UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN: POLITIAL STUDIES DEPARTMENT

Master of Arts in International Relations

Dissertation

Bridging the Values Gap

How support for women's constitutional rights changed
in the two decades following South Africa's democratic transition

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts: International Relations in the Faculty of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town.

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17 November 2023

DECLARATION

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THANKS

My sincerest thanks goes to my supervisor, Professor Robert Mattes, who has contributed an incredible amount of research and literature to this field of study. It was my privilege to have had the supervisory assistance of such a formidable academic. To my late step-father, Tom Nevin, you lit a torch that will continue to shine ever brightly. Thank you for teaching me so early on in life why justice and freedom matter. To my dear friend and mentor, Christy Kirkpatrick, you are the most remarkable mind that I have the privilege to know. Thank you for the time you spent with me, ensuring that I finally finished what I started so long ago.

ABSTRACT

The objective of this research is to understand how levels of support for women's Constitutional rights changed in South Africa between 1996 and 2013. It further aims to advance an explanation for the findings, within the context of the applied theoretical framework.

The timeframe over which these attitudes are assessed is between 1996 and 2013. This period measures a 17-year time frame that can be roughly aggregated to demonstrate progress towards the adoption of progressive attitudes concerning the rights of women, as enshrined in the South African Constitution. This period coincides with immediate two decades following the first free and fair Democratic national elections in 1994.

The theoretical framework within which this research is conducted, is Value Change Theory which will be used as an analytical lens which will be returned to for explanatory purposes rather than hypothesis testing.Here, I explore Ronald Inglehart's original thesis Value Change Theory (1971 and then 1977), as well as the various argument advanced in response. I further provide an analysis of the antagonisms inherent within Cultural Relativist and Universalist constructions of human and gender rights, and how these are relevant in the South African context.

Value Change Theory advances that whilst economic modernisation and the satisfaction of material needs generate relatively rapid increments in self-expression value adoption in much of the world, in nations where democratic consolidation and economic development is slow, the adoption of progressive values - such as support for women's equal rights - tracks a far slower course. It is contended that this hastens as genuine democratic consolidation occurs over time, as a result of the forces of economic modernisation.

The data that is relied upon in this study was collected and made available for independent analysis by the international research organisation, World Value Surveys (WVS) and self-processed using IMB's SPSS data processing software. The population statistics that are used to measure any substantive change in the material conditions of South Africans are derived from Statistics South Africa.

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Background and context

This thesis seeks to measure the extent to which public support for the social, political, and economic rights of women shifted in the seventeen-year period following South Africa's democratic transition in 1994, between 1996 and 2013. Here, quantitative research is conducted to determine whether aggregate levels of public support for gender equality increased, regressed, or remained stagnant during this time period. These findings are then analysed and explained within the theoretical framework of political scientist, Ronald Inglehart's Value Change Theory. These theories provide the basis for a theoretical framework that will be used as an analytical lens through which to understand the data outputs.

Undertaking research on the subject of gender equality in the South African context is critical for a number of reasons. For generations, women in South Africa have been subjected to systemic gender-based discrimination that has manifested in varying degrees of economic and social comparative disadvantage to men (Commission for Gender Equality: 2022, 3). During the Apartheid regime (1948 – 1994) gender-based discrimination was not only socially pervasive, but in many instances, legislatively entrenched and institutionally embedded within the apparatus of the state. Women of colour - and black women in particular - were acutely affected by additional layers of race and class based discrimination. (Commission for Gender Equality: 2022, 3).

Whilst much valuable work has been done in post-Apartheid South Africa to remedy the structural inequalities of the past, the collective social and economic advancement of women continues to track a comparatively slow path to men. (Commission for Gender Equality: 2022, 3). Despite the promulgation of progressive legislation,[1] present day statistics continue to reflect marked inequalities between men and women's economic, social and political development, with oversight bodies citing insufficient resourcing of legislative implementation plans as an ongoing, structural challenge mitigating the full realisation of women's Constitutional rights (Parliamentary Research

[1] *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No108 of 1996); Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Act No 4 of 2000); Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (Act No 120 of 1998); Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulated Matters Act (Act No 11 of 2009); The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act No 41 of 2003)*

Unit: 2019, 5). Additionally, the extent to which the adoption of progressive laws by political elites has shifted social values and attitudes towards women remains under-investigated (Parliamentary Research Unit, 2019, p. 5).

The objective of this thesis is to make an empirical research contribution to the academic disciplines of comparative politics and gender studies, with a view towards understanding and identifying some of the key social, political, economic and structural impediments that continue to hinder the full adoption of progressive attitudes towards women in the South African context.

After setting out a brief introduction, select academic literature relevant to the international women's rights movement and the struggle for gender equality in South Africa is interrogated. The thesis then advances towards an interrogation of related theoretical literature, after which the primary research problem and question are detailed. The relevant research methodology is then presented, after which reliable quantitative data is processed to measure the extent to which support for the equal rights of women shifted following democratisation in South Africa. The study will then offer an analysis of findings in the context of the relevant theoretical framework. In conclusion, the broader significance of research outcomes is interrogated.

1.2. An overview of the global women's rights movement and key outcomes

Throughout history, hetero-normative patriarchal attitudes have influenced the structure and organisation of society across most of the world (Heywood: 2002, 94). The central tenet of feminist theory, which emerged in response to the patriarchal structure of many societies, has been to advance and enhance to role of women in all facets of society, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that both men and women have equal access to social, political and economic rights. (Heywood: 2004, 62). Although feminist sentiments were first recorded as far back as the Ancient China, it was during the *Renaissance*[2] period that the written works of 15th and 16th century feminists first generated debate within the political classes. Early feminist thinkers, the likes of Christine de

[2] "A period in European civilization that was marked by a revival of Classical learning and wisdom." - Britannica

Pizan[3], Heinrich Agrippa[4], and Modesta di Pozzo di Forzi[5] were later credited as having advanced the central theoretical foundations upon which later feminists would build. (Schneir: 1994, 23).

However, it was only in the late eighteen century that (Western) feminist ideals gained broader recognition and prominence within civil society. Here, feminist thought can delineated into three distinct historical phases, each focused on achieving a specific set of objectives towards the full political, social and economic emancipation of women. It was Mary Wollstonecraft's seminal work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women ([1792] 1985),* which first emphasised that the rights of women were intrinsic to the notion of personhood. Wollstonecraft's thesis was largely influenced by John Locke's early liberal ideals, and by the egalitarian principle of social contract as espoused by French Enlightenment philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau (Heywood: 2002, 45, 61, 75).

More than fifty years later, the emergence of an organised women's suffrage movement gave rise to broader social and political debates concerning the rights of women. This movement - most commonly referred to as the "First Wave" - emerged in the late 1840's and was primarily concerned with questions of suffrage and social contract (Heywood: 2002, 61). Here, First Wave feminism focused predominantly on legal rights - such as achieving political franchise for women. Whilst this movement eventually succeeded in achieving its ultimate objective of winning the vote for women in many western democracies, this did not immediately translate into broader social and economic emancipation for women (Caughie: 2010, 6). It was only in the 1940's that ground breaking literary contributions such as *The Second Sex* by Simone de Beauvoir gave rise to broader debates regarding the status of women, the gendered nature of identity, and sexuality.

By the late 1960's, "Second Wave" feminism had emerged. Here, proponents of this movement critiqued the gendered nature of social relations, and specifically focused their attention on themes related to women's reproductive rights, sexual violence, mothering, domestic labour, credit, capitalism, and racism (Gillis et al: 2004, 67). Second wave feminism later gave rise to divergent

[3] *The Book of the City of Ladies, 1405* and *The Treasure of the City of Ladies, 1405*
[4] D*e nobilitate et praecellentia foeminae sexus* (On the Nobility and Excellence of the Feminine Sex), 1509
[5] *The Worth of Women, 1600*

sub-doctrines, such as liberal, social and radical feminism. Liberal feminists, such as Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan, promoted legal reforms and legislative protections for women in order to enhance their social and political status. These activists further sought to restructure the gendered nature of domestic life in modern America (Heywood: 2002, 62). Notwithstanding the noteworthy legal victories that women attained between the 1960's and 1980's, Second Wave feminism is most notably credited with widely transforming prevailing social attitudes about women's sexual and reproductive rights.

In 1981, feminist author Bell Hooks published her seminal work *Ain't I a Woman? Black Women and Feminism*. Here, Hooks is credited with influencing the emergence of a more inclusive feminist narrative, highlighting the multiple forms of oppression that black women historically navigated, examining the convergent impacts of slavery, colonialism, racism, and patriarchy (Knight: 2021). Writing about the seminal nature of Hook's work in a New York Times tribute[6] to the activist, Min Jin Lee notes:

> "Hooks's writing broke ground by recognizing that a woman's race, political history, social position and economic worth to her society are just some of the factors which comprise her value, but none of these can ever be left out in considering the totality of her life and her freedom."

Influenced partially by the intersectional nature of literature produced by African-American authors such as Hooks, "Third Wave" feminism commenced in the early 1990 and ultimately sought to redefine and broaden feminist discourse throughout much of the world. Here, the Third Wave sought to highlight individualism and diversity, emphasising the intersection of race, class, sexuality and gender – with a specific focus on the experience of minorities. By addressing the confluence of limitations inherent within earlier waves of feminism, the emphasis on the intersection between gender, class and race became a prominent and necessary feature of this movement. (Cochrane: 2013).

In this context it is important to note that the lived experience of women in the developed and developing worlds are not monolithic and nor has their advancement been linear. Here, the

[6] *Jin Lee, Min (February 28, 2019) "In Praise of Bell Hooks". The New York Times*

experience of women in the developing world has been radically different from to women in the developed world for a variety of structural, political and geographical reasons. Structural issues arising from the impact of colonialism such as conflict, territorial displacement, violence and poverty all exert a sustained impact on the development trajectories of women in the developing world (Korac in Yuval-Davis and Werbener: 1999, 192).

Whilst there is evidence to substantiate the assertion that the full empowerment of women results in better outcomes for the whole of society - including enhanced economic growth and productivity, and marked reductions in poverty and hunger - women in the developing world continue to navigate marked disadvantage as a result of complex layers of historical oppression (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: 2022, 4). According to a recent research report published by the United Nations (2022: 5) which tracks progress against the global Sustainable Development Goals, if international development continues to trace the current path, it will take 286 years to close prevailing gaps in policy and legal protections for women in the developing world.

Here, Western perspectives on women's emancipation may well be informative, but are not sufficiently contextualised for historical application in the South African context given the non-linear development paths of women in Western democracies, and developing nations in the global south. It is in this context, and against the historical backdrop of colonialism, apartheid and the intersectionality of race, class, culture and gender that this research is conducted.

1.3. The struggle for gender equality in the South African context

Whilst the focus of this study is to determine the extent to which prevalent social attitudes towards women shifted in the two decades following Apartheid, understanding South Africa's unique historical context is a critical preface to our subsequent findings and analysis. Given the lasting structural and psychological consequences of decades of forced social and geographical segregation on the basis of race, present-day South African society remains indelibly affected by the brutal realities of its past. As will be demonstrated by contemporary development indicators,

the country's women in particular, have not been spared the deleterious and lasting impact of colonialism and apartheid (Chingwere et al: 2014, 1).

According to Johnson (2004, 140) the doctrine of separateness, known officially as Apartheid, had its origins in *Broederbond* ideology stemming back to the 1930's, which had subsequently been developed by the South African League of Racial Studies. This was later officially entrenched into National Party policy by a commission set up during the Second World War, prior to the formation of the Republic in 1947.

Whilst the ideology of racial apartheid was established under the apologist auspices of, 'separate but equal', the legislative institutionalisation of this ideology was deeply destructive. This ideology - developed by white, male, predominantly Afrikaans nationalists - had been for 'Whites' and 'Blacks' to live separately in legally defined territories - whilst Indians had been classified as *alien* and initially left unaccounted for (Johnson: 2004, 140).

The National Party subsequently came to power in 1948 in a 'Whites' only vote. Gradually, beginning in 1948 and stemming almost 45 years, the National Party promulgated legislation that not only legally entrenched racial separation but provided for brutal forms of enforcement by state organs such as torture, detention without trial and capital punishment. Shortly after their rise to power, the National Party embarked on a social engineering campaign which commenced with the passing the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act in 1949, followed by the Population Registration Act in 1950. This law resulted in every citizen having to be registered under a specific and often arbitrary racial category. While there was little scientific basis upon which these classifications were based, the impact of this legislation on individual family units was often catastrophic as members of the same family were regularly classified as belonging to race group's converse to their true heritage and culture (Johnson: 2004, 142).

A plethora of discriminatory legislation was promulgated over the course of the next two decades, including The Abolition of Passes and Consolidation of Documents Act (1952) as an instrument of influx control which compelled native, 'black' Africans to carry reference books; The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) which outlawed inter-racial marriage; the Immorality

Act (1950) and The Native Laws Amendment Act (1952) which restricted the geographical freedom of native, 'black' Africans (Johnson: 2004, 142).

Nationalists subsequently moved to eliminate non-whites from the voting roll. Whilst Parliament was at the time overwhelmingly dominated by white, politically conservative, nationalist males, roughly 15% of 'Cape Coloureds' were still enfranchised in what had previously been known as the Cape Colony - a compromise entrenched in the 1910 Constitution - under which the four previously self-governing British and Afrikaaner colonies were unified. This Constitutional provision could only be amended via a two-thirds majority vote. Moreover, coloured voters still had some, albeit, a minor degree of direct representation on the Cape Provincial Council (Klein and Viljoen: 1995, 230).

To remove coloureds from the voting roll, the two Houses of Parliament sat separately and passed the Separate Representation of Voters Bill with an ordinary majority, contrary to existing Constitutional provisions, which were ignored on the basis that Parliament was sovereign (Klein and Viljoen: 1995, 230).

Cavalier political and judicial gerrymandering by the Nationalists was by this stage growing impertinent. In response to this, a group of 'coloured' voters instituted a legal challenge. The ruling party hit back by attempting to promulgate the High Court of Parliament Bill, essentially giving the Legislature powers of judicial oversight. Furthermore, the National Party used its simple majority to enlarge both Houses of Parliament as well as the Appeal Court, thereby forcibly swelling Nationalist numbers in Parliament. The Bill was eventually made an Act after a lengthily legal battle in 1956 (Klein and Viljoen: 1995, 231).

A number of further tactical moves were subsequently made as the National Party tightened their grip to extend white supremacist rule. This ultimately resulted in the establishment of eight separate homelands or *Bantustans,* which were legally entrenched in 1959 during Hendrick Verwoerd's tenure under the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act. This Act brought the indirect representation of 'Africans' in Parliament to an end and established traditional governance

structures with the intention that these "states" would eventually become self-governing territories (Johnson: 2004, 146).

On 31st May 1961, after a referendum was put to the public on South Africa exiting the British Commonwealth and becoming a Republic, South Africa was declared independent. The Apartheid regime continued to gradually cement as the majority of enfranchised white South Africans continued to use their vote to defend against *die swart gewaar* – translated as 'Black Danger' (Johnson: 2004, 147).

Beyond their obvious racism, the Nationalists were furthermore inherently patriarchal, with minimal representation by women within any of their structures (Geisler: 2002, 606). The link between the political ideology of the Nationalists and the deeply conservative and Calvinistic teachings of the Dutch Reform Church – known as the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) – was inextricable, with the religious philosophy of the church both informing and sustaining the patriarchal approach of the time. Here women were seen as largely relegated to the domestic sphere – responsible for the care of men and children. Reproductive healthcare, access to credit and marriage rights for women were all limited during this regime. Political representation by women was largely supressed, with a total of eight women serving as elected public representatives in the South African Parliament prior to 1994 (Geisler: 2000, 606).

