense. It is easy to express an 'opinion' that you know will not need to be followed through with action. Being involved in an inter-racial relationship, on the other hand, involves a day-to-day commitment to the principle of racial integration (even if only at sub-subconscious level), without which the respective relationship is unlikely to be lasting, given the kinds of resistance – socio-cultural, as well as institutional - to inter-racial relationships in South Africa (not to mention globally). Without such commitment, such a relationship is likely, rather, to dissipate and eventually break down. Having said all of the above, it is important to stress, however, that clearly the seed of any action taken to advance racial integration lies in a combination of emotion and thought. Thus, any micro-act that embodies a manifestation of amenability to racial integration is in and of itself a powerful driver of that racial integration. This could be as small as a genuine show of common courtesy, such as a greeting, to something that requires a greater level of commitment, such as raising the quality of life of a domestic worker as their employer by raising their salary above a socially accepted – but unreasonable – level.



Figure 2.2. Distribution of racial profile of intimate partnerships, by race

Note: The categories 'Indian' and 'Other' have been excluded from the distribution.

$n = 725$

Figure 2.2 above depicts patently that the majority of respondents are involved in intra-racial rather than inter-racial intimate relationships. This is not a surprising finding, since, for the very reasons set out above, racial integration on an intimate level is likely to be the final frontier in what could be seen as an inevitable 'browning' of the nation (as is the case of Brazil, for example), rather than as a pioneering occurrence of racial integration.

4) ARII Inter-Racial Marriage Variables (4 a-d below) and AR Intra-Racial Marriage Indicators

a) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a coloured person by member of family**
b) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a black/African person by member of family**
c) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a white person by member of family**
d) **Level of approval / disapproval of inter-racial marriage to a Indian person by member of family**



Figure 2.3. Distribution of the ARII inter-racial marriage variables, and AR intra-racial marriage indicators, by race

Note: Red (1) = 'disinclined', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'amenable', except in the case of the AR intra-racial marriage indicators, where Red (1) = 'disapprove', Yellow (2) = 'evasive', and Blue (3) = 'approve'

Key to X-Axis Labels: 'Intra-_ _ _' refers to level of approval/disapproval of intra-racial marriage of a family member (the AR intra-racial marriage indicators). All other labels refer to level of amenability/disinclination to inter-racial marriage. For example, 'Black-Coloured' refers to the black sub-sample's level of amenability/disinclination to inter-racial marriage of a family member to a coloured person, and so forth.

When it comes to the issue of inter-racial marriage of a family member to a coloured person, black respondents are shown in figure 2.3 above to be clearly more amenable to racial integration than white respondents, even though this percentage of the black

sub-sample is not a large one by any means (43%). Simultaneously, black respondents show higher levels of disinclination than white respondents on this issue. Whites, on the other hand, are shown to be almost three times more evasive on this issue than blacks, which inevitably dilutes the intensity of either their amenability or disinclination on the issue. Staying for the moment with inter-marriage to a coloured person, it becomes apparent when this distribution is disaggregated by gender that while black women are slightly more amenable to familial inter-racial marriage to a coloured person than black men, white women are somewhat less amenable, as well as more disinclined, in this sense in relation to white men. Black men also appear to be rather more evasive on the issue as compared with black women.

Coloured levels of amenability in the instance of inter-marriage to a white person are notably higher than those of black respondents. There is also an even more considerable gap between levels of disinclination as regards the above two racial sub-samples, with black respondents far more disinclined. The coloured sub-sample, however, shows more evasiveness on the issue. The only notable gender differences in terms of inter-marriage to a white person entail slightly higher levels of evasiveness amongst black men than black women, and higher levels of disinclination from coloured women as opposed to coloured men.

Coloured respondents show a slight increase in levels of disinclination as compared with their average disinclination level (12%) when it comes to approval/disapproval of a family member marrying a black, as opposed to a white, person. They are also less amenable to racial integration in this respect. Whites appear to be somewhat more disinclined as compared with their average levels of disinclination with respect to inter-marriage with a black person. They are also less evasive, as well as less amenable in this sense. By gender, coloured women are to some extent more disinclined than coloured men when it comes to familial inter-marriage to a black person, whilst coloured men show higher amenability levels in this sense.

Black respondents are clearly the most disinclined and least amenable to familial inter-racial marriage to an Indian person, more-so than any other race group. When the distribution levels concerning inter-racial marriage to an Indian person are disaggregated by gender, it becomes apparent that black men are slightly more

evasive on the issue of inter-marriage to an Indian person. Coloured women are somewhat more disinclined in this regard as compared with coloured men, as are white women as compared with white men. White men, on the other hand are shown to be more amenable than white women in this sense.

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[1] In this respect, many questions were included, not just on self-identity but also on how respondents are seen by others, what respondents mean when they describe themselves as x or y, and so forth.

[2] Clearly, the interviewer's opinion of what race group the respondent 'belongs' to could be potentially influenced by multiple factors.

[3] This is explained in the Census in Brief 2001 document as follows: "Statistics South Africa continues to classify people by population group, in order to monitor progress in moving away from apartheid based discrimination of the past. However membership of a population group is now based on self-perception and self-classification, not on a legal definition. Five options were provided on the questionnaire, Black, African, Coloured, Indian or Asian, White, and Other....Responses in the category 'Other' were very few..." (Statistics South Africa, 2003:xii).

[4] Although Table 2.1 is a duplicate of Table 9 in Seekings et al (2005:29) in format, the percentage figures in Table 2.1 differ slightly with those in the corresponding Table 9 in Seekings et al., since weighting for race and gender has been applied in the former case.