

AN ANALYSIS OF THE WINTERVELD SETTLEMENT STRATEGY  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF THE ARCHITECTS  
OF THE NATIONAL BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

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## ABSTRACT

Architects in South Africa, intentionally or unintentionally, play a political role within apartheid ideology each time they become involved in housing provision. This thesis will investigate their role within the new housing policies which were being developed in South Africa in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The specific focus will be an analysis of the work of the Architectural Branch of the National Building Research Institute (N.B.R.I.) who initiated a community participation process to formulate an upgrading strategy for the Winterveld settlement, 30 km north of Pretoria.

An historical perspective will reveal how the plotowner and tenant communities were established in the Winterveld and how conflicts arose between these groups, the South African government and the Bophuthatswana government. An investigation of the issues around which these conflicts revolve will reveal why it was that the conflicts could not be resolved. This will, in turn, uncover why it was that in 1980 the architects of the N.B.R.I. initiated a community participation process to formulate an upgrading proposal to deal with the intolerable living conditions in the settlement.

Each stage of the participation process will be discussed and analysed with special emphasis being placed on understanding how the actions of the architects served various interested parties. It will become clear that the architects had no power to intervene as independent arbitrators. Their

actions and final proposals were to a large extent based on their own interests and those of the most powerful actors in the situation.

Finally, we shall consider whether the Architectural Branch intentionally or unintentionally served the interests of the apartheid state. Conclusions will be drawn with respect to architects understanding their work from an historical perspective which encompasses a broad appreciation of economic and political factors.

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
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LOCATION OF THE WINTERVELD

## CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

The work of architects is essentially a social activity which is part of, and shaped by, the historical process of the society of which it is part. Thus, any critical assessment of the role of architects must assess their work within the historical process of the community and broader society in which they work. For this reason this thesis will assess the role of the architects who worked on the upgrading of the Winterveld by situating their work within the historical setting of not only the Winterveld community, but also within the historical processes of broader South African society.

An understanding of the historical processes in society throws light on the social forces which influence the actions of people. These social forces are to a large extent shaped by material factors which often override cultural factors. Thus it is assumed that all social action is primarily motivated by material interests. As a result, the role of architects must be assessed by taking into account the material interests of the community within which they work. At times this may require a broad assessment of which parties have interests focussed upon the situation within which the architect is working. In the Winterveld situation, it will be argued that the interests of both the tenants and plotowners, as well as the interests of the South African and Bophthatswana governments, all had an influence on the way in which the architects of the N.B.R.I. responded to the situation. Indeed, it will be argued that the material interests of the architects themselves influenced the outcome of the community participation strategy which was initiated in the Winterveld.

Recent trends in South African architectural thinking have encouraged architects to move into new areas of work in housing. These moves have, however, not been complemented by a critical assessment of the role of the architect. The calls for architects to move into new areas of low income housing were made at the Housing 75 Conference<sup>(1)</sup> and at the subsequent congresses of the Institute of South African Architects<sup>(2)</sup>. These movements in architectural thinking reflected the ideas propagated by John Turner in his books 'Housing by People' (1976) and 'Freedom to Build : Dweller Control of the Housing Process'<sup>(3)</sup>. The major emphasis of his books were echoed in South Africa through calls on the state to withdraw from centralised housing provision. It was argued that it should be replaced, or at least supplemented by, self-help development strategies. Le Grange has noted that these calls were based on a dualist perception of South African development and it has opened up the way, on a theoretical and practical level, for architects to expand their area of work into what is perceived as the traditional sector of South African society<sup>(4)</sup>.

During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the South African government had adopted these housing strategies with the result that architects have now become involved in the self-help housing projects of both the Urban Foundation and the N.B.R.I. This thesis is based on the understanding that the opening up of these opportunities and the architects' involvement in them should be complimented by a thorough analysis of the role they are playing.

Initiatives to encourage community participation in housing provision are not new. Within the international debate on self-help housing, Harms has assessed from an historical perspective why it is that this is encouraged at various times. (5) Drawing on examples from Latin America, North America and Puerto Rico, he concludes that self-help is adopted during times of restructuring and crisis in capitalism. He argues that where self-help is advocated on an individualised basis, it dissipates social movements and leads to the integration of the participants into the capitalist mode of production. While his arguments need to be assessed critically, his historical emphasis raises questions as to why community participation and self-help housing initiatives which have been promoted and implemented by architects have now been adopted within current South African government policy. In reply to these questions it may be argued that the state, as the single landlord of the urban African community, has since the mid 1970's been under attack as communities have mobilised politically around the issue of housing. Finding itself unable to deal effectively with this opposition, the state has found self-help housing and community participation development strategies an effective way to withdraw from, and so depoliticise, housing provision.

This argument must however be rooted in an understanding of the way the state has, since the introduction of the Urban Areas Act, used housing to implement political and influx control over Africans. During the 1940's and 1950's, the emphasis was on centralised housing provision in order to gain control of the politicised urban African squatter communities. Once this policy had been effectively pursued, state initiatives moved on to the rural areas where, during the 1960's, the control of the movement and

settlement of Africans was integrated with the control of work allocation through the Labour Bureau system. This thesis will argue that, from this historical basis, it has not been a simple matter for the state to relinquish its centralised control of housing. Rather, it has switched emphasis during the late 1970's and early 1980's towards withdrawing from the costly provision of houses, while still retaining control over access to urban land. The control of which Africans gain access to land is, in turn, linked to the labour requirements of the economy of the country as a whole.

Pradilla in his study of housing policy in South America has noted that the price of state housing is determined by laws of capitalist development. He argues furthermore that state produced housing will not be supplied to those who need it, but to those who represent 'solvent demand'<sup>(6)</sup>. Thus the state will concentrate on providing housing for the employed rather than for the unemployed who cannot afford the cost of land, services, etc. Within the South African context, the state has similarly followed a non-subsidised housing policy for Africans.<sup>(7)</sup> This has meant that in the urban areas the employed have been provided with housing, whereas the unemployed, who have been confined to the rural areas, have only been provided with a level of services which they can afford.<sup>(8)</sup>

Within the South African economy as a whole there have been changes towards capital intensive production over the last twenty years. This has led to a demand for fewer, but more skilled, African workers in the cities which has, in turn, led to specific policies being pursued by the state. These have taken the form of the granting of greater privileges and stability to

urban Africans, while simultaneous attempts have been made to increase the division between the employed urban Africans and the unemployed rural Africans.

The Winterveld represents an anomaly in that it is situated between urban and rural areas and contains both employed and unemployed. The work of the architects of the N.B.R.I. was therefore founded within a situation where the state would be inclined to house the employed workers necessary to the economy, while simultaneously excluding the unemployed. Yet the state's interests could not be the only determinant, as both the employed and the unemployed residents of the Winterveld would have to be considered within any community participation strategy initiated by the architects.

Having made the above points, this thesis does not assume that architects necessarily enter situations with dubious motives. Neither is it assumed that the outcome of the work of an architect is historically and materially pre-determined. Rather, this thesis does hope to demonstrate through this case study that architects must be more critically aware of the role they play within South African society.

Chapter 2 will trace the development of the plotowner and tenant communities of the Winterveld and will illustrate the significance of their relationship to the South African government through a discussion of the Bantustan strategy. This will incorporate a discussion of the rise of the Bophuthatswana authorities and a discussion of the effects of influx and labour control policies on the settlement. Throughout the historical

survey, it will be possible to trace the development of tensions between the various groups who had interests centred on the Winterveld situation.

Chapter 3 will explore the issues around which the conflicts revolved. The four major parties or actors, namely: the South African government, the Bophuthatswana authorities, the plotowners and the tenants, each had various powers to realise their own interests. They were, however, in a deadlock situation and throughout the chapter it will become apparent why this was so, and why it was that the architects of the N.B.R.I. entered the situation in 1980.

The question as to why it was specifically the architects of the N.B.R.I. who entered the situation will be investigated in Chapter 4. The history of the N.B.R.I. architects will be discussed and, in particular, their relationship to the South African government. This will, in turn, raise questions about their own interests in becoming involved in the Winterveld situation and whether they entered this situation as independent arbiters or as a party with their own vested interests.

Chapter 5 will comprise the analysis of the community participation upgrading strategy initiated by the architects of the N.B.R.I. As each phase of the participation process unfolds, the actions of the Branch and the consequences of the process will be discussed. The analysis will end at the point where the proposals for the Winterveld were submitted selectively adopted by the South African government.

The analysis is mainly based on records of meetings which were held between representatives of the Winterveld tenant and plotowner communities, the South African government, the Bophuthatswana government and architects of the N.B.R.I. Further reports and surveys and records of interviews conducted by the author will supplement this empirical data.

Finally, in Chapter 6, some conclusions will be drawn with respect to the effects of the work of the N.B.R.I. on national settlement policy. Some questions will be raised concerning the ideological stance taken by architects and some suggestions made.

#### Conditions in the Winterveld : 1980

It is difficult to give an accurate perspective of the material conditions which existed in the Winterveld other than broad descriptive terms. Many of the statistics derived from surveys sponsored by the South African government are questionable, as it appears that a sizeable proportion of the non-Tswana community were not accounted for. (9)

The appearance of the Winterveld is that of large, densely populated, squatter camp. In the area closest to Pretoria, known as Klipgat, the gross residential density reaches more than 104 persons per hectare. (10) However, the dwellings thin out towards the north west, the area furthest from Pretoria. The main roads are wide and dusty and laid out in a 1 000 m by 750 m grid. From these, dirt tracks meander along the plot boundaries and inbetween the houses.

The settlement is served by a tar road which runs through the neighbouring townships of Mabopane and Soshanguve to Pretoria. More recently, a railway line has been built between Pretoria and Mabopane. When using the bus to commute between the Winterveld and Pretoria, passengers must change buses at the large bus terminus built on the border of 'white' South Africa and Bophuthatswana.

The majority of tenants surveyed, 55.7 per cent, arrived in the Winterveld between 1965 and 1974, with 21 per cent arriving before 1965, and 23.3 per cent after 1974.<sup>(11)</sup> The major reason given for moving to the Winterveld was because the settlement was close to work opportunities. However, a sizeable proportion gave government relocation programmes as a reason.<sup>(12)</sup> The majority of tenant households, 93 per cent, are not of Tswana origin while 85.4 per cent of the plotowners are also not of Tswana origin.<sup>(13)</sup>

The level of formal education was extremely low, with 32.7% of the population surveyed having no formal education at all, 44.1% having formal education only up to standard four, and only 1.8% having matric.<sup>(14)</sup> Despite the contention that many of the 'illegal' non-Tswanas, who probably constitute a high proportion of the unemployed, were not picked up in the survey, there is still a high unemployment rate of 22.6% amongst the potentially economically-active males who were surveyed.<sup>(15)</sup>

Of the potentially economically-active women, the surveys indicated that 35.3% were employed.<sup>(16)</sup> It appears that the largest proportion of the employed men and women - 54.8% - were in unskilled employment, and that they consisted mainly of labourers and domestic servants who, as will be

seen, received poor remuneration. Of the remainder, 23.3% were in semi-skilled, and 21.9% in skilled employment. Self-employment accounted for 6.4% of the employed, although their mean monthly income was only R133.51, with the median figure of R89.52. The table of incomes given below indicates that wages were extremely low. When the gross monthly income of each household was compared with the calculated subsistence level for that household, it was discovered that the situation slightly improved, with 23.5% of households below the primary household subsistence level and 76.5% above. It is obvious, however, that the subsistence level of an adult male, which was given at R32.98 per month, did not take into consideration the average travelling costs which ranged between R20 and R40 per month. The official figure for those above household subsistence level is, therefore, highly questionable.

**TABLE 1.1 : Individual and Household Income in the Winterveld**

	SALARY PER MONTH	ACCUMULATED PERCENTAGE	HOUSEHOLD INCOME/MONTH	ACCUMULATED PERCENTAGE
R0 - R50	15.9%	15.9%	1.7%	1.7%
R51 - R100	23.3%	39.2%	8.0%	9.7%
R101 - R150	20.4%	59.6%	13.4%	23.1%
R151 - R200	21.6%	81.2%	21.4%	44.5%
R201 - R250	8.1%	89.3%	17.4%	61.9%
R251 - R300	5.9%	95.2%	11.8%	73.7%
R301 - R400	2.9%	98.1%	12.5%	86.2%
R401 and above	1.9%	100%	13.8%	100% (21)

It is important to note that, despite the fact that rents represented less than 4 percent of income for the majority of tenants, the landowners stated that there were rent defaulters in considerable numbers. <sup>(22)</sup> This was an important indication that, no matter how much state expenditure on infra-structural services was reduced, the tenants would be hard pressed to meet the service charges that would have to be levied.

The high cost of transport relative to incomes was matched by a seemingly intolerable cost in terms of commuting time. The major places where people worked were Pretoria (77.4%), Rosslyn (3.1%), Johannesburg (5.2%), Mabopane (2%), and Winterveld (8%). The time spent in commuting each day is laid out below.

TABLE 1.2 : Commuting times in the Winterveld

PERCENTAGE OF COMMUTERS	COMMUTING TIME: BOTH DIRECTIONS		ACCUMULATED % OF COMMUTERS
2.8%	0 to 1 hour		
22.4%	1 to 2 hours	more than 1 hour	97.1%
29.2%	2 to 3 hours	more than 2 hours	74.7%
18.4%	3 to 4 hours	more than 3 hours	45.5%
13.3%	4 to 6 hours	more than 4 hours	27.1%
13.8%	6 to 12 hours	more than 6 hours	13.8% (23)

Clearly, this required that people leave home extremely early in the morning. In view of the toll which this must have taken on productivity in the work place, it is not surprising that the improvement of transport links was studied in depth by the Department of Transport in the early 1980's.

TABLE 1.3 : Times of leaving home

PERCENTAGE OF COMMUTERS		ACCUMULATED PERCENTAGE OF COMMUTERS	
17.7%	Midnight to 4.00 am	before 4.00 am	17.7%
39.2%	4.00 am to 5.00 am	before 5.00 am	56.9%
25.9%	5.00 am to 6.00 am	before 6.00 am	82.8%
17.2%	6.00 am onwards		(24)

The other major hardship and discontent for the residents of the Winterveld was the polluted ground water which they were forced to buy from the landlords. The water was drawn from open wells and boreholes which were situated close to the pit privies which served the sanitary needs of the community. These practices led to the outbreak of cholera in the region in 1981. It is not, therefore, surprising that the shortage and poor quality of water was the major grievance of the community. (25)

Ironically, the most satisfactory element in the Winterveld situation was possibly the accommodation afforded by the mud brick and, in some cases, the concrete block houses themselves. Apart from the very real problem

that tenants could be evicted at short notice and would lose their home,  
(26)  
there were only minor deficiencies in the accommodation itself. This in  
itself is an extremely important point in relation to an analysis of the  
role of the architects. While the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I.  
offered its expertise in dealing with the upgrading of housing, it was  
actually unemployment, low incomes, long commuting hours and poor services  
which were the real problems. However, in order to understand why they did  
intervene, it is necessary to turn to an historical perspective of the  
development of the Winterveld situation.

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#### FOOTNOTES :

- 1 LAZENBY, M. Housing People. Proceedings of the Housing 75 Conference, Johannesburg, October 1975; arranged by the Institute of South African Architects. Johannesburg. A D Donker 1977.
- 2 See the Congress Report of the 1977 Golden Jubilee of the Institute of South African Architects. In particular, see the records of H Hallen: Trouble in the Making, p 33, and the records of the panel discussions. In addition, see the I.S.A.A. 1983 Congress Papers of P Stewart : Mfolweni and Mgaga: Controlled versus Spontaneous Self-Help, and F Frescura: Rural Preceptions of the Housing Crisis.
- 3 Turner, J. Housing by People : Towards Autonomy in Building Environments London : Marion Boyards, 1976, and Turner, J (ed). Freedom to Build Macmillan, 1972.
- 4 Le Grange, L. Development and Architecture in South Africa. Paper presented to the National Congress of the Institute of South African Architects, April 1983.
- 5 Harms, H. Historical Perspectives on the Practice and Purpose of Self-Help Housing, in Ward (ed): Self-Help Housing : A Critique. London : Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1982, pp 17-55, and Limitations of Self-Help, in Architectural Design No.46, 1976. p 230-231.
- 6 Pradilla, E. Notes on the Housing Policies of Latin America. Unpublished translation of the Spanish by Rod Burgess for educational purposes of the Architectural Association, London. p 109-138.
- 7 The consistent policy of not subsidising African housing is noted in Morris, P. A History of Black Housing in South Africa, South Africa Foundation, 1981.

- 8 This is argued in Chapter 2, under the sub-section: The South African Government : Policies, Practices and Intentions.
- 9 The most likely reason for this is that non-Tswana residents who did not have residence permits had been fined during the 1970's for living in the Winterveld. They would, therefore, have been reluctant to reveal their presence in the surveys sponsored by the South African Government in the early 1980's.
- 10 National Building Research Institute (N.B.R.I.). Plotowners Survey. Pretoria, June 1981. p 21.
- 11 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 11.
- 12 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 11 & 12.
- 13 N.B.R.I. Population Survey. Pretoria, March 1982. p 39-40.
- 14 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 13.
- 15 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 15.
- 16 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 16.
- 17 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 18.
- 18 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 22.
- 19 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 30-35.
- 20 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 25.
- 21 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 30-31.
- 22 N.B.R.I. Plot Owners Survey. Pretoria, June 1981. p 20.
- 23 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 28.
- 24 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 28.
- 25 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 52.
- 26 N.B.R.I. Socio Economic Survey. Pretoria, March 1983. p 42.

## CHAPTER 2 : AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WINTERVELD

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

A review of the historical development of the community of the Winterveld reveals the emergence of both landowner and tenant communities. The emergence of these two groups did not, however, take place in isolation but were part of developments in the broader South African society. It is thus important to survey these developments in order to understand the effects they had on the position of the landowners and tenants.

In particular, the position of the community in relation to the South African government and within the Bantustan strategy is important. Both the South African government and the Bantustan authority had particular policies towards the Winterveld. Our concern is to establish how these policies affected the material conditions in the Winterveld and how they led to the intervention of the NBRI in 1980.

Initially we shall look at the establishment of the African landowners who purchased land in the Winterveld in the 1930's. Of importance was the fact that the landowners were part of a minority of Africans throughout South Africa who held land in freehold. Holding the land in freehold allowed the landowners to appropriate rent from tenants who later moved onto the land. Of further importance was the situation of the land in the Reserves and, as a result, the political and economic development of the community was later tied into the ethnically divided apartheid structure of the Bantustan.

The establishment of the tenant community in the area between the 1950's and 1970's was due to both economic and political reasons. Firstly,

tenants were moved out of white cities to the Winterveld in terms of the strategy of 'grand apartheid' which required them to realise their political and economic aspirations in the Bantustans. Secondly, people who were forced out of the white rural areas settled in the Winterveld from where they could commute to look for work in Pretoria. Once settled in the Winterveld, the unemployed and those with legal employment intermingled. This caused problems for the South African government when it later tried to implement labour and residential control.

The creation of the Tswana Bantustan Authority in the 1950's and 1960's, and its increasing role in the administration of the Winterveld led to discrimination against non-Tswana land-owners and tenants alike. This discrimination increased during the 1970's when the authority assumed the greater powers passed on to it by the South African government. Despite these greater powers, the authority was unable to take full control of the community and this remained a cause of tension in 1980, when the Architecture Branch of the NBRI began its work in the Winterveld.

Throughout the discussion of the historical evolution of the Winterveld situation, it will become clear that the policies and practices of the South African government were playing a decisive role. In particular, the Government's policies towards the establishment of the Bantustan authority, its policies of labour control, its policies towards settlement, and the way it indirectly controlled the Bantustan authority will be discussed. A study of these policies reveals the directions in which the South African government was moving at the time of the intervention of the N.B.R.I. Thus, through the development of this historical perspective, we will arrive at a point where we can discuss the tensions that existed in the Winterveld in 1980. Subsequently, we shall look at the issues around which these tensions revolved.

## 2.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WINTERVELD LANDOWNERS

The origins of the Winterveld community can be traced to the late 1930's and early 1940's, when five farms in the Odi magisterial district were divided into five and ten morgen lots and sold to African landowners.<sup>(1)</sup>

The division and sale of the five farms, which covered a total area of 225 km<sup>2</sup><sup>(2)</sup> was carried out by a land speculative enterprise - Pan Africa Real Estates - which was based in Pretoria.

The earlier land sales around 1941 were made to a wealthier group of farmers who purchased the richer agricultural land to the west. These landowners had once been share croppers from the Vaal Triangle, shop owners and traders from the urban locations, and rich peasants from the Northern Transvaal. The portions to the south were smaller and were sold after 1947. Once the land had been purchased, the majority of the land-owners moved onto the land with only the wealthier landowners remaining absentee landlords.<sup>(3)</sup> Farming in the area flourished and the situation remained stable until the early 1960's. There are, however, two important points to note at this early stage.

Firstly, the land that comprised the Winterveld was incorporated in the Reserves. This meant that the community lay in that portion of South Africa which was specifically set aside for the occupations of Africans under tribal authority. Therefore, the future political and economic aspirations of the community were to be deflected away from the mainstream of South African development and tied to that of the Reserves.

Secondly, the African landowners were unique in that very little land has been held in private ownership by Africans in South Africa. The result was that the appropriation of wealth by the landlords through agriculture and

the renting of land brought the landowners into conflict with the African tribal authorities who could not accumulate wealth in the same manner. We shall now look at these two aspects in more detail.

### 2.2.1 The Reserve Strategy

In order to understand the way in which the Reserves contained and deflected the political aspirations and economic progress of the Winterveld community, it is necessary to look at the history of the Reserve strategy adopted by the South African state.<sup>(4)</sup>

The military resistance of the African peasants to dispossession by trekboers had been crushed by the turn of the century.<sup>(5)</sup> The remaining portions of land under peasant control were called the Reserves. However, to ensure a supply of labour for the mines after the discovery of diamonds and gold, it was necessary to undermine the peasant subsistence economy. This was achieved through the introduction of various measures such as taxes, which forced peasants into wage labour.<sup>(6)</sup> In addition, the 1913 Land Act, which broke down the pattern of traditional farming through the restriction of African farm land, reinforced the undermining of the peasant subsistence economy.

The Reserves fulfilled an economic function in that they allowed for the subsistence of the workers' families who were not allowed into the cities. The subsistence of the family, while ensuring the long-term reproduction of labour, allowed wages in the cities to be kept low and wages on the mines were kept extremely low until 1930. This is noted by Molteno who states:

" Because the capitalist class is dependent on a class of workers, they have to pay wages which make it possible for the workers to live and to support children who will take their places when they become unfit to work or eventually die. If, however, workers retain access to means of subsistence that lie outside the immediate sphere of commodity production, they are not entirely dependant upon wages which, as a result, can be less

than what it actually takes for the workers to survive and for a continuing flow of workers to be ensured. It was precisely such extra-low wages that the Reserves, in their conservationist functions, made possible and, up until about the 1930's, the mining industry particularly depended upon this possibility, of which they took full advantage. " (7)

The continued residence of the workers' families in the Reserves also meant that the cost of housing the workers' families in the cities was negated. A permanently urbanised African proletariat would have led to a political struggle for housing in the cities. This in turn would have led to greater demands on the system of subsidised state housing. However, with a vast number of the families living in the Reserves, the cost to the state was substantially reduced and this remained a key issue underlying the conditions that developed in the Winterveld and other settlements in the Reserves.

Furthermore, in the political arena, the Reserves played two major roles. Firstly, they allowed the white rulers to contain resistance through a strategy of 'divide and rule'. Secondly, a strategy of 'indirect rule' was adopted in the Reserves. (8)

The strategy of 'divide and rule' was brought about through the maintenance of the Reserves as a number of small parcels of land. The reason for this was clearly spelt out in the following quote from the Social and Economic Planning Council in 1942 :

"The motive forces behind the "chessboard" pattern of Reserves were, firstly, the attainment of more secure control against combinations of tribes and native uprisings generally." (9)

This strategy was to have a very significant effect on the Winterveld as real divisions were later created in the community through the emphasis of tribal background. This became particularly apparent in the division established between Tswana and non-Tswana which limited the communities' bargaining power with the state.

The strategy of 'indirect rule' was achieved through the replacement of chiefs who opposed white domination. They were replaced by chiefs who were appointed and paid by the government. These chiefs were then incorporated into the administration of the Reserves. Thus the line of administration of the Reserves :

"ran from the chief magistrate to the district magistrate to the government-appointed headman who became the 'non-commissioned officer' of the administration directly under the positional authority of the magistrate and responsible to him for the peace and welfare of his location." (10)

The significance of indirect rule for the Winterveld was that the community of residents were to be ruled by tribal authorities to which they were not necessarily affiliated or which they did not necessarily accept. Nevertheless, through this system, the community's demands could, in theory, be deflected away from the South African government and towards the Bophuthatswana tribal authority.

A further form of division by the Reserve strategy was that of separating migrant workers of the Reserves from the permanently urbanised labour of the cities. This distinction was created in order to keep the number of Africans who lived permanently in the cities and who made direct political demands on the South African state to a minimum. The division this created within the African working class, and their consequent vulnerability to repatriation to the Reserves, was later to lead to the settlement of large numbers of tenants on the Winterveld owners' land.

We have noted at this point that the land purchased by the landowners was incorporated into the Reserves. This meant that the Winterveld community was to succumb to ethnic division, which would ultimately reduce the community's bargaining power with the state. Furthermore, the community was to be indirectly ruled through a tribal authority whom the community did not appoint. The tribal authority ruled on behalf of the South African

government. Finally, the Reserves allowed for the division of workers into migrants and permanent urban residents. This was later to facilitate the repatriation of Africans to the Winterveld by the government.

Having looked at the effects of the Winterveld's incorporation into the Reserves, it is now necessary to look at the position of the owners of land held in freehold in the area.

## 2.2.2 Land held in Freehold

Freehold land ownership by Africans was restricted throughout South Africa, both in the Reserves and in the rest of white South Africa. The landowners of the Winterveld were, therefore, part of a small privileged minority of Africans who had the right to appropriate individual wealth through agriculture or, as occurred later, through the collection of rent from tenants.

The majority of land in the Reserve in which the Winterveld was situated was under tribal ownership.<sup>(11)</sup> While chiefs did in theory own land, they acted more as trustees and were obliged to allocate land to members of the tribe. Thus the land was not regarded as an asset. This form of ownership did not allow for the appropriation of wealth in a manner comparable to that of the landowners. Furthermore, by the 1920's, the land in the Reserves was overcrowded and over-grazed.<sup>(12)</sup> This was in stark contrast to the Winterveld where farming prospered during the 1940's and 1950's.<sup>(13)</sup> It was these contrasts in ownership and prosperity that were later to bring the landowners of the Winterveld into conflict with the tribal authority. This conflict manifested itself in a struggle for control of the land.

