
AN ANALYSIS OF WHY SAPPI LIMITED HAD TO ISSUE FOREIGN DENOMINATED DEBT

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ABSTRACT

SAPPI Limited (“SAPPI”) is a company that was established in South Africa in the 1930’s and has grown into a global player in the paper and pulp industry, as well as the chemical cellulose industry. Historical financing decisions made in the growth phases of the company’s life cycle left it with the need to re-finance debt obligations payable in the early 2010’s. In order to meet these obligations, four callable bonds with high coupon rates denominated in Euro and US Dollar were issued in 2011 and 2012 below investment grade.

This study examines the cost at which these high yield bonds were issued by SAPPI and discusses the potential reasoning behind the decisions made by SAPPI in the process to obtain further financing. Financing solutions within the South African market are discussed with the conclusion that the South African listed high yield corporate bond market was not adequate for SAPPI, given its credit rating being below investment grade and the value of funding required. In addition, SAPPI’s exposure to foreign currencies through global operations made the Euro and US Dollar denominated bond issues favourable to the business.

To illustrate the cost of the bonds issued in both Euro and US Dollar, the second part of this study consists of an analysis of the option-adjusted spreads at which these bonds were issued. Our analysis involved taking into account the probability of the call provisions being exercised by SAPPI at the date of issue through a detailed application of the option-adjusted spread methodology and the use of a recombining binomial lattice. Through a quantitative example of the process followed and a discussion of the spreads determined, we indicate the true cost at which finance was obtained by SAPPI for each bond issued. A brief discussion on the hedging decisions taken by SAPPI management on the issuance of the debt has also been included. Furthermore, the retrospective performance of the foreign exchange hedging decisions made have been assessed through movements in global financial markets from the time hedging decisions were enacted up until 30 September 2015.

CONTENTS

Plagiarism declaration.....	i
Masters of Commerce in Financial and Risk Management	i
Abstract.....	ii
Tables	v
Figures.....	vi
Glossary of terms	vii
1. Introduction	1
1.1. Background	1
1.2. Objectives.....	3
1.3. Outline.....	3
2. SAPPI Limited	4
2.1. Introduction	4
2.2. Background to the SAPPI Group	4
2.3. Historical funding mechanisms	6
2.4. Share price performance	7
2.5. Financial position in 2011 and 2012	9
2.6. SAPPI's global operational exposure	10
2.7. Outcome	12
3. Literature review.....	13
3.1. Introduction	13
3.2. Junk Bond Definition	13
3.3. A history of the global high yield bond market.....	14
3.4. Edward Altman, historical default rates and the effect on the high yield debt market...	20
3.5. Increase in market prevalence of the callable bond.....	21
3.6. Using option-adjusted spread analysis to value bonds	22
3.7. Using interest rate swaps.....	26
3.8. Exchange rate hedging.....	27
4. SAPPI debt issuance	29
4.1. Introduction	29
4.2. Background of bond issues	29
4.3. Callable bond terms	31
4.4. Option-adjusted spread on SAPPI callable bonds.....	33
4.5. Results.....	44
5. Sappi hedging of bond issuance global exposures.....	46

5.1.	Introduction	46
5.2.	SAPPI management’s potential reasoning for hedging decisions made.....	46
5.3.	Matching of SAPPI operational assets and financing obligations	47
5.4.	Retrospective effects of hedging decisions made	50
5.5.	Results	52
6.	Recent developments update	53
7.	Conclusion and recommendations	54
7.1.	Conclusion.....	54
7.2.	Scope for future research	55
	Appendices.....	57
	Appendix A: further bond details.....	57
	Appendix B: Bloomberg risk-free rates and prices utilised.....	59
	Appendix C: Implied spot rates determined (NACA)	60
	Appendix D: Zero curve comparisons - Linear and Cubic spline interpolation.....	60
	Appendix E: Implied spot rates and forward rates determined (NACM)	61
	Appendix F: Volatility data sets.....	62
	Appendix G: Pre-calibration binomial lattices	65
	Appendix H: Post-calibration binomial lattices.....	66
	Appendix I: Final bond valuation models for determining OAS.....	67
	Appendix J: Source data for historical default rates	68
	References	69

TABLES

Table 1: Summary of key bond issue terms (own calculations).....	31
Table 2: Applicable bond redemption price (SAPPI bond prospectus).....	32
Table 3: Market risk-free Mid-prices {data amended as indicated} (Bloomberg)	37
Table 4: Implied NACA spot rates on 2011 USD curve {own calculations}	38
Table 5: Implied forward rates for 2021 notes {own calculations}.....	40
Table 6: Determined annualised historical volatilities {own calculations}	41
Table 7: Calculated OAS at issue date {own calculations}	44
Table 8: Summary of hedging decisions made through utilisation of interest rate swaps	47
Table 9: Optional bond redemption terms	57

FIGURES

Figure 1: SAPPI NET DEBT DEVELOPMENT – USD MILLIONS (SAPPI, 2011, P. 8)	7
Figure 3: 1990 – 2015 SAPPI share price (ZARc) (Bloomberg)	8
Figure 4: SAPPI segmental assets – proportional {Operating segments note in AFS} (SAPPI).....	11
Figure 5: SAPPI segmental sales – proportional {Operating segments note in AFS} (SAPPI).....	11
Figure 6: SAPPI segmental profits - proportional {Operating segments note in AFS} (SAPPI).....	11
Figure 7: SAPPI segmental profits – USD {Information from Segmental note in annual financial statements} (SAPPI)	12
Figure 8: Annual Global High Yield Market New Issue Dollar Volume by Principal Amount (Reilly, et al., 2009)	16
Figure 9: Global corporate bond issuances 2007 – 2013 (The Economist, 2013).....	17
Figure 10: Historical high yield debt default rates (Altman & Kuehne, 2013)	20
Figure 11: SAPPI debt maturity profile as at March 2011 (SAPPI, 2011, p. 9)	30
Figure 12: 2018 note timeline.....	32
Figure 13: 2021 note timeline.....	32
Figure 14: 2017 note timeline.....	33
Figure 15: 2019 note timeline.....	33
Figure 16: Graphical comparison of Linear and Cubic Spline interpolation {own calculations}.....	39
Figure 17: Demonstration of Binomial tree notation	41
Figure 18: Graphical comparison of bootstrapped yield curves derived in chapter 4.4 {own Calculations}.....	45
Figure 19: Currency exposure before and after swapping of USD exposure (SAPPI, 2015)	48
Figure 20: Segmental asset and liability exposure as at 30 September 2012 (SAPPI, 2012)	48
Figure 21: Segmental sales and liability exposures as at 30 September 2012 (SAPPI, 2012).....	49
Figure 22: USD 6 month LIBOR movements (Bloomberg)	51
Figure 23: EUR/USD exchange rate movement 2012 - 2015 (Bloomberg).....	52

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

2018 notes	€ 250-million bonds issued in April 2011 at a coupon of 6.625% maturing in April 2018
2021 notes	\$ 350-million bonds issued in April 2011 at a coupon of 6.625% maturing in April 2021
2017 notes	\$ 400-million bonds issued in July 2012 at a coupon of 7.75% maturing in July 2017
2019 notes	\$ 350-million bonds issued in July 2012 at a coupon of 8.375% maturing in June 2019
ADS	American Depositary Share
ACT/360	Actual days over 360 days; day count convention
BDT model	Black, Derman and Toy (1990) model
BESA	Bond Exchange of South Africa
BMA	Bond Market Association
BUND	German government bond
EMU	European Monetary Union
Fallen angel	Original issue investment grade bonds that have been downgraded below investment grade
Junk bond	Higher risk instrument which has a credit rating lower than the investment grade of the respective rating agency
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
LBO	Leveraged buy-out
LIBOR	London interbank offered rate
NACA	Nominal annual interest rate compounded annually
NACM	Nominal annual interest rate compounded monthly
NYSE	New York Stock Exchange
OAS	Option-adjusted spread
SAPPI	SAPPI Limited
SOE	State-owned enterprise
S&P	Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC
US/USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
T-bill	United States government issue treasury bill
YTM	Yield-to-maturity
ZAR	South African Rand
ZARc	South African cents

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The evolution of the corporate bond market has led to the increase in prevalence of callable, convertible and redeemable bonds. Since the mid-1990's, the corporate bond markets have become an important source of financing in the private sector (Luengnaruemitchai & Ong, 2005). As corporate bond markets have developed, the markets have increased in depth, liquidity and market variety which has enabled market participants to utilise it for more financing and investing decisions as growth has occurred.

In addition, as the market has grown in volume of instruments and value of the total market, the emergence of high-yield junk bonds in the market has been observed. Junk bonds are higher risk instruments which have a credit rating lower than the investment grade of the respective rating agency. Historically, the junk bond market consisted primarily of investment grade bond issuances which had seen a deterioration in the credit rating of the issuer to below investment grade. As markets have developed, investors have developed an appetite for the issuance of junk bonds where the counterparties have a credit rating lower than investment grade. These bonds are issued at attractive higher yields or coupon spreads to compensate for the additional risk associated with the credit quality of the issuer, with the market comprising the aforementioned bond issuances referred to as the high yield bond market.

Another layer within the bond market is the emergence of corporate bond markets outside of the United States of America and the growth of these markets in recent history. This growth enables issuers and investors to assess the possibility of transacting on platforms outside of the US which may be more financially beneficial to them.

SAPPI Limited ("SAPPI") is a company that was established in South Africa in the 1930's and has grown into a global player in the paper and pulp industry, as well as the chemical cellulose industry. Financing decisions made in the growth phases of the company's life cycle in the 1990's left it with the need to re-finance debt obligations payable in the early 2010's.

In order to meet their re-financing obligations, SAPPI issued two bonds in April 2011 and two bonds in July 2012, through their wholly-owned Austrian subsidiary Sappi Papier Holding GmbH. Three of these issuances were in US Dollar with the fourth issuance being in Euro. Upon issuance, the obligations of two of the Dollar-denominated obligations were swapped for Euro exposure through the use of cross currency swaps.

For a South African-based company, the research question over why the bonds were issued in foreign currencies and markets requires further research into the nature and location of the company's global position. Particularly as South African bond issuer credit ratings are capped by the sovereign foreign rating ceiling of South Africa when issuing off-shore. Furthermore, the immediate swapping of US Dollar exposure to Euro exposure presents the question as to whether cheaper funding available was in the US debt market.

The focus of this study will be these four bond issuances, and the main research questions addressed in this study are:

- What financing options did SAPPI have in the selection of the most appropriate source of financing;
- what is the state of the South African bond market and what would the viability of utilising this market be for SAPPI;
- why did SAPPI issue the foreign bonds and what were the costs and benefits of doing so;
- what was the cost of issuance on the bonds for SAPPI in both US and European debt markets; and
- what are the retrospective effects of the hedging decisions taken by the management of SAPPI relating to the four bond issuances?

In answering these questions, we particularly focus on the financing decisions made by SAPPI and the respective costs of these decisions. In providing an understanding of the market conditions in which SAPPI was seeking financing, a brief history of both the global bonds market and SAPPI are provided. This context provides readers with a sufficient basis to understand any discursive elements encountered throughout this paper.

By way of a case study, we illustrate the cost that was incurred by SAPPI on the bonds issued through the calculation of an option-adjusted spread ("OAS") for each bond issue. Furthermore, we analyse the retrospective performance of the foreign exchange decisions made by SAPPI management through movements in global financial exchange rates. Through both qualitative and quantitative consideration, the following research questions are addressed:

- why is the use of an OAS methodology appropriate for the comparison of bond issuances;
- what was the OAS on issue date for each bond issuance;
- what were the comparative OASs on the bond issuances; and
- how has SAPPI benefitted or been penalised by hedging decisions made at the issue date of the bonds?

This study contributes to the South African bond market by demonstrating the costs that are incurred by South African entities when financing in foreign bond markets. It further provides a basis to measure these costs relative to each option through the introduction of an OAS methodology.

1.2. OBJECTIVES

The objective of the study is to explore the financing options available to SAPPI and assess the cost of issuance incurred by SAPPI by means of an OAS analysis. Retrospective analysis on the performance of SAPPI will also be performed to assess the viability of the foreign exchange decisions made.

1.3. OUTLINE

This study is set over seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction including background, problem statement, objectives and outline. Chapter 2 introduces SAPPI as the focal point of the case study and provides the context and required detail to follow the key decisions made within the text. Chapter 3 is a literature review, which provides a brief history of the global corporate bond market with a particular focus on the growth of the high yield debt market. This chapter also considers the historical default rates on debt instruments and the prevalence of callable bonds within corporate bond market. Finally, the chapter introduces the considerations for the use of an OAS analysis to value debt instruments and the use of interest rate swaps and natural hedges as risk management tools. Chapter 4 is a case study on the corporate bonds issued by SAPPI and an analysis of the cost of the financing selected. This section provides detailed guidance on the methodology applied in order to calculate an OAS on the issue date of all four instruments and comments on the findings thereof. Chapter 5 introduces the hedging decisions made by SAPPI subsequent to the issuance of the bonds and provides a retrospective assessment of the decisions made. Chapter 6 is a summarised update of SAPPI's financial performance subsequent for the period ended 30 September 2015. Finally, chapter 7 presents the overall conclusion and observations made within work performed and provides scope for future research.

2. SAPPI LIMITED

2.1. INTRODUCTION

SAPPI Limited (“SAPPI”) is a company listed in the Basic Materials, Forestry and Paper sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”). SAPPI was the second largest producer of both coated wood free paper and coated mechanical paper in the world in 2015 (SAPPI, 2015) with business operations in Europe, North America and Southern Africa and product sales in over 100 countries (SAPPI, n.d.). In 2015, the market capitalisation of SAPPI was approximately R35 billion (Bloomberg).

This chapter introduces SAPPI as the subject of the case study. The case study, predominantly in chapter 4, analyses the two bond issues made by SAPPI in 2011 and the further two bond issues made in 2012. Particular focus is given to the following research questions:

- what is a brief history of SAPPI Limited including its the growth and the strategic decisions made by the company’s governance;
- what are the historical financing mechanisms utilised by SAPPI;
- what performance have SAPPI equity shares provided to shareholders;
- what viable funding mechanisms did SAPPI have available to them in 2011 and 2012; and
- what is the geographical distribution of operational assets, sales and profits for the SAPPI group?

This chapter is laid out in a number of sections. The chapter begins with a brief history of SAPPI from its formation in the 1930’s up until the end of 2015. This is followed by discussions on the historical funding mechanisms utilised by SAPPI and the historical share price movement of SAPPI on the JSE. The next section discusses the financial position of SAPPI at the time re-financing was required in 2011 and 2012 and details the global operational exposure of SAPPI at this time. The chapter concludes with the outcome of the factors discussed and the potential reasoning for the financing mechanism of foreign denominated debt issuances being provided.

2.2. BACKGROUND TO THE SAPPI GROUP

SAPPI was founded and incorporated as ‘South African Pulp and Paper Industries Limited’ in South Africa in 1936 and construction of their first paper and pulp mill started in Springs in 1937 (SAPPI, n.d.). The company listed on the JSE in 1937 under the ticker SAP, which is still in use today, began to grow within the South African paper industry. The first years of existence saw the business continue to grow through the acquisition of strategic subsidiaries. Twenty five years after its incorporation, SAPPI produced its millionth ton of paper (SAPPI, n.d.), a sign of the growth the company had experienced.

The following twenty years saw the addition of a timber division and the production of its third millionth ton of paper indicating the exponential growth of the business. In 1973, the company was re-registered as 'SAPPI Limited' and the formation of separate operating divisions, namely paper and timber, within the company was finalised (SAPPI, n.d.). Growth through the acquisition of South African subsidiaries that provided synergistic benefits continued over the next fifteen years.

SAPPI's growth into the global marketplace, including Europe and United States, began in the late 1980's. SAPPI acquired five fine paper mills in the United Kingdom and established the headquarters of SAPPI Europe in 1990; followed by acquisitions of operating facilities in Germany in 1992 (SAPPI, n.d.).

Diversification from the paper industry was introduced into the business when SAPPI acquired Saiccor, the world's largest producer of chemical cellulose at the time. Furthermore, SAPPI was established as the largest global producer of coated fine paper when it acquired a 75% controlling stake in S.D. Warren, incorporated in the United States, in 1994. This acquisitive growth strategy demonstrated by SAPPI continued throughout the remainder of the twentieth century (SAPPI, n.d.).

SAPPI appeared to be moving from strength to strength and the turn of the century continued to deliver returns to investors. The growth strategy followed by management helped to raise earnings for most of the 2000's and the share price, as discussed in 2.4 below, demonstrated that with the highest historical share prices of SAPPI being observed during this period.

Market conditions declined following this high point and SAPPI began to struggle in an industry that was put under pressure by the global financial crisis of 2008. In addition to the initial pressures of the financial crisis, the paper and pulp industry struggled to recover going into 2009 and the early 2009 share price fell to levels last seen by investors in 1998. Dividend payments were halted in 2009, as cash flow constraints threatened the operational viability of the business (SAPPI, 2009).

The pressure experienced by SAPPI operationally, coupled with the decline in market share prices signified the need for a change in the business strategy followed by management. As such, a consolidation of global operations was started with a focus on long-term profitable growth established by the company (SAPPI, 2009). Non-core operations were disposed of and low-cost production methodologies were investigated and implemented throughout SAPPI's global operations. The implementation of the strategy reduced the production capacity of the company as high-cost unutilised operational capacity was eliminated. A focus was also placed on the sustainability of operations including the efficient use of water, wood, chemicals and energy (SAPPI, 2009).

The capital intensive nature of the paper and pulp industry, as well as the chemical cellulose industry, can be viewed in as both a blessing and a curse to SAPPI. In times of economic growth and industry profitability, the capital expenditure required acts as a barrier of entry to other market participants, but in times of economic uncertainty and industry pressure the reaction required to react to increasing input costs and high overheads in tough market conditions can be more strenuous and timely to implement. The difficult operating conditions within the industry continue to affect the business and the sustainability thereof and SAPPI's (2015) current strategy includes focusing on obtaining costs advantages, consolidating declining business segments, improving the business cash position and developing potential growth segments in the industry through moderate investments.

The shift in the strategy of the business indicates the pressures and changes that have been evident within the industry in more recent times. The tough operating conditions of the late 2000's were difficult to navigate and SAPPI (2009) indicated in the 2009 Annual Report that the year was the worst in the group's 73 year history. In addition to a difficult trading environment, the company was struggling to generate sufficient cash to service the debt obligations inherited from previously implemented acquisitive growth strategies.

2.3. HISTORICAL FUNDING MECHANISMS

The acquisitive growth strategy historically implemented by SAPPI included the use of long term debt funding mechanisms. These decisions involved issuing debt at unfavourable yields or spreads in markets in both South African and US markets. The other mechanism utilised for the specific purpose of financing a European acquisition was a rights offer, completed in 2009 (SAPPI, 2011). While these mechanisms were available and enabled the company to take advantage of growth opportunities, they reduced the operational flexibility of the company through an increase in finance costs and more onerous and sizeable debt obligations. The net debt position of SAPPI was in excess of USD 2 billion over the period from 2008 to 2011, demonstrated graphically in figure 1, indicating the sizeable value of debt obligations which SAPPI had.




FIGURE 1: SAPPI NET DEBT DEVELOPMENT – USD MILLIONS (SAPPI, 2011, P. 8)

The decisions that were made in the 1990's and early 2000's had repercussions for the business and weakened SAPPI's financial position, which was sufficiently poor for SAPPI to cut its dividend to nil as all funds were required to keep the business in operation. In a year indicated as its toughest in the company's operating history, 2009, SAPPI had to go the market to raise debt and re-finance existing debt obligations. This introduced a dilemma to SAPPI as it did not have the financial position to support favourable financing terms but needed the financing to service their debt obligations and remain solvent.

A total of USD 650 million payable in 2014 had been raised in the United States in 2009, with an additional USD 60 million raised in the South African bond markets to meet debt obligations of that period. Furthermore, the interest repayments associated with these issues significantly increased SAPPI's finance costs (SAPPI, 2009). Two years later, SAPPI's financial outlook continued to look bleak but the sheer need for funding eliminated any reservations that SAPPI had about approaching the market in 2011.

2.4. SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE

SAPPI has been listed on the JSE under the ticker SAP since 1937. Figure 2 provides the historical share price of SAPPI quoted in South African cents ("ZARc") from September 1990 until September 2015. The share price movements have, as would be expected, tracked the historical performance and market perception of SAPPI. Notable data points have been discussed below.



FIGURE 2: 1990 – 2015 SAPPI SHARE PRICE (ZAR) (BLOOMBERG)

The early 1990's share price demonstrates the success of the acquisitive growth strategy taken by SAPPI and, with a growth in global operations, SAPPI investor sentiment carried the share to prices in excess of R40 in 1995. The latter years within the twentieth century saw a mismatch between the performance of SAPPI and the share performance thereof. The decline in the 1998 share price was related to US American Depositary Shares ("ADSs") being issued on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and further shares being issued on the JSE (SAPPI, 1999). These share issues diluted the value of existing shares in issue and resulted in a decrease in the SAPPI's share price on the JSE. The ADSs were subsequently voluntarily delisted from the NYSE by SAPPI in 2013 due to the savings in costs and management time associated therewith (SAPPI, 2015).

The early 2000's share price supported the perceived growth observed in SAPPI's business, with the share price peaking in 2002 at R99.42. While there were cyclical movements in the industry over this time, the share price remained in the region of forty to sixty Rand per share until the global financial crisis of 2008. Following the financial crisis, and SAPPI's decision to cut all dividend payments (SAPPI, 2009), the share price plummeted below R20 per share. Following this decline, the share price continued to stay under pressure over the next two years as a result of market conditions and SAPPI's poor financial performance. Share prices of particular significance for this study were around the times of the four bond issuances. The share price in July 2011 was in the region of R30 per share, with this price declining to approximately R27 per share in July 2012.

The market was factoring in the upcoming debt obligations which were expected to be re-financed at expensive spreads into the share price and indicated that the re-financing of debt was not likely to be favourable to shareholders. In addition, SAPPI was still not paying any dividends and investors did not see the required returns given the share price.

The SAPPI share price indicated that a rights issue would not be able to raise sufficient capital for SAPPI through the equity market, either locally on the JSE or within foreign equity markets.

The share price has strengthened subsequent to the re-financing of SAPPI's debt and focal point of this study. A perceived improvement in the company's performance over the three years ending in 2015 is observed with the 2015 share price exceeding R60 per share for the first time in almost a decade.

2.5. FINANCIAL POSITION IN 2011 AND 2012

SAPPI's acquisitive growth strategy relied on the issuance of debt in combination with equity rights issues at favourable times in equity markets. The debt maturity profile, included in figure 10 of chapter 4.2, indicated SAPPI's need for financing to service both the upcoming debt obligations of approximately USD 2.5 billion over the next two years (SAPPI, 2011) and the operating cash requirement of the business. As SAPPI did not have sufficient cash on hand to furnish these obligations as they fell due, the possible mechanisms that SAPPI had available included issuing equity (either ordinary or preference), obtaining bank financing or issuing corporate debt.

The share price in 2011 and 2012, as discussed in 2.4., was under pressure and not at levels favourable to the issuance of equity as it would not be possible to raise funding from the historically low share prices. Hence, preference shares, ordinary shares or an equity rights issue were not financing mechanisms that SAPPI could utilise. Furthermore, the financial appeal to investors of debt issuances convertible to equity would be diminished by the equity price of the company at the time of issuance.

The SAPPI group had been assigned credit ratings of Ba3 and BB-, according to the Moody's and Standard & Poor's ("S&P") rating agencies respectively (SAPPI, 2015A). The secured debt of SAPPI had a higher rating than the group, with ratings of Ba2 and BB assigned by Moody's and S&P. The ratings on both the SAPPI group and the secured debt are below investment grade. There is no evidence available that a South African bank was approached for either a financing arrangement or syndicated loan.

The remaining mechanism which SAPPI could utilise was the issuance of debt instruments. The credit rating of the group indicates that the issuance of debt would include higher spreads as investors would require compensation for the risk inherent in an investment in a company such as SAPPI in its 2011 or 2012 financial position.

Alongside the consideration of whether or not to issue debt, SAPPI would need to consider the currency in which the issuances would be denominated.

Given the operational exposure to the US, Europe and South Africa, the three logical options would be US Dollar, Euro or South African Rand denominated debt. The South African corporate debt market, as discussed in further detail in 3.3, did not have the depth for a high-yield bond issuance below investment grade of the notional size that SAPPI would require. Furthermore, SAPPI had existing debt in issue in the South African market, reducing the market's potential appetite for a new SAPPI debt issuance denominated in South African Rand.

2.6. SAPPI'S GLOBAL OPERATIONAL EXPOSURE

Through the course of the acquisitive growth strategy of SAPPI, the company had grown from its inception as a South African company into a global entity with exposure to economies other than South Africa through foreign operations. Acquisitions of European and American operations had helped to diversify SAPPI to the extent where foreign operations exceed South African operations. SAPPI provides disclosure for three separate operating segments, namely North America, Europe and South Africa within its financial results. Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide segmental assets, sales and profits as proportions of the total figure within the SAPPI group results for the period from 2010 to 2015.

SAPPI's three operating divisions have remained consistent in size relative to each other over the past six years, with the sales of the North America, Europe and Southern Africa segments accounting for approximately 25%, 50% and 25% of total group sales in this time. The ratio of segment assets differs slightly, but the proportions between divisions have remained relatively constant over the preceding six years with Europe accounting for approximately 40% of SAPPI's segmental assets.

Segmental operating profits deviate from the trends observed in the asset bases and total sales. Operating profit margins of approximately 6% over the six year period in focus are notably low, and under these circumstances it is possible for operating profit behaviour to deviate from other trends within the business. Figure 6 includes an analysis of the segmental operating profits in US Dollar and provides further detail relating to year-on-year movements. The South African operating segment managed to perform better than the North American and European segments in a time of declining profitability, increasing the profits of the South African segment in relation to the other segments.




