"THE COMMISSIONER-GENERALSHIP OF ANDRIES STOCKENSTROM."

by

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CONTENTS.

FOREWORD.

Much research has already been done into the years of Cape Colonial history covered by this thesis, and various writers, enlarging and refining upon the work of predecessors, have given careful attention to the problems of the time. My decision to venture further into this period thus requires explanation.

No student will deny the vital significance of these years immediately before the Great Trek. They saw the clash between the British liberal or 'philanthropic' view of native affairs and the Cape frontier tradition, which led inevitably to the Trek itself; Hottentot and Slave Emancipation; the reorganization of the judiciary and administration in the Colony; the growth of the stream of frontier farmers, trekking for land and pasture beyond the Orange River, into unmanageable proportions; and, finally, the Sixth Kaffir War. Such a time, I felt, deserved separate treatment of its own, and I hoped that further research would aid in clarifying and interpreting these changes. I hoped, further, that a new approach would add to existing knowledge of the subject, and therefore set to work particularly on the career of Andries Stockenstrom, a well-known frontier official, in its relation to the period. This study has proved of great interest.

Second, the character of Stockenstrom himself and his views on native policy have often puzzled South African writers. Sir George Cory observed that "one of the most difficult problems of South African history is the comprehension of Stockenstrom's attitude towards the native affairs of the country," [1] and today the most conflicting views are still taken of his various periods of administration. By examining and arranging the facts of his period of office as Commissioner-General I hope to have contributed something to the understanding of his life and policies, and of his character as a man.

To understand the events that took place during the Commissioner-Generalship it is essential to know something of the origin and nature of the problems with which Stockenstrom was faced. In

Chapter I, therefore, I have dealt briefly with each of these questions and with Stockenstrom's relations with them as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet. Further, it will be seen that the problems of the Commissioner-Generalship fall, for the most part, within a period ending in 1834, and I have therefore, where necessary, continued the narrative to that date.

Little comment is needed on my "Bibliography", as it consists largely of standard works on the history of South Africa. Stockenstrom's "Autobiography", consisting of documents loosely strung together by memoirs and editorial notes, has been valuable. In writing Chapter V I have been greatly assisted by the written work of Dr. P.J. van der Merwe, which has thrown increasing light on the problems of the North-Eastern Frontier of the Cape. My grateful acknowledgements are also due to Professor H.A. Reyburn, of the University of Cape Town, for allowing me to use his still incomplete work on "The Life and Times of Sir Andries Stockenstrom."

CHAPTER I.

LANDDROST STOCKENSTROM AND THE FRONTIER PROBLEMS OF THE CAPE COLONY.

The boyhood of Andries Stockenstrom was spent in times of great change in the Cape Colony and abroad. The year of his birth, 1792, saw the commencement of the wars which spread the slogans of the French Revolution through Europe in the steps of the conquering French armies. These wars affected, directly or indirectly, every state on the European continent, and brought in their train ideologies whose repercussions are felt today.

Distant though it was from the affairs of Europe, the Cape also felt the play of world forces. The Dutch East India Company, which had founded the settlement in 1652 and administered it during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, was by the last quarter of the latter in a state of serious decline. Suffering itself from the long wars in which the Netherlands had been involved, it spent large sums on forts and soldiers to guard its interests; competitors had found their way into the spice trade of the Indies; the upkeep of an army of officials involved it in expenditure beyond its means. At the Cape, as elsewhere, its restrictive economic policy called forth much opposition, and in 1779 a petition from the free burghers was laid before the Chamber of Seventeen in Holland. From 1791 there was drastic retrenchment in the Colony, and new duties were imposed. The purchasing power of the paper money was low, and the burghers were unable to obtain satisfactory prices for their produce. Finally, the frontier farmers were dissatisfied with the conduct of the Kaffir "war" of 1793 and the native policy of Maynier, the Company official on the Eastern border. In 1795 the men of Graaff-Reinet, like the French Revolutionaries, rose and declared themselves an independent Republic. Swellendam followed their example.

Meanwhile, however, events had been moving in Europe. In January, 1795, Pichegru's army invaded Holland, and a Batavian Republic was proclaimed. In June a British squadron arrived in Simon's Bay, troops were landed, and in September the Colony was surrendered to

Britain. After a short delay the "Nationals" of Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam surrendered. Thereafter, except for one brief period (1803-1806), the Cape remained the permanent possession of Britain.

These were difficult times for the Eastern Frontier farmers of the Colony. For many years they had been to a large extent independent of the Company, and, deriving little protection from the latter, they had had to fend for themselves. The outlook of the average farmer, in the absence of real education, commerce, or administration, was limited to the practical tasks of tending stock and directing coloured servants. Among the frontiersmen the Rule of Law was very imperfect in its operation. In the solitudes of the interior many developed an attitude of downright hostility toward the Government in Cape Town. "Even before the Drostdy of Graaff Reinet was established," wrote the traveller Lichtenstein, "the inhabitants of the country were some of the most factious and turbulent of the whole Colony. They lived in so remote a part that it was almost impossible for the Government to provide effectually for the laws being properly enforced." In 1795, as we have seen, this attitude drew to a head, and "when the Cape was taken by the English .... the Colony was in an unusual state of anarchy and internal distraction." [1]

In the year 1803 Andries Stockenstrom the elder, a Swede who had been employed in the service of the Dutch East India Company, was appointed Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet by General Janssens, the new Governor under the Batavian Republic. The purpose of this appointment, Lichtenstein tells us, was the introduction of law and order on the frontier, which Janssens had found in a serious condition. Stockenstrom was regarded as "a man who had all the qualities and all the knowledge requisite for occupying so arduous a post." [2] In this position he was not disturbed by the re-occupation of the Cape by the British in 1806. His years of office covered a period of increased tranquility on the frontier. Colonel Collins, who conducted an official tour of investigation in 1808, expressed a high opinion of the Landdrost, [3] and the younger Stockenstrom remarks in his Memoirs on "the universal respect with which I found my parent's name received whenever it was mentioned." [4]

It was in such times that the youth of Andries Stockenstrom junior was spent. After some years' schooling at the Cape, in the course of which he picked up "some grammatical Dutch and French", some English, and "the first elements of arithmetic", he was sent in 1808, at the age of sixteen, to be supernumerary clerk in the Public Office in Graaff-Reinet. En route for the frontier, however, he was fortunate enough to meet Colonel Collins, who had been sent by the Governor to report on conditions on the Colonial borders. After a short stay in Graaff-Reinet Stockenstrom joined Collins in the position of interpreter, and travelled with him across the Sneeuwberges to the Orange River. Thence they turned east, crossed the Stormberg Spruit, and returned later into the Tarka District. At this stage they were joined by the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, and the party proceeded by way of the Klipplaat River and the Amatolas to the White Kei. After interviews with Hintsa, the Paramount Chief of the Xosas, and Gaika, the nominal chief of the Rarabe branch of that people, at which the younger Stockenstrom was present, Collins proceeded to the kraal of Ndhlambi, Gaika's formidable rival who had occupied a large tract of land west of the Fish River. Meanwhile the rest of the party returned to Uitenhage.

This meeting with Colonel Collins laid the foundation of Stockenstrom's official career. In January, 1811, he was gazetted as Ensign in the Cape Corps, and in 1812 he took part in the operations set on foot by Governor Sir John Cradock for the expulsion of the Ndhlambis and Gunukwebes from the Zuurveld. It was on this campaign that Stockenstrom's father, who commanded the contingent of Graaff-Reinet burghers, was cut off with a small party of farmers and killed. The son was then placed in command of the left wing of the burgher forces, and served until the conclusion of hostilities.

In July, 1813, Stockenstrom was appointed Deputy Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, with his station at the new village of Cradock. His duties were partly civil, but mainly military in character. He was instructed to command the burgher forces when they were called out, and take part in Cradock's scheme of frontier defence. Meanwhile he was not to resign his commission in the Army. [5]

In June, 1814, he was promoted Lieutenant, and in May, 1815, became Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet. It was with pardonable misgivings that the young man, now but twenty-two years of age, entered upon this responsible office. "But," he relates, 'my reception by the Graaff-Reinetters, who had then known me for years as a public functionary and as a private individual, confirmed my belief that such a community might be controlled by common sense, honesty, and a disinterested zeal in the promotion of their welfare." [6]

During his twelve years of office as chief magistrate of the Graaff-Reinet district Stockenstrom was faced by the various problems with which he came in contact as Commissioner-General, and it will be instructive to observe shortly what these problems were.

Stockenstrom's first task, like that of his father before him, was to enforce the Rule of Law on the frontier. In this he was carrying out the desires of the British Government at the Cape, which possessed a stability and prestige lacking in the Company's rule. In 1811 Governor Caledon instituted a circuit court of two judges, with full civil powers and every criminal power except that of passing the death sentence. Conditions were still extremely difficult. Little real education found its way to the frontier. "There is .... no other way or prospect for the young people," wrote Chief Justice van Ryneveld in 1812, "than the easy livelihood of breeding cattle. .... In the districts where there is no Church, fixed magistracy or village, the young people have little intercourse or communication with one another, and therefore no development of each others' ideas." [7] The distance of many farms from the Graaff-Reinet drostdy rendered the task of administration extremely difficult, and hindered the execution of justice. As late as 1825, according to Stockenstrom, a decision of the Colonial authorities to remove the Government Establishment at Cradock from that village to Somerset threw the divisions of Tarka, Brak River, Agter Sneeuwberg, and Rhenosterberg "out of the pale of the law". Farmers living on the extreme borders thus might have to travel 150 or 200 miles to attend to a trifling piece of litigation. "The consequence is that the most serious grievances and annoyances and insults are often submitted to rather than incur such burthensome

redress, the protection of the law is only known by name, and justice becomes subservient to physical strength." [8]

Soon after Stockenstrom's appointment in 1815 the power of the local administration was severely tested by the Slachter's Nek Rebellion of that year. This was in fact a revolt of certain sections of the frontier farmers against the claim of the central government to enforce impartial justice throughout the Colony, and no stone could be left unturned in suppressing it. Stockenstrom, as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, played a leading part in isolating the rebels and pacifying the frontier. [9]

But there was a brighter side to the picture. It was a matter for satisfaction that the Second British Occupation of 1806 had been effected without disturbance on the frontier. Of Slachter's Nek Professor Walker remarks with truth that "the really significant fact is that the great mass of the frontiersmen either gave the rebels no support or actively helped the authorities." [10] The revolt was, from one view-point, a sign that the impact of law and order was really being felt in the interior. The Landdrost's annual tours of inspection through his enormous district brought greater understanding between the colonists and the administration. [11] Other signs of improvement were not lacking. In 1815 Stockenstrom was instructed during one of his circuits to raise subscriptions towards school funds, and in 1817 Governor Somerset set on foot new schemes for advancing education in the Colony, whereby Andrew Murray and William Robertson came to Graaff-Reinet as Ministers of the Church and Government teachers. The arrival of the 1820 Settlers brought a more compact population to the Zuurveld, and increased the degree of intercourse between the inhabitants of the Eastern Frontier.

During the earlier years of his administration Stockenstrom's relations with the officials and military officers of the colony were of the best. He shows in his Memoirs that Governor Cradock, Colonel Bird, (the Colonial Secretary), and Commandants Graham, Brereton, and Willshire treated him as a personal friend. Until October, 1819, he was also on the most cordial terms with Lord Charles Somerset, and the utmost

attention was paid to his views on frontier and native affairs. By this time he had been for two years technically a half-pay Lieutenant, having been compelled to choose between full-time service in the army and his civil appointment. In this month he was promoted Captain in the Cape Regiment. A fine military career seemed to lie before him. At this point his fortunes took an important turn for the worse.[12] In November he was faced with the alternative of relinquishing his office as Landdrost or his new military position. He chose to retain the civil appointment, and accordingly in May, 1820, found himself gazetted a Captain on half pay in the Corsican Rangers. So ended his military career. Technically the Governor's action was in order, but Stockenstrom was convinced from the facts of the case that he had been singled out for arbitrary treatment. The civil appointments of two other Landdrosts were not allowed to interfere with their military promotion, and the rule made to apply to Stockenstrom was not at the same time applied to Lord Somerset's two sons. The reason given by Stockenstrom for Somerset's opposition to him was the fact that he was a stumbling-block to the Governor's son, Henry. Certain it is that Somerset, by means of various appointments at the Cape, provided magnificiently for his sons. Equally certain it is that ill-feeling grew up between Stockenstrom and Henry Somerset.[13]

One of the most difficult problems of the early frontier was that of the policy to be adopted toward the Bushmen. This people, the most primitive encountered by the Cape colonists, caused much trouble to the farmers from the earliest days of the settlement. Roving about in bands, they attacked or drove off Colonial stock, and sometimes took human lives. The perplexed Government alternated between ordering the extermination of the Bushman clans and warning the farmers against committing unnecessary cruelties. Bushman policy, in fact, depended a great deal on the attitude of the frontiersmen themselves. They, being directly affected by the depredations, time and again went out on their Commandos and followed the savages into the mountains, sometimes taking a bloody revenge, sometimes losing their quarry among the caverns and bye-paths. The generation beginning in 1770 saw the height of the

Boer-Bushman conflict. During these years raids and reprisals followed one another monotonously. [15]

From the time of the First British Occupation there gradually developed a new attitude toward the Bushmen. While the administration, with the colonists, realised the need for military preparedness, an effort was made to employ more humane methods. The movement may be said to have begun with the suggestions of Vlasser and Louw, veldwagt-meesters in the north-western divisions, that cattle should be collected for the Bushmen with a view to teaching them more settled habits. The scheme was approved by Governor Macartney, and, from the Boldeveld and Hantam to the North-Eastern Frontier, contributions of cattle and sheep were made to the Bushmen and game was shot for them. Both Colonel Collins and Chief Justice van Ryneveld remarked on the beneficial results of this system, and the latter reported that the elder Stockenstrom played a leading part in its maintenance. [16] After 1800 depredations continued to take place in the border districts, but these were on a diminished scale. Commandos were fewer in number, and, unlike the expeditions of the Eighteenth Century, aimed more often at recovering stock than at punishing the Bushmen. [16]

As Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet the younger Stockenstrom developed further the humane policy followed by his father. Commandos or patrols were still necessary from time to time, but Stockenstrom did everything in his power to control their activities and prevent unnecessary bloodshed. We find him repeatedly ordering his local officials to refrain from shooting when it is not essential, and requesting more detailed information concerning some particular expedition. On one occasion he refuses to sanction a large Commando of 150 men, "as we have hitherto heard of nothing more than the inroads of small bands, or single stragglers urged on by want, and during the last drought driven to desperation, as they are literally starving": on another he orders the prosecution of a colonist for firing without provocation on six Bushmen: on a third he urges caution and restraint as the soundest general policy. [16] At the same time he would not consent to a law prohibiting farmers from following

robbers over the Northern Frontier, as this would produce large-scale plundering with impunity. "One night," he wrote, "will be sufficient for the destruction of half the families on the extreme borders, by those who know that the crossing of a river or a ridge ensures a safe retreat. Before reference can be had to Cape Town, the gang may be beyond the Tropic." In his opinion the best check on pursuers of marauders was to make them appear at the drostdy on their return, and give a deposition of their proceedings. "No Boer will inconsiderately run the risk of such inquiry if his cause be not just." [17]

In other ways Stockenstrom strove to improve the relations between the colonists and the Bushmen. Charges had been made concerning the custom of farmers on Commandos of bringing Bushman survivors to their homes, and there employing them as servants. This was even referred to in some quarters as a kind of slave trade in women and children. The Landdrost favoured the practice in so far as survivors of Commandos had lost their means of support and were in danger of starvation, but considered that by some farmers it was being abused. [18] Thus in May, 1817, he wrote to the Colonial Secretary, proposing regulations for legal apprenticeship of Bushman children for a fixed term of years and for greater protection and supervision by local officials. Accordingly in that year a proclamation was issued embodying Stockenstrom's proposals and laying down that apprenticeship could only take place under written contracts. [19]

In general, Stockenstrom hoped that the Bushmen would be induced in increasing numbers to settle down as servants among the farmers. This hope was attained in various parts of the district, and in 1822, when he travelled through the country from the Winterberg to the Zeekoe River, he found no single Bushman, except one small party of a dozen, living apart from the farmers. The relations between the two peoples he described as being of the best. In August, 1826, he informed the Commissioners of Inquiry that the colonists as a body were not opposed to any rational plan for improving the lot of the Bushmen, and voluntary contributions of cattle were made from time to time to peaceful kraals. [20]

But the problem was too deep-lying for complete settlement along

these lines. The Bushmen were nomadic Stone Age men, and could not be induced to settle down for periods long enough to ensure real civilisation. Basically it was all a question of land. With the gradual advance of the Colonial frontiers the hunting grounds of the Bushmen had correspondingly diminished. More and more fountains were occupied, the game was driven into the deserts, and the Bushmen followed across the Northern Frontier. Thus it became imperative that reserves should be set aside for them, in which they might live undisturbed. By the 1820's, however, there was not a single place within the boundary which could be kept as a reserve. Realising this, Stockenstrom conceived the idea of founding a mission station for Bushmen immediately across the Orange River, supervised by missionaries and assisted with stock by the Europeans. In 1823 Philippolis was established as a Bushmen station, and remained one until 1826. In that year, however, Griquas were admitted to the institution, and the missionary Clark was compelled to found another station for the Bushmen on the Caledon River, where they were soon disturbed by the migrating frontier farmers. Once again, in 1827, Stockenstrom tried to set up a station and reserve for the Bushmen, but the farmers distrusted the missionaries and fell back on the old policy of providing sheep and cattle for the Bushmen individually, without any preconceived plan. Stockenstrom's scheme broke down.[21]

Thus in the long run the Landdrost's Bushmen policy, however liberally conceived, had failed. We may say that it was inevitable that it should have failed. Where two peoples - one, weak and disorganised, the other, armed with rifles, and both eager for land - meet in one country, it is a lesson of history that the former become vassals or are exterminated. As a people the Bushmen were too primitive in character to settle down permanently in the service of the colonists. Thus Stockenstrom could but delay the process whereby they were pushed beyond the boundary to perish among the Griquas and Korannas, or to hide in little groups on the fringes of the deserts.

Another question with which the Colonial administration was faced at this time, and one to whose solution Stockenstrom was later to make an

important contribution, was that of the Hottentots. From very early times this people had come in contact with the colonists, and had, by a process which can no longer be clearly traced, been gradually dispossessed of their lands. Being in a more advanced stage of civilisation than the Bushmen, they had a less rooted objection to settled life, and many became farm-labourers and shepherds in the service of the colonists. The rest lived as vagrants, or withdrew northwards to the banks of the Orange River, where bands of Griquas and Bastards (or half-breeds) were congregating by the end of the Eighteenth Century. During the Dutch East India Company's regime the Hottentots proper were still beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, except where they were involved in cases with Europeans. The wages of those who worked for the colonists, whether paid in money or kind, were miserably low. The treatment of Hottentot servants depended on the character of their masters. In the interior, and especially on the Eastern Frontier, where a drostdy was established only in 1786, it was difficult to keep an effective control on European-Hottentot relations. [22]

The British occupation of the Cape in 1806, as we have seen, introduced a Government which was more ready and more fitted to administer the Colony, and which was more alive to the colour problems of the day. In his instructions to the Landdrosts of the frontier districts in April, 1812, Governor Cradock wrote: "The instructions I have .... received from His Majesty's Government .... are to extend to all classes of persons 'equal justice and protection' .... In the dispensation of justice no distinction is to be admitted, whether the complaint arise with the man of wealth or the poor man, the master or the slave, the European or the Hottentot." [23]

A new interest in the condition of the Hottentots had been awakened by the great revival in the Protestant churches of England and Germany, one of whose results was the arrival of missionaries in increasing numbers at the Cape. Several institutions were set up among the Hottentots, of which Bethelsdorp, founded near Uitenhage by the London Missionary Society, was the most famous. Many of the colonists regarded the stations, especially those of the London Missionary Society,

with suspicion, and accused them of interfering with their labour supply. Certain it is that to the Hottentots the institutions were a welcome alternative to labour on the farms or roads.

It was in the spirit of the instructions given to Cradock that the Secretary of State for the Colonies ordered the Cape Government to go fully into charges of cruelty to Hottentots brought forward by the Rev. J. Read of Bethelsdorp. It was partly in that spirit that his predecessor, Caledon, issued his Proclamation of 1809. Some of its clauses were directed at abuses in the treatment of Hottentots. It reinforced the old laws governing contracts; directed that, on the expiry of agreements, Hottentots should be free to depart with their property; forbade the withholding of pay, the issuing of liquor as wages, the detention of families for debt, and the confiscation of the property of deceased Hottentots; and ordered that cases of ill-treatment of Hottentots should be tried before a Committee of the Court of Justice, or before the Landdrost and Heemraden. On the other hand, the Proclamation laid down that every Hottentot must have a fixed abode; that all Hottentots going about the country should have passes, and, when found without passes, should be handed over to a Landdrost or Field-Cornet as vagabonds; and that no master should engage a Hottentot unless he was provided with a certificate that he had duly served his time with his previous master. In 1812 Cradock enacted that Hottentot children maintained by Europeans to the age of eight were to be apprenticed for a further period of ten years, and in 1819 the same provision was extended to orphans.

Such was the Hottentot code which was in force till 1828. The documents of the time contain many criticisms of its working. It is clear that the pass system did much to immobilise Hottentot labour - that is, prevented it from finding its best markets. The Chief Justice wrote in 1812 that the Hottentots had been "absolutely reduced either to service under the farmers or to soldiers, or to take refuge in the schools established here and there by the missionaries." In times of sickness their dependence on the farmers was absolute. [24] The Rev. Hallbeck, of the Moravian institution, Genadendal, stated that

the law of 1809 had caused great hardships to the mission Hottentots, and proposed that for passes should be substituted certificates from the missionaries, giving holders time to search for work. [25] Commissioner Bigge described the position of the Hottentots, except for those who had settled at mission stations and those who had served in the Cape Corps, as one of "servitude to the white inhabitants." The law of apprenticeship, he added, had increased the power of masters and extended the terms of service of Hottentot parents. "I have been unable to discover in that respect it has been advantageous to the children, with the exception of those few who have learned trades." "It will not be presumed that their moral characters have gained by their contact with the colonists." [26]

The administration of the laws, reported the Commissioners of Inquiry, had left much to be desired. Few of the 153 Field-Cornets of the Colony were beyond the reach of local power and prejudice, especially in adjusting contracts with Hottentots. The law of 1809 had given the members of the Court of Justice and the Heemraden excessive powers of punishing Hottentots. Many circumstances had added to the severity of the enactment, and multiplied the pretexts for enforcing it. The duty of regulating contracts and protecting Hottentots had too often been delegated to sub-officials, who were unworthy of being entrusted with it. The apprehension of Hottentots under the above Ordinance had been "very rigorously executed", and little respect had been paid by under-sheriffs and constables to "the right of personal freedom" in any of the coloured classes of the community. [27]

There can be no doubt that the living and labour conditions of the Hottentots during this period were bad. Reporting in 1829 on prices and wages in the districts of Albany and Somerset, the Acting Civil Commissioner placed Hottentot wages in 1819 at £1.10 s. per annum to 7s.6d. per month. When particular circumstances enabled them to get daily work, they had received ½d. to 1/- a day with food. The Dutch inhabitants, he added, had rarely, if ever, worked for hire. [28] George Thompson, a traveller, stated in an examination in 1834 that the Hottentots and Griquas employed by the colonists of the northern

regions within the frontier were very dissatisfied with their condition, and many were quitting. They also complained of ill-treatment.[29] Commissioner Biggs reported that neglect of apprentices was wide-spread. There was much negligence in maintaining the conditions laid down. Local officials were not administering the laws with real impartiality.[30] During this period the missionary institutions served as places of refuge where Hottentots might at least gain a respite from service on the farms. As such they came in for a good deal of criticism. From their side, however, the missionaries also had criticisms to make. They complained of the quite inadequate amount of land at the disposal of the institutions. Those at Bethelsdorp stated that their Hottentots were called upon too often to do forced labour - road work, waggon driving, and military service after the conclusion of hostilities. They complained several times of the unsympathetic attitude of Colonel Cuyler, the Landdrost of Uitenhage.[31]

Viewing the Hottentot situation as a whole, we can say that their hard lot was to a large extent due to their lack of land. It was this which, by removing the incentive to strenuous effort, delayed any substantial improvement in their position, and led to the "idleness and inebriety" and addiction to stock-theft which the Commissioners of Inquiry observed. In the absence of land obtainable by individual tenure, the Hottentots were forced by the pass-laws and overcrowding on the mission stations to seek employment on the farms, where low wages prevailed. It was a vicious circle.

As Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet Stockenstrom had had intimate experience of the working of the Hottentot code. He tells us in his Memoirs that he had always considered the law of 1809, which, as we have seen, was aimed partly at the eradication of abuses in the treatment of Hottentots, as great an advance as was Bourke's 50th Ordinance some twenty years later. This law, he says, was criticised from many quarters on the ground that it conferred too many privileges on the Hottentots.[32] On the other hand, he was alive to the hardships caused by the annexation of the lands over which the natives had roamed.[33] We are told that in his opinion the apprenticeship system

was a failure, and the farmer had no just claim on the services of Hottentot children who had been with him eight years, in view of the low wages paid and the trifling quantity of food consumed.[54] In 1813 he told Governor Cradock that the greatest injury that could be inflicted on the coloured classes would be to make them the object of a special policy or patronage, and advocated equal justice for all.[55] His memorandum of 1828 was to urge an important modification of the pass laws.

From the Hottentots we pass to the Griquas, the mixed-breeds who were, as a result of European occupation of the land and labour conditions in the Colony, during this period congregating in increasing numbers on the Northern frontiers. During the opening years of the Nineteenth Century some of these people were gradually induced by London Missionary Society missionaries to settle down at Griquatown, in the Griqualand West of later times. Another village centre grew up at Campbell, and later a band of Griquas moved eastward to Philippolis, near the junction of the Orange and Zeekoe Rivers. Each of these had a "captain" or chieftain of its own - Andries Waterboer at Griquatown, Cornelius Kok at Campbell, and Adam Kok at Philippolis. Of these the first was the ablest, exerting himself to enforce order gradually in his neighbourhood and to hunt down banditti. The character of Adam Kok was much more doubtful. It was against his Griquas, among others, that charges were made of atrocities against the natives. During the 1820's sections broke away from the villages and took to the mountains, whence they conducted "Commandos" against the Bushmen and Bechuanas. These brigands were known as Bergenaars.[56]

The relations between the Griquas and the Colonial administration were vague. The Government looked with suspicion upon these communities beyond the boundary, and was alarmed at the accounts of cruelties committed by Griquas, Bastards, and Korannas. In April, 1820, the Cape Colonial Secretary suggested to the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet that, in view of "the state of confusion and misrule which exists among the emigrated Bastaards" in the vicinity of Griquatown and "the

many serious evils" which they had inflicted on the peaceable natives, these Bastards should be surprised by two companies of Cape Infantry, and brought back with their cattle to be settled on "extensive and fruitful spots" within the Colony. Stockenstrom appears to have dallied with the scheme, but soon turned it down as impracticable. [37] In September of that year he submitted a Report on the Griquas, based on a 12 days' visit to the country beyond the Northern Frontier. In this he stated that he had long looked with suspicion on this increasing tribe. Of their way of life he took a poor view. They had dispossessed the Bushmen of their land: "the most cheering reflection" concerning the latter was that the persecutions of the Griquas would soon end their miseries by extirpating the race. It was most unfortunate that the Griquas had been allowed to gain so firm a footing beyond the boundary, but it was impossible now to bring them back. An agent should be appointed by the Government, to reside with them "under wise regulations" and "keep alive the idea of dependence". The sale of ammunition to the Griquas should be carefully regulated and conducted only through definite channels. [38] In 1822 the Government so far interfered in affairs on the Northern frontiers as to appoint John Melville Government Agent at Griquatown. This was a step in the right direction, but Melville, lacking effective support from the Government, found that he had little influence with the Griquas, and resigned his post in April, 1826.