Similarly, it was not until 1943 that women were permitted to join South Africa's major liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), as full members. According to Joseph (1993: 45), women's political activism during this period - and for subsequent decades - was frequently substantiated under the auspices of the imperatives of motherhood "as a unifying factor across rural-urban, class and race boundaries". This, in many respects, relegated women's political activism to the domestic sphere as their contributions were cast-typed to supporting and not starring roles.

The Federation of South African Women established in 1954, sought to expand the role of women within the struggle for racial equality (Geisler: 2000, 608). In 1956, non-white South African women were required compelled to carry pass books when entering 'whites only' areas. In

response, on 09 August 1956, more than 20 000 women marched to the seat of government in protest. Over time, this campaign became increasingly vociferous, with women frequently staging public 'pass-burning' demonstrations which generated violent opposition and response by government officials and police services (Johnson: 2002, 154).

In the 1960's, after the ANC were forced into exile, the ANC's armed resistance movement Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was established. Despite women comprising roughly 20% of this army, they were seldom featured in high-ranking positions in the higher commanding structures of this resistance army. Here, women continued to confront structural exclusion from decision making forums, and were predominantly mandated to serve the resistance in supporting positions, largely tasked with domestic and family-related duties (Geisler: 2000, 609).

Furthermore, the eminent Black Consciousness Movement, led by Steve Biko, regarded gender as a non-political issue. Women thus participated in the Movement on the basis of their race or their class rather than their gender. In this context, despite the additional burden of gender discrimination that female South Africans of colour faced on a daily basis, the struggle by non-whites for equality before the law assumed a hierarchical dimension, with the attainment of race-based equality superseding that of gender (Geisler: 2000, 608). Here, despite the significant contributions of women to the struggle against Apartheid, gender equality was largely relegated to the periphery of the struggle for universal human rights in South Africa during this period. Here, it was only towards the latter part of the 1980's that a broader recognition of women's rights began to take hold within the structures of the ANC as a result of influence exerted by the "United Nations Decade of Women" (Geisler: 2000, 609).

Eventually, as a result of sustained internal defiance and mounting international pressure, combined with the devastating economic sanctions imposed on South Africa, the Nationalists were ultimately forced to concede to the unbanning of the ANC in early 1990. So began the gradual transition away from Apartheid towards a multi-racial democratic dispensation, characterised most definitively by universal franchise and equality before the law.

In May 1990, shortly after the unbanning of the ANC by the Nationalists, the ANC Women's League (ANCWL) was relaunched – this time, within the borders of South Africa. It was at this point that the ANC's Executive structures adopted a policy statement that compelled the movement to "seriously address the emancipation of women" and to acknowledge the necessity of women's participation in all decision making (Geisler: 2000, 611).

In October of 1991, 92 political parties, interest groups, civil society actors and leaders representing homeland governments gathered to deliberate on this transitional process. This process was termed the *Convention for a Democratic South Africa* (CODESA). Five working groups were subsequently formed, one of which was given clear guidelines to develop and establish a democratic constitution that would for the first time in South African history, guarantee equal legal rights to all citizens over the age of 18. After protracted primary negotiations - and the withdrawal of a number of political actors in various acts of protest - a Declaration of Intent that established the terms of reference that would constitute the ideological and legal foundations of the transition was finally agreed to. This Declaration was signed on 21 December 1991[7].

It reads as follows:

"We, the duly authorised representatives of political parties, political organisations, administrations and the South African Government, coming together at this first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), mindful of the awesome responsibility that rests on us at this moment in the history of our country, declare our solemn commitment:

1. *to bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty, pursuing amidst our diversity, freedom, equality and security for all irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed; a country free from apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination;*
2. *to work to heal the divisions of the past, to secure the advancement of all, and to establish a free and open society based on democratic values where the dignity, worth and rights of every South African are protected by law;*

[7] *United Nations Peacemaker: https://peacemaker.un.org/southafrica-codesa-intent1991*

3. *to strive to improve the quality of life of our people through policies that will promote economic growth and human development and ensure equal opportunities and social justice for all South Africans;*
4. *to create a climate conducive to peaceful constitutional change by eliminating violence, intimidation and destabilisation and by promoting free political participation, discussion and debate;*
5. *to set in motion the process of drawing up and establishing a constitution that will ensure, inter alia:*
    1. *that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and* ***non-sexist state***[8] *in which sovereign authority is exercised over the whole of its territory*
    2. *that the Constitution will be the supreme law and that it will be guarded over by an independent, non-racial and impartial judiciary;*
    3. *that there will be a multi-party democracy with the right to form and join political parties and with regular elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll; in general the basic electoral system, shall be that of proportional representation;*
    4. *that there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary with appropriate checks and balances;*
    5. *that the diversity of languages, cultures and religions of the people of South Africa shall be acknowledged;*
    6. *that all shall enjoy universally accepted human rights, freedoms and civil liberties including freedom of religion, speech and assembly protected by an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights and a legal system that guarantees equality of all before the law.*

WE AGREE

1. *that the present and future participants shall be entitled to put forward freely to the Convention any proposal consistent with democracy.*
2. *that CODESA will establish a mechanism whose task it will be, in co-operation with administrations and the South African Government, to draft the texts of all legislation required to give effect to the agreements reached in CODESA.*

[8] *Italics: for contextual emphasis.*

We, the representatives of political parties, political organisations and administrations, further solemnly commit ourselves to be bound by the agreements of CODESA and in good faith to take all such steps as are within our power and authority to realise implementation."[9]

This Declaration of Intent was signed by 16 representatives of political parties and homeland governments party to the negotiations. It was indeed the liberal, universalist ideals contained within this Declaration - based on international human rights law and liberal democratic ideals - that paved the way for the formulation of the Interim Constitution of 1993, and the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, that is now the Country's supreme law (McCrudden: 2008, 661).

The high minded ideals underpinning this Constitution are grounded in international human rights law and, most importantly in the context of this study, laid the foundation for the protection of women's rights in South Africa. Specifically, the equality clause in chapter two of provides the legal framework within which the principle of gender equality is entrenched. This provision prohibits discrimination against anyone on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, sexual orientation and ethnic or social origin. Furthermore, this overarching legislation paved the pathway towards the introduction of progressive, rights-based laws in the following years.

After the first free and fair elections which took place on 27th April 1994 in South Africa, a staggering 111 (26%) women entered Parliament as officially and legally recognised elected public representatives. So began Parliament's genuine and on-going efforts to repeal past discriminatory laws, and entrench legal protections that would guarantee equality before the law for all citizens - regardless of race, gender, class, culture, and religion - in the political, legal, social, economic, cultural, environmental, and economic spaces (Britton: 2005, 1-29). Here, it was the entrance of female lawmakers into negotiation spaces and later the South African Parliament that provided the immediate impetus and sustained motivation to embed minority rights, equality and gender-based protections into law (Bauer: 2012, 381).

[9] *https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa*

These gains are not unique to South Africa. In many countries across the world, the representation of female political leaders in Parliament has increased rapidly since the early 1990's. This increase has been particularly notable in sub-Saharan Africa. By 2012, eight sub-Saharan countries, including South Africa, ranked amongst the most progressive in the world - where more than 30% of Parliamentary seats were occupied by women (Bauer: 2012, 370). In South Africa, in 1989, only 2.8% of Members of Parliament were women. This steadily improved over time, with 26% of seats in the National Assembly belonging to women by 1994, 32.8% in 2004, and 42.3% by late 2009 (Bauer: 2012, 372).

However, an examination as to whether the mere presence of women in Parliament equates to a more equal society, or results in progressive policy and legislation which protects the rights of women is necessary. Waylen (2007) argues that South African women have indeed made significant progress in Parliament since 1994, and that this progress indeed benefits all women. Here, these gains included the promulgation and adoption of the ground breaking Constitution as well as progressive laws that protect women's reproductive healthcare rights (Bauer: 2012, 378). Britton (2005) goes on to detail positive changes that occurred in the culture of Parliament itself as a result of the presence of women. This is ultimately suggestive of substantive gains for women, ranging from greater protection against gender-based violence, to gains made in the fields of family law, land, reproduction and access to healthcare (Bauer: 2012, 381).

1.4. Universalism and International Human Rights Law

In classical Roman philosophy, the concept of *dignitas* was used in the political context to attribute worth to human beings on the basis of their God-given humanity or 'basic nature' (McCrudden: 2008, 658). It is from these early philosophical roots that the concept of universal, basic human rights originate.

The adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996 finally brought the country's supreme law in line with modern international human rights standards. Importantly, the right to basic human dignity regardless of class, race, gender, religion, culture or sex was finally codified in domestic

law. Here, the Country's sovereign law was grounded in a universalist approach to human rights and was reflective of broader international efforts to universalise and entrench liberal philosophical ideals throughout the world.

The rights-based approach underpinning the first globally recognised international protections for women emanated out of the *United Nations Conference on International Organization* in 1945. Here, the League of Nations came together in San Francisco to pen the United Nations Charter. This Charter was ultimately designed to prevent against the outbreak of a war in the aftermath of Second World War. By signing and ratifying the United Nations Charter, member states pledged their commitment to uphold, respect and protect the rights of all human beings, regardless of their race, sex, language, or religion. This commitment was further entrenched when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations in 1948 (United Nations Charter Preamble: 26 June 1945).

Here, the UDHR emphasised the importance of human rights based education in its Preamble. This was considered fundamental to developing a human rights culture, the world over:

"Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Now, therefore the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms"[10]

Since the adoption of the UDHR by member states, and in recognizing the limitations of a reliance on economic development as the primary facilitator of gender development, international women's movements and multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union initiated structural attempts to alleviate institutional barriers to gender equality (Galey, 1995, p.1342). Here, the primary intention was to address the international establishment of universal political, social, and economic rights for women that would be formally supported by

[10] From a suggestion made at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in December 2004, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Decade for Human Rights Education as being from 1 January 1995 until 31 December 2004 (Resolution 49/184).

judicial recourse mechanisms. A variety of organisations, international bodies, mechanisms, charters and treaties mandated to enforce this approach were subsequently established.

One of the most notable frameworks developed in the ensuing period was the 1951 *Convention on Equal Pay* which was adopted by the International Labour Organisation that operated under the umbrella of the United Nations. Later, in 1952 the *Convention on the Political Rights of Women* was promulgated. This extended political franchise to women residing within the countries which had ratified the convention. This was later followed by the *Convention on Eliminating Discrimination against Women in Education* in 1961. In 1962, the *Convention on the Consent to Marriage* was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in an attempt to prevent the sale of young women to men under the auspices of the traditional marriage requirement of 'dowry payment' (Galey: 1995, 134). Later, in 1975, as a result of the attention garnered by the International Year of the Woman, the United Nations set up the *Development Fund for Women* which provided skills training and development assistance to women (Pietila et al: 1990, 94).

In 1981 the *Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) came into force. CEDAW now has the authority to publicly scrutinise each government party to the Convention. Further, a variety of international watchdogs, gender activists and academics monitor the compliance of governments to this treaty (Pietila et al: 1990, 96).

In 1985, in an attempt to properly realise the goals and objectives of existing protection mechanisms for human rights of women, the *System-wide Medium-term Plan for Women and Development* was adopted. The plan was comprised of 23 sub-programmes which could each be located within one of six frameworks.

The '*Elimination of Legal and Attitudinal forms of Discrimination*' framework attempted to transform existing attitudes, especially within the developing world. The '*Access to Productive Resources, Income and Employment'* framework aimed at increasing women's involvement within the sphere of productive labour - especially within the informal sector - via the extension of credit covers a range of issues relating to equality within the work place (Pietila et al: 1990, 110).

However, the effectiveness of these protection mechanisms are not always universal and nor are they able to effectively inculcate in certain geopolitical strongholds for a variety of structural reasons. Moreover, as a result of the entrenched gender biases of many development planners, the integration and operation of the many treaties and organizations intent on protecting the human rights of women, especially within the developing world, have been slow to progress (Galey: 1995, 134).

Further, when assessing the effectiveness of the vast protections that have been promulgated over time to protect and advance universal human rights, especially within the context of the developing world, conditions which continue to hamper the organic reproduction of these views at the social level, need to be analysed and addressed. Beyond these treaties, there exist two primary international organs responsible for the implementation of programmes designed to emancipate and enfranchise women across the world.

The first of these is the *Commission on the Status of Women* - which operates within the United Nations framework and is responsible for the implementation of their progressive gender instruments (Pietila et al: 1990, 96). The second of these is the *Economic and Social Council* which is responsible for the co-ordination of the economic and social bodies regulated by the United Nations. This organ receives recommendations from the *Commission on the Status of Women* and is then responsible for presenting them to the General Assembly for confirmation and ratification (Pietila et al: 1990, 96). Lastly, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in which all member states are represented, has the power to adopt and implement the international charters agreed upon by the various committees (Pietila et al: 1990, 98). Further, regional bodies such as the *African Union*, the *Organisation of American States* and the *European Union* exercise judicial authority over party states.

Looking specifically at the developing world, according to Articles 30-44 of the *African Charter*, the *African Commission on Human and People's Rights* was established to further the rights of people on the African continent. The purpose of this organ is to ensure that the provisions and the rights and duties that are entrenched within the African Charter are adhered to by the states that have ratified and become party to such a document. In this regard, the Commission is entitled to

investigate alleged violations of protected rights and thus conclude on their findings whether or not these violations require a remedy.

The *African Charter* provides for civil and political rights such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, ill-treatment, equality before the law, and the right to non-discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, fortune, birth or other status – all self-expression values by definition.

Although the *African Charter* provides for civil, political, social and economic rights, it calls upon individual states to ratify corresponding documents, such as the treaties promulgated under the auspices of the United Nations. Here, the *African Charter* calls upon member states to adopt and give effect to the provisions of such treaties and thus provide the *African Commission on Human and People's Rights* with reports regarding their implementation and enactment of such international provisions.

However, despite the extensive arrangements that have been constructed in an attempt to protect and further human rights, such as a woman's right to equality, very seldom are violations of these rights actually reported, litigated and remedied. This is because one of the fundamental flaws in the establishment of the *African Union* was the fact that there were no oversight mechanisms provided for in its constitutive Act. Therefore, there is no genuine course for redress should a member-state violate or contravene any of its prescripts. Thus, whilst numerous governments have signed international conventions pledging themselves to support equal representation of women in all structures of government and civil society, the enforcement of such undertakings remains scant at best (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 21).

As such, whilst statutory reforms and the formal recognition of women's rights within both the international and domestic legislative space are indeed positive indications of the potential for real and authentic transformation at a grass roots level if implemented effectively, they are insufficient in isolation to effect substantial social change. So long as the subjective attitudes of policy makers, social culture and the views and attitudes of ordinary men and women remain at loggerheads with universalist conceptions of human rights such as dignity, equality before the law and individual

freedom, the realisation of the full expression of these rights will remain limited (Galey: 1995, 134).

1.5. A case for the rights of South African women

As has been demonstrated in the above chapter, much progress has been made both within South Africa and the international arena to safeguard, uphold and protect the basic rights of women over the course of recent decades. Whilst these developments are laudable, available indicators demonstrate that progress towards the full realization of women's rights in many parts of the world remains slow. This is particularly astute in the developing world (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: 2022, 4).

Here, despite genuine progress made to institute democratic reforms and institute a culture of respect for universal human rights – including respect for the equal rights of women – in the post-Apartheid era, South Africa continues to experience significant development challenges including high rates of unemployment, crime and gender-based violence (Commission for Gender Equality: 2022, 3).

Harmful traditional practices such as *Ukuthwala*[11] (the practice of abducting a girl child for the purposes of forced marriage) and male primogeniture[12] (the right of succession assigned to the first born male child) still persist in many rural areas of South Africa (Commission for Gender Equality: 2022, 8). Moreover, the rates of sexual violence in South Africa are now considered to be some of the highest in the world. For the 2019 calendar year, the South African Police Services noted that on average 148 sexual offences were committed daily, whilst more than 53 000 South African women were victims of sexual assault. 42 000 rapes were reported during the same period with 63% of the top 30 worst police stations reporting an increase in sexual offences (South African Police Services: Police Statistics, 2020). These staggering rates of gender-based violence (GBV) give researchers an indication that patriarchal attitudes are still prevalent in much of society (Parliamentary Research Unit: 2019, 5).

