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THE INTRODUCTION OF BANTU EDUCATION AND THE QUESTION OF RESISTANCE: CO-OPERATION, NON-COLLABORATION OR DEFIANCE? THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICAN SCHOOLING WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CAPE TOWN, 1945 - 1960

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ABSTRACT

THE INTRODUCTION OF BANTU EDUCATION AND THE QUESTION OF RESISTANCE: CO-OPERATION, NON-COLLABORATION OR DEFIANCE? THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICAN SCHOOLING WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CAPE TOWN, 1945 - 1960.

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The purpose of the Bantu Education Act was to extend the state's direct political control over African communities; African resistance modified this control and shaped the implementation of Bantu Education.

Through the centralization of the administration and the financing of African schooling the state was able to accommodate an increasing demand for schooling at a reduced cost per pupil. Control of these schools was exercised through inspectors and through statutory School Committees and School Boards. A secondary purpose of Bantu Education was to provide suitably skilled and co-operative workers to meet the needs of a growing industrial economy.

The major national resistance to state control came from the A.N.C. in the form of the Bantu Education Campaign. This plan that parents should withdraw their children from state schools from 1 April 1955 received wide support in the East Rand and Eastern Cape areas. African opposition to the intervention by the state also influenced the outcome of Bantu Education - it defined the limits of the state's control and it increased the need to supply an acceptably academic education.

A case study of the implementation of Bantu Education in Cape Town illustrates the above contentions. Not only were School Boards and Committees used to regulate the schools, also the selective opening of schools in the new official location and closing of other schools in "non-African" areas point to Bantu Education being used as a lever to resettle Africans. Economically the expansion of African schooling coincided with a rapid growth in Cape Town's industry but there was no simple correspondence between the two.

The response to the A.N.C. call to withdraw pupils from schools in Cape Town was limited not because of the absence of traditions of resistance in the City but because of divisions between resistance movements. The defiant proposal of the A.N.C. was condemned by the Cape African Teachers' Association (and the Unity Movement) as shifting the burden of the struggle onto the children. The conflict between the two bodies concerned more than tactical differences since they refused to co-operate even when their tactics were the same (e.g. to boycott School Boards and School Committees). The failure to unite resistance to Bantu Education in Cape Town arose essentially from the fact that the local A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. branches were linked to opposing movements for national liberation, viz. the Congress Alliance and the Non-European Unity Movement respectively. The latter body called on Africans not to collaborate by participating on School Boards or voting for School Committees.

In contrast to the above two resistance movements, the a-political Cape African Teachers' Union was prepared to co-operate with the state and to restrict its opposition to protest through the official channels. Each of these three groupings contributed to the shaping of state policy. Each made it necessary for the state to demonstrate its commitment to African education especially through the increased provision of schooling.

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PREFACE

This study was undertaken while the consequences of the 1980 schools' boycott were becoming apparent. Most senior African pupils in Cape Town lost at least that year of schooling. The reason for their apparent rejection of their schools despite their keenness to learn was puzzling. As personal friendships with pupils, families and teachers have deepened through my work with Scripture Union so I grasped a little of the ambivalence they experienced towards the schools.

Initially my research was restricted to reading about Bantu Education especially in relation to Christian-Nationalism. That focus was interesting but unhelpful. It failed to go beyond the explanation that Christian-National Education stemmed from a religious conviction but was subverted to a political end. There followed an attempt to explain Bantu Education as ideology. That too proved to be a blind alley dark with words.

The break came during a week's visit in July 1983 to the manuscript departments of the libraries of the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) and the University of South Africa (Pretoria). At first I found myself wading through fascinating documentary material relating to the 1950s. A discussion with Tom Lodge (WITS) and two days with Gregor Cuthbertson (UNISA) gave valuable direction. Most of the time though I was beyond my depth, not knowing how to select material strategically, but I did come away with some useful photocopies and a sense of closeness to key figures of the fifties whom I had met through their personal letters and files.

The ground became more sure under foot as I consulted newspapers in the South African Library (Cape Town) and began to gain a feel for the period when Bantu Education was born. Rather than theology or ideology, history became the primary focus as my supervisor, Peter Kallaway, sent me back repeatedly to find more raw data on the one hand and to read yet another new book on the other. Wisely, he discouraged me from seeking interviews until I knew the contours of the period. The interviews in November 1984 were fruitful. I am deeply grateful to the 19 people who gave me their trust and a half-hour to three hours of their time in this way. While their contributions are recorded anonymously in the text to preserve confidentiality, the insights of those teachers, politicians and clergy have made the struggles of the fifties come alive. I was fortunate to speak to people

who co-operated with the Government as compliant teachers and inspectors, as well as to those who denounced Bantu Education and refused to "collaborate" by supporting School Boards and Committees, as well as to those who defied the state in open boycott. It is hoped that this exposure has prevented a misrepresentation of any one of these positions.

The lines of the argument which have shaped the dissertation came into focus during 1985 as Cape Town erupted again. The renewed schools' boycotts and teacher activism of 1985 echoed the resistance strategies of the fifties. While not wishing to fall into the trap of interpreting the past in the light of the present, the similarities between the 1950s and 1980s are a salutary reminder that those holding a view of education in the present that is not rooted in a grasp of the past will continually be surprised at the repeated outbreak of "disturbances" in the schools.

Chapter 5 was presented in a slightly adapted form as a paper at the fifth workshop on the history of Cape Town at the University of Cape Town in December 1985.

I wish to thank the librarians of the African Studies Department for help given me while I studied in each of their three recent locations, and the Education Library for the use of a carrel during 1985. Dr E. Bradlow kindly gave me permission to attend her History Honours Seminars on South Africa during 1981. I have a debt to my first supervisor, Prof. Owen van den Berg, for inspiring me to get started. Although the period is the one that he suggested, I have travelled with a view different to the one we first envisaged and have moved away from a concentration on educational policy to include a study of African agency as shaping that policy.

Prof. John de Gruchy, Prof. Clive Millar, Prof. Colin Bundy, Dr Ken Hartshorne, Dr Howard Philips, Frank Molteno, Mary Simons and Mohamed Adhikari have each given of their time, encouragement and insight to this project which one of them called "dauntingly diverse". Peter Kallaway has given himself to dozens of discussions to guide this dissertation whenever I have pressed him for time. He has also in the process taught me some of the research skills I missed by not doing an honours course in history. I have appreciated his intolerance of poor style and argument in the papers I have submitted to him.

I wish to thank my father, Alan Cameron, for his persistent help and patient editorial aid, Anne Williams for her help with the typing and Diana Hoffa for typing the bulk of the manuscript with care and speed under pressure. Most of all I thank Bridget, my wife, for her firm encouragement to get each chapter finished. She has had to be father and mother to Alison, Gregory and Christopher for much too long.

Mike Cameron
March 1986

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation		Reference page
A.A.C.	All African Convention	194
A.F.C.W.U.	African Food and Canning Workers' Union	121
A.N.C.	African National Congress / also Congress	16
A.N.C.(W.C.)	African National Congress (Western Cape)	
A.N.C.(W.L.)	African National Congress (Women's League)	116
Anti-C.A.D.	Anti-Coloured Affairs Department	61, 194
C.A.T.A.	Cape African Teachers' Association	194
C.A.T.A.P.A.W.	Cape Association To Abolish Passes for African Women	116
C.A.T.U.	Cape African Teachers' Union - breakaway from C.A.T.A.	194
C.T.F.C.	Cape Teachers' Federal Council	194
C.N.E.	Christian-National Education	27
C.N.T.A.	Cape Native Teachers' Association - forerunner of C.A.T.A.	
C.O.D.	Congress of Democrats	70
C.P.S.A.	Communist Party of South Africa	61
D.V.T.	Departmental Visiting Inspector	140
F.C.W.U.	Food and Canning Workers' Union	121
F.R.A.C. (Fr.A.C.)	Franchise Action Committee	113
F.S.A.W.	Federation of South African Women	116
I.C.U.	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union	111
M.O.H.	Medical Officer of Health	92
N.A.D.	Native Affairs Department	
N.C.W.	National Council of Women	116
N.E.U.M.	Non-European Unity Movement / also Unity Movement	194
N.P.	National Party	
N.R.C.	Native Representative Council	17
N.V.A.	Ndabeni Vigilance Association	104
N.W.D.T.U.	North Western Districts Teachers' Union	72
S.A.B.R.A.	Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse Aangeleenthede	
S.A.C.P.O.	South African Coloured Peoples' Organization	
S.A.I.C.	South African Indian Congress	63
S.A.I.R.R.	South African Institute of Race Relations	
S.G.E.	Superintendent General of Education - head of Cape Education Department	
S.H.A.W.C.O.	Students Health and Welfare Community Organization	
T.A.R.C.	Train Apartheid Resistance Committee	113
T.B.	Tuberculosis	
T.E.P.A.	Teachers' Educational and Professional Association - Breakaway from T.L.S.A.	194
T.L.S.A.	Teachers' League of South Africa - Coloured	194
T.O.B.	Transkeian Organized Bodies	169
U.G.	Union Government	
U.P.	United Party	

THREE RESISTANCE/OPPOSITION TRADITIONS

Body/ tradition	1. Congress Alliance/Movement Defiance	2. N.E.U.M. Non-collaboration	3. Cape Liberal Tradition Co-operation
	ASSOCIATED BODIES:	ASSOCIATED BODIES:	ASSOCIATED BODIES:
Coloured	S.A.C.P.O.	Anti-C.A.D. T.L.S.A.	
White	C.O.D.		Liberal Party; S.A.I.R.R.
African	A.N.C.	A.A.C. C.A.T.A.	C.A.T.U.
Indian	S.A.I.C.		
Publications	Guardian Advance New Age	The Torch Educational Journal The Teachers' Vision	

Explanatory Note

Repeated reference is made in the text to the strategies of the three principal opposition bodies: the defiance of the A.N.C., the non-collaboration of C.A.T.A. and the co-operation of C.A.T.U. These three bodies were associated with wider political movements, e.g. the A.N.C. worked alongside the C.O.D. in the Congress Alliance. The above table is given in order to help the reader to locate a particular body in its relationship to other bodies. It is not intended as the basis for an analysis of opposition movements.

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INTRODUCTION

The basic question confronted in this study is why the South African State took over the full control of African schooling in the 1950s. Bantu Education was created firstly to serve the economic needs of the country at a time of rapid secondary industrialization. Secondly to help to meet the political need for methods of coercive control over an emergent African proletariat. Thirdly it was intended to legitimise White hegemony in the eyes of African people who were looking for their own freedom as they saw the success of colonised peoples against imperial powers (e.g. in India) and the rise of African nationalism to the north. Each of the above three outlooks throws some light on the nature of Bantu Education and each is discussed in some detail in the body of the dissertation.

The need for such a work arises from some significant omissions in writing on Bantu Education over the past two decades. A brief review of relevant literature is given below in order to point out gaps in current knowledge and to establish the value of a local case study of the introduction of Bantu Education in one place (Cape Town).

The dissertation examines three interpretations of Bantu Education: as a tool for economic growth, as a means of entrenching political control and as seeking an inexpensive mass education system. In the first place some writers on Bantu Education have emphasized its role in securing the growth of South Africa's capitalist economy. By contrast Robert C. Jones[1] has argued that it was a hindrance to growth. His work is typical of an early liberal viewpoint. His essay on Bantu Education singles out three major issues, financing policy, the low proportion of secondary pupils and thirdly the insistence on mother-tongue instruction throughout primary school.[2] The theme of Jones's argument is that there is a contradiction between the government's policy of encouraging African development and its policy of limiting the amount of finance available for Bantu Education to income from "Bantu economic productivity and tax revenues".[3] The two quotations which follow are given because they illustrate the commonly held naive position that Bantu Education policy is economically irrational.

> "It would appear to be to the benefit of the Afrikaner himself to see progress advance (sic) as rapidly as possible, *toward a well-educated Bantu population*, thus moving up to the day when apartheid ... could be achieved to the fullest. What other conclusion can be reached...?"[4]

> "Since a basic objective which is stated by the Nationalist government is to assist the Bantu in developing gr ater respect for his cultural heritage, it logically follows that all steps should be taken which raise the level of his educational attainment."[5]

Jones does not seek the purpose of Bantu Education beyond the stated intentions of Government policy. Hence he cannot reconcile the Government's supposed desire for "the mutual benefit of all ethnic groups"[6] with its apparent failure to finance Bantu Education.[7] Despite this naivety it is to Jones's credit that he focusses on the relationship between Bantu Education and the economy.

A second approach which is taken by conservative authors such as A.L. Behr and, more recently, R.M. Ruperti sees no conflict in the relationship between the economy and Bantu Education. Education is viewed as if it existed in a political and economic vacuum. The respective treatments of Bantu Education reveal this clearly.

In a text book for education students A.L. Behr has written a chapter entitled "Education for non-Whites".[8] The book purports to present "the more important aspects and problems of the South African educational system against the background of its historical development."[9] The relevant chapter commences with a purely descriptive account of seventeenth century slave schooling, and eighteenth and nineteenth century mission education. No interpretative comment appears in the careful listing of the numerous reports of important officials who visited mission settlements. Although quotations from their reports cry out for comment regarding the nature of colonial rule and the role of mission stations in securing the submissive co-operation of local people, Behr is silent.[10] Neither does he comment on the wider political role of the four White controlled territories of "South Africa" from 1806 to Union in 1910. Furthermore, his treatment of the 1936 Interdepartmental

Committee Report on Native Education is narrowly descriptive and does not even mention the relationship of "Native Education" to the significant "Native" legislation of Hertzog's Government in the mid-thirties. His non-interpretative outline of the Eiselen Commission Report (1951) is also characteristic. Despite a promising remark that it "was one of the most important and controversial documents on education ever to be produced in South Africa"[11] no reason is given why this should be so. The only passing mention of any controversy concerns the mild reaction of the Conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations which, Behr says, "opposed ... the idea of a separate type of education designed specifically for the Bantu."[12] Behr's approach to his work is that of the stamp collector. He patiently catalogues the report's recommendations into neat subsections without comment. This selective focus on Reports and Acts makes a powerful statement about what is "of interest to students of education in this country and overseas."[13] The blandness of Behr's approach and his view of education as a benefit for all and the state's intentions as benign typify an uncritical Afrikaner Nationalist position.

R.M. Ruperti attempts a theoretical focus but is unable to reflect on the profound value judgements implicit in her a-political descriptive approach. Ruperti divides her book into two parts: a theoretical "orientation" and an applied "analysis".[14] The first section states the presuppositions which give structure to her work. The basis of each system of schooling is the religion ("ground motive") of the people it serves. Various determing "natural" and "cultural" factors are seen as influencing a given education system. For example, geographical conditions determined migration patterns and thus shaped the all-important inter-cultural contact between "Europeans" and "Bantu". The results of such contact and the way in which it takes place are the key to Ruperti's orientation. She says that "contact between cultures always results in one influencing the other."[15] She applies this in a patronising way to the African peoples of South Africa.

> "For the rest (i.e. the non-equatorial tribes) the various Black tribes lived in comparative isolation, an isolation interrupted mainly by inter-tribal warfare. The strength of the tribe as a continuing community depended on this isolation. The older folk transmitted the tribal culture unchanged to the next generation. Change was regarded with suspicion and

> even enmity as it could endanger the continuing identity of the community. The exaggerated importance accorded to tradition is typical of an introverted community lacking enriching contact with other communities ... the comparative peace enforced by colonial powers and encouraged by contact with more developed Western cultures marked the beginning of a period of comparatively vigorous cultural unfolding."[16]

This outlook is blind to the violence used by the colonial powers which destroyed African tribal economies. It is also biased in that it portrays White colonists as enforcing (sic) a peace which resulted in cultural development. Presumably when peace follows the defeat of one African tribe by another there is no cultural effect worth mentioning. Ruperti sees enrichment resulting from contact with Europeans in what is otherwise viewed as a static African tribal culture. She ignores the effects of the inherent conflict of interests between the colonial power and the African tribes. Her view is functionalist in that it studies the structure of schooling but not conflicts of interest regarding the allocation of resources. Also there is no sense of historical development.

The second section of Ruperti's book is predictably descriptive and lamentably lacking in explanatory power. Chapters 5 to 11 wade through details of educational policy and organization. "This work," she claims, "is mainly descriptive and, to a certain extent, explanatory. It does not seek to evaluate explicitly." But it does evaluate as her treatment of African schooling demonstrates. Like Behr, she is preoccupied with formal policy statements. Her chapter on legislation applying to African education simply lists four major Acts in one six-line paragraph without comment, but then proceeds to devote an entire page to the development of what she calls Black legislative assemblies in the independent homelands. Her work reflects hidden value judgements which arise as much from what she omits as what she says.

In a refreshing contrast to the above two dry accounts, there is the insight of Penny Enslin who depicts such apparently a-political educational philosophy as an ideological smokescreen hiding real material interests.

For example, she criticizes the Christian National Education policy, on which Bantu Education is supposedly based, as serving "the purpose of justifying a separate and inferior schooling system for Blacks."[17] She further criticizes the role of the current educational philosophy of Fundamental Pedagogics for excluding a consideration of political questions from its analysis of education in South Africa.[18] This exclusion, she says, serves to promote an ideology of White racial superiority since it explicitly avoids identifying the interests which it serves.[19]

The works of Behr and Ruperti have been reviewed in the light of Enslin's article because of their avoidance of the key question of the role of Bantu Education as a tool for economic growth. And this silence is a political action. For the sake of completeness two other recent articles which highlight the economic purpose of Bantu Education must be mentioned. Frank Molteno has written on "The historical foundations of the schooling of Black South Africans".[20] In his article he outlines the economic sense of Bantu Education in its teaching of rudimentary skills needed by growing industry.[21] The second article, by Pam Christie and Colin Collins, views Bantu Education as reproducing the labour required by the growing capitalist state.[22] They introduce their article with an illuminating caricature of a naive liberal position[23] but fail to acknowledge their debt to mature liberal research which is clear from their footnotes.[24] Nevertheless their article focusses attention on the importance of examining the relation between Bantu Education and economic growth.

A second answer in the writings on Bantu Education to the question of why the state centralized control of African schooling is given in terms of political control. The best case for this has been made by J.D. Shingler.[25] He contends that the goal of Bantu Education was the establishment of political order, a point which Molteno also makes.[26] Both authors see the significance of centralized control as enabling the state to influence the thinking of the African people, "to subvert the political and economic aspirations of Black South Africans" as Molteno puts it.[27] As this point is developed and discussed in some detail below,[28] it will not be developed further here.

A third mode of explanation is that Bantu Education was essentially a mass education system introduced to expand African schooling as rapidly as possible. While Collins and Christie argue this point as part of the state's economic programme[29] and Molteno mentions it in relation to political control,[30] it has not been systematically evaluated as an objective in its own right. This is attempted in chapter 2 following lines suggested by some helpful popular education studies on nineteenth century England.[31]

The dissertation as a whole presents Bantu Education from two perspectives: in terms of policy and resistance. On the one hand chapter 2 suggests that the policy of Bantu Education was shaped by economic, political and demographic demands. These three interpretations are tested in chapter 5 to see whether they describe accurately the reality of Bantu Education in a specific place, Cape Town.

For example, the question: "Was Bantu Education implemented primarily to serve the labour needs of capitalism?", is asked in chapter 2 and answered in chapter 5 for the case of Cape Town. This example also illustrates the need for background material on African labour in Cape Town. Chapter 4 sketches this needed socio-economic picture of Cape Town of the 1950s, and details local housing and employment practices. This in turn makes it possible in chapter 5 to show how the provision and closure of schools was used to bolster an apartheid housing policy.

In summary then, chapter 5 on African schooling in Cape Town depends on chapter 4's outline of Cape Town in the 1950s. And these two chapters are written to test the theoretical propositions made in chapter 2 about the purposes of Bantu Education.

Resistance is the second major theme of this dissertation. It overlaps with the above discussion of African schooling policy and development. Resistance is handled in four places in the text. A section in chapter 1 traces the various African views on schooling over the period prior to the take-over of schools by the Nationalist Government. Secondly, the nation-wide development of resistance to Bantu Education is depicted in chapter 3. This then gives the background for a detailed study in

chapter 6 of the three major African responses to the introduction of Bantu Education in Cape Town. Chapter 4 explains these three responses (co-operation, non-collaboration and defiance) in terms of broader resistance strategies in Cape Town.

These strategies are discussed in the light of a key definition of grades of resistance.[32] The struggle for the schools is thus set in the context of a broad range of political and ideological battles. The manner in which parents and teachers resited is examined in the light of these wider struggles. At the same time their resistance incorporates specific features related to schooling and these are described and assessed according to given criteria. African resistance to Bantu Education was strong, varied and widespread but writing on the subject tends either to ignore it or to treat it descriptively. This dissertation has had two objectives in relation to resistance. On the one hand it has investigated the resistance which did take place (some of which had not been systematically recorded).[33] On the other hand it offers a tentative theoretical consideration of the problematic concept of resistance in the school context (in chapter 6).

The inclusion of interview material in the text has made this dissertation longer than would have been necessary if the information had been available from secondary sources. Owing to the sensitive nature of some of the material, the interviews cited in the text are numbered to preserve anonymity. A confidential list is in the possession of the dissertation supervisor, Mr P. Kallaway.

An explanation must be made about the use of the terms "Bantu", "African" and "Native". This category (as well as White, Coloured, European, non-European) must be viewed with due caution. In Cape Town in the 1950s there was no clearly defined boundary between the racial groups and the use of these terms especially prior to the Population Registration Act is a problem. These racial terms are used as denoting common usage not an acceptance of the underlying race ideology.

In the light of the foregoing discussion of the problems facing research into the nature of Bantu Education a new mode of analysis may be helpful. This dissertation emphasizes that a contextual study of a major city like

Cape Town provides an illuminating perspective on the nature of Bantu Education and resistance to its introduction. Thus the first part of this dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, provides a theoretical background with chapter 2 being pivotal, and chapters 4 to 6 provide a means of testing the theory to see if it describes the reality of one place accurately. It is this exercise of concentrating on apartheid education in the context of a specific period and place which leads to a bold assertion of the findings as they are summarized in the Conclusion.

INTRODUCTION: NOTES

1. "The Education of the Bantu in South Africa" in Rose, B. (ed.) Education in Southern Africa. London, 1970, pp. 38-89.
2. Ibid., pp. 86,87.
3. Ibid., p. 86. Emphasis in original.
4. Ibid., pp. 87,88.
5. Ibid., p. 85.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 86.
8. Behr, A.L. and MacMillan, R.G. Education in South Africa. Pretoria, 1966, pp. 307-377. In 1952 Behr obtained a D.Ed. degree for a thesis entitled "Three centuries of Coloured education in South Africa". Ibid., p. 377.
9. Ibid., preface.
10. See for example Lt.-Col. Bird's delighted report on the Pacaltsdorp mission station in 1819, Ibid., p. 318.
11. Ibid., p. 348.
12. Ibid., p. 351.
13. Ibid., preface.
14. Ruperti, R.M. The education system in South Africa. Pretoria. 1976. The respective lengths of the two sections are 41 pages and 130 pages.
15. Ibid., p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. 19.
17. Enslin, P. "The role of Fundamental Pedagogics in the formulation of educational policy in South Africa" in Kallaway, P. (ed.) Apartheid and Education. Johannesburg, 1984, p. 141.
18. Ibid., p. 144.
19. Ibid., pp. 140,146.
20. In Kallaway, 1984, pp. 45-107.
21. For an assessment of Molteno's position see below pp. 44, 45.
22. Christie, P. and Collins, C. "Bantu Education: apartheid ideology and labour reproduction" in Kallaway, 1984, p. 163. See also below ch. 2, p. 37 and ch. 5, pp. 142-148 for an outline and assessment of their view.
23. Collins and Christie, 1984, pp. 160-162. Their description fits the more polemical writing of authors such as Ian Robertson. In his Harvard Ed.D. thesis on "Education in South Africa" he argues that the purpose of the Nationalist Government was the entrenchment of segregation and White domination and that this aim was reflected in its educational policy based on Christian Nationalism. Robertson, 1973, p. 3.
24. Collins and Christie, 1984, p. 183. Especially the work of Horrell and Malherbe.

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25. Shingler, J.D. Education and political order in South Africa, 1902-1961. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1973.

26. Molteno, 1984, p. 94. See also below p. 45.

27. Molteno, 1984, p. 94.

28. Ch. 2, pp. 41, 42 gives an evaluation of Shingler's analysis.

29. See below for a quotation ch. 5, p. 131.

30. Molteno, 1984, pp. 90,94.

31. See below ch. 2, pp. 44-52.

32. See below pp. 104, 105.

33. Lodge, T. Black politics in South Africa, Johannesburg, 1983.
Gerhart, G. Black power in South Africa. Los Angeles, 1978.
Feit, E. African opposition in South Africa, Stanford, 1967.
The above texts provide three of the major published records of resistance. Molteno's lengthy article also has an extensive treatment of the subject (ref. in note 20 above).

CHAPTER 1

A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE 1953

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of important landmarks and directions in African educational policy prior to Bantu Education. It is not necessary to review the details of the subject as these have already been extensively covered elsewhere.[1] Nevertheless it is important to outline the opposing viewpoints of the African leaders and of the Afrikaner Nationalist politicians who challenged United Party policy.

Three aspects of both the U.P. policy and the later Nationalist Government's "Bantu Education" policy need to be distinguished since they are often confused: education policy as stated by the politicians, the liberal critique of such policies, and the actual schooling practices which were supposed to reflect these policies. This dissertation attempts both to test Government policy in the light of real developments and to test the conventional interpretations of African education policy.

1.2 United Party "Native Education" policy

Bahlmann[2] has characterized United Party policy under Smuts concerning African education as moving tardily towards piecemeal reform. An essential dilemma was was faced by the U.P. Government. On the one hand the Minister of Education, J.H. Hofmeyr, was keen to extend African schooling especially in the rapidly growing urban areas both in response to African demand and in order to control these volatile areas. One commentator has summed up the need for this succinctly:

> "With shortage of housing, lessening of family control and other social problems arising from a large and rapid movement of population, it became evident that many more schools were needed in urban areas to combat neglect of children and a growth of juverile delinquency."[3]

There was certainly a need to secure social stability by opening more schools for uban Africans. But on the other hand the extension of African schooling was seen by a strong section of the white electorate as both threatening and costly. The National Party exploited this fear that white jobs were at stake. In the words of an N.P. Member of Parliament in 1945:

> "the Natives will be powerful competitors with the Europeans in every sphere. They are given the same education as the whites and it will not be long before they dominate on account of their tremendous majority."[4]

The cost of African eduation to the taxpayer was a further concern of the electorate which kept the U.P. back. Again Nationalists were quick to deplore the rapid increase in expenditure on African education at the alleged expense of the white man.

> "In 1938 the expenditure on Native education was £893 000, and in 1944 it had risen to £1 900 000, and in 1945 to £2 530 000 if we include the amount devoted to the feeding of natives. We must rather be careful."[5]

> "The European is taxed in order to pay old age pensions to the natives. The European is taxed to provide the natives with education. The European is taxed to pay wounded natives and coloured people and buy land for them."[6]

The attitude of Prime Minister Smuts to the dilemma of 'Native' policy as a whole was to urge Hofmeyr to move as fast as the electorate would allow. In a comment to Hofmeyr in the latter half of 1946 during the tension of the African mineworkers' strike Smuts said

> "our native policy would have to be liberalized at modest pace but public opinion has to be carried with us..."[7]

Regarding the actual African education policy of the Smuts Government, Bahlmann has put forward the following case.[8] The intention was to

limit the budget so as not to antagonise the white taxpayers; to restrict vocational and technical training to protect white skilled labour; and to commence school feeding (from 1943) in order to combat malnutrition.[9] Bahlmann does not account for the increase in enrolment during his period. He recognises that the number of African pupils was rising at a faster rate than expenditure[10] and he explains the U.P.'s limited funding of 'Native' education in terms of the white fear of an educated African majority and white reluctance to pay for their own downfall.[11] What he fails to explain is why during the decade of the Smuts Government there was a continuous increase in African school attendance.[12] It may be argued that as enrolment was in the hands of the provinces, it was not in the central government's power to regulate it and to point out that the government's refusal to fund Native education on a per capita basis (as recommended by the Welsh Committee) is proof that it did not wish to, or have the power to control intake. But this is begging the question. Is it not likely that increasing school attendance was in fact a major policy objective of the U.P. in view of the vast, rapidly growing urban shanty towns and the accumulation in rural villages of unemployed landless people? This point will be explored in the following chapter.

Bahlmann does cover the critical areas of the financing and control of 'Native' education.[13] The central Government provided the finance for each Province to subsidise its own African schooling programme but the Provinces jealously guarded their right to disburse funds and so monitor the development of African schooling.[14] The first public body to consider African education from a national perspective was an Interdepartmental Committee under the chairmanship of W.T. Welsh in 1935-6. The Committee recommended a substantial increase in financial provision and deplored the shortsightedness behind the "fairly

general" idea "that native education should be done 'on the cheap', an idea which may yet cost future generations very dear."[15] It also recommended that control of African education should be taken from the Provinces and vested in the central Union Department of Education. Ultimate executive authority was to be in the hands of the Union Minister of Education, and while there would be provincially organised departments of African education, these departments would be responsible directly to the Minister. This was a radical proposition and it was opposed by the Provinces.[16] It was another two decades before centralized control of African education was actually achieved by the Bantu Education Act of 1953, and then not under the Department of Education as proposed by the Welsh Committee, but rather under the Department of Native Affairs as had been suggested by the 1936 annual report of the Native Affairs Commission.[17] As will be shown in the next section, African leaders were wanting centralised control of 'Native' education but under the Minister of Education, not the Minister of Native Affairs. The Native Affairs Commission argued along the same lines as the Native Education Commission (under W.W.M. Eiselen) was to argue in its report of 1951: the law concerning the education of Africans should be closely linked to other laws regulating African life especially with regard to urban residence and labour. Put bluntly, the 'education' of Natives' was to serve 'Native' policy and not to induct the 'Native' into 'European' society by providing the same education as for whites under one Union Education Department. It appears that the clash of ideas over how the education of Africans should be financed and controlled was a reflection of the debate over the direction of what was termed 'Native policy.' This was an issue which the United Party was never able to resolve. At the end of its term of office it was moving hesitantly in a reformist direction. The U.P.'s so-called Fagan (Native Laws Commission) Report of February 1948 proposed inter alia a uniform pass

system, the relaxing of influx control by means of a centrally co-ordinated system of labour bureaux, the "stabilization" of urban African society by permitting workers to bring their families with them, and the creation of concentrated village settlements in the Reserves for the landless.[18] But it was the new formulation of the Sauer Report (1948) of Malan's National Party which won the electorate's support with its promise of a 'Native policy' based on racial separation in every possible sphere of life including the residential, educational, social, and labour fields. O'Meara has argued that the Sauer report only differed in substance from the Fagan Report on one key issue viz. that it allocated surplus African labour to the Reserves.[19] This seems a bit strong in that it denies or at least underplays the role of the voter's desire for a clear cut policy of the Nationalists. The N.P. policy was unhampered by the inherent contradiction of the U.P. policy - there was no clash of interests between the need on the one hand to greatly increase spending to extend African schooling and so quieten the clamorous calls of African leaders and the simultaneous need to protect White jobs and limit spending. In the Nationalist view it did not matter what the 'wrongly educated' African thought, it was in the African's best interest to have a rurally based, culturally specific education to which was contributed directly as much as possible. A strict application of segregation to African schooling would help to ensure that whites were protected in their political domination.

1.3 African views on U.P. 'Native Education' policy

The two basic issues which preoccupied the United Party Government about 'Native' education were funding and control. The bases for collecting and distributing finance for African schools and the question of the centralization of control were also points of extensive

discussion by African organizations during the same period.[20] The views of African political bodies on the issue of Native education were not static over the years c. 1935 to 1948. In the 1930 s demands were largely for limited changes in specific areas such as would benefit the African elite which already had access to post elementary schooling. By the mid forties the demand had changed to a call for full democratic rights including access to a free, compulsory and unsegregated education for all. Before outlining this transition in the views of African political bodies a brief description of each organization is necessary to bring these changes into context and to give background for chapter three which discusses their responses to Bantu Education in the 1950s. The major bodies directly concerned with African education at the time were the African National Congress (A.N.C.), the All African Convention (A.A.C), and the Native Representative Council (N.R.C.).

The A.N.C. dated back to the time of Union and had a history of protest against legislation discriminating against African people. Its leadership was largely mission-educated and incorporated the conservative House of Chiefs (only abolished in 1943). In its strategy it was on the whole cautious in order to remain acceptable to the White Parliament that it hoped to influence. This changed gradually in the forties under Dr. A. Xuma's leadership and particularly from 1943 when in its document, African Claims ,the A.N.C. called for a universal franchise.[21] In 1944 Xuma initiated a Youth League which injected new vigour into the A.N.C. The Youth League was more radical and exclusively Africanist than the parent body and began to take a higher profile after 1948.

In 1936 and 1937 despite A.N.C. and other African opposition Prime

Minister Hertzog persisted in pushing through his so-called Native Bills which deprived the Cape's African voters of their place on the common voters' roll, as well as Bills to tighten the 1913 Land Act and to control migration towards the towns.[22] The proposed legislation brought African opposition groups together at the All African Convention in Bloemfontein in December 1935. Despite the wide range of African groups present at the Convention its motions were carried unanimously. This unanimity is understandable because the Convention refused to choose between establishing a permanent organisation committed to non-co-operation with the government on the one hand and adopting a reformist stance seeking change by negotiation and deputation on the other. An A.A.C. delegation to the Prime Minister was led by D.D.T. Jabavu but it did not succeed in averting the legislation. In 1937 the A.A.C. constituted itself as a permanent body under Jabavu and adopted a gradualist policy.[23] The A.A.C. continued to hold annual conferences but it was only after it espoused the cause of Non-European unity in 1943 that it revived and came to the point of pledging itself "to fight for full democratic rights".[24]

Partly in exchange for the loss of the Cape African vote the Native Representative Council and five white Native Representatives in Parliament were provided by the 1936 Representation of Natives Act. The N.R.C. was an advisory body[25] of eight elected and four nominated members meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Native Affairs. Although A.N.C. and A.A.C men served at times on the N.R.C.[26] it retained its conservative attitude throughout the war years (1939 - 1945). It was only in 1946 at the time of the African Mineworkers' strike that the N.R.C. suspended its sittings in angry rejection of the government's failure to consult it on key issues. At this point Senator Edgar Brookes, a Native Representative in Parliament, urged

Hofmeyr, the Acting Prime Minister, to take a clearly reformist stance on urgent matters such as pass laws and to appoint a judicial enquiry into the miners' strike.[27] Brookes also called for an unequivocal declaration "in favour of free and compulsory education."[28] But the statutory representatives of Africans were impotent to bring the Smuts government to change the tradition of white control which meant upholding pass laws, repression of African trade unions, and inadequately funded education.

During the term of office of the United Party Government the African demand for educational reform shifted in its emphasis from seeking piecemeal changes for the benefit of the few to demanding schooling as a universal right for all. This was certainly true of the A.N.C. and the A.A.C. by 1943, and if Senator Brookes can be taken as expressing the views of the N.R.C. it was also true of that body by 1946. In the early period, during the 1930 s, African bodies sought a variety of changes most of which had been proposed by the 1936 Welsh Report[29] on Native Education but had not been implemented by the Union Government. The A.A.C. adopted a policy in 1937 which referred explicitly to this report in its section 8 on Education.

> "The first steps towards improving the present inadequate system of Native education is to put into force the recommendations made in the Inter-Departmental Report on Native Education (1936) ... especially the points suggesting
> (a) .... that Native education be financed on a per capita basis ...
> (b) equal pay for African and European teachers ...
> (c) and a general improvement in the salary scales of African teachers."[30]

It is not difficult to see which of the elite African interests were being considered by this statement. A notable omission is the issue of whether control should be centrally administered by the Union Department of Education, but is is possible that the furore raised

by the Cape Province[31] in this regard made a statement unnecessary. Two years later however, this question was very much alive and it was taken up both by the N.R.C. and the A.N.C. in 1939. In February the N.R.C., also referring back to the Welsh Report, adopted resolutions calling for the control of African education to be transferred from the Provincial Council to the Union Government, and for the administration and financing to be dissociated from the Native Affairs Department and undertaken by the Union Education Department.[32] The matter was clearly one of considerable concern at the time. In May the A.N.C. President-General, Rev. Z. Mahabane, and the Secretary General, Rev. J. Calata, joined with the extremely conservative Advisory Boards Congress in a deputation to interview the Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs. Resolution 14 of the Report[33] dealt with "Native Education." The verbatim report of the proceedings gives a rich insight into the thinking of the African leaders at this time of moderation. The fairly extensive quotation of the report which follows is not given because the delegation was crucial but rather because its views are typical. The A.N.C. expressed the same view as the February N.R.C. resolution about centralising the control of African education under the Union Education Department. It is significant that the case for this was being presented to the Minister of Native Affairs. On behalf of the A.N.C. Rev. A.S. Mtimkulu presented the resolution and argued the essential issue at stake viz. whether the education of Africans should be on the same lines as white education.

> "As we are here to live side by side with the Europeans it is essential that we should understand each other, and that is impossible if we are to be educated on different lines.
> Congress is of the opinion that Education can only be properly controlled by a body of specialists primarily interested in Education. It is also essential that the Department of Education should breathe the atmosphere....."[34]

Control by the Native Affairs Department would not be in the African interest, argued Mtimkulu:

> "the segregation of Native Education would be detrimental to its interests. Although the Natives have confidence in the Native Affairs Department, still it is associated in their minds with the courts of law."[35]

With this key issue of control out of the way the delegation turned to finance. On the question of the funding of 'Native' education J.M. Lekhetho argued that it should not be related to income from the variable Poll Tax, which was resented, but that

> "it should be financed from the General revenue. Apart from many ways in which general revenue is increased by our indirect taxation it should be taken into consideration that the country derives immense profits from the cheap labour supplied by the natives .... we consider that we have a share in the profits which accrue to the country as a result of the low wages paid to Natives."[36]

At the end of the year in December 1939 the A.N.C. Annual Conference called for improved funding on a per caput basis, and for the provision of "milk and soup kitchens".[37] The Smuts government did eventually acceed to the idea of a school feeding scheme for Africans in 1943.[38] What is significant here is that it was at least in part in reply to the request from Africans themselves that the scheme was introduced. The United Party Government was not altogether deaf to African concerns and as will be shown in chapter 5 regarding Cape Town, African schooling expanded throughout its period. The first African high school was built there in the early forties and enrolment at Cape Town schools grew steadily. But that did not mean African education was improving in the eyes of critics who compared its inadequate sponsorship with that of White schools.

In 1943 while conservatives such as N.R.C. Councillor Selope Thema were still asking for educated Africans to be recognised as equals of

the Whites[39] the political demands by the more radical African leaders had changed from gradualism to an outright demand for political freedom for all Africans. The A.N.C.'s African Claims (1943) called for universal adult suffrage and the repeal of laws discriminating on the basis of race. As far as education was concerned "(t)he right of every African child to a free and compulsory education"[40] was asserted. The A.N.C. was no longer campaigning for the improvement of aspects of education, it was focussing on the central issue of political rights and integrating its demand for schooling into this. The Smuts Government rejected the Claims as unrealistic.[41] The A.A.C. issued a comparable document on 26 August 1943. The tone was more strident and the scope was broader, including all non-Europeans in its definition of African.[42] Three of the eleven rights it claimed were related to education.

> " (6) Equal educational facilities and equal subsidies for all children irrespective of colour.
>
> (7) Compulsory and free education for all children up to Standard 7 and free education up to Standard 10 .
>
> (11) The repeal of all colour discrimination in political, educational, industrial and social spheres."[43]

There was no mention of teachers' salaries which had been such a central concern in 1937.[44] The year 1943 introduced a demand for free, compulsory education. Senator Brookes urged Hofmeyr in 1946 to agree in principle to this demand. Hofmeyr's answer was given to the N.R.C. at its session on 20/11/1946 when he sidestepped the issue of African rights and instead of announcing intended reforms he pointed out all that the Government was doing for the Africans quoting as one example the improvements brought by the 1945 Education Finance Act.[45] With a sharply repressed mineworkers' strike just past and a general election campaign just over a year away the United Party was caught between African demands for political freedom and the extremely

successful jibes of the Afrikaner Nationalists that segregation was being allowed to lapse.

1.4 The views of Afrikaner Nationalists on 'Native' education up to 1948

The United Party's policy on 'Native' education tried to reconcile the mutually exclusive goals of meeting African demands and pacifying Malan's Nationalists who were making political capital out of Hofmeyr's alleged liberality towards the Africans. The Nationalists maintained that 'Native' education under the U.P. had three basic shortcomings: it was inadequately controlled, it was inappropriately financed, and worst of all it was moving in the wrong direction as it destroyed tribal culture and made Africans unfit for manual labour.

The first shortcoming as the Nationalists saw it was that the schooling of African children lay in the hands of too many authorities. Schools for Africans were run by almost every church denomination[46] they were inspected by the Provincial Education Departments, and largely paid for by the central Government. The Nationalists used the opportunity of the Native Education Finance Bill (1945) to attack this unwieldy system of divided responsibility. They stated that increased expenditure on African education was not justified unless adequate controls were also instituted. The answer given by Education Minister, J.H. Hofmeyr, was that a Union Advisory Board on Native Education would allocate the funds to the Provinces and advise, but not dictate, how these should be spent.[47] The Nationalist Party was divided on the question of Provincial control. The Orange Free Sate leader, C.R. Swart, was in favour of the retention of Provincial powers while M.C. de Wet Nel and others wanted to centralise control under the Department of

Native Affairs, Swart agreed to support the Nationalist amendment calling for a full enquiry into Native Education on the understanding that Provinces would still have the say in their respective African schools. The amendment proposed that the house should decline

> "to pass any legislation in regard to the financing of native education until a competent Commission of Enquiry has investigated and reported thereon with the object of placing it under the Department of Native Affairs in order to obtain uniformity of policy and administration."[48]

It is significant that while the amendment was defeated, it was proposing a similar course that was to be followed by the Eiselen Commission (1949-51) and subsequent Bantu Education Act (1953) in centralising control under the Department of Native Affairs.

The second shortcoming of the U.P.'s 'Native' education policy was closely related to the above complaint that there was inadequate control of state expenditure. It was that the money was coming from the wrong source. Instead of using 'White' taxes to pay for the schooling of African children,[49] it was proposed that Africans should directly support their own schools. A key Nationalist document issued in 1948 actually spelled out that "the financing of native education must be placed on such a basis that it does not occur at the cost of White education."[50]

In the Nationalists' view the most serious danger inherent in the U.P. policy was not finance or control in themselves. It was the Native policy in general and the direction of 'Native' education in particular which was considered to be a threat to the continuance of White political control of the country. A few months before the Nationalist victory, Nationalist M.P. J.G. Strydom attacked the naivety of Hofmeyr's education policy.

> "He wants to raise all the non-Europeans to the standard of the European and then he expects them, with their overwhelming numerical superiority to accept our leadership - the leadership of a handful in a country of millions and millions of non-Europeans."[51]

Not only was the political and economic security of Whites seen to be threatened by educating Africans but the schooling given by the churches was seen to cause the African to be unwilling to do manual work. It was asserted in Parliament that the proper direction of schooling was to "teach him (the African) manual labour, and his schools must be run so that he will be capable of performing manual labour."[52]

W.D. Brink (N.P.) had much the same idea in mind when he claimed

> "... the general purpose of education is to prepare people for life. What upbringing has the native necessary in South Africa? The great majority of them are labourers. Let them be prepared for that work. Then they will be better equipped for life."[53]

The roots of this thinking are two-fold. There was an influential group within the Nationalist ranks which saw the real danger of the U.P.'s schooling policy for Africans not primarily in terms of the Whites' self-interest but as robbing Africans of their cultural heritage. Instead of a Westernized education, which was seen as undermining African values, a specially adapted education was required. A typical statement of one proposed alternative was made by Rev. Gustav Eiselen in 1932.[54] Schools should teach Christianity, "Bantu" culture, "useful" citizenship, and the know-how of agricultural work. Mother tongue should be the basis of all instruction.[55] This type of thinking was partly based on the rather abstruse philosophy of German cultural idealism which proposed a fairly static view of culture.[56]

The view that education should be specially adapted for Africans was

also current in the English-speaking world. In Natal, for example, it was linked to the segregationist thought of Maurice S. Evans.[57] He influenced Charles T. Loram who was seen as "South Africa's leading White authority on African education" in the 1920s.[58] These two men looked to the United States for a model for rural African schooling and found it in the Jeanes scheme. This model sought to get away from bookish, White-orientated schooling and to persuade the local community to "view education in terms of successful living and the performance of everyday tasks in the home and on the farm."[59]

While in no way querying the sincerity of the men who put forward these views, a question remains concerning the way such a clearly articulated philosophy was used as Nationalist theoreticians hammered out a 'Native' policy in the 1930s and 1940s. That there was a close link between Eiselen's outlook and Nationalist arguments is clear from the latter's use of similar forms of expression. In 1932 Rev. G. Eiselen wrote from his Bothsabelo Mission:

> "To steep the Bantu completely in the distinctive ways of Europeans is to rob them of their own distinctiveness, to withdraw the solid basis from underneath their feet, to leave them suspended in mid-air, so that they cannot but fall."[60]

Echoing this in 1945 P. Sauer of the Nationalist Party accused some missionaries of this very crime:

> "... but they gave the native nothing which was of value to him but took away from him something that was his own, with the result that he was left in the air with something he did not understand."[61]

The link is clear. The Nationalist policy-makers were using this

cultural preservation argument as a basis for their attack on the United Party. When they came to power they were to use it again to justify Bantu Education, and it was the son of Rev. Gustav Eiselen who was its chief architect. Despite the fact that an unchanging tribal culture did not exist, the goal of the Nationalists was well served by the argument that they were safeguarding African culture. The disintegration of tribal economies and the urbanization of vast numbers of Africans had changed the patterns of social and economic relationships in 'African' societies beyond recognition. Who then was responsible for drafting the alternative 'Native' education policy and to what real end? Without wishing to imply a dark conspiracy by men intent on power, it is suggested that during the 1930s and 40s the policy was developed by leaders of various groups of White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and bound the latter together with a common aim.

The Afrikaner-Broederbond was influential in formulating the principles and implementing the strategy which led to the capture of State power in 1948. O'Meara has argued that the Bond laid the basis for a class alliance by forging a sense of Afrikaner identity. It accomplished this by economic means and by forging a sense of Afrikaner identity especially through its fight for Christian-National Education and home language tuition.[62] There were various interests, some of them conflicting, in this new alliance of Afrikaans-speaking Whites. There is evidence that some Afrikaans workers refused to be drawn into any co-operation with capital,[63] but the majority of the White Afrikaans workers accepted the control of Afrikaner capital in exchange for the promise of stronger legislation to protect Whites from the competition of African labour. While the differences of interest between

Afrikaans speakers were negotiated in this way, certain major areas of common interest were developed. Policy and ideology were formulated by the leaders and the reactions of the people were sought before it was redrafted and issued both at a popular and at a scholarly level.[64] An illustration of this is the way in which the ideology of Christian-National Education (C.N.E.) was worked out and the slogans and justifications which emerged from that process. At the level of the popular slogan the chairman of the issuing body of the C.N.E. policy statement,[65] J.C. van Rooy, wrote in his preface

> "We do not want any mixture of languages, of culture, of religion or of race. We are winning the language-medium struggle. The struggle for the Christian and National school still lies ahead...."[66]

At the more scholarly level, there are the 15 articles of the Christian-National Education Policy document itself. While it is not an academic treatise, van Rooy claimed that the document had been published "after nearly ten years of studious effort."[67] At an intellectual level the document deals with 15 subjects, the last of which is "Native Education". This article is given in full below because of its relevance to Bantu Education.

> "Art. 15. Native Education.
>
> "We believe that the calling and task of White South Africa with respect to the native is to christianise him and to assist him culturally, and that this calling and task has already found its clearly defined expression in the principles of guardianship, no levelling, and segregation.
>
> "Therefore we believe that any system of education of the native should be based on these three principles. In accordance with these principles we believe that education of the native should be based on the life and world view of the European, more particularly that of the Boer nation as the senior European guardian of the native, and that the native should be led to a mutatis mutandis but independent acceptance of the Christian and national principles in education, as these principles are more fully described in the foregoing articles 1, 2 and 3. We believe also that

> the mother-tongue is the basis of native education, but that the two official languages of the country should be learned as subjects because they are the official languages of the country and are for the native the key to that 'culture-adoption' which is necessary for his own cultural advancement. Because of the cultural immaturity of the native we believe that it is the right and duty of the state in co-operation with the Christian Protestant churches to provide for and control native education. We believe, however, that the education of the native and the training of native teachers should be undertaken by the natives themselves as soon as possible, but under the control and guidance of the state; with this proviso, however, that the financing of native education be placed on such a basis that it does not take place at the cost of European education. We believe finally that native education should lead to the development of an independent self-supporting and self-providing native community on a Christian-National basis."[68]

The high-sounding religious and cultural purpose is clearly qualified at the outset in terms of complete segregation. In recommending the continued participation of the Christian Protestant Churches in 'Native' education, the Article differs from what was enacted five years later. In other respects the 1943 C.N.E. proposals were followed by the Bantu Education Act of 1953 specifying mother-tongue teaching, the teaching of Afrikaans[69] and regarding the basis of financing. It is clear that the C.N.E. document influenced Nationalist policy. The document itself can be traced back to the initiative of the Afrikaner-Broederbond. One of the articles of the Bond's constitution stated that

> "all brothers should strive for the following seven ideals in their political activities:
> ... (7) the Afrikanerizing of public life and our education and teaching in the Christian-National sense."[70]

The application of apparently the same principle to African education gave an ingenious method for popularising Christian-Nationalism among poor Whites who feared the competition of Africans with a fully Westernized education. This fear had a strong racist component to it. While

it is true that the White working class was seeking protection from another (African) fraction of the working class, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that a generation previously most of the Afrikaans White workers had lived in the countryside and that their forebears had relatively recently been involved in bloody battles with African tribes.

1.5 Conclusion

African education was evidently a hot political subject prior to the introduction of Bantu Education in 1953. The material covered in this chapter provides a background for the discussion in chapter 5 of Cape Town African schooling before 1953. The present chapter shows that the seemingly peaceable development reflected in the table on page 135 took place against the opposition of Nationalist politicians especially in regard to the direction and control of African schooling. Also it was the subject of repeated demands by African leaders - at first for improved schooling for the few who could gain admission and then from 1943 for compulsory schooling in unsegregated schools. The changes in African schooling were the outcome of a contest.

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1. See Bahlmann, B.B. Some aspects of Native education policy in South Africa from 1939 until 1948. M.Ed. Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1983. Hunt Davis, R. "The administration and financing of African education in South Africa 1910-1953" in Kallaway, 1984, pp. 126-138.

2. Bahlmann, 1983.

3. Atkinson, N. Teaching South Africans: a history of educational policy in South Africa. Salisbury, 1978, pp. 213-4.

4. W.D. Brink, Assembly Debates, April-May 1945, vol. 53; col. 4532, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 70.

5. M.C. de Wet Nel, Assembly Debates, 5/4/1945, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 87.

6. Gen. J.C.G. Kemp, Assembly Debates, 8/4/1945, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 89.

7. Davenport, T.R.H. South Africa a modern history. Second ed., Johannesburg, 1978, pp. 243-4.

8. pp. 194-200.

9. Bahlmann also points out that the purpose of school feeding may have been to increase school attendance and so help to reduce juvenile delinquency. It might be added that it also had something to do with limiting the potential for urban resistance.

10. For example in a section entitled "Increased enrolments but decreased expenditure", p. 41.

11. Ibid., pp. 194,195.

12. Horrell, M. Bantu Education to 1968. Johannesburg, 1968, pp. 51,52 gives the following attendance figures:

Year	Attendance	Percentage increase	Percentage increase per annum	Average annual increase
1930	284 250	-	-	1930-1950: 5,5%
1935	353 044	24,2	4,8	
1940	464 024	31,4	6,3	
1945	587 586	26,6	5,3	
1950	747 026	27,1	5,4	1950-1965: 7,6%
1955	1 005 774	34,6	6,9	
1960	1 500 008	49,1	9,8	
1965*	1 950 558	30,0	6,0	* includes Transkei

13. Bahlmann, 1983, chapter 5, pp. 65-73, and chapter 6, pp. 75-96 respectively.

14. See for example the Report of the Superintendent General of Education. Cape Education Department, 1956, pp. 44,45. This is discussed in Atkinson, 1978, p. 215.

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15. Quoted in Atkinson, 1978, p. 214.

16. Ibid., p. 215.

17. Ibid., p. 216.

18. Davenport, 1978, p. 245.

19. O'Meara, D. Volkskapitalisme. Cambridge, 1983, p. 235.

20. Karis, T. and Carter, G.M. (ed.) From Protest to Challenge. 1935-1952, vol. 2, Hope and Challenge, 1973. For example A.N.C., p. 200; Youth League, pp. 325,326; A.A.C., p. 356.

21. Ibid., pp. 209-222.

22. The Representation of Natives Bill was enacted at a joint sitting of Parliament on 7/4/1936 following a vote of 169 to 11. The Native Trust and Land Act of May 1936 provided for the additional acquisition of 7 1/4 million morgen of land for African use and entrenched the traditional status quo of communal ownership in the Reserves. The Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Bill (passed in 1937) was seen by Africans at the All African Convention as threatening "to disorganize everything already indicated by urban Africans in the way of self-development." Quoted in Karis and Carter, vol. 2, 1973, p. 30.

23. See the document entitled "Policy of the All African Convention, as found in the minutes of ... December 1937" (sic), in Karis, T. and Carter, G.M., Microfilm Reel 7A, hereafter "Reel 7A".

24. "The programme of the All African Convention" on Reel 7A. On the subject of Non-European unity see ch. 3 below.

25. Carter and Karis, vol 2, 1973, p. 225.

26. Davenport, 1978, p. 223.

27. Davenport, T.R.H. "The Smuts government and the Africans", in I.C.S. Seminar Papers, 1974, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 168.

28. Ibid.

29. See above, pp. 13,14.

30. Minutes of the A.A.C., December 1937, Reel 7A, see note 23.

31. Atkinson, 1978, p. 216.

32. S.A. Outlook, 1/3/1939. Referred to in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 164.

33. "Report of the joint deputation of African National Congress and Advisory Boards Congress", 16/5/1939, Reel 7A, see note 23.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. The same sentiment was expressed by Rev. Mtimkulu.

37. Resolutions passed at the annual conference of the A.N.C., 15 to 18 December 1939, Reel 7A, see note 23.

38. See Bahlmann, 1983, pp. 108-128 for details of the scheme and related debates. The timing was significant in that the critical war situation required African support.

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39. Ballinger, V.M.L. From Union to Apartheid. Cape Town, 1969, p. 167. Quoted in Bahlmann, p. 156.

40. Quoted in Bahlmann, p. 173.

41. Davenport, 1978, p. 247.

42. "The programme of the A.A.C.", 26/8/1943, Reel 7A, see note 23.

43. Ibid.

44. See above, p. 18.

45. Davenport, 1974, p. 87, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 169. The appointment of the Fagan Commission had already been made known to the N.R.C. in August, Bahlmann, p. 168.

46. Table listing the number of African mission schools being run by the various denominations (n.d. but after 1946). Document obtained from the University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Literary and Historical Papers, S.A.I.R.R., B. Boxes, 321-10.

47. Bahlmann, 1983, pp. 82-84.

48. Quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, pp. 85-86.

49. See above, p. 12. Also Bahlmann, 1983, p. 125.

50. See below, p. 28.

51. Quoted in Bahlmann, pp. 54-55.

52. J.N. le Roux, Assembly Debates, 28/4/1947, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 156.

53. Quoted in Bahlmann, pp. 60,61, from Assembly Debates, April 1945, col. 4536. It is obviously a word for word translation from the Afrikaans.

