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Date Oct 15, 2003

Does democracy deliver?

An analysis of the debate on the relationship between development and democracy

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A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of
the degree of Master of Social Science in Political Studies

Faculty of the Humanities

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2003

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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Oct 15, 2003

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ABSTRACT

The assertion that economic development can lead to democracy has been one of the most contested and debated issues in political science. Chapter Two outlines the evolution of the definitions and measurements of democracy and development which are used by Western scholars. The empirical studies on the relationship between development and democracy were largely generated in response to Seymour Martin Lipset's controversial study in 1959, which showed that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances are for it to sustain a democracy.

African scholars' criticisms of the Western canon will be presented in Chapter Three. This paper will describe the link between modernization theory and the development projects that have disappointed African scholars, thus causing them to search for a "new and improved" development theory which should replace Western theory. African scholars connect the failures of development projects in their own countries to the inapplicability of Western theory to the African continent. This paper will describe the African argument against Western definitions of democracy and development, methodologies used by Western theorists, and the 'Westernization' of social science. Then, the original literature will be presented to show that African scholars have created a contestable caricature of the Western canon which denies the possibility that African scholars and Western theorists have much in common. However, African scholars do not attempt to contribute to the evolution of the analysis on the relationship between development and democracy. Instead, they negatively stereotype the entire Western canon and do not acknowledge the robust value of the empirical findings outlined in Chapter Two. This "misunderstanding" of the Western canon suggests that African scholars are arguing against a construct rather than an accurate paradigm.

1.0 Introduction

One of the most highly debated and researched topics in development studies over the last several decades is the relationship between development and democracy, specifically the assertion that economic development leads to democracy. However, the body of literature that links development and democracy has been misrepresented by critics who question the reliability of the relationship in the “real” world. The debate, and the misrepresentation of original development literature, is the focus of this paper.

Firstly, it must be clearly stated that the literature which addresses the relationship between development and democracy reviewed in the first chapter of this paper will be classified as ‘Western’ scholarship. The reason for the classification is historical. Early literature came from Western social scientists after World War II, who attempted to make sense of the reconstruction of economies and governments in postwar Europe, as well as aid the development and democratization of countries in the ‘Third World’. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, academics produced volumes of theoretical literature, and conducted quantitative studies using newly available statistics on contemporary nations. These analyses investigated the relationship between factors such as industrialization, urbanization, education, and the spread of the mass media, on the one hand, and political mobilization and democratization on the other.

Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959) study, which is described in Chapter Two, advanced the notion that economic development, through a general process of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, political incorporation, among numerous other factors, can lead to democracy. The connection between economic development and democracy is an integral component of modernization theory.

Since then, many political scientists have responded to Lipset’s hypothesis. Some improve methodology to defend further the positive relationship between economic development and democracy, while some attempt to contradict previous literature. Because the majority of the early development literature comes from the West, or at least has been influenced by Western scholars, one can group these scholars into a canon which is fairly distinguishable, although not all form part of the modernization school. For the purpose of this paper, these theorists investigate (from a variety of perspectives and methodologies) the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy in order to pinpoint some prerequisites or conditions for sustainable democracy. Chapter Two describes the work of this canon.

The strong assertion by these scholars that there are conditions or prerequisites for democracy, and that socioeconomic development may increase the ability of a nation to sustain democracy, has attracted a great deal of criticism. Recently, scholars from the African continent have attacked the Western canon. Unlike their predecessors, they do not take the original theory and try to build or improve it. Instead, they comment on the current levels of underdevelopment and failures of democratization in African countries and profess a need for a “new and improved” social science directed at improving the conditions on the continent. It is difficult to distinguish “an” African canon. However, the one thing they all seem to have in common is their distrust of prevailing Western orthodoxy on the relationship between democracy and development. They connect previous Western literature to the development experience of African countries. Yet, do they have a clear understanding of the Western literature? Are their suggestions part of a trend in development studies that is based on *clear, distinguishable* differences from Western theory? In order to answer these questions and describe the “debate” between Western scholars and African scholars, one must first understand what types of studies and analyses have linked development and democracy, and secondly understand the African arguments that refute Western studies and analyses. This paper is an investigation of the “debate” between original development theorists and the African scholars who criticize the original theory in order to make “new and improved” suggestions on analyzing the relationship between development and democracy.

1.1 Modernization theory

In order to better understand the evolution of the Western canon, it is important to understand how and why modernization theory emerged. Critics often connect modernization theory to the Western development of the “Third World” when they argue against Western orthodoxy. However, modernization theory is only one part of the Western canon. Critics may not recognize the differences between modernization scholars and others, and/or may not fully understand modernization theory itself.

Modernization theorists have varying positions. Some scholars believed that the process of modernization would result in the spread of knowledge, higher standards of living, the emergence of lawful, humane and liberal policies, and the perfection of the human spirit. Yet, others were aware of a long process towards modernization, one that would be full of disequilibria. A variety of routes towards modernization were emphasized by theorists.

Some writers gave emphasis to psychological factors such as attitudes, values, and individual characteristics. Others paid attention to the importance of institutions such as bureaucracy. Theorists also proposed and tested specific development paths; some were linear, some traced historical transitions, some outlined specific conditions for democratic endurance. Regardless of the variation in theory, “the academic world has become a great storehouse of what had hitherto been rather scattered pockets of expertise throughout this country, and a great flowering of intellectual effort on far places has resulted (Almond, 1987: 440). When Western social, economic, and political theorists turned their attention to the problems of the decolonizing and developing world, they attempted to draw from an increasing knowledge of the world, both physical and social (Higgott, 1983:3).

Economic historians were particularly interested in third world development problems and investigated characteristics of the Western experience in order to access the potential of third world industrialization.

The “new,” the “emerging,” the “underdeveloped,” or “developing,” nations, as they were variously called, challenged the classificatory talents and theoretical imaginations of Western social scientists. They brought to this effort to illuminate the prospects of the third world the ideas and concepts of the enlightenment and nineteenth- and early twentieth century social theory, which had sought to make sense of European and American modernization (Almond, 1987: 439).

The Committee on Comparative Politics of the American Social Science Research Council launched a program of conferences and publications in order to bring together all of the knowledge and studies on development issues.

The planning that grew out of this series grew out of the conviction that development in the third world called for not only a mix of economic policies but for political institutions with the capacity for mobilizing and upgrading human and material resources. Political variables were viewed as important as economic ones; indeed, it was the assumption of the committee’s program that there could be no economic development without political development (ibid: 441).

A host of themes and relationships emerged as a result of this compilation of literature. The role of the mass media was considered important in order to transform attitudes, communication patterns, and the roles of elites to those conducive to democracy in transitional countries. The importance of education, bureaucracy and its tension with democratization, political culture and political development were also addressed at length. The final stages of the modernization theorists’ combined literature series included an analysis of five development ‘problems’ that could constrain and determine a political system: national identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration, and distribution. These crises were examined historically, comparatively and empirically.

This substantial literature did not lend itself easily to simple characterizations. It was methodologically variegated...Politically it included scholars with relatively naive expectations of democratization in the third world, as well as skeptics and pessimists who foresaw authoritarian regimes (Almond, 1987: 444).

Modernization theorists can be considered to be a strain of “prerequisiteists”; generally one can consider a prerequisiteist to be a scholar who is able to isolate socio-economic and political factors in a society, which ultimately may determine the level of democracy in that country. Chapter Two is an overview of “prerequisite” theory, described by the scholars who have contributed to the large body of development literature, referred to above, on the connection between economic growth and democracy. These scholars emphasize the necessity of reliable empirical evidence and precise measurement indices to defend their claims that there are observable relationships between democracy and a myriad of socioeconomic factors. In other words, there is a systematic way to analyze democracy and development; one which entails a definitional exercise, measurement indices, and specific data on several countries, which enables a researcher to compare nations’ levels of development and democracy. The purpose of such an exercise would be to discover if there are common factors and conditions that explain why democracy endures in some countries and fails in others. Chapter Two begins by outlining the definitions of democracy and development according to Western theorists, then discusses the various studies and hypotheses intended to test the assertion that economic growth and/or socioeconomic development lead to democracy. It must be stated that although scholars investigate the possibility that development is necessary for democracy, one cannot claim that these theorists believe development is a sufficient condition for democracy.

1.2 Criticism of the Western scholars

The modernization paradigm was criticized immediately after developing nations began to face difficulties and turn to authoritative and military regimes. The first wave of critique came from dependency theorists who stated that modernization literature was ethnocentric, projective, quietistic, and unilinear. Such characterizations of modernization theory is nothing new; Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Faletto write:

In almost all theories of modernization it is assumed that the course taken by political, social and economic systems of Western Europe and the United States, foretells the future for the underdeveloped countries. The ‘development’ process would consist in completing and even reproducing the various stages that characterized the social transformation of these countries (Almond, 1987: 446).

Responding to their dependency theory critics, modernization theorists of the post World War II era correctly asserted that they had been unequivocally dedicated to principles of equality (Sklar, 2002: 266).

According to Huntington and Weiner, the argument that modernization theory is ethnocentric and unilinear cannot survive even a casual reading of the Political Development Series produced by the committee (see above) (Almond, 1987: 447).

This essay makes the case that the characterization of the literature of comparative politics as an ideological defense of imperialism and capitalism simply is not borne by evidence...Mainstream comparative studies, rather than being in crisis, are richly and variedly productive. If there is no single paradigm today, it may be said that there never was one. In the four decades since World War II, the level of rigor has been significantly increased in quantitative, analytical, and historical-sociological work (ibid: 478).

Since modernization theory, a number of 'improvements' have come about in the field of comparative and development politics, both incorporating and altering some of the original propositions. Marxist-dependency theory collapsed in the 1980's, when it could not be reconciled with the hard facts that capitalist development in Asia and Latin America was a relative success compared to the economic failures of communism. In its new and refined form, modernization theory has hit a second wave of credibility. It is now more attentive to cultural diversity, is compatible with other forms of class analysis, and its related methodologies are more sophisticated and deductive than those of the 1950's and 1960's. (ibid: 267). As a result of the emergence of the modernization school and the post World War II period of development, development policies were regarded as policies aimed at modernization. The formation of the United States Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics reflected the optimism that the growth of a 'scientific' social science would form the basis for rational exercises in social engineering.

African scholars have now turned their attention to development theory with reference to their own countries' "levels" of democracy and development. These scholars are uneasy with the way Western theories of development and democracy have prevailed over the last several decades and attempt to discredit such theories. Evidently the realities of development initiatives have been disappointing to such scholars. Therefore, they seek an alternative development path in order to secure rights to the citizens of African countries. Chapter Three will explain why African theorists have decided to join the development debate and hence formulate a more "African" perspective on development and democracy. Just as modernization theory emerged to fill a global need for a scientific political study

dedicated to democratization, African scholars readdress development theory according to their own experience and perspective.

This paper will critically examine African authors' comments on the dominant Western scholarship's concepts of democracy and development, the supposed relationship between the two, the failure of development policies and/or the failure of democracy to deliver equal or expected rights to the citizens of African countries, and inequalities which result as an effect of democratization and development. This chapter not only presents the African argument against 'Western' theorists, it argues that African scholars have constructed an inaccurate paradigm which they present as the Western paradigm. The assertions made by the African scholars will be compared to the original literature where possible. Additionally, as stated above, this area of development studies is complicated and varied. The caricature or stereotype that African critics have constructed must incorporate a wide range of contributions by social scientists in order fairly represent this canon. If African authors take a position against their predecessors, they must first comprehend the latter's argument(s). Failure to do so will result in an argument against a construct rather than a "real" group of theorists, paradigm, or development theory.

1.3 Chapter Overview

Chapter Two describes the evolution of the research which is dedicated to the link between development and democracy. In Chapter Two, the contributions by 'Western' scholars are outlined based on the perspective that political science benefits from robust empirical studies on the relationships between a multitude of factors and political regime structure. Chapter Three investigates the emergence of African critics and their problems with the assertions of development theorists from the West. The third chapter examines if the African criticism of Western scholarship is founded in the original literature, or if African scholars are opposing nonexistent arguments. Chapter Three also addresses the crux of the critics' problem. If they are arguing against a caricature of the Western canon which may not exist, and if in reality there are many similarities between African scholars' assertions and the assertions found in Western development literature, why do the African scholars reject the credibility of the contributions made by 'Western' development theorists? The African critique may be the result of a dissatisfaction of Western social science in general, regardless of the content of the analyses.

To summarize, this paper has four main goals:

A. To accurately describe a 'Western' school of development theorists who consider empirical study useful and necessary to determine sociopolitical and economic prerequisites for democratization and democratic stability, with specific reference to the hypothesis that economic growth influences the ability of a nation to sustain a democracy.

B. To present a response to the 'Western', modernization scholars, or "prerequisiteists" from the African continent who are dissatisfied with the current trends and outcomes of democratization, development policies, and the literature which emanates from the West.

C. To examine the accuracy with which African scholars have represented 'Western' scholars as the foundation of their critique.

D. Explore the possibility that the African criticism has more to do with "how" and "from where" development theory grew, (in other words, with the fact that preceding development scholars are Western), than the content of the theory itself. Hence, the development debate is rather a nondebate, since the 'Western' perspective is essentially misunderstood, and furthermore discredited in its entirety, despite similarities with the African contribution to development studies.

2.0 The Western canon

This chapter describes the contribution to the study of the relationship between development and democracy made by Western scholars, the evolution of empirical studies, and prevalent associations between this relationship, capitalism, and inequality. First, common definitions of democracy will be summarized, as well as the standard measurements of democracy in empirical study. Then, Seymour Martin Lipset's controversial study of the direct relationship of economic development and democracy will be presented followed by the ensuing literature. This paper will then explore theorists' attempts to explain *why* development facilitates democracy and how democratic norms are encouraged through the process of liberalization, stabilization and growth in the economy in addition to the measurements commonly used to measure socioeconomic growth. Finally, this chapter will address the controversial connection between development, democracy and inequality to highlight the 'real' effects of democracy on the poorest members of society.

Again, the purpose of this section is to accurately describe a highly varied group of theorists who respond to the hypothesis generated by Lipset in 1959 which links development to democracy. The studies which follow are considered to be a part of the Western canon that is criticized by African scholars in Chapter Three.

2.1 Defining democracy

The term "democracy" has a myriad of meanings, and the practice of defining democracy has been the subject of many debates. Empirical study requires that the word democracy has a specific and measurable meaning; therefore theorists are faced with the task of pinpointing characteristics of the democratic political process. Therefore, literature on democracy usually involves some type of definitional exercise. Comparing different scholars' interpretations of "democracy" is an enormous study on its own; the purpose of this section is to provide an understanding of how and why scholars have chosen certain variables in order to measure levels of democracy in different countries. The selection of these variables as well as the "Western" definition of democracy poses a problem for critics which will be addressed in Chapter Three.

Due to the complicated nature of the use of the word democracy, theorists pay careful attention to defining the concept that their empirical studies revolve around, for the obvious reason of providing clarity rather than confusion in their conclusions. As Axel Hadenius states: "The overall objective is indeed to specify a concept which can be used in causal

analysis, that is to examine the empirical connection between democracy and a number of external features”(Hadenius, 1992: 8).

If one accepts that there are several principles that could be used to define democracy, one must decide upon a combination of these principles that best represents a democratic political system. The inclusion of some characteristics in one’s definition of democracy, and the exclusion of others, will necessarily affect any resulting classification of nations by level of democracy.