At this point we have noted the highly specific situation of the landowners within the social and political structures emerging in South Africa. We

must now move on to study how more people came to settle in the area and what effect this had. Initially, the landowner's family members and friends moved onto the land to assist with agricultural production.<sup>(14)</sup> In addition, more people were involved with the establishment of businesses, churches and schools. In this way, the size of the resident community grew, as it were, in an organic fashion. The 1960's, however, saw a major change in the Winterveld as changes in state policy forced large numbers of people to move into the Winterveld and to establish residence there as tenants of the landowners.

(19)  
the squatter movements of 1944 and 1946. In addition, militant action in the form of bus boycotts and the African Mineworkers Strike of 1946 pointed to a growing political crisis in the cities.

In response to this continuing African urbanisation and the political threat presented by squatting movements within the urban African population, the Nationalist government decided on a two-fold settlement strategy. Firstly, those Africans whose labour was necessary to meet the demands of manufacturing and industry in the white urban areas were to be accommodated in "properly planned native townships".<sup>(20)</sup> Secondly, the unemployed were to be relocated in the Reserves, or as they were newly-named: "Bantustans".

The accommodation of the urban black community in "properly planned townships" was brought about on the Rand and elsewhere through the implementation of site and service schemes and a massive expansion of the system of mass housing provision. This involved the re-structuring of the state housing apparatus and the resolution of issues concerning the cost of African housing and the way in which its provision was to be financed. The use of site and service schemes allowed for the alignment of housing policy and apartheid policy in order to achieve rapid control of the "Bantu housing problem". The site and service scheme meant that squatters and residents of the freehold townships could be relocated as fast as possible and at minimum cost to the state. A major aspect of relocation was the need to separate the employed from the unemployed. The above points are clearly illustrated in the following statement made in mid-1951 by the Secretary of Native Affairs:

"In the nature of things, the urban areas are in themselves a fruitful breeding ground for unrest because the Native population has increased so rapidly that housing measures could by no means keep pace with the great influx of population. To control the over-populated villages held in Native ownership, such as Sophiatown and Alexandra and the numerous squatter camps around the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, efficiently would be attempting the impossible ..... Only by the provision of adequate shelter in properly planned Native townships can full control over urban

natives be regained, because only then will it be possible to eliminate the surplus natives who do not seek or find an honest living in the cities." (21)

The relocation and confining of the unemployed surplus natives in the Reserves was pursued with vigour. Unlike the period 1923 to 1948, the influx control measures were strictly applied from 1948 onwards. Influx control was extended to women, and, in an amendment to the Urban Areas Act in 1972, the notorious 72 hour clause was introduced in 1952, whereby no African person could remain in an urban area without the rights allocated under Section 10 of the Act. The rights to live in the cities favoured those who had been born in the cities or who had had employment in the cities for an extended period. The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act was a further means to tighten influx control. The unemployed could be relocated, as magistrates had the power to endorse out of the city those whom they considered to be idle, aged or unemployed. In fact, some 465,000 people were relocated in this manner nationwide between 1956 and 1963.<sup>(22)</sup> Simultaneously, the confinement of the unemployed to the Reserves was achieved through the establishment of labour bureaux in 1952. These bureaux, through a rationalisation of the allocation of labour, controlled efflux from the rural areas.

Having examined in broad terms the legislation and practices which allowed the apartheid state to institutionalise its urbanisation policy, it is now necessary to indicate specifically how this was implemented in the Pretoria-Winterveld region.

### 2.3.2 Removals from Pretoria

The implementation of the urbanisation policy in the Pretoria region was clear and unambiguous. The settlements of Mooiplaas, Lady Selbourne and Eersterus situated around Pretoria were "sprawling and overcrowded" and

"the site of militant popular struggles during the 1950's."<sup>(23)</sup> As part of the drive to gain control of the situation, the Urban Areas Commissioner of the Department of Native Affairs and the Peri-urban Health Board in 1952 planned and set in motion the establishment of the townships of Vlakfontein (Mamelodi) and Atteridgeville. The removals took place between 1953 and 1968 and in the process many 'illegal'<sup>(24)</sup> families were sifted out and moved to the Bantustan which was to become Bophuthatswana. The removals involved large numbers of people. In 1953, Marabastad was cleared and between 1954 and 1957 Derdepoort, Riverside and Highlands were moved. By 1959, 37 585 Africans had been moved from Mooiplaas, Eastwood, Eersterus and Garsfontein. Between 1965 and 1968, 54 000 people were removed from Lady Selbourne.<sup>(25)</sup>

Although the exact number of illegal people who were sifted out is not available, it is clear that large numbers of people who did not qualify for municipal housing were removed to the Winterveld area. Almost the entire population of Mooiplaas, 3119 residents of Lady Selbourne and 1100 residents of Eastwood did not qualify for municipal housing and were moved to the Winterveld.<sup>(26)</sup>

Not all the people removed from Pretoria were illegals however. In 1961, the township of Ga-Rankuwa was established 30 km north-west of Pretoria in the Bantustan which was to become Bophuthatswana. Urban Africans with Section 10 rights who had owned freehold land in Pretoria were compensated with land in Ga-Rankuwa. However, once Mamelodi township was full, people were moved to Ga-Rankuwa irrespective of Section 10 rights or ethnic background.<sup>(27)</sup> The residents were allowed to retain the right to work in Pretoria.<sup>(28)</sup> Ga-Rankuwa was established alongside a railway line in order to ensure that workers could commute to Pretoria and its industrial areas.

The significance of the removals from Pretoria for the Winterveld was that, within the relocation process, divisions were being created in the way people were relocated in the new areas. The employed were settled in the townships of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville, while those who were employed and who spoke Tswana were settled in the border town of Ga-Rankuwa. However, this ethnic division was blurred later when the non-Tswana employed were also sent to Ga-Rankuwa. Of primary significance was the fact that illegal and unemployed surplus labour was being separated and relocated in the Winterveld.

### 2.3.3 Frontier Commuting : further expulsions from the cities

We have noted that political turmoil in the 1940's led to an urbanisation policy which settled employed Africans around 'white' cities and removed the unemployed Africans to the Bantustans. After 1961, increasing emphasis was placed on Bantustan development by the South African government. This, in turn, led to the expulsion of more Africans - employed and unemployed - to the Bantustans and, in particular, to the Winterveld. We shall now look at this in greater depth, noting the reasons for the adoption of this policy and in what way it affected the growth and composition of the tenant community in the Winterveld.

The rise of popular struggles amongst urban Africans in the 1950's led the South African government to place increasing emphasis on the Bantustans as the areas in which Africans were to settle and to express themselves politically. Subsequently, the repression of the popular struggle in the 1960's paved the way for an economic boom. This boom took the form of increasing monopolisation and capital intensification as South African industry was incorporated into the world market. This form of development meant that a proportion of the labour force became more skilled but that its overall size increased relatively slowly. (29) The result of this was

that the function of the Bantustans began to change from that of providing reservoirs of cheap migrant labour to that of providing dumping grounds for the growing number of unemployed. In addition, the demand for more skilled labour necessitated a change from the policy of employing migrant labour to one of employing labour which was settled in the Bantustans but which was close enough to commute on a daily basis to work in 'white' South Africa.

The result of the above developments was that in order to remove the increasing number of unemployed Africans from the 'white' cities, the terms under which they could be expelled from the urban areas were extended under the Bantu Labour Act of 1964 and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of the same year. In addition, the laws made permanent residence in the cities even more difficult by making Section 10(1)(d) rights dependent on the availability of accommodation in urban townships. A further strategy to exclude Africans from residence in the cities and so place them in the economic and political sphere of the Bantustans was the nationwide policy to curb the growth of black townships outside the Bantustans. This was carried out in two ways. Firstly, the number of people eligible for urban housing was limited. Black women, be they widows with dependents or not, were not to be placed on the housing waiting list. Housing permits were only to be issued to males over the age of 21 who had Section 10 rights, and the permit could be cancelled if the possessor was unemployed for more than 30 days or was seen as an unfit person in the eyes of the Township Superintendent.<sup>(30)</sup> Secondly, the central government prohibited the building of any further family housing in the white urban areas in favour of construction in Bantustan towns. It became increasingly difficult for local authorities to obtain loans for family housing. Local authorities who wanted to extend townships had to prove that the new developments were essential and that it was not possible to provide the necessary accommodation in adjacent Bantustans.<sup>(31)</sup> The nett effect of the above

measures was that, between 1960 and 1980, 750,000 people were relocated. As a result of this policy, African housing construction was frozen around Pretoria and housing production stepped up in Ga-Rankuwa. In 1968, when these measures were instituted, there was an official shortage of 1280 houses in Atteridgeville and 5529 houses in Mamelodi. As a result, the Pretoria City Council and the South African Bantu Trust decided to build the township of Mabopane inside the Bophuthatswana Bantustan to accommodate the overflow of people from Mamelodi and Atteridgeville. It appears that the Department of Bantu Administration and Development asked the landowners of the Winterveld to accommodate this overflow until such time as the houses at Mabopane were completed. However, when residents of the Winterveld later applied for housing in Mabopane, this was refused as the houses had already been filled and by 1971 the residents had given up trying. (32)

At this point, we can conclude that the tenants who now lived in the Winterveld comprised not only the unemployed, who were classified illegal under Section 10, but also the legals. These legals were now placed outside the cities and in the political sphere of the Bantustans. Moreover, to the tenant community of the Winterveld which had been displaced from the cities was now added an increasing number of people who had been displaced from the 'white' farming areas. This displacement from the 'white' rural areas had two causes, namely the abolition of labour tenancy and squatting on 'white' farms and the mechanisation of agriculture.

#### 2.3.4 Abolition of Labour Tenancy and Squatting

Labour tenancy was the practice whereby a labourer worked for a farmer in return for the right to live on and farm a portion of the land. The abolition of this practice had the effect of forcing tenant farmers off the land and into wage labour.

The successive laws phasing out labour tenancy meant that by 1964 the practice was being abolished in an increasing number of areas. (33) The Department of Bantu Affairs held that:

"the surplus labour tenants should be canalised through the various bureaux to places where farmers experience a shortage of labour". (34)

During the period 1960-1970, 340,000 people were removed from 'white' farms through the abolition of labour tenancy and 656,000 people were expelled from 'white' farms through the abolition of squatting on 'white' farms. (35) By 1969 the practice of labour tenancy had been abolished in 25 of the 85 districts in which it had been practised in the Transvaal. The phasing-out process continued into the 1970's and, between 1970 and 1979, a further 141,219 people were uprooted in the Transvaal alone. (36)

The nett effect of the above was that, over a period of time, Africans were forced to move from 'white' farming areas to the Bantustans, including Bophuthatswana. This led to a further increase in the tenant population of the Winterveld.

#### 2.3.5 Mechanisation of Agriculture

The number of people liable to be evicted from 'white' farms was increased through the mechanisation of agriculture on 'white' farms. Farm labourers were made redundant through three recent changes in agricultural practice.

These were:

- 1 changes from hand harvesting to mechanised harvesting;
- 2 changes from transport of food in sacks to bulk transport; and
- 3 changes from manual weeding to weed control by spraying.

Between 1968 and 1981 the number of labourers per 1,000 ha. dropped from 100 to 30.<sup>(37)</sup> The nett effect was that thousands more labourers were shifted to the Bantustans.

We have noted that the unemployed Africans were being dumped in the Bantustans, but as yet we have not investigated what attracted large numbers of these unemployed people to the specific location of the Winterveld. Firstly, it must be recognised that there was no rigid mechanism of influx control in the Bantustans. Furthermore, the Winterveld was the portion of Bophuthatswana closest to the employment opportunities of Pretoria and the Rand. It was, therefore, logical that unemployed Africans would locate themselves in the area closest to these work opportunities but beyond the strictly enforced influx control mechanisms of 'white' South Africa. This area was the Winterveld. In addition, the possibility of obtaining employment in the vicinity of the Winterveld was increased through the establishment of the Brits and Rosslyn industrial decentralisation points.

### 2.3.6 Industrial Decentralisation

Industrial decentralisation, along with Bantustan urbanisation, had first been proposed by the Tomlinson Commission during the 1950's. This however had been ignored by the government at the time. The Commission's recommendations were part of a plan to move Africans off the over-populated land in the Bantustans in order to facilitate agricultural development.

With the rise in urban African militancy during the 1950's, the idea of industrial decentralisation became attractive as a means to contain a large proportion of the labour force at a distance from the 'white' cities. The result was a close link between decentralised industrial development and township development in the Bantustans.

The Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act of 1968 restricted the growth of African employment opportunities in 'white' areas and encouraged the decentralisation of industry in border industrial zones. Loans at reduced rates were offered by the state for industrial expansion in these areas and were supplemented by tax concessions. In addition, the industries in these areas were not subject to minimum wage levels and were often exempt from industrial council agreements. The state enforced decentralisation after 1973 by forcing labour intensive industry to relocate and in 1975 it was reported by the state that, over the previous eleven years, 343 industries had been established in industrial decentralisation areas at a cost of R585 million, offering 68 685 employment opportunities. The cost per job created was thus R8 530. (38) By 1977 the policy was beginning to falter and, noting opposition from industrialists, Riekert recommended the withdrawal of the enforcement of industrial decentralisation. A less direct form of state control was proposed limiting the allocation of industrial land in 'white' urban areas.

The two industrial decentralisation points created near the Winterveld were Rosslyn and Brits. The establishment of Rosslyn in 1962 attracted an increasing labour supply to the Pretoria region which, in turn, benefitted the industrialists who established themselves there. Rosslyn proved to be one of the relatively more successful decentralisation points but was, in effect, an industrial zone of Pretoria. In a survey of industrialists in Rosslyn in 1979, it was found that their prime motivations in locating

there were, firstly, the incentives offered by the state and, secondly, the unlimited labour supply of the area which included the labour of the Winterveld.<sup>(39)</sup> The state incentives were withdrawn in 1971, at which time there were 56 factories, but this did not stop the expansion of the area to a total of 82 factories in 1979.<sup>(40)</sup>

Brits, a second decentralisation area drawing on labour from the Winterveld area, was made a priority growth point in 1968 but, due to poor infra-structural development and its distance from the P.W.V. region, it was less popular than Rosslyn. It became a more attractive area for industrialists after incentives applied to Rosslyn were cancelled.

Job creation was to have been a central feature of the decentralisation programme but, in effect, nationwide only 7 185 jobs were created annually between 1960 and 1974. Against this, approximately 60 000 Bantustan work-seekers entered the labour market every year. By 1975, 13 000 jobs had been created in Brits<sup>(41)</sup> and by 1976 33 792 Bophuthatswana residents were employed at Rosslyn and Brits.<sup>(42)</sup> The proportion of unskilled to skilled workers was high<sup>(43)</sup> and this, together with large unemployment in the area, undermined workers' bargaining power and was reflected in high staff turnovers<sup>(44)</sup> and extremely low wages.<sup>(45)</sup>

The limited ability of the border industries to absorb labour was further reduced with the recession of the 1970's and, between 1975 and 1978, employment at Brits dropped from approximately 13 000 to 10,376.<sup>(46)</sup> Nevertheless, the proximity of Winterveld to possible employment in Rosslyn and Brits continued to attract people from other areas within Bophuthatswana as well as from other impoverished Bantustans.

### 2.3.7 Conclusions

We have examined the policies and practices which forced Africans out of the 'white' cities and farming areas. Through this study it has become apparent that not only the unemployed were dumped in the Winterveld, but also a portion of those who were employed in Pretoria and who could not be accommodated in the border towns of Ga-Rankuwa and Mabopane. Both the employed and the unemployed needed to settle as close as possible to the work opportunities of Pretoria and the new decentralisation points of Rosslyn and Brits. The closest point of residence to these work opportunities, which at the same time lay beyond the influx control mechanisms of 'white' South Africa, was the Winterveld.

The increasing flow of Africans to the Winterveld was complemented by a decline in the agricultural productivity of the freehold farmers in the 1960's.<sup>(47)</sup> The result was that the landowners found it increasingly profitable to rent ground to the people moving into the Winterveld. The growth of the Winterveld community was substantial and at the time of the intervention of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I. no effective means of influx control was operative in the area.

We shall now move on to investigate the way in which the South African government was attempting to govern the growing community through the creation of the Bophuthatswana Authorities.

## 2.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANTUSTAN AUTHORITY

The fact that the land which comprised the Winterveld was part of a Reserve was noted earlier. The significance of this in the economic sphere was that the community living there was expected to provide for itself through a subsistence economy, while simultaneously providing cheap labour to the cities. In the political arena the community was to be administered by an ethnically based tribal authority, in terms of powers delegated by the South African government. This exclusion of the Winterveld community from the economic and political sphere of 'white' South Africa was substantially increased after the coming to power of the Nationalist Government in 1948. The change from the Reserve to the Bantustan strategy, as part of the implementation of the apartheid programme, resulted in the largely non-Tswana community of the Winterveld being increasingly subjected to the discriminatory rule of the emerging Tswana Bantustan authority. The community resisted the rule of this body. However, as the Bantustan authority received more powers from the South African government, the repression of the non-Tswana community escalated. The tension that this created within the Winterveld was a further factor underlying the eventual intervention of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I.

We shall now look in more detail at the reasons for the increased state emphasis on the development of the Bantustans and the way in which this affected the administration of the Winterveld by the Bophuthatswana authorities.

### 2.4.1 **Developments in the Bantustan strategy and their consequences on the political control of the Winterveld.**

The rising black nationalism of the 1940's and the African Mineworkers strike of 1946 led to the collapse of the Native Representative Council, the official mouthpiece of Africans. In the wake of this rise of black

nationalism, the National Party set about withdrawing the limited parliamentary representation of Africans which had existed. African political aspirations were from then on to find expression in a "whole litter of tribally constituted"<sup>(48)</sup> Native Representative Councils based in the Bantustans, the new title of the Reserve areas. The strategy was :

"... to entrench the status of the bulk of the subordinate colour caste as literal non-citizens by placing them politically in a sphere completely removed from that of South African citizenship."<sup>(49)</sup>

Molteno notes that initially it was proposed to give only a minimal amount of self-government to the Reserves. However, from the 1950's onwards the chiefs, along with an emerging petty-bourgeoisie, were to be increasingly incorporated into the administrative hierarchy of the Bantustans.

The imposition of this form of tribal control in the Winterveld was not achieved easily, as the landowners of the Winterveld did not fall under the direct authority of a chief. In the 1950's the Winterveld Vigilance Committee (W.V.C.) was formed under the Peri-Urban Areas Act. This was a necessity if the community was to claim school subsidies and other social benefits under the South African Native Policy.<sup>(50)</sup> The new emphasis on tribal authorities meant, however, that in the 1960's the W.V.C. had to be reformulated as the Winterveld Community Authority, in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.<sup>(51)</sup> This body in turn had to affiliate to a regional authority which, in its turn, was affiliated to a territorial authority<sup>(52)</sup> which was tribally based. After 1961, the entire structure of the territorial authority was given additional significance and power.

This change was precipitated by the more militant actions of the urban African community during the late 1950's. The Defiance Campaign, the women's anti-pass laws campaign of 1956-59 and the rise of the militant faction of the African National Congress were followed by repression in the early 1960's. Repressive actions of the state included the shootings at

Sharpeville and the banning of the A.N.C. and the P.A.C. Alongside this repression, the government embarked on a policy of Bantustan development. This meant that, from 1961 onwards, the Bantustans were to be developed into 'independent' states with the territorial authorities being brought up to the status of parliaments.

A consequence of this national policy was that the Tswana Territorial Authority was established in 1961 and this constituted the nucleus of what was to become the Bophuthatswana government in 1977. The Tswana Territorial Authority (T.T.A.) was made up of eight regional authorities which in turn comprised seventy tribal authorities. The Winterveld Community Authority was effectively the equivalent of a tribal authority and was accordingly incorporated into the structure in this capacity.

The T.T.A. received expanded powers in 1968 and began to establish its own administrative structure. At about this time a labour office was established in the Winterveld and residents were charged a fee when registering as work-seekers. In addition, the T.T.A. began to tax landowners for every tenant occupying a site on their land with each tenant being registered in the census of 1970. A further move by the T.T.A. was to undertake a survey of all businesses in the Winterveld in order to levy taxes on them. In this way the Authority endeavoured to expand its revenue base. (53)

The most significant aspect of the early development of the T.T.A. was that the landowners, who were mainly non-Tswana, did not offer it their allegiance. In order to secure social benefits, they had had to affiliate to the Tswana Territorial Authority via the Winterveld Vigilance Committee and later the Winterveld Community Authority. However, they tried to assert their independence by refusing the stipend offered to the chairmen of the W.V.C. and W.C.A. and elected instead to finance the running of their organisations themselves. (54)

In 1972 the power of the T.T.A. was again expanded significantly and this led to a further increase in tension between it and the largely non-Tswana Winterveld community. The Bantu Homelands Consolidation Act of 1971 retained the traditional tribal administrative structures in establishing legislative assemblies for the Bantustans. As a result appointed chiefs from the regional and tribal authorities occupied 48 of the 72 seats of the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly established in 1972. The remaining 24 seats were for members elected from the twelve regional authorities. The opposition party in the Bantustan, under Chief Pilane, wanted a fully elected legislature whereas Chief Mangope, who became the Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, supported the inclusion of the appointed chiefs.<sup>(55)</sup> The Winterveld, which in 1982 comprised 93,8% non-Tswana households, had traditionally favoured the opposition party which placed less emphasis on ethnicity<sup>(57)</sup> than the governing party.<sup>(56)</sup>

In an attempt to gain control of the Winterveld community, the T.T.A. took control of the chairmanship of the Winterveld Community Authority by allowing only Tswanas to fill this position after 1972.<sup>(58)</sup> The reason for this was that the chairman's position in the Winterveld was a powerful one. Matsetela notes that:

"... in practice the Chairman acted more like a chief and tended to employ dictatorial powers in enforcing certain decisions."<sup>(59)</sup>

As has been noted, the non-Tswana chairmen had previously asserted their independence from the Bantustan authority by refusing the stipend offered to them. However, after 1972, the newly-appointed chairman was given the privileges of a Tswana chief and provided with clerical staff and a salary. From this time onwards the W.C.A. aligned itself more directly with the interests of the Tswana Territorial Authority. This brought it into line with the tribal authorities who were appointed by chiefs or headmen for a period of five years. Tribal authorities advised the Tswana authorities

on local affairs and could levy taxes. Chiefs had to report unlawful activity, could arrest people, pass sentence and it is evident that "they serve for local control over resources and over people".<sup>(60)</sup> With this development therefore, the Winterveld Community Authority became more and more alienated from the community whom they were supposed to represent, and increasingly used their power extent to discriminate against the non-Tswana members of the community.

Our survey of the development of the Bophuthatswana authorities so far has outlined the growing tension between the Winterveld community and the Bophuthatswana authorities who, from the early 1960's, were given increasing powers to rule the largely non-Tswana community. This growing tension was most clearly manifest in the victimisation of non-Tswanas. In 1972, in a effort to protect North Sotho residents of the Winterveld from victimisation, the Lebowa Bantustan authority initiated discussion with the South African government. The South African government assured the Lebowa authority that the Mabopane - Ga-Rankuwa - Winterveld complex would remain a multi-ethnic area under South African rule.<sup>(61)</sup> This undertaking was however not adhered to by the South African government and the Winterveld remained incorporated in Bophuthatswana when it became independent in 1977.

The exercising of power over the Winterveld increased dramatically after Mangope opted for independence in 1975. This was duly conferred on the Bantustan in 1977. The number of elected members of the legislature was increased to 48, with appointed chiefs still holding the remaining 48 seats. Later, when the Wiechers Commission found that some chiefs were "indolent, useless dictators" and "impediments to development", the number of nominated chiefs in Bophuthatswana was reduced to 24, while the number of elected seats was raised to 72.<sup>(62)</sup> By this time however, the opposition party had become ineffectual and President Mangope's position was secured.

In July 1977 an agreement on the future of the Winterveld was concluded between the South African government and the Tswana authorities. It stated that the South African government would relocate those in the Winterveld who wanted to move, while the Bantustan authority would allow those who so chose, to remain. (63) The relocation process also allowed for the expropriation of non-Tswana landowners who did not wish to remain in Bophuthatswana, or who were "not willing to co-operate in the resettlement project". (64) No indication was given as to what was meant by the "resettlement project". From the course of events, it appears that an initial strategy was to use intimidation to force the landowners and tenants to move to the Bantustan of their respective ethnic group.

Having studied the rise in status and power of the Bophuthatswana authorities, we shall now consider in detail the discriminatory practices carried out against the landowners, tenants and traders. This will assist in identifying the tensions and issues which ultimately resulted in the intervention of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I.

#### 2.4.2 Intimidation of the Plotowners

As early as 1972, the plotowners complained to the South African government of intimidation by Tswanas. Mangope at that time was threatening to move the landowners to their respective Bantustans if they did not take out Tswana citizenship. (65) At Independence, the plotowners again approached the South African government and expressed the desire to remain under South African rule. (66) Their request was not acceded to and they were told to negotiate their relocation according to the independence agreement between the Bophuthatswana and the South African government. (67) Concurrently, the Bantustan authorities promulgated a regulation forbidding the sale of land in Bophuthatswana to non-Tswanas.

Between August and November of 1978 a series of raids was carried out on the Winterveld by both the South African and the Bophuthatswana police. The landowners were charged with harbouring people without residential permits and with sub-letting plots without the magistrates' permission.<sup>(68)</sup> These prosecutions were in terms of the title deeds which stipulated that the land was to be used only for agricultural purposes and that only the owner, his family and farm helpers were allowed to live on the land.<sup>(69)</sup> Mangope then told the landlords to register their tenants, but they were turned away when they tried to do this. In 1979, Mangope threatened to expropriate the landowners and accused them of mistreating their tenants.<sup>(70)</sup> In the same year he urged the landowners not to accept new tenants and to join the Winterveld Community Authority which was now controlled by the Bophuthatswana authorities.<sup>(71)</sup>

#### 2.4.3 Intimidation of the Tenants

In 1977, the Winterveld Community Authority stopped issuing residence stamps to non-Tswanas.<sup>(72)</sup> This in turn meant that the non-Tswana work-seekers could not have their work permits endorsed which was necessary if they wanted to work in 'white' South Africa. The Bophuthatswana authorities told the non-Tswanas to apply for Bophuthatswana citizenship in order to receive a residence stamp. The local magistrate, however, was not sympathetic to applications by Wintervelders for citizenship. The magistrate claimed that few could prove that they had lived in Bophuthatswana for five years - which was a requirement for citizenship. In addition, the Dube Labour Bureau in the Winterveld was closed in 1978 and work-seekers were told to report to the Odi magistrates court in Ga-Rankuwa.<sup>(73)</sup> Here, however, the tenants were referred to the Bantustans of their respective ethnic group.

