SOME ASPECTS OF 'NATIVE EDUCATION' POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1939 UNTIL 1948

with special reference to financing, school feeding and technical and vocational training

by

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A B S T R A C T

This study focuses special attention on some crucial aspects of 'Native Education' policy during the period 1939-48. It is contended that 'Native Education' cannot be analysed outside its political and economic context. It was an essential aspect of the broader 'Native' policy followed by successive white governments (Provincial and Union) in S.A. before 1948.

The study is divided into two parts. Part one provides the economic, political and educational ('Native') background of the period 1939-48.

Chapter one assesses the political and economic context of 'Native Education' prior to 1939.

Chapter two provides an historical analysis of 'Native Education' prior to 1939 and highlights the following crucial issues:

(i) the role of the missionary as educator;

(ii) the State's interest in industrial education for Africans;

(iii) the State's financial provision for 'Native Education'.

Part two attempts to uncover aspects of the political orientation of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy (1939-48) and investigates the following issues:

(i) why the State provided insufficient financial backing for 'Native Education' when compared with that given to

White Education (Chapter five);

(ii) the reasons for the introduction of the 1943 School Feeding Scheme for African children; (Chapter six).

(iii) the reasons for the State's provision of insufficient technical and vocational training for Africans when compared with that given to whites (Chapter seven).

This section also analyses the political ideologies of the U.P. Government and the N.P. Opposition with regard to 'Native Education' (Chapters three and four) as well as the Smuts Government's 'Native' policy and the reaction to this policy (Chapter eight).

The study also focuses attention on the House of Assembly Debates (1939-48) relating to the issues examined in Chapters five, six and seven.

It is contended that these debates are of paramount importance for an understanding of subsequent policies as they touch on a particularly sensitive area in the field of race relations in South Africa in specific ways.

C O N T E N T S

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The focal point of this study is an analysis of some aspects of 'Native Education' policy in South Africa during the period 1939-48.

The United Party Government was in power during the above period; J.B.M. Hertzog was the Prime Minister in 1939 but was forced to resign on 4 September of that year when he lost the war vote in Parliament. Hertzog had introduced a motion of South African neutrality but this was defeated by the amendment of Deputy Premier J.C. Smuts, that S.A. should participate in the war effort.

Consequently the U.P. split in two with Smuts becoming P.M. of the U.P., a position he held until he was defeated in the general election of 1948 by the National Party of D.F. Malan.

In this study the term 'Native Education' is used to signify the education given to Africans ('Natives' in South Africa) until 1948; after which African education became known as 'Bantu Education'. Although a distinction was often made, in the period under review, between the 'Native' policy as followed by the Union's Native Affairs Department, and 'Native Education' which was under the Union's Education Department with the Provinces excercising a large measure of control, this study regards 'Native Education' as part of the over-all 'Native Policy' followed by the U.P. Government.

The study is divided into two parts. Part one provides the

economic, political and educational ('Native') background of the period 1939-48.

Chapter one analyses the political and economic context in which 'Native Education' occurred before 1939.

Chapter two examines some crucial issues in 'Native Education' until 1939 and stresses the following:

(i) the role of the missionary as educator;

(ii) the State's interest in industrial education for Africans;

(iii) the State's funding of 'Native Education'.

Part two analyses some aspects of 'Native Education' policy in the period 1939-48.

Chapter three examines aspects of the political ideology of the N.P. and outlines this party's proposed 'Native Education' policy. Chapter four provides a general analysis of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy and seeks to reveal the nature of that policy.

Chapters five, six and seven provide the focus of this study as they investigate some crucial aspects of the Smuts Government's 'Native Education' policy.

With regard to the financing of 'Native Education' (chapter five) it is argued that the U.P. Government followed a policy which reflected meagre funding when compared with funds given to white education. This was a feature of the

educational policies of white Governments (both Provincial and Union) before 1948. The study contends that the U.P. Government limited the financing of 'Native Education' because it was basically concerned with its political survival. It did not wish to add fuel to N.P. accusations that it was using white tax-payers' money to educate Africans who 'would pose a threat to the very existence of white civilization in S.A' (See 5.3.3). Furthermore it was always realised that the white electorate, which contained many Afrikaners and poor-whites, was basically conservative in its political outlook. There was concern within white circles over urban congestion of Africans and the increasing crime rate. The study argues that the above factors largely influenced the U.P. Government to adopt a go-slow policy with regard to expenditure on 'Native Education'. The Government was also prepared to leave 'Native Education' in Provincial (missionary) control as this would necessitate less Government expenditure.

The School Feeding Scheme for African Children (1943) is examined in chapter six. The study argues that the Scheme may be seen as a positive aspect of the Government's 'Native Education' policy, for the following reasons:

(i) It would help alleviate the effects of malnutrition among African children in S.A.;

(ii) It would possibly alleviate the growing problem of African juvenile delinquency in the large urban

centres, by encouraging school attendance and thereby keeping children off the streets for most of the day.

Chapter seven examines aspects of technical and vocational training during the above period. It is argued that the Government limited the growth of technical and vocational training when compared with that given to whites. The U.P. Government (and its predecessor, the S.A.P.) had no intention of providing Africans with technical and vocational training, as skilled Africans might present a competitive challenge to whites in the field of labour. This could possibly result in the loss of electoral support for the U.P. Government. Chapter eight outlines aspects of the Smuts Government's 'Native' policy and the reaction of some Africans to this policy.

The study also investigates and examines the House of Assembly Debates relating to financing, technical and vocational training and school feeding in 'Native Education'. In this respect the study uncovers new ground for, with the exception of one chapter in E.G. Malherbe's Education in South Africa*, it appears that nothing has been written on the nature of formal political (and parliamentary) debates on questions relating to 'Native Education' in this period. Furthermore Malherbe's chapter deals mainly with white

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* Malherbe, Ernst J.; Education in South Africa; 1977; Juta & Co. Ltd., C.T., pp 82-92.

education and outlines the Assembly's arguments for and against the introduction of dual medium education in South African Schools.

It should be noted that debates on 'Native Education' occupied a relatively short period of time in the Assembly, (during the war years 1939-45) when compared with the time spent debating other measures. In particular, a great deal of time was spent debating matters relating directly to the war effort. However this study contends that these debates on 'Native Education' are of paramount importance for an understanding of subsequent policies as they touch on a particularly sensitive area in the field of race relations in South Africa in specific ways. The intensity of these debates and the heated exchanges between the U.P. Government and the N.P. Opposition illustrated the tensions which existed within the minority white power-bloc with regard to the education of the numerically superior African majority.

This study seeks to show that 'Native Education' cannot be analysed outside its political and economic context. It was an essential aspect of the broader 'Native' policy followed by successive white governments (Provincial and Union) in S.A. before 1948. The issues relating to 'Native Education' were both contentious and significant as they reflected the political and economic milieu of this era.

P A R T O N E

SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND 'NATIVE EDUCATION' IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1939

This section is significant in that it provides the economic, political and educational background with regard to aspects of 'Native Education' policy analysed in Part Two (the years 1939-48).

Chapter one outlines the political and economic context of the 'Native Education' policies of successive white Governments (both provincial and Union) before 1939, and provides the background of the later period (above).

Chapter two provides an historical analysis of 'Native Education' in the period prior to 1939.

C H A P T E R O N E

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF 'NATIVE EDUCATION' PRIOR TO 1939.

1.1 Introduction: The Nature of Educational Policy and its formulation

Educational policy cannot be analysed outside its political and economic context. There will always be forces influencing it in a particular direction.

These political and economic influences are usually formulated and dictated by the dominant class in a particular society.

No society can be without education for it is education that prepares the young for life; that transmits cultural values to them; that teaches them technical and social skills; and that encourages the belief in specific ideas and attitudes.

The form taken by education is largely influenced by historical circumstances. It is outlined by the specific objectives of the ruling-class in a society and usually reflects their ambitions and attempts to maintain the status quo. So it was with 'Native Education' in South Africa. From its inception there were political and economic influences which acted upon it; they regulated its growth and the direction in which it was to proceed.

White Governments in South Africa had one specific objective

in common with regard to 'Native' policy, namely to uphold the status quo of the whites as the dominant ruling-class and the Africans as the subserviant class.

However, their policies were often influenced by historical circumstances.

As Molteno states:

> "Policy is not an expression of official intent removed from the context in which it is implemented. Indeed it is that context which determines what policy means in practice ... and the consequences are often unintended."[1]

The policies applied by successive white Governments towards African education changed at specific times for they were affected by historical circumstances which had arisen.

The political and economic aspects relating to 'Native Education' will now be examined.

1.2 The discovery of minerals and the rise of secondary industry and their effect on 'Native Education'.

Bundy states that

> "the discovery of diamonds in 1867 in the soil of Griqualand West wrenched the Cape and South Africa, out of the slough of depression of the 1860's. Men flocked to the diamond fields to seek their fortunes, and others followed to provide goods and services".[2]

The discovery of minerals transformed the political and economic life of South Africa. The extraction of these minerals at the maximum profit-rate necessitated a cheap labour-force. Bundy states that the 1890's saw

> "...the emergence of gold-mine owners as a powerful interest group in South Africa . ... the mine owner's demands were for cheap labour and cheap foodstuffs."[3]

It was in the interests of both the capitalist mine-owners and the white ruling-class to maintain a steady supply of labour for the mines (diamond and gold) and the growth of secondary industry. The needs of mining necessitated the use of unskilled and uneducated labour. It is not surprising that a chief characteristic of the State's 'Native Education' policy in the early 20th century was its gross underfunding of 'Native Education' when compared with the amounts spent on white education (See 2.3.2). The limited financing of 'Native Education' led to poor facilities in this field; subsequently the standard of 'Native Education' was abhorrently low when compared with the level of white education (See 2.3.2). The above policy would have the effect of providing Africans with an inferior education, thereby possibly increasing the number of generally 'uneducated' Africans who would be fit only for manual labour.

The growth of secondary industry is highlighted by the following quotation from Hotz (1929):

> "South Africa is in the midst of a far-reaching economic revolution, the keynote of which is the efflorescence of a great variety of secondary industries and the progressive industrialisation of large sections of the population."[4]

The rapid growth of secondary industry is reflected by the fact that the number of manufacturing establishments in the Union increased from 3638 in 1915-16 to 6645 in 1929.[5]

At the same time the total number employed in private

industry rose from 101 178 to 201 180 during the same period.[6]

During the First World War these industries received an initial boost when it became impossible to import certain consumer goods.

The furniture industry on the Reef, for example, developed in the following way: 3 firms were established in 1912, 2 in 1915, 1 in 1916 and 3 in 1917.[7]

By 1929 however there were 50 firms in Johannesburg alone.[8]

Secondary industry further benefited from the'protection policy' of the Pact Government after 1924, as L. Hotz (1929) wrote:

> "The policy of protection is becoming deeply ingrained in the national consciousness, and is having decided effects in the introduction of new industries. The home market for the products of the local manufactures is assuming growing proportions, with the gradual disappearance of the old prejudice against the home-made article, the improvement of the quality of the latter, and, most important, the increasing purchasing power of the population, not excluding the non-European element.[9]

The Hertzog Government's Iron and Steel Act (1928) boosted secondary industry in S.A. and may be seen as the beginning of the S.African industrial revolution. The Act provided for the creation of ISCOR, an undertaking primarily to provide employment for thousands of unemployed and unskilled poor-whites (See 1.4.3). However, the need soon arose for more skilled and unskilled workers. An educational emphasis was therefore placed on the industrial training of both Africans and whites. More funds, though still insufficient when

compared with those given to white education, were granted to 'Native Education' (See 2.3.2).

Legassick emphasises the rapid expansion of secondary industry and its changing structure during the period 1930 to 1945. He states that

> "increased capital-intensity, increased mechanization meant that the old labour structure of skilled white and unskilled blacks began to be replaced by a division between supervisors (white) and semi-skilled machine operators.
> Increasingly during the war-time years manufacturers employed blacks in such operative positions because they could be paid lower wages than whites."[10]

The need and use of more highly-qualified African labour in industry is substantiated by Houghton:

> "It would appear that in periods of rapid economic growth the restrictions on non-white employment tend to be relaxed owing to the need to maintain output. In such periods non-white people can even move into more highly skilled occupations, replacing white workers who have moved into preferred avenues of employment elsewhere."[11]

The need to increase industrial training for Africans was greatly debated in the House of Assembly (See 7.4).

Historians such as Bundy, Legassick, Houghton, and the economist Hobart, have suggested that the discovery of minerals and the growth of secondary industry necessitated a supply of cheap manual labour which could readily be supplied by Africans. It is undeniable that white Governments insitituted 'Native' policies in order to maintain that steady supply of labour. (See 1.3.)

Although it has not been conclusively proved there is strong evidence to suggest that white Governments' 'Native Education' policies prior to 1948 were specifically shaped in order to provide the right type of workers for both mining (unskilled labourers) and secondary industry (semi-skilled workers).

An examination of Government Commission Reports and other official documents during the above period provides no direct evidence of manipulation of native education by white Governments.

However this study does not refute the possibility that Governments influenced educational policies in order to provide the right type of African workers for the State. As the lack of detailed records in this area makes it difficult to corroborate the above allegation, it must therefore remain merely an assumption.

1.3. Measures designed to force Africans off the land

Carter and O'Meara observe that

> "despite the disruption of tribal organization there were Africans who continued to produce commodities not only for their own needs but also for sale... The ever-increasing demand for cheap manpower to service the mines (diamond in Kimberley (1867) and gold on the Witwatersrand - (1880's) led to the imposition of taxes and other measures that steadily squeezed out self-sufficient peasant economies (in South Africa) to reduce their competition and to force Africans into the wage system."[12]

Both Colonial and Republican Governments issued taxation on Africans as a means towards obtaining labour for diamond and

gold mining and farms. Bundy states that in the Orange Free State, in the 1860's, the

> "persistent litany of farmers for labour was answered by a thicket of proclamations and laws, notable for the unambiquous determination to force Africans on to the labour market".[13]

Further evidence supplied by Van der Horst indicates that between 1870 and 1886 there were important and significant changes in both the amount and nature of taxes levied upon the 'Natives' of South Africa.[14]

An example was the hut tax of 10 shillings in the Cape (1869), 14 shillings in Natal (1875) and 10 shillings in the South African Republic (1880).[15]

Colonial and Republican Governments in South Africa made other official attempts to promote the supply of 'Native' labour by forcing Africans off the land. An example is the Cape Act No. 33 of 1892 which required the owner of every private location to take out a licence for which £1 was charged for every male adult 'Native' resident on his land who was not working for him.[16]

The 1913 Land Act is an excellent example of an attempt made by the White (Botha) Government to force Africans off the land. Legassick states that under the 1913 Land Act, African occupation of territory was restricted to some 13 percent of the area of the Union of South Africa.[17]

Atmore and Westlake outline some of the underlying motives behind the Act by stating that

> "...colonists and Africans were to become geographically and socially segregated within the total sphere of domination by the ruling colonial group, while economic intermingling was to take varied forms depending on the particular needs of the more politically influencial sections within that group."[18]

Subsequent legislation, the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, set aside further areas which were to be occupied by Africans. The S.A.P. Fusion Government regarded the reserves as constituting the roots of its 'Native Policy':

> "In these reserves lies the core of our Native Policy - the maintenance of Native life and institutions developing in harmony with the Europeans on parallel lines."[19]

However, as the African population increased, the reserves eventually became too small to effectively support such large numbers. Primitive methods of agriculture, coupled with the raging drought in the 1930's, resulted in low productivity and malnutrition in the reserves. Africans were therefore forced to leave the reserves and move in large numbers to the urban areas in search of employment.

1.4. Urbanization and its related problems

1.4.1. Some views relating to the townward movement of Africans

Historians differ with regard to the reasons for the townward movement of Africans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. De Kiewiet stresses that Africans were forced to migrate to the towns because they could not produce enough food owing to the fact that their land had been"wrenched

away."[20]

He further states that rising consumption needs

> "threw upon the tribes a burden their subsistence economy could not bear."[21]

D. Hobart Houghton on the other hand, argues that Africans failed to adapt the tribal economy to the problem of land scarcity. The failure to adapt their economy was due to

> "lack of technical knowledge, the inhibiting forces of social custom and a hostility to innovation and, a lack of response to market incentives.[22]

Houghton further refers to the 'weakness' of the traditional African economy and the inability of Africans to adapt that economy or forsake it for participation in the market economy.[22]

Monica Wilson observes that there was an initial period of early prosperity in the reserve areas of South Africa (and in the present day territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), followed only later by the symptoms of underdevelopment and subsistence.[23]

Bundy argues that there was an African peasantry* in South Africa during the nineteenth century.[24] This relatively small group of 'peasants' competed favourably with white farmers but failed to survive because "discriminatory and coercive means were utilized by the holders of economic and political power to disadvantage the African peasantry".[25]

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* A peasant was a rural (African) cultivator with access to a specific portion of land and who, by use of family labour, sought to satisfy the consumption needs of his family.

The measures imposed upon Africans to force them off their land, such as taxes and the Land Act (1913) were discussed in the previous section.

1.4.2. The problem of the over-crowding of Africans in urban areas

The townward movement of Africans brought with it many problems for the white Government. The Native Commission reported in 1921 that:

> "South African natives are not by nature town dwellers so that their congregation into towns largely at the instigation of Europeans raises hygienic, economic and social problems of considerable magnitude..."[26]

One of the major problems for the State was that of over-congestion around the cities. This led to the formation of slum areas and squatter camps on account of the serious shortage of accommodation for Africans. The Native Affairs Commission (1921) reported:

> "The provision for the housing and control of natives engaged in the industry, commerce and domestic service has not kept pace with the growth of the native population..."[27]

The Natives (Urban Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 was introduced by the State in an attempt to control the conditions of 'Native' residence in the white towns and villages. It was a comprehensive enactment providing

> "for the improved conditions of residence for Natives in or near urban areas and the better administration of native affairs in such areas..."
>
> (Off. Yr. bk. 1941)

The above Act in effect provided for residential segregation

(the basis of racial segregation) and for the removal of 'redundant Natives' from the towns. Africans generally resented this Act as it was discriminatory by nature.

Poverty and over-crowding of Africans into slum areas gave rise to the problem of juvenile delinquency. This problem is discussed in depth in Section 6.5. Education, it was always realised, was one of the ways of alleviating juvenile delinquency by keeping children off the streets for the greater part of the day.

1.4.3. The Poor-White Problem

The early 20th century saw a considerable increase in the townward movement of unskilled white workers. These were mainly Afrikaners who had gained a livelihood from farming, but had been forced to vacate their small-holdings on account of economic hardships intensified by factors such as drought and cattle-disease (rinderpest).

These unskilled, poor Afrikaners became known as poor-whites. A poor-white was a person of European descent who was not able to support himself according to the normal living standards of South African whites.[29]

Data obtained from questionaires sent to practically half the schools in the Union covering 72 844 families indicated that 17,5% of all the families with children at school were considered 'very poor'.[30]

If the same percentage was applied to the total white

population (just over 1,800 000 in 1931), more than 300 000 of the whole population were 'very poor'.[31]
These figures were taken in 1929/30 before the effects of the depression (See 1.5.) were so noticeable.

1.4.4. Wage rivalry and repressive industrial legislation

The labour force required in urban areas, chiefly in secondary industries, was recruited from the ranks of unskilled Africans and poor-whites.

It was inevitable that rivalry would develop between unskilled whites and Africans in the field of labour. Africans with considerably lower standards of living could work for wages much lower than whites would accept.
A disturbing factor was the disparity between the wages paid for skilled and unskilled labour. Lewis states that the difference between skilled and unskilled wage rates

> "might be roughly stated as the difference between £1 a day and £1 a week"[32]

F.A.W. Lucas, Chairman of the Wage Board (1929), argued that the disparity between skilled and unskilled wage rates led to considerable pressure for "deskilling" and for the downward reclassification of skilled work:

> "...the skilled worker's wage was relative to the native's wage so high that much of the semi-skilled work which formed part of the skilled man's work was handed over to the native, generally without any increase of wages...This process also tended to push the skilled man in some industries into entirely supervisory positions."[33]

Unskilled and even semi-skilled whites found themselves faced with African competition on the labour market. It was always realised, by white Governments, that the unskilled white class formed the majority of the white electorate upon which the Governments depended for their political survival. White governments in the 1920's introduced job-reservation to safeguard the labour available to unskilled whites thereby hoping to secure their political support.

In 1925 the Hertzog Government introduced the Wage Act which enpowered the Government to lay down wages for unskilled and unorganized labour (African). This Act must be seen in conjunction with the Colour Bar Act of 1926 which excluded Africans from a large number of skilled occupations, both in mining and in industry. These occupations were reserved for poor-whites who in terms of the Wage's Act then received more remuneration.

The above Acts formed part of the Pact Government's "civilized labour policy" which aimed at entrenching the economic privileges of whites.

1.4.5. The 1922 White Miners' Strike

The mood of unskilled white workers was reflected by the white gold and coal miners' strike which took place on the Witwatersrand during the period 1st to 10th January 1922.

The principal reason for the Strike was the decision by the Chamber of Mines, which was feeling the effects of the

depression (1920-23), to lower the wages of white miners and to decrease the ratio of white and African workers. The strike assumed political overtones when bodies of armed poor-whites became involved in attacking African miners who tried to go to work. The Smuts Government intervened by calling on the military to quell the strike. After 150 to 200 deaths and 500 to 600 injuries, the strike was eventually put down.[34]

1.4.6. Educational implications with regard to the above factors

It appears that the State's overall 'Native' policy towards the Africans was designed to keep them subordinate and to keep the whites dominant in S.A. The white (Hertzog) Government always realized the possibility that educated Africans might eventually oust whites on the labour market. This factor was reflected in the limited financing and support given to 'Native Education by the State.
Although the U.P. Government allocated more funds towards 'Native Education' in the 1930's., these funds failed to meet growing 'Native' educational needs (See Section 2.4.3.).

1.5. The effect of the depression in S.A.

An event which indirectly affected the course of 'Native Education' was the Great Depression which shook the world economy in the 1930's. This section briefly examines the

effect of the depression on agriculture, industry and the reserve system.

1.5.1. The effect of the depression on agriculture

S.A. could not escape the effect of the depression. Agriculture was adversely affected.

Schumann observes that...

> ..."the South African farmer shares this unenviable lot with the farmers of the U.S.A., Canada, South America ... the prices of cotton, wheat, sugar and rubber have fallen as much as those of wool and maize."[35]

The plight of the farmers was aggravated by one of the worst droughts in the history of the country. The Secretary for Agriculture described this period (1930) as

> "the darkest and most difficult experienced for the last 30 years."[36]

1.5.2. The 'failure' of the Reserve System

The depression and drought demonstrated the fragility of the reserve system and its failure to adequately support its African population with even the basic needs necessary for its livelihood. In 1913 the Botha Government had reserved all land already occupied by Africans at that time as their sole property (See 1.3)

Legassick states that

> "...under the 1913 Land Act African occupation of territory was restricted to some 13 per cent of the area of the Union of South Africa."[37]

The depression therefore exacerbated the problem of land

shortage in the reserves and forced Africans, who were dependent on an agricultural subsistence economy, to leave the reserves in large numbers. They headed for the cities and swelled the ranks of the unemployed. This increased urban congestion, and created with it both social and political problems (See Section 1.4.2). The State's 'Native Education' policy had to take cognizance of these problems. A need arose for more schools in urban areas and for more expenditure on 'Native Education'. One of the chief problems which arose was that of juvenile delinquency in the large urban areas. It was always realised, by the State, that a possible way of alleviating this problem was through education. This would assist in keeping African children off the streets for the greater part of the day.

The effects of the depression also resulted in whites being forced to leave their small-holdings and to head for the cities in search of employement (See 1.4.3).

1.5.3. The collapse of the diamond Industry and the increase in unemployment

The diamond industry was hard-hit by the depression. The exports of diamonds fell from £12 074 in 1929 to £5 841 in 1930 and to £3 574 in 1931.[39]

On 20 February 1932 the De Beers Company announced that it was closing down and shortly afterwards the Premier Company made a similar announcement.[40]

The collapse of the diamond industry led to large-scale

unemployment of both Africans and Whites. This is substantiated by the fact that the number of Africans on construction works increased from an average of 322 575 for 1927 to 342 513 a the end of November 1929, to 355 328 for November 1930 and fell to 353 381 for November 1931.[41] The number of whites employed on mines decreased from 355 115 in November 1930 to 31 598 in November 1931[42] - the decline being almost exclusively due to the depressed state of the diamond industry.

Employment in secondary industry also showed an appreciable decline.

