
***OMNIA VINCIT AMOR***

**Parody and Tone in Ovid's *Amores* 3.11a&b**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of the names of ancient authors and the titles of their works are generally those found in Hornblower, S. And Spawforth, A. (eds.) *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4). Oxford, 2012. Additionally, the following abbreviations have been used:

*OLD* P. G. W. Glare (1968-82), *Oxford Latin Dictionary.* Oxford.

*TLL* *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae.* Leipzig: 1900–.

*Anth. Pal.* *Anthologia Palatina*

## ABSTRACT

Ovid's *Amores* 3.11a&b has been discussed by many in passing, and few in detail. The poem contains the Ovidian lover's second attempt at a *renuntiatio amoris,* and (arguably) comprises two parts of a whole: in 3.11a, the lover boasts to have emancipated himself from love's shackles and proceeds to outline the reasons for his renunciation (largely his beloved's indiscretions); in 3.11b, however, he backtracks into a drawn-out internal conflict between his love and hate for her, that exhausts in elaborate detail the Catullan *odi et amo* idea. Because in this poem elegiac commonplaces abound, and because of Ovid's verbal dexterity and allusiveness, the poem has often been deemed simply a playful parody of or variation on the Catullan theme: that is, insincere and not at all serious. Few have considered the possibility that in 3.11 we ought to take Ovid more seriously than elsewhere. I aim to show that there is good reason to do so: that the poem's irony and humour need not preclude seriousness, and that its literariness does not come at the expense of emotional intensity. Ovid's elegiac lover in the *Amores*, like the *praeceptor* in the *Remedia Amoris*, treats love as a game to be won through strategy and artifice. I suggest that, in *Am*. 3.11, Ovid reflects on the inevitable failure of this approach. By considering Ovid's use of intertextuality and intratextuality, and the difference between the Ovidian lover's attitude in *Am*. 3.11 and elsewhere in the *Amores,* I argue that the poem voices a serious concern: the lover's attempts to conquer love inevitably fail, because love conquers all; it cannot be treated as a game, because it is not one — at least not one that he can win.

# INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I critically analyse Ovid's *Amores* 3.11a&b. The poem frequently invokes elegiac commonplaces; it includes many examples of intertextual playfulness and of Ovid's characteristic verbal dexterity. It is my view that, in *Amores* 3.11a&b, Ovid provides a complex meditation on the paradoxical experiences of love. I aim to challenge the assumption that *Amores* 3.11a&b is largely a clever parody, or an exercise in literary wit. I suggest that, although irony and humour are undoubtedly present, they need not preclude emotional intensity or thematic depth. Instead, Ovid employs intertextual and intratextual allusions that infuse the poem with a balance of humour and sincerity, irony and seriousness. The poem's engagement with Catullus 85 does not merely reproduce the *odi et amo* dilemma; rather, it expands upon it, layering in another paradox: that love cannot be controlled or shaped to one's advantage, despite the lover's attempts to do so.

In the *Amores*, Ovid's persona moves through a trajectory of increasing confidence in his ability to navigate love through strategy and artifice. He manipulates the conventions of *servitium amoris*, at times weaponising it to his advantage and teaching his beloveds how to play the game. Yet, by *Amores* 3.11, the Ovidian lover's illusions of control have begun to unravel. He invokes the voices of his predecessors—Catullus, Propertius, Tibullus—in an attempt to replicate their renunciations, only to discover that he cannot escape love's grip. The poem thus becomes a commentary not only on the failure of the lover's strategies but on the limitations of the elegiac tradition itself. In this moment of reflection, Ovid reduces his persona to an archetypal elegiac lover, undone by the very generic conventions he once manipulated.

By reconsidering *Amores* 3.11 in the broader context of Ovid's literary corpus, I argue that the poem serves both as a reflection on the lover's personal plight and as a broader commentary on the state of elegiac poetry. The elegiac tradition, with its recurring motifs of devotion, suffering, and betrayal, reaches a point of exhaustion in Ovid's hands. The overwhelming intertextuality of *Amores* 3.11—its references to Catullus, Propertius, and even its foreshadowing of Ovid's own later works—suggests an awareness that Augustan love elegy has come full circle. The genre has been stretched to its limits, revisiting the same themes and reworking the same conceits, until ultimately, there is nothing left to add.

This study engages closely with Ovid's use of intertextuality and intratextuality, tracing how *Amores* 3.11 interweaves references to earlier love elegy while offering a final, paradoxical statement on the

impossibility of escaping love's dominion. In this way, I aim to illuminate the significance of *Amores* 3.11 not only within the trajectory of Ovid's own elegiac project but also within the broader development—and potential endpoint—of Latin love elegy as a whole. The poem becomes an enigmatic point of exchange between past literary traditions and future poetic innovations, marking both the culmination and dissolution of the elegiac lover's journey.

Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation provide a detailed analysis of *Amores* 3.11a and 3.11b respectively, followed by a wider discussion of the poem's key concerns in Chapter 4. Before this analysis, I address in my introductory chapter (Chapter 1) several issues relevant to my discussion: tone and parody in Ovid; pertinent scholarship on the *Amores* and on 3.11 in particular; the features of Ovid's elegiac persona.

# CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES & GENERAL SCHOLARSHIP

## 1. Parody and Tone in Ovid's *Amores*

I begin this chapter with a brief survey of scholarship on the *Amores*, because I suspect that many of the issues are at stake in my interpretation of *Amores* 3.11. Fränkel begins *Ovid: a Poet between Two Worlds* with the following remark:

> "It is the ephemeral product that allows of one explanation only…it is only natural that we should frequently be obliged to revise opinions handed down to us."[1]

By now, it seems commonplace to assert that Ovid parodies his elegiac predecessors, plays with the genre's conventions, and pushes its boundaries.[2] When Ovid arrived on the scene, the elegiac tradition had already witnessed Gallus, Tibullus, and Propertius, each of whom had left their unique mark on the genre. To offer something innovative was naturally going to be a challenge. According to Quintilian, Ovid was too much a lover of his own talent (*nimium amator ingenii sui*),[3] and Seneca the Elder suggests that he never knew when to leave well enough alone (*nescit quod bene cessit relinquere*).[4] Thus earlier scholars have long been expecting Ovid to do something clever or innovative, so that if and when he parodies his elegiac predecessors, he does so in a way that is light-hearted, witty, humorous, verbally dexterous, playful, and often ironic.[5] As a result, few readers of the *Amores* have considered that the collection may contain serious messages. As a latecomer to elegy, Ovid's work falls victim to the "progressive fallacy," the one that comes late to the dinner least deserves a seat at the table.[6] Since the *Amores* form his first body of work, they face additional reproof: a poet's youthful scribblings are puerile, juvenile, and not as serious as his later works.

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[1] Fränkel (1945): 1.

[2] Fyler (1971): 196. Cf. Davis (1981): 2460; (1989): 37-55.

[3] Quint. *Inst*. 10.1.88. Cf. also *Inst*. 10.1.98: *si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset*.

[4] Sen. *Con*. 2.2.12.

[5] See James (2003), 155.

[6] On this concern, see Boyd (1997): 4-16.

## 2. Identity of Ovid's Elegiac Persona

The perception of Ovid's *Amores* as a playful parody rests on the premise that the emotional material of Ovid's elegiac predecessors ought to be treated as comparatively more “sincere” and also more "serious".[7] Indeed, many have considered that, for a work of Ovid's to be sincere, it should contain 'some truthful reflection on the autobiographical life of the poet," a now dated idea famously questioned by Veyne.[8] Veyne's semiotic reading proposes that "elegy is a pseudoautobiographical form of poetry in which the poet is in league with his readers at the expense of his own *ego*".[9] He links the concept of 'sincerity," to the "seriousness of the imaginary" rather than simply autobiographical reflection.[10] In the context of the *Amores*, the imaginary pertains to the fictive reality experienced by the poet-lover, and in this thesis, where I use “sincerity”, it should be understood to have this meaning. Ovidian scholarship increasingly appreciates the distance between the autobiographical poet and his fictive elegiac persona.[11] In my discussion, I adopt the approach of Oliensis, who treats the fictive “poet” and the fictive “lover” as one unified persona.[12] Following Oliensis' lead, I refer to this persona as “Naso”.[13] The distance between Ovid and Naso allows us to appreciate, for example, the possibility that Naso's failures can amount to a success on Ovid's part. Ovid can be ironic while Naso is being sincere; Ovid can be serious even when Naso appears playful. For these reasons I am careful not to conflate sincerity with seriousness: both sincerity and irony can be "serious" or be "playful". The events that Ovid sets out, the highs and lows of love, and the emotions that he describes, need not relate to the autobiographical poet, nor does he need to treat them sincerely for them to i) have a serious impact on his elegiac persona and ii) contain serious extratextual messages. Ovid can humorously and playfully poke fun at his fictive

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[7] Cf. Allen (1950): 145–60. See also Sullivan (1961): 522-36; Quinn (1969): 54; Oliensis (2019): 1-2.

[8] Veyne (1988): 67.

[9] Veyne (1988): 44.

[10] Veyne (1988): 67-8.

[11] E.g. Boyd (1997), Weinlich (1999), and Holzberg (2002). More recently Oliensis (2019) has made room for the elision between the fictive *poeta* and *amator*; her reunification of the persona is not dissimilar to Bretzigheimer's (2001) reading of a *poeta-amator*, whose "*poeta*" side dominates the strictly poetological poems (cf. e.g. 1.1; 1.15; 2.1), and the "*amator*" the others (11-46).

[12] Oliensis (2019): 19.

[13] Oliensis (2019): 19.

persona who suffers a serious experience, and in doing so he can also engage with serious concerns.[14]

We may also show seriousness in the *Amores* if we are willing to rethink the objectives of Ovidian "parody". It is no coincidence that "parody" in Ovidian discourse is often found coupled with adjectives like "witty", "ironic," and "humorous." Thus Hardie warns that parody is "a term often used in dismissive acknowledgement of Ovid's entertainment value".[15] Indeed, in the case of Ovid's *Amores*, the connection between parody and playfulness, and by extension parody's presumed incompatibility with seriousness, seems often taken for granted. However, parody or imitation of his elegiac predecessors does not prevent Ovid's work from offering any serious meaning.[16] I aim to demonstrate this point through a critical reading of Ovid's *Amores* 3.11 that engages with the pertinent intratextual and intertextual material.

**3. Scholarship on *Am*. 3.11**

Partly because of its parodic and generic character, *Amores* 3.11 looks like an open-and-shut case: Ovid is making fun of his predecessors. I think this is one reason why the poem has received comparably less attention than some of Ovid's other elegies. When it does receive attention, it is often mentioned in passing, recalled only to make a more general point or to be compared to another poem, or it is given a sweeping overview.[17] Some of those who have afforded *Am*. 3.11 greater attention are Neumann (1919); Ferguson (1960), Lee (1962), Jäger (1967), Gross (1975), Cairns (1979), Keul (1989), Döpp (1992), Bretzigheimer (2001), and Perkins (2002). Relevant observations have been made in the commentaries of Némethy (1906), Brandt (1911), Munari (1951), Lenz (1965), Harder-Marg (1978), Weinlich (1999), Holzberg (1999; 2014), and more recently, Davis (2024).

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[14] Cf. Parker (1969): 80; Spentzou (2013): 66.

[15] Hardie (2006a): 4.

[16] Cf. Fyler (1971): 196-7; Morgan (1977): 1-5; Miller (2009).

[17] For instance, Jacoby (1905): 86-8; Wilkinson (1955): 32-6; de Saint Denis (1958): 187-90; Williams (1968): 508-12; Santirocco (1969): 83-4; Frécaut (1972): 188-90; Büchner (1976): 290f.; Sabot (1976): 510; 515; 535; 544; Morgan (1977): 97-8; Vitale (1980): 335-9; Pallotto (1982): 670-6; McKeown (1987): 95; (1998): 408-9; Damon (1990): 287-92; Hinds (1998): 26-9; (2006): 18; Barchiesi (2001): 155-61; Bretzigheimer (2001): 140-43; Holzberg (2002): 56; (2006): 67; James (2003): 47-8; 127-8; Armstrong (2005): 14-5; Booth (2009): 68; 72-3; Heyworth (2009): 273; Sharrock (2012): 76-7, Oliensis (2019): 110, Zimmerman Damer (2019): 118-19, among others.

Neumann's study is informative, but focused largely on intertextuality between Ovid and Propertius, and it is therefore not concerned with 3.11 in particular. Ferguson's paper is also useful, but references to 3.11 are sporadic and limited to intertextuality between Ovid and Catullus, his broader focus. Lee's chapter looks at Ovidian playfulness across the *Amores* and discusses briefly the latter part of the poem (b); this discussion is limited to passing comments on particular lines. Although Lee has reason to question the "obvious judgement…that Ovid's poem fails in comparison with Catullus," and to suggest rather that Ovid is not in competition with Catullus, his interpretation of the poem's theme as an "excuse for intellectual entertainment" is not much of an improvement.[18] Jäger's dissertation focuses on paired poems in Augustan elegy. Although useful, it is not a comprehensive study of 3.11. The same may be said of Cairns' study, which compares 2.9 and 3.11 and analyses the characteristics of the *renuntiatio amoris.* His study is now dated in its conflation of Ovid with his fictive elegiac persona, and the identification of the unnamed *puella* of 3.11 as Corinna.[19]

Gross affords 3.11 much needed direct attention, but I mostly disagree with his interpretation. He sees 3.11 as a "literary melange," but while the integration of various popular *topoi* and the many allusions create a sort of pastiche of the elegiac tradition. I am less supportive of his claim that Ovid "combines disparate and heterogenous elements," and that he breaches elegiac code by conjoining a renunciation, or "invective," with an "amatory dilemma".[20] His reading of 3.11 as a parodic collage leads him to the false conclusion that a serious message cannot lie behind playfulness or humour: "Ovid is more interested in facetious manipulation of amatory topics than in a serious depiction of a typical stage in a love affair".[21] He offers no reason as to why one must preclude the other. This trend can be observed in other interpretations of the poem.[22]

Keul's dissertation provides the most comprehensive and detailed discussion of the poem and its relationship with others in the *Amores*. Like Gross, Cairns, and most dated scholarship on the poem,

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[18] Lee (1962): 164.

[19] Cairns (1979): 131; 137; 140.

[20] Gross (1976): 152; 154; 160.

[21] Gross (1976): 152; 159-60.

[22] Cf. e.g. Ferguson (1960), 343: "a cold brilliance"; Lee (1962), 164: "the ostensible theme is simply an excuse for intellectual entertainment"; Booth (2009), 68: "a facetious self-review".

Keul conflates Ovid with Naso and identifies the *puella* of 3.11 as Corinna despite the name's absence.[23] She makes no reference to the studies of Veyne and Davis, who caution against making this assumption.[24] She attributes this decision to her belief that this poem belongs to a cycle of poems (3.5; 3.3; 2.5; 1.7; 2.9; 3.11; 3.14) that is her own construction.[25] Although these poems are relevant to 3.11, they need not be thought of as a cycle, and there are, besides, several other poems that are equally (if not more) relevant to 3.11, such as 1.2; 1.3; 2.17; 2.19; 3.4.

Perkins' more recent article is detailed, but not comprehensive. Perkins explores the role of protest and paradox in the poem; although I think that there is much in the way of paradox offered in 3.11b, her paper pays attention almost entirely to 3.11a. She argues that the renunciation's failure is due to an increasing erotic interest, and refers to 'suggestive" language to support this argument. Although I agree that the lover's complaints of the "unhappy aspects of his relationship," weaken his renunciation, I am not convinced that these actually are the "happy times" (that he enjoys these negative aspects, that is) nor that he is sexually aroused and that this is the chief reason for the renunciation's failure.[26]

The commentaries of Némethy, Brandt, Munari, and Lenz are helpful for textual parallels but less argumentative. Harder-Marg's commentary is likewise brief and offers few comments on 3.11, as is the case with Holzberg's 1999 commentary and the revised 2014 edition. Weinlich's commentary is helpful, but tends to overlook the many intratextual and intertextual links in favour of comparisons with 2.9. No modern study on a poem in the *Amores* is complete without reference to McKeown's commentaries (1987; 1989; 1998).[27] P. J. Davis' new commentary provides a useful analysis of the poem and posits that the whole poem is a response to Catullus,[28] but neglects much of the important secondary literature and is limited to representative observations rather than extended discussion. I disagree with his rejection of a narrative trajectory across the *Amores,* views posited by Boyd and

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[23] Keul (1989): 214. Cf. Gross (1975): 154; Cairns (1979): 131.

[24] See Veyne (1988): 71ff; Davis (1981): 2468-72. Cf. also Plessis (1909): 436; Oliver (1945): 203.

[25] Cf. Kennedy (1991): 63.

[26] Perkins (2002): 125.

[27] Note that a fourth volume on the third book, poems 1-8, has since been released (2023).

[28] Davis (2024): 281-98.

Holzberg among others, in favour of a 'series of discontinuous performances" in which the protagonist is rarely identifiable.[29]

Because many of the discussions of 3.11 are brief, superficial, or lacking in detail, and as the poem is a main focus in only a handful of studies, many of which are broad, comparative, imbalanced, and have arguments that are dated or at least deserving of revision, I think that the poem deserves a closer look.

## 4. Wider Interpretations of the *Amores*

Before chapter one begins, I briefly outline some general interpretations of Ovid's amatory oeuvre that have a direct bearing on my interpretation of 3.11. I classify these readings broadly under the following headings: (a) Ovidian love elegy as a game/stage, (b) *servitium amoris*, and (c) the "circularity" of Ovidian love elegy. It is neither my aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the *Amores*, nor to commit to a particular view of the *Amores* or of Ovid's oeuvre as a whole.

### a) Love as a Game/Stage

Ovid's elegiac persona seeks to bring love, sometimes seen as an invasive or maddening force (Cf. Prop. 1.1), under his control.[30] Ironic or not, in his *Ars Amatoria*, Ovid's *praeceptor amoris* sets out a "rational" system to manage the maddening effects of *eros*.[31] This strategy involves the "trivialisation of passion,"[32] which can spare one no less from pain than from pleasure.[33] The student of love is encouraged to embrace artifice and cunning, to treat love as a game in which the

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[29] Cf. Boyd (1997): 95; Holzberg (2002): 46-70. See also Bretzigheimer (2001): 91-152. See also Davis (2024): 7. Similarly, Oliver (1945): 202. Although I agree that *varatio* develops unity across the *Amores*, I disagree with the presumption that *varatio* ought to preclude a narrative trajectory; it could inform it. For such a reading, cf. Boyd (1997): 142–7.

[30] Fyler (1971): 201. Cf. Lee (1962): 151; Konstan (1972): 102.

[31] Cf. Ov. *Rem.* (10): *quod nunc ratio est, inpetus ante fuit*. See also Kennedy (2000): 165-6; Gibson (2009): 94.

[32] Fyler (1971): 201. Cf. Boyd (2002), 96: "controlled, even analytical passion"; Oliensis (2019), 3: "Ovid's explicit trivialisation of passion, embodied in a protagonist who plays at love but is seldom convincingly tormented"; Sharrock (2006b): 153.

[33] Ov. *Ars*. 687-8.

rules can be exploited by strategy.[34] Accordingly, he should learn to play the part of the elegiac lover (and in *Ars* 1.611, the *praeceptor* advises: *est tibi agendus amans*).[35] A similar approach can also be seen in Ovid's *Amores*,[36] and pretence is indeed a go-to weapon in Naso's arsenal.[37] Davis (1989) sees the *Amores* as a stage, and considers Naso a poseur who steps into the role of the elegiac lover.[38] He imitates his elegiac predecessors, tries on their costumes and makes use of their props, but he puts his own spin on the character, one indeed that appears parodic: "the shamelessly promiscuous behaviour of the Don Juan…makes a mockery of the professed *fides* of the elegists".[39] In chapters one and two I discuss how Naso's treatment of love as a game (to win through strategy and posturing) is met with a serious challenge in *Am* 3.11.

**b) The Circularity of Love Elegy**

A related interpretation is foregrounded in Fulkerson's (2004) exploration of the circular nature of Ovidian love elegy:

> "Ovidian elegy has created a world in which there is nothing but love…since true relief from erotic suffering comes only from new love…the student of the *Remedia* will always return eventually to the *Ars*…in genre as in life, *omnia vincit amor*: love defeats every attempt to escape it."[40]

The elegiac lover is trapped by love in an inescapable circle.[41] Several approaches to the *Ars* and *Remedia* highlight their ironic failures: we have a *praeceptor* who offers advice on how to maintain

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[34] Cf. Allen (1950): 156; Romano (1972), 815: "for Ovid love is a game and we have to play it according to very strict rules"; Olstein (1975): 246; Myerowitz (1985): 36-7; Miller (1993): 231; Armstrong (2005): 17; Sharrock (2006b): 152; Spentzou (2013): 66.

[35] Ov. *Ars.* 1.611.

[36] Cf. Cameron (1968): 321. See also Green (2007): 6; Volk (2010): 75; Oliensis (2019): 3.

[37] Romano (1972): 816; Booth (2009): 67.

[38] Davis (1989): 3-55. Cf. Lyne (1980), 243: "adopting…the character and genre [of elegy] he is effectively parodying both". Cf. Johnson (2009): xii.

[39] Davis (1989): 37. Cf. Otis (1966): 14; Barsby (1973): 17; Wyke (2002): 146; Oliensis (2019), 12: "what Ovid is writing…is elegy at one remove: an anatomy or parody or critique of the conventions of his chosen genre".

[40] Fulkerson (2004): 223. On this circularity, cf. Rosati (2006): 143-65; Hardie (2006b): 166-92.

[41] Fulkerson (2004): 213: "[the *Remedia*] does not offer a way to stay out of love". See also Henderson (1979): xiii.

the upper hand in love, yet he admits that even he has been unable to put such theory to action.[42] The *praeceptor* is aware of the flaws in his approach; nevertheless, he continues to teach.[43] On a wider view, the addition of the *Remedia Amoris* may itself be a testament to the didactic failures of the *Ars*: if the reader has been sufficiently trained in the art of love, why would he need to learn how to fall *out* of love?[44] If he maintains control over his *ars*, as the teacher should have taught him to do, then he would not find this task difficult. In *Am*. 3.11 we find the young lover, despite his best efforts, unable to fall *out* of love.[45] Nor is it the first time that he has attempted to do so.[46]

The futility of turning love into a game is an idea discussed mostly in relation to the *Remedia;* in the *Amores*, this circularity is more subtle. Armstrong plots Naso's development from *Amores* to *Ars* as follows: from a self-confident novice, whose confidence gradually wanes as he goes on, he ends up an insecure *praeceptor*.[47] Holzberg's reading of the erotic narrative is similar,[48] and in both interpretations, Naso's stature, confidence, and ability seems to diminish over the course of the *Amores*. Taken together with Naso's conception of love as a game, his diminishing potency may be viewed as a failure to win the game, especially if his "farewell" in 3.15 is just a 'see you later".[49] So, we have a poet-lover who attempts to conquer love and outsmart the love god at his own game, but he ends up ironically unable even to escape the game.

My discussion of 3.11 will assume that Naso aims, across the *Amores*, to gain control of love successfully through the implementation of cunning and artifice, and as a last resort, to escape it.[50] In my discussion of 3.11 (chapters one and two) I consider how the poem, through its interaction with other poems from Ovid's amatory ouevre (intratextuality) and with those of Ovid's elegiac predecessors (intertextuality), suggests the impossibility of these aims and explores the futility of

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[42] E.g. Miller, (1993): 231: "the self-proclaimed master of *erotodidaxis* turns out to be a figure who betrays a considerable lack of control over what he is teaching".

[43] E.g. Armstrong (2005): 33-43.

[44] On the ironic failures of the *Ars* and *Remedia*, see Rosati (2007): 165; Hardie (2006b): 168.

[45] Similarly, we find him returning more than once to the elegiac metre. The interaction between *Ars*, *Remedia*, and *Am*. 3.11 is discussed later in chapter 4.

[46] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 2.9. For an analysis of this *renuntiatio*, see: Boyd (2002): 96-116.

[47] Armstrong (2005): 21-52, esp. 35-43. Cf. Miller (1993): 231; Oliensis (2019): 3.

[48] Holzberg (2002): 46-58, esp. 46-7.

[49] See Holzberg (2006): 67-8.

[50] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.15. See also McKeown (1989): 389; Armstrong (2005): 15.

the elegiac project. The poem may thus be seen as an early intimation in the *Amores* of that very circularity which will be made clearer as Ovid's amatory journey progresses.[51]

**c) *Servitium Amoris***

A key part of Naso's strategy to "control" love is his adoption of the *servitium amoris* paradigm. At its most basic, as the *servus amoris*, the elegiac lover portrays himself as devoted or subordinate to his beloved, whom he characterises as a *domina*.[52] The *servitium* espoused by Ovid's elegiac predecessors has been seen as a kind of fantasy in which the elegiac lover plays the role of a subordinate to his beloved.[53] Fitzgerald, James, and Fulkerson make compelling arguments for the disingenuousness of the *servus amoris* posture.[54] Ovid's *servitium* has typically been treated as even less sincere than that of his predecessors.[55] Davis suggests that Ovid parodies and reconfigures the paradigm and that *servitium amoris* lies "at the heart of Ovid's burlesque of the elegiac lover".[56] He later elaborates on the aim of the Ovidian burlesque, and suggests that it is a "dissection of the artificialities of love elegy".[57] Similarly, Mack:

> "Ovid offers us glimpses of real life behind the elegiac conventions. Part of Ovid's analysis of the conventions entails bringing some of these consequences into the fictional world of elegy."[58]

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[51] Note: I am not assuming that Ovid already has his other amatory works in view when composing the *Amores*; I am framing my discussion within the general lines of interpretation of Ovid's amatory works.

[52] See e.g. Copley (1947): 285–300; Lyne (1979) 117-30. For Lee-Stecum (1998), *servitium amoris* appears more simply a "negation of comfort" (49). See also: Pichon (1991) *servitium amoris*; Veyne (1988): 132–50; Hallett (1973); Wyke (2002): 33; 166-73; Fulkerson (2013): 180-93; Keith (2023): 223-46.

[53] Cf. Lyne (1979): 117-8; Copley (1947): 295. Copley recognises that, even in Propertius, the *servitium* is fantastical; James (2003) sees *servitium* as something closer to *obsequium*: a "state of mind rather than a social status" (149), and notes its voluntary nature, which she suggests the *docta puella* would realise (147). Cf. also Wyke (2002), who suggests that male sexual submission is more important than female dominance (172).

[54] Fitzgerald (2000), esp. 73-4; James (2003), esp. 146-48; Fulkerson (2013): 180-93, esp. 181.

[55] Cf. Lyne (1980), 283: "Ovid stands out against a moral earnestness of Augustan Rome…against the romantic earnestness of his poetic predecessors". Cf. Martini (1933): 11; Oliver (1945): 205; Sullivan (1961): 528-30. Quinn (1969): 80-4.

[56] Davis (1989): 38. See also Rand (1907): 294.

[57] Davis (1981): 2464.

[58] Mack (1988): 62.

James supports this idea: "Ovid does not add hypocrisy, exploitation, and pretence to Roman love elegy—he lays them bare".[59] One reason that Naso's *servitium* is seen as satirical or unique is that his promiscuity conflicts with the pledges of eternal loyalty that are characteristic of Ovid's predecessors,[60] and so undermine his *servitium*. Indeed, *servitium amoris* had long been characterised by unreciprocated loyalty.[61]

As Naso's *servitium* is postured, we can hardly expect it to conform to this tradition; "his behaviour belies his pose…he makes the true *servus amoris* out to be a fool".[62] He does make the typical oaths opportunistically, but he does not fulfil them.[63] In this way, Naso does not conform to the established concept of *servitium amoris*: whereas his elegiac predecessors purport to feel their suffering and may appear "sincere" in their oaths of loyalty (even if they are not), for Naso, *servitium amoris* (and by extension love itself)[64] was not to be suffered, but enjoyed.[65] Ovid exploits the *servitium* motif in a way that highlights the disingenuous character of the traditional elegiac lover's claims of subordination: Naso "enjoys" his *servitium*, because he shamelessly uses it to his advantage.[66] Indeed, the pose of *servitium* enables physical proximity to one's beloved,[67] and as McCarthy, Thorsen, and Zuckerberg suggest, it is designed to gain control over the beloved covertly.[68] Fundamental to my discussion is this concept of a false subservience designed to achieve a sense of control, dominance, or to meet one's ends. That is, he is not required to *feel* like a *servus amoris*; he should merely act like one.[69]

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[59] James (2003): 157. Cf. Mack (1988): 62.

[60] For this contrast between Ovidian lover and his predecessors, cf. e.g. Ripert (1922): 46-9; Fränkel (1945): 26; Du Quesnay (1973): 1-2, esp. n. 2; Tracy (1978): 58.

[61] Davis (1981): 2467-8. Cf. also Hallett (1973): 111; Gibson (2005): 163; Gale (2021): 220.

[62] Davis (1981): 2472. For the more general idea that Ovid ridicules the seriousness or suffering of his predecessors, see Neumann (1919): 124; Haight (1932): 150-51.

[63] Davis (1989): 39; Booth (2009): 67. See also Cameron (1968): 321.

[64] Cf. Conte (1994): 37-8, for the idea that *servitium* essentially *is* elegiac love.

[65] Otis (1966): 14, n. 1; Lyne (1980): 286, n. 2.

[66] Cf. Conte (1994): 453; Fulkerson (2013): 190-2.

[67] Brecke (2023): 169.

[68] McCarthy (1998): 178; Thorsen (2013a): 10; Zuckerberg (2018): 117.

[69] Ov. *Ars*. 2.195-8. See Sabot (1976): 511.

Despite acting unethically, the *callidus servus*, tends to go unpunished.[70] Although this may for the most part also be true of Naso, I think that in 3.11 we witness the culmination of a predicament that will be the undoing of his strategy. This poem explicitly draws on a number of others from the *Amores* that exhibit Naso's exploitation of the *servitium amoris* motif for his own gain (namely: 1.2; 1.3; 2.9; 2.12; 2.16-18; 2.19) and eventually to his loss (3.3; 3.4; 3.12; 3.14; 3.15). In chapters one and two I examine the relationship between these poems and 3.11 in more depth; I provide here a broad overview of the context.

In the opening *Amores*, Naso begins his amatory journey by falling in love reluctantly and with nobody in particular, and soon embracing his role as Cupid's captive (1.1-2).[71] The *servitium amoris* motif becomes his strategic weapon (1.3): Naso dons the pose of *servus amoris* and directs his affections to a new beloved, using generic displays of loyalty.[72] He fails, however, to honour his promises of undying *fides*, (e.g. 2.4; 2.7-8).[73] By 2.9a, seeming to grow weary of the "game," he attempts to renounce love, only to retract his decision in 2.9b with renewed vigour and submit to Cupid's dominion again.[74] Having built up his confidence (2.10; 2.12), by 2.19 he taunts a rival *vir* and begs a new beloved to treat him like a slave (18-24). These circumstances signal, in my view, Naso's growing confidence in his mastery of the "game".

However, in Book 3 his confidence begins to wane. In 3.3, he confronts his beloved, accusing her of infidelity, and in 3.4 a *vir* who has been too watchful over his beloved, far from the playful lover of the earlier elegies. By 3.11a, Naso reaches his breaking-point: he is fed up from the *vitia* of his beloved(s) (3.3), the competition (3.4), his own impotence (3.7), and superior rivals (3.8).[75] He again renounces his love, though now he addresses a single beloved and finds himself ultimately unable to escape his feelings of *amor* and *odium.* In subsequent elegies, Naso struggles with his beloved's unfaithfulness (3.12) and the conflict between *odium* and *amor* is soon revisited (3.14), so

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[70] Fulkerson (2013): 191. Cf. Parker (1989): 233–5.

[71] On the untraditional beginning of the *Amores* and Naso's positive and pragmatic approach towards *servitium amoris*, see Otis (1938): 198; Holzberg (1981): 201; Miller (1995): 291; Booth (2009): 62.

[72] On *Amores* 1.3 and *servitium amoris* as part of the lover's strategy, see Davis (1989): 98-9. On the false displays of loyalty, see Thorsen (2013b): 122; (2014): 158-59; Jouteur (2005): 74-5.

[73] Cf. Olstein (1975): 241-57, esp. 246.

[74] On this poem, see: Cairns (1979): 121-42; McKeown (1998): 169-97; Boyd (2002): 96-116.

[75] On 3.7 as it relates to Naso's "ebbing confidence," see Armstrong (2005): 41-2. Holzberg (2009) places an emphasis on a movement away from love elegy (933–40).

that he is ultimately forced to accept a faithless beloved and a proto-elegiac, Catullan idea of love. By the time he bids farewell to Love in 3.15, he appears much less confident than he had been at the end of the second book (2.19).

In my discussion of 3.11 (Chapters 2 and 3), I consider how the difference in Naso's attitude toward his *servitium,* his language, and circumstances may be suggestive of a broader change of heart: that by 3.11b, Naso's pose of *servitium* no longer seems to be the advantageous tool that it had been; rather it marks the collapse of his strategy. The change is marked by i) a comparable lack of volition, whereas previously he had encouraged his *servitium,* and ii) a commitment to (unreciprocated) *fides*; previously he had delighted in disobeying this aspect of the *servus amoris*' protocol. What he had weaponised to his own gratification becomes a reminder of his failure, and this failure appears less comic and more fatal than his previous blunders.[76] I discuss the possibility that, at this stage, Naso, who formerly revelled in his *servitium* as a means of controlling his love and of parodying or indeed exposing his elegiac predecessors, devolves into a more real form of *servitium*; real in the sense that it is may now be genuinely felt by Naso inside his affective reality. It is a *servitium* of the classic kind, that which was espoused and idealised by Catullus, Propertius, and Tibullus: to his horror, his elegiac forebears, who up until now have been an object of intertextual play, were right all along.

Before the third book of the *Amores*, where the *topos* of *servitium* surfaces, Naso actively encourages it, because playing the role of a slave is a part of his deceptive strategy (Cf. e.g. 1.2; 1.3; 2.17); by 3.11b, he is forced into an involuntary servitude. Thus, Spentzou:

> "By Book Three, the outrageous proclamation of slavery and the insinuation of servility as the route to freedom have become so much darker. Now, Ovid is paying the prices for his servility."[77]

For all his daring plots and outrageous manipulation of elegiac conventions, Naso ends up no better off than those that came before him; arguably even worse, if he genuinely cannot escape the shackles of love. He is no longer a Don Juan standing on the shoulders of his elegiac predecessors and removed from their predicaments; now he appears as a quintessentially unambitious,

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[76] For the idea of Naso's comic failures (his distinctly unelegiac reaction to failure), see: Davis (1981): 2479-85; (1989): 43.

[77] Spentzou (2013): 78.

stereotypical, and generic elegiac lover,[78] who can hope for no more than to be a *servus amoris* to a single *puella*, whether he likes it or not. Naso's attempt to conquer love inevitably fails, because love conquers all — this, I shall demonstrate, it Ovid's conscious message. His identity as a *servus amoris*, and how it changes, is central to my discussion of 3.11.

**5. Summary of Key Concerns**

It should, by now, be clear that there are a number of reasons to examine *Am*. 3.11: the poem's parodic qualities; its interaction with other poems within Ovid's amatory ouevre and those of his elegiac predecessors; its interesting position in the *Amores* and the bearing that it may have on Naso's status as a *servus amoris*; its potential extratextual messages (reflections on human emotion and Ovid's place in the elegiac tradition); the questions left by the limited and at times antiquated treatment of the poem. These are the major issues with which my analysis is concerned.

It is my view that 3.11 occupies an important position in the *Amores,* and that the poem voices serious extratextual concerns: Ovid explores the genuine human experience of the heart in conflict with itself and reflects on the state of the elegiac tradition. In 3.11, Ovid employs intratextuality and intertextuality to voice these concerns and to create an immersive literary experience. An ironic tension permeates the poem. The irony, I suggest, is rooted in Ovid's use of intratextual and intertextual allusions and facilitated by the distance between Ovid and his fictive elegiac persona. The allusive material creates an ambiguity that highlights Naso's obliviousness. In some instances, the words that Ovid places in Naso's mouth hark back to specific experiences or memories from the poet-lover's amatory past. When the language recalls certain passages of Ovid's predecessors, primarily Catullus and Propertius, I suggest that Naso is not fully conscious of the implications of the allusions: that is, these verbal links ironically undermine his renunciation. There are, however, occasions on which Naso seems to invoke the words of his predecessors in a conscious effort to inspire his renunciation (e.g. line 7), perhaps even to upstage them and prove himself love's decisive conquerer. Even in these instances, the full weight of the intertextuality, and the (often ironic) consequences, appear by the end of the poem to be lost on Naso. Ovid thus develops dramatic irony,

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[78] Where I use the phrases, "(stereo)typical" or "generic" with reference to an elegiac lover who precedes the Ovidian, I mean not to undermine the range and idiosyncrasies of each elegiac *persona*; I use these terms to describe the general attributes displayed by these elegiac lovers as a point of comparison with the Ovidian lover, who I argue at times distinguishes himself from them.

which he sustains throughout the poem; as we shall see, this need not diminish the seriousness of Naso's affective reality.

# CHAPTER TWO: *Am*. 3.11a

## 1. Introduction

In *Amores* 3.11a, as in 2.9a, Naso attempts a *renuntiatio amoris*: a renunciation of love. The *renuntiatio* is a hallmark feature of Augustan love elegy. For brevity's sake, I provide a simplified picture of what we might expect in a *renuntiatio amoris*:[79] a speaker (in this case, Naso) announces his decision to an addressee (the beloved, or a love deity); an expression of sentiments towards Love/the beloved; a justification for the decision to renounce; the formal renunciation. Although 2.9 and 3.11 have much in common, there are important differences. 2.9 is largely generic, but 3.11 appears more personal: in the former, it is Cupid whom the Ovidian lover addresses, accuses of mistreatment, and from whom he attempts to escape; in 3.11, although Naso initially claims to have ousted the love god from his heart, his addressee is a single beloved. Thus, 2.9a and 3.11a follow broadly the same path and incorporate similar features (e.g. complaints of injustice, reasons to renounce). However, the expressions of the former appear much more generalised, whereas the latter lists specific reasons for the renunciation that recall Naso's past amatory experiences. 2.9b and 3.11b are less alike. 2.9b opens on a markedly stronger foot, as Naso, revitalised, makes a clear about-face on his decision to renounce his love and instead reaffirms his allegiance to the love god. In 3.11b, however, he betrays less conviction; he is caught in a struggle between feelings of love and hate that recalls Catullus' *odi et amo*,[80] and in the end, he is resigned to his fate that he will love his beloved, whether he wants to or not. *Odium* and *amor,* as used throughout this dissertation, are to be understood broadly as feelings of "repulsion" and "attraction" respectively.[81] It is my view that both feelings are in play throughout 3.11a and b and that they contribute to the failure of the lover's renunciation in different ways.[82]

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[79] For a more comprehensive breakdown of the *topoi* that appear in *renuntiationes*, see Cairns (1972): 80-1.