[11] *The State v Jezile (2015)*
[12] *Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa (2008)*

Moreover, economic scarcity remains a significant domestic concern, with millions of South Africans remaining trapped in the cycle of poverty. Despite notable advancements in the provision of access to basic services such as piped water and electricity, as well as an increased rate of formal housing, high unemployment continues to characterize the lived experience of millions of South Africans. According to Statistics South Africa's 2022 *Second Quarter Labour Force Survey*, 47% of South African women are not economically active[13].

These social challenges persist despite considerable improvements made towards availing full legislative protections to women in both the South African and international contexts. Moreso, significantly increased numbers of female public representatives at all levels of government have been achieved since 1994, where women now make up close to 42% of Parliamentarians with reorientation between the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (Parliament: 2022). As stated earlier, whilst some academics have argued women's representation in Parliament directly translates into improved development outcomes for women, Tripp and Kang (2008) in Bauer (2012: 371) have argued that quota's reserved for female political representation by political elites do not translate into improved socio-economic outcomes for women. Britton (2005) in Bauer (2012: 374) notes that in her analysis of female Parliamentarians in South Africa that noticeable differences were observed in the stature and characteristics of Members of Parliament between the first and second National Assemblies. Britton (2005) remarks that whilst there was an obvious professionalisation of female Members of Parliament in the first Parliament (1994), the women elected to serve in the second Parliament (1999) were not particularly socially or economically representative of the women of South Africa.

Furthermore, research conducted by Afrobarometer (Chingware et al:2014) demonstrated that despite democratisation having occurred in many African countries, including South Africa, in recent decades, support for women's equality on the continent continues to track a slow path. In this study, data from 15 countries measured between 2002 and 2012, demonstrated only a modest increase in support for women's equality, with support climbing from 68% in 2002 to 73% in 2012 (Chingware et al: 2014, 9). However, despite broader gains made towards the recognition of

[13] https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2022.pdf

women's rights in Africa, support for gender equality decreased in four countries, most notably in Namibia (-10%) and South Africa (-9%) from 83% in 2002 to 74% in 2012.

This is despite South Africa ranking among the top ten nations in the world with the highest percentage of female parliamentarians (Chingware et al: 2014, 4). Afrobarometer also noted an 8% regression in support for female political leaders respective to male leaders, with levels of support dropping from 80% in 2005 to 72% in 2012 (Chingware et al: 2014, 4). According to the same study, 42% of South African women cited frequent unfair treatment by traditional Leaders, whilst 33% of combined survey respondents in the Southern African region recorded similar responses (Chingware et al: 2014, 35).

Here, the study fails to provide theoretical explanations for the noted comparative decline in support for women's rights in the South African context. Rather a set of interventions for implementation towards increased support for women's rights are advanced. These include, rejecting traditional norms, the promotion of equal education of girls, and enhanced political participation by women as an *"essential tool for extending the gains that women have made thus far"* (Chingware et al: 2014, 25).

Whilst interventions such as those proposed above are indeed laudable, such research is largely silent on the causative nature of observed regressions. Here, an exploration of the available academic literature within which to contextualise this study is required.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1. An introduction to Value Change Theory

This purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the literature relevant to this research.

The theoretical framework underpinning this study is Value Change Theory. This theory was first advanced by political scientist, Ronald Inglehart in 1971. Here, Inglehart contended that in

industrialised economies, political and social values gradually shifted away from material concerns regarding financial and physical security, towards the adoption of values such as tolerance and individual freedom, described as post-materialist or emancipative values (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995: 1-8).

Value Change theory advances that the widespread adoption of high levels of post-materialist values are only observed in advanced industrial nations, where affluence gives rise to the subjective consideration of second and third generation rights (such as individual freedom and environmental rights). Here, whilst exceptions in nations such as China are provided for, it is postulated that industrialisation is most usually the result of the consolidation of genuine, participatory democracy.

Ronald Inglehart and Christian Wenzel later went on to expand on this thesis, classifying the political beliefs and values traditionally associated with liberalism as self-expression values. Self-expression values placed an emphasis on personal well-being, individual freedom, tolerance of others, gender equality, political participation, environment, and the rights of minority groups. Conversely, the political values most traditionally associated with scarcity were conservate in nature – such as a high regard for religious authority, traditional family values, respect for established customs and national pride. These values were defined as materialist, survival or traditional values (Inglehart and Welzel: 2003, 64).

According to these scholars, nations are grouped according to the following value sets, as per the most prominent set of subjective values measured at the level of the individual, but extrapolated and aggregated for to provide for value at the macro-level:

1) *Traditional values* versus *Secular-rational values*

- *Traditional values* emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook.

- *Secular-rational values* place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable.

2) *Survival values* versus *Self-expression values*

- *Survival values* place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance.
- *Self-expression values* give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life[14].

"Expression values are a syndrome of mass attitudes that tap a common underlying dimension, reflecting emphasis on freedom, tolerance of diversity, and participation, at both the individual and aggregate levels. Self-expression values are present in a political culture in so far as the public emphasizes liberty and participation, public self-expression, tolerance of diversity, interpersonal trust, and life satisfaction."
- Inglehart and Welzel, 2003: 64.

It was then advanced that the first notable shift towards the adoption of post-materialist political and social values tends to occur in 'developing' democracies and that these changes coincide with concomitant rates of economic industrialisation. The adoption of progressive values then consolidates alongside the satisfaction of basic economic needs which is brought about by advanced industrialisation. Conversely, where economic development is slow and uncertain, the adoption of progressive values lingers linearly alongside the slow and unsteady rate of industrialisation (Inglehart and Welzel: 2005, 135).

According to the available academic literature in this subject area, there are four possible theories relating to value-change at the level of the nation-state. Resultantly, four possible hypotheses exist through which to explain the degree to which the adoption of post-materialist values has shifted in South Africa in the seventeen-year period following democratization.

[14] World Value Surveys (www.worldvaluesurveys.org)

Primarily, we will interrogate debates that have occurred within the discourse of Value Change Theory between international political theorists such as Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, Wayne Baker; Robert Mattes; Mitchell Seligson; Christian Welzel; and Harold Clarke amongst others. In this regard, we will attempt to understand the extent to which political ideology and individual values can be shifted towards self-expression values.

In this Chapter, I provide an outline of the four prominent debates that have been advanced by academics since the late 1970's in regards Value-Change.

2.2. Scarcity versus Socialisation

In developing the theoretical framework for value change theory in 1977, Inglehart applied the logic of Maslow's hierarchy to political issues, advancing that political issues such as economic security are in fact material values. Here, if a society could make significant enough progress in addressing and providing for basic, material needs, that respective society's focus would shift toward higher order values such as the need for personal freedom, self-expression, and political consciousness, which were termed post-material values.

As originally postulated in his work *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (1977), two key hypotheses emerged in respect of inter-generational value change.

The first of these is what Inglehart terms the 'scarcity hypothesis' in which it is advanced that scarcity drives value change at the level of individual. Similar to Abraham Maslow's 1943 thesis *A Theory of Human Motivation*, otherwise known as *"*Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs', Inglehart proposes that when basis needs are not met, individuals are not capable of contemplating loftier ideals such as post-materialist values. Furthermore, should material demand meet supply at the micro-level, an individual who has experienced systemic scarcity will continue to prioritise the acquisition of other scarce material goods throughout their lifetime rather than focus their attentions on philosophical pursuits. Here, value changes are only observed in later generations where basic, material needs are met early on in life.

The second of these hypotheses is what Inglehart terms the 'socialisation hypothesis'. Here, it is hypothesised that the most highly prioritised values of an individual, or community, are those that were prevalent during their formative years, pre-adulthood. Once basic value-based priorities have developed, they are likely to remain foundational, despite material acquisition. Here again, value change is only likely to occur in following generations.

This cycle then reproduces across generations as needs arise, are met, and economic priorities shift. Herein, the combination of both of these hypotheses produces what can be defined as a reliable model for predicting emancipative, self-expression or post-materialist value change across any given society. Inglehart asserts in his original thesis as referenced, that a preoccupation with material values tends to be more prevalent in pre-industrialised nations compared to post-materialist value systems observed in more industrialised countries.

In his response to Inglehart's original thesis, Dalton in *Was There a Revolution? A Note on Generational Versus Life Cycle Explanations of Value Differences (1977)* uses the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data of seven European nations to demonstrate the relationship between age and values. Here Dalton corroborates Inglehart's socialisation hypothesis, concluding that the prevailing economic conditions in a nation when an individual is aged 10 have the greatest impact of any single variable on subjective value formation.

Many decades later, in *Values in Change* (2008), Dalton tests the socialisation hypothesis by comparing the values of older generations that survived the Second World War and younger generations that were raised in subsequent periods of comparable affluence. Here, Dalton finds that materialists are still dominant in older, war-surviving generations, whilst younger generations are more evenly balanced between the materialist and post-materialist values sets. Thus, it is concluded that values attained in early life will be maintained through-out an individual's lifetime, despite the subsequent acquisition of comparative material security.

Using the scarcity hypothesis modelling, Dalton further found that post-materialists were more prevalent in wealthier, more industrialised nations, compared to the proportion of materialists

prevalent in developing nations, with the most notable shifts in the subjective value sets of any given population being apparent during the transition from a subsistence-based economy to an industrialised society (Dalton: 2008).

Here, Dalton, referencing Inglehart, defines Post-materialist Values as follows:

- Changing authority patterns in social relations;
- Deference to authority as gradually waning;
- Changing moral standards;
- More tolerant of individual choice;
- Post-materialists champion a new set of political issues that the political elite have often overlooked
- Post-materialists are more likely to be interested in political participation
- Changes in value priorities and the style of participation contribute to public pressure for reforms of democratic institutions and processes

In substantiating such an hypothesis, the 2005-08 wave of *World Value Surveys* research evaluated individual value priorities by asking respondents to rank the importance of 12 political goals. In turn, the majority of respondent's cited material goals as their first and foremost priority. These choices were then used to create a single index of the relative weight given to post-material goals, in which the study proceeded to record the cross-national percentages of post-materialists over time (Dalton: 2008).

This study was undertaken on the basis of findings in earlier studies having revealed that post-materialists were indeed a small minority in every nation. This was not surprising, given that the political conditions thought to foster post-material value change (consolidated democracy and advanced industrialisation) were still developing during that time throughout much of the now, developed world. However, it was found that by the 1990's, the population share of post-materialists had increased in countries where long-term trends were available, with a large proportion of the public in advanced industrial societies in latter year placing priority on the acquisition of post-material values (Dalton: 2008).

Support for this position - which emphasized that the values defining a society reflect the conditions decades earlier when values are being formed - opened a lengthily debate on the causative nature of value change in highly industrialised democracies.

The 2008 economic recession that impacted the lives of many previously 'middle class' Americans, provided Robert Dalton with the perfect opportunity to test Inglehart's earlier hypothesis. Here, Dalton contended that if Inglehart had indeed been correct in his propagation of the socialisation hypothesis, value priorities should predictably remain relatively stable, given that Inglehart asserted that such values are formed and adopted early in life. As such, they reflect a combination of both economic and social conditions during a formative and defined period (Dalton: 2008).

Dalton's research methodology required his team to compare national levels of post-material values, relative to the socio-economic conditions of their respective societies. Here, it was advanced that if scarcity indeed resulted in the revival of materialists concerns, and, if affluence conversely increased support for post-materialist goals, then it would follow that advanced industrial nations would exhibit post-material values whilst conversely, underdeveloped nations would exhibit material values (Dalton: 2008).

The results of such experiment demonstrated a clear relationship between wealth and the distribution curves indicative of support for of both material and post-material values. Post-materialists occurred at a more regular rate in wealthier, comparatively industrialised nations than in their poorer counterparts. The study further revealed that the greatest value shift occurred in countries that were undergoing a transition from traditional, subsistence economies to an industrial economies, such as occurred in Europe during the post-war years.

Further, Dalton tracked the value priorities of generations over time from 1974 to 2008 with the oldest generation born as early as 1885-1909, with the youngest generation born 1940-1954. The results indeed proved Inglehart's socialisation hypothesis, revealing that in 1974, the proportion of materialists in the oldest generation outweighed post-materialists by nearly fifty percent. The youngest generation was evenly balanced between both materialists and post-materialists.

Furthermore, generational gaps in value orientation remained relatively constant over time. This then cemented the position that whilst life cycle experiences may possibly modify value systems, they do not replace value priorities learned early in life. This is important. Ultimately, the claim that post-material values are more concentrated among the young and better educated was substantiated. As such, post-material value-based concerns should theoretically, gradually replace material concerns as older generations are gradually replaced by younger generations whose material needs are satisfied at relatively greater levels (Dalton: 2008).

The importance of this study must not be underestimated given that this thesis confirmed the understanding that it is the economic outcomes of democratic consolidation as opposed to the mere institutionalisation of democratic values at the state level that have the most significant influence on the adoption of liberal, post-material values. This is for the simple reason that according to Dalton, post-materialists are more active in politics than materialists, with their political influence disproportionately influential as a result. This is positive for the consolidation of democratic, liberal ideals.

In Clarke and Dutt's 1991 *"Measuring Value Change in Western Industrialized Societies: The Impact of Unemployment"*, the authors contend that the metrics of measurement for post-materialism as advanced by Inglehart have a fatal flaw, in that they do not take unemployment into account as a primary factor in value change (Clarke and Dutt: 1999, 910). In the South African context, Clarke's critiques of Inglehart's post-materialism thesis is important.

In response, Inglehart and Abramson (1994 and 1995) responded by noting that long-term trends towards post-materialism were as a result of economic development and prosperity across replacement generations who enjoyed greater security whilst growing up. The respondents also demonstrated that it was in fact inflation of prices rather than unemployment that had the greatest impact on post-materialist value regression (1994: 345). The primary factor, therefore in predicting a stable path towards prolific post-materialism in any given nation state is sustainable and substantial economic growth over time.

According to Abrahamson (2011: 4), Dalton's original theory (1977) contained one crucial omission – the impact of conflict on value formation. Herein, Abramson contends that a more robust analysis would include both the impact of war and industrialisation measured by GDP - noting that in the surveyed countries, all but one had escaped the brutal impacts both World War I and II (Denmark). Abrahamson concedes, however, that Dalton's 1977 thesis is corroborated by the analyses of subsequent prominent scholars, the likes of Duch and Taylor (1993, 758).

2.3. The Resilience of Culture

In *Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values* (2000) Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker set out to test the hypothesis that industrialisation is directly correlated with notable changes in value systems. Alternately, whether shifts in value systems are directly and more significantly correlated with prevalent cultural and religious belief systems (2000, 3).

The theorists make a number of notable findings. Strikingly, democratisation is in fact, directly correlated to industrialisation. Therefore, a shift away from traditional values is first required in order to generate industrialisation due to women entering the work force, broadened access to education, increase preference for democratic processes and an increase in economic productivity (2000: 47). Whilst shifts from traditional to secular-rational values are promoted by industrialisation, post-materialist value prevalence is measured at higher levels in post-industrial societies (2000: 49). Following on, the authors conclude that industrialisation generated by democratisation will, in time, reduce the prevalence of organised religion which is asserted to limit individual freedoms, despite the indelible mark of such religion remaining enmeshed in the cultural fibre of a nation long after modernisation and industrialisation have occurred.

Inglehart and Baker note that no two sets of respective national development trajectories are entirely linear due, to the sheer number of factors that must be taken into consideration when measuring such progress. Here, it is argued that economic development is indeed the most reliable factor associated with subject value change. Importantly, whilst economic development does not yield cultural convergence across industrialised nation-states, the prevalent worldviews of rich and poor countries differ significantly (2000, 50).