The definitions of democracy range from the admittedly minimal, to those which attempt to capture wide-spread components of civic culture and liberty. Joseph Schumpeter was troubled by “classical theory” which prioritized the power of the electorate to decide on issues and then elect officials to carry out its will. Instead, he suggests that the role of the people rather to decide on the government who will ultimately make the decisions. “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”(Schumpeter, 1942: 269).

Schumpeter emphasizes the role of political competition in the definition of democracy. People’s preferences will not be realized through legislation because political parties are “a group of men who intend to promote public welfare upon some principle on which they are all agreed”(ibid: 283). Rather, political parties are in a competitive struggle for political power. The electorate’s preferences are realized because political leaders are publicly accountable in order to remain in power in a democratic system. He further defines democracy as competition for leadership that is free, and includes the free vote of the public (ibid: 271). Most importantly, Schumpeter explains that the primary feature of the electorate in a democratic political system is to produce a government that will be responsible for decision-making.

Similarly, Seymour Martin Lipset defines democracy as “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office”(Lipset, 1960: 45). His definition, which Lipset attributes to the work of Schumpeter and Max Weber, implies three basic conditions:

1. a political formula or body of beliefs specifying which institutions - political

parties, a free press, and so forth - are legitimate (accepted as proper by all);
 2. one set of political leaders in office; and 3. one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office (ibid).

Seymour Martin Lipset's conditions for democracy will be discussed further below, in reference to his empirical study on the relationship between economic growth and democracy. For now, it is important to remark that Lipset also placed enormous emphasis on the election of officials to make decisions on behalf of the public.

Samuel Huntington addresses the division between an "idealized" concept of democracy and a procedural definition. He remarks that theorists who previously debated over rationalistic, utopian, and idealistic definitions of democracy versus empirical, descriptive, institutional, and procedural definitions, concluded that only the procedural definition was useful in precisely analyzing the absence or existence of democracy in a nation (Huntington, 1991: 7). "Following the Schumpeterian tradition, this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote"(ibid).

Furthermore, Huntington warns against measuring democracy by any other standards. He questions the ability to draw useful and concrete conclusions from normative qualities of democracy:

First, the definition of democracy in terms of elections is a minimal definition. To some people, democracy has or should have much more sweeping and idealistic connotations. To them, "true democracy" means *liberte, egalite, fraternite*, effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation and power, and various other civic virtues. These are, for the most part, good things, and people can, if they wish, define democracy in these terms. Doing so, however, raises all the problems that come up with the definitions of democracy by source or by purpose. Fuzzy norms do not yield useful analysis. Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non (Huntington, 1991: 9).

Many scholars define and measure democracy in terms of political democracy in order yield useful analysis. Adam Przeworski, Micheal Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi investigate the conditions that lead to the endurance of democracy. They state bluntly that their definition of democracy is a minimalist one; they classify regimes which hold elections in which the opposition has the chance of winning and taking office as democratic (Przeworski et al., 1996: 39). To simplify further, they take literally Przeworski's statement that "Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections". Similar to Schumpeter's

argument, the fear of losing elections forces political elites to respond to citizens' preferences. Therefore, elites must act according to the wants and needs of the people because they are accountable to the masses (ibid: 51).

Robert Dahl uses five specific criteria to the democratic process. These characteristics are:

1. Equal votes
2. Effective participation
3. Enlightened understanding
4. Final control of the agenda by the demos
5. Inclusiveness (Dahl, 1985: 59).

Dahl maintains that changes in the size of the polity, representative government, and an increase of cleavages and conflicts in society led to the development of political institutions that distinguish democracy from all other political systems, including earlier democratic systems. Democracy, therefore, has changed its "shape" over time. Dahl uses the term polyarchy, rather than democracy, to describe a system in which people vote for candidates who are accountable to carry out the people's will.

Polyarchy can be understood in several ways: as a historical outcome of efforts to democratize and liberalize the political institutions of nation states; as a distinctive type of political order or regime different in important ways not only from nondemocratic systems of all kinds but also from earlier small-scale democracies; as a system (à la Schumpeter) of political control in which the highest officials in the government of the state are induced to modify their conduct so as to win elections in political competition with other candidates, parties, and groups; as a system of political rights; or as a set of institutions necessary to the democratic process on a large scale (Dahl, 1989: 218, 219)

He suggests that institutions of "polyarchy" are necessary to democracy, and that these institutions must exist to achieve the highest level of democratic process in any nation. Dahl's seven institutions are listed as follows: 1. Elected officials, 2. Free and fair elections, 3. Inclusive suffrage, 4. Right to run for office, 5. Freedom of expression, 6. Alternative information, 7. Associational autonomy (Green, 1994: 65). Although the institutions of polyarchy do not guarantee the "ease and vigor" of public participation due to the scale of modern day nation states, Dahl maintains that with these institutions of polyarchy it is unlikely that any government will be able to pursue policies that deeply offend the majority of citizens (Dahl, 1989: 223).

Giovanni Sartori attempts to define democracy by first defining what democracy is not. He explains that democracy must eliminate the possibility for an individual to have unlimited political power which might characterize other regimes.

In democracy no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule, and therefore no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. The difference between democracy and its opposite lies in the fact that in a democracy power is scattered, limited, controlled, and exercised in rotation; whereas in an autocracy power is concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite, and unlimited. What democracy is not is, in one word, autocracy (Sartori, 1969: 36).

Of interest in all of the above definitions, which by no means constitutes the whole debate on the “meaning” of democracy, is that the scholars reduce “democracy” to a political concept. Huntington, among others, has given a practical reason for defining democracy (see Huntington 1991: 5-10). Axel Hadenius also explains the logic of selecting criteria for democracy that may seem minimalist. He asserts that one must take into account the purpose for defining the term, which is to facilitate the ability for a researcher to make clear conclusions in empirical study. Therefore, the aim of defining democracy must be to incorporate few and firm statements to specify the concept in order to draw clear conclusions about the connection between facts about democracy and a number of other factors (Hadenius, 1992: 8).

The issue of interest to us is democracy in a specific sphere of society, namely political democracy... Thus the focus of interest is the control of the highest organs of state, those which determine the overall public policy, which is primarily pursued via legislation. Political democracy may in this context be formulated as follows: Public policy is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby all individuals are to be treated as equals (ibid: 9).

Hadenius, like many scholars before him, refers to a double relationship in which the citizen controls the state and are in turn controlled by it via the holding of elections and the existence of various restrictive institutions (Hadenius, 1992: 32).

Several modernization theorists “measure” democracy by using a political definition of democracy. However, the use of minimal definitions for quantitative analysis does not imply that scholars fail to see the importance of other definitions that involve more subjective interpretations in normative analysis. More will be discussed on aspects of democracy other than political equality in this paper, but for now it will be sufficient to say that democracy can also be defined as social and economic concepts. William Douglas briefly differentiates three types of democracy. Political democracy corresponds to popular sovereignty through free elections, rule of law and civic liberties. Economic democracy refers to the existence of a certain level of the equality of economic opportunity in a nation. Lastly, social democracy is achieved only after random distinctions of race, sex, social class, religion etc. are eliminated.

Again, the work of scholars that are examined in this chapter concentrate for the most part on using criteria of political democracy as the basis for empirical study, however this is not to say that theorists who “measure” democracy confine democracy to its political meaning. Many critics accuse the Western canon of minimalizing democracy. This section has explained the purpose for doing so.

2.2 Measures of democracy

Democracy is defined procedurally in order to easily measure levels of democracy globally. One must remember that if Western scholars investigate the relationship between development and democracy, there must be a way to establish if a nation is a democracy or not. Western scholars believe there is an empirical component to comparative study that enables them to classify regimes. Just as the definitions of democracy may vary, the measures of democracy have been widely debated. Scholars from the Western canon attempt to create indices which accurately determine the level of democracy in any nation in order to locate factors which may be responsible for a democratic political system. In general, these theorists believe democracy *can* be measured for quantitative study and regimes can be ranked using an accurate measurement system. It is important to describe the evolution of democratic indices, since the use of these indices (as well as empirical study) is one subject of critique in Chapter Three.

The first attempt to measure democracy systematically was by Kenneth A. Bollen in 1979 (Leftwich, 1996: 51). He was preceded by several other scholars who wanted to relate national social conditions to political systems empirically. Phillips Cutright sought to measure the association between the development of a democratic political system and the development of other national social institutions such as education, urbanization, communication development, and economic growth. He created an index from the following concept, which he states is operationally defined:

A politically developed nation has more complex and specialized national political institutions than a less politically developed nation. Degree of political development can be measured and each nation can be placed on a continuum of development, which will allow it to be compared with any other nation in the world. Operationally, we bank heavily on the role played by political parties in national political life in measuring political development (Cutright, 1963: 253).

Cutright’s scheme for measuring political development consisted of determining if a nation achieved or retained complex forms of political organization: i.e. a legislative branch of government and an executive branch of government. In the legislative category, he gave the

highest point score to those countries in which the parliament contained members of two or more political parties and the minority parties had at least 30 per cent of all seats. The highest score in the second category, executive government, was given to countries that were ruled by a chief executive who was in office by direct vote in a free and fair election. The purpose of this index was to relate political development to socio-economic development, which will be discussed below (ibid: 256).

Cutright's study on the institutionalization of political democracy stresses the importance of a representative government whereby the common preferences of citizens are enacted into public policy. Along with factors of development already discussed (education, urbanization, etc.), his index incorporates the conditions for political democracy which include the ability for members of a political system to communicate preferences among each other, and the ability for the 'losers' of any given issue to comply with the resulting policy instead of withdrawing from the political system or attempting to overthrow it (Neubauer, 1967: 224, 225).

Deane E. Neubauer was not satisfied with the Cutright index, since according to him, it did not measure the variation of democracy within the sub-sample of the "most democratic" nations. Therefore, he devised an index to concentrate mainly on the procedural features of democratic regimes. Specifically, these indicators were to measure electoral equality and competition in a political system (Neubauer, 1967: 228).

The indicators chosen for the index reflect these considerations. They are:
 a. Per cent of the adult population eligible to vote. This indicator is basic to the concept of "democraticness"....
 b. Equality in representation: It demands that votes be given equal weight in the choice of candidates...
 c. Information equality. An important condition in Dahl's model, but one absent in Down's is: "All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives."
 d. Competition...Two measures are utilized. 1. Per cent of time period in which the dominant party held office...2. Mean percentage of the vote received by the winning party (parties) (ibid: 228,229).

Kenneth Bollen acknowledges the difficulty in empirically testing any hypothesis related to democracy due to controversy surrounding its measurement. In his paper, "Issues in the Comparative measurement of Political Democracy", Bollen presents a redefined index which he claims overcomes previous research problems. Firstly, he draws attention to two commonly used indicators, voter participation and political stability. While Bollen admits that voter-participation is a potential indicator of democracy, it can exist symbolically in

countries that are undemocratic. Additionally, voter turnout has an ambiguous meaning when there is a universal franchise. As Lipset remarks, either low level participation denotes satisfaction with the government or apathy of the masses who feel alienated from the government. Bollen strongly suggests that voter turnout should not be used as a measure of political democracy (ibid: 374). He is also unsatisfied with the use of political stability in previous studies (e.g. Cutright's scoring higher points to countries where over time, the legislative and executive branches of government fulfill his outlined requirements).

Bollen associates selected indices which reflect the definition of political democracy, which includes political liberties and popular sovereignty: "The three indicators of political liberties are: 1. press freedom, 2. freedom of group opposition, 3. government sanctions...The three measures of popular sovereignty are: 1. fairness of elections, 2. executive selection, 3. legislative selection...Each of six components was linearly transformed to range from a low of 0 to a height of 100"(Bollen, 1980: 375, 376).

Bollen names the index (POLDEM) and compares it to the indices of both Cutright and Jackman. He finds a moderately high correlation of POLDEM with other proposed measures of political democracy. Bollen affirms that political democracy is an abstract and complex concept, thus there are a large number of measures that indirectly represent it.

In the ideal case, a random sample of all possible indicators of political democracy could be chosen, selecting a sufficient number to reach the desired reliability. Unfortunately, this is never the case. A number of desirable indicators of political democracy were not available; for example, the composition of the ruling elite and how representative they are of the general population, the extent of political discrimination, the mobility in-and-out of the political elite, the extent to which policy decisions are in accordance with the "will" of the people, and the real franchise (not the "legal" franchise) of the population (ibid: 384).

Most measures of political democracy revolve around the issue of voter franchise and/or more subjective measures that revolve around civil liberties and political rights. Freedom House publications and the polyarchy scale expand on the concept of elections, freedom of political organization, and freedom of the media (Coppedge, 1997: 180). As data becomes more available, indices may be constructed to capture a broader measure, yet again, the use of the mentioned indicators must be viewed in terms of practicality rather than a failure to realize the myriad of characteristics that pertain to democracy. Now let us turn to the studies that Western scholars conducted using the above-mentioned definitions and measures to analyze the relationship between development and democracy.

2.3 Seymour Martin Lipset's controversial study

Most literature by Western scholars on the relationship between development and democracy refers to Seymour Martin Lipset. Lipset's (1959) article "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" has been both highly contested and widely accepted in the literature. His work is a good starting point when describing the work of the Western canon, since it generated numerous studies, which respond to his (1959) article. Lipset attempts to pinpoint the conditions that lead to democracy and that ensure democratic stability in a nation. Lipset's definition of democracy has already been stated above, and the structural characteristics of a society which sustain a democracy are economic development and legitimacy (Lipset, 1969: 153). The main point of Lipset's entire study is that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain a democracy (ibid: 156). His hypothesis is referred to time and time again by Western theorists and critics. However, Lipset's 1959 study, and even more so his article published in 1994, offer a much less minimal explanation of how democracy emerges than what is represented by critics. Let us first describe his original study. His subsequent work will be referred to later.

Lipset examines the relationship between development and democracy by doing a cross-sectional correlation for a sample of 48 countries. He divided the countries into two main groups. One group consisted of 28 European and English speaking countries and the other consisted of twenty Latin American countries. He divided the two groups for the purpose of avoiding the complications that may arise when classifying a country as "more" or "less" democratic. Lipset's study does not include a scale of democracy; either a country is a stable democracy, an unstable democracy, or a dictatorship; the reasons for these classifications are based on his definition of the democratic political system.

He uses four indices: wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, to define economic development in the 48 countries. (Lipset, 1969: 157). Measure of wealth includes per capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and per physician, and the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons. Industrialization is measured by the percentage of males employed in the agricultural sector of the economy, and the per capita produced energy measured in terms of tons of coal per person per year. Urbanization is measured by the percentage of the population living in places of 20,000 and over, 100,000 and over and in standard metropolitan areas. The average literacy rate and the educational enrollment of the population at three levels of schooling (ibid: 157-161).

Lipset found that each country that was deemed democratic had a higher score of each of these indicators than the countries that were unstable or undemocratic. Hence, he concludes that economic development supports democracy.

2.4 Economic growth and capitalism

If economic development supports democracy, which type of economic system will best support economic growth? This question is not the primary focus of the literature reviewed in this chapter, but Western scholars who assert that development enables democracy are often considered to be advocates of capitalism by the critics reviewed in Chapter Three. The literature on the connection between capitalism and democracy is robust, and this paper will not review the literature in depth. Yet, it is important to state that although Western theorists often do advocate free-market practices, they do find fault and inequalities in the free market system, which will be addressed below.