A question which was closely to affect the Griqua communities was that presented by the farmers' habit of trekking. From very early times the free burghers of the Colony had, as a result of the Company's restrictive economic policy and the occupation of the land in the existing settlements, pushed forward into the interior with their families, waggons, and stock. The advance continued steadily through the Eighteenth Century, and the natives who inhabited the interior either withdrew or entered into service with the colonists. This movement was stimulated by the farmers' desire for large farms of 3,000 morgen or more, which were obtainable under the "Loan-Place System" on terms which amounted practically to free grants, in which

holders were seldom disturbed. The Company looked with suspicion upon these trek-boers who moved beyond its sphere of effective control and disobeyed its orders against the cattle-trade with the natives. Prohibitions were placed upon the unrestrained trekking, but these went unheeded. Faced by these realities, the Company appointed a Landdrost at Swellendam in 1745, and another at Graaff-Reinet in 1786.[39] Under the First British Occupation Governor Macartney drew a frontier which ran along the Fish River to the Tarka Mountains, on to Plettenberg's Beacon, thence to Tafelberg and the Nieuwveld Berg, along the Riet, thence to Spioenkop and the Langebergen, and finally along the Buffel's River to the sea. His proclamation stated that the natives had been injured by "several of the inhabitants in the more distant parts of this settlement," under pretence of barter: this led to depredations by the natives in order to support life. Colonists were forbidden, under severe penalties, to cross the boundary.[40]

In the first decade of the Nineteenth Century land scarcity was already acute, and the farmers were impatient of restrictions upon their movements. Above all, the Bushman menace had slackened appreciably. Farmers settled in increasing numbers in those regions within the frontier which had hitherto been unsafe. By 1809, when Collins conducted his tour, they had moved to the Zeekoe River and close to the Orange (Nu Gariep), and were clamouring for an extension of the boundary. Collins himself reported in favour of such an extension, but the Government refused to act in the matter. As a result the colonists trekked across the Northern boundary between 1809 and 1820, acting on their own responsibility.[41]

In September, 1820, Stockenstrom, who had just completed a tour of the Northern Frontier, reported on the situation as he found it. In his report he states that the colonists who wander about the country in search of pastures make it impossible for him to preserve order. He would like clearly to point out the limits of the Colony, and insist upon their being respected, but this is impossible because the boundary is quite uncertain. It would cause much hardship if he forced the people back to the south of it, for this would deprive them of refuge

for their cattle. "Yet some measure is necessary to counteract the increasing evil, and at all events to show that Government reserves its right over these lands so illegally taken possession of, if they are to be considered Colonial." He has already forbidden anyone who takes shelter with his flocks for a few months at a place to consider the latter his own. He recommends that a commission chosen by the Governor be sent to examine the country and set up a conspicuous boundary, over which no colonist should be allowed to trespass, except by special permission. [42] In 1832 Stockenstrom and Lieutenant Bonamy were instructed to mark out a line of boundary on the east and north of the Graaff-Reinet district. The objects of this, Stockenstrom relates, were "to do away with doubts caused by imaginary lines mentioned in the law; to include within the Colony those farmers who had unintentionally or ignorantly emigrated beyond those lines; and for the future to check all further encroachment." "This, of course, was quite impossible without including a great extent of the depopulated Bushman country." [43]

In 1836 Stockenstrom was requested by the Commissioners of Inquiry to explain why the boundary had been extended under his superintendence to the Orange River, thus including an additional area of 50,000 square miles, and to supply them with a copy of his instructions. His reply, dated 9 August, 1835, gives us further insight into Stockenstrom's attitude toward the problems of the Northern borders. He admits that much territory has been annexed. It is parched, miserable country, and if the extension were to take place now, he would not consider it worth while. It would have been better both for the colonists and for the Bushmen if the former had never got into that country. But now that possession has been taken, these resources cannot be abandoned, as this would ruin many families, without benefitting the Bushmen at all; "for these, lamentable to say, were, with very few exceptions, scattered far and wide over the interior, long before the old boundary was passed, and this was effected long before the fixing of the new boundary, which was not meant to justify these migrations, but to prevent their further extension." He gives a brief account of the historic trekking movement toward the east and north, and

shows that arbitrary fixation of boundaries could never have kept the farmers permanently out of the lands beyond. Finally, he is of opinion that the farmers are doing no active harm to the Bushmen. While he was on the frontier with Lieutenant Donsay in 1822, he found these people herding cattle for the colonists or hunting with them, and at liberty to come and go as they pleased. The Bushman children are not always well treated by the farmers, but it is far preferable that the latter, who are subject to the law, should receive them than that they should starve or be killed by their parents. He recommends, however, that the frontiersmen should be excluded from the land east of Philippolis, which should be kept as a Bushman reserve.[44]

As early as 1823, Stockenstrom tells us in his Memoirs, the colonists were desirous of migrating across the Orange River, and he had much difficulty in preventing them from taking possession of it.[45] 1825 was a year of bad drought and locusts, and in September Stockenstrom received a memorial from three frontier Field-Cornets, asking permission to cross the boundary. The Landdrost sent the memorial on to the Government, which replied by empowering him to give the desired permission for a limited period, if he considered it necessary. Stockenstrom showed clearly that in principle he opposed periodical migrations over the boundary, which, by extending the frontiers, were prejudicial to the welfare of the Colony. He feared that he would not be able to enforce the return of the colonists or refuse permission to trek, once a precedent had been set up. Further, trekking across the Orange would disturb the Bushmen in their hunting-grounds. On the other hand, the hardships the farmers were suffering within the Colony could not be denied, and it would have been impossible at this time to have held back a movement which was so deeply rooted in the history of the Colony, and which had already gone so far. Stockenstrom therefore compromised by allowing the farmers to trek only when compelled by absolute necessity, and then only upon certain conditions. Every farmer had to promise to return by February, 1826; to refrain from taking steps for permanent settlement beyond the Orange; to avoid trading with the natives; and to refrain from using force in his

dealings with them. Those who violated these rules were to suffer certain penalties.[45]

Thus was set up the precedent which Stockenstrom had feared. If drought had been considered sufficient pretext for trekking in 1825, permission could not be refused when similar conditions prevailed in the following years. The call for land was a call which would not be denied. By real statesmanship the trek to the North might be controlled, but it could no longer be delayed.

On the eastern borders of the Colony the advancing frontiersmen had met a formidable neighbour in the Xosas, the advance guard of the South-Eastern Bantu. This people had pushed southward along the coast in comparatively modern times, and did not until the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century present a real check to European progress eastwards. Here the struggle was bound to be a notable one, for the Xosas were, like the colonists, cattle-farmers, agriculturists, and hunters. It was to be a question of land.

About the year 1775 the Xosa Paramount, Palo, died, and his lands were divided between two of his sons, the territory east of the Kei passing to Galeka, that between the Kei and the Fish to Rarabe. Gunukwebes (Xosa-Hottentot mixed breeds) were already settled west of the Fish. In 1778 Governor van Plettenberg met some petty chiefs, and persuaded them to recognise the Fish River as the boundary between the Bantu and the Colony. The following year Kaffirs crossed the river and spread over the Zuurveld with the Gunukwebes. Fighting began between the Bantu and the Europeans, the former were driven back, and the frontiersmen began to settle in the Zuurveld. Skirmishes, however, continued, more tribesmen came over the Fish, and in 1793 Maynier, the Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, made peace, allowing the Kaffirs to remain in the Zuurveld.[46] The Second British Occupation found the colonists still claiming the land up to the Fish, and the Zuurveld still occupied by the Kaffirs. In 1812 Cradock, with a strong force of troops and burghers, cleared the land west of the Fish and placed a double line of military block-houses along this river. The Kaffirs, however, stole cattle continually

despite Cradock's posts and the constant patrolling of the thickets by the troops. This duty was harassing to the latter, and the farmers were urged to be more vigilant in protecting their stock. All Kaffirs found within the boundary, except those sent in by the chiefs, were to be fired on as enemies. A corps of Hottentot infantry was raised, and the inhabitants of Graaff-Reinet and Uitenhage were always liable to Commando service. [47]

In 1817 Governor Somerset was called to the frontier by reports of increasing depredations upon Colonial property, and took the opportunity of summoning Gaika, the nominal chief of the Rarabes, to a conference. Gaika had succeeded his grand-father Rarabe when still a boy, and for some years his uncle Ndhlambi had acted as Regent. When Gaika came of age Ndhlambi refused to give up his position, an armed dispute resulted, and Ndhlambi was forced to flee into the Zuurveld. Thence he was driven back across the Fish by Cradock's 'sweep' of 1812. From this feud it followed that Gaika could not in 1817 speak effectively for the whole mass of Bantu people living west of the Kei. At his conference with Somerset Gaika stated that other chiefs claimed equality with himself and were in fact independent of him. To this Somerset replied that he had always been acknowledged by the Colonial authorities as the principal Kaffir chief, and it was as such that he was treated on this occasion. [48] Gaika agreed "to use his utmost endeavours" to put a stop to depredations on the colonists' cattle, and accepted a new system for the recovery of stock, whereby, in the official words of the day, "in future cases of cattle being stolen from the Colony, and traced to any particular kraal, that kraal should be made responsible for the cattle, although not to be found there, and should be bound to furnish from its herds the number of cattle stolen from the Colony." Gaika also promised to put to death any Kaffirs he found plundering the colonists. [49] It was arranged that the natives might come to a fair at Grahamstown twice a year to trade, provided they had passes from Gaika himself.

Stock-thefts, however, continued, reprisals were taken, and Gaika himself was angered by the shooting of Kaffirs who crossed

the boundary. The chiefs, jealous of Gaika's ascendancy, formed a confederacy and heavily defeated him at the Battle of Amalinde. Gaika requested help from the Cape Government, and a large force of troops and burghers was collected to punish Ndhlambi and his allies and obtain redress. Brereton, the Commandant, could not bring the Kaffirs to a battle, but took thousands of head of cattle - "much beyond what was necessary to do justice to those who had suffered", as the Government itself recognised. [50] More marauding resulted, and in 1819 Ndhlambi attacked Grahamstown. He was driven off, the forces again entered Kaffirland, and many more cattle were taken. In October, 1819, Lord Somerset arrived on the frontier and summoned Gaika and the other chiefs to meet him. Gaika's position as Paramount was confirmed by the Governor and recognized by the chiefs. At the same time it was considered impossible to maintain the security of the Colony so long as the Kaffirs had access to the Fish River Bush, and it was laid down that the land between the Fish and Keiskamma, except for the basin formed at the various sources of the Tyumie (which Gaika was to retain), should be neutral. The Kaffirs were given one month in which to move beyond the Tyumie and the Keiskamma, which were now made the boundary: thereafter the troops would scour the country and destroy every vestige of a kraal. Military posts were to be established in the Neutral Territory, to prevent further occupation of it by petty chieftains. [51]

The system laid down by Somerset at the Conferences of 1817 and 1819 did not bring security on the Eastern Frontier. In the first place Gaika, as he had himself pointed out, could not effectively control the chiefs, and the Commissioners of Inquiry reported in 1825 that the policy of working through him as Paramount had been abandoned in favour of recognizing the responsibility of each chief for the conduct of his people. [52] Further, the plan of keeping the land between the Fish and the Keiskamma neutral was not consistently followed. Stockenstrom, who acted as interpreter at the 1819 Conference, stated years afterwards that the cession by Gaika had been most unwilling. [53] Captain Aitchison, of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, who had also been present on that occasion, believed that Ndhlambi, who,

with the other chiefs, was not consulted on the matter, had positively refused to consent to it. [54] The Gunukwebes had never recognised Gaika's control, and their chief Pato told John Fairbairn in 1830 that had the tribe known that Gaika had dared to give away this territory, they would have resisted him. [55] Land hunger among Europeans and Bantu alike made it inevitable that this neutral belt policy should be of short duration. In 1821 Acting-Governor Donkin, having obtained Gaika's concurrence at an interview in 1820, founded a military settlement at Fredericksburg (near the coast), but Somerset abandoned this soon afterwards. Then Makoma, a son of Gaika, was allowed by the Governor and the Military Commandant to re-occupy the land about the sources of the Kat River, and was soon followed into the Ceded Territory by two other chiefs, Tyalie and Botman. [56] In 1825 the Gunukwebes were allowed to graze their cattle west of the Keiskamma, as far as the Buka. [57] Farmers were also permitted to enter the lands between the Fish and Koonap, and in 1828 the frontier district was extended to include the modern Bedford. [58] At a later date both Major Dundas, ex-Landdrost of Albany, and the Rev. Shaw, the missionary residing with the Gunukwebes, gave their opinion that the original scheme of setting up a neutral belt had been mistaken policy, as this land was a bone of contention between the two peoples; the Kaffirs entered it at all times and could not be properly observed; and no chief could be held responsible for this neutral area, or Ceded Territory, as it came to be called. [59]

In 1820 5,000 British immigrants were located on the frontier, in pursuance of the Governor's scheme of promoting security by closer settlement. Cattle stealing continued, however, and the Commissioners of Inquiry reported in 1825 that the losses of the Albany settlers were partly due to negligence in the care of their cattle, and to their want of servants to herd them. [60]

On the merits and demerits of the 'Reprisal System' of recovering stolen cattle instituted by Somerset in 1817 opinion was sharply divided. Stockenstrom, in his examination before the Aborigines Committee in 1835 and 1836, and also in his Memoirs, spoke repeatedly of the evils committed under this system. He said that the farmers often

clamoured for patrols and commandos at times when he had to reprimand them for allowing their flocks to scatter unprotected in the 'bush', thus tempting the natives to steal. Not one-tenth of the cattle lost would have been lost if the farmers had been on their guard. When farmers were slow in noting losses or delayed reporting them, the patrols which then entered 'Kaffirland' usually punished the innocent for the guilty. The taking of Kaffir cattle had results disastrous to the frontier, for the natives who were deprived of their stock were driven to fresh depredations in order to obtain the means of life. Among the colonists there were some bad men who would not hesitate to make fraudulent representations of robberies.[61] His indictment of the system was striking, but it suffered from a lack of examples backed by proofs. Shaw also stated that the entry of Kaffir territory and the taking of their cattle was a great source of annoyance. Cattle were sometimes taken from parties not implicated in thefts, and the nature of the system made it impossible to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty.[62] This view was strongly supported by Dr. Philip, Thomas Pringle, and other members of the 'philanthropic' party at the Cape. On the other hand, the majority of the military officers and local officials took the 'frontier' view, considering the Reprisal System a just system and holding that the losses of the Kaffirs were no more than they deserved. Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset, who came in for much criticism as the man for years chiefly responsible for its working, denied the charges made against him, and claimed that he always acted honestly and with justice. He stated that he gave special orders to his patrols which were intended to prevent the misleading of military parties by guilty Kaffirs and the punishment of innocent kraals.[63] The Rev. W. B. Thompson, the missionary residing on the Tyumie, considered that the system worked fairly on the whole.[64] Major Dundas and Captain Aitchison considered that it was not unjust to the natives, and Dundas even stated that the latter came off best, for only a small fraction of the cattle stolen was recovered.[65] This much is certain - that Somerset's system did not put an end to stock-thefts. Kaffir depredations disturbed the frontier throughout this period, and from time to time Commandos

entered Kaffirland to exact reprisals on a large scale.[66] In April, 1826, the Reprisal System was abandoned by Lieutenant-Governor Bourke, and a new system set up in its place.

Stockenstrom, as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, had for years been in contact with the problems of the Eastern Frontier. He had taken part in the Fourth Kaffir War of 1812, when his father had perished, and the Fifth of 1819. In February, 1819, he had written to the Colonial Secretary, deprecating Bresreton's seizure of an excessive number of native cattle, but urging that the Kaffirs should be "effectually set down" by "a repetition of the Commando of 1812 on the other side of the Fish River."[67] He had been present at the Conferences of 1817 and 1819, and had considered the scheme of maintaining a neutral belt a good one, if it could be persevered with.[68] When it was reported to him in 1825 that Kaffirs were occupying the land at the sources of the Kat River, he informed the Governor and showed on a chart that this tract lay within the Neutral Territory. At the same time he observed that it would be most inadvisable to leave the Kaffirs in that position, as they would endanger the Bavians's River and Tarka divisions. He was informed, however, that the Commandant had allowed them to settle there as long as they remained quiet, and nothing further could be done.[69] His views on frontier policy conflicted with those of Colonel Somerset, and he tells us that he "openly and warmly" expressed his sentiments, "so that it became no difficult matter to contrast my views with those then in force."[70] In 1826, in a letter to the Commissioners of Inquiry, Stockenstrom stated his opinion that the chiefs were men with authority, and that with the Kaffirs the community could be held responsible for the acts of its members.[71] In his Memoirs he describes a conversation he had with Pringle and Dr. Philip in that year, in which he observed that the Government and the missionaries, working together, should make the chiefs their "principal lever" in civilising the Kaffirs: treaties should be made and faithfully kept, and the chiefs brought gradually under the influence of the Government, so that "its word will be law without appearing or pretending to be so."[72] In 1826 the Graaff-Reinet district was divided, and the Somerset

district created on the frontier. This cut Stockenstrom off from the military frontier and from the duty of criticising the Reprisal System.[75]

We see that when Stockenstrom entered upon his duties as Commissioner-General, he had already had years of experience of frontier problems. From our account of his period of office as Landdrost it will be seen that he had striven to apply liberal principles in his treatment of the native peoples of the Colony. At the same time he had not identified himself with the 'philanthropic' party at the Cape. Dr. Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society in the Colony, had made various charges against him to the Commissioners of Inquiry, but his and Pringle's interview with the Landdrost in 1826 did much to allay his suspicions, and in future years they were to work cordially together. Stockenstrom, in fact, had endeavoured during these years to follow a <u>via media</u>, to protect the coloured races and at the same time to defend the lives and property of the colonists.

CHAPTER II

THE OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER-GENERAL.

The origin of the Commissioner-Generalship is to be found in the intention of the British Government, stated in 1825, to set up a separate government in the Eastern districts of the Cape Colony. The Commissioners of Inquiry had reported in favour of such an independent administration, and in August, 1825, Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State, informed Lord Charles Somerset that he had appointed a Lieutenant-Governor, who would assume the government of the East as soon as it should be separately organised.[1] Much could be said in support of such a plan. Cape Town, the seat of government, was 700 miles from the frontier districts of Albany, Somerset, and Graaff-Reinet, and the communications were bad. Important decisions which had to be referred to the Governor were sometimes inconveniently delayed, and the East suffered from a lack of effective supervision by the central government.[2] Bathurst's scheme for complete separation was soon abandoned on the ground of expense, but Earl Goderich, the new Secretary of State, gave instructions that the Colony should in future consist of two divisions - a Western, comprising the Cape, Stellenbosch, and Worcester; and an Eastern, consisting of Graaff-Reinet, Albany and Somerset, Uitenhage and George. At the same time the office of Commissioner-General was instituted to superintend the affairs of the Eastern division.[3] No person was officially recommended for this position, but Goderich advised that the most capable of the Landdrosts should be appointed.[4] In a despatch of 26 January, 1828, Lieutenant-Governor Bourke informed the Secretary of State that Stockenstrom had been chosen for the post.[5]

The Commissioner-General entered upon his new appointment at a time when great changes were taking place in the administration of the Colony. In 1825 a Council was set up to advise the Governor on all except urgent matters: he might disregard its advice, provided he could satisfy the Secretary of State that this was in the interests of the Colony. The year 1828 saw the achievement of a free press at the Cape and the institution of a Supreme Court, with a Chief Justice

and three puisne judges. In the districts the courts of Landdrosts and Heemraden, which had consisted of men lacking in legal training and open to influence by local opinion, disappeared, and their duties were taken over by Resident Magistrates. The administrative duties of the Landdrosts passed to Civil Commissioners. In general, the government of the Colony gained in efficiency, but popular participation in the work of administration practically disappeared. Stockenstrom tells us that the abolition of the Court of Heemraden, "the link which had so long existed between the Government and the governed", caused much discontent. In 1836, when these reforms had already been decided on, he had told the Commissioners of Inquiry that they were destroying the only shadow of representation in the Colony, and that he had as Landdrost been wholly dependent on the support of his Heemraden. He had made up his mind not to accept the office of Civil Commissioner when Bourke, by appointing him Commissioner-General, enabled him to continue his services to the Colony. [6]

Goderich's despatch of June 14, 1827, had instructed the Lieutenant-Governor to appoint two colonists to the Council in place of the Colonial Secretary and the Auditor. Stockenstrom was given one of these vacancies. [7]

The Secretary of State, in instituting the Commissioner-Generalship, had written as follows:-

"In the establishment for the Eastern Division you will perceive that I have provided for the residence of a superior magistrate under the denomination of Commissioner-General. To this functionary I propose to delegate the duty of generally superintending the affairs of that Division, of controlling the proceedings of its Civil Commissioners and inferior magistrates in all cases of urgency in which the delay of a reference to Cape Town would be prejudicial to the public interests, and of exercising a special superintendence over the affairs of the Border. It will be expedient that the Commissioner-General should reside at Grahamstown; but he will be

strictly subject to the authority of the Governor, to whom he will regularly report all his proceedings and apply for instructions for his guidance."

There were no further instructions from Downing Street to throw light upon the purposes of the office or the nature of its duties. It will be seen that Goderich's brief statement was very general in character, and was capable of various interpretations. Was it possible to superintend the affairs of the Eastern Division and the Border without at all times controlling the proceedings of the Civil Commissioners and inferior magistrates? To what extent were the officials of the frontier districts to be responsible to the Commissioner-General at times which were not urgent? What was to be his relationship with the military authorities? Were the officials and missionaries to correspond with the Government through the Commissioner-General, or with Cape Town direct?

These were questions which puzzled Bourke up to the time of his departure from the Colony, and it was not until September, 1828, that Stockenstrom received his written instructions from the Cape Government. These instructions, which were of considerable length, were divided into twenty-one clauses, fourteen referring to duties connected with the border and the tribes beyond, seven relating to the interior of the Colony. Under the former he was ordered to superintend the affairs of the whole frontier, except such as were purely military in character. Those agents and missionaries who resided toward the western line of frontier, whose readiest communication was with Cape Town, were to correspond with the Colonial Secretary, who would pass on important information to the Commissioner-General. Those who could correspond directly with the latter were to do so, and to receive directions from him: at the same time they were to continue communicating with the Colonial Secretary. The Commissioner-General was to keep up a personal acquaintance with the principal chiefs along the frontier line, and be responsible for maintaining friendly intercourse with the tribes. He was to tour the whole line of frontier once a year, if the Governor considered it necessary. He was

to do his utmost to prevent jealousies and misunderstandings between the civil and military authorities. He was to receive reports of stock stolen by natives, and give directions for recovering it or for protecting the colonists from further depredations. He was also to receive returns of the number and state of the burgher forces of the frontier districts, and to see that proper officers were appointed and such regulations adopted as would ensure the speedy assembly of those forces. When he considered it necessary, or upon a written requisition from the Military Commandant, he was to assemble the whole or part of the burgher forces of Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Albany, and Uitenhage, to be employed under the orders of the Commandant; and might on his own initiative call out the men of any of these four districts to recover stolen cattle or patrol the frontier, or authorise the Civil Commissioners to do so. He or any Civil Commissioner might remain in immediate command of the burgher forces, subject to the Commandant or any military officer who might be present, should they think proper: otherwise they might place the burghers under their Field-Commandants or Field-Cornets. He was also to suggest, for the Governor's information, such arrangements of the military forces as his knowledge of the border tribes might indicate.

Under these instructions which related to the interior of the Colony the Commissioner-General was directed to inquire into and report on applications for grants of land or leases of Government farms. He was to inspect Government buildings, roads, and bridges. He was to pay attention to the operation of Ordinances 49 and 50,[8] observing every departure from these laws and every instance of ill-treatment of Hottentots or native 'foreigners' in the service of the colonists, and reporting on the subject. He was to inspect the accounts of the Civil Commissioners, report on any inefficiency in their departments, and suggest improvements. The Civil Commissioners were to obey written orders from the Commissioner-General, and to supply him with any information he required. They were, however, to continue to correspond directly with Cape Town. It was also laid down that the Commissioner-General should reside at Uitenhage, this being the most convenient position for keeping up communication with the frontier.[9]

It was by these lengthy instructions that the Cape Government endeavoured to define the duties of the Commissioner-General. As will be seen, they showed planning and attention to detail, and, given a fair degree of co-operation among the officials concerned, the purposes of the Secretary of State in instituting the office might be attained. But, should such co-operation be lacking, there was room for disputes over authority. What weight, for instance, was to be attached to the Commissioner-General's suggestions concerning the "arrangement of the military forces", and what was to be the relationship between his general superintendence and the military authority of the Commandant? Again, the Government had instructed the Civil Commissioners to correspond directly with Cape Town. How, then, was the Commissioner-General to be kept constantly informed of affairs in his Division? Differences of opinion on these matters were soon apparent. Sir Lowry Cole afterwards told the Secretary of State that Stockenstrom was dissatisfied with his instructions, and certain of his objections had finally to be passed over. Bourke and Cole could not admit that the powers of the Commissioner-General were intended to be equal to those of the 'Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province', whose appointment the Commissioners of Inquiry had recommended, nor that he should have any right of interference with the Civil Commissioners as Treasury Agents. They considered that the right of objecting to hostile measures against the natives should rest with the Governor alone, and that the Commissioner-General should by no means control the Commandant of the Frontier. Stockenstrom, however, held that the Secretary of State had had more important ends in view. He considered that he was meant to take cognisance of every non-judicial matter brought to his notice in the Eastern Division, to exercise an effective control over the affairs of the frontier, and to introduce schemes for protecting the colonists and the natives. While he realized that he was to have no military authority over the Commandant, he considered that his sanction should be necessary for armed expeditions against the natives. The gulf between these two interpretations was gradually to widen as Stockenstrom's period of office progressed.[10]

During the years 1828-1830 there was much to make Stockenstrom hope that his Commissioner-Generalship would develop into a responsible and important position. The Landdrost of Albany informed the Colonial Secretary that his appointment had given general satisfaction to the Settlers as well as others, while the Dutch were elated. [11] Plasket (the Colonial Secretary) and Bourke also referred to his popularity, and spoke warmly of his appointment. [12] Numerous addresses were sent from the Graaff-Reinet district to the departing Landdrost.

Up to the time of Stockenstrom's resignation Sir Lowry Cole, Bourke's successor, did his utmost to co-operate with him, and from time to time thanked him warmly for his services. Thus in November, 1828, he expressed his "high approbation" of the measures adopted by Stockenstrom on the Northern Frontier.[13] In May, 1829, he approved in like manner of the Commissioner-General's schemes for settling the Ceded Territory and defending the frontier. [14] In August of that year the Colonial Secretary assured him that the Governor placed the utmost confidence in his ability to exercise the powers conferred upon him in the manner best suited to the welfare of the Colony.[15] In April, 1830, Stockenstrom was instructed to check the correctness of Colonel Somerset's statements about the state of the frontier, as the Governor would not authorise the use of force until he was certain of the real condition of affairs. [16] In May, 1831, Cole expressed his complete reliance on Stockenstrom's judgment and activity in bringing the arrangements at the Kat River Settlement, "to which you have so largely contributed," to a prosperous result. [17] In the same month, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, the Governor spoke of Stockenstrom as "one of whom I cannot speak too highly for liberality of sentiment and indefatigable zeal and perseverance in the discharge of his public duties." [18] There appears to have been for some time a fair measure of co-operation between Stockenstrom and Colonel Somerset. In May, 1829, the former wrote hopefully of a new military position taken up by the Commandant, which would reduce depredations to a minimum. [19] In July he informed Somerset that Provisional Field-Commandant Erasmus had been

instructed to receive orders from the military officers "in everything tending to a cordial co-operation with the military posts for the protection of the frontier." [20] In September he sent on to the Colonial Secretary a letter he had received from Somerset, with his own reply, to "show how we agree as to the employment of the burgher force." [21] At the time of the well-known Commando of June, 1850, Stockenstrom and Somerset were still working in harmony. [22]

But, despite this degree of co-operation with the Central Government and the military, it was soon clear to Stockenstrom that his office was not fulfilling the purposes of the Secretary of State, as he understood them. From January, 1838, when he arrived in Cape Town, to the time of Cole's arrival he was kept in the capital. He was then sent on a tour of the frontier, and returned in November. In February, 1839, he told Colonel Bell, the new Colonial Secretary, that, except for the very limited service he was able to perform as a member of Council, he had little or no official business to transact, and he regretted that he was not affording greater assistance to the Governor. At the same time he recommended that he should be sent to superintend the expulsion of the chief Makoma from the Ceded Territory, which had been decided upon that month. [23] Accordingly in April he was sent to the Eastern Frontier to co-operate with Somerset in carrying out this operation. It was effected in May, and Stockenstrom took this opportunity of making arrangements for the settlement of the Ceded Territory and the foundation of the Hottentot locations on the Kat River.

In July the Commissioner-General returned to Cape Town to close up his home and transfer his possessions to Uitenhage, and set out for the latter in August with his young wife, whom he had married the previous December. Early in September he again journeyed to the frontier, investigated reports that a confederacy of Kaffir chiefs had been formed with the intention of invading the Colony, and satisfied himself that there was no danger. [24] In December he heard that a Commando had been sent against some Bushmen, and he had to request the Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet to forward to him

copies of his correspondence on the subject.[25] In February, 1850, he received a letter from the Colonial Secretary, drawing his attention to the alarming extent of Kaffir depredations specified in a list sent in by the Acting Civil Commissioner of Albany, and replied that he had not received a single report on the subject since Cole left the interior a year before.[26] In that month he travelled north to the Orange River, to investigate certain charges which had been brought by the Griquas against the farmers who had trekked into Trans-Orangia.[27] He then returned to the Eastern Frontier, and in June, 1850, sanctioned a Commando against four petty chiefs who had been charged with systematically robbing the colonists. His duties took him north again to Colesberg in July, and then he returned to the Cape.