In further understanding the factors that influence the adoption of certain value systems, Inglehart and Baker (2000) test the hypothesis that economic development is not necessary reliant on, but is directly linked to systematic changes in national value systems – whether through dispensation change, as is the case in South African, or through the course of incremental progression. The authors suggest that there is indeed evidence to defend the notion that while economic development is traditionally associated with shifts away from conservative norms toward values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory, this change cannot be understood in isolation from cultural change. The path, they assert, is inter-dependent and incremental.

Having analysed data from the three respective World Values Surveys, which includes 65 societies and 75 percent of the world's population, the authors were able to draw four key findings. Firstly, they found that whilst values can and do change, they continue to reflect significant social and cultural national traditions. Therefore, it is unlikely that the influence of traditional value systems will disappear entirely. Here, industrialisation is linked to marked cultural shifts away from traditional value systems, whilst economic development leans towards augmenting societies in a common direction. Rather than converging absolutely, they move along parallel trajectories that are shaped by their respective cultural heritages and comparative levels of democratic consolidation (Inglehart and Baker: 2000, 40)

In respect of this finding, the researchers contended that developmental shifts from agrarian based economies to urban industrial societies do, in time, reduce the importance of organized religion, moving further to suggest that increasing secularization is most pronounced during the industrialization phase of development. The authors conclude that whilst economic development does indeed led to an ultimately ubiquitous change in political culture, the fact that a society was historically shaped by any given specific religion leaves an indelible cultural heritage that has lasting effects. This then influences later development, which in turn leads them to conclude that it is trite to assert that social value progression and the adoption of liberal values is "Americanization". This is because, in reality, Americans tend to hold much more conservative values than citizens of the Nordic or Scandinavian regions of European that tend to be far more liberally inclined than the vast majority of American citizens (Inglehart and Baker: 2000, 48).

In conclusion, Inglehart and Baker note that whilst modernization and the concomitant industrialisation that it engenders is indeed a predictable factor in the progression of liberal value adoption, this is not entirely predictable nor linear. Further, whilst economic development might transform a society in a somewhat predictable pattern, the process, method and the consequences of such a development is not linear nor inevitable. This is because there are a multitude of factors involved in the transition from a traditional society into an advanced, liberal democracy. Thus, any prediction made by political scientists as to the degree of liberal value adoption that is forecast must first be contextualised within both the historical and cultural contexts of the country.

2.4. The clash of culture

In *The True Clash of Civilizations* (2003) Inglehart and Norris argue in response to Samuel Huntington's seminal thesis *The Clash of Civilisations* (1993) that the core clash between the developed Western world and the Islamic world, which the authors term a 'cultural fault line', is not about democracy, but rather gender (2003, 63).

Huntington had originally postulated that in the post-Cold War era, the world should be viewed in terms of Civilisations, rather than geopolitical divides. Defining the primary sources of conflict throughout different time periods in history, Huntington argued that the world had moved through three distinct periods. First, the modern international system which was primarily characterised by conflict between various empires and monarchies. Second, the creation of nation states and the territorial related conflicts that ensued between the French Revolution and the First World War. Here, Huntington attributed the post-World War I nationalisation that swept across much of the developed world, to an intrinsic need to create a strong sense of nationalism and unity to guard against further annexure by external power (1993, 23). Third, a series of conflicts that emerged as a result of differing ideological interests, most notably communism, fascism and liberal democracy (2003, 24). This period, Huntington argued, lasted until the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Here, it was asserted that the end of the Second World War – which arose as a result of a clash of ideologies, most notably between liberalism, communism and fascism - ushered in a new dynamic

in international relations, giving rise to the Cold War. By 1991, however, it was clear that not only the modern world, but much of the Eastern Bloc would not tolerate the United Soviet Socialist Republic's (USSR) oppressive, communist autocracy, and resultantly, the USSR's economy could no longer self-sustain. The *Glasnost* reform era and *Perestroika* followed, culminating in the fall of the Iron Curtain, marking the end of the Cold War.

Going on to argue that the "Velvet Curtain of Culture" has subsequently replaced the ideological "Iron Curtain" of the Cold War, Huntington postulated that in following decades, the great conflicts of the world would occur between nations of different Civilisations (1993, 22). Huntington maintained that Western Capitalism has indeed triumphed in the post-Cold War era, and that from this point in history, wars will be raged between the civilisations of the West and the non-West. In essence, Huntington's primary thesis proposed that the cultural divisions between "Orthodox Christianity and Islam" (as one aligned civilisation), and "Western Christianity" were the new fault lines for global conflict. This was because Islamic states allegedly lacked secular authority and representative government, and therefore failed to protect individual rights and freedoms. Here, it was contended that respect for individual rights and freedom was required to usher in social pluralism and multi-party, democratic government (1993, 28).

In critique, in *Civilisational Conflict: Fighting the Enemy under a New Banner* (1995) Adam Tarock, maintained that there was nothing new about conflicts between the 'Western World' and what he terms the 'Third World'. Tarock contended that this distinction was designed to highlight the juxtaposition that existed for much of the Nineteenth century between the "free" (First) and "captive' (Second) worlds. Tarock concluded his thesis by suggesting that contrary to Huntington's thesis, future conflicts will not be fought between Civilisations, but will rather continue - as with much of the past century - to be fought on both ideological and economic bases (Tarock: 1995, 23).

Protracted academic debates on the topic of Huntington's thesis followed for much of the following two decades. Here, Inglehart and Norris (2003) went on to assert that while freedom rankings - a decade on from Huntington's original work - corroborate some of his views in regards to the correlation between religion, culture and democracy, these views had been altogether

circumstantial at the time (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 65). Using World Value Survey's Data, Inglehart and Norris proceed to present their findings on the basis of empirical evidence.

To test such an hypothesis, Inglehart and Norris categorised a number of countries included in the 1995-1996 and 2000-2002 World Value Survey's waves into 9 major civilizations, based predominantly on the historical and religious legacies of each society. In doing so, they reveal that throughout much of the word, historical and religious traditions continue to influence contemporary values (2003, 65). Thus, the authors contend that the primary clash between civilisations is not between political values, but cultural ones. Even within the majority of Islamic societies surveyed, democratic political processes were found to have an overwhelmingly positive image, despite democratic norms being uncommon.

"Yet, as heartening as these results may be, paying lip service to democracy does not necessarily prove that people genuinely support basic democratic norms – or that their leaders will allow them to have democratic institutions. Although constitutions of authoritarian states such as China profess to embrace democratic ideals such as freedom of religion, the rulers deny it in practice. In Iran's 2000 elections, reformists candidates captured nearly three quarters of the seats in parliament, but a theocratic elite still holds the reins of power." – Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 67.

Importantly, the authors note that:

"A society's commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization proves time and again to be the most reliable indicator of how strongly that society supports principles of tolerance and egalitarianism." – Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 67.

Here, it is concluded that whilst the global 'West' has indeed become more liberal in the adoption of self-expression values as a result of modernisation and industrialisation over time, Islam has remained highly conservative and traditional, specifically insofar as gender relations are concerned. Here, women remain - for the most part - marginalized and disempowered in the name of religious traditions (Inglehart and Norris 2003: 62). This is because, whilst democratic processes may be idealised in the vast majority of nations across the globe, including within many developed

Islamic states, concomitant attitudes of interpersonal trust, tolerance and freedom must accompany the institutionalisation of democratic governance processes. (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 67).

The authors also asserted that the divide between these cultures runs deeper than just gender equality. Given that a respective society's commitment to gender equality tends to be the most reliable indicator of how vociferously such a nation supports liberal values, the authors conclude that whilst many citizens of the Muslim world may subjectively desire the institutionalisation of democracy, such a democracy may not be sustainable in their societies given their cultural attitudes.

Here, gender attitudes form part of a broader 'culture' of values such as trust and individual freedom which, as a whole, can be broadly characterised as self-expression values. High levels of self-expression values directly correlate with the emergence and sustainability of institutions that support democracy. Therefore, the authors found that countries that demonstrated high levels of self-expression values had more robust democracies (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 68). To summarise, there is a correlation between self-expression values and democracy, and conversely, a correlation between traditional values and non-secularism.

The authors maintain that among all countries included in their research, support for gender equality is most closely linked with a society's level of democracy. As a result, countries that do not support gender equality tend to not to be rated as truly democratic, given that these values are part of a broader democratic narrative which supports principals such as trust, individual autonomy and tolerance (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 66).

"None of the societies in which less than 30% of the public rejects this statement (such as Jordan, Nigeria and Belarus) is a true democracy. In China, one of the world's least democratic countries, a majority of the public agrees that men make better political leaders than women, despite a party line that has long emphasized gender equality. [-] India is a borderline case. The country is a long standing parliamentary democracy with an independent judiciary and civilian control of the armed forced, yet it is also marred by a weak rule of law, arbitrary arrests, and extra-judicial killings. The status of Indian women reflects this duality. [-] Almost 50% of the Indian populace believes only men should run the government." – Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 68.

In conclusion, Inglehart and Norris state that contrary to Huntington's theory, the divergence of values are what constitute the real clash between Western and Islamic nation-states.

The authors further attest that economic development produces increasingly liberalised attitudes in virtually any society. Similarly, industrial modernization encourages changes to gender roles. This is as a result of women's increased participation within the labour force. Later, the post-industrial phase brings a shift towards greater gender equality as women move into higher status economic and political roles. Here, the authors prove the latter hypothesis by providing examples of relatively industrialized Islamic nations such as Turkey, which share similar views on gender equality and sexual liberalization as other new democracies (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 70).

Ultimately, it is concluded that it is economic development, and not the process of democratisation itself which generates shifts in values. This is because modernisation inevitably produces systemic shifts in traditional gender roles as a result of the increased employment opportunities offered by industrialisation. This industrialisation ultimately attracts more women into the work force, increased their economic leverage, lowers reproduction rates and allows women to participate in decision making (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 69). Once the industrialisation phase has completed, the post-industrialisation phase propels women into higher-status management roles, where they are able to gain and exert influence in broader, higher-level decision-making structures. Here, modernisation forces cultural change.

2.5. Value change follows democratisation

> *"Democracy is an emancipative achievement that frees people from oppression and discrimination and empowering them 'to live the lives they have reason to value" Sen (1999) in Welzel and Inglehart (2009).*

In an attempt to understand the factors which most substantially influence the subjective adoption of values across the political spectrum, in *The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy* (2002) Mitchell Seligson claimed that cross-national correlations

between political culture and democracy which do not also appear at the individual level, do not follow a linear or systematic path. Here, Seligson (281, 2002) advances that individual level relationships between indicators of political culture and support for democracy are random. This, given that strong aggregate level relationships between culture and democracy are not systematically reproduced at the individual level in any predictable manner. Seligson goes on to argue that individual level support for democracy is only predictable where there is a notable presence of democratic institutions. As a result, the expression of individual values are present in political culture so long as the respective society underscores the importance of these values as a collective.

Here, self-expression values are measured by their strength at the cross-national level and not the individual level. This is because individual level (subjective) survey data is considered to be affected by intrinsic measurement errors that are cancelled out through the process of aggregation (Seligson: 293, 2002). Here, aggregation to the national level does not produce random correlations but rather to the contrary, it exposes systematic and over-arching correlations that may be hidden by measurement errors at the individual level. As a result, attitudes associated with self-expression values appear to be much more pronounced and therefore, reliable, at the aggregate national level.

Seligson further asserts that in order to understand the impact of mass attitudes on democracy, the widespread value priorities of nations are what matters. In respect of the measurement of self-expression values and their correlation to effective democracy, Seligson proceeds to examine links between political culture and democratic institutions. Here, pronounced support for democracy among individuals is considered to be superficial, except for instances in which they are accompanied by more generous attributes such as tolerance, trust and participation which have an impact at the social level in promoting effective democracy (Seligson: 298, 2002). Seligson then concludes that in order to demonstrate a linkage between political culture and democratic institutionalisation, individual level attitudes must be aggregated to the national level. This is especially important if one considers that democracy is an attribute of a nations' broader values, and not the values of individual citizens and their subjective feelings.

In *Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages* (2003) Inglehart and Welzel go on to analyse the role that political culture plays in maintaining democratic institutions. Here it is argued that strong correlations exist between societies in which high levels of self-expression values are recorded at the individual level, which then correlate with more robust democracy at the level of governance (Inglehart and Welzel: 2003, 74). This conclusion is arrived at by measuring one single independent variable (attitudes) against a dependent variable (democracy). Where the public place a strong emphasis on self-expression values, the broader society is more likely to have robust democratic institutions.

The authors maintain that high scores on effective democracy directly correlate to high scores on freedom rights as measured by Freedom House International. Herein, subjective support for democracy at the level of the individual is seen to be inconsequential, save for instances in which this support is accompanied by freedom or self-expression values that impact more broadly at the social level (Inglehart and Welzel: 2003, 62). Ultimately, political culture is the most effective prediction that should be used to measure the potential for democratic consolidation. Here, democratic consolidation is a slow and gradual process which emerges, most routinely, as a result of economic development and access to opportunities at the personal level - which then promote economic freedom and in turn, generate self-expression.

Further to this, Inglehart and Welzel: *Political Culture, Mass Beliefs and Value Change* (2009) assert that political and ideological regimes become stable only in so far as their patterns of governance are similar to the mainstream beliefs of the people which they seek to govern. The authors note that the values motivating democracy place emphasis on freedom, tolerance, liberty, equality and decision making – all of these are ultimately emancipative values (Inglehart and Welzel: 2009, 129). Eckstein (1998: 3) had earlier contended that this is regardless of the nature of the ideology. Accordingly, authoritarian regimes receive the support of the populace only in instances where citizens authentically consider such leadership to be legitimate, in just the same way that democratic regimes are stable in so far as citizens feel that political authority is subject to accountability.

Here Inglehart and Welzel suggest that in the interests of sustainability, political regimes must emanate ideology which both correlates to and satisfies the public's desires. The authors substantiate this claim by pointing to the global wave of democratization in countries in which mass aspirations for democracy exceeded the extent of institutionalised democratic ideology – the Cold War bearing one fine example of this. Conversely, countries in which the level of democracy surpassed the level of mass aspirations for democracy tended to become less democratic in following years (2003, 136).

Here, the author's research is substantiated by two different approaches contained in existing literature: structure-focused approaches and action-focused approaches. Whilst structure-focused approaches emphasize the structural aspects of society, such as equality, demographics, resource distributions, industrialisation, cultural heritage and the respective nation state's balance of power within the international environment; action-focused approach focuses on the real and structural democratization processes that lead to institutionalisation.

Here, as emancipative, post-materialist values grow stronger with increasing development, the legitimacy of the ruling elite will increasingly come to depend on whether the type of administration they offer can correlate with similarly placed emancipative values. While industrialisation as a direct result of authoritarian control may indeed legitimize certain forms of authoritarian regimes in the early stages of development, such as is the case with China, it no longer does so at higher levels of economic development as people's basic needs become met (2003, 141).

Walt Rostow's 1960 work *The Stages of Economic Growth* had long before asserted that linear economic development would most effectively improve attitudes that improve the status of women. Here, Rostow argued that the most harmful forms of inequity such as poverty and illiteracy would organically diminish as democratic consolidation and the concomitant economic growth that democracy fostered, ensued. This growth would directly translate into an expansion of health care services for all citizens, adequate nutrition, access to education, employment, social protections, and importantly, an increasing urban middle classes.

As such, this development would serve as the single most crucial social foundation for the consolidation of a cohesive society. As such, Rostow assumed that economic development would automatically benefit marginalised women in all, but especially the poorer societies. Here, Inglehart and Norris (2003, 18) cite Sweden as a powerful example of the correlation between gender equality and consolidated democracy.