Lipset acknowledges that a capitalist market system may create the type of economic growth that can lead to democracy (ibid: 155). Other scholars (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, Huber, Evelyne and Stephens, John D., 1992; Dahl, 1985; Block, 1977) have also advocated capitalism, but what is important is that they are generally careful not to state that capitalism is the ideal economic system, but rather that it is more favorable than any other system.

Adam Przeworski discusses the role of capitalism in achieving class compromise, which he sees as necessary to establish and maintain democracy. He explains that in a capitalist democracy, capitalists are expected to save, invest, and transform their profits into a productive capacity, as well as partially distribute profits into the hands of other social groups. Wage earners are expected to increase their material gains if they organize as participants and cooperate. Ideally, workers should believe that they will benefit in the future from investments that may be withheld from them now, since capitalism is a positive-sum system (Przeworski, 1997: 131).

Przeworski states that the typical democratic development project is likely to be based on Keynesian “practice”, which he sees as the perfect route for encouraging compromise among several groups. The ownership of the means of production rests in private hands; while increases in lower incomes are treated as just and technically efficient. The state maintains an active role to protect the nation from economic crisis. The trifold package

including maintenance of private property, redistribution of income, and an active state seems to be ideal (Ibid).

Although capitalism can theoretically increase productivity and efficiency, the system is full of uncertainty. Przeworski writes:

- As long as private property is preserved, accumulation requires that capitalists appropriate profits and invest them. A redistribution of income, even if it increases consumption, aggregate demand, and supply in the short run, must eventually lead to crises of profitability and hence of investment. Indeed, if the economic system is highly concentrated, rapid wage increases seem to result simultaneously in unemployment and inflation. And, if wage increases are rapidly eroded by price increases and unemployment, the organizations that represent the poorer sectors of the population in the nascent democratic system are likely to lose their popular support (ibid: 132).

He confirms that according to Keynesian projects, workers are almost expected to be completely docile and understanding. They must ultimately 'wait' for their turn to see the benefits of capitalist democracy if the transition to democracy is to succeed. Although it may seem that capitalist democracy is an ideal goal, Przeworski recognizes that transformations to democracy from authoritarian regimes are full of complications under the auspices of market driven economic transformations.

- We cannot avoid the possibility that a transition to democracy can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations in fact, not only the structure of production but even the distribution of income...Democracy restricted to the political realm has historically coexisted with exploitation and oppression at the workplace, within the schools, within bureaucracies, and within families. Struggle for political power is necessary because without it all attempts to transform the society are vulnerable to brutal repression. Yet, what we need, and do not have, is a more comprehensive, integral, ideological project of antiauthoritarianism that would encompass the totality of social life (ibid).

Hadenius also examines the connection between capitalist development and democracy, which he partially attributes to historical parallelism. Both capitalism and democracy grew at approximately the same time. He remarks that those who question capitalism's positive impact on democracy generally do so according to two basic arguments:

The arguments adduced tend to follow two lines: firstly, it is claimed that the economic hierarchy created by the market and private ownership stand in direct logical contrast to the principles of popular self-government which democracy represents. Furthermore, an empirical objection is put forward. There is in capitalistic society a wide, ever-growing gap between rich and poor -the have's and the have not's- which promotes increasing inequality in political resources and which, finally, unless the economic system is radically changed, can generate a conflict with such strong outbreaks as to lead to the collapse of political democracy (Hadenius, 1992: 104).

Hadenius tested the empirical validity of such statements, questioning the previous claim that capitalism hinders democracy. Since capitalism and modernization are often construed as closely linked, it is worthwhile to review the results of his own study. After a rather lengthy discussion of what constitutes the definition of a capitalist system, he asserts that the crucial components of capitalism are that the means of production are privately owned, and activities are carried on for the purposes of profit according to the terms of the market (ibid: 107). In Hadenius's study, he makes a moderate adjustment to the Raymond Gastil system in order to rank countries according to their degrees of capitalism. To measure democracy, he uses factors such as elections, political freedoms, organizational freedoms, freedoms of opinion, and political violence and oppression. The overall conclusion of his empirical findings, is that on an aggregate level, one can maintain a strong link between capitalism and democracy which support Schumpeter's thesis (ibid: 108).

Again, it must be mentioned that this economic system is seen as the most desirable rather than perfect.

This system [capitalism] has enabled an enormous material increase which has benefited not least the common people. Assuredly, it is characterized by hierarchy, privileges, and substantial class differences. But the gap between rich and poor is nevertheless moderate compared with most other types of society. What is more, the barriers to social mobility are, in relative terms, very low. Capitalism can therefore contribute to a mitigation of the general conflict level in society. Instead of an increased polarization, it could through an (at least in absolute figures) higher living standard for large groups, and a general economic and social modernization, create the conditions for increased harmony in political life (ibid: 106).

If economic growth is to be achieved by capitalist means and liberalization, despite capitalism's potentially negative consequences, political scientists had to address the connection between economic growth and development further. Their empirical studies began to incorporate other measures of democracy and development to expand on the pre-existing theory and reexamine the ability of economic growth to increase harmony in political life and a higher standard of living for large groups. Theorists began to create broader indices to measure standard of living. Hence, scholarship reflected a broader concept of the benefits of democracy and development. Seymour Martin Lipset's work was highly influential, but not just for its message but for the body of literature that grew as a result.

2.5 Testing Lipset's hypothesis

Obviously Lipset was not the only one to question the link between development and democracy. Western scholars produced numerous studies in response to Lipset's famous statement that the more well-to-do a nation, the higher the chances it will support democracy. His study presented a host of complications that became apparent to other social scientists. Some wanted to improve on methodology, some questioned the determinist nature of such an assertion, and some felt that the study deserved defense. Nonetheless, his controversial thesis catalyzed a body of literature on the relationship between development and democracy which characterizes the Western canon. Although some scholars "critique" Lipset, it must be stated that their ensuing responses are still conducted using empirical studies and can still be considered to 'follow in his footsteps'. The perceived failings of development practices is often attached to the perceived shortcomings of this body of literature.

Cutright was the first to relate economic development's relationship to democracy. He used a political democracy index which stressed the operations of elite in government heavily. His development index included the level of communications, economic development, education and urbanization much like Lipset's indicators. Cutright claims to improve upon the original study by Lipset. He attests, "Lipset makes no distinction between the varieties of "democratic" or undemocratic political systems. His working hypothesis asks only whether or not a significant difference on each economic indicator exists between nations with two types of political characteristics"(Cutright, 1963: 255).

∇ Despite any objections that Cutright has to Lipset's work, he found a strong correlation between the indicators of development and the level of democracy in a nation. Six years later, Cutright and Wiley compared countries that had sustained democracy for 40 years. They found a strong positive association between development and democracy, and produced evidence of a causal path from socioeconomic development to democracy (Diamond, 1992: 104).

John F. Helliwell compared growth per capita GNP and education with measures of democracy according to the Bollen index for 125 countries worldwide. He assessed growth and democracy from 1960-1985 for the selected countries and found that the data surveyed supported Lipset's hypothesis that countries at higher income levels are more likely to have democratic forms of government (Helliwell, 1994: 225-248).

Larry Diamond presents a robust review of the empirical research by various scholars, as well as his own research, to defend the relationship between development and democracy first introduced by Lipset. Diamond's study differs from Lipset's first hypothesis, however, because he expands Lipset's minimalist measurement indices. Diamond attests that GNP tells nothing about the income distribution in a country, and may not adequately describe the level of human development in a country. The Physical Quality of Life index, which is a weighted measure of adult literacy, infant mortality, and life expectancy at the age of 1 year, can capture human development characteristics, but at the expense of excluding monetary measures (Diamond, 1992: 100).

According to Diamond, the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the UNDP helps combine several measures to attain a more accurate assessment of real levels of well-being. He expands on the previous measurement of democracy as well, stating that in the real world, the principle dimensions of democracy include competition, participation, and liberty, as opposed to a minimal classification that deciphers only between democracy and nondemocracy. Therefore, he uses a 13 point scale of "political freedom" to create a typology of seven regime types ranging from liberal democratic to highly closed state hegemony (Diamond, 1992: 98).

He makes seven points regarding the relationship, some of which are paraphrased below:

1. There is a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development.
2. This relationship is causal in at least one direction: higher levels of socioeconomic development promote higher levels of democracy.
3. It appears that higher levels of socioeconomic development are associated with the stability of democracy.
4. The causal relationship between development and democracy may vary across waves in world history.
5. The level of socioeconomic development is the most important variable in determining the chances of democracy but it is not totally determinative.
6. Lipset's thesis might be slightly reformulated: the more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a democracy. (although this reformulation does not contradict Lipset in the least).
7. Although per capita national income appears to be the one independent variable that has the most reliability and consistently predicted the level of democracy, this is a likely

surrogate for a broader measure of average human development and well-being that is in fact more closely associated with democracy (Diamond, 1992: 109).

Additionally, Diamond stresses that despite the variations in interpretation and methodology used by other scholars to examine the relationship, the fundamental association from Lipset's original work has persevered.

It is important to emphasize here the extraordinary consistency with which the central premise of Lipset's thesis has stood up through all manner of tests. Although different studies and research designs yield different angles of inference and interpretation, virtually all demonstrate a consistent and strong positive relationship between the level of economic development and democracy...The effects of economic development are not only powerful and consistent but often literally overwhelming (ibid).

Despite the connection between economic development and democracy, Diamond does not make any sort of determinist claims that economic wealth is the sole contributor to the ability of a country to maintain democracy. In his conclusion, he writes:

It is not economic development per se and certainly not mere economic growth that is the most important developmental factor in promoting democracy. Rather, it is the dense cluster of social changes and improvements, broadly distributed among the population, that are vaguely summarized in the term socioeconomic development... Economic development provides a structural context in which human development can occur, but to the extent that its benefits are grossly maldistributed..., it may do little to promote democracy or may even generate stresses and contradictions that are hostile to democracy. For the democratic prospect, one aspect of economic development overrides all others in importance: reducing the level of absolute poverty and deprivation (Diamond, 1992: 126).

Most recently, (Adam) Przeworski, (Micheal) Alvarez, (Jose Antonio) Cheibub and (Fernando) Limongi observed instances of democratic survival in 135 countries for forty years (or as long as data for specific countries was available). Democracy was measured in terms of the ability for an opposition party to win an election. Development was measured by per capita income. The authors reported that poor democracies, those with per capita income less than \$1,000 per year, are extremely fragile, while countries with a per capita income of over \$6,000 per year would sustain democracy. Their conclusions are summarized by the following excerpts:

Hence, Seymour Martin Lipset was correct to assert that the more well to do a nation the greater the chances that it will sustain a democracy.... Economic performance then is crucially important for the survival of democracy in less-affluent countries. When the economy grows rapidly with a moderate rate of inflation, democracy is much more likely to last even in the poorest lands...Indeed, we have found that once a country is sufficiently wealthy, with per-capita income of more than \$6,000 a year, democracy is certain to survive, come hell or high water (Przeworski et al., 1996: 41-49).

Przeworski and Limongi warn against determinist theories; whether it be from a modernization or historical perspective. The authors are skeptical about any conviction that democracies are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, but this is not to say that democracies did not sometimes emerge because countries become modern (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 163). What they did however find, is a strong probability that democracies will survive if they grow economically. The authors term this Lipset's "exogenous" theory: once democracy is established, the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely that it will survive (ibid: 166).

The studies reviewed in this section have largely evolved out of Lipset's (1959) hypothesis. Western scholars have broadened indices, expanded definitions, and incorporated newly available data since Lipset's first study was published. Despite the changes in methodology, studies which incorporate more substantial meanings of democracy and development still show the correlation between high levels of development and high levels of democracy.

2.6 Why economic development supports democracy

Western scholars' attention to quantitative analysis does not suggest that they do not offer explanations on *why* economic growth and democracy are linked. Let us return to the importance of modernization theory as one possible explanation. The modernization school suggests that classic economic models are insufficient to describe any political change. It is insufficient to say that economic growth alone is favorable to democracy without making reference to the "modernization" that leads to economic growth. Additionally, economic growth alone is not responsible for the ability of a nation to become more democratic. Modernization theorists believe that economic growth provides changes in social structure to make nations more conducive to democratization. Such changes in social structure mixed with economic development and political events form a complex pathway to democracy (Leys, 1996: 9).

Lipset contributes a theoretical explanation of how socioeconomic development leads to democracy in addition to his empirical study.

For the lower strata, economic development, which means increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, permits those in this status to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics. A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower class. Increased wealth and education also serve democracy by increasing the extent to which the lower strata are exposed to cross pressures

which will reduce the intensity of their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to supporting extremist ones (Lipset, 1969: 163).

The existence of free and fair elections, which define democracy, has caused political parties to appeal to either working class or middle class interests. Because the majority is enfranchised, including those with little to no property or assets, political competition has greatly increased, thus ultimately moving politics to the left.

Lenski's (1966) theory of social stratification closely parallels Lipset's argument. For Lenski, the "new democratic ideology" is significant because it legitimates a major redistribution of political power in favor of the majority - namely, the disadvantaged elements of society. This increased political equality has led to more social equality because the major electoral demand made on modern political elites has been for a more egalitarian distribution of material goods (Bollen and Jackman, 1985: 439).

Axel Hadenius conducted his own study to respond to previous studies of socioeconomic conditions that favor democracy using three measurements for development: literacy rate, energy consumption and the percentage employed in agriculture. His empirical study was designed to test the viability of existing research which defends modernization theory. According to modernization theory, development in the aforementioned areas will bring about general changes in society that will be conducive to democratic rule.

Through enhanced popular education and a concomitant industrialization, and with that an increased overall prosperity, groups which have formally been excluded from influence will obtain improved political resources and thus better chances of having a say in public life. Economic progress will also create a greater national asset to be used for distributional purposes. Hence it will be less difficult to meet various demands on the public sector, which may reduce the level of tension between competing groups (Hadenius, 1994: 76).

Hadenius's conclusions are cohesive with Lipset's and Cutright's studies. His empirical study demonstrated that his selected measures of socioeconomic development have an essential association with the duration of democracy (ibid: 83).

Hadenius also responded to Lipset's and Cutright's study in a semi-critical fashion. He acknowledged that the reality of aid efforts towards economic development in the Third World, particularly in Latin America and Africa where authoritarian regimes prevailed despite these efforts, did not meet the expectations of the modernization theorists. These areas were characterized as having relatively high levels of income inequality as well as a background of colonialism. Therefore, there were other crucial factors that determine a nation's level of democracy, i.e. income inequality and colonial heritage, that should be taken into consideration (ibid: 64).

Samuel Huntington agrees with the basic argument that economic development correlates to democracy, and attempts to answer the question “why did economic development and the movement of countries into the upper-middle class income levels promote democratization?” (Huntington, 1991: 64). He explains, in accord with Lipset, that economic development created wealth that was not state controlled. Therefore, a change in social values and norms aided democratization. According to Huntington, economic well-being within a nation shapes attitudes of interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and competence which are conducive to democracy. More educated people seem to adopt attitudes of interpersonal trust, satisfaction and competence; economic development increases the levels of education in society. Economic development also increases the number of resources available to social groups, thus encouraging compromise. Furthermore, economic development fosters foreign trade, investment, technology, tourism, and communication systems. The involvement of any country in the global economy exposes the society to free-market access to wealth and influence, and lastly,

Economic development promotes the expansion of the middle class...Democracy is premised, in some measure, on majority rule, and democracy is difficult in a situation of concentrated inequalities in which a large, impoverished majority confronts a small, wealthy oligarchy...A substantial middle class is normally [however] the product of industrialization and economic growth (ibid: 65, 66).