[80] Catullus was not the first to explore the paradox, but his treatment of the idea, which would be foundational for Augustan elegy, is surely in play in *Am*. 3.11. E.g. Greek precedents, see *Anth*. *Pal*. 5.107; 5.284; 12.103; 12.104; 12.107; 12.108; 12.156; 12.172. More generally, see Bishop (1971): 636-42.

[81] *Odium* and *amor* do not always carry over neatly into English, and "hate" and "love" are not always comprehensive. These broader definitions are not without precedent, cf. Arkins (2011): 29-30; Zuckerberg (2018), 98: "The Latin term *amor* does not map neatly onto the English word love".

[82] *Contra* Keul (1989), who prefers a shift from *odium* (3.11a) to *amor* (3.11b) and a lighthearted treatment of the emotions (146-8; 373).

Although Ovid's two *renuntiationes* produce the same overall result (Naso falls back in "love"), the processes and attitudes involved stand in contrast: he does not achieve his initial aim in 2.9, but Naso's return to love is spirited and of his own volition (25-26). In 3.11, I argue that Ovid offers a profound reflection on human behaviour, and this marks a significant shift in the narrative progression of the *Amores* and in the lover's mindset: it is a testament to the fact that, even if love can be made into a game, it is not one to be won.

In 3.11a, Naso starts off strong: he is fed up with his beloved's indiscretions (1-2), claims already to have ousted Love from his heart, and to have trampled his feet over Cupid's head (3-6). However, after the opening three couplets he seems less sure of his decision, and issues a self-exhortation (7-8). He proceeds to recall all his beloved's wrongdoings and his suffering (9-26), summarising his beloved's indiscretions in terms that highlight his suffering (27-8). Convinced of the renunciation's success, he claims to have departed from the tides of Love and arrived at safer shores (29-30). Not even his beloved's seductive approaches can influence him, for he is no longer the fool that he once was (31-2).

Throughout 3.11a, Ovid develops a portrait of Naso in denial of his emotions, who despite his best efforts and contrary to his own assertions, is unable to walk away from his beloved. There is a disconnect between how Naso perceives his feelings, suffering, and *patientia* and their impact on him and his decision-making ability. I suggest that this is a consequence of Naso's treatment of love as a game that he can win through artifice and strategy. Understood in this way, the poem is a demonstration of the strategy's inevitable failure. Ovid develops an ironic tension between the reality of Naso's predicament and his own perception of it through the extensive use of intratextual and intertextual allusions.

These allusions provide clues to the failure both of the renunciation and of Naso's gamification of love. They achieve this by highlighting Naso's change in circumstances and his reversal of attitude. Formerly, he had presented himself as a Don Juan figure (2.4; 2.10) who made empty promises of *fides* (e.g. 1.3; 2.17) and dared to taunt his rivals (2.19), but after early warning signs (3.3; 3.4; 3.7; 3.8), he appears by 3.11a to be off his game: he moans about his beloved's infidelities, and he is the one that suffers the presence of a more competent rival. We notice these changes largely in the dramatic contrast between Naso's portrayal of *servitium amoris* in this poem, where it is discouraged and recognised as shameful, and his previous approach to the motif, where he actively

encouraged his *servitium* and where it appeared as a pose designed to reduce love to a game (1.2; 1.3; 2.17; 2.19).

Naso begins to display qualities and attitudes that we might more readily associate with his elegiac predecessors: detesting his *servitium,* loving involuntarily, conflicting feelings of love and hate. In this way, instead of distinguishing him from his predecessors' personae or satirising their conceits, Ovid's distinctive approach to love paradoxically serves to approximate his formerly ambitious and unique elegiac persona to their likeness: for all his efforts to stand out, Naso ultimately turns into a stereotypical portrait of the "generic" elegiac lover: instead of responding to elegiac precedents or challenging them, he ends up reproducing them. I think, therefore, that there is good reason to reject the view that, at least in the case of 3.11a, the use of humour, irony, and literary allusions, precludes a serious and meaningful reading the poem.

## 2. Analysis

### i. 1-6: Decision to Renounce Love

*Multa diuque tuli; vitiis patientia victa est;*
*cede fatigato pectore, turpis amor!*
*scilicet adserui iam me fugique catenas,*
*et quae non puduit ferre, tulisse pudet.*
*vicimus et domitum pedibus calcamus amorem;*
*venerunt capiti cornua sera meo.*

It is at least likely that Ovid's Roman readership would have connected 3.11 with 2.9 because both are *renuntiationes*, and both involve an eventual retraction.[83] Naso opens 3.11 with a bold protest against Love (1-2):

*Multa diuque tuli; vitiis patientia victa est;*
*cede fatigato pectore, turpis amor!*

We are immediately reminded of 2.9.1-2:

*O numquam pro re satis indignande Cupido,*

[83] Cairns (1979): 132; Weinlich (1999): 241-2.

*o in corde meo desidiose puer…*

In both, Naso expresses his exhaustion from the love god's lingering presence in his heart (*cede fatigato pectore*; *in corde meo desidiose*).[84] In *Am*. 2.9 Naso appears to take a reverent approach to the love god, as the use of elevated language (the formulaic and anaphoric *o*'s) suggests. While there is a sign of frustration (the epithets, *indignande* and *desidiose* are less than respectful), Naso's appeal in 2.9 is subdued in comparison to 3.11, where he is impatient, as the comparably harsh *turpis,* the emphatic half-line, *multa diuque tuli*,[85] and the imperative, *cede,* suggest.[86] The wholly dactylic makeup of the line further underlines his brashness.[87] The half line, *multa diuque tuli,* replicates 2.19.49 (*multa diuque tuli*) where Naso's impatience is directed at his rival's laxity over his *puella*'s whereabouts, which spoils the fun.[88] The phrase's repetition serves to contrast the difference in Naso's circumstances: in 2.19, he felt in control of love, and he wants a challenge because the game seemed too easy (1-4);[89] by 3.11, his patience is depleted (*patientia victa est*) by a buildup of difficulties (3.3: an unfaithful beloved; 3.4: an overprotective rival; 3.7: his sexual impotence; 3.8: a more successful rival; 3.10: further sexual frustration) and his beloved's *vitia*.[90] Keul suggests that the lover's suffering (in 3.11) should be read in the perspective of 2.19 to prepare us for the second part of the elegy.[91] But repetition need not imply a parallel, it can just as easily signal a contrast: given the difference in situation and tone, I suggest that the repetition accentuates how Naso's attitude has changed between 2.19 and 3.11.[92] Hence, in 3.11a he intends to renounce his love because he does not want to suffer; he no longer embraces his mistreatment or *servitium* (Cf. 2.19.19-24) because it is no longer simply a pose. *Turpis amor* recalls Prop. 3.21.33, where, leading up to his own *renuntiatio* (3.24-5), Propertius rejects the possibility of being broken by

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[84] For *pectus* as the love god" seat, see: *Am*. 1.2.8; 1.11.9; 2.9.52; 3.2.40; 3.3.42; 3.6.59; 3.10.18; 3.11.33. Cf. McKeown (1989): 28; Pichon (1991) *pectus*. See also *OLD cor* 5.

[85] Cf. McKeown (1998): 168. Cf. Prop. 3.25.3:. On the phrase emphasising exhaustion, see Marg (1968): 307.

[86] See Williams (1968): 508; Gross (1975): 154-6; Weinlich (1999): 242.

[87] For Davis (2024), his "confidence" (285).

[88] McKeown (1998): 428; Hutchinson (2008): 179-80; Davis (2024): 285. Note the recurrence of *patientia* in 3.11.1 from 2.19.59.

[89] Cf. Zuckerberg (2018): 100.

[90] McKeown (1998): 428. Cf. Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 9-10.

[91] Cf. Keul (1989): 10.

[92] On the attitude of Naso of 2.19, see: Davis (1989): 43; Keul (1989): 72-3. Keul, however, insists that 3.11 is cheerfully absurd (10).

love: *seu moriar, fato, non turpi fractus amore*.[93] Ovid uses Propertius' words to mark the poem's intention. Keul suggests that Naso's decision to renounce his love comes from his rational *ego,* dominant in 3.11a but overpowered by the emotional *ego* in 3.11b.[94] My approach is not psychoanalytical, but surely the situation is more complex: Naso renounces on account of his impatience and frustration (*patientia victa est*) that arises from neglect and hurt from his beloved's indiscretions (*vitiis*); this is as much about feeling as it is about thinking.[95]

With the use of *cede,* Ovid again ironically reflects on Naso's twist of fate. In 1.2, as here, Naso is aware of Cupid's presence in his heart. There, however, he uses *cedere* in a self-instruction to yield to the love god's authority:

> *...et possessa ferus pectora versat Amor.*
> *Cedimus, an subitum luctando accendimus ignem?*
> *cedamus!*[96]

Now, Naso transfers the command to the love god himself in an effort to oust him. It is easy enough to understand the reversal. In 1.2, Naso steps onto the stage and into the shoes of the classic elegiac lover; he poses as a *servus amoris*.[97] He *wants* to submit to the love god's authority because this is part of the act (or game); by doing so willingly, he therefore exerts paradoxical control.[98] In 3.11, Naso begins to realise that he has less control over love than he had thought. This attempt to oust the love god from his heart is ironic when compared to 1.2, where his rationale for yielding to Cupid was the futility of resistance (1.2.11-18).

I am unconvinced by Perkins' suggestion that the exhaustion described by *fatigato pectore* and *turpis amor* is sexual.[99] She ignores Quintilian's warning (that one should not infer sexual innuendo

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[93] Davis (2024): 285. See also Prop. 2.16.36.

[94] Keul (1989): 12; 24. See also p. 163.

[95] Cf. Gross (1975), 154-6: "rage"; Williams (1968), 508: "indignant and implacable"; Keul (1989): 10.

[96] Ov. *Am*. 1.2.9-11. Note there (and here) the *cedere* invokes *militia amoris*, cf. Keul (1989): 11, n.1; Murgatroyd (1975): 78. The roles are reversed again at *Ars*. 1.21, where the *praeceptor* claims to be able to tame Love.

[97] Cf. Reitzenstein (1935): 72-3; Olstein (1975): 242-3.

[98] Cf. Olstein (1975): 246. See also Athanassaki (1992): 127, who notes that he decides to surrender because it is "more advantageous".

[99] Perkins (2002): 120-21.

simply because the inference *could* be made),[100] and her suggestion does not make schematic sense of Naso's situation: it is illogical that he renounces his love because he has had too much sex, when over the course of *Amores* 3 Naso's erotic frustrations have only increased,[101] in 3.7 he has been unable to perform sexually, and as recently as 3.10 his exploits were again interrupted. According to Perkins' logic, we ought also to relate *patientia victa est* and *multa diuque tuli* to sexual exhaustion. Perkins notes that *patior* is, according to Pichon, the "technical term of the passive role in intercourse".[102] For Perkins, Naso intimates: "my (sexual) passivity is overcome by your (sexual) activity".[103] If by "(sexual) passivity," she refers to the passive role in intercourse, then I disagree; in the search for witty undertones, the primary meaning of the phrase should not be overlooked. In my view, *patientia* suggests simply sexual (or erotic) inactivity combined with Naso's willingness to endure his beloved's indiscretions (*vitia*)[104] and the presence of a rival.[105]

> *scilicet adserui iam me fugique catenas,*
> *et quae non puduit ferre, tulisse pudet (3-4).*

After a seemingly successful expulsion, Naso is emboldened, and asserts that he has emancipated himself: *scilicet adserui iam me fugique catenas*. Ovid's use of *scilicet* should alert us to the irony of this claim.[106] Ovid has placed *scilicet* in this metrical position before to a similar effect.[107] The language (*adserui*; *fugique catenas*) is pointed; what Naso claims to have escaped is *servitium amoris.*[108] This is, in my view, a sign that he is coming to resemble his elegiac predecessors. He no longer encourages his *servitium* as he did previously (E.g. 1.2; 2.17.1-2; 2.19.18-22), where his

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[100] Cf. Quint. 8.3.47, cited by Perkins in a discussion of a later section of the poem.

[101] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 3.2; 3.3; 3.7; 3.8. See also Bretzigheimer (2001): 139-40; Spentzou (2013): 77.

[102] Perkins (2002): 121. Cf. *OLD* s.v. 3b; Pichon (1991) s.v.; Keul (1989): 9; Adams (1990): 196.

[103] Perkins (2002): 121.

[104] Pichon (1991) s.v. 1. Note that Pichon cites this very line as his example. Cf. *Am*. 3.4.11-2 and Davis (2024): 285.

[105] Cf. Ov. *Ars*. 2.539-40.

[106] *OLD scilicet* 4. Cf. Cairns (1979): 139; Perkins (2002): 118. Note that the term recurs at 3.11.19. I disagree with Davis (2024) that the "particle seems unironic here" (286); the irony, I think, is dramatic — it is on Ovid's part and not Naso's. Cf. Keul (1989): 13.

[107] Cf. e.g. *Am*. 2.7.25 (sarcastic); 2.19.53 (ironic); 3.4.35 (in rhetorical question).

[108] See: Pichon *fugere*. Cf. Copley (1947): 296; Sabot (1976): 510*;* Keul (1989): 13-4. On chains, see Tib. 1.1.55; Prop. 1.5.12. For the sentiment, see Tib. 1.9.83-4.

*servitium* had been a pretence, a "chance for the elegiac *amator* to play at being less powerful than he really is".[109] If all he is doing is removing the *dolus*, a useful weapon in the war-game of love,[110] then he only makes himself more vulnerable. Therefore, this attempt to escape his *servitium* may signal Naso's abandonment of his strategy. This is the first of many signs in 3.11 of his loss of control.

Ovid heightens the irony of Naso's claim to freedom through legal jargon: the phrase *adserui…me* pertains to the emancipation of a slave,[111] and it is, as Cairns notes, a "legal impossibility," since a slave could not lay claim to his own freedom.[112] In conjunction with *fugi catenas*, the phrase characterises Naso as a runaway slave with an illegitimate claim to freedom.[113] It also serves as a clue that his emancipation will be short-lived.[114] For Cairns, the statement is an ironic reversal of Naso's pledge of loyalty to Cupid's camp in *Am*. 2.9.3 (*quid me, qui miles numquam tua signa reliqui*).[115] Given the betrayal of the love god's trust, and the fact that under Roman law a runaway slave who claims his own freedom faces a harsher consequence on his capture,[116] it is safe to say that Naso's confidence is misplaced. Ovid here seems to anticipate a passage from the *Remedia Amoris,* where the *praeceptor* claims that a lover who is able to free himself from his own shackles has nothing to learn from the teacher.[117] It is unwise, however, to presume that the *praeceptor*'s teachings are infallible.[118] After making this admission, he suggests that a lover can claim his own freedom by recalling often his beloved's wrongdoings: *saepe refer tecum sceleratae facta puellae.*[119] Yet in 3.11 this very strategy is pursued to no avail. In *Remedia*, the *praeceptor* goes on to produce

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[109] Fulkerson (2013): 181. Cf. also Davis (1979): 37-9.

[110] Cf. Olstein (1975): 246; McCarthy (1998): 178.

[111] Brandt (1911): 179; Copley (1947): 296; Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 14. Cf. Ov. *Rem*. 73.

[112] Cairns (1979): 138; Weinlich (1999): 242-3.

[113] Cairns (1979): 133; 139.

[114] Cf. Keul (1989): 12.

[115] Cairns (1979): 133.

[116] Cairns (1979): 138-9.

[117] Ov. *Rem*. 293-4. See also *Rem*. 73. Cf. Brandt (1911): 179; Murgatroyd (1981): 598, n. 27.

[118] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Ars*. 2.547-52. On the fallibility of the *praeceptor*'s teachings more generally, see Armstrong (2005): 35-42; Fulkerson (2004): 211-23; Rosati (2006): 143-65.

[119] Ov. *Rem*. 299. Bretzigheimer (2001) notices the connection to *Am*. 3.11 (141).

a series of examples of a beloved's wrongdoings that recall those listed in 3.11.[120] As the *praeceptor* supports his breakup advice with examples that closely resemble the memories invoked unsuccessfully by Naso in 3.11, his advice should probably not be trusted. The *praeceptor* ends this breakup advice with the following statement:

> *Haec tibi per totos inacescant omnia sensus:*
> *Haec refer, hinc odii semina quaere tui*.[121]

In this couplet, he suggests that, by inciting feelings of *odium*, one will be able to emancipate himself from love, but other passages from the *Remedia* undermine this strategy,[122] and as we shall see, 3.11 demonstrates its futility.

In the couplet's pentameter, Naso openly admits to his shame: *et quae non puduit ferre, tulisse pudet.* The chiastic arrangement recalls Catull. 8.2: *et quod uides perisse perditum ducas* (in a Catullan *renuntiatio*).[123] According to Gross, the allusion creates "a rather unusual literary effect".[124] There is a literary effect, but his claim that such "literary borrowings" make evident a 'sense of artificiality" is too general and it goes unsubstantiated.[125] Catullus 8 is surely, by Ovid's day, a programmatic renunciation, so the echo is not purely decorative; it flags Naso's intention to renounce his love generally, and to renounce a specific beloved, as opposed to the love god he had tried to renounce before (Cf. 2.9.1-2). Williams observes that the texts are related "not only [by] a chiasmus of verbs but also a chiasmus of sense which is linked to the tenses".[126] In Catullus' *renuntiatio*, he struggles to accept his loss; in *Am*. 3.11, Naso claims already to have distanced himself from his past.

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[120] For instance, *Rem*. 303 recalls 3.11.21-2, 3.11.45-6; *Rem*. 304 mirrors 3.11.9-12; *Rem*. 305-6 is not dissimilar to the situation of 3.11.11-13.

[121] Ov. *Rem*. 307-8.

[122] E.g. Ov. *Rem*. 640-49.

[123] Cf. Perkins (2002): 120; Gross (1976): 157.

[124] Gross (1976): 157.

[125] Gross (1976): 160.

[126] Williams (1968): 508-9.

Naso's distaste for his *pudor* means that he no longer actively welcomes his *servitium.* Previously he encouraged his debasement because it served him in one way or another.[127] In 2.19 for instance, he begged to be mistreated (19-24, esp. *pati* 22), as to avoid the effects of overindulgence (25-6). What he wanted in 2.19, I suggest, was not difficulty, but the semblance of difficulty. In 2.19.20, Naso asks the beloved to pretend to be afraid (*simulans*), and the implication is that this will allow him to pretend, in turn, to be suffering (22: *pati*). Now that he experiences difficulties that are serious and not on his terms, the taste is bitter. It was an act; now that it does not feel like one, he wants out.[128] When Naso embraced his *servitium* in 1.2, *Pudor* had, as Booth note, "become one of his assets".[129] Now, however, it offers him little benefit.

Naso takes his bold affront to the love god a step further as he boasts to have conquered the deity (5-6):

> *Vicimus et domitum pedibus calcamus amorem;*
> *venerunt capiti cornua sera meo*.[130]

Many have noted that this couplet ironically reverses Prop. 1.1.3-4, where *Amor* tramples over the head of the Propertian lover.[131] Naso inverts the image that opens Propertius's elegies in what is supposed to be the closure of his own. In fthe lines he has gone from *victus* to victor (*vicimus*). We should be skeptical of his confidence.[132] As Drinkwater notes, the allusion suggests the "impossibility of escaping military and poetic endeavours imposed by a god".[133] She also points out that the image takes us to the beginning of Naso's journey, where "Cupid dictates both his metre

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[127] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.2; 2.17.1-4; 2.19.19-24.

[128] Ov. *Am*. 1.2.32. Cf. also Pichon (1991) *vincire;* McKeown (1989): 48; Keul (1989): 15; Booth (2009): 63; Miller (2013): 177.

[129] Booth (2009): 63.

[130] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.5-6. Cf. *Ars*. 1.17 where we find a similar boast to have conquered Cupid overturned ironically a few lines later. Keul (1989) notices the link (17, n. 3).

[131] Du Quesnay (1973) suggests that this allusion cannot be certain, but does accept probability (23-4, n. 13). See also Morgan (1977): 85 n. 28; Keul (1989): 18; Perkins (2002): 119; Armstrong (2005): 14; Sharrock (2012): 76; Davis (2024): 286.

[132] Cf. Büchner (1976): 288; Weinlich (1999): 243.

[133] Drinkwater (2013): 204.

(1.1.4) and his material (1.1.24)".[134] The triumph over *Amor* also inverts *Amor's* triumph in 1.2,[135] and reverses Naso's stance in his previous *renuntiatio* (2.9), where he begged Love for mercy.[136] I suggest that Ovid intends also to recall the image of 2.12.1-2:

*Ite triumphales circum mea tempora laurus!*
*Vicimus: in nostro est, ecce, Corinna sinu.*

In addition to the common first person plural *vicimus* and its identical metrical position, the hyperbolic haughtiness of this opening is familiar. In 2.12, Naso claims for himself a victory and a triumph, and compares his success to the capture of Troy.[137] I suggest that the laurel crown of 2.12 anticipate the horns donned in 3.11, since both are tokens of power.[138] Whereas in 2.12 Naso seems to have had a legitimate cause for celebration, albeit short-lived,[139] in 3.11 the claim of victory appears premature, less certain, and it will be more fleeting. The verbal similarities and hubristic tone in any case imply that in 3.11, like 2.12, there are imminent consequences.[140] Taken together, these reversals signal that Naso has no chance at getting away with this slight against the love god.[141]

**Summary of 1-6:**

My analysis so far shows that, in the opening section of his *renuntiatio,* Naso puts on a brave face as he voices his frustrations. He declares his decision to renounce his love in no uncertain terms. He prematurely claims to have emancipated himself from his shackles, acknowledges the shamefulness of his former ways and boasts to have conquered the love god and trampled over his head. Despite Naso's increasing confidence, Ovid has left clues that he misapprehends the situation. These clues take the form of intratextual and intertextual allusions that i) suggest that he has ignored lessons, either from his own past or those left by his elegiac forebears, and ii) spotlight his ironic change of

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[134] Drinkwater (2013): 204.

[135] Cf. Keul (1989): 17.

[136] Cairns (1979): 139.

[137] Ov. *Am*. 2.12.9-18. Cf. Cahoon (1988): 298; Booth (2009): 64-5.

[138] On the *cornua* evoking power see: Otto (1890): 94; Brandt (1911): 179; Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 18. See e.g. Ov. *Ars*. 1.239; Hor. *Carm*. 3.21.18.

[139] Cf. Cahoon (1988): 298-9.

[140] On *hybris* as "an attempt to rise above one's proper place," see Gagarin (1977): 25; Dover (1994).

[141] For *hybris* and the gods, see e.g. MacDowell (1976): 19-20.

fortune and mindset. The implications of this intertextuality are, I think, lost on Naso, and therefore the situation produces dramatic irony.

Indeed, Naso's effrontery seems wilfully to ignore and at times contradict experiences that should have been formative. His attempt to resist love and to force the love god out of his heart contradicts the self-advice of *Am*. 1.2.9-19 which stressed the futility of resistance. The lesson again goes unheeded when he declares to have triumphed over love (5-6); we are reminded of love's triumph over him (1.2) and of the haughty tone of Naso's prior triumph (2.12). The regret of his recent *pudor* undermines his initial intimation that it had been his asset (*Am*. 1.2.32). The claim to have emancipated himself, with language suggestive of a deserter, undermines his pose as a loyal soldier of Cupid in (2.9.3) and the contrast in register and tone between the poems highlights Naso's impudence. The image of the love god lingering in Naso's heart prompts this comparison (Cf. 2.9.1-2; 3.11.1-2). Furthermore, had Naso heeded the lessons of Propertius, he might not be so brazen: as Prop. 2.30a.1-2 suggests, nobody can escape love, yet in 3.11a.3-4 Naso claims to have done so, when it is always the love god that stomps the lover's head (Cf. Prop. 1.1.3-4; 2.30a.7-8).

Similarly, the allusions highlight Naso's radical change of circumstance and attitude. The claim of self-emancipation, for instance, invokes language of *servitium amoris* and suggests that Naso is no longer satisfied with how the pose serves him (*contra Am*. 1.3; 2.17.1-2; 2.19.19-24), while *scilicet* casts further doubt on the legitimacy of his freedom. But, *servitium* is part and parcel of elegiac love (Prop. 2.23.23-4); to abandon it would be to forgo an essential aspect of his identity as an elegiac lover. His control is thus relinquished either way. Neither course will satisfy him, and so he is stuck in a predicament unlike any that he had previously encountered. As yet, Naso is unaware of the depth of his predicament, and his trouble becomes more apparent from this point onward.

Ovid has thus far created a careful arrangement of intratextual and intertextual allusions. Gross was not wrong to call this a literary mélange.[142] However, with his claim that in 3.11 "Ovid does not attempt to express serious emotion…but rather adroit poetic playfulness,"[143] I can hardly disagree more. Although he demonstrates that Ovid indeed develops this poem with verbal dexterity, Gross

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[142] Gross (1975): 152.

[143] Gross (1975): 160.

fails to demonstrate why precisely "adroit poetic playfulness" and "serious emotion" should be considered mutually exclusive.[144] On this subject, Hinds:

> "At a time when Propertian criticism has in most respects shaken itself free of the biographical fallacy, it is odd to find the old opposition between ‘sincerity' and ‘literariness’ still persisting in discussions of the difference between Propertian and Ovidian elegiac inspiration".[145]

As earlier outlined, what had been considered 'sincere" in the tradition of Augustan elegy is dubious,[146] and the distance between Ovid and his elegiac persona is conducive to the coexistence of playfulness and seriousness. In 3.11, Ovid conjures an elegiac pastiche in a way that is at once both playful and serious: the allusions to his own works and to those of his elegiac predecessors provide both an entertaining burst of literary repartee and a more meaningful comment on Naso's precarious position. With allusions to Catullus, Propertius, and Tibullus, Ovid brings to our attention their inability to get the best of love, and with references to his previous amatory experiences Naso recalls his own pitfalls.[147] Ovid thereby colours the renunciation with dramatic tension as he builds towards its failure in 3.11b.

**ii. 7-8: Hesitation, Self-Exhortation, and Formulation of Strategy**

*Perfer et obdura! dolor hic tibi proderit olim;*
*saepe tulit lassis sucus amarus opem.*

After a bold start, Naso hesitates, exhorts himself to persist with the renunciation, and offers a supportive aphorism. The couplet is often included in the introduction (1-6).[148] I isolate it because it contains a clue as to why Naso's renunciation ultimately fails.[149]

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[144] Gross (1975): 160. Gross' premise is that serious emotion must be autobiographical; I see no good reason for that to be necessary. Ovid's *persona* is just as much entitled to "serious emotion" as the Propertian lover.

[145] Hinds (2006): 26.

[146] Cf. e.g. Allen (1950): 152-4; Veyne (1988): 39-43; 67-9; Oliensis (2019): 1-4; 8-12.

[147] Perkins (2002), 119: "allusions that either support or refute the sentiments of his fellow poets fuel Naso's tirade".

[148] Cf. e.g. Cairns (1979): 132; Keul (1989): 24-6; Perkins (2002): 118.

[149] This failure has often been attributed to the intervention of the beloved, e.g. Jäger (1967): 145; 166; Keul (1989): 88; Döpp (1992): 59.

Ovid begins line 7 with the exclamation, *perfer et obdura*, a famous allusion to the Catullan *renuntiatio* (Catull. 8.11; 12; 19).[150] Like Catullus, Naso opens a soliloquy in which he exhorts himself to persevere,[151] and as in Catullus, this self-exhortation suggests a weakness of resolve.[152] Following his bold claim to have conquered the love-deity, this change of heart appears ironic.[153] Williams considers this a "surprising exception" to the speaker's indignant tone, and a "casual aside…to suggest the painful inner struggle which will be the subject of the second half of the poem".[154] I think that this jitter is less a surprising exception than a sign of what is to come. The apprehensive self-address is at odds with the inflated opening because it is the first time that Naso demonstrates some awareness that the renunciation will be more than a formality. Although he puts on a brave front against the love god, it is just that: a front.

There is another layer of irony in Ovid's use of synonymous terms: he tells himself that he needs to persist (i.e. be patient),[155] but in line 1 he claimed that his *patientia* had run out.[156] There his patience was exhausted by his beloved's *vitia*. Now he requires this quality to move on from her. He is trapped: he wants to get out of the relationship, or to be in it on his own terms. He can do neither, since to leave would require what he has already expended by staying: *patientia*. Booth suggests that "the context of facetious self-review in which Ovid's near-quotation is embedded arguably undermines its original Catullan earnestness".[157] Although there is irony and humour in this "self-review," I do not see why this precludes earnestness. For Ovid this is no self-review; he develops

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[150] Cf. Brandt (1911): 176; Ferguson (1960): 354; Lee (1962): 162; Lenz (1966): 234; Williams (1968): 589; Gross (1975): 152; Cairns (1979): 133; Holzberg (1981): 201; Cahoon (1988): 304; Keul (1989): 20; Döpp (1992): 5-6; Weinlich (1999); Perkins (2002): 118-119; Armstrong (2005): 14; Hinds (2006): 18; Booth (2009): 68; Sharrock (2012): 76; Hanses (2022): 91; Davis (2024): 286.

[151] Cf. Lee (1962): 160; Gross (1975): 157; Döpp (1992): 58. Keul (1989) suggests that the self-exhortations should prove that lines 1-8 all constitute a soliloquy (20).

[152] Cf. Damon (1990): 288; Weinlich (1999): 243; Perkins (2002): 118; Hutchinson (2008): 180; Sharrock (2012): 76. See also Hardie (2006b): 175, who notes, also on an allusion to this line from Catull. 8, though in the *Remedia*, as follows: "less reassuring are the allusions to Catullan attempts to escape from a painful love". For the opposite view, see Vitale (1980): 337; Keul (1989): 25. Armstrong (2005) alternatively suggests that Ovid is showing off by contrasting himself from his predecessor (14).

[153] Cf. also Keul (1989): 20; Döpp (1992): 58.

[154] Williams (1968): 508.

[155] *OLD obduro* 1; *perfero* 7.

[156] This patience was necessary for him to endure (*tuli*); the verbal connection between this and *perfer* suggests a link between the *patientia* that is conquered and that which he attempts to evoke in himself.

[157] Booth (2009): 68.

and watches these mistakes at a safe distance from his "callous *amator*".[158] If there is a self-review, it is Naso's, and there is little to suggest that he finds his predicament amusing. He has thus far made several ironic, even contradictory statements without himself realising so; this is dramatic irony. Booth seems to suggest that the self-exhortation is insincere because it follows his claim to have ousted *Amor,* but irony on Ovid's part is not insincerity on Naso's. Internal dissonance is one of the most prevalent themes of 3.11. In any case, Naso knows that his patience has been overcome (1); it is logical, or at least plausible in its desperation, that he would try to rouse more in himself, particularly after making so bold a claim that he now must support. This may be humorous to us, but Naso himself is frenzied. I suggest that he calls on one of his "comrades" (Catullus) for inspiration. I suggest that the need to exhort himself is symptomatic of Naso's regression from the self-confident Don Juan (itself not entirely convincing),[159] to the more vulnerable, proto-elegiac lover of the Catullan sort.[160] By invoking another *renuntiatio*, Ovid forces us to think about how these renunciations usually pan out. The uncertainty of Catullus' renunciation does little to reassure us of Naso's conviction.[161]

Rather than serving only as a witty interplay that contributes to the "literariness" of the poem,[162] I suggest that the allusion*,* obvious as it is, poses a more meaningful reflection on the inevitable failure of the elegiac lover's attempt to escape his generic and erotic confines: even Naso, cunning as he is, can fare no better than his lyric and elegiac predecessors in the game of love. If we follow Armstrong's suggestion that Naso is “showing off,” then his reckoning in 3.11b might be considered a kind of poetic justice.[163]

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[158] On the distance between Ovid and his "callous *amator*," Cf. Cahoon (1985): 37-9; Boyd (1997): 138-41; James (2003): 155–211; Gardner (2013): 127.

[159] Cf. Davis (1989): 37; 55; Sellar (2010): 324-9.

[160] Cf. Cairns (1979): 137. Cairns suggests that Ovid himself vacillates between "witty withdrawn observer to elegiac lover of the Propertian/Tibullan type." I suggest only a change of character in the persona, with the Catullan proto-elegiac lover as a chief reference, not only the Propertian/Tibullan. I follow Cahoon (1985) that the Ovidian *amator* experiences a regression (though not, as she suggests, a moral one), as opposed to a fluctuation between two archetypes (85-6).

[161] Cf. Perkins (2002): 120. See also Quinn (1969): 93-4; Spentzou (2013): 20-1.

[162] Gross (1975): 157; 160.

[163] Armstrong (2005): 14.

It is also worth noting that 3.11 reverses the developments of Catullus 8:[164] in the Catullan poem, the lover is at the start still in a state of misery (1-8); the self-exhortation, marked by *nunc* (9), takes place over Iines 9-11, his resolve is affirmed in line 12 (*obdurat*) and in line 20 (20: *obdura*); *desinas* (1) becomes *destinatus* (20). In Ovid, we start with a call for resolve (7: *perfer et obdura*), and then collapse into uncertainty with the Catullan dichotomy of *odium* and *amor* (33-4). Ovid's use of the Catullan phrase in 3.11 anticipates later advice given by the *praeceptor* in the *Remedia Amoris.*[165]

Ovid assigns to the rest of the couplet the following aphorism: *dolor hic tibi proderit olim; saepe tulit lassis sucus amarus opem*.[166] Like bitter medicine, Naso tells himself, the pain brought on by bitter memories will aid his healing. The language invokes the concept of love-sickness,[167] To persist through the renunciation, Naso assumes that the "bitter medicine" (*sucus amarus*) involves inciting feelings of *odium,* which he strives to achieve by recalling his beloved's indiscretions (9-28). Perhaps the bitter medicine rather involves distance from the beloved, in which case the aphorism may anticipate advice give in the *Remedia Amoris*.[168] In 3.11, instead of distancing himself, Naso castigates his beloved. Naso's awareness of aid evokes Catullus 76.18 (*tulistis opem*).[169]

**iii. 9-26: Execution of Strategy, the List of Grievances**

After a moment of hesitation, Naso enumerates the ways in which he has been slighted by his beloved. This section comprises a series of elegiac commonplaces that also allude to particular experiences from Naso's past. My discussion addresses how these intratextual connections, aided at times by intertextual allusions, deepen our understanding of the seriousness of Naso's predicament.

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[164] Cf. Davis (2024), whose explanation is a little different. He notes: "the Catullan lover has been discarded…[Naso] rejects his mistress" (286).

[165] See Ov. *Rem*. 642-8. Ferguson (1960): 342; Holzberg (1981): 201; Keul (1989): 20, n. 4. See also Ov. *Rem*. 661-2; *Rem*. 729; Hardie (2006b): 168-9.

[166] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.7-8.

[167] For which see Skinner (1987): 230–33.

[168] Ovid, *Rem*. 213-4. See verbal resonances with the couplet at *Rem*. 225-8. On distance to remedy love, see Rosati (2006): 161-2.

[169] Perkins (2002): 120. Like Keul (1989): 21, Perkins sees the optimistic message of the *opem* as undercut by *dolor*, *lassis*, and its position after *amarus* (118).

I divide the list of grievances as follows. We begin with the *exclusus amator* episode (9-16), followed by a brief reflection where Naso stresses his *fides* and his beloved's lack thereof (17-20), a rant of his beloved's other misdeeds (21-6), namely: her perjuries (21-2); dinner-table flirtations (23-4); and feigned illness (25-6).

**9-16: *Exclusus Amator***

After issuing himself advice and misunderstanding how to implement it, Naso laments the indiscretions of his beloved (9-26).[170] The first section (9-16) is largely devoted to the *exclusus amator topos*.[171] The invective begins with two successive rhetorical questions directed at his beloved:

> *Ergo ego sustinui, foribus tam saepe repulsus,*
> *ingenuum dura ponere corpus humo?*
> *ergo ego nescio cui, quem tu conplexa tenebas,*
> *excubui clausam servus ut ante domum?*[172]

While Naso issues complaints based on his beloved's actions, his words are self-focused: he begins each couplet with the rhetorical and emphatic *ergo ego* and the first person verbs, *sustinui* and *excubui,* to emphasise his indignation.[173] This is one of three instances of the *sustinere* + infinitive construction.[174] More particularly, the focus is on his *servitium* and the *pudor* that has accompanied it.[175] By invoking the *komos* image, Ovid draws on a thoroughly exploited elegiac paradigm.[176]

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[170] On the list of complaints in general, see: Lenz (1966): 234; Jäger (1967): 223-5; Cairns (1979): 133; Keul (1989): 27f.; Perkins (2002): 121.

[171] Cairns (1979): 132; Keul (1989): 28-9; Damon (1990): 289; Bretzigheimer (2001): 141; Perkins (2002): 121-2. On the *exclusus amator*, see Copley (1956); Sabot (1976): 511-15; Sharrock (2021): 59-82.

[172] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.9-12.

[173] Cf. Keul (1989): 28; Perkins (2002): 119; James (2003): "rather than berate her, in Propertian style, he focuses on his own condition" (127). For *ergo ego*, see Cic. *Phil*. 2.30.5; Prop. 3.21.17; Ov. *Am*. 1.4.3; 1.7.11; *Her*. 10.119; *Met*. 7.51; 7.172; 9.182; 9.513. Cf. Davis (2024): 287. I disagree with him that *sustinui* underlines the speaker's disbelief; the term seems to emphasise the hardship of bearing the humiliation, cf. *OLD* s.v. 4; 6.

[174] See Ovid's previous *renuntiatio* (2.9.39) with McKeown (1998): 189.

[175] Cf. Döpp (1992): 58; Bretzigheimer (2001): 141.

