Public Evaluations of the South African Presidents

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:_____ Date:_____

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the nature of public evaluations of the presidents of South Africa over time. It consists of two statistically explorative components; a descriptive analysis which looks at the nature of Presidential Approval, and a multivariate analysis which tests competing hypothesis. Using IDASA and Afrobarometer data from 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 and 2015, this thesis tests an Identity hypothesis, a Performance Evaluation hypothesis and a Cognitive Awareness hypothesis to determine which factors predict approval levels of the president. Findings indicate that South Africans are more likely to make use of low-information reasoning when ascribing support than to use their cognitive awareness of current affairs. There is an indication that South Africans who share an identity with the president are more likely to approve of the president- especially in recent years. However, South Africans are rational people who are more likely to base their approval of the president on how the government performs and how they perceive the economy.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In 2014 the African National Congress (ANC) won their fifth successive term as South Africa's ruling party, which meant that their party leader, Jacob Zuma, became South Africa's sixth democratic president. Yet, prior to his election in 2009, the South African news media was rife with criticism of Zuma over rape charges laid against him, his views of women, his polygamous beliefs, and his involvement in the South African arms deal saga (Feinstein, 2007: 216-225). Despite these allegations not only did the ANC garner high levels of voting support in 2009 and 2014 with Zuma as its leader, but Zuma has been seen as a highly popular leader- often referred to as "the populist" by academics and media alike (BBC, n.d. and Pascal Zachary, 2009).

By 2013, when former South African President Nelson Mandela passed away, it seemed as though South Africans had changed their minds about President Zuma. He was met with widespread boos across a packed First National Bank (FNB) stadium in Johannesburg whenever he made an appearance on the stadium's big screen. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, on the other hand, received a high level of applause and cheering, despite having been seen as widely unpopular prior to and shortly after being asked to resign ahead of the end of his second presidential term in 2008.

This manifestation of a change in attitudes towards these two presidents raises interesting questions about the South African people and their political attitudes. On what basis do South Africans decide whether they approve or disapprove of their president? What role do external influences have on South Africans, for example, the role of news media (which at times may seem the most critical of Jacob Zuma)? Do they internalise or ignore what they hear or read, or do they focus on other factors, such as the performance of the president's government and their ability to deliver macro- and micro-economic goods and services? Finally, do they

consider personal characteristics and traits such as race, gender, or ethnicity of themselves and their leader?

Alternative explanations/theories argue that even if people are not fully informed or sophisticated (or educated), they base their evaluations on low level reasoning. To which extent does "sophistication" play a role in the shaping of South Africans' evaluations of the president? Additionally, how have any of these factors changed over time? Do people use the same criteria or do they change them depending on the incumbent i.e. have evaluations of former Presidents Thabo Mbeki, and Nelson Mandela been shaped differently to that of Jacob Zuma?

The South African Context – Shaping the South African Mind

South Africa has a pluralistic and heterogeneous society. This means that South Africa has a range of social cleavages that, literature has told us, ought to take precedence in public opinion research. These social cleavages are born out of the separatist nature of pre-colonial, colonial and Apartheid South Africa.

Daryl Glaser (2000) has argued that South African racial and ethnical order has been defined by a number of historical factors. Whilst the existence of racism was already entrenched in European society before landing on South African shores, there were a specific set of occurrences that allowed racial and ethnical cleavages to become firmly entrenched in South Africa. Upon settling in South Africa, European settlers were met with their first problem when trying to establish a land-extensive economy- the lack of labourers. This problem was solved by bringing in non-European slaves and using indigenous Khoisan. These labour relations formed the basis of the initial race-based hierarchy. Glaser also argued that the racial attitudes formed amongst the Dutch-Afrikaners through their isolation from other societal groups, the continuing existence of the Griqua people and their lasting identity, the

forced instillation of Christianity (and the accompanying idea of "normality"), as well as the role of British capitalism in dispossessing blacks, all had a unique contribution towards establishing a racial and ethnical hierarchy in South Africa (Glaser, 2000: 6-20).

This racial hierarchy became further entrenched with the introduction of Apartheid. The Apartheid era can be defined as a period of "racial segregation, separate development of the different groups, preservation of white Afrikaner identity, white political domination, exploitation of cheap black labour, or the maintenance of the capitalist system" (Roberts, 1994:54). Some Apartheid laws made a deeper impact than others and formed the basis for the development of more complex laws and a more complex society.

The basis of all Apartheid laws lay in the Population Registration Act 1950 which stated that South Africans were to be assigned to racial groups (black, white, indian, or coloured) based upon physical and linguistic characteristics (Seekings, 2008: 3 and Roberts, 1994: 54). These racial groups determined what people could do, where they did it and with whom. Even though the Population Registration Act did not state that one race group was better or more privileged than another, it formed the basis of other racially discriminatory legislation.

Despite forming the largest proportion of the country, black South Africans were harshly discriminated against in every way. The most obvious (and oldest) form of discrimination took place in the labour market. Major sectors such as mining and agriculture saw the introduction of migrant labour systems and the "colour bar", notions which influenced other sectors of the South African labour market. Essentially, this meant that non-white South Africans rarely made more than white South Africans, and the possibility of upward mobility was severely stunted (Glaser, 2000: 42 – 48, and Johnstone, 1970: 125-135). The difference in wages earned amongst different racial groups had obvious consequences in terms of what different groups could afford such as material possession and general livelihood.

The living conditions of different population groups varied substantially. The Group Areas Act 1950 enforced the relocation of groups to areas that were outlined by government as appropriate to that group. It meant that areas close to urban centres were marked as "white" territories, whereas areas along the periphery and rural areas were marked as liveable places for Indians, Coloureds and Black. The living conditions in areas marked for white South Africans were considerably better than other areas. A lack of infrastructure and government input in non-white areas meant that these areas were severely under-developed (Nelson Mandela Centre for Memory, n.d.)

Legislation also impacted the type of education received by various race groups. The Bantu Education Act 1953 was passed under the recommendation of the Commission of Native Education. In terms of institutional structures, what this meant was that control of black schools and syllabi was centralised in Pretoria. In 1963 and 1965, the Coloured Persons Education and Indian Education Acts were respectively passed. These Acts transferred the control of Coloured education to the Department of Coloured Affairs and Indian education to the Department of Indian Affairs (Molteno, 1984: 88-94). The aim of the syllabi for Black, Indian and Coloured education was to ensure that people within these race groups were educated in the direction and to the level that suited the ruling government. As Frank Molteno states;

> "[t]hey aimed to dwarf the minds of black children by conditioning them to servitude. Like the segregation and inferior schooling before it, the new system was intended to prepare black children for the subordinated positions that awaited them in such a way that they were appropriately equipped with limited skills as well as ready to resign themselves to exploitation." (Molteno, 1984: 94)

What this indicates is that the ruling National Party aimed to educate black South Africans enough to run homelands, but not enough to threaten the job security of white working class South Africans (Molteno, 1984:94). Levels of education amongst these groups remained either limited or low. Non-white South Africans were able to receive an education that reared them towards unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Employment prospects were often severely limited to lower wage paying jobs.

The impact left by the Population Registration Act, Group Areas Act, Bantu Education Act, as well as other laws not mentioned above, ensured that today South Africans have different perceptions based upon their individual histories. Apartheid firmly entrenched racial cleavages, ethnical cleavages, regional cleavages, and class cleavages. Economically, South Africa has one of the most unequal societies in the world- evident by the high Gini-coefficient of 65 out of 100, according to the latest World Bank data[1]. What this means is that there is a small minority of rich South Africans and a large proportion of the society that is poverty ridden. Whilst during the Apartheid era race and economic inequality were strictly correlated, current South African economic inequality and race are strongly, but not perfectly, correlated. According to Natrass and Seekings (2001), in 1993 the richest decile in South Africa earned half the total household income, whilst the bottom four deciles earned less than 10% of total household income. Also, 90% of the poorest 60% of households were black, whilst 75% of the richest decile were white (Natrass and Seekings, 2001: 46-49). What this indicates is that the majority of South African people exited Apartheid being extremely poor, and in need better economic and living conditions.

Socially, there were obvious marks left by Apartheid. Whilst it was easier to remove the formal institutions of Apartheid, it is harder to remove the attitudes shaped by Apartheid. The racial hierarchy is still entrenched in the minds of many South Africans. According to the

[1] Data available at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9

South African Human Rights Commission there have been over 500 reported cases of racist incidences in South Africa in the year proceeding July 2014 (News24, 2014). These do not include unreported cases. Many South Africans continue to live racially and culturally separate and homogenous lifestyles as a result of the lack of regional migration and perhaps even as a result of cultural preservation.

Since the end of Apartheid, we saw an interesting manifestation of political attitudes in South Africa. The ANC became the leading political party, gaining a majority vote in every election since the first democratic election in 1994 (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009: 25-27). Following its formation in the early 20th century, the ANC as an organisation became a leader in the fight against Apartheid and the fight for equal rights for black South Africans. They led some of the most prominent passive and active resistance campaigns from its inception in 1912 to the fall of Apartheid. Some of their most noteworthy efforts include the Defiance Campaign, which called for mass non-violent civil disobedience, and the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military arm of the ANC which carried out acts of sabotage. Following the fall of Apartheid, the ANC became a key player in negotiations for a new South Africa. In the first free national election of 1994, it stood as one of the parties running for governing power, and won with an overwhelming 62.6% majority (African National Congress, n.d.). Given the role the ANC played in the liberation of black South Africans, it is no surprise that many black South Africans have a deep-rooted loyalty to the party.

It is for this reason that research following the 1994 election delved into the racial cleavages that exist in voting behaviour. Many have found that race has been a strong predictor of voting behaviour, especially for black and white South Africans. Though they did not prove that black and white South Africans exclusively voted for specific parties, they prove that there was a higher likelihood that people of a specific race would vote for specific parties (Ferree, 2006:803).

Voting behaviour studies touch on the complicated and entangled nature of South African political attitudes. For one thing, each political party had its own racial or even ethnic support base- such as parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which was established by Zulu Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his fellow patriots (Inkatha Freedom Party, n.d.). By the end of Apartheid the racial hierarchy had been well entrenched in the minds and everyday lifestyle of South Africans. These divisions were further entrenched in the physical boundaries that separated people during Apartheid, and continued to separate people in the new South Africa owing to restricted relocation into spaces typically occupied by members of a different race.

What is obvious is that the past has affected the way South Africans live their lives. However, since becoming democratic, does it also influence the way South Africans make decisions? Are South Africans still bound under the mentality crafted under the colonial and Apartheid regimes, or do they think more critically and rationally when expressing their opinions? Can the same be said for the way South Africans approve or disapprove of the president? Do people who approve of the president fall within a specific category, or is approval of the president an arbitrary decision made by individuals?

Research Question

Given what we know about South Africans, do things such as race, ethnicity, where they come from or which party they support play a role in how they evaluate the president? Or are they able to hold leaders or government accountable for their actions. This leads me to ask the following research question:

On what factors do South Africans base their evaluations of the performance of the president?

This may be further divided into sub-questions such as do South Africans hold their leaders accountable for government performance? Or are evaluations still shaped by factors derived from South African history? What is the best explanation of presidential approval? Why do some South Africans approve of presidential performance while others are more critical?

More importantly, what would answering these questions tell us about South Africans? What does this mean for South African society and research in general? Given what we know about South African society and African political science literature, we might assume that South Africans are more likely to use some part of their identity to ascribe support for the president. If this is the case, it means that I will confirm existing political science theories grounded in identity politics. It would mean that South African minds are still influenced by the ghost of Apartheid. It would mean that despite government and civil society's efforts since 1994 to ensure that South Africa became the open and inclusive rainbow nation, South Africans are still a divided people in terms of their thinking and rationale.

If I find, instead, that South Africans look around them and consider whether things are going well- thereby giving the president a score based upon how well he or his government are doing- it tells us that contrary to popular understanding, South Africans make rational based choices. This would mean that South African society has moved away from being considered as a traditional society and is more modern.

I may also find that South Africans simply look at the man and make a decision. Since 1994, South Africa has had three elected presidents. Each president has differed in perceived character, and performance. At the broader level, Nelson Mandela was seen as "the father of the nation", Thabo Mbeki as the "intellectual", and Jacob Zuma as the "populist" (Battersby, 1999, Ciulla, 2004: 120, Adebajo, 2010: 179-180 and Robins, 2008: 416). Perhaps people based their evaluations upon who the president was, giving constant levels of approval

because they were who they were. This would raise important questions (and answers) about the South African people and what it takes to please them, as a leader. Perhaps, it may even provide future leaders with an idea of who their target audience is.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Presidential and Prime Ministerial popularity has been thoroughly covered in western literature. The variation and complexity of this study has been evident since it rose to prominence in the 1970s. What I aim to do in my literature review is to unpack the history of this topic so that it may inform the direction of my study. I will also address the ideas and themes present in public opinion literature specific to South Africa. In so doing, I will be able to specify particular gaps in the literature that are specific to the South African context. In having this two-fold review approach, I will be able to not only assess which relevant issues have been addressed and where the gap in the literature lies, but we may also have an indication of which variables are important for the purpose of this study.