White employment in secondary industry decreased from 28 409 in November 1929 to 25 092 in November 1931 while Coloured employment dropped from 13 296 to 10 757, Native from 32 381 to 27 097 and Asiatic from 3275 to 2447 for the same period.[43]

The effect of the depression was that is exacerbated the problem of unemployment already prevalent in the urban areas.

1.6. The crisis of the 1930's; political and economic factors

The depression helped create the 'crisis of the 1930's, the chief characteristic of which was unemployment.

Large-scale unemployment and a shortage of adequate housing led to squatter camps being erected on the outskirts of urban areas. Davenport clearly outlines the situation by stressing

that the African population of Johannesburg, for example, increased by 68% between 1936 and 1946, from 229000 to 384000[44]. More educational opportunities would have to be found for Africans and attempts would have to be made to alleviate growing social problems such as juvenile delinquency (See 6.5 - 1943 School Feeding Scheme).

Most whites began to feel threatened by the growth of a large black proletariate virtually on their door-steps (See J.G.Strydom's speech - 3.2). Furthermore the depression was biting deeply. The world economic recession caused a sharp decline in national income between 1927 and 1931[45]. To make matters worse the gold-standard crisis brought the Hertzog Government to the point of rupture. Britain left the gold standard in 1931 but Hertzog*1 refused to follow suit, trying to show that South Africa's economy did not depend on Britain. There was considerable doubt as to whether S.A. would be able to maintain the gold-standard*2 and money was sent out of the country. Tielman Roos (former Pact Cabinet Minister) returned to politics and demanded that S.A. leave the gold-standard. O'Meara observes that the Hertzog Government endured fifteen months of rapidly deepening economic crisis rather than leave gold.[46]

It was only after Tielman Roos threatened to form a Coalition Government that Hertzog in 1932, rather than risk defeat, announced that S.A. had gone off the gold standard.

*1 J.B.M. Hertzog was Prime Minister of the Pact Government (1924-34).

*2 A system in which a country's currency is based on gold in determining the value of the currency.

The problems of the 1930's, especially unemployment and the economic crisis, made the chances of a Hertzog victory in the 1934 elections slim indeed. Small wonder therefore that the Government made an all-out attempt to curb white grievances of unemployment by further building upon the "civilised labour policy" begun in the 1920's. (See Section 1.4.4).

"Civilised labour" may be defined as

> "the labour rendered by persons whose standard of living conforms to the standard of living generally recognised as tolerable from the usual European."[47]

The Hertzog Government's overall actions during this period must be seen in terms of its attempts to safeguard labour for the white working class and thereby win their political support. This policy is substantiated by the following examples:

1. In Government employment the substitution of European for 'Native' workers took place; between 1924 and 1933 the proportion of European labourers employed by the Railways and Harbours rose from 9.5 to 39.3 percent, while that of the 'Natives' fell from 75 to 48.9 percent.[48]
2. The Department of Public works followed the same policy; in 1937 it employed approximately 10 000 Europeans on types of work previously done by 'Natives'; while employment was found on subsidized works for approximately the same number.[49]

Increased urban congestion of Africans in the 1930's, besides leading to increased competition between unskilled whites and Africans on the labour market, also gave rise to the

increased growth of juvenile delinquency. The Government always realised that this problem could be possibly alleviated by the provision of more schools in the large urban areas (See 6.5).

1.6. Notes

1. Molteno, F. The Evolution of Educational Policy in South Africa, (1981); Wits. Univ.; p. 1.
2. Bundy, C. "The Emergence of a South African Peasantry". Contemporary Southern African Studies: Research Papers Vol. II; (1978);
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CHAPTER TWO

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 'NATIVE EDUCATION' PRIOR TO 1939

2.1. Introduction

This chapter examines 'Native Education' from its inception until 1939 and investigates the following issues:

1. The role of the missionaries.
2. Why and how the various Governments (Colonial, Republican and Union) displayed an interest in 'Native Education'.
3. Why the above Governments provided insufficient funds for 'Native Education' compared with the amounts spent on white education.

For convenience the history of 'Native Education' is separated into the following stages*:

1. Up to 1854: Church responsibility and control.
2. 1854-1925: Recognition and subsidization of Colonial and later Provincial Governments.
3. 1925-1944: Joint control by the Department of Native Affairs and Provincial Governments. This section outlines 'Native Education' until 1939.

This chapter is significant in that it provides the background in 'Native Education' to the crucial issues

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* P.E. Smith's stages as quoted in: Leonie, "The Development of Bantu Education in South Africa 1652-1954; p. 61.

examined in Chapters five, six and seven.

2.2. Church Responsibility and Control until 1854

2.2.1. The Role of the Missionary as Educator

Missionaries always realised that education was necessary to achieve their religious ideal which was to evangelise the Africans. Africans were to be taught to read and write so that they might better appreciate the Bible and Christianity. It is therefore not surprising that missionaries emphasised an academic rather than a manually-orientated type of education for Africans.

Missionary teachers inevitably introduced the type of education which they had themselves received in Europe and England. This was basically of a formal classical nature with a strong emphasis on literary content. The bases of the curriculum were the three R's.[1]

2.2.2. Missionary Activity in the Provinces of South Africa.

The first mission schools in the Cape were established in the 1820's and were primarily for Coloured pupils. However missionaries soon moved to the border districts, establishing mission schools at Chume (1821) and Lovedale (1824).[2]

Missionary activity was disrupted by the series of Frontier Wars which lasted from 1779 until 1850, but the missionaries always returned and did outstanding work in the rural

districts. The early mission schools operated independently of Government assistance and the first Government aid was given to schools that catered for the 'poorer classes', in 1841.[3] These schools used English as the medium of instruction.

African education in Natal commenced with the arrival of Captain Allan Gardiner, who in 1835 began his mission activities. In 1839 the first Voortrekker Council granted the American missionary Dr. Adams some land to establish a mission school in Natal.[4]

The Council of Representatives of the Voortrekkers of Natal did not oppose missionary activities among the Zulus in Natal as long as the 'Natives' were taught to obey the authorities and the laws of the land. Loram C.T.* reports that the few missionaries in Natal maintained small and struggling schools.[5]

With regard to finance the Letters Patent of 1848 stated that the sum of not less than £500 raised from general revenue of the Colony was to be expended for the benefit of 'Natives'.[6] A portion of this amount was spent on grants to the mission schools, but there was no Government control of the teaching in these schools.[7]

The control of 'Native Education' in the Transvaal and Orange Free State was at this time also securely in missionary hands

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* Chief Inspector of Native Education in Natal (1918) and Chairman of the Native Affairs Commission (1920-1930).

and was still in its infancy. Missionary work in the O.F.S. began in 1835 and in the Transvaal in the early 1850's, but the Republican Governments of both these states refused to give missionaries financial grants in the early years.

2.3. 1854-1925: Recognition and Subsidization by Colonial and later Provincial Governments

2.3.1. The State's interest in Industrial Education for Africans

The question must be asked: Why did white Governments (after 1850) begin to take an interest in 'Native Education'?
It appears that there were both political and economic motives which activated this interest.
In 1854 Governor George Grey in the Cape saw the economic and political advantages which could be gained if the 'correct' education was prescribed for Africans.
Grey stressed the advantage that industrial training would bring to the 'Natives' and to the whites in terms of trade, as well as the need to consider Christian responsibility to the underprivileged races. However Grey's motives were clearly political and economic rather than Christian. As Governor he was intent on introducing a new policy, that of integration of the 'Native' into the 'economic life' of the community. Grey hoped that this policy would help bring peace between Xhosas and whites on the troubled Eastern Cape frontier.

His system is described by Pells in the following passage:

> "Grey knew that the best way to raise the standard of living and civilize the morals of a people is by training the young. He induced the Cape government to allocate grants for six schools of handicraft and agriculture, to be called, like Lovedale, 'Institutions'.[8]

A further example of education being utilised to uphold political ideals is to be found in these words of Dr. Dale, Superintendant - General of Education in the Cape (1889):

> "The spread of civilization by school-industrial habits among the natives in the Border districts are of importance to the political security and social progress of the Colony"[9]

Sir Langham Dale's special report to the Cape House of Assembly in 1889 expresses some of the Government's motives for the introduction of industrial training among Africans. He stated:

> "The only way to enable the groups (Africans and whites) to do their parts respectively in the social world is to provide instruction adapted to the needs of each: for the native races, ordinary school instruction and training in the workshop and in domestic industries. You may thus send forth into the labour market from year to year a fair supply of ordinary artisans and domestic servants...
> If the European race is to hold its supremacy, the school instruction of its children must not only be the best and most advanced, but must be followed by a systematic training of the young colonists...
> The majority of the natives may be, at the best, qualified to do the rough work of artisans; but even this work must be under the direction of the guiding eye and hand of the skilled European, and it is the paramount duty to see that the colonist is as well fitted for the exercise of this directive intelligence as the stranger who comes hither with the cultivation and energy and development in the populous beehives of European industry."[10]

It would be difficult to find a better expression of the general attitude of whites towards Africans in the second

half of the 19th century as that outlined above. In fact, the belief that whites were to be masters and Africans servants was held by the conservative elements among the whites and was even an assumption of liberals until the 1930's.

White governments (both Colonial and Repulican) began to see the advantages of increased education for Africans. It was always realised that a 'black-schooled' population would supply a competent labour force for the State.

Molteno states that the increased grants available to 'Native Education', such as the £10 000 granted by the British to the Cape Government in 1877 led to an increase in African enrolment.[12]

He further notes that in the Cape the enrolment of African pupils rose from 2827 in 1865 to 1556 in 1885 and 25000 in 1891.[12]

In Natal African school enrolment rose from 145 in 1855 to 10618 in 1900.[13]

African education in the Transvaal and OFS, during the time of the Republics, was given little financial support. After the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), the Natal Government conducted a survey of schools controlled by the various religious bodies and instituted a scheme for the payments of grants-in-aid. A greater number of schools were unable to meet the Government's conditions (for grants-in-aid) and continued to operate as unaided mission-controlled institutions. In 1906 there were 177

unaided schools with an enrolment of 8492 pupils in addition to the 107 aided schools with an enrolment of 11720 pupils.[14]

The first half of the 20th century saw a slow but steady increase in the development of 'Native Education' and in African school enrolment. With increasing industrialisation, white Governments realised the tremendous advantage of readily available schooled 'Native' labour. The Eiselen Commission (1951) substantiated this view:

> "the discovery of minerals, the building of railways and the Anglo-Boer War...radically transformed the political and economic life of South Africa. The new conditions bred a new emphasis on Native policy and particularly on the view of the State concerning the education of the Native. The new mines, railways, farms, cities, and industries cried out for labour."[15]

Molteno observes that the rise of secondary industry increased the demand for workers with some level of literacy and numeracy, as well as semi-skilled and skilled workers.[16] The development of secondary industry is examined in Chapter One (Section 1.2).

2.3.2 The State's under-funding of 'Native Education'

The State had both political and economic motives for under-funding 'Native Education'. Africans were to be 'kept in their place' so as not to pose a political danger to the white rulers. Dr. Dale (1890) substantiated this view:

> "Whilst the present cautious system is pursued no social inconvenience or practical danger can result, but if some system of obligatory school attendance were introduced and thousands of kaffirs were leaving

> school year by year with sufficient school-instruction to cut them loose from tribal customs and modes of savage life, what would you do with them? What agencies could be devised to direct teeming thousands into the various channels of colonial industries?
> ...the crowding together of <u>educated</u> natives, living without a trade or regular habits of daily employment must tend to mischief and social disturbances."[17]

A further example of the concern in some white circles with regard to the education of 'Natives' is to be found in a memorandum submitted to Levey (1892)*:

> "...to have 20 000 or 30 000 (educated 'Natives') in the colony would be a serious matter. The present system of education is not only a waste of money, but money spent in raising up an army of discontents who sooner or later would become a serious danger to the country."[18]

The State's favouring of white education at the expense of 'Native Education' is illustrated by the following statistics:

In 1905 there were 73900 'African' school-children attending school in S.A. with a per capita expenditure of 13s 6d per educand.[19] By 1925 there were 206,623 'African' pupils at school. However the cost per African educand was still deplorable, a mere £2.05 as compared with £4.10 for Coloureds and Asians and £20.4.10 for whites.[20]

The State's limited financing of 'Native Education' appeared to be the major factor in denying Africans proper educational facilities. Loram provides evidence of the results of the underfunding of African education:

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* G3/1892: Report of a Commission appointed to inquire into and report upon certain matters connected with the educational systems of the colony.

> "...the education given is often of an extremely rudimentary kind. In 114 schools inspected during 1904 no less than 85,5 percent of the children in attendance were in the sub-standards, and only 1,5 percent had passed or reached standard III. In 1905-1906 only 65 out of the 305 Native teachers held certificates.[21]

The Government's limited financing of 'Native Education' was noted by E.H. Brookes (1929):

> "One of the reasons why more schools are not under state control is that the State is shirking its financial responsibilities and is only too glad to allow the missionay societies and churches to carry them"[22]

Further evidence of Government under-funding is substantiated by the appalling material conditions which existed in 'Native' mission schools in the 1920's. Loram observes that in the Transvaal: ...

> "they (schools) are generally held in church buildings ill adapted for educational purposes. In many cases seats and desks have not been provided, 'squatting' room for the children having been thought sufficient."[29]

The needs in secondary industry for better-trained workers encouraged governments to increase their control over 'Native Education' from 1920 onwards. However governments always realised that increased educational training of Africans might lead to competition with white workers. Skilled 'African' workers whose lower standard of living enabled them to accept lower wages might consequently displace whites in trade and industry.

The 1922 white miners' strike on the coal and gold mines demonstrated to the State how whites reacted when threatened with competition from Africans (See Section 1.4.5)

The S.A.P. and, (after 1924), N.P. Governments realised that their political survival was largely dependent upon their ability to safeguard the sphere of skilled labour for the white working class. Governments were to achieve this in two ways:

(i) by limiting the finances available for the education of Africans (See 2.3.2), governments would make it increasingly difficult for them to acquire the necessary technical skills which might cause them to present a serious challenge to skilled whites on the industrial labour market;

(ii) by means of repressive industrial legislation (Colour Bar and Wages Acts; See 1.4.4) some occupations in mining and industry were to be reserved for whites.

2.3.3 Increased Control over 'Native Education': 1922-1925

The State passed two Acts, in 1922 and in 1925, by which it progressively took over the financing of 'Native Education'. The Smuts Government, by Act No.5 of 1922, debarred the provinces from imposing direct taxes on Africans, except under certain conditions.[24] The State (S.A.P) thereby took the first national steps to control 'Native Education', in that the taxation of the Natives was changed from a provincial to a Union matter. The Act stipulated that each province had to spend annually on African education a sum not less than what it had expended during 1921-22.[25] The Act further provided that grants made by the Central Government to the provinces

for the education of the Africans would be paid out of funds obtained from direct taxation on Africans

> "but shall not exceed in aggregate a sum specifically appropriated each year by Parliament for the purpose"[25]

Act No.41 of 1925 is reviewed in the following section (2.4.1.). The Acts of 1922 and 1925 are of special significance in that the taxation of the 'Natives' was changed from a provincial to a Union matter. The provision of funds for 'Native Education' became entirely the responsibility of the Central Government. The Pact Government which was busy drafting legislation to curb the political and economic rights of Africans (See Sections 1.4.4.), wished also to control 'Native Education' and the best method to achieve this was by controlling its finances.

2.4. 1925-1939: Joint Control by the Department of Native Affairs and Provincial Governments

The State always realised that increased control over 'Native Education' would be necessary in any attempt to limit its development and growth. To achieve this the Central Government would have to gain control of the financing of 'Native Education'.

2.4.1. Dual Control of 'Native Education'

The Pact Government introduced the Native Taxation and Development Act (No. 41 of 1925). In terms of this Act a

Native Development Account was created which was administered by the Minister of Native Affairs in consultation with the Native Affairs Commission. Money made available by this fund would provide for the maintenance, improvement and extension of education among the 'Native' people. African taxation and the financing of 'Native' education became the responsibility of the Central Government although the provinces still retained control of the administration and the direction of policy in respect of the African people. Loram criticised the dual control of 'Native Education' by the Provincial and the Union Department in that it led to difficulties in administration and the amounts were not distributed on any fixed ratio.[26]

The Cape, for example, with a population of 1640162 Africans and 1661 recognised schools (1929), received £311643 while the Transvaal, with 1495869 Africans and 650 schools, received only £77100 in the same year.[27]

It appears that the State intentionally gained control of the financing of 'Native Education' in order to underfund it and thereby effectively limit its growth.

2.4.2. Increased enrolment of pupils but decreased expenditure on 'Native Education'

During the years 1925 to 1935 the enrolment of African pupils increased by nearly 75 percent, whereas the expenditure rose by only 50 percent.[28]

The following table provides information as to the amounts

spent on 'Native Education' during the 1920's and 1930's.[29]

TABLE 1

	YEAR	POPULATION	PUPILS	TEACHERS	EXPENDITURE (£)
AFRICANS	1928	5604900	241775	8991	540525
WHITES		1738937	337737	15113	6514747
AFRICANS	1938	6870900	424356	9880	893238
WHITES		2081400	381174	16657	8169648

An analysis of the above statistics reveals that in 1928 the African population outnumbered the whites by approximately 4 to 1 and the per capita amount spent on African pupils was £2-24 compared with the £19-29 spent on each white child per annum. In 1938 whites were outnumbered by about 3-1 whereas the amount spent on each African pupil was £2-10, slightly less than that spent ten years previously. The amount spent on white pupils, on the other hand, had risen to £21-43. These figures reflect the distribution of political and economic power in South Africa. The implications of the disparity in spending were to ensure that whites would receive a superior education and thereby maintain their privileged position in S.A. 'Native Education' would suffer because it was drastically under-funded.

The provision of schools and teachers was inadequate. The teacher-pupil ratio in 1928 was 1 to 27 for African and 1 to 22 for whites. The situation had deteriorated in 1938 when there was 1 teacher per 43 African pupils as compared with 1 per 23 whites (See Table I). Furthermore, overcrowding and a

lack of suitable facilities in 'Native' schools ensured that only a minority of pupils progressed beyond the very junior classes.[30]

It may be contended that this state of affairs in 'Native Education' clearly suited the capitalist-orientated State which required uneducated and unskilled Africans to provide manual labour in the economic sector, especially the mining industry.

2.4.3. The slow growth of 'Native Education' in the 1930's

The disparity between the amounts spent on 'Native' and white education in the 1930's is reflected by Table I above.

The question which needs to be asked is why the State devoted so little time, energy and money towards 'Native Education' in the 1930's? To answer this question 'Native Education' must be seen within the context of the crisis prevalent during this period. The depression and the resultant decline of the reserves (See 1.5.2) had resulted in urbanization as thousands of workers streamed to the cities in search of a livelihood. The gold-mines, by the 1930's could not accommodate the increased numbers of unemployed 'Natives'. The problem of urban unemployment was aggravated by the presence of poor-whites largely forced off their land by drought conditions and the economic effects of the depression (See 1.4.3).

Urbanization was advancing at a rapid pace; the number of registered African dwellers in the towns rose from 587000 in

1921 to 1794212 in 1946.[31]

The State's 'Native Education' policy must be assessed within the context of this 'crisis' of the 1930's. Education was merely one part of a much broader strategy designed to keep Africans 'in their place' and to appease the white working class in S.A. The State did not wish to see educated or skilled Africans posing a threat to whites on the overcrowded labour market.

The State however appeared to be concerned with deteriorating conditions in 'Native Education'. Various commissions were appointed to investigate the situation. Evidence of the plight of 'Native Education' is substantiated by the fact that the Native Economic Commission (1932) stressed the need to provide a more extensive base of financial support for 'Native Education'.[32] The Commissioners under Dr. J.E. Holloway pointed out that only one-fifth of the total number of African children between the ages of 6 and 16 were attending school, the cost to the State had been £618 000.[33] In the prevailing economic crisis the Commission considered it would be "unwarrantable optimism" to expect that the additional funds

> "necessary to make education permeate the whole or even part of the native population, will be made available on the present system."[34]

Evidence of the unhealthy state of 'Native Education' is substantiated by Dr. Wollheim, writing in connection with the Welsh Commission (1936). He observed that during the years

1925 to 1935:

> "...Native education has been in an apalling condition... Buildings in most cases consist of tin shanties or wattle and daub huts into which are crammed two or three times the number of pupils which the room should hold. The equipment is correspondingly pitiful...The salaries paid to teachers likewise appalling... The teachers are seriously overloaded, and one teacher will occasionally be found to be teaching eighty to a hundred pupils in two or three different standards all in the same room.[35]

Dr. Wolheim observed that

> "...in 1935 the position had become so severe that the Government appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee, consisting of the four Chief Inspectors of Native Education..."[36]

The Welsh Committee came at a moment of crisis in South African society yet it made no attempt to uncover the root causes of the deteriorating conditions in 'Native Education'. The Welsh Committee, unlike the Native Economic Committee, believed that an immediate and substantial increase in financial support from the State was necessary. It stated that:

> "the idea is fairly general that native education should be done 'on the cheap', an idea which may yet cost future generations very dear."[36]

It appears that the Welsh Committee was intended to be a Government showpiece - an attempt to indicate that the S.A.P. was indeed concerned with the appalling conditions in 'Native Education' and had therefore appointed a committee to investigate the matter.

The Welsh Report did contain a number of significant recommendations. It suggested that the existing division of responsibility between the Union and Provincial

Administration had proved unneccessary and should be replaced by a centralised system.[38] Control by the Union Department of Education was necessary in order to maintain close links with white education, thereby ensuring a co-ordinated educational policy for all ethnic groups.[39]

The Welsh Report`s recommendation that 'Native Education' should be centralised was clearly an attempt to gain more control over 'Native education'. Education was to be brought into line with the State's overall strategy towards the African population which Molteno describes as being "the denial of all political rights and the use of State power for the regimentation and physical control of the lives of African people by means of the reserve system, the pass laws, and an all-covering net of repressive legislation."[40]

The Welsh Commission also attempted to establish some general priciples with regard to the aims and scope of 'Native Education', but stated their conclusions in only the broadest terms. The essential continuity of the educational process was emphasised, whether it took place in a tribal or Western environment. The Report stated that

> "education should ensure the effective organization of the native's experiences so that his tendencies and powers may develop in a manner satisfactory to himself and to the community in which he lives, by the growth of socially desirable knowledge, attitudes and skills."[41]

The Welsh Commission devoted a large section of the Report to praising missionary effort, and it recommended increased

Government aid to the Mission Societies. This was not surprising for the missionaries were relieving the State of the burden of educating the 'Natives'.

Furthermore the Welsh Report attempted to justify the the Government's ambivalent 'Native Education' policy which smacked of conscious and intentional neglect. The following excerpt from the Report was not unlike the policy put forward by Nationalist Party politicians (See 3.5):

> "The education of the white child prepared him for life in a dominant society and the education of the black child for a subordinant society... It is no use shutting our eyes to the fact and ostrichlike positing aims for Native education which the very circumstances of South Africa make impossible to realise...Limits are there and form part of the whole social and economic structure of the country, and it serves no good purpose to act as if they did not exist.[42]

The Welsh Report's positive recommendations may be summed up as increased control over 'Native Education' both financially and administratively.

The State however did not increase expenditure on 'Native Education', using the excuse that the poor economic climate of S.A. (See Section 1.5.) made this suggestion hardly feasible. The State therefore continued its policy of under-funding 'Native Education'. This is substantiated by the fact that in the mid-1930's the Fusion government (S.A.P. and N.P.) spent over forty times as much per capita on the white population as on the African population![43]

Furthermore less than a quarter of African children between the ages of 6 and 16 were in school in the years 1939-40.[44]

The historian Pells observes that

> "...in the case of those who did go to school, the time spent and the work done there was so meagre as to amount to no education at all. For over half of them schooling terminated in the sub-standards. Most of the remaining 40 percent only reached Standard 6! The position by 1940 was that only one in every 1000 native children received a fair elementary education!"[45]

'Native education' was therefore failing to make the 'Native' literate. Government control had been firmly established and was being effectively maintained.

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P A R T T W O

SOME ASPECTS OF 'NATIVE EDUCATION' POLICY FROM 1939-1948

This section analyses some significant aspects of 'Native Education' policy in the above period.

Chapters three and four seek to reveal the underlying ideologies of the N.P.'s and U.P.'s 'Native Education' policies and reflect the political emphasis in 'Native Education'.

Chapters five, six and seven provide the focus of this study as they investigate the crucial issues of financing, school feeding and technical and vocational training in 'Native Education'.

Chapter eight provides a synopsis of the Government's overall 'Native' policy and indicates the reaction of some Africans to this policy. The study argues that 'Native Education' must be seen within the context of the above policy.

