

**Brazil's Foreign Policy from the context of South-South Development
Cooperation initiatives: the case of Brazil and Mozambique after Lula**

Julia Corrêa

CRRJUL001



Minor dissertation submitted in *partial fulfillment* of the requirements for the
award of the degree of Master of Social Science in International Relations

Supervisor: Dr. Elias Phaahla

Faculty of the Humanities

University of Cape Town

2020

The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non-commercial research purposes only.

Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author.

Declaration

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signed by candidate

Signature: _____

Date: 10 February, 2020

Dedications

It goes without saying that I dedicate this thesis to my cherished family in Brazil. Through their never-ending support and encouragement I was able to complete what I had envisioned. Without them I would not have dreamt this big.

Abstract

South-South Development Cooperation is a longstanding practice that has undergone many unprecedented changes since the dawn of the twenty-first century. However, following the first decade of the century, some key players in development cooperation seem to have reduced their efforts to promote South-South Development Cooperation, notably Brazil. Under president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil's ambitious strategy of international prominence was most eminent within the framework of development cooperation, wherein the African continent occupied a central place. Such efforts, however, lost impetus under the subsequent presidencies of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018).

This thesis reflects upon the changes in Brazil's foreign policy dispositions after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2011-2018) and how it affected the country's South-South Development Cooperation initiatives. By looking at the case of Mozambique, it seeks to understand such changes *vis-à-vis* the shifting nature of both the international system and, most importantly, the domestic setting of Brazil. While the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva laid the foundations of Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda (i.e. an instrument for the pursuit of the country's global ambitions and a reflection of the national approach to development), these foundations were undermined during the subsequent governments, led by constraining international circumstances and the dismantling of the state-led developmental model advanced by the Workers' Party. The undermining of South-South Development Cooperation's foundations occurred through two major mechanisms. Firstly, foreign policy goals were re-defined in economic terms, and so was South-South Development Cooperation. The political goals that underpinned Brazil's reformist ambitions lost space once the latter were gradually abandoned under Dilma Rousseff and completely discarded under Michel Temer. Secondly, South-South Development Cooperation both reflected and fed the model of state-led development adopted by the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Once this model was delegitimised and eventually dismantled, the South-South Development Cooperation agenda lost its impetus.

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend a big and heart-filled thank you to everyone who assisted me with this accomplishment. From those who offered me a positive word when I needed it most, to those who acted as sounding boards throughout the development of my ideas.

To my supervisor Elias, thank you for believing in my project from the start and for your continuous enthusiasm about the topic. I will never forget your continued patience and guidance throughout this task. I truly appreciate your support.

To my UCT family, I am indebted to the support I received from you during my time away from home, not only did you all assist me in my studies, your friendship gave me the moral supported that I needed.

I would like to extend a special thank you to my partner, who in my moments of anxiety was patient, calmed me down and reminded me of my goal.

Above all, I would like to thank my parents, Urias Corrêa and Marta Cristiana Licerre Corrêa. Through your life-long sacrifices, I was able to reach this point in my academic journey. I am eternally grateful to you.

To everyone who played a part in my thesis, big or small, thank you.

Table of Contents

Declaration	i
Dedications	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	vii
Chapter I: Introduction	1
1.1. Background	1
1.2. Problem statement.....	4
1.3. Aims and significance	7
1.4. Research Question	8
1.5. Hypothesis.....	8
1.6. Conceptualising South-South Development Cooperation.....	9
1.6.1. The case for unity and cooperation	11
1.6.2. What South-South Development Cooperation means for Brazil: Actors and Institutional Setting	13
1.7. Methodology	15
1.8. Literature Review.....	15
1.8.1. State of literature on the causes of Brazil's reduced international influence	16
1.8.2. State of literature on the Mozambican case under Rousseff and Temer	18
1.8.3. Gap identified in the literature	19
1.9. Limitations of study	19
1.10. Chapter Outline	20
Chapter II: Theoretical framework – South-South Cooperation and Foreign Policy	21
2.1. Introduction.....	21
2.2. Mainstream International Relations Theories: incomplete accounts of South-South Development Cooperation?.....	23
2.2.1. Realist theories	23
2.2.2. Liberal theories	27
2.2.3. Constructivism	29
2.2.4. Critical theories	30
2.3. Neoclassical Realism: incorporating the three levels of analysis.....	31
2.4. Concluding remarks.....	35
Chapter III: Brazil's Foreign Policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Mozambique: the Lula years (2003-2010).....	36

3.1.	Introduction.....	36
3.2.	Brazil's foreign policy disposition under Lula and the South-South Development Cooperation Agenda in Africa: navigating between national and international goals	38
3.2.1.	Brazil's rise to global prominence.....	39
3.2.2.	Domestic factors shaping South-South Development Cooperation in Africa	41
3.3.	Brazil and Mozambique: South-South Development Cooperation between 2003 and 2010	48
3.3.1.	Technical cooperation	49
3.3.2.	Trade and the internationalisation of Brazil's "national champions"	51
3.4.	Concluding remarks.....	52
Chapter IV: Pulling the plug? Brazil's Development Cooperation in Mozambique under Rousseff and Temer		54
4.1.	Introduction.....	54
4.2.	International and domestic factors driving changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy under Rousseff and Temer.....	56
4.2.1.	Changing dynamics and limited resources: the global financial crisis, South-South Cooperation and Brazil	56
4.2.2.	Domestic factors and Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation in Africa	59
4.3.	Rousseff's and Temer's foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation Initiatives in Africa: pulling the plug	62
4.3.1.	Dilma Rousseff's foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Africa	63
4.3.2.	Michel Temer's foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Africa	65
4.4.	Mozambique: from economic partner to development cooperation partner and back	67
4.5.	Concluding remarks.....	70
Chapter V: Conclusion.....		72
5.1.	Considerations for future research.....	78
Bibliography.....		79

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency / <i>Agência Brasileira de Cooperação</i>
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARV	Antiretroviral
BAPA	Buenos Aires Plan of Action
BNDES	Brazilian Development Bank / <i>Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social</i>
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CIFA	Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries / <i>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</i>
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAF-III	Africa Division III / <i>Divisão da África III</i>
Embrapa	Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation / <i>Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária</i>
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FioCruz	Oswaldo Cruz Foundation / <i>Fundação Oswaldo Cruz</i>

Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front / <i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>
G20	Group of Twenty
G7	Group of Seven
G77	Group of Seventy-Seven
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
Ipea	Institute for Applied Economic Research / <i>Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada</i>
IR	International Relations
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
Mercosur	Common Market of the South
MRE	Ministry of Foreign Relations / <i>Ministério de Relações Exteriores</i> or <i>Itamaraty</i>
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NDB	New Development Bank

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique / <i>Operação das Nações Unidas em Moçambique</i>
PALOP	Portuguese-Speaking African Country / <i>País Africano de Língua Oficial Portuguesa</i>
PEI	Independent Foreign Policy / <i>Política Externa Independente</i>
ProSavana	Mozambique-Brazil-Japan Cooperation Programme for the Agricultural Development of the Savannah of Mozambique / <i>Programa de Cooperação Tripartida para o Desenvolvimento Agrícola da Savana Tropical</i>
PT	Workers' Party / <i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i>
SEPPIR	Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality / <i>Secretaria Nacional de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial</i>
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSDC	South-South Development Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
UN	United Nations

Unasur	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNSC	United Nations' Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Chapter I: Introduction

1.1. Background

Although South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) is a longstanding practice¹, the new millennium has witnessed an intensification of such practices among countries in the Global South². More favourable systemic circumstances, particularly driven by the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, tilted the distribution of power towards the developing world. In this context, the rise of countries from the South as key players on the international stage fostered the resurgence of South-South Development Cooperation. Previously classified as recipients of international aid, several emerging countries are now also at the opposite end of development assistance. For these countries, SSDC emerges as not only a means to bolster their national development, but also as a way of increasing their international presence and influence. However, some key players in international development cooperation have recently demonstrated a decreasing interest in promoting these practices - notably Brazil.

Under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), popularly known simply as Lula, Brazil stood out as one of the major actors of South-South Development Cooperation. Lula placed the country's relations with the Global South at the centre of Brazil's foreign policy agenda, considerably increasing development cooperation practices with its southern partners (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683). Needless to say, Lula's agenda was significantly shaped by the positive macroeconomic and political circumstances experienced in the domestic domain, expressed in the internationally-acclaimed domestic initiatives aimed at fighting hunger, poverty and inequality. While lifting millions of Brazilians out of poverty, Lula reinvigorated Brazil's international relations and sought to advance a positive image of the country abroad. Brazil, in President Lula's eye, should be understood as a successful story worth emulating and a credible leader of the developing world. As argued by Cunha (2016:10), Lula's foreign

¹ The Bandung Conference of 1955, in Indonesia, is considered "a milestone in the formation of SSC as a global political movement" (Gray & Gills, 2015:557). The meeting gathered African and Asian countries around the quest for the end of colonialism, imperialism and underdevelopment in the Third World. Among several other established goals was the commitment with the promotion of political, economic and cultural cooperation among those countries (Prashad, 2007:32)

² Dados & Connell (2012:12) argue that "the North-South language provided an alternative to the concept of 'globalization', contesting the belief in a growing homogenization of cultures and societies. As such, "North-South terminology, [...] like core-periphery, arose from an allegorical application of categories to name patterns of wealth, privilege, and development across broad regions. The term Global South functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment. It references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained." (Dados & Connell, 2012:12)

policy was an essential part of the national development project. Besides favourable circumstances, some scholars will argue that Brazil's disposition to engage in South-South Development Cooperation projects during Lula's two administrations (2003-2010) was, to a certain extent, personified in the image of the head of state, his personality and foreign policy ambitions (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:686).

Brazil's desire to develop a more active role within the emerging Global South is best illustrated by the country's deepened relations with Africa, in particular with Lusophone African countries such as Mozambique, whose historical, racial and socio-cultural proximity to Brazil set the stage for strengthened cooperation between the two countries in the new century (de Castro, 2013:3).

After the Lula years, however, Brazilian disposition to engage in SSDC, in particular with the African continent, has been challenged. In 2011, Lula da Silva was succeeded by his party fellow, Dilma Rousseff, who would supposedly provide continuity to her predecessor's mandate of strengthening relations with Africa and exert little impact on the country's involvement in SSDC. However, Rousseff and her foreign affairs team soon signalled possible shifts in the focus and rhetoric of the country's foreign policy, which will be observed later.

The low profile international agenda carried out under Rousseff was, in part, motivated by as less favourable international economy caused by the 2007-2008 economic crash and the decrease in commodity prices, which affected the country's ability to keep up with the previous pace of economic growth. Domestically, this resulted in the decline of Brazil's once successful developmental project, which was aggravated by corruption scandals involving the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT - Workers Party), leading to an unprecedented political and legitimacy crisis involving the ruling party. Consequently, urgent matters at the national level reduced the president's ability to keep the ambitious international agenda initiated by Lula. This, in turn, compromised the country's relationship with Africa, which moved away from the solidarity³ narrative towards a more pragmatic, results-orientated tone where commercial interests would play a central role (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:689).

Although Rousseff's administration had already shown a decreasing interest in maintaining the SSDC initiatives initiated by Lula da Silva, it was under Michel Temer (2016-2018) that changes in Brazil's foreign policy orientation were even more significant. Temer had been Rousseff's vice president, and assumed office following the

³ The definition of *solidarity*, for this thesis, was borrowed from Muhr (2016:633), as "the commitment to mutual support and joint efforts to achieve sustainable and integral human development, and the appropriate care of countries' emergent needs, within the possibilities and in accordance with shared responsibilities" (Muhr, 2016:633)

impeachment of Rousseff in August 2016. Temer's international agenda sought to re-align Brazil's foreign policy with its "traditional partners" of the West, particularly the United States and Europe (Lima, Bragatti & Borges, 2017:12), causing Brazil's development cooperation, in particular with Africa, to lose much of its impetus. The pragmatic tone adopted by Temer loosened the cooperation ties with the continent, transforming the African cooperation agenda into one driven by economic interest.

Amidst Brazil's vast and complex bureaucratic apparatus, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores - MRE*, or *Itamaraty*) has always been studied as a successful example of bureaucratic institution whose insulation from the political disturbances has enabled continuity and consistency in Brazil's foreign policy direction. However, different depths of involvement in SSDC practices under different administrations is evidence of a more complex group of factors playing a role in Brazil's foreign policy orientation and, particularly, its disposition towards SSDC practices.

Although Brazil's use of SSDC as a foreign policy tool could be examined against its relationship with various different countries – ranging from Latin America to Asia – Mozambique was chosen as a case study for this research for two main reasons. Firstly, Brazil's relationship with its South American neighbours represent a more urgent matter in the country's foreign policy agenda, due to the fact that geographical proximity and the question of regional leadership have a direct impact on Brazil's strategic economic policies and national security. Besides, the existence of economic frameworks such as Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) makes the establishment and deepening of ties an institutionalised demand that cannot simply be disposed of.

Secondly, the central place occupied by Africa in the country's foreign policy agenda during Lula's administrations indicates that the country's broader SSDC project – developed against the background of Brazil's international ambitions – attempted to reach beyond matters of regional power-building or geographical proximity, which makes the African case more emblematic and more illustrative of the character of Brazilian South-South Development Cooperation.

Within Africa, Lula's government strengthened ties with several different nations, from the Portuguese-speaking countries to economic powers such as Nigeria and South Africa. However, Mozambique was the largest recipient of Brazilian cooperation initiatives, which range from the cancellation of debt to technical cooperation in areas such as agriculture, health, education and social development (Gonçalves, 2018:87). The significance of the Mozambican case also accounts for a bilateral relationship outside any institutional framework, as opposed to South Africa, for example, whose

relationship with Brazil takes place against development initiatives such as the BRICS⁴ and IBSA⁵.

1.2. Problem statement

South-South Development Cooperation, as carried out in the twenty-first century, is built upon the specificities of the existing international order, i.e. multipolar, as opposed to South-South Cooperation within the post-Second World War context. Therefore, in order to understand the sustainability and consistency of SSDC initiatives among countries from the South, it is imperative that multiple factors are taken into consideration. Above all, analysing changes in these countries' approach towards international development entails the assessment of both systemic and domestic factors. To name but a few, the distribution of economic and political power within the global order, the political dynamics within each country's borders and the international aspirations of their incumbent political leaders are examples of factors shaping the intensity and nature of SSDC. Regardless of the forces in place, the promotion of SSDC has been underpinned by the developing world's beliefs and ambitions.

By placing Mozambique at the centre of the country's cooperation for development agenda, Brazil promoted two main ideas: firstly, that cooperation for development could be fairer and more beneficial if carried out between countries with similar historical and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as similar domestic struggles, such as poverty and inequality. In other words, South-South Cooperation (SSC) should be pursued as an alternative to North-South Cooperation (NSC). Moreover, Brazil's active presence in the country, and in the continent in general, promoted the idea that stronger ties among Southern countries could give voice to those who have been hard done by an unequal international order. This idea underpins the reformist ambitions of Brazil's foreign policy under Lula, carried out via its SSDC agenda.

However, as illustrated by the Brazilian case, different countries' disposition to engage in development cooperation is subject to changes throughout time and is far from being consistent and stable. New global, regional, and national challenges will re-shape individual states' international standing and their ambitions. In the light of the aforementioned, for instance, a summit to discuss a new Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA +40) took place in March 2019. It reiterated the importance of assessing progress and learning from past experiences of South-South Cooperation, as well as reformulating the plan of action created 40 years earlier. The key suggestion is that SSDC needs to

⁴ A group comprised of Brasil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

⁵ Brazil-India-South Africa Dialogue Forum, established in June 2013.

adapt to the new international context and the new United Nations (UN) 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2018:2).

That is to say, although big initiatives such as the BRICS attempt to institutionalise SSC practices for future continuity and consistency, they do not provide a wider framework of action in which smaller countries could build stable and consistent partnerships with other Southern countries. Put differently, outside the domain of the “most powerful” among the Global South, countries such as Mozambique are held hostage by their Southern partners’ disposition to engage in development cooperation. In Brazil, the interplay between systemic and national political dynamics dictated the changes observed under Rousseff and Temer and reshaped the countries’ cooperation efforts towards Africa, particularly Mozambique.

Under Rousseff, the technical cooperation budget (one of the SSDC modalities pursued by Brazil) was reduced by 25 per cent between 2012 (US\$36.9 million) and 2014 (US\$ 27.8 million). Under Lula, 105 and 143 projects of technical cooperation with Africa were initiated in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Contrastingly, 87, 47, 12 and 11 projects were initiated in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively (Costa, 2015:15). As for the country’s cooperation with Mozambique, for instance, the Mozambique -Brazil-Japan Cooperation Programme for the Agricultural Development of the Savannah of Mozambique project (ProSAVANA) - which consists of the biggest trilateral cooperation project that involves the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), *Japanese International Cooperation Agency* (JICA) and the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture – faced financial constraints in 2015 that hindered the cooperation agreement and led to the paralysation of activities (Fingermann, 2015b:12). Furthermore, as far as presidential diplomacy is concerned, Lula visited Mozambique five times during his two terms in office, whereas Rousseff only visited once, as did Temer while he was Rousseff’s vice president.

Amidst several contributing factors for this inconsistency, major international shocks (e.g. the global financial crisis) and how they were perceived and responded to at home cannot be overlooked, especially in twenty-first century Brazil. Recently, the rise to power of conservative leader Jair Bolsonaro in 2019 is seen as the result of a renewed nationalist sentiment in Brazil. In terms of foreign policy, it represents a shift towards Brazil's “traditional” partners (i.e. the United States of America and Europe), the forging of stronger political ties with the Western nations and the subordination of the country's foreign policy agenda that was once independent and innovative. Nonetheless, changes in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation did not start with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, and can be traced back to the two governments that came before that.

Despite clear changes in the conduction of Brazil’s SSDC policies in the immediate post-Lula era (2011-2018), not enough research has been done to analyse

this, particularly with regards to the driving forces behind the process of decline since Lula left office. Extensive research has been conducted to understand the transition from the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to that of Lula. Due to its innovative character, Lula's international agenda has long been a topic of interest for IR scholars, particularly concerning the president's efforts to increase Brazil's international presence and foster a multicultural approach to its international partners⁶.

Similarly, several studies have dedicated to the topic of South-South Cooperation under Lula⁷, as well as Brazil's growing presence in Africa during his administration⁸. Other studies have focused specifically on Mozambique⁹. All in all, most research pertaining to Brazil-Africa relations has aimed to understand the prominent role Mozambique - and Africa broadly -, came to play in Brazil's foreign policy agenda, especially with regards to development cooperation efforts.

However, existing literature on what came after the "golden years" of Brazil's SSDC agenda is still scarce. Some studies scantily pointed out the significant decline of Brazil's international presence after 2010¹⁰, though not enough has been done to analyse individual cases. This study aims to plug this gap by looking at the complex web of factors determining Brazil's international agenda, and driving its decline, particularly from the context of South-South Development Cooperation. More specifically, this paper uses the case of Brazil's relations with Mozambique to test the hypothesis of retreat of Brazilian efforts towards development cooperation in Africa.

As Chichava (2017) anticipated, the political and economic crises that arose in Brazil during Rousseff's administrations signalled possible changes in the country's relationship with Mozambique, that could compromise their efforts towards development cooperation. This research aims to investigate the extent of such changes, as well as what drove them. Besides being Brazil's major cooperation partner in the continent, Mozambique also epitomises the essential features of Brazilian SSDC, as well as its driving factors. Moreover, presenting comprehensive and diverse projects, Brazil-Mozambique relations also provide the best illustration of the limitations and the unstable nature of such relations.

In short, the intention of this research is to identify the changes in Brazil's foreign policy that impacted on the country's approach towards South-South Development

⁶ See Cason & Power, 2009; de Almeida, 2010; Trinkunas, 2014; Lima, Bragatti & Borges, 2017

⁷ See Dalvergne & Farias, 2012; Abdenur & Neto, 2013; Bry, 2017a

⁸ See Captain, 2010; Saraiva, 2010; Mapa, 2011b; da Costa Filho, 2018; Ridderbusch, 2018

⁹ See de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013; Avelhan, 2015; Fingermann, 2015b; Alden, Chichava & Alves, 2017

¹⁰ See de Castro, 2013; Cervo & Lessa, 2014; Cornetet, 2014; Albanus, 2015; Leite & Cavalcanti, 2016; Malamud, 2017; Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017; da Silva & Perez, 2019

Cooperation in the post-Lula years. To this end, this study will make apparent the internal and external forces behind this reconfiguration. As it is noted later in this thesis, the study case of Mozambique is a clear manifestation of changes in Brazil's SSDC agenda after 2011.

1.3. Aims and significance

This thesis aims to investigate how changes in Brazil's foreign policy disposition affected the country's SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique after the Lula years, from 2011 to 2018. The significance of this study is that it contributes to the understanding of SSDC as both a function and instrument of foreign policy, therefore constantly being shaped by both domestic and international constraints experienced by countries from the South in different periods of time.

There seems to be a consensus by scholars that the post-Lula agenda towards Africa, up until 2018, can be characterised by continuity with less intensity (Albanus, 2015). Though many have written about Africa's place in Brazilian foreign policy after Lula's administrations, very few studies have attempted to look at country-specific cases to illustrate the scope of said changes. The determinants, extent and consequences of such changes also reflect the nuanced character of Brazil's relationship with its African counterparts.

Beyond that, individual case studies can provide some important insights into the broader dynamics of South-South development cooperation. For countries such as Mozambique, that have not achieved the status of "emerging powers" that others such as China, India and Brazil have, this is of utmost importance. Their development cooperation partners need to be better understood in terms of their motivations, the institutional setting of their initiatives and, as advanced in this study, how their cooperation agenda is informed by an amalgamation of domestic and international forces.

Against the aforementioned backdrop, the different approaches to SSDC observed in the three administrations to be studied in this thesis – Lula, Rousseff and Temer – can be better understood by looking at specific partnerships and how these have been altered throughout time. The relevance of this study lies on this exact point. Notwithstanding the limitations of foreign policy studies to contribute towards broader international relations analysis, the fragility and sustainability of development cooperation amongst the South reflect the several facets of this agenda.

One of Brazil's most important partners in the African continent, Mozambique occupies a significant place within the country's SSDC agenda. What is still to be explained, however, is how changes in Brazil's foreign policy disposition (after Lula)

affected Brazil's cooperation for development with its largest and most emblematic African partner. This can only be achieved through a thorough study of the factors that shaped these changes. Thus, this paper seeks to contribute, in the first place, to the literature on Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation practices in Mozambique and the African continent as a whole. More broadly, it aims to elucidate the subjection of South-South Development Cooperation to the national and international contexts. In essence, this study is driven by the belief that, for the motivations behind countries' engagement in SSDC to be fully understood, it is not enough to understand the periods characterised by its expansion. Moments of decline need to be as deeply analysed as those of expansion and prosperity, as they offer a richer understanding of SSDC's sustainability and future prospects.

To this end, this thesis will fully explore the Brazil-Mozambique case by focusing on the South-South Development Cooperation agenda and initiatives within the time frame proposed. The paper will take Lula years as the point of departure, in order to gauge the reverberations of the retreat of development cooperation under Rousseff and Temer.

1.4. Research Question

In view of the goals established above, this thesis will be guided by the following research question:

How did changes in Brazil's foreign policy disposition affect South-South Development Cooperation initiatives towards Mozambique after Lula's administrations?

Moreover, this study will be supplemented by the following question:

What were the main (domestic and international) factors that informed these changes?

1.5. Hypothesis

Against the backdrop of the aforementioned research question, this thesis argues that the jettisoning of South-South Development Cooperation as an integral feature of Brazil's foreign policy towards Mozambique after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva left office was due to global economic and domestic political turbulences that propelled the waning and eventual erosion of focus under the administrations of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer, respectively. Under Lula, Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda was informed by the country's leadership ambitions on the global stage. At the same time, this agenda also reflected model of development that had been adopted by the government. Following the Lula government, Brazil's foreign policy orientation took a

significant turn, which changed Brazil's international presence from one of protagonist to one of timid conductor of its international agenda. This, in turn, compromised Brazil's SSDC initiatives towards Africa, particularly Mozambique. These changes were dictated by both international and national factors. Internationally, a less favourable global economy for Brazilian commodities moved the country's foreign policy orientation towards the pursuit of economic benefits, intensified by the quest for the return of the investments previously made in Mozambique. Domestically, crises in the economic and political domains affected the two administrations' ability to provide continuity to the significantly costly SSDC project initiated by Lula. This, coupled with corruption scandals affecting both the Brazilian government and Mozambican officials, had direct impact on SSDC initiatives between the two countries.