The most commonly used measurements of socioeconomic development should come to no surprise given the theoretical inclinations of the modernization approach. The use of such measurements in the above-mentioned studies, such as education, literacy, urbanization, and of course per capita income are the clear results of the modernization school’s conceptualization of economic growth.

Modernization theory has had a major impact on scholars’ analyses of the route to democracy. Micheal Coppedge writes in his article on modernization and democracy:

Large-scale comparative research on modernization and democracy, which never completely died out, accumulated evidence that vindicated the connections between aspects of modernization and democracy. In particular, the robust association between wealth - usually operationalized as per-capita GNP - and democracy came to be widely recognized as a fact (Coppedge, 1997: 178).

2.7 Democracy and inequality

In the reviewed literature, scholars’ examine the roles of individuals to elect leaders who act on behalf of the majority. Citizens are expected, through modernization, to gain increased understanding and participation in the political system. It is also discussed above that

democracy and development are complex concepts. Modernization theorists stress that economic growth brings a change in values that make a society more conducive to democracy. However, the emphasis on economic restructuring reveals the troublesome controversy surrounding economic equality and wealth distribution. Western theorists confirm that development does not guarantee changes in personal wealth. In developing countries, economic inequality may persist despite changes in national wealth. Development theorists also studied the effects of income inequality on democratic endurance. They questioned if poverty and extreme income disparities would hinder a nation's ability to sustain a democracy. Western scholars recognize that in any process of democratization and economic growth, the issue of economic equality must be addressed.

This section outlines the literature aimed at answering the questions: Does inequality threaten democracy? Does economic growth increase economic equality and how is this related to democracy and political equality?

Among other reasons, it is worth mentioning that inequalities in democratic countries come in many varieties; the advantages and disadvantages of different varieties are not all concentrated in the same individuals, strata, or classes; given the political and legal structures of democratic countries, not all inequalities are readily convertible, if at all, into political inequality; and the advantages of superior resources often suffer from diminishing returns in political life...Nonetheless, the existence of sizeable inequalities in political resources among the citizens of a democratic country should be disturbing to anyone who places a high value on political equality (Dahl, 1985: 53).

Dahl explains democracy's dependency on an economic order which is efficient, just, encourages individuals to accept responsibility for their own actions, and would help distribute political resources to promote voting equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding and final control of the political agenda (ibid: 85). The ideal type of economic order would be one that is market driven and decentralized, according to Dahl. Because of the ability of some societies to maintain a high level of democracy while simultaneously having capitalist economies, modernization theorists are often classified as advocates of capitalism. Whether or not such scholars defend capitalism is not the issue, but instead what is expected from economic growth in terms of political equality and democracy.

If economic growth provides societal change that promotes a higher level of democracy, what effect does income inequality have on democracy? This question has been debated since data on personal income became available in the early 1970's (Muller, 1988: 50).

Because socioeconomic development does not guarantee changes in personal wealth, the subject of economic inequality and a potentially inverse relationship with political democracy was empirically tested by several scholars to help answer such questions. If it is inevitable that class division exists in democracy to some degree, what is the relationship between inequality and democracy?

Kenneth Bollen and Robert Jackman review the political arguments and empirical findings that surround the assertion that income inequality has some effect on levels of democracy and vice versa. They state that there are essentially three arguments surrounding the topic: a) the majority of the population will support parties who serve the interests of working and middle class citizens, hence electoral demand is made on political elites for a more equal distribution of material goods thus reducing inequality (Lipset 1960, Lenski 1966); b) economic resources can be translated to political resources enabling the upper-class to control political legislation and economic inequality leads to frustration of the lower classes thus diminishing the legitimacy of democracy (Dahl 1971, Hadenius 1992); and c) there is no systematic causal relationship between democracy and inequality because industrialization increases inequality while simultaneously providing for the distribution of material goods, thus providing no meaningful relationship. Moreover, any sort of meaningful relationship is predicated on the assumption that inequality undermines legitimacy; there is no reason to believe that the majority of the population views economic inequality as political inequity (Bollen and Jackman, 1985: 439,440).

Typical of many critiques of other theorists' empirical conclusions, Bollen and Jackman draw attention to the fact that measurement of the distribution of material goods is difficult. In addition, defining and measuring political democracy is problematic, and comparative studies require the same sampling for which data for alternative measurements may not be available. Despite problems with measurements and working data, Bollen and Jackman resolve that there is no link between democracy and inequality.

Political democracy and economic inequality do not seem linked in any meaningful way...Part of the explanation may be that any association between democracy and equality is a spurious effect of their common dependence on socioeconomic development...In democracies the electorate can translate its preference into actions. However, it is possible that the dominant preferences of the voting population are not for redistributive policies...Many in capitalist countries may not favor the extensive government intervention that would be necessary to institute the policies required to redistribute income (ibid: 450).

Edward Muller believes that the lack of attention to income inequality is a major explanatory variable in the perceived failure of modernization in the 1960's and 1970's. Firstly, he paraphrases Lipset's research, drawing attention to the fact that Lipset concentrates on two interrelated variables: political culture and social structure. Correctly so, Muller summarizes the supposed benefits of economic development: increasing levels of education, leading to political attitudes which are conducive to democracy; and increasing the size of the middle class, which leads to weakening the intensity of class struggle. However, Muller asserts that one must necessarily question why large declines in democracy occurred in modernizing states (Muller, 1997: 134). His hypothesis is as follows:

I argue that income inequality...is a critical component of the explanation. Income inequality is hypothesized to be an economic determinant of democratization that is as causally relevant as level of economic development. Furthermore, its negative effect on democratization can counteract the positive influence of economic development. Moreover, the process of economic development initially exacerbates income inequality, which may explain the declines in levels of democracy in moderately developed countries (ibid).

According to Muller, previous studies have attempted to determine if political democracy catalyzes income concentration in the hands of the few. He states that the most reliable study was that of Bollen and Jackman (see above), who concluded that the level of democracy has no systematic effect on income distribution, and income inequality has no systematic effect on the level democracy (ibid). Muller warns that any other study conducted measuring democracy at a single point in time will inevitably be unreliable, since democracy must be measured according to a nation's experience over time. "All countries with a high level of democracy are expected to have a relatively low level of income inequality, regardless of the length of time that democratic institutions have existed. But, if the egalitarian influence of democracy is in reality a long-term incremental effect, then relatively new democracies should not be expected to be as egalitarian as older ones, even if they have the same level of democracy in a given year" (ibid).

Branco Milanovic and Mark Gradstein confirm that studies which compare new, inegalitarian democracies may fail to equate level of democracy with a negative effect on income inequality. New democracies may not exhibit the long-term incremental effect of egalitarian democratic influence (Milanovic and Gradstein, 2002: 12).

In fact, the relationship between income inequality and both levels of democracy and levels of economic development is said to resemble an inverted U-shaped curve. Several authors adhere to this concept.

In the ethnographic record - which does not include many industrialized societies - equality decreases with economic development. That should not be too surprising once one remembers that the apparent cross-national linear relationship between development and equality really masks a U-shaped curve whereby equality generally decreases in the early stages of economic growth, but then rises to relatively high levels as the economy reaches a fairly advanced stage of industrialization (reviewed by Lipset, 1994) (Ember et al., 1997: 111).

The authors remark that modern nation-states, especially those that are more industrialized, resemble simpler societies in the ethnographic record because both have relatively high levels of political participation (ibid).

Muller explains that although Lipset may be correct in asserting that economic development increases the size and organizational power of the subordinate class, it generates a less equal distribution of income. Although the poor may outnumber the rich, the rich may be able to convert economic power into political power and prevent redistributive practices. If redistribution is not proposed in the legislature, the lower classes may lose faith in the democratic system and form dissident organizations. The poor may use undemocratic or violent means to reach their economic goals, while the rich may support military action against such dissident groups.

On the one hand, the process of capitalist economic development is expected to have a positive impact on democratization because it produces a shift in the labor force from agriculture to industry and services. This shift increases the size of the urban middle class which fosters the *inauguration* of democracy. On the other hand, capitalist economic development also initially heightens income inequality in a country, and this is expected to have a negative impact on democratization because a high level of income inequality radicalizes the working class, enhances class polarization, and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for political participation by the lower classes (Muller, 1997: 137).

Muller compared crossnational relationships between democracy, economic development, and income inequality in 55 countries. He used the Bollen index as a measure of democracy, and energy consumption as a measure of economic development. To measure income inequality, Muller used both the Gini coefficient (an indicator of the extent to which the population deviates from perfect equality) as well as the size of the share of personal income received by the richest quintile of the population (an indicator of how income may be concentrated at the top of the distribution)(Muller, 1988: 52, 53).

The study showed that *over time* democracy would reduce some income inequality provided there was only a moderate level upon democratic inauguration. According to Muller, when the level of democracy measure is replaced by qualitative measures of a nation's experience

with democracy, there is a significant negative relationship between democracy and income inequality that operates gradually over time. Following modernization theorists, Muller supplements his empirical findings with an explanation that the effect of democratic institutions on income distribution is connected to a chain of causes relating to a change in social structure. An egalitarian political system provides all citizens with an opportunity to participate in political processes and oppose decisions, but naturally it takes time for the poorer members of society to rise to their potential by forming unions, interest groups, and providing emerging parties of the left with a solid electoral following (Muller, 1988: 65).

Muller's argument has been contested by several scholars, including Erich Weede, for various methodological problems, and for his failure to control for literacy rates, which has direct implications on the level of democracy in a country (Weede, 1988: 867). Muller responded shortly after, controlling for literacy rates as well as using an alternative measure of the length of the democratic experience. His latter study reproduced his original thesis (Milanovic and Gradstein, 2002: 18).

Despite the debate on whether or not income inequality affects democracy, problems with finding an accurate measurement of income distribution can be pinpointed in many studies. Therefore scholars' conclusions may be a result of insufficient data or methodological pitfalls. Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire attempt to provide a measure that overcomes methodological problems in order to revisit the relationships between income inequality, growth, and poverty reported in previous literature.

Empirical work using cross-country data to draw inferences regarding the relationship between growth and inequality has a long tradition and has led to a number of fruitful (or controversial) hypotheses...the lack of time series that are sufficiently long has prevented appropriate testing of these hypotheses. Furthermore, problems in the quality of data and the fact that existing measures are often based on different definitions hamper comparability between countries - and often even within the same country over time - thus affecting empirical results in unpredictable ways (Deininger and Squire, 1996: 566).

The authors support the validity of using the Gini coefficient, which plots the share of the population against the share of income received. Their study attempts to improve on studies in previous literature by basing observations on household surveys, comprehensive coverage of the population, and comprehensive coverage of income sources (ibid: 568). The results of comparative data in this particular study show that there appears to be little systematic relationship between growth and inequality. Similarly, there seems to be no positive association between growth and the welfare of the bottom quintile of the population (ibid: 588). Notwithstanding,

The most recent paper by Lundberg and Squire, 1999, which studies the simultaneous determination of growth and inequality within the framework of an even more expanded data set relatively to Deininger and Squire, 1996, does not discern a significant relationship between *aggregate* measures of inequality, but they do find that expansion of democracy benefits the lowest quintile of income distribution thus reducing poverty (Milanovic and Gradstein, 2002: 20).

Regardless of the conclusions, the above-mentioned study does provide a more standardized mechanism for measuring inequality which can be used to compare inequality to democracy. In essence, any attempt to expand political democracy to a broader definition that encompasses economic equality would rely on an empirically sound means of assessing economic equality in order to avoid complications warned by other theorists (e.g. Hadenius).

Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek Davids empirically enquire why poor nations have a lower probability of sustaining a democracy than wealthier countries. Despite the efforts of democratization in Africa, the area used in their study, widespread levels of poverty still exist. Therefore, the authors questioned if relationships between poverty and democracy that had been identified globally would apply to the African continent (note this issue will be discussed at length in Chapter 3). Perhaps in Africa, poverty may affect the “development may lead to democracy” hypothesis, which they consider to be one of the clearest findings of empirical political science.

However, we also noted that the precise reasons behind this relationship have not been so obvious. Most importantly, we have not yet determined conclusively whether the linkage between development and democracy is a micro-level phenomenon that occurs because the poor are differentially “democratic” in their behaviors, interests and attitudes compared to the relatively wealthy, or whether it is a macro-level dynamic with its roots in the greater abilities of wealthy societies to sustain democratic institutions and procedures (Mattes et al., 2003: 35).

Furthermore, the authors inquire if lived poverty affects the political activity of the impoverished group in society.

The conventional wisdom implies that poverty decreases both participation in democratic life and popular support for democracy. Poorer people may have less time to devote to the types of participation that give life to democracy, independent of the fact they tend to be less educated and more rural...Given their imperative to satisfy basic survival needs, poor people may have little reason to worry about satisfying supposedly “higher order” needs like self-government, freedom and equality that democracy fulfills. On the other hand, it is also possible that, independently of correlates such as lower levels of education, poverty may provide people with greater incentives to mobilize politically in order to demand redress (ibid).

The authors respond to a growing scholarly skepticism about the previous modes of assessing inequality. Solely focusing on monetary measures of poverty may not adequately reflect the 'real' affect that poverty has on poor people's ability to participate politically. They construct a *Lived Poverty Index* that measures overall well-being which does not simplify poverty to a single composite measure. The study was conducted by an "Afrobarometer" survey which directly asks respondents to remark on their ability to secure basic needs. Food, water, home security, medical treatment, cash income, and home fuel are the six indicators chosen by the researchers to assess poverty in seven southern African countries (ibid: 1-7).

Their conclusions can be reduced to two important findings for the purposes of this paper. Although they have constructed a poverty measurement alternative that may encompass a wider scale of quality of life, their study yields similar results to studies using measures preferred by economists such as GNP or massive surveys (Mattes et. al., 2003: iv). Secondly, the authors attest that while social scientists have often claimed adverse affects of poverty on democracy on a national level, they find no strong linkage between poverty and citizenship behaviors that are crucial for a nation to sustain democracy at the individual level(Mattes et al., Afrobarometer Briefing paper No. 4, 2003).

...Those who suffer frequent shortages of basic necessities are actually more likely to say they attend meetings of community organizations, contact political leaders, participate in conventional political processes, or comply with the law...We find that lived poverty has no observable impact on the extent to which people see democracy as the preferred form of government (ibid).

Finally, the authors suggest that the key relationship between democracy and development might occur at the macro level. Poor countries have fewer resources to maintain important formal institutions as well as social institutions such as effective political parties, an independent news media, and well organized civil society groups (ibid). Certainly this would reflect Lipset's original, as well as subsequent and prevailing, literature which attests that economic growth may provide a foundation for the survival of pro-democratic institutions.

In addition to defining and measuring development and democracy, scholars have also studied the effects of inequality on democracy specifically in relation to the poverty which exists in many developing nations. Western scholars maintain that development does not guarantee economic equality, but that inequalities may lessen over time if democracy endures. Poverty does not seem to have any systematic negative influence on political equality however. This section shows that Western scholars realize that income inequality

and poverty are issues that deserve attention and could potentially influence the durability of democracy in transitional countries.

