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THE IMPACT OF THE 9/11 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES'
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA:
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

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May 2008

by
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This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature: *Michael E Petersen*

Date: *21 May 2008*

ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Michael Edward Petersen for a Master of Arts in International Relations, University of Cape Town, May 2008

Title: The Impact of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on United States' Security Assistance to Southern Africa: A Quantitative Analysis

Background:

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States government deemed Southern Africa to be of no strategic value. An impoverished region with a wealth of problems, Southern Africa mattered little to the United States government who approached regional security cooperation with a primarily minimalist approach. During the pre-9/11 years the United States did provide Southern African governments with some security sector assistance, primarily in direct military training and law enforcement programmes. Other areas such as peace support operations assistance, border and transportation security, and counter-proliferation training were marginal, as were arms authorisations. Everything changed on September 11th, 2001. The result of the attacks was a massive security and foreign policy shift for America. In response, the United States launched a Global War on Terror, which truly affected its relations with regions in every part of the globe, Southern Africa included.

Research:

This thesis examines pre and post-9/11 security assistance from the United States government to the nations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the time periods 1998-2001 and 2002-2005. Chapter Two focuses on pre-9/11 security cooperation and Chapter Three on post-9/11 security cooperation. Each chapter quantifies bilateral treaties and agreements, joint military exercises, military training, peace support operations training, arms authorisations and grants, nuclear security training, law enforcement training, and border and transportation security training and overall training expenditure. Chapter Four then pools the data together and provides a pre vs. post-9/11 analysis of collective security cooperation. Results are stated in percent changes from pre-

9/11 levels. Training and arms per soldier ratios are calculated based on the data to produce regional rankings of United States' assistance. Chapter Five offers conclusive observations and recommendations.

Results:

Data analysis of the time periods clearly demonstrates post-9/11 increases in security assistance to the region including large increases in law enforcement, border and transportation security, nuclear security, military HIV/AIDS assistance, and peace support operations. There was, disconcertingly, a significant reduction in military training which dropped due to several nations refusing to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the United States government, which protect American military personnel from being sent to the International Criminal Court. Additionally, there was an almost doubling of training expenditure and a tripling of arms authorisations and grants to the region. The post-9/11 years also show a shift in assistance priority, as South Africa falls far down the overall ranking and Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique become the region's greatest benefactors of the increase in United States' attention. Ultimately, the data demonstrates that the United States is approaching the Global War on Terror and post-9/11 security relations in Southern Africa with a law enforcement rather than military focus.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Term
9/11	September 11 th , 2001
ACIPOL	Mozambique Police Sciences Academy
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
ACRI	Africa Crisis Response Initiative
ACSS	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
AFRICOM	United States African Command
ALP	Aviation Leadership Program
ANG	Angola
ASPA	American Servicemembers' Protection Act
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
ATF-ITP	Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agency International Training Program
ATF-K9	Alcohol Tobacco, and Firearms Agency Canine Training Program
BDF	Botswana Defence Forces
BIA	Bilateral Immunity Agreement (Article 98)
BNC	Bi-national Commission
BOT	Botswana
BTS	Border and Transportation Security
C3IS	Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems
CBP-ITP	United States Customs and Border Patrol International Training Program
CBP-IVP	United States Customs and Border Patrol International Visitors Program
CSL	Cooperative Security Location
CSOS	Command and Staff Operations Skills Peacekeeping Course
DCS-A	Direct Commercial Sales Agreements
DCS-TA	Direct Commercial Sales Technical Agreements
DEA-ITP	Drug Enforcement Agency International Training Program
DEC	Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission
DHAPP	Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIILS	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
DLEU	Namibian National Drug Enforcement Unit
DoD	Department of Defence
DoE	Department of Energy
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
DP	Department of Energy- Nuclear Security Defense Program
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeepers Course
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EUCOM	United States European Command
FAA	Armed Forces of Angola
FADM	Armed Forces of Mozambique

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI-ITP	Federal Bureau of Investigation International Training Program
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center International Training Program
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS-A	Foreign Military Sales Agreements
FY	Fiscal Year
GCMECSS	George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
GOM	Government of Mozambique
IACP	Sub-Africa Mini Congress
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICE	United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency
ICE-ITP	United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency International Training Program
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program
IDRTTA	International Demand Reduction Technical Training and Technical Assistance Program
ILEA-G	International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, Botswana
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INL	United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
INS-ITP	United States Immigration and Naturalization Service Agency International Training Program
ITP	International Training Program
JCET	Joint Combined Exchange and Training Program
JMPD	Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department
LDF	Lesotho Defence Forces
LE	Law Enforcement Training and Assistance
LES	Lesotho
MA	Mine Assistance Program
MAL	Malawi
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MCP	Military Contacts Program
MDF	Malawi Defence Forces
MEDFLAG	United States sponsored Joint Medical Training Exercise
MIL	Military Training and Assistance
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOZ	Mozambique
NAM	Namibia
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NDF	Namibian Defence Forces
NEST	Department of Energy Nuclear Emergency Support Team Training Program
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NNP	Namibian National Police
NP/NS	Department of Energy Non-Proliferation/Nuclear Security Training Program
NS	Nuclear Security Training and Assistance
NY NG	New York State National Guard

OGTR	Department of Energy Office of Global Threat Reduction Training Program
OPDAT-ITP	Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program
OPDAT-IVP	Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training International Visitors Program
PME	Professional Military Education Program
PSI	Population Services International
PSO	Peace Support Operations
QRDF	Mozambican Quick Reaction De-mining Force
RBNP	Department of Energy Regime Building/Prevention Proliferation International Training Program
RCSS	Regional Centers for Security/Strategic Studies
RCTFP	Regional Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
RLDF	Royal Lesotho Defence Force
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SA	South Africa
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAFE SKIES	Safe Skies for Africa Initiative
SANDF	South African National Defence Forces
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARPCCO	South African Regional Police Commissioners Conference
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SWA	Swaziland
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
USDF	Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force
USG	United States Government
USSS	United States Secret Service
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
ZAM	Zambia
ZDF	Zambian Defence Forces
ZIM	Zimbabwe
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“Together with our allies and friends, we must help strengthen Africa's fragile states; help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones. Forming coalitions of the willing and cooperative security arrangements are key to confronting these emerging transnational threats.”

*President George W. Bush
July 11th, 2003*

The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States resulted in a profound change in USG security and foreign policies. Since that infamous day, the George W. Bush Administration has been committed to global security cooperation, with a strong focus on ‘coalitions’ and ‘partnerships’ with other nations and regions, as a means of dealing with threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and non-democratic regimes.

With world focus on the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa, the nature of security cooperation between the USG and Southern Africa has remained largely unpublicised and analysed. It is not clear how the U.S. has sought greater influence in the Southern Africa security sector as a result of the global nature of the ‘War on Terror.’

An empirical question can thus be asked: What has been the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on how the USG approaches Southern African security?

We can assume that 9/11 *was* a catalyst for significantly increased interdependence between the U.S. and Southern African nations. Investigation of this hypothesis requires precise study of the pre and post-9/11 security relationship. Therefore this thesis will be a theory-generating case study consisting of two parts. The first identifies a lot of facts about the data and the second draws implications about the existing factual interpretations of the case and on future research. This is done by examining security sector assistance at the quantitative level, primarily through international training data and arms transfer figures. These will collectively demonstrate how the world’s superpower has penetrated and is shaping the regional security complex of Southern Africa in the post-9/11 world. This thesis will quantify how the USG has been drawn into the

region and how through security cooperation programmes, it is working to enhance its own regional influence on African policy.

DEFINITIONS

This thesis defines Southern Africa as consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This is not a study of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

‘Security cooperation’ refers to the following areas: bilateral security treaties or agreements; military training and assistance (MIL); military HIV/AIDS assistance; joint military exercises, peace support operations training and assistance (PSO); arms authorisations and grants; nuclear security training and assistance (NS); law enforcement training and assistance (LE); and border and transportation security training and assistance (BTS).

The terms ‘pre-9/11’ and ‘post-9/11’ refer to specific periods of time, with ‘pre-9/11’ referring to Fiscal Years 1998 – 2001. ‘Post-9/11’ refers to Fiscal Years 2002 – 2005. The fiscal year begins on October 1st of each year. For example, FY1998 began on October 1st, 1997. The four-year blocks of time provide consistency for data analysis.

When reference is made to the size of police forces in tables or within the chapters, the numbers are inclusive of all non-military law enforcement officials unless otherwise stated. For example, counter-narcotics agents may be included under the term ‘police forces’ despite not being labelled a ‘police force’.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The main objective of this thesis is to answer the following questions:

What has the United States government (USG) done in the Southern Africa security sector from FY1998 through FY2005?

Were the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States a catalyst for dynamic change in the security relationship between the United States and Southern Africa? Do the quantitative measures show a change or not?

What are the implications of the changes, if any, in the security relationship between the United States and Southern Africa?

IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC

A study of pre vs. post-9/11 security cooperation between the USG and Southern Africa is important for many reasons. The first is simply due to the general lack of research available on the topic, as well as the growing importance of African security affairs. Academic attention may be largely focused elsewhere when it comes to post-9/11 U.S. security studies, but that does not mean that regions beyond the Middle East are not changing security relationships with the U.S. in significant ways. There have been no academic works comparing and contrasting pre vs. post-9/11 arms sales, bilateral security treaties and agreements, law enforcement training programs, border and transportation security training programs, nuclear security programs, or HIV/AIDS assistance for security forces. These areas need to be examined to assess any change.

This topic will provide valuable information to academics studying African security, USG officials involved with security assistance, and Southern African officials who are recipients of security aid in the hope of showing the growing U.S. influence in Southern Africa while offering solid recommendations for future relations.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research is a triangulation of method through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. The complementary strengths of each method are necessary to provide the best picture of the security relationship. Given that the subject area has not been extensively studied in prior academic work, qualitative methods based on secondary research are used to build the theory and testable hypotheses.

As the thesis question aims to establish the substance of the security relationship between the U.S. and the Southern African states, much of the text-based data is in the form of documentary evidence collected from USG documents. The qualitative method of choice will be based on four primary components: Pre-9/11 security cooperation between the USG and Southern Africa as a region and on an individual state basis; Post-9/11 security cooperation between the USG and Southern Africa as a region and on an individual state basis; Pre vs. Post-9/11 security cooperation analysis; and implications of the data results. Qualitative data analysis is used in the chapters to extract themes, identify patterns and make generalisations.

To complement the qualitative data, the thesis includes the quantitative research tool of numerical historic data to help establish levels of security cooperation between the U.S. and individual countries. This data is used to determine trends, security cooperation programme priorities, and establish favoured nations within the region.

The first stage of the research analyses the level and quantity of security cooperation between the U.S. and ten Southern African countries from FY1998-FY2001. Several types of data were collected. The first was an estimated size of military forces and police forces. Then international training data was gathered from all U.S. federal agencies that operate international training programmes in security-related sectors, separated into individual years. The training sectors were broken down into military, peace support operations, law enforcement, nuclear security, and border and transportation security sectors. With the identified number of personnel trained per program per year, came an estimated USG monetary expenditure on military and law enforcement programs for each year. Next, arms authorisations and grants from the USG to individual nations were collected for each year in the period from both the U.S. commercial and government-to-government arms industries. All data is organised into tables for improved representation. In addition to the statistical data, bilateral security treaties and agreements; joint military exercises; and military HIV/AIDS assistance programs through the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) are summarised.

The second stage of the research is identical to the first stage in that it also analyses the level and quantity of security cooperation between the U.S. and the same ten Southern African countries in the same areas as the pre-9/11 analysis. The post-9/11 time frame chosen is FY2002-FY2005.

The third stage of the research is an analysis of the data in stages one and two. It brings the two time periods together at both the regional and country-levels, which lead to a comparison of the pre and post-9/11 statistics, to determine conclusions about the research question. Results are based on taking the training numbers, arms authorisations, and training expenditure, and putting together data tables which show the percent change in a particularly area, comparing pre and post-9/11.

In addition to the data tables, 'training ratios' were calculated to show how training allocation has changed after 9/11 in relation to military and police force sizes. This calculation was completed by taking the average size of the military and police forces in the pre and post-9/11 years, multiplied by four to represent each year of the period, and then divided by the total number of persons trained in either the military or law enforcement sectors. For purposes of the training ratio, training figures from the peace support operations and nuclear security training are not included in calculations. However, border and transportation security numbers are added to law enforcement training numbers to determine a law enforcement ratio. This is quite fair due to the overlap in law enforcement and border and transportation security.

Given that the U.S. is a superpower, how and if the increases in U.S. assistance have affected regional security in Southern Africa is explained. Based on data provided in the previous three stages, this shows how post-9/11 security assistance has changed the dynamic of power relations in Southern Africa as shifts in U.S. attention prop up nations that previously were not identified or treated as important partners.

LIMITATIONS

The study of security is wide-ranging and subject to much debate. This thesis will not focus on each and every academic perspective of security studies, but rather security relations in terms of the realist definition- the use and application of military and law enforcement-related security. Traditional elements of security studies fall under military, intelligence, law enforcement, and the legal realm. The discipline has expanded in recent years to include extra-traditional concepts such as environmental security and food security, terms more closely associated with the notion

of 'human security.' This thesis will not delve into the concept of 'human security' and all that goes with it. Only the more traditional sectors of defence and law enforcement will be studied.

Due to the lack of information on specific terrorist threats in Southern Africa, this study will not seek to study specific terrorist networks or activities within the region. It will focus more on possibility, response, and capabilities that involve U.S. interests.

When examining security architecture, this thesis is not going to focus on conflict areas involving Southern African states. Therefore, there will be very little to no discussion on the impact of Southern African state involvement in conflict areas such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, or civil wars and their overlap in Angola and Mozambique. This thesis is not a study of regional conflict.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH

This thesis opens up information on the scope and types of security programmes the USG operates in Southern Africa and even around the globe. Many of the programmes on which data has been collected are not in mainstream focus, particularly in non-military sectors. In each sector discussed, the information analysed and provided should open up a door to other researchers for more detailed exploration of the programmes and how they impact security. It will serve as a model for security assessment in other regions of the globe, which may also have been overlooked since the beginning of the U.S Global War on Terrorism. This thesis will also provide African security experts and researchers with ample data to pursue greater understanding of expanding USG security interests on the continent, particularly with the advent of the U.S. African Command.

**CHAPTER TWO:
PRE-9/11 SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FY1998-2001**

In the late 1990s Southern Africa had a regional population of approximately 110,500,000 and a regional military size of 290,200. Police and other security forces numbered an estimated 220,000. The region faced poor infrastructure, low performing institutions, rising crime, epidemic HIV/AIDS, and fragile economies. Given those factors the region was of no real strategic concern to the USG. A U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report declared explicitly how little Southern Africa mattered in strategic terms to the U.S. government, "America's security interests in Africa are very limited. At present we have no permanent or significant military presence anywhere in Africa. We have no bases; we station no combat forces; and we homeport no ships. We do desire access to facilities and material, which have been and might be especially important in the event of contingencies or evacuations. But ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa."¹ Southern Africa was clearly not a priority.

PRE-9/11 REGIONAL SECURITY SECTOR TRAINING TOTALS (number of personnel)						
Country	MIL.	PSO	NS	LE	BTS	Total
ANG	6	0	0	10	0	16
BOI	433	0	0	25	3	458
LES	228	0	0	6	0	234
MAL	447	1476	0	8	0	1931
MOZ	454	0	0	111	49	614
NAM	226	0	0	13	1	240
SA	2266	15	25	2266	302	4874
SWA	233	0	0	23	0	256
ZAM	382	0	0	6	22	410
ZIM	355	0	0	3	1	359
Region	5030	1491	25	2471	375	9392

Table 1

Despite this, the USG did provide some assistance to Southern African governments through a variety of security programmes including training for 9,392 military and security personnel at a cost of more than \$27,000,000. This included training for 5,030 uniformed military personnel in general military training programmes; 1,491 Malawian and South African military personnel in peace support operations programmes; 25 South Africans in nuclear security programmes; 2,241

¹ United States Department of Defense. Office of International Security Affairs. *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington: Office of International Security Affairs, 01 August 1995. as found on <http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=943> (accessed 13 February 2007)

via with law enforcement programmes; and 375 officials border and transportation security officials (see Table 1). This training was complemented by regional arms authorisations and grants exceeding \$230,551,000 (see Table 2).

This chapter closely examines country-by-country training statistics, detailed monetary authorisations and grants for arms, and overall training program expenditure.

Statistical data collected from multiple USG government agencies is used to identify and summarise the level of security assistance. Information for each country is broken down into several sections comprised of: bilateral security treaties and agreements, military training and assistance, military HIV/AIDS assistance, joint military exercises, peace support operations training and assistance, arms authorisations and grants, nuclear security training and assistance, and border and transportation security training and assistance.

PRE-9/11 REGIONAL ARMS AUTHORIZATIONS and GRANTS (000s of U.S. dollars)					
Country	FMS-A	FMF	DCS-A	DCS-TA	Total
ANG	0	0	499	2010	2509
BOT	2108	1597	23209	14201	41115
LES	0	0	0	0	0
MAL	1469	900	3	0	2372
MOZ	3	0	0	0	3
NAM	366	0	1399	0	1765
SA	654	1900	100611	73995	177160
SWA	0	0	0	0	0
ZAM	0	500	2511	0	3011
ZIM	858	0	1758	0	2616
Region	5458	4897	129990	90206	230551

Table 2

ANGOLA

The United States' pre 9/11 security relationship with Angola focused primarily on the political workings of ending the civil war. As one of three observer nations (together with Russia, and Portugal), the USG worked with the United Nations (UN) and Angolan factions to bring

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES ANGOLA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	RCSS	0	0	4	2	6
Law	OPDAT-IVP	0	0	2	0	2
Enforcement	DEA-ITP	0	2	6	0	8
	TOTAL	0	2	12	2	16

Table 3

peace while overseeing the Lusaka Protocol.² Hastening efforts to solve the crisis lay in part to Angola's significant strategic importance to the U.S. Approximately 7% of U.S. oil imports came from Angola, which also served as the United States' second largest investment site and the third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa.³ The USG recognised that a stable and peaceful nation would better serve American interests. Due to the civil war, minimal military and law enforcement training was provided for Angolan officials in that there were no joint military exercises, no peace support operations training, no WMD or counter-proliferation training, and no border or transportation security training and assistance of any kind.

In this period the USG only trained 16 Angolan military and law enforcement officials via three programmes: at several Regional Centers for Security Studies (RCSS), the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) and the Drug Enforcement Agency's International Training Program (DEA-IIP) (see Table 3). Beyond training data, the rest of the security cooperation came in the form of arms sales (see Table 4).

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

In what was the most significant sign of improving relations, in FY99 the U.S. and Angolan governments launched the U.S.-Angolan Bilateral Consultative Commission, which aimed to encourage dialogue and coordinate programmes and needs. This commission included committees involving defence and law enforcement cooperation. Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, described the significance of the commission, as "The Bilateral Consultative Commission is a device that is used by the U.S. government to demonstrate that they want to have major improvements in their relationship with particular countries. This is what was done with South Africa. In effect it says to the other nation- you are a privileged partner for us."⁴

² Kansteiner, Walter H. III. "Africa's Weak States: U.S. Policy Options in Angola." Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington D.C., 16 December 2002.

³ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1997*. Washington: GPO, November 1996. p. 177.

⁴ Herman Cohen Interview, by John Rosenberg, in "Imagining Angola" by International Special Reports at <http://www.internationalspecialreports.com/africa/01/angola/index.html>

Military Training and Assistance

Military training and other assistance was virtually non-existent as the International Military Education and Training programme (IMET) program was suspended in FY98 due to continued hostilities between the Angolan government and rebel forces. This left only the RCSS program that sent six Angolan defence officials at a cost of \$24,000 to attend defence seminars at the USG's Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) (see Table 4). The seminars focused on civil-military relations and human rights. U.S. officials felt Angolan officials benefited from the ACSS seminars because, "it was important in allowing them to hear disparate views and break out of an isolated mentality borne of years of war."⁵

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA ANGOLA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	10	24
TOTAL	0	0	14	10	24
ARMS/DEFENCE ARTICLES EXPORT DATA					
DCS-A	0	14	463	22	499
DCS-TA	0	0	0	2010	2010
TOTAL	0	14	463	2032	2509

Table 4

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

U.S. HIV/AIDS assistance to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) via the Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) program began in FY01 when an initial needs assessment was conducted.⁶

Arms Authorisations and Grants

\$2,509,000 in arms authorisations was granted to Angola through the U.S. commercial defence industry (see Table 4). Most of the approved arms export licenses were for miscellaneous spare parts for aircraft maintenance, but totals also included \$42,000⁷ for explosives and \$2,010,000

⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at http://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php

⁶ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, p. 6

⁷ United States Department of State. Office of Defense and Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2000*. Washington: GPO, 2000, p. 4. (<http://www.pnddtc.state.gov/rpt655intro.htm>) accessed 3 January 2007

for munitions-related exports.⁸ This is noteworthy because the country was technically still in a civil war and still a fire control system was authorised for sale to the government.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement assistance for Angola was not a priority for the USG beyond payments to the UN mission. Only two law enforcement-training programmes were active, both in FY99-00. These included the DEA-ITP, which trained eight counter-narcotics Angolan officials, and the OPDAT program which trained two Angolan lawyers in criminal prosecution. The USG did not view Angola as a major concern for narcotics crime affecting the U.S. or as a centre of money laundering, although in FY01 Angola was added to a State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) list of countries to watch for potential increases in drug and financial crime.⁹ This concern led to the USG's first offer of centrally funded anticrime and counter-narcotics training during FY01. The same year a law enforcement needs assessment survey team was sent to the country with plans to grow cooperation and training.¹⁰

BOTSWANA

In the pre-9/11 years, Botswana enjoyed a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. It was described as a "regional player" and having "one of the region's most professional and responsible military establishments and offers a model for civilian-military relations for the rest of the continent."¹¹ The major security sector goals stated by the USG

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES BOTSWANA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	35	56	57	96	244
	JCFE	0	32	60	82	174
	RCSS	5	0	7	2	14
	ALP	1				1
Law	OPDAT	2	0	0	0	2
	FBI	0	1	0	15	16
	DEA	0	2	0	0	2
	ATF	0	0	0	5	5
TOTAL		43	91	124	200	458

Table 5

⁸ United States Department of State, Office of Defense and Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2001*. Washington, 2001, Part II., p. 1. (<http://www.pmdtc.state.gov/rpt655intro.htm>) accessed 23 November 2006

⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. Washington: GPO, March 2002 (<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/>) accessed 24 November 2006

¹⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. Washington: GPO, March 2002 (<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/>)

¹¹ United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2002*. Washington: GPO, July 2001, p. 168.

included helping Botswana build regional power, improving security resource allocation and civil-military relations.¹²

The U.S. trained 458 Botswana military and security officials at a cost of \$2,259,400 with the vast majority (433) training in military programmes (see Tables 5 and 6). Additional forms of security assistance came in the form of arms sale authorisations, military financing grants, and the establishment of an International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone (ILEA-G). Botswana did not actively receive or participate in any USG-sponsored peace support operations, border or transportation security, and nuclear security training programmes.

Bilateral Security Treaties/Agreements

In July 2000 the U.S. and Botswana governments entered into an agreement establishing an International Law Enforcement Academy to provide training for middle managers from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The academy is funded by the USG, but is staffed by both U.S. and Botswana nationals with training conducted by federal U.S. agencies. Botswana was chosen as a site due to “long standing and close cooperation in law enforcement and mutual interest in combating trans-national crime.”¹³ It is designed to, “serve the interests of all participating SADC nations in several ways: by establishing and expanding the long-term liaison relationships among law enforcement officials that are critical to combating international crime; by supporting

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA BOTSWANA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	9	23
ATA	0	0	0	11	11
IMET	540	201	479	624	1844
JCET	0	113	96	164	373
TOTAL	540	314	589	808	2251
ARMS/DEFENCE ARTICLES EXPORT DATA					
DCS-A	5515	8393	6783	2518	23209
DCS-TA	0	86	10500	3615	14201
FMP	0	0	0	1597	1597
FMSA	512	267	419	910	2108
TOTAL	6027	8746	17702	8640	41115

Table 6

¹² United States Departments of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and Assistance and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2001*. January 2001

¹³ International Law Enforcement Academy Gaborone Website.
<http://www.ileagaborone.co.bw/ILEA%20History.html> accessed 05 March 2007

democracy and stressing the rule of law in international and domestic police operations; and by raising the professionalism of officers involved in the fight against crime”¹⁴.

Military Training and Assistance

The U.S. trained 433 of the 458 Botswanan officials via four military programmes: IMET, Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET), RCSS, and the Aviation Leadership Program (ALP). IMET trained the most with 244 over the four years at a cost of \$1,844,000. A total of \$373,000 was spent on training 174 Botswana Defence Force (BDF) commandos in unspecified subject areas through JCET (see Tables 5 and 6).

The numbers trained include 14 BDF officers sent to senior leadership seminars at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMECSS) in Germany and the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS). Botswana was one of only two countries in the region (the other being South Africa) funded to send a pilot to training through the U.S. Air Force’s Aviation Leadership Program (ALP). This occurred in FY98, after which the program was suspended until FY02.

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

The DHAPP program was initiated in Botswana in FY01 when officials conducted an in country needs assessment in order to begin combating HIV/AIDS in the BDF. The initial assessment led to a Botswana Brigadier General being assigned as the BDF HIV/AIDS Policy Director and increased future programme design collaboration between the DHAPP, Center for Disease Control, the BDF.¹⁵

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Regionally, and only second to South Africa in the pre-9/11 years, Botswana benefited from the highest authorisations of defence/arms sales via the FMS-A, FMI, and DCS-A programmes which collectively totalled \$41,115,000. The \$2,122,000 in FMS arms agreements was primarily

¹⁴ Stephen Schrage, “Dedication of ILEA Gaborone,” remarks at dedication ceremony. Gaborone, Botswana, 15 March 2003. at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/200319.htm> accessed 2 February 2007

¹⁵ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005

for ammunition related items as well as a series of small boats, which were likely to help in river patrols along the borders. The \$37,410,000 in authorisations with the DCS programme was primarily for military electronics, computers, communication and radar equipment, aircraft purchase, and spares for tank, planes, and armoured vehicle maintenance (see Table 6).

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Beyond the remarkable bilateral agreement establishing Botswana as the host of the ILEA, very little direct law enforcement training or assistance was initiated in the pre-9/11 years. Just 25 Botswana officials participated in international law enforcement training sessions with U.S. federal agencies. This included two Botswana legal professionals through OPDAT as well as 23 others with various Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Agency International Training (ATI), DEA-IIP, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sponsored law enforcement programmes (see Table 5).

LESOTHO

Although the U.S. and Lesotho maintained good state-to-state relations in the pre-9/11 years, the internal instability within Lesotho due to poor military and police institutions became the main security issue between the two nations. The U.S. did not want further internal instability to contribute to regional destabilisation so U.S. efforts focused on encouraging the development of an apolitical, democratic, and human rights aware military force. Therefore American security cooperation was only in the military sector through the IMET and RCSS programmes and with law enforcement via OPDAT. The programmes provided training for 228 Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) members at a cost of \$319,000 (see Tables 7 and 8). No nuclear security, border or transportation security, peace support operations, military exercises, arms authorisations or military HIV/AIDS assistance were offered.

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES LESOTHO (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	0	77	68	67	221
	RCSS	0	0	5	2	7
Law Enforcement	DEA	2	0	0	0	2
	Regional Seminar	0	0	4	0	4
TOTAL		11	77	77	69	234

Table 7

Military Training and Assistance

Military programmes were focused on civil-military relations and respect for human rights with additional training areas added in FY01 for disaster management and peacekeeping operations. The primary means of training was via the IMET programme with 221 personnel participation in the four-year period. Upon establishment of the ACSS in FY00, seven senior RLDF officials participated in regional seminars and conferences.