C H A P T E R T H R E E

THE N.P.'s POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND 'NATIVE EDUCATION' POLICY

3.1. Introduction

The National Party of D.F. Malan, (the official Opposition Party) had a distinctive policy on 'Native Education'. It followed this policy after the 1948 election victory over the U.P. This section examines N.P. political ideology and 'Native Education' policy.

3.2. The doctrine of "Apartheid"

"Apartheid" refers to the N.P.'s doctrine of racial segregation. J.G. Strydom, M.P., Afrikaner H.N.P. leader and Broederbonder explained "apartheid" in these terms:

> "Our task in South Africa is to maintain the identity of the white race, and in that task we will die fighting."[1]

This was the philosophy of hard-core nationalists who exploited factors such as the sheer numerical superiority of the Africans in relation to the whites, in order to drive 'fear into the hearts of the white electorate'. Evidence of the numerical superiority of the Africans over the whites and other races was provided by the 1946 Census which listed the totals for the various sections of the population as follows:[2]

White: 2 335 460

African: 7 735 809

Asiatic: 282 539

Coloured: 905 050

The above figures reveal that Africans outnumbered whites by approximately three to one.

There was concern in some white circles (mainly poor-white) over the threats posed by the growing number of Africans on the outskirts of the large urban centres (See Chapter 8.5). Poor-whites resented the economic competition presented by unskilled Africans on the labour market. Further concern in white circles was expressed over the growing African crime rate and juvenile delinquency prevalent in the urban slum areas (See 6.5; 8.5).

The N.P. capitalised on the above factors. It stressed that its political philosophy advocated racial segregation which favoured the removal of excess Africans from the urban areas and their return to the reserves. It appears that the N.P. was not concerned that the native reserves could not adequately support even the basic subsistence needs of their rural populations (See 6.4 - School Feeding Scheme).

N.P. politicians played on white 'fears' of being swamped by the African majority (See 3.2, 5.3).

J.G. Strydom (M.P.), speaking at Bethal (1 January 1948) used these 'fear tactics' while criticising U.P. 'Native' policy. Strydom stated:

"He (Hofmeyr) wants to raise all the non-Europeans to

> the standard of the European and then he expects them, with their overwhelming numerical superiority to accept our leadership - the leadership of a handful in a country of millions and millions of non-Europeans."[3]

He further stated that in Pretoria, East London and Potchefstroom the Europeans were only just in a majority.[3] In all other towns and cities the Europeans (whites) were overwhelmingly outnumbered.[4] He believed that there was only one solution - the N.P.'s policy of "apartheid".

The "apartheid" theory was developed by the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (S.A.B.R.A.). This Afrikaner body was founded in 1947 and was based at Stellenbosch University. S.A.B.R.A. defined the N.P.'s policy of "separate development" as follows:

> "By a policy of free and separate development we must understand the territorial separation of European and Bantu (African), and the____provision of areas which must serve as National and political homes for the different Bantu communities and as permanent residential areas for the Bantu population or the major portion of it."[5]

"Apartheid" was nurtured and supported by influential Afrikaner organizations, the most powerful being the Afrikaner Broederbond.

3.3. The Afrikaner Broederbond

The A.B., (founded on 5 June 1918) gave the following reason for its establishment:

> "The Afrikaner Broederbond was born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner nation was planted in this country by the hand of God and is destined to exist as a nation in its own right and with its own mission."[6]

It must be categorically stated that the A.B., far from being the cultural organization which it claimed to be, was deeply involved in politics. Munger believes that the A.B. played a significant role in the 1930's as a secret Nationalist Shadow Government.[7]

The political aim of the A.B. was best expressed by the A.B. itself in its circular letter of 16 January 1934:

> "Brothers, our solution for South Africa's ailments is not that one party or another shall obtain the whip hand, but that the Broederbond shall govern South Africa."[8]

Dr Malan and his lieutenants were prominent members of this 'cultural-political' organization. Hertzog, in his denunciation of the A.B. had provided evidence of its solid links with the N.P. In his Smithfield speech (7 November 1935) he stated:

> "There is therefore no room for doubt that the secret Broederbond is nothing other than the 'purified' National Party secretly busy in an underground capacity and that the National Party is nothing other than the secret Broederbond pursuing its objectives openly."[9]

Serfontein provides further evidence of the involvement of N.P. M.P.'s in the A.B.:

> "The Broederbond is an elite organization representing the vast majority of Nationalist Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentarians."

It may be assumed that the A.B. (with regard to the above evidence of its role) was 'actively' involved behind-the-scenes in formulating the Government's 'Native' and 'Native Education' policies.

3.4. Religious attempts to 'justify' "Apartheid".

The N.P. believed that it had a genuine religious basis on which to ground its policy of separate development and its educational programme. The following N.P. arguments attempt to illustrate that "apartheid" is according to the Will of God:

(i) Dr. J. Cronje Published "'n Tuiste vir die Nageslag", (1945), (A Home for Posterity). In this book he stated that:

> "the racial policy which we as Afrikaners should promote must be directed to the preservation of racial and cultural variety. This is because it is according to the Will of God..."[11]

(ii) In the late 1940's the N.P. appointed a Commission under P.O. Sauer (M.P.) to investigate and formulate the new race policy. It concluded that "apartheid" was based on the Christian principles of right and justice, and that the various non-white groups in South Africa should live in their own areas and develop to their full capacities as separate communities.[12]

(iii) Professor Coetzee (of Potchefstroom University) attempted to'justify' the "apartheid" philosophy on scriptural grounds. In an article entitled "Die Grondslag van die Afrikaanse Studentebond", he stated:

> "...It is God that orders that there should be separate nations. It is He who at the Tower of Babel disarranged the language of the people ... so that they could not be one people any longer ... Each people with its own language has received its own culture and history ..."[13]

> Professor Coetzee is guilty of interpreting this event solely to further the aims of segregationists.

The D.R.C. made many more attempts to justify "apartheid". At the "Volkskongress", held in Bloemfontein in July 1947, it was decided that scriptural grounds should be sought for the policy of separate development. Afrikaner intellectuals within the D.R.C., such as P.J. Meyer, stressed that the national purpose of the Afrikaners was subject

> "to the Ordination of God as He has revealed it in His Word."[14]

The N.P. was of the opinion that its political ideology was sanctioned by God and as such was unquestionable. Its 'Native Education' policy therefore had a religious basis for its implementation.

3.5. The N.P.'s C.N.E. policy for 'Native Education'

The educational aims of Afrikanerdom were to be implemented through an organization known as the "Nasionale Instituit vir Christelik Onderwys en Opvoeding" (National Institute for Christian Teaching and Education) which was established in July 1939.[15]

Its policy became known as Christian National Education. C.N.E. views on 'Native Education' were expressed in the Institute's "**Manifesto for Christian National Education.**" The following quotation from the **Manifesto** sums up the N.P.'s 'Native Education' policy:

> "The task of White South Africa with respect to the Native is to Christianise him and to help him culturally, and this vocation and task has found its immediate application in the principles of trusteeship, (there was to be) no placing of the native on the level of the white, and in segregation... The teaching and education of the Native must be based on the European's attitude to life, more particularly that of the Boer nation as the senior European trustee ... The mother-language is the basis for instruction ... Because of the cultural immaturity of the Native, it is the task of the State in co-operation with the Christian Protestant Churches to provide and superintend education for Natives ... The actual teaching should be undertaken by the Natives themselves under the control and guidance of the State, with the proviso that the financing of Native Education be placed on such a basis that it is not provided at the cost of European education."[16]

Robertson is of the opinion that it is difficult to regard the C.N.E. programme as being either Christian, national or educational in any convincing sense.[17]

3.6. The political views of N.P. politicians on 'Native Education'.

As education cannot be divorced from politics or economics, it was inevitable that in the debates on the funding of 'Native Education', the political ideologies of both the U.P. and N.P. would be highlighted. A few excerpts from the speeches of N.P. politicians during the debate on the 'Native Education' Finance Bill (April 1945) clearly sum up N.P. policy with regard to 'Native Education'. N.P. politicians repeatedly stated that:

> "...the correct system to be applied to the natives is the system of defininte Christian national education."[18]

In fact one of the greatest accusations directed against the Native Education Finance Bill was that it gave no indication about the kind of education envisaged by the Minister (J.H. Hofmeyr) or his Advisory Board. The N.P. believed that there should be a reform of the whole African educational system and it should be based

> "on the culture and background and the whole life of the Native himself in his tribe, on which development may take place."[19]
>
> (M.D.C. de Wet Nel, M.P., Wonderboom; April 1945)

The N.P. believed that if that were done, the 'Natives' own life would be developed and he would take the best of Western civilization and apply it to his own life.

P.O. Sauer (N.P.; M.P. for Humansdorp) adequately summed up the N.P.'s 'Native' policy in these words:

> "The one direction is that of the Nationalist Party: namely that wherever it is possible to do so, the Native should be kept in his tribal state, and that he should be educated and developed as far as possible in accordance with his customs and traditions."[20]

Such a policy envisaged a separation of white and black in S.A. The white man was to be educated along so-called 'civilised lines' so that he could rule effectively and the African was to be kept in his Kraal with the gates being opened only that he might emerge to work for the white man.

W.D. Brink (M.P. for Christiana) expressed N.P. thinking with regard to labour:

> "...the general purpose of education is to prepare people for life. What upbringing has the native

> necessary in South Africa? The great majority of them are labourers. Let them be prepared for that work. Then they will be better equipped for life.[21]

It is clear then, that the N.P. quite openly envisaged the creation of a subserviant African working class in S.A. M.D.C. de Wet Nel (M.P. for Wonderboom) provided a clear analysis of N.P. policy when he stated:

> "what is the policy which we should follow? ... it should indeed be our task to adhere to the following three principles: maintaining our European Christian civilization to the benefit of European and non-European in South Africa; secondly a policy of separateness between European and non-European in every possible sphere of life; and, thirdly, the maintenance of the principle of trusteeship"[22]

Horrell states that the N.P. accused the U.P. of having no clear-cut 'Native' policy.[23]

N.P. politicians in the Assembly Debates, skillfully played on the 'fear' which whites in South Africa had, of an 'ultimate black domination'. Government speakers stated emphatically that the N.P.'s purpose was not to do the African an injustice, but rather to give him ampler room for developing his own national identity separately from the white man.

It is virtually conclusive that most Africans found "Apartheid" and its C.N.E. policy totally unacceptable. Africans rejected the concept that differences of colour and culture should neccessitate an educational policy based on social, territorial and economic segregation. The following

excerpt from an article written by B.B. Mdledle, entitled Apartheid and Trusteeship, typifies the reaction of most Africans towards "apartheid". Mdledle stated:

> "The policy of Apartheid has no moral basis. It can only be maintained by force."
>
> (The South African Outlook, 1 Oct., 1948)

3.7. Notes

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2. Union of South Africa, Official Year Book (1947); Census figures.
3. The South African Outlook; (1 Jan. 1948); p.1.
4. Ibid.
5. Rheinallt Jones, J.D., "At the Crossroads," (1953); S.A.I.R.R.; p. 3.
6. Serfontein, J.H.P., Brotherhood of Power; (1978); Rex Collings Ltd., London, p. 40.
7. Munger, E.S., Afrikaner and African Nationalism; (1967); Oxford U.P., p. 65.
8. Wilkens, I. and Strydom, H., The Super-Afrikaners (1978); Jonathon Ball Publishers, p. 64.
9. Ibid.
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12. Ibid., pp. 229-230.
13. Vatcher (1965); p. 108.
14. Serfontein (1979); p. 52.
15. Vatcher (1965); p. 101.
16. Robertson, I.A., Education in South Africa: A Study in the Influence of Ideology on educational practice (1973); Harvard Univ., Ed. D., p.59.

17. Ibid.

18. **South African Assembly Debates**, (April 1945).

19. Ibid, Col. 4499.

20. Ibid, (22 May 1946), Vol. 58, Col. 4501.

21. Ibid, Col. 4536.

22. Ibid, Col. 8243.

23. Horrell (1954); p. 12.

24. **The South African Outlook**, (1 Oct. 1948); p. 152.

C H A P T E R F O U R

A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT'S 'NATIVE EDUCATION' POLICY

4.1. Introduction

Although a distinction was often made, in the period under review, between the 'Native' policy as followed by the Native Affairs Department, and 'Native Education' which was under the Union's Education Department with the Provinces exercising a large measure of Control, this study regards 'Native Education' as part of the overall 'Native' policy followed by the U.P. Government.

This section attempts to ascertain the nature of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy.

4.2. The Nature and Control of 'Native Education'

The control of 'Native Education' in 1939 was a rather complicated procedure which was unsound in theory and cumbersome in practice. According to this system: (1) the Union Government provided the finances mainly from taxation; (2) the Union Native Affairs' Commission apportioned the money among the Provinces and between the services in each Province, and (3) the Provinces were responsible for the day-to-day administration.

The Inter-Departmental Committee headed by Senator Welsh

(See Section 2.4.2) had recommended that 'Native Education' should become a Union service.

It suggested that a National Board should be formed which would represent the Central Government, the Provincial Advisory Boards on which the missionary bodies were largely represented and the 'Natives'. The above Committee recommended that the Union Department of Education should undertake the detailed administration of 'Native Eduction' as it was already responsible for Technical Schools and University Education. The N.P. disagreed with the above reommendations as it wished to see 'Native Education' brought under the control of the Native Affairs Department and divorced from the rest of the educational system. The N.P. argument was that S.A. had adopted a 'distinctive Native policy', one of 'segregation' (See 3.2)

The difference in emphasis between the nature and control of U.P. and N.P. 'Native Education' policy was reflected by J.H. Hofmeyr (Minister of Education) in an address to the Pretoria Native Welfare Association (30 Nov. 1939).

Hofmeyr attacked the N.P.'s policy which advocated complete segregation between African and white education. He stated:

> "Segregation in Native Education would be or might be a defensible policy if we had to deal with natives in the reserves. It breaks down completely in relation to the urban native."[1]

Hofmeyr believed that 'Native Education' should continue to be regarded as part of the general educational scheme of the country. He was not in favour of the strong movement (N.P.)

to bring 'Native Education' under the Native Affairs Department and divorce it from the rest of the education system.

The N.P. argued that S.A. had adopted a distinctive 'Native' policy, one of segregation, and as 'Native Education' was part of the general 'Native' policy it should also be separate and distinctive in nature. (See 5.3.3.; Debate on Control and Finance). The U.P. Government, on the other hand, although it allocated land for 'Native' occupation, believed that total segregation of Africans and whites was unwise, if not impractical. Hofmeyr stated:

> "One fact you cannot get away from and that is that there never will be much more than half our Native population living in the Native areas (reserves). The rest will continue to live on the white man's farms and in the white man's towns. They will do so because the white man thinks that it will be to his advantage that they should."[2]

The above words indicate that the U.P., like the N.P., was concerned with the advantages which African labour would provide for the white man. The Africans' aspirations would have to take second place.

Hofmeyr believed that segregation (as advocated by the N.P.) failed to take into account the position of the urbanised 'Natives' and the fact that they were living among Europeans; their education should be such that it enabled them to make a full contribution to the white man's economy.[3] The nature of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy reflected an

economic emphasis which was manifested in the Government's actions with regard to 'Native Education'. These factors are exmained in subsequent sections of this study.

The question of the control of 'Native Education' is examined in the Debate on the Native Education Finance Bill. The conclusion arrived at in this Debate was that there would be 'no immediate centralization' of Native Education; Provincial control would be maintained but the Advisory Board would suggest where the finances should be expended (See 5.3)

4.3. Principles of the U.P.'s 'Native Policy'

The U.P.'s 'Native Education' policy must be analysed within the context of its overall 'Native' policy, of which it was an essential part. It is therefore necessary to provide a synopsis of the U.P.'s 'Native' policy.

The U.P.'s 'Native' policy was clearly expressed in a pamphlet issued by Smuts as leader of the U.P.[4]

Firstly the U.P. stood for European (white) leadership and authority and the principles of Christian Trusteeship towards the 'Native' peoples who were nevertheless regarded as a permanent part of the population. Briefly the Trusteeship ideology stated that the proper relationship between white and African was analogous to that of guardian and ward. Gerhart observes that

> "trusteeship has the advantage for the whites of combining a conscience-saving benevolence with a practical policy aimed at indefinite maintenance of

white privileges".[5]

For many years Africans believed in the promises of Trusteeship, that they would eventually obtain equality. They therefore restrained their demands accordingly. However, Africans eventually grew impatient with the unfulfilled promises of their rulers and began to call for more than token political rights (See Ch.8). Secondly the U.P.'s policy was based on the 'factual position' that there were differences between Africans and whites and of the existence, in addition to the 'Natives' in the reserves, of a settled 'Native' population on farms and in urban areas.

The third point made by Smuts was that the U.P. was not in favour of a policy of equality and assimilation, but it rather stood for the social and residential separation of the races. Fourthly, the U.P. believed in the development and education of the Africans but this was to take place under 'European guidance'.

4.4. The U.P. Government's 'reluctance' to grant educational reform

The U.P. Government's hesitant and indecisive policy with regard to the development of 'Native Education' was expressed in the address of Colonel Reitz (Minister of Native Affairs) to the N.R.C. on 7 December 1942. He stated:

> "...there is a great deal of fear and prejudice to overcome, and we must walk warily to avoid antagonising (white) public opinion and arousing uncompromising forms of reaction."[6]

It appears that the 'appeasement' of white opinion was a major characteristic of the Smuts Government's policy towards the Africans. The Government was afraid that whites might see reform as a token of surrender and therefore it decided to 'tread warily'. Further evidence of the Government's go-slow policy with regard to reform is reflected in Smut's reply to Hofmeyr:

> "...our Native policy will have to be liberalised at modest pace but public opinion has to be carried with us..."[7]

An aspect of the 'nature' of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy was that it was characterised by caution and reluctance to introduce meaningful reforms in 'Native Education'. It appears that the Government was unwilling to do 'too much' for Africans because it was concerned with its political survival. It was always realised that the white electorate, which was largely conservative, would be inclined to support the N.P. accusations that the U.P. was using white tax-payers' money to educate Africans (See 3.2 and 5.3 for further information supporting this argument).

W.D. Brink, for example, (N.P.; M.P. for Christiana) accused the Government of plotting the downfall of the European race by spending 'too much money' on 'Native Education' (5.3). Brink stated that:

> "the Natives will be powerful competitors with the Europeans in every sphere. They are given the same education as the whites and it will not be long before they dominate on account of their tremendous majority".[8]

This study argues that the U.P. Government adopted a

cautious 'Native Education' policy as it was concerned with losing white electoral support.

The Smuts Government was always aware of the inter-racial problems which were accentuated during the war years.

Speaking at the annual prize-giving of the Welsh High School in East London, (November 1944) Senator Welsh expressed Government concern with regard to African-white relations:

> "...I trust that you will all endeavour to create good relations between Africans and Europeans (whites). The feeling is widespread that relations between these races have deteriorated recently. I do not propose to discuss the reasons for this very unfortunate and deplorable development for which of course, you are not responsible."[9]

The above quotation suggests that the possiblity of a confrontation between whites (especially poor-whites) and Africans in the large urban areas could not be ruled out.

It is argued that the above factors were largely responsible for the negative aspect of the nature of the Government's 'Native Education' policy, namely its reluctance to introduce reforms. The U.P. Government was prepared to leave the control of 'Native Education' largely in missionary hands as previous white Governments had done (See Chapter Two).

This policy would necessitate less Government expenditure.

The debate relating to missionary involvement in Native Education is examined in Section 5.3.4..

A significant aspect of the nature of the Government's 'Native Education' policy was the provision of limited technical and vocational training for Africans as

compared with that given to white technical and vocational institutions. It is argued that the Government followed this policy because it had no intention of providing Africans with techical and vocational training as this might result in them presenting a competitive threat to whites in the field of skilled labour (See Chapter Seven for furhter development of this argument).

The discrimination against Africans with regard to wages (i.e. paying unskilled Africans much less than unskilled whites; See Chapter 8) often resulted in whites being displaced by Africans on the unskilled labour market. The Pact Government had introduced the colour-bar in industry which reserved certain skilled trades entirely for whites thereby artificially reducing the supply of workers in those trades and increasing the supply in the unskilled trades (See 1.4 for Pact legislation).

The Smuts Government retained the colour-bar while also limiting opportunities for African children in the sphere of technical and vocational training. There did not appear to be any sense in training Africans for the skilled trades if avenues for them in these trades remained closed.

A significant aspect of the Government's 'Native Education' policy was its introduction of the 1943 School Feeding Scheme for African children. A comprehensive account of some aspects of the Scheme is to be found in

Chapter six. This study contends that the Scheme was a positive development in 'Native Education' policy in that:

(i) It helped provide for the nutritional needs of African children who were suffering from malnutrition in the Native reserves and Urban areas (See 6.4);

(ii) It was a possible means of alleviating the growing problem of juvenile delinquency, in the large urban areas (See 6.5). This problem had accelerated during the war years because of the increased townward movement of Africans.

It may be contended from the above account, that the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy mainly reflected negative characteristics. A few aspects however, could be viewed in a positive light. The following chapters provide an analysis of some of these aspects.

4.5. Notes

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CHAPTER FIVE

SOME ASPECTS OF THE FINANCING OF 'NATIVE EDUCATION' FROM 1939-1948

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to show that the Smuts Government under-funded 'Native Education' as compared with the finances provided for white education.
This section also examines the arguments put forward in the South African House of Assembly Debates with reference to the financing of 'Native Education'.

5.2. The Limited financing of 'Native Education'

The Smuts Government virtually had its hands tied with regard to expenditure on 'Native Education'. It was always recognised that the provision of technical training for vast numbers of Africans could possibly lead to them presenting a challenge to whites in the field of skilled labour.
The U.P., with the strike of 1922 a not too distant memory, (See 1.4.5) was always aware that the white electorate might feel threatened by an educated African majority in S.A. Furthermore the U.P. Government was dependent on white votes for its political survival. (See remarks of Reitz and Smuts later in this section).
Besides this pressure emanating from its own white

supporters, the U.P. Government had to face a constant barrage from the right-wing N.P. in Parliament, who were opposed to the policy of using 'white tax-payers' money' to educate Africans whom they argued would eventually threaten the 'very existence of the white man in S.A.' (See Section 5.3.3)

According to the N.P. the chief purpose of 'Native Education' was to prepare the Africans for their role as the subordinate working class in S.A. The N.P. launched an all-out attack on the Government's 'Native Policy', of which education was an essential part. The measure of the N.P.'s success in influencing white public opinion was reflected in the N.P.'s electoral success of 1948.

The above factors were largely responible for the Government following a go-slow policy with regard to its 'Native' policy.

The Government's wary attitude and indecisive policy is substantiated by the remarks of Colonel Reitz (Minister of Native Affairs) in his address to the N.R.C. on 7 December 1942:

> "...there is a great deal of fear and prejudice to overcome, and we must walk warily to avoid antagonising public opinion and arousing uncompromising forces of reaction."[1]

Further evidence of the U.P.'s attitude is reflected in Smuts' (P.M.) reply to Hofmeyr (Minister of Education):

> "...our Native Policy would have to be liberalised at modest pace but public opinion has to be carried with us..."[2]

(The above have been re-quoted for emphasis.)
(see section 4.4.)

The affect of the above factors is reflected in the meagre amounts spent on 'Native Education' during the above period. Although the Smuts Government (1939-48) spent more per capita on 'Native Education' than the Hertzog Government had done, the increased expenditure was insufficient to meet the educational demands of Africans. The following statistics indicate the disparity between the amounts spent on white and 'Native Education'.

In 1939 the cost of educating 'African school-goers was £909.340 which amounted to an annual cost of £2.4o per pupil whereas the cost per white educand was £21.4 per pupil.[3]

Horrell observes that until 1945 the funds for 'Native Education' were always far from adequate; generous voluntary contributions were made by missions and African communities but for twenty-three years the sum voted by the State was restricted to an amount of £680 000 a year (the total for 1922) plus a proportion of the money paid by Africans in direct taxation.[4]

On account of the limited financing of 'Native Education', conditions in mission schools were far from satisfactory. The pupil-teacher ratio was extremely high; 42 to 1 in 1942 as compared with 23 to 1 for whites.[5] Teachers were under-paid and about 18 percent of them were unqualified.[6] Furthermore there were not enough buildings and those available were primitively constructed. There was also a great shortage of furniture, books and equipment.[7] Hurwitz

observes that the 'Native' educational system had reached a critical stage by 1945 on account of the lack of adequate funds.[8] Although the sum allocated for 'Native Education' out of the General Tax had increased from 4s.5d. to 16s.8d (in the £) before 1945, the system showed signs of collapse as the 'Native' population increased at a faster rate than the tax receipts.[9] Less money was therefore available for more people seeking education. The U.P. Government, conscious of the Opposition's accusations of using white tax-payers' money to further 'Native Education', (See 5.3. and 7.4.3) was unwilling to provide adequate finances for the growing educational needs of the Africans.