54. Rev. Eiselen's son was W.W.M. Eiselen, the chairman of the Commission on Native Education (1949-1951) and then Secretary of the Native Affairs Department when Bantu Education was introduced. South African Who's Who 1956. Johannesburg, 1956, p. 214.

55. See appendix I for an elaboration of these points. The memorandum was obtained from the Department of Literary and Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand. S.A.I.R.R., B Boxes, 321-10.

56. Douglas Bax (Johannesburg, n.d. 1980?) succinctly outlines the thinking of the German Lutheran philosopher J.G. von Herder (1744-1803) who proposed that every people (Volk) possessed a "unique Volksgeist or collective historical personality which made every Volk an organic whole and gave it a coherent and unique culture. ... Thus men were above all members of national communities; only as such, only through the medium of language and the tradition of the Volk could they be truly creative, truly themselves, in accordance with God's calling." See also note 57.

57. Shingler, 1973, pp. 292-294.

58. Hunt Davis, R. "Charles T. Loram and the American Model for African Education in South Africa" in Kallaway, 1984, pp. 110-11.

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59. Ibid., p. 117. The question as to why this view ever gained currency in the United States does not appear to have been explored. It seems likely that it may have been acceptable there because of its similarity to Dewey's views that education in general should be closely related to life. It would have required but a small step from this to conceive an education adapted to African needs. This idea was suggested by Peter Kallaway in a discussion on 17/9/1985 and merits further exploration.

60. Memorandum on Native Education, p. 3, see note 55 above.

61. Assembly Debates, 5/4/1945, col. 4507, quoted in Bahlmann, 1983, p. 95.

62. O'Meara, 1983, p. 245. See note 19 above.

63. For example those in the Garment Workers' Union. O'Meara, 1983, pp. 94-5 gives details of this particular cause, while p. 242 refers to the failure of the Nationalists to win over "both artisans and workers in those industrial unions with a history of militant struggle."

64. This application of Gramsci's idea to the Afrikaner Broederbond is given by O'Meara, 1983, p. 15.

65. Die Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereeniginge, usually abbreviated to F.A.K. The document was literally translated from the Afrikaans by J. Chr. Coetzee in 1949. S.A.I.R.R., B. Boxes, 321-D.

66. Ibid., p. 3.

67. Ibid., p. 4.

68. Ibid., Article 15.

69. Afrikaans had been largely neglected up to that time. English was not only taught, it was usually the medium of instruction for Africans.

70. Watcher, W.H., White Laager, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p. 283.

CHAPTER 2

THE TRANSFORMATION OF 'NATIVE' EDUCATION INTO BANTU EDUCATION

2.1 Introduction: the nature of Bantu Education

The present chapter is concerned with the nature of Bantu Education: was it politically[1] or economically[2] determined? Clearly both views are valid but the question is: which provides the better explanation? Was Bantu Education introduced during the 1950s to meet the demand for social and political control or was it a response to the needs of economic growth? This chapter, while it will present evidence for each outlook, is not intended to resolve the debate. Rather it seeks to stake out the contested terrain as preparation for a detailed case study of African schooling in Greater Cape Town. A study of the application of Bantu Education policy and the response to it in Cape Town will make it possible to evaluate the political and economic functions empirically. The examination of schooling within a specific community context will dispel the confusion about Bantu Education in one urban area, and it may provide a base for a more complex analysis of the nature and purpose of Bantu Education in general. Rather than arguing in theoretical terms alone about why African schooling was transformed, this approach gives a way of assessing the different viewpoints empirically in a particular district during the critical period when Bantu Education was introduced.

Looking at urban education in general Gerald Grace[3] has warned against misguided empiricism which avoids theorising, which allows "the bleeding-heart liberal in us to pretend that we are contributing to a solution when in fact we are not", and which wades mindlessly through masses of statistical and anecdotal material and emerges with abstractions.[4] He suggests that

> "we need forms of empirical enquiry in urban education which, at their best, will be historically and theoretically situated on the one hand, and generative of critical action on the other."[5]

It is intended that the theorising of the present chapter should contribute towards a coherent critique of Bantu Education and that the empirical study of its development and the subsequent conflict in a key urban area will throw some light on possibilities for significant action regarding apartheid in education.

2.2 Schooling for economic growth: Bantu Education in the service of capitalism?

It has been argued that the growth of a country's economy to a large extent determines the development of its system of education. In this view the state uses or controls schools to serve the needs of economic production. Schools achieve this by reproducing both the skills and the workplace relationships required for production. According to this view future workers are prepared not only to be competent but also to be subservient, and at the same time a management group is prepared for its role of planning and control, i.e. to "dominate".

The American Marxist theoreticians, Bowles and Gintis, have argued along this line regarding schooling in the capitalist economy of the United States.[6] They maintain that schools are crucial to the structuring of society in that while they appear to reward according to merit, their function is to mirror the social relations of the capitalist society and so prepare their pupils to accept their future place in the economic order. They assert that

> "(e)ducation has been historically a device for allocating individuals to economic positions where inequality among the positions themselves is inherent...
> Repression, individual powerlessness, inequality of incomes, and inequality of opportunity do not originate historically in the educational system, nor do they derive from unequal and repressive schools today. The roots of repression and inequality lie in the structure and functioning of the capitalist economy."[7]

In this view the school is the primary institution used to prepare people to accept their station in the capitalist economy which is itself ruled by the "imperatives of profit and domination".[8] In pursuing profit the capitalist minority undermines the power of the worker majority both by means of force (repressive laws and police power) and by means of structuring a hierarchy of social relationships in the workplace to facilitate a broad acceptance of domination and to fragment labour power.[9] The school is an essential agent in this process. The authoritarian nature of the school helps make future workers submissive.[10] Schools also help to legitimate the control of capital over labour by "the ostensibly

meritocratic manner by which they reward and promote students, and allocate them to distinct positions in the occupational hierarchy".[11] By using a seemingly objective examination to rank pupils both the pupils who succeed and those who fail come to accept that they have deserved their place, i.e. that it is legitimate. In fairness it must be pointed out that Bowles and Gintis allow for abberation within their theory.

> "The authoritarian classroom does produce docile workers, but it also produces misfits and rebels. The university trains the elite in the skills of domination, but it has also given birth to a powerful radical movement and critique of capitalist society."[12]

This is a significant qualification because it suggests a role for individuals and groups in shaping educational systems. Bowles and Gintis do not make enough of this point. Local agency is an underestimated shaping force in schools. Challenges to schooling policy and practice do influence outcomes. This is one reason for the inclusion of two chapters in the present work on resistance by teachers and communities on issues related to schooling.

In a further qualification to their theory, Bowles and Gintis assert that schooling is not mechanistically determined by the uniform demand of capital. They see these demands as only one factor in a hotly contested domain involving many components.

> "Students, working people, parents, and others have attempted to use education to attain a greater share of the social wealth, to develop genuinely critical capacities, to gain material security, in short to pursue objectives different - and often diametrically opposed - to those of capital. Education in the United States is as contradictory and complex as the larger society; no simplistic or mechanical theory can help us understand it."[13]

Despite these caveats the theory of schooling proposed by Bowles and Gintis is essentially economistic in that it proposes a correspondence between the economy and the schools.

The view that an educational system corresponds to the broad needs of the capitalist economy cannot simply be applied to Bantu Education in the

South African context. Firstly because Bowles and Gintis wrote concerning American schooling in a mature capitalised society, and this outlook cannot be fairly applied to South African society in the 1950s. While South Africa at this time was entering a new phase of industrial growth, this growth focussed in a few urban areas and only indirectly drew the majority of the population into its orbit. There has, however, been an attempt to explain Bantu Education principally as a means to reproduce in African labour the skills and worker attitudes required by the developing capitalist economy in South Africa. This view has been put forward by Collins and Christie[14] who claim that the state expanded African schooling to meet the crisis caused by large-scale urbanization in the 1940s. As more Africans came to the towns, they needed to be absorbed into the urban capitalist mode of production.[15] Collins and Christie argue that this was largely achieved by increasing the intake of African children into the first years of elementary schooling.[16] These authors maintain that the content and style of this elementary schooling also served to teach African children their place. They claim that:

> "language instruction (in English or Afrikaans - MC) was ... to facilitate communication in the language of the employer (but) ... rudimentary exposure ... would perpetuate the ideology of inferiority, and the social relations of domination and subordination. On the other hand, four years of schooling would certainly perform the function of preparing blacks to participate in such bureaucratic practices as filling in basic forms, reading basic instructions ..."[17]

According to this theory Bantu Education intended the reproduction of both the labour skills and of submissive worker attitudes required for capitalist production at a stage of industrial expansion which increasingly demanded the labour of an urban African proletariat. It certainly provides one strong reason for the admission of increasing numbers of African children into schools. But to reduce Bantu Education to a response to the requirement of the economy for appropriate labour is to give an incomplete solution to a complex problem. The solution proposed does not readily fit the evidence. In Cape Town, for example, the expansion of African schools contradicted the pattern suggested by Collins and Christie as will be shown below.[18]

2.3 Bantu Education for political control

Not only has schooling been seen in terms of securing increased labour power from a docile work force, but it has also been argued that it has been used to secure political control. The case for the latter viewpoint has been put by a number of English writers concerned with the rapidly industrializing nineteenth century England. In an early paper[19] Richard Johnson argued from the extensive official records of 1846 that this was the intention of the British educational policy makers.[20] They saw economic growth as potentially benevolent for the working classes[21] but denounced working-class decadence[22] and planned a schooling policy of tightly controlled elementary schools[23] to "substitute for the abrogated functions of the working-class parent".[24] The concern behind this "early Victorian obsession with the education of the poor" was "about authority, about power, about the assertion (or the re-assertion?) of control".[25] Schooling was to be the means of salvation. "Supervised by its trusty teacher, surrounded by its playground walls, the school was to raise a new race of working people - respectful, cheerful, hard-working, loyal, pacific and religious."[26]

The idea that schools for the masses were founded for the purpose of social control has also been developed by other British authors. McCann has edited a book of nine articles on the subject spanning the entire 19th century.[27] The repeated refrain of the book is that popular education (as mass schooling was called) was a "process largely concerned with the control of children in the interests of social order".[28] McCann has made the point in his introduction that it is necessary to move beyond the functionalist definition of socialization (concerning mechanisms by which it is achieved), towards a focus on control, "the question of who guides, modifies or controls the behaviour of whom and for what purpose".[29] The implication of these and other writings on English schools in the 19th century is that education is by no means an unqualified good for the benefit of each individual but that it may have negative outcomes for the majority - even if a few individuals find success through it. In this view the purpose of schools for the majority is to keep the children away from bad influences and to bring them to accept control

and authority even when these are exercised to their disadvantage.

While there is impressive evidence for this in the English case, there has been no comprehensive attempt to establish links which would justify applying the same critique in the South African situation. It is tempting to draw parallels between the moralistic and paternalistic rhetoric of English educators and that of the South African Whites (both Afrikaner nationalist and English liberal) concerned with African schooling, but there are real problems in that the situations are not simply comparable. Not only was South Africa of the 1950s a post-colonial society, its educational development was racially based. While this does not mean that the English developments do not have bearing on the South African case, especially since so many English educators played key roles there (e.g. Bishop Colenso in Natal), it is clear that references to similarities between English popular education and Bantu Education will have to be read at the level of illustrative analogy rather than as comparative analysis. The goal of political control is nevertheless obviously common both to the English reformers of the nineteenth century and to the proponents of Bantu Education in the twentieth century. What is needed is a basis from which to explain how a similar process operated in two widely divergent situations.

The term 'political control' has been helpfully clarified by Gramsci.[30] He differentiates two fundamental types of political control: 'domination' (direct physical coercion) and 'hegemony' (obtaining consent or ideological control). This is a particularly useful distinction to apply to Bantu Education which is all too often viewed only as a harshly imposed system. Indeed, growing numbers of parents consented to Bantu Education by sending their children to state schools. This fact demands more careful attention. Gramsci suggested that to a large extent the dominant ideology is accepted and not imposed. Boggs explains Gramsci's view of the limitations of state power and the need for popular consent as follows:

> "He assumed that no regime regardless of how authoritarian it was, could sustain itself primarily through organised

> state power; in the long run, its scope of popular support or 'legitimacy' was always bound to contribute to stability, particularly during times of stress or crisis. ... By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil society - including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches and the family - of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or other supportive of the established order and in the class interests that dominate it."[31]

The two dimensions of political control, viz. domination and hegemony, are both illustrated in the English case mentioned above. State coercion is shown in the tightly controlled elementary schools based on authority and power. On the other hand, consent was subtly obtained from the community by the teacher. He acted as a social intermediary between the Department of Education which paid him and the community whose children he taught.[32] He obtained security in exchange for his work with working class children, getting them accustomed to discipline and order. While some elements of working class society opposed these schools,[33] it cannot be said that the schools were imposed on a population duped into believing in the virtue of submission. To say this is to argue that it is possible to impose a consciousness on people which works to their own detriment, i.e. it assumes working class people to be stupid. Rather, the working class accepted the moralistic tone of popular education in exchange for access to opportunity through learning of the three Rs. And those few who succeeded in being incorporated into the higher socio-economic strata provided support for the myth that diligence was usually rewarded. In this sense the majority of people were being 'duped' but there was at least some evidence for them to cling to the promise of an improved future.

By contrast, in the South African case it appears that the race laws were structured to prevent incorporation, i.e. apartheid legislation precluded upward social mobility for Africans. Two alternatives follow. Either Gramsci's theory does not apply to the instance of Bantu Education because the achievement of hegemony is impossible in a segregated society where there could be no ground for believing in advancement. Or Gramsci's

model is applicable and a substantial number of African people did in fact perceive that Bantu Education could be to their advantage, i.e. they saw through Verwoerd's rhetoric about not being allowed to "occupy posts within the European community"[34] and accepted Bantu Education because it offered a real opportunity to participate in the modern economy. It is this latter position which is taken up in the discussion which follows.[35]

An explanation of Bantu Education as the outcome of racially based ideologies being used to bolster political control has been made by J.D. Shingler.[36] He claims that the education of White and Black was used:

> "to preserve separate identities and to prevent the emergence of a common unity .... The Whites, and above all the Afrikaners, were able by means of education and related instruments of social policy, successfully to maintain and to protect their identity, power and status."[37]

Shingler argues that the Nationalist Government temporarily resolved the debate over the future direction of African policy in South Africa by clearly reasserting racial segregation. Whereas 'Native' education before 1950 had "rested tenuously on integrationist principles"[38] Bantu Education is seen as a principal means of maintaining a political order based on segregation. The major flaw in Shingler's otherwise perceptive treatment is that he views Bantu Education in idealistic terms. He refers to Bantu Education as "an awkward marriage of two segregationist doctrines, Christian-Nationalism and cultural idealism".[39]

There is a gap between this proposition and his other point that Bantu Education was about political control. What is it that makes a "doctrine" so powerful that it is able to control people, preventing them from acting in their own best interest? This is where Gramsci's distinction regarding political control is helpful. Gramsci's insight is that popular support was needed especially at times of crisis, and certainly

there was a growing challenge to White rule. This leads to the conclusion that while various doctrines may have been used to justify Bantu Education to White voters, the critical question is how did the African people come to accept it as sufficiently legitimate that they sent their children to school? The answer may be that they believed neither in preserving their tribal culture nor in developing along Christian-National lines, but rather that they were willing to ignore these justifications so long as their children could learn to read and write and so advance along the same path that the Whites had followed. There were of course some Africans who did not want their children to be schooled at all - for example, the red blanket Xhosas.[40] But for an increasing number of African parents, any schooling was sought after, even that under the Bantu Education Department. The school was seen as offering access to opportunity and this belief enhanced the established order. But that order was not maintained by consent alone.

Coercive political control in the field of Bantu Education was exercised through School Boards, School Committees and Departmental Sub-Inspectors. The composition, powers and functioning of the School Boards have been detailed by Horrell[41] and will only be sketched here. These bodies had a heavy responsibility for fund-raising for school building programmes but also possessed considerable powers over the appointment and dismissal of teachers.[42] The School Boards were dependent bodies both in their composition and in their functioning. The Department had to approve the appointment even of the elected members.[43] Also the Department could oblige a School Board to dismiss a teacher by simply withdrawing the subsidy for his/her salary.[44]

This is not to imply that the School Boards did not usually fulfil their intended function. The Board members had a stake in the smooth running of the schools, but the control nevertheless resided with the Department. In 1958 a meeting of the Council of the South African Institute of Race Relations requested that in the interest of these bodies exercising "effective control of their schools", their members should be fully elected, independent of Departmental approval and able to co-opt "missionaries and other interested qualified Europeans".[45] The Council

was overlooking the non-negotiable characteristic of the whole arrangement. The School Boards were created to be dependent bodies with enough real power over vital local affairs to draw support but always subject to the dictates of the Department. The State was co-opting African people from the community to carry out its purposes. An essential role of the School Board was that it legitimised the State's control. The evidence that Africans were exercising real power over the schools and securing their development was intended to give the impression that the community controlled the school.

At a lower level there were the School Committees which were set up for the same purpose of co-opting members of the community into bodies which would ensure that the schools ran smoothly and did not challenge the system of Bantu Education. Although they had an equal number of nominated and elected members, these appointments were also subject to the approval of the Secretary for Bantu Education who could suspend any member or disband the entire School Committee if, in his opinion, it was not serving the Bantu community.[46]

Another agency of state control introduced by the Bantu Education Department was the position of Sub-Inspector. This was the most senior position an African could hold in the teaching profession and a number of former Departmental Visiting Teachers took up the 39 new positions in the mid-fifties. The Sub-Inspectors' work involved many mundane responsibilities essential for the smooth running of the schools. These men also played a key role as the primary agents of the Department in the schools to ensure that the paid staff complied with regulations.

The African School Boards, School Committees and Sub-Inspectorships were agencies of organized state power. To some extent the state could use these agencies to impose its will on African teachers, children and parents. But to avoid the appearance of domination the state offered positions on these bodies to African people, i.e. it tried to use these bodies to gain support from the community. It is shown in chapter 6 that at least initially African communities resisted this hegemonic intention by refusing to participate in the new bodies. The coercive role of these agencies was then thrown into relief as they were used to dismiss teachers and to close schools.

2.4 Bantu Education: elementary schooling for the masses

A central but often overlooked feature of African schooling during the mid-20th century is its remarkable expansion both before and after the Bantu Act was signed in 1953. Attendance grew from half a million during World War II to one million by 1955 and to nearly two million by 1965. This represented a phenomenal average growth rate of 5,7% per annum between 1940 and 1955.

Two questions about this need to be asked. Firstly, why has this feature been underplayed in critical writing on Bantu Education? And secondly, would it not be reasonable to view Bantu Education as a strategy for mass schooling, an attempt to transform 'Native' education into a system that could expand to cater for the masses?

In reply to the first question, there are many reasons why the continuous expansion of African schooling has been underemphasized until recently. Some liberal interpretations[47] of Bantu Education have tended to focus on policy rather than practice.[48] The startling statements made by the Minister of Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, appear to provide a wealth of evidence for the view that the Bantu Education policy was primarily reactionary and racist. So much so that in establishing this point, the evident growth is almost ignored.

In contrast to this omission some radical scholars have pointed out, and sometimes even stressed,[49] the increase in attendance. Frank Molteno has suggested that Bantu Education was intended to increase the number of people with rudimentary skills. Part of the aim, he says, to meet the demands of an emergent manufacturing industry:

> "was initially to reduce the number of black people with medium-level academic qualifications to that minimum required mainly as teachers and functionaries in the Bantustan bureaucracies. At the same time, it was to increase the number of workers with skills limited to a level which would not threaten the white working class but be sufficiently high for them to move into the growing number of semi-skilled jobs being opened up through the process of deskilling and job fragmentation. Bantu Education was also to begin expanding the number of workers with basic literacy and numeracy."[50]

In this view the educational system is subject to a large measure of manipulation by the Government and economic interests. Molteno cannot, however, be accused of economic reductionism for at least two reasons. On the one hand he does qualify his position by the claim that "Bantu Education ... was first and foremost part of a broader state reaction to factors other than the 'purely economic' demands of the labour market"[51] and he elaborates this by pointing out that Bantu Education was extended for political control.[52] On the other hand, so as not to give too much weight to the calculating role of the State, Molteno has counterbalanced the role of economic and coercive State pressures with an extended treatment of the resistance to these pressures.[53] These are necessary points to make in relation to Bantu Education but the consistent and strong growth in attendance at African schools despite resistance was perhaps its major feature and Molteno does not give this point sufficient prominence.

In addition to the schools providing for the country's needs (for various skills and habits of restraint for workers), it seems clear that to a large degree they also fulfilled the parents' wishes. African education was not compulsory. There was an undeniable demand for schooling despite people's negative feelings about Bantu Education. In centralising the control of schooling through the Bantu Education Act the Nationalist Government was able to offer schooling as a means of securing support from African people. In view of the unpopularity of the various discriminatory laws, the rapidly increased provision of schooling represented a way of obtaining a measure of acceptance. It will be argued below that the Bantu Education policy was specifically designed at a time when financial resources were becoming strained to make possible a rapid expansion at moderate cost, and that a major reason for this was to win support from the disenfranchised African people. If it seems naive to claim this positive intention in the light of the harsh realities of other repressive laws of the early Nationalist rule, a careful look at Nationalist policy and practice with regard to African schooling may help.

The Nationalists' criticisms of United Party 'Native' education policy have been outlined in the previous chapter.[54] Basically they focussed on three problems: control was divided, finance should not be obtained

from African taxation, and most schools were seen as alienating their pupils from their own culture and from manual labour. The Nationalist policy of Bantu Education was not a direct application of the 1948 Christian-National Education policy document.[55] It was not even fully elaborated in the brief enabling provisions of the 1953 Bantu Education Act. The policy was promulgated throughout the 1950s. Different phases of its development are seen in the Eiselen Commission[56] 1949-1951; the Bantu Education Act (no. 47) of 1953 with various amendments in subsequent years; the Senate speeches of Verwoerd;[57] and a multitude of ministerial regulations promulgated in various Government Notices.[58] A clear sequential description of the developing policy is given by Norman Atkinson in his Teaching South Africans: a history of educational policy.[59] Muriel Horrell also outlines the policy but on a thematic rather than on a chronological basis in A decade of Bantu Education.[60] Instead of repeating this work only a brief sketch of the findings and recommendations of the Eiselen Commission, and of the subsequent legislation and policy, will be given.

While the Eiselen Report is a lengthy and detailed document, its analysis is summed up in its four major criticisms of existing systems of 'Native' education and in its two principal recommendations. Its critique is delivered along the lines of earlier Nationalist argument, i.e. in terms of direction,[61] control,[62] and financing.[63]

> "Conclusions ...
> 752. Your Commission considers that the four most important criticisms of the present systems are:-
> (a) Bantu education is not an integral part of a plan of socio-economic development;
> (b) Bantu education in itself has no organic unity; it is split into a bewildering number of different agencies and is not planned;
> (c) Bantu education is conducted without the active participation of the Bantu as a people, either locally or on a wider basis;
> (d) Bantu education is financed in such a way that it achieves a minimum of educational effect on the Bantu community and planning is made virtually impossible."[64]

While no direct reference is made here to the failure to draw the African masses into the school system, this criticism is clearly implied in the first and last points above. The perceived problem was that the education

of Africans was haphazard. It was not planned to align with the development of independent social, political and economic institutions for Africans. Pupils were not prepared for their place in society. The recommended aims for Bantu Education focussed on the same points: the need to subvert schooling to "Bantu development" and limit the individual to opportunities within African society.

> "765. Your Commission proposed the following definition of the aims of Bantu education:-
> (a) From the viewpoint of the whole society the aim of Bantu education is the development of a modern progressive culture, with social institutions which will be in harmony with one another and with the evolving conditions of life to be met in South Africa, and with the schools which must serve as effective agents in this process of development.
> (b) From the viewpoint of the individual the aims of Bantu education are the development of character and intellect, and the equipping of the child for his future work and surroundings."[65]

The obvious intention was that this teaching should be given to the majority of African children. The Eiselen Commission even suggested that schooling could become mandatory. "It is hoped that in the not too distant future attendance at a lower primary school for four years will be made compulsory." Also the limited enrolment at the schools was explicitly condemned in the Commission's findings. Schools for Africans were seen as "providing education for a relatively small proportion of a backward population".[66] This was a major concern of the Afrikaner Nationalist reformers. In order to organize education to support the development of a separate African identity in town and countryside, it was necessary to expand schooling to influence the development of as many children and parents as possible.

In the eyes of the Commissioners it was not the purpose of Bantu Education to curtail the growth of African schooling, but rather to fund it on a new basis in such a way that it could be rapidly expanded without costing the State coffers too dearly in the long term. In time it was expected that Bantu Local Authorities would be able "to shoulder a proportionately heavier share" of the cost,[67] with the State contributing more initially "as an investment or 'pump-priming' device".[68] It was evidently envisaged by the Commission that State expenditure would increase significantly.

However, the subsequent legislation did not provide for a really substantial increase. Most of the revenue for African schooling before Bantu Education had come from central Government funds[69] but in 1954 this amount was pegged at R13 000 000 (£6½ million) per annum by the Minister of Finance.[70] This direct State contribution remained fixed[71] during the decade 1955-1965 as enrolments at African schools doubled from one to nearly two million.[72] The increase in expenditure on Bantu Education of approximately 5% per annum through the fifties[73] was largely due to contributions from the African general tax.[74]

The effects of these arrangements were simply that the aim of increased enrolment sought by the Eiselen Commission was achieved by the Nationalist Government without the financial means the Commission had recommended.[75] This was made possible by the centralization of the control of spending. Those Provinces worst affected by the new measures were the Cape and Natal which had over the years won proportionately higher block grants for African education from Government funds.[76] One stark illustration of this is that in Greater Cape Town while enrolment increased phenomenally through the 1950s, the number of teachers, and hence much of the cost, remained constant.[77] More and more pupils were being admitted but no more teaching posts were being created.

The expansion of African schooling was a major policy objective of the Nationalist Government in its legislation on Bantu Education. In the light of this goal the provisions of the Bantu Education Act make sense. The legislation created the machinery for expansion. Horrell has outlined the system created by the new Act (as amended) under six headings, viz.

> "(a) Transfer of control;
> (b) Types of schools;
> (c) Illegal to conduct unregistered schools;
> (d) School boards and committees;
> (e) Teachers;
> (f) Regulations."[78]

Provisions in each of these areas contributed to a streamlined system for rapid growth. With central Government as opposed to Provincial control, it became possible to reduce the higher rates of expenditure

in certain provinces and so cut the cost of expansion overall. It is doubtful that it would have been feasible to cut Provincial grants for 'Native education', and without centralization financial constraints would have retarded growth.

Furthermore the legislation recognized only three types of schools as legitimate: Bantu community schools,[79] government schools, and other State-aided schools, including mission schools. The significant proviso was that financial grants would only be made to the State-aided schools where the existence of such schools would not preclude or retard the establishment of a government of Bantu community school.[80] The application of this principle led to the closure of the vast majority of mission schools (except those owned by the Roman Catholic and Seventh Day Adventist Churches which were not happy with the proposed religious instruction). One result of this was that the State lost the contribution from these institutions towards the upkeep of the schools. This seems to contradict the earlier point that the intention was to use available funds to expand African schooling. But the lost amount was relatively small, being approximately three percent of the amount of the State contribution,[81] and there was a considerable financial saving involved in eliminating the higher paid White teachers employed by the mission schools. For example, one African delegation to the Minister of Native Affairs on 16 May 1939 claimed that it was possible "at the present scale to pay three of our men on the salary of one European".[82]

Thirdly, as if the reduction or removal of State aid were not enough disincentive, it was declared illegal to conduct an unregistered school. This measure eliminated alternatives to State schooling. While the intention behind the prohibition of unregistered schools was certainly broader, it did enable the State to force the choice on parents of Bantu schooling or no schooling. Most parents felt they had little option but to accept Bantu schooling. In the absence of other available avenues Bantu schools by definition became "popular" on the basis of attendance. While African people were suspicious of the insidious intentions of Bantu Education, more and more African children were attending Bantu schools.

The fourth provision listed by Horrell empowered the Minister of Native

Affairs to establish School Committees and Boards to manage and control schools and groups of schools. These bodies served inter alia to raise funds for the development of school buildings. Often the finance raised was matched by the State.[83] In this way the support of the African community was secured to assist in an ambitious expansion programme on behalf of Bantu schooling. Such was the extent of community involvement that there were occasions when a community had raised its share and the State was unable to match it.

The fifth area covered by the legislation concerned the control of teachers. For the purpose of obtaining a uniform expansion an increased corps of compliant teachers was required. As teachers came under State (as opposed to Mission) control through the new Bantu Authorities and School Boards which were largely government nominationed, so the freedom of teachers to protest against any of the new provisions was inhibited. The new tightened service conditions were attacked by the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) when some of its members were dismissed.[84] In Section 15 of the Act the Minister of Native Affairs had been given wide powers to make regulations concerning Bantu schools and the changed provisions for teachers were promulgated under these powers and not enacted legislatively.[85]

Horrell's sixth heading is "Regulations". Teachers, syllabuses and language medium were among the nineteen specified areas over which the Minister had discretion.[86] This meant that adjustments to the system of Bantu Education could easily be introduced over time and that it could be effectively extended on a planned and uniform basis. For example, there was a big need for teachers for the first four years of schooling where the greatest expansion took place. The entrance qualification for candidates for the three year Lower Primary Teachers' Certificate was accordingly lowered from Standard 8 (Form 3) to Standard 6 (Form 1).[87] This is only one of many examples of the Minister's use of regulations to stimulate the growth of the mass based education system.

The thrust of the Bantu Education Act in its major provisions was towards the expansion of African schooling. There was a persistent demand for the Nationalist Government to provide more schools. In meeting this demand the Government secured tacit support from many working class

and rural parents whose children had previously been denied schooling. This was undeniably at the expense of the quality of that schooling, a point of grievance for middle-class parents which was one reason for their opposition to Bantu Education. But this drop in quality must not be allowed to obscure the mass nature of Bantu Education schools.

This view of Bantu Education as a system for mass schooling has a parallel in nineteenth century England. An important article by Richard Johnson[88] traces the transition from earlier forms of exclusive education providing for the few to the mass system which emerged after c. 1850 providing for all. Johnson describes the earlier philanthropically endowed schools as "essentially selective, ... part of a system of sponsored social mobility, for 'poor scholars'".[89] The criticisms levelled against those schools sound distinctly familiar when compared to the criticisms of the Eiselen Commission of African schooling before 1950 in South Africa.[90] Concerning the English case Johnson notes similar concerns to those expressed by the Eiselen Commission about unplanned ("haphazard"), wrongly financed, and inappropriately directed schooling. The concern for a mass system was more explicit in the English case. The nineteenth century English educational reformers launched the following

> "very sharp criticisms ... against the older systems: the attack on endowments as too rigid ...; the attack on free education ... as 'empauperising'; the attack on charity schooling as teaching mere deference and not self-helping virtues; the general attack on haphazardness and lack of efficient management and oversight; above all, the attack on the failure of endowed schools to cater for the growing numbers of children."[91]

Johnson claims that by the mid-1840s the reformers had laid "the machinery and infrastructures of a system of provided mass day schooling"[92] and that the purpose was neither to develop job skills nor to transmit knowledge but rather to inculcate attitudes and habits appropriate to the industrial workplace. Judging from the vast monitorial school rooms[93] which were geared more to obedience than learning, Johnson avers that

> "... when economists or economic historians tell us that the industrial revolution 'required' new skills, we may doubt the premise and also reply that it seems to have needed new human beings with a new, more disciplined sociality."[94]

Johnson points out that the urgent task of the school was to "take the child from home and prepare it for work and loyal citizenship".[95] The development of appropriate work attitudes and acceptance of the legitimacy of state authorities were likewise crucial purposes of Bantu Education in South Africa a century later. And the more children who could be put through Bantu Education schools, the better. The development of a mass schooling system for Africans in South Africa received its first impetus in 1945 from the Native Education Finance Act. The system then hobbled along under divided Church and Provincial control for a further decade. Bantu Education legislation introduced a foundation for efficient expansion. By the mid-1950s the qualitative change was complete; the necessary models and organization for a mass system had been established, control and finance were strongly centralised and unprecedented growth was the result.

2.5 Conclusion

In summary it may be said that there are those who propose a correspondence between the economy and education and this is a widely held explanation of Bantu Education in South Africa. There are also those who hold that the development of Bantu Education sprang from segregationist thought of South Africa's colonial past, and that it was formulated to serve the need for keeping political order on racial lines. It is argued in chapter 5 that this latter view accords with the application of Bantu Education in Cape Town but this is not to deny that economic and class factors were also important. A mass based education system for Africans was needed from the 1940s to serve a variety of economic functions in the growing industrial economy. The reproduction of labour skills and "appropriate" worker attitudes, the teaching of rudimentary literacy and numeracy to potential consumers, and the education of a small proportion of professionals were all required from the expanding system of African schooling. But these needs themselves were tempered by other factors: there must not be an overproduction of educated people who might organize the unemployed or underpaid workers against the state in the context of a growing revolutionary spirit in the rest of Africa, nor must skilled

Africans be allowed to threaten White jobs. It is not necessary to attempt to analyse whether class or race played a determining role, it is enough to spell out the part played by different economic and political factors in transforming the poorly controlled system of 'Native' education into the easily expandable system of Bantu Education. More than this, there is a sense in which Bantu Education was introduced neither to serve the economy nor to secure White hegemony, but in response to an undeniable demand from Africans themselves for more schooling.

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1. See for example: Robertson, I. Education in South Africa. A study in the influence of ideology on educational practice. Ed.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1974; and Shingler, J.D. Education and political order in South Africa. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1973.
2. See for example Collins, C.B. and Christie, P. "Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology and Labour Reproduction" in Kallaway, P. (ed.) Apartheid and Education. Johannesburg, 1984.
3. Grace, G. Education and the city. Theory, history and contemporary practice. London, 1984.
4. Ibid., p. 41.
5. Ibid.
6. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. Schooling in Capitalist America. London, 1976.
7. Ibid., p. 49.
8. Ibid., p. 54.
9. Ibid., p. 55.
10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Ibid., p. 11.
12. Ibid., p. 12.
13. Ibid., pp. 12,13.
14. Collins and Christie, 1984, pp. 160-183.
15. Ibid., pp. 170,171.
16. See the quotation below, p. 131.
17. Collins and Christie, 1984, p. 179.
18. See below pp. 142-148.
19. Johnson, R. "Education policy and social control in early Victorian England". Past and Present, Nov. 1970, no. 49, pp. 96-119.
20. Ibid., p. 100.
21. Ibid., pp. 101-104.
22. Ibid., pp. 104-110.
23. Ibid., pp. 116-119.
24. Ibid., pp. 100, 110-113.
25. Ibid., p. 119.
26. Ibid., p. 119.
27. McCann, P. (ed.) Popular education and socialization in the nineteenth century. London, 1977.
28. Ibid., dustjacket.
29. Ibid., p. xi.

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30. Boggs, C. Gramsci's Marxism. London, 1976, p. 38.

31. Ibid., pp. 38,39.

32. From the Johnson and McCann articles reviewed above, it is not clear to what extent women were involved as teachers. In referring to teachers these authors consistently use the male pronoun.

33. The Spitalfields weavers in the 1830s, for example, preferred and were prepared to pay for a utilitarian education without a religious and moral component (McCann, 1977, p. 30); and the London poor, after the 1870 Education Act, resisted compulsory education as a "monstrous irrelevancy" which they felt robbed them of their homes to build schools and robbed them of the wages their children could earn. (Rubinstein, D. "Socialization and the London School Board 1870-1904" in McCann, 1977, pp. 235,236).

34. Speech 7/6/1954, quoted in Rose, B. and Tunmer, R. Documents in South African Education. Johannesburg, 1975, p. 261.

35. The statistical evidence of increasing numbers of pupils enrolling voluntarily (see p.44 below) and oral evidence from African sources support this idea. See also the quotation on p. 189.

36. Shingler, 1973, ch. 17: "Bantu Education and the African Identity", pp. 278-290.

37. Ibid., p. 295.

38. Ibid., p. i. Abstract.

39. Ibid.

40. Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. Hidden struggles, rural mobilization and popular consciousness - 1890 to 1930. Africa Seminar Paper, University of Cape Town, 6/3/1985, p. 10.

41. Horrell, M. Bantu Education to 1968. Johannesburg, 1968, pp. 24-27.

42. Ibid., pp. 25,44.

43. Ibid., p. 25.

44. In practice a straightforward letter from the Department of Bantu Education to a School Board was used to instruct the Board to terminate the services of "unsuitable" teachers. One such letter is reproduced in a pamphlet entitled It is ordered ... Bantu School Boards on trial, Cape African Teachers' Association, Umtata, 1957 (?), p. 3. This document is located in the South African Library, ref. A.P. 326: 37 CAP.

45. Horrell, 1968, pp. 26,27.

46. Ibid., p. 24.

47. E.g. Robertson, 1974; Shingler, 1973.

48. Horrell, 1968, is an exception but then she stops short of interpreting the extensive statistical evidence she provides of the rapid expansion of African schooling. See pp. 51,52,147,148.

49. E.g. Collins and Christie, 1984, pp. 176, 177.

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50. Molteno, F. "The historical foundations of the schooling of Black South Africans" in Kallaway, 1984, p. 90.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 94.

53. Ibid., pp. 74-88, pp. 94-101.

54. See above, pp. 22-24.

55. See above, pp. 27,28.

56. Report of the Commission on Native Education, 1949-1951, U.G. 53/1951. The chairman was Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen.

57. Especially on 7/6/1954, cols. 6438, 6452-6453.

58. E.g. Government Notices no. 61 and no. 68 of 1955 governing conditions of service of teachers.

59. Atkinson, 1978, pp. 222-231.

60. Horrell, M. A decade of Bantu Education. Johannesburg, 1964.

61. See (a) in the given quotation.

62. See (b) in the given quotation.

63. See (d), and to some extent (c), in the given quotation.

64. Commission's Report, 1951, p. 129. Also referred to as the Eiselen Report.

65. Ibid., p. 130.

66. Ibid., p. 164, par. 1052, sec. h; and p. 163, par. 1047, respectively.

67. Ibid., p. 164, par. 1052, sec. (k)(iii).

68. Ibid.

69. Horrell, 1968, p. 35, points out that the Consolidated Revenue Account contributed two-thirds of the funds for Bantu Education in 1955.

70. Budget speech, 24/3/1954. See Horrell, 1968, p. 29; and Atkinson, 1978, p. 225.

71. Horrell, 1968, p. 35.

72. See above p. 44.

73. From R16 210 000 in 1954 to R20 223 000 in 1959, Collins and Christie, 1984, p. 181.

74. Four-fifths of this tax was earmarked for Bantu Education until 1963 when the whole of the tax was allocated. Other contributions included miscellaneous receipts, such as boarding fees: Horrell, 1968, p. 35.

75. It is granted that the amount spent in 1951, viz. R20 223 000 was almost identical to that suggested by the Commission, viz. R20 522 800, but in principle the use of African taxes to finance expansion was not seen by the Commissioners as inviolable. See Horrell, 1968, p. 24. See also Rose, B. and Tunmer, R. (ed.), Documents in South African Education. Johannesburg, 1975, p. 257 for key extracts from the Eiselen Report regarding finance from African taxes.

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76. Atkinson, 1978, p. 213. Also Eiselen Report, par. 196.

77. See below p. 158.

78. Horrell, 1968, pp. 8, 9.

79. These were maintained by Bantu Authorities or tribes or communities. Horrell, 1968, pp. 8, 9.

80. Bantu Education Act, 47/1953, sec. 8(1).

81. Horrell, 1968, p. 35. R273 782 is approximately 3% of R9 495 334.

82. Karis and Carter, Reel 7A. See chapter 1, note 23.

83. Horrell, 1968, pp. 30, 31.

84. See below ch. 6, pp. 195, 199, 200.

85. It was the legitimacy of these provisions that was contested by C.A.T.A. in the courts. See below pp. 200, 201.

86. The full Act (as amended) is quoted in the Bantu Education Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, Nov. 1954.

87. Horrell, 1968, p. 57 and Collins and Christie, 1984, p. 178.

88. Johnson, R. "Notes on the schooling of the English Working Class, 1780-1850", in Dale, R. et al. (ed.) Schooling and Capitalism. London, 1976.

89. Ibid., p. 45.

90. See above p. 46.

91. Johnson, 1976, p. 45.

92. Ibid.

93. McCann, P. "Popular education, socialization and social control: Spitalfields 1812-1824" in McCann, 1977, pp. 13, 25. One such school room in London accommodating 19 rows with 16 pupils per row is pictured in the Autumn 1979 issue of Ideology and Consciousness, p. 58.

94. Johnson, 1981, p. 48.

95. Ibid., p. 51.

CHAPTER 3

NATIONAL RESISTANCE TO BANTU EDUCATION, c. 1948-1955

3.1 Against apartheid education: national bodies involved

(a) Historical background up to c. 1950

By 1952 the first spate of the Nationalists' apartheid laws were on the statute books. The Eiselen Commission Report of 1951 on 'Native' education clearly showed that more was coming. There were at least three well-defined responses to apartheid by Blacks. These are illustrated by events at the end of June 1952. On the Reef and in the Eastern and Western Cape, a hundred and fifty selected volunteers defied apartheid laws.[1] This opened the Defiance Campaign of the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress (S.A.I.C.) in which the number of arrested "defiers" ultimately exceeded 8 000.[2] At the same time in Cape Town six hundred Coloured and African teachers crowded into the Drill Hall to denounce the recent Eiselen Commission's Report on 'Native' Education.[3] The teachers, who belonged to two teachers' associations, were a major constituency of the Non-European Unity Movement (N.E.U.M.). Simultaneously, and also in Cape Town, a few moderate Africans[4] and a larger number of Liberal Whites convened to deliberate on the merits and demerits of the Eiselen Report. This was at a National Conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations.[5] Each of the above three groupings responded differently to the coming of apartheid: the A.N.C. by defiance, the N.E.U.M. by denunciation and non-collaboration, and liberal-minded Africans by deliberation and deputation. Their opposition to the Bantu Education legislation of the 1950s followed similar lines.

To explain the opposition to Apartheid education it is therefore essential to give a broader historical background. Clearly, political divisions cannot be reduced to three static categories as though each response were rigidly conditioned by past loyalties, so the changing pattern of political groupings over time must be sketched. In the outline below the role of the moderate African teachers who belonged to the third grouping and who formed the Cape African Teachers' Union in 1953 is omitted. This is because the Union did not take an active role in partisan politics (this was of course a profoundly political position, as its opponents

pointed out) and because the sixth chapter gives a full account of the political developments surrounding its formation.[6]

The Defiance Campaign (June to November 1952) gave a popular expression of the anger of many Africans to the recent apartheid laws - it attracted a huge support to the A.N.C., with some 75 000 new members joining Congress in 1952.[7] On the other hand the Non-European Unity Movement opposed the Defiance Campaign. This move cost the N.E.U.M. dearly. Colin Bundy claims that the N.E.U.M. "failed to survive its opposition to the 1952 Defiance Campaign".[8] In fact in 1955 the N.E.U.M. repeated its opposition to the A.N.C.'s strategy in the parents' school boycott.[9] The two major reasons why the N.E.U.M. acted in this way both lay in the past. First, it had consistently refused to transgress the law. Second, its relationship to the A.N.C. became increasingly hostile after the breakdown of talks in 1949 between the A.N.C. and the A.A.C., an affiliate of the N.E.U.M.,[10] and following the realignment of the A.N.C. to include Communists. The Defiance Campaign served to stir up these old antagonisms, the roots of which lie in the past.

Tom Lodge views the 1930s as a period of Black political lethargy.[11] He argues that even the 1935 Bloemfontein All African Convention[12] was inconsequential because its leaders were unwilling to boycott the new segregated institutions.[13] H. and R. Simons concur with Lodge, claiming that the broadly based Convention was "a peoples' front so widely based that it was bound to cheer the radicals and follow the moderates."[14] Lodge observes that the A.A.C. "settled down into a familiar routine: wordy protests through consultative meetings, delegations, vague calls for African unity, and national days of prayer."[15] It was not until the war induced political turmoil of the 1940s that a new restiveness came into African politics. This was evident in the revival both of the A.N.C. and the A.A.C. in the early forties. These will be dealt with in turn.

The A.N.C. of the 1930s was weak and disorganized. Under the authoritarian leadership of Pixley Seme (1930-1937) it was organizationally weak[16] and losing support.[17] It was slowly built up again after its 1937 Silver Jubilee Conference. With the able Rev. James Calata as Secretary-general (1936-1949) and the moderate Dr Alfred B. Xuma as President-general (1940-

1949) the A.N.C. continued along a co-operative path and its leaders were still prepared to work within Government bodies such as the Native Representative Council.[18] This generation of leaders had been successful in their professions and promoted the idea that the way should be open for educated Africans to be incorporated into the modern society.[19] Younger Africans saw the reality of their position less optimistically and came to identify more closely with the cause of an exclusive African nationalism. In 1944 the A.N.C. Youth League was established with Xuma's blessing and with it came a fresh analysis and ultimately a new programme for the A.N.C. as a whole.[20] The young men involved in its leadership worked hard to build it up organizationally. At the University College of Fort Hare a strategically placed branch was formed in late 1948 at the instigation of Youth League president, A.P. Mda. He organized a strong contingent of Youth Leaguers to attend the A.N.C. national conference in December 1949 and secured the support of that conference for an action-oriented, strongly nationalist programme calling for "National freedom from White domination and the attainment of political independence." Mda was a principal author of this "Programme of Action".[21]

In the years that followed the Youth League gradually eclipsed the N.E.U.M. group on the Fort Hare campus. For example, Robert Sobukwe was an incisive critic of A.A.C. there in 1949.[22] Especially after the Defiance Campaign of the A.N.C. in 1952 the support of the N.E.U.M. there dwindled and it lost initiative to the Youth League.[23] Gerhart's interpretation of this is that the student body at Fort Hare sought more than the "passive politics of the A.A.C."[24] Through its adoption of the Programme of Action in 1949 the A.N.C. had moved in theory to accept civil disobedience, strikes and boycotts as means towards achieving national freedom.[25] In the fifties it worked at mobilising mass support for specific campaigns, e.g. the 26 June 1950 work stay-away. The growing support for the A.N.C.'s new strategy reached a climax in the 1952 Defiance Campaign. As it moved towards open mass action the N.E.U.M. condemned its strategy as rash.

There were two factors which influenced the political strategy of the N.E.U.M. in the forties and fifties. First the majority of members were teachers who were inclined to play a strictly legal role though still opposing the state. Secondly the leaders of the N.E.U.M., who were mostly

well acquainted with Marxist theory, had little time for the people or policies of the Communist Party of South Africa (C.P.S.A.). Antagonism towards the C.P.S.A. dated back to the purges in the Party in the early thirties,[26] and the subsequent emergence of the breakaway Spartacist Club.[27] Bundy points out that the principles adopted by the N.E.U.M. in 1944 were largely those which had been formulated by the Spartacists in the thirties[28] and that key N.E.U.M. leaders (B. Kies, G. and J. Gool and I.B. Tabata) had belonged to the Spartacists.

The planning to set up the N.E.U.M. was given impetus by statutory moves against Coloureds. In 1943 the Smuts' Government announced the introduction of a Coloured Affairs Department (C.A.D.) to administer the affairs of Coloured people separately, and the institution of a Coloured Advisory Council of nominated Coloured leaders to advise on matters of policy affecting Coloured people. A strong response came from the New Era Fellowship, a Spartacist debating society in Cape Town, which formed a federal organization, called the National Anti-C.A.D., on 28 February 1943 to co-ordinate a boycott of the government's discriminatory plans. The leadership of this body under the chairmanship of Dr Goolam Gool included one African, I.B. Tabata, and B.M. Kies, a prominent figure in the (Coloured) Teachers' League of South Africa (T.L.S.A.). Many T.L.S.A. branches affiliated to the Anti-C.A.D. Three months after the inception of the Anti-C.A.D. its first national conference was attended by representatives of some 109 societies.[29] The momentum of the new movement was maintained at the 1943 Kimberley conference of the T.L.S.A. where the Anti-C.A.D. radicals captured power.

During the same year I.B. Tabata was influential in the radicalization of the A.A.C.[30] Tabata shared the Spartacist view, which he had no doubt helped to shape, that change in South Africa was to come through a harnessing of the forces for revolution which were present among the rural peasantry on the one hand[31] and by means of a well-organized Non-European unity using non-collaboration with all forms of representation, and boycott as its chief weapons on the other. Tabata was born in the Queenstown district in the Eastern Cape and he completed his secondary schooling at Lovedale, going on to the University College of Fort Hare. At the age of 22 he left Fort Hare and came to Cape Town where he became politically

active in the non-racial Lorry Drivers' Union and in the Cape African Voters' Association. He later married Janub Gool, the sister of the prominent Coloured leader, Dr Goolam Gool. Tabata saw Non-European unity as essential in the struggle against the erosion of African rights. In a call to unity issued by the executive of the A.A.C. on 26 August 1943 the tone of Tabata's thinking comes through clearly:

> "The same policy that applied to us (i.e. the Africans - MC) in 1935 is now being applied to the Indian and Coloured people. But they are not repeating our mistakes and they are fighting back. The Coloured people are uniting behind what they call the Anti-C.A.D. movement, a kind of federal organization like our All African Convention. The Indian people are also uniting behind their federal organization, the S.A. Indian Congress.
> It should be obvious that if all these Non-European peoples are struggling to obtain the same thing - the rights of full citizenship, it would be foolish of them to stand separately while they have a better chance of success if they join forces."[32]

Tabata's role cannot be construed as that of a puppet in the hands of the Anti-C.A.D. It was largely his deep concern for building peasant resistance in the rural areas that shaped the A.A.C.'s policy, and which was subsequently enshrined in the programme of the N.E.U.M. Tabata organized vigorously against the Government's land rehabilitation schemes, opposing the unpopular cattle culling both by holding meetings throughout the Xhosa tribal areas and by means of distributing pamphlets, one of which he authored.[33] He and his colleagues in the A.A.C. also provided legal aid for peasants who were taken to court.[34] He was an outspoken delegate at the All African Convention in Bloemfontein eight years before he became a founding member of the National Anti-C.A.D. organization. In short, Tabata's early involvement in African politics especially through the A.A.C. and his influential commitment to Non-European unity illustrate the contention that the co-operation between the Coloured and African leaders within the N.E.U.M. was not one-sided. The A.A.C. itself played a significant role in Cape Town particularly but not exclusively[35] through the Cape African Teachers' Association, which affiliated to the A.A.C. in 1948.[36]

At the end of 1943 the Anti-C.A.D. and the A.A.C. executives met and on 17 December a preliminary "Draft Declaration of Unity" was drawn up by them. It was adopted by the national conferences of the two bodies in January and December of 1944 respectively, so forming the Non-European Unity Movement.[37] The basis of the unity in the new federal partnership was the so-called "Ten Point Programme" which called for basic democratic rights for all "Non-Europeans": universal suffrage, compulsory education,[38] individual liberties, and the appropriate revision of laws concerning land,[39] criminal and civil codes, taxation and labour.

(b) Assessment of the N.E.U.M.

As a national initiative to achieve "Non-European" unity the N.E.U.M. did not succeed. It did, however, make two significant contributions to the struggle against apartheid in that it focussed on the crucial land issue and in its active role in the field of education. On the side of its weaknesses the N.E.U.M. did not incorporate any Indian organizations, it did not obtain wide support outside of the Cape Province, it was elitist, and in attacking its potential allies it weakened the liberation movement as a whole. These four points will be reviewed below. The reasons for a more extensive treatment of the N.E.U.M. than the A.N.C. are that the N.E.U.M. has not been as fully assessed as the A.N.C. on the one hand,[40] and that the N.E.U.M. played a key role in the Cape and is therefore obviously important for this dissertation with its Cape Town focus.

Firstly the N.E.U.M. did not achieve "Non-European" unity. The South African Indian Congress was initially warm to the idea of joining in the N.E.U.M. in 1944 but was put off by the unqualified franchise proposal of the Ten Point Programme. Late in the following year, however, the S.A.I.C. shifted sharply to the left under the new radical leadership[41] and initiated a two year campaign of civil disobedience against the Asiatic Land Tenure Act.[42] The N.E.U.M. saw this strategy as "abusing" the masses to win rights for the Indian merchants, and no further attempt was made to draw the S.A.I.C. into the N.E.U.M. For its part the S.A.I.C. leaders entered an agreement with the A.N.C.[43] and in the fifties was drawn into full co-operation with the A.N.C.

Secondly, the N.E.U.M. did not succeed in becoming a national movement. Although it did make an initial attempt to launch itself on the Reef where it arranged five meetings,[44] there seems to be little further evidence of any sustained campaign to organize outside of the Cape Province. In 1944 The Cape Standard criticised the N.E.U.M. for organizational ineptitude, for a "lack of preliminary work in other provinces" and for failing "to realize that the Cape Peninsula is not South Africa."[45] There are, however, occasional references to attempts to promote the A.A.C. on the Reef,[46] and also The Torch did have a fair national coverage in its articles.

The control of the N.E.U.M. lay in the hands of relatively few people. One of its own leaders referred to its organization as "mistakenly elitist"[47] and Bundy euphemistically calls it "numerically unimpressive".[48] Its strategy was to work through a tightly controlled leadership and vocal participation by sympathisers outside of the inner circle was discouraged.[49]

A fourth weakness of the N.E.U.M. (made up of the A.A.C. and the Anti-C.A.D. movement) was its relationship to other radical organizations. The Simons' sharply criticized the Anti-C.A.D. for its racist thinking. and maintained that although the rhetoric of the Anti-C.A.D. was initially set in class terms it soon became so obsessed with race that it turned against its potential ally in the Communist party (which was still substantially influenced by Whites).[50] They further claim that the Anti-C.A.D. leaders' "abuse" of the Communists was motivated by a self-interest in order to ward off "the danger of being persecuted as a subversive organization"[51] (i.e. under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950). They conclude with a harsh judgement on what they saw as the misguided work of the Anti-C.A.D.:

> "The main achievement of the Anti-C.A.D. was to immobilize a generation of Coloured intellectuals, immunize them against Marxist theory and isolate them from the rest of the liberation movement."[52]

This accusation that the Anti-C.A.D. was largely responsible for a weakness in the liberation movement in the Western Cape highlights two issues. Firstly, the effectiveness of the Anti-C.A.D. organization was acknowledged

and not disputed. This testimony comes from a source which was acquainted at first hand with the situation in the Western Cape at the time,[53] and it is a key point for the discussion of education-related resistance which will be undertaken in chapter 6. Secondly, it condemns the Anti-C.A.D. for organizing on the basis of colour and not class. The struggle according to the Simons' was essentially a class struggle and thus the issue of White involvement was irrelevant. Their criticism of the Anti-C.A.D. was not so much on the grounds of alleged inactivity.[54] The original sin of the Anti-C.A.D. was its conception that racial discrimination (and not class exploitation) as practised by the government was the root of the problem.