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: LESOTHO (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Sector	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
IMET	81	42	86	87	296
RCSS	0	0	14	9	23
TOTAL	81	42	100	96	319

Table 8

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Two Lesotho police officers participated in a USG-funded SADC regional counter-narcotics training programme in FY98. Lesotho officials also participated with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and DEA agents in intercepting and investigating controlled deliveries of narcotics from Colombia, via Lesotho, to South Africa; and from Pakistan to Nicaragua (via Lesotho and Miami).¹⁶ During FY00 Lesotho sent four participants to the U.S.-sponsored Regional Law Enforcement Training Needs Assessment Forum held Gaborone.¹⁷

MALAWI

Pre-9/11 years saw the U.S. and Malawi as having, "close relations; Malawi generally supports U.S. positions on international issues."¹⁸ The main security objective for the USG in Malawi was to build up apolitical defence forces in order to help strengthen fragile institutions and pave the way for a stable democratic society. Relative to its size, Malawi enjoyed excellent security relations with the U.S. This was likely influenced by it being the sole Southern African nation to

¹⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999*, March 2000 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/926.htm>

¹⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*, March 2001 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/893.htm>

¹⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1998*, Washington: GPO, May 1997. p. 306.

participate in the American peace support operations programme in Africa, the controversial Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).

A total of 1,931 MDF and Malawian law enforcement officials received training assistance from the USG at a cost of \$3,116,000, the majority of which was through

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES MALAWI (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	25	105	128	66	324
	RCSS	4	0	5	2	11
	JCET	0	24	56	32	112
Peacekeeping	ACRI	0	45	705	726	1476
Law Enforcement	OPDAT	1	0	0	1	2
	DEA	0	2	0	0	2
	ATF	0	0	0	4	4
Total		30	176	894	831	1931

ACRI, which trained 1,476 MDF personnel in peace support operations (See Tables 9 and 10). Second to ACRI was military training, which supported 447 MDF personnel (See Table 9). Law enforcement training occurred, but for only eight Malawian officials. There was no military HIV/AIDS assistance, joint military exercises, WMD/counter-proliferation training, or border and transportation security training and assistance.

Military Training and Assistance

The U.S. sponsored 447 MDF and MoD personnel in Military Training and Assistance programs in the pre-9/11 years. IMET trained 324 personnel at a total cost of \$1,102,000 in a variety of areas, including finance, management, and medical care. Malawi also had regular interaction with American Special Forces trainers via the JCET program. JCET training by U.S. Special Forces and civil affairs groups occurred annually between FY99-01 for 112 MDF personnel focused on light infantry tactics. This was at a cost of \$317,000. The military was also a participant in RCSS programmes with 11 senior leaders attending seminars (see Tables 9 and 10).

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Malawi was the only country in Southern Africa to participate in the USG's flagship peace support operations training programme, the ACRI. The military received communications and other non-lethal equipment with 1,476 troops trained at expenditures of \$1,675,000 (see Tables 9 and 10).

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Malawi received \$2,372,400 in arms grants and authorisations of which all but \$3,400 were through one-time Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and government-to-government Foreign Military Sales-Agreements (FMS-A) in FY98 (see Table 10). The FMS arms exports were primarily for weapon system construction design and aircraft/vehicle related maintenance and spares.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Malawi's porous borders and proximity to East African terrorist activity were primary concerns of the USG. Despite that, there was very little interaction in the pre-9/11 years between Malawian law enforcement officials and Table 10 counterpart agencies in the U.S. No Malawians were involved in border or coastal security programmes. Only eight Malawian law enforcement personnel received training from the USG including two senior drug officials with the DEA-ITP who attended a DEA-sponsored two-week seminar on drug control in Cape Town, South Africa; as well as four with the ATF-ITP, and two prosecutors with OPDAT (see Table 9).

MOZAMBIQUE

U.S.-Mozambican security relations in the pre-9/11 years were not particularly close, but due to the fragile state of the Mozambican government and institutions, as well as an inability to patrol its coast and border, the USG provided defence, law enforcement, and coastal security assistance in support of the government. The U.S. saw a need to assist in order to, "develop a viable,

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: MALAWI (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	8	22
IMET	284	113	345	360	1102
JCET	0	70	213	34	317
TOTAL	284	183	572	402	1441
PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE					
ACRI	0	150	750	775	1675
TOTAL	0	150	750	775	1675
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	0	0	3	0	3
FMF	900	0	0	0	900
FMS-A	1469	0	0	0	1469
TOTAL	2369	0	3	0	2372

integrated, non-political, professional [military] force, maintained at a level consistent with Mozambique's limited economic resources."¹⁹

To work towards U.S. security goals, 614 military and other security personnel were provided training at a cost of \$8,152,000 (see Tables 11 and 12). The majority was in the defence sector with 454 personnel, primarily through IMET and Mine Assistance programmes (MA). In the law enforcement sector 111 Mozambique lawyers and security agents were involved in various programmes while 49 Mozambique Navy personnel were trained in United States Coast Guard (USCG) programmes (see Table 11).

The biggest amount of security cooperation came in the form of equipping and training Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) de-mining battalions and in building up a Mozambican de-mining Quick Reaction De-mining Force, operating under U.S. DoS control. In April 2001, the U.S. DoS established the world's first and only standing Quick Reaction De-mining Force (QRDF). The QRDF is able to rapidly deploy worldwide, when the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs requests its services. When not deployed, the QRDF keeps its skills sharpened by helping to de-mine Mozambique at the request of Mozambique's National De-mining Institute (INI).²⁰

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES MOZAMBIQUE (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	63	59	66	5	193
	RCSS	0	0	5	0	5
	MA	100	116	0	40	256
Law Enforcement	OPDAT	2	25	1	31	59
	DEA	0	2	0	0	2
	FBI	0	0	0	50	50
Border and Transportation Security	USCG	0	0	0	49	49
Total		165	202	72	175	614

Table 11

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA MOZAMBIQUE (in \$000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	0	14
IMET	178	118	178	182	656
INCLC	0	130	130	170	430
MA	2600	500	1750	2180	7030
TOTAL	2778	748	2072	2532	8130
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	0	0	0.3	0	0.3
FMS-A	0	0	0	3	3
TOTAL	0	0	0.3	3	3.3

Table 12

¹⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1998*, Washington: GPO, May 1997. p. 312.

²⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, Washington: GPO April 2006, <http://www.state.gov/pm/rfs/rpt/walkearth/2006/68013.htm#qrdf>

The goal is for the QRDF to receive tasks from the IND and deploy within ten days to anywhere in the world that the U.S. DoS, in coordination with United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) directs them.²¹

Military Training and Assistance

Support of the Mozambican defence sector came primarily through the IMET, MA, and RCSS programmes. IMET trained 193 FADM personnel in courses focusing on civil-military relations, human rights, and budget management at costs of \$656,000 (see Tables 11 and 12).

The majority of U.S. expenditure was on enhancing Mozambique's indigenous de-mining capabilities. To achieve this \$7,030,000 was spent on helping FADM de-mining battalions and developing a Quick Reaction De-mining Force. To train the de-miners, U.S. Special Forces and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel trained and equipped 216 FADM personnel from the 1st Battalion of the FADM army²² at a cost of \$1,150,000. In FY00 the USG provided the commercial de-mining company RONCO with \$450,000 to provide FADM with dogs for de-mining.²³ This was followed in FY01 when the U.S. continued operational de-mining training of FADM at a cost of \$2,180,000 (see Tables 11 and 12).²⁴

Beyond these two major assistance programmes, RCSS was active with five senior FADM and MoD officials participating in leadership seminars with the ACSS at a cost of \$14,000 (see Table 12).

²¹ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001/mozambique/#Heading2641> accessed 25 April 2007

²² United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO April 1999, p. 12

²³ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/mozambique/#Heading1663>

²⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO September 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14869.htm>

Joint Military Exercises

Service members from the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Operations Command participated in MEDFLAG 01-2, held in Nampula and Maputo, Mozambique. MEDFLAG was a medical training and civic assistance exercise conducted by the U.S. European command (EUCOM). It provided mobility training and operational experience for U.S. medical units. Collateral benefits included interchange of medical information and techniques with Mozambique medical personnel and enhanced telemedicine.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

In FY98 the USG provided funds for the National Assembly to conduct a seminar on developing money laundering and asset forfeiture legislation. According to the USG, the course “was extremely well attended by members of the Assembly, personnel from the ministries of Justice, Interior and Foreign Affairs, and received very favourable press coverage.”²⁵ Between FY1999-2000 the USG offered \$260,000 in law enforcement assistance for, “law enforcement safety and survival; police science; assessment of the justice system (legislation and enabling regulations), and investigating and prosecuting public corruption.”²⁶ In FY01 INL funding of \$170,000 was provided to Mozambique for support of a new Police Services Academy, particularly with curriculum development.²⁷ As far as international exchange and training are concerned, OPDAT and FBI-ITP were the most active as 57 Mozambican judges and lawyers get prosecutorial training and 50 Mozambican law enforcement officers trained with the FBI. Two Mozambican personnel worked with the DEA in counter-narcotics (see Tables 11 and 12).

²⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1998*. February 1999 at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/afme98.html

²⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999*. March 2000 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/926.htm>

²⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. Washington: GPO, March 2002, Section X, p. 47.

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

USG concern about Mozambique's limited ability to patrol its coastline led to a team of United States Coast Guard (USCG) officials being sent to work with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on a Coast Guard Development plan and an initial Needs Assessment during FY99.²⁸ Mozambique's continued request for assistance led to a six-man USCG mobile training team being sent to train 41 members of the fledgling Mozambique Navy in maritime security. Additionally, eight Mozambican Navy officials travelled to the U.S. via the USCG's International Visitor Program (USCG-IVP) to meet, interact with, and learn from USCG leadership.

NAMIBIA

During the pre-9/11 years in Namibia the U.S. focused on objectives similar to those worked on in other Southern African nations. This included sustained civil-military relations, the building of democratic values, enhanced military respect for human rights, and general military professionalism. During these years, the USG saw Namibia's greatest strength as a de-mining success story and felt it served as a great example to other regional states suffering from landmine problems. The USG wanted to see Namibia take a stronger position in regional affairs through its regional landmine expertise and in landmine operations in international peacekeeping. Therefore, the USG invested heavily in de-mining training and assistance programmes.

Collectively, 240 Namibian military and other security officials participated in training programmes costing \$1,620,000 (see Tables 13 and 14). This included military, law enforcement, and coastal security training. Namibia did not participate in any peace support operations training, joint military exercises, or nuclear security training.

²⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999*. March 2000 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/926.htm>

Military Training and Assistance

Military Training and Assistance occurred in the IMET, JCEI, RCSS, and MA programmes with a total of 226 personnel trained, with the vast majority in the MA program (see Table 13). These years saw focused training for the Namibia Defence Forces (NDF) and Namibian National Police (NNP) in de-mining. The MA program had the greatest funding and attention with more than \$1,000,000 spent on training and equipping 136 NDF and NNP mine experts (see Table 13). In FY98, U.S. military personnel completed the train-the-trainer

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURE 6.5
NAMIBIA
(number of personnel)

Sector	Program	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	10	8	10	19	47
	RCSS	0	0	4	2	6
	JCEI	0	39	0	0	39
	MA	114	20	0	0	134
Law	OPDAT	1	0	0	2	3
	DEA	0	2	0	0	2
	ATF	0	0	0	8	8
Border and Transportation Security	USCG	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL		125	69	14	32	240

programme for the NDF and Police, instructing 114 military engineers and police in de-mining operations²⁹. That number included 20 police de-miners as well as 20 medical personnel.³⁰ Additional de-mining training for 20 Namibian soldiers totalled \$472,000 in FY1999.³¹ The \$485,000 in FY00 de-mining funding provided technical expertise, through a U.S. contractor, to the NDF to enable it to continue clearing the remaining berms surrounding electric power pylons in northern Namibia.³²

The USG used IMET and ACSS programmes to provide professional training on civil-military relations as well as for professional development programmes at U.S. military colleges. Second to the de-mining programmes, IMET was the largest military programme and through it 47 NDF personnel were provided professional training. A large portion of the \$484,000 in IMET funds was spent on sending Namibian officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers

²⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO September 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14869.htm>

³⁰ David Hartley, "Namibia," Landmines in Africa. Issue 6.2 August 2002. Mine Action Information Center at <http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.2/profiles/profilenamibia.htm>

³¹ United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and Assistance and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000*. March 2000. Section IV at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/cta_af_a2gam.html

³² United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO November 2001 at <http://www.state.gov/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2001/6939.htm>

(NCO) to English language training at defence language schools in the U.S.³³ Six NDF and MoD officials participated in ACSS senior leadership seminars in FY00-01 at a cost of \$23,000 (see Table 14).

NDF training with U.S. Special Forces occurred only during FY99 via JCET when American counterparts trained 39 NDF Special Forces in light infantry tactics (see Table 13).³⁴

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

Military HIV/AIDS assistance began in FY01 when the USG funded a Namibian military HIV/AIDS program proposal written by Population Services International³⁵, an NGO focused on health issues in low-income countries.

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Namibia was authorised both Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and FMS agreements during the pre-9/11 years, totalling \$1,399,000 in DCS-A and \$366,000 in FMS-A (see Table 14). Almost 100% of the commercial defence articles licenses under DCS-A in the pre-9/11 years were for small arms (pistols, rifles) and ammunition for the small arms.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement assistance was minimal with just 17 Namibian personnel receiving training. One received criminal justice and prosecutorial training via OPDAT and the DoJ sent a U.S.

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM EXPENDITURE DATA: NAMIBIA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	9	23
IMET	203	43	84	154	484
JCET	0	54	0	0	54
MA	0	472	485	80	1037
TOTAL	203	569	583	243	1598
ARMS/DEFENCE ARTICLES EXPORT DATA					
DCS-A	513	492	256	138	1399
FMS-A	366	0	0	0	366
TOTAL	879	492	256	138	1765

Table 14

³³ United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and Assistance and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress*. March 2002. Section IV, pgs. 22-23. at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10964.pdf>

³⁴ United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and Assistance and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1999 and 2000*

³⁵ Population Services International. www.psi.org

attorney to Namibia as part of the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) to provide training in criminal investigations. Additionally, 10 Namibian law enforcement personnel trained in DEA and ATF-ITPs, the majority of which occurred in FY01 (see Table 13).

As far as specific law enforcement funding is concerned, the U.S. attempted to provide \$30,000 worth of assistance to Namibia's Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU) at the end of FY00, including dogs, drug test kits, and computers. However, Namibia's Ministry of Justice was unable to approve the required Letter of Agreement before the end of the fiscal year and the offer had to be withdrawn.³⁶ Namibia did not accept any U.S. law enforcement funds in FY01 (see Table 14).

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

The only border security assistance Namibia received was during FY01 when a USCG official travelled to Namibia to conduct a Maritime Law Enforcement Pre-Training Survey to help design future training programmes for the Namibian Navy and Customs Services.³⁷

SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa received the most security assistance of any Southern African state in the pre-9/11 years and was viewed by the USG as its greatest partner in the region. This was due in large part because South Africa had the largest population, most strongly established institutions, largest economy, and strongest military. It made sense for the U.S. to cultivate a strong relationship. The USG felt South Africa's importance could not be understated as, "it is key to regional stability in Southern Africa."³⁸

³⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001, at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/893.htm>

³⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001, at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/893.htm> and Inter-agency Working Group on USG Sponsored International Exchanges and Training (IAWG). *FY2001 Inventory of Programs*. Washington: GPO, p. 86.

³⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1998*. Washington: GPO, May 1997. p. 330

The USG's security objectives were primarily in establishing a strong defence relationship between the two nations through mediums such as the new U.S.-S.A. Bi-National Commission, and helping the military and law enforcement agencies continue to transition in the post-apartheid era. South Africa was seen as the regional leader and merited the most attention.

Therefore, the USG ended up training 4,874 military and other security officials in every security sector, almost half of the entire region's total. This included 2,266 in four military programmes; 25 in three nuclear security programmes; 15 in one peace support operations training programme; 2,266 in ten law enforcement programs; and

302 in border and transportation security programmes (see Table 15). All of the training was provided at a cost well exceeding \$6,366,000. In addition, South Africa had by far, the largest volume of arms agreements with the U.S. commercial and government defence industries, with totals exceeding \$177,000,000 (see Table 16).

FIG. 9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES SOUTH AFRICA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	204	917	447	673	2241
	JCET	0	0	15	0	15
	RCSS	0	0	7	2	9
	ALP	1				1
Nuclear Security	DP	0	1	0	0	1
	NP/NS	0	0	24	0	24
Peacekeeping	EIPC	0	5	1	9	15
Law Enforcement	ICITAP	0	14	0	185	199
	OPDAT	15	0	220	80	315
	OPDAT-IVP	0	0	13	4	17
	FBI	33	213	470	380	1096
	DEA	0	24	27	26	77
	ATF	0	0	0	28	28
	ATF-K9	0	0	0	6	6
	ATA	0	0	138	70	208
	USSS	0	120	0	0	120
	IDRFTA	50	0	0	150	200
	Border and Transportation Security	USCB-JTF	0	20	0	1
USCB-JSP		0	4	5	1	10
	CBP	0	84	77	30	191
	USCIS	80	0	0	0	80
TOTAL		383	1402	1444	1645	4874

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

In FY99, the U.S.-S.A. Bi-national Commission (BNC) created a new committee dedicated to anti-crime issues. The New Justice and Anti-Crime Cooperation Committee became the focal point of U.S.-S.A. anti-crime and counter narcotics cooperation efforts. In response to the establishment of the committee during FY99, the countries signed a treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, as well as an Extradition Treaty which both went into effect during FY01. Also in FY99 the U.S. and South Africa signed an agreement concerning security measures for

the protection of classified military material and an agreement regarding the status of military personnel and civilian employees of the U.S. DoD who are in South Africa on mutually agreed upon exercises.³⁹

In FY00, the USG and South Africa also signed a customs mutual assistance agreement and a Letter of Agreement on Anticrime and Counter-narcotics Assistance. The Letter of Agreement provides U.S. training and commodity assistance to several South African law enforcement agencies.

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: SOUTH AFRICA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	F01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	10	24
IMET	804	512	904	789	3009
JCFE	0	0	42	0	42
ATA	0	35	1559	1579	3173
INL	21				
TOTAL	825	547	2519	2378	6269
PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE					
EIPC	0	61	0.2	36	97.2
TOTAL	0	61	0.2	36	97.2
ARMS/DEFENCE ARTICLES EXPORT DATA					
DCS-A	36507	26915	6543	30646	100611
DCS-TA	0	4900	1750	67345	73995
FMP	350	300	250	1000	1900
FMS-A	0	0	599	55	654
TOTAL	36857	32115	9142	99046	177160

During FY01, the USG and South Africa signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which provides for mutual exchange and cooperation in all logistics matters related to defence.⁴⁰ The agreement opened the way for mutual assistance in matters of logistical support in matters of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster support, bilateral exercises, and unforeseen contingencies.⁴¹ This was a key development as with the agreement the USG gained access to strategic facilities in South Africa.

Military Training and Assistance

Military objectives in the pre-9/11 years were primarily to provide middle and senior level officers with professional training in order to develop personal and professional relationships with new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) leadership. The U.S. also wanted to help South Africa build indigenous peacekeeping capacity and integrate its post-apartheid forces. These goals led to 2,266 SANDF members participating in a huge variety of IMET programmes at a cost of \$3,009,000 (see Tables 15 and 16). Beyond IMET, one South African pilot trained

³⁹ United States Department of State. *Treaties in Force*. Section I: Bilateral Agreements, April 2007, p. 332

⁴⁰ United States Department of State. *Treaties in Force*. Section I: Bilateral Agreements, April 2007, p. 332

⁴¹ "Mozambique: Military Agreement with the United States", Agencia de Informacao Mocambique, 2 May 2007 at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705020580.html>

with the U.S. Air Force in FY98 prior to the ALP program's suspension and the SANDF was active with U.S. Special Forces via JCET training in FY99 when 42 members operated with U.S. counterparts at a cost of \$611,000. Like all other Southern African states, the SANDF and MoD were active in ACSS programming with nine senior leaders attending seminars (see Table 15).

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

The U.S. DoD initiated a DHAPP needs assessment and initial survey of the SANDF in FY01 in partnership with South African Medical Health Services (SAMHS), paving the way for future programming.⁴²

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Given that one of the USG's main goals for South Africa was to see it take on a lead role in international peacekeeping, six SANDF personnel were sent to peacekeeping courses in FY00 via IMET at the U.S. Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) and to the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capability (EIPC) programme. Fifteen SANDF officers were designated Peacekeeping Trainers between FY99-01 (see Table 15).

Arms Authorisations and Grants

South Africa had \$177,160,000 in FMF, DCS, and FMS agreements, technical services, and grants, more than half of which came during FY01 (see Table 16). Agreements and deliveries were established in every sector of the arms industry including, but not limited to: aircraft and helicopters and their spare parts, rockets, small arms, ammunition, chemical agents, satellites, missile parts, sonar equipment, torpedoes, communication equipment, etc.

⁴² United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, p. 58. at <http://www.nhrc.navy.mil/programmes/dhapp/countryreports/fouryear/FirstFourYears.pdf>

Nuclear Security Training and Assistance

Between FY98-01 the USG trained 24 South Africans under the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) Non-Proliferation/National Security programme (NP/NS) and one through the DoE Defense Program (DP). Given South Africa's nuclear history, it is reasonable to assert that the USG would want South African officials to be involved with U.S. national security energy programmes.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

South Africa was the only Southern African state for which the USG listed specific law enforcement and judicial strategies in its annual Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations publications. It was the only country in Southern Africa where the FBI, DEA, United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and every other major U.S. federal agency set up regional offices at the U.S. Embassy. Much of this was coordinated through the new Bi-national Commission.

As evidence of the large support it received, 2,498 South African law enforcement and legal officials were trained through 10 law enforcement programmes. The FBI accounted for almost half of the total with 1,096 law enforcement officials involved in their ITP.

Legal and judicial assistance training was well represented through ICITAP and OPDAT programmes with 57 U.S. attorneys sent to train 571 South African Ministry of Justice officials in a variety of legal areas including legislation drafting (see Table 15).

Counter-narcotic assistance was also well represented via DEA-IIP and International Demand Reduction Training and Technical Assistance (IDRTTA) programme numbers combining for 277 South African officials (see Table 15). As part of the assistance, during FY01 the U.S. donated two 4x4 trucks to assist in counter-narcotics activities in rural areas. The same year also saw a U.S. DoJ consultant sent to assist the South African Attorney General's office in drafting

new counter-narcotics legislation while laboratory technicians from the Drug Enforcement Centre attended training in clandestine drug laboratory investigations.⁴³

USG law enforcement agencies and officials trained the South African Directorate of Special Operations, known as the 'Scorpions' as the bureau was being developed. They also provided extensive police training for the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the South African Police Services (SAPS) on a variety of law enforcement topics such as gang crime, sexual crime investigation, interviewing technique, interrogation, fraud, and major case handling.⁴⁴ In FY01, the United States provided a complex fraud investigation computer-programming tool to the organised crime units of the SAPS in an attempt to facilitate increased sharing of information among investigators in different parts of the country. The USG also provided extensive training to the Scorpions, SAPS, and SARS on issues including investigating sexual offences, interviewing and interrogation techniques, gang violence, drug detection and monitoring, major case management, and complex fraud cases.⁴⁵

South Africa was also the lone recipient amongst Southern African nations of an ATF programme in K-9 dog handling for six personnel and with a U.S. Secret Service (USSS) program in personal protective details for VIPs offered to 120 South African agents (see Table 15).

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

South Africa was a participant in several border and transportation security assistance programmes in the pre-9/11 years. The first was with citizenship and immigration training from the USCIS in FY98, which trained 80 South Africans. There were also fairly regular training and exchanges with USCG programmes as 10 South African Navy personnel visited USCG

⁴³ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/>

⁴⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8701.pdf>

⁴⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8701.pdf>

leadership in the U.S. and 21 navy personnel got in country training on maritime security and law enforcement (see Table 15).

The U.S. CBP provided the greatest amount of training in the border security sector. Between FY99-01 the CBP sent 16 American CBP officers to train 191 South African counterparts. Assistance also included CBP officers sent to South Africa during FY99 to advise and assist with the first Regional Border Control Course conducted by the South African Regional Police Commissioners Conference (SARPCCO).⁴⁶ Part of the funding during FY99 was for a U.S. Customs Seaport Contraband Enforcement Team training programme, which focused on proper searches of maritime vessels. Training was for port security officers and South African customs agents.⁴⁷ Also, in FY00 the USG and South Africa signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, which was designed to 'improve conformity to current operational practices at borders.'⁴⁸ In FY01, a team of experts from U.S. Customs and the Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) inspected border crossings as part of an effort to improve border control operations.⁴⁹

SWAZILAND

During the pre-9/11 years the U.S. had cordial relations with Swaziland, which were described as, "open and fairly cooperative."⁵⁰ Due to the power of the Swazi monarchy, U.S. security interests related to the establishment of democratic reform and institutional strengthening. As in other Southern African countries, the USG felt its main security objective was to encourage a

⁴⁶United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999*. March 2000

http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/afme99.html

⁴⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999*. March 2000

http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/afme99.html

⁴⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001 at

<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/887.htm>

⁴⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002 at

<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/>

⁵⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1999*. Washington: GPO, May 1998. p. 133

stable and apolitical defence and security force that could eventually participate in international peacekeeping missions.

To help achieve security goals, the USG trained 256 Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (USDF) and other security officials at a total cost of \$1,561,000 (see Tables 17 and 18). The majority were trained via IMET

courses, JCET exercises, and MA programmes. Swaziland was not involved in peace support operations training, nuclear security training, military HIV/AIDS assistance, joint exercises, or border and transportation security programmes.

Military Training and Assistance

The IMET program, with focus on civil-military relations and professional development, was the primary medium through which the USG exerted its influence on the USDF while training 97 personnel in a variety of professional courses. This was at a cost of \$309,000 (see Tables 17 and 18).

The U.S. also provided \$1,046,000 in equipment and mil-to-mil training to build USDF de-mining capability.⁵¹ In the summer of FY99, U.S. Special Operations Forces conducted phase one of their train-the-trainer programmes for USDF military personnel. On April 1, 2000 SOF trainers returned to Swaziland to conduct phase two of the training programme, with the goal of creating an indigenous USDF capability to conduct humanitarian de-mining operations.⁵² Despite the USG's allocation of funding for

PRE-9/11 INTERATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES SWAZILAND (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	7	39	17	34	97
	RCSS	0	0	5	1	6
	JCET	0	50	0	40	90
	MA	0	40	0	0	40
Law	OPDAT-ITP	1	0	0	15	16
	OPDAT-IVP	0	0	0	1	1
Enforcement	DEA	0	2	0	0	2
	ATF	0	0	0	4	4
	TOTAL	8	131	22	95	256

Table 17

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: SWAZILAND (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	9	23
IMET	93	23	105	88	309
JCET	0	66	0	82	148
INL	0	35	0	0	35
MA	210	828	8	0	1046
TOTAL	303	952	127	179	1561

Table 18

⁵¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programmes. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO April 1999, p. 15

⁵² United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programmes. "To Walk the Earth in Safety," Washington: GPO July 2000 at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pm/hdp/walk_africa.html#swa

mine clearance, the Swazi government did not submit a request to use the funds and de-mining of the border area with Mozambique did not take place before or during FY01. This angered the USG, which saw no logistical reason for the de-mining to not take place.⁵³ Beyond de-mining, six MoD and senior USDF officials participated in American-led seminars with the ACSS during FY00-01. Additionally, American Special Forces soldiers worked with 90 USDF soldiers on training exercises during FY99 and FY01 at a programme cost of \$148,000 (see Tables 17 and 18).