However, Inglehart and Norris assert that Rostow failed to take into account the complexity of the issue. This issue could not be reduced to a simple equation of democratic transition and economic development resulting in increased levels of post-materialist values. This is because vast spectrums of subjective national experiences were simply too complex for such a deduction.

These arguments then leave us with a number of hypothesis to explain how values and attitudes have shifted in South Africa in the first two decades of democracy.

Chapter Three: Research Question and Methodology

3.1 Research Question

The objective of this chapter is to clearly set out the research question that this thesis seeks to answer, as well as to provide a detailed explanation of the research methodology that will be applied in obtaining data outputs and drawing concomitant findings.

As previously discussed, this study aims to assess how levels of support for gender equality shifted in the first two decades of constitutional democracy in South Africa – a political dispensation that now provides for the equal protection of all citizens before the law, regardless of their race, language, marital status, class, culture or gender. In the context of Value Change Theory, support for gender equality is indicative of broader post-materialist values, whereas a lack of support for gender equality is indicative of materialist or survival values (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 70). Through the lens of political ideology, these value sets can be read as liberalism and conservatism, respectively. Further, we aim to provide an explanation for the findings produced in the context of our theoretical framework.

In the context of this study, understanding the degree to which subjective support for the rights of women has shifted, and advancing an explanatory theory that adequately accounts for the findings, is critical for the long-term sustainability of democracy and freedom in South Africa.

As noted by Inglehart and Welzel in *Political Culture, Mass Beliefs and Value Change* (2009), political and ideological regimes become stable only in so far as their patterns of governance are similar to the mainstream beliefs of the people which they seek to govern. The authors further note that the values underpinning and later sustaining democracy place an emphasis on freedom, tolerance, liberty, equality and decision making – and that these preferences are ultimately emancipative, self-expression, post-materialist values (Inglehart and Welzel: 2009, 129).

An analysis of the prevailing economic and social conditions within South Africa, as well as the attitudes of the populace towards liberal political values, must be contextualised within the history of Apartheid and the values it entrenched, before any explanatory theory is applied in understanding the status quo and predicting future behaviours.

In practical terms, our research aims to ask a number of questions. Firstly, where does South Africa score in terms of support for the equal rights of women in the international context. Secondly, has support for the rights of women in South Africa shifted - relative to the global average, between 1996 and 2013. Thirdly, how have levels of support shifted in the domestic context between 1996 and 2013. Fourth, in order to explain our findings in the context of the Scarcity Hypothesis, we analyse levels of domestic support for the rights of women according to four independent variables – age, gender, level of education, employment status. Lastly, we aim to provide an analysis of our observations in the context of the Scarcity Hypothesis by providing a snapshot of how material living conditions in South Africa have shifted at the Country level between 1996 and 2013.

3.2. The Scarcity Hypothesis

If democratisation has resulted in economic modernization and a concomitant improvement in material living conditions, this should produce a notable increase in values and attitudes that indicate a shift towards greater levels of self-expression values. In this instance, the *Scarcity*

Hypothesis as advanced by Ronald Inglehart in 1977 would be the correct explanatory hypothesis to account for value shifts in the South African context.

Here, it is postulated that as living conditions improve and people move away from material scarcity, this relative progression towards material affluence deceases materialist value scores, and increases post-materialist value scores (which is adequately demonstrated by higher rates of support for gender equality).

Moreso, Inglehart and Welzel in *Political Culture, Mass Beliefs and Value Change* (2009: 127) argue that:

> *"People's priorities reflect their socioeconomic conditions, placing the highest subjective value on the most pressing needs. Since material sustenance and physical security are the first requirements for survival, under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic goals; while under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize self-expression and emancipative values"*

Here, increased levels of education encourage the spread of emancipative values that prioritise tolerance for minority groups, support for gender equality and active participation in civil society.

Whilst democratic 'processes' may be idealised within a given country, attitudes towards interpersonal trust and the tolerance of diverse groups (self-expression values) must accompany support for democracy in order for genuine, notable value shifts to occur. This is because high levels of self-expression values directly correlate with the emergence and sustainability of institutions that support freedom and democracy. Where this has not yet happened, democratic consolidation and institutionalisation must occur before one can expect to see increasing support for post-materialist, or self-expression values (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 65).

Conversely, if economic modernisation is not resulting in shifting values and attitudes towards support for gender equality (a post-materialist value), then Inglehart and Norris theory, as espoused in their 2003 work *The True Clash of Civilizations,* may explain the South African status quo. The authors argue that it is not only material affluence that influences higher post-materialist value scores. Rather, historical and religious traditional beliefs continue to influence contemporary

values, especially in countries where democratic consolidation is not yet fully complete. Here, support for religious or cultural authorities continues to play an active role in how civil society is organised, which in turn, shapes values (Inglehart and Norris: 2003, 65).

My hypothesis advances that self-expression values amass in measure with industrialisation and economic development, which are bolstered by democratisation. It is this process that will lead to economic and material living conditions improving. Here, genuine, democratic consolidation and concomitant economic and social development must occur before one can expect to see increasing support for post-materialist, or self-expression values. Support for post-materialist values hereby increases as basic survival needs are me and concomitant survival values diminish.

In my cautions view, the Scarcity Hypothesis originally is an applicable hypothesis to apply in understanding, explaining and predicting value change in South Africa. According to Dalton in Values in Change (2008), in order to test the Scarcity Hypothesis, a researcher must compare national levels of post-material values to the socio-economic conditions of each nation. If scarcity breeds materialists concerns and affluence increases support for post-materialist goals, then advanced industrial nations should exhibit post-material values while underdeveloped nations should exhibit material values.

Conversely, if we approach our analysis from the Socialisation Hypothesis as per Dalton's work in *Values in Change* (2008), these effects should occur with a time lag. Here, the best predictor of public values should be national conditions a generation earlier when values were being formed. The results should demonstrate a clear relationship between wealth and the distribution of material and post-material values, with post-materialists more common in wealthier nations and less common in poorer nations. The greatest value shift occurs during the transition from a subsistence economy to an industrial society. Once this level of affluence is achieved, further improvements in living standards produce progressively smaller changes in values.

Furthermore, post-material values should be more concentrated among the young and better educated. If Dalton is correct, post-material concerns should gradually replace material concerns

as older materialist generations are replaced by younger more post-materialist generations, where economic development has occurred.

Modifying this hypothesis to the South African context, we will analyse the extent to which the material living conditions of South Africans improved during the period in which their levels of support for gender equality are measured. Here, observations obtained from the data outputs will be used to substantiate or nullify our prediction that an observed, marked increase in the material living conditions of South Africans between 1996 and 2013 will translate into a decline in survival values and a gradual, albeit incremental increase in the adoption of post-materialist values (Puttergill: 2000, 30).

3.3 Research Design and Methodology

This research thesis takes the form of a quantitative analysis (van Eerden and Terre Blanche: 2000, 123). This research is situated within an interpretive paradigm given that it seeks to make meaning of social phenomena (van Eerden and Terre Blanche: 2000, 124).

My research design is a longitudinal analysis of two repeated cross sections of International and South African public opinion, collected in 1996 and in 2013. In the South African context, this time period coincides with the first 17 years of Democracy after Apartheid.

The data that is relied upon in this study is representative of the full population, and was collected and made available for independent analysis by the international research organisation, World Value Surveys (WVS). The data collected by WVS is made available, at no cost, to researchers and academics, globally.

This data was then self-processed using IMB's data-analysis software, SPSS Statistics in order to produce meaningful frequency distribution tables for analysis (van Eeden: 2000, 210).

The WVS was founded by political scientist Ronald Inglehart, of the University of Michigan, who has been referenced throughout much of this body of work. The WVS is a representative survey

of the social, political, economic, religious and cultural values of the populations of roughly 120 countries around the world. The WVS measures opinions, values and attitudes every five years.

Prior to 2013 - which constitutes the last wave of the data surveyed for the purposes of this study - the WVS had been conducted on five previous occasions, starting in 1981. The data derived from these Surveys has made it possible for researchers to execute statistically valid analyses of the change in values across much of the world, over time.

In the South African chapter of these waves, the research used for the purpose of this study was conducted in 1996 and 2013. It is worth noting at this point that the planned Wave 7, due to take place between 2017 – 2020, was delayed due to the Covid and was published only after this thesis had been (originally) submitted in 2022.

The research outcomes produced for the purpose of this thesis were generated by commanding SPSS to run a variety of cross tabulations and frequency analyses.

Crosstabulations are commonly used in statistical analysis to demonstrate varying probabilities and trends within sets of raw data. Crosstabulation processes assemble different variables in order to make sense of the relationship between different these variables. Furthermore, crosstabulations demonstrate how correlations shift between variables. For the purposes of this study, cross tabulations were run using each respective question as the dependent variable, against five independent variables. Conversely, in the frequency distribution tables below, one variable is considered at a time (van Eeden: 2000).

WVS questions that measure values and attitudes towards gender equality used for the purposes of this study:

- Economic: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman”.
- Political “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”.
- Social: “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl”.

WVS independent variables that have been used for the purposes of this study: World, Age, Gender, Level of Education, Employment Status

The population statistics used to measure substantive changes to the material conditions within South Africa were derived from various Statistics South Africa research surveys.

The gender equality metrics highlighting distinct differences in the levels of political, social and economic equality between men and women are derived from research reports compiled by both the United Nations and the South African Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) - a Chapter 9 Institution established in terms of Section 187 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in 1996.

The research design proceeds as follows:

1. Raw data sets were harvested from WVS Waves 3 and 6. This was downloaded from the WVS website with permission from the data owners.
2. This data was then processed using IMB's SPSS programme, which was downloaded from UCT's website with the owner's permission and full licencing authorisations.
3. The tables below labelled Figures 1 to 46 demonstrate the commands that SPSS was given, and the relevant outputs.
4. Code books and results per country for the relevant variables are attached to this research thesis as Annexures 1 – 4.
5. The research objectives in processing this data were as follows:
    a. Where does South Africa score in terms of support for the equal rights of women in the international context?
    b. Has support for the rights of women in South Africa shifted, relative to the global average, between 1996 and 2013?
    c. How have levels of support shifted in South Africa between 1996 and 2013?
    d. How does support for the rights of women differ according to four independent variables – age, gender, level of education, employment status.

e. To what degree did the macro-level, material living conditions of South Africans change between 1996 – 2013. These are measured in terms of population change, unemployment rate, % of population with post-school education, % of population living in an informal dwelling, % of population with access to running water, % of population with access to energy supply, and, urbanisation.
f. Are observed changes congruent with the Scarcity Hypothesis?

Chapter Four: Presentation of Findings

"A basic principle in social science research is that time-series evidence is required in order to demonstrate or refute hypotheses about change."

- Inglehart and Abramson 1999, 67

4.1. Worldwide Results

Figure 1: 1996 Worldwide number of survey respondents

Number of survey respondents worldwide				
		On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
N	Valid	66907	68861	73031
	Missing	10911	8958	4787

A total of 77818 research respondents participated in the 1996 WVS data collection process worldwide. The column labeled "Valid" indicates the number of these participants whom provided responses to the three sets of questions that are detailed. The column labelled "Missing" indicates the number of participants whose responses were not assessed on the three sets of questions.

Figure 2: 2013 Worldwide number of survey respondents

Number of survey respondents worldwide				
		When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
N	Valid	87964	85483	86948
	Missing	1601	4081	2617

A total of 89565 research respondents participated in the 2013 WVS data collection process world-wide. The column labeled "Valid" indicates the number of these participants whom provided responses to the three sets of questions that are detailed. The column labelled "Missing" indicates the number of participants whose responses were not assessed on the three sets of questions.

4.1.1 Frequency distribution for worldwide results

Figure 3: 1996 Worldwide results on question: "Men make better political leaders".

Worldwide: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	13961	17.9	20.9	20.9
	Agree	20062	25.8	30.0	50.9
	Disagree	23628	30.4	35.3	86.2
	Strongly disagree	9255	11.9	13.8	100.0
	Total	66907	86.0	100.0	
Missing	Not asked	5335	6.9		
	No answer	221	.3		
	Don't know	5356	6.9		
	Total	10911	14.0		
Total		77818	100.0		

Findings: 50.9% of valid participant responses agreed that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 49.1% of valid participant responses who disagreed with the statement.

Figure 4: 2013 Worldwide results on question "Men make better political leaders".

Worldwide: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree strongly	19574	21.9	22.9	22.9
	Agree	23844	26.6	27.9	50.8
	Disagree	29457	32.9	34.5	85.3
	Strongly disagree	12608	14.1	14.7	100.0
	Total	85483	95.4	100.0	
Missing	Not asked	6	.0		

	No answer	486	.5		
	Don´t know	3590	4.0		
	Total	4081	4.6		
Total		89565	100.0		

Findings: 50.8% of valid participant responses agreed that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 49.2% of valid participant responses who disagreed with the statement. This represents a 0.1% decline in the number of materialist responses, and 0.1% increase on the number of post-materialist materialist responses in the period measured.

Figure 5: 1996 Worldwide results of question "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than a woman"

Worldwide: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	27807	35.7	38.1	38.1
	Neither	15566	20.0	21.3	59.4
	Disagree	29658	38.1	40.6	100.0
	Total	73031	93.8	100.0	
Missing	Not asked	3029	3.9		
	No answer	107	.1		
	Don't know	1651	2.1		
	Total	4787	6.2		
Total		77818	100.0		

Findings: 40.6% of valid participant responses disagree that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman, compared to 38.1% who agree with the statement.

Figure 6: 2013 Worldwide results of question "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than a woman"

Worldwide: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	34719	38.8	39.5	39.5
	Neither	16625	18.6	18.9	58.4
	Disagree	36620	40.9	41.6	100.0
	Total	87964	98.2	100.0	
Missing	No asked	6	.0		

	No answer	303	.3		
	Don´t know	1291	1.4		
	Total	1601	1.8		
Total		89565	100.0		

Findings: 41.6% of valid participant responses disagree that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman, compared to 39.5% who agree with the statement. This represents a 1% increase on the number of post-materialist responses, and 1.4% increase on the number of materialist responses, thereby reducing the number of undecideds.

Figure 7: 1996 Worldwide results "A University education is more important for a boy than for a girl"

Worldwide: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	6941	8.9	10.1	10.1
	Agree	10884	14.0	15.8	25.9
	Disagree	31344	40.3	45.5	71.4
	Strongly disagree	19691	25.3	28.6	100.0
	Total	68861	88.5	100.0	
Missing	Not asked	5335	6.9		
	No answer	185	.2		
	Don't know	3438	4.4		
	Total	8958	11.5		
Total		77818	100.0		

Findings: 25.9% of valid participant responses agree that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl, whilst 74.1% of of valid participant responses disagreed.

Figure 8: 2013 Worldwide results "A University education is more important for a boy than for a girl"

Worldwide: A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent*	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree strongly	9462	10.6	10.9	10.9
	Agree	13049	14.6	15.0	25.9
	Disagree	38524	43.0	44.3	70.2
	Strongly disagree	25913	28.9	29.8	100.0

	Total	86948	97.1	100.0	
Missing	Not asked	15	.0		
	No answer	362	.4		
	Don´t know	2240	2.5		
	Total	2617	2.9		
Total		89565	100.0		

Findings: 25.9% of valid participant responses agree that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl, whilst 74.1% of of valid participant responses disagreed. This represents no movement in post-materialist and materialist views, with marginal shifts occurring only in the strongest indications of the respective views.