1.6. Conceptualising South-South Development Cooperation

As per Emma Mawdsley, South-South Cooperation is as “a term that is capacious, variegated and flexible”. Ranging from “market-driven activities to the transfer of official resources for genuinely humanitarian purposes” (Fues, 2013:2), the concept is used to refer to a variety of objectives, actors (state and non-state) and modalities. That said, “very broadly, it refers to the transfer and exchange of resources, technology and knowledge, set within claims to shared colonial and post-colonial experiences and identities, and anchored within a wider framework of promoting the collective strength and development of the global South” (Mawdsley, 2019:259).

Standing as an alternative to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Official Development Assistance (ODA) , South-South Cooperation is promoted amongst developing countries and underpinned by principles that have been advocated for at various different moments in history, i.e. solidarity, horizontality, mutual-benefits and non-interference in domestic affairs (de Renzio & Seifert, 2014:1861). The historical background behind the formulation of these principles will be outlined in the next section.

Informed by shared experiences and similar concerns about national development, SSC practices are also premised on demand-driven development cooperation and respect for the singularities and characteristics of the recipient country (South Centre, 2009:1). With regards to its modalities, “SSC is broadly understood as the exchange of resources, technology, skills and technical know-how among countries of the South, as well as the building of coalitions to promote social, economic, cultural, political and scientific development and to transform global governance power balance.” (Besharati et al, 2015:9).

For the purpose of this thesis, and given the broadness of SSC, the term South-South *Development* Cooperation (SSDC) was adopted over the term South-South Cooperation (SSC). Once again, there is no common ground among scholars over the differences between both concepts and they are often used interchangeably. In this paper, however, it is understood that SSC underpins a broader range of cooperation practices that are not necessarily developmental, such as arms trading (Besharati et al, 2015:12).

On the other hand, South-South *Development* Cooperation (SSDC) consists of transfer of state funds that are exclusively directed towards development, mostly exercised on a bilateral basis (Fues, 2013:2). The different interpretations of “development” in different countries, as well as the lack of standardisation of South-South Development Cooperation practices universally, SSDC is usually subject to different understanding and goals (Gore, 2013:772).

Nonetheless, the same demand-driven principle of SSC is extended to development cooperation practices amongst developing countries, which imply the participation of recipient countries as the evaluator of their own needs and priorities, upon which cooperation projects will be designed (Bry, 2017b:165; Fues, 2013:3). That being said, this mobilisation of national resources towards cooperation projects is also accompanied by efforts to align SSDC with domestic policies for development in the “donor” countries. State-funded practices coexist with other sources of finance, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Gore, 2013:771) and debt relief initiatives.

All in all, South-South Development Cooperation can be defined as “an intersection between international development co-operation and SSC, comprehending the flows of technical co-operation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans among developing countries aimed at tackling primary development problems” (Besharati et al, 2015:11). Through the sharing of developmental practices and experiences, SSDC seeks to achieve a set of goals, as discussed by Gore (2013:771-772): a) promotion of larger independence from the most advanced economies and “traditional donors”; b) reduction of extreme poverty and the provision of “a minimally adequate living standard globally by tackling specific human development deprivations” (Gore, 2013:772); c) provision of “global public goods”, such as national security, infectious disease control, and the promotion of environmental practices (Gore, 2013:772). Furthermore, Gore also stressed SSDC’s aspirations towards the reform of the traditional global development landscape “so as it is more development-friendly” (Gore, 2013:771).

Finally yet importantly, most national cooperation agencies are located within the Ministry of Foreign Relations of each country, which designates the close relationship

with the international agenda and its political ties (Bry, 2017b:167). While this is also the case within Brazil's SSDC structure, several other domestic institutions take part in cooperation initiatives. Before outlining Brazil's understanding of South-South Development Cooperation and the domestic setting that structure these initiatives, it is essential to attend to the evolution of South-South Cooperation as a political project over the past seven decades.

1.6.1. The case for unity and cooperation

The idiosyncrasies of South-South Development Cooperation, as known in the twenty-first century, have been shaped by the existing economic and political context. That being said, the "spirit" behind development cooperation among the South¹¹ can be traced back to the post-World War II movements of unity and non-alignment, inaugurated by the Bandung Conference of 1955¹². In the context of a bipolar world order in which two major powers, the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR), sought to expand their sphere of influence into the so-called "Third World", the disadvantaged regions of the world continue to experience the consequences of colonial rule and extreme poverty.

"Despite the promise of self-determination, universal 'well-being', 'equal rights' and 'economic and social progress and development' contained in the United Nations Charter, living standards in 'peripheral' world regions in the early 1950s, as measured by per capita output, were on average only marginally better than they had been in 1750, while their relative share of world manufacturing (6.5 per cent) was five times lower than it had been in 1860 (36.6 per cent)" (Golub, 2013:1003)

Against this background, the Bandung Conference gathered 29 countries from Africa and Asia in their quest for decolonisation, development, respect for human rights and self-determination, and world peace (Final Communiqué, 1955). Within the context of the Cold War, Bandung symbolised the birth of "Third World solidarity" (Lee, 2009:87) and unity in the fight against Western colonisation and rife underdevelopment in the two continents. Among the goals established in Bandung, documented in its *Final*

¹¹ The idea of a "Global South" emerges within the context of the globalisation movement. Prior to that, terminologies such as the "Third World" and "periphery" were used to refer to the group of (politically and economically) marginalised countries outside Europe and North America (Dados & Connell, 2012:12-13). These countries share several characteristics, which include the socio-economic consequences of a colonial past and endemic underdevelopment.

¹² Though Bandung symbolises the beginning of a new era of cooperation and unity, the Conference did not happen in a political vacuum. For more on the pre-Bandung context, see Assie-Lumumba, N. T. (2015). Behind and beyond Bandung: historical and forward-looking reflections on South-South Cooperation. *Bandung: Journal of the Global South*, 2:11.

Communiqué, was cooperation for development in the economic, social, political and cultural domains. With regard to economic development, commitment to “mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty” (Final Communiqué, 2009) as well as technical cooperation expressed the collective desire to find an alternative to the Western-imposed model of development. This “Third World solidarity”, also called the “Bandung spirit” (Lee, 2009:87), would pave the way for the rise of South-South Development Cooperation as an important apparatus in the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. In other words, as stated by Gray & Gills (2016:557), Bandung laid the foundations for the establishment of South-South Cooperation as a political movement.

Still in the twentieth century, Bandung was followed by the institutionalisation of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961 (Lee, 2009:87). Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the NAM embodied the Bandung ideas of non-interference and furthered the spirit of cooperation and solidarity among the Third World. Both Bandung and Belgrade asserted the developing world’s right to autonomously define their approach to development, and sought to minimise their dependence on the advanced economies of the North (Gray & Gills, 2016:558).

This movement for autonomy and cooperation among the developing world continued with the creation of the Group Seventy-Seven (G77) at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1964 (UNCTAD, n.d.). The group sought to increase the influence of developing countries within the United Nations by improving the means for the articulation and negotiation of their interests. Concurrently, the group also aimed at promoting South-South Development Cooperation (G77, n.d.). In 1974, the G77 launched the *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order* (NIEO), which called for a negotiated reform of the existing international order for purposes of redressing the historical legacies of colonialism and fostering social emancipation and economic development in the developing countries (Gray & Gills, 2016:558; Golub, 2013:1004).

In 1978, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), endorsed by the United Nations, sought to formalise South-South Cooperation initiatives and promote the practice of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). The document is considered the first attempt to formally recognise the growing importance of developing countries in international practices of cooperation and development assistance. At the same time, BAPA reiterated the importance of maintaining technical assistance from traditional donors (de Renzio & Seifert, 2014:1862; Ferreira et al, 2016:2)

Among others, the meetings in Bandung, Belgrade, Geneva and Buenos Aires all paved the way for the re-emergence of South-South Cooperation in the twenty-first century. After South-South Cooperation initiatives were temporarily put on hold during

the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of debt and economic crises in great part of the developing world, the cooperation agenda re-emerges in the 2000s. The emerging economies of the South, in particular China, India and Brazil, acquired greater economic and political power and assumed new roles in the international development landscape. Therefore, South-South Cooperation, in the new century, built upon the zeitgeist of the 1950s¹³ to challenge the Northern model of development aid (Amanor & Chichava, 2016:13).

Since the post-war era until recently, members of the OECD-DAC coordinated and dominated the efforts towards international development, providing most of the resources for such purposes. As stated by Gore (2013:770), “there was a clear sense of what ODA was, and there was also a well-defined aid architecture through which three leading institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—regulated and structured the practices of donors and recipients”. Northern-led development aid, in this context, is usually tied to conditionalities underpinned by a liberal ethos, i.e. the endorsement of free and open markets, deregulation, privatization and the promotion of democracy (Gore, 2013:774).

Though significant to the development of poorer countries, the historical dependence on the resources by advanced economies spurred the emergence of various Global South initiatives seeking to challenge the dominance of Western aid and its limitations, as discussed before. For most of the developing world, the vertical, unequal and conditional approach to development assistance that characterises the majority of DAC’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) “still bore traces of nineteenth century colonialism, fostering a form of relative dependence” (Ferreira et al, 2016:2). In this context, the re-surfacing of South-South Cooperation in the new millennium depicts not only the changes in the global political economy, but also the need to challenge DAC-related standards and practices in international development.

1.6.2. What South-South Development Cooperation means for Brazil: Actors and Institutional Setting

Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation is underpinned by Article Four in the Federal Constitution, which states that “the Federal Republic of Brazil conducts its international relations [based on principles such as] cooperation between people for the

¹³ Mawdsley (2019:261) provides a periodisation of South-South Cooperation as having three different phases: SSC 1.0 (1950-2000) or Third-Worldist phase; SSC 2.0 (2000-2015) or expansionist phase, characterised by the formation of relevant institutions such as the BRICS, IBSA and FOCAC; and SSC 3.0, an emerging phase where a more pragmatic and even interventionist approach may arise (Mawdsley, 2019:266-268).

progress of humanity” (MRE, 2018, n.d.). The different modalities of Brazilian cooperation for international development contemplate technical cooperation, education cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, humanitarian cooperation and peacekeeping operation (Lima, 2017:15). Having over 100 partner countries, it seeks to collaborate towards social and economic development in areas such as agriculture, education, health, environment, national safety, professional training, food security and food safety and energy (MRE, 2018, n.d.). Within the scope of SSDC adopted in thesis, emphasis will be placed on Brazil’s technical cooperation, encompassing areas such as agriculture and health.

According to de la Fontaine and Seifert (2010:4), Brazilian South-South Cooperation agenda is shaped by five major domestic actors: A) Presidential diplomacy; B) Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores* – MRE), also called *Itamaraty*: the Ministry has historically held the monopoly of foreign policy formulation, but this has changed steadily since democratisation. The Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC) operates within the structure of *Itamaraty*. C) Apart from ABC, Brazilian SSC involves a number of other ministries and state agencies that have become key actors of international policies such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Development, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) and so forth; D) Brazilian enterprises and E) Brazilian Non-Governmental Organisations (ONGs)

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) operated under the umbrella of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is responsible for coordinating the country’s development cooperation initiatives alongside multiple other actors involved in their execution, the majority of which are federal entities and ministries (Chichava et al, 2013:7). ABC’s conception of Brazilian SSDC is one of “an important instrument of foreign policy, which Brazil uses to ensure a positive and growing presence in countries and regions of primary interest” (Bry, 2017a:7). More broadly, within both the ABC and *Itamaraty* there is a shared understanding of the country’s motives behind its SSDC initiatives, which can be briefly resumed into five main points: a) SSDC is guided by the notion of multilateralism; b) cooperation is the means to safeguard Brazil’s international emergence; c) SSDC speaks to Brazil’s ambitions of reforming the United Nations Security Council by acquiring one of the permanent seats; d) SSDC as an instrument to reinforce the country’s anti-imperialist sentiment and disposition in the international scene; and e) SSDC’s aim to support developing countries’ economies speaks to Brazil’s interests in accessing new markets (Bry, 2017a:8).

1.7. Methodology

Although quantitative data on Brazil's SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique will be presented to support the analysis, this study will adopt a qualitative approach to unpack the question. This choice was mainly guided by the lack of availability of quantitative data on the Temer government's SSDC initiative. Moreover, this study is premised on the belief that a country's South-South Development Cooperation initiatives cannot be measured in quantitative terms only. In Muhr's (2016:635) words, "reciprocal benefits may be generated that cannot always be expressed in quantifiable monetary terms, such as with respect to experience, knowledge and cultural exchange, capacity building, diplomatic solidarity, human rights promotion, and the visibility and recognition of the South generally" (Muhr, 2016:635). In fact, the examination of non-quantitative data can offer better insights into the the use of SSDC as a foreign policy instrument, as well as what the determinants of different countries' SSDC agenda are.

For Williams (2007:67), qualitative research is used to describe, explain, and interpret an array of collected data. As opposed to the deductive rationale behind quantitative approaches, qualitative research is guided by the use of an inductive rationale to respond to the questions proposed (Williams, 2007:67). Bennet & Elman (2007:171) stress that the contributions of qualitative methods to the study of complex phenomena in the discipline of International Relations explain the prominence this research approach within the field, particularly the use of case studies. In Creswell's (2007:73) words, "case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes. (Creswell, 2007:73)".

Therefore, the adoption of a case-study approach to investigate Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda during the selected time frime will enhance the explanatory capacity of this research on the subject. In other words, by looking at the specificities of the Mozambican case, this study will achieve a better comprehension of Brazil's approach to SSDC under Rousseff and Temer's administrations (2011-2018).

Finally, this study will make use of both primary (official governmental documents and reports, as well as speeches) and secondary sources (available academic literature, journal articles and books) in order to provide detailed information on the subject in question.

1.8. Literature Review

1.8.1. State of literature on the causes of Brazil's reduced international influence

Traditionally, the monopoly of Brazil's foreign policy formulation is held by its Ministry of External Relations, or *Itamaraty*, which works alongside Brazilian presidents to decide on the country's international agenda. *Itamaraty* is traditionally mandated to run independently and shielded from partisan politics, in order to achieve efficient levels of consistency, professionalism and continuity (Burgess and Bastos, 2017:277). However, different interpretations of Brazil's international role and what the priorities of its foreign policy should be surely impact on the way the country behaves under different governments. At the same time, different research done on the subject has adopted a variety of divergent theoretical points of departure, focusing on what they believe to be the important aspects of the analysis. In this context, a great variety of analyses have been carried out to explain the Brazil's withdrawal from the active international agenda pursued under Lula, and a few of them deserve special attention.

Recent research, which analysed Brazilian foreign policy between 1990 and 2015 and across five different administrations, has reasserted the importance of presidential authority. Presidents' engagement above the minimal roles stipulated in the Constitution will exert significant influence on the country's formulation of innovative foreign policy. While Lula's innovative international agenda was shaped by the president's active involvement in foreign affairs, Burgess and Bastos (2017:278) argue that, contrary to her two predecessors, Rousseff was less engaged with the country's foreign policy agenda. Faced with domestic political and economic crisis, Rousseff allowed the *Itamaraty* to work for itself, transforming the previously dynamic and innovative Brazilian foreign policy into a more inertial one (Burgess and Bastos, 2017:287).

Similarly, by looking at the period between 2013 and 2016 and the transition between two presidents from the same political party Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), Mawdsley, Kim & Marcondes (2017:8) argue that Brazilian practices of development cooperation were personified as a "Lula agenda", as a consequence of the president's charisma and personal experience, a strategy that proved limited as of the transition to Rousseff's administration. For the authors, the retreat experienced in the country's SSDC practices were caused by a combination of changes in political leadership and domestic and international circumstances (Mawdsley, Kim & Marcondes, 2017:10). Still on the president's role, some researchers have attributed the inertial foreign policy, right after Lula, to Rousseff's personality, appointed as one the causes for Brazil's timid role in development cooperation. For Cornetet (2014:129), Lula and Rousseff differed in terms of their socioeconomic and educational background and their political experience; elements that certainly shaped their world views, political ambitions and leadership styles. Notwithstanding the important role played by leadership on

Brazil's foreign policy configuration, several other international and domestic elements shape the scope of these leaders' ambitions and actions, acting as key determinants of the international agenda.

Nery (2017:262) goes beyond presidential leadership to analyse Brazil's foreign policy formulation vis-à-vis the different views and interests that characterise domestic political coalitions, or the "internal power dynamics". By looking at the country's different levels of disposition to engage in cooperation practices with South American countries from Lula until Temer, Nery contributes to the idea that the Brazilian foreign policy agenda has become highly politicised, centred on the presidents themselves but also reflecting the internal power dispute between different political and ideological views under different administrations (Nery, 2017:261). According to the author, Lula and Rousseff found support in a political coalition that included representatives of both the national elite and the social movements, workers and labour unions, an arrangement that allowed for an international agenda characterised by autonomy and closer relationships with the Global South (Nery, 2017:253). This arrangement, however, was dismantled by the rise of conservative neo-liberal forces within the government, under Temer, that radically changed the country's foreign policy orientation, moving away from its relationship with the South and towards the United States and Europe.

Commentators and foreign policy researchers find themselves on common ground when depicting Dilma Rousseff's foreign policy agenda as an imperfect continuation of that of her predecessor, Lula. Although significant events involving the emergence of the Global South took place during Rousseff's tenure, such as the establishment of the New Development Bank with the other BRICS countries in 2014, much of the impetus is said to have been lost. Upon his inauguration in office, Rousseff's Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota was asked whether Brazil would continue to pursue the same international agenda crafted by President Lula, to which he responded that continuation did not mean repetition and that new emphasis and nuances could be expected in the new government (MRE, 2011a).

For Cervo & Lessa (2014:149), Brazil's reduced international presence between 2011 and 2014 is a consequence of four main factors: a) poor communication between the government and segments of the society about the directions of Brazil's international agenda; b) investors and entrepreneurs' lack of trust in the government; c) absence of innovative ideas and strategies to boost foreign actors' interest in the country; and d) loss of persuasive and productive capacity by the state in the public management sphere.

Marcondes & Mawdsley (2017:689), on the other hand, identify two main factors that explain the downturn under Rousseff and Temer. Firstly, although SSDC practices

widened and deepened under Lula da Silva, they were not institutionalised so as to guarantee long-term sustainability. In other words, the authors believe that the creation of a legal framework within which South-South practices would be institutionalised, along with clearly defined bureaucratic roles would have allowed for consistency and continuity (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:691). Furthermore, a weakening political support by the Congress and increasing scrutiny over allocation of resources and debt relief initiatives helped change the narrative towards a more “result-orientated” one, in which the capital previously invested, had to now benefit a struggling domestic economy (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:692).

Alternatively, Malamud (2017:158) states that Brazil’s reduced international participation in the second decade of the century can be attributed to both changes in the international system, which became economically less favourable to Brazilian performance in global markets, and the structural consequences of an economic rise underpinned by de-industrialisation and increasing dependence on commodity prices, which compromised the country’s long-term economic growth and, therefore, its international presence.

1.8.2. State of literature on the Mozambican case under Rousseff and Temer

The relevance of the Mozambican case to understand Brazil-Africa relations in the broad scheme of SSSC lies within the fact that the Portuguese-speaking country was Africa’s largest recipient of Brazilian development cooperation during the course of Lula’s tenure. At the centre of the country’s African agenda, Mozambique received Brazilian SSSC initiatives in several areas, notably agriculture, health and education. The Brazilian government under Lula’s administration also cancelled 95 per cent of Mozambique’s debt with the country, a total of US\$315 million (Gonçalves, 2018:87). Simultaneously, Lula was also committed to boosting the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Brazil to Mozambique by increasing the presence of Brazilian multinational companies such as Odebrecht (in the construction field) and Vale (in the mining field) in the country and enhancing trade relations with Brazil.

The Mozambican case has not been studied in depth when it comes to the two administrations that succeeded Lula, neither was the influence of Brazil’s economic and political environment on development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. Much of the focus is placed on the Brazilian private enterprises based in Mozambique and the corruption scandals involving such companies and the two PT governments.

For Chichava (2017:382), Rousseff assumed office in the midst of a political and economic crisis that was about to get worse. A contracting Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing unemployment rates and inflation, coupled with corruption scandals

involving both government officials and the private sector have all added up to the weakening of ties between Brazil and Africa, in particular Mozambique. Corruption scandals involved President Rousseff and former President Lula, as well as Brazilian construction companies, such as Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht, which were accused of paying bribes to Mozambican authorities in order to win contracts (Chichava, 2017:388). Therefore, although Mozambique remained one of the largest recipients of the Brazilian development cooperation budget under the Rousseff and Temer governments, several projects were either cancelled, affected by a lack of resources or postponed in light of the corruption accusations. All this damaged the reputation of Brazilian companies and development practices in the country.

According to Burges (2014), when interviewed about the perceived differences between Lula and Rousseff's international engagement, Odebrecht officials based in Maputo stated that "where the Lula government worked hard to open doors and encourage Brazilian firms to move into Latin American and Sub-Saharan markets, Dilma [Rousseff] was [...] very clear to executives in Maputo that her government was going to follow the corporate sector, and not lead it" (Burges, 2014). Rizzi and Schutz (2017:42) also observe that, although the Rousseff government maintained the Africa project in the country's foreign policy agenda as inherited by Lula, this was done more "discretely, with fewer high-level relations with Mozambique" (Rizzi and Schutz, 2017:42).

1.8.3. Gap identified in the literature

Although there is general consensus among scholars that Brazil-Africa relations were never the same under Rousseff and Temer as they were under Lula, there is no in-depth study of the relationship between changes in Brazil's foreign policy orientation and the country's South-South Development Cooperation practices towards Mozambique. Additionally, the reconfiguration of Brazil's development cooperation with Mozambique has not been examined *vis-à-vis* the domestic and international forces at play during the governments of Rousseff and Temer. In fact, most of the research has focused on the African continent as a whole, with little research carried out on Rousseff's agenda towards Mozambique and no research that attempted to do the same analysis for Temer's two years in office. Therefore, understanding Brazil and Mozambique relations within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation after Lula left office is necessary in order to fill this literature gap.

1.9. Limitations of study

This paper aims to investigate Brazil's foreign policy during a specific period of time, and examines the impacts of foreign policy changes on the country's SSDC agenda

in Mozambique. The specificity of this research is in itself limiting, but a few major limitations should be mentioned. Primarily, this paper examines Brazil-Mozambique relations from the Brazilian perspective only, not extending the analysis to the African country's foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, the paper does not assess the results of development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique, being limited to the analysis of the *determinants* of Brazil's SSDC approach.

1.10. Chapter Outline

Following this introductory chapter, this paper is divided into four other chapters. The second chapter sets the theoretical approach that will guide the research. After looking at mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), i.e. their assumptions, contributions and limitations, it elucidates the adoption of Neoclassical Realism as the theoretical point of departure. The third chapter looks at Brazil under the Lula government, i.e. its rise as an international development player, the formulation of the country's South-South Development Cooperation agenda, as well as the domestic and global factors that informed it. Brazil's SSDC initiatives in Mozambique between 2003-2010 are then discussed, setting the tone for the following chapter. This part is crucial as it identifies the major forces driving Brazil's international agenda, both nationally and internationally. In short, this part presents the context within which the following administrations will emerge, and identifies several aspects of Brazil's SSDC that compromised its sustainability in the long-term, e.g. the involvement of the private sector and the personification of Brazil's Africa agenda as a "Lula agenda" rather than a Brazilian one.

The fourth chapter addresses the main subject of this study, which is the changes in Brazil's approach towards South-South Development Cooperation experienced after the Lula government, i.e. during Rousseff and Temer's administrations. These changes are examined in light of the broader reconfiguration of Brazil's foreign policy during said period. To that end, the chapter looks at the main driving forces behind Rousseff and Temer's cooperation agenda, touching on the domestic and the international environment. This will afford the author the chance to identify the major determinants of SSDC in the Brazilian case, which is crucial to understand Brazil-Mozambique relations during said period. The chapter will then focus on the Brazilian development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique under Rousseff and Temer and identifies the differences in the nature and the intensity of such initiatives in comparison to the Lula government.