The rapid industrialization of S.A. led to the increased urbanization of Africans. Leonie, for example, observes that the urban population of the Aficans for the period 1921 until 1946 multiplied by three times.[11] The result of this was overcrowding, shortage of housing, lack of employment and a growing demand for schools in urban areas. This situation was aggravated by the problem of growing juvenile delinquency in the cities (See Section 6.5). The above factors were instrumental in influencing the Government to follow a new course in its 'Native Education' policy.

Act 29 of 1945 was passed to increase expenditure on 'Native Education.' This Act provided, inter alia, that Parliament should make availble for 'Native Education' in each of the provinces funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Funds

required for 'Native Education' were no longer dependent on the general tax paid by the Africans. The Act furthermore set up a Union Advisory Board whose members were nominated by the Minister of Education and whose function was to advise the Minister and the provinces on all matters relating to African education. The Board was enpowered to prepare the budget for 'Native Education' for approval by the Minister and for submission to Parliament. The estimates were discussed under the Vote of the Department of Education, Arts and Science.[11]

The Act, which is further discussed in Section 5.3, marked a definite change in the financing of 'Native Education', since the principle that any extension of educational facilities for the Africans should be financed out of direct taxation on the Africans, embodied in the 1925 Act, was discontinued. The immediate result of this new system was a significant increase in the expenditure on 'Native Education'. The following table indicates how this rise took place:[12]

TABLE II

YEAR	EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION (AFRICAN)	NUMBER OF PUPILS	PER CAPITA COSTS
1945	£2.248.529	587.586	£3.82
1946	2.610.673	640.638	4.08
1947	3.657.701	670.515	5.46
1948	4.283.625	723.039	5.93

Although the above figures represented a spectacular increase

when compared with the amounts spent on 'Native Education' in previous years, they were insufficient to cope with the increasing needs of the African child and his society. Furthermore the above amounts spent on African education still represented gross under-funding by comparison with the following amounts spent on white education during the same years.[13]

TABLE III

YEAR	EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION (WHITE)	NUMBER OF PUPILS	PER CAPITA COSTS
1945	£13.216.580	404.878	£32.64
1946	14.582.981	413.884	35.23
1947	13.005.012	422.241	30.80
1948	14.021.262	434.701	32.30

The disparity between the financing of white and 'Native Education' remained a characteristic of the Smuts Government's policy which was designed to give whites a better education than Africans. The gross disparity is reflected by the fact that, for example, in 1945 £28.37 more per capita was spent on white than on African education, while in 1948 the difference was £26.37 per capita (See Tables II & III above).

The increase for Africans was therefore really insignificant

if it is borne in mind that expenditure on 'Native Education', though more than in previous years, was still insufficient to meet increased African school needs. As stated above, it appears that the U.P. had no desire to arouse the antagonism of the white electorate by spending too much money on 'Native Education'. This would enhance N.P. criticism that it was using white tax-payers' money to educate Africans who would eventually compete with and even oust whites on the labour market.

5.3. House of Assembly Debates relating to the financing of 'Native Education'

5.3.1. Introduction

Assembly Debates relating to the financing of 'Native Education' took place from 1945 to 1948. These debates often led to heated discussions between the U.P. and N.P. and illustrated the maxim that 'all Native Education is politics'. Far from being restricted merely to the financial aspect of 'Native Education', the arguments during these debates also referred to the following issues:

(i) the centralization of 'Native Education';

(ii) the role of the missionaries.

5.3.2. The Native Education Finance Bill

The Native Education Finance Bill, introduced in April, 1945, stimulated a lively discussion in Parliament between the U.P.

Government and the N.P. Opposition. J.H. Hofmeyr (Minister of Education and Finance) expressed the Government's reason for introducing the Bill:

> "Although Parliament has been finding virtually all the money for native education, Parliament has had really very little opportunity for discussing a service for which it has had to appropriate virtually all the money required."[14]
>
> (Assembly; 2 April 1945)

Hofmeyr outlined the background which he believed necessitated the legislation. Under the Act of Union, education, other than Higher Education, was assigned to the Provinces. However Act No.5 of 1922 had removed provincial imposition of a direct tax on 'Natives'. The legislation of 1925 (2.4) meant that Parliament would finance'Native Education' to the sum of £340 000 p.a. In addition the Native Taxation and Development Act (1925) provided for the allocation of one fifth of the 'Native' general tax for 'Native Education' and 'Native' welfare.[15]

Parliament had therefore given the Provinces £340 000 a year for 'Native Education' and £1 200 000 not appropriated but payable in terms of the Act of 1925.[16] Hofmeyr stressed that Parliament had provided the money necessary for 'Native Education' for the past twenty years and yet did not have a direct say in the way that money was to be used. He further noted that the 'present system' did not keep pace with the needs of 'Native Education'. The Government had therefore embodied in Clause 2 of the Bill what the Minister believed was the correct principle:

> "There shall from time to time be paid to each of the Provinces from the Consolidated Revenue Fund such

> sums of money in respect of native education as Parliament may appropriate for the purpose."[17]
> (Assembly: 2 April 1945)

What Hofmeyr was in fact advocating was control of the growth of 'Native Education' by controlling and regulating the financial backing it would receive.

The chief purpose of the Native Education Finance Bill was to create the machinery whereby the finances relating to 'Native Education' would be effectively controlled.[18] The Bill did not envisage taking 'Native Education' away from the control of the provinces as this was in Hofmeyr's opinion "not practical politics".[19]

He stated that the Union Government had in fact suggested that possibility to the provinces but they had rejected the idea.[20] Furthermore the provinces were safeguarded by Act 45 of 1934 which ensured that the powers of the Provincial Council could not be abridged except on their petition.[21]

Hofmeyr stated that the question as to which department 'Native Education' should fall under was merely of academic interest as it was not included in the Bill.[22] The 1936 Welsh Commission had however recommended that it should fall under the Union Education Department.[23] Hofmeyr stressed that it was not the Bill's intention to take 'Native Education' from the Provinces.[24]

The Provinces, through the missionaries, were doing a 'good enough job' and the Government would leave education largely in their hands. (See 5.3.4).

The Bill would merely provide the machinery necessary for the distribution and allocation of money available for 'Native Education'. The Provinces would furnish their estimates and the Advisory Committee (Board) would examine them, report on them and submit them to the Treasury. Once approved the money would be sent to the Provinces. With regard to the constitution of the Advisory Board, the Secretary for Native Affairs would be the Chairman and the Union Education Department would provide the Secretariat.[25] Hofmeyr stated that the Bill received the suppport of the Ministers of Education and Native Affairs. It was however a Bill purely for financial control. He assured Parliament:

> "The Bill does not give us the power to impose a policy on the provinces".[26]
> (Assembly: 2 April 1945)

P.O. Sauer (N.P.; M.P. for Humansdorp) congratulated the Government for the fact that

> "we are at least getting a little more centralization with regard to the direction of native education."[27] (Assembly: 3 April 1945)

He regretted that the Bill did not go far enough, for it merely gave the central body advisory powers and it was then left to the Provinces to decide whether they would accept that central advice.[28] Sauer's criticism indicated the authoritarian control of 'Native Education' envisaged by the N.P. Sauer further criticised the composition of the Advisory Board:

> "I need only look at the manner in which this proposed board is constituted to realise immediately that it will be practically impossible to devise a uniform educational system".[29]
> (Assembly; 3 April 1945)

Criticism of the Advisory Board became the main line of N.P. attack. S.A. Cilliers (M.P. for Zoutpansberg) took up the cudgel. He believed that the Board should constitute:

> "practical men who came into contact with the natives throughout the day and whose children actually play with their children and who know what the natives' attitude is towards the education that he has obtained from the European."[30]
>
> (Assembly; 3 April 1945)

He was furthermore concerned that no provision was made in the Bill for the number of members who would serve on the Board and what sort of members they would be. The Minister should also advise the board as to how the money should be utilised when it was handed over to the different provinces.[31]

Nationalist M.P.'s J.J. Serfontein (Boshof) and J.J. Fouche (Smithfield) further criticised the Bill because of the wide-sweeping powers given to the Minister of Education under Clause 4 which stated

> "The Minister may make regulations with regard to...the powers, duties and functions of the board."[32]
>
> (Assembly: 3 April 1945)

Such criticism was rather ironic in that, had the N.P. been in power, it would possibly, with its authoritarian nature, have introduced far more dictatorial measures.

The N.P.'s belief in the centralization of 'Native Education' was epitomised by the proposed amendment to the Bill, introduced by M.C. de Wet Nel (N.P. for Wonderboom):

> "I therefore wish to make the following ammendments- to omit all the words after "that" and to substitute

> 'this House declines to pass any legislation in regard to the financing of native education until a competent Commission of Enquiry has investigated and reported therein with the object of placing it under the Department of Native Affairs in order to obtain uniformity of policy and administration.'"[33]

The amendment was seconded by Sauer and agreed to by C.R.Swart (N.P. O.F.S. leader and M.P. for Winburg) on condition that it was not the intention of the amendment that 'Native Education' would be taken away from the provinces.[34] The above debate reflected a difference in opinion within N.P. ranks with regard to the amount of centralization that should be implemented. Swart, by insisting that a certain amount of Provincial control be maintained, was actually closer to U.P. Government policy on this matter than he was to the policy advocated by the N.P. M.P.'s, Nel and Sauer.

The amendment proposed by Nel was defeated by 75 votes to 36 and the original motion (Bill) was accepted by 76 votes to 34.[35] There would therefore be no immediate centralization of Native Education, provincial control would be maintained but the Advisory Board would suggest where the finances should be expended.

5.3.3. Arguments relating to the financing of 'Native Education'

This section analyses the arguments in the assembly with regard to the general financing of 'Native Education' during the years 1945 and 1946. Many of the arguments presented

took place during the debate on the above mentioned Native Education Finance Bill (3 April 1945) and during the debate on Vote No. 19 (17 April 1945) which proposed the allocation of £2 530 000 for 'Native Education'. This motion, though strongly opposed by the N.P., was 'carried' by the Government because of its greater majority in Parliament.

The general attitude of both the U.P. Government and the N.P. Opposition was that enough was being done for the Africans financially. Nel stated that the N.P. was in favour of giving the Africans an opportunity to develop but: "we must not move too fast"[36]

He cited the following statistics:

> "In 1938 the expenditure on native education was £893 000, and in 1944 it had risen to £1 900 000, and in 1945 to £2 530 000 if we include the amount devoted to the feeding of natives. We must be rather careful."[37]
>
> (Assembly: 5 April 1945)

W.D. Brink (M.P. for Christiana) supported this view by stating that the European, by paying for African education, was working for his own downfall.[38]

He observed that within a short time

> "the natives will be powerful competitors with the Europeans in every sphere. They are given the same education as the Europeans and it will not be long before they dominate on account of their tremendous majority."[39]

Brink's argument manifested N.P. fears of being swamped by the 'Black majority'; at that time (April 1945) the Africans numbered approximately 8 000 000 as against 2000 000

whites.[40] The N.P. believed that white, and principally Afrikaner, interests should be considered first and foremost, so that the Afrikaner identity and the 'ruling-class status ordained by God' would be effectively maintained. (See Chapter 3.4)

It was in N.P. opinion foolhardy to spend large amounts on African education before white educational needs had been fully met.

N.P. speakers S.A. Cilliers (Zoutpansberg) and J.N. Le Roux (Ladybrand) seriously criticised the principle that Europeans should pay for African education.[41] Le Roux regretted that there was not enough money available for white education in the O.F.S.; the authorities had been trying for years to raise compulsory education up to Std. VIII but it could not be afforded.[42] He expressed the views of the public:

> "The European population feel that when we have to neglect our own interests because we have not got the money that is necessary for the objects we think desirable, we should not devote such large sums on native education as will injure our interests. The two come in collision with each other.."[43]
>
> (Assembly: 5 April 1945)

Clearly this was a biased point of view; in the N.P.'s opinion the volks' needs were to come first, everything else came second.

The Government's African taxation policy came under N.P. attack. Gen. J.C.G. Kemp (M.P. for Wolmaranstad) spoke of the Africans as if they were the privileged race:

> "The European is taxed in order to pay old age pensions to the natives. The European is taxed to provide the natives with education. The European is taxed to pay wounded natives and coloured people and buy land for them".[44]
>
> (Assembly; 8 April 1945)

He observed that during the last 10 years the amount for 'Native Education' had swelled to £2 500 000.[45] He posed the question - what would it cost the Government if the amount increased yearly like that?[46]

Swart (N.P.; M.P. for Winburg) further criticised the Government's taxation system:

> "Natives are today receiving high wages in comparison with earlier times, and many receive from £15 to £35 per month. Do they pay tax?"[47]

Upon being assured by Hofmeyr that they did he replied:

> "The Provincial Council does not receive the Poll Tax and the other taxes bring in very little to the pocket of the provincial council."[48]
>
> (Assembly: 8 April 1945)

It is noticable that the Government M.P.'s did not make any great effort to defend the interests of the Africans and left this task to the Native Representative, Mrs. V.M.L. Ballinger (M.P., Cape Eastern). The U.P. appeared loathe to champion the cause of the Africans in Parliament for fear that this might lose them the political support of the basically conservative white S.A. electorate. It was to be expected that Ballinger on the other hand, being a N.R., would have African interests at heart. However, instead of furnishing humanitarian reasons as to why African education should receive a better deal, her argument was largely based on

economic grounds. She saw the main task facing the Government as being to

> "abolish illiteracy and to develop the capacity of our native population to increase the wealth of our country."[49]
>
> (Assembly: 12 April 1945)

She added weight to her argument by stating that if the 'Native' population were better trained then

> "the wealth of this country would increase at a rate that would probably make social security possible; and that must be our objective."[50]
>
> (Assembly: 12 April 1945)

Ballinger further stated that

> "the whole foundation of the industrial age is a trained working class...if our friends (the N.P.) do not want industrial development then they must shut the door on the natives' advance and they may be able to maintain tribalism."[51]
>
> (Assembly: 12 April 1945)

Ballinger was clearly making a plea for increased vocational and technical training for Africans. (This argument is further developed in Section 7.4). M. Kentridge (U.P.; M.P. for Troyville) supported Ballinger's argument for increased education for Africans:

> "We cannot develop our industries in South Africa, whether primary or secondary, without the native population, and we cannot have an efficient native labour force without giving them an adequate education."[52]
>
> (Assembly: 13 April 1945)

From the above arguments, it may be contended that the N.P. M.P.'s were against increasing financial grantsto 'Native Education'. They argued that these amounts were granted at the expense of the white taxpayer. The N.P. furthermore had no intention of using 'white money' in order to produce a

'black-schooled' population which, if allowed to compete equally with whites in all levels of life, would present a threat to 'white civilization in S.A.'

The U.P. on the other hand, increased expenditure on 'Native Education' but this increase was insufficient (if compared with that spent on white education) to meet basic African educational needs (See 5.2). It must therefore be concluded that while talking of 'partnership' with the Africans and the 'principle of fair play', (See 4.3), the U.P. was loathe to pursue this policy too strongly. From the above arguments it appears that some U.P. politicians, like the N.P., were concerned with the political implications of the rise of an educated African majority in S.A.

It is noticeable that the N.P. severely criticised U.P. policy, in the Debates, as being far too liberal in emphasis. The N.P. regretted that U.P. 'Native' policy was degenerating from a policy of Trusteeship into one of partnership with the Africans. This accusation was levelled at the U.P., during the debate on the Finance Bill, by M.D.C. de Wet Nel (M.P. for Wonderboom). He stated:

> "That (the) traditional principle of Trusteeship is being replaced by the partnership principle and that is the danger."[53]
>
> (Assembly: 22 May 1946)

He believed that the Trusteeship policy should be upheld so that Western civilization might survive in South Africa and that would be advantageous to both whites and Africans.[54]

The N.P. objected to the Bill in that it fostered partnership

and did too much for Africans. However the U.P. replied that the Bill represented a great step forward in its 'Native' policy. A.G. Barlow (U.P., M.P. for Hospital) stated:

> "...it (the Bill) represents the greatest step forward since Union for the liberal view, and my friends (U.P.) are to be congratulated. When it is passed we shall have taken away the question of trusteeship: the question of trusteeship of the white man in respect of the black man will have gone, and it is a partnership that has come along to take its place."[55]
>
> (Assembly: 22 May 1946)

However Barlow and the U.P. stressed that the white man would always remain the senior partner in this new 'firm'. In this respect it appears that the N.P.'s "apartheid" doctrine, which also guaranteed white leadership, differed little from the U.P.'s 'new' philosophy. In fact, many of Smut's reassuring speeches to the white electorate, such as that it was the chief objective of the U.P. to

> "keep the position of our Western civilization safe here in South Africa."[56]

could quite easily have been uttered by N.P. lips.

It is ironic that Smuts, who stood as an apostle of peace and goodwill abroad, did not make an attempt to implement his 'liberal' convictions at home. The N.P. in fact accused the U.P. of having a leader who was too involved in overseas affairs (such as drawing up the Charter of U.N.O.) to have sufficient time left to devote towards developing a workable 'non-white' policy at home.[57] Paton aptly summed this up:

> "His (Smuts) mind was full of the Great Bear and the American Eagle, and he was thought to understand their affairs with special insight."[58]

Smuts therefore left U.P. affairs chiefly in the hands of a cabinet which Ballinger alleged was

> "freely and publicly described as the weakest the history of the Union had thrown up..."[59]

With the exception of a hard-pressed J.H. Hofmeyr, the U.P. Government M.P.'s were no match, in Parliament, for the forceful opposition speakers of the calibre of C.R. Swart, J.G. Strydom, M.C. de Wet Nel and D.F. Malan.

5.3.4. Arguments relating to the role of missionaries in 'Native Education'

Arguments relating to missionary control of 'Native Education' were raised during the debates on the Native Education Finance Bill (See 5.3.2).

The N.P. attacked the Government's policy of allowing education to remain in Provincial, and therefore basically in missionary hands. The N.P. alleged that this created a chaotic state, with each province, and in fact each missionary society, implementing its own 'brand' of African education. The onslaught was led by Nel who stated:

> "Each province simply adopts its own course and its own direction and each province does just as it likes while the Union Government keeps mum."[60]
> (Assembly: 4 April 1945)

He regretted that there was no uniformity of policy, but utter confusion with regard to the administration of 'Native Education' in the Provinces.[61] 'Native education' was being controlled by missionary societies and sects and there were about 500 sects and societies in existence.[62] Nel admitted

that each province had a curriculum but

> "each sect has only one aim namely to put its own stamp on the soul of the native children."[63]
> (Assembly: 4 April 1945)

Nel subtly purported to have African interests at heart by stating "that is not right towards the natives."[64] It is more likely that it was the N.P.'s interests, in particular, that he was championing, instead of those of the 'Natives'!

The fact that the missionaries evoked the wrath of the N.P. Opposition is indeed evidence of the sterling work they were doing in educating the 'Natives', often against overwhelming odds. The N.P. could certainly not accuse the missionary societies of lacking in good works.

The N.P. attack was based on N.P. accusations that missionaries were performing an injustice by detribalising and denationalising the 'Natives'. Nel did not deny that the missionary societies did good work but stated that

> "most of the missionary societies - I am sorry to have to say it, but I must - in many cases have as motive not so much to preach the gospel, not so much to develop the soul of the native, but more the cultivation of a definite culture and denationalization of the native to make him an imitator of the Western civilization."[65]

It appears that the N.P., although not admitting it, was not so upset that the 'Native' was receiving a 'stamp on his soul' but what worried them was that it was not the C.N.E. stamp!

J.N. Le Roux argued that missionaries were spreading anti-

white propaganda among Africans. He alleged (but did not prove) instances of missionaries teaching Africans that S.A. was their country and they should try to gain it back. Le Roux stated

> "It seems pleasant to him (the African) when he is told that he should assert himself against the white man. He is like a child and he is easily incited with that sort of thing, if he is told that he has rights that the white man is withholding from him. He is not fond of those who teach him that he should be subject to the white man and do his duty."[66]

The last words of the above quotation explain the real reason as to why the N.P. was upset about Africans receiving a missionary education; it would not instil in the African the fact that it was 'his duty' to be subject to the white. In other words, it would not make him a good labourer for the white man. Furthermore the 'Natives' in the opinion of the N.P., should not be given an 'academic education'. If they were given one;

> "the country would be burdened by a number of academically trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and who is going to do the manual labour in the country?"[67]
>
> (J.N. Le Roux; Assembly: 5 April 1945)

Sauer levelled the following accusation against the misionaries:

> "...they gave the native nothing which was of value to him but took away from him something that was his own, with the result that he was left in the air with something which he did not understand."[68]
>
> (Assembly: 5 April 1945)

The N.P. envisaged a system whereby there should be central control of 'Native' Education - it was hoped that uniformity of provincial education could then be introduced and

Africans would be prescribed a form of education which would best satisfy white needs such as the need of an African working-class to provide manual labour.

A noteworthy feature of the above debate was that none of the U.P. Government M.P.'s made determined attempts to defend missionary interests against the N.P. accusations. They merely allowed the N.P. attack to fall on deaf ears, fully aware that the Government had not the slightest intention of removing 'Native Education' from missionary control in the Provinces.

It was left to D.L. Smit (Secretary for Native Affairs) to sum up the Government's appreciation of missionary work in these words:

> "I desire to express the high sense of appreciation of the Government of the great services rendered by the missionaries of all denominations in the cause of Native Education. In the past the missions have been the pioneers in this great social service as in the case of so many other social services. The missionaries have been the pioneers in this field and the native people owe a lasting debt of gratitude to them. We shall continue to need their help for many years to come and we are anxious to work in the closest collaboration with them."[69]

It was expedient for the Government to allow missionary involvement in 'Native Education' to continue as this necessitated less Government expenditure.

5.4. Notes

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4. Horrell, M., African Education: Some Origins and development until 1953; (1963); Johannesburg, p.15.
5. Ibid, p.5.
6. Ibid, p.1.
7. Ibid.
8. Hurwitz (1964), p.54.
9. Ibid.
10. Leonie, A., The Development of Bantu Education in South Africa, 1652-1954; (1965); Ph.D., Montana State University; p.102.
11. Hurwitz (1964); p.55.
12. Leonie, (1965); p. 104.
13. Ibid.
14. S.A. Assembly Debates, (2 April 1945); Vol. 52; Col. 4495.
15. Ibid, Col. 4479.
16. Ibid, Col. 4483.
17. Ibid, Col. 4483.
18. Assembly Debates; (April-May 1945); Vol. 53, Col. 4623.
19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

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27. Ibid, Col. 4505.

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29. Ibid.

30. Ibid, Col. 4519.

31. Ibid, Col. 4520.

32. Ibid, Col. 4549.

33. Ibid, Col. 4503.

34. Ibid, Col. 4538.

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36. Ibid, Col. 4502.

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39. Ibid, Col. 4532.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid, Col. 4519, 4527.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

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45. Ibid.

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47. Ibid, Col. 4538.
48. Ibid, Col. 4529.
49. Ibid, COL 4556.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid, Col. 4557.
52. Ibid, Col. 4604.
53. Debates (22 May 1946), Vol. 58, Col. 8245.
54. Ibid.
55. Debates (Apr. - May 1945); Vol. 53; Col. 4615.
56. Kruger, C.D.W.; **The Age of the Generals** (1960); Human & Rousseau; p. 408.
57. Assembly, Vol. 53, Col. 4616.
58. Paton, A., **Hofmeyr**, (1964); Oxford U.P., p.399.
59. Ballinger (1969), p. 37.
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63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
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66. Ibid, Col. 4527.
67. Ibid, Col. 4528.
68. Ibid, Col. 4507.
69. UG 43/1945; Review of the Department of Native Affairs for the years 1943-44; p. 37.

CHAPTER SIX

THE 1943 SCHOOL-FEEDING SCHEME FOR AFRICAN CHILDREN

Introduction

The study argues that the School Feeding Scheme was a positive aspect of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy for the following reasons:

(i) School-feeding would help alleviate the effects of malnutrition among African children in S.A. It was necessary to provide for the nutritional needs of African children in the reserves and Urban areas where living conditions were deteriorating.

(ii) It is argued that the Government saw the Scheme as a possible way of alleviating the growing problem of juvenile delinquency prevalent in the large urban areas. School feeding would, it was hoped, increase school attendance, thereby keeping children off the streets for the greater part of the day.

This section provides evidence relating to the above arguments. It also briefly outlines the history and the financial provision for the above School Feeding Scheme. The study also analyses the House of Assembly Debates (1943-48) with regard to the above scheme.