The following year Stockenstrom again visited the frontier. In June Somerset proposed to him that an armed force should be sent into Kaffirland. He objected, stating that he wished to make careful inquiries first. The Commandant then obtained permission directly from the Governor to enter Kaffirland, having called up the necessary burgher force to assist. Stockenstrom relates that this convinced him that the Commissioner-Generalship was "a fraud upon the public." "As long," he writes in his Memoirs, "as one single soldier could be moved with hostile intent, without my requisition or sanction, my political responsibility was a sham and a hoax."[28] As early as 1850 he had pointed out the uselessness of his situation and offered to retire, but Cole, hoping that the office might still be placed upon an effective basis, would not yet consider its abolition. The Governor proposed as a compromise that, as Captain Campbell desired to retire from the post of Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset, Stockenstrom should take over his duties while keeping the title and pay of the Commissioner-General. To this plan Stockenstrom objected on the ground that it would defeat the whole object of the Commissioner-Generalship. Thus the office was left upon its previous unsatisfactory basis.[29]

After the Commando of July, 1851, Stockenstrom remained some months upon the frontier, but the position had become impossible. He reported that his instructions which forbade the taking of Kaffir cattle were being violated on all sides, and his and Somerset's views on native policy were completely at variance. He complained that he had heard nothing, except through the Colonial

Secretary, of the patrols of farmers ordered out by the Commandant with the consent of the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset. No report had been made to him on the operations of the recent Commando. [30] At the end of the year Stockenstrom returned to the Cape. In January, 1832, a report arrived from the frontier that the Kat River Hottentots were on the point of attacking the colonists, and the Commissioner-General asked to be allowed to investigate. By the following September he had received no reply to his request. When he desired later to visit the borders of Graaff-Reinet, where the Griquas were said to have murdered several families and a Commando had been called for, the Governor told him it was unnecessary. [31] During 1832 Stockenstrom had nothing to do with the Eastern Division, except for reporting on reports. Communications from the Civil Commissioners, which had always been irregular, ceased altogether during that year. [32] Meanwhile the position had been further complicated by the arrival of a despatch from the Secretary of State, which took away the Commissioner-General's house and travelling allowance, laid down that he should reside at Grahamstown or Bathurst, and ordered him to resign his seat in Council, as his duties required his constant presence in the frontier districts. [33] The Governor wrote to ask for the recall of this direction, and pending a reply Stockenstrom continued to attend Council, where, unfortunately enough, he and Cole held conflicting opinions on the powers of the Governor. [34] At length, unable to endure the position further, Stockenstrom obtained leave from office from January 1, 1833. In February he was informed that the Secretary of State had refused to allow him to continue as a member of Council, and his resignation was requested. On 7 March, 1833, he left the Colony "with aggrieved and acrimonious feelings, and a thorough contempt for the whole system of Colonial administration. [35]

Reviewing his Commissioner-Generalship at a later date, Stockenstrom stated that the office had become useless, because his frontier regulations were not carried out and his complaints on the subject were disregarded at headquarters. The fact that the officials

of his Division corresponded directly with the Government made it impossible for him to exercise effective control. From time to time important matters were decided without reference to him, and he felt that he had no real authority. Further, his relations with the military authorities were not properly defined, and his own control over the burgher forces was impaired by the appointment of burgher officers without his being consulted. In short, he had become "a fifth wheel on the waggon." [36]

The facts show that there was much truth in Stockenstrom's contentions. The Commissioner-Generalship did lose a great deal in effectiveness through the Secretary of State's inadequate definition of its powers. How easily the civil and military authorities might disagree was proved by an angry dispute between the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Colonel Somerset in May, 1828, over the use of the burgher forces. [37] On the other hand, Stockenstrom was in certain respects himself open to criticism. For instance, incredible as it may seem, the Commissioner-General showed in his evidence before the Aborigines Committee that he was unaware of Lieutenant-Governor Bourke's suspension of the Reprisal System from April, 1826. [38] We shall consider later whether his conduct in connection with the Commandos of 1830 and 1831 was not at fault.

In weighing up the merits and defects of Stockenstrom's administration we must attach due importance to his character and personality. From his correspondence, his Memoirs, and his evidence before the Aborigines Committee, and from the testimony of his contemporaries it is clear that Stockenstrom was a man of high ideals, utterly opposed to injustice and oppression in any form, and intent on advancing the interests of all sections of his countrymen, of whatever colour. He was also industrious and energetic, and his arrangements at the Kat River Settlement showed careful attention to detail. He proved at the time of the Slachter's Nek Rebellion, during his Lieutenant-Governorship, in the struggle for Representative Government, and at many other times, that he could stand alone in defence of what he believed to be right. But there was another side

to his nature, one difficult to understand, which gained for him many enemies during his career. He certainly took offence very easily. Numerous passages in his correspondence and his Autobiography are devoted to defending himself against critics, real or imaginary. Frequently he used the most passionate language. During the Commissioner-Generalship he quarrelled with Judge Menzies, and wrote letters of tremendous length rebutting charges made against him in connection with his administration as Landdrost. Before he left the Colony he clashed with Cole over the degree of power assumed by the latter in the Council. It is obvious, then, that Stockenstrom could be a difficult man to work with. A more genial character, one who could accept or disregard criticism without anger and see public questions in a less personal light, might perhaps have placed the office upon a sounder footing.

We shall see that the Commissioner-Generalship was not the complete failure that Stockenstrom in his first disappointment felt it to have been. During this period he was to play an honourable part in Hottentot Emancipation, and to set on foot the highly interesting Kat River Settlement. Though the problems of the North-Eastern and Eastern Frontiers were not brought to an effective settlement in these years, the failure of the administration to cope adequately with them was already of old time and was to continue for years to come. Native policy was still in the melting-pot, and, in the absence of the funds necessary for native administration, contributions to the solution of these problems were necessarily limited in scope.

CHAPTER XII

HOTTENTOT EMANCIPATION

The credit for Ordinance 50 of 1828, which brought about sweeping changes in the position of the Hottentots, must be taken by the British philanthropic and evangelical movement which did so much to stimulate missionary activity and interest in the coloured peoples of the Cape Colony. Mainly through the efforts of Dr. John Philip, Superintendent of the London Missionary Society stations in South Africa, steadily increasing attention had been paid in the years before 1828 to the conditions under which the Hottentots were living. [1] In 1826 Philip went to England to urge Hottentot reforms upon the British Government. In April, 1828, his "Researches in South Africa" was published, and in July of that year the House of Commons presented an address to the King, asking that directions should be given "for effectually securing to all the natives of South Africa the same freedom and protection as are enjoyed by other free people at the Cape." [2] On 5 August the Secretary of State sent off a copy of Philip's publication to the Cape, and authorised the Governor to remedy any well substantiated causes of complaint on the part of the natives of the Colony. Particular attention was drawn to the law of contracts with Hottentots, the apprenticeship of Hottentot children under the Proclamation of 1809, and the law of vagrancy. [3]

Meanwhile Lieutenant-Governor Bourke, who was very shortly to be superseded by Sir Lowry Cole, had taken action at the Cape. In 1825, before he left England, he had informed the London Missionary Society that he was most anxious to improve the condition of the Hottentots, [4] and, as he afterwards stated, he had soon after his arrival at the Cape realised the need for such an enactment as Ordinance 50 was to be. Therefore he had had "much consultation with those persons whom he considered to be best acquainted with the condition of the people for whose benefit it (was later) passed. [5] One of these persons was Andries Stockenstrom.

In February, 1827, Bourke had asked the Landdrosts of four frontier districts for their opinions on a scheme for admitting Kaffirs into the Colony to enter service with the colonists. In expressing his views Landdrost Stockenstrom referred also to the condition of the Hottentots. He stated that he was "equally remote" from agreeing with those who maintained that these people were unfit to enjoy any extent of liberty, as with their opponents who considered them incapable of doing wrong once they were freed from the restraints which bound the rest of the community. They should be made to work unless they could prove that they could live without working. They should be watched closely, for in a country where property, particularly sheep and cattle, was so much exposed, it was easy to live by theft. "But", continued Stockenstrom, "provided they do work, to apprentice them, or their children if they can maintain them, or to say where, with whom, or for how much they shall work, or how apply their earnings, is as impolitic as it is unjust; and upon this principle I would not only propose to deal with the savages now the subject of consideration, but all free classes who are not above the reach of such scrutiny, from their known avocations, fixed abodes, or respectability of character." [6]

Believing that the subject was being attended to by the Commissioners of Inquiry, Bourke refrained from bringing forward any measure of his own until it appeared certain that none was likely to come from them. [7] At length on April 3, 1828, the Commissioner-General submitted [8] to him a memorandum on the position of the "free inhabitants", and particularly the Hottentots, of the Colony. In this document Stockenstrom commenced by criticising the distinction made between the various classes of free inhabitants by the existing laws. These laws had been enacted with the object of preventing retaliation by the natives for "the aggressions and outrages" committed against them by the colonists. They had retarded the improvement of the coloured peoples and kept alive prejudices which had arisen during the earlier history of the settlement. They had humiliated the natives and gradually degraded their moral character. This had produced the plea that they were

"too miserable and inferior a species" to participate in the rights and liberties enjoyed by the more fortunate classes. "The old system," stated the Commissioner-General, "is not worth retaining any longer .... I therefore do not hesitate to recommend the enactment of a law placing every free inhabitant in the Colony on a level, in the eye of the law, as to the enjoyment of personal liberty and the security of his property, subject, of course, to those limitations which the local circumstances of individuals may subject them to, upon principles admitted and acted upon under most civilised governments."

The memorandum then dealt more specifically with the Hottentots. This people, in Stockenstrom's opinion, were "born to the right of citizenship and entitled to hold land (though I have heard this disputed", but various "draw-backs" had been imposed upon them by the laws of the Colony. Examples of these were "the prohibition against their possessing fire-arms; their liability to perform duties to which the whites would not condescend; their obligation to show passes to any person of the latter colour, though in every other respect, perhaps, their inferiors; the deprivation and apprenticeship of their children, when often they themselves can provide for those children." The ordinance which the Commissioner-General had just proposed should therefore repeal these and similar laws. Contracts for more than a month's service should only be valid if formally entered into before a notary, Clerk of the Peace, or Justice of the Peace, and they should be in writing. No contract should be for longer than one year. The apprenticing of children, as regulated by the Proclamation of 1812 and a later one of 1823, should be abolished "as most injurious and oppressive." No such apprenticeship should be allowed, except upon the principle laid down in the Proclamation of 9 July, 1819, and certain amendments should be made in the latter. This was not, however, to interfere with the right of parents to bind their children as apprentices, or any competent individual to bind himself.

Two further proposals of the Commissioner-General are of special interest as not being embodied in Ordinance 50. First, the

enactment he desired should consist of "one comprehensive law, embracing all free inhabitants without reference to colour or name of the tribe." This would "avoid the odium of denominating particular classes." Second, it "would ... enact prohibitions against such an abuse of the liberty generally conceded, as would endanger the peace of the community. It would become absolutely necessary that a person travelling to any distance from where he is known should be provided with a pass, or be able to satisfy the local authorities that his pursuits are legal." It would also be the duty of every inhabitant to secure persons "taken upon well-founded suspicion of criminality, skulking in secret haunts without apparent means of subsistence, or collecting in gangs." "The laws against vagrants would undoubtedly require to be rigorously enforced."

The memorandum concluded by stating that "if His Honour .... should be pleased to attach any weight to these observations, and contemplate an ordinance, various minutiae would come under consideration; as only the leading principles of the policy suggested to be adopted are above laid down, with every possible deference to His Honour's better judgment." [9] It was submitted by the Commissioner-General in April, 1828, and (by Stockenstrom's account) "placed in the hands of" Judge Barton. From the latter Ordinance 50 "received its legal shape and details", which were "more extended and complicated" than Stockenstrom had intended. [10] It was promulgated on 17 July, and approved by the Secretary of State in a despatch of 10 January, 1829.

It is clear that this highly important piece of legislation was, generally speaking, imposed upon the Colony from without. Bourke's despatch to Huskisson informing him of the enactment, and Murray's to Cole authorizing him to legislate on Hottentot grievances crossed at sea. Had the Cape authorities not taken the initiative themselves at this time, a law resembling Ordinance 50 would yet have been soon enacted. Nevertheless, credit is due to Bourke and Stockenstrom, who were as eager for Hottentot emancipation as the leaders of the "philanthropic" party. Particularly noteworthy was the way Stockenstrom, a man born in South Africa and exposed all his life to

Colonial currents of thought, rose above the prevailing ideas of his time and played his part in securing fair treatment for the Coloured People. Creditable, too, was the clear insight shown by the Commissioner-General into the nature of the injustices suffered by this people.

Ordinance 50, "the Magna Carta of the Hottentots," repealed the Hottentot laws of 1809-1819. It cancelled the law of passes, and stated that "no Hottentot or other free person of colour" should be subject to any compulsory service to which other free inhabitants were not liable, "nor to any hindrance, molestation, fine, or imprisonment ... under the pretence ... of vagrancy." It removed all doubts as to the right of Hottentots to possess land. It laid down that oral contracts should be valid for one month only, and written contracts for twelve. The relations between masters and servants were regulated along the lines laid down by Caledon in 1809, but with some changes. The laws of apprenticeship were revised, and it was enacted that no child might be apprenticed without its parents' consent.

It will be seen how closely the Ordinance followed Stockenstrom's suggestions. It was, however, unlike Stockenstrom's proposed enactment, a piece of class legislation, referring specifically to "Hottentots and other free persons of colour." It was not until 1841 that a Master and Servants Act made no mention of colour. Further, Stockenstrom's advice that careful provision should be made against vagrancy was not taken.

There can be no doubt that the promulgation of Ordinance 50 was followed in the short run by an increase of Hottentot vagrancy and stock theft.[11] Thomas Pringle, a friend of Dr. Philip's and a keen supporter of the "philanthropic" movement, stated that a large number of these people, finding themselves free of "coercive shackles", left the service of the colonists as soon as their contracts expired, and some even fancied themselves authorised to break off these engagements. "Many," he wrote, "repaired to the missionary institutions..... without having adequate means to maintain themselves there. Numbers flocked to the district towns and villages, where

the temptation of cheap brandy, procurable by little labour, soon betrayed many into profligate habits, and led some of them to commit depredations on the flocks of the farmers." [12] Stockenstrom, [13] Dundas, [14] and Wade [15] all gave evidence to the same effect before the Aborigines Committee. Bourke [16] and Cole [17] considered the abuse sufficient to warrant a Vagrancy Law. The Returns of Albany and Somerset during the years immediately following 1828 abound in complaints of Hottentot thefts, vagrancy, trespassing, and drunkenness. The Civil Commissioner stated in 1832 that the "depredations" committed by "idle Hottentots" were contributing with other factors to produce a sense of insecurity among the colonists. [18] From Grahamstown came a report that many Hottentot families had made temporary sheds in the bushes about the town, and there were general complaints against Hottentots, slaves, and others, who left their masters' premises in the town and country during the night and committed robberies. [20] W. Currie, Justice of the Peace at Bathurst, stated that "Hottentots and other free persons of colour" frequently broke their contracts and ran away from their masters. Individuals and families idled about the village and country without means of support and perpetrated petty thefts. Bathurst lay on the road between Theopolis mission station and Kaffir Drift, and its canteen was most convenient for the people of the former. Thus there were frequent drunken squabbles in the village, and, in the absence of a proper lock-up, malefactors had to be kept in the Constable's kitchen. [21] The Constable at Cradock reported "nightly depredations, drunkenness, and rioting", by the Hottentots of that village. One night in January, 1830, the prison was surrounded by a body of Hottentots who tried to break in. On Sundays, at the time of Divine Service, numbers of them were "in the practice of fighting and dancing." [22]

These unfortunate short-term results of Ordinance 50 were to be attributed to the sudden liberation of the Hottentots from the pass laws which had hitherto bound them, and to the lack of available land for those who really desired to settle down. To the

solution of the land question Stockenstrom was to contribute by founding the Kat River Settlement. [25] Vagrancy and theft, however, were widespread evils during these years, and they contributed to the dissatisfaction which was soon to find an outlet in the Great Trek. It is impossible to say how far this discontent was the result of Hottentot Emancipation itself, and how far of the manner in which it was effected. The Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset reported in 1832 that Ordinance 50 had impressed many of the colonists with the idea that the Government cared more for the welfare of the Hottentots than that of the white population. [24] Stockenstrom also considered that there was much irritation in various parts of the Colony, but believed that the mass of the population would be satisfied with the suppression of vagrancy and thefts. [25]

The question of vagrancy was one to which Stockenstrom was fully alive. We have seen that his memorandum had proposed "strict prohibitions" against the abuse of their newly-found liberty by the Hottentots, but this advice had not been accepted. It seems that he continued to hope that steps would be taken to remedy the abuse, for in January, 1829, he told the Council that "the 50th Ordinance will soon be found (after proper checks upon vagrancy have been established) to make the labour of the majority of Hottentots and free blacks more available than it has heretofore been." [26] That same month he informed a correspondent that the difficulty of procuring Hottentots for labour service was due to the "novelty" of the measure for improving that people, and this inconvenience, he hoped, "a very little time will remedy and bring to a proper level." [27] In a report drawn up in June, 1829, he stated that both he and Judge Burton had considered that the enforcement of existing laws in the Colony would have been sufficient to prevent vagrancy. "A few trifling examples would have convinced the Hottentots that the law did not authorise their roaming about without means of subsistence." [28]

Looking back at this period, we can see how difficult it was to remedy this abuse. "The enforcement of existing laws" was impossible, because no one knew exactly what they were. The

Attorney-General, when asked in November, 1828, what constituted vagrancy in the Colony, answered that this was a question he could not solve. [29] More important still, the Colony lacked a proper police force to execute the laws. The alternative, a return to something resembling the old pass system, must have produced many of the pre-1828 evils, for it would have placed the Hottentots once more at the mercy of petty local officials. Light is thrown on the eligibility of the latter for executing pass laws by the fact that W. M. Mackay, ex-Landdrost of Somerset, and H. J. Onkruydt, Clerk of the Peace in that village, advised that Field-Cornets should not be allowed to countersign indentures of Hottentot children under Ordinance 50, as they were exposed to local influences. [30] Yet it was a Vagrancy Law that Bourke and Cole favoured as a solution, and at length in January, 1834, Acting-Governor Wade issued a draft law "for ..... the prevention or punishment of Vagrancy ..... and for securing a sufficiency of labourers to the Colony," although the Cape judges held that it could not stand against Ordinance 50. [31] This law, however, was suspended by D'Urban, the new Governor, and disallowed by the Secretary of State.

The changes wrought in the long run by Ordinance 50 of 1828 were of fundamental importance. "So far as mere legislation could upset established social customs and over-ride the hard facts of economic helplessness, the position of the Hottentots was revolutionised". [32] Drastic operations are never gentle in their immediate effects, and vagrancy and 'depredations' were evils which had to be borne in the interests of later times. For it is in later times that the real value and importance of this Ordinance is to be found. "With the passage of Ordinance 50 the Cape Colony turned a sharp corner. A totally new direction was given to its legislation concerning non-Europeans. Henceforward its laws became 'colour-blind' or in other words, legislation differentiating between one inhabitant and another on the mere ground of colour or race became taboo." [33] When the slaves were emancipated they too inherited the newly-found freedom

of the Hottentots. The enactment was embodied in later Master and Servants Acts, and laws affecting the position of coloured servants followed, in general, the lines it laid down. 1828 saw the commencement of the 'liberal tradition' which flourished at the Cape through many years of constitutional change, and which in these post-Union years has faced and combated the spirit of the trekker North.

CHAPTER IV.

THE KAT RIVER SETTLEMENT

The urgent need of the Hottentots for land of their own to cultivate had already been recognised here and there before 1828. As early as 1800, for example, Major-General Dundas had stated that it was "absolutely essential to the public tranquillity and no less important to themselves (the Hottentots), that they should all be established in situations where they will remain undisturbed, and can subsist themselves in a creditable way." He had proposed settling them on farms "not actually occupied by the colonists", buying some seed-corn and cattle to set them up, and forming them into a community under their own "captains." [1] At a more recent date George Thompson, the traveller, had told the Commissioners of Inquiry that if thefts by this people were to be prevented, places must be bought for industrious Hottentots all over the Colony. [2] Thomas Pringle had advised more specifically that a line of fortified Hottentot villages should be placed in the Ceded Territory to help defend the frontier. These villages, which should be settled according to a definite plan, were to be occupied by a number of Hottentot families from the missionary institutions and farms. Each was to be allotted arable land and pasturage. [3]

We have seen that the need for land was acute after 1828. Vagrancy was the logical result of the emancipation of the Hottentots from the restrictive pass-laws and of the lack of available land. Many preferred veld-kos to the low wages paid by the farmers, and as long as land was unprocurable there could be no incentive to settling down. Commissioner Colebrooke had found that the titles of Hottentots who had settled at missionary institutions were still unconfirmed, and was of opinion that the regulations framed by the missionaries for the management of their institutions (which included the right of arbitrary expulsion) were inapplicable to the existing condition of the Hottentots. [4] At the same time the missionaries of the London Missionary Society complained about the

miserable distribution of land for the use of the missions.[5] In January, 1829, a petition was sent in from Bethelsdorp, stating that lack of land had prevented the natural increase of their cattle and deprived them of the reward of their industry. They thanked the Government for Ordinance 50, which had "declared their ancient right to hold land," and asked that it might be followed by the means of obtaining grants.[6] A petition from Theopolis in March, 1830, drew attention to a similar need at that station.[7]

Faced by the realities of vagrancy and stock-theft, the Government did in 1828 consider ways and means of inducing the Hottentots to settle down. In September of that year the Colonial Secretary wrote to the Commissioner-General, suggesting that much advantage would be derived from the settlement of Hottentot families on vacant Government lands in the vicinity of towns and villages, where they might enjoy the protection of a civil magistrate. Stockenstrom was instructed to investigate and point out places which would, in his opinion, be suitable. It was planned to place the Hottentots on small erven, each head of a family getting not more than one morgen. These grants should be free of rent for three years, provided that a house of certain dimensions was built on them, in stone or brick, within that period. When these conditions had been fulfilled the erven should be granted on perpetual quit-rent at 1s.6d. per annum. To each settlement a portion of grazing ground should be allowed as commonage. The distribution of water should be conducted at the expense of occupiers of erven.[8]

It was some time before the Commissioner-General answered this letter. At length, on December 13, he wrote to say that he had carefully considered the subject, and had decided that the settlement of the Hottentots near towns was not advisable. These people, he said, "in their present condition" had not sufficient check on themselves to resist the strong liquor which was to be procured in the towns. "Shops for the retail of such liquor would be opened; every dispensable article would be turned into money for the purchase thereof; the conditions of the grants would not be complied with; the grants would consequently be cancelled, and the

inhabitants dispersed, further removed from civilisation than when they were collected." Further, it was not desirable that special measures should be taken for promoting the advancement of the Hottentots, who were now legally on the same footing as the Europeans. "Villages and towns should be left to create themselves, as the improvement of trade induces people to settle in compact numbers." Stockenstrom then drew attention to a letter he had written the previous month, which had stated that the occupation of the whole Ceded Territory was essential for effective frontier defence. "In it", he now stated, "I should propose settling as many Hottentots (indiscriminately with other colonists) as can be found with sufficient character, recommendation, and property, or assistance of others, to be set up as graziers or agriculturists." The grants should be as small as the water and other conditions would allow, in order to secure a dense population and strong defence. Among the discharged soldiers of the Cape Corps, at the missionary institutions, and in other parts of the Colony, many Hottentots of this description could be found. "No better defence against the Kaffirs (in case of necessity) does exist than such a community of Hottentots, attached to the soil by the right of property, would be." [9]

In January, 1829, the chief Makoma attacked the Tambookies (Tembus) under Powana, drove them into the Tarka district, put several of them to death, and carried off their cattle. [10] In February the Government decided to expel him and his people from the land they were occupying about the sources of the Kat River, in the most northern part of the Ceded Territory, and the following month the Commissioner-General and the Commandant of the Frontier were ordered to perform this task. [11] Stockenstrom left at once by sea for Algoa Bay, and on the voyage it occurred to him that here was his opportunity of locating Hottentots in the Ceded Territory. [12] On April 16 he arrived at Algoa Bay, and proceeded at once to Uitenhage. Thence he sent in a memorandum, dated April 17, describing his views at length. This document begins with a general observation that "whatever may be said of the policy of the Government relative to the Ceded Territory originally, it is now perfectly clear that it is locked

upon as part of the Colony and that the understanding [13] between Sir Rufane Donkin and Gaika is consider'd binding." Now it has been decided to expel certain Kaffirs from this region, but there is a danger that when this has been done they may return, scatter over the Ceded Territory, and cause trouble. The Government, however, has ample resources with which to make the expulsion effective. There are many Hottentot families scattered over the country without fixed abodes; at the mission stations there are numbers who complain that they cannot live there, because their flocks are dying for want of pasturage; with the farmers there must also be many who are anxious to better their condition. Among these people there must be many who can be recommended as steady characters, many who have served as soldiers, and many who have stock with which to begin farming. They might be collected together, marched to Koonap Post, [14] and there armed. Thence they might advance with the troops into the territory from which Makana is to be driven, while their families follow at their leisure with their flocks and other possessions. They would then be settled in small parties at places where they could support and be supported by the military, and would become a permanent barrier against the Kaffirs. Their location should, however, be provisional, because permanent grants would deprive them of the "examples of industry and civilisation" which would be provided for them by indiscriminate mixing with European settlers; because the approval of the Home Government still has to be obtained for this scheme; and because it may be prudent to give these people a trial and find out which of them, by their industry and general good conduct, are worthy of grants of land. The Hottentots are well suited for the purpose in hand, and will gladly take up their abode in the Kat River region. From the point of view of the colonists, the scheme would put an end to the clamour about their wandering over the Colony, and would deprive them of their plea of having no place of refuge. The Hottentots would settle "near enough each other to meet often for the purpose of religious instruction", and would be benefitted by missionary labour. In time "the way would be paved for their

gradually becoming land-holders more generally." [15]

The following week Stockenstrom again referred to his scheme. He had meanwhile consulted with Colonel Somerset, who agreed that it was necessary to settle a dense population on the frontier, but did not favour Hottentot settlements, as there would be enough Europeans to fill up the Ceded Territory. The Commissioner-General, however, repeated his conviction that deserving Hottentots should not be excluded, for "if we (keep) them from all participation in the possession of the soil we may force them to quit the Colony and strengthen our enemies." [16] Maleoma was expelled in the first week of May. On the 8th the Colonial Secretary communicated to Stockenstrom the Governor's acceptance of his scheme. The Hottentots who were to settle in the Ceded Territory must be subject to the same conditions [17] as the colonists who had entered that region. They had to be prepared to help with frontier defence, and their occupation was to be provisional. It was left to the Commissioner-General to assemble them as he saw fit, and to make regulations for grazing and defence of stock for the parties he located. [18]

Stockenstrom received this letter at the Kat River on the 22nd and decided to visit those places where he would probably meet the greatest number of Hottentots of the type he wanted. Accordingly he proceeded to Grahamstown, and instructed the Civil Commissioner to help collect suitable characters. On the 26th he wrote from Theopolis to say that although the Hottentots' allotments, when permanently made, would be mixed up with those of Europeans, he did not intend locating the farmers and Hottentots together at present, as this would lead to jealousies and disputes, in which the latter people and their flocks would be the sufferers. [19] On the 30th he advised that fire-arms should be issued to Hottentots who were without them, and the Governor approved the proposal. [20] On June 5 Stockenstrom wrote from Bethelsdorp, reporting that he had explained the views of the Government to the Hottentots there, and was returning at once to the frontier, touching at Knon, where members were expecting him. [21]

During June many Hottentots and Bastards arrived on the Kat River. Stockenstrom was hopeful of success, but asked that liberal

allowances should be made for their first efforts, as they laboured under many disadvantages. They had little seed, and had suffered severely from the drought. [22] On July 1 he sent in a plan for provisional locations on the North-Eastern branches of the Kat. A strong party from the Somerset and Graaff-Reinet districts had been placed in two divisions on the Mancazana and 'Toatoa' under "a respectable Bastard" named Groepe. Another from Theopolis was located under one Boesak on the 'Kogne' and 'Tebenze'. The Rhon party was expected shortly, and was to be settled on two other tributaries. Stockenstrom had decided to place them under Johannes Tromp, a Sergeant of the late Cape Corps. Other branches of the river were to be reserved for the Bethelsdorp party. [23]

During the following months the Kat River Settlement grew steadily, and in September the Commissioner-General reported that, despite the frontier scare of the previous month, the locations were "on the increase and in a very thriving condition." [24] According to a Return drawn up by Stockenstrom, 881 people had been provisionally settled on the Kat River by January, 1830. [25] Who were these people, and whence did they come? On this matter we must speak with the utmost caution. Stockenstrom, who left the frontier in 1831, told the Aborigines Committee that the majority of the settlers were Bastards (half-breeds), not pure Hottentots, and that most of the heads of parties were also Bastards, "those far advanced in the amalgamation or crossing with the European races." [26] But even the roughest figures of the relative numbers of Bastards and Hottentots are lacking. Stockenstrom stated that many of the settlers came from the London Missionary Society missions, and these contributed a great deal to the Settlement, but not more than many who came with property earned on the farms. [27] On the other hand, Dr. Philip declared that the families from Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, who brought with them "cattle, wagons, and implements of husbandry," formed in 1829 "the great proportion" of the new settlers and were, "generally speaking, the only persons qualified for improving and civilising those of their countrymen who had not enjoyed similar advantages." [28] Colonel Wade's evidence is of interest, though it refers to the end

of 1834, when he visited the Kat River. He found the Bastards "men of sober, industrious, and settled habits", "an infinitely superior class to the Hottentots," and he attributed the success of the Settlement chiefly to their example. [29] On the subject of what fraction of the settlers came from regions other than the frontier districts there is, once again, no real evidence. In July, 1839, we find Stockenstrom reserving certain branches of the Kat for "such people as His Excellency may be disposed to admit from more remote parts of the Colony". [30] A month previously he had instructed the Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet to send on to the Eastern Frontier a number of Hottentot families of New Hantam, who had been compelled by lack of land to migrate from certain parts of the Beaufort District. [31] On July 2 he told a Field-Commandant van Wyk that he was expecting some Hottentots from the Orange River, and gave orders for their safe conduct. [32] Of relative numbers there is no mention.