FIGURE 3: SAPPI SEGMENTAL ASSETS – PROPORTIONAL {OPERATING SEGMENTS NOTE IN AFS} (SAPPI)




FIGURE 4: SAPPI SEGMENTAL SALES – PROPORTIONAL {OPERATING SEGMENTS NOTE IN AFS} (SAPPI)




FIGURE 5: SAPPI SEGMENTAL PROFITS - PROPORTIONAL {OPERATING SEGMENTS NOTE IN AFS} (SAPPI)




FIGURE 6: SAPPI SEGMENTAL PROFITS – USD {INFORMATION FROM SEGMENTAL NOTE IN ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS} (SAPPI)

The operational figures included above provide the user with a brief understanding of the current geographical positioning of SAPPI’s global operations and enable us to better assess the company’s hedging of the bond issuances global exposure included in chapter 5.

2.7. OUTCOME

The funding mechanism of choice for SAPPI management was the issuance of four bonds, denominated in Euro and US Dollar, in 2011 and 2012, through their wholly-owned Austrian subsidiary Sappi Papier Holding GmbH. All four bond issuances in the two year period were completed at high coupon spreads to compensate investors for the aforementioned risks associated with SAPPI. These bonds are discussed in further detail in chapter 4. The motivation behind management’s decision to issue the bonds outside of South Africa would have been twofold. Firstly, while SAPPI did have South African corporate debt in issue, the South African high yield corporate debt market would not have the capacity or appetite for an issuance of the size SAPPI required. Secondly, the global operations of SAPPI indicate the need for financing that matches the global risk profile of the company.

The focus of this study will be these four bond issuances, and an investigation into the cost of these issues to SAPPI and the procedures they utilised to hedge out their resultant exposures. The details of the bonds are discussed in further detail in chapter 4, followed by a discussion of the foreign exchange hedging considerations in chapter 5.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a definition for a junk bond and provides a brief history of the global high yield corporate bond markets. As both the corporate bond market and the high yield bond market have their roots in the United States, the overview begins with the corporate bond market in the United States and then extends to the European and South African markets.

In the next section, we introduce the research performed by Altman on historical default rates within bond markets and demonstrate how these have fluctuated over time. We then explore academic literature of theoretical concepts applicable to this study; including the prevalence of callable bonds in debt markets, the valuation of bonds with call provisions, the use of interest rate swaps and the concept of a natural hedge which can be utilised to hedge risks to which a business is exposed.

We answer the following research questions in this chapter:

- what is the definition of a junk bond;
- with particular focus on the high yield corporate bond markets, how has the global bond market developed over time;
- what were the conditions in the global, US and European bond markets at the time of SAPPI's bond issuances;
- what was the state of the South African corporate bond market at the time of SAPPI's bond issuances;
- how do historical default rates relate to growth in bond markets;
- what is an appropriate methodology to value an instrument with an embedded call provision;
- would an option-adjusted spread methodology be appropriate for valuation and what practical assumptions would be needed for this methodology to be used;
- what is the definition of an interest rate swap; and
- what foreign operational hedging strategies can be utilised by multinational entities?

3.2. JUNK BOND DEFINITION

Fixed-income security yields are determined from the market's determination of three risks on a given issue: "(i) its sensitivity to changes in interest rates, (ii) its illiquidity, and (iii) its probability of default" (Altman, 1992, p. 78). These yields will increase as the investor's assessment of the three risks is heightened. Market risk assessments are assigned to instruments through the use of credit ratings.

These ratings are assigned by credit rating agencies with the three most commonly referred to being Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC ("S&P"), Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings Inc.

The need for standardised credit ratings stems from investor risk management requirements and an investment grade threshold provides a benchmark with which to compare investment securities. The threshold for investment grade is 'Baa' as rated by Moody's, or 'BBB-' as rated by S&P and Fitch. With particular reference to the liquidity and probability of default, the most risky debt securities will receive ratings below investment grade and are more commonly referred to as high yield or "junk" bonds (Altman, 1992).

Junk bonds are issued by three different types of debt issuers: "fallen angels" – which were originally investment grade bonds that have been downgraded as the company's financial status has declined; original issue junk bonds by corporate's without investment grade ratings; and junk bonds issued to finance large corporate restructurings (Altman, 1992).

3.3. A HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL HIGH YIELD BOND MARKET

The junk bond market had humble beginnings in the United States during the 1960's and 1970's, with the total junk bond market of the mid-1970's worth approximately \$7 billion (Altman, 1992) and consisting almost entirely of fallen angels. The market began to develop and expand in 1977, when original issue junk bonds of corporate entities with non-investment grade ratings (or no credit rating) were first issued in significant quantities (Taggart Jr., 1987).

The economic environment of the late 1970's and 1980's was suited to the emergence of the original issue junk bond market (The Economist, 2013). As investors' appetites for higher yield securities were growing, the number of non-investment grade medium-sized firms that were seeking means of stimulating growth was increasing. The high yield bond market provided non-investment grade firms access to funding that had the potential to be a cheaper alternative than historically utilised financial intermediaries (Taggart Jr., 1987).

The competitive pressures in the investment banking environment were reducing the profitability of investment grade bond underwriting, hence the large, previously untapped market of high yield bond issues had the potential to increase the margins and profitability in the bond sector of investment banking (Taggart Jr., 1987).

The junk bond market was of particular appeal to Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., who had a small share in the existing investment grade market but had successfully established their junk bond trading operations, under the supervision of Michael Milken (Taggart Jr., 1987). The grouping of a network of potential investors and the building of an infrastructure to speedily obtain capital for potential issues

enabled Drexel Burnham Lambert to create a liquid secondary high yield market and emerge as the market leading underwriter within the sector (Taggart Jr., 1987).

The improvement in the secondary market and increased number of firms considering funding in the high yield market contributed to a rise in the number of original issue junk bonds and, in 1978 10.8% of all public bond issues were straight junk bonds (Taggart Jr., 1987). Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert managed to grow their share of the market through the efficient operation of the established secondary market and their ability to buy or sell bonds and match the demands of their clients (The Economist, 2010). The liquidity that Milken managed to create in the junk bond market and the fact that Drexel Burnham Lambert issued over 60% of all US junk-bonds up until 1981 earned him the nickname of the 'junk bond king' (Meserve, 2012).

In the early 1980's, the number of junk bond issues continued to increase and the market continued to expand as it provided a new way for companies to access funding and both corporate issuers and investors experienced the benefit of the boom (Meserve, 2012)

Milken took the junk bond market further by using the junk bond market and his connections within the markets to finance leveraged buy-outs ("LBOs") and in doing so helped Drexel Burnham Lambert to become the leading investment bank in the US during 1986 (Meserve, 2012). While other investment banks began to retreat from the underwriting of new issues, Milken continued to underwrite new issues (The Economist, 2010). Corporate raiders now had the ability to raise large amounts of capital to fund takeover bids that were not possible before the prominence of the junk bond market (Epstein, 1987).

The growth in the market was substantial, with the junk bond market growing from approximately \$93 billion in June 1986 to over \$125 billion by April 1987 (Altman, 1987). The success of the LBOs that Milken was underwriting and the ease with which they were actioned led to the US government passing bills in 1986 and 1987 to implement anti-takeover legislation and protect American businesses from hostile takeovers and corporate raiders (Meserve, 2012).

The economic landscape began to transform in the late 1980's. While 1986 was a record-setting year for the high yield market, it was also a year where debt to the value of \$3 billion (approximately 3.9 percent of the total debt outstanding) was defaulted upon by the issuer (Altman, 1987). The increased regulation and resultant costs, along with rising interest rates and increased rates of default in the high yield bond market combined to drive down prices in the market (The Economist, 2010).

Michael Milken was indicted in 1989 on 89 charges, including insider trading, securities fraud and racketeering and pleaded guilty to 6 charges that primarily involved tax and securities fraud in 1990 and was sentenced to 10 years in prison (Meserve, 2012).

The culmination of these factors led to a decline in the high yield bond market with no significant new issues being entered into in 1990 (Yago, 2008). The next decade saw corporate entities approaching fixed income markets to re-finance existing debt and drive an increase in both high yield and investment grade markets (Yago & Trimbath, 2003). This trend continued until the turn of the century, where the bond market was affected by the global decline of financial markets (Yago & Trimbath, 2003). Difficulties in the telecommunications industry sparked a general downturn in the global economy and the high yield bond market struggled under these difficult market conditions (Yago, 2008). The decline experienced in global bond markets in the early 2000's was short-lived and an upturn in the market returned until the global economic recession of 2008.

An analysis of the volatility of the returns over the 30 year period, ending 2008, leads Reilly, et al. (2009) to observe that when there is stability in global markets, high yield bond market volatilities are likely to be more similar to those of their investment grade counterparts; however during times of political or economic uncertainty the volatility of high yield bonds increases by two to three times the volatility of investment grade bonds. Figure 7 below indicates fluctuations in new issue high yield debt over the time period from 1977 until 2008.




FIGURE 7: ANNUAL GLOBAL HIGH YIELD MARKET NEW ISSUE DOLLAR VOLUME BY PRINCIPAL AMOUNT (REILLY, ET AL., 2009)

The 2008 financial year was a year with markedly less global high yield bond issuances due to the global financial crisis, as depicted in figure 7 and further supported by data provided in figure 8. Following this decline, the global bond market started to grow again, as the reduction of banks' lending capacities and low equity markets led to entities approaching the bond market for corporate financing (The Economist, 2013). Figure 8 shows the issuance of new bonds from 2007 until 2013, with the issuance of high-yield bonds being depicted in dark blue.




FIGURE 8: GLOBAL CORPORATE BOND ISSUANCES 2007 – 2013 (THE ECONOMIST, 2013)

The economic climate since the crisis of 2008 has meant that interest rates within the global economy have fallen, making the high-yield bonds more appealing to investors (The Economist, 2013). In addition, the high yield bond market has broadened its global base and, in October 2013, was estimated to be worth approximately \$1.7 trillion and comprise almost half the value of all bonds in global markets (The Economist, 2013). In 1998, the United States (“US”) and Europe comprised 88% and 3% of the market, respectively; while in 2013, the US accounted for 57% and Europe for 27% (The Economist, 2013). These statistics demonstrate that the market is growing both in value and investment locale, but the large majority of the global bond market is still concentrated in the developed economies of the US and Europe.

The total value of debt outstanding in the US in June 2015 was valued at USD 38.4 trillion, while the value of debt outstanding in Europe totalled approximately USD 39 trillion (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). In comparison, the South African bond market comprised debt securities to the value USD 233 million, of which 200 million were domestic debt securities (Bank for International Settlements, 2015). This demonstrates the ground that the South African bond exchanges would need to make up to reach the levels in more established markets.

EUROPEAN BOND MARKET

The US corporate bond market, where the high-yield bond market was pioneered, has been an important source of funding for the US private sector (Luengnaruemitchai & Ong, 2005). In contrast, corporate bond markets in Canada, Japan and Europe have historically been insignificant when compared to other private sector funding sources (Luengnaruemitchai & Ong, 2005).

A major feature of European bond markets at the start of the 1990's was a segmentation of markets along national boundaries with secondary markets remaining largely domestically domiciled until the late 1990's (Pagano & von Thadden, 2004). The formation of the European Monetary Union ("EMU") and the 1999 introduction of the Euro helped to develop the European corporate bond market with Euro-area bond issuances more than doubling in 1999 (Pagano & von Thadden, 2004). As the European corporate bond market grew in size and liquidity, it became a more viable location for the issuance of high-yield debt.

Trends in the European high-yield market have mirrored those of the global market in more recent years. Following the decline experienced during the 2008 financial crisis, the market has continued to grow with issuances in the market exceeding €60 billion in 2015 (Millar, 2015). The largest European market in June 2015, with a value of debt outstanding of approximately USD 9.5 trillion, was the United Kingdom, followed by the largest Euro-denominated market of Germany with approximately USD 5 trillion outstanding (Bank for International Settlements, 2015).

SOUTH AFRICAN BOND MARKET

In the late 1980's Eskom, the South African state-owned enterprise ("SOE") that produces energy products, began to issue and make a market for their bond issues. Until this point, the South African corporate public debt market was virtually non-existent (Ojah & Pillay, 2009). However, following the success of Eskom, other South African SOEs, Transnet and Telkom, began to issue bonds and grow the South African bond market. The South African bond market was formalised in 1987 when the self-regulating Bond Market Association ("BMA") was formed (Ojah & Pillay, 2009).

Economic sanctions were imposed on South Africa in 1986 as the world reacted to apartheid in South Africa. The formation of the BMA coincided with the economic sanctions imposed on South Africa as it was a means by which the South African government could raise funding locally in lieu of sanctions (Heft & Staehelin-Witt, n.d.). The sanctions placed on South Africa as a result of apartheid prevented the South African bond market from being exposed to the growth in global markets in the early 1990's. Furthermore, it became an important source of funding for the South African government and related SOEs.

The funding source was of such importance to the South African government and SOEs that the sole corporate listing in the BMA era was a 1992 corporate bond that was issued by South African Breweries. The BMA obtained a formal exchange license in 1996 and the formation of the Bond Exchange of South Africa (“BESA”) was completed.

The first four years in the existence of BESA did not have any issuances of corporate bonds, but the first six years of the new millennium saw the issuance of 305 corporate bonds (Ojah & Pillay, 2009). While corporate bond issuances increased over this period, they still accounted for only 22 percent of the total nominal value of issuances over this period (Ojah & Pillay, 2009). In 2008, the corporate bond market accounted for approximately a third of the total South African bond market (Hassan, 2013). BESA became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”) in 2009 (Floor, 2013) and the JSE has made a concerted effort to improve governance and regulation of the exchange (JSE Limited, 2014).

The South African bond market caters primarily for the needs of the South African government, with approximately 79% of the market being government and parastatal debt (Standard Bank, 2013). The market is not diversified and does not contain the liquidity that investors are accustomed to in more developed global markets (Standard Bank, 2013), with the majority of the large investments coming from South African pension funds with legislated asset allocations including investment grade bonds. BESA’s market capitalisation was approximately ZAR 1 370 billion in 2014 (JSE Limited, 2014), which is small in comparison to the global bond markets, and the corporate debt is an even smaller component thereof. The South African junk bond market is an even smaller component of the market, with only 7 bonds listed on the exchange in 2013 defined as ‘junk bonds’ and a total of 10 high-yield debt instruments with a total value of ZAR 8.56 billion (Thomas, 2013A).

The first default event in the South African bond market occurred in August 2013, and involved First Tech Group's R925m First Strut bond (Thomas, 2013B). While there was no actual default of debt, First Strut applied for provisional liquidation in July 2013 after the death of the company’s chairman and subsequently on-sold the outstanding high yield debt (Bonorchis, 2013). The default event served to negatively influence market sentiment and the high yield market in South Africa experienced a decline through the remainder of 2013 (Bonorchis, 2013).

Consistent and sound budgetary practices within the South African economy have enabled the country to reach further into global bond markets (The World Bank, 2015). Therefore, while the South African market is notably smaller than other developed markets, it should begin to grow in line with trends historically observed in global bond markets while sustainable policies are maintained.

The current South African market exists but is comprised of unlisted bonds and issuers are price takers as there no auction mechanism by which to obtain favourable prices. Finally, South Africa companies have tended to prefer equity and bank financing to fund their operations. With higher funding costs and interest rates, companies would tend to obtain syndicated bank financing over issuing debt in a volatile market where they don't have access to an auction mechanism to lock in lower, more favourable spreads.

3.4. EDWARD ALTMAN, HISTORICAL DEFAULT RATES AND THE EFFECT ON THE HIGH YIELD DEBT MARKET

Altman (1987, p. 17) defines a corporate bond default as “either debt issues dropping to a D rating or involved in formal bankruptcy (whichever comes first).” Investors in high yield bonds should be aware of the short term default risk associated with these bonds. Hence, these bonds have lower credit ratings in the market. Furthermore, increased default rates are likely to adversely affect growth in the high yield bond market more so than investment grade instruments. High yield bond have equity-like features in volatile market conditions as the financial performance of their issuers is more likely to fluctuate than that of their investment grade counterparts (Altman, 1992).

The fluctuations expected through an understanding of the high yield market is confirmed by research performed by Altman & Kuehne (2013) whereby default rates increase in years where the markets are experiencing external pressure. Figure 9 below graphically depicts the fluctuations in historical default rates on US high yield debt as reported by Altman & Kuehne (2013, p. 276) {Refer to Appendix H for underlying data utilised to create figure 9}. The periods where increases in default rates are observed coincide with the periods, identified in 3.3, where the high yield debt market and global economy were under pressure.




FIGURE 9: HISTORICAL HIGH YIELD DEBT DEFAULT RATES (ALTMAN & KUEHNE, 2013)

The major spikes in default rates identified by Altman & Kuehne are linked to declines in new issue high yield bonds within the market. Figure 7 above graphically depicts the decline in new issues over the periods 1988 to 1990 and 2000 to 2002 coinciding with the first two spikes in the default rates of figure 9. Furthermore, the new high yield debt issues over the period 2008 to 2010 depicted in figure 8 are close to nil, corresponding with the third spike in figure 9.

3.5. INCREASE IN MARKET PREVALENCE OF THE CALLABLE BOND

Callable bonds are a form of fixed income security with a call provision that can be exercised at the option of the issuer. Upon exercising the call provision, the issuer would redeem the principal amount of the security through a payment to the holder of the security. The call provision would be exercised where market rates have declined and the issuer can re-finance the instrument at lower market-related rates. For example, if a callable bond issued with a call provision of R 100 on 'X' date is priced at R 105 in the market on 'X' date, the issuer would exercise their call provision and redeem the principal amount of the security at R 100.

Fabozzi (2005) intimates the market value of a callable bond would be lower than that of an identical fixed income security with no call provision due to the limited benefit to the holder where market rates decline. Furthermore, the uncertain cash flow pattern of the bond and uncertainty of future capital appreciate due to interest rate movements may lead to the issuance of callable bonds being unfavourable to investors (Fabozzi, 2005). Interest rate hedging is thought to be the primary reason for the inclusion of call provisions, with the intention of aligning the interests of bond and equity holders (Banko & Zhou, 2010).

The callable bond provisions included in new bond issuances declined in the decade of the 1990's, following a period of twenty years where these provisions were popular and common in most bond issuances, due to the availability of interest rate hedging derivatives that were now available to corporate issuers that were not available in the 1970's and 1980's (Banko & Zhou, 2010). Furthermore, investors do not like call provisions as the call is generally at par and the market value of the bond may shift with market rates and render the bond holder unable to exercise the call at par without making a loss on mark-to-market.

Callable bonds can exhibit negative convexity at certain price-yield combinations, which refers to the certain market conditions where a decrease in market yield will be combined with a decrease in the duration of the bond (Fabozzi, 2005). This may be unfavourable to market participants as it is difficult to hedge against these market movement. Following these market developments, Banko & Zou (2010) noted that the bonds that included call provisions were also more likely to be high yield debt issuances.

The inclusion of call provision in high yield debt instruments was empirically found by Banko & Zou (2010) to improve the combined situation of a relatively smaller issuer where information is not readily available to investors and incentivises investment by the issuer in future projects that are likely to generate returns. The alignment of shareholder and bondholder interests can be summarised through the findings made by Barnea, et al. (1980) whereby both the value of an embedded call provision and the price of a bond will decrease if default risk increases. As high yield bonds are more sensitive to market and economic condition changes, the alignment is more prominent on changes in high yield instrument default risk.

3.6. USING OPTION-ADJUSTED SPREAD ANALYSIS TO VALUE BONDS

The traditional method of valuing and pricing a fixed income instrument with no embedded options involves the calculation of a bonds yield-to-maturity (“YTM”) and comparison of the given bond to similar instruments in the market. This method of valuation assumes that all payments of interest and capital are made as scheduled and that these payments are re-invested at the same yield until the maturity date of the instrument.

This method is particularly useful in the valuation of an instrument that does not contain early redemption call or put provisions, nor any exotic terms as the instrument’s cash flows can be determined with a large degree of certainty.

The inclusion of provisions in an issued instrument introduces uncertainty to the prediction of future cash flows. The additional uncertainty that is introduced with a callable bond would relate to uncertain future movements in interest rates that would affect the issuer’s decision on whether or not to exercise the call provision. In order to perform a yield analysis on callable bonds, assumptions are required to address the uncertainty introduced by the call provision. Miller (2007) indicates that the implications of the assumptions made would have a significant effect on the value determined on a callable bond due to the number of coupon payments being directly related to the assumed redemption date specified and the price of the bond as at the date of valuation.

Market participants may take into account the shortfalls of the YTM approach by using a yield-to-call or yield-to-worst basis. In the yield-to-call approach, the investor would forecast the date at which the call provision would be exercised and calculate the YTM utilising the assumed date as the redemption date. The yield-to-worst approach involves the consideration of all potential outcomes and their respective yields and then selecting the redemption date which would result in the worst-case YTM for the investor.

The prediction of future redemption dates would be performed using market information available at the day of pricing to forecast the future interest rate environment. Hence, the inherent uncertainty of future interest rates is present in any YTM based approach utilised. Miller (2007) proposes that a better method that takes into account the inherent uncertainty of future market conditions and provides a means to measure returns relative to a riskless benchmark is that of option-adjusted spread (“OAS”) analysis.

The OAS methodology is briefly described by Kopprasch (1994) as the generation of a series of future interest rate paths, with equal probabilities, according to a strict set of constraints followed by the discounting of the future predicted cash flows of a security utilising the forecasted future interest rate paths and a spread in order to obtain the current market price. The spread utilised to obtain the instruments current market price is referred to as the option-adjusted spread. While the OAS determined is not the precise amount that is expected to be earned on the instrument, it does however provide a relative measure on which instruments with different maturity profiles and embedded options can be comparatively measured.

The generation of future interest rate paths is formulated through the development of a recombining binomial lattice tree from implied forward rates. The binomial model was first introduced by Cox, et al. (1979) as a simplified method to value options with a discrete set of nodes over which an instruments cash flow are determined. This methodology can be used to value a security from the developed binomial lattice tree, whereby the securities’ determined cash flows at each node on the lattice are discounted backwards along the tree (Pedersen, 2006). A fixed spread is added to all short rates at each node within the lattice and the spread that determines the current market price of the security is referred to as the OAS.

Some of the advantages that the OAS spread analysis has over conventional yield measures include taking into account factors not considered in conventional measures (including interest rate volatility and cash flow sensitivities), the ability to compute the measure for both assets and liabilities and, primarily, the ability to meaningfully compare the relative returns of different securities (Babbel & Zenios, 1992).

However, as with most financial models, there are limitations to the use of an OAS analysis. Perhaps the greatest limitation of the methodology is the dependency on the model utilised and the assumptions inherent in its construction (Kopprasch, 1994). Parties making use of OAS models keep their inputs closely guarded, thus limiting market consensus available to an investor without an understanding and/or access to the OAS model inputs (Babbel & Zenios, 1992).

Another pitfall of the methodology lies in the construction of the binomial lattice with equal probabilities (thus enabling it to recombine) leading to most numbers along the lattice being averaged in the model and casting a degree of uncertainty over the precise relation between the interest rate level and the OAS (Babbel & Zenios, 1992). Finally, there may be minor discrepancies through the addition of a fixed spread to a lognormal lattice (Babbel & Zenios, 1992).

OAS CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE

The construction of a binomial lattice for the determination of an OAS can involve a number of different methods and schools of academic thought. The academic process followed in this paper involves the use of the lognormal model as it allows for the use of a single volatility input in the construction of a binomial tree (Miller, 2007).

The methodology, technically referred to as a 'onefactor, arbitrage-free, binomial tree of lognormally distributed short rates' (Miller, 2007, p. 47), was developed by Fischer Black, Emmanuel Derman and William Toy (1990) and is commonly referred to as the Black Derman Toy ("BDT") model or the lognormal model (Fabozzi, 2005). The use of lognormal rates prevents negative rates and accounts for the expectation that rates will increase over time (Fabozzi, 2005).

The model is dependent on market data at discrete points in the future, as quoted at valuation date. Black, et al. (1990) demonstrate the need for implied spot rates at the nodes of the lattice in order to build the curve. This process utilised is referred to as the bootstrapping of interest rates to fit the term structure required, whereby the determined implied forward rates available in the market at the valuation date are utilised to construct a zero coupon curve as at the valuation date (Fabozzi, 2005).

The zero curve constructed could be a means of valuing an instrument where all coupons are discounted with the applicable zero coupon forward rate but this approach would create a simplifying assumption whereby current market rates remain unchanged over time. This assumption is avoided by BDT as the model treats the implied forward rates as outcomes of the binomial process and provides for future market uncertainty through the introduction of a volatility factor (Miller, 2007). The model produces a possible range of outcomes that could occur based on the volatility factor utilised therein. Hence, the volatility input can drastically influence the output interest rates and care needs to be taken in selecting an appropriate factor. The trade-off for a modeller is between the consistency of the volatility utilised and the accuracy thereof in the market (Miller, 2007).

The primary choice in the volatility factor is whether to use a historical or implied volatility, while the secondary choice is whether to use one rate throughout a binomial model's construction or to make adjustments at discrete points.

The historical volatility would be determined through an estimation of the historical yield movements in the market, while the implied volatility involves estimating the future yield movements based on currently observable interest rate derivative prices (Fabozzi, 2009).

$$X_t = \ln\left(\frac{y_t}{y_{t-1}}\right)$$

EQUATION 3.1: LOGNORMAL RETURNS ON MARKET YIELD

The historical volatility is easier to determine as it relies solely on market information that has occurred in the past but does not always provide a good indicator of future market conditions (Fabozzi, 2009). The most basic calculation of historical volatility includes the simplifying assumption that all yield returns (X_t) are lognormally distributed and determined in terms of equation 3.1 (Fabozzi, 2009).