Presidential Popularity

The study of presidential popularity has been well documented in the United States. The majority of literature makes use of the Gallup Poll to do descriptive, macro-level analyses of presidential popularity. The use of the Gallup Poll has been disputed amongst academics for its ability (or lack thereof) to predict voting behaviour. Lee Sigelman states that one may use the Gallup Polls if the survey was conducted at a time that was close to the elections (Sigelman, 1979: 532-533). Nonetheless, whilst the voting predictability of the Gallup Poll may be questioned, it is an accurate portrayal of presidential popularity levels in the United States at the point of survey.

A large body of the literature is dedicated to discussing the cyclical model of presidential approval. Although there are a variety of variables considered to play a role in proving this hypothesis, the basic consensus is that all presidents experience their highest levels of approval following their election into office (referred to as the "Honeymoon period"),

followed by decreases in approval until the latter half of their term, where it would have reached its lowest point. Thereafter, approval rises slightly until the end of their term. At the most basic level, it has been argued that presidential popularity is a function of time and the president is a "passive observer of his down-sliding popularity" (Mueller, 1970: 25 and Stimson, 1976:1, 5-6, 9-10). However, various authors have argued that it cannot simply be time that influences presidential popularity, but rather what happens during that time.

There are two arguments which have dominated presidential popularity literature in trying to prove why the cyclical model exists. The first argument is that presidential popularity is a function of events which occur during each presidency. Mueller (1973) discusses four variables in detail, namely; "The Coalition-of-minorities" variable, where he proposes that if the president alienates enough minorities, he may develop an opposition big enough to lead to his defeat; "The Rally-round-the-flag" variable, which looks at the phenomena of events which lead to an increase in patriotism and subsequently, an increase in levels of presidential approval; "The Economic Slump" variable, where he uses the unemployment rate as an indicator for economic conditions, stating that increases in unemployment lead to decreases in approval, but not vice-versa; and "The War" variable, which indicates that as wars progress, levels of approval decrease. In his study he conducts a multiple regression analysis to ascertain if any variable is a significant predictor of presidential approval (Mueller, 1973: 196-217). The conclusion is that as the presidency progresses, opinions surrounding these events are influencing the levels of approval the president receives, and this manifests in increasing and fluctuating levels of approval.

The second argument is that presidential popularity is a function of expectation and disillusionment. This perception is grounded in the argument that all presidents have high levels of approval which can be attributed to the misperceptions of the public- as a result of ill-informed high expectation- and not the president. These "unrealistic early expectations

ensure the inevitability of later disillusionment" leading to a body of literature branded as Expectation/Disillusionment Theories (Stimson, 1976:1, 5-6, 9-10). It is also argued that levels of "sophistication" – or rather levels of education- act as another independent variable which may influence expectation and disillusionment. More importantly, when sophistication was introduced as a variable, authors found that lower levels of sophistication led to a substantial decrease in approval (Presser and Converse, 1976-77: 538-539).

As expected, the literature did not go uncontested. Sigelman and Knight argued that the macro-level analysis of expectation/disillusionment using the Gallup poll was not an accurate representation of actual expectation and disillusionment. They claim that the only effective way to measure the Expectation/Disillusionment theory is to seek what expectations the public had- which cannot be efficiently done with cross-national surveys. They proceed to use the CBS News/New York Times Polls, which contain that same question as the Gallup Survey ("do you approve of the president…"), yet asks questions such as "Do you think [the incumbent] will or will not be able to… [series of questions follow]" (Sigelman and Knight, 1983: 314-316). Using this framework, they established that at the macro level, the data indicated parallels between expectation and approval. At the individual level, they found that specific issues performed differently in a correlation analysis with approval but were all statistically significant (Sigelman and Knight, 1983: 318-322). Other criticism surrounded the definition of the economy, which they thought was faulty, and the exclusion "hard" economic indicators. Kernell, instead, argues two main propositions. That, a) contemporary events and conditions effect short-term evaluations, and b) current popularity is based upon a reflection upon previous months (Kernell, 1978: 509-517).

A key aspect of presidential studies that Kernell brought to light is the notion of economic influences on presidential popularity. A large body of research was dedicated to studying the effects of hard economic indicators such as unemployment, inflation and real income growth on presidential popularity. The understanding is that economic conditions produce a lagged effect that influences popularity levels of presidents, because people make the rational choice of having approval of a president when conditions are good and disapproving when conditions are bad. The president is seen as a key role-player in determining economic conditions and therefore is held accountable when things are going badly (Norpoth and Yantek, 1983: 788). Other studies have expanded on this notion by introducing potentially important variables, such as current events, which together with the hard economic indicators, produce a stronger predicting model for presidential approval (Mackuen, 1983: 166-179).

Prime Ministerial Popularity

What has to be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the South African president is that even though he has the title "president", he is elected in a manner similar to that of the prime minister. South Africans vote for a political party, not a president. Logically, the situation is relatively different to that of the United States because the results cannot be interpreted in the same manner (for instance, one cannot use popularity results of the prime minister to determine potential voting behaviour). However, the importance is not diminished. In the past twenty years, there has been a development in literature on "Presidentialisation"; a term which is defined as "the movement over time away from collective to personalised government, movement away from a pattern of governmental and electoral politics dominated by political party towards one where the party leader becomes a more autonomous political force" (Mughan, 2000: 7). This indicates that there is an increasing significance of the head of government.

The literature which focusses on prime ministerial approval looks at the prospects of the prime minister having any effect on levels of party support and whether prime ministerial evaluations have any place in analyses. The majority of studies use prime ministerial popularity as an independent variable which influences levels of party support. Various authors argue that the prime minister is used as a short-cut in decision-making by voters. The literature highlights that, even though prime ministers (or in South Africa's case, the president) are not directly elected into their position by the voter, they play a significant role in the decision-making process for potential voters. Therefore, analysing the ways in which people evaluate leaders in this position still has important consequences (Denver and Garnett, 2012: 57, Heffernan, 2005: 53, Evans and Andersen, 2005: 818, and Clarke, Ho and Stewart, 2000: 257-267). The other arm of this debate focuses on the fact that, regardless of their personalities, prime ministers (as a variable of measurement) cannot stand alone. Instead, they have to be understood in terms of a political, social and economic context (Heffernan, 2005: 605).

The Analyses of South African Presidents

The literature on prime ministers indicates that there is a space for the analysis of a head of state in the context of South African governance. Since South Africa was declared a Republic in 1961, the country has had six recognised prime ministers (Smuts, Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd, Vorster, and Botha) and six presidents (Botha, de Klerk, Mandela, Mbeki, Motlanthe, and Zuma), although PW Botha served as both a prime Minister and president as the position of Prime Minister was abolished in 1984 (The Presidency, n.d.). Some of these presidents and prime ministers were studied both quantitatively and qualitatively. The latter method has received greater attention over time.

Perhaps the closest academics and researchers have come to a theoretical analysis of presidents that includes "variables" is when a conceptual framework was employed to

analyse political leadership. Geldenhuys and Kotze (1985 and 1991) analysed P.W. Botha and F.W. de Klerk's style of leadership using Margaret Hermann's conceptual framework of decision-makers/leaders. In the studies, they look at decisions previously made and match them to the framework in an aim to possibly determine the types of decisions that will be made in future (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1985: 30-34; and 1991: 20-21). Whilst the study includes some elements of why the president could be considered popular based on personality, it provides no substantive evidence that indicates how popular the president was.

Quantitative studies of presidential approval in South Africa seems to be limited to descriptive analyses. A perfect example would be the study by Paul Graham and Carmen Alpin (2012) on the levels of approval of Jacob Zuma (Using 2011 Round 5 of Afrobarometer), which made some interesting, yet predictable, findings. In the case of partisanship, they found that ANC supporters had the highest levels of approval for Jacob Zuma, whilst the DA supporters had the lowest levels of approval. They also found that high levels of poverty influenced levels of approval, as respondents who experienced the highest levels of poverty showed the lowest levels of approval (Graham and Alpin, 2012: 2-7). Even though the study of presidents in South Africa is limited, there are other studies which have been conducted in South Africa and Africa which may also be helpful to look at.

Voting Behaviour and Performance Evaluation

The most prevalent study of public evaluations in South Africa is the topic of voting behaviour. Most studies indicate that choice of party is driven by race and partisanship, although recent literature suggests a movement away from race, towards other factors. Pierre Du Toit indicates that race, partisanship and voting behaviour are strongly correlated in the 1994 elections, with some indications that race is, rather, an indication of identity rather than the "race" as colour (Du Toit, 2009). Norris and Mattes explore the role of ethnicity in support for the governing party. They do so by using Afrobarometer data to determine levels

of partisanship, which they conclude are relatively ethnically related (Norris and Mattes, 2003: 1). Ferree looks at the race question, and explores two hypotheses; 1) that "racial voting results as voters use the ballot box to express their identities as members of racial groups", and 2) "explains racial voting through non-racial factors" (performance and policy evaluation) (Ferree, 2006: 803). Habib and Naidu analyse the aspects of race, identity and social status or income, as predictors for electoral behaviour (Habib and Naidu, 2006).

There seems to be an indication that, given South Africa's history, identity shapes the way South Africans think and behave. Horowitz (1985) claims that individuals express support for members of the same ethnic group, irrespective of the leader's party affiliation or who its leader is. According to John Dunn, people seek someone to represent them "perfectly as individuals". In the absence of a perfect fit, they will settle for someone who is as similar as possible. This means that political leaders are often able to rely on consistent support from members of the same ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985: 294-320). This concept of ascribing support on the basis of ethnicity is referred to as the study of co-ethnicity; supporting an individual because they are a co-ethnic[2]. In poorer societies, voters do not have the means to do research on political parties and candidates. Instead, they will regard the co-ethnic as someone who understands their wants and needs and therefore will represent them i.e. identifying the co-ethnic is the cheapest form of information gathering (Hislope, 2005: 578).

There is another body of literature that argues that information gathering which informs political behaviour is more complex to understand than the co-ethnic hypothesis would suggest. Lodge and Hamill (1986: 505-506) argue that every person has an "effective cognitive framework" which influences the way they process information, and consequently, the decisions they make. This framework is developed through "sophistication" i.e. the levels of education of the individual. The sophistication argument has been further developed

[2] For more on co-ethnicity, refer to Habyarimana et al, 2007; Robinson, 2009; and Chandra, 2006

through work suggesting that in addition to people's level of education, what drives levels of regime support is their awareness of public affairs (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 35-36). Even if people are poorly informed, they are still able to use "low information reasoning" by drawing from immediate circumstances to arrive at short-term economic and political performance evaluations (Bratton and Mattes, 2007: 199).

Another body of literature that looks at the fact that people draw from their circumstances to reach conclusions is that surrounding economic performance evaluations. Whilst in western literature researchers were able to explore this hypothesis in the form of the expectation/disillusionment theory, in Africa, the concept of economic performance evaluation was explored as a more straight-forward performance evaluation (testing expectation/disillusionment requires a longitudinal panel study which is unavailable in Africa at present). The theory on performance evaluations is grounded in rational choice. It contends that if people believe that they are receiving material benefits from politicians or governing systems they will offer higher levels of support for these politicians or governing systems. These material benefits include economic goods, and basic social services (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 42-43). In voting behaviour, this phenomenon is referred to as "pocketbook voting" – where voters give support for a party or person based upon what they have gained or stand to gain from that person or party being in office (Elinder, Jordahl and Poutvaara, 2008: 1).

The last form of performance evaluation I would like to discuss is the theory of the Gender Gap. The Gender Gap can be defined as an all-encompassing occurrence within political science where men and women have differing opinions on a multitude of political issues (Inglehart and Norris, 2000:422). The basis of this argument is that women are less likely to be proponents of an aggressive style of politics, such as going to war with others, and are

more likely to approve of physical, emotional and economic security (Box-Steffensmeier et al, 2004:516).