The fifth chapter concludes the study by presenting its main findings and reflecting upon the case study in question, i.e. Mozambique. At last, it makes a few considerations for future research in the subject.

Chapter II: Theoretical framework – South-South Cooperation and Foreign Policy

2.1. Introduction

As stated by Jules and Sá e Silva (2008:45), South-South Cooperation is an interdisciplinary phenomenon and, as such, it has been studied by different fields of the social sciences, such as education, comparative politics, international relations and development studies. In the absence of a general theory of South-South Cooperation or a general theoretical conception of states' motivations behind these policies, any attempt to analyse such a topic, as well as its transformations throughout time, can be carried out through the lens of different theoretical points of departure. Within the realm of International Relations, wherein this thesis places itself, different theoretical approaches may disagree on several issues ranging from the objects of studies and levels of analysis to its actual investigative purposes as theories.

However, regardless of how wide the field may be, a few major theories have dominated scholarly discussions about international politics. Neorealism and neoliberalism have remained at the forefront of foreign policy discourses since the end of the Second World War, but others such as constructivism and critical theories represent a challenge to their dominance. Additionally, self-acclaimed “theories of foreign policy”, such as neoclassical realism, emerge as an attempt to fill the analytical gap left by dominant perspectives when looking at individual states. For this reason, the applicability of each major International Relations (IR) theories is discussed in this chapter, though they do not exhaust all the sub-theories that can be found under the umbrella of realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical (or Marxist) theories.

The discussion around the applicability of these theories to individual cases is one that occurs frequently among IR theorists, who carry divergent views on what aspects¹⁴ to include and what to exclude in the formulation of theories in the first place, as well as what the *object* of analysis should be (Burchill & Linklater, 2005:19). For instance, with the emergence of the “level of analysis” within the field of international politics (Singer, 1961; Putnam, 1988), mainstream theories began to be questioned on

¹⁴ For instance, Liberal theories attack realism's failure to acknowledge the importance of economic factors, such as interdependence, in determining the prospects of war and peace in world politics, an aspect often neglected by realists (Burchill, 2005:66). Moreover, liberalism will advocate the relevance of non-state actors and international institutions in shaping international politics (Burchill, 2005:82). With reference to constructivism, its proponents will challenge both realist and liberal theories by arguing that normative and ideational structures, such as identity and international norms, will determine states' actions, yet are often overlooked by mainstream theories of international politics (Reus-Smit, 2005:196).

their explanatory capabilities. The idea advanced was that the domestic context of a country will exert more influence on its international behaviour than previously thought, generating the need to incorporate to the analysis the examination of national politics, institutional settings, leadership style, among others,

For example, realist theorist Kenneth Waltz in *Man, the State and War*, argues for the dominance of the third image, or the international system, in determining the occurrence of war or peace in international politics, though he argues that an understanding of the two other levels (individual and the state) is required (Waltz, 2001:238). Later, when defending the applicability of realist theories to the analysis of individual states' foreign policies, Waltz maintained that theories of international politics are doomed to underspecification like any other theory. That does not mean, according to him, that specific factors could not be added to the analysis when such theories are applied (Waltz, 2001:56). In other words, international politics theories may exclude unit-level factors that are required in the analysis of individual cases because they are theories of international relations and not theories of foreign policy. As such, when international factors are more decisive than international ones in defining a states' behaviour, theories of international politics need assistance (Waltz, 2001:57).

Brazil's emergence as a new superpower must surely be explained in relation to the opportunities found in the international stage. Still, this would not be enough. A set of characteristics emerging from the domestic arena shaped the kind of foreign policy pursued by Lula, i.e. political ideologies, the success of developmental initiatives implemented nationally, leadership style and the nature of the relationship between the government and other domestic (political and economic) actors. Similarly, the subsequent governments of Rousseff and Temer reacted to a combination of changes in the international and domestic domains, which will determine the objectives and the scope of their international agenda.

In other words, opting for a purely systemic theoretical tool to fully analyse the Brazilian agenda towards Africa, most particularly Mozambique, would result in a too simplistic conclusion that would ignore the unit-level dynamics influencing the changes in the country's foreign policy. In the same vein, national factors alone cannot account for the combination of circumstances involved in Brazil's rise and fall as key actor of South-South Development Cooperation, such as changes in the global economy. Therefore, Brazil's development cooperation with a major African partner, Mozambique, must be carefully studied in order to cover all the important determinants of this agenda. Only then will one be apt to understand the retraction of such practices under Rousseff and Temer.

After discussing the applicability of dominant IR theories to this individual case, this chapter will argue that, despite the relevant contributions of each theory to the broader understanding of Brazil's international relations, they were deemed incomplete and less predisposed to offer a thorough explanation of the turn of events. Choosing between one of these theoretical frameworks would entail leaving out important internal and external factors that affected Brazil's disposition towards South-South Development Cooperation practices from the Lula years until Temer's term in office, particularly in Mozambique.

Therefore, Neoclassical Realism was chosen as the most appropriate theoretical framework for the purposes of this chapter in order to grasp the amalgamation of factors involved in Brazil's changing orientation towards the use of South-South Development Cooperation initiatives as an instrument of foreign policy. A further discussion outlining the superiority of the neoclassical approach for the purposes of this study, as well as its specificities, will be touched upon later in this section. Similarly, the inappropriateness of the other theories for this study will also be examined. To begin with, this chapter will provide an overview of the most prominent theories of international politics as well as their limitations as theoretical tools for a good understanding of the particularities of this case.

2.2. Mainstream International Relations Theories: incomplete accounts of South-South Development Cooperation?

2.2.1. Realist theories

Realism is considered to be the oldest theory of international politics. Nevertheless, this well-conceived theoretical framework remains one of the dominant approaches to understanding and sometimes predicting inter-state relations. Realist concepts, such as the security dilemma and the balance of power, derive from the notion of an anarchic system where states are the main actors. Realism is, above all, a state-focused understanding of international interactions (Donnelly, 2005:30).

For realists, states are rational entities whose ultimate goals are to survive in a chaotic anarchic international environment and pursue their own national interests. While realists agree that power is the central and only concern in international politics and that states constitute the main relevant actor (Clark, 2016:149), ideas vary significantly within the realist theory. For this reason, they shall be divided into two main sub-theories: "classical realism" and "neorealism" – the latter also being called structural realism.

With its roots in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, classical realism's focus is on the imperfection of human nature, or man's natural inclination

towards the pursuit of power and domination. For Morgenthau, interest is defined in terms of power (Kopalyan, 2009:31). This desire for power, inherent to human nature (i.e. first image), will then collectively reflect on the behaviour of states (i.e. second-image) and their interactions in the international level (viz. third image), making states the central element of analysis for realist thought.

Though both classical realists and neorealists agree on the centrality of power, and the struggle for power in international politics, they disagree on its conception and on the roots of this struggle. The classical realist conception of power differs to the neorealist one, going beyond military capabilities to encompass other phenomena such as economic, ideological and cultural power (Kopalyan, 2009:29). For Morgenthau, “it is not the nature or the form of power that is of essence, but rather the capacity of such power to establish control” (Kopalyan, 2009:29-30).

Moreover, the reasons for this struggle are understood differently by neorealists and classical realists. While classical realism traces its roots back to humans’ natural inclination, neorealists will argue that the struggle for power and dominance in international politics will occur due to the inexistence of a supra-national body, or a global leviathan, to which states have to respond (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009:4). Anarchy, not human nature, is the primary cause of world conflict for neorealists. In a way, classical realism takes into account elements that are neglected in neorealism, such as the importance of looking at the individual and state levels of analysis. Furthermore, classical realism offers a broader conception of power, defined not only in military, but also economic and ideological terms (Kopalyan, 2009:28). Therefore, it can be argued that classical realism, though emphasising the primacy of the international system, did not neglect the state and the individual levels of analysis. Yet, as stated by Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman (2009:16), classical realists did not offer a sound research programme for international politics studies, and often focused on unit-level analysis, overlooking the limitations imposed by the international system.

Kenneth Waltz, the founder of structural realism, will advocate for a move away from reductionist (unit-level) approaches to international politics, such as classical realism, and towards a systemic approach (Kopalyan, 2009:44). Neorealism’s main assumptions are based on the existence of an anarchical international system, in which the absence of a supranational government body leads individual states to pursue a primary goals, i.e. their own survival, mostly achieved through the maximization of wealth power (Donnelly, 2000:9), which is defined mostly in military terms. Given this anarchical nature of world politics, every country is seen as a potential enemy, and cooperation among states is hard to achieve, if not impossible. Consequently, as per the neorealist understanding, states’ national interests and their subsequent behaviour towards other

states will be uniquely shaped by the structural constraints of the system (Waltz, 1979:92). Thus, as with classical realism, neorealism attributes the existence of conflict and the pursuit of power to the anarchical nature of the international system. However, contrary to classical realism, neorealism states that this feature will be the one and only determinant of nations' behaviour in international relations.

Despite the relevance of realist paradigms, especially after the end of the Second World War, efforts to analyse Brazil's foreign policy disposition within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation through the lens of classical realism or neorealism are doomed to incompleteness. Thus, it is fundamental to understand the inadequacies of both sub-theories of realism for this individual case.

Firstly, realist theories are fundamentally sceptical of international cooperation as an attainable practice in international relations. Drawing on the theory of classical realism, the idea that individuals continuously influence a country's behaviour is a relevant choice for understanding Brazil's agenda towards Africa. This is evidenced by the sharp contrasts between the three administrations in question. That said, the classical realist idea of an imperfect, egoistic and self-interested human nature, if applied as a point of departure for this analysis, would fail to explain Brazil's horizontal, solidarity-based cooperation with the developing world under Lula. Brazil-Mozambique cooperation practices were built consequent to a narrative of mutual benefit, solidarity and fairness, principles that are not considered in the realm of classical realism.

Though the motivations behind the horizontality and solidarity narrative are related to the pursuit of national interests, ignoring such narrative altogether would go against efforts to fully understand the evolution of Brazil's South-South agenda and its cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. In other words, Brazil's pursuit of national development and international influence, through SSDC, *can* be seen as an example of a state in pursuit of economic and ideological power. However, the specific ways in Brazil framed its cooperation practices between 2003 and 2018 would be poorly analysed through the lens of classical realism, as this would entail rejecting key elements before even analysing them.

As for the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical reference for this study, a few issues can be pointed out. Individuals as well as domestic constraints (of political and economic nature) played an essential role in the definition of Brazil's foreign policy orientation under the two administrations following Lula. Thus, changes in the Brazilian approach to SSDC were primarily, but not exclusively, dictated by international factors, as neorealism would assume. Moreover, for realists, states are seen as the most important units in international relations, and they can be understood as unitary rational actors seeking to maximise their national interests (Donnelly, 2000:7). Brazil's foreign

policy orientation towards South-South Development Cooperation, however, cannot be understood as the pursuit of an agenda devoid of contestation. On the contrary, the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy undergoes negotiation between different interest groups within the government and society in general. The presence of Brazilian private enterprises in Mozambique, for example, indicates that various non-state actors that have distinct interest are at play, and these have to be taken into account when analysing and explaining the different depths of involvement with Mozambique under different administrations.

Therefore, neorealism is a relevant but inadequate tool for the analysis of Brazil's rise and fall as Mozambique's strategic development partner. Its relevance lies on the explanatory capacity of the systemic circumstances that led to Brazil's emergence and decline between 2003 and 2018. Put differently, there is no doubt that a series of international events created the necessary opportunities for Brazil's rise as a South-South Development Cooperation partner. Similarly, international events also contributed towards Brazil's more timid and constrained behaviour under Rousseff and Temer. The relevance of the international environment will be discussed further in the next chapters, but a brief outline is in order.

Firstly, in the early 2000s, factors such as the global commodity boom and the emergence of China as a threat to American hegemony created promising opportunities for the rise of middle-power countries such as Brazil. With the advent of Lula's rise to power in this period, Brazil re-formulates its policy towards the South, expanding its presence not only in neighbouring Latin America, but also in Africa. Secondly, the post-2008 world crisis and the end of the commodity boom, which was a consequence of China's declining economic growth, affected the Brazilian economy and put an end to the country's acclaimed economic development that projected the country as a "role model" for the developing world. Assuming office in 2011, Dilma Rousseff faced the constraints of a slowing global economy in which Brazil had lost political space and material power, a situation that became more pronounced towards the end of her tenure and ultimately reached its worst during Michel Temer's administration.

That being said, systemic factors alone do not explain, for instance, the fact that Rousseff's attempts to give continuity to Lula's endeavours in the African continent were jeopardized by a more hostile and divisive political environment in which the President had to work. Likewise, systemic factors do not explain Michel Temer's difficulty to attain legitimacy before Brazil's Southern partners after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. Moreover, the ideological reorientation under Michel Temer, i.e. towards Brazil's "traditional partners", exerted immediate pressure on the country's South-South

Development Cooperation agenda, meaning that changes in this domain were not solely forced upon by the international system.

With regards to Mozambique in particular, a systemic interpretation would fail to explain the effect of political pressure, exercised by actors within the government and society more broadly, for a budget reduction that impacted the allocation of resources to development cooperation projects. Furthermore, it would also fail to recognise the impact of corruption accusations involving big Brazilian construction companies and Mozambican officials on the legitimacy of Brazilian projects in the country.

In other words, it seems unsuitable to presume that international factors alone shape Brazil's or any other country's disposition towards South-South Development Cooperation practice. It seems equally inappropriate to deem Brazil's motivations as merely (material) power-seeking ones. These are the two main reasons why neorealism, along with classical realism, has been considered an inadequate framework for this study.

As previously stated, a confluence of actors influenced the formulation of Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda under Lula, Rousseff and Temer. The idea of a "plural" state is supported by liberal theories of international politics, as well as the idea of a country's predisposition to cooperate in the international arena. Therefore, a look into liberalism and its contributions and limitations to the case of Brazil and Mozambique is necessary.

2.2.2. Liberal theories

Liberal theories of international politics look at non-state actors rather than the state itself to explain countries' international behaviour. Such theories provide a more complete account of inner state dynamics than realism, once it attempts to look inside the "black box" of the state by assuming that the formation of national interests in foreign policy will reflect the pressures exerted by non-state actors, such as individuals and the private sector (Slaughter, 2011: 4). In substance, domestic groups are key actors whose interests will be transmitted to domestic political institutions and define a country's preferences. These dynamics, therefore, will change throughout time alongside variations on domestic and transnational contexts (Moravcsik, 2010:1). Amidst the different domestic aspects considered by different liberal theories are economic interests, political ideologies, national identity and the institutional representation of domestic groups. A state's foreign policy will then be "constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction, by domestic social coalitions" (Moravcsik, 2010:2).

These assumptions are very useful to understand the turn in Brazil's foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis the domestic dynamics, in particular upon the ascent to power of the Temer government in 2016. Demands from societal groups for the return of the investments placed in Africa under Lula (de Castro, 2013:1) were the result of a political process of delegitimisation of the Workers' Party's foreign policy agenda, encapsulated in the Temer government. Besides, the economic interests of the big Brazilian companies located in Mozambique are among the different causes for the pursuit of a more economic-driven approach to SSDC after Lula left office.

However, there are two main problems with the adoption of a liberal theoretical framework to understand Brazil-Mozambique relations from the context of SSDC. Firstly, the Brazilian international agenda for cooperation and its increasing presence in Africa during Lula's administration were primarily dictated by systemic factors, which allowed for the country's rise to an "emerging power". In this case, domestic dynamics cannot be prioritised in detriment of the international context, as it allowed for the increase in Brazilian SSDC initiatives and somehow constrained them at a later stage.

Secondly, the pluralist notion of states developed by the liberal theory assumes that states' interests in the international stage are defined in terms of the different interest groups, private actors and societal forces. These forces will compete for influence within the state and occasionally "capture" it (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:11). This notion of a weak state in constant risk of being captured and submissive to non-state actors' interests would largely distort the reality Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda which, despite the plurality of actors involved in its formulation and execution, is essentially state-driven.

As argued by Milani & Pinheiro (2013:18), the formulation of Brazil's foreign policy agenda has shifted from the traditional monopoly of the Ministry of External Relations, or *Itamaraty*, towards a variety of other actors. It must be considered that different ministries, federal agencies and subnational entities are involved in initiating and implementing foreign policy, but also that non-state agents such as corporations, social movements, and economic sectors have growing influence in these decisions. However, though increasingly relevant in the debate surrounding the country's international agenda, non-state actors are not the ultimate decision-makers, and the responsibility for policy formulation still lies with the government (Milani & Pinheiro, 2013:21).

As for development cooperation in Mozambique, for example, the majority of the projects are either carried out by governmental agencies, such as the establishment of an antiretroviral drug manufacturing plant in Maputo by *Fundação Oswaldo Cruz* (FioCruz), or by private actors that are heavily financed by the Brazilian Development

Bank (BNDES)¹⁵. Therefore, it is safe to say that, under Lula, the Brazilian state occupied the central role in Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation, despite the involvement of private capital interests and other actors. The interplay between the state and private interests in defining the SSDC agenda will be encapsulated in the Mozambican case, which will be discussed in the next chapters.

To conclude this section, although liberalism sees international cooperation (thus South-South Development Cooperation) as possible as well as desirable, it fails to provide an appropriate theoretical framework in which *state* interests are accurately accounted for. Furthermore, liberal theories neglect the fundamental importance of systemic factors as determinants of the country's opportunities and motivations (or lack thereof) to cooperate. Consequently, liberal theories will not fully contribute to the analysis of the retreat in Brazilian SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique between 2011 and 2018.

Having looked at the contributions and limitations of realism and liberalism to the purposes of this paper, constructivism and critical theories shall be considered next.

2.2.3. Constructivism

Constructivist approaches, though offering a valuable explanation of questions of national identity and individual perception of events in the global state, fails to accounting for the various domestic structures and actors influencing the direction and practices of a country's foreign policy.

Constructivism emerges as an alternative set of theories to fill the gap left by realist and liberal theories in explaining the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Its most prominent scholar is Alexander Wendt, who as per his own statement, shares with realists a few assumptions, i.e. the anarchical nature of the international system; states' centrality to international politics analysis and their rationality; and the importance of theorising on the third image (Wendt, 1995:72). According to constructive perspectives, however, identities and perspectives are socially constructed at the individual, national

¹⁵ "The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is the main financing agent for development in Brazil. Since its foundation, in 1952, the BNDES has played a fundamental role in stimulating the expansion of industry and infrastructure in the country. Over the course of the Bank's history, its operations have evolved in accordance with the Brazilian socio-economic challenges, and now they include support for exports, technological innovation, sustainable socio-environmental development and the modernization of public administration. The Bank offers several financial support mechanisms to Brazilian companies of all sizes as well as public administration entities, enabling investments in all economic sectors. In any supported undertaking, from the analysis phase up to the monitoring, the BNDES emphasizes three factors it considers strategic: innovation, local development and socio-environmental development" (BNDES, n.d.)

and international levels, an idea that is best explained by Wendt's famous statement: "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992:395). Thus, constructivism argues for an understanding of international structures as socially, rather than materially, constructed (Wendt, 1995:71). The same applies to the concepts of power and interest, defined by shared ideas and knowledge (Wendt, 1995:74).

Furthermore, this socially constructed international system pictured by constructivists will not only shape actor's behaviour, as realists would assume, but it will shape their identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:72). It is, therefore, one of the main elements of constructivist theories to understand the international system as a socially-constructed space where state's identities – and consequently their interests – are fluidly and continuously being shaped by their interactions with one another.

Constructivism allows for the inclusion of "intangible", non-rational factors shaping agents' interest, ideas and behaviour. Identity politics, for example, cannot be overlooked when understanding a country's foreign policy agenda and its objectives. However, constructivism does not offer a clear research programme for the study of international politics, thus lacking systematic and empirical capability to understand ever-changing identity constructions and national interests (Keohane, 1988:392)

For the study of Brazil's withdrawal from the international scene as a key actor of South-South Development Cooperation, actors' identities and perceptions are indeed of relevance, however there are also objective constraints – both domestically and internationally – of political and material (economic) nature that will determine the country's withdrawal from SSDC. In short, constructivism is applicable in several instances of this specific case, but certainly not sufficiently adequate.

2.2.4. Critical theories

Critical theories' main focus are on analysing and explaining the unequal relations and how they are reflected in states' interactions in the international arena. The main argument behind critical theories of international relations, which generally derive from or employ elements of the Marxist approach, is that the evolution of capitalism through the process of globalisation has perpetuated material inequalities within and among countries (Linklater, 2005:133). However, while critical theories will draw upon Marxist theories, it will also include the social and political domains in understanding global affairs, trying to provide a framework of analysis in which the exclusionary nature of international relations is a central assumption (Devetak, 2005:159).

Although the Brazilian approach to SSDC under Lula was characterised by the "Southern" principle of horizontality and underpinned by a narrative of fair and equal relations, studies have been carried out on the interplay between class interests,

domestic policy and foreign policy behind Lula and Rousseff's international agenda¹⁶. Other studies focus particularly on the exploitative nature of Brazilian cooperation projects in Mozambique, raising concerns over irregular land appropriation, poor labour conditions, and environmental degradation. They also argue that the kind of partnership developed between Brazil and Mozambique is neither characterised by solidarity nor horizontality, as its proponents would argue. Instead, this relationship is said to be one of exploration that serves to increase Mozambique's dependence on Brazilian investments¹⁷.

Though extremely important to understand the outputs and long-term impact of Brazilian South-South Cooperation practices, this kind of analysis will not be the focus of this research. Rather, this thesis will investigate the broader changes in Brazil's foreign policy orientation under different administrations after the Lula years, thus the "inputs" rather than outcomes and impact. It will do so by looking at the interplay between different domestic factors – without turning a blind eye to the international stage – in defining Brazil's interest and disposition to engage in SSDC initiatives with Mozambique. For this reason, critical theories do not offer a theoretical framework upon which the main arguments of this thesis can be built.

Having looked at major theories of international politics and outlined their contributions and limitations to the individual case under examination, it is now pertinent to concentrate efforts on the theoretical framework chosen as a point of departure for this paper, viz. neoclassical realism.

2.3. Neoclassical Realism: incorporating the three levels of analysis

The term "neoclassical realism" was first coined by Gideon Rose in 1998, and presented as a theory of foreign policy that stems from the realist perspective of international politics. According to Rose, efforts to develop a general theory of foreign policy have been limited by the use of two opposite, yet complimentary, views of international politics. On the one extreme, *Innenpolitik* approaches understand domestic politics as key defining factors of foreign policy outcomes. *Innenpolitik* accounts of a country's behaviour will focus on factors such as ideology, social structures, partisan politics and identity (Rose, 1998:148), overlooking systemic forces. The other extreme, or the so-called systemic approaches to international relations, is explored by different strands of realist theories, in which foreign policy behaviour reflects the reaction of

¹⁶ See Boito, A., & Berringer, T. (2014). Social classes, neodevelopmentalism, and Brazilian foreign policy under presidents Lula and Dilma. *Latin American Perspectives*, 41(5), 94-109.

¹⁷ See Alden, C., Chichava, S. & Alves, C. (2017) *Mozambique and Brazil: Forging New Partnership or Developing Dependency?*

rational and unitary states to systemic factors. By privileging international variables, however, most of the domestic variables are neglected (Rose, 1998:146).

While understanding international politics as a mere product of unit-level dynamics can produce misguided interpretations, purely systemic theories such as neorealism, on the other hand, are also doomed to eminently simplistic and, at times, deterministic analyses that are unable to grasp specific contexts within which a state's policies are determined (Rose, 1998:147). Additionally, for Singer (1961:23), purely systemic approaches will fail to recognise a country's agency or autonomy to choose its actions in international politics, given that it understands these unitary states – “black boxes” – as being impacted by systemic factors but not as agents impacting the system.

In attempt to bridge *Innenpolitik* and realist understandings of states' external behaviours, neoclassical realism looks at both external and internal factors in order to explain states' international behaviour. The starting point of neoclassical realism, along the lines of other realist approaches, is the international system or third image. For neoclassical realists, the international system (i.e. its anarchical nature and, most importantly, the distribution of material power among different states) will ultimately define the scope and ambitions of a country's foreign policy and of states' interactions. Given that “a state's foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment” (Rose, 1998:151), these policies will primarily reflect a country's relative power within the global system.