One shortfall of this assumption would be that it assumes that proportional yield volatility remains constant and does not depend on time or yield level (Fabozzi, 2009). This assumption is referred to as the '*Constant Elasticity of Variance Model*' or '*Power Function Model*' within financial literature (Fabozzi, 2009). Fabozzi (2009) recommends the use of a moving average lognormal return to smooth the volatility present in daily trade data and recommends the number of daily observations utilised be specifically related to the situation at hand. Another possible solution, instead of moving average returns, suggested by Longerstacy & Zangari (1995) is to assume returns are distributed around a mean of zero simplifying the resultant equation for the determination of variance to equation 3.2 below. In other words, when scaling volatility to an annualised volatility the square root of time function is it assumed that returns are independently and identically distributed and that the underlying returns are normally distributed. Where moving average returns are utilised, variance would be determined relative to the mean of the sample population.

$$Variance = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{X_t^2}{T-1}$$

EQUATION 3.2: VARIANCE OF LOGNORMAL RETURNS WITH ASSUMED MEAN OF NIL (LONGERSTACY & ZANGARI, 1995)

The variance is converted to annualised volatility through the use of equation 3.3 below. This equation combines the conversion of the calculated variance to the standard deviation ($\sqrt{Variance}$) and the conversion of the determined standard deviation to an annualised figure depending on the number of annual data points in the data utilised ($\sqrt{Number\ of\ data\ points\ in\ year}$). For instance, an annualised volatility would be derived from monthly data through the multiplication of $\sqrt{12}$.

$$Annualised\ volatility = \sqrt{Variance} \times \sqrt{Number\ of\ data\ points\ in\ year}$$

EQUATION 3.3: CONVERSION OF VARIANCE TO ANNUALISED VOLATILITY (FABOZZI, 2009)

Calculation of an implied volatility is dependent on observable market prices on derivatives such as options on bond futures, swaptions, and interest rate caps and floors but follows the same construction process as detailed for historical volatility. Fabozzi (2009) notes that implied volatility results determined are dependent on the model applied and availability of market information. Hence, the determination of an implied volatility is generally more complex than its historical counterpart.

The volatility assumption, either historical or implied, can be kept constant throughout the construction of the binomial lattice or amended at discrete points at the discretion of the model builder. All rates at one discrete time period within the binomial lattice are related through the volatility assumption and, when combined by taking into account their probability of outcome, should equate to the implied forward rate at that time period.

Many market participants utilise the implied volatility of equity option prices as a proxy of volatility as they deem this to be superior to realised historical volatility observed. Furthermore, other market participants utilise a volatility term surface when valuing OAS spreads.

The rates that have been calculated, taking into account the volatility assumptions of the model, will form that binomial lattice. At this point, it is recommended that the model is calibrated, with the instruments utilised to bootstrap the zero curve, to ensure the constructed model is matched to current market conditions when pricing instruments (Fabozzi, 2005).

The final step in the OAS methodology involves using the BDT binomial model constructed to calculate an instrument price by discounting future cash flows at each node until the present value is determined. A fixed spread is added on to each node within the model until the current market value of the instrument is calculated by the model. The final fixed spread with which the market value is determined is referred to as the option-adjusted spread (Miller, 2007).

3.7. USING INTEREST RATE SWAPS

McNulty (1990) asserts that one of the most crucial financial innovations of the 1980s is the interest rate swap. The interest rate swap instrument is one of the most commonly used financial instruments in the current market as the variety of hedging strategies that it can be used for make it a popular hedging mechanism for many market participants (Henshall-Howard, 2011).

The interest rate swap agreement occurs between two parties who agree to exchange interest rate payments based on an underlying notional principal amount. The market for interest rate swaps is usually arranged by dealers who act as the principal and maintain a swap book (McNulty, 1990). The most common interest rate swap is the fixed for floating swap which involves the agreement of one party to pay interest based off a predetermined fixed rate while receiving interest based off a floating

rate over the same period. Other interest rate swaps could involve the agreement to pay interest in one currency while receiving interest in another, referred to as a cross-currency swap.

Cash flows between the two parties are settled net, with the party liable once interest amounts are offset making the payment. It will be contractually dependent as to whether or not parties exchange the principal amount at the inception and maturity of the contract. Valuation of the interest rate swap is performed through the forecasting of future payments and discounting these amounts back under market conditions and rates at a valuation date.

The initial fair value of the agreement would be nil as fixed rates or floating rate spreads are utilised to ensure the present value of all future cash flows is nil at issue date. Subsequent movements in market conditions will see a shift in the fair value of the interest rate swap. Should market rates increase, the fixed rate payer will benefit while the floating rate payer would experience an equal but opposite decrease in the fair value of the instrument.

The applicability of interest rate swaps to the corporate bond market is in the ability that it presents to investors and issuers to hedge out interest rate and cash flow risks. Should an issuer of a fixed rate coupon bond wish to exchange fixed payment obligations for a floating rate dependent on market conditions, an interest rate swap paying interest dependant on a floating interest rate and receiving fixed rate interest payments at the same rate as the bond issued could be utilised. The terms of the interest rate swap could be fully matched to the notional and date of payment of the bond issued to fully transfer the interest rate profile.

Furthermore, an issuer initially paying coupons in Currency A could elect to receive interest based off a Currency A notional and rate and then pay interest based off a Currency B notional and interest rate. By this process the issuer has swapped the obligations of Currency A for equivalent obligations in Currency B at the date at which the interest rate swap was entered into.

3.8. EXCHANGE RATE HEDGING

A significant risk for a multinational company would be the fluctuation in exchange rates to which it may be operationally exposed, and the mitigation thereof is an important aspect of the company's risk management procedures (Allayannis, et al., 2001). One manner in which the exchange rate risk of the company can be reduced is to finance operations in the currency of the operations which the funding is intended for (Boyabatli & Toktay, 2004). In doing so, movements in exchange rates would have the same effect on both the cash inflows and outflows in operational regions where this hedging approach is taken. This approach is a form of natural hedging which a global entity can utilise, whereby

exchange rate fluctuations effects on global results are reduced by the matching the location of funding to the location of operations (Makar, et al., 1999).

The proportion of sales in each region is one of the most common measures used in practice to determine a foreign exchange funding mix (Aabo, et al., 2011) due to being able to match liability cash outflows with the related cash inflows from third party sales. Shapiro (1975) shows that one of the major factors affecting the exchange rate risk of an entity is the sales within each domicile. Furthermore, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that the foreign sales of a multinational entity have historically been used as the primary decision metric of the balance of foreign debt to be issued to form a suitable natural hedge.

4. SAPPI DEBT ISSUANCE

4.1. INTRODUCTION

SAPPI issued four callable bonds in 2011 and 2012 to re-finance debt obligations. This chapter explores the bond issues made by SAPPI as a case study. Particular focus is given to the following research questions:

- what was the financial position of SAPPI at the time the bonds were issued;
- what are the terms of the callable bonds;
- what was the option-adjusted spread (“OAS”) on date of issue for each bond; and
- what observations are made on comparison of the determined OAS’s amongst the four issues?

This chapter is laid out in four sections. First, the financial position of SAPPI in 2011 is outlined to provide context to the company’s need for finance. We then detail the key terms and contractual provisions of the bonds issued, including dates of issuance, coupon rates, maturity dates, and a timeline of each bond’s call provisions and the dates at which these can be exercised. We then turn our focus to calculating an OAS for each bond issue through the construction of a recombining binomial tree and solving for the appropriate spread priced onto each bond at the date of issue.

Based on the results determined and an understanding of SAPPI, we then comment on the calculated spreads. The calculated OASs for each bond are analysed and compared across the four issuances, with specific comparisons made on the currency and timing of the bonds issued.

4.2. BACKGROUND OF BOND ISSUES

SAPPI’s financial position and pending financial obligations in 2011 and 2012 required the entity to issue debt in order to re-finance existing debt obligations and meet the operational cash flow requirements of the business. Chapter 2 provided an understanding of the growth of SAPPI’s business and we indicated that one of the consequences of the acquisitive growth model employed by the company and unfavourable global market movements left it with the repayment of debt obligations which could not met solely by operational cash flows.

The financing raised by SAPPI in 2009 payable in 2014, as referred to in chapter 2.3., did not provide a long term solution to the cash flow constraints and debt obligations of the business. The maturity profile of SAPPI in March 2011, included in Figure 10, indicated the need for approximately USD 1.5 billion to service their debt obligations payable within one year and a further USD 1 billion payable within two years.



FIGURE 10: SAPPI DEBT MATURITY PROFILE AS AT MARCH 2011 (SAPPI, 2011, p. 9)

SAPPI Limited did not have the cash on hand to fund these debt obligations as they fell due and, for reasons indicated in chapter 2, the decision to issue three US Dollar (“USD”) denominated bonds and one Euro denominated bond was taken. The first two callable bonds were issued in April 2011, one Euro and US Dollar, with a further two US Dollar tranches of callable bonds being issued fifteen months later, in July 2012.

The April 2011 issues comprised two notes: Euro-denominated bonds with an aggregate principal amount of € 250-million maturing in April 2018 with a semi-annual coupon rate of 6.625% (referred to as the “2018 notes”) and USD-denominated bonds with an aggregate principal amount of \$ 350-million maturing in 2021 with a semi-annual coupon rate of 6.625% (“2021 notes”).

The two secured notes issued as the second tranche in July 2012 were both USD-denominated bonds with the following key terms: bonds with an aggregate principal amount of \$ 400-million bonds maturing in July 2017 with a semi-annual coupon rate of 7.75% (“2017 notes”) and bonds with an aggregate principal amount of \$ 300-million maturing in June 2019 with a semi-annual coupon rate of 8.375% (“2019 notes”).

All four of the bonds are listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange and all four bonds have been structured similarly, making it a simple task to simultaneously analyse all four issuances and highlight any differences identified. Table 1 outlines the key terms of these issuances.

Issued	April 2011	April 2011	July 2012	July 2012
Maturity – Year	2018	2021	2017	2019
Maturity – Date	15 April 2018	15 April 2021	15 July 2017	15 June 2019
Aggregated Principal	€ 250-million	\$ 350-million	\$ 400-million	\$ 300-million
Coupon (p.a.)	6.625%	6.625%	7.75%	8.375%
Issue Price	100% of principal	100% of principal	100% of principal	100% of principal
Interest Payable (* first interest)	15 April; 15 October*	15 April; 15 October*	15 January*; 15 July	15 June; 15 December*

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF KEY BOND ISSUE TERMS (OWN CALCULATIONS)

The bond issuances are ranked as senior, secured instruments with a Moody's credit rating of Ba2 assigned to them. The rating of Ba2 is higher than the credit rating of SAPPI Limited, due to the secured, collateralised nature of the bonds issued (Moody's Investor Services, 2015). Therefore, these bond issuances were done with a rating below investment grade and the high coupons attached to the bonds indicate that the bonds were issued with high yields and would meet the definition of high-yield debt, or junk bonds.

4.3. CALLABLE BOND TERMS

All four issuances include specific call provisions with the specific terms thereof summarised below. All callable terms are subject to notice of 30 or 60 days.

Prior to a pre-specified date, the bonds can be redeemed at an aggregate of the par value, accrued interest and an applicable premium. The applicable premium is defined in the offering memorandum as the greater of:

- a) 1% of the principal amount of the relevant notes; or
- b) The excess of:
 - (i) The present value (using an applicable treasury yield to maturity plus 50 basis points as a discount factor) of the redemption price (per the table below) and all accrued interest; over
 - (ii) The principal amount of said note.

Note	2018 notes (issued 2011)	2021 notes (issued 2011)	2017 notes (issued 2012)	2019 notes (issued 2012)
Redemption price	103.313%	103.313%	100%	106.281%
Date at which first call option expires	15 April 2015	15 April 2016	15 April 2017	15 April 2017

TABLE 2: APPLICABLE BOND REDEMPTION PRICE (SAPPI BOND PROSPECTUS)

Following the expiry of the first call option, the specific call options of each bond differ due to issue and expiry dates, with explicit call prices. The timelines of each bond can be seen below, with the applicable redemption price starting on the dates per the specific timeline:

2018 BOND TIMELINE




FIGURE 11: 2018 NOTE TIMELINE

The timeline of the bond demonstrates the contractually stipulated dates between which the following redemption prices are applicable:

- Redemption price 1: 103.313%
- Redemption price 2: 101.656%
- Redemption price 3: 100.000%

KEY	
A	Issue date
B	Expiry of initial redemption terms
B - C	Redemption price 1
C - D	Redemption price 2
D - E	Redemption price 3
E	Bond maturity date

2021 BOND TIMELINE




FIGURE 12: 2021 NOTE TIMELINE

The timeline of the bond demonstrates the contractually stipulated dates between which the following redemption prices are applicable:

- Redemption price 1: 103.313%
- Redemption price 2: 102.208%
- Redemption price 3: 101.104%
- Redemption price 4: 100.000%

KEY	
A	Issue date
B	Expiry of initial redemption terms
B - C	Redemption price 1
C - D	Redemption price 2
D - E	Redemption price 3
E - F	Redemption price 4
F	Bond maturity date

2017 BOND TIMELINE




FIGURE 13: 2017 NOTE TIMELINE

The timeline of the bond demonstrates the contractually stipulated dates. After 15 April 2017, the bond can be called at its par value.

KEY	
A	Issue date
B	Expiry of initial redemption terms
B - C	Redemption at 100%
C	Bond maturity date

2019 BOND TIMELINE




FIGURE 14: 2019 NOTE TIMELINE

The timeline of the bond demonstrates the contractually stipulated dates between which the following redemption prices are applicable:

Redemption price 1:	106.281%
Redemption price 2:	104.188%
Redemption price 3:	102.094%
Redemption price 4:	100.000%

KEY	
A	Issue date
B	Expiry of initial redemption terms
B - C	Redemption price 1
C - D	Redemption price 2
D - E	Redemption price 3
E - F	Redemption price 4
F	Bond maturity date

FURTHER BOND TERMS

In addition to the call provisions and their applicable premiums highlighted above, further bond terms have been included in Appendix A.

4.4. OPTION-ADJUSTED SPREAD ON SAPPI CALLABLE BONDS

The analysis of the relative cost of financing that SAPPI obtained can be determined through an OAS analysis. While other methodologies can be utilised to determine a cost of financing, the consistent application of an OAS methodology will provide results which can be used for a comparison of relative costs of financing obtained by SAPPI. Refer to discussion in chapter 3.6 for applicability of the methodology utilised and further motivation into the decisions taken in the construction of the model.

METHODOLOGY

The OAS calculated for each bond will be determined relative to a benchmark yield curve approximating an appropriate risk free rate. The results and analysis of the OAS will vary depending on the model utilised in the analysis with the model utilised in this study referred to as the *lognormal model* or more technically as the “onefactor, arbitrage-free, binomial tree of lognormally distributed short rates” (Miller, 2007, p. 48).

In the following analysis, we must first develop an appropriate recombining binomial tree, also referred to as a binomial lattice, which incorporates the market interest rates at the date of determination and the expected volatility of these rates over the period of forecast. This model is first built from determined forward rates within the market and then calibrated to ensure that prices as determined by the model match those in the market.

The second step in the process is to value the callable bond off the binomial lattice developed, including all expected coupon payments and building in all dates at which the specific bond can have a call provision exercised. At the date where a call provision may be exercised and the projected value of the bond exceeds the value of the provision, the model needs to be programmed to select the callable value as the value for further discounting periods.

The final step incorporates a fixed spread into the binomial tree model used for discounting purposes. A goal-seek function within excel is utilised to determine the spread which, when added to the discount rate at each node of the binomial tree, produces the market value of the bond at the valuation date. The derived spread is referred to as the OAS, as it takes into account the call provisions within the bond terms.

Once the OAS has been calculated for each bond, it enables us to compare the spreads on each issue and consider the costs incurred by SAPPI on each bond issue.

CONSTRUCTION OF BINOMIAL LATTICE

The key inputs when developing the recombining binomial tree are the market risk-free interest rates at initiation date, the time duration of each step between nodes and the underlying volatility of the aforementioned rates. The market risk-free rates in the currency of issue will be used to determine the implied forward rate for each step, or node, in the binomial tree.

We have elected to construct a binomial tree with monthly nodes to incorporate market volatility. As such, the nodes of the binomial tree constructed will match the coupon dates for the bond which is being valued but will also include points in between each coupon date for further arithmetic accuracy.

There may be an argument for using a weekly frequency of nodes but given that this tree is being used for a long term period, this would add minor potential additional accuracy with a significant amount of additional computation required. Hence, we have deemed the monthly period to be appropriate.

All cash flows occur on the fifteenth of the month in this case, therefore the binomial tree for the 2021 notes will start on the issue date of 15 April 2011 and continue with nodes every month (on the fifteenth of each month) until the maturity of the bond, namely 15 April 2021.

The underlying volatility assumption utilised in the building of the binomial lattice incorporates the inherent uncertainty of interest rates into the analysis (Miller, 2007). The volatility utilised could be either the implied or historical volatility. As discussed in chapter 3.6, while both are appropriate, the historical volatility is utilised in this study due to the availability of information and the ability to apply volatility consistently at any date. Furthermore, while it may be appropriate to change volatility at a certain point within the model, this approach has not been taken to increase comparability between OASs calculated.

The methodology for each valuation date will be the same, with the inputs varying slightly in each model. We will model the 2021 notes issued in April 2011 as the primary issue for calculation purposes and then repeat the same process for the three other issues. While the 2018 notes issued in April 2011 match the coupon periods of the 2021 notes, the same lattice cannot be used for this bond as the 2018 notes were issued in Euros while the 2021 notes were issued in US Dollars. Conversely, the monthly nodes of the binomial tree enable the same binomial tree to be utilised for the 2017 and 2019 notes which were both issued in July 2012 in US Dollar with coupon periods of January/July and June/December, respectively. Market data from Bloomberg has been utilised in all calculations.

Binomial nodes

All four bond issues pay interest semi-annually, but monthly nodes provide further data points and increase the accuracy of the model. Hence, a monthly binomial tree will be utilised with a length of time period (Δt) of 0.833 years. Throughout this chapter, decimals are carried until final amounts are presented to maintain calculation integrity and coupon dates will be consistent with those summarised in earlier in this chapter.

Market risk-free rates

Consideration must be given to the appropriate data to be utilised for a risk-free rate. The US Treasuries Actives Curve comprising US treasury bills ("US T-bill") and government bonds provides a suitable basis for the US Dollar-backed securities due to the availability of instruments at discrete point and the liquidity of the instruments at the discrete points.

German government bonds (“BUNDs”) are an accepted benchmark, within the European market, for Euro-denominated fixed income products due to their liquidity in the secondary market and being a perceived safer investment product in times of financial crisis (Kempf, et al., 2012). Hence, the EUR German Sovereign Curve, comprising German government bills and BUNDs, is deemed to be an appropriate benchmark curve for the 2018 notes denominated in Euro.

The market risk-free rate data has been obtained from Bloomberg, as required for each respective note, and included in Appendix B. The quoted bond mid prices as at the required valuation dates have been provided in table 3. These prices will be utilised to determine the implied spot and forward rates in the market as at valuation date. In addition, these prices will be utilised to calibrate the binomial tree once constructed. A simplifying assumption made in this case is that all coupon and principal payments on underlying instruments will be made on the discrete ‘days’ as per table 3. US government bond coupons are paid semi-annually, in contrast to BUNDs which pay an annual coupon. At all times a day count convention of ACT/360 has been utilised.

US T-Bill mid prices as quoted by Bloomberg ($Q_{Bloomberg}$) have been converted to a valuation date price (P_{bill}) as determined by equation 4.1, where d represents days to maturity on a T-Bill with a face value (F_{bill}) of \$100. US government bond prices, which have been quoted by Bloomberg in US Dollars and 32nd fractions of Dollars, have been converted to decimal format in table 3.

$$P_{bill} = F_{bill} - \frac{(Q_{Bloomberg} \times d)}{360}$$

EQUATION 4.1: VALUATION DATE PRICE OF A US TREASURY BILL

	Days	2018 notes (Euro) [EUR German Sovereign Curve]		2021 notes (USD) [US Treasuries Actives Curve]		2017 & 2019 notes (USD) [US Treasuries Actives Curve]	
Date of valuation		15 April 2011		15 April 2011		15 July 2012	
		Instr.	Mid-Price	Instr.	Mid-Price	Instr.	Mid-Price
1 month	30	N/A	N/A	T-BILL 0	99.9975**	T-BILL 0	99.9956**
3 month	90	BUBILL 0	99.829	T-BILL 0	99.9843**	T-BILL 0	99.9792**
6 month	180	BUBILL 0	99.474	T-BILL 0	99.9432**	T-BILL 0	99.9304**
1 year	360	BKO 1	99.689	T-BILL 0	99.7795**	T-BILL 0	99.8381**
2 year	720	BKO 1.5	99.366	BND 0.75	100.1016*	BND 0.25	100.0195*
3 year	1 080	OBL 2.25	100.376	BND 1.25	100.1641*	BND 0.25	99.7383*
4 year	1 440	OBL 2.5	100.236	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
5 year	1 800	OBL 2.5	96.819	BND 2.25	100.6016*	BND 0.75	100.6289*
7 year	2 520	DBR 4	105.724	BND 2.875	100.4609*	BND 1	100.1641*
10 year	3 600	N/A	N/A	BND 3.625	101.7813*	BND 1.75	102.3828*

*Prices converted to decimal notation for consistency and rounded within table.

** Prices converted for consistency using Equation 4.1 and rounded within table.

TABLE 3: MARKET RISK-FREE MID-PRICES {DATA AMENDED AS INDICATED} (BLOOMBERG)

Bootstrapping of implied spot curve and implied forward rates

The instrument details in table 3 include the coupon rate on each of the underlying instruments. Where no coupon is paid and the sole cash flow on the instrument occurs at the maturity date, the implied spot rate (s_n) is determined by equation 4.2 utilising an annual compounding period. Inputs include the instruments face value (FV), current price (PV) and days till maturity (d).

$$s_n = \left(\frac{FV}{PV} \right)^{\frac{360}{d}} - 1$$

EQUATION 4.2: IMPLIED SPOT RATE ON ZERO COUPON INSTRUMENTS

Due to no coupons being paid on the underlying instruments making the data points up to one year on the 2011 US Treasuries curve, the implied spot rates for these points can be determined utilising equation 4.2. At the two year point and beyond, the underlying instruments include coupon payments that would be made at regular intervals over the life of the instrument. The implied spot rate at the maturity of the instrument must take into account the implied spot rates at each coupon payment date.

The process, commonly referred to as the bootstrapping of a curve, would involve solving for implied spot rate (s_n) utilising equation 4.3, the instrument-specific coupon payments (C) and the previously calculated spot rates at these points. Where an implied spot rate at a coupon date has not been determined, the cubic spline interpolation function is utilised to predict the rate at the date required. This predicted rate is then used for all further coupons at this date to ensure consistency in the determination of later implied spot rates that may utilise the same data point.

$$PV = \frac{C_1}{(1 + s_1)^{\frac{d_1}{360}}} + \frac{C_2}{(1 + s_2)^{\frac{d_2}{360}}} + \frac{C_3}{(1 + s_3)^{\frac{d_3}{360}}} + \dots + \frac{FV + C_n}{(1 + s_n)^{\frac{d_n}{360}}}$$

EQUATION 4.3: VALUATION DATE PRICE OF INSTRUMENT UTILISING IMPLIED SPOT RATES

Equation 4.3 would be re-arranged into equation 4.4 for the determination of the two year implied spot rate (s_2) of the 2011 US Dollar Curve. An implied spot rate of 0.703% is calculated from a face value of \$100, current price of \$100.1016 and semi-annual coupon of 0.375 on the two-year US government bond. The implied spot rate at $s_{1.5}$ was determined with cubic spline and previous implied spot data to be 0.328%.

$$s_2 = \left\{ \frac{FV + C_2}{PV - \frac{C_{0.5}}{(1 + s_{0.5})^{0.5}} - \frac{C_1}{(1 + s_1)^1} - \frac{C_{1.5}}{(1 + s_{1.5})^{1.5}}} \right\}^{\frac{360}{720}} - 1$$

EQUATION 4.4: IMPLIED SPOT RATE ON ZERO COUPON INSTRUMENTS

Following the same process for all data points on the 2011 US curve, the implied spot rates indicated in table 4 are determined with t in years and nominal annual interest rates compounded annually (“NACA”). Appendix C includes the implied spot rates determined for the 2011 Euro curve and 2012 USD curve.

t	s_n
0.083	0.030%
0.25	0.063%
0.5	0.114%
1	0.221%
2	0.703%
3	1.207%
5	2.179%
7	2.915%
10	3.609%

TABLE 4: IMPLIED NACA SPOT RATES ON 2011 USD CURVE {OWN CALCULATIONS}

The forward rates utilised in the construction of the binomial lattice are required to match the compounding frequency of the binomial lattice. Hence, the NACA rates in table 4 are converted into nominal annual interest rates compounded monthly (“NACM”) and interpolated. Cubic spline interpolation is the interpolation methodology utilised in this study as it provides interest rate projections outside the bounds of known data points. Another commonly utilised method is linear interpolation, however resulting spot rate differences between the two methods are minor. Figure 15 graphically compares the determined 2011 US Dollar zero curves off both, while Appendix D includes similar comparisons for the two additional zero curves.