[176] For an outline of the *exclusus amator* see: Pichon *excludere*; Canter (1920); Copley (1956); Cairns (1972): 6; (1975): 1-23; (2020): 262-6; Mack (1988): 54-5. On this example, see: Neumann (1919): 75; Haight (1950), esp. 138; Cairns (1979): 133-4; Keul (1989): 28-9; Perkins (2002): 121-2; Davis (2024): 287. Cf. e.g. Catull. 67; Prop. 1.16; 2.17; Tib. 1.2.7-14; 1.5.59-68; 2.6.11–14.

Ovid's language is particularly reminiscent of Tibullus 1.1.56 (*sedeo duras ianitor ante fores*).[177] It is possible that Ovid invokes this image to mock the paradigm as it had been used by his elegiac predecessors.[178] However, by employing a convention so familiar, so exhausted already by his forerunners, explored even by himself,[179] Ovid gives us particular insight into Naso's predicament. McKeown suggests that, by changing Tibullus" metaphor into a comparison (*ut*), Ovid 'seems almost to be rejecting the concept of *servitium amoris*".[180] I agree that *ut* weakens the metaphor, and thereby shows Naso's displeasure at resembling the *servus.* He does not want to be likened to a slave; it is shameful (4: *tulisse pudet*), not least because he is a freeman (10: *ingenuum*). In other words, Naso's attitude towards his *servitium* has changed. Ovid makes Naso resemble his elegiac predecessors not merely to mock them, nor to add novelty, but to show that his fate is no different from theirs. There are two reasons for this. The first concerns Ovid's uncharacteristic presentation of the paradigm, and the second Naso's attitude about his situation.

When previously Ovid experimented with the *komos* motif (1.6), he added a twist to the tradition by having Naso plead with the doorkeeper.[181] In 3.11, the komastic image is fleeting and given a more generic treatment; it is one of the many elegiac commonplaces in Naso's list of grievances.[182] In 1.6 he did something obviously witty; now he does something ostensibly conventional. Maybe the cleverness lies in the conventionality: the formerly clever, self-confident, mischievous Naso, always with a trick up his sleeve, now appears as nothing more than a worn-out elegiac stereotype. The situation is the more ironic since this image comes soon after Naso's hubristic affront to the love god (1-6).

It is also worth considering Naso's status as *exclusus amator*, his attitude towards it, and why this time seems different. To address the issue, I compare his position and attitude in two other poems,

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[177] Cf. McKeown (1989): 64.

[178] Often Ovid's *Amores* are oversimplified and reduced on this account. For example, Arkins (1990): 832; McKeown (1989): 122.

[179] On Ovid's forerunners: Cf. e.g. Tib. 1.1.56; 1.5.68; 2.3.74f.; 2.4.22f.; 2.6.12f.; Prop. 1.5.20; 1.18.24; 2.7. 9; 3.17.12f.; 3.23.12; 4.3.47. On Ovid: Ov. *Am*. 1.4.61; 1.6; 1.9.7; 15f.; 2.1.17ff; 2.9.46; 2.12.3; 2.19..6; 21f.; 37-40; 3.1.53; *Ars*. 3.69; *Rem*. 36. See also Canter (1920): 355; McKeown (1989): 123.

[180] McKeown (1989): 64-5.

[181] For which, see Morgan (1977): 42-3; Yardley (1987): 183; McKeown (1989): 121-3; 127; Boyd (1997): 37-8; James (2003): 139-40; Sharrock (2012): 75.

[182] Cairns (1979): 133.

1.6 and 2.19. In 1.6, denied access to his beloved, Naso was in a similar position, but there are important contextual differences.[183] 1.6 follows on from Naso's titillating exploits in 1.5; he has hardly been sexually deprived, a point that he stresses to the doorkeeper.[184] In 3.11, Naso is wearied in the opposite way: after the erotic letdowns of 3.7 and 3.10,[185] he is exhausted by the *vitia* of his beloved (1-2), where *patientia* itself is a term suggestive of his sexual inactivity.[186] Naso now is less spirited and more frustrated. Humorous though his predicament may be, he has more reason to be unhappy with his position, itself now more humiliating than in 1.6, as *corpus humo* suggests.[187] Indeed, he is not even in the same old position where the *exclusus amator* begs for admission, be it by flattery,[188] violence,[189] or negotiation directed at the *ianitor*[190] or the door itself[191]. Instead, now he is the *servus* and also the doorkeeper.[192] If having to beg for admission as a freeman is an indignity, more so if one has to beg the doorkeeper, "among the most menial of domestic staff, being unfit for other duties," then actually being the doorkeeper, or the *servus* waiting to accompany his mistress/master, is that much more degrading.[193]

The second passage that contrasts Naso's current attitude toward his position is 2.19.21-4. There, Naso encourages his exclusion in similarly komastic terms because it sustains his erotic interest:

> *Et sine me ante tuos proiectum in limine postis*
> *longa pruinosa frigora nocte pati.*
> *sic mihi durat amor longosque adolescit in annos;*

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[183] A point Bretzigheimer (2001) stresses (141; 227).

[184] Ov. *Am*. 1.6.3-6.

[185] On 3.7, see Davis (1989): 45; Sharrock (1995): 152-180, esp. 156-9; James (2003): 183-4; Holzberg (2009): 933–40.

[186] Cf. Perkins (2002): 121.

[187] As McKeown (1998) notes, this is "the *exclusus amator's* most abjectly humiliating posture" (417). Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.9.7f.; *Ars*. 2.237f.; 3.581; *Rem.* 304, 507f.; Catull. 63.65; Tib. 1.1.56; 2.4.22; 2.6.47; Prop. 1.16.14; 22f.; 2.6.2; 2.14.32; 2.17.15; 3.7.72; 4.1.145f.

[188] Tib. 1.2.7-14; Canter (1920): 355.

[189] Tib. 1.1.73; 1.10.43-5; Canter (1920): 355.

[190] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.6; ; Brandt (1911): 179; McKeown (1989): 122.

[191] Cf. Tib. 1.2.7; Prop. 1.16.17-20.

[192] Cf. Tib. 1.1.55-6. The role of *servus* might also denote a companion to the rival or the mistress, for which see Keul 32 n. 4, *contra* Williams (1968): 508-9. See also Weinlich (1999): 243.

[193] Cf. McKeown (1989): 122-3.

*hoc iuvat; haec animi sunt alimenta mei*.[194]

This passage also bears greater situational and verbal resemblance to ours: *me ante tuos proiectum in limine postis* corresponds with *ponere corpus humo* and *excubui clausam…ante domum.* However, in 2.19 Naso pursues these challenges because he feels that the game has become too easy.[195] As the command, *sine*, and *hoc iuvat* confirm,[196] Naso's exclusion is actively encouraged. Again, therefore, in 3.11 Naso resents the treatment he previously endorsed.

Although at certain stages he undertakes a role that resembles that of a masochist,[197] I prefer pseudo-masochist,[198] and suggest that by 3.11 Naso is no longer keen on his suffering because it has become real, and no longer part of his "game" or "act". That is, in 2.19.19-24 Naso plays the part of a masochist, but once he experiences the harsh manifestation of these desires (Cf. 3.2; 3.3; 3.4; esp. 3.11.9-20), particularly when they are no longer of his own volition (Cf. 3.11.33-8), he then reverts to a weaker, more insecure and helpless love.

Ovid's language intensifies Naso's degradation. *Ingenuum* is for McKeown a pun connoting both delicacy and freeman status; it is juxtaposed by *dura*, which underlines the absurdity and humiliation of the freeman's position.[199] Naso's disgrace is also shown by the contrast between his actual status (*ingenuus*) and his current servility: *clausam servus ut ante domum*.[200] In the *Ars Amatoria* (2.523-4), the *praeceptor* instructs his pupils in similar terms to persevere in this position,[201] where *perfer* is a choice word that recalls his misguided self-advice at 3.11.7.

There is also a connection to the previous *renuntiatio*, 2.9. The clause, *foribus tam saepe repulsus*, echoes 2.9.46: *saepe fruar domina, saepe repulsus eam.* There, Naso's rejection is counterbalanced

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[194] Cf. Keul (1989) who also makes this connection, but offers no comment on its significance (30).

[195] Davis (1989), 48: "easy prey is no fun to pursue"; McKeown (1998): 406.

[196] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 2.19.20: *time…nega*.

[197] Cf. Perkins (2002): 125; Oliensis (2019): 104-14.

[198] Cf. Booth (2009), who suggests rather a sort of "humorously insouciant pragmatism" (67).

[199] McKeown (1987): 189. Cf. also Davis (2024): 287-8.

[200] Williams (1968): 509; James (2003): 299, n. 105; Davis (2024): 288.

[201] Cf. Brandt (1911): 179; Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 31; Davis (2024): 288. They recognise this link, though offer no explanation for it. See also Prop. 3.15.16.

by occasional enjoyment; now, however, he is spared the happy times and left only with rejection.[202] Oliensis' observation on 2.9.46 puts this into perspective:

> It matters that Naso puts the quarrels and rejections second: what he is envisioning is not a happy ending (lovers fight and then make up), but the endless resurgence of difficulties that he associates with life itself.[203]

Hence, the second wave that Naso feels in 2.9b is short-lived, and by 3.11a he relapses into feelings of abjection. *Saepe repulsus* also recalls the advice that Dipsas gives her pupil in 1.8.73-76: *saepe nega noctes… ut nullum patiendi colligat usum …saepe repulsus amor,*[204] and Naso's own words when encouraging his exclusion in 2.19.20: *saepe time simulans, saepe rogata nega*. The recurrence of *saepe repulsus* in 3.11 is thus suggestive Naso's loss of control: in 2.9, he encourages occasional rejection; now that the rejection is more than he is prepared to handle, he regrets it. He resents that his beloved implements the strategy recommended by Dipsas in 1.8 and that he himself encouraged in 2.9 and 2.19. Dipsas use of *patiendi* is also important. Although Dipsas advises the *puella* to apply this rejection technique with moderation, Naso seems to enjoy little moderation. As a result, his *patientia* is conquered.

Thus far I have paid attention to Naso and his beloved, but there is another actor whom I have not mentioned, the rival that renders Naso a third party: *nescio cui, quem tu conplexa tenebas*. The only name afforded to the figure is *nescioquis*, recognised by McKeown as "a jealous but ostensibly contemptuous term of abuse directed against a successful rival".[205] There is in the term also an implied insult to the beloved: the anonymity of the rival is suggestive of her promiscuity.[206] Naso complains because he is jealous, another intratextual reference that ironically points back to his earlier words: in 2.19 he encourages a beloved's *vir* to "add spice to his affair by putting difficulties in his way".[207] Now, it seems that either Naso cannot handle those difficulties (as suggested in 3.2; 3; 4),[208] or, as I shall elaborate on in my analysis of line 18, Naso has himself taken on the role of

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[202] See Cairns (1972): 138. Cf. Tracy (1977): 500.

[203] Oliensis (2019): 110. Although, Oliensis' interpretation admits more of a masochistic enjoyment of rejection*:* "Naso's desire…also values sexual frustration alongside or above sexual gratification".

[204] McKeown (1989): 145; Perkins (2002): 122.

[205] McKeown (1989): 80; (1998): 107. Cf. Cairns (1972): 81; Davis (2024): 288.

[206] Keul (1989): 33. See Ov. *Am*. 1.13.39.

[207] McKeown (1998): 406. In particular, see 2.19.1-4; 25-6.

[208] Cf. Greene (1994): 346.

the *vir* (Cf. 3.11.18: *ipse vir*). Either way, Naso's twist of fortune is fatefully ironic. If that were not enough, at 2.19.33-4 he hopes that his words, *siqua volet regnare diu, deludat amantem,* do not come back to haunt him (*ei mihi, ne monitis torquear ipse meis!*).

In the subsequent lines (13-6) he turns his attention to the *nescioquis*:

*Vidi, cum foribus lassus prodiret amator,*
*invalidum referens emeritumque latus;*
*Hoc tamen est levius, quam quod sum visus ab illo –*
*eveniat nostris hostibus ille pudor!*

Sharrock underscores the rivalry at play in these lines.[209] Whereas Naso is outside his beloved's door, his rival was just in her bed. There is a clear winner in this rivalry. Ovid visualises this difference by opening line 13 with the first person *vidi* and suspending *amator* to the opposite end of the line.[210] The contrast is further accentuated by the rival being described as *lassus,* the same quality recently related to Naso (3.11.8: *lassis*) in a quite different sense. *Lassus* in this context implies exhaustion from sex;[211] applied to Naso, it means love sickness.[212] Naso has transformed from 1.5, where he was the one who was *lassus* from sexual activity.[213] The contrast between lover and rival is further developed by *prodire*: in line 7 pain would come to (the benefit of) Naso (*dolor…proderit*); in line 13 it is the rival who comes out (*prodiret*) from the beloved's doors. He also emerges with a *latus* that is *invalidum* and *emeritum.* The arrangement of adjectives, between which is sandwiched *referens*, is to Williams "amusingly clever…a cleverness which is verbal… totally self-contained and involves nothing beyond itself," and I agree.[214] We might also have an allusion to the bawdy image of Catullus 6.13 (*non tam latera ecfututa pandes*).[215] Indeed, both *emeritus* and *latus* have sexual overtones: the former appropriates its militaristic context to emphasise sexual exhaustion, and the latter refers both to male genitalia and the site of this

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[209] Sharrock (2012): 75.

[210] Note that the rival, rather than Naso, is the *amator*. But see Pichon (1991) s.v., for alternative uses of the word.

[211] Adams (1990): 196; Perkins (2002): 121. See e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.5.25-6; 3.7.80.

[212] The term is, I believe, intended to recall a *puella's* accusation in 3.7, where Naso is accused of being *lassus amore* (80), when he failed to get an erection.

[213] Ov. *Am*. 1.5.25-6. Cf. Davis (2024): 288.

[214] Williams (1968): 509. On the arrangement see also Keul (1989) 35; 36, n. 1. Kraus (1968) comments on the line's epigrammatic quality (86).

[215] Cf. Brandt (1911): 179; Ferguson (1960): 354; Davis (2024): 288.

exhaustion.[216] Less attention has been paid to *invalidum,* which denotes bodily weakness, in this context resulting from the rival's recent exploit.[217] But like *emeritus*, *invalidus* has a particular military application: incompetency in battle; a lack of martial skill.[218] In the parameters of *militia amoris*, where the lover plays the role of a soldier of love, Naso's remark suggests that his rival is unfit for, and therefore undeserving of, sex with his beloved.[219]

Although Ovid uses terms that have these sexual applications, and I agree that he intends to recall the sexual side of Naso's relationship, I am not convinced by Perkins' suggestion that "the lies and [the] sexual games that Naso bitterly decries in *Amores* 3.11 are integral to his sexual play".[220] Oliensis agrees with Perkins' assessment, claiming that "for Naso, the recollection of distress is a most potent aphrodisiac.[221] I disagree. First, although they could have sexual implications, certain terms that she outlines (*fatigato*; *turpis*) are in this context not as suggestive as she implies, and the sexual dimension should not eclipse a more straightforward reading.[222] *Cede fatigato pectore, turpis amor* could be Naso "asking shameless love to depart…because he is exhausted from sex," but does this make sense in a context where he has just declared that his *patientia* (deemed by Perkins herself as a sign of sexual passivity [inactivity]),[223] has been conquered?

However, in *Am*. 3.11 Naso's behaviour seems more in line with his predecessors than with the Ovidian lover earlier in the *Amores*. Hence, Cairns observes a fluctuation from "witty withdrawn observer to elegiac lover of the Propertian/Tibullan type,"[224] and Sharrock, a lover who at once exhibits intense emotion and parodies the elegiac tradition's potential for shallowness.[225] It is,

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[216] Cf. Pichon *emerere, invalidus*; Gross (1975): 152-3; Murgatroyd (1975): 601; Perkins (2002): 121. Cf. e.g. Tib. 1.9.60; Ov. *Am*. 1.8.48; 2.8.23. See also Prop. 4.11.72; McKeown (1998): 166. For *latus*, see Brandt (1911): 179; Adams (1990): 49.

[217] *OLD invalidus* 1b; 2.

[218] *OLD invalidus* 3. See e.g. Liv. 27.39.2; 41.2.3.

[219] The term is used in proximity to other terms frequently employed in *militia amoris* (*emeritum*; *hostis*).

[220] Perkins (2002): 124.

[221] Oliensis (2019): 110.

[222] See Keul (1989), 12; Pichon (1991) *Fatigato.*

[223] Cf. Perkins (2002): 124. I prefer the suggestion that *conplexa tenebas* is sexual, for which see Keul (1989): 33.

[224] Cairns (1979): 137.

[225] Sharrock (2012): 77.

therefore, useful to view the lover of 3.11 as lapsing into the same pitfalls as his elegiac predecessors, rather than as the detached and witty Ovidian lover we know (and loathe?). Perkins concedes this point.[226] Despite recognising the textual support for this interpretation, she continues to suggest that Naso reverts to his prior ways: "he cannot escape his conditioning as he allows the presence of rivals to stimulate his own interest in his mistress".[227]

I think that Naso's jealousy is crucial to his inability to renounce; however, I disagree with Perkins' (and Oliensis') insistence on his "interest" being sexually charged, and that this is conveyed by innuendo. The presence of a detailed erotic visual, namely the exhausted rival leaving the beloved's home, to which Naso has a front-row view (*vidi*), does not prompt arousal. Naso may use such detailed sexual language (e.g. *emeritum*; *invalidum*) to emphasise how grating he finds the experience.[228] There is no decisive textual evidence that the sighting, nor Naso's jealousy itself, arouses him; it inspires him to "reclaim" his beloved from the rival, but this is not necessarily sexual.[229]

Perkins also mentions that obstacles sustain the lover's interest.[230] I agree. Throughout the *Amores* this is the usual protocol. However, in this context, Naso is not in a position to besiege the obstacle in his way; as the *servus* (12) and the *custos* (18), he has become the obstacle.[231] That is what makes his predicament so ironic, and to him so unbearable. It seems unlikely that he is aroused by being the obstacle, but outraged at his having turned into the very obstacles he used to thrill in surmounting. Part of Perkins' argument relies on the fact that elsewhere in the *Amores* the mere presence of a rival increases sexual excitement.[232] She cites 2.19. Yes, Naso welcomes competition by encouraging his beloved's *vir* to be more territorial (19.1-3) and declares that he wants to be deceived by his beloved (7-10; 13-4). No, it is not the rival's presence alone that arouses Naso,[233] nor should the situation of 2.19 set the precedent for 3.11, which, as we have seen, contains

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[226] Perkins (2002): 123.

[227] Perkins (2002): 123.

[228] Cf. Keul (1989): 36.

[229] Volk (2022): 137.

[230] Perkins (2002): 121.

[231] Perkins (2002): 122.

[232] Perkins (2002): 122. Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.8.95-99; Greene (1994), 349.

[233] Perkins (2002): 123.

contextual differences. From the perspective of homosocial desire, more important than the presence of a rival is victory over the worthy opponent, and the virility and validation that the lover might feel as a result.[234] Perkins' approach assumes that Naso derives sexual gratification from the pain he endures in 3.11, which corresponds with the enjoyment he felt from goading his rival to be more protective in 2.19. This fails to account for the fact that the presence of a rival was only encouraged and enjoyed when Naso had the upper hand over the rival.[235] As that is no longer the case, is there enough evidence to suggest that he *must* feel the same as he did before? That would imply that Naso receives a voyeuristic pleasure from the scene that he witnesses, an argument lacking in textual evidence and Ovidian precedent. One more of Perkins' statements requires addressing. On Naso's list of complaints, she notes:

> "While he recalls the unhappy aspects of his relationship in order to leave it, in his reality these are the happy times of his relationship which cause him to stay with it…he is not made miserable by the aspects that define an elegiac situation…all of its trappings of lies and betrayal…masochistic sufferings".[236]

Although he is cuckolded, Naso shows no signs of enjoying it. Victory over a formidable rival, not merely the presence of one, is key to Naso's satisfaction. Currently, however, Naso is the loser. Thus, being spotted by his rival is a shame he would wish only on his enemies (*eveniat nostris hostibus ille pudor!*).[237] The culmination of his humiliation is illustrated in the difference between having seen (*vidi*) and having been seen (*visus*). It is not only a matter of jealousy; his weakness in this homosocial relationship is also humiliating.[238] Thus, I disagree with Perkins' suggestion that "the unhappy aspects of his relationship… are the happy times of his relationship which cause him to stay with it." They are indeed the unhappy times of his relationship that cause him to stay with it. He is not aroused by his beloved's sexual activity with his rival; he is jealous and (his ego is) hurt; he wants to "repossess" his beloved and regain the advantage in his rivalry.[239]

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[234] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 2.19.47-60. Sharrock (2012): 75. On homosociality in Augustan literature, see Keith (2008): 1-18; 115-138.

[235] Cf. Sharrock (2012): 75.

[236] Perkins (2002): 124-5.

[237] Cf. James (2003): 299, n. 105. Cf. also Sharrock (2012): 75. The *hostes* in question are likely previous erotic rivals, cf. Pichon (1991) s.v.; Keul (1989): 37; Bretzigheimer (2001): 141.

[238] On homosocial theory in general, see Lipman-Bluman (1976): 15-31; Sedgewick (1985); Connell (1995); Connell and Messerschmidt (2005): 829-59. On homosocial relations in Augustan elegy, see Oliensis (1997): 151-170; King (2004): 197–223; Keith (2008): 115-17.

[239] On non-sexual jealousy see Keul (1989): 34. See also Booth (2009): 67.

Rekindling his relationship will not necessarily remedy his pain (e.g. 3.14), but it may be more tolerable than witnessing his beloved's sexual activity from the outside. Thus I welcome Cairns' reading of Naso's list of complaints as a series of elegiac commonplaces; by placing the lover in such a predicament, Ovid intentionally illustrates that his *amator* is not as immune to the pains of his predecessors as he has previously intimated.[240] So at 2.19.8 he is right to exclaim that he is unable to love that which does not bring him pain. However, in that more frivolous context, where he protests "with logical but absurdly impertinent pragmatism," *amo* seems to imply volition as opposed to the involuntary attraction now felt.[241] Rather than being "unlike his lyric and elegiac predecessors" in that he is "not made miserable by the aspects that define an elegiac situation,"[242] the opposite seems true: in 3.11 Naso increasingly resembles his predecessors, increasingly more defeatist, focused on his pain, more resigned to his fate in, or out of, Love.

Naso's apotropaic wish that his humiliation happen rather to his enemies (*hoc tamen est levius… eveniat nostris hostibus ille pudor!*) looks back to 2.10.15-8:

> *Sed tamen hoc melius, quam si sine amore iacerem –*
> *Hostibus eveniat vita severa meis!*
> *hostibus eveniat viduo dormire cubili*
> *et medio laxe ponere membra toro!*[243]

In that context, Naso's biggest concern was that he was torn between two love objects; now he has none. Yet this luxury of choice is better than living without love (15); a life of lonely nights (16-18)[244] he would only wish upon his enemies (*hostibus eveniat*). Ironically, Naso is now the victim of his own hex.

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[240] Cairns (1979): 133; Perkins (2002): 125. Damon (1990) thinks more directly of Catull. 8 (288).

[241] Cf. McKeown (1998): 406. For the idea that *amo* can here mean "like," see p. 411-12; Ov. *Am*. 2.10.21f.

[242] Perkins (2002): 125.

[243] Cf. Brandt (1911): 179; Keul (1989): 37-8; McKeown (1998): 208; Davis (2024): 289. Ovid may also have in mind Prop. 2.4.17-8; 3.8.20; Hor. *Carm*. 1.21.13. We find the construction at *Ars*. 3.247, and see also *Fast*. 2.494, where *pudor* is replaced by *color*.

[244] Cf. Damon (1990), 288. Sleeping in the middle of the bed is indicative of having no partner, cf. Weinlich (1999): 131.

**17-20: Reflection on Relationship**

*Quando ego non fixus lateri patienter adhaesi,*
*ipse tuus custos, ipse vir, ipse comes?*
*scilicet et populo per me comitata placebas;*
*causa fuit multis noster amoris amor.*

In these two couplets Naso addresses his beloved directly (either in reality or in his imagination) and stresses his *fides* and her lack thereof (17-20). Many have suggested that the content and attitude of this section is inconsistent with the rest of the harangue; that here Naso is actually reminded of the happy times of his relationship.[245] I suggest instead that these are further reminders of Naso's debasement and his beloved's misdeeds.[246] I take Keul's point that this reflection contributes to Naso's relapse, not because "the woman's abominable acts are as sweet as they are painful,"[247] nor since these "unhappy aspects" are really "the happy times of his relationship;"[248] rather, these memories are further attempts to incite *odium*, which is a recipe for failure.[249] That is, these memories do not need to arouse him sexually in order to ensnare him. They are not somehow treasured by Naso; they mark his misery and inspire him to "reclaim" what was "his".

In lines 17-8, Naso asks his beloved another indignant rhetorical question:

*Quando ego non fixus lateri patienter adhaesi,*
*ipse tuus custos, ipse vir, ipse comes?*

I am not convinced that this section is a recollection of their happy times, nor that it operates independently from, and in a tone entirely at odds with, the list.[250] It forms part of Naso's strategy to incite feelings of *odium* but this is nuanced: in his self-pity, he looks for sympathy and negotiates a

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[245] Cf. Keul (1989): 39; Döpp (1992): 59; Bretzigheimer (2001): 142; Holzberg (2002): 62-3.

[246] More in line with this view are Jacoby (1905): 86; Neumann (1919): 70; 78; Jäger (1967): 144; Williams (1968): 508; Sabot (1976): 541. None considers the possibility that the negative memories contribute to Naso's relapse. I agree with Davis (2024) that this is a moment of 'self-pity" (289).

[247] Holzberg (2002): 62.

[248] Perkins (2002): 124.

[249] E.g. Ov. *Rem*. 642-8; 657-8; 661-2; 729.

[250] Cf. Keul. (1989): 39; Döpp (1992): 59. On the overlooking of this distinction, Neumann (1919): 78; Jäger (1967): 144; Williams (1968): 508; Gross (1975): 154; 157.

reward for his services; this marks a shift in his resolve.[251] Attempts to parse out of the couplet a happy reflection are, I think, unconvincing. For instance, Keul suggests that *quando ego* is comparably warmer than *ergo ego* (Cf. 3.11.9; 11).[252] Yet this question is also rhetorical, as indicated by the negative auxiliary; together with hyperbolic (*fixus*) and emphatic language (*patienter*), the question hardly appears to be asked gently and without tension. The triple clausal anaphora of *ipse* leaves little doubt: Naso's tone is indignant. He shows no sign that these duties are happy memories, but he does use her misdeeds, and his loyalty despite them, to suggest that his beloved is indebted to him.[253] Implicit in this is the suggestion that she ought to take him back. His approach is flawed: the logic of reciprocity is not going to change an emotional decision.

James sees lines 17-8 as evidence that "the guardianship of *Amores* 3.11…is overtly described as sexual companionship of the *puella* by the lover-poet rather than purely servile duty".[254] I am not convinced. At this stage, his duties could be purely servile.[255] Coupled with *fixus, latus* might look back to a sexual companionship between lover and beloved, but *patienter* works against this reading. In this context, where Naso is firmly out of love, the use of *lateri* recalls the exercised *latus* of the rival (*invalidum referens emeritumque latus*).[256] There is reason, then, to view this image as having a sexual undertone: it brings to mind Naso's lack of activity in contrast to his rival's activity.[257] It is surely no mistake that this image is stamped with a signifier of Naso's *patientia* and *servitium*: *patienter*.[258]

The picture of a lover who does not leave his beloved's side is, moreover, an elegiac convention and not always sexual.[259] The couplet may allude to Tib. 1.5.61-2:

> *Pauper erit praesto semper, te pauper adibit*

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[251] Keul. (1989): 39.

[252] Keul. (1989): 39.

[253] Cf. Weinlich (1999): 243.

[254] James (2003): 148.

[255] Cf. Davis (2024): 289.

[256] Note the similar placement of the terms in their respective lines.

[257] (*Ad*)*haerere* may admit a sexual undertone, Adams (1990): 181; Keul (1989): 41.

[258] Cf. Ov. *Ars*. 1.140. For the link to *servitium*, see Davis (2024): 289. He cites *Am*. 1.14.25; *Her*. 20.88-90.

[259] Cf. Prop. 1.3.19; 3.14.22; Tib. 1.5.62. On the passages, see Brandt (1911): 180; Lyne (1970): 14.

*Primus et in tenero* fixus *erit* latere.[260]

As in 3.11, the lover, in a moment of separation from his beloved, recalls his closeness to her in terms that highlight his *servitium*. Naso's commitment is stressed by the litotic rhetorical question involving a temporal (*quando ego non*)[261]; the Tibullan lover also uses temporal dimensions to express his devotion to his beloved (*erit praesto semper…adibit…primus…erit*). The sentiments are similar. The Tibullan lover's assertion is riddled with signs of his *servitium* (1.5.61: *pauper…te pauper*), and like the Ovidian, he is a self-proclaimed *comes* (1.5.63: *pauper in angusto fidus comes agmine*).[262] Both lovers are also locked outside their beloved's door (3.11.9-16; Tib. 1.5.66-7), and both leave no doubts about their servile status (3.11.12: *servus ut ante domum*; Tib. 1.5.64-6: *subiciet manus efficietque viam/ pauper ad occultos furtim deducet amicos/ vincla de niveo detrahet ipse pede*). By stressing his own loyalty, Naso hints at his beloved's lack thereof.

In the second half of the rhetorical question (18), Naso outlines three duties that he has carried out in the service of his beloved: *custos*; *vir*; *comes.* Naso is now what stands in the way of his rival.[263] He has been displaced as the protagonist of his own amatory exploits. Before I comment on these duties and their intratextual significance, it is worth considering the line's construction. Three clausal *anaphorae,* signalled with *ipse*, are bunched into a single line. As in the previous *renuntiatio* (2.9.3-4), Naso's use of *ipse* stresses his devotion to his addressee. In Tib. 1.5.11-2, where the lover takes on an ancillary role, the use of *ipse* is similar.[264] The fact that we find *ipse* three times and employed anaphorically emphasises Naso's loyalty together with his indignation that much more,[265] seeing that his loyalty is not returned: the focus is on Naso's deeds of loyalty in contrast with the misdeeds of his beloved (9-16). This is one reason why I think that the positivist interpretation of the couplet fails.[266] Keul's suggestion that the ranks of *custos*, *vir*, and *comes* are portrayed in descending order of Naso's dominancy, while undercut by their homogeneity as servile duties,

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[260] Unitalicised terms to indicate verbal connection are my own. Cf. Brandt (1911): 180; Lenz (1966): 234; Davis (1989): 92; Davis (2024): 289.

[261] See: Ov. *Am*. 1.13.5-6; *Her*. 1.11 (with *non*), for similar rhetorical phrasing. Cf. McKeown (1989): 343.

[262] Cf. Tib. 1.9.42; Keul (1989): 66, n. 3.

[263] Perkins (2002): 122.

[264] Cf. Murgatroyd (1980): 177. Although both contexts we have ancillary roles, the Tibullan lover takes on a role not overtly identifiable with the Ovidian lover here (that of a "hired saga").

[265] Cf. Keul (1989): 42.

[266] Cf. Keul (1989): 39-44.

seems plausible.[267] This ordering does not, however, suggest mutuality or equality.[268] Instead, the sequence tracks Naso's gradual descent into deeper levels of subservience. I think that Perkins' identification of the services as obstacles on the elegiac lover's course to satisfaction paves the way for more plausible intratextual links.[269] For instance, in 2.12, Naso employs the same construction to express an antithetical sentiment: *ipse eques, ipse pedes, signifer ipse fui.*[270] There, Naso is a triumphant general, a mirror image of the victorious Cupid that we saw in *Am*. 1.2.[271] Both 2.12 and 3.11 begin with Naso as a victor (2.12.2: *vicimus;* 3.11.5: *vicimus*), but over the course of each poem, Naso takes different paths. In 2.12, Naso holds his beloved firmly in his embrace (2: *in nostro est, ecce, Corinna sinu*); in 3.11, he watches his beloved embracing another (11: *nescio cui, quem tu conplexa tenebas*). While Naso of 2.12 goes on to liken his victory to that of the Greeks over Troy,[272] in 3.11 he soon realises that his celebrations are premature. Indeed, in 3.11.18, Naso becomes himself the very sort of obstacle (*ipse tuus custos*, *ipse vir*, *ipse comes*) that at 2.12.3-4 he boasts to have overcome: *quam vir, quam custos, quam ianua firma (tot hostes!)*. The triple clausal anaphora of *ipse* mimics that of *quam* (and of *ipse* in 2.12.13-4). I suggest that the infrequency of this device in Ovid strengthens this intratextual connection.[273] In the context of a military triumph, it makes sense that Naso's obstacles are classified as enemies (*hostes*). By 3.11 Naso has, ironically, become his own enemy.

These duties that Naso performs also develop a series of ironic intratextual reversals. The significance of *vir* in this context need not be anything more than symbolic: not strictly a husband, but someone whose (intimate) relation to the beloved prevents the lover from having open sexual contact with her; in other words, another obstacle.[274] In the *Amores*, the *vir* for the most part appears

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[267] Keul (1989): 42-5.

[268] Keul (1989): 45.

[269] Perkins (2002): 122.

[270] Ov. *Am*. 2.12.13-4. Cf. McKeown (1998): 270.

[271] Boyd (1997): 81. See also Murgatroyd (1975): 70, n. 31; Drinkwater (2013): 203. Cf. Ov. *Am*.1. 7.35-8; *Ars*. 2.539-40, *Rem*. 449-50; Prop. 2.14.23-6; 4.1.139-40.

[272] Ov. *Am*. 2.12.9-16. Cf. Cahoon (1988): 298; McKeown (1998): 264; 268-9; Booth (2009) 64-5.

[273] *Ipse* in triple anaphora, as here, occurs only in 2.12 and 3.11 in Ovid's amatory corpus (including *Heroides*).

[274] Cf. James (2003): 48-52; Miller (2004): 184; Armstrong (2005): 66–70; Booth (2009): 63. Keul (1989) argues for both husband and companion/friend (43).

worse off than Naso.[275] Having previously encouraged a *vir* in 2.19 to be more protective over his beloved, it appears now that Ovid, placed into the role of the *vir*, had himself not been protective enough. Naso's taunting of his rival's passivity (2.19.51-2: *lentus es et* pateris *nulli* patienda *marito/ at mihi concessi finis amoris erit!*) is particularly ironic, since x his own passivity is now highlighted (ego *non fixus lateri* patienter *adhaesi*).[276] In 1.4, the *vir* is Naso's obstacle, whom he instructs his beloved to deceive (11-28) and deny (29-70). In 3.11, Naso becomes the *vir* who stands as an obstacle and is both deceived (21-26) and denied (9-10) by his beloved, which is ironically what he had asked for in his last renunciation (Cf. 2.9.41-2). On 1.4, Sharrock notes that Naso "tells his mistress not to yield to her *vir* in bed, or to do so only unwillingly, and not to give him pleasure, or at least not to take pleasure herself".[277] In 3.11, Naso is the *vir* with whom she does not have sex, and it is he who cannot help but love her (35); he has all the disadvantages of the *vir*, but none of the rewards.

Similarly, Naso is now the *custos* whose duty and fate he had in 1.6 said that he would prefer to his own:

> *Forsitan et tecum tua nunc requiescit amica –*
> *heu, melior quanto sors tua sorte mea!*[278]

There he also begs the *custos* to hand over his chains (47: *dummodo sic, in me durae transite catenae!*) from which, come 3.11, he cannot wait to break free (*scilicet adserui iam me fugique catenas*).[279] Now that he is the *custos*, he again appears to be yet another servile obstacle against the erotic advances of a worthier rival. Naso's third role, *comes*, can be understood broadly as a companion that, again, is an obstacle to the lover.[280] In this context, I suggest that *comes* denotes the role of a mistress' attendant: a mark of inferior status that emphasises Naso's relegation from sexual

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[275] Cf. Ov. *Ars*. 2.151-8; Armstrong (2005): 69.

[276] Emphasis mine.

[277] Sharrock (2012): 77.

[278] Ov. *Am*. 1.6.45-6. Cf. McKeown (146): 1989. Ovid may also have Tib. 1.2.87–96 in mind. See also James (2003): 299, n. 105.

[279] Cf. Davis (2024), who notes that in the *Amores*, guards are usually enslaved (289). See also *Am*. 3.4.36.

[280] For the role of "companion" as a servile one, see Ov. *Ars*. 2.227-8.

to servile responsibilities.[281] The term also highlights, therefore, his emasculation at the hands of a superior rival.

Naso's next move is to point out that he is the reason for his beloved's (sexual) popularity:

*Scilicet et populo per me comitata placebas;*
*causa fuit multis noster amoris amor*.[282]

Neumann, Lenz, Gross, Morgan, and Keul see an allusion to Prop. 3.24.3-4:

*Noster amor talis tribuit tibi, Cynthia, laudes:*
*versibus insignem te pudet esse meis*.[283]

On the tone, I agree with Perkins that Naso "grudgingly accepts responsibility for his mistress' popularity,"[284] although implicit in the remark is, I think, a suggestion that his beloved is therefore indebted to him; he may have in mind a sexual reward, as at 2.8.21-4. After all, Naso himself has previously hinted at the transactional side of his relationship with his *puella*(*e*):

*Non erit hic nobis infitiandus amor.*
*sunt mihi pro magno felicia carmina censu*.[285]

If he can claim responsibility for her fame (*per me comitata*), which has now manifested in ways that Naso does not like and cannot control, he may think he is due certain benefits. This concept mirrors the elegiac poets' use of *amicitia* to elicit favours from their patrons in exchange for their services.[286] The tactic is two-pronged: it suggests that the beloved should reward him and it emphasises his *pudor*; coupled with Naso's servile treatment (9-16), the list of *officia* (17-20) also suggests that she is essentially his owner/master.[287] I am not convinced by Perkins' suggestion that

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[281] Ovid clearly has in mind Tib. 1.9.42. See also Tib. 1.5.61-4; 73-4; Ov. *Am*. 2.18.38, of Laodamia. Cf. *OLD comes* 2a; 4b. Cf. Janan (2012): 381. For the servility of a *comes*, see Davis (2024): 289. Ovid may exploit the military sense (*OLD* s.v. 3a: a general's attendant); Naso is positioned as inferior in status to the mistress whom he accompanies.