However, contrary to the neorealist theory of international politics, neoclassical realism also incorporates domestic variables as an intervening factor in the definition and scope of a country's foreign policy agenda (Rose, 1998:147). As much as international factors, domestic ones will also constrain and induce national leaders and states' policies. For Singer (1961:27), including the nation state as an essential object of analysis allows for a more accurate description and in-depth explanation of specific events in international politics.

The relevance of realist paradigms, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is drawn upon by neoclassical realism. As explained by Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman (2009:13), “neoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the constraints of the international system”. Additionally, while neorealism tries to identify and analyse recurring patterns of behaviour in international politics, neoclassical realism tries to assess countries' responses to the circumstances of the international system (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009:21-22).

Neoclassical realism will then reject the idea of a perfect “transmission belt” between the constraints of the third image and the domestic response, by looking at the

way in which internal aspects of states will impact leaders' perception of international threats and opportunities and shape a country's economic, military and diplomatic policies abroad. Therefore, the first image, or the "individual", must be equally analysed. Among factors to be considered in the domestic domain are the state's capacity to extract and mobilise the necessary national resources for the pursuit of international strategies; the influence of domestic actors (i.e. legislators, political parties, and others) and interest groups (such as economic segments); the social cohesion of societies; and the latter's impact on national policies vis-à-vis state autonomy (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009:4).

In other words, leaders will constantly play what Putnam (1988:434) describes as a *two-level game*, in which their response to international incentives or threats occurs simultaneously and not independently from the domestic institutional setting and domestic actors, i.e. there is constant bargaining with the domestic society (from which resources are extracted and mobilised) and the states' key stakeholders (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:7). While leaders will ultimately define national interests by assessing international opportunities and threats from a privileged position (for example, where they have more access to information), this process is more complex than assumed by realists, and often entails negotiating with other sectors and actors within the state (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:26).

Furthermore, the impact of non-state or sub-state actors on a country's foreign policy decisions will increase the more vulnerable this state and its ruling political elites are. Therefore, "less autonomous states must frequently build coalitions and make compromises to mobilise social and political actors in order to enact policy" (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:27) and their "vulnerability to violent overthrow[...]inhibit the state's ability to respond to systemic pressures (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:28). This will be of utmost importance when assessing Rousseff's weakened authority to give continuity to her predecessor's foreign policy agenda. Against the backdrop of a legitimacy crisis and a divided political environment at home, Rousseff had to respond to a lot of pressure from her political opposition and segments of the civil society, a situation that would reach its climax with the impeachment in 2016.

A neoclassical realist account of international politics understands systemic factors as the main drivers of foreign policy, particularly dictated by a country's relative material power in relation to others, an idea that steams from classical realism. However, neoclassical realism argues that these external variables alone will not determine specific state choices of course of action or their behaviour. State-level factors, such as the *perception* of leaders and political elites of their relative material power, as well as external threats and opportunities, will closely shape such behaviours (Rose, 1998:147).

Systemic pressures and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction of foreign policy without being strong or precise enough to determine the specific details of state behavior. This means that the influence of systemic factors may often be more apparent from a distance than from up close - for example, in significantly limiting the menu of foreign policy choices considered by a state's leaders at a particular time, rather than in forcing the selection of one particular item on that menu over another (Rose, 1998:147).

Therefore, for neoclassical realists, a better understanding of a country's foreign policy formulation and implementation entails a closer examination of how systemic circumstances will play out within the domestic domain. Most specifically of how they will limit or broaden leaders' scope of action within a specific state structure (Rose, 1998:152). As for the nature of Brazil's international agenda, there is consensus among scholars that the definition of the scope of South-South Development Cooperation projects was heavily influenced by presidential role, that characterises how specific leaders' personalities will shape perceptions and responses to systemic forces (Faria & Paradis, 2013; Burges & Bastos, 2017), but also by unit-level elements such as partisan politics (Nery, 2017) and by the agency of other actors – the *Itamaraty*, federal agencies, NGOs and social movements as well as private enterprises (de la Fontaine & Seifert, 2010).

In *De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira*, political scientist Amorim Neto develops an in-depth analysis of the determinants of Brazilian foreign policy between 1946 and 2008, during eighteen different administrations. Amorim Neto uses the country's voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly as a quantitative indicator of Brazil's foreign policy orientation in order to test whether it is unit-level or systemic factors that play a more decisive role in shaping the country's agenda. By making use of several systemic as well as domestic variables, the research concludes that systemic forces are the primary conditioning elements of Brazilian foreign policy orientation, though domestic aspects such as the ideological leaning of the president's cabinet also impacted significantly (Malamud, 2012:121-122). However, it is suggested that the degree of support for and personal involvement of the president affects the way in which bureaucratic traditions and ideological orientations interplay and respond to systemic constraints and incentives (Malamud, 2012:122)

Similarly, Malamud's (2017:150) assessment of Brazil's rise as a global power under Lula pays good attention to the systemic causes that, according to him, created a permissive international setting for the country's rise in the first place. According to this

thesis, the capability of a new power to rise is decided by the permissiveness or restrictiveness of the global affairs, dictated in terms of degrees of polarity and rivalry (Malamud, 2017:150). Between 1991 and 2011, key external events and conditions allowed for Brazil's growing presence in the international stage: the fall of the Soviet Union and end of a bipolar world, which allowed for regional and middle powers to become more proactive; the nonexistence of enemies, conflict or nuclear powers in South America and the creation of the Mercosur (Common Market of the South) in 1991, characterising a relatively peaceful regional setting for Brazil's rise and the emergence of China in the early 2000s (Malamud, 2017:152).

Brazil's "rollback", in a similar way, will also be internationally conditioned by, among other factors, the economic slowdown in Europe and the US, China's declining economic growth and revisionist intentions, as well as an apparent reduction in "global demand for softer, greener and gentle powers" after Trump's rise to power (Malamud, 2017:159,161). However, this thesis will argue that domestic elements played a fundamental role in defining the scope of Brazil's foreign policy, both during its "rise" and its "decline". While political stability, presidential activism and the success of economic policies in the domestic sphere will push the country's global ambitions forward under Lula, poor leadership, economic and political constraints and the country's stained image abroad due to corruption scandals will determine Brazil's drastic retraction from its international ambitions, affecting primarily its humanitarian and cooperation agenda (Malamud, 2017:163).

2.4. Concluding remarks

The aforementioned context leaves no doubt about the complexities behind Brazil's formulation of its foreign policy, especially in the realm of SSDC. The country's rise as a key player in the international development landscape can be explained in relation to the conduciveness of the international political economy in the early 2000s. However, the configuration of Lula's SSDC agenda surely carried the specificities of the domestic environment, such as the President's own views and ambitions and the state-led model of development implemented at home. Similarly, Brazil's withdrawal from Lula's international project after 2010 are informed by both the constraints imposed by the international environment and the way it unfolded within the domestic remain. Thus, neoclassical realism offers a more comprehensive framework for analysing the various aspects pertaining to the subject under study. It is argued that SSDC initiatives with Mozambique declined in response to the changes in Brazil's foreign policy orientation, which were dictated by both domestic and international factors during the two administrations after Lula.

Chapter III: Brazil's Foreign Policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Mozambique: the Lula years (2003-2010)

3.1. Introduction

The incorporation of “development” into Brazil’s international agenda is not a complete novelty. As pointed out by Dauvergne and Farias (2012:907), this idea can be traced back to the emergence of the Independent Foreign Policy (*Política Externa Independente*¹⁸) of the 1960s. At the time, however, Brazil’s foreign policy was permeated with the politics of the Cold war, and it emphasised the economic aspects of development, in particular the commercial ones. Moreover, that was period in which colonisation was still intact as a political project in most parts of the Third World, hindering the forging of solid ties between Brazil and countries in Africa and Asia, for instance.

In the years that followed, the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil’s transition from over two decades of military government (1964-1985) to democracy saw a detachment from the former’s “national-developmental economic model of state intervention and import substitution” (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012:907). With the rise of global neoliberalism, the developmental approach was replaced with a neoliberal approach to both domestic and international politics, pushing both “development” and the developing world away from the country’s foreign policy. As a result, major changes in the country’s foreign policy would only come about in the early 2000s, shaped by the transformations of international dynamics and Brazilian domestic politics alike.

Against this background, the Lula government can be considered the starting point of Brazil’s rise as a “global developmental power” (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012), a status pursued mostly through the intensification of the South-South relations approach. As per the hypotheses under investigation for this thesis, and in order to understand the transformation of Brazilian foreign policy and its impact on cooperation for development in Mozambique during Rousseff’s and Temer’s administrations, it is imperative to begin with a careful analysis of Brazil’s emergence under Lula (2003-2010). Functioning as a tool for the achievement of the country’s international ambitions, South-South Development Cooperation mirrored and aided Brazil’s development at the same time. As for Africa, the continent was given a prominent role within Lula’s foreign policy agenda, and Mozambique figures as an important illustration of the nuances of Brazil’s SSDC.

¹⁸ Within the context of the Cold War, the Independent Foreign Policy sought to minimise the effects of the bipolar world order on national development projects. Accordingly, Brazil’s international agenda should foster new partnerships devoid of political ideologies (Oliveira, 2005:89)

In other words, while Brazil's bilateral relations with Mozambique in the twenty-first century, particularly with respect to cooperation for development, needs to be understood within the broader Brazilian agenda for South-South Development Cooperation with Africa, the latter cannot be fully comprehended without a closer examination of the country's renewed international ambitions under President Lula's two terms in office (2003-2006 and 2007-2010). According to Saraiva (2010:169), reviving and strengthening ties with the African continent as a whole characterised one of the major instruments for the realisation of Brazil's desired global prominence in the new century. This new foreign policy agenda, called "assertive" by Lula's foreign minister Celso Amorim¹⁹, was not only the result of pro-active foreign policy decision makers such as Lula and Amorim themselves, but was also shaped and made possible by the favourable environment for the rise of Brazil, both domestically and internationally.

Against this backdrop, this chapter will aim to shed light into the events prior to the decision to "pull the plug" on cooperation for development in Mozambique between 2011 and 2018. The chapter will be structured in two parts. The first part will attempt to locate the SSDC agenda in Africa within Brazil's broader national and international aspirations during Lula's administration. In accordance with the assumptions of neoclassical realism, Brazil's ambitions cannot transcend the space and the opportunities provided by the existing world order. In the same vein, such opportunities are not automatically translated into foreign policy, but undergo a complex process of filtering, interpreting and planning in the domestic domain, hence the need to look carefully at the domestic setup. The transformations in the global dynamics and the shift away from American hegemony towards the emerging developing world characterise a fundamental stepping stone for Brazil's emergence as a key SSDC player, particularly in Africa. Notwithstanding these international elements, however, the analysis will be largely centred on the domestic sphere, where such opportunities were read and translated in relation to the opportunities and constraints of national politics and, more importantly, mirroring the developmental project that was installed.

The second part of this chapter will focus primarily on the case study in question, Brazil's development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. Rather than an attempt to outline the perceptions, results or impact of Brazil's cooperation projects in Mozambique, efforts will be channelled into placing Mozambique within Brazil's broader South-South Development Cooperation agenda under Lula, shedding light into the nature of this relationship and its nuances. This should afford the author the chance to understand Mozambique's place and relevance within Brazil's foreign policy agenda, as well as start

¹⁹ Amorim, C. (2017). *Acting globally: memoirs of Brazil's assertive foreign policy*. Rowman & Littlefield.

mapping what domestic and international elements enabled this relationship to reach unprecedented levels between 2003 and 2010.

This chapter will argue that the foundations of Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda were laid by the Lula government's two pronged approach socioeconomic development, on the one hand, and Brazil's reformist ambitions on the international stage, on the other. Put differently, Brazil's successful experiences of economic growth with social inclusion, in the Lula government, were exported to other developing countries through SSDC initiatives, as in the case of Mozambique. At the same time, development cooperation provided Brazil with the necessary credentials to consolidate its leadership aspirations and granted the political support it needed in its reformist aspirations, i.e. the reform of the UN and the WTO, for instance, in order to serve the developmental goals of the developing world.

3.2. Brazil's foreign policy disposition under Lula and the South-South Development Cooperation Agenda in Africa: navigating between national and international goals

Although Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda was not limited to Africa, the continent played a fundamental role in shaping the Brazilian strategy towards the developing world, especially under Lula's two terms in office. As much as SSDC is an essential tool of the country's renewed aspirations in its foreign relations, Africa is one of the major spaces in which this new policy was experimented, deepened and legitimised.

Brazil's relations with the continent can be traced as far back as the years of slavery, but were formalised upon the onset of independence of African countries in the twentieth century. However, close and stable relations between both sides of the Atlantic were not an immediate result of this formalisation of diplomatic ties. On the contrary, Brazil's Africa agenda has always been a shifting, inconsistent one, in which the level of depth of Brazil's involvement with the continent were defined and re-defined by the ruling decision makers' motivations and priorities (Mapa, 2011b:9). Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that this relationship was renewed and strengthened during the first decade of the new millennium, informed by Lula's national and global ambitions.

There is enough evidence on the ground to attest to changes in Brazil's diplomacy towards Africa after the rise of President Lula to power in 2003. During his eight years in office, the President visited 25 African countries and his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited 40 (Cicalo, 2012:7). Presidential visits to the continent totalled to 33 (Chichava, Alves and Alden, 2017:2) and the number of Brazilian embassies in Africa increased

from 18 to 36. At the same time, the number African diplomatic representations in Brazil also increased from 16 to 29 between 2003 and 2009 (Mapa, 2011b:8). Moreover, trade between Brazil and Africa increased from US\$4 billion to US\$20 billion in the same period (Chichava, 2017:381), and there was also a substantial augment in the budget destined to South-South Development Cooperation projects in the African continent, from US\$524,000 in 2003 to US\$20 million in 2010, culminating in a total of 30 recipient countries (da Costa Filho, 2018:84). In 2010, 57 per cent of Brazil's technical cooperation budget was directed towards African countries, of which 26 per cent, 22 per cent and 12 per cent were earmarked for agriculture, health and education, respectively. Among Africa's largest beneficiaries of the country's technical cooperation were the Portuguese-speaking African countries (*Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – PALOP*), with 74 per cent of the budget (Chichava, 2017:381).

In Amorim's own words, "South–South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the same time, it helps expand Brazil's participation in world affairs. [...] Building coalitions with developing countries is also a way of engaging in the reform of global governance in order to make international institutions fairer and more democratic." (Amorim, 2010:231). The configuration of this strategy international prominence, however, reflects the opportunities posed by the new dynamics of the international political economy during those years, in which Brazil saw room for the country's increasing protagonism and for multilateralism (Mapa, 2011a:6).

3.2.1. Brazil's rise to global prominence

The last three decades saw a significant rearrangement of global production networks, with larger participation of countries from the South, as opposed to the historical dominance of the industrialised North (Gray & Gills 2016:558). As per foreign minister Amorim (2010:215), the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India characterise "the most important phenomenon of the post-Cold War period", further contributing to the redistribution of international power and the configuration of a multipolar global order.

This movement was intensified by the 2008 financial crisis and its subsequent years, when the economies of the North plummeted and the prevailing economic model was delegitimised by the devastating socio-economic consequences. The global financial crisis tilted the balance of forces in the international system, characterised by the decline of central economies and the emergence of important players in global economic and finance governance structure, such as China and Brazil (Trikunas, 2014:22).

For Brazil, this realignment of forces and the emergence of multiple new powers created favourable opportunities which, supported by a democratic and economically stable reality at home, informed the country's new foreign policy disposition in the twenty-first century (Trinkunas, 2014:12). Brazil's characterisation as an important emerging power, fuelled by the publication of the Goldman Sachs' report about the potential BRIC countries in 2011²⁰, was legitimised by the country's active participation in world governance frameworks under Lula's administration. Devoid of rivalry both regionally and globally, Brazil achieved considerable levels of economic growth pushed by the rise of China as a major market for Brazilian commodities (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173). Moreover, Brazil legitimised its international agenda through active participation in multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Group of Twenty (G20), including United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.

Moreover, Brazil's pro-reform attitude towards Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs), such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and its protagonist role in the establishment of multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS and IBSA, enhanced the country's Global South identity and its aspirations as a leader of the South (Trinkunas, 2014:20). In *Ideological Repertoires of the Brazilian Foreign Policy toward Africa across three presidential administrations (1995-2016): from realism to south-south solidarity, and back*, Brazilian diplomat José Joaquim Gomes da Costa Filho examines the different repertoires driving Brazil's agenda towards Africa under the presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff. Through the analysis of official speeches and publications, da Costa Filho shows that Brazil's self-identification shifted significantly under the Lula government, moving away from the identity of "a developing country with global ambitions" towards a renovated self-image of belonging to the Global South, but holding the material capabilities and intentions to challenge the existing international order (da Costa Filho, 2018:97)

While the 1980s and the 1990s were difficult years for both Brazil and Africa, the first decades of the twenty-first century gave rise to a more optimistic scenario. The consolidation of democracy after 1985²¹ in Brazil and its macroeconomic improvement, in step with Africa's economic recovery, set a more favourable environment for Africa's resurgence in Brazil's international agenda, especially under Lula (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2). The establishment of the country's SSSDC agenda, with Africa in its centre, is a reflection of the changing prospects for development of both sides of the

²⁰ O'Neill, J. 2001. Building better global economic BRICs. *Global Economics Paper*, 66. New York: Goldman-Sachs

²¹ The year of 1985 marked the beginning of the redemocratisation era in Brazil, following two decades of authoritarian military rule (1964-1985).

Atlantic and a result of the increasingly relevant role of the South in the international development landscape. Besides increasing economic power, the prevalence of underdevelopment and inequality within the South worsened due to the unequal nature of international system, which resulted in renewed efforts to challenge the established global order. In this context, South-South Development Cooperation emerges as both a tool for the South's project of structural transformation and the hope for development through mutual support amongst the South (Gray & Gills, 2016:557).

Faced with new opportunities in the international system, Brazil reformulates its global agenda. A combination of elements in Brazilian politics, alongside the formulation of a new approach to national development, contributed to the configuration of Brazil's SSSDC strategy. As a result, Africa's place in this new setting will be redefined, in particular from the perspective of development cooperation.

3.2.2. Domestic factors shaping South-South Development Cooperation in Africa

Lula and Amorim's "assertive" foreign policy was shaped and carried out by a variety of other domestic actors. Going beyond *Itamaraty* and committed presidential diplomacy, the new foreign policy was built upon the ruling party's views of international politics and Lula's progressive government coalition, as well as the influence of segments of the civil society (de Almeida, 2007:5). The next sections will outline some of the distinctive characteristics of domestic politics in the period between 2003 and 2010 which drove Brazil's rise as an international player, in particular within the South-South Development Cooperation realm. This amalgamation of elements will characterise the domestic environment within which Lula's foreign policy objectives were formulated, implemented and, to an extension, legitimised. By delineating them, it will also be easier to draw a parallel between the Lula government and the subsequent periods of Brazilian foreign policy, under Rousseff and Temer, particularly within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation.

3.2.2.1. Beyond *Itamaraty*: domestic actors determining South-South Development Cooperation

The foreign policy decision-making process in Brazil has profoundly changed since the advent of democracy (mid-1980s) and the Constitution of 1988. The democratisation of the state, the internationalisation of the economy and the interplay between the international and the domestic domains have forced a move away from the monopoly of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or *Itamaraty*, over decisions contemplating Brazil's international agenda (Milani, 2015:57). Articles 21 and 84 of the Constitution render the President and his/her Foreign Minister the responsibility of

primary formulators of foreign policy (Milani, 2015:59). For Milani (2015:59), Brazilian foreign policy navigates between the status of a “state policy” – attending to permanent concerns over security, territorial integrity and sovereignty, for example – and a “public policy”, negotiated among different social actors, their agenda, interests and perceptions of Brazil’s role in the international order. He further argues that, since democratisation, the formulation of the international agenda entails negotiation between the Executive and other actors such as Parliament, Ministries, federal agencies, sub national entities, private sector, civil society, social movements and even academia (Milani, 2015:57).

The expansion of Africa’s role in Brazil’s global plans during said period was made possible by the rise to power of a political group dismissive of mainstream neoliberal principles of self-regulating markets and assumptions of a well-balanced and advantageous global capitalism. This ideological foundation encompasses not only Lula himself, but also a variety of other domestic actors and entities, such as political coalition, party politics, and the economic and social experience at home.

Lula’s progressive Workers’ Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT) understands that foreign policy should concentrate efforts towards enhancing the country’s position vis-à-vis its relations with the North. This should be realised through mechanisms of multilateralism, regional integration, and proximity with the South. Moreover, the use of protective measures against unfair international trade (Oliveira & Onuki, 2010:167) is seen as essential for developing economies to achieve sustainable economic growth. Inspired by these motives, the party advocates for the employment of South-South Cooperation as the major tool for increasing Brazil’s international profile. In this process, the party also advocates for a strong state that participates and intervenes in the structuring and implementation of foreign policy, from foreign trade to national security (Oliveira & Onuki, 2010:169).

Beyond party ideologies, the formulation of Brazil’s global agenda reflects the perceptions of the major foreign policy decision makers about the international system and global politics. President Lula’s inner circle of foreign policy makers and advisors included his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim; Ambassador and General Secretary of International Relations Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães; and the president’s Special Advisor on International Affairs Marco Aurélio Garcia. These officials shared the understanding of evident instability in the established international order and a propitious environment for multilateralism, in which the North-South asymmetric relations should be confronted. The country’s major national interest, development (which also entailed expansion of international trade and internationalisation of Brazilian companies) and Brazil’s goal of international leadership should be pursued through South-South Cooperation for development and multilateralism (Mapa, 2011a:6).

The ideological motivations of the Lula government found support in the nationalist, developmentalist and pro-integration group of diplomats within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (*Itamaraty*)²², who retained hegemony within the institution throughout the eight years of Lula in office (Mapa, 2011a:7). This environment, in turn, paved the way for a foreign policy agenda based on principles of deepened South-South relations (Mapa, 2011a:2). A clear manifestation of the new place occupied by Africa in the country's international relations took place within the structure of *Itamaraty* itself. President Lula initiated significant structural changes in the operation framework of the ministry, starting by the disintegration of the Department of Africa and the Middle East in order to form the *Africa Division III* (DAF-III), which joined the two existing *Africa Division I and Africa Division II*. This was an indication of the central position of the continent in Brazil's foreign policy. As for *Itamaraty's* Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), it occupied a leading role in the coordination of multiple SSDC actors and projects (Chichava et al, 2013:7) and had its budget significantly increased with the intensification of the country's cooperation activities, as will be shown later in this chapter.

Welding all these elements together, the role of the president as the ultimate foreign policy decision-maker can neither be overlooked nor underplayed in twenty-first century Brazil. In fact, scholars have argued that, given the bureaucratic nature of *Itamaraty* and its resistance to innovation, "presidential diplomacy" is the primary driver of the formulation and execution of innovative Brazilian foreign policy (Burgess & Bastos, 2017:287). This argument was substantiated by Lula's intense participation in Brazil's international insertion. In search for influence and legitimisation within the South and, particularly, in Africa, the image of a president who personally experienced poverty and hunger held significant power (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683). As a result, the idea of Brazil as Africa's major cooperation partner was personified in the image of Lula, most notably in his approach towards Africa²³.

For Stolte (2015), the president's "very personal engagement was an essential part not just of the decision to have Brazil take a very active and engaged approach to Africa and the global South, but also in the implementation of the policy by using his

²² Mapa stresses the existence, within *Itamaraty*, of two major ideological groups that diverge in terms of the directions of Brazil's foreign policy, i.e. the "autonomous", which disapprove of total alignment with the United States and support South-South relations; and a group that wishes to strengthen Brazil's ties with more advanced economies (Mapa, 2011a:16).