A different interpretation of the N.E.U.M.'s position on the class or colour basis of the struggle comes from Gail Gerhart who follows uncritically the A.N.C. Youth League's line of argument. She quotes Youth League leader, Anton Lembede's "Policy of the Congress Youth League" (May 1946) with its claims that occasional "co-operation between Africans and other Non-Europeans on common problems ... may be desirable" but that this would have to be between "Africans as a single unit and other Non-Europeans as separate units."[55] By contrast with the Youth League policy, Gerhart implies that the Unity Movement sought an undifferentiated, non-racial policy. She states that "unity of Africans, Coloureds and Indians was a declared goal of the radical Non-European Unity Movement ..."[56] This, however, takes the Draft Declaration of Unity of 1943[57] at its face value and unproblematically assumes that what is stated as policy is a sufficient basis for judging the effect of a body. But ideology cannot be examined apart from actual practice. And the practice of the Unity Movement was colour based, at least in regard to its exclusion of Whites. It seems unwarranted, however, to say that the N.E.U.M. (or even the Anti-C.A.D.) adopted an anti-class analysis position because it opposed the C.P.S.A. Suffice it to say that that is what some Communists believed. Nevertheless, given its overall approach, the N.E.U.M. shares the responsibility for division within the radical opposition to apartheid in the 1950s.[58]

The other major partner with the Anti-C.A.D. in the N.E.U.M. was the All African Convention. From 18 months prior to the A.N.C.'s adoption of the Programme of Action in December 1949[59] the A.A.C. was involved in a

determined attempt at unity with the A.N.C. The A.N.C. had been a co-sponsor of the 1935 Convention at Bloemfontein where the A.A.C. was established, but it withdrew from this body in 1936. In the early forties, although the democratic emphasis of the A.A.C.'s "Ten Point Programme" was similar to the "African Claims" made by the A.N.C. in 1943,[60] there was no rapprochement between the two bodies. Serious talk of unity with the A.N.C. only came in 1942 with the accession to power of the Afrikaner Nationalist Government. These talks were, however, severely hampered by the political rhetoric which the A.A.C. had picked up when it joined the N.E.U.M. in 1944, and by the direction that the A.N.C. Youth League was then promoting.[61]

Three meetings took place between A.A.C. and A.N.C. representatives within seven months. The final 16 hour meeting, held in April 1949, reached deadlock and the proposed All African National Congress was still-born. The A.N.C. evidently wished for an entirely African body while the A.A.C. sought a federation of Coloured, Indian and African organizations.[62] There were undoubtedly other tensions: Tabata and W.M. Tsotsi of the A.A.C. were more uncompromising than Jabavu had been,[63] and the A.N.C. was moving towards an espousal of defiant mass action at that time.[64]

The fourth point above has been made to show that in turning its back on the Communists, and in failing to reach agreement with the A.N.C., the N.E.U.M. was partly responsible for the disunity in the forces opposing apartheid. This was especially true of Cape Town in the 1950s as will be shown below.[65] Now, what of the two perceived strengths of the N.E.U.M.?

Bundy has argued that the Spartacist group of the thirties had a decisive influence on the shaping of the land policy of the A.A.C. and N.E.U.M. of the forties.[66] It was the first liberation movement to argue for, and to actively seek, links with peasant movements struggling against "land rehabilitation" and stock culling.[67] As Bundy says

> "Both in its theoretical stand and in its practical involvement in the rural struggle the NEUM/AAC stood apart from other nationalist and revolutionary movements, until in the 1950s an awareness of and commitment to a rurally-based struggle manifested itself more broadly in the national liberation movements."[68]

The importance of the issue is evident from the fact that the A.N.C. itself took up the organization of peasant resistance from 1952.[69] It is an open question whether the A.A.C. was responsible for recognizing that rural struggle should be linked with urban struggle but clearly the credit goes to the A.A.C. and N.E.U.M. initiative.

The second major contribution of the N.E.U.M. was its stress on the importance of education. The Unity Movement viewed schooling as crucial since parents naturally wanted better education for their children. Their newspaper The Torch frequently ran scientific articles. Science was king. Knowledge was the key. Ideas shaped thinking and schooling shaped ideas. Schooling was therefore not dispensable, and a boycott of school was unthinkable. In a recent interview one Unity spokesman of the time drew the classic Unity distinction between boycotting the school (which he opposed) and boycotting the state's controlling bodies (which he endorsed).

> "The method was not to work with oppressive structures but to subvert the machinery. Rather boycott the Committee and Board elections than boycott schools. School boycotts weaken because people are vulnerable to victimization. Therefore boycott the machinery rather. The argument was, (for the teachers - MC) 'Stick to your posts and teach alternatively. Rather be an instrument for change in the class than abandon the pupils to collaborators.'"[70]

He went on to point out that highly politicised P.T.A.s acted as watchdogs, labelling certain people as collaborators if they were felt to be using their positions to their own advantage. Unity supporters rated the teaching profession highly, a majority of them were teachers; and they valued education for its own sake, offering bursaries for further study to promising candidates.[71] It was therefore inevitable that they were horrified at the suggestion that schools should be boycotted by parents or teachers should strike. On the contrary, teachers were advised to stay at their posts at all costs.[72] This placed the N.E.U.M. strategy in direct opposition to the strategy of the A.N.C. The A.N.C. wanted a massive demonstration against Bantu Education as it had achieved with the Defiance Campaign in 1952. On the other hand, the N.E.U.M. continued to oppose A.N.C. Bantu Education strategy in 1955 as it had done during the 1952 Defiance Campaign.

(c) The Defiance Campaign and the Bantu Education Campaign of the A.N.C.

The N.E.U.M. position that school classes should continue was undoubtedly popular with ambitious parents. The A.N.C. on the other hand placed a very difficult choice before parents in 1955. In advocating a boycott strategy the A.N.C. registered its rejection of Bantu Education but it probably limited its potential support in the process. The A.N.C. President-General Albert Luthuli expressed the problem in these terms:

> "The choice before parents is an almost impossible one. They do not want Bantu Education and they do not want their children on the streets. They have to choose between two evils and no rule of thumb indicates which is the greater."[73]

The strategy in regard to the Defiance Campaign three years earlier was much clearer, and as noted at the start of the chapter, it received considerable support. A brief survey of this Campaign is useful firstly for the light that it throws on the variations in A.N.C. regional support; and secondly in that it highlights the changed role of the Communists in the formation of the emerging Congress Alliance. Both of these factors are important for an understanding of the uniqueness of the Bantu Education campaign in the Western Cape.

Support for the Defiance Campaign (1952) and the Bantu Education Campaign (1955) across South Africa was particularly significant in the East Rand and in the Eastern Cape.[74] The earlier Defiance Campaign was better supported in the Eastern Cape while the Bantu Education Campaign was far more successful numerically in the Transvaal than it was in the Eastern Cape. Lodge has explained the widespread support of the latter campaign in what he calls the "parents' school boycott"[75] in terms of the East Rand having a long-standing tradition of radical activism to work for the amelioration of local grievances.[76] He calls the relatively light response to the Bantu Education Campaign in the Eastern Cape surprising ... "when one remembers that the Eastern Cape was the region most affected by the Defiance Campaign and an area in which the A.N.C. and the trade union movement were comparatively strong and the links between the two well developed."[77] This limited response is attributed in part to "the deep

cleavages between grass roots membership and a very cautious leadership still much more schooled in the pre-1950 liberal tradition in African politics than that which prevailed in the Transvaal."[78] Lodge does mention the A.A.C.-inspired boycott of elections as "the most sustained local reactions to Bantu Education"[79] in the rural Eastern Cape Reserve areas. Nevertheless he does not identify the influence of the A.A.C. against a school (as opposed to an election) boycott as a factor of major significance in the reduced Eastern Cape reaction.

Is it not likely that the less enthusiastic Eastern Cape response is attributable to the concerted drive against the A.N.C. boycott call by the locally influential A.A.C.? In the Eastern Cape the schools' boycott of the A.N.C. was being called on the home ground of the Cape African Teachers' Association. Here C.A.T.A. had direct access to the parents and would not have allowed the A.N.C. boycott proposal to be implemented without opposition. Lodge has interpreted the teachers' opposition to a school boycott as motivated by self-interest, "after all, had it been effective, many of the members would be without jobs."[80] This, however, is no explanation of the different reaction in the Reserves, for the same was surely true in the urban areas. Certainly teachers must have been apprehensive about losing their jobs but that does not remove the need to weigh their influence in curbing the school boycott. A further factor influencing a reduced Eastern Cape reaction may have been opposition to a boycott coming from the Cape African Teachers' Union[81] but as in the case of Cape Town this was probably still small in 1955. In conclusion it seems unwise to ignore C.A.T.A.'s influence in the light of its unequivocal rejection of the A.N.C. call. One indicator of this is the failure of a motion at the C.A.T.A. Cradock conference calling for a boycott of schools to even gain a seconder.[82] It seems that the reasons for the surprisingly small response in the Eastern Cape call for a re-examination. This subject is studied in chapter 6 with regard to Cape Town. It appears that the problem is fairly complex.

At the same time,as the relationship between the A.A.C. and the A.N.C. was being re-defined, the position taken by the Communist Party altered significantly. The dissolution of the Party just prior to the enactment

of the Suppression of Communism legislation (1950) brought about conditions favourable to an alliance between the former members of the Communist Party of South Africa and the African National Congress. The act provided for the suppression of such a broad range of activities that the African nationalists were themselves threatened, while on the other hand the Communists saw in the force of African nationalism an ally against the threat of the National Party and a vehicle for achieving a socialist revolution.[83]

The Defiance Campaign was launched nationally by the Joint Planning Council of the A.N.C. and the S.A.I.C. on 26 June 1952. In the leadership of these bodies there were influential Communists such as Moses Kotane on the A.N.C. side and Dr Yusuf Dadoo of the S.A.I.C. The influence of the former Communists was not confined within these bodies. The largely white Congress of Democrats (C.O.D.) was formed in 1952[84] and included in its membership many former C.P.S.A. members. The C.O.D. joined forces with the S.A.I.C. and the A.N.C. in the so-called "Congress Alliance". This grouping organized the Congress of the People in June 1955 in Kliptown, a Coloured suburb of Johannesburg. The demands of the Congress were published in the "Freedom Charter" which called for democratic rights for all the people of the land.[85] The shift into an alliance with (White) Communists was not without its problems for the A.N.C. The A.N.C. Youth League was becoming increasingly Africanist in its stance and a rift within the A.N.C. widened as the Youth League feared that the A.N.C. was under the influence of other bodies, especially the white C.O.D. which controlled the widely circulated New Age newspaper.

It is not intended to exaggerate the influence of former C.P.S.A. members on the Congress Alliance or in the Congress of the People, although they did take an initiative in organizing, financing and providing press coverage.[86] The really significant feature of the formation of the Congress Alliance is the fact that it reflected a new broad front with a Charter which demanded a range of democratic rights. Its most radical demand was that the gold mines be run by a workers' committee and that the workers "take over and run the factories".[87] Given the history of division and disunity among various movements for national liberation and the continued entrenchment of apartheid by the Government; it is not surprising that the broadly

based Congress Alliance should win popular support in response to the frustration suffered by Blacks.

It was in this context that the battles against Bantu Education were fought.

3.2 Against apartheid education: themes

The transformation of 'Native' education into Bantu Education introduced a number of completely new initiatives.[88] There was also a sense, though, in which the schooling of African children prior to Bantu Education was consistent with previous developments in 'Native' education. It is therefore to be expected that there should be echoes in the fifties of opposition themes and strategies from earlier decades. For example, just as "disturbances" had occurred in rural boarding schools in the thirties and forties[89] so they continued into the fifties and sixties.[90]

Broadly speaking there were three African political groupings which responded to Bantu Education: the African National Congress (A.N.C.), the Cape African Teachers' Association (affiliated in 1948 to the A.A.C. and the N.E.U.M.) and the Cape African Teachers' Union.[91] While these bodies were often bitterly opposed to one another, there was a surprising degree of agreement between them concerning certain themes raised by Bantu Education. These issues will be discussed below under the same three headings (viz. control, finance, and direction) used in the first chapter to describe the Afrikaner Nationalists' attack on the United Party Government's 'Native' education policy.[92]

(a) Control

The removal of schools from the churches only receives oblique mention in the extensive minutes of the 1954 C.A.T.U. meeting.[93] What did worry some was that the work of decades was being set aside. Fort Hare students, for example, condemned the Bantu Education Act as a measure "calculated to undermine both the foundations and entire superstructure of the African educational system so laboriously built up over the years."[94] The loss of

initiative by churches was not a dominant concern among Africans. On the other hand the transfer of control to state-approved School Committees and School Boards elicited sharp reaction. The A.N.C. National Executive requested African people "not to participate in elections or to serve on school committees/boards."[95] An A.N.C.(Natal) source graphically illustrates the deep suspicion of the new bodies, asking

> "do they (the parents) think that the Government is such a damn fool to allow snakes into its house? ... The African people will never forgive those who knowingly join the school boards and committees ..."[96]

The newspaper of the radical N.E.U.M., The Torch, claimed that Dr Eiselen "virtually dictates to school committees and boards",[97] while the Cape African Parents' Association (affiliated to the N.E.U.M.) urged "African people generally not to operate the machinery of their own servile position."[98]

As a strictly "professional" teachers' body, the Cape African Teachers' Union was, of course, silent on this political issue. Their associates in the Liberal Party did spell out their jointly held position: Mrs Margaret Ballinger said that the Party "supported participation in the School Committees and Boards under the Bantu Education Act."[99] The conservative North Western Districts Teachers' Union[100] made a revealing request that membership of these bodies "be drawn from the educated Africans" and not from government nominated Bantu Authorities.[101] The general concern was that the new controlling bodies should be in the hands of enlightened and not reactionary individuals. There was little concern that the churches had lost their jurisdiction over the day to day affairs of the schools.[102]

As far as the transfer of the control of 'Native' education from Provincial to Central Government was concerned, the only African body which appears to have opposed the move was the N.W.D.T.U. which basically wished to retain its good relationship with the Cape Education Department.[103] Most African leaders agreed, however, that if African education had to be centralized, the Union Department of Education was the appropriate body to administer its affairs and not the Native Affairs Department (N.A.D.).

This point had been made repeatedly by African spokesmen over the years.[104] Moderate Africans argued that the Education Department possessed the needed educational expertise whereas a new sub-department within the N.A.D. would result in wasteful spending, "the price the country must pay for Apartheid, at the expense of efficiency."[105] By contrast, the more radical views of C.A.T.A. and the A.N.C., as expressed in their respective programmes, demanded a "uniform" educational system for the country[106] which implied a centralized control under a national Education Department.

The third aspect of control concerned teachers. It was on this issue that C.A.T.A., with its particular focus on education,[107] was especially outspoken. The regulations governing the teachers' conditions of service[108] were roundly condemned as intending to silence criticism by African teachers.[109] Regarding the control of teachers there were sharp reactions from a variety of African interest groups about the transference of control from the churches to conservative community leaders and from the provinces to the Native Affairs Department. The moderates sought to consolidate the positive developments of the past and deplored the destruction of good traditions. The radical Africans teachers launched their main attack on the segregationist and reactionary purposes behind the control measures.[110]

(b) Finance

The basic strategy of the Nationalist Government regarding the financing of African education was that African people should pay directly for it themselves.[111] The annual contribution to Bantu Education from central state funds was to be fixed at the amount of R13 000 000 (£6½ million) and further expenditure was to be met from the general tax paid by Africans.[112]

African bodies were unanimous in criticizing these measures concerning the limitation of the state's contribution. Even the moderate C.A.T.U. minuted that its General Secretary, B.C. Thema, had:

> "criticized and condemned the decision by the Government to peg the parliamentary votes for African Education at 6½ million pounds as an indication of the hollowness of the Bantu Education Act."[113]

The corollary that African taxes should fund increased expenditure was castigated by the N.E.U.M.'s The Torch as requiring payment "from them that hath not".[114] It was regarded as robbery to force Africans to pay for their schooling when they were themselves underpaid. The North Western Districts Teachers' Union said as much.

> "All funds for this purpose should come from the State. There is no point in arguing that the African contribute very little to their educational services. No account seems to be taken of their contribution to State funds indirectly and through their labour, for which they are very often poorly remunerated."[115]

This refrain was familiar. It echoed the sentiments of A.N.C. spokesmen of the 1930s.[116] But by the 1950s the A.N.C. was demanding far more radical change than increased funding. The A.N.C. and the A.A.C. viewed the basic problem as the state's design to use African education to fragment African unity.

(c) Direction

The major objection to Bantu Education concerned its perceived goal. It was the link between Bantu Education and the overall apartheid policy which aroused the greatest suspicion. There were, of course, the emotive issues concerning the organization, content and medium of instruction but it was essentially the broader apartheid package which came under attack.

The substance of the syllabuses, which only appeared after the boycotts of 1955 had ceased, was not so much at issue although accusations were made that it was intended to poison the minds of the children. Also, it was certainly resented that all instruction had to be given in the mother tongue up to the end of primary school. This was seen as "making African education sterile and narrow" and depriving the African child of access to the "universal heritage" of civilization.[117] The introduction of double teaching sessions for elementary classes aroused resentment amongst parents and teachers.[118] The Torch criticized the change as increasing the burden of teachers who were already overworked.[119] In a discussion at the 1954 C.A.T.U. conference delegates felt that despite the fact that

the "double-shift system" would allow more children to come to school, "it was a wrong method of putting right what is wrong in African Education."[120]

The above issues were used to mobilize public opinion against Bantu Education. For most of the African opposition groups the real problem was seen as White domination, based on racial separation and promoting labour exploitation. Late in 1954 (or early 1955) A.N.C. leaders drafted a perceptive analysis of Bantu Education as aiming to consolidate White rule.[121] Their argument is basically that in seeking to control African education, the state sought to counteract the liberating force of "the political consciousness of the masses".[122] This consciousness, asserted the authors, derived from a knowledge of other freedom movements and an understanding of the possibility of a non-racial democracy. To counter these ideas the state was trying to instill an acceptance of White domination and of divisive tribal identities.[123] The A.N.C. argument accords too much influence both to ideas and to the state. Nevertheless it clearly identifies Bantu Education with White dominion based on the fragmentation of African nationalist forces.

In a similar vein but from a different tradition, I.B. Tabata of the A.A.C. identified Verwoerd's aim in his 'Native' policy as the creation of separate Bantu and European societies.

> "To bring this about he pushed through Parliament two laws that supplement each other: the Bantu Education Act, which is designed to fit the African into a separate Bantu Community and the Bantu Authorities Act, which aims to create this Bantu Community."[124]

The criticism here is that the purpose of Bantu Education was the bolstering of racial segregation. This theme was also expressed by the editor of the Transvaal African Teachers' Association journal.

> "What we object to is the fact that our education is to be separated from the education of other people in South Africa."[125]

Racism in education was similarly deplored by the Teachers' League of South Africa (an N.E.U.M. affiliate).[126] Even the hesitant, a-political N.W.D.T.U. objected to the principle that "education must be co-ordinated with a carefully planned policy for the development of Bantu Societies", fearing that the aim was "to place the Native in a subordinate position".[127]

Clearly Bantu Education was regarded by a wide range of African groups as aiming for political control. Its economic role in exploiting labour was also criticized both by radical and Liberal Whites. An Advance editorial claimed that its aim was to:

> "generally re-align the educational system for the mass-production of half-baked and cheap labour."[128]

The Deputy leader of the Liberal Party, O.D. Wollheim, surmised that:

> "the Government hopes through the transfer to be able to develop a more tractable and docile labour force thoroughly conditioned and indoctrinated as to its place in the scheme of things."[129]

The main attacks by African groups against the Bantu Education Act concerned the control, financing and direction of African education. Although the perceptiveness of their different analyses varied considerably, in principle there was general agreement between the different bodies about the deficiencies of Bantu Education. There was, however, little agreement about the strategy to be adopted.

3.3 Against apartheid education: strategies

This brief section describes three national opposition strategies against Bantu Education. It is not intended to analyse the strategies since that is presented in chapter 6. Nor is it intended to be exhaustive since detailed accounts already exist, especially of the A.N.C. strategy[130] and the other two strategies are outlined elsewhere in this dissertation.[131] Its purpose is to sketch the national background as a preparation for the more particular study of resistance to Bantu Education in Cape Town.

The most militant grouping was the A.N.C. It came to the 1955 Bantu Education Campaign with the success of the Defiance Campaign (1952) behind its back. The first half of 1955 was also the time of the Congress of the People.[132] This saw the A.N.C. co-operating within the non-racial Congress Alliance to draft the Freedom Charter.[133] The Charter countered the state's segregationist policies by making certain demands regarding education:

> "There shall be equal status ... in the schools for all races. ... The doors of Learning shall be opened. ... The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their people and their culture. ... Education shall be free, compulsory ... and equal for all children. ... The colour bar ... in education shall be abolished."[134]

This form of protest was not unique at that time. Both the A.N.C. and the N.E.U.M. had had similar statements on their own programmes. But this was the first time that such a broad front had joined in a public challenge to apartheid.[135]

The heart of the A.N.C.'s strategy lay in its defiant mass action against the state. In December 1954 the A.N.C. launched its Bantu Education Campaign calling on African parents to withdraw their children from primary schools. Tom Lodge[136] has described and analysed this Campaign. The extensive support on the East Rand and in the Eastern Cape has been mentioned above[137] and the nature of the response, such as it was, in the Western Cape is given below.[138]

What was the national significance of the Bantu Education Campaign? In numerical terms some 7 000 pupils who had been involved in the boycott were initially refused readmission.[139] The Campaign clearly caught the imagination of a large number of parents as a sacrificial means of expressing their anger. While, as Luthuli pointed out,[140] the strategy faced parents with an almost impossible choice and so failed to unite African opposition to Bantu Education, it did represent an outright popular rejection. It is true that alternative education in so-called "cultural clubs" was not sustained,[141] and that most of the pupils ultimately returned to state schools. Nevertheless, the Campaign enjoyed wide support for a limited period. It focussed extensive publicity on the

subject of Bantu Education. It did not stop Bantu Education but it certainly clarified the different stances taken by those who opposed its implementation.

If the Campaign strategy is considered in the light of the wide-ranging criticism at the time, perhaps the most surprising thing is that any parents withdrew their children at all. The respected former President-general of the A.N.C., Dr A.B. Xuma, publicly opposed "political action which involves children."[142] Even the usually pro-A.N.C. newspaper, New Age, criticized inadequate preparation.[143] The N.E.U.M. slated the plan as lacking any concern for the children.[144] The Liberal Party took the trouble to be represented at the hastily convened A.N.C. Easter 1955 conference.[145] The Liberals were concerned at the lack of alternative schooling for pupils who boycotted state schools and believed that "a boycott which fails will be worse than no boycott."[146] But despite these protestations from A.N.C. veterans and allies, from the Unity Movement, and from the Liberal Party, the parents of at least 7 000 pupils defied Minister Verwoerd's threat to bar them permanently from school and withdrew their children. Ultimately no child was excluded from returning. Neither Verwoerd nor the parents had achieved what they said they would. The Minister was not omnipotent to impose Bantu Education and nor were the parents powerless to oppose its implementation. Each had tested the other's strength and neither had won.

The boycott of schools was but one strategy in a wider war. The A.N.C. and the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A., the Unity Movement affiliate) were agreed on the strategy of a boycott of School Committees and School Boards.[147] The refusal of C.A.T.A. to co-operate with the A.N.C. in a joint campaign on an agreed strategy is discussed in chapter 6.[148] Moderate teachers either supported the proposed new bodies[149] or suggested modifications such as full parental control.[150] The boycott of School Boards and Committees did not prevent them from operating, but it did provide a pretext for a sustained campaign against Bantu Education.

Public meetings, regional and national conferences and a wide variety of publications were employed by opposition groups in their battle to shape public opinion regarding apartheid in schooling. A few illustrative examples follow.

The Education League, a Johannesburg based association[151] of White educationists concerned about the implications of Christian-Nationalism,[152] held a number of public meetings and mounted a broad publicity drive in local newspapers, and in education and business association journals.[153] The initial concerns were broad, for example unilingual schools were opposed and "intellectual and spiritual" freedom was upheld.[154] After the publication of the Eiselen Commission Report (1951), however, the Education League put a great deal of energy into a response, holding five meetings for this purpose in the space of a month.[155] Their critique of the details of the Commission Report was then presented by League representatives at the July 1952 Conference of the South African Institute of Race Relations.[156] This gathering represented a wide variety of concerned individuals, including African people such as I.D. Mkize,[157] who were basically willing to work for reform within an increasingly segregated education system. The significance of Mkize's involvement lies in the fact that he took a lead in 1953 in the formation of C.A.T.U.[158] so that in his working with Liberal Whites he represented other moderate, and often older, Africans whose interests would be best served by gradual change.

There were also more radical strategies which aimed primarily to influence public opinion. N.E.U.M. teachers organized a large public meeting in the Cape Town Banqueting Hall on Sunday 11 September 1955 to protest against the dismissal of teachers of the Cape African Teachers' Association.[159] Shortly afterwards a public appeal was launched to raise funds for legal action against the dismissals.[160] The eventual result of the protracted litigation in Grahamstown and Bloemfontein is described and discussed in chapter 6.[161] It is significant that C.A.T.A. published the trial proceedings and outcomes widely, since its purpose appears to have been to secure public support for its cause. To this end it received frequent publicity from the Unity Movement newspaper, The Torch, on a wide variety of other issues as well. Among these issues were the following: "collaborationist" African teachers' associations both in the Transvaal[162] and in the Cape;[163] "educational enslavement" of Africans by means of the Bantu Education Act;[164] and teacher dismissals.[165] C.A.T.A. itself used its annual conferences and issued statements to further publicize its rejection of Bantu Education and its restrictive regulations.[166] Its own

mouthpiece, The Teachers' Vision, was controlled by the radicals in the Association from the mid-forties until the state forced its closure after the January to March 1955 issue.

The strategies used by C.A.T.A., the A.N.C. and C.A.T.U. in opposing Bantu Education were related to the national strategies of the Unity Movement, the Congress Alliance and the Liberal tradition respectively. Broadly speaking they may be described as aiming to obtain influence in the sphere of African education by differing means. The Unity Movement's strategy was basically a well-publicised, articulate denunciation of Bantu Education, coupled with a boycott of School Committees and Boards. The fact that the Unity Movement was largely a teacher-led body was clearly significant in shaping a strategy which advocated that teachers should stick to their posts and pupils to their school work. The Congress Alliance supported a defiant challenge of Bantu Education both by a boycott of these school bodies and by a boycott of the schools themselves. This Congress strategy was linked to a wider strategy which defied discriminatory laws and was both committed to opposing removals and to the Bantu Education Campaign. The third grouping had a Liberal outlook and was comprised of those who believed in negotiating for improvements by building on the positive changes brought by Bantu Education, and who hoped, for example, that centralized control would at least bring increased funding per pupil. The hope was vain.

The above paragraph is a summary of the positions adopted by the three major bodies discussed in the present chapter. The study has been more descriptive than analytical. An evaluation of the respective strategies in Greater Cape Town is given in chapter six. That assessment provides a new understanding of the complexity of the task of evaluating national strategies.

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1. Lodge, T. Black politics in South Africa since 1945. Johannesburg, 1983, p. 43.
2. Lodge estimates 8 326. Ibid., p. 46.
3. See below p. 184.
4. Including I.D. Mkize, see below p. 204-207.
5. Report of the proceedings of a National Conference convened by the S.A.I.R.R. to study the Report of the Commission on Native Education. Johannesburg, 1952.
6. See below pp. 204-212.
7. Gerhart, G.M. Black power in South Africa: the evolution of an ideology. Los Angeles, 1978, pp. 8, 9. Feit, E. African opposition in South Africa. Stanford, 1967, p. 65.
8. On page 2 of an article entitled "Land and liberation" awaiting publication in a collection of essays to be edited by Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido.
9. See below pp. 201-204.
10. See above p. 66.
11. Lodge, 1983, p. 11.
12. See above p. 17.
13. Lodge, 1983, p. 11. The institutions included the separate representation of Africans by White Native Representatives in Parliament and the Native Representative Council (N.R.C.).
14. Simons, H.J. and R.E. Class and Colour in South Africa: 1850-1950. Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 493.
15. Lodge, 1983, p. 11.
16. Bundy, "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above), p. 10.
17. Lodge, 1983, p. 10.
18. See above p. 17.
19. See below pp.206,207.
20. Lodge (1983, p. 20) refers to the establishment of the Youth League as one of the two most important developments in African politics in the 1940s.
21. Karis, T. and Carter, G. From Protest to Challenge. Vol. 2, Stanford, 1973, p. 337, Document 60. See also Lodge, 1983, p. 26.
22. Gerhart, 1978, footnote on p. 184.
23. Hirson, B. Year of fire, year of ash. London, 1979, p. 34.
24. Gerhart, 1978, pp. 127,128.
25. Lodge, 1983, p. 26. Gerhart (1978, p. 186) gives reasons for the popularity of boycotts in the Cape.
26. Hirson, B. "Land, labour and the 'Black Republic', Part II. The Workers' Party and the land question". Unpublished paper, n.d.

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27. Also known as the Workers' Party or the Minority Tendency, this group was a faction of the 'Trotskyist' left which Bundy describes as including "expelled C.P.S.A. members and anti-Stalinists of various hues in addition to avowed Trotskyists" in "Resistance in the Reserves: the A.A.C. and the Transkei" in Africa Perspective, no. 22, 1983, p. 52 and note 4, p. 61.

28. Bundy, "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above), p. 13.

29. Simons, 1969, p. 543.

30. Bundy (1983, p. 52) refers to Tabata as the "most important political actor" in the A.A.C.

31. Lodge, 1983, p. 86; Bundy, 1983, p. 52.

32. Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, p. 351. See also the explanatory note on p. 112 of the same volume.

33. Under the title "The Rehabilitation Scheme - a Fraud". See Karis, T. and Gerhart, G. From Protest to Challenge. Vol. 4, 1977, p. 150. According to Beinart and Bundy, Tabata was arrested at Mount Ayliff (Transkei) for "incitement to violence" during this campaign. Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. "State intervention and rural resistance: the Transkei 1900-1965" in Klein, M.A. (ed.) Peasants in Africa, Beverley Hills, 1980, p. 302.

34. Lodge, 1983, p. 86.

35. The Transkeian Organised Bodies was also affiliated to the A.A.C. and played a role in Cape Town. See below, p. 109.

36. This political affiliation of a teachers' body had some far-reaching implications which will be dealt with in chapter 6, pp. 204-212.

37. Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, note on p. 113.

38. The Torch, 17/3/1953 quotes the Programme as demanding "Compulsory, free and uniform education for all children up to the age of 16, with free meals, free books and school equipment for the needy."

39. See Bundy, "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above), pp. 13, 14 for a discussion of the N.E.U.M.'s view of the land issue as crucial.

40. Neither Feit (1967) nor Lodge (1983) has much coverage on the N.E.U.M. Bundy, however, provides an assessment of the N.E.U.M.'s contribution as far as the land issue was concerned in "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above).

41. Under G.M. Naicker and Y. Dadoo, Davenport, T.R.H., South Africa, 2nd ed., 1978, p. 249.

42. Lodge, 1983, p. 33.

43. The so-called "Doctors' Pact" (7/3/1947) between A.B. Xuma (A.N.C.), G. Naicker (Natal Indian Congress) and Y. Dadoo (Transvaal Indian Congress) is reproduced as Document 39 in Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, p. 272. See also Lodge, 1983, p. 33.

44. Kahn, F. The origins of the Non-European Unity Movement, U.C.T. History (Hons.) Thesis, 1976, p. 113.

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45. The Cape Standard, 19/12/1944, p. 3, as quoted in Kahn, 1976, p. 114.
46. The Torch, 2/8/1955, p. 2 records an A.A.C. tour of the Reef.
47. Interview no. 27, 15/9/1983.
48. Bundy, "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above), p. 2.
49. See p. 203.
50. Simons, 1969, pp. 545, 546.
51. Ibid., p. 546.
52. Ibid.
53. Ray Simons (née Alexander) was active in Trade Union organization and the C.P.S.A. in the forties and fifties. The Simons' judgement is valuable but obviously partisan.
54. See below pp. 112,113.
55. Gerhart, 1978, p. 76.
56. Ibid., p. 76, footnote.
57. Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, p. 354. Article X of the Preamble, adopted on 17/12/1943, states that "the task of this movement will be the breaking down of the artificial walls erected by the rulers, walls of mistrust and suspicion between the Non-Europeans".
58. This is assessed in relation to Cape Town in Chapter 6, pp. 202-204.
59. See above p. 60.
60. See Lodge, 1983, pp. 23,24, and above p. 21.
61. See above, p. 60.
62. Davenport, 1977, p. 263.
63. The Simons' (1969, p. 601) blame the failure of the proposed merger on the fear of the Coloured intellectuals that they would lose their influence on the A.A.C., and who thus persuaded the Cape Western Committee of the A.A.C. to repudiate Jabavu's agreement to unite with the A.N.C. Jabavu was a key leader in the A.A.C.
64. The A.N.C. Youth League's Programme of Action was published in July 1949, Davenport, 1977, p. 263. Davenport nevertheless notes that the A.A.C. had agreed to a "mass struggle for national freedom" (p. 262) and so the judgement of this as a tension is perhaps tinged with hindsight. Possibly unity with the A.N.C. would have resulted in the A.A.C. backing the Defiance Campaign. This might in turn have resulted in a split between the A.A.C. and the Anti-C.A.D.
65. See below pp. 201-204.
66. Bundy, C. "Resistance in the Reserves: the A.A.C. and the Transkei". Africa Perspective, 1983, no. 22, pp. 52, 53.
67. Ibid., pp. 53-55. Excepting possibly a brief digression by the A.N.C. into rural politics in 1929 and 1930 in the Western Cape, see Hofmeyr, W. Rural struggles in the Western Cape 1929-1930. Africa Seminar Paper, University of Cape Town, 1983; and below p. 112.
68. Bundy, "Land and liberation" (see note 8 above), p. 2.

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69. Ibid., p. 23.

70. Interview no. 27, 15/9/1983. "Alternative" teaching implied not teaching apartheid propaganda.

71. The Torch, 16/2/1954, p. 6 records an award of eight University bursaries; and The Torch, 8/3/1952, p. 2 records two for school pupils.

72. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.

73. Quoted in Feit, 1967, p. 155.

74. See below pp.117,118.

75. Indicating that parents initiated the withdrawal of their (primary school) children from school.

76. Lodge, 1983, pp. 134, 135. For quote see below p. 178.

77. Lodge, 1983, p. 127.

78. Ibid., p. 127.

79. Ibid., p. 128.

80. Ibid.

81. For an account and assessment of C.A.T.U. see pp. 204-212.

82. The Torch, 8/2/1955, p. 7.

83. Lodge, 1983, pp. 27, 26.

84. Gerhart, 1978, p. 105.

85. Lodge, 1983, pp. 70-74.

86. Ibid., p. 72.

87. Ibid., p. 73.

88. See above p. 44ff. regarding the new mass basis for expanding African schooling. Statutory School Boards and School Committees were also new.

89. Some 52 recorded "disturbances" occurred between 1935 and 1947. Official Report, p. 72 - see chapter 6, note 4 for the reference.

90. Molteno, 1984, pp. 94-101.

91. C.A.T.U. was a member of the Federal Council of African Teachers' Associations with other similarly middle-of-the-road provincial teachers' unions. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, p. 4. Reproduced as Appendix III.

92. See above. pp. 22-29.

93. P. 6, final paragraph.

94. The Torch, 23/11/1954, p. 7.

95. New Age, 17/3/1955, p. 1.

96. Quoted in Feit, 1967, p. 152.

97. The Torch, 1/2/1955, p. 1.

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98. Second report of the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa. General Assembly Official Records, 9th session. Supplement 16(A 2719), New York, 1954.

99. New Age, 8/9/1955.

100. The N.W.D.T.U. was a co-founder of C.A.T.U.

101. Report of the Commission on Native Education 1949-1951. Views of the North Western Districts Teachers' Union (hereafter, "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.") University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Library. Department of Historical and Literary Papers. S.A.I.R.R. "B" Boxes, 321(10). Reproduced as Appendix IV.

102. There were many objections among White churches but most decided to "wait and see", as Trevor Huddleston points out. Huddleston, T. Naught for your comfort. Johannesburg, 1956, p. 171.

103. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 2. (See note 101 above.)

104. See above pp. 19,20.

105. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 2. (See note 101 above.)

106. For example, the N.E.U.M. Ten Point Programme p. 63 above.

107. See above p. 62.

108. Government Gazette no. 540 of 14/1/1955, quoted in Educational Journal, Mar. 1955, pp. 13-16.

109. E.g. The Torch 25/1/1955 and 25/4/1955. Also The Teachers' Vision, Jan.-Mar., 1955.

110. See below regarding direction, pp. 74-76.

111. See above p. 48.

112. Horrell, 1968, p. 29.

113. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, p. 6. See above note 91. It is possible that the pegging was unpopular with the Bantu Education Department itself.

114. The Torch, 8/2/1955, p. 6.

115. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 4. (See note 101 above).

116. See quotation above ch. 1, p. 20.

117. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 4. (See note 101 above.)

118. See p. 142.

119. The Torch, 2/2/1954.

120. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, p. 4.

121. Feit, 1967, pp. 150-151 discusses the document.

122. This quotation is given by Feit (1967, p. 150).

123. Ibid., p. 151.

124. Tabata, I.B. Education for barbarism, 1959, p. 7.

125. The Good Shepherd, quoted in Advance, 25/3/1954.

126. The Torch, 12/4/1954.

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127. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 1. (See note 101 above.)

128. Advance, 29/7/1954.

129. Advance, 27/8/1953, p. 7.

130. E.g. Lodge, 1983; Feit, 1967.

131. See below pp. 191-204, 204-212.

132. See above p. 70.

133. See above p. 70.

134. Karis, T. and Carter, G. From Protest to Challenge. Vol. 3, Challenge and Violence, Stanford, 1977, pp. 205,207.

135. Feit (1967, p. 111) estimates 2 000 delegates representing 200 000 people.

136. Lodge, T. "The parents' school boycott: Eastern Cape and East Rand townships, 1955", in Kallaway, 1984, pp. 265-295. Also a chapter in Lodge, 1983. See also Feit, 1967, pp. 143-189.

137. See above pp. 68,69.

138. See below pp. 178-181.

139. Lodge, 1984, p. 278.

140. See above p. 68.

141. Lodge, 1984, p. 284.

142. Letter to New Age (5/5/1955) from Duma Nokwe of the A.N.C. Youth League. Nokwe was sharply critical of Xuma.

143. New Age, 31/3/1955, p. 2.

144. See below pp. 201,202.

145. New Age, 21/4/1955.

146. J.T.R. Gibson in New Age, 21/4/1955.

147. For example see New Age, 2/6/1955, and The Torch, 12/4/1955, p. 1.

148. See below p. 201-204.

149. E.g. Mr Quwe who was a teacher at Eureka School, Cape Town. See also New Age, 29/9/1955.

150. "Views of the N.W.D.T.U.", p. 3. (See note 101 above.)

151. Established on 25/11/1948. The Education League's Minute book is housed in the library of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Department of Historical and Literary Papers.

152. See above, pp. 22-29.

153. Education League Minutes, 26/1/1949. (See note 151 above.)

154. Ibid., 2/3/1949.

155. Ibid., 27/5/1952 to 30/6/1952.

156. See above, p. 68.

157. See below pp. 204-212.

158. See below pp. 207-212.

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159. The Torch, 13/9/1955, p. 1; New Age, 15/9/1955, p. 8.

160. The Torch, 25/10/1955, p. 1.

161. See below pp. 199-201.

162. The Torch, 21/7/1953.

163. The Torch, 11/8/1953.

164. The Torch, 27/1/1954.

165. The Torch, 2/9/1955.

166. E.g. The Teachers' Vision, Dec. 1953, p. 10; Educational Journal, July 1955, p. 5.

CHAPTER 4

THE GROWTH OF AFRICAN COMMUNITIES IN CAPE TOWN : LABOUR, SEGREGATION AND RESISTANCE UP TO C. 1955

4.1 Introduction

The concern of this chapter is to provide a background study of the influence of Cape Town's socio-economic growth on its African population. The demand for unskilled labour attracted increasing numbers of African people to the City. The majority of these people lived in conditions of appalling squalour. This is shown for example by the population's poor state of health. In order to control the undesirable effects of squatting (both directly on health and indirectly on labour) the State and City authorities devised and gradually implemented a restrictive network of housing and labour policies which discriminated especially against African people. The African response to this discrimination came in a bewildering variety of opposition and resistance strategies.

4.2 Growing African Communities : Squatting, disease and schooling.

(a) Economic Growth and African Labour in Cape Town, c. 1945 - 1960.

The Second World War brought economic development to the major urban centres in South Africa.[1] It also brought work-seekers. During and after the War migration to the urban areas was a nation-wide phenomenon. It resulted from a complex variety of factors both in the towns and in the countryside. In the towns it was encouraged by the departure of former workers to the war and a need for replacement labour. It was further encouraged by industrial growth stimulated first by war-time, then by consumer demand. African town-ward migration was also influenced by coercive measures. Imposed taxes forced many African people to seek paid work. In the countryside another major reason for people leaving their rural homes at this time was the diminishing ability of the land to sustain both a growing population and increasing numbers of stock animals.[2]

Figure 1

POPULATION RETURNS*

TABLE 1: CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY

Year	White	Coloured and Asians	Africans	Total	African % of Total
1865	15,118	13,065	274(K)†	28,457	1·0
1875	18,973	14,093	173	33,239	0·5
1891	25,392	25,235	623	51,251	1·2
1904	44,203	31,318	2,147	77,668	2·8
1911	86,239	80,449	1,569	168,257	0·9
1921	111,764	89,259	8,684	209,727	4·1
1936	152,244	135,621	13,583	301,448	4·5
1946	180,865	171,767	31,258	383,830	8·1
1951	186,660	214,334	40,215	441,209	9·1
1959	196,560	307,350	72,711	576,621	12·6
1960	188,545	269,172	39,254	496,971	7·9

TABLE 2: GREATER CAPE TOWN

1865	20,996	17,118	767(K)‡	38,791	1·8
1875	25,256	19,250	202	44,688	0·5
1891	40,956	37,318	761	79,055	1·0
1904	104,421	62,534	7,492	174,447	4·3
1911	86,708*	80,801	1,581	169,090	0·9
1921	117,027	94,562	8,893	220,502	4·0
1936	173,412	156,651	14,160	344,223	4·1
1946	220,480	216,315	35,197	471,413	7·5
1951	247,442	280,413	49,793	577,648	8·6
1960	278,555	374,609	65,025	718,189	9·0

* *Census Reports. Social Survey of Cape Town No. SS. 2* 1941; University of Cape Town. City of Cape Town, *M.O.H. Annual Reports.*
† 'Kaffirs' only - i.e. Xhosa-speaking only, excluding Sotho.
‡ Includes troops.

Population of Cape Town classified according to race, 1865-1960.

Source: Wilson, M. and Mafeje, A. Langa, 1963, p. 2.

The above tables show that a flood of African workseekers poured into Cape Town during and immediately after the War. These official statistics record an increase of about 250% in the African population of Cape Town in the decade up to 1946. This phenomenon was specifically related to the rapidly growing demand for ultra-cheap, unskilled labour. Sheila van der Horst estimates that 90% of Cape Town's African workers in 1954 were employed in the unskilled category.[3] Reasons for the relatively high number of unskilled workers and the correspondingly low number (8%) of semi-skilled and skilled (2%) workers being African include the fact that Coloured and White workers had traditionally held these intermediate positions, and were reluctant to admit competition. Van der Horst summarised the two barriers to African advancement in skilled positions as follows:

> "Craft trade union influence has been a potent force preventing the apprenticeship of those African youths who reach the required educational standard, which in itself has been a barrier preventing Africans from access to skilled trades."[4]

The work which Africans undertook in Cape Town in the 1950s was mainly unskilled and much of it involved heavy manual labour. The three major industries employing African workers were heavily labour intensive : building (5861, i.e. 25% of the African workforce was in building in 1948-9), food and canning (17%), and stone and clay (15%) processing.[5] The size of each of these concerns was increasing.

The expansion of the food and canning industry illustrates the rapid growth of the Western Cape economy. War-time demand for canned foods increased production sharply - by 400% between 1938 and 1945.[6] The number of workers employed in the food and canning industry during this period increased almost five times to 8 018 in 1945 and then continued its surge to more than double again by 1958 when it reached 21 291.[7] These figures include Coloured workers who slightly outnumbered Africans in 1950.[8] During the fifties this pattern changed to the extent that by 1963 there were twice as many Africans as Coloureds in the canning industry. The pattern would have been similar in other concerns employing African labour. Whittingdale[9] mentions other growing industrial firms. By 1960 a thriving ship-repairing industry, three heavy engineering works and a bottle manufacturing company had been firmly established.[10] Mafeje and Wilson[11] have documented social groups in Cape Town's official African township, Langa. Their case studies further indicate the variety of jobs taken on by African workers.[12] They were employed by dairies, garages, shops, hospitals, clothing and blanket manufacturers, the City Council and in domestic service.[13] These facts and figures illustrate the Western Cape's attraction for increasing numbers of Africans who sought to escape from rural poverty and find employment in the rapidly expanding industrial and commercial sectors in the urban areas. Sheila van der Horst gives extensive evidence of the growth of the African labour force in Cape Town. From 1925 to 1953 the number of Africans employed in private industry rose five times from 5 000 to 28 700. In addition to this numerical growth, the proportion of Africans in the total labour force grew from 14% to 27% in the same period.[14]

The resultant growth of the African population in the urban perimeter of Cape Town was not, however, welcomed by all interests. In fact, nationally the results of urbanization had been one key issue in the 1948 election. The Afrikaner Nationalists' Sauer Report[15] proposed

that "surplus" African labour should be returned to the Reserves, a move which was favoured by farming and mining interests. The proposal had the additional benefit that it caught the votes of Whites who were alarmed at the prospect of "being flooded by Black hordes."

(b) Living conditions of African communities in Cape Town, c. 1950.

Public concern over the unplanned growth of squalid, sprawling African settlements around Cape Town was running high in the early 1950s. The Cape Times declared that there was

> "a semi-circle of 40 huge Native slum towns which lie around the outskirts of the Peninsula."[16]

Even the official census figures show a remarkable growth in the number of Africans in Greater Cape Town during and after the Second World War - from 14 160 in 1936 to three and a half times that number (49 793) in 1951, just fifteen years later.[17] The actual figures were far higher. In contrast to the 50 000 recorded in the census of 1951, the local authorities estimated that there were 80 000 Africans[18] in Cape Town. Van der Horst records that an estimate for 1952 indicated that some 56 000 people (16 000 migrants and 10 000 families) lived crowded in the unauthorized and revolting squatter settlements.[19] The Cape Times (13/1/1951) corroborates this, estimating that there were 60 000 African people without housing.

Each year there were thousands of Africans who came to live in Cape Town. Basically they found one of five types of settlement in which to live. In the early 1950s a few would have moved into areas of long-standing settlement (District Six in Cape Town and Luyolo at Simon's Town); some into built-up areas which were predominantly Coloured (Athlone, Woodstock, Retreat and, to an extent, Elsies River); some into Langa, the only official township, with its bachelors' quarters to house migrants; some into the developing site and service scheme at Nyanga (from 1953 onwards); most, however, would have settled in the burgeoning shanty towns (Kensington, Windermere, Cook's Bush in Retreat, Marabastad in Elsies River, Vrygrond or Freeground in Muizenberg). A map and a brief description of the nature of the five types of settlement is given below in Chapter 5.[20] This categorization is used to explain why schools were established or closed in the different areas, and will therefore not be repeated here.

Given the fact that the majority of Africans in Cape Town in the 1950s were living as squatters, what was the quality of their living conditions? An answer to this question is important for the light that it throws on housing policy,[21] resistance[22] and schooling policy in the 1950s. A reliable indicator of social conditions is needed, and although it may at first seem somewhat unrelated to these three areas, the statistics of community health provide such a measure. The annual reports of the Medical Officer of Health (M.O.H.) of Cape Town offer an illuminating perspective on the social and physical position of Africans resident in the City. An investigation of Cape Town's mortality rates has been undertaken by Peter Buirski following a similar British study. Infectious diseases are distinguished on the basis of their mode of transmission. The M.O.H. Reports list mortality rates under three major headings viz. infant mortality (mainly caused by gastro-enteritis), enteric fever (i.e. typhoid), and tuberculosis. Each of these diseases is related to a different aspect of community health. Gastro-enteritis (or infantile diarrhoea) is a food-borne infection, typhoid is water-borne, and tuberculosis is air-borne. Buirski points out that the first two, having to do with food and water, are indicators of standards of cleanliness and sanitation. Thus a drop in the infant mortality figures or in the enteric fever death rate would point either to an improvement in medical treatment or to better hygiene. On the other hand tuberculosis is transmitted by an air-borne bacillus which spreads rapidly in areas of poverty and dense population. In the 1934 M.O.H. Report the non-medical nature of the basic social problems "causing" tuberculosis are explained.

> "Amongst the chief factors causing tuberculosis are bad nutrition, bad housing, bad industrial conditions, and alconolism and other vices, and while good results may be expected from the treatment and isolation of patients it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the most promising line of attack on tuberculosis is in the direction of the improvement of housing and of sanitary and social conditions generally."[23]

Looking at the mortality figures for tuberculosis and those for the other two diseases the impression is that these conditions were improving. The relevant statistics for all three diseases taken at intervals of 10 years over four decades appear to indicate a steady improvement on all fronts for "Non-Europeans".[24]

Figure 2

The year up to 30 June of	Infant mortality rate	Enteric fever death rate	Tuberculosis death rate
1915	224,36	0,30	5,09
1925	173,93	0,21	4,51
1935	146,18	0,07	4,66
1945	127,19	0,09	5,90
1955	100,80	0,02	1,21
1955 Europeans	21,45	0,00	0,17

Annual death rates (per 1000) for "Non-Europeans" for the years 1915, 1925, 1935, 1945 and 1955, and "Europeans" for 1955.

Source: Report of the M.O.H., Cape Town for the year ended 30/6/1955, p.100.

A comparison of the final row with European death rates for 1955 shows a most unsatisfactory position despite the apparent improvement. The fact that only four out of every five "Non-European" children survived to the age of a year in 1955 indicates an appallingly low standard of living in the shanty towns. Even the exceptional improvement in the tuberculosis death rate from 5,9 in 1945 to 1,21 in 1955 is misleading since this was largely due to the discovery in 1947 of a powerful drug (streptomycin) which made it possible to treat the disease successfully. The incidence of tuberculosis remained persistently high despite the sharply reduced death rate. This is shown by the notification rate (tuberculosis was a notifiable disease and so fairly reliable records exist) which drops less rapidly than the death rate.

Figure 3

The year up to 30 June of	Notification rate	Death rate	Langa notification rate (and Ndabeni for 1934)	Langa death rate
1934	8,78	5,24	13,3	5,7
1938	8,16	4,76		4,94
1945	10,25	5,90	11,6	6,39
1950		3,96		
1955	6,35	1,21	9,4	1,32

Nofification and death rates (per 1 000) for "Non-Europeans" with tuberculosis for Cape Town as a whole and for the African township, 1934 - 1955.

Source : Reports of the M.O.H., Cape Town for the given years.

It is of interest that the death rate for "Non-Europeans" in general and that for Africans in the township show no substantial difference. This suggests that it is not unreasonable to use the Non-European statistics as indicating trends in the specifically African sector. What conclusions concerning the community health of Africans in Cape Town may be drawn from the above discussion? Most importantly that the high incidence of infectious diseases, particularly tuberculosis, points to a grossly inadequate social and economic climate. Secondly, there are many direct links between deprivation and schooling. In a standard text on tuberculosis, Prof. E. Glatthaar[25] has outlined the conditions in which the disease spreads.

> "Tuberculosis is truly a disease directly influenced by unfavourable socio-economic conditions. Poor housing, overcrowding, malnutrition, lack of hygiene, emotional or physical stress, long hours of work, loss of sleep, lowered resistance, unpasteurised milk, etc., are all factors that favour the development and spread of T.B."[26]

So while tuberculosis is a health matter seemingly unrelated to education, its prevalence actually indicates a great deal about factors in a community's life which have a direct bearing on schooling. Each of the factors mentioned by Glatthaar affects the schooling of the young. Inadequate and crowded accommodation restrict the ability of school-goers to do homework. Parents away from home for long hours are unable to supervise the activities of their children. These children would themselves have to assume certain time-consuming domestic duties such as caring for younger children. Besides the above limitations on their time and motivation, malnutrition would disqualify many potential school-goers before they even started. In severe cases the disease causes permanent brain damage. The other factors Glatthaar mentions also hinder work. A home atmosphere of physical tiredness and emotional stress does not help study. A lack of hygiene will predispose young people to disease which further limits school attendance.

A clear conclusion from the frightful health statistics is that a majority of African people lived under adverse conditions. In such circumstances discontent was rife and provided fertile soil for resistance to state policy. Recognizing this volatile situation, various authorities sought to contain it through changes in housing and labour policies.

4.3 Growing segregation : housing and labour policy

(a) Segregated housing

Before 1900 there was no legislated separation of Africans into segregated residential areas in Cape Town. It was largely the availability of work and land which determined the places where African people lived. Most often their scattered settlements were alongside and within Coloured and White residential areas. They lived in groups in makeshift dwellings, or in the outhouses of the wealthy whom they served, or in crowded, rented accommodation. They were scattered across the Peninsula - from above Camps Bay on the north west to Simon's Town on the south east. They lived on the lower slopes of Table Mountain above the city, and in more or less organised 'locations' across the Cape Flats.[27] Despite random settlement and the establishment of informal "Non-European" living areas before 1900, it became the policy of the City Council to seek segregated residential areas for African people after the turn of the century. Successive official African settlements were established - each one further from the city centre than its predecessor. Ndabeni, near present day Pinelands, was set up in 1901[28], Langa in 1927[29] and Nyanga in the 1950s.[30] None of these was sufficiently large to deal with the growing size of the population and Africans continued to live outside of these designated areas. Many did so by choice rather than have to pay the high rentals or leave their families or communities.

Why did the city and national authorities respond to the urbanization crisis by means of segregated housing and labour policies? Why were so few houses provided? Was it an irrational racist response motivated by prejudice or was it to exploit labour or to seek political control? To answer these questions it is first necessary to outline chronologically the developments towards increasing segregation of housing.

The first official residential segregation of Africans in Cape Town was established in 1901. While the period is remote from the 1950s a brief examination of the reasons given for the move is relevant. Africans had lived and worked in Cape Town since the late 1830s. The key to Cape Town's early attractiveness for African labour was its

harbour. Dockside jobs were created both by inland developments such as mineral discoveries and agricultural growth, and by external factors such as periodic wars. By the turn of the century the docks were the largest employer of African labour.[31] At this time it was clear to the city fathers that Africans were needed and that growing numbers had come to stay. The problem as many saw it was whether large numbers of these people with such a different language and culture (the terms used were "rawness" and "barbarity")[32] could be accommodated within the city. The question was discussed at length but without resolution during the 1890s. The bubonic plague of 1901 solved the problem. In the furore which followed the Africans' alleged insanitary habits were blamed. Under enabling health legislation the City Council effected the removal of Africans from District Six to Uitvlugt (later renamed Ndabeni). This was South Africa's first officially established location. Saunders' conclusion regarding the reason for this move is that it was essentially racially motivated. He interprets the purpose of this racism as follows:

> "The creation of the location, then, was a racist response... to the great influx of Africans, one designed to control the urban African population by defining where it might live and subjecting it to a network of restrictions."[33]

To further establish the point Saunders claims that those who "demanded or defended the location rarely did so on economic grounds"[34] and points out that many Cape Town employers in fact criticised its establishment. Having argued then that the reasons for setting up a separate location were

1. White fear of "the Kafir invasion"
2. desire for the control of liquor and the entry of women
3. ease of management via the curfew
4. desire for better health control,[35]

Saunders concludes his outline of the reasons for the establishment of Ndabeni with a restrained analysis of a major effect viz. the control of labour and wages.