Inglehart and Norris (2000) argue that there are three types of gender gaps that have arisen in societies based upon their level development; the traditional gender gap- where women are perceived to be generally more conservative (right) in their political stance than men-, the pattern of "gender dealignment"- where women and men had little difference in opinion, more particularly towards voting behaviour and partisanship- and the modern gender gap which shows a pattern of gender realignment- this takes place in post-industrial societies and sees women as being more liberal (left) than men. South Africa is classified as a developmental society in their analysis, and therefore is placed under the group that ought to have a traditional gender gap, where women are more conservative than men, according to Inglehart and Norris' theory. The ANC describes itself as a social democratic, centre-left party. As a representative of this party, each South African president may serve as a symbol of the centre-left ANC. There are certain events during each presidency that could provide as a catalyst to existing leftist ideology, and it is during these times that we expect to see even greater difference between men and women.

Conclusion

The literature review indicates that there is indeed a lack of research on presidential or prime ministerial popularity in Africa and South Africa. In particular, there is a lack of quantitative studies and especially multivariate studies on this topic. However, I find that Western literature, and especially presidential studies in the USA has laid an adequate foundation for the field of presidential/prime ministerial studies. In addition, performance evaluation and voting behaviour research in Africa and South Africa has revealed some interesting and noteworthy factors which need to be considered when addressing popularity and approval studies in South Africa. I will draw from some of the predictor variables mentioned in these

studies which are relevant to South Africa and, using the available data, try to answer my own research questions.

Research Hypotheses

Given the literature and what I know about South Africa, I have three hypotheses which I will test in this thesis. I will call them the Identity hypothesis, the Performance Evaluations hypothesis and the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis. Each hypothesis is grounded in pre-existing theories of approval or evaluation. I intend to use these theories to guide my research.

The Identity Hypothesis:

The first hypothesis I will be testing is the Identity hypothesis. Given what we know about South Africa I expect that identity plays a strong role in people's evaluations. Drawing from previous studies of co-ethnicity, I will test a co-identity hypothesis. I anticipate that I should be able to test if South Africans share an identity trait with the president in any given year they will be more likely to approve of him. Given this logic, my main hypothesis is:

> H1: *South Africans evaluate the president based upon whether they are a co-ethnic of the president.*

I use the word co-ethnic, but this includes ethnicity, race, gender, where they come from, and their partisanship. For H1 to be true, I should find a positive relationship between Presidential Approval and all of my independent co-identity variables in a given survey year.

The Performance Evaluations Hypothesis:

My second hypothesis is based upon the performance evaluation work of Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi. This hypothesis would be a contending hypothesis to the Identity hypothesis because it would argue that people have moved beyond thinking about evaluations on the basis of who is leading and are now making rational choices about what they have and what

the president and his government is offering. We would expect that if South Africans are rational, when they believe that government is performing well in terms of the economy and social services, there should be a higher likelihood of there being higher levels of approval for the president. Using their logic, my second hypothesis is:

> H2: *South Africans evaluate the president based upon their perception of government's performance on economic conditions and their perception of the economy.*

I refer to economic conditions, but this is an umbrella term to encompass macro-economic conditions, social services, and their ability to protect the economy to some degree. For H2 to be true, I should find a positive relationship between both performance evaluation variables and my dependent variable. Once again, I hope to find that the hypothesis stands for each year analysed.

<u>The Cognitive Awareness Hypothesis:</u>

My third hypothesis moves away from people considering who they are and what they have, and moves towards what people know. With the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis, I will be testing if differing levels of education, news media usage and political discussion with others presents as differing levels of approval. In fact, we may argue that highly educated and highly informed individuals ought to have the ability to analyse political events more critically (owning to their having a wider range of facts to draw from), and therefore be more critical of the president or hold him accountable for his actions (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005: 40-41). I will test this hypothesis by determining if the level of education has an impact on levels of approval. Secondly, I will test whether the respondent's use of media resources influences the way the decisions they make. Lastly, I will look at the level of political discussion the respondent engages in. Therefore my third hypothesis I will be testing is:

H3: *South Africans evaluate the president based upon their cognitive awareness*.

For H3 to be true, I expect to find that each variable significantly related to my independent variable in each year analysed. Owing to the two streams of thought demonstrated in my logic, I am not looking for both a positive or negative significant relationship between my dependent and independent variables.

Research Design

In order to conduct my multivariate analysis of Presidential Approval, I will use cross-sectional data in the form of an IDASA Diversity Study from 1997, and Afrobarometer data from 2000 to 2015. This consists of Round 1 (2000), Round 2 (2002), Round 2.5 (2004), Round 3 (2006), Round 4 (2008), Round 5 (2011) and Round 6 (2015) data. According to their website, "Afrobarometer is an African-led, non-partisan survey research project that measures citizen attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, civil society, and other topics". Furthermore, the IDASA diversity study was considered to be one of three projects that later led to the formation of Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer, n.d.).

Concepts and Measurement

Using the IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys, I draw from specific questions to match up to concepts I have created to test my hypotheses. The dependant variable is "Presidential Approval". Presidential Approval will be measured with the question in all surveys that asks respondents "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? [The incumbent]". This question is consistently measured by asking respondents whether they "Strongly Disapprove", "Disapprove", "Approve", "Strongly Approve" or "Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough to Say". For the purpose of this study, I will have excluded Don't Know responses.

The independent variables are a set of factors that help to test the hypotheses. In this case, the independent variables for the Identity hypothesis are Co-race, Co-ethnicity, Co-gender, Co-region and Co-partisan. The independent variables for the Performance Evaluation hypothesis are Macro-Economic Goods and Social Services. The independent variables for the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis are Education, Media Usage in the form of Newspaper usage, Television usage and Radio usage, and Political Discussion.

To test the Identity hypothesis, I created five dichotomous variables to represent the Co-identity characteristics. Each variable changes depending on the president of the year in question. In each year, 0 represents the other respondents and 1 represents the Co-identity variable. Table 2.1 indicates what the Co-identity variable looks like in each year. With the 0-1 coding, what we expect is that the higher score will mean a movement towards being more co-ethnic, co-racial etc. with the president. This makes it easier to read the Beta coefficients as we can read a positive Beta coefficient as a positive relationship between the co-identity variable and Presidential Approval, and a negative Beta coefficient indicates a negative relationship.

Table 2.1: Co-identity categories for South Africa Presidents 1997-2015

	1997 Nelson Mandela	2000 Thabo Mbeki	2002 Thabo Mbeki	2004 Thabo Mbeki	2006 Thabo Mbeki	2008 Thabo Mbeki	2011 Jacob Zuma	2015 Jacob Zuma
Co-Race	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black	Black
Co-Ethnicity	Xhosa	Xhosa	Xhosa	Xhosa	Xhosa	Xhosa	Zulu	Zulu
Co-Gender	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male	Male
Co-Region	Eastern Cape	Eastern Cape	Eastern Cape	Eastern Cape	Eastern Cape	Eastern Cape	Kwa-Zulu Natal	Kwa-Zulu Natal
Co-Partisan	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC	ANC

To test the Performance Evaluation hypothesis, I will use the two concepts referred to by Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi – Macro-Economic Goods and Social Services. A third concept which I will call "Economic Safety" will also be tested. These concepts will be measured using survey items that measure government's ability to handle a specific set of responses as set out by the Afrobarometer surveys. Each question item is measured on a four point scale- Very Badly, Fairly Badly, Fairly Well, and Very Well. Unfortunately, data is unavailable to test this hypothesis in 1997.

Additionally, to ensure reliability of the measurement, I have chosen variables that are consistently used in all rounds analysed. Lastly, I filtered out variables that did not match the concepts. Appendix I shows the question items that have been selected for the analysis based upon their availability in all rounds. I then tested the factorability of the ten items which remained using the 2015 R6 data. I found that every item correlated with at least one other item in the analysis, which may suggest reasonable factorability (See Appendix II). The

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.88, which is commonly accepted as a great and well above the recommended measure of 0.6, and the Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant (χ^2 (45) =7327.42, $p<0.001$). The communalities of all variables were above zero, indicating that each item shared common variance with another (see Appendix III). This information indicates that a factor analysis will be useful for these items.

A factor analysis was conducted using the Maximum Likelihood method of extraction and a Direct Oblimin rotation. The results indicated that there were two factors with initial Eigenvalues over 1. The first factor accounted for 41.96% of the variance and the second factor accounted for 14.09% of the variance. Appendix IV indicates how each of the ten items loaded on to one of the two factors. However, I do believe that Reducing Crime and Fighting Corruption is not a conceptual match to "Macro-Economic Goods" and, instead, should be captured in a third concept "Economic Safety". To ensure that my concepts convert into reliable indices, I conducted a reliability analysis of the three concepts. The analysis indicated that all three measures were reliable, as seen in Table 2.2, which also contains the question items which will form each index.

Table 2.2: Question items measuring Macro-Economic Goods, Social Services, and Economic Safety

Concept	Question Item	Cronbach's Alpha
Macro-Economic Goods	Managing the Economy	.78
	Creating Jobs	
	Keeping Prices Down	
	Narrowing Income Gaps	
Social Services	Improving Basic Health Services	.75
	Addressing Educational Needs	
	Providing Water and Sanitation Services	
	Distributing Welfare Payments To Those Who Are Entitled	
Economic Safety	Reducing Crime	.64
	Fighting Corruption	

Lastly, I will test a fourth concept called "Economic Perception". I will test people's perception of the country's economy by creating an index consisting of three questions measured in Afrobarometer. The first question measures South Africans' perception of the economy at the point of survey. It asks people to rate "The present economic conditions of this country". The responses range from "Very Good", "Fairly Good", "Neither Good nor Bad", "Fairly Bad", to "Very Bad". The second and third question asks South Africans to "rate economic conditions in this country compared to twelve months ago" and whether they "expect economic conditions in this country to be better or worse in twelve months' time"[3]. The responses range from "much worse", "worse", "same", "better" and "much better". All three questions are measured on a Likert scale with the middle option indicating neutrality. I

[3] Wording based upon Afrobarometer R6 survey

conducted a reliability analysis of the three question items and the Cronbach's Alpha = .65, indicating that the index is a reliable measure of one concept.

The third, Cognitive Awareness hypothesis will be tested using four question items to measure Media Usage, Education and Political Discussion. Media Usage will be measured with three items. These questions measure the frequency of using newspapers, radio, and television, measuring frequency as "Never", "Less than once a month", "A few times a month", "A few times a week", or "Everyday". Education is measured from (0) No formal schooling to (9) Post-Graduate education. Political Discussion will be measured with responses indicating that respondents (0) Never, (1) Occasionally or (2) Frequently discuss politics with others. Table 2.3 indicates which question items where used from the IDASA and Afrobarometer Surveys. I have used the wording which has been most frequently used in all surveys.

Table 2.3: Dependent Variables

Hypothesis	Concept		Afrobarometer Survey Item(s)
Identity	Race	Item	Respondent's Race
	Ethnicity	Item	What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?
	Region	Item	Region/Province
	Partisanship	Item	Which party is that?
	Gender	Item	Respondent's Gender
Performance Evaluation	Macro-Economic	Index	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't heard enough to say? - Managing the Economy - Creating Jobs - Keeping prices Down - Narrowing Income Gaps
	Social Services	Index	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't heard enough to say? - Improving Basic Health Services - Addressing Educational Needs - Providing Water and Sanitation - Combatting HIV/AIDS - Distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them (such as old age pensions, disability pensions, child support grants)
	Economic Safety	Index	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't heard enough to say? - Reducing Crime - Fighting Corruption
	Economic Perception	Construct	How would you describe the present economic condition of this country?

			Looking back, how do you rate the economic conditions in this country compared to twelve months ago? Looking ahead, do you expect economic conditions in this country to be better or worse in twelve months' time?
Cognitive Awareness	Education	Item	What is the highest level of education you have completed?
	Radio Usage	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources? - Radio
	Television Usage	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources? - Television
	Newspaper Usage	Item	How often do you get news from the following sources? - Newspapers
	Political Discussion	Item	How often do you discuss politics and government with other people?

Questionnaire design and comparability

There are a few issues related to the IDASA and Afrobarometer surveys that I would like to clarify as they may have an impact on results or the ability to compare findings across years. The first issue, which has already been mentioned, is the fact that questions measuring government's ability to handle certain things is not measured in the IDASA survey. Therefore, the Performance Evaluation hypothesis will only be tested between 2000 and 2015, and across two presidencies.