The pressure on tenants to leave was greatly increased during the police raids of August to November 1978. Fines of R30 were imposed on those tenants without residential stamps. (74) The culmination of all this pressure was the issuing of eviction orders on thousands of tenants in December 1978. In January 1979, the magistrate of Odi confirmed that two-thirds of tenants' fines, (then at R90 or 90 days), were being suspended on condition that the tenant leave the area within three months. The full sentence would be invoked if the tenant did not comply. (75)

A further intimidatory measure adopted by the Bophuthatswana authorities was the refusal to pay out pensions unless the recipient was a citizen of Bophuthatswana. In effect this meant that no non-Tswanas received pensions. According to the independence agreement, the pensions of Wintervelders were to have been paid out by the Bophuthatswana authorities. This has been one of the most brutal forms of coercion as it is a direct measure to force the elderly to move out of the Winterveld to far-off Bantustans where their "ethnic pensions" may be registered.

The enforcement of the Tswana language as the medium of education in the schools was a further intimidatory tactic. As a result, many 'private' schools have been created where residents can have their children taught in their own language. These private schools have been raided regularly since 1978 and the principals fined and jailed.

Another means used against the Wintervelders was the refusal to allow them the use of the medical clinics of Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa. Until 1981, when the Catholic church started a clinic in the area, there were no facilities for treating the dysentery, gastro-enteritis, bilharzia, kwashiokor, bronchitis and venereal disease of the residents. (76)

#### 2.4.4 Intimidation of the Traders

Intimidation of traders working in the Winterveld began with the withdrawal of licences from non-Tswanas. In addition, the Bantustan authorities created the Bophuthatswana Federated Chamber of Commerce, which it set up in opposition to the local affiliate of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC).<sup>(77)</sup> Threats were subsequently issued that licences would be withdrawn from those traders who were not members of the Bophuthatswana body.<sup>(78)</sup> No loans were issued to non-Tswanas by the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation.

Measures against the traders were stepped up in 1978 with raids directed at unlicensed traders. In August 1979 it was announced by a Mabopane police officer that only four grocers were licenced to serve the Winterveld and that no licences had been issued to street vendors. Those caught trading illegally paid between R10 and R50 admission of guilt fines and their goods were confiscated. The effect of this action on the community was widespread as informal sector activity in the Winterveld is highly developed.

#### 2.4.5 Effects of Intimidation

The nett effect of all these measures was that by the end of 1979 the South African government was able to announce that 5,000 families had 'voluntarily' left the Winterveld.<sup>(79)</sup> Extreme insecurity had forced some squatters to move to Dennilton, Kwaggasfontein and Hammansdrift in the Ndebele Bantustan. These areas also presented few opportunities for work either and the commuting distance to the Pretoria - Rand industrial complex was much greater than from the Winterveld. Those who wanted to live within commuting distance of Pretoria moved to the neighbouring tribal trust lands within Bophuthatswana. Residents finding no relief in neighbouring Bantustans began returning and, in effect, little was achieved through the constant pressure and raids in the period leading up to 1980.

By the time the NBRI's Architectural Branch intervened in the situation, an impasse had been reached. The Bophuthatswana authorities were trying to exert political control over the Winterveld community by simultaneously trying to reduce the number of people living in the area and by forcing the acquisition of citizenship on these people. However, the Bophuthatswana authorities' resolve to exert its authority was matched by the community's resolve to stay in the Winterveld and resist the imposition of Bophuthatswana citizenship. The reasons why the impasse could not be resolved and why it was necessary to introduce the Architectural Branch will be discussed in Chapter 3. However, having observed the rise of the Bophuthatswana authorities and their clash with the residents of the Winterveld, we shall again turn our attention to the broader policies and practices of the South African government.

## 2.5 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT : POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND INTENTIONS

Throughout the historical review of the establishment of the Winterveld landowners and tenant communities, and of the Bophuthatswana authorities, it has been clear that the policies of the South African government were the dominant factor which ultimately dictated the relocation of people to the Winterveld. Furthermore, it was the South African government's Bantustan strategy which empowered the Bophuthatswana authorities to engage in the strategy of intimidation of non-Tswana members of the community which has been delineated above. We will now examine settlement and labour control mechanisms designed and applied by the South African government to contain the growing population of the Bantustans. Of particular importance is the degree to which the Winterveld did not fit the orderly pattern of settlement which those mechanisms were intended to produce and maintain.

### 2.5.1 Settlement strategy : 1950's -1970's

In 1952, a survey was undertaken of the Bantustans to ascertain the number of "landless and stockless natives" in order to establish them in 'rural villages'.<sup>(80)</sup> The laying out of these villages was started in 1953 "for the closer settlement of Bantu persons" in "the interests of soil economy".<sup>(81)</sup> The settlements comprised plots on native trust land and were under the strict control of chiefs who chaired Bantu village councils. The villages were established on an ethnic basis and all residents were required to take out membership of the local tribe and be "subject" to its practices.<sup>(82)</sup> It became government policy in 1956 that all those being relocated should be settled in these villages, along with the families of migrants. No animal husbandry could be practised in the villages and it appears that the families were entirely dependant on remittances from the heads of households working in the white areas. Free movement was to be controlled through the settlement of people in areas "for members of their

(83)  
ethnic group".

It appears that these villages could not accommodate the large numbers of people being involved in the relocation programmes. By 1964, it had become necessary to make alternative provision for those who could not be settled in the towns established by the South African Bantu Trust and for those who could not be settled on 'economic' farming schemes. These people were to be settled in 'closer' or 'temporary' settlements. Such settlements were for the relocation of surplus (oortollig) or illegal (onregmatig) residents of white towns, for those removed from black spots, those removed from white farms and mission stations, for landless blacks and finally for families of migrant workers. The people relocated were to be divided and, where circumstances and numbers permitted, people were to be settled in tribal villages, while those who had sufficient income were to be settled in the S.A. Bantu Trust towns. The remainder, those who were aged, poor and unemployed, were to be moved to closer settlements. They were to remain there until such time as the Department of Bantu Administration and Development's Labour Office found them work. Thereafter, they were to be moved to the 'Bantu towns' of the S.A. Bantu Trust. It is in this policy that the integration of labour control and settlement strategy is clearly illustrated.

(84)  
The 'closer' settlements were to be established on an ethnic basis and when allocating work the labour bureau was to ensure that the worker could, on taking up employment, settle in a town of his own ethnic group. This would ensure "the gradual elimination and correct resettling" of "foreign groups".

(85)  
The establishment of Bantu towns in the Bantustans by the S.A. Bantu Trust included the servicing of sites in the towns for the purpose of self-build construction. These sections were classified as part of the Bantu towns and

to all intents and purposes were treated as such. Residents living there were presumed to be able to pay for the services which they received. The 'closer' settlements were also to be built on a self-help basis, but with 'rudimentary services', and were to be situated near existing S.A. Bantu Trust towns. It is important to note that both self-construction in the towns (selfboudorpe) and closer settlements included self-help housing, and that the primary distinction between the two was whether the resident concerned was employed. The transition from the one settlement to the other required the resident to be employed through the labour bureau system.

A circular of 1967 once again defined the hierarchy of Bantustan settlements. At the top of the hierarchy were the 'self-contained Bantu towns' of the S.A. Bantu Trust. Next were those towns with 'rudimentary services' (ie. piped water supplied through communal standpipes). In the settlements with rudimentary services at least one member of each family should be employed in 'white' South Africa. Both of the above towns were serviced by the S.A. Bantu Trust and appear to correlate with the conventional and self-built housing sections of the Bantu towns of the 1964 circular. In another two categories were 'agricultural residential areas' and 'controlled squatting on trust land'. The distinction between these two categories was made on the basis of the size of the plot. <sup>(86)</sup> The distinction between the S.A. Bantu Trust settlements and these last two settlement types was whether a family member was employed and the household consequently able to afford the higher level of services provided by the Trust. The settlement policies of the 1964 and 1967 circulars, says Perlman:

"... indicate clearly that the state was attempting to structure the residential conditions of the African population according to their relationship to employment and the urban areas." <sup>(147)</sup>

This employment was, in turn, regulated through the labour bureau system.

## 2.5.2 Labour Control : 1964 - 1977

The system of labour control prior to the 1960's had emphasised the exclusion of Africans from permanent residence in the white urban areas. In 1964, in an effort to further control the movement and supply of African labour, the labour bureau system was extended into a "complex hierarchical network of labour bureaux"<sup>(87)</sup>. A central labour office was established in Pretoria with subservient regional, district and local labour bureaux. This hierarchy was extended to the Bantustans in 1968 with territorial labour bureaux being set up in the office of each territorial authority. Within the hierarchy of the territorial authorities, district and tribal labour bureaux were also established. Tribal labour bureaux were established in the office of every tribal or communal authority. Thus two interrelated systems of labour bureaux were firmly established :

WHITE SOUTH AFRICA		BANTUSTAN
Central Labour Bureau		8 Territorial Labour Bureaux
8 Regional Labour Bureaux		96 District Labour Bureaux
294 Local Labour Bureaux	241 District Bureaux	518 Tribal Labour Bureaux
	(88)	(89)

The 1968 regulations required that every African male between the ages of 16 and 65, living within the area of a tribal labour bureau, had to register as a work-seeker within one month of becoming unemployed. This did not allow the person to seek work actively however - he had to remain within the area until recruited for work. The purpose of the bureaux was :

"...to feed the needs of the economy and to control the movement of black people in and into areas where employment is available" (90)

The effect of this measure was to ensure that the issuing of work permits via the labour bureaux could determine the geographical location of work-seekers.

Having examined the content of these policies, it is important to note that the Winterveld did not fit neatly into the hierarchy of settlements structured by labour control mechanisms. Firstly, the Winterveld, which was regarded in the official hierarchy as a 'closer' settlement, did not only contain the unemployed people, but also a substantial proportion of those with legal jobs in white South Africa. Secondly, the unemployed residents did not have to wait to be processed by a labour bureau, but could commute to Pretoria on a daily basis and take up illegal employment. It can therefore be concluded that the Winterveld represented a breakdown of the system of residential and labour control. Further evidence of this was that, despite the closing of the Dube labour bureau in the Winterveld during the 1970's, there was still an influx of people to the area.

### 2.5.3 Labour Control : 1977 onwards

The labour control mechanisms were re-examined on a national scale in 1977. The result was that after 1977 the state adopted an 'urban insiders' and 'rural outsiders' strategy, whereby those Africans who lived in the cities were to be given additional privileges, while influx control was to be strengthened to keep illegal migrants or commuters in the Bantustans. For the Winterveld this meant that residential and labour control was to become even more closely integrated and refined. As this was a major aspect of the work of the Architectural Branch which we shall be examining in Chapter 5, it is important to look at the strategy in some detail.

The new strategy was most clearly articulated in the 1979 Report of the Riekert Commission and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982. The Commission reported on the efficiency of the labour recruiting and utilization mechanisms and suggested the re-inforcement of the influx control system. On the one hand, the containment of the black

proletariat in the Bantustans was to be achieved through a renewed industrial decentralisation strategy and rural development schemes. On the other hand, the need for more stable, skilled labour by monopoly capital was also recognised. Thus one of the chief aims of the Riekert Commission was to protect and co-opt the "privileged labour aristocracy"<sup>(91)</sup> to foster the creation of an urban black middle class. The creation of this division within the African working class would in addition strengthen the state's political control.

This strategy of division was prompted by the decreasing rate of job provision in the economy as a whole in the late 1960's and 1970's. Simkins estimates that unemployment rose from 17,5% in 1967 to 22,4% in 1977.<sup>(92)</sup>

The rate of job provision in manufacturing had not kept pace with the number of new workseekers in the 1960's and the growing centralisation and capitalisation of production in the 1970's had resulted in a further reduction in the rate of job creation in the economy as a whole. In part, this was due to the fact that the increasing numbers of African workers who had moved into semi-skilled positions were required to work more overtime. The number of technicians and salaried staff in the economy as a whole rose from 25,42% of the workforce in 1969 to 29,09% in 1977. Within the African labour force, the proportion of technicians and salaried staff grew from 8,66% to 12,85% in the same period. Africans in skilled positions grew from 2,86% to 4,97% of the total work force, and semi-skilled from 16,73% to 19,67% of the total work force, in the same period.<sup>(93)</sup>

In order to stabilise the urban African labour force necessary to the changing economic structure, a moratorium was announced in 1979 which allowed employers to register and so legalise those workers whom they were employing illegally at that time. Approximately 60,000 workers were legalised countrywide by 31st October 1979.<sup>(94)</sup> After the moratorium, the means by which the division between the urban insiders and the rural

outsiders were to be maintained were reinforced. The Riekert Commission recommended that this be done by controlling influx at the point of employment and residence.

The Commission recommended that entry to white urban areas be subject to the availability of employment and that this was to be strictly enforced. The fine imposed on employers employing illegal employees was subsequently raised to R500 in 1979. It was reported in 1979 that the raising of the fine to R500 had proved to be effective in "shipping all redundant people out of sight of the cities."<sup>(95)</sup>

The implementation of control at the point of residence proved more problematic. It was proposed that no illegal African person be allowed to reside in 'white' cities between 10 pm and 5 am. Any person caught accommodating such people would be fined R500 or be subject to six months imprisonment. The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill which contained these enforcement measures was withdrawn due to widespread public protest. Despite the withdrawal of these proposals, Perlman notes that legal residence is now central to the registration of employment and thus to the influx control system.<sup>(96)</sup>

The state has controlled the supply of housing for Africans and under the new policies will continue to supply the land and site for house construction at the national level. Dewar, Todes and Watson conclude that by making the availability of housing 'a key element', this will 'facilitate manipulation of the spatial distribution of labour'.<sup>(97)</sup>

When considering these influx control policy changes in the Pretoria-Winterveld area, it becomes clear that there is no strict urban/rural divide in this area. Rather, the historical development of the residential

areas has resulted in those townships closest to Pretoria accommodating the most skilled workers, while the residential areas furthest from Pretoria, including the Winterveld, have accommodated the less skilled workers who commute. The structure of this continuum of residential areas and its use within the labour allocation system will be discussed further in Chapter 3. At this point, it is important to recognise that the Winterveld fell within the urban category in that it contained a proportion of skilled and semi-skilled workers who were necessary to the functioning of the Pretoria-Rand industrial economy. This suggested that the residents of the Winterveld should be incorporated in the "new labour aristocracy" and that the Winterveld area be subject to the same residential control policies as the conventional urban townships. There were, however, two factors which made this form of urban policy problematic in the Winterveld situation.

Firstly, the random nature of settlement which took place under the control of the landowners made it difficult to enforce the new urban residential controls. The unemployed could thus settle in the Winterveld from where they could commute into Pretoria on a daily basis and find illegal employment. The by-passing of the labour control mechanisms was therefore a major obstacle to the state's settlement strategy.

Secondly, the settlement fell within Bophuthatswana and was therefore subject to the settlement strategies being promulgated for the Bantustans. It is to these new Bantustan settlement strategies of the 1980's that we will now turn our attention.

#### 2.5.4 Settlement Strategy in the Bantustans : 1980's

The measures which had been adopted in the 1960's for the establishment of the S.A. Bantu Trust towns, closer settlements and tribal villages had been inadequate to cope with the large influx of relocated Africans. By the

late 1970's it was realised that the lack of a comprehensive national settlement strategy was leading to the emergence of a squatter problem around Bantu Trust towns, <sup>(98)</sup> while, simultaneously, large rural areas of the Bantustans remained without urban settlements. In addition, it was recognised that rural development schemes initiated in the Bantustans had not slowed migration to the cities, but had, in fact, had the opposite effect.

In the face of these realities, the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Cooperation and Development, Mr van der Waal, proposed the development of a decentralised form of urbanisation in the Bantustans. This was aimed at protecting 'white' areas from African urbanisation. The basis for this so-called 'organic' settlement strategy was that control of 'closer' settlements and settlements of landless and landed rural Africans be lodged with tribal authorities in the Bantustans. It was premised on the assertion that the rural townships and closer settlements had "strong political/social ordering structures grounded on the traditional tribal system which ensures stability". <sup>(99)</sup> Thus it was stated that:

"Tribal authorities and tribal authority areas should thus be accepted as modules for administrative and regional development units in as far as it affects urbanisation. The establishment, either through organisational growth or through initiating of so-called tribal towns which can serve as administrative and economic kernels, should be encouraged. In addition, it will have the important advantage that it will foster greater tribal and thus political cohesion." <sup>(100)</sup>

It was recognised that this small scale, controlled urbanisation was not optimal from an economic point of view, but it was argued that administration and control were the primary factors to be considered. This is spelt out in the following statement by van der Waal :

"Although it is generally accepted according to Western standards that larger cities are more effective in the light of servicing at low cost (water supply, sewerage, transport, etc) it must not be lost sight of that bigger cities also make higher demands on administration and control. Such cities are also cosmopolitan and lead to cultural dilution (kultuutverwatering). From this perspective of effective administration and of the development of

a national ethos, it might be advantageous to initially concentrate on smaller, more dispersed development and urbanisation incentives in tribal authority areas in the national states." (101)

The primary motivation for the urbanisation strategy was thus the "development and stimulation of a national ethos" and the fostering of tribal control. However, it was also stated that decentralised urbanisation would have the additional advantage in that it would be achieved with less government finance. This was based on the argument that "local standards and norms" would be adopted rather than "Western norms which are economically unrealistic". (102)

The imposition of this form of urbanisation in the Winterveld was problematic as the community had not followed the apartheid states neat pattern of tribal urbanisation. Firstly, the community was large and not of a single ethnic group. Secondly, the community had not accepted the legitimacy of the tribal authority which had been placed in control of the Winterveld. Thus one of the major sources of tension in the Winterveld was around the form of local authority that was to govern the community. Of further importance was the fact that the South African government was committed to fostering the development of a housing strategy which was 'appropriate' to what the community could afford. This policy was to significantly influence the proposals of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I.

Having studied the emerging policies towards urbanisation and influx control in both the white cities and the Bantustans, we shall now turn our attention to the relationship between the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities.

## 2.6 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE BOPHUTHATSWANA AUTHORITIES

An understanding of the historical development of the relationship between the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities is essential because the dependence of the latter upon the former prior to 1980 sheds light on the position of these two actors at the time of intervention of the Architectural Branch. Bophuthatswana was dependent on South Africa, firstly for work opportunities for its inhabitants and, secondly, for finance to run Bophuthatswana's limited economy. Furthermore, the South African government seconded staff to the Bophuthatswana administration and in this way exercised some considerable degree of control over the direction of policies and practices in the Bophuthatswana government.

The extent to which the Bantustan was dependent on South Africa for work opportunities for its inhabitants is evident in that, of the 12 200 new job seekers requiring work each year, 61% had to look for work in 'white' South Africa.<sup>(103)</sup> Of the total workforce, 84% worked in 'white' South Africa,<sup>(104)</sup> while for the Winterveld region this figure was 88,5%. Furthermore, if the South African government wanted to exert its influence, it could manipulate the allocation of employment opportunities via the labour bureau system. Thus Duncan points out that those Bantustans who do not cooperate with the South African government could "find themselves in a position where no recruitment in their area is allowed and they will be left with enormous numbers of unemployed and hungry people."<sup>(105)</sup>

The financial dependence of Bophuthatswana on South Africa was evident in the 80% contribution by South Africa to the Bantustan's public revenue requirements in the 1976/77 financial year. In addition, South Africa has

contributed a large proportion towards the gross fixed investment by the public sector in Bophuthatswana - some 73% in 1974/75.<sup>(106)</sup> The overwhelming dominance of the S.A. economy as a whole is evidenced in the fact that the gross domestic product of Bophuthatswana represented only 0,76% of the gross domestic product of white South Africa.

Since 1979, the contribution of the South African government to the Bophuthatswana economy has declined in relative terms, but in absolute terms it has continued to rise as is illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Financial contributions to Bophuthatswana by S.A. government.

(Figures given in R'000s)

	BUDGET ASSISTANCE	TRANSFER PAYMENTS*	LOANS	GRANTS
1979/80	R22 000	R 92 100	R 9 000	R10 000
1980/81	R22 000	R122 940	R16 700	
1981/82	R25 067	R135 800	R 3 893	

Notes:

\* Transfer payments include:

- 1 taxes collected from Africans employed in 'white' South Africa
- 2 a share of the customs union pool
- 3 transfer payments in terms of monetary agreement.

Source: Hansard 10, Q.C. 631-636. 06 October 1981.

As has been suggested, a further aspect of the relationship between the Bantustan authority and the South African government was the seconding of staff to the former by the latter. In 1979, there were 430 seconded officials<sup>(107)</sup> and these included magistrates who had traditionally played a prominent role in administering the Bantustans on behalf of the South African government. Perlman notes that the magistrate also formed the main

link between the South African and Bantustan labour bureaux and it appears that they were key figures in the integration of labour and residential control as discussed above.

The power that this relationship enables the South African government to exercise over Bophuthatswana's affairs is obvious. However, while the Bantustan remained in this dependant position, the concept of 'independence' was seriously flawed and exposed the weak foundations of apartheid. Thus a real tension existed between the legitimacy to be accorded to the concept of an independent Bophuthatswana and the South African government's continued insistence on controlling developments within the territory.

The attempted resolution of this tension in the Winterveld situation will be studied in the following chapters.

## 2.7 CONCLUSION

In concluding this chapter, it is well to recall in summary the main developments in the Winterveld - developments which resulted in tension focussed on specific issues at the time of intervention by the Architectural Branch.

We have seen that the landowners who held land in freehold were able to appropriate wealth from their land initially through agriculture and later through the renting of land and/or housing to tenants. The tenants who moved into the area did so because they had been forced out of the 'white' cities and farming areas. An important consequence of this was that the community consisted of both the employed and the unemployed who worked or were seeking work in the Pretoria - Rand area.

The community developed initially in a Native Reserve which was later incorporated into the Bantustan system and which finally became the independent Republic of Bophuthatswana. The result of this was that the community was divided on ethnic grounds with the Tswana residents being placed in a politically and materially advantaged position. Furthermore, the largely non-Tswana community was placed under the rule of the Bophuthatswana authorities as it was the South African government's intention to deflect the demands of the community away from itself. The community rejected the imposition of this tribally-based authority but, as the Bophuthatswana authorities gained more power, they tried to exert greater control. The continuing conflict was manifested in increasing discrimination against non-Tswanas and resulted in rising tensions within the community, and between it and the authorities.

Despite the very rigid mechanisms of settlement and labour control established by the South African government during the 1950's and 1960's,

there were problems in their implementation which allowed large numbers of people to congregate in the Winterveld and take up illegal employment in the Pretoria area. The South African government were looking at the further integration of residential and labour controls on a national scale and this directly affected the workers of the Winterveld who were to be integrated into the urban African workforce. Simultaneously, the Winterveld was also to be subjected to the tribal forms of urbanisation which were being re-emphasised in the Bantustans.

The historical review of the dependence of Bophuthatswana on South African finance and employment opportunities for its residents, has given a clear indication that the concept of Bantustan 'independence' had little credibility. The continuing intervention of the South African government was, therefore, almost as problematic as its sudden withdrawal would have been. This remained an unresolved matter.

Finally, the brief survey of material living conditions of the majority of Winterveld residents in 1980, which was covered in Chapter 1, exposed a degree of hardship in, for example, the extremely arduous commuting patterns and the lack of unpolluted drinking water. Of even more importance was the conclusion that, due to high levels of unemployment and extremely low wages, the majority of households in the community could barely subsist, let alone pay for any increased level of service provision.

Thus, at the time of the NBRI Architectural Branch's intervention in 1980, there remained numerous unresolved issues. The reasons why the various groups involved in the Winterveld situation could not themselves resolve these issues is the subject to which we will now address ourselves.

## FOOTNOTES

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- 26 Ibid. p 26-28.
- 27 Ga-Rankuwa had in its initial stages been established as a town for Tswanas although it was estimated that, in 1969, only 30,92% of the town was Tswana.
- 28 This was allowed on an apparent ad hoc administrative basis. The general intention was that all those moved to a Bantustan would lose their Section 10 rights.
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## CHAPTER 3 : AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTS SURROUNDING THE WINTERVELD SITUATION

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Our survey of the emergence of the Winterveld community has indicated that by 1980 there were numerous issues which had created tensions within the community. In this chapter, we shall analyse each of these issues in turn and try to understand why they remained unresolved. In particular, we shall observe how each of the major actors in the situation, namely the landowners, the tenants, the Bophuthatswana authorities, and the South African government, had specific interests centred on each of these issues. Their respective powers to realise their interests, and so resolve the issues in one way or another, were limited either by the powers of opposing actors, or by the actor's own countervailing interests in other issues.

This analysis will in turn facilitate a clearer perception of the issues confronting the Architectural Branch of the NBRI when it intervened in the Winterveld in 1980. We shall also perceive, to some extent, the constraints which the conflict of interests placed on the work of the Architectural Branch as it faced the highly problematic task of resolving the issues.

The issues will be ranked in an order reflecting the more general significance of what was at stake. For example, it will be argued that the most important issue was that which concerned the supply of labour to the Pretoria-Rand area from the Winterveld. The continued flow of this labour was important for the functioning of the economy in that area, and thus for the functioning of the South African economy as a whole. Next in order of importance was that set of issues which revolved around the control of

influx to the Winterveld. The continual influx of unemployed people threatened the efficient functioning of the labour and residential control mechanisms employed by the South African government and, ultimately, its overall control of the African population.

A third set of issues was centred upon the question of the Winterveld's incorporation into the Bantustan. These issues were important in that they were connected to the legitimisation of the Bantustan strategy within the programme of apartheid. They were not, however, as important as the immediate threat posed by the collapse of influx control.

The fourth and final set of issues involved the question of who was ultimately to bear the financial responsibility for the development of the Winterveld.

The significant actors, or groups of actors, have been defined as the tenants, the landowners, the Bantustan authority and the South African government. The latter two were constituted entities, functioning as state organisations within the situation. The former groups were not formally constituted, but can be considered as two distinct groups of actors because of their position within the land tenure system prevailing in the Winterveld. The depth of analysis in this chapter does not require that these actors be broken down into further sub-categories, except in the case of the tenants, who must sometimes be divided into two groups: those who were employed and those who were unemployed. This distinction is important as the two groups occupied two different positions within the broader South African social structure and were sometimes treated differently. Where reference is made to tenants without distinguishing between employed or unemployed, it must be assumed that both groups are being referred to and, that in the situation under discussion, whether they are employed or unemployed makes no difference.