> "The location enabled a Government previously without any control over the 'Kafir invasion' to attempt to regulate the supply of African labour in the Cape Town area on a monthly basis. As African labour remained highly migrantised and 'rent'... fixed, it is likely that wages remained lower than they would otherwise have been."[36]

Racism was undoubtedly an element in the demand for urban segregation, just as public health was the reason given for the creation of Ndabeni, but behind the racist reaction lay the perception that the proposed move would be economically more efficient and make political control easier. This seems to have been understood by the Africans themselves. It was not the Whites' racism which was the focus of the Africans' objections but rather the material conditions of their lives in the location. As early as 1901 a leader of the people at Ndabeni; Alfred Mangena, claimed that the inhabitants did "not object to the actual rent, but to the unfit accommodation where they had to sleep on the wet sand."[37] He also questioned whether the location was to be permanent : "is it an established location or merely a disused bubonic camp utilised for a temporary purpose?"[38] In fact Ndabeni provided the anvil on which to hammer out the practice of segregating African residence. Ndabeni was begun by means of health legislation, but these provisions were not strong enough to enable an effective control.

The Langa township was opened in 1927 to replace the "temporary" township of Ndabeni. Like its predecessor, Langa was not even able to house a third of Cape Town's African population.[39] With the coming of the 1939 - 1945 War the pressure of African migration to the City built up, but there were no available funds for an extensive building programme. After the war the pressure mounted even more but still nothing was built. Bloch and Wilkinson have conjectured[40] that the failure to provide African housing arose from a clash between mining interests (favouring migrancy) and industrial interests (favouring a stable urban proletariat, adequately housed). While this may be valid, it does not cast any light on the tardiness of housing provision in Cape Town where there were no mining operations and where commerce and industry would have favoured a settled population.

The Smuts' government's "Native" policy was rocked by the 1946 African mineworkers' strike, the adjournment of the Native Representative Council, and the Afrikaner Nationalists were exploiting the urban "Native" crisis to their full advantage. When power changed hands to the Nationalists in 1948, funds from central government were still refused to the local authorities. In Cape Town for example the City Council wanted an African township at Retreat, but this was too close for the Nationalists' liking. The Council was unwilling to use White

ratepayers' money to fund African housing so an impasse was reached. It was only once the broad plan for a totally separate African township (Nyanga) had been drawn up that the government allocated funds.[41] Bloch and Wilkinson have identified employer organizations as a third interest in providing funds for African housing.[42] They have pointed out that businesses argued that they only had a responsibility to pay an "economic wage." Taking this argument further, it was in the short term interest of business to have workers living in shanty towns since the cost of accommodation was minimal. Thus businesses could pay a lower wage and workers could obtain a higher nett return from wages than if they were living in rented accommodation.

The initiative for the provision of African housing had moved in fifty years from the local authority to the central government. But at the root of all the arrangements made was the desire for segregated townships. A strong motivation for segregation becomes clear when African labour legislation is examined.

(b) Segregated employment

At the end of the 1914 - 1918 War the number of Africans in the Ndabeni township and in the areas surrounding Cape Town picked up sharply.[43] New measures were designed to regulate African labour especially in two broad spheres - influx control and union organization - and the Western Cape was set aside for a particularly strict prescription of both. Through the Urban Areas legislation (1923-) curbs were placed on the entry of Africans into Cape Town. Through the Industrial Conciliation legislation (1924-) African workers were progressively prohibited from negotiating in their workplace. Through the Coloured Labour Preference Policy (1955-) African labour in the Western Cape was more tightly circumscribed than anywhere else in the country.

In 1923 the Natives (Urban Areas) Act was passed by Parliament. It was the first legislation enacted which enabled local authorities to eject certain categories of Africans from urban areas.[44] Three years later, in 1926, the Cape Town municipal area was declared a proclaimed area in terms of the 1923 legislation and registration of service contracts for Africans was required. Over the next three decades a series of amendments to this legislation followed providing inter alia for

local urban authorities and rural magistrates to have to issue permission for women to enter the urban area (1937), for the City Council's jurisdiction to cover the whole of the Cape Peninsula (1945/46), for a restriction of railway ticket sales in rural areas outside the Western Cape to persons approved by a local magistrate (1945), for Africans to remain in the area for no more than 72 hours unless they qualified by virtue of permanent residence, lengthy employment or by being wives or children of qualified residents (1952). In terms of the latter provision the Cape Town City Council began in 1954 to issue permits (passes) to women and to prosecute offenders. Few actions of the Council aroused such ill feeling as did issuing passes to women.[45]

The growth of the African population in the Western Cape was also the direct concern of the Union Department of Native Affairs through its so-called Coloured Labour Preference Policy. The Secretary of the Department, Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen, announced in 1955 that since the Western Cape was the traditional home of the Coloured people, he intended to tighten influx control measures, to expel "illegal" residents, and to repatriate families which had recently entered the area.[46] Eiselen went on to summarise his point quite bluntly:

> "Kort en bondig gestel, mik ons naturellebeleid wat die Westelike Provinsie betref op uiteindelike eliminasie van die naturel uit hierdie gebied. Dit behoort met verdrag te geskied sodat dit nie lei tot nadelige ontwrigting van nywerheidslewe nie."[47]

Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs also expressed his determination to eliminate the African presence from the area. Speaking to a deputation from the Christian Council on 7/9/1955, Verwoerd repeated what he had said in the House of Assembly in June 1954 viz. that while in the short term the African population may increase, ultimately (he estimated 1978) there would be a decline as the Reserve industries attracted African labour to those areas.[48]

The accompanying map shows the vast extent of the area conceived by Eiselen as the "Western Province". One commentator, S.B. Becker, explains that the area was seen as essentially different from the rest of the country in racial terms :

> "(t)he Western Cape - in area representing four tenths of the Republic South Africa - incorporates no part of these homelands and is the only

substantial region of the Republic in which blacks constitute a minority of the population."[49]

Figure 4



Map of the Western Cape Province where the Coloured Labour Preference Policy was proposed by Dr W.W.M. Eiselen in 1955.

Adapted from: Horner, D. Labour preference, influx control and squatters: Cape Town entering the 1980s. South African Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper No. 50, Cape Town 1983.

It is arguable that while racial considerations influenced the policy, the effect of restricting African workers' access to jobs was to serve the interests of some employers. Ian Goldin[50] has argued that African workers who were illegally in the area were powerless to resist extreme exploitation because their

> "desperate position ensures that they constitute the cheapest, most subservient and most easily dismissable category of employees."[51]

The effect of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy in Cape Town was to create divisions within the ranks of African labour (illegally employed workers could not count on "legal workers" to stand with them) and to alienate African from Coloured labour by attempting to form a "labour aristocracy" of Coloured workers.[52] The fragmentation of the workforce and the reduction of the collective power of labour was also a goal of the Industrial Conciliation legislation.

African workers had been largely excluded from the collective bargaining processes allowed for other races by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. All Africans who carried passes were simply excluded from the definition of "employee" within the Act. Various amendments to the Act sought to still the voice of successive groups of Africans in their place of work. By the 1930 amendment (Act No. 24) agreements made by the newly created Industrial Councils could be extended to include African workers. The compliance of both workers and management being mandatory, this meant that without having been consulted Africans could have such "settlements" thrust upon them. The 1937 amendment (Act No. 36) again altered the definition of "employee" this time to exclude those Africans who had registered service contracts in terms of the 1923 Urban Areas legislation. The effect of this was to exclude most Africans from any share in the bargaining process. Two groups of Africans did, however, remain within the definition. African men who were exempt from carrying passes by virtue of their qualification and registration for the parliamentary franchise and secondly African women who were working in factories were not then under the pass laws.

The 1953 Act expressly excluded all Africans from the conciliation process. In terms of Section 36 "employee" was finally redefined to exclude any "person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa". This Act also provided a three-tier system, with the top tier or Central Labour Board being predictably composed entirely of White officials, for the settlement of disputes involving African labour. In a study published a decade later and concerning African labour in Cape Town, Sheila van der Horst comments: "Little use has been made yet of this machinery. Few works committees have been established under this legislation, and at the time of this study little use has been made of the procedure for settling disputes."[53] The reason for this lies both in the insecurity of the African worker

and in the simple conclusion that this suited the employer's interest. The position of the African worker was tenuous since there was a strong likelihood of losing a job and thereby the right to remain in the area (where there might be another job). A second reason is that it was the intention of the legislation to effectively curb the power of African workers to take collective industrial action. The title of the legislation might as well have referred to the "prevention" and not the "settlement" of disputes. The effect of the policy is a clear indication of its success. As a measure to provide an effective means for settling disputes it was a failure. As a move to accompany the other repressive legislation aimed at silencing the voice of the African worker it achieved temporary success.

The Industrial Conciliation Act No. 28 of 1956 consolidated and extended the legislation of the past thirty years, providing for job reservation to people of specified race ("to prevent inter-racial competition") and simply ignoring the existence of African trade unions. These were neither banned nor was provision made for their registration. They thus had no official bargaining power. In the case of a dispute the results of an arbitration by a ministerial appointee was binding. The reason for the non-action regarding unions was that there were other means for dealing with troublemaking unionists. As the Botha Commission on Industrial Legislation noted in 1951 "other laws provide for... activities by agitators who... use such organizations for other purposes."[54] Indeed the Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950 allowed the state of summarily list persons as Communists and thereby exclude them from public office or political activity on the basis of their being deemed to be furthering the ends of Communism. These ends were so broadly defined that they could quite simply and most effectively be applied to trade union organisers, to newspaper editors and so on. Even if they did not qualify as Communists under the formal definition as adherents of "Marxian socialism" striving to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, they could be convicted for aiming to:

> "bring about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions...
> "bring about change under the direction of a foreign power...
> "encourage feelings of hostility between European and non-European races."[55]

Legislation so broad could be made to apply to a range of activities far beyond the scope of Communism in the usual sense of the word. One significant provision of the 1956 Act was that it did ban racially mixed unions, and required that separate branches of existing mixed unions be formed. This meant that benefits won by one branch for their racial group did not have to be extended to the other group, and it thus encouraged workers of advantaged groups to fight for benefits at the expense of the other groups. The banning of any political affiliation for unions was a further provision of the Act - one which was probably aimed at the 1955 Congress Alliance and its co-operative relationship with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (formed in March 1955).

In conclusion it is evident that the purpose of the Urban Areas, Industrial and Labour Preference policies was to divide the Black workforce and so prevent a substantial challenge to continued White dominance. Divisions between races and between migrants and non-migrants and even between legally and illegally employed workers were all made wider by the combined effects of these policies.

4.4 Growing protest and resistance

In Chapter 5 on the education of Africans in Cape Town, some of the facets of the struggle against the policy of Bantu Education will be highlighted. An attempt will be made in this section to outline the background by providing an overview of the traditions of resistance in Cape Town from sporadic, unco-ordinated and localised reactions to more coherent organised responses. For this it is important to have an historical overview of the local political groupings, their relationships with the national opposition bodies, the issues which they faced, and their strategies.

It is not a simple matter to categorise the Cape Town based bodies which mobilised African opposition to official policy and administration in the two decades leading up to the 1950s. The reason is that they changed in aims and strategies over time as the conditions within the society around them changed. The case of the Vigilance Associations illustrates this variation over time. In the late 1920 the new Langa township remained largely unoccupied as the residents of

Ndabeni refused to move to Langa where rentals and transportation costs to work were higher. When Superintendent Cook invoked the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 to reduce the population of Ndabeni by evicting migrants without service contracts, it was the Ndabeni Vigilance Association which took action. Under the leadership of Rev. Stephen Olifan the Vigilance Association eclipsed the divided local A.N.C. in the late 1920s, and took a lead in protest. Thirty years later in the 1950 s and under very different conditions the Langa Vigilance Association was often seen as representing the conservative interests of settled Africans, and lacking an active concern for the issues facing migrants.[56] Where Olifan had fought against stringent influx controls[57] in the twenties, there was no agency which voiced the grievances of the migrant and semi-urbanised workers in the 1950s.

At least two writers have claimed that the gap in local political organization was evident from the enthusiastic response which the Pan African Congress received in the City in the late 1950s.[58] In contrast to the conservatism of the Langa Vigilance Association in the 1950s, the bodies which responded to the national call of the A.N.C. to support the Defiance Campaign were brought together by a common threat to the security of their members from a network of new discriminatory laws. More details will be given below of the scores of people who were arrested for their acts of passive resistance. The Defiance Campaign brought many new supporters to the A.N.C., but it alarmed the Unity movement. The N.E.U.M. was critical of the "unprincipled" sacrifice of people to popularise the A.N.C. It also condemned the conservatives for their collaboration, and castigated the Government and the white "Herrenvolk" for their racism.

The above categorization of opposition bodies - as (i) Unity, with its articulate critical stance; (ii) A.N.C. (or Congress Alliance), with its involvement in symbolic acts of lawbreaking; and (iii) the various official and semi-official representative bodies which usually worked through given channels - is simplistic. A careful definition of resistance shows this up at once. Beinart and Bundy have given a definition which may be applied to urban as well as to rural African resistance:

> "Civil unrest can be described in terms of a declension that runs from disaffection, disturbance, unrest and rebellion to insurrection

> and revolution; and it is as well at the outset to make plain what we mean by the term "resistance" and what is intended by our focus on it. We are referring to instances of overt political action that protest against or attempt to end political and economic pressures, such action(s) assuming forms not recognised by the state as legal or permissable."[59]

In terms of this definition it is possible to suggest a more refined categorization which shows up the inner tensions and the complex nature of Cape Town's resistance traditions. It was Unity Movement strategy to stay within the letter of the law and so, on the face of it, the Movement did not overtly resist the state. The state, however, while it never banned the Unity Movement, certainly regarded the actions of Unity affiliates, C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A., as impermissable. As will be shown in Chapter 6, recognition was withdrawn from the associations and office bearers were dismissed from their state-paid teaching posts. In this sense the Unity Movement engaged in resistance. But for the most part the teachers, who largely made up Unity's support, remained at their posts and did not intend to resist the state by overtly breaking the law.[60]

Turning to the Congress Movement largely represented by the A.N.C.(W.C.) the position regarding resistance is not clear either - there were still differences over the extent to which a resistance strategy should be implemented. It is true that the Defiance Campaign offered strong resistance by its deliberate and co-ordinated transgression of selected discriminatory laws, but in other respects the A.N.C. was prepared to co-operate with government agencies. This is shown below[61] in the A.N.C.'s ambivalent attitude to support for the Whites who represented Cape African voters in Parliament. While withholding one's vote can hardly be construed as an "instance of overt political action" in a form "not recognised by the state as legal", the point is that it was a strategy which aimed to undermine peoples' faith in the legality of the system of representation and as such represents a mild form of resistance. It also usefully shows up a difference which developed within the A.N.C. One wing wanted to use the system of Parliamentary representation to the best advantage, the other wing favoured a boycott of the election. Now the boycott of elections was also a strategy of the Unity Movement and so, at least on the surface a simple categorization of resistance politics in Cape Town into Unity or A.N.C. does not re-

flect the complexity of the situation. It is nevertheless a useful way of regarding the local picture for the purposes of this dissertation.

There was a clear trend over the twenty years from the Hertzog Native Bills to the implementation of the Bantu Education Act towards increasing polarization. Whereas in the late thirties people belonged to both the A.N.C. and the All African Convention even at leadership level,[62] the split over strategy was complete by the early fifties and the battle lines were clearly drawn. The focus for the division between the two principal groupings - the Defiance Campaign supporters which became formalised as the Congress Alliance[63], and the Unity Movement affiliates - was ostensibly the strategy of boycott. But it was no simple matter of the N.E.U.M. being pro-boycott and the Congress Alliance being anti-boycott. In the A.N.C.(W.C.) there were elements which, like the N.E.U.M., favoured a boycott of all bodies where Whites represented Blacks. There was division for example within the A.N.C.(W.C.) over the issue of whether there should be African support for the Native Representatives in Parliament. On the one hand Johnson Ngwevela, G. Ngotyana, and John Mtini supported the candidature of Brian Bunting (elected by a large majority in November 1952) while on the other hand Joseph Nkatlo and Lucas Phillips claimed that the A.N.C. had boycotted the election in accordance with its nationally approved Programme of Action.[64] This stipulated non-collaboration with the agencies like Native Representation which were seen as enabling the Government to contain African protest in a narrow ineffectual channel. This tension within the A.N.C. concerned how far the resistance should continue to operate within the structure of the legislation of the land. The radicals opposed any form of collaboration while the centre accepted the benefits arising from co-operating with Whites who could represent their interests sympathetically in Parliament and whose newspapers could publicise their policies and actions.

It is significant that this split in the A.N.C.(W.C.) reflected the tension in the A.N.C. nationally. There were those who later supported the broad Congress Alliance and those who saw such co-operation with Whites as undermining African nationalist unity. The local disunity had a history of various factions struggling for leadership. "Professor" James Thaele, leader of the Western District Branch (as the A.N.C.(W.C.) was then known), aroused fierce popular anger in

public meetings in 1926 when his support of the Native Superintendent Cook was seen as unacceptably conservative. At one meeting a fight broke out over this matter while at another Thaele was heckled and mobbed.[65] Thaele's conservative leadership was again challenged in 1936, this time successfully by Chief A.V. Coto, who achieved his (Thaele's) removal from office by appeal to the national body.[66] But the struggle for power continued and participants took on positions of various political groups of the time. Some supported the A.N.C. Secretary-General (1936 - 1949) Rev. James A. Calata and his liberal ideal of a unity of the long divided Eastern and Western Cape regions. On the other hand the Communists rallied under the Cape Town A.N.C. Branch Chairman (1938 - 39) and later General Secretary of the Communist Party, Moses Kotane. The Communists were ousted from the leadership of the Cape Town branch in the 1940 election in what appears to have been a calculated move against them when a completely new executive was voted in.[67] The third power group was led by the conservative Stephen Oliphant, the Secretary of the A.N.C(W.C.) and editor of a newspaper,[68] who was opposed both to the Communists and the liberals. Oliphant opposed the candidature of Native Representative Donald Molteno. One result of this was that the national A.N.C. President-General, Dr. A.B. Xuma, stopped the A.N.C. practice of officially sanctioning candidates for the General Election. Xuma was in close touch with Molteno.

Against a background of such disunity within the A.N.C.(W.C.) it is hardly surprising that Africans were also involved in other bodies of a political nature. In the early forties most appeared to support the candidature of Donald Molteno as the Natives' M.P. for the Western Circle. In an article proposing "a complete and unopposed return of our faithful D.B. Molteno", Imvo claimed a virtually unanimous support for him from at least ten diverse organizations :

> "Welknown (sic) and influential Bantu leaders in the Congress ranks are determined as never before to see that Mr. Molteno shall be returned as their representatives (sic). Along with these ... (are included the - MC)
> African National Congress (Under Prof. J. Thaele)
> Cape Town African Voters' Association (Under Messrs Bassi and [illegible])
> Langa African Voters' Association (under Chief A.V. Coto and J. Malangabi)
> All African Convention Western Cape Committee and J. Tabata (sic) and H. Jayiya,

> Alfred Dock Workers' Association (under J. Masupha and F.C. Welcome)
> National Liberation League (under Messrs Alb. Ndlwana and W. Ndunyana)
> Communist Party (under M. Kotane and others)
> Langa Workers' Association (under Messrs T.D. Hlati and G.N. Citashe)
> the Langa Vigilance Association (under Messrs B. Ntshinga and J.D. Mehloane)
> the Ama Khosi Committee under Messrs W. Somana and J. Ngwevela)
> and many other individuals and youth movements"[69]

In the late forties many of the more educated Africans were strongly influenced by the All African Convention which was closely alligned with the Anti-C.A.D. movement under the umbrella of the N.E.U.M..

As the position of the N.E.U.M. has been described already[70] what is needed here is to place the N.E.U.M. in the local context of Cape Town, its origin and the centre of its strength. Its African support came mainly but not exclusively via the local Cape African Teachers' Association.[71] During the course of research no evidence came to light regarding any support for the N.E.U.M. from the relatively small number of Indians in Cape Town.[72] In fact some fragmentary evidence suggests that there was organised Indian opposition to the Unity Movement in Cape Town in the early 1950s. This came from a body called the Cape Provincial Indian Assembly which was active in local instances of resistance at the time. By 1955, however, it was inoperative[73]. The Non-European Unity Movement in Cape Town was thus a predominantly Coloured-led body which included some Africans, possibly a few Indians, but certainly no Whites. When the N.E.U.M. was established intensive campaigning for supporters was undertaken throughout the Cape Peninsula. On the 28 January 1944 an inaugural meeting of the "unity campaign" was held in the Claremont Town Hall[74]. At a mass meeting in the Langa African Township on 9 February I.B. Tabata called for Africans to join under the banner of Non-European unity. At the meeting a characteristically worded motion was approved unanimously :

> "That this meeting of Non-Europeans in Langa is in full agreement with the efforts of the A.A.C., the National Anti-C.A.D., and the S.A.I.C. in striving to unite all three sections of the Non-Europeans for full political, economic, educational and social rights on the basis of the 10-Point Programme.
> That we support the struggle and shall do everything in our power to extend the campaign until it

> becomes a national movement for full democratic rights for all Non-Europeans."[75]

It is worth noting that the term "Non-Europeans" was used and not the term "Africans" in spite of the fact that the meeting would have been attended by a big majority of Africans. This was clearly intended to help bring about a new unity consciousness between Blacks. It points to a significant fact about Cape Town society at the time viz. that apart from Langa, the Coloured, African and even White residential areas were racially mixed. Inter-racial marriage was a natural corollary. This calls into question one assumption of the present study - that racial category is a valid means for examining resistance strategy. Whilst not completely satisfactory since the categories were not at all clear (especially before the population registration legislation) the assumption is defended on the grounds that the concept of race was widely used and was being statutorily enforced. At the same time this study does not use the racial terms as if resistance or collaboration were uniquely conceived within the largest group and then transmitted to the others. The case of I.B. Tabata, one of the major initiators of the revived A.A.C., illustrates this point well.[76] Before examining the role of the N.E.U.M. as a partner in the African struggle, a look at another dimension of African politics in Cape Town is in place here. Africans in the city were strongly linked with the reserves. This is shown by the concern of Cape Town Africans over the land rehabilitation scheme in the Transkei. The focus of the protest is clearly expressed in a letter to the Cape Times in late 1950 by the chairman of the Transkeian Organised Bodies, Cape Branch, Mr. E.E. Tsopana :

> "The objects of these schemes seems to be to divorce the people from the land. They seem to aim at depriving the people of the means of independent existence and of taking from them their land and cattle."[77]

In February of the same year a mass meeting had been held in Langa in protest against the fact that the people had "not been fully informed of the proposed culling under the betterment scheme."[78] From whom did the support for this Cape Town protest come? The Cape Times simply says that is was a "mass meeting of Transkei Natives". But which "Natives"? A useful suggestion is found in an article on peasant resistance by Beinart and Bundy. They propose an "hypothesis to identify

the key social basis of the fight against rehabilitation" in the following terms :

> "several reports at the time noted that the most concerted opposition came from families heavily involved in migrant labour ... those who had most to lose were the "middle migrants" or "peasant migrants" - as opposed to their more thoroughly proletarianized brethren (the landless migrant), they had cattle of their own and access to grazing and arable lands. Removal to a rural village would confirm and emphasise their identity as wage labourers - at the same time, it would erase their identity as family heads of peasant households."[79]

It seems likely that those who protested in Cape Town were the ones with a material stake in the Transkei in the form of land and cattle. While C.A.T.A. was deeply involved in organising against land rehabilitation in the Transkei, it is not known to what extent the protest in Cape Town involved teachers. It is probable that as salaried workers with financial responsibilities to families in the reserves they would have been very concerned at these threats to their future security and status. This point will be taken up again in Chapter 6 when an attempt is made to assess the role of teachers in resistance.

The question arises from the earlier discussion of the nature of the control in the N.E.U.M.: was the organization representative of a class vanguard of a rising petty bourgeoisie among Coloured and African people in Cape Town? Certainly the N.E.U.M. attracted young professional Africans - it was evidently very popular at Fort Hare in the late 1940s.[80] Nevertheless it is clear that there was a consciousness of racial categories which lay at the basis of N.E.U.M. organization. The call of the N.E.U.M. was not for a unity of individuals but for a federal unity of organizations, as is evident in the A.A.C. executive's appeal to cooperate with the Anti-C.A.D. and the South African Indian Congress. The most obvious explanation for this racial conception being used is that such a definition of society was being strongly reinforced by the White Government's differential onslaught on the meagre rights of each other race group. This was certainly the way that the A.A.C. viewed the matter as is clear from the above quotation : "the same policy that applied to us in 1935 is now being applied to the Indian and Coloured people".[81]

The significance of the role of the N.E.U.M. in Cape Town is best seen in contrast with the roles of other radical bodies on the basis of their different strategies. It is contended that there were firmly established and often conflicting traditions of protest. The conflict of these traditions may throw light on the apparently low level of political activism among Africans in Cape Town in the mid-1950s.

The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, best known by the initials I.C.U., had an early and catalytic effect on Cape Town resistance politics. It sponsored a successful dock workers' strike in 1919 in Cape Town and its influence spread across the country during the following decade. In Cape Town, as was mentioned above, the initiative for taking up parochial concerns of Africans passed to the Native Vigilance Association under the Rev. William Olifan.[82] He had been a resident of Ndabeni since 1906 and was a minister of the Church of Christ. He took a lead in instigating legal and popular action against the local application of the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Formal legal representation was made to the Secretary of Native Affairs that the Act was being too harshly applied. The Native Vigilance Association also collected 1 275 signatures on a petition calling on the Secretary to dismiss the unpopular Superintendent Cook from his position. The resultant one man 'Loram Commission', while critical of Cook's apparent partiality towards the old wing in the A.N.C. cleared Cook on the whole and

> "attributed the opposition in the large part to his having been more active than his predecessors especially in the collection of rent and his having to introduce the unpopular Urban Areas Act" (of 1923).[83]

The activities of the N.V.A. and the I.C.U. together eclipsed the local branch of the A.N.C. at that time. The significance of the I.C.U. for the present study lies in the fact that it was the first labour union in the country not to be racially exclusive and that this example evidently influenced the Communist Party of South Africa (C.P.S.A.) to seek to build up its support among African workers, a policy which it adopted in 1924.[84] The I.C.U. however had a different outlook to that of the Communists. Lodge writes of its charismatic leader, Clements Kadalie, that he:

> "...viewed the struggle as primarily a political one (and he) ... viewed social conflict in South Africa mainly in nationalist or colonial terms and did not share the communist vision of a class struggle complicated only by racist false consciousness."[85]

Nevertheless a number of C.P.S.A. leaders, seeing the need for co-operation with other bodies working at organising labour, became active in the I.C.U. in the mid-1920 In 1927 the Communists were expelled by the I.C.U. executive. In the Western Cape the Communists turned to the A.N.C. For example two C.P.S.A. members, Bransby Ndobe and Elliot Tonjeni, undertook a vigorous recruiting campaign for the A.N.C. among farm workers.[86] In fact their work helped to precipitate the rural struggles at the turn of the decade which resulted from the severe stress of the depression as employers sought to offset losses by reducing wages. At this time the rural A.N.C., although in name African, was evidently more Coloured in composition than African.[87] Lodge points out that it was significant that the C.P.S.A. was successful in its organization in the farming areas of the Western Cape where wage labour predominated over labour tenancy, the latter being the form more prevalent in the Transvaal.[88] The redefinition of the policy of the Communists which brought them alongside of the African nationalists in support of the idea of an independent "Native Republic" was decided by the Party in 1928.[89] This plan for a "Native Republic" was much to the liking of the A.N.C.(W.C.) leader, 'Professor' James Thaele[90], but it brought a tension into the A.N.C.(W.C.) over the issue of the extent to which it should co-operate with the Communists who were demanding more radical action than the conservatives under Thaele were prepared to sanction. In the thirties and forties the tensions persisted. Thaele for instance took so conservative a stance that he was accused of collaborating with the Government to curb opposition to his leadership.[91] This stress was also reflected at the national level in the A.N.C. Executive in the forties when, paradoxically the more conservative members favoured the continued participation of the Communists[92] whereas the younger group, the Africanists, sought their expulsion, failing twice - in 1945 and 1947.[93]

In Cape Town in the late forties and early fifties there was a marked influence of Communist organisers in the numerous campaigns of protest against discriminatory laws and practices. Several ad hoc committees were set up to conduct these campaigns. These included the Train

Apartheid Resistance Committee (the T.A.R.C. was established in August 1948), the Action Committee against Passes for Women (formed in April 1950), the Day of Protest and Mourning Committee (which planned action for the 26 June 1950), and the Franchise Action Committee (the F.R.A.C. was formed in January 1951 to resist the Government's moves to eliminate Coloured people from the Voters' Roll).[94] Of these committees the T.A.R.C. illustrates most vividly the Communist-N.E.U.M. tension. The T.A.R.C. included a minority of Communists. There were two occasions when symbolic groups took seats in European coaches during early days of the committee's existence but as the Unity Movement gained control of the T.A.R.C., its members put an end to what they saw as irresponsible activism. The Communists, finding their hands tied, withdrew from the committee. The fundamental difference between the grouping of which the Communists were a part and the N.E.U.M. was not in aim - they both sought to resist train apartheid - it was strategy. For the Unity people actions such as the token defiance of train regulations could not hope to achieve a reversal of these discriminatory practices so it was considered irresponsible to court arrest because this would weaken the struggle as it played into the hands of the Government. Those who opposed this view, among them the Communists and members of the A.N.C.(W.C.), believed that a strategy of token resistance could spark off a mass response which might result in the repeal of repressive legislation. These differences over strategy persisted throughout the period of the 1950s and will be illustrated later with regard to the Defiance Campaign.

It would be a mistake to overemphasise the influence of the Communists in the formulation of the response of people to issues which concerned them. Spontaneous popular action arose over several matters and whatever means appeared best were employed. As early as the 1920s for example the value of fighting an order to leave the City was recognised and even taken beyond the local magistrates' courts. In 1926 six African women were charged under Section 17 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 for being "idle and dissolute" and ordered to leave Cape Town.[95] They took their case to the Cape Supreme Court and then to the Appelate Division. Despite the consistent rulings against them, two of the women took their resistance one step further and defied the Appeal Court's repatriation order, and this led to the discovery that

the repatriation order had no more than a semi-judicial status. The Native Superintendent (Cook) responded by proposing that the legislation be amended. News of such a symbolic victory for the women would certainly have become well known among those Africans who were similarly threatened with repatriation. It is important to ask whether legal action of this sort can in any way be construed as being part of a tradition of resistance which was continued by the next generation of Africans in Cape Town. It seems probable that it would at least have influenced Africans in later years to regard litigation as a useful weapon. In Cape Town in the 1950s litigation does not appear to have been used in the specific struggle against Bantu Education, but it did play a major role at a provincial level in the strategy of the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) against the state's assumption of direct control of African education.[96] It is true that the motivation of C.A.T.A. in going to court was not so much to seek the re-instatement of dismissed teachers as it was to demonstrate the immorality of Bantu Education, but still it seems that it arose from a longstanding respect among Africans for the value of legal action to redress their grievances. To this extent one may see the recourse to legal action as part of a tradition of resistance.

A quarter of a century after the legal wrangles of the 1920s over the question of removal of Africans from Cape Town, the issue was still very much alive. The rapid wartime and post-war expansion of the African population in Cape Town was a source of deep concern to the Government. As has been mentioned above[97] the response of the local authorities and the Government was towards stricter control of the migration, settlement and social life of Africans. Legislation and regulations relating to every aspect of African life from segregated housing to the establishment of beerhalls, were approved. Some were implemented strictly such as the laws relating to entry into designated White areas. Most were only partially implemented like the fiercely contested beerhall propositions of the Cape Town City Council.[98] Some were as unsuccessful as King Canute's command : despite M.C. Botha's (deputy minister of Bantu Administration and Development) claim that his department's policy had stopped the tide of African urban migration[99] the pressure of employers' demands for cheap labour and the impoverishment of the reserves continued to pull and push Africans to places like Cape Town. The Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen, claimed that he was aiming at the ultimate removal of all Africans from the

Western Cape. Removal threats created a sense of insecurity in the community. During 1954 the newspaper Advance[100] claimed that even "the 12 112 African inhabitants of Langa township ... (were) ... threatened" with removal to a new township: that Langa was to be used to house bachelors only;[101] and that the whole of the African workforce in the Peninsula was to become migrant.[102] While action to implement the policy of reducing the size of the African workforce was only effective from 1958, the threat of removal was a focal point for African resistance from much earlier than this date. In fact it was in 1953 that the Government announced its African housing plan for Cape Town.[103] Families living legally in Langa and elsewhere were to be moved to the Divisional Council site and service camp at Nyanga to make way for 17 000 bachelors to be housed at Langa. "Illegals", especially women, were to be endorsed out of the area. The laws to make this large scale removal possible were primarily the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, no. 52 of 1951,[104] and the Native Laws Amendment Act, no. 54 of 1952.

A graphic illustration of the effectiveness of these provisions is seen in the case of Africans settled at Windemere. There was a police raid in October 1948[105] and then followed a four year respite as further legislation was enacted. In January 1953 400 police were used in a massive raid and 1 184 illegal residents were arrested. At the same time it was reported that police destroyed 10 000 gallons of African beer - further evidence that home brew was a symbol of independence.[106] Regular raids followed through the ensuing year and were directed especially against "bachelors".[107] A further concerted drive over a few weeks in June 1955 resulted in the removal of 2 500 bachelors from Windemere to Langa[108] and by 1958 between 10 and 12 000 bachelors had been expelled from Windemere leaving some 13 000 Africans mostly in family groups.[109] By June of the following year 930 of these families had been moved to Nyanga West (later known as Guguletu).[110] Chiara Swart, who collected the information used in this paragraph, has also recorded that protests came from many quarters including Councillor Cissie Gool, the Friends of Windemere Association, the A.N.C., S.H.A.W.C.O. officers (who protested against the breakup of established families by proclaiming the father a bachelor), various church spokesmen, and finally the South African People's Congress.[111] Organizations within the latter Congress Alliance saw clearly the link

between the removals and the obligation placed upon African women to carry 'passes' and it was on the latter issue that campaigning was geared. Women's organizations took a lead.

In April 1954 the Federation of South African Women (F.S.A.W.) was formed in Johannesburg at a conference attended by a number of delegates from Cape Town. Passes for women were among the items which were denounced, as they were a year later at the Congress of the People. In 1956 a huge campaign against passes was organised and 20 000 women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria where they made their protest and dispersed peacefully. In Cape Town on the same day, the 9th August, a much smaller number (200) staged a similar Anti-Pass Demonstration in which the women of the local S.A. Congress of Democrats took a leading role.[112] Exactly one year later on 9 August 1957 a broader anti-pass committee, the Cape Association To Abolish Passes for African Women (C.A.T.A.P.A.W.) held a significant demonstration of approximately 1 000 women in the centrally situated Drill Hall, Cape Town. A perceptive analysis of the roles of the widely different women's organizations involved in this protest has been made by Annette Griessel[113] who shows up the tensions between the Liberal (Black Sash and National Council of Women (N.C.W.)), and Congress (A.N.C. Women's League and F.S.A.W.) groupings. She points out that while the White Liberals saw the protest as an end in itself, the more numerous group of African women (representing the A.N.C.W.L. and the F.S.A.W.) took the opportunity to hold a spontaneous meeting outside the Drill Hall on the adjacent Grand Parade. By means of this meeting the African women were able to

> "overcome their isolation, to actively join in the anti-pass campaign and to be incorporated within the Congress Alliance structures".[114]

The Liberal women reacted with alarm. They ordered those who were addressing the unscheduled meeting to stop. This was done. In a later press statement the leaders of C.A.T.A.P.A.W. dissociated the Association from the sentiments expressed on the Parade. The differences in outlook between the two groupings were highlighted by the incident. For the African women who were under severe pressure from the pass laws and the threat of removals, protest was simply not enough. There was a perceived need to stand together, to draw strength from their unity and to contemplate action together. It is unfortunately not

known just what action was proposed, whether pass burning or other defiance, but it was the last straw for the most conservative of the groups in C.A.T.A.P.A.W., the N.C.W.. An emergency visit by the National Secretary to the Cape Town branch of the N.C.W. resulted in its withdrawal from C.A.T.A.P.A.W. [115] The Liberals of the Black Sash continued to serve in the Association restricting its activities to investigating cases of known hardship resulting from the removals and to protest. Their analysis of society as expressed for example two years later in a press statement revealed a radical outlook for the time but took the protest no further :

> "We consider that all women should stand together to defend women's rights and to try to protect the family ... in this instance we know that the pass system has caused havoc in disrupting family life of the African people ... our objection to the reference books are (sic) that they are not merely identity documents but a method of canalising the flow of labour, and of subjecting the African to many forms of restrictions and of strictly controlling their movements round the country and particularly their entry into towns... the Government policy is to exclude African families from the Western Cape under the Eiselen line."[116]

Those critical of the Liberals accuse them of containing the anger of the oppressed and thus serving to forestall real change. On the other hand they did provide much needed financial sources and organising skills for C.A.T.A.P.A.W. and gave its concerns a degree of prominence where otherwise the lack of resources may have prevented a co-ordinated expression of the women's suffering.

Having established some of the broader traditions of struggle involving Africans in Cape Town, a consideration of the Defiance Campaign provides a helpful conclusion since it throws the distinctions among resistance groups into relief. The Defiance Campaign was a demonstration not against a particular law but against the package of discriminatory practices as a whole. An examination of the Defiance Campaign is also useful for the light that it throws on the later Bantu Education Campaign. Both campaigns were initiated by the national A.N.C. Edward Feit has analysed both campaigns and argued that the 'failure' of both campaigns can be explained in terms of factors other than the odds against them.[117] Feit's work is a classical statement of the view that a failure to achieve stated objectives is the most signifi-

cant basis on which to judge the effectiveness of a resistance strategy.

The Defiance Campaign met with limited success in the Western Cape. Nationally it brought out more than 8 000 Africans in acts of non-violent protest such as using railway and Post Office facilities reserved for "Europeans". In the most recent survey of the available sources on the subject Tom Lodge estimates that 490 people were arrested in 1952 in the Western Cape (including Kimberley and Mafeking).[118] The figures for the areas near to Cape Town he gives as follows:

Cape Town	157
Stellenbosch	114
Worcester	76
Paarl	20
Ceres	15
	382

This is a small response when compared with the 1 578 in the Transvaal and the 5 941 in the Eastern Cape. It is significant that the token participation by at least four whites was accepted by the organisers as a good means to restrain racial animosity.[119] Before looking at some possible reasons for the different response in the Western Cape, it is necessary to try to gauge the respective views regarding strategies of the two principal radical groupings. This will be done by means of a review of their respective newspapers about a year after the Defiance Campaign.

The nature of the relationship between the N.E.U.M. (and its affiliates) and the supporters of the Defiance Campaign was one of increasing antagonism and the interchange between their publications was sharp. For example, in the Cape Town based newspaper Advance, which was generally favourable to the Campaign, there is criticism of the strategy of the N.E.U.M.:

> "Playing with the idea of a negative boycott as the alleged solution to any and every political situation should be left to the N.E.U.M. and others who seek to cover up their fear of positive action with this sort of childishness."[120]

The above advice was given to the 1953 annual conference of the A.N.C. The N.E.U.M. had advocated a boycott of the 1953 General Election.

On the other hand the leftist Advance newspaper, while it was no friend of the United Party, certainly saw Malan's Nationalists as the greater threat and would not refrain from encouraging a vote for a U.P. candidate if it meant excluding another Nationalist from parliament.[121] It was not only the political strategy of the N.E.U.M. which came under fire from Advance. When the Unity Movement opposed trade union action in January 1954, Advance retaliated by questioning the breadth of support of the N.E.U.M. and claiming that it had a narrow base mainly among teachers. Under the heading "Unity movement decries militant action. Scurrilous attack on trade unions", Advance attacked the N.E.U.M. leaders for :

> "Still sheltering under the cloak of the boycott and having learned nothing from the wealth of political activity in the past two years...", and goes on to quote
> "...one of the Unity Movement "theoreticians", Mr. I.B. Tabata", as saying "'The Coloured people stayed out of the Defiance Campaign thanks to the Anti-Cad and due to our strength they stayed out of the strikes.'"[122]

Advance concluded by analysing the claim by the Anti-C.A.D. that 59 organizations attended their conference. The delegates, it said, were mostly "teachers resident or on holiday in Cape Town".[123] It was this narrow base and the consequent lack of concern for the workers which was the most disturbing aspect of the Unity Movement's policy as far as the workerist Advance was concerned.

Reporting at the same time and also on the national conferences of the Anti-C.A.D. and the A.N.C., the Unity Movement newspaper, The Torch, condemned the A.N.C. conference as a "rigged political farce".[124] It commended the Anti-C.A.D. conference for its declaration of solidarity with Africans in the Cape African Teachers' Association who had opposed the "enslavement" of the Bantu Education Act at their conference in Queenstown in December 1953.[125] The Torch's basic criticism of the A.N.C. was the latter's opportunism. The A.N.C., it claimed :

> "...has consistently blocked the way to unity... since 1943.
> ...Pretending "African Nationalism"; "Unity", "Non-collaboration" and "action", it had misled "the militants with the unprepared, futile demonstrations which result in arrest, jail and even death at the hands of the waiting police."[126]

Unity Movement criticism of A.N.C. action remained consistent with this stance as will be shown in Chapter 6 on issues in education.

Although Lodge outlines a few of the events surrounding the Defiance Campaign in the Western Cape - its start on 27 June at Worcester, and its purposeful use of small volunteer units "watched by a much larger crowd of supporters and ... often preceeded by meetings and street processions"[127] - he does not examine the reasons for the extent of support as he does for Natal and the Eastern Cape. For example, in his catalogue of the reasons for the strength of the Campaign in the Port Elizabeth area, he includes : the rapid population growth, the extreme poverty, the fact that political initiative was in the hands of working class leaders through the strong local trade union movement, the recent threat to tighten influx control measures (in 1952), and the "well-established tradition of mass protest".[128]

Why was there a limited response to the Defiance Campaign in the Cape Town area? As in Port Elizabeth there had been a rapid growth in the African population. Poverty, overcrowding and disease proliferated in Cape Town as well. Official regulations governing African mobility and access to work were being tightened in an even harsher way than in Port Elizabeth because of the Western Cape's tightened policy of according preferential treatment to Coloured labour.[129]

In what respects were conditions in Cape Town different? Lodge argues that Port Elizabeth had a large number of settled families.[130] In Cape Town there was a fairly extensive use of migrant labour and so relatively fewer African families than in the Eastern Cape. The implication of this is that it would have been more difficult to sustain a tradition of resistance in a largely migrant population. Secondly the relatively benign administration of the City of Port Elizabeth largely ignored the need for tight social controls (no doubt reflecting the area's greater need for labour) and thus gave freer rein to the organisers of the Defiance Campaign.[131] In Cape Town by contrast the fact that the Defiance Campaign sponsors co-operated with former Communists and did so in the very sensitive legislative capital of the land meant that the available repressive laws were more readily applied to them. For example A.N.C.(W.C.) President, Johnson Ngwevela, was named under the 1950 Act as a Communist on 23 June, three days before the Defiance

Campaign was due to start.[132] Ngwevela immediately defied his ban by addressing a public meeting in support of the Campaign. His appeal, upheld in the Supreme Court, against a three month sentence was a significant contribution to the resistance tradition in Cape Town.[133] In the months and years that followed the majority of the leaders and activists in local campaigns were banned (listed under the 1950 Act), arrested or endorsed out of the area. While younger leaders (e.g. Zollie Malindi) emerged, and women became more active especially as they were encouraged by the Federation of South African Women, the movement did not recover from the sustained assault on its leadership. This point is significant for an assessment of the subsequent weakness of the Bantu Education Campaign in Cape Town; those who had been leaders of the earlier Defiance Campaign were largely silenced.

Another distinctive feature of the Cape Town situation was the nature of the trade union movement. Reference has already been made to the extensive Food and Canning Industry in the Western Cape.[134] The powerful Food and Canning Workers' Union (F.C.W.U.) and its close ally the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (A.F.C.W.U.) were particularly strong in Paarl and Worcester and it seems significant that the Defiance Campaign began in Worcester a month prior to its commencement in Cape Town.[135] In Worcester strong union organization correlated with good support for the Defiance Campaign, a relationship which Lodge points out as one of the reasons for the breadth of the Campaign in Port Elizabeth. The strength of the unions with African membership in the Cape Town metropolitan area in the fifties has not been documented adequately but the failure of the £1 per day strike[136] at the Spekenham factory evidently caused the collapse of the Cape Town branch of the F.C.W.U. in 1957 and does not seem to point to a virile organization.

Little is known of the strength of African union organization within specific industries[137] in the 1950s. For example the Secretary of the F.C.W.U. of the time indicated that the Union's organization among Africans in Greater Cape Town was extremely weak.[138]

Goldin, in his study of African workers in the Cape Peninsula and the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, concludes that no other trade union

organization was even attempted for the specific benefit of African labour. He ends his cursory review by pointing out that:

> "with the notable exception of the Food and Canning Workers' Union, and more recently the General Workers' Union (since the fifties - MC), no union seriously sought to organise African workers in the Western Cape. Apart from a few notable exceptions, trade unions in the Western Cape have adopted policies and practices which in their effect have further undermined the position of Africans in the Western Cape, have failed to advance the position of the bulk of unskilled 'Coloured' workers in the region and have served to entrench the racial division of labour in the Western Cape."[139]

As Goldin himself indicates[140] a detailed historical review of trade unions in the Western Cape has yet to be undertaken. In spite of a paucity of available evidence it does, however, seem probable that there was almost no union organization for African labour in Cape Town in the 1950s.

A final difference between Cape Town and other areas was the relatively small proportion of Africans to the rest of the population. Using official census figures, Wilson and Mafeje give the percentages of the African population to the total population over three decades as follows:[141]

Year	1921	1936	1946	1951
Municipality of Cape Town	4,1	4,5	8,1	9,1
Greater Cape Town	4,0	4,1	7,5	8,6

There are at least two reasons why these figures need to be regarded with a healthy scepticism. As it was in the interests of illegal migrants to evade being counted in a census, official figures would not have reflected the full number of Africans.[142] Secondly before the 1950 s there was no rigid system of racial classification and there would have been a steady process of absorption of some Africans into the ranks of the far larger Coloured group. While the extent of this miscegenation is uncertain, there is clear evidence for the process in the Nationalists' concern to stop it. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr. W.W.M. Eiselen, declared at the 1955 S.A.B.R.A. Conference[143] that he felt it necessary to recognise African men living with Coloured women as Coloured on the understanding that this would be the last time that such an adjustment would be necessary:

> "...naturelle wat verbintenis met kleurlingvroue aangegaan het en wat in alles behalwe kleur by die kleurling gemeenskap tuishoort, asook persone wat uit huwelik of verbintenisse tussen naturel en kleurling. Hierdie kategorie behoort myns insiens burgerreg binne die kleurlinggemeenskap te verkry mits rassevermenging hiermee beeindig word."[144]

The fact remains that Africans were a minority group in Cape Town in the 1950s. Also they were for the most part living among other poor people in the squatter areas referred to in the above discussion on their housing. For these two reasons their political activity would have been influenced though not necessarily determined by Coloured, and even to some extent by White political developments, especially since there was no single strong body giving political leadership to Africans. In conclusion it seems valid to assert that the limited response to the Defiance Campaign in Cape Town was due to the high rate of migrancy among Africans, the weakness of the trade union movement (in comparison with its definite strength in Port Elizabeth, for example), the existence of repressive legislation and its early use against A.N.C. leaders, and the fact that Africans constituted an almost destitute minority in an area where the tensions within Coloured resistance movements influenced African political activity. This latter point was referred to earlier[145] and will be illustrated in Chapter 6 in the significant area of teachers' organizations.

4.5 Conclusion

The first sections of the present chapter describe the socio-economic conditions and official policies affecting Africans in Cape Town. The purpose is twofold: to locate the later resistance discussion and to point out the rapidly changing demography of the City. The latter part of the chapter has defined resistance in terms of overt, illegal actions aiming at political change.[146] It has traced the varied fortunes of resistance movements in Cape Town up to the 1950s. In particular the strategies of the N.E.U.M. and the A.N.C. are contrasted in preparation for chapter 6 where their strategies in regard to African schooling are shown to have been in conflict. Against this background it becomes clear why African schooling provision was hotly contested as each interest group sought its own ends.[147]

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1. See "The growth of towns", chapter 4 in the Oxford History of South Africa. Vol. 2, 1975.
2. See below chapter 5, note 6.
3. Van der Horst, S. African workers in town: a study of labour in Cape Town. Cape Town, 1964, pp. 23,24.
4. Ibid., p. 27.
5. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
6. From 1,3 million cartons in 1938 to 4,9 million cartons in 1945. Goode, R. For a better life: the Food and Canning Workers' Union, 1941-75. University of Cape Town. Unpublished Africa Seminar Paper, 31/8/1983, p. 1.
7. Ibid.
8. The ratio was five to four, Ibid.
9. Whittingdale, J. The development and location of industry in Greater Cape Town, 1652-1972. Geography M.A. Thesis. University of Cape Town, 1973.
10. Ibid., p. 173.
11. Wilson, M. and Mafeje, A. Langa, Oxford, 1963.
12. Ibid., pp. 38-46.
13. The weak state of African union organization is discussed below pp. 121,122.
14. Van der Horst, 1964, pp. 22,23.
15. See above p. 15.
16. The Cape Times, 12/1/1951.
17. At best these figures are conservative estimates of the real size of the African population since for many Africans the last thing they wanted was for their presence in the area to be officially recorded. See van der Horst, 1964, p. 32.
18. Van der Horst, 1964, p. 33.
19. Ibid., p. 36.
20. See below chapter 5 for the map (p. 151, figure 9) and description, pp. 152-154.
21. See below, pp. 95-98.
22. See below, pp. 103-123.
23. Report of the Medical Officer of Health, Cape Town, 1934, p. 38.
24. Only those Africans living in official townships were listed separately.
25. Glatthaar, E. Tuberculosis: Basic Perspectives, 1982. Quoted in Consumption in the land of plenty. Conference papers of the Medical Students' Conference, University of Cape Town, 1982, p. 55.
26. Ibid., p. 34.
27. The Cape Flats is the level section of land joining the mountainous Peninsula with the mountain chain of the South Western Cape.

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28. Saunders, C. "The creation of Ndabeni: urban segregation and African resistance in Cape Town" in Studies in the history of Cape Town. Vol. 1, University of Cape Town, 1979.

29. Saunders, C. "From Ndabeni to Langa" in Studies in the history of Cape Town. Vol. 1, University of Cape Town, 1979.

30. See map below, chapter 5, p. 151, figure 9.

31. Saunders, C. "The creation of Ndabeni", 1979a, p. 136. At this time there were some 10 000 Africans mainly from the Eastern Cape in the city according to Saunders, C. and Phillips, H. "Africans in Cape Town in the nineteenth century: an outline" in Studies in the history of Cape Town. Vol. 2, University of Cape Town, 1980, p. 32.

32. Saunders, C., 1979a, p. 143.

33. Ibid., p. 173.

34. Ibid., p. 144.

35. Ibid., pp. 136,137.

36. Ibid., p. 145.

37. Ibid., p. 150.

38. Ibid., in December 1901.

39. Wilson and Mafeje, 1963, p. 4. For a full description of the move to Langa see Saunders, 1979b, p. 167 ff.

40. Bloch, R. and Wilkinson, P. "Urban control and popular struggle: a survey of State urban policy, 1920-1970" in Africa Perspective. No. 20, 1982, p. 19. The authors follow a similar interpretation by O'Meara.

41. See Horrell, M. Group areas in Cape Town, S.A.I.R.R., 1958. Available in the African Studies Library of the University of Cape Town.

42. Bloch and Wilkinson, 1982, p. 25.

43. See above, p. 89.

44. For example the "habitually unemployed" or those leading an "idle, dissolute or disorderly" life. See Saunders, 1979b, p. 177. Wilson and Mafeje, 1963, give a clear review of the development of this policy in an appendix to their study, pp. 182-184.

45. Resistance to this measure is explained in more detail below, pp. 116,117.

46. Eiselen, W.W.M. "Die Kleurling en die Naturel" in Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-Aangeleenthede Referate, Stellenbosch, January 1955, pp. 118,119.

47. Ibid., p. 122. A free translation is given below: "Succinctly put, the eventual aim of our Native policy for the Western Province is to eliminate all Natives from this area. This ought to take place gradually so that it is not detrimental to industry."

48. Reported in S.A. Outlook, 1/3/1956, pp. 39-43.

49. Becker, S.B. and Coetzee, J.H. Black urban employment and Coloured Labour Preference. The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1980, p. 2.

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50. Goldin, I. The poverty of Coloured labour preference: economics and ideology in the Western Cape, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper No. 59, University of Cape Town, 1984, pp. 52,53.

51. Ibid., p. 53.

52. Ibid., p. 48.

53. Van der Horst, 1964, p. 26.

54. U.G. 62/1951, sec. 1034, p. 147.

55. Act No. 44 of 1950, sec. 1.

56. For example Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje in their study, Langa (1963, pp. 8,9) point out that the township's Vigilance Association was referred to "by the younger and more radical people ... as X's (the Superintendent's) Association and regard(ed) ... as a 'collaborationist organization'."

57. Saunders, 1979b, p. 183.

58. Gerhart, 1978, p. 234; Lodge, 1983, pp. 85,86.

59. Beinart and Bundy, 1980, p. 272.

60. This is discussed below on p. 204.

61. Pp. 106,107.

62. Rev. Z.R. Mahabane was both the President-general of the A.N.C. and a Vice-President of the A.A.C. at that time. Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, p. 83.

63. The bodies within the "Congress Alliance" were represented at the populist Congress of the People held in Kliptown, Johannesburg in 1955.

64. The Cape Times, 11/11/1952. The Programme of Action stated "we resolve to work for the abolition of all differential institutions ... specially created for Africans, viz. representative councils, present form of parliamentary representation." (sic). Quoted in Karis and Carter, From Protest to Challenge, vol. 2, 1973, p. 337.

65. Saunders, 1979b, p. 182.

66. Kingwill, R. The African National Congress in the Western Cape. History Honours Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1977, p. 34.

67. Ibid., p. 37.

68. Inkokeliya ya Bantu was under his editorship from November 1940 - July 1942. Oliphant was a representative of the statutory Congress of Urban Advisory Boards and also on a delegation to the Minister of Native Affairs from 16-17 May 1939. Kingwill, 1977, p. 37.

69. Imvo, 25/4/1942, p. 2. The names and organizations listed in the article are quoted in full because they reflect on the breadth of political activity of the time. A debt to Kingwill for noting this reference is acknowledged.

70. Chapter 3, pp. 60-63.

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71. It also included business people such as one interviewed on 9/1/1984.

72. The 1951 census gives the 1946 figure as 6 865 Asiatics out of a population of 471 413, i.e. just less than 1,5% of the total.

73. Kingwill, 1977, p. 79.

74. Cape Standard, 1/2/1944. Referred to in Khan, F. The Origins of the Non-European Unity Movement. History Honours Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1976, p. 113. Khan incorrectly claims that it was the inaugural meeting of the N.E.U.M. The N.E.U.M. was in fact only established after the conference of the A.A.C. in December, 1944.

75. Cape Standard, 15/2/1944, p. 6. Quoted in Khan, 1977, p. 113.

76. See above pp. 61,62.

77. The Cape Times, 30/11/1950.

78. The Cape Times, 28/2/1950.

79. Beinart and Bundy, 1980, p. 303.

80. Hirson, 1979, at the end of chapter 1.

81. See above p. 62.

82. Saunders, 1979b, pp. 182-3.

83. Ibid., p. 183.

84. Lodge, T., 1983, pp. 5, 7, 8.

85. Ibid., p. 8.

86. Hofmeyr, 1983.

87. Ibid. Also Eddie Roux in Time longer than rope (2nd ed., Wisconsin, 1964) notes that "owing to the influx of large numbers of Coloured people who joined the A.N.C. Umsebenzi began to publish reports in Afrikaans", p. 240.

