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ABSTRACT

The rapid economic advancement of emerging economies in the South has come to effect a change within the nature of the global South and within the traditional North-South relationship more broadly. One development representative of a change within the global South as a unit has been the emergence of smaller, ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings comprising the exclusive membership of emerging economies. While rooted in a common historic agenda of enabling a more equitable distribution of power for the South with the North, such new groupings have been increasingly independent and detached from the rest of the developing world. As such, they represent the ambitions of its members to garner more economic and political power within international politics.

The BASIC grouping consisting of Brazil, South Africa, India and China represents an example, formed at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen as a bloc opposition against the suggested implementation of binding emissions reduction obligations for emerging economies as part of the global South. BASIC argued that this was primarily an issue of equity, departing from the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" between developed and developing states as agreed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. While ostensibly arguing on behalf of the broader South, the formation of the BASIC grouping represents a detachment from the rest of the developing world, inspired in large by the growing economic and political ambitions of emerging economies. Inspired by the vestiges of a North-South relationship rooted in inequity and marginalisation, the formation of BASIC signifies a new direction of multilateralism that has come to define the changing nature of the global South, enabled by its increasingly powerful members.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BAU	business as usual
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBDR	common but differentiated responsibilities
COP	Conference of the Parties
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
G20	Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
G77	Group of 77 developing countries at the United Nations
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
GHG	greenhouse gas
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	least developed countries
MEF	Major Economies Forum
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
WTO G20	World Trade Organization Group of 20 developing countries

ANNEX 1 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Australia	Netherlands
Austria	New Zealand
Belarus	Norway
Belgium	Poland
Bulgaria	Portugal
Canada	Romania
Croatia	Russian Federation
Czech Republic	Slovakia
Denmark	Slovenia
European Union	Spain
Estonia	Sweden
Finland	Switzerland
France	Turkey
Germany	Ukraine
Greece	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Hungary	United States of America
Iceland	
Ireland	
Italy	
Japan	
Latvia	
Liechtenstein	
Lithuania	
Luxembourg	
Malta	
Monaco	

NON-ANNEX 1 parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Albania	Chad	Grenada
Algeria	Chile	Guatemala
Andorra	China	Guinea
Angola	Colombia	Guinea-Bissau
Antigua and Barbuda	Comoros	Guyana
Argentina	Congo	Haiti
Armenia	Cook Islands	Honduras
Azerbaijan	Costa Rica	India
Bahamas	Cuba	Indonesia
Bahrain	Côte D'Ivoire	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Bangladesh	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Iraq
Barbados	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Israel
Belize	Djibouti	Jamaica
Benin	Dominica	Jordan
Bhutan	Dominican Republic	Kazakhstan
Bolivia	Ecuador	Kenya
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Egypt	Kiribati
Botswana	El Salvador	Kuwait
Brazil	Equatorial Guinea	Kyrgyzstan
Brunei Darussalam	Eritrea	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Burkina Faso	Ethiopia	Lebanon
Burundi	Fiji	Lesotho
Cambodia	Gabon	Liberia
Cabo Verde	Gambia	Libya
Cameroon	Georgia	Madagascar
Central African Republic	Ghana	Malawi

Malaysia	Paraguay	Swaziland
Maldives	Peru	Syrian Arab Republic
Mali	Philippines	Tajikistan
Marshall Islands	Qatar	Thailand
Mauritania	Republic of Korea	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Mauritius	Republic of Moldova	Timor-Leste
Mexico	Rwanda	Togo
Micronesia (Federated States of)	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Tonga
Mongolia	Saint Lucia	Trinidad and Tobago
Montenegro	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Tunisia
Morocco	Samoa	Turkmenistan
Mozambique	San Marino	Tuvalu
Myanmar	Sao Tome and Principe	Uganda
Namibia	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates
Nauru	Senegal	United Republic of Tanzania
Nepal	Serbia	Uruguay
Nicaragua	Seychelles	Uzbekistan
Niger	Sierra Leone	Vanuatu
Nigeria	Singapore	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Niue	Solomon Islands	Viet Nam
Oman	Somalia	Yemen
Pakistan	South Africa	Zambia
Palau	South Sudan	Zimbabwe
Palestine	Sri Lanka	
Panama	Sudan	
Papua New Guinea	Suriname	

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCING THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Important issues in international relations have long been contested on a North-South axis. The nature of the South[1] in particular has changed considerably in recent years, while an ongoing North-South[2] relationship continues to act as a constraining force when it comes to international dialogue surrounding issues of global scope. Friction between these two socioeconomic and political divides is entrenched in a history of inequality and power. In many ways, the fact that the North (particularly North America and Western Europe) today enjoy higher levels of development and affluence is a direct result of earlier marginalisation of the South, including the extraction of resources that was a key feature of the colonial period. While the end of colonization held the promise of a more equitable world, the legacy of Northern dominance at Southern expense remains visible, as seen most clearly in the imbalance between these divides within the political-economic dimension. Representing its ongoing ambitions to rectify this imbalance within the international system, the South has over the years resorted to utilizing multilateral[3] institutions[4] as an outlet for its dissatisfaction with marginalisation. While considerable progress has been made with organizations such as the Group of 77 (G77) and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) addressing such inequality with an audible and unified voice, the balance of political-economic power still very much lies in favour of the North.

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[1] Alden *et al*, identifies the "South" as a phrase used to describe those regions of the globe that have in common a political, social and economic history rooted in the inequalities of a colonial or imperialist past" (2011: 3). For the purposes of this study, the terms "South" and "developing world" shall be used interchangeably.

[2] According to Najam (2005: 111), the North as a distinct category includes the developed and industrialized economies of the global North as contrasted against the global South which refers to the lesser developed countries which forms the membership of the Group of 77. The North is generally referred to as those countries comprising membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

[3] Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as "the practice of co-coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions (1990, 731).

[4] Robert Keohane defines international institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activities and shape expectations (1989: 3).

While the terms "North" and "South" were originally devised in reference to political entities, the border has become blurred. Today, the terminology of the "South" is increasingly being understood as an ideological expression representing a range of concerns that developing countries are facing. The term acts as a mobilising symbol uniting diverse developing countries towards a strategy for organizing relations with the more powerful industrialised states in the North via decision-making groups such as the NAM and G77 (Alden *et al*, (2010: 3). A main reason responsible for the changing meaning of the "South" has been the growing differences in stages of development between states of the South. Stratification in the global South has become more pronounced as some emerging economies have experienced development in increasing their international economic and political abilities while least developed countries (LDCs) have fallen further behind. As economic development among certain states in the South has evolved, the "South" has come to represent more than just the making of foreign policy, a shared history, or proximity in terms of geography. Such changes within the South have called into question the usefulness of the terms "South" going forward. In regards to the contemporary usage of a concept of a unified South as an entity, Alden *et al*, states that numerous scholars "disagree profoundly over the significance and utility of a geographic term whose origins reside in political entrepreneurship among a clutch of post-colonial leaders struggling to assert themselves both domestically and internationally" (2010: 1).

An important recent development within international relations has been the increase in perceived cooperation between small groups of powerful developing states on an ad hoc, issue-based basis. This change taking place within the nature of the global South has also been reflective of other, broader power shifts that are taking place within international relations more generally as emerging economies are gaining more prominence while the traditional powers of the United States and Western Europe have started to wane. A rapid growth taking place within the global South is of particular interest as future economic as well as population growth is expected to come particularly from here. As certain developing states have progressed industrially and economically, instances of convergence amongst the emerging economies of the South has become a more frequently used tool to influence the traditional unequal distribution of North-South power that have been characteristic of the hierarchical international system. Ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings can be seen as supplementing the ambitions of traditional,

broad-based South interest groups including the Group of 77 (G77) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), injecting renewed vigour into addressing an ongoing inequality within the international system. Within the emerging economies, increased wealth and economic power have translated into political power and ambition towards challenging the traditional imbalance of power between the North and the South and to become more involved within the international arena. Groupings such as the BASIC group (Brazil, India, South Africa and China), the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the IBSA dialogue forum (India, Brazil and South Africa) represent a new way forward for a more exclusive and targeted allegiance located (with the exception of Russia) within the global South. What however distinguished BASIC from earlier Southern groupings is that while rooted in similar historic efforts to address the North-South imbalance of power and a long held dependence on the North, BASIC very much also represents the narrow ambitions of its membership to garner more economic and political power within the international system.

Within environmental politics, climate change represents an issue that is entrenched within the ongoing North-South debate. While the problem of a changing climate has historically been driven by the emissions of green house gases (GHGs) coming from the wealthier North's efforts to industrialize and develop, the poorer South has arguably more to lose from the effects of a changing climate due to its weaker defences, and its more direct reliance on agriculture. Climate change provides an issue of particular global complexity and reach, given the fact that it also affects the arena of international trade and development, and specific issues revolving around consumption and growth. According to Duncan, "climate change is the hardest political problem the world has ever faced. It is a prisoner's dilemma, a free-rider problem and the tragedy of the commons all rolled into one" (2009: 4). Within the climate change conundrum, a major obstacle has been the fact that the North and South hold different experiences of the problem, as well as divergent views on what is just within an international context. A major hindrance for the South within international negotiations has been the fact that it lacks the resources and knowledge required to affect the structures and regimes[5] within the dimension of the global political economy. The South perceives itself as having less power within such an international system,

[5] Keohane defines regimes as "institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations" (1989: 4).

forming part of an unfortunate, ongoing legacy. The current climate change negotiations continue to strain the ongoing North-South dialogue, as the arguments of equity coming from both sides are very much inspired by pointing blame at the other. The South does this by looking back by blaming the North for its historic responsibility in contributing to the climate problem, while the North does so by being forward-looking and blaming the South for not taking enough responsibility for its rising share of the emissions to fuel its development. Essentially, environmental issues and most notably climate change have emerged as a new arena for the confrontation taking place between the North and the South, as well as an example of how the very nature of the North and especially the South are changing. For the South: "global environmental politics is one subset of discussions within the larger enterprise for more just and meaningful North–South relations. The key goal of this politics, then, is not just an improvement in the global environmental condition; it is an improvement in larger North–South relations and, thereby, the creation of a more fair and just international order" (Najam, 2005: 112).

1.2 Problem Statement

It is no longer possible to comprehend of the world and its international relations simply along the axis of a North-South division. While many contemporary issues of international scope and importance are rooted within the vestiges of ongoing North-South grievances, the nature of the international system as well as the two parts that once distinctly comprised it is today experiencing rapid changes. As the key issues of interest within international relations are shaped by globalization, increased interconnectedness, and a general changing nature of the international system and its influential players, it has become increasingly important to comprehend the changing nature within the North-South relationship.

Rapid changes taking place within the global South is of particular interest since the majority of future economic and population growth is expected to take place within the South. Alden *et al* refers to the South as an "absolutely vital, if neglected, area of study" (2010: 11). While still at a power disadvantage compared to traditional Northern powers, the fact that emerging economies are starting to become more vocal within the international arena reflects their growing share in international economic and political power, challenging the status quo. Of particular interest has been the recent increase in emerging economies banding together in hopes of achieving more

clout within the international system. As the South and particularly its emerging economies are expected to play an increasing role within the international political economy, a change within the global South and an understanding of the increased occurrence of the ad hoc, issue specific groupings that embody this change is important going forward as it is representative of a broader change taking place within the North-South relationship. In spite of a transformation taking place within the North-South relationship over the past several decades, a gap still exists between these two categories, and historic grievances continue to drive a tenacious relationship between the two groups within larger issues of international scope. The changing nature of the South thus serves to further strain this relationship.

As such, the research question that this study aims at answering is whether ad hoc, issue specific groupings represent a broader change taking place in the North-South relationship? This will be done by examining how the ongoing issue of equity have shaped the negotiations between the North and the South.

1.3 Research aim

The emergence of the BASIC group at the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change[6] in Copenhagen, 2009, will be explored as a case study reflecting changes within the global South, characterised by the emerging economies banding together to form small, issue-specific, ad hoc South-South groupings and impacting the North-South dialogue. As such, the study will explore the drivers and the emergence of the BASIC grouping that surprised many when it materialized at the Copenhagen Summit, capable of preventing a much anticipated US-UK-Danish international 'climate deal' that would have seen emerging economies being held to internationally binding emissions reduction targets. The BASIC grouping will be explored as an example of increased stratification within the "global South", with countries with similar interests banding together out of self interest and with common ambitions.

[6] The fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is also referred to as the 'Copenhagen Summit', the '2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference', or simply 'COP15'.

Understanding the dynamic of South-South groupings such as BASIC is important not only in the context of comprehending the current stagnation in negotiations within the climate change regime, but also as it represents a larger shift currently taking place within the nature of the global South, and within international relations as a whole. As powerful developing states such as Brazil, South Africa, India and China are rising, we are paying witness to a grouping together of these emerging players to advancing its own coordinated policy interests and thus international negotiation clout. Understanding the emergence and purpose of such South-South groupings can be useful in deconstructing stagnation in negotiating important current issues within international relations. It is further useful in anticipating the risk of future international insecurities, especially given the expectation that members of the global South will become increasingly powerful and start to challenge the traditional dominance of the North and its existing powers. The study will explore both a change as well as continuity within multilateral cooperation within the South. The research will attempt to achieve its aims by firstly introducing a brief history and conceptualization of the North-South divide, and then examine environmental politics and the example of climate change with a specific emphasis on the marginalisation of the South.