[282] Ov. *Am.* 3.11.19-20. Note that *amoris* divides *noster* and *amor, cf.* Lenz (1966): 234.

[283] Neumann (1911): 76; Lenz (1966): 234; Gross (1975): 156; Morgan (1977): 98; Keul (1989): 47, n.4. Cf. also *Ars*. 1.741f.

[284] Perkins (2002): 119. Cf. also Seel (1958): 160; Keul (1989): 46. Keul reads *per me cantata,* for which see n. 4.

[285] Ov. *Am*. 2.17.26-7. This is more convincing if we follow Keul (1989): 46, or Neumann (1911): 70, in their preference for *cantata* over *comitata*, since it links to *carmina censu*. Davis (2024) opts for *comitata* (290). For a detailed discussion on transactionality as it relates to the relationships of the lover, see Gibson (1995): 68-72.

[286] Gibson (1995): 75. Cf. e.g. Juv. 3.124-5.

[287] Cf. Gibson (1995): 74. Gibson applies his discussion of *amicitia* to the passage.

*scilicet* "recalls his sarcasm in line 6," because at that stage Naso was unaware that his victory over *Amor* would be short-lived.[288] Sarcasm requires a degree of self-consciousness that Naso surely does not yet possess; *scilicet* recalls his use of the word in line 3, where his statement elicits dramatic irony. I agree with critics that *placebas* has erotic overtones,[289] and an additional a derogatory undertone serves to highlights Naso's acerbity.[290] *Multis* suggests promiscuity. The arrangement of the line, *causa fuit multis noster amoris amor,* is careful: *amoris* is adjacent to *amor* (*polyptoton*), and *multis* is juxtaposed with *noster,* understood as a *pluralis maiestatis,*[291] to underscore the difference between her popularity (plurality) and its cause (singular), and the contrasting *fides* of beloved and lover.

Nevertheless, Keul, Döpp, and Holzberg insist that the section creates an overall positive impression.[292] For Keul, Naso's tone is not angry but melancholic: *amor* is accompanied not by a derogatory term but by *noster*, and he does not explicitly ascribe guilt to his beloved.[293] *Noster* is, however, a reminder that she was "his," in contrast to her now "belonging" to "many" (*multis*); it is a possessive term that treats the beloved as an object of contestation. If melancholic, Naso ends this plea even more hopeless; he is no longer indignant at her lack of gratitude (17-8) but despondent since he, being the cause for her disloyalty, has found yet another reason to resent himself and his treatment of love as a game (19-20).[294] He has, moreover, attempted and failed to rekindle their union, after recently retracing his humiliation on her account (9-17).

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[288] Cf. Perkins (2002): 119. Ovid the poet is aware, but sarcasm is not the right word here. The sarcasm that Ahern (1987) identifies at 2.7.25 (208), cited by Perkins, is different to the use of *scilicet* here. There it was integral to the *reductio ad absurdum* that Naso constructs to persuade Corinna.

[289] Perkins (2002): 121. For the erotic sense of *placere*, see: Ov. *Am*. 1.3.15-6; 1.8.23, 25; 1.10.12, 28; 2.2.5, 14; 2.4.17, 18, 20, 29; 2.10.8; 3.4.27; 32, 41; 3.6.47; 3.12.11, Pichon (1991) *placere*; McKeown (1989): 70. For a different view, see Keul (1989): 47.

[290] As Davis (2024) notes, *placere,* when directed at women, often implies prostitution (290). Cf. e.g. Sen. *Con*. 1.2.7.9.

[291] As by Keul (1989): 47.

[292] Keul (1989): 49.

[293] Keul (1989): 50.

[294] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.4, where Naso teaches a *puella* how to deceive her *vir*, essentially arming her with the weapons he intends to use on her or others. This becomes a "Frankenstein narrative," as Holzberg (2002) points out (49). For this reading, see chiefly Sharrock (1991): 36-49.

Naso's recollections are neither clearly fond, nor solely damning.[295] Rather, they reflect a composite of emotions. Naso is indignant on account of his beloved's ingratitude, but he also wants her back (on his terms, that is): he attempts at once to persuade her of one decision (to repay him a favour) and himself of the opposite (to renounce his love for her). The momentary reflection emphasises that Naso went about his breakup in precisely the wrong way (9-16),[296] and it highlights his weakening resolve. The duties that Naso performs (*vir*; *custos*; *comes*) are not suggestive of a still fiery sexual relationship nor an all-encompassing, familial love; instead, they stress how he has been demoted from the position of *amator* and tasked with demeaning *officia*. This is another way in which Ovid represents Naso's regression from a self-confident game-player (the postured *servus amoris*) to the more conventional, self-effacing *servus amoris*.

**21-6: Her Miscellaneous Misdeeds**

After the brief reflection, Naso continues to enumerate the misdeeds of his beloved (21-6), wrongs that are commonplace in elegy but that also refer to specific episodes in the *Amores*. First are her perjuries (21-2), followed by her dinner-table flirtations (23-4), and finally her pretending to be ill (25-6). Keul suggests that the use of plurals (*turpia mendacia*; *periuratos deos*; *mea damna*; *iuvenum*; *tacitos nutus*; *convivia*; *verba dissimulata*; *compostis notis*) has a generalising effect that gives the impression that the beloved's misdeeds are nonspecific and recurrent.[297] Her claim is undercut by Ovid's use of detail and allusive language that establish clear connections to previous poems.[298] Keul also suggests that from here onwards Naso directly targets his beloved and no longer connects her misdeeds to his self-abasement.[299] Although his self-abasement might appear less pronounced, it is not absent, as my analysis will demonstrate.

Naso first takes aim at his beloved's lies in the form of a rhetorical question:

> *Turpia quid referam vanae mendacia linguae*

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[295] Fond: Keul (1989): 39; 49-50; Döpp (1992): 59; Bretzigheimer (2001): 142; Holzberg (2002): 62-3. Damning: Neumann (1919): 78; Jäger (1967): 144; Williams (1968): 508; Gross (1975): 154; 157.

[296] Cf. Ov. *Rem*. 642-8.

[297] Keul (1989): 52.

[298] Cf. Keul (1989): 52. The allusions will be discussed below, but outlined briefly: lines 21-2 (least plausible of the three) seems to contain an allusion to 2.8.17-20; lines 23-4 to 1.4 & 2.5; and lines 25-6 to 1.8 & 2.19.

[299] Keul (1989): 52-3.

*et periuratos in mea damna deos?*[300]

The couplet is loaded with language that stresses the beloved's deceptiveness (*turpia*; *vanae*; *mendacia*; *periuratos; damna*), and more generally her *nequitia.*[301] Ovid compresses these terms into a space comparably tighter than his extended treatment of the komastic scene. His use of hyperbaton is pointed: the separation (and frontal placement) of the adjectives (*turpia*; *vanae*) from their suspended nouns (*mendacia*; *linguae*) adds force to Naso's reproach and suggests a frenzied state of mind.[302] The transference of *vanae* onto the beloved's *linguae,* and their connection with *mendacia* is emotionally charged:[303] lying is an innate part of the beloved's nature. His interrogative tone is enhanced by the *praeteritio*, *quid referam*.

The second line adopts the more familiar chiastic arrangement (*periuratos…mea damna deos*).[304] Descriptions of a *puella's* perjuries are commonplace in Augustan poetry,[305] and again Naso seems to fare no better than his predecessors. *Turpia* recalls *turpis Amor* (2); the link reinforces Naso's feelings of reproach. Anger at a beloved's false oaths of loyalty is explored elsewhere in Ovid's *Amores*.[306] I suggest that Ovid alludes to, and develops an ironic role-reversal of, 2.7.27-8:

*per Venerem iuro puerique volatilis arcus,*
*me non admissi criminis esse reum!*

In 2.7, Naso shows no reluctance in taking a false oath with divine witness to cover up his own infidelity. Now that he is on the receiving end, he is less open-mined. His hypocrisy is once again fatefully ironic considering 2.19.33-4 (*siqua volet regnare diu, deludat amantem/ ei mihi, ne monitis torquear ipse meis!*), since Naso was first to commit this foul.[307]

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[300] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.21-2.

[301] Cf. Perkins (2002): 124. On the double standard of the elegiac lovers' feelings of their own *nequitia* vs that of their beloveds, and for examples, see Sharrock (2013): 165.

[302] We find similar patterns elsewhere in the *Amores* to suggest frenzy, e.g. 1.7.25. Cf. Morrison (1992): 572. Note the presence of *in…mea* in both passages. Davis (2024) notices the unique verbal pattern and cites 3.6.16.

[303] Cf. Keul (1989): 53.

[304] Ovid makes frequent use of this structure. Cf. eg. Ov. *Am*. 1.1.17-23.

[305] For instance, see Hor. *Carm*. 2.8.11-16; Catull. 64. 143-4; Tib. 1.9.29-40; Prop. 1.8a.17; 1.15.25-6; 35-8; 2.28b.5-8; Ov. *Am*. 1.8.85-6; 3.3.3-4; 21; 36. See Müller (1952): 25-9; Keul (1989): 53, n. 3; Davis (2024): 290.

[306] Ov. *Am*. 1.1.85-6; 1.10.37-8; 2.9b.41-2; 3.3 (*passim*); 3.11b.45-6.

[307] Cf. Armstrong (2005): 82.

In connection to this couplet, Brandt, Keul, and Davis cite 1.8 and 3.3.[308] In the former, Dipsas claims that Venus never punishes a lover's perjuries:

*Nec, siquem falles, tu periurare timeto—*
*commodat in lusus numina surda Venus*.[309]

This is another common elegiac motif.[310] The remark follows Dipsas' claim that there is no harm in feigned love: *nec nocuit simulatus amor; sine, credat amari*, a sentiment clearly contradicted by Naso's present outrage.[311] At 3.3.12, Naso expresses his indignation that the gods permit his beloved's perjuries.[312] On this passage Perkins suggests that "[Naso's] dismay arises only from his mistress' swearing by his eyes as well as her own".[313] I find this argument reductive; his reaction is humorous, and he does not appear as offended as in 3.11, but that reason is not the "only" factor at issue.[314] Spentzou sees a Catullan inner conflict.[315]

In 3.3, Naso seems particularly angered by the fact that the gods permit her injustices.[316] Nevertheless, he concedes that, were he a god, he would do no different.[317] We might then suppose that he is really upset with himself:[318] having realised in 3.3 that neither he nor the gods will stop her perjuries, he now redirects his indignation, and appeal, to the only authority left, his beloved.

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[308] Brandt (1911): 180; Keul (1989): 54, n.1; Davis (290-1).

[309] Ov. *Am*. 1.8.85-6.

[310] Cf. Luck (1959): 94; McKeown (1989): 245. Cf. e.g. Catull. 70; Tib. 1.4.2-4; 1.9.31-4; Prop. 1.15.33ff; 2.28.8; Ov. *Am*. 2.8.19-20; 3.3.1-12; *Ars*. 1.630-6.

[311] Ov. *Am*. 1.8.71.

[312] Cf. Brandt (1911): 180; Du Quesnay (1973): 45.

[313] Perkins (2002): 124. See also Berman (1972): 171-2; Morgan (1977): 34. Davis (1989) notes that he is upset because of an offence done unto *him*, not just comically to his eyes (22-3). However, Davis later claims that the indignation is "much ado about a case of sore eyes", which suggests comedy without significance (85). Cf. Bretzigheimer (2001): 141-42.

[314] Cf. e.g. Keul (1989), whose alternative argument emphasises that Naso himself is punished for the lies rather than his beloved (54-5). This I find more persuasive.

[315] Spentzou (2013): 77.

[316] This is made clear by the second person imperative (*dicite*), vocative (*di*), and the recurrent focus on the gods' permitting such injustice (3.3.12; 15-6; 19-26; 35-6; 45-6) and by the *exemplum* that sets a precedent for punity on such accounts (17-8).

[317] Ov. *Am*. 3.3.43-6.

[318] Cf. Berman (1972), 172: "Ovid…accepts his girl's perjury as part of the game." Berman is, however, convinced that the poem is light and humorous.

There is another layer of irony in that, in his previous *renuntiatio*, when drawn back to love, Naso was enthusiastic and ready to be deceived:

*Me modo decipiant voces fallacis amicae;*
*sperando certe gaudia magna feram*.[319]

Again, the difference is volition. In 2.9, his keenness on being deceived is alleged in ignorance of involuntary deceit. Hence, Cairns: "there he was overwhelmed by Love but had no real understanding of his defeat, and could end with an optimistic fantasy".[320] That posture is reasserted at 2.19.5-10, but by 3.3 it no longer seems sustainable. As we shall see, by 3.14, having accepted defeat in 3.11b, he begrudgingly acknowledges that his beloved's promiscuity is a necessary condition of staying with her; the only mitigating factor becomes her mendacity.[321] His beloved's deceptiveness is not necessarily "integral to his sexual play,"[322] but it is a necessary evil if he wants to stay with his *puella*.

In the next couplet, Naso laments the furtive signals that his beloved gives other young men:

*Quid iuvenum tacitos inter convivia nutus*
*verbaque conpositis dissimulata notis?*[323]

*Inter convivia* recalls a couplet from Propertius' *renuntiatio*:

*Risus eram positis inter convivia mensis,*
*et de me poterat quilibet esse loquax*.[324]

Although the situations are not identical (the Ovidian lover is humiliated by his beloved's flirtations with another; the Propertian by men who deride his *servitium* to his beloved), the sentiments align: both lovers redirect towards their beloveds a resentment that is rooted in homosocial insecurity. The Propertian lover's humiliation results from his derision;[325] Naso is forced to witness his amatory rivals usurp his *puella's* interest (Cf. 2.5).

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[319] Ov. *Am*. 2.9b.42-3. Such is to be inferred by the jussive *decipiant.*

[320] Cairns (1979): 139.

[321] The lying is no longer something that he ignorantly encourages (e.g. 2.9b.42-3; 2.19.5-10); it is a pain that he must endure, hence his request that she only be less blatant about her infidelities at 3.14.3-4.

[322] Perkins (2002): 124.

[323] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.23-4.

[324] Prop. 3.25.1-2. Keul (1989) notes the verbal echo (57).

[325] Not dissimilar to *Am*. 3.11.15, where Naso is humiliated at having been seen by his rival. On the Propertian passage, see Keith (2008): 113.

The couplet also has verbal resonances with 1.4,[326] especially lines 17-20: 3.11: *tacitos…nutus*; 1.4: *nutusque…vultumque loquacem*; 3.11: *verbaque…dissimulata*; 1.4: *verba…sine voce loquentia*; 3.11: *conpositis…notis*; 1.4: *furtivas…notas.* The setting of a *convivium* reinforces the link,[327] and the hyperbaton of *verbaque conpositis dissimulata notis* is, moreover, reminiscent of *excipe furtivas et refer ipsa notas* and *verba superciliis sine voce loquentia dicam*. This allusion develops yet another ironic reversal: Naso is, therefore, denouncing the very tricks that he had in 1.4 taught a *puella*.[328] The only difference is that this time, they are weaponised against him. In other words, he has become the *vir* of 1.4, as I suggest was intimated at 3.11.18 (*ipse vir*).[329] In fact, Naso's fate is even worse than that of the *vir*, who might at least be ignorant of these furtive gestures;[330] Naso, as an *amator* trapped in the position of a *vir*, is well aware.

Ovid explored a similar idea in 2.5: again at a *convivium*, Naso is conscious and jealous of his beloved's furtive flirtations.[331] In particular, *tacitos…nutus* in 3.11.23 is in dialogue with *nutibus… vocis* (2.5.16). Likewise, *verbaque conpositis dissimulata notis* echoes *verbaque pro certis iussa valere notis*; the lines even begin and end with the same words. Thus, Naso's present complaint reprises the experience of 2.5 in particular. There is, however, an important difference between then and now. Consider Perkins' assessment of 2.5:

> "[Naso's] jealousy at observing his mistress at play with a rival changes from anger to arousal mixed with a prurient fear at her newfound skill as he begs for and receives her sexual attention."[332]

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[326] See also *Am*. 2.5.20; 2.7.6; 2.8.8. Cf. Brandt (1911): 180; Lenz (1966): 234; Gross (1975): 156; Keul (1989): 57-8; McKeown (1989): 86; Perkins (2002): 123; Davis (2024): 291. For the secret signs of lovers in general, see: Tib. 1.2.21-2; 1.6.17-20; Prop. 3.8.23-6. 1.4 (and 2.5) seem connected to this passage, if for no other reason than the rarity of the *convivium* in the *Amores,* mentioned outside these poems only at 3.1.17, 3.4.47 and in the current passage.

[327] Cf. Keul (1989): 57; McKeown (1989): 76; (1998): 90.

[328] Cf. Gross (1975): 156.

[329] Cf. Miller (2009): 172. See also p. 177.

[330] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.4.15-6. See also *Ars*. 3.610-32, where the *praeceptor* teaches *puellae* how to sneak love letters or secret messages past their *custodes* and *viri,* roles which Naso presently embodies (Cf. 3.11.18).

[331] Ov. *Am*. 2.5.4-22. On 1.4 and 2.5, see Luck (1959), 158: "the villain has now become the victim"; Miller (2009), 172: "Corinna deploys against the *amator* the very tricks Ovid had instructed her to use against the *vir*". See especially 2.5.15–18 and 1.4.17–20; 2.5.30 and 1.4.40; Cf. Booth (1991): 38–39; Stapleton (1996): 16.

[332] Perkins (2002): 123.

In 3.11, there is no such development; the memory simply gives another reason for Naso to feel humiliated and to renounce his love (albeit in vain). I disagree with Bretzigheimer's interpretation that the *convivium*-related complaints involve harmless flirtations, part of the rules of elegiac love, that suggest Naso's initial outrage has already subsided.[333] In my view, these memories are all the more vexatious to him because his beloved manipulates the "rules" of the game against him, in a way that he had done so and taught before. He is not only frustrated with her, but also with himself, for having wound up in this predicament; Ovid thus highlights his lover's hypocritical and egoistic nature. Although I think that this memory contributes to Naso's inability to renounce, it is surely not a "happy time" that erotically stimulates him. Rather, it is an unwelcome suffering that underpins Naso's new, peripheral role as an obstacle in the affair of another; he is now the one that 'stands for the social norms that elegy famously seeks to violate".[334]

The final charge that Naso brings against his beloved is that she has feigned illness while seemingly healthy enough for his rival:

*Dicta erat aegra mihi – praeceps amensque cucurri;*
*Veni, et rivali non erat aegra meo!*[335]

The couplet brings to mind Dipsas' advice at 1.8.73 that a beloved ought often to deny her lover's pleasures by pretending to be ill: *saepe nega noctes. capitis modo finge dolorem*.[336] In 2.19 Naso testifies to the effectiveness of this tactic:

*Viderat hoc in me vitium versuta Corinna,*
*quaque capi possem, callida norat opem.*
*A, quotiens sani capitis mentita dolores*
*cunctantem tardo iussit abire pede!*[337]

Although Naso was aware of the tactic, and indeed its effectiveness, I have shown that Naso now occupies a role that is different from when he encouraged these tactics (2.19.9-12). As with his encouragement of his exclusion (2.19.19-24), his awareness of the success of the feigned illness

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[333] Bretzigheimer (2001): 142.

[334] Miller (2009): 171. See also Sullivan (1972): 23; Hallett (1973): 108; Gaisser (1983): 66; Van Nortwick (1990): 121.

[335] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.25-6.

[336] Cf. Brandt (1911): 180; McKeown (1989): 240. See also Olstein (1975): 247; McKeown (1989): 240; James (2002): 66; Davis (2024): 291. A similar expression occurs at Tib. 1.6.36-7; 2.6.49-50.

[337] Ov. *Am*. 2.19.9-12. Cf. Perkins (2002), 122.

tactic in 2.19 suggests that, at that stage, he *wanted* to be deceived. Indeed, he also demanded to be hurt, and suggested that he would not love what brings him no pain: *nil ego, quod nullo tempore laedat, amo.*[338] In 3.11, those words seem no less true: he cannot help but be drawn to what pains him (his beloved's cruelty), and his emotional outburst at his beloved's feigned illness affirms its effectiveness. The reality, which results in him "loving" involuntarily, is harsher than he had anticipated.

This time there is the addition of a competent rival, and *rivali non erat aegra meo* is clearly an understatement suggestive of intercourse.[339] Based on a progressive reading of these three poems (1.8; 2.19; 3.11), we can conclude that the beloved *wants* to get caught with Naso's rival.[340] Indeed, in 2.19 the rival's presence is, Naso alleges, a sure-fire means of keeping him interested.[341] I suggest that, by combining the feigned illness tactic (1.8.73) with a rival's presence (1.8.95-99), his beloved means to double the allure, as it were. The allure does not need to be sexual; it can be ideological: jealousy, fear of loss, the usurpation of his role, and "losing face" in the homosocial rivalry are all ideological barriers to his renunciation. However, instead of simply drawing Naso back into the familiar state of voluntary *servitium*, the beloved's powerful combination of attraction-by-repulsion overwhelms him and sends him into a state of involuntary *servitium*. Dipsas did warn against using this tactic in excess, but for the opposite reason:

> *Mox recipe, ut nullum patiendi colligat usum,*
> *neve relentescat saepe repulsus amor.*[342]

Contrary to even her expectations (or to Naso's, who eavesdrops on the lesson), his drawn-out suffering (*patiendi)* only makes him more enslaved. So when Volk notes on 2.19 that "love that is not difficult holds no appeal, and the poet thus ends with the dire warning that if his rival does not shape up, he himself will lose interest," she is not wrong.[343] At that stage, however, what Naso really wanted was a simulation of difficulty: a "challenge" as long as he can comfortably overcome it. It is not, despite his insisting otherwise, the presence of a worthy rival that he desires in 2.19, for

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[338] Ov. *Am*. 2.19.8.

[339] Cf. Lee (1962): 161.

[340] The beloved knows that by using such an excuse (1.8.73) she will lure Naso and tempt his arrival (2.19.9-10).

[341] Ov. *Am*. 2.19.1-6. Elsewhere, for example, see Ov. *Am*. 1.8.95-6; *Ars*. 3.593-4.

[342] Ov. *Am*. 1.8.75-6.

[343] Volk (2010): 47.

in 3.11 he cannot bear it; what he wants is a homosocial rival over whom he can claim victory. Now that he faces true difficulties and experiences a more classic kind of *servitium*, Naso is left to regret his words.

The visual strength of this couplet (3.11.25-6) deserves attention.[344] Unlike the two before it, the couplet is not a rhetorical question, but a four-fold paratactic statement.[345] It gives the impression of a factual report (especially. with *dicta erat*), but I am not convinced that it contrasts the indignant tone of lines 21-4, as Keul claims.[346] The division of the first line into two *cola* encourages a comparison between the beloved's report, described in unaffected language, and Naso's frenetic reaction. Placing the adjectives (*praeceps amensque*) before Naso's action enables this contrast, and gives us an idea of Naso's state of mind.[347] *Praeceps* adds colour to his hurrying, but it also indicates the rashness of his decision, and *amens* is likewise suggestive of Naso's madness or irrationality, which by now has become an established theme.[348] The entire action is constrained to four words: *praeceps amensque cucurri…Veni.* These words are bookended by the verbally similar yet antithetical reported statements: *dicta erat aegra mihi…rivali non erat aegra meo*. This combination of *versus iteratus* and chiastic word ordering highlights the contrasting circumstances of Naso and his rival: the beloved's illness implies that Naso is to stay away (Cf. 1.8.73-4; 2.19.11-2), but by doing the opposite (the attested impact of this tactic, à la 2.19.9-10), he arrives to find his beloved preoccupied with his rival. The humiliation works on two levels. First, the connotations of the language, *praeceps amensque cucurri*, poke fun at Naso's excessive and, as it turns out, unjustified care for his beloved. Second, because Naso shows up at the beloved's side (*veni*) and finds his rival there, Naso has likely been seen. This, of course, is Naso's worst nightmare (Cf. 3.11.15-6 :…*quod sum visus ab illo/ eveniat nostris hostibus ille pudor!*). The only thing worse than suffering such a humiliation is to endure it twice. Keul's suggestions of a cheerfully comic component and that Naso's feelings are put into the perspective of 2.19.11-2 are interesting. I suggest that they are true for Ovid, but not necessarily for Naso.[349] There is humour in the punchline, *et rivali non erat aegra meo*, but it is not cheerful; it is a dark humour rooted in Naso's

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[344] Cf. Du Quesnay (1973), 16: "a brilliant thumbnail sketch".

[345] Cf. Keul (1989): 61.

[346] Keul (1989): 61.

[347] Keul (1989): 62.

[348] Cf. Pichon (1991) *amens*. See e.g. Prop. 1.1.11. For *praeceps* in this sense, see: *OLD s.v. praeceps* 3.

[349] Keul (1989): 65; 73.

self-abasement and indignation.[350] Indeed, in the *Ars*, the *praeceptor* warns that lovers should never rush to the aid of their ill beloved, but leave that role to their rivals.[351] Ovid and his readers might find his predicament humorously ironic, since the *puella*'s feigned illness is a tactic that Naso previously encouraged, but that he himself is cheery I find hard to believe.

A final point on the couplet concerns the quality of *rivalis* in this context and more generally in Ovid's *Amores*. James claims that *rivalis* is simply "an adynaton for a Roman husband".[352] Whether she means by this an elegiac *vir,* which in her own terms never denotes a true Roman husband,[353] or in the full legal sense is unclear, but the latter seems unlikely.[354] There is a nuanced difference between *rivalis* and *vir* in the *Amores*. Outside 3.11, *rivalis* is employed on only three occasions (1.8.95; 1.9.18; 2.19.60) and *vir* on forty-two. On every occasion that *rivalis* is used, we find it in a theoretical sense to denote a lover's main competition:[355] it is a position of primacy that warrants more regard and caution than a mere *vir,* which denotes simply a male companion to the beloved and an obstacle to the elegiac lover.[356] The difference is subtle: relative to the *vir*, the elegiac lover is in a stronger position than he is to the *rivalis;* the *rivalis* poses a serious threat to the lover, whereas the *vir* is a routine inconvenience. At 2.19.60, Naso uses *rivalis* to describe and contrast himself to the *vir,* whom he goads to be more protective (*me tibi rivalem si iuvat esse, veta!*). In that context, Naso has the upper hand over the *vir*. It makes sense, then, that he describes himself as a *rivalis;* he is the threat. By 3.11, however, he self-identifies as a *vir* (18) and his *rivalis* is in bed with his beloved (*rivali non erat aegra meo!).* Ovid therefore uses these terms to show that the roles have been switched.

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[350] On Ovidian dark humour, see Peek (2001): 80-1.

[351] Ov. *Ars*. 2.335-6. Here, *amari…suci* recalls 3.11.8.

[352] James (2003): 48. Cf. Keul (1989): 63, n.4, for whom the term is simply a colloquialism in amatory contexts for competition.

[353] James (2003): 49-52. See also Camps (1965): 100; Miller (2009): 170.

[354] Ovid refers to himself as a *rivalis* when encouraging a beloved's *vir* to embrace the competition (2.19.60). This presents a logical problem if we understand *rivalis* as a hyperbole of the Roman husband.

[355] At 1.8.95, Dipsas advises the beloved: *ne securus amet nullo rivale, caveto*. Here, *rivalis* refers to a general archetype: a lover's main obstacle. At 1.9.17-8, *rivalis* is used as a technical term for Naso's erotic competition; at 2.19.60, Naso describes himself as the *rivalis*, while encouraging his opposition, the *vir*, to be more protective over his girl or else he risks losing Naso as his competition.

[356] Cf. Miller (2009): 171. Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.4; 2.5.

The three complaints issued in lines 21-6 invoke elegiac commonplaces and allude to specific experiences from Naso's past. Ovid thus illustrates that Naso is not as enthusiastic for nor immune to these challenges as he had previously suggested.

**Summary of the List of Grievances (9-26)**

Cairns observes that, in addition to being commonplace, all of Naso's complaints are explored in detail when compared to Naso's generalised complaints against Cupid in 2.9a.[357] The attention to detail makes sense, since Naso's renunciation is of a specific *puella.* Her cruelty is depicted through a (re)collection of the painful memories that she has caused; Ovid combines the generality of traditional elegiac conventions with precise details that hark back to the experiences of Naso.[358] Ovid thus characterises Naso as an elegiac lover that resembles the classic kind, no less prone to the pitfalls and pangs of love than his predecessors. Despite his treatment of love as a game, an approach that should have distinguished him from his predecessors,[359] he winds up in a similar position. The list of grievances is inspired by a self-exhortation (*perfer et obdura*) intended to reinforce his renunciation. By attempting to inspire *odium* towards his beloved, Naso overwhelms himself with reminders, and although the memories are negative, they give rise to feelings of jealousy and loss that he is unable to ignore. The futility of his approach is suggested by his effort to remind his beloved of his services to her and his insinuation that she is indebted to him (17-20). The language that Ovid employs throughout the list is carefully constructed to allude to passages from previous poems in the *Amores.* This enables us to identify the *puella*'s wrongdoings with specific incidents from Naso's past. The allusions also create a string of ironic reversals that i) reflect Naso's change in circumstances, and ii) highlight his inability to stick to his strategic treatment of love.

**iv. 27-32: To Safer Shores**

On ending his list of grievances, Naso summarises its key points: his suffering and passivity (27-8). In the two couplets that follow this summary, he claims to have arrived on safer shores and notes that, since he is not the fool that he once was, his beloved will not be able to sway him by means of

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[357] Cairns (1979): 138. Cf. also Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 27.

[358] On the complaints relating to previous *Amores*, see: Keul (1989): 27, n.3.

[359] Cf. Spentzou (2013): 68.

seduction. The section is saturated in dramatic irony. The claims to freedom are undermined by subtle clues that Ovid brings to our attention through intratextual and intertextual allusions.

Naso, aggrieved, ends his list with a final recognition of his sufferings, and tells his beloved to find someone else that she can make suffer:

*His et quae taceo duravi saepe ferendis;*
*quaere alium pro me, qui queat ista pati*.[360]

In the context of a renunciation, *durare* means to harden (physically or mentally) or to make capable of endurance.[361] The implication is that, having endured all of these offences so frequently (*his…saepe ferendis*), he is tougher: his resolve has been hardened to the point that he is finally able to separate himself from his beloved.[362] For Keul, his "hardening" means that he has renounced his love.[363] I agree only that he might think that he has. She highlights the change of addressee: because he addresses the *puella* directly, as opposed to *Amor* initially (1-2), his resolve has stiffened. She goes on, however, to argue that the current confrontation is imaginary, which undermines her point.[364] We should not trust Naso's words: based on the list's intratextual and intertextual clues and on the language of this summary, it is insinuated that his conviction will be undermined.

Indeed, having followed his own instructions (*perfer et obdura*), he feels that his resolve has hardened. We know, however, that his implementation of the advice is misguided and has done more harm than good. With *duravi,* Ovid tempts us to reflect on the self-exhortation (7), and by extension Catullus 8. Keul highlights line 12: *vale, puella! Iam Catullus obdurat.*[365] She argues that, although it is clear that the Catullan speaker still loves Lesbia,[366] Naso's words suggest no such sentiment. However, the language used clearly recalls Catullus' renunciation in general, or at least several lines, and not just one.

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[360] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.27-8. This couplet is absent at Gross (1975): 157.

[361] *OLD* s.v. 2; 4. Interpreted in this way by Showerman (1914); Büchner (1951): 289; Keul (1989): 70-1.

[362] Cf. Neumann (1919): 75 (implied); Munari (1951): 211; Williams (1968): 507; Damon (1990): 289.

[363] Keul (1989: 70).

[364] Keul (1989): 72.

[365] Keul (1989): 71.

[366] On this particular part of Catull. 8, affirmation of his resolution to renounce seems clearer, for which see Quinn (1969): 94.

The connotations of the language of the summary also undermine intimations of Naso's determination. In this couplet Ovid employs ring composition.[367] Many of the terms used refer to the opening line of the renunciation: *his…ferendis* echoes *tuli*; *saepe* recalls *diuque*; *pati* and *duravi* serve as reminders of his *patientia* (1).[368] The gerundive, *ferendis,* is a passive construction which further highlights Naso's passivity.[369] Like Keul and Damon, Davis suggests that the language reinforces Naso's determination.[370] I suggest the opposite: these terms are verbal clues from Ovid of Naso's inability to commit to his renunciation: with each utterance the readers are reminded of his passivity and depleted patience. Naso thinks that his statement brings finality and closure, but Ovid intimates otherwise.

The difference in my interpretation stems partly from my reading of *patientia victa est.* By Keul, among others, the phrase has been viewed as the reason for the *renuntiatio*: Naso's tolerance/ patience has been depleted; he can tolerate no more of his beloved's *vitia* and must leave her.[371] Implicit in this, at least in the eyes of Naso, is that his tolerance (i.e. his willingness to suffer)[372] being exhausted is sufficient to stop his loving. In other words, he thinks that the decision to love is his. I suggest that *patientia victa est* contains not the reason for the renunciation, but for its inevitable failure: because his *patientia* has already been defeated, the renunciation will fail. His endurance is exhausted, he is no longer able to encourage his *servitium*, and he has run out of steam; accordingly, incapacitated by his love, he is unable to rid himself of it.

Keul turns to 2.19 to support her interpretation. I follow suit. First, let us consider 2.19.23-4:

> *sic mihi durat amor longosque adolescit in annos,*
> *hoc iuvat; haec animi sunt alimenta mei*.

In 2.19, Naso uses *durat* to claim that his love grows more robust (*durat*) through his beloved's acts of exclusion (2.19.19-22). In 3.11, *duravit* expresses the opposite message (he is hardened and therefore ready for the renunciation). Keul agrees, but suggests that the allusion undermines the seriousness of 3.11: the situation is cast in the perspective of 2.19 and is therefore not as tragic and

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[367] Cf. Davis (2024): 291.

[368] For the connection between *patientia* and *duravi*, see *OLD* s.v. *durare* 6.

[369] Keul (1989): 70-71.

[370] Keul (1989): 70-2; Damon (1990): 189; Davis (2024): 291.

[371] Cf. e.g. Gross (1975): 156 (implied); Döpp (1992): 58-9; Perkins (2002): 122.

[372] Keul (1989): 71.

problematic for "Ovid' as it would have been for someone like Catullus.[373] On the contrary, I suggest that, in the present couplet, Naso is closer to the prototypical elegiac lover of the Catullan sort than he is to his earlier self-image (2.19). For instance, his claim to have suffered in silence (*his…taceo…ferendis*) is precisely the sort of model we find used by Catullus and his elegiac predecessors.[374] Of course, his claim is betrayed by the reality (9-26),[375] which again develops dramatic irony and makes what is insufferable for him humorous to us.

Keul's argument also conflates Ovid with his elegiac *persona.* Ovid does not have to consider Naso's situation tragic or problematic in order for Naso himself to suffer a Catullan sort of experience. Even if we identify Ovid with Naso, Keul's point is still problematic: why should the contrasted meanings of *durare* between 2.19 and 3.11 undermine the seriousness of Naso's feelings in the latter? Keul offers no explanation, and her interpretation overlooks the role of irony and how this may influence our understanding of the allusion. For instance, understood in the same way as in 2.19.23-4, Naso's claim to have hardened reflects a truth of which he is not aware: following his recollections of rejection and abasement (9-26), he has not hardened against his beloved; his love *for* her has hardened. In the summary (3.11.27-8) he is still unaware of this. The dramatic irony is humorous for us, but not for Naso.

At 2.19.51, as Naso taunts the *vir* for enduring what no husband can, the language that he uses is pointed: *lentus es et* pateris *nulli* patienda *marito*. Here, the *vir*'s *patientia* resembles that of Naso in 3.11. Naso raises this question to the *vir* before he claims for himself the privileged status of *rivalis*. This is another ironic reversal: in 2.19, Naso's *patientia* facetiously reflected a lack of competition (the game is too easy); in 3.11, his *patientia* refers to his depleted tolerance for suffering an unfaithful beloved (the game is too difficult), not unlike the *patientia* of the *vir* of 2.19.[376] In both 2.19.59 (*quin alium, quem tanta iuvet patientia, quaeris?*) and 3.11.28, Naso suggests that his addressee find another to suffer.[377] In 2.19, Naso bids the *vir* to seek out a rival who likes an easily attainable beloved; in 3.11, he tells his beloved to find someone else who can withstand her offences

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[373] Keul (1989): 73.

[374] For instance, Catull. 68.135-148; Prop. 1.1.27-8; 5.14; 8a.17-8; 9.1-2; 17-28; 18.23-6; 2.5.16; 24-39; 34.49; Tib. 1.4.39-40; 5.5-6; 2.4.51-4.; 6.11-14; 41-43. Cf. Davis (1989): 44.

[375] This had also been the case with his predecessors, cf. esp. Prop. 2.5.16.

[376] Cf. Holzberg (2002): 67.

[377] Cf. McKeown (1998): 408.

(*alium…qui queat ista pati*). The point is rhetorical: he hardly means to send his beloved to another; the expression emphasises that Naso is no longer *willing* to suffer, in the same way that, in 2.19, he did not want the *vir* to find another *rivalis*; he just wanted him to up his game. As we discover, Naso's reluctance toward further suffering does not matter: he settles for suffering/*servitium* (3.11b.35-6) and fierce competition (3.12; 14.1-8) even though he no longer encourages either. That this is not an exact reversal (Keul's objection)[378] is not important; Naso's ironic role reversal from the one that taunts to the one that suffers is clear.

We find a third parallel at the opening of 3.15, where Naso bids farewell to Elegy, and tells the *mater Amorum* to seek a new poet:

> *Quaere novum vatem, tenerorum mater Amorum:*
> *raditur haec elegis ultima meta meis*.[379]

In line with 3.11 and 3.14, this does not seem to be a happy or triumphant ending for Naso.[380] Given the return to the amatory in his *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris,* it is tempting to view this as a false goodbye.[381] We can understand 3.11.27-8 in a similar way.[382]

In the penultimate couplet, Naso claims to have sailed away from the volatile seas to the safety of the shores, a symbol for the success of his renunciation:

> *Iam mea votiva puppis redimita corona*
> *lenta tumescentes aequoris audit aquas*.[383]

The couplet resembles an image from the Propertian *renuntiatio,* 3.24.15-8:

> *Ecce coronatae portum tetigere carinae,*
> *traiectae Syrtes, ancora iacta mihist.*
> *nunc demum vasto fessi resipiscimus aestu,*
> *vulneraque ad sanum nunc coiere mea*.