88. Lodge, 1983, p. 8.

89. Ibid., pp. 8,9.

90. During his studies in the U.S.A. Thaele had been strongly influenced by the ideas of Marcus Garvey who preached that Africa should be returned to the Africans.

91. Roux, 1964, p. 240 ff.

92. The Communists M. Kotane, J.B. Marks and D. Thloome were on the executive in 1945. The Africanists felt that their co-operation with Whites was undermining the African nationalist struggle.

93. Lodge, 1983, p. 29. See also chapter 3 of the present work.

94. Kingwill, 1977, p. 56 ff. has details of these campaigns.

95. Saunders, 1979b, p. 184.

96. See p. 153 on the Sihlali case.

97. See above, pp. 95-103.

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98. The proposal to establish a beerhall was part of the wider strategy for exercising social control over Africans. In 1947 there was a riot in Langa over the issue (according to Kingwill, 1977, p. 46 quoting Guardian, 27/3/47). In 1954 the proposition was again fiercely opposed by the people at several crowded meetings in May (Advance, 20/5/54 and 27/5/54), by the Langa Advisory Board in June (Advance, 16/6/54) and by the local Congress of Democrats which organized a signature protest campaign (Advance, 1/7/54). In August after a two-and-a-half hour debate the Cape Town City Council accepted the recommendation of the Native Affairs Committee (a subcommittee of the C.T.C.C.) that its decision to establish a beerhall be rescinded (Advance, 26/8/54, The Cape Times, 18/8/54). Two years later the proposal was again put. The motivation given is significant - a beerhall was suggested for the 13 000 "bachelor Natives" who had come to Langa over the previous three years (The Cape Times, 10/12/56). There was an evident link with the removals. The beerhalls were seen as a means of exercising control over potentially volatile migrants by regulating their socializing to controllable venues and more importantly for providing a valuable source of revenue which could be used to finance the running of the location. A more detailed study of this issue is to be found in Paul la Hause "Drinking in a cage: the Durban system and the 1929 riots" in African Perspective 1982, no. 20, pp. 63-75. La Hause points out (p. 66) that under the 1908 Native Beer Act a municipal monopoly of beerhalls was established. The profits, he says, were used to finance the system of control in the Native locations: "the workforce ... subsidized their own reproduction as well as the salaries of the bureaucrats, police and municipal departments through the consumption of beer." p. 72.

99. Botha addressed a meeting of Afrikaner businessmen and was reported to have said "that in 1950 there were 48,497 registered male African workers in the proclaimed area of the Greater Cape Peninsula. In 1958 this figure stood at 54,734 but since then it has decreased to 49,341 in 1959 with a further decrease of more than 2,000 in 1960. The flood has been stemmed! May the ebb now begin!"

    This exuberant claim failed to take into account the extent of the dependence of local businesses on African labour. The crisis produced by the implementation of the policy is evident from the flood of articles and editorials in 1961 and especially 1962 in The Cape Times calling for a stop to the reduction of the African labour force. The South African Library has an illuminating clippings file from The Cape Times on this subject under the title Natives in the Western Cape, Removal of, 1954/1961.

100. Advance, 24/6/1954.

101. Advance, 9/12/1954.

102. Advance, 30/12/1954.

103. Swart, C. Windemere: from peri-urban area to suburb 1920's to 1950's. History Honours Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1983, p. 64.

104. Applicable to the Peninsula from 30 May 1952. Swart, 1983, p. 66.

105. Swart, 1983, p. 66.

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106. See above, note 98, on beerhalls which were to be started in Langa to cater for the influx of bachelors.

107. The term "bachelor" applied to men without marriage certificates even those who had been married by traditional ceremonies. This action was deeply resented.

108. The Cape Times, 24/6/1955; cited in Swart, 1983, p.68.

109. The Cape Times, 11/8/1958; cited in Swart, 1983, p. 68.

110. The Cape Times, 18/6/1959 and 4/9/1959; cited in Swart, 1983, pp. 68, 71 respectively.

111. Swart, 1983, pp. 65-68. S.H.A.W.C.O. is the health and welfare organization of the University of Cape Town.

112. Counter Attack, Bulletin of S.A. Congress of Democrats, 27/8/1956, p. 6. University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Library. Department of Historical and Literary Papers. Federation of South African Women Papers.

113. Griessel, A. "C.A.T.A.P.A.W. and the Anti-Pass Campaign in Cape Town in the fifties" in Selected research papers on aspects of organization in the Western Cape, Department of Economic History, University of Cape Town, June 1982.

114. Ibid., p. 12.

115. Ibid., p. 14.

116. This statement by C.A.T.A.P.A.W. press officer, Mrs Eulalie Stott, appeared in The Cape Times of 22/10/1959. Cited in Griessel, 1982, p. 17.

117. Feit, 1967, p. vii.

118. Lodge, 1983, p. 46. For a map of this rather extensive definition of the "Western Cape" see p.100.

119. Advance. 11/12/1952. From Kingwill, 1977, p. 69.

120. Advance, 10/12/1953, p. 3, col. 5.

121. Advance, 2/4/1953, p. 8, col. 3. "It is unlikely that the 'boycott' policy will gain any new adherents during the present election campaign ... The Coloured voter wants to use his vote ... for all his misgivings about the U.P. the Coloured voter will cast his vote against the Nats and so do his bit to defeat the most reactionary section of the European electorate." On page 1 of the same edition the significance of the Coloured vote in some constituencies was pointed out with figures for the number of voters being given, e.g.

	European	Coloured
Cape Flats	6 386	5 841
C.T. Castle	7 511	4 532

122. Advance, 14/1/1954.

123. Ibid. The article points out that of the 50 organizations, 20 were branches of the Teachers' League and 11 were Parent Teacher Associations.

124. The Torch, 27/1/1954, p. 8.

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125. The Torch, 27/1/1954. p. 7.

126. The Torch, 3/8/1953.

127. Lodge, 1983, p. 43.

128. Ibid., p. 55

129. This only became official policy in 1955 but it was no new idea then. Also it was not supported in practice by a number of employees who found Africans more suitable especially for heavy labour. Nevertheless, the fact that Coloured labour preference was sanctioned by the Government was an added burden to Cape Town's African workers and made their position even less secure.

130. The proportion of men to women was nearly equal.

131. This changed after a couple of incidents of violence in P.E. towards the end of 1952. See Lodge, 1983, p. 45.

132. Kingwill, 1977, p. 70.

133. Ibid. To close that loophole the Act was amended in 1954 (Act no. 15).

134. See above p. 90.

135. Kingwill, 1977, p. 67.

136. Goode, R., 1983, p. 13.

137. See ch. 4.2, p.90 for details of specific exmployment.

138. See quote in ch. 6.3, p. 183.

139. Goldin, 1984, p. 34.

140. Ibid., p. 32.

141. See Figure 1, p. 89.

142. See also van der Horst, 1964, p. 33 for further discussion on the reliability of Cape Town census figures.

143. See note 46 above.

144. Ibid., p. 123. A free translation is given below:

"...Natives with relationships with Coloured women and who apart from race (kleur) belong to the Coloured community, as well as any offspring from unions between Native and Coloured. This group in my opinion should be given citizenship rights provided that racial mixing ends herewith."

145. See above p. 111,113.

146. For a full definition see pp. 104,105.

147. See below, pp. 134,136.

INTRODUCING APARTHEID EDUCATION IN CAPE TOWN C. 1948 - 1960.

5.1 Introduction

Until recently not much attention has been given to the interpretation of the vast body of statistics concerning Bantu Education. The detailed research of Muriel Horrell[1] has given little interpretive comment. Other liberal writers[2] have focused on the Christian-National philosophy or racist policies of the Afrikaner Nationalists and have in the process neglected the interpretation of the statistical data available. In contrast radical studies[3] since the late seventies have moved away from a critique of the stated intentions of Government to focus on the data as evidence for their case that Bantu Education was a timely device for providing a cheap labour force, which just happened to be largely African. This theory holds that Bantu Education was designed to reproduce in the future labour force the skills and attitudes required in the workplace. Using this approach Collins and Christie have claimed that the state's purpose in expanding African schooling under Bantu Education is to be found by examining the nature of that expansion.

> "Bantu Education was clearly aimed at extending the mass base of schooling at the lower levels." 4
> "On this pattern of (imbalanced - MC) distribution (in the lower primary schools - MC) it is obvious that most schooled blacks would be prepared for subordinate positions in the workforce." 5

This argument has some merit especially in its emphasis on the nature of Bantu Education as a system for mass education. But the point that schooling prepared labour for subordination is not "obvious." Collins and Christie base their argument on national statistics but fail to account for the fact that a national figure conceals considerable local variations. What is needed is an examination of African schooling in one or more specific localities. For example the present study of development of African schooling in Cape Town not only qualifies simplistic labour reproduction theory, it also reveals a surprising correlation between housing policy and education policy in greater Cape Town. The correlation is not only surprising because it is so clear but also because it was possible to achieve in the first place. The Nationalist government radically changed both African housing and schooling in the area by 1960. A decade earlier schools were controlled, funded and monitored by a variety of government and church agencies, and housing

policy had reached a stalemate between the Government and the City Council. The Nationalist Government transformed the diversely controlled African school system into a uniform, centralised administration. In Cape Town this transformation was undertaken with the additional purpose of forcing an acceptance of residential segregation.

5.2 African settlement in Cape Town up to c. 1950

The ebb and flow of successive tides of African migration to Cape Town and the deteriorating conditions on the crowded Reserves have been extensively described elsewhere.[6] For the most part Africans came from the eastern Cape Province and from the Transkei where even subsistence agriculture was becoming difficult. They were drawn to seek work in Cape Town especially at times of relative prosperity for the city such as during wartimes when the docks demanded manual labour. The 1939 - 1945 war was the third in the space of half a century which drew African migrants to Cape Town. After the war the expanding Western Cape economy switched from wartime to consumer production and the demand for cheap labour drew increasing numbers of African men and women to Cape Town. Although the work available was mostly manual, it was preferred to the heavy labour available to the men on the mines of the Witwatersrand.

The types of dwelling in which Africans lived in Cape Town in the early fifties varied considerably - from brick houses to tin shanties. The African settlements of the time may be categorised into five groups: the official townships, the old locations, the settlements alongside built-up 'Coloured' areas, the shanty towns and the developing site and service townships. From about 1953 onwards most of those Africans who had arrived in Cape Town during and since the war were moved from the shanty towns. They were either thrown out of the area or relocated in the new townships. The former three types of settlement were areas in which Africans had traditionally lived : Langa, built to replace the insanitary 'dabeni, was the only formally planned African township; the old locations such as Luyolo at Simonstown had grown up over decades into stable African communities; there were also Africans who settled among the White and Coloured people in areas such as Woodstock and Athlone. Many of the African people who lived in these settled areas had lived in the city for generations. Some owned property, for example in Athlone.[7]

These communities developed a variety of political, cultural and religious associations. There was a widespread belief in Cape liberalism within these established communities. This belief persisted in spite of the fact that Africans had been taken off the Cape common voters' roll in 1936. There was still a semblance of representation in the White Parliament whereby qualified Cape Africans elected four White representatives. Despite the Nationalist's stated intention to be rid of the Native Representatives in Parliament and despite the rejection by some Africanist leaders of indirect representation for Africans by Whites, many members of the Cape Town African elite continued to hope that the Cape's liberal legal tradition might prevent a further erosion of their rights. This is not to say that there was a political consensus among Cape Town Africans. In fact strategies varied considerably. Conservatives who sat on various official bodies (e.g. Advisory Boards) worked with government for progress. This was rejected as collaboration by a significant and vocal group of African and Coloured marxists from the Unity Movement.[8] A third strategy among Cape Town Africans in the 1950s was the open defiance of the ANC. While there were still conservatives in the ANC in the late 1940s the wide support the movement[9] enjoyed at the time of the 1952 Defiance Campaign came from the people who were most affected by the discriminatory race laws - those living in the shanty towns. These sprawling communities absorbed most of the Africans who poured into greater Cape Town during the 1940s and early 1950s. Although the shanty towns were undesirable to many Africans for the purpose of raising a family[10] they did provide cheap accommodation and hence a higher nett return from wages. This arrangement also suited the short-term interests of employers who were reluctant to invest capital in housing for their African employees. In the medium term, however, the crowded and turbulent shanty towns were seen as presenting a sharp challenge to the stability of Cape Town and the press reflected public concern on the issue.[11] The problem was made worse by the fact that housing development in the early fifties was at a virtual standstill. One City official, A.A. Balsillie, claimed in 1951 that nothing had been built for seven years.[12] In their attempts to establish a suitable housing policy to ensure long term economic growth the local authorities clashed with the Government. The Cape Town City Council sought national funds to establish African townships at places (such as Retreat) where there were already established African settlements. The Nationalist Government wanted the whole demography of the area to be reorganised into racial zones and was unwilling to approve

funds for urban development which did not separate Africans completely from the rest of Cape Town's population.

African people in Cape Town in the early 1950s lived in scattered settlements. They were variously influenced by a number of political groupings. These political groups obtained support by appealing to a diverse set of material interests. These interests ranged from those of the large number of recently arrived workers living in shanty towns to the smaller but influential groups of permanent residents. There were bitter divisions even among the latter groups of African Capetonians. It is therefore not surprising that there is an equally complex picture in the area of schooling. The community divisions and the policy differences between local, regional (Divisional and Provincial) and the national authorities, were just as evident in respect of African schools as its was for housing.

5.3 African schooling in Cape Town up to c. 1950

Schools for African children in Cape Town have a history which reaches back to the 1850 when the Cape Governor, Sir George Grey started a school for the sons of chiefs from the eastern Cape and the Transkei regions.[13] Grey intended to impress the future chiefs with the power and benefits of the British empire. The political purpose behind schooling for Africans has often been closely associated with religious purposes. This was the case for the new school. Anglican Bishop Robert Gray was a willing partner to the Governor's scheme[14] and for the first two years he housed the school's first four boys himself.[15] While it is true, as Hodgson maintains, that Zonnebloem in its early years was more in Cape Town than of Cape Town the two elements of political function and religious context continued as prominent features of African schooling into the next century. Work needs to be done to fill in the gap between 1860 and 1930, but the point is at least valid for the two decades up to 1950. Both the churches and the state had a vital interest in the schooling of African children - see Figure 1. Also African communities sometimes ran independently financed schools themselves. Schooling was not a neutral terrain in which state, church and community interests harmoniously co-operated to achieve the maximum benefit for all concerned. It is essential to ask what purposes were being served by a particular school or system of schools, and to examine points of tension and conflict over the financing and control of

FIGURE 1

TABLE : AVERAGE ATTENDANCE AT STATE-SUBSIDISED AFRICAN SCHOOLS IN GREATER CAPE TOWN : 1931 - 1959

SCHOOL	DENOM	LOCALITY	YEAR: 31	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
1 UITVLUCHT	United	Ndabeni (?)	204															
2 ST CYPRIAN'S	EC	Ndabeni	208															
3 SIMONSTOWN	Meth.	Luyolo Location	60	75	85	98			130	125	142	126	136			140		182
4 BELLVILLE QUARRY	EC	Bellville	62															
5 ST CYPRIAN'S	EC	Church St, Langa	85	364	396	393			440	450	436	416	432			536		659
6 LANGA HIGH		Washington St, Langa		184	226	228			303	292	281	301	346			355		337
7 LANGA	Meth.	Lerotholi Ave, Langa		477	439	417			443	448	527	525	554			697		693
8 LANGA	DRC	Jungle Walk, Langa		63	68	77			125	107	189	180	252			316		346
9 HOLY CROSS	RC	Langa		194	206	252			261	247	224	242	263					
10 ATHLONE	Meth.	Cashel Ave, Athlone		259	271	383			383	424	423	416	393			543		637
11 RETREAT	Pres.	Boundary Rd, Retreat		185	221	230			347	352	323	309	353			507		593
12 PAROW	DRC	Parow		106	153	217			272	229	219	190	186					
13 KENSINGTON	Meth.	Third St, Windemere		196	227	333			293	349	320	360	371			749		516
14 CHAPEL ST	Meth.	Chapel St, Cape Town			76	93			143	133	114	111	94			118		114
15 NYANGA PRIMARY/H.P.'57-		Nyanga				115			144	158	149	204	253			300		429
16 ST MARY'S	RC	Nyanga				36			42	44	48	70	89			112		
17 HAMILTON BONNER	AME	Rubusana Ave, Langa								82	68	76	88			102		101
18 COOK'S BUSH	DRC	Grassy Park								93	102	150	150			249		
19 ST BARNABAS	EC	Welcome Est,nr Langa								66	77	72	75			72		44
20 EUREKA ESTATE		Elsies River								229	349	404	406					
21 WINDEMERE	EC	Seventh Ave, Windemere									143	208	226			295		234
22 FREE GROUND	Meth.	Muizenberg (?)									56	37	37			71		104
23 ST ANDREW'S	EC	Goodwood									102	91	68					
24 NYANGA	DRC	Nyanga										111	167			470		656
25 ST MATTHEWS	EC	Oakdale, Parow										38	32					
26 NYANGA LWR PRIM		Nyanga														510		900
27 ST LOUIS	RC	?														339		
28 LINGE LOWER PRIMARY		Nyanga																304
TOTAL			619	2103	2368	2872			3326	3888	4292	4646	4971			6881		6909

Abbreviations : EC English Church, Meth. Methodist, Pres. Presbyterian, DRC Dutch Reformed Church
RC Roman Catholic Church, AME African Methodist Episcopal, Denom. Denomination, H.P. Higher Primary.

Sources : Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Department of Public Education, 1931-1954.
Bantu Education Bulletin, Department of Native Affairs, 1957, 1959.

schooling i.e. to see it as a contested domain. At the same time even groups with widely differing interests sometimes worked together to achieve specific ends. These various purposes are illustrated by the following casestudy of the development of African schools in Cape Town.

By whom and for what changing purposes were schools for African children established and developed in Cape Town? Churches, parents, communities and the state were all involved in providing schooling for Africans. It has been shown above that the demography of Cape Town was undergoing a transformation as unprecedented numbers of Africans moved to the city during and following the war of 1939 - 1945. Where churches had been at the forefront in providing African schools in Cape Town during the pre-war period, the initiative was already shifting to the state well before 1953 when the Bantu Education Act was passed centralising formal control.

Church involvement in African schooling in Cape Town up to 1953 was extensive. This is evident from the table below. (Figure 2). The Methodist, Anglican and Dutch Reformed denominations were responsible for two-thirds of the African pupils receiving state-subsidised education in greater Cape Town in 1953. At this time, when the control of African schools was about to pass from the churches to the state, eighty percent of these pupils attended schools run by various churches. The remaining twenty percent were at schools directly managed by statutory School Boards. These results are tabulated and illustrated in the figures below.

Controlling body	Attendance
Methodist	1 575
Anglican (E.C.)	825
Dutch Reformed	640
Roman Catholic	312
Presbyterian	309
African Methodist Episcopal	76
School Board	909
TOTAL	4 646

Figure 2

Attendance at denominational and non-denominational schools in 1953 in Cape Town. (Derived from Fig. 1)



Figure 3

Percentage attendance at denominational and non-denominational African schools in Cape Town in 1953.

The reasons behind the churches' involvement in African schooling in Cape Town merit careful research. Why for instance did the Methodist Church take such a bold initiative after the war? Was it those denominations which were more racially integrated at regional council level that responded more strongly? While clear answers to such specific questions remain to be given, some broad suggestions may be made to throw light on the interests of church denominations. Most obviously there was a widespread demand by parents, who were often members of local congregations, for schooling for their children. It is reasonable to assume that churches which were able to provide their buildings as school premises during the week would receive a greater measure of support within the community. In the same way a denomination would be better established in an area where it was providing schooling. Competition between various denominations would have been a real incentive to their involvement in providing schools. It would thus have been possible for African churches to tap the resources of wealthier white churches in the same denomination. The benefits of such support would have included the securing of a degree of peace within a denomination and contributing to the stability of the potentially unruly African locations.

African people in Cape Town were there because they felt they could secure their future by living and working in the area. Earning money themselves and obtaining schooling for their children were primary means towards this end. In fact by having children looked after daily at school, mothers were also free to seek employment. The additional possibility of having children able to read and so have the chance of obtaining a good job was an important consideration for any family in a society where working children contributed towards the family income.

The way in which parents gained school admission for their children varied from place to place. In the older settlements where population growth was less rapid and where churches were established there was less of a problem than in the newer shanty towns. In an area of more recent settlement parents would organise among themselves to find a suitable teacher - for example a woman who had lost her teaching post in a state-subsidised school because of her marriage. Such a person was the first principal of the Eureka African Primary School in Elsies River. She described the parents' initiative for the school as follows:

> "In 1949 some parents in Elsies River asked me to open a little school because it was dangerous for their children to cross the main road to the other school." 16

There is some evidence that not only random groups of parents but also community organisations such as the ANC had an interest in local schooling arrangements. By 1954 the Eureka School had grown to accommodate several hundred pupils. A state subsidy had been obtained for the school which by then fell under the control of the Parow School Board. Some parents and most teachers were happy with the new arrangements. But there was dissatisfaction amongst others regarding staffing matters. A significant group of parents and community leaders who were related to the Congress movement[17] took determined protest action by means of pickets, representations and marches[18]. The point is that there were community organisations which objected to the loss of control over one key area of local affairs. The contest which followed shows that some community elements saw in their schools an opportunity to maintain control over their own areas on their own terms.

It should not be imagined that schools were immediately, or in some cases, ever, supported by churches or the state. An unrecorded number of schools eked out an existence without such aid. For example in 1946, before the educational statistics record any school at Nyanga,[19] The Cape Times reports on help given by Mrs A.W.H. Mears to a "Native woman's school at Inyanga" run by Mrs Florida Mabowe.[20] Information on these unaided community schools is extremely sparse and in the nature of their operation little written record of their existence can be expected. Oral research is probably the only means to obtain a clear picture, but it was beyond the scope of the present research to investigate this question. Only one interview out of more than twenty undertaken gave anything like a broad picture. The veteran former ANC (Western Cape) Secretary indicated that there were many unaided schools amongst African settlements.[21] He mentioned four such schools which had ANC links, each of which was closed after the government took over control in 1955: Klip School under Mr Roxo in Grassy Park which evidently went up to standard three, one school in Bellville near Stikland, another at Kraaifontein and Dora Tomana's school in Retreat which went up to standard one. With regard to the government take-over he commented that "nearly all schools which resisted were wiped out."[22]

Well before the formal take-over of control of African Schools (on 1 April 1955) there was a discernable trend towards greater state involvement. This trend had been given impetus by the United Party's Native Education Finance Act of 1945 which considerably increased the funding for African education providing it from central state revenue. In practice it meant that community schools could become state supported. The case of the Eureka School in Elsies River illustrates the increased financing by the state and the resultant loss of autonomy by the school. At its inception in 1949 there was an agreement between the parents and the locally resident teacher that there would be a contribution of two shillings per month for each pupil.[23] Many did not pay. As numbers increased three other teachers joined the staff in 1951. The following remarks give evidence of vigorous fundraising campaigns by the staff.

> "We ran concerts every second week. Once the coloureds helped us with a big bazaar." 24
>
> "We raised funds for my bustare (from Kensington to Elsies River - MC) by going to Salt River to buy fish to cook and sell." 25

The apparently coincidental way in which state funding for this school was granted suggests the existence of similar schools - some of which never received aid. The former principal of Eureka explained how financial support was obtained.[26] A certain mother was unable to pay the two shillings per month because her husband had lost his job. She approached the South African Institute of Race Relations for financial assistance. The Institute appealed to the Province and following these representations "the Education Department agreed to take over the school on the grounds that we pay 50-50".[27] The community continued to make a contribution. Control was formally exercised through a committee. When it was alleged that teachers were misappropriating funds this committee wisely called for a strict accounting for the two shilling payments.[28] It has already been pointed out that there was division over staffing matters. Finance was also an issue. The real problem behind these two issues was the question of who should have the final control.

The growing state funding of the schools meant the de facto assumption of a form of control over the communities. In Cape Town this control was exercised through the (African) Departmental Visiting Teachers, known as DVT s, who were concerned with day to day liaison between schools and the Cape Education Department.[29] There were also more senior (white) Circuit Inspectors who maintained oversight of buildings, standards and planning. One illustrative report from a Cape Town Circuit Inspector in 1940 reads:

> "Native education is progressing satisfactorily, and adequate facilities are provided for primary education in four primary schools, and secondary education up to the Junior Certificate stage in the Langa Secondary School.
> .... In 1940, 59 Native pupils sat for the Std VI examination and 60 per cent passed. Of this number 40 per cent proceeded to the Langa Secondary School for post primary education." 30

The above report of "satisfactory" progress and "adequate facilities" may have been true in 1940 in the established Langa area. But for the expanding African population the schooling provision was becoming less and less adequate. The Provincial policy of gradual and partial funding of new enterprises was unable to keep step with the growing demand for schooling. Speaking of the early fifties one DVT claims that even the rapidly increasing official figures for school attendance[31] did not reflect actual growth. He said

> "Schools had too few places and teachers were overloaded. Accommodation was inadequate. ..... The people from the bushes brought their children all though the year and admission was only allowed at certain times. But we turned a blind eye to this practice. Those children were kept under cover who were not on the registers."[32]

At the Eureka African Primary School there were possibly as many as 900[33] pupils attending in the mid-fifties, while the official figure in 1954 was given as only 406.[34] This was apparently an exceptional case but it seems clear that the formal statistics reflect considerably lower attendances than actually obtained. The Departmental Circuit Inspectors must have been aware of this situation. What did they achieve by not reporting the actual position? While one must not read too much into this omission it seems reasonable to claim that it limited the cost of providing schooling for African children and secondly that it averted the need to admit that under the given conditions and funding the Department was unable to provide for the adequate development of schooling. In fact a specific provision, the so-called quota system[35] introduced on 1 July 1949, limited enrolment per teacher to 50. This followed an almost despairing observation in the 1947 SGE report that to give schooling to all African children of schoolgoing age would mean

> "bringing them in at the rate of approximately 30 000 per annum as compared with the average of some 10 000 during the past few years. A glance at Table F. below will give some idea of the financial implications, ta (sic) say nothing of the formidable problems of staffing and housing if such a scheme were embarked upon."[36]

While these comments and the quota system applied to the whole Cape Province it is evident that Cape Town was not exempt from the strain of trying to provide for the schooling of African children from inadequate resources of manpower, accommodation and finance. In this sense the Provincial education authority had lost control of African schooling. While some schools could be held up to contradict this assertion, the rapidly changing demography of Cape Town made it increasingly true in the fifties. The real rate of growth in schooling was beyond the capacity of local churches, communities or even the Provincial Administration to handle. It had ceased to be possible for the Province to expand African schooling on the traditional basis because this would have entailed a huge increase in spending especially to build new schools.

It had been relatively cheap to rely on churches for the use of their buildings[37]. In the burgeoning shanty towns there were no really suitable buildings. And, significantly, the problem of how to expand schooling was but one issue in a complex matrix of problems like housing and health which resulted from the unprecedented rate of urbanization following local economic growth. The Provincial education authority simply lacked the powers to deal with issues which had a serious effect on schooling but were not in themselves educational issues.

5.4 Bantu Education in Cape Town - expansion for labour reproduction?

It was at this point that the state stepped in. The Native Affairs Department took over control which had previously been exercised by the churches, the local communities and the Province. The buildings were bought or temporarily leased from the churches, the communities lost their influence over teaching appointments and the Province (willingly) relinquished its control of funds, teachers and inspection to the Central Government. Despite changes of control there was a measure of continuity in Cape Town. Mr F.J. de Villiers who had been the Chief Inspector of Native Education in the Cape Education Department was appointed to head up Bantu Education in the Native Affairs Department.[38]

The change of control over African schooling took place in stages. And, far from inhibiting the growth of school enrolment, the Nationalist government took over a process of rapid expansion and continued to service it. The fairly evenly rising graph in figure 4 illustrates this contention. In the decade up to the introduction of Bantu Education the attendance at state-subsidised schools in Cape Town doubled. It doubled again in the decade after 1953. Certainly the 1953 Bantu Education policy of Native Affairs Minister Verwoerd was opposed and resisted by Africans. But in giving more schooling to African people he was giving them what they wanted. In the 1950 when his overall plans were being widely challenged, he was using the increased provision of schooling to gain the acquiescence of Africans.

One key means by which the expansion was achieved in Cape Town (as elsewhere) was through the introduction of double sessions for the substandards. As there were probably about 70 per cent of the pupils in these junior classes this meant a substantial increase in enrolment with no additional expenditure on buildings or on staff. Inevitably the expansion came at the cost of the quality of instruction. As one teacher

FIGURE 4

AFRICAN ATTENDANCE AT STATE-SUBSIDISED SCHOOLS IN GREATER CAPE TOWN : 1931-1964



put it

> "(the) double session was not nice. To teach a hundred children in one day is hard. You can't cough the same thing twice with the same energy."[39]

But expansion did not occur only at the level of elementary schooling. There was considerable growth in the higher primary (the second four years) phase of schooling. To answer the question posed earlier as to the purpose of extending African schooling to the masses, it is helpful to examine the statistics of this growth. The labour reproduction theory of Collins and Christie quoted above[40] suggested that in order to prepare most schooled blacks for subordinate positions in the work-force, Bantu Education extended the mass base of schooling at the lower levels[41] and especially at the lower primary level[42]. But to reduce Bantu Education to a response to the economy's demand for appropriate labour does not adequately explain a complex problem. The case of Cape Town illustrates this point. The nature of the expansion of African schooling did not uniformly follow the lines proposed by Collins and Christie. Growth did take place in the lower primary sector, one such school recording an attendance of 960 in 1959[43]. But it is simply not true that in Cape Town there was an imbalance in the attendance at Lower Primary Schools which remained "almost static"[44]. Figure 5 shows that the proportions continued a pattern of change which had been established before Bantu Education was introduced.

Figure 5

Year	No. schools	No. pupils	Lower Prim.	Higher Prim.	Secondary	Source [45]
1945	10	2 103	51,5 (1084)	40 (341)	8,7 (184)	pp.386-7
1953	22	4 646	68,1 [46] (3162)	25,5 (1183)	6,5 (301)	pp.203-5
1957 [47]	19 [48]	7585 [49]	69,5 (5268)	25,7 (1947)	4,8 (370)	pp.237-40
1961	22	9024	64,7 (5839)	30,1 (2784)	4,4 (401)	pp.244-5, pp.162-4

Table: The percentages of pupils in Lower Primary, Higher Primary and Secondary State-subsidised Schools for African pupils in Greater Cape Town: 1945 - 1961. (Attendance/Enrolment also given)

The proportion of pupils in the Sub. A to Standard 2 range increased fairly uniformly over twelve years from 51,7% in 1945 to 59,5% in 1957. Then in the following four years there was a surprising drop to 64,7% as the number of places at Higher Primary Schools grew more rapidly. Why was there this proportionately larger growth in the Higher Primary Schools? Or correspondingly, why was there proportionately little increase in the Lower Primaries? There is no ready explanation. A decline in the birthrate more than seven years earlier seems unlikely. The tightening of influx control through a rigid application of the pass laws in the period 1957 to 1961 was probably the strongest contributory factor since it is arguable that those who were most likely to be deported to the Reserves were those relatively younger Africans who had been resident for the shortest time in Cape Town. And if they had families, their children would have been younger as well and so more likely to be at a Lower than at a Higher Primary School. It is also possible that some of these African families "illegally" resident in Cape Town simply stopped sending their young children to school in order to escape detection.[50] Whatever the reason for the greater growth of the Higher Primary Schools in Cape Town in the late fifties it is clear that the first eight years of Bantu Education did not witness any unbalanced growth of Lower Primary School attendances. In fact in Cape Town that kind of growth was well under way before 1953 indicating that it is incorrect to attribute the expansion of lower primary schooling to the operation of Bantu Education alone.

In the area of secondary schooling there is a decided pattern between 1945 and 1961 which emerges from the table above (Figure 5). During these years the growth of Langa Secondary School, the only African high school in Cape Town, was initially fairly rapid, rising from 184 to 301 in the first eight years and then it tailed off, increasing to 401 in the next eight years. Thus for the period 1945 - 1961 the number of secondary pupils increased uniformly but the slower rate compares with the rapid increase in the numbers of primary school pupils over the same period. This is shown by the dropping percentage of secondary pupils. In 1945 there were 8,7% secondary pupils or 1 in 11, whilst in 1961 the percentage was only 4,4% or 1 in 22.

The stunting of secondary school growth particularly after 1953 seems to accord closely to Molteno's version of labour reproduction theory which presents

Bantu Education as intending to

> "reduce the number of medium level academic qualifications to that minimum level required mainly as functionaries in the Bantustan bureaucracies." 51

This explanation goes beyond Verwoerd's stated intentions to make the educated African a servant of his own people. It is true that as Minister of Native Affairs he sought to 'ruralise' secondary education to bring urban pupils into contact with the tribal society that he was seeking to reform according to his development plan. While ideological retribalization provided an attractive rationale for those who believed in 'preserving African culture', it is probable that Verwoerd judged his strategy on a much more pragmatic basis. This seems to be borne out by a consideration of the effect of the policy in Cape Town. Perhaps the immediate local purpose of limiting the availability of secondary schooling was not even so much to regulate the supply of better educated workers, as labour reproduction theory might suggest, but rather to use post-primary schooling as a political lever. Some would gain by the policy and some would lose. Firstly what was the effect on those parents who gained the particular benefit of a secondary education in Cape Town for their children while many others were denied the opportunity? This group, regarding itself as privileged, would have become embedded with a vested interest not to challenge an administration which was treating them well. Secondly it is important to consider the effect on the relatively small number of parents who did not get their children into the local High School. A few may have had the means to send them to the Reserves for secondary education and may well have preferred their children to grow up away from the city.[52] Nevertheless there would have been a number who wished to but could not obtain secondary schooling. The dissatisfaction of this group, probably numbering one or two hundred[53] could safely be ignored. This was so because a far larger group had been accommodated for the first time at Higher Primary Schools. In 1953 these schools had taken slightly more than 1 000 pupils, but 1961 the number was approaching 3 000.

The introduction of Bantu Education in Cape Town accompanied the continued rapid growth in primary schooling and the relatively slower growth in secondary schooling provision. These developments were not simply determined by the needs of the labour market. They resulted from the complex interplay of a number of factors related to the massive urban migration

of thousands of Africans to Cape Town. Housing, work, liquor control, health and schooling were all in a state of turmoil following unprecedented growth. The Nationalist government's response to these problems was the rigid application of its Apartheid policy. Strict residential segregation, tight influx control, and a multitude of regulations covering every aspect of African society and labour were introduced. While it may seem reasonable to assume that Bantu Education in the urban context was geared to the labour needs of those areas, this on its own is altogether too simple an explanation.

If it were that Bantu Education was designed primarily to meet labour needs, then it would be expected that in other urban areas similar consistent applications of this schooling policy would be evident. As this is a point of importance for an adequate analysis of the nature of Bantu Education a comparative survey of two other key urban areas is given below. The areas chosen are Greater Port Elizabeth, close to large African Reserve areas in the Eastern Cape; and the Central and East Rand, an area of longstanding African settlement in the mining and industrial heartland of the Transvaal. Such a comparative study provides a means of answering another key question viz. was there a better provision of schooling for African pupils in Cape Town than in the other two areas? Following the suggesting by Collins and Christie that the expansion of Lower Primary Schools shows up the purpose of Bantu Education, it makes sense to examine the patterns of growth in the three areas. Figure 6 summarises the data.

Figure 6

Year	Cape Town	Port Elizabeth [54]	Central and East Rand [55]	National [56]
1945	51,5 (1084)	53,6 (2759)	69,3 (24 599)	1945: 75,9
1953	68,1 (3162)	63,7 (6094)	62,9 (37 510)	1950: 73,5
1957	69,5 (5268)	59,6 (8181)	69,2 (49 112)	1955: 72,7
1961	61,7 (5839)	72,2 (14 490)	65,5 (61 647)	1960: 72,8

Percentage of pupils in state-subsidised Lower Primary African Schools in three urban areas and in South Africa as a whole, 1945-1961.
(Attendance/Enrolment figures given in parenthesis)

Figure 6 shows large variations in the percentage of primary pupils in the smaller samples of Port Elizabeth and Cape Town whilst the Rand and national percentages do not fluctuate materially. This means that one cannot draw conclusions from larger samples and apply these in smaller cases such as Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. For example in Port Elizabeth there was a ten percent increase in the proportion of children at Lower Primary Schools in the eight years before the introduction of Bantu Education and a further ten percent increase in the following eight years. This is quite unlike the national pattern. In the light of this, statements such as those made by Collins and Christie[57] on the basis of national figures, are invalid for some specific areas. Hence the descriptive ability of their presentation of labour reproduction theory is called into question for being too broad. The objection might be made that whatever the local variations over a relatively short space of time, the overall long-term trend must be the basis for formulating conclusions. While there is certainly a place for a careful broad analysis the danger is that sweeping statements when applied at a local level are not just meaningless, they may lead to invalid conclusions. Whatever the national trend, local variations which do not directly accord with the theory that Bantu Education sought above all else to reproduce a suitably skilled and docile labour force, cannot be ignored. Changes in schooling provision reflect many more trends than the immediate labour needs of the economy.

5.5 Bantu Education in Cape Town - relocating schools for an apartheid society

In Cape Town the way in which the Bantu Education legislation was applied suggests that its purpose in the fifties had less to do with the area's immediate needs for suitable labour than it was to contribute to the restructuring of the layout of Greater Cape Town along apartheid lines. The way in which schooling was provided aided the physical removal of African communities to the specified Group Area of Nyanga. In each of the five types of settlement area[58] the goal of using the schools to achieve state control is reflected. A table (Figure 7) and a bar graph (Figure 8) detail the trends which are discussed below.[59] A map (Figure 9) showing where the schools were situated is given as a background.

Figure 7

Area \ Year	1945	1950	1953	1957	1959	1961
A. Official location						
Langa	1282	1572	1821	2078	2180	2231
B. Old settlement Areas						
Central	0	143	111	118	114	133
Simonstown (incl. Freeground)	75	130	163	211	286	349
C. Predominantly 'Coloured' areas						
Athlone	259	383	416	543	637	501
Retreat (inc. Cook's Bush)	185	347	459	759	593	350
D. Shanty town areas						
Windermere (incl. Kensington)	196	293	568	1044	750	469
Elsies River (incl. Parow/Goodwood)	106	272	723	0	0	0
E. New Official location						
Nyanga (incl. present-day Guguletu)	0	186	385	1792	2349	4991
TOTAL	2103	3326	4646	6542	6909	9024

Table: African attendance at State-subsidised schools in Greater Cape Town, summarised by area : 1945 - 1961.

FIGURE 8 ATTENDANCE AT STATE-SUBSIDISED AFRICAN SCHOOLS IN GREATER CAPE TOWN, 1945 - 1961



FIGURE 9

MAP : CAPE TOWN IN THE 1950s SHOWING AREAS WHERE SCHOOLS FOR AFRICAN PUPILS WERE SITUATED



Derived from : Horrell, M. Group Areas in Cape Town, SAIRR, 1958.

Langa had been built in the late 1920s and was Cape Town's only official African "location" up to the 1950s. It was limited in capacity and had been carefully designed with a police station at its centre. Attendance at the township's schools grew steadily at a moderate pace, nearly doubling in the sixteen years after 1945. Although there was a good deal of political activism, some of it even focused on the schools, the location itself was considered more readily governable than the squatter areas.

Since well before the turn of the century there had been a settled African community in central Cape Town. Most Africans were moved from there to Ndabeni in 1901 following the outbreak of bubonic plague but a few remained right up to the 1960s. The Chapel Street School which accommodated their children neither grew nor declined between 1945 and 1961 and like the small African community in the city centre it was allowed to continue in existence. Another old settlement area was at Simonstown. Most of the men worked in the naval dockyard. The Luyolo Location where the African community lived was firmly under the control of a Superintendent (van Aar) who was feared by the people as one who rigidly applied the law to the letter.[60] There was obviously little threat from this small location and its old Methodist School was permitted to grow according to the needs of the community. In neither of these two areas was there any perceived need for immediate action to close the small settlements or their schools.

The third category of African settlement in Greater Cape Town was within and alongside the built-up Coloured areas of Athlone and Retreat. Both areas were centres of political organisation among Africans and, sometimes in co-operation with the Coloured political groupings, they posed a vocal challenge to the government's policies. The drop off in school enrolments in these areas was both a reflection of, and a mechanism for, the implementation of the Group Areas policy. Where the attendance at schools had more than doubled in ten years, it suddenly began to decline in the late fifties, the school at Cook's Bush near Retreat closing altogether after 1957. It was no mere chance that it was in Athlone and Retreat that this curtailment was made in the schooling provision while nothing was yet being done in the better controlled areas mentioned above. The dovetailing pattern of school attendances is graphically illustrated in Figure 8. In established areas there was little initial change. In shanty town areas there was a rapid

decrease corresponding to a rapid increase in the new townships, Nyanga. Examination of the latter two areas of settlement reveals this trend.

Windemere and Kensington were sprawling squatter areas. A racially heterogeneous community lived there. In Elsies River where there were African and Coloured people living closely together, there was also a completely African pocket known to locals as Marabastad. In each of these areas there had been phenomenal population growth. Even the extremely conservative official census figures for Goodwood indicate a four-fold rise from 1 128 in 1945 to 4 155 in 1951[61]. In these areas there were widespread challenges to state attempts to regulate anything from the production of home brewed beer to political movements.[62] Elsies River was a centre of ANC activity. One organiser of the time said: "It was an emergency camp like Crossroads. Compact and easy to organise. The ANC was very strong there."[63] Elsies River had the additional distinction of being close to the municipalities of Parow and Goodwood which supported the move to implement the Group Areas Act at the earliest opportunity.[64]

The official school attendance figures in the Elsies River and Parow areas shot up from 106 in 1946 to 723 eight years later. The actual attendance was reportedly much larger. And then suddenly, at the end of 1956 the schools there were closed.[65] Those children who continued to live with their parents in Elsies River were obliged to travel by bus to Nyanga to continue their schooling.[66] This was no case of schools closing after pupils had left the area. The schools were used to effect the removals; being closed while families were still resident in the area. The schools in Windemere and Kensington did not close as abruptly. Nevertheless the drop from 1 044 in 1957 to 469 just four years later was also dramatic. What was the reason for this decisive intervention by the state in the shanty towns? These areas were feared by the local authorities as challenging the security of the area. Why else was it necessary to use 400 police in one raid?[67] The clear conclusion that arises from this is that the schools were used as a lever to oblige the squatters out of their positions of independent challenge to the state and into controlled locations where the threat of eviction was effective.

A look at the fifth area confirms the earlier findings. Nyanga was established as the second official location in the late forties. It was largely a site and service scheme. Some houses were built there

for example at the instigation of the Goodwood and Parow municipalities for 'their' Africans.[68] It was a carefully controlled area with strategically placed police stations and a minimum number of entry and exit points. The growth of its school attendance from only 385 in 1953 to more than ten times that number in 1961 was phenomenal and unprecedented in Cape Town. This was precisely what the gradualist policy of the Cape Education Department could never have achieved: the focusing of state funds on an extensive schools' building project clearly aimed at extending political control. Where the closure and constriction of schools in other areas helped to squeeze people out of their living areas, the opening in Nyanga of a number of new schools which provided a generous number (1 416)[69] of Higher Primary places had the effect of drawing people to the area. One key ANC leader claimed:

> "It was not only that schools were closed. They were telling people to go (from the shanty towns) to certain places where they will have facilities and schools" 70

5.6 Bantu Education in Cape Town - the closure of community and night schools and the establishment of control

The state used every available means to restructure African society in Cape Town. It closed any agency which was perceived as representing a challenge to its plan and it established a tightly controlled organisation to administer its new order. Both of these strategies are illustrated with regard to schooling. In addition to state-aided African schools being re-sited by the government, independent community schools were immediately closed down as were the night schools over a period.

In terms of the Bantu Education Act it was illegal to run even an independently funded school without the permission of the Minister of Native Affairs. It was mentioned above that four such schools, at least two of which had militant ANC teachers (Roxo and Tomana), were summarily closed[71]. There were doubtless many others. Just a few years earlier, in 1952, the ANC had mounted its Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign directed especially against the recent Afrikaner Nationalist Apartheid laws. In Greater Cape Town there were 157 arrests of Defiance Campaigners.[72] The Nationalist government did not view such a direct challenge lightly and nor did it regard the existence of schools in unsegregated areas, whether run by ANC sympathisers or not, as desirable. And so

to help effect its Group Areas policy and to silence defiant voices it closed these schools.

The thriving night school movement in Cape Town, where voluntary teachers were readily available, was severely restricted. The Cape Non-European Night Schools Association had been formed in Cape Town in 1945. In 1951 it boasted more than 700 adult pupils, a staff of 125 voluntary helpers (including many university students), the provision of text books free or at cost and free tuition. A Government grant of R600 (£300) in that year contributed half of the costs.[73] By 1955 there were 12 schools with 1 100 African and 100 Coloured students[74] located at Retreat, Langa, the Docks Compound, Matroosfontein and elsewhere.[75] In addition, in that same year, the Cape Education Department was sponsoring evening continuation (i.e. secondary) classes for some 303 adults at five African schools.[76] In 1959 there were still some of the schools running in White areas but fees had to be levied and fundraising undertaken. The control of four night schools in African areas had to be handed over to the (African) School Committees of the day schools where they were held,[77] and Whites were not permitted to teach there. By 1962 there were only three night schools and five continuation classes still operating[78], the school at the Docks Compound having closed after it proved difficult to recruit and pay African teachers to replace White volunteers.

Why were the schools closed? In June 1959 the Minister stated his intention "to make night schools and continuation classes self-supporting" and that he was opposed to "the existence of a large number of night schools in White urban residential areas."[79] One one level given the priority of day school education and the Group Areas legislation the purpose of state policy regarding night schools was to discourage the African presence outside of the designated African townships. But it was also to eliminate the "undesirable influence" of the White teachers on Africans. Those Liberals who sponsored and organised this type of education believed that it made African workers more productive and could not understand the Government's failure to see the economic benefit. As early as 1947 the SAIRR conference on Adult Education held in Cape Town propounded this view:

> "While an appeal must be based on justice and Christian principle, what the European group must also be asked is: Can South Africa, in the face of present and future developments on this Continent and overseas, afford economically to carry this burden of illiteracy ....?"[80]
> (emphasis in the original)

This view failed to appreciate that which the Nationalist Government saw clearly. The demand of the late fifties was to consolidate state power. Then it could engineer the conditions under which Africans lived and worked in such a way as to provide the maximum order possible especially through regulated townships. Any organization which might challenge this was to be closed. It was not only the liberal influence on the night schools that was considered undesirable by the government. It is also probable that the state feared the possibility of "communist" infiltration. In her research on night schools in Johannesburg[81] Adrienne Bird has shown the existence of the two distinct liberal and radical traditions in the area, and of the government's greater anxiety about the latter. In the reaction of the government to the night school at the Cape Town Docks Compound in the extremely sensitive early sixties there is a hint of a similar anxiety. It is possible that the 1961 closure of the night school in the Docks Compound by the General Manager of the Railways[82] was motivated by a concern that the seventy dock-workers attending might be acquiring more than the literacy skills required to improve their personal positions. The existence of an African labour compound, the presence of White teachers, and the possibility of collective action would have been seen as a potential threat to labour relations during the turmoil of the early sixties in Cape Town.

Having used Bantu Education legislation to close those schools considered to be a hindrance to the achievement of a thorough segregation in Cape Town, the Department of Native Affairs ensured that any challenge from within the existing African schools was stifled. A hierarchy of control was established to this end. The Department attempted to co-opt members of the African community as state agents to manage the schools. In Cape Town the Peninsula School Board was established with a majority of nominated members and possessing wide regulatory powers over local schools and their teachers. It was through this School Borad that at least one teacher leader of the opposition to Bantu Education was dismissed.[83] Individual schools were to be run by statutory School Committees half of the members of which were to be elected, though still subject to Departmental approval. In Cape Town this process of co-opting members of the African community into control bodies designed to ensure the smooth implementation of Bantu Education did not proceed without considerable conflict.[84] To get the new system to work even the teachers were involved. They were instructed that it was their duty to encourage parents to participate in elections.[85] One of the

people interviewed affirmed that the parents were divided.

> "Some said that the Government is giving us control of the schools, what else do we want? Others opposed elections (of School Committees - MC) entirely." 86

It was a number of years before moderately representative School Committees began to function in Cape Town.

Control was also exercised in the new system by Departmental employees - inspectors and teachers. The African Sub-Inspectors played a key role as the primary agents of the Department in the schools to ensure that the paid teaching staff complied with regulations. The Sub-Inspector responsible for Cape Town spent three months per year in the area and the rest of his time in the rural parts of his circuit.[87] According to a report in the newspaper New Age he was "sent by the Native Affairs Department to arrange for the election of school committees in terms of the Bantu Education Act,"[88] and held two meetings on Saturday 19 March 1955, one at the Dutch Reformed School and the other at the Methodist School. At both meetings the motion to elect a School Committee was reportedly defeated.[89] The role of the Sub-Inspector in a politicised area like Cape Town was not only unpopular but at times dangerous.[90]

Teachers were also obliged to help implement Bantu Education. Not only were they required to canvass parent support for School Committee elections, they also suffered the consequences of rapidly growing classes. Furthermore they were not permitted to protest under the threat of dismissal. It is well-known that the Minister of Native Affairs cut the Gordian knot and reduced qualifications required for entry into teacher training college from Form III to Form I for prospective Lower Primary teachers and greatly increased the intake of women into teaching.[91] The effect of this on the level of qualifications of teachers in Cape Town has not been researched. In 1953 all of the 127 teachers paid by the state were certificated.[92] The details of their qualifications and the changed position by the early sixties would make for an interesting study but as there is no regional breakdown in the published statistics of the Bantu Education Department, this would have to be obtained from local records. What is evident from the available records is the fact that Cape Town's teachers were severely handicapped by the greater numbers of pupils admitted while there was no corresponding increase in

the number of teachers. Figure 10 sets out the relevant statistics, probably the most telling of which is that between 1953 and 1959 the number of teachers dropped by one while the number of pupils increased by 2 263!

Figure 10

Year	Number schools	Number pupils	Number teachers	Pupil - teacher ratio	Source[93]
1945	10	2 103	52	40 : 1	p. 387
1953	22	4 646	127	37 : 1	pp. 203-5
1959	17	6 909	126	55 : 1	p. 200
1961	22	8 366	138	61 : 1	p. 162-4

The pupil-teacher ratio at state-subsidised African schools in Cape Town : 1945 - 1961.

It is probable, as observed earlier, that the relatively favourable ratio of 37 : 1 in 1953 was due to an under-recording of attendance. Nevertheless, the effect of the Bantu Education policy on this ratio was devastating for teachers particularly those who taught the youngest children. Added to the growing stress of coping with the increased workload was the insecurity resulting from the application of the harsh new set of conditions of service which was published for African teachers in January 1955.[94] This prohibited teachers from publically criticising any state department of school body or any official connected with them. The penalty was dismissal, without recourse to legal representation. An African leader in Cape Town Unity Movement circles, I.B. Tabata, complained that African teachers were at the mercy of officials,[95] that a reign of terror had been let loose on them as police "swooped on the schools"[96] and that hundreds of teachers had been replaced as the new "Bantu-ized trainees" came onto the market.[97] The effect of this in Cape Town is difficult to asess fully but oral evidence points strongly to a debilitating sense of insecurity in the teaching corps. The following two extracts from interviews illustrate this:

Interview with a teacher:

Question : Were any teachers members of the ANC?
Answer : Teachers were kept on being warned of being (that they were - MC) government servants, not to join any meetings or side associations.
Question : How?
Answer : Documents used to come to our classrooms and we had to sign them.
Question : Were any teachers saying that they did not like this?
Answer : Teachers were afraid of each other. Each one kept anything he or she thought within. (Emphasis added - MC)[98]

Interview with an official (former teacher):

"Teachers did not want to involve themselves in politics. We were always entertaining fears that we would lose our jobs. New teachers were coming out of teachers colleges and old teachers felt the authorities were trying to move them on. Especially the politically conscious teacher had to suppress his feelings. No teacher knew how well he could trust his colleagues. At that time there was only a single area for education (for those who had education - MC), the teaching profession. The teacher had to protect his position. Once out he was in the doldrums."[99]

The fear teachers experienced was well grounded. Some Cape Town teachers were dismissed during the mid-fifties. At the end of the second quarter Mr. J. Kwebulana of the Methodist Higher Primary School, Langa was dismissed for his role in chairing protest meetings to discourage parents from taking part in elections for school committees.[100] Not only was he dismissed but he was barred from obtaining any government related job and was obliged to work as a meat vendor and in various other jobs for ten years before being permitted to return to teaching. Likewise Mr Mquingwana on the same staff was transferred from the school near his Langa home to Simonstown 30 km away. He was considered a "really bad influence,"[101] and evidently nearly resigned but was advised by his politically active colleagues not to play into the Department's hands.[102] Yet another teacher, Miss Ngumbela was transferred to the Eureka School in Elsies River three months prior to its closing,[103] but evidently never

took up that post.[104] Taking into account the fact that during this period there was little increase in the number of teachers it is clear that those teachers who remained in service were under severe pressure. Despite the formidable penalties some did object but that is to be dealt with in the following chapter.[105]

5.7 Conclusion

The introduction of Bantu Education did not change the pattern of the rapid growth of African schooling in Cape Town. What it did was to severely prune the cost of that growth thus laying the foundation for a continued expansion. The major purpose achieved by this expansion in Cape Town in the 1950 s was to help in securing political control especially over the urban African proletariat. Bantu Education was one of a number of instruments used to divide the huge squatter population into racially segregated residential areas. The closure of African schools (in squatter areas and in areas of Coloured majority) and the siting of new schools in more easily managed locations linked education policy with housing policy, the Bantu Education Act with the Group Areas Act. This achieved a transformation of the socio-economic structure of Cape Town. In order to limit the resistance to this social engineering project the state took firm control of the management, funding and staffing of the schools. It attempted, against stiff opposition, to co-opt Africans onto School Boards and Committees and used these bodies to curb the challenge of those individuals and groups who resented this intrusion of the state in community affairs. Funds were channelled through and partly raised by School Boards but their disbursement remained at the discretion of the Department of Native Affairs. The teachers freedom of action and expression was sharply curtailed. They were forbidden to criticise the new policy, they were intimidated with the threat of losing their hard-won jobs and they were grossly overworked. Some of them left teaching while others continued to give what they could to make the best of a bad job. Their various responses and the resistance shown to Bantu Education in Cape Town may have modified the implementation of the new policy but did not seriously deflect the state from using the provision of African schooling to help redirect Cape Town's urban development.

CHAPTER 5: NOTES

1. A decade of Bantu education. Johannesburg, 1964. Bantu education to 1968. Johannesburg, 1968.

2. For example: Shingler, J.D. Education and political order in South Africa, 1902 - 1961. Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1973; Robertson, I.A. Education in South Africa: a study on the influence of ideology on educational practice. Ed.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1973; Mbere, A.M. An analysis of the association between Bantu Education and Christian Nationalism: a study of the role of ideology in education. Ed.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1979.

3. For example: Collins, C. and Christie, P. "Bantu Education: apartheid ideology and labour reproduction" in Kallaway, P. (ed.) Apartheid and Education. Johannesburg, 1984.

4. Ibid., p. 176.

5. Ibid., p. 177.

6. On African migration to and settlement in Cape Town: Harries, P. "Mozbiekers: the immigration of an African community to the Western Cape, 1876-1882"; Saunders, C. "The creation of Ndabeni: urban segregation and African resistance in Cape Town" and "From Ndabeni to Langa" in Studies in the history of Cape Town, vol. 1, University of Cape Town, 1979.
On the developments in Reserve areas: Wilson, M. and Thompson, L., The Oxford History of South Africa. Vol. 2, Oxford, 1975. Chapters 3 and 4 on "Farming 1865-1966" and "The growth of towns".
Bundy, C. The rise and fall of the South African peasantry. London, 1979.