1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This research will be explorative in nature while the design of the research will be qualitative in nature. The primary research methodology will involve a literature review[7] of secondary sources, including relevant official reports and documents, books, journals, newspapers and magazine articles. The emergence of the BASIC grouping of Brazil, South Africa, India and China during the 2009 United Nations Climate Change conference in Copenhagen will be utilized as a case study[8] within the scope of the complex issue of international climate change negotiations. Case studies are often utilized to assist in the understanding of complex issues, with its emphasis on the contextual analysis of a finite number of conditions or events enabling a detailed investigation and explanation that might represent

[7] According to Mouton, a literature review is used to provide an overview of the key debates and trends within the sphere of a certain field of scholarship (2005: 179).

[8] Yin defines a case study as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (1984, 23).

similar realities for broader conditions and events. The case study is a well established method for qualitative research, particularly within the social sciences to investigate real events. It is one of the most flexible research designs, making allowance for retaining the holistic nature of real-life situations while at the same time examining empirical situations. Given the complex nature of empirically proving a change within the nature of the global South, BASIC as an example of an ad hoc, issue specific grouping consisting of emerging economies within the global South will be utilized as a representative case study that allows for making broader assumptions as far as the nature of a changing global South.

1.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Due to constraints in time, space and finances, this study has to delimit the material that shall be covered through the research. As a result, only selected and focused issues and material pertaining to the research question can be covered. It is further recognized that the research methodology might contain a weakness due to the inevitable biased nature of the choice of sources collected by the researcher. Due to a particular focus on the relationship of the North and the South and the examination of relevant instances of multilateralism, time and space limitations means that a focus on country-specific details regarding the evolution of Southern multilateralism may fall outside of the parameters of the analysis. Particularly, an in-depth examination of country analysis and comparison with regards to the members of the BASIC grouping will not be conducted. A further constraint extends to the inability to validate secondary sources that are employed in this research. A wide range and scope of sources will thus be used in the effort to mitigate against such inherent limitations of the study. The time frame of the study will include the period starting in 1952 with the coining of the term "Third World", and extend to focus mainly on the period surrounding the formation of the BASIC grouping in 2009.

1.6 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 2: This chapter will trace the historical context of the emergence of the North- South relationship within international politics, addressing ongoing cleavages and disputes between these conceptual entities. It will examine whether the terms "North" and "South" are still regarded as useful given the changes taking place within both of these groups, most noticeably

within the global South. This section will explore how the South in particular has become increasingly stratified and ineffectual as the divide between emerging economies and least developed countries (LDC) has grown, and will focus on identifying the utilization of multilateralism by the South affecting the North-South divide.

Chapter 3: This chapter will explore the start of the global environmental consciousness within the North-South relationship. The issue of climate change will be investigated as a particularly important issue that has emerged within the North-South relationship, focusing on the diverging perception that the South and North have in terms of "equity" within climate change negotiations.

Chapter 4:

This chapter will explore the emergence of the BASIC grouping of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, asking what caused the inception of this grouping during the 2009 United Nations Climate Conference in Copenhagen, and how it relates to the recent emergence of similar smaller groupings of powerful states within the global South, organized around shared interests.

Chapter 5: The final chapter will serve as a conclusion. General thoughts on the future of North-South relations, South-South cooperation and climate change negotiations specifically will be expounded upon. In conclusion, some limitations of the study as well as recommendations for future research will briefly be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Long after the end of colonialism, there still exists a general difference between the more developed states located in the North and the lesser developed parts of the world generally located within the South. The constitution of the international political economy that has shaped the North-South relationship since decolonization is still responsible for significant structural differences between these two conceptual entities, contributing towards the ongoing difficulty for the North and South to agree on a variety of issues. Over the last several decades, the South's identity has been shaped not only through decolonization and its marginalisation at the hands of Northern powers, but also actively by means of coalition building and the setting up of multilateral organizations to further Southern- objectives such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77).

This chapter will provide a brief historical backdrop concerning the development of North-South relations, before exploring the changes that have been responsible for a shift in these relations. Given the end of the Cold War, the impressive emergence of some developing economies, and a general shift in the international political landscape, this chapter will explore whether the terms "North" and "South" are even still regarded as useful, and whether such an expansive area home to such vast diversity can warrant a shared conceptualization under the simplistic and perhaps outdated label of still being referred to as the "South". This chapter will lay the foundation on which the politics of the environment and particularly of climate change will be explored in Chapter 3. The emergence of the BASIC grouping of Brazil, South Africa, India and China within the climate regime will then be explored in Chapter 4 as a case study of the changing nature of the global South, and thus for the evolution of North-South relations more generally.

2.2 A DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF THE TERM "SOUTH"

Adil Najam writes that "since scholars and practitioners routinely talk and act within the language of alleged 'North–South' relations, it is only fair that we try to understand the meaning behind this language" (2005: 111). During the colonial era, the colonizing of less developed areas was achieved primarily with the purpose of resource extraction and to access a cheap workforce in order to fuel industrial development in the North. Some have argued that the current state of global poverty and inequity between the developed and developing worlds have its roots firmly in the North-South relationship during, and also as an ongoing legacy of the colonial era (Thérien, 1999:723). After the Second World War, colonial powers effectively started to grant former colonies sovereignty. The end of colonialism enabled a focus on global justice and equity, from where it became clear that while one half of the world has enjoyed economic prosperity and political change, the other continued to be plagued with conflict and problems. For newly independent colonial states, institutionalized inter-group cooperation would become a method for strengthening their newly found sovereignty within the international system.

When distinguishing between areas of the world that either enjoys or still lacks general development and industrialization, the terms "North/ South" and "First World/Third World" has become common terms**.** The term "Third World" emerged first, and was coined by French economic anthropologist and historian Alfred Sauvy in 1952 in reference to those countries that were not aligned with either the Capitalist First World consisting of the democratic NATO states, or the Second World Communist Eastern Block that contested the Cold War. As it were, the term "Third World" came to refer to those countries generally found within South America, Africa and Asia, or in other words the general "southern" area of the globe. What unified these three southern continents were a history of colonialism, marginalisation at the hands of the North, and the subsequent experience of economic, social and political underdevelopment. From the 1960s to 1980s, a majority of the countries located within Sauvy's "Third World" experienced independence and post-colonial modernization. However, while they were granted membership to the international community and its various organizations and institutions, the realization soon came that even though colonialism had ended, these previously disadvantaged areas of the world still experienced the remnants of several decades of marginalisation at the hands of the so-called "First World". This was particularly true concerning the situation of the international political economy and its institutions. In attempts at levelling the playing field, this era came to see

increased efforts by Third World states, uniting in order to call for a more equitable economic and political international landscape. However, already in the 1970s, dissatisfaction accumulated surrounding the use of the terms "Third World" and "less developed" for the negative implications that they held. It was the term "South" that started to be used more commonly, and also appearing more frequently on UN documentation (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3). The impact and relevance of the term "Third World" to describe the various members of this disenfranchised union further started to wane with the end of the Cold World. Since the "Second World" category lost its significance with the defeat of the Communist bloc, the use of the three-world system as definition was no longer relevant. Instead, the term "Third World" would soon start to make way for the term "South" and later the "global South".

Braveboy-Wagner argues that although the terms First/Third World and South/North are often still used interchangeably, they are in fact not synonymous (2009: 2). Today, we see that the term "North/South" have become preferred, less crude and value-laden than earlier labels such as developed/underdeveloped, industrialized/non-industrialized, rich/poor, and also less emotive than the popular First World/Third World distinction (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). Alden *et al,* echoes Braveboy-Wagner by saying that the preference of the "South" instead of "Third World" or even the more recent "Global South" shows the mutability, but also the endurance as a descriptive term (2010: 1). For Najam, the 'South' retains its intent of being a political entity, while referring to the 'Third World' today has become more of an economic concept used at pointing to the poorest countries" (2005: 113). According to Braveboy-Wagner, the 'global South' has emerged as a more acceptable term to make reference to the developing world's nations in a more neutral way, while still recognizing the rough geographical status as well as a general set of common problems and aims that they share (2009: 3).

As it is used in this study, the term "South" refers to those countries that have traditionally been less developed than their counterparts in the "North". Unfortunately, there exists at present no clear consensus in the academic literature concerning what the exact parameters are for a country to qualify as forming part of the global South, and to date "such an empirical definition is not possible" (Najam, 2005: 112). It is recognized here that this is of course a weakness and limitation in the study that chooses to investigate not only the characteristics and membership of these two groups, but also the ways in which they have related

to one another historically as well as contemporarily. While the merits of such an oversimplified classification as North-South can surely be called into question, a conceptual division will be useful in examining the evolution of the efficacy of the term, and the foundation of the relationship between North and South that has lead to the current stagnation on the issue of international climate change negotiations. While not intended for absolute classification, one useful method to distinguish between those countries comprising the South and the North has emerged, and assumes the global South to refer to what have today become the extended members of the Group of 77 (G77) bloc of countries as the best way of conceptualizing this grouping (Najam, 2005: 111). This draws a clear differentiation with the more industrialized countries comprising the "North" which for the purpose of this study will be said to include members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which generally includes the wealthier states of Northern America and Western Europe, as well as the likes of Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Chile as the only South American state (Najam, 2005).

According to Jean-Philippe Thérien, the North-South analytical framework has in recent years been upset by two approaches that have competing world views (1999: 724-725). While the "Bretton Woods paradigm" claims that the current gap between the rich and poor is being closed, the "UN paradigm" asserts that the gap is in fact growing ever wider. Thérien argues that while it is the Bretton Woods paradigm that has been enjoying a higher degree of international political support, it is in fact the UN paradigm that better speaks to the problem of global poverty (Thérien, 1999: 724-725). Unlike the period from the 1960-80s, the image of the world split between the rich North and poor South is no longer viewed as quite so black and white. Despite significant financial and technical resources being pumped from the North to the South during this period, the gap between the wealthy and poor has remained, while this divide perhaps no longer has the same resonance as it once had (Thérien, 1999: 723). This is in large due to the fact that while most developing states remain stuck in poverty and inefficient governance, a small amount of emerging countries has made massive comparative progress, still being labelled as being essentially 'Southern" in nature, and thus somehow managing to pull the entire South into a sphere of false optimism. Thus, while on the one side of the world poverty is seen as a lingering phenomenon that is slowly subsiding, on the other side it is perceived as a serious problem that is in fact growing.

According to Thérien, while the Bretton Woods paradigm postulates the roots of poverty to lie within the economic policy choices of governments, the UN paradigm instead places a focus on the lack of cooperation at an international level (1999, 725). The gap between the North and the South continues to grow in most Southern States. Thérien states that "the image of a polarisation between a Northern developed hemisphere and a Southern developing hemisphere no longer offers a perfectly clear representation of reality" (1999: 724). Starting in the 1980s and 1990s, the gap between certain areas of the South became dramatically evident. It was in particular the success of the emerging countries of East Asia that began to contrast heavily with stagnation found within sub-Saharan Africa. According to Thérien "this diminished the analytical and political usefulness of the image of a South united by the chains of underdevelopment" (1999: 726). This fragmentation of the South became especially clear when it became possible for countries previously considered as Southern to be "upgraded" to become part of the "North" (South Korea and Mexico as examples after the attainment of OECD membership) In Europe, some formerly underdeveloped states have gained EU membership, while the fact that former Soviet countries are receiving development aid further adds to the shifting nature of what it means to be part of the global South as the lines have become blurred and the term approaches obsolescence. Today, the idea of 'the South' in referring to one entity has thus become open to scrutiny and criticism (Alden et al., 2010: 1).

Another area of North-South study that emerged in the 1980s was to look at whether the North and the South in fact have different economic needs to mirror their vastly different inherent economic structure. The consensus, (that is still currently maintained) is that their needs are not all that different (Thérien, 1999: 726). Economic policies in the South have seen a sharp reorientation, in line with the Bretton Woods ideals of increasing the role of the market over the role of the state, lead by the emerging economies. Thérien argues that "this convergence of developing countries around free-market economic principles has deeply altered the traditional North-South configuration" as the economic orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World bank has been internalized by the South, following the roadmap of success written by the North, with a greater importance on the role of the private sector in enabling national development goals. What was once regarded as a sense of 'exceptionalism' concerning the South (in regards to the way that the South has different needs than the North) has now evaporated with ongoing globalization and the line between North and South becoming

increasingly blurred. An example of the erosion of such Southern exceptionalism can be seen in the realm of international environmental negotiations. In the 1980s, when the environment emerged as a priority on the political agenda, numerous authors recognized it as an area of North-South confrontation (Thérien, 1999: 726). On a structural level, a deteriorating international economic environment was responsible for creating a new balance of power within the North-South dynamic, with especially the debt crises being responsible for a diminished "bargaining power" of the South in relation to the North (Thérien, 1999: 727). Thanks to the Brundtland Commission, a spotlight was placed on how developing countries had endured the brunt of poverty and misfortune related to environmental degradation. There has since been an effort to push the North's environment lobby together with the South's development lobby, uniting together around the theme of sustainable development. "Environmental politics thus help to elucidate how and why globalisation has jostled the basic premises of the North/South cleavage" (Thérien, 1999: 727).