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[378] Keul (1989): 73-4.

[379] Ov. *Am*. 3.15.1-2. Cf. Holzberg (2006): 67.

[380] Cf. Holzberg (2014): 248.

[381] Holzberg (2002): 67.

[382] Perkins (2002): 119.

[383] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.29-30.

Most agree that Ovid adopts also the Propertian sentiment (his ship has reached the harbour; he is safely out of love).[384] By echoing the language of the first half of the Propertian image, Ovid does enough to remind us of the sentiment attached to it: an escape from love and a return to sanity or calm. The image is invoked by Naso to affirm his success. However, this affirmation is premature and self-fulfilling. Naso's rashness is intimated by his hastiness in passing over the image, in comparison to Propertius' treatment, in which the lover pauses to reflect on his journey.[385] Whereas Propertius' image is not undermined by the rest of the *renuntiatio,* but Ovid's is.

It has been supposed that Ovid's vocabulary is erotically charged (*tumescentes aquas* and *lenta*). Generally, the conclusion is either that i) humour is elicited, and thereby Ovid, or the poem, should not be taken seriously,[386] or ii) the erotic language functions as "verbal foreplay": Naso is aroused and thereby "convinc[es] himself to pursue a course of action that counters his ostensible purpose".[387] I am not convinced that *lenta* has a sexual connotation. Those that mention its suggestiveness do not elaborate on what precisely *lenta* pertains to.[388] If it is to be a sexual innuendo, it needs a relevant sexual application. *Lentus* can mean supple or flexible when applied to a body part,[389] but are we really to think that the garlanded ship reaching the harbour, already symbolic of Naso's safe exit, is also intended to be viewed as his virile member? I doubt it. Curiously enough, *lentus* is not given a sexual meaning by Adams in his *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*. In amatory contexts, *lentus* can be used of an unrequited love or a cruel beloved, as Pichon notes: *lentus dicitur saepe qui amantem non redemat, sed frigidus remanet*.[390] Ovid may invite this connotation, but it is hardly sexual: Naso claims to have turned the tables on his beloved; he is the one now to give her the cold shoulder.[391]

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[384] Many scholars have noticed the connection. E.g. Brandt (1911): 180; Neumann (1919): 77; Munari (1951): 100; Lee (1962): 161; Lenz (1966): 234; Jäger (1967): 226-7; Gross (1975): 153; Cairns (1979): 134-5; Morgan (1977): 84; 97-8; Keul (1989): 82; Damon (1990): 289; McKeown (1998): 186; Döpp (1992): 57; Weinlich (1999): 244; Perkins (2002): 119; Heyworth (2009): 273; Davis (2024): 291. Lenz disagrees, for which see Lenz (1966): 234.

[385] Weinlich (1999): 244.

[386] Cf. Lenz (1966): 234; Lee (1962): 161; Gross (1975), 153, n. 6.

[387] Perkins (2002): 121; Oliensis (2019): 110.

[388] Cf. e.g. Lee (1962): 161; Gross (1975): 153.

[389] *OLD* s.v. 1b.

[390] Pichon (1991) s.v.; *OLD* s.v. 8; Davis (2024): 291. Cf. e.g. Tib. 2.6.36; Prop. 3.8.20; Ov. *Am*. 2.19.51; 3.6.60. Notably, 3.11 is not recalled here. For a different interpretation, see James (2003): 129-30.

[391] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 3.6.50-60.

It seems more viable, if not more tempting, to look for innuendo in *tumescentes aquas*. Interpreted sexually, the phrase may be taken together with *blanditias* and *potentia verba* to anticipate the renunciation's failure.[392] However, I do not see why this ought to "make doubtful the seriousness of Ovid's effort to reject his love".[393] Gross' conflation of Ovid with his fictive elegiac persona overlooks the possibility that Naso is unaware of the suggestiveness that Ovid might self-consciously invoke. In claiming to have left love in his wake, Naso inadvertently uses terms that anticipate the renunciation's failure. Indeed, as I have shown throughout 3.11a, Naso's remarks are littered with verbal clues of the renunciation's inevitable failure and his apparent ignorance to them. Perkins refutes Quintilian's objection of *tumescere* as *kakemphaton* on the grounds that the *exemplum* that he offers counterintuitively "demonstrates that *tumesco* admitted sexual innuendo".[394] Perkins' argument, however, counterintuitively proves the very point that Quintilian sets out to make: many people are eager to find a sexual or indecent meaning where there is none.[395]

The intratextual evidence suggests that the *aquas* are to be understood as the tides of Love.[396] The swelling (*tumescentes*) is shows the emotional turbulence and suffering associated with love.[397] This is why Naso claims to listen undisturbed (*lenta…audit*) from the shore. The contrast between the safety of being out of love and the turbulence of being in love is brought out by the juxtaposition between *lenta* and *tumescentes aquas*.[398] As the perils of love, *tumescentes aquas* encompass temptations that could weaken Naso's resistance; the swelling waves call him back to sea (hence *audit*). These temptations might carry an erotic undertone. However, the sexual reading of *tumescere* has eclipsed another viable alternative. In an amatory context, *tumescere*, stemming from

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[392] Cf. e.g. Perkins (2002): 124.

[393] Gross (1975): 153, n. 6.

[394] Cf. Perkins (2002): 121 n. 22; Quintilian *Inst*. 8.3.47.

[395] Quintilian *Inst*. 8.3.47.

[396] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.4.8; 2.9.21-2; 31-2; 2.10.9; 31; *Ars.* 1. 367-8; 373-402; 411-12; 516; 2.9-10; 337-8; 429-30; 513-14; 725-31; 3.259-60; 584; *Rem*. 13-14; 447; 487; 531; 569; 610; 635; 737; 790. For this interpretation, see Jäger (1967): 145; Keul (1989): 76, n. 5; McKeown (1998): 186; Weinlich (1999): 244; Davis (2024): 291.

[397] Cf. Kahlmeyer (1934): 22-26; Keul (1989): 75-6.

[398] Keul (1989) argues that the hyperbaton (between *tumescentes* and *aquas*) suggests a narrow/difficult escape (77); Williams (1968) identifies the juxtaposition but offers no explanation (509).

*tumere*, often refers to an inflation or excess of intense passion, love, or pain, or hate.[399] If Naso invokes the Propertian image to inspire his escape to sanity,[400] it follows that the tides of love signal the opposite: excessive emotion, love, hate, madness.[401] The turbulent seas, then, symbolise the difficulties and pleasures of his relationship, the hate and the love, both emotional extremes from which he must escape to renounce love successfully.[402] That 3.11a is largely devoted to the expression of Naso's emotion and suffering, and 3.11b to the conflicting feelings of love and hate, encourages this interpretation. Although he claims be indifferent (*lenta*) to the roaring waves, the fact that Naso is still listening to them (*audit*) subtly undermines his claim.

3.11a ends with Naso demanding that his beloved put an end to her formerly powerful flirtations, with the exclamation that he is no longer the fool that he once was:

> *Desine blanditias et verba, potentia quondam,*
> *perdere – non ego nunc stultus, ut ante fui!*[403]

Some critics suggest that the couplet contains the reason for the renunciation's failure, or at least foreshadows it.[404] Others argue that it strengthens the poet's resolve so that we are caught off-guard by the opening of 3.11b.[405] Some critics also suggest that the beloved herself intervenes in the renunciation and seduces Naso;[406] others that her image appears in Naso's mind, and that memories or fantasies of her flirtations thwart his resolve.[407] I am more concerned about the primacy given to her seductive words as a reason for the renunciation's failure.[408] For instance, Damon:

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[399] Cf. Pichon (1991) s.v. 284: *tumere dicuntur animi affecru aliquo nimio et violento, amore, dolore, odio, superbia.*

[400] Cf. Morgan (1977): 97-8; Döpp (1992): 57; Perkins (2002): 120.

[401] Cf. Morgan (1977): 77; 97.

[402] Cf. Keul (1989): 77; 79.

[403] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.31-2.

[404] Abel (1930): 68; Lenz (1966): 234; Jäger (1967): 145-6; 166-7; 207; Harder-Marg (1978): 231; Cairns (1979): 138; Döpp (1992): 59; Weinlich (1999): 245; Perkins (2002): 124-5.

[405] Jacoby (1905): 87; Neumann (1919): 70; Müller (1952): 61-2; Gross (1975): 154; Keul (1989): 81-2.

[406] Abel (1930): 68; Harder-Marg (1978): 231; Cairns (1979): 138; Keith (1994): 32.

[407] Lenz (1966): 234; Jäger (1967): 146; Harder-Marg (1978): 230; Damon (1990): 288-9; Döpp (1992): 59; Weinlich (1999): 245.

[408] Most certain seems to be Weinlich (1999): 245.

> "something happened before line 33 to revive love…The reader can only assume that, just as one cannot say "not A" without calling A to mind, so Naso's defiant *desine blanditias et verba potentia quondam perdere* (31-32) brought those able pleaders to life in his mind."[409]

Throughout Naso's renunciation, his strategy of resistance (recalling memories designed to inspire *odium*) has been working against him. The negative memories are nevertheless reminders, and so these together with the beloved's seductive words work to undermine the renunciation.

Perkins offers a different interpretation:

> "It is as much, however, if not more, that his complaints about his ill treatment by his mistress have become reminders of the erotic nature of the relationship. Thoughts of lies, adultery, and resistance to sex have stimulated him…Thus when the poet addresses his mistress…he could equally be addressing himself, since his descriptions of his sufferings have become precisely the verbal foreplay that *blanditiae* is meant to convey."[410]

This is self-fulfilling: the conclusion that the *blanditiae* may address the "unhappy times" of the relationship (according to Perkins, the "happy times") is meant to support her argument for the sexually stimulating character of the list of grievances, but reading *blanditiae* in this way requires that the list of grievances does amount to "verbal foreplay" in the first place. As Naso's stance in 3.11 differs from his earlier position in that he no longer actively encourages his *servitium*, Perkins' claims that lines 9-26 detail "the lover's masochistic sufferings" and that "Ovid's poet rejoices in these situations and is as happily faithless as his *puella*," are difficult.[411] I suggest instead that the recollections of his beloved's wrongdoings (9-28) and of her sweet-talk (31-2) should be appreciated for their difference: these represent respectively the *odium* and the *amor* of 3.11b, both of which contribute to the failure of Naso's renunciation. The "unhappy times," to borrow Perkins' phrase, encompass true *odium* (they are thus not the "happy times"), and the happy times recalled by the *blanditiae* conversely represent *amor*; together, both work against Naso's renunciation.

*Desine* recalls Prop. 1.15.25, where the Propertian lover uses the term to discourage Cynthia's false oaths of loyalty.[412] In the conclusion of that poem (42), Propertius issues a warning to fellow lovers

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[409] Damon (1990: 288-9.

[410] Perkins (2002): 125. Davis (2024) also suggests a self-address (292).

[411] Perkins (2002): 125.

[412] Cf. Lenz (1966): 234; Heyworth (2009): 273. Both suggest that *desine* may also allude to Prop. 4.11.1.

that no girl's charms should ever be trusted: *non ullis tutum credere blanditiis*. Judging by his response to his beloved's approach*, potentia quondam/ perdere – non ego nunc stultus, ut ante fui,* Naso has at least convinced himself that he has heeded Propertius' caution. Previously his beloved's *blanditiae* could sway him (*potentia quondam*); this is what made him *stultus*, but now that he is not (*non ego nunc*), her approach is allegedly ineffectual. Ovid employs language that prompts us to doubt Naso's claim. The idea that he is no longer *stultus* is related to ship metaphor of the previous couplet: he is safe and sane on the shores and out of the turbulent and maddening seas of love; only a fool (*stultus*) would return to the tides. For Keul, Naso's recognition of his former folly reinforces his resoluteness, as do the imperatives (*desine*; *perdere*);[413] we are therefore surprised when 3.11b begins with a struggle of the heart (33-4). I am not so sure. Naso's claim echoes that of line 4, where he recognised the shamefulness of his former ways (*et quae non puduit ferre, tulisse pudet*). The formulation of that line recalls one from the Catullan *renuntiatio* (8.2: *et quod vides perisse perditum ducas*). This allusion led us to be suspicious of Naso's confidence. Indeed, soon after that assertion, he shows signs of apprehension and resorts to self-exhortation (7) to regain confidence. The imperatives used here, *desine* and *perdere,* like *perfer* and *obdura,* are suggestive of Naso's desperation and weakness of resolve. Although he puts on a brave face and claims that her seductive methods are ineffective, he desperately compels his beloved to stop because he is at the tipping point. Even more telling is that both imperatives (*desine* and *perdere)* allude to the self-exhortation that opens Catullus 8:

> *Miser Catulle,* desinas *ineptire,*
> *Et quod vides perisse* perditum *ducas*.[414]

Davis suggests that Naso responds to Catullus' self-exhortation with a "firm claim to success".[415] The firmness of this claim is, I suggest, dubious, and particularly undermined by its connection to Naso's own self-exhortation (7).

Note also that both 3.11.31-2 couplet and Catull. 8.3 feature *quondam* in reference to the "loving" times of the past.[416] Like Naso's previous claims (27-30), there is reason to doubt that he is *non*...

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[413] Keul (1989): 80-1. For Keul (88), the hints of a relapse come primarily in lines 17-20. Müller (1952) suggests that there is no hint of a relapse whatsoever (371). I disagree. Davis (2024) looks to Catull. 21.12; 23.27; 69.10; 103.3 (292).

[414] Catull. 8.1-2. Unitalicised words have been emphasised.

[415] Davis (2024): 292.

[416] Döpp (1992): 56.

*nunc stultus, ut ante fui*.[417] *Quondam* is used similarly, but with an emphasis on former *fides*, in Catull. 72 (1: *dicebas quondam solum te nosse Catullum*),[418] a poem that is important to my discussion of 3.11b.

*Amores* 3.11.31-2 also recalls Propertius' *renuntiatio*:

> *Nil moveor lacrimis: ista sum captus ab arte*
> *semper ab insidiis, Cynthia, flere soles*.[419]

I disagree with Lenz, who suggests that the connection is only verbal and not functionally comparable.[420] In both texts, the elegiac lover acknowledges the seductive powers of his beloved (*potentia quondam*; *ista sum captus ab arte*) and claims no longer to be affected by them (*non ego nunc stultus, ut ante fui*; *nil moveor*). Keul suggests that the Propertian lover's tears (6: *flere*; 7: *flebo ego discedens…fletum*; 9: *limina…lacrimantia*) hint at the failure of Naso's renunciation.[421] I disagree; Propertius' renunciation is, compared to Ovid's, a success, and the lover's tears betray a recognition of the emotional difficulty of the renunciation; in the Ovidian couplet, Naso pretends to be unaffected. The Propertian lover seems more in touch with the reality of his feelings; the Ovidian gives the impression of denial. Aspiring to match (or surpass) the Propertian lover's resolve, Naso imitates his remarks as if doing so would ensure his success.

The intratextual allusions of Ovid's couplet (31-2) support this interpretation. Similar language has been used before (*blanditiae*; *potentia verba*; *stultus*): 2.9 and 2.19. The use of *blanditiae* recalls 2.9.45: *et modo blanditias dicat*, *modo iurgia.*[422] In 2.9 Naso seeks the *blanditiae*; in 3.11 he is pursued.[423] However, in 2.9, the amorous *blanditiae* were counterbalanced by the odious *iurgia.* Naso encouraged both, because he did not view the negative aspects as a problem; indeed, to play the *exclusus amator* effectively, it is essential that he embrace both *blanditiae* and *iurgia.*[424] In the

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[417] Cf. Jäger (1967): 145-6; 166; 207. For an opposing view, see Keul (1989): 87, n. 4.

[418] Cf. Rosati (2008): 1451. Rosati notes the connection between the two Catullan poems but his focus is not on Ovid; 3.11 is unmentioned.

[419] Prop. 3.25.5-6. Cf. Neumann (1919): 76; Abel (1932): 66; Munari (1951): 100; Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 83. Keul also cites Prop. 3.24.17-9 (84-5), discussed above in connection to Ovid's ship metaphor.

[420] Lenz (1966): 234.

[421] Cf. Keul (1989): 85-6.

[422] Cf. Cairns (1979): 138; McKeown (1998): 190.

[423] Cairns (1979): 138.

[424] Ov. *Rem*. 35-6.

pentameter of that couplet (2.9.46), he encourages both aspects: *saepe fruar domina, saepe repulsus eam.*[425] In 3.11.31, we see only the "loving," (*blanditiae*) and not the "hating" (*iurgia*). As I have suggested, the negatives do not bother him in 2.9 because he was playing the part of the elegiac lover; he had not yet become one. In 3.11, he feels the repercussions. It is also in 2.9b that Naso issues *stultus* in an exclamation: *stulte, quid est somnus, gelidae nisi mortis imago!*.[426] There he intimates that the man without love is *stultus*, yet now that he presents himself as impervious to love's allurements, he calls himself *stultus* for having ever been susceptible, or rather, for having been a lover. This ironic reversal in what he considers *stultus* reminds us of Naso's fickleness and suggests that he might regret his present claim (31-2). The changed attitude is also informative: when he was playing the part of the elegiac lover and seemed to be in control, he exalted love as something essential to one's soundness of mind; now that things are not going his way, it is only a fool who could be in love. As 3.11b begins, our suspicions are confirmed: Naso is, in fact, still a fool.

The couplet's intratextual connections to 2.19 make Naso's remarks seem even more naive. In that poem, Naso twice indicts the *vir* on account of his *stultitia* for not feeling the need to be protective over his beloved (2.19.1-2; 46),[427] but in 3.11, as he is now the *vir,* he is the one that appears *stultus*, despite his claiming otherwise. Consider the following couplet:

> *quas mihi blanditias, quam dulcia verba parabat*
> *oscula, di magni, qualia quotque dabat!*[428]

As was the case in 2.9, the beloved's *blanditiae* in 2.19 can be seen as the "loving" aspect that counterbalances the "hating," which are the acts of exclusion that draw Naso back in (11-18).[429] In 3.11, the beloved's strategy is similar: after her efforts to exclude Naso (9-26), she employs her *blanditiae* to retain him (29-30). Although, this time Naso is not *stultus* as before, and so her strategy should fail. Of course, it succeeds, because Naso's claim assumes that he still has a say. Even though he seems to know that her *blanditiae* are strategic (*potentia quondam*), he is unable to resist them. In fact, in 2.19 he already recognises that her *blanditiae* are part of a (counter)balancing

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[425] Ov. *Am*. 2.9.46.

[426] Ov. *Am*. 2.9.41.

[427] Cf. McKeown (1998): 414.

[428] Ov. *Am*. 2.19.17-8. Cf. McKeown (1998): 414.

[429] Olstein (1975): 247.

act. So why is this time different? In 2.19, Naso was not just willing to accept these deceptive strategies as part of the game; he invites them (19-24). In 3.11, however, not only does he discourage them, but he is also no longer willing even to endure with them. Despite his reluctance, he cannot help but be drawn back to her.

So by the end of 3.11a, Naso is still *stultus*, although he insists otherwise. For this reason, I agree with Perkins' statement that Naso's *stultitia* 'stands as a monument of ambiguity".[430] However, her explanation is problematic:

> "A shift of emphasis, or the addition of a comma, refocuses the time frame of his *stultitia*, so that *non ego sum stultus, ut ante fui* ("I am not foolish, as I was before," 32) becomes *non, ego sum stultus, ut ante fui* ("I am foolish, not as I was before")".[431]

But why was he not foolish before? The intratextual evidence from 2.9 suggests that he *was* foolish in the very same way that he is now (by implying that he is not *stultus*): he is a lover. The irony in 2.9 and 3.11 lies in the unbelievability of his self-proclaimed indifference: in both poems he is the wise one that scorns the fool; in 3.11 he inverts his definition of *stultitia* from 2.9, which leads us to the conclusion that he has been the fool all along. I do agree with Perkins that Naso is "neither convinced nor convincing, and that his arguments are as flimsy as a house of cards".[432]

**Summary of 27-32**

The final section of 3.11a (27-32) began with a summary of Naso's list of grievances (27-8). The language employed stressed his suffering and passivity (*his…ferendis; taceo; duravi; pati*), so that, despite his claim to have hardened from his suffering and the demand that his beloved find somebody else to torment, we suspect that his resolve is weakening. Several intratextual allusions confirm our suspicions. First, *his…saepe ferendis* recalls *multa diuque tuli* (1); *duravi* and *pati* recall *patientia* (1) and *perfer et obdura* (7), connections that I suggest undermine rather than reinforce his resolve: they are reminders not simply of the reasons behind his renunciation, but also the reasons behind its inevitable failure. The couplet also engages with 2.19: 23-4 (*duravit*); 51; 59 (*patientia*) to highlight Naso's ironic fall from glory. Next came the suggestion that Naso had

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[430] Perkins (2002): 119.

[431] Perkins (2002): 119.

[432] Perkins (2002): 119.

arrived on safe shores and heard undisturbed the distant roaring tides of love (29-30). He invokes an image from a Propertian *renuntiatio* to inspire the success of his own renunciation, but the supplicatory image of the votive wreaths (*votiva…redimita corona*) are contradicted by his hubristic affront to *Amor* (Cf. 5-6). Allusions to his previous *renuntiatio* further undermine his alleged security (2.9.21; 31-2) and anticipate the renunciation's impending failure. I have also suggested that we have reason to doubt the suggestiveness of *lena* and *tumescentes…aquas*. Naso concluded 3.11a with the claim that his beloved's seductive tactics have no effect on him, for he is not the fool that he once was. His apparent disillusion is undermined by almost every utterance. *Desine*; *quondam*; *perdere* allude to Catullus 8 and recall the apprehensive self-exhortations of line 7 (*perfer et obdura*); the assertion, *non ego nunc stultus, ut ante fui,* echoes the sentiments of the Propertian *renuntiatio* (3.25.5-6) and suggest that Naso is suppressing his emotions; *stultus, blanditiae,* and *verba potentia* are terms that ironically contrast their use in 2.9 and 2.19. These allusions give the impression that Naso's indifference is feigned.

**3. Conclusion**

Over the course of 3.11a, we have witnessed Naso attempt his second *renuntiatio amoris,* and like the first (2.9), this one will fail. He began on a strong note with a declaration of intent: he claims to have trampled over the head of *Amor* and to have escaped *servitium amoris* (1-6). Naso had exploited the paradigm in a way that distinguished him from his elegiac predecessors: he adopted the pose of a *servus amoris* and actively encouraged his *servitium*. By 3.11, however, his attitude has changed. After the brash opening Naso wavered: he exhorted himself to persist and said that bitter medicine brings relief (7-8). He determined that, to take the bitter medicine, he must inspire feelings of *odium* towards his beloved, which he did through the enumeration of her indiscretions (9-26). The list of grievances contained a number of elegiac commonplaces that also allude to specific experiences from Naso's past and memories of his relationship. By conjuring these memories, he successfully inspired feelings of *odium*, but this did not help his renunciation; these feelings kindled a desire to "repossess" his beloved. Unaware that his approach was counterintuitive, he summarised the list in terms that highlighted his suffering (27-8). Naso proceeded to claim that he had safely escaped the tumultuous tides of Love (29-30). He closed the poem with a rejection of his beloved's advances that he substantiated with the claim that he is not the fool he had been (31-2), but the very words used to convey his indifference undermined it. Despite Naso's assurances, we are primed to anticipate the renunciation's failure.

To support his *renuntiatio amoris*, Naso calls upon the programmatic renunciations of his predecessors, Catullus 8 and Propertius 3.24-5. By alluding in 3.11.7 to Catullus 8, Ovid forces us to consider the Catullan lover's fate, which anticipates the failure of Naso's own renunciation. He thereby produces a dramatic tension between Naso's expectations and the reader's that reflects the poet-lover's internal dissonance. Naso invokes Propertius 3.24-5 in a premature declaration of his success. With this allusion, Ovid maintains the dramatic irony: although the Propertian lover could not conquer love, he at least seemed, at the end of Book 3, to have had some success in his escape; Naso, we find out, will not be so lucky. As Ovid's second *renuntiatio amoris*, we are led to expect something new. Ovid delivers on this by reworking something old.

# CHAPTER 3: *AMORES* 3.11b

"It is a great caricature which is beautiful, and a great humour which is serious".
T. S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood*, p. 57.

## 1. Introduction

In 3.11b, the renunciation falls apart. Naso does not do a dramatic about-face (as in 2.9b); instead, he gradually struggles to come to terms with his defeat. Central to 3.11b are two related Catullan ideas: the lover's internal conflict between feelings of *odium* and *amor* (Catullus 85) and the state of involuntary love (Catullus 72; 75). Ovid represents *amor*, we shall see, as comprising qualities that draw the lover towards loving; these "pull factors" constitute voluntary love. *Odium*, on the other hand, consists of qualities invoked to prevent his loving; in practice, these "push factors" counterintuitively ensnare him even deeper in love. Naso, viewing these forces as mutually exclusive (33-6), is unable to comprehend why his love lingers: no matter how many times he reframes his inner conflict (37-44), he cannot view the forces as non-binary, nor arrive at a rational solution for this fundamentally emotional dilemma. Ultimately, he submits to his beloved, begs for her mercy (45-8), and begrudgingly resigns himself to the fact that, regardless of her deeds of disloyalty, he will be forced to love her (49-52). Naso's failure to overcome the famous Catullan dilemma reflects, I suggest, that, despite his innovative attempts to turn love into a game and set himself apart from his elegiac predecessors, he is fated to progress no further. He regresses to a point before Augustan love elegy's genesis: he is unable to escape even the protoelegiac mode of Catullus. This regression, I think, symbolises the futility of his strategic approach to love.

## 2. Analysis

### i. 33-34: The Struggle

> *Luctantur pectusque leve in contraria tendunt*
> *hac amor hac odium, sed, puto, vincit amor.*

After claiming to be unaffected by his beloved's advances, Naso shows his unyielding posture. The theme of this couplet is reworked throughout lines 33-43, described often as an extended variation on the *odi et amo* poem, Catullus 85.[433] In 3.11b Naso suddenly demonstrates an awareness of the forces of *odium* and *amor* at work. Although this is an improvement on the ignorant stance of 3.11a, he is still off the mark. Naso visualises the relationship between *odium* and *amor* as a struggle for supremacy over his heart: *in contraria tendunt* imagines a powerful clash: the violent battle juxtaposes the gentle heart (*pectusque leve*) in which it is fought, but it also suggests that the forces of love and hate are working against each other. Naso is mistaken because, as I shall show, these forces are working together against him.

On the division of 3.11a and b, whether they constitute independent but related poems or indeed comprise two parts of a whole is not my chief concern.[434] I shall, however, comment briefly on the nature of the transition. Some consider the transition abrupt and unexpected, and at least part of this argument rests on the contrast between Naso's unwavering resolve throughout 3.11a and the "about-face" in 3.11b.[435] Those who recognise signs of weakness in 3.11a generally agree that these signs anticipate 3.11b.[436] It is my view that we are indeed led to anticipate the renunciation's failure through comparison with 2.9 and the many of intratextual and intertextual clues in 3.11a. However,

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[433] Cf. e.g. Jacoby (1905): 86; Brandt (1911): 80; de Saint Denis (1958): 188; Luck (1959): 159; Ferguson (1960): 341; Herescu (1962): 50; Lee (1962): 163-4; Lenz (1966): 234; Jäger (1967): 146-7; Williams (1968): 509; Gross (1975): 158; Sabot (1976): 541; Harder-Marg (1978): 231; Cairns (1979): 135; Vitale (1980): 338-9; Keul (1989): 87; 89; Döpp (1992): 55-6; 59; Hinds (1998): 26-9; Weinlich (1999): 245; Perkins (2002): 117; James (2003): 127; Armstrong (2005): 15; Booth (2009): 68; Heyworth (2009): 273; Volk (2010): 47; Sharrock (2012): 76; Wray (2012): 26; Davis (2024): 292.

[434] Müller (1856): 89-91; (1863) for division. For a list of relevant scholarship, see Davis (2024): 281-2.

[435] Cf. e.g. Lee (1962), who argues for division and cites only line 3.11a.7 as a preparation (162); Keul (1989), who does not commit to a stance about division, but suggests that Naso's resolve was unwavering at the end of 3.11a (87-8). Harder-Marg (1978) argues for unity but suggests a sharp contrast between 3.11a and b (230), on which see also Davis (2024): 283.

[436] Cf. e.g. Jacoby (1905): 86; Perkins (2002): 124-5; Damon (1990): 288-9; Jäger (1967): 145-6; 166-7; 207; Weinlich (1999): 245. The signs themselves are disputed.

unlike 2.9b, 3.11b does not present a sudden or dramatic about-face.[437] It opens with the verb, *luctantur,* which is suggestive of disarray. Naso's ambivalence is pointed by the verb's foremost position,[438] and the line's spondaic structure also suggests deliberation.[439] Moreover, *luctantur pectusque leve in contraria tendunt* is the only hexameter in the *Amores* that has neither a 'strong third foot *caesura*," nor compensates for its omission "by having strong *caesurae* in both the second and the fourth foot".[440] The suffering suggested by the violent image is thus reinforced by the line's drawn-out rhythm.[441] *In contraria tendunt* suggests that Naso's heart is torn between two diametrically opposed forces; this is the impression that Naso is currently under.

These two forces, suspended to the pentameter,[442] are revealed to be love and hate: *hac amor hac odium.* Ovid reverses the order of Catullus 85's *odi et amo* with *hac amor hac odium,*[443] and by using the verb, *luctantur*, Ovid personifies the two forces. For Naso, these forces embody the conflicting emotions of 3.11a, where he associates *amor* with the factors that pull him back to his beloved, and *odium* with those that push him away. As I have suggested, in 3.11a Naso's feelings of *amor* and *odium* are less distinct than he presumes: although he thinks that they vie against each other, in reality they collaborate to ensnare him. The proximity of *amor* and *odium* emphasises the confrontation, and the *hac…hac* construction syntactically coordinates these forces. This signals that they are on equal footing,[444] or at least coordinated in other ways. The asyndetic pentameter undercuts the deliberative hexameter,[445] an abrupt shift that mimics Naso's loss of control. It is ironic that *Amor* is present in Naso's *pectus* because this contradicts the lover's earlier celebration (3) at having expelled love from his heart (2) and further suggests that his approach to the renunciation was misguided.[446] The line also confirms our suspicions that his claim to have

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[437] *Contra* Lee (1962): 162; Davis (2024): 283.

[438] Cf. Damon (1990), who sees in *luctantur* a "troubled uncertainty" (288); Perkins (2002): 124; Davis (2024): 292.

[439]McKeown (1989): 201; Keul (1989): 90. Cf. Prop. 2.1. 13; 2.6. 16a; 2.15. 5; 3.14. 4; 3.22. 9; 4.1. 147; Ov. *Am*. 3.7. 9.

[440] McKeown (1987): 120.

[441] McKeown (1987): 120.

[442] Davis (2024): 292.

[443] Döpp (1992): 59.

[444] Keul (1989): 91. For the opposite view, see Davis (2024): 292.

[445] McKeown (1987): 120; Thorsen (2013c): 374.

[446] Cf. Keul (1989): 91; 93.

conquered *Amor* (5-6) was premature and hubristic: since *Amor* is thought to be the victor (*puto vincit amor*), the natural spoils are Naso's *pectus*,[447] whose powerlessness is emphasised by *leve,* a term used frequently to describe Ovidian elegy itself.[448] Ovid's light-hearted elegy, or rather his light-hearted elegiac lover, is grossly ill-equipped for Catullan intensity.

Damon, among others, argues that as early as *sed*, *puto*, *vincit amor*, we observe a shift from "troubled uncertainty… to an increasingly confident reaffirmation of his love".[449] However, that depends on the reading of *puto* (i.e. is it doubting, or confident?). Gross takes a more extreme view than Damon: he describes the tone as "insouciant," and suggests that the subsequent elaboration (35-43) is "purely *pro forma*".[450] These arguments overlook the possibility that *puto* connotes hesitancy; Santirocco suggests plausibly that "*puto* undercuts the effectiveness of *vincit amor*...the poet is not sure that Love has triumphed over Hate".[451] I am less convinced, however, that Ovid thus "clearly establishes the tone of indecision which characterises the poem';[452] it is not Naso's indecision that dominates the poem, but his abjection. I agree with Keul and Davis, who recognise the apprehension behind *puto* and affirm *Amor's* advantage over *odium,*[453] although I think that this is only an apparent advantage. Naso is not entirely convinced but has a strong hunch that love will win, and he appears ready to admit defeat. This makes sense in light of his depleted *patientia*. That *puto* is suggestive of a belief, rather than certainty, accords with my suggestion that Naso is not yet sure why his renunciation fails, or rather why *Amor* wins. That is, he does not understand that *amor* is not victorious over *odium*; rather, both combine to conquer Naso's heart. Although *odium* and *amor* seem to be opposites, they might better be understood as two parts of a whole: two forces that work together to undermine Naso's renunciation. That is why Naso suspects that *Amor* prevails (*sed*, *puto*, *vincit amor*); not because *odium* assumes a weaker position than *amor* in line 34, but because

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[447] Jäger (1967): 148; Armstrong (2005): 15.

[448] E.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.1.19; 2.1.21; 3.1.41, noticed by Davis (2024): 292.

[449] Damon (1990): 288. On Love's victory, see Lee (1962): 164; Williams (1968): 510.

[450]Gross (1975): 158. Cf. also Jäger (1967): 147; Booth (2009): 68.

[451] Santirocco (1969): 83. Cf. also Döpp (1992): 59. Gross (1975) cites Santirocco (1969) as if Santirocco's study supports his argument (158, n. 19). Perkins' (2002) argument that *puto* is "distancing and humorous" seems non-committal, and she does not elaborate on the significance of this on the interpretation of the poem (124).

[452] Santirocco (1969): 83.

[453] Keul (1989) suggests that "Ovid' has an inkling as to which force will emerge as victor (94). Davis (2024) notes that "Ovid's lover, if hesitantly, sees love as the more potent force" (292).

his feelings of "*Amor'* for his beloved encompass aspects of both *odium* and *amor*. I suggest that the uncertainty is not about whether love will or will not prevail (it will), but whether Naso can come to terms with that outcome, or at least understand it.

*Vincit amor* invokes Gallus in Virgil's *Ecl*. 10.69: *omnia vincit amor; et nos cedamus amori,*[454] and the phrase alludes perhaps to lines of Gallus now lost.[455] In any case, it had clearly become a recognisable aphorism by Ovid's time of writing.[456] Gross suggests that allusions of this kind undermine the seriousness of the conflict: "the obviousness of literary borrowings undercut the supposed emotional turmoil."[457] He errs, however, in his approximation of literariness/allusiveness to insincerity.[458]

Gross' solution is an easy and superficial one that underestimates the very cleverness that he ascribes to Ovid; this is especially true in light of the "obviousness" of the allusions. It is at any rate uncharitable that Gross does not even consider the possibility that Ovid may have something more meaningful in mind. I think that we might better understand the "obviousness" of the borrowing by considering its universality. Thus, Armstrong: "whereas before Ovid claimed to have conquered love…now, once again, it is love that conquers…just as Vergil's Gallus said it did".[459] This turn of fate is ironic, but the irony makes a serious point.[460] The elaboration that follows is thus not merely "*pro forma*":[461] Naso is trying to make sense of how he has been conquered by love despite his calculated efforts to avoid that fate and despite his elaboration of elegy. Invoking the *odi et amo* idea is an effective way of capturing Naso's regression. Because Catullus presented the idea in

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[454] Gross (1975): 158; Keul (1989): 93, n. 3. It has been suggested by Lee that, by extension, this may allude to now lost lines of Gallus.

[455] Lee (1962): 164; Cairns (2006): 107-8.

[456] For similar expressions, cf. also Tib. 1.4.40: *plurima vincit amor*; 1.5.60; 2.3.14; *Am*. 3.2.46; 3.10.28-9; *Rem*. 260; 462.

[457] Gross (1975), 158.

[458] See Frécaut (1972): 189-90; Boyd (1997): 49-50. Keul (1989) demonstrates the flaws in Gross's assessment (see 94, n. 4; 95 n.1).

[459] Armstrong (2005): 15.

[460] Cf. Parker (1969): 80.

[461] Gross (1975): 159.

simple and concise terms is no reason to dismiss the affective reality of a more detailed expression; to write it off as "parody" is no less self-fulfilling.[462]

Although Lee does suggest that Ovid is not in competition with Catullus, his justification is no less reductive than the reading of Gross: "this is verse at a much lower level of intensity; the ostensible theme is simply an excuse for intellectual entertainment".[463] Lee does not consider what implications the Catullan (and Vergilian, or rather Gallian) ideas have on the outcome of the *renuntiatio*. Instead, he notes:

> "When Ovid says *sed puto vincit amor* he does not go on to make one feel the pull of love as Catullus does, but he gives one the intellectual pleasure of recognising, by the way, an allusion to Vergil's famous line."[464]

Ovid is not in competition with Catullus, but that does not mean that he cannot invoke the Catullan idea in a way that is, in its own right, “serious" or unfrivolous.[465] Again, Armstrong:

> "This is no crude parody, but a re-engagement with some of the most familiar commonplaces of amatory rhetoric. The effect on this occasion is to show that despite the familiarity of such ideas, their power is undiminished. Far from killing off love elegy, Ovid demonstrates that it is still very much alive."[466]

Thus, even though in 3.11a Naso invokes the help of his elegiac predecessors (e.g. lines 7-8 for Catullus; 29-32 for Propertius), or if we follow Armstrong, boasts of his superiority to them,[467] in 3.11b he learns that he is doomed to fare no better, and in doing so he re-presents the duality immortalised by Catullus 85, and experiences its weight for himself.[468] Keul suggests that the lowering of tone from line 33 to 34, rather than the use of literary allusions, plays down the tragic mood of the self-conflict.[469] This I find more conceivable. Still, the shift itself does not necessarily undermine Naso's pain nor the seriousness of the conflict; it is symptomatic of his mental

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[462] Cf. Sharrock (2012): 76.

[463] Lee (1962): 164.

[464] Lee (1962): 164.

[465] Cf. Hinds (2006), 21: ""we should begin to see the point of the Ovidian wordplay if we think about the significance of that Catullan idealisation in its original context".

