

A COMMENTARY ON BOOK 3

OF

Q. CURTIUS RUFUS'

HISTORIAE ALEXANDRI MAGNI

J. E. ATKINSON B.A. (Dunelm)

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Summary

This Commentary has an immediate claim to originality in that it is the first full-scale commentary on any part of the Histories to appear since Mützell's work of 1841. Further it is, as far as I know, the first extended commentary on Curtius to appear in English.

The Introduction deals first with the vexed problem of Curtius' identity and his dates. Korzeniewski's thesis that Curtius wrote in Augustus' reign, in the 20s. B.C., is rejected, and more recent attempts to date Curtius to other reigns are likewise rejected (Verdière - Nero; Milns-Galba; Instinsky and Scheda - Vespasian; Robinson - Septimius Severus; Griset - Alexander Severus). The internal evidence indicates a date in Claudius' reign. Passages in the Histories indicate that Curtius was a Senator, and it is argued that the historian should be identified as the 'novus homo' who held at least one pro-consular appointment in Claudius' reign. The Senator's cursus is fully analysed. It is further argued that the historian may also have been the Curtius referred to in Suetonius' list of rhctors.

The Introduction then deals with Curtius' sources and his narrative art. It is emphasized here and throughout the Commentary that study of the primary sources on the history of Alexander has generally failed to establish the features of Curtius' individual style which have to be discounted in the process of identifying Curtius' sources. It is argued that Curtius read Trogus' Philippica and in places adopted his phraseology whilst taking the historical detail from other sources. Whilst Curtius tallies with Arrian on many points, Tarn's argument that Aristobulus was the common source is rejected; Curtius appears to have read Ptolemy's work, which like Aristobulus' was a source for Arrian's Anabasis, but Curtius used another source too which included detail suppressed by Ptolemy. Theories that the parallels between Curtius and Diodorus arise from their common use of Cleitarchus or Duris are shown to have little support from the

known fragments. The influence of Livy, and of the schools of rhetoric and philosophy is also indicated.

The Introduction concludes with a short survey of elements of Curtius' narrative art. The structure of the Historics is episodic, though the episodes are carefully interrelated, in part, as Book 3 shows, by motifs which run right through a book. The theory of Tarn and others that the inconsistent portrayal of Alexander stems from Curtius' clumsy contaminatio of different sources is shown to be unsatisfactory: some inconsistencies are illusory, dispelled by examination of the dramatic structure of the episodes concerned; some of the inconsistency arises from Curtius' inability to separate the historical Alexander from the Julio-Claudian image.

The Commentary concentrates on historical problems, the sources and Curtius' narrative art, though some attention is given to textual problems.

A series of appendices covers problems concerned with the chronology of events in 334-333 B.C., Athenian politics, Athena on coins of Cilicia, the identity of the River Pinarus, and cataphract cavalry.

Preface

The third book of Curtius' Histories is on the face of it one of the less interesting sections of the work, and one whose study is less likely to be rewarding than some of the other books. I should therefore point out that this project has not finished as it was originally planned, for the intention was to provide a commentary on the fourth book as well as the third. However it emerged that there was a great deal of work to be done on the third book and an extension of the commentary would have resulted in an unreasonably long thesis. Analysis of the single book has, I think, shown up the main features of Curtius' narrative art and revealed something of Curtius' use of his sources.

I have tried to indicate the type of man Curtius was, and the circumstances in which it was written, for it is necessary to see the work in the social context in which it was prepared. A critique of Curtius' ideas and of the values of the social class to which he belonged and for which he was writing has not been included in this thesis, since such a critique should be subsidiary to the analysis of Curtius' work per se, and it would cover much ground that is well known and not of immediate relevance to the Histories. Thus my concern has been to set the work in its historical context, rather than to assess it in political and ethical terms.

The preparation as a thesis of a commentary on a work like Curtius' Histories presents special problems: if the commentary is to be thorough and comprehensive it must cover many points on which little can be said that would be original; and it must require of the commentator discussion of topics that are marginal to his field of study. Thus I regret that there are several topics connected with the Histories Book 3 on which I cannot claim to write with any expert knowledge, for instance the topography and archaeological sites of Turkey. However my field is Alexander

studies, and no doubt the reader's interest will be the same. Therefore I have avoided loading this thesis with material that is readily available in standard handbooks in this field. For example, I have omitted a detailed discussion of each of the primary sources mentioned, as the relevant material can conveniently be found in Jacoby's Fragmente, Pearson's Lost Histories of Alexander and Hamilton's commentary on Plutarch's Alexander.

The Commentary is primarily concerned with historical problems and textual problems have generally been ignored, except where the textual crux requires the historian's aid. Further, as Bardon's text is not wholly accurate I have commented on a number of textual points to illustrate the deficiencies of his edition. Despite its weaknesses Bardon's edition has been selected as the text for this commentary, as it is the most recent of the reputable editions and belongs to a series which is held by most university libraries.

I was fortunate enough to have as External Supervisor Professor Badian, and his diligence and prompt attention to every letter assured me of ready assistance although several thousand miles separated us. His contribution to Alexander studies is considerable and well known, and it will be appreciated how great an advantage it is to have his assistance. I am further grateful to Professor Badian and also to Dr. Errington for having allowed me to read certain articles ahead of their publication date.

Professor Paap acted as Internal Supervisor and I am grateful to him for his assistance, particularly in the matter of securing study grants. Then I must record my gratitude to the Council of the University of Cape Town for granting me a year's study leave in the period '69 - '70, and awarding me a travel grant. I am grateful to the librarians of the universities of Manchester and Liverpool, and of the Bodleian and Ashmolean libraries, Oxford, for allowing me to study in their libraries during my period of leave.

Finally I must thank Mrs. O. Corder and my wife for their patience and industry in typing this thesis.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

A. Author Abbreviations

C.R. = Curtius Rufus, and unless otherwise indicated all references are to book 3. The text employed is Bardon's and the lemmata give his readings with the exception that I have preferred to use 'v' for 'u' where this is customary.

A. = Arrian.

D.S. = Diodorus Siculus, and unless otherwise indicated the reference is to book 17.

Plut. = Plutarch, and the text used is that of C. Lindskog and K. Ziegler, Plutarchi, Vitae Parallelae vol. ii, fasc. 2² Teubner, Leipzig '68.

J. = Justin.

Metz Epit. = Metz Epitome. P.H. Thomas Incerti Auctoris Epitoma Rerum Gestarum Alexandri etc. Teubner, Leipzig, '60.

B. The abbreviation of titles of periodicals follows the scheme of L' Année Philologique. This bibliography is primarily intended to explain abbreviations employed in the text of this thesis and is not intended to be a comprehensive list on Curtius Rufus and the history of Alexander the Great's campaigns of 333 B.C.

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- F.W. Walbank i/ii = A historical Commentary on Polybius
vol.i, Bks.I - VI; vol.ii, Bks.
VII - XVIII, Oxford '57 and '67.
- G. Walser (1) = Audienz beim persischen Grosskönig
Zürich, '65.
- " (2) = Die Völkerschaften auf den Reliefs von
Persepolis (Deutsch. arch. Institut,
Teheraner Forschungen, 2) Berlin, '66.
- P.G. Walsh Livy = Livy, his historical aims and methods
Cambridge, '61.
- C.B. Welles (1) = Diodorus of Sicily vol.8, Loeb
Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass. '63.
- " (2) = The Reliability of Ptolemy as an historian,
in Miscellanea di Studi Alessandrini
in memoria di Rostagni Torino '63
101-116.
- U. Wilcken = Alexandre le grand translated from the
German by R. Bouvier, Payot, Paris '52.