It should be noted that there is limited meaningful literature available with regard to the above Scheme. This study has drawn chiefly on the information obtained from the School Feeding Report (published in 1949) and Hansard's Assembly Debates.

6.2. A Brief History of the School Feeding Scheme

From the history of the scheme it is clear that the original object was to allow the African population of the Union to participate in the Social Security plan of the Government in 1943. The School Feeding Scheme was initially entrusted to the Department of Social Welfare. It was only on 1 April 1945 that the administration of the scheme was transferred to the Union Education Department.[1]

6.3. Financial provision for the Scheme

The Report of the Native School Feeding Committee (published in 1949) provides a summary of the financial arrangements relating to the above Scheme.[2] According to this Report the Union Government would bear full responsibility for a subsidy of 2d per child per school day; payments would be calculated at 50 school days per quarter. In addition the Government made available a grant of 5/- per pupil (p.a.) to cover non-recurrent expenditure during the first year and after the second year of a school's participation in the Scheme an amount of 1/- per pupil towards the cost of replacing equip-

ment. Speaking during the Debate on School Feeding, J.H. Hofmeyr (Minister of Education) stated that school feeding:

> "...was to be provided partly at the expense of the State and partly at the expense of the Provinces, although primarily at the expense of the State. We believe that a reasonable basis for financial support will be for the Treasury to bear two-thirds of the cost of meals and 50 percent of the non-recurrent expenditure."[3]
>
> (Assembly: 14 April 1943)

It was estimated that in the course of time the expenditure would be no less than £1 000 000.[4]

The Committee appointed in 1948 to inquire into the cost of the scheme, which was estimated at £1 240 000 for 1948-49, found that:

> " a situation has gradually developed where it is tacitly assumed that the Government has now accepted the sole responsibility for feeding the children at school and even those native communities which at the commencement were prepared to make and actually did make a not inconsiderable contribution, have now ceased to do this."[5]

The financial aspect of the Scheme raised considerable discussion in Parliament with N.P. speakers questioning as to why whites should be totally responsible for feeding Africans.

6.4. Humanitarian grounds for the introduction of the School Feeding Scheme

It is argued that there were sound humane reasons for the introduction of the above Scheme. This section examines the poverty of Africans in the Native reserves and the large

urban centres and the consequent malnutrition of African children living in these areas. It also examines the effect of poverty on educational progress.

There is overwhelming evidence of the deteriorating conditions in the 'Native' reserves.

The Mine Natives' Wages' Commission (1943-44) after an exhaustive investigation concluded:

> "In place of the Transkeian Territories being practically self-supporting...the figures... indicate clearly that for a number of years the Native population in the Transkeian Territories has been living very much below the bread line, or, as one witness put it, the mealie line."[6]

Further evidence was supplied by the Report, No. 2., of the National Health Services' Commission (U.G. No. 30, 1944):

> "One factor stands out pre-eminently...the grinding poverty of almost all of the non-European population of this country ... the evidence we have received strongly suggests - in the absence of precise data it could do no more - that in the Territories ... their (the Natives') poverty is increasing and their health deteriorating."[7]

The meaning of the phrase "the absence of precise data", refers to the fact that no vital statistics were kept, after Union, of the African population outside the towns. The Union Government decided to stop keeping such records (they had been kept in the old Cape Colony) on grounds of economy.[8]

Report No. 9 of the Social and Economic Planning Council* entitled The Native Reserves and their place in the Economy of the Union of South Africa (23 March, 1946) provided evidence of the deterioration of the Native reserves and suggested remedial measures to the U.P. Government.[9]
The Council's main conclusion, with regard to Report No. 9, was that

> "the Native Reserves...are rapidly deteriorating, and that urgent remedial measures are necessary in the interests of the nation as a whole".[10]

Besides other remedial measures the Council recommended

> "Improved education as the first step towards an improvement of social and economic conditions as a whole."[11]

The Council noted that education in the reserves was linked

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* The Council was set up in 1942 and since then has published nine Reports dealing with a variety of problems. The Council was not a legislative body but was instituted in order to conduct investigations and make recommendations.

not only with an improvement in agriculture but also with a general improvement in health and living standards.[12]

The above evidence indicates that there was widespread poverty in the Reserves; this led to a marked deterioration in the health of the 'Native' population living in these territories.

J.F. Herbst (Secretary for Native Affairs) provided evidence in the South African Medical Journal (22 April 1944) of the poor state of health of the reserve 'Natives' in the Transkeian Territories. He recorded that

> "the deterioration in the health of the Community is now most evident. The well-developed, well-muscular figures of say fifty years ago have been replaced by weedy, undersized, deficient manhood...The food position in the Transkei is a very serious one and is exercising a most deleterious effect on the health of the community. Disease is on the increase. Maize and milk were once the staple foods; today (1944) milk is practically unobtainable and even children are suffering..."[13]

The Native School Feeding Committee's Report (1949) stated that in a survey of six districts in the Transkei it was found that 44% of the families had no cattle and 20% owned five head or less. Many of the people were landless and the absence of able-bodied men (migrant labourers) threw the main burden of agriculture on the women, old men and children.[14]

The above survey investigated the home diet of 10 982

'Native' school-going children in the reserves during the years 1939-40.[15] Their diet was found to be as follows:

Percentage who ate -

Mealies	100
Meat	14.6
Milk	39.4
Pumpkins	8.2
Beans	28.3
Other Vegetables	8.4
Marewu *	.7

Number of meals taken:

	1 meal	2 meals	3 meals
per day	84,5%	14,9%	0,6%

The above figures reveal the poor diet of African children. There was an emphasis on starch, and a general lack of essential vitamins, which is recognised as detrimental to the sound physical development of children.

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* Marewu - thin fermented porridge

The above figures further reflect the low protein diet of African children. Meat was virtually a luxury and milk was rarely available.

With reference to the above table evidence suggests that the following argument may be applicable to African children. It has been experimentally proved that animals which are subjected to diets deficient in protein during their early formative years generally suffer from poor brain development and slow learning ability.* In the human situation it may be extremely difficult to overcome the effects of severe prenatal and early childhood nutritional deprivation which is largely caused by a diet rich in carbohydrates and very poor in proteins and vitamins.

The above factors may be instrumental in accounting for the generally poor learning ability of African children. (See arguments relating to malnutrition earlier in this section and to school feeding in section 6.5).

The U.P. Government conducted two surveys in an attempt to ascertain whether there was a general need for a School Feeding Scheme. The first involved the assessment of the Health and Nutrition of 7 000 African school children in

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* J. Cravioto, "Application of a Newer Knowledge of Nutrition on Physical and Mental Growth Development": American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 53 (1963); pp1803-1809.

selected areas of the Union. In this survey, the following table reveals the percentage of children whose health was considered to be "grossly abnormal requiring early medical treatment."[16]

	BOYS	GIRLS
PIETERMARITZBURG	23,4	20,3
QUMBU	30,7	23,5
PRETORIA	39,2	22,3
NQUTU	42,4	31,9
BLOEMFONTEIN	52,5	48,7
WITZIESHOEK	58	46,9
KENTANI	63,3	52,0
LETABA	65,2	58,1
BOCHEM	75,6	64,8

The above figures reveal that malnutrition among African children was indeed widespread. Secondly a health survey was conducted on African School children in the Alexandria Township.[17] It was estimated that of the 3510 children attending school:

1388 (39,6%) showed no abnormalities;

1778 (50,6%) required nursing or medical supervision;

343 (9,8%) needed to be hospitalised.

It was considered that malnutrition was the basic cause of the above findings.

Further evidence (from the above Report) of the home diets of African children in two shanty towns (Witwatersrand municipality) revealed a basic lack of nutritional foods:[18]

(i) It was estimated that the lowest income group (a comparatively small group) had an average family income of £1/10s per week. Their diet comprised one meal per day (in the evening) consisting of mealie meal or samp. No milk, vegetables or fruit were eaten.

(ii) The middle income group (a very large majority of families) earned £2 2s 3d per family per week. Their diet consisted of:

(a) Breakfast; only tea (no milk or sugar)

(b) Mid-morning; Sour porridge (no milk or sugar)

(c) Samp or mealie meal, potatoes; occas-ionally meat and vegetables were eaten.

(iii) The upper income group (a few isolated cases) had an average income of £4 5s per week. Their diet comprised:

(a) Breakfast; mealie meal or bread. Tea with milk and sugar;

(b) Midday; Mealie meal or samp. Tea with milk and

sugar;

(c) Evening; Meat, potatoes, mealie meal or samp and one vegetable (usually cabbage, onion, tomato or spinach). There was one pint of milk per day per family. Very little meat, fruit and vegetables were eaten.

It is noticeable that the above diets were greatly lacking in nutritional foods which were essential for the maintenance of good health among adults and children. The following evidence of a medical doctor, F.W. Fox (1943) revealed widespread malnutrition among African children. He reported that:

> "A careful investigation of seven thousand Bantu (African) children at 9 centres showed that at least 71 percent of the boys and 66 percent of the girls were malnourished. In some centres there were many cases of well-marked disease directly attributable to dietetic causes."[19]

A further factor relating both to poor diet and malnutrition, as well as juvenile delinquency (Section 6.5), was the detrimental effect on children while left on their own because their parents were away working. The School Committee Report stated:

> "An important and relevant aspect of town life is that frequently both parents are wage-earners, and as they have to leave home early in the morning, the

> chance of the child receiving breakfast is greatly reduced; moreover no meal will be available if he returns home toward midday."[20]

The above Report recorded that in a survey of 862 children in a Witwatersrand location in 1939, it was found that 614 (71%) did not have more than one meal at home during the day. Of the 419 families from which these school children were drawn, 307 (73%) had no parents at home during the day.[21]

It was furthermore noted that factors such as fatigue, cost of fuel and time involved in cooking tended to make the urban family consume 'quick' items, e.g. bread, tea and mineral waters.[22]

These foods were deficient in nutritional value and not generally conducive to good health.

The quality of food which the Scheme intended supplying to African School-children is noted in Section 6.6.

The above evidence suggests that there were sound and humane reasons for the introduction of a School Feeding Scheme for African children in the rural and urban areas of S.A.

6.5. The possible alleviation of Juvenile Delinquency by the School Feeding Scheme:

It is argued that the School Feeding Scheme was seen by the Government as a possible means of alleviating the growing problem of juvenile delinquency which was prevalent in the

large urban areas. This growth of juvenile delinquency was related to the problems caused by increased African congestion in urban areas. The accelerated movement of Africans to the towns was accentuated by the virtual failure of the reserves to adequately support their population. Africans moved to the towns in search of employment, attracted by the growth of secondary and tertiary industry (See 1.4). The Social and Economic Planning Council supplied the following statistics with regard to increased urbanization; it has been calculated that the total African population of the Union increased by 18.3 percent between 1936 and 1946, whereas the African population of the nine principal towns increased by 51,6 percent during the same period.[23]

Increased urban (African) congestion led to a serious housing shortage with the result that insanitary, overcrowded African slums grew up on the outskirts of the towns. These conditions in turn were the result of extreme poverty and favoured crime (See 8.5) and juvenile delinquency. The following article, written in The South African Outlook (1 September 1944) provides an example of slum conditions in the large urban centres:

> "...the overcrowding that exists in all Johannesburg slums and locations. Some two thousand families have been reduced to camping out all winter in erections composed mainly of sacking. There are no schools for more than half the children growing up in the locations. When the latest school at Orlando was opened up not long ago by the Anglican Church, in two or three days it was full and seven hundred children had to be turned away. The people are not allowed to build houses for themselves...[24]

In 1944 the housing shortage was recognised as being a national crisis.[25]

The abject scarcity of houses led to the growth of shanty towns where living conditions and the standard of health deteriorated. Slums became the hot-bed of juvenile delinquency and crime. In an article, entitled Municipal Policy and Native Welfare (1941), Hawarden stated:

> "The third main group of problems confronting African town dwellers (besides health and housing) are social ones. In Johannesburg half the 40 000 African children grow up without ever going to school. It is not surprising that in recent years there has been an alarming increase in juvenile delinquency: And the juvenile delinquent of today is, in too many cases, the adult criminal of tomorrow."[26]

It is argued that the Smuts Government was tempted to use the 1943 School Feeding Scheme to alleviate the social problem of juvenile delinqueny. The problem of juvenile delinquency was particularly severe in the urban areas of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Vereeniging. This is substantiated by the Conference on Urban Juvenile Native Delinquency held at Johannesburg in October 1938.

The Conference stressed that Juvenile Delinquency had become a serious problem as the Probation Officer (Johannesburg) reported that there had been an increase of 63,8% in the number of cases of Bantu Juveniles who came before the courts in 1939 as compared with the previous year.[27]

The Conference outlined the chief factors which contributed towards Juvenile Delinquency. It stated that poverty was one of the main reasons. The records of the Diepkloof

Reformatory, for example, showed that 82,4% of African male juvenile inmates from the Witwatersrand had been convicted of theft, housebreaking and robbery - crimes usually associated with an impoverished community.[28]

The Conference tried to ascertain the reasons for the state of impoverishment among urban Africans in 1939. It observed that urban Africans were worse off than their counterparts in the country in that the prime necessities of life; food and drink, shelter and fuel, had to be paid for in the cities whereas in the reserves these, if paid for at all, were obtainable at much less cost.[29] The Conference further concluded that wages paid to Africans in the urban areas were hopelessly inadequate to "keep a family under civilised conditions."[30]

It noted that Africans suffered owing to restrictions upon the use of African labour, particularly in skilled and semi-skilled work.[31]

It concluded that

> "the traditional basing of African wages upon the level acceptable to the temporary worker with other resources in the Reserves have kept African wages at constant and low level, while Africans have established homes in the urban areas upon wages which have no relation whatever to the cost of living, but upon which they are wholly dependent.[32]

The second contributing factor established by the Conference was the factor of unstable marital unions.[33] Briefly this referred to the great number of men and women who lived in the African urban locations as husband and wife without any formal union. These informal unions often lasted for years

and often ended in the desertion of the women with children dependent upon her. The women could not, on their meagre incomes support the children, who often turned to juvenile delinquency to survive.

The third factor raised by the Conference was the lack of education for African urban youths. The records of 407 African delinquents at Diepkloof Reformatory in September 1937 revealed that 64,9% had never attended school, 13,3% had only attended the sub-standards while 21,8% had been in Std.I or above.[34]

It was further established that there were 40 000 children of school-going age in Johannesburg (1939) and that 60% of them never attended school.[35]

The juvenile problem would be largely eliminated if these children could be kept off the streets for most of the day by being coerced to attend school.

The relationship between crime and the lack of education is suggested by the following statement of a judge of the Supreme Court:

> "the crimes of violence committed on the Witwatersrand appear to be committed by the uneducated."[36]

The study has not been able to statistically prove that the 1943 School Feeding Scheme had the effect of reducing the rate of juvenile delinquency in the urban areas. Although the numbers of juvenile offenders have been recorded, (in the period under review) these figures cannot be calculated as a percentage of the African 'child-population'. As far as

can be ascertained no detailed records of the numbers of African children have been kept during the above period. Furthermore census figures of African children obtained in 1936 and 1946 cannot be used in any analysis as these years are 'far-removed' from 1943 (the year of the Scheme). The Official Year Book of South Africa supplies the following figures of African juvenile offenders (under twenty-one): in 1940 there were 11762; in 1944 (the year after the Scheme), 10901; and in 1948 there were 9884 offenders.[37]

It may be seen that the fall in Juvenile delinquency from 1940 until 1944 was 9.32% as compared with a 7.32% fall from 1944 until 1948.

Not much meaning can be attached to these figures for many factors besides school feeding, such as improvement in living conditions (increased wages and housing) may be responsible for this slight decrease in the number of juvenile offenders. The supposition that the 1943 School Feeding Scheme alleviated the problem of urban juvenile delinquency must therefore remain an assumption. However this 'possibility' cannot be overlooked.

During the Debate on the Native Education Finance Bill, G.K. Hemming (U.P.; M.P. for Transkei) suggested that it was possible that money spent on education would lead to a decrease in 'Native' delinquency. He warned that

> "Juvenile delinquency leads to adult delinquency, and that leads to gaol; and that is the path our Native boys in the towns are travelling."[38]

6.6. The Purpose of the School Feeding Scheme

The basic aim of the Scheme was outlined by the Department of Education in February 1948. It stated that the Scheme aimed

> "to make provision in the child's diet, in addition to the normal meals consumed at home, of protective foods which contain large quantities of first-class protein, vitamins and mineral salts.[39]

The Department further stated the aims in providing 'protective foods' at school:[40]

(i) "To ensure that the diet of every child shall contain as large as possible an amount of the foods needed for good health, irrespective of the circumstances of the child's home";

(ii) "To ensure that food eaten during those hours when the child is not under the mother's supervision, but is the responsibility of the State, shall be of the kinds best suited to promote health";

(iii) "To prevent fatigue and listlessness and so to foster alertness and the ability to learn"

6.7. Educational aspects of the Scheme

This section supplies statistics and examines opinions and evidence with regard to the following aspects of the Scheme:

(i) the effect on School attendance and enrolment;

(ii) the effect on the health of African children;

(iii) the effects on educational progress.

6.7.1. The Scheme's effect on school attendance and enrolment

Evidence tends to suggest that the Scheme did in fact considerably increase school attendance.

The School Feeding Committee reported that while there was no increased enrolment in registered schools as the result of school feeding because the admission to the register was controlled, it had reason to believe that there was increased enrolment in unregistered schools.[41] The Report of the Committee suggested that attendance may have increased on account of the

> "lesser tendency to go hunting round for food in the middle of the morning and less absenteeism on the ground of sickness."[42]

The overriding influence of poverty on education was expressed in the following statement, at the Conference on Urban Juvenile Native Delinquency: (Oct. 1938).

> "...the poverty of the home is reflected in the hunger of the children and their irregular (school) attendance."[43]

National Party M.P.'s thought otherwise. Much of their criticism of the Scheme in the House of Assembly (See 6.8) was based on their allegations that increased school attendance only occurred on the days on which food was supplied to African children. The N.P. believed that the Scheme was being abused and should be terminated.

Evidence tends to suggest that the Scheme did in fact considerably increase school attendance. Using the OFS as an example, in the three years (1942-44), before the instituton of the Scheme, the average percentage of absentees was 9,52%

while for the three years immediately after institution of the Scheme, it was only 6,99%.[44] A similar trend was noticed in the Ciskei during the same period. The principal of a Ciskeian school supplied attendance figures which revealed that the average percentage of absentees in the first three-year period (1942-45) was 14,1%, whereas it had dropped to 10,7% in the second three-year period (1945-47).[45]

There appears little doubt that the Smuts Government succeeded in increasing African school attendance with the introduction of the School Feeding Scheme. The reasons for the Government's introduction of this scheme are examined in Sections 6.4. and 6.5.

6.7.2. The Scheme's effect on the health of African children

The above Committee reported that

> "evidence from teachers and principals showed that there was a decrease in fainting during school hours; coughs and colds had decreased in frequency, the children were less sleepy, more lively and alert, and improved in appearance, while there was deterioration during the holidays."[46]

The Committee's Report stated that medical evidence from the Chief Medical Inspector of Natal and the Polela Health Centre supported the above conclusions, as did that of several opthalmologists.[47]

However factoral evidence was difficult to obtain and the Committee recommended that a planned study should be carried out.'[48]

6.7.3. The effects of the Scheme on educational progress

The effects of the lack of suitable nutrition on educational progress was investigated by the School Feeding Committee and in concluded that

> "under certain conditions of privation, a child either becomes drowsy, inattentive, or unable to concentrate or, alternatively, highly restless, super-unstable and irresponsible. Malnutrition may be so severe and persist for so long as to produce some degree of mental deficiency."[49]

Further evidence is supplied by Dr. Thomas Parran (former Surgeon-General of the U.S.A.) who stated in 1948:

> "We are wasting money trying to educate children with half-starved bodies. They cannot absorb teaching."[50]

The above Committee arrived at a number of conclusions with regard to the relationship between diet and learning.[51] Some of the most significant aspects were:[52]

(i) Even simple hunger reduced the powers of concentration particularly with regard to the young;

(ii) The lack of some specific nutritient, for example Vitamin B Complex*, could affect the well-being of the whole organism, including the nervous system.

(iii) It was not yet fully known to what extent the harm done to an individual (the mental effects observed might range from depression and confusion in mild cases to insanity) could be repaired if that person was given treatment, including a fully adequate diet.

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* Vitamin B Complex - "Vitamin B" is known to be a mixture of a number of vitamins.

(iv) A dietry deficiency would have adverse effects on individuals of all ages but was likely to be more extensive and less reversible in the young rapidly developing body.

The School Feeding Committee reported that, with regard to the effect on learning ability, most witnesses were emphatic that school feeding had improved the learning ability of the school child.[53] The Committee came to a similar conclusion, namely

> "...that school feeding has produced two worthwhile and indeed important results. It has improved the average child physically and has thereby enabled him to do more justice to the work expected of him."[54]

The above statements support the view that school feeding was of educational benefit to the African children.

The evidence examined tends to support the view that school feeding was a positive and humane aspect of the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy.

6.8. House of Assembly Debates with regard to the School Feeding Scheme

6.8.1. Introduction

Assembly Debates on the Scheme took place during the period 1943-1946. These debates were conducted mainly between the U.P. and N.P. and reflected the economic and political emphases in their 'Native Education' policies.

School feeding had been the task of the Department of Social Welfare until 1945 when it was transferred to the Union Education Department. This study examines the principal debate on School Feeding which took place after this transfer, with reference to Union Education Department Vote No. 19. The Government introduced a motion on 17 April 1945 that an amount of £2 530 000 was to be spent on 'Native Education', of which £380 000 was for School Feeding. The following arguments on School Feeding arose on account of a proposed amendment by General J.C.G. Kemp (N.P.; M.P. for Wolmaranstad) to the above motion, to "reduce the amount by £380000, being the item School Feeding".[55] (Assembly: 17 April 1945).

6.8.2. The argument relating to the parental responsibility of Africans

The N.P. attacked the School Feeding Scheme from the point of view that it was an unsound principle to provide food for children of any colour at school because it ultimately removed the idea of parental responsibility.[56] J.G. Strydom stressed that it was

> "unsound to give the children food at school free of charge, even in the case of European children."[57]
> (Assembly: 17 April 1945)

J.G.W. van Niekerk supported this view and stated that the scheme

> "...will have the effect that native parents will work less and they will rapidly cultivate a state of

> mind whereunder they will not fulfil their objectives in respect of the feeding of their children."[58]
>
> (Assembly: 17 April 1945)

This argument was countered by J.H. Hofmeyr who stated that he agreed with the N.P. that the principle of parental responsibility should not be impaired but

> "...you have to deal with the facts as they exist today. It will of course be very desirable if every parent in the country should be in the position to be able to do everything necessary for his child, but that is simply not the position both in relation to European and non-European...[59]
>
> (Assembly: 17 April 1945)

M.C. de Wet (N.P; M.P. for Wonderboom) stressed that the domestic life of the 'Native' was being disturbed because of the Scheme. The question of food was one of the cornerstones of the 'Native's domestic life.' The Government was destroying

> "...that obligation that has so far rested on the native to take care of his child."[60]
>
> (Assembly: 17 April 1945)

This view was supported by Strydom who cited the example of a small 'Native' school on a farm. He stated:

> "The young natives attend school. There is no question of their being without food. But they are now being fed at school practically on the doorstep of the native's hut. I am speaking of cases of which I have personal knowledge. That child gets one meal a day only, in accordance with their custom. In other words ... the native no longer has any responsibility...to feed his child. The result is that the native, who from the nature of things, works as little as possible, is now going to work even less, because there is even less incentive for him to work."[61]
>
> (Assembly: 17 April 1945)

This line of argument presented by N.P. speakers was, at face value, difficult to contradict for the U.P. However, the

facts of malnutrition among the Africans was the most effective Government reply. (See 6.4; argument relating to malnutrition).

The N.P. stressed the social problems that had arisen in the urban areas. Nel stated:

> "there are thousands of children roaming the streets. Who are their fathers? No one is able to say who their fathers are. That licentiousness takes place, and the man simply walks away, leaving the poor native woman to look after the child ... and this type of measure encourages that immorality to a very large degree."[62]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

The N.P. stressed that the Government's feeding of illegitimate children would encourage immorality among urban Africans as it would remove any parental responsibility which still existed.