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement cooperation and assistance was minimal during pre-9/11 years with just 23 officials involved in U.S. programmes. Seventeen of those officials were prosecutor and Ministry of Justice officials involved in the OPDAT legal advisory programmes. Beyond OPDAT, two Swazis were trained by the DEA in counter-narcotics and four by the ATF in investigation techniques. Swaziland was however, the recipient of a onetime \$35,000 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) grant from the U.S. DoS in FY99 to support marijuana crop eradication.⁵⁴ Also, In FY01, the U.S. DoJ sponsored a consultant to visit to Swaziland to advise the Assistant Attorney General drafting anti-narcotics legislation. An additional sum of money was spent to conduct a workshop for several Members of Parliament on the new legislation and to purchase computers for the police.⁵⁵

ZAMBIA

Throughout the pre-9/11 years, the USG saw Zambia as one of the most positively progressing states in the region. Security objectives were based around enhancing Zambian peacekeeping abilities, and developing the defence forces' appreciation of and respect for democratic values as

⁵³ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001/swaziland/>

⁵⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2001*. Washington: GPO, May 2000. p. 320

⁵⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*, March 2001 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/893.htm>

well as, "an affinity for the U.S. military."⁵⁶ The USG wanted to strengthen the Zambian Defence Forces (ZDF) in order to counter the potential for instability due to the ongoing civil wars on the Zambian border in Angola and the DRC.⁵⁷

In these years the USG trained 410 ZDF and other security officials through seven

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES ZAMBIA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMET	5	71	42	15	133
	JCET	0	0	120	120	240
	RCSS	1	0	6	2	9
Law	OPDAT	2	0	0	0	2
Enforcement	DEA	0	2	0	2	4
Border and Transportation	USCG	0	0	0	20	20
	CBP	0	0	0	2	2
TOTAL		8	73	168	161	410

military, law enforcement, and coastal/border security programmes. Zambia was also on the receiving end of more than \$3,000,000 in U.S. commercial arms sales agreements and government-to-government arms grants (see Tables 19 and 20).

Zambia was not involved in U.S. sponsored peace support operations training and assistance, military HIV/AIDS assistance, joint military exercises, or nuclear security programmes.

Military Training and Assistance

The ZDF actively participated in IMET programmes through which 133 ZDF soldiers received approximately \$510,000 in professional training over the 4-year period, mostly for middle and senior grade officers and MoD officials. Adding to that, \$301,000 was spent on 240 ZDF personnel of the First Commando Battalion who trained with U.S. Special Forces in FY00-01 as part of the JCET programme. The ZDF and MoD were active in ACSS seminars through which eight personnel attended senior leadership programmes in FY00-01 (see Tables 19 and 20).

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: ZAMBIA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	8	22
IMET	143	65	137	165	510
JCET	0	0	219	82	301
TOTAL	143	65	370	255	833
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	16	1378	406	711	2511
FMF	0	0	0	500	500
TOTAL	16	1378	406	1211	3011

Table 20

⁵⁶ United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations - Fiscal Year 1998*. Washington: GPO, May 1997, p. 341-342.

⁵⁷ United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; Fiscal Year 2000*. Washington: GPO, May 2000, p. 327

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

The DoD's DHAPP programme began working with the Zambian government in FY00 when an initial needs assessment was conducted. This led to revelations that an estimated 35% of the ZDF suffered from HIV/AIDS, a figure far above the national average of 21%. DHAPP followed up in FY01 with meetings with the ZDF HIV/AIDS coordinator to learn more about ZDF efforts. DHAPP contracts for additional assistance were not signed before FY02.⁵⁸

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Arms authorisations and grants from the U.S. commercial and government industries totalled \$3,011,000 in the pre-9/11 years. This was primarily through the commercial U.S. defence industry with \$2,511,000 in arms agreements (see Table 20). Most of these DCS-A agreements were for helicopter and aircraft parts and maintenance, with large dollar values attached to new aircraft engines.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Not many Zambian law enforcement officials received USG-sponsored training in the pre-9/11 years. That being said, two Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) officers trained in FY00 with the DEA and in FY01 when two Zambian DEC lab technicians received training in clandestine drug lab investigations.⁵⁹ The OPDAT programme was also represented during FY98, when it trained two Zambian legal professionals in prosecutorial skills (see Table 19).

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Most border security assistance for Zambia occurred in FY00 and FY01. It began in FY00 when the USG donated computers and 24 drug-testing kits to the Zambian Drug Enforcement

⁵⁸ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy, Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA, June 2005, p. 74, at <http://www.nhrc.navy.mil/programmes/dhapp/countryreports/fouryear/FirstFourYears.pdf>

⁵⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002., Section X, pg. 81

Commission (DEC), which was used for drug control efforts in international airports and at border crossings.⁶⁰ FY01 saw the USCG conduct a Maritime Law Enforcement Pre-Training Survey in Zambia, which led to a Mobile Training Team conducting a Boarding Officer and Counter-narcotics Maritime Law Enforcement class.⁶¹ This was part of an effort to help the Zambian border patrol monitor rivers along borders with Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and the DRC as well as on Lake Mweru and Lake Tanganyika to monitor crossings from Tanzania. Additional border assistance came during FY01 when U.S. CBP and INS officers visited Zambian border crossings with Tanzania to advise Zambian border patrol officials on more efficient controls.⁶²

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe is perhaps, the most interesting case to follow in Southern Africa during the pre-9/11 years. The FY98 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations offers for Zimbabwe the most glowing praise of any Southern African military. The report states, "Zimbabwe is an economic and political force in Southern Africa supports U.S.

PRE-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES ZIMBABWE (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
Military	IMEI	51	76	18	0	145
	JCEI	0	0	51	3	54
	RCSS	0	0	4	0	4
	MA	50	54	51	0	155
Law Enforcement	OPDAT-IVP	0	0	0	2	2
	DFA	0	2	0	0	2
Border Security	CBP	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL		102	132	124	2	359

Table 21

policy in military and peacekeeping operations in the region and often takes a leadership role in mediating regional conflict.⁶³ It continues with praise of the Zimbabwean military (ZNA) as, "highly professional, accepting of civilian control, and has been a source of stability in the region."⁶⁴ U.S. security objectives included improving Zimbabwean military

⁶⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001. at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/887.htm>

⁶¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001. at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/887.htm>

⁶² United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*. March 2002., Section X, pg. 81.

⁶³ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1998*. Washington: GPO, May 1997. p. 343

infrastructure to help them deploy in peacekeeping operations and helping them downsize to build an economically feasible force. They wanted them to take on 'international leadership in peacekeeping operations.' Clearly, the U.S. thought highly of Zimbabwe's defence sector through FY00. However, as the political situation in Zimbabwe created economic, political, and social crisis, USG security sector support wavered considerably, dropping to nothing more than a \$621,000 grant to train and equip a de-mining platoon of the ZNA (see Table 22).

Despite a major drop in security relations, 357 ZNA and other security officials received training in military, law enforcement and border security programs. Of those, 353 were involved in Military Training and Assistance, three in law enforcement, and just one in border security programmes. All of the training was at a cost of \$5,011,500 however the majority of that was for equipping and training four ZNA de-mining platoons, which was the most significant of all security cooperation programmes (see Tables 21 and 22).

Zimbabwe did not receive any training or assistance in military HIV/AIDS, joint exercises, or WMD/counter-proliferation training,

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

An extradition treaty signed in July 1997 officially came into force in April 2000.

Military Training and Assistance

The USG provided approximately 361 ZNA and MoD personnel with training in FY98-00 via IMET, MA, RCSS, and JCET programmes. Due to the political crisis and USG disagreement with Zimbabwe policies, all funding was cancelled in FY01. When they were offered, IMET courses were primarily for senior ZNA officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) with focus on budget control, democratic value, and management to encourage military downsizing.

⁶⁴ United States Department of State: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 1998*. Washington: GPO, May 1997. p. 343

The programme with the greatest support (\$4,264,000) was the MA programme. USG assistance funded U.S. Special Forces training of four platoons of Zimbabwean Army Combat Engineers in minefield survey procedures, basic de-mining techniques, medical orderly skills, and vehicle maintenance, as well as the purchase of equipment and vehicles necessary to outfit and transport the platoons⁶⁵. In July 98, the U.S. military started a project providing several advisors and equipment for ZNA mine clearance at Victoria Falls. In FY99, \$1,743,000 in U.S. de-mining assistance purchased equipment, vehicles, and supplies for a second de-mining platoon as well as provided a team of U.S. army Table 22 trainers.⁶⁶ This continued in FY00 when another \$1,900,000 was provided to equip and train the third platoon. During FY01 \$621,000 was spent on equipping a fourth platoon.⁶⁷ All four platoons were trained and operational by the end of FY01 (see Table 22).

PRE-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: ZIMBABWE (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	TOTAL
RCSS	0	0	14	8	22
IMET	336	82	286	0	704
MA	0	1743	1900	621	4264
TOTAL	336	1825	2200	629	4990
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	379	1056	70	253	1758
FMS-A	0	0	0	858	858
TOTAL	379	1056	70	1111	2616

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Both the DCS and FMS programmes were active in Zimbabwe through FY01, with quite a few annual DCS-A agreements (totalling \$1,758,000), a large one-time FMS-A agreement during FY01 (totalling \$858,000). It is interesting to note that the USG authorised more than \$1,000,000 in FMS-A and DCS-A agreements during FY01 when they had stopped funding all defence and law enforcement programmes and were publicly vocal in criticism of the Zimbabwean government (see Table 22).

The majority of DCS-A licenses authorised during the pre-9/11 years were for aircraft and helicopter spares, small arms, and mine components.

⁶⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety." Washington: GPO November 2001 at <http://www.state.gov/t/pn/rls/rpt/walkearth/2001/6939.htm>

⁶⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety." Washington: GPO July 2000 at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pn/hdp/walk_africa.html#zim

⁶⁷ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2002/zimbabwe#Heading12566>

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement cooperation and assistance was almost non-existent in the pre-9/11 years, with the most significant event being an extradition treaty between the two nations that went into force in April 2000.⁶⁸ Beyond that, the DEA trained two Zimbabwean counter-narcotics officials during FY99. Additionally, the OPDAT-IVP brought one Zimbabwean official to the U.S. to meet with DoJ counterparts (see Table 21).

Border and Transportation Security

One Zimbabwean border/customs official trained with the U.S. CBP in FY98. (see Table 21)

CONCLUSION

Given the collected data it is easy to conclude that Southern Africa as a region was, as the USG acknowledged, not of strategic interest. While South Africa, Botswana, and even Malawi enjoyed fairly strong relations, the region as a whole did not gain much. It was no secret that the defence sectors of the Southern African nations were ill equipped, ill trained, and under-funded. The quantity of security cooperation was marginal and clearly the USG strategy was to provide a lot of aid to South Africa in order to build influence and get in the good graces of the regional power, figuring that South Africa could then provide aid to its neighbours in a trickle down effect without the USG having to get too directly involved. This fit with the well known American aversion to getting directly involved in African security issues due to its fiasco in Somalia some years before. Therefore, promoting friendship and assistance towards the regional powers would produce the best results.

⁶⁸ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2000*. March 2001 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2000/893.htm>

CHAPTER THREE:
POST-9/11 SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FY2002-2005

By the early to mid-2000s the population of Southern Africa had increased from a pre-9/11 level of 110,500,000 to 117,700,000. Overall regional military size decreased by almost 20,000 to 271,400 and regional police size had increased slightly to 225,500. The region faced many of the same challenges as it had pre-9/11, yet with the added concern of terrorism. The attacks brought on an international outcry

POST-9/11 REGIONAL SECURITY SECTOR TRAINING TOTALS (number of personnel)						
Country	MIL.	PSO	NS	LE	BTS	Total
ANG	81	0	0	83	94	258
BOT	346	2240	0	669	334	3589
LES	75	0	0	79	1	155
MAL	303	1011	0	126	2	1442
MOZ	437	1137	0	250	6	1830
NAM	147	46	9	177	79	458
SA	1184	267	216	1769	38	3474
SWA	60	0	0	148	1	209
ZAM	635	23	134	238	14	1044
ZIM	2	0	2	1	2	7
Region	3270	4733	361	3540	571	12475

condemning terrorism and Southern African nations scrambled to do their part. This included increased attention on crime, border control, and counter-terrorism, which, in turn, led to new legislation. Terrorism became a global issue. The USG did its part by shifting policy and rhetoric, issuing a "With Us or Against Us" battle cry.

The nations of Southern Africa denounced the attacks and became partners of the USG in its 'Global War on Terror'. With an American pledge to help all nations combat terrorist threats, the region gained a variety of assistance and training opportunities. All told, between FY02-05 a total of 12,475 regional military, law enforcement, and other security personnel were trained through U.S. security assistance

POST-9/11 REGIONAL ARMS AUTHORISATIONS and GRANTS (000s of U.S. dollars)					
Country	FMS-A	FMF	DCS-A	DCS-TA	Total
ANG	150	359	21491	0	23000
BOT	4017	2724	68598	67005	142344
LES	0	0	0	0	0
MAL	441	150	6255	0	6846
MOZ	56	665	0	0	721
NAM	368	0	475	0	843
SA	14551	12650	368545	115771	511517
SWA	0	203	0	0	203
ZAM	600	300	10647	10821	22368
ZIM	0	0	0	0	0
Region	20183	17051	476011	193597	706842

programmes. This included 3,270 in the military sector; 4,733 through the EIPC and ACOTA peace support operations programmes; 361 in nuclear security; 3,540 in law enforcement; and 571 in border and transportation security. More than \$49,000,000 was spent on providing training for these personnel (see Tables 23 and 24).

In addition to increased training, the USG raised regional arms authorisations to \$706,842,000. This was broken down into \$20,283,000 for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme; \$17,051,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants; \$476,011,000 in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) authorisations; and \$193,597,000 in Direct Commercial Sales Technical Agreements and Services (DCS-TA). These were significant funding increases (see Table 24).

All told, Southern Africa voluntarily entered into a much more interdependent strategic partnership with the United States, who on the back of terrorism, extended its regional influence and penetrated the regional security complex on its own terms.

ANGOLA

During the post-9/11 years the USG became more involved at all levels with the Angolan security sector. Angolan strategic importance to the USG grew rapidly as the Bush Administration actively sought to increase oil imports from the Gulf of Guinea region. Given that Angolan oil production was projected to double between 2003 and 2008⁶⁹, a push to assist Angola in protecting oil assets and enhancing internal security became an American priority. USG officials stated that, "a new stability in Angola can ensure that the country's territory is not used as a base of operations for international terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized crime."⁷⁰ Internal stability became a key concern of the USG who feared insurgencies could threaten the oil industry and by proxy, U.S. investment.

The relative power and size of the Angolan defence and police forces to other states in the region has not been lost on the USG as, "The Angolan Armed Forces remain one of Africa's strongest militaries with a demonstrated ability to project power beyond Angola's borders."⁷¹ Recognition that the Angolan military is a strong force in a strategic state, located in an important region, has meant increased attention and resources from the American government.

⁶⁹ Staff Writer. "Angolan Oil Production to Double by 2008," African News Agency, 18 February 2007, at <http://www.afrol.com/articles/11314>

⁷⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004. p. 222

⁷¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004. p. 222

Beyond internal stability issues, concrete USG security goals included de-mining, destruction of small arms and light weapons, and professional training of Angolan military forces through the resurrected IMET programme. U.S. efforts focused on civil-military relations, human rights, and English language training, as few Angolan officials could communicate with American officials.

In recognition of Angola's increasing importance, the USG sponsored training for a total of 315 Angolan officials at a cost of approximately \$1,261,000. Additionally, the USG spent approximately \$16,573,000 on de-mining and small arms/light weapon destruction and approved \$21,991,000 in arms exports agreements (see Tables 25 and 26).

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES						
ANGOLA						
(number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	Total
Military	IMET	0	42	16	10	68
	RCSS	6	2	2	3	13
Law Enforcement	OPDATIVP	0	0	4	1	5
	FBI	11	0	12	17	40
	DEA-ITP	2	0	12	0	14
	DEA-IVP	0	0	1	0	1
	ATF	0	8	8	7	23
Border and Transportation	TSA	0	62	0	0	62
	USCG-ITP	0	0	2	4	6
Security	USCG-IVP	0	0	6	0	6
	SAFESKIES	0	1	9	6	16
	CBP	0	1	2	0	3
	USCIS	0	0	1	0	1
	TOTAL	19	128	92	76	315

Table 25

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Angola signed an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG in FY05, which ensured that American citizens would not be surrendered by Angolan authorities to the International Criminal Court without American government consent.⁷² Without signing an Article 98 agreement Angola would have likely lost all defence aid.

Military Training and Assistance

The post-9/11 years saw a significant increase in Angolan participation in military training programmes as 75 FAA and MoD officials were involved with the IMET and RCSS seminar

⁷² Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2005. at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm>

programmes. U.S. expenditure amounts totalled \$461,000⁷³ spread out over the four-year period (see Tables 25 and 26).

Significant annual IMET funding increases were observed between FY02-05 as the civil war ended and the USG reinstated the IMET programme. FY03 saw all 42 IMET participants receive healthcare resource management training while FY04-05 focused on English language instruction. A Distinguished Visitors Orientation Program highlighted FY04 defence cooperation for the Angolan Minister of Defence and ten of his senior deputies. This created the first opportunity for senior Angolan defence officials to directly interact with senior U.S. DoD staff (see Table 26).⁷⁴

Angolan officials also participated in U.S.-sponsored regional security seminars through the ACSS, with 13 officials attending events between FY02-05.

Joint Military Exercises

FY05 saw the first ever U.S. military exercise in Angola, as part of the U.S. European Command MEDFLAG event. This was a primarily humanitarian assistance event comprised of a 10-day, three-phase exercise. It brought 212 American military personnel as part of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit to Angola to stage a simulated mass casualty drill, treat 100 surgical patients, and provide medical and dental care in three rural Angolan villages.⁷⁵

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: ANGOLA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	66	26	30	76	198
IMET	0	8	84	151	243
Safe Skies	0	0	0	800	800
TOTAL	66	34	114	1027	1241
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	11	343	10	21127	21491
PMF	0	0	150	200	350
FMS-A	0	0	0	150	150
TOTAL	11	343	160	21477	21991

Table 26

⁷³ see Table 26

⁷⁴ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2004 and Fiscal Year 2005*, Volume 1, Section IV, pg. 1. at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45785.pdf>

⁷⁵ Boyd, Terry. Stars and Stripes. "Units Deploy to Angola for Humanitarian Work." 4 September 2005, at <http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=30568&archive=true>

Additionally, Angola participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. This was a major USG-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focusing on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.⁷⁶

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

Angola has not been affected by HIV/AIDS at the same levels as other regional militaries. Estimates range between 3-11% of FAA personnel afflicted with HIV/AIDS as of FY03. The DHAPP programme expanded in FY03 when two FAA staff members were sent to an All-Africa Military HIV/AIDS Conference in Gaborone. It continued to grow in FY04 when FMF funds were designated for HIV/AIDS laboratory infrastructure including screening and diagnostic technology, computers and computer technology, rapid testing kits, and staff training. A total of 10 master trainers and 49 peer educators have been trained via DHAPP.⁷⁷

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Prior to FY05, there were fairly marginal levels of arms export authorisations and grants for Angola, although it was a recipient of both FMS and DCS agreements and FMF grants FY04-05. Post-9/11 FMF grants totalled \$350,000 and were designed to help Angola pay for USG provided training and services (see Table 26).

The majority of arms authorisations came in FY03 when Angola secured a DCS-A of \$343,000. Approximately \$180,000 was for bomb detection equipment and \$126,000 for miscellaneous technical assistance.⁷⁸ However, a more than \$21,000,000 DCS-A in FY05 proved that the USG had become serious about opening up to the Angolan military. The U.S. DoS approved sales for

⁷⁶ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

⁷⁷ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 6-7.

⁷⁸ United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2003*. pgs. 4-5.

three helicopters, which accounted for approximately \$19,000,000 of the FY05 agreement. The rest was for aircraft spares and communication equipment (see Table 26).⁷⁹

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

As the USG sought to expand influence and assist with reform, there was an increase of cooperation in the law enforcement sector. Over the four years Angola participated in six OPDAT, DEA, FBI, ATF, and ILEA-G-sponsored training programmes, through which 140 Angolan law enforcement and legal officials receiving instruction. Forty Angolan law enforcement officials were trained by the FBI; 15 by the DEA in counter-narcotics; 23 by the ATF; 57 by courses at the ILEA-G, and five lawyers trained via OPDAT in counter-terrorism legislation writing (see Table 25).⁸⁰

As the USG became more invested in the ILEA-G, it encouraged and funded Angolan police officers to attend training at the academy. The first offer for training at ILEA-G came in FY02, but Angola did not designate anyone to attend and lost out on the programme.⁸¹ This changed during FY03 when 12 Angolan police officers attended courses⁸² and later in FY04 with 17 police.⁸³ Participation doubled to 28 during FY05.⁸⁴

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Angolan personnel participated in six border and transportation security training and assistance programmes in the post-9/11 years as coastal, border, and maritime security became a major

⁷⁹ United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2005*. pgs. 2-3.

⁸⁰ see Table 25

⁸¹ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2002*, March 2003, Section X, pg. 3.
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29913.htm>,

⁸² United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2003*, March 2004
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29839.htm>

⁸³ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2005: Volume II*, March 2005
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42361.htm>,

⁸⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2006*
<http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/html/62112.htm>, march 2005

focus of American interest in the Gulf of Guinea. A total of 94 Angolan security officials were involved in the various programmes (see Table 25). The new focus on border and transportation security was due to a concern that relaxed borders at the end of the civil war would increase drug trafficking, smuggling, and cross-border crime. "An increased FAA capacity to security maritime borders will protect fishing and oil resources and help prevent the country's use as a transit point for terrorists and illegal drugs."⁸⁵

One element of the maritime focus included USCG-conducted coastal security training for eight Angolan navy personnel in FY04-05. Additionally, six Angolan officials were invited to the U.S. to observe and interact with USCG officials as part of the USCG-IVP. This was financed through FMF grants as part of the USG's resurrected African Border and Coastal Security Programme, of which Angola is a member.⁸⁶

As Gulf of Guinea maritime security became a more pressing issue for the USG, it hosted a three day Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference at the U.S. 6th Fleet Headquarters in Naples, Italy during FY05. Angolan naval leadership participated along with 16 other nations to discuss, "common interests, challenges and threats, including combating piracy; the illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs and people; and the need to reduce maritime threats to economic development, such as those over national fishing rights and offshore oil production."⁸⁷

Transportation security assistance was also enhanced as 16 Angolan officials received aviation security training through the Safe Skies for Africa Programme in FY03-05. Direct assistance came during FY05 as the U.S. spent \$800,000 on training and equipment to increase airport security. On top of that, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Agency (TSA) trained 62 Angolan security officials in airport and aviation security through their IIP in FY03 (see Table 25).

⁸⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004. p. 222

⁸⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2007*. Washington: GPO, May 2006. p. 335

⁸⁷ Armed Forces Press Service. "Maritime Security Conference Brings Navies Together". 05 October 2004, at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25137>

BOTSWANA

The U.S.-Botswana security relationship has remained one of the strongest, if not the strongest, amongst all Southern African nations in the post-9/11 years. Viewed as a model of professionalism and a partner in the Global War on Terror, the country is described as, "advancing regional stability and supportive of U.S. goals in Southern Africa...with an important role to play in regional security and conflict resolution."⁸⁸ This is strongly evident in the amount of military, law enforcement, and peacekeeping assistance which have been offered to the nation. The primary security concern of the USG is the tremendously debilitating effect HIV/AIDS is having on the capabilities of the BDF and other security forces.

To increase Botswana's domestic security capacity, the USG spent more than \$16,000,000⁸⁹ training 3,598 BDF and other security officials. The majority came from BDF participation in peacekeeping programmes, which trained 2,249 BDF personnel. Complementing this were five military training programmes for 348 personnel; nine law enforcement training programmes for 669 law enforcement

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES						
BOTSWANA						
(number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	145	63	64	47	319
	RCSS	7	2	2	7	18
	ALP	0	1	1	2	4
	RCTFP	0	0	2	3	5
Peacekeeping	EIPC	1	0	0	0	1
	PME	30	60	0	0	90
	ACOTA	0	0	2102	56	2158
Law Enforcement	OPDAT	0	60	0	0	60
	OPDAT-IVP	1	0	0	0	1
	FBI-ITP	51	37	92	130	310
	DEA-ITP	49	25	20	0	94
	DEA-IVP	0	0	0	2	2
	ATF-ITP	25	52	27	31	135
	FLETC-IVP	0	3	0	0	3
	FLETC-ITP	0	28	5	0	33
	ATA	34	0	0	0	34
	Border and Transportation Security	CBP-ITP	0	0	202	0
CBP-IVP		0	0	1	0	1
ICE-IVP		0	0	1	1	2
	ICE-ITP	0	0	129	0	129
	TOTAL	343	328	2648	279	3598

Table 27

⁸⁸ United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*, Washington: GPO, May 2004, pg. 225.

⁸⁹ Figure does not include U.S. expenditure on the Botswana ACOTA programme, which is publicly unavailable at present time.

personnel; and four border and transportation security training programmes for 334 personnel (see Table 27).

Law enforcement cooperation saw a big boost with the establishment of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA-G) in Gaborone. The ILEA-G is staffed and taught by U.S. and Botswanan officials and serves as a focal point for regional training. The establishment of the ILEA-G showed great confidence in Botswana as a key player in African security affairs.

In addition to the training figures, the USG authorised more than \$142,000,000 in arms agreements with the Botswanan government, covering a wide range of defence articles (see Table 28).

Collectively, the rhetoric, programme funding, and cooperation prove that Botswana enjoys a very strong bilateral relationship with the U.S.

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Botswana signed an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the U.S. in FY03,

ensuring that American citizens would not be surrendered by to the International Criminal Court by the Botswanan government without first having USG consent.⁹⁰ Without signing an Article 98 agreement Botswana would have likely lost all defence aid.

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: BOTSWANA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	48	25	29	108	210
ALP	0	10	10	8	28
ATA	310	0	49	0	359
IMEI	437	491	621	681	2230
JCET	191	0	0	0	191
RCTFP		0	18	9	27
ILEA-G	3857	2910	2700	3755	13222
TOTAL	4843	3436	3427	4561	16267
PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE					
EIPC	5	0	0	0	5
PME	3	205	0	0	208
TOTAL	8	205	0	0	213
ARMS AUTHORIZATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	13896	25101	20751	8850	68598
DCS-TA	4075	59000	0	3930	67005
FMF	1000	728	500	496	2724
FMSA	1115	1032	147	1723	4017
TOTAL	20086	85861	21398	14999	142344

⁹⁰ Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2005, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm>

Also in FY03, Botswana signed an "Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement" with the USG which opened the way for mutual assistance in matters of logistical support in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster operations, bilateral exercises, and unforeseen contingencies.⁹¹ Additionally, Botswana has signed an agreement with the USG to serve as a U.S. military 'Cooperative Security Location' as part of its global positioning strategy.⁹² A Cooperative Security Location is defined as, "a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access."⁹³

Military Training and Assistance

Approximately \$2,230,000 was allocated to train 319 BDF personnel in IMET courses. Botswanan officials also continued to be active in ACSS programmes with 18 personnel attending various seminars and four BDF pilots attending aviation training in the U.S. through the ALP programme (see Tables 27 and 28).

The JCLT programme was active in FY02 with two exercises conducted for 40 and 50 members of the BDF Commando Squadron.⁹⁴

As counter-terrorism became a focus of American security interest, funding was allocated beginning in FY04 to help Botswana establish a counter-terrorism unit.⁹⁵ Botswana also was invited in FY04 and FY05 to send five officials to counter-terrorism training seminars as part of the new Regional Combating Terrorism Fellowship Programme (RCTFP).