D. Other works (continued)

Rotraut Wolf Soldatenerzählungen = Die Soldatenerzählungen
des Kleitarch bei Quintus Curtius Rufus
Diss., Wien '64.

E. For other references the reader might consult:

- 1) A tentative classification of books, pamphlets and
pictures concerning Alexander the Great and the
Alexander Romances from the collection of Julio
Berzunza, privately printed '39.
- 2) G.T. Griffith (editor) Alexander the Great, the main
problems, Cambridge '66.
- 3) E. Badian, Alexander the Great: Selected Bibliography
1948-1968, due to appear in CW '71.

F. Dates

In the text of this thesis all dates relating to Greek
and Roman history are B.C., unless otherwise indicated.

INTRODUCTION

Curtius Rufus' Dates and Identity

A. The Internal Evidence

Korzeniewski's dissertation on the dates of Curtius offers an adequate survey of the preceding literature on the subject (esp. 1-50), and it makes it unnecessary to repeat the exercise here. The following survey will therefore be concentrated mainly on arguments advanced since the publication of Korzeniewski's work.

Korzeniewski argued that Curtius wrote in Augustus' reign, but more recent writers generally agree that the eulogy of the new Emperor in Bk. 10 must refer to either Claudius or Vespasian.

It will be argued below that Korzeniewski's observations on the cataphracts and C.R. iii, 11.15 and iv, 9.3 have virtually established the terminus ante quem for Curtius' Histories as the date of the establishment of a cataphract squadron in the Roman army. Korzeniewski believed that as the squadron is first attested in Hadrian's reign, Hadrian was the innovator, but, as will be seen, there are reasons for thinking that the squadron was established by Trajan rather than Hadrian. The argument with regard to cataphracts is not capable of proof, but if a date later than Hadrian is advocated it is at least necessary to explain why Curtius described mailed cavalry without using the term 'cataphract' (E. Griset RSC xii, '64 160 sq. and C.A. Robinson AJP lxxvii, '61 356 sq. arguing respectively for dates in the reigns of Severus Alexander and Septimius Severus fail to answer Korzeniewski on the point). The terminus post quem must be later than Tiberius' accession, as the digression in x, 9 shows, and for various other reasons which will be discussed below. Thus Korzeniewski's dating of Curtius' work to the period pre-23 B.C. is to be rejected.

References to Parthia

Those who favour a late date for Curtius fix the terminus ante quem by reference to his observations on the Parthian empire, and it is agreed that Curtius could not have written of Parthia's empire as still in existence after its fall in

the period 224-7 (C.R.v, 7.9 and 8.1; vi, 2.12). Robinson's advocacy of a date in Septimius Severus' reign still does not answer Korzeniewski's points on C.R.v, 7.9 and iv, 4.21: 'urbes .. quas nunc habent Parthi' (v, 7.9) could hardly have been written in Septimius Severus' reign after the campaign of A.D. 198 which won for the Empire Babylon and Ctesiphon, and Curtius could hardly have written, 'nunc tandem longa pax' (iv, 4.21) in the period before 198 when Severus was fighting to check Pescennius Niger and Albinus (Korzeniewski 48-9).

The references to Parthia are somewhat tantalizing for it is not clear whether Curtius favoured recognition of Parthia as being beyond Rome's sphere of interest, or whether he thought that the extent of the Parthian empire was a threat to the Roman empire or an affront to its dignity. The point is of some interest because Rome's relations with Parthia were very different in the two periods commonly advanced in the debate on Curtius' dates: at the outset of Claudius' reign Claudius demonstrated that he would not follow a policy of appeasement of Parthia (Dio lx, 8.1 and Tac. Ann.xi, 8.1 and 10.1; references to modern works on Rome's dealings with Parthia in K - H. Ziegler, Die Beziehungen zwischen Rom u. dem Partherreich Wiesbaden '64). By contrast, after Nero's death the Parthian king, Vologaeses, took a friendly line with the Romans, and his offer of military aid to Vespasian in the latter part of A.D. 69 produced a guarantee that Vologaeses could expect the Senate to maintain the peace with Parthia (Suet. Nero 57, 2, Tac. Hist. ii, 82.5; iv, 51; however, one realizes that this information is presented from the Roman point of view). On a broader view the two emperors had less dissimilar policies, for the policy outlined by Claudius in 49, in a speech which Tacitus styled 'de fastigio Romano Parthorumque obsequiis' (Tac. Ann. xii, 11), was non-interventionist in the same way as Vespasian's policy was in the Parthian crisis of 75 (Dio lxxv, 15.3; Suet Dom. 2, 2).

Thus we may conclude that Curtius could not have taken a belligerent line against Parthia in the early part of Vespasian's reign without dropping out of tune with the diplomatic relations with Parthia at the time; on the other hand the neutrality of Curtius' comments would have been acceptable to either emperor.

No less tantalizing is Curtius' mention of Ecbatana as the summer quarters of the Parthian kings, for he does not go on to mention the winter palace at Ctesiphon, which was perhaps out of commission during the early years of Claudius' reign, since the neighbouring city of Seleucia on the Tigris was in revolt (Tac. Ann. xi, 9.6; the period was 36-43, cf. Streck RE 2.R. ii, A. 1183-4).

Cataphracts

In iii, 11.15 and iv, 9.3 Curtius refers to Persian mailed cavalry, and employs periphrases to describe them instead of using the simple term 'cataphract'. The term 'cataphract' was used by many Latin writers (for example Sisenna ap. Peter HRR i, p.288), but it was felt that the term needed some explanation (e.g. Sallust Hist. iv, 66, Livy xxxv, 48.3, and Tacitus Hist. i, 79 probably published in A.D. 105 [Syme Tacitus i, 118]). Tacitus describes the 'catafractae', coats of mail, worn by the Roxolani when they raided Moesia in A.D. 69 as 'tegimen ferreis lamminis aut praeduro coro consertum'. For examples in poetry, see Propertius iii, 12. 11-12 and Vergil Aen. xi, 770-1). In Korzeniewski's view Curtius' periphrases indicate that Romans were not as yet familiar with 'cataphracts'; however, when the 'ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata' was established as a regular unit of the Roman army, such periphrases would have been unnecessary (Korzeniewski, 45 sq.). This line of argument is fundamentally acceptable: it remains to determine the date of the ala's establishment. Korzeniewski thought Hadrian was the innovator as the relevant inscription (CIL xi, 5632) is of Hadrianic date; however one need not assume that because the squadron of cataphracts existed in Hadrian's day, it was established by him; Trajan's Parthian war would provide a suitable historical context for this innovation (Gabba, Parti e Romani, esp. p.67).

The digression on Tyre: Tyros nunc tandem longa pace cuncta refovente sub tutela Romanae mansuetudinis acquiescit (iv, 4.21).

If the reign of Hadrian is recognised as the terminus ante quem for Curtius' work (cf. on cataphracts, supra), then it seems that this passage can not have been written during the

reigns of Galba, Otho and Vitellius, nor during the early part of Vespasian's reign, for Tyre was hardly basking in peace during the Jewish War, even if her direct involvement did not extend much beyond a pogrom of the Jews (Josephus BJ ii, 18.5 361). A date in Claudius' reign would be more suitable, and it may be added that Claudius apparently granted permission to the Tyrians to style themselves Claudiopolitans (IGR i, 132). Further the reference to Tyre's new relationship to Rome may reflect the reunification of Herod's kingdom under Agrippa's control in the period A.D. 40-41 (Josephus AJ xviii, 6.10 237; 7.2 252; xix, 5.1 274-5; BJ ii, 9. 6 181-3; 11.5 215).