The second issue pertains to the measure of Ethnicity across surveyed years. In Round 1 and Round 2, Ethnicity is not consistently measured as in other years. In R1, they asked South Africans "Besides being South African, which group do you feel you belong to"? Responses ranged from ethnic, linguistic, religious or racial identities, to economic standing/occupation

("middle class" or "teacher"), position relative to the community ("traditional leader") or even position relative to the household ("housewife") to mention a few. This does mean that there is room for overlap- a respondent can be a "black" "African" "xhosa" and "Christian", yet all of these groups are represented separately. In R2, Ethnicity is not measured at all. I do want to stick to keeping the concept of Ethnicity because of its historical significance. However, because of the lack of or unreliability of data in R1 and R2, I will use a proxy measure in those two rounds. I did a crosstabulation of Ethnicity and Language in Rounds 2.5, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and found that there is a high level of overlap between these two concepts, as shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Percentage Co-ethnic respondents who spoke the co-language

Round	*% Co-ethnic that speaks Co-language*
2.5	93.2%
3	96.6%
4	97.2%
5	94.5%
6	96.0%

In any surveyed year, more than 90% of respondents who identified as the co-ethnic also indicated that they spoke the co-language, or rather, the language commonly associated with that ethnic group. Given this high level of overlap, I will use Language as Ethnicity in those two rounds.

In R2.5, the Afrobarometer had a different measurement scale for "Political Discussion". Instead of the usual three-point scale, it had a five-point scale. I have recoded the values as shown in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5: Recodes for R2.5 Political Discussion variable.

R2.5 Coding	**New codes (consistent with other rounds)**
0 No, would never do this	0 Never
1 No, but would do if I had a chance	
2 Yes, once or twice	2 Occasionally
3 Yes, several times	
4 Yes, often	3 Frequently
9 Don't Know	9 Don't Know

CHAPTER THREE

The South African presidents and the public

This chapter aims to illustrate the variation in the dependent variable Presidential Approval at the descriptive level. I aim to explore patterns and trends in Presidential Approval in relation to important economic, political and social occurrences in South Africa at a given time that may have influenced trends in approval. I will also use bivariate analysis to look at the nature of approval between various demographic groups. Nelson Mandela was the president from 1994 to 1999, Thabo Mbeki from 1999 to 2004 and then again from 2004 to 2008, when his term ended with his resignation. South Africans were still surveyed that year and asked what they thought of Mbeki. In 2009, Jacob Zuma became president and is the incumbent. Each president had moments when they seemed popular or unpopular during their term/s. The question is, do these moments translate into perceptions of the public?

According to IDASA/Afrobarometer, the levels of approval vary across the surveyed years. These levels of approval are validated by a similar trend in data generated by survey research company Ipsos-Markinor (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: % Levels of Approval of the President of South Africa[4]



In Table 3.1 I have added the percentage of respondents in the Afrobarometer and IDASA surveys who said that they "Strongly Approve" and "Approve" of the president. It is evident that Afrobarometer and Ipsos-Markinor data follows a similar trend, even if the levels of approval are not equal. The only point the two lines seem to split is in 2009, but this can be attributed to the fact that it was President Zuma's first approval rating and Afrobarometer conducted a survey only in 2011, three years later.

[4] "Markinor" percentages represent averages of surveys taken in a specific year, as they sometimes did three surveys in one year where they explored approval levels of the president, whilst "IDASA & Afrobarometer" percentages refer to both IDASA and Afrobarometer percentages.

Table 3.1: Levels of Approval of the Presidents of South Africa by President[5]

President	Year	IDASA/AB	Ipsos Markinor	AB Mean
Mandela	1995	76		73
	1996			
	1997	64		
	1998	79	80	
	1999		74	
Mbeki	2000	50	63	61
	2001		56	
	2002	51	55	
	2003		62	
	2004	73	76	
	2005		78	
	2006	77	73	
	2007		67	
	2008	55		
Zuma	2009		77	51
	2010		62	
	2011	66	61	
	2012		54	
	2013		46	
	2014		51	
	2015	36		

As Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 indicate, the highest percentage of approval received using Afrobarometer data is 79% by Nelson Mandela in 1998. The lowest Afrobarometer approval point is was 36% by Zuma in 2015. It is worth noting that in the 2006, Mbeki received the

[5] For the purpose of these statistics, "Don't Know" responses have been left out.

second highest approval percentage recorded by Afrobarometer amongst presidents at 77%. Mandela had the highest mean score during his presidency at 73%.

As mentioned in the literature review, various authors have have made attempts to explain Presidential Approval. The majority of these cases resorted to a macro-level analysis of approval and its correlation to events and conditions at that time. Three possibilities that I would like to address and explore is; that the expression of levels of approval happens in a cyclical manner (Mueller's Cyclical Model); that levels of approval often coincide with fluctuations in the economy (as Mackuen et al argued); or that people take current events into consideration when deciding on whether they like the president or not (as Kernell argued).

Figure 3.2: Approval Levels of the South African Presidents, with shaded presidential eras



The presidential periods indicate some possible support of the Cyclical model that Mueller speaks about in his book *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (1973). Whilst the question was not asked in 1994, the year Mandela was elected to the presidency, IDASA data for 1995 and 1997 indicates fairly high levels of approval (in Figure 3.2 the Mandela era is shaded in blue). Following 1995, there is a dip in approval levels (an occurrence Mueller says can be

expected following the president's election) then followed by an increase towards the end of his presidency. What we see in both surveys following the 1999 election is a steady decline in approval levels, which continues up until 2002, the middle of Mbeki's first term (Mbeki's terms are shaded in green). We then see a steady increase up until 2005 (a year after the election) in the Ipsos data and 2006 (two years after the election) in the Afrobarometer data. Following the 2009 election, we once again see an incline in support of the new president, Jacob Zuma, followed by a steep decline in support following the second election in 2014, with a slight incline on the Ipsos data (Zuma's terms are shaded in yellow). During these times we do see some evidence of the cyclical model, although it is important to note that the data Mueller uses has more data points than Afrobarometer and Ipsos because the Gallup survey is conducted more frequently.

Mueller also argued that unemployment may result in further declines- higher unemployment means lower levels of approval. Figure 3.3 indicates, it was during the highest levels of unemployment that Thabo Mbeki experienced his lowest levels of approval in 2000 and 2002. However, the evidence does not perfectly fit our expectation because in Mbeki's decline in popularity from 77% in 2006 to 55% in 2008 occurs at the same time as when South Africa experiences its lowest levels of unemployment in 10 years. Following a slight rise in unemployment between 2007 and 2010, levels of unemployment are relatively stable between 2010 and 2015. However, this is also the period where we see the greatest decline in approval levels of the president (Zuma).

Figure 3.3: Level of Unemployment in South Africa and Level of Presidential Approval in South Africa



Two other concepts which have commonly been looked at when analysing the economic environment are Inflation and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Inflation is defined as "the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising and, consequently, the purchasing power of currency is falling."[6] It is measured using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI). In this instance I will use the CPI because this measures "the rate of change in the prices of goods and services purchased by consumers" which I find more applicable when analysing the attitudes of the consumers i.e. the South African citizens (StatsSA, n.d.). What I expect to find is that when there are higher levels of Inflation, then there will be lower levels of approval of the president. As indicated in Figure 3.4, the annual average CPI inflation in 2003 and 2004 was on decline, followed by four years of increasing annual CPI inflation levels. In 2008, South Africa had their highest level of annual CPI inflation since entering into a democracy. It is evident that two of the three

[6] http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inflation.asp

approval levels within the 50%-60% category coincides with South Africa's two highest annual CPI inflation levels- 9.2% in 2002, when approval levels were 51%, and 11.5% in 2008, when approval levels were 55%. In two out of the four approval levels that lie in the 70%-80% category, inflation was at its lowest- 1.4% in 2004, when approval was at 73%, and 4.6% when approval was 77%. However, during the Mandela era, inflation was relatively high- 8.7% in 1995, 7.4% in 1996, 8.6% in 1997 and 6.9% in 1998, yet his approval levels were consistently high as well- 76% in 1995, 64% in 1997 and 79% in 1998. This may be as a result of coming out of Apartheid and recovering from economic sanctions. Another period that once again does not match our expectation is during Zuma's presidency, where we see stable CPI inflation levels ranging between 4.3% in 2010 at the lowest point and 6.4% 2014 at the highest, yet a steep decline in approval between 2011 and 2015.

Figure 3.4: % Annual average CPI inflation in South Africa and Levels of Presidential Approval in South Africa



The last economic condition that I will consider is GDP in South Africa. What I expect to find is that if the percentage GDP per capita is higher, then we will see higher levels of

approval of the president. As shown in Figure 3.5, most notable declines in annual percentage GDP growth took place between 1996 and 1998- when the Asian Financial crisis occurred- as well as between 2007 and 2009- when the Global Financial Crisis occurred. Most notable increases in annual percentage GDP would be between 1998 and 2000, the steady climb between 2003 and 2006- a probable result of GEAR- and then the sharp increase between 2009 and 2010. It seems that during Mandela era, there is no relation between approval levels and economic growth. In fact, Mandela enjoyed his highest level of support during the Asian Financial Crisis, despite the effect it had on the weakened South African economy. It does seem that at some point during Mbeki's time in office- particularly during the time of steady economic growth- that the levels of approval seem to correspond with the change in annual percentage GDP growth. It is most notable that Mbeki's fall in popularity coincides with the drop in economic growth. We see that during Zuma's terms, the rise in GDP coincides with Zuma's higher levels of approval and declines in GDP coincides with declines in approval.

Figure 3.5: % Annual GDP Growth in South Africa and Presidential Approval in South Africa



However, this does point to the importance of considering current events. We can't tell if the lower levels of approval coincides more with the weak economic performance, or with the resignation of Mbeki- which perhaps also played a role in the percentage GDP growth for that time.

Since 1994, there have been some events which, in its portrayal in the media, seemed to have a greater impact on society than others. These events were either seen as newsworthy, or they received a more intense reaction from the public, whether good or bad. Could it be that these events played a role in people's attitudes? As I have touched on in the section above, it seems that there are events that may correlate with an increase or decrease in approval levels. It is important to note that this type of analysis is better done with data that is taken more frequently. Nonetheless, we can still analyse events within a given year or period and determine whether they coincide with levels of approval.

Figure 3.6 indicates when certain newsworthy and impressing events occurred along with the levels of approval. Even though media tends to lean towards publishing negative events, I am also outlining positive events in an attempt to ensure that there is no bias towards only negative news having an effect.

Figure 3.6: Important events that occurred in South Africa and Presidential Approval in South Africa



Whilst there are many events that occur on a day to day basis that may be considered as possible triggers for changes in attitudes, I have highlighted some events that seem to have some significance when they occurred- particularly because they were highly publicised events that often dominated the news for some time. We find evidence that in years when Mbeki was highly criticised in the media- particularly for his AIDS denialism and his contestation for a third term as ANC leader (which peaked at the ANC Polokwane conference)- he seemed to slump in the ratings. We also find that when South Africa was in a tumultuous place, dealing with an electricity crisis, a global recession, xenophobic attacks, and Mbeki's resignation, approval levels were also particularly low. Similarly, we find that by 2015, when Zuma had the lowest levels of approval, the news had been dominated by the Marikana Massacre in 2012, the investigation into the misuse of state funds by Zuma (Nkandlagate), the death of Nelson Mandela (I have already highlighted the memorial service in my introduction) and another electricity crisis.

Demography of Presidential Approval

In this section, I aim to map out who in South Africa does or does not approve of the president at the bivariate level. I will break down approval ratings according to major demographic categories in an attempt to explore where approval and disapproval lies, and if there are any preliminary patterns that can be seen. As already mentioned in chapter two, voting behaviour in South Africa is said to be a racial census.

Figure 3.7: Percentage Approval of the President, ANC Vote, and ANC Vote of the Voting Age Population



Yet in Figure 3.7 we find that there is significantly less variance in the percentage of votes received by the ANC in each national election than the levels of approval of the president. Additionally, the percentage of votes the ANC receives based on the voter age population is just as stable, although on a stable decline. Either way we are finding that the levels are more stable than the levels of Presidential Approval. This indicates that I should expect to find something different to voting behaviour analysts.

Who Approves?

In Figure 3.8 below, by adding the Strongly Approve and Approve categories, I managed to produce a level of Approval by race. As a result of the small and in some years non-existent N in some years, East Asian, Arab and Other have been excluded from this graph. This table indicates that in each year, black South Africans are more likely to approve of the president than any other race. The graph indicates that approval is not a perfect racial census- in fact it is very unlikely that we would expect every black respondent to say they approve of the president. However, we do find that if the respondent is black then there is a higher likelihood that the respondent approves of the president compared to other races.

Figure 3.8: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Race



This graph also shows that up until 2004, indian and white South Africans were more likely to disapprove of the president than coloured or black respondents. 2006 saw an upsurge in approval by all races except coloured South Africans, followed by plummeting levels in 2008. This is expected, considering the previous tables we looked at showed that approval

levels drastically dropped in 2008. The same can be found in 2015 where we find all time low scores in each racial category.