4.1.2 Crosstabulation for all three questions combined by country

Figure 9: 1996 Worldwide results: Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders

Worldwide: Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation					
% within Country					
Country or Region	Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders				Total
	.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	
Sweden	2.0%	8.4%	22.4%	67.2%	100.0%
Norway	2.9%	9.3%	21.3%	66.5%	100.0%
Finland	5.4%	12.2%	25.9%	56.5%	100.0%
Australia	5.4%	14.3%	27.2%	53.1%	100.0%
Germany	4.6%	12.9%	29.8%	52.7%	100.0%
United States	7.7%	16.6%	27.3%	48.4%	100.0%
New Zealand	7.3%	16.2%	28.4%	48.1%	100.0%
Puerto Rico	6.7%	17.4%	30.5%	45.4%	100.0%
Spain	10.7%	16.1%	30.0%	43.1%	100.0%
Argentina	7.5%	21.0%	31.6%	39.9%	100.0%
Peru	12.0%	22.5%	30.8%	34.7%	100.0%
Venezuela	14.0%	25.3%	28.2%	32.5%	100.0%
Dominican Rep.	12.2%	23.3%	33.6%	30.9%	100.0%
Slovenia	14.0%	22.9%	32.9%	30.2%	100.0%
Albania	17.9%	33.0%	20.3%	28.7%	100.0%
Chile	13.4%	27.1%	31.9%	27.6%	100.0%

Serbia	19.7%	26.6%	27.6%	26.2%	100.0%
Croatia	18.4%	27.6%	29.8%	24.2%	100.0%
South Africa	12.0%	31.0%	33.4%	23.5%	100.0%
Czech Rep.	18.4%	29.1%	30.1%	22.4%	100.0%
Lithuania	17.2%	31.0%	30.5%	21.2%	100.0%
Macedonia	13.1%	30.8%	35.1%	21.1%	100.0%
Bosnia	16.0%	33.8%	29.5%	20.8%	100.0%
Hungary	16.3%	31.8%	31.4%	20.5%	100.0%
India	24.8%	27.9%	26.9%	20.4%	100.0%
Latvia	14.5%	32.5%	34.3%	18.7%	100.0%
China	16.3%	34.7%	30.4%	18.7%	100.0%
Montenegro	25.4%	27.1%	29.2%	18.3%	100.0%
Bulgaria	21.1%	33.2%	28.5%	17.2%	100.0%
Estonia	20.0%	30.2%	33.7%	16.2%	100.0%
Poland	27.0%	33.3%	24.7%	15.0%	100.0%
SrpSka Republic	34.3%	24.0%	27.0%	14.8%	100.0%
Bangladesh	35.3%	26.8%	23.4%	14.6%	100.0%
Ukraine	27.6%	30.3%	28.3%	13.7%	100.0%
South Korea	27.7%	34.3%	24.4%	13.5%	100.0%
Russia	22.6%	33.2%	30.7%	13.5%	100.0%
Turkey	26.4%	37.1%	23.3%	13.2%	100.0%
Nigeria	29.5%	36.6%	22.1%	11.9%	100.0%
Romania	27.1%	34.9%	26.1%	11.9%	100.0%
Slovakia	28.9%	32.0%	27.7%	11.4%	100.0%
Azerbaijan	30.6%	35.6%	22.7%	11.0%	100.0%
Belarus	28.5%	34.2%	26.2%	11.0%	100.0%
Moldova	24.0%	35.9%	30.9%	9.2%	100.0%
Philippines	23.8%	36.0%	31.5%	8.8%	100.0%
Japan	39.8%	31.4%	20.7%	8.2%	100.0%
Pakistan	33.8%	27.2%	31.3%	7.6%	100.0%
Armenia	33.6%	39.2%	20.3%	7.0%	100.0%
Georgia	26.6%	43.5%	23.3%	6.5%	100.0%
El Salvador	9.9%	34.9%	52.2%	3.0%	100.0%
Taiwan	20.3%	34.7%	42.8%	2.2%	100.0%
Mexico	21.2%	33.7%	43.6%	1.5%	100.0%

Uruguay	12.7%	32.4%	53.8%	1.1%	100.0%
Brazil	19.1%	33.9%	46.4%	0.7%	100.0%
Colombia	54.3%	14.7%	30.5%	0.5%	100.0%
United Kingdom	32.8%	67.2%			100.0%
Switzerland	45.4%	54.6%			100.0%
Total	22.7%	28.7%	28.6%	20.0%	100.0%

This table represents an international analysis of combined responses to the three questions. The column labeled 0.00 indicates the percentage of respondents per country that did not agree women have equal rights to men in respect of any of the questions asked; 1.00 indicates the percentage of respondents per country that agreed women should have 1 of the 3 rights assessed; 2.00 indicates the percentage of respondents per country that agreed women should have 2 of the 3 rights assessed; 3.00 indicates the percentage of respondents per country that agreed women should have all 3 of the rights assessed. A high score on the column labelled 3:00 represents a high score of post-materialist value adoption. The results are ordered in descending order on the basis of responses to the column indicating 3.00. In 1996, South Africa ranked 19 out of 59 countries with a score available for 3.00 with 23.5% (Scores on all three questions were not available for the United Kingdom and Switzerland).

Figure 10: 2013 Worldwide results: Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation					
% within Country					
Country or Region	Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders				Total
	.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	
Sweden	1,0%	3,3%	15,5%	80,2%	100,0%
Spain	4,9%	9,5%	18,9%	66,7%	100,0%
New Zealand	5,4%	10,7%	22,4%	61,6%	100,0%
Netherlands	4,8%	9,5%	25,3%	60,4%	100,0%
United States	4,0%	10,3%	26,4%	59,3%	100,0%
Australia	2,8%	10,1%	27,9%	59,2%	100,0%
Slovenia	3,9%	10,3%	29,4%	56,4%	100,0%
Brazil	5,0%	13,8%	27,8%	53,4%	100,0%
Uruguay	3,0%	12,2%	31,6%	53,2%	100,0%
Mexico	7,2%	12,5%	27,8%	52,5%	100,0%
Germany	8,7%	12,8%	26,7%	51,8%	100,0%
Peru	8,3%	13,4%	27,8%	50,5%	100,0%
Argentina	9,2%	15,2%	28,5%	47,0%	100,0%
Colombia	4,2%	15,3%	34,0%	46,4%	100,0%
Trinidad and Tobago	3,0%	17,7%	33,3%	45,9%	100,0%
Chile	11,9%	16,3%	29,6%	42,2%	100,0%
Ecuador	10,4%	15,9%	31,9%	41,8%	100,0%

Cyprus	9,5%	19,1%	33,0%	38,5%	100,0%
Taiwan ROC	10,0%	17,4%	35,4%	37,2%	100,0%
Poland	8,1%	22,6%	35,1%	34,3%	100,0%
Estonia	11,6%	24,1%	30,7%	33,7%	100,0%
Hong Kong SAR	14,2%	19,7%	33,0%	33,1%	100,0%
Zimbabwe	9,0%	28,0%	35,5%	27,5%	100,0%
Ukraine	11,5%	28,6%	32,8%	27,0%	100,0%
South Africa	24,1%	25,6%	25,1%	25,2%	100,0%
Singapore	18,6%	22,8%	35,1%	23,6%	100,0%
Thailand	20,1%	27,0%	30,5%	22,4%	100,0%
Georgia	12,6%	32,7%	32,7%	22,0%	100,0%
China	21,4%	28,8%	27,9%	21,9%	100,0%
Belarus	16,0%	32,3%	30,0%	21,8%	100,0%
Romania	16,8%	29,6%	31,8%	21,8%	100,0%
Russia	17,9%	33,0%	31,0%	18,1%	100,0%
Rwanda	17,4%	30,1%	34,3%	18,1%	100,0%
South Korea	20,3%	26,6%	36,4%	16,7%	100,0%
Lebanon	18,2%	37,4%	28,1%	16,3%	100,0%
Armenia	18,3%	37,0%	30,3%	14,5%	100,0%
Kazakhstan	15,8%	39,7%	31,6%	12,9%	100,0%
Kyrgyzstan	30,6%	32,3%	24,3%	12,7%	100,0%
India	32,5%	31,9%	23,3%	12,3%	100,0%
Morocco	20,8%	43,8%	23,2%	12,3%	100,0%
Algeria	36,5%	35,6%	16,3%	11,7%	100,0%
Haiti	17,3%	37,6%	34,0%	11,1%	100,0%
Philippines	28,4%	29,7%	30,9%	11,0%	100,0%
Ghana	20,3%	37,2%	32,0%	10,4%	100,0%
Turkey	25,2%	42,3%	22,2%	10,3%	100,0%
Malaysia	35,1%	34,8%	20,1%	10,1%	100,0%
Tunisia	24,6%	47,6%	17,9%	10,0%	100,0%
Uzbekistan	37,3%	35,7%	17,1%	9,9%	100,0%
Nigeria	39,1%	33,7%	18,6%	8,6%	100,0%
Japan	36,7%	27,4%	27,4%	8,5%	100,0%
Iraq	27,6%	48,0%	16,8%	7,6%	100,0%
Palestine	22,1%	50,1%	20,6%	7,2%	100,0%
Libya	28,2%	44,9%	20,0%	6,9%	100,0%
Egypt	33,7%	50,4%	9,3%	6,6%	100,0%

Qatar	22,7%	50,8%	20,7%	5,7%	100,0%
Kuwait	30,8%	45,0%	18,9%	5,4%	100,0%
Jordan	24,4%	53,3%	17,8%	4,4%	100,0%
Azerbaijan	24,4%	47,7%	23,9%	4,1%	100,0%
Yemen	43,8%	38,3%	14,3%	3,6%	100,0%
Pakistan	37,9%	35,9%	24,2%	2,0%	100,0%
Average	**18,2%**	**28,4%**	**26,6%**	**26,8%**	**100,0%**

In 2013, South Africa ranked 25th out of 60 countries with a score available for 3.00 with 25.2%. South Africa therefore ranked 6 places lower in 2013 than it did in 1996 on support for post-materialist values when compared to other countries. However, there was a 1.7% increase in terms of overall support for all 3 of the rights assessed which indicates an overall increase in post material value adoption in South Africa between 1996 and 2013.

4.2 South African results

Figure 11: 1996 South Africa survey respondents

Survey Respondent Numbers: South Africa 1996				
		On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women
N	Valid	2571	2811	2886
	Missing	364	124	49

2935 survey respondents participated in this study in South Africa in 1996. This is a statistically significant sample, representative of the Country's population.

Figure 12: 2013 South Africa survey respondents

Survey Respondent Numbers: South Africa 2013				
		When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women	On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
N	Valid	3531	3531	3531
	Missing	0	0	0

3531 survey respondents participated in this study in South Africa in 1996. This is a statistically significant sample, representative of the Country's population.

4.2 South Africa Results

4.2.1 Frequency distribution for South African results

Figure 13: 1996 South Africa results:" On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	687	23.4	26.7	26.7
	Agree	711	24.2	27.6	54.4
	Disagree	785	26.8	30.5	84.9
	Strongly disagree	388	13.2	15.1	100.0
	Total	2571	87.6	100.0	
Missing	No answer	1	.1		
	Don't know	362	12.3		
	Total	364	12.4		
Total		2935	100.0		

Findings: 54.4% of valid participant responses agreed that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 45.6% of valid participant responses who disagreed with the statement.

Figure 14: 2013 South Africa results:" On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree strongly	691	19.6	20.3	20.3
	Agree	1131	32.0	33.2	53.4
	Disagree	992	28.1	29.1	82.5
	Strongly disagree	597	16.9	17.5	100.0
	Total	3410	96.6	100.0	
Missing	Don´t know	121	3.4		
Total		3531	100.0		

Findings: 53.4% of valid participant responses agreed that on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 46.6% of valid participant responses who disagreed with the statement. This represents a 1% decline in the number of materialist responses since 1996, and 1% increase on the number of post-materialist materialist responses in the period measured.

*Figure 15: 1996 South Africa result: "*A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"

A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly agree	219	7.5	7.8	7.8
	Agree	246	8.4	8.8	16.6
	Disagree	1033	35.2	36.8	53.3
	Strongly disagree	1312	44.7	46.7	100.0
	Total	2811	95.8	100.0	
Missing	No answer	1	.0		
	Don't know	123	4.2		
	Total	124	4.2		
Total		2935	100.0		

Findings: 16.6% of valid participant responses agree that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl, whilst 83.4% of of valid participant responses disagreed.

*Figure 16: 2013 South Africa result: "*A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"

A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree strongly	492	13.9	14.2	14.2
	Agree	878	24.9	25.3	39.5
	Disagree	1022	29.0	29.5	69.0
	Strongly disagree	1072	30.4	31.0	100.0
	Total	3465	98.1	100.0	
Missing	Don´t know	66	1.9		
Total		3531	100.0		

Findings: 39.5% of valid participant responses agree that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl, whilst 60.5% of of valid participant responses disagreed. This represents a 22.9% increase in the number of materialist responses, and 22.9% decrease in the number of post-materialist materialist responses since 1996.

*Figure 17: 1996 South Africa result: "*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women"

When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	1068	36.4	37.0	37.0
	Neither	395	13.5	13.7	50.7
	Disagree	1424	48.5	49.3	100.0
	Total	2886	98.3	100.0	
Missing	Don't Know	49	1.7		
Total		2935	100.0		

Findings: 37% of valid participant responses agree that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman, compared to 49.3% who disagree with the statement.

*Figure 18: 2013 South Africa result: "*When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women"

When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	1061	30.0	30.3	30.3
	Neither	772	21.9	22.1	52.4
	Disagree	1668	47.2	47.6	100.0
	Total	3501	99.2	100.0	
Missing	Don´t know	30	.8		
Total		3531	100.0		

Findings: 30.3% of valid participant responses agree that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman, compared to 47.6% who disagree with the statement. This represents a 6.7% decrease in the number of materialist responses, and 1.7% decrease in the number of post-materialist materialist responses since 1996. The group that would commit to neither answer increased between 1996 and 2013 by 8.4%.

*Figure 19: 1996 South Africa result "*Women are equal political leaders to men"

Women are equal political leaders to men*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1762	60.0	60.0	60.0
	Agree	1173	40.0	40.0	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that women are equal political leaders to men in 1996, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 20: 2013 South Africa result "*Women are equal political leaders to men"

Women are equal political leaders to men*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1942	55.0	55.0	55.0
	Agree	1589	45.0	45.0	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that women are equal political leaders to men in 2013, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 21: 1996 South Africa result: "*University education is equally important for girls and boys"

University education is equally important for girls and boys*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	589	20.1	20.1	20.1
	Agree	2346	79.9	79.9	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that a university education is equally important for girls and boys in 1996, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 22: 2013 South Africa result: "*University education is equally important for girls and boys"

University education is equally important for girls and boys*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1436	40.7	40.7	40.7

	Agree	2095	59.3	59.3	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that a university education is equally important for girls and boys in 2013, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 23: 1996 South Africa result "*Women have an equal right to scarce jobs"

Women have an equal right to scarce jobs*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1511	51.5	51.5	51.5
	Agree	1424	48.5	48.5	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that women and men have equal right to scarce jobs in 1996, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 24: 2013 South Africa result "*Women have an equal right to scarce jobs"

Women have an equal right to scarce jobs*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	1863	52.8	52.8	52.8
	Agree	1668	47.2	47.2	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Total aggregated number of respondents who agree and disagree that women and men have equal right to scarce jobs in 2013, combining strongly agree and agree into one category; combining strongly disagree and disagree into one category and averaging for 'don't know' and 'no answer".

*Figure 25: 1996 South Africa result "*Women have equal rights to jobs, education, and are equal political leaders"

Women have equal rights to jobs, education, and are equal political leaders*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	353	12.0	12.0	12.0
	1.00	911	31.0	31.0	43.1
	2.00	981	33.4	33.4	76.5
	3.00	690	23.5	23.5	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Participants provide liberal, positive response with 0, 1,2 or all 3 of the questions. Findings: In 1996, 23.5% of the population in South Africa agreed that men and women had equal right to university education, jobs and political leadership.