2.8 Concluding remarks: revisiting Lipset

Let us return to Lipset's more recent work to establish a well-rounded understanding of modernization theory at its roots. Although much attention has been directed at empirical study using carefully created indices which may seem to reflect a minimal and procedural definition of democracy, modernization theorists cannot be accused of failing to take other factors into consideration. Likewise, Western scholars are not deterministic concerning the relationship between development and democracy; they maintain that the factors that influence the relationship are complex. In Lipset's article, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited", he comments on the prospects and conditions for democracy across the globe after gaining the ability to discuss transitions retrospectively.

He affirms much of the work by other scholars who reacted to his original proposition. This paper will now address topics such as the relationship democracy may have with inequality, the connection between capitalism and democracy, and the shortcomings that any "predictive" type analysis will have. On the issue of inequality, he states that studies indicate that as a country begins to grow and urbanize, economic inequality may worsen; however, once the economy stabilizes and industrializes, income distribution becomes more equitable (Lipset, 1994: 2). Lipset recognizes the connection and perhaps definitive expansion between economic well-being and political equality. Again, measuring democracy based on what may seem to be a procedural definition is not because other important democratic rights should be disregarded. His stance should be quoted at length:

Weffort (1992), a Brazilian scholar of democracy, has argued strongly that, although "the political equality of citizens,...is...possible in societies marked by a high degree of [economic] inequality," the contradiction between political and economic inequality "opens the field for tensions, institutional distortions, instability and recurrent violence...[and may prevent] the consolidation of democracy" Contemporary social scientists find that greater affluence and higher rates of well-being have been correlated with the presence of democratic institutions. Beyond the impact of national wealth and economic stratification, contemporary social scientists also agree with Tocqueville's analysis, that social equality, perceived as equality of status and respect for individuals regardless of economic condition, is highly conducive for democracy (ibid).

Lipset comments that the movement towards a market economy may affect the probability that a nation can sustain a democracy. He maintains that a system *such as* capitalism aids in the transformation of class structure, enabling the working class to organize against anti-

democratic practices such as nepotism and privileged state access to resources. A competitive market economy can be justified as the best way to limit state power: “the less the state has to do the better; the fewer economic resources the state can directly control, the greater the possibilities for a free polity”(Lipset, 1994: 3). Furthermore, “the rise of capitalism, a large middle class, an organized working class, increased wealth, and education are associated with secularism and the institutions of civil society which help create autonomy for the state and facilitate other preconditions for democracy”(Lipset, 1994: 7).

Lipset does not limit the conditions for democracy to economic liberalization and growth alone, he emphasizes the need for attention to many differentiating factors that must be taken into account when attempting to outline prerequisites for democracy. Civic culture, religious tradition, legitimacy of the government, electoral and executive systems, political parties, and the rule of law are just some of the determining features of levels of democracy. Additionally, he explicitly states that socioeconomic correlations are associational rather than causal (ibid: 16). Lipset, who initiated the great debate on the relationship between economic growth, democracy, capitalism, and inequality, does not draw a linear pathway through any political transition. He admits that his empirical studies have focused on emphasizing correlations between growth and democracy, but there are many other variables and the outcomes will often be contradictory. Democratic stability takes time, and especially in the cases of more recent transitions, it is difficult to trace and compare Western transitions that are well established and model a nexus of cause and effect.

This chapter has described the contributions of the Western canon on the study of the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy. It has shown that numerous quantitative, as well as qualitative analyses, have been dedicated to discovering conditions that favor democracy in a nation. This is not to say that *all* nations must follow the same path or exhibit the same conditions in order to sustain a democracy. Bearing the contents of this chapter in mind, let us now turn to the African scholars’ criticism of the Western canon.

3.0 The African critique of the Western canon

The preceding chapter outlined the ‘Western’ canon of scholarship on the relationship between economic growth, inequality, and democracy. Development and democracy measures were improved upon by various scholars to describe the characteristics of modernization and democracy accurately. The attention to empirical study reflected a need to scientifically defend positive and negative relationships between variables as an annex to normative arguments. Despite the debate over specific studies and methods of measurement, most modernization theorists believe that economic growth in the form of an efficient market system will contribute to greater chances for a nation to sustain a democratic political system. Yet, modernization theory cannot be directly connected to any strong adherence to capitalism, form of development, opinion on wealth inequality, “type” of education, or positivism. In fact, modernization theorists are the first to report that the process of development and democratization is an extremely complicated field that involves a myriad of definitions and variables, which are all interrelated in a tangled web of cause and effect.

This chapter will describe several African scholars’ criticisms of the concepts and measures of development and democracy which they claim exist in Western theory. The chapter will also summarize arguments which connect modernization theory to capitalism, as well as modernization theory to failing or perceived malevolent development policies. The major assumptions or misunderstandings expressed in the alternative theorists arguments will be drawn from their work in order to compare such misunderstandings with the original modernization literature. In addition, this chapter will describe the African dissatisfaction with the use of quantitative analysis and the “Westernization” of social science.

3.1 Development and modernization

From the previous chapter, it is clear that an enormous amount of effort has been focused on defining and measuring development and democracy. The connection between the modernization approach and development policies is assumed; Peter Gibbon states that the World Bank’s definition of political economy and its implementation of foreign policies is a direct result of the adoption of the modernization paradigm (Gibbon, 1995: 130).

Western social science geared itself to aid and assist the international effort at cooperation and change. Funds flowed freely to support research in this direction. The researchers recognized the need to come out with formulations that would not offend the sensitivities of the emerging nations and would offer them, at the

same time, attractive paradigms to shape and order their development programs. Modernization was one such formulation (Dube, 1988: 27).

If development is viewed in a positive way, then modernization theorists in general are seen as credible in the field of social science. However this has not been the case. For the past several decades, there has been an ongoing debate on what development has actually accomplished in less developed countries. The assumption that improvements in economic conditions and societal changes such as industrialization, urbanization, education etc. had an effect on democracy was questioned by alternative scholars. The viability of 'Western' literature from the 1950's onwards took a turn for the worst, for failure of development initiatives in the developing world were directly attached to these empirical 'conclusions'. The studies outlined in the previous chapter have been 'tainted' in a sense by the perceived failures of socioeconomic development regardless of how accurate and robust the analyses may be.

For many, terms like Development and Modernization have lost their meaning... They refer to policies pursued by governments and international agencies that enrich ruling elites and technocrats, while the masses are told to await the benefits of the "trickle down" effect. For many, Development and Modernization are terms that refer to a politics of reform designed to preserve the status quo while promising to alter it. And for many, social scientists who have rationalized the interests of governments committed to such policies are accomplices in deception (Gendzier, 1985: 2)

Many scholars argue that despite attempts at socioeconomic development, the majority of African countries are experiencing economic crisis. Of course the degree of the seriousness of the crises varies greatly, but nonetheless the failure or lack of development has far-reaching and negative consequences on these countries' citizens. Many views on 'why' and 'how' African countries are faced with economic suffering and hopelessness revolves around the opinion that such a crisis is the inevitable outcome of the failure of post-independence development policy. Those who viewed development as a malevolent pathway claimed that as a result of these policies, poverty and socioeconomic inequalities increased, the external debt burden became heavier, brain drain intensified, capital flight deepened, the balance of payments weakened, the physical infrastructure deteriorated, unemployment and crime escalated, famine and malnutrition became more pronounced, budget deficits soared, agricultural productivity declined, urbanization burgeoned, environmental degradation expanded, political and civil strife worsened, and corruption became more rampant (Hope, 1997: 3,4).

Much of the alternative or radical theory originated in the West, but many African scholars followed in the critical footsteps of the radicals to describe the socioeconomic conditions in African countries. Even though scholars observed what they considered to be negative global relationships, these theorists also believed that the countries of the 'periphery' could, through better theory and able leadership, overcome the obstacles that history had set up and assume an alternative development path. The path would be more equal and less painful - the costs of development could be decreased with structurally different policy-making (Leys, 1996:13).

African social scientists not only criticized development projects for the results or perceived failings of such processes, but the point of origin, the modernization school of thought. Hence, a long running battle began, putting modernization theorists against African critics. Yet given the extremely varied nature of the Western scholarship on development, generalizations about these approaches became ingrained in alternative scholars' critiques (Gendzier, 1985: 17). In order to facilitate a proper critique of modernization theorists, African social scientists created a caricature of the 'Western, liberal development school'. Therefore, the argument may not be with the modernization school but in fact with the caricature. If the caricature is accurate, then we have a rich debate. However, if the caricature is imagined, the argument becomes one-sided.

This chapter will examine the African critique on essentially two levels. Firstly, the African response to rather generalized modernization theory will be examined. It is necessary to determine if the African scholars have an accurate understanding of what can be called orthodoxy, 'Western' theory, the modernization paradigm, or, in general, the dominant discourse. African scholars make an effort to criticize 'Western' development studies for methodological problems as well as problems with defining democracy and development, discussed in Chapter Two. They accuse Western scholars of minimalizing concepts, drawing lines of causality that are oversimplified, relying on empirical studies that are poorly designed, and adhering to capitalist systems which are malevolent to local societies. The 'truth' may lie in the literature of the Western scholars. In other words, African scholars make references (implicitly or explicitly) that can be cross-referenced.

Simultaneously, African scholars have a problem with 'Western'-based analysis in general. These arguments are directed at the *way* that social science is constructed and how this affects the societies which are being studied and in turn democratized and developed either internally or externally. African scholars believe that the Western canon is Eurocentric,

imperialistic, attempting to spread capitalist ideology, because they adhere to universalistic and self-proclaimed superior paradigms. According to African scholars, Western theorists believe the rest of the world should develop and democratize along the same path as the West, as well as study development using Western methodology.

3.2 The background of African scholars

Before embarking on an investigation of the African response to the studies of Chapter Two, one needs to place such scholars in context in order to understand why they are disappointed with the Western canon. Firstly, these authors are from African countries, which like many countries, do not model Lipset's hypothesis that the more well-to-do a nation the higher the chances are for democracy in that nation.

The bulk of liberal democratic theory establishes a close relationship between the economy - referred to as levels of development - and stable democratic rule. But levels of development are located outside the context of forms of appropriation and methods of production, and restricted primarily to questions of incomes, resource distribution and welfare...Theorists tend to work their way backwards by identifying the end values of democracy in Western societies - tolerance, moderation, loyal opposition etc. How such values can be developed in societies marked by intolerance, violence and polarization is left largely unexplained (Bangura, 1992: 48).

The 'real' political effects of modernization are grim. African scholars formulated their arguments amid chaotic political and economic conditions. They were not convinced that political instability, centralization of power, intense ethnic and elite competition for resources, and political repression were the result of rapid and multi-dimensional changes that would eventually subside with time.

...in the new states modernity was being introduced and rapidly taking ground in situations where there were no supportive institutions and cultural values. Modern institutions capable of constraining political behavior and structuring political relations were nonexistent and in cases where they existed they had not taken root in the culture of the society. For political life this meant that in the new states there was no agreed set of rules and procedures capable of governing political interaction, resulting in the unconventional means to gain elective office and unconstitutional behavior of people in power (Barongo, 1995: 139).

Scholars living in these nations during transitions saw contradiction and complexity in the relationship between development and democracy. The observed economic and political crises in Africa did not give credibility to theories claiming that economic development could eventually lead to a sustainable democracy. According to African observers, the development initiatives were not leading to democracy, but authoritarian regimes hidden under a cloak of "free and fair" elections.

Many African authors write from their own experiences, and their studies generally include a description of the current economic and political situation in specific African countries. From these particular economic and political histories, African scholars make deductive comments on the relationships between development, democracy and inequality. Yusuf Bangura explicitly states: "What are the general conclusions to be drawn from the Nigerian experience?" (Bangura, 1992: 79). Therefore, African scholars have an entirely different approach to drawing conclusions from "conditions" that exist in society. It may not be imperative for them to even look at cross-national studies that compare development and democratic variables, since the answers to any nation's attempt at democratization lies within the nation itself. African scholars locate conditions which exist in a particular society and speculate about the possible relationship between development and democracy, as opposed to hypothesizing about the relationship from comparative empirical studies and applying "lessons learned" to create a suitable development project (Toyo, 1983: 17).

Now this paper will focus on the arguments made by African scholars, bearing their background in mind, against what they consider to be liberal (or 'Western') democratic theory.

3.3 On democracy

Many African scholars either directly refute, or indirectly locate problems with the relationship between democracy and development which is empirically tested by Western scholars (outlined in Chapter Two). African scholars are uncomfortable with the definition of democracy used in quantitative study. They often accuse previous scholars of placing too much emphasis on multi-party elections and concentrating on procedural democracy. They warn against the tendency for 'Westerners' to focus on the importance of procedural democracy, thus ignoring other, less minimal, interpretations of "democracy". The minimal interpretation has maintained a primary role in developing democracy. Procedural democracy, with all of its formal institutional trappings, are the key feature of the third wave of democratization, regardless of other significant prerequisites (Ninsin, 2000: 12).

The dominant discourse on democratization in Africa is premised on the necessity for establishing the basic institutional elements of democracy...Democracy is not about popular sovereignty or self-determination, which would have made the institutional reforms an adequate basis. There is also a strong ethical foundation to democracy, which is embedded in liberty as self-development or progress for both the individual and the group...This presupposes an educated, economically secure and critically conscious citizen. The conflict between this richer conception of

democracy and narrowly defined procedures is at the heart of the failure of the democratic revolution in Africa (ibid: 12).

African authors assert that a new social science, different from dominant discourse, must meet the real needs of the people: the need to get the basic amenities of life, the need for self-determination, the need to create conditions which allow the people of the Third World to realize their potentialities, the need to end their exploitative dependence on imperialist powers, ultimately to achieve development in the fullest sense of the word (Ake, 1994: 3). Therefore, they question what democracy, in its procedural form, is really able to deliver to citizens. Alternative scholars believe that in light of Africa's current level of "underdevelopment", there must be more to democracy than standardized elections and multi-party systems. For many African scholars (Saine, Ake, Olukoshi, Ninsin), the former optimism about the third wave of democratization has turned to disappointment and criticism, which exposes inherent contradictions and paradoxes in Western literature. While multi-party elections and liberal constitutions are important, they are not sufficient prerequisites for democracy.

Hence, it is the responsibility of social scientists to define democracy with the people that live its reality in mind (ibid). The African argument maintains that democracy must be appreciated not because of its utility, but for a political value on its own. Likewise, the goal of democracy should not be the acquisition of institutional practices or material gains. Although democratic values are worth defending for what they are, no democratic system can persist unless the real and tangible needs of the people are met. People will ultimately lose faith in democracy, and the system will lack legitimacy (Olukoshi, 1998: 3). "Real democracy" provides both economic and political rights, opposed to a formal democracy which refers to elections.

Clearly, economic democracy must be central in Africa's effort to democratize. Individuals, groups, and collectives in society must be guaranteed a minimum level of economic security, to empower them to become full and active participants in political and economic decision making. Otherwise, extreme levels of poverty would effectively bar the most vulnerable - women, children, and minority ethnic groups - from shaping their destinies...Any effort by Western donor countries or the IMF and the World Bank to impose rigid political conditionality to encourage democratization in Africa will result in mere window-dressing (Saine, 1995: 195).