FIGURE 15: GRAPHICAL COMPARISON OF LINEAR AND CUBIC SPLINE INTERPOLATION {OWN CALCULATIONS}

Once the implied spot market rates are obtained and interpolated, the spot rates at the discrete points required for the binomial lattice are selected. As a monthly lattice is to be constructed, monthly spot rates are selected and equation 4.5 is utilised to obtain implied forward rate (f), where n and t are both quoted in years.

$$f_n = 2 \left\{ \sqrt[2\Delta t]{\left(\frac{\left(1 + \frac{S_n}{2}\right)^{2n}}{\left(1 + \frac{S_{n-\Delta t}}{2}\right)^{2(n-\Delta t)}} \right) - 1} \right\}$$

EQUATION 4.5

t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd
0.08	0.029%	0.029%	2.08	0.745%	1.810%	4.08	1.733%	3.679%	6.08	2.583%	4.718%	8.08	3.157%	5.029%
0.17	0.046%	0.063%	2.17	0.788%	1.878%	4.17	1.773%	3.749%	6.17	2.612%	4.740%	8.17	3.176%	5.039%
0.25	0.063%	0.098%	2.25	0.831%	1.947%	4.25	1.813%	3.817%	6.25	2.641%	4.761%	8.25	3.195%	5.050%
0.33	0.080%	0.132%	2.33	0.873%	2.016%	4.33	1.853%	3.883%	6.33	2.669%	4.781%	8.33	3.214%	5.062%
0.42	0.097%	0.165%	2.42	0.915%	2.085%	4.42	1.892%	3.946%	6.42	2.696%	4.800%	8.42	3.232%	5.074%
0.50	0.114%	0.195%	2.50	0.957%	2.156%	4.50	1.932%	4.007%	6.50	2.724%	4.818%	8.50	3.250%	5.086%
0.58	0.129%	0.222%	2.58	0.998%	2.228%	4.58	1.970%	4.065%	6.58	2.750%	4.835%	8.58	3.268%	5.099%
0.67	0.144%	0.251%	2.67	1.038%	2.302%	4.67	2.009%	4.120%	6.67	2.777%	4.850%	8.67	3.286%	5.113%
0.75	0.160%	0.288%	2.75	1.079%	2.378%	4.75	2.047%	4.172%	6.75	2.802%	4.865%	8.75	3.304%	5.127%
0.83	0.178%	0.335%	2.83	1.119%	2.456%	4.83	2.084%	4.222%	6.83	2.828%	4.878%	8.83	3.321%	5.142%
0.92	0.198%	0.396%	2.92	1.160%	2.537%	4.92	2.121%	4.268%	6.92	2.852%	4.890%	8.92	3.338%	5.158%
1.00	0.221%	0.476%	3.00	1.200%	2.622%	5.00	2.158%	4.310%	7.00	2.877%	4.902%	9.00	3.355%	5.175%
1.08	0.248%	0.573%	3.08	1.241%	2.709%	5.08	2.193%	4.350%	7.08	2.901%	4.912%	9.08	3.372%	5.192%
1.17	0.279%	0.680%	3.17	1.282%	2.796%	5.17	2.229%	4.388%	7.17	2.924%	4.922%	9.17	3.389%	5.211%
1.25	0.313%	0.791%	3.25	1.323%	2.882%	5.25	2.264%	4.425%	7.25	2.947%	4.932%	9.25	3.405%	5.230%
1.33	0.350%	0.906%	3.33	1.364%	2.968%	5.33	2.298%	4.460%	7.33	2.970%	4.942%	9.33	3.422%	5.251%
1.42	0.389%	1.022%	3.42	1.405%	3.052%	5.42	2.332%	4.494%	7.42	2.992%	4.951%	9.42	3.438%	5.273%
1.50	0.431%	1.138%	3.50	1.446%	3.136%	5.50	2.365%	4.526%	7.50	3.014%	4.961%	9.50	3.454%	5.295%
1.58	0.474%	1.252%	3.58	1.488%	3.218%	5.58	2.398%	4.557%	7.58	3.035%	4.970%	9.58	3.471%	5.319%
1.67	0.519%	1.363%	3.67	1.529%	3.299%	5.67	2.430%	4.587%	7.67	3.057%	4.979%	9.67	3.487%	5.344%
1.75	0.564%	1.469%	3.75	1.570%	3.378%	5.75	2.461%	4.616%	7.75	3.077%	4.989%	9.75	3.503%	5.371%
1.83	0.610%	1.568%	3.83	1.611%	3.456%	5.83	2.493%	4.643%	7.83	3.098%	4.999%	9.83	3.519%	5.398%
1.92	0.655%	1.659%	3.92	1.652%	3.532%	5.92	2.523%	4.669%	7.92	3.118%	5.008%	9.92	3.535%	5.428%
2.00	0.700%	1.739%	4.00	1.692%	3.607%	6.00	2.553%	4.694%	8.00	3.138%	5.018%	10.00	3.551%	5.458%

TABLE 5: IMPLIED FORWARD RATES FOR 2021 NOTES {OWN CALCULATIONS}

The NACM implied forward rates for the 2021 are included in table 6 alongside the NACM implied spot rates. Appendix E includes the NACM forward and spot for both the 2011 Euro and 2012 USD curves.

Historical volatility

The volatility utilised in each lattice has been calculated from historical market yield information available for the ten year USD government bond and ten year German government bonds (Investing.com, 2016). We have elected to use daily data off the respective ten year US and German government bonds, with the derived lognormal returns adjusted for a moving average of 21 days to approximate one month (260 trading days in a year) and match the construction period of the binomial lattice. Historical moving averages were determined for a full calendar year preceding the valuation date and, due to moving averages being utilised, Longerstacy & Zangari's (1995) recommendation for a mean of zero when calculating variance has not been applied within this case.

We have calculated an annualised volatility in terms of the methodology outlined in equation 3.3 of chapter 3 for use in the three binomial constructions and summarised in table 6. Figures were annualised on the assumption of 260 trading days in a year. Refer to Appendix F for the full data sets of market information and the respective moving average and annualised volatility calculations.

Valuation date	Currency	Annualised volatility
15 April 2011	USD	7.0349%
15 April 2011	EUR	6.6493%
15 July 2012	USD	8.7615%

TABLE 6: DETERMINED ANNUALISED HISTORICAL VOLATILITIES {OWN CALCULATIONS}

Notation

The notation utilised in this case for the interest rate and probability at each node follows the form $R_{t,j}$ and $p_{t,j}$ respectively, where t is the time period from inception date in years and j is the number of the node from top to bottom. Refer to figure 16 for a demonstration of the notation used throughout this study for co-ordinates within the binomial tree.




FIGURE 16: DEMONSTRATION OF BINOMIAL TREE NOTATION

Construction

The methodology applied to the construction of the binomial lattice involved starting at the front end of the tree ($R_{1,1}$) and continuing to build the tree to the final node required for each instrument. The final node required will be one period (Δt) before the maturity date of the instrument as this rate is utilised to discount the final cash flows.

The first node in the lattice, in this case $R_{0,08,1}$, is available in the market on the valuation date as the quoted spot rate. For the 2011 USD curve, this value will be 0.0286%. Following the first node, each node at the same time (t) will have a relationship with the node above or below it, as applicable for the particular node, determined by the assumed volatility ($V(r)$) and length of each step in the model (Δt). We note that the volatility utilised in the construction of each model, detailed in table 6, have been kept constant to ensure comparability between the OAS's calculated. Equation 4.6 quantifies the lower node's rate relative to the node above it, with a re-arranging on the terms allowing for the determination of the upper node.

$$R_{t,i+1} = R_{t,i} \times e^{2 \times V(R) \times \sqrt{\Delta t}}$$

EQUATION 4.6

The implied forward rate for each time (t) calculated from market rates and the probability of each node are utilised to calculate the forecasted interest rate at each node using equation 4.5. Substituting the expression from equation 4.6 into equation 4.7, the interest rate at node $R_{t,1}$ is calculated. Following the determination of $R_{t,1}$, equation 4.6 is utilised to calculate all applicable nodes.

$$f_n = \sum_{i=1}^j \{ (p_{t,i} \times R_{t,i}) + (p_{t,i+1} \times R_{t,i+1}) + (p_{t,i+2} \times R_{t,i+2}) + \dots + (p_{t,j} \times R_{t,j}) \}$$

EQUATION 4.7

A practical demonstration of this construction can be done using the nodes $R_{0.17,1}$ and $R_{0.17,2}$ for the 2011 USD binomial tree, where there are two outcomes and each will have an equal probability of 0.5. The substitution of equation 4.6 into equation 4.7 enables us to derive equation 4.8. With an implied forward rate of 0.0627% and an assumed volatility of 7.0349%, this would lead to a values of 0.0614% at $R_{0.17,1}$ and 0.0639% at $R_{0.17,2}$.

$$R_{0.17,1} = \{p_{0.17,1}\} + \left\{ \frac{f_1}{p_{0.17,2} \times e^{2 \times V(R) \times \sqrt{\Delta t}}} \right\}$$

EQUATION 4.8

The number of nodes at each leg in the binomial lattice increases by one, increasing the number rates to be determined and the number of times that Equation 4.6 is substituted into Equation 4.7. This process is continued until the final nodes required are determined, which in the case of the 2011 USD lattice will be as at 15 March 2021 ($t=10$). The pre-calibration lattices for all three models have been included in Appendix G.

Valuation using the binomial lattice

The binomial lattice incorporates the probabilities of each node in the rate determined and, as such, the value of an instrument would be the present value of the applicable discount rates for each node. The price of the instrument ($P_{t,j}$) is determined with equation 4.9, where m is the number of compounding periods per year.

$$P_{t,j} = \frac{(P_{t+1,j} + P_{t+1,j+1})}{2 \times \left(1 + \frac{R_{t,j}}{m}\right)}$$

EQUATION 4.9

Equation 4.9 would be utilised from the right hand side of the binomial tree with cash flows incorporated until the outcome of $P_{0,1}$ is derived.

Calibration

The usage of the binomial tree is dependent on the model being able to accurately price instruments in line with their market-based prices. Instrument which were used to derive the implied forward rates are also used for model calibration, starting with the most near dated maturity. The calibration of the models involves the solving for the correct rate at $R_{t,1}$, with other nodes in that tree leg determined with equation 4.6, that would allow the binomial lattice created to produce the market value of the instrument on valuation date. Calibration of each binomial tree is performed at the discrete points utilised to determine the implied spot rates for each curve, as detailed in table 4.

The GRG Nonlinear solver function within excel can be used to set the implied forward rate for each node to a value which would determine the market mid-price for each underlying instrument. Refer to Appendix H for all three post-calibration binomial lattices determined.

DETERMINATION OF OAS

The determination of the OAS involves further use of the now-calibrated binomial tree in three steps. First, the instrument is loaded as a bullet bond, assuming that there are no call provisions included within the instrument and one final return of the par value at the maturity date. The valuation of the bullet bond is programmed off the binomial lattice in terms of equation 4.9 but will not produce the market price of the instrument as the spread related to the risk of the investment has not been taken into account.

Secondly, the call provisions of the instrument are incorporated into the model. Where the value of the present value of future cash flows exceeds the value of a call provision exercisable at a specific node, the valuation model will be programmed to select the value of the call provision and continue to discount this value along the binomial tree until $P_{0,1}$ is derived. Call provisions outlined in chapter 4.3 have been included in the valuation of all four bond issuances.

The third and final step involves adding a fixed spread to the discount rates used at each node within the binomial lattice. Since a constant spread is added to all data points within the lattice, equation 4.10 can be utilised for the valuation of bonds incorporating said fixed spread.

$$P_{t,j} = \frac{(P_{t+1,j} + P_{t+1,j+1})}{2 \times \left(1 + \frac{R_{t,j} + spread}{m}\right)}$$

EQUATION 4.10

The GRG Nonlinear solving method within excel is utilised to determine the constant spread adjustment that would be made within the model to generate the bond issue price. As all bonds were issued at 100% of the principal amount, a par value of 100 currency units was utilised for both the notional value and issue price of the all issuances. Furthermore, models were confirmed to accurately account for call provisions as outlined in chapter 4.3. The determined fixed spread is referred to as the OAS, with table 7 listing the four OAS's calculated on the respective issuances. Refer to Appendix I for all four bond valuation models utilised to determine the OAS.

	2021 notes (USD)	2018 notes (EUR)	2017 Notes (USD)	2019 Notes (USD)
<i>Option-adjusted spread</i>	329.33 basis pts	355.49 basis pts	704.48 basis pts	749.62 basis pts

TABLE 7: CALCULATED OAS AT ISSUE DATE {OWN CALCULATIONS}

4.5. RESULTS

This chapter, by means of a case study, has taken the reader through the thought process SAPPI management would have followed in deciding what mechanism to utilise when re-financing debt obligations in 2011 and 2012. As the South African corporate debt market did not have the depth required for an issuance of the size SAPPI required, the sole viable financing option remaining was to issue corporate debt denominated in Euro or USD.

The global exposure of SAPPI to both Euro and US Dollar through the European and North American business segments, respectively, afforded the opportunity for SAPPI to approach these debt markets for funding. Through the methodology applied in this study on the 2018 and 2021 notes issued in April 2011, it can be observed that the OAS in the US market was lower than the comparable spread in the European market. Given the longer time to maturity on the 2021 notes, the disparity may be even greater than the 25 basis points that appears on an initial observation.

The relatively cheaper source of financing in the US identified in this study on the 2011 issuances could have been a contributor to the decision made by SAPPI management to domicile both 2012 issuances in USD. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 5, the USD obligations were immediately swapped to Euro exposures by SAPPI, supporting the notion that it was more affordable to raise debt in the US high yield market and enter into an interest rate swap to obtain Euro exposure than it would be to raise debt primarily in the European high yield market.

The second significant observation in 4.4 relates to the calculated OASs on the 2012 issuances being notably higher than the OASs determined on the 2011 issuances. The reasoning could be due to SAPPI's financial position being weaker in 2012 than 2011 but also could be indicative of shifts in the market conditions in 2012.

SAPPI's financial performance in 2011 and 2012 saw year-on-year growth in profits (SAPPI, 2012) and the likelihood of such an unfavourable shift in the company position is not clearly noticeable within financial information available. Hence, more viable reasons for the unfavourable OASs in 2012 need to be investigated.

The higher OAS on the 2012 issues may be due to less successful negotiation of financing terms by SAPPI management or a failure of SAPPI management to update financial decision-making tools for shifts within the market in the fifteen months since the 2011 issuances.




FIGURE 17: GRAPHICAL COMPARISON OF BOOTSTRAPPED YIELD CURVES DERIVED IN CHAPTER 4.4 {OWN CALCULATIONS}

Figure 17 graphically depicts how the USD 2012 zero curve derived within this chapter is almost a full two percent below the comparable USD curve fifteen months earlier at almost all data points. However, the coupons on the 2017 and 2019 notes (7.75% and 8.375% respectively) are more than one percent higher than both 2011 issues. The shift in the underlying risk free rate would increase the OAS by approximately 200 basis points, which still leaves a remaining 200 basis points unexplained.

The yields in the European market, included as part of the risk free data in Appendix A, have also observably declined in the fifteen month period from April 2011 until July 2012. The decrease in rates within the European bond market may also indicate that SAPPI could potentially have obtained funding at lower spreads in the European high yield corporate bond market. While this would have to be investigated in further detail, this may also indicate that SAPPI had incurred unnecessary costs on the sourcing of funding in USD and subsequent swapping to Euro, when it could have gone directly to European markets.

5. SAPPI HEDGING OF BOND ISSUANCE GLOBAL EXPOSURES

5.1. INTRODUCTION

The acquisitive growth of SAPPI led to the company being one of the largest in the global paper and pulp industry, as well as the chemical cellulose industry, with operating segments in South Africa, Europe and North America. While three bond issues were at fixed coupons in US Dollar and an additional bond issue in Euro with a fixed coupon, the management of SAPPI hedged these initial exposures with interest rate swaps. Two of the US Dollar issues were swapped to Euro with the remaining USD Dollar fixed exposure swapped to floating interest rate exposure.

SAPPI utilised swap contracts to hedge the coupon exposure of three of the bonds issued. This chapter continues to explore the bond issues as a case study with a particular focus on the hedging strategies employed and the following research questions:

- what was management's potential reasoning for the hedging decisions made;
- did the hedging decisions made align financing obligations and the assets which they were financing; and
- what were the retrospective effects of the hedging decisions up until 30 September 2015?

5.2. SAPPI MANAGEMENT'S POTENTIAL REASONING FOR HEDGING DECISIONS MADE

SAPPI management made the decision to hedge some of the risks attached to notes issued in 2011 and 2012. In April 2011, upon issuance of the 2021 notes, the fixed US Dollar payments were swapped for 6 month US Dollar LIBOR payments to match bond repayments for the duration of the bond's life. From an economic perspective, SAPPI introduced exposure to a variability in US exchange rate through this hedge and in order to benefit from this hedging decision would want US interest rates to remain low. Hence, management's potential justification for this decision could be linked to an expectation that US interest rates are to remain lower than currently priced into market rates.

The 2017 and 2019 notes future obligations were both swapped, in July 2012, from US Dollar exposure to fixed Euro payments at 7.56% and 8.33% respectively. Economically, this shifted the underlying exposure of the financing from the US to Europe.

Chapter 4 of this case calculated the OAS on the US Dollar denominated debt issued in 2011 to be lower than the OAS determined on Euro denominated debt issued in 2011, thereby indicating the possibility that SAPPI was able to raise funding at comparatively lower spreads and costs in US Dollar.

Therefore, while SAPPI would prefer Euro denominated funding, this observation would justify the decision to made by SAPPI obtain funding in US Dollar and immediately swap the future obligations to Euro to produce a more cost-effective natural hedge.

A brief summary of the hedging decisions made can be seen in table 8. The most likely motivation that SAPPI management would have for the described hedging decisions being made subsequent to the debt issuances would relate to the global operational exposure of SAPPI and an attempt to align the currency exposures of operational assets and financing liabilities. These decisions would follow the risk management approach of introducing a natural hedge to reduce the foreign exchange risk of the business, as discussed in 3.8.

Issued	2018 notes	2021 notes	2017 notes	2019 notes
Base Currency	€ 250-million	\$ 350-million	\$ 400-million	\$ 300-million
Swap fixed to floating?		YES (floating 6m LIBOR USD)		
Swap USD to EUR?			YES (fixed EUR at 7.56%)	YES (fixed EUR at 8.33%)
Final exposure	Fixed EUR	Floating USD	Fixed EUR	Fixed EUR

TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF HEDGING DECISIONS MADE THROUGH UTILISATION OF INTEREST RATE SWAPS

We will assess the subsequent economic viability of the two hedging options taken by SAPPI in 5.4 below with the proviso that economic movements within the operating regions are likely to be the driver of the exchange rates and interest rates. While the presence of a natural hedge may be easily observable, the measurement of the effectiveness thereof is more difficult to quantify due to the vast number of factors that may affect both segmental performance and the fair value of amounts payable. Hence, the assessment of the hedging decision will relate more closely to the fluctuations in global markets and their effects on SAPPI’s financial performance and not be extrapolated into an isolated assessment of the business’s operational performance.

5.3. MATCHING OF SAPPI OPERATIONAL ASSETS AND FINANCING OBLIGATIONS

SAPPI provides disclosure for three separate operating segments, namely North America, Europe and South Africa. The global exposure of SAPPI has been introduced in chapter 2.6, with the proportion of operational assets in each region remaining relatively stable over the period from 2010 to 2015.

The operational figures provide us with the data necessary to assess whether the operational assets in each division are matched to financial obligations across the SAPPI group. As can be seen in the

figure 18 below, before taking into account the debt that was swapped into Euro the majority of SAPPi's exposure to interest-bearing debt is in US Dollar.




FIGURE 18: CURRENCY EXPOSURE BEFORE AND AFTER SWAPPING OF USD EXPOSURE (SAPPI, 2015)

The currency exposure before the swapping of rates is disproportionate to the underlying assets of the business segments but figure 19 depicts how, immediately after the swapping of the USD exposure to Euro, the 2012 foreign currency funding exposure is more aligned to the underlying assets. The South African Rand (“ZAR”) liability exposure is disproportional to the South African segment as the debt market, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, is not a suitable corporate bond market for SAPPi to raise significantly more funding than the debt already in issue.




FIGURE 19: SEGMENTAL ASSET AND LIABILITY EXPOSURE AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 2012 (SAPPI, 2012)

These switches indicate that the exposure that SAPPI desired was to European markets, as the majority of their business operations are in the European operating segment. Due to the variation in division splits when utilising different measures like sales and segment assets, SAPPI had to decide on the basis on which to assess the proportions of debt exposure to the Dollar, Euro and South African Rand. Figure 20 demonstrates how the funding exposure of US Dollar and Euro closely matches the sales of the North American and European segment after the swap to Euro has been made.




FIGURE 20: SEGMENTAL SALES AND LIABILITY EXPOSURES AS AT 30 SEPTEMBER 2012 (SAPPI, 2012)

The effort which SAPPI management appears to have taken to match funding liabilities to the segmental sales exposure of the respective segments indicates the strong possibility that SAPPI management were looking to make use of a natural hedge in global operations. The main drivers of the exchange and interest rates within an economy are likely to be related to the financial performance of an entity within that economy. Therefore, movements in underlying market conditions are likely to affect the performance of SAPPI within that segment in addition to affecting the market rates that would affect the fair value of the debt obligations SAPPI has within that segment.

The motivation behind SAPPI wanting to match their interest-bearing liabilities' currency exposure with their operational exposure is based on theoretical concepts discussed in chapter 3.8. The finding that companies have historically been able to hedge their foreign exposure to reduce exchange rate volatilities supports the decisions that SAPPI made with the multiple domiciles of their debt financing.

Regardless of the measure on which the currency exposure decision was made, it is observable that the Rand currency exposure is lower than the respective Southern Africa divisional size. The decision not to utilise further South African debt funding is presumably due to the systemic conditions of the South African market discussed in this paper.

5.4. RETROSPECTIVE EFFECTS OF HEDGING DECISIONS MADE

SAPPI made two explicit hedging decisions; to exchange fixed USD exposure for floating USD exposure and to swap the remaining USD exposure to Euro exposure. While these decision could have been made for speculation or hedging purposes, we will assess the retrospective effects under the assumption that management had made the decisions for the purpose of hedging foreign exposure. This assumption is supported by management's assertion in the 2012 annual report (SAPPI, 2012) that their purpose for entering into these hedging transactions was not for speculative reasons.

The hedging decision would only be economically beneficial if the market movements are in the direction that the hedge has been enacted against. Should the movements be opposite to the direction hedged, the entity would have been economically better off without the hedge in place. While it is not possible to assess the hedging decisions made at the time they were made, it is possible to retrospectively assess the decisions with subsequent movements in global markets. The economic effect of these hedging transactions will be investigated from the time at which they were entered into until 30 September 2015. Hedge accounting may have been applied by SAPPI to ensure reduced financial statement volatility, but external market conditions and movements can be utilised to determine whether the decisions have been beneficial to SAPPI.

PAY FLOATING US DOLLAR LIBOR TO RECEIVE FIXED INTEREST PAYMENTS

The decision to swap the fixed interest payments to floating payments provides a natural hedge against movements within the US economy. Floating interest rates fluctuate with state of the economy and will increase as the economy strengthens (Montiel, 2009). Furthermore, increased interest rates have the effect of strengthening a currency, *ceteris paribus* (Montiel, 2009). The natural hedge that SAPPI management have introduced with this decision based on the premise that a stronger economy will increase interest rates, and subsequently debt obligations, but that these movements should be offset by improved company performance in a stronger economy.

SAPPI entered into an interest rate swap contract in April 2011 receiving fixed USD payments (to offset the coupon payments on the 2021 notes) and paying a floating rate linked to USD 6 month LIBOR. A contractual spread would be added onto the floating rate to ensure the value of the swap on day one is nil.

The fair value of the swap will fluctuate as USD LIBOR rates shift in the market. Figure 21 below graphically depicts the movement in the USD LIBOR over the period from 2011 to 2016. While there was a minor fall in rates during the first six months, the first year of the hedge appeared to be unfavourable due to higher rates in the market. However, the reducing rates in the period from

September 2012 until 31 March 2015 would have benefitted SAPPI through the hedge entered into. Given the low rates in the US economy observed in the more recent past due to the US policy of quantitative easing, this appears to have been a good business decision made by SAPPI.




FIGURE 21: USD 6 MONTH LIBOR MOVEMENTS (BLOOMBERG)

RECEIVE FIXED US DOLLAR TO PAY FIXED EURO

SAPPI entered into an interest rate swap contract in July 2012 to receive fixed USD payments in exchange for paying fixed Euro interest. Both the 7.75% USD coupon 2017 notes and 8.375% USD coupon 2019 notes were switched to Euro at rates of 7.56% and 8.33%, respectively. The interest rate swap utilised would be a cross-currency swap where the fixed payments are based on a notional amount in the base currency indicative of the market USD/Euro foreign exchange rate at the time the contract was issued.

SAPPI (2014) has disclosed that the movements in their coupon obligations are matched by the movements in the fair value of the hedging instruments, thereby implying that the notional amount of Euro at which the swap is based would be at the exchange rate around the time at which the swap was entered into, which was approximately \$1/€0.8.

The graphical movement in the Euro/USD exchange rate over the period of hedge inception in July 2012 until 30 September 2015 can be seen below in figure 22. The Euro initially strengthened relative to the US Dollar and remained relatively stronger up until December 2014, thereby inferring that SAPPI would have been a stronger financial position without the hedge in place over this period. However, the strengthening of the US Dollar from the period since December 2014 indicates how SAPPI's hedge would have protected them from increased US cash flows and has enabled them to benefit from the hedge they had enacted.




FIGURE 22: EUR/USD EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENT 2012 - 2015 (BLOOMBERG)

5.5. RESULTS

The approach that SAPPI management appear to be taking with respect to operational foreign exchange exposures is to make use of natural hedges within funding mechanisms and resultant hedging decisions. We have demonstrated how the hedging decisions made appear to better align the segmental operations and financing obligations in the same currencies, with the exception of the South African segment due to a lack of depth in the corporate debt market.

The decision taken by SAPPI management to expose the business to floating USD payments appeared to have increased USD debt obligations as market rates rose steadily in the period up until March 2015, but these obligations would have decreased as rates decreased from this date.

The decision taken to swap USD debt obligation for Euro obligations appears to have been disadvantageous to SAPPI for the majority of the time examined, however the relative strengthening of the USD over the last year examined would have favourably affected SAPPI's hedged position.