⁹¹ "Mozambique: Military Agreement with the United States", Agencia de Informacao Mocambique, 2 May 2007 at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705020580.html>

⁹² Ploch, Lauren. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Divisions. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. Washington D.C. December 7, 2007, p. 9

⁹³ United States European Command. http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transformation/Transform_Blue.asp, 13 January 2008

⁹⁴ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2002*, Volume I, Section IV, pg. 2

⁹⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2004*. Washington: GPO, May 2003. pg.196

Joint Military Exercises

Botswana participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major U.S.-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focusing on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.⁹⁶

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

HIV/AIDS is greatly affecting the BDF, which suffers an estimated 40% infection rate. Given the high level of military relations between the two nations and the USG's desire for the BDF to be a regional leader in peacekeeping, HIV/AIDS is greatly undermining USG security goals for the BDF.

The DHAPP programme began in earnest during FY02 as funds were allocated for revision of a train-the-trainer curriculum; the purchase of nine modular counselling and testing centres, a Toyota Land Cruiser for staff travel, computers, test kits, lab equipment, and mass awareness materials for the BDF. Funds sent two BDF personnel to an international HIV/AIDS conference in Barcelona, Spain and during FY03 Botswana hosted an all-Africa HIV/AIDS conference, all of which was paid for by DHAPP. Additionally, two BDF HIV clinicians were sent for training in San Diego, California and to an HIV/AIDS symposium in South Africa. Since programme inception DHAPP has trained 55 BDF master trainers and 314 peer educators⁹⁷

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Botswana participated in three PSO programmes in the post-9/11 years. These included one officer sent to the U.S. as part of the now defunct EIPC programme. More significant PSO

⁹⁶ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

⁹⁷ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 10-11.

training came through the Professional Military Education (PME) programme, which trained 30 and 60 BDF personnel, respectively, during FY02-03. This was in the form of an introductory peace support course given by a mobile education team from the U.S. This meagre PSO assistance has been eclipsed by BDF participation in the U.S.-led ACOTA programme with 2,128 BDF personnel trained between FY04-05. Programme structuring included a variety of senior level PSO management training for battalion staff and eventually full battalion exercises. To date, three BDF battalions have completed the ACOTA training programme.⁹⁸

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Post-9/11 arms export authorisations to Botswana totalled \$142,244,000 with the majority via through the DCS programmes. The agreements were primarily for aircraft parts, communications equipment, and military electronics (see Table 28).

Direct USG arms authorisations through the FMS programme totalled \$4,017,000. FMF training and equipment grants added up to \$2,724,000. The FMF grants helped Botswana purchase C-130 aircraft parts to help with future peacekeeping troop deployments (see Table 28).

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Post-9/11 law enforcement training exploded as the USG built the ILEA-G and trained many Botswanan law enforcement officials. USG and Botswanan officials share administrative and training duties at the ILEA-G. This is perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the U.S.-Botswana security relationship.

As far as courses are concerned, the FBI-ITP trained 310 Botswanans while the DEA-ITP trained 94 people and the ATF-ITP 135. Subject areas were agency specific such as forensic analysis by the FBI, counter-drug operations by the DEA, and counter-small arms smuggling courses by the ATF. On top of that, 35 mid to senior level Botswanan officials were sent for training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in unspecified disciplines.

⁹⁸ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personal correspondence, 3 May 2007)

As for the legal side of law enforcement, OPDAT was active during FY02 when four U.S. OPDAT attorneys were sent to Botswana to meet counterparts in various ministries. One Botswanan attorney was sent to the U.S. in a reciprocal training arrangement. In FY03 eight OPDAT attorneys went to Botswana and trained 60 counterparts in prosecutorial matters. The programme also worked with Botswanan officials on domestic counter-terrorism legislation.⁹⁹

The ATA programme was active for in FY02 when 34 officials participated in courses in Delaware and Texas, USA on Vital Installation Security and Surveillance Detection.¹⁰⁰ Additional ATA funding in FY04 was designated for a technical consultation on security at the Sub-Africa Mini Congress (LACP).¹⁰¹

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Border security assistance was active as three CBP officer and 12 ICE officers were sent from the U.S. to train 331 Botswanan customs, border, and immigration officials in border and immigration security (see Table 28).

LESOTHO

U.S. security relations with Lesotho remained fairly consistent in the post-9/11 years, although Lesotho's small stature kept it towards the bottom of USG regional security priorities. USG security goals remained the same as pre-9/11 years and included encouraging establishment of an apolitical, professional military and law enforcement agencies with respect for civil-military affairs and human rights.

Bilateral relations did however suffer a substantial setback in FY02 when the USG enacted the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) in response to the Rome Statute. Despite

⁹⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Released March 2004. at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29913.htm>

¹⁰⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2002*. February 2003. p. 11

¹⁰¹ United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2004*. February 2005. p. 32

USG threats to withhold aid monies, Lesotho refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (Article 98) with the USG, leading in a loss of IMET military assistance funds, severely decreasing total training figures. More than \$331,000 was spent on Lesotho security training for 181 LDF and law enforcement officials in the post-9/11 years. This included 75 LDF trained in two military-related programmes; 105 law enforcement officials trained in five law enforcement programmes; and just one official by the U.S CBP in border and transportation security (see Table 29).

POST-9/11 INTERATIONAL TRAINING AND FIGURES LESOTHO (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	53	4	0	0	57
	RCSS	9	7	7	5	18
Law Enforcement	FBI	11	5	17	0	33
	DEA	11	3	5	0	19
	AIP	8	6	5	6	25
	FLETC	0	0	2	0	2
Border and Transportation Security	CBP-IVP	0	0	1	0	1
	TOTAL	92	20	32	21	155

Table 29

Lesotho was not involved with any arms deals or nuclear security and peace support operations training programmes.

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Despite USG entreaties, the Lesotho government opted not to sign an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG and in so doing was prohibited from receiving direct military training assistance.

Military Training and Assistance

There was a marked downgrade in the number of LDF personnel trained by the U.S. in the post-9/11 years with numbers falling to 75 persons. That led to a loss of approximately

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: LESOTHO (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	81	25	28	89	223
IMET	83	25	0	0	108
TOTAL	164	50	28	89	331

Table 30

\$175,000 in military assistance during the two years.¹⁰²

Despite that, Lesotho defence officials were active in U.S.-sponsored RCSS activities at the ACSS with 18 senior leaders involved in approximately \$223,000 worth of security seminars (see Tables 29 and 30).

Joint Military Exercises

The RLDF participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. The event is a major U.S.-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focusing on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.¹⁰³

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

The DHAPP programme began in Lesotho during FY02 when a preliminary needs assessment was conducted. As of that year, the general population of Lesotho was estimated to have a 29% HIV/AIDS infection rate. No studies of the RLDF have been conducted, but rates are estimated to equal that of the general population. FY03 saw increased collaboration as DHAPP provided funding for lab equipment, test kits, computer hard and software, haematology analyser, and nutritional supplements for the troops. Funds were also spent on nurse, physician, and lab technician training in California which was focused on diagnosis and clinical procedure. FY04 and FY05 funding was designated for the creation of a peer educator training programme as well as a mass educational campaign for the defence forces.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Eberhart, Sally. Coalition for the International Court. *Countries Opposed to Signing a Bilateral Immunity Agreement: US Aid Lost in FY04 and FY05 and Possibly FY06*, pg. 1. at

http://www.iccnw.org/documents/CountriesOpposedBIA_AidLoss_current.pdf

¹⁰³ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at

<http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art:912>

¹⁰⁴ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 38-39.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

A total of 79 Basotho law enforcement personnel were trained under DEA, FBI, ATF, and FI,ETC international training programmes between FY02-05. Unfortunately, sector training dropped off dramatically over the course of the four post-9/11 years (see Table 29).

Several members of the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS), Lesotho Revenue Authority, and Directorate of Economic Corruption and Offences attended classes at the ILEA-G,¹⁰⁵ including 26 in FY02.¹⁰⁶ More Basotho law enforcement involvement included participation in FY03 seminars on counter-terrorism legislation writing and a FY04 Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering conference on public corruption.¹⁰⁷ In the both years U.S. advisors from the Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance went to Lesotho to help senior ministry and bank officials with financial and tax reform aimed at money laundering and financial crime.¹⁰⁸

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Border and transportation security assistance for Lesotho was virtually non-existent in the post-9/11 years with just one official trained during FY04. A U.S. CBP textile production verification teams operated in Lesotho to assist with seizures of counterfeit certificates for apparel.¹⁰⁹ This sector was clearly not a priority for the USG.

¹⁰⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2007*. Washington: GPO, May 2006. pg. 289.

¹⁰⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2002*, March 2003, Section X, pg. 32.

¹⁰⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2005: Volume II*, March 2005. P. 29.

¹⁰⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2003: Volume II*, March 2004.

¹⁰⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY2004 and FY2005*, March 2005, p. 85.

MALAWI

During the post-9/11 years Malawi maintained a solid relationship with the USG. Despite under funding issues and a general lack of law enforcement and military resources, the USG considered the Malawian security sector, particularly the MDF, to be very professional.

Unlike other Southern African countries, terrorism was designated a primary security concern for the USG in Malawi. American officials expressed concern with the potential for an external threat to Malawian and U.S. interests from rising terrorist activity in East Africa and trans-national crime.¹¹⁰ U.S. officials even named Malawi a partner and participant in its Global

War on Terror in that, "Malawi has been a strong supporter in counter-terrorism efforts...Malawi has cooperated with the United States in coordinating anti-terrorism activities."¹¹¹

Beyond terrorism concerns, USG security interest in Malawi is similar to that of other Southern African countries, with main objectives being to increase peacekeeping capacity, ensuring a continued apolitical military structure and positive civil-military relations, and working to combat the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on the MDF.

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES						
MALAWI						
(number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	82	81	36	58	257
	RCSS	8	2	2	0	12
	JCET	30	0	0	0	30
	ALP	0	1	3	0	4
Peacekeeping	ACOTA	0	29	0	982	1011
Law	FBI	4	21	19	0	44
Enforcement	OPDAT-IVP	0	7	0	0	7
	DEA	4	11	17	0	32
	ATF	5	20	14	1	40
	FLETC	0	0	3	0	3
Border and Transportation Security	USCG	2	0	0	0	2
TOTAL		135	172	94	1041	1442

Table 31

¹¹⁰ United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for FY2004*. March 2005.

¹¹¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington: GPO, July 2005, p. 276.

To meet USG security goals, training was provided for 1,442 military and security officials through 11 different training programmes. This included 303 in military programmes; 1,011 in the ACOTA peacekeeping support operations programme; 126 in law enforcement programmes; and two in border and transportation security programmes (see Table 31). In addition to the hands-on training provided, the USG authorised \$6,846,000 in arms sales to boost domestic security capacity (see Table 32).

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Malawi signed an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG in FY03, ensuring that American citizens will not be surrendered to the International Criminal Court by the Malawi government without first having USG consent.¹¹²

Military Training and Assistance

Collectively, military training and assistance diminished rather abruptly between FY02-05 despite the participation of the MDF and MoD in several programmes. A total of 303 MDF and MoD personnel were provided U.S.-sponsored training via IMET, RCSS, ALP, and JCET. However, the majority was with the IMET programme, which trained 257 MDF and MoD personnel at a total cost of \$1,169,000 (see Tables 31 and 32).

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: MALAWI (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	57	27	31	0	115
ALP	0	10	23	0	33
IMET	301	232	382	254	1169
JCET	112	0	0	0	112
TOTAL	470	269	436	254	1429
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	0	70	0	6185	6255
FMF	0	0	0	150	150
FMS-A	185	0	253	0	441
TOTAL	185	70	253	6338	6846

Table 32

Despite these combined numbers, there was a noticeable drop in MDF IMET training figures in FY04-05 as compared to FY02-03. Despite that, the RCSS was active with a total of 11

¹¹² Press Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 3, 2005. at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm>

MDF/MoD personnel attending security seminars at the ACSS.

Additionally, a total of four MDF pilots were sent to the U.S. for training through the ALP in years FY03-04 and 30 MDF personnel from the Parachute Battalion of the MDF trained with U.S. Special Forces in a JCET training mission in FY02.¹¹³

Joint Military Exercises

The MDF participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major U.S.-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focused on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.¹¹⁴

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

HIV/AIDS infection rates in the MDF are estimated at around 15% of the forces. The DHAPP programme began in Malawi during FY02 when the USG awarded a contract to the company ResourceLinC to build a programme. During FY03 DHAPP sent two MDF personnel to the all-Africa HIV/AIDS conference in Botswana and one MDF physician to HIV training in San Diego, California. Funding also went towards condom distribution, lab equipment, mass awareness campaigns, establishment of three Counselling and Testing Centres, and for 18 MDF personnel to attend HIV/AIDS diagnostic and clinical treatment courses at the Malawi Armed Forces College. Since programme inception 25 MDF master trainers and 275 peer educators have been trained via DHAPP.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2002*, Volume I, Section IV, pg. 14

¹¹⁴ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," Unites States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

¹¹⁵ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 42-43.

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Having been the lone Southern African participant in the ACRI programme, Malawi easily transitioned into the ACOTA programme. Despite enthusiasm, MDF participation in ACOTA was hampered by a lack of Malawi governmental funding and inoperable defence equipment. Despite this, an initial Training Strategy Conference was conducted in FY03 when 29 MDF staff worked with U.S. DoS programme managers to design a general plan. The first stages of ACOTA training were conducted in FY05 when 982 MDF personnel were involved in introductory training. This included a battalion staff and company commander Training, Planning, Management and Development course and a Command Post Exercise. To date, no MDF battalion has completed a full ACOTA training cycle.¹¹⁶

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Arms export authorisations were fairly small compared to other Southern African nations with a total of \$6,846,000 in FMF grants and DCS/FMS sales. The majority of the authorisations came in FY05 with a \$6,185,000 DCS-A for communications equipment and explosives cartridges. Other than that, only FY03 saw a DCS-A of \$70,000 for pyrotechnics. There was also \$441,000 in unspecified USG direct FMS arms authorisations and a FMF grant in FY05 which presumably was to help the MDF pay for associated costs in the ACOTA programme (see Table 32).

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Malawian law enforcement officials received consistent training through the FBI, DEA, ATF, and FLETC-ITPs with 44, 32, 40, and 3 trained under each agency, respectively (see Table 31). Malawian officials were also regular participants in ILEA-G courses; however no specific numbers of participants are publicly available.

¹¹⁶ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personal correspondence, 3 May 2007)

OPDAT was also active in Malawi in FY03 when seven Malawian law enforcement and legal officials received assistance with counter-terrorism legislation writing.¹¹⁷ In FY05 the government of Malawi requested help from USAID in developing an anti-corruption/administration of justice programme. In turn USAID approached ICITAP and OPDAT to begin developing a country programme focused on seven components: (1) assessment of the Malawi law enforcement and justice system capacities; (2) basic police skills development for instructors; (3) fraud investigation development; (4) internal affairs development; (5) case management development; (6) forensic development; and (7) ICITAP management of all areas.¹¹⁸ Early efforts in components (1), (2), and (3) were conducted during FY06-07.

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Border and transportation security cooperation was virtually nonexistent, save two Malawian officials getting training by the USCG during FY02 (see Table 32). The USCG went to Malawi to conduct a Pre-Training Maritime Survey, presumably to assist with patrols of Lake Malawi to counter a variety of smuggling operations and better control the borders.¹¹⁹ After FY02 no border or transportation security training was initiated or conducted by the USG.

MOZAMBIQUE

Post-9/11 U.S.-Mozambican security relations have increased and are focused on building up military and law enforcement relationships, basic technical skills of law and military personnel, assisting in coastal and maritime management, and humanitarian de mining.

The USG has named Mozambique a supporter of its counter-terrorism efforts in that Mozambique “has provided political support for the Global War on Terrorism and has undertaken to improve border security and anti-terrorist activities that its limited resources

¹¹⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

¹¹⁸ United States Department of Justice. Criminal Division. International Development and Training Program. “*Malawi Law Enforcement Development Program*” (received via personal correspondence, 23 January 2007)

¹¹⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2002*. Washington: GPO, March 2003, Section III

allow.”¹²⁰ Despite that acknowledgment, very little has been done by the USG to help with border and transportation security.

The USG identified its main security interest in Mozambique as helping the government to gain, “control of international crime, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking through capacity building in law enforcement and the judiciary.”¹²¹ A sizeable increase in law enforcement assistance for the country followed this declaration. This occurred primarily in anti-corruption initiatives with sizeable technical and advisory assistance.

Collectively, the USG spent \$1,236,000 on military and law enforcement training; \$12,269,000 on mine assistance; and authorised \$1,426,000 in arms agreements and sales (see Table 34). A total of 1,670 military and other security officials were provided training in the post-9/11 block including 277 in military programmes; 1,137 in peacekeeping support operations training programmes; 250 in law enforcement programmes; and 5 in border and transportation security programmes (see Table 33).

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES MOZAMBIQUE (number of personnel)						
Sector	Program	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	79	68	25	38	210
	JCET	47	0	0	0	47
	RCSS	12	2	1	5	20
	MA	40	40	40	40	160
Peacekeeping	ACOTA	0	0	269	868	1137
Law	ICITAP	0	0	0	5	5
Enforcement	OPDAT	33	15	0	10	58
	FBI	44	13	27	43	127
	DEA	6	13	7	0	26
	ATF	13	7	7	10	37
Border and Transportation	USCG	1	0	0	0	1
	CBP	0	0	2	2	4
Security	USCIS	0	0	1	0	1
	TOTAL	275	358	379	1018	1830

¹²⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004, p. 265

¹²¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004, p. 237

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Mozambique signed an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG in FY03, ensuring that American citizens would not be surrendered to the International Criminal Court by the Mozambican government without first having USG consent.¹²² Mozambique is not a State Party to the Rome Statute and therefore was never eligible for IMET and FMS/FMF sanctions.

In May 2007, the U.S. and Mozambique signed an "Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement" with the USG which opens the way for mutual assistance in matters of

logistical support in matters of peacekeeping operations, humanitarian and disaster support, bilateral exercises, and unforeseen contingencies.¹²³

Military Training and Assistance

The U.S. provided training for 277 FADM and MoD personnel in three military training programmes: IMET, RCSS, and JCET. The majority was IMET with \$433,000¹²⁴ spent primarily on Infantry Officer, English language instruction, and maritime training courses for 210 FADM personnel (see Table 33).

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME					
EXPENDITURE DATA:					
MOZAMBIQUE					
(000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	67	28	17	88	200
IMET	74	108	85	166	433
JCET	94	0	0	0	94
INL	470	*	*	*	470
MA	2424	3431	2620	3794	12269
TOTAL	3129	3567	2722	4048	13466
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
FMF	0	40	0	625	665
FMS-A	16	0	0	40	56
TOTAL	16	40	0	665	721

Table 34

¹²² Georgetown University Law School Website.

http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/guides/article_98.cfm#countries

¹²³ "Mozambique: Military Agreement with the United States", Agencia de Informacao Mocambique, 2 May 2007 at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200705020580.html>

¹²⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2002*. Washington: GPO, March 2003

The FADM participated in JCET training with U.S. Special Forces during FY02 in two separate training activities. The first was for 30 FADM members of the 1st Special Forces Platoon and the second activity was for 17 FADM members of the Graciano Antinio Navila.¹²⁵ Twenty FADM and MoD officials participated in regional security seminars with the ACSS.

Large portions of MA funds were split to support FADM de-mining capabilities, civilian landmine-related charities and de-mining companies, and the 40 members of the Mozambique Quick Reaction De-mining Force.¹²⁶ In FY04 \$120,000 went directly to FADM training and \$2,500,000 was directly provided to the QRDF.¹²⁷ During FY05 \$1,666,000 was spent on training and support of FADM de-mining capability and \$2,178,000 on the QRDF.¹²⁸ The QRDF has been deployed to Bosnia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Iraq by the U.S. DoS (see Table 34).

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

HIV/AIDS has affected FADM immensely. While general population HIV/AIDS rates stand around 13%, MDF infection rates are estimated to be 39%. DHAPP began operations with FADM during FY03 when a needs assessment was conducted and a training programme development contract awarded to Population Services International. FMI funding was earmarked to financially support the programme. FADM has almost no capacity for HIV diagnosis, treatment, or education s. funding has been for master and peer trainer establishment, mass awareness campaigns, and the beginning of infrastructure development. A total of 10 master trainers and 43 peer educators have been trained.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2002*, Volume I, Section IV, pg. 18

¹²⁶ International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Country Report Mozambique, Years 2002,2003,2004, 2005 at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/mozambique>

¹²⁷ International Committee to Ban Landmines, Country Report 2005 at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/mozambique.html#Heading261>

¹²⁸ International Committee to Ban Landmines, Country Report 2006 at <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/mozambique.html#Heading390>

¹²⁹ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2003, pgs. 46-47.

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Mozambique began active involvement with the U.S-led ACOTA programme in FY04. While FADM interest in participation is high, funding setbacks and lack of equipment have hampered the FADM's ability to become as involved as the government would like. Despite some difficulties, an initial Training Strategy Conference was conducted in FY04 with 19 FADM staff and a group of 250 FADM personnel completing an ACOTA cycle. During FY05 there was an increase in ACOTA participation as elements of a second and third battalion (430 and 438 personnel, respectively) completed a full ACOTA cycle (see Table 33).¹³⁰

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Arms cooperation was extremely limited with just a total of \$721,000 in FMF grants and FMS-A programmes approved (see Table 34).

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

USG efforts were quite strong in the law enforcement sector during post-9/11 years. The FBI, DEA, and ATF trained a total of 186 officials in areas such as forensics auditing, anti-crime, and counter-narcotics. Mozambique also received legal, anti-corruption, money laundering, and criminal prosecution assistance through ICITAP and OPDAT in which 17 and 32 officials, respectively, received training (see Table 33).

OPDAT advisors were sent to Mozambique in FY03 to advise and begin training a new anti-corruption unit.¹³¹ By FY04, the Government of Mozambique was able to open anti-corruption offices in Nampula and Beira with USAID funds.¹³² OPDAT was also active in Mozambique in

¹³⁰ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personnel correspondence, 3 May 2007)

¹³¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Part II. Bilateral Activities. Washington: GPO, March 2004

¹³² United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2005*. Washington: GPO, March 2005

FY03 when several law enforcement and legal officials received assistance with counter-terrorism legislation writing.¹³³

In FY02-03 the USG spent \$470,000¹³⁴ to assist the Police Sciences Academy to begin to make the academy an effective training institution. To do this, ICITAP sent an intermittent Technical Advisor to ACIPOL to consult with and provide training for a variety of law enforcement officials. In FY04 groundwork on the development of a teaching forensic lab at ACIPOL was begun. The lab construction, funded by the USG, was completed during FY05 and today ICITAP provides materiel and training support to the academy in both forensic and general law enforcement disciplines.¹³⁵ ICITAP Technical Advisors also implemented a community-policing project with the Mozambique Police Service that established bicycle patrol units in Maputo neighbourhoods during FY04. ICITAP provided training and new bicycles for the units.¹³⁶

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

The majority of border and transportation security assistance came via IMFTI funds, which, during FY02 and FY03, trained a total of 52 FADM Army and Navy personnel on maritime security issues. To help with coastal security, the USG included Mozambique as part of its resurrected Africa Coastal and Border Security Programme.¹³⁷ Despite that, very little direct training or equipment was provided to Mozambican border and coastal security personnel, as just one Mozambique customs and border official was sent to the U.S. for training and three others visited U.S. counterparts during FY04 and FY05 through the CBP-IVP programme. Just one Mozambique citizenship and immigration official trained with the USCIS-IVP. At the

¹³³ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

¹³⁴ United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2002*. Washington: GPO, March 2003 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17950.htm>

¹³⁵ United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, International Development and Training Program. "Mozambique Law Enforcement Development Program" (received via personal correspondence, 23 January 2007)

¹³⁶ United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, International Development and Training Program. "Mozambique Law Enforcement Development Program" (received via personal correspondence, 23 January 2007)

¹³⁷ United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2007*. Washington: GPO, May 2006. p. 335

beginning of FY07, the USG donated three coastal patrol boats to the Mozambican Navy to assist in border and maritime security.¹³⁸

NAMIBIA

Namibia has been viewed by the USG as one of the most stable countries in the region. Therefore much rhetoric is devoted to the promotion of democratic values and civil-military relations within the security forces. Namibia is also seen as an active participant in peacekeeping operations and like other Southern African nations, the USG has prioritised its primary security goal to be to increase Namibia's peacekeeping capacity.

During the post-9/11 years the USG spent \$878,000 on military and law enforcement training for 458 personnel in several security sectors. Within the defence sector, 147 NDI' personnel were trained through the IMEI, RCSS, and JCET programmes. An additional 46 NDI' staff members began involvement in the ACCOTA peacekeeping support operations training programme. On the law enforcement side, 176 security officials were provided training, as were 79 border and transportation security officials. Namibia was also unique in that nine personnel were provided nuclear security training through several U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) programmes (see Table 35).

In addition to security training, the USG provided \$1,900,000 in de-mining assistance and authorised \$843,000 in arms agreements (see Table 36).

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Namibia refused to sign an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG, which led to a sanction on IMEI funding during FY04-06. In October 2006, President Bush, who has to

¹³⁸ Ports and Ships Website. "US Beefs Up Mozambique Navy With Patrol Boats," 16 January 2007 at http://www.ports.co.za/navalnews/article_2007_03_13_2719.html

provide written authorisation to the U.S. Secretary of State for ASPA sanction waivers, granted one to Namibia. Participation in IMET will resume during FY07.¹³⁹ Additionally, Namibia signed an agreement with the USG to serve as a U.S. military 'Cooperative Security Location' as part of its global positioning strategy.¹⁴⁰ A Cooperative Security Location is defined as, "a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access."¹⁴¹

Military Training and Assistance

The U.S. spent \$829,000 on three programmes which trained 147 NDF and MoD officials. The majority of this was with \$494,000 in IMET funds (see Table 36). Due to ASPA sanctions Namibia lost out

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES						
NAMIBIA						
(number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	22	61	1	0	87
	RCSS	6	2	2	10	20
	JCET	40	0	0	0	40
Peacekeeping	ACOTA	0	0	0	46	46
Nuclear Security	DP	0	0	0	1	1
	OGTR	0	0	7	0	7
	RBPP	1	0	0	0	1
Law Enforcement	OPDAT	1	0	0	0	1
	DEA	16	19	8	0	43
	FBI	16	19	20	10	65
	ATF	21	25	12	10	68
Border and	TSA	0	25	0	0	25
Transportation Security	SAFE SKIES	0	3	48	0	51
	ICE	0	0	1	0	1
	CBP	0	0	1	0	1
	USCIS	0	0	1	0	1
	TOTAL	123	157	101	77	458

Table 35

¹³⁹ Release by the Office of the Press Secretary, "Waiving Prohibition on United States Military Assistance with Respect to Various Parties to the Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court," 2 October 2006 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2006_presidential_documents&docid=pd100c06_txt-11

¹⁴⁰ Ploch, Lauren. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Divisions. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. Washington D.C. December 7, 2007, p. 9

¹⁴¹ United States European Command. http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transformation/Transform_Blue.asp, 13 January 2008

on \$325,000 in IMET funding in FY04-05.¹⁴² That was a substantial loss as it had been Namibia's most well-funded security programme.