6.8.3. The Argument relating to the economic apects of school feeding

Gen. J.C. Kemp summed up the N.P.'s attitude with regard to the economic aspect of the above Scheme in these words:

> "We do not want to be hard on our non-Europeans, but we say that trusteeship does not mean that the Europeans must provide food for natives with the sweat of their brow. That is not trusteeship. You must teach the native to realise his responsibility towards his children."[63]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

J.J. Fouche, (N.P. M.P for Smithfield) further argued that the Government, by means of the Scheme, was placing an unbearable burden on whites, and that the white electorate

would not tolerate this state of affairs for long.[64] Fouche posed the question:

> "Is it humanly possible for these 2 000 000 Europeans, no matter how anxious you are to do it, to bear the expenditure in the future, to make available the necessary funds in order to provide the necessary facilities for these 10 000 000 people?".[65]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

This argument was used by several N.P. speakers who furthermore regretted that Africans were abusing and taking advantage of the Scheme. They stated that it had been proved that African children only attended school twice a week - on the days when they would receive food.[66] However they did not provide statistics to prove their allegations.

The N.P. went as far as accusing the Government of employing communistic principles. Kemp stated:

> "That is one of the Communistic doctrines, that the State should accept the responsibility for the children."[67]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

The N.P. believed that this was unnecessary as Africans were not starving.[68] General Kemp challenged the Government to find one farm in the country where Africans were being under-fed. He alleged that

> "Afrikaners have always seen to it that the labourers on the farms are properly fed."[69]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

The Government disagreed with the Opposition's accusation that the Africans were 'not unduly impoverished'. Dr. Ekstein (once a district surgeon) stated that research had been conducted for years previously by two medical men (Drs. Kark and Le Riche). They had exmained 7 000 black

school children in nine different areas of S.A. Their report had appeared in the S.A. Medical Journal stating:

> "Most of the disease (typhus epidemic) is due to malnutrition which is the polite way of saying starvation".[70]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

Ekstein believed that it was the Government's 'Christian duty' to see that people who were undernourished should be given food.[71] However it should also be realised that

> "the native is a great asset to our country as a source of labour, and if we do not assist him by means of proper feeding, we might lose that asset. The economic position of the native is such that he himself is unable to feed his family."[72]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

It appears that the U.P. Government was primarily concerned with the economic condition of the country which it believed would be stabilized by the maintenance of a sufficiently healthy and active work force.
The U.P.'s stress on the humanitarian aspect of school-feeding appeared to take second place.

Lt. - Col. K. Rood (U.P.; M.P. for Vereeniging) indicated the U.P.'s infatuation with economic affairs:

> "It our European population do not see to it that we have a sound (healthy) native population we shall lose that source of labour and thereby we shall be injuring agriculture as well as industry.[73]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

According to the opinion of certain U.P. politicians, to maintain the Africans' health would be in the interests of the future economic development of South Africa. Col. Rood stated:

> "The food given to the native children will yield a good return in the future to the European population"[74]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

African children, he believed, could not exist on the food their parents provided because the white man was paid on a higher scale than the African.[75] He supported the policy that whites should receive a greater remuneration than Africans with these words:

> "...and we are doing that largely because we feel that the white man ought to stand on a higher scale socially than the native."[76]
>
> (Assembly: 18 April 1945)

The economic emphasis of the U.P., with regard to its 'Native Education' policy, was repeatedly expressed in the above debate. In this respect the U.P. and N.P. shared a common concern for the well-being of the 'European' race.

N.P. concern with regard to the economic climate was expressed in these words:

> "the Europeans are being impoverished. They do not receive a reasonable price for their products and they are being more and more taxed for the non-Europeans."[77]
>
> (J.C. Kemp; Assembly: 18 April 1945)

The N.P.'s accusation that the U.P. was using white taxes in order to feed and educate a growing African majority was an argument repeatedly used in most of the debates on 'Native Education' from 1939-48. At the present point in time (1945) the U.P. was not over-concerned with the arguments raised by N.P. politicians in the School Feeding debate. The U.P. knew that it possessed the necessary majority in Parliament which would enable it to sanction measures such as the School

Feeding Scheme Vote (R380 000) under consideration. It was therefore not surprising that General Kemp's amendment was defeated in the Assembly by 69 votes to 32.[78]

The Vote on 'Native Education' (No. 19 - £2,430 000), which included the amount for School Feeding, was then put to the House and agreed upon.[79] The U.P. Government had once again triumphed over the N.P. Oppositon and could pursue its 'Native Education' policy.

6.9 NOTES

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76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid, Cols. 5671-5672.

79. Ibid.

C H A P T E R S E V E N

SOME ASPECTS OF HIGHER (VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL) TRAINING FOR AFRICANS

7.1. Introduction

This chapter examines aspects relating to the vocational and technical training of Africans from 1939-48. It emphasises that 'Native Education',especially technical training, must be evaluated within its political and economic context. It is argued that the U.P. Government had, (as did its predecessor, the S.A.P.), no intention of providing too-many Africans with technical and vocational training. It was always realised that skilled Africans might pose a competitive threat to whites on the labour market.

This section seeks to show that technical training was an important aspect of the overall 'Native' policy of the Government, and as such was inextricably linked to the industrial legislation of the above period.

It should be noted that there is a limited amount of meaningful literature available on aspects of technical and vocational training examined in this study. It is noticeable that the Reports on technical and vocational training, during the above period, devoted very little attention to the training of Africans but were mainly concerned with the training of white youths (especially poor-whites).

The limited attention paid to technical training for Africans

is illustrated by the following excerpt from the Annual Report of the Union Education Department (1941-45).

At the end of a comprehensive analysis of Technical Education for whites, the following paragraph in the above Report is the only one that relates to technical training for Africans:

> "The colleges (S. African Technical) also began to make increased provision for educational work among nonEuropeans (Africans)".[1]
>
> UG no. 39 (1948)

Much of the information contained in this section has been obtained from the Report of the Commission on Technical and Vocational Education (UG 65/1948): and from Hansard's Assembly Debates.

7.2. Industrial colour-bar legislation and technical training for Africans

The Government's attitude towards technical and vocational training for Africans must be seen within the broader context of the prevailing atmosphere created by both historical circumstances and the actions of its predecessors. Factors such as the measures taken by the Governments to force Africans off the land (See 1.3), the effects of the depression (See 1.5) and the gross increase in urbanization (See 1.4) had led to a massive unemployment problem in the cities.

Against this background, the colour-bar legislation of the 1920's was specifically designed to appease white workers by restricting Africans and in fact keeping them out of the labour market. The Pact Government (N.P. and Labour)

introduced these measures because it was primarily concerned with its political survival which depended on keeping whites satisfied and employed at the expense of Africans. The industrial colour-bar legislation of the 1920's was an attempt by the State to combat the problem of white unemployment by the introduction of a "civilized-labour" policy (See Section 1.4.4 for explanation).

The State found it imperative to keep Africans unskilled and untrained. Technical and vocational education was therefore to be principally restricted to whites.

An important piece of colour-bar legislation enforced by the U.P. Government of Smuts was the Apprenticeship Act which originated in 1922 but was re-enacted in ammended form as Act 37 of 1944.[2]

The origin of the Apprenticeship Act is closely tied up with the question of so-called "civilised standards" and the poor-white problem. Doxey states that the widely held fear that poor-whites would eventually be replaced by Africans resulting in the 'debasement of civilization', caused considerable concern about the adequacy of facilities for the training of white youths.[3]

Until 1920 there were few opportunities for Africans for organized training in the skilled trades as compared with training for whites where vocational education was to be the means of

> "the social rehabilitation of the poor white youth of the country, the majority of whom left school at the

> end, and many even before the end of the primary school, ill-equipped for life".[4]

It is interesting to note that the Apprenticeship Act (above) did not make any discrimination on racial grounds. Its object was to provide for the registration, training and conditions of service of apprentices.[5]

However in practice the Act operated to the disadvantage of 'non-whites' since they lacked the opportunities to obtain the prescribed educational qualification of Std. VI which became the point of entry for most of the trades. Furthermore few of them had the financial means to enable them to remain at school long enough to reach this point of qualification. The shortage of facilities for higher and primary schooling of Africans further reduced their likelihood of reaching Std. VI. For those who did qualify as artisans, the future appeared bleak for there was a lack of occupational outlets for them on account of the State's job-reservation policy.

'Native Education' cannot be analysed outside its political and economic context but must be seen as part of the State's overall 'Native' policy. This is particularly true of vocational and technical education which is closely related to the State's industrial policy towards Africans.

It is therefore necessary to examine the general tenor of the State's 'Native' policy. This is well reflected by measures in industry which were principally aimed at preventing African advancement. The Smuts Government enforced the

regulations of Industrial Acts passed by its predecessor, the S.A.P. of Hertzog. One of the most significant measures was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 re-enacted in amended form in 1937. This act provided for the registration and regulation of trade unions and employers' organizations, the establishment of industrial councils and conciliation boards, and the appointment of arbitrators.[6] The importance of the I.C.A. from the racial point of view centred on the definition of persons excluded from the definition of "employee". The 1924 Act excluded any person who fell within the scope of any 'Native' pass laws and regulations. The bulk of Africans in the provinces other than the Cape were excluded. In the 1937 Act the definition of persons excluded from the scope of the Act remained the same.[7]

The attempt to limit the progress of Africans on the mines extends as far back as 1911 when the Botha Government (S.A.P.) passed the Mines and Works Act. This measure became known as the First Colour Bar Act. Besides controlling conditions of work and safety in the Mines, the Act enpowered the Governor-general to issue certificates of competency in skilled occupations. Largely as a result of the pressure by white trade unionists, a regulation was made to the effect that these certificates were not to be granted to coloured persons in the Transvaal or Free State.[8] Any certificates issued in the Cape or Natal would not be valid in the northern province.[9]

The 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act narrowed down the field of competency by restricting the granting of certificates for many skilled occupations to "Europeans, Cape Coloureds and Mauritian Creoles or St. Helena persons".[10]

The colour-bar legislation of the Pact Government era was retained and formed the basis of the Smuts Government's basic policy towards the Africans. The Smuts Government (1939-48) aimed at restricting Africans in two ways; firstly by limiting their opportunities in the educational field through underfunding and consequently inadequate training and poor facilities, and secondly, by limiting their advancement in the sphere of labour through restrictive legislation. Those Africans who succeeded in obtaining educational qualifications therefore often found their path of advancement blocked by restrictive and discriminatory measures. The Factories, Machinery and Buildings Work Act (1941) was one such measure. It contained a clause which enpowered the Governor-general to make different regulations for different classes of persons on the basis of race or colour in respect of the accomodation facilities and conveniences to be provided in factories.[11] This was an attempt to prevent the social mixing of whites and Africans.

The Smuts Government further built upon the history of the suppression of industrial action by Africans, of its predecessors (See 1.4.4) by introducing War Measure 9 and 145 of 1942. War Measure 9 gave the Minister of Labour the power

to suppress all industrial disputes that "threatened the war effort."[12]

This measure was withdrawn after the war but measure No. 145 which was specifically designed to cover all industrial disputes in which African workers were involved, remained in force for eleven years![13]

The above color-bar legislation indicated that the Government was principally concerned with defending white economic privileges. It hoped to thereby maintain so-called "civilized standards" of living and to preserve the status quo of the whites as the dominant class in S.A. Furthermore the Government always realised that the white working class which formed the majority of the white electorate, thereby wielding political power, had to be appeased by first considering their interests at the expense of African workers. It is therefore not surprising that the Smuts Government provided limited vocational (educational) training for Africans (See 7.3). This would be the best method of 'ensuring' that they would remain unskilled labourers with little chance of providing serious competition to skilled whites.

7.3. The Slow Growth of Technical and Vocational Training for Africans

The Report of the Commission on Technical and Vocational

Education (UG 65/1948) draws attention to the inadequacy of Technical Training for Africans.

The State's limited vocational training for Africans is reflected by the fact that no technical colleges existed for the training of Africans in 1926/27 while in 1948 there were 42 schools but the number of students was merely 1235.[14] This may be compared with the growth of vocational eduction for whites. For the years 1926/27 there were seven white technical colleges in the Union with a total of 15668 students (full and part-time) while in 1946/47 the number of colleges had risen to eleven with 38,403 students.[15]

The question which needs to be asked is: Why, given the early influence of the notion of industrial education for Africans (See Grey: 2.3.1.), had this form of education not developed over time?

The answer appears to lie in the fact that the Government had political motives for providing inadequate technical training for Africans. It had no intention of giving Africans vocational and technical training which might lead to them displacing skilled whites in industry.

The State became concerned during the war years, that there was a shortage of trained technicians. S.A., at the outbreak of World War II was cut off from overseas supplies to an alarming degree and plans had to be made to cater for her own needs. There was a great demand for technical equipment to carry on a war which, as soon became apparent, would be waged

on an unprecedented scale. It was estimated that S.A. would require 20 000 technicians to maintain the production level considered necessary. Instead of embarking on a full-scale plan for the training of Africans, the Smuts Government (for the political reasons stated above) was more concerned with providing technical training for poor-whites.

In November 1939 representatives of the Departments of Defence and Labour, the Union Education Department and nine Technical Colleges in the Union attended a conference in Pretoria. They drew up a plan to increase technical training in order to meet the national emergency of the shortage of technicians. At this conference details were worked out for the Central Organization for Technical Training. The emphasis on technical training for white youths was expressed by the States regret that

> "during the war these schools (Technical High) could not be expanded or developed to keep pace with changing conditions. At times the acute shortage of equipment, tools and machinery assumed serious proportions and greatly hampered the work."[17]

The C.O.T.T. Scheme was basically designed to provide training for poor-whites who were largely unskilled and were therefore threatened with African competition on the labour market. The State was therefore principally concerned with the technical training of white youths in the early war years and gave scant attention to the technical and industrial training of Africans. The Report of the Commission on Technical and Vocational Education made the

following comment with regard to the industrial training of Africans:

> "Notwithstanding the fact that industrial training has from the beginning been emphasised in all Government schemes of native education, not much progress has been made in this direction".[18]

The same report states that in 1936 the total number of students was 1164 while by 1946 the figure had risen to 2015[19].

By 1948 the numbers had dropped to 1235, a minimum number when it is compared with the 731021 scholars in 'Native' public education in the same year[20] out of an African population of approximately 8 million.[21]

The U.P. Government's record with regard to vocational training for Africans was a poor one indeed and tended to contradict the official noises some of its ministers were making with regard to the value of training Africans in the national interest. General Smuts said in 1947 that

> "industrial development must be promoted to the maximum extent which could only be achieved by making the fullest use of the country's manpower whatever the colour."[22]
>
> (The Star: 23 Oct. 1947)

Furthermore the 1948 Report of the Commission on Technical Education stated:

> "It cannot be doubted that the equipping of the native with greater manual and technical skill will be in the national interest. The national income of goods and services is the product of the peoples' labour, and if the skill and efficiency of a large proportion of the people can be considerably advanced, the national output and wealth must increase correspondingly."[23]

It appears that the U.P. Government was being pressurised on

the one hand to satisfy the manpower demands of secondary industry for workers with some level of literacy and skill and on the other hand the broader demands and fears of the white working-class. The Government opted for the latter course as it was primarily concerned with its political survival. As stated above, it appears that it had no intention of giving Africans vocational and technical training in order that they might eventually pose a threat to whites in the field of skilled labour.

The Government's policy of limiting the growth of technical and vocational training for Africans must be seen within the context of its overall 'Native' policy. As this study has indicated, the Government controlled the advancement of Africans in industry by means of colour-bar legislation. There appeared to be no point in training too-many skilled Africans if their progress in industry was to be restricted by the above industrial legislation.

7.4. House of Assembly Debates on some aspects of technical and vocational training for Africans

7.4.1. Introduction

The above debates took place during the period April 1945-April 1947.

The following motions were debated in the above period:

(i) 'Union Education' Vote. No. 17 (introduced 13 April

1945); this advocated spending £1 670 900 on technical and vocational training for the year 1945.

(ii) 'Union Education' Vote No. 17 (introduced 3 May 1946); this advocated spending £2 342 000 on technical and vocational training, for the year 1946, of which £380 000 was for School Feeding. Some of the arguments put forward with reference to School Feeding (See 6.8) took place during debates on this motion.

The above motions were 'carried' by the Government after some often heated discussions between U.P. and N.P. speakers.

The study analyses aspects of some of the above debates and also outlines the arguments furnished by two contemporary 'liberal' organizations, the S.A.I.R.R. (South African Institute of Race Relations) and N.U.S.A.S. (National Union of South African Students), against the principle of university segregation.

7.4.2. Some Arguments put forward during the debate on University Training for Blacks

7.4.2.1. Introduction

This section uses the term 'black' to refer to the Africans, Coloureds and Asiatics in South African Universities. This general term is used because some university records did not make distinctions between the above groups; neither did M.P.'s in the Assembly specify to which specific group they

were referring when they used the above term.

The debates on University Education largely reflected the political emphasis in 'Native Education' policy. These debates (centred chiefly around the colour-bar in University Education) began in the Assembly in April 1945 and ended in May 1946. Before examining the arguments presented it is necessary to outline the historical background with regard to university training for blacks.

7.4.2.2. Historical Background

The two oldest South African universities are the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand. The race of students was not indicated in early records but this does not mean that these two universities were truly 'open' institutions.[24] Evidence in fact suggests that the colour-bar did operate until the middle of the 20th century. It was, for example, necessary to make a formal decision to admit Blacks to the medical school at U.C.T.[25] The discussion on this issue is summarised in the following section (See 7.4.2.3.).

Those blacks who did attend these universities had to respect the policy of 'academic non-segregation', lecture rooms were shared but their accommodtion and recreational facilities were separately organised.[26] Natal University adhered to the colour-bar until 1936 when it admitted the first black students.[27] Rhodes University only accepted blacks under-

taking post-graduate courses not offered at Fort Hare.[28] However the Afrikaans Medium Universities of Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Potchefstroom and the Orange Free State, complied with traditional Afrikaner segregationist philosophy and did not admit black students.[29] In 1936 the University of South Africa decided to start both full-time and part-time courses for blacks.[30]

The first Black University, the South African Native College renamed Fort Hare in 1952, was opened in 1916. In accordance with its basic segregationist philosophy the Government (U.P.) should have given much help and encouragement to the establishment of Fort Hare. However, the U.P. Government only donated £600 towards the college while other donations, by comparison, included amounts such as £8000 from the United Transkeian Territories General Council (an African body) and the United Free Church of Scotland which gave £5000.[31] The ensuing section illustrates that Government policy did not envisage the establishment of separate universities for blacks. This was deemed to be too costly an undertaking.

7.4.2.3. Arguments relating to the inter-mixing of black and white Students

Both U.P. and N.P. M.P.'s were concerned about the admission of blacks at the University of the Witwatersrand. F.E. Mentz (M.P. for Westdene) expressed N.P. concern:

"What worries me is that at the University of the

> Witwatersrand there is an increase in the number of non-European students. If things go on like this, we shall have the native students of Fort Hare there."[32]
> (Assembly, 17 April 1945)

N.P. politicians were concerned that segregation was being openely violated at the University of the Witwatersrand. N.P. policy was reflected in the words of J.H. Conradie: (M.P. for Gordonia)

> "The non-European should also enjoy university education but should enjoy their training in separate institutions and should not sit alongside Europeans on the same University benches."[33]
> (Assembly, 17 April 1945)

The U.P., on the other hand, also preferred separate universities for the majority of white and black students in S.A., but were prepared to make exceptions with regard to courses such as medicine, which was not offered at the black University College of Fort Hare. There was, however, division within the U.P. fold with regard to the sharing of universities by whites and blacks. The conservative U.P. M.P. for Johannesburg West, S.J. Tighy, stressed that

> "...at all costs the principle of separateness in our education; primary, higher and university education, must be maintained."[34]
> (Assembly, 17 April 1945)

It was, Tighy maintained, therefore imperative to establish a separate university (medical) for black students.

This view was in opposition to that expressed by J.H. Hofmeyr. He was not prepared to initiate legislation to establish a separate medical faculty for blacks as this would "be a very costly undertaking".[35] Neither was he prepared to

enforce the principle of separation in the white universities as long as there were no proper facilities (medical) for black students at Fort Hare.[36] J.H. Hofmeyr was however

> "...in favour of the maintenance of separateness in the social sphere also as regards the universities."[37]
>
> (Assembly, 17 April 1945)

The U.P. believed it was necessary to have a certain measure of social separation among white and black students within the same university; the "lecture rooms should be shared but accommodation and recreational facilities should be separate."[38]

The difference of opinion in U.P. ranks was highlighted by Gen. J.C.G. Kemp (N.P. M.P. for Wolmaransstad):

> "...I am very glad to see that even members opposite are opposed to that liberal standpoint of the Minister (Hofmeyr) and that they themselves feel that there should be a dividing line between European and non-European in the universities."[39]
>
> (Assembly, 18 April 1945)

It was being said that expenses were too high but he (Gen. Kemp) believed that the expense could never be too high to maintain European civilization in South Africa.[13] Similar sentiments were voiced by J.H. Le Roux (N.P. M.P. for Ladybrand) who warned that the intermixing of blacks and whites constituted a great danger:

> "The inevitable result is a certain amount of fraternisation which will eventually become a great danger to the continued existence of the European race".[40]
>
> (Assembly, 18 April 1945)

The ideas of certain U.P. politicians during the above debate were similar to those of the N.P. with regard to university

training. G.N. Haywood (U.P. M.P. for Port Elizabeth District) aptly illustrated this

> "I have nothing against Natives, Coloureds and Asiatics receiving university education. We can ourselves vote money so that they will have their own university. What I am really opposed to is there being no dividing line in the universities between white and black."[41]
>
> (Assembly, 3 May 1946)

Hayward furthermore gave an indication of the mood of the white(S.A.) electorate with regard to the admittance of black students to white universities:

> "I feel convinced that white public opinion in South Africa is decidedly hostile to that intermingling at our universities."[42]
>
> (Assembly, 3 May 1946)

Hayward was warning the U.P. that it was misjudging the mood of the white electorate which, he believed, was generally conservative with regard to social mixing between whites and blacks.

The above arguments reflected the political and economic emphases of the U.P. and N.P. on Higher Educational training for blacks. The U.P. was generally prepared to allow blacks to attend white universities as this would necessitate less Government expenditure than the erection of separate facilities (Universities) for black students. The debates also reflected differences in political emphasis in the U.P.; between the conservatives S.J. Tighy and G.H. Haywood and the liberal J.H. Hofmeyr.

The debates reflected the ultra-conservatism and political emphasis of the N.P.'s 'Native Education' policy in that it

advocated the erection of separate facilities for black students, even if this might prove a costly undertaking, rather than permitting social intercourse between whites and blacks at University level.

7.4.2.4. The views of N.U.S.A.S. and the S.A.I.R.R. towards university segregation

The principle of University segregation was opposed by the National Union of South African Students.*1 In a letter written to the press, in May 1945 J.E. Stewart (Vice President N.U.S.A.S.) stated:

> "The National Union of South African Students has decided, by a majority decision to declare its opposition to segregation of Non-Europeans for purposes of University education...this came to a head in recent debates on the Education Vote in the House of Assembly and the Senate...N.U.S.A.S. applies the democratic principles incorporated in its constitution as follows: 'To defend democracy as the fundamental basis of every sphere of our national existence and therefore to encourage the promotion of equality of educational and economic opportunity for all in South Africa...'"[43]
>
> (The South African Outlook; 1 June 1945)

N.U.S.A.S.'s opposition to the segregation of blacks within the universities, and segregated universities for blacks, was based on the fact that there was substantial danger that such segregation would provide blacks with markedly inferior facilities. This was borne out by the operation of

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*1 Founded in 1924 to represent the interests of S.A. university students; Leo Marquard was the prime mover in its foundation.

segregation in other fields e.g. school education (See 2.3.2.; 2.4.3. and 5.2).

The S.A.I.R.R.*2 (in evidence given to the Commission of Enquiry into Separate University Education) criticised the principle of segregation in University education (as proposed by the N.P.) Some of the most significant points made were:[44]

(i) In segregated institutions the tendency would be to provide little more than technical training, which could fail to counteract group prejudice but would engender an extreme nationalism. The fact that the University College of Fort Hare had disaffiliated from N.U.S.A.S. while black students at the Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand co-operated actively in N.U.S.A.S. was a significant indication that this process was taking place in S.A.

(ii) The S.A.I.R.R. stated that the two open universities (U.C.T. and Wits.) had educated black students since they were first founded. At no time had there been any serious friction between white and black students.

(iii) The S.A.I.R.R. believed that the opposition (N.P.

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*2 The S.A. Institute of Race Relations, founded in 1929 was a non-party-political organisation dependent on voluntary public subscription for its support. It had an individual membership of over 3,700 drawn from all racial groups and had affiliated to it 78 bodies which included municipalities, churches, missions, universities, welfare and other organizations.

mainly) to the open system rested mainly on two grounds: the fear that the social contacts which took place at the universities would lead to miscegination; and the objection to situations which allowed whites and blacks to associate on a basis of equality. The S.A.I.R.R. considered the former allegation groundless and the latter unjustified.