While crucially important to the distinction between lesser and more developed countries, it needs to be taken into consideration that economic parameters are not the only measure that should be considered. Williams writes that efforts showing the developing world as only an economic or cultural concept makes the mistake of trying to reduce a fundamentally political concept to non-political explanation, and that "the unity of these countries arises firstly from the inability of these states to exert significant influence on world events" (2005: 115). In looking at Southern coalitions, it is thus important to not only consider the common goal of achieving economic equality or justice, but also to regard the larger goal of reorganization of international institutions and regimes to reflect a more just world in all capacities. Najam argues that the distinction between the North and the South has often focussed too much simply on the economic dimension, "leading to the image of a South forever knocking at the North's door with a begging bowl in hand" (2005: 113). Sensitive to this illustration, the 1990 South Commission opted to define the term South in a rather more political context, speaking about poverty not only in economic terms, but also now in terms of influence, highlighting the inherent weakness accompanied with not only economic but also political dependence.

"The self-definition of the South, therefore, is a definition of exclusion: these are countries which believe that they have been 'bypassed' and view themselves as existing 'on the periphery' (Najam, 2005: 113). According to Alden *et al,* the term "South" is meaningful exactly because it forms a source of both national and transnational identities for state as well as non-state actors in the international system (2010, 3). The very identity of the "South" also presumes a "North", as an integral aspect of the origination of the term and also in its understanding today. The durability of the identity of the South is proven through means of the ongoing formation of foreign policy within pressure groups in the South, most notably at state and Ministerial meetings by members such as the NAM and G77, and with motivations informed by experience representing issues of Southern interest within the United Nations structure. For the South, its identity sums up the shared problem of sovereignty that faced leaders of newly independent states attempting to build a nation after the end of colonialism, the problem of developing economies within markets controlled by the North, and thus also as a strategy speaking to a critique of the modern international system and its inequities.

2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTILATERALISM WITHIN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Multilateral diplomacy provides many unique benefits as compared to traditional bilateral diplomacy. It refers to the collective, cooperative action taken by states to deal with problems and challenges within the international arena. More complex international issues such as peace and security, human rights, international trade, economic development and environmental protection require collaborative action of a multilateral variety in order to minimize costs and attempt order within the international system. Even the most powerful states cannot affect such complex issues alone. Today, states are facing not only increased interdependence, but also mutual vulnerabilities. Reasons why governments engage in multilateralism can extend to the gathering and pooling of information, joint projects, managing the external environment, leveraging security concerns, and accessing a louder voice together than any of the composite states would have been able to alone. Multilateralism is also of particular use for states seeking to increase their power and voice within the international system. This may include smaller, weaker states that have little direct power within international relations outside of their participation in the United Nations. Smaller or weaker states are not able to use force like larger

states, and thus tend to seek out multilateral organizations and alliances to ensure their security and to accomplish their foreign policy objectives (Hey, 2003: 4). Within the UN system, these smaller states also frequently consolidate their vote in a bloc with other nations. Since the end of the Second World War, multilateralism has become a defining characteristic of international politics as is shown by the increase in multinational conferences on a great variety of topics, as well as a significant increase in the amount of multilateral intergovernmental organizations.

Southern states in particular seem to focus their foreign policy mostly within the international institutional arena, stemming from a historically weaker international position than that of the North. According to Alden *et al,* "the belief in the possibility of systemic change, 'peace through law' and equitable development, all grounded in a recognition of the underlying democratic ethos inherent in international institutions such as the United Nations and its founding charter – though questioned at times by some of the more radical states – remains one of the consistencies of practice observed by the South" (2010: 7). Due to having fewer resources, a defining characteristic of states in the South has historically been to exercise greater influence on international events through means of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and the World Trade Organization. The emergence of 'groups' or 'bloc politics' operating both within and without the United Nations, and including the gatherings of regional groups, both in formal and informal gatherings, enable weaker states to assert influence that it could not achieve single-handedly. States in the South thus invest in international institutions and regimes to off-balance their structural weaknesses, attempting an alteration of international norms from within or alternatively to create new institutions such as the G77, NAM and the likes of other South-South groupings in order to amplify negotiating power. International institutions are utilized by the South as a practical, efficient and low cost method to assert global influence. For poor states of the South in particular, the UN General Assembly offers a setting for coming into contact with other members of the international community. Entities associated with developing country interests have utilized the international convergence within the United Nations system to leverage their limited resources for conducting international diplomacy (Alden *et al,* 2010: 20).

Within the context of the global South, a history of multilateral cooperation is rooted in the South's shared experiences of marginalisation with several pertinent historical events shaping South-South dialogue and cooperation over the years. After independence, many developing

countries actively pursued membership in the United Nations as a method of announcing to the world their newfound autonomy, and in line with article 2 of the UN Charter that speaks to the sovereignty of nations as equals. These countries also quickly sought membership in the Bretton Woods organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and institution like the General Agreement on tariffs and Trade or GATT (which later became the World Trade Organisation or WTO) as a further way of securing their newfound independence as states. Such enthusiasm towards being included in international institutions however quickly made way to the stark realization that these institutions did not always serve the interests of all developing states very well. The GATT/WTO serves as an example where developing nations came to experience the negative effects of its trade liberalization. Similarly, developing nations began to question the IMF and World Bank policies and their commitment to address the global South's development needs.

Following the end of decolonization, some movements of Southern solidarity started to emerge, lead by the leaders of India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Egypt, with success as a grouping being the opposition of French and British imperial powers at the Suez Canal in 1956. The Bandung Conference of 1955 marked an important achievement in Southern coalition that saw members from Arab, African and Asian states coming together to discuss the pertinent issues of the time regarding the Cold War. During the Cold War, "the North-South conflict based on developmental differences became more intertwined with the more prominent East-West divide as these regions competed to grant favours to their respective political allies in the south" (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). For the most part, the Southern States were left out of the dominant preoccupation of East-West conflict that defined the Cold War. This gave momentum for the active steps of cooperation that followed, including in particular the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, and The Group of 77 that both proved pivotal in shaping a shared Southern identity. Morphet argues that "familiarity with the historical development of the foreign policies and cooperative behaviour of the global South during the Cold War is a prerequisite for assessing changes in the position of these countries in the post–Cold War era" (2004: 523). In 1960, the United Nations Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was established, marking an early victory for the Southern lobby. Global political uncertainty was increased with the building of the Berlin wall and the nuclear aspirations of the

Soviet Union, and coincided with the founding of the Non Aligned Movement and its first summit in 1961 in Belgrade.

It was the disenchantment with the Bretton Woods institutions that acted as one of the key drivers that would later spur developing nations to call for the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. (Morphet, 2004: 527). Almost all members of the Non Aligned Movement also had membership in the G-77 grouping that was established with UNCTAD in June 1964. Both the NAM and the G77 were very large groups that were concerned with finding agreement amongst themselves to impact common objectives and foreign policy issues. The 1960s-1970s can be seen as the era where NAM and G77 was perhaps most successful in impacting the current international regime. (Morphet, 2004: 527). Victories came in the enlargement of the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It's lobbying to increase the number of General Assembly Vice Presidents was also successful, as was its plight for establishing the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Committees on disarmament, decolonization and apartheid were set up (Morphet, 2004: 527). However, as the global South was clearly gaining power within the international system during this period, the Group of 7 was subsequently established in 1975 as the largest Western economic powers acted in response to the newfound multilateral diplomatic ability of the global South. The Group of 7 was intentionally established outside of the scope of the UN following a series of successful events where the global South was able to impact UN processes as outlined above.

Whereas the NAM was built on the premise of detachment from or "non-alignment" with the two poles contesting the Cold War, the 1970s saw the movement shifting its focus from non-alignment to a drive towards international integration in order to prevent being left behind. Trade and economic aspirations were the focus, and in an effort to integrate the global South's agenda, the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was established in the 1970s by numerous developing countries through means of UNCTAD, and with purpose to promote their interests in terms of trade, tariff reductions and development assistance from the North. NIEO was however not as successful and later made way for regional linkages with developed countries. It was also at this time that other areas of interest came to the front of the NAM's list of priorities. This included issues of human rights, peace-building, and environmental concerns. As a whole, the

end of the cold war thus marked a clear shift in the multi-lateral policy of the global South. Once a deciding force of the collective South in affecting a shifting towards a more equitable international regime, today "the G77 countries are justified in seeing themselves as far less influential than in the 1970s" (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 51).

2.4. CHANGING MULTILATERALISM WITHIN THE SOUTH TODAY

Today, the NAM and G77 remains important vehicles to voice the collective concerns of the global South. While developing countries have achieved significant change within the international system, this has however been without affecting the necessary recognized forms of structural power capable of giving effect to these aims (Alden *et al*, 2010: 7). As such, many of the problems that caused the initial inception of the NAM and G77 are still what drive its agendas today. Difficulties in coming together to achieve the objectives with which these organizations were first established perhaps speak to the fact that the South as a whole has become increasingly stratified. An example of ongoing frustration within traditional larger multilateral bodies of the South included when the NAM announced its disappointment with the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003, outlining how still no acceptable agreement had been reached to address developing countries' interests and concerns. A key factor has been that today, several emerging economies in the South have progressed impressively, while least developed countries (LDCs) have fallen further behind. Several East-European countries have also stagnated, calling into question their cohesion with other European states including the European Union's 28 members. According to Alden *et al,* "it is only in the early twenty-first century, when sufficient material power has accrued to the leading developing countries in the G5 [9] that we are beginning to see the forceful application of financial means towards the attainment of a renegotiation of their standing in key international institutions like the IMF" (2011: 7).

As the nature of the international system is changing, the North too has become stratified to some extent. The environment and climate change can be seen as an example issue where the North has become increasingly stratified, with the position of Europe diverging significantly from that of the United States for instance. Thus, just as the nature of the South is shifting, so too

[9] The Group of 5 (G5) refers to convergence of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa with the role of playing an active role in the rapidly evolving international order. (http://www.groupoffive.org/)

is the nature of the North, in part also due to the rise experienced in certain emerging economies in the South, and the consequent decrease in power in particularly the United States and Europe as the world system is becoming more of a multi-polar affair with each state out for itself and less top down structure ensured by the traditional powers.

2.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the evolution of a sense of Southern solidarity and identity that has been created in relation to the North. Since the colonial era, there has been an ongoing redefinition in terms of reference regarding the more and lesser developed parts of the world. As some terms have fallen out of fashion, and as the makeup of both the more and lesser developed areas of the world has changed, a general consensus still exists today in defining the global South as an entity of lesser development as compared to the global North. The South as a phrase has become the preferable term used to describe those regions of the world that have a common political, social and economic history rooted in the inequalities of the past such as colonialism. (Alden *et al*, 2011:3) It refers to the lesser developed countries as compared to the global North, and can be said to include the members of the Group of 77 (G77) that in has today expanded to include 133 countries plus China who acts as an ongoing observer and special invitee to the group (Najam, 2005: 111). In comparison, the global North as a distinct category includes the developed and industrialized economies as contrasted against the global South who are generally. The North is generally referred to as those countries comprising membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Exploring the historic relationship between the North and the South has allowed for a discussion on the definition of both terms. It can be argued that this conceptual classification (similar to the First World/Third World distinction) however once held more weight than it does today. The meaning and validity of the "South" has been waning since the end of the Cold War, and also as a consequence of the ongoing stratification between lesser and more developed countries. Whereas the likes of the NAM and G77 were born out of a shared Southern vision to impact the unjust architecture of the international regime, they have also become stagnant. Once successful in garnering Southern disillusionment with the international political-economic status-quo and raising awareness on the inequality present within the international structure, these

organizations can be credited with being at least partly responsible furthering the "Southern" agenda towards a more even international playing field after suffering years of marginalisation under the North. Some emerging economies the likes of Brazil, South Africa, India and China has gained much prosperity while less developed countries have stagnated or even fallen further behind. It thus has to be called into question whether such shared Southern solidarity has been successful in impacted the entire South's wellbeing as it purports to have achieved, or if blessings have simply been enjoyed by the most powerful members of the global South, and incidentally those who were the original architects of such Southern multilateral organizations. The fact that states in the South have come to have less and less in common with one another represents a change within the nature of the South. Globalization has highlighted the stark differences found within not only the South, but also within the North. It has emerged that no complete breakthrough ever truly eventuated in levelling the field between the North and South as the relationship still leave much to be desired for concerning an egalitarian affiliation. A striking transformation within the international system has been the increase in economic and political power on behalf of a small handful of emerging economies in the South, and the changing role that they have started to affect within both the nature of the global South, and within North-South relations more generally. In the North too, cleavages have appeared largely as a consequent of globalization and a restructuring of the international architecture due to the likes of a rising China and India, and a bigger gap emerging between the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, with changes taking place in both the North and the South, the terms of "North" and "South" still very much holds truth and value in an attempt at assessing the current international political-economic landscape. From both a historic and contemporary viewpoint, the examination of the South and North offers much insight in illuminating issues of particular global complexity such as the problem of climate change.

CHAPTER 3

CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN ARENA FOR NORTH-SOUTH POLITICAL STANDOFF

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The environment has emerged as a key arena for playing out the North-South debate. Climate change in particular has materialized as an important issue within international environmental politics, and as a highly functional area for the South to further its ongoing debate concerning equity with the North. According to Najam, developing states (just like industrial states) are primarily interested in giving voice to their own individual national self-interest when it comes to international politics, which has led many to become prominent players within global environmental issues (2005: 111). According to Held and Roger (2013: 1), a growing body of evidence suggests that the center of climate policymaking has been shifting to the developing world and countries like of Brazil, India and China. Although no concrete scientific evidence exists yet, the South still echoes the (perhaps now outdated) remark by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change that calls the North responsible for historically contributing to most greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that is leading to climate change, while the underdeveloped South has historically contributed least, yet is most vulnerable (UNFCCC Preamble, 1992). Furthermore, the South has particular leverage in the climate debate because most of the world's remaining natural resources are located here, with resource depletion not (yet) as widespread as it is in the more industrialized North. Finally, a key factor enabling climate change to come to the forefront of the North-South debate is the rise of certain emerging economies whose rise in economic and political power have translated into garnering leverage for the South as a whole to affect the climate change debate, rooted within a broader North-South debate.