Verdière compared Curtius' reference to peace with Calpurnius Siculus' comment on Nero, written perhaps in A.D. 56, 'perpetuamque regit et iuvenili robore pacem', and suggested that both reflected the failure of Parthia's aggressive foreign policy first in A.D. 51 and then in 54-5 (Verdière (1) 36-7, (2) 494; Calpurnius Siculus Buc.iv, 85). However the Parthian threat was localised and of little relevance to Tyre, and Calpurnius' reference to the Neronian 'pax' had a broader context. There is no compelling reason why one should consider that Curtius was referring to the Neronian pax and was influenced by Calpurnius Siculus.

It is unlikely that this passage was written in the early part of Septimius Severus' reign (pace Robinson, who rejects the argument about the cataphract cavalry), when the issue between Severus and Albinus was still undecided (cf. p. xxi supra).

C.R. vi, 4.23: ad oppidum Arvas pervenit

Von Domaszewski (p.12) argued that Curtius here fell into error by mistranslating Arrian iii, 23.6: ἄραç δὲ ἐντεῦθεν προῆει ὡς ἐφ' Ἵρκανίας εἰς Ζαδράκαρα. The detail offered in these two passages tallies on many points. If von Domaszewski were right it would show that Arrian wrote earlier than Curtius; however if Curtius made a mistake in mistranslating the participle ἄραç it is no less possible that he read the word in a source which Arrian was later to use. This argument will be considered further à propos of Curtius' sources.

C.R. vii, 5.42: nunc forsitan, sagittarum celebri usu,
minus admirabilis videri ars haec possit

Altheim used this passage to support his dating of Curtius to Septimius Severus' reign, for he saw in the phrase 'sagittarum celebri usu' a reference to Commodus' skill. Korzeniewski (44-5) pointed out however that 'celebris' need not mean dexterous, 'geschickte' or 'gefürchte', celebrated, as Altheim translated it, and might as well mean common or frequent. We do not have to find the point in the Empire when archery was at its zenith, and as Korzeniewski said (p.69) archers played an important part in the Roman army from the time of Caesar.

Mounted archers are attested in Pompey's army (Caesar b.c. iii, 4.5), in Cassius' army at Philippi (App. b.c. iv, 88), and under Germanicus at Idistaviso in A.D. 16 (Tac. Ann. ii, 16). Then perhaps in A.D. 38 the first 'ala Parthorum et Araborum' was constituted, made up of mounted archers (see H. Petersen, New evidence for the relations between Romans and Parthians Berytus xvi, '66 61-69).

The reference to archery does not therefore necessitate a late date for Curtius; it permits a date in the first century.

The digression on Rome's new emperor - x, 9. 1-6.

It seems desirable to offer a detailed commentary on this passage since it is central to the whole problem of Curtius' dates. Under each lemma I attempt to indicate the range of emperors considered relevant by modern authors, particularly since the publication of Korzeniewski's dissertation, but I have reserved full discussion only for the cases of Claudius and Vespasian since other emperors appear to be excluded on various grounds. To avoid constant repetition it will be as well to indicate these arguments in advance: the reference to the indivisibility of the monarchy appears to exclude at least Nero and Nerva, the description of the accession of the new emperor must postdate Augustus, and exclude Caligula, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, the Flavians, Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian and the prayer for the dynasty appears to rule out Augustus, Galba,

Vitellius, Vespasian and Trajan.

The argument from the cataphracts (supra p.xxii) is taken as sufficient to exclude emperors later than Hadrian.

9.1: insociabile est regnum

This idea was a commonplace in the period within which Curtius is to be placed: Livy i, 14.3, 'infidam societatem regni' (perhaps inspired by Ennius, 107 V), Suetonius Gaius 22, 1 attributing to Caligula the quotation from Homer of the words εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς, Seneca Agam. 259, Tacitus Ann. xiii, 17 on the readiness of people to overlook the murder of Britannicus, 'antiquas fratrum discordias et insociabile regnum aestimantes' (cf. on this L. Alfonsi Aevum xli, '67 154), Columella ix, 9.1, 'nulla sit regni societas', and Suetonius Dom. 12, 3 on Domitian's use of the Homeric formula οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη (cf. K. Waters Phoenix xviii, '64 57 n.19). The tone of the comment varies with the individual's opinion of 'regnum'. It was, of course, possible, irrespective of one's view of monarchy to blame an emperor for yielding too much to his advisers - a Sejanus, for example, or Claudius' freedmen and womenfolk (cf. Dio lx, 2.4) - or for failing to trust his associates. These lines of criticism, incidentally, emerge as major motifs running through Bk. 3 (cf. for example on 8.1 sq. and 12.18 sq.).

Whilst the idea of the indivisible monarchy was a commonplace and thus could have been repeated in several reigns, yet it would not have been appropriate at times when the emperor of the day took a co-regent. Thus in the case of Claudius, the period from A.D. 50 would be inappropriate, for apparently after the adoption of Nero in A.D. 50, Claudius styled his wife, Agrippina Augusta (E. Kornemann (2) esp. 53 sq.; cf. E.M. Smallwood Documents nos. 100 - 102). In the case of Vespasian the period of sole rule was even shorter: as early as February 71 Titus was spoken of as partner in the principate, and this had practical significance from the date of Titus' arrival in Rome, sc. 5th April 71, and then from 1st July 71 Titus entered upon his first year of tribunician power (Philostratus Vita Apoll.

vi, 30; Suet. Titus 6 and Kornemann (2) 59 sq.). Thus it seems that Curtius would have written 'insociabile est regnum' in the period 41-50, if he wrote in Claudius' reign, and earlier or not much later than February 71, if he wrote in Vespasian's reign.

The coregency of Tiberius with Augustus, Agrippina with Nero and Trajan with Nerva would seem to exclude Nero and Nerva and perhaps Tiberius and Trajan as the emperor whom Curtius was praising.

9.2: cum pluribus corpus quam capiebat onerassent, cetera membra deficere coeperunt

The image of the state as a human body is so common in descriptions of civil unrest that it does not facilitate the precise dating of Curtius' work (e.g. Cic Phil. viii, 6.15; Vell. Pat. ii, 90.1; Suet. Aug. 48.2; Florus ii, 6.1; Seneca de clem. i, 12.3; J. Béranger Recherches 218 sq.; P. Jal REL xxxix, '61 228-9). Further the imagery echoes that apparently used by Trogus in dealing with the same events (xiii, 6.17).

9.3: qui noctis quam paene supremam habuimus novum sidus illuxit

The clearest literary parallel is a passage in Seneca's Ad Polybium de consolatione 13, 1: sidus hoc quod praecipitato in profundum et demerso in tenebras orbi refulsit, semper luceat. Seneca's 'sidus' refers to the emperor Claudius.