In the early days of the Settlement Stockenstrom and the authorities in Cape Town were determined to admit only those Hottentots who were of good character and had property of their own. Soon, however, would-be settlers flocked in from all sides, many of them people without property, who had hitherto been vagrants. It seemed harsh to refuse these people an opportunity of bettering their condition, and it became difficult to exclude them. [33] According to the Rev. J. Read, Stockenstrom stated that he had himself, as Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, given to the colonists hundreds of 'places' which they had sold or neglected, and he thought the Hottentots should be given a fair trial. Thus the Commissioner-General "sent in from different parts of the Colony very many that had nothing whatever, and the most unlikely persons to succeed." [34] Stockenstrom told the Aborigines Committee that only a third or a quarter of the Hottentots who came to the Settlement had property. [35]

In December, 1839, Stockenstrom issued "Provisional Regulations" for the Settlement. These were concerned largely with the defence of the locations and the protection of stock. On each location there were to be not less than ten able-bodied men, capable of bearing arms

and doing patrol and commando duties. Any respectable Hottentot [36] capable of mustering this number of men should be allowed to select a location (subject to the approval of the Commissioner-General, the Civil Commissioner, or some other qualified person), occupy it, and be considered head of his party. Every person who joined a party was to submit to the orders of its head, who was held responsible for the conduct of his followers. Not more than two men out of every ten capable of bearing arms were to be allowed at one time to be absent from the location to which they belonged. Of the remainder two were always to be with the flocks, three to be prepared to go on patrol and Commando duty, and three to protect the houses and families. C. J. Groepe was to act as Field Cornet "on all ordinary occasions", and to him the heads of parties were to report important events. In case of any sudden levy on the armed forces, "Captain" Boosak was to take command until the arrival of a military or burgher officer. No Kaffirs were to be allowed to wander about the locations, and Kaffir cattle found straying into the Settlement were to be sent to the nearest kraal. The men liable to Commando duty were to repair the roads when necessary. The Commissioner-General would after "a reasonable period" inspect the roads and cultivated lands, and see whether the settlers were duly exerting themselves, "as the farther favour of His Excellency must be entirely regulated by the merits of the candidates themselves." Judicial matters, both criminal and civil, were to be subject to the same jurisdiction as the rest of the Colony. Expulsion would follow any case of disobedience to local regulations or conviction on a crime. [37]

The Kat River Settlement formed part of Stockenstrom's system of frontier defence, [38] and he intended that the Hottentots should co-operate, when needed, with the military. In April,1830, he reported that by the time the locations had been completed there would be 400 men available for burgher duty on the upper branches of the Kat, [39] and the following month, by request of Colonel Somerset, he was able to place at the latter's disposal a detachment to be stationed between Forts Willshire and Beaufort during the winter. [40] The Hottentots of the Settlement were to be subject to the same

regulations concerning defence and recovery of stock from the Kaffirs as were laid down for the Europeans in the Ceded Territory, with the addition of their own "Provisional Regulations." [41]

In 1851 Stockenstrom stated in detail the conditions upon which land was to be allotted in the Settlement. In doing this he aimed at ensuring that allotments should be granted only to people who were willing to work hard and live decently. It was provided that settlers had to make definite improvements on their lands within five years, otherwise they would revert to the Government. The conditions referred to fencing, cultivation, and building. Allotments were to be granted in full title, as soon as they could be surveyed, to those who made the required improvements. Every land-holder was to have the right to graze a certain number of stock on the commonage. It was also stipulated that no holder of an erf should "harbour any person who had no permission to remain within the Settlement." [42]

In accepting the Commissioner-General's plan for settling Hottentots on the Kat River, the Government had left him to decide whether they should be kept apart from the European farmers or mixed with them. [43] Stockenstrom himself favoured the latter scheme, but soon found it to be out of the question, as the farmers could not be satisfied with grants which would suffice for Hottentots, and in a system of close settlement extensive farms could find no place. [44] Read later gave evidence that the Hottentots had begged to be left alone for a few years, and Stockenstrom had entered into their feelings and said, "Then show the world that you can work as well as others, and that without the sjambok." [45]

During the first three years of the Settlement Stockenstrom was able to visit it from time to time and see that his instructions were carried out. Cole informed the Secretary of State in January, 1851, that as the Commissioner-General attended to the settlers' wants and complaints, it had not yet become necessary to appoint a magistrate on the spot. [46] Judge Menzies, during a brief visit in 1850, also gained the impression that the Settlement did not yet need a special magistrate, as the people seemed quite capable of managing their own affairs without European interference. [47] Stockenstrom told the

Aboriginees Committee that he could remember only two cases tried before the civil courts in which Kat River settlers were accused. [48] According to Read, differences were decided by "what might be called a jury", the parties choosing their own judges. During these early years Stockenstrom's personal influence clearly did much to launch the Settlement successfully. Cole paid warm tribute to his "zeal and assiduity", while Read stated that he thoroughly understood the people he had to deal with and knew many of them personally. [49] We shall see that the removal of his supervision after 1831 had results injurious to the Settlement.

During their early months on the Kat River the settlers had many difficulties to contend with. Numbers of them had no food when they arrived, and had to live on roots, berries, Kaffir melons, and what they could get from friends who were better off than themselves. Many had no agricultural implements of any kind, and these either made rough wooden ploughs and hired oxen, or worked for others in return for pay. [50] The young Settlement commenced under most trying climatic conditions. In the neighbourhood of the Katberg the winters are intensely cold. After the sun has fallen the temperature drops rapidly, and often there is severe frost. The winter of 1829 was unusually rigorous. In June, 1829, there were heavy rains on the Eastern Frontier, and, while these greatly benefitted the crops, it became colder than at any time since 1820. Much snow fell in the Somerset district, and there were casualties among the farmers' stock. [51] Under these conditions it was to be expected that the Government would make some effective contribution to the Settlement during its initial stages. But this was not to be. The scheme was but an "experiment", and the authorities confined themselves to providing 15 to 20 muids of Indian corn and some oats, and lending guns and ammunition to those who were unarmed. [52] A further draw-back to the progress of the Settlement was the Government's slowness in having the lands marked out. It was not until May, 1831, that the Commissioner-General was instructed to have the locations surveyed and to confirm in their allotments those Hottentots who had conducted themselves well. [53] The task of surveying the Settlement

proved a laborious one, and it was not until shortly before the Sixth Kaffir War that the majority of the people had had their lands pointed out to them. Thus many of those who had a little property used it in assisting their friends, rather than let them leave the locations and lose the land they hoped to receive. [54]

Despite these handicaps the Kat River locations quickly settled down. During the first year the Hottentots had little seed, and their crops were insufficient for consumption and for the following season's seed. In the second year, however, they were able to provide for their families and also to deliver a surplus at neighbouring military posts. [55] The settlers had at once set to work, tilling and sowing the land and cutting watercourses, and Dr. Philip wrote in 1830, after he had visited the Settlement:

"The exertions of the people are beyond anything I ever saw, or could have imagined. To the long reiterated calumnies of their enemies, that Hottentots will not work unless they are driven to it by the sambok, we can point to these labours, and triumphantly ask, where can they show us in the whole Colony such an example of industry? ... When their former state is taken into consideration, the whole appeared more like a dream than a reality." [56]

Stockenstrom was also highly satisfied with the efforts of the settlers, and contrasted the apathy and improvidence of the Hottentots before 1828 with the industry shown on the Kat River. [57]

For some time the Governor refrained from sending a clergyman to the Settlement, as he wished to see whether it was likely to succeed. In June, 1830, however, the Rev. J. Read, at the request of the Hottentots who had migrated from Bethelsdorp and Theopolis, settled on the Kat River. Cole was most suspicious of this move, as he disliked missionary interference with what was entirely a 'Government experiment', and he feared that Dr. Philip and his friends were bent on claiming the credit for the scheme. The following month, therefore, the Rev. W. R. Thompson, the late Government Agent at Gaika's kraal, was installed as official clergyman to the Hottentot settlers, and it was impressed on Read that his residence on the

In attempting to describe the progress of the Settlement during these years it will greatly simplify matters to take first the evidence of positive advance, and then to mention the difficulties which, partially at least, it had failed to overcome.

In January, 1850, Stockenstrom sent in a "Return of Hottentots provisionally settled in the Ceded Territory." This gave a detailed account of where the various parties, 18 in number, had been located, and provided the following statistics:

Number of men 343; women 187; children 451; private muskets 127; Government muskets 99; waggons 58; ploughs 22; horses 369; cattle 1822; oxen 792; sheep and goats 8,227.

In 1850 Judge Menzies visited the Kat River, and was duly impressed by the labours of the Hottentots. He found that many water-courses had been cut, and, except at two places, every location had enough corn and pumpkins to last it during the winter. Despite the thefts of Kaffir vagrants, horse-sickness, and the amount of work wasted in cutting furrows in unsuitable parts, the people were healthy and happy, and all had provided themselves with huts.[60]

The Grahamstown Journal published a letter in June, 1852, written by Robert Godlonton,[61] describing a visit made by him to the Kat River Settlement. He drew attention to certain problems on the locations, but gave the following as his conclusion:

"They (the settlers) have been placed in a situation equally critical and conspicuous. With nothing to depend on but their own resources, the whole Colony has watched with much interest this experimental test of the capability of the coloured classes to exercise the duties devolving on denizens having a direct and positive interest in the soil they occupy; and though the difficulties they have had to contend with were arduous and discouraging, they have been found equal to every exigency; and it must now be admitted that a large measure of success has at length crowned their united efforts."

Having estimated[62] the numbers of stock possessed by the people and remarked on their lowness in relation to the population of the

Settlement, Godlonton observed that the success of the latter must therefore depend entirely on the settlers' industry.

"Hitherto," he said, "great activity has been displayed; and the incipient marks of civilisation observable in every direction clearly indicate that, where no impediments oppress, they are capable of attaining a respectable station in the ranks of society .... Independently of the labour required in the cultivation of the soil, instances of uncommon exertion and perseverance are manifested in the construction of channels, which convey water to their fields and gardens. In some places they have been carried through the solid rock; in others it has been necessary to cut to the depth of twelve feet, to preserve the level while their entire length throughout all the locations is upwards of twenty thousand yards."

During the previous season 450 muids of wheat, 1,600 of barley, and 400 of Indian corn had been reaped in the Settlement, "besides large quantities of wheat, potatoes, pumpkins, sweet-cane, and many other edibles of a minor character."

Godlonton then referred to the "inordinate desire for spirituous liquors", which had hitherto degraded the Hottentots and caused great misery among them. At length, he said, this evil had been "arrested in its progress." Twelve hundred of the settlers had joined a Temperance Society which had lately been formed on the frontier, "and although it is not pretended that intemperance is entirely banished, yet it may be asserted that the habitual use of intoxicating liquors is now looked upon in a disreputable light, and that instances of drunkenness are of very rare occurrence."

Finally Godlonton stated that the settlers were keen that their children should be given education, and two "infant schools" had been established.[63]

In his evidence before the Aborigines Committee Colonel Wade gave these figures for 1833:

Parties 58; population 3,114; riding horses 88; breeding horses 142; cattle 2,444; sheep 4,996; muids of wheat and barley reaped 2,300; built, besides inferior cottages, 12 substantial stone houses and 13 orchards; canals 55, of which 44 measured nearly 24 miles.[64]

In May, 1853, the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset sent in a lengthy report on the Settlement. Although he found that on certain locations little advance had been made, on the great majority much labour had been spent and there was evidence of substantial progress, while in some there was already real comfort. Few parties had failed to connect their locations with branches of the Kat by water-courses. Campbell's report is of special interest, as it deals separately with each of the parties, and gives details of their activities and the difficulties they had to contend with.[65] In a letter written the following month the Civil Commissioner mentioned that the settlers had, by their voluntary efforts, built a church, capable of holding 300 or 400 people, for the Rev. Read.[66]

At the close of 1854 Wade visited the Settlement, and found that 300 mounted and 451 unmounted men were available for defence,[67] with 458 stand of arms, of which 192 were private property. The settlers were suffering considerably at this time from the intrusions of vagrants and Kaffir depredations, but Wade concluded from the statistics of the settlers' progress that "they could be industrious, and were as capable of contending with ordinary difficulties as any of their countrymen."[68]

In a Memorandum on the Kat River Settlement drawn up at a later date Dr. J. Rose-Innes gave the following as the Returns for December, 1854 (just before the outbreak of the Sixth Kaffir War):

Horses 624; black cattle 5,406; sheep and goats 8,925; quantity of seed sown - 300 muids of wheat, barley, and oats, 70 muids of Indian corn, beans, and peas, 645 ridges of pumpkins; quantity reaped - 1,500 muids of wheat, barley, and oats, 60 muids of Indian corn, etc., and 55 loads of pumpkins.[69]

One important hindrance to the progress of the Settlement was the great poverty of the bulk of the people. We have seen that in setting the scheme on foot the Government had intended, as far as possible, to admit only persons with property, but that soon it had been found impossible to exclude numbers of Hottentots who possessed

nothing. The result was that as newcomers arrived they had to be provided for by those who had already settled down, and the continual entry of people seeking land for themselves caused a good deal of disturbance. While Stockenstrom was still Commissioner-General 'Gonahs' were beginning to migrate from 'Kaffirland' and settle among the Hottentots, and there was already some vagrancy on the Settlement, though limited in extent. Stockenstrom stated afterwards that "the vagrants who gave occasion for complaints were Mantatees, [70] Gonaquas, and Hottentots who were coming in. People were rushing in from all sides, and before they could all be settled there were irregularities, and complaints made." [71] Godlonton found in 1832 that the extreme poverty of the "great bulk" of the people was retarding the progress of those who were better circumstanced:

"Hospitality with the Hottentots is, in general, carried to such an extreme pitch that it ceases to be a virtue ... It cannot be concealed that many, without an article of property, have left service and joined the Settlement that they might there indulge in habitual sloth and listless inactivity; and the consequence is that others who, when they went thither, possessed a decent property, the earnings of their whole lives, have in the short intervening period exhausted the whole of it."

Vagrancy and 'squatting' increased during these years. As early as February, 1830, Stockenstrom had ordered Field-Cornet Groepe to remove some of Makoma's Kaffirs, who had settled on part of the locations. [72] A Return of May, 1833, signed by Civil Commissioner Campbell, stated that there were then 416 Bechuanas, 40 Kaffirs, 126 Fingos, and 79 'Gonahs' on the Settlement. [73] In December of that year Campbell reported that "a large number of Kaffirs," with their families and stock, had taken up their abode there. The ease with which the Settlement might be entered had enabled many to pass through it further into the Colony, where, being armed, they caused trouble and alarm. The settlers themselves also entered Kaffirland without passes, annoyed the natives, and committed "irregularities" in the vicinity of the Wesleyan missions. [74] Wade also gave evidence of the intrusions of "foreigners", who established themselves "not only as

squatters, but in regular kraals in the heart of the locations." They were described to him by the Acting Commissary-General as "idle dissolute vagabonds who declined to take service, following no occupation subsisting on the plunder of the inhabitants, and ... sturdily refusing to leave the Settlement when required to do so." When Wade visited the Kat River at the end of 1834, the settlers complained that they were "eaten up" by swarms of friends and relations, who had no fixed abode or means of subsistence.[75]

Although we have comparatively little detailed information on the extent of Kaffir 'depredations' on the Settlement during these years, it is reasonably clear that the Hottentots did suffer a good deal from the natives, and especially from Makoma's people, who had recently been expelled from the Ceded Territory. At an early date a detachment of troops was stationed at the 'Kat River Post', immediately in front of the locations, to assist in recovering stock and in defending that part of the frontier. From time to time we hear of trouble from the natives. Thus in August Field-Cornet Groepe reported that he had received orders to drive out his party and subsequent messages asking when he meant to move off. At the same time Colonel Somerset stated that the Kaffirs were committing "daily depredations" on the Hottentots' cattle.[76] One of the reasons for the Commando of June, 1830, was the manner in which the Kaffirs had harassed the Hottentot locations, and the abuse and threats which Groepe received when he traced cattle several times to Tyalie's kraals.[77] When Read joined the Settlement in May of that year, he found "a feeling against the Kaffirs" because of the depredations of the latter, and he had to use his "utmost exertions" to cultivate better relations between them.[78] The cause assigned for Makoma's[79] and Tyalie's removal from the Ceded Territory in 1833 was the fact that their people stole the cattle of the Hottentots, occupied their grazing ground with their herds, and drove the latter into the corn-lands and gardens of the locations.[80] Wade informed the Aborigines Committee that the Settlement had been "constantly harassed" by the Kaffirs, although they had not, up to the time of his visit at the close of 1834, been called upon to resist "any open attack or general inroad."[81]

Another difficulty of the Settlement during these early years was the maintenance of order among the settlers themselves. During the first four years of the experiment no special magistrate was appointed, and, where the Hottentots could not decide their differences themselves, cases had to be taken to Grahamstown, which was seventy miles away. In December, 1833, Civil Commissioner Campbell reported that petty offences occurred frequently, and occasional trespasses of cattle led to quarrels, but there was no satisfactory way of settling these matters. The want of a matrimonial court also had unfavourable results. Accordingly Wade appointed Captain Armstrong, of the Kat River Post, to act as Justice of the Peace for the Settlement at £100 a year, in addition to his other duties. This appointment of a military officer was due to a desire for economy.[83] It seems, however, that the task of maintaining peace and harmony was complicated by something resembling a party spirit in the Settlement. According to Read, certain of the Bastards had soon shown a desire to attain a pre-eminence over the Hottentots. Stockenstrom had warned them, and during his residence in the Colony all had been well. But no sooner had he gone than they began to treat the Hottentots as inferiors. The unpleasant feeling between them was increased by the appointment of certain men as Field-Cornets against the wishes of many of the Hottentots.[85] Wade also referred to the "party feeling and political discussions" between the Bastards and Hottentots, the former of whom looke almost entirely to the Rev. Thompson, the latter to the Rev. Read as their "spiritual guides". Extracts from letters quoted by Colonel Wade before the Aborigines Committee show that little love was lost between these two men.[84] At the time of the draft Vagrancy Act a meeting was held on the Settlement to discuss the matter, and Read in an address stated that the measure was aimed at the root of Hottentot liberties, and would result in many of them leaving the Colony rather than submit to it. A petition against the law, signed by 400 people, was sent to the Governor in Council. The Bastards of Thompson's congregation, however, then submitted a counter-memorial, asking that the proposed act might become law.[85]

An important problem which already faced the Settlement, and which

was to increase with the years, was that involved in the attitude of the European colonists toward the experiment. The Kat River territory includes some of the best land in South Africa, as Godlonton observed in 1838:

"The soil of the valleys is enriched by alluvial deposits carried down from time to time by the rains, ... and when to this is added the abundance of water flowing in every direction, and so situated that not only all the low lands may be readily irrigated, but even to some height up the sides of the hills, it will easily be imagined that advantages are presented for agriculture which are not, perhaps, surpassed by any other part of the Colony".[86]

These were times when farmers were trekking across the Orange River in search of new pastures, and it was to be expected that many would desire the distribution of the Kat River lands among themselves. Indeed, it was not many years before such a distribution was effected.

It is difficult to estimate how far this desire became general among the farmers during these early years, as the evidence on the subject is very limited. Civil Commissioner Campbell did, however, state that the impression of the frontiersmen after the promulgation of Ordinance 50, that the Government cared more for the Hottentots than for the colonists, was strengthened by the establishment of the Kat River Settlement. They viewed with jealousy, he said, the bestowing of land on any others than themselves. "The local position of the Settlement, between the colonists and the Kaffirs, is also a source of mistrust, as it is supposed by the former that in case of a misunderstanding arising between them and the Kaffirs, the latter will be joined by the Hottentots."[87] Stockenstrom also stated that there were many people who considered it a grievance that they and their relations were not allowed to possess these lands.[88] Apart from the opinion of the farmers on the Settlement itself, the latter grew up amid the bitterness caused by the immediate results of Ordinance 50. In April, 1829 (before the foundation of the Settlement), C. Buchner, a Field-Cornet of a large ward in the east of Uitenhage, told the Acting Civil Commissioner of Albany that "the Boers thought Government had done more for the Hottentots than for them. He said he felt it his duty to make these

remarks, as animosities are increasing and producing reciprocal injury between Boers and Hottentots ... The impression within his district was that ... Government was taking the part of the Hottentots against them." [89] In September of that year the Rev. Thompson advised against mixing the Dutch farmers and the Hottentots in the Ceded Territory, in view of the ill-feeling between them. He considered that "the mutual prejudices in respect of the English people" were not so strong. [90] Stockenstrom later gave evidence that much alarm was felt on the frontier at the arming of hundreds of hungry Hottentots with muskets, and gloomy predictions were made. These were contradicted, however, by the conduct of the settlers. [91]

Light is thrown on the mutual attitudes of the frontiersmen and the Kat River settlers by a frontier 'scare' which took place at the beginning of 1839. On December 30, 1851, Campbell wrote to the Colonial Secretary, enclosing a letter he had received from John Vaughan, a man who lived near the Koonap. According to this letter Frederick Roy, a Hottentot of the Settlement, had told Vaughan that

"the hottentots in the Cat River is ready to make a rebellion and that they want the bastards to help them but they will not, and the hottentots say they was afrjad to speak before, but now Mr. Smith [92] a frenchman and Store-keeper has supplied them with two tubs of Powder and Lead, and gives them Clothes upon Credit, and they say the farmers can come, they have guns enough, and that Christian Groupe has got too much of the farmers' ways, and they will fetch that out of him, and then they will begin with the farmers ..."

This story Campbell considered an "idle tale", and would have disregarded it had he not received an express from J.W. van der Riet, the Civil Commissioner of Uitenhage, enclosing a similar statement by one S. Vermaak, whose information had come originally from a Kaffir and had reached Vermaak at third hand. Van der Riet was also sceptical, but saw "no harm" in sending the express. [93] Events moved quickly during the following week. Campbell sent the reports on to Colonel Somerset, who notified the Officers Commanding at outposts and decided to investigate. The Commandant passed through the Fish-Koonap lands,

where he found that several of the farmers were already much excited, and reached the Settlement. Here he heard from the Rev. Thompson that the Hottentots were "under the greatest alarm and anxiety" at the reports that had been circulated, especially as it had been found that several of the farmers were assembling. A patrol of burghers had been seen on the hills above the locations. Somerset proceeded through the Settlement, and satisfied himself that the rumours of a revolt had been groundless:

"I should be doing injustice to the Bastards and Hottentots of the Kat River, did I not bear witness to the industry that was apparent in every part of these locations, and that but for the indignance and excitement that these reports had caused, it was evident that the greatest tranquillity had hitherto existed."

He considered that much of the alarm had been due to the manner in which "people ill-disposed to this race" had put questions to Hottentot vagrants, who wandered in and out of the locations: "these fellows (particularly when having become eloquent by the excitement of a Soopee) have made all sorts of tales." Somerset found hundreds of the settlers attending services at Read's and Thompson's stations, and he took the opportunity of reassuring them and warning them to keep quiet whatever happened.

The Commandant then re-entered the Koonap area, and found that the rumours had had a most disturbing effect:

"It would be difficult to describe the sensation and high state of excitement that had been established thro' every part of the frontier, within the short space of 6 or 7 days, from these reports. I learn that in Tarka, Graaff Reynette, and Beaufort in the Karroo, all was anxiety. I ascertained that the farmers were armed throughout the country, and I am thoroughly convinced that had I not proceeded to make the enquiries I did, and allay by my presence the excitement and alarm that existed, ... on the night of the First the slightest hasty conduct on the part of any Bastard or Hottentot would have been the signal for a general assault by the farmers on the Hottentots, along the whole country, and must have spread through many parts of the adjoining districts."

On January 15, 1838, the Government Gazette published an Advertisement which stated that the report of a Hottentot insurrection had been wholly without foundation, and censured the Field-Cornets who had failed to report the matter at the proper time, and to prevent the farmers arming themselves against their fellow-subjects.[95] The 'scare', however, did not at once die down, and as late as 10 February Campbell reported that many of the colonists were "still believing or affecting to believe" that their fears had been well founded, and that the Hottentots had not yet abandoned their sinister intentions. The farmers were commissioning their friends who visited the villages to bring them powder and lead. W. Davenish, who lived on the Mancazana, told the Civil Commissioner that he had bought 200 pounds of powder for his neighbours, and that when he tried to convince them of the absurdity of their fears, they alluded darkly to the days of Maynier and Bresler. Thus, wrote Campbell, "in the present angry state of the public mind, the most absurd reports, which would be rejected at any other time, are received with avidity and implicit belief."[96]

Examining these problems of the young Settlement - poverty, vagrancy, squatting, Kaffir depredations, dissensions among the settlers, and the suspicions of the frontiersmen - one sees that all of these, except the last, could have been alleviated by the expenditure of funds and the appointment of capable officials on the Kat River. These difficulties resulted, to a greater or less extent, from the inadequate amount of responsibility taken by the Government, which set the Settlement on foot under difficult and trying conditions and then gave it the most trifling assistance. Any community, however advanced, needs magistrates, and for this settlement of Hottentots and half-castes, just freed from restrictive pass-laws, administration by trained Civil Servants was a necessity. The problems of vagrancy, unauthorized occupation of lands, and, to a certain extent, stock-theft by the natives, could have been coped with by the appointment of police. Poverty on the Settlement resulted inevitably from the previous circumstances of the Hottentots, many of whom, "a landless

proletariat," had possessed no property of their own. This was a question which, to be faced, required more than the distribution of a few maids of seed. It demanded that the settlers should be continually given material aid during the early years of uncertainty, and that they should be instructed in methods of agriculture and stock-farming. Above all, it required that more and more land further afield should be set aside for the Hottentots, as increasing numbers flocked to the Kat River and caused over-crowding on the Settlement. These things, however, the state of the Colony's finances forbade. At a time when annual expenditure substantially exceeded revenue and the Secretary of State was demanding wholesale retrenchment, [97] the Government was unable to embark on expensive experiments. It was under these circumstances that the Settlement was founded and developed, circumstances which withheld from it that administration and economic assistance which were essential for real advance.

The later history of the Kat River Settlement - its sufferings from three wars, its unimaginative treatment by frontier officials, and the steady encroachments of the colonists upon its lands - has lately been told. [98] During the period with which we have dealt it had had serious difficulties to contend with, but had suffered no major disaster. Thus during these years it had been able to develop under comparatively favourable conditions, and its position in 1854 was sound. The evidence of men like Menzies, Godlonton, Campbell, Stockenstrom, and Wade shows that the Hottentots had, by their industry, made good their claim to land in the Colony, and immediately before the outbreak of the Sixth Kaffir War there seemed to be every prospect of steady progress in the future.

up to 1853 it was more a case of Bantu encroachment.

No small credit is due to the man who, after playing his part in the emancipation of the Hottentots, launched an experiment whereby a portion of this people received land of their own to cultivate. It is perhaps Stockenstrom's chief title to our respect that he founded the Kat River Settlement, assisted and guided it during the first two and a half years of its existence, and remained its champion to the last. The history of the Hottentots, like that of all coloured peoples who have fallen in the path of European colonisation, has been

an unenviable one, and, while the process which compelled them to settle down as farm labourers or become a town proletariat has been delayed from time to time, its conclusion has never been in doubt. For such delays and for other measures which have brought them partial relief, the Hottentots, merging into the Cape Coloured People, have been indebted to individuals who broke through the moulds of thought which held sway during their time, and strove for their welfare and happiness. Many of these men were missionaries; some, like Stockenstrom, were Government officials. None saw more clearly than Stockenstrom that the Hottentots must be freed from humiliating subjection to colonists and petty officials, and that for this to become possible they must have land. The Kat River Settlement, then, gave a section of the Coloured People a respite from the conditions which oppressed their fellows, and, for a time at least, the sense of dignity which accompanies ownership of private property.

CHAPTER V

THE NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER: TREK-BOERS AND GRIQUAS

During Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship the problems of the North-Eastern Frontier grew in complexity, and the Northward Movement of the farmers into Trans-Orangia reached a stage where it was no longer manageable by the Government.