The power of the major groups of actors to realise their interests in the Winterveld situation was connected to their overall position within the economic and political structures of South African society. For example, the South African government was economically the most powerful actor as it controlled the distribution of state spending and ultimately could decide, within the limitations discussed below, the form and timing of the development in the area. The Bophuthatswana authorities, on the other hand, were economically dependent on the South African government.

It is important to note that an actor's power could be limited in two ways. Firstly, the opposing interests and powers of two actors or groups of actors could prove to be mutually limiting. The South African government could not, for example, impose direct forms of influx control in the Winterveld as the area was under the jurisdiction of the Bophuthatswana authorities.

Secondly, the power of an actor or group of actors to realise its interest in one issue might be limited by its own countervailing interest in another issue. For example, the South African government's power to intervene in the Winterveld situation to impose influx control was also limited by its other interest in projecting the Bantustan as an "independent state" in which the South African government did not interfere.

Let us now move on to an analysis of the specific issues.

### 3.2 THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF EMPLOYED NON-TSWANA RESIDENTS TO REMAIN IN THE WINTERVELD.

The most important issue around which there was a conflict of interests was whether those non-Tswana residents who worked in the Pretoria-Rand area could continue to live in the Winterveld. A sizeable proportion of those who had been removed from Pretoria or from white farms had either continued to work, or had obtained work, in Pretoria. The continual harassment of these non-Tswana workers had forced a number of tenants to move from the Winterveld to other Bantustans.<sup>(1)</sup> These Bantustans were much further away from Pretoria and, consequently, these workers experienced even more difficulty than they had previously in commuting to work on a daily basis. In addition, the Magistrate in Ga-Rankuwa had placed the continued residence of the entire tenant community in jeopardy by fining landowners for harbouring tenants.<sup>(2)</sup> Thus the flow of labour to the industries of the Pretoria-Rand area was seriously threatened. The continued functioning of industry in the Pretoria-Rand area was essential to the South African economy as a whole and thus the issue of its labour supply was paramount.

The Bophuthatswana government's desire was to exclude as many non-Tswanas from the Winterveld as possible. The Bantustan strategy, as noted previously, was based on the ethnic division of Africans and their rule by ethnically-based Bantustan authorities. The presence of large numbers of non-Tswanas in the Winterveld area was therefore a threat to the legitimacy of the Bophuthatswana authorities who claimed to govern the territory for its Tswana population.

A further reason for the Bophuthatswana government wanting to exclude non-Tswanas from the area was that they did not contribute to the revenue of the Bantustan government, although they continued to make financial demands. The practice of the South African government was to collect the

labour, which was an inherently unstable form of labour, be phased out in favour of labour settled within commuting distance of the Pretoria-Rand area. The provision of secure residence for non-Tswana workers within commuting distance of Pretoria in order to build up a stable skilled workforce had, therefore, to be held in tension with the ideal of implementing the broader political strategies of apartheid.

The need to stabilise the workforce in order to develop skilled labour coincided with the desire of the non-Tswana workers to settle in the Winterveld area. This desire was obviously due to the advantages of being able to sell their labour while living with their families within commuting distance of Pretoria, rather than being forced to enter the migrant labour system.

The Bophuthatswana government's power to realise its interest lay in its ability to discriminate against non-Tswanas in the Bantustan labour bureaux system. The first evidence of this emerged when the labour office serving the Winterveld was closed in the late 1970's.<sup>(4)</sup> The Winterveld residents who were legally employed, had relied on the bureau to process their work permits which had to be renewed regularly. When these workers went to the alternative office at Ga-Rankuwa, they were turned away and told to go to their respective Bantustans.<sup>(5)</sup> In addition, no residence stamps were issued to non-Tswanas who had not already become citizens of Bophuthatswana after 1977.<sup>(6)</sup> The residence stamp was a vital element of the influx control mechanism and without it workers could not have their contracts renewed. Thus citizenship became a criterion of discrimination within the distribution of jobs within the Bantustan labour bureaux system. Where non-Tswana residents of the Winterveld did apply to the Bophuthatswana authorities for citizenship, their applications were not accepted, as it was claimed that the applicants could not prove they had been living in the Bantustan for five years.<sup>(7)</sup> The tenants were also reluctant to take out

what was regarded as second rate "Zulu Tswana" or "Xhosa Tswana" citizenship<sup>(8)</sup> which was all that was available to them.

The employed non-Tswana tenants were in a relatively advantaged position in that many of them were employed in skilled and semi-skilled positions,<sup>(9)</sup> 21,9% and 23,3% of the total number of residents employed, respectively.

Moreover, the South African government had the means to ensure that this relatively valuable labour force could continue to work in the Pretoria-Rand area by nullifying the discriminatory practices of the Bantustan labour bureaux. The function of the Bantustan labour bureaux was to register work-seekers, while that of the South African labour bureaux was to collect requisitions for labour from employers, which were then allocated to the Bantustan bureaux. Hence, in order to by-pass the discrimination practised against non-Tswana work-seekers in the Bantustan bureaux, the Central Transvaal Administration Board began to process the registration of work-seekers and the allocation of work permits to non-Tswanas at the Enkeldebos Labour Bureau, situated outside the Bophuthatswana border. The Board did, however, check that the applicant had<sup>(10)</sup> previously worked in the Pretoria-Rand area.

On the other hand, the South African government could not by-pass the Bantustan labour bureaux system indefinitely as the registration of work-seekers and the attesting and renewing of work permits close to Pretoria would have encouraged work-seekers to move to the area. The influx control system would have been seriously weakened as workers would no longer have<sup>(11)</sup> to wait at distant rural tribal bureaux for an attested work permit.

The checking of residence permits by both the Enkeldebos bureau and the Bantustan labour bureaux system was only a partial solution as there were<sup>(12)</sup> many illegal residence stamps in circulation. In order to overcome this problem, the residence stamps of work-seekers were checked against the

census of 1970. This was unsatisfactory however, as the census did not include those who had arrived in the Winterveld after 1970 and obtained legal employment.

In order to safeguard the influx control system, the South African government needed to update its records of those who were employed and living in the Winterveld. Their ability to do this was limited firstly by the fact that the Bophuthatswana authorities did not want to accept or acknowledge the presence of the non-Tswanas. Secondly, any integration of an updated record of residence with the labour bureau system would have required the co-operation of the landowners. Perlman noted the following :

" Preventing people from moving into Winterveld has proved impossible, largely because of its sheer size and density, but also because the plot-owners effectively decide whether or not to let people onto their land. Most plot-owners earn a substantial amount of money from rents, much more than they could hope to earn by farming. " (13)

The power of the landowners to allow large scale settlement in order to appropriate rents was in turn limited by the title deeds of their plots, which stipulated that only the owner's family and farm helpers could live on the land. Indeed, we noted in the introduction to this section that in 1979 the landowners were being fined by the Magistrate in Ga-Rankuwa for harbouring tenants. We shall note later that the Magistrate's ability to implement this control effectively was limited. A point was being reached, however, where the disruption of the residence of the employed tenants was imminent and a resolution of this issue was urgently required.

### 3.2 THE REJECTION OF THE RIGHT OF UNEMPLOYED NON-TSWANA RESIDENTS TO REMAIN IN THE WINTERVELD

The right of unemployed non-Tswanas to remain in the Winterveld settlement was under threat and of concern to both the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities. We have noted that the unemployed tenants had been moved out of white cities and farming areas and had congregated in the Winterveld as a place where they could live in close proximity to the work opportunities of the Pretoria-Rand area, while still escaping the more rigid influx control which was strictly enforced in neighbouring townships. From the Winterveld, the unemployed tenants could commute to Pretoria and the Rand where they could take up illegal employment. Employers were prepared to employ illegal labourers, despite the heavy fines if they were caught doing so, because such people were prepared to accept harsher working conditions and lower rates of pay than legal workers.

The relocation of the unemployed away from the white cities was a consistent policy of the South African government. It had the ability to force the unemployed tenants to move away by refusing to allocate work permits to those who did not have any record of previous employment in the Pretoria-Rand area. In practice however, its application of this power was constrained by two factors. Firstly, if an unemployed non-Tswana found illegal employment, he could possibly have the employment legalised if there was no legal labour locally available to do the work. This legalisation of self-recruited workers was not official policy but a pragmatic practice which was necessary because, as the Central Transvaal Administration Board discovered, the residents of Mamelodi, Atteridgeville and neighbouring townships would not accept certain types of work, generally the lowest paid and most unpleasant. <sup>(14)</sup> Such work opportunities would therefore be filled by self-recruited workers from areas such as the Winterveld.

The second factor which tended to attract unemployed people to the Winterveld was the way in which the Central Transvaal Administration Board distributed labour requisitions. Because the Africans living in the townships closest to Pretoria would not accept low-paid unskilled work, the Board offered the most skilled and highly-paid work to the Mamelodi and Atteridgeville labour bureaux. If the vacancy was not filled at that point, it would be passed on - firstly to Shoshanguve, secondly to Ga-Rankuwa and Mabopane, thereafter to the Winterveld and finally it would be passed to the furthest points in the Bantustan. (15) Once again this was a

pragmatic practice on the part of South African government officials in order to keep unemployment in the vicinity of Pretoria as low as possible. (16) The effect of the above policy was that the best, most

highly-skilled jobs were available in the townships of Pretoria, with the most arduous work allocated to those in the more distant rural areas. The effect of this, in turn, was to encourage people to move closer to the cities where the higher paid and higher quality work was allocated. Residence in the townships of Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Shoshanguve and the Bophuthatswana townships was, however, strictly controlled. Thus the Winterveld was again the nearest point for the illegal unemployed to settle when attracted to higher levels of employment. We thus note that the pragmatic practices of the South African government worked against removing the unemployed from the Winterveld.

The Bophuthatswana authorities did not favour the presence of large numbers of unemployed non-Tswana tenants in the Winterveld for the same reasons they did not favour the presence of employed non-Tswanas. Briefly, this was because non-Tswana residents challenged the ethnic purity of the homeland and thus the pretext on which it was founded.

The Bophuthatswana authorities had the power to force relocation of the

unemployed non-Tswana residents away from the Winterveld by refusing to issue them with new residence permits. In turn this would disqualify these work-seekers from obtaining a work permit through the Enkeldebos bureau if they did not already have a record of previous employment in Pretoria. In this instance, the South African government would not seek to subvert the efforts of the Bophuthatswana authorities, as its interests also lay in the removal of unemployed residents from the Winterveld.

It was recorded in Chapter Two that raids were carried out during August to November 1978 by the Bophuthatswana authorities against tenants without residence stamps. The power of the Bophuthatswana authorities to attempt to force relocation in this way was limited by the fact that the other Bantustan governments did not want to assume responsibility for those who would be forced to move out of the Winterveld. <sup>(17)</sup> The raids also had the effect of unsettling the employed tenants whose accommodation, as we noted earlier, the South African government was seeking to stabilise. The raids thus countered an interest of the South African government.

While the Bophuthatswana authorities' interests and the South African government's interests were convergent, they were directly opposed to those of the unemployed tenants, who wanted to sell their labour while living in the Winterveld. Their need to do this was imperative as they needed to earn a wage in order to live, and their determination to do so was evident in the fact that they continued to live in the Winterveld despite the repression experienced in the raids of the late 1970's. The only real advantage possessed by the unemployed tenants lay in the fact that in the Winterveld they remained largely outside the system of residential control. The basis of this advantage was that they thus remained officially unrecorded. When raids were carried out by the Bophuthatswana authorities, the tenants simply used their official anonymity to disappear temporarily into neighbouring tribal lands or to other Bantustans. They could then

return to the Winterveld when the raids ceased, as many in fact did. However, each time a tenant took this course of action, they lost the house which they had built on the plotowner's land.

When the Architectural Branch intervened in the situation, a major unresolved issue was that unemployed non-Tswana work-seekers could still find accommodation in the Winterveld and take up illegal employment in Pretoria. In order to prevent this, the Bophuthatswana authorities and the South African government would have to introduce rigid residential control which would require the co-operation of the landowners who directly controlled the influx of tenants onto their land.

### 3.4 CONTROL OF THE LAND

The control of influx to the Winterveld was not in the interests of the plotowners as it would have restricted the inflow of tenants and this threatened the plotowners' major source of income, namely rent.

The tenants on the other hand sought not only to satisfy their basic need for shelter in the Winterveld, but also the right to work in the Pretoria-Rand area, which the securing of a residence permit offered. In addition, their arbitrary eviction by the plotowners, with the subsequent loss to the tenants of their investment in their homes, dictated that they attempt to achieve as much security of tenure as possible. <sup>(18)</sup> The power of the tenants to acquire permanent residence was, as stated earlier, dependent on whether they were employed or not, ie. if they were necessary to the industrial economy of the Pretoria-Rand area.

The South African government's attitude to control of the land was somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand it wanted a form of residential control to be implemented in order to stop influx and so control illegal labour commuting into the Pretoria-Rand area. On the other hand however, it wanted the land to remain under the ownership of the landowners as this would mean that the landowners and tenants would continue to provide their own housing. This would ease the financial burden of the South African government which, until that time, had borne the major proportion of the cost of housing in the Bantustans.

The landowners' position was underpinned by their legally acquired title to the land they occupied, but their right to allow tenants to rent land from them was circumscribed by a clause in the title deeds which restricted residence on a particular erf to the owner, his family and farm helpers. <sup>(19)</sup> The Bophuthatswana authorities could not enforce this law

effectively, as its enforcement would affect employed and unemployed, Tswana and non-Tswana tenants alike, thus threatening its other interests. A further limitation was that the fines imposed on landowners for harbouring tenants were negligible in comparison to the income which landowners could earn through rents. Eventually, the Bophuthatswana authorities threatened to expropriate landowners for harbouring tenants,<sup>(20)</sup> and when the landlords did try to have the residence of their tenants registered, they were turned away by the Bantustan authority.<sup>(21)</sup> This was because it was not in the interests of the Bantustan to officially recognise the presence of non-Tswanas.

The South African government had in the past used population removals and township development as complimentary means to establish residential control. Their power to use these means in the Winterveld was limited, as the provision of conventional townships in the Winterveld through the expropriation of the land and the provision of conventional housing units for the employed would have required substantial financial input from the South African Government. This was counter to the South African government's other interest of making Bophuthatswana financially independent. To realise its objectives then, the South African government preferred not to spend money on expropriating the landowners, but would rather encourage them to impose residential control themselves by providing housing on their land for legally employed tenants.

The right of the landowners to continue owning their land, however, was under threat from the Bophuthatswana authorities who were threatening to expropriate because the right of the landowners to appropriate wealth from the land through agriculture or renting ran counter to the norm within Bophuthatswana. The non-Tswana plotowners were part of a small minority as only 14,6% of the land in Bophuthatswana was in private ownership, the rest

being tribal or tribal trust land. The growth of this wealthy group of landowners, who were non-Tswana and who did not support the Bophuthatswana authorities, <sup>(22)</sup> was clearly perceived as a threat by the latter.

The Bophuthatswana authorities consequently had two interests in the situation. They wanted firstly, to remove economic power from a wealthy group who were not Tswana nationals and secondly, they wished to secure the revenue that could be derived from the land. The landowners' interest was to retain ownership of the land and so protect their major source of income. It was alleged that they made large amounts of money through rent and the sale of water to tenants. <sup>(23)</sup> Their power to do this was circumscribed once again by the title deed which stipulated that the land was to be used exclusively for agricultural purposes. <sup>(24)</sup> In the face of prosecution and threats of expropriation for not obeying this clause, some landowners adopted an alternative strategy. This was to suggest to the Bophuthatswana authorities that the authority remove the tenants and that the landowners be allowed to return to farming the land. Clearly the right to farm the land with the new nearby markets of Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa was preferable to losing the land entirely.

The first measure which the Bophuthatswana authorities took was to restrict the sale of land after 1977 to Tswanas. While this would not have transferred the income from the land directly to the authority, it would have restricted non-Tswanas from acquiring economic power. This new ruling did not work effectively as, at the time of the intervention of the Architectural Branch, 85.5% of the plots still belonged to non-Tswanas. <sup>(25)</sup>

In 1979 however, the Bophuthatswana authorities began to threaten the landowners with expropriation. <sup>(26)</sup> The pressure to accept the presence of employed non-Tswanas in the Winterveld would only have been acceptable to the Bophuthatswana authorities if they could secure the sources of income from the tenant community. The Bophuthatswana authorities did not receive

rates from the land.<sup>(27)</sup> Thus the acquisition of the rents through expropriation offered an alternative source of income.

The ability of the Bophuthatswana authorities to expropriate this land however was limited by the South African government. In the first instance, the authority was dependent on the South African government for the finance necessary to expropriate the landowners. Secondly, while expropriation would have secured the income of the rents for the Bophuthatswana authorities, it would also have placed the responsibility for upgrading water and sewerage services on the Bophuthatswana authority. The cost of this upgrading would in turn be passed on to the South African government on whom the Bophuthatswana authorities were financially dependent. Both measures thus ran counter to the objective of the South African government to project Bophuthatswana as an independent state. Although the interests of the South African government and those of the Bophuthatswana authorities were in opposition, it must be emphasised that the landowners still feared expropriation at the time of the intervention of the Architectural Branch.

### 3.5 ESTABLISHING THE LEGITIMACY OF BOPHUTHATSWANA INDEPENDENCE

A further unresolved tension within the Winterveld situation was that, while it was obvious that the Bophuthatswana government was dependent for its existence on the South African government, both governments needed to project the image that Bophuthatswana was an independent state. In relation to the Winterveld situation, this need was manifested in two ways. Firstly, there was the need to resolve whether and how the largely non-Tswana residents were to be integrated into the Bantustan's political and administrative system. Secondly, if the presence of employed non-Tswanas

in the Winterveld was to be accepted, there was the need to establish how the improvement of poor housing and servicing was to be financed given the overall financial dependence of the Bophuthatswana authorities on the South African government.

### 3.5.1 Political integration of the Winterveld into the Bantustan

We have noted earlier that the largely non-Tswana landowners had asserted their political independence from the Bantustan authority in the early days of the Winterveld Community Authority. Later, they had asked the South African government not to include the settlement in Bophuthatswana when it became 'independent' in 1977.<sup>(28)</sup> Their main reason for not wanting to be placed under the control of the Bophuthatswana authorities was that as non-Tswanas they would be discriminated against, particularly when applying for work permits, pensions and business rights. They considered that, while they remained under South African government administration, their children would obtain work permits more easily.<sup>(29)</sup> This was also the tenants' major objective for similar reasons. In addition, after independence, residents were being forced to take out Bophuthatswana citizenship which they considered to be second class<sup>(30)</sup> and which would place them outside of the mainstream of the South African political arena.

The South African government's primary objective was directly counterposed to that of the landowners and tenants. It was, in fact, to place the Winterveld community outside of the South African political arena. To this end, therefore, it was imperative that the administration of the community be handed over to the Bophuthatswana government. The fact that the community was not Tswana and did not fit into the ethnic framework of the Bantustan strategy was of secondary importance. The members of the community could not simply be relocated to the Bantustan of their own individual ethnic backgrounds: firstly, because the labour of its employed

members was needed in the Pretoria-Rand area, and secondly, because the South African government would have faced a very difficult task in relocating a few hundred thousand people. The clearest way forward for the South African government was to secure the incorporation of the community into the Bantustan's political and administrative framework. The land-owners' and tenants' pleas to be re-incorporated into South Africa would be studiously avoided throughout the period we shall be examining in subsequent chapters.

The Bophuthatswana authorities, while not wanting to include non-Tswanas in the Bantustan political framework, could not simply ignore these interests of the South African government. Consequently, they sought to incorporate the community into Bophuthatswana's political framework in such a way as to legitimise their rule.

The first move they made was an attempt to impose Tswana citizenship on the Winterveld community. However, the Bantustan's ability to impose Tswana citizenship through discrimination against non-Tswanas in the labour bureaux was limited; firstly, by the South African government's ability to sidestep this discrimination where it applied to non-Tswana workers legally employed. Secondly, the unemployed could sidestep the discrimination through taking up illegal work opportunities in Pretoria. A more effective means of forcing Tswana citizenship on Winterveld residents was to withhold pensions and business permits unless the applicant was a citizen. This measure, however, could only be applied to a small portion of the community. The attempt to incorporate the community into the Bantustan political structure through the imposition of Tswana citizenship thus remained a very vexed issue at the time of the intervention of the Architectural Branch.

The second measure adopted to incorporate the Winterveld into the Bantustan's political and administrative framework was the imposition of a tribal local authority on the community. We have noted that the Winterveld Community Authority had been taken over by the Bantustan authority in 1972. However, by the early 1980's it had only four active members<sup>(31)</sup> and effectively played little role in the community.<sup>(32)</sup> The chief limitation facing the Bantustan in its attempts to impose a local authority, was that of ethnic representation. With ethnic representation constituting the basis of its own claim to legitimacy, the Bophuthatswana authority could not easily claim unproblematically the right to administer a non-Tswana community through an appointed local authority. However, neither could it allow a truly representative body to constitute a local authority as this would inevitably have resulted in a direct conflict with its own interests.

The question of how a viable local authority was to be established was thus a further matter facing the Architectural Branch when it intervened in the situation. Of paramount importance was the requirement that, once established, the authority should be capable of controlling influx to the Winterveld.

### 3.5.2 Financial responsibility

The establishment of Bophuthatswana as a supposedly independent state had a direct bearing on how the cost of providing houses and services in the Winterveld was to be met. We have noted that the Bantustan was financially dependent on the South African government. The intention of the South African government was, however, to force the Bophuthatswana authorities to bear more of the cost of housing and services through encouraging the Bantustan to establish its own tax base. This was part and parcel of the overall strategy of projecting the Bantustans as 'independent states'.

The Bophuthatswana authorities needed to extend their tax base to include the possible sources of revenue represented by the Winterveld community. However, we have noted previously that the income of the tenant population was extremely low and that, consequently, the only substantial source of revenue was that which might be derived from the landowners and businessmen in the community. This would still have been inadequate for any large scale development and the Bophuthatswana authorities would clearly remain dependent on the South African government in this regard. In view of the South African government's intention to reduce its subsidisation of Bantustan government expenditure, various possibilities for cutting back on the level of these expenditures became extremely important.

One such possibility in the Winterveld situation was to restrict spending on the provision of services to that sector of the population which was legally employed in South Africa. This reinforced the need for the South African government and the Bantustan authority to impose some form of influx control, in order to reduce the responsibility for housing the unemployed. A second possibility was to abandon conventional housing provision in favour of the self-help system, whereby tenants would build or improve their own housing. Public expenditure would thus be restricted to the provision of basic services only. A third possibility was to encourage the landowners themselves to act as "developers". The responsibility for servicing each plot would then be borne by the landowner who would recoup his costs from the tenants. In this case public expenditure would be limited to the provision of main trunk services. The question of whether the South African government or the Bophuthatswana authorities should finance such expenditure remained a crucial issue as did the possibility and extent of any subsidisation of the costs involved.

The landowners who wanted to retain the right to derive income from renting their land would have favoured acting as developers in this sense rather than losing their land entirely through expropriation. We have noted, however, that there was a large number of rent defaulters amongst the tenant population.<sup>(33)</sup> The landowners would thus find it difficult to recoup the costs of providing additional services and, ultimately, it would fall to them to evict from the Winterveld those people who could not pay their rent because they had been unable to find or retain employment.

The final resolution of how development was to take place and be funded could not be resolved, however, until decisions had been made as to who would be allowed to stay in the Winterveld.

### 3.6 CONCLUSION

It becomes apparent that all the issues manifested in the Winterveld situation were interwoven in a complex manner and that the resolution of one issue would affect the parameters of other issues. It is, however, possible to identify a hierarchy within the matrix of issues related to the importance of the stakes involved in each issue. Thus, when it came to resolving the issues in the Winterveld development strategy, the issues with the highest stakes were dealt with first. The chronological resolution of the issues will be dealt with in Chapter 5. However, before we turn to this analysis, it is necessary to look at the agency which was introduced into the situation in an effort to secure its resolution. It will be argued that the various initiatives taken by this agency, the Architectural Branch of the NBRI, and the way in which its development strategy was arrived at, were related to its own interests. It is to the history, work and interests of the Architectural Branch that we now turn our attention.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 S.A.I.R.R. Survey: 1980. p 453.
- 2 Work in Progress. No.10. November 1979. p 54.
- 3 S.A.I.R.R Survey: 1981. p 294.
- 4 Perlman, J. The State and the Working Class in the Pretoria-Odi Area: Population Relocation, State Management and Class Restructuring. B.A. Honours Thesis. University of the Witwatersrand. 1982.
- 5 Work in Progress. No.10. November 1979. p 55.
- 6 The Star. 31 January 1980.
- 7 Work in Progress. No.10. November 1979. p 54.
- 8 The Star. 31 January 1980.
- 9 Winterveld Socio-Economic Survey. National Building Research Institute. Pretoria. 1983.
- 10 Perlman. op cit. p 92.
- 11 Ibid. p 90.
- 12 Ibid. p 67.
- 13 Ibid. p 79.
- 14 Ibid. p 64-65.
- 15 De Jager, H. Industrial Decentralisation and its Consequences for the Two Regions of Bophuthatswana. Unpublished B.A. Thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 1979. p 55; and Perlman, J. op cit. p 58.
- 16 Perlman. op cit. p 68-70.
- 17 Surplus Peoples Project. Forced Removals in South Africa. Vol 5. Cape Town. 1983. p 317.
- 18 Once the tenant had been evicted, the landowner would then re-let the house built by the tenant to someone else.
- 19 Surplus Peoples Project. op cit. p 317.
- 20 Work in Progress. No.10. November 1979. p 56
- 21 Ibid. p 54.
- 22 Matsetela. The Informal Sector in the Political-Economy of the Winterveld. Unpublished B.A. Honours Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. 1978-79.
- 23 Perlman. op cit. p 79.
- 24 Surplus Peoples Project. op cit. p 317.

- 25 Population Survey of the Winterveld. National Building Research Institute. Pretoria. 1982.
- 26 Work in Progress. No.10. p 56
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Letter to the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development from the Winterveld Property Owners; 28 November 1977.
- 29 Minutes of the Meeting of the Plotowners; 25 May 1980. Point No.11.
- 30 Meintjies, R. Home is a slum, but where else can we live? The Star. 31 January 1980.
- 31 Surplus Peoples Project. Op cit. p 319
- 32 Stated by Mr Finlayson of the Architectural Branch of the National Building Research Institute at a Seminar on the Winterveld; University of the Cape Town. April 1983.