Since the early 2000s, the issue of anthropogenic climate change has escalated in urgency at an international level. A joint report between scientists from the United States Academy of Sciences and the British Royal Society refers to climate change as one of the defining issues of our time, and that it is now more certain than ever that humans are responsible for changing the Earth's climate (Royal Society, 2014: 2). Measurable evidence includes findings relating to the

warming of oceans and the atmosphere, sea-level rise, and a large decline in sea ice in the Arctic (Royal Society, 2014: 2). The world's leading authority on climate change is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international scientific body that operates under the auspices of the United Nations, and comprising thousands of leading scientists internationally. In recent years, the consensus has become more certain that climate change occurs not only because of natural variability but also increasingly because of human-induced anthropogenic influences (NOAA, 2007, IPCC report, 2013).

While the North has historically[10] been responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, disproportionately bigger growth in the South means that future emissions are expected to come especially from emerging economies within the South. This illuminates the contrast between historic, current, and future GHG emission responsibilities, an issue of much importance in the ongoing climate debate, and an issue of particular North-South importance. While the South continues to focus on historic emissions the North wants to place adequate focus on the current and future scenarios under which emerging economies should be held responsible for being major GHG emissions contributors. As it stands, the North cannot afford to tackle the problem alone. Climate change related events also pose a great threat to the developmental agenda of the South as a whole. Severe weather events, droughts, unpredictable rainfall patterns and likes are representative of a zero-sum game, and the South is undoubtedly more vulnerable to such events. This, together with the realization that resources required for development are much more scarce than the period in which the North developed, has further pushed the South towards assuming firmer bargaining in climate politic. It is then also the issue of equity that forms the backbone of the South's argument concerning climate change. The message from the South is clear: in order to facilitate the transition to a climate friendly economic and development path, it lacks the required resources to do so alone, in part due to historical injustices suffered under the North. It thus considers itself dependent upon assistance from the North in terms of finance, intellectual and technological ability to facilitate its mitigation and adaptation efforts.

[10] The UNFCCC notes that "the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries" (United Nations 1992, 1). According to Derek Bell (2011: 391), the use of the term "historic emissions" generally implies a reference to those countries that have contributed more to the issue of climate change, and should thus be held more accountable for the costs associated with protection of the climate system.

As Najam highlights, "the 'North–South' divide, ostensibly signifying the differences between the more industrialized economies of the global 'North' and the relatively less developed and developing countries of the global 'South', has been, and continues to be, a defining feature of global environmental politics" (2005:111). Given the ongoing political-economic imbalance in power between the North and South, the climate debate has emerged as an opportune arena for the South to argue for a change in the international structure looking at broader economic, political and social reform. The South has also further managed to couple the climate issue with enabling sustainable development. For the South, the type of demands concerning equality and fairness posed within the climate debate are however not new, and harks back to the start of the modern environmental movement in Stockholm in 1972. Multilateral South groupings in particular have come to realize the environment as a pivotal issue through which to explore the ongoing North-South rift. This chapter will explore the start of the international modern environmental consciousness, and examine the issue of climate change within the dynamic of the North-South political dialogue, especially as it concerns the notion of 'equity'.

3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP

The issue of climate change represents a relatively new arena within the politics of the environment. Early environmental awareness dates back as far as the early 19th century, when the poet William Wordsworth referred to the English Lake District as "sort of national property in which every man has a right and interest who has an eye to perceive and a heart to enjoy" (1951: 127). During the industrial revolution, air pollution emerged as a serious concern for the first time following the rise in factories and the growth in coal consumption. As a result, the first modern environmental laws were seen in Britain with the 1863 Alkali Act aiming to regulate air pollution. Since the industrial revolution, the global human emission of pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere has increased drastically. In 1972, Donella Meadows argued that it turned out that there are actually not "unlimited opportunities" for

growth as was once believed, with the two limiting factors being the exhaustion of natural resources, and that of global environmental pollution. To preserve the planet's delicate balance and carrying capacity, pollution needs to be kept at an acceptable level in order to maintain the "environmental utilization space" (Weterings and Opschoor, 1994: 221), a concept acknowledging the limits of the environmental pressures that the planet is able to withstand without irreversible damage to life on earth.

The start of the contemporary global environmental movement concerning the North-South relationship can to a large extent be traced back to the United Nations Conference on Human Development held in June 1972 in Stockholm. Here, industrialized nations assembled on a global stage to address the environmental effects of an increase in pollution and resource depletion at the hands of industrialization and population growth. A major topic of discussion at the Stockholm summit was examining the roles that the poverty in the South vs. affluence in the North played in the problem of environmental pollution and degradation. During this time, developing countries drew attention to the differences in how the North and the South experienced the anthropogenic degradation of the environment. While the developed world's experience was limited to the pollution of land and water, toxic waste accumulation, fauna and flora extinction, and the loss of arable land and forests, the developing world on the other hand had to endure the stark consequences of severe disease, starvation and poverty due to its weaker defences stemming from a lack of resources compared to the wealthier North. Given their very different experiences as well as abilities to deal with escalating environmental problems, developing countries took on a newfound sense of environmental consciousness, and found that a unified voice might only stand to better their chances of impacting the international regime. Soon, environmental institutions and policies were formulated within the borders of the developing world, mirroring the concern expressed within the developed world.

Conscious to the emerging threat of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in 1988 by joint efforts between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Recognizing the escalating importance of addressing climate change, the United Nations General Assembly set up the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) in 1990. This paved the way for the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC). A central mechanism and institution for implementing the FCCC was established by the Conference of the Parties (COP), which meets once a year and consists of negotiator representatives from all the ratifying countries. The yearly goal is to review the implementation process and make key decisions on how to improve it. The Framework Convention text (1992) acknowledges the urgency with which the climate issue must be addressed.

The UNFCCC was opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that took place in Rio de Janeiro. The high-profile "Earth Summit" was distinguished for its focus on considering environmental protection from both a developed and developing country perspective, and for its aim to integrate global environmental and sustainability concerns with the economic and social development. The Earth Summit proved that the issues of the South were gaining international recognition, with the environment leading the way. A decade later, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg built upon the platform laid by the Earth summit. The issues that emerged to define the Johannesburg Summit included three key points of discussion: 1) the North had not delivered upon many of the promises made a decade earlier, 2) the South was now engaging in increased development practices that came at the cost of the environment, and 3) the inability of the North to control the negative effects that its private sector was having in the exploitation of resources within developing countries. Cognisance was however taken of the fact that a decade after the 1992 Earth Summit, much of the developing world had created environmental agencies and departments and put in place concrete policies concerning the environment in regard to pollution and methods of sustainable development. While in essence an era of the optimism, the third summit that took place in Rio 2012 later highlighted the lack of progress that had been made in the 20 years since the Earth Summit, and the inefficiency of national environmental institutional structures located within the South.

While it was more in the North that modern global environmental policy first originated, the South only 'came on board' later and in part due to the concept of environmental politics expanding to include sustainable development incorporating Southern interests. In a sense, while the North was clearly focused on improving the state of international environmental affairs, the South has come to see this as an opportunity to simultaneously improve its own, broader experience within international politics as a whole. When considering the "game" that is

international relations and its various issues such as the environment and climate change in particular, Najam also reminds us that it is recognition of the "larger game" that helps explain the South's behaviour: "In evoking the language of the South in global environmental politics, developing countries are clearly signalling that they view this as one more arena to pursue their long-standing goals of creating a more fair and amenable international order" (Najam, 2005: 116).

The North and South view and prioritize the environmental predicament very differently. A differentiation between "developed" and "developing" countries in terms of responsibility forms a significant focal point of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change text. This is demonstrated in the fact that the UNFCCC text calls attention to "acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions" (UNFCCC Preamble, 1992). The preamble further acknowledges that developed countries has contributed the largest share of historical GHG emissions and that responses to climate change should be harmonized with economic and social development in an integrated manner, taking into account the rightful priority needs of developing countries to reduce poverty and accomplish sustainable economic growth (UNFCCC Preamble, 1992). Acknowledging the weaker capacity inherent in the developing world to address the issue of climate change, the Framework Convention text essentially asks developed countries to take the lead, and to assist the developing world with developing in a sustainable manner.

The clear distinction that the UNFCCC text makes between the developed and developing world is an integral aspect to understanding the ongoing and current stalemate within the international climate regime. The 1992 document clearly distinguishes between the obligations of the two groups of countries in a time where one was able to draw a much clearer line separating developing from developed countries, and when certain members of the developing world such as China and India had not yet become the impressive emerging economies and powers that they are today. The FCCC's article 4.2 (a) and (b) says that developed countries should assume the added burden of returning their GHG emissions to 1990-

level, while also assisting developing countries in reducing their growth of GHG emissions by means of financial and technical assistance (1992). Article 4.7 stresses the degree to which developing countries will implement their commitments is dependent on transfers of financial and technology resources coming from developed country Parties (1992).

By neatly splitting up countries along the axis of developed vs. developing; the United Nations Framework Convention runs into some of the same problems when attempting to draw a neat distinction between the developed and developing world as examined in Chapter 2 of this study. This resulted in a complex, nuanced understanding that each group has today assumed within a fast changing world order. While the 1992 text can surely be commended for bringing the world's nations together concerning a very divisive and complex issue, the Framework Convention's simplistic division of countries along a developmental axis is instrumental in what has today evolved into a dispute between states in the North and the South, especially with the change in the international landscape and the ascendance of the emerging economies.

While the United Nations climate negotiations got off to a very slow start, some progress towards a global climate deal came in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol was the first international climate change treaty that provided an actual timetable as well as emissions targets for developed countries to follow through on, although a noticeable feature was the fact that a similar response was not expected from the developing world. The Kyoto Protocol was significant in the fact that it committed developed countries to limit emissions, whereas previous conventions simply 'encouraged' the doing of so. A highly controversial aspect was that the United States (then both the largest economy and biggest emitter of GHGs) signed, but did not ratify the Protocol as it was unanimously blocked by the US Senate. One of the primary reasons given was that unless developing countries (particularly the large economy/emitter, China) also agreed to binding commitments of lowering its GHG emissions, the US did not see fit to do so. Leaders in the South denounced this idea, arguing that it was the US who was largely to blame for the climate problem due to being responsible for contributing the greatest amount of emissions (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622). Canada withdrew from the protocol in 2011 for similar reasons as the US, while Japan, New Zealand and Russia dropped out after participating in the first round. This left the Protocol to stand alone as a rather weak 'international' treaty lacking not only some of the

largest emitters globally that were excluded on account of being non Annex 1[11] countries (such as China and India), but also without some of the major world economies including the US, Japan, Russia and Canada. Realizing a deadlock within the climate regime, some progress was made in 2002 when the US together with a number of developing countries such as India and China agreed to shift the focus from binding emissions reductions to that of the North assisting the South in its adaptation to climate change (Harris, 2008: 461). Negotiations remain split along the North-South axis.

As the emerging economies in the South increased their political-economic clout within the international system, they also became more vocal, maintaining that A) promises made under the initial UNFCCC guidelines concerning a transfer of financial and technological assistance needs to be satisfied first before any transference to a new deal can be endorsed, and B) requiring developing countries to be held to equal binding emissions reduction targets (similarly to developed, Annex 1 countries) before they have had an equal opportunity to follow a developmental path as the North once did is not seen as fair. During high-level climate negotiations, the non-Annex 1 block has typically been backwards looking (past GHG responsibility), while the Annex 1 group has for the most part been present and forward looking, highlighting the (fast growing) significant contribution in GHG emissions on the part of developing countries. The incorporation of the non-Annex 1 block of countries has been said to be the main issue on the negotiation agenda, and the absence of binding targets for developing countries has been one of the main arguments why developed countries such as the United States has not in recent years been willing to commit to a climate deal (Caparros *et al*, 2004: 455).

Today, the ongoing inability of the Kyoto Protocol to attract sufficient qualifying ratifications points to the pessimistic state that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations are facing. Little progress has been made in solving the Climate Change conundrum since the UNFCCC was signed into existence by its 154 member states in 1992. This speaks to the complex nature of the climate change problem. One of the major obstacles impeding progress within climate negotiations has been said to be the inability for leaders of the developed and the developing world to come to agreement on an issue that is

[11] 'Annex 1' countries refer to developed countries with emission reduction commitments, as defined in the Kyoto Protocol. (1997)

viewed through radically divergent historical, cultural and economic lenses. (Susskind, 1994: 8) The interwoven nature of climate change and the international political economy, trade and development within the North-South parameter is evident. To date, the South has remained largely marginalized due to having less power within the international system as compared to the North. Its historical lack of necessary resources required to change the structure of the international political economy is mirrored in its lack of resources to be able to deal effectively with climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. For the South, its argument is thus very much inspired by the notion of 'equity'.