African theorists ultimately question the merits of liberal democracy. Democracy, according to the caricature of the Western definition, is a political system characterized by "a range of political and civil rights and regular free elections in which organized parties compete to form a government, with virtually all adult citizens exercising their right to vote."(Osabu-

Kle, 2000: 76). The notion of liberal democracy is regarded as a myth; the dominant classes are able to prevent social and economic reform and the poor do not benefit from its practice.

Dominant groups in society may accept the trappings of democracy in order to get international recognition, which can lead to the inflow of foreign aid and loans. They may also value democratic rules for their own interests and cherish liberty and open political competition for the same purpose. But when, for instance, the IMF and World Bank advocate economic liberalization accompanied by austerity measures, the most likely outcome is repression and not democratization (Osabu-Kle, 2000: 76).

3.4 What would the Western scholars say on democracy?

African scholars criticize previous literature, and therefore the resulting development practices, for their minimalization of democracy to a procedural definition, which does not encompass the real needs of the people. Let us now go back to the original literature and examine the assertions of the African scholars. Firstly, we must not forget why Western scholars minimalize the definition of democracy. Since procedural democracy is practically measurable, the existence of procedural institutions can help determine the level of democracy in a nation.

By in large, most scholarly and policy uses of the term democracy today refer to a purely political conception of the term, and this intellectual shift back to an earlier convention has greatly facilitated progress in studying the dynamics of democracy, including the relationship between political democracy and various social and economic conditions (Diamond, 1999: 8).

In the previous chapter, the reasons for defining democracy were made clear. However, procedural democracy is not the end all be all of the meaning of democracy, but an *essential component* of democracy. Many Western scholars consider nonelectoral characteristics of democracy in their definitions (see Dahl, 1985; Huntington, 1991; Diamond 1992).

Important normative and political issues are at stake in the way we define democracy. If we rest content to promote the mere constitutional form of democracy, pressure for democratization will cease once the structural form is put into place, and assistance may go mainly to strengthen formal institutions and assist economic reform and development. Those are necessary objectives for democratization, but they are not sufficient (Diamond, in Hadenius, 1997: 312).

Much of the problem that African scholars have with the 'Western' scholars' interpretation of the meaning of democracy can be attributed to the fact that African scholars do not see the connection between the purpose for minimal definitions for use of empirical study, and

the literature that directly addresses other aspects of democracy. 'Western' empirical study necessitates a clear meaning of democracy that is easily measurable in order to make significant deductions about the nature of democratic sustainability in nations. African scholars believe that this same definition would be used in a normative analysis on democracy by the same scholars, which may not be the case. They illustrate all 'Western' discourse on democracy as focusing entirely on electoral procedures and nothing else. In addition, they look at the "real" effects of democratization and lead it directly back to modernization theorists, which disables them from locating the similarities that exist between them and their apparent theoretical opponents.

African scholars also maintain that economically secure and educated people are essential to democratic endurance. The claim that education, political participation and economic stability are essential components of the ability of a nation to sustain a democratic regime is *a crucial part* of 'Western' discourse, marked by the factors that Western scholars stress in their research. The above arguments fail to acknowledge the link between 'procedural' democracy and the previously listed conditions. Western theorists would agree that democracy should meet the real needs of the people, and this can be accomplished through elections. Such theorists might argue, as discussed in Chapter Two, that elections pave the way for the majority of citizens to swing politics slightly to the left if they should chose. Additionally, the economic growth or socioeconomic development that can add to a country's level of democracy will ultimately improve education, political participation etc. and give an opportunity to people to develop themselves.

The argument that poor people are easily pushed aside because they do not have the interest or inclination to partake in politics is a stereotype that African scholars have made no attempt to empirically justify. We can refer to the above-mentioned Afro Barometer studies which asserts that the poor are just as likely to be active in politics as other classes. Western development may or may not 'solve' inequality, but an attempt at stimulating economic growth *in order to* increase the chances of poverty alleviation, political equality, socialization of marginalized groups and ultimately a sustainable democracy must not be completely tossed aside for its apparent lack of a maximized concept of democracy. Potential for improvements in education and attitudes which are conducive to democracy does not mean that the people will respond in any predictable manner. Democracy does not promise instant equity for all. A 'real' definition of democracy should then include all of the necessary hardships that a transition to democracy entails, be it in a Western country or elsewhere.

3.5 The reality of democratic consolidation

Several “alternative” scholars continue to question the democratization process for its failure to deliver the social benefits which are supposedly inherent in the term democracy, despite the complications with the assumption that democracy can extinguish economic and social inequalities. They stress that countries which are moving toward democracy are still faced with economic and social crises.

What then are the limits and prospects for sustained democratization in Africa? What kind(s) of democracy would be relevant for Africa? These questions are important because the democratization process is intrinsically paradoxical. And regardless of whether these reforms towards democracy succeed or fail, but especially when they succeed, its most salient initial product will be suffering - injustice, inequity, even repression, perhaps the very thing that democratization intends forever to banish from society (Saine, 1995: 184).

Whether or not democracy has universal applicability must be referenced to whether or not African scholars are able to distinguish between ‘real’ versus ‘idealized’ concepts of democracy. Perhaps democracy is the most desirable regime, but it is certainly not a perfect regime. The failure of democratization to secure economic equality or to prevent struggles is not the failure of development policies stemming from modernization theory, but a misunderstanding of the nature of political democracy itself.

Utopia disappears as the architecture of a type of society in which history comes to an end (be it modern, democratic, or socialist society), and it gives way to partial Utopias which point to the temporary realization of only some of the principles which define that society. There is no ideal society just around the bend; there is always struggle and process (Garreton, 1991: 104).

Most importantly, African scholars assert, opposing what they consider to be the liberal democratic viewpoint, that there is no unilinear history for all nations. The transition into liberal democracy is subject to unpredictable ambiguities and consequences (Ninsin, 2000: 12). Adam Przeworski made this very point: under democracy, no substantive compromises can be guaranteed. If a peaceful transition to democracy is to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse the process (Przeworski, 1997: 131). The empirical studies conducted by Western theorists cannot be directly tied to promises concerning democratization. On this note, Western theorists and African scholars have something in common: both share an understanding for the shortcomings of democracy.

Much of the African literature is coherent with modernization literature at a certain level. Yet, African scholars create a negative stereotype of 'Western' theorists because the reality of democratization is not regarded positively. African scholars reflect on the current situation in their own countries, attach the conditions to policies aimed at development and democracy, and then attach "harmful" policies to 'Western' literature on development. Therefore, similarities between the schools as well as the robust, valuable, empirically-founded relationships are disregarded because the modernization canon is mis-stereotyped. Modernization theorists would strongly support the need for the poorer classes to gain economic wealth in order to form a larger middle class. Additionally, most modernization theorists would agree that inequality, injustice, and struggle do not disappear once a country reaches a certain level of democracy. Nor would they promise that democracy has the capability of exterminating problems.

3.6 On development

The meaning of development has also presented a great challenge to African scholars and decision-makers. African scholars question the Western scholarship on what constitutes development, as well as the adequacy of the methodology used to link factors of socioeconomic development with levels of democracy. "By the early 1970's, the 1950's concept of development, or the linear view - which *inter alia* equated development with economic growth, with trends in income per capita taken as the chief indicator of progress - raised questions about the nature, causes and objectives of development, the theoretical adequacy, the empirical validity and the value basis of its assumptions and models"(Asante, 1991:3).

African scholars criticize the definition and measurement of development used by the modernization theorists for a host of reasons. They are uncomfortable with Western empirical study of the relationship between democracy and development; they consider it to be oversimplified. In particular, the Lipset study poses quite a problem, since Lipset attests that economic development can lead to higher levels of democracy in a nation.

...Thus there was nothing in its methodology that was truly a multivariate analysis with proper control for determining the precise significance of particular variables, much less multiple regression or dynamic analysis such as event history. Even though there is nothing in the study that establishes causality, it appears to assume that development is what has brought about democracy (Ake, 1979: 77).

Scholars, such as Ake, make constant reference to a line of causality and the constant liberal democratic attachment to development as the independent variable and democracy as the dependent variable. Ake draws on the (1994) study by Przeworski and Limongi as an example. He expresses that although scholars may obtain inconclusive results to prove a correlation, or even if results are negative, they somehow explain that due to biased data or by “complexifying” their analysis, economic development does positively affect the ability of a country to sustain a democracy (ibid: 80).

Development theory relies heavily on classifications, which implies that a political system is a functional system and the sequence of political development is of some significance. Critics are not certain that classifications can help explain development at all.

In development theory, it would appear that the phrase, sequence of political development, does not mean stages in quantitative increases of structural differentiation and cultural secularization, as such, but rather the order in which the crises or the problems of political development arise and are dealt with...The theory of political development does not as yet have a sequential model of political development. It is unlikely that the theory can be used to develop this model, because of its inadequacies (Ake, 1979 68-71).

African scholars recognize that because the initial minimal indices of development induced a series of academic attempts to create new and improved indices, the ranking system of developed vs. non-developed countries has become more sophisticated. However, with the inclusion of several sociopolitical variables and non-economic indices, the definition of political and social development becomes more vague.

...since any rank ordering implies a commitment to the validity of common factors throughout the scale, growing doubts about regarding development as a continuum based on Western indices are likely to reduce interest in producing such rank orderings. If development is indeed a highly differential process according to particular societies and their goals, then rank ordering comparisons become meaningless (Nettl, 1969: 22).

Moreover, it is important for development theorists to consider social justice and human satisfaction in order to “revolt against the long-held view that growth alone would spread benefits to the poorest majority. Contrary to expectations, the increased output of goods and services had failed to trickle down to the poorest sectors” (Asante, 1991: 3).

As no social indicators are built into the modernization formulation its social objectives are neither specific nor quantifiable...It should be noted that the objectives of modernization have not been related to the paramount consideration of social justice...Nothing better than the lackluster Western style development is promised...The modernization approach, as mentioned earlier, has little explanatory

power and it tends to gloss over some of the uglier aspects of the development process in the West. The West was able to modernize itself, it would appear to say, because its citizens had all the desirable personality attributes and value orientations (Dube, 1988: 28).

Parallel to their argument against the definition of democracy, critics question Western theorists' stipulation that there is a set of variables or characteristics that can determine if a nation is developed or underdeveloped. They have a problem with the meaning of the term 'development', and the variables that have been attached to it. African scholars question the very notion that development can be measured and used in comparative study to determine the potential that a nation has to sustain a democracy. Furthermore, there are inherent contradictions among the elements of the development syndrome; the process of development and modernization must be regarded as interminable (Ake, 1979: 40).

Therefore, African scholars insist that the concept of development must be reassessed. Although various relationships between economic growth, modernity, industrialization and different categories of development (political, social, and psychological) have been investigated, conceptual problems due to the relativist nature of these categories is evidence of ideological uncertainty. Critics claim that there is a basic contrast between normative and logical/empirical ordering of categories in this area, as well as most other areas in social science (Nettl, 1969: 18).

3.7 Western scholars on development

Let us look at the caricature African scholars have created about 'Western' concepts of development. African scholars state that the Western concept is minimal, and depends heavily on economic indicators as the primary measure of level of development. Thus essential human development indicators are ignored. Additionally, they challenge the relative classification process of Western study, which they claim relies on vague and confusing indices. Furthermore, they allege that liberal development theory is based causal connections which are not supported.

Throughout "alternative" literary critique, Lipset's original hypothesis frequently appears. If African scholars had challenged his hypothesis in 1959, one might find some truth in the argument that liberal development theorists should refrain from attaching "causality" implications to their studies. Any notion that Lipset's study concludes that there is a causal relationship between development and democracy would be refuted by Lipset himself, as

well as other modernization scholars. We have seen from the previous chapter that Lipset's original hypothesis has evolved greatly; to the point where many modernization theorists are convinced that economic development has an *influence* on democracy, although few would insist on a linear, causal relationship.

Clearly, socioeconomic correlations are merely associational, and do not necessarily indicate cause. Other variables, such as the force of historical incidents in domestic politics, cultural factors, events in neighboring countries, diffusion effects from elsewhere, leadership and movement behavior can also affect the nature of the polity (Lipset, 1993: 16).

This issue will be discussed in greater detail below; but one must understand immediately that the African accusation of 'Western' theory being based on causal relationships that are supported by "manipulated" data is hardly found in the original literature.

It would be remarkable to find a theory of development that could tackle the full scope of development possibilities. Here, many American political scientists have already asserted that the indices for measuring development must take into account other forms of development besides economic. Plenty of attention has been given to extending indices to incorporate human development measures. The so-called 'uglier' development aspects have certainly been taken into consideration by modernization theorists, hence the intense body of research on the relationship between economic growth and inequality.

African scholars accuse Western political scientists of relying on standard variables that do not describe the full meaning of development, but once the scope of the variables is extended they assert that the definition of political and social development becomes vague. A good many modernization theorists would agree. However, to state that rank comparisons are useless infers a misunderstanding of their purpose. It must be remembered that normative arguments and empirical evidence reinforce each other. Again, the concept of development used for creating indices serves the purpose of clear measurement. It may not encompass the full scope of development, because modernization theorists have warned that doing so dilutes or confuses apparent connections between factors, and may render such studies meaningless. Again, both African and Western scholars would agree that the connotations of the term development are complicated and highly debatable.

3.8 Does development deliver?

Not only do African theorists challenge the previous scholarship on measuring and assessing development, they doubt if increases in levels of development according to Western indices actually provides societal benefits. The relationship between socioeconomic and political development described in the previous literature does not address the needs of the poorest members of society in the real world. The list of African perceived inadequacies of modernization theory include: a) there is considerable ambiguity with regard to the human dimension of modernization; “the intention may be to benefit all sections of the population in modernizing societies, but nowhere has this been stated explicitly; b) the object of modernization is not discussed in distributive terms, nor has it been related to the wider question of quality of life; c) modernization makes the assumption that a higher GNP, leading to a higher national income, would enrich the nation as a whole (Dube, 1988: 27). Modernization is regarded as an ambiguous goal, and the recipients of its benefits are difficult to find.

Modernization makes the same fallacious assumption and addresses its programs to the amorphous mass of society rather than to particular, especially the needy, sections of it. It is not realized that under certain conditions the magic of the market place simply does not work. The trickle down effect is weak and the invisible hand often misses the poor and the vulnerable (ibid).

African commentators credit Western political scientists with defining problem areas, but lacking the ability to resolve the question of ‘what’ constitutes development and how it is to be attained. Furthermore, perhaps prevailing orthodoxy implies that development can never be achieved, and that modernization theorists have not managed to decipher when development has taken place, or how much, in any country. Therefore, the key focus of pinpointing variables or characteristics of development (determining if a nation is developed or not) has become blurred and confusing (Ake, 1979: 40,41). African authors maintain that the theories may be tied to actual events in the developing world, but the failings of the theories in the ‘real’ world render the theories incapable of tackling the full scope of development possibilities.

Above all it was recognized that the actual goals of society might in fact not be wholly conducive to economic growth or modernization in spite of the rhetoric; both democracy and development (especially economic development) came to be regarded as in conflict with what was actually happening, above all with what a good part of leadership in the Third World seemed to want most immediately. At was the first period of disillusion- too many armies, too much bureaucratic parasitism, too much unequal distribution and not enough production, too much concentration on display products and neglect of infrastructure, too much articulation of conflicts between communities, in short too much politics for the

elites, not enough authentic participation for the masses (ibid: 19).