[466] Armstrong (2005): 15.

[467] Armstrong (2005): 14.

[468] In other words, a proof that *amor omnibus idem*, cf. Ver. *G*. 3.224.

[469] Keul (1989): 95.

exhaustion and despondence. The explanation is simple enough: having experienced a failed renunciation before (Cf. 2.9), all Naso needs to lose hope of success is a small sign of dissonance; this is what line 33 delivers.

In the subsequent couplet, Naso continues in his attempt to understand the clashing feelings of *odium* and *amor*:

> *Odero, si potero; si non, invitus amabo.*
> *nec iuga taurus amat; quae tamen odit, habet*.[470]

Before I analyse this couplet, I should comment on the connection between *odium* and a lack of volition, and the unity of *odium* and *amor,* as these ideas are key to my understanding of Naso's internal conflict. As I outlined in Chapter 1, I regard *odium* in 3.11 to point to a broad category that encompasses factors designed to "push" Naso away from his beloved, such as her *vitia* (because of the negative feelings that they arouse in Naso). In practice these "push factors" pull him towards her: in 3.11b, the factors of *odium* do not repulse him, but force him to love against his will. This is important to the remainder of my discussion because Naso is concerned with the involuntary nature of his love. I am in general agreement with critics that Catullus 72 and 75 are key influences on the passage.[471]

The hexameter, *odero, si potero*; *si non, invitus amabo,* substantiates the previous couplet, and the pentameter, *nec iuga taurus amat*; *quae tamen odit, habet*, offers an illustrative *exemplum*. Ovid maintains the dichotomy between *odium* and *amor* with the placement of *odero* and *amabo* at opposite ends of the hexameter. This highlights that Naso views the relationship between *odium* and *amor* as one of opposition and antithesis. He cannot comprehend that they are connected, an insight to which we are privileged through Ovid's allusions to Catullus.The trisyllabic pairing creates an equilibrium that underlines the fact that there is no clear winner between love and hate.[472] The order (*odero* followed by *amabo*) reverses that of the previous line (*hac amor*, *hac odium*), and reinstates the Catullan (*odi et amo*). Coupled with the chiastic arrangement, the transposition of "loving" and "hating" suggests that the two are interrelated. The use of the future tense is significant: Naso displays an awareness that his present dilemma will have long-standing

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[470] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.35-6.

[471] Brandt (1909): 180; Ferguson (1960): 343, n. 28; Herescu (1962): 51; Sabot (1976): 542; Cairns (1979): 135; Vitale (1980): 335; Keul (1989): 91-3; Booth (2009): 68; Davis (2024): 293.

[472] Cf. Keul (1989): 96.

ramifications. He uses *odero* in reference to an *odium* that can offset *amor*; the likelihood of his desire is undermined by his use of the conditional *si potero*.[473] This paradox is brought out by the metrical mirroring of the verbs.[474] *Amabo,* qualified by *invitus*, expresses a love to which volition is not integral, which for Naso is inevitable.[475] Naso, still not aware of their interdependence, ironically perceives *odero* and *amabo* as mutually exclusive actions. He does at least recognise that the decision is not his, as expressed by the doubtful *si potero*.[476] Keul claims that both *odero* and *amabo* involve compromise and the future tense makes it clear that "Ovid' (Naso) does not suffer because he is impartial to either outcome.[477] I disagree. The outcomes are not equally probable: the conditional, *si potero,* sustains Naso's hopeless tone and implies that he will be unable to hate his beloved; to hate her in a way that will not cause him to love her, that is. Keul, I think, confuses despondence with impartiality: Naso's lack of volition does not undermine his suffering; it intensifies it. He struggles even to protest his defeat; this is a symptom of hopelessness and not indifference. Keul also argues that the line is lacking in depth, and not to be taken seriously: hereafter the conflict of the heart becomes increasingly trivialised and superficial; she detects superficiality in the reworking of Catull. 72 and 75 and the use of simpler language.[478] There is no verbal evidence that Ovid's treatment of involuntary love is meant to undermine that of Catullus: by echoing the Catullan sentiment, Ovid could be reinforcing it.[479]. Keul's argument that the use of a "lower" register and short, simple terms undermines the seriousness of the conflict is subjective;[480] it fails to consider the possibility that the contrary may be true: simpler expression can effect more sincere expression.[481] After all, that was part of the brilliance of Catullus 85.[482]

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[473] Cf. Keul (1989): 98. *Contra* Davis (2024): 293.

[474] Cf. Davis (2024): 293.

[475] Cf. Keul (1989): 97.

[476] *Contra* Davis (2024): 293.

[477] Keul (1989): 97.

[478] Keul (1989): 98.

[479] As understood by Quinn (1963): 266, n. 1. Cf. Davis (1971): 196–201, esp. 200-201. Davis comments on the structural arrangement of Catull. 72; like Catullus, Ovid plays with tense and uses chiasmus to reflect a tension between willing and unwilling love.

[480] Keul (1989): 98, n. 2; 113.

[481] Cf. Vitale (1980): 338. For an unconvincing objection, see Keul (1989): 98, n. 2.

[482] On Catullus' expression, see Sheets (2007): 191; Chahoud (2021): 121-27. Cf. Ferguson (1960), 341: "direct passion"; Lee (1962), 163: "direct and objective statement of emotion"; Fraser (1964), 12; 31: "a feeling of harsh, unresolved complexity"; Miller (2007), 402: "a marvel of concision whose conflicting emotions become the hallmark of erotic elegy as a whole"; Arkins (2007): 462.

Ovid reiterates Naso's lack of choice and the irrelevance of his volition with a supportive *exemplum*: *nec iuga taurus amat; quae tamen odit, habet.* Lee is unhappy with the "logical irrelevance" of this line, Lenz follows Heinsius and Kenney in wanting it removed, Williams laments its "carelessness in logic," and McKeown calls it “strained".[483] Davis, however, presents a persuasive counterargument which focuses on Ovid's stylistic tendencies and the popularity of the line.[484] The *exemplum* is also relevant to the subject of 3.11, and there seems to be a broad neglect of the line's allusive qualities.[485] Consider 1.2.13-4:

*Verbera plura ferunt, quam quos iuvat usus aratri,*
*detractant prensi dum iuga prima boves.*

Having decided that resistance to love is futile (9-10), Naso explains that, although reluctant, by resisting his oppression he would only exacerbate his suffering. In 3.11a he ignores this lesson with the list of grievances (9-26), but now he reverts. The intratextual link highlights Naso's ironic regression: despite how far he thought he had progressed (1-6), he is forced back to the beginning of his amatory journey; he has not learnt anything. The *exemplum* of the bull suffering the yoke, coupled with the allusion to 1.2, also marks Naso's realisation that he cannot escape his *servitium* (*contra* 3.11.3).[486] In addition, at 1.2.14, acceptance of servility was helpful (*iuvat*); now, it is simply something that must be suffered (*habet*).[487]

Furthermore, although a bull suffering the yoke typically suggests an initial resistance to subjection,[488] applied to Naso's present situation it has a unique application. Keul recognises the nuance in part: the bull hates the yoke, but this hatred cannot change his predicament, because the yoke is fatefully connected with him.[489] In other words, the yoke symbolises Naso's submission to his beloved, which is part of his identity as an elegiac lover. My reading of the *exemplum* is as

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[483] Kenney (1962): 13; Lee (1962): 164; Lenz (1966): 154; Williams (1968): 590; McKeown (1989): 41. See also Courtney (1987): 7-9; Tarrant (2006b): 63.

[484] Davis (2024): 293. See also Graverini (2013-4; 2019).

[485] Williams (1968) comments on its generalising quality (590).

[486] Sabot (1976): 541. On the link with *servitium amoris*, see e.g. Tib. 1.6.38; McKeown (1989): 41.

[487] For this sense of *habere*, see *OLD* s.v. 18. Compare *Ars*. 1.19, where *oneratur* matches the use of *habet* here.

[488] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.13.16; *Ars*. 1.471-2; 3.555-6; *Rem*. 235; Tib. 1.3.41. See also Keul (1989): 100; McKeown (1989): 41.

[489] Keul (1989): 99.

follows: Naso resents that he cannot stop loving his beloved, and he resents that this resentment itself does not prevent his loving (*nec iuga taurus amat, quae tamen odit*); he thus acknowledges that he is forced to suffer his loving (*habet*). Naso's recognition of the futility of resistance marks an improvement in his awareness of the situation, but he is still ignorant of the fact that the hating actually drives his loving. The arrangement of the line further intimates that *odium* and *amor* are interconnected. The *exemplum* fits into a *tricolon diminuens*: the bull (lover's) diminishing resistance (will) is visualised with the shortening of each clause and marked by the parallel placement of the verbs at the end of their respective clauses: *amat, odit,* and the lone *habet* that comprises the entire third clause, where we might expect a concessive in response to *tamen*.[490] The isolation of *habet* emphasises Naso's feelings of abjection: all that is left for him is to suffer. Keul suggests that, by applying the image of a bull to himself, an intellectual, Ovid is being playful; he thus further undermines the seriousness of the conflict of the soul.[491] She follows Barsby, who makes the point that "being essentially a poet of the intellect, [Ovid] might have despised the mindless beasts of the field (*pecudes ratione carentes*)…".[492] Both conflate Ovid with his fictive elegiac persona. In any case, that he had referred to cattle as a *turpe ingenium* may just as well reflect Naso's deprecation and the degradation of his self-worth.[493]

**ii. 37-44: Variations on *Odi et Amo***

In the next passage (37-44), Naso presents and re-presents his conflicting feelings in a string of paradoxes:

> *Nequitiam fugio, fugientem forma reducit;*
> *aversor morum crimina, corpus amo.*
> *Sic ego nec sine te nec tecum vivere possum*
> *et videor voti nescius esse mei.*
> *Aut formosa fores minus aut minus improba vellem:*
> *non facit ad mores tam bona forma malos.*
> *Facta merent odium, facies exorat amorem:*

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[490] Cf. Lenz (1966) who notices the omission but offers no explanation aside from dismissing the line's authenticity (234).

[491] Keul (1989): 100.

[492] Cf. Barsby (1973): 123.

[493] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 1.10.26.

*me miserum! vitiis plus valet illa suis*.[494]

This section is rightly seen as a reinterpretation of the Catullan *odi et amo* conceit.[495] Perhaps because the passage seems "playful," and because it draws out the concisely expressed Catullan idea, many have charged it with insincerity or superficiality.[496] For instance, Booth:

> "…a pretended conflict in Naso's mind between love and hate, but actually the final decision in favour of love is from the start (33–4) never in doubt, and the passage's bravura display of scintillating wit is at odds with any real pain (contrast with Catullus 85)."[497]

Despite the question surrounding *puto*, Booth fails to support her claim that the conflict is "pretended." She also sees 'scintillating wit" and "real pain" to be at odds, but this is a false dichotomy, because the former can be on Ovid's part and the latter on Naso's. Similarly, Gross:

> "Nor does this couplet [33-4] alone raise doubts about the seriousness of the poet's involvement; rather, the chief factor is Ovid's manner of expression, for he reduces this amatory problem from a serious struggle to a war of words…Surely the intricate word play… further illustrates that 11b displays verbal precocity rather than embodies spiritual conflict."[498]

Both take for granted that verbal dexterity precludes genuine emotion, and neither provides a good reason why. These readings overlook the passage's potential significance on Naso's amatory trajectory. Now that Naso is no longer in "denial" (as in 3.11a), why should he not attempt to resolve or at least make sense of his internal conflict? If his best efforts to extinguish his love fail, is it not natural to wonder why? Naso's expansion of the *odi et amo* idea can be seen as playfully overdone while still being sincere. The cleverness and long-windedness can, I suggest, shine light on the problem. By drawing out the conflict, Ovid depicts Naso's inability to rationalise his conflicting feelings. Indeed, Lee notes: "to represent the internal conflict by this succession of

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[494] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.37-44.

[495] Cf. Pichon (1903): 544; Jacoby (1905): 86; Brandt (1909): 80; de Saint Denis (1958): 188; Luck (1959): 159; Ferguson (1960): 341; Herescu (1962): 50; Lee (1962): 163-4; Lenz (1966): 234; Williams (1968): 509; Gross (1975): 158; Harder-Marg (1978): 231; Cairns (1979): 135; Vitale (1980): 338; Keul (1989): 87; Döpp (1992): 55-6; 59; Barchiesi (2001): 159; Perkins (2002): 117; James (2003): 127; Armstrong (2005): 15; Hinds (2006): 18; Hutchinson (2008): 180; Booth (2009): 68; Heyworth (2009): 273; Volk (2010): 47; Sharrock (2012): 76; Wray (2012): 26; Davis (2024): 293.

[496] For instance, see Jacoby (1905): 86-87; Neumann (1919): 68; Pichon (1919): 409; Weinreich (1926): 70; Ferguson (1960): 343; 356; Lee (1962): 163; Davis (1981): 2470, n. 27; Keul (1989): 106.

[497] Booth (2009): 68.

[498] Gross (1975): 158-60.

balanced antitheses is to stress the intellectual in a situation that is fundamentally emotional."[499] However, Lee does not consider the possibility that Naso's intellectualisation of an emotional problem reflects a deeper message; instead he reduces it to an "excuse for intellectual entertainment".[500] Pichon also suggests that Naso's analysis undercuts any emotional seriousness.[501] By taking the Catullan idea and drawing it out in an exhaustive string of variations Ovid shows that, no matter how the Protean lover attempts to adapt to or manipulate his circumstances, he inevitably returns to the same fate as Catullus: he will love unwillingly (Catull. 72; 75).[502] This over-analytic attempt to circumscribe emotion is symptomatic of Naso's treatment of love as a game to be won through strategy and artifice. Its inability to provide a resolution is suggestive of the futility of this approach.

As many have noted, the beloved's hold over Naso appears to be strictly physical.[503] This, it seems, is another reason why the passage has been regarded as "unserious" or trivial.[504] On this subject, Gross notes: "the poet has, in fact, externalised what should be an internal conflict".[505] I agree. However, I disagree that the externalisation of emotions is "out of place," "inappropriate," and that it "undermine[s] the struggle between emotion and reason".[506] Gross claims that the mention of external features (such as beauty) belongs to the "angry farewell" rather than the "amatory dilemma".[507] His insistence on the discrete categorisation of these literary paradigms is reductive.[508]

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[499] Lee (1962): 163. Similarly, see Hutchinson (2008): 180.

[500] Lee (1962): 163; Williams (1968), 510: "plausibility was not Ovid's intention: intellectually it is a clever juggling with ideas". Kraus (1968) similarly contrasts Ovid's intellectualisation of the emotional with the expressiveness of Tibullus and Propertius (86).

[501] Cf. Pichon (1919): 409. See also de Saint Denis (1958): 189-190.

[502] See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the extratextual implications of this re-presentation of the old Catullan idea.

[503] Cf. e.g. Brandt (1909): 180; Gross (1975): 158: "he creates a lengthy contrast between his rejection of Corinna's promiscuous behaviour and his attraction to her beauty, specifically her body"; Vitale (1980): 338; McKeown (1989): 288; Keul (1989): 102; Weinlich (1999): 245; Sharrock (2012): 76; James (2003), 127: "a hold that is purely physical".

[504] Cf. e.g. Gross (1975): 158-60; Keul (1989): 106-110.

[505] Gross (1975): 158.

[506] Gross (1975): 158.

[507] Gross (1975): 158, n. 17.

[508] Cf. Keul (1989): 102, n. 3. Keul provides arguments as to why Gross' approach is inappropriate. The Ovidian *renuntiatio amoris* comprises elements of both an "angry farewell" and an "amatory dilemma," as we already witness in 2.9a+b. The angry farewell comes in (a) and the amatory dilemma in (b), but there is no reason not for them to overlap.

The insinuation that Ovid's "amatory dilemma" ought strictly to adhere to those of his predecessors is misleading, as is the intimation that not doing so undermines the legitimacy of the dilemma. I agree with Gross' observation that Naso externalises his emotions; that is key to my belief that Naso's struggle is to be treated seriously: unable to comprehend why he cannot resist his beloved despite her wrongdoings, he reduces the nuanced relationship between his feelings of love and hate into a "simple mind-body dichotomy".[509] He cannot grasp the emotional sensation that what he hates reinforces his loving, and so attempts through (specious) rationalisation to bifurcate his love into *odium* and *amor*. In 3.11a, especially 9-26, we see that Naso's "hating" contributes to his "(involuntary) loving," and the frequent engagement with Catullus 72 (e.g. 3.11.40-1; 43-4; 49-50; 52) lends colour to this interpretation. For example, Catullus' forced love increases (8: *cogit amare magis, sed bene velle* minus) as a result of Lesbia's unfaithfulness (7: *quod amantem iniuria talis*).[510] By alluding to Catullus 72, Ovid elicits dramatic irony from Naso's hopeless attempts to comprehend this paradox.[511] Naso's attempt to conceive of love as a game insists on the trivialisation of passion.[512] When he turns to this strategy in 3.11b, it no longer helps him; if the incessant reworking of the conflict between *odium* and *amor* seems redundant, that is precisely the point. Previously the strategy worked, and Naso could derive pleasure by trivialising love, but only while he played the part of the elegiac lover. Now that he has become one, it is ineffective. Weinlich explains the attraction as follows: the power of the beloved's beauty is far stronger in 3.3 than it had been in 2.5 and that is why he forgives her indiscretions in 3.3; by 3.11b, her beauty's victory over the lover is therefore unsurprising.[513] I agree, but I emphasise rather the increase in Naso's emotional dependence on his beloved(s), which I see as an ironic consequence of i) his own strategic approach to love, ii) the beloved's indiscretions/mistreatment of him, and iii) her beauty. In my view, Naso fixates on her beauty, and in doing so overlooks the other factors.

In the first couplet of this section (37-38), Naso laments that, although he flees from his beloved's wickedness and misdeeds, he is drawn back by her beauty and her body:

*Nequitiam fugio, fugientem forma reducit;*

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[509] Cf. Sharrock (2012): 76.

[510] Cf. Gibson (2021): 97.

[511] *Contra* Bretzigheimer (2001): 210-11.

[512] Fyler (1971): 201; Oliensis (2019): 3 Sharrock (2006) 153.

[513] Weinlich (1999): 245. I agree with her criticism of Keul's (1989) discussion which fails to account for the difference in the lover's attitudes from 2.5 to 3.3 and 3.11 (109).

*aversor morum crimina, corpus amo.*

Ovid re-presents the antithesis between *odium* and *amor* by contrasting the reasons for each feeling and Naso's reaction to them. The reasons for hating and loving are counterpoised to intensify the antithesis. This separation of extremes by *caesura* develops a jagged, disjointed rhythm that mimics the difficulty of Naso's oscillation between *odium* and *amor*.[514] In the hexameter, the qualities that are representative of the respective forces (*nequitiam* of *odium*; *forma* of *amor*) are separated by the verbs that correspond to Naso's attempted renunciation. Indeed, *fugio*, *fugientem* recall *fugique catenas* (3), which, coupled with the image of the bull suffering the yoke, suggests that Naso is still subjected to *servitium amoris.* The separation of *nequitia* and *forma* also emphasises a contrast between the beloved's qualities.[515] The active present participial *fugientem* is undercut by *reducit,* which is suspended to the final position and governed by the nominative *forma* that usurps Naso's "active" position and relegates *fugientem* to the accusative.[516] The chiastic word order is suggestive of his entrapment: the verbs ascribed to Naso (*fugio*, *fugientem*) are enclosed by the qualities that arouse his feelings of *odium* and *amor,* and the only verb outside of the chiasmus, *reducit*, only confirms his inability to escape. Furthermore, the triple fricative alliteration (*fugio*, *fugientem forma*) establishes a feeling of turbulence that emphasises the violence of Naso's struggle.

That he attempts to flee from his beloved's *nequitia* exposes Naso's hypocrisy, since elsewhere he indulges his own *nequitia*.[517] This double standard is also exhibited by Ovid's elegiac predecessors,[518] which lends weight to the argument that Ovid's persona lays bare their insincerities,[519] and is, I suggest, further evidence that he has been reduced to a sort of caricature of them. Naso's focus on the physical may also strengthen the argument that Ovid exposes the

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[514] Weinreich (1926): 76; Jäger (1967): 146-7.

[515] *Nequitia* is associated here with the beloved's perfidy based on Naso's complaints in 3.11a, the rest of 3.11b, and the word's application in similar contexts. Cf. Pichon (1991) *nequitia*; Munari (1951): 211; Lee (1962): 163; Keul (1989): 102; Davis (2024): 294. Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 3.40.10; 3.14.17.

[516] Cf. Keul (1989): 102.

[517] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.1.1-2; 3.1.17. On Naso's own *nequitia* as a source of pride, see Bretzigheimer (2001): 223-4; Sharrock (2013): 151-2; 63-5.

[518] For relevant examples, see Sharrock (2013): 151-65. Ovid thus seems to illustrate Naso's fall from grace: while previously he celebrated his own *nequitia*, now he laments that of his beloved, from which he is unable to escape.

[519] Cf. e.g. Mack (1988): 68; James (2003): 156-8; Sharrock (2012): 77-8.

insincerity of his elegiac predecessors, by whose *personae* the *docta puella* was pursued.[520] Naso himself has elsewhere suggested the importance of a beloved's character and education.[521] None of that seems to matter in 3.11. Keul assumes from this shift in character that Naso is operating on a playful level in 3.11.[522] Although I agree that Naso does not present himself or his preferences as he might have in previous poems in the *Amores*, I disagree with the deduction that the internal conflict of 3.11b is facile.[523] Naso may appear shallow or conceited by focusing on the beauty of his beloved in 3.11b, but by no longer pretending that her learnedness is necessary, he also appears more honest.[524] The idea of external beauty being sufficient for love and remaining unaffected by character defects also undermines the precedent set by other elegiac lovers in *renuntiationes*. For instance, Prop. 3.24.1-2:

*Falsast ista tuae, mulier, fiducia formae,*
*olim oculis nimium facta superba meis*.[525]

Then at the end of the renunciation, 3.25.11-18, the Propertian lover acknowledges that Cynthia's beauty remains, but wishes for age to take it away, and in a previous (failed) *renuntiatio*, he attempts to dampen her beauty by verse:

*scribam igitur, quod non umquam tua deleat aetas*
*"Cynthia, forma potens: Cynthia, verna levis"*.[526]

Keul suggests that, by exaggerating the role that beauty plays and deeming it a reason for Naso's inability to separate from his beloved, Ovid parodies his predecessors, and that this further downplays the seriousness of the conflict.[527] But is this just parody for the sake of play, or is Ovid casting their motif in a new light? I propose that Ovid amplifies the concept (the power of a beloved's beauty) to illustrate that his persona has fallen into a state even more hopeless and pathetic than those before him. Naso's hypocrisy, combined with the harsh auditory effect produced

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[520] Cf. e.g. Prop. 1.7.11; 2.11.6; 2.13.11; 2.28.28; On the *docta puella*, see Hallett (1989): 59–78; Keul (1989): 107-9; James (2003): 21-5; 71-108; Johnson (2012): 42; Skoie (2013): 83.

[521] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.4.11; 13; 15; 17-30; 2.10.5-6; *Ars*. 3.237-42; 269-380; *Rem*. 709-14. Cf. also Keul (1989): 108-9; Luck (1959): 161-2; James (2003): 71-107. 72; 79-83.

[522] Cf. Keul (1989): 110.

[523] Keul (1989): 110-111.

[524] Ovid elsewhere places importance on the beloved's moral character and education, but we have reason to doubt the truth behind his claims, cf. Mack (1988): 84-91; Armstrong (2005): 33-40.

[525] Cf. Bennett (1969): 31.

[526] Prop. 2.5.27-8.

[527] Keul (1989): 111-2.

by the successive fricatives (*fugio, fugientem forma*) reinforces the tension between humour and misery: Naso appears pathetic and doomed, but, we might think, rightfully so.

In the pentameter Naso reconfigures the antithesis between his resentment of his beloved's character (*aversor morum crimina*) and love of her physical beauty (*corpus amo*). Ovid intensifies the dichotomy of *odium* and *amor* by replacing *fugio* with the more acerbic *aversor,* and *reducit* with the clearer *amo.* By placing the verbs on opposite ends of the line, Ovid visually mimics Naso's polarising feelings. This distance also highlights Naso's insistence on viewing *odium* and *amor* as a binary, and thus his inability to make sense of his emotions. The objects of his hate (*morum crimina*) and love (*corpus*) are also made more specific.[528] In this case, the *morum crimina* pertain to the beloved's *vitia,* which as we know from 3.11a are acts of disloyalty: *mores* here is not simply character, but faithfulness too.[529] The contrast between *morum crimina* and *corpus* is brought out by their juxtaposition, and the plosive *c*'s create an abrasive sound that emphasises the abruptness of the switch from "hating" to "loving". There is an impression of turbulence suggestive of Naso's inner struggle, and the implication, I think, is that Naso cannot easily escape. The connection between these contrasting feelings is subtly suggested as both begin with the *a* sound (*aversor*; *amo*), and the reasons are similarly joined by their common *c* beginning (*crimina*; *corpus*). Again Ovid employs chiasmus, magnified by alliteration, in a way that suggests the inescapability of Naso's dilemma: the feeling of hate for a negative quality leads is followed by the loving of a positive quality (*aversor… crimina*, *corpus amo*). Naso is thus imagined as paralysed by his contradictory emotions. The sophisticated stylistic arrangement informs, rather than undermines, the conflict.

Although Catullus 72 appears to be the obvious influence,[530] let us consider how the line relates to Naso's previous sentiments in the *Amores*. For instance, 1.10.13-4:

> *Donec eras simplex, animum cum corpore amavi;*
> *Nunc mentis vitio laesa figura tua est.*

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[528] I agree with Keul 103 that the *morum crimina* pertain to the beloved's acts of betrayal, and that *mores* here describes not just character but loyalty.

[529] *Contra* Davis (2024): 294. Cf. Keul (1989): 103.

[530] Cf. Ellis (2010): 348; Davis (2024): 294.

Although some have identified the link, Keul alone offers a detailed comment.[531] In 1.10, Naso claims to be unable to love his beloved: because she is ugly on the inside, she is not beautiful on the outside.[532] Body and mind are connected (*animum cum corpore amavi*) and both are necessary for his loving (*donec eras simplex…amavi…nunc mentis vitio laesa figura tua est*).[533] Now his stance is the opposite: even though she is ugly on the inside (*crimina*), her outer appearance is irresistible. Keul infers from reversal of his prior stance (at 1.10.13-4) that Naso in 3.11b cannot be making a profound point about the internal conflict, and should not be taken seriously.[534] I disagree. Keul's argument rests on the lover of 1.10 being credible and therefore presumes insincerity in 3.11. In 1.10, as in many of the earlier poems, Naso is a self-righteous poseur, hence Davis: "the pose assumed at the beginning of the poem is only a mask".[535] If one of 1.10 and 3.11 is not to be taken seriously, it is surely not the latter. On 1.10, Barsby suggests: "[Ovid] presents a convincing picture of Naso who, having idealised his girl into a mythological beauty, is then dismayed by the discovery of her true nature".[536] If we accept this comment, then it is unsurprising that the embittered Naso does not fully mean what he says. In 3.11b, by contrast, Naso no longer idealises his beloved; he is fully aware of her infidelities and shortcomings, and yet he cannot live up to the claim made in 1.10. Naso's insincerity in 1.10 is, according to Davis, reminiscent of that of 1.3.[537] This is pertinent not only because in 1.3 the promises of eternal *fides* are false, but also because the couplet alludes to that poem. At 1.3.12-14, Naso tells his beloved that he is undyingly loyal and a gift to her from Love:

> *Hac faciunt, et me qui tibi donat, Amor,*
> *et nulli cessura fides, sine crimine mores*
> *nudaque simplicitas purpureusque pudor*.[538]

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[531] Cf. Brandt (1909): 180; Keul (1989): 104-6; McKeown (1989): 288; James (2003): 292.

[532] Keul (1989): 105.

[533] Keul (1989): 106.

[534] Keul (1989):.106.

[535] Davis (1989): 84. Davis includes 1.10 in his count of poems where this is the case. He notes: "[Ovid] assumes a pose of righteous indignation" (74); "Ovid's apparent outrage over a violated principle is simply a mask for his stinginess" (75). See also Wilkinson (1955): 67; Lenz (1966): 234; Barsby (1973), 119; 123; McKeown (1989): 282-3; James (2003): 309, n. 79.

[536] Barsby (1973): 123.

[537] Davis (1989): 76. For a more detailed discussion of 1.3, cf. Davis (1988): 22-6.

[538] Cf. Olstein (1975), 245: "Ovid's exaggerated claims of fidelity (in lines 12-14) and their mocking sound effects". See also Oliver (1945): 200.

The language with which Naso indicts his beloved's perfidy (*morum crimina*) in 3.11.38 recalls his claim to have unblemished loyalty (*sine crimine mores*).[539] He thus charges his beloved with the exact opposite behaviour of that which he had ascribed to himself. This situation is ironic, since the erotic resumé of 1.3 is clearly embellished; his professed loyalty is undermined throughout the *Amores* (e.g. 1.4; 2.4; 2.7-8; 2.10; 2.19; 3.2; 3.7).[540] Ovid highlights Naso's capriciousness: he appears as a hypocrite who dishes out what he cannot take — there is justification in finding his predicament amusing. That he believes his "love" is chiefly physical might seem shallow to us, but that does not delegitimise the feeling; it may emphasise his weakness of resolve: previously, character and beauty were necessary (Cf. 1.10.9-14), but now the latter alone is sufficient.

I suggest that both the beloved's physical beauty and her indiscretions draw Naso back to her. This does not mean that the beloved's unfaithfulness is to be seen as a "happy" part of the relationship, nor that Naso is sexually stimulated by it. He resents his beloved's indiscretions, as his language suggests (*nequitia*; *morum crimina*), but her actions also incite feelings of jealousy and humiliation (11-16). In the subsequent poem, Naso approximates his beloved's promiscuity to her desirability and expresses an awareness of competition (3.12.5-6). By the same logic, the beloved's indiscretions in 3.11 give the lover more reason to desire her. That is, he does not want to be dispossessed of a *puella* in which other men see value; this is not only an erotic, but also a homosocial desire. Thus, on the role of female objectification in male homosocial dialogue, Hammarén and Johansson: "women become a kind of currency men use to improve their ranking on the masculine social scale".[541]

In the next couplet (39-40), Naso acknowledges his lack of choice and laments that he can live neither with nor without his beloved:

> *Sic ego nec sine te nec tecum vivere possum,*
> *et videor voti nescius esse mei*.

The connective *sic* demonstrates that Naso's involuntary love is a result of the contradictory emotions explored in the preceding couplets. A life without her (*nec sine te*), he thinks, would be the

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[539] The similar context, where loyalty is clearly the subject at hand, means that *sine crimine mores* ought to be read as implying loyalty inasmuch as *morum crimina* implies acts of infidelity.

[540] Cf. Barsby (1973), 53; 55: "[Ovid leaves his audience] to wonder quite how sincere he is"; Davis (1989), 72: "exaggerated protestations of eternal fidelity"; 73; James (2003), 80: "overprotestations".

[541] Hammarén and Johansson (2014): 2.

consequence of his *odium*, and with her (*tecum*), his *amor.* Either alternative would suffice were one extreme not inseparable from the other. The sequencing of these alternatives (*odium* followed by *amor*) parallels those of the preceding couplet (*nequitiam fugio…forma reducit*; *aversor…amo*). This arrangement intimates that both unhappy alternatives are a consequence of his inability to experience one extreme without the other. The unity and balance of either alternative (*sine te*; *tecum*) is suggested by their adjacency, and the parallel *nec…nec* construction. Cleverly, *sine te* visualises the separation from his beloved, and *tecum* their union.[542] There is hyperbole and irony in the claim that he cannot live with neither alternative (*nec…vivere possum*), since presently he is able to live with both. In using *possum,* instead of the weaker *velim,* Ovid intensifies the emotion; by placing these words in Naso's mouth, he makes him appear melodramatic. This has a comic effect: because his predicament is partly of his own making, we are encouraged to laugh at Naso's self-pity, or think that it might just be deserved. He again expresses a sentiment that echoes those of his predecessors, for instance at Prop. 2.1.78, the lover wants to be remembered for his elegiac misery: *huic misero fatum dura puella fuit*.

In the pentameter, Naso emphasises his lack of control over his feelings: *et videor voti nescius esse mei*. I do not view *voti* as a reference to Naso's decision to renounce his love (11a).[543]. It is plausible that *votum* broadly encompasses the idea of will, or *voluntas.*[544] Illustrative of this point is *Ars*. 1.64 which displays marked verbal similarities with the line: *Cogeris voti nescius esse tui.*[545] Both lines begin with passive constructions (*videor*; *cogeris*) that are followed by *voti,* then *nescius,* emphasised by its central position, and in both *nescius* is followed by *esse*, which is enclosed by a personal pronoun (*mei*; *tui*) corresponding to the passive verb that opens the line. In that passage, *votum* pertains to *voluntas* in general and not a particular promise. In 3.11, however, Naso is not simply saying that he cannot decide on which extreme to embrace, and, as Keul suggests, hinting that he does not really care either.[546] There is a difference between indecision and the lack of an opportunity to have a choice. This is not Naso's decision; the line implies that, regardless of which extreme Naso might want to embrace, he is fated to endure both. I also reject Keul's suggestion that

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[542] Cf. Keul (1989): 112, n. 4.

[543] Brandt (1909): 181; Lörcher (1975): 17; Cairns (1979): 139.

[544] Cf. Munari (1951): 211; Wilkinson (1955): 33; Williams (1968): 507; Lee (1962): 162; Keul (1989): 113.

[545] Cf. Brandt (1909): 181.

[546] Keul (1989): 113.

there is no hint of Naso's suffering because the passive construction (*videor*), and the disjointed arrangement of the line exude indifference.[547] The obscuring syntactical arrangement, the absence of an active subject, and the emphatically positioned passive, *videor,* emphasise Naso's passivity and lack of control, and *nescius* his growing uncertainty. Similarly, the labial–velar approximant alliteration, *videor voti*, has an undulating effect that develops an impression of instability. The distance between *videor* and *mei* reflects Naso's estrangement from himself (or his former identity). Ovid's use of simple expression does not necessarily suggest Naso's indifference;[548] like Catullus 85, it reflects his disenchantment. Lee suggests a contrast: "whereas Catullus claims not to know why he hates and loves simultaneously, Ovid gives the impression of knowing precisely".[549] This argument is at odds with the verbal evidence: *nescius*, emphasised by its central position indicates uncertainty; moreover, the term recalls *nescio* from Catullus 85, also used to describe uncertainty over feelings of both love and hate.[550] Ovid's presentation of the *odi et amo* dichotomy is analytic, but that does not make it conclusive; why would Naso analyse it if he knows perfectly well its cause? I suggest the point is that no matter how elaborate an analysis he conducts, no matter how many different ways he reframes the problem, he is unable to understand why he loves; to rationalise the irrational. To revive the pastiche for analysis is to demonstrate exactly its relevance and inevitability. The only way that he comes to some sort of answer is by comparing his inability to separate from his beloved to her beauty (37-8; 42-43). Although I consider her beauty a factor, Gross himself suggests that the lover "has externalised what should be an internal conflict,"[551] and that "by constant repetition…the poet denies the possibility of a gradual clarification of his problem".[552]

This couplet has verbal similarities to Propertius 1.11.22: *aut sine te vitae cura sit ulla meae!,* 2.9.43: *te nihil in vita nobis acceptius umquam*; Horace *Carm*. 3.9.24: *tecum vivere amem, tecum*

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[547] Keul (1989): 113.

[548] Keul (1989): 113.

[549] Lee (1962): 163. Similarly, Williams (1968), 509; Gross (1975): 158. On why this deduction is questionable, see Keul (1989): 124, n. 1.

[550] Cf. Gibson (2021), 95: "the reply conveys not the clarity of the forthright expression of Catullus' thoughts in the first three words, but the uncertainty (*nescio*) of his understanding of why he is experiencing such emotional turbulence.".

[551] Gross (1975): 158.

[552] Gross (1975): 159.

*obeam lubens an*.[553] In these examples, the speaker claims only to be unable to live without their beloved. Ovid takes it a step further, since Naso can live neither with nor without her. Ovid does not merely parody; he adds to the idea a layer of paradox:[554] he recalls the Horatian and Propertian ideas to contrast their willingness to love to Naso's unwilling love.[555] They are happy to pledge eternal devotion; Naso has no choice.

In the subsequent couplet (41-2), he turns to wishful thinking:

*Aut formosa fores minus, aut minus improba, vellem;*
*non facit ad mores tam bona forma malos.*

In the hexameter, Naso proposes two solutions to his problem: his beloved could either grow less beautiful (*aut formosa fores minus*), or less reprehensible (*aut minus inproba*). The wish for his beloved's beauty to diminish reinforces the impression that it is what Naso believes prevents his separation from her. Naso again resembles Propertius at the end of his *renuntiatio,*[556] but whereas the Propertius' apotropaic wish closes the renunciation, Naso's is placed in the middle of his conflict and it brings no closure. Naso's renunciation has failed; although the Propertian lover could not conquer love, his renunciation had some success.[557] Propertius' renunciation marks a departure from the typical position of the elegiac lover (the "exclusive devotion to one woman"),[558] Ovid's has the opposite effect: Naso ends up devoted to a beloved who herself is not faithful to him and accepts this relationship on whatever terms (49: *quidquid eris*).

In the hexameter, Ovid maintains the contrast between qualities associated with *amor* and *odium: formosa* indicates beauty that is independent of character,[559] and picks up *forma* (37) and *corpus* (38). The context and similar use elsewhere suggests that *inproba* describes the beloved's disloyalty:[560] it is aligned with *nequitiam* (37) and *morum crimina* (38). Naso's reasoning is simple:

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[553] Keul (1989): 114.

[554] Cf. Berman (1972): 173.

[555] Cf. Herescu (1962): 50.

[556] Prop. 3.25.11-18.

[557] Günther (2006): 355. On the limitations of Propertius' escape, cf. Hutchinson (2008): 179.

[558] Günther (2006): 355.

[559] Cf. Pichon (1991) s.v.