²³ In 2005, upon his visit to the House of Slaves and the Door of No Return in Senegal, Lula was called "the first black President of Brazil" by the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. After crying and apologising for Brazil's "grave historical mistake", referring to the country's past of slavery, Lula was also told to persevere with his policy towards Africa. "Do not give up, even if this makes other presidents jealous. And consider yourself an African", said President Wade (Senado, 2005). This episode epitomises Lula's personal involvement with the new Africa agenda.

personal presence as a central driver to build and entrench new bilateral linkages” (Stolte, 2015 *cited* Burges & Bastos, 2017:284). Though very positive for Brazil during Lula’s administrations, the president’s personal engagement in Brazil’s international development agenda helped create a mistaken idea of Brazil’s SSDC, personalised by some as a “Lula agenda” rather than a “Brazilian” initiative. In this context, de Almeida (2010:176), points out that “not surprisingly, the personal figure of da Silva is even more present [in the world agenda] than the country, which confirms the real success of his diplomacy in projecting his own image as the personification of Brazil”. This will explain some of the difficulties experienced by his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff, to be discussed in the next chapter.

Lastly, the president found support in a government coalition called “productivist” (*produtivista*) by Nery (2017:253), representative of the interests of workers and social movements, as well as part of the private sector or national bourgeoisie – construction, mining, commodity processors and agribusiness companies. This heterogeneous group will help inform foreign policy decisions, especially within the context of South-South Development Cooperation, which the private sector will see as an opportunity to internationalise and increase its presence in Africa and, in particular, Mozambique.

The process of internationalisation of Brazilian large corporations in the Lula government was mostly funded by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), under the banner of “national champions”. The funds of the federal development bank, created in 1952, were traditionally directed towards national development projects, particularly large-scale ones. Under Lula, however, the agency’s mandate was expanded and the BNDES also began to fund the internationalisation of Brazilian companies Bohn (2019:79). BNDES’ funding increased from R\$10 billion in 1996 to R\$137 billion in 2009. As per the “national champions” Casanova (2009:43-44) stresses the fact that there is no clear criterion for the selection of these national champions, but they are mostly blue-chip Brazilian companies that have a global reach. Nonetheless, the government’s financial support for the internationalisation of Brazilian enterprises is evidence of strong public-private partnerships between the state and the business community, a characteristic feature of Lula’s administration. In other words, Brazil’s SSDC agenda coincided, in many ways, with the interests of the Brazilian private sector. The interests of the Brazilian enterprises were represented by segments of Lula’s political coalition (i.e. the national elite), which worked hand-in-hand with more progressive groups (Cason & Power, 2009:129).

Having looked at the major actors that shaped Brazil’s South-South agenda in the Lula government, it is necessary to go a step further with the analysis of the domestic determinants of SSDC during said period. Directing Brazil’s efforts on international

development cooperation towards the South characterised the Lula government's main instrument for the pursuit of the country's development. Conversely, Brazil achieved its necessary credentials as a development cooperation partner due to its acclaimed developmental experiences. This interplay between foreign policy and the domestic model of development is key to understand Brazil's SSDC agenda during and after Lula and is the focus of the next section.

3.2.2.2. "Two sides of the same coin": the national project of development and Brazilian SSDC

The history of Brazil-Africa relations shows that the presence of Brazilian companies on the continent does not initiate under the umbrella of development cooperation. By the late-1970s, several Brazilian businesses had already started its activities in different African countries, most notably the mining company Vale, state-owned oil company Petrobrás, as well as big construction and engineering companies such as Odebrecht and Mendes Jr (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:14). During the 1990s, Brazilian politics were led by a series of neoliberal governments, from Fernando Collor to Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1990-2002), a period in which the distance between Brazil and Africa steadily decreased, but the presence of Brazilian companies on the continent remained significant (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:11).

Needless to say, Africa's large market potential and its natural resources, in particular oil, are also appealing to Brazil's growth and development ambitions. This fact helped consolidate the continent as a strategic partner (Cicalo, 2012:8) and can be illustrated by the growing trade between the two sides of the Atlantic as well as the increasing presence of the largest Brazilian energy company, Petrobras, in several African countries (Cicalo, 2012:8). Though the country's Africa agenda spoke directly to Brazil's political and economic ambitions (as will be illustrated with the Mozambican case later in this chapter), it also entailed an approach that responds to the necessities and aspirations of African countries (Mapa, 2011b:11).

In facing similar economic and social challenges, Brazil and Africa found common ground upon which to build trust and strengthen cooperation. The incorporation of the "solidarity" principle into Lula's foreign policy toward Africa, the foundational element of Brazil's South-South Cooperation, was based on building horizontal relationships with African countries in which the gains would be mutual (da Costa Filho, 2018:108). Furthermore, Brazil's successful experiences in fighting hunger and inequality – as previously discussed – helped legitimise its move towards Africa (Cicalo, 2012:9).

Acting as "two sides of the same coin" (de Lima & Hirst 2006:21), the country's development diplomacy and its manifestation in SSDC serves the national project of

development. Conversely, “the return to democracy, monetary stability, economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement in social indicators, internationalisation of Brazilian companies, the change of status from debtor to creditor, all add up to redefine Brazil's image in the world” (Amorim, 2010:216). Under Lula, the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and promotion of Brazilian businesses occurred in parallel with significant policies to fight hunger, poverty and inequality (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173).

Surely Brazil's recent experience with growth and distribution sparked the interest of the international community, particularly of other developing countries. Pushed by the rise of China and the commodity prices, Brazil's Gross National Product (GNP) grew at an average of 4.2 per cent yearly between 2003 and 2008, reaching 7.5 per cent in 2010 after the slowdown experienced in 2009 with the advent of the financial crisis (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173). Unemployment, in the same period, decreased from 11.3 per cent to 6.1 per cent. This economic growth was accompanied by the implementation of major cash transfer programmes such as *Bolsa Familia* – which target the poor and extremely poor – and an increase in the real minimum wage (Curado, 2015:90). As a result, 32 million Brazilians were lifted out of poverty (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173). For Faria & Paradis (2013:14), this successful story gave Brazilians a sentiment of collective pride and legitimised the country's international ambitions as leader of the Global South and key development cooperation partner. Within this context, Africa became an important space in which Brazil's successful domestic policies could be emulated. By bolstering its SSDC agenda, Brazil projected its national model of development abroad and attended to the needs of poorer countries such as Mozambique. At the same time, it developed new alliances and acquired the necessary political support for its reformist aspirations in the international system.

In other words, the success of the President's developmental strategy helped improve the country's international standing and provided the necessary credentials for Brazil to strengthen its SSDC initiatives, particularly in a continent bedevilled by high levels of hunger and poverty. For the new political leadership, Brazil's pursuit of national development with social justice also entailed an assertive and pro-active approach to international politics to reduce the asymmetries of the international system, increase the country's bargaining power and push for the necessary reforms, which could only be achieved by strengthening the ties with Brazil's South American neighbours and the rest of the developing world, particularly with Africa (Mapa, 2011a:4). Moreover, the development of alliances and policies of economic, technical, scientific and technological cooperation with African countries could contribute to the expansion of Brazil's economic and political interests within the global order (Mapa, 2011b:8).

Another significant domestic initiative that reflected on Brazil's cooperation agenda towards Africa was the government's efforts to reduce race inequalities and improve race relations domestically. This element will play a relevant role in the formulation of Brazil-Africa relations, and will be discussed next.

3.2.2.3. Brazil's race relations and the African Agenda

Brazil's large black population, the largest outside Africa, is mostly a consequence of the country's historical ties to the continent. Besides being the largest recipient of African slaves between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Brazil only abolished slavery in 1888, after all the other American countries. For this reason, as well as the continuous flow of trade and people between Brazil and West Africa up until the declaration of independence by the majority of the continent, Africa is naturally and inherently an important part of Brazilian culture and national identity. Furthermore, contrary to the USA and South Africa, Brazil did not pursue or implement a racialised system of segregation, and was for long considered a "racial democracy" where blacks and whites lived harmoniously together (Cicalo, 2012: 20).

While Brazil used this positive image as a way to legitimise itself to newly independent African countries up until the 1970s and 1980s, it highly contradicted the racial inequality and the reality of race relations experienced at home (Cicalo, 2012:4). Over time, however, this approach in Brazil's Africa policy moved away from the "now-discredited concept of racial democracy to one of racial healing and strength through diversity" (Captain, 2010:190).

In the 1980s and 1990s, redemocratisation and liberal policies favoured the emergence of Brazil's *movimento negro* (black movement) and paved the way for affirmative action in a country prepared to acknowledge and address racial inequality. However, Brazil's relations with the West outpaced those with the developing world in the same period, in particular with the African continent (Cicalo, 2012:6). Under Lula, Brazil's agenda towards Africa was deeply connected to the changing dynamics of race relations domestically. The prevalent discourse of the Brazilian Africanness and the historical racial inequality are now strategically used by those who hold the power of decision-making in Brazil's foreign policy, including the *Itamaraty* (Cicalo, 2012:10).

Lula's Workers' Party's proximity with different social movements, including the *movimento negro*, increased the interest in reviving and promoting cultural ties with the African continent as part of the new developmental project (Mapa, 2011b:7) and the promotion of blackness both domestically and transnationally (Cicalo, 2012:14). Achieving coherence between domestic racial politics and Brazil's policies towards Africa helped legitimise Brazil's SSDC agenda in the continent and responded to the demands

of the Brazilian black movement. Immediately after assuming office, Lula passed the Law 10.639/03, which made the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture compulsory in public and private schools throughout the country. Later in 2003, the government launched the Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality (*Secretaria Nacional de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial* - SEPPIR), aiming at the protection of the individual rights of racial and ethnical groups affected by discrimination, in particular Brazil's black population (Lechini, 2018:408).

In other words, a fundamental motivating factor behind Brazil's agenda for Africa was to respond to domestic demands for the legitimisation of an Afro-Brazilian identity (Mapa, 2011b:10; Captain, 2010:194) by strengthening the ties with the continent and addressing the "historical debt". By calling Africa "one of the cradles of Brazilian civilisations" (Captain 2010:190) and stating that Brazil had a moral "debt" to the continent, Lula moved the country's approach to Africa towards solidarity and development cooperation (Cicalo, 2012:11), making SSDC one of the foundations of the president's African agenda.

Having looked at the domestic determinants of Brazil's development cooperation agenda towards the African continent, it is now appropriate to devote attention to the country case under analysis. Mozambique occupies a very particular position within Brazilian SSDC agenda. Featuring as the largest recipient of Brazil's technical cooperation under Lula, it is also an important destination for Brazilian private capital. This two-sided strategy illustrates the nuances of Brazil's SSDC initiatives in Africa (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2). With the intention of placing Mozambique within the scope of SSDC in Brazil's foreign policy agenda, the next section will focus on development cooperation initiatives initiated under Lula's administration, with special attention given to the role played by Brazilian state actors, though not ignoring the converging interests of private sectors.

3.3. Brazil and Mozambique: South-South Development Cooperation between 2003 and 2010

The independence of Mozambique from the Portuguese in 1975 marked the beginning of the diplomatic relations between Brazil and the former Portuguese colony. However, as Pereira & Tatim (2017:22) argue, the years that followed were characterised by unfavourable conditions both in Mozambique and in Brazil. The Mozambican post-independence civil conflict only came to an end in 1992 with the General Peace Agreement. In Brazil, a series of governments after redemocratisation surfed the wave of neoliberal globalisation and prioritised the country's relationship with the developed countries from the North, in particular the United States. It is worth mentioning, however,

two important initiatives towards Mozambique by the Brazilian governments in the 1990s: (a) for two years (1993 and 1994), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) received great contribution from the Brazilian Army to carry out peacekeeping initiatives in the country and (b) the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) indicated the country's interest in intensifying its relations with those nations, notably Mozambique (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:23).

As previously discussed, cooperation for development is portrayed as an alternative to previous approaches adopted by Brazil in its international insertion (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:12). The legitimisation of the country's SSDC in Mozambique, as in Africa more broadly, is justified through, firstly, vast presidential diplomacy. Lula visited the country three times during his time in office, while Brazil received three official visits from Mozambican presidents in the same period. During these occasions, several commitments in the realm of development cooperation were made (de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013:341). Secondly, Brazil's image as a reliable and desirable partner for Mozambique was constructed upon discourses of demand-driven cooperation, devoid of economic conditions, commercial interests and political interference in Mozambique. Moreover, Brazil also used the concepts of "solidarity", "moral debt" – because of the historical link of slavery –, "geographical proximity – due to similar tropical climate – as well as "cultural proximity" in its approach to the country (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:3). Besides cooperation, 95 per cent of the Mozambican debt to Brazil was pardoned in 2004, an amount estimated at US\$351 million (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:4; Pereira & Tatim, 2017:19).

3.3.1. Technical cooperation

In 2010, 55 per cent per cent of the Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa went to the PALOP, or Portuguese-Speaking countries (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2), with Mozambique as a key partner, receiving alone 81 per cent of the technical cooperation budget destined towards the African continent (Ridderbusch, 2018:45). By 2011, the country had 21 cooperation projects under execution and nine others being negotiated under the flag of Brazilian cooperation for development (Avelhan, 2015:8). The main areas of cooperation were agriculture, health and education. While a variety of projects could be mentioned here to illustrate Brazil's initiatives in Mozambique, this section will focus on two emblematic cases that, alone, epitomise the fundamental features of Brazilian cooperation for development in the country. For this purpose, the ProSavana and the antiretroviral (ARV) factory in Matola are going to be examined.

In 2011, 75 per cent of the Mozambican population lived in rural areas and relied on agriculture, which in 2012 accounted for 31 per cent of the country's GDP, employing

25 million people (Avelhan, 2015:8). The importance of the agricultural sector for Mozambique's economy and its potential for growth sparked Brazil's interest in fostering development cooperation projects in the field. Mozambique is one of only two African countries (alongside Ghana) to host the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa)²⁴, receiving the highest number of researchers from that cooperating institution in the continent (Chichava *et al*, 2013:9). Embrapa is also involved in the research component of ABC's largest and most innovative project for agricultural development in Mozambique, the ProSavana.

Considered Brazil's largest agricultural cooperation project in Africa, ProSavana has an expected budget of US\$36.2 millions and was created through the triangular cooperation between the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican governments. It was formulated with the goal of developing agricultural production in the Nacala Corridor, north Mozambique, by engaging private investors to promote sustainable agricultural production and poverty reduction (Avelhan, 2015:11). By directly supporting 400 million small and medium farmers in that region, the project aimed to enhance both the national level of food security and the competitiveness of Mozambican agriculture internationally (Avelhan, 2015:11).

Much like other cooperation projects initiated by Brazil in Mozambique, ProSavana emulated a successful domestic story, that of the Brazilian Cerrado. Between the 1970s and the 1990s, a cooperation project between the Brazilian government and the Japanese government enhanced agricultural development in the area and increased the production of food (Ridderbusch, 2018:45). The similarities with the Savannah area in Mozambique and the Brazilian experience of "pioneering farmers from a sparsely-populated bush zone into one of the world's most important regions of export-oriented agricultural production" (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016:36) inspired the triangular cooperation project.

The ProSavana, however, did not come without issues. The project was subjected to increasing and legitimate contestation from Brazilian and Mozambican scholars and actors of the civil society over allegations of land grabbing and disregard for local communities, among others (Avelhan, 2015:15). Acting alongside several SSDC initiatives, Brazilian private companies also benefited from ProSavana. Brazil's mining company Vale found in the project an opportunity to link its mining activities in the Nacala Corridor to the agricultural project (Ridderbusch, 2018:48).

²⁴ "Embrapa was created in 1973 as an agricultural research organization under Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture and was almost entirely funded by government resources. Pursuing a clear vision of recuperating and boosting the agricultural sector, Embrapa has developed and transferred more than 9,000 technologies to Brazilian farmers" (Correa & Schmidt, 2014:1)

Beyond agriculture, the majority of the projects of technical cooperation executed in Mozambique speak to important themes advocated by Brazil in intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations. An example is the emphasis on the fight against HIV/AIDS and hunger (de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013:362). With regards to the HIV/AIDS agenda, Mozambique is the only country in Africa to hold a factory manufacturing antiretroviral (ARV), funded and built by Brazil. As with the ProSavana, the ARV factory was inspired by the success of the fight against HIV/AIDS in Brazil. The project aimed to establish the first and only publicly-owned pharmaceutical factory in Sub-Saharan region. By 2014, costs for the construction of the factory were estimated at US\$34.6 million, mostly funded by the Brazilian government, but with a significant contribution of US\$8.5 million from the Mozambican government. The Brazilian Vale donated an extra US\$4.5 million to the project (Russo et al, 2014).

“ProSavana, More Food Africa²⁵ and the Food Acquisition Programme²⁶ are all examples of cooperation programmes aiming to reproduce in Africa Brazil’s own policy experiments with agricultural development, for which claims of domestic success have been made” (Chichava *et al*, 2013:9). The same can be said about Brazil’s health cooperation. Fundamentally, Brazil’s SSDC is informed by the belief that successful national experiences with development could be exported and replicated in Africa (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:3). The international projection of the Brazilian state – and its central role in the national development project – also reflects on the several cooperation projects which attempts to enhance the institutional capacity of the Mozambican state (de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013:365)

On the other hand, ProSavana and the ARV factory encapsulate the interplay between development cooperation and the advancement of Brazil enterprises and their interests, which will be the focus of the next section.

3.3.2. Trade and the internationalisation of Brazil’s “national champions”

Brazil’s development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique also demonstrate the pragmatic side of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula. While Lula’s national development programme and its social policies were internationally projected to expand the country’s influence in the Global South within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation,

²⁵ More Food International (MFI) is a development cooperation programme that emulates Brazil’s More Food Program. The initiative aims at “strengthening the productive capacity of smallholder farmers in African countries, who are claimed to bear a resemblance to Brazil’s family farmers.” (Cabral et al, 2016:47)

²⁶ Inspired in a Brazilian initiative and “exported” to the African country, “it aims to ensure that populations suffering from food and nutritional insecurity have access to food, and to promote social inclusion in rural areas.” (Souza & Chmielewska, 2010:1)

the government also supported the internationalisation of Brazilian companies (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683).

For some, “Brazilian business perceived the potential of the Mozambican market, while Mozambique saw in the Brazilian partnership a chance to make its projects possible without the political costs traditionally imposed by Western powers” (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:23). Between 2003 and 2011, ties forged between Mozambique and Brazil through development cooperation initiatives resulted in an expansion of trade and investments flows between the two countries. Trade between Brazil and Mozambique increased from US\$4 billion in 2003 to US\$20 in 2010 (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2).

As for FDI flows from Brazil to Mozambique, major Brazilian companies have operations in the African country in the fields of mining, energy and engineering. The internationalisation of Brazilian private companies was mostly funded by Brazil’s National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES), especially during Lula’s administration and particular attention was paid to the so-called “national champions”, especially mining and engineering-construction companies such as Vale and Odebrecht, both in Mozambique.

The world’s second largest mining company, Brazil’s Vale is responsible for the operations of one of the largest Brazilian investments in Mozambique, the Moatize coal mining in Tete Province (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:4). Moreover, large Brazilian construction companies such as Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa and Antonio Gutierrez, are involved in infrastructure building such as mining sites, dams, roads and airport (Chichava et al, 2013:8). In this context, Mozambique features once again as a relevant study case of Brazil’s SSDC and its nuances.

3.4. Concluding remarks

Brazilian SSDC agenda in Africa was shaped by the existing international dynamics and a plurality of domestic actors with diverse interests and motivations. Presidential diplomacy, party diplomacy, government coalition, the “progressive” wing within *Itamaraty* and, not least important, the changing dynamics of Brazilian race relations are all manifested in the country’s global ambitions, serving and being served by the national developmental experience during that period. The formulation of Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation agenda was, from the beginning, informed by the synchrony between the national model of development and Brazil’s global ambitions. In other words, Brazil’s impressive levels of development could be emulated in other developing countries (under the banner of SSDC) and it could have provided the country with the political support it needed to champion its global reformist agenda.

In Brazil's impressive economic growth, Lula saw a window of opportunity to implement a state-led model of development that responded to the social challenges of the Brazilian society. Globally acclaimed initiatives aimed at *inter alia*, tackling extreme poverty and income inequality, gave shape to the country's SSDC initiatives. At the same time, Lula's national project was also characterised by strong synergies between public and private business interests. By advancing development cooperation initiatives in the developing world, Brazil paved the way for the internationalisation of its "national champions", or large Brazilian enterprises, which were heavily funded by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). De Castro (2013:248) summarises Brazilian strategy under Lula as one in which "political dialogue, technical cooperation, investment, and trade became complementary elements in Brazil-Africa relations".

Mozambique encapsulates all aspects of Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation outlined before. Several successful Brazilian projects and policies were "exported" to Mozambique through development cooperation initiatives. Investments in the Mozambican agricultural sector, with ProSavana, emulated the experience of the Brazilian Cerrado, which had enhanced Brazil's productivity and competitiveness in the field. Similarly, the Brazil-funded construction of a public ARV factory in Matola was inspired by the successful story of the fight against HIV/AIDS at home. In short, the projects were aimed at the strengthening of the Mozambican state and addressed major social challenges. These projects also mirrored the national project with regards to the involvement of Brazil's large enterprises in most of these projects, such as Vale.

Cooperation for development in Mozambique, as in other African countries, was promoted under the banners of solidarity and altruism. Nonetheless, these initiatives also served Brazil's economic interests and the search for political support (Leite e Cavalcante, 2016:358). However, as argued by many, economic interests and altruism are not mutually exclusive, since it does not preclude Brazil's contributions towards the development of recipient countries (Leite e Cavalcante, 2016:358). Be it as it may, Brazil's initiatives in Mozambique granted the necessary credentials for its leadership ambitions and secured the political support of a strategic African partner.

Against this backdrop, the sustainability and consistency of Brazilian SSDC in Mozambique, as well as in Africa more broadly, is directly tied to the national project of development. The links between Brazil's approach towards national development and its SSDC agenda, particularly in Africa, will dictate the changes that will be observed under the subsequent administrations. Faced with internal and external constraints, Brazil's state-led, inclusive economic development would gradually crumble. As for SSDC in Africa, and Mozambique particularly, significant changes would emerge.

Chapter IV: Pulling the plug? Brazil's Development Cooperation in Mozambique under Rousseff and Temer

4.1. Introduction

After eight years as the President of Brazil, Lula left office in 2010 with an unprecedented approval rating of 83 per cent by the Brazilian public (Veja, 2010). The election of his party fellow, Dilma Rousseff, who was closely supported by Lula during the 2010 elections, indicated that there would be no major changes in the direction of Brazil's domestic and foreign policies. The Rousseff government was expected to be an extension of her predecessor's, whose progressive approach to development reflected in the country's internal and external policies.

Despite expectations, however, Rousseff's government would have to deal with the political and economic crises that began at the end of Lula's mandate, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Brazil's thriving economy, which had allowed for successful distributive and social policies, would eventually be hit by the international financial crisis. This posed a challenge to Brazil's efforts towards inclusive development in the domestic domain and, in turn, affected its ambitious global agenda that champions South-South development (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:176). Domestically, the political setting (i.e. the ruling political coalition and an overall public approval of domestic policies) which sustained Brazil's rise as an international player was now more divided and less conducive for pursuing such ambitions.

Rousseff's vice-president, Michel Temer, ascended to the country's highest office in August 2016, representing a renewal in national politics, economic policies and, no less important, its foreign policy agenda. The Temer government redefined the developmental model, introducing a series of neoliberal economic reforms and austerity measures. Politically, Temer had to deal with the challenge of legitimising his government before the Brazilian society and the different power branches of Brazil's political system. Even though it was a very brief government, duration did not stop significant changes to also happen in Brazil's foreign policy outlook, though most of its manifestations are still to be seen.

Against this backdrop, this chapter will shed light on Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation in Africa, particularly Mozambique, placing this agenda within the broader context of the country's foreign policy from 2011 until 2018. A key instrument for achieving Brazil's global ambitions under Lula, South-South Development Cooperation in Africa under Rousseff and Temer can only be understood within the scope of the two administrations' foreign policy. In fact, the main goal this paper set out

to achieve was to understand the impact of changes in foreign policy disposition on Brazil's SSDC agenda, particularly in Mozambique. Following the introduction, this chapter will further seek to discuss the different factors shaping the formulation of Brazil's foreign policy and its impact on the country's SSDC agenda for purposes of identifying the circumstances that could have led to the decision to pull the plug on South-South Development Cooperation.