CHAPTER 4 : THE ROLE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL BRANCH OF THE N.B.R.I.  
AND ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE WINTERVELD

4.1 INTRODUCTION

At the end of 1979, representatives of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I. became involved in formulating a development strategy for the Winterveld. Clearly, any development strategy which the Branch proposed would involve it in the conflict of interests outlined above. The way it attempted to resolve these issues would inevitably be affected by its relationships with the tenants, landowners, the Bophuthatswana authorities and the South African government.

It is our intention in this chapter to discuss the relationship of the Architectural Branch to the South African government and in particular its financial and administrative links with various state departments. Furthermore, we shall examine how the housing policy objectives of the government and the Architectural Branch were brought into alignment during the 1970's. We shall observe on a national level that the Branch's promotion of new directions in state housing and influx control involved it in developing techniques and formulating methods of implementing the new state policies.

Finally, we shall examine how the established close relationship between the Architectural Branch and certain state departments influenced the manner in which the former acted in the Winterveld situation. It will be argued that the Branch entered the situation not as an apparently independent arbitrator, but as a 'technical' consultant to the state. This meant that the Branch had both an explicit and implicit brief. The explicit brief as portrayed in initial statements to the press was to formulate a development strategy that would satisfy the tenants and land-

owners through a community participation process. The implicit brief was to devise the means of controlling influx to the Winterveld, while simultaneously incorporating the employed community into the Bophuthatswana homeland strategy. It will be argued that the terms of the Branch's implicit brief would not have been immediately evident to the community. Indeed, in conclusion, we shall raise the question as to whether the Architectural Branch was consciously or sub-consciously following its implicit brief.

## 4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE N.B.R.I. AND THE GOVERNMENT

### 4.2.1 The Role of the N.B.R.I. in the 1940's and 1950's

Our investigation of the relationship between the Architectural Branch and the state should begin with the establishment of the N.B.R.I. This is because the N.B.R.I.'s founding in 1946 was based on the need to establish a technical body to assist the state in dealing with the urban African housing crisis which had developed in the major urban centres at that time. <sup>(1)</sup> Wilkinson has documented the role of the Institute during this period in some detail <sup>(2)</sup> and here we shall merely outline it in summary form.

The migration of large numbers of Africans to the major urban centres during World War II, <sup>(3)</sup> coupled with slow rates of housing provision, led to the establishment of large squatter settlements around Johannesburg in 1944. <sup>(4)</sup> Concurrently, there was a rise in the militancy of the urban African population. They expressed their growing economic power in a series of strikes, notably the African mineworkers' strike of 1946. After the collapse of the Native Representative Council in 1946, the African National Congress adopted an increasingly militant stance. In the face of this political threat posed by urban Africans, the Nationalist Government

began to institute its programme of "total apartheid" when it came to power in 1948. Part of this strategy was to resolve the "urban Native question" by completing the rehousing of the urban African population in "properly planned townships"<sup>(5)</sup>. This allowed for the employed to be separated from the unemployed as the state could control who was settled in the new townships. In addition, it was implied that political control of the urban African population could be easier in the planned townships.

It was in the implementation of the "properly planned township" that the Institute played a major role. The Institute described its role as "dealing with human and national needs in building";<sup>(6)</sup> however, in effect, it was assigned the task of scientifically establishing a basis for the physical resolution of a political strategy. The initial part of this physical resolution was the adoption of a site and service scheme in order that African squatters be removed from the 'emergency camps' and spontaneously developed shanty towns or suburban 'freehold villages' in which they were living. The adoption of site and service meant that this was achieved as speedily as possible and at minimum cost to the state.<sup>(7)</sup> It was the primary task of the N.B.R.I. to investigate how the cost of housing provision, including layout and servicing, could be reduced in order to ensure that subsidisation of the process by the state was kept to a minimum.

The work was entrusted to eight sub-committees of the N.B.R.I. who investigated the planning and design of dwelling units. This resulted in the development of minimum accommodation standards, which were, in turn, incorporated in the design of the standard NE 51/6 and NE 51/9 plans, which were drawn up by the Architectural Branch.<sup>(8)</sup> A further aspect of the N.B.R.I.'s work was the reduction of the cost of housing through the development of 'optimal' township layouts. For example, higher

densities were proposed which saved on the cost of servicing and land. (9)  
In addition, the Institute began to develop "new patterns" of township layout "suitable to the conditions of South Africa's heteronomous population" (10) In reality, this involved the introduction of apartheid (11) into the townships in the form of ethnic grouping of residents.

In effect the Institute became a professional consultant to the state on technical matters related to housing. The construction techniques and planning methods it had developed were used to resolve a crisis which the state faced - namely, the establishment of "full control" of the urban African population. By 1956 the N.B.R.I. had fulfilled its function (12) in this respect and it was only in the late 1970's that it once again began to play a role in the implementation of the Nationalist government's apartheid policy.

#### 4.2.2 The N.B.R.I. in the 1970's

The reasons why the N.B.R.I. once again became directly involved in the implementation of apartheid policy in the 1970's were both financial and political. On the one hand, the N.B.R.I. was attempting to secure work contracts from state departments. On the other, it was offering the government new tools to deal once again with the control and housing of Africans both in the urban areas and in the Bantustans under changing historical circumstances. We shall now look at the financial dependence of the N.B.R.I. on the state in greater detail.

From its inception, the N.B.R.I. had been dependent upon the government for the major proportion of its income. In the 1946/47 financial year a parliamentary grant accounted for 93,5% of the Institute's income. (13) This parliamentary grant had dropped to 88% in 1957 with earnings from contract work and donations making up the outstanding 12 per cent. During the

period 1975 to 1979, the parliamentary grant had dropped to an average of 56,6% of annual income, while earnings from contracts and donations had risen to 43,4% of income.<sup>(14)</sup> Thus the drop in parliamentary grants was replaced with a more direct form of state sponsorship in that, after 1975, there was an increase in the number of contract investigations commissioned directly by state departments.<sup>(15)</sup> In particular, the Department of Co-operation and Development began to commission the Architectural Branch to undertake research projects for the Bantustans and Administration Boards. The Department of Community Development also commissioned large projects via the Housing Matters Advisory Council for the Housing Policy Council.<sup>(16)</sup>

The direct commissioning of the N.B.R.I. research by state departments was mutually beneficial in that the Institute could secure contracts and thus income, while the state could continue to draw on the new forms of professional expertise that the Architectural Branch offered. The Department of Co-operation and Development, in particular, was once again facing problems with respect to the control and housing of Africans - both in the urban areas and in the Bantustans. This will be discussed later.

In addition, the alignment of the N.B.R.I.'s research programme with government policy could be influenced through state departmental representation on the Building Research Advisory Committee (B.R.A.C.). The B.R.A.C. was established in the early days of the N.B.R.I. to guide the research of the Institute.<sup>(17)</sup> This committee has comprised representatives of professional and building interests, together with representatives of government departments involved with housing. The B.R.A.C. advised, among other aspects, on:

- " - the selection, priorities, initiation and execution of research done by the Institute;
- the application of research results;

- the dissemination of knowledge obtained by the N.B.R.I.;
- planning of the overall policy of the Institute. " (18)

Thus, not only did the state departments commission the work done by the Architectural Branch, but their representatives could also influence the overall direction of the research programme in which it was engaged.

It has not been possible to obtain records of the B.R.A.C. meetings and thus it is not possible to state to what extent, or to give examples of how, these channels are used. However, a senior research officer in the Architectural Branch stated in April 1983 at a seminar on the work of the Branch, that officials as senior as Cabinet Ministers had intervened in order to influence the direction of the uMasisakhe project in Graaf Reinet. In this instance, the Cabinet Ministers had assisted the Architectural Branch in overriding local resistance to an upgrading strategy. (19) While, in this instance, the Architectural Branch and the state departments happened to be in agreement, it does illustrate the influence which the state departments could bring to bear on projects. The same senior research officer also stated that on other occasions state officials had required him to justify decisions he had taken with respect to the Winterveld development strategy. The research officer was, however, not prepared to disclose further details of these meetings.

#### 4.2.3 Government and N.B.R.I. Objectives

Having established that there was a close relationship between the N.B.R.I. and the government, it is now necessary to investigate in greater detail what the objectives of the government were in the later 1970's. It will then be possible to trace the way in which the overall objectives of the N.B.R.I. came to be aligned with those of the government. Ultimately this will provide a foundation for investigating what the specific objectives of

the government and the Architectural Branch were in the Winterveld situation.

After 1968, the state switched its priorities from providing housing in the urban centres to housing provision in the rural areas. Housing for Africans in the cities was only provided where absolutely necessary and where housing could not be provided in a neighbouring homeland. In order to finance this housing provision in the rural areas and to subsidise the commuting of workers, finance was channeled from the townships via the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards to the homelands. The effect of the above policies was that, by 1976/1977, there was an urban housing backlog of 170 - 200,000 dwelling units, and a fiscal crisis had developed in the urban townships.<sup>(20)</sup>

Simultaneous to the development of these urban crises was a rise in African militancy. This began with strikes in Durban in 1973 and was most starkly manifest in the student uprisings of 1976. Of particular significance with respect to housing policy were the rent strikes and campaigns against rent increases in April and May 1977. With the state being the single landlord in the townships, it was strategic from both a political and a financial perspective for the state to withdraw from housing provision. In addition, the attacks on the beer halls and liquor outlets had severely interrupted the flow of money from the urban townships to rural housing provision.<sup>(21)</sup>

A further influence on government housing finance was the downturn in the economy in the late 1970's, which together with the worldwide trend towards the "re-capitalisation of capital"<sup>(22)</sup> dictated that the state cut back on housing provision in favour of investment on infrastructure which more directly supported accumulation.

The resultant trend in state policy was an attempt to shift the

responsibility from housing onto the private sector. This involved the emphasis on free market housing and self-provision through such measures as employee-assisted housing and self-help schemes. Simultaneously, an attempt was made to limit the demand on state provision for urban housing by reducing the number of Africans moving into the cities. This attempt was made via the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, whereby it was proposed that the state would restrict entry to the urban areas to only those Africans who had housing. By continuing to control the supply of serviced land for housing in the cities, the state could implement a new form of influx control.

In the rural areas the state pursued a similar policy of shifting the responsibility for housing onto employers and individuals. In 1978, the regulations with respect to the administration of towns in the Bantustans were changed to facilitate Building Society finance for those in higher income groups.<sup>(23)</sup> These changes were necessary in order to provide sufficient security of tenure for the intervention of the private sector. For similar reasons, 99-year leasehold was introduced to encourage employer assisted housing. Major emphasis was, however, placed on the individual for "accepting full financial responsibility"<sup>(24)</sup> for providing his own home.

Having examined the elements of the government's new policy, we shall now consider how the N.B.R.I. aligned itself with the objectives it incorporated. This will include a survey of the mechanisms which the Architectural Branch developed to facilitate the implementation of the government policy.

The N.B.R.I.'s support of state policy was developed in two complimentary ways. Firstly, the state was encouraged to withdraw from financing the provision of conventional housing units. Secondly, the Institute began to

formulate a strategy for upgrading existing informal or squatter settlements and detailed work on standards of site and service provision for new settlements.

The support of state withdrawal from housing was evident in the Institute's Annual Report of 1977, wherein it stated that:

" It is becoming increasingly evident that no government in the world today can afford to assume overall responsibility for the provision of fully serviced housing and associated facilities for all its peoples. Therefore, to meet the ever increasing level of demand, a diversified approach is necessary involving government at various levels, private enterprise, group and individual capital savings. " (25)

Following on from this motivation for state withdrawal and a diversified approach, the N.B.R.I. began to suggest that it could be instrumental in developing a variety of mechanisms for encouraging and directing the resources of the private sector with respect to housing. Thus, the Director of the Institute stated :

" Recent statements by those in authority have indicated the government's desire to persuade the private sector to assume a share of the responsibility for housing the homeless in South Africa. The N.B.R.I. is well placed to make a major contribution to this effort by virtue of the experience developed over many years of research in such fields as the provision and financing of housing, and the development of settlements. With the involvement of the private sector, much more flexibility in the approach to these problems can be expected, which could lead to better use of the Institute's vast store of knowledge and experience." (26)

A survey of the publications of the Architectural Branch reveals that they were influenced by the ideas propogated by John Turner, author of *Freedom to Build* and numerous other publications. In these publications he advocates greater community participation in order to encourage communities to provide their own housing with little state assistance. Thus one aspect of "the experience developed over many years of research" into the "development of settlements", was the adoption of a community participation approach. Various projects which were undertaken will now be reviewed through the prism of the particular aspects of the new approach to housing provision manifested in their formulation and implementation.

#### 4.2.3.1 Employer Assisted Housing

The possible role of employers in providing housing for their employees was "explored and demonstrated" in a core housing scheme at Ka-Nyamazane in the Eastern Transvaal. In 1977, the N.B.R.I. assisted a private company and the Eastern Transvaal Bantu Affairs Administration Board in planning the establishment of an area for 330 houses. A range of house types was presented to the employees, who could then "participate in decision-making" by placing the house of their choice on the plot. The houses were designed to be extended and homeownership was encouraged "to permit a viable form of security of tenure and so release individual and group savings ..... into home improvement with all its ramifications"<sup>(27)</sup>. The company created a revolving fund for use by the employees in home extensions, as it was claimed that this would not only promote "small scale entrepreneurial and self-help activity",<sup>(28)</sup> but would also relieve "the public sector of this responsibility".<sup>(29)</sup> By 1980, the project had largely been completed and follow-up surveys on tenant preferences were being carried out.<sup>(30)</sup>

The limited industrial base in the homelands meant that the possibility of extending this form of housing provision in the rural areas was limited. In addition, it was shown that on a broader level only workers in the higher income groups could afford employer-assisted housing which was provided on an economic basis. Clearly, the low incomes of workers in the border towns dictated that other measures be more widely employed in housing provision.

#### 4.2.3.2 Community Participation

Community participation was stressed in most projects undertaken by the N.B.R.I. after 1975.<sup>(31)</sup> However, the two most significant projects in this respect were at Ngangelizwe near Umtata and uMazisakhe near Graaf Reinet.

Ngangelizwe is an informal township on the outskirts of Umtata, which was perceived to be suitable for upgrading. In 1975, at the request of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development and the Umtata Municipality, the N.B.R.I. initiated a community participation process. (32)

This involved meeting with the community settlement council, ward representatives, community organisations and a sampling of school children and parents. The object of the participatory process was to assess the socio-political structure of the community and the problems which the community faced. This was with a view to deciding on physical development and changes in planning control legislation to allow for incremental upgrading. (33) Ultimately, this led to the development of techniques of decision-making using trade-offs in the allocation of the development budget. (34) The upgrading proposal which was ultimately adopted championed the cause of the fostering of "...local enterprise, self-reliance and self-initiative..." (35) alongside the use of appropriate technology.

In the uMasizakhe project in Graaf Reinet, begun in the late 1970's, the N.B.R.I. enlisted the participation of the local community councillors in deciding on whether the township should be upgraded or moved to a new site. The community councillors carried out a socio-economic survey which showed that there were "employment constraints" and consequently "the extremely low income structure of the residents influenced the N.B.R.I. to recommend that it (the township) be retained and upgraded". (36) The proposals for upgrading were submitted to the Department of Co-operation and Development and the project was launched as "the first officially approved upgrading scheme in South Africa". (37) This included the building of two new schools, high mast lighting and the upgrading of services. (38)

These two community participation projects were forerunners to the involvement of the N.B.R.I. in the Winterveld. It should be noted that the Institute was gaining experience in enlisting the help of community

representatives. A further aspect of the projects was that they involved socio-economic surveys of the community. It may be argued that these allowed the state to ascertain who the occupants of the settlements were and what intervention, if any, was required to control influx or improve housing. In addition, the survey would also inform the state as to the level of government expenditure which the community could support on an economic, ie. unsubsidised, basis.

#### 4.2.3.3 Reduction of Housing Standards

The N.B.R.I. also undertook extensive research at a more general level into the possible reduction of both the standards of engineering services for residential sites and the standards of low-cost houses themselves.

##### Reduced standards of servicing

An extensive study by the N.B.R.I. in 1980 on the rationalisation of engineering services for residential sites included setting up five working groups to investigate how the cost of the major services in townships could be reduced. The study covered sanitation services, water reticulation, roads and side-walks and stormwater. When the results of the study : "Rational Norms for Township Services", were finally published, they also included guidelines on township planning in general. In its 1981 Annual Report, the N.B.R.I. suggested that the recommended standards be adopted by the state and strictly applied.

##### Reduced standards of dwellings

The most direct way of cutting back on government expenditure on the dwellings themselves was to propose self-help and 'core' housing. The N.B.R.I. initiated research into this aspect of the new approach in three

projects in different Bantustans.

In 1979, at Siyabuswa in the KwaNdebele Bantustan, the N.B.R.I. were asked by the Highveld Administration Board to plan an area of 366 sites for core housing.<sup>(39)</sup> The project was described as an experiment and involved the investigation of various forms of appropriate technology, such as rainwater storage, solar heating and the manufacture of building materials. The house cores were built on sites held in freehold by the residents. A technical aid centre supplied credit and expertise to the residents when they wanted to extend their core units.<sup>(40)</sup>

A similar project was undertaken by the Institute in the early 1980's at Kabokweni in Kangwane, where the Eastern Transvaal Administration Board sponsored a core housing experiment of nine houses.<sup>(41)</sup> Through the use of a sand/cement mixture cast in a walling formwork, employing unskilled labour and some standardisation, the Institute was able to reduce the cost of construction to half that of a conventional NE 51/9 house.<sup>(42)</sup>

In an apparent effort to convince all the Bantustans and Administration Boards of the advantages of core housing, the Institute constructed 98 core houses in another scheme at Ntuzuma in KwaZulu for the Port Natal Development Board.<sup>(43)</sup> Here again the Institute was involved in the planning, design, administration and finance. The more interesting aspect of the project, however, was that the Institute's work included a socio-economic survey, a focus on community participation and the selection of participants.

#### 4.2.3.4 Appropriate Technology

An important part of each project was the propagation of appropriate technology. We have seen that in some cases this facilitated the use of cheaper, unskilled labour, whereas in other instances it avoided the

necessity of installing expensive services such as sewers where septic tanks were used. The promotion of local self-help techniques of building material and dwelling production was a logical strategy if it is born in mind that, with state withdrawal from housing finance, the formal construction industry could not intervene in this area of low profitability.

This brief account illustrated the strategies and techniques which the Architectural Branch was developing to assist the government in its new approach to urban and Bantustan housing policy. In the urban areas, the government could adopt self-help housing schemes which would allow it to withdraw from conventional housing production, while at the same time it retained political control in terms of regulating the access of Africans to accommodation in these areas. In the Bantustans, the government could withdraw from its role in financing the provision of conventional housing, leaving the apparently independent Bantustan authorities to cope with housing needs through such mechanisms as self-help and appropriate technology. Having examined how the N.B.R.I.'s research programme was aligned to the new policy, it is now necessary to see how this affected the Winterveld situation.

#### 4.3 THE ARCHITECTURAL BRANCH'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WINTERVELD

The earliest record of the Architectural Branch's involvement in the Winterveld was in the annual report of 1978, where it was recorded that the Branch had made tentative proposals to the Department of Co-operation and Development with respect to an upgrading scheme. As we have noted already the Branch was working on numerous projects commissioned by this Department. The relationship was of mutual benefit as the Department of Co-operation and Development was engaged in the later 1970's in a conflict with the Department of Community Development over the acceptance of self-help housing as state housing policy. The Department of Community Development, who controlled all housing finance via the National Housing Commission, opposed the adoption of self-help as it argued that it would lead to the creation of slums. The Architectural Branch on the other hand, actively supported the Department of Co-operation and Development by propogating and demonstrating the positive aspects of self-help housing. The advantage for the Architectural Branch was that it gained commissions for research projects from the Department of Co-operation and Development. As we have noted already, the Architectural Branch was increasingly financially dependent upon direct commissions from state departments.

In the Winterveld situation the Branch was once again offering its technical expertise in self-help housing and, more specifically, its experience in community participation. It had proved in the projects at Ngangelizwe near Umtata and uMasizakhe near Graaf Reinet that it could enlist the cooperation of communities. In general this was a commodity which was desirable to the Department of Co-operation and Development as it was facing problems of control with respect to squatter settlements around border towns in the Bantustans. In the Winterveld situation it offered the possibility of gaining the cooperation of the community who had previously resisted the state's attempts at controls, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.

The 1978 Annual Report of the Branch states that it was proposing "that the potential for Black private enterprise should be encouraged in upgrading and developing"<sup>(44)</sup> the Winterveld. This would include "short and long term upgrading of the district and its adjoining areas, the involvement of the public and private sectors, particularly Black private entrepreneurial initiative, skill, capital and manpower"<sup>(41)</sup>. Thus, the Branch was proposing a broad development strategy which was relatively undefined but which offered the possibility of improving living conditions while simultaneously minimizing state expenditure.

Smit and Booyesen have pointed out that the Bantustans lacked comprehensive urbanisation policies.<sup>(46)</sup> The possibility existed for the Branch to expand its work from the more narrow confines of housing to planning and policy proposals for the Bantustans. Such policies would inevitably lead it into dealing with the control of squatting on the borders of Bantustan towns, of which the Winterveld was a prime example.

The National Building Research Institute presented itself as technical experts to the state. The question which should be asked is whether the Branch consciously perceived that it was being used to implement housing policy which served the interests of apartheid ideology, or whether it believed it was neutral in the situation.

In attempting to deal with this question, it should be recognised that it is difficult to give a definite answer. It does appear that the Institute was aware that it was undergoing, as the 1978 Annual Report states: "a shift from largely technological to techno-socio-economic considerations"<sup>(47)</sup> and that this was "particularly true of architectural research". The Institute stated that this was due to the "national South African problem of ethnological development" which was part of a broader problem of

"population growth and rapid urbanisation". The N.B.R.I. Director's Review went on to state that:

" It becomes increasingly evident, therefore, that technological or scientific building research cannot be divorced from human, ecological, environmental, ideological and economic development". (48)

While the above statements do illustrate a perception of the integration of scientific research and "ideological and economic development", they do not demonstrate conclusively that the Architectural Branch was aware of the extent to which its research and implementation were aligned to the specific ideology of apartheid housing policy. The Winterveld project was classed as a "techno-socio-economic" research project, but there was never any acknowledgement in the Institute reports that it would be dealing with a highly complex set of conflicts of interests, as outlined in Chapter 3. This was possibly due to the Institute's desire to project itself as an independent technical adviser with no ideological preconceptions nor vested interests in the Winterveld situation.

The appearance of neutrality would have been important in order to gain the co-operation of the landowners and tenants in the Winterveld. The close relationship of the Architectural Branch to the government would not have been immediately apparent to the Winterveld community. More specifically, knowledge of the role which the Branch had played in the 1940's and 1950's and its financial dependence on the South African state would not have been readily accessible or evident to the community.

The close relationship between the Architectural Branch and the South African state and, in particular, its financial dependence on the South African government departments, allows us to suggest that the Architectural Branch would align itself with the South African government's interests in the Winterveld situation. We can thus postulate that, within the conflict of interests outlined in Chapter 3, the Branch would have as a primary goal

the settling of the employed residents of the Winterveld who were necessary to industry in the Pretoria-Rand area. Secondly, it would be involved in instituting some form of residential control in order to limit the influx of the unemployed people into the area. A third requirement would be to situate the upgrading strategy clearly within the ideological framework of Bantustan "independence". This meant that the community would need to be placed under the rule and control of the Bophuthatswana government. Simultaneously, this required that South African government interference be kept to a minimum in order to project Bophuthatswana as an independent entity.

Finally, it would involve reducing the South African state's financial obligations to house the community. As argued above, the state, for fiscal and political reasons, was withdrawing from the provision of conventional housing. In addition, the South African government needed to reduce the financial dependence of the Bantustans in order to legitimise their independence. This dictated that proposals put forward by the Architectural Branch would have to rely on the private financial resources of the landlords and tenants with possibly some input from employee-assisted housing. Ultimately, because the community of the region was so poor and the economy of the area undeveloped, any proposals would need to be low key and inexpensive.

It can be suggested that the Architectural Branch had other interests besides those directly associated with the South African government. Possibly the most important of these was the need to demonstrate its skills with easily identifiable results stemming from its involvement in the Winterveld situation. Its previous projects had always aimed at improved housing and facilities. The most publicised projects of the Branch were those where the project had been completed with a reasonable degree of success. This success was projected in newly completed houses, reductions

in cost and/or claims of the project's acceptability to the community because of the community participation processes adopted. In the Winter-veld situation this interest at arriving at a final product would be counter-balanced primarily by the South African government's interests of establishing influx and political control, but also by the complex set of interests of the other parties outlined in Chapter 3.

If the Architectural Branch were to succeed in a community participation process, they would need to offer the community benefits which would stem from participation in such a process. For the tenants such benefits would need to include easier access to work permits, improved security of tenure and improved levels of servicing, such as clean water. The landowners would cooperate with the Architectural Branch if they in turn could retain the right to their land and the wealth generated from it. Neither the tenants nor the landowners would favour the imposition of influx control for reasons set out in Chapter 3. Thus we can postulate that the Architectural Branch would need to maintain a delicate balance between meeting its own interests and those of the various actors - while simultaneously maintaining each one's co-operation. If the co-operation of the parties was lost, the participatory process would fail.

## FOOTNOTES

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- 2 Wilkinson, P. A Place to Live : The Resolution of the African Housing Crisis in Johannesburg, 1944-1954. Paper presented to the African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1981.
- 3 Housing production for urban Africans by local authorities was slow because local authorities were reluctant to take out loans for African housing. In addition, a shortage of building materials due to the effects of World War II brought housing production to a standstill.
- 4 Wilkinson, P. op. cit. p 1.
- 5 Ibid. p 30-31.
- 6 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Annual Report 1946/47. Pretoria. p 6.
- 7 Morris notes that to have met the backlog in 1955 using conventional housing would have taken seven years. Morris, P. A History of Black Housing in South Africa. South Africa Foundation, 1981.
- 8 Wilkinson, P. op. cit. p 34.
- 9 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Annual Report 1948/49. P 29.
- 10 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Annual Report 1947/48. p 27
- 11 This was a definite attempt to re-tribalise the urban African and so promote tribal discipline.  
See Morris, P. op. cit. p 50.
- 12 Wilkinson, P. op.cit. p 37.
- 13 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Annual Report 1946/47. p 16
- 14 Crichton, C. Five years to 1984 : Review of N.B.R.I. activities 1974-1979 and their relevance to future trends. Planning and Building Development, March/April 1979. p 38.
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- 29 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1977. p 8.
- 30 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1980. p 4.
- 31 Crichton, C. op.cit. p 59-83.
- 32 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1976. p 12.
- 33 N.B.R.I. Housing Research Review Newsletter, No.4. 1984
- 34 Jammie, E. op.cit. p 13.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1981. p 6.
- 38 N.B.R.I. Housing Research Review Newsletter, No.4. 1984
- 39 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1979. p 3.
- 40 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1980. p 10.
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- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Smit, P and Booysen, J.S. Swart Verstedeliking Proses Patroon en Strategie. Tafelberg Press. Cape Town, 1981.  
See concluding Chapter V.
- 47 N.B.R.I. Annual Report 1978. p 1.
- 48 Ibid. p 2.