7. Interview no. 16, 23/10/1984.

8. This grouping was formed in response to the Smuts' Government's creation of a separate Coloured Affairs Department (or C.A.D.) in 1943. The Non-European Unity Movement was a federation of the affiliated groups of the Anti-C.A.D. and of the All African Convention.

9. For the sake of clarity the divisions within the A.N.C. (Western Cape) and the A.N.C.'s relationship with the wider Congress Movement, including some Communists, is glossed over. The subject is more adequately discussed on pp. 71, 106, 107 above.

10. Van der Horst, S. African workers in town: a study of labour in Cape Town. Cape Town, 1964.

11. The Cape Times, 12/1/1955.

12. Ibid., 13/1/1955.

13. Hodgson, J. "Zonnebloem College and Cape Town, 1858 - 1870." in Cape Town History Conference Papers, University of Cape Town, 1978. The collection is available from the African Studies Library.

14. Ibid., p. 1.

15. Ibid., p. 3.

16. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.

17. Including but broader than the local ANC - see note 9 above.

18. An account of these events is given in chapter 6, pp. 184-188 "The 1954 Eureka School boycott". The sources used were the Advance newspaper (sympathetic to the ANC) and some interviews.

19. The first record of any school at Nyanga is of the St. Mary's Roman Catholic School there with an attendance of 36 in 1947. Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Department of Public Education, 1947.

20. The Cape Times, 11/12/1946.

21. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

22. Ibid. A "resisting" school was one where A.N.C. influence was strong.

23. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.

24. Ibid.

25. Interview no. 19, 15/11/1984.

26. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. The Report of the Superintendent General of Education (S.G.E.) for the years 1948 and 1949, Cape Education Department, p. 24, notes a departure from the

> "Usual practice of using Visiting teachers mainly for inspection work and a return to the original policy of using them to help with the introduction of more effective methods of teaching in Native Primary Schools."

30. The Education Gazette, Cape of Good Hope, 27/11/1941, p. 1572. The report was by Inspector H.S. Bowden.

31. See Figure 1, p. 135 above.

32. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

33. Ibid. The former inspector said "Eureka was an exception (in having as many as 900 pupils - MC) but the official numbers were lower than actual." Another interview (no. 1, 10/11/1984) with a teacher who had been at the school at the time indicated that between 500 and 600 pupils were at the school in 1956.

34. Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Department of Public Education, 1954.

35. Detailed in the Report of the S.G.E. for the years 1948 and 1949, Cape Education Department, pp. 19 - 21.

36. p. 29.

37. In 1943 only 11 of more than 2 000 school buildings in the entire Cape Province were owned by the state.

38. Report of the S.G.E. for 1952 and 1953, p. 12. Mr de Villiers was appointed as the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs (Bantu Education).

39. Interview no. 18, 10/11/1984.

40. See p. 131.

41. Collins and Christie in Kallaway, 1984 , p. 176.

42. Ibid., p. 177.

43. See figure 1 above, p. 135.

44. Collins and Christie, 1984, p. 177.

45. The page numbers refer to the Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Department of Public Education for 1945 and 1953; and to the Bantu Education Bulletin for 1957 and 1961.

46. Including two Primary Schools which accommodated pupils beyond Std. 2. Regrettably there is no breakdown as to how many were above and below Std. 2 but the two schools together had 606 pupils and in both the majority would have been in the lower classes.

47. Enrolment figures are given in this row and the next. These are usually slightly higher than attendance figures.

48. 17 out of these 19 schools were using double sessions.

49. The discrepancy of 704 between this total of 7 585 and the total given in figure 1 viz. 6 881 is the difference between the enrolment and the average attendance during the second quarter of 1957.

50. Of course it is also possible that the Lower Primary statistics are unreliable and that the actual attendance was higher than reported. Children from the bush may have attended school but not been formally enrolled.

51. Molteno, F. 'The historical foundations of the schooling of Black South Africans' in Kallaway, 1984, p. 90. A fuller quotation is given above on p. 44.

52. Sheila van der Horst, in her analysis of 229 African men working in seven different industries and factories in Cape Town, records that "the majority of men who had sons did not wish them to grow up in Cape Town."
African workers in Town : a study of labour in Cape Town, Cape Town, 1964, p. 92.

53. For example in 1957 there were 1 947 higher primary pupils and 370 secondary pupils. It is generous to assume that one fifth of the 1 947, i.e. about 400, were in the higher primary final year group which constituted 14% of the higher primary total. Of the 400, some would have left school anyway; some, not more than 200, would have gone to high school and the disappointed group would have amounted to 150 at the most.

54. This column is summarised from the following table.

Year	No. Schools	No. pupils	Lower Prim.	Higher Prim.	Secondary	Source[a.]
1945	20	5 140	53,6 (2759)	41,9 (2153)	4,4 (228)	pp.402-3
1953	39[b.]	9 568	63,7 (6094)[c.]	30,2 (2893)	61, (581)	pp.224-6
1957[d.]	43	13 730	59,6 (8181)	32,4 (4452)	8,9(1097)	pp.247-8
1961	53	20 067	72,2 (14490)	22,6 (4532)	5,2(1045)	p.163[e.]

The percentage of pupils in Lower Primary, Higher Primary and Secondary state-subsidised Schools for African pupils in Port Elizabeth : 1945 - 1961. (Attendance/Enrolment also given).

Notes

a. See note 45 above
b. Excluding two small orthopaedic homes with a total of 35 pupils
c. Including one Primary School which may have accommodated pupils beyond Std. 2. There were however only 44 pupils at this school.

d. See note 47 above.
e. There is a discrepancy within the published statistics for 1961. Whereas p. 163 of the Bantu Education Bulletin gives 14 490 L.P., 4 532 H.P. and 1 045 Secondary, the summary statistics on p. 245 reduce the high number of L.P. pupils to 13 896, increasing the H.P. total to 5 126. This would make the L.P. percentage 69,2 and not 72,2 as the statistics for individual schools reflect. Whether this was due to an error or not is not clear.

55. This column is summarised from the following table.

Year	No. schools	No. pupils	Lower Prim.	Higher Prim.	Secondary	Source
1945		35 474	69,3 (24599)			
1953		59 580	62,9 (37510)			
1957	145	70 959[a]	69,2 (49112)	25,3 (17983)	5,4 (3864)	p. 110
1961	173	94 143	65,5 (61647)	29,6 (27866)	4,9 (4630)	pp. 219, 221

The percentage of pupils in Lower Primary, Higher Primary and Secondary State-subsidised Schools for African pupils in the Central and East Rand : 1945 - 1961. (Enrolment also given)

Note

a. This total differs from that given in the Bantu Education Bulletin which includes teachers in training.

56. Horrell, 1968, pp. 51,53.

57. See above p. 131.

58. See above p. 132.

59. They should be read in conjunction with the full schools' list in Figure 1 of which they are a summary.

60. Interview no. 16, 23/10/1984.

61. Population Census, 8 May 1951, U.G. 42/1955, P. 47.

62. See chapter 4.

63. Interview no. 12, 12/11/1984.

64. Horrell, M. Group Areas in Cape Town, SAIRR, 1958. Copy in African Studies Library, U.C.T.

65. Interview no. 1 with a teacher at the school, 10/11/1984.

66. Ibid. Also interview no. 13, 14/11/1984. This teacher gave a graphic account of the accompanying destruction : "A bulldozer came and just threw the houses down. Some people may have hidden among the Coloured people. The (African - MC) people couldn't afford to have their stuff moved. We were staying there very happily."

67. See chapter 4, p. 115.

68. Horrell, 1958.

69. Derived from Bantu Education Bulletin, 1961, pp. 163-164.

70. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

71. See above p. 139.

72. Lodge, 1983, p. 46.

73. The Cape Times, 24/4/1951. The national subsidy which had been R44 000 in 1955/6 had been stopped entirely by 1965 according to Horrell, 1968, p. 38.

74. A survey of race relations in South Africa, SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1954/5, p. 201.

75. The Cape Times, 27/2/1956.

76. Horrell, 1968, p. 113.

77. Ibid., p. 117.

78. Ibid., p. 118.

79. Horrell, 1964, p. 116.

80. Quoted in A. Bird's article "The adult night school movement for blacks on the Witwatersrand, 1920 - 1980" in Kallaway, 1984, p. 201.

81. Ibid., p. 192.

82. Horrell, 1964, p. 117.

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83. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.

84. This subject is dealt with in detail in chapter 6, pp. 188, 189 (A.N.C.) and pp. 197-199 (C.A.T.A.).

85. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984. The interviewee was a teacher at the time.

86. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

87. Ibid.

88. New Age, 24/3/1955.

89. Ibid.

90. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984. In 1960 the trouble at Langa brought threats to kill the men regarded as responsible for Bantu Education.

91. Horrell, 1968, p. 57. Only women could take the Lower Primary course, Ibid., p. 87.

92. Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Department of Public Education, 1953, pp. 203 - 205.

93. See note 45, and Bantu Education Bulletin,1959.

94. Government Gazette, no. 5401, 14/1/1955.

95. Tabata, I.B. Education for barbarism, Prometheus, Durban, 1959, p. 32.

96. Ibid., p. 33.

97. Ibid.

98. Interview no. 19, 15/11/1984.

99. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

100. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983. But see also The Torch 17/4/1956, p. 3; and The Torch, 12/6/1956.

101. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

102. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.

103. Ibid.

104. Interview no. 1, 10/11/1984.

105. See note 84.

CHAPTER 6

CO-OPERATION, NON-COLLABORATION OR DEFIANCE? A CASE STUDY ON RESISTANCE RELATED TO AFRICAN SCHOOLING IN CAPE TOWN, C. 1940 - 1960.

6.1 Towards a definition of resistance in the context of schooling

In 1955 the Secretary of Native Affairs dismissed Leo L. Sihlali from his teaching post. The occasion for the dismissal was that Sihlali had taken a leading role in the protests of the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) against the Bantu Education legislation.[1] Two years later it was ruled in the Appeal Court that Sihlali had been unfairly dismissed.[2] In the eyes of the Secretary of Native Affairs Sihlali's involvement with C.A.T.A. constituted resistance to state policy and he argued that as a result Sihlali should not be allowed to continue in its employ. According to the court, however, he was entitled to protection since his actions were not seen as warranting dismissal. It appears that behind the two opinions lay a difference of outlook as to the nature of resistance. This is also a problem faced trying to explain resistance.

Are there objective criteria for defining resistance? This research problem is similar to the daily problem faced by teachers - how does one decide when the behaviour of a pupil is punishable? And who decides - the teacher, the principal, the school committee, the officers of the state educational department, the police or the magistrate? There will be some measure of agreement between them but each individual or group will place a particular construction on a given instance of "resistance". Although the research has the advantage of hindsight into the consequences of whatever corrective action was taken, the task is still difficult because it depends on which particular set of criteria is adopted. The choice of standards for assessing resistance implies a value judgement and this will arouse controversy. One way out is not to judge resistance according to some outside viewpoint. The trouble with this is that on its own it is subjective and furthermore almost any disagreement with an aspect of school policy could be construed as resistance. An attempt at an acceptable definition of resistance in the context of schooling needs to be made in relation to the state authority and it needs to consider the initiator's perception.

The following definition has been modified from a broader definition of political resistance given by Beinart and Bundy in relation to peasant resistance in the Transkei.[3] *Resistance in the area of schooling is taken to mean any overt action which is intended by its perpetrator as a protest against or an attempt to end a school-related policy or practice, such action(s) assuming forms which the state does not recognize as being legal or permissible.*

Clearly there is more to resistance than the act itself. The stated or signalled intent of the actor must also be taken into account in judging an instance of resistance. This qualification is of critical importance for an analysis of the resistance of the three major African organizations concerned with Bantu Education. Sihlali's organization, C.A.T.A., saw its actions as making the strongest possible protest within the law. C.A.T.A. publications unequivocally rejected the intention and provisions of the Bantu Education legislation but took great care to avoid illegal action. The Cape African Teachers' Union (C.A.T.U.) broke away from C.A.T.A. accusing its leaders of politicising their professional association, and of placing the teachers, whom it was supposed to represent, in disfavour with the Department which employed them. C.A.T.U. nevertheless protested against many of the provisions of Bantu Education policy but always through official channels. The third body, the African National Congress, rejected the idea of staying within the framework of what it saw as unjust laws and openly contravened them in acts of deliberate symbolic defiance. In each of the above three bodies the intention was to oppose the implementation of Bantu Education, but the judgement of the state as to the permissibility of their actions differed in each case.

It is difficult to judge resistance when intention and overt action are both used as criteria. To take the example of Sihlali above. His outspokenness on behalf of C.A.T.A. was certainly aimed at attempting to end Bantu Education but the law itself judged him as being within the law. The question of whether he was resisting or not is open to debate. In terms of the above definition he was resisting since one department of the state dismissed him for it. By contrast C.A.T.U. was not resisting despite its intention to protest against aspects of Bantu Education since the state accepted the use of official channels as permissible.

6.2 Early resistance on school related issues, 1935 - 1954

The present chapter examines Cape Town as a centre for a school related resistance to Bantu Education in the 1950s. This does not imply that the urban resistance was separated from rural movements or that Africans had always accepted schooling as a benefit prior to the introduction of Bantu Education. In fact the state practice of placing most secondary and all training college and university institutions for Africans in the rural areas ensured that there was a vital urban-rural link as teachers and pupils moved between town and countryside. In particular Cape Town was not immune from the effects of disturbances at rural institutions. For this reason it is appropriate to take a brief look at three particular types of dissatisfaction which arose: incidents at many boarding schools up to 1947; the "quota system" in 1950; and the upheaval which caused 108 expulsions from the Healdtown College in 1953.

At the time of the 1939-45 War there were a number of "disturbances" at State-aided boarding schools and teachers' colleges for Africans. An investigating committee was set up in 1947 by the Minister of Education on the advice of the Union Advisory Board on Native Education. The ensuing report[4] was under consideration by the Board in March 1948[5] when its second annual report was issued. The subject of the disturbances was politically sensitive.

When the Board published its third annual report nearly three years later in January 1951, it was euphemistically noted that the Board had considered the report on the disturbances but that "on account of practical difficulties the report has not been released for publication".[6] The copy of the report housed in the collection of the South African Institute of Race Relations bears the handwritten inscription "Confidential. Not to be quoted".[7] The "disturbances" were important for Cape Town since most of the African teachers there were certificated[8] and all the training colleges were located in the Eastern Cape and Transkei areas. Some who were teachers in Cape Town in the fifties would themselves have been studying at the time of the disturbances during the forties while the others would certainly have heard of the tension and grievances. Although these incidents were far away from Cape Town they were significant because the press reported them extensively.

So much so that the Committee of Enquiry found it necessary to try:

> "to remove the impression that the institutions are in a continuous state of turbulence, an impression which tends to be deepened by the prominence given in the press to recent outbreaks."[9]

Clearly African teachers in Cape Town were well informed - if not by the press, then certainly through contact with family members or past pupils who were at the training colleges. As far as these teachers were concerned the events would have brought an awareness that schooling was an area of contest. Where student grievances were thought to be legitimate, such teachers may have been less inclined to view African schooling as an unqualified benefit. Some, in the light of the deteriorating opportunities for educated Africans, would possibly have been inclined to these incidents to link the school disturbances with their political dispossession.[10] A case for this possibility can be made from the Committee's report. In the body of the report the major focus is on the immediate reasons for the strikes. In some cases there were instances of violence. Claiming that the acts of violence could not be explained, the report calls "this feature ... an unsolved mystery" and even asks:

> "What possible relation can there be between violence and bad cooking or shortage of sugar?"[11]

The report does list the following as some of the underlying causes:

> "political propaganda and influence from without,
> "general state of unrest throughout the world,
> "race consciousness", and
> "the failure on the part of many institutions to adapt themselves to the changing situation".[12]

It goes little further than the immediate school situation in its discussion of the causes and recommendations. Issues such as expulsion, staff, accommodation, student life and organization, and finance are dealt with at length and the recommendation is made that appropriate expenditure would

> "bring rich dividends to the Government, not only in eliminating causes of disaffection but also in promoting a culture and civilization which is almost impossible in the environment at present provided by the majority of missionary institutions."[13]

It is only in the introductory two chapters of the report that the context beyond the schools is outlined. Politically, the "Native Acts" of 1936 are blamed for having "solidified and deepened African resentment against the European";[14] economically the impoverishment of the reserves and reduction of real wages are seen as having reduced the African to "a perpetual state of penury";[15] and socially he is seen as deprived and in some cases depraved.[16] These ills are traced back to "a dark curtain of pagan belief based upon (sic) illiteracy, ignorance and superstition".[17] No mention is made of the reasons for which the African was politically and economically deprived at a time when rich industries were growing rapidly. The possibility of unfair treatment is not mentioned. The report does, however, give a more pointed analysis of how race relations were affected by conditions obtaining outside of the institutions. The four specific factors described were the frustration brought home by Africans who had volunteered for war service but who were not given a share in the fighting or the right to bear arms; the political activists calling for a United Non-European Front; leftist newspapers (no direct evidence of Communists' involvement in the strikes was found); and the influence of growing African trade unionism.[18] On this latter point the report indicates that many students were "mature men and women returning to school" and that their awareness of the success of industrial strike action could have influenced "impressionable youths" to similar action in the schools and colleges.[19] This point is taken no further, there is no mention of the 1946 Rand Miners' Strike and the impression is given that the report viewed such outside influences as mere background and secondary to the actual conditions within the institutions themselves. The burden of the report appears to be to establish a case for the improvement of the atmosphere, staffing and facilities within the schools and colleges as the primary means of redressing grievances.

In the light of the evidence considered or thought relevant to the investigation, it is not surprising that the causes of the violence appear mysterious. The committee, comprising D. McK. Malcolm (Chairman),

D.D.T. Jabavu, Ray E. Philips, and H.R. Storey, with K.R. Crossman as Secretary, even expresses its doubts about whether its 21 recommendations[20] (all relating to internal matters) will prevent further outbreaks. It was probably not naivity but rather a consciousness that its frame of reference was too narrow that caused the committee to say:

> "(T)he Committee ... does not regard these recommendations, even if they are carried out, as a guarantee against the danger of disturbances; but it hopes that they may, to some extent, remove some of the causes of such occurrences and thus lessen the burden and relieve the anxiety of the authorities."[21]

The political and economic conditions outside the institutions influenced their students to take action on matters of internal grievance. The most frequently alleged causes of the disturbances concerned food, "tribal fights" and harsh discipline.[22] At 12 of the 19 institutions in the Cape Province (including the Transkei) there were 27 reported disturbances between 1935 and 1946. At 7 of these institutions there were 8 incidents of violence and 12 instances of damage to property. The violence included the assault on White and African staff, stone throwing and stick fighting; and property was damaged by arson and stoning.[23]

What is significant about these situations for an understanding of the situation in Cape Town is that there was a growing sense of grievance relating to schooling which predated Afrikaner Nationalist rule. There was a resentment which filtered through to Africans in the city before 1948. After the Nationalist take-over the incidents continued and the resentment grew. Molteno[24] has described five further instances of student resistance at boarding institutions in the Cape Province (including the Transkei) from 1950 to 1952. This is firm evidence for the continuity of school related resistance. As the new policy emphases of Bantu Education began to take shape in the early fifties, so the resistance took on new forms as teachers and parents got involved. This new wave of resistance used as its foundation the resentment which had been growing for decades. That this resistance was located in the school would have come as no surprise to Cape Town's Africans. Instances of overt resistance and disturbance in rural African boarding institutions were influential in shaping African opinion because they were widely reported.

There were also more widespread and less dramatic forms of resistance in Cape African schools of which the response to the "quota system" was one. The "quota system" which sought to improve the quality of schooling by limiting entry to schools has already been discussed in the previous chapter.[25] It is significant here that the way in which it was resisted was by an unheralded non-application of the policy. Schools admitted children whose names were not placed on the official rolls. In practice the full real attendance was not reported and funding was based on official attendance only. This allowed the Cape Educational authority to maintain appearances (in the reported statistics) while saving on costs. Resistance to the quota system which was sharply criticised in the press simply led to unregistered pupils attending schools and inspectors overlooking the fact. The third instance of school related resistance predating the implementation of Bantu Education took place at Healdtown College and shows the close relationship between rural and urban areas.

The actual events[26] which led to the expulsion of 108 senior students from the Healdtown College in the Eastern Cape are of less importance to the present discussion than the response in Cape Town. A rally organized by the Western Province branch of the Cape African Teachers' Association drew some 500 people to pack out the Langa Hall on 3 November 1953. A unanimous resolution rejected the Bantu Education Act and protested against the Healdtown expulsions.[27] It is probable that the large turn-out was to some extent due to the fact that many aspirant teachers from Cape Town were studying at Healdtown. The expulsion of some of themand their return to Cape Town[28] increased local resentment towards the newly enacted Bantu Education and provided a focal issue on which to express it.

In African circles resentment towards aspects of African education had built up over many years prior to the Nationalist take-over in 1948. It was freshly stimulated by the Commission on Native Education (1949-1951) and by the passage of the Bantu Education Bill through Parliament in 1953. The African response to the Commission, its report and the subsequent Act was one of rejection. The Commission itself recognized that Africans who testified showed "an extreme aversion to any education specially adapted for the Bantu".[29] The Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) made a submission to the Commission requesting equal educational funding for

children of all races and the retention of English as the medium of instruction,[30] both of which were clearly in contradiction to what the Commission was proposing, viz. that education should be "for Natives as an independent race" and that it should increasingly be directly funded by Africans themselves.[31] The Cape Town based Teachers' League of South Africa (T.L.S.A.), which was influential with local African teachers,[32] submitted a memorandum in May 1949 rejecting the principle of racial segregation in education which was seen as the fundamental aim of the Commission.[33] When the Commission report was published in 1951 it drew a variety of responses. The South African Institute of Race Relations organized a conference in July 1952 at which the details of the report were evaluated.[34] The T.L.S.A. and C.A.T.A. annual conferences rejected the recommendations of the report unequivocally at a significant joint sitting in Cape Town on 26 June 1952,[35] as did the Cape African Parents' Association in mid-January 1953 at its annual conference.[36] The A.N.C. was at this time busy with its Defiance Campaign in protest against a series of unjust laws. No direct A.N.C. response in Cape Town to the Eiselen Commission's report has been found - it was two years before the A.N.C.'s Bantu Education Campaign was launched following the enactment of the Bantu Education Bill.

Protest against the Bantu Education Bill and Act came both from the A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. Osca Mpetha claimed that the A.N.C. held a meeting in the Rondebosch Town Hall to oppose the Bill and that some of the participants were arrested.[37] The Bantu Education Act was depicted in Advance (sympathetic to the A.N.C.) as "a cornerstone of ... apartheid ... for the mass-production of half-baked and cheap labour".[38] In December 1954 the A.N.C. National Executive called for "positive action" against the Bantu Education Act,[39] and shortly thereafter the A.N.C. Conference in Albert Luthuli's home town resolved to organize a withdrawal of children from schools from 1 April 1955.[40] The way in which this call was echoed in Cape Town is covered in detail in the following section of this chapter. C.A.T.A.'s viewpoint on the legislation was articulated at length in the columns of The Torch. The purpose was seen as "perfecting the technique of domination" by using education to restore tribalism.[41] The Torch's argument suggested that the Bill was anachronistic since

> "... economic forces in South Africa have completely broken down the whole basis of the tribal system and ... it is ... futile to attempt to revive tribalism through the agency of the schools or in any other manner."[42]

It is also argued that Eiselen's (then the Secretary of Native Affairs) order to teachers to take no part in protest against the Bantu Education Act because it had already become law was ridiculous. The idea was greeted with mocking derision in an editorial comment which at the same time stated the rationale for resistance very clearly.

> "(L)et us examine the 'logic' of his position. First, a commission is set up and is opposed by the over-whelming majority of Non-White teachers and laymen. ...Second, a Bill is considered by a parliament in which Non-Whites are not represented ... Third, this same Eiselen now presumes to tell the African teachers that, although they were outside the framework of democracy for the Bill, they have to behave as though they were inside the framework of democracy for the Act. In other words, they must accept the Act; they must not protest against it, they must work it. The disenfranchised majority is told to behave as though it were a minority democratically defeated in Parliament!"[43]

The transfer of the control of African schools from the Churches and Provinces to the Native Affairs Department was effected on 1 April 1955. The year 1955 brought with it new responses to the adjustments in education, especially from teachers. While the response was occasioned by the change in the control of African education, it undoubtedly drew its impetus from the frustrations of decades. There was a continuity in the rejection of the State's inadequate provision for African education. This rejection was given different forms from 1955 by the A.N.C., by C.A.T.A. and by the newly-formed, conservative Cape African Teachers' Union. The following account of each of these in turn shows that while they were all opposed to Bantu Education, they also vehemently attacked each other.

6.3 No A.N.C. defiance of Bantu Education in Cape Town?

Introduction

When one considers that Bantu Education was a highly volatile issue among Africans in the mid-fifties and that Cape Town had a long tradition of Congress (A.N.C.) organization,[44] it is surprising to find that nothing

appears to have been written about the response of the A.N.C. to Bantu Education in Cape Town. It is more surprising to find the implied judgement in Tom Lodge's writing[45] that there was no significant response from the A.N.C.(W.C.) in regard to Bantu Education. The following discussion seeks to correct this mistaken impression. It suggests that the A.N.C. in Cape Town was not inactive in relation to Bantu Education but that its response over time and in different places was diverse. This essay sketches four dimensions of that response. In the first place there is evidence that a limited withdrawal of pupils did take place in Cape Town in 1955. Secondly, Cape Town had been an active centre for the Defiance Campaign in 1952, so it is natural to expect a response to Bantu Education just three years later. At the time when the call for boycott came, however, there were other pressing concerns about forced removals which tempered the response. Thirdly, there is at least one reported incident of a boycott in an African school in Cape Town. Angry mothers at Elsies River emptied the Eureka school a year before the A.N.C.'s national Bantu Education Campaign. And finally, the A.N.C. supported boycott of School Committee elections did succeed initially campaign could be organized, why not another? These four factors will be considered in turn.

Before discussing details of the A.N.C.'s response to Bantu Education in Cape Town two qualifications need to be made. The first is that to speak of the A.N.C. in the Western Cape as the initiator of school-related defiance could give the mistaken impression that the A.N.C.(W.C.) was a unified, centralised body. In fact supporters of the A.N.C. were divided on policy and spread out geographically.[46] The larger rural towns, for example Worcester and Paarl, had substantial African populations while that in Greater Cape Town was somewhat smaller.[47] In these rural areas of the Western Cape A.N.C. organization was strong.[48] The present study, however, is focussed on the Greater Cape Town area where the A.N.C. support was relatively weaker. To this extent the study is unbalanced in its treatment of the A.N.C.'s school boycott campaign which appears to have taken place in some rural areas, e.g. Stellenbosch.[49] The first qualification then is that the A.N.C. in Cape Town had links with local rural areas and it is somewhat arbitrary to exclude these. This is acknowledged as an inherent limitation of the study. The second qualification, which to some extent accounts for this limitation, relates to

sources. Published information on the A.N.C.'s school strategy in Cape Town is sparse. At first it seemed that this reflected a dearth of activity. A few significant interviews have led to a revision of this view but it remains a controversial issue. The story is certainly incompletely explored. It nevertheless raises some important questions not the least of which is whether further oral investigation in fields where written evidence is lacking would throw a different light on the incidence of school boycotts in areas where they were not reported in the press.

(a) Evidence for a limited parents' school boycott in Cape Town in 1955.

The word 'defiance' is usually associated with the A.N.C.'s Defiance Campaign of 1952.[50] Although the term was not used at the time of the 1955 Bantu Education Campaign, 'defiance' aptly describes the attitude and actions of the A.N.C.(W.C.) supporters in Cape Town with regard to Bantu Education. Elsewhere in the country this defiant attitude produced a strong community response as parents withdrew their children from schools. Tom Lodge has written an account of "The parents' school boycott: Eastern Cape and East Rand Townships, 1955".[51] In his analysis he explains the strength of the resistance in the two given areas in terms of the traditions of strong working class organization especially in the old locations.[52] He maintains that

> "Opposition to Bantu Education though widespread only developed into open political rebellion in a few areas. In fact most of the opposition movements of the 1950s were geographically isolated and sporadic: amongst a fearfully poor and politically rightless population a peculiar combination of factors had to be present before anger could be translated into active defiance."[53]

The following discussion aims to challenge the implication that in Cape Town there was an absence of open political rebellion and active defiance over the issue of the introduction of Bantu Education.

On Sunday 21 March 1955 the 60 delegates at the monthly regional conference of the A.N.C.(W.C.) "unanimously decided to proceed with the boycott of African schools from April 1, in spite of the recent decision of the national executive to postpone action on the matter."[54] The meeting was

evidently held in Langa[55] and was attended by delegates from all over the Peninsula as well as from Stellenbosch and other rural towns in the Western Cape. The response represented a defiant attitude not only towards the state but also towards the A.N.C. national executive. But what about action?

The press is curiously silent concerning any implementation of this resolution to boycott schools in Cape Town. Oral evidence was initially not much help either. One Unity Movement supporter even dismissed the idea that there might have been a response to the A.N.C.(W.C.) school boycott call because of Unity's strength and its opposition to the withdrawal of pupils. "There will remain a gap in your work on the A.N.C.'s call for a boycott here," he said.[56] On the other hand, A.N.C. activists were understandably difficult to contact and some were predictably reluctant to talk, but at last a roughly coherent picture began to emerge with some unexpected corroboration from an official source. It appears that a significant proportion of pupils were withdrawn from schools by their parents. An inspector of the time said that in Cape Town

> "10 or 15 or 20 per cent of pupils were withdrawn. There were still some, not many, children absent on the day (26/4/1955 - MC) when Verwoerd gave his deadline. But they came back to school. It was overlooked by the authorities in Cape Town (that they had been absent on that day - MC)."[57]

He attributed the withdrawal to A.N.C. "diehards" and those who acted out of fear. Certainly staunch A.N.C. people withdrew their children. Mrs Annie Silinga apparently withdrew her son Amos from his school in Langa and Mr Msingisana took his child from the Athlone School.[58] The A.N.C.(W.C.) secretary of the time claimed that very few pupils attended school at this time:

> "In most of the schools of the Western Cape pupils were withdrawn. The position (attendance - MC) at schools was minute then (in response to the March 1955 call) ... the Congress did not keep statistics" (of the extent of the closure - MC)[59]

It seems then that there was an unreported response to the A.N.C. call. This is obliquely confirmed by a press statement in New Age in June 1955

by the A.N.C.(W.C.) chairman, John Ntini, who said, "we stand by the A.N.C. decision to boycott the schools."[60] While the rest of the article in New Age concerns School Boards and gives no further details, it would have made no sense if at the time there had been no action in Cape Town.

There remains the problem of the state's apparently lenient action towards individual pupils in Cape Town but its exclusion of pupils (who were absent on 26 April) from schools in the other parts of the country. The answer is both simple and surprising. It relates to the uniqueness of Cape Town during that period. As has been shown in the previous chapter on African schooling in Cape Town, the state was undertaking an ambitious consolidation programme for African settlement in Cape Town in the mid-50s and schools were used to effect the removal of Africans from White and Coloured Group Areas to the new Nyanga location.[61] In particular, schools were closed by the state in areas where African settlement was not desired, and this process took place most rapidly in areas where the defiant challenge of the A.N.C. was strong. Thus instead of acting against individuals who had resisted Bantu Education (by withdrawing their children from schools), the Department of Bantu Education acted in accordance with the 'development plan' and took action against entire schools by denying them registration. According to the A.N.C.(W.C.) Secretary of the time, schools were closed in Retreat, Grassy Park, Bellville and Kraaifontein.

> "There Congress was strong - in the same areas where schools were closed in 1955. Nearly all schools which resisted were wiped out. There were many in the shanty towns."
>
> Question: Why did the authorities fear community schools so much?
>
> "They were afraid of Congress more than they were afraid of a boycott of schools. They feared Congress influence would show up the wrong of the story. It was because we complained about Bantu Education that schools were closed. At the same time, to confuse the issue, people were concentrating on the removals. This is why the boycotts were not seen as important (by the news media - MC). News concentrated on the removals and not on the school boycott."[62]

The extent of the alleged boycott of schools will probably remain in

dispute. The A.N.C.(W.C.) did not keep statistics[63] and the local education authorities were apparently overlooking the absences on the critical day.[64] Attendance estimates vary from "minute"[65] to 90 per cent[66] or even 100 per cent.[67] The cautious assessment of a C.A.T.A. activist of the time probably best reflects the situation at most schools: "some parents may have withdrawn their children - I was not aware of it - but the majority were at school."[68] It is at the same time possible that at some schools attendance was "minute".

(b) The A.N.C.'s response to Bantu Education limited by an urgent concern with forced removals.

A strong reason one might expect evidence of a withdrawal of pupils from African schools in Cape Town is the fact that there were widespread boycotts in other places in South Africa where Congress organization was strong.[69] Tom Lodge's account is of:

> "those instances in which opposition to Bantu Education did transform itself into a popular movement ... particularly ... in the East Rand townships as well as, to a lesser extent, the Eastern Cape urban centres and black rural communities."[70]

Lodge explains the active defiance of the school boycott in the East Rand townships against the background of a tradition of local political activism largely inspired by communists. He describes it as:

> "a tradition of radical politics ... among its black communites, a tradition which was characterised by a sensitivity to parochial concerns, and the successful intervention in these by African nationalist and socialist politicians."[71]

The local radicalism in these small, densely populated townships came from the extreme poverty, the strong sense of community and the reluctance of local town councils representing a largely White worker constituency, to improve the squalid conditions of the locations. The first expressions of this radicalism over school-related issues were not the school boycotts of the mid-1950s. As early as 1944 in Brakpan there was a 2 000 strong school boycott and a worker stay-at-home in support of David Bopape, a

local teacher who had been dismissed for his political activities.[72] Parent-teacher associations were also active in similar campaigns against teacher dismissals in other East Rand townships in the forties.[73]

Turning to Cape Town the situation of Africans was in some respects significantly similar to that on the East Rand. There were also pockets of dense settlement such as at Marabastad in Elsies River, and at Retreat. These were not official 'locations' as were the East Rand townships. Perhaps this was the reason why the state responded differently in Cape Town by closing the schools and clearing the settlements, whereas on the East Rand it had expelled those pupils who boycotted. In the old locations of the East Rand the boycott of schools signified a protest by parents against the loss of control over a crucial area of their lives, viz. the schooling of their children.[74] In Cape Town whole communities were living outside of the effective control of the state. Within these squatter communities there were independent schools[75] in some of which teachers' salaries were subsidised by the state, while other schools were completely independent. In the independent schools a withdrawal of pupils was not a consideration - why boycott what one controlled anyway? In the partially-funded schools which came under full state control from 1 April 1955,[76] a boycott would have constituted a stronger option had there not at the same time been the threat of imminent removal. When homes were threatened by the bulldozer and schools were threatened by closure, it would have made less sense to boycott the school than it did in established townships like those on the East Rand. Nevertheless, withdrawals evidently did take place on a limited scale, perhaps in areas where the threat of removal was only to come later.[77] The popular defiance, however, was shown principally on the issue of women's passes since these were used to effect the removals.[78]

When the Afrikaner Nationalist Government took over, it began to deal first with the question of African settlement in Cape Town, and then it sought to bring the schools into line to support the required removals of Africans to the areas designated for them. Significantly, the African Nationalists in the A.N.C. saw the situation in the same way as the Afrikaner Nationalists so that their struggle was especially directed against the pass system by which the government's policy of "Group Areas" for different races was enforced and not primarily against the changes brought about by Bantu Education, although this did attract some attention.

The limited nature of the Cape Town boycott was also due to factors such as the relatively[79] small and spread out African population. The exceptional case was the Langa township which had six schools and 1 935 pupils in 1954.[80] There are at least two reasons why there was no extensive school boycott in Langa in April 1955. The first and most significant is that the locally influential C.A.T.A./Unity camp actively campaigned against the withdrawal, favouring rather a strategy of boycotting School Committee elections.[81] Secondly, just a month earlier, in March 1955, the Cape Town City Council had agreed to the government's plan to convert Langa into accommodation for single men only[82] and this may have diverted some people's attention from schooling issues. On the other hand the news of this threat of the removal of families would have created an instability in the Langa community and may have predisposed otherwise complacent people to use the school issue as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction. Why then did such people not withdraw their children from schools as suggested by the A.N.C.? Almost certainly because the children could be victimised - there was evidently not enough at stake to risk that - so the alternative opposition strategy of the C.A.T.A. group was followed instead. By not voting in a voluntary election one could hardly be penalised.

Not only was the African population relatively small and widely dispersed, the operation of radical workers' unions was weak in greater Cape Town.[83] In particular the Food and Canning Workers' Union which supported the Congress school boycott strategy in the Eastern Cape and on the East Rand was strong only in the rural towns of the Western Cape.[84] It is possible that the boycott at Khaya Mandi (Stellenbosch)[85] and the closure of the African school in Paarl,[86] were related to the strength of F.C.W.U. there. By contrast the F.C.W.U. was "very, very weak" in Cape Town itself as its Secretary of the time said.[87] The only food processing concerns he mentioned were fish factories in Kensington and Woodstock, and the Crosse and Blackwell factory and "at these factories there was no proper organization".[88] Without such an infrastructure it would have been harder to mobilize people to take action than in places like the Eastern Cape and East Rand. Parents withdrew their children from schools in the latter two areas where Congress and allied radical unions were strong. While the major radical union with African members in the Western Cape, the Food and Canning

Workers' Union, was weak in metropolitan Cape Town, there were nevertheless pockets of Congress strength such as at Retreat and Elsies River. At such centres one would expect some evidence of defiance of the state's moves to control schooling. This was indeed the case at Elsies River, though it came a year earlier than the Bantu Education Campaign of the national A.N.C. in other parts of the country.

(c) The 1954 Eureka School boycott - a tradition of Congress resistance in Elsies River.[89]

The case of the Eureka school resistance provides further evidence that it is incorrect to dismiss Cape Town as not having been an active area of A.N.C. organization regarding Bantu Education in the mid-fifties. In the second quarter of 1954 Africans in Elsies River were involved in organized defiance of the state's take-over of schooling. The African population within the local (Parow) School Board Area had expanded rapidly in the post-war years. In 1945 the area had only one African primary school, run by the Dutch Reformed Church, with an average attendance of 106. Only eight years later, in 1953, there were four African primary schools catering for an officially recorded average attendance of 723 pupils. More than half of these pupils attended the Eureka African Primary School at this time.[90] The defiance was focussed on this school in Marabastad.[91] This school was started in 1949 by Mrs Makaleni who was joined in January 1951 by Mrs Mahlambi as the attendance by then exceeded 200.[92] In the same year, the school was recognized[93] by the Cape Education Department; equipment was supplied, subsidies towards teachers' salaries were granted and plans were submitted to build suitable classrooms.[94] Just two years later, in 1953, there were ten teachers for the average of 404 pupils who attended.[95] In the next year the school opened 14 new classrooms at a "big occasion" during which cows were slaughtered for the celebration.[96] This school which had been the focus of such rapid growth also became the site of a sharp struggle which came to a head in the second quarter of 1954.

The issues which precipitated the conflict may be viewed at two levels - there were the immediate concerns and the less tangible, deeper issues resulting from the changes taking place within the Eureka School. The immediate concerns related to the teaching staff: the replacement of

Mrs Makaleni as principal by the better qualified John Majebe; the dismissal of Mrs Eleanor Khabele; and the desired removal of an unnamed teacher who was allegedly not "working in the interests of the children..."[97] The deeper issues concerned the intrusion of the state into the life of the Marabastad community. As the new buildings were provided and the teachers were appointed, so the control of the school which had previously been exercised by an autonomous parent community was being taken over by the state through the Parow School Board. The symbolic issue around which the conflict turned was the question of who should be principal. Months after Majebe was appointed parents would still come to the school demanding to see Mrs Makaleni whom they regarded as the legitimate principal of their school. As she herself said

> "They (most parents) wanted me badly as principal ... (they) were rather grumbling seeing something (one - MC) as a new principal. The majority were not keen to accept him as principal."[98]

She was not making this claim because she felt she had been rejected - it was not even a position to which she aspired. The work had become too much for her: "I told them that the school was too big."[99] Her first colleague, Mrs Mahlambi, pointed out that parents were deeply concerned at the diminution of their influence.

> "Mr Majebe from De Aar was made principal. He was good in English and Afrikaans. Mrs Makaleni who started the school was no longer principal. Many parents were upset by this. Parents didn't like that they begun the school with Mrs Makaleni and now they had to accept a new principal. It came to them as a shock. The parents had no power."[100]

The question of authority was the real problem behind all of the issues in the conflict. The agitation came from an organized grouping of Africans in Elsies River who were disturbed at the evident direction of schooling policy. Sunday afternoon meetings,[101] two pickets outside the school,[102] two delegations to the Parow School Board,[103] and an "illegal" mass march "spontaneously" coinciding with the second delegation,[104] were some of the tactics used. The Elsies River Vigilance Association[105] appears to have been the primary organizer of this protest. It was probably linked to

wider groups such as the A.N.C. The evidence is circumstantial: Motleoloa and Levitas marched together to the School Board and this points to a degree of co-operation between them.[106] Then John Mtini, Chairman of the whole Western Cape A.N.C., took the Chair at a constituency report-back meeting of Ben Levitas, a Natives Representative on the Cape Provincial Council.[107] The meeting expressed confidence in Levitas' leadership. It does not seem unlikely that the M.P.C., the A.N.C. and Vigilance Association were operating closely with each other, and that the actions relating to the school came from an A.N.C.-inclined group of Marabastad residents. Just as the local Vigilance Association was concerned with immediate issues such as staffing so Congress with its national links would have presented the local schooling questions in a broader perspective. Congress influence probably accounts for the incorporation of Bantu Education as an issue in the organized campaign of protest and defiance. The radical Advance newspaper, which was supportive of Congress, construed the dismissal of Mrs Khabele in terms of her being Sotho-speaking in the mainly Xhosa-speaking school since it was "(o)ne of the provisions of the Act to divide people against each other by separating both children and teachers on tribal lines."[108] Other issues, which were to become familiar in the national A.N.C. Bantu Education Campaign of April 1955, were also raised with regard to the Eureka School in the second quarter of 1954. It was during this term that the school was used as a prototype for the application of the Bantu Education Act. Two illuminating reports in Advance[109] highlight the concern with broader issues:

> "Behind the dispute (regarding Mrs Khabele - MC) is the fact that the Eureka Primary School ... was chosen by the Department of Native Affairs to be an experimental 'guineapig' for the application of the Act ... Teaching time for the younger children was slashed almost in half and double shifts of children were started ... Afrikaans being introduced and teachers made to study the language."[110]

It was not, however, a simple matter of Congress addressing the broad concern about Bantu Education and the Vigilance Association taking up the local disputes over particular teachers. There were people who were involved in both organizations - Mothloheloa, for example, was an office

bearer in both bodies.[111] It appears reasonable that Congress with its wider links with the national A.N.C. and with the support of the Advance newspaper was responsible for the broadening of the local campaign to include more than parochial interests. Whether this was the case or not, it is evident that the Vigilance Association also addressed these broader concerns. On 29 April 1954 Advance reported that

> "A meeting of parents called by Elsies River Vigilance Association has protested against this attempt to foist the Bantu Education Act on their children and resolved to oppose it by every means in their power."[112]

Just as there was an organized group in Elsies River opposed to the state take-over of the school, so there were those parents who favoured the move. At the start of the experiment to use Eureka as one of the first schools to put Bantu Education into operation, teachers were asked by a Departmental inspector to 'co-operate' by going around to all the parents and trying to get their support for the scheme.[113] Some teachers actually campaigned against the attempts to discredit the government. Mr Quwe, one of the early staff members, is reported to have advised that "the people should not listen to the politicians.... The Government is trying to help you."[114] Mrs Makaleni was equally positive concerning the good intentions of the government.

> "The Parow School Board was so fair. They gave us a gardener and our children did not have to work in the garden. They gave us 14 classrooms and 14 teachers. (They) said that if we had not taken on Std 4 and Std 5 I could have remained principal ... the Board thanked me very much for what had been done. But it was too much for me."[115]

Certainly such accommodating attitudes were prevalent, but there were other people in Elsies River who protested strongly risking prosecution in the process. It is the existence of this latter activist group in mid-1954 that makes it so difficult to explain why, in the following year when the national protest over Bantu Education came to a head, there was apparently no action in Elsies River. Probably the most cogent reason is that the threat of removal was a locally more urgent and pressing issue. It would have made little sense to have campaigned for greater control

in a school that was to be closed down shortly.[116] The same would be the case in other areas where removals took place.

Activists in communities which were under sentence of destruction would have been unlikely to have been primarily concerned with the schooling of their children. Thus other places of A.N.C. strength such as Retreat (where Dora Tomana was active) would have had good cause to have been more alarmed about imminent removal. Nevertheless it is unwise to conclude that there was no overt resistance to Bantu Education in these communities, as Lodge implies. It has already been pointed out above that in Elsies River campaigners were prepared to face prosecution in mid-1954 for their actions to gain more control in the running of the local school.

What of African communities not threatened by removal? Was there withdrawal there as there was on the East Rand where powerful support for the A.N.C.'s Bantu Education Campaign came from the old locations?[117]

(d) A.N.C. action against School Committees and School Boards.

Any study which asserts that the A.N.C. was ineffectual in regard to Bantu Education in Cape Town has to explain the evident successes it achieved initially against School Committee elections, notably in Athlone and Langa. The only long-established official African township in Cape Town was Langa. The response to Bantu Education there was complicated by the involvement of the Unity Movement which actively opposed the A.N.C. strategy of withdrawing pupils from school.[118] There was a bitter contest between Unity and A.N.C. supporters over this issue. Through the Cape African Teachers' Association, the Unity Movement influence was stronger in Langa and this would account for there apparently being no boycott there.

On the other hand, the strategy of boycotting School Boards and School Committee elections was followed both by the A.N.C. and by the Unity Movement. It will be shown in the next section that Unity supporters also campaigned on this issue. While the A.N.C. never co-operated with them, it did speak and organize against these elections. The assistant secretary of the Langa branch of the A.N.C., S. Xamlashe, made a press

statement in New Age in June 1955 protesting "strongly against the new school board, pointing out that the people of the Western Cape are strongly opposed to Bantu Education."[119] The chairman of the Western Cape Region of the A.N.C., J. Mtini, criticized the School Board for sitting "shamelessly ... at the feet of the government" and promised that the A.N.C. would "boycott all school boards and other parents' committees in connection with Bantu Education."[120] Where the A.N.C. was strong it acted. In Athlone the election of a School Committee for the Methodist Primary School was blocked by 33 votes to 23 at a parents' meeting which had an influential A.N.C. presence.[121] The secretary of the Athlone branch of the A.N.C., Z.Z. Malinidi, claimed that no Committee was elected at this school during the 1950s.[122] For Langa it is impossible to assess the extent to which the election boycott reported in the local press[123] was supported by A.N.C. people but it seems only fair to assume few if any A.N.C. parents actually voted. The initial success of the election boycott in Cape Town may thus be attributed to the work of both the Unity movement[124] and the A.N.C.

Some of the reasons for many parents ultimately supporting School Committees are given in the next section.[125] Parents in settled areas who were deeply upset by Bantu Education were at the same time unwilling to risk reprisals against their children. In the strategy of boycotting School Committee elections they had a means of expressing their discontent. As there was already difficulty for African children to gain admission into the schools, a minority of parents would have been willing to withdraw their children in a temporary protest which might cost them their places. In those African settlements threatened by removal, the election of School Committees does not appear to have been an issue. The state's strategy was to close down these community schools, not to regulate their functioning by setting up School Committees.

Conclusion

In the complex network of different living conditions and competing resistance traditions, it would be invalid to claim that there was no active A.N.C. defiance in Cape Town in response to the introduction of

Bantu Education. There is some evidence of a partial withdrawal of children from Cape Town schools[126] but defiance must not be measured in these terms alone. Cape Town's African population experienced a diversity of living conditions and in each of these - whether brick township or squatter community there was an angry but different response which was influenced by different traditions in each place. It would be a mistake to measure resistance by the one yardstick of school boycott. Also there must be a realistic assessment of the resistance of A.N.C. supporters and a fair consideration of factors which may have limited their response to Bantu Education. The countervailing pressure of C.A.T.A. against school boycotts will be outlined in the following section. A further pressure, this time against any boycott whatsoever, came from the Cape African Teachers' Union. This subject is also treated later in this chapter.

Besides these external pressures against the A.N.C. strategy, there was considerable pressure on parents to get a schooling for their children. Especially since the start of World War II Africans had migrated from the growing impoverishment of the rural areas to the city where they sought to establish a stable base. Educated children represented a form of investment for their future. Also, for parents to support a boycott would create the problem of supervising their children during the day while they themselves worked. So while parents were willing to stay out of elections for a time, most were not prepared to withdraw their children from school.

The above general factors would also have a limited response elsewhere in the country and has been fully discussed by other authors.[127] As far as the Western Cape was concerned probably the major factor inhibiting a widespread response to the A.N.C. call for a school boycott was the diversity of conditions and traditions in the different settlements across the Peninsula and Cape Flats. New Age editorialised the problem on the eve of the proposed boycott as a question of readiness:

> "If the Africans of the Western Cape can begin an effective boycott on April 12, so much the better - it will inspire and challenge the rest of the country. If they cannot - and only their leaders can tell - it would be better for them to organize massive demonstrations on that day preparing for the general mass action as soon as they are ready."[128]

The A.N.C.(W.C.) call for a boycott of schools in March 1955 presupposed a uniformity in the conditions faced by African parents in Cape Town. But each locality was different and communities responded in locally appropriate ways to the most pressing concerns they faced.

6.4 The Cape African Teachers' Association: Non-collaboration and the boycott of the agencies of control

Introduction and background

In the 1950s in Cape Town the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) took a leading role in articulating a powerful case against successive waves of apartheid legislation and especially the Bantu Education Act. In this crusade C.A.T.A.'s strategy was strongly influenced by the leaders of the Unity Movement. C.A.T.A.'s quarterly journal, The Teachers' Vision, expressed its views; litigation was used to oppose dismissal of its leaders; and School Committees and School Boards were boycotted. But at the same time it opposed any pupil boycott of schools.[129] To explain how these strategies evolved a brief retrospect would be appropriate.

In 1920 the Cape Native Teachers' Association (C.N.T.A.) was formed.[130] In June of the next year the inaugural conference of the C.N.T.A. was held at Kingwilliamstown. The African teachers of the Cape Peninsula were represented by a delegation. This showed a measure of local teacher organization in Cape in the 1920s.[131] In the chairman's address, D.D.T. Jabavu emphasized that an association of Cape African teachers was needed to work for better salaries, improved management and professional communication. A teachers' association was also necessary, he said, in view of "(t)he fact that the government is only moved by the pressure of powerful but constitutional agitation."[132] The C.N.T.A., with English as its official language, was soon recognized by the Cape Education Department.[133] Renamed the Cape African Teachers' Association (C.A.T.A.) in 1927, it refined its strategy of "constitutional agitation" to the point where it established a Legal Defence Fund in December 1930.[134] Significantly this was accomplished with the help of the man who was later to become the Cape Secretary of the A.N.C., Rev. James Calata.[135] The

purpose of the Fund was to:

> "protect, at law, members contributing to the Fund and to obtain legal opinion on issues affecting the teaching profession."[136]

This represented a clear recognition by the Cape African Teachers' Association of the need to do more than merely make representation to the Department on issues causing dissatisfaction. A further attempt to strengthen the hand of African teachers was through the publication of a quarterly "C.A.T.A. Journal".

The C.A.T.A. Journal made its first appearance in 1934 and, after a shaky start, was well under way by 1939 under its new name, The Teachers' Vision. It was in the pages of this journal that matters discussed at annual conferences became more widely known - though its circulation was limited, e.g. 320 in 1939.[137] The principal focus was upon day to day teaching concerns and prominent personalities but immediate political issues relating to African education were also aired. In particular the relatively low government expenditure on African education was deplored.[138] The Teachers' Vision also reflected the growing concern over wider political issues especially during the 1940s. This concern was exemplified by the C.A.T.A. decision in 1948 to affiliate to the All African Convention (A.A.C.).[139] From the time of that decision the tone of C.A.T.A.'s official organ became even more overtly political. Editorials asserted the government's use of African education for "keeping the African in his place",[140] and the government's intention "to cripple and render inferior African education".[141] In 1952 the Cape Education Department withdrew recognition from C.A.T.A. and one of the reasons given was that The Teachers' Vision "had become political and was no longer a 'professional'" publication.[142]

The political realignment of C.A.T.A. to the revived All African Convention in 1948 was of particular significance to Cape Town's African teachers since it formally linked them to those Coloured teachers who belonged to the radical Teachers' League of South Africa. The T.L.S.A. also had a strong political affiliation to the so-called Anti-C.A.D. movement,[143] formed in 1943. In 1944 these two political organizations,

the (African) A.A.C. and the (Coloured) Anti-C.A.D. established a united front in the Non-European Unity Movement (N.E.U.M. or Unity Movement). So both teachers' associations were affiliated to the N.E.U.M.: the T.L.S.A. in 1944 by virtue of its membership of the Anti-C.A.D. body and C.A.T.A. through its affiliation to the A.A.C. in 1948. This close association raises the problem of assessing how strongly Cape Town's C.A.T.A. supporting teachers were influenced by their more numerous T.L.S.A. colleagues. Did the indirect formal link between African and Coloured teachers guide the local branch of C.A.T.A.?

The relationship between C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A. was strengthened by personal friendships and in the fifties by direct formal co-operation between the two teachers' associations. In Cape Town there was close contact between African and Coloured teachers in the forties and fifties both at teachers' meetings and in political discussion circles as the following Langa teacher's testimony indicates:

> "Whenever T.L.S.A. meetings were held we (the African teachers - MC) were invited and most of us went. We met in Claremont, Grassy Park, Kensington.... Also (we met - MC) at New Era Fellowship meetings."
>
> Question: Did Coloured teachers attend C.A.T.A. meetings held in Langa?
>
> "We held most meetings away from here (Langa - MC) because most of us (i.e. Langa residents - MC) had a location mentality. But when meetings were held there T.L.S.A. executive people would come especially if there was something to be explained."
>
> Question: So you looked to the T.L.S.A. for guidance?
>
> "Yes ..."[144]

The T.L.S.A. and C.A.T.A. were also formally linked. A joint council for the two bodies was first proposed by the executives of the two associations meeting on 16/12/1950,[145] A draft constitution was put forward by the T.L.S.A. executive in April of the following year and the inaugural meeting of the Cape Federal Teachers' Council (C.F.T.C.) was held at Kimberley on 20 December 1951.[146] By the end of 1951, C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A. were co-operating closely. Diagrammatically the relationships may be represented as follows:



Figure 1: Formal links between C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A.
Year of formation given in brackets.

In June 1952, six months after the joint Cape Federal Teachers' Council had been established, a joint sitting of the C.A.T.A. and T.L.S.A. conferences was held in the old Drill Hall in Cape Town.[147] The one day joint sitting on 26 June was the culmination of the planning of the past two years. A major aim of this co-operation was to work towards teacher unity in order to tackle broader political issues as well as matters of specific educational concern. The president of C.A.T.A., Leo L. Sihlali, called for this, saying, "separate teachers' organizations are still with us ... (it is - MC) high time these artificial barriers were knocked down .... no more shall we hear talk of 'purely professional matters' at our conferences."[148] It was reported that there were 590 members of the T.L.S.A. and C.A.T.A. present at the joint sitting.[149] There is thus a good case for asserting that there were strong links between Coloured and African teachers and that Cape Town was a significant centre in this regard.