Verdière has suggested that the star image refers rather to Nero, and in particular to the comet which appeared as an omen before Nero's accession (Verdière (2) 490 sq.; the comet appeared on the 13th October A.D. 54, according to Verdière (1) p.34, but one cannot rely on the literary evidence which Verdière used, for Chinese astronomers recorded sighting a comet from 9th June to 9th July 54 [R.S. Rogers TAPA lxxxiv, '53 237-249 cf. P.J. Bicknell Latomus xxviii, '69 1074-5 and on Nero's dates B.R. Reece AJP xc, '69 72-4]). Verdière's explanation of this passage involves the adoption of the reading of an inferior

manuscript, 'cui' for 'qui', but this choice is hardly justifiable. Further, whilst the comet of A.D. 54 was seen, at least later, as an omen of Nero's accession (Dio lx [lxi] 35.1 and Suet. Claudius 46), yet it had disappeared three months before Claudius' death; thus to call the comet a phenomenon 'noctis quam paene supremam habuimus' implies a dramatic foreshortening of the period, since the 'nox' must refer immediately to the period in which the principate was vacant (contrast Calpurnius Siculus Ecl.i, 86-7:

cernitis up puro nox iam vicesima caelo
fulgeat et placida radiantem luce cometem
proferat?

It is possible that Calpurnius was referring to the comet of A.D. 60 rather than that of 54 [cf. J.M.C. Toynbee CQ xxxvi, '42 83-93], but either way the connotation of 'nox' is less sombre than that attached to Curtius' 'nox').

Certainly in Nero's reign the star image had associations with the emperor. Lucan in his attack on Alexander as the tyrant type, brands him a 'sidus iniquum', and this, whilst it does immediately indicate his judgement on Julius Caesar, makes an oblique reference to Nero (Lucan x, 35-6; M.P.O. Morford The Poet Lucan '67 p.15 and n.2 emphasizes the immediacy of the reference to Caesar).

Milns developed this argument, for a date in Galba's reign. He suggested that whilst 'sidus' would refer to the 'sidus Iulium', the 'novum sidus' would refer to the foundation of a new imperial house after the fall of the Julian house with the death of Nero. Further he argues that 'sidus' could be applied to the sun, and since Nero in his later years developed a propaganda image of himself as the sun-god or Νέος Ἡλιος, it was natural for Galba to turn this propaganda line against Nero. Finally he appeals to the decree issued in Egypt on 6th June A.D. 68 by the Galban partisan, Tiberius Julius Alexander, in which Galba's imminent rise to power is foreseen as being like the rising of the sun (ἐπιλάμψαντος SEG xv, 877; Milns (4) esp. 497-8). However, the reference in δ 6 to 'eiusdem domus' is almost sufficient to eliminate Galba.

If Curtius' eulogy is not linked with Galba's revision of Neronian propaganda, then it may be linked with Vespasian's adaptation. G. Scheda followed this line of argument, and stressed the contrast made by Curtius between 'sol' and 'sidus': Vespasian was not going to pose as a Νέος Ἥλιος (Hist. xviii, '69 380 sq.; the positive argument advanced by Scheda for a Vespasianic date is the link between 'annum supremum' in Tac. Hist.i, II and Curtius' 'nox suprema'). Instinsky likewise favoured Vespasian, but in dealing with the 'sidus' metaphor he argued rather from a comparison with Pliny n.h. xxxiii, 41 where reference is made to 'exortus Vespasiani': if the metaphor of a rising star had been applied to Claudius it is unlikely that Pliny would have reemployed it in eulogy of Vespasian; thus the two passages more likely both belong to Vespasian's reign. However this argument is weakened by the appearance of ἐπιλάμπειν in Tiberius Julius Alexander's eulogy of Galba (SEG xv, 877).

Those who favour a late date for Curtius link the 'sidus' with that which appeared at the time of the birth of Alexander Severus (SHA xviii, 13.5; Steele (1) 423; Griset RSC xii, '64 163), but the link is too tenuous to merit further discussion, in view of the other arguments against so late a date.

The link with Seneca's Consolatio ad Polybium remains the most striking, but one has to remember first that the 'sidus Iulium' was a symbol of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, apparently adopted by Vespasian (BMC Roman Empire ii, '30 p.x1), and secondly that the star image was a common feature of court panegyrics (Pliny n.h. ii, 25.94 on Augustus, xxxiii, 3.41 on Vespasian, and Statius Silvae iv, 1.2 sq. on Domitian; Alföldi Hermes lxxv, '30 381). Thus the phrase 'novum sidus' is of limited value as an aid to the dating of Curtius.

The debate over the reference in 'noctis quam paene supremam habuimus' centres on the question whether a specific night is referred to, or whether the usage is metaphorical. The night of the 24/25th January A.D.41 still merits serious consideration as the point of Curtius' comment. The term 'habuimus' is of some interest, for by it Curtius identifies himself in the final analysis with a particular social class; the crises of 41 and 68-9 involved power-struggles within the ruling social

order and the danger was that such 'discordia' might result in the destruction of that ruling order. In 41 the Senate temporarily lost control of the army (Dio lx, 1.2 and 4) and peace was restored when the force majeure, to which the Senate had to yield, drove them to nothing more revolutionary than the appointment of Claudius. We can imagine that Curtius spoke as a member of the ruling class, perhaps as a senator, rather as Dio speaks in the first person for example of the troubles of A.D. 193 (Dio lxxiii, 12.2 and 5, 13.2 and 17.2 sq.). The transition from 'populus Romanus' to 'habuimus' is significant, for with the accession of Claudius the chasm that had divided the people and the Senate during the anarchy had to be concealed: hence the execution of militant army officers and the adoption of the coin legend 'ex s.c. ob cives servatos' (Suet. Claud. 11, 1; E.M. Smallwood Documents no.93). Claudius was helped both by the failure of radicals to mould a common front, and by activist demonstrators who went from the demolition of statues of Caligula to pressuring the Senate to relinquish the initiative in choosing a new head of state (Dio lix, 30.1a; Suet. Claud. 10, 4 and 11, 1). Thus in a sense Claudius emerged to provide the leadership the people were looking for, and the senate was rescued.

Those who reject the literal interpretation of 'nox' may appeal to metaphorical usages in Philostratus vit. Apoll.viii, 23 and in the model panegyric set out by the 3rd (?) Century A.D. rhetorician Menander in his τέχνη ῥητορικῆ (Rhetores Graeci iii, 378 Sp.; J. Stroux Philologus lxxxiv, '28/9 esp. 238-240 who cites other later examples). These parallels are later than Curtius and are not sufficient to disprove the literal interpretation.

G. Sceda opposed the literal interpretation on the grounds that Curtius did not qualify 'noctis' with a demonstrative pronoun, and this is the more striking because Livy wrote, 'memoriam noctis illius quae paene ultima atque aeterna nomini Romano fuerit' (vi, 17.4 referring to the night when the Gauls stormed the Capitol) and Curtius could be expected to follow Livy's style if he meant 'noctis' to be taken literally (Hist. xviii, '69 381-2 and n.1).

An answer to Scheda's argument is that even if Curtius had a specific night in mind the image of the star added a metaphorical facet, enough to break the parallel with Livy's phraseology. Further, 'caliganti mundo' in the next sentence, coupled with mention of the parts of the empire being disturbed, shows that Curtius turns from Rome to consider what happened in the provinces, and there the darkness of uncertainty extended beyond the night of 24/25th January 41.

9.4: huius, hercule, non solis, ortus lucem caliganti
reddidit mundo

'Huius' presumably agrees with 'sidus' in the previous sentence, rather than with 'princeps', but either way the contrast is made between the 'novum sidus' and the 'sol', and this clearly indicates that the primary meaning of 'sidus' here is a star rather than the sun.