CHAPTER 5 : THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PROCESS WITH RESPECT TO THE  
RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE WINTERVELD.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

A concrete strategy to deal with the issues at stake in the Winterveld situation began to unfold late in 1979 with the announcement of the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Management Committee (I.G.M.C.)<sup>(1)</sup> which was to investigate the question of upgrading the existing settlement. An additional facet of the announcement was that all the people in the Winterveld<sup>(2)</sup> were to be involved in the project.

In this chapter, the various phases of the participation process will be set out and analysed. In particular, attention will be paid to how each phase served the interests of the actors involved in the situation. This will lead to an investigation of the role which the Architectural Branch played in the resolution of the Winterveld situation.

The period of negotiation which will be examined lasted from January 1980 to December 1981. During this period, many issues were tackled by the I.G.M.C. and its subordinate Working Committee. At various points, decisions were reached and resolutions proposed. However, it was only at the end of 1981 that a comprehensive strategy for upgrading the settlement was compiled. This was presented in the form of an Inter-Governmental Report to the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities. In concluding this chapter, a brief chronology of events subsequent to the formulation of the I.G.M.C. Report will be presented.

## 5.2 INITIATING THE PARTICIPATION PROCESS

The I.G.M.C. initially consisted of twelve representatives of South African state departments and fourteen representatives of departments controlled by the Bophuthatswana authorities. In addition, the local magistrate and representatives of the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I. were drawn onto the committee. The majority of the work of the I.G.M.C. was assigned to a Working Committee. This Working Committee was chaired by Mr Finlayson of the Architectural Branch and initially consisted of three representatives from South African government departments, seven from the departments controlled by the Bophuthatswana authorities, the local magistrate and various technical experts who were co-opted onto the committee from time to time. This Working Committee submitted regular progress reports to the Inter-Government Management Committee.

The formation of the I.G.M.C. represented a shift away from the ad hoc method of dealing with the Winterveld situation. During the period immediately prior to the establishment of the I.G.M.C., there had been mounting tension in the Winterveld. The Bophuthatswana authorities, in their efforts to force non-Tswanas out of the area, were prosecuting plot-owners for accommodating tenants. This threatened the continued residence of non-Tswanas in the Winterveld which, in turn, threatened to disrupt the supply of labour necessary to the Pretoria-Rand area. Thus a point had been reached where the problem was perceived as sufficiently serious for the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities to attempt to formulate a comprehensive strategy for the Winterveld. Repressive tactics had not resolved the issues at stake, and a new approach was required if the complex conflict of interests they embodied was to be resolved.

In this situation, the Architectural Branch had already formulated certain proposals for the development of the Winterveld. These were encapsulated in the 1978 Annual Report of the N.B.R.I. and were discussed in Chapter 4.<sup>(3)</sup> This proposal had entailed the upgrading of the Winterveld and surrounding areas through the use of "black private entrepreneurial initiative".<sup>(4)</sup> It may be argued that the selection of a representative of the Architectural Branch as head of the Working Committee by the South African government was thus logical for a number of reasons. These reasons will be recalled briefly.

Firstly, the Branch was proposing to develop a comprehensive strategy for the whole Odi district. This would reduce the possibility of tenants moving from place to place in order to escape official sanctions. Secondly, the Branch was suggesting that the settlement be retained and upgraded and this would allow the supply of labour necessary to the Pretoria-Rand area to continue with relatively little hindrance. Thirdly, the stabilisation and upgrading of housing would take place at least cost to the Bophuthatswana authorities and, consequently, to the South African government on whom they were financially dependent. The reduction of state expenditure would be achieved through the encouragement of "black private entrepreneurial" provision of housing. Finally, while not being explicitly recognised, the implementation of a comprehensive development strategy clearly held out the possibility that further influx to the area could be curtailed.

The Bophuthatswana authorities would not have favoured the Branch's proposals, as they had consistently opposed the settlement of large numbers of non-Tswanas in the Winterveld. Their opposition, however, was constrained by the dominant interest of the South African government in maintaining necessary labour supplies to the Pretoria-Rand area. In addition all previous tactics of direct repression adopted by the Bophutha-

tswana authorities had failed to remove the non-Tswana residents of the settlement. In the face of their failure to realise this objective and in acceptance of the subordination of their interests to those of the South African government, the Bophuthatswana authorities also came to favour a comprehensive development strategy for the Winterveld. It can be argued that they recognised that the encouragement of private sector housing provision would both reduce immediate demands on their limited financial resources and, eventually, establish a potentially substantial source of revenue. Thus, having laid the basis for the formulation of the I.G.M.C. and the inclusion of the Architectural Branch, we shall now look at the brief which was laid out for the Architectural Branch.

A memo to President Mangope, dated 13 February 1980, stated that the Inter-Governmental Management Committee would have the following terms of reference :

- " 1 To determine the scope of the project.
- 2 To upgrade the existing Winterveld / Klippan area
- 3 To initiate the necessary investigations, and investigation procedures.
- 4 To involve all the people in the Winterveld project. "(5)

We have already noted that the Architectural Branch had made proposals which fitted in with, and perhaps influenced, the formulation of the above brief.

The memo did not reflect the underlying set of interests which was outlined earlier and which implicitly laid out a far more extensive and fundamental brief for the Architectural Branch. It should be noted, however, that the inclusion of "all the people in the Winterveld" in the participation strategy was explicitly stated. However, there was no mention of tenant representation in the memo, mention only being made to the plot-owners. At the first meeting of the I.G.M.C., it became apparent that the inclusion of the tenants in the negotiation process was not automatically assumed by all the members of the I.G.M.C. (6). The reasons why the tenant community

was later included will be discussed below.

The first issue dealt with by the I.G.M.C. was the question of how the Winterveld community was to be represented in its deliberations in order to promote effective community participation.<sup>(7)</sup> The recommendation of the Working Committee was that a Winterveld Plot Owners Committee (W.P.O.C.) and a Winterveld Tenants Committee (W.T.C.) should be established and represented on the I.G.M.C., together with representatives of the Winterveld Community Authority (W.C.A.). It was agreed that three representatives of each body should sit on the I.G.M.C., while each body should be represented on the Working Committee by one member.<sup>(8)</sup>

The incorporation of the idea of "black private entrepreneurial" initiative necessitated the formulation of a strategy which explicitly involved a process of "community participation". This proved problematic at the outset of the negotiation process. The establishment of a plot-owners committee to assist in upgrading the Winterveld met with an immediate reaction from some of the plot-owners, who perceived the strategy as implying a threat to their continued land ownership. They claimed that the subdivision of their land in such a development would be an infringement of their property rights. They suggested to the representatives of the South African state departments and the departments controlled by the Bophuthatswana authorities, that the tenants be resettled on neighbouring tribal trust farms. The plot-owners claimed that this had been negotiated with the Bophuthatswana authorities on 29 July 1976.<sup>(9)</sup>

The plot-owners' mistrust of the Bophuthatswana government's motives was based on public threats by President Mangope to expropriate their land. He had accused the plot-owners of "robbing the squatters of thousands of rands" while "they did not care about (their) welfare"<sup>(10)</sup> It is clearly

possible that these threats originated from the Bophuthatswana authorities' intention of gaining access to the revenue and local political power which the renting of land brought to the non-Tswana plot-owners. Faced with expropriation of their land for subdivision and urban settlement, some of the plot-owners felt that it would be in their interests to retain the land for agricultural purposes and thus asked for the tenants to be resettled elsewhere. (11)

The Architectural Branch had already noted that it wanted to encourage black private entrepreneurial initiative. Mr Finlayson, who directed the Branch's involvement in the Winterveld situation, stated that the protection of private ownership was one of the main aims of the Branch. (12)

It may well have been the Branch's opposition to the expropriation proposal which persuaded the plot-owners to enter the I.G.M.C.'s negotiation process.

The tenants were not immediately assumed to have any formal role to play in this process. It appears that their eventual inclusion may have resulted from the tension which had developed between the plot-owners and the Bophuthatswana authorities. At one of the first meetings of the I.G.M.C., a representative of the latter body stated that:

" The plot-owners are not to be represented until the tenants are represented. The plot-owners must not think they alone represent the Winterveld community." (13)

This concern for the tenants right of representation was in sharp contrast to an earlier statement by the Bophuthatswana Minister of Internal Affairs who described the tenants as "superfluous and undesirable" (14) Undoubtedly, therefore, the Bophuthatswana government's interest in their welfare and their inclusion in the participation process can be construed as a ploy to weaken the effect of the plot-owners' representation.

For the purposes of electing representatives to the W.P.O.C. and the W.T.C., the Winterveld was divided into three geographical regions, namely: Klippan, Five Morgen Zone, and Ten Morgen Zone. The plot-owners in each area elected six representatives and the combined body of eighteen members constituted the Winterveld Plot Owners' Committee (W.P.O.C.). Similarly, the tenants elected six representatives from each area to constitute the eighteen member Winterveld Tenants' Committee (W.T.C.). Once the two committees had been elected, they in turn elected representatives from amongst themselves to sit on the I.G.M.C. and the Working Committee. The various election procedures had been completed by March 1980. (15)

The division of the community's representation along the lines of tenant and plot-owner represented a weakness in their ability to bargain collectively when their interests did coincide. In assessing the situation in the early 1980's, the Surplus Peoples Project suggested that "the seeds of a tenant - landlord conflict do exist and could be exploited by the Bophuthatswana authorities." (16) In fact, there was considerable tension between the tenants and the plot-owners, as reflected in a statement made by a tenant in January 1980 :

" We pay ... rent, but the landlords give us nothing. If I asked for improvements, we would have to pack there and then. The land-owner knows somebody else who will fill our place." (17)

The differing treatment accorded the plot-owners and tenants by the South African and Bophuthatswana authorities respectively tended to exacerbate the division between them. The South African government gave the plot-owners preferential treatment when issuing work permits to their families. The Bophuthatswana authorities, on the other hand, imposed larger fines on plot-owners than on tenants when they were convicted of illegal trading. (18) Throughout the negotiation process, the division between the plot-owners and tenants continued to deepen. Later we shall see how this occurred and how this led to the plot-owners being used to control the

further influx of tenants.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss why the plot-owners were represented both on the Plotowners Committee and on the Winterveld Community Authority. This was because the W.C.A. was no longer representative of the non-Tswana plot-owners<sup>(19)</sup> and had very few active members. It would not have been possible to exclude the W.C.A. from the negotiation process however, as it remained part of the Bophuthatswana authorities' structure despite its general ineffectiveness.

At this point, we have identified the reasons underlying the adoption of a strategy dependent on community participation. We turn now to analyse the phases through which the participation process evolved.

### 5.3 LABOUR RATIONALISATION : JANUARY 1980

Concurrent with the establishment of the I.G.M.C. and initiation of the community participation strategy, an announcement was made by the South African government with respect to labour control in the Winterveld. The announcement, made on 01 February 1980, was that all those non-Tswanas who lived in the Winterveld and who had legally worked in 'white' South Africa before 01 January 1980 would be allowed to continue to do so, despite their not having Tswana citizenship.<sup>(20)</sup> The announcement formalised as official policy the existing practice of issuing temporary work permits by the South African labour bureaux to non-citizens who had employment records at labour bureaux in 'white' South African.<sup>(21)</sup>

It may be argued that this announcement conferred real benefits on both the tenants and plot-owners which, in turn, encouraged them to participate in the formulation of the upgrading strategy. The announcement represented a realisation of the South African government's intention to maintain and stabilise the supply of labour to the Pretoria-Rand area. The advantage to the legally employed members of the non-Tswana community was that the value of their labour had been recognised and the South African government was prepared to underwrite some stabilisation of their situation. The announcement did, however, include a deadline : all those who arrived after the 01 January 1980 and the unemployed who had no work records would not be given work permits. The conclusion to be drawn is that the South African government was not interested in stabilising the position of those who had not yet demonstrated officially that their labour power was required by the economy of the Pretoria-Rand area.

As discussed previously, the stabilisation of the employed non-citizens was not in the interests of the Bophuthatswana authorities. However, their capacity to resist this decision was limited because, within the broader South African social formation, the Bophuthatswana government remained financially and politically subordinate to the South African government. The decision by the South African government represented an indirect interference in Bophuthatswana affairs which ran counter to its interests in projecting Bophuthatswana as an independent entity. It may be argued, however, that the stakes were sufficiently high for the South African government to prejudice the notion of Bophuthatswana's independence rather than to allow the interruption of a significant component of the labour supply to interfere with production in the Pretoria-Rand area.

The stabilisation of the employed non-Tswana residents would have been advantageous to the Bophuthatswana authorities if the residents took out Tswana citizenship. Under these circumstances, the taxes which the workers paid in South Africa would then be paid into the Bophuthatswana state coffers. However, the issue of citizenship had yet to be resolved. A further unresolved issue was how those who were not given work permits were to be removed and further influx to the Winterveld area prevented.

#### 5.4 THE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

At the first meeting of the I.G.M.C. in February 1980, it was decided that research was required in two major areas. As a consequence, demographic, socio-economic and other surveys of the community were initiated and an investigation was commissioned to ascertain what form of local authority could be suitable to administer the Winterveld. (22)

#### 5.4.1 Surveys of the Community

Four surveys of the community were initiated which were based on questionnaires compiled by the Architectural Branch. These included :

- \* A survey of the plot-owners
- \* A socio-economic survey of tenants
- \* A survey of the informal sector
- \* A survey of the housing stock.

The surveys were carried out by the Bureau of Market Research of the University of South Africa, and were paid for by the Department of Co-operation of Development and by the Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa. <sup>(23)</sup>

The full results of the various surveys were only compiled between June 1981 and March 1983, and were treated as strictly confidential. However, it appears that portions of the data collected became available to the Working Committee from October 1980 onwards, in the form of interim reports. <sup>(24)</sup> It should be recognised at this stage that undertaking and processing the surveys constituted a major portion of the work of the Working Committee and, more specifically, of the Architectural Branch which acted in effect as its directorate.

The purpose of the surveys was ostensibly to gain information of a demographic nature which would then be used to determine the form which development of the settlement should take. <sup>(25)</sup>

The press announced that the surveys were "aimed at pinpointing areas most urgently in need of attention". <sup>(26)</sup>

Mr Finlayson, Senior Research Official in the Architectural Branch and Chairman of the Working Committee, when referring to the survey of the plot-owners, claimed that :

" The purpose of the this questionnaire is to collect factual information relating to the use to which the plots in the Winterveld are being put. No questions relating to the attitude or preference of the plot-owners involved will therefore be included in this questionnaire. " <sup>(27)</sup>

Again, referring to this survey and the socio-economic survey, Mr Finlayson told the I.G.M.C. :

" ... the type of questions asked will not demand that the people should take a decision on any issue. They are just going to be asked to give facts." (28)

Two aspects of this should be noted. Firstly, the Architectural Branch did not intend to canvass the opinion of the plot-owners or tenants. Thus, while their co-operation was required to complete the surveys, their perceived needs and preferences were not to be taken into account. Secondly, the surveys were being used to gather information which would ultimately be used to further particular interests - most notably, the interests of the South African government. This becomes clear when it is realised that the results of the surveys were treated as highly confidential and were interpreted, as we shall see later, by the Architectural Branch in such a way as to support the intentions of the South African government. Moreover, the survey results were not made available to the representatives of the plot-owners nor the tenants for their consideration and comment.

There was resistance to the carrying out of the survey by both plot-owners and tenants. Previous surveys had been undertaken by the Bophuthatswana authorities on the pretext of helping the community, but the result had been increased taxation with no accompanying benefits. (29) Suspicion of the motives underlying the plot-owners survey led to resistance from the plot-owners, particularly in the most densely populated portion of the Winterveld, Klippan. (30) The reasons given by the Architectural Branch as to why plot-owners had refused to answer questions was the "... continuing uncertainty with regard to the future of the non-Tswana residents of the Winterveld". (31) Other reasons given for non-cooperation were that some plot-owners wanted to deal directly with the authorities while others wanted clarification of the purpose behind the survey.

In order to overcome this resistance, members of the Plotowners' Committee were used to distribute the questionnaires and hence provide some legitimacy for the surveys. In addition, the names of the people who represented the plot-owners on the I.G.M.C. were attached to the questionnaires. Eventually, of the 315 questionnaires circulated in the survey of plot-owners, only 225 were completed. This represented 13,6% of the total number of plot-owners. (33)

The reluctance of some plot-owners to respond to the survey appeared to highlight the division between those plot-owners willing to co-operate with the I.G.M.C. and those whose primary concern was to protect the right to own their land. The reference to the Klippan land owners as being the most resistant (34) suggests that those with the highest number of tenants, and thus the highest income, perceived their interests as being threatened by the upgrading strategy. There is not sufficient empirical evidence to draw any further major conclusions from this division. The divisions may, however, account for the different development options offered to the plot-owners in the final proposals as set out in the Inter-Governmental Report. This will be discussed later.

The survey of the tenants was incorporated in a socio-economic survey which covered 1078 households. The majority of the households surveyed, 900 in total, were in the Klippan area. There does not appear to have been much resistance to the survey, with the Bureau of Market Research who ran the survey claiming a 1% refusal rate. (35)

The interpretation of the survey results gave the clearest indication of the way in which the Architectural Branch used the notion of community participation to advance the interests of the South African government. The statistic most emphasised by the Branch was the high percentage of

Winterveld residents who worked in the Pretoria-Rand region.<sup>(36)</sup> It was stated that 75% of the tenant families had at least one member of the family employed in the Pretoria-Rand area.<sup>(37)</sup> This confirmed the importance of the labour supplied by the community and reinforced the South African government's argument that its legally employed members should be allowed to settle in the Winterveld.

It should be noted that this statistic was based on a rather dubious estimate of the total population of the Winterveld as comprising 105 000 people.<sup>(38)</sup> Previously, when emphasising the magnitude of the problem which the community posed to the state, the figure given for the total population had been much higher. In a publication by the Architectural Branch, which proposed the construction of medical clinics in the area, the population was estimated at 500 000 to 750 000.<sup>(39)</sup> In the press release about the future of the Winterveld which was made in September 1980, the population was said to be between 750 000 and one million people.<sup>(40)</sup> Later, when dealing with the cholera outbreak, the Bophuthatswana Department of Health stated at a Working Committee meeting that the population was between 200 000 and 300 000 people.<sup>(41)</sup> Non-government sources consistently estimated the figures to be much higher than 105 000. The Surplus Peoples Project stated that the total population was in the region of 600 000 and commented that official figures tended to ignore a large portion of the non-Tswana residents.<sup>(42)</sup> Five other sources gave total population estimates of between 250 000 and 750 000 people.<sup>(43)</sup>

There are three possible reasons for the large discrepancy between the actual population and the figure given by the Architectural Branch. Firstly, there was resistance by the plot-owners to the carrying out of the survey. Secondly, those tenants who had previously been classified as illegal residents and who thus faced prosecution if discovered by the

Bophuthatswana authorities, would not have disclosed their presence. Thus it is likely that only legally employed non-Tswana residents would have registered their presence. This would account for the high proportion of families with one employed member recorded in the survey. Thirdly, it was in the interests of the Architectural Branch to emphasise only that sector of the community in which its client, the South African government, was interested - namely, people legally employed in "white" South Africa. The low figure would also serve the financial interests of both the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities as it would reduce the scope of their commitment to the provision of housing, education, etc. The Architectural Branch itself also benefitted in that a relatively low figure would limit the size of the upgrading project and therefore make it both more manageable and viable.

A further example of selective, if not actually biased, interpretation of the survey results was manifested in the way the Branch rationalised the decision to upgrade the Winterveld. It was clearly in the interests of its client, the South African government, to have the employed members of the population remain in the Bantustan rather than have them move to townships in "white" South Africa, where their political demands would be more directly addressed to the South African state. The Branch's own interest in propagating an upgrading strategy was that this would enable it to demonstrate its usefulness in developing techniques and methods to facilitate the state's new approach to housing provision: namely, self-help strategies, appropriate technology, and reduced standard of servicing.

The specific way in which the Branch rationalised the decision to upgrade the settlement was based on its analysis of the replies which residents had given to the question of why they had moved to the Winterveld. These are tabulated below :

Table 5:1

REASON FOR MOVING	PERCENTAGE	
* Access to employment	40.3	
* Due to government reasons	14.9	
* Family reasons	13.9	
* No other accommodation	3.1	
* Hoping to move to a formal township	1.0	
* Other :		
- Availability of sites for self-help		
- Low cost of living		
- Possibility of agriculture		
- Presence of schools		
- Availability of water	26.8 %	(44)

The survey of the historical development of the Winterveld in Chapter 2 indicated that people moved to the area as a result of the under-development of the rural areas and more directly because they had been relocated or expelled from "white" farms and cities. Rather than recognise the degree to which people had been forced to move to the area, the Architectural Branch interpreted the statistics obtained through the surveys in a positive light, as the following extract from its Survey Report reveals:

" Commenting on these findings, it is notable that 82% of those who had moved into the area appeared to do so by desire rather than compulsion, and as such this is perhaps representative of the fact that the Winterveld is perceived as being a place of hope rather than a place of despair. " (45)

This interpretation obviously ignores the fact that it was the influx control laws which were preventing the tenants moving even closer to the work opportunities provided by the economy of the Pretoria-Rand area. Instead, it served the South African government's interests by legitimising the settling of the employed residents further afield within the borders of the Bantustan, through categorising the Winterveld as "a place of hope rather than a place of despair."

To this end, the Branch played down the extreme hardships experienced by the community. It did not comment on the extremely long hours spent by the employed residents in commuting to and from work. To have done so would have raised the question as to why the community should not live closer to Pretoria, and this would not have been in the interest of the Branch's client. The hardships were merely alluded to in passing before the Branch went on to articulate its primary concern - namely, the private development of housing by the plot-owners. In a preamble to a survey report, the Branch stated :

" The Winterveld, notwithstanding its many negative factors and unacceptable conditions, nevertheless constitutes a prime example of the responses made by the private entrepreneur to the perceived forces of supply and demand, and, therefore, recommendations emerging from the overall investigation could contribute towards not only the creation of more income-earning opportunities in southern Africa, but also these recommendations could assist with the promotion of a more flexible free enterprise system within the various economic regions of southern Africa." (46)

The Branch, having argued for the continued existence and upgrading of the settlement, was encouraging "free enterprise" landlordism in order to reduce or preclude any demand for state investment in the provision of housing. This was again illustrated when a representative of the Branch, Mr Finlayson, presented the results of the housing survey at a lecture to a Congress of the South African Institute of Architects, in April 1983. Mr Finlayson highlighted the fact that 68.9% of residents spent less than 4% of their income on rent and he projected this as a positive outworking of the forces of "supply and demand" (47) What was not mentioned was that there were large numbers of rent defaulters among the tenants due to their extremely low incomes and also that tenants' houses could be appropriated by the plot-owners at any time. The support of "free enterprise" housing development resulted in the Branch positively projecting the idea of using the plot-owners as quasi-developers, rather than involving the government in large scale housing provision. When it was pointed out to Mr Finlayson

that he had avoided discussing the lack of security experienced by non-Tswanas or any of the other issues related to citizenship, he stated that these issues were about to be resolved. (48)

Whether the issues of security and citizenship were being resolved at that point in time is highly questionable. However, the main point which can be drawn from Mr Finlayson's presentation is that the data on the Winterveld situation was selectively presented in order to bolster the ideology which the Architectural Branch wanted to project.

The aims of the survey concerning those involved in the informal sector were directly conveyed by the Architectural Branch in a statement to the I.G.M.C., in which it was declared that :

" ... it was very important to have an inventory of the number of people who are self-employed in the Winterveld. With this information these matters can then be brought to the attention of both the governments of the Republic of South Africa and the Bophuthatswana. Ways and means should be examined whereby these activities can be made legal. " (49)

The recognition of informal sector activities in order to generate tax revenue was perceived as necessary to decrease the Bophuthatswana government's financial dependence on the South African government. Clearly, the interest of the Bophuthatswana government was to become financially independent and so the regulation of the informal sector, through the issue of trading licences to non-Tswanas, was important to them. However, a countervailing interest of the Bophuthatswana authorities was to favour Tswana traders. The South African government would favour the expansion of the Bantustan's tax base and it was for this reason that its "technical" representative, the Architectural Branch, collected information on the informal sector in the Winterveld - in order to facilitate the development of "income-earning opportunities". (50) Despite this, it appears that the conflict of interests over the continued protection of the Tswana traders

as opposed to the expansion of the tax base, was not resolved. This was evident in the fact that licences had not been issued to non-Tswana traders and raids on their informal sector activities continued well into 1982. (51)

In concluding this section on the running of surveys, we can note that it was the Architectural Branch who encouraged the community representatives to co-operate when there was resistance to the surveys. Furthermore, the Branch interpreted the information obtained from these surveys in such a way as to favour the interests of its client. Thus the result most forcefully put forward by the Architectural Branch was the high proportion of employed workers living in the Winterveld. The Branch's secondary interest was to prevent the influx of people to the area. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to gather information which would allow for the updating and continuing control of the registration of tenants' residence permits. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Branch stated that the "surveys were to be used to work towards eliminating uncontrolled settlement" as is illustrated clearly in the following quotation from the Inter-Governmental Report :

" The importance of the information obtained from the surveys cannot be over-emphasised. They contain information relevant to the settlement pattern characterised by (sic) other informal settlements in the Odi-Moretele region, thereby facilitating the formulation and introduction of an upgrading strategy aimed at minimising, and perhaps eliminating, the current random pattern of informal settlement in the region. " (52)

We shall note later how the Architectural Branch went on to implement a strategy of "eliminating informal settlement in the region". Before we discuss this, however, it is necessary to look at the other issues which were dealt with by the I.G.M.C. at the same time as these surveys were being undertaken.