3.3 EQUITY WITHIN THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME

The issue of equity has long been a defining characteristic of the broader North-South debate, with the South calling for a more just and inclusive international architecture. The climate change issue can be said to be representative of the ongoing North-South relationship in its preoccupation with equity. Growth and industrial development have become synonymous with pollution, with climate change being a direct consequence. In the scope of international climate change politics, the question has become how a level of 'acceptable pollution' can be justly shared between all countries, and how the remaining 'carbon space' can be justly divided. What significantly complicates the matter is the inability to trace back the origin of current pollution levels, as well as the fact that while pollution might occur in one corner of the world, its effects are felt elsewhere in stronger or varying capacity. What is seen as a 'fair' way to solve the climate conundrum is sometimes perceived very differently in the South and in the North due to the diverging ways that these two groups perceive the problem. Speaking about the future of international climate change negotiations, Benito Müller in 2002 wrote that "it is equally widely understood that, consequently, success will not be forthcoming unless the key concerns of these countries – particularly those pertaining to inequities – are sufficiently taken into account in the future development of the regime" (2002:1).

Since the 1990's, developing countries have consistently maintained that they have little obligation to take immediate action on climate change. As such, they have proven very reluctant to adopt binding emissions mitigation targets within international climate change negotiations

believing that this would reduce their economic growth and development priorities. (Held and Roger, 2013: 2) Despite their unwillingness to assume equal obligation as the developed world, one of the most remarkable developments in recent years have however been the growing number of developing, non-Annex 1 states who have made unilateral commitments towards national emissions reductions at home. While China has pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by between 40 and 50% by 2020 (compared to 2005 levels), Brazil now plans to reduce its emissions by about 40% below its baseline emissions scenario by the year 2020, and South Africa has pledged a 34% reduction below business-as-usual by the same timeframe (Held and Roger, 2013: 2). Even a country like Ethiopia who has been active in arguing for equity for the South within international climate change negotiations have pledged to become carbon neutral by the year 2022. This marks a progressive and positive trend within the South, yet independent and divergent from developed world climate rhetoric, remaining firm on the central issue of equity within international climate change negotiations. It shows that while the developed world is increasingly unwilling to play the 'North's game', it is however also realizing that a sustainable and climate friendly plan for the future is in their general national interest.

Climate change is seen and acted upon in fundamentally different ways in the North and South. In the North, climate change is seen as an ecological problem of degrading the environment, the victim being nature with mankind the wrongdoer. In instances where suffering does cross over into the human dimension, this view sees such suffering as man's own fault. The overriding moral purpose is one of "environmental integrity" or to treat nature fairly, and issues of distributive justice are a concern only as far as they become an obstacle towards the paramount objective of achieving such "environmental integrity" (Müller, 2002: 2). This view of climate change differs starkly from the view in the South, where it is often thought of in terms of a human welfare problem with the focus falling on the harms against humans and not so much against the environment. Both the victim and the wrongdoer are human, and thus climate change in the South is perceived in terms of it being a developmental issue (Müller, 2002: 2). Being poorer, the South also has significantly less defences against the effects of a changing climate. Thus, one may say that while climate change is seen as threatening a certain sort of lifestyle in the North, in the South it is seen as life threatening, period.

The North and South also have different actors that affect policy decisions. In the North, discussions are often spearheaded by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and stakeholder who are chiefly interested in targets for emission mitigation. In the South however, NGOs typically play a smaller a role, and governments are the key actors, interested in fair division of the burdens that stem from climate change impacts. In the developing world, issues of equity are especially expressed in terms of required financial and technological assistance from North to South to assist with climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts. While these mechanisms do exist, they are often seen as inefficient and inadequate to date. For the developed world on the other hand, discussion of climate equity relates more to dialogue on emissions mitigation. Such diverging views are to a large extent responsible for the ongoing stalemate within international climate change negotiations. According to Benito Müller**,** while the South often places much emphasis on equity by adding this to the agenda, it is important to realize that the agenda itself (namely emissions mitigation) has been firmly set by the developed world (2002: 1).

Achieving equity between the North and the South has been difficult, perhaps because the two groups are essentially not 'playing on the same field'. Since developing countries are not yet liable to any internationally binding emissions reductions, they have subsequently not been involved in the "hard part of the negotiations", translating to climate negotiations frequently being a lopsided endeavour operating under pretences of equality assumed under the United Nations 'one country-one vote system' (Caparros et al., 2004: 456). What follows is also unequal access concerning knowledge about the abatement costs and options between the North and the South. Since the South has not yet been involved in binding reductions, there exists not nearly as much statistics and information in the South concerning such costs as there does in the North. According to Caparros *et al*, this is a significant benefit for the South within the North-South climate standoff, as gaining better knowledge of the characteristics of the "opponent" is considered useful (2004: 457). The fact that international negotiations and implementation typically requires a significant timeframe to conclude also enables "opponents" to gather as much useful knowledge and thus power against one another concerning the argument of who should be responsible for doing what. Using game theory, Caparros *et al*. shows how delaying a climate agreement may actually have short term benefits for both groups, and how the asymmetry of information about the capacity of the South to reduce its emissions are a main characteristic of the negotiations at present (2004: 457). Both the South and the North however

pay a price in delaying negotiations in the long term due to the obvious escalation of the problem should irresponsible environmental degradation continue.

As long as some countries are being held to different accountability measures than others, the United Nations-type negotiation system based on the 'one country one vote' ideal where all nations are truly operating on an equal playing field leaves some to be desired for. The South argues that until the 'playing field' in a more general and broader international political-economic perspective is made more equal, the arena of climate change cannot and should not be used as a testing ground using this sort of issue-specific international cooperation. It is perhaps ironic that while the North is calling for more equality concerning the climate issue in particular, the South's refusal to participate is very much inspired by its grudge held against the North for historical inequality on a much broader and general international political-economic and social level. However, a significant departure from the past is that the South today has recently become more capable of rejecting Northern direction. In many ways, the climate issue thus encapsulates not only the historical grievance still held by the South against the North, but also a change within such a relationship as the South is slowly becoming more vocal and active within the international arena.

According to Heyward, issues of equity "have been among the most contentious of those that stand in the way of full international agreement on a unified approach to the climate change problem" (2011: 518). The issue of equity is largely responsible for the divide between the North and South within climate negotiations. Without viewing negotiating processes and proposals for action as equitable, there is a chance that Parties might not act at all (Heyward, 2011: 518). The UNFCCC's Article 3.1 calling Parties to act "on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (1992) has to date failed to be successfully operationalized to the approval of all Party members. While it might be tempting to think of equity in terms of representing a sort of 'common good' or most fair scenario taking all parties into consideration, Heyward argues that within the climate regime, equity and self interest are not necessarily independent of one another and that arguments built on the notion of equity are often interconnected with interest, often utilized as a more politically and publicly acceptable way for realizing essentially self-interested motivations (2011: 519). This is also evident in considering the fact that while both the North and the South are interested

in an equitable outcome, it is perhaps their diverging interests that guide them to see what is equitable in two rather different ways. In essence, this is what makes agreement during multilateral negotiations so difficult, because while all parties involved might have a common overarching goal in mind (for example, avoiding the negative effects of a changing climate), the way that the North and the South respectively sees as the 'fair way to get there' is sometimes very different and even conflicting in nature.

The concerns that emerging economies such as Brazil, South Africa, India and China have regarding climate change can be said to be differentiated from the concerns of least developed countries (LDCs) in the South, particularly in Africa and Asia-Pacific. In fact, many of the arguments used by emerging economy leaders of the developing world regarding a differentiation of climate change experiences for the North and South can be used against them by conceptualizing a revised LDC-emerging economic axis. Emerging economies are arguably far more capable of dealing with the effects of climate change than LDCs, who are more vulnerable due to having fewer resources available, and being more reliant on climate-sensitive primary commodities and labour-intensive manufactured goods. Having a more robust economy, emerging economies have access to more resources to deal with a changing climate as compared to small island states, for example, whose very existence is threatened by rising sea levels as a result of a changing climate.

Given the rise in emissions taking place within emerging economies, LDCs has started to become more critical of emerging economies, putting a strain on broader South-South relations. During the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, one spokesperson for the Alliance of Small Island States made a direct link between the predicament of low-lying islands and the development of emerging economies in saying that 'This little island is where I get my dignity from. I shouldn't be transported somewhere else by the whims and fancy of others who want to develop. While they develop, we die. Why should we accept this?" (Minas, 2013). While the prominent emerging economies ostensibly argue on behalf of the broader South and continue to blame a stagnant climate regime on developed countries and especially their slow movement in providing financing to the developed world, some less affluent developing countries have increasingly started to place more blame on the likes of China which is holding back climate negotiations through not wanting to take on more responsibility for their growth and its

consequent translation to an increase in GHG emissions. Criticism of the likes of China has also come from the rest of the developing world including non-LDC members, highlighting a further division in the South. During the May 2013 UNFCCC meeting in Bonn, Chile's negotiator expressed concern by saying that he would like to see China commit more and that "there is this game between the US and China. They are both waiting for the other to make a move … I would like to see these two nations being more ambitious, that would raise the bar for the world' (Minas, 2013).

Within the G77, there has been an increase in the number of developing country coalitions that have started to share joint positions with developed countries and against the emerging economies. An example was when the LDCs of the Alliance of Small Island States supported the EU 'roadmap' for a second Kyoto period and a new global deal by 2015 as India withheld agreement on this, at least until the very end of negotiations (Minas, 2013). Since the argument of emerging economies like China and India pivots on their identity as 'developing countries' within an unfair international system, having other developing countries disassociate themselves with the emerging economy members could be very costly. LDCs have also been increasingly critical of emerging economies and their growing contribution to international GHG emissions. This echoes the argument of the developed world, who agrees that the likes of China, India, Brazil and South Africa have to be held to increasing accountability for their share of global GHG emissions, and that hiding behind the CBDR is becoming increasingly inappropriate as the economy and GHG emissions of emerging economies are skyrocketing.

The climate change regime and negotiations are in many ways different for lesser developed countries as compared to the emerging economies, with equity being a concern for LDCs in relation to the more powerful emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. For LDCs, climate change essentially reflects an issue of survival, where their very existence is at stake as significantly more vulnerable and helpless states than the more robust emerging economies. For emerging economies, the climate change issue is much more intertwined with the politics of sharing the climate burden, and also the equitable access to natural resources to drive a hungry economy. While emerging economies are more interested in how climate negotiations will impact their economic concerns, for LDCs in particular, the economic focus regarding climate change negotiations is more focused on enabling the transfer

of funds from richer countries to assist in climate adaptation and mitigation. Whether this comes from developed countries or from wealthy emerging economies is probably of no significance. The differentiated concerns between LDCs and emerging economies can thus be said to be representative of a broader shift in the traditional (G77-like) North-South relationship where the focus of the South was more on aligning as a group to face off against the North. Within the climate regime, the rise of emerging economies is placing strain on the global South coalition, with LDCs even starting to side with the developed world in seeking 'equity' by calling on the emerging economies to assume more responsibility.

3.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the development of global environmental consciousness within the context of the North-South relationship. Climate change has been explored as a suitable area for the South to further its longstanding debate with the North regarding a more just and equitable international system. The South views its inability to deal effectively with climate change mitigation and adaptation as a direct result of past marginalisation by the North, including the exploitation of its natural resources that in many ways helped fuel the industrial revolution in the North on which the climate problem can now largely be blamed. While the South feels entitled to follow a similar developmental path as the North once did, the natural world has however changed and unlimited natural resource availability and unlimited growth are simply no longer considered possible to the same capacity as it was during the industrialization of the North. For the South, its growing leverage within the international system, coupled with the massive rise in GHG emissions expected to come from the more developed parts of the South has resulted in the emerging economies being invited to be closely involved within international climate negotiations, both inside and outside of the United Nations platform.

The inability of the North and the South to reach compromise within the climate arena pivots on the issue of equity. What is seen as a 'fair' way to proceed forwards is not the same for the North and the South. To address the climate issue, it is clear that a drastic decrease in GHG emissions is required. How this burden should be divided between the North and South is disagreed on, with the South pointing blame to the North for their share of historic emissions responsibility, while the North wants binding emissions reductions to be implemented in the

South, looking forward to a future where the South will become the biggest emitter of GHGs. A growing change within the nature of the global South itself has also contributed to the lack of a stable and secure international architecture on which an international deal can be firmly and finally constructed. As emerging economies have grown and increased their share of global GHG emissions, least developed countries in particular have become disillusioned with the fact that they are not assuming the appropriate amount of responsibility associated with their development. As such, LDCs have joined not only the developing world but also other areas of the developing world in being critical of the behaviour of emerging economies within the climate regime, thereby creating strain within the solidarity of the global South.

CHAPTER 4

COPENHAGEN AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BASIC GROUP

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The BASIC grouping consisting of Brazil, India, South Africa and China took many by surprise when it emerged at the 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, 2009. BASIC can be explored as a case study example of ad-hoc, issue specific South-South grouping which signifies the emergence of such groupings in recent years, speaking more broadly to the changes taking place in the nature of the global South. Not yet having fully developed or 'caught up' to the North, emerging powers are still learning to flex their diplomatic muscle. In Copenhagen, the formation of the BASIC grouping essentially represented a modified expression of South dissatisfaction with the international status quo. By examining the emergence and purpose of the BASIC grouping during and after the pivotal 2009 conference in Copenhagen, this chapter will explore to what extent the climate regime has been employed as a suitable platform for these emerging economies to band together and assert their newfound power. By building on existing South coalition structures such as the NAM and G77 groups, BASIC members further pushed the agenda to be more sensitive also to their own unique needs as emerging economies in a resource scarce world. As such, the following questions will be explored in this chapter: 1) how did the BASIC grouping come to be? 2) What drove and enabled the formation of BASIC? , 3) what has happened to BASIC since Copenhagen, and 4) what does this represent for the (changing) nature of the global South?