(iv) The short experience of S.A. had shown that segregated institutions were invariably inferior institutions. Fort Hare (founded in 1918) could not compare in teaching staff, variety of courses, equipment and contributions to research with any other university.

The above evidence of the S.A.I.R.R. reflected that segregation in S.A.'s universities would be detrimental to the education of Africans. They would furthermore face financial difficulties. A recurrent theme of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into University Finances (1951) was the lack of finance and consequent deficiencies of the "existing universities over the last few years."[45]

The lack of finance and consequently of teaching staff and equipment would be multiplied by any attempt to set up separate university institutions for blacks.

7.4.3. Some arguments presented during the debate on technical training for Africans

The lack of sufficient technical training for Africans, when

compared with that given to whites has been outlined above (See 7.3). However the need for the technical training of Africans was clearly expressed in Parliament by both Opposition and Government speakers.

In her arguments put forward in the Assembly, V.M.L. Ballinger (N.R.C.; M.P. for Cape Eastern) stressed the economic advantages of providing technical training for African children.

Ballinger, for example stated that the

> "...great bulk of the African population goes into the labour market untrained for anything" and that "...it is this inefficiency which costs the country very heavily in its national income."[46]
> (Assembly, 26 April 1947)

It is to be hoped that Ballinger's emphasis on the economic value ofthe black worker was merely a technique to get the Government to realize the enormous potential of human resources which awaited development. If the Government could be coerced into taking action to increase financial expenditure on African technical education, this would be to the benefit of the Africans and would also satisfy the humanitarian outlook of the N.R.'s.

Ballinger refuted the claim that it was not worth training Africans for the industrial field as long as the colour-bar operated to prevent them from having full scope for their developed abilities.[47] She maintained that

> "...the field that is covered by the colour-bar which operates specifically in terms of the

> Apprenticeship Act - I am talking now of the explicit colour-bar,the fact that it is practically impossible for Africans to get into skilled trades - covers a very small part of the industrial field. There is a large part of the industrial field that is open to being made to train him for jobs in that field.[48]
> (Assembly, 26 April 1947)

Ballinger did not however state the reason for the Government's reluctance to train Africans for jobs in industry. Ballinger suggested that there were a number of industries which would benefit if Africans were properly trained. She stated that the efficiency of African girls in the domestic service could be improved by introducing training in that field.[49] There were furthermore numbers of industries which were employing Africans only in operative capacities. She believed that

> "...in order to improve the standard of efficiency in these jobs, it would surely be common sense to try to establish some sort of part-time educational system."[50]
> (Assembly, 26 April 1947)

She warned the Government that the skills of the Africans would have to be used in the industrial field even in specialised jobs such as building.[51] However the problem of the shortage of labour, and particularly of skilled labour was not merely an urban one but also rural.

Ballinger stressed that the complete absence of any training on the part of the African worker was the greatest drag on all agricultural development in the country.[52] She hoped that the Government would initiate a scheme that would

> "develop our labour resources, that will enable us to build up our national income and to lay the foundations of an efficient economic system in this country."[53]

The Government's reply to Ballinger's requests was that it was awaiting the report of the De Villiers Commission on Vocational and Technical Training. However, it seems that this was merely a cover-up for its reluctance to provide sufficient funds for African education because when the report did appear, the Government did not take up the Commission's recommendations of substantially increasing expenditure on technical education for Africans. The Government's policy was clearly expressed by J.H. Hofmeyr:

> "Our policy is to go slowly: we cannot expect to proceed rapidly."[54]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

The Government certainly had no intention of speeding up the development of African education. It shared a common fear with the N.P. that the mass education of Africans would ultimately threaten the position of the white man in South Africa. It might also give rise to unhealthy competition between whites and Africans. This eventuality was highlighted by Dr. L.S. Steenkamp (U.P. for Vryheid) while discussing the possibility of adult education classes for Africans at the Technical College in Johannesburg. He stated:

> "When we permit the training of those natives as technicians or artisans, have we taken their background into consideration? We now find that at those technical colleges the native is being trained just like the white man. He will be trained there to <u>compete with the white man</u> because he is being trained with the same objective as the white man is being trained, and this will lead to greater difficulty for the native himself and further complicate our whole native problem."[55]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

This conservative U.P. viewpoint was very similar to that

expressed by the N.P. politicians during the above debate. The following quotation of J.N. Le Roux (N.P.; M.P. for Ladybrand) substantiates this:

> "We are not opposed to something being done for the native but there will immediately be many trades in which he will enter into direct competition with Europeans..."[56]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

The N.P. stated that it was not adverse to 'educating blacks' but that they should be educated so that they might remain labourers and not threaten the position of whites in industry. Le Roux summed this up:

> "Our present system for the natives is not on right lines. We cannot give him merely an academic education and expect him to make a living in the future. We must teach him manual labour, and his schools must be so run that he will be capable of performing manual labour."[57]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

The creation of a 'black working class' was clearly a priority in both U.P. and N.P. thinking. It was indeed necessary for the rapid 'economic progress' of the State. One of the methods of acquiring suitable African workers was through educating them with technical skills so that they might be rendered suitable for wage-labour. The ruling-class historian, Pells, argued that it was essential to school Africans

> "if they are not to be left profoundly dissatisfied and an ever-present menace to society."[58]

The Report of the Transvaal Director of Education (1903) aptly sums up the white ruling class attitude towards 'Native Education'. It put forward the view that

> "no proposal for a plan of native education would be likely to command itself to the sense of the great majority of the (white) people of this country that

> did not contemplate the ultimate social place of the native as that of an efficient worker..."[59]

These words, expressed in the early 20th century, could very well have been uttered by either the N.P. or U.P. politicians of the mid 1940's. Steenkamp (U.P.) explained white ruling-class philosophy with regard to Africans:

> "An educated Native is better than an uneducated native. He is better for society and also for the work that he has to do".[60]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

The Government had begun to realise the economic value of a black-schooled population, yet it provided insufficient vocational training for Africans by underfunding African education (See 3.2). The basic reasons for this policy, have been expressed above. However, a further important reason for this attitude was expressed in this debate:

> "In my opinion, facilities for technical and vocational training should be priority No. 1 for Europeans today. There is an acute shortage of facilities for technical and vocational training for European children".[61]
>
> (Assembly, 28 April 1947)

The State had no intention of providing additional education facilities for the training of Africans when there was a shortage, during the war years, of suitable technical training for whites (See Section 7.3). It was essential that whites should be adequately trained so that they might maintain their expertise in the technical and industrial fields. Technical and vocational training for Africans was to take second place.

The U.P. Government chose to ignore the recommendations of

the Commission on Vocational and Technical Training that there should be free and compulsory education for all African children. It is significant that this was an A.N.C. demand contained in the Bill of Rights (December 1943). The Bill demanded

> "the right of every African child to a free and compulsory education".[62]

The above Commission further recommended the establishment of a national vocational training organization for Africans. The fact that both this Commission and the Van Eck Commission were appointed after the war may be attributed to the pressure of black militancy which had reached its peak at that time. The dissatisfaction of Africans with the U.P. Government's 'Native Education' policy and some Africans' reactions towards the Government's over-all 'Native Policy' is analysed in the following chapter.

7.5. Notes

1. Report of the Commission on Technical and Vocational Education (U.G. 65/1948); p. 7.
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C H A P T E R E I G H T

SOME ASPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIVE POLICY AND AFRICAN REACTION TO THIS POLICY

8.1. INTRODUCTION

Most Africans were dissatisfied with the 'Native' policy of the Native Affairs Department and made a distinction between this policy and the 'Native Education' policy which was left largely in missionary hands under Provincial Control. However Africans resented the limited aid given by the Union Government to missionary schools; this resulted in chaotic conditions being experienced in most schools as a result of poor facilities.

This section outlines aspects of the Government's 'Native' policy and the opinions of the moderate Native Representative Council and the more radical organizations, the African National Congress and African Mine Workers' Union, towards that policy.

8.2. The Native Representative Council

8.2.1. Establishment of the N.R.C.

As far as political rights for Africans were concerned, the U.P. Government upheld the 1936 settlement which provided for the representation of the 'Natives' by 'Europeans' (whites) in Parliament (Senate, Assembly and Cape Provincial Council),

and for the establishment of the N.R.C.

The Representation of Natives' Act 12 of 1936 had provided for the formation of

> "a Council consisting of partly elected African members whose function would be to advise the Government on legislation and other matters affecting African welfare ..."[1]

The N.R.C. consisted of eight elected members and four nominated members. It should be noted that the former were highly educated and respected leaders of the African people such as Dr. John Dube, Selope Thema, R.H. Godlo and Alexander M. Jabavu.

The N.R.C. initially co-operated with the Government but the impotence of this body, which Africans termed a 'toy telephone', was demonstrated as soon as it began to press for the removal of restrictions on African freedom of movement.

Among resolutions passed by the N.R.C. were those urging the abolition of the Pass laws and of influx control.[2]

8.2.2. The N.R.C.'s educational views

The N.R.C. members made some significant statements with regard to the control of 'Native Education'. Councillor Ndhlovu stated that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to 'Native Education' being removed to the Union Government but would not like to see it under the Native Affairs Department

> "because they have no experts in education, whereas if education was removed to the Education Department then there are the necessary experts in education."[3]

He did not wish education to become mixed up with the 'Native Policy' of the Native Affairs Department.[4]

The N.R.C. supported the recommendations of the Inter-Departmental Committee (Welsh; See 2.3.2), amongst others;

(i) that 'Native Education' be transferred from the control of the Provincial Council to that of the Union Government;

(ii) that the administration and financing of 'Native Education' be dissociated from the Native Affairs Department (including the Native Affairs Commission) and be placed with the Union Education Department.[5]

The above recommendations were adopted as resolutions at the N.R.C. meeting in February 1939.

With regard to the kind of education desired by Africans the N.R.C. stated:

> "We ask for a liberal education from the Government which has been started by the missionaries and we are very grateful because most of us are missionary products."[6]

Some Africans, while appreciating the Government's 'liberal policy' of allowing 'Native Education' to remain largely in missionary hands, deplored the Government's limited funding of missionary endeavours.

Professor Z.K. Matthews (Chairman of the N.R.C. Caucus) in an article entitled Native Education in South Africa during the last twenty-five Years (1946) supplied evidence of the outstanding work done by Missions despite the limited

financial assistance obtained from white Governments during that period. Matthews stated:

> "...while those primarily responsible for what progress has been made in Native Education, namely the Missions and the African People themselves have had to live a hand to mouth existence during the period under review, they have not been daunted by difficulties nor have they been deterred from their endeavours by the usual reply to their representatives to public authority, "No funds available". With faith and determination, self-sacrifice and devotion to duty, they have embarked upon new develpments, started new schools of the old type and new schools of the new types. While continuing their plea for the provision of better facilities for the education of African Youth they have carried on in dilapidated buildings with the barest minimum of equipment or material."[7]

While the above quotation is a fitting tribute to the outstanding role played by mission societies, it is also a sad reflection on the effects of the 'Native Education' policies of white Governments in the above period. The role of the missionaries has been reviewed in this study (Section 2.2.1; 2.2.2) and is further analysed in the debates relating to missionary involvement in'Native Education' (Section 5.3.4).

8.2.3. The N.R.C.'s dissatisfaction with Government policy

The N.R.C. became increasingly critical of the Smuts Government's 'Native' policy towards the Africans. Councillor Thema alleged that the Government failed to recognise those Africans who had become civilized enough, according to Western standards, to be treated as equals with Europeans. He posed the following searching questions to

Smuts (1943):

> "...Now what is the intention of the State with regard to these people (the uneducated Africans)? Are they going to be left in that condition? and then the few others who have advanced will be told that they must go slowly because they leave behind these illiterate masses of people..."[8]

The Smuts Government could and would not honestly answer those questions. It did not wish the whites to be swamped by the black tidal wave and therefore it advocated a policy which was similar to that of the N.P. in the respect that it envisaged a virtual separation of Africans and whites in most spheres of South African life - political, cultural, educational and social. The U.P. Government therefore outrightly rejected the resolutions which were passed at various N.R.C. sessions from 1936 until 1947. Some of these resolutions were:[9]

(i) Educated Africans should be given the opportunity to rise to responsible posts in the public service, more particularly in the capacity of serving their own people.

(ii) The Government should make use of its powers to compel local authorities to concede trade licences to Africans in African urban townships, and white traders should be eliminated from African reserves and locations.

(iii) African industrial workers should be granted the same rights of collective bargaining through the recognition of registered trade unions as were possessed by other workers (See 8.4.1 for trade

unions).

(iv) The poll tax should be abolished and Africans should instead pay ordinary personal taxes to provincial revenues.

(v) Individual Africans should be permitted to purchase land in rural locations and on trust farms on individual freehold tenure.

It is noticeable that these N.R.C. demands were similar to those listed by the A.N.C. (See Section 8.3).

8.2.4. The resignation of the N.R.C.

The U.P.'s 'Native' policy took a dramatic nose-dive with the resignation of the N.R.C. in 1946. The N.R.C. had become disillusioned with the U.P., particularly with the Government's handling of the 1946 Mineworker's strike. (See 8.4.2)

The Government's disregard of N.R.C. opinion was reflected by the fact that when Fred Rodseth (a minor official) opened the N.R.C. session on 4th August 1946, he made no mention of the disastrous strike which had occurred two days before.[10] The Government clearly did not think it necessary to consult the N.R.C. about such an important matter. Furthermore when he had been requested to do so, Rodseth had no information to give members about the strike.[11] This was yet another example of the tactless handling of the N.R.C. by the Government. It illustrated that while Government M.P.'s made a

loud noise in Parliament with regard to the Partnership Policy of the Government, in reality they had no intention of fully consulting with the so-called leaders of black opinion in S.A. Furthermore the Government had sent a relatively minor official (Rodseth) to open an important N.R.C. session. Government Ministers were evidently not available, neither was the Chairman (N.R.C.), Dr. G. Mears. Rodseth announced the appointment of the Fagan Commission. (See 8.7 for details).

Although this news aroused a favourable reaction, the N.R.C. was at this stage in no mood for further delaying tactics of the Government.[12]

Dr. J.S. Moroka moved the adjournment of the session with a motion which deprecated

> "the Government's post-war continuation of the policy of Fascism which is the antithesis and negation of the letter and spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter."[13]
>
> (N.R.C.; 4 August, 1946)

and called upon the Government

> "forthwith to abolish all discriminatory legislation affecting non-Europeans in this country."[14]
>
> (N.R.C.; 4 August, 1946)

The N.R.'s, fearing a deadlock frantically tried to persuade the Government to consider a meaningful programme of reform. Brookes (Native Representative) wrote to Hofmeyr that

> "unless we are prepared to take seriously questions such as the Pass Laws (See 8.6)...to make unequivocal declarations...in favour of free and compulsory education, and the strengthening of the Status of the Representative Council, we shall be heading for disaster."[15]

Brookes suggested a judicial commission to investigate the

Miners' Strike and Government recognition of trade unions.[16] Hofmeyr however refuted Brooke's proposals, but Smuts, finding international pressures embarrassing and with an Indian crisis imminent, (the Indians in Natal started a passive resistance campaign in June 1946 against the Pegging Act which introduced

> "the principle of separate land tenure and residence, and of separate political representation for Indians ... as in the case of 'natives' ..."[17])

asked that a draft on the lines of Brooke's plan be submitted to the Cabinet.[18] Smuts remarked that the'Native' policy should be "liberalised at modest pace."[19]

The expectant N.R.C. met again on the 20 November 1946 to hear the Government's response to its proposals. Hofmeyr's handling of the situation and especially his reply to the N.R.C. was indeed both tactless and unsatisfactory. He side-stepped the burning issues of the day such as the detested pass laws, the colour-bar in industry and the political rights of non-Europeans. Instead he stressed that the Government could not remove all legislation towards 'Natives' as some of it was designed to protect 'Native' interests. He cited the example of land which was reserved for 'Natives' to protect them against European purchase. He further listed the benevolent actions taken by the Government to improve the 'Natives'' position, quoting improved education (Finance Bill), medical and health services.[20] He stated that the Government would not however be prepared to recognise African trade unions for miners.[21]

The N.R.C. however, was in no mood to be placated by the Government's benevolent paternalism. What they wanted was real freedom for the Africans - a chance to compete equally in all spheres of South African life.

Neither the U.P. Government nor the N.P. Opposition was willing to give them this kind of freedom. Hofmeyr had clearly disappointed the Africans and could no longer be called "Ntembu" (our hope).[22] The N.R.C. therefore adjourned with these words:

> "the Council makes a further appeal to the Government to undertake such revision of its Native Policy with a view to making possible co-operation between white and black in this country."[23]
>
> (N.R.C.; 4 Aug., 1946)

The Government at last began to take swift action and the Native Affairs Commission brought out of cold-storage a report of the N.R.C.'s 1943 Recess Committee.[24] However even these demands proved too extreme and were consequently adjusted. The Government came up with the recommendation of an enlarged N.R.C. which would have an African chairman and would be allowed certain functions such as the right to make by-laws subject to Parliamentary approval and to have an executive Committee whose members would hold individual portfolios.[25] Smuts had no new constructive changes to offer the dissatisfied N.R.C. Small wonder therefore that they were bitterly disappointed at the minor concessions received from the man who was considered the champion of liberty abroad. Brookes urged Smuts not to close the door on future negotiations and Smuts obliged by stating in the Assembly in

reply to one of Malan's merciless attacks:

> "Do not let us break off, but let us give them certain powers and see ... what use they will make of the executive powers that will be accorded to them ... we must not abolish the council but go forward."[26]
> (Assembly; August 1946)

No doubt Smuts wished to proceed at his moderate pace which was designed not to upset the white electorate on the eve of a general election, but which was definitely frustrating the moderate African leaders. The remarkable patience of moderate African leaders such as Xuma, Godlo and Matthews, is noteworthy. They did not wish to sever relations with the Smuts regime and therefore opposed the protest measures of the A.N.C. such as the boycotting of N.R.C. elections. A stalemate had been reached between the N.R.C. and the Government and for two years no further meetings were called. Prime Minister Smuts eventually, in June 1947, personally intervened in the dispute between the N.R.C. and the Government. Prof. Z.K. Matthews issued the following statement after the meeting between the Council and the Prime Minister:

> "... he seemed to us to admit quite frankly that our present 'Native' policy was out of date and did not fit in with the changed and changing conditions of African life today. That is a significant admission made at Ministerial level by the first citizen of the State. To my mind that is a definite gain ... The battle has been won, and the present Government at any rate, is committed to finding a new direction for Union 'Native' policy."[27]

Indicative of Smuts' thinking, at that point in time, is the fact that he had appointed the Fagan Commission in 1946 to

inquire into the laws relating to Africans in urban areas, the pass laws and migratory labour. Smuts could not fulfil his promises to the N.R.C. as he was defeated by the N.P. in the 1948 general election. Malan's N.P. Government abolished the N.R.C. in 1951.

8.3 The influence of the A.N.C.

The A.N.C., which had been founded in 1912, with the Rev.J.L. Dube as Chairman, was initially ineffective in that it did not pressurise the white regime into introducing meaningful reforms for Africans both in the general and educational spheres. Heribert Adam stresses that this

> "first generation of urban African leaders were in the main mission - educated and mission sponsored Christians who had gained impressive degrees abroad ... and had infinite faith in Christian democracy..."[28]

O'Meara supports the view that the A.N.C. (before the 1940's) was basically an ineffectual organization which could not truly claim to represent the majority of Africans in S.A.[29] Benson observes that the A.N.C. co-operated fully with the U.P. Government and its leaders in fact sat on the Government-constituted N.R.C.

> "despite the rejection of that Council as a dummy organization by an influential body of African opinion which called for its boycott."[30]

The A.N.C. concentrated on rebuilding its structure during the war years under the leadership of Chief Luthuli, Dr. James Moroka and W.M. Sisulu. The A.N.C. published its Bill of Rights (Dec. 1943) which was valuable in that it

outlined the main grievences of most Africans (so it claimed) to the Smuts regime. Its most important demands were:[31]

(i) The removal of political discrimination based solely on race;

(ii) The repeal of all laws restricting freedom of residence;

(iii) The right of every African child to a free and compulsory education;

(iv) The right to an equal share in the material resources of the country;

(v) Adequate medical and health facilities for the African population.

Some of the above demands are reiterated in the sections relating to African Trade Unionism (8.4.1) and Government Commissions (8.4.2 and 8.7).

In 1943 the A.N.C. issued its most important document since 1919, African Claims in South Africa. It not only emphasised African opposition to racial discrimination but also endorsed universal franchise without qualifications.[32]

The Youth League, established in 1944, set itself the task of generating a spirit of self-reliance and militant nationalism among the African masses to achieve these goals.[33]

The Youth League's outlook is illustrated by the following quotation:

> "We of the Youth League take account of the concrete situation in South Africa and realise that the different racial groups have come to stay. But we insist that a condition for inter-racial peace and progress is the abandonment of white dominaton, and such a change in the basic structure of South African

> society that those relations which breed exploitation and human misery disappear."[34]

The A.N.C. clearly emphasised the dissatisfaction of most Africans with the Government's 'Native' policy. However, not being a militant organization at this stage, the A.N.C. was largely ineffectual in influencing the Government to introduce meaningful reforms for Africans.

8.4. The growth of African militancy as a reaction to the Government's 'Native' policy

This section reviews the period from 1939-48 and seeks to establish the reasons for the growth of African militancy.

Africans had much to resent in the Smuts Government's policy towards them. They were frustrated by a policy which forbade them to make use of their abilities and skills in the professions, in industry and commerce. Colour-bar legislation (See 1.4.4. and 7.2) effectively reserved certain skilled trades entirely for whites and closed the door to African advancement in industry and in mining. Furthermore this labour policy was backed up by the Government's 'Native Education' policy which effectively under-funded Technical education (See 7.3), a sector of education directly under the Union Government's control.

8.4.1. African Trade Unionism

The growth of African trade unionism in the 1930's was partly on account of the above policy (colour-bar) and partly due to the inequality of the wage structure where semi- and unskilled Africans mostly received less remuneration than their white counterparts (See below)

The Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Africans (1942) reported that in commerce and industry there had been an increase in wage rates since 1937 but even in 1942 these rates still left a wide gap between the earnings and minimum costs of the barest necessities of life.[35]

The National Health Services Commission (1944) stated that in farming the evidence suggested that real wages had declined due to the "failure of standards of remuneration to move upwards with rising costs."[36]

African labourers had good reasons to be dissatisfied with the labour structure in S.A.

The Mine Natives' Wages Commission (1944) concluded that the wages paid to African mine labourers failed to meet the cost of even the poorest living standard.[37]

The following article appeared in the April (1947) edition of Libertas with regard to the wages being paid in the S.A. coal mines. It stated

> "White labour numbering 2733 gets £1 316 600; an average wage of £481 a year each.
> African labour, numbering 45 836 gets £1 744 000; an average cash wage of £38 a year each, about one-

twelfth of the white worker's wage."[38]

Dissatisfaction with low wages was one of the reasons for the rapid growth of the Council for non-European Trade Unions (C.N.E.T.U.) during the war years. By 1945 it could claim a membership of 158 000 persons in 119 unions, embracing more than 40% of the 390 000 Africans employed in commerce and manufacturing.[39]

The growth of African trade unions in the period 1930-45 was matched by a corresponding growth in African militancy. From 1933 to 1946 the number of African strikers consistently exceeded that of whites.[40]

The Industrial Conciliation Act allowed for the registration of trade unions and employers' organizations but effectively excluded the bulk of the African workers from its scope. (See 7.2 for clarification). The steady growth of the illegal African Trade Unions during the war years worried the U.P. Government. African workers united in attempts to obtain better wages. In 1942 a rash of strikes in C.N.E.T.U.'s campaign for a weekly minimum wage of 40/- led directly to State action against African trade unions.[41]

The Government passed War Measure 145 of December 1942 which outlawed strikes by Africans.