The two administrations in question, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer's (2016-2018), will be discussed through the lens of the theoretical angle upon which this thesis is anchored, viz. neoclassical realism. For this reason, the international system – its opportunities and restrictions – will be the point of departure to understand the opportunities and limitations imposed by the *third image* on Brazil's foreign policy during said period. After identifying the systemic factors that constrained the realisation of the country's South-South agenda, the chapter will turn to Brazil's domestic context. The domestic setting is given special attention in order to understand how international events were filtered through very particular domestic ones, leading to substantial changes in Brazil's foreign policy. The latter and the consequences for Brazilian SSDC towards Africa will then be discussed, with each administration discussed separately. Lastly, this chapter will focus once more on the selected country case, which is Mozambique. The two major areas of cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique discussed in Chapter 3, namely health and agriculture, will be used to discuss the extent of changes in those sectors during Rousseff and Temer's administrations.

In short, the general tone of Brazil's South-South Cooperation agenda in Africa and Mozambique, after Lula, changes significantly. Mozambique continued to be one of Brazil's major cooperation partners in Africa. However, fewer resources and less effort were allocated to development cooperation by the Brazilian government, and economic interests prevailed over those that championed development projects. A constellation of external and domestic factors, such as the impact of the global economic crisis on the national economy and major corruption scandals involving Brazilian companies and Mozambican officials altered the direction of the country's foreign policy to be less supportive of the country's SSDC initiatives.

This chapter argues that, following the Lula government, Brazil's withdrawal from its South-South Development Cooperation agenda was a reflection of the new approach to national development (i.e. a more timid state participation in the economy, austere policies, and an eventual neoliberal turn under Temer), as well as its approach to international development (i.e. a shift towards commercial interests and the traditional partners of the North, and a move away from the country's reformist ambitions). Under Lula, SSDC became the key instrument for the realisation of the government's global

ambitions, i.e. becoming a leader of the Global South and a key cooperation partner; making new allies and acquiring political support to support Brazil's demand for reform in the international system; fostering Brazil's own national development. After Lula, Brazil gradually moved away from its global ambitions of leadership and reform, and began to display a more pragmatic approach – the search for short-term economic benefits. This movement was slow and gradual under Rousseff, but clearly intensified under Temer.

4.2. International and domestic factors driving changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy under Rousseff and Temer

The impact of the international financial crisis on the developing world was eventually felt after the deceleration of the economies of Europe and China. After more than a decade of strong presence in the global economy and the political power that it provided, some developing countries were challenged by a more restrictive international system and forced to look inward to solve their own economic crises.

In Brazil, a tighter budgetary capacity meant that the political climate became more challenging for the pursuit of the national developmental agenda. Moreover, the year of 2014 marked the beginning of the country's farthest-reaching corruption investigation, which would contribute to the weakening of Rousseff's government (Svartman & da Silva, 2016:7) and propelled the rise of her vice-president, Michel Temer, to the presidency in August 2016. As for Brazil's foreign policy, though continuation was expected under Rousseff, her first foreign minister Antonio Patriota, soon announced upon his inauguration in office that "continuation is not repetition" (MRE, 2011a), signalling possible changes in foreign policy. Under Michel Temer, however, changes in Brazil's foreign policy disposition were way more significant. With the narrative of ridding the country of its political ideologies and realigning with the traditional partners of the North, SSDC is no longer the priority, nor is it the tool for the realisation of Brazil's international ambitions.

In order to understand how changes in foreign policy occurred, this section will cast light on the external and internal factors shaping the formulation of Brazil's international agenda during Rousseff and Temer.

4.2.1. Changing dynamics and limited resources: the global financial crisis, South-South Cooperation and Brazil

As discussed in Chapter 2, neoclassical realists' point of departure when analysing a country's foreign policy is the international system. The latter, it is argued, is the first and foremost determining factor of the international strategy and actions of a

country. The third image, or the international system, will delimit how far foreign policy goals can go in relation to the opportunities and restrictions in place (Rose, 1998:151).

Under Lula's administrations, Brazil enjoyed a more permissive global environment for the economic and political claims of the developing world. The onset of the world financial crisis helped push emerging economies like Brazil to the centre of the global economic system, increasing their political relevance as a consequence. According to Sobrinho & Filho (2018:26), more than exposing the fragility of central economies such as the United States and Europe, the financial crisis also showed the potential of the developing world. In this context, for example, the world witnessed the emergence of the G20 and its central role in the world's economic recovery, fostering deeper integration (Sobrinho & Filho, 2018:26). Politically, for countries like Brazil, the G20 was the opportunity to sit at the negotiation table with the world's most advanced economies and a chance to put forward its major claims (Filho, 2018:142).

Cooperation amongst emerging economies, then, emerged as an instrument of development and a way to counter-balance the centrality of more advanced economies and put forward claims for reform of the international architecture of power. For Brazil, as discussed in the previous chapter, SSDC became an instrument to achieve its own national development imperatives. By making new alliances and cooperating towards development, Brazil aimed at gathering the necessary political support to assume a greater role in the "setting of international norms" (de Castro, 2013:2).

Thus, it can be argued that the government led by Lula was able to translate such opportunities into an ambitious foreign policy agenda, in which South-South relations occupied a vital place. In those circumstances, Brazil was able to establish an international agenda that served, in the first place, the country's developmental goals, while pursuing the role of a credible leader of the Global South by strengthening ties with the developing world, especially via South-South Development Cooperation initiatives.

As previously discussed, Africa was a key region for the country's ambitious project. By intensifying its efforts to help African partners address the challenges of development, Brazil also sought to elevate its international profile and gain access to new markets and economic opportunities (de Oliveira, 2015:31). Needless to say, 2011 was way different to 2003, and the inauguration of Rousseff in the presidential office happened amid a challenging international scenario, which will restrain the continuation of Brazil's long-term project of international prominent. The world financial crisis will begin to affect the emerging economies and challenge both their recently-achieved position as global players and their efforts to integrate.

The economic meltdown affected the developing world more intensively after 2011. The slow improvement of the United States' economy reinforced the centrality of

the G7 over the prominent role played by the G20 in the first years after the outbreak of the crisis. An example of the economic and political consequences of this shifting reality is the unsuccessful negotiations of the Doha Rounds before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Saraiva, 2014:26).

Another significant change regards the declining prices of commodities worldwide as a consequence of, among other factors, decline in demand for primary products from China (Saraiva, 2014:26). Under Lula, China featured as one of the major drivers of Brazil's economic growth via commodity exports to the Chinese market. While China imported mainly primary products from Brazil, it also promoted the exports of manufactured goods from Brazil to South American partners, who also enjoyed a boom in their international reserves. However, this trend was interrupted by the European recession from 2010 onwards, as well as America's protectionist economic policies, which negatively affected China's economic growth. The slowdown in Chinese exports led to a decrease in commodity prices by 40 per cent between 2011 and 2015, ending the boom years of 2004 to 2011 (Neto & Tussie, 2018:337).

These factors, notwithstanding their political consequences in different regions of the world, characterise the period between 2008 and 2015 as one with deep changes in the global economic architecture, in which the available alternatives for action became very limited, particularly for the emerging countries (Neto & Tussie, 2018:338). In Brazil, this restrictive scenario posed a challenge on the country's model of economic growth, which is highly dependent on the export of primary goods. The effects on Brazilian economy were significant, which will be discussed in the next section, and its consequences in the social and political arenas pushed for a revamped foreign policy agenda under the presidencies of Dilma Rousseff, and subsequently, Michel Temer (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:176,181).

Limited by restrictions in resources domestically and low perspectives of improvement in the short run, Brazil's scope of action in the international stage was significantly affected (Cornetet, 2014:138). Furthermore, the "model of development" that once provided the necessary credentials for the country to consolidate its desired goal of a leader of the Global South now shows its flaws and unsustainable characteristics through pessimistic accounts of the country's future. On the other hand, SSDC – which had become Brazil's primary tool of national development and global acquisition of political support – is reshaped to exhibit more pragmatic features in search of short-term benefits and return of investments that could help with the recovery of the Brazilian economy.

While Rousseff's government did not characterise significant change in Brazil's foreign policy goals (though the intensity and ambition previously experimented lost

impetus), Temer symbolised greater retraction in Brazil's SSDC agenda by promoting the reorientation of Brazilian international agenda towards the North-South axis, to the detriment of the close relationship that had been established with the Global South (Actis, 2017:1). Nevertheless, the President's efforts to advance his liberal agenda and bring Brazil closer to its "traditional partners of the North", particularly the United States, was frustrated by the electoral victory of Donald Trump in 2016 (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:181)

In this context, though Brazil's agenda for SSDC in Africa remains an important part of the country's international agenda, it will be reframed to incorporate a more commercial tone (Leite & Cavalcante, 2016:364). These changes will characterise Rousseff and Temer's responses, on the one hand, to the limitations imposed by the reality outside borders, and on the other, to the country's domestic setting, which will be discussed later in the next section.

4.2.2. Domestic factors and Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation in Africa

Some scholars and foreign policy analysts will argue that, more than the domestic dynamics, the international ones will be the primary factor driving change in Brazil's foreign policy (Malamud, 2012:121). However, though international circumstances ought to be the point of departure to understand Brazil's rollback in SSDC practices, particularly in Africa, no account can be complete without careful examination of particular domestic factors shaping the country's international approach. This is mostly true during the timeframe in question (2011-2018), where political and economic crises dominated the realm of domestic politics. For this reason, scholars such as Cervo & Lessa (2014:149) will argue that the decline in Brazil's global ambitions experienced under Rousseff, and furthered under Temer, is consequence of domestic factors rather than international ones.

Challenged by global economic shocks, Brazil's economy began to experience a slowdown. Export growth rates fell to 1.6 per cent in the years between 2011 and 2014 in comparison to the yearly average 5.2 per cent between 2004 and 2010, and the country's GDP also suffered a massive decrease of 7.4 per cent from 2010 to 2014, when it was only 0.1 per cent. This sharp decline in Brazil's GDP, coupled with the collapse of investments and a growing unemployment rate posed significant constraints to the government's actions domestically and internationally (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:177). Besides the economic crisis, post-Lula Brazil underwent a series of significant events that will deeply affect national politics, i.e. international sportive events, large corruption scandals, an impeachment and the dismantling of the developmental coalition of the previous years.

Brazil's global prominence since the 1990s conferred the country the opportunity to host the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. These prestigious international events kept Brazil in the spotlight after the Lula era, yet they did not happen without serious contestations from various quarters of Brazilian society. In June 2013, thousands of Brazilians took to the streets in one of the largest public demonstrations never seen before in the last 20 years (Watts, 2013b). Sparked by the government's decision to increase bus fares, the protests evolved to include deeper objections over the government's escalating expenditure on the sporting events, increasing unemployment levels, poor service delivery and endemic corruption (Watts, 2013a).

This scenario of internal dispute and the government's fading legitimacy in the public's eyes did not stop Rousseff from being re-elected for a second term in office in 2014. However, the consequences of the economic crisis forced the government to adopt unpopular austerity measures, leading to objections by civil society and popular movements, which resulted in the weakening of her support base (Svartman & da Silva, 2016:7).

Rousseff's diminishing support is also reflected in the president's relationship with its political support basis in Congress, where a weakened coalition offered a less solid support than that enjoyed by her predecessor (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:175). While no major international projects related to foreign policy issued were vetoed in parliament during her two administrations, some authors point towards some deterioration in the relationship between the President and her own support base, or coalition (Ribeiro, 2018:58). Milani (2015:70) reiterates that in times of budgetary constraints and distributive conflicts, members of the Brazilian legislative will mobilise against themes of foreign policy that are deemed controversial. Thus, the legislative house became a stage where contested views of Brazil's foreign policy agenda were exposed, reflecting somehow their feelings towards SSDC.

The following was said by a member of the opposition in the National Congress, and illustrates the divergent opinions on the foreign policy instruments used by the governments of PT, and mostly, Lula: "This government has been prodigy in using the money of Brazilian citizens and workers, deposited onto BNDES [Brazilian Development Bank], to finance projects based on the president's lunatic dream of world leadership and to finance projects of dictators (...). In other words, all the Brazilian citizens' money is applied, by the federal administration, in other countries, which will fail to pay us back. (...) it has, in fact, a humanitarian essence, but it serves, above all, the political interests of the president in doing wrong foreign policy" (Brasil, 2018 *in* Ribeiro, 2018:68).

Far from being a major decisive factor in terms of foreign policy formulation under Rousseff, this scenario of dispute illustrates the diminishing political support for Brazil's

SSDC initiatives that were consolidated under Lula. For Cervo & Lessa (2014:149), the weakening of the dialogue between different sectors of Brazilian society and the executive power, as well as the loss of leadership capacity of the Brazilian state are the major causes of Brazil's declining international presence under Rousseff's administrations.

To make matters worse, 2014 marked the beginning of Operation Car Wash, which would uninterruptedly denounce cases of corruption involving major political parties, especially those that made up Rousseff's ruling coalition. The Operation, which would later be called one of the biggest corruption investigations in world history, exposed not only government officials (including former president Lula himself), but also jailed dozens of leaders from some of Brazil's major private companies (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:178). While the corruption scandal inflicted serious damage to the Workers' Party's image domestically, it also challenged the legitimacy of the government internationally, as well as the internationalisation of its "national champions", most of them involved in international bribery schemes.

The deterioration of the image of the President's political party led to another wave of protests in March 2015, where thousands took to the streets calling for the impeachment of Rousseff, though the President herself had not been accused or criminalised by the investigations (Douglas, 2015). This, in turn, paved the way for the undemocratic process of impeachment in the Brazilian Congress, after both the ruling coalition and the private sector dismissed its support for Rousseff (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:178).

Faced with a hostile Congress and diminishing support from the public, her democratic mandate would be eventually interrupted by the parliamentary *coup d'état* that impeached the President in August 2016 (Cavalcanti & Venerio, 2017:145). Dilma Rousseff was impeached due to contested accusations of using improper loans from public banks for the national budget without Congress approval (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:178). Though improper administrative actions were used as the basis for the impeachment, the political motivation for the coup is linked to the president's refusal to stop Operation Car Wash investigations, aimed at investigating a money laundering scheme involving Brazil's majority-state-owned oil company Petrobras, and other national champions as well as politicians (Watts, 2016).

As the new president of Brazil, Michel Temer faced numerous challenges to respond to the economic challenges and the public's grievances. Above all, the legitimacy of his government was always a bone of contention to advance the new government's policies both at home and abroad (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:178).

In his short term in office, Temer enjoyed a more solid support base in Parliament and was able to advance a series of economic reforms to reverse Brazil's dire economic circumstances. With a more neoliberal approach, the President executed significant cuts in government spending, including those allocated to social programmes that reduced inequality during Lula's years in office. As da Silva & Pérez (2019:180), "the proposals (...) [were] met with great resistance from a population accustomed to high levels of government spending since the Lula years". With insignificant implications on the economy, and faced with corruption charges in 2017, Temer left office as the most unpopular president in the history of Brazil, with an approval rating of only 3 per cent.

4.3. Rousseff's and Temer's foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation Initiatives in Africa: pulling the plug

Along with South America, Africa is where the changes in Brazil's SSDC approach were felt the most. Though numerous factors from Africa's perspective could also be used to understand such changes, the combination of international and national events between 2011 and 2018 affected Brazil's foreign policy in Africa in three major ways. Firstly, under major economic crisis and budgetary restrictions, there was increasing contestation by parts of Brazilian society over the allocation of public funds towards development cooperation in other countries, especially in times of austerity. Not only did Brazil's exports to the continent decrease from US\$12 billion in 2011 to US\$9.7 billion in 2014, but cooperation projects in Africa implemented by *Itamaraty's* ABC also decreased from 253 to 161 in 2015. (Chichava, 2017:382)

Secondly, Temer's assault on the supposedly ideological underpinnings of Brazilian foreign policy, or the "Lula Agenda", compromised the nature and longevity of Brazil's SSDC agenda in Africa. By prioritising economic interests over long-term political alliances, Rousseff and Temer, the latter more intensively, distanced themselves from the narrative of inclusive development and democratisation of the international system. Lula's international agenda was not devoid of economic interests, but these did not undermine the development of an altruist attitude with regards to South-South relations. Furthermore, cooperation for development, especially in Africa, had served as an anchor to Lula's reformist ambitions and the consolidation of its desirable leadership in the Global South. This change in narrative, coupled with the declining credibility of Brazil's initiatives in Mozambique, represented significant changes in the relationship between Brazil and Mozambique, though the latter's position as the most important African partner remained unchanged.

Thirdly, Operation Car Wash, which saw several business leaders of the “national champions” sent to jail, also compromised the model of development cooperation also within the realm of Brazil’s private sector. Large Brazilian companies, whose initiatives to venture into Africa had been financed by BNDES (such as construction companies Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Corrêa) were accused – following the outcomes of Operation Car Wash – of corruption and bribes in exchange for favours to obtain international contracts. This process led to an eventual suspension of BNDES funds for these companies’ projects (Chichava, 2017:382). Additionally, the involvement of many African government officials was also unveiled by the Operation, as is the case of Mozambique, to be discussed later in this chapter. These large corruption scandals²⁷ deeply affected the legitimacy of Brazil in the eyes of Mozambican civil society, diminishing support for the presence of Brazilian enterprises in the country.

If under Lula Brazil dedicated an increasing amount of its budget towards SSDC initiatives via, for instance, the export of successful public policies and technical skills, under Rousseff and Temer, Brazil showed a declining capacity to allocate resources towards cooperation for development. Furthermore, the parsimonious approach towards SSDC commitments as shown by Rousseff and Temer’s presidencies triggered another chain reaction which resulted in Brazil becoming less enthusiastic about the possibility of diversifying her international partners (Neto & Tussie, 2018: 352).

4.3.1. Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Africa

Rousseff’s agenda for Africa remained very similar to the one implemented by Lula, though differences of personal, domestic and international levels gave it a less active and innovative character (Burgess & Bastos, 2017). In the main, two main differences can be observed in Rousseff’s approach to Africa and SSDC in comparison to Lula: (a) a less intense presidential diplomacy and, (b) the prioritisation of short-term economic gains over the government of Lula’s long-term developmental goals.

With regards to presidential diplomacy, the personalisation of Brazil and Africa relations in the image of Lula originates from the latter’s promotion of closer ties with the African continent as never experienced before. Rousseff’s less active presidential diplomacy led many scholars and analysts to attribute Brazil’s reduced international prominence solely to her personal characteristics and leadership style. In fact, Rousseff was different to her predecessor in several ways, which may have resulted in a different approach to management, described by Cornetet (2014:132) as “more practical and

²⁷ As for the corruption practices by the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht, it was called “the largest foreign bribery case in history” by the US Department of Justice (Pressly, 2018).

technical” rather than Lula’s “charismatic” profile. Rousseff was criticised by Brazilian diplomats and businessmen alike for “weakening Brazil-Africa relations” (IBRAF, 2018:1).

However, as argued by Bastos & Hiratuka (2017:12), it is unlikely that Rousseff would have been able to reverse Brazil’s declining visibility and international presence had she been fonder of presidential diplomacy, once most of its causes originated from unfavourable international circumstances, as well as national ones. Under Rousseff, the combination of challenging domestic and international factors resulted in efforts being channelled towards acting upon Brazil’s economic and political crisis.

The slowdown of the Brazilian economy led to major cuts in the budget allocated to the Foreign Ministry and, consequently, its cooperation agency ABC. Between 2011 and 2013, Brazil allocated R\$3.2 billion to development cooperation projects, a decrease of 11.5 per cent in comparison with the period between 2008 and 2010 (Neto & Tussie, 2018:352). According to Lechini (2018:418), Rousseff’s government substantially reduced ABC’s budget and the incentives for cooperation projects by prioritising existing ones over the creation of new ones. As said by ABC’s Africa, Asia and Oceania department coordinator at the time, budget cuts amounted to 70 per cent only during Rousseff’s first year in office (Lechini, 2018:418). Rousseff’s foreign policy began to prioritise short-term benefits over what Saraiva (2014:27) calls “diffused gains” in Brazil’s international agenda (Saraiva, 2014:27).

As a response to the accusations of “neglecting Africa”, Rousseff reiterated the enduring importance of the continent in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda by launching *Grupo África*, a group comprising different national ministries whose objectives were to redefine Brazil’s policy towards Africa. In order to strengthen relations with the continent, the new agenda sought to connect Brazilian investments and trade to development cooperation projects in Africa (de Oliveira, 2015:35).

In 2013, *Agenda África* was launched with the main goals of pardoning African countries’ debt to Brazil, negotiating investment and trade agreements and broadening cooperation projects (Lechini, 2018:417). Also in 2013, Brazil pardoned or negotiated a total of US\$900 million in debt from twelve African countries. Though in line with her predecessor’s policy of debt relief, this action was announced by Rousseff in a more pragmatic tone in comparison to Lula and Amorim’s “historic debt” and “solidarity” approach. Rousseff described it as a necessary measure to promote increased Brazilian investments, internationalisation of Brazilian companies and trade with the African continent, indicating that the government’s narrative distanced itself from Lula’s (Leite & Cavalcante, 2016:353).

Thus, economic issues become key not only in the domestic sphere, but in the country's external policies (Saraiva, 2014:27). As a consequence of this, insofar as Brazil-Africa relations are concerned, Rousseff's government emphasised the economic benefits that could be accrued from closer ties with the African continent (Abdenur & Marcondes, 2018:178), which can be understood as a tipping point for kicking-off a new agenda for Africa. In striking contrast to the expectations about the pursuit of an assertive approach towards human rights under Rousseff – due mainly to the president's own history as a militant and a victim of torture by the Brazilian military dictatorship – Brazil's priorities seemed to be concentrated on the economic and commercial aspects (Abdenur & Neto, 2013:22), pushing the human rights agenda and SSDC away.

Leite & Cavalcante (2016:364) will argue that, while Lula's cooperation for Africa was closely advanced through *presidential diplomacy*, Rousseff's cooperation for Africa was one executed through *commercial diplomacy*. These changes signified a decrease in presidential diplomacy and cooperation for development, but they did not alter Africa's position as a key partner in Brazil's international agenda (de Oliveira, 2015:42).

Brazil's new approach towards the continent is a function of the economic challenges posed by the global economy and the bearing it had on domestic politics. Maintaining the country's alliances with the Global South was still seen as a priority by the Brazilian government under Rousseff, in part due to the party's political convictions about the undemocratic international system. However, the president's reduced enthusiasm for matters of international politics meant that the motivations behind the country's SSDC agenda were slowly abandoned. This rollback of the country's international development projects would be intensified under Michel Temer, as discussed in the next section.

4.3.2. Michel Temer's foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation in Africa

When Temer took office in 2016, his appointed foreign ministry José Serra announced the launch of a "New Brazilian Foreign Policy", in which there would supposedly be the execution of a non-ideological agenda and the reorientation of Brazil's international relations towards traditional partners in the North (Nunes & Rodriguez, 2017:31). As a reflection of Temer's domestic policies, Brazilian foreign policy would envisage commercial policies over political ones, as well as bilateral relations over multilateral ones, resulting in what Nunes & Rodriguez (2017:37) called "political retraction and economic pragmatism". Thus, while Rousseff's international agenda had already presented some changes in relation to previous decade, Temer's seemed to symbolise a tipping point for Brazil's international ambitions and SSDC practices.

The very short duration of Temer's government and the several political and economic challenges his government faced limited diplomatic capabilities (Stuenkel, 2017:2). While drastic changes did not happen, partly due to the contestation of part of *Itamaraty's* diplomatic corps (Silva, 2019:35), there were some significant changes in foreign policy disposition when compared to the 14 years of the Workers' Party government. Under Temer, Brazil abandoned its claims for the reform of international organisations and its developmental approach (Oliveira, 2018:303). Instead, it sought to return investments to the country by recovering Brazil's international legitimacy as an "economically and politically responsible" country (Silva, 2019:34), a movement that reached its most symbolic point upon Temer's submission of formal request to become a permanent member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2017.

Brazil's SSDC agenda did not disappear completely from Temer's agenda, though his government was deeply disapproved by some countries from the Global South due to his support for Rousseff's impeachment process. This illegitimacy in the eyes of some of Brazil's major partners in the developing world made it difficult for the continuation of the South-South agenda, crafted by the Workers' Party, to find its place in Temer's Brazil (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:179). At the same time, Temer's efforts to dissociate from his predecessors' policies entailed revising the criteria for choosing the country's international alliances (Oliveira, 2018:301).