While the performance of both the USD fixed to floating and USD to Euro swaps appear to have been beneficial to SAPPI for most of the periods observed, the fluctuations may also have affected the underlying performance of the segment. For instance, a weaker Euro may be beneficial from a funding perspective, but may adversely affect the performance of the European division in a tougher economic environment.

6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UPDATE

The financial performance of SAPPI for the period ended 30 September 2015 indicated higher earnings as a result of the execution of the strategy detailed in chapter 2 aimed at consolidating operations and reducing net debt within the business (SAPPI, 2015).

SAPPI was able to react to market conditions and a new debt issue was announced in early 2015 with the purpose of restructuring debt obligations within the business. SAPPI intended to use the proceeds from the new issue to exercise the call provisions on both the 2018 (issued in Euro) and 2019 (swapped into Euro) notes. The aggregate principal amount of the new issue in April 2015 would be € 450 million. The notes will pay a coupon 3.375%, significantly lower than the coupons of the respective notes discussed within this study, semi-annually and will mature on 1 April 2022.

The 2018 notes were redeemed on 15 April 2015 and an aggregate principal amount of USD 291 million and a further USD 9 million of accrued interest. The 2019 notes were redeemed on 15 June 2015 at an aggregate principal and accrued interest amount of USD 313 million. The applicable premiums on the exercising of the call provisions, as outlined in chapter 4.3, totalled USD 42 million.

The cross-currency swap associated with the 2019 notes was unwound out at the same time as the underlying notes in June 2015 and generated approximately USD 9 million in cash proceeds (SAPPI, 2015) due to favourable market movements on the hedge discussed in chapter 5.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. CONCLUSION

SAPPI issued four USD and Euro denominated bonds in 2011 and 2012. The objective of this study was to explore the financing options available to SAPPI and assess the cost incurred by SAPPI on these issuances by means of an OAS analysis and retrospective assessment of hedging decisions made.

The main research questions that this paper planned to address were:

- What financing options did SAPPI have in the selection of the most appropriate source of financing;
- what is the state of the South African bond market and what would the viability of utilising this market be for SAPPI;
- why did SAPPI issue the foreign bonds and what were the costs and benefits of doing so;
- what was the cost of issuance on the bonds for SAPPI in both US and European debt markets; and
- what are the retrospective effects of the foreign exchange hedging decisions taken by the management of SAPPI?

SAPPI was introduced by means of a brief history of the company detailing historical funding mechanisms used in an acquisitive growth strategy and the development of global operating segments in Southern Africa, Europe and North America. We then presented the adverse market conditions in place since the late 2000's and how those conditions had unfavourably affected SAPPI's operations and increased their debt obligations. The financial position of SAPPI at the time of the bond issuances was discussed to provide the user with the funding options SAPPI management had at their disposal.

A brief history of the global high yield corporate bond market was provided and we found that the current South African bond market was small in comparison to developed corporate bond markets. In addition, we commented on the volatility of yields on high yield bonds in times of economic downturn and uncertainty.

In response to the research questions above, we outlined how the South African corporate high yield market did not have sufficient depth for a bond issue of the size SAPPI required and the use of any equity-linked financing mechanism or bank financing were not viable for the business. Hence, SAPPI's only alternative was to issue USD and Euro denominated debt.

We calculated option-adjusted spreads on all four bonds on their respective dates of issuances and made two prominent observations. Firstly, a comparison of the OASs calculated on 2011 bond issuances in Euro and USD indicated that SAPPI was able to access funding through the US high yield market at relatively lower spreads than through the European debt market. It appears that SAPPI management were aware of the apparently cheaper funding on USD denominated securities as both 2012 issuances were denominated in USD and immediately swapped to Euro through the use of an interest rate swap.

Secondly, the OASs determined on the 2012 issuances were significantly higher than the OASs on issuances fifteen months earlier. The reasoning for these increases is clearly observable but we intimate that market movements may not have been fully taken into account for the period between the two issuances. We observed that benchmark rates within the US decreased significantly while the coupon spreads on both issuances were higher than their 2011 counterparts.

The global operations of SAPPI outside of Southern Africa are currently greater than those in South Africa, hence the decision to approach corporate bond markets domiciled in currencies their operations were exposed to was a logical step for management to take. The global operations of SAPPI provided a natural hedge to the obligations of the USD and Euro denominated debt, a benefit which SAPPI management was clearly aware of. We indicated how management was clearly aware of the natural hedging possibilities through a comparison of segmental assets and funding obligations in the segments currency. While the value of South African funding lagged behind the value of assets and sales within the region, due to the lack of funding alternatives within the region, the proportions of US and European funding obligations outstanding within the SAPPI group were closely aligned to the proportions of US and European assets and sales within the group.

SAPPI entered into two hedging transactions on the issuance of the bonds. The 2011 notes USD fixed rate obligations were exchanged for USD floating rate obligations and the USD obligations on both 2012 issuances were swapped for Euro obligations. The retrospective assessment of the hedging decisions indicated that exposure to USD floating rates was beneficial for the period from September 2012 until March 2015 while the increased exposure to the Euro was only beneficial on the strengthening of the US Dollar in the period since from December 2014.

7.2. SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The research performed in this case and the findings thereof provide a number of areas for further study.

Firstly, there is scope for further research into the OAS methodology and the producing of publicly available information which can be utilised in the construction of binomial lattices. Due to the lack of readily available market standards within this branch of corporate finance, research could assess and compare current methodologies and academic theories deployed in the global market. Specific focus could also be given to the volatility assumptions utilised in the construction of the binomial lattice.

Secondly, the case study focused on the foreign denominated debt issued by SAPPI in 2011 and 2012. As highlighted in chapter 6, there have been subsequent debt issuances for which the same methodology could be applied. Furthermore, the same debt issuances were only assessed at the date of issuance and future research could extend the scope of the analysis on the bonds herein.

Thirdly, the OAS methodology could be applied to the SAPPI debt issued in the South African corporate bond market to investigate whether the OAS varies from those observed on SAPPI's foreign denominated issuances. Should the results indicate comparable spreads, it may provide an indication that the South African market is a more viable funding alternative than local companies are currently aware of.

Finally, within our research of the South African high yield corporate bond market, we observe that the market is still in the early stages of its development. A future study could research what steps could be taken within South Africa to enhance the corporate high yield market. Reference could be made to countries and markets where high yield bond issuances have been successfully incorporated into the debt market.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: FURTHER BOND DETAILS

In addition to the call provisions and their applicable premiums highlighted within the case, the following key terms are similar in all bonds issued, with a brief explanation on each point included below:

- *Optional redemption from equity offering* – summarised below;
- *Senior secured debt* – the notes will all rank equally with all senior debt obligations currently in existence and SAPPI limited and subsidiaries will be jointly and severally liable to guarantee these notes on a senior basis.;
- *Change in tax legislation* – should tax legislation be changed as defined within the offering memorandum, SAPPI has the right to redeem the bond issues at their principal amount (including accrued interest); and
- *Change in control* – should SAPPI experience a change in control of ownership, as defined in the memorandum, the holder may redeem the notes at a price of 101% of the principal amount (including accrued interest).

OPTIONAL REDEMPTION FROM EQUITY OFFERING

SAPPI has the ability to redeem up to 35% of each of the bond offerings at a contractually specified redemption price through the net cash from an equity offering, provided that the following terms are met:

- (i) At least 65% of the original bonds issued, excluding those held by SAPPI's related parties, remain outstanding after the exercising of the terms; and
- (ii) Redemption occurs within 90 days of the date of the closing of such Equity Offering.

Refer below for the dates specified for each bond issued:

Note	2018 notes (issued 2011)	2021 notes (issued 2011)	2017 notes (issued 2012)	2019 notes (issued 2012)
Optional redemption until	15 April 2014	15 April 2014	15 July 2015	15 June 2015
Redemption price	106.625%	106.625%	107.750%	108.375%

TABLE 9: OPTIONAL BOND REDEMPTION TERMS

The “equity offering” referred to is simplistically defined as the tradable shares of SAPPI Limited or any direct parent entity, should there be a restructuring within the group. The benefit of this clause to both bond holders and SAPPI is that, should the share price of SAPPI increase significantly, a rights or standard share issue could be utilised to repay a portion of their debt obligations.

SENIOR OBLIGATIONS – COLLATERAL DESCRIBED

The notes will all rank equally with all senior debt obligations currently in existence and SAPPI limited and subsidiaries will be jointly and severally liable to guarantee these notes on a senior basis.

APPENDIX B: BLOOMBERG RISK-FREE RATES AND PRICES UTILISED

B1. US TREASURY PRICES AS AT 13 JULY 2012 AND 15 APRIL 2011 {SOURCE: BLOOMBERG}

YCGT0025 3m 0.280 6m 0.377 1y 0.454 2y 0.877 5y 1.504 10y 2.082 30y 2.857

US Treasury Actives Curve

US Treasury Actives Curve 125 125 11 (Change)

07/13/12 04/15/11 07/13/12-0

Tenor	Description	Mid Price	Yield	Description	Mid Price	Yield	Price
11)	1M B 0 08/09/12 Govt	0.063	0.064	B 0 05/12/11 Govt	0.033	0.033	0.030
12)	3M B 0 10/11/12 Govt	0.085	0.086	B 0 07/14/11 Govt	0.063	0.063	0.023
13)	6M B 0 01/10/13 Govt	0.140	0.142	B 0 10/13/11 Govt	0.113	0.115	0.027
14)	1Y B 0 06/27/13 Govt	0.168	0.170	B 0 04/05/12 Govt	0.223	0.227	-0.055
15)	2Y T 0 06/30/14 Govt	100-00%	0.240	T 0 03/31/13 Govt	100-03%	0.697	-0.02%
16)	3Y T 0 07/15/15 Govt	99-23%	0.338	T 1 04/15/14 Govt	100-05%	1.194	-0.17%
17)	5Y T 0 06/30/17 Govt	100-20%	0.621	T 2 03/31/16 Govt	100-19%	2.121	-0.00%
18)	7Y T 1 06/30/19 Govt	100-05%	0.976	T 2 03/31/18 Govt	100-14%	2.801	-0.09%
19)	10Y T 1 05/15/22 Govt	102-12%	1.488	T 3 02/15/21 Govt	101-25	3.410	-0.19%
20)	30Y T 3 05/15/42 Govt	108-27	2.573	T 4 02/15/41 Govt	104-19	4.469	-4.0%

Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 2395 9000 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 2927 6000 Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2016 Bloomberg Finance L.P. 3H 681038 6925-600-0 22-Jan-16 17:20:34 EET GMT+2:00

B2. GERMAN SOVEREIGN PRICES AS AT 13 JULY 2012 AND 15 APRIL 2011 {SOURCE: BLOOMBERG}

YCGT0016 3m -0.55 6m -0.47 1y -0.44 2y -0.45 5y -0.22 10y 0.494 30y 1.281

EUR German Sovereign Curve

EUR German Sovereign Curve 116 116 116 (Change)

07/13/12 04/15/11 07/13/12-04/15/11



Tenor	Description	Mid Price	Yield	Description	Mid Price	Yield	Price	Yield
11)	3M BUBILL 0 08/15/12 Corp	100.000	-0.093	BUBILL 0 07/13/11 Corp	99.829	0.729	0.119	+82.1
12)	6M BUBILL 0 01/09/13 Corp	100.035	-0.072	BUBILL 0 10/12/11 Corp	99.474	1.083	0.501	+115.4
13)	1Y BUBILL 0 06/26/13 Corp	100.056	-0.060	BKD 1 03/16/12 Corp	99.689	1.347	0.369	+148.7
14)	2Y BKO 0 04/13/14 Corp	100.085	-0.045	BKD 1 03/15/13 Corp	99.366	1.941	0.719	+188.8
15)	3Y OBL 2 04/10/15 #157 Corp	104.143	-0.001	OBL 2 04/11/14 #154 Corp	100.376	2.118	0.746	+211.8
16)	4Y OBL 2 04/08/16 #160 Corp	109.782	0.115	OBL 2 02/27/15 #156 Corp	100.236	2.434	0.548	+212.9
17)	5Y OBL 0 04/07/17 #163 Corp	100.903	0.207	OBL 2 02/26/16 #159 Corp	96.819	2.706	0.094	+219.9
18)	6Y OBL 4 07/04/18 Corp	121.760	0.529	OBL 3 01/04/17 Corp	104.528	2.677	17.052	+254.8
19)	7Y OBL 3 07/04/19 Corp	118.760	0.727	OBL 4 01/04/18 Corp	105.724	3.042	13.037	+251.5
20)	8Y OBL 3 07/04/20 Corp	115.985	0.910	OBL 3 01/04/19 Corp	103.844	3.178	12.361	+188.9
21)	9Y OBL 3 07/04/21 Corp	118.503	1.073	OBL 3 01/04/20 Corp	99.666	3.293	11.827	+122.0
22)	10Y OBL 1 07/04/22 Corp	104.570	1.250	OBL 2 01/04/21 Corp	92.831	3.377	12.210	+211.8
23)	15Y OBL 6 07/04/27 € Corp	162.598	1.719	OBL 6 01/04/24 € Corp	126.369	3.621	26.099	+199.1
24)	20Y OBL 4 07/04/34 Corp	148.893	2.010	OBL 4 07/04/28 € Corp	110.856	3.873	37.237	+185.3
25)	25Y OBL 4 07/04/39 Corp	144.188	2.090	OBL 4 07/04/34 Corp	112.319	3.930	31.899	+184.0
26)	30Y OBL 2 07/04/44 Corp	108.585	2.127	OBL 3 07/04/42 Corp	89.364	3.840	19.021	+173.2

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APPENDIX C: IMPLIED SPOT RATES DETERMINED (NACA)

t	s_n – USD 2011	s_n – EUR 2011	s_n – USD 2012
0.083	0.030%	N/A	0.053%
0.25	0.063%	0.687%	0.083%
0.5	0.114%	1.060%	0.139%
1	0.221%	1.315%	0.162%
2	0.703%	1.830%	0.240%
3	1.207%	2.130%	0.338%
4	N/A	2.458%	N/A
5	2.179%	2.713%	0.628%
7	2.915%	3.155%	0.992%
10	3.609%	3.409%	1.552%

APPENDIX D: ZERO CURVE COMPARISONS - LINEAR AND CUBIC SPLINE INTERPOLATION



APPENDIX E: IMPLIED SPOT RATES AND FORWARD RATES DETERMINED (NACM)

E1. EUR 2011 DETERMINED RATES

t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd
0.08	0.422%	0.422%	2.08	1.850%	2.717%	4.08	2.456%	3.639%	6.08	2.928%	4.267%	8.08	3.247%	4.001%
0.17	0.548%	0.675%	2.17	1.883%	2.693%	4.17	2.479%	3.633%	6.17	2.947%	4.286%	8.17	3.255%	3.980%
0.25	0.685%	0.958%	2.25	1.912%	2.670%	4.25	2.502%	3.630%	6.25	2.965%	4.302%	8.25	3.262%	3.959%
0.33	0.821%	1.231%	2.33	1.938%	2.652%	4.33	2.524%	3.629%	6.33	2.982%	4.316%	8.33	3.268%	3.939%
0.42	0.948%	1.455%	2.42	1.963%	2.639%	4.42	2.544%	3.633%	6.42	3.000%	4.325%	8.42	3.275%	3.919%
0.50	1.055%	1.592%	2.50	1.985%	2.634%	4.50	2.565%	3.640%	6.50	3.017%	4.331%	8.50	3.281%	3.901%
0.58	1.136%	1.619%	2.58	2.006%	2.639%	4.58	2.585%	3.652%	6.58	3.034%	4.334%	8.58	3.287%	3.883%
0.67	1.193%	1.594%	2.67	2.026%	2.656%	4.67	2.604%	3.668%	6.67	3.050%	4.333%	8.67	3.292%	3.866%
0.75	1.233%	1.552%	2.75	2.046%	2.686%	4.75	2.623%	3.690%	6.75	3.066%	4.328%	8.75	3.298%	3.849%
0.83	1.261%	1.516%	2.83	2.067%	2.732%	4.83	2.642%	3.718%	6.83	3.081%	4.319%	8.83	3.303%	3.834%
0.92	1.284%	1.512%	2.92	2.087%	2.796%	4.92	2.661%	3.752%	6.92	3.096%	4.306%	8.92	3.308%	3.820%
1.00	1.307%	1.562%	3.00	2.109%	2.879%	5.00	2.679%	3.793%	7.00	3.110%	4.289%	9.00	3.312%	3.806%
1.08	1.336%	1.676%	3.08	2.133%	2.979%	5.08	2.698%	3.840%	7.08	3.124%	4.268%	9.08	3.317%	3.794%
1.17	1.369%	1.809%	3.17	2.158%	3.079%	5.17	2.718%	3.886%	7.17	3.137%	4.246%	9.17	3.321%	3.783%
1.25	1.408%	1.946%	3.25	2.184%	3.174%	5.25	2.737%	3.931%	7.25	3.149%	4.224%	9.25	3.325%	3.774%
1.33	1.450%	2.082%	3.33	2.211%	3.263%	5.33	2.756%	3.975%	7.33	3.161%	4.202%	9.33	3.329%	3.765%
1.42	1.495%	2.214%	3.42	2.238%	3.345%	5.42	2.776%	4.016%	7.42	3.172%	4.179%	9.42	3.333%	3.759%
1.50	1.542%	2.338%	3.50	2.267%	3.419%	5.50	2.795%	4.056%	7.50	3.183%	4.156%	9.50	3.336%	3.753%
1.58	1.590%	2.452%	3.58	2.295%	3.484%	5.58	2.814%	4.093%	7.58	3.194%	4.134%	9.58	3.340%	3.749%
1.67	1.638%	2.552%	3.67	2.323%	3.540%	5.67	2.834%	4.128%	7.67	3.204%	4.111%	9.67	3.343%	3.747%
1.75	1.685%	2.634%	3.75	2.351%	3.584%	5.75	2.853%	4.161%	7.75	3.213%	4.089%	9.75	3.347%	3.746%
1.83	1.731%	2.694%	3.83	2.379%	3.617%	5.83	2.872%	4.192%	7.83	3.222%	4.066%	9.83	3.350%	3.747%
1.92	1.774%	2.729%	3.92	2.405%	3.637%	5.92	2.891%	4.219%	7.92	3.231%	4.044%	9.92	3.354%	3.750%
2.00	1.814%	2.736%	4.00	2.431%	3.644%	6.00	2.910%	4.245%	8.00	3.239%	4.022%	10.00	3.357%	3.755%

E2. USD 2012 DETERMINED RATES

t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd	t	spot	fwd
0.08	0.043%	0.043%	2.08	0.249%	0.449%	4.08	0.478%	1.070%	6.08	0.818%	1.916%	8.08	1.188%	2.665%
0.17	0.062%	0.081%	2.17	0.257%	0.460%	4.17	0.491%	1.105%	6.17	0.834%	1.950%	8.17	1.204%	2.695%
0.25	0.083%	0.125%	2.25	0.265%	0.473%	4.25	0.504%	1.140%	6.25	0.849%	1.983%	8.25	1.219%	2.725%
0.33	0.104%	0.168%	2.33	0.273%	0.486%	4.33	0.517%	1.176%	6.33	0.864%	2.017%	8.33	1.234%	2.756%
0.42	0.124%	0.201%	2.42	0.280%	0.500%	4.42	0.530%	1.211%	6.42	0.880%	2.050%	8.42	1.250%	2.786%
0.50	0.139%	0.218%	2.50	0.288%	0.516%	4.50	0.543%	1.247%	6.50	0.895%	2.083%	8.50	1.265%	2.816%
0.58	0.150%	0.214%	2.58	0.296%	0.533%	4.58	0.556%	1.283%	6.58	0.910%	2.116%	8.58	1.280%	2.846%
0.67	0.156%	0.201%	2.67	0.304%	0.551%	4.67	0.570%	1.318%	6.67	0.926%	2.148%	8.67	1.296%	2.876%
0.75	0.160%	0.186%	2.75	0.312%	0.572%	4.75	0.584%	1.354%	6.75	0.941%	2.180%	8.75	1.311%	2.907%
0.83	0.161%	0.172%	2.83	0.321%	0.594%	4.83	0.598%	1.390%	6.83	0.957%	2.211%	8.83	1.326%	2.937%
0.92	0.161%	0.165%	2.92	0.329%	0.619%	4.92	0.612%	1.425%	6.92	0.972%	2.242%	8.92	1.342%	2.967%
1.00	0.162%	0.170%	3.00	0.338%	0.646%	5.00	0.626%	1.461%	7.00	0.988%	2.273%	9.00	1.357%	2.998%
1.08	0.164%	0.187%	3.08	0.347%	0.675%	5.08	0.640%	1.496%	7.08	1.003%	2.303%	9.08	1.372%	3.028%
1.17	0.167%	0.209%	3.17	0.356%	0.705%	5.17	0.654%	1.531%	7.17	1.019%	2.333%	9.17	1.388%	3.058%
1.25	0.172%	0.233%	3.25	0.366%	0.736%	5.25	0.669%	1.567%	7.25	1.034%	2.363%	9.25	1.403%	3.089%
1.33	0.177%	0.258%	3.33	0.376%	0.767%	5.33	0.683%	1.602%	7.33	1.050%	2.393%	9.33	1.418%	3.119%
1.42	0.183%	0.284%	3.42	0.386%	0.799%	5.42	0.698%	1.637%	7.42	1.065%	2.424%	9.42	1.434%	3.149%
1.50	0.190%	0.310%	3.50	0.397%	0.832%	5.50	0.713%	1.672%	7.50	1.080%	2.454%	9.50	1.449%	3.180%
1.58	0.198%	0.335%	3.58	0.408%	0.865%	5.58	0.728%	1.708%	7.58	1.096%	2.484%	9.58	1.464%	3.210%
1.67	0.206%	0.360%	3.67	0.419%	0.898%	5.67	0.743%	1.743%	7.67	1.111%	2.514%	9.67	1.479%	3.241%
1.75	0.214%	0.383%	3.75	0.430%	0.932%	5.75	0.758%	1.778%	7.75	1.127%	2.544%	9.75	1.495%	3.271%
1.83	0.223%	0.404%	3.83	0.442%	0.966%	5.83	0.773%	1.812%	7.83	1.142%	2.574%	9.83	1.510%	3.302%
1.92	0.232%	0.422%	3.92	0.454%	1.000%	5.92	0.788%	1.847%	7.92	1.157%	2.605%	9.92	1.525%	3.332%
2.00	0.240%	0.437%	4.00	0.466%	1.035%	6.00	0.803%	1.881%	8.00	1.173%	2.635%	10.00	1.541%	3.363%