[560] *OLD inprobus* 7; Pichon (1991) *inprobus.* Cf. Keul (1989): 115. For *inproba* in this sense, see e.g. Catull. 57.1; Prop. 1.1.6; 1.3.39; Ov. *Am*. 2.5.23; 3.14.14; *Ars*. 2.400.

if his beloved were less beautiful, he would have no more reason to love her (Cf. 37: *fugientem forma reducit*; 38: *corpus amo*). His hatred would thus triumph. Alternatively, if she were less licentious, he would have no reason to hate her (Cf. 37: *nequitiam fugio*; 38: *aversor morum crimina*). His love would prevail. The sequencing of *odium* followed by *amor,* maintained in 37-9, is reversed, as though presenting the antithesis in a new way would somehow help. The frontal placement of *formosa* suggests that beauty is at the fore of Naso's mind.[561] The subjunctives, *vellem* and *fores*, imply wishful thinking. The qualities associated with *amor* and *odium* are divided by *aut…aut* into two balanced *cola*. Ovid thereby maintains balance between the opposing forces. This equilibrium is reinforced by the matching trisyllabic adjectives (*formosa*; *inproba*) and the presence of *minus* in both *cola*. Ovid suggests that Naso views either alternative as equally possible solutions to his dilemma. I disagree with Keul's suggestion that this balance demonstrates Naso does not suffer and that "Ovid' deals with the conflict superficially.[562] Naso's ambivalence towards either alternative seems to suggest the contrary: by not showing a preference, he stresses his desperation for a resolution. He wants to be put out of his misery; he cares less about how.

It is this line that Gross suggests displays "verbal precocity rather than embodies spiritual conflict".[563] Why can Ovid's verbal precocity not inform Naso's conflict? For instance, with the fricative alliteration, *formosa fores,* Ovid reinstates the sense of turbulence established by *fugio — fugientem forma* (37). Although the alternatives appear discrete because of the *aut…aut* construction, the proxies of *amor* (i.e. *formosa*) and *odium* (i.e. *inproba*) are bound by chiasmus (*formosa…minus…minus inproba*), and the repetition of *minus*. Again, Ovid carefully structures the line to hint at the interrelatedness of the binaries. That is, the beloved's excessive beauty is directly tied to her excessive "depravity". Ovid confirms what he has suggested before: that they are intrinsically connected.[564] Implicit in Naso's wish for his beloved's beauty to diminish is the hope that his rivals might pay her less attention. That would theoretically make her less *inproba.*[565] Since he constructs the alternatives as equal resolutions, if she becomes less *inproba*, then Naso would surely be more drawn to her. On the other hand, if she became less *inproba*, she might seem less

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[561] Cf. Davis (2024), 295.

[562] Keul (1989): 115.

[563] Gross (1975): 159.

[564] Ov. *Am*. 2.17.7-10.

[565] *Aut…aut*, suggests a disjunctive proposition and is therefore potentially misleading.

*formosa:* if she has less attention from his rivals, Naso's desire to "repossess" her may lessen.[566] By removing what causes pain, or rather what feeds his *odium* (*minus inproba*), he removes a factor of his *amor.*

Naso not only acknowledged but even espoused this phenomenon in 2.19, as a way to make the "game" more interesting:

> *quo mihi fortunam, quae numquam fallere curet?*
> *nil ego, quod nullo tempore laedat, amo!*[567]

Formerly, therefore, Naso wished never to love what did not make him suffer; now that is precisely what he desires. We have yet another ironic reversal.[568] The implication of his statement in 2.19 is, as McKeown notes, "that fortune should have enough regard for Ovid to work against his wishes".[569] Now that *Fortuna* has granted that request, Naso begs for the opposite. The reversal brings to mind Naso's "Protean" characteristic, part and parcel of his strategic approach to love.[570] Ironically, it does not, at this stage, reflect his cleverness; it marks his fall from glory.[571] In 3.4, the counterpoint to 2.19, Naso issues a warning to an overprotective *vir* that likewise undermines his wish for his beloved to be less "*inproba*".[572] There he claimed that a girl who is allowed to be licentious will indulge less (*peccat minus*); her *nequitia* will languish (*semina nequitiae languidiora facit*). He should not forbid the indiscretions (*vitia…vetando*). In 3.11, however, he ignores this logic and attempts to wish away his beloved's propensities; he resembles the *vir* on the receiving end of the admonition.

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[566] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 3.4.27-30.

[567] Ov. *Am*. 2.17.7-8.

[568] The reversal is strengthened if we, as I do, read an implicit *velim* in the opening clause, that corresponds with *vellem* in the line. For this suggestion, see Booth (1991) *ad loc*.

[569] McKeown (1998): 411.

[570] Cf. Davis (1989): 57-100.

[571] Davis (1989), 57: "the lover who can and will try to adapt himself to any situation in order to get his way".

[572] Ov. *Am*. 3.4.9-12.

Naso's wish is supported with the observation that internal ugliness should not be packaged in external beauty: *non facit ad mores tam bona forma malos.*[573] Ovid again binds the opposites with *chiasmus* (*mores…bona forma malos*). By suspending *malos* to the line's end, Ovid encloses *forma* between *bona* and *malos*; he thus intimates that the beloved's beauty possesses both positive and negative force. The suggestion that *mores* and beauty should accord is not new.[574] By using *mores* to suggest disloyalty (38: *morum crimina*) in contrast to beauty, Ovid draws on Propertius.[575] Ovid shifts from first to third person with *non facit ad* to establish a semblance of objectivity:[576]
in declaring that beauty should not coincide with disloyalty, Naso asserts a fallacy with the authority of an aphorism. The coinciding of outer and inner "beauty" would make things easier for him, but at 3.4.41-42 he mentioned that it is impossible:

> *Quo tibi* formosam*, si non nisi* casta *placebat?*
> *non possunt ullis ista coire modis*.[577]

There, of course, he has the aim of persuading his beloved's *vir* to let down his guard, so we might not take his word for it. He probably should have. Now those words come back to bite him,[578] so that again he resembles the addressee of 3.4. Ovid's reversal of Naso's stance is playful, but it also has a narratological function: now that the incompatibility of *malos mores* and *bona forma* no longer suits him (*contra* 3.4), he deems it unfair. Naso is out of clever tricks and unable to stand by his strategy when it no longer conveniences him. As he struggles to come to terms with his involuntary *servitium,* his downfall appears to us comically pathetic. At *Ars.* 2.400, the *praeceptor* suggests that Clytemnestra would have remained chaste (*casta*), had Agamemnon not first betrayed their marriage; her infidelities (*improba facta*) were a result of his misdeed (*vitio…viri*). Naso's

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[573] Note that the beginnings of lines 42-50 are missing due to manuscript corruption, cf. Davis (2024): 295. I agree with Frecaut (1972), who notes that the complaint appears pathetic (188), and with Keul (1989) that *bona forma* pertains to physical beauty (116).

[574] A tradition that begins with Greek tragedy and comedy, is found in Roman comedy, and inherited by elegy, cf. Keul (1989): 117-8. For more detail see Keul (1989): 116 n. 2-4; 117, n. 1-2.

[575] Cf. Prop. 2.24.18, where the suggestion is that the beloved's beauty and moral rightness should go hand in hand; 2.16.25 where the opposite is suggested. Cf. Munari (1951): 100; Keul (1989): 117, n. 6; 118, n. 1.

[576] On the idiom and the change in voice, see Gibson (2003): 312. For the construction, *non facit ad…*, see: Ov. *Her*. 15.8; *Tr*. 1.10.44. For *facit ad*, see *Am*. 1.2.16; *Her*. 6.128; 14.56; 16.192; *Ars*. 3.540. Cf. also Davis (2024): 295.

[577] Unitalicised terms for emphasis are mine. On the passage, cf. Brandt (1909): 181; Wilkinson (1955): 66; Harder-Marg (1978): 231; Keul (1989): 118; McKeown (1989): 222. See also Ov. *Am*. 1.8.43-4; 10.13-4; 2.2.14. Implicit in my comparison is a similarity between *proba* and *casta*, and an antonymic relationship between *casta* and *improba*, for which see *Ars* 2.400. See also *Ars*. 2.143-4, where the *praeceptor* advises the lover not to trust in beauty blindly.

[578] He reasserts this position at 3.14.1-2.

previous *vitia*, and not his beloved's, are perhaps to blame for her disloyalty (41: *inproba*; 43: *facta*).

In the couple that concludes this section, Ovid brings the dramatic irony to its height (43-44):

*Facta merent odium, facies exorat amorem –*
*me miserum, vitiis plus valet illa suis!*

The arrangement of the first line sustains the equilibrium between *odium* and *amor.* The hexameter is bisected into two *cola* each comprising three words that follow a symmetrical word order (subject-verb-object), and that begin with "*fac-"*.[579] The beloved's *facta* (her indiscretions à la 3.11.9-26)[580] are counteracted by her *facies* (synecdoche for her beauty)[581]; *merent* (what the indiscretions deserve) is undercut by *exorat* (her beauty pleads for love); *odium* corresponds with *amorem*. *Odium* and *facies* are juxtaposed and split by caesura: their interfacing renders Naso stuck in a limbo between feelings of attraction and repulsion. Keul suggests that the structural balance is deceptive because *amor* takes the dominant position over *odium,* as Naso finds his beloved's beauty irresistible.[582] Although there is reason to contemplate the emotional and communicative potential of the beloved's "face" in particular.[583]

Like *non facit ad*, Ovid's use of the third-person verb, *merent,* gives the impression of an objective statement. We need not believe that Naso is being objective; on the contrary, his previous and subsequent use of first-person verbs (41: *vellem;* 50: *amem*; 52: *nolim, cogar…velim*) and terms of self-reference 44: *me miserum*; 48: *meos;* 50: *me quoque*) remind us that he is not.[584] By using objective phrasing, Naso attempts to assume a false sense of power. His application of *merere*,

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[579] Cf. Davis (2024): 295.

[580] I agree with Keul 118-9 that the *facta* in question must be the beloved's indiscretions, as outlined in 3.11a (9-26).

[581] "Face" is a denotation (recorded in Williams [1968]: 507), but it surely recalls her overall beauty, cf. e.g. *Am*. 1.8.33; 1.10.42; 2.1.33; 2.3.13; 2.8.11; 2.17.7; 11-2; 3.3.2; 3.4.27.

[582] Keul (1989): 119.

[583] *Contra* Keul (1989): 118-9. It may not simply be another cosmetic variation of the beloved's external beauty (l. 37: *forma*; 38: *corpus*; 42: *forma*), as Keul proposes. Cf. Bretzigheimer (2001): 203-4.

[584] Cf. Veyne (1988): 55. Veyne notes that the appearance of the fictive first person "poorly camouflages the objectivity of the third-person plural" in Ovid's *Amores*.

suggestive of one deserving a punishment, has a forensic undertone.[585] *Exorare*, which denotes entreaty by begging or pleading, also has a forensic ring.[586] The beloved is, I think, meant to resemble a *rea.* As the one upon whom judgement is being cast, she is framed as the vulnerable party. It ends the other way around. In this picture, it is her face (*facies*) that elicits compassion/ mercy; Naso is not solely persuaded by her overall beauty.[587] Indeed, in a forensic setting, the *facies* plays a crucial role in determining a speaker's persuasiveness,[588] a point that Quintilian addresses in detail.[589] With her face Naso associates not just her beauty, but also her emotions, his own mixed emotions, and their shared memories; it is hypnotic.[590] Stirring the emotions is crucial to a successful entreaty, hence La Bua: "the effectiveness of a planned *miseratio* can be measured against the judges' emotional participation in the defendant's fate".[591]

In the pentameter Naso acknowledges that his beloved's face (by proxy, her beauty) outweighs her indiscretions: *me miserum, vitiis plus valet illa suis!.* As her beauty and indiscretions have been proxies for Naso's *amor* and *odium* respectively, the line might be construed to confirm what we, and he, had suspected (34: *sed, puto, vincit amor*). However, even though love grows stronger (*plus valet*), it has not actually conquered (*vincit*) *odium*.[592] I suggest that the interrelation between love and hate accounts for this technicality: *Amor's* success is not decisive because it alone does not decide Naso's fate; it is aided by *odium.* This interpretation is supported by Davis' suggestion that

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[585] For *merere* in forensic contexts used in the same sense, *OLD* s.v. 4b. Cf. Cic. *Cat*. 2.11; *Phil*. 3.14; 8.17; 14.13; *Leg*. 3.32; Quint. *Dec*. *Min*. 248.10; 249.4; Sen. *Con*. 1.5.1; 2; 8; 1.8.1; 2.3.4; 6.2.1; 7.6.3; 9; 11; 13; 7.8.6; 10.3.4; I include only those applications of *merere* that describe a punishment or negative consequence. For *merere* + *odium*, see: Quint. *Inst*. 4.1.44; *Dec Min*. 277.8.

[586] *OLD* s.v. 1a; 2a. (*Am*. 3.11.43 cited). In forensic contexts, the term has a similar use, see Quint. *Inst*. 9.2.90; *Dec*. *Min*. 247.15; 267.3; 275.5; 281.5; 330.9; 349; 377.11; 15; Sen. *Con*. 1.5.3; 2.3; 1; 3; 4; 5; 7; 9; 10; 11; 14; 15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 21; 22; 7.8.1; 9.2.21; 10.3.3; 4; 6; 14; 15; *Exorat* is understood in the sense of begging by Keul (1989): 119.

[587] Cf. Cic. *De Or*. 3.59.221; Quint. *Inst*. 11.1.54; 6.1.9; 25-7; 30.

[588] Cf. Bourdieu (1980): 69; Gleason (1995): 55-60; 76-81; Hall (2007): 225-8; 230; Connolly (2007): 131; 166; 269; Winterbottom (2019): 194-95.

[589] Cf. Quint. *Inst*. 1.11.8; 9-11; 2.3, esp. 65–87; 4.1.54–7. When the defendant is skilled at arousing pity, this becomes her most powerful tool, cf. *Inst*. 2.13.10; 6.3.29; 6.1.44; 9.3.30; 101; 11.3.160. Cf. La Bua (2019): 336.

[590] Quint. *Inst*. 2.16.6-7 makes a point of this. Take the example of Aquilius at Cic. *De Or*. 2.124; 194; *Ver*. 2.5.3. See also Quint. *Inst*. 6.1.30-34; 2.1. On this subject, cf. Fantham (1982): 243-63; May (2002): 66–8; La Bua (2019): 285-86; 293. Previously in Ovid's *Amores*, the face has had such an effect, for which see 2.5.47-48.

[591] La Bua (2019): 293.

[592] Keul (1989): 121.

the line involves a paradox: the beloved's *vitiis* ("misdeeds") are a source of strength (*valet*).[593] That is, the beloved's beauty (and Naso's love) grows even greater (note the emphatic combination of *plus* and *valet*) on account of her *vitia*, as had been the case in Catullus 72.7-8. Naso might be certain of *Amor's* superiority, but we should not be.

I disagree with Davis' claim that *me miserum* alludes specifically to "a moment of Catullan self-pity (76.19): *me miserum aspicite*".[594] The phrase is canonical;[595] Ovid employs the exclamation to invoke the misery, often due to unrequited love, that is characteristic of his generic predecessors (including Catullus).[596] Ovid employs the exclamation the most,[597] and Naso uses the exclamation after being shot by Cupid's arrow, at 1.1.25-6:

> *Me miserum! certas habuit puer ille sagittas.*
> *uror, et in vacuo pectore regnat Amor.*[598]

At that stage, his misery seemed humorous: it was not caused by unrequited love but by his being forced to settle for the elegiac meter.[599] By invoking the canonical exclamation, Naso puts on the pose of the elegiac lover. In my view, the exclamation marks Naso's realisation of the severity of his position.[600] He employs the phrase at 2.17.8 (*me miserum! Cur est tam bene nota sibi?*) as he complains that Corinna's beautiful face brings him trouble in the form of her vanity (7-10). The contexts are similar, but there is a key difference: in 2.17 he only pretends to be a loyal *servus amoris* to Corinna;[601] in 3.11b, his suffering is not undermined, and for the remainder of book 3, he betrays no signs of disloyalty.

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[593] Davis (2024): 295.

[594] Davis (2024):. 295.

[595] Cf. e.g. Catull. 30.5; 50.9; 76.19; 99.11; Prop. 1.1; 1.3; 2.33b.35; 3.6.21 (*miseram*); 23.19.

[596] In an exclamation, cf. e.g. Catull. 76.19; Tib. 2.3.78; Prop. 2.33b.35; 3.23.19. Cf. Pichon (1991) s.v.; Gross (1975): 153; Keul (1989): 120; Hinds (1998): 28.

[597] As an exclamation, it is employed as follows: Catullus (1); Tibullus (1); Propertius (2); Ovid (19). For Ovid, I count only his amatory corpus, including *Heroides*. Cf. Pichon (1991) *me miserum*.

[598] Already we have been prompted to think of this passage (Cf. esp. 1.1.26: in *vacuo pectore regnat Amor*) at 3.11a.2, where we that *Amor* still resides in Naso's heart.

[599] Cf. Gross (1975): 153; Davis (1981): 2468; (1989): 63; McKeown (1989): 27; James (2003): 130; Thorsen (2013c): 370; Miller (2013): 177.

[600] Cf. Burck (1952): 177.

[601] Note esp. *Am*. 2.17.25-30. On the lover's deceptiveness in 2.17, cf. Armstrong (2005): 61-2; Thorsen (2014): 157-9.

Ovid may wish to recall these previous uses, but to pinpoint an allusion of such a canonical phrase seems futile.[602] It is better, I think, to appreciate the phrase for what it is: an elegiac commonplace. In the previous examples (1.1; 2.17), Naso uses the exclamation in a fashion or context that undermines its traditional "depth". In 3.11b, however, *me miserum* is used in a peculiarly appropriate context, where elegiac suffering is brought about by rejection or unrequited love. In a poem where Naso is subjected to the most commonplace of elegiac predicaments, one that he should have known to avoid and not least to overcome (9-26), where he turns his back on his espousal and posturing of *servitium amoris* (2.17) and of competition (2.19), where his amatory protocol and erotic penchants work against him, where his distinctive features have inadvertently rendered him a facsimile of his predecessors, where he slowly realises that his love is beyond his control, and where no amount of rhyme nor reason come to his avail (37-44). Ovid, I suggest, uses this clichéd expression precisely when and how we might least expect it: in its proper context and appropriate mood. Naso gets a taste of traditional elegiac suffering. Whom better to call upon than Catullus for this dilemma (*odi et amo*), and what phrase could more convincingly deceive Ovid's audience of Naso's sincerity than *me miserum*? By extending the *odi et amo* dilemma and concluding it with this canonical exclamation, Naso expresses a conflict that is unique and unprecedented to him in a way that, for us, ironically highlights its mundanity. Thus, James:

> "Even in writing highly generic language (*dura, saeva puella; me miserum; heu;* etc.), the lover-poet manages to pretend that his situation is unique, special to himself…thus he presents the *puella* as inordinately cruel, himself as extravagantly miserable, and his love as unprecedented in its degree of devotion and suffering."[603]

*Me miserum*, therefore, suggests that the Naso has failed to "game" this relationship and has fallen victim to the fate of his predecessors: a *servitium amoris* of the classic kind.

**Summary of 37-44:**

Thus ends Ovid's extension of the *odi et amo* conceit. After several attempts to resolve his internal conflict, Naso finally realises the gravity of his predicament. No matter how he reframes his

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[602] Cf. Boyd (1997): 25. The expression is from Plautine comedy, by the *adulescens amator,* e.g. Plaut. *Amph*. 159-60; *Aul*. 409; 721; *Bacc*. 1094. On the phrase, see Gamel (2012): 344; James (2012): 254. Gale (2021) notes that the *adulescens* role is particularly exploited by Catullus in poems of relevance to my discussion, including 8 (the *renuntiatio*) and 85 (225).

[603] Cf. James (2003): 150-1.

contradictory feelings, neither loving nor hating can be escaped: these forces pull against each other to effect a trap of sorts; they immobilise their victim and allow no way out.

**iii. 45-8: Last Gasp**

After accepting defeat, Naso supplicates his beloved in a last-gasp plea for mercy (45-48):

*Parce, per o lecti socialia iura, per omnis*
*qui dant fallendos se tibi saepe deos,*
*perque tuam faciem, magni mihi numinis instar,*
*perque tuos oculos, qui rapuere meos!*

In this supplication, he employs elevated language and inflated rhetoric to persuade his beloved i) to accept his love, and ii) to accept it on his terms. He exaggerates their past faithfulness and the binding nature of their oaths with legal terminology and marital symbolism. Although he realises that he is beaten, he bargains for reciprocal loyalty in a final bid to maintain some control over the relationship. The elevated language and the style of the plea emphasise the shift in the relationship's power dynamics.

The elevated language (*parce*; *per…per*; *o lecti socialia iura; magni…numinis; perque…perque*) affords the plea a hymnic quality suggestive of an invocation.[604] Cairns compares this section to 2.9.47-54 on the basis that both are prayer parodies.[605] Both parody the language and elevated style of more traditional prayers, but there are important differences between the two pleas. In 2.9, Naso supplicates and glorifies *Cupido* (47-50), whom he keenly encourages to rule over him and *puellae* (53). In 3.11, the plea is addressed to his beloved, a single *puella*.[606] Contextual changes account for the differences. In the former *renuntiatio*, Naso gets a second wind: he returns to the role of the elegiac lover reinvigorated: he thinks the man out of love is the fool (41), actively encourages Cupid to shoot him (35), his beloved to deceive him (43), he embraces the highs and lows of love (45-6). In 3.11, he claims that the man in love is the real fool (32), despite his best efforts (9-28) he

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[604] Weinreich (1926): 77; Cairns (1979): 136; Keul (1989): 126. Cf. e.g. Hor. *Carm*. 1.9.8; Tib. 1.5.7. In Ovid: *Am*. 2.9.1-2; 47-54; 2.13.15; *Met*. 6.264; *Trist*. 1.2.105; 1.4.25; 5.5.64.

[605] Cairns (1979): 135.

[606] It is not, despite the claim to have conquered *Amor* (3-6), a "conflict with a personified Amor," as Zimmerman Damer (2019) suggests (119).

is unable to stop loving (33-44), he no longer wants to suffer the highs and lows (35-42), and he pleads not for more suffering, but for his beloved to have mercy (45-9).

Prayers are normally directed at the gods (Cf. 2.9.1: *O…Cupido*), but Naso addresses this supplication to his beloved; he thereby attributes to her a divine agency.[607] Naso recognises her power and he employs persuasory tactics that we have seen before.[608] As the supplicant, Naso's inferiority is implied, which contrasts his false sense of authority in the previous hexameter (43: *facta merent odium, facies exorat amorem*). The opening word of the plea, *parce,* suggests desperation and confirms that this is a plea for mercy.[609] *Parce* is also often a sign of the addressed deity's anger.[610] Keul suggests that Naso's supplication to "Corinna" signals her return to the status of *domina*.[611] Although *parcere* can evoke the language of slavery, Ovid has avoided using the term *domina*. Previously, Naso liked to use the term when he role-played the elegiac lover: that is, when he pretended to suffer.[612] In those contexts, he had the luxury of choice; the *domina*'s "power" was a component of the elegiac lover's fantasy and thus subject to his whim.[613] In 3.11, however, Naso's prayer comes just after he relinquishes control (*me miserum*); it appears as a desperate attempt to regain his footing in the power dynamic. The supplication therefore marks not a reversion to his fantastical *servitium,* but his recognition of the reality that his beloved has really supplanted him in their power struggle.[614] That is why he can no longer encourage competition (9-26) nor endorse his loving (33-44); she is in control. That is why he can no longer embrace the yoke (1.2.13-4: *iuvat*); he can only suffer it (36: *habet*). That, I believe, is the function of *parce*, and its foremost placement emphasises the power-switch.

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[607] Keul (1989): 126.

[608] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.7-8. For studies on Ovid's use of persuasory rhetoric in this pairing, see: Jäger (1967): 11-15; Watson (1983): 91-103; Davis (1977): 98-107; Henderson (1991): 37-88; (1992): 27–83; James (1997): 60-76; McKeown (1998): 146-68. For smaller but relevant discussions: Lenz (1966): 196-7; Mills (1978): 303–6; Martyn (1981): 2442-48; Ziogas (2021): 117-23.

[609] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.2.49-50; 3.3.48 (also to a 'superior" *puella*); *Her*. 7.30-1; 163; *Rem*. 3. On *parcere* as indicative of urgent pleas for mercy, see Naiden (2006): 243. See also Davis (2024), 296: "[*parce*] recalls a number of urgent requests in Tibullus". For instance, cf. Tib. 1..3.51; 1.4.83; 1.5.7.

[610] Abel (1930): 94; Appel (1909): 120; Keul 126. Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.13.15; *Met*. 6.264.

[611] Keul (1989): 126.

[612] Cf. esp. Ov. *Am*. 2.9b.46; 2.17.5.

[613] See chiefly Greene (1998): 84-92; 95-9; 99-108; Fulkerson (2013): 180-93.

[614] When I speak of "reality", this should not be understood as relating to Ovid personally; it pertains only to affective reality that exists in world of Naso's *Amores*.

The beloved's "mercy" involves her putting an end to Naso's suffering,[615] which stems from his conflicting feelings of *odium* and *amor*, which in turn stems from his inability to reconcile his beloved's unfaithfulness. Implicit in *parcere* are two requests. The first is that the beloved take him back. As his analysis (37-44) hinted, that is enough for him to be in love, even if that love is involuntary. The irony is pointed: just after the self-serving lover tries and fails to reject his beloved, he begs her not to reject him. The attempt to garner her pity seems humorously doomed. The second implication is that the beloved might stop entertaining his rivals, so that he might love again of his own volition.[616] The effect is similarly humorous: having lost the upper hand, and being in no position to bargain, Naso has the gall to intimate that his beloved should change her ways, for his sake no less (as *parce* concerns his suffering). In his tone we have already detected signs of resignation; this plea, I think, is a last gasp attempt to claim for himself a small reconciliation. After Naso fully resigns himself to involuntary love (and accepts an unfaithful beloved), in 3.14 he pleads only that his beloved might not inform him of her indiscretions, and his prayer is no less self-centred:

> *Tantum non oculos crimen deducis ad ipsos*
> *si dubitas famae* parcere*,* parce mihi![617]

The rationale for his request is further suggestive of Naso's loss of control:

> *Tunc amo, tunc* odi *frustra quod* amare *necesse est;*
> *Tunc ego, sed tecum, mortuus esse velim!*[618]

As Davis notes, "he does not want to be bothered with the unpleasant symptoms of a Catullan-style *servitium*".[619] The thematic and verbal connections to 3.11b are self-evident: we have the the love-hate dichotomy (*tunc amo, tunc odi frustra*) and involuntary love (*quod amare necesse est*). 3.14 is, I suggest, best understood as a result of the resignation developed in 3.11. Davis insists that in 3.14 Ovid provides a "correction" to the love-hate convention.[620] Naso does not, however, suggest that his feelings can be "turned off or on". On the contrary, traumatised by his experiences in 3.11b, he

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[615] Cf. Pichon (1991) *parcere*. Cf. e.g. Tib. 1.5.7; 2.5.114; Ov. *Her*. 4.162; 167. See also Burck (1952): 179, n. 3.

[616] Keul (1989): 127.

[617] Ov. *Am*. 3.14.35-6. Italics for emphasis are my own. Cf. Davis (1989), 42; 47, n. 26.

[618] Ov. *Am*. 3.14.39-40.

[619] Davis (1981): 2504.

[620] Davis (1981): 2505.

acknowledges that his conflicting emotions cannot be controlled: his only solution is to remain ignorant of the beloved's misdeeds, which give rise to this conflict. Thus *liceat stulta credulitate frui* (3.14.30) serves ironically to retract *non ego sum stultus ut ante fui* (3.11a.32).[621] In 3.11b, he has lost control, and his only option is to beg for mercy. In 3.14, he is no longer encouraging his beloved to lie because it makes the "game" more enjoyable, but because it is the only way for him to shield himself from another struggle between *odium* and *amor* (3.11b), an experience he never wants to revisit.[622] Naso is not enthused about his beloved lying to him; it is his last resort.

The remainder of the couplet comprises two clauses that qualify the supplication, each of which begin with an anaphoric *per* that stresses the intensity of Naso's plea:[623]

*per o lecti socialia iura, per omnis*
*qui dant fallendos se tibi saepe deos.*

The formulaic *per*, the structure, and the language of the couplet recall Tib. 1.5.7-8:

*Parce tamen, per te furtivi foedera lecti,*
*per venerem quaeso conpositumque caput*.[624]

Like the Tibullan lover, the Ovidian invokes to his beloved symbols of their mutual commitment. He first remembers their *lecti socialia iura,* which recall *furtivi foedera lecti*. Ovid introduces an erotic element, since these oaths take place in bed (*lecti*).[625] However, this does not mean that the relationship is "primarily sexual".[626] As the traditional sanctuary for elegiac lovers, the *lectus,* encompassing sexual union, functions as a witness to the oaths,[627] and symbolises shared intimacy. The terminology used, *socialia iura*, recalls the legal marital terminology.[628] *Iura* pertains to lovers'

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[621] Hutchinson (2008): 181.

[622] *Contra* Keul (1989): 213-47. Cf. Hutchinson (2008), 181: "the narrator actually wishes to go beyond dissatisfaction: into a state of wilful ignorance".

[623] Cf. Appel (1909): 136; Keul (1989): 126; McKeown (1998): 283; Davis (2024): 296. Cf. e.g. *Am*. 2.13.11-2.

[624] Brandt (1909): 181; Munari (1951): 100; Lenz (1966): 234; Sabot (1976): 543; McKeown (1987): 41; James (2003): 48; Davis (2024): 296. I disagree with Keul (1989), who suggests that the stronger connection is to Prop 2.5.17 (135-6).

[625] Cf. Lier (1987): 45; James (2003): 48; Keul (1989): 127. Cf. e.g. Cat. 6.7; 61.111; Ov. *Am*. 3.14.26; Ars. 2.703; Prop. 2.15.1; 2.18.35.

[626] James (2003): 48.

[627] Pichon (1991) s.v. Cf. e.g. Tib. 4.13.1; Prop. 2.6.23; 2.20.24; 2.34.17; 3.8.37; 3.20.2; 21; Ov. *Ars*. 1.743; 2.377; *Her*. 4.127.

[628] Cf. Davis (2024): 296.

oaths of eternal loyalty,[629] and underpins the request for an end to the beloved's indiscretions. The term's legal colour gives the impression that these oaths are legally binding.[630] In this way, Naso exaggerates the relationship, and implicitly the obligation of loyalty, by representing it as something akin to a marriage.[631] The use of *socialia* further strengthens this impression.[632] The language establishes irony, since Naso himself has broken such promises before.[633] In fact, guilty of disloyalty, he pleaded his innocence to Corinna in similar terms (2.7.18: *obicitur dominae contemerasse torum*; 27: *per Venerum iuro*) and bragged to Cypassis about having taken false oaths:

> *Per Veneris feci numina magna fidem!*
>
> *tu, dea, tu iubeas animi periuria puri*.[634]

*Lecti socialia iura* is also generally at home in the *foedus amicitiae* lexicon.[635] Ovid consciously invokes this tradition, which itself is steeped in contradiction: the pact of loyalty, in erotic discourse, is formed by and large by adulterers.[636] Naso thus attempts to exploit another popular, but inherently flawed, tactic of the traditional elegiac lover, one indeed that has served him well before.[637] Now, however, it is ineffective.

The plea's second qualifier comprises the remainder of the couplet: *per omnis qui dant fallendos se tibi saepe deos*. The gods are often invoked to intensify the elegiac lover's outrage at the beloved's

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[629] Cf. Pichon *iurare*. Cf. e.g. *Catull*. 64.144; 146; *Tib*. 1.4.21; 24; 1.9.31; 4.13.15; 18; Prop. 1.15.35; 2.20.15; 2.28.8; Ov. *Am*. 2.16.43; 3.2.61; 3.3.1; 11; 13; 45; *Her*. 2.23; 37; 3.53; 8. 117; 10.73; 13.159; 15.321; 19.1; 159; 196; 216; 227-8; 20.2; 108; 135; 137; 143; 225; *Ars*. 1.635; 3.457; *Rem*. 303.

[630] Cf. Ziogas (2021): 150; 190-92.

[631] Thus, James (2003): 48. For *iura* in combination with *lectus*, see: Vir. *Aen*. 4.314-6; Tib. 1.5.7-8; 4.13.1; Prop. 3.20.14-6; Ov. *Met*. 7.709-10; *Her*. 3.107-10; 5.103; 13.157-60.

[632] Cf. Keul (1989): 127; Davis (2024): 296. For *socialia* suggesting marriage, see: *OLD* s.v. 3, where *Am.* 3.11.45 is cited. Cf. also Ov. *Her*. 4.17, where *socialia foedera* is used by Phaedra to describe her marriage-bond to Theseus. Also, see *Her*. 12.139; *Met*. 7.800; 14.380; *Fast*. 2.729; *Tr*. 2.161; *Pont*. 3.1.73. Of course *socius* has a more general application, for which Cf. Pichon (1991) s.v.*, cf.* e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.10.36; 2.8.5; 2.11.7, 3.6.82; 3.6.82; *Her*. 2.33; 4.17; 5.126; 12.139; 20.155; *Ars* 3.564. Pichon does, however, cite this couplet as using marital terminology (264).

[633] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.4; 2.4; 2.8; 2.10; 3.2.

[634] Ov. *Am*. 2.8.18-9.

[635] Cf. e.g. Catull. 76.4; 87.3–4; 109.6; Prop. 3.20.15; 21; 25; 4.3.69-70. See also Keul (1989): 128; Reitzenstein (1912): 1-8; Quinn (1962): 49; Ellis (2010): 387-8; Bessone (2013): 51.

[636] Pichon (1991) *foedus*; *OLD* s.v. 3. Cf. e.g. Tib. 1.9.2; Prop. 3.20.21-26; On the ficklesness of lovers' pacts, see Prop. 2.9.35f; 3.20.21-6; Ov. *Ars*. 3.593. For the irony of "marital" language used by adulterers in the erotic, cf. Konstan (1972): 104. See also Keul (1989): 128; Greene (1998): 14-15; James (2003): 44-49.

[637] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.3.13-6; 2.7.27; 2.8.19.

perjury.[638] Naso, however, mentions them expressly in their capacity to enable his beloved's false oaths: *qui dant fallendos se tibi saepe deos.* The language looks back to line 22 (*et periuratos in mea damna deos?*), where the invocation's more conventional application was used, and 3.3, where Naso complained about his beloved's perjuries and the gods" permission of them. Until, of course, he realises that, were he a god, he would do no different.[639] For Keul, Naso's attitude is now at odds with the general anger of line 22 and 3.3: the lover seems indifferent towards his beloved's perjuries and the fact that the gods permit them; he thus expresses how much he has fallen in love with his beloved again.[640] I suggest, rather, that he has shifted from self-righteous indignation to a begrudging acceptance of his beloved's power over himself and even, it seems, the gods. As Naso's plea is directed at his beloved, he accordingly stresses her authority instead of the gods'. Ovid uses hyperbaton (*omnes…deos*) to shift the gods to the periphery; their enabling of the beloved's perjuries, intensified by the lingering *saepe,* thus becomes central (*fallendos se tibi*). The implication is that, for Naso, the gods have lost importance.[641] The subordination of the gods and the focus on their complacency rather than their power is consonant with Naso's disregard for them in 3.3, and for *Amor* in 3.11.1-6.[642] Thus, Naso's stance is not, as Keul suggests, a dramatic contrast to his previous position, but rather the next phase of its natural progression: first he was incensed at the injustice, but realising his protestations are useless, he surrenders and redirects his plea for mercy to the proper authority, his beloved.

In the subsequent couplet, Naso continues his plea(47-48):

*Perque tuam faciem, magni mihi numinis instar,*
*perque tuos oculos, qui rapuere meos!*

Ovid sustains the elevated register with anaphorae of *per* and the use of supplicatory language.[643]

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[638] Ov. *Am*. 3.11.22; Catull. 76.3; Prop. 1.15.25-8; 2.16.47; 53-4; Hor. *Carm*. 2.8.9-12. James (2003) suggests a connection here to Cynthia's perjuries that offend the gods at Prop. 1.15.26-7 (128). Davis (2024) compares Hom. *Il*. 15.36-9 (296).

[639] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 3.3.43-4.

[640] Keul (1989): 130.

[641] Keul (1989): 129-31. Keul contrasts Naso's tone to that of the Catullan lover in Catull. 76.3-4. See, however, Vitale (1980): 339.

[642] Cf. esp. Ov. *Am*. 3.3.11-16; 23-6; 31-4.

[643] Compare Ov. *Am*. 2.13.11-2. Cf. McKeown (1998): 283; Keul (1989): 131.

The structure of the first clause of the pentameter parallels that of the hexameter (*per*; second person singular possessive; accusative object of beauty).[644] Naso's obsequious tone and the power he ascribes to his beloved is pointed by the plea's over-the-top style (notably, the repetition of *per*). Ovid thus stylistically reinforces the plea's hymnic quality while the content does not follow supplicatory conventions. Often what is sworn by is of significance to the oath-taker.[645] It is amusing, given the importance of the beloved's physical beauty in 3.11b, that Naso swears by her face and her eyes (*faciem*; *oculos*). Brandt, Keul, and Weinlich are keen to dispel those translations of *facies* as "face," and prefers that it be understood as the beloved's general *forma*.[646] Again, I see no reason for it not to encompass both. It is her general beauty, but it is also her face, with the emotions and memories behind it, that is so dear to Naso. So dear indeed that he attributes to it divine authority (*magni…numinis*),[647] and with the image of a scale (*instar*),[648] suggests that her face (beauty) is as significant to him as a god.[649] She is, in other words, a *divina puella*.[650] Naso's deification of his beloved emphasises his desperation. *Magnum* and *numen* are used together particularly of the most powerful gods; Naso thus further augments his beloved's superiority.[651] The combination is used on one other occasion in the *Amores*: to describe Naso's false oath sworn by Venus at 2.8.18: *per Veneris feci numina magna fidem!*. With the reappearance of *magnum numen*, the beloved's beauty is implicitly attributed the amatory authority of Venus; this reinforces the power already suggested by *parce*, used typically in pleas to Venus or *Amor*.[652] On the other hand,

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644 Cf. Keul (1989): 131.

645 That is why at Tib. 1.5.7-8 the Tibullan lover swears by Venus (*per Venerem*), and in Horace's *Carm*. 2.8.9-11, Barine does well to swear by her mother's ashes, the heavens, and the gods.