Similarly, when analysing approval levels by province, I found that approval levels dropped in every province in 2008. Table 3.2 shows approval levels in each province, with increases in approval levels shaded in dark green and decreasing levels shaded in a light green. There also seemed to be a general decrease in approval in 2000, with the exception of the Northern Cape province and the Western Cape province. It seems that there is a general upward trend in most provinces between 2004 and 2006. There does not seem to be an obvious trend in a specific province- no province is more approving of all presidents than another and the responses are varied. What we do see is possible tell-tale signs of some provinces being preferring their co-regional president- something I will test for later in my multi-variate analysis. We see that even though South Africans from Kwa-Zulu Natal tend to give relatively low scores (their mean score is 59%) in 2011, they gave their highest score for homeboy Jacob Zuma (81.6%). However, it is not particularly visible that South Africans from the Eastern Cape were more approving of Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela. There are years when Thabo Mbeki has relatively low scores in the Eastern Cape. However, after 2002, Mbeki received relatively high scores in the Eastern Cape, even when he went through the 2008 slump. The Eastern Cape is also responsible for giving Jacob Zuma his lowest score- a possible indication of homeground alliances being formed.

Table 3.2: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Province

	1997	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015
Eastern Cape	61%	48%	61%	90%	87%	78%	45%	39%
Free State	75%	73%	72%	77%	98%	62%	75%	31%
Gauteng	71%	53%	36%	66%	71%	63%	64%	21%
Kwazulu Natal	56%	41%	52%	75%	68%	40%	82%	56%
Limpopo	76%	63%	72%	63%	80%	44%	72%	28%
Mpumalanga	82%	52%	62%	79%	87%	57%	82%	50%
North West	78%	46%	68%	79%	88%	59%	68%	33%
Northern Cape	54%	73%	68%	84%	89%	74%	54%	23%
Western Cape	56%	63%	47%	71%	73%	49%	46%	31%

Cells are shaded to easily identify increases and decreases in approval from one year surveyed to another. Lighter shades indicate a decrease, and darker shades indicate an increase from the previous year surveyed.

The Western Cape province is the only province that has been governed by more than one party since 1994. It is the only province that has managed to gather a sizable opposition. In 1994 it was one of two provinces that did not elect the ANC as the provincial government (the National Party won), and in the 2009 and 2014 provincial election, the Democratic Alliance has managed to win the majority of votes in the Western Cape province. One might suspect that this opposition may translate to lower levels of approval. With the exception of 2000, the Western Cape province is the only province to consistently score below the mean level of approval; however, this pattern is not particularly outstanding as there are provinces that average lower levels of approval than they do.

In this section I will try to distinguish what approval levels look like amongst ANC supporters, Opposition supporters and Apartisans-who for the purpose of this paper I will refer to as Independents. We would expect to find that ANC supporters are more supportive of their leader than opposition supporters and independents. In Afrobarometer, respondents

are asked a two part question to determine whether they support a party, and if yes, which party. I am treating respondents who said that they did not support any party or those who said that they do not know if they support any party as independents. Of those who said yes, I will divide them into two groups mentioned above; ANC supporters and opposition supporters.

Figure 3.9 tells us that a large majority of the respondents in 1997 and 2000 were independents. Thereafter, there seems to be similar numbers of ANC supporters and independents, with the exception of 2006 and 2015 where there was a larger number of ANC supporters than independents and opposition supporters.

Figure 3.9: Afrobarometer Percentage Respondents who felt close to particular political party



Figure 3.10 indicates the proportion of ANC supporters, opposition supporters and independents that approve of the president. As I expected, the proportion of ANC respondents who said that they approved of the president is higher in every year than

opposition supporters and independents. It also makes sense that in six out of the eight surveyed years, opposition supporters were proportionally less likely to approve of the president than any other group, and that independents are in the middle. In voting behaviour, it's believed that you can still swing the vote of the independent in favour of the ruling party, whereas it is less likely to do so with opposition supporters. Perhaps the same can be said for approval of the president. We find that in most years, with the exception of independents in 2002 and opposition supporters in 2011, all three lines follow the same trend, even if by a few percentage points. Understandably we see sharp declines in approval in 2015, but we see that this decline is particularly noticeable in the Opposition and Independent group, with a drop of 29% and 39% respectively.

Figure 3.10: Afrobarometer Percentage Approval of the President by Partisanship



An important demographic statistic is age, which explores whether there are possible generational differences that influence the way people think. What I expect is that, over time,

we should see differences in the way different age groups approve of the president. For the purpose of this analysis, I have created generational cohorts based upon the work of Mattes (2011). He argues that there are five generations in South Africa and these generations were formed based upon the political nature when people were sixteen. These generations are the Pre-Apartheid generation, the Early Apartheid generation, the Grand Apartheid generation, the Struggle generation and the Born Free Generation. Appendix V demonstrates what the ages of people within a generation are in each surveyed year. It is evident in Appendix VI that the Pre-Apartheid generation being surveyed is shrinking as the sample of people who were sixteen in 1948 is dying out. It is also evident that there are no Born Frees- those who turned sixteen after Apartheid fell- in 1997, as they were sixteen in 1997 and were not old enough to be sampled, but they are becoming a proportionally greater part of society. I expect to find that older generations may have higher levels of approval because of their loyalty to the president and his party who freed them. I also expect younger generations to be more critical of the president.

Figure 3.10: Afrobarometer Approval of the President by Generational cohort



However, Figure 3.10 indicates that there is no pattern of approval as no one generational cohort consistently approves any more or less than the other. Appendix VII shows the percentage approval of the president by generational cohort, and the numbers indicate that there is not much variation. The two years with the greatest range are 2000 (15%) and 2015 (18%) where we find that the Born Frees and Early Apartheid generation respectively are a lot more approving than the other groups.

Similarly with levels of education, as Table 3.3 indicates, there is not one particular group that consistently had the lowest or highest levels across all years. What we find is that all groups showed declining levels of approval in 2008, followed by increasing levels of approval in 2011 and then declining levels again in 2015.

Table 3.3: % Approval amongst different levels of education

	1997	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015
No formal schooling	79%	65%	68%	82%	81%	64%	73%	44%
Informal schooling only	N/A*	N/A*	61%	73%	62%	45%	83%	N/A**
Some primary schooling	68%	52%	69%	79%	83%	65%	65%	46%
Primary school completed	66%	60%	62%	81%	80%	64%	71%	51%
Some secondary/high school	68%	57%	55%	77%	79%	54%	65%	39%
Secondary/high school completed	62%	49%	50%	68%	81%	58%	66%	34%
Post-secondary qualifications	66%	43%	59%	62%	81%	54%	62%	32%
Some university	57%	58%	45%	72%	75%	50%	63%	27%
University completed	48%	57%	36%	52%	75%	45%	57%	16%
Post-graduate	56%	35%	42%	79%	79%	38%	42%	39%

*Not Available **N=0 (All respondents replied "Disapprove, Strongly Disapprove, or Don't Know. Cells are shaded to easily identify increases and decreases in approval from one year surveyed to another. Lighter shades indicate a decrease, and darker shades indicate an increase from the previous year surveyed.

What we find that is interesting is that the mean level of approval amongst respondents who have either a undergraduate or postgraduate degree is lower than any other group, with each group having an average of 48% and 51% respectively across all years surveyed. We also find that respondents with no schooling had the highest mean score than any other group, at 70%.

The next demographic variable I would like to consider is Language- something which some have described to be just as important as ethnicity. Perhaps because in South Africa the two are very closely tied together. I have brought out four languages and have clustered other official South African languages together. I have singled out Xhosa because it is the most commonly spoken language in South Africa, and because two of our three presidents spoke

Xhosa as a first language- coming from traditionally Xhosa households. I have coded Zulu separately because it is the second most commonly spoken indigenous language, and because it is the first language of President Jacob Zuma. With Xhosa and Zulu, I would expect to see higher levels of approval during the respective presidencies of the Xhosa and Zulu-speaking presidents. I have singled out English because it is seen as the most used language in cross-cultural exchange, after Xhosa and Zulu. I have singled out Afrikaans because it seems to have strong cultural ties to the Afrikaner people, as well as because of its strong psychological ties to Apartheid- as part of Bantu Education, Afrikaans was forced upon non-white South Africans, and thus, was seen as a symbol of oppression. I would expect first language Afrikaans speakers to be the most vocal opponents of the presidents because of the higher probability that they have stronger emotional ties to the previous regime. English speakers were often depicted as more "liberal" than Afrikaans speakers, so I would expect English speaking South Africans to be more likely to approve of the President than Afrikaans speakers.

Figure 3.11: Afrobarometer Percentage Presidential Approval by Language



What we find in Figure 3.11 is not straight-cut. Firstly, we find that contrary to what we expected, Xhosa speakers do not show the highest level of support for Nelson Mandela. It is only in 2004 that we see that Xhosa speakers rate Mbeki higher than people who speak other languages. This is followed by a sharp drop in 2011. We also find that Zulu speakers gave relatively average scores, up until 2011, when Zulu-speaker Zuma was appointed as president. This trend continues in 2015, where Zulu speakers have the highest levels of approval for the president. Something else that we expected but did not happen, is that Afrikaans speakers are not the most disapproving of the president. It is only in three out of eight years that they are the most disapproving, and in the remaining four years, it is English speakers who are more disapproving than any other group. However, in all but one year (2006) Afrikaans and English speaking South Africans are always the lowest two rankers of all groups.

We should expect similar outcomes in terms of ethnicity. I expect that in years 1997 to 2008 Xhosa respondents should be more likely to grant higher levels of approval than any other group, and in 2011 and 2015, we should expect to see the highest levels of approval amongst Zulu respondents. What Figure 3.12 tells us is that from 2000 onwards we find this to be true. English, Afrikaans/Afrikaner/Boers, and White/European, seem to have more consistently, lower levels of approval than other groups.

Figure 3.12: Afrobarometer Percentage Presidential Approval by Ethnicity



In moving closer to my multivariate analysis, the last variable I would like to analyse is Gender, which will remain dichotomous here and in the multivariate analysis because Gender is dichotomous when measured by Afrobarometer. What I expect to find is that men will be more likely to show higher levels of support for the presidents than women. There are two reasons why this is the expectation; firstly, men represent the Co-identity group and therefore, we should expect that men will have higher levels of approval for the presidents because they feel that they are being better represented and sought after as men. Secondly, the theories on the Gender Gap would indicate that there may be higher levels of approval amongst men than women owing to the masculine nature of South African politics.

What we find in the South African case, is that generally there is no difference in the way men and women support the president. Figure 3.13 indicates that the lines of Presidential Approval follow a similar trend, and one line is not too far from the other.

Figure 3.13: Approval of the Presidents by Gender



The biggest percentage difference between men and women is when women had 5.42% higher levels of approval than men in 2002 during Mbeki's presidency. The second biggest gap is when women were 3.88% more approving than men during Mandela's presidency. It is clear that men and women have very similar levels of approval of the president, regardless of who the president is. It is also evident that, in the small differences, we can see that in five out of eight surveyed years, women had higher aggregate levels of support for the president than men.

It is evident that contrary to Inglehart and Norris' findings, there is neither a trend of a traditional gender gap, nor a trend of gender dealignment or realignment. There may be several possible explanations for this divergence. Inglehart and Norris (2000: 449) demonstrate in their paper that according to World Value Surveys, South African women do not see themselves as left or right. Perhaps this diversion from what the literature prescribes is the primary reason for South Africa being dissimilar. Perhaps another explanation is that the events I have highlighted are not the events that concern South African women, and they

are less critical than the media on these events. After all, Box-Steffensmeier et al mentioned that when it comes to women's issues, men and women tend to have little difference in their stance. Perhaps the explanation is that there are other factors that South African's think are more important than Gender.

CHAPTER FOUR

Sources of Presidential Approval: Testing Competing Hypotheses

In the previous chapter, I was able to lay the foundation and draw preliminary conclusions about the way South Africans shape their evaluations of the presidents. In this chapter I will conduct a multivariate analysis of my three hypotheses laid out in Chapter Two in an attempt to understand the nature of South Africans' approval of the president and how these factors perform relative to one another. I will be conducting three Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. An OLS regression assumes that a linear relationship exists between my dependent and independent variables, and is considered appropriate because all my independent variables are on a continuous scale or dichotomous. Therefore, when interpreting the results I am able to determine the strength and direction of my independent variables, which will make contextual analysis easier. In my analysis I will make use of unstandardized Beta coefficients (B) as well as standardised regression coefficient (β). The B will help me understand the unique contribution of my independent variables in any given model and year, and is helpful when comparing my variables over years. The β, on the other hand, helps me understand the relative strength or contribution of my independent variables within one year.