#### 5.4.2 Investigation into a suitable form of Local Authority

The tenants and plot-owners had rejected the imposition of administration by the Bophuthatswana government and its puppet body, the W.C.A. In 1976, the plot-owners had clearly stated that they did not want to be included in the Bantustan which at that time was about to adopt "independence".<sup>(53)</sup> At the beginning of the participation process in January 1980, the plot-owners reiterated their request "to remain under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of South Africa."<sup>(54)</sup> At a meeting of plot-owners on 15 May 1980, they again stated that they wished to remain under the jurisdiction of the South African government's Commissioner for neighbouring Soshanguve, as they believed that under his administration there would be no discrimination against non-Tswanas and that work permits would be available to them.<sup>(55)</sup>

The South African government's interest, however, lay in retaining the Winterveld within the jurisdiction of the Bophuthatswana authorities as this would allow for the system of "indirect rule", outlined in Chapter 2. The Bophuthatswana government, on the other hand, if it was not able to remove the non-Tswana population from the area, needed to exert its political authority over them. The control of the Winterveld Community Authority by the Bophuthatswana government after 1972 had led to its rejection by the community and, consequently, a new institutional arrangement was required to incorporate the settlement's population into the Bantustan's structure of administrative and political control. Hence, one of the major tasks facing the I.G.M.C. was to formulate an appropriate form of local authority which would not be rejected by the community.

An outside academic, Professor Gildenhuys of the University of Pretoria, was commissioned to undertake the study. He argued that a local authority for the Winterveld would have to be structured in accordance with the overall form of government adopted in the Bantustan. He thus embarked on a broad study of the existing form of government in Bophuthatswana and then turned to examine possible appropriate forms of local government. (56)

The handing over of the formulation of proposals for an appropriate local authority to an outside academic expert effectively removed the issue from consideration by community representatives. The academic concerned, Professor Gildenhuys, acted essentially as a technical advisor to the South African government. He presented his interim proposals to the I.G.M.C. meetings but at no time were the interests or wishes of the community representatives discussed. By November 1980, the broad study had been completed (57) and in February 1981 a memorandum on proposals for the local authority was presented to the Architectural Branch. (58) This proposal situated the Winterveld directly and unequivocally within a highly centralised administrative structure controlled by the Bophuthatswana government. (59)

This recommendation immediately met with two reactions from community representatives. Firstly, they saw a highly centralised system as a threat to local representation. (60) Secondly, the minutes of the Working Committee record that a representative of the plot-owners protested that :

" ... the various committees were not being consulted at all stages of the development of this project. " (61)

In response to this protest, an assistant to Prof Gildenhuys, Mr van Straaten of Verwoerdburg Town Council, stated that the proposals were still open to discussion. However, if there was such discussion, it does not seem to have had any marked effect on the final proposals for a local

authority which were put forward in 1983. The local authority was to be known as the Winterveld Development Foundation.

The most significant point to note about the Foundation at this stage was that no provision was made on its controlling Board for direct community representation. Instead, the South African and Bophuthatswana governments were to control the Foundation through appointed representatives.<sup>(62)</sup> These government officials were to communicate with the plot-owners and tenants via Information Officers who would also be appointed by the two governments.<sup>(63)</sup> In addition, it was proposed that two meetings a year should be held between community representatives and the appointed government officials.<sup>(64)</sup>

At the time of writing, it has not been possible to ascertain how far the implementation of this proposal had proceeded. It is clear that direct community control of the Winterveld Development Foundation was not envisaged and that a highly centralised form of local government was being advocated. A concession had been made to the wishes of the community in that they were not to be governed solely by the Bophuthatswana authorities but would remain partially under the jurisdiction of the South African government when the Foundation eventually came into being. Whether this concession was sufficient to persuade the plot-owners and tenants to cooperate with the proposed Foundation remains to be seen. What is clear is that there had been very little input into the formulation of these proposals by the community representatives.

Besides research work, the I.G.M.C. and its Working Committee also had to deal with the numerous issues which were raised by the community representatives. In particular, the plot-owners and tenants wanted to resolve the conflicts that had developed around the acquisition of citizenship,

residence stamps and work permits. In addition, they raised questions concerning the provision of infrastructure and social welfare services, for example: pensions. These issues will now be discussed.

#### 5.4.3 Work Permits, Residence Stamps and Citizenship

Early on in the participation process, the representatives of the plot-owners and tenants raised the matter of work permits for those who did not have Tswana citizenship. <sup>(65)</sup> The issue of work permits to young entrants into the labour market was a particularly pressing problem as they did not have previous employment records and, therefore, could not get work permits in terms of the announcement setting the 01 January 1980 deadline. In addition, it appears that work permits obtained in terms of this announcement were regarded by the authorities as temporary work permits, issued pending the outcome of citizenship applications.

The enquiries of the community representatives were continually deflected by the South African government and Bophuthatswana officials. They were continually referred to a press release which was due to be issued in the near future by both governments and which, they were told, would resolve the matter. This press release was eventually issued in September 1980.

The press release dealt with the issue of citizenship by stating that all residents should immediately register their residential addresses with the Bophuthatswana authority and that after five years they would be able to choose between taking out permanent residence or citizenship. It was suggested by the Bophuthatswana government that those who registered as residents in the Winterveld should be given work permits by the South African authorities. <sup>(66)</sup> Soon after this announcement, community representatives began to enquire when the recommendations would be implemented but the issue was once again referred to the two governments

for further consideration. <sup>(67)</sup> The matter was, in fact, never resolved and, when temporary residence permits were issued in April 1982, they did not automatically entitle the residents to obtain work permits. The situation remained that only those people with employment records prior to 01 January 1980 could continue to seek work in the Pretoria-Rand area. <sup>(68)</sup>

At this point, it is possible to point to a pattern which was emerging from the outworking of the participation process. The pattern was that those issues which affected the interests of the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities were dealt with promptly. These related mainly to the control of influx into the area, the establishment of a local authority to incorporate the administration of the settlement, and the imposition of citizenship. Those matters which concerned the plot-owners and tenants - namely, the issuing of work permits to the unemployed, the payment of pensions etc., were endlessly referred between the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authority. We shall see how this pattern was evident in the handling of the question of the provision of infra-structural and social welfare services.

#### 5.4.4 Infra-structure and Social Welfare Services

##### 5.4.4.1 Pensions

The community representatives raised the plight of those elderly non-Tswana residents of the Winterveld who were not receiving pensions because they were not Bophuthatswana citizens. The detailed circumstances of a few of the elderly were recorded and handed to relevant government departments between August and October 1980. <sup>(69)</sup> Thereafter, a further report was drafted on the matter by the Working Committee. <sup>(70)</sup> A year later, at the time the Inter-Governmental Report outlining the future of the Winterveld

was submitted to both governments, the issue of pensions to non-Tswana residents had still not been resolved. (71)

#### 5.4.4.2 Water Supply and Servicing

The use of polluted ground water by the residents of the Winterveld became a serious issue when cholera broke out in the area late in 1980. The immediate response of the Bophuthatswana Health Department was to initiate an education programme and to send tankers of clean water to supply the affected areas. (72) These short term measures were to be replaced in the long term by the introduction of full water reticulation throughout the settlement. In the interim, it was necessary to finance an emergency clean water supply. A representative of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs stated that the responsibility :

" ... for financing the implementation of an emergency strategy ... would be a matter of negotiation between the Bophuthatswana and R.S.A. governments. " (73)

While this negotiation was proceeding, the Architectural Branch intervened and commissioned the installation of forty water chlorinators at the head of the boreholes owned by the plot-owners. (74) Nevertheless, in July 1982, polluted open wells were still in use.

#### 5.4.4.3 Road Construction

A matter which had annoyed the plot-owners was the planning and construction of a road through the settlement without, it was alleged, prior consultation with the plot-owners. (75) The new road traversed various plots and a number of tenant families had had to move. The first request by the community representatives for the matter to be investigated was ignored. (76) When the requests for information about the planning of roads

persisted, the plot-owners' representatives were rebuffed, as the following extract from the minutes of the I.G.M.C. meeting in October 1980 indicates:

" Mr Finlayson, on receiving confirmation that the planning of the new roads had taken place before the establishment of the Inter-Governmental Management Committee, stressed that the planning and building of these roads had nothing to do with this committee, the Working Committee, or any of the three community committees." (77)

Despite this assessment of the situation by Mr Finlayson, the plot-owners still felt, in June 1982, that they should have been kept informed. They cited this issue as one of the factors contributing to the later breakdown in the participation process. (78)

#### 5.4.5 Deferment of Issues

When issues were raised by the community representatives, decisions were generally deferred so that the matter could be referred from the I.G.M.C. to the Working Committee. The Working Committee would, in turn, tend to refer the issue to various departments of either the Bophuthatswana or the South African government. (79) In some instances, problems were referred to the local magistrate who was also a member of the I.G.M.C. (80)

The result of this was that there was no comprehensive discussion of problems with the representatives of the plot-owners and tenants and hence insufficient cognizance was taken of their interests and wishes. A further result was that the referral of issues from one body to the next led to the postponement of decisions which, in turn, meant that the representatives of the plot-owners and tenants began to lose credibility in the eyes of their respective constituencies.

#### 5.4.6 Accountability to the Community

The inability of the plot-owners and tenants to detect any real benefits emanating from the participation process was one factor which affected the credibility of their involvement in it. A further factor was the tendency to treat certain issues as highly confidential, which meant that the community's representatives could not openly discuss issues with their electorate.

During the initial stages of the participation process, it appears that the community representatives were encouraged to report back to their electorate about the surveys which were to be undertaken in the community.<sup>(81)</sup> However, when it came to deliberations about the future of the community, the members of the I.G.M.C. were informed that the discussions were confidential.<sup>(82)</sup> The Architectural Branch's representative, as Chairman of the Working Committee, emphasised this confidentiality and, as far as possible, controlled the issue of press releases.<sup>(83)</sup> The South African government stated that where press releases were issued concerning progress in the negotiations, they were to be short and as "positive as possible" in tone.<sup>(84)</sup> In addition, both the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities were to ratify any information released.<sup>(85)</sup> Rules were established to control how information was to be passed on to the public at large.<sup>(86)</sup> Reporting back to the community was further hampered, it appears, by the requirement that representatives of the Working Committee should be present at meetings where representatives of the plot-owners and tenants reported back to their own constituents.<sup>(87)</sup>

The net result of the lack of feedback from community representatives and the non-resolution of the issues raised by them, was that they soon lost

credibility in the eyes of the community. By August 1980, three members of the plot-owners committee had resigned and had given as one of their reasons the fact that "the Committee of 18 is not consulting the people"<sup>(88)</sup> Furthermore, it was pointed out, "the credibility of the Committee is at stake". A representative of the Architectural Branch stated that he :

" ...agreed about the credibility of the committee being at stake. The people outside the committee see no change - that is why they are accusing the committee. The problems and questions of the people must be solved and answered. " (89)

However, when a representative of the plot-owners' committee asserted that "they [had] been labelled sell-outs and asked if this could be discussed",<sup>(90)</sup> the Branch representative dismissed this as a problem "to be resolved on a personal level."<sup>(91)</sup>

Six months later, in February 1981, no detectable progress had been made in solving the problems raised by the representatives of the plot-owners and tenants. At a meeting of the Working Committee in February 1981, Mr Shongwe, a representative of the tenants' committee, and Mr Lekala, a representative of the plot-owners' committee, both re-emphasised :

" that people in the Winterveld questioned the credibility of the various committees. " (92)

But again, the Architectural Branch representative by-passed these warnings by stating that the solving of the community's problems required more time.

The role of the Architectural Branch as pre-eminently an agent of the South African government, was exposed to some degree through its handling of these issues. It is clear that within the process of negotiations, the Branch did not, and could not, act in any authentic way as an arbitrator.

The Branch required the co-operation of the plot-owners and tenants to

complete the surveys and to work towards implementing residential control. In return, the Branch's intervention seemed to offer certain benefits to the community. Such at least was the implication of the offer to negotiate the upgrading of the community and the protection of African private property, as stated in the Branch's Annual Reports discussed in Chapter 4. While the Branch was probably interested in these goals, its role as arbitrator in the situation stood exposed when faced with the more pressing demands of the community - namely, the demand for work permits, the resolution of the citizenship issue, and the demand for genuine democratic power over local affairs.

Firstly, the Branch had virtually no experience in these affairs and, secondly, the Branch had no mandate from either the community or the state to act as an arbitrator with respect to these issues. As a result, the Branch was dependent on the South African and Bophuthatswana state departments to make decisions on these matters. When the respective governments procrastinated, the Branch was left powerless and exposed. In this instance, confidentiality became important as the inability to resolve the major issue could then be postponed and disguised under a cloak of secrecy. This situation could not continue indefinitely.

Faced with the continuing demands of the community representatives that these issues be dealt with, the Architectural Branch responded by asking that they "should try and forget these political problems to a degree"<sup>(93)</sup>. In the light of this statement and the above discussion, it is possible to understand why Mr Finlayson avoided the discussion of the problems of work permits and citizenship in his address to the South African Institute of Architects' Conference in April 1983, which was discussed above. Clearly, any discussion of these issues would have raised the question as to why they had not been resolved. Perhaps, in their own minds, the represent-

atives of the Architectural Branch were trying to draw a distinction between "political issues" and their own work. It has become clear that there was no such distinction in the minds of the community representatives. When they continued to demand resolutions, the Branch on another occasion "requested that patience should be exercised"<sup>(94)</sup>. The resignation of the representatives of the plot-owners' committee was a clear sign that the community representatives and their electorate would not forget their demands nor be patient indefinitely.

It may be surmised that there were two factors which sustained the willingness of the majority of community representatives to participate in the negotiation process. Firstly, there remained the hope that the problems surrounding work permits and citizenship would be resolved once a comprehensive development plan had been drawn up. Secondly, the Architectural Branch had stated that its intention was to foster black entrepreneurial initiative.

## 5.5 THE PRESS RELEASE : SEPTEMBER 1980

A press release dealing with the future of the Winterveld was finally prepared by the Bophuthatswana authorities. It was approved by the South African government before its release on 11 September 1980.<sup>(95)</sup> The release laid down categorically that those non-Tswanas who did not have Tswana citizenship were aliens in Bophuthatswana. They would be allowed to remain in the Winterveld on condition that they were "willing to prove their own bona fides"<sup>(96)</sup> by accepting permanent residence status or citizenship of the Bantustan.

To demonstrate their bona fides all non-citizens living in the settlement were required to apply for temporary residence status. The residence permit would have to be renewed annually over a five year period. Thereafter, the holder could apply for permanent residence or Tswana citizenship.<sup>(97)</sup> In the press statement, the Bophuthatswana government recommended that the South African government offer alternative areas for relocation of those who did not want to remain in the Winterveld under these circumstances. In addition, it recommended that all residents of the Winterveld be allowed to work in the Pretoria-Rand area.

The press release went on to state that the Bophuthatswana government could no longer tolerate the poor living conditions in the area. In order to deal with the problem, further influx to the Winterveld was forbidden. Residence permits would form the basis on which this influx was to be controlled, and the acquisition of residence rights was to be dependent upon the applicants' undertaking to upgrade their housing.<sup>(98)</sup>

It must be emphasised that at no time prior to its issue was the content of the press release discussed in the I.G.M.C. meetings. After the release, a

representative of the tenants' committee asked when the resolutions would be implemented and, in reply, a representative of the Architectural Branch stated that certain matters were still being clarified. (99) In February 1981, five months after the press release, South African and Bophuthatswana Departments of Foreign Affairs were still uncertain as to the procedure to be adopted in issuing residence stamps. (100) The resolution of this issue was dealt with outside the meetings of the I.G.M.C.

An analysis of the contents of the press release will illustrate the specific way in which it attempted to resolve a number of the issues which had arisen. However, it must be re-emphasised that the press release, although an important statement of the development strategy, was not discussed with community representatives prior to its release by the Bophuthatswana government.

Firstly, the release placed the Winterveld squarely within the Bantustan strategy. Despite the expressed wishes of the plot-owners to remain under South African administration, they were required to place themselves under the Bophuthatswana authorities. They had to "prove their bona fides" (101) through "their willingness to render evidence of their allegiance to the constitution and laws, as well as respect for the honour and aspirations of their host country." (102) This meant, in fact, registering themselves as temporary residents and later taking permanent residence or Tswana citizenship. The Financial Mail, in a comment on the release, stated that :

" It would appear Wintervelders are being pressured into accepting some form of Bophuthatswana status. If they do not, they'll have to leave. " (103)

We have noted that previously the tenants and plot-owners had resisted taking out citizenship. In this instance the residents were having the offer of work permits linked to the adoption of Bophuthatswana status in an attempt to induce them to co-operate. The press release suggested that if

residents accepted this status, they would be able to obtain work permits. The uncertainty as to whether work permits would, in fact, be available is reflected in the following statement from the press release :

" ... the [Bophuthatswana] government recommends that aliens residing in Bophuthatswana (more particularly, the Winterveld and adjoining areas) shall not be barred from employment in the P.W.V. complex as long as they have fulfilled their obligation of legalising their domicile ... " (104)

In terms of the press release, the South African government, while in no way committed to delivering work permits, was hoping to achieve its goal of deflecting the demands of the community into the political system of an "independent" Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswana government would benefit from this to the degree that it was able to exert its political authority over the members of the community who were now technically subject to its administration. Indeed, it may be argued that the "grace period" of five years, which was to elapse before residents of the Winterveld were forced to make a final choice of taking out either permanent residence or Tswana citizenship, was intended to make the latter the more probable choice. If, during the five years' temporary residence, the members of the community could be persuaded to invest their savings and labour in upgrading the Winterveld, then they would be reluctant to leave should they, at the end of this time, be refused permanent residence status. In this instance, they would be forced to apply for citizenship if they wanted to remain in the Winterveld.

There is no evidence that the plot-owners and tenants adopted a more unified stance after the press release to resist the strategy which it implied. The Pretoria News did report that :

" ...some [residents] have already said that they would resist 'forced' Bophuthatswana citizenship, in order to be housed, with all the means at their disposal. The people believe they are being blackmailed into accepting Bophuthatswana citizenship at the expense of their South African rights. " (105)

Ultimately, however, officially unemployed members of the community did not receive work permits and a massive police raid on the Winterveld in April 1982 was used to force all non-Tswana residents to apply for temporary residential permits.

This development can be seen to represent an attempt to resolve the second major issue which had informed the strategy embodied in the press release : namely, the imposition of residential and influx control. Forcing non-Tswana residents to apply for temporary residential permits laid the basis for excluding newcomers to the Winterveld by restricting the legislation of domicile to those who were already there. This is clearly spelt out in the following statement from the press release :

" Under no circumstances can the continued arbitrary growth by way of illegal influx of a squatter population without residence permits and without accommodation and/or employment ...be tolerated ... No alien shall therefore be allowed to settle there unless he is in prior possession of a legal residence permit ... The government will therefore do its utmost to implement as far as possible the above controls as from the date of this statement. " (106)

The control of further influx into the area served the South African government's interests in that it would allow for the exclusion of newcomers, who might try to take up residence in the Winterveld in order to seek illegal work in Pretoria. The Bophuthatswana government would benefit in that such controls would prevent more non-Tswana people from entering the Winterveld where they might make demands on its limited financial resources for infrastructural and social services. The plot-owners' interests, on the other hand, were adversely affected in that the curtailing of influx would limit their capacity to generate revenue through the renting of sites and houses to newcomers.

A third major issue, which was mentioned only in outline in the press release, was the extension of the requirements to be satisfied in order to

obtain permanent residence status. It was stated that :

" In view of the major priority which problems of housing assume .. it is contemplated, for instance, to link permanent residence to a qualification in respect of accommodation ... " (107)

This requirement was elaborated upon by members of the Architectural Branch when the author visited the Winterveld in January 1981. The Branch representatives explained that, during the five years which would elapse before residents were required to take out either Tswana citizenship or permanent residence, the residents would have to upgrade their housing. (108) Certain standards of accommodation would be set, against which the progress of residents would be measured. Members of the Branch argued that it was necessary to have these "incentives" to compel residents to upgrade their accommodation as an earlier self-help scheme in Mabopane had not been universally successful. Some of the participants in the Mabopane scheme had not improved their accommodation beyond that necessary to provide very basic shelter, and the Branch argued that this was not acceptable to the Architectural Branch or sections of the South African government. (109)

The way in which the proposal was to be implemented remained to be spelt out. However, it is clear that, by forcing the plot-owners and tenants to upgrade their housing, the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities would avoid the expense involved in providing conventional housing. The obligation that would be placed on the tenants by this requirement was significant because their income in many instances was extremely low, with over 81% earning below R200.00 per month. (110) It had yet to be established what sort of security of tenure would be offered to tenants and hence how the upgrading requirement would affect the plot-owners and their ability to extract rent from their tenants.

## 5.6 THE WORK OF THE I.G.M.C. AFTER SEPTEMBER 1980

The processing of the surveys of the community constituted the bulk of the work that the I.G.M.C. and its Working Committee undertook between September 1980 and the end of 1981. The Architectural Branch continued to act as the initiator and co-ordinator of the work involved in these surveys.

A cholera outbreak in January 1981 necessitated the diversion of the resources of the Working Committee to deal with this crisis. The cost of providing an emergency water supply once again turned into a matter to be negotiated between the South African and Bophuthatswana governments. (111)

In the interim, the Architectural Branch organised the installation of water purifiers on the boreholes owned by various plot-owners.

## 5.7 The Population Survey : June 1981

The implementation of the proposals contained in the press release was delayed while both the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities decided the question of how temporary residence permits were to be issued. In the interim, a population survey was initiated in June 1981 to document the presence, and establish the identity, of the existing residents of the Winterveld. (112) The objectives of the population survey were thus complementary to the intentions of the press release. They were:

- 1 to establish how many people lived in the Winterveld;
- 2 to identify each family and its dwellings;
- 3 to record the names, ages and sex of each inhabitant; and (113)
- 4 to check on the movement of people.

The Architectural Branch, who initiated and supervised this survey stated that the most important aspect was the recording of the reference book numbers of all adults surveyed. (114) It was necessary, they said :

" .. to identify the household members more conclusively and to assist, for example, with the identification of persons at a later date. " (115)

This proved difficult and a decision was made to record one reference book number per household. (116)

Initially, the community resisted participation in the survey, but the Architectural Branch noted in the Population Survey Report that methods were developed to overcome the problem. The Report stated that the survey was conducted under the pretext of being necessary to upgrade housing and education within the area, and to improve the water supply. Secondly, the authorisation of the survey by the community representatives was used to persuade residents to co-operate. The Branch also stated in the Report (117) that a pilot study had been run to help overcome resistance. It was claimed that the final survey yielded an 87.1 per cent return. The reasons given for the incomplete returns were that people were not at home, and that both plot-owners and tenant households had, in some cases, refused to co-operate. (118)

It may be argued that the population survey exposed the Architectural Branch to an even greater extent than had previously been the case. The Branch was increasingly becoming involved not only in sanctioning, but also implementing residential control. Previously, the census of 1970 had served as a means of checking the residential status of applicants for work permits. These records, however, were clearly outdated and the population survey was intended to bring the state's records up to date. Furthermore, the survey would allow for the implementation of controls on the influx of further people into the area, by identifying who was already resident in the area.

When the survey was completed, it was claimed that it indicated a total population of 119 196. As noted for the earlier surveys, the total population figure was low in comparison to other figures given by various state bodies and independent organisations. Once again there were various possible reasons for this. Firstly, the community had again resisted the survey and, in some instances, plot-owners had not allowed questionnaires to be administered to the tenants living on their plots. (119) Secondly, people who had previously been classified as illegal residents would not have been officially "legalised" through the registration of their residence in the area and would, therefore, have been reluctant to reveal their presence. The large discrepancy between the survey figure and the actual population was emphasised by a member of the tenants's committee who claimed that :

" .. the population census carried out by the surveying committee did not reflect a true picture of the situation because the tenant population has been left out. In other words, people who had not been registered in the census would not qualify for whatever rights are accorded the squatters in future, and they would be regarded as aliens by the authorities." (120)

The low figure recorded in the survey, in theory at least, reduced the number of people for whom the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities might have to provide both infrastructural and social services. In addition, it once again suited the Architectural Branch to limit the officially recognised size of the community, as this would make the implementation of its upgrading strategy more manageable.

The Branch's intention was not only to stop influx into the Winterveld, but also to control the establishment of settlements throughout the surrounding area. The Branch clearly stated that the methods used in carrying out the population survey were being developed in order that they could be applied "in similar circumstances elsewhere in Southern Africa." (121) This was confirmed by Mr Finlayson, who later stated that similar residential

control mechanisms would be implemented in the areas bordering the Winter-  
veld. (122) It can be concluded that this was a logical progression, as  
people who were prevented from living in the Winterveld would move onto  
adjacent tribal land which they would rent from the chiefs controlling  
access to it. Hence, in order to prevent this, the pattern of residential  
control would have to be expanded beyond the immediate boundaries of the  
settlement.

The collection of the pass book numbers by the Architectural Branch was an  
intentional act with a definite goal : the control and structuring of  
settlement in the area. From its previous work in uMazisakhe near Graaf  
Reinet and other townships, the Architectural Branch must have been aware  
of the highly contentious role that the pass book played in the control of  
Africans within broad apartheid policy and, most specifically, the hated  
African labour control.

This leads to the question as to whether the Branch unintentionally arrived  
at a position where its interest in upgrading had progressively led to its  
playing an overtly political role. If the Branch's arrival at this  
position was progressive and unintentional and was a role which it carried  
out at the South African government's direction, then it must be stated  
that the author has no record of the Branch objecting to this role once it  
became aware of just what it was implementing with respect to the  
integration of labour and residential control. Indeed, it may be argued  
that, at best, the Branch turned a blind eye to the way it was being used  
and, at worst, that it carried out the population survey in full knowledge  
that the success of the upgrading depended on the effective division of the  
community into the "insiders", who were registered in the population  
survey, and the "outsiders", who were to be excluded from entering or  
remaining in the Winterveld.

## 5.8 THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL REPORT

The Architectural Branch finally formulated an overall development strategy for the Winterveld in the form of the Inter-Governmental Report which was presented to both the South African and the Bophuthatswana governments in September 1981. It will be argued that it represented an attempt to resolve many of the issues discussed in Chapter 3. In particular, it dealt with the way the residential plots were to be controlled and developed.