The IMET training Namibia was able to take advantage of was primarily in HIV/AIDS medical training and English Language Instruction.¹⁴³

NDF and MoD officials were also active participants in ACSS programmes as a total of 20 people attended security related seminars and symposiums at total cost of \$257,000 (see Tables 35 and 36). The JCLT training the NDF received in FY02 was for 40 members of the 12th, 26th, and Combat Support Brigades.¹⁴⁴

Joint Military Exercises

The NDF participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. The event

was a major U.S.-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focused on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.¹⁴⁵

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME					
EXPENDITURE DATA:					
NAMIBIA					
(000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	44	25	29	159	257
ATA	0	0	0	49	49
IMET	226	253	15	0	494
JCFE	78	0	0	0	78
MA	88	600	0	0	688
TOTAL	436	878	44	208	1566
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	187	72	9	207	475
FMS-A	368	0	0	0	368
TOTAL	555	72	9	207	843

Table 36

¹⁴² Eberhart, Sally. Coalition for the International Court. *Countries Opposed to Signing a Bilateral Immunity Agreement: US Aid Lost in FY04 and FY05 and Possibly FY06*, pg. 1. at www.iccnw.org/documents/CountriesOpposedBIA_AidLoss_current.pdf

¹⁴³ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2002*, Volume I, Section IV, March 2003

¹⁴⁴ United States Departments of Defense and State. Bureau for Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Year 2002*, Volume I, Section IV, March 2003

¹⁴⁵ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," United States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

HIV/AIDS has affected the NDF in greater percentages than national averages, with an estimated 33% of NDF personnel afflicted. To help combat it, DHAPP began operating in Namibia during FY03 after awarding a training programme development contract to PSI. However, since programme inception, the Namibian government has not been terribly involved in pursuing extra assistance, such as requesting lab and infrastructure support. The most that has been done is an educational video for NDF personnel made, and support was provided in FY03 to send three NDF personnel, one member of the Namibian MoD, the U.S. Defense Attaché, and a PSI rep to the all-Africa HIV/AIDS conference in Botswana. An NDF physician and nurse were also funded to attend the HIV training programme in San Diego, California. A total of 40 NDF peer educators were trained through DHAPP.¹⁴⁶

Peacekeeping Operations Training and Assistance

Namibia has signed onto the U.S.-led ACOTA programme, but to date has only conducted an initial Training Strategy Conference attended by 46 NDF personnel.¹⁴⁷

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Both the FMS and DCS arms programmes were active in Namibia during the post-9/11 years. A one time FMS-A of \$368,000 was provided in FY02 for unspecified government sales, as was a total of \$475,000 in DCS-A (see Table 36). The majority of those funds were for several hundred small arms weapons, mostly pistols and rifles and almost 1,000,000 cartridges of small arms ammunition.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 48-49.

¹⁴⁷ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager, (personal communication, 3 May 2007)

¹⁴⁸ United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005*.

Nuclear Security Training and Assistance

Namibia is unique in that it was one of the only countries in Southern Africa to receive training through U.S. DoE WMD/Counter-proliferation programmes. It began in FY02 when one Namibian official was trained via the Regime Building/Non- Proliferation (RBNP) programme, which focuses on reducing global tension due to nuclear concerns and conflict. In complement to this, seven officials were involved with the Office of Global Threat Reduction (OGTR) programme during FY04. The OGTR focuses on the identification, securing, removal, and disposal of vulnerable and other radioactive materials around the globe designated a threat to the U.S. and the global community. Finally FY05 saw one official trained under the Defense Program (DP), which focuses on the military application of nuclear energy. Perhaps this training is influenced by the fact that, "Namibia is currently one of the biggest exporters in the world of "yellow cake", the uranium oxide that forms the basis for fuel rods to be used in atomic power stations."¹⁴⁹

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement training was conducted for 178 officials, primarily through FBI, DEA, and ATF International Training Programmes with 65, 43, and 68 in each, respectively. Assistance had dropped off significantly by FY05 when only 20 law enforcement personnel were provided training of any kind (see Table 35).

Members of the Namibia Customs Service, Prison Service, Immigration, and prosecutors from the Ministry of Justice have attended a variety of courses held at ILEA-G in the post-9/11 years, but detailed numbers have not been publicly released. Interestingly enough, the Namibian Police Services have declined annual invitations for training at the ILEA despite continued overtures from the USG.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Catherine Sasman, "Namibia: Renewable Energy. Namibia's Future?" *New Era*. Windhoek, 1 June 2007. at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200706010563.html>

¹⁵⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

Namibia received \$88,000 in de-mining assistance during FY02. The funds provided for protective clothing, supplies for field operations, and communications equipment for the Namibian Police Force's six Explosive Ordnance Demolition field teams.¹⁵¹ Allocating \$600,000 in FY03, the USG provided refresher training, equipment and vehicles to de-mining and explosive ordnance demolition (EOD) mobile response teams made up of personnel from the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF) and Namibian Police Forces.¹⁵² During FY05 Namibia was allocated Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) funding of less than \$50,000 for unspecified purposes.¹⁵³ Additionally, OPDAT was active in Namibia in FY03 when several legal officials received assistance with counter-terrorism legislation writing.¹⁵⁴

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Assistance to the border and transportation sectors occurred during FY03-04 for 79 officials. The majority of the training was related to transportation issues as 76 officials in the aviation sector were involved with the TSA-ITP and Safe Skies for Africa Initiative (see Table 35). Both programmes are dedicated to improving African aviation security and safety in order to foster growth of aviation services between the U.S. and Africa.

U.S. CBP officials travelled to Namibia during FY03 to conduct an initial training needs assessment.¹⁵⁵ The only year with dedicated training for border and immigration officials was during FY04 when three personnel were involved in U.S. programmes. One Namibian official participated in training with CBP, one with the USCIS focusing on immigration and one with ICE focusing on the investigative side of customs and immigration enforcement.

¹⁵¹ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian De-mining" Washington: GPO September 2002 at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14869.htm>

¹⁵² United States Department of State. Bureau of Political Military Affairs. Office of Humanitarian De-mining Programs. "To Walk the Earth in Safety: The U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian De-mining" Washington: GPO August 2004 at <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2004/37227.htm>

¹⁵³ United States Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005*. March 2005 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/>

¹⁵⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

¹⁵⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

SOUTH AFRICA

It is no secret that in the post-9/11 world, South Africa has been one of the most important countries on the African continent to American strategic and security interests. President Bush singled South Africa out in his first post-9/11 National Security Strategy as a country having, “a major impact on its neighborhood” and being an “anchor for regional engagement requiring focused attention.”¹⁵⁶ The U.S. largely views South Africa as a powerful partner in security efforts, “It is a tangible partner in addressing terrorist and international crime threats, non-proliferation, regional instability, and the security of American citizens visiting South Africa.”¹⁵⁷

To build the partnership, the USG stated in a FY05 Foreign Operations Budget Request that, “the South African government has requested assistance to help it address international organized crime and potential terrorism threats; and our combined governments have identified the final priorities for assistance:

border control, counter-narcotics, youth and domestic violence, sex crimes, major case management, and money laundering.”¹⁵⁸ Beyond these issues, and far beyond efforts in any other Southern African country, the USG has assisted in police reform and close military cooperation.

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES SOUTH AFRICA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Program	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	511	459	73	0	1043
	JCET	0	78	0	0	78
	ALP	1	2	0	0	3
	RCSS	14	1	4	9	28
	RCTFP	0	0	4	1	5
	MCP	0	0	23	0	23
Nuclear Security	DP	0	0	21	0	21
	NPRD	1	0	0	0	1
	OGTR	0	0	13	13	26
	OHA	0	0	0	3	3
	RB/PP	2	0	0	0	2
	ATA	139	24	0	0	163
Peacekeeping	EIPC	30	171	0	0	201
	ACOTA	0	0	26	0	26
Law Enforcement	OPDAT	115	119	618	0	852
	OPDAT-IVP	10	16	4	12	48
	FBI	103	78	124	112	417
	DEA	4	13	33	0	50
	ATF	21	9	5	15	50
	ATA	35	90	0	0	125
	USSS	0	0	52	0	52
	IDRTTA	20	21	0	0	41
	FLETC	0	0	72	62	134
Border and Transportation Security	TSA	0	0	1	1	2
	USCG	1	1	7	0	9
	CBP	0	10	4	2	16
	ICE	0	2	12	1	15
	TOTAL	1013	1094	1096	231	3434

Table 37

¹⁵⁶ President of the United States. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002, p. 11

¹⁵⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 284

¹⁵⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 312

Most of the focus is on senior leadership development and encouragement in growth of civil-military relations.

Collectively, the USG provided training for 3,434 South African military and other security personnel between FY02-05. This was achieved through 31 separate programmes, the most of any Southern African nation, including the training of 1,184 in military programmes; 216 in nuclear security programmes; 227 in peace support operations training; 1,635 in law enforcement; and 48 in border and transportation security programmes (see Table 37). More than \$12,500,000 was spent on this training (see Table 38). Added to this has been more than \$500,500,000 in approved arms authorisations and grants (see Table 38).

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: SOUTH AFRICA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	77	12	52	77	218
IMET	1459	1115	343	0	2917
JCET	0	611	0	0	611
INL	2034	1442	1770	1756	7002
ALP	1	16	0	0	17
RCITFP		0	28	0	28
ATA	710	179	244	0	1133
TOTAL	4281	3375	2437	1833	11926
PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE					
EIPC	100	381	0	0	481
TOTAL	100	381	0	0	481
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	284720	6694	37010	40121	368545
DCS-TA	7025	76474	21317	10955	115771
FMF	6700	5950	0	0	12650
FMS-A	1916	12498	0	137	14551
TOTAL	300361	101616	58327	51213	511517

Table 38

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

The U.S. and South Africa signed a Joint Research Arrangement concerning collaboration on Biomedical Military Health and Clinical Research in FY05. South Africa also signed onto the U.S. Customs-led Container Security Initiative, which improves U.S. Customs port security collaboration in the Durban port to allow the USG to have greater controls in containers headed to the U.S. from South Africa. Additionally, South Africa signed a Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Agreement, which works to increase private companies' supply chain security from terrorist activity.

During FY04 South Africa and the USG signed a memorandum of cooperation providing for the exchange of information in nuclear safety, safeguards, and physical security. A second nuclear agreement was signed during FY05 with an arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.

Military Training and Assistance

Post -9/11 military training was conducted through a variety of programmes including: IMET, RCSS, JCET, ALP, RCTFP, and the National Guard State Partnership Program at an expenditure of \$3,791,000 (see Table 38).

Like other states in the region, South Africa did not sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement. Without a BIA, South Africa lost out on an estimated \$8,650,000 in military assistance.¹⁵⁹ Despite that, 1047 SANDF personnel participated in a huge variety of IMET courses at a cost of \$2,917,000 (see Tables 37 and 38).

This policy has been criticised by senior U.S. military commanders at the mercy of Washington policy. Displeasure from the top came has appeared in testimony by U.S. European Command Commander, General Bantz Craddock, before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee when speaking of his misgivings at dropping military aid, "Due to ASPA sanctions we are no longer able to provide spare parts or training under the FMF programme. One consequence is that now South Africa no longer has the capability to transport African Union peacekeepers into Darfur and other peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a result the U.S. and other allies must provide air transport at great cost. Another consequence is the compromise of our once solid relationship due to a perception that the U.S. is an unreliable and mercurial security partner over the long term."¹⁶⁰ To circumvent the ill effects of IMET and FMF sanctions, military leaders have actively worked with the SANDF in other military programmes. Despite their efforts, without IMET, U.S.-SANDF military interaction has dropped to low levels.

Efforts in other programmes have included the JCET programme, which in FY03 brought U.S. Special Forces trainers to South Africa on three occasions to train 78 members of the SANDF

¹⁵⁹ Eberhart, Sally. Coalition for the International Court. *Countries Opposed to Signing a Bilateral Immunity Agreement: US Aid Lost in FY04 and FY05 and Possibly FY06*, pg. 1. at www.iccnw.org/documents/CountriesOpposedBIA_AidLoss_current.pdf

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander, United States European Command 15 March 2007

Special Forces Brigade.¹⁶¹ Beyond that, three SANDF pilots have received aviation training in the U.S. via ALP; 28 SANDF senior officials have participated in RCSS programmes; five were awarded fellowships with the new Regional Combating Terrorism Fellowship Programme; and 23 senior officers with the Military Contacts Program (see Table 37). This placed U.S. military officers in the Ministry of Defence to help with defence resource management and planning as well as provided SANDF officers with familiarisation tours in the U.S., conferences, and military and civilian exchanges with U.S. counterparts.

In the most significant development in mil-to-mil relations, during FY03 the New York State National Guard and the SANDF began working together under the USG State Partnership Program. This programme joined U.S. National Guard members with the SANDF to enhance mutual security cooperation. The SANDF and NY NG work together to identify training needs and take part in bilateral training exercises, joint fellowships, and civic and military leader visits and exchange. South Africa is one of only four countries on the African continent involved in the programme.

Joint Military Exercises

Approximately 180 U.S. military personnel were based at Ditholo Training Base and Hoedspruit Air Base in South Africa as part of MEDFLAG 04. The exercise involved interchange of medical information, techniques and training. It also developed interoperability between the U.S. and SANDF to improve their ability to respond jointly to an emergency or natural disaster. In FY05 and FY06 the SANDF participated in the world's largest communication and information systems exercise, the U.S. European Command sponsored Combined Endeavor.¹⁶²

The SANDF then hosted the African version of the event with the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006. The event was a communications interoperability workshop

¹⁶¹ United States Departments of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for FY2003*. Section IV. March 2004 p. 37

¹⁶² Captain Bryan Walbridge. "5th Signal Command Supports Combined Endeavor," United States Department of Defense. European Command. Public Affairs Press Release. 24 May 2005. at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=538>

focused on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.¹⁶³

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

HIV/AIDS rates in the SANDF are estimated at 21%, which is very close to the 20% national average. DHAPP provided funding for four SANDF physicians to attend the HIV training programme in San Diego, California and four SANDF physicians to attend the all-Africa HIV/AIDS workshop in Botswana during FY03. Funds also contributed to the establishment of four HIV/AIDS clinics that administer anti-retroviral treatment to SANDF personnel and their family members. DHAPP sent U.S. military infectious disease specialists to each clinic to oversee programme implementation and collaborate with SANDF staff. A total of 513 master trainers and 1,032 peer educators have been trained via DHAPP.¹⁶⁴

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

In FY02-03 the USG trained 201 SANDF personnel in the train-the-trainer EIPC programme. Eventually the EIPC concept was melded into development of the ACOTA programme, and the programme was discontinued after FY03 (see Table 37).

South Africa has signed on to participate in the ACOTA programme with an initial Training Strategy Conference conducted in FY04 for 26 personnel. Despite the large size and ample resources of the SANDF, participation and planned activities have been limited. The SANDF requested unique training beyond the typically structured ACOTA programme and in turn, was provided with a variety of enhanced medical training for staff beginning in FY06 when 127 medical personnel received a variety of training. Additionally, 27 members of the 43rd Brigade staff and 40 of the 46th Brigade staff completed a Command and Staff Operational Skills (CSOS) training course which focused on decision making in a PSO environment and a Command Post

¹⁶³ Captain Christine Miller, "Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise," United States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

¹⁶⁴ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 58-59.

Exercise which is just a practical application of the CSOS course and a computer-simulated exercise (see Table 37).¹⁶⁵

Arms Authorisations and Grants

South Africa was approved for arms authorisations and grants totalling \$511,517,000 between FY02-05. The majority of this came during FY02 with totals of \$300,361,000. Collectively, \$368,545,000 was authorised via DCS-A; \$115,771,000 via DCS-TA; \$12,650,000 in FMF grants; and \$14,551,000 in FMS-A. The majority of the funds in FY02 were for aircraft part spares, which totalled \$272,655,694 of the annual figures (see Table 38). The rest of the DCS-A was primarily for small arms, ammunition, submarine equipment, propellants, electronics, weapons systems and other defence articles.

Major DCS-TA included \$45,000,000 in FY03 for ammunition and ordnance. Also, FY03-05 authorisations were primarily for aircraft equipment, fire control systems, and space systems. FMF grants supported training needs and FMS-A continued to support transfer of spare aircraft parts.

Nuclear Security Training and Assistance

Two hundred and sixteen South African officials participated in six nuclear security programmes in the post-9/11 years, far more than any other Southern African country. The majority of the programme participants were involved in the ATA, Defense Program (21) and Office of Global Threat Reduction Programme (OGTR) (26) (see Table 37). FY02 ATA funds were used on sending 139 law enforcement officials to a WMD training seminar. During FY03 the programme sent 24 South African officials to the U.S. for a WMD Operations course.

¹⁶⁵ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personal communication, 3 May 2007)

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

The law enforcement sector received the most assistance of any of the security sectors with 1,769 South African officials provided training and exchange. This was at a cost of more than \$8,000,000 through INL and ATA funding (see Tables 37 and 38).

The largest numbers were through the two OPDAT-ITP and IVP programmes, which combined for 900 participants (see Table 37). South Africa participated in multiple OPDAT-led seminars focusing on money laundering, international asset forfeiture, counter-terrorism legislation, and prosecution.¹⁶⁶ The ICITAP programme was also very active with focus on assisting the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD). ICITAP placed a permanent American Technical Advisor within the police department beginning in FY03. The advisor works with senior leadership to develop strategic planning and help the JMPD modernize beyond a traffic crime and regulation function.¹⁶⁷

Seconding the OPDAT programme was the FBI-ITP, which trained 417 officials and FLETC which trained 134 in the U.S. Also 100 South Africans participated in DEA and ATF-ITP programmes. Beyond these, South Africa was unique amongst all Southern African countries with 52 South African Secret Service agents trained in FY04 by the United States Secret Service (USSS). In FY02-03 41 officials were a part of the State Department's International Demand Reduction Training and Technical Assistance (IDRTTA) programme which complements the DEA-ITP while focusing on mobilising support for counter-narcotics policies, programmes, and strategies (see Table 37).

The USG spent \$1,133,000 on ATA training during FY02-04 in both the law enforcement and nuclear security sectors (see Table 38). Within the law enforcement sector in FY02, a course on surveillance detection was taught to 15 personnel, Anti-Terrorism Instructor training was provided for 12 officials in Delaware, and eight attended an explosive detector dog and handler

¹⁶⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004 at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/29913.htm>

¹⁶⁷ United States Department of Justice. Criminal Division. International Development and Training Program "South Africa Law Enforcement Development Program" (received via personal correspondence, 23 January 2007)

course in Texas.¹⁶⁸ This was followed up in FY03 as 24 South African officials attended a WMD Operations course in New Mexico at the ILEA facility in Roswell. Finally 90 personnel received training on Mail Security (see Table 37).¹⁶⁹ Follow on training and equipment was provided during FY04 at a cost of \$244,000 (see Table 38).

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

South African customs, border, and transportation security assistance sectors received the least support of any security sector with just 48 officials involved with TSA, ICE, CBP, and USCG programmes. Most significantly, however, the USG assigned a CBP Attaché to the Embassy in Pretoria to facilitate all border and customs issues. That influence led to South Africa's signing of the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol's Container Security Initiative in FY04. This initiative brought a U.S. customs official to Durban to work full time with South African customs officials on screening containers and shipboard cargo leaving Durban for U.S. ports. The focus is on preventing terrorist use of shipping containers to transport illegal or nuclear materials. South Africa also participates in the U.S. Customs Patrol Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, which allows U.S. CBP officials to work with the South African government to implement joint security criteria for all forms of trade logistics. In exchange, South Africa gets expedited ship entry upon arrival in U.S. ports and reduced inspections.¹⁷⁰

SWAZILAND

Post-9/11 USG interaction with Swaziland has been fairly minimal. The most pressing security concerns for the USG involve the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on the military and other security forces, a virtual collapse of the justice system, and a lack of respect for human rights and democracy.

¹⁶⁸ United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2002*. February 2003. p. 11.

¹⁶⁹ United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2003*. February 2004. p. 12.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Patrol website.

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/cbp_attaches/pretoria_safrika.xml

To address these concerns the USG trained 209 persons in military, law enforcement, and border security programmes (see Table 39).

Bilateral Security Treaties

In the pre or post-9/11 years Swaziland was not a signatory to the Rome Statute and therefore was not prohibited from receiving military assistance. In FY06 Swaziland signed an Article 98 agreement with the USG.

Military Training Assistance

The U.S. spent \$440,000 in IMET funds training 45 members of the USDF in the post-9/11 years (see Tables 39 and 40). The majority of it was for infantry officer courses, defence resource management, and legal training.

In addition to IMET training, 14 USDF members attended ACSS seminars throughout Africa and in Washington as part of the RCSS programme. To complement this, one USDF officer was invited to participate in the new RCTFP.

Joint Military Exercises

Swaziland hosted the U.S. humanitarian exercise MEDFLAG 02, which brought 80 U.S. Air Force medical personnel to the country for two weeks of disaster response and humanitarian medical care.¹⁷¹

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES SWAZILAND (number of personnel)						
Security	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	13	10	11	11	45
	RCSS	6	2	2	4	14
	RCTFP		0	0	1	1
Law	OPDAT-IVP	4	0	0	0	4
Enforcement	FBI-ITP	5	5	14	0	24
	DEA-ITP	11	65	7	0	83
	ATF-ITP	13	11	7	6	37
Border and Transportation Security	CBP-IVP	0	0	0	1	1
TOTAL		52	93	41	23	209

Table 39

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA SWAZILAND (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	37	25	28	70	160
IMET	87	69	146	138	440
RCTFP		0	0	2	2
TOTAL	124	94	174	210	602
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
FME	0	3	0	200	203
TOTAL	0	3	0	200	203

Table 40

¹⁷¹ Global Security Website. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/medflag.htm>

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

National HIV/AIDS infection rates in Swaziland are estimated at 39%. Specific data on the USDF is unknown, but is believed to be much higher than the national average. DHAPP began operating in Swaziland during FY02 with a needs assessment and programme development contract awarded to Medical Care Development International. This has led to mass awareness campaigns, an FMI grant for testing and medical equipment, and procurement of test kits and other lab equipment. Two members of the USDF attended the all-Africa HIV workshop in Botswana and two USDF physicians attended the HIV training programme in San Diego, CA during FY03. DHAPP has trained two master trainers and 50 peer educators.¹⁷²

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Swaziland was provided \$203,000 in FMF grants to help pay for training and training-related supplies and services (see Table 40). One can assume that the grant was used to fund IMET and other military assistance programmes.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Swaziland had 148-law enforcement and legal officials receive training through four U.S.-sponsored programmes in the post-9/11 years. Leading training numbers were the DEA with 83 officials in counter-narcotics operations. Following them was the ATF who trained 37 personnel and the FBI who provided investigative and forensics training for 24 (see Table 39).

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

A U.S. CBP textile production verification team was sent to Swaziland in FY03 in order to combat illegal textile shipments and quota circumvention. Later in FY05 the CBP brought a

¹⁷² United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 60-61.

Swazi customs official to the U.S. as part of the CBP-IVP to interact with and develop relations with U.S. counterparts.¹⁷³

ZAMBIA

In the post-9/11 years USG security interests in Zambia have been to create internal stability in order to improve Zambia's position as a partner in the Global War on Terror in that, "Zambia has few defences against international terrorism. If allowed to take root in Zambia, terrorist networks could undermine all efforts to create a stable, democratic, and prosperous Zambia."¹⁷⁴ This is linked to Zambian proximity to Tanzania, which has known terrorist activity. If the USG helps to build stability by enhancing the security sector, it sees Zambia as being able to contribute to its Global War on Terror in that, "a peaceful, stable Zambia will assist in the war against terrorism by denying terrorists refuge and financial or other support."¹⁷⁵ The USG has provided quite a bit of security sector assistance to help further its security goals.

POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING AND EXCHANGE FIGURES ZAMBIA (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	IMET	14	48	295	77	434
	JCFET	80	105	0	0	185
	RCSS	7	1	8	0	16
Nuclear Security	DP	0	0	0	1	1
	RB/NP	1	0	0	2	3
	ATA	0	0	130	0	130
Peacekeeping	ACOTA	0	0	23	0	23
Law Enforcement	FBI	22	74	27	20	143
	DEA	18	7	12	0	37
	ATF	17	14	12	15	58
Border and Transportation Security	FLETC-IIP	0	0	3	0	3
	CBP-IIP	2	0	0	0	2
Security	CBP-IVP	0	0	3	0	3
	ICE-IVP	0	0	0	2	2
	USCG-IVP	0	0	4	0	4
	TOTAL	161	249	517	117	1044

Table 41

Post-9/11 security sector assistance came in the form of military, peacekeeping, law enforcement, counter-proliferation, and border and transportation security training for 1,144 personnel. This number includes 635 in four military programmes, 134 in three counter-proliferation programmes, 23 in the ACOTA peacekeeping programme, 338 in four law

¹⁷³ World Trade Organization Website. Doha Development Initiative. Trade Capacity Building Database. http://tebdb.wto.org/trta_project.aspx?prjCode=021-0635-03-A&benHostId=116

¹⁷⁴ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 312

¹⁷⁵ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington: GPO, May 2004. p. 294

enforcement programmes, and 14 in five border and transportation security programmes (see Table 41). Additionally, the USG actively supported humanitarian de-mining programmes and began to authorise significant increases in arms agreements and grants in both government-to-government and the private commercial arms industries.

Bilateral Security Treaties and Agreements

Zambia signed an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG in FY03, ensuring that American citizens will not be surrendered to the International Criminal Court by the Zambian government without first having USG consent.¹⁷⁶

Additionally, Zambia has now signed an agreement with the USG to serve as a U.S. military 'Cooperative Security Location' as part of its global positioning strategy.¹⁷⁷ A Cooperative Security Location is defined as,

“a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access.”¹⁷⁸

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM EXPENDITURE DATA: ZAMBIA (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	67	12	127	0	206
IMET	195	263	408	196	1062
JCET	146	571	0	0	717
ATA	0	0	264	0	264
TOTAL	408	846	799	196	2249
ARMS AUTHORISATIONS AND GRANTS					
DCS-A	26	609	3	10009	10647
DCS-TA	0	0	641	10180	10821
FMF	0	100	0	200	300
FMS-A	0	0	0	600	600
TOTAL	26	709	644	20989	22368

Military Training and Assistance

The USG spent more than \$2,249,000 in military training assistance between FY02-05. The majority of the training was designated for the IMET programme, which was quite proportionally large as compared to other Southern African nations. A total of \$1,062,000 was

¹⁷⁶ Georgetown University Law School Website. http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/intl/guides/article_98.cfm#countries

¹⁷⁷ Ploch, Lauren. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Divisions. *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*. Washington D.C. December 7, 2007, p. 9

¹⁷⁸ United States European Command. http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transformation/Transform_Blue.asp, 13 January 2008

spent on 434 individuals (see Tables 41 and 42). The majority of the training via IMET was designed to enable Zambian military personnel (ZDF) to, “attend courses through the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies¹⁷⁹ and U.S. military staff colleges, and receive training in counter-terrorism, corruption investigation, and medicine. Medical training complemented Emergency Plan projects to address the crisis of HIV/AIDS in the Zambian military.”¹⁸⁰ These courses proved useful as the USG considered the Zambian military to be “severely hampered in its resources and professional development.” They felt the government was suffering from a “cold war mentality developed under socialist rule.”¹⁸¹

The JCET programme was also active in FY02-03. In FY02 the USG spent \$146,000 on Special Forces training for 80 members of the ZDF First Commando Battalion. This was followed up in FY03 when \$571,000 was spent on more Special Forces training for 105 ZDF personnel (see Tables 41 and 42). Finally, 16 ZDF and MoD officials attended regional seminars through ACSS programmes at a total cost of \$206,000. No Zambian officials were invited to attend ACSS programmes in FY05.

Joint Military Exercises

The ZDF participated in the U.S. European Command-sponsored Africa Endeavor 2006 Military Exercise in South Africa. The event was a major U.S.-sponsored military communications interoperability workshop focused on command, control, communications and information systems (C3IS) among 20 participating African nations.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Run by the U.S. Department of Defense as a military lawyer international training group. Info at <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/diils/>

¹⁸⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2006*. Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 313

¹⁸¹ United States Departments of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress for FY2005*. March 2006

¹⁸² Captain Christine Miller, “Nations Plan African Endeavor Exercise,” Unites States European Command Public Affairs Office, Stuttgart, Germany, 19 April 2006 at <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=912>

Military HIV/AIDS Assistance

General population HIV/AIDS infection rates are estimated to be near 21% in Zambia, yet the ZDF may have rates as high as 35%. The DHAPP programme in Zambia has included provision of lab and computer equipment; social worker and physician assistant training; refurbishment and outfitting of a ZDF Counselling and Testing Centre; training for 18 staff members of the ZDF Counselling and Training Centre; training in HIV serology testing for 45 clinical officers and nurses; training for 36 ZDF personnel in HIV prevention programme management; for three physicians to attend the HIV training programme in San Diego, California; and for two physicians to attend an international HIV conference in Barcelona, Spain. A total of 31 master trainers and 321 peer educators have been trained through FY05.¹⁸³

Peace Support Operations Training and Assistance

Zambia signed on to participate in the USG-led ACOTA programme, but to date has only conducted an initial Training Strategy Conference for 23 staff. Lack of funding for Zambian participation on behalf of the Zambia government and other internal issues have prevented the ZDF from participating, however the first battalion is scheduled for training in FY08.¹⁸⁴

Arms Authorisations and Grants

Zambia received \$22,368,400 in arms authorisations and grants between FY02-05, the majority of which came during FY05 when \$20,989,000 were authorised. The majority of the funding approval came via the DCS-TA and DCS-A programmes. The FY05 authorisations were strictly for weapons systems including launch vehicles, missiles, etc.¹⁸⁵ Beyond the DCS authorisations, \$300,000 in FMF grants and \$600,000 in unspecified FMS-A were approved (see Table 42).