3.9 The “Westernization of democratic and development definitions and variables

Besides inferring that concepts of democracy and development are minimal and that democracy and development do not deliver what is expected, African scholars believe that Western concepts conflict with the particular African situation. They assert that previous scholarship on democracy is universal and ahistorical; political scientists must engage in more profound and critical analysis of the objective conditions which prevail in African societies (Awa, 1983: 33).

Although the European experience shows that development is possible through conducive democratic practice, democracy is not necessarily dependent on ‘Western’ modernization variables. For example, although India does not exhibit the characteristics of development (such as a history of pro-democratic institutions, comparative capitalism, industrialization, high literacy levels, a large middle class etc.. normally outlined as conducive to democracy) the nation has maintained a liberal democracy for over forty years (Osabu-Kle, 2000; 72). Hence, the nature of “democracy” must be questioned. Perhaps the Western form of democracy is not suitable for African cultures. Even more so, perhaps historical African politics resembles democracy more than it is given credit for. Little attention is paid to the existing democratic structures in African culture, and the attempt to import democracy from the West ultimately fails. Discourse on Africa has ignored the specific nature of Western transitions and that global forces have eroded any existing social forces on the African continent that may make it possible to implement the democratic project (Ninsin, 2000: 13).

Furthermore, European democracy emerged from a competitive culture, while African democracy is based on a culture of compromise and co-operation. Therefore, many African theorists reject the connection between capitalism and democracy and assert that Western scholars’ conditions for democracy necessarily include a capitalist system. The Western instrumentalization of democracy on behalf of development poses two key problems. The first problem is methodological. The substitution of political development for economic development is always based on the idea that the development movement is immanent. The way the West has achieved its development does not lead to any universal historical law. The substitution is also Eurocentric in its linear and universalistic vision of economic development (Dieng, 1995: 114). Liberal democracy is regarded as a historic product, and one that lies side by side with capitalism. Since sixty per cent of Africa’s population is

rural, the continent is not yet part of a market society. Therefore, the democratic promise of privatizing interests is meaningless.

These differences have important implications for the sense of well-being, freedom, and democracy. In a society of foot-loose, utility-maximizing egotists, sociability is a problem, as is social order. Freedom is tendentially defined in terms of privacy, autonomy, the absence of constraint, and guarantees against the collectivity. The rule of law which liberal society celebrates is the necessary attribute of a market society in which people are first and foremost sellers and buyers, and their relation primarily contractual...In market society, the sense of freedom is associated with individualism, the inevitable tensions between the individual and the collectivity, and the immunities which protect the individual from the tyranny of the collectivity (Ake, 1994: 2).

African scholars attest that according to the liberal democratic perspective, democracy is thought only to be possible where a capitalist class exists. In Western societies where this model is derived, the capitalist class formed the social forces necessary to bring about democratic transition (Ninsin, 2000: 13). Therefore, the definition of democracy formulated by 'Westerners', and the subsequent democratization initiatives, also serve to reinforce and idealize capitalist values and institutions which Western culture depends on.

Thus, the push for democracy in Africa is supported by the US and her allies and the World Bank in order to institute more liberal political conditions to ease the flow of international capital, and make capitalist penetration of these countries and regions more efficient. This new 'liberal democracy', if achieved, would further incorporate these countries and regions into the global capitalist economy, while simultaneously undermining alternative forms of economic strategy and governance (ibid: 188).

Contemporary, as well as classic theorists, are accused of redefining democracy in order to describe the practices which already exist in the West. In essence, the purpose of defining democracy in "practical" terms is not to reflect the reality of this political system in the world today, but rather to justify the practices of the West as being democratic (Ake, 1994: 29). Furthermore, "in the midst of the contrived confusion over the meaning of democracy, all kinds of ideological representations, most of them inconsistent or incoherent, are put out in response to changing political and economic conditions of democracy and internalized. In these circumstances, some people in the West are unable to be critical about their own democratic practice, and they tend to relapse into regarding democracy as 'the way we are' and what we do." (ibid).

Western scholars analyzed Africa and other Third World regions not by inventing new tools of analysis, but by using the tools already in existence, which were conducive to the comparative study of Western countries and the Third World societies.

The comparative studies which emerged from this concern with the Third World tended to use the typologies of Western social science to characterize the evolution and development of societies. They represented the societies of the Third World as being approximations of the typologies of the lower ends of the developmental continuum and offered the Western societies as approximations of the typologies of the higher ends of the developmental continuum...Following this tradition the scholarship on Third World countries was impregnated with teleologism. To date, many works on development studies are preoccupied with prospects for democracy (liberal democracy), the possibility of modernization, the prospects of development (thinly disguised expression of capitalist development). More importantly the methodology association was tendentially reduced to the possibility of becoming more like the West (Ake, 1979: 128, 129).

African theorists maintain that Western social scientists view Western societies as ideal. They state that the perception of Western society being at the highest level of a political evolutionary process caused the science to become very conservative. When scholars from the West addressed 'Third World' development, such a conservative bias caused all sorts of complications and absurdities (Ake, 1994: 2).

African scholarship stereotypes the theory of modernization as a means of restructuring society, and directly links the theory to negative development practices. Therefore, any positive or meaningful concepts expressed by development theorists are necessarily tainted by an attachment to cultural imperialism. Unfortunately once again, critical literature creates a picture of modernization as a linear pathway that has no flexibility. Therefore, suggestions from alternative African scholars infer that their approach is somehow quite different from previous development theory. "The second condition concerns the need to approach development issues from a multi-faceted perspective and avoid the temptation to indulge in single-formula ideological prejudices. The problems are so complex and the changes under way so profound, that a standard prescription cannot work in one country, let alone for all countries"(Bangura, 1997: 390).

African scholars often profess that Western-experienced development and neoclassical theory are written as historic law or a universal prescription for democracy and spread to the rest of the world. Therefore, development procedures are Eurocentric (Bangura, 1997: 354). The crisis of African economies can be partially attributed to development attempts that abide strictly to market-reform strategies; therefore, the real affects of development require a reassessment of modernization theory. "Modernization itself was associated with a particular way of organizing society, a distinct structure of accumulation, and a set of values and beliefs for regulating social behavior and state systems. In terms of social organization

and accumulation, a 'modern' society was to be created by a gradual but progressive relocation of groups into formal institutions"(ibid: 376).

According to African scholars, Western scholars believed that absorbing attitudes, knowledge, and orientations of the industrialized West would render the newly modernizing elites competent enough to lead their countries to reach development objectives. The cultural standards of the West were of prime importance, and the existing indigenous cultural dimension was of little or no importance. Development ignored local history, underlying economic infrastructure, natural resource endowment, weather conditions, external terms of trade, foreign indebtedness, foreign aid with strings attached, unexpected crises such as the oil-price and monetary shocks of the 1970's and 1980's, and protectionism in the international marketplace. Because Westerners 'controlled' development, the local elites were never able to set in place the culturally compatible political conditions necessary for fruitful development (Osabu - Kle, 2000: 72).

Modernization efforts are implemented in African countries through a process of total cultural imperialism: massive funding of formal education and health systems, restricting informal urban economic activity, providing special housing for those earning wages or salaries in the cities, creating official regulations which insisted on the nuclear family as a model for living, and various other ways of delegitimizing cultural and social practices that already existed. Therefore, a change in social relations or class structure became a crisis of lost identity and the like (ibid: 376,377).

Critics not only blame the theory of not delivering what it promises, and being culturally imperialist, but also using development to advance the economic goals of the so-called developed countries. The development of modernization theory was in response to Western nations' attempt to secure stable and mutually beneficial relationships with newly emerging independent states (Dube, 1988: 28). Moreover, globalization and policies aimed at economic reform and democratization have proven unsuccessful and harmful in several developing countries. Dominant discourse on economic reform generally includes an emphasis on the benefits of globalization, manifested in market reform politics, which will lead to democratization.

On the one hand, it is argued that market-based solutions to Africa's economic crisis forced the initial political opening which led to multi-party competitive elections. This is because economic liberalization freed social forces, otherwise constrained by the commandist economies of the 1960-80 period, to agitate for a political opening and liberal political environment in which basic freedoms and the rule of law could flourish. On the other hand, globalization, with its stringent

demands for efficiency as well as infinite opportunities for growth, has compelled regimes to liberalize the political arena (Ninsin, 2000: 11).

Although modernization theorists attempt to defend their hypothesis that economic growth will positively influence democratization, African critics have not observed such benefits and even accuse Westerners of aiding development attempts to suit their own economic practices.

3.10 What would the Western scholars say?

Scholars from African countries accuse Western scholars of analyzing the possibilities for democracy and development based on universalistic and ahistoric definitions which reflect a bias towards capitalism that enables the West to dominate the world. Most modernization theorists would maintain that economic growth will help a nation sustain a democracy, because increases in wealth lead to changes in sociopolitical structures which are conducive to democracy. Economic liberalization may free social forces enabling the majority to participate in the political system. Yet, again, Western theorists in general make connections between several variables that will ultimately affect any transitional outcome. Many deny the ability to linearly draw a pathway to democratization with economic growth as the sole cause.

Some critics assert that the dominant discourse defines development and democracy to idealize the West and allow Western countries to reinforce their values elsewhere. It is true that many modernization theorists created indices using more democratic and more developed countries as examples of higher ranking countries, but the assumption that the indices were created *in order to* idealize Western countries and justify imperialism is unfounded. To state the obvious, Western countries modernized before African countries modernized,. The point of using the same measurements to rank countries worldwide is to give credibility to empirical comparative study, not to spread capitalist development ideology.

Within African literature, there are numerous misunderstandings about modernization theory and the supposed prescriptions that it offers. A common feature in this literature is connection between modernization theory and development strategies; modernization and the failings of international development programs are viewed as one in the same. If development strategies have failed to increase the general well-being of a nation, then it must be because the original theory paid no attention to the importance of human development.

Such an assertion misses a great bulk of literature written by scholars, some classified as modernization theorists, who specifically address the human dimension of modernization and hence attempt to incorporate these dimensions in measurement indices. As stated above, modernization theory and the ensuing Western studies have most definitely addressed the quality of life and inequality issues. In fact, Larry Diamond particularly “re-formulates” Lipset’s hypothesis to emphasize that the more well-to-do the *people* of a nation, the better the chances for that nation to sustain a democracy (Diamond, 1992: 109).

Moreover, most scholars, as discussed in the previous chapter, do not believe that free-market systems benefit all. They would absolutely agree that the invisible hand often misses the poor and the vulnerable, hence the need for poverty alleviation strategies and a great deal of attention to examining the reality of political equality for the poorest members of society. In the previous chapter, it was argued by some Western scholars that economic development in the form of capitalism increases inequality in early stages but will eventually reduce inequality as democracy endures over time (see above).

One can understand that the African scholars are observing negative effects of democratization around them and directly attaching development policies to the so-called intellectual base of such strategies. But, the original theorists hardly idealized capitalism or even democracy, nor do they assert that Western societies resemble the ideal. Dahl remarks on his own criteria for democracy: “The ideal criteria are so demanding that no actual regime has ever fully met them. Possibly no one ever will...” (Dahl, 1997: 268). African scholars who view capitalism and democratization as two malevolent Western influences, supported by the intellectual canon’s analysis, may do under the false pretenses that the canon idealizes capitalism and democracy which are in turn reflected in universal and ahistorical development prescriptions. Perhaps African scholars have valid complaints about the effects of development procedures, but one must be careful not to directly connect modernization theory with development strategies that did harm to existing social structures.

Modernization theorists would maintain that external influence can affect development and democracy, but the transition to democracy must take place primarily by an internal change that allows for greater liberty, not repression, of individual beliefs. Social organizations would form according to the wants and needs of groups, thus putting pressure on political parties to materialize specific interests, not that, as stated, “the developed Western society was held up as a model for the emerging ideal-type African society”(Bangura, 1997: 376).

This paper has presented an overview of the African stereotype of the Western canon. In general, development theorists from the West are characterized as those who fail to grasp the full meaning of democracy and development, rely on measurements and variables that do not encompass the 'real' conditions in nations (i.e. they ignore the characteristics of democracy and development which may relate to subjective human rights), create indices that are based on the Western path to democracy through Western means of economic development (i.e. capitalism), and ultimately enforce cultural imperialism through the Westernization of political science.

One argument against the critics naturally includes that they have not appropriately reviewed the original literature; thus they are relying on a manufactured stereotype as the basis of their opposition against the strength of the Western canon. However, as it will now be discussed, even if African scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the original literature, they have fundamental disputes with *how* Western scholarship presents information. One recurrent theme throughout the reviewed African literature is the mistrust of empirical study. African scholars maintain that the empirical studies of the Western canon represent ahistoricism, linear thinking, and minimalization. Secondly, empirical study embodies Western ideology and is essentially Eurocentric. Therefore, any potential contribution that these studies have made to the development field in general do not apply to Africa and must be disregarded.

3.11 The African view of empirical study

A substantial amount of African criticism revolves around the 'Western' dependence on empirical study, which is a problem in its own right. The value of empirical study has been the focus of debate since political science began to include empirical study as a necessary component to normative arguments. In general, African scholarship and Western orthodoxy clash due to differences of methodology; Africans rely on subjective methodologies which are not based on mathematical proof (Sklar, 2002: 432).

In fact, African scholars might assert that development social scientists need to move away from the excessively quantitative obsessions of the past. The criticism of many political scientists' attention to empirical findings, the dedication that academics have to empirical research, and especially any proposition that empirical research and theory building are

essential to each other, centers around the lack of attention to broader and less “classifiable” conditions in society.

This approach...in which the researcher brought to the field a set of theoretically derived hypotheses to be investigated in relation to appropriately selected facts, involved a phenomenal effort of self-denial; facts not relevant to the hypothesis had to be ignored, or at least set aside, however much more interesting or accessible or in a vulgar sense ‘important’ they might seem to be (Leys, 1969: 8).

If Western scholars ignore or omit research, conclusions, or ideas that do not fit the original hypothesis or methodological framework in order to remain true to a particular body of thought or paradigm, they lose sight of what is really occurring in each nation.

Perhaps the close adherence to empirical research can be questioned, yet the magnitude and reliability of such findings should not be ignored. Just as empirical researchers may ‘throw out’ important facts, scholars who attack Western political scientists throw out the possibility that the empirical findings are justified, therefore should not be ignored or replaced by an alternative theory. Note, the attempt of the mentioned African scholars is seemingly not theory building, but rather theory replacing. Therefore, the entire Western body of work is set aside with hopes of finding an alternative theory that is neither contingent nor cohesive with the volumes of undeniably useful empirical study.

Alternative theorists would suggest that qualitative criteria of a multi-dimensional character should be the primary focus of research (Von Troil, 1993: 71).

As in the 1950’s, the currently dominant approach to political and social studies in African is one which is impaired by methodological preconceptions that divert attention away from the critical issues of politics and society. It would be wise for scholars in the field to begin their research with those issues rather than prescribed methodologies for which suitable case studies are then devised (Sklar, 2002: 268).

Western theorists would argue that the inclusion of empirical study in the social sciences has been a great improvement. Western scholars also criticize each others’ empirical findings, but do so in order to increase measurement accuracy, not question the applicability of empirical study itself.