APPENDIX G: PRE-CALIBRATION BINOMIAL LATTICES

G1. USD 2011 PRE-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

G2. EUR 2011 PRE-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

G3. USD 2012 PRE-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

APPENDIX H: POST-CALIBRATION BINOMIAL LATTICES

H1. USD 2011 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

H2. EUR 2011 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

H3. USD 2012 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

USD 2011 pre-calibration lattice

15-Dec-13	15-Jan-14	15-Feb-14	15-Mar-14	15-Apr-14	15-May-14	15-Jun-14	15-Jul-14	15-Aug-14	15-Sep-14	15-Oct-14	15-Nov-14	15-Dec-14	15-Jan-15	15-Feb-15	15-Mar-15	15-Apr-15
t = 2.75	t = 2.83	t = 2.92	t = 3	t = 3.08	t = 3.17	t = 3.25	t = 3.33	t = 3.42	t = 3.5	t = 3.58	t = 3.67	t = 3.75	t = 3.83	t = 3.92	t = 4	t = 4.08
1.3304%	1.3496%	1.3691%	1.3891%	1.4095%	1.4287%	1.4463%	1.4625%	1.4771%	1.4902%	1.5018%	1.5119%	1.5204%	1.5275%	1.5330%	1.5371%	1.5398%
1.3791%	1.3990%	1.4192%	1.4400%	1.4613%	1.4810%	1.4993%	1.5161%	1.5312%	1.5448%	1.5568%	1.5672%	1.5761%	1.5834%	1.5892%	1.5934%	1.5961%
1.4297%	1.4502%	1.4712%	1.4928%	1.5146%	1.5352%	1.5542%	1.5716%	1.5873%	1.6014%	1.6138%	1.6246%	1.6338%	1.6414%	1.6474%	1.6518%	1.6546%
1.4820%	1.5033%	1.5251%	1.5474%	1.5701%	1.5915%	1.6111%	1.6291%	1.6454%	1.6600%	1.6729%	1.6841%	1.6937%	1.7015%	1.7077%	1.7123%	1.7152%
1.5363%	1.5584%	1.5809%	1.6041%	1.6276%	1.6497%	1.6702%	1.6888%	1.7057%	1.7208%	1.7342%	1.7458%	1.7557%	1.7638%	1.7703%	1.7750%	1.7780%
1.5926%	1.6155%	1.6388%	1.6628%	1.6872%	1.7102%	1.7313%	1.7507%	1.7682%	1.7838%	1.7977%	1.8098%	1.8200%	1.8284%	1.8351%	1.8400%	1.8431%
1.6509%	1.6746%	1.6989%	1.7237%	1.7490%	1.7728%	1.7947%	1.8148%	1.8329%	1.8492%	1.8636%	1.8760%	1.8867%	1.8954%	1.9023%	1.9074%	1.9106%
1.7113%	1.7360%	1.7611%	1.7869%	1.8130%	1.8377%	1.8605%	1.8812%	1.9000%	1.9169%	1.9318%	1.9447%	1.9557%	1.9648%	1.9720%	1.9772%	1.9806%
1.7740%	1.7995%	1.8256%	1.8523%	1.8794%	1.9050%	1.9286%	1.9501%	1.9695%	1.9871%	2.0025%	2.0160%	2.0274%	2.0368%	2.0442%	2.0497%	2.0532%
1.8390%	1.8654%	1.8924%	1.9202%	1.9483%	1.9748%	1.9992%	2.0216%	2.0418%	2.0599%	2.0759%	2.0898%	2.1016%	2.1114%	2.1191%	2.1247%	2.1283%
1.9063%	1.9338%	1.9617%	1.9905%	2.0196%	2.0471%	2.0724%	2.0956%	2.1165%	2.1353%	2.1519%	2.1663%	2.1786%	2.1887%	2.1967%	2.2025%	2.2063%
1.9762%	2.0046%	2.0336%	2.0634%	2.0936%	2.1221%	2.1483%	2.1723%	2.1941%	2.2135%	2.2307%	2.2457%	2.2584%	2.2689%	2.2771%	2.2832%	2.2871%
2.0485%	2.0780%	2.1081%	2.1389%	2.1703%	2.1998%	2.2270%	2.2519%	2.2744%	2.2946%	2.3124%	2.3279%	2.3411%	2.3520%	2.3605%	2.3668%	2.3709%
2.1236%	2.1541%	2.1853%	2.2173%	2.2497%	2.2804%	2.3086%	2.3344%	2.3577%	2.3786%	2.3971%	2.4132%	2.4268%	2.4381%	2.4470%	2.4535%	2.4577%
2.2013%	2.2330%	2.2653%	2.2985%	2.3321%	2.3639%	2.3931%	2.4199%	2.4441%	2.4657%	2.4849%	2.5016%	2.5157%	2.5274%	2.5366%	2.5434%	2.5477%
2.2820%	2.3148%	2.3483%	2.3827%	2.4175%	2.4505%	2.4808%	2.5085%	2.5336%	2.5560%	2.5759%	2.5932%	2.6078%	2.6199%	2.6295%	2.6365%	2.6410%
2.3655%	2.3995%	2.4343%	2.4699%	2.5061%	2.5402%	2.5716%	2.6004%	2.6264%	2.6497%	2.6703%	2.6881%	2.7034%	2.7159%	2.7258%	2.7331%	2.7377%
2.4522%	2.4874%	2.5234%	2.5604%	2.5979%	2.6332%	2.6658%	2.6956%	2.7226%	2.7467%	2.7680%	2.7866%	2.8024%	2.8154%	2.8256%	2.8332%	2.8380%
2.5420%	2.5785%	2.6158%	2.6542%	2.6930%	2.7297%	2.7635%	2.7943%	2.8223%	2.8473%	2.8694%	2.8887%	2.9050%	2.9185%	2.9291%	2.9369%	2.9419%
2.6351%	2.6730%	2.7116%	2.7514%	2.7916%	2.8297%	2.8647%	2.8967%	2.9256%	2.9516%	2.9745%	2.9944%	3.0114%	3.0254%	3.0364%	3.0445%	3.0497%
2.7316%	2.7709%	2.8109%	2.8521%	2.8939%	2.9333%	2.9696%	3.0027%	3.0328%	3.0597%	3.0834%	3.1041%	3.1217%	3.1362%	3.1476%	3.1560%	3.1614%
2.8316%	2.8723%	2.9139%	2.9566%	2.9999%	3.0407%	3.0783%	3.1127%	3.1438%	3.1717%	3.1964%	3.2178%	3.2360%	3.2510%	3.2629%	3.2716%	3.2771%
2.9353%	2.9775%	3.0206%	3.0649%	3.1097%	3.1521%	3.1911%	3.2267%	3.2590%	3.2879%	3.3134%	3.3356%	3.3545%	3.3701%	3.3824%	3.3914%	3.3972%
3.0428%	3.0866%	3.1312%	3.1771%	3.2236%	3.2675%	3.3079%	3.3449%	3.3783%	3.4083%	3.4348%	3.4578%	3.4774%	3.4935%	3.5062%	3.5156%	3.5216%
3.1543%	3.1996%	3.2459%	3.2935%	3.3417%	3.3872%	3.4291%	3.4674%	3.5021%	3.5331%	3.5606%	3.5844%	3.6047%	3.6214%	3.6346%	3.6443%	3.6506%
3.2698%	3.3168%	3.3648%	3.4141%	3.4641%	3.5112%	3.5547%	3.5944%	3.6303%	3.6625%	3.6910%	3.7157%	3.7367%	3.7541%	3.7678%	3.7778%	3.7828%
3.3895%	3.4383%	3.4880%	3.5391%	3.5909%	3.6398%	3.6849%	3.7260%	3.7633%	3.7967%	3.8262%	3.8518%	3.8736%	3.8916%	3.9057%	3.9162%	3.9228%
3.5137%	3.5642%	3.6158%	3.6687%	3.7224%	3.7731%	3.8198%	3.8625%	3.9011%	3.9357%	3.9663%	3.9929%	4.0155%	4.0341%	4.0488%	4.0596%	4.0665%
3.6423%	3.6947%	3.7482%	3.8031%	3.8588%	3.9113%	3.9597%	4.0039%	4.0440%	4.0798%	4.1115%	4.1391%	4.1625%	4.1818%	4.1971%	4.2083%	4.2154%
3.7757%	3.8300%	3.8855%	3.9424%	4.0001%	4.0546%	4.1047%	4.1506%	4.1921%	4.2293%	4.2621%	4.2907%	4.3150%	4.3350%	4.3508%	4.3624%	4.3698%
3.9140%	3.9703%	4.0278%	4.0868%	4.1466%	4.2031%	4.2551%	4.3026%	4.3456%	4.3842%	4.4182%	4.4478%	4.4730%	4.4937%	4.5101%	4.5221%	4.5299%
4.0574%	4.1157%	4.1753%	4.2364%	4.2985%	4.3570%	4.4109%	4.4602%	4.5048%	4.5447%	4.5800%	4.6107%	4.6368%	4.6583%	4.6753%	4.6878%	4.6958%
4.2060%	4.2664%	4.3282%	4.3916%	4.4559%	4.5166%	4.5724%	4.6235%	4.6697%	4.7112%	4.7478%	4.7796%	4.8066%	4.8289%	4.8465%	4.8594%	4.8677%
	4.4227%	4.4867%	4.5524%	4.6191%	4.6820%	4.7399%	4.7928%	4.8408%	4.8837%	4.9217%	4.9546%	4.9827%	5.0058%	5.0240%	5.0374%	5.0460%
	4.6510%	4.7192%	4.7882%	4.8534%	4.9135%	4.9684%	5.0180%	5.0626%	5.1019%	5.1361%	5.1652%	5.1891%	5.2077%	5.2219%	5.2308%	5.2380%
		4.8920%	4.9636%	5.0312%	5.0944%	5.1503%	5.2018%	5.2480%	5.2888%	5.3242%	5.3543%	5.3792%	5.3988%	5.4131%	5.4224%	5.4280%
			5.1454%	5.2155%	5.2800%	5.3389%	5.3923%	5.4402%	5.4824%	5.5192%	5.5504%	5.5762%	5.5965%	5.6114%	5.6210%	5.6268%
				5.4065%	5.4733%	5.5345%	5.5898%	5.6394%	5.6832%	5.7213%	5.7537%	5.7804%	5.8014%	5.8169%	5.8268%	5.8328%
					5.6738%	5.7372%	5.7945%	5.8459%	5.8914%	5.9309%	5.9644%	5.9921%	6.0139%	6.0299%	6.0402%	6.0452%
						5.9473%	6.0068%	6.0600%	6.1071%	6.1481%	6.1828%	6.2115%	6.2342%	6.2508%	6.2615%	6.2658%
							6.2268%	6.2820%	6.3308%	6.3732%	6.4093%	6.4390%	6.4625%	6.4797%	6.4908%	6.4958%
								6.5121%	6.5627%	6.6066%	6.6440%	6.6748%	6.6992%	6.7170%	6.7285%	6.7353%
									6.8486%	6.8873%	6.9193%	6.9445%	6.9630%	6.9749%	6.9808%	6.9849%
										7.0994%	7.1366%	7.1727%	7.1988%	7.2180%	7.2304%	7.2344%
											7.4011%	7.4354%	7.4625%	7.4824%	7.4952%	7.5024%
												7.7077%	7.7358%	7.7564%	7.7697%	7.7752%
													8.0191%	8.0405%	8.0542%	8.0592%
														8.3349%	8.3492%	8.3550%

USD 2011 pre-calibration lattice

15-Jan-21	15-Feb-21	15-Mar-21
t = 9.83	t = 9.92	t = 10
0.6460%	0.6378%	0.6298%
0.6696%	0.6611%	0.6529%
0.6942%	0.6854%	0.6768%
0.7196%	0.7105%	0.7016%
0.7459%	0.7365%	0.7273%
0.7733%	0.7635%	0.7539%
0.8016%	0.7914%	0.7816%
0.8309%	0.8204%	0.8102%
0.8614%	0.8504%	0.8399%
0.8929%	0.8816%	0.8706%
0.9256%	0.9139%	0.9025%
0.9595%	0.9473%	0.9356%
0.9947%	0.9820%	0.9688%
1.0311%	1.0180%	1.0053%
1.0688%	1.0553%	1.0422%
1.1080%	1.0939%	1.0803%
1.1486%	1.1340%	1.1199%
1.1906%	1.1755%	1.1609%
1.2342%	1.2186%	1.2034%
1.2794%	1.2632%	1.2475%
1.3263%	1.3095%	1.2932%
1.3749%	1.3574%	1.3405%
1.4252%	1.4072%	1.3896%
1.4774%	1.4587%	1.4405%
1.5315%	1.5121%	1.4933%
1.5876%	1.5675%	1.5480%
1.6458%	1.6249%	1.6047%
1.7060%	1.6844%	1.6634%
1.7685%	1.7461%	1.7244%
1.8333%	1.8100%	1.7875%
1.9004%	1.8763%	1.8530%
1.9700%	1.9451%	1.9208%
2.0422%	2.0163%	1.9912%
2.1170%	2.0901%	2.0641%
2.1945%	2.1667%	2.1397%
2.2749%	2.2460%	2.2181%
2.3582%	2.3283%	2.2993%
2.4446%	2.4136%	2.3835%
2.5341%	2.5020%	2.4708%
2.6269%	2.5936%	2.5613%
2.7231%	2.6886%	2.6551%
2.8228%	2.7870%	2.7523%
2.9262%	2.8891%	2.8531%
3.0334%	2.9949%	2.9576%
3.1445%	3.1046%	3.0659%
3.2596%	3.2183%	3.1782%
3.3790%	3.3362%	3.2946%
3.5028%	3.4583%	3.4153%
3.6311%	3.5850%	3.5404%
3.7640%	3.7163%	3.6700%
3.9019%	3.8524%	3.8044%
4.0448%	3.9935%	3.9438%
4.1929%	4.1398%	4.0882%
4.3465%	4.2914%	4.2379%
4.5057%	4.4485%	4.3931%
4.6707%	4.6115%	4.5540%
4.8417%	4.7803%	4.7208%
5.0191%	4.9554%	4.8937%
5.2029%	5.1369%	5.0729%
5.3934%	5.3250%	5.2587%
5.5910%	5.5201%	5.4513%
5.7957%	5.7222%	5.6510%
6.0080%	5.9318%	5.8579%
6.2280%	6.1490%	6.0725%
6.4561%	6.3742%	6.2949%
6.6926%	6.6077%	6.5254%
6.9377%	6.8497%	6.7644%
7.1917%	7.1005%	7.0121%
7.4551%	7.3606%	7.2689%
7.7282%	7.6302%	7.5351%
8.0112%	7.9096%	7.8111%
8.3046%	8.1993%	8.0972%
8.6087%	8.4996%	8.3937%
8.9240%	8.8108%	8.7011%
9.2509%	9.1335%	9.0198%
9.5897%	9.4680%	9.3501%
9.9409%	9.8148%	9.6926%
10.3049%	10.1742%	10.0476%
10.6823%	10.5469%	10.4155%
11.0736%	10.9331%	10.7970%
11.4791%	11.3335%	11.1924%
11.8995%	11.7486%	11.6023%
12.3353%	12.1789%	12.0272%
12.7871%	12.6249%	12.4677%
13.2554%	13.0873%	12.9243%
13.7409%	13.5666%	13.3977%
14.2441%	14.0635%	13.8883%
14.7658%	14.5785%	14.3970%
15.3065%	15.1124%	14.9243%
15.8671%	15.6659%	15.4708%
16.4482%	16.2396%	16.0374%
17.0506%	16.8344%	16.6248%
17.6751%	17.4509%	17.2336%
18.3224%	18.0900%	17.8648%
18.9935%	18.7526%	18.5191%
19.6891%	19.4394%	19.1973%
20.4101%	20.1513%	19.9004%
21.1576%	20.8893%	20.6292%
21.9325%	21.6544%	21.3847%
22.7358%	22.4474%	22.1679%
23.5684%	23.2695%	22.9798%
24.4316%	24.1217%	23.8214%
25.3264%	25.0052%	24.6938%
26.2539%	25.9209%	25.5982%
27.2154%	26.8703%	26.5357%
28.2121%	27.8543%	27.5075%
29.2454%	28.8745%	28.5149%
30.3164%	29.9320%	29.5593%
31.4267%	31.0282%	30.6418%
32.5777%	32.1645%	31.7640%
33.7708%	33.3425%	32.9274%
35.0076%	34.5636%	34.1333%
36.2897%	35.8295%	35.3834%
37.6188%	37.1417%	36.6792%
38.9965%	38.5020%	38.0226%
40.4247%	39.9120%	39.4151%
41.9052%	41.3738%	40.8586%
43.4399%	42.8890%	42.3550%
	44.4598%	43.9062%
		45.5142%

15-Sep-17	15-Oct-17	15-Nov-17	15-Dec-17	15-Jan-18	15-Feb-18	15-Mar-21
t = 6.5	t = 6.58	t = 6.67	t = 6.75	t = 6.83	t = 6.92	t = 7
0.9741%	0.9559%	0.9374%	0.9183%	0.8989%	0.8790%	0.8586%
1.0122%	0.9934%	0.9741%	0.9543%	0.9340%	0.9134%	0.8923%
1.0518%	1.0322%	1.0122%	0.9916%	0.9706%	0.9491%	0.9272%
1.0930%	1.0726%	1.0518%	1.0304%	1.0086%	0.9863%	0.9635%
1.1357%	1.1146%	1.0929%	1.0708%	1.0481%	1.0248%	1.0012%
1.1802%	1.1582%	1.1357%	1.1127%	1.0891%	1.0650%	1.0403%
1.2264%	1.2036%	1.1802%	1.1562%	1.1317%	1.1066%	1.0811%
1.2744%	1.2507%	1.2264%	1.2015%	1.1760%	1.1499%	1.1234%
1.3242%	1.2996%	1.2744%	1.2485%	1.2220%	1.1950%	1.1673%
1.3761%	1.3505%	1.3242%	1.2973%	1.2698%	1.2417%	1.2130%
1.4299%	1.4033%	1.3761%	1.3481%	1.3195%	1.2903%	1.2605%
1.4859%	1.4582%	1.4299%	1.4009%	1.3712%	1.3408%	1.3098%
1.5440%	1.5153%	1.4859%	1.4557%	1.4248%	1.3933%	1.3611%
1.6045%	1.5746%	1.5440%	1.5127%	1.4806%	1.4478%	1.4144%
1.6672%	1.6362%	1.6044%	1.5719%	1.5385%	1.5045%	1.4697%
1.7325%	1.7003%	1.6672%	1.6334%	1.5987%	1.5634%	1.5272%
1.8003%	1.7668%	1.7325%	1.6973%	1.6613%	1.6245%	1.5870%
1.8708%	1.8360%	1.8003%	1.7637%	1.7263%	1.6881%	1.6491%
1.9440%	1.9078%	1.8707%	1.8328%	1.7939%	1.7542%	1.7136%
2.0200%	1.9825%	1.9440%	1.9045%	1.8641%	1.8228%	1.7807%
2.0991%	2.0601%	2.0200%	1.9790%	1.9371%	1.8942%	1.8504%
2.1813%	2.1407%	2.0991%	2.0565%	2.0129%	1.9683%	1.9228%
2.2666%	2.2245%	2.1812%	2.1370%	2.0916%	2.0453%	1.9981%
2.3553%	2.3115%	2.2666%	2.2206%	2.1735%	2.1254%	2.0763%
2.4475%	2.4020%	2.3553%	2.3075%	2.2586%	2.2086%	2.1575%
2.5433%	2.4960%	2.4475%	2.3978%	2.3470%	2.2950%	2.2420%
2.6428%	2.5937%	2.5433%	2.4916%	2.4388%	2.3848%	2.3297%
2.7463%	2.6952%	2.6428%	2.5892%	2.5342%	2.4781%	2.4209%
2.8537%	2.8007%	2.7462%	2.6905%	2.6334%	2.5751%	2.5156%
2.9654%	2.9103%	2.8537%	2.7958%	2.7365%	2.6759%	2.6141%
3.0815%	3.0242%	2.9654%	2.9052%	2.8436%	2.7806%	2.7164%
3.2021%	3.1425%	3.0815%	3.0189%	2.9549%	2.8895%	2.8227%
3.3274%	3.2655%	3.2021%	3.1370%	3.0705%	3.0025%	2.9332%
3.4576%	3.3933%	3.3274%	3.2598%	3.1907%	3.1200%	3.0479%
3.5929%	3.5261%	3.4576%	3.3874%	3.3156%	3.2422%	3.1672%
3.7335%	3.6641%	3.5929%	3.5200%	3.4453%	3.3690%	3.2912%
3.8797%	3.8075%	3.7335%	3.6577%	3.5802%	3.5009%	3.4200%
4.0315%	3.9565%	3.8796%	3.8009%	3.7203%	3.6379%	3.5538%
4.1893%	4.1114%	4.0315%	3.9496%	3.8659%	3.7803%	3.6929%
4.3532%	4.2723%	4.1892%	4.1042%	4.0172%	3.9282%	3.8374%
4.5236%	4.4395%	4.3532%	4.2648%	4.1744%	4.0820%	3.9876%
4.7006%	4.6132%	4.5236%	4.4317%	4.3377%	4.2417%	4.1437%
4.8846%	4.7938%	4.7006%	4.6052%	4.5075%	4.4077%	4.3059%
5.0757%	4.9814%	4.8846%	4.7854%	4.6839%	4.5802%	4.4744%
5.2744%	5.1763%	5.0757%	4.9727%	4.8672%	4.7595%	4.6495%
5.4808%	5.3789%	5.2744%	5.1673%	5.0577%	4.9457%	4.8314%
5.6953%	5.5894%	5.4808%	5.3695%	5.2566%	5.1393%	5.0205%
5.9182%	5.8082%	5.6953%	5.5796%	5.4613%	5.3404%	5.2170%
6.1498%	6.0355%	5.9182%	5.7980%	5.6751%	5.5494%	5.4212%
6.3905%	6.2717%	6.1498%	6.0249%	5.8972%	5.7666%	5.6333%
6.6406%	6.5171%	6.3905%	6.2607%	6.1280%	5.9923%	5.8538%
6.9005%	6.7722%	6.6406%	6.5057%	6.3678%	6.2268%	6.0829%
7.1705%	7.0372%	6.9005%	6.7603%	6.6170%	6.4705%	6.3210%
7.4512%	7.3126%	7.1705%	7.0249%	6.8760%	6.7237%	6.5683%
7.7428%	7.5988%	7.4511%	7.2999%	7.1451%	6.9869%	6.8254%
8.0458%	7.8962%	7.7428%	7.5855%	7.4247%	7.2603%	7.0925%
8.3607%	8.2052%	8.0458%	7.8824%	7.7153%	7.5444%	7.3701%
8.6879%	8.5264%	8.3607%	8.1909%	8.0172%	7.8397%	7.6585%
9.0279%	8.8600%	8.6879%	8.5115%	8.3310%	8.1465%	7.9583%
9.3812%	9.2068%	9.0279%	8.8446%	8.6570%	8.4653%	8.2697%
9.7484%	9.5671%	9.3812%	9.1907%	8.9958%	8.7966%	8.5934%
10.1299%	9.9415%	9.7483%	9.5504%	9.3479%	9.1409%	8.9297%
10.5263%	10.3306%	10.1298%	9.9242%	9.7137%	9.4987%	9.2791%
10.9383%	10.7349%	10.5263%	10.3125%	10.0939%	9.8704%	9.6423%
11.3664%	11.1550%	10.9382%	10.7161%	10.4889%	10.2567%	10.0197%
11.8112%	11.5916%	11.3663%	11.1355%	10.8994%	10.6581%	10.4118%
12.2734%	12.0452%	11.8112%	11.5713%	11.3260%	11.0752%	10.8193%
12.7538%	12.5166%	12.2734%	12.0242%	11.7692%	11.5087%	11.2427%
13.2529%	13.0065%	12.7537%	12.4948%	12.2298%	11.9591%	11.6827%
13.7716%	13.5155%	13.2529%	12.9838%	12.7084%	12.4271%	12.1399%
14.3105%	14.0445%	13.7715%	13.4919%	13.2058%	12.9134%	12.6150%
14.8706%	14.5941%	14.3105%	14.0199%	13.7226%	13.4188%	13.1087%
15.4526%	15.1653%	14.8705%	14.5686%	14.2597%	13.9440%	13.6217%
16.0573%	15.7588%	15.4525%	15.1388%	14.8177%	14.4897%	14.1548%
16.6858%	16.3755%	16.0573%	15.7312%	15.3977%	15.0568%	14.7088%
17.3388%	17.0164%	16.6857%	16.3469%	16.0003%	15.6460%	15.2844%
18.0173%	17.6824%	17.3387%	16.9867%	16.6264%	16.2584%	15.8826%
18.7225%	18.3744%	18.0173%	17.6514%	17.2771%	16.8946%	16.5042%
	19.0935%	18.7224%	18.3423%	17.9533%	17.5558%	17.1501%
		19.4551%	19.0601%	18.6559%	18.2429%	17.8213%
			19.8060%	19.3860%	18.9569%	18.5188%
				20.1447%	19.6988%	19.2435%
					20.4697%	19.9966%
						20.7792%

15-Apr-22	15-May-22	15-Jun-22
t = 9.83	t = 9.92	t = 10
0.1649%	0.1623%	0.1596%
0.1735%	0.1707%	0.1679%
0.1825%	0.1795%	0.1766%
0.1920%	0.1889%	0.1858%
0.2019%	0.1986%	0.1954%
0.2124%	0.2090%	0.2055%
0.2234%	0.2198%	0.2162%
0.2350%	0.2312%	0.2274%
0.2472%	0.2432%	0.2392%
0.2600%	0.2558%	0.2516%
0.2735%	0.2691%	0.2647%
0.2877%	0.2831%	0.2784%
0.3027%	0.2977%	0.2929%
0.3184%	0.3132%	0.3081%
0.3349%	0.3294%	0.3241%
0.3523%	0.3465%	0.3409%
0.3705%	0.3645%	0.3586%
0.3898%	0.3834%	0.3772%
0.4100%	0.4033%	0.3967%
0.4313%	0.4242%	0.4173%
0.4536%	0.4463%	0.4390%
0.4772%	0.4694%	0.4617%
0.5019%	0.4938%	0.4857%
0.5280%	0.5194%	0.5109%
0.5554%	0.5463%	0.5374%
0.5842%	0.5747%	0.5653%
0.6145%	0.6045%	0.5946%
0.6464%	0.6359%	0.6255%
0.6799%	0.6689%	0.6579%
0.7152%	0.7036%	0.6921%
0.7523%	0.7401%	0.7280%
0.7913%	0.7785%	0.7658%
0.8324%	0.8189%	0.8055%
0.8756%	0.8614%	0.8473%
0.9210%	0.9060%	0.8912%
0.9688%	0.9531%	0.9375%
1.0191%	1.0025%	0.9861%
1.0720%	1.0545%	1.0373%
1.1276%	1.1092%	1.0911%
1.1861%	1.1668%	1.1477%
1.2476%	1.2273%	1.2073%
1.3124%	1.2910%	1.2699%
1.3804%	1.3580%	1.3358%
1.4521%	1.4285%	1.4051%
1.5274%	1.5026%	1.4780%
1.6067%	1.5805%	1.5547%
1.6900%	1.6625%	1.6354%
1.7777%	1.7488%	1.7202%
1.8700%	1.8395%	1.8095%
1.9670%	1.9350%	1.9034%
2.0690%	2.0354%	2.0021%
2.1764%	2.1410%	2.1060%
2.2893%	2.2521%	2.2153%
2.4081%	2.3689%	2.3302%
2.5331%	2.4919%	2.4511%
2.6645%	2.6211%	2.5783%
2.8027%	2.7571%	2.7121%
2.9482%	2.9002%	2.8528%
3.1011%	3.0507%	3.0008%
3.2620%	3.2090%	3.1565%
3.4313%	3.3755%	3.3203%
3.6093%	3.5506%	3.4926%
3.7966%	3.7348%	3.6738%
3.9936%	3.9286%	3.8644%
4.2008%	4.1325%	4.0650%
4.4188%	4.3469%	4.2759%
4.6480%	4.5724%	4.4977%
4.8892%	4.8097%	4.7311%
5.1429%	5.0592%	4.9766%
5.4097%	5.3217%	5.2348%
5.6904%	5.5979%	5.5064%
5.9857%	5.8883%	5.7921%
6.2962%	6.1938%	6.0926%
6.6229%	6.5152%	6.4088%
6.9666%	6.8533%	6.7413%
7.3280%	7.2088%	7.0911%
7.7082%	7.5829%	7.4590%
8.1082%	7.9763%	7.8460%
8.5289%	8.3902%	8.2531%
8.9714%	8.8255%	8.6813%
9.4369%	9.2834%	9.1318%
9.9266%	9.7651%	9.6056%
10.4416%	10.2718%	10.1040%
10.9834%	10.8048%	10.6282%
11.5533%	11.3654%	11.1797%
12.1527%	11.9551%	11.7598%
12.7833%	12.5754%	12.3699%
13.4466%	13.2279%	13.0118%
14.1443%	13.9142%	13.6869%
14.8781%	14.6362%	14.3971%
15.6501%	15.3956%	15.1441%
16.4621%	16.1944%	15.9298%
17.3163%	17.0347%	16.7564%
18.2148%	17.9185%	17.6258%
19.1599%	18.8483%	18.5403%
20.1540%	19.8262%	19.5023%
21.1997%	20.8549%	20.5142%
22.2997%	21.9370%	21.5786%
23.4567%	23.0752%	22.6982%
24.6738%	24.2725%	23.8759%
25.9540%	25.5319%	25.1148%
27.3007%	26.8567%	26.4179%
28.7172%	28.2501%	27.7886%
30.2072%	29.7159%	29.2304%
31.7745%	31.2578%	30.7471%
33.4232%	32.8796%	32.3424%
35.1574%	34.5856%	34.0206%
36.9816%	36.3801%	35.7858%
38.9004%	38.2678%	37.6425%
40.9188%	40.2533%	39.5957%
43.0419%	42.3419%	41.6501%
45.2752%	44.5389%	43.8112%
47.6243%	46.8498%	46.0844%
50.0954%	49.2807%	48.4755%
52.6946%	51.8376%	50.9907%
55.4288%	54.5273%	53.6364%
58.3047%	57.3565%	56.4194%
61.3299%	60.3325%	59.3468%
	63.4629%	62.4261%
		65.6651%

APPENDIX H: POST-CALIBRATION BINOMIAL LATTICES

H1. USD 2011 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

H2. EUR 2011 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

H3. USD 2012 POST-CALIBRATION LATTICE

Refer to following pages.