646 Brandt (1909): 181; Keul (1989): 131, esp. n. 4; Weinlich (1999): 246.

647 *OLD numen* 3; 4; 4b. Cf. Weinreich (1926): 73; Wilkinson (1955): 33; Lee (1962): 163; Keul (1989): 132-3. e.g. Cic. *Div*. 1.53.120; *Verr*. 2.4.49; 4.107; *Cat*. 2.13.29; Catull. 64.204; Hor. *Carm*. 3.10.8; *Epod*. 5.54; 17.3; Ov. *Tr*. 5.3.45; Tac. *Ann*. 1.10; 1.73; 3.71; 15.45.

648 *OLD instar* 1(b). Cf. e.g. Cic. *Ver*. 5.44; 89; Ov. *Her*. 8.62.

649 This is not a new idea; Cf. Ov. *Am*. 3.3.12: *formaque numen habet.* The ideological link to this line further supports a reading of numen as "divine power/authority". Cf. Keul (1989): 133.

650 The *topos* of the *divina puella* appears as early as Homer (See *Od.* 6.149-185). In Augustan poetry, cf. Vir. *Aen.* 1.327-328; Prop. 2.5.5-13. In Ovid, cf. *Am.* 1.5.1-8, with McKeown (1989): 104-105. Cf. also *Am*. 2.1.20; 3.2.60; *Met.* 13.857-858.

651 I agree with Keul (1989): 133, although she omits Venus in the list of gods worthy of the power. Cf. e.g. Ter. *Eun*. 709; Liv. 8.6.4; Catull. 34.6; Ov. *Am*. 2.8.18; *Met*. 7.617; Ver. *Aen*. 2.623; 3.264; 633-4; 697. Cf. also Appel (1909): 100.

652 Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.2.50; *Her*. 7.31; *Rem*. 3.

by alluding to 2.8.18, Ovid reminds us of the lover's penchant for lying his way out of trouble. This time, however, his tricks do not prevail.

In the pentameter, Naso next mentions oaths sworn by his beloved's eyes: *perque tuos oculos, qui rapuere meos!*[653] The distance between *tuos…meos* mirrors the couple's separation.[654] A beloved's eyes are generally a potent means of ensnaring the elegiac lover,[655] and the emphasis on her eyes, especially their debilitating effect on him (*rapuere meos*) gives further reason to understand *facies* as meaning "face" and not only "beauty".[656] By acknowledging the power of the *puella*'s eyes, Ovid intimates that Naso is still susceptible to their pull. The image recalls Propertius 1.1.1: *Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit ocellis,*[657] where *miserum me* also corresponds to Naso's exclamation (44: *me miserum*). With this allusion, Ovid signals Naso's lingering susceptibility: he can fall prey to the same vice that first ensnared the Propertian lover.[658] In other words, Naso's end resembles the Propertian lover's beginning.

Ovid also creates two intratextual allusions with this image. Consider 2.19.19 (*tu quoque, quae nostros rapuisti nuper ocellos*),[659] where Naso addresses a *puella* whose eyes seized his own, the same whom he subsequently begged to exclude him (20-24). Coupled with Naso's exclusion in 3.11.9-16, the verbal similarities (*tuos oculos…rapuere meos*; *tu…nostros rapuisti…ocellos*) raise the possibility that this girl, and not Corinna, is the addressee whom Naso now begs for mercy. This interpretation accounts for the dramatic change in Naso's attitude towards his *servitium* and his lack of strategic success in book 3. The plea also alludes to 3.3.13-4:

> *Perque suos illam nuper iurasse recordor,*

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[653] For oaths sworn on parts of the body, see: Ov. *Am.* 2.16.44, 3.3.9-10, 3.3.15; *Epist*. 3.107; *Trist*. 5.4.45; *Pont*. 3.3.68; Vir. *Aen.* 9.300; Juv. 6.16-17; Mart. 7.12; 9.48.2. For oaths sworn on the eyes, see Tib. 4.5.8; Ov. *Am*. 2.16.44. Cf. Keul (1989): 132, n. 2.

[654] He creates a remarkably similar effect with *tuos…meis* at *Her*. 13.18.

[655] Cf. e.g. Prop. 1.1.1; 1.19.5-6; 2.15.12; 23; 3.10.15-6; Ov. *Am*. 1.10.10; 2.19.19; *Her*. 12.36; *Ars*. 3.510; *Rem*. 615-6. On the erotic qualities of the eyes, see Bartsch (2006): 67-83; 148-9.

[656] As noted by Prop. 2.15.12: *oculi sunt in amore duces*.

[657] Cf. James (2003): 128.

[658] Cf. Prop 1.15.33-4.

[659] Cf. McKeown (1998): 408; Davis (2024): 296.

*perque meos oculos: en doluere mei!*.[660]

Whereas in 3.3, Naso had sworn by his own eyes, in 3.11 he swears by his beloved's. These allusions have garnered surprisingly little interest. Keul, for instance, suggests only that in 3.11 Ovid takes the *topos* beyond its use in 3.3.13-4 to emphasise the beauty of the beloved.[661] This reading overlooks the humorous twist. In 3.3, after Naso accepts that his protestations are useless because the gods only care to satisfy beautiful girls (25-6), he begs that at least his eyes be spared (48: *aut oculis certe parce, puella, meis!*). In 3.11, he resorts to oaths sworn by *her* eyes, since the gods do not care about his; they (or she) would surely care about hers. The allusion to 2.19.19 reminds that beauty is Naso's weak spot, but also sustains the dialogue of contrast with that poem, which Ovid has developed throughout 3.11.

**Summary of 45-8:**

Naso's plea for mercy aims to persuade his beloved not to abandon their relationship (as he was just about to). The entreaty is inflated and rhetorically charged: it contains marital symbolism and language suggestive of reciprocal *fides*; Naso pitches his case in idealised terms that exaggerate the historical faithfulness of his relationship and the extent to which their oaths are binding. Although Naso is resigned to his faithless beloved, he nevertheless bargains for reciprocal loyalty in a last-gasp attempt to attain a semblance of "control" over the terms of the relationship. He also emphasises his beloved's authority, which is on the one hand a tactic of his plea, and on the other, a sign that the power dynamics of their relationship have shifted. I suggest that they have definitely turned in the beloved's favour: the content of 3.11a, and Naso's desperate, resigned mood in 3.11b develop this impression. Whether he himself, through this plea, sincerely acknowledges his beloved's superiority is different question altogether, and one that we cannot answer.[662] The divine agency that he ascribes to her is, in my view, a means of salvaging his "power" by encouraging his *servitium*: if he can get her to think that she is in control while he still sets the conditions of their

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[660] Cf. Brandt (1909): 181; Keul (1989): 134-5. A less commonly mentioned link is 2.16.44: *per me perque oculos, sidera nostra, tuos*. There, the beloved's eyes are also sworn on in a pledge of loyalty, but one made by the beloved herself.

[661] Keul (1989): 134.

[662] Cf. Sharrock (2012), 77: "a strand runs through the erotic corpus which plays with the question of knowledge, interspersing exposure and concealment which tempt and seduce the reader into wanting to know, but ultimately deny that possibility".

reunion, then he retains a degree of authority. Because he is unable to set the terms, as the final two couplets of the poem make clear, we know that he is unable to achieve his goal.

**iv. 49-52: Resignation**

After the entreaty, Naso resigns himself to the fact that his fate is in the hands of his beloved. The two couplets that form this admission close the poem. In the first couplet, he promises an unconditional, eternal love for his beloved, and begrudgingly concedes that, even if he does not *want* to, he will nevertheless be forced to love her. In the closing couplet, he reiterates his preference for a love that he can condone, but also his recognition that he has no say in the matter. The poem thus concludes with an emphasis on Naso's involuntary love: he knows that he is helpless, and in contrast to his energetic and willing "return" to Love in 2.9b, the "return" of 3.11b is marked by resignation.

In the penultimate couplet, he pledges to love his beloved unconditionally (49-50):

*Quidquid eris, mea semper eris; tu selige tantum,*
*me quoque velle velis, anne coactus amem!*

In the hexameter, Ovid's use of unadorned language creates the impression of frankness, if not utter exhaustion on Naso's part.[663] The term of endearment, *mea,* is possessive: she will always be his.[664] This does not suggest dominance on his part; when employed by the elegiac lover, *mea* can sometimes imply the opposite.[665] Again, I think that the remark can be read in two ways. Either Naso is still attempting to lead his beloved back into his fantasy (pseudo-*servitium*), or he is surrendering on her terms. The first possibility is not unthinkable. Previously Naso has made similar promises of eternal *fides* that he went on to break.[666] On those occasions, however, the deceptive nature of these promises has been highlighted by subsequent actions that undermine them.[667] That is not the case now: after this promise, he expresses the difficulty of honouring his commitment (3.12; 3.14), but he shows no comparable signs that he betrays it. The second possibility, that Naso admits

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[663] Cf. Davis (2024), 296: “in the simplest possible language the lover submits to his beloved”.

[664] Cf. e.g. *Am*. 3.12.5; Brandt (1909): 181.

[665] Pichon (1991) s.v. Cf. e.g. Tib. 3.1.6; Prop. 1.6.9; 1.8.26; 34; 42-4; 2.8.6; Ov. *Am*. 2.19.48; 3.12.5; *Her*. 5.4; 6.111; 12.158; 16.138.

[666] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 1.3.5-16; 2.17.23-34.

[667] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.4; 2.8; 2.10; 2.19.19.26.

his defeat is, I suggest, better supported by intratextual and intertextual evidence. Let us consider his previous promises of loyalty. For instance, 1.3.5-6:

*Accipe, per longos tibi qui deserviat annos;*
*accipe, qui pura norit amare fide!*.[668]

In both promises there is a gesture of *servitium* (*coactus amem*; *deserviat*), unconditional loyalty (*quidquid eris*; *pura…fide*), an exaggerated time frame (*semper*; *per longos…annos*), and a decision to be made by the beloved (*tu selige*; *accipe…accipe*). These verbal similarities, however, are accompanied by dramatic changes in context. In 1.3, Naso, having freshly assumed the pose of an elegiac lover, assigns himself a love-object.[669] He thus encourages his *servitium* (1; 5-6),[670] whereas in 3.11, he is anything but (9-26; 29-32). In 1.3, although the promise is of a similarly profound commitment, it is made without the necessary amatory experience to back it up.[671] So when he claims to be a one-woman man (1.3.15-6; 25-6), he is not to be trusted (Cf. e.g. 2.4; 2.7-8; 2.10; 2.19; 3.2; 3.7).[672] In 3.11, however, his promise is supported by his entire amatory journey (he has had his fun) as well as his recent internal struggle (3.11b), he does embrace the role of *servus amoris* (9-26), and most importantly, his promise involves *quidquid*, whereas in 1.3 there was no such hint of unconditionality. Indeed, *quidquid eris* suggests that Naso will love his beloved, regardless of the her future misbehaviour; unconditionally, that is.[673] Some link the language to the promise of Prop. 1.15.32: *sis quodcumque voles, non aliena tamen*.[674] Although *quidquid* recalls *quodcumque*, Propertius draws a line that the Ovidian lover does not: the lover will not share Cynthia with a rival (*non aliena tamen*). Naso's promise has no such conditions: it is in his beloved's hands.[675] We may also consider 2.17.23-4:

*Tu quoque me, mea lux, in quaslibet accipe leges;*
*te deceat medio iura dedisse foro.*
*Non tibi crimen ero, nec quo laetere remoto;*
*non erit hic nobis infitiandus amor*.

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[668] McKeown (1989) identifies the thematic connection (64).

[669] Cf. Olstein (1975): 242; James (2003): 130.

[670] McKeown (1989): 61; 64-5; Weinlich (1999): 32

[671] Cf. Curran (1966): 48.

[672] Cf. Oliver (1945): 199-201; Olstein (1975): 246.

[673] Cf. Pichon (1991) *quidquid*.

[674] Weinreich (1926): 74; Lenz (1966): 234; Keul (1989): 138 n. 6; James (2003): 128.

[675] Cf. Davis (2024): 296.

Like *mea semper eris*, *non erit…nobis infitiandus amor* describes a love that is everlasting, and like *quidquid*, *quaslibet* suggests that the beloved is given free-reign: she can set the terms of the relationship, as *te deceat…iura dedisse foro* confirms. There is, however, good reason to distrust Naso in 2.17, since he enthusiastically encourages his *servitium,* yet also goes on to violate these declarations of fidelity and faithful service.[676] Moreover, in 2.17, *quaslibet,* and *iura dedisse* suggest that the beloved's "free-reign" pertains specifically to her ability to impose "rules" or "laws" on Naso; the implication is that he is the one that needs to be disciplined. In 3.11, however, implied in *quidquid* is the beloved's promiscuity:[677] she is given a "free-reign" that overrides Naso's qualms, or any "rules" that he would prefer her to obey. Lover and beloved, it seems, have switched places. With this intratextual reversal, Ovid subtly affirms the beloved's power and Naso's helplessness.

The couplet is dominated by the second clause, in which Ovid sets up an disjunctive: *tu selige tantum, me quoque velle velis, anne coactus amem!.* Naso expresses that he would prefer to love his beloved of his own volition, but acknowledges that the decision is hers; he will love her regardless. Although it takes the form of an ultimatum, the expression is undermined by the lack of a consequence for the addressee. This "ultimatum" also depicts the two possible outcomes of the alternatives, rather than the choices themselves, and the language in both is self-involved: it describes only what impact either decision would have on Naso. The implicit choices are: either the beloved decides to correct her behaviour (stop the *vitia*), or she can carry on doing as she pleases unencumbered. Regardless of which decision she chooses, the beloved will be loved; the ultimatum is inconsequential to her.[678] On Naso's part, this is a hopelessly contrived attempt to elicit pity from his beloved,[679] an attempt that reflects how submissive and out of control the lover has become. His lack of will is further highlighted by the omission of *utrum* and the obscuring juxtaposition of different forms of *velle* (*velle*; *velis*).[680] Common sense dictates that Naso would prefer the first alternative, despite Keul's suggestion that he is indifferent towards either and shows no sign of

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[676] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Am*. 2.17, esp. 19.26; 3.2; 3.4; 3.7. See also McKeown (1998): 380.

[677] Keul (1989): 138.

[678] Cf. James (2003): 128.

[679] Cf. James (2003), 128: "The plea here is based purely on pathos—there is no more offering of specious logic".

[680] Davis (2024): 297.

suffering.[681] Keul's argument is based on structure and stylistics, not content:[682] because *me quoque velle velis* is equal in syllabic quantity to *anne coactus amem*, she suggests, neither option is preferred,[683] and that "Ovid' simply lets the beloved choose. On the contrary, Naso has a clear preference, but he is helpless to do anything about it. He does not let her choose his fate;[684] he concedes that the decision is no longer his. This realisation surely suggests desperation,[685] and resignation, not indifference.

Yet for Keul, the fact that "Ovid' vows to love his beloved even if she remains unfaithful is reason not to take him seriously, because no other elegiac lover make this (wholly unconditional) comittment.[686] Her argument is dated: it rests on Ovid's predecessors being perceived as sincere, and that the speaker of 3.11 being taken as Ovid himself. Besides, in Propertius we find a pledge of eternal love that is not hedged by conditions of reciprocity.[687] It also seems remiss not to include Catullus in this consideration, seeing as 3.11b interacts extensively with Catullan material. Consider Catullus 75.4: *nec desistere amare, omnia si facias*. Like Ovid's *quidquid*, Catullus' *omnia si facias* suggests an unconditional love, and as 72.1-8 intimate, the phrase pertains specifically to Lesbia's disloyalty. Nevertheless, Keul insists that, for such promises to be considered authentic (or realistic), the love must be conditioned on faithfulness; if not, the love is forced and thereby limited.[688] I disagree; Naso's love has risen to such an irrepressible height that no *vitia* can suppress it, nor willpower overcome it. The fact that the love is forced (*coactus amem*) and yet inevitable, regardless of the beloved's transgressions, does not limit it; it makes it unconditional.

It is, moreover, self-fulfilling to consider Ovid's use of simple language and brevity of expression facetious, simply because it is Ovid. For Keul, the couplet does not suggest passion or intensity, but

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[681] Keul (1989): 140.

[682] Keul (1989): 141.

[683] Keul (1989): 140. Although she admits that the former is "auspicious", and ignores the fact that the hexameter's *tu selige tantum* is a part of the first alternative, which undermines her argument for syllabic balance.

[684] Cf. Keul (1989): 146.

[685] Cf. Weinlich (1999): 247.

[686] Weinlich (1999): 138. She cites specifically Ps. Tib. 4.13.21f;

[687] Cf. Prop. 2.9.43-8.

[688] Keul (1989): 138-140.

playfulness.[689] The language of the pentameter, *me quoque velle velis, anne coactus amem*, is redolent of Catullus 72.8: *cogit amare magis, sed bene velle minus*.[690] Like *cogit amare*, *coactus amem* describes an involuntary love, and *velle velis* recalls *bene velle:* both lovers juxtapose a forced love with one that is voluntary; while Catullus emphasises the contrast with *magis* and *minus,* Ovid does so by presenting the alternatives as a disjunctive, indicated by *anne*, which also matches Catullus' *sed* in sense and positioning after the caesura. Keul's claim that Naso shows no signs of suffering[691] is undermined by the fact that she offers no comment on *coactus,* a form applied only here to Naso himself and employed on only one other occasion in the *Amores,* of a *vir* who suffers an unfaithful beloved.[692] *Coactus* recalls Naso's *patientia* (1); Ovid employs ring composition to highlight Naso's lack of success in escaping his *servitium.*[693] The unadorned expression, in my view, establishes an air of resigned disillusion: Naso's exhaustion is palpable.

Before I discuss the concluding couplet, let us consider a possible intratextual allusion to 1.3.2-3:

> *Aut amet aut faciat, cur ego semper amem!*
> *a, nimium volui – tantum patiatur amari…*[694]

In his prayer to Cytherea, Naso asks that his beloved, as in 3.11b.49-50, fulfil one of either alternative: to love him, or to give him a reason to love her forever (*aut amet aut faciat…ego semper amem*). The decision is the beloved's, and although the two alternatives have different applications, they broadly encompass the same idea: either Naso can love her, or he can have no choice but to love her. The choices are paradoxical.[695] On top of the confession of eternal love and the alternatives (*aut…aut*; *anne*), there are also similarities in language and style: *semper amem* corresponds with *mea semper, nimium volui* with *me quoque velle velis,* both couplets feature *tantum*, and both hexameters end with *amem*. The subjunctive *amem* occurs only three times in the *Amores*, and always in this metrical position. The other appearance comes at 2.4.10, where the

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[689] Keul (1989): 139-41. Notably, Keul's supportive examples exclude those shorter promises of love, especially the ones we have already seen in the Amores (1.3; 2.17)

[690] Cf. Hinds (1998): 28; Davis (2024): 297.

[691] Keul (1989): 141.

[692] Cf. Ov. *Am*. 2.2.48. The form being masculine singular, *coactus*.

[693] Cf. Pichon (1991) *cogi.* Pichon cites this passage. Cf. also Prop. 2.33.42. This meaning thus confirms the thematic relevance of 3.11b.36: *nec iuga taurus amat; quae tamen odit, habet.*

[694] Ov. *Am*. 1.3.2-3. Surprisingly, I have not come across anybody who discusses this connection. Thorsen (2014) connects 1.3 to *Her*. 15.79-80, but not to this couplet. (159).

[695] McKeown (1989): 62.

clause is identical to that of 1.3.2: *cur ego semper amem*. I suggest that, in 1.3 and 2.4, Naso is unaware of the profundity of his statements. Read progressively, the three occurrences of *amem* paint a telling picture. First (1.3) Naso makes an ignorant promise that he cannot keep, or rather, employs a cunning tactic. Second (2.4), he claims that he always finds new reasons to love different women. The echo humorously undermines the sincerity of 1.3.2; 5-6; 13-4; he admits that he was never really going to contain himself to one beloved. Finally (3.11b), he is left with no choice but to fulfil his initial promise and love only one *puella*.

In the couplet that concludes the poem, Naso expresses a preference for voluntary love and an acknowledgement of his lack of choice (51-52):

*lintea dem potius ventisque ferentibus utar,*
*ut, quam, si nolim, cogar amare, velim*.

The nautical imagery of the hexameter recalls lines 29-30, where Naso claimed to have departed from the louding seas and arrived on safe shores.[696] Now, however, the image describes his return to the tides of love. On the failure of Naso's previous *renuntiatio* (2.9), Ovid invoked a similar analogy (31-34):

*ut subitus, prope iam prensa tellure, carinam*
*tangentem portus ventus in alta rapit…*
*sic me saepe refert incerta Cupidinis aura,*
*notaque purpureus tela resumit Amor*.[697]

The language that Ovid used in this comparison (*subitus*; *ventus in alta rapit*) suggests that the return to seas is involuntary: the return was out of Naso's control. At the end of 3.11b, on the other hand, he expresses a desire to be sent back to sea (*lintea dem potius ventisque ferentibus utar*). The *incerta Cupidinis aura* also sound less accommodating than *ventisque ferentibus*. I suggest that these verbal hints are deliberately misleading; they do not reflect the reality of the lover's situation. That is, in 2.9 Naso returned to his loving ways of his own volition, whereas in 3.11b he is resigned to the fact that his return will be forced, he merely wishes that were not so.[698] Let us consider the differing contexts and the relationship between the passages. In 2.9b, Naso did not claim that he was safely out of love; only that he almost was, as *prope iam prensa tellure* and *carinam tangentem*

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[696] Jäger (1967): 148; Keul (1989): 141; Damon (1990): 289; Davis (2024): 297. Davis cites also Tib. 1.5.75-6.

[697] Cf. Jäger (1967): 145; McKeown (1998): 186.

[698] *Contra* Zimmermann Damer (2019): 118, who suggests that the lover returns willingly.

*portus* suggest. If he did not consider himself wholly out of love, then he was at least still open to suggestion. In 3.11, however, he claims to have remained unmoved on hearing the tumultuous tides (29-30: *iam…lenta tumescentes aequoris audit*); his return (51-52) thus constitutes a greater reversal, one that goes against his expectations. Additionally, I suggest that in 2.9b Naso still adopted a pose (as in 2.17; 19): he pretended that his return to love was not his own decision.[699] Accordingly, the language of his simile (31-2) suggests an involuntary return. We have already been informed, however, that the choice was in fact his (25-6):

*"Vive" deus "posito" siquis mihi dicat "amore!"*
*deprecer – usque adeo dulce puella malum est*.

Naso's keenness to return to his loving ways was further developed by the allusion to Prop. 2.25.9-10, where the Propertian lover actively decides to continue loving. Hence, Morgan: "the imitation thus operates as a hint because of its Propertian context. It subtly foreshadows the new tone which will be introduced in *Am*. 2.9b".[700] In 3.11b on the other hand, Naso is in no position to choose: his wish is an pipe dream, expressed as a fanciful alternative (*dem potius*) to the reality of his forced love (*cogar amare*).[701] Thus, although the language of 2.9b.31-34 suggests an involuntary return, it may simply be part of the act: having elected to return to love even if a god forbade it (25-26), Naso continued to play the part of the wounded or servile lover; to embrace the highs and lows of the game, and use them to his advantage (46: *saepe fruar domina*, s*aepe repulsus eam*). By 3.11b, however, he can no longer enjoy the vicissitudes of love (2.9.33: *incerta Cupidinis aura*); he longs only for the good times (*ventisque ferentibus*). *Potius*, like *anne* in the previous couplet (50), emphasises the disparity between the lover's wish and his reality. The desire, expressed by the preferential subjunctive, *dem potius…utar*, is specifically to return to a love that he enjoys (*utar*), in other words, a return that is on his terms.[702] This interpretation is supported by the use of *ventisque ferentibus,* a phrase that some suggest describes favourable circumstances for a sea voyage and suggests positive momentum.[703] Lest any doubt linger, compare *Trist*. 1.2.73: *ut mare considat*

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[699] Cf. Allen (1950): 156.

[700] Morgan (1977): 83.

[701] This interpretation is strengthened if one interprets *cogar* as a future indicative, as I do. That is, as opposed to a jussive subjunctive, which in my view, makes less sense in the context where a desire for the opposite is clearly expressed.

[702] Cf. Weinlich (1999): 246.

[703] *OLD* s.v. 5b.

*ventisque ferentibus utar.*[704] The line also comprises a wish and its phrasing is identical (*ventisque ferentibus utar*) and Ovid refers to this wish as one for *faciles…ventos* (81). In other words, Naso wishes for a happy return to his beloved,[705] a possibility precluded by her continuing indiscretions. The wish is hopeless: no love is free from difficulty, and these favourable winds contrast the bumpy reality of "love," and of Naso's relationship (30: *tumescentes…aquas*). Hence, the *praeceptor* warns that although the winds may be favourable near the shore, they will not serve one (*utendum*) on the open seas (*medio…freto*).[706]

The pentameter, which continues the wish (*ut…*) lends colour to this interpretation.[707] Ovid develops an explicit contrast between volition (*velim*) and a lack thereof (*nolim*). Like the previous couplet, this contrast brings to mind Catull. 72.8 (*cogit amare magis, sed velle minus*).[708] Naso can only imagine for himself a favourable outcome; with *si nolim* he acknowledges that he will not be the one to determine his fate. The passive construction, *cogar,* further confirms that he is subjected to his beloved's will. The suspension of *velim* to the end of the pentameter reinforces the tone of resignation. The successive short *cola* are disruptive: the resultant staccato effect is, I think, suggestive of the debilitating impact that the combined feelings of *odium* and *amor* have on the lover. He is reduced from verbal dexterity and (specious) analytic rigour (37-44) to an almost convulsive stutter. He can wriggle around, but he remains ultimately trapped by, or rather between, his feelings of *amor* and *odium*; voluntary and involuntary love. It is for this reason, I suggest, that *cogar amare* is enclosed through chiasmus to the left by *nolim* and to the right by *velim*. The poem does not, therefore, close on a happy or frivolous note: Naso's renunciation fails and although he does not want to, he is forced to love on, regardless of the suffering that his beloved will continue to inflict on him.[709]

**Summary of 49-52:**

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[704] Davis (2024) notices the parallel (297). Keul (1989): 141 turns instead to *Rem*. 13-4. This seems less convincing as *ferre* is absent. Ovid has elsewhere described winds to suggest not ease of travel but volatility (2.9.32).

[705] Cf. Heftberger (1972): 126; Keul (1989): 142; Weinlich (1999): 246.

[706] Ov. *Ars*. 2.337-8.

[707] Note, however, the manuscript tradition for this verse is particularly corrupt. For detail, see Keul (1989): 143, n. 3.

[708] Cf. also Catull. 8.6-10.

[709] Cf. McKeown (1987): 95. See also Lörcher (1975): 83; Weinlich (1999): 247.

The final two couplets leave no doubt that Naso surrenders himself to his beloved's will: he begrudgingly accepts an unhappy return to the tides of Love. Twice he clarifies that he would rather love of his own volition, which requires his beloved to be faithful to him, than by force, and twice he acknowledges that, even if not granted this wish, he will be forced to love his beloved. The conclusion to 3.11 confirms that volition is merely a preference and by no means necessary for Naso to love. The concise expression, suggestive of despondence, and the language that emphasises his passivity (*coactus amem*; *cogar amare*), are a testament to the fact that his feelings of *odium* still linger. If *amor* was truly victorious over *odium* (33: *sed, puto, vincit amor*), Naso would be left only with feelings of (voluntary) love. It is thus the combined force of *odium* and *amor* that conquers the lover, and renders his escape impossible.

**3. Conclusion**

Ultimately, through extensive interaction with Catullus, Ovid devotes 3.11b to an exhibition of his lover's powerlessness: his failure to make sense of his conflicting feelings is a reflection on the broader failure of his attempts to gamify love. By drawing on famous Catullan conceits (Catull. 72; 75; 85) that set the precedent for Augustan love elegy, Ovid reduces his elegiac persona, previously so unique and cunning, to a proto-elegiac, Catullan state: he is conquered by the most conventional and basic (proto-)elegiac paradigm. Because Naso views love and hate as two diametrically opposed forces (33-6), he cannot make sense of nor overcome his inner conflict: no rhyme nor reason will help him to rationalise this fundamentally emotional experience (37-44). Ultimately, he submits to his beloved, begs for her mercy (45-8), but begrudgingly resigns himself to the fact that, regardless of her infidelity, he will be forced to love her (49-52).

The vast use of intratextual and intertextual allusions affords 3.11b a quality of "literariness," but the poem's literary quality by no means undermines Naso's suffering; on the contrary, it qualifies it. My interpretation is at odds with other critics who land at the familiar conclusion that Ovid merely parodies Catullus.[710] Granted, like Lee,[711] Keul notes that the intent is not to ridicule his predecessor. I cannot, however, agree that Ovid intends simply to reflect on their different

[710] Keul (1989): 124-5.

[711] Lee (1962): 164.

conceptions of love: that for Catullus, it is an intense, passionate, and inescapable affair; for Ovid, it is light, playful, and lacking in tragedy.[712] I suggest the opposite: in 3.11b, through his interaction with Catull. 72, 75, and 85, Ovid reflects on the likeness between his persona and those of his predecessors, especially Catullus. For both Naso and the Catullan lover, there is no solution, and thus no end, to their dilemmas: both love involuntarily, are unable to prevent their love, and are conquered by *amor* together with *odium*. Despite his efforts to carve his own path, Naso ends up in the same helpless position as Catullus that, through the lessons of his predecessors, as well as his own experiences, he should have known how to avoid. With the invocation of elegiac commonplaces and his extensive use of intertextuality, Ovid suggests that, in spite of all cunning and support, Naso is fated to fail; he cannot conquer love, because love conquers all.

[712] Keul (1989): 123-5.

# CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In "The Crack-Up," F. Scott Fitzgerald remarks that "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function".[713] In *Am*. 3.11 we learn that Ovid could do so; Naso could not.

## 1. Review of Key Ideas

In the landscape of Ovidian scholarship, the *Amores* continues to evolve alongside us: with each generation comes new ideas, old convictions are challenged, sometimes forgotten, and no consensus lives forever. *Amores* 3.11 stands out as a particularly divisive, yet often overlooked poem. Some see the Ovidian lover's failed renunciation as little more than a playful experimentation with Catullus' *odi et amo* idea; to others, it is a tragic and heartrending reflection on the suffering inherent to young love. As with most things, I think, a resolution lies somewhere in the middle. Throughout the poem, Ovid employs intratextual and intertextual allusions that temper it with a confounding balance of humour and sincerity; irony and seriousness; love and hate. He does not merely reproduce Catullus 85 or reduce the conceit *ad absurdum*; he adds to it a new (and final) layer of paradox: *odium* and *amor* become two inseparable parts of a whole that create a hold on the lover that makes his escape impossible. This paradox is an effective means of expressing the futility of Naso's attempts to make love into a game. By tying into the *odium-amor* dichotomy (Catullus 85) and the paradox of involuntary love (Catullus 72; 75), Ovid binds the two ideas that define love elegy. In this paper I have attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis of the poem that engages with the most relevant intratextual and intertextual material, and I have shown that the poem deserves more attention and credit than it has received. 3.11 occupies an important position in the narrative trajectory of the *Amores* and it engages with concerns of intratextual and extratextual significance. Ovid begins the *Amores* determined to leave his unique footprint on Augustan love elegy, and by 3.11, he reduces his elegiac persona, Naso, to a sort of elegiac pastiche. The abundance of allusive material is part of what makes this poem so special. In my discussion, the poem's intratextual and intertextual relationships were at the fore. They inform Naso's renunciation, its failure, and the internal conflict that follows.

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[713] Fitzgerald (1936): 1.

In the epigram that opens the *Amores*, Ovid tells us that he initially published his elegies as a collection of five books; later, he reintroduced them as a set of three. When exactly he winnowed out the chaff we do not know, nor can we be certain that he did in fact revise his collection at all; the epigram may be simply a marker of Callimachean influence.[714] For these reasons, among others, the *Amores* form a body of uncertainty. In my discussion of 3.11, I examined the poem's verbal parallels to others from the *Amores*, but also to passages from the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Remedia Amoris*. The straightforward reading, I should think, would be that the *praeceptor*'s teachings allude to 3.11 and not vice versa; the teacher reflects on a youthful breakup. Because, however, the dating of the second edition is so cloudy, it does not seem impossible that the reader of 3.11 might have already had access to the *Ars Amatoria* (access to the *Remedia Amoris* seems less likely).[715] If that were the case, then the first-time reader's experience of the poem would, in my view, be that much more stimulating. From one line to the next, the reader is tasked to fit together verbal parallels that now reflect, now project the Ovidian lover's amatory journey. The poem becomes a puzzle that is only truly appreciated when one takes into consideration the affective trajectory of Ovid's elegiac persona. Regardless of the dating of the second edition, however, the poem stands out as an enigmatic point of exchange between the lover's past memories and his future teachings.

**2. Broader Implications**

*Amores* 3.11 can be viewed, I believe, as a medium through which we might compare Ovid's approach to love elegy, and the experiences of his persona, to those of his predecessors. The peculiar position that Ovid occupies at the end of a rich line of elegiac heritage might be viewed as burdensome, but it is also what affords his *Amores* this unique privilege. In 3.11, Ovid's use of intertextuality contributes to the understanding of his elegiac persona's narrative trajectory (i), but it also offers a broader comment on the state of the elegiac project at Ovid's time of writing (ii).

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[714] On the existence and dating of the first and second editions, see Oliver (1945): 191-215, esp. 191-95; d"Elia (1958): 210-11; Luck (1959): 168; Lenz (1966): 164; Kraus (1968): 82-83; Cameron (1968): 320-33, esp. 331-33; McKeown (1989): 1-4; Boyd (1997): 136; 142-47; Weinlich (1999): 181-2; Barchiesi (2001): 159-61; Hardie (2006): 369; Tarrant (2006a): 13-14; Knox (2009): xviii; Thorsen (2013): 381.

[715] All of Ovid's amatory works fall into the same broad period (mid-late 20s BC to 2 AD). The argument that the second edition of the *Amores* must have preceded *Ars Amatoria* 3 relies on a dubious manuscript variant rejected by Kenney (1994), for which see Tarrant (2006a): 13, n. 2. The timeline provided by Thorsen (2013), for example, leaves open the possibility (381). See also Harrison (2017).

**i.** Naso steps onto the stage and plays the role of an elegiac lover (1.1), but Ovid will bring something new to the table: Naso makes the role his own through his gamification of love. He decides to weaponise *servitium amoris* to make ends meet (1.2; 1.3), and even teaches his beloved(s) some nifty tricks (1.4). Along the way, his confidence rises, not without an apparent blip (2.9), and he seems increasingly different from his elegiac predecessors: he wants every woman within reach (2.2; 2.4), one is never enough (2.10); but they need to think that it is, and what better way to persuade a beloved of one's fidelity than through the invocation of *servitium amoris*? (2.17). By the end of the second book, the game seems too easy for him: he goads a *vir* to keep up, and his beloved to deceive (2.19). In the third book, however, the tide turns: he castigates his mendacious beloved (3.2) and an overprotective *vir* (3.4), and finds himself unable to perform (3.7), so that by 3.11 he is set to renounce his love, only he fails at that too. He calls upon his literary predecessors, primarily Catullus (8) and Propertius (3.24-25), to inspire a successful renunciation, but his attempt fails, and he is left to suffer the same pangs endured by the Catullan lover (72; 75; 85). He is forced to endure a faithless beloved and suffer a more potent rival; he becomes the *vir,* an obstacle in the way of another lover, and no matter how he attempts to regain control, he cannot escape his *servitium.* For all his clever tricks and posturing, he realises that he is doomed to end up no better off than those before him: nobody can cheat love; even if he can make love into a game, he cannot always dictate the rules, and in the end, it is not one that he can win. In 3.11, Naso becomes an essentialised elegiac lover, identified by the very generic commonplaces that he had previously contorted. Ovid takes his elegiac persona back beyond the bounds of Propertius and Tibullus, to a primitive, protoelegiac Catullan state. Although Naso's downfall may seem humorous, if not justified, and his suffering caricatured, the point is surely serious: love makes stereotypes of us all.

**ii.** Through his experimentation with intertextuality in 3.11, Ovid also offers a comment on the state of love elegy. The poem teaches us that *omnia vincit amor*; for Ovid himself, the apothegm may be better understood as love *elegy* conquers all. I suspect that the insistence in Ovidian scholarship on Ovid wanting to set himself apart from his elegiac predecessors, to add something new to the elegiac tradition, prevents a reading of 3.11 as a sort of confession of his inability to do so. But would such an interpretation undermine Ovid's cleverness, or add to it another layer of paradox? What could be more clever than betraying our expectations by finally conforming to all the "rules" of love elegy, and having his unique elegiac persona yield to essentialist ideas of what constitutes the "elegiac lover"? Considering the volume of literary intertextuality (and intratextuality) in this poem, and the sheer obviousness of the allusions, maybe clever young Ovid with this elegiac

pastiche is offering more than simply "an excuse for intellectual entertainment".[716] These allusions are surely more than playful references designed to please the learned reader. In my view, Ovid is making a comment on the state of the elegiac tradition: as the self-proclaimed last of the elegiac poets, it is curious that Ovid makes extensive reference to Catullus, the forerunner of Augustan elegy,[717] whom he cares not to number among the Augustan elegists (Cf. *Tr*. 4.10.53-4). It is my view that, by subjecting his elegiac persona to an inescapable conflict between *odium* and *amor,* Ovid illustrates how the genre has come full circle, or even more than full circle, as it were, stretching beyond its inception: it has all been done. By taking the simple Catullan idea of *odi et amo* and drawing it out in exhaustive variations, Ovid may be hinting at the futility of the elegiac project. He has pushed the boundaries of elegiac convention throughout his *Amores*, broken every lover's law, blurred the line between the material and the subject, and done just about all that he can to revive the genre, or to kill it. After offering so much, and working with so little, he expresses that there is nothing left to offer. But that itself is a new offering; his perennial joke is a serious point.

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[716] Cf. Lee (1962): 163.

[717] Cf. Prop. 2.34.87-94. See also Luck (1969): 56–69; Wray (2012): 25-38; Bessone (2013): 50-55; Spentzou (2013): 1–24, esp. 23–4; Gale (2021): 219.

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