Model 1: The Identity Hypothesis

As I have briefly discussed towards the end of Chapter Three, Gender- a predictor variable we anticipated would be significant in determining levels of approval, did not produce the expected outcome. South African men and women differed very little in their approval of any of the presidents. However, Gender is but one of five Co-identity factors I intend to test. In Table 2.1 I have already highlighted the Co-identity category in each year surveyed by Afrobarometer. As previously stated, the purpose of this hypothesis is to understand if South Africans who share specific identity traits with the president are more likely to approve of

him. We assume that a reason may be that they feel that the president may be able to represent them better as a co-identifier. The regression equation for this model is as follows:

$$Approval = (b_0 + b_1 Race_1 + b_2 Ethnicity_2 + b_3 Partisanship_3 + b_4 Region_4 + b_5 Gender_5) + \varepsilon_1$$

Does the data indicate that someone who shares the same race, ethnicity, party affiliation, regional heritage and gender as the president in any given year is more likely to approve of him?

Table 4.1 shows the results of OLS regression in each year containing all the Identity variables. The model was statistically significant in every year ($p<0.001$) as indicated in the last row of Table 4.1 and in Appendix VIII, which contains the model statistics for every year. The model preformed best in 2015, where it accounted for 18.4% of the variance ($R^2=.184$, $F=105.5$, $p<0.001$). Given these statistics, I am able to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is indeed a relationship between Co-identity and Presidential Approval.

As expected based upon the descriptive analysis, Gender is not statistically significant in any year. The Co-race and Co-partisan variables are consistently statistically significant predictors of Presidential Approval in every year surveyed. The Co-race variable had a positive Beta coefficient in every year, indicating that black respondents were more likely to approve of the president than other South Africans. Co-race has the strongest relationship in 1997 (B=.871) and 2000 (B=.372) and the weakest in 2006 (B=.128) and 2015 (B=.168). In 1997, when analysing the standardised regression coefficients, co-race is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. This corroborates voting behaviour research at that time which suggested that race was the best predictor of political behaviour. However, it is only in 1997 that Co-race is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval.

Table 4.1: OLS Regression Analysis of Identity predicting Presidential Approval

	1997		2000		2002		2004		2006		2008		2011		2015	
	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β
(CONSTANT)	2.230 (.032)		2.117 (.040)		2.231 (.037)		2.509 (.040)		2.649 (.040)		2.268 (.042)		2.317 (.037)		1.646 (.043)	
CO-RACE (BLACK=1)	**.817***** (.035)	.379	**.372***** (.045)	.189	**.226***** (.043)	.121	**.284***** (.045)	.134	**.128**** (.045)	.064	**.225***** (.049)	.103	**.289***** (.043)	.149	**.168***** (.048)	.075
CO-ETHNICITY (XHOSA/ZULU=1)	-.059 (.071)	-.015	-.133 (.075)	-.057	-.038 (.064)	-.016	**.234***** (.064)	.090	**.161*** (.065)	.072	**.383***** (.076)	.147	**.170**** (.056)	.084	**.412***** (.060)	.177
CO-REGION (EASTERN CAPE/ KWAZULU NATAL=1)	**-.228***** (.051)	-.080	-.096 (.076)	-.039	-.019 (.066)	-.007	**.161*** (.068)	.057	-.023 (.064)	-.010	**.202*** (.079)	.073	**.387***** (.055)	.190	**.238***** (.061)	.096
CO-PARTISAN (ANC=1)	**.252***** (.059)	.069	**.489***** (.042)	.261	**.378***** (.039)	.215	**.472***** (.040)	.251	**.460***** (.037)	.267	**.100*** (.041)	.053	**.187***** (.035)	.112	**.525***** (.039)	.268
CO-GENDER (MALE=1)	.051 (.031)	.026	.014 (.037)	.008	.065 (.035)	.037	-.028 (.036)	-.015	.026 (.034)	.015	-.006 (.037)	-.003	.014 (.032)	.009	-.058 (.036)	-.030
R^2	.156***		.129***		.081***		.146***		.100***		.071***		.125***		.184***	

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL, P<0.05*, P<0.01, P<0.001***, (STANDARD ERROR)**

1997=NELSON MANDELA, 2000-2008=THABO MBEKI, 2011-2015=JACOB ZUMA

FOR EACH VARIABLE 0=OTHER

Similarly, the Co-partisan variable also had positive Beta coefficients in every year, indicating that ANC supporters were more likely to approve of the president than other South Africans. The Co-partisan variable has the strongest relationship in 2015 (B=.268) and the weakest relationship in 2008 (B=.053). In 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2015, the co-partisan variable was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval, as indicated by the standardised regression coefficients. This meant that in five of the eight years surveyed, being an ANC supporter was the strongest predictor of whether someone approved of the president. This makes sense given that we can expect supporters of the ruling party to be more likely to support their leader.

The Co-ethnicity variable is only statistically significant from 2004 onwards, and performs best in 2008 (B=.383). In fact, when looking at the standardised regression coefficients in 2008, the co-ethnicity variable has the strongest relationship with Presidential Approval. This may be as a result of the nature of the run up to the 2008 ANC Polokwane conference. Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were running for the position of president of the ANC. The campaigning seemed to take on a more personal tone, with ethnicity being a particularly strong theme.

In 1997, Co-region has the only negative Beta coefficient out of any of the years analysed. This means that in 1997, other South Africans were more likely to approve of the president than South Africans from his home province, the Eastern Cape. In 2011, the Co-region variable, in this case Kwazulu Natal- the home province of Jacob Zuma- is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. In 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015 all variables, excluding Gender, are significant predictors of Presidential Approval. This may be some indication that South Africans are moving towards making more Co-identity considerations when approving of the president.

Model 2: Testing Performance Evaluations

The competing hypothesis is the Performance Evaluation hypothesis, which, as I have mentioned in Chapter 2, is based upon rational choice theories within political science. In South Africa, the socio-economic landscape laid out in Chapter One tells us that there should be variation in needs of different parts of the country. It also tells us that the provision of social services is not consistent across the country. Similarly, economic conditions are constantly changing. This variation should help add value to the statistical analysis because we have respondents of varying needs and expectations. I expect to find that if respondents have positive evaluations of how the government delivers Macro-economic Goods, Social Services and Economic Safety, and if they have a positive perception of the economy, they are more likely to have positive evaluations of the president. For this hypothesis, the regression equation for this model is the following:

$$Approval=(b_0+b_1MacroEconomicGoodsEvaluation_1+b_2SocialServicesEvaluation_2+ b_3EconomicSafety_3+b_4EconomicPerception_4) + \varepsilon_1$$

Table 4.2 indicates the results of the OLS regression of Performance Evaluations predicting Presidential Approval. The results indicate that the model performed best in 2015, where it accounted for 30% of the variance (R^2=.299, F239.01, p<0.001). The model was also statistically significant in every year, as indicated in Appendix IX. In most years the model accounted for approximately 20% of the variance.

Table 4.2: OLS Regression Analysis of Performance Evaluations predicting Presidential Approval

	2000		2002		2004		2006		2008		2011		2015	
	B	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**
(CONSTANT)	.989 (.061)		.996 (.075)		1.597 (.081)		1.243 (.075)		1.022 (.066)		1.287 (.070)		.129 (.076)	
MACRO-ECONOMIC GOODS	**.181***** (.036)	.130	**.126***** (.032)	.089	.036 (.031)	.030	**.195***** (.028)	.164	**.248***** (.031)	.205	**.281***** (.029)	.233	**.464***** (.036)	.322
SOCIAL SERVICES	**.221***** (.028)	.197	**.171***** (.024)	.151	**.354***** (.028)	.311	**.189***** (.026)	.164	**.334***** (.026)	.296	**.206***** (.025)	.181	**.270***** (.029)	.194
ECONOMIC SAFETY	.041 (.028)	.037	**.226***** (.024)	.213	**.076**** (.026)	.076	**.133***** (.022)	.136	.023 (.026)	.022	**.102***** (.025)	.103	**.128***** (.030)	.100
ECONOMIC PERCEPTION	**.261***** (.019)	.296	**.175***** (.019)	.181	**.059*** (.023)	.052	**.169***** (.018)	.183	**.059**** (.019)	.059	**.043*** (.017)	.050	**.069**** (.020)	.067
R^2	**.269*****		**.194*****		**.160*****		**.223*****		**.233*****		**.202*****		**.299*****	

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL, P<0.05*, P<0.01, P<0.001***, (STANDARD ERROR)**

1997=NELSON MANDELA, 2000-2008=THABO MBEKI, 2011-2015=JACOB ZUMA

According to Table 4.2, Social Services and Economic Perception are statistically significant in every year surveyed, the Beta coefficients indicate that in every year surveyed, respondents who had positive evaluations of government's handling Social Services, or respondents who had positive perceptions of the South African economy, were more likely to have positive evaluations of the president. Social Services performs best in 2004 followed by 2008 (B=.354 and B=.344 respectively). Social Services performs worst in 2002 (B=.171). The unstandardized regression coefficients indicate that Social Services was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2004 and 2008, relative to the other variables. Economic Perception performed best in 2000 and 2002 (B=.261 and B=.175 respectively). The unstandardized regression coefficients indicate that Economic Perception was also the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2000 and 2006.

Macro-Economic Goods is a statistically significant predictor of Presidential Approval in six of the seven years analysed. Similarly to Social Services and Economic Perception, the Beta coefficients indicate that in every year when the variable was statistically significant, respondents who had positive perceptions of how government handled Macro-Economic Goods were more likely to have positive evaluations of the president. 2004 is the only year when it is not statistically significant. The Beta coefficients indicate that Macro-Economic Goods performed best in 2011 and 2015 (B=.281 and B=.464 respectively). Similarly, the unstandardized regression coefficients indicated that Macro-Economic Goods was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2011 and 2015. This coincides with the two surveyed years when Jacob Zuma was president. During this time, he had announced the ANC's new plan to "reduce poverty, unemployment and inequality" in the form of the New Growth Plan in 2010, followed by the National Development Plan in 2013 (South African History Online, 2013). Given that approval levels are low in 2015, we can assume that South Africans do not believe President Zuma and his government are doing a great job at

delivering on the objectives of the NGP and NDP, as Macro-Economic Goods encompasses the concepts of reducing unemployment and inequality.

Economic Safety is statistically significant in five of the seven years surveyed. It is not statistically significant in 2000 and 2008. Economic Safety performs best in 2002 (B=.226). In this same year, it was the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. In 2002, 2006, 2011 and 2015, all four variables were significant predictors of Presidential Approval. This may indicate that South Africans make rational decisions based on what they have; considering the economy and the way government is performing when they decide whether the president is doing a good job. The fact that the model performs best in 2015 may be a further indication of the importance of economic variables.

Model 3: The Cognitive Awareness Hypothesis

My third model assesses the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis. I expect to find that differing levels of education, media usage and political discussion will present differing levels of approval. I also expect that if the respondent engages more, that they ought to be more critical of the president. The regression equation for this model is as follows:

$$Approval = (b_0 + b_1 TV_1 + b_2 Radio_2 + b_3 Newspaper_3 + b_4 Education_4 + b_5 PoliticalDiscussion_5) + \varepsilon_1$$

Table 4.3 and Appendix X indicate that the model was statistically significant in all years. It is evident that the model performs best in 2004, when the model accounts for 4% of the variance (R^2=.038, F=17.62, p<0.001). As the model is significant in every year, I am able to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that Cognitive Awareness has some effect on Presidential Approval.

Table 4.3 shows that not one variable is consistently statistically significant in every year surveyed. The most successful variables are Education and Discuss Politics, which are statistically significant in six of the eight years surveyed. I find that every Beta coefficient for

Education is negative, indicating that the less educated a respondent was, the more likely they were to approve of the president. Education performed best in 2015 (B=.074, $p<0.001$), and the standardised regression coefficient indicates that relative to the other variables in that year, Education is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval. Education is also the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 1997.

Discuss Politics is statistically significant in 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2015. In every year, the Beta coefficient indicates that the more frequently people discuss politics, the more likely they are to approve of the president. The variable performs best in 2006 (B=.147, $p<0.001$). It is the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval relative to other variables in 2006. Discuss Politics is also the strongest predictor of Presidential Approval in 2000. Newspaper usage is statistically significant in five of the eight years surveyed, between 2002 and 2011, and the Beta coefficients indicate that in every year respondents who read newspaper more frequently were more likely to disapprove of the president. Newspaper usage performs best in 2004 (B=.-.090, $p<0.001$). It is also the only significant predictor of Presidential Approval in 2008 (B=-.069, $p<0.001$). In four of the five years that Newspaper Usage significantly predicted Presidential Approval, the standardised regression coefficient indicates that Newspaper Usage is the strongest predictor relative to other variables. (2002, 2004, 2008, 2011). This means that Thabo Mbeki was more unpopular amongst those who read the Newspaper more frequently for the majority of his presidency.