Figure 26: 2013 South Africa result "Women have equal rights to jobs, education, and are equal political leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and are equal political leaders*					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	850	24.1	24.1	24.1
	1.00	903	25.6	25.6	49.6
	2.00	887	25.1	25.1	74.8
	3.00	891	25.2	25.2	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Participants provide liberal, positive response with 0, 1,2 or all 3 of the questions. Findings: In 2013, 25.2% of the population in South Africa agreed that men and women had equal right to university education, jobs and political leadership. This represents a 1.7% increase in support for women's rights, which is indicative of a 1.7% increase in the adoption of post-materialist values.

Figure 27: 1996 South Africa respondent breakdown by sex

Sex					
	Frequency		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	1398	47.6	47.6	47.6
	Female	1537	52.4	52.4	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Split between number and percentage of male and female respondents in 1996.

Figure 28: 2013 *South Africa respondent breakdown by sex*

Sex					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	1707	48.3	48.3	48.3
	Female	1824	51.7	51.7	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Split between number and percentage of male and female respondents in 2013.

Figure 29: 1996 *South Africa age intervals*

Age recorded (10 intervals)					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	17	171	5.8	5.8	5.8
	22	445	15.2	15.2	21.0
	28	380	13.0	13.0	34.0
	32	398	13.6	13.6	47.6
	38	382	13.0	13.1	60.6
	42	291	9.9	9.9	70.6
	48	237	8.1	8.1	78.6
	52	151	5.2	5.2	83.8
	58	288	9.8	9.8	93.6
	62	186	6.4	6.4	100.0
	Total	2930	99.8	100.0	
Missing	DK	5	.2		
Total		2935	100.0		

Number and percentage of respondents by age in 1996: 10 age intervals were recorded for data processing purposes.

Figure 30: 2013 *South Africa age intervals*

Age recoded (6 intervals)					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	15-24	934	26.5	26.5	26.5
	25-34	818	23.2	23.2	49.6
	35-44	640	18.1	18.1	67.8
	45-54	507	14.4	14.4	82.1
	55-64	397	11.3	11.3	93.4
	65 and more years"	234	6.6	6.6	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Number and percentage of respondents by age in 2013: 6 age intervals were recorded for data processing purposes.

Figure 31: 1996 *South Africa highest education level*

Highest educational level attained					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None	318	10.8	10.8	10.8
	Incomplete Primary Education	578	19.7	19.7	30.5
	Complete Primary Education	309	10.5	10.5	41.0
	Secondary university preparatory incomplete	998	34.0	34.0	75.1
	Secondary university preparatory	420	14.3	14.3	89.4
	Some university education	59	2.0	2.0	91.4
	University degree	254	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Number and percentage of respondents by level of education in 1996: 7 categories were recorded.

Figure 32: 2013 *South Africa highest education level attained*

Highest educational level attained					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None	83	2.4	2.4	2.4
	Incomplete primary school	157	4.4	4.5	6.9
	Complete primary school	216	6.1	6.2	13.0
	Secondary technical / vocational secondary school incomplete	255	7.2	7.3	20.3

	Secondary school: technical/ vocational type complete	274	7.8	7.8	28.1
	Secondary technical / vocational secondary school complete	909	25.7	26.0	54.1
	Complete secondary university-preparatory school	1292	36.6	36.9	91.0
	Some university-level education, without degree	168	4.8	4.8	95.8
	University degree	148	4.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	3503	99.2	100.0	
Missing		28	.8		
Total		3531	100.0		

Number and percentage of respondents by level of education in 2013: 9 categories were recorded.

Figure 33: 1996 *South Africa employment status*

Employment status					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Full time 30 hours a week or more	1057	36.0	36.2	36.2
	Part time less than 30 hours a week	138	4.7	4.7	40.9
	Self employed	123	4.2	4.2	45.1
	Retired pensioned	272	9.3	9.3	54.4
	Housewife not otherwise employed	251	8.5	8.6	63.0
	Student	361	12.3	12.3	75.3
	Unemployed	722	24.6	24.7	100.0
	Total	2924	99.6	100.0	
Missing	No answer	11	.4		
Total		2935	100.0		

Number and percentage of respondents by employment status in 1996: 7 categories were recorded.

Figure 34: 2013 *South Africa employment status*

Employment status					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Full time	936	26.5	26.6	26.6
	Part time	206	5.8	5.9	32.5
	Self employed	121	3.4	3.5	35.9
	Retired	395	11.2	11.2	47.2
	Housewife	253	7.2	7.2	54.4
	Students	399	11.3	11.3	65.7
	Unemployed	1206	34.2	34.3	100.0
	Total	3516	99.6	100.0	
Missing	No answer	15	.4		
Total		3531	100.0		

Number and percentage of respondents by employment status in 2013: 7 categories were recorded.

Figure 35: 1996 *South Africa income deciles*

Income Deciles					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	.00	458	15.6	15.6	15.6
Valid	1.00	1236	42.1	42.1	57.7
	2.00	497	16.9	16.9	74.7
	3.00	225	7.7	7.7	82.3
	4.00	122	4.1	4.1	86.5
	5.00	84	2.9	2.9	89.3
	6.00	83	2.8	2.8	92.2
	7.00	65	2.2	2.2	94.4
	8.00	42	1.4	1.4	95.8
	9.00	40	1.4	1.4	97.2
	10.00	83	2.8	2.8	100.0

	Total	2935	100.0	100.0	

Number and percentage of respondents by income decile in 1996, with income decline 10 being the highest level of income.

Figure 36: 2013 *South Africa income deciles*

Income Deciles					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	95	2.7	2.7	2.7
	1.00	317	9.0	9.0	11.7
	2.00	171	4.8	4.8	16.5
	3.00	323	9.1	9.1	25.7
	4.00	380	10.8	10.8	36.4
	5.00	613	17.4	17.4	53.8
	6.00	585	16.6	16.6	70.4
	7.00	442	12.5	12.5	82.9
	8.00	428	12.1	12.1	95.0
	9.00	104	3.0	3.0	98.0
	10.00	72	2.0	2.0	100.0
	Total	3531	100.0	100.0	

Number and percentage of respondents by income decile in 2013, with income decline 10 being the highest level of income.

4.2.2 South African responses by independent variable across all three questions

Figure 37: 1996 *South Africa within country: "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation			
% within Country			
		Country	Total
		South Africa	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	12.0%	12.0%
	1.00	31.0%	31.0%
	2.00	33.4%	33.4%
	3.00	23.5%	23.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

In 1996, 23.5% of South Africans agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders.

Figure 38: 2013 *South Africa within country "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation			
% within Country			
		Country	Total
		South Africa	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	24.1%	24.1%
	1.00	25.6%	25.6%
	2.00	25.1%	25.1%
	3.00	25.2%	25.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

In 2013, 25.2% of South Africans agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders.

Figure 39: 1996 *South Africa by sex "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation				
% within Sex				
		Sex		Total
		Male	Female	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	14.0%	10.2%	12.0%
	1.00	35.7%	26.7%	31.0%
	2.00	30.7%	36.0%	33.4%
	3.00	19.6%	27.1%	23.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 1996, 19.6% of men agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders. 27.1% of women agreed with the same questions. Here, women demonstrate 7.5% higher support for equal rights than men do.

Figure 40: 2013 *South Africa by sex "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation

% within Sex				
		Sex		Total
		Male	Female	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	28.0%	20.4%	24.1%
	1.00	26.4%	24.8%	25.6%
	2.00	25.6%	24.7%	25.1%
	3.00	20.0%	30.2%	25.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 2013, 20% of men agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders. 30.2% of women agreed with the same questions. Here, women demonstrate 9.8% higher support for equal rights than men do. Overall, support for the rights of women increased by 1.8% since 1996.

Figure 41: 1996 *South Africa by age "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation											
% within Age (10 intervals)											
	Age										Total
	17	22	28	32	38	42	48	52	58	62	
.00	8.8%	7.9%	9.2%	9.5%	10.7%	15.1%	18.6%	19.9%	12.5%	17.7%	12.0%
1.00	20.5%	24.9%	30.6%	36.7%	30.1%	31.6%	30.4%	37.7%	34.4%	36.0%	31.1%
2.00	40.4%	33.5%	34.6%	29.4%	38.5%	32.3%	29.1%	27.2%	35.4%	32.8%	33.5%
3.00	30.4%	33.7%	25.6%	24.4%	20.7%	21.0%	21.9%	15.2%	17.7%	13.4%	23.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 1996, support for the equal rights of men and women was highest amongst adults in their early 20's and lowest amongst adults in their 60's. Decline in levels of support for the equal rights of men and women was marked the older the respondents were.

Figure 42: 2013 *South Africa by age "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation								
% within Age recoded (6 intervals)								
		Age recoded (6 intervals)						Total
		15-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and more years"	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	28.3%	23.8%	22.2%	19.5%	21.9%	26.5%	24.1%
	1.00	24.9%	24.2%	29.1%	26.0%	22.9%	26.5%	25.6%
	2.00	23.0%	26.4%	23.5%	28.0%	28.0%	22.6%	25.1%

	3.00	23.8%	25.6%	25.2%	26.4%	27.2%	24.4%	25.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 2013, support for the equal rights of men and women was relatively evenly spread, with moderately higher levels of support for all three sets of rights recorded by respondents aged between 45 and 64. Respondents who were in their early 20's in 1996 would be reflected in the 35 – 44 increments in 2013, and it is clear from the data that levels of support did not hold constant as these respondents aged, but rather a decline in support was noted. (33% in 1996 versus 25.2% in 1996). It is interesting to note that the youngest cohort of respondents in 2013 demonstrated a significantly lower level of support for the equal rights of men in women compared to the youngest two cohorts in 1996 with scores of 23.8% and 33.7% respectively.

Figure 43: 1996 *South Africa by education level* "Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation								
% within Highest educational level attained								
	Highest educational level attained							Total
	None	Primary incomplete	Primary	Secondary university preparatory incomplete	Secondary university preparatory	Some university education	University degree	
.00	22.6%	16.3%	8.7%	9.1%	12.1%	1.7%	6.7%	12.0%
1.00	44.3%	34.8%	35.0%	30.0%	25.0%	22.4%	17.3%	31.0%
2.00	24.2%	33.6%	37.2%	35.0%	32.4%	32.8%	35.7%	33.4%
3.00	8.8%	15.4%	19.1%	25.9%	30.5%	43.1%	40.4%	23.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 1996, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with either some university education (43.1%) or a full university education (40.4%). It was lowest amongst those with no education (8.8%) and an incomplete primary education (15.4%). Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 23.5% across all levels of education.

Figure 44: 2013 *South Africa South Africa by education level* "Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation		
% within Highest educational level attained		
	Highest educational level attained	Total

	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	Complete primary school	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	Some university-level education, without degree	University - level education, with degree	
.00	33.3%	30.1%	23.3%	24.2%	26.7%	23.8%	23.4%	23.8%	18.8%	24.2%
1.00	27.4%	28.2%	30.7%	23.8%	28.2%	26.3%	23.9%	31.0%	17.4%	25.6%
2.00	19.0%	19.9%	23.3%	25.4%	26.7%	26.7%	25.4%	19.0%	24.8%	25.0%
3.00	20.2%	21.8%	22.8%	26.6%	18.3%	23.2%	27.3%	26.2%	38.9%	25.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 2013, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with a full university education (38.9%). It was lowest amongst those with an incomplete technical or vocational secondary school education at (18.3%). 20.2% of respondents with no formal education supported the equal rights of men and women, up from 8.8% in 1996. Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 25.2% across all levels of education, an of 1.7% since 1996.

Figure 45: 1996 *South Africa employment status "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders Crosstabulation									
% within Employment status									
		Employment status							Total
		Full time	Part time	Self employed	Retired pensioned	Housewife	Student	Unemployed	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	12.9%	10.9%	8.9%	16.5%	16.3%	5.8%	11.8%	12.1%
	1.00	31.9%	31.9%	27.4%	33.3%	29.5%	25.1%	32.3%	30.9%
	2.00	31.3%	37.7%	37.1%	34.4%	37.1%	36.5%	32.4%	33.5%
	3.00	23.9%	19.6%	26.6%	15.8%	17.1%	32.6%	23.5%	23.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 1996, students demonstrated the highest level of support for all three sets of equal rights between and women at 32.6%. The lowest levels of support were recorded amongst housewives at 17.1%.

Figure 46: 2013 *South Africa by employment status "*Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders"

Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders

% within Employment status									
		Employment status							Total
		Full time	Part time	Self employed	Retired	Housewife	Students	Unemployed	
Agrees women have rights to jobs, education, and equal leaders	.00	25.2%	27.8%	24.8%	20.3%	14.2%	24.5%	25.6%	24.0%
	1.00	24.4%	25.4%	27.3%	25.6%	23.2%	28.2%	25.8%	25.5%
	2.00	25.2%	22.4%	30.6%	23.8%	30.7%	22.5%	25.2%	25.2%
	3.00	25.2%	24.4%	17.4%	30.4%	31.9%	24.8%	23.4%	25.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In 2013, housewives demonstrated the highest level of support for all three sets of equal rights between and women at 31.9%. The lowest levels of support were recorded amongst those who were self-employed at 17.4%.

4.3 Statistics South Africa Population Data for period 1996 - 2013

In order to assess the progression that South Africa has made towards realising satisfactory materialist conditions, an analysis of the living conditions of South Africans has been conducted using data obtained from Statistics South Africa. Each survey utilised in the production of this table is listed in the Bibliography under the section dealing with Statistics South Africa.

The measurements selected are indicative of changes in levels of urbanisation, education and basic services. The unemployment rate and levels of access to formal housing are indicative of the levels of relative poverty over the period in question. Collectively, these results speak to how the provision of basic needs and physiological security has improved and receded.

Ultimately, the data contained in the below chart (Figure 47) is descriptive to the extent that it provides a reliable snapshot of how economic changes over the course of the first two decades of democracy have changed.

Figure 47: Changes in socio-economic conditions in South Africa between 1996 and 2013

Metric:	1996	2001	2006	2013
Population Size	40, 583, 573	44, 819, 778	47, 391, 000	52, 982, 000
Official Unemployment Rate %	19.5%	16.5%	25,50%	24,10%
% Population with Post-School / Higher Education	6,20%	8,40%	9,20%	12,80%
% Population living in formal dwelling	57,50%	63,80%	71%	77,70%
% Population with running water in dwelling or on site	61,40%	61.2%	71,30%	72,10%
% Population with access to household energy supply	58%	69,70%	81,30%	85%
Living in Urban Area	53, 7%	56.29%	60%	63,70%

As we can ascertain from the above table, the following changes took place between 1996 and 2013:

1. The population grew by 12 398 427
2. The official unemployment rate grew by 4.6%
3. From 19.5% in 1996, 24.10% of the population was unemployed by 2013.
4. 10% more South Africans lived in Urban areas by 2013 than in 1996.
5. 6.6% more South African's had a post-school qualification in 2013 than in 1996.
6. The percentage of South African's without any form of post-school / higher education still remained tremendously high, at 87.2%.
7. 20% more South Africans were living in formal structures by 2013, at 77.7%.
8. Access to piped, running water increased by 10.7% to 72.10% in 2013.
9. 27.8% of South Africans did not have piped water in 2013.
10. Access to electricity supply increased by 27% to 85% in 2013.
11. 15% of South Africans did not have access to electricity supply in 2013.

Chapter Five: Analysis and Summary

5. Analysis of findings

5.1. South Africa in 1996 and 2013

2935 survey respondents participated in this study in South Africa in 1996. This is a statistically significant sample, representative of the Country's population.

3531 survey respondents participated in this study in South Africa in 2013. This is a statistically significant sample, representative of the Country's population.

"Men make better political leaders than women do":

1996: 54.4% agreed, whilst 45.6% disagreed.
2013: 53.4% agreed, whilst 46.6% disagreed.

Findings: This represents a 1% decline in the number of survival values since 1996, and 1% increase on the number of post-materialist responses in the period measured.