We have seen [1] that in 1825 the frontiersmen were given permission to cross the Colonial boundary, provided they were back by February, 1826. The early months of 1826 saw good rains in the Graaff-Reinet district, and the farmers were able to return as instructed. By the end of the year, however, the locusts had destroyed much of the pasturage in the northern Field-Cornetcies, and in November a memorial was sent to Stockenstrom by twenty-six farmers of New-Hanten, asking to be allowed to cross the boundary for a short while. Stockenstrom satisfied himself that large portions of the district were in a disastrous state, but, in sending on the memorial to the Government, advised that permission should not be granted, as it would tend to perpetuate the nomadic life of the frontier farmers. Furthermore, thunder rains were daily expected, and the vegetation would grow quickly. With this view the Acting Lieutenant-Governor concurred. During the following months, however, conditions grew worse. Rain fell in only three Field-Cornetcies, and the locusts did not diminish. Despite strict instructions from Stockenstrom, the farmers had, acting on their own initiative, by the end of 1827 crossed the Orange River with their stock. [2]

By the beginning of 1828, when Stockenstrom entered upon his new office, the frontier districts were in a terrible condition. Of the Graaff-Reinet district he himself wrote: "The country is in a frightful state, the drought continues, the locusts have left nothing, the cattle dying by hundreds, no market for what remains because the butcher cannot get across the Karoo, hardly a rix-dollar afloat." [3] The Landdrost of Albany reported that summer rains had commenced in

his district, but the graziers were in sad distress, and many had been forced into the Ceded Territory for pasturage. The springs and rivers were dry or so brack as to injure the cattle. "I cannot," he wrote, "without an appearance of exaggeration express half the sufferings of the inhabitants of the frontier .... The rains, if continued, may and will do much good, but the young locusts, which in number exceed anything that imagination can fancy, hold out a melancholy prospect for the following season, and even now eat up the grass as it springs and rob the exhausted cattle of their support." [4] In April, 1828, Dundas, then Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset, asked, in view of the extraordinary losses of sheep and cattle that had already occurred, that the farmers of his districts should be allowed to cross the boundaries with their stock. It would be the duty of the Field-Cornets to prevent their trekking further into the unoccupied country than was necessary. He proposed that the inhabitants of the Tarka might pass the Klaas Smit's River, and those of the Brak River Field-Cornetcy might cross the Orange or go eastward across the Stormbergen. In none of these parts could there be any interference with the natives. The Lieutenant-Governor's view of the matter is laconically expressed in a pencilled note: "Acquaint the Civil Commissioner," it says, "that His Honour cannot approve of this suggestion - it would lead to the unlimited extension of the Colony." [5]

From this refusal it was to be expected that migrations from the districts of Albany and Somerset would, for a time at least, be prevented. It seems, however, that Dundas on his own responsibility had issued a Notice permitting the people of the Tarka to graze their cattle beyond the frontier, and that this was acted on for years afterwards. [6] During the year 1828 there was no improvement in the condition of the Albany and Somerset districts. In November Campbell, the new Civil Commissioner, toured the frontier for the purpose of inspecting lands and fixing quit-rents, and sent in a report after completing his investigation. He found that losses of stock had been appalling, and considered that half the sheep of the Somerset district had already died. In one Field-Cornetcy there were a hundred farms

which had formerly produced corn, but only twenty-two were then in cultivation, and their owners depended wholly upon a fall of rain to mature the crops. "Throughout the whole range of the Tarka a succession of hills and extensive flats presented themselves to the eye, where no objects were discernible excepting stones and red earth, without any appearance of vegetation." Faced by these realities the younger members of each family had, despite the Government's prohibition, moved with what remained of their cattle "to the Neutral Country and beyond the boundary of the Colony," but, as they found a type of grass to which their stock was unaccustomed, the mortality did not cease. The people of Brak River had retired beyond the Orange River. Those of Bruintjie's Hoogte, Swager's Hoek, Agter Sneeuwberg, and the other parts of the district of Somerset had not generally left their homes, as all the pasture lands immediately beyond the Colony had been occupied by those who livedin their vicinity. [7]

The Commissioner-General spent the greater part of 1828 in Cape Town, but in October he left for the frontier. That month the Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet received a memorial from Field-Cornet M. A. Oberholzer of the Winterveld and other farmers who had trekked beyond the boundary, together with a covering note from Oberholzer. The latter, writing from a tributary of the Riet River, north of Philippolis, stated that he longed to return to the Colony, but could not do so, because he had found that conditions within the boundary were hopeless. When his party did return it would have to pass through the Griqua and Korana country, which would be dangerous. He therefore asked for a cask of powder and two hundred pounds of lead. [8] The memorial was sent in by farmers from various Field-Cornetcies, "faithful subjects of His Majesty's Government." They said there had been no rain for a year, and thus no grazing for their cattle nor water for their grain. For four months the locusts, "like a ravaging fire", had laid waste their districts. Therefore they had been forced to trek to a region where they might find grazing, and could bring up their families and pay the Government's taxes.

They had now been trekking about for six months, but had found no subsistence as yet, and were in a grievous condition. Many of the families of the party, which numbered a few hundred in all, had to wear skin clothes. For safety's sake they had hired a piece of land, worth about 900 rix-dollars, from Adam Kok. Meanwhile the time approached for the annual payment of taxes, but they could not see how they were to get back to the Colony without severe loss of life and goods, while there was so little water and grazing on route.[9]

Van Ryneveld, the Civil Commissioner, answered Oberholzer's letter by stating briefly that it was impossible to send all the ammunition asked for, but he despatched 90 pounds of powder and 60 of lead.[10] He then passed on a copy of the memorial to the Commissioner-General, who had arrived in Graaff-Reinet, giving his opinion that the Government would not sanction the arrangement made between Oberholzer and Kok for the hiring of land, "especially as the latter has no right to hire out what does not belong to him, it being bona fide the Bushman country in which he had established himself without apparent right." At the same time he drew attention to the terrible drought, which had compelled the farmers to trek. He was aware that the law forbade their crossing the boundary, but he saw no possibility of enforcing implicit obedience to it under existing circumstances.[11]

Stockenstrom studied the correspondence which had already passed between Oberholzer and the Civil Commissioner, and replied immediately. His letter to van Ryneveld showed a more tolerant attitude toward Trekking than he had ever displayed as Landdrost. He still opposed it on principle, and considered that it would be their "paramount duty" to "prevent the precedent of that year leading to annual migrations or permanent residence among the natives beyond the boundary, as nothing could more retard the improvement of the inhabitants and frustrate the Government's administration of the frontier settlements." He hoped rains had fallen since the memorial was written, so that the farmers might return to their homes, for he would not have it in his power to recommend a reply which would encourage them to remain where they were. Yet he half-sanctioned the migration by stating that although he could not on behalf of the Government admit that Kok had the right to farm out

the country occupied by the memorialists, he did not expect the Government would interfere with the transaction, unless it should appear that any of the colonists had dislodged or molested the Bushmen.[12] In His despatch to the Colonial Secretary he also drew attention to the peaceable way in which the colonists were living among the Griquas.[13]

The beginning of 1829 saw no improvement in the condition of the Graaff-Reinet district, and the greater part of the burghers of the Northern Field-Cornetcies remained in Trans-Orangia.[14] In December, 1828, and January, 1829, good rains fell in the Somerset district, and the farmers of the latter who had crossed the boundary returned to their homes. Large swarms of locusts appeared, however, both in Albany and Somerset, and though the inhabitants were ploughing and sowing in the hope that they would disappear, Campbell did not participate in this hope. The young grass had already been injured, and he stated that whatever part of it did spring up would be destroyed by the first cold winds. Accordingly he asked that the farmers should be permitted on the approach of winter to cross the boundary and re-occupy the empty country where they had been the previous year, as the only means of saving what remained of their stock.[15]

The Government was now in a peculiar dilemma. On the one hand, the condition of the frontier districts forbade that the farmers should return to the Colony and there increase the distress which already existed. This would not only be inhuman treatment of the trek-boers: from the point of view of the Colony it would be the height of folly. On the other hand, the authorities were opposed to the habit of Trekking, which was already threatening to pass beyond their control. For an efficient administration of the interior to be possible, it was essential that His Majesty's subjects should be prevented from passing periodically beyond the reach of the Colonial laws. Faced by these equally important sides to the question, the Government compromised. "Inform him," wrote the Secretary to Government on Campbell's despatch, "that tho' His Excellency the

Governor sincerely regrets the lamentable posture of distress which his communication represents, yet it is wholly impossible for him to grant to the farmers permission to occupy a country which does not belong to the Government of this Colony: if, however, they cannot continue on their homes throughout the winter for the reasons detailed by you, and will undertake to cross the boundary in search of pasturage without such permission, it must be left to them to do so at their own risk." [16]

v.d. Merwe 233

In February, 1829, the position in Trans-Orangia was complicated by the arrival at the Cape of a memorial from Adam Kok and his 'Council'. This document commenced by stating that the Griquas of Philippolis and the adjacent country belonged to the "race of Hottentots" who had "anciently" possessed the country around Cape Town, but had withdrawn to the Orange River. There they had been connected with London Missionary Society missionaries for twenty-eight years, being governed, however, by their own chiefs and subject to their own laws. In 1825 the Government had assured them that it had no intention of interfering with them in any way contrary to their own inclinations, and that it was interested only in their peace and happiness. But lately many farmers had crossed the boundaries and encroached on the Griqua lands. Inquiries had been done, and the farmers had been guilty of insulting behaviour. Great evils would result from these provocations, unless the Government interfered. The memorial also stated that the Basutos, an impoverished tribe who lived to the north-east of them, would be reduced to great misery and driven to attack the Griquas by the way the farmers were destroying the game in their region. The memorialists were fully prepared to give their Colonial neighbours assistance, but experience had taught them the duty of defending their rights. They asked that if the farmers were to be allowed to cross the frontiers, they should be restricted to such routes and to the use of such lands as the Griquas might point out, and in other ways be subject to reasonable regulations, which were necessary for the welfare of the natives. [17]

also summarised in v.d.M. pp. 263-5.

This memorial was sent to the Commissioner-General, and late in February Stockenstrom submitted a report to the Colonial Secretary which showed a further development in his views. He stated that if the farmers encroached on the lands of the native beyond the frontier, the latter would come into the Colony for plunder or attack the weaker tribes in Trans-Orangia, and "the end must be a general scene of anarchy and desolation." On the other hand, the interior was suffering severely from drought, locusts, and trek-bokken, and the flocks of both the colonists and the natives beyond the frontier were dying in thousands. "That the boors therefore migrate in search of pasturage is not to be wondered at, and I see no possibility or necessity to prevent it, in as far as the object is attainable by resorting to vacant tracts of country." The only effective measure that could be adopted for the present was that the Field-Cornets who had migrated with the inhabitants should be directed to order back into the Colony any one who molested the natives, or encroached on their cultivated lands or pasturage. Upon non-compliance with such an order the offender should be left to the chiefs to be dealt with according to their laws and customs, and he should be made to understand that the Government would not interfere on his behalf. Stockenstrom considered that there could be no harm in the farmers killing game for consumption, but hunting parties should not be allowed, for many of the natives lived entirely on game. Farmers who transgressed in this respect should also be ordered back. The Field-Cornets should receive strict orders on these points, and the Civil Commissioners should take care not to allow these migrations to last longer than was absolutely necessary.[18] On the same day that Stockenstrom wrote this report he despatched a letter to the Rev. J. Melville, the missionary at Philippolis, stating that he had sent on Kok's memorial to the Government, with such observations as he was confident would bring about the necessary measures for checking the abuses complained of. He trusted that Melville would use his influence to prevent extremities on either side, and to impress both parties with the necessity for mutual forbearance.[19]

Summarised somewhat more fully than in V.d.M. 266.

During 1829 there occurred further events which could not fail

to cause the authorities anxiety. At the beginning of the year van Rynevald heard rumours that farmers were ploughing and sowing north of the Orange, and that several had planted beacons marked with their names near the Harts River. [20] In April fourteen memorials for farms along the Modder and Riet reached the Colonial Office. This was most disturbing to a Government which was completely opposed to permanent settlement beyond the boundaries. Accordingly the Civil Commissioner was instructed to recall the memorialists to the Colony. In June a notice was published in the Government Gazette, stating that no attention would be paid to memorials for land beyond the Orange River. [21] That same month a letter was received from the missionaries of the Caledon River Bushman institution, complaining that the latter had sustained much injury from the unrestricted occupation of the country by the trek-boers and their stock, and from the destruction and dispersion of the game on which the Bushmen relied mainly for their support. [22] In October there arrived another memorial from Adam Kok and his Council. This declared that the farmers were still causing great injury to the Griquas, and their conduct gave rise to the suspicion that they intended to seize lands. As yet the Griquas had submitted without opposition, but inevitably a spirit of hatred had arisen, and the memorialists feared that it would not long be in their power to prevent considerable disputes. They asked that the farmers should be compelled to return to the Colony. [23]

At the end of December Stockenstrom was informed that the Governor suspected that the long continuance of the trek-boers in Trans-Orangia would have results fatal to good relations with the natives. He was instructed to investigate and report on the state of affairs beyond the Boundary, and "to suggest some means of enforcing, if possible, the return of the farmers to the Colony, or of dealing with the evils which were to be expected from their prolonged occupation of extra-Colonial lands against the will of the natives." [24] An exchange of correspondence during January, 1850, shows, however, that the Colonial Government and the Commissioner-General had accepted Trekking as a necessary evil. On the 19th Stockenstrom reported that Adam Kok had visited Grahamstown, made several complaints

V.d.M. 264

against the trek-boers, and asked for a large supply of ammunition. This he had refused to grant until he could gain information from van Rynsveld on the state of the border tribes. He then observed that the divisions from which the farmers had migrated were still in a terrible state, owing to the drought and locusts, and passed on illogically to the statusof the country beyond the Orange. "It must not be forgotten", he said, "that the Griquas are as much as the colonists intruders into the Bushman country (until quite recently exclusively inhabited by these savages)". [25] On the 29th the Colonial Secretary replied. He said that the Governor realised the "extreme delicacy" of the question of the Griquas' right to the occupation of the region into which the colonists were migrating. He felt it was impossible to contest it with a view to keeping the colonists in possession of the lands to which, whether belonging to Griquas or Bushmen, they had no legitimate claim. But "it seems doubtful whether the Government possesses the means of compelling these emigrants to return to the Colony ... It would appear that nothing more can be done than to impress the emigrants with the conviction that their safety depends entirely on the conduct which they pursue towards the possessors of those countries, whether the rightful possessors or not." It was left to Stockenstrom to take such steps, "in general accordance with the views of Government," as he thought fit. [26]

v.d.M. 268

v.d.M. 269

Before the winter of 1829 rains had fallen in most parts of the Graaff-Reinet district, and by May the trek-boers had returned to four Field-Cornetcies. In July the Civil Commissioner ordered his Field-Cornets to prevent further trekking, and to see that the farmers who were still beyond the boundary returned as soon as the state of the veld allowed it. By the end of the year the drought in the Graaff-Reinet district had completely broken, and good rains fell in every part. Van Rynsveld therefore ordered the farmers who had remained beyond the Orange River to return. [27]

In February, 1830, the Commissioner-General journeyed to the

Orange River, and found that the farmers were crowding to the banks of the river and, in their anxiousness to return to the Colony, trying by various expedients to cross it, although it was then impassable. He reported that, despite the tremendous rains, great tracts were still looking bare, "without any symptom of returning vegetation," and the state of the country showed "how absolutely necessary the migration of the graziers was for the presence of any part of their flocks." [28]

On February 27 Stockenstrom wrote to tell the Rev. Melville that he would investigate the charges made against the farmers by Adam Kok, and that he hoped he and the chief would provide him with every proof at their disposal. A similar letter was despatched to the missionaries of the Caledon River institution, who had charged several farmers with having shot a Bushman. [29] He then proceeded to Philippolis, and had a conference with Kok's principal Griquas in the presence of Melville and four Field-Cornets of the Graaff-Reinet district. The Griquas declared that they knew of no offence that had been committed by the farmers against any tribe beyond the Orange except their own. They themselves complained of four cases in which Griquas had been beaten by trek-boers, one of trespass by a farmer's cattle, and three in which a few muskets and some powder had been supplied to Korannas. Stockenstrom laid before them proofs he had obtained of the Griquas having attacked two Bushman kraals and killed 14 or 15 people. They then remembered that eight farmers had instigated these attacks because the Bushmen had committed murder and stolen horses. [30] The Commissioner-General informed van Rynevald in detail of these various charges, and instructed him to investigate. [31]

On his way back to the Colony Stockenstrom found that many families had already crossed the Orange River, and the rest were doing so as quickly as possible. On 5 March he visited the Caledon River institution, where it transpired that the death of the Bushman had occurred under conditions very different from those reported by the missionaries. Van Aswegen, the farmer who had been principally accused, was present and challenged proof, which was not forthcoming. [32]

In his report on these investigations Stockenstrom reviewed the problems of Trekking and the policy towards the Griquas, and further expressed his views. It was clear, he said, that the greatest jealousy existed between the Griquas and the trek-boers about the possession of the country into which both parties had recently migrated. The farmers were returning to the Colony, but "it is to be feared that every season of drought will drive them to the same alternative as long as there remain vacant tracts to resort to. If the country be reduced to what it was for the last two years, it is clear that there is no choice between flying to wherever there is grass and seeing the last beast perish." These annual migrations were a serious draw-back to the improvement of the colonists, and "by holding out to the rising generation an easy livelihood" of hunting and stock-breeding ("tho' it be a bare subsistence"), kept them from "more industrious and profitable pursuits." Yet in real extremities the farmers could not be kept out of uninhabited tracts, as these were the only means of relief. The Griquas, wherever they settled down to a regular livelihood, must be protected, lest they adopted a marauding life. If they could be induced to become orderly and prosperous communities, hundreds of Hottentots who could not get land in the Colony would migrate thither and settle peacefully. If, on the other hand, they continued in their "blood-thirsty barbarity" to weaker peoples, they must understand that their country would be populated by people on whom laws and religion had more influence. [33]

In May van Ryneveld proceeded to Colesberg to hold the Opgaaf and inquire into the charges of the Griquas. On arriving there, however, he found that the Field-Cornet when he had ordered to summon the accused and witnesses had been unable to find all of the former, and by misunderstanding the Civil Commissioner's letter, had not called up Kok and his Griquas. Van Ryneveld conducted certain preliminary business, then postponed the case. In reporting these circumstances to the Commissioner-General he showed that his sympathies lay with the farmers. He considered that the trek-boers who crossed the Orange from time to time were a check on the Griquas, for the former treated the Bushmen, Korannas, and other tribes humanely. The country was so

extensive that there was no need for the farmers to encroach on the cultivated lands of the Griquas, and by being warned not to destroy the game they could not injure the other peoples. He concluded by stating that the farmers of his district were now all back in the Colony, and he had given strict orders against further migrations without the Governor's permission. [34] Stockenstrom replied that he would proceed to Colesberg as soon as possible, and conduct the investigation himself. He was anxious to convince the colonists how seriously such matters were regarded by the Government, and he wanted to get to the truth. He was aware that the jurisdiction of the Colonial courts did not extend over crimes committed beyond the boundary, but he trusted that the Government would yet have the means of preventing impunity as far as its subjects were concerned. With respect to trekking beyond the frontiers his views differed from van Rynsveld's, and he could not recommend its being sanctioned by the Government. "Measures of a different nature ... will be necessary to protect the savage hordes against the rapacity of the Griquas and Korannas ... I am not losing sight of the impossibility to prevent the flocks being sent across the boundary when the locusts and drought have exhausted every particle of vegetation on the Colonial side thereof, but those who do so will not have the permission of Government to plead." [35]

In July Stockenstrom travelled to Colesberg, where he found seven of the eleven accused farmers. The remaining four had been called to remote parts by business. Not one Griqua appeared, but Kok sent a letter purporting to explain the absence of his witnesses. The Commissioner-General heard five witnesses from the Boer side, and decided that the matter was too important to drop at this stage. Accordingly he proceeded to Philippolis and told Kok that he would still have a chance of proving his charges if he could collect his witnesses. He then rode seventy miles beyond the Orange River and examined several Korannas and two kraals of Bushmen, hearing in each case that the attacks on the Bushmen had been the work of Griquas and Korannas alone. From various Bechuanas he heard that the trek-boers had completely refrained from molesting the blacks, and many of the latter had been given flocks of goats. On the 29th he returned to

Philippolis, and found that Kok had got together fourteen witnesses. These, when examined separately, entered "a labyrinth of prevarication and contradiction." [36]

During these years the half-breed communities beyond the Northern Frontier proved, apart from their relations with trek-boers, a most serious problem in themselves. Subject to no proper authority or restraint, they inflicted much suffering on the Bushmen and weak Bantu clans in their neighbourhood. These were times of turmoil in the interior. The Chaka Wars had set on foot a series of conflicts and folk movements which caused great destruction. Refugees like the Bechuanas fled southward towards the Colonial boundaries, there to endure cruelties from the Griquas and Korannas. From 1825 onward the position was complicated by the periodical migrations of the farmers. From time to time the Colonial Government received reports of depredations by marauding gangs of half-breeds or Bushmen, and Commandos had to be sent against them. At times, too, the Civil Commissioners of the frontier districts were embarrassed by influxes of Bechuanas and other tribes into the Colony, whither they were driven by Griqua aggressions.

In the early months of 1838 letters were received from the Rev. R. Moffat, the missionary residing with the Bechuanas at Litako, reporting that the 'Bergenaar' bands, composed of Griquas, Korannas, Bushmen, and other banditti, had been guilty of great cruelties to the native tribes. Thousands of cattle had been stolen, and many lives lost. Every Bergenaar 'Commando' was well provided with ammunition, which could only have come from the Colony. Moffat urgently requested Government intervention, without which the natives would be driven to the tropics or reduced to the level of Bushmen. [37] These letters were referred to the Commissioner-General, who expressed a belief that the Colonial Bastards were supplying the Bergenaars with their ammunition, and recalled the objections he had always made against trade with the natives other than at proper fairs. He advised special vigilance on the part of the frontier Field-Cornets, and suggested that a Government agent with the Griquas

might do much to maintain peace and order beyond the frontier.[38] Nothing seems to have been done.

In October, 1828, van Ryneveld reported to the Commissioner-General that marauders from across the Orange River had attacked some families near the frontier and committed several murders, and he placed before him further information on the state of the border. In his reply Stockenstrom advised a conciliatory policy toward the Griquas. He stated that he and the Governor were agreed that a Commando was unnecessary. It would be very difficult to find the aggressors in this instance. They had a dangerous enemy to contend with, and half-measures would be useless. He believed Waterboer and Cornelis Kok were anxious to remain on terms of peace with the Colony, and the recent murders had not been connived at by any acknowledged chief. The Government should maintain a strict neutrality towards the quarrels of the Griquas themselves, but endeavour, through the frontier Field-Cornets, to cultivate a good understanding with their 'captains.' Stockenstrom criticised the way some of the farmers migrated into untrodden regions and exposed themselves to attack. Many, he said, abandoned their farms for months, and were surprised to find when they returned that their houses had been broken open. At the same time His Majesty's subjects must be protected. The Civil Commissioner was therefore instructed to provide the Field-Cornets with a sufficient supply of ammunition, and to direct them to be always on the alert, so that they might protect the lives and property of the inhabitants.[39]

During 1829 Stockenstrom's attention was confined largely to the problems of the Eastern Frontier. In September he accompanied Sir Lowry Cole on his tour of the interior, until a report reached him that the Kaffirs intended invading the Colony. He then hurried to the East, while Cole proceeded to Beaufort. There the Governor investigated reports of Bushmen depredations on the North-Eastern Frontier, and himself authorised van Ryneveld to assemble a commando. In November the latter set out. The Civil Commissioner found the frontiersmen in a despondent state, owing to the drought and the plunderings of the Bushmen. The latter had killed over 50 horses,

and from two farmers they had carried off 1,100 sheep and goats. Van Rynevald and his burghers advanced some distance into Bushman territory, and in a skirmish with a section of the Commando several of the savages were killed. Beyond recovering a handful of oxen this expedition seems to have effected nothing. [40]

The opening months of 1850 saw more depredations [41] in the frontier Field-Cornetcies, and in March Stockenstrom ordered the Field-Cornets of the Tarka and the Brak River to collect strong forces and recover the stolen property of the farmers. In his instructions he stated that the endless marauding had made severe measures necessary, but violence was to be used only against kraals found in actual possession of Colonial stock, and in case of resistance. Any burgher convicted of having intentionally fired upon women or children would be severely punished. [42] At the end of May a force under Field-Cornet van Wyk traced a band of Bushmen to the Kei River, and found in their possession six horses and the skins of a number of horses and cattle, which they had destroyed in front of their huts. Van Wyk tried to parley with them, but they shot at the farmers, and in the skirmish which followed one Bushman was killed and six captured. [43] A Commando under Field-Cornet Pretorius proceeded to another kraal, where they also found several stolen horses. Here twenty Bushmen were shot. [44] Despite these expeditions, however, depredations continued, to the alarm of people on outlying farms. [45]

In February, 1850, as we have seen, the Commissioner-General proceeded to Philippolis to investigate certain charges against the trek-boers. On this visit he satisfied himself that the Griquas were a scourge to the Bantu clans and the Bushmen. Many Bechuanas gave him terrible accounts of their sufferings. From being prosperous graziers and agriculturists, "populous tribes" had become hunters or servants to the Griquas and colonists. "At every step", he reported, "some unfortunate Bootchoeana begged of me to get his cattle restored, which he still was obliged to see in possession of, and perhaps obliged to herd for, the Griequas; often showing his back covered by the most cruel marks of the sjambok, as the

reward of his services under the plunderers of his tribe." Many of these people insisted on following the farmers into the Colony, for fear of being plundered or killed. [46] During his visit of July Stockenstrom obtained further evidence to the same effect. A Bechuana chief, Maletzana, told him that he and Gassapan, a chief of another tribe, had been driven southward by the Matabele. They had, however, retained much of their property until they had been attacked by Griquas of Kok's and Barend's parties. These had taken everything they possessed. When Stockenstrom faced Kok with this charge, he did not deny it, but stated that the two chiefs had been coming to attack the Griquas, having been incited by the Koranna Abram Krieger. This Krieger absolutely denied. When the Commissioner-General left Philippolis at the end of the month, it was with the conviction that the Bushmen and Bechuanas were being driven to plunder the colonists, and that the Griquas were carrying on a war of extermination. He left Kok abruptly, telling him that if he persisted he must take the consequences. [47]

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Reviewing the situation on and beyond the North-Eastern Frontier, as it stood at the end of 1850, we see that it gave little ground for satisfaction to the Colonial Government. No really constructive policy had been adopted toward the problem of Trekking, and no means had been found of checking Griqua and Koranna aggressions and bringing stability in Trans-Orangia.

Until 1850 the migrations of the farmers had been regarded as mere temporary affairs, rendered essential by conditions in the Colony. By that year, however, it was clear that they were becoming regular and seasonal, [48] and that they could be performed with impunity. In May the Civil Commissioner of Graaff-Reinet had reported that all the trek-boers were back in his district, and that he had given strict orders against further trekking without the Governor's permission. In July, however, the Commissioner-General heard that the farmers were again crossing the frontier with their flocks, [49] and in his 'Return of London Missionary Society Missions' Dr. Philip (putting forward the missionary or 'philanthropic' point of view) wrote: "Things cannot remain long as

they now are. The farmers have for some years past been in the habit of crossing the Colonial boundary, and oppressing the Griquas in their own country. The Griquas have hitherto borne all this with admirable patience, waiting for the Colonial Government to put a stop to the causes of their grievances. If no stop be put to the vexatious conduct of the farmers, the missionary states that he cannot be answerable for the consequences." [50]

By the end of 1853, the year of Stockenstrom's departure from the Colony, the problem of Griqua and Koranna aggressions had, if anything, become worse. In July the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset reported that the influx of Bechuanas into the Colony was too great for him to cope with. These people usually had some cattle and thus refused to enter service with the farmers. At the same time the thought of returning across the Orange terrified them, as this would have meantcertain death. In a private letter Campbell wrote: "There is no doubt whatever that these scoundrels (Basterds and Korannas) slaughter the Bechuanas solely for their cattle, but I have not sufficient evidence to say it thus broadly in my official letter ... I was never more perplexed since I entered office than I am in this matter. I do not know what to recommend. ... I am quite at a loss, at a stand-still." [51] In October Captain A. B. Armstrong, who had just conducted a special tour of inspection on the North-Eastern Frontier, sent in a long report on the half-breed communities beyond the Orange. He found that they were without law or government, and that their affairs were in a deplorable state; that there were great jealousies among themselves; and that Adam Kok was unfit to rule. "The result of my inquiries," he wrote, "has led me to perceive that these people are little better than a set of bandits." [52] The following month Sir Lowry Cole, looking back upon his period as Governor, stated that during the last four or five years the tribes on the Northern Frontier had carried on a system of murder and depredation seldom, if ever, equalled in past times. [53]

Examining these problems from this distance of time and in the light of later events, one sees that there was but one solution. Had Trans-Orangia during this period been incorporated in the Colony -

that is, had the frontier been extended to include the triangle formed by the Orange, the Caledon, and the Modder, or the first two of these rivers and the Riet - later history would have been a different matter. Such a step would have placed within the Colony the pasture lands for which the trek-boers were so eager. Trans-Orangia could have been formed into a new district and given a Civil Commissioner and Field-Cornets of its own. The Griquas could have been preserved in their lands, and, above all, placed under European magistrates, without whom they would never cease their aggressions and settle down to a peaceful life. Reserves could have been set up for the Bushmen immediately beyond the new boundaries, where they would not have been harassed by Korannas and Bergenaars. It is possible that the Great Trek, which was in part a continuation of the Northward Movement of two centuries, could have been conducted under the sanction and control of the Cape Government, and the history of South Africa in the Nineteenth Century utterly changed.