Table 4.3: OLS Regression Analysis of Cognitive Awareness predicting Presidential Approval

	1997		2000		2002		2004		2006		2008		2011		2015	
	B	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**	**B**	**β**
(CONSTANT)	2.980 (.064)		2.602 (.090)		2.725 (.077)		3.087 (.067)		2.771 (.075)		2.629 (.084)		2.778 (.065)		2.238 (.090)	
TV USAGE	-.003 (.013)	-.005	.018 (.016)	.030	.012 (.016)	.019	.001 (.015)	.001	**.060***** (.015)	.101	.025 (.018)	.033	.001 (.014)	.001	.033 (.020)	.036
RADIO USAGE	.014 (.014)	.018	-.008 (.016)	-.009	.020 (.019)	.024	**.057**** (.017)	.076	.025 (.019)	.030	.017 (.019)	.020	.025 (.013)	.042	.016 (.016)	.023
NEWSPAPER USAGE	-.020 (.014)	-.031	-.023 (.017)	-.039	**-.060***** (.014)	-.109	**-.090***** (.015)	-.149	**-.054***** (.013)	-.100	**-.069***** (.015)	-.111	**-.027*** (.012)	-.051	-.017 (.015)	-.026
EDUCATION	**-.059***** (.012)	-.099	**-.034*** (.013)	-.066	**-.043***** (.012)	-.087	**-.046**** (.013)	-.083	-.009 (.012)	-.019	-.014 (.013)	-.024	**-.024*** (.012)	-.045	**-.074***** (.013)	-.129
DISCUSS POLITICS	**.117***** (.026)	.082	**.118***** (.032)	.086	**.062*** (.027)	.050	**.075**** (.028)	.058	**.147***** (.026)	.122	.023 (.028)	.017	.047 (.026)	.039	**.100**** (.030)	.070
R 2	.016***		.011**		.024***		.038***		.027***		.012***		.007**		.021***	

It is clear from the analysis that the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis is not as strongly proved as other hypotheses, as the model performs weakly relative to the other two models. There does not seem to be any progression towards all Cognitive Awareness variables predicting approval, in fact, the model never performs as well as in 2004. It may be that there are other outside factors which contribute towards these findings. One contributing factor may be the way people access various media sources. Lower literacy levels may contribute towards people not reading newspapers as frequently. This may be why we see that Newspaper usage and Education both always have negative beta-coefficients, whilst information gathering that may be used by illiterate respondents (Television, Radio and Discussing with others) always have positive coefficients. This may in fact mean that perhaps it is literate South Africa that is more critical of the president. A second factor may be the nature of each source of information gathering. As Garramore and Atkin (1986: 77-78) point out, television (as well as radio) tends to have briefer, simpler and more engaging news content, which, as pointed out above, may be used by the illiterate/less "sophisticated". On the other hand, print media tends to be more in depth, require focussed attention and some motivation, and allows the reader to be in control of the content they are receiving. I would also argue that whereas radio and television tends to have brief fact-based excerpts, the reader of the newspaper is often exposed to the bias of the newspaper or journalists, which may be more critical than television or radio (this depends on the type of radio content because some radio channels/programmes are dedicated to political discussion).

Block-wise Regression: Model 1, 2 and 3 in competition

Judging by the performance of each model separately, it seems as though the Performance Evaluation model and variables perform better than the other two models. I would like to test if the predicting power of any variables changes once they are competing with variables in other models. In particular, I would like to see if any of the Performance Evaluation variables lose their predicting power once taking the Identity and Cognitive Awareness variables into account, or if they perform equally strong. In order to test for changes in predicting power of my three models and their variables, I will conduct a Block-wise regression, entering each model as a separate block. Step one will be Model 2 because this seems to be the Model performing best on its own. I will be reporting standardised regression coefficients because variables in different models are measured differently, and by standardising my results, I am better able to interpret how they are performing relative to one another.

According to Table 4.4, I find that all block-wise models are statistically significant. In 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2008, the addition of Model 1 to Model 2 accounts for an additional 2-3% more variance (ΔR^2=.027 in 2000, .029 in 2002, .034 in 2006, and .024 in 2008). However, in 2004 we find that the addition of Model 1 accounts for 7% more variance (ΔR^2=.070). In 2011 and 2015 there is an additional 8% more variance accounted for with the addition of Model 1 (ΔR^2=.076 in 2011 and .080 in 2015). This means that Model 1 may be adding more value in 2004, 2011 and 2015 than in other years surveyed. As indicated earlier, Model 2 performs best in 2015. With the addition of Model 1 and Model 3, I find that the overall model accounts for 40% of the variance- almost half of the sample. On the other hand, the addition of Model 3 does not seem to be as impactful as the addition of Model 1 in every year. At most, the addition of Model 3 accounts for 1% more variance in 2002 and 2004 (ΔR^2=.011 and .010 respectively).

Table 4.4: Block-wise Regression of Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3

	1997		2000			2002			2004			2006			2008			2011			2015		
Model 2																							
Macro-Economic Goods			**.128*** **	**.130*** **	**.132*** **	**.087*** **	**.089*** **	**.099*** **	.039	**.069** **	**.076** **	**.163*** **	**.163*** **	**.171*** **	**.223*** **	**.230*** **	**.233*** **	**.233*** **	**.204*** **	**.202*** **	**.322*** **	**.297*** **	**.296*** **
Social Services			**.200*** **	**.162*** **	**.164*** **	**.153*** **	**.127*** **	**.125*** **	**.318** **	**.265*** **	**.259*** **	**.167*** **	**.147*** **	**.147*** **	**.293*** **	**.258*** **	**.261*** **	**.179*** **	**.178*** **	**.180*** **	**.194*** **	**.142*** **	**.142*** **
Economic Safety			.034	.006	.003	**.211*** **	**.188*** **	**.184*** **	**.074** **	-.017	-.020	**.134*** **	**.093*** **	**.092*** **	0.16	.003	.000	**.106*** **	**.062***	**.064** **	**.100*** **	**.072** **	**.070** **
Economic Perception			**.299*** **	**.272*** **	**.274*** **	**.183*** **	**.159*** **	**.170*** **	**.046***	.036	**.052***	**.188*** **	**.171*** **	**.175*** **	**.051** **	**.044***	**.055** **	**.051***	**.063** **	**.067** **	**.066** **	**.051** **	**.053** **
Model 1																							
Co-Race	**.379*** **	**.397*** **		**.047***	.042		**.056** **	.031		**.090*** **	**.068** **		.037	.027		.040	.027		**.108*** **	**.098*** **		.032	.032
Co-Ethnicity	-.010	-.009		-.002	-.001		-.011	-.018		**.082** **	**.076** **		.050	.044		**.113*** **	**.110*** **		**.094*** **	**.093*** **		**.123*** **	**.122*** **
Co-Region	**-.082*** **	**-.081*** **		-.023	-.026		.015	.016		.042	.034		.009	-.002		.036	.021		**.143*** **	**.145*** **		**.096*** **	**.096*** **
Co-Partisan	**.073*** **	**.070*** **		**.160*** **	**.154*** **		**.145*** **	**.136*** **		**.189*** **	**.181*** **		**.158*** **	**.152*** **		.024	.022		**.076*** **	**.070*** **		**.175*** **	**.169*** **
Co-Gender	.027	.014		.010	.000		.026	.035		-.010	-.002		.000	.006		-.006	.001		-.001	-.002		-.025	-.024
Model 3																							
TV Usage		**.053** **			-.005			.014			.020			**.058** **			.030			.007			.034
Radio Usage		**-.051** **			-.014			.009			**.042***			-.022			-.005			.015			.002
Newspaper Usage		.026			.001			**-.068** **			**-.088*** **			**-.096*** **			**-.056***			-.018			-.008
Education		-.030			-.024			**-.068** **			**-.047***			-.014			-.034			**-.039***			-.031
Discuss Politics		**.043***			**.057** **			-.017			.011			.023			-.003			.026			.001
R^2	.157***	.164***	.270***	.298***	.301***	.193***	.218***	.228***	.164***	.233***	.241***	.226***	.261***	.269***	.239***	.263***	.267***	.201***	.275***	.276***	.299***	.378***	.380***
F	118.78	62.67	182.43	92.52	60.23	131.33	69.40	47.52	111.72	77.04	52.29	165.30	88.42	59.14	178.59	90.02	58.96	145.34	98.03	63.62	237.43	150.53	97.28
ΔR^2		.007		.027	.003		.029	.011		.070	.010		.034	.008		.024	.004		.076	.002		.080	.002

Dependent Variable: Presidential Approval, p<0.05*, p<0.01**, p<0.001***, Reporting standardised regression coefficients

In analysing the effects of individual predictors, it is evident that the Performance Evaluation variables perform better compared to other variables. In 2002, 2006, 2011 and 2015, all Performance Evaluation variables are statistically significant even when adding Model 1 or adding Model 3. In 2000, 2004 and 2008, when adding Model 1 and Model 3, all Performance Evaluation variables except Economic Safety are statistically significant. Of all the variables across all models, Social Services is the only variable to be consistently significant whether analysed within Model 1 only, or when the other two models are added. This means that regardless of what South Africans are considering, even when accounting for all other factors, they always consider whether government is performing well on social services when they evaluate the president. More importantly, if they think the government is doing well on delivering social services they are more likely to approve of the president.

I also find that Macro-Economic Goods and Economic Perception consistently significantly predicts Presidential Approval, even when accounting for other factors in other models. With each variable there is one instance where it is not statistically significant- Macro-Economic Goods when only analysing Model 2, and Economic Perception when competing with variables in Model 1, but becomes significant when adding Model 3. Regardless, I am able to conclude that respondents' perception of whether government is delivering on Macro-Economic Goods and their perception of how the South African economy is doing are important factors when considering how well the president is doing. More specifically, if they have positive considerations of these factors, they will be more likely to approve of the president.

The Block-wise regression results indicate that Co-Gender is still consistently non-significant in every regression. This just further reiterates that even when controlling for other factors, Gender does not determine whether a South African would be more likely to approve or disapprove. On the other hand I find that, with the exception of 2008, Co-partisan

significantly predicts Presidential Approval in every year, meaning that ANC supporters are more likely to approve of the president when considering other factors. This could be expected given the literature on British parties and Prime Ministerial approval, where we were told that the two are closely linked. In the South African context, it demonstrates the deep-rooted loyalty that ANC supporters have for their leader relative to non-ANC supporters.

The results in 2008 may be an interpretation of events in that year. It is the only year where the Co-partisan variable is non-significant. This may be a result of the ANC leadership battle that occurred at that time between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, which may have resulted in ANC supporters rather preferring to support Zuma, than the president in question, Mbeki. The results also indicate that Co-ethnicity became the only Co-Identity statistically significant predictor of Presidential Approval. Given that the run-up to the Polokwane conference was heavy-laden with ethnic comparisons of the two presidents, it makes sense that Xhosa respondents were more likely to support their Co-Ethnic president. It is also evident that the ethnic nature of the Polokwane conference may have had long term effects, as Co-ethnicity becomes a more consistently significant predictor of Presidential Approval from 2008 onwards. In fact, in 2015, Co-ethnicity is the second strongest predictor of Presidential Approval after Macro-Economic Goods. Additionally, 2011 is the only year where four Identity variables (excluding Co-gender) are statistically significant predictors of Presidential Approval.

However, even when controlling for other variables, the Performance Evaluation variables still perform better. The standardised regression coefficients indicate that Macro-Economic Goods and Social Services were the strongest predictors of Presidential Approval compared to other variable that year. Given that this was the year that South Africa started to feel the effects of the Great Recession and suffered from xenophobic attacks sparked by

unemployment, it makes sense that they would resort to a form of "pocket-book" ascription of support.

Unlike when the Model 1 was analysed in isolation from other models, in the Block-wise regression Co-race is not considered a consistently significant predictor when considering performance evaluation or cognitive awareness factors. The only time Co-race is the strongest predictor is in 1997, which is surprising considering Nelson Mandela was considered the champion of the "Rainbow Nation" and non-racialism. However, it is important to note that this is the only year where Model 2 could not be entered into the Block-wise regression because of the lack of data availability. This could mean that race disappears once we control for economic and performance factors.