4.2 TRACING THE EMERGENCE OF THE BASIC GROUP

Despite being relatively diverse countries located on three very different continents, Brazil, South Africa, India and China share a common identity of being increasingly influential leaders in the developing world, possessing historic pathways that have frequently since overlapped the decolonization era. The turn of the millennium has paid witness to these four countries increasingly aligning in various policy areas, often providing a counterforce against a block of developed countries. Similar paths from poverty to growing power and economic status have enabled the four members to develop closer relations over the years. While the formation of

BASIC in 2009 took many by surprise, common ambitions for more effective South-South cooperation had been increasing since the turn of the century (Tanaka, 2012: 4). The BASIC grouping was largely founded on the basis of negotiating a climate regime that is more sensitive to justice and equality as viewed by the South in general, and specifically by four of its emerging economies. It is important however to note that the BASIC grouping is not a formal grouping. It merely represents an example of the emergence of policy-specific, ad hoc South-South groupings that have come to represent the changing nature of the global South in recent years. According to Hallding *et al,* BASIC should be seen as "an informal alliance that represents the 'climate' outcropping of a somewhat amorphous set of emerging economy groupings that focus on a range of strategic purposes (2013: 617).

The Copenhagen Summit was to become a landmark event in the international climate debate, and provided the impetus that directed the growing relationship between Brazil, South Africa, India and China towards the specific focus of enabling a more equitable climate regime. Leading up to Copenhagen, the four BASIC countries had begun to be invited to take part in high-level climate events such as the 2007 G8+5 Climate Dialogue, as well as the 2009 Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), both taking place in the American Capital of Washington, DC. Realizing the increasing role and importance that emerging economies were beginning to play within shaping international climate change, the aim for developed countries was to put pressure on and engage these emerging nations in discussions on the basis of a more equally shared burden in regards to climate change mitigations, outside of the scope of the UNFCCC and its safeguard of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" (CBDR). Eager on realizing their ambition of improving their voice within the international system and being more involved within prominent international institutions, the BASIC members agreed and attended, in part also due to growing pressures experienced from least developed countries (LDCs) within the South who were also beginning to urge the emerging economies to take on more responsibility in limiting their increasing emissions that had now begun rivalling that of the traditionally wealthier developed world. So the emerging economies came to the negotiating table, but maintained that even considering their rapid development, they were still developing countries at the core. While they were trying desperately to industrialize and catch up to the North, they were being presented with many problems, climate change being just one.

As emerging economies started to increase their share of global GHG emissions, this placed them in the spotlight. It was thus big news in 2007 when China surpassed the US as the biggest CO2 emitter in the world, (Lynas, 2009). China was however quick to remind that its 1,3 billion population is roughly an entire billion people larger than the US as the former largest GHG emitter with its approximately 310 million large population (World Bank, 2012), with much of China's population still living in poverty compared to the developed world. Echoing the UNFCCC's CBDR principle, BASIC countries together maintained that they deserve an equal opportunity to develop, and that as members of the broader South, they are still reliant on the developed world in order to adequately address the climate change issue at home. Their view was that despite the relative rise of a few emerging economies, the South as a whole still fundamentally lacks the resources to address climate change in comparison with their perceptions of the North's capabilities. This very much also includes its emerging economy members such as China and India. The BASIC grouping was thus able to relate its negotiations within the climate regime to its broader view of an unbalanced North-South relationship.

The 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen came at a time when climate change was escalating as a serious international political issue. The Summit was surrounded by tremendous optimism for the international community to finally come together and unite towards action. The European Union was expected to play a leadership role in enabling an ambitious global "climate deal" that would firmly address the curbing of GHG emissions (Falkner, Stephan, Vogler, 2010: 10). The importance of the Copenhagen Summit was punctuated by the attendance of world leaders, including US President Obama, German Chancellor Merkel, British Prime Minister Brown and French President Sarkozy. Many were thus surprised when the only real 'deal' that was achieved was between the United States and a new international grouping made up of the emerging economies Brazil, India, South Africa and China (Hallding, 2013: 618).

In the days leading up to the much anticipated Copenhagen conference, leaked documents that came to be referred as the "Danish text" depicted how world leaders would be expected to sign a deal in Copenhagen that essentially "hands more power to rich countries and sidelines the UN's role in all future climate change negotiations" (Vidal, 2009). While the deal's architects remained secret, it was widely believed to have been a collaborative effort of the UK,

US and Danish governments, pushing for the developing world to take on more responsibility for its rising emission of GHGs, especially coming from its biggest emitter countries such as China and India, and steering away from the original UNFCCC foundation of CBDR (Vidal, 2009). The "Danish text" draft proposed abandoning the only legally binding treaty on global emissions reduction (Kyoto Protocol), and handing over the control of climate change to the World Bank (Vidal, 2009). The BASIC grouping became instantly and exceptionally averse to the proposed deal, opposing the departure from the UNFCCC text that had become the basis on which the climate regime had been built, and arguing on behalf of the broader South that such a departure from the CBDR foundations was not sensitive to the needs of them as members of the South. The formation of BASIC was however not a collaborative result stemming from any other developing countries asking the group to lead and represent the South's agenda in Copenhagen. Rather, it was an effort strictly by the group's four members. This marked a departure from broader, earlier South-South multilateral efforts.

For BASIC, the "Danish text" was perceived as essentially threatening its development agenda. Industrialization had been responsible for lifting many out of poverty within the BASIC countries, but the idea of stopping progress before a more complete developmental transition had been achieved, as in the West, was BASIC's chief fairness argument. As its biggest member and arguably the leader of the BASIC group, China argued that its per capita contribution to the world's GHG emissions was a mere quarter of that found in the United States. It is thus conceivable how the likes of China and India were not eager to commit to an offer which would have developing countries reduce their GHG emissions by 80% by the year 2050 in order to prevent the earth from warming more than 2 degrees Celsius. To end a negotiating deadlock, the BASIC counties finally reached an agreement together with US President Obama, in a diplomatic stunt that managed to split the US-EU partnership, get rid of the "Danish text", and instead replace it with what was to become the severely watered down and non-binding "Copenhagen Accord".

While BASIC managed to prevent a drastic departure from the CBDR tenets upon which the UNFCCC was originally constructed in order to reach a compromise with the US, what it conceded was emissions transparency for itself and all other Annex 1 countries. The ambitious goal of a 'new deal' replacing the Kyoto Protocol by having both developing and developed

countries agree to legally binding emissions reductions did not happen. The Copenhagen Accord instead speaks to the fact that Annex 1 countries should "commit to economy-wide emissions targets for 2020" while Non Annex 1 countries would implement "Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions" to slow its growth concerning carbon emissions (Copenhagen Accord, 2009). In regards to compensation, the Accord emphasise "scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention" (Copenhagen Accord, 2009).

At the conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit, the disappointment and pessimism at a failed deal was to some extent balanced by the optimism that the climate change regime was indeed going forward, albeit at the (unexpected) direction of BASIC as developing countries that were finally able to play a more active role in shaping an issue located within the North-South debate. This marked a stark departure from the predominantly North-directed multilateral negotiations utilised in the past to affect the establishment or agenda-setting of international institutions. In Copenhagen, while there was sharp criticism directed at the BASIC group for stalling climate progress, the BASIC countries collectively and individually made a big effort to direct (and deflect) the attention towards their own progressive and ambitious domestic climate policies.

At the conclusion of COP15, China's Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, praised the summit in a statement which said: "developing and developed countries are very different in their historical emission responsibilities and current emissions levels, and in their basic national characteristics and development stages….Therefore, they should shoulder different responsibilities and obligations in fighting climate change" (BBC News, 2009). On the other hand, EU Commission President Jose Mauel Barriso said that "I will not hide my disappointment regarding the non-binding nature of the agreement here. In that respect the document falls far short of our expectations", while French President Nicolas Sarkozy argued that because no binding deal was reached, "two countries as important as India and China would be freed from any type of contract...(and) the United States, which is not in Kyoto, would be free of any type of contract" (BBC News, 2009). British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called the conference "at best flawed and at worst chaotic" and called for a substantially reformed UN process (BBC

News, 2009). According to Brown, the climate summit was essentially held ransom by a small handful of countries in that "some leading developing countries currently refuse to countenance this (a legally binding agreement)" (BBC News, 2009). According to Brown, the 50% reductions in global emissions by 2050 or 80% reductions by developed countries was not reached because "both were vetoed by China, despite the support of a coalition of developed and the vast majority of developing countries" (BBC News, 2009).

4.3 BASIC SINCE COPENHAGEN

The BASIC group remains active since causing a stir in Copenhagen. The various BASIC country Ministers involved in climate issues continue to meet roughly once every quarter, signifying a commitment to their ongoing cooperation. An investigation of the issues on BASIC's agenda highlights the motives that inspire its cooperation. An ongoing focus of the workings of the group includes a push towards maintaining the "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" foundation that binds Annex 1 developed countries to set emissions reduction targets, while non-Annex 1 countries such as the BASIC members remain excluded. BASIC strongly opposes a further distinction amongst developing countries, fearful that a separation from LDCs would result in it being held more accountable for reducing its own emissions. As a result, the joint statements that BASIC delivers often have the underlying message of unity with and support for the rest of the G77 (BASIC joint statements: 2010, 2011, 2012).

One method of demonstrating commitment to support less capable developing countries has been the ongoing discussion of establishing funding mechanisms. BASIC continues to push for fast-start finance for LDCs that was promised as far back as Copenhagen, but has still been slow to get off the ground. Support has frequently been reaffirmed for the G77+China proposal regarding the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and the importance of a new fund to combat a changing climate. During the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group in Rio (26 July 2010), the group again called on the importance of fast-start financing as being key for effective results in climate change negotiations. The group expressed their concern with the lack of fast-start financing resources, and for such funds to be new and additional stemming from the outcome of the Copenhagen Accord. Ministers of the

BASIC Group especially called for more comprehensive and detailed information on fast start finance flows coming from developed countries to be made officially available, and for such financing to include adaptation as well as the transfer of technology development, in line with the principles6 of the UNFCCC (Government of India Press Information Bureau online, 2010).

BASIC working groups and joint statements also often have a considerable focus on a perceived unity with the rest of the developing world. During the Second Ministerial Meeting of the BASIC group (New Delhi, 24 January 2010); BASIC members issued a joint statement, again expressing a unity with the rest of the developing world and a commitment to "working together with all other countries to ensure an agreed outcome at COP-16 in Mexico later this year" (BASIC Joint Statement, 2010). Ministers emphasized the importance of a "two-track process negotiation under the Bali Roadmap" (BASIC Joint Statement, 2010). The first track being the 'convention track', centering around the Bali Action Plan and its four blocks of "mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing", and the second track regarding the Kyoto Protocol and its dealing with the commitments of industrialized countries (Annex-1 Parties) and looking beyond the end of the first commitment period in 2012 (UNDP Climate Community online, 2013). During the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group in Rio (26 July, 2010), BASIC members emphasized the importance of working together with the G77+China rather than against it, and highlighted the importance of multilateral negotiations of various kinds in building upon a climate regime that is more inclusive of the needs of the developing world. This interest in collaboration has often been referred to in various BASIC joint statements as the "BASIC-plus approach" (BASIC Joint Statements: 2010, 2011, and 2012).

As far as the workings of the group go, a considerable focus has been placed on the issue of equity. This has been the focus of several of its technical workshops, interested in the issue of carbon budgets. The issue of equity has formed an integral part of BASIC Ministerial meetings after Copenhagen. During the Fourth Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC Group leading up to the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Ministers underlined the need for more inter-BASIC collaboration on how to better effect a more equitable access to the carbon space for BASIC countries, and especially its consequences on economic, social, technical and scientific matters. An ongoing point of importance for the BASIC grouping has been a call on the developed country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to raise their level of ambition consistent with

their historical responsibility, and that developed countries should take the lead in assisting the developing world with finance, adaptation and technology and capacity transfers in line with the principles of equity agreed upon under the UNFCCC. BASIC Ministers have reiterated the significant importance of meeting the US$100 billion goal per year climate financing by 2020, and the importance of scaling up financing in the years leading up to 2020 (BASIC Joint Statements: 2010, 2011). During the 13th Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in Beijing, Ministers expressed their concern regarding the gap between what developed countries have pledged in terms of financing and what is actually required, based on scientific evidence and in regards to historical emission responsibilities (BASIC Joint Statement, 2012). They also pointed to their belief that the mitigation contribution of developing countries was much larger than that of developed countries and that this is not agreeable given the lead that developed countries should instead be taking. Echoing the ongoing sentiment since Copenhagen, BASIC Ministers in Beijing made an objection to any attempt to transfer the objections and obligations of developed countries over to developing countries (BASIC Joint Statement, 2012).

BASIC countries have at times found it difficult to agree on the issue of 'equity' concerning the planet's remaining carbon reserves and how this should be divided. These different views centre on the different domestic contexts that each of the BASIC countries face. India prefers the emissions per capita approach as its per capita emissions are far lower than the other BASIC countries, with India also ranking lowest of the group in terms of human development. (Hallding *et al*, 2011: 14). The issue of equity has often been spoken of in terms of the "per capita", the "capacity to pay", and the historical responsibility approach. (Hallding *et al*, 2011: 14). China and Brazil both prefer the historical emissions approach, probably due having much higher per capita emissions in relation to Brazil and South Africa. Instead, this approach aims at placing the focus on low emissions compared to overall historic emissions of industrialized countries over time. On the other hand, South Africa calls for capacity to be taken into the equation, favouring a more multi-criteria approach including level of human development. (Hallding *et al*, 2011: 14). This most likely reflects its relatively high emissions per capita and on the other hand its low level of development in global terms.