"When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman":

1996: 37% agreed, whilst 49.3% disagreed.
2013: 30.3% agreed, whilst 47.6% disagreed.

Findings: This represents a 6.7% decrease in the number of respondents who demonstrated survival values by agreeing with the statement, and 1.7% decrease in the number who demonstrated post-materialist responses since 1996. The group that would commit to neither answer increased between 1996 and 2013 by 8.4%.

"A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl":

1996: 16.6% agreed, whilst 83.4% disagreed.
2013: 39.5% agreed, whilst 60.5% disagreed.

Findings: This represents a 22.9% increase in the number of respondents who demonstrated survival values by agreeing with the statement, and a 22.9% decrease in the number of post-materialist responses since 1996.

All three questions combined:

Findings: In 1996, 23.5% of the population in South Africa agreed that men and women had equal right to university education, jobs and political leadership.

Findings: In 2013, 25.2% of the population in South Africa agreed that men and women had equal right to university education, jobs and political leadership. This represents a 1.7% increase in support for women's rights, which is indicative of a 1.7% increase in the adoption of post-materialist values.

5.2. Worldwide compared to South Africa in 1996 and 2013

A total of 77818 research respondents participated in the 1996 WVS data collection process worldwide. The column labeled "Valid" indicates the number of these participants whom provided responses to the three sets of questions that are detailed. The column labelled "Missing" indicates the number of participants whose responses were not assessed on the three sets of questions.

A total of 89565 research respondents participated in the 2013 WVS data collection process world-wide. The column labeled "Valid" indicates the number of these participants whom provided responses to the three sets of questions that are detailed. The column labelled "Missing" indicates the number of participants whose responses were not assessed on the three sets of questions.

"Men make better political leaders than women do":

International (1996):
50.9% agreed whilst 49.1% disagreed.
South Africa (1996):
54.4% agreed whilst 45.6% disagreed.

International (2013):
50.8% agreed whilst 49.2% disagreed.

South Africa (2013):
53.4% agreed whilst 46.6% disagreed.

Finding: Survival values in South Africa are 3.5% higher than the global average in 1996. Survival values in South Africa are 2.6% higher than the global average in 2013. Whilst South Africa demonstrates comparatively higher than average rates of survival values on this question, there has been a 0.9 positive shift towards the national average on the part of South Africa, over the 17 year period measured.

"When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman":

International (1996):
38.1% agreed whilst 40.6% disagreed.
South Africa (1996):
37% agreed whilst 49.3% disagreed.

International (2013):
39.5% who agree whilst 41.6% disagreed.
South Africa (2013):
30.3% agreed whilst 47.6% disagreed.

Finding: Survival values in South Africa are 8.7% lower than the global average in 1996. Survival values in South Africa are 8.7% lower than the global average in 2013. Whilst South Africa demonstrates comparatively lower than international average rates of survival values on this question, survival values increased domestically by 2.7% over the 17 year period measured.

"A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl":

International (1996):
25.9% agreed, whilst 74.1% disagreed.
South Africa (1996):
16.6% agreed, whilst 83.4% disagreed.
International (2013):

25.9% agree, whilst 74.1% disagreed.
South Africa (2013):
39.5% agree, whilst 60.5% disagreed.

Finding: Survival values in South Africa are 9.3% lower than the global average in 1996. Survival values in South Africa are 13.6% higher than the global average in 2013. The international average remained constant between 1996 and 2013, at 74.1% of respondents disagreeing with this statement. In South Africa, there was an increase of 22/9% in survival values on this question over the same period.

On all three questions combined:

In 1996, South African ranked 19th out of 59 countries with a score available for 3.00 with 23.5%. The highest post-materialist scores were recorded in Scandinavian states and highly developed western democracies, with Sweden scoring 67.2%. The lowest post-materialist scores were recorded in the South Americas – Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Colombia ranking last, at 0.5%.

In 2013, South African ranked 25th out of 60 countries with a score available for 3.00 with 25.2%. South Africa therefore ranked 6 places lower in 2013 than it did in 1996. The highest post-materialist scores were recorded in developed, Western states, with a particularly high score of 80.2% in Sweden. The lowest scores were recorded in highly religious, middle eastern countries such as Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen and Pakistan ranking last, at 2%.

5.3. Independent Variables for South Africa in 1996 and 2013

Gender:

In 1996, 19.6% of men agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders. 27.1% of women agreed with the same questions. Here, women demonstrate 7.5% higher support for equal rights than men do.

In 2013, 20% of men agreed that women and men have equal rights to jobs and education and that women and men are equal political leaders. 30.2% of women agreed with the same questions. Here, women demonstrate 9.8% higher support for equal rights than men do. Overall, support for the rights of women increased by 1.8% since 1996.

Age:

In 1996, support for the equal rights of men and women was highest amongst adults in their early 20's and lowest amongst adults in their 60's. Decline in levels of support for the equal rights of men and women was marked the older the respondents were.

In 2013, support for the equal rights of men and women was relatively evenly spread, with moderately higher levels of support for all three sets of rights recorded by respondents aged between 45 and 64. Respondents who were in their early 20's in 1996 would be reflected in the 35 – 44 increments in 2013, and it is clear from the data that levels of support did not hold constant as these respondents aged, but rather a decline in support was noted. (33% in 1996 versus 25.2% in 1996). It is interesting to note that the youngest cohort of respondents in 2013 demonstrated a significantly lower level of support for the equal rights of men in women compared to the youngest two cohorts in 1996 with scores of 23.8% and 33.7% respectively.

Level of Education:

In 1996, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with either some university education (43.1%) or a full university education (40.4%). It was lowest amongst those with no education (8.8%) and an incomplete primary education (15.4%). Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 23.5% across all levels of education.

In 2013, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with a full university education (38.9%). It was lowest amongst those with an incomplete technical or vocational secondary school education at (18.3%). 20.2% of respondents with no formal education supported the equal rights of men and women, up from 8.8% in 1996. Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 25.2% across all levels of education, an of 1.7% since 1996.

Employment Status:

In 1996, students demonstrated the highest level of support for all three sets of equal rights between and women at 32.6%. The lowest levels of support were recorded amongst housewives at 17.1%.

In 2013, housewives demonstrated the highest level of support for all three sets of equal rights between and women at 31.9%. The lowest levels of support were recorded amongst those who were self-employed at 17.4%.

5.4 Analysis and findings in Summary

As detailed in our findings, we were able to establish that, by 2013, a more significant number of South Africans had access to formal housing (20% increase), had completed some form of tertiary education (6.6% increase), had access to piped water (10.7% increase), as well as access to the electricity supply (27% increase). However, the unemployment rate also increased during this period by 4.6%, and the number of South Africans without a tertiary education was 87.2%.

In respect of the overall change in values and attitudes, by 2013, 25.2% of the population in South Africa agreed that men and women had an equal right to university education, jobs and political leadership. This represented a 1.7% increase in support for women's rights from 1996, which is indicative of a 1.7% increase in the adoption of post-materialist values.

When we compared the combined South African results to the outcomes of other countries, we noted that in 1996, South Africa ranked 19th out of 59 countries with support for the equal rights of women across all three questions totaling 23.5%. By 2013, South African ranked 25th out of 60 countries with a score of 25.2%. South Africa therefore ranked 6 places lower in 2013 than it did in 1996, but, as already detailed, the overall adoption of post-materialist values relating to the rights of women had increased by 1.7%. This finding suggests that, on average, South Africa was lagging behind other nations in advancing support for women's rights.

Regarding the independent variable, gender, in 1996, women showed 7.5% greater support for equal rights compared to men. In 2013, this difference increased to 9.8%, indicating that women

exhibited a higher level of support for equal rights than men. Overall, there was a 1.8% increase in support for women's rights since 1996.

In respect of the independent variable: age, in 1996, it was found that the older the respondents were, the lower the levels of support for the equal rights of women. However, in 2013, support for the equal rights of men and women was relatively evenly spread, with moderately higher levels of support for all three sets of rights recorded by respondents between ages 45 and 64. It was interesting to note that the youngest cohort of respondents in 2013 demonstrated a significantly lower level of support for the equal rights of men in women compared to the youngest two cohorts in 1996 with scores of 23.8% and 33.7%, respectively. This finding meant that support for the equal rights of women amongst the youngest cohort declined by 9.9% between 1996 and 2013.

On independent variable of education, in 1996, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with either some university education (43.1%) or a full university education (40.4%). It was lowest amongst those with no education (8.8%) and an incomplete primary education (15.4%). Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 23.5% across all levels of education. In 2013, support for the equal rights of women was highest amongst those with a full university education (38.9%). It was lowest amongst those with an incomplete technical or vocational secondary school education at (18.3%). 20.2% of respondents with no formal education supported the equal rights of men and women, up from 8.8% in 1996. Overall, support for the equal rights of women averaged at 25.2% across all levels of education, an of 1.7% since 1996.

On the independent variable of employment status, between 1996 and 2013, an increase in the support for women rights was recorded amongst full time workers (1.35%), part time workers (4.8%), housewives (13.3%,) with the most significant increase being recorded amongst retirees (14.6%). Deceases in support for the rights of women between 1996 and 2013 were recorded amongst those who classified as self-employed (9.2% decrease), and students (7.8% decrease). Amongst those who classified as unemployed, there was no statistically significant movement, with a reduction of 0.1% over the period measured.

The 9.9% decline in support for equal rights among the youngest age group (15-24 years old) and the 7.8% decrease in support among students suggest that despite the statistically indicated improvement in material living conditions during their formative years, there has not been an overall positive impact on the adoption of post-materialist or self-expression values.

Conversely, support by retired individuals for the equal rights of women increased by 14.6% from 15.8% in 1996 to 30.4% in 2013. Equally, support for the same rights amongst the two oldest cohorts of South Africans on the independent variable of by age (52 – 64 and older), increased during the period by roughly 11%. This means, that as material conditions improved, so did increased level of support post-materialist or self-expression values. However, we do not have enough data to establish a causative relationship between material improvements and increased support, given that democratic transition took place during the mid-life period of these individuals, which could have equally exerted a positive influence on their value systems.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

6. Concluding Remarks

The examination of survey responses from both a national and global perspective, coupled with an exploration of independent variables such as gender, age, education, and employment status, has provided a valuable insight into the dynamics of social transformation in South Africa following the dawn of democracy.

At the outset of this research thesis, the Scarcity Hypothesis was advanced as a possible explanation for our findings. Here, it was argued that the process of industrialisation will lead to economic and material living conditions improving, which in turn leads to the adoption of post-materialist or self-expression values, as defined by Ingelhart and Welzel (2003, 64). In line with this theory, economic development must occur before increased support for post-materialist, or self-expression values can be observed. Support for post-materialist values is thereby thought to increase, as basic survival needs are met and concomitant survival values diminish.

As previously discussed, the Scarcity Hypothesis suggests that the first notable shift towards the adoption of post-materialist political and social values tends to occur in 'developing' democracies, and these changes are thought to coincide with rates of economic development. The adoption of progressive values then consolidates alongside the satisfaction of basic economic needs, which arise as a result of advanced industrialisation. Conversely, where economic development is slow and uncertain, the adoption of progressive values lingers linearly alongside the slow and unsteady rate of industrialisation (Inglehart and Welzel: 2005, 135).

Applying the Scarcity Hypothesis model, Dalton discovered that wealthier, more industrialized nations exhibited a higher prevalence of post-materialists compared to developing nations, where materialists were more common. The most significant changes in the subjective value sets of any population were notably evident during the transition from a subsistence-based economy to an industrialized society (Dalton: 2008).

According to Dalton in Values in Change (2008), in order to test the Scarcity Hypothesis, a researcher must compare national levels of post-material values to the socio-economic conditions of a nation. If scarcity breeds survival values and affluence increases support for post-materialist goals, then advanced industrial nations should exhibit higher levels of post-material values, while underdeveloped nations should exhibit a higher degree of traditional or survival values. Here, there should be a marked correlation between better living conditions and the increased adoption of liberal values.

During the course of this research, we analysed the extent to which the material living conditions of South Africans improved or declined between 1996 - 2013, and then compared these findings to changes in levels of support for, or opposition to, the full and equal rights of women in society.

Here, observations arising from data outputs were used to either substantiate or nullify our prediction that an observed, marked increase in the material living conditions of South Africans between 1996 and 2013 would translate into a decline in survival values and a gradual, albeit incremental increase in the adoption of post-materialist values (Puttergill: 2000, 30).

It is clear from the statistical findings rendered above, that the improvement in material living conditions (such the number of those with a post-matric qualification, access to formal housing and increased access to water, electricity and formal shelter) yielded a net increase of 1.7% of South Africans who hold subjective, self-expression and post-materialist values in respect of gender equality. This change occurred between 1996 and 2013.

The overall decrease of 9.9% support for the equal rights of women amongst the youngest age cohort (15 – 24 year olds), as well as the overall decrease in support amongst students of 7.8%, indicates that the relative improvement in material living conditions during this period has not had a net positive impact on the adoption of post-materialist or self-expression values amongst the youth. This may be because they have not been the net recipients of this positive transformation. Here, according to available Statistics South Africa data from the period, we are able to establish that the increased unemployment of 4% between 1996 and 2013 disproportionally affected the youth, potentially exacerbating levels of material scarcity within this demographic, and magnifying its impact on a national scale, disproportionately.

Conversely, the formative years of this generation coincided with the dawn of our democracy, and the promulgation of our Constitution. Here, whilst this cohort did not experience the direct racial oppression of the Apartheid regime, material scarcity may have continued to characterised the conditions in which millions of South African youth spent their formative years. Here, according to the Scarcity Hypothesis, where economic development is slow and uncertain, the adoption of progressive values lingers linearly alongside the slow and unsteady rate of industrialisation and development (Inglehart and Welzel: 2005, 135). The Scarcity hypothesis seem to adequately explain these research findings.

On the contrary, we found that support by retired individuals for the equal rights of women increased by 14.6%, from 15.8% in 1996 to 30.4% in 2013. Equally, support for the same rights amongst the two oldest cohorts of South Africans on the independent variable of by age (52 – 64 and older), increased during the period by roughly 11%. This means, that as material conditions within South Africa improved over the period measured, so did increased level of support post-materialist or self-expression values. However, we do not have enough data to establish a causative

relationship between material improvements in access to basic services, and this statistically significant increase in support for the rights of women amongst the older cohort of survey respondents. This is because, while the democratic transition coincided with the mid-life period of these individuals - and this positive transition may have exerted a positive influence on their value systems - these older South Africans may have also been beneficiaries of improved material conditions in higher numbers than young South Africans.

Ultimately, the above findings reveal a nuanced picture of South Africa's evolving stance on gender equality. While the overall support for women's rights increased by a modest 1.7%, the detailed analysis of individual questions suggests a complex interplay of factors. Comparisons between South Africa and the global community highlight the country's unique trajectory. Although South Africa demonstrated higher survival values than the global average in 1996, the subsequent years saw a convergence, with a 0.9% positive shift towards the global average. However, South African slipped five places down the global averages ranking, from 19 out of 59 in 1996, to 25 out of 60 in 2013. This suggests that, while South Africa has made progress, it has not kept pace with global trends towards the adoption of post-materialist values concerning gender equality.

What is clear from the research, is that in the South African context, the contemplation and adoption of post-materialist values is unlikely to occur at sustained levels, across all demographics, until material living conditions improve further, and genuine access to the fruits of a functioning democracy are realised. The incremental increase in support for women's rights overall signals marginal progress, however, the persistence of survival values and the decrease in support for the full and equal rights of women amongst the youth emphasise the need for targeted and context-specific interventions.

As South Africa continues on its journey of democratic consolidation and social transformation, the findings of this study offer valuable insights for policymakers, researchers, and advocates working towards a more equitable and inclusive future.

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Appendices:

Appendix 1 – 4 : Technical details for World Value Survey Data contained in the primary thesis