How far did Stockenstrom realize these things? We have seen that he was alive to every side of these problems of the North-Eastern Frontier. He realised that annual migrations beyond the laws and magistrates of the Colony must make it impossible to rule the frontier districts effectively. He saw, on the other hand, that it was out of the question to keep the farmers in the Colony during times of hopeless drought. He wished to maintain the Griquas in their lands, and yet he anxiously desired to put a stop to their aggressions against the outlying frontier farms and the weak tribes beyond the boundary. Did he realise that these ends could be attained only by placing Trans-Orangia under the Colonial Government? We have observed that in October, 1828, he advocated a strict neutrality toward the quarrels of the Griquas. At a later date, however (1834), he observed that while they should be left to rule themselves and relations with them governed only by "amicable treaties", they should be placed under Colonial "protection" upon "just and liberal principles". No land should be taken from them except by treaty. [54] In his 'Remarks on Dr. Philip's Return of

London Missionary Society Missions' (December, 1850), having dwelt on the impossibility of preventing trekking when it became essential for the preservation of the farmers' flocks, he stated that the frontiersmen argued as follows:

"If the Government will not incorporate that territory ('the land of the Bushmen') with the Colony, so as to include the Griquas as well as ourselves, and restrain their lawlessness by the same rules which shall control us, we must reluctantly shift for ourselves." Then he himself added:

"Migrate they will and it only remains for the Government to turn their and the Griequas' migrations to the advantage of the Bushmen and other defenceless tribes ... A more decided interferance (sic) than the Colonial Government has hitherto been able to exercise in that quarter will be requisite to bring matters to a proper bearing."

The greater the number of Griquas who could be established in permanent homes and lands, the better for themselves, the colonists, and the natives. [55]

More instructive still is a report he drew up in the previous month on a memorial from the inhabitants of one of the frontier Field-Cornetcies. Referring to the problem of periodical trekking; he said:

"I have fully exposed the evils of this, but have failed in discovering any other remedy except 'Systematic Colonisation', against which I am aware too strong prejudices exist in the Mother Country, but which must ultimately be resorted to after much mischief shall have been done, and when the task will be more colossal. As consequently the Colonial Government cannot sanction this only safe course, I do not see how it can grant the prayer of memorialists." [56]

This statement shows a sound understanding of the questions involved, and reminds us that their solution by the incorporation of Trans-Orangia was obstructed by the views of the British Government on Colonial policy. [57] Further, the state of the finances of the Colony did much to bar such a step. In February, 1850, Governor Cole announced that the demands on the Colonial Treasury exceeded

the existing balance, and that it had been necessary to draw on a deposit in the Discount Bank known as the "500,000 Rix-dollar Fund."[58] In July he stated that an annual deficit was unavoidable, and that it could be provided for only by drafts on the British Treasury in aid of the revenue.[59] In May, 1831, the Secretary of State wrote to the Governor, informing him that the Lords of the Treasury had urgently drawn his attention to the economic position of the Colony, and expressing "anxious solicitude" at the deficit of £5,731 for 1829. Cole was ordered to stop all public works involving an expenditure of more than £300, and to carry out retrenchment in the Colonial service according to a Schedule enclosed with the Secretary of State's despatch.[60]

In considering the native policy of the Cape Colony during this period we must constantly keep the condition of its finances in mind, for these retarded any systematic efforts to cope with the frontier and colour questions of the time, and put ambitious schemes out of the question. Of Stockenstrom we can say that his despatches showed clear insight into the problems of the North-Eastern Frontier, and that some of his proposals on the best policy to be adopted were constructive. How far his attitude would have differed had the Colony been in a thoroughly sound economic position, is an interesting and debatable question.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EASTERN FRONTIER.

No problems of the Cape Colony during these years were more complicated and troublesome than those of the Eastern Frontier. Here two peoples, chiefly pastoralists, partly agriculturists, had come into immediate contact, and with both there was an increasing need for land. The grants which had been made to the Albany Settlers had been found inadequate, and applications for more land continued to be made year by year. [1] By this time, however, practically all the agricultural land of the Colony had been disposed of. [2] Some of the farmers found an outlet across the Orange River, but those who had settled in the East and South-East hoped for an opportunity to expand beyond the Fish and Koonap. For the South-Eastern Bantu these were also difficult times. Their further advance along the west had been blocked, and from time to time we receive evidence of over-crowding in Kaffirland and distress among the natives. [3]

The difficulties of the position were heightened by the turmoil produced, directly or indirectly, by the Chaka Wars. In October, 1827, Lieutenant-Governor Bourke reported that "the interior of Africa, at no great distance from this settlement, appears to be in a state of great commotion, and for some time past various powerful tribes have been pressing to the southward, driving the weaker ones before them, from which many fugitives (under different appellations) have obtained refuge in the Colony." He added that there was no room for more. [4] These tribal movements caused anxiety to the Colonial Government, as the military forces were then on a very low scale. In 1827 3,000 Tambookies were driven into the Colony by 'Massoutas', and the troops were called out. The invaders, however, retired, the Tambookies settled again on their lands, and the chiefs were urged to repel all hostile tribes. [5] The following year 1,000 regulars and burghers were sent against a large tribe of 'Fetcani' (at first thought to be Zulus) who were advancing south-westward toward the Colony, and defeated them. This people then settled down quietly in part of the Tambookie country. [6]

In January, 1829, the death of Chaka was reported, [7] but the unrest among the tribes did not immediately cease. At later dates travellers reported a conflict between a force of Zulus and Faku's Pondos, [8] and the massacre of a tribe called the 'Quabies' by Dingaan's followers. [9]

It was under the unusually difficult conditions created by drought and by these inter-tribal struggles, which packed increasing numbers of natives against the Eastern Frontier, that Stockenstrom entered upon his Commissioner-Generalship.

During Stockenstrom's first visit to the Eastern Frontier, at the end of 1828, he found that many Kaffirs were wandering about the Ceded Territory and stealing farmers' stock, and that several kraals had been actually established in this area. He recalled Lord Somerset's treaty with Gaika, and advised, in the interests of peace on the border, that all the Kaffirs should be expelled from the Ceded Territory, and that the latter should be densely populated by European farmers. He had little confidence in the chiefs, and suspected that they connived at the depredations of their followers. [10]

Early in 1829 took place the events which led to the expulsion of Makoma from the Ceded Territory. The previous December he had attacked a party of Tambookies who were living within the Colonial boundary, and took from them some 500 cattle. [11] This act was allowed to go unpunished. In January, 1829, Makoma again attacked the Tambookies, pursued them into the Tarka district, put some of their men and women to death, and carried off their cattle. The aggression was at once reported to the Government, [12] and the Commissioner-General was called upon to report. Stockenstrom pointed out that Lord Somerset had allowed Makoma to occupy the Ceded Territory on condition that he and his people behaved themselves. Depredations, however, had now been going on for a long time, and the attack on the Tambookies was the last straw. Makoma must be compelled to make full restitution and forced to leave the Ceded Territory as soon as he had reaped his crops. [13] On the day that Stockenstrom sent in his report the Commandant of the Frontier was instructed to tell Makoma that unless he restored the Tambookies' cattle

and moved from the position he was occupying by the end of March, he would be driven out by force. [14] By the conclusion of this period the chief had shown no sign of complying with these orders, and Stockenstrom and Somerset were directed to co-operate in removing him. [15]

In April the Commissioner-General proceeded to the frontier, and, according to the instructions he had received, interviewed several of the chiefs. He impressed upon the Gunukwebes, Pato, Kama, and Conga, what benefits were to be derived from remaining on good terms with the Colony, and was himself impressed by their sincerity. They promised to punish members of their tribe who stole colonial stock, and gave instances of having already done so. Stockenstrom then saw Gaika, and explained that his son, Maketa, was to be removed from the Ceded Territory. In Gaika the Commissioner-General placed little confidence. He stated that he continually plundered his own people, thus driving them to commit depredations on the colonists, and shared in the booty when he could do so without fear of detection. Botman and Enno, two other chiefs who had settled west of the Keiskamma, were not to be found when Stockenstrom arrived. The latter stated that Enno was a plunderer of repute, who (with Gaika and Botman) was known to be harbouring a great part of the Tambookie cattle. He expressed dissatisfaction at Botman's and Enno's presence in the Ceded Territory. [16]

On May 1 a force of troops and burghers entered the Kat River area, from which Maketa was to be expelled. The kraals had been abandoned, and there was no resistance. Stockenstrom managed to induce the chief to meet him. He told him that he had not sent in to Fort Beaufort one-tenth of the cattle he had taken from the Tambookies. Maketa replied that he had no more Tambookie cattle, and asked what he should do. The Commissioner-General then ordered him to hand over 3,000 of his own, as a pledge that he would recover those he had stolen. When Maketa had agreed to these terms, they shook hands and parted. During the afternoon that this conversation took place the Kaffirs had persisted in driving their cattle into the 'bush', and when the Commando followed to collect them there were a few casualties among the natives. On May 3 Maketa sent word that he had no more cattle to give,

and on this the burning of the Kaffirs' huts began, to show them that there was no chance of their being allowed to remain. On the following day the cattle that had been captured were handed over to the Tambookies.[17] Makoma and his people meanwhile retired to the east bank of the Tyumie, and settled down near Block Drift.[18]

It was during 1829 that Stockenstrom developed a clear policy toward the problems of the Eastern Frontier. In April he again spoke of removing all the Kaffirs, except the Gunukwebes, from the Ceded Territory,[19] but by September he had abandoned this idea in favour of including the border tribes "under the protection of the Colonial arms," as part of his frontier settlement and his scheme of defence.[20] This scheme was, briefly, settling the Ceded Territory with a dense population under careful regulations. The Commissioner-General first alluded to it in November, 1828, and worked it out more fully in later despatches. He considered that it would bring far more security and peace than the frontier had hitherto enjoyed. In April, 1829, he reported that the farmers who had been driven into the Ceded Territory by drought and locusts were wandering about in confusion. The country between the Winterberg and Fort Beaufort, Fort Beaufort and Fort Willshire, and Fort Willshire and the sea (except the parts occupied by Hanno's people and the Gunukwebes) was completely exposed to depredations. He advised that military posts should be placed at various strategic points, and that the farmers should be assembled in parties containing not less than twenty men capable of bearing arms. These parties should be so located as to fill up the spaces between the posts, with the understanding that these locations gave no permanent claim to the land, but obliged the farmers to co-operate for mutual defence. Unless this plan was adopted, he would have to force the farmers back across the Keiskap, for their present position was dangerous.[21] The Government immediately approved Stockenstrom's suggestions.[22]

In May the Commissioner-General issued orders to the frontier Field-Cornets, to be carried out by the latter in the interests of the frontier and of the people themselves. The farmers were to be

assembled in parties including at least twenty armed men, and a trustworthy man, known as a Provisional Field-Cornet, was to be placed over each. His orders were to be obeyed by his party. The waggons or huts were to be placed in circles, and cattle and other property kept inside them at night. During the day stock was to be guarded by armed herdsmen. Parties were to assist one another if necessary, but none were at any time to leave less than ten men behind to guard the camp. The farmers might move from one place to another, provided they informed a Field-Cornet. No one was to be allowed to make any permanent settlement in the Ceded Territory or cultivate the land. The occupation was to be provisional, and the Government would not hesitate, when the drought broke, to remove the farmers and dispose of this region as it saw fit. Anyone who refused to obey these regulations was to be expelled from the Ceded Territory. Field-Cornet P. R. Erasmus was placed in charge of the northern part of this region, and Field-Cornet J. Draayer of the southern.[25] These orders were supplemented by further instructions in July. These stated that the previous regulations were to remain in force except for the Sixth Clause (that forbidding cultivation of the land), "in as far as the cultivation of the soil has been specially admitted, such permission, however, not ... giving any permanent claim to the land." Until further orders no party was to cross the Kat River below Fort Beaufort or use the pasturage on the opposite side. None of the men bearing arms were to absent themselves without leave from heads of parties, who were to grant no unnecessary leave. No one was to cross the Kaffir frontier, except on duty, or have any relations with the natives, except at fairs or by "special admission according to law." Vagrants were to be removed. Drunkenness and riotous behaviour were to be sternly dealt with. The Farmers were to help the military forces when necessary, and obey the orders of officers.[24]

It was by these regulations that Stockenstrom sought to control the settlement of the Ceded Territory. In January, 1830, he submitted to the Government certain suggestions concerning the system of land allotment in this area,[25] which were embodied in an Advertisement in

the Government Gazette of March 8, 1850. This stated that all memorials for land in the northern part of the Ceded Territory had been transmitted to the Commissioner-General, who would inspect the area between the Kat and Koonap and consider applications. The colonists were reminded that they were to be subject to regulations, and that the occupation of the Ceded Territory was to be dependent on the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government.[26] By April 14 Stockenstrom was able to report that he had divided the land on the east bank of the Koonap and that on a branch called the 'Gola', from their sources to their junction, into 46 locations and 3 outspan places. He had laid down special orders for defence, and believed that this part of the frontier was perfectly secure.[27] In the next fortnight he divided the territory between the Kat and Koonap, south of a line drawn from Fort Beaufort to Koonap Post, into 58 locations and 2 outspan places, leaving commonage near the Karoomoo Forest. By his arrangements for defence there would be 452 well-armed men in this area.[28]

An important part was played in Stockenstrom's frontier policy by his plan for a just system of recovering stolen stock. The old Reprisal System, of which he was a most determined critic, had been suspended in 1836 by Bourke, who had directed that no entry should be made into Kaffir country, either for the purpose of taking a number of cattle equal to that stolen by the natives or even for the recovery of actually plundered stock. Every effort was to be made to overtake the plunderers before they reached their own borders, and, except when they or their spoil were actually in view, these borders were never to be passed by pursuers. When the spoor crossed the boundary, the owner or patrol was to proceed to the nearest Kaffir kraal, and demand that it should be followed up with a view to recovering the stolen cattle.[29] This system was superseded by another in February, 1839. Under this patrols of burghers, headed by Field-Commandants, Field-Cornets, or Provisional Field-Cornets, might follow the spoor of stolen animals across the boundary without obtaining permission from any chief. On coming up with such stolen animals and finding them in the possession of the natives, the patrol might demand their immediate delivery, and, upon refusal, take them by force. The Field-Cornets were to be held

responsible that no blood was unnecessarily shed. The chiefs were to remain under their obligation to do their utmost to suppress depredations. [30]

This new system introduced by Cole was fully approved by the Commissioner-General. The latter also considered that patrols should be allowed to enter the territory occupied by the Kaffirs in order to recover stolen cattle, but on no account were the farmers to indemnify themselves by taking native stock, and before returning cattle thus taken to the colonists who claimed them the men commanding patrols were to satisfy themselves of the truth of these claims. Stockenstrom considered that if it was found that any chief encouraged depredations, or allowed plunderers to pass through his kraals, or could not control his people, he and his followers should be expelled from the Ceded Territory. Kraals in 'Kaffirland' proper (that is, beyond the Keiskamma-Tyumie line) which were proved to carry on a regular system of plunder against the Colony should be attacked, and their cattle taken to indemnify sufferers in the Colony. [31] At the same time he believed that the farmers were themselves to a considerable extent to blame for their losses. Many, he said, were lazy about guarding their stock, and were putting their trust too much in the military patrols. More vigilence was needed rather than more troops. [32] Accordingly in the regulations which he issued to the parties of farmers in the Ceded Territory he laid down that stock should be guarded by armed herds, not by defenceless natives who could easily be murdered by the Kaffirs. Cattle protected in this manner could not be taken except by force, and Provisional Field-Cornets could always pursue plunderers at once. Nobody should be compelled to follow up cattle which had been stolen through the carelessness of others. Upon no pretext whatever were Kaffir cattle to be taken without special orders. [33] Toward the close of 1829 Cole proceeded to the frontier, and, according to Stockenstrom, told the chiefs in an interview that no Kaffir cattle would be taken, except under special circumstances. [34]

Stockenstrom's scheme of settling the Ceded Territory with a dense population did not comprehend only the European farmers. We have seen that an important part was played in this system by the Kat River

Settlement of Hottentots, who were to co-operate in defending the frontier. As the Commissioner-General's plans developed he included within them the Kaffirs who had already taken up positions in the Ceded Territory. When the Governor visited the Eastern Frontier in September, 1839, Stockenstrom submitted to him a memorandum on the policy to be adopted towards these natives. He considered that they should be allowed to occupy the positions they had taken up on condition of good conduct. They should be permitted to graze their cattle in it and cultivate the land, and each separate native area should be pointed out and marked by natural boundaries. The Government's title to this land under the treaty of 1819 must, however, remain undisturbed, and kraals of confirmed plunderers must be expelled. [35] That same month Stockenstrom found that the chiefs were conniving at the plundering expeditions of their people, and that stock-thefts were going on to a large extent. Yet these had been partly due to the drought and to the carelessness of the farmers in defending their cattle. Having interviewed the Gunukwebe chiefs, Botman, Bruno, Tyalie, and two of Gaika's captains, he sent in a report in which he mentioned the advantages of using the chiefs as "auxiliaries in checking inroads and intercepting plunderers", if such a plan could be made practicable. [36]

(Arrangements did these live?

This plan of settling a strip of land between the Colony and Kaffirland proper with Europeans and Bantu, who were to live in close proximity to one another and learn, by obeying carefully prepared regulations, to maintain friendly relations, was aided by an increasing intercourse between the two peoples after 1826. The Colonial Government had long set its face against such intercourse, and there was until recently practically no lawful frontier trade. As late as 1825 Lord Somerset had issued a proclamation confirming earlier penalties, including corporal punishment and death, for unlicensed communication with the natives. [37] For a few years before 1826, however, a restricted commerce had been allowed at fairs held annually at Fort Willshire. In September, 1826, Bourke issued an Ordinance which laid down new regulations for the border fairs, permitted "colonists of good character" to obtain licenses to trade beyond the frontier, and allowed natives to enter the Colony with passports to trade within the

boundaries.[38] In 1830 Cole promulgated another Ordinance on the trade with the natives. It required traders to give monetary guarantees for the good conduct of themselves and their servants beyond the boundaries, but reduced the license fee and permitted greater freedom of trade with the interior.[39] In August, 1831, the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset announced that as a result of this Ordinance the Fort Willshire fair was no longer attended.[40]

The earlier segregation policy of the Government was further undermined by Ordinance 49 of July, 1828. The previous year Bourke had asked the Landdrosts of Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Albany, and Uitenhage to report on the expediency of admitting native 'foreigners' within the Colonial boundaries to enter labour service with the colonists. The views of the Landdrosts were favourable in the main, though Stockenstrom was opposed to placing these people under long-term contracts, and considered that natives, when once admitted, should be compelled to have "some fixed abode and honest occupation .... on pain of being severely punished as vagabonds if they go about ... in gangs without the means of subsistence." Bourke believed that a large supply of labourers might be obtained from the lands beyond the frontiers, and was supported in his scheme by the Council of Advice.[41] The Ordinance which embodied the Lieutenant-Governor's plan stated that natives who were admitted into the Colony should be provided with passes by Justices of the Peace or Field-Cornets of the district which they entered, and anybody who employed them without such passes would be fined £5. During their stay in the Colony these people were to be subject to its laws, and liable to its penalties for breach of contract. Labour engagements for longer than one month were to be entered as written contracts before Clerks of the Peace, J.P's, or other specially appointed persons. Stockenstrom's objection to long-term engagements was accepted, and it was enacted that contracts were not to be for longer than one year. Native 'foreigners' found wandering about the Colony without passes could be taken by any land-holder to a magistrate, who was to place them again in employment or remove them beyond the boundary.[42]

The Colonial Government and the Commissioner-General did not, by developing this Eastern Frontier policy, succeed in establishing real security on the borders of the Colony. The years immediately preceding the Sixth Kaffir War saw increasing unrest among the colonists and the natives.

Cole's and Stockenstrom's system of settling farmers provisionally in the Ceded Territory did not last long. In May, 1831, the Secretary of State, in granting his permission for the settlement of this area, directed that only Englishmen and Hottentots should get lands in it: Dutch settlers were to be excluded. The lands were to be sold at a given sum per acre. [43] In August he ordered that the latter provision should be applied generally at the Cape, and that in future, instead of disposing of Crown lands by grant (as had hitherto frequently been the case), these should be sold "on the terms which might be most advantageous to the public." [44] Accordingly in May, 1832, the Government Gazette published an Advertisement stating that Crown lands would no longer be alienated on quit-rent grants, but would be exposed at upset prices and sold by auction to the highest bidders. [45] Stockenstrom relates in his Memoirs that soon after Cole's departure from the Colony his system, whereby lands were to be provisionally distributed without surveying costs until holders were quite prepared to meet them, was disregarded. "A surveyor was sent to survey the lands in violation of the promise made to the grantees, the condition of occupation was set aside altogether, and many of the locations became Pingoe kraals .... Sir H. Smith and Secretary Montagu, under the auspices of Lord Grey, literally gave away by public auction for less than one-twelth of its value large tracts of the land which had been devoted to Sir L. Cole's system." [46]

By 1831 Stockenstrom had found that the farmers in the Ceded Territory were disregarding his order to keep four armed men on each location. [47] He also stated that many were by their carelessness in guarding their stock tempting the Kaffirs to steal, and that not nearly the number of cattle reported as stolen by the Kaffirs were actually stolen. [48] The principle laid down by the Governor in his

conference with the chiefs and by himself in his instructions, that no Kaffir cattle should be taken by patrols, was being violated, with the result that many Kaffirs were being driven to steal. Peaceful kraals had been plundered to make good the colonists' losses. [49] The latter charge was often repeated by Stockenstrom in later times, but, as we have observed, [50] his statements on this subject were not backed by proofs. A few years later he told the Aborigines Committee that during this period he "received returns weekly of their going in and taking Caffre cattle." [51] If this was so, it was his duty as Commissioner-General to investigate these cases, obtain facts, and report them to the Government. His reports were always, however, except on one occasion, made in general terms. On this occasion he reported that two farmers, Scheepers and Gordon, had obtained Kaffir cattle by unjust means. [52] The Colonial Secretary replied by stating that if these charges could be proved the Governor would deprive them of their promised grants of land. Stockenstrom did nothing further in the matter, stating that Scheepers' and Gordon's patrols had been under military officers, and that he had no right to institute inquiries into military proceedings. [53]

Reviewing the great number of reports of Kaffir depredations which entered the Colonial Office from various sources during this period, I have found very little specific information substantiating Stockenstrom's statements regarding the taking of Kaffir cattle. Civil Commissioner Campbell considered that the reports of losses fell far short of the numbers of cattle actually stolen, because it was often difficult for losers to go to Grahamstown, and the Field-Cornets, to whom they might also report, were frequently away from home.[54] On the other hand, there is some evidence of a more general character that the farmers were not conscientiously following the Commissioner-General's regulations. In August, 1831, the chiefs complained bitterly of the patrols to Stockenstrom, and told him that the evils of the frontier were to be traced to the taking of Kaffir stock. [55] The Rev. J. Ross, who was in 1830 residing in 'Kaffirland', referred to the "general complaint" of the natives among whom he lived "as to Commandoes (i.e. patrols) sent against them from the Colony, in which

while the guilty suffer to a fearful extent, the innocent are not spared. They can never feel at rest, so that they cannot make that improvement which is desirable." [56] The Rev. W. Shaw gave evidence that the chiefs of the Gaualorebes, with whom he resided, also complained of "reprisals", by which the innocent suffered as well as the guilty. [57] That the Governor himself at times doubted the accuracy of reports of 'depredations' is shown by a letter from the Colonial Secretary to Campbell in November, 1831, acknowledging a list of cattle said to have been stolen in Albany and Somerset, and remarking as follows:

"I am desired by His Excellency the Governor to acquaint you that he inclines to doubt their being stolen by the Kaffirs exclusively, and that many may rather have been lost than stolen at all... His Excellency cannot but regret that in most cases no effectual steps can be taken for their recovery, from the general want of an accurate description of the stolen animals and the great delays in reporting their loss." [58]

Stockenstrom's statements about the carelessness of the farmers in defending their property were usually illustrated, and can leave no doubt in our minds as to their correctness. A minute written by the Colonial Secretary on a report of depredations in the southern part of Albany serves as a pointer toward the views of Cole on this subject:

"Inform him that His Excellency has directed a party of the Cape Corps to be placed in the vicinity of the Kap River. His Excellency has, however, to observe that if the inhabitants in that part of the district do not exert themselves better in protecting their own property, they must submit to these constant losses." [59]

From the Colonial side there is no doubt that this was a most trying time for the inhabitants of the frontier districts. During these years there were continual complaints of thefts along the border, and periodically the Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset sent in formidable 'Returns of Caffre Depredations', which invariably exceeded (usually by far) the lists of stock recovered by patrols or sent in by the chiefs. The position was rendered more difficult by the entry of

numbers of Kaffirs into the Colony under Ordinance 49. This measure which, given an adequate frontier police force, could have been most beneficial to the Colony, did not produce the excellent results for which Bourke had hoped. In August, 1829, Campbell reported that bands of armed Kaffirs entered the Colony with passes from the mission stations, robbed the colonists of stock, and caused them great alarm. Since the previous November some 750 of these people had come in with passes, and others without. The great majority of the Kaffirs who entered the Colony did not look for work, and scarcely any of those who were in service with the colonists gave satisfaction.[60] Accordingly a proclamation was issued on August 25, 1829, directing that no more passes were to be granted to Kaffirs for the time being. Kaffirs found wandering about in the Colony were to be taken to the nearest magistrate or military post.[61]

Under these conditions it was to be expected that Commandos would have to be sent against kraals which persisted in carrying on depredations against the colonists. The first Commando of Stockenstrom's Commissioner-Generalship was that which expelled Makoma from the Ceded Territory in 1829. This was conducted with his full concurrence. The second took place in 1830. In May of that year the Military Commandant wrote to Stockenstrom, drawing his attention to the bad behaviour of Tyalie and his Kaffirs, who had carried out various depredations and treated with contempt the patrols which traced stolen cattle to their kraals.[62] The Commissioner-General decided that this conduct of Tyalie's people, together with the manner in which they had harassed the flocks and gardens of the Kat River Settlement, warranted their removal from the Ceded Territory, and he advised that a Commando should be assembled.[63] Permission to carry out this operation was granted by the Governor, provided he and Somerset could obtain definite proof against the chief. If they decided that the Commando was necessary, no stock should be seized except that stolen from the colonists. The Commissioner-General and the Commandant discussed the matter further, and decided that expulsion was necessary. The former ordered 150 burghers to assemble at the Kat River, stating in a note to Field-Cornet P. R. Erasmus that only cattle

which could be sworn to as Colonial property should be turned out of the guilty kraals.[65] Stockenstrom arrived at the Kat River on 14 June, and sent for Tyalie. The latter arrived, and after much evasion admitted that he knew where the greater part of the cattle taken from the Colony had been hidden, and offered to lead the Commando to the kraals of the plunderers. It was decided that the chief should be given a chance of proving his sincerity, and the force of troops and burghers was divided into three parts, which were to surprise these kraals. Stockenstrom reported at this time that there was a great desire among the farmers to take Kaffir cattle in lieu of their own if the latter could not be found. "But," he wrote, "we must resist every attempt at such indemnification, and I have informed those concerned that in case of doubt I shall have an oath enacted as to the cattle to be claimed being in reality Colonial property: so that those possessing themselves of Caffer cattle will have both the perjury and theft to answer for."[66]

By June 23 the three parties had returned from their expedition. One Kaffir 'captain', Magogo, had been taken prisoner. Two others, Jejanie and Sebeco, had previously escaped eastward. Captain Aitchison, who commanded one of the parties, related afterwards that he took 1,000 cattle (including Kaffir stock), none of which, to his knowledge, were restored to the natives. He was accompanied by Tyalie, who gave him no assistance, and, as far as he could see, tried to mislead him.[67] Field-Cornet Erasmus, whose party consisted entirely of burghers, proceeded to the kraal of a 'captain' named Zeko, who had stolen much Colonial stock, and turned out the cattle in his kraals. Then, having told Zeko that he was acting under orders and that the Kaffirs might claim their own cattle at Fort Willshire, he drove all these cattle, except for the tribe's milch-cows, towards Fort Willshire. On the way they were accompanied by several unarmed Kaffirs, who said that they would help them drive the cattle. After about an hour they entered bushy country, and at this point several of Erasmus' men told the Field-Cornet that some armed Kaffirs were hovering about, that their number appeared to be increasing, and that they had been seen giving assagais to the unarmed men who accompanied the burghers. Suddenly Erasmus

heard a war-whoop, followed by whistles and cries, and the cattle surged back in confusion. [68] Provisional Field-Cornet D. P. de Lange saw the Kaffirs separate two 'parcels' of cattle from the herd and drive them off. In the midst of the melee one of the men called out that the Kaffirs were throwing assagais, and de Lange gave the order to fire. Several shots were fired, and the 'parcels' of cattle were pursued and overtaken. Six or seven Kaffirs were found dead, all with assagais in their hands. Among them was Zeko himself: de Lange stated that he saw him fall, and was positive that when he fell he held assagais. The natives had succeeded in getting some cattle away, but the party rode on with the rest to Fort Willshire. [69] The Commissioner-General approved of the steps taken by this Commando, and accepted Erasmus' statement that his party had been attacked by the Kaffirs under Zeko. [70] Tyalie was allowed to select some of his own cattle from the herd (estimated at 1,600 by Erasmus, at 1,100 by Aitchison) taken from Zeko's kraals, and the rest were sent to Civil Commissioner Campbell, to be used towards compensating sufferers from Kaffir depredations. [71]

The events of the Commando of 1850 have been described in fair detail, because at a later date they gave rise to a strong controversy. In 1851, when the Commissioner-General was again on the frontier, Tyalie and Maluma told him that his instructions that only stolen cattle should be taken on this occasion had been disobeyed, and that the firing on the Kaffirs had been unprovoked. Stockenstrom held a very brief and one-sided inquiry, in the course of which he cross-questioned the chiefs and two or three Coloured men, [72] and at the end of August reported to the Government that Zeko and six of his people had been murdered in cold blood, and that the taking of the Kaffir cattle had been a violation of his orders, which permitted this only in case of violent resistance. [73] Stockenstrom kept this view of the matter, and gave evidence to the same effect before the Aborigines Committee. This called forth an inquiry by Campbell, who examined Colonel Somerset and a dozen burghers who had been present upon this Commando. It is clear from the evidence that Somerset ordered the three parties to seize Kaffir cattle and bring them to Fort Willshire.