It is possible that Curtius was referring in the term 'sol' to an emperor who linked himself with the cult of the sun-god, and both Caligula and Nero established such a link (on Caligula; IGRR iv, 145 = E.M. Smallwood Documents no.401, cf. 126, both from the provinces; Dio lix, 26.6 and Philo Legatio ad Gaium esp. 95 and 103, though in the early principate Apollo and Sol retained their separate identities - G.K. Galinsky, Sol and the 'Carmen Saeculare' Latomus xxvi, 167 619 sq.; on Nero: IGRR iii, 345 = Smallwood Documents, no.146 cf. 64; Dio lxii [lxiii], 20.5; SHA Hadrian 18; L. Cerfaux et J. Tondriau Le Culte des Souverains '57, 344-5 and 352-3).

If Curtius was passing a cynical comment on some emperor's association of himself with the sun-god, then Nero is the more likely target than Caligula; however, Vespasian yielded to the temptation to have himself portrayed with a radiate crown, as Nero had done (K. Scott Imperial Cult under the Flavians '36 32-3).

The term 'caliganti' may provide a clue to the date for it suggests a pun on Gaius' nickname, Caligula. Three lines of arguments have been followed to reject this theory: first the

differences in quantities between 'Caligula' and 'caligans' make it scarcely a possible pun, but the answer to that is that parallels do exist (e.g. Suet. Nero 33, Quint. ix, 3.69, Martial x, 41; Verdière (2) 503-4 and Hermann REA '29; G.V. Sumner AUMIA xv, '61 notes the play on Allobrogicus in the Tabula Lugdunensis, ILS 212); secondly, the emperor was known as Gaius, and not Caligula (A.D. Leeman Ratio Orationis 468 n.77), but, one may reply, he was dubbed Caligula early in life (Suet. Gaius 9) and Cicero's letters are surely enough to show that nicknames were an established feature in Roman political discussion; thirdly, Curtius uses 'caligo' in various forms frequently in his Histories and thus it has no particular significance in this passage, though to this one may answer that the frequency of its appearance makes the pun at this one point more subtle. The case for a pun has not been disproved.

9.4: cum sine suo capite discordia membra trepidarent

The phrase 'sine suo capite' taken in conjunction with 'principi suo' seems sufficient to date this passage to the Principate, no earlier than the death of Augustus (contrast Cic. Mur. 51 and Plut. Cic. 14, 6 with Tac. Ann. i, 13.4; Béranger Recherches 231).

The antonym of 'discordia', 'concordia' is featured in the preceding narrative, x, 8.19. Tiberius made Concordia a special figure in the imperial pantheon (Suet. Tib. 20,3 relating to A.D. 12; CIL vi, esp. nos. 91-3 coupled with 'vota', 'pro incolumitate' and 'pro salute Tiberii'; cf. Tac. Ann. ii, 32.4), and after the demise of the Julio-Claudians 'concordia' was refurbished for the Flavians (Concordia Augusti as a coin legend in Vespasian's day, BMC R. Empire ii, nos. 588 and 603; Tacitus noted the credibility gap in its use in the context of events of A.D.69; pax et concordia speciosis et inritis nominibus iactata sunt, Hist. ii, 20.2; references to modern works in R. Hosek Eirene vi, '67 82 sq.). Thus Curtius' use of 'concordia' and 'discordia' does not favour a date in one emperor's reign rather than another.

'Membra' could refer to territorial parts of the empire (cf. Cic. ad Att. viii, 1.1; Suet. Aug. 48; Silius xii, 318; Stroux Philologus '29 241 insisted that it must refer to the provinces), but it should rather be taken as indicating political and social units (thus Seneca spoke of the army, people and senate as the 'membra' of the state, ep. 102, 6; cf. Vell. Pat. ii, 90.1, sepultis ... bellis civilibus, coalescentibusque reipublicae membris; Lucan v, 37 and ix, 25). In the political vocabulary of the early empire then, 'membra' might include the provinces, but qua units of the Roman army or administrative class. Thus Curtius' description would fit the situation in 41 when in Rome the Senate, the troops and the people were at variance; it would fit the Senate's disinclination to recognise Claudius (Dio lx, 1.4; Suet. Galba 7), for 'concordia' meant that the Senate gave no protection to a rival for the principate; finally it would cover the ambitions of provincial governors.

The case against a Vespasianic date rests heavily on the argument that this clause is too mild an expression to cover the civil war that followed on Nero's death (G.V. Sumner AUMIA xv, '61 32; R.D. Milns (4) 491 and 6). 'Trepidatio' certainly meant less than civil war when used by Velleius Paterculus to describe the situation at Augustus' death: 'quae senatus trepidatio, quae populi confusio' (ii, 124.1). Lucan used the verb of a civil-war situation when he wrote of Cato after the battle of Pharsalus: populi trepidantia membra refovit (ix, 25), but he was describing the feebleness of the interest in further opposition to Caesar after Pharsalus. The arguments that exclude Vespasian as the new emperor would likewise exclude Galba and Vitellius.

The phrase 'cum sine suo capite' would have been indelicate in Otho's reign as Galba was decapitated, and more seriously Otho's claim to power rested on the disaffection that existed before rather than after Galba's death (cf. Dio lxiii [lxiv] 4.1 sq.; Plut. Otho 1; Suet. Otho 7). Similarly the line taken by Nerva against Domitian makes it unlikely that Curtius was writing after Nerva's accession.

9.5: quot ille tum exstinxit faces! quot condidit gladios!
quantam tempestatem subita serenitate discussit!

The connection between the storm metaphor and Calpurnius Siculus Buc. iv, 102-5 is too tenuous to link this passage with Calpurnius' panegyric of Nero (pace R. Verdière (2) 504-5). The phraseology would suit the breakdown of law and order in Rome immediately after Gaius' death (Dio lx, 1) better than the period of civil war before Vespasian's accession. The ruling class was in grave peril, but the holocaust did not materialize (noctis quam paene supremam habuimus).

Stroux saw in the reference to 'faces' the arson of the Capitol in A.D. 69, but there is merit in Hermann's objection (REA xxi, '29) that Vespasian was not in Rome and could not be of any assistance when the arson took place.

Curtius' reference to the menace of arson and bloodshed would not suit those occasions when the accession was as far as we know peaceful, as when Caligula, Nero, Titus, Domitian, Trajan and Hadrian, ^{became Emperor} and even the accession of Nerva was too smooth to fit Curtius' picture (even Suet. Dom. 23 supports this argument).

9.5: non ergo revirescit solum, sed etiam floret imperium

Again the parallels drawn by Verdière between Curtius' phraseology and Calpurnius' fail to convince (Buc. iv, 90-2 and 112-121; Verdière (2) 505).

H.U. Instinsky linked this sentence with the Flavian reconstruction programme, advertised on coins in the legend, 'Roma resurgens' (Hermes xc, '62 382; BMC R. Empire ii, '30 nos. 425, 565-6 and 812). The force of this argument is reduced by the coins of Galba's reign with the legend 'Roma renasce(n)s' (BMC R. Empire i, '23 p.cxciii and 291 nos.9 sq.).

9.6: absit modo invidia

The influence of Livy emerges here, cf. Livy ix, 19.15 and 17: absit invidia verbo et civilia bella sileant ... mille acies

graviores quam Macedonum atque Alexandri avertit avertetque, modo sit perpetuus huius, qua vivimus, pacis amor et civilis cura concordiae.

9.6: absit modo invidia, excipiet huius saeculi tempora eiusdem domus utinam perpetua, certe diuturna posteritas

The critical phrase 'eiusdem domus' could mean that the new emperor was of the same line as the previous emperor, as 'eadem domus' is used in the preceding narrative (7.15, cf. iv, 1.17 sq.), or that he was the founder of a new dynasty.