Since Copenhagen in 2009, the BASIC countries have all made pledges and enforced domestic legislation committing them to considerable deviation from BAU (business as usual)

emissions trajectories (Hallding *et al*, 2011: 105). Even within the scope of UN Climate Change conferences, BASIC members sometimes agree, and sometimes do not. Some members even occasionally form other alliances in order to push through their individual agendas. An example can be seen as India's collaboration with non-BASIC countries at the 2010 UN Climate Conference in Cancun to include the "equitable access to sustainable development" wording in the negotiation text. At the recent 2013 UN Climate Change conference in Warsaw, BASIC again delivered a combined press conference urging the developed world to do more, particularly in regards to providing fast-start financing (BASIC press conference, 2013). This suggests that the group remains committed to continue its cooperation on climate change issues. As voiced in Warsaw, BASIC continues to portray itself as a spokesperson for the rest of the G77 countries. Being four diverse countries on the rise, sometimes doing so in direct competition with each other, the BASIC countries have remained mostly in unison in regards to several key aspects of the climate regime. For example, Ministers have renewed their commitment to keeping a global temperature increase within the 2 degrees Celsius limit. As such, the reduction of global emissions should be built upon a concept of fair burden sharing between the developed and developing worlds. The BASIC grouping believes that as members of the developing world, both their economic as well as sustainable development should form an integral part of the climate change regime going forward.

4.4 BASIC IN RELATION TO THE BROADER GLOBAL SOUTH

One of the most significant changes in the geopolitical landscape since the UNFCCC established in 1992 has been the emergence of some developing countries in terms of economic growth and greater prominence in global affairs, while on the other hand the relative power of the US and Europe has waned. Within the South, the gap between members has widened, with the more prominent members sometimes having more in common with one another and even with the developed world, rather than with other countries in the South. A recent increase in South-South groupings can be viewed as having its normative roots within the likes of the G77 and NAM, but also creating new avenues for furthering the same, ongoing objectives of fairness and a drive for equal development.

Three forums speak to a change taking place within the global South and the international system more broadly: the World Trade Organization Group of 20 developing countries (WTO G20), the IBSA Dialogue Forum, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) all represent examples of such smaller groupings consisting of powerful emerging economies that are starting to challenge the status quo powers of the US and Western Europe. They exist as groupings synergistic with larger traditional institutions such as the G77, with an overarching similar agenda of enabling a more even and equitable distribution of power between the traditional "North" and "South". What they have in common is the fact that they offer examples of an increased occurrence of ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings that have been formed by emerging economies A brief examination of these forums highlight their mutual ambition to affect the North-South relationship within the international system.

Firstly, the formation of the WTO G20 can be seen as a reaction to a joint US-EU proposal at the 2003 Doha development Round on agricultural trade policy which the group saw as unfair. The proposal was opposed by several of the more economically powerful members of the G77 with India and Brazil being instrumental in bringing together the Group of 20 countries to oppose the US-EU proposal. Just like with the formation of the BASIC grouping later in Copenhagen, the position of the WTO G20 in Cancun was one of defensiveness and in direct opposition to a perceived unfair push by the big players in the developed world to affect international institutional policy as not sensitive to the position of developing countries. Despite clear differences existing between the individual WTO G20 members, member countries found it to be in their ultimate interest to shelve these conflicts of interest for the greater good of the group and for the individual benefits it stood to gain from taking on international leadership.

Whereas the WTO G20 sought to reform international trade (especially concerning agriculture) along the traditional North-South axis of inequality, the 2003 IBSA Dialogue Forum was originally created stemming from the failed Cancun conference of the World Trade Organization. Here, developing countries realized urgency in strengthening cooperation within trade and investment. A drive that originated in economic diplomacy was solidified by the IBSA members at the 2003 United Nations General Assembly Forum with the consequence of a trilateral agreement. The Brasilia Declaration (2003) particularly stressed the need for improving a multilateral trade system through the removal of protectionist policies and trade distorting

practices. During the signing of the Declaration, the IBSA member states further expressed a common desire and urgent need for reforms in the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council. IBSA members called for a widening of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to include more permanent seats for developing countries to join China as the only historically "Southern" member of the Council. Along with trade, security and defence, the IBSA Dialogue Forum list of priority issues has further expanded in recent years to include a focus on agriculture, culture, and climate change, an area that its working group on the environment is concerned with (IBSA website, 2013). Like the WTO G20, IBSA thus grew out of a desire to reform international institutions so that they may better speak to the new distribution of economic wealth and growth that has been experienced within emerging economies of the developing world.

A look at the BRICS grouping offers a final example of an exclusive emerging economy club, this time including Russia in addition to the four BASIC Southern members. The grouping was originally known as BRIC, with South Africa joining in 2010, representing the largest economy on the African continent and the gateway to the region. Members are developing or newly industrialized countries distinguished by their regional influence and internationally by their fast-growing economies. Combined, the BRICS countries represent about 3 billion people. According to Ghosh, BRICS represents one of several new initiatives of various countries to break out of the "Northern axis" (2013). The BRICS group has concerned itself chiefly with economic issues, and with balancing the US hegemony in hopes of affecting a broader and more equitable international leadership in relation to the traditional powers. The acronym BRIC was first coined by Goldman Sachs, who in 2001 predicted that by 2050, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China will exceed the total size of the economies of the richest 7 developed countries (Arkhangelskaya, 2011: 7).

BASIC has much in common with the WTO G20, IBSA and the BRICS in that it functions as a relatively loosely organized group of emerging powers "each of which has vastly different domestic dynamics and divergent, often conflicting, global ambitions" (Hallding et al, 2013: 619). Asides from comprising the membership of emerging economies not categorized as traditional economic or political powers, these groupings all share overarching aims of

continuing their development efforts and affecting an international architecture that is more accommodating to its ambitions and more sensitive to its direction. They signify the increased occurrence of ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings. What distinguishes these groupings however, is the fact that they all have low levels of institutionalism. A focus on trade and economic matters is one aspect that informs the practices of all four of the groups, and which occupies a top position in the national agenda of its member states. Of particular interest is examining the link that the rising powers of the South have to other developing states and how this interaction and relationship has changed, shaping a change taking place within the global South.

In relation to less developed states in the South, one may ask to what extent the agenda of ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings comprising emerging economies are interested in furthering the traditional South agenda, and to what extent is it merely trying to assert its newfound power in the international system? Ghosh notes that a recent attempt by South Africa to incorporate other African states as observers of the BRICS suggests that this gesture "was simply a cosmetic attempt at suggesting wider representation than actually existed" (2013). The question that stems from this is whether emerging economies engaged within such exclusive new groupings such as the BRICS, IBSA and BASIC are simply replicating North-South interaction in their marginalisation of the rest of the South?

In the past, it was believed that South-South economic interaction would be more beneficial than the North-South alternative that was built on an unequal division of labour, with the North having a monopoly of more high-value-added production while the South is left with the unfavourable specialisation in primary commodities and labour-intensive manufactured goods (Ghosh, 2013). Such generalizations have however been questioned in recent years as the likes of East Asian states have been transformed into advanced manufacturing hubs. A change within the traditional North-South division of labour spurred by the rapid development of emerging states has called into question the allegiance of such states with the developing world as a whole and a commitment to the ongoing agenda of the South as a unity.

Within trade relations between stronger and weaker developing states, some have expressed fears of exploitation of natural resources that are not only damaging to the

environment, but also of little benefit to local peoples. In other words, a South-South exploitation or 'neo-colonialism' where the poor and weak are exploited by the rich and powerful (Ghosh, 2013). The effect speaks to the same concerns that have come to dominate a critique of North-South trade: with cheaper exports of wealthier countries in the South undermining local competitiveness in lesser developed regions, resulting in forced primary commodity exporting and thus negatively affecting development ambitions. China in particular has been criticized for dumping its products on the international market. It can be said that economic incentives function as a common factor uniting the emerging economies of BASIC, and have served as key drivers behind the establishment of South-South groupings in general comprising emerging economy membership. This shows a divergence from earlier South-South coalitions like the NAM and G77 that were more politically driven by challenging the imbalance within the international institutional architecture.

4.5. CONCLUSION

A more nuanced understanding of the BASIC cooperation is crucial in the scope of international climate negotiations. Examining the impetus that enabled and sustains the existence of the BASIC grouping helps explain the current climate negotiation stagnation, and offers insight into the changing North-South relationship. It can be said that BASIC was born out of a unified desire of four emerging economies to have their voice heard to signal their growing international economic and political importance. While representing their own individual self-interest, the BASIC group also appointed itself as spokespersons for the greater South. Remaining a part of the UNFCCC non-Annex 1 group of developing countries has the benefits of not being held accountable for GHG emissions to the same extent as developed Annex 1 countries. For BASIC, having to reduce GHG emissions because of binding GHG reduction targets is seen as damaging to their short term goal of swift economic development.

BASIC developed out of a direct opposition to the Northern-directed "Danish text" ambition of passing international binding emissions restrictions applicable to both the developed and developing worlds. The BASIC group saw this as a major threat to its ongoing developmental goals. Action was taken despite the backlash expected from the developed world in doing so. Still, a gutsy effort paid off, whereas the outcome might have looked rather different if any of the BASIC members had acted alone. BASIC countries appointed themselves as leaders of the

developing world, and in Copenhagen as leaders of the high-level international summit as a whole, something that up until then would not have been expected. By announcing itself as a new dimension within the ongoing yet stagnated climate change negotiations, BASIC's assumed leadership in Copenhagen can also be seen as reflective of other, broader power shifts currently taking place within international relations. This signifies a shift in the balance of power traditionally concentrated in the North, and chiefly responsible for the setting up of institutions after WWII. 'South-South' groupings such as BASIC calls into question the evolving nature of the 'South' as a group that was originally instrumental in establishing the NAM and G77. Today the BASIC grouping remains active, as demonstrated by its ongoing Ministerial meetings and its coordination at UN Climate Change negotiations. According to Held and Roger, the locus of climate change policy seems to be shifting from the North to the South, (2013: 4) and BASIC and its success in Copenhagen provides a clear example of this. Should the grouping stay active, it will surely remain an important dimension within the climate change regime. As Brazil, South Africa, India and China are all expected to increase their share of international political and economic power in the future, any sustained coalition consisting of this membership should be observed closely, as it is expected to play an important role in the specific scope of climate change politics as well as beyond.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study has investigated a change taking place within the nature of the global South, as highlighted by a shift within Southern multilateralism in resistance to ongoing marginalisation and perceived inequity in regards to the North. The study has aimed at showing how the increased occurrence of smaller, issue specific South-South groupings as a result of the emergence of certain emerging Southern economies has been a key ingredient in the changing North-South relationship. The emergence of such exclusive South-South groupings represents a supplement to traditional, larger South-South groupings such as the NAM and G77. While an ongoing commitment to impact a more equal and inclusive international political-economic structure is shared by developing countries, a growing gap between states within the South has been a driving force enabling a change within multilateralism within this conceptual entity.

While the study has been able to procure the importance of new trends that have been established, it has also highlighted that the ongoing asymmetries between the North and the South remain. It has further established that the regulation of environmental issues such as climate change is prevalent to future economic development, creating novel imperatives between the North and the South. The issue of a just subdivision of the burden related to environmental degradation and a required decrease in GHG emissions is closely linked with the issue of entitlement between the North and South in regards to issues of economic growth, trade and social development. The main impetus that the study supports is that the emergence of smaller ad hoc, issue specific South-South groupings comprising emerging economies represents a shift within the nature of the global South, driven by the increase in economic and political power amongst its emerging members. Being cognizant of this significant development within international relations is useful when exploring the existing rift within the North-South relationship, and when examining the reasons behind stalled international climate negotiations and other issues of international significance.

5.2 EXPLAINING THE CONVERGENCE OF THE BASIC STATES

Understanding the motives behind the formation of BASIC is important for comprehending why climate change negotiations to date have not been terribly successful, and for examining a change in the global South more generally through the emergence of smaller, issue specific ad hoc groupings of emerging economies. In order to comprehend the current state of largely failed negotiations as reflected by the lack of international binding commitments, it helps to examine the motives behind a grouping that has been instrumental in the negotiation process. The reasons responsible for bringing together BASIC in Copenhagen are still goals of the grouping today, explaining its active continuation.

The BASIC group was established as a way for its four emerging economy members to unite against a US-UK-Danish plan aiming at erasing the disparity in accountability between Annex 1 and BASIC states as far as binding emissions reduction targets were concerned. Having themselves locked into binding GHG emissions reduction targets was perceived by each of the BASIC states to pose drastic, unfavourable implications for its economy and its subsequent developmental efforts. A block argument was perceived to be more in line with the collaborative, democratic processes of the United Nations than one of its members 'going at it alone'. With differences between them, the four members agreed strongly on the urgency to oppose a new deal. Being emerging economies still in the process of developing, the BASIC countries have largely lacked the sort of international negotiation and bargaining experience that comes with being an established powerful state. Acting as part of a group was likely perceived to result in a less severe backlash against each of the individual countries as opposed to individual action. And a backlash must clearly have been expected, particularly given the high expectations and optimism surrounding a climate deal in Copenhagen supported by the attendance of prominent world leaders pushing for a new climate deal. BASIC's refusal of the suggested deal was widely unpopular, but as four diverse countries "representing" three diverse continents, it was to some extent acting under the notion of furthering a democratic process.