As for Brazil and Africa relations, foreign minister Serra's inauguration speech in 2016 indicated that the economic pragmatism – which underpinned Rousseff's policy agenda – would be the main guiding principle, in stark contrast to the solidarity rhetoric that defined Brazil's SSDC approach in the Lula years. According to Serra, "contrary to what was promoted, the Africa of today does not ask for sympathy but hopes for an effective technological and investment exchange. Pragmatic solidarity towards countries of the global South will continue to be an important strategy of Brazil's foreign policy. This is the right South–South strategy and not the one that was practised for publicity purposes with low economic benefits and high diplomatic investments" (MRE, 2017 cited Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:695).

Brazil's efforts to make a pro-business approach an integral cog of its SSDC agenda, particularly towards Africa, reflected Temer's attempt to eliminate what the government called "ideological" underpinnings of the Workers' Party's foreign policy. Lula and Rousseff's foreign policy, which mirrored the national project of inclusive development, was repeatedly linked to the idea of a "failed" and "corrupt" government, and the need for a different strategy found support in this politicisation (de Lima, 2018:49).

As for SSDC, rather than eliminating these practices and risk deteriorate Brazil's already diminishing image as a global player in the international stage, efforts were put in place to change the nature and objectives of such initiatives, which will be clearly illustrated in the case of Mozambique.

4.4. Mozambique: from economic partner to development cooperation partner and back

As discussed before, Mozambique is arguably a key case study to understand Brazil's agenda of development cooperation, particularly towards Africa. Considered the largest recipient of Brazilian development cooperation budget on the African continent under the three administrations in question, Mozambique is also one of the main African destinations for Brazilian exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) alike. As for Brazil's rollback as Africa's development cooperation partner from 2011 onwards, Chichava (2017:383) argues that Mozambique continues to be an emblematic case to understand the impact of the political and economic crises that characterised the post-Lula era. The relationship between both Portuguese-speaking countries also fairly illustrates the complexity of the dynamics of Brazil's SSDC agency, its controversies and questionable sustainability.

The strengthening of Brazil and Mozambique relations throughout the eight years of Lula in power placed the African country at the centre of Brazil's African agenda and SSDC. Rousseff's visit to Maputo in October 2011, her first year as president, signified interest to have ties between the two countries maintained. Official documents signed during the visit expressed the countries' intention to maintain efforts towards development cooperation and reiterated the importance of South-South solidarity as an instrument to achieve some of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (MRE, 2011b). However, the following years would demonstrate that changes in the Brazilian approach towards development cooperation and, later on, in the level of importance given to South-South relations more broadly, also affected its major African partner, Mozambique.

Lula's active diplomacy towards Mozambique worked hand-in-hand with Brazil's cooperation for development and search for political alliances. Between 2003 and 2010, Lula visited the country three times and received three visits from Mozambican presidents. During the course of Rousseff's and Temer's administrations, Brazil's visits to Africa were pragmatically chosen, once the presidents visited Africa's most important economic partners for Brazil (de Castro, 2013:4), which included Mozambique.

This decrease in the intensity of presidential diplomacy when compared to Lula's government can also be understood against the backdrop of Brazil's economic

challenges and government spending cuts. Under Rousseff, for example, Brazil reached the height of its political and economic turbulences caused by the decline in GDP and FDIs, rising inflation and unemployment levels, and Operation Car Wash scandal (Chichava, 2017:382). Notwithstanding the economic circumstances in place, previously mentioned, Rousseff shallow engagement with presidential diplomacy also points towards the argument that she pursued a less active international agenda, driven by personality traits and different priorities.

In 2011, the number of Brazilian cooperation projects being implemented in Mozambique amounted to 21, with 9 others under negotiation (Chichava, 2017:383). During Rousseff's government, several of these projects were delayed or even cancelled as a result of lower budget allocation to federal agencies responsible for development cooperation. ProSavana, for example, was highly compromised by Brazil's significant withdrawal from its implementation, which left the bulk of the responsibility to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Chichava, 2017: 386). In this respect, Chichava (2017:386) also argues that most projects which survived the Brazilian withdrawal were those with a trilateral setup, in which the Brazilian actors contributed mostly towards technical expertise and training (Chichava, 2017:387).

The most recent report done by the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) on the country's cooperation for international development show that, although Mozambique remained the largest recipient of Brazil's cooperation between 2014 and 2016, the budget allocated decreased significantly. In 2016, the Brazilian government spent just over R\$8 million in bilateral cooperation with the African country, a sharp decline compared to the R\$42.7 million it spent in 2014 financial year (Lima, Viana & Júnior, 2018:273) At the end of Rousseff's government, 40 technical cooperation projects were on course, maintaining Mozambique's position as the main partner for cooperation in the continent (Chichava, 2017:385). However, key federal agencies that are responsible for executing SSDC projects in Mozambique had its budget reduced in the same period. Between 2014 and 2016, Embrapa's expenditure with cooperation projects falling sharply from R\$61 million to R\$21 million, which is a reduction of 35 per cent. In the same period, Fiocruz also saw a reduction of 46 per cent in its international cooperation budget (Lima, Viana & Júnior, 2018:268).

No data exists to account for Brazil's SSDC commitments after 2016, but domestic contestations over the international cooperation agenda is reflected in some of the Brazilian government's decisions after 2016. In August of that year, Temer's government withdrew the offer to donate three military aircraft to the Mozambican air force, over claims of excessive bureaucracy. The donation had been proposed by Brazil in 2009 as a way of deepening cooperation and strengthening ties with the country

(Chichava, 2017:387). In a similar trend, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister declared, in 2018, that the country would insist that Mozambique pay back the loans used to finance activities of Brazilian companies in the country, which had been defaulted by the Mozambican government (Marcello, 2018).

Nonetheless, some important cooperation projects were executed in Mozambique during the period. The antiretroviral factory funded by the Brazilian government was launched 2012 and the first Breast Milk Bank of Mozambique, which followed the successful Brazilian experience, was opened in 2018 (Fiocruz, 2018). However, both health cooperation projects had been negotiated under the presidency of Lula and, although it represents continuation of the government's SSDC agenda, it does not characterise intensification or strengthening of Brazil-Mozambique relations. Rather, it illustrates the tendency to execute projects that had been previously negotiated (Lechini, 2018:418).

The move away from Lula's "solidarity" diplomacy is also identified in Brazil-Mozambique relations during the period in question. In order to reduce the barriers for the expansion of Brazilian private businesses on the African country, Brazil and Mozambique signed the Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) in 2015. The agreement aimed to facilitate the internationalisation of Brazilian companies in the country, offering greater security for investors, increase in Brazilian exports and promoting the integration of industrial production between the countries (Fernandes & Fiorati, 2015:248; Nogueira *et al*, 2017:222). The agreement, above all, illustrates the economic pragmatism adopted by the Brazilian government with regards to its relationship with the African continent and, most particularly, its largest cooperation partner on the continent, Mozambique.

However, contestations over the performance of Brazilian companies and institutions in the country, especially with regards to ProSavana project, led different sectors of the Mozambican society to distrust Brazilian initiatives. In Mozambique, social segments, rural population, small farmers and the population that live in the areas affected by the mega-projects have resisted such initiatives over accusations of land grabbing and disregard for local communities (Nogueira *et al*, 2017:244). In fact, Brazil's initiatives in the Nacala Corridor within the context of ProSavana were called a "Trojan horse of Brazilian economic interest" by certain quarters of the Mozambican civil society (Chichava *et al*, 2013 *cited* Bry, 2017a:24).

Additionally, in the context of the outcomes of Operation Car Wash, the presence of Brazilian companies in Mozambique was challenged by revelations of corruption, as well as the temporary cancellation of incentives for internationalisation by the BNDES. Mozambican officials were accused of receiving bribery in return for contracts, as was

the case with Brazilian construction companies Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht – bribery with Mozambican officials of illegal benefits (Chichava, 2017:389).

All in all, Brazilian foreign policy under Rousseff presented some level of continuity when it came to the relationship with key partners such as Mozambique. This continuity, however, was not deprived of significant changes in the narrative and actions of the Brazilian government towards SSDC in Mozambique. The pursuit of mutual economic gains were emphasised over the inauguration of new development cooperation projects. Under Temer, the significant changes in the domestic setting – towards a more neoliberal approach – reflected in the relationship with the country through the cancellation of cooperation projects and the search for the payment of loans, which is in sharp contrast with Lula and Rousseff's debt relief agenda.

Moreover, though efforts to expand the presence of Brazilian businesses in Mozambique intensified under both administrations in question, accusations of corruption in the context of Car-Wash and contestations over key Brazilian cooperation projects by the Mozambican society have furthered weakened the relationship between the two countries.

4.5. Concluding remarks

Although Mozambique remains one of Brazil's major development partners in Africa, with ongoing projects like ProSavana, the approach towards the country moved from one of solidarity-based cooperation to one of sole economic pragmatism. It is then appropriate to say that, by 2018, Brazil had “pulled the plug” on development cooperation in Mozambique, or at least the state-led model developed under Lula. This, however, happened gradually over the administrations of Rousseff and Temer, led by the economic recession (and the austere response by the Rousseff and the Temer governments); and the political crisis that began after major street demonstrations against the austerity measures adopted by Rousseff, intensified by the revelation of Operation Car Wash and the impeachment.

Faced with limited budget, Brazil began to adopt initiatives that could provide short-term economic gains over the more complex, long-term objectives drafted under Lula. The quest for economic returns from the relationship with the African continent dominated parliamentary meetings, as shown previously. More than just a rational claim, this also reflected the politicisation of South-South Development Cooperation and Brazil's agenda towards Africa. With its credibility destroyed by the revelations of Operation Car Wash, the Workers' Party (PT) lost most of its public approval, and so did the international development agenda driven the party. In other words, the “Lula agenda” for Africa – initially carried on by Rousseff – became target of the media, public opinion

and politicians alike, intensified by the “default” of some African partners who received resources from the Brazilian government, such as Mozambique.

Under Lula, besides being a major economic partner, Mozambique was also considered an important ally to support Brazil in its international agenda of reforming international financial institutions. Acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and establishing itself as a leader of the Global South were ambitions pursued through SSSC. In this sense, Brazil’s SSSC agenda also carried political intensions, i.e. to gain legitimacy among global South countries and thus garner developing countries’ solidarity in its quest for global prominence. As of the rise of Temer to the presidential office, following the parliamentary coup inspired by anti-PT sentiments, the Brazilian government reshaped its foreign policy goals, distancing itself from initiatives associated with the Lula government. Therefore, the political foundations of Brazil’s relationship with Mozambique were put aside over economic ones.

Under Rousseff, Brazil started to adopt a more commercial tone to its SSSC agenda. Though it completed important SSSC projects that had been negotiated under Lula and even started others, the intensity was much lower. Most importantly, the SSSC agenda towards Africa and Mozambique, in particular, was provided with an economic nature that, although existent, was not emphasised under Lula’s administrations.

During Temer’s government, the narrative towards Africa highlighted the need for mutual economic gains and the return of the investments carried out in the previous governments. Furthermore, under Temer, the government sought to rid the foreign policy agenda of the political ideologies that used to drive the pursuit of alliances with the Global South and the reform of the international system. The consequences for SSSC were not totally destructive, but helped to reframe the foundations and objectives of this agenda.

As for Brazil-Mozambique relations, in the context of SSSC, the contestations around the social consequences of ProSavana and the corruption scandals involving Brazilian enterprises and Mozambican government officials helped further damage the credibility of Brazilian initiatives in the country, dealing a heavy blow to the two countries’ once strong relationship. While it can be argued that Brazilian foreign policy disposition changed gradually under Rousseff, under Temer the changes were far more significant, expressed in his desire to realign Brazil with its traditional partners from the North to the detriment of South-South relations. In other words, while the Rousseff government exhibited features of continuation, yet with less intensity, under Temer Brazil pulled the plug on South-South Development Cooperation concerning Mozambique.

Chapter V: Conclusion

The quest for development in the disadvantaged regions of the world intensified after the Second World War, when the wave of decolonisation swept across most of Africa and Asia. The marginalisation of these economies within the international architecture of power and their economic and political dependence to the industrialised North gave birth to a series of movements for autonomy, independence and the right to development. From Bandung to Buenos Aires and beyond, such political movements questioned the traditional Northern model of development aid. The unfair nature of this kind of aid is best illustrated by the fact that assistance is usually attached to conditionalities of economic nature (“tied aid”) and frequently motivated by the donors’ political interests.

The demand was high for alternative models of development to those generally imposed by Western powers, and South-South Development Cooperation (SSC) emerges as an attempt to fulfil said aspirations. SSC rejected DAC-related practices and embodied the principles of horizontality and reciprocity. Unlike North-South cooperation, SSC did not entail an empathetic transmission of “superior” practices to those who need them, but the sharing of experiences that seek to tackle similar concerns (provision of basic needs, health, education, hunger and poverty eradication, and so forth). It also entailed respect for national sovereignty and for the specificities of the national context of those countries that receive assistance. However, it was not until the turn of the century that the rise of key Southern players, such as Brazil, would diversify and challenge the global development landscape.

The beginning of the new millennium was accompanied by a series of significant changes to the existing international political and economic architecture, especially with regards to development cooperation. The “rise of the South” reshuffled the global structures of power. Economic growth and integration into the world’s production chains provided countries such as China, India and Brazil a stronger political voice. While China challenged the domination of the neoliberal international order, countries like Brazil sought to revive their demands for reform, i.e. a more democratic global architecture was vital for the development of Southern countries.

Against this backdrop, Brazil stood out, in the first decade of the millennium, as a key development partner and a legitimate voice of the South. Under Lula’s administrations, Brazil raised its international profile by exporting, through SSC, successful domestic policies aimed at fostering economic development and social inclusion. As for Africa, for example, the Kenyan Harvard professor Calestous Juma’s well-known saying “for every African problem there is a Brazilian solution” illustrates Brazil’s notability among its Southern counterparts.

This positive image, however, is not only consequence of Brazil's "assertive" foreign policy towards South-South relations. Neither is it the sole result of Lula's presidential diplomacy, exercised through constant visits to the African continent, for instance. Whereas all these factors did play a role, it was Brazil's remarkable levels of development in the first decade of the century that sparked the interest of African countries. Enabled by the country's impressive economic growth, the Lula government put in place distributive policies that lifted millions of Brazilians out of poverty, coupled with social programmes aimed at fighting hunger, racial inequality and extreme poverty. In short, Brazil became the "successful model to be emulated", a status that laid the foundations of the country's international ambitions and its South-South Development Cooperation agenda.

However, this upward trajectory was thwarted after 2011 when the global financial crisis eventually hit the Brazilian economy and other developing countries, thus rearranging, once more, the distribution of global economic power. Beyond that, the loss of economic weight led to the weakening of political power once wielded by the Global South, and consequently their reformist agenda. For Brazil, the financial crisis brought an end to the cycle of economic prosperity and ascendance experienced under the Lula government, severely affecting its South-South Cooperation agenda, particularly with the African continent.

In this context, this paper's main objective was to understand how changes²⁸ in Brazil's broader international agenda affected the country's South-South relations under the governments of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018), especially with regards to Brazil's development cooperation agenda in Africa. Contrary to South America (Brazil's immediate neighbours, where questions of security and regional dominance need to be attended to), Africa is not an immediate priority for Brazil's foreign policy. For this reason, Brazil's stance towards the continent is constantly revised, being directly tied to the perceptions and motivations of political leaders. Though Brazil enjoys relationships with several other African countries, this paper set out to analyse the individual case of Brazil-Mozambique relations, specifically within the realm of SSDC.

The main finding of this paper is that, *while the Lula government laid the foundations of Brazil's South-South Development Cooperation agenda (i.e. an instrument for the pursuit of the country's global ambitions and a reflection of the national approach to development), these foundations were undermined during the subsequent governments, led by constraining international circumstances and the dismantling of the*

²⁸ When using the term "changes", this paper reflects back to the Lula government, where both SSDC and Africa occupied unprecedentedly relevant roles within Brazil's foreign policy.

state-led developmental model advanced by the Workers' Party. The jettisoning of SSDC initiatives was a consequence of two main mechanisms, (a) changes in Brazil's foreign policy disposition which was driven more by an economist outlook than merely the promotion South-South interests, and (b) the re-orientation of the national development project characterised by its in-ward looking approach which prioritised, first and foremost, domestic economic interests.

With regards to the *first mechanism*, this paper contends that *foreign policy goals were re-defined in economic terms, and the same applied to SSDC. The political goals that underpinned Brazil's reformist ambitions lost space once the latter were gradually abandoned under Rousseff and completely discarded under Temer.*

Under Lula, the desire to expand Brazil's alliances within the South and achieve a leadership position was motivated by the demand for the democratisation of the international system, i.e. the United Nations Security Council (in which Brazil's aspirations for a seat gained momentum during the Lula government) and the World Trade Organisation, most prominently. Reform was seen, by Lula's progressive government, as the only way for marginalised countries to achieve sustainable economic development. Conversely, Brazil could only lead the pro-reform agenda with the support of other developing countries. Strong political ties with the South were mostly cultivated through Lula's diplomacy and SSDC initiatives.

Coming from the same political party as Lula, Rousseff carried these reformist ambitions through her two terms, however with less enthusiasm and not so assertively. The reasons for that lie in the re-arrangement of economic and political power after the Global South was hit by the global financial crisis, mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the political crisis installed inside the Rousseff government (i.e. corruption scandals, loss of political support) drew the President's attention to domestic issues and led to a decrease in efforts towards foreign affairs. This rollback was intensified under the Temer government, now motivated by the re-configuration in Brazil's international politics. Holding a more conservative understanding of global politics, Temer's Brazil sought to redirect the country's foreign policy by realigning with the "traditional partners" of the North, i.e. the USA and the European Union. Notwithstanding political ideologies, Temer was motivated by the need for the country to "regain" credibility in the eyes of the international community and attract the necessary investments for economic recovery. This reorientation resulted in an obvious detachment from the reformist ambitions of the progressive Workers' Party, relegating South-South relations and the SSDC agenda to a secondary position within the country's international agenda, where it had occupied a pivotal role.

Moreover, faced with the economic constraints imposed by the global financial crisis, “economics” returned to the centre of Brazil’s international agenda. The need to reverse the downward trajectory of the Brazilian economy reflected in the country’s foreign policy. Africa, as in other periods of Brazilian history, lost once more the status of Brazil’s strategic development partner. In this context, investment agreements and policies to expand international trade outpaced cooperation for development. Accordingly, state-led development (both domestically and in the country’s international approach) gave way to the interests of private capital. As a result, South-South Development Cooperation as seen during the Lula government was not officially abandoned, but redefined in terms of mutual economic gains. In Africa, the solidarity and altruistic narrative that accompanied Brazil’s SSDC practices and helped legitimise them diminished, and a more pragmatic tone was adopted.

Though the points presented summarise the major changes observed in Brazil’s foreign policy under Rousseff and Temer, it does not provide a full account of the country’s rollback in South-South Development Cooperation agenda towards Africa. On the contrary, while the global circumstances discussed above aided in limiting the reach of Brazil’s SSDC during said period, it did not define the outlook of this agenda. In this point, the adequacy of the theoretical point of departure adopted in this study is once more evidenced. Paraphrasing Rose (1998), the influence of systemic factors may have limited Brazil’s “menu of foreign policy choices” for the Rousseff and Temer governments, but it did not dictate “the selection of one particular item on that menu over another”. In other words, Brazil faced clear limitations for the expansion of its cooperation agenda in Africa, but these were merely constraints, not determinants. The nuances behind the re-formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy with regards to SSDC in Africa are mostly found within Brazil’s *internal setting*, i.e. the president’s diplomatic style, the standing of the ruling coalition, the relationship with non-domestic actors and, most importantly, the model of national development and its accomplishments.

As previously discussed in this paper, domestic politics played a significant role in both the rise and the fall of Brazil’s development cooperation agenda for Africa. Bearing this in mind, the *second mechanism* through which the foundations of Brazil’s SSDC agenda were undermined can be summarized as follows: *South-South Development Cooperation both reflected and fed the model of state-led development adopted by the Lula government. Once this model was delegitimised and eventually dismantled, the SSDC agenda lost its impetus.*

Under Lula, national development dominated both national and international policies. Inspired by the progressive ideas of his political party, which he helped found, Lula promoted the idea of a state-led developmental model, in which the state resurges

as the key distributor and provider of economic resources. As discussed in this thesis, the Lula government introduced a series of economic and social policies aimed to fight hunger, eradicate HIV, increase social protection and minimum wage, among others. Commended by the international community, several of these policies attracted the interest of developing countries that faced similar predicaments, particularly in Africa.

Via SSDC, mostly financed by the Brazilian government, Brazil shared experiences and exported successful stories of development. As a result, the prominent role of the Brazilian state in SSDC allowed for a narrative of altruism without private economic interests. This, however, became unsustainable once the state lost its financing capacity. The economic recession led the governments of Rousseff and Temer to pursue austere policies, consequently affecting development cooperation practices. This was illustrated by the cuts in the ABC's budget that started in the first years of Rousseff's government. Under tighter budgetary capacity, Brazil reduced promotion of SSDC and emphasised the need to establish economically-beneficial partnerships that could aid the recovery of the Brazilian economy. This trend was both intensified and extrapolated under Temer, where the demands for "return" of the investments made in Africa evolved to the condemnation of partner countries that were unable to pay back the Brazilian government.

Furthermore, the "SSDC in Africa" agenda was largely personified in the image of Lula and his political party, the PT. Lula's personal engagement with Brazil's international agenda along with his own history of poverty and hunger provided Brazil with important credentials to develop its cooperation activities, particularly in Africa. Though very positive, the imaginary of a "Lula Agenda", as opposed to a Brazilian one, carried significant consequences for the subsequent governments. With the onset of Operation Car Wash, allegations of corruption involving PT officials, coupled with the dire consequences of the economic recession for the Brazilian people led to diminishing support for the Rousseff government. Street demonstrations clamouring for Rousseff's impeachment were clear manifestations of the dismantling of the Workers' Party's government.

After losing the support of the Brazilian public, its government coalition and Brazilian private sector alike, Rousseff's government crumbled. These difficulties, coupled with the President's dull presidential diplomacy helped to undermine Brazil's international presence. The impeachment of Rousseff was conveniently supported by her vice-president Michel Temer, who ascended to power in 2016. Building upon this anti-PT sentiments and the demands of the street protests, Temer had to represent "a new era" for Brazil's national and international agenda. As for Brazil's foreign policy, Temer waged a new agenda that would be capable of reviving economic growth and 'win

back' the country's credibility internationally, particularly countries in the North. Deemed by conservatives as "extremely ideological" (given the reformist nature), the Workers' Party's foreign policy had to be replaced with a "non-ideological" and pragmatic one. Brazil's SSDC agenda was mistakenly taken as representing the sole interests of the governments of PT, though doomed to failure. Temer's request to officially join the OECD illustrates that the pro-reform project was discarded, opening a new chapter in Brazil's foreign policy and its relations with the African continent, in particular Mozambique.

It is important to reiterate the two main reasons behind the choice for Mozambique over other African countries. Firstly and most obviously, this lusophone country is considered to be Africa's largest recipient of Brazil's development cooperation initiatives in the twenty-first century. It hosts, for instance, the ProSavana, Brazil's largest cooperation project in the continent. Secondly, for decades Mozambique has been an attractive destination for foreign direct investments from Brazil, having hosted some of Brazil's major "national champions" such as Vale. Analysing the interplay between state-funded SSDC and the internationalisation of Brazilian private capital is of utmost importance to understand the significant changes experienced under Rousseff and Temer. It also displays an important feature of Brazil's cooperation initiatives in Africa.

The factors driving Brazil-Mozambique relations before and after Lula were adequately identified and analysed through the lens of the theoretical framework adopted in this study, namely neoclassical realism. As a theory of foreign policy that draws upon realist assumptions about the international system, neoclassical realism offered a broader understanding to the Brazilian case than neorealism would have, for instance. Any attempt to analyse this individual case taking into account uniquely systemic factors would have resulted in an incomplete account. This is demonstrated by the unique set of circumstances inherent in Brazilian politics that shaped and re-shaped the country's development cooperation agenda in Mozambique, as will be outlined later.

Notwithstanding the particularities of Brazil's relationship with each of its African partners, Mozambique once more epitomises the determinants of Brazil's approach to Africa through South-South Development Cooperation. Mozambique is a clear manifestation of the rationale behind Brazil's SSDC agenda and exposes its fragility. More than that, this case illustrates of the two major foundations of Brazil's SSDC, i.e. a reflection of the national approach to development, formulated within the domestic political environment.