The Inter-Governmental Report accepted as a basic premise the legal registration of residential rights, as laid out in the press release of September 1980.<sup>(123)</sup> It proposed that residents who acquired such rights should be entitled to work permits and that they be offered pensions, business rights and the education of their children in their mother tongue.<sup>(124)</sup>

The development strategy outlined in the Report was formulated in terms of a number of propositions. The first was that the settlement needed to be upgraded. The second was that the development of the area would provide a source of revenue for the Bophuthatswana government. The third was that the Winterveld should be developed as part of a regional urban complex including Mabopane and Soshanguve. Finally, the Report suggested that a range of options should be offered to both the plot-owners and the tenants.

The plot-owners could choose between legalizing their rights of residence in the Winterveld or moving to Soshanguve, Mabopane or other Bantustans. Those who chose to leave could either sell their plots to Tswanas or be reimbursed by the South African government. The land which the South African government acquired in this way would, in turn, be handed to the Bophuthatswana authorities for housing development.

Those plot-owners who chose to remain in the Winterveld could elect to continue to use their land for agricultural purposes, or to develop it for residential purposes. If the plot-owner chose to pursue the agricultural option, then the tenants on his or her land would be required to move to other plots developed for residential purposes. If plot-owners allowed more tenants to move onto the land retained for agricultural purposes, then they would be expropriated for improper use of their land.

Those plot-owners who elected to develop their land for residential purposes would be required to apply to the Bophuthatswana authorities to change the permitted land-use from agricultural to residential purposes. If this was granted, they could then develop their land into serviced sites for rental or sale. <sup>(125)</sup> This development was to take place in phases, with the most densely populated area in the south-east closest to Pretoria receiving priority.

The options made available to the tenants were that they could either move to other Bantustans or remain in the Winterveld. If they elected to remain, then their residential status would depend on the option selected by the plot-owner on whose land they lived. If the latter chose to practise agriculture, they would have to move to a plot which was to be developed for residential purposes either by other plot-owners or by the Bophuthatswana authorities.

A part of the development package was that 1 800 to 2 000 houses would be developed west of Mabopane and that a further 1 800 to 2 000 houses be built north of Soshanguve. The report did not specify how these houses were to be allocated amongst the plot-owners and tenants. Neither did it mention whether ethnicity or Section 10 qualifications would be taken into account.

The Inter-Governmental Report was presented to the South African government by the Architectural Branch in September 1981. According to a representative of the Branch, it was adopted in broad principle. However, we shall note that only selective parts of the Report were taken up for consideration and it will be argued that this selective reconsideration served particular interests in the Winterveld situation.

#### 5.8.1 Affects on the Plotowners

An analysis of the proposals contained in the Report identifies the way in which the plot-owners were supposed to serve the interests of the South African government and the Bophuthatswana authorities by acting as quasi-developers of housing. Firstly, the plot-owners could choose to retain ownership of their land which essentially left them in possession of the asset from which they derived a considerable part, if not most, of their revenue. The obligation that was placed on the land-owners however, was that they would exercise control over their tenant populations. This directly served the South African government's interests by preventing new tenants from settling in the Winterveld and taking up illegal employment in Pretoria. Simultaneously, and for the same reason, it served the interests of the Bophuthatswana authorities by limiting the potential financial demands that might be placed on them.

Secondly, the plot-owners were being encouraged to use their private asset, the land they owned to provide "free market" housing. They would use their own capital or loans obtained from state agencies to provide housing for sale or rental. The responsibility of providing housing and the concomitant problems of recouping the costs involved from tenants would, therefore, become the responsibility not of the state but of the land-owners. This was clearly a great advantage to the state, as the surveys

had already revealed that the income of the tenant population was extremely low<sup>(126)</sup> and this meant there were considerable numbers of rent defaulters.<sup>(127)</sup> As developers, the plot-owners would have to assess what level of service their tenants could afford when the accommodation was upgraded for sale or rental.

The decision to leave the responsibility for housing with the plot-owners followed the state's policy of withdrawing from housing provision. The housing programme of the 1950's had led to attacks on the state in the 1970's as the state was the landlord of the entire urban African community. Rent increases were a major issue around which African communities united against the state and, clearly, it was in the state's interest to avoid this form of politicization of housing in the Winterveld.

It is necessary at this point to consider whether the option of moving out of the Winterveld was a viable one for the plot-owners. Since 1972, the plot-owners had been restricted to selling their land to people officially categorised as Tswanas. This effectively restricted the size of the potential market for the plots, and thus competition to buy them. This in turn would probably tend to lower the market value of the plots. Thus, the option to sell their plots on the so-called "open market", as suggested in the Report, was in fact not a particularly attractive one.<sup>(128)</sup> Furthermore, if the plot-owners chose to be expropriated by the South African government, it was unlikely that they would receive a greater sum than might be offered on the "open market". Consequently, the financial costs of electing to move out of the Winterveld could prove to be quite substantial. In contrast, the opportunities for the plot-owners to capitalise on the development of their properties appeared to be considerable if they pursued the upgrading strategy. The Architectural Branch could therefore be reasonably confident that the way in which they had structured the options would ensure that most of the plot-owners would

choose to adopt this latter course.

We have so far discussed how the way in which the Inter-Governmental Report dealt with the issue of land-ownership affected the interests of the plot-owners. It is now necessary to examine how it affected the respective interests of the Bophuthatswana authorities, the South African government and the tenants.

#### 5.8.2 Affects on the Bophuthatswana Authorities

The Bophuthatswana authorities had previously been concerned with the large revenues derived by some of the plot-owners from rent. This, in turn, had led to attempts by the Bophuthatswana government to gain control of the land. The Inter-Governmental Report did not propose to transfer ownership of all privately-owned land to the Bophuthatswana government, but it did substantially extend the latter's ability to manipulate the way in which the land was used. Firstly, all the land acquired by the South African government, through the expropriation of plot-owners who chose to leave, would be passed on to the Bophuthatswana government. Secondly, the right of the Bophuthatswana authorities to determine the use of land retained in ownership by plot-owners was firmly established, as applications to change land-use and to sub-divide plots would have to be approved by the Bophuthatswana authorities<sup>(129)</sup> and any subsequent deviations from the prescribed land-use could lead to expropriation.<sup>(130)</sup> It was noted that any new settlement of tenants would be regarded as constituting such a deviation and, as the Report noted :

" As all tenants currently resident in this area have been listed already, it will be possible to identify any settlement of new tenant families that may enter the area after the strategy proposed is implemented. " (131)

In addition, it appears that a change of land-use from the existing agric-

ultural classification to an urban classification would only be granted if the plot-owners agreed to service the sites to standards specified by the Bophuthatswana authorities. In essence, these controls did not offer direct ownership of the land to the Bophuthatswana government, but they did allow it to control whether a plot-owner was to be permitted to capitalise on his land or not. If plot-owners did capitalise on their land, then the Bantustan would benefit through rates and taxes which could be levied on such developments. (132)

### 5.8.3 Affects on the South African Government

As recorded previously, the Report proposed that the Winterveld should be developed as part of a regional urban complex including Mabopane and Soshanguve. The South African government would favour the development of this new urban complex as it would offer a viable residential alternative to the settlement of large numbers of Africans in the "urban" townships of Pretoria. This was all the more important in the light of the landmark Rhikoto judgement of 1981, according to which those African workers who had worked in a prescribed urban area continuously for ten years were not debarred from gaining Section 10(1)b rights, despite the fact that they had returned to the Bantustans each year to renew their contracts. Thus, in the case of the Winterveld, possibly 29.1% (133) of the employed would be entitled to claim Section 10(1)b rights as they had worked in Pretoria for more than ten years. This percentage would rise as more people qualified as the years passed. In the face of a large and increasing demand for Section 10 rights by Winterveld residents, it was preferable for the South African government to settle these people in the new urban complex rather than in the townships more proximate to the "white" urban areas. If they could be encouraged to invest in the provision of their own housing in the Winterveld or the adjacent settlements, they would be less enthusiastic in pressing for the right to live in Mamelodi or Atteridgeville.

There was a further proposal in the Inter-Governmental Report which, potentially at least, appeared to promote the interests of the South African government. This proposal stated that the land retained by the plot-owners for agricultural purposes should be cleared of tenants. This might open the way for the establishment or consolidation of a class of commercial farmers and could be construed as serving to bolster the South African government's strategy of class polarisation in the Bantustans.

#### 5.8.4 Affects on the Tenants

The tenants were, ultimately, the interest group which would derive least benefit from the implementation of the proposals contained in the Report. In particular, the proposal for alternative accommodation in Soshanguve remained only vaguely specified. The suggested construction of between 1 800 and 2 000 dwellings there was clearly inadequate to cater for more than a fairly small proportion of the population. Thus it can be assumed that only those non-Tswana residents with Section 10 rights would qualify to move to Soshanguve, and that plot-owners would probably be given preference. It can also be assumed that the 1 800 to 2 000 dwellings to be built in Mabopane would be reserved specifically for those Tswana plot-owners and tenants who chose to move out of the Winterveld. The situation of those tenants who might prefer to remain in the Winterveld would obviously be affected by the decision of the plot-owner on whose land they lived. If the plot-owner chose to retain the land for agricultural purposes, they would have to move to another plot where housing was being developed and where they would also be dependent on the decision of the plot-owner as to whether the housing would be for sale or rental.

The Architectural Branch, by providing the Chairman of the Working Committee and by acting as compiler of the Inter-Governmental Report,

played a central role in realising the interests of its client, the South African government. Of major significance in this respect was the way in which the potential obligation of the Bophuthatswana authorities to provide conventional housing was reduced, which, in turn, reduced their financial dependence on the South African government. Nevertheless, the decision to install a mains water supply reticulation and to pay compensation for the expropriation of plot-owners who wanted to move, would still require some level of financial commitment from, ultimately, the South African government. Despite the fact that it accepted the Inter-Governmental Report proposals in broad principle in September 1981, there do not seem to have been any unequivocal statements to the effect that the South African government would, in fact, accept these financial obligations. (134)

Subsequent enquiries have revealed that, by 1984, a pilot upgrading project planned by the Architectural Branch could still not be implemented because of a lack of funds.

#### 5.9 A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Despite the South African government's failure to provide finance for the upgrading process, the Architectural Branch set in motion the registration of residential status of each resident of the Winterveld.

Working from a local administration office, it began issuing three month temporary residence permits in April 1982. The permits were issued in terms of the Bophuthatswana Aliens and Travellers Control Act, No.22 of 1979, and allowed the recipients three months to decide whether or not they wanted to stay in the Winterveld. (135) Once an individual had decided to stay, he or she would be issued with an annual residence permit. Simultaneously, a control file was opened for each resident in which his or her identity number, nationality and residential address were recorded. The endorsement of this permit every year for five years would eventually

enable the holder to apply for Tswana citizenship, if he or she so decided. If the permit was not endorsed by the Bophuthatswana authorities, then the holder would be required to leave the Bantustan or face either six months imprisonment or a R200 fine.<sup>(136)</sup>

Before being issued with permits, applicants were required to prove that they were residents of the Winterveld by providing a receipt for the rental payments issued by the plot-owners. In addition, their claims were being checked against the list of residents compiled through the population survey.<sup>(137)</sup> Hence, it can be seen that, even at this early stage, the plot-owners were being incorporated into the operation of influx control mechanisms. Moreover, obtaining such a permit did not entitle the holder to "alter the purpose for which he or she was permitted to be in Bophuthatswana, enter into business, or accept any employment, paid or unpaid."<sup>(138)</sup> Neither did it entitle the holder to work in the Pretoria-Rand area. The ruling, that only those who had worked in the Pretoria-Rand area before January 1980 could continue to work in "white" South Africa, remained in force.<sup>(139)</sup> Clearly, the putative advantages to residents in registering their presence in the Winterveld were not being realised.

In view of this, it is not surprising that the Bophuthatswana authorities were obliged to use force to compel residents to apply for permits. A combined police and army house-to-house search was carried out in April 1983, under the guise of a "crime prevention" raid.<sup>(140)</sup> Approximately 500 shebeen owners, illegal traders and "other suspects" were arrested. However, an explicitly stated intention of the raid was to warn people to establish their residential status or "they would be arrested".<sup>(141)</sup>

Despite the restrictions and continued harassment to which residents were being subjected, there was an influx of newcomers to the Winterveld during 1982 and 1983. A major cause of this was the drought which was forcing

Africans out of the rural areas of South African and towards the cities.<sup>(142)</sup> Furthermore, it was announced that the Rosslyn industrial area was to be expanded, thus creating more job opportunities in the vicinity of the settlement.<sup>(143)</sup> It remained to be seen whether the new system of controls introduced by the Architectural Branch could effectively counter these forces compelling people to move to the Winterveld.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 The formation of the Inter-Governmental Management Committee was announced jointly by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both the South African and the Bophuthatswana governments. South African Press Association. Rand Daily Mail. 17 January 1980.
- 2 Memo to President Mangope. 13 January 1980.
- 3 N.B.R.I. Annual Report, 1978. p 4.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Memo to President Magope. 13 January 1980.
- 6 Minutes of the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Management Committee (I.G.M.C.), held at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on 26 February 1980. Points 4 and 5.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 N.B.R.I. Inter-Governmental Report on the Winterveld. 1981. Diagram 1.
- 9 Ackermann and Hurly, Attorneys. Letter to the Department of Internal Affairs, Bophuthatswana. 07 January 1980.
- 10 Work in Progress, No.10. p 56.
- 11 The removal of the tenants would allow the plot-owners to practise agriculture and to take advantage of the new markets of Mabopane and Soshanguve.
- 12 This was stated at two seminars on the Winterveld attended by the author. The one was held at the N.B.R.I. in Pretoria in January 1981, and the other at the School of Architecture, University of Cape Town in April 1983.
- 13 Minutes of the I.G.M.C. on the Winterveld. 26 February 1980. Point 4.1.
- 14 S.A.I.R.R. Survey 1979. p 314.
- 15 Dube, A. The Post, 11 January 1980, and Finlayson, K., Chairman's Report of the Winterveld Working Committee. 26 February to 18 April 1980. Point 3.1.1 and Point 3.1.2.
- 16 Surplus Peoples Project. Forced Removals in South Africa. Cape Town. The Project, Vol 5. 1983. p 318.
- 17 Meintjies, R. Home is a slum, but where can we live? The Star. 31 January 1980.
- 18 Matsetela. The Informal Sector in the Political Economy of the Winterveld. Unpublished B.A. Honours Thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, 1978-79. p 73.

- 19 Perlman, S. The State and the Working Class in the Pretoria-Odi Area: Population Relocation, State Management and Class Restructuring. B.A. Honours Thesis. University of the Witwatersrand, 1982. p 83.
- 20 Meintjies, R. Winterveld "squatters" allowed to work in S.A. The Star. 01 February 1980.
- 21 Meintjies, R. Legal "squeeze" on squatters. The Star. 31 January 1980.
- 22 Minutes of the I.G.M.C. on the Winterveld. 26 February 1980. Point 5.
- 23 Letter from the Bureau of Market Research, U.N.I.S.A., to the Department of Foreign Affairs, R.S.A. 03 April 1980.
- 24 Finlayson, K. Chairman's Report of the Winterveld Working Committee. 06 August 1980 to 08 October 1980.
- 25 Minutes of the Winterveld Working Committee. 06 February 1981. Point 3.1.3.
- 26 Mabe, S. City of mud and tin. Winterveld waits in misery for facelift. Sunday Post. 06 July 1980. p 4.
- 27 Finlayson, K. Chairman's Report of the Winterveld Working Committee. 18 April 1980 to 06 June 1980. Point 2.2
- 28 Minutes of the I.G.M.C. on the Winterveld. 06 June 1980. Point 9.10.
- 29 Matsetela. op.cit. p 1.
- 30 Minutes of the Winterveld Working Committee. 11 September 1980. Points 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.
- 31 Finlayson, K. Chairman's Report of the Winterveld Working Committee. 06 June to 06 August 1980. Point 2.2.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Minutes of the Winterveld Working Committee. 11 September 1980. Point 1.2.5.
- 35 N.B.R.I. Winterveld Socio-Economic Survey. Pretoria. March 1983. p i-iv.
- 36 This point was emphasised in both the Inter-Governmental Report and in seminars on the Winterveld led by the Architectural Branch, at the University of Cape Town, in April 1983.
- 37 N.B.R.I. Inter-Governmental Report on the Winterveld. 1981. p 2.
- 38 Ibid.

- 39 N.B.R.I. Community Health Centres: Bohuthatswana Study.  
N.B.R.I., 1976. P 2.
- 40 Press release of September 1980, obtained from the African Studies section of the U.N.I.S.A. Library, Pretoria. Unclassified. p 2.
- 41 Minutes of the Winterveld Working Committee. 06 February 1981.  
Point 2.2.6.2.
- 42 Surplus Peoples Project. op.cit. Vol 5. p 315.
- 43 \* Matsetela. op.cit. p 8.
- \* Development Studies Group Education Collective Winterveld, in Control. Development Studies Group, University of the Witwatersrand, 1979.
- \* Giorgiades, S. Winterveld: Shanty town of oft-shattered dreams. Sunday Express. 05 March 1981.
- \* The magistrate of Odi quoted by Laurence, P. Magistrate speaks out on squatters. Rand Daily Mail. 25 January 1979.
- \* Smit, P. and Booyesen, J.J. Swart Verstedeliking: Proses Patroon en Strategie. Cape Town. Tafelberg Press, 1981. p 92.
- 44 N.B.R.I. Socio-Economic Survey. Pretoria. March 1983. pp 11 & 12.
- 45 Ibid. p 12.
- 46 N.B.R.I. Plotowners' Survey. Pretoria. June 1981. p 2.
- 47 The two presentations were at the University of Cape Town in April 1983. The one address was to the Congress of the Institute of South African Architects (I.S.A.A.), while the other was to the fifth and sixth year students of the School of Architecture.
- 48 This was raised during the discussion time, after the address to the I.S.A.A. in April 1983.
- 49 Minutes of the I.G.M.C. on the Winterveld. October 1980.  
Point 7.
- 50 N.B.R.I. Plotowners' Survey. Pretoria. June 1981. p 2.
- 51 Ngale, N. Soldiers, police blitz Winterveld. Sowetan. 14 April 1982.
- 52 N.B.R.I. Inter-Governmental Report on the Winterveld. 1981 p 4.
- 53 Letter to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, from Winterveld Plotowners. 28 November 1977.
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Point 5; and 18 April 1980. Point 7.4.
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- 97 The was stated at a seminar on the Winterveld held at the N.B.R.I. in January 1981.
- 98 Once again, the full content and implications of the press statement were spelt out at the seminar held on the Winterveld at the N.B.R.I. in January 1981.
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22 August 1982. p 1015.
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30 April 1982.
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January 1981. It should be noted that at this time self-help housing  
was still being resisted by the Department of Community Development.  
While the Department of Co-operation and Development favoured self-  
help schemes, they may have adopted this cautionary approach as the  
Department of Community Development still controlled housing finance.
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the Architectural Branch. January 1981.
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Point 2.2.6.5.
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06 July 1983. p 5.
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April 1983.

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- 130 Ibid. p 18.
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## CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION

An historical survey of the Winterveld situation and an analysis of the issues around which conflict developed has allowed for an understanding of why the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I. entered the Winterveld situation. Furthermore, while the Branch entered the situation as 'technical experts', it has become evident that they played a highly specific role within new forms of control which were being developed.

The Winterveld did not fit into the hierarchy of controlled settlements established by the South African government in the Bantustans during the 1950's and 1960's. This uncontrolled settlement represented a weakness in the labour control mechanisms and also signalled the need for the government to devise new strategies to deal with the urbanisation which was taking place on the borders of controlled townships. This need was particularly evident in the Winterveld however, for, as the Architectural Branch pointed out, the methods devised for establishing residential control in the Winterveld were to be used in similar circumstances elsewhere in southern Africa. Thus it can be noted that the Architectural Branch were extending their brief well beyond their original statement of intent to one of implementing apartheid settlement policy.

Their original statement of intent had proposed that as technical experts they could adopt a community participation strategy to upgrade the Winterveld. The result would be better living conditions fostered through African private entrepreneurial initiative. It has been argued that the Branch knew that the state would favour these policies as the latter was

trying to withdraw from the problematic political position of being the sole landlord of the African community. The question which should be asked is whether the Architectural Branch also initially intended to work on the imposition of influx control besides propagating state withdrawal from housing provision.

It may be argued that the Architectural Branch was unaware at the outset that the implementation of new forms of residential control would comprise the major portion of its work. The Branch may well have considered itself neutral in these matters with no intention of working on the new forms of control. Furthermore, it may be argued that the Architectural Branch was merely following a selection procedure with respect to who was to receive the benefits of upgraded sanitary services and housing and who was to be excluded. This would be a major aspect of any housing project with a 'waiting list' of those who wanted to be included. It is difficult however to conceive that the Architectural Branch, with its previous history of involvement in African housing, was unaware that in the past the South African government had used housing to draw a distinction between those who were the employed "insiders" and the unemployed "outsiders".

Even if the Architectural Branch was unaware at the outset that the community participation upgrading strategy would lead to residential control, it is evident that by the time the population survey was initiated they were aware of the consequences of their actions. The Branch noted that the registering of pass book numbers against individual houses would be used to control the movement of people at a later date. Moreover, the

Branch disguised this intention of the survey in order to overcome community resistance.

Yet it was not only in the area of influx control that the Architectural Branch was seen to be playing a role well beyond that of 'technical experts'. Their interpretation of the survey results in such a way as to project the Winterveld as a "place of hope" to which people had moved voluntarily, denied the historical evidence that the people had been forced there through relocation out of white cities and off white farms. Furthermore, the projection of the Winterveld as a place of hope denied the evidence that people were forced to stay in the Winterveld rather than move closer to the work opportunities of Pretoria. Ultimately, the Architectural Branch stood exposed as it did not have the power to act as arbitrator between the community and the state. In particular, it could not resolve the pressing problem of work permits for the unemployed. Members of the Architectural Branch may have considered themselves "neutral technical experts" who could deal with the appalling living conditions, however their goal of ensuring private entrepreneurial initiative meant that they overlooked the more fundamental problems of commuting and the fact that the low income levels of the residents could not support the provision of services on a 'free market' basis. Indeed, with the survey results showing extremely low incomes and proportionally exorbitant transport costs, the integrity of the Architectural Branch must be called into question when it projected the Winterveld as a situation suitable for the encouragement of 'private enterprise' housing.<sup>(1)</sup>

A further question which arises is whether the Architectural Branch could have pursued an alternative course of action which would have aligned it more closely with the interests of the residents of the Winterveld. In response to this, it should be stated that the proposals of the Inter-Governmental Report did allow the plotowners to realise their interest of retaining their land, albeit on condition that they controlled influx into the area. It was, however, more difficult for the Branch to align itself with the interests of the tenants as this would have required it to deal more effectively with the problems of commuting. This would have led to the Branch questioning why the residents should not have been settled closer to the work opportunities of Pretoria. Clearly, this would have been outside the brief laid down by the Inter-Governmental Management Committee. This questioning would also have brought the Branch into conflict with its client, the South African government, who had moved the residents of the Winterveld out of Pretoria and into the Bantustan in the first instance. This meant that, even if the Architectural Branch had had the will actively to identify with the interests of the tenants, the consequences would have threatened the securing of future contracts from the state.

It may be postulated that, if the Architectural Branch had wanted to acknowledge the interests of the tenants as laid out in Chapter 3, it would have had to work towards unifying the tenant community around their own clearly articulated interests within the forum of the I.G.M.C. This course of action would have necessitated revealing the results of the surveys to aid the tenants, who could then have used the results to emphasise the importance of their labour to the Pretoria-Rand area. The tenants could

also have emphasised the negative effects of the long commuting times. Whether this would have effectively influenced the proposals of the Inter-Governmental Report however, is debatable.

As it was, the Architectural Branch had taken away the little power which the unemployed tenants had to by-pass influx control - namely: their anonymity. In the future, those residents not registered in the surveys would not be allowed to stay in the Winterveld. Furthermore, as the Architectural Branch moved on to apply the methods of surveying in other regions in Southern Africa, they would effectively be updating the registration of the residence of Africans on a comprehensive, possibly nationwide, scale. This was essential if the South African government was to do away with the pass book system of influx control and move towards a system of control based on officially registered residence.

There is a great deal, with regard to the policies and practices adopted in the Winterveld, which is specific to that situation. It is important to note, however, that the adoption of the new policies in other areas in the future should be carefully monitored, particularly with respect to the running of surveys and the registration of residence. The apartheid state used the N.B.R.I. to develop the techniques necessary to implement full control of the urban African population in the 1950's and 1960's. Later, it switched its attention to Bantustan urbanisation and the creation of border townships within the Bantustans. The Winterveld situation represented a new crisis to which the Architectural Branch of the N.B.R.I. could respond in the 1970's as the state tried to deal with the squatting crisis on the edge of Bantustan towns. Thus the N.B.R.I. was playing a

vital role as the South African government expanded the web of state control over residence, reaching out ever further from the 'white' cities.

In conclusion, it must be noted that it is important for architects to perceive their work in an historical perspective. Such a perspective will allow them to examine their role more self-critically, particularly within the history of the interaction of the under-developed communities with the state. This, in turn, will lead to a more thorough examination of the concept of the role of the state and to a questioning of the architects' relationship to the state. In particular, architects should be more self-critical with respect to where their own powers and interests lie. Only through a rigorous assessment of these factors can architects begin to work towards a more just society.

Finally, architects should consider their work on housing within the broad perspective of the political economy. Recently, the profession has wanted to make its expertise available to impoverished and unhoused communities through programmes incorporating community participation and free market housing. There has, however, been no questioning on a fundamental basis as to whether private initiative can, or will, provide housing to communities who can barely afford clean water, food and exorbitant transport costs, let alone profit for private entrepreneurs who might upgrade the sanitary services. Clearly, a broader understanding of the difference between the 'need' for sanitary services and housing and the 'solvent demand' for these commodities is imperative. This would involve the profession in a far broader debate concerning the nature of the relations of production in the building industry and the economy as a whole.

A broad understanding of the role of the state within the economy will highlight the fact that the state is bound by the laws of capitalism when it produces serviced land or housing. The state will, therefore, favour those who are most likely to be able to afford the cost of services and housing. We have noted this in the South African context and this conclusion is concurrent with the findings of Pradilla in his studies on South American housing policy.<sup>(2)</sup> Therefore, any demand by architects for more state finance for serviced land will be made in a context where the state will favour the allocation of serviced land or housing to the employed. The result is that where architects enter state housing initiatives, they may intentionally or unintentionally, enter into a process of separating the employed from the unemployed. This dilemma must be faced.

It is the opinion of the author that a broadened understanding of the context and nature of their work will not lead professionals into a paralysis concerning their work. Rather it opens up the possibility for more effective intervention in the establishment of a just society.

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#### FOOTNOTES

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