15-Jan-21	15-Feb-21	15-Mar-21
t = 9.83	t = 9.92	t = 10
0.4961%	0.4886%	0.4814%
0.5167%	0.5089%	0.5013%
0.5381%	0.5300%	0.5221%
0.5604%	0.5519%	0.5437%
0.5836%	0.5748%	0.5663%
0.6078%	0.5986%	0.5897%
0.6330%	0.6235%	0.6142%
0.6592%	0.6493%	0.6397%
0.6866%	0.6762%	0.6662%
0.7150%	0.7042%	0.6938%
0.7447%	0.7334%	0.7225%
0.7755%	0.7638%	0.7525%
0.8077%	0.7955%	0.7837%
0.8412%	0.8285%	0.8162%
0.8760%	0.8628%	0.8500%
0.9124%	0.8986%	0.8852%
0.9502%	0.9358%	0.9219%
0.9896%	0.9746%	0.9601%
1.0306%	1.0150%	0.9999%
1.0733%	1.0571%	1.0414%
1.1178%	1.1009%	1.0846%
1.1641%	1.1466%	1.1295%
1.2124%	1.1941%	1.1763%
1.2626%	1.2436%	1.2251%
1.3150%	1.2951%	1.2759%
1.3695%	1.3488%	1.3288%
1.4262%	1.4047%	1.3839%
1.4854%	1.4630%	1.4412%
1.5469%	1.5236%	1.5010%
1.6111%	1.5868%	1.5632%
1.6778%	1.6525%	1.6280%
1.7474%	1.7210%	1.6955%
1.8198%	1.7924%	1.7657%
1.8953%	1.8667%	1.8389%
1.9738%	1.9440%	1.9152%
2.0556%	2.0246%	1.9945%
2.1408%	2.1085%	2.0772%
2.2296%	2.1960%	2.1633%
2.3220%	2.2870%	2.2530%
2.4183%	2.3818%	2.3464%
2.5185%	2.4805%	2.4436%
2.6229%	2.5833%	2.5449%
2.7316%	2.6904%	2.6504%
2.8449%	2.8019%	2.7603%
2.9628%	2.9181%	2.8747%
3.0856%	3.0390%	2.9939%
3.2135%	3.1650%	3.1180%
3.3467%	3.2962%	3.2472%
3.4854%	3.4328%	3.3818%
3.6299%	3.5751%	3.5220%
3.7804%	3.7233%	3.6680%
3.9371%	3.8777%	3.8201%
4.1003%	4.0384%	3.9784%
4.2702%	4.2058%	4.1433%
4.4472%	4.3802%	4.3151%
4.6316%	4.5617%	4.4939%
4.8236%	4.7508%	4.6802%
5.0235%	4.9477%	4.8742%
5.2318%	5.1528%	5.0763%
5.4486%	5.3664%	5.2867%
5.6745%	5.5889%	5.5058%
5.9097%	5.8205%	5.7341%
6.1547%	6.0618%	5.9718%
6.4098%	6.3131%	6.2193%
6.6755%	6.5748%	6.4771%
6.9522%	6.8473%	6.7456%
7.2404%	7.1312%	7.0252%
7.5405%	7.4268%	7.3164%
7.8531%	7.7346%	7.6197%
8.1786%	8.0552%	7.9355%
8.5176%	8.3891%	8.2645%
8.8707%	8.7369%	8.6071%
9.2384%	9.0990%	8.9638%
9.6214%	9.4762%	9.3354%
10.0202%	9.8690%	9.7224%
10.4355%	10.2781%	10.1254%
10.8681%	10.7041%	10.5451%
11.3186%	11.1479%	10.9822%
11.7878%	11.6100%	11.4374%
12.2764%	12.0912%	11.9116%
12.7853%	12.5924%	12.4053%
13.3153%	13.1144%	12.9195%
13.8672%	13.6580%	13.4551%
14.4420%	14.2242%	14.0128%
15.0407%	14.8138%	14.5937%
15.6642%	15.4278%	15.1986%
16.3135%	16.0674%	15.8286%
16.9897%	16.7334%	16.4847%
17.6939%	17.4270%	17.1681%
18.4274%	18.1494%	17.8797%
19.1912%	18.9017%	18.6209%
19.9868%	19.6852%	19.3927%
20.8152%	20.5012%	20.1966%
21.6781%	21.3510%	21.0338%
22.5767%	22.2361%	21.9057%
23.5125%	23.1578%	22.8137%
24.4872%	24.1177%	23.7594%
25.5022%	25.1175%	24.7442%
26.5593%	26.1586%	25.7699%
27.6602%	27.2430%	26.8382%
28.8068%	28.3722%	27.9506%
30.0009%	29.5483%	29.1093%
31.2445%	30.7731%	30.3159%
32.5397%	32.0487%	31.5725%
33.8885%	33.3772%	32.8813%
35.2932%	34.7608%	34.2443%
36.7562%	36.2017%	35.6638%
38.2798%	37.7023%	37.1421%
39.8666%	39.2651%	38.6817%
41.5191%	40.8927%	40.2851%
43.2402%	42.5878%	41.9550%
45.0326%	44.3532%	43.6941%
46.8992%	46.1917%	45.5054%
48.8433%	48.1064%	47.3916%
50.8680%	50.1005%	49.3561%
52.9765%	52.1773%	51.4020%
55.1725%	54.3401%	53.5327%
57.4595%	56.5926%	55.7518%
58.9385%	58.9385%	58.0628%
		60.4696%

15-Apr-22	15-May-22	15-Jun-22
t = 9.83	t = 9.92	t = 10
0.8919%	0.8958%	0.8253%
0.9382%	0.9423%	0.8682%
0.9869%	0.9912%	0.9132%
1.0381%	1.0426%	0.9606%
1.0919%	1.0967%	1.0104%
1.1486%	1.1536%	1.0629%
1.2082%	1.2135%	1.1180%
1.2709%	1.2764%	1.1760%
1.3368%	1.3426%	1.2370%
1.4062%	1.4123%	1.3012%
1.4791%	1.4855%	1.3687%
1.5559%	1.5627%	1.4398%
1.6366%	1.6438%	1.5145%
1.7215%	1.7290%	1.5930%
1.8108%	1.8188%	1.6757%
1.9048%	1.9131%	1.7626%
2.0036%	2.0124%	1.8541%
2.1076%	2.1168%	1.9503%
2.2169%	2.2266%	2.0515%
2.3320%	2.3422%	2.1579%
2.4530%	2.4637%	2.2699%
2.5802%	2.5915%	2.3877%
2.7141%	2.7260%	2.5116%
2.8549%	2.8674%	2.6419%
3.0031%	3.0162%	2.7790%
3.1589%	3.1727%	2.9231%
3.3228%	3.3373%	3.0748%
3.4952%	3.5105%	3.2344%
3.6765%	3.6926%	3.4022%
3.8673%	3.8842%	3.5787%
4.0680%	4.0858%	3.7644%
4.2790%	4.2978%	3.9597%
4.5011%	4.5207%	4.1651%
4.7346%	4.7553%	4.3813%
4.9803%	5.0020%	4.6086%
5.2387%	5.2616%	4.8477%
5.5105%	5.5346%	5.0992%
5.7964%	5.8218%	5.3638%
6.0971%	6.1238%	5.6421%
6.4135%	6.4416%	5.9349%
6.7463%	6.7758%	6.2428%
7.0963%	7.1274%	6.5667%
7.4645%	7.4972%	6.9074%
7.8518%	7.8862%	7.2658%
8.2592%	8.2953%	7.6428%
8.6877%	8.7258%	8.0394%
9.1385%	9.1785%	8.4565%
9.6127%	9.6547%	8.8953%
10.1114%	10.1557%	9.3569%
10.6361%	10.6826%	9.8423%
11.1880%	11.2369%	10.3530%
11.7685%	11.8199%	10.8902%
12.3791%	12.4332%	11.4553%
13.0214%	13.0783%	12.0496%
13.6970%	13.7569%	12.6748%
14.4077%	14.4707%	13.3325%
15.1552%	15.2216%	14.0242%
15.9416%	16.0113%	14.7519%
16.7687%	16.8421%	15.5173%
17.6388%	17.7160%	16.3225%
18.5540%	18.6352%	17.1694%
19.5167%	19.6021%	18.0602%
20.5293%	20.6192%	18.9973%
21.5945%	21.6890%	19.9830%
22.7150%	22.8144%	21.0198%
23.8936%	23.9981%	22.1105%
25.1333%	25.2433%	23.2577%
26.4374%	26.5531%	24.4644%
27.8091%	27.9308%	25.7338%
29.2520%	29.3800%	27.0690%
30.7698%	30.9044%	28.4735%
32.3663%	32.5079%	29.9509%
34.0457%	34.1947%	31.5049%
35.8122%	35.9689%	33.1396%
37.6703%	37.8352%	34.8591%
39.6249%	39.7983%	36.6678%
41.6809%	41.8633%	38.5704%
43.8435%	44.0354%	40.5716%
46.1184%	46.3202%	42.6767%
48.5113%	48.7236%	44.8910%
51.0284%	51.2517%	47.2203%
53.6760%	53.9109%	49.6703%
56.4611%	56.7081%	52.2475%
59.3906%	59.6505%	54.9585%
62.4722%	62.7455%	57.8100%
65.7136%	66.0011%	60.8096%
69.1232%	69.4257%	63.9647%
72.7098%	73.0279%	67.2836%
76.4824%	76.8170%	70.7747%
80.4508%	80.8028%	74.4469%
84.6250%	84.9953%	78.3097%
89.0159%	89.4054%	82.3729%
93.6346%	94.0443%	86.6469%
98.4929%	98.9239%	91.1426%
103.6033%	104.0566%	95.8717%
108.9789%	109.4557%	100.8461%
114.6334%	115.1349%	106.0786%
120.5812%	121.1088%	111.5826%
126.8377%	127.3927%	117.3722%
133.4188%	134.0026%	123.4621%
140.3414%	140.9555%	129.8681%
147.6232%	148.2691%	136.6065%
155.2828%	155.9622%	143.6944%
163.3398%	164.0545%	151.1502%
171.8148%	172.5666%	158.9928%
180.7296%	181.5204%	167.2423%
190.1070%	190.9388%	175.9198%
199.9709%	200.8459%	185.0476%
210.3466%	211.2670%	194.6490%
221.2607%	222.2288%	204.7486%
232.7410%	233.7594%	215.3722%
244.8170%	245.8882%	226.5470%
257.5196%	258.6464%	238.3016%
270.8813%	272.0665%	250.6661%
284.9363%	286.1830%	263.6722%
299.7205%	301.0319%	277.3531%
315.2718%	316.6513%	291.7439%
331.6300%	333.0811%	306.8813%
	350.3633%	322.8042%
		339.5532%

APPENDIX I: FINAL BOND VALUATION MODELS FOR DETERMINING OAS

I1. 2021 USD NOTES FINAL VALUATION MODEL

Refer to following pages.

I1. 2018 EURO NOTES FINAL VALUATION MODEL

Refer to following pages.

I1. 2021 NOTES FINAL VALUATION MODEL

Refer to following pages.

I1. 2021 NOTES FINAL VALUATION MODEL

Refer to following pages.

15-Mar-15	15-Apr-15	15-May-15	15-Jun-15	15-Jul-15	15-Aug-15	15-Sep-15	15-Oct-15	15-Nov-15	15-Dec-15	15-Jan-16	15-Feb-16	15-Mar-16	15-Apr-16	15-May-16	15-Jun-16
t=4	t=4.08	t=4.17	t=4.25	t=4.33	t=4.42	t=4.5	t=4.58	t=4.67	t=4.75	t=4.83	t=4.92	t=5	t=5.08	t=5.17	t=5.25
-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	106.63	103.87	104.42
107.83802	104.98982	105.43528	105.87640	106.31449	106.75043	107.18457	104.30448	104.72236	105.13842	105.55261	105.96487	106.37514	103.47089	103.86508	104.41717
107.72968	104.90064	105.36143	105.81451	106.26126	106.70408	107.14413	104.26960	104.69280	105.11407	105.53337	105.95063	106.36581	103.46633	103.86508	104.41717
107.58564	104.79245	105.26620	105.73811	106.19986	106.65357	107.10155	104.23320	104.66202	105.08872	105.51334	105.93581	106.35608	103.46159	103.86508	104.41717
107.39534	104.62207	105.13469	105.63351	106.11868	106.59124	107.05314	104.19453	104.62398	105.06233	105.49248	105.92038	106.34596	103.45566	103.86508	104.41717
107.15553	104.41152	104.95476	105.48488	106.00067	106.50143	106.98725	104.14695	104.59468	105.03485	105.47077	105.90342	106.33542	103.45152	103.86508	104.41717
106.87038	104.15202	104.72309	105.28344	105.83150	106.36557	106.88409	104.07352	104.54534	105.00236	105.48162	105.87959	106.32444	103.44617	103.86508	104.41717
106.54742	103.85085	104.45229	105.03134	105.60788	106.17344	106.72619	104.05152	104.54860	104.94710	105.41682	105.87017	106.31301	103.44059	103.86508	104.41717
106.19285	103.51583	104.13034	104.73769	105.33739	105.92869	106.51046	103.76863	104.31218	104.83997	105.34897	105.83637	106.30111	103.43479	103.86508	104.41717
105.80941	103.15162	103.78500	104.41140	105.03076	105.64287	106.24734	103.53097	104.10358	104.66531	105.21390	105.74608	106.25726	103.42874	103.86508	104.41717
105.39667	102.75906	103.41183	104.05715	104.69517	105.32598	105.94958	103.25334	103.84762	104.43376	105.01091	105.57777	106.13241	103.35927	103.86508	104.40867
104.95231	102.33643	103.01001	103.67541	104.33283	104.98247	105.62450	102.94659	103.55922	104.16445	104.76204	105.35155	105.93234	103.19103	103.73819	104.27376
104.47345	101.88083	102.56767	103.26406	103.94249	104.61231	105.27376	102.61458	103.24521	103.86822	104.48369	105.09158	105.69166	102.97099	103.40229	104.09986
103.95762	101.38936	102.10927	102.81899	103.52114	104.21302	104.89566	102.25676	102.90656	103.54796	104.18124	104.80663	105.42427	102.72167	103.30985	103.89883
103.40337	100.90593	101.60454	102.33977	103.06555	103.78107	104.48687	101.87029	102.54120	103.20271	103.85511	104.49875	105.13395	102.44851	103.05364	103.65105
102.81060	100.20216	101.06116	101.92148	102.77225	103.51308	104.04367	101.45133	102.14549	102.82931	103.50298	104.16576	104.82102	102.15363	102.77580	103.38976
102.18043	99.68542	100.47904	101.26418	102.04024	102.80667	103.56297	101.09624	101.71538	102.42359	103.12082	103.80716	104.48280	101.83558	102.47649	103.10807
101.51485	99.04257	99.85941	100.66853	101.46927	102.26101	103.04310	100.50248	101.24757	101.98160	102.70427	103.41538	104.11491	101.49046	102.15265	102.80417
100.81525	98.36556	99.20443	100.03635	100.86070	101.67682	102.48404	99.96919	100.74028	101.50066	102.24978	102.98721	103.71263	101.11335	101.79949	102.47375
100.08695	97.65885	98.51661	99.37013	100.21682	101.05609	101.88728	99.39722	100.19356	100.97988	101.75549	102.51978	103.27216	100.69968	101.41191	102.11550
99.32885	96.91860	97.79838	98.67245	99.54033	100.40147	101.25530	98.78870	99.60904	100.42021	101.22150	102.01217	102.79153	100.24641	100.98587	101.71251
98.54335	96.15251	97.05170	97.94559	98.83374	99.71569	100.59096	98.14649	98.98941	99.82401	100.64961	101.46549	102.27092	99.75263	100.51927	101.27352
97.73126	95.35966	96.27797	97.19123	98.09908	99.00110	99.89689	97.47346	98.33770	99.19432	100.04274	100.88230	101.71232	99.23597	100.01238	100.79361
96.89298	94.54063	95.47798	96.41046	97.33773	98.25943	99.17516	96.72204	97.65666	98.53417	99.40409	100.26587	101.11890	98.65004	99.46741	100.27420
96.02856	93.69561	94.65209	95.60383	96.55049	97.49712	98.42717	96.04398	96.94841	97.84608	98.73655	99.61938	100.49407	98.04756	98.87809	99.71737
95.13786	92.82453	93.80033	94.77149	95.73766	96.69851	97.65367	95.29031	96.21434	97.13179	98.04229	98.94543	99.84082	97.41550	98.27717	99.12990
94.22064	91.92716	92.92252	93.91333	94.89924	95.87989	96.85493	94.51152	95.49517	96.39233	97.32266	98.24580	99.16138	96.75651	97.63866	98.52122
93.27661	91.03223	92.01839	93.00210	94.00500	95.03572	96.03089	93.70766	94.67112	95.62813	96.57836	97.52146	98.45708	96.07237	97.06839	97.86839
92.30549	90.05244	91.08762	92.11849	93.14466	94.16573	95.18132	92.87856	93.86209	94.83921	95.80956	96.77279	97.72856	95.36403	96.38603	97.19987
91.30701	89.07540	90.12993	91.18119	92.22789	93.26959	94.30590	92.02392	93.02783	94.02535	95.01612	95.99978	96.97596	94.63182	95.57382	96.50766
90.28093	88.09114	89.14501	90.21689	91.28435	92.34696	93.40428	91.14339	92.16798	93.18623	94.19755	95.20217	96.19909	93.87567	94.83794	95.79202
89.22707	87.103615	88.13261	89.22530	90.31375	91.39750	92.47610	90.23660	91.28217	92.32147	93.35408	94.37960	95.39763	93.09528	94.07818	95.05284
88.14528	85.97534	87.02923	88.20618	89.31581	90.42092	91.52105	89.30321	90.37004	91.43069	92.48471	93.53169	94.57119	92.29030	93.29419	94.28980
87.03547	84.88659	86.02459	87.15933	88.29029	89.41695	90.53882	88.34289	89.43124	90.51352	91.58927	92.65803	93.71935	91.46029	92.48556	93.50251
85.89762	83.76983	84.92869	86.08459	87.23700	88.38537	89.52917	87.35537	88.46545	89.56962	90.66738	91.75824	92.84171	90.60485	91.65185	92.69053
84.73174	82.62503	83.80475	84.98187	86.15581	87.32600	88.49188	86.34039	87.47241	88.59869	89.71872	90.83195	91.93790	89.72357	90.79264	91.85341
83.53793	81.45225	82.65279	83.85111	85.04662	86.23870	87.42678	85.29774	86.45187	87.60046	88.74297	89.87885	91.00756	88.81608	89.90755	90.99076
82.31636	80.25159	81.47285	82.69233	83.90939	85.12341	86.33374	84.22728	85.40363	86.57469	87.73989	88.89864	90.05037	87.88202	88.99619	90.10218
81.06726	79.02323	80.26508	81.50561	82.74417	83.98009	85.21272	83.12890	84.32754	85.52120	86.70924	87.89105	89.06604	86.59210	88.05823	89.18728
79.79097	77.76745	79.02967	80.29110	81.55104	82.80861	84.06370	82.00554	83.23252	84.43984	85.65085	86.85589	88.05431	85.93360	87.09335	88.24574
78.48787	76.48458	77.76691	79.04901	80.33017	81.60966	82.88675	80.04822	81.09153	82.30055	83.56459	84.79297	86.01500	84.93751	86.10127	87.27225
77.15847	75.17506	76.47715	77.77965	79.08180	80.38283	81.68199	79.66600	80.93158	82.19328	83.45039	84.70218	85.94793	83.87443	85.08177	86.28154
75.80334	73.83939	75.16086	76.48341	77.80625	79.12859	80.44962	78.45604	79.74376	81.02908	82.30824	83.58346	84.85299	82.80359	84.03465	85.25838
74.42318	72.47819	73.81857	75.16076	76.50393	77.84726	79.18992	77.21856	78.52824	79.83505	81.13817	82.43681	83.73015	81.70492	82.95977	84.20750
73.01878	71.09218	72.45092	73.81226	75.17534	76.53929	77.90325	75.95384	77.28525	78.61436	79.94032	81.26228	82.57940	80.57836	81.85704	83.12904
71.59101	69.68217	71.05865	72.43858	73.82105	75.20518	76.59005	74.66227	76.01510	77.36626	78.71486	80.06001	81.40082	79.42393	80.72643	82.02264
70.14088	68.24907	69.64260	71.04047	72.44177	73.84555	75.25008	73.44431	74.71819	76.01908	77.46206	78.83019	80.19456	78.24172	79.56797	80.88836
68.66499	66.79392	68.20372	69.61882	71.03827	72.46111	73.88636	72.00053	73.39500	74.78924	76.18227	77.57312	78.96081	77.03189	78.38176	79.72626
67.17808	65.31786	66.74306	68.17458	69.61145	71.05266	72.49722	70.63158	72.04611	73.46123	74.87591	76.28914	77.69989	75.79466	77.16795	78.53643
-	63.82214	65.26179	66.70884	68.16230	69.62114	71.08430	69.23822	70.67221	72.10766	73.54351	74.97870	76.41217	74.53034	75.92679	77.31905
-	-	63.76120	65.22282	66.69196	68.16756	69.64854	67.82131	69.27406	70.72922	72.18569	73.64235	75.09810	73.29933	74.65860	76

15-Mar-19	15-Apr-19	15-May-19	15-Jun-19	15-Jul-19	15-Aug-19	15-Sep-19	15-Oct-19	15-Nov-19	15-Dec-19	15-Jan-20	15-Feb-20	15-Mar-20	15-Apr-20	15-May-20	15-Jun-20
t=8	t=8.08	t=8.17	t=8.25	t=8.33	t=8.42	t=8.5	t=8.58	t=8.67	t=8.75	t=8.83	t=8.92	t=9	t=9.08	t=9.17	t=9.25
103.86	103.31	100.55	101.10	101.66	102.21	102.76	103.31	100.55	101.10	101.66	102.21	102.76	103.31	100.55	101.10
-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
103.18325	100.21796	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22372	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22904	100.55208	101.10417
103.17817	100.21510	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22151	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22705	100.55208	101.10417
103.17288	100.21224	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21922	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22249	100.55208	101.10417
103.16738	100.20988	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21683	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22284	100.55208	101.10417
103.16164	100.20710	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21434	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22260	100.55208	101.10417
103.15567	100.20421	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21175	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21287	100.55208	101.10417
103.14945	100.20120	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20906	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21584	100.55208	101.10417
103.14298	100.19807	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20625	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21331	100.55208	101.10417
103.13623	100.19481	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20332	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21068	100.55208	101.10417
103.12921	100.19141	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20027	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20794	100.55208	101.10417
103.12190	100.18787	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19710	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20508	100.55208	101.10417
103.11428	100.18418	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19380	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20211	100.55208	101.10417
103.10636	100.18034	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19036	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19911	100.55208	101.10417
103.09810	100.17654	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18677	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19579	100.55208	101.10417
103.08950	100.17218	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18304	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19243	100.55208	101.10417
103.08055	100.16785	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17916	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18889	100.55208	101.10417
103.07122	100.16333	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17511	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18529	100.55208	101.10417
103.06151	100.15863	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17089	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18150	100.55208	101.10417
103.05140	100.15373	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16651	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17755	100.55208	101.10417
103.04088	100.14864	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16194	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17343	100.55208	101.10417
103.02991	100.14333	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15718	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16915	100.55208	101.10417
103.01850	100.13780	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15222	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16469	100.55208	101.10417
103.00661	100.13204	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.14706	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16021	100.55208	101.10417
102.99424	100.12605	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.14169	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15504	100.55208	101.10417
102.98135	100.11980	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13609	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15017	100.55208	101.10417
102.96793	100.11330	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13026	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.14492	100.55208	101.10417
102.95396	100.10654	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.12420	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13946	100.55208	101.10417
102.93941	100.09949	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.11788	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13377	100.55208	101.10417
102.92427	100.09215	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.11130	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.12785	100.55208	101.10417
102.90849	100.08450	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.10444	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.12168	100.55208	101.10417
102.89207	100.07655	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.09731	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.11526	100.55208	101.10417
102.87497	100.06826	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.08988	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.10857	100.55208	101.10417
102.85717	100.05963	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.08214	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.10161	100.55208	101.10417
102.83864	100.05064	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.07409	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.09435	100.55208	101.10417
102.81934	100.04129	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.06570	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.08680	100.55208	101.10417
102.77468	100.03155	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.05696	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.07874	100.55208	101.10417
102.65813	99.97202	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.04787	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.07075	100.55208	101.10417
102.46114	99.81853	100.45279	101.06591	101.65314	102.20833	102.76042	100.03840	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.06222	100.55208	101.10417
102.21315	99.59811	100.26468	100.91715	101.55312	102.16914	102.76042	100.02924	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.05325	100.55208	101.10417
101.97511	99.34287	100.03156	100.03156	101.37553	102.02849	102.66620	100.02047	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.04410	100.55208	101.10417
101.64666	99.06768	99.77425	100.47103	101.15780	101.83417	102.49545	99.84003	100.46120	101.06597	101.65030	102.20833	102.76042	100.03448	100.55208	101.10417
101.33588	98.77868	99.50187	100.21540	100.91930	101.61359	102.29814	99.66021	100.30603	100.94780	101.56306	102.17069	102.76042	100.02315	100.55208	101.10417
101.02035	98.47776	99.21759	99.94755	100.66778	101.37837	102.07943	99.45851	100.12193	100.77600	101.42039	102.05448	102.67716	99.97406	100.54964	101.10417
100.69000	98.16522	98.92212	99.66886	100.40559	101.13244	101.84956	99.24459	99.92358	100.59348	101.25437	101.90623	102.54891	99.87956	100.47436	101.06712
100.34719	97.84082	98.61534	99.37940	100.13313	100.87668	101.61019	99.02132	99.71574	100.40089	101.07690	101.74392	102.40209	99.73897	100.36117	100.97475
99.99155	97.50420	98.29694	99.07890	99.85021	100.61102	101.36147	98.78921	99.49950	100.20020	100.89148	101.57351	102.24646	99.59799	100.23444	100.86254
99.62264	97.15495	97.96652	98.76699	99.55649	100.33516	101.03144	98.54808	99.27479	99.99159	100.69866	101.39615	102.08425	99.45062	100.10123	100.74324
99.24005	96.79266	97.62368	98.44329	99.25160	100.04875	100.83148	98.29764	99.04315	99.71854	100.49826	101.21178	101.91558	99.29733	99.96256	100.61889
98.84332	96.41689	97.26801	98.07399	98.93515	99.75142	100.55633	98.03754	98.79887	99.54964	100.29002	101.02016	101.74024	99.13795	99.81837	100.49596
98.43201	96.02722	96.89908	97.75889	98.60675	99.44279	100.26714	97.76744	98.54702	99.31570	100.07365	100.82103	101.55800	98.97226	99.66844	100.35507
98.00566	95.62280	96.51647	97.39737	98.26501	99.12249	99.96695	97.45701	98.28547	99.07270	99.84886	100.61410	101.36860	98.80063	99.51256	100.21521
97.56382	95.20437	96.11973	97.02342	97.91251	98.79012	99.65356	9								