Comparative sociological studies of political systems in modern nations have, in recent years, experienced impressive theoretical development. Attention has been focused on the “functional prerequisites” for political democracies, the structural conditions generating political stability or instability in “democratic” states, and the value structures necessary for a democratic order. A number of excellent studies of political stability in non-democratic nations exist, but when more than one nation is studied, the comparison is usually limited to somewhat similar underdeveloped nations. When comparisons between democratic

and nondemocratic nations are made, the number of observations (nations) is severely limited by the absence of scales and indexes relevant to the analytical variables guiding the analysis (Cutright, 1969: 429).

African scholars often assert that the dominant development approach does not take the real world into consideration. However, the real world is the basis for locating variables and factors that affect democracy in nation. Empirical theories are descriptive and explanatory, constructed from 'real' observations (Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969: 1). Although empirical study is linked to normative study, democratic theorists "explicitly eschew attempts to justify values or prescriptive statements" (ibid: 2). Therefore, African criticism of empirical methodology unfairly connects an empirical hypothesis with an overall ideology of the Western canon. For example, using a rather minimal concept of democracy to construct a democratic index should not be confused with believing that democracy *should be* minimal. The purpose of minimalizing definitions of democracy and development which is defended by the Western canon is not seen by African scholars as necessary for comparative study. Practical definitions are confused with the "whole" definitions that Western scholars may describe in a normative argument. African scholars must be careful not to assume that empirical theory is in fact a normative theory in disguise.

There is plenty of debate on whether or not African people have been harmed by biased research by non-African scholars. According to one argument, methodological Afrocentricity states that those who study Africa should adopt a unique and sympathetic understanding of African systems and values. Sklar quotes C.S. Whitaker on two perspectives:

Properly invoked, Afrocentricity is an analytical imperative, not a sentimental gesture. Its importance derives from fundamental issues of comprehension in the wake of powerful intellectual legacy that tend to discount the capacity of African cultures and societies to act rationally and constructively in the face of historic realities. It suggests, importantly, that these realities, not Africans, are the source of problematic conditions.

And,

Like all precepts, Afrocentricity is also liable to promote distortion and misuse if it is uncritically invoked. In the course of trying to render sensitively and accurately the data of African politics, obscurantism and exoticism are no less dangers than in other scholarly arenas. A sound corollary of authenticity is that novelty of treatment is not an end in itself (Sklar, 2002: 429).

3.12 The universal vs. the particular

The empirical/normative debate brings us to another crucial accusation by African scholars which implies that the Western canon ignores particular characteristics of individual

societies and relies instead on universal characterizations based on histories of the West. African scholars assert that Western development theory does not take specific social conditions or national histories into account when discussing the possibilities for development and democracy.

They [all Western developmentalist approaches] are ahistorical because they do not take into account the historical experience of a society as a major variable in explaining contemporary patterns of behavior. The perspectives are primarily concerned with the present and to them the present has no past; what matters is to look at the existing society and identify the forces that account for what is happening in it. They are non-explanatory because, being static and ahistorical, these perspectives are not able to help the analyst in identifying the essential variables that must be taken into account to understand and explain the nature, the content and the dynamics of African politics (Barongo, 1995: 142).

African independence attracted Western scholars from the beginning. The modernization perspective's central argument was that African states were experiencing rapid and multi-dimensional changes. Western scholars located factors and forces responsible for the various problems that accrued as a result of the rapid changes.

Many intellectuals were anxious to reconstruct the prevailing theories of society so that they would fairly represent the aspirations and problems of people everywhere on earth. From this perspective, due regard for the contributions of Africa was deemed to be a scientific, as well as a moral, imperative. These goals, democracy and universalism, were embraced and combined by the theorists of modernization (Sklar, 2002: 267).

One must attempt to get beyond universal structural determinism, in which national histories only serve as examples to general rules. One must not look at political or social analysis without understanding the particular relationships between the state, the regime, the political parties, and the civil society which constitute a matrix of social subject-actors proper to each society enabling the study of the reality of the social and political situation (Garreton, 1991: 102). The critique of the dominant perspective assumes that scholars from the West predict development possibilities in all nations based on the same set of indicators. African scholars assert that Western theory does not account for understanding African politics. Accordingly, all Western development approaches are static and ahistorical and do not explain particular phenomenon beyond the environment in which they occur. The perspective is too concerned with the present and does not offer any explanation on *why* countries are politically unstable, only that they are (Barongo, 1995: 138-141).

However, African scholars should be careful not to draw conclusions about the entire development school based on few statements or early assertions without taking the evolution

or entire body of literature into consideration. Even Lipset himself returned to his original hypothesis once the so-called realities of development were observed. He states:

But specific outcomes depend on particular contexts: on whether the initial electoral and other political institutions are appropriate to the ethnic and cleavage structures of the given country, on the current state of the economy, as well, of course, on the abilities and tactics of the major actors...Clearly then, we cannot generalize by a formula. The various factors I have reviewed here do shape the probabilities for democracy, but they do not determine the outcomes. The record of social scientists as futurologists is not good (Lipset, 1993: 17).

Again, Western authors often comment that they are *not* attempting to draw ahistorical lines of causality, but to account for positive correlations between democracy and development.

We are not arguing that the correlation between level of development and degree of democratization is unilinear or automatic...Perhaps the biggest complicating factor; given the centrality of the balance of class power in our overall interpretations of the association of development and democracy, is that class interests are not ahistorical givens; they are historically constructed by movements, organizations and leaderships that act in some particular environment of influences and oppositions, possible alliances and enmities (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992: 144).

Even if Western scholars argue that their theories are not unilinear or ahistorical, African scholars still accuse liberal orthodoxy of being Eurocentric. From the African critics' perspective, Western social science is flawed on three grounds: 1) It foists capitalist values, institutions and development on developing countries; 2) it focuses social science analysis on the question of how to make the developing countries more like the West; and 3) it propagates mystifications, and modes of thought and action which serve the interests of capitalism and imperialism (Ake, 1994: 128, 129).

African critics assert that the relationships and definitions that are explored by Western scholars are still used in comparative study. Therefore, the European experience serves as the model for high levels of democracy and development. It would be completely ridiculous to imply that scholars are able to completely unobjectively look at society without the influence of cultural ideology. But the same can be said for alternative scholars. These scholars have witnessed national upheaval and equate the terms 'democracy' and 'development' with chaos. The reality and/or the practicability of these terms is not regarded in a positive light. 'Democracy' may represent corrupt elections, enabled leaders who misuse power, promised economic, social, and political liberty that has never manifested. 'Development' may represent a failure to eradicate poverty, conditional structural adjustment programs which question the legitimacy of the government, policy

insulation, ruthless free-market economic policies, and Westernization of education, the media, housing, and the general lifestyle.

But, how can one separate the cultural experience of the political scientist from his/her work? Surely any scholar investigating the relationship between development and democracy will do so with reference to the realities that they observe in society. Critics who come from a similar background to that of the author they criticize do so from a similar perspective. Yet, criticism from a scholar who does not relate to the observed world, so to speak, of the original theorist may argue against the implications of their studies from an entirely different perspective. "The question is one of priorities. In the human sciences, moral sentiments determine the problems that we select for resolution and the relative importance that we attach to them. Only then do empirical theories and methodologies become relevant; and they will be judged by their results, rather than the degree of their logical or methodological rigor"(Sklar, 2002: 270).

African scholars may ultimately take the specific, and perhaps negative, outcomes of development and democratization in their own environments and relate it to a Eurocentric, poorly formed, unparticularistic, and imperialistic research canon that dominates social science. However, Western theorists may understand the different environments that development takes place in more than they are given credit for. "Most democracies are building, if not from scratch, then at least from a patchwork of blocks and beams. This hard reality demands of scholars and policy makers an appreciation for the multilayered and nonlinear nature of the process, which often involves progress on some fronts and regression on others or setbacks followed by increments of progress (Diamond, 1999: 20,21).

4.0 Conclusion

This paper has described the “debate” on the relationship between development and democracy between African scholars and Western scholars. The purpose of this exercise is to examine the argument by the African scholars critically, to show that African scholars have inaccurately represented the Western canon.

In Chapter Two, Western scholars’ definitions and measurements of democracy were reviewed. The definition of democracy, which can be roughly stated as a procedural definition, reflects Western scholars’ assertion that the definition of the term must reflect the purpose of defining the term. In other words, if one is to study the relationship between democracy and a host of other variables, the meaning of democracy must be confined to include characteristics which are specific and determinable, in order to conduct a useful comparative study. Next, this paper traced the evolution of democratic indices used to measure the levels of democracy in any nation.

The influential hypothesis by Seymour Martin Lipset that stressed the connection between economic growth and democracy generated several theorists’ empirical research on the relationship between modernization and democracy. These scholars have produced robust studies, with varying methodologies, that in some way or another support Lipset’s *basic* assertion that economic development and democracy have a positive relationship. Again, the degree of variance is notable; some scholars advocate capitalism, some make no firm commitment to the necessity of capitalism. Measurements and variables used to compare countries have changed to incorporate human development factors, hence attempting to expand the definitions of development and democracy. This paper also examined the studies on income inequality and its effects on levels of democracy. It can be said that the predominant viewpoint is that the relationship resembles an inverted U-shaped curve: as democracy persists in a country, income inequality might decrease despite an initial increase in the period after democratic transition. However, income inequality cannot be directly connected to reduction of political democracy in developing nations. Extreme poverty can hinder a nation’s democratization process (following the hypothesis that economic growth improves a country’s likelihood of sustaining democracy), but this could occur at the macro level. An individual’s income may not have any bearing on that individual’s willingness or interest in participating politically.

African scholars have attacked the work of Western social scientists on many levels: measurements and definitions of democracy, definitions of development, development prescriptions, ignoring the importance of human development in a quest for capitalist growth, supporting imperialist procedures and attempting to spread Western practices in the name of democracy etc... African literature which describes development and democracy depends on the shortcomings of Western theorists. These critical scholars have created a stereotype of modernization theorists and social scientists from the West in general in order to reclaim their superiority in the field of African studies. It can certainly be said that African authors are diametrically opposed to the Western viewpoints that they have referred to in their work. However, it is not certain that they are, in reality, of a fundamentally different school than the original modernization scholars which were discussed in Chapter Two. Now, this paper will turn its attention to the similarities between Africanist scholars and the Western scholars to perhaps unravel why the African scholars have such a problem with the work of Western theorists, if it is not for any looming difference in theory.

4.1 Similarities between the schools

Many similarities have already been addressed in the third chapter, mostly by the Western theorists 'responses', to the Africanist argument. One could assert that both sets of scholars are attempting to search for a solution to whatever 'problem' is at hand, in this case, a road to development and democracy. Both Western and African scholars search for the most beneficial political, economic, and social systems to replace or repair previous systems in transitional nations. They would agree that the terms democracy and development are highly loaded; what may constitute democracy for one scholar may fall short of another's concept of democracy. Both schools understand the extremely complex nature of the connections between democracy and development. African scholars criticize elements of Western theory that may not exist in the theory at all.

For example, African scholars often assert that democratization is a nonlinear process, and it is impossible to determine causality. From the second chapter of this paper, it is clear that there is no consensus by the Western scholars that a direct chain of causality exists in this respect. There are several factors which are interrelated and difficult to isolate which lead to the ability for a nation to sustain a democracy. This is not to say that political scientists do not attempt to determine causality, but at the same time, these theorists are the first to maintain that there is no obvious or even determinable chain of causality.

Now, it is possible to argue that the African scholars have not investigated the literature of the Western theorists closely enough to ascertain that they actually have much in common with them. Certainly we could compare passages from both sets of literature and find plenty of similarities. But, for some reason or perhaps many reasons, the African scholars do not embrace the similarities and try to improve upon the theory. They appear diametrically opposed to the Western canon. In fact, they rely on that opposition and use it as the starting point of their own literature. Many times, the caricature that the African scholars have created is exaggerated or even bluntly incorrect. If this paper was able to conclude that Western scholars and African scholars had clear cut theoretical differences, one could define two arguments and understand why scholars would fit into one or the other.

Take, for example, the evolution of the Western school. After Lipset's study, a variety of scholars found a need to address the same issue with a change in some part of his study to determine if his hypothesis was merited. Most of them discovered elements that they agreed with and elements that needed improvement. It was a "theory-building" process. As more data become available, as nations themselves transformed, and as more studies were emerging, it would be strange to believe that development theory would be stagnant. However, although the scholars critiqued each other, they were essentially on the same wavelength.

This has not been the case, as outlined in Chapter Three, with the African theorists. One can hardly consider their critique a further evolution of development theory. It would appear that the African development theory is completely separate from previous literature, or at least this might be what African scholars would attest. In reality, if the African scholars embraced the similarities and altered the theory accordingly, the theory could maintain the same evolution. This is not easily done unfortunately. The African scholars' concept of Western theory is not spot on, therefore, they are arguing against a construct that they believe is inherently wrong. This paper has investigated why the debate is hardly straightforward; it is perhaps a matter of fundamental differences that have more to do with the theorists themselves than the assertions of the theory.

4.2 Empirical vs. normative arguments

In Chapter Two, it is clear that quantitative analysis is a critical part of addressing the relationship between democracy and development. In Chapter Three, it is clear that empirical study is not the basis of African scholars' arguments. If the assertions defended by empirical study are questioned, one must at least adhere to the belief that empirical study itself is useful. If that 'hump', so to speak, is not crossed, then there is no credibility in the outcome of the study regardless of how robust the argument is. As we have seen, even if empirical study incorporates a wide range of democratic and development indicators, seeks to address the poverty and inequality issue, and suggests nonlinear relationships between variables, as perhaps an African theorist would claim to be necessary, it is still unuseful because it is first and foremost an empirical study.

Unfortunately, because the caricature of Western scholarship includes the idea that all development theory is based on the attention to quantifiable relationships (based on minimal indicators and Western-based models on what constitutes development and democracy), the valuable relationships that have been investigated at length are disregarded.

4.3 Universal vs. particular arguments

African theorists often accuse Western theorists of creating a universalized model of development and attempting to implement such a model globally. This may be the case of development policies; but this paper has addressed that development policies and Western literature on democracy and development are not interchangeable constructs. It seems the crux of the problem that African scholars have with the Western canon is the fact that the latter take a large number of countries in a research set, observe the conditions/events/experiences of those countries, and then formulate some hypothesis based on general trends between such countries. In the majority of African literature, scholars take one country, describe the experience of that country in great detail, and then speculate what these conditions, or realities, mean in the greater scheme of development theory. One will find throughout compilations of work from the African continent the reference to a particular country which is used as a "case study" of sorts to represent the hypothesis of the scholar. Clearly, through the way they construct their own arguments, African scholars distrust any theory which is developed by looking at large samples and relating findings to the particular.

These things aside, the debate between Africans and the 'Western' canon is really not a debate at all. In order for a debate to be settled, or even understood, both parties must have a sound comprehension of the opposition's viewpoint. Additionally, there must be solid evidence that the parties are in fact opposed. This paper has shown that there are many similarities between what African scholars believe should be different in theories of development, as well as the shortcomings of what development and democracy are able to deliver, and the original propositions made by theorists who first investigated these relationships. The African stereotype hinders the "evolutionary" process of development theory. Instead of focusing on how a new theory must be completely separate and different from Western theory, African scholars would benefit from extracting the robust and valuable assertions found in Western scholarship and building upon the aspects that are outdated.

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