The formula would seem to exclude Galba on the grounds that he only acquired an heir by adoption five days before he died, and he died at the age of 72. R.D. Milns ([4] esp. 494-6) clambered over this hurdle to his theory by noting that Curtius chose the word 'posteritas', rather than 'suboles' or 'progenies', and by suggesting that Curtius wrote not in the five day gap between the adoption and Galba's death, but earlier in Galba's reign and as a reminder to Galba that time was not on his side if an heir was to be established. The latter argument is particularly unconvincing.

Vitellius too would be excluded as his son suffered from the handicap of a serious speech impediment (Suet. Vit. 6 and 18). Otho had male relatives (Suet. Otho 10,2) but can be excluded if only on the grounds that his murder of Galba cannot be accommodated to the impression Curtius gives of the accession.

Nerva can be excluded as the adoption of Trajan occurred only some three months before his death, and before Trajan's accession he had become both in titles and in powers Nerva's partner (Pliny Paneg. 8) which would conflict with Curtius' approval of 'insociabile regnum' (§1). Furthermore Curtius' eulogy does not include anything to match the main point in the lauding of adoption: finita Iuliorum Claudiorumque domo optimum quemque adoptio inveniet (Tac. hist. i, 16; Pliny Paneg. 7,4).

Trajan too would not fit Curtius' reference to the emperor's heirs, if that is implied, for Trajan had no children (cf. Dosson Étude 30).

The range of choice seems to be restricted to the Julio-Claudians and the Flavians, with the circumstances of the accession further reducing the field to Claudius and Vespasian.

The term 'posteritas' was appropriate in the early days of Claudius' reign, for whilst his son, Britannicus, was born in 41, the dynasty was strengthened by the marriages of his daughters Antonia and Octavia to Cn. Pompeius Magnus and L. Junius Silanus (Dio lx, 5.7; Suet. Claud 27, 2).

The phrase 'absit modo invidia' implies that some uncertainty surrounded the emperor's possible heirs, and H. Dahlmann made the point that such a qualification would have been inappropriate in Vespasian's reign as he had two sons of mature age (Hermes lxii, '37 315). Titus' experience and well-entrenched position left little doubt that a new dynasty had been established.

By contrast, when Nero became emperor he was not yet 17, his stepbrother Britannicus had a limited future and Nero's partner was his mother: the 'posteritas' was scarcely discernible. Nevertheless R. Verdière has sought to link Curtius' eulogy with Nero's accession and sees as parallels to this passage Calpurnius Buc. i, 93-4 with the verb 'excipiet':

scilicet ipse deus Romanae pondera molis
fortibus excipiet sic inconcussa lacertis

and Buc. iv, 150: hos, precor, aeternus populos rege! (Verdière (2) esp. 497 sq. and 505). The differences between Calpurnius and Curtius and the historical circumstances militate against a date in Nero's reign for this passage of Curtius.

Curtius' prayer for the emperor's family seems to reflect the formula of prayers linking the dynasty's survival with the survival of Rome. Instinsky argued that there is no evidence for such vota in Augustus' reign and that they were inconceivable as early as 29 B.C. (Hermes xc, '62 382, pace Korzeniewski p.85).

The conclusion must be that nothing in Curtius' eulogy of the new emperor could not apply to Claudius; none of the other emperors from the relevant period fits Curtius' statement on every count.

Literary parallels and the dating problem

It is clear that argument from literary parallels offers no secure system of stratification of literature. If stratification is to be attempted the total mass of material requires analysis. This still has to be done for Curtius and the other writers of his period, for in the past analysis has either ranged superficially over a large number of authors who might have influenced, or been influenced by, Curtius (so R.B. Steele (1)), or has been restricted to a limited number of authors, whose links with Curtius have been studied more comprehensively (so C. Hosius RhM xlviii, 1893 380 sq., on Curtius and Lucan). More recently writers have offered suggestions on Curtius' dates based on a comparison of a single passage of Curtius with a passage of a single other author (see below on Columella and Silius Italicus). This thesis is primarily concerned with historical problems and thus no attempt has been made to establish the date of the Histories by the stratification of the literature of the Early Empire. However the following notes indicate some of the gains and weaknesses of work that has been done on this subject, further this brief survey shows that it is most likely that Curtius wrote later than Livy, and thus Korzeniewski's early date for Curtius is unacceptable.

Livy

The links between Livy's work and Curtius' have often been noted and remain particularly striking. Parallels are indicated at 3.1, 8.11 and 25, 11.7 and 12.23; see too p. xxxiii *supra* on C.R. x, 9.6 (x, 9.7 may be linked with Livy praefatio 5) and p. lxiii sq. *infra* (other examples are listed by Steele (1) 404 sq., and 421 sq. Dosson Etude 276-7). The 'cunctator' motif found in Bk. 3 may owe its inspiration to Livy's account of the Second Punic War (cf. on 8.7 sq.), and Curtius' elaboration of the tale of Darius'

mutilation of the Greeks and Macedonians caught at Issus may have been influenced by a similar story in Livy (C.R. 8.15 sq.). One would expect an historian writing later than Livy to have read and been impressed by his work, but it is hardly credible that the parallels were due to Livy having copied Curtius' style.

If Curtius' admiration of Livy's style was in part a reflection of the literary fashion of his own day, then it may be significant that Livy was not to Caligula's taste, but influenced Claudius greatly (Suet. Gaius 34; Claud. 41; Tabula Lugd. with Livy iv, 3-4; Lana RFIC '49).

Livy's digression on Alexander and Rome (ix, 17.1 sq.; on which see H.R. Breitenbach MH xxvi, '69 146 sq.), combines the annalistic tradition and elements perhaps of Cleitarchus' history of Alexander (art.cit. 155-6; compare Livy 18.6 with Cleit., Frag. 31), with features of rhetorical exercises, especially on the theme of fortuna and virtus, and features of associated philosophical essays. This type of rhetoric provided Seneca with exempla for his essays (e.g. de clem.i, 25.1; de benef. i, 13.3 and vii, 2. 5-6); it influenced Lucan's presentation of Caesar and it is reflected more directly in Lucan's references to Alexander (cf. on 10.5 infra and P. McCloskey and E. Phinney Jr. Hermes 96, '68 80 sq.; A. Bruhl MEFR xlvii, '30 212-3). Clearly Curtius was familiar with the same exercises and there are many links between Livy's digression and passages in Curtius' Histories: see on 10.4 sq. and 12.18 sq.

Valerius Maximus and Velleius Paterculus

So far no evidence has been found to show that Curtius used, or was followed by these two writers of Tiberius' era (cf. Steelo [1] 411). Links with Velleius appear to be restricted to commonplaces of eulogy of the early Principate (see e.g. on 2.9).

Analysis of the story of Alexander's sickness at Tarsus shows that Valerius and Curtius both read Trogus' version, and Valerius' version did not influence Curtius (infra esp. 102 sq.). On the episode when Alexander gave up his seat by the fire to a

soldier who was suffering from exposure Curtius and Valerius Maximus tell the story quite differently (C.R.viii, 4. 15-17 with Val. Max. v, 1 ext.1; one notes incidentally the consistency of phraseology between these two passages of Curtius, and the consistency between the two passages of Valerius Maximus, a reminder that we are dealing with a writer who had a style of his own). Contrast too C.R. 12.15 sq. with Val. Max. 4, 7 Extn.2 and C.R.iv, 11.11 with Val.Max. 6, 4 Ext.3.