¹⁸³ United States Department of Defense. Department of the Navy. Navy Health Research Center. *The First Four Years: Synopsis of the Global Effort*. San Diego, CA. June 2005, pgs. 74-75.

¹⁸⁴ Gentry, Kevin L. ACOTA Acquisitions and Operations Manager. (personal communication, 3 May 2007)

¹⁸⁵ United States Department of State. Office of Defense Trade Controls. *Direct Commercial Sales Authorisations for Fiscal Year 2005*. pg 130

Nuclear Security Training and Assistance

Interestingly enough, the USG funded four Zambian officials to receive training through two DoE defence programme. This included one person with the DP in FY05 and three others with the RBPP in FY02 and FY05. The funding of Zambian participation in the DP programme is unclear, as the programme focuses on the military application of nuclear energy, which is not applicable to the capabilities of the ZDF. Additionally, the RBPP programme focuses on reducing global tension due to nuclear concerns and conflict and perhaps may be more relevant. The USG may have wanted to impart its views on the international nuclear community to Zambian officials who could at one point in time be called to work at the IAEA or for the UN in nuclear proliferation.

Although the ATA programme normally falls under the Law Enforcement sector, due to the nature of training it is being included in this section. FY04 saw the first and only participation of Zambian officials in the ATA programme with \$264,000 spent on 130 Zambian officials for a WMD Awareness Seminar (see Tables 41 and 42).¹⁸⁶

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement training in the post-9/11 years was both direct and indirect. Directly, 368 officials were provided training with American counterparts, and indirectly ICITAP, OPDAT, and the U.S. Department of Treasury brought American advisors to Zambia to assist rather than train counterparts (see Table 41).

On the direct training side, quite a bit was conducted by the FBI in criminal investigation and forensics with 143 Zambian officials trained. Likewise the ATF-ITP trained 58 Zambians and the DEA-ITP, 37. Additionally, Zambian law enforcement officials were active in ILEA-G courses. Despite specific figures being unreleased, the FY02 State Department JNL report states that, "over one hundred Zambian law enforcement officers, at least a quarter of whom are active

¹⁸⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security. *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2004*. February 2005. p. 12

in narcotics control, completed training at the U.S.-sponsored International Law Enforcement Academies in Gaborone, Botswana and Roswell, New Mexico.”¹⁸⁷

OPDAT was indirectly active with Zambian officials in FY03 when several Zambian law enforcement and legal officials received assistance with counter-terrorism legislation writing through a USG sponsored seminar in South Africa.¹⁸⁸ In complement to OPDAT training, U.S. Department of Treasury resident advisors assisted Zambia in combating money laundering.

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

Border and transportation security assistance was extremely limited in Zambia. Just 14 officials were provided training: two with the CBP-IIP; three in FLETC-IIP, three with CBP-IVP; four with USCIS IIP; and just two with ICE-IIP (see Table 41).

ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe's deteriorating post-9/11 relationship with the United States has been well documented. The USG has been sharply critical of the Mugabe government and in FY02 imposed a ban on the transfer of defence items and services. In FY03 it imposed a ban on non-humanitarian government-to-government services.¹⁸⁹ This has resulted in a complete drop off in direct security assistance, although Zimbabwe has, “cooperated with the United States on law enforcement and

POST 9/11 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FIGURES ZIMBABWE (number of personnel)						
Sector	Programme	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
Military	RCSS	2	0	0	0	2
Nuclear Security	DP RB/PP	0 1	0 0	0 0	1 0	1 1
Law Enforcement	OPDAT-IVP	0	1	0	0	1
Border and Transportation Security	CBP-IIP	0	2	0	0	2
	TOTAL	2	3	0	1	7

Table 43

¹⁸⁷ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2002*. Washington: GPO, March 2003

¹⁸⁸ United States Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report FY 2003*. Washington: GPO, March 2004

¹⁸⁹ United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affairs. Country Background Notes. Zimbabwe. At <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ci/bgn/5479.htm>

counter-terrorism matters.¹⁹⁰ Only seven Zimbabwean military and security officials received training via five U.S. defence programmes in FY02 and FY03 (see Table 43).

Military Training Assistance

Due to cessation of all military aid, only two ZNA members received USG-sponsored training, both at an ACSS seminar in FY02, at a cost of \$34,000 (see Table 44).

POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE DATA: ZIMBABWE (000s of U.S. dollars)					
DEFENCE and LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING					
Activity	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	TOTAL
RCSS	34	0	0	0	34
TOTAL	34	0	0	0	34

Table 44

Nuclear Security Training and Assistance

Curiously enough, of the seven total Zimbabwean personnel involved in USG training programmes, two were involved with U.S. DoE programmes- one with RBPP in FY02 and one with the DP in FY05. Reasons for Zimbabwean participation in such programmes are unknown.

Law Enforcement Training and Assistance

Law enforcement training and assistance was virtually non-existent. Due to sanctions just one Zimbabwean legal official visited the U.S. as part of the OPDAT-IVP in FY03. Despite that, as previously stated, Zimbabwe has been cooperative in law enforcement matters with the U.S.

Border and Transportation Security Training and Assistance

One Zimbabwean border official was trained in FY03 through the U.S. CBP-IIP.

¹⁹⁰ United States Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 2004*, Washington: GPO, May 2005. p. 269

CONCLUSION

In light of the data, it is obvious that 9/11 became a catalyst for change in the security relationship between the U.S. and Southern Africa. While not a hotspot like the Middle East or North Africa, Southern Africa suffered from many of the problems the USG deemed amenable to encouraging terrorist activity such as proximity to East Africa, high crime, impoverished populations, poor internal security, weak borders, and corruption at all levels of the government, not to mention the extremely fragile state of Zimbabwe which teeters on the verge of collapse. With post-9/11 USG security concerns seemingly centred on radical Islam, at first glance it would seem Southern Africa is of no real concern with marginal Muslim population. In reality, however, other factors played into American fears.

Southern Africa was right to accept increased assistance from the USG and should request more, particularly in the border and transportation security sector. SADC should not hesitate to engage with the USG on security assistance in the future, as it is not a matter of sovereignty, but rather a way to benefit from a partnership with the world's superpower and improve the global standing of the SADC nations.

**CHAPTER 4:
SECURITY ASSISTANCE ANALYSIS**

It is indisputable that Southern Africa received a lot more security cooperation training and assistance in the post-9/11 years. The 9/11 attacks were a catalyst for change in terms of the USG's approach to regional security policies. But while there has been major improvement, the increase has not necessarily reached a level which will dramatically affect overall regional security. It is merely an improvement.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 REGIONAL TRAINING COMPARISON (number of personnel)				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	5030	3270	minus	35%
PSO	1491	4733	plus	217%
NS	25	361	plus	1344%
LE	2471	3540	plus	43%
BTS	375	571	plus	53%
Region	9392	12475	plus	33%

In breaking down the data, all sectors showed fairly large percentage increases, with the exception of military training, which decreased 35% (see Table 45). That being said, the region's collective military force size decreased from 291,200 to 271,400 and police sizes increased from 220,000 to 225,500. Force size numbers are important in the following country analyses as they are used to compare training number ratios. These are calculated by multiplying the pre or post-9/11 force size by 4, which is the number of years in each block. This number is then divided by the number of personnel trained in a sector whether that be military training or combined law enforcement/border and transportation security programmes. For data analysis purposes, all non-military security officials are included under the term 'police forces.' This assists with training ratio calculation.

For example:

Size of post-9/11 Botswana Defence Forces = 13,000
 BDF size x 4 = 52,000
 (BDF size x 4) / total number of BDF forces trained = 346
 Therefore, training ratio = 1: 150

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 PSO TRAINING FIGURES (number of personnel)				
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
ANG	0	0	none	0%
BOT	0	2249	plus	224900%
LFS	0	0	none	0%
MAL	1476	1011	minus	33%
MOZ	0	1137	plus	113700%
NAM	0	46	plus	4600%
SA	15	267	plus	1680%
SWA	0	0	none	0%
ZAM	0	23	plus	2300%
ZIM	0	0	none	0%
Region	1491	4733	plus	217%

Table 46

In terms of regional training, overall numbers increased from 9,392 to 12,475, a 33% jump (see Table 45). While all sectors except military training increased fairly dramatically, this overall jump is primarily due to many Southern African nations participating in the ACOTA peace support operations training programme. This dramatically increased USG-sponsored peacekeeping training, with numbers shifting from 1,491 to 4,733, a 217% jump. This is because pre-9/11 only Malawi participated in the ACRI program, but post-9/11 six nations became involved with ACOTA.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 MILITARY TRAINING FIGURES (number of personnel)			
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
ANG	6	81	plus 1250%
BOT	433	346	minus 21%
LFS	228	75	minus 67%
MAL	447	303	minus 32%
MOZ	454	437	minus 4%
NAM	226	147	minus 35%
SA	2266	1184	minus 48%
SWA	233	60	minus 74%
ZAM	382	635	plus 66%
ZIM	355	?	minus 99%
Region	5030	3270	minus 35%

As previously mentioned, regional military training figures fell 35% from 5,030 to 3,270. This was largely due to several

Southern African countries refusing to sign Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the USG, which resulted in cancellation of military training programmes and government-to-government arms sales and grants. The decrease in training resulted in shifts of the regional training ratio from 1: 232 to 1: 332, a large drop. The USG cannot meet its own security goal of creating more capable and professional militaries while simultaneously restricting military aid (see Table 47).

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 REGIONAL ARMS AUTHORISATIONS and GRANTS in thousands of U.S. dollars			
Program	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
FMS-A	5458	20183	plus 270%
FMF	4897	17051	plus 248%
DCS-A	129991	476011	plus 266%
DCS-TA	90206	193597	plus 115%
Total	230552	706842	plus 207%

On a more positive note, with the addition of the DHAPP military HIV/AIDS training and assistance programme the USG provided training for 2,913 Southern African military health officials. Given the

extremely high rate of infection amongst military members of all nations, this is vital to the future of Southern African militaries (see Table 52).

Table 48

Arms authorisations and grants increased 207% during post-9/11 years, a massive jump. Numbers grew from \$230,552,000 to \$706,842,000. This is indicative of USG goals for the region with the USG expecting Africans to take on more peacekeeping roles on the continent;

they know they have to arm them. The increase in arms is directly linked to overall increases in security assistance (see Table 48).

Nuclear security training increased 1,344% in the post-9/11 years as numbers jumped from 25 to 361, with the majority of trainees from South Africa, Zambia, and Namibia. Given the global threat of counter proliferation and WMD concerns, this type of training is regionally important despite only South Africa having nuclear capability and capacity (see Table 49).

Law enforcement training figures jumped 43% from 2,471 to 3,540. This is critical, as law enforcement is arguably the most important security sector to build up in the region. The increase shifted regional training ratios from 1: 309 to 1: 219, a solid improvement. Civil society will improve only with better internal security. Many more federal agencies became involved

with international training programmes in the post-9/11 years, particularly from **Table 49** functions created within the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security (see Table 50).

Border and transportation security saw a 53% increase in training figures, moving from 375 to 571. This is positive given that porous African borders are a primary security concerns on the continent, however these numbers are still inadequately low. Given Southern Africa's 8,440km in ocean coastline; 4,715km in inland navigable waterways; 35,411km in borders; 31 ports and 29 international airports one would think the USG would provide much more than they have (see Table 51).

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 NUCLEAR SECURITY TRAINING FIGURES (number of personnel)				
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
ANG	0	0	none	0%
BOT	0	0	none	0%
LES	0	0	none	0%
MAL	0	0	none	0%
MOZ	0	0	none	0%
NAM	0	9	plus	900%
SA	25	216	plus	764%
SWA	0	0	none	0%
ZAM	0	134	plus	13400%
ZIM	0	2	minus	100%
Region	25	361	plus	1344%

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 I.F. TRAINING FIGURES (number of personnel)			
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
ANG	10	83	plus 730%
BOT	25	669	plus 2576%
LES	6	79	plus 1217%
MAL	8	126	plus 1475%
MOZ	111	250	plus 125%
NAM	13	177	plus 1262%
SA	2266	1769	minus 22%
SWA	23	148	plus 543%
ZAM	6	238	plus 3867%
ZIM	3	1	minus 66%
Region	2471	3540	plus 43%

Table 50

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 BTS TRAINING FIGURES (number of personnel)			
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
ANG	0	94	plus 9400%
BOT	0	334	plus 33400%
LES	0	1	plus 100%
MAL	0	2	plus 200%
MOZ	49	6	minus 88%
NAM	1	79	plus 7800%
SA	302	38	minus 87%
SWA	0	1	plus 100%
ZAM	22	14	minus 36%
ZIM	1	2	plus 100%
Region	379	571	plus 52%

Table 51

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 MILITARY HIV/AIDS TRAINING FIGURES (numbers of personnel)			
Country	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
ANG	0	61	plus 6100%
BOT	0	373	plus 37300%
LES	0	4	plus 400%
MAL	0	321	plus 32100%
MOZ	0	53	plus 5300%
NAM	0	46	plus 4600%
SA	0	1553	plus 155300%
SWA	0	56	plus 5600%
ZAM	0	446	plus 44600%
ZIM	0	0	none 0%
Region	0	2913	plus 291300%

Table 52

ANGOLA

There is no question that Angola saw large increases in all kinds of security cooperation post 9/11 with an overall increase of 1513% in number of personnel trained, a 777% increase in arms authorisations and grants and a 5,071% increase in overall training programme expenditure (see Table 53). While at first glance this may seem remarkable, it is primarily a result of the end of the civil war, which in the pre-9/11 years put a virtual hold all forms of security cooperation. The percentage increases may seem staggering in a pre vs. post-9/11 comparison, but in reality, the change is minuscule given the size of the Angolan military and police forces.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION ANGOLA			
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
MIL	0	81	plus 1250%
PSO	0	0	none 0%
NS	0	0	none 0%
I.F.	10	83	plus 730%
BTS	0	94	plus 9400%
Total	16	258	plus 1513%
ARMS	2509	2200	plus 777%
TRS	24	1241	plus 5071%

Table 53

While accurate pre-9/11 figures are difficult to pinpoint due to the civil war, combined military and police size was estimated at 140,000 for a population of 10,100,000. Currently the estimated

population is 11,200,000¹⁹¹, with the FAA size at a severely bloated 120,000 and Angolan police and other security forces at 8,900. Military training increased from six FAA trained FY98-01 to 81 between FY02-05, a 1250% increase. This was at expenditures of \$24,000 and \$441,000, a 1738% increase (see Table 53). This was largely due to the FAA's reinstated eligibility for participation in IMET courses and an increase in number of personnel sent to ACSS programmes. Given the numbers, the pre-9/11 years saw a period average of 1: 30000 FAA trained in American military programmes while in the post-9/11 period was 1: 5926. Together they indicated an improved, but relatively low level of military cooperation. One bright star in the post-9/11 timeframe was the training of 61 FAA medical personnel in HIV/AIDS programmes, which was not a part of pre-9/11 assistance.

Arms authorisations and grants saw a 777% increase post-9/11. While pre-9/11 authorisations were entirely with the U.S. commercial defence industry, post-9/11 arms agreements were opened to government-to-government defence sales programmes and Angola was also a recipient of military financing grants. Using the arms sales values in each period and dividing them by the number of personnel in the military in that period it is possible to produce arms per person ratio, which can be used to determine an arms recipient ranking. When calculating for Angola the pre-9/11 arms per person figure of \$22 increases to \$183 per person post-9/11.

Law enforcement sector training rose 730% from 10 to 83 personnel. The sector also saw the addition of FBI and ATF training programmes. Border and transportation security training figures rose from 0 to 94 personnel, the majority of which focused on aviation security. Adding these sectors together and calculating the training ratio results in 1: 201. Despite that ratio, the general absence of coastal security and land border control training is troublesome. Only 12 Angolan officials were provided coastal and maritime security training and just three customs and one immigrations official were trained (see Table 53). Given Angola's 1,600km of coastline; 5,198km in land borders; 1,300km of navigable inland waterways; nine ports and two international airports, it would seem reasonable to focus more on border and transportation security. The USG is not doing enough.

¹⁹¹ CIA World Factbook 2007

BOTSWANA

Security cooperation between the USG and Botswana increased significantly in the post-9/11 years. This included first time participation in peace support operations and border/transportation security training. There was an overall increase of 686% in personnel trained, a 246% increase in arms authorisations and grants, and a 632% increase in training expenditure (see Table 54). This occurred with increases in both military and police force sizes, which were 10,000 (BDF) and 5,800 during the pre-9/11 years and 13,000 (BDI) and 6,500 post-9/11. The greatest increases were in the law enforcement and border/transportation security sectors, which brought an ILEA to Botswana.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION BOTSWANA				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	433	346	minus	21%
PSO	0	2249	plus	224900%
NS	0	0	none	0%
LE	25	669	plus	2576%
BTS	0	334	plus	33400%
Total	458	3598	plus	686%
ARMS	41115	142344	plus	246%
TRS	2251	16480	plus	632%

Table 54

Military training was the only sector to decrease in volume, despite a 3,000-person increase in the size of the BDF. Training numbers dropped 21% from 433 to 346. This led to a pre to post-9/11 training ratio increase of 1:92 to 1:150. While this may seem fairly significant, spending on military programmes increased from \$2,240,000 to \$2,286,000 and the BDF participated in the ALP and RCTFP, which they were not involved with pre-9/11. Additionally, the BDF signed onto ACOFA PSO training, which involved 2,249 BDF soldiers. Botswana did not participate in ACRI during pre-9/11 years so this marked a great increase in military cooperation. The USG also vastly increased the number of military HIV/AIDS personnel provided training to 343 from 0 with the addition of DHIAPP programming. Arms authorisations and grants were increased significantly from \$41,115,000 to \$142,344,000, an almost tripling of sales (see Table 54). Using these numbers to calculate arms per person values within the BDF produces a pre-9/11 figure of \$4,112 per BDF soldier and post-9/11 figure of \$10,950 per soldier, which is a major increase. Perhaps most significant in the military sector was the signing of the "Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement" which opened the way for much larger cooperation between militaries, including force staging, access for the USG to Botswana military bases, and logistics services.

Law enforcement and border/transportation security saw the greatest increases in overall training with law enforcement rising from 25 to a whopping 669 and border/transportation rising from 0 to 334. Combined, this moves pre-9/11 training ratios from 1:928 to 1: 26, a massive jump (see Table 54). Law enforcement training for Botswanan officials was added through two new programmes, FLETC and ATA.

The addition of border and transportation security sector training was strongly implemented in Botswana as compared to other regional countries. Both CBP and ICE programme trained fairly large numbers of personnel. Yet beyond the sheer number of trainees, the decision to construct and operate the ILEA was the greatest addition to security cooperation. This can be seen in the \$13,222,000 spent building and operating the ILEA in the post-9/11 years. This has and will continue to increase American influence in many security sectors.

LESOTHO

While Lesotho increased the size of its military and police forces from 2,500 (LDF) and 2,400 (LMPS) to 4,000(LDF) and 4,000 (LMPS) in the post-9/11 years, overall USG security assistance decreased. Lesotho was one of five Southern African nations to see a decrease in overall security assistance in the post-9/11 block. This was a result of a 34% decline in number of personnel trained, primarily in the military sector due to ASPA sanctions. Despite the drop in numbers of personnel trained, total training expenditure increased 4% from \$319,000 to \$331,000 (see Table 55). The one positive development was in law enforcement training, which greatly increased in figures.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION LESOTHO				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	228	75	minus	67%
PSO	0	0	none	0%
NS	0	0	none	0%
LE	6	79	plus	1217%
BTS	0	1	plus	100%
Total	234	155	minus	34%
ARMS	0	0	none	0%
TRS	319	331	plus	4%

Table 55

Due to Lesotho's refusal to sign an Article 98 agreement with the USG, the number of military personnel trained in IMET' dropped from 228 to 75, while the LDF increased in size from 2,500 to 4,000. This changed the defence-training ratio of 1: 43 to 1: 160. Military HIV/AIDS assistance and training was provided for four LDF health officials.

As previously stated, the law enforcement sector enjoyed the greatest growth in security cooperation as training numbers jumped from 6 to 79, a 1,217% increase (see Table 55). This changed the training ratio change from 1:1600 to 1: 200, a massive improvement. Border and transportation security assistance was almost non-existent as just one Lesotho customs and border official was provided training as opposed to none during the pre-9/11 years.

MALAWI

Malawi was one of the five Southern African nations to see an overall decrease (34%) in security training despite large increases in law enforcement training and arms authorisations and grants. What makes the losses more significant is that the military and police force sizes increased in size. The MDF increased from 5,000 to 5,600 while police and other security forces quadrupled from 1,500 to 6,000. Increases in military and police size brought a 189% increase in arms authorisations and grants, while total training expenditure increased just 1% (see Table 56).

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION MALAWI				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	447	303	minus	32%
PSO	1476	1011	minus	33%
NS	0	0	none	0%
LE	8	126	plus	1475%
BTS	0	2	plus	200%
Total	1931	1412	minus	34%
ARMS	2372	6846	plus	189%
TRS	1441	1429	minus	1%

Total military training dropped from 447 to 303. With the loss in training and the increase in MDF size, the training ratios shifted from 1:44 to 1: 74. The MDF also participated in peace support operations through ACRI and its successor ACOTA, although there was a 33% drop in number of personnel trained from 1,476 to 1,011. The drop was largely because the government did not budget for its portion of ACOTA training. The MDF experienced a large increase in military HIV/AIDS assistance with 321 total personnel involved in post-9/11 DHAPP programmes. Based on the arms authorisations and grant figures, the arms dollar per soldier spent pre-9/11 was \$474 and almost tripled to \$1,223 per soldier post-9/11 (see Table 56).

With the increase in police and other security force size, Malawi saw an increase in law enforcement and border/transportation security training. Officials were trained through three USG agencies in the pre-9/11 years, but that increased to six agencies in the post-9/11

timeframe. Bulk numbers increased 1,475% from 8 to 126 (LE) and 0 to 2 (BTS) (see Table 56). This led to a training ratio move of 1:750 to 1:188, which is a marked improvement. Most concerning though is the utter lack of border and transportation security training and assistance. Given that Malawi has 2,881km of bordering states; 700 km of coastline along lakes and rivers; five ports and two international airports, one would expect the USG to provide much more help. Even more worrisome is that the USG has stated that terrorism infiltration from Tanzania is a primary security concern in Malawi.

MOZAMBIQUE

While the military almost halved from an estimated pre-9/11 size of 11,000 to 6,000 and the police and other security forces increased slightly from 18,000 to 20,000 Mozambique received one of the largest increases in security assistance of any Southern African nation. Overall there was a 198% increase in number of personnel trained, the bulk of which was in peace support operations. Additionally there was a deceptively large percentage increase in arms authorisations and grants of 23,933%, although that figure is inflated because Mozambique had only \$3,000 in pre-9/11 arms agreements. Overall training programme expenditure increased 34% from \$8,130,000 to \$13,466,000 (see Table 57).

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION MOZAMBIQUE			
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
MIL	454	437	minus 4%
PSO	0	1137	plus 113700%
NS	0	0	none 0%
LE	111	250	plus 125%
BTS	49	0	minus 88%
Total	614	1830	plus 198%
ARMS	3	721	plus 23933%
TRS	8130	13466	plus 34%

Table 57

While sheer numbers of military training decreased from 454 to 437, due to the decrease in FADM size, the training ratios shifted from 1: 96 to 1: 55, which is quite significant. Additionally, post-9/11 training added JCET for FADM Special Forces. Military training programme expenditures increased from \$7,030,000 to \$12,996,000. The USG also provided military HIV/AIDS training for 53 Mozambican personnel. The deceptively large arms authorisations were just an increase from just \$3,000 during pre-9/11 years to a still small \$721,000 authorisation post-9/11. Arms were not a major form of security cooperation between the USG and Mozambique. Despite that, the arms per soldier ratio rose from \$0 to \$120 post-9/11.

Law enforcement and border/transportation security training numbers increased from 160 to 256. This led to an improved training ratio of 1:450 to 1:310. What is concerning though is that the number of personnel trained in the border and transportation security sector actually dropped from 49 to just six (see Table 57). Given Mozambique's 2,740km in coastline; 4,571km in borders; 460km of navigable inland waterways; six ports and eight international airports one would expect a lot more in assistance. The USG is not matching its rhetoric of being concerned about Mozambican coastal and border patrol capability with non-existent help. Quite obviously, the USG is not taking border and transportation security seriously.

NAMIBIA

While Namibia saw increases in the number of personnel trained in four of the five security sectors, with an overall increase of 91%, the data is deceiving. That is because Namibia's military increased in size from 9,000 to 16,000 and police forces increased by almost fivefold from 2,800 to 12,500. Despite these increases in personnel, Namibia also saw a more than 50% decrease in arms authorisations and grants and a halving of military training expenditure.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION NAMIBIA				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	226	147	minus	35%
PSO	0	46	plus	4600%
NS	0	9	plus	900%
LE	13	177	plus	1262%
BTS	1	79	plus	7800%
Total	240	458	plus	91%
ARMS	1765	843	minus	52%
TRS	1598	878	minus	46%

Despite the 77% increase in the size of the NDF, the USG military training dropped from pre 9/11 levels of 454 to 437.

This was primarily due to the fact that Namibia refused to sign an Article 98 Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the US and subsequently lost all military funding. It was also due to the completion of the USG demining training programme (MA) for the NDF, which had been, by far, the biggest USG programme in the country. The combined result of an increase in force size and reduced American assistance shifted training ratios from 1:79 to 1:146. The loss of IMET funding and no MA halved post-9/11 training expenditure to \$878,000 from \$1,598,000. Namibia did shift on peace support operations and in the post-9/11 years opted to sign onto the ACOIA training programme. No full battalions or brigades were trained in post-9/11 years, but 46 senior NDF staff began planning future training operations with USG

counterparts, which indicated greater cooperation. Beyond traditional programmes, an additional 46 MDI health officials were provided with HIV/AIDS training, up from zero. Based on the total arms authorisations and grants pre-9/11 arms per soldier figures were at \$196 and decreased to \$53 post-9/11.

The post-9/11 years also saw nine Namibian security officials train under USG nuclear security-training programmes. This was fairly unique amongst Southern African nations and perhaps stems from Namibia's public acknowledgement of interest in future development of a civilian nuclear energy capacity as well as its large uranium deposits. It seems to be in American interest to develop relationships with Namibian energy officials, if this is the case.