The statement of Erasmus and others that the Commissioner-General gave similar verbal orders at Fort Willshire must be treated with great suspicion, as it conflicts with the instructions given to Erasmus by letter and was later denied by Stockenstrom himself. The position occupied by Stockenstrom on this occasion, however, is by no means sound. If, as he told the Aborigines Committee, he considered that native stock might be taken upon regular commandos, he should have had no objection to the seizure of Zeko's cattle. But if he objected to the latter on the ground that no resistance was made by the Kaffirs at the kraal, he should have complained at once, because he realised at the time that the skirmish with the natives had taken place on the way to Fort Willshire. Indeed he practically sanctioned Erasmus' act by stating in his report that "great quantities of Kaffir cattle were necessarily brought with those recognised by the colonists as stolen, and sent to Fort Willshire." [74] Wade argued soundly that if the identification of colonial cattle had been intended to take place at Zeko's kraal, Stockenstrom or some other responsible official would have accompanied the burghers to administer the oath. [75]

Stockenstrom did not follow up his report of 1831 by instituting a real inquiry on the spot. His reason for this neglect, as stated later, was a belief that the Governor would himself order an investigation. [76] Wade, however, stated that Cole distinctly told the Commissioner-General that if the charge against Erasmus could be proved, he should not go unpunished. [77] But nothing was done in the matter. By the time of Stockenstrom's arrival on the frontier in 1831 Somerset had decided that another Commando was necessary, in view of reports of many horses having been stolen by the natives and the general state of agitation on the frontier. The two men met in Grahamstown, and the Commandant, having mentioned his plan, asked for the help of the burghers who had lost horses. The memory of the previous year's Commando, however, sat heavily on Stockenstrom's mind, and he told Somerset that he would first have to find out whether the step was necessary. Upon enquiry he satisfied himself that "so far from the country being in a state of agitation and from the people being terribly frightened, the cattle were running wild as usual over

all the Ceded Territory, and, instead of being greatly agitated, the Caffres were in the most perfect state of tranquillity." The Commandant, however, applied to Cape Town direct, without mentioning the Commissioner-General's objections, and obtained the Governor's sanction for the expedition. [78] On receiving word of this Stockenstrom wrote to the Colonial Secretary, reminding the authorities that he had been on the frontier, where he was best able to judge of the state of the country and to exercise the discretion with which he was entrusted as Commissioner-General. He also explained that he had objected to the Commando, having considered it his duty to make careful inquiries before consenting to a measure which could endanger the peaceful state of the border. Were it not for the Governor's special authority, he would now countermand it. [79] The following week the force entered 'Kaffirland' and took 65 horses and 15 cattle. [80] A few days later Stockenstrom received a despatch from the Colonial Secretary, stating that the Governor had not been aware of his having arrived on the frontier. Had he stated his objections to the Commando, as was his duty, it would not have been sanctioned. [81] Somerset was severely reprimanded for not having mentioned Stockenstrom's objections. [82]

Reviewing the numerous despatches which described the Kaffir 'depredations' of this period, we see how much was due to the failure of the chiefs to control their people. Time and again it was proved that each of the chiefs in the Ceded Territory was but primus inter pares, and that efforts to prevent their followers from committing stock-thefts undermined their popularity. Again, when a chief seized stolen Colonial cattle which were being driven through his kraals, he risked making enemies, and there is evidence that the various 'captains' who occupied land west of the Keiskamma quarrelled among themselves. Both Stockenstrom and Somerset stated their opinion at times that they connived at and profited by the depredations of their people, and the Commandant once declared in a moment of exasperation that "talking to the chiefs is in most cases like appealing to the winds, and they do not exert themselves in the least, but make ten thousand excuses for their people." [83] This circumstance made it almost impossible to maintain a

just system of recovering stolen stock, for such a system required the active co-operation of the chiefs. During the years 1828-1834 every one of the border captains, except the well-behaved Gunukwebes in the south of the Ceded Territory, came at one time or another under the displeasure of the frontier officials. Early in 1828 Somerset took Gaika strongly to task for standing by as a passive spectator while British subjects were robbed, and told him that the Colony suffered more from his Kaffirs than from any others. [84] Before his death however, in November, 1829, the Commandant was able to praise the "firmness and good disposition" shown of late by the old chief, and the latter enjoyed a trip to Grahamstown at the Government's expense. [85] In 1829 Makoma was the chief villain of the piece; in 1850 and 1853 it was Tyalie. In February, 1828, Somerset reported on the "excellent conduct" of Botman and his Kaffirs, but in August, 1831, referred to his kraals as "a nest of the greatest vagabonds in Kaffirland." In May, 1830, Stockenstrom stated that Enno's people had been of "essential service" in the recovery of stolen cattle, but Wade declared before the Aborigines Committee that he was "the greatest scoundrel on the frontiers."

From time to time we are reminded of the difficult conditions produced among the natives by drought and over-crowding in the Ceded Territory and 'Kaffirland' proper. In November, 1827, Dundas reported that the drought had reduced the natives in the drier parts of the country to a position worse than that of the colonists, because their milk had failed. [86] In February, 1829, Somerset advised against preventing Makoma's people from grazing their cattle on the high ground between the Tyumie and the Vidoom Mountains, because "there is not a blade of grass anywhere else, and the distress (arising from the state of the country) in Kaffirland is beyond anything I can possibly express. In forcibly driving their cattle from those hills we should be driving the Kaffirs to their own destruction, and cause a feeling of hostility towards the Government, very opposite to that which now exists." He considered that the Kaffir country, in contrast to that of the Tambookies, was already very confined. [87] The following month,

however, Campbell reported that some Tambookie kraals had encroached on Makoma's lands because of the failure of the pasturage in their own country.[88] Makoma's expulsion from the Kat River area seems to have placed him and his people in great difficulties, and several times he asked permission to return and live under the Colonial laws, because he had nowhere to go. In September, 1829, Stockenstrom stated that stock-theft was as extensive in Kaffirland as in the Colony. "I met the chief Gola," he said, "whom I knew as a very opulent Caffer a ~~three~~ few years ago, going to Bethelsdorp for an asylum, having been plunder'd of all his cattle by his countrymen. He told me 'there are too many people in Gafferland; they must steal or die, therefore you will never see an end to cattle-stealing on the frontier'".[89] In an interview with Somerset in 1828 Gaika "expressed his regret at the conduct of the Kaffirs, and said that the chiefs were very generally anxious to prevent depredations, that as for himself the conduct of the Kaffirs had caused him so much misery that if it continued he had intended to request the King of England to give him a grant of land in England, that he might retire from the troubles that surrounded him."[90]

Added to the problem of land shortage among the Kaffirs was that involved in the insecurity of their tenure in the Ceded Territory. The position of the chiefs was a difficult one, knowing as they did that continued depredations by their people might lead to expulsion. The first chief to be driven out, as we have seen, was Makoma. The Rev. Thompson, then a Government Agent, told the Governor that his removal produced "much irritation and hostility" in the minds of those who suffered by it, and that it was likely to cause "an unfavourable impression on the natives generally." If other chiefs were expelled at a later date they might well be "exasperated" against the Colony, because their former possessions beyond the Keiskamma had been occupied by other natives who pressed in from behind.[91] Botman was most dissatisfied with the position of land allotted to him by Cole in 1829, and in June, 1830, the Commissioner-General reported that he had voluntarily withdrawn beyond the Keiskamma. After that date most of his people lived in 'Kaffirland' proper.[92] As early as July, 1828,

Campbell had wanted to drive out Kmo's people, "the most lawless of any of the neighbouring tribes," but the step was not taken. Again in 1833 Acting-Governor Wade was urged to expel them, but refrained in the absence of definite proofs of their bad behaviour. [93] In 1830 Stockenstrom and Somerset had both been in favour of driving out Tyalie, but the Governor had given him one more chance. In 1833, however, Cole gave orders for his removal, and, hearing of this intention, Tyalie withdrew beyond the Gaga, which was then believed to constitute part of the Colonial boundary. [94] Shortly afterwards the Acting-Governor found that Makoma had established a kraal in a part of the country assigned to Botman in 1829, and, being convinced that the real boundary was not the Gaga but a stream which lay above it, he decided to remove both Makoma and Tyalie beyond the latter. Orders were given to this effect, but the military authorities on the frontier advised that the step should be delayed until the Kaffirs had reaped their corn and pumpkins. Further orders were received to act immediately, and in November, 1833, the natives were removed. "They were driven out of a country," stated Captain Aitchison, who carried out this measure, "that was both better for water and grass than the one they were removed to, which was already thickly inhabited. They took me over the country they were to inhabit, and I assure you there was not a morsel of grass upon it .... It was as bare as a parade." Colonel Somerset, who had been away from the frontier at the time, returned to his post in January, 1834, and allowed Makoma to go back. The Acting-Governor, however, refused to sanction the Commandant's act, and the chief was again expelled "by return of post." [95]

It is to this insecurity of land tenure and to these actual expulsions that we must attribute a great deal of the anger and unrest that finally broke out in the Sixth Kaffir War. Aitchison gave evidence that in November, 1833, Makoma had at first "refused positively" to withdraw, and had been "very violent." [96] In October, 1834, Sir Benjamin D'Urban reported to the Secretary of State that the Kaffirs were "stimulated by a strongly excited feeling of discontent and ill-will toward the Colony," and attributed this to the expulsion of Makoma and Tyalie. This step, he said, had been taken at a time when a severe drought was approaching. [97] On the eve of the war

Wade was on the Eastern Frontier, and he had a long conversation with Makana, which he afterwards described as follows:

"I rode with Maccmo for some time ... He complained of the Caffres being so often permitted to enter the Colony and again thrust out, without any apparent cause for their removal ... He asked me emphatically, 'When am I to have my country again?' I replied, 'What country?' He said, 'This country, where we are, and that country', pointing towards the Hottentot locations ... Shortly afterwards (he) rode away, saying in a very marked and peculiar manner, 'But we are to have the land again'". [77]

The Kaffirs who poured into the Colony in December, 1834, were the border people of Makana, Tyalie, Botman, and Enno.

The Sixth Kaffir War is the measure of the Colonial Government's failure to bring security to the Eastern Frontier. It had failed to prevent continual stock-thefts by the natives, and to apply a system of recovering stolen stock which was satisfactory to both peoples. It had failed to bring about really friendly relations between the frontiersmen and the border Kaffirs. It had failed in its policy of admitting natives into the Colony to enter labour service with the farmers. It had expelled several of the tribes from the Ceded Territory.

During the years 1828-1832 Stockenstrom's position on the Eastern Frontier was, as we have seen, only semi-responsible, and his measures could be cancelled by the Governor at any time. The policy officially followed, however, by the Colonial Government was one with which he was in complete agreement. The scheme of settling the Ceded Territory with a dense population under special regulations was his own, and the system of cattle recovery introduced by Colo in 1829 coincided with his views. Thus, in so far as blame attaches to the steps taken by the Government during these five years, Stockenstrom must share in it.

Reviewing this period, however, we see how supremely difficult was the task which faced the authorities. Nothing could have brought

Kaffir 'depredations' under real control, except a numerous and efficient frontier police force. This the Colonial Treasury could not afford. The position was aggravated by the disturbances in the interior and the southward movements of the coastal tribes, circumstances beyond the Government's control. The latter was further hampered by the 'human problems of the borders', the fears and prejudices which so often abound on frontiers dividing a 'civilised' fom an 'uncivilised' people. The problem of continual stock-thefts was a moral question, which could be dealt with in the long run only by education. On the side of the colonists the matter was complicated by fears of attack by the natives ('frontier scares') which arose from time to time, the increasing demand for land beyond the boundaries, and the wide-spread feeling (difficult to assess, but deep-lying and real enough) that Southern Africa was a white man's country. Finally, the problems of the frontier were rendered still more acute by the recurring droughts of this period and the suffering they caused among both peoples.

My own conclusion is that it was not the policy followed by the Government which was to blame, but rather the inefficient instruments it had to employ and the great difficulty of the problems with which it was faced. The policy it endeavoured to adopt - settling the Ceded Territory closely with Europeans, Hottentots, and Bantu, and giving them an opportunity of learning how to live peacefully in one another's neighbourhood; carefully regulating their relations, in order to prevent possible clashes; imposing on the colonists a just system of regaining stolen stock, and endeavouring to secure the co-operation of the chiefs in punishing thieves; allowing limited numbers of natives to enter the Colony and work with the Colonists; and encouraging the missionaries in their efforts to spread civilisation - was constructive enough. The question of administration, however,was a vital one. How were the natives to be kept quiet and peaceful while these sound measures were put into practice?

There can be no question that full 'incorporation' of the natives in the Ceded Territory (and in the Keiskamma - Kei region, if possible) within the Colony and under its laws and magistrates would have gone far to attain the objects of the Colonial Government. The

problems of the Eastern Frontier could never be really dealt with until the natives were brought under effective European administration. Nothing so much demanded this step as the need to preserve the natives in their lands, which the inadequately controlled advance of the colonists was taking from them by degrees. Stockenstrom was alive to the land problem, and told the Aborigines Committee that if the 'Reprisal System' continued the colonists would advance from river to river, taking one slice of native territory after another, until they reached Delagoa Bay.[99] Did he realise that native lands could be protected only by gradual 'incorporation' of the Bantu in the Colony and the setting aside of reserves within the boundaries? This is a question which I cannot solve. After reading the 'Treaty of Peace' made between Sir Benjamin D'Urban and the natives west of the Kei, which extended the Cape frontier to that river, he wrote to Lord Glenelg, stating that he was opposed on various grounds to incorporating the Kaffirs. The latter had been roused by the late war, and could not be trusted. They would make the Colony pay dearly for their temporary submission, for they would be rebellious subjects. The Government would have to check and redress their injuries against the tribes which lay beyond them. The power of the chiefs should on no account be weakened, as it was through them that the Kaffirs could best be brought to civilised life. European judges and magistrates might in the performance of their duties raise questions or provoke acts of resistance with which the Government could not cope. That generation of Kaffir chiefs could not be used as magistrates, because they could not administer English law; and even if they could, they could serve the Colony and their own people better as chiefs.[100] With this statement we must contrast the views Stockenstrom expressed in a letter written at the end of 1834. One of his objects, he said, in founding the Kat River Settlement had been to experiment in how far such a system of colonisation could be extended along the frontier and beyond it. He had hoped that the scheme could be applied next to the Gunukwebes and to "the Caffre natives generally."

"Other Caffre chiefs," he wrote, "who have hitherto been upon a

less amicable footing with us, but have been occasionally allowed to reside in the Ceded Territory, would soon be brought to adopt the same course, and we might gradually have obtained a dense population of white colonists, Caffres, and Hottentots, from the Winterberg to the sea, all governed and protected by the same laws and equally interested in the peace of the country."[101]

These two contrasting statements are most perplexing. How far that made in 1836 (and followed as practical policy during the Lieutenant-Governorship) was influenced by the special conditions which obtained at the end of the Sixth Kaffir War and by the economic position of the Colonial Government, I shall not venture to say. A detailed study of Lieutenant-Governor Stockenstrom's papers should prove an interesting and instructive task.

C O N C L U S I O N.

I have endeavoured to describe the frontier and colour problems of the Cape Colony in the years which preceded the Sixth Kaffir War, the efforts made by the Government to deal with those problems, and, more particularly, the efforts of Andries Stockenstrom. Realising that the latter's position was only semi-responsible, I have, where necessary, passed beyond the views and activities of the Commissioner-General, and dealt more generally with the main trends of policy during this period.

The authorities at the Cape had achieved successes and suffered failures. Under general instructions from England, they had freed the Hottentots and Coloured People from many restrictions, but had produced no remedy for the short-term results of Ordinance 50, vagrancy and stock-theft. They had set on foot the Kat River Settlement, but had given it quite inadequate assistance. They had realised that treking across the Northern boundaries could no longer be prevented, and had given it their half-hearted sanction, but had found no solution to the problems of Trans-Orangia. On the Eastern Frontier they had followed a definite policy, aimed at promoting friendly relations between Europeans and Bantu by settling the Ceded Territory with farmers and tribesmen under wise regulations, but, in the absence of effective administration, their plans had largely failed. With all these policies Stockenstrom had been associated.

We have seen that in each case the Government was impeded in carrying its views into effect by the inadequacy of the means at its disposal. The Commissioner-General had wished after 1828 to apply in full the existing laws against vagrancy, but this was impossible without an efficient police force. Given moderate economic assistance, policing, and sympathetic magistrates, the Kat River Settlement might have remained in existence to this day, and become the basis of further experiments of a similar type. The complicated issues of Trans-Orangia could have been solved only by the annexation of this region to the Colony, but again it is doubtful whether the finances of the Colony could have allowed this step. On the Eastern Frontier there were

similar difficulties.

Thus the economic situation formed a background to all the aims and efforts of the Colonial authorities during this period. It must be remembered, however, that even if the incorporation of Trans-Orangia and land beyond the Eastern Frontier had been more practicable, such steps could have been taken only one at a time. Thus intercourse between frontiersmen and semi-civilised or uncivilised tribes would have had to have been carefully controlled as the boundary advanced eastward and northward, just as Stockenstrom endeavoured to control relations between the white, black, and coloured peoples on the frontiers of his time. Regulations of the type he imposed would have remained necessary as long as there were natives separated from the Europeans by frontiers.

In their efforts to achieve their ideals men are subject to the conditions of their time. Often they are impeded by a lack of sufficient resources, human or material. They are obstructed by the unprogressive ideas and the prejudices of men. They are exposed to unforeseen events. But their ideals do not perish. We have seen that Stockenstrom had had many difficulties to contend with - the economic debility of the Cape, the hopelessness of trying to co-operate with uneducated native chiefs, personal differences. But we cannot but be struck by the way he fought throughout his life for the rights of the black and coloured peoples of South Africa. While fully alive to the claims of the colonists to protection and assistance, he stood out at all times for the oppressed, and refused to compromise upon his conviction that justice and freedom know no colour barriers. The part he played in establishing the 'Cape Liberal Tradition' was an honourable one. The ideals of justice and freedom live on.

APPENDIX I.

ABBREVIATIONS:

A.C.	= Aborigines Committee Blue-Book.
P I	= Papers relating to the Natives of South Africa, Part I.
P II	= Ditto, Part II.
Autobiography	= Autobiography of Sir Andries Stockenstrom.
C.O.	= Colonial Office section, Cape Archives.
L.G.	= Lieutenant-Governor's section, Cape Archives.
C. of Advice	= Minutes of H.M. Council of Advice.
Theal	= Theal's Records of the Cape Colony.
Sixth Kaffir War	= Papers relating to the Sixth Kaffir War.

FOREWORD.

1. Rise of S.A., Vol. II, p.369.

CHAPTER I.

1. Autobiography, Vol.I (pp. 19, 17).
2. Ibid. (p.27).
3. Collins: Report. (P I, p.51).
4. Autobiography, Vol. I (p.30).
5. Ibid (pp.64-5).
6. Ibid (p. 87).
7. Report of Commission on Circuit (P I, p.112).
8. Stockenstrom to Secretary to Government (24/6/29) (L.G. 279, No. 98 of 1829).
9. Autobiography, Vol. I (p. 89 ff).
10. History of S.A. (p.160).
11. On the eve of Stockenstrom's appointment as Commissioner-General 80 inhabitants of the Graaff-Reinet district petitioned Governor Bourke as follows: "We ... pray that it may please Your Honour that we may retain our Landdrost, the man who has ruled as a father ... This true philanthropist ... is not only acquainted with his whole district, but also with the situation and value of each farm, and with the character of the owners of the same; a friend to those who conduct themselves according to law, and a terror to transgressors." (Autobiography, Vol. I, pp.376-7).
12. Ibid (p.139 ff).
13. A table based on Graaff-Reinet documents placed the number of Bushmen killed between 1793 and 1796 at 2,480 (van der Merwe: Noordwaartse Beweging , pp. 52-5).
14. Collins, Report: Rynveld, Report of Commission on Circuit (P I, p.40 ff, 112 ff).
15. Noordwaartse Beweging (p.95).
16. Correspondence between Landdrost of Graaff-Reinet and Local Officials re the Bushmen (1820-4) (P I, p.56 ff).
17. Stockenstrom to H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry (9/8/26) (Ibid., p.116 ff).
18. Stockenstrom to Secretary to Government (5/5/17) (Ibid., p.56).
19. Ibid: Autobiography, Vol. I, p.335.
20. Ibid (p.325 ff., 330 ff.).
21. Noordwaartse Beweging (p.247 ff); Stockenstrom, Evidence before Aborigines Committee (A.C., Question 1907 ff.).
22. The minutes of a meeting of the Swellendam Heemraden on December 4, 1797, mentions that the Hottentots have long complained that they do not duly receive their wages, and are detained after their period of contract. Employers are ordered not to ill-treat their Hottentots, a fine is threatened, and Veldwachmeesters are instructed to be vigilant. (Autobiography, Vol. I, pp.382-3.)

25. Ibid. (p.76).
24. Report of Commission on Circuit (P I, p.112 ff).
25. H.P. Hallbeck to H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry (12/5/25) (Ibid., p.24).
26. Report on Hottentots and Missionary Institutions (28/1/30) (Theal, Vol. XXXV, p.306 ff).
27. Report on Police at the Caye (20/5/28) (Ibid., p.124 ff).
28. D. Moodie to Secretary to Government (24/12/29). (G.O.605, No.256).
29. Evidence taken by H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry (6/9/24) (P I, No.XI).
30. Report on Hottentots and Missionary Institutions.
31. Ibid.
32. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.48. See also Stockenstrom to Secretary to Government (12/2/19). (Ibid., p.144).
33. Ibid, p.245 ff.
34. Report on Hottentots and Missionary Institutions.
35. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.65 ff.
36. Macmillan, "Bantu, Boer, and Briton" (Chapter IV). Stockenstrom: Aborigines Committee (Q.1393 ff).
37. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.178 ff.
38. Report on the Griquas (15/9/20) (P I, No.10).
40. Papers re Boundaries of the Colony (P I, No.8).
41. Noordwaartse Beweging. (p.114 ff).
42. Stockenstrom to Secretary to Government (29/9/20) (P I, No.8).
43. Autobiography, Vol.I, p.210: Stockenstrom to Secretary of State (5/11/24) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098).
44. H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry to Stockenstrom (30/8/26): Stockenstrom to H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry (9/9/26) (P I, No.8).
45. Noordwaartse Beweging, p.207 ff.
46. Walker, History of S.A. (p.114 ff., 123 ff).
47. Report of H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry on Kaffir Depredations (25/5/25) (P I, No.26).
48. Government Gazette, 19 April, 1817.
49. Ibid.
50. Evidence of Col. T. F. Wade (A.C., Q.3558). The evidence given by Wade during his long examination is valuable, for, although he maintained throughout the 'official' and 'settler' view of native affairs, his statements were carefully documented. Wade was Military Secretary to the Government from September to November, 1828, and from January, 1830, to August, 1833. From this date to January, 1834, he was Acting-Governor of the Colony.
51. Government Gazette, October 30, 1819.
52. Report on Kaffir Depredations (P I, No.26).
53. A.C. (Q.541 ff.).
54. Ibid. (Q.47).
55. Document published by J. Fairbairn (6 January, 1836): read by Wade (A.C., Q.3510).
56. Walker, History of S.A. (p.188): Stockenstrom's Autobiography, Vol. I, p.237.
57. W. Shaw to J. Gregory (6/4/26) (P I, No.20).
58. "Bantu, Boer and Briton," pp.62-3: Stockenstrom's Autobiography, Vol. I, p.238.
59. A.C. (Q.1196, 749). Dundas was Landdrost of Albany from March, 1825, to the end of 1827, and Civil Commissioner of Albany and Somerset until June, 1828. The Rev. Shaw resided with the Gamtoosbes from 1825 to 1830.
60. Report on Kaffir Depredations (P I, No.26).
61. See, for example, A.C., Q.970 ff.
62. Evidence of Shaw (Ibid., Q. 716 ff.)
63. Somerset to H.M. Commissioners of Inquiry (6/2/26) (P II: Appended Document No.3).
64. W.R. Thompson to Lieut. Col. Somerset (6/2/26). (Ibid.)
65. A.C., Q.1165 ff.

66. Ibid., Q.3558 (a long prepared statement by Wade based on documents).
67. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.142 ff.
68. Ibid, p.126.
69. A.C., Q. 965, 3558.
70. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.237-8.
71. 9/8/26 (P I, No.8).
72. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.245 ff.
73. Ibid, p.240.

CHAPTER II.

1. Bathurst to Somerset (20/8/25) (Theal, Vol. XXII, p.496).
2. See, for example, the arguments later advanced by Sir Benjamin D'Urban for the removal of the capital to the Eastern districts. (D'Urban to Aberdeen, 26/5/35: Sixth Kaffir War, No.4).
3. Goderich to Bourke (14/6/27) (Theal, Vol. XXXII, p.6).
4. Do. (17/6/27) (Ibid.) Stockenstrom states, however, that in a private note to the Lieutenant-Governor Goderich had mentioned his name. (Autobiography, Vol.I, p.267).
5. Bourke to Huskisson (26/1/28) (C.O.1445, No.6).
6. Walker, History of S.A. (Chapter VII): Stockenstrom's Autobiography, pp. 249-250, 267 ff, 290 ff.
7. Bourke to Huskisson (26/1/28) (C.O.1445, No.6).
8. See Chapters III and VI.
9. Instructions to the Commissioner-General (27/9/28) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1581). Stockenstrom himself advised that Uitenhage should be his place of residence, as it was close to Port Elizabeth, which was to be the capital of the Eastern Province (A.C., Q.2096 ff.).
10. Stockenstrom's Remarks on the Instructions intended for the Commissioner-General (28/9/28) (Arrears, Civil Commissioners: Vol.II): Cole to Goderich (20/3/33)(C.O. 1445, No.15 of 1833): Stockenstrom to H.M. Secretary of State (5/11/34) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1096): A.C., Q.580 ff., 1084 ff.
11. Dundas to Plasket (13/11/27) (Theal, Vol. XXXIV, p.154).
12. Plasket to May (22/11/27) (Ibid., p.155): Bourke to Huskisson (26/1/28) (C.O.1445, No.6).
13. Bell to Stockenstrom (6/11/28) (C.O.1505, p.100).
14. Do. (8/5/29). (C.O.1505, p.479).
15. Do. (25/8/29) (C.O.1506, p.148).
16. Do. (30/4/30) (C.O.1507, p.117).
17. Do. (17/5/31) (C.O.1507, p.278).
18. Cole to Goderich (10/5/31) (C.O.1444, No.38 of 1831).
19. Stockenstrom to Bell (19/5/29) (C.O.619, No. 25).
20. Stockenstrom to Somerset (2/7/29) (C.O.619, Enclosure to No.31).
21. Stockenstrom to Cole (5/9/29) (C.O.619; document not numbered).
22. Stockenstrom to Bell (17/5/30 and 17/6/30) (C.O.647, Nos.24 and 30).
23. Do. (18/2/29) (C.O.619, No.6).
24. Autobiography, Vol.I, p.352 ff.
25. Stockenstrom to W.C. van Ryneveld (22/12/29) (L.G.279, No.129 of 1829-9).
26. Stockenstrom to Bell (10/2/30) (L.G.279, No.21 of 1830).
27. Autobiography, Vol.I, p.372 ff.
28. Ibid, p.407 ff: Stockenstrom to Bell (14/7/31) (C.O.654, No.10).
29. A.C., Q.1985 ff.
30. Stockenstrom to Bell (31/8/31) (C.O.654, No.16).
31. A.C., Q.1991 ff., 2035.
32. Ibid., Q.2104, 2012 ff.
33. Goderich to Cole (27/5/31) (C.O.1518, p.1249).
34. C. of Advice (31 March, 1835).
35. Autobiography, Vol. I, p.417.
36. A.C., Q.522, 1048 ff., 1925 ff., 2055.ff.
37. Somerset to Bell (8/5/28) (C.O.582, No.43). Somerset also quarrelled with a Field-Commandant Meyer, and Dundas recommended the latter's removal from office in view of the ill-feeling between him and the Commandant of the Frontier. (Dundas to Bell, 30/6/28: C.O. 579, No352.)