What distinguished BASIC from earlier Southern groupings is that while rooted in similar historic efforts to address the North-South imbalance of power and the long held dependence of the South on the North, BASIC very much also represents the ambitions of its

membership to garner more economic and political power within international politics, above and beyond a mere interest in furthering the South's agenda in relation to the North. This is in line with the desires of other emerging economies, as well as with the driving forces that created other emerging economy South-South groupings such as the WTO 20, IBSA or BRICS mentioned above. BASIC countries each desire an increased voice internationally to match their recent growth, not just limited to the climate regime. They further desire a fair share of the 'global commons', especially now that resources are becoming scarcer and competition fierce. Brazil, South Africa, India and China are all interested in securing their futures within a changing and uncertain world order. This is done in terms of cementing their position of leadership within their respective regions and within the South more generally, also in terms of the economic opportunities that this represents. The climate regime can be seen as just one area which served as a viable outlet for such expression with the formation of BASIC.

In the period of 1992 until 2009, BASIC's contribution to the global GDP nearly doubled. An increase in economic power has heightened the visibility and interest that the international community has come to associate with the four members. According to Alden *et al*, even though the literature concerning globalization often portrays the South as a passive victim of market forces, an increasing reality is that emerging economies within the South are using trade liberalization and the opening of markets to their interest through assuming a larger role in the international economy and also in the very direction that globalization is going (2010: 18). A testimony to this powerful phenomenon can be witnessed in the discourse of fear by many industrialized countries that the economic dynamism in the South is displacing historic Northern dominance (Alden *et al*, 2010: 18). In regards to natural resources, Hallding *et al* argues that emerging economies have a strategic need for a secure supply of access to resources and also to markets which may sustain their economic development domestically (2011: 616). Emerging economies are however aware that it is not only industrial states that they will have to enter into competition with for securing resources, but increasingly also one another. Climate change offers an example of emerging powers becoming a grouping in its own right, distinct from both the global North and increasingly also from the global South.

For the BASIC members, remaining a member of the developing world community and maintaining a unified voice for broader Southern interests arguably has many benefits, not least so for its biggest economy and the world's largest CO2 emitter, China. Concerning the climate change issue as an example, such a broad alliance as the G77 allows larger emerging economic powerhouses to hide behind the "Common but Differentiated Responsibility" (CBDR) safeguard as defined in the 1992 UNFCCC Treaty, and its 1997 Kyoto protocol that splits the world and climate responsibility in two groups along a North-South developmental axis. This ability to 'have your cake and eat it too' is also paralleled by China's role as influential "observer" member to the G77, also referred to as the G77+China due to the fact that China is technically only an observer state and not a fully fledged member, aligning with the group when convenient (such as in the climate regime).

Regurgitating past Northern inequality and injustices provides leverage for the BASIC countries as its spokespersons to push through not only items on the agenda that are of concern for the greater good of all G77 nations, but by default also those items of greatest concern in enabling (not restraining) its own economic development. While the likes of the G77 provided the initial basis for BASIC to come together under a sense of shared Southern solidarity in opposition to lopsided Northern dominance, their innovative way of finding common ground with some of the other big players in the G77 group points to the new emergence of South-South groupings to supplement and go beyond the objectives of a large and socio-economically diverse grouping such as the G77 and its inherent political problems, reflecting a broader reshuffling and power shift within international relations of the past decade.

As long as the BASIC group is defined as part of the developing South in terms of its Human Development Index score, they will likely remain a distinct grouping from the North, more so than from the rest of the South. Concerning the Climate Change regime, as highlighted in Copenhagen, BASIC has fiercely resisted any binding commitments as far as binding GHG emissions reductions. Its allegiance to the rest of the developing world is demonstrated in the pledges that BASIC members have made to assist lesser developed countries within the rest of the G77. During several meetings of the Ministers of the BASIC group held in 2010, the group discussed funding mechanisms that would assist the least developed and thus most climate vulnerable members of the South (BASIC Joint Ministerial meeting, 2010). Since Copenhagen in

2009, BASIC members have repeatedly urged the use of fast-start financing for least developed countries as stated in the Copenhagen Accord (BASIC Joint Ministerial meeting, 2010). While BASIC maintains its ties with the rest of the developing world by, for example, inviting chairs of groups such as the African group to its meetings, one may speculate to what extent this is just a tactic to draw attention away from negative perceptions by some accusing BASIC's agenda of revolving primarily around issues of self-interest. Self interest however does not necessarily have to incompatible with efforts of cooperation.

The BASIC initiative was in part successful because it was so capable of blending BASIC-specific political and economic objectives with speaking on behalf of a wider-held Southern sentiment, located within a historical North-South context of inequity. The BASIC grouping represents a key example of emerging countries, combined through their respective and unifying disillusionment with the international architecture and its institutions that was originally built by leaders of a more powerful North. It can be argued that the historic North-South debate and a desire to affect the traditional imbalance within the international system of power further coloured BASIC's objectives, and especially its reasoning and rhetoric strengthening its argument for why they as members of the South should not be asked to pay for a problem that was caused by the North. Banding together significantly strengthened the negotiating power of the four emerging economies in unison as regional hegemons representing three corners of the world, and injecting a new dimension within the North-South relationship.

While ostensibly representing the greater good on behalf of the South, the BASIC emerging economies thus in a way detached themselves from the rest of the developing countries, many of whom might have supported the Danish text as UK Prime Minister Brown argued (BBC News, 2009). According to Hallding *et al*, it would be a misunderstanding of the group's nature to see BASIC as just another G77 subgroup alongside least developed countries (2011, 77). Instead, BASIC is more of an informal alliance that overlaps with other constellations of emerging powers that focuses on various strategic purposes, mostly regarding a stronger say for these countries within world politics (Hallding *et al*, 2011, 77). Thus, while the solidarity of groups like BASIC is rooted within broader historical objectives to overcome dependency on the North, a significant reason behind the formation of South-South groupings the likes of BASIC can be said to be the economic interests and growing power ambitions

(Hallding *et al*, 2011, 77). This marks a departure from the objectives of lesser developed states in the South with economies too weak to have similar ambitions, and whose foreign policy behaviour remains more in line with traditional G77-like multilateral efforts as part of a larger group of developing countries. As such, groupings such as BASIC represent a change in the nature of the global South.

5.3 THE NORTH-SOUTH STANDOFF

The study has established the historical narrative between the South and the North as encouraged by their interaction on a political and economic level. Multilateralism within the South and the establishment of the likes of the Group of 77 and the Non Aligned Movement can be credited to a large extent for being responsible for giving life to the South as a political entity, forged through a common historical experience. While the South as a political entity was in many ways formed as a result of a shared legacy of marginalisation such as during colonialism, a growing gap between its poorest and most affluent members has been responsible for calling into question the ongoing usefulness of the term "South" which has replaced the conceptualization of the "Third World". This has been further supplemented by the falling away of the "Second World" after the end of the Cold War, as well as an increasing stratification within the North as a coherent opposition entity. Due to the South having undergone multiple conceptual ramifications, scholars have called into question the ongoing usefulness of the term given the backdrop of a changing international structure where some states can no longer be classified as 'North' or 'South'.

The likes of the NAM and G77 remain an important vehicle to further the Southern voice and its collective concern for effecting a more just and inclusive international architecture. However, due to a growing division in the political and economic capabilities amongst Southern members, such institutions have been prone to internal conflicts affecting its cohesiveness as members of the South are transitioning towards having less and less in common. A change within the South has made it difficult for its broad membership to act as a coherent entity. This has been chiefly inspired by the fact that some of its members have been able to significantly improve their position in the global order, as exemplified by the inclusion of the likes of India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and China as part of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and

Central Bank Governors also known as the G20 major economies. Emerging economy members exemplify a common Southern sentiment of entitlement to follow their own developmental path as the North was once able to do. However, such a desire comes in a time when the natural world has changed and resources have become significantly more limited.

The negotiations at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen was instrumental in demonstrating that while some continuity has remained intact considering the North-South relationship within global interactions, new trends have developed that signify a change within the dynamics. The study has identified one such trend as the convergence between emerging economies to form smaller, ad hoc groupings with the ambition of restructuring the international institutional architecture. An example of the BASIC grouping of Brazil, South Africa, India and China represents one such grouping that was formed against the milieu of the international climate change regime. The rhetoric that drove BASIC's argument in Copenhagen was firmly rooted in representing the interests of a broader South. Still, an exclusive, small club of emerging economies ostensibly representing but not incorporating the greater South can also be seen as a new type of further marginalisation of the weakest of developing countries, this time by other Southern states rather than by the North.

The fact that the BASIC grouping reached agreement with the United States to form the Copenhagen Accord also marks a new power dimension within the twenty-first century. Thus, the negotiations in Copenhagen may be used as a template for assessing where the shifting power centres lie within the international community. Copenhagen and the triumph of BASIC represented how technologically and financially advanced members of the global South came to define the South as a whole within the North-South dimension. It represents one instance of a new alliance taking form within the global South, consisting of the exclusive membership of its few advanced members coming together with similar political and economic interests. Copenhagen represented a shared ambition amongst the BASIC membership to deny the "Danish text" and its goal of achieving binding emissions reduction obligations for the emerging economies. This was perceived as unfair by BASIC, and would have seriously threatened its economic ambitions and development goals. Arguing on a basis of the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle, the group pointed to the fact that until they are given the fair opportunity to develop to par with the developed world, such a departure from the

UNFCCC principles dividing an already developed with a still developing world is unjust. The cause of stalled climate negotiations between the North and South is representative of a main impetus that the study supports, being that it is inequality at the core of the global political economy that remains as a key obstacle within the North-South relationship.

Copenhagen provided a suitable platform for emerging economy leaders to band together and asserts their newfound power within the international system. It further marked a stark departure from a predominantly Northern-directed multilateral negotiation process that has been utilized in the past to affect the establishment and agenda setting of international institutions. While BASIC's direction in Copenhagen was in line with a furthering of principles of Southern 'equity' within an unequal and often unjust international architecture, its ambitions of thwarting a new climate deal was very much also rooted in economic self interest and a resistance towards essentially slowing down its economic growth which is dependent on cheap and environmentally damaging fossil fuel utilization. BASIC was formed at a time when all of its members happened to converge on a common goal, all interested in protecting their own economic interests and leadership roles as emerging, influential players. Cooperation with one another and with the basic tenants of furthering the common Southern agenda of equality with the North enabled its establishment.

Since hegemonic powers often are the ones who create institutions in the first place (Stein, 2011: 212), BASIC's leadership in Copenhagen speaks to a broader gain in power by its four member states whose rise in power translated to influence exerted on the international climate change regime. The success of BASIC within the climate regime in Copenhagen is thus demonstrative of a broader shift currently taking place within international relations. While the formation of BASIC was ad hoc within the context of mutual ambitions, the partnership remains unstable, essentially representing the self-interested nature behind the formation of the grouping, and also the anarchic nature of the international system within which it was forged. BASIC represents a change in direction within multilateralism within the South, and as such a change within the nature of the South and its role as a conceptual entity within international relations. Built firmly upon the ongoing and historic North-South relationship, it also represents a change within this nature, punctuated by the materialization of power amongst emerging economies.

5.4 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The study has examined the historic and contemporary nature of the global South as a focus area within the North-South relationship, concluding that the South as a conceptual entity has become increasingly stratified. Due to constraints in time, space and finances, the study has had to delimit the material that was covered through the research. As such, it was not considered feasible for example to invest sufficient effort in deconstructing changes taking place within the North as a coherent entity, and its own role in the evolution of the North-South relationship. A comprehensive account may reveal certain important nuances buried with the multi-layer facets of such a complex relationship. While a lack of cohesion within the South has formed a basis for the arguments presented, a similar account of the North might provide further insight, drawing conclusions and thus comparisons between the evolutions taking place within these two conceptual entities.

A further limitation of the study has been the inability to examine individual countries and their influence on the topics discussed, especially the four countries comprising the BASIC membership, as well as other countries most generally conceived of as leaders within both the North and the South. Future research could focus more specifically on regions and individual countries in particular. Given the particular emergence of China within the international political economy and as largest CO2 emitter, it would be interesting to examine the nature of international climate negotiations from a Chinese point of view. Furthermore, while the study of BASIC has been discussed mainly along the lines of politics and economics within the North-South relationship, ideational and cultural perspectives may be utilized to further illuminate the convergence of BASIC, as well as the convergence of other South-South groupings, and of the shifting North-South relationship in general. Finally, while the formation of BASIC in the context of climate change negotiations was chosen to represent a case study exemplifying broader shifts taking place within the nature of the global South and the North-South relationship more generally, it needs to be considered that climate politics is still a relatively new and novel subfield of political science /International Relations, and thus requires greater investigation in its own right.

5.5 AFTER-THOUGHT

The issue of climate change is in many ways representative of the irony that has come to define our time. A drive to economic growth and unprecedented consumption is occurring at the significant cost of both human and environmental wellbeing. While sustainable development and reducing the emission of GHGs are well within human reach and ability, a sense of entitlement in the exhaustion of natural resources together with the greed associated with short-term gains through unsustainable practices have become entrenched within our modern existence. The issue of climate change in many ways thus speaks to the ongoing tension between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' which perpetuate patterns of global injustice.

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