The law enforcement and border/transportation security sectors saw sizeable increases in number of personnel trained via USG programmes while greatly increasing force size. The law enforcement sector training increased from 13 to 177 and BTS training increased from 1 to 79. The BTS sector benefited the most due to Namibian participation in the Safe Skies for Africa programme, which provided modest aviation security training. The increases of force size coupled with increased USG sponsored training shifted training ratios from 1:800 to 1:195, which is quite a bit better. The utter lack of coastal security and customs and border patrol assistance post-9/11 is very troubling. Just three Namibian officials were provided customs and immigration training. Given Namibia's 1,572 km of coastline; two ports, and 3 international airports one would think that border and transportation security beyond aviation is important, particularly when border control is a primary American concern in Southern Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA

While the USG considered South Africa to be one of its main security partners on the African continent in pre and post 9/11 years, security cooperation clearly dropped post-9/11. South African security force size remained similar in the two periods due to increases in police force size complementing by a reduction of military size. The pre-9/11 SANDF had an estimated active duty standing force of 73,500 with a police force of 120,000. Post-9/11 the SANDF numbers dropped to 57,000 and police size increased to 130,000. While overall training decreased 29% from 4,874 to 3,474, arms authorisations and grants were increased a whopping

189%, as was overall training expenditure which increased 92%. South African military and other security officials participated in 30 different training programmes in the post-9/11 years, up from 22 in pre-9/11 years. While peace support operations and nuclear security programme participation increased, all military, law enforcement, and border and transportation security training decreased. Despite that, South Africa was the host of several U.S. military exercises and joined the State Partnership Program. Both help to counter the loss of overall military training yet do not make up for it.

Military training numbers decreased 48% in post 9/11 years from 2,266 to 1,184. This was due to a loss of IMET funding. This increased the training ratio from 1: 130 to 1:193. Despite a loss of general military training, the SANDF did enjoy a large increase in military HIV/AIDS training and assistance for 1553 personnel. South Africa also increased peace support operations cooperation with the USG by 1680% when it signed onto the ACOFA programme. Training numbers increased from 15 to 267. Also helping the military and other security forces was a large 189% increase in arms authorisations and grants. Dollar values increased from \$177,160,000 to \$511,517,000, despite the cancelling of FMS-A and FMF grants due to South Africa's refusal to sign the Bilateral Immunity Agreement. This occurred largely on the back of large authorisation increases with the U.S. commercial defence industry. Based on the arms data, the arms per soldier data stood at \$2,410 pre-9/11 and increased dramatically to \$8,974 post-9/11. Another bright spot was South African inclusion in the State Partnership Program with the New York State National Guard. This allowed continued military cooperation despite the negative impact of the loss of federal military programme funding.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION SOUTH AFRICA				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL	2266	1184	minus	48%
PSO	15	267	plus	1680%
NS	25	216	plus	764%
LF	2266	1769	minus	22%
BTS	302	38	minus	87%
Total	4874	3474	minus	29%
ARMS	177160	511517	plus	189%
TRS	6551	12107	plus	92%

Table 59

One bright spot was with nuclear security training, as South African officials increased participation in USG programmes by 784% from 25 to 216. Given international concern with nuclear security, it is in the USG's interest to increase cooperation with South African

counterparts, as South Africa is one of the few countries in Africa with nuclear power. Continued interaction through exchange and training needs to be a top priority for the USG.

Despite an increase in South African law enforcement personnel during post-9/11 years, security cooperation in the law enforcement and border and transportation security sectors declined 22% and 87%, respectively. This was in spite of more than \$7,000,000 in direct law enforcement funding from the U.S. State Department's INL bureau. Total law enforcement training numbers decreased from 2266 to 1769 while border and transportation security numbers decreased from 302 to 38. Together, these decreases coupled with an increase in police force size changed training ratios from 1:212 to 1:294. While cancellation of military training assistance was the greatest mistake on America's part, more problematic is the reduction in these two sectors' training. South Africa needs continued assistance with a variety of security challenges, primarily in the law enforcement sector and the USG should be offering more assistance.

SWAZILAND

Despite a decrease in training expenditure and a slight increase in arms authorisations, security cooperation between the USG and Swaziland in pre and post-9/11 years remained fairly even. The USDF decreased from 3,000 to 2,700 and police forces increased from 2,500 to 2,800. Sponsored training decreased 18% with a large drop in USDF members trained. However, making up for that was a very large increase in law enforcement training.

Military training numbers dropped from pre-9/11 figures of 233 to 60. This changed training ratios from 1: 51 to 1: 180, quite a loss. This was perhaps because both the JCET and MA

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION SWAZILAND				
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE	
MIL.	233	60	minus	74%
PSO	0	18	none	0%
NS	0	18	none	0%
LE	23	148	plus	543%
BTS	0	1	plus	100%
Total	256	209	minus	18%
ARMS	0	203	plus	20300%
TRs	1561	602	minus	61%

Table 60

programmes, which had provided the greatest level of training, were absent in post-9/11 years. Swaziland was provided with military HIV/AIDS training and assistance for 56 personnel in the post-9/11 years, which added to overall cooperation. It received none pre-9/11. With no pre-9/11 arms authorisations or grants, the country received \$203,000 in FMF grants to

help pay for military training programmes including the HIV/AIDS programme. The post-9/11 arm per soldier figure is calculated at \$75, up from \$0.

Law enforcement training enjoyed the greatest increase in aid in the post-9/11 years with training numbers increased by 543%, from 23 to 148. Despite the slight rise in number of police forces, the training ratio improved from 1: 435 to 1: 76, a dramatic improvement. Only one border and transportation security official was provided training post-9/11, up from zero. That is not a real improvement.

ZAMBIA

Of all Southern African nations, Zambia enjoyed the greatest post-9/11 increase in security cooperation except in border and transportation security. These increases included an overall training increase of 155%, up from 410 to 1,044; a 643% increase in arms authorisations and grants; and a 170% increase in training expenditure. All of this occurred while Zambia decreased ZDF size from 21,600 to 18,100 and left its police force size at 13,000. Zambia is clearly moving up in American favour and strategic importance.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION ZAMBIA			
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
MIL	382	635	plus 66%
PSO	0	23	plus 2300%
NS	0	134	plus 13400%
LE	6	238	plus 3867%
BTS	22	14	minus 36%
Total	410	1044	plus 155%
ARMS	3011	22368	plus 643%
TRS	833	2249	plus 170%

The number of post-9/11 ZDF personnel trained almost doubled from 382 to 635. The majority of the increase came through the IMFT programme, which increased ZDF participation from 133 to 434. Overall the increase shifted the training ratio from 1: 226 to 1: 114, a big improvement. Zambia was also a major recipient of military HIV/AIDS training as 446 personnel were involved in the DHAPP programme. Unlike pre-9/11 years when the ZDF was not involved with any peace support operations training programmes, post 9/11 Zambia signed onto ACOTA and 23 officials were provided initial training and programme consultation. This is indicative of greater military confidence and cooperation with the USG. As training increased dramatically, so did arms authorisations and grants. Pre-9/11 levels were a mere \$3,011,000 and this increased more than

Table 61

sevenfold to \$22,368,000. The increase increases the arms per soldier ratio of \$139 to \$1,236. Clearly the USG is working to invest in the ZDF.

Zambia also was provided quite a bit of nuclear security training for the first time during post-9/11 years, mostly through the ATA programme. One hundred and thirty-four officials were provided training. This demonstrates an American commitment to educating partners in WMD and counter-proliferation dangers.

Of any Zambian security sector, law enforcement saw the biggest percentage change with a 3,867% increase. Post-9/11 training numbers increased from 6 to 238. This was due to large numbers of personnel involved in FBI, DEA, and ATF programmes. Despite a big improvement in the law enforcement sector, border and transportation security suffered a loss of 36%. Training numbers decreased from 22 to 14. Overall the law enforcement-training ratio improved from 1:1,857 to 1:206.

ZIMBABWE

Of all Southern African nations, none lost more security cooperation and assistance in the post-9/11 period than Zimbabwe. This was due to American sanctions on all non-humanitarian assistance. Zimbabwe represents the most dramatic shift in relations with the USG from a positive, close, and professional one to virtual non-existence. The sanctions called for a 100% loss in military aid, arms authorisations, and law enforcement training. Oddly enough Zimbabwean officials did participate in nuclear and one border and transportation security programme in the post-9/11 years. Zimbabwe's military size decreased from 39,000 to 29,000 while police forces increased from 19,000 to 21,800.

PRE-9/11 vs. POST-9/11 SECURITY COOPERATION ZIMBABWE			
Sector	PRE	POST	% CHANGE
MIL	355	2	minus 99%
PSO	0	0	none 0%
NS	0	2	plus 200%
LE	3	1	minus 66%
BTS	1	2	plus 100%
Total	359	7	minus 98%
ARMS	2616	0	minus 100%
TRS	1990	34	minus 99%

Table 62

With a 100% loss of military aid, the number of ZDF personnel trained dropped from 355 to 2 and the pre-9/11 military training ratio of 1:439 decreased to 1:19,500. The two who were

trained were involved with regional seminars with the ACSS. As arms sales dropped the arms per soldier ratio decreased from \$67 to \$0. Zimbabwe never participated in the military HIV/AIDS training and assistance programme.

While no Zimbabwean officials were involved in nuclear security programmes in pre-9/11 years, as previously mentioned, two did participate in the DP and RBPP programmes. There is no easy explanation for the USG's actions regarding this training. Zimbabwe had the most to lose and it certainly did.

CONCLUSION

Based on the data above it is possible to determine collective security cooperation rankings. To determine rankings, data is collected for each country in both the pre and post-9/11 years from three areas: military training ratio, police forces training ratio, and arms per soldier ratio. Countries can then be ranked by these figures to determine where the priority for the USG was in terms of security assistance. Based on the results, generalisations can be made about the importance of each country to the USG and an overall ranking can be concluded. This ranking can be determined by adding up the specific numerical ranking of an individual country in all three sectors and getting a total number. The country rank totals are then compared to determine overall rankings. The country with the lowest total has the highest priority. In determining the ranking, all three areas must be considered equal in importance and for purposes of this thesis, they are. The post-9/11 table ranking also shows a (+/-) and a number within each ranking column. This number indicates ranking change from pre-9/11, whether the country has gained or lost in ranking number. Using this system allows a more even-keeled view of regional assistance rather than just looking at raw numbers, which do not take into account security force size.

PRE-9/11 U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE RANKINGS				
Rank	MIL TRAINING	LE TRAINING	ARMS PER SOLDIER	OVERALL
1	Lesotho	South Africa	Botswana	Malawi
2	Malawi	Swaziland	South Africa	South Africa
3	Swaziland	Mozambique	Malawi	Botswana
4	Namibia	Malawi	Namibia	Namibia
5	Botswana	Namibia	Zambia	Swaziland
6	Mozambique	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique
7	South Africa	Lesotho	Angola	Lesotho
8	Zambia	Zambia	Mozambique	Zambia
9	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
10	Angola	Angola	Lesotho	Angola

Table 63

The pre-9/11 ranking is not terribly surprising, with the exception of Malawi's overall placing. In relation to its small size Malawi received quite a good amount of military training and a reasonable amount of law enforcement training. Due to its consistent position in the top tier of the three sectors it sits at the top. It is also important to note that Malawi was the only country to participate in the ACRI peace support operations training programme and that brought in more contact with the USG and helped it indirectly. South Africa would seem an obvious choice near the top given its regional dominance; however it proves surprising that it tanks near the bottom tier in military training assistance relative to the size of the SANDF. That was made up for in the law enforcement-training sector and in arms authorisations. (See Table 63)

The post-9/11 rankings quite clearly show how security cooperation shifted as Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique enjoyed a lot more attention from the USG. Despite slipping one place in the overall ranking from 1 to 2, Malawi stayed close to the top in post-9/11 years. The most significant change was South Africa's 5 place overall drop. This was due to a slip from an already mediocre 7th place in pre-9/11 military assistance to 8th place post-9/11 and an alarming 8 place slip in law enforcement training. That Namibia and Lesotho slipped comes as no surprise given their loss of military assistance in the post-9/11 years, which had made up the majority of pre-9/11 aid. Angola may be ranked 9th overall, just a one-position jump, but it was, along with Zambia, the only country to rise in the rankings in every column. Zimbabwe's position at the bottom comes as no surprise (see Table 64).

POST-9/11 U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE RANKINGS				
Rank	MIL. TRAINING	LE TRAINING	ARMS PER SOLDIER	OVERALL
1	Mozambique	Botswana	Botswana	Botswana
2	Malawi	Swaziland	South Africa	Malawi
3	Zambia	Malawi	Zambia	Zambia
4	Namibia	Namibia	Malawi	Mozambique
5	Botswana	Lesotho	Angola	Swaziland
6	Lesotho	Angola	Mozambique	Namibia
7	Swaziland	Zambia	Swaziland	South Africa
8	South Africa	South Africa	Namibia	Lesotho
9	Angola	Mozambique	Lesotho	Angola
10	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe

Table 64

It is reasonable to conclude that the Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique post-9/11 positions at the top of the security cooperation ranking are due to rising terrorism concerns from East Africa. They are the geographically closest countries to Tanzania, which has a significant Islamic population and has been beset by terrorist activity in recent years. Beyond that, all three nations have much higher Muslim populations than other Southern African nations. An estimated 20% of Mozambican and Malawian citizens are Muslim, of which the vast majority are Sunni. While Zambia may only have a 5% Muslim population, it borders Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique all of which have significant Islamic populations.¹⁹² It is no coincidence that America is increasing aid to regions with growing Islamic influence.

While having only a 5% Muslim population, Botswana enjoys the closest security relationship with the USG, playing host to the IJFA and shares the longest border of any Southern African nation with Zimbabwe, whose political and economic crisis is one of the biggest regional security concerns. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to continue strong security relations with Botswana.

¹⁹² http://www.islamicpopulation.com/africa_general.html accessed August 1st, 2007

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

Were the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States a catalyst for dynamic change in the security relationship between the United States and Southern Africa? Do the quantitative measures show a change or not?

The empirical data collected in the course of preparing this thesis does indeed seem to demonstrate that the 9/11 attacks led to a change in the security relationship shared between America and Southern Africa. That being said, it would be imprudent to believe that 9/11 is the only factor in increased security cooperation. One can point to tangible evidence of the increase in the number of U.S. sponsored training programmes, as well as the increase in African security and defence officials trained, and defence article and arms support. However, in reality the increase in U.S. aid is paltry for a region the size and scope of Southern Africa. One only has to look at what other regions are being provided for comparison. For example, through FMF financing, the entire 10-country Southern Africa region received \$17,051,000 in the post-9/11 years. In the same period East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) received more \$27,573,000¹⁹³ in FMF assistance. Sure, one can claim that comparing Southern Africa and East Africa's security situation is like comparing apples and oranges, as both Kenya and Tanzania suffered Al-Qaeda linked terrorist attacks, but that sort of disparity is quite telling. Regardless, the USG appears to be more engaged in Southern African security as a result of its heightened global security awareness and resultant foreign policy practices.

The data also suggests a newly dominant approach to post-9/11 US security cooperation with Southern Africa. With military spending declining dramatically; large increases to INL, ATA, and ILEA funding; and tremendous growth in the number of law enforcement and border and transportation security training programmes offered, one can conclude that the USG is handling security cooperation and the Global War on Terror in Southern Africa with a criminal justice approach. This is a dramatic departure from what one might expect, but it makes perfect sense. Post-conflict nations are in dire need of improved law enforcement capability, much more so than the need for military growth, particularly in a region with bloated and underfunded militaries.

¹⁹³ Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2003-2007

Since 9/11 the USG has had to cultivate new and closer intelligence relationships across the globe. By building those relationships and networking with Southern African police and other security forces, American officials stand to gain greatly in terms of intelligence collection, information sharing, and joint-investigation. By focusing on criminal justice, the USG stands to gain the most, at a lower cost, and in a shorter period of time.

Other Factors Affecting the Post-9/11 Security Relationship

Beyond the USG's enhanced focus on global security in the post-9/11 world, its military relationship with Southern African nations has been dramatically affected by the passage of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act in August 2002 which prohibits the United States from providing military aid to countries that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). While provisions exist for waivers to the loss of military aid, such as a presidentially-decreed national security waiver or the signing of a Bilateral Immunity Agreement between the USG and other nations, several Southern African countries opted not to establish bilateral immunity for military personnel. These included Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. They suffered dearly by losing IMET and FMF funding. This has certainly resulted in squandered goodwill in the early post-9/11 years and diminished the USG's ability to achieve its stated regional objectives.

Continuity of Pre and Post-9/11 Influences

With most Southern African countries in some stage of post-conflict, USG security policies have remained largely committed to prominent pre-9/11 influences, most significantly through building indigenous de-mining capabilities, growing African military peace support operations capacity, and offering professional military training.

While the majority of regional de-mining assistance came in the pre-9/11 years, most notably in Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, the USG did not abandon efforts post-9/11. Mozambique and Namibia continued to enjoy USG support in this security sector, as the USG remained committed to helping nations reduce danger from mines. Clearly, this emphasis has

been most richly rewarded in Mozambique and across the region as mine danger has been dramatically reduced.

While America's pre-9/11 ACRI peace operations programme was more or less a disaster, America's commitment to building African PSO capability through the post-9/11 ACOTA programme has proven to be much more effective in assisting Southern African nations. Many more have signed onto the programme, indicating that governmental hesitation towards greater PSO training has waned. Maybe nations are less leery of USG intentions, or perhaps as the AU become more involved in African and UN peacekeeping missions, under-budgeted Southern African governments recognize a need for external sources of training and equipment, which ACOTA provides.

Pre-9/11 security rhetoric from the USG clearly defined a commitment to the professionalism of African militaries as one of the primary security goals in the region. This was primarily done through the IMET programme. As seen in the course of this thesis, however, post-9/11 IMET participation decreased for every country except Angola, who had been largely restricted from IMET training due to the civil war. Since the USG has continued to stress the enhancement of professionalism in Southern African militaries, why of the five security areas outlined in this thesis, has only military training decreased - by a whopping 35% (See Table 45)? This cannot be blamed solely on South Africa, or any the three other nations (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia) who refused to sign a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the USG. One only has to view the post-9/11 American approach to security sector reform in Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to see that professional military and police force training is the USG's policy lynchpin to stability, security, and reform. The dramatic reduction in regional military training clearly calls into question the American commitment to professionalising Southern African militaries.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The comparison of the pre and post-9/11 security cooperation data undisputedly shows that the USG is taking Southern Africa far more seriously as a security partner in the post-9/11 era. It firmly demonstrates that the USG is starting to make a commitment to help improve the fundamental aspects of defence and law enforcement within state security institutions. The data proves that the vulnerability felt by the USG after the 9/11 attacks has resulted in a shift in policy, resource allocation, and urgency.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Is the United States safer in the post-9/11 years because of the changes it has made to security assistance in Southern Africa?

To answer the first question one must balance security cooperation with U.S. national strategy in the region. The U.S. Secretary of Defense's Office of African Affairs, which is charged with defence strategy and policy in Africa, outlines the basic assumptions of security interests in sub-Saharan Africa as:

(1) U.S. security interests are linked to the elimination of terrorist networks, strategic port and airfield access, open sea lanes of communication, and critical natural resources (energy); (2) vulnerable states create threats to U.S. interests because they are attractive environments for terrorists, and can lead to proliferation and crime; and (3) many African nations are willing to help, but they need assistance.¹⁹⁴

In addressing the first point, if elimination of terrorist networks are a security goal, then surely the increase in relationship development between USG and Southern African intelligence, military, law enforcement, energy, and border and transportation security officials is building cooperative networks to combat the terrorist threat. USG lawyers have helped Southern African

¹⁹⁴. *United States Administration and Defense Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Office of African Affairs, 6.

governments draft counter-terrorism legislation, hosted counter-terrorism training programmes such as the ATA, and offered several counter-proliferation programmes. There was a large increase in counter-terrorism cooperation occurred in post-9/11 years.

In terms of strategic port and airfield access the USG signed several “Acquisition and Cross Servicing” agreements with South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique, which opens up logistics cooperation between strategic nations. Additionally, the USG has established a series of Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) across the continent including in Namibia and Zambia.¹⁹⁵ These CSLs are described by the USG as “a host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. personnel presence, which may contain pre-positioned equipment and/or logistical arrangements and serve both for security cooperation activities and contingency access.”¹⁹⁶ They are designed,

“to help partners meet the challenges of ungoverned and under-governed areas. A series of Cooperative Security Locations to enhance regional training, help African states build counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities, and provide contingency access. They will be rotationally manned by U.S. troops and will come from host-countries’ pre-existing inventory of military facilities. They will remain host nation property and U.S. forces will be tenants. The idea here is presence without permanence.”¹⁹⁷

As far as open sea lanes, there is not much of a threat to Southern Africa at the moment and some small assistance has been provided to coast guards. Beyond that, permanent American navy ship deployments along the West African coast are designed to deter maritime threats along the weak West Coast while the South African navy can control its coast and work with Mozambique.

U.S. assistance in law enforcement and border, nuclear security, and border and transportation security has been increased to better combat the threats of crime and proliferation. The United States is safer because of its efforts in Southern Africa.

¹⁹⁵ Scheinmann, Gabe. “AFRICOM: A New American Military Command,” Policy Watch #1259, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10 July 2007 at www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2635

¹⁹⁶ Strategic Theater Transformation. United States European Command. United States Department of Defense Website accessed at http://www.eucom.mil/english/Transformation/Transform_Blue.asp on 12 February 2006

¹⁹⁷ Ibid

Is post-9/11 Southern Africa more secure because of USG security policy?

Southern Africa is more secure as its security relationship with the USG has grown. For decades the militaries, police forces, and other security services have been under-funded, overworked, under-equipped and trained, and quite corrupt. The USG and Southern African governments know that development depends on security. Internal instability due to high crime, drugs trafficking, or unhappy military forces affects national growth at all other levels including in the health sector, economics, and education. Societies must feel secure and protected in order to flourish. As USG assistance to the region has increased, particularly at the law enforcement level, the strength, professionalism, and capability of the indigenous security apparatus has grown. That in turn results in a trickle down effect of allowing other important civil sectors to improve. There is no question that there is a long way to go and that Southern Africa will need increased security aid in order to become a strong security partner of the USG and to better handle regional and continental responsibilities and threats, but movement is in the right direction.

Have post-9/11 USG security assistance policies been adequate?

While the USG has made improvements in security assistance to the region by increasing aid at all levels, it still is not doing enough. In the military sector, the decision to rescind IMET funding and government-to-government arms grants and sales has been terrible. Not only has it angered and alienated African militaries, but by punishing rather than working with fragile security establishments, the USG degrades its chances of meeting regional goals. The alienated military structures view the USG as bullying, mercurial, and a wavering partner. Trust is what needs to occur, not the dismantling of relations. If the USG is not involved with military sectors, then other competing powers will fill the void, the most obvious being China which is rapidly developing relationships with African governments. In order for the USG to achieve security goals, which primarily involve influence over African defence, it must prove to African counterparts that African interests are a priority, not purely American needs. The U.S. military must build friendship, cultural understanding, and assistance in order to be effective. Increasing military exercises, port visits, and military to military visitation is all part of that.

Improving security relations means increasing interaction between American and African security officials and military personnel. To do this the USG must work to improve its training ratios, focusing on military size and need. For example, a country like Angola, which is poised to be a major regional player, needs a whole lot more attention than it has been given. To train just 1 of every 5,926 FAA personnel is shocking and dangerous. Therefore, in the military sector the USG should provide Article 98 waivers for all countries in Southern Africa, increase training program expenditure for senior leadership at the ACSS and with mid-level enlisted and officer staffs via IMET, JCET, ALP, etc. Annual training ratios should be at approximately 1:25 military members.

In the law enforcement sector, INL funding needs to be increased to bring ICITAP and OPDAT lawyers to each country on an annual basis to assist in judicial and legislative development, as well as in police force development. Again, this needs to be scaled to police size. Like the military sector, an optimal training ratio of 1:25 should be worked towards, focusing on a train-the-trainer concept. Law enforcement is perhaps the most immediate need for internal security in Southern Africa given high crime. The USG was right to significantly increase law enforcement aid as well as bring on the ILEA, but more can and should be done.

The ACOTA peace support operations programme seems to be well-managed and quite well responded to. However, it is held back by a lack of ability of African governments to pay for their portions of the training events. Given that funding is the primary reason the programme does not always occur on schedule, the USG should allocate enough money in its annual ACOTA budget to cover all costs including equipment. It is nice that the USG offers the training, but if it is not conducted due to financing then neither side gains, in that the African military capability does not improve and the USG does not get to further its goals of enhancing indigenous peacekeeping capacity.

Nuclear security training is fairly well-managed; however the USG should provide training annually for at least a few officials from each country rather than a few scattered countries. If energy officials in each country are better aware of counter-proliferation or defence programs within nuclear security, as well as gaining professional knowledge and developing relations with American counterparts, everyone wins.

Border and transportation security is woefully inadequate. Most of the rhetoric from the USG discusses a need for much greater border and coastal security, due to the porous nature of the region. In four years just 571 customs, coast guard, and border officials were provided training. Clearly, this is counter-productive. The USG must get significantly more engaged in assisting countries develop border and customs security. This should be achieved through much higher offerings and participation in training programmes as well as quite a bit more equipment donation, particularly coast guard and navy vessels for ocean, river, and lake operations.

The biggest problem with overall security assistance is that USG agencies are seemingly unaware of what other USG agencies are providing. A great example of this came through in a conversation held with a U.S. military lawyer working with the Defence Institute of International Legal Studies, an office funded through IMET, which provides a variety of training for military and MoD personnel. The lawyer I spoke with focuses on military and peacekeeping legal training in Southern Africa and I asked him if he was familiar with the ILEA-G and if he ever coordinated training there. He had been in his position a year yet had never heard of the ILEA. USG agencies seem to be competing for influence in African nations rather than working with other agencies to coordinate and design appropriate training programmes which do not overlap in substance or style in order to provide a better product.

Has the US policy to restrict military assistance funding and programmes for non-Bilateral Immunity Agreement signees proven harmful to US regional policy aims?

When countries refuse to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the USG, they lose funding and support for programmes such as IMET, FMF, and EDA which provide military to military training and arms grants. Such programmes are described by the USG to be,

“Foreign Military Financing, the U.S. government program for financing through grants or loans the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training, supports U.S. regional stability goals and enables friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. FMF helps countries meet their legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Defense Security Cooperation Agency Website.
http://www.dsca.mil/home/foreign_military_financing%20_program.htm, accessed 22 March 2008.

By definition alone, a policy restricting security aid is clearly counter-productive to regional objectives. Most significantly, it stopped South Africa's FMF allocation, which led to a dramatic drop in professional training and support for arms and defence articles. USG logistical support for the SANDF in AU and other peacekeeping missions was affected by the loss of funding, as U.S. General Bantz Craddock stated to Congress,

“Due to ASPA sanctions we are no longer able to provide spare parts or training under the FMF program. One consequence is that now South Africa no longer has the capability to transport African Union peacekeepers into Darfur and other peacekeeping missions in Africa. As a result the U.S. and other allies must provide air transport at great cost.”¹⁹⁹

South African military staff, particularly cadre and senior NCOs who may have benefitted through professional military training for peace support operations certainly suffered. Even senior US military and diplomatic staffs have decried the Bush Administrations' policy,

“The Bush administration and Congress have slashed millions of dollars of military aid to African nations in recent years, moves that Pentagon officials and senior military commanders say have undermined American efforts to combat terrorist threats in Africa and to counter expanding Chinese influence there...Some cite this as a case where the unintended consequences of the go-it-alone approach to foreign policy that Washington took after the Sept. 11 attacks affected the larger American efforts to combat terrorism.”²⁰⁰

Have Southern African nations manipulated the USG to provide more than perhaps what is needed under the guise of the “Global War on Terror” as many other countries across the globe have?

Throughout the course of gathering data for this thesis, only two countries requested specific security training above and beyond what had been offered by the USG- Malawi and South Africa- and both were post-9/11. Malawi wanted criminal justice support for anti-corruption programmes and South Africa requested general support for criminal justice issues and extended military medical training through ACOTA. This very minimal level of assistance requests indicates that Southern African countries are more hands-off than countries in other regions of the world and do not seem to be demanding much more than is being offered by the DoS. Admittedly, Southern Africa is not a known hotbed of terrorist activity and is relatively stable, which means that perhaps it has less need, or less influence in gaining more from the USG.