38. A.C., Q.2355 ff.

CHAPTER III.

1. For Philip's activities from 1826 to 1828 see Macmillan's "Cape Colour Question" (Chapter XV).
2. Murray to Cole (2/8/28) (C.O.1515, No.1027).
3. Do. (3/8/28) (C.O.1515, No.1028).
4. Cape Colour Question, p.314.
5. Bourke to Huskisson (22/7/22) (C.O.1443, No.35).
6. Stockenstrom to Plasket (20/2/27) (P II, Enclosure to No.2).
7. Bourke to Huskisson (22/7/22) (C.O.1443, No.35).
8. Whether on his own initiative or by request of the Lieutenant-Governor I am unable to discover. Among the official correspondence between the Commissioner-General and the Colonial Secretary there is no letter calling for such a memorandum. But as Stockenstrom was in Cape Town at the time, Bourke may have requested it verbally.
9. Memorandum of the Commissioner-General (5/4/28) (Autobiography, Vol.I, p.286 ff). Also Vol.II, p.405.
10. Autobiography, Vol.I, p.291.
11. Walker, History of S.A. (p.180): J.S.Marais, Cape Coloured People (p.180 ff): Macmillan, Cape Colour Question (p.220 ff).
12. Quoted by Wade (A.C., Q.2331).
13. Ibid, Q.1367.
14. Dundas remained in the Colony after resigning the Civil Commissionership of Albany in June, 1828. (Ibid., Q.1136).
15. Ibid., Q.1472 ff.
16. C.of Advice (17 July, 1828).
17. Cole to Goderich (10/5/31) (C.O.1444, No.36 of 1831).
18. C.of Advice (20 February, 1832).
19. D. Moodie (Acting Civil Commissioner) to Bell. (29/1/30) (C.O.630, No.14).
20. M. J. Oakruydt (Clerk of the Peace at Somerset) to Bell. (4/2/29) (C.O. 604, No.38).
21. W. Currie to Bell (27/11/28) (C.O.580, No.272): Do. (1/7/29) (C.O.605, No.154).
22. J. Walker to J. Marais (J.P. at Cradock) (8/3/30). (C.O.650,No.39).
23. See Chapter IV.
24. C. of Advice (20 February, 1832).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. (7 January, 1829.)
27. Stockenstrom to J. Crause (15/1/29) (L.C.279, No.51 of 1828-9).
28. A.C., Q. 1367.
29. W. Currie to Bell; note of the Attorney-General. (27/11/28) (C.O.580, No.272).
30. Oakruydt to Bell (20/9/28): Mackay to Bell (15/10/28) (C.O.580, Nos.316 and 346).
31. Cape Colour Question, p.254.
32. Ibid, p.211.
33. Cape Coloured People, p.157.

CHAPTER IV.

1. P I, p.31 ff.
2. 6/9/24 (Ibid., No.11).
3. Pringle's Plan for Defending the Frontier (P II, extra paper No.8: undated).
4. Draft for Settlement of Lands at the Missionary Institutions (11/3/29) (Theal, Vol. XXXV).
5. Report on Hottentots and Missionary Institutions (Ibid., p.306 ff).
6. 22/1/29 (C.O.617, No.3).
7. 4/5/30 (C.O.648, No.150).

8. Bell to Stockenstrom (22/9/28) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.2784).
9. Stockenstrom to Bell (13/12/28) (C.O.586, No.22).
10. Campbell to Bell (30/1/29) (C.O.604, No.35).
11. Bell to Stockenstrom (8/4/29); Dundas to Somerset (10/4/29) (A.C., Enclosures to Q.1876).
12. A.C., Q.969.
13. Whereby Caffa had agreed to Durkin's planting a military settlement at Fredericksburg in the Ceded Territory (see Chapter I).
14. About five miles south of the modern town of Adelaide.
15. Minutes for the Consideration of the Secretary to Government. (17/4/29) (C.O.619, No.14).
16. Stockenstrom to Bell (24/4/29) (C.O.619, No.16).
17. See Chapter VI.
18. Bell to Stockenstrom (8/5/29) (C.O.1505, p.477).
19. Stockenstrom to Bell (28/5/29) (C.O.619, No.27).
20. Do. (30/5/29) (Ibid., No.28): Bell to Stockenstrom (5/6/29) (C.O.1506, p.23).
21. Stockenstrom to Bell (3/6/29) (C.O.619, No.29).
22. Do. (24/6/29) (Ibid., No.30).
23. Do. (1/7/29) (L.C.279, No.100 of 1828-9).
24. Stockenstrom to Cole (11/9/29) (C.O.619: following No.37).
25. Do. (11/1/30) (C.O.647,No.56).
26. A.C., Q.2334.
27. Ibid., Q.1416-7.
28. Philip's Return of L.M.S. Missions in S.A., 1830 (C.O.1778: undated). Philip said that 144 families arrived in 1829 from these two stations. Stockenstrom in his "Remarks on the Return of L.M.S. Missions" challenged the statement that these people from the missions alone were qualified to civilise their countrymen. There were families, he said, who were at least their equal in industry, good conduct, and property, though they had never before been away from the farms. (31/12/30) (C.O.647, No.58).
29. A.C., Q.2881.
30. Stockenstrom to Bell (1/7/29) (L.C.279, No.100 of 1828-9).
31. Stockenstrom to W.C. van Rynsveld (2/6/29). (Ibid., No.93 of 1828-9).
32. Stockenstrom to S. van Wyk (2/7/29) (Ibid., No.106 of 1828-9).
33. Evidence of Stockenstrom (A.C., Q.1587).
34. Read: Ibid., Q.5235. Read's evidence refers only to conditions after June, 1830, when he arrived on the Kat River.
35. i.e. more than "two or three goats". (Ibid., Q.1415).
36. Unless otherwise stated, I shall use this word to cover all the recognised settlers on the Kat River, whether pure Hottentots or Bastards.
37. Provisional Regulations of December 22,1829 (C.O.647, No.56).
38. Viz., the settling of a dense population in the Ceded Territory, subject to careful regulations for defence and recovery of stock (See Chapter VI).
39. Stockenstrom to Bell (26/4/30) (C.O.647, No.16).
40. Stockenstrom to Somerset (19/5/30) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098).
41. Stockenstrom to Bell (11/1/30) (C.O.647, No.56).
42. Cape Coloured People, p.220.
43. Bell to Stockenstrom (8/5/29) (C.O.1505, p.479).
44. A.C., Q.2364-5. According to Dr. J. Rose-Innes, the Superintendent-General of Education, the population of the Settlement in 1833 was 2,114. Had the 640 allotments of that time been granted to stock-farmers, they would, on the average size of such farms on the Eastern Frontier, have been subdivided into 25 'places', on which the population could not have been more than 350. (Memorandum on the Kat River Settlement, May 30, 1851; 'Autobiography,' Vol.II, pp.421, 425).
45. A.C., Q.5235.
46. Cole to Murray (22/1/31) (P II, No.25).
47. Menzies to Cole (undated) (P II, No.20).
48. A.C., Q.1587. Both were cases of petty stock-theft.

49. Ibid., Q.5235.
50. Ibid.
51. Campbell to Bell (10/7/29) (C.O.605, No.147).
52. Evidence of Stockenstrom: A.C., Q.1387.
53. Bell to Stockenstrom (17/5/31) (C.O.1507, p.278). It was directed that the locations should be laid out in small villages or hamlets, each having its own communal grazing ground. Each grant was to be assessed at a moderate quit-rent, covering not only the allotments but also the grantee's proportion of the commonage. The Assistant Surveyor-General was given the task.
54. Evidence of Read: A.C., Q.5235. By the winter of 1834 about 600 lots of land had been distributed, on an average size of 5 morgen (6 acres).
55. Ibid.
56. Return of L.M.S. Missions in S.A. (1830).
57. A.C., Q.1387, 2300 ff.
58. Stockenstrom to Bell; despatches of June and July, 1830 (C.O.647, Nos.32, 34, 35): Bell to Stockenstrom (18/6/30) (C.O.1507, p.198): Cole to May (25/10/30) (C.O.1444, following No.61.)
59. Return of Hottentots provisionally settled in the Ceded Territory (11/1/30) (C.O.647, No.56). The statistics of stock which are available for that period 1829-34 are not very instructive, and I can give no indication of their degree of accuracy. Godlonton's figures for 1832 and Wade's for 1833 are lower than Stockenstrom's for January, 1830, but those given by Rose-Innes for 1834 show a substantial increase during that year. I shall quote these figures without comment, and they must be taken in conjunction with more general evidence.
60. Menzies to Cole (P II, No.20).
61. Later a member of the Legislative Council. Godlonton was to become very hostile to the Settlement.
62. 200 horses; 3,500 horned cattle; 6,000 sheep and goats. Note that these are 'round' numbers.
63. Letter in the Grahamstown Journal (27/6/32) ('Autobiography', Vol.II, p.404 ff). There is little real information about education in the Settlement before 1834. James Read (junior) told the Aborigines Committee that he had had 10 or 11 "schools" under his superintendence. He believed the Rev. Thompson had had an "infant school", but it had been "dropped". (A.C., Q.5101, 5111).
64. A.C., Q.2881.
65. Campbell to Acting Secretary to Government. (31/5/33). (C.O.714; Acting Commissioner-General's section, No.4).
66. Do. (14/6/33)(Ibid., No.5)
67. In this force, however, were included some who were not settlers, but "natives from beyond the boundaries," chiefly "Coosha" in the service of farmers.
68. A.C., Q.2881.
69. Memorandum on the Kat River Settlement ('Autobiography; Vol.II, p.421).
70. The name given to refugees from the Bantu tribes broken by the wars which Chaka's aggressions had started.
71. A.C., Q.2341 ff.
72. Stockenstrom to Field-Cornet Groepe (10/2/30) (L.C.279, No.25 of 1830).
73. Return of Population in the Kat River Settlement, May, 1833. (C.O.714; not numbered).
74. Campbell to Acting Secretary to Government (20/12/33) (P.II, Enclosure to No.23). In working on frontier history it is often supremely difficult to get at the plain truth, when so much of the available information came from people with a strong bias in one direction or another. Often it is impossible to tell whether a man is generalising from mere fragmentary evidence. Campbell's statement that Kat River Hottentots entered Kaffirland is supported by later evidence from the Rev. W. B. Boyce, a Wesleyan missionary, according to whom a number of people from Albany and the Settlement,

armed with guns, were "found settled" among the frontier tribes, and that their presence was "highly injurious to the Colony". (Enclosure to D'Urban's despatch to Aberdeen, 19/6/35: Sixth Kaffir War). With this, however, contrast the younger Read's evidence before the Aborigines Committee: "Q: During the last year or two before the breaking out of the war, did the Caffres and Hottentots live in vicinity together without mutual encroachments? - A: Without encroachments: the Hottentots never went into Caffreland without a military officer; and there was no constant communication kept up between them, but when cattle were lost by the settlers they used to follow the spoor, headed by an officer; but as to encroachments, none were made upon the Caffres by the Hottentots"(A.C., Q.5229).

75. A.C., Q.2881.
76. Somerset to Dundas (12/8/29) (C. of Advice; Appendix).
77. Somerset to Stockenstrom (16/5/30) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098): Stockenstrom to Bell (17/5/30) (C.O.647, No.24).
78. A.C., Q. 5235.
79. Makoma had to be expelled a second time in 1833 (see Chapter VI).
80. A.C., Q.2794.
81. Ibid., Q.2881.
82. Wade to Stanley (4/1/34); Campbell to Acting Secretary to Government (20/12/33)(P II, No.29).
83. A.C., Q.5235.
84. Ibid., Q.2793, 2795.
85. Ibid., Q.5235.
86. Grahamstown Journal (27/6/32) ('Autobiography', Vol.II, p.404 ff).
87. C. of Advice (20/2/32).
88. Ibid.
89. Moodie to Bell (27/11/29) (C.O.605, No.362).
90. Thompson to Cole (28/9/29) (C.O.617, No.61).
91. A.C., Q.1537.
92. Smith kept a store on the Kat River.
93. Campbell to Bell (30/12/31) (C.O.694; No.122, with enclosures).
94. Somerset to Bell (5/1/32) (C.O.693, No.5).
95. Government Gazette, 13/1/32.
96. Campbell to Bell (10/2/32) (C.O.714, No.122).
97. The Secretary of State even reprimanded Wade for appointing Captain Armstrong J.P. for the Settlement without previous reference to him. Later we shall deal more specifically with the state of the Colony's finances.
98. Cape Coloured People: Chapter VII, "The Kat River Settlement."

CHAPTER V.

1. Chapter I.
2. Noordmarthse Beweging, pp. 215-223.
3. Stockenstrom to Plasket (11/11/27) (Theal, Vol.XXXIV, p.134).
4. Dundas to Bourke (15/11/27) (Ibid.)
5. Dundas to Bell (25/4/28) (C.O.579, No.115).
6. Bantu, Boer, and Briton, p.45 ff. In May Lieutenant Warden, who commanded the military post on the Klaas Smit's River, reported that a number of farmers had crossed that river with their families and cattle and taken up their abode beyond the boundary. The previous week he saw not

less than 30 waggons. The farmers told him that they had permission from Major Dundas to reside beyond the Colony during winter. (Warden to Somerset, 19/5/28: C.O.602, No.81).
7. Campbell to Bell (18/11/28) (C.O.590, No.265).
8. M.A. Oberholzer to van Ryneveld (3/10/28) (C.O.586; Enclosure 3 to No.17).
9. M.A. Oberholzer and 11 other memorialists to the Lieutenant-Governor (undated). (Ibid., Enclosure 4).
10. Van Ryneveld to Oberholzer (14/10/28) (Ibid., Enclosure 5).
11. Van Ryneveld to Stockenstrom (22/10/28) (Ibid., Enclosure 2).
12. Stockenstrom to van Ryneveld (22/10/28) (Ibid., Enclosure 1).
13. Stockenstrom to Bell (22/10/28) (Ibid.)
14. Noordmantse Beweging, p.250.
15. Campbell to Bell (10/4/29) (C.O.604, No.85).
16. Ibid.
17. Memorial of Adam Kok and Council to Sir L. Cole (23/1/29) (C.O.619; enclosure to No.7).
18. Stockenstrom to Bell (26/2/29) (Ibid.)
19. Stockenstrom to J. Melville (26/2/29) (L.C.279, No.61 of 1828-9.)
20. Noordmantse Beweging, p.235 ff.
21. Government Gazette, 26/6/29.
22. R. Miles to Bell (4/6/29) (C.O.617, No.33).
23. Memorial of Adam Kok and Council to Sir L. Cole (12/10/29) (Ibid., No.64).
24. Bell to Stockenstrom (30/12/29) (C.O.1506, p.352).
25. Stockenstrom to Bell (19/1/30) (C.O.647, No.4).
26. Bell to Stockenstrom (29/1/30) (C.O.1506, p.422).
27. Noordmantse Beweging, pp. 235-7.
28. Stockenstrom to Bell (27/2/30) (C.O.647, No.9.)
29. Stockenstrom to J. Melville: Stockenstrom to Messrs. Clark and Kolbe (27/2/30) (L.C.279, Nos. 33 and 34 of 1830.)
30. Stockenstrom to Bell (24/3/30) (C.O.647, No.13).
31. Stockenstrom to van Ryneveld (25/3/30) (L.C.279, No.39 of 1830).
32. Stockenstrom to Bell (24/3/0) (C.O.647, No.13).
33. Ibid.
34. Van Ryneveld to Stockenstrom (15/5/30) (C.O.647, Enclosure to No.27).
35. Stockenstrom to van Ryneveld (5/6/30) (Ibid).
36. Stockenstrom to Bell (4/8/30) (C.O.647, No.39).
37. R. Moffat to R. Miles (5/12/27; 30/1/28; 7/4/28) (C.O.587, Nos. 6, 12, and 15).
38. Stockenstrom to Bell (28/2/28) (C.O.586, No.24).
39. Stockenstrom to van Ryneveld (22/10/28) (L.C.279, No.16 of 1828-9).
40. Evidence of Wade (documented) (A.C., Q.3558).
41. Government Gazette, 22/1/30: Stockenstrom to Bell (10/2/30) (C.O.647, No.7).
42. Stockenstrom to S. van Wyk and A. Pretorius (12/5/30) (C.O.647, No.13).
43. van Wyk to Stockenstrom (23/6/30) (Ibid., No.36).
44. Stockenstrom to Bell (19/7/30) (Ibid., No.37).
45. Do. (4/8/30) (Ibid., No.39.)
46. Do. (24/3/30) (Ibid., No.13).
47. Do. (4/8/30) (Ibid., No.39).
48. Noordmantse Beweging, pp. 282-3.
49. Stockenstrom to Bell (19/7/30) (C.O.647, No.37).
50. Return of L.M.S. Missions in S.A., 1830 (C.O.1778; loose document).
51. Campbell to Secretary to Government; 2 letters (12/7/33) (C. of Advice; Appendix).
52. A.B. Armstrong to R. England (28/10/33) (Ibid.)
53. Cole to Stanley (15/11/33) P II, No.28).
54. Stockenstrom to Secretary of State (5/11/34) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1036).
55. Remarks on Dr. Philip's Return of L.M.S. Missions (31/12/30) (C.O.647, No.58).
56. Memorandum of the Commissioner-General (30/11/30) (Ibid, No.33).
57. "The general principles by which the British policy towards the aborigines of Southern Africa should be governed, are obvious, and beyond the reach of doubt. The extension of His Majesty's dominions in that quarter of the globe, by

conquest or cession, is diligently and anxiously to be avoided." (Glenelg to D'Urban, 26/12/35: Sixth Kaffir War).
58. Cole to Murray (28/2/30) (C.O.1444, No.22).
59. Do. (25/7/30) (Ibid., No.47).
60. Goderich to Cole (27/5/31) (C.O.1518, p.1249).

CHAPTER VI.

1. Campbell to Bell (23/3/31) (C.O.604, No.80).
2. Goderich to Cole. (26/5/31) (P.II, No.21).
3. For example, Bourke to Bathurst (30/6/27) (Ibid., No.2).
4. Bourke to Goderich (15/10/27) (Ibid., No.4).
5. Ibid.
6. Bourke to Huskisson (29/6/28) (Ibid., No.6): Cole to Murray (31/1/29) (Ibid., No.13).
7. Ibid.
8. Campbell to Bell (14/8/29) (C.O.603, No.181).
9. D. Moodie to Bell (5/5/30) (C.O.586, No.18).
10. Stockenstrom to Bell (22/11/28) (C.O.580, No.294).
11. Campbell to Bell (19/12/28) (C.O.580, No.294).
12. Do. (30/1/29) (C.O.604, No.35). There was a good deal of controversy about this event. The Rev. J. Ross, the missionary who resided with Makoma, stated that he had been invoked by Powana, the Tambookie chief, to punish his subjects, whom he could not control. He was also punishing the Tambookies for stealing from the Colony! (J.Ross to Acting Secretary, 6/9/29: C.O.617, No.84). Somerset's evidence that these people had been encroaching on Makoma's already inadequate lands is much more to the point. The Commandant, with whom Makoma was a favourite, at first accepted his plea that he had been assisting Powana, but afterwards criticised him strongly (Somerset to Bell, 27/2/29 and 6/3/29: C.O.602, Nos.51 and 58). Campbell carried out a special investigation, and found that Powana and his people had suffered severely from the attack. He saw nothing to palliate Makoma's conduct. The number of cattle lost by the Tambookies on this occasion he placed at 5,000. (Campbell to Bell, 27/3/29: C.O.604, No.71).
13. Stockenstrom to Cole (6/2/29) (C.O.619, No.5).
14. Bell to Somerset (6/2/29) (C.O.1572, p.51).
15. Bell to Stockenstrom (8/4/29); Dundas to Somerset (10/4/29) (A.C., Enclosures to C.1576).
16. Stockenstrom to Bell (30/4/29) (C.O.619, No.19).
17. Do. (5/5/29) (Ibid., No.21).
18. W. R. Thompson to Bell (27/11/29) (C.O.617, No.75).
19. Stockenstrom to Bell (24/4/29) (C.O.619, No.16).
20. Stockenstrom to Cole (11/9/29)(Ibid., following No.37).
21. Stockenstrom to Bell(30/4/29) (Ibid., No.18).
22. Bell to Stockenstrom (8/5/29 and 22/5/29) (C.O.1505, p.479, and C.O.1506, p.3). Stockenstrom writes in his Memoirs: "His Excellency ... placed at my disposal the whole of the Ceded Territory beyond what Lord Charles Somerset had already given away. I undertook to proceed with the distribution forthwith, and submitted my plan, ... and I stated my determination in considering applications to make no distinction between Hottentots and English, or Dutch." (Autobiography, Vol.I, p.366).
23. Orders to Frontier Field-Cornets (19/5/29) (C.O.619; following No.24).
24. Stockenstrom to Bell (11/7/29) (C.O.619; Enclosure to No.31).
25. Do. (19/1/30) (C.O.647, No.67).
26. Government Gazette, March 5, 1830.

27. Stockenstrom to Bell. (14/4/30) (L.G.279, No.50 of 1830).
28. Do. (26/4/30) (C.O.647, No.16).
29. Dundas and Wade condemned this system, the former stating that after a time no cattle were recovered by these means (A.C., Q.1187 ff., 2770 ff). Aitchison considered that no system which forbade the taking of Kaffir cattle could work satisfactorily, as plunderers drove the stock they had stolen among that belonging to the natives, and sometimes sent in a great distance away (Ibid., Q.98). Somerset sent in a report in February, 1829, showing that the method of placing responsibility upon the chiefs had broken down, as the latter would not or could not co-operate. (Somerset to Bell, 5/2/29: C.O.602, No.16). Stockenstrom does not seem to have been aware that this system ever existed (A.C., Q.2255 ff).
30. Bell to Somerset (6/2/29) (C.O.1572, p.51.)
31. Stockenstrom to Bell (12/5/30) (C.O.647, No.23): Suggestions of the Commissioner-General (28/9/29) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1875). Stockenstrom showed in his evidence before the Aborigines Committee that he had no objection to Kaffir cattle being taken on those occasions when regular Commandos were sent out. Commandos played a definite part in his frontier system. He considered that they should be used as a last resort against chiefs who persisted in carrying on depredations despite repeated warnings from the Government (Ibid., Q.2147 ff).
32. Stockenstrom to Bell (19/5/29) (C.O.619, No.26).
33. Orders to Frontier Field-Cornets (19/5/29) (C.O.619; following No.24).
34. Stockenstrom to H.M. Secretary of State (5/11/34) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098.)
35. Suggestions of the Commissioner-General (28/9/29) (Ibid; Enclosure to Q.1875). The plan of making occupation of this region strictly dependant on good conduct was assisted by the fact that in 1829 the status of the Ceded Territory was still uncertain. In October of that year Sir George Murray asked to be supplied with informationabout the nature of this area and of the border tribes beyond before he could authorise its occupation (Murray to Cole, 15/10/29: C.O.1517, p.1104). In May, 1830, he reluctantly agreed to let the Kaffirs occupy parts of the Ceded Territory during their good behaviour (Do., 6/5/30: P II, No.19). It was not until May, 1831, that the Secretary of State gave his formal permission for the location of European settlers within it. (Goderich to Cole, 26/5/31: Ibid., No.21). Thus the Colonial Government, which on grounds of economic necessity allowed the farmers to move into it before that date, was able to impose whatever regulations it pleased upon its occupants. People who violated these regulations could not well complain if they were expelled from a region whose settlement has not yet been formally sanctioned.
36. Stockenstrom to Cole (11/9/29) (C.O.619; following No.37).
37. Proclamation of November 28, 1823 (P I, No.28).
38. Ordinance 23 (11/9/28).
39. Ordinance 81 (25/12/30).
40. Campbell to Bell (19/9/31) (C.O.667, No.69).
41. Bourke to Bathurst (30/8/27); Stockenstrom to Plaskat (20/2/27) (P II, No.2).
42. Ordinance 49(14/7/28).
43. Goderich to Cole (26/5/31) (P II, No.21).
44. Do. (5/8/31) (C.O.1518, p.1285).
45. Government Gazette, 17/5/32.
46. Autobiography, Vol. I. pp 366-371.
47. A.C., Q.1022.
48. Stockenstrom to Bell (12/5/30) (C.O.647, No.25).
49. Do. (31/8/31) (C.O.654, No.16).
50. Chapter I.
51. A.C., Q.2150 ff.
52. Stockenstrom to Bell (14/7/31) (C.O.654, No.10),

55. A.C., Q.2225 ff.
54. Campbell to Bell (7/8/29) (C.O.605, No.175). We have seen that Wade, Dundas, and Aitchison all considered the Reprisal System, which had permitted the taking of Kaffir cattle, a just system.
55. Stockenstrom to Bell (31/8/31) (C.O.654, No.16).
56. J. Ross to Bell (17/8/30) (C.O.648, No.149).
57. A.C., Q.1123. Wade spoke of the system introduced by Cole as if it were simply a reversion to Lord Somerset's Reprisal System. (Ibid., Q.2722, 2775).
58. Bell to Campbell (18/11/31) (C.O.1502).
59. Campbell to Bell; minute of the Colonial Secretary (19/3/30) (C.O.630, No.182).
60. Campbell to Bell (14/8/29 and 21/8/29) (C.O.605, Nos.181 and 191).
61. Government Gazette, 26/8/29.
62. Somerset to Stockenstrom (16/5/30) (C.O.647, Enclosure to No.34).
63. Stockenstrom to Bell (17/5/30) (Ibid., No.34).
64. Bell to Stockenstrom (28/5/30) (C.O.1507, p.105).
65. Stockenstrom to P.R.Brasmus (15/6/30) (L.G.279, No.91 of 1830).
66. Stockenstrom to Bell (17/6/30) (C.O.647, No.30).
67. Do. (23/6/30)(Ibid., No.31): Evidence of R.S.Aitchison (A.C., Q.435 ff).
68. Affidavit of P.R. Brasmus (A.C., Enclosure to Q.2735).
69. Affidavit of D.P. de Lange (Ibid., Enclosure to Q.2735).
70. Stockenstrom to Bell (23/6/30.) (C.O.647, No.31).
71. Stockenstrom to Campbell (23/6/30) (L.G. 279, No.93, of 1830): Affidavit of Lieut.-Col. Somerset (A.C., Enclosure to Q.3543).
72. Stockenstrom to T. F. Buxton (1/4/36) (Ibid., p.319 ff).
73. Stockenstrom to Bell (31/8/31) (C.O.654, No.16).
74. Do. (25/6/30) (C.O.647, No.31).
75. A.C., Q.3558.
76. Ibid., Q.2804.
77. Ibid., Q.3558.
78. Ibid., Q.1021 ff., 2071 ff.
79. Stockenstrom to Bell (14/7/31) (C.O.654, No.10).
80. Somerset to Campbell (29/7/31) (C.O.667, No.60).
81. Bell to Stockenstrom (29/7/31) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098). Stockenstrom then stated that having finished his discussion with Somerset by stating his objections to the Commando, he left Grahamstown under the impression that the Commandant had left him answerable for any mistaken policy, after he (Somerset) had shown his readiness to act in his capacity (Stockenstrom to Bell, 13/8/31: C.O.654, No.12).
82. Wade to Somerset (12/8/31) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098).
83. Somerset to Wade (5/8/31) (C.O.648, No.62).
84. Somerset to Bell (5/2/28) (C.O.582, No.16).
85. Do. (25/1/29) (C.O.602, No.15).
86. Dundas to Bourke (15/11/27) (Theal, Vol. XXXIV, p.154).
87. Somerset to Bell (27/2/29) (C.O.602, No.51).
88. Campbell to Bell (27/2/29) (C.O.604, No.71).
89. Stockenstrom to Cole (11/3/29) (C.O.619, following No.37).
90. Somerset to Bell (5/2/28) (C.O.582, No.16).
91. Thompson to Cole (1/7/29) (C.O.617, No.36).
92. Stockenstrom to Bell (17/6/30) (C.O.647, No.30): Evidence of Wade (A.C., Q.2780).
93. Campbell to Bell (25/11/30) (C.O.630, No.171): A.C., Q.2781.
94. A.C., Q.2331.
95. Evidence of Aitchison and Wade (A.C., Q.115 ff, 2331).
96. A.C., Q.122 ff.
97. D'Urban to Spring Rice (P XI, No.38).
98. A.C., Q.2794. Shaw and Aitchison also considered that losses of land were a leading cause of the war (Ibid., Q.650, 753 ff).
99. A.C., Q.1035.
100. Stockenstrom to Glenelg (7/1/36) (Autobiography, Vol.II, p.30 ff.).
101. Stockenstrom to H.M.Secretary of State (5/11/34) (A.C., Enclosure to Q.1098).

APPENDIX II.

Secretaries of State for the Colonies:

W. Huskisson, 1827 - May, 1828; Sir George Murray, 1828 - November, 1830; Viscount Goderich, 1830 - March, 1833.

Governors of the Cape Colony:

Major-General Sir Richard Bourke (Lieutenant-Governor), 1826 - September, 1828; Lieutenant-General Sir G. Lowry Cole, 1828 - August, 1833.

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Missionaries in the Interior to Colonial Secretary (C.O.587,617,643,655,683).

Cape Governors to Secretaries of State for the Colonies (C.O.1443-1447).

Secretaries of State to Cape Governors (C.O.1515-1519).