8.4.2. The Lansdown Commission and 1946 African Mineworkers' Strike

In August 1941 the C.P. and the Transvaal A.N.C. called a

conference and formed the A.M.W.U. (African Mine Workers' Union). From its inception this Union fought for wage demands but these were ignored by the Chamber of Mines. After a series of strikes in February 1944 the Government appointed the Lansdown Commission to investigate the position of African miners in the gold mining industry. The Commission expressed horror at both conditions in the mines and remuneration paid to miners.[42] It made recommendations for the improvement of conditions and wages of African miners but vetoed African trade unionism largely because it feared white public reaction to the idea.[43]

When the U.P. Government accepted some of its recommendations only and rejected others, including the provision of a

> "means under which any general grievance of the workers or any serious suggestions made by them for the improvement of their labour conditions could be brought under the consideration of the Government and employers"[44]

very deep dissatisfaction resulted. African miners reacted angrily, with 74 000 striking on the 12 August.[45]

Government reaction was swift and violent:

> "To the Head Council of his United Party, Prime Minister Smuts declared himself 'not unduly concerned'. The strike was the result of agitation, not legitimate grievances, and 'appropriate action' was being taken."[46]

This action consisted of paralysing the leadership while police attacked miners with rifles and clubs. The strike was carefully timed to coincide with the opening of the N.R.C. session. O'Meara observes that the

> "hitherto conservative Native Representative Council, after a series of unprecedented verbal attacks on Government policy, unanimously resolved to suspend sittings of their 'toy telephone' in angry and vehement protest at the Government's refusal to discuss the strike."[47]

In terms of its objectives the 1946 strike was a dismal failure - although the exact number of casualties was never made known, at least 12 Africans were reported killed and over 12 000 injured.[48]

The rise of African militancy was an important factor which caused the Smuts regime to take cognizance of African aspirations and to gradually steer its 'Native' policy in a 'moderate direction.'

(See 8.2.4: Smuts' promises to the N.R.C. in 1947).

It is significant that the above strike, the largest in South African history was undertaken by migrant workers. They had left the reserves because of great poverty in most of these territories. These migrant labourers flocked to the cities where they faced an even greater curse than poverty; discrimination in industry, a housing shortage, a high cost of living and the continued enforcement of the Pass Laws by arrest and imprisonment.

8.5. The Native (Urban Areas) Act and problems of urban congestion

Africans who moved to the towns were subject to conditions of residence governed by the regulations of the Natives (Urban

Areas) Act No. 21 of 1923 (See Section 1.4) as amended by Acts No. 25 of 1930 and No. 46 of 1937.[49]

Generally these Acts defined and described the powers of urban local authorities to set aside land for the accommodation of the 'Natives' who were 'legitimately' within their boundaries. They furthermore prohibited the acquisition of the 'Natives' of any land situated within any urban area or rural township except with the approval of the Governor-General.[50]

The Urban Areas Act enpowered the U.P. Government to move Africans at will to any area it deemed necessary. The 'dumping' of Africans by the Government in the already over-congested living areas had serious repercussions for the African urban population. The following excerpts illustrate the gravity of the problems that existed. The Star (a Johannesburg newspaper) contained the following news item:

> "The movement of squatters from the Tobruk and Oriel Camps to Moroka emergency camp has been completed and 7,200 families or about 35 000 people have been received at Moroka.
> Each of the 7,200 families is allotted a piece of ground, the size of a large room (20ft x 20ft) on which to re-erect the hessian shelter brought from the previous more crowded camps. They are now given water supply and sanitation and medical and nursing services. The rent, including these services, is 15/- a month.
> There is much talk about "thousands of vagrants" who were said to be "loafing" in these hessian camps, living by their wits or by crime."[51]
> (24 June 1947)

The South African Outlook (a monthly news-journal) reported on 1 January 1945:

> "The crime wave is still causing perturbation in South Africa. In more than one quarter it has been stressed that crimes of violence are being perpetrated not only against Europeans but that in many Native townships the people are suffering from the deeds of criminals."*
>
> (1 January 1945)

The European (white) press in stressing the growing crime rate and thereby increasing white fears, often overlooked the fact that Africans were the main victims of the crime wave. The subject of crime was discussed at the 'Native' conferences held in 1945, notably the All African Convention, the African National Congess, the Congress of Location Advisory Boards (all held at Bloemfontein) and the non-European Unity Conference held at Kimberley. It was a common contention at these conferences that while the crime wave in 1945 was a world-wide phenomenon, in S.A. it was accentuated by social and economic conditions affecting the poorer sections of the population. Some of these conditions were poor housing and urban unemployment.

The following excerpt suggests that the Government was slow-in-acting with regard to improving the poor conditions (See above) for urban Africans.

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* The South African Outlook, Vol. 75, No. 885, p.1.

The Star (16 Oct. 1947) reported that

> "South Africa requires 154 000 Native houses, of which 142 000 are needed in urban areas. But in the last 12 months only 7 000 have been built under Government financed schemes. Time and again, Government departments, including those of Health and Native Affairs, have declared that unless measures are taken "immediately" to alleviate the Native housing position, serious health and repercussions can be expected. But weeks and months pass. Meanwhile the country has before it ominous examples of mass squatting movements, and of some hapless Natives still living in tin tanks, which they first inhabited years ago as "temporary arrangements".[52]

An example of a Commission instituted to investigate the conditions relating to urban Africans was the Broome Commission. This one-man Commission was set up in September 1947 to inquire into the conditions of Africans in Durban.

The conclusions arrived at by Justin Broome were as follows:[53]

1. The approximate African population in Durban in 1946 was 104 100, of whom 26 600 were permanently urbanized and 77 000 were migrant workers.
2. The African population in Durban had increased by 64% between the years 1936 and 1946.
3. The great majority of male shack-dwellers were usefully employed in the city.
4. There was no need to control the influx of Africans but this would be achieved through the rehabilitation of the reserves.

The above slum areas proved to be excellent 'breeding-

grounds' for juvenile delinquency and crime. The state of poverty of the urban Africans and their deteriorating health has already been examined (See 6.4 and 6.5); the social results are noteworthy. It can be argued that when poverty drove both parents into the labour market the control of the children declined and there was an increase in juvenile delinquency and in adult criminality.

There was a need for more schools and education in the urban areas as a possible means of combating juvenile delinquency. The Government was prepared to finance a School Feeding Scheme as a possible means of alleviating malnutrition among urban African children.

8.6. The Pass System

The pass system was one of the deepest grievances of the African population. A pass was a document carried by Africans alone containing details such as the name, race, place of abode and work of the bearer. It should be noted that these laws were applicable to the Transvaal and Orange Free State and to a limited extent in Natal. The laws relating to travelling passes in the Transvaal and Orange Free State had been consolidated under Proclamation No. 150 of 1934 as amended by later Proclamations, the most recent being Proclamations No. 227 of 1939 and No. 186 of 1940.[54]

The above proclamation defined the provinces mentioned, excluding scheduled 'Native' areas, as pass areas and

provided for the carrying of passes by'Natives' entering, leaving or travelling within such areas. Section 14 exempted certain classes of 'Natives', including those "certified by Native Commissions to be of good character and report."[55] In Natal, Africans were not required to carry passes to travel within the province but only if they left or entered, in terms of Law No. 48 of 1884. [56] In the Cape Province there was freedom of movement for Africans.

Marquard observes that there were few aspects of the administration of the U.P. Government that the Africans resented as bitterly as the pass laws and regulations.[56] Failure to produce a pass was considered a punishable offence. Africans considered passes as badges of inferiority and they resented the constant interference of the police. In an article entitled Protests against midnight raids, The South African Outlook (1 Dec. 1947) stated:

> "Two largely attended protest meetings were held respectively at Lady Selborne and New Mooiplaats Location during the week-end, under the aegis of the Pretoria branch of the African National Congress. The protests were against the recent police raids for poll-tax, passes, liquor and general mass arrests. The Rev. N.B. Tantsi, Pretoria Congress Chairman, described the raids as inhuman. The raids were disturbing to law-abiding Africans and a letter has been sent to the Minister of Justice (the Hon. H.G. Lawrence) seeking an interview for a deputation of African leaders who will protest against the raids."[57]

The Government's Smit Commission (1942), appointed to examine the social, health and economic conditions of the urban Africans, stated with regard to the pass system:

> "The harassing and constant interference with the freedom of movement of Natives gives rise to a burning sense of grievance and injustice which has an unsettling effect upon the Native population as a whole."[58]

The rigid application of the pass system was one of the factors contributing towards inter-racial hostility during the period under review. It could be expected that Africans would view with suspician any educational reform introduced by a Government which legalised discrimination and offended human dignity. After the Smit Report the Government attempted to alleviate the pressures on Africans due to the Pass Laws. A request was made by Col. F.C. Reitz (Minister of Native Affairs) to apply the pass laws more reasonably in the large urban centres. He stated:

> "I have travelled a great deal in the Native Areas, especially in the Transvaal, and I have found that nothing is so conducive to irritation, to bad feeling, to hatred, to disturbance between Black and White than the pass laws ... No one can call this offence a crime; a contravention of the pass laws is done, in 90 percent of the cases through sheer ignorance."[59]

The 'more reasonable' application of the pass laws led to a rapid decline in the number of arrests made on Africans not carrying passes. A comparison between the three-month periods February to April and June to August 1942, revealed that the number of pass arrests on the Rand fell from 13641 in the former to 1808 in the latter period.*

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* Davenport, T.R.H., **The Smuts Government and the Africans**; (1974); I.C.S. Seminar Papers; p.84.

Unfortunately the Smuts Government did not persist with this policy of 'moderation' and yielded to the report of the Elliot Commission which discovered that the 'moderate pass policy' had led to a greater flow of Africans into the towns.*

The decision to apply a stricter pass policy initiated the anti-Pass Campaign (1944) which stirred up racial feelings in S.A. and led to bad publicity overseas.

It is noticeable that although individual Cabinet Ministers (liberally-inclined men like Reitz and Hofmeyr) often criticised the pass system, the Government still found it expedient to retain this system in an attempt to control the movement of Africans in the urban areas. The Government was, by means of the pass system and the Urban Areas Act, covering up for and attempting to circumvent the failure of its 'Native' policy (Reserve System) which had led to the numerous problems of increased urbanization.

8.7. The Fagan Commission

It is particularly significant that the Fagan Commission was appointed soon after the 1946 Mineworkers' Strike had taken place. The rise of black militancy as a reaction to the

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* Davenport, T.R.H., The Smuts Government and the Africans; (1974); I.C.S. Seminar papers; p. 84.

Government's 'Native' policy appeared to be pressurising the State into introducing some meaningful reforms for Africans. African hopes were raised by the appointment of the above Commission which was authorised to inquire into the laws relating to Africans in urban areas, the pass laws and migratory labour.

The significance of this document cannot be over-estimated. After an exhaustive study of the facts, the Commission concluded that the African must be regarded as a part of the permanent industrial population of the country settled in urban areas, that the 'Native' territories (reserves) could not maintain the future increase of their population and that there would thus have to be a continued addition over the years to the urbanized African population.[60]

The Fagan report concluded that the

> 'urban migration of 'Natives' was purely an economic phenomenon which the Government could guide but would find impossible to prevent.'[61]

The Report condemned the system of migratory labour.

The Report frankly stated that the system of migrant labour reflected two basic features of the South African economy, namely "reserve poverty and the absence of adequate facilities (e.g. housing and recreational) for a stable Native urban life[62]. It recommended that a system of "central guidance be developed to channel the migrant labour stream into the most useful avenues."[63]

In this respect the Report was supporting J.H. Hofmeyr's views on Trusteeship:

> "The rest (Africans) will continue to live on the white man's farms and in the white man's towns. They will do so because the white man thinks that it will be to his advantage that they should."[64]

The Report was not as outspoken against Government policy as Africans had hoped it would be. With regard to the Pass Laws the Report suggested that

> "some regulation of the movement of Natives was essential and beneficial for the Natives themselves and for the country as a whole."[65]

Rather than recommending the abolition of the Urban Areas Act and the Pass Laws, the Report offered urban Africans more management in their own affairs. It recommended that Natives be given a degree of responsibility in maintaining law and order in urban Native villages and suggested that a Government sub-department should be created to deal with 'Native' villages outside municipal areas.[66]

Hancock states that the Fagan Report embodied the 'social philosophy' of Smuts and gave him some ammunition for his election campaign in 1948. It furthermore contained the 'virtues of comprehensiveness and feasability.'[67]

Davenport suggests that the Report appeared too near the end of the Government's term of office and with none of the recommendations (which were accepted by the Smuts Government) yet tested, it offered the electorate a "liberal aspiration rather than a policy"[68]

It appears that the white S.A. electorate preferred the

N.P.'s principles (with regard to 'Native' policy) embodied in its Sauer Report which appeared four days after the Fagan Report.

The above reports provided the white electorate with a basic outline of U.P. and N.P. `Native' policy on the eve of the 1948 general election. The U.P.'s Trusteeship policy of 'partnership' was reflected in the Fagan Report while the Sauer Report outlined the N.P.'s policy of separate development ("Apartheid"). The N.P. victory in 1948 indicated that whites had opted for a conservative approach towards the racial issue facing S.A. African reaction against the U.P. Govenment's go-slow and often ambivalent 'policy of promises' had possibly influenced the white electorate to choose a Government which was intent on keeping the African in his place.

The need for more schools and for better education in the urban areas has been stated above. However the Government's legalization of discriminatory laws towards Africans and the consequent arousal of the African people's indignation, would possibly offset the work being done in the educational field. Africans would view education with suspicion as it came from a regime which could at the same time inflict measures such as the harsh 'pass system'.

The following article, written by B.B. Mdlede expressed the views of most Africans in 1948 towards the Trusteeship policy

of the Smuts Government. Under the heading Apartheid and Trusteeship (the South African Outlook, 1 Oct., 1948) it stated, with regard to Trusteeshp:

> "It presupposes that the ward is not to be regarded as one who is capable of managing his affairs with any sense of responsibility. He must be taxed but he must not be represented in that body which determines how those taxes are disbursed. He must be law-abiding... Any institution which purports to express his feelings is immediately dubbed as agitators and is threatened with extinction. This complex of domination displayed by our rulers makes them abhor any idea of the Africans ever sitting with them in the supreme councils of the country - the legislature. That is not all. Ever since the creation of separate rolls of voters, a peculiar situation has arisen. No member of Parliament ever thinks of addressing or exchanging views with the Africans. Even those who ever put in a word for them are prompted purely by humanitarian feelings rather than by views of those they purport to legislate for. In a word they are out of touch with African opinion. No one wishes to see this country turned into a blood-bath, but as things are developing at present one has one's fears." [69]

The above article vividly portrayed African reaction towards the 'Native' policy of the U.P. Government. The article further stated that Africans equated Trusteeship with "Apartheid":

> "In the last analysis the theory of trusteeship is no different from "Apartheid" in that the driving motive is the same - the fear of the white people of being submerged by the Africans. They (both the above doctrines) are unacceptable to the Africans"[70]

It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the views and reactions of most Africans towards the Smuts Government's overall 'Native' policy than that presented in the above article.

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42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. The South African Outlook, (2 Sept. 1945), p. 142.
45. Davenport (1974) p. 193.
46. O'Meara (1979), p. 75.
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61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.

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66. Ibid.

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C O N C L U S I O N

A number of important conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis of 'Native Education' policy from 1939-48. Firstly it is concluded that the Smuts Government's 'Native Education' policy mainly displayed negative characteristics which were detrimental to the advancement of the African population.

The following negative aspects (from the African point of view) may be observed:

1. **The limited financing of 'Native Education'**

In this respect the Smuts Government's 'Native Education' policy was similar to the policies followed by White Governments before 1939. These Governments allocated meagre funds to 'Native Education' when compared with the amounts given to white education (See 2.4.2. Table I).

Under-funding of 'Native Education' led to appalling conditions with regard to the facilities available for teaching. This is well-substantiated in the 1936 Welsh Commission's Report (See 2.4.3) and by the statement of Professor Z.K. Matthews (Chairman of the N.R.C. Caucus):

> "...they (missionaries) have not been deterred from their endeavours by the usual reply..."No funds available"... they have carried on in dilapidated buildings with the barest minimum of equipment or material (See 8.2.2)".

It must be concluded that the U.P. Government's go-slow policy with regard to 'Native Education' was influenced by two factors (See 4.4). Firstly the Government was wary of

antagonizing white public opinion as it realised that whites would feel threatened by an educated African majority in S.A. Secondly, the U.P. Government did not wish to add fuel to the N.P.'s arguments in Parliament that it was using white tax-payers' money to educate Africans who would eventually threaten the 'very existence of the white man in S.A.'. (See 7.4.3). The issues relating to the funding of 'Native Education' were keenly debated during the reading of the Native Education Finance Bill (See 5.3). It is concluded that the arguments relating to 'Native Education' reflected the political ideologies of both the U.P. Government and the N.P. Opposition (See 3.2 and 4.3) and verified the maxim that 'Native Education' 'cannot be analysed outside its political and economic context' (See 1.1).

2. **The limited support given to technical and vocational education for Africans**

It is concluded that the State (before 1930) saw the economic and political advantages that would accrue if technical and industrial training was given to Africans (See 2.3.1). Both Grey and Dale, in the late 19th century, believed that the encouragement of industrial habits among the 'Natives' would lead to the 'political security of the colony' (See 2.3.1). The discovery of minerals and the rise of secondary industry necessitated a ready supply of cheap manual labour. This view was supported by the Eiselen Commission which stated

that the

> 'new conditions bred a new emphasis on 'Native' policy and particularly on the view of the State concerning the education of the 'Native'. The new mines, railways, farms, cities and industries 'cried out for labour' (See 2.3.1).

The Government's change in emphasis towards industrial training for Africans was reflected in the slow growth of technical and vocational education, particularly in the 1930's. This 'policy' had definite political overtones. The S.A.P., and later the U.P. Government, always realised that providing Africans with technical and vocational training might pose a threat to whites in the field of skilled labour. The Government had no desire to 'antagonise' white public opinion upon which it was primarily dependent for its political survival. The U.P. Government furthermore faced the daunting task of defending its 'liberal' 'Native Education' policy in Parliament, against a determined conservative N.P. assault. The N.P. mainly accused the U.P. of using white taxpayers' money in order to 'create' an educated African majority which would ultimately threaten the dominant position of the white minority in S.A. The crucial issue of technical and vocational training was therefore well-debated in the Assembly (1939-1948). Both the U.P. and N.P. outlined the above danger that skilled Africans would

> 'compete with the white man and that tremendous competition ... will not have good results.' (See 7.4)

The N.P.'s views were reflected in the comment:

> "we must teach him (the Native) manual labour and his schools must be so run that he will be capable of

> performing manual labour."(See 7.4.3).
> (J.N. Le Roux, M.P. for Ladybrand)

It is noteworthy that the U.P.'s views, reflected in the following comment from the Welsh Commission were similar in emphasis:

> "We must give the native an education which will keep him in his place." (See 2.4.2)

The debate relating to University Training for Africans reflected the disarray which existed within the U.P. Government, with regard to the implementation of its 'Native Education' policy. The differences in the U.P. surfaced during these debates and were highlighted by the differences in opinion between the M.P.'s S.J. Tighy and G.N. Haywood, and the Minister of Finance and Education, J.H. Hofmeyr. The above M.P.'s expressed the opinion that they (like the N.P.) would prefer separate universities for the different population groups in S.A., especially for whites and Africans. J.H. Hofmeyr (U.P. Minister of Education), on the other hand, deemed the establishment of a separate medical faculty for Africans too costly an undertaking. He preferred as much separation as possible between whites and Africans, but this should be within the same universities.

Secondly it is concluded that the Smuts Government's 'Native Education' policy was an essential overall part of the broader 'Native' policy of the Government. Furthermore the 'Native' policies of both the N.P. and the U.P. reflected their underlying political ideologies. (See Chapters three

and four). It can be seen that negative aspects of the Government's 'Native' policy (an example being the Reserve System - See 1.5.2) adversely affected 'Native Education' and encouraged the Government to institute the 1943 School Feeding Scheme. Furthermore malnutrition in the reserves had a detrimental effect on African childrens' health and learning ability. (See 6.4). The failure of the reserves to support their populations with even the basic every-day needs was one of the reasons which led to the increased townward movement of Africans with the resultant over-congestion in the large urban areas. This in turn led to deteriorating living conditions and to the shortage of houses and schools. The problem of juvenile delinquency also arose and necessitated a new educational approach (See 8.5).

Thirdly it is concluded that the 1943 School Feeding Scheme for 'Native' children (Chapter six) was a positive development in 'Native Education'.

It has been argued that the Government had two principal motives for introducing the Scheme:

(i) It was intended that the Scheme would alleviate the effects of malnutrition among African children in the reserves and large urban areas. (See 6.4.1). From the evidence gathered, the study concludes that the Scheme had a beneficial effect in that respect (See 6.7.1. and 6.7.2).

(iii) It was hoped that the Scheme would have the further

> beneficial effect of increasing school attendance in large urban centres thereby keeping children off the streets for most of the day and alleviating the growing problem of juvenile delinquency.

It is noticeable that the U.P. Government never clearly stated that the above scheme was an attempt to combat juvenile delinquency. The Government however emphasised that the Scheme was devised for humanitarian reasons, namely to provide nutrition for impoverished 'Native' children.

The N.P.'s attack on the Scheme in the Assembly (See 6.8.2) was principally based on the grounds that it was an unsound principle to provide food for children of any colour at school because it ultimately removed the idea of parental responsibility. However, it is concluded that the N.P.'s major reason for attacking the Scheme was that it did not wish to see more Africans being educated as it feared the political threat posed by an educated African majority in S.A.

The N.P. furthermore resented the idea of white tax-payers' money being used to feed African children. General J.C. Kemp's words support this statement:

> "...trusteeship does not mean that the Europeans must provide food for natives with the sweat of their brow" (See 6.8.3).

The U.P. in defending the Scheme in the Assembly, furnished economic reasons for its implementation:

> "the native is a great asset to our country ... if we do not assist him by means of proper feeding, we

might lose that asset."
(Ekstein - See 6.8.3)

The school feeding issue was a significant development in 'Native Education'. It illustrated that the U.P. Government had become concerned with the nutritional needs of 'Native children'. However the School Feeding Scheme Debates in the Assembly also reflected the ambivalence in Government thinking on 'Native Education' during the period 1939-1948. On the one hand the debates revealed the U.P.'s humanitarian outlook, but they also reflected an economic emphasis with regard to 'Native Education', (See 6.8.3)

Fourthly it is concluded that the negative aspects of the Government's 'Native Education' policy aroused the indignation of most Africans (See Chapter 8). Even moderate bodies, such as the N.R.C. (the Government's 'toy telephone') became disillusioned with Government policy. This is expressed by the question of Councillor R.V. Selope Thema (N.R.C.) to General J.C. Smuts:

> "...now what is the intention of the State with regard to the people (the uneducated Africans)? Are they going to be left in that condition? ... will they be told they must go slowly ..."
> (See 8.2.3.)

Dr. J.S. Moroka (N.R.C.) further expressed African abhorrence with Trusteeship when he referred to it as:

> "the Government's post-war continuation of the policy of Fascism..."
> (See 8.2.3.)

African reaction to the Smuts Government's 'Native' policy was indeed wide-spread. (See Chapter eight). This was

reflected by the growth of black militancy. The A.N.C. gradually became a revitalised force during the war years (See 8.3) and there was a rapid growth in African Trade Unionism (See 8.4.1.).

The influence of black militancy (1946 African Mine Workers' Strike) was reflected in the Government's appointment of the Fagan Commission (See 8.7) to inquire into the laws relating to Africans in urban areas, the pass laws and migratory labour.

It may be concluded that most Africans were dissatisfied with Smuts' 'Native' policy. They lost faith in the unfulfilled promises of Trusteeship and equated this policy with Malan's doctrine of "Apartheid" which they regarded as having 'no moral basis' (See 3.6).

The above crucial aspects reflected the Government's emphasis in 'Native Education' policy in the above era. They furthermore verified the maxim that 'Native Education' could not be separated from politics and economics, but was an essential part of the broader 'Native' policy applied by successive white Governments (Provincial and Union) before 1948.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

A.A.	APPRENTICESHIP ACT
A.B.	AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND
A.M.W.U.	AFRICAN MINE WORKERS' UNION
A.N.C.	AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
C.N.E.	CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION
C.N.E.T.U.	COUNCIL OF NON-EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS
C.P.	COMMUNIST PARTY
C.T.	CAPE TOWN
D.R.C.	DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH
I.C.A.	INDUSTRIAL CONCILIATION ACT
ISCOR.	IRON AND STEEL CORPORATION
M.P.	MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
N.P.	NATIONAL PARTY
N.R.	NATIVE REPRESENTATIVE
N.R.C.	NATIVE REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL
N.U.S.A.S.	NATIONAL UNION OF SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS
O.F.S.	ORANGE FREE STATE
P.M.	PRIME MINISTER
S.A.	SOUTH AFRICA
S.A.B.R.A.	SOUTH AFRICAN BUREAU OF RACIAL AFFAIRS
S.A.I.R.R.	SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS
S.A.P.	SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY
S.A.R.	SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC
U.C.T.	UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
U.P.	UNITED PARTY

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