15-Jul-20	15-Aug-20	15-Sep-20	15-Oct-20	15-Nov-20	15-Dec-20	15-Jan-21	15-Feb-21	15-Mar-21	15-Apr-21
t = 9.33	t = 9.42	t = 9.5	t = 9.58	t = 9.67	t = 9.75	t = 9.83	t = 9.92	t = 10	t = 10.08
101.66	102.21	102.76	103.31	100.55	101.10	101.66	102.21	102.76	103.31
-	-	-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	103.3125
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.23357	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.23177	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22997	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22796	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22593	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22382	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.22162	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21933	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21695	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21447	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.21188	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20919	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20639	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20347	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.20042	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19726	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19396	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.19053	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18695	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.18323	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17935	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17531	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.17110	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16672	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.16216	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15741	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.15247	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.14732	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.14195	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13637	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.13055	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.12449	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.11819	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.11162	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.10478	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.09766	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.09025	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.08252	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.07448	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.06611	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.05739	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.04832	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	100.03887	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.64714	102.20833	102.76042	100.02902	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.57939	102.17438	102.75837	100.01647	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.48240	102.09408	102.69750	99.97985	100.54744	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.37685	102.00222	102.61954	99.91647	100.49991	101.07600	101.64482	102.20636	102.76042	-
101.26650	101.90558	102.56321	99.84637	100.44231	101.03070	101.61173	102.18559	102.75245	-
101.15172	101.80502	102.49966	99.77333	100.38216	100.98316	101.57651	102.16239	102.74099	-
101.03233	101.70042	102.39592	99.69732	100.31957	100.93368	101.53984	102.13823	102.72905	-
100.90816	101.59161	102.29573	99.61824	100.25444	100.88218	101.50166	102.11308	102.71663	-
100.77903	101.47843	102.19817	99.53596	100.18666	100.82858	101.46193	102.08690	102.70369	-
100.64474	101.36071	102.09668	99.45035	100.11612	100.77280	101.42057	102.05964	102.69022	-
100.50511	101.23828	101.96111	99.36129	100.04273	100.71474	101.37752	102.03127	102.67619	-
100.35991	101.11096	101.85130	99.26863	99.96637	100.65433	101.33271	102.00173	102.66159	-
100.20895	100.97855	101.73708	99.17223	99.88691	100.59145	101.28608	101.97098	102.64639	-
100.05201	100.84087	101.61829	99.07196	99.80424	100.52603	101.23754	101.93898	102.63056	-
99.88885	100.69771	101.49474	98.96766	99.71823	100.45794	101.18702	101.90566	102.61408	-
99.71925	100.54886	101.36627	98.85917	99.62875	100.38710	101.13444	101.87097	102.59692	-
99.54297	100.39411	101.23267	98.74633	99.53566	100.31339	101.07972	101.83487	102.57906	-
99.35975	100.23324	101.09375	98.62898	99.43883	100.23669	101.02278	101.79729	102.56046	-
99.16955	100.06601	100.94931	98.50693	99.33810	100.15689	100.96352	101.75818	102.54110	-
98.97449	99.89219	100.79914	98.38001	99.23332	100.07387	100.90185	101.71947	102.52095	-
98.78590	99.71153	100.64302	98.24803	99.12435	99.98750	100.83768	101.67510	102.49996	-
98.55230	99.52379	100.48074	98.11080	99.01101	99.89765	100.77091	101.63100	102.47812	-
98.33040	99.32869	100.31205	97.96812	98.89313	99.80417	100.70143	101.58510	102.45538	-
98.09990	99.12597	100.13672	97.81978	98.77055	99.70695	100.62914	101.53733	102.43171	-
97.86050	98.91536	99.95451	97.66558	98.64308	99.60581	100.55393	101.48762	102.40707	-
97.61188	98.69656	99.76516	97.50528	98.51054	99.50062	100.47568	101.43589	102.38143	-
97.35371	98.46928	99.56840	97.33866	98.37274	99.39122	100.39427	101.38205	102.35473	-
97.08565	98.23322	99.36398	97.16549	98.22946	99.27745	100.30959	101.32603	102.32694	-
96.80737	97.98806	99.15160	96.98553	98.08051	99.15913	100.22149	101.26773	102.29801	-
96.51852	97.73349	98.93098	96.79852	97.92568	99.03609	100.12985	101.20707	102.26790	-
96.21872	97.46917	98.70184	96.60420	97.76474	98.90816	100.03453	101.14396	102.23657	-
95.90762	97.19477	98.46385	96.40232	97.59747	98.77514	99.93539	101.07829	102.20395	-
95.58485	96.90994	98.21612	96.19528	97.42362	98.63685	99.83228	101.00997	102.17001	-
95.24996	96.61432	97.96011	95.97472	97.24297	98.49308	99.72504	100.93889	102.13468	-
94.90262	96.30755	97.69371	95.74845	97.05526	98.34363	99.61352	100.86494	102.09791	-
94.54240	95.98924	97.41716	95.51345	96.86022	98.18828	99.49756	100.78802	102.05965	-
94.16889	95.65903	97.13013	95.26943	96.65761	98.02683	99.37698	100.70799	102.01983	-
93.78168	95.31652	96.83225	95.01607	96.44713	97.85903	99.25161	100.62476	101.97840	-
93.38032	94.96130	96.52316	94.75304	96.22851	97.68466	99.12127	100.53818	101.93528	-
92.96439	94.59298	96.20249	94.48001	96.00147	97.50347	98.98576	100.44813	101.89042	-
92.53344	94.21113	95.86986	94.19663	95.76569	97.31522	98.84491	100.35448	101.84373	-
92.08703	93.81534	95.52488	93.90257	95.52089	97.11965	98.69849	100.25708	101.79516	-
91.62470	93.40517	95.16714	93.59746	95.26673	96.91650	98.54632	100.15580	101.74462	-
91.14600	92.98018	94.79624	93.28052	95.00290	96.70549	98.38817	100.05049	101.69204	-
90.65045	92.53994	94.41177	92.95260	94.72906	96.48634	98.22382	99.94098	101.63734	-
90.13760	92.08400	94.01332	92.61210	94.44488	96.25877	98.05306	99.82713	101.58044	-
89.60697	91.61190	93.60044	92.25903	94.15001	96.02248	97.87563	99.70676	101.52124	-

	15-Nov-14	15-Dec-14	15-Jan-15	15-Feb-15	15-Mar-15	15-Apr-15	15-May-15	15-Jun-15	15-Jul-15	15-Aug-15	15-Sep-15
t=3.67	t=3.75	t=3.83	t=3.92	t=4	t=4.08	t=4.17	t=4.25	t=4.33	t=4.42	t=4.5	
-	-	-	-	-	106.63	103.87	104.42	104.97	105.52	106.07	-
-	-	-	-	-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	-
103.66629	104.18127	104.69390	105.20379	105.71053	102.90121	103.38686	103.86879	104.34717	104.82218	105.29400	
103.50923	104.03154	104.55141	105.06841	105.58211	102.77960	103.27175	103.76001	104.24459	104.72566	105.20343	
103.34629	103.87620	104.40356	104.92792	105.44885	102.65339	103.15227	103.64709	104.13806	104.62538	105.10924	
103.17725	103.71504	104.25016	104.78215	105.31056	102.52242	103.02827	103.52990	104.02750	104.52128	105.01146	
103.00183	103.54783	104.09101	104.63091	105.16708	102.38652	102.89959	103.40827	103.91274	104.41323	104.90996	
102.81967	103.37428	103.92586	104.47399	105.01820	102.24550	102.76606	103.28204	103.79364	104.30108	104.80460	
102.63017	103.19393	103.75438	104.31112	104.86370	102.09917	102.62750	103.15105	103.67003	104.18469	104.69524	
102.43229	103.00604	103.57601	104.14189	104.70330	101.94729	102.48370	103.01511	103.54176	104.06388	104.58174	
102.22443	102.80933	103.38981	103.96563	104.53649	101.78952	102.33442	102.87403	103.40864	103.93852	104.46393	
102.00425	102.60182	103.19418	103.78112	104.36241	101.62524	102.17922	102.72750	103.27044	103.80840	104.34167	
101.76886	102.38082	102.98676	103.58640	104.17949	101.45331	102.01731	102.57497	103.12681	103.67327	104.21476	
101.51521	102.14322	102.76451	103.37867	103.98536	101.27178	101.84720	102.41540	102.97703	103.53268	104.08288	
101.24080	101.88604	102.52420	103.15465	103.77683	101.07780	101.66648	102.24688	102.81971	103.38567	103.94545	
100.94421	101.60720	102.26314	102.91115	103.55046	100.86786	101.47183	102.06648	102.65243	103.23040	103.80115	
100.62541	101.30597	101.97981	102.64593	103.30332	100.63854	101.25955	101.87048	102.47173	103.06388	103.64762	
100.28555	100.98301	101.67426	102.35823	103.03381	100.38740	101.02646	101.65515	102.27362	102.88216	103.48123	
99.92644	100.63998	101.34781	102.04887	102.74205	100.11368	100.77086	101.41786	102.05461	102.68116	103.29766	
99.54995	100.27887	101.00247	101.71972	102.42957	99.81836	100.49293	101.15782	101.81288	102.45799	103.09307	
99.15753	99.90145	100.64025	101.37297	102.09860	99.50356	100.19446	100.87621	101.54872	102.21185	102.86548	
98.75007	99.50890	100.26267	101.01046	101.75130	99.17166	99.87793	100.57543	101.26418	101.94416	102.61531	
98.32793	99.10182	99.87063	100.63343	101.38927	98.82464	99.54567	100.25809	100.96204	101.65764	102.34495	
97.89110	98.68035	99.46445	100.24245	101.01338	98.46374	99.19932	99.92628	100.64482	101.35516	102.05751	
97.43933	98.24434	99.04409	99.83762	100.62393	98.08949	98.83975	99.58122	100.31418	101.03890	101.75568	
96.97229	97.79347	98.60929	99.41876	100.22084	97.70195	98.46719	99.22343	99.97095	100.71008	101.44115	
96.48957	97.32736	98.15970	98.98555	99.80383	97.30093	98.08154	98.85290	99.61532	100.36914	101.11469	
95.99077	96.84561	97.69492	98.53760	99.37254	96.88608	97.68250	98.46942	99.24715	100.01604	100.77644	
95.47545	96.34780	97.21453	98.07452	98.92659	96.45704	97.26972	98.07265	98.86614	99.65053	100.42621	
94.94320	95.83351	96.71813	97.59588	98.46555	96.01340	96.84280	97.66220	98.47191	99.27228	100.06369	
94.39359	95.30231	96.20528	97.10127	97.98903	95.55474	96.40134	97.23768	98.06409	98.88090	99.68852	
93.82618	94.75377	95.67556	96.59027	97.49659	95.08067	95.94494	96.79870	97.64228	98.47602	99.30032	
93.24055	94.18747	95.12854	96.06246	96.98783	94.59076	95.47317	96.34484	97.20607	98.05724	98.89872	
92.63628	93.60298	94.56381	95.51739	96.46231	94.08459	94.98564	95.87569	96.75508	97.62415	98.48331	
92.01294	92.99987	93.98092	94.95466	95.91961	93.56173	94.48190	95.39084	96.28888	97.17636	98.05370	
91.37011	92.37772	93.37946	94.37383	95.35930	93.02178	93.96155	94.89897	95.80705	96.71346	97.60949	
90.70738	91.73611	92.75899	93.77448	94.78096	92.46428	93.42416	94.37236	95.30919	96.23503	97.15027	
90.02434	91.07463	92.11911	93.15618	94.18416	91.88884	92.86930	93.83787	94.79487	95.74065	96.67563	
89.32059	90.39286	91.45940	92.51851	93.56848	91.29500	92.29654	93.28600	94.26366	95.22991	96.18514	
88.59574	89.69042	90.77944	91.86107	92.93350	90.68237	91.70547	92.71630	93.71515	94.70238	95.67840	
87.84942	88.96691	90.07885	91.18344	92.27881	90.05051	91.09566	92.12836	93.14890	94.15764	95.15498	
87.08126	88.22194	89.35722	90.48522	91.60399	89.39902	90.46669	91.52176	92.56450	93.59527	94.61446	
86.29092	87.45517	88.61419	89.76602	90.90865	88.72748	89.81815	90.89607	91.96152	93.01483	94.05641	
85.47806	86.66624	87.84938	89.02547	90.19240	88.03549	89.14962	90.25088	91.33953	92.41591	93.48042	
84.64238	85.85482	87.06246	88.26320	89.45486	87.32267	88.46071	89.58578	90.69813	91.79809	92.88605	
83.78359	85.02060	86.25308	87.47885	88.69566	86.58864	87.75102	88.90037	90.03691	91.16096	92.27289	
-	84.16329	85.42094	86.67211	87.91445	85.83302	87.02018	88.19425	89.35546	90.50409	91.64052	
-	-	84.56574	85.84264	87.11090	85.05547	86.26781	87.46705	88.65338	89.82709	90.98854	
-	-	-	84.99018	86.28469	84.25565	85.49356	86.71839	87.93030	89.12956	90.31653	
-	-	-	-	85.43554	83.43325	84.69710	85.94791	87.18584	88.41112	89.62411	
-	-	-	-	-	82.58796	83.87810	85.15528	86.41963	87.67139	88.91087	
-	-	-	-	-	-	83.03627	84.34017	85.63135	86.91001	88.17646	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83.50229	84.82067	86.12664	87.42049	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83.98728	85.32095	86.64264	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84.49263	85.84256	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	85.01995	

15-Aug-17	15-Sep-17	15-Oct-17	15-Nov-17	15-Dec-17	15-Jan-18	15-Feb-18	15-Mar-18	15-Apr-18
t = 6.42	t = 6.5	t = 6.58	t = 6.67	t = 6.75	t = 6.83	t = 6.92	t = 7	t = 7.08
102.21	102.76	103.31	100.55	101.10	101.66	102.21	102.76	103.31
-	-	3.3125	-	-	-	-	-	103.3125
102.20833	102.76042	100.17525	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.17213	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.16888	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.16551	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.16201	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.15837	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.15459	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.15066	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.14658	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.14234	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.13793	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.13335	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.12859	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.12365	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.11851	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.11317	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.10763	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.10187	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.09588	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.08966	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.08320	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.07648	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.06950	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.06226	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.05472	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.04690	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.03877	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20833	102.76042	100.03032	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.20175	102.76042	100.02155	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.15758	102.74518	100.00870	100.55208	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.08679	102.69102	99.97492	100.54459	101.10417	101.65625	102.20833	102.76042	-
102.00652	102.62301	99.91973	100.50320	101.07933	101.64785	102.20833	102.76042	-
101.92221	102.55052	99.85883	100.45337	101.04045	101.61999	102.19189	102.75609	-
101.83464	102.47517	99.79543	100.40127	100.99937	101.58963	102.17196	102.74628	-
101.74374	102.39695	99.72959	100.34717	100.95670	101.55810	102.15126	102.73609	-
101.64938	102.31573	99.66123	100.29098	100.91239	101.52535	102.12975	102.72550	-
101.55143	102.23142	99.59025	100.23264	100.86637	101.49133	102.10741	102.71450	-
101.44976	102.14389	99.51656	100.17205	100.81857	101.45600	102.08421	102.70307	-
101.34424	102.05304	99.44005	100.10914	100.76894	101.41930	102.06010	102.69120	-
101.23472	101.95872	99.36062	100.04382	100.71739	101.38119	102.03506	102.67887	-
101.12106	101.86082	99.27816	99.97600	100.66387	101.34160	102.00905	102.66606	-
101.00310	101.75921	99.19255	99.90558	100.60828	101.30049	101.98203	102.65275	-
100.88070	101.65375	99.10369	99.83247	100.55056	101.25779	101.95396	102.63892	-
100.75369	101.54430	99.01145	99.75656	100.49063	101.21344	101.92481	102.62455	-
100.62190	101.43071	98.91570	99.67776	100.42840	101.16739	101.89453	102.60963	-
100.48516	101.31283	98.81632	99.59595	100.36378	101.11956	101.86308	102.59413	-
100.34329	101.19051	98.71318	99.51103	100.29669	101.06990	101.83042	102.57802	-
100.19612	101.06358	98.60613	99.42288	100.22703	101.01832	101.79649	102.56129	-
100.04345	100.93189	98.49504	99.33137	100.15471	100.96476	101.76125	102.54392	-
99.88509	100.79525	98.37975	99.23639	100.07963	100.90915	101.72466	102.52586	-
99.72084	100.65350	98.26012	99.13781	100.00169	100.85141	101.68665	102.50711	-
99.55048	100.50644	98.13599	99.03550	99.92077	100.79145	101.64718	102.48763	-
99.37381	100.35390	98.00719	98.92931	99.83678	100.72919	101.60619	102.46740	-
99.19061	100.19567	97.87356	98.81912	99.74959	100.66456	101.56362	102.44638	-
99.00065	100.03157	97.73492	98.70476	99.65909	100.59745	101.51941	102.42456	-
98.80370	99.86137	97.59111	98.58611	99.56516	100.52778	101.47350	102.40188	-
98.59952	99.68487	97.44192	98.46298	99.46767	100.45545	101.42583	102.37833	-
98.38786	99.50186	97.28718	98.33524	99.36649	100.38036	101.37633	102.35387	-
98.16846	99.31209	97.12669	98.20271	99.26148	100.30241	101.32492	102.32846	-
97.94108	99.11535	96.96024	98.06521	99.15252	100.22150	101.27155	102.30208	-
97.70544	98.91140	96.78763	97.92259	99.03944	100.13752	101.21614	102.27467	-
97.46126	98.69998	96.60865	97.77464	98.92212	100.05034	101.15860	102.24621	-
97.20827	98.48085	96.42307	97.62119	98.80038	99.95987	101.09887	102.21665	-
96.94618	98.25375	96.23067	97.46203	98.67408	99.86596	101.03685	102.18595	-
96.67469	98.01841	96.03122	97.29698	98.54305	99.76851	100.97247	102.15407	-
96.39350	97.77457	95.82447	97.12583	98.40712	99.66738	100.90563	102.12097	-
96.10230	97.52193	95.61017	96.94836	98.26613	99.56243	100.83625	102.08659	-
95.80077	97.26021	95.38809	96.76435	98.11988	99.45353	100.76422	102.05089	-
95.48859	96.98913	95.15795	96.57359	97.96819	99.34054	100.68946	102.01381	-
95.16543	96.70838	94.91949	96.37584	97.81088	99.22331	100.61186	101.97532	-
94.83096	96.41764	94.67244	96.17087	97.64775	99.10169	100.53132	101.93535	-
94.48482	96.11662	94.41651	95.95843	97.47859	98.97551	100.44774	101.89385	-
94.12668	95.80498	94.15142	95.73827	97.30321	98.84463	100.36098	101.85076	-
93.75617	95.48240	93.87688	95.51014	97.12137	98.70887	100.27096	101.80603	-
93.37293	95.14855	93.59258	95.27377	96.93287	98.56805	100.17754	101.75958	-
92.97660	94.80308	93.29822	95.02890	96.73748	98.42201	100.08060	101.71136	-
92.56681	94.44565	92.99348	94.77524	96.53496	98.27057	99.98001	101.66131	-
-	94.07591	92.67805	94.51251	96.32508	98.11352	99.87565	101.60934	-
-	-	92.35160	94.24043	96.10758	97.95068	99.76738	101.55540	-
-	-	-	93.95870	95.88223	97.78185	99.65506	101.49941	-
-	-	-	-	95.64875	97.60682	99.53854	101.44129	-
-	-	-	-	-	97.42539	99.41768	101.38097	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	99.29232	101.31837	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	101.25339	-

APPENDIX J: SOURCE DATA FOR HISTORICAL DEFAULT RATES

Source of data extracted from Altman & Kuehne (2013, p. 276):

Table 4: Default Rates and Losses, 1978-3Q 2013 (Dollars in Millions)

Year	Par Value Outstanding ⁽¹⁾ (\$)	Par Value of Default (\$)	Default Rate (%)	Weighted Price After Default (\$)	Weighted Coupon (%)	Default Loss (%) ⁽²⁾
2013 (3Q)	1,392,212	11,744	0.84	55.7	10.19	0.42
2012	1,212,362	19,647	1.62	57.8	8.97	0.76
2011	1,354,649	17,963	1.33	60.3	9.10	0.59
2010	1,221,569	13,809	1.13	46.6	10.59	0.66
2009	1,152,952	123,878	10.74	36.1	8.16	7.30
2008	1,091,000	50,763	4.65	42.5	8.23	2.83
2007	1,075,400	5,473	0.51	66.6	9.64	0.19
2006	993,600	7,559	0.76	65.3	9.33	0.30
2005	1,073,000	36,209	3.37	61.1	8.61	1.46
2004	933,100	11,657	1.25	57.7	10.30	0.59
2003	825,000	38,451	4.66	45.5	9.55	2.76
2002	757,000	96,858	12.79	25.3	9.37	10.15
2001	649,000	63,609	9.80	25.5	9.18	7.76
2000	597,200	30,295	5.07	26.4	8.54	3.95
1999	567,400	23,532	4.15	27.9	10.55	3.21
1998	465,500	7,464	1.60	35.9	9.46	1.10
1997	335,400	4,200	1.25	54.2	11.87	0.65
1996	271,000	3,336	1.23	51.9	8.92	0.65
1995	240,000	4,551	1.90	40.6	11.83	1.24
1994	235,000	3,418	1.45	39.4	10.25	0.96
1993	206,907	2,287	1.11	56.6	12.98	0.56
1992	163,000	5,545	3.40	50.1	12.32	1.91
1991	183,600	18,862	10.27	36.0	11.59	7.16
1990	181,000	18,354	10.14	23.4	12.94	8.42
1989	189,258	8,110	4.29	38.3	13.40	2.93
1988	148,187	3,944	2.66	43.6	11.91	1.66
1987	129,557	7,486	5.78	75.9	12.07	1.74
1986	90,243	3,156	3.50	34.5	10.61	2.48
1985	58,088	992	1.71	45.9	13.69	1.04
1984	40,939	344	0.84	48.6	12.23	0.48
1983	27,492	301	1.09	55.7	10.11	0.54
1982	18,109	577	3.19	38.6	9.61	2.11
1981	17,115	27	0.16	72.0	15.75	0.15
1980	14,935	224	1.50	21.1	8.43	1.25
1979	10,356	20	0.19	31.0	10.63	0.14
1978	8,946	119	1.33	60.0	8.38	0.59
Arithmetic Average 1978-2012			3.44	45.65	10.55	2.29
Weighted Average 1978-2012			3.83			2.54

Notes: ⁽¹⁾ Excludes defaulted issues. ⁽²⁾ Default loss rate adjusted for fallen angels is 9.3% in 2002, 1.82% in 2003, 0.59% in 2004, 1.56% in 2005, 0.039% in 2006, 0.20% in 2007, 3.42% in 2008, 7.38% in 2009, 0.66% in 2010, 0.58% in 2011, 0.86% in 2012 and 0.41% in the third-quarter 2013.

Source: NYU Salomon Center.

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