¹⁹⁹ U.S. Congress. House. Armed Services Committee. Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, USA, Commander, United States European Command 15 March 2007

²⁰⁰ Mark Mazzetti. “U.S. Cuts in Africa Aid Said to Hurt War on Terror,” New York Times. 23 July 2006.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Does USG security assistance in Southern Africa demonstrate that America has embraced and enacted an amoral Realist type foreign policy, as it has often been accused of globally, post- 9/11?

Hans Morgenthau stated, "Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place."²⁰¹ That being said, many American critics have levied claims of an amoral Realist approach to foreign policy by the USG since President George W. Bush uttered his famous, "You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror" phrase in November 2001. Data in this thesis demonstrates that the USG *is not* engaged in an amoral Realist foreign policy agenda (at least in Southern Africa); most significantly in the way it has isolated Zimbabwe and curtailed all security assistance. The USG has even referred to Zimbabwe with fairly damning rhetoric as one of six "outlaw states" and as one of the world's few "outposts of tyranny" in company with Cuba, Burma, and Belarus.²⁰²

Zimbabwe is a well-known disaster with half the population facing the threat of famine, inflation up 150,000%²⁰³, hundreds of thousands of people displaced, 80% unemployment, and rule of law replaced by the arbitrary and brutal rule of self-appointed elite. By denying security and other government-to-government assistance to Zimbabwe, the USG has made policy decisions based upon moral grounds. As the government of Zimbabwe continues to terrorise the majority of its population, the USG has refused to continue to train or arm the military and other security forces, in order to avoid indirect complicity in the brutalisation of the Zimbabwean population. In this case, the USG is holding the Zimbabwean government accountable for its actions, and can hardly be accused of amoral Realism.

Additionally, a review of my post-9/11 rankings shows that the highest regional security priorities for the USG are neighbours of Zimbabwe- Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and

²⁰¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, (New York: Alfred Knopf), 1978

²⁰² "Condoleezza Rice Says Zimbabwe an Outpost of Tyranny," www.newzimbabwe.com. 03 November 2006.

²⁰³ Shakeman Mugari, "Zimbabwe: IMF Estimates Inflation at 150,000%," *Zimbabwe Independent*. 18 January 2008

Mozambique, with South Africa not far behind (see Table 64). It might even be argued that those nations rise in security assistance rankings could be linked to the problems in Zimbabwe, as an insurgency or humanitarian crisis would affect them most directly.

If, as Hans Morgenthau said, “We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own”²⁰⁴ then the USG has demonstrated in Southern Africa that it is basing its security policies with some level of moral consideration.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY STUDIES-SCHOLARS

Security Studies scholars, particularly those concerned with Southern Africa on the regional or country-to-country level should use this data to expand understanding of USG operations and influence on the continent and the region. This thesis opens up information on the scope and types of security programmes the USG operates in Southern Africa and even around the globe. Many of the programmes on which data has been collected are not in mainstream focus, particularly in non-military sectors. Hopefully scholars also see an opportunity for further research on USG criminal justice efforts in the region, particularly in relation to the Global War on Terror.

The data presented should also help scholars compare a changing AU and SADC security architecture to fluctuating USG influence and support, which undoubtedly will be influenced by USG policy. This thesis should also serve as a model for security assessment in other regions of the globe, which may also have been overlooked since the beginning of the Global War on Terror. African security scholars should also take close note on shifting USG assistance levels as Chinese influence grows on the continent and as the Zimbabwean situation changes or worsens.

²⁰⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To combat the assistance overlap, competition between agencies, and overall monetary waste, my main recommendation is to the USG and involves coordinating all security assistance from every federal agency operating in Southern Africa under the new U.S. African Command (AFRICOM). I propose that AFRICOM designates one of its primary command branches as SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

A senior military officer will command the SECURITY ASSISTANCE branch with a deputy from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). SECURITY ASSISTANCE will be broken into geographical regions, one being SOUTHERN AFRICA. This regional branch will be run by a senior military officer with permanently assigned representatives from the following U.S. federal agencies: Department of Defense, Bureau of INL, Diplomatic Security, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and USAID. These federal department representatives will coordinate international training from all agencies within their department. For example, the DoJ representative will coordinate with OPDAT, ICITAP, ATF, DEA, and FBI international training programme managers. They will work with local embassy representatives, host nation security officials, and offices in Washington D.C. to determine training needs, develop budgets, and most importantly coordinate departmental and interdepartmental training with the other representatives.

Doing this will centralise training and keep all agencies informed of what their USG partners are involved in. Working together rather than blindly and separately will vastly improve efficiency, resource allocation, and quality of relations between the USG and Southern Africa. In addition, a liaison from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation should be permanently attached to the SOUTHERN AFRICA branch. This liaison would act as a go-between between the SADC, AFRICOM, and individual nations on matters of security co-operation.

As far as future security cooperation is concerned, based on the pre vs. post-9/11 rankings in Chapter Four, the countries at the top of the post-9/11 rankings should not be terribly surprising, although not having South Africa there might seem unusual. The USG is providing

less assistance because South Africa has a strong defence infrastructure in place and in theory needs less help. That being said, the significant decreases in international training and exchange are worrisome. Of perhaps any country in the region, the USG should be ever expanding its relationship with South Africa. It is the regional hegemony and therefore needs requisite attention. That Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique bettered their positions is good news, and that Zimbabwe remains at the bottom is no small surprise. However, here is no question that Angola must be brought towards the top of the ranking list. Angola did not receive nearly the attention it now warrants given its rising power in Africa and the size of its military. The USG should not discount Angola and efforts need to be significantly increased.

In summation, the United States has a unique opportunity to assist a region in need, and forge bonds in a part of the world largely ignored and underdeveloped. Given its status as the world's lone superpower, the United States has a responsibility to protect itself and like it or not, other parts of the globe. Southern Africa is a region which in future years will be of great importance to the United States, not only due to the power of the rising South, but also because of energy security, a potential implosion in Zimbabwe, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and rising anti-American sentiment throughout the globe. In Southern Africa, the United States has eager partners willing and wanting to learn and enjoy the fruits of a strong partnership. It is up to the United States to make the appropriate choices to cultivate a tremendous opportunity.

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APPENDICES: SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

APPENDIX A

AVIATION LEADERSHIP PROGRAM (ALP)

The ALP is an U.S. Air Force-funded undergraduate pilot training programme for students from less-developed nations, deemed to be friendly to the U.S. Training generally includes pilot instruction, English language training, and as well as programmes focusing on the democratic institutions and social framework of the U.S. Included in the costs of the programme are transportation, flight clothing, billeting, food, health services, and all educational supplies.

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APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)

International Military Education and Training (IMET) pays for the training or education of foreign military personnel and a limited number of civilians. IMET grants are given to foreign governments, which choose the courses their personnel will attend. The goal is to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defence articles and defence services obtained by them from the U.S., with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.

Once a country determines its training needs and a funding source is designated, the Service International Training Agencies process the training requests. Course options include amongst other things: English Language Training, professional military education, management training, postgraduate education, and operational and technical training. These programs cover hundreds of topics and skill areas required by both international military officers and enlisted personnel and civilians. Courses also cover special emphasis areas as defence resources management, "rule of law" and other training that exposes international students to the U.S. professional military establishment, the American way of life, democratic values, and internationally recognised human rights.

APPENDIX C

JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE AND TRAINING (JCET)

The JCET programme involves sending small U.S. Special Forces teams overseas to work with, or to train with, foreign militaries. The average JCET group is comprised of 10 to 40 troops, though groups can include as many as 100. Missions range from training, advising, and organisation of foreign groups for unconventional warfare to training coalition forces for multinational military operations.

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APPENDIX D

REGIONAL CENTERS FOR SECURITY STUDIES (RCSS)

The Regional Centers' mission is to enhance regional security by building sustained and mutually beneficial relationships; fostering regional cooperation on security issues; and promoting effective communications and strategic capacity through free and candid interaction in an academic environment. Programmes take place both in Washington, DC and within Southern Africa. Southern African military and MoD leadership attending RCSS programmes have gone to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany (GCMECSS) and more recently, at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) in Washington, D.C.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (ACSS)

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the development of U.S. strategic policy towards Africa by providing high quality, relevant academic programs, fostering awareness of and dialogue on U.S. strategic priorities and African security issues, building networks of African, American, European and international military and civilian leaders, assisting U.S. policymakers in formulating effective African policy, and articulating African perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

APPENDIX E

REGIONAL COMBATING TERRORISM FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM (RCTFP)

The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a U.S. DoD security cooperation tool that provides education and training to international security personnel as part of the U.S. global effort to combat terrorism. Section 2249c of Title 10, U.S. Code authorises the Defense Department to use up to \$20 million per year “to pay any costs associated with the attendance of foreign military officers, ministry of defence officials, or security officials at United States military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or other training programs conducted under the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.” The RCTFP is focused on strategic and operational level combating terrorism education and training for mid-level to senior-level foreign military officers, MoD officials, and security officials with counter-terrorism responsibilities. The goals of the programme are to build and reinforce the combating terrorism capabilities of partner nations; to build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist organizations; and to counter ideological support for terrorism.

APPENDIX F

MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACTS PROGRAM (MCP)

The MCP programme maintains a team of U.S. military personnel within the Ministry of Defence for selected countries, to facilitate dialogue of requirements for defence management appropriate to democratic societies. These military liaison teams help in the creation of Travelling Contact Teams with expertise in specific functional areas. The information provided by the team is tailored to the host nation's particular needs. In addition to use of the contact teams, the objectives of the MCP may be accomplished through the use of familiarisation tours, conferences, and exchanges of civilian and military personnel.

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APPENDIX G

NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

This programme links U.S. states with partner countries for the purpose of supporting the security cooperation objectives of the Combatant Commander, in Southern Africa's case this would be the U.S. African Commander (AFRICOM). The programme's goals reflect an international affairs mission for the National Guard (NG) using the unique civil-military nature of the Guard to interact with both active and reserve forces of foreign countries. The State Partners actively participate in a host of engagement activities from bilateral familiarisation to training exercises opportunities, fellowship-style internships, civic leader visits, and medical events. All activities are coordinated through the Combatant Commander and the U.S. Ambassador's country team, and other agencies as appropriate, to ensure that National Guard support is tailored to meet both U.S. and country objectives.

The value of the SPP is its ability to focus the attention of a small part of DoD—a State National Guard—with a single country or region in support of USG policies. This concentrated focus allows for the development of long-term personal relationships and a mechanism to catalyse support from outside the DoD, which otherwise would not occur but nevertheless complements U.S. policy.

APPENDIX H

MINE ASSISTANCE (MA)

The Mine Assistance (MA) programme assists countries that are experiencing the adverse affects of uncleared landmines and other explosive remnants of war. Activities include U.S. military training of host nation defence and law enforcement forces on de-mining operations as well as equipment donation. Occasionally funds are used to contract civilian de-mining companies to aid and assist militaries with training.

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APPENDIX I

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HIV/AIDS PREVENTION PROGRAM (DHAPP)

The DoD HIV/AIDS prevention programme was established in FY01 as a way to fund, treat, and educate African militaries in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. HIV/AIDS is deemed by the USG to be affecting the readiness and national security of allied African nations due to the high rates of infection in military personnel. Many militaries are experiencing readiness problems due to high rates of morbidity and mortality among their personnel. The U.S. Navy serves as the Executive Agent for DoD international HIV/AIDS prevention activities

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APPENDIX J

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) / FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme is the government-to-government method for selling U.S. defence equipment, services, and training. A military buying weapons through the FMS programme does not deal directly with the company that makes them. The U.S. DoD serves as an intermediary, usually handling procurement, logistics and delivery and often providing product support and training.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) refers to congressionally appropriated grants given to foreign governments to finance the purchase of American-made weapons, services and training. Congress appropriates FMF funds in the International Affairs Budget, the U.S. DoS allocates the funds for eligible friends and allies; and the U.S. DoD executes the programme. According to the Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “FMF helps countries meet their legitimate defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cements cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances interoperability with U.S. forces.”²⁰⁵ FMF grants are often used to fund FMS arms sales.

²⁰⁵ United States Department of Defence. Office of the Secretary of Defence. Defence Security Cooperation Agency Website at http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_financing%20_program.htm

APPENDIX K

DIRECT COMMERCIAL SALES (DCS)

The U.S. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programme regulates private U.S. companies' overseas sales of weapons and other defence articles, defence services, and military training. Unlike FMS sales, direct commercial sales are negotiated directly between the foreign government and the U.S. arms manufacturer without the Pentagon serving as an intermediary. DCS purchases avoid the surcharges for U.S. government administrative costs that are levied on FMS sales. DCS sales are usually quicker than FMS, as they avoid much "red tape" associated with the government-to-government programme. DCS are also less transparent than FMS; some buyers are attracted to the programme's relative lack of reporting requirements. Governments that have more experience in military procurement, and do not feel a need to have the USG negotiate sales on their behalf, tend to choose DCS. DCS sales may also come in the form of Technical Assistance agreements (DCS-TA) rather than simply manufactured defence articles, which provides expertise on a particular arms issue.

APPENDIX L

ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY PROGRAM (EIPC)

EIPC was an initiative aimed at increasing the number of foreign military personnel qualified to participate in international peacekeeping missions. EIPC provided: peacekeeping related to training and education (mostly through the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) located in Monterey, California), English language training, workshops, visits to peacekeeping training centres, non-lethal training equipment, library resources, and training simulation software. The goal was that upon completion, participants would have a good grasp of peace support operations policy, doctrine, logistics, and interoperability issues. Once the ACOTA programme came into existence EIPC was folded into it.

APPENDIX M

AFRICA CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI)

The ACRI's objective was to enhance the capacity of African nations to better perform peacekeeping and relief tasks and thus encourage regional self-reliance. It sought to promote common doctrine, interoperability and standard communications technology among African forces. U.S. trainers conducted training in peacekeeping operations, communications, mine removal, and logistics. The U.S. also contributed non-lethal equipment to ACRI participants. While ACRI encouraged joint training exercises between African forces to hone their capacity to respond in emergency situations, ACRI was not designed to create a standing force.

APPENDIX N

AFRICAN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ACOTA)

This is the programme created by the Bush Administration in the spring of 2002 to take the place of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). It was designed to provide training in peacekeeping operations and regular military tactics to military units from selected countries. The most significant difference between the two programmes is that ACOTA includes training for offensive military operations, including light infantry tactics and small unit tactics. This is designed to enhance the ability of African troops to conduct peacekeeping operations in hostile environments. The programme's goal is to increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, and small unit operations.

APPENDIX O

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM (PME)

The Professional Military Education (PME) programme is comprised of progressive levels of military education designed to prepare military officers for leadership. It includes various basic level courses for the new and junior officers, command and staff colleges for the mid-level officers, and war colleges for the senior officers. International students may attend most of these courses through the normal Security Assistance Training quota process; however, the command colleges as well as the war colleges are by-invitation-only, with each U.S. Military Service deciding the invitation list. The sponsoring country is asked to provide only career personnel for these types of courses, and to meet the required rank/grade and educational level criteria for each course of study.

APPENDIX P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TRAINING PROGRAM (OIIA)

This programme brings foreign participants to the U.S. based on individual technical expertise and then marries their knowledge to intelligence operations. The participants work together to produce intelligence analysis, intelligence security, and assist in developing lab analysis and technical capabilities.

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APPENDIX Q

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DEFENSE PROGRAM (DP)

This programme deals with the military application of nuclear energy. The goal of the programme is to reduce global nuclear danger by maintaining a secure supply of U.S. nuclear weapons, and maintaining the ability to design, produce and test nuclear weapons in order to meet U.S. national security requirements, and ensure that associated materials, capabilities, and reliable technologies are in a safe, environmentally sound, and cost effective manner. The training programme focuses on increasing intellectual capacity to maintain appropriate nuclear stockpiles.

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APPENDIX R

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION TRAINING PROGRAM (OGTR)

This office identifies, secures, removes, and/or facilitates removal of vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive materials around the world that pose a threat to the U.S. and the international community. International training is conducted in these areas.

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APPENDIX S

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REGIME BUILDING/PREVENTING PROLIFERATION PROGRAM (RBPP)

This programme works to support international efforts to reduce worldwide tensions through non-proliferation treaties, cooperative monitoring and verification regimes, export controls and sensitive materials and technology, and international nuclear safeguards. It provides policy and technical expertise to foreign governments in regards to U.S. efforts to implement non-proliferation regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

University of Cape Town

APPENDIX T

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAM (NSNP)

This programme provided training in the following areas: prevention of nuclear weapons technology proliferation; protection of nuclear materials and facilities; research and development activities, which supported advanced technologies that aid in detecting and countering emerging proliferation threats. The programme was eventually disbanded and incorporated into the RBPP.

University of Cape Town

APPENDIX U

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAM (NEST)

This programme addressed issues with existing nuclear power plants; supported nuclear energy research and nuclear energy education; worked on provision of power systems for defence and deep space exploratory needs; worked to develop technologies for production and application of isotopes; and provided medical research. It is no longer in existence.

University of Cape Town

APPENDIX V

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NON-PROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (NPRD)

The objectives of this training programme are to use technology to promote the reduction of threats to national security posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation and assist in commitments to treaty monitoring. Programme participants develop applicable technologies, demonstrate and validate field able prototypes, and provide operational hardware and software to end-users. The four main programmes are the: Chemical and Biological National Security Program, Proliferation Protection, Nuclear Explosion Monitoring, and Proliferation Deterrence.

APPENDIX W

OFFICE OF OVERSEAS PROSECUTORIAL, DEVELOPMENT, ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROGRAM (OPDAT-ITP, OPDAT-IVP)

OPDAT uses DoJ resources to assist prosecutors and criminal justice personnel worldwide in developing and sustaining effective criminal justice institutions. On occasion, OPDAT partners with the U.S. Federal judiciary, providing an opportunity for judges to share their experience and expertise with their foreign counterparts. Working with the DoS and USAID, OPDAT provides technical assistance tailored to meet the specific justice sector needs of a particular country or region. Once a justice sector assessment has been conducted, OPDAT applies a best practices methodology to develop effective criminal codes and procedures; improve institutional structures, policies and relationships; and/or enhance the professional capabilities and skills of prosecutors and select law enforcement officers to help create more responsive and responsible criminal justice systems abroad. OPDAT also stations long term Resident Legal Advisors in country with long-term rule of law programmes.

APPENDIX X

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICITAP)

ICITAP'S mission is to serve as the source of support for U.S. criminal justice and foreign policy goals by assisting foreign governments in developing the capacity to provide professional law enforcement services based on democratic principles and respect for human rights. ICITAP's activities encompass two principle types of assistance projects: (1) the development of police forces in the context of international peacekeeping operations, and (2) the enhancement of capabilities of existing police forces in emerging democracies. Assistance is based on internationally recognized principles of human rights, rule of law and modern police practices.

ICITAP's training and assistance programs are intended to develop professional civilian-based law enforcement institutions. This assistance is designed to: (1) enhance professional capabilities to carry out investigative and forensic functions; (2) assist in the development of academic instruction and curricula for law enforcement personnel; (3) improve the administrative and management capabilities of law enforcement agencies, especially their capabilities relating to career development, personnel evaluation, and internal discipline procedures; (4) improve the relationship between the police and the community it serves; and (5) create or strengthen the capability to respond to new crime and criminal justice issues.

APPENDIX Y

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (FBI)

The FBI is made up of International Training and Assistance Units that identify and follow through with training needs of foreign law enforcement agencies. Most training is on basic and advanced investigative techniques, counter-terrorism, organized crime, and intelligence gathering. The programme also supports law enforcement infrastructure development with donation of equipment and training on uses thereof.

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APPENDIX Z

DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (DEA)

The DEA's role is that of international consultant to law enforcement agencies, as well as foreign governments seeking to develop quality narcotics law enforcement programs, organisational infrastructures, and judicial reforms.

The specific courses offered are continually changing as new curricula are developed and instituted in response to experiences, changes in law enforcement emphasis, current international narcotics trafficking situations, new technologies, and specific requests of the host governments. However, the curricula generally include core narcotics enforcement principles and techniques. Topics of instruction include: initiation and development of narcotics investigations, surveillance techniques, pharmacology, intelligence collection and analytical methods, tactical safety, interviewing, drug identification, asset forfeiture and financial investigations, undercover operations, operational planning and an overview of current international trafficking trends and situations. All DEA international training programmes have as a major objective the building of regional working relationships between countries.

DEA offers both in-country and regional training programmes conducted by mobile training teams. In-country programmes are seminars conducted in a host country and only include participants from that country. Regional training is designed to bring together a combination of participants from a number of countries sharing common drug trafficking issues or routes. Regional schools have been found to be beneficial in fostering an improvement in professional relationships among the participants, in addition to covering the topical materials. A training team member to design each school to the specific requirements of the receiving country conducts an advance pre-school planning and assessment trip.

APPENDIX AA

INTERNATIONAL DEMAND REDUCTION, TRAINING, AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (IDRTTA)

The DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INI) runs IDRTTA. Its focus is on a worldwide reduction of the demand for illicit drugs by motivating foreign governments and institutions into giving increased attention to the negative effects of drug use on society. The programme provides training to try to mobilise regional and international support for counter-narcotics programmes, policies, and strategies.

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APPENDIX BB

ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, and FIREARMS AGENCY INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (ATF)

The ATF agency focuses on enforcing laws and regulations relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and arson. Its international programmes provide technical assistance, support institution building and increase enforcement capability in these areas.

ATF K-9 INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMME (ATF-K9)

The ATF programme provides trained explosives detection canine teams to selected foreign countries to assist them in their efforts to combat terrorism. To support the mission, the ATF developed a scientifically based explosives detection canine programme that trains dogs capable of detecting a myriad of different explosives compounds. ATF's programme uses a food and praise reward training methodology that exposes canines to five basic explosives groups, including chemical compounds used in estimated 19,000 explosives formulas. This training methodology allows for a canine to be repeatedly exposed to various explosives' odours daily, thus reinforcing these odours to the canine continually. Only South Africa has received this type of training.

APPENDIX CC

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (USSS)

The USSS sponsors two security cooperation initiatives in Southern African states: the Counterfeit Detection Program and the International Training Program. The Counterfeit Detection Program provides classroom and lab-based training for foreign counterparts in counterfeit U.S. currency. The ITP introduces participants to investigative procedures and processes involving counterfeiting, financial fraud, identity theft, and computer forensics.

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APPENDIX DD

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (FLETC)

FLETC offers three types of training in Southern African countries: International Banking and Money Laundering Program (IBMLP), Interview Training, and an International Students Program (ISP). The IBMLP program is at basic and advanced levels and is designed for criminal investigators and law enforcement intelligence analysts studying financial crimes and terrorist financing. The Interview Training program trains law enforcement officials in proper interview and questioning techniques. The ISP program brings foreign law enforcement counterparts to the FLETC to train in every training division at the centre in order to foster collaborative relationships with foreign government officials.

APPENDIX EE

ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ATA)

The ATA program trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in police procedures that deal with terrorism. Diplomatic Security (DS) officers work with the host country's government and a team from that country's U.S. mission to develop the most effective means of training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protections, and VIP protection. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program builds the capacity of key countries to fight terrorism; establishes security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; and shares effective anti-terrorism techniques.

DS assesses the training needs, develops the curriculum, and provides the resources to conduct the training. The bureau uses its own training experts as well as those from other U.S. federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, police associations, and private security firms and consultants.

Most ATA program recipients are developing nations lacking human and other resources needed to maintain an effective antiterrorism programme and infrastructure. ATA training seeks to address deficiencies noted in the ability to perform the following areas: protecting national borders; protecting critical infrastructure; protecting national leadership; responding to and resolving terrorist incidents; managing critical terrorist incidents which have national-level implications.

APPENDIX FF

INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY- GABORONE, BOTSWANA (ILEA-G)

The United States and the Government of Botswana signed a bilateral agreement in July 2000 to establish an ILEA in Gaborone to promote international cooperation against crime. The main feature of the ILEA is a six-week intensive personal and professional development program, called the Law Enforcement Executive Development Program (LEEDP), for law enforcement mid-level managers. The LEEDP brings together approximately 45 participants from several nations for training on topics such as combating trans-national criminal activity, supporting democracy by stressing the rule of law in international and domestic police operations, and by raising the professionalism of officers involved in the fight against crime.

The ILEA also offers specialized courses for police and other criminal justice officials to enhance their capacity to work with U.S. and regional officials to combat international criminal activities. These courses concentrate on specific methods and techniques on a variety of subjects, such as counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, financial crimes, border security, drug enforcement, firearms and many others.

The training faculty for ILEA is drawn from a cross-section of U.S. Federal law enforcement agencies, U.S. state and local law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the international law enforcement community. ILEA training programmes includes a six-week core curriculum, offered approximately four times per year; special courses, approximately two weeks in length; and senior management conferences designed to disseminate vital crime control information to participants who are at the policy-making levels of government.

APPENDIX GG

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD INTERNATIONAL TRAINING AND VISITOR PROGRAM (USCG-ITP)

The USCG provides training and consulting services in maritime law enforcement, marine safety/environmental protection, small boat operation and maintenance, search and rescue, and infrastructure development for countries with waterway law enforcement programmes. The USCG works with individual nations, other U.S. federal agencies, and U.S. Embassies to determine the needs and coordinate specific training that can be held for small unit, multi agency, or several countries in a regional forum.

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APPENDIX HH

AFRICAN COASTAL/BORDER SECURITY PROGRAM

In Africa, the U.S. has initiated the African Coastal and Border Security programme to provide new and follow-on assistance to African partners to help them control sensitive border areas and to defend coastal waters from terrorist and criminal activities, as well as to better protect fisheries, oil, and environmental resources. The U.S. wants to prevent unlawful or hostile exploitation of the African maritime sector while collectively improving African capability to monitor activity throughout the domain; establish responsive decision-making architectures; enhance maritime interdiction capacity; develop effective policing protocols; and build cooperation.

APPENDIX II

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL AGENCY INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (TSA)

The CBP is focused on border and port security in the U.S. with a priority on preventing terrorist entry into U.S. borders. The CBP has three security cooperation initiatives: the International Visitor Program (IVP), the general International Training and Assistance Program (ITAP), and the Export Control/Border Security Program (EXBS). The goal of the IVP program is to facilitate foreign official visits with senior managers and program officers relating border security. The ITAP program provides border security training with a focus on all aspects of security and law enforcement to help foreign nations develop and maintain their own working border security programs. The EXBS program specifically trains border security officials and agents on weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention.

APPENDIX JJ

SAFE SKIES FOR AFRICA INITIATIVE

The purpose of the Safe Skies for Africa Initiative is to promote sustainable improvements in aviation security and safety in Africa and to create the environment necessary to foster the growth of aviation services between Africa and the U.S. Nine African countries were selected to participate in this programme. They are: Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

Inter-agency teams comprised of Federal Aviation Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service, DEA, and U.S. DoD specialists have conducted aviation security and safety observations (or assessments) of all the countries listed above with the exception of Zimbabwe. The FAA has hosted civil aviation authority (CAA) executives from these countries (except Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire) to assist them in developing plans to improve their aviation infrastructures.

APPENDIX KK

UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (TSA)

The TSA programme assists foreign aviation and security counterparts with management of aviation security operations, improvement and maintenance of aviation security and safety, and in meeting International Civil Aviation Organization standards.

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APPENDIX LL

UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AGENCY INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (ICE)

The ICE is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) investigative bureau and it has two programmes in Southern Africa: the International Visitors Program and International Training Program. The IVP brings counterparts to the U.S. for specially designed training and senior level meetings with a large focus on border-related legal issues. The ITP provides country-specific training for foreign law enforcement officials in areas such as WMD, cyber-crime, smuggling, and fraud.

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APPENDIX MM

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM (USCIS)

The USCIS international training programme offers training to foreign counterparts in an Asylum Officer course. This course provides training in international human rights law, asylum and refugee law, interviewing techniques, decision making and decision writing skills, and effective background research investigative skills relative to the country of origin. All training is conducted in the U.S.

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