The local branch of C.A.T.A. was so closely identified with the Coloured Teachers' League of South Africa that it was sometimes known as the Western Province Bantu Teachers' League.[150] One young African teacher of the time expressed the close relationships within the Unity Movement as follows:

> "with the Unity people there was a lot of fraternization between Coloured and African. Jordan (a T.L.S.A. official - MC) tried to woo the (African - MC) teachers to Unity. Tabata - he married a Coloured wife (Junab Gool - MC) - was a great fraternizer."[151]

But while there were these links, were there not also differences between C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A. in Cape Town? There is some evidence of disaffection between members of the two bodies at the time when African leaders in C.A.T.A. were dismissed from their teaching posts in 1955. For example, Mary Simons has claimed[152] that I.B. Tabata was of the opinion that the African teachers felt that they had been let down by the Unity Movement and the T.L.S.A. She recalled that Tabata had said that:

> "African teachers felt that had Coloured teachers been prepared to abandon their posts they could have overthrown the Bantu Education system ... there were these (early) tensions over the Coloured teachers leaving their jobs which caused problems in the A.A.C.-Unity relations ..."[153]

She felt that there was a sense of betrayal over the issue of Coloured teachers not being prepared to resign their jobs. Another activist of the time reflected on the opinion she had offered:

> "There may be some point in that physical support for dismissed teachers was not as much as could be expected, but then teachers were very poorly paid - they were not wealthy. (She) may have misrecalled the statement of I.B. Tabata, or if he is reported correctly it may have been that he is reflecting his own bitterness from the 1958/59 split (between the Anti-C.A.D. and the A.A.C. - MC). The split was very bitter. I recall I.B. Tabata saying to me that Kies (B.M. Kies, a leader of the T.L.S.A.) and them have never really got beyond Colouredism."[154]

One of the dismissed African teachers, who would have had every reason for bitterness, when asked whether he felt he had been let down by the Coloured teachers of the Teachers' League explicitly denied it:

> "The T.L.S.A. definitely stood with us to the last. We worked closely together ..."

Question: Did C.A.T.A. teachers have any problems with Coloured teachers?

"I don't think any of them could have had ill feeling to (the) T.L.S.A. The T.E.P.A. was collaborationist; we had no relations with them."[155]

It thus seems valid to assert that there was a friendly co-operation between C.A.T.A. and T.L.S.A. teachers in Cape Town, with the T.L.S.A. helping to shape the strategy of the local C.A.T.A. branch. One participant in the T.L.S.A. branch meetings put it this way:

"... surface relations were amicable. For example, at branch meetings in Athlone (with) 30 to 40 teachers present there were usually a good number of Africans present. Also it is significant that the main discussion centred around Bantu and not Coloured education."[156]

A Departmental official of the time who was not in favour of C.A.T.A.'s politicization claimed that the co-operation was only among the leaders of the two movements.

Question: Were C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A. very close in Cape Town?

"There were differences between African and Coloured teachers which were increased by the government to try to separate the two groups (differences mentioned were salaries, facilities and syllabuses - MC) ... But there were those teachers who visited each other. It was especially in the top area among (teachers' association - MC) officials that the link was strong. Most teachers were not a part of this ... they did not know what the conflict was about."[157]

On the basis of the above evidence it is apparent that C.A.T.A. leaders in Cape Town were strongly influenced by T.L.S.A. leaders in a mutual struggle against Bantu Education. These C.A.T.A. leaders formed an influential pressure group among the approximately 120[158] African teachers in Cape Town in the fifties, and they directed a well-organized campaign against Bantu Education in certain areas. Certainly there were just a few who took active leadership but they made a significant impression on Cape Town's African communities. It was largely as a result of their work that many School Committee elections were boycotted in Cape Town.

C.A.T.A. strategy in Cape Town

(a) The boycott of School Committee elections

The campaign to discourage parents from participating in School Committee elections was initially widely successful. C.A.T.A. leaders held meetings in Langa, Retreat and Nyanga "to educate the people on the meaning of the (Bantu Education) Act" and specifically to promote a boycott of the election of Committees.[159]

In March 1955 the parents of children at the Methodist, Dutch Reformed, A.M.E. and Anglican Schools in Langa voted "overwhelmingly" not to elect School Committees.[160] To overcome the impasse, school principals were instructed to forward names of committee nominees to Pretoria within seven days[161] but the opposition of parents made this difficult. A further attempt to hold elections was made in August[162] but a meeting of the Parents' Association of Langa evidently resolved unanimously to boycott the elections.[163] The Cape Times reported that this was a second attempt to elect committees at "most" of the 22 African schools in the Cape Peninsula. The first attempts had evidently failed because of a boycott by parents.[164] Early in September at a packed meeting in Nyanga only two people voted in favour of holding an election.[165] At Athlone and three of the Langa schools elections were again rejected.[166] At the Dutch Reformed Mission School parents agreed to form a committee while another Langa school, possibly the St. Cyprian's Anglican School,[167] the decision was deferred for a week.[168] In April of the following year, 1956, attempts were still being made at the Langa Methodist School to get parents to co-operate. In this instance the Cape Peninsula School Board instructed the headmaster to write to parents to obtain individual replies as to whether they were opposed to a School Committee.[169] So pressure was put on head-masters and parents to get committees going. Teachers were also pressurized to involve the parents. One alarming claim concerning a slightly later period was that teachers threatened corporal punishment of pupils to get parents to take part in elections.

> "Teachers threatened pupils that if their parents did not attend they would be assaulted."

Question: Caned?

"Yes."

Question: Why were teachers saying this?

"If parents don't come to elections officials would come around and say that it means teachers are not interested. It was said to be the teachers' duty to tell parents that they must take part in the education of their children."[170]

This assertion by a teacher was made of the 1960s when there was evidently a "semblance of (a) majority" of parents at elections. Concerning the fifties he claimed that few parents participated in elections: "you cannot call it an election when only 10 out of 500 parents attend."[171] Reasons for this poor support probably went beyond the general antipathy to Bantu Education. One official alleged that intimidation caused the lack of response:

"Some of us were afraid of the threats of the politicians. Afraid to speak out, we joined in the flow but were inactive. People would speak to appease the politicians at the top. Otherwise you could lose your house or your life. These threats were not open as they are today. Under the ground this thing was sizzling."[172]

An assessment of the boycott of School Committee elections in the mid-1950s in Cape Town must account both for its initial success and for its ultimate demise. There was widespread community opposition to the Bantu Education Act and the boycott of the elections gave parents a means of expressing their dissatisfaction without foregoing the benefits of having their children at school. And it was precisely for this latter reason that the election boycotts were unsuccessful in the long term. The schools themselves were used to manipulate parents into electing committees. The means employed included the physical coercion of pupils, the persuasion of parents that the government was giving them real control[173] and the use of teachers, who already feared for their jobs,[174] to encourage participation by parents. It was because people wanted schooling for their children that they were ultimately drawn into the running of the schools which provided it. Some of these parents justified their involvement by

claiming that the government was well-intentioned despite its negative statements:

> Question: Why did people eventually elect committees?
>
> "They felt the government will be fair. We have a voice (they said - MC)."
>
> Question: Are you saying that what Verwoerd said and what he did were different things?
>
> "Verwoerd was saying this (i.e. the Black must stay out of the White man's pastures) but he was put into power by people who expected him to say certain things. But in effect he gave (what the people wanted - MC)."
>
> Question: An academic education?
>
> "Yes."[175]

It is true that pressure on principals, teachers, ministers and parents explains why the parents ultimately elected committees, but it is unwise to ignore the fact that pupils were at school in the first place because of their parents' choice. It was on account of this desire for schooling that the pressure was possible and in the long run effective.

(b) Legal action for moral victory

The state acted against C.A.T.A. teachers who were seen to be instigators of the boycott of School Committee elections. At the Langa Methodist School, where some of the teachers were outspoken supporters of C.A.T.A.,[176] Mr J.G. Kwebulana was dismissed with effect from 30 June 1955 and Mr Mqingwana and Miss Ngumbela were both transferred.[177] Kwebulana, who chaired many of C.A.T.A.'s protest meetings, was not officially notified of the reason for his dismissal. Newspaper reports and interviews[178] suggest, however, that animosity between him and the Secretary of the School Board, D. Roc Ngo, an assault charge and other problems were all involved. At the bottom of the matter was Kwebulana's vociferous opposition to Bantu Education. There were other C.A.T.A. leaders who suffered a similar fate. In mid-1955 nine executive members and officers of C.A.T.A. were dismissed from their teaching posts in the Cape.[179] The counter response of C.A.T.A. was to seek to win a moral victory against the Native Affairs Department by means of well-publicised legal

action. The banqueting hall of the City Hall was packed for a Sunday afternoon protest meeting held under the auspices of the Cape Teachers' Federal Council.[180] The meeting condemned the dismissals and also those people who became members of the School Committees and School Boards.[181]

In October C.A.T.A. appealed for funds to fight a test-case against the dismissals[182] and just over a year later, in January 1957, the former president of C.A.T.A., Leo L. Sihlali, was successful in the Grahamstown Supreme Court against the Native Affairs' Department (N.A.D.) and the local School Board.[183] There was no ruling as to the costs of the case and thus each party would have had to bear its own legal expenses. C.A.T.A. immediately published a booklet on the judgement under the title "It is ordered ... Bantu School Boards on Trial"[184] showing that its real objective in the litigation was to popularize the justice of its cause. The N.A.D. was not to be beaten and it appealed against the judgement to reinstate the dismissed Sihlali. Sihlali filed a cross-appeal for the costs of the earlier Supreme Court case to be awarded against the N.A.D. The Appeal Court upheld the Supreme Court judgement but ruled costs against the Minister of Native Affairs for both cases.[185] Given the concern of C.A.T.A. to demonstrate the moral validity of its position this judgement was a notable victory. A Unity Movement supporter affirmed this intention:

> "We went to court in order to educate the people. We wanted to impress the people that we are (were - MC) right. They couldn't show we were wrong, even in court."[186]

In effect the victory was Phyrric. C.A.T.A. was cornered. It had put all of its resources into the prolonged legal battle while its leaders had been effectively silenced in the schools. In Cape Town Sihlali's test case victory was not followed through. The C.A.T.A. attorney handling the case, Mr Tsotsi, evidently failed to capitalise on the Sihlali ruling and seek Kwebulana's reinstatement.[187] He was not reinstated and was barred from work in any government service for ten years.

It has been contended above that C.A.T.A.'s aim was to secure a moral victory against Bantu Education and so to attract a broader support at a time when a rival association[188] was taking away some of its following.

C.A.T.A.'s strategy was to fight at key points against the N.A.D. take-over of African schooling. C.A.T.A. won the legal battle on a crucial issue but the N.A.D. won the control in the end. Did C.A.T.A. nevertheless achieve its moral victory? It did not win back the teachers to membership. It did not secure the reinstatement of all of the dismissed teachers.[189] It increased the determination of the N.A.D. to close the legal loopholes in its control over teachers. C.A.T.A. recognized this. Its publicity pamphlet said as much:

> "It is open to the Government, of course, to appeal against the judgement and/or to pass a law quickly regularising all that the Bantu School Boards have done so far, and such a law can be expected during the present session of Parliament."[190]

But did C.A.T.A. win the hearts and minds of "the people"? There is no simple way of telling that in retrospect. It is necessary though to ask: what was the effect of articulating the disapproval of the people for Bantu Education? Parents still sent their children to schools despite their misgivings about the Government's motives. Many teachers would have been pleased at the judgement against the School Boards but most were too afraid to speak to colleagues, let alone pupils, of their feelings.[191] As in the case of the boycott of School Committee elections an assessment of C.A.T.A.'s litigation strategy must point out that while the legal action probably increased people's awareness of the N.A.D.'s high-handed treatment of teachers, and while it must have made the N.A.D. respect the teachers' ability to resist arbitrary dismissal, it also ironically would have contributed to the need for the N.A.D. to secure the parents' approval for Bantu Education. The fact that parents still sent their children to schools indicates that the authorities at least secured their acquiescence.

(c) No boycott of schools

C.A.T.A. campaigned for a boycott of School Committee elections but it opposed any suggestion that parents should withdraw their children from schools in protest against Bantu Education. In this it was not fighting the state as it had done through the election boycott and by litigation, it was fighting against the alternative resistance strategy of the A.N.C.

The A.N.C. campaign has been treated earlier under a separate heading; the present argument seeks to clarify the strategy of C.A.T.A. by contrast with that of the A.N.C. In the series of meetings held across the Peninsula by C.A.T.A. and Unity Movement leaders to popularise the boycott of School Committee elections, the platform was also used to speak against the A.N.C. call for a boycott of schools. A leading C.A.T.A. campaigner claimed that at least one meeting was held to this end:

> "We held a meeting, which I chaired, at the Langa Market Hall where we explained that the parents should fight their own battles and not the children."[192]

At the time of the schools' boycott in April and May 1955 in the Eastern Cape and on the East Rand, The Torch[193] referred to it as a cowardly move which "shifted the burden of the struggle from our backs onto the backs of our children". On the other hand the pro-A.N.C. New Age newspaper supported the boycott and attacked the leaders of the Unity Movement for their attempt to sabotage it:

> "They opposed the Defiance Campaign ... (the) resistance to train apartheid ... they have now come out in opposition to the people's action in boycotting Verwoerd's Bantu Education schools."[194]

It is difficult to assess this strategy of the Unity Movement and C.A.T.A. The opposition to the A.N.C. school boycott proposal could be interpreted as arising from the teachers' self-interest since if pupils were to boycott schools indefinitely, the teachers' jobs would be jeopardy.[195] But these same C.A.T.A. teachers were involved at the same time in the risky business of encouraging the boycott of School Committee elections. In terms of the definition at the start of the chapter the C.A.T.A. strategy can be construed only in a limited sense as resistance. It is true that the election boycott was an instance of overt political action (protesting the co-option of Africans into the state control network) and that it took a form which the N.A.D. did not recognize as legal. But C.A.T.A.'s perception was that its actions could be defended in court as legal. Its intention was to mount a popular challenge against regulations but not to break the law in the process. One Unity Movement supporter (African) of

the time claimed that the Movement was meticulously careful to avert prosecution:

> "A lot of those deeply into the Unity Movement were aware that the Government found it difficult to oppose us. High Government circles were out to make things difficult for us but we were careful about expressing ourselves in public. We wouldn't allow unqualified people to address a meeting because they would make statements which would incriminate the organization."[196]

In addition, if C.A.T.A.'s campaign against the A.N.C. school boycott call is considered, it is evident that C.A.T.A. was opposing a strategy of resistance. The A.N.C. certainly regarded these moves of C.A.T.A. and the Unity Movement as reactionary. The New Age newspaper commented:

> "It is no coincidence that they support the boycott when the boycott helps the Government (as when democratic candidates stand against apartheid candidates) and they oppose the boycott when opposing the boycott helps the Government (as when they stand together with Verwoerd in slandering the school boycotters). Every action of the so-called 'Unity' movement serves to discredit them more completely."[197]

On the other hand Unity spokesmen considered the A.N.C. parents' school boycott proposal as a:

> "haphazard stunt (which is - MC) no fight against a planned and ruthless system of oppression .... Children must be taugnt to read and write and arm themselves with ideas."[198]

There was agreement between C.A.T.A. and the A.N.C. over the issue that Bantu Education had to be opposed, the fundamental difference between the two organizations was over strategy. Put negatively, C.A.T.A.'s strategy was that teachers should not resign their positions to "collaborators";[199] that pupils should not leave the classroom and that the people should not collaborate with the state by joining School Committees and School Boards. A.N.C. action in Cape Town was less coherent but some A.N.C. teachers did stop teaching and a disputed number of pupils were withdrawn from their schools.[200] Active opposition to School Committees and Boards was the one point of strategy which the A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. shared. While both bodies

resisted the spirit of the new law, only A.N.C. supporters were prepared to break the letter of the law, and in this they were opposed by C.A.T.A. It is thus contended that C.A.T.A.'s work in the articulate but carefully controlled form it took was not intended as a strategy of overt resistance in the sense of transgressing the law. Underlying C.A.T.A.'s approach was a faith in the protection offered by the law and in the legitimate basis of that law. In fact C.A.T.A.'s litigation was seeking to obtain redress through the very body of laws which was being increasingly weighed against the interests of African teachers. And strangely - in that the Sihlali case was won - they were able to establish the legitimacy of their position. This must be considered as a primary principle underlying C.A.T.A. strategy. It also explains why C.A.T.A. could not co-operate - even when strategy was not in dispute - with the A.N.C. When C.A.T.A. aligned itself to the Unity Movement in 1948, it accepted the Unity rhetoric which defined the only valid resistance as a "principled struggle" on the basis of its Ten Point Programme. This rhetoric excluded any who would not join on this ticket. Those who were only prepared to use official channels to protest were labelled as collaborators (e.g. C.A.T.U. and T.E.P.A.) and those who broke the law in their protest were accused of adventurism (e.g. the A.N.C.). It was this inflexible attitude based on old antagonisms which was ultimately responsible for the failure to unite resistance against Bantu Education in Cape Town.

6.5 The Cape African Teachers' Union: Half a loaf is better than no bread.

(a) I.D. Mkize: sage or stooge?

Towards the end of the first quarter of 1955, at the time when the Bantu Education Act came into operation, I.D. Mkize died a broken man in self-imposed exile in Bechuanaland (now Botswana). From 1940 to 1954 Mkize had been the headmaster of Langa High School, the only African high school in Cape Town.[201] He had been elected President of the Cape African Teachers' Association at successive C.A.T.A. conferences, between 1946 and 1950,[202] and he had fought against the move to affiliate C.A.T.A. to the A.A.C., a political body. Mkize was a member of the A.N.C.[203] and resented being linked to the A.A.C. through his membership of the Teachers'

Association. After an unsuccessful five-year battle to disaffiliate C.A.T.A. from the A.A.C. Mkize helped to found the rival Cape African Teachers' Union at Grahamstown in 1953 and became its first President.[204] Back in Cape Town there was pressure on him because of his "moderate stance" - even some members of his own staff bitterly opposed him.[205] He was dubbed by the Unity Movement press as the 'Big Stooge' responsible for the acceptance of Bantu Education.[206] He was attacked both for his co-operation with the Government - he was a member of the Cape Advisory Board for Native Education[207] - and for his participation in the South African Institute of Race Relations (S.A.I.R.R.) National Conference in Cape Town in July 1952. The Unity Movement newspaper, The Torch, criticized Mkize's involvement with the S.A.I.R.R. calling it a

> "Herrenvolk created, dope inflicting body formed to hoodwink the Africans into thinking that it was speaking for them."[208]

It also accused Mkize, who had been publicly critical of inefficiency in African schools, of contriving

> "to put the whole blame on the Africans themselves. It is not the deliberately engineered starvation of African education that he blames."[209]

Mkize was further criticized for having betrayed the Association he had promised, as President, to serve.[210] He was accused of having "filled the country" with his circulars calling on teachers to leave C.A.T.A.[211] The new association C.A.T.U. was dubbed Y.A.T.U., the "Yellow" African Teachers' Union, for having left the "progressive and principled rôle of struggle adopted by the Cape African Teachers' Association."[212]

So ultimately, at the end of 1954, Mkize accepted the offer from veteran D.D.T. Jabavu[213] to be the headmaster of a new school in Bechuanaland, and took up his post there in February 1955. Early one morning two weeks later while he was working in the garden he contracted a severe headache and he died of a stroke on the same day.[214] He was studying for an LL.B. degree at the time.[215] His children had to return to be schooled under Bantu Education, an outcome which his opponents saw as poetic justice

against the man whom they regarded as responsible for Bantu Education being accepted in Cape Town.[216]

An assessment of the life of I.D. Mkize is important for an understanding of the moderate position which he represented. The key question is why had his apparently reasonable stance become so desperately unpopular in the 1950s? What lay behind the intense struggle against Mkize and why was he vilified by the Unity Movement supporters as a quisling?[217] How, in short, did he see his own role and why did his critics judge him so harshly for playing it?

Mkize was conservative in his politics, well-respected in his community and highly placed in his employment. While he was indeed a member of the A.N.C. in the late forties, it was not the A.N.C. of the 1952 Defiance Campaign that Mkize supported. His loyalty belonged to the A.N.C. of a former generation, that of A.B. Xuma and James Calata with their incorporationist ideals.[218] Secondly, he had gained position and respect within the Langa community - in 1942 when he obtained the degree of Master of Education a special meeting was held there in his honour.[219] In the third place, he had been rewarded for his hard work within the Cape Education Department. His Langa appointment may have been at the recommendation of Inspector Wiggett who had taught with him at St John's College, Umtata.[220] These were impeccable credentials. The man had succeeded and seemed living proof that it was possible for any hard-working, able African person to do likewise. Paradoxically, this was also the reason that he came under such stress in the fifties.

Mkize's problem was that his life preached a creed which had worked for him but which was unobtainable by the new generation. He was unable to see that his success was the exception and not the rule, and he worked diligently to popularise the exception. This led him in the view of his critics to underplay the negative aspects of Bantu Education and to point out the positive where his detractors saw none. His response to the report of the Eiselen Commission on 'Native' education is illustrative. He joined the 1952 conference of the S.A.I.R.R. on the subject and defended his action to his critics as follows:

> "We made a careful study of the report as a whole, approved any recommendations which in our opinion were calculated to serve our interests and expressed ourselves, giving full reasons therefor, and suggesting what we considered to be improvements against any recommendations which were definitely retrogressive."[221]

This is a classical statement of the counsel for moderation. To the liberal the position seems laudable - Mkize was acting wisely to seek the best interest of his people. But this view overlooks the fact that Bantu Education was firmly premised on continued White domination. To a radical observer, on the other hand, Mkize seems a puppet manipulated by circumstances beyond his power to control. Even Mkize's criticism of the details of Bantu Education is seen as accepting the legitimacy of the whole. But these views do not do justice to the man: he was neither the well-intentioned, misunderstood sage nor was he the stooge of the 'Herrenvolk'. He was a man whose success limited his ability to see the lack of opportunity that his pupils and younger colleagues were growing up to face. He would respond to blanket criticism by pointing out, for example, that the state was intending to introduce compulsory education for Africans.[222] And he was a man who was not prepared to be manipulated by his critics, as his fight to establish an alternative teachers' association demonstrates. He was a man with weaknesses and strengths and with a particularly scant regard, on the surface at least, for what people thought of him. His role in the formation of the Cape African Teachers' Union underlines this characteristic of the man.

(b) The formation of the Cape African Teachers' Union: whose initiative?

The establishment of a new teachers' body in the Cape was essentially a reaction by moderate African teachers to the radicalisation of the existing Cape African Teachers' Association.[223] This took place during the time when the spectre of Bantu Education was coming nearer: first with the investigations of the Eiselen Commission (from 1949) and with the publication of its report (1951), then with the passage of the Bantu Education Bill through Parliament (1953) and finally with the implementation of the Act, especially in 1955. The radical A.A.C. supporters in C.A.T.A. became progressively more outspoken[224] and eventually actively opposed the implementation by boycotting School Committee elections.[225] In 1951 at an

early stage in the course of this process the Cape Education Department withdrew recognition from C.A.T.A.[225] This led to a crisis for moderate teachers within C.A.T.A. who saw their professional standing in the eyes of the Department being threatened, and the prospect of recovering control of C.A.T.A. from the radicals as a vanished hope.

Which parties were responsible for the formation of the Cape African Teachers' Union and what interests did the new body represent? A chronology of the relevant events from mid-1952 to mid-1954 clarifies the issue. The June 1952 C.A.T.A. conference held in the Langa Market Hall[227] was the watershed. It was the last conference to take place before the provincial Association split irretrievably. The C.A.T.A. radicals sat apart from the moderates in conference sessions and heckled them when they spoke. One participant remembered that "it almost came to blows there was so much ill feeling."[228] Apparently the radicals even organized an alternative reception at the same time as the official one.[229] It seems clear that the radical elements were determined to intimidate the moderates into leaving the Association. The tactics they used to achieve this were surprisingly like those used a decade earlier when a similar split in the Coloured teachers' association took place.[230] It is possible that the radical African teachers were being tutored in these tactics of sabotage by their Coloured colleagues.[231] Thus it may be said that the C.A.T.A. radicals were partly responsible for the formation of C.A.T.U.

At the June 1952 conference the C.A.T.A. president stridently affirmed the principle that broader political issues affected education and were therefore the concern of teachers' associations. On this issue the Cape Education Department differed. A few days after the conference some C.A.T.A. officials met the Chief Inspector of Native Education, F.J. de Villiers, and he made it clear that the Department had withdrawn recognition (in 1951) from C.A.T.A. because of the latter's political affiliation.[232] De Villiers pointed to the moderate Coloured teachers' association (T.E.P.A.)[233] as having an appropriately "professional" orientation. It does not seem at all unlikely that de Villiers might have suggested to moderate African teachers that they should form a strictly a-political body. Whether the suggestion came from him or not, the moves during the second half of 1952 were almost certainly encouraged by the Department.

The most explosive episode in the formation of C.A.T.U. took place on 18 August 1952 in Langa,[234] probably at the High School.[235] It demonstrates just how deeply feelings were running. The occasion was the Annual General Meeting of the Western Province Bantu Teachers' League, as the local branch of C.A.T.A. was also known. The attendance was good. More than 60[236] of the 110 African teachers[237] in Greater Cape Town were present. From the result of the meeting it seems that Mkize and the moderates had done a good job at recruiting and that they were expecting to wrest control of the local branch from the radicals. But the chairman, J. Kwebulana, evidently tried to close the meeting before a motion effecting the change could be put. Mkize was a large man with a hot temper.[238] He was enraged by Kwebulana's move and, according to The Torch newspaper, he

> "leapt across the floor, shut the door of the hall, put his weight against it and then shouted at the officials that they dare not close the meeting. As the secretary walked towards the door Mkize made frantic attempts to take the League's (i.e. the C.A.T.A. branch - MC) books from him by force. He did not succeed. Thereafter, after Mkize had signed on 62 new members 'a meeting' was held under the conductorship of Mr Lengisi, vice president of the League, who had supported the quisling elements ... 'officials' were elected, and resolutions disaffiliating the League from the A.A.C." (were passed - MC) [239]

At the same time as the above public demonstration of the moderates' determination to de-politicise their association, they were also holding small clandestine meetings to plan the next move. These discussions, held in the second half of 1952 in Cape Town, developed the idea of linking with like-minded African teachers in other parts of the Cape in a new organization.[240] Women played a significant role in these meetings because, as one of them put it, "we women section of the teachers here were fed up."[241] This adds weight to Hyslop's suggestion that C.A.T.A., being male dominated, did not successfully "accommodate the specific problems of their women members",[242] problems such as discrimination against women with regard to salary and job opportunities. Women, it seems, had quite a bit to do with the formation of C.A.T.U. This was also shown as the first province-wide move was made that December (1952).

A meeting of regional representatives was held in the Mallet Hall in

Queenstown "to talk between those who wanted to get politics out of the association."[243] There were three representatives from Cape Town, viz. I.D. Mkize, S.G. Magodla and Miss I.V. Dabula; from the Eastern Cape Border, J.M.Z. Noah; and from the Transkei, Mr Songca. The conservative North Western Districts Teachers' Union (N.W.D.T.U.) which had left C.A.T.A. on 4 August 1951[244] was not represented but it did send a supportive letter saying "that it would accept what the group agrees on."[245] Not unexpectedly the meeting agreed on setting up an alternative association. An illuminating perspective of a woman teacher from Cape Town who was present is worth citing in full:

> "Much planning was being done to fight these people within C.A.T.A. I stood up and said,
> 'We have been planning and planning and have been defeated each time. I propose to start a new organization which will be professional alone.'
> I had not spoken up to that time but I convinced the men and they agreed. My arguments were:
> (i) we cannot out-vote these people
> (ii) we cannot go on and on doing this (i.e. putting up repeated motions to disaffiliate C.A.T.A. from the A.A.C. - MC)
> (iii) teachers' affairs are not being dealt with."[246]

She further proposed that the opening conference be held in her home town, Grahamstown. This was agreed.

The inaugural conference of the Cape African Teachers' Union was held in June 1953. It was attended by 47 delegates,[247] half of whom represented the North Western Districts Teachers' Union. The only delegates from Cape Town were Mkize and Dabula. For at least three reasons Mkize was the obvious choice as the first President of C.A.T.U. He was an outspoken advocate of keeping politics out of association business, he was experienced as a past C.A.T.A. President, and he was physically close to the headquarters of the Education Department in Cape Town. The Department readily granted recognition to the new body. In fact it sent one of its Chief Inspectors, Dr E.G. Schnell, to open the conference, and he stressed the need for "a responsible body of (A)frican teachers to advise the Department on Native Education."[248]

The Cape Education Department was pleased with C.A.T.U., but the new

Union could not ignore the realities of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. At the Clarkebury conference in June/July 1954,[249] a year after the inauguration, C.A.T.U. was on the road with an ambivalent attitude to the changes brought about by the Bantu Education Act. Hyslop characterizes C.A.T.U.'s political direction as combining "suprisingly sweeping" attacks on aspects of the education system with a "highly conciliatory and a-political approach to the authorities."[250] Thus while the 1954 conference expressed its "total strong opposition to the Bantu Education Act" it also "exhorted the teachers to work as hard as they possibly could in order to raise the standard of African education in spite of the insidious aims of the Bantu Education Act."[251] Further, the new Union showed at least some of the interests it was representing when, regarding the prospect of African teachers being promoted to the new sub-inspectorships, it was decided "that no obstacles be placed in the way of those who may receive such promotions."[252]

Who, then, was ultimately responsible for C.A.T.U.'s formation, and what interests did they represent? The sequential account above shows that there were four interested parties: the radical leaders in C.A.T.A., the moderate leaders in C.A.T.A. and in the N.W.D.T.U., some women teachers, and the Cape Education Department. The radicals[253] wanted the moderates out so that they could pursue their goal of resisting Bantu Education by mass means to encourage popular rejection. This was at a time when opportunities for younger teachers were looking increasingly bleak. The moderate teachers,on the other hand, sought to secure the positions they had gained by hard work. In this they would be aided by an association in good standing with the Department. Also the new system would mean new promotional appointments and who better to fill new positions than experienced moderates? The women who would have benefitted from the new body were those who sought a platform to seek redress of their grievances which they had never had in C.A.T.A. It is not known to what extent they used it. The Cape Education Department had an obvious interest in a docile association - it wanted to hand over its 'Native' education portfolio smoothly to the Native Affairs Department and co-operative teachers were important. Furthermore, it is just possible that Chief Inspector de Villiers realized he stood to become the new Secretary for Bantu Education. A viable teachers' association to prove that he had a

good working model for Bantu Education in the Cape would be a strong recommendation in his favour.

Was there any material basis for the split between C.A.T.A. and C.A.T.U.? While it would not be expected that there should be a direct link with age, it seems plausible that older teachers with land[254] and an expectation of returning to the reserves would have acted more conservatively than those who saw little prospect for material gain.

A final question remains. Can C.A.T.U.'s strategy be regarded in any way as resistance? In terms of the definition which commenced the chapter, no and yes. No, in that C.A.T.U. would never have contemplated any act which might be unlawful. But yes in that it could not help speaking out against Bantu Education. As far as there being actions to prove the intention, the fact that C.A.T.U. members remained in their classrooms when conditions in schools deteriorated may be considered an act of commitment to the children they taught. Where this was done with the purpose of helping children to overcome the disabilities of Bantu Education, it may be considered brave "resistance" in the absence of viable alternatives.

6.6 Conclusion

In assessing the strategies used by African organizations in Cape Town to resist Bantu Education, the purpose is not primarily to rank their relative success or to explain why they failed, but rather to indicate why they tried as and when they did. Since C.A.T.A., the A.N.C. and C.A.T.U. shared common ground in their stated rejection of Bantu Education, it also needs to be explained why they could not obtain any agreement to shelve differences in order to work together against Bantu Education.

C.A.T.A.'s programme against Bantu Education in Cape Town was run by a few African teachers who worked closely with their Coloured colleages in the Unity Movement. The tactics used were intended to establish the justice of C.A.T.A.'s position and included the politicization of C.A.T.A. through its affiliation with the A.A.C. in 1948, the organization of

public meetings concerning schooling issues between 1951 and 1956, the boycott of School Committee elections especially in 1955 and 1956, publishing of political commentaries in The Torch and Teachers' Vision, and the support for litigation against the Native Affairs Department in 1956 and 1957. Why were these methods employed between 1947 and 1957? Changes in the nation's economy and demography brought about vast post-War urbanization which brought on a crisis in many spheres, one of which was schooling for the children of recently urbanized families, both Coloured and African. The state responded to the crisis by seeking to expand the schooling system as rapidly and cheaply as possible. C.A.T.A.'s aggressive but legal activism was partly a response to the state's new direction and partly a bid to secure privileges for the educated whose support it so conscientiously canvassed.

On the other hand, the dominant group in the A.N.C.(W.C.) in the 1950s was more populist in nature. Its purpose was to co-ordinate mass opposition to the erosion of African political rights and the imposition of unjust laws. In making five widely resented laws the focus of its Defiance Campaign in 1952, it did attract a broad support but was hamstrung when the state used the powerful Suppression of Communism legislation against its leaders. In March 1955 the local A.N.C. made a late call for a school boycott and it appears to have had a measure of success but probably not over a wide area. Two factors seem to account for this. Firstly there was a concurrent campaign to organize a delegation for the Congress of the People in May 1955. More significantly the removals were of greater concern than Bantu Education in many areas where Congress was strong. Organization on related issues such as passes for women in the middle and late fifties also reflected the A.N.C.'s interest in action on matters of parochial concern. This won support from many but it also led the Unity Movement to accuse Congress of sacrificing patriots in mass action which changed nothing. Congress replied that one had to test one's pupils - it was not enough to just tell people what was wrong, they had to have the opportunity to act on their knowledge.[255] Here was a fundamental difference between the A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. over strategy, but it went beyond disagreement over methods. Personal antagonisms and basically different outlooks made for a deep rift between the organizations. Once C.A.T.A. had adopted a Unity

Movement position condemning all activism apart from its own programme of "principled non-collaboration" as "adventurist stunts", there was no room left for co-operation with the A.N.C.

The discussion of C.A.T.U. under the heading of resistance would have been disputed both by the A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. The A.N.C.-inclined Advance newspaper criticized C.A.T.U. for failing in its diagnosis of the "insidious designs of the Bantu Education Act"[256] and for its inability to prescribe a direction for either teachers or parents. C.A.T.U.'s "vague aims about uplifting the African race" and solving the problems of all races "by negotiation and mutual consultation" were judged inadequate. C.A.T.U. had urgently sought recognition by the Cape Education Department and thus showed its basic goal: to negotiate for the teachers' interests on issues related to the schools and their conditions of service. C.A.T.A. dismissed this as collaboration which made it possible for the hated Bantu Education to work and for Verwoerd's dreams to be implemented. C.A.T.U. proponents argued that what Verwoerd said to please the electorate and what he did in continuing to give an academic education to more and more pupils were two entirely different things. They were quick to believe and publicise those positive aspects which they saw in the new arrangements, for example the suggestion of compulsory education for Africans.[257] At the same time C.A.T.U. minutes repeatedly raise a number of grievances against Bantu Education. Hyslop correctly characterizes this position as combining "surprisingly sweeping attacks on aspects of the education system with a highly conciliatory and a-political approach to the authorities."[258] For example, the 1954 C.A.T.U. minutes at once "deplored the declared aims ... of African Education" and exhorted teachers "to spare no effort" in their work.[259] They were saying that half a loaf is better than no bread. It was an unpopular message in the mid-fifties when the nationalist struggle offered a measure of hope. Hyslop has argued[260] that it was only with the state's defeat of African nationalism in the early sixties that C.A.T.U.'s cause won widespread support. Certainly in Cape Town in 1960 it was no light thing to be known as a collaborator responsible for the poison of Bantu Education. Houses and lives were at stake in the Langa uprising and leading figures were key targets. A teacher risked his job if he failed to comply with

regulations and he risked his physical security if he were seen as prominent in making Bantu Education work. Little wonder that so few African teachers were politically active in opposing Bantu Education. What is amazing is that any were prepared to risk their hard won positions.

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1. The actual pretext was a technicality relating to the fact that the Secretary had not endorsed the appointment in the first place. S.A. Law Reports, 1957 (4), p. 452.
2. Ibid., p. 451.
3. See chapter 4, pp. 104,105.
4. Report on the disturbances at State-aided Native educational institutions with boarding establishments. 26 July 1947, Pietermaritzburg. The Report is 124 pages long and has 41 pages of appendices. Obtained from University of the Witwatersrand, Library. Department of Historical and Literary Papers, S.A.I.R.R. "B" boxes 92.7.2. Copy in Education Faculty Library, University of Cape Town. Hereafter referred to as "Report on the disturbances".
5. Union Advisory Board on Native Education, Annual Report for 1947. U.G. 42/1948, 3.II(d).
6. Union Advisory Board on Native Education, Annual Report for 1948. U.G. 15/1951, p. 5.
7. See note 4 above.
8. See for example Statistical Report of the Cape Education Department, 1947, p. 196. Just two out of 70 teachers were not certificated.
9. Report on the disturbances, 1947, p. 73.
10. Ibid., p.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 71.
13. Ibid., p. 124.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. Ibid.
16. The male pronoun is used exclusively in ch. 1 of the report.
17. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Ibid., pp. 4-7.
19. Ibid., p. 7.
20. Summarized in Appendix H at the end of the report and given as Appendix V below.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
22. Ibid., Appendix C and see also p. 72, reproduced below as Appendix VI.
23. Ibid., Appendix C.
24. Molteno, 1984, p. 95.
25. See above p. 141.
26. See Molteno, 1984, pp. 95-96 for details based on the account in the Rand Daily Mail, 30/10/1953.
27. The Torch, 10/11/1953.

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28. Rand Daily Mail, 30/10/1953. This reference is given by Molteno, 1984, p. 96.

29. Horrell, 1968, p. 5.

30. The Teachers' Vision, March 1950. Referred to in Hyslop, J. C.A.T.A. and C.A.T.U.: The politics of African teachers' organizations in the Cape, 1948-1968. Chapter in forthcoming doctoral thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, used with permission.

31. See Rose and Tunmer, 1975, p. 257 regarding finance; and see Eiselen Commission's Report. U.G. 53/1951 for the terms of reference.

32. See above pp. 192-196.

33. The Teachers' Vision, September 1949, pp. 14-16.

34. See quotation above p. 207, for the view of a prominent African participant.

35. The Teachers' Vision, September 1952, pp. 15, 16.

36. The Torch, 27/1/1953.

37. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

38. 29/7/1954, p. 2.

39. New Age, 9/12/1954, p. 3.

40. New Age, 23/12/1954.

41. The Torch, 18/8/1953.

42. Ibid.

43. The Torch, 15/12/1953, p. 4.

44. See above pp. 106,107.

45. See above pp. 178-181.

46. See chapter 4, pp. 105,107 for an outline of the division over whether or not to participate in parliamentary elections.

47. The Government Gazette, no. 1835, 3/9/1954 records the number of resident African taxpayers as: Worcester 2 447, Paarl 1 075, Greater Cape Town (Bellville to Simonstown) 475.

48. See chapter 4, pp. 117,118 and 120-123 regarding the Defiance Campaign.

49. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

50. See chapter 3, pp. 69-72.

51. It is a chapter in his book. Lodge, 1983, pp. 114-138.

52. For quotation see above p. 181.

53. Lodge, 1983, p. 129.

54. New Age, "Cape boycott to proceed", 24/3/1955.

55. Interview no. 7, 15/11/1984.

56. Interview no. 21, 9/1/1984.

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57. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.
58. Interview no. 7, 15/11/1984.
59. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.
60. New Age, 2/6/1955, p. 7.
61. See chapter 5, pp. 148-154.
62. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.
63. Ibid.
64. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984. See also above p. 179.
65. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.
66. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984, with Departmental official.
67. Interview no. 21, 9/1/1984, with Unity Movement supporter.
68. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984.
69. Lodge, 1983, p. 46.
70. Ibid., p. 114.
71. Ibid., pp. 133,134.
72. Ibid., p. 132.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 134.
75. See chapter 5, p. 138.
76. For example the Eureka school in Elsies River came fully under state control while the Klip school in Retreat remained completely independent. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984; and official Education Statistics as listed, e.g. on fig. 1 of ch. 5.
77. See above p. 123. Elsies River was cleared of Africans first from 1955, and Kensington four years later.
78. See above pp. 116,117.
79. Census figures for East London of 39 850 Africans, Port Elizabeth of 65 110, and the East Rand (Germiston, Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan only) of 250 653, as against 49 793 Africans for Cape Town are some indication of the relative size of these urban areas. The denser settlement of the East Rand would have made organization easier. Population Census 1951, U.G. 42/1955. Cf. ch. 5, notes 54, 55 and fig. 5 for school statistics for Port Elizabeth, the East Rand and Cape Town.
80. See the table on p. 135.
81. See the following section 6.4.
82. New Age, 3/3/1955, p. 1.
83. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.
84. Lodge, 1983, p. 43 indicates that the Union was especially strong in Worcester.

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85. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

86. The Torch, 30/3/1954, 6/4/1954; New Age, 8/4/1954.

87. Interview no. 15, 21/11/1984.

88. Ibid.

89. School boycotts in shanty towns in Cape Town were not new in the 1950s. Barry Kinkead-Weekes records an instance of an almost total boycott in Ndabeni in May 1918. The development of popular resistance among local Africans, 1918-1935. Paper for fifth workshop on the history of Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 1985.

90. Statistics in this paragraph are derived from the table on p. 135.

91. See above p. 91.

92. Interviews no. 11 15/11/1984, and no. 19, 15/11/1984.

93. See above p. 138 for details.

94. The Cape Times, 9/8/1951.

95. See above p. 141 for claims that more than 700 pupils attended.

96. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.

97. Advance, 22/7/1954.

98. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.

99. Ibid.

100. Interview no. 19, 15/11/1984.

101. For example see Advance, 15/4/1954.

102. On 12 April and 19 July 1954 - see Advance 15/4/1954 and 22/7/1954.

103. One late in April, Advance 29/4/1954, p. 7; the second a month later, Advance 22/7/1954, p. 8, referring to a deputation led by M.P.C. Ben Levitas.

104. Led by J. Motleola, secretary of the local Vigilance Association who was acquitted on a charge of leading an illegal procession seven weeks later, Advance, 22/7/1954, p. 8.

105. Not to be confused with the Elsies River Vigilance Society, a largely Coloured body which followed an Anti-C.A.D./Unity line - Interview no. 5, 17/10/1984.

106. Advance, 22/7/1954, p. 8.

107. Advance, 22/7/1954, p. 8. Sixty-five year old Mtini had been a member of the A.N.C. since 1923, New Age, 23/6/1955, p. 5.

108. Advance, 29/7/1954.

109. 29/4/1954, p. 7 and 29/7/1954.

110. Advance, 29//1954.

111. New Age, 24/3/1955 indicates that he was acting secretary of the Cape Western Region of the A.N.C.; Advance, 22/7/1954, p. 8 names him as secretary of the Vigilance Association. The name is spelled differently in the two reports but it is unlikely that two men of such similar names and convictions were politically active in Elsies River.

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112. Advance, 29/4/1954.
113. Advance, 29/4/1954, p. 7.
114. New Age, 29/9/1955.
115. Interview no. 11, 15/11/1984.
116. The school was closed at the end of 1956. Interview no. 1, 10/11/1984.
117. Lodge, 1983, pp. 129-134.
118. See above pp. 201-204.
119. New Age, 2/6/1955, p. 7.
120. Ibid.
121. New Age, 15/9/1955.
122. Interview no. 12, 12/11/1984.
123. See above p. 197.
124. See above pp. 197-199.
125. See above pp. 198-199.
126. See above pp. 179-181.
127. E.g. Feit, 1967, pp. 167-189.
128. New Age, 31/3/1955, p. 2.
129. See above p. 59.
130. Peteni, R.L., Towards tomorrow. Michigan, 1979, p. 20.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., p. 23.
135. See above p. 59.
136. Peteni, 1979, p. 23.
137. Ibid., p. 27.
138. Ibid., p. 25.
139. See above p. 62.
140. The Teachers' Vision, May 1949, p. 4.
141. Ibid., December 1948. p. 3.
142. Ibid., June 1953, p. 8, reporting an interview between C.A.T.A. officials and the C.E.D. Chief Inspector of Native Education.
143. See above p. 61.
144. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984.
145. The Teachers' Vision, March 1951, p. 8.
146. Ibid., March 1952, pp. 5-6.

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147. Educational Journal, July-August, 1952.

148. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

149. Ibid., p. 17.

150. The Torch, 9/9/1952.

151. Interview no. 20, 9/1/1984. Concerning I.B. Tabata see pp. 108,109.

152. Personal communication, 3/9/1984 and 24/9/1985.

153. See note 152.

154. Interview no. 3, 19/11/1984.

155. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984. T.E.P.A. was the moderate group which broke away from the radicalised T.L.S.A. See above fig. 1.

156. Interview no. 3, 19/11/1984.

157. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

158. There were 127 teachers in 1953. Educational Statistics, Cape of Good Hope, Dept. of Public Education, pp. 204-5.

159. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.

160. The Torch (22/3/1955) gives the vote at the D.R.C. school as 39 to 6 and at the Methodist school as 41 to 19. See also New Age, 24/3/1955.

161. Ibid., 12/4/1955.

162. The Cape Times, 1/9/1955.

163. The Torch, 30/8/1955, p. 8.

164. The Cape Times, 1/9/1955.

165. New Age, 8/9/1955, p. 8.

166. Ibid.

167. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

168. New Age, 8/9/1955, p. 8.

169. The Torch, 1/5/1956.

170. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984.

171. Ibid.

172. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

173. Ibid.

174. See quotation on p. 159 above.

175. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

176. Ibid.

177. Interviews no. 1, 10/11/1984; no. 14, 17/11/1984; and no. 22, 28/11/1983.

178. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983; The Torch, 17/4/1956, p. 3; and 12/6/1956.

179. The Torch, 2/8/1955, p. 1.

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180. See above p. 194.

181. The Torch, 13/9/1955, p. 1; New Age, 15/9/1955, p. 8.

182. The Torch, 25/10/1955, p. 1.

183. It is ordered ... Bantu School Boards on trial, C.A.T.A. Umtata, 1957. See also S.A. Law Reports, vol. 2, Apl-Jun 1957, p. 393.

184. Op. cit. in note 183.

185. South African Law Reports, October-December 1957, pp. 451-463.

186. Interview no. 21, 9/1/1984.

187. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983. Hyslop (1985) says that teachers who stood to be reinstated on the basis of the Sihlali ruling were subsequently redismissed under other regulations and cites The Torch, 11/2/1958 as his source. He then concludes that "(t)he turn to legalism was a dead end strategy for C.A.T.A." p. 34. It may be "remarkable" that C.A.T.A. used the courts in the first place but it is at least understandable.

188. The Cape African Teachers' Union, see above p. 204 ff.

189. It is not even known whether Sihlali was paid out his salary. A letter to him at his home in Mt. Frere dated 15/12/1953 remains unanswered.

190. It is ordered ... Bantu School Boards on trial, C.A.T.A. Umtata, 1957, p. 7.

191. See above p. 159.

192. Interview no. 9, 19/11/1984.

193. The Torch, 13/5/1955.

194. New Age, 12/5/1955.

195. This point was made by the Simonses (1969), pp. 544-5.

196. Interview no. 21, 9/ 1/1984.

197. The final sentence was capitalised in the original, New Age, 12/5/1955, p. 2.

198. The Torch, 3/5/1955, p. 1 quoting a pamphlet of the Society of Young Africa which was supported by the Unity Movement. See also New Age, 12/5/1955, p. 2.

199. When Mqingwana was transferred from Langa to Simonstown his colleagues urged him not to refuse. "We said: 'no their aim is to get rid of you; let them rather dismiss you.'" Interview no. 22. See also Molteno, 1984, p. 101.

200. See above pp. 178,179 and p. 139.

201. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.

202. Hyslop, 1985, p. 18 indicates 1948-50. Peteni, 1979, p. 31 says 1946.

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203. According to interview no. 9 on 19/11/1984 he paid his subscription to the A.N.C. publicly at a meeting in 1948. See also The Teachers' Vision, Sept. 1948, p. 5 for the view that it was unwise to affiliate to a political organization since that would alienate the teachers from the Education Department "in whose hands lay the teachers' destiny."

204. Minutes of inaugural conference, 23-25 June, 1953. Reproduced as Appendix II.

205. Interview no. 20, 9/11/1984.

206. Ibid.

207. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, p. 6. See Appendix III.

208. The Torch, 25/11/1952.

209. The Torch, 10/2/1953.

210. Letter from A. Chrikwana of Idutywa in The Torch, 17/3/1953.

211. Ibid.

212. The Torch, 11/8/1953.

213. See above pp. 173,191.

214. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.

215. Ibid.

216. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.

217. The Torch, 16/9/1952.

218. See above pp. 59,60.

219. Imvo, 30/5/1942.

220. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.

221. The Torch, 27/1/1953.

222. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1984. The Eiselen Report in fact stated that this was hoped for in the not too distant future, p. 164, para. 1052, sec. h.

223. Hyslop, 1985, p. 17, makes this point.

224. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

225. See above 6.4, pp. 197-199.

226. Hyslop (1985), p. 16. He refers to The Torch, 16/10/1951.

227. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.

228. Interview no. 14, 17/11/1984.

229. Interview no. 20, 9/1 /1984.

230. See p. 196 and p. 194.

231. For the close link between C.A.T.A. and the Coloured T.L.S.A. see pp. 192-196.

232. The Teachers' Vision, June 1953, p. 8. The meeting took place on 7 July 1952.

233. See fig. 1 above.

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234. The Torch, 9/9/1952.
235. Interview no. 13, 14/11/1984.
236. The Torch, 9/9/1952.
237. Educational Statistics, Cape Education Department, 1952, p. 207.
238. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.
239. The Torch, 9/9/1952.
240. Interview no. 20, 9/1 / 1984.
241. Ibid.
242. Hyslop, 1985, p. 13.
243. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.
244. See Hyslop, 1985, p. 18.
245. Interview no. 20, 9/ 1/1984.
246. Ibid.
247. C.A.T.U. Minutes 23-25 June 1953. (See above note 204).
248. Ibid., p. 2.
249. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, Clarkebury Conference. (See above note 207).
250. Hyslop, 1985, p. 30.
251. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, p. 7. (See above note 207).
252. Ibid., p. 4.
253. See also above pp. 197-204 for a discussion of C.A.T.A. strategy.
254. Mkize had land in uMzimkulu for example. Interview no. 20, 9/1/1984. Land was sometimes allocated to school principals.
255. Interview no. 12, 12/11/1984.
256. 22/7/1954.
257. Interview no. 22, 28/11/1983.
258. Hyslop, 1985, p. 30.
259. C.A.T.U. Minutes, 1954, pp. 6 and 4 respectively. (See above note 207).
260. Hyslop, 1985, p. 37.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has made a case for Bantu Education being viewed not only in terms of stated policy but also in terms of the contested implementation of that policy. There were a number of conflicting forces which shaped African schooling under Bantu Education. An impressive range of aims and achievements have been attributed to Bantu Education, no one of which is a sufficient explanation of its complexity. It was not simply a result of a direct application of Christian-National Education or any other ideology. It did not have a single economic or political purpose underlying its implementation. Its outworking did not accomplish the massive subjugation of young African minds which some have claimed to be its end. Bantu Education cannot be fairly represented as a monolithic edifice erected by racist Afrikaner Nationalists for the final suppression of African nationalist spirit or solely as a device for harnessing cheap African labour. The evidence does not point to ultimate consequences or single causes. Of course there cannot be an adequate explanation of Bantu Education which ignores the influence of motives of race prejudice, economic exploitation or political subjection. The point is that no one of these factors alone is a sufficient explanation of the development of Bantu Education in the context of growing segregation in South Africa.

African schools were the arena of significant resistance to the implementation of apartheid in education. This resistance had a considerable effect in shaping the policy of Bantu Education. The warp and woof of Bantu Education - the basic elements responsible for its actual texture and outcome - were policy and resistance. Together these two factors determined the end result which was essentially the negotiated product of a struggle for the school. The actual allocation of resources was made on the basis of a power struggle between the state and African people. This view moves the focus from the supposed inability of African people to influence the state's provision of schooling. It denies that the state dictated the terms for the provision of African schooling without reference to its clientele.

The state has been represented as being capable of using schools for an

amazing variety of purposes from imposing mental slavery on individuals to forcing African people to return to an antiquated form of tribal society. An illuminating illustration of this widespread belief in the power of the state is seen in the titles of a variety of commentaries on Bantu Education. At various stages of the shaping of the Bantu Education policy it was dubbed as "education for serfs",[1] a "blueprint for blackout",[2] "slave schooling",[3] an attempt to revive tribalism,[4] "educating for ignorance",[5] "education for servitude",[6] and "education for barbarism".[7] Even if due allowance is made for an overstatement of each point, it is nevertheless true that the views of the authors of these statements accorded little influence to Africans in shaping the transformation of African schooling, i.e. they underestimate African agency. Education in this view is essentially imposed. The primary purposes are seen as ranging from segregation to slavery, from barbaric tribalism to a fostering of ignorance.

By contrast one aim of this dissertation has been to point out that the state assumed control of African schooling for a variety of purposes not the least of which was in order to gain the support of African people. As Feit points out "(f)or a very large number of Africans, what the Government offered was not a worse substitute for the education already available but an education of some kind instead of no education at all."[8]

The second aim of this dissertation has been to demonstrate that the implementation of Bantu Education was affected deeply by the reception it had from African people representing a range of political views. Bantu Education in practice was being negotiated with co-operative Africans - in the Cape African Teachers' Union for example - as well as being shaped by radical opponents such as the A.N.C. and the Cape African Teachers' Association. This is shown on the one hand by the state's initiative in the formation of the Cape African Teachers' Union (to establish a "responsible" African opinion on educational matters) and on the other hand by the state's efforts to undermine the campaign of the resistance bodies against School Committees and School Boards (to secure a measure of participation by African communities in local schooling).

The implementation of Bantu Education in Cape Town illustrates both the state's purpose in assuming control of African education and also it shows the influence of the African response in shaping the changes that took place. There are two unique features of the African population in Cape Town. Firstly it was relatively isolated from Africans in the rest of the country. Secondly in the Western Cape of the 1950s African labour was technically regarded as migrant in terms of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy and so subject to greater pressure than elsewhere in South Africa. In view of this the present case study of Cape Town provides a barometer by which to test the intentions behind Bantu Education against its actual effects. Insofar as this dissertation presents an accurate reading of the practice of Bantu Education in Cape Town as a microcosm of apartheid, it indicates the need to focus further research not on what the politicians said they intended but on interpreting the actual provisions of Bantu Education in practice.

This dissertation has argued that the application of Bantu Education in Cape Town enhanced the City's economic growth and political stability principally by extending schooling to the rapidly growing numbers of African children in the area. That is to say that a clearer understanding of the purposes behind Bantu Education may be found in its nature as a mass based system, rather than in trying to determine exactly how increased literacy, for example, served capitalism. This is not intended to mean that there were no locally specific goals behind the way that Bantu Education was applied. Again the Cape Town study demonstrates conclusively that the removal of African settlements in terms of the Group Areas Act was aided by the selective opening and closing of schools in terms of the Bantu Education Act.

Although the provision of schooling had much to do with political considerations, the resistance of communities must also be considered. In this dissertation an act of resistance is measured by the intention of the perpetrator and by the state's perception of the permissibility of the act.[9] In the light of this the following conclusions regarding the resistance of the three major African bodies opposed to Bantu Education are suggested. The Cape African Teachers' Union intended strong opposition to the Bantu Education Act[10] but its strategy of

working through the given channels was quite acceptable to the Department of Native Affairs and so its position, though critical of government policy, is not judged as resistance. Secondly the Cape African Teachers' Association aimed to influence public opinion towards a complete rejection of Bantu Education. Its activities (in co-operation with its partner in the Unity Movement) in campaigning for a boycott of statutory School Boards and School Committees was certainly regarded by the state as impermissible and so its strategy, while strictly legal in the eyes of the courts, is judged as resistance. Thirdly the strategy of the A.N.C. in its rejection of Bantu Education through its defiant boycott not only of School Boards and School Committees but of Bantu Education schooling itself was the clearest case of resistance to Bantu Education.