As for Brazil's SSDC cooperation Mozambique after Lula, shifts in this approach manifested in different ways. The ProSavana experienced lack of resources that compromised the implementation of the project, a problem that was only counter-balanced due to the involvement of the Japanese government, for example. Though the

Rousseff government initiated new projects in the country, the Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) signed in 2015 – an important realisation for Brazil-Mozambique relations – illustrates the economic diplomacy towards the country that resurges after 2011. More than that, it reflects the national model of development in place, in which the state gives way to private capital in order to restore its finances. Furthermore, even though there is little quantitative information about SSDC under the Temer government, his standing towards Mozambique is best illustrated by the cancellation of major cooperation projects and the condemnation of Mozambique’s “default”, largely covered by the media and used by conservative politicians to delegitimise the “Lula agenda” of cooperation for development.

Not least important, Operation Car Wash exposed illegal practices involving Brazilian companies and Mozambican officials. This, coupled with contestations over the activities of ProSavana, helped undermine the credibility of Brazilian projects in the country. It is also worth pointing out that the Temer government charted a new era for the political relationship between Brazil and Mozambique, given the fact that the affinity between the PT and the Mozambican ruling party Frelimo also facilitated cooperation between the two countries²⁹.

5.1. Considerations for future research

Needless to say, this research does not exhaust all the complexities of Brazil-Mozambique relations, not even within the realm of development cooperation alone. As an analysis of foreign policy and foreign policy disposition, this paper focused on the determinants of development cooperation agenda rather than the results or impact of such activities. Though it can be concluded that foreign policy changes did impact on Brazil’s South-South Cooperation with Mozambique, future field research could further analyse the results of such cooperation for the African country’s actual development. Furthermore, though touched upon in this paper, the interplay between national development and South-South Development Cooperation – how exactly do they feed each other, other than the fact that both are governmental projects? Furthermore, the impact of Mozambican and Brazilian civil society on the formulation of the SSDC agenda could also be further researched, especially given the controversies of projects such as ProSavana.

²⁹ See UOL (2016). Afinidade política favorece relações de Brasil e Moçambique. *Últimas notícias*. Available at: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/lusa/2006/11/11/ult611u73399.jhtm>. [15 December, 2019]

Bibliography

- Abdenur, A. E., & Neto, D. M. S. (2013). Brazil's Development Cooperation with Africa: What Role for Democracy and Human Rights. *SUR-Int'l J. on Hum Rts.*, 19, 17-36
- Actis, E. (2017). La política exterior de Michel Temer. *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 31.
- Albanus, A. P. F. (2015). " Continuar não é repetir": a política externa dos governos Lula e Dilma em perspectiva comparada. *Revista Neiba, Cadernos Argentina Brasil*, 4(1), 1-12.
- Alden, C., Chichava, S., & Alves, A. C. (2017). Mozambique and Brazil: Forging new partnerships or developing dependency?. Jacana Media.
- Amanor, K. S., & Chichava, S. (2016). South–south cooperation, agribusiness, and African agricultural development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique. *World Development*, 81, 13-23.
- Amorim Neto, O. (2011). De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier
- Amorim, C. (2010). Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview. *Revista brasileira de política internacional*, 53(SPE), 214-240.
- Amorim, C. (2017). *Acting globally: memoirs of Brazil's assertive foreign policy*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Assie-Lumumba, N. T. (2015). Behind and beyond Bandung: historical and forward-looking reflections on south-south cooperation. *Bandung: Journal of the Global South*, 2:11.
- Avelhan, L. L. (2015). A presença brasileira na África: um estudo sobre o Programa Embrapa-Moçambique. *Conselho Editorial Conselho Científico*, 108.
- Bastos, P. P. Z., & Hiratuka, C. (2017). A política econômica externa do governo Dilma Rousseff: comércio, cooperação e dependência. *Textos para Discussão*, 306.
- Bennett, A., & Elman, C. (2007). Case study methods in the international relations subfield. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(2), 170-195.
- Besharati, N., Moilwa, M., Khunou, K., & Rios, O. (2015). Developing a conceptual framework for South-South Cooperation. *Network of Southern Think-Tanks, Africa Chapter Working Document*.
- Bohn, S. (2018). Quasi-post-neoliberal Brazil: social change amidst elite adaptation and metamorphosis. In *Dominant Elites in Latin America*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 57-92.

- Boito, A., & Berringer, T. (2014). Social classes, neodevelopmentalism, and Brazilian foreign policy under presidents Lula and Dilma. *Latin American Perspectives*, 41(5), 94-109.
- Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). (n.d.). The BNDES. Available at: https://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES/ [Accessed 01 February 2020]
- Bry, S. H. (2017a). Brazil's Soft-Power Strategy: The Political Aspirations of South-South Development Cooperation. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13(2), 297-316.
- Bry, S. H. (2017b). The evolution of south-south development cooperation: Guiding principles and approaches. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 29(1), 160-175.
- Burchill, S. (2005). Liberalism. *Theories of international relations*. Macmillan International Higher Education. 3, 55-81
- Burchill, S., Linklater, A. (2005). Introduction. *Theories of international relations*. Macmillan International Higher Education. 3, 1-23.
- Burges, S. (2014). Brazilian development cooperation: here to stay, but how strong?. Development Policy blog. Available at: <https://devpolicy.org/brazilian-development-cooperation-here-to-stay-but-how-strong-20140305/> [Accessed 15 Nov 2019]
- Burges, S. W. & Bastos, F. H. C. (2017). The importance of presidential leadership for Brazilian foreign policy. *Policy Studies*, 38(3), 277-290.
- Cabral, L., Favareto, A., Mukwereza, L., & Amanor, K. (2016). Brazil's agricultural politics in Africa: More food international and the disputed meanings of "family farming". *World Development*, 81, 47-60.
- Captain, Y. (2010). Brazil's Africa Policy under Lula. *The Global South*, 4(1), 183-198.
- Casanova, L. (2009). Brazil's 'National Champions': Beyond Privatization. In *Global Latinas*. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 43-61.
- Cason, J. W., & Power, T. J. (2009). Presidentialization, pluralization, and the rollback of Itamaraty: explaining change in Brazilian Foreign Policy making in the Cardoso-Lula Era. *International Political Science Review*, 30(2), 117-140.
- Cavalcanti, B. M., & Venerio, C. M. S. (2017). Uma ponte para o futuro. Reflexões sobre a plataforma política do governo Temer. *RIL*, Brasília a, 54, 139-162.
- Cervo, A. L., & Lessa, A. C. (2014). The fall: the international insertion of Brazil (2011-2014). *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 57(2), 133-151.
- Chichava, S. (2017). Moçambique e a crise político-económica brasileira. *Desafios para Moçambique*. 381-391.

- Chichava, S., Alves, A. C. & Alden, C. (2017). Mozambique and Brazil. In Alden, C., Chichava, S. and Alves, A. C., eds. (2017) *Mozambique and Brazil: forging new partnerships or developing dependency?* Jacana Media, Johannesburg, South Africa. 1-8.
- Chichava, S., Duran, J., Cabral, L., Shankland, A., Buckley, L., Lixia, T., & Yue, Z. (2013). Chinese and Brazilian cooperation with African agriculture: the case of Mozambique. *Future Agricultures working paper*, 49, 1-30.
- Cicalo, A. (2012). Brazil and its African mirror: discussing 'black' approximations in the South Atlantic. *Desigualdades: Working Paper Series*. (24).
- Clark, A. (2016). Classical Realism and Human Nature. *Prized Writing*, 2015-2016, 148-158.
- Cornetet, J. M. C. (2014). A política externa de Dilma Rousseff: contenção na continuidade. *Conjuntura Austral*, 5(24), 111-150.
- Correa, P., & Schmidt, C. (2014). Public research organizations and agricultural development in Brazil: how did Embrapa get it right?. *Economic premise*, 145, 1-10.
- Costa, C. M. D. (2015). Cooperação técnica Brasil-África no governo Dilma Rousseff—expansão ou retração?
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2007). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*. Sage publications.
- Cunha, D. C. (2016). O Modelo de Desenvolvimento Brasileiro e a Política Externa. *Revista Neiba, Cadernos Argentina Brasil*, 5(1).
- Curado, M. (2015). China rising: Threats and opportunities for Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, 42(6), 88-104.
- da Costa Filho, J. J. G. (2018). Ideological Repertoires of the Brazilian Foreign Policy toward Africa across three presidential administrations (1995-2016): from realism to south-south solidarity, and back. *Cadernos de Política Exterior* 4(7), 79-114.
- da Silva, A. L. R., & Pérez, J. O. (2019). Lula, Dilma, and Temer: The Rise and Fall of Brazilian Foreign Policy. *Latin American Perspectives*, 46(4), 169-185.
- Dados, N., & Connell, R. (2012). The global south. *Contexts*, 11(1), 12-13.
- Dauvergne, P., & BL Farias, D. (2012). The rise of Brazil as a global development power. *Third World Quarterly*, 33(5), 903-917.
- de Almeida, E. L., & Kraychete, E. S. (2013). O discurso brasileiro para a cooperação em Moçambique: Existe ajuda desinteressada?. *Astrolabio*, (10).
- de Almeida, P. R. (2007). Brazil as a regional player and an emerging global power. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper*, 8, 1-12.

- de Almeida, P. R. (2010). Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's grand diplomacy. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53(2), 160-177.
- de Castro, C. M. (2013). Brazil's South-South Foreign Policy Post-Lula: Where Does Africa Fit In?. *Afrique contemporaine*, (4), 1-15.
- de la Fontaine, D., & Seifert, J. (2010). The role of South-South cooperation in present Brazilian foreign policy: actors, interests and functions. *Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies*.
- de Lima, M. R. S. (2018). A agência da Política Externa Brasileira: uma análise preliminar. In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacional no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG, 39-53.
- de Lima, M. R. S., & Hirst, M. (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities. *International affairs*, 82(1), 21-40.
- de Oliveira, G. Z. (2015). Política Africana Do Brasil: Mudança Entre Lula E Dilma?. *Conjuntura Austral*, 6(29), 29-48.
- de Renzio, P. & Seifert, J. (2014). South–South cooperation and the future of development assistance: mapping actors and options. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(10). 1860-1875.
- Devetak, R. (2005). Critical theory. In *Theories of international relations*. Macmillan International Higher Education, 3, 137-160.
- Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and international relations. Cambridge University Press.
- Donnelly, J. (2005). Realism. In Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C. & True, J. (2013). *Theories of international relations*. Third edition. Macmillan International Higher Education. 29-54.
- Douglas, B. (2015). Brazilian president under fire as tens of thousands protest in 200 cities. In *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/16/brazil-protests-dilma-rousseff> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]
- Faria, C. A. P. D., & Paradis, C. G. (2013). Humanism and solidarity in Brazilian foreign policy under Lula (2003-2010): theory and practice. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 7(2), 8-36.
- Fernandes, É. C., & Fiorati, J. J. (2015). Os ACFIs e os BITS assinados pelo Brasil: uma análise comparada. *RIL, Brasília*, 52(208), 247-276.
- Ferreira, J. R., Hoirisch, C., Fonseca, L. E., & Buss, P. M. (2016). International cooperation in health: the case of Fiocruz. *História, Ciências, Saúde*, 23(2), 1-10.
- Filho, J. G. S. (2018). O Brasil e o G20. In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacionais no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG, 135-166.

- Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference. (1955). In: Asia-Africa speak from Bandung. Jakarta: Indonesia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <https://www.cvce.eu/s/3n> [Accessed 12 December 2019]
- Fingerman, N. (2015a). A Cooperação Sul-Sul no Governo Dilma. *Núcleo de Estudos e Análises Internacionais*.
- Fingermann, N. N. (2015b). A study of Brazilian trilateral development cooperation in Mozambique: the case of ProSAVANA and ProALIMENTOS. *Working Paper-Future Agricultures*, (113).
- Fiocruz. (2018). First breast milk bank opens in Mozambique. Available at: <https://portal.fiocruz.br/en/news/first-breast-milk-bank-opens-mozambique> [Accessed 15 December, 2019]
- Fues, T. (2013). New dynamics in South-South cooperation. *German Development Institute Policy Brief*.
- Golub, P. S. (2013). From the New International Economic Order to the G20: how the 'global South' is restructuring world capitalism from within. *Third World Quarterly*, 34(6), 1000-1015.
- Gonçalves, N. B. A. (2018). Potências médias emergentes e Cooperação Sul-Sul: uma análise comparada das relações do Brasil e da Índia com Moçambique.
- Gore, C. (2013). The new development cooperation landscape: actors, approaches, architecture. *Journal of International Development*, 25(6), 769-786.
- Gray, K., & Gills, B. K. (2016). South–South cooperation and the rise of the Global South.
- Instituto Brasil-África (IBRAF). (2018) The future of Brazil-Africa relations: analysis of the proposals of the candidates for the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil. Brazil-Africa Institute.
- Jules, T. D., & Sá e Silva, M. (2008). How different disciplines have approached South-South cooperation and transfer. *Society for International Education Journal*, 5(1), 45-64.
- Keohane, R. O. (1988). International institutions: Two approaches. *International studies quarterly*, 32(4), 379-396.
- Kopalyan, N. (2009). Paradigmatic recrudescence: Classical realism in the age of globalization. *UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones*.
- Lechini, G. (2018). As Relações com a África. In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacional no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG. 405-427.

- Lee, C. J. (2009). At the rendezvous of decolonization: The Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 18–24 April. *Interventions*, 11(1), 81-93.
- Leite, A. C. C., & Cavalcante, T. F. (2016). A Cooperação Brasileira para a África: da diplomacia presidencial de Lula da Silva à diplomacia comercial de Dilma Rousseff. *Brazilian Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 342-370.
- Lima, J. B. B. (2017). Brazilian cooperation for international development: 2011-2013. Brasília: Ipea, ABC.
- Lima, J. B. B., Viana, A. R. & Júnior, J. R. P. (2018). Brazilian cooperation for international development: 2014-2016. Brasília: Ipea, ABC.
- Lima, M.C., Bragatti, M. & Borges, F. (2017). Brazil in three moments of Foreign Policy: Between regionalism, multilateralism and the South-South context. v. 30. 27-43.
- Linklater, A. (2005). Marxism. In *Theories of international relations*. Macmillan International Higher Education, 3, 110-136.
- Malamud, A. (2012). Power Matters: The Structural Sources of Brazilian Foreign Policy. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 6(2). 119-124
- Malamud, A. (2017). Foreign policy retreat: Domestic and systemic causes of Brazil's international rollback. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 2(2), 149-168.
- Mapa, D. M. (2011a). Política Externa e instituições democráticas no governo Lula: politização, interpretações divergentes e ensaios de opinião pública. *Anais do Seminário Nacional da Pós-Graduação em Ciências Sociais-UFES*, 1(1).
- Mapa, D. M. (2011b). A África na política externa do governo Lula: fortalecimento do diálogo Sul-Sul. *Anais do XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História – ANPUH*. 1-16.
- Marcello, M. C. (2018). Brazil will insist Venezuela, Mozambique pay back debt. In *Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-venezuela-debt/brazil-will-insist-venezuela-mozambique-pay-back-debt-idUSKBN1I41X6> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]
- Marcondes, D. & Mawdsley, E. (2017). South-South in retreat? The transitions from Lula to Rousseff to Temer and Brazilian development cooperation. *International Affairs*, 93(3), 681-699.
- Mawdsley, E. (2019). South–South Cooperation 3.0? Managing the consequences of success in the decade ahead. *Oxford Development Studies*, 47(3), 259-274.
- Mawdsley, E., Kim, S. M. & Marcondes, D. (2017). Political leadership and 'non-traditional' development cooperation. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(10), 1-16.
- Milani, C. (2015). Política externa é política pública?. *Insight Inteligência*, 18, 56-75.

- Milani, C. R., & Pinheiro, L. (2013). Política externa brasileira: os desafios de sua caracterização como política pública. *Contexto Internacional*, 35(1), 11-41.
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2011a). "Continuar não é repetir" (Veja - 09/01/2011). Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/8094-continuar-nao-e-repetir-veja-09-01-2011> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2011b). Comunicado Conjunto por ocasião da visita da Presidenta Dilma Rousseff a Moçambique – Maputo, 19 de outubro de 2011. Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/2821-comunicado-conjunto-por-ocasio-da-visita-da-presidenta-dilma-rousseff-a-mocambique-maputo-19-de-outubro-de-2011> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]
- Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2018). Cooperação entre países em desenvolvimento. Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/19477-cooperacao-entre-paises-em-desenvolvimento> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]
- Moravcsik, A. (2010). Liberal theories of international relations: a primer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
- Muhr, T. (2016). Beyond 'BRICS': ten theses on South–South cooperation in the twenty-first century. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(4), 630-648.
- Nery, T. (2017). A política externa brasileira, as coalizões de poder e a Unasul: ascensão e desconstrução da América do Sul como bloco geopolítico. *Mural Internacional*, 8(2), 250-264.
- Neto, O. A. (2011). De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira. Elsevier Brasil.
- Neto, W. A. D., & Tussie, D. (2018). As Relações Sul-Sul (2008-2015). In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacionais no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG, 333-370.
- Nogueira, I., Ollinaho, O., Baruco, G., Saludjian, A., Guedes Pinto, J. P., Balanco, P., Pinto, E. C. & Schonerwald, C. (2017). Investimentos e cooperação do Brasil e o padrão de acumulação em Moçambique: reforçando dependência e porosidade?. *Revista NERA*, 20(38).
- Nunes, R. C., & Rodriguez, V. G. (2017). A política externa brasileira de Temer-Serra: retração política e subordinação econômica. *Boletim de Conjuntura NERINT*, 1(4), 1-91.
- O'Neill, J. 2001. Building better global economic BRICs. *Global Economics Paper*, 66. New York: Goldman-Sachs

- Oliveira, A. J. & Onuki, J. (2010). Eleições, partidos políticos e política externa no Brasil. *Revista Política Hoje*, 19(1). 144-185.
- Oliveira, C. A. T. (2018). A política externa do governo Temer: características e oportunidades de uma política pública negligenciada. *Fronteira: revista de iniciação científica em Relações Internacionais*, 17(34), 296-309.
- OLIVEIRA, H. A. (2005). A Operação Panamericana e a política externa independente. In *Política Externa Brasileira*.
- Pereira, A. D. & Tatim, J. M. (2017). Brazil-Mozambique relations: From the geopolitics of the Cold War to South-South Cooperation. In Alden, C., Chichava, S., & Alves, A. C. (2017). In *Mozambique and Brazil: forging new partnerships or developing dependency?*. Jacana Media. 9-25.
- Prashad, V. (2008). *The darker nations: a people's history of the Third World*. The New Press.
- Pressly, L. (2018). 'The largest foreign bribery case in history'. In *BBC World Service*. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43825294> [Accessed 21 November, 2019]
- Putnam, R. D.(1988)," Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 429-460.
- Reus-Smit, C. (2005). Liberalism. *Theories of international relations*. Macmillan International Higher Education. 3, 188-211.
- Rezende, L. (2016). Dissenso de Washington e a política externa de Temer e Serra. *Carta Capital Internacional*, 8.
- Ribeiro, P. F. (2018). O Legislativo e a Política Externa Brasileira (2008 A 2015). In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacional no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG, 57-81.
- Ridderbusch, J. (2018). *Cooperação Sul-Sul entre o Brasil e a África subsaariana: A política externa brasileira em Angola e Moçambique* (Master's thesis).
- Rizzi, K. R. & Schutz, N. X. (2017). Brazil, Mozambique and the PALOP: An analysis of high-level relations and policy stances. In Alden, C., Chichava, S., & Alves, A. C. (2017). In *Mozambique and Brazil: forging new partnerships or developing dependency?*. Jacana Media. 26-45
- Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. *World politics*, 51(1), 144-172.
- Russo, G., De Oliveira, L., Shankland, A., & Siteo, T. (2014). On the margins of aid orthodoxy: the Brazil-Mozambique collaboration to produce essential medicines in Africa. *Globalization and Health*, 10(1), 1-8.

- Saraiva, J. F. S. (2010). The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: the rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 53(SPE), 169-182.
- Saraiva, M. G. (2014). Balanço da política externa de Dilma Rousseff: perspectivas futuras?. *Relações Internacionais (R: I)*, (44), 25-35.
- Senado. (2015). Lula chora e pede perdão à África por escravidão no Brasil. Available at: <https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/307270/noticia.htm?sequence=1> [Accessed 15 December, 2019]
- Shankland, A., & Alves, E. G. (2016). Imagining Agricultural Development in South–South Cooperation: The Contestation and Transformation of ProSAVANA. *World Development*, 81, 35-46.
- Silva, Á. V. C. (2019). A política externa do governo Michel Temer (2016-2018): mudanças para a legitimidade? Um teste da teoria de Charles Hermann. *Conjuntura Austral*, 10(49), 23-41.
- Singer, J. D. (1961). The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. *World Politics*, 14(1), 77-92.
- Slaughter, A. M. (2011). International relations, principal theories. *Max Planck encyclopaedia of public international Law*, 129.
- Sobrinho, S. A. A. L. F. & Filho, E. B. S. (2018). A agenda da política externa brasileira no período pós crise: uma análise crítica. In *Dimensões e Estratégias de Inserção Internacionais no pós-crise de 2008*. Ipea: FUNAG, 135-166.
- South Center. (2009). South-South Cooperation Principles: An Essential Element in South-South Cooperation. *línea*. Available at: https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/South-South-cooperation-Principles_EN.pdf [Accessed: 10 January, 2020]
- Souza, D., & Chmielewska, D. (2010). Supporting Food Production and Food Access through Local Public Procurement Schemes: Lessons from Brazil.
- Souza, D., & Chmielewska, D. (2010). Supporting Food Production and Food Access through Local Public Procurement Schemes: Lessons from Brazil. <https://ipcig.org/pub/IPCOnePager110.pdf>
- Svartman, E. M., & da Silva, A. L. R. (2016). Castigo sem crime? Raízes domésticas e implicações internacionais da crise brasileira. *Conjuntura Austral*, 7(35), 4-14.
- Taliaferro, J. W., Lobell, S. E., & Ripsman, N. M. (2009). Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. In *Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy*, 1-41.

The Group of 77 (G77). (n.d.). About the Group of 77. Available at: <http://www.g77.org/doc/> [Accessed 01 February 2020]

Trinkunas, H. (2014). Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance. *Latin America Initiative, Foreign Policy at Brookings*.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (n.d.). Economic Cooperation and Integration among Developing Countries: A Brief History. Available at: <https://unctad.org/en/pages/gds/Economic%20Cooperation%20and%20Integration%20among%20Developing%20Countries/Economic-Cooperation-and-Integration-among-Developing-Countries-A-Brief-History.aspx> [Accessed 01 February 2020]

United Nations, General Assembly. (2018). Role of South-South cooperation and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Challenges and opportunities: report of the Secretary-General. A/73/383. Available from: <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/2018/09/17/role-of-south-south-cooperation-and-the-implementation-of-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-challenges-and-opportunities-report-of-the-secretary-general/> [Accessed 08 April 2019]

UOL (2016). Afinidade política favorece relações de Brasil e Moçambique. Últimas notícias. Available at: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultnot/lusa/2006/11/11/ult611u73399.jhtm>. [Accessed 15 December, 2019]

Veja (2010). Lula encerra mandato com aprovação de 83%, afirma Ibope. Available at: <https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/lula-encerra-mandato-com-aprovacao-de-83-afirma-ibope/> [Accessed 19 December, 2020]

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.

Waltz, K. N. (2001). *Man, the state, and war: A theoretical analysis*. Columbia University Press.

Watts, J. (2013a). Brazil protests erupt over public services and World Cup costs. In *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/brazil-protests-erupt-huge-scale> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]

Watts, J. (2013b). Brazil erupts in protest: more than a million on the streets. In *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/brazil-police-crowds-rio-protest> [Accessed 19 December, 2019]

Watts, J. (2016). Dilma Rousseff impeachment: what you need to know. In *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/31/dilma-rousseff-impeachment-brazil-what-you-need-to-know> [Accessed 10 December, 2019]

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391-425.

Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. *International security*, 20(1), 71-81.

Williams, C. (2007). Research methods. *Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER)*, 5(3). 65-72.