As already noted in the analysis of the Model statistics, it seems at Model 3 does not add much more value when considering other factors. The most consistent variable is Newspaper Usage, which significantly predicted Presidential Approval for the majority of Thabo Mbeki's two terms. Unfortunately for Mbeki, it seems that respondents who used newspapers more frequently were more likely to disapprove of him, similarly to when Model 3 is analysed alone. The Model 3 results may indicate that, rather than using sophisticated or low-information reasoning when deciding if they approve of the president, South Africans are more likely to draw from other experiences which may be considered more personal or personal to those around them. They are more likely to look at whether the president is similar to them, and even more so, they are willing to consider what they have and how the country is performing when they decide if the approve of the president

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The results of my analysis using IDASA and Afrobarometer data indicates that South Africans do shape their evaluations based on Performance Evaluation, Co-Identity and, to an extent, between 1997 and 2015. I have shown that there is variation in the levels of approval for each president and this variation seems to be driven by these factors over time. Although the nature of approval changes over time, there seems to be some consistency with the existing theory.

It is clear from the descriptive analysis that some Identity variables such as Co-race and Co-partisanship may influence the way people approve of the president when analysed relative to other Identity variables. With more in-depth statistical analysis I found that South Africans may be more co-ethnic over time, as the predicting strength of Model 1 and its variables are better towards 2015. It is obvious that allegiance to the ANC would be a good predictor of Presidential Approval, and the statistical significance of Race in every year compliments the literature on voting behaviour which seems to allude to some form of a racial census. Even though there is not a perfect relationship between Black respondents and high levels of approval, it is still true that if the respondent is black, there is a higher likelihood that they will approve of the president. However, it is important to note that when controlling for performance evaluation factors, Race becomes less important than when alone. Whilst my findings of Race and Approval were somewhat expected, my findings on Gender were not. Given the emphasis placed on Gender issues and politics in literature and media, my expectation was that Gender would be statistically significant, even if only during Jacob Zuma's presidency. However, my analysis seems to disprove any claims made, especially by the media, that woman would be more critical than men of Jacob Zuma.

The Performance Evaluations theory does stand particularly strong, whether on its own or relative to other theories. My statistical results consistently indicate that South Africans are more likely to approve of the president if they believe that his government is doing a good job, or if they believe the economy is doing well. This rational choice-type ascription of approval corroborates previous findings in Western literature such as Expectation/Disillusionment and other economic theories. In a country that suffers from high levels of unemployment and a high Gini-coefficient indicating high levels of economic inequality, this may serve as a wake-up call to any current or future serving president who aims to be well liked; delivery and performance equals higher approval. In the past two surveyed years it seems that Macro-Economic Goods are particularly worth serving, as they performed better than any other variable- perhaps an indication that more South Africans are taking the bigger picture in to account. To the president and his government this would mean delivering on things such as jobs, keeping the economic conditions of the country stable and decreasing levels of inequality in South Africa. However, this does not mean that Social Services and the broader economy can be forgotten as they too were statistically significant in every year, performing better in five of the seven years where these questions were answered. Economic Safety, which includes how government handles corruption, is also becoming more important, which may indicate that the president may want to seriously consider the way they handle crime and corruption.

It is clear from my analysis that whilst Model 3 is statistically significant, the Cognitive Awareness hypothesis does not take a specific form. Instead, other factors may have to be taken into account when reading each individual variable. Factors such as the types of people who use and have access to various media sources. What this may mean is that whilst information-gathering does not influence respondents to make specific types of decisions, it may be more likely that certain people who are predisposed to have certain levels of

approval, use specific forms of information gathering. Rather the type of information gathered by respondents is perhaps more personal; what do I have, or what do I need from my government? What can I afford? How does they president represent me as a person?

Suggestions for further research

My study of presidential approval was a first attempt to quantitatively understand *how* South Africans shape their evaluations of the president, and it was a first attempt to expand presidential studies to the African continent using established political theory. However, this being a first attempt and a Master's dissertation (which is limiting in terms of length and scope), I believe that there are gaps which may still be filled by future research and that there is room for development on president approval studies in South Africa and Africa.

I would recommend that in order to provide a better picture of presidential approval in South Africa, more questions be added to the Afrobarometer questionnaire which explores the relationship people have to levels of approve. This would include questions on how people feel the *president* is performing specific tasks, or even what these tasks ought to be. I would also recommend a study using hard economic indicators and government delivery statistics in an advanced statistical analysis.

Another recommendation is that this study be taken to the cross-national level. This is feasible using Afrobarometer data which has been collected in multiple African countries, and consistently in some. A cross-national analysis may help us understand the nature of presidential versus prime ministerial systems in Africa, and whether they do impact popularity studies. It will also help us explore the Identity and Performance Evaluation hypothesis in more detail as we add more variation in the form of varying economic conditions and varying levels of co-ethnicity.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Government Handling variables included in Performance Evaluation indices

Round 1	Round 2	Round 2.5	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6
Q63a. How well is govt creating jobs	Q45b. Handling creating jobs	Q65b. Handling creating jobs	Q65b. Handling creating jobs	Q57c. Handling creating jobs	Q65c. Handling creating jobs	Q66c. Handling creating jobs
Q63c. How well is govt ensuring that prices remain stable	Q45c. Handling keeping prices stable	Q65c. Handling keeping prices stable	Q65c. Handling keeping prices stable	Q57d. Handling keeping prices down	Q65d. Handling keeping prices down	Q66d. Handling keeping prices down
Q63d. How well does govt reduce crime	Q45e. Handling reducing crime	Q65e. Handling reducing crime	Q65e. Handling reducing crime	Q57f. Handling reducing crime	Q65f. Handling reducing crime	Q66f. Handling reducing crime
Q63e. How well is govt improving health services	Q45f. Handling improving basic health services	Q65f. Handling improving basic health services	Q65f. Handling improving basic health services	Q57g. Handling improving basic health services	Q65g. Handling improving basic health services	Q66g. Handling improving basic health services
Q63f. How well does govt address the educational needs of all South Africans	Q45g. Handling addressing educational needs	Q65g. Handling addressing educational needs	Q65g. Handling addressing educational needs	Q57h. Handling addressing educational needs	Q65h. Handling addressing educational needs	Q66h. Handling addressing educational needs

Q63g. How well does govt manage the economy	Q45a. Handling managing the economy	Q65a. Handling managing the economy	Q65a. Handling managing the economy	Q57a. Handling managing the economy	Q65a. Handling managing the economy	Q66a. Handling managing the economy
Q63h. How well does govt deliver basic services like water and electricity	Q45h. Handling delivering household water	Q65h. Handling delivering household water	Q65h. Handling delivering household water	Q57i. Handling providing water and sanitation services	Q65i. Handling providing water and sanitation services	Q66i. Handling providing water and sanitation services
Q63k. Fighting corruption in govt	Q45j. Handling fighting corruption in government	Q65j. Handling fighting corruption	Q65j. Handling fighting corruption	Q57k. Handling fighting corruption	Q65k. Handling fighting corruption	Q66k. Handling fighting corruption
Q62m. Narrowing income gap	Q45d. Handling narrowing gaps between rich and poor	Q65d. Handling narrowing income gaps	Q65d. Handling narrowing income gaps	Q57e. Handling narrowing income gaps	Q65e. Handling narrowing income gaps	Q66e. Handling narrowing income gaps
Q63n. How well is govt distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to it	Q45OSAF Distributing welfare payments to those entitled to it	Q65n-SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments	Q65n_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments	Q57r-saf. Handling distributing welfare payments	Q65R-SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them	Q66o_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them

Appendix II: Inter-item correlation of Performance Evaluation indices

	Q66A. Handling managing the economy	Q66C. Handling creating jobs	Q66D. Handling keeping prices down	Q66E. Handling narrowing income gaps	Q66G. Handling improving basic health services	Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs	Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services	Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments	Q66F. Handling reducing crime	Q66K. Handling fighting corruption
Q66A. Handling managing the economy	1.000	.479	.467	.375	.404	.406	.325	.282	.405	.391
Q66C. Handling creating jobs	.479	1.000	.539	.443	.301	.360	.291	.173	.519	.446
Q66D. Handling keeping prices down	.467	.539	1.000	.523	.329	.302	.224	.205	.425	.423
Q66E Q66e. Handling narrowing income gaps	.375	.443	.523	1.000	.290	.247	.206	.165	.444	.400
Q66G. Handling improving basic health services	.404	.301	.329	.290	1.000	.662	.417	.359	.302	.246
Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs	.406	.360	.302	.247	.662	1.000	.466	.340	.309	.236
Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services	.325	.291	.224	.206	.417	.466	1.000	.309	.239	.225
Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments	.282	.173	.205	.165	.359	.340	.309	1.000	.199	.168
Q66F. Handling reducing crime	.405	.519	.425	.444	.302	.309	.239	.199	1.000	.465
Q66K. Handling fighting corruption	.391	.446	.423	.400	.246	.236	.225	.168	.465	1.000

Appendix III: Table of Communalities for Performance Evaluation indices

COMMUNALITIES

Q66A. Handling managing the economy	0.384
Q66C. Handling creating jobs	0.457
Q66D. Handling keeping prices down	0.439
Q66E. Handling narrowing income gaps	0.362
Q66G. Handling improving basic health services	0.492
Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs	0.509
Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services	0.276
Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them	0.183
Q66F. Handling reducing crime	0.387
Q66K. Handling fighting corruption	0.325

Appendix IV: Factor Loadings of factor analysis for Performance Evaluation indices

	Factor Loading	
	1	**2**
Q66A. Handling managing the economy	.487	
Q66C. Handling creating jobs	.718	
Q66D. Handling keeping prices down	.720	
Q66E. Handling narrowing income gaps	.677	
Q66F. Handling reducing crime	.656	
Q66K. Handling fighting corruption	.650	
Q66G. Handling improving basic health services		-.802
Q66H. Handling addressing educational needs		-.867
Q66I. Handling providing water and sanitation services		-.530
Q66O_SAF. Handling distributing welfare payments to those who are entitled to them		-.425
Eigenvalues	4.20	1.41
% of Variance	41.95	14.09

Appendix V: South African Generational Cohorts

GENERATION	1997	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015
PRE-APARTHEID	66 and older	69 and older	71 and older	73 and older	75 and older	77 and older	80 and older	84 and older
EARLY APARTHEID	65-53	68-56	70-58	72-60	74-62	76-64	79-67	83-71
GRAND APARTHEID	52-38	55-41	57-43	59-45	61-47	63-49	66-52	70-56
STRUGGLE	37-17	40-20	42-22	44-24	46-26	48-28	51-31	55-35
BORN FREES	16 and younger	19 and younger	21 and younger	23 and younger	25 and younger	27 and younger	30 and younger	34 and younger

Appendix VI: Percentage South African Generational Cohorts in Sample



Appendix VII: Percentage Presidential Approval by Generational Cohort

	1997	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015
Born Free Generation		63%	57%	78%	81%	55%	69%	36%
Struggle Generation	69%	55%	55%	75%	80%	56%	65%	36%
Grand Apartheid Generation	66%	52%	58%	72%	78%	62%	59%	37%
Early Apartheid Generation	60%	48%	57%	71%	85%	55%	67%	54%
Pre-Apartheid Generation	58%	54%	58%	66%	74%	52%	69%	38%
Range	11%	15%	4%	12%	11%	10%	11%	18%

Appendix VIII: OLS Model 1 Statistics: Identity predicting Presidential Approval

YEAR	R^2	F	SIGN.
1997	.156	121.62	p<0.001
2000	.129	58.7	p<0.001
2002	.081	39.3	p<0.001
2004	.146	78.28	p<0.001
2006	.100	51.31	p<0.001
2008	.071	35.36	p<0.001
2011	.125	66.26	p<0.001
2015	.184	105.5	p<0.001

Appendix IX: OLS Model 2 Statistics: Performance Evaluation predicting Presidential Approval

YEAR	R^2	F	SIGN.
2000	.269	182.97	p<0.001
2002	.194	133.98	p<0.001
2004	.160	108.44	p<0.001
2006	.223	164.75	p<0.001
2008	.233	175.59	p<0.001
2011	.202	146.92	p<0.001
2015	.299	239.01	p<0.001

Appendix X: OLS Model 3 Statistics: Cognitive Awareness predicting Presidential Approval

YEAR	R^2	F	SIGN.
1997	.016	10.17	p<0.001
2000	.011	4.26	p<0.01
2002	.024	10.63	p<0.001
2004	.038	17.62	p<0.001
2006	.027	12.71	p<0.001
2008	.012	5.35	p<0.001
2011	.007	3.35	p<0.01
2015	.021	9.94	p<0.001

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