The above characterization brings with it an additional problem for the study of the resistance of Bantu Education. Why was there no co-operation between C.A.T.A. and the A.N.C.? In fact in Cape Town C.A.T.A. opposed the A.N.C. One way of resolving this problem may be found in viewing these two Cape Town resistance organizations as opposed to each other because they had each linked their individual strategies to a different view of the wider struggle for national liberation. In this view they opposed each other because they had moved beyond spontaneous protest on isolated issues to adopt opposing rhetorical positions. This follows a formulation of resistance outlined by Gerald Grace.[11] Speaking of urban resistance he points out that

> "organisations in the city can be placed on a scale of participation - protest - urban social movement. The crucial distinguishing feature of an urban social movement is that it has developed beyond the participation level, beyond organised (or spontaneous) protests on specific urban issues to the point of linking an immediately urban issue with the framework of a wider struggle..."[12]

This is most useful because it suggests that the reason for the mutual antagonism of the A.N.C. and C.A.T.A. lies in the fact that they each saw their resistance to Bantu Education as a part of the two respective broader struggles in which they were engaged - C.A.T.A. through the Unity Movement and the A.N.C. through the Congress Alliance. It was

because they were committed to differing conceptions of the struggle for national liberation that they opposed each other not because they differed in tactics. In fact in one respect - in opposing School Committees and School Boards - their tactics were the same.

The effect of the opposition outlined above on the implementation of the Bantu Education Act is clearly a matter for debate. It is argued in this dissertation - in theory in chapter 2 and in practice in chapter 5 - that the major strategy of the state was to use the new legislation to expand the number of school places available for African children and thereby to secure the acceptance of the mass of the people for apartheid which in this respect was giving schooling to many who had previously been denied it. It may thus be argued that the increased growth of schooling services under Bantu Education was in part a result of the resistance. It is interesting that the greater the contest over apartheid schooling, the greater was the need to expand it.

CONCLUSION: NOTES

1. P.R. Mosaka, N.R.C. member, quoted in Guardian, 3/2/1949.
2. Education League brochure, quoted in Guardian, 10/2/1949.
3. Resolution of Fort Hare students at a mass meeting. The Torch, 23/11/1954.
4. C.A.T.A. and the T.L.S.A. (see above p. 194 for a diagram depicting their relationship) referred to it in this way at their 1952 Joint Conference Sitting. The Torch, 18/8/1953.
5. Congress of Democrats Educating for ignorance. Johannesburg, 1955 (?). The 18 page brochure ends with the statement "Bantu education is designed for one purpose only: the strengthening and perpetuation of apartheid."
6. This is the title of chapter 9 in Trevor Huddleston's book, Naught for your comfort, London, 1956.
7. This is the title of I.B. Tabata's book. Durban, 1959.
8. Feit, 1967, p. 145.
9. See the definition in chapter 6 on p. 169.
10. See p. 7 of Appendix III at the end of this dissertation.
11. Grace, G. "Theorising the urban: some approaches for students of education" in Grace, G. (ed.) Education and the City. London, 1984, pp. 94-112.
12. Ibid., p. 108.

APPENDIX I

Obtained from University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Library. Department of Historical and Literary Papers. S.A.I.R.R. "B" Boxes, 43.4.1.

The handwritten date 12/11/34 possibly refers to the date of receipt or filing of the 1932 Memorandum. The full Memorandum elaborates each of the 11 points summarized on this first page.

12/11/34

MEMORANDUM ON NATIVE EDUCATION

By Rev. G. Diselen
Bethsabelo
November 12th, 1932

(Translated from the German by R.F.A.Hoernlé - Phrases in brackets added by the translator)

A. PRINCIPLES AND AIMS OF NATIVE (BANTU) EDUCATION:-

1. They are to be taught to become Christians through communicating to them the Bible; and through training them to be members of the congregation and church.

2. They are to be strengthened in being Bantu in nature and culture.

3. A mere show-culture through imitation of the ways of Europeans is to be prevented.

4. They are to be brought up to be useful members of State and Society.

5. They are to be trained in gardening, agriculture, cattle-culture, and, in general, in manual labour (arts and crafts).

B. WAYS (METHODS) OF REALISING THESE PRINCIPLES AND AIMS:-

1. In Christianising them, not only the Church, but the School also must play its part with conscious purpose.

2. The mother tongue must be the medium of instruction, preferably from beginning to end of the school life.

3. The education must furnish, in the first instance, moral (character) training, and, only in the second line, the imparting of information.

4. Special attention must be given to training in manual arts and crafts, in order that they may be manually equipped to carry on these activities in later life.

5. In view of the Bantu love of music, music should be used as a first-class educational instrument in all schools.

6. Higher (secondary) schools for Bantu should be developed on a broad basis of elementary schooling and of Normal Colleges. Private schools to be inspected by the Government.

APPENDIX II

(1)

Cape African Teachers' Union inaugural Conference held in the Municipal Hall Grahamstown from 23-25 June 1953

Delegates

Region	Branch	Delegates
Border	1. East London	S.Bashe, P. Mango
	2.Keiskamahoek	V.V.Hermanus & P.G.Stamper
Eastern Cape	Albany Bathurst	S.S.Ndungane & C.Mdyesha
	Port Elizabeth	E.Bam, A.Lalendle &W.Sekeleni
	Peddie Central	L.K.Siwisa,P.Bekwa & B.Mpati
	Uitenhage&District	M.Memeni & B.Hopa
N.W.D.E.U.	Barkly West	N.Bojozi, W.Moya
	Hay Herbert	I.P.Monyatsi & J.Melakeco
	Kimberley	P.M.Mafungo,M.G.Phula, A.B. Malunga
	Kuruman	J.M.Mokgwabone, Molale
	Mafeking - Setlagole	T.J.Molefe,S.T.Molefe, B.C.Thema.
	Taungs	Miss B.Matshane,V.P.Crutse Mrs. Mgobozi,Z.Shuping,B. Letebele,H.T.Ditshetele, J.D.Ndamu
	Tikerkloof-Vryburg	C.N. Lekalake,P.Tsatsi, H.Letebele, S.Gaubepe.
Pondoland	Flagstaff Libode Lusikisiki Ngqeleni Port St.Johns [illegible]Tsolo	Mr.J.D.Zoka represented the Pondoland Regional African Teachers Association
Tembuland	Engcobe	Mniki,D.V.Geanga,S.T.Mdaka M.Maka, H.Bottoman, M.Mlatelwa, H.A.M.Ndungane
Western Province	Peninsula [illegible] Kimberley	I.D.Mkize,Miss I.V.Dabula A.B.Malunga

Visitors

Midlands	Culeb Mdyesha & Mrs Khuse
Victoria East & Fort Beaufor	Mr.C.D.Zulu & H.A.Mdledle
Port Elizabeth	Mr.C.B.Dzoya, Mpondo, Rev.G.B.Molefe
Uitenhage	Miss [illegible]ma
Peddie	Mr.Tyitilika

(2)

Delegates met at 11.00 a.m. in the Municipal Hall. Mr. Ncamashe welcomed the visitors. He then asked the General Secretary of the Albany Bathurst Teachers' Union Mr. J.H.P.Diepu to read the notice Convening the Conference. After that he read the names of the delegates who had reported. Mr.Ncamashe asked CBO Conference to elect an interim Commitee consisting of the Chairman, Secretary & Treasurer. The delegates asked the Executive of the Albany Bathurst Teachers' Union to carry on until the end of the agenda.

Official Opening

The Official opening was at 14h00 and Rev. G.T.Mnonopi led the devotions. Delegates were Welcomed by the Deputy Mayor Councillor Ross Munn. Dr. E.G.Schnell who was there in a dual Capacity as Circuit Inspector and also acting for the Superintendent General of Education opened the Conference officially. His address was Some problems of Native Education. He mentioned the following:-

(a) The implementation of the recommendations of the Fiseleen Commission by the Government. He said the reasons for this change were financial and administrative.
(b) The transmission of experience and racial heritage.
(c) The provision of a suitable medium within which the child may develop fully and freely.
(d) He stressed the need of a responsible body of african teachers to advise the Department on Native Education.

The Eastern Province Regional President Mr. L.K.Siwisa and Mr.E.T.Scott President of the Albany Bathurst Teachers' Union addressed Conference. They both deplored the [illegible] affiliation of CATA to the All African Convention. They praised the Regions and branches which had answered the Clarion call of the Albany Bathurst Teachers' Union to start a new professional Teachers organisation not affiliated to a political organisation.

Wednesday 24 June 1953.
Devotions were conducted by Rev.Father R. Pane: His address was "The training of a complete man". As a basis for his address he took the Psalmist's question "What is man that thou art mindful of him"

Constitution & Policy The teachers of the N.W.D.T.U. submitted to Conference a draft policy which laid out what their Union considered to be the Aims and objects of a Teachers organisation. Mr.Lekalake explained that the proposed policy was an elaboration of the aims and objects in the draft Constitution on which the N.W.D.T.U. had brought along. Copies of the draft Constitution and policy were distributed among the delegates. An Ad hoc Committee consisting of the following C.N.Lekalake (Convenor) I.D.Mkize, L.K.Siwisa, J.D.Zeka & V.V.Hermanus was elected to study the Constitution policy and report to Conference.

Sister Truda's address:Subject: The Place of Imitation in Education
(a) Imitation is of great importance for all forms of Education.
(b) Imitation of feeling (sympathy)
(c) Imitation of thought (suggestion)
(d) In groups people do what they would not do as individuals.
[illegible]
(e) Imitation of thought is the technique employed by propagandists through the medium of the wireless and the press.
(f) Habits are acquired by a conscious desire to imitate.

Mr. C.N.Lekalake's address
Subject: "It shall not happen again"
(a) He asked the teachers to make a vow that they would never allow themselves to be destroyed by what had destroyed CATA.
(b) We noted with shame what had happened in the Cape.

(3)
(c) We had learnt from bitter experience which factor had called for a close self scrutiny.
(d) The new organisation must realise that it is intended to serve not a section of the people but the whole Nation.
(e) As a professional organisation it must not align itself with a political organisation.
(f) Recognition of a Teachers organisation by the Department is very important because an exchange of views with Education Department is essential and beneficial to the profession.
(g) We must fight to achieve Unity amongst ourselves.
(h) This new organisation must not allow itself to be influenced to the extent of surrendering its powers and judgment.

Constitution
Mr. Lekalake (Convenor) reported as follows:
Committee suggested the name Cape African Teachers' Union. He reported the amendments they had made on (a) Membership (b) Finance
Conference accepted the Constitution unanimously.
The N.W.D.T.U. offered its Journal "THE FORESIGHT" at the disposal of the Cape African Teachers' Union until CATU published its Journal.

It was unanimously agreed that a collection be done in the Conference hall to meet the immediate expenses of the secretary. A sum of £6.12.0 was collected.

Address by I.D.Mkize
Subject "Then and Now"
He gave a survey of the development of African Teachers Associations in the Cape Province.
(a) Amalgamation of CATA and N.W.D.T.U at Umtata in 1947
(b) Paralled with this there was growing in the teacher an unhealthy interest in politics.
(c) The disintegration of CATA and harm to African Education.
(d) Undermining the loyalty of the staff to the Principal.
(e) Result: Was bad results in many schools in the country.
(f) Closing down of some Secondary Schools in the Cape Province.
(g) Lowering the status of some High Schools.
(h) Appealed to teachers to ask for recognition by the Department of the newly formed Association.
Delegation to ask for Recognition of CATU to the Superintendent General of Education in Cape Town:-
Mr. I.D.Mkize was unanimously elected to represent CATU in the Cape Education Advisory Board.

ELECTIONS

President	:	Mr. I.D. Mkize
President Elect	:	Mr.C.N.Lekalake
General Secretary	:	Mr.B.C.Thema
Treasurer	:	Mr.S.R.Gaobepe
Assistant Secretary	:	Mr.L.M.Zambodla

Venue of Next Conference Clarkebury

CLOSING

Mr. C.D.Zulu who had attended as an observer from Lovedale thanked the Albany Bathurst Teachers' Union for having taken the initiative to call Conference. He also congratulated the branches from different Regions for answering the call.
After singing the National Anthem the President Closed Conference by pronouncing the Benediction.

APPENDIX III

Obtained from University of South Africa, Pretoria. Library. Documentation Centre for African Studies.

MINUTES.

FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE CAPE AFRICAN TEACHERS' UNION

Held at Clarkebury, 29th June to 2nd July, 1954.

ROLL CALL.

	DELEGATES	& OTHER MEMBERS OF CONFERENCE.
BORDER		
1. East London	C.C. Moeki	
2. Keiskamahoek		R. Manakaza.
3. King (Central)	A.N. Mongauza	
4. King (District)	A.D.J. Monde Gitywa	
E. CAPE.		
5. Albany-Bathurst	A.A.K. Daniels, (B.T. Scott	
6. Peddie-Central	M.M. Sishuta.	L.K. Siwisa, O.Z. Titit
7. Uitenhage	[illegible]	
8. Port Elizabeth	C.B. Dzeya	
N.E. CAPE		
9. Herschel	G.W.I. Ntlahla	
10. Queenstown	L.P. Takane,	J.M.Z. Noah, T.D. Mdzuta
N.W.D.T.U.		
1. Barkly West	Miss M.R.C. Soyizwapi,	M. Pojosi.
2. Hay-Herbert	M. Moseki	
3. Kimberley	E.P Lekhela	
4. Kuruman		
5. Mafeking-Setlagole.	M.R. Gaebepe, H.M.T, Ngcobo, D.S. Maine (Leader of (Union delegation)	
6. Taungs	S.R. Gaebepe	
7. Tigerkloof-Vryburg.	Miss A.L. Towane, S.P.R. Tsatsi, Miss A.V. Mashiqane.	
PONDOLAND		
8. Flagstaff		
9. Libode		
0. Lusikisiki		
1. Ngqeleni		
2. Port St. Johns	E.D. Matoti	
WESTERN PROVINCE.		
4. Peninsula	D. Lengisi.	
MIDLANDS		
5. Cradock	V. Ralarala	Mrs C. Khuze, Miss M. [illegible] Mongameli
6. Bedford		
7. Somerset East		
8. Graaff Reinet	S.C. Magodla.	
TRANSKEI		
9. Willowvale.	V.[illegible] Mdani	[illegible], V. Mngqutha, Miss L.M.[illegible]
GRIQUALAND EAST		
Matatiele	P.S.J Maswi, (an observer)	
[illegible] Frere	S. Mahlati, (an observer)	
TEMBULAND		
[illegible]	V.C. Nonkonyana, W.B. Ntsobeza, S.O.L. Paaghu.	

33....../

E.M. Mbiyo, E.S. Cenge, E.G. Mega, G.G.T. Matshayan, S. Conjwa, K. Mfesane, B.P.L. Macingwane, G Xuza, A.S. Bottoman, E.B. Saba, T Mbiyo, L.S. Matiwane, E. Maka, L.Z. Majija, A.M. Merwetyane, L. Lande, V. Nokwali S. Mkondweni, L. Mbuyazwe, E.E.P. Lobi, A. Ngaje, C.M. Mnyando, L.N. Mankomo, Miss N.Z. Mdekwe, M.K.M. Njosela, N. Mandita, E.N. Balfour.

OFFICIALS : Mr. I.D. Mkize presided. Other officials present were : Mr C.N. Lekalake, (Vice-President), S.S.J. Ndungane (Treasurer) B.C. Thema (General Secretary). In the absence of the Recording Secretary Mr D.E. Maine was elected to serve in his place for the duration of conference.

OPENING CEREMONY : Mr J.M.Z. Noah led the opening devotions. Mr I.D.Mkize the President, welcomed the delegates, and made a brief review of the circumstances that led to the formation of the C.A.T.U. in June 1953.

Mr. W. Caley (Inspector of Schools) addressed conference on behalf of the Chief Inspector of Native Education who could not attend. Amongstother things Mr Caley criticised English Newspapers and those people who did not see anything good in the Bantu Education Act. He told Conference that the Act sought to bring the parents into partaking in the education of their children, as they will run the schools themselves. He felt very strongly that it was necessary for African parents to have a hand in the running of African schools. He did not feel there was any danger of the lowering of standard of Bantu Education. Besides, the Government aimed at bringing a large number of children into schools by making sure that at least every African child shall go as far as Std II. He strongly recommended the double shift system to ensure the success of t this aim. He assured conference that the New Department of Bantu Education was keen to know the opinion of African teachers relative to the changes in African education. Mr E.T. Scott proposed a vote of thanks

PRESS REPORTERS : The following were elected press reporters :

Mr.	C.B. Dzeya ---	S.A.P.A.
Mr.	I.D. Mkize ---	The Advance.
Mr.	A.N. Nongauza --	Imvo.
Mr.	E.P. Lekhela --	Bantu World and Umteteli.

AD HOC COMMITTEES : Messrs E.P. Lekhela (Convener), S.G. Magedla, and D.V. Ocanga were elected to form a Motions Committee.

MINUTES OF THE INAUGURAL CONFERENCE : Minutes of the inaugural conference held at Grahamstown in June 1953 were read and adopted.

BUSINESS ARISING FROM MINUTES : (a) Foresight - Mr C.N. Lekalake, on behalf of the N.W.D.T.U. explained that the journal Foresight had not been published for the four quarters since the last conference on account of lack of articles for publication. The Editorial Board would issue numebs of the journal in the near future, and would supply copies tothose who had already subscribed towards the journal. (b) Recognition of C.A.T.U. During the year representations had been made to the Department of Education for recognition of the Union, which recognition had already been granted, and Mr Mkize had been allowed to sit on the Cape Advisory Board on Native Education as a representative of the Union. The right to open an Agency in Capetown had also been granted, and Mr Mkize had undertaken the task of acting as an Agent for the Union. (c) Inter-Provincial Meeting : After the 1953 conference Mr Mkize had attended a meeting of the provincial associations convened by the Bantu African Teachers Union. As a result of this meeting a link had been forged between C.A.T.U. and the other provincial bodies, and a practice of exchanging literature had been started. (d) The Kimberley Branch represented by Mr Kalumza at Grahamstown : It reported that Mr Kalumza and his Branch had joined the Kimberley Branch of the N.W.D.T.U. A suggestion was made that the minutes of the inaugural conference be printed and copies be sold to members as it was necessary that all members be conversant with the business of the inaugural conference of C.A.T.U. It was left to the Executive to arrange for the publication of the minutes in Foresight.

The...../

The President, Mr Mdize reported that he had lost his case containing the presidential address and other documents for conference on his way to his home. Later he had been called to a nearby police station where he recovered his case without the documents. As a result of the loss he felt he would not be able to give conference accurate information on several matters of interest, especially bearing on the developments in Native Education.

CORRESPONDENCE : In the correspondence the Secretary read letters from the Education Department, the Institute of Race Relations, the President, Regional and Branch Secretaries as well as individuals in connection with the organisation of C.A.T.U. One letter came from the Institute of Race Relations inviting the Union to a conference propose to be held sometime next year to study and formulate a policy on race relations. There was a letter from the Assistant Secretary expressing his regret at his failure to attend conference on account of the sudden change of dates. Two were read from Prof. Matthews and Mr S.B. Ngcobo expressing their inability to attend and address conference as they had been asked. Correspondence was read between the Secretary and Mr Bongco of Kingwilliamstown, in connection with the latter's application to have his case taken up by the Agency in Capetown in spite of the fact that he had not been registered yet with the treasurer as a paid-up member. Much correspondence had passed between the Ngcobo Association and the Secretary over preparationsfor conference. The Secretary read his reply to an enquiry from Herschel about the policy of the C.A.T.U. concerning the Bantu Education Act and its implications. There were letters from the African Art House in Queenstown asking for leave to come and display their art, and from the Road Safety Organisation asking for leave to come and give a film show to delegates. There has been some correspondence with S.A.P.A., who were being invited to send reporter to conference. A number of telegrams of good wishes were received and read during conference.

MOTIONS : The following resolutions were taken by conference after discussions of motions submitted by Branch and Regional Associations :

(1) That C.A.T.U. annual subscriptions be paid by stop order as early as possible in the year, and that such order should cover Provincial Regional and Branch subscriptions.
Conference accepted the principle of paying subscriptions through the stop order system, but decided to refer the matter to the Regional and French Associations for consideration.

(2) That the Department should establish a day Government Training School under the control of a school board for the training of African teachers in the Uitenhage, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth districts.

(3) That the Department should employ male teachers as principals in one and two teacher schools (Lower Primary Schools), as women teachers find these posts generally unsuitable.

(4) That male principals employed in Lower Primary Schools be paid salaries applicable to teachers employed in Higher Primary Schools, if these teachers fill posts which cannot be ably filled by women teachers.

(5) That the Department should merge or consolidate part of the Cost of Living Allowance paid to African teachers with their salaries, as had been done with teachers of other racial groups.

(6) That the Department should pay rail and bus fares to and from vacation courses held at the Francis de Villiers Training School, or at any other centre that may be established from time to time.

(7) That C.A.T.U. should define clearly its attitude to promotions (e.g. to sub-inspectorships) which are part of the provisions of the Bantu Education Act.

Reference...../

Reference was made to a relevant part in the minutes of the Federal Council Meeting held in January 1954, and conference endorsed the decision of the Federal Council that no obstacles be placed in the way of those who may receive any such promotions.

(8) (Notice of Motion) : That C.A.T.U. membership subscriptions be so readjusted that men shall pay 10/- and women 7/6 annually, irrespective of scale of pay.

Emerging from discussions on Motion No. 7 above conference adopted the following resolution : "That, while conference does not subscribe to the principles which underlie embodied in the Bantu Education Act, C.A.T.U. nevertheless pledges itself : (i) to maintain the standard hitherto attained, and (ii) to spare no effort at raising the standard of African Education in all its aspects."

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL : Mr B.C. Thema read the report of the Federal Council of African Teachers' Associations. The Council had met twice during the period under review - first in Bloemfontein in December 1953, and again in Kimberley in January 1954.. C.A.T.U. had been admitted as member of Council. At the second meeting held in Kimberley the Transvaal African Teachers' Union had also been admitted to membership of the Council. At its second meeting the Council had decided to send a delegation to wait on the Minister for Native Affairs. The Under-Secretary of Native Affairs (Bantu Education Division) had received the delegation instead. The memorandum submitted to him by the delegation dealt with the following points of African Education : Administration, Curricula, Salary Scales and Conditions of Service of African teachers, and the financing of African Educational services. The Under-Secretary had not answered the memorandum, but had promised to send written comments to the various points the memorandum raised.

The Report recommended that conference should consider ways and means of reforming the Federal Council to make it more effective. A committee consisting of Messrs Mkize, Lekalake and Thema, with powers to co-opt, was elected to explore ways of re-organising the Council.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. The Address - "The Resolution of a Conflict", discussed, among other things, the part played by C.A.T.U. in helping to resuscitate the Federal Council, and the activities of that Council relative to the Bantu Education Act and its implications. The address analysed the various types of schools envisaged by the Act, and how these schools would be administered. It made reference to some of the changes announced in connection with the curricula, such as the decision to implement the provision for the teaching of Afrikaans, which had not been observed in some of the provinces. Proficiency in the teaching of Afrikaans would be insisted upon, and teachers were going to be given five years within which to qualify in Afrikaans, failure to do so may result in the stoppage of payments of increments after the expiration of the period. New teachers would Now teachers would probably be paid lower salaries than obtain at the present, as from next year. Only 6½ million pounds was in future to to be the parliamentary vote for Bantu Education, and any amount needed over and beyond that would have to come from the African himself - through taxation. The double-shift system was going to be introduced in all Lower Primary Schools to make sure that more African children attend school.

The discussions on the Presidential address disclosed the convictions that Africans were going to be [illegible] of education. Conference doubted whether the present standards would be maintained in African Education. In Parliament speeches were being made by responsible ministers that the African was being prepared for a position inferior to that of the European. It was felt that examinations might be made easier and correspondingly inferior. The double-shift system may be of benefit in so far as more children would come to school, but it was a wrong method of putting right what is wrong in African Education. It was felt that C.A.T.U. should request the Bantu Education Department to submit the syllabi to the Associations of teachers for...../

for criticism. Conference resolved that the Presidential Address and other addresses delivered at conference be published in pamphlet form and be sold to members of the Union.

THE SECRETARY'S REPORT : In his annual report the Secretary stated that during the year C.A.T.U. had achieved recogniton by the Cape Education Department, and had also been admitted to the National Council of African Teachers' Associations. The number of Branch Associations affiliated to C.A.T.U. had steadily grown during year too, and even in the Transkei, which had been supposed to be a stronghold of the C.A.T.A. a C.A.T.U. branch had been established at Willowvale with a membership of twenty fully-paid up members. During the year he had issued 'Suggestions and Directives as to Organisation' of C.A.T.U. Some Branch Secretaries had not followed these suggestions and had not submitted their Return Forms. C.A.T.U. had to organise more intensively as there were stillmany more teachers outside the organisation. The report was adopted and the Secretary congratulated on the performance of his duties.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT : The Treasurer, Mr S.S.J. Ndungane presented the following statement for the period ended 30th June 1954. :

Receipts :	To Subscriptions and Sundry sources :	£224. 3. 10.
Payments :	By Equipment, Stationery & Delegation :	19. 14. 6
Balance :		204 . 9. 4.

In his remarks the Treasurer complained that Branch Associations had paid subscriptions very late in the year, and several had actually paid in at conference. As a result he had not drawn up his statement in time. Conference decided that £50 be paid as an initial instalment into a reserve fund. Donations totalling £1. 11. 0 were collected in conference.

REGIONAL REPORTS. : The following Regional Associations reported :

North Western Districts Teachers' Union : There were seven Branch Associations in the Union, six of which had paid C.A.T.U. membership subscriptions. About a third of the teachers in the North Western Districts were members of the Union. The Region reported a substantial financial account.

Eastern Province Regional Teachers' Association : There were four active Branch Associations. A regional conference had been held in Port Elizabeth during the year. The conference drew and adopted the regional constitution, but the regional subscriptions had not yet been collect.

Tembuland Region : The Regional Organiser for Tembuland reported that "teacher politicians" were busy in the district. Lack of means of conveyance and of funds made the work of organisation difficult. The Engcobo Branch Association was the best organised in the district. The same association had been successful in obtaining a shiled and a cup for C.A.T.U. from two of their friends. No Branch Associations had been formed yet in Umtata, Elliott and Mganduli. The Engcobo Association had obtained generous assistance from the public in preparing for conference.

Midlands African Teachers' Association : A regional conference had been held Bedford. Two Branch Associations, Cradock and Golden Valley, while in other centres individual members only belonged to the Teachers' Association. The Region had decided to organise adult schools wherever possible.

Western Province : An unwritten report was submitted. The association had forty-five members on the roll; fifteen were fully paid up members. A regional association had not yet been formed, but the formation of such association was contemplated. During the coronation celebrations a ... £250 ... by the City Council to provide entertainment for African children. C.A.T.U. had tried to discourage the acceptance of the donation by the Council.

North Eastern Cape.....

North Eastern Cape. : There is no regional association in this area yet. The two associations in the North Eastern Cape affiliated to C.A.T.U. , namely Queenstown and Herschel, were still working independently of each other. The Herschel African Teachers' Association felt that they would rather constitute themselves into a Regional Association apart, as they were too far from Queenstown. The Herschel Association was active. The Association awarded an annual bursary of £7 to the Std VI pupil who obtained the highest marks in the annual external examinations.

It was suggested that a new regional association be formed in the areas of Kingwilliamstown, Central and District, as well as Keiskamahoek, and that when this Regional body was established it should absorb East London and form a strong Regional Association for Border. It was further suggested that a sum of money be voted for organisation in the areas of St Mark, Elliot, Mqanduli and Xalanga.

REPORT OF THE CAPE ADVISORY BOARD : Mr I.D. Mkize gave a report of the Board meeting held in August 1953. The Chief Inspector had given information concerning the following matters among others : (i) In view of the move to transfer Native Education to the Native Affairs Department nothing had been done about improving salaries of teachers in Native Industrial Schools. (ii) The introduction of both official languages in schools was being considered. (iii) the establishment of depots for the manufacture and distribution of school furniture will be left in abeyance until the transfer has been effected. (iii) . 325 additional Secondary and Primary Schools teachers had been appointed during the period 1952-53, and the same number would be appointed for the period 1953-54. (iv) 75 new schools had been recognised and aided during the period 1952-53. (v) Hardly any applications had been received for funds to use for libraries in Primary Schools. (v) The Board had recommended that provided adequate accommodation is furnished for Union students, non-Union students should be admitted to Union Institutions, particularly to those situated in the border, and having historical link with extra-Union territories which they serve at present.

The Board had noted the application of the Cape African Parents' Association for recognition and admission to membership of the Board. Only the Superintendent-General of Education can consider the admission of such a body to membership of the Advisory Board. The Board resolved to request that regulations proposed under the new Bantu Education Act be submitted to it (the Board) for consideration. Further that the code governing the conduct of teachers and other conditions of their service should make provision for a system of transfer. The Chief Inspector informed the Board about the decision to close down the Duncan Village Training School. The Board decided to recommend the increase from £3 to £5 of the per caput allowance for post-primary boarders at Boarding Schools.

In the course of discussions of the Cape Advisory Board report it was suggested that C.A.T.U. should interest herself in the activities of the Cape African Parents' Association. It was pointed out that some of the Branch Associations of C.A.T.U. eg. Kingwilliamstown Central and Xalanga, were affiliated to C.A.P.A. It was resolved that the Queenstown Teachers Association should constitute themselves into a Parents' Association and affiliate to C.A.P.A., and that C.A.T.U. should pay Queenstown's membership fee of £1.1.0. for this year.

ATLANTIC AND CONTINENTAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION : Conference resolved that C.A.T.U. interview the Company with a view to obtaining their agreement to use C.A.T.U.'s name in selling policies to her members.

AN ADDRESS BY MR. L.C. T[illegible]MA : The Address - "Some Trends in African Education" deplored the declared aims and ends of African Education as expressed in many pronouncements by officials of the Bantu Education Department, and especially by the Minister in his parliamentary speeches. It criticised and condemned the decision by the Government to reg the parliamentary votes for African Education at £6 million pounds as an indication of the hollowness of the Bantu Education Act. The address also deplored the centralisation [illegible] Education, and the pushing out [illegible] the place [illegible] educational services for t[illegible]

It was resolved that this address be published in pamphlet form together with the Presidential address and be sold as mentioned earlier in the minutes. Further conference decided that in future a News Letter be issued every two or three months to keep the members of C.A.T.U. informed on developments in African Education, and to passany other necessary information to the members. Conference felt that in future members of the Association should be very careful about making statements ments to the press especially about the Association, and that if any such statement is to be made, it should first be referred to the General Secretary or the Executive for scrutinising and confirmation. Following a lengthy discussion on whatthe attitude of C.A.T.U. should be to the Bantu Education Act and all its Implications, the conference adopted a declaration which embodied the views of the Federal Council meeting held in Kimberley in May. The declaration expressed a total strong opposition to the Bantu Education Act, and condemned its implications, but exhorted the teachers to work as hard as they possibly could in order to raise the standard of African education in spite of the insidious aims of the Bantu Education Act. The Declaration was to be published in the same pamphlet as the addresses delivered at conference.

INFORMATION ON THE REORGANISATION OF SCHOOLS UNDER THE BANTU EDUCATION ACT : Mr I.D. Laing gave conference the following points of interest :

1. Double-shift system — the teaching hours would be increased from 5 to 6, so that in schools where it was operating the teachers would work three hours in the morning, and three in the afternoon.
2. The Primary Schools would be re-organised into two sections - Lower and Higher Primary divisions, (Sub A to Std II, and Std III to VI respectively). The Lower Primary section would be staffed by female teachers entirely. Male teachers employed in female posts would be paid salaries applicable to female teachers.
3. Community Schools would be run by Bantu Authorities. Local School Boards (African) would control these schools where the Bantu Authorities have not been constituted yet, and provision would be made for the training of school board secretaries.
4. Training Schools would all be taken by the Government and would concentrate more on the training of female teachers. Missions which desire to train teachers for their own schools (State-aided) will be free to do so, but the Government will not employ teachers trained in such schools.
5. European teachers employed in Native Schools will be allowed to remain in their posts, but the policy of the new Department shall be to fill such posts with African teachers when they become vacant vacant.
6. In the Lower Primary division there will be automatic promotion of children up to Std II when a departmental examination willbe conducted. Those who are unsuccessful may be readmitted if there is room for them in the school.
7. It was hoped that the syllabi would be ready forbe introduced at the beginning of 1955.
8. It was rumoured that J.C. examinations may be discontinued, and that Senior Certificate candidates may be allowed to write the National Senior Certificate, or the Joint Board Matriculation.
9. Teachers' conditions of service would be based on the Natal Code as far as possible, and would definitely make provision for the transfer of teachers.
10. The Cape Province would be divided into 18 inspectorial circuits. Seven sub-inspectors and forty-one Departmental Visiting teachers would be appointed. The Cape Wouldprobably divided into two zones, the Western, the Central, and the Eastern Province including the Northern Districts. The new Governors would be there at Umtata, East London or Kingwilliamstown, and Kimberley respectively.
11. The Cape Provincial Requisites Stores would continue to sell books to schools for some time until some other arrangements are made.
12. Missionaries may serve on school boards and give religious instruction in schools.
13. An attempt would be made to organise vacation courses in Afrikaans for teachers.
14. New teachers would probably receive salaries based on lower scales than those that are in at present.

ELECTION OF OFFICE BEARERS :

President : C.N. Lekalake, P.O. Tigerkloof, Cape.
Vice-Pres. : I.D. Mkize. Langa High School, P.O. Langa, Cape.
Gen. Sec. : E.C. Thema, P.O. Box 165, Mafeking, Cape.
Ass. Secretary : S.G. Magodla, P.O. Box 284, Graaff Reinet.
Treasurer : S.T.J. Mavungana, 50, Wood Street, Grahamstown.

REPRESENTATIVES ON THE FEDERAL COUNCIL : Messrs C.N. Lekalake, I.D. Mkize, and E.C. Thema.

CAPE ADVISORY BOARD & AGENCY : Mr I.D. Mkize.

REGIONAL ORGANIZERS :

N.W.L.T.U. : D.M. Maine. P.O. Box 166, Mafeking, Cape.
Transkei : M.M. Mdani, Malan Mission, P.O. Willowvale.
Pondoland : J.D. Zeka, Ntlaza Secondary Sch, PO.Ntlaza.
Tembuland : D.V. Gcanga, Manzana E.C. Sch., P.O.Box 30, Engcobo.
Griqualand East : P.SJ. Macwi, Elukolweni H.M. School; P/B 775, Matatiele.
Mt Currie & Ntabankulu : G.L. Kekana, Carl-Malcomess Sec Sch, Kokstadt.
Border : A.N. Nongauza, P.O. Zwelitsha, Kingwilliamstown.
Eastern Province : L.K. Siwisa, Ayliff Secondary Sch., P.O.Peddie.
N.E. Province : [illegible] Ntlahla, Umlamli School, P.O. Sterkspruit, Herschel.
Wotern Province : V. Benya, (Address unknown)
Midlands : W. Ralarala, St Jones Mission. Cradock.
De Aar - Upington : S.S. Tire (Address unknown)

The new Executive was inducted by Mr L.K. Siwisa.

VOTES OF THANKS : The following votes of thanks were proposed :

1. to the Governor of Clarkebury Institution.
2. to the local Zenzele Club, for painstaking and meticulous catering for the delegates,
3. to the Engcobo Branch and all to all those who handled the preparations for conference.

VENUE OF NEXT CONFERENCE : 1955. Queenstown was chosen as the VENUE for the 1955 conference.

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Mafeking, C.P.
3rd September, 1954.

N.B. Three copies of these minutes are being supplied to every affiliated Branch Association of C.A.T.U. Branch Secretaries are asked to circulate two of these copies round their members as much as it is possible for them to do so. The third copy is intended for the Secretary's files. Copies are being supplied independently to Regional Presidents and Secretaries, as well as to Regional Organisers.

The reproduction of this document is considered important (see especially ch. 6.5) for an understanding of the ambivalence of moderate teachers towards Bantu Education. As they had no official organ at this time such minutes constitute key documentary evidence. It is a pity that the quality of reproduction was so poor. The annotations are those of the present author.

APPENDIX IV

REPORT of the COMMISSION on NATIVE EDUCATION 1949 - 1951.

VIEWS of the NORTH WESTERN DISTRICTS TEACHERS' UNION,

Northern CAPE PROVINCE.

The Committee which studeied the Report comprised of the following:

Messrs. C. N. Lekalake,
E. P. Lekhela (Chairman),
B. C. Thema,
D. E. Maine,
V. P. Crutse,
T. J. Molefhe.

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We wish to report that this document is very thought provoking in many ways. It is not merely an educational document, but has also far reaching implications of a political nature which are closely related to the policy of the government.

It was practically impossible to go through the whole report within the time at our disposal, and so the committee decided to confine themselves to a study of the report under the following headings:-

(1) Aims and Guiding Principles,
(2) Control,
(3) Regionalization,
(4) Administration,
(5) Organization of Schools, and
(6) Finance.

APPROACH.

There was one of two ways whereby the committee could study the report viz. approaching the report with a bias against anything that savoured of the Apartheid policy, or approaching the report with scholarly objectivity. We followed the latter approach.

GENERAL IMPRESSION.

We are satisfied that the inquiries and investigations that have been made were very thorough. It is in the recommendations that the report fails in a shocking manner. The recommendations are at the ideal stage and are unconvincing as positive suggestions which can be put into practical form. One very distressing feature of the recommendations is the dubeity and ambiguity that arise immediately with careful study; and it seems most probable that this elusive language has been used deliberately to cloud the reader's mind or hide any ulterior motives which may be unpleasant to express. One is led to become suspicious and feel that the recommendations have been written from the Apartheid standpoint.

AIMS.

We cannot find much to raise against the aims of African (Bantu) Education as expressed in par. 765 (a) (b) of the report.

As regards the guiding principles however, one finds much thatis objectionable. According to par. 776 c. education must be co-ordinated with a carefully planned policy for the development of Bantu Societies. We are merely left to guess what this policy would be, as the report is quiet on the nature of the policy with which education must be co-ordinated, except to say that that policy "should pay special attention to the economic development of the Bantu". From experience we know that all aspects of the country's Bantu policy (Native policy) tend to place the Native in a subordinate position in relation to other racial groups. In the absence of a full and lucid definition of the policy to be planned for African development, we are left no alternative by but to conclude that African Education will be used as a means/ to the country's traditional policy of Apartheid or Segregation, with all its aspects of subordination and exploitation. We will however, accept nothing for our people short of a policy which concedes to

the African /.....

the African a position of partnership in the country, according as his development merits such concessions.

Par. 766 g. further recommends the linking of schools with Bantu social institutions. We agree that Bantu tradition and culture must serve as a starting point, a basis, in any educational and cultural development of our people, but we will reject any designs to use education as a means of preserving any outmoded and obsolete Bantu Social institution. Besides, if any such social institutions must be "linked up with the school", the Bantu themselves should be the judges, and they alone should decide what institution in their social system deserves to be preserved, or to be used as a basis for the evolution of a "modern progressive culture" (vide Par. 765 a.).

Whilst we accept the purport conveyed in Par. 774 that education must not divorce the Bantu child from his community, we wish to lay emphasis on the last line of that paragraph, viz. that he must be educated to fit him for "developing the life and culture of his community". In brief we do not accept Bantu culture as something static and fixed for which education must prepare, and into which it must fit Bantu Youth. We maintain that the purpose of education for the African child, as for that of the child of any other community, should be, to develop him into a full citizen and enable him to contribute his full share to

(a) the advancement of learning and
(b) the upliftment of his country.

CONTROL.

There is much to say for the Provincial Administration of African Education, even if all Provincial Departments were to create Sub-department which will be concerned entirely with administering African Education. The Commission has taken particular care to refute the arguments for retaining Provincial control, but in our opinion the Commission has failed to refute the argument that under the Provincial control, African Education is removed from the hurly-burly of party politics. It is true that Provincial Councils too are elected on a party basis, but their provincial nature, tones down the party political bias that is a feature of parliament, and that is why some provinces are comparatively more advanced than others, which is far much better than what would happen where a reactionary government came to power and took over a centrally-controlled system of African Educa.

This is our ideal, but for a long time African Education has been the worst starved of State Services, and on that score alone we are tempted to accept control by the Central Government with a hope that more and more funds will be made available, as the body that holds the purse strings will be responsible.

If we accept control by the Central Government however, we maintain that the right department to take over control is the Union Department of Education, for the following reasons:-

(1) The Union Department of Education already has technicians and educational experts, and we do not see the need for creating a new sub-department for Native Education. It is one of those cases of wastage and needless spending, which we suppose is the price the country must pay for Apartheid, at the expense of efficiency.

(2) The Native Affairs Department, is, in our opinion, the most over-worked of the State departments, and, putting aside all arguments on prejudice against that department etc., we submit that adding yet another service to its manifold duties will simply serve to make its work less effective.

(3) The Department for Education is comparatively the least over-worked of the State Departments; and this, in addition to arguments under (1) above, should make it just the right department to assume control of African Education.

Cordination.

The Commission's chief argument for placing African Education

under / .....

under The Bantu Affairs Department is that co-ordination would be possible between Education and other Services for the African people. There is hardly any weight in this argument. We do not see why co-ordination should not be effected through a consultative Committee of the Bantu Education and the Bantu Affairs Departments. There is much to say for an independent Education Department, free from the dictates of the Native Affairs Department, but co-operating with the latter on a purely consultative basis.

REGIONALISATION.

In view of the numerous petitions, court cases, etc. over the Transvaal Language Ordinance since last year, one cannot but view the suggested division of the country into regions on ethnic grouping with a strong suspicion. It would be a very effective means of putting back the African racial groups just where they were before the advent of the White man. This recommendation and the Bantu Authorities Act appear to be complementary, and no doubt they are aimed at the growing Bantu nationalism, and as such no one will support them. The African people of Bloemfontein have recently had a foretaste of things to come; their rights as parents to send their children to whatever school they choose have been waived aside, and they have been told from above where they should send their children.

Actually the Commission itself was quite confused about some of its recommendations. They recommend a policy of promoting the unification of the Suto-Group of these languages, (par. 1007 et seq.), yet the recommendation to regionalise the country according to ethnic groups would straightway neutralise the former recommendation of building the Suto dialects into one comprehensive language.

ADMINISTRATION.

We would propose that the Union Education Department should administer Native Education through Provincial Sub-Departments. If, for t technical or "apartheid" reasons the Central Department cannot administer African Education through the existing Provincial Department of Education, then let special Provincial Departments be created for the purpose. This will mean only four instead of the Bantu Affairs Department working through a system of Regional and Local Bantu Authorities as envisaged by the Commission, we recommend in turn that the Provincial Education Department should evolve a system of School Boards and School Committees to be constituted and to work along the same lines as for European School, the membership to be drawn from the educated Africans whose numbers are growing, and other classes of Africans who are directly concerned, like parents and ex-teachers. This will ensure participation by the right people, the parents, in the administration of African Education, instead of the Bantu Authority "government".

It will be argued against this that the system of electing Boards and Committees will be a novel and difficult undertaking for the African people, yet the novelty of it is nothing compared to the creation of an hierarchy of Bantu Authority government bodies, to which the Bantu themselves are opposed.

ORGANISATION OF SCHOOLS.

We accept the recommendations for pre-school going children, and would desire that thorough and adequate provision be made for during the training of the child during this period.

We strongly support the institution of technical or industrial schools to be intergrated with higher primary and secondary schools. To these can be dragted

(i) such children as cannot benefit by doing academic work, and
(ii) such as show the aptitude and a liking for technical education.

Efforts should be made to eradicate the wrong idea that technical education is meant for the "dull child" in the family.

Staff, Inspectors and Supervisors.

Even under a system of the nature proposed by the Commission, the highest / .....

highest and best paid offices are a special reserve for the Europeans. Sub-inspectorship is the highest position an African can hold. Nothing short of the best is acceptable. The African should be able to qualify for the highest office if he proves himself capable.

For the same reason we cannot see why there should be another junior post of Educational Officer (Par. 976 b.) to be filled by Europeans, who would become Inspectors later, instead of the Bantu Sub-Inspector, as one would expect in a system of Education for the Bantu. This is just another instance of using the funds intended for Bantu services to give employment to Europeans, to the extent of starving the services for which the funds were originally intended.

Conditions of Service of African Teachers.

We had expected the Commission to recommend the remedying of one glaring injustice to the African teacher, viz. absence of rights of leave with pay, as enjoyed by teachers of other Communities. Instead the position is left just where it was before. This is very much to be deprecated, and if this could not be done by a Commission with such wide powers, one wonders when anything will ever be done about it at all. We strongly recommend that some form of relief in the form of free-travel warrants, be given to the newly-appointed teachers.

Private Enterprise.

While for years we have clamoured for State-control of our education, we would make it quite clear that enough room be left for private enterprise in African Education, with a certain amount of state supervision and inspection. An entirely state controlled system of education can be a dangerous weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous and reactionary government. It is the Church schools in the Transvaal which have been able to raise a voice against the wrongs of the Language Ordinance in that province. Should the Education of a subject race especially be an entire concern of the State, there will be no safeguards against any reactionary manipulation of it to boost the policy of the government.

Medium of Instruction:

We stand foursquare behind the present system of using mother tongue instruction up to Std. II. The Bantu languages are our own, and we know better than any body else, their shortcomings and weaknesses. One can conceive no method more effective for making African education sterile and narrow than the use of Bantu languages up to Secondary Classes. Education is the chief means of acquiring the so called western civilisation, and school instruction must, as much as possible be imparted through the media of the languages of those who bring us that culture. The leaders of the Afrikaans-speaking people are mainly the product of the Old English medium schools of the Cape and the Orange Free State, and it is these men who have been able to develop Afrikaans. If they cared to do so, the new generation of Afrikaners, educated in the exclusively Afrikaans-medium schools could admit that their outlook is, as a result, narrowed and confined to the confines of South Africa. After all, in the process of acquiring and passing on this Universal heritage of civilisation, the Romans spoke Greek, and for along time the European nations spoke Latin, and how can we do it otherwise?

FINANCE.

As we reject the system of control by the Native Affairs Department and the dreamed of Bantu Authorities, we can have nothing to do with the proposed system of sharing the burden of financing African Education between the Bantu Authorities and the State. All funds for this purpose should come from the State. There is no point in arguing that the Africans contribute very little to the [illegible] services. No account should be taken of their contributions to State funds indirectly and through their labour, for which they are very often poorly remunerated.

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APPENDIX V

Report on the disturbances at State-aided Native educational institutions with boarding establishments, 1947. See ch. 6, note 4.

APPENDIX H.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE.

Page.

1.. Levelling up of salaries.

That the policy be accepted by the Government of progressively narrowing the gap between European and African salaries over a period of years, with a somewhat speedier tempo for graduate teachers 24

2. Governing Councils:

(1) Membership of the Governing Councils should be broadened to include:

(a) Representatives of parents of the students.

(b) European and African staff members, elected by staff.

(2) If the Governing Council is made up largely of members living at a distance from the institution an Executive Committee should be formed of members who can meet monthly, or oftener if necessary, to deal with current matters of detail, and to be available for consultation as the need arises 31

3. Discipline Committees:

That all institutions should establish discipline committees with African representation, and, if possible, African parent representation 32-33

4. Boarding establishments:

(1) (a) Division into small units on an age basis, i.e. into separate houses.

(b) Control of each house by persons with knowledge of student life in all its aspects, men and women living in close contact with the students, and thus able to share their interests, receive their confidences, and advise them.

(c)/...2.

(c) Appointment of adequate and suitable non-teaching staff..... 42

(2) (a) That large dormitories should be partitioned into 'houses'.

(b) That comfortable, well-equipped quarters be provided for supervising African staff members, either in the dormitory block or closely adjacent to it. 42

5. Prefect system:

(1) The use of any form of corporal punishment must be strictly forbidden.

(2) Warning must precede marking for infringements.

(3) Black marks against students must be discussed with the boarding master in the prefects' meeting.

(4) Students must be told at the time for what breach of rules they are being marked..... 48

6. Size of institutions:

Institutions should not be allowed to enrol more students than they can accommodate in reasonable comfort, not to say decency. 57

7. Graduated scale of punishment:

That this matter be considered by the suggested Federal Council of Heads. 64-65

8. Handling of strikes:

That in cases of parents living at a distance the Head should communicate by telegram with the parent briefly describing the situation and asking for instructions. 77

9. Expulsions following riots or strikes:

That youth and record should be carefully considered. Suspension for a period or re-admission on probation or leave to apply for entry to another institution should be normal alternatives 80

10. Procedure prior to expulsion of individuals:

That/..3.

That the Head telegraph the parent, pre-paying a reply if necessary, informing the student at the same time that he has done so. The student should then, unless he is a public danger, be kept at the institution, actively occupied until the parent appears or replies. 84

11. Pension scheme:

That the investigation by the Government now proceeding into the possibility of introducing a pension scheme for all teachers engaged in African Government aided schools be expedited. 96

12. Sanitation:

That as soon as possible water-borne sanitation be installed in all institutions. 99

13. Institution vegetable gardens:

That this question be given serious consideration by the institution authorities. 103

14. Institution finance:

That the institutions prepare statements of income and expenditure, especially on the boarding department side, for handing to intelligent Africans, giving in detail the actual cost of buying so many bags of mealies, so many pounds of meat, and the way in which this works out at so much per student per year. 103

15. Old Students' Associations:

That Old Students' Associations be formed at each institution and the authorities urged to keep in contact with members through monthly or quarterly communications as well as with central and district meetings of old students. 110

16. Relations of the sexes:

Definite exploring of ways and means for improving the relationships between the sexes in the institutions by:

(a)/...4.

(a) Relieving a staff member who may have had special training of part-time duties to undertake lectures on modern behaviour patterns in a civilised society;

(b) Arranging for a specialist lecturer, or a medical practitioner, to give lectures on sexual hygiene to boy and girl students in separate groups. (Care will be required here, for not all doctors are understanding or tactful enough to undertake the presentation of this subject without embarrassment or undue crudity). 117

17. Boarding fee:

(a) That an attempt should be made to arrive at a uniform basic fee for all institutions.

(b) That fees should be raised or lowered to the highest capacity of the African parent to pay.

(c) That there should be a subsidy on a per caput basis paid by the Government to meet the difference between the basic fee and the actual cost to the institution. 119

18. Financial assistance to institutions: (Classrooms, domestic science rooms, carpenters shops, etc.)

(a) That sufficient funds be made available to cover all approved applications under the rent-grant scheme.

(b) That the percentage rate paid by the Government be sufficient to cover interest and redemption on an assumed life of 40 years for the building.

(c) That a further grant of 1% per annum on a valuation of all approved classroom buildings (i.e. existing buildings and those to be erected) be paid for maintenance and repairs.

(d)/...5.

(d) That a per caput grant up to £2 per annum, calculated on the average attendance of students, be paid for furniture and equipment, on production of receipted accounts for articles previously authorised. 120

19. Financial assistance to institutions (Boarding department and related buildings):

(a) That as far as the capital cost of new approved buildings for the boarding and residential side of an institution is concerned, the Government should give rent-grant facilities similar to those recommended for classroom buildings.

(b) That an annual repairs and maintenance grant of 1% on the valuation of existing buildings and on the capital cost of new buildings should be paid.

(c) That a per caput grant, up to £2 per annum, on the average attendance of students who are boarders, should be paid towards the cost of all equipment, fittings and furniture, on production of receipted accounts for articles previously authorised.

(d) That a grant to cover the salaries and wages of the non-teaching staff, such as matrons, boarding masters, cooks, clerical assistants and domestic servants, should be paid.

(e) That the subsidy recommended under "Costs" for the improvement of the diet be paid. 123

20. Determination of amount of subsidy for non-teaching staff: That each institution be required to furnish a statement of its expenditure for the previous year, together with an estimate for the current year and an explanation of any proposed increases, to the

Education/....6.

Education Department concerned for recommendation to the Government, and that upon the information supplied, the Government should determine the amount of the subsidy. .....

21. Conditions for acceptance of Government aid: That institutions which accept Government aid of the foregoing nature for their boarding departments, should be subject to inspection by Departmental Dietitians, Inspectors of hostels and Medical Inspectors. 124

APPENDIX VI

Report on the disturbances at State-aided Native educational institutions with boarding establishments, 1947. See ch. 6, note 4.

(3) Failure to redress students' complaints.
(4) Manual work.

(3) ANALYSIS OF THE TABULAR STATEMENT OF DISTURBANCES (APPENDIX C.)

The statement compiled from files made available to us or from evidence submitted covers generally the period 1935-47.

Immediate causes:		
Tribal fights		6
Food		17
Treatment by boarding master or house master:	African 4	
	European 4	8
Withdrawal of, or refusal to grant privileges		5
Classroom discipline		4
Treatment by prefects		3
Treatment by teacher supervising manual work		2
Censoring of letters		1
Other causes		2
Unknown		4
		52
Involving violence directed against property or persons (including injuries sustained in private fights)		26
Police called in		16
Disturbances not considered by Committee to be of serious nature		18

N.B. A few trivial "incidents" are recorded to complete the picture; these can hardly be called "disturbances".

(4) FREQUENCY OF STRIKES.

Study of the tabular statement discloses that some institutions have had a trouble-free history and that in most of th

institutions/.....73.

REFERENCES

Notes on Sources

Note on paucity of archival material covered

Beyond the statistical reports, little use has been made of official reports of the difficulties experienced by the authorities in implementing Bantu Education for the reason that access to this material is closed. This is an obvious area for further research as the one example of the 1947 Report on the Disturbances at Native Educational Institutions illustrates (see pp. 170-174 of text). A second problem with archival material is that much of the African resistance was not recorded in the first place. This led the present research into the fruitful area of oral investigation.

Note on interviews by the author

Oral material was gathered from interviews with nineteen people who were active in the 1950s including teachers, clergymen and political organizers. Following newspaper research, the critical gaps in the field of enquiry were identified and questions were drafted to cover these gaps. The questions concerned school staffing, teachers' political affiliations, conditions in the schools (both state-funded and independent "bush" schools), the A.N.C. proposal to withdraw pupils from school, and the boycott of School Boards and School Committee elections. There were fifteen questions and these were recorded on separate cards. Prior to an interview those questions judged to be appropriate were selected. Interviews varied in length from ten minutes to nearly three hours, averaging just over an hour. When key responses to set questions were made, verbatim notes were recorded. On crucial issues the interviewer repeated what he had heard in order to check that the meaning was acceptably recorded. The full interview was written up within an hour or two after it had taken place or at least on the same day.

The evidence from interviews has been treated with care bearing in mind that they covered a period of some thirty years earlier and that many of the interviewees were strongly partisan. Points of difference have occasionally been mentioned in the text, e.g. over the extent of the A.N.C. boycott of schools. A second problem with the interview material is the issue of interviewer bias. The selection of questions and the guiding of the interview are both influenced by the interviewer's understanding of the period under review. The inclusion of interviews representing each of the three major political positions did, however, give a measure of balance.

It is intended that the interviews will be typed and housed in the Oral History Archive of the University of Cape Town. As some of the material is confidential the permission of the interviewee may have to be obtained before the interviews are made available for related research. This rudimentary oral research suggests the value of further work in this area.

The interviews are numbered and dated in the text. A list of persons interviewed is in the possession of the dissertation supervisor, Mr P. Kallaway.

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