Strabo

Steele catalogued parallels between passages of Curtius and Strabo and concluded that the relevant passages of Curtius represent 'gleanings from Strabo' rather than 'the results of a reading of the original sources by Curtius' (Steele (2) esp. p.308). Were Steele's case accepted it would still not provide a precise time reference for Curtius as Strabo's Geography spans the period from before 19 B.C. to A.D. 23 (Bowersock surveys Strabo's movements and work, see esp. pp.123, 126, 133 sq.; the latest reference is to Juba II's death c.A.D.23 [xvii, 3.7 828]).

Steele commented on the links between Curtius iii, 4. 8-10 and Strabo xiii, 4.6 627 and 1.61 612 and xiv, 5. 5-10 670 sq., but the Commentary will show that these links are too tenuous to be meaningful. Similarly Steele saw parallels between Curtius' digression on Tyre and Strabo's note (xvi, 2.23 757; C.R.iv, 4. 19 sq.), but there are too many differences between the two passages for any connection to be established: for example, Curtius' mention of Agenor, Thebes and the alphabet is not matched by Strabo, whilst Curtius fails to mention Tyre's dye industry, its status in the Hellenistic period and its autonomy under Roman rule. Long before Steele's article Kaerst advanced the theory that Curtius used Strabo's historical work, but Fränkel showed that Kaerst's list of parallels was unsatisfactory (Quellen 438 sq.), and one must consider the possibility that similarities arose from their common use of Timagenes.

Seneca the Elder

There are verbal links between Curtius and Seneca: for example between C.R.ix, 4. 17-18 and Suas. i, 1 and 2, and between C.R.vii, 8.12 and Suas.i, 5 (cf. Bardon (3) 125, Dosson Etude 244 and Leeman Orationis Ratio i, 256; see too on 10.4 sq.). Seneca was born c.55 B.C. and died before the exile of his son in A.D.41 (Sen. cons.ad Helv. 2, 4; Schanz-Hosius 340-1). Curtius could therefore have read the elder Seneca's work, and have written himself in Caligula's reign or Claudius'. Nevertheless, as Leeman prudently reminds us, one has to allow for the strong oral tradition of the declamation.

It appears that Seneca's work on declamations was completed in Caligula's reign, thus if Curtius found inspiration there, a date for the Histories later than A.D.37 is suggested.

The younger Seneca

Links between Seneca and Curtius are numerous and often cited: note for example:

- C.R.iii, 6.2 with de ira 3, 1.2
 " iii, 8.7 with ep 13, 8
 " iii, 12.19 with de benef.i, 13.3 and de clem.i, 25;
 " vii, 1.4 with ep 56, 9
 " ix, 9.2 with de ben.i, 13.2 sq. and vii,3.1 (cf. Korzeniewski 40 sq.).
 " viii,10.27-9 with ep 59, 12
 " x, 9.3 with ad Polybium 13, 1 (cf. p.xxvi sq. supra; and for other references Steele (1) 412; Schanz-Hosius 598-9).

Fr. Wilhelm (Curtius u. der j. Seneca Paderborn '28 known to me indirectly) concluded that the similarities of expression and ideas arose from their common familiarity with the schools. This obviates the problem posed by the dates of Seneca's work for, if Curtius wrote in the early years of Claudius' reign, he would not have read Seneca's epistles (which were the work of his retirement, that is from A.D.62; Ep. 8.2 and Schanz-Hosius 704). It is of course possible too that Seneca read Curtius' Histories.

Lucan

The most comprehensive survey of parallels between Curtius' work and Lucan's Pharsalia appears in Hosius' article in RhM xlviii 1893, 303 sq. Hosius' conclusion was that Curtius was one of Lucan's sources of inspiration. Hosius' arguments were submitted to careful analysis by Pichon, who concluded that it was impossible to establish that Lucan was influenced by Curtius, but he suggested that both writers may have drawn common inspiration from Livy (Pichon 254-5; cf. *infra* on 1.13; 5.6, 8.2; and 11.4).

Columella

G.M. Lee argued that there is a close link between C.R. viii, 9.19: 'aestimantur purgamenta exaestuantis freti pretio' and Columella re rust.viii, 8.19 (sic): 'purgamenta freti aestuantis' (Meander xxii, '67 57 sq.; Lewis and Short, s.v. purgamentum, attribute the latter phrase to Col. viii, 9.19, but I have been unable to find the phrase in Columella). As Columella wrote not long before the death of Seneca (Schanz-Hosius 786), it would help to establish a Claudian date for Curtius if one could show that Columella had read his work, but one cannot do that on the basis of a single phrase. The moralizing comment in the quotation from Curtius may suggest that Curtius and Columella (if he ever used the phrase) were both echoing a rhetorical commonplace.

Silius Italicus

Many parallels between Curtius' Histories and Silius' Punica have been noted (see on 2.15 sq., 5.6, 6.14, and 10.5, and compare C.R.iv, 7.22 with Silius iii, 669 and C.R.vii, 4.27 with Silius iii, 654 sq.; Schanz-Hosius 599). Bruère has argued that Curtius' reference to the evacuation of Tyrians to Carthage and the talk of a sacrificial murder of a child provided Silius Italicus with the inspiration for his tale of Hannibal sending his wife and son from Spain to Carthage and Hanno's bid to have Hannibal's son sacrificed (Bruère CP '52 219 sq.; C.R.iv, 3. 20-23, Silius iii, 62-162 and iv, 763-822). If Bruère were

correct one would conclude that Curtius published his Histories before Silius began writing, that is by 88, or before the publication of parts of the Punica in A.D.93 (on Silius' dates see especially Silius iii, 607 sq. and Martial vii, 63; Schanz-Hosius, 528 and E. Wistrand Die Chronologie der 'Punica' des Silius Italicus Göteborg '56). However Edson, who accepts that Curtius was the earlier writer, has expressed reluctance to assume that Curtius must have been Silius' source, and suggests that Silius' reference to Punic sacrificial rites might rest on 'no more than the poet's vague recollection of either Cleitarchus or Curtius' (CP '61 199-200, my underlining). Further whilst Curtius and Silius both described the oracle at Siwah there is no evidence that Silius was influenced by Curtius' account (contrast C.R.iv, 7. 16 sq., with Silius iii, 6 sq., and 645 sq., and for background detail on Siwah see Parke (2) 200, 223 sq., and 248 sq.).

The literary evidence is, therefore, inconclusive, though it seems highly likely that Curtius wrote after Livy's history was 'published'; further Curtius has much in common with the Senecas, and the style of declamation exemplified by the Senecas.

Linguistic pointers

Closely linked with literary criteria for dating Curtius must be linguistic criteria, for these have to do with not only word forms and semantics but also syntax and style. Again if evidence of this type is to be considered a comprehensive analysis of the whole of Curtius' work and all Latin texts from say Augustus to Hadrian would be necessary for any firm conclusions to be made. Such a project would demand the aid of a computer and I have not had the time or resources to initiate this (for an idea of what is required see T.F. Carney, Content Analysis for Classicists, A.Class. xii, '69 151 sq., and Computers in Humanistic Research, ed. E.A. Bowles, New Jersey, '67 esp.p.119 sq.).

Even with a mechanical aid one would have to determine what elements in Curtius' Latin usage should be attributed to conservatism or radicalism; further one would have to recognize the uneven survival rate of literature produced during the early empire.

An early example of dispassionate statistical analysis is the article of E.B. Lease, 'The use and range of the future participle' AJP xl, '19 262 sq. His results show the importance of personal preferences and the difficulty of stratification: for example, the percentage of occurrences of the future participle without 'esse' is 92% for the whole of Silver Age literature; 100% for Sallust (Cat. and Jug.), Velleius and Tacitus but only 77.5% for Curtius and 77.3% for Gellius. Similarly the choice between 'futurum (esse)' and 'fore' clearly followed the whim of the writer concerned (art.cit. 266-7. Compare the recent work on Tacitus' Latin: I.G. Burnet BICS xvi, '69 63 sq., R.H. Martin CR xviii, '68 144 sq., and F.R.D. Goodyear JRS lviii, '68 22 sq.).

Most of Vergès' notes on Books 3 and 4 deal with Curtius' Latin and suggest that Curtius was a post-Augustan writer (see, for example, *infra* on l.11, 14 and 19, 2.14, 3.6 and 8.19, and Vergès p.26), but there is no attempt at a systematic stratification of usages. It is a pity that M. González-Haba's Zur Syntax der Unterordnung bei Curtius (München beim Verf. '59, known to me from Bardon's review of it [5] 173-4) does not compare Curtius' grammatical usages with those of other writers in the same era.

The inadequacy of the analysis of Curtius' Latin so far is shown up by the range of dates still advocated. Korzeniewski thought that Curtius' Latin suited an early period of Augustus' reign; by contrast Griset (RSC xii, '64 160 sq.), who would place Curtius in the reign of Severus Alexander, 222-235, argued that Curtius' Latin belongs to a period later than the first Century A.D., though he noted the close affinity between Curtius Latin and that of Pliny the Younger, Tacitus and Florus.

More may be achieved by an analysis of terms that Curtius shared with the language of politics of his own day, and phrases that were characteristic of Imperial Rome (for example the description of Callisthenes at viii, 5.20 as 'vindex publicae libertatis' and Cleo's comment on the Persian monarch, 'maiestatem enim imperii salutis esse tutelam' [viii, 4.11]). The sentence 'occupant liberum mortis arbitrium' at iv, 4.12 reflects a formula that appears in the context of 'maiestas' trials (e.g. Suet. Dom. 8, 4 and 11.3).

Non-political terminology too can be of assistance. Thus it has been argued that Curtius' failure to use the term 'cataphract' indicates that he wrote earlier than Hadrian; other terms suggest that Curtius postdated Augustus: for example, G. Lieberg has noted that the usage of 'structura' by Curtius at v, 1.26 differs from that of Vitruvius at de arch. ii, 8 (of. 25-23 B.C.) and Livy xxi, 11.8. Curtius gives the word an active verbal voice as opposed to the idea of a material structure (Der Begriff 'structura' in der lateinischen Literatur Hermes lxxxiv, '56 p.458). Lucan used the word in the same sense as Curtius, but one cannot say whether the usage, taken on its own originated with Curtius or Lucan (vi 64); Other post-Augustan usages would seem to include 'annuntiare' (x,8.11) and 'pigre' (v, 9.7); 'temporarius' (iv, 5.11) appears earlier only in Nepos.¹

Thus far linguistic arguments have not discredited a Claudian date for Curtius, even if they have not confirmed it. A post-Augustan date is suggested.

1. I have not yet been able to consult Toivo Viljamaa, Nouns meaning 'river' in Curtius Rufus, Turku '69: it may provide fresh evidence.

Passages echoing the reigns of Tiberius and Claudius

Badian, following on the article by G.V. Sumner in AUMLA '61, suggested that Curtius had gained the quaestorship before Augustus' death and thus as a member of the Senate had witnessed the stages by which Tiberius secured the principate. Thus, whilst Curtius wrote after the accession of Claudius, his account of events in Babylon in 323 B.C. reflected the political history of Tiberius' accession, with Perdiccas cast as Tiberius (Badian (1) 263).

The emphasis on Perdiccas' 'dissimulatio' (x, 6.18 and 9.8) is an indication that Curtius was writing after Tiberius' reign. We may go further and see other allusions in Book 10, for, as so often Curtius offers antithetical pictures and in the section before chapter 9 Perdiccas' behaviour is contrasted with Arrhidaeus'. Thus the hypocrisy of Perdiccas' show of reluctance to accept the insignia of the monarchy, contrasts with Arrhidaeus' sincerity in offering to stand down if his abdication could obviate civil war (6.18 with 8.19; J. Béranger [Recherches 137 sq.] has surveyed the evidence for 'le refus du pouvoir' as a convention of the principate). There were similarities between Claudius and Arrhidaeus: both members of the dynasty, neither regarded as naturally suited to rule, both accepting monarchy of necessity rather than from desire, both owing their accession to popular pressure (7.3 sq.), both showing initiative as peace-makers (on Arrhidaeus' initiative, 8.16 sq.). The digression linking contemporary and historical events breaks the narrative at a point before Arrhidaeus abandons the initiative and emerges as the mere tool of Perdiccas (9.16 sq.). Clearly a suggestion that Claudius was like Arrhidaeus could not have been diplomatically made at a later stage in Curtius' narrative (Errington [2] 51 n.23 noted the problem which Curtius faced in discussing Arrhidaeus in Claudius' reign).

To return to Tiberius, one notes the parallels between Curtius' version of Amyntas' speech at the time of Philotas' trial and the speech of M. Terentius in answer to the charge of collusion with Sejanus (C.R. vii, 1.26 sq. with Tac. Ann. vi, 8 and Dio lviii, 19.3 sq.). This suggests that Curtius wrote later than Terentius' trial and knew of it (Dosson Étude 34 sq.;

Bardon [1] 6-7; Sumner AUMLA xv, '61 esp. 33 sq.; it is less likely that Curtius influenced Tacitus in his version of Terentius' trial - cf. I. Lana RFIC xxvii, '49).

If it be established on other grounds that Curtius wrote after Tiberius' reign was over, then other features of the Histories may have associations with Tiberius: for instance the tales of secret correspondence (cf. on 7.14).

As we have seen the eulogy of the new emperor in x, 9 fits the accession of Claudius and the reference to Tyre (iv, 4.21) harmonizes with Claudius' dealings with Agrippa, Herod's kingdom and Tyre.

Germanicus and Caligula

At the time of Germanicus' death in A.D.19 people saw him as having much in common with Alexander (Tac. Ann.ii, 73, cf. infra on 8.5). Treves argued that Germanicus consciously imitated Alexander (Treves Il mito, p.161 cf. G.J.D. Aalders Hist.x, '61 382 sq.), but the evidence is indecisive (C. Questa, Il viaggio di Germanico in oriente e Tacito Maia ix, '57 291 sq.; W.F. Akveld rejected Treves' attempt to depict Germanicus' epigram, ad Hectoris tumulum, as a manifestation of his 'imitatio Alexandri' [Germanicus Groningen, '61 135 sq.; Anth.Lat. ii, 708 (Riese); cf. Pliny n.h. viii, 155]; on the 'Grand Camée' see now J. Gagé Basileia '68 15 sq.). Nevertheless the myths of Germanicus and Alexander were linked by others, if not on Germanicus' initiative.

Such associations were bound to be developed when Germanicus' son Gaius Caligula, became emperor, for Caligula made a show of emulating Alexander (e.g. Suet. Gaius 46; Dio lix, 25), and was the first emperor to do so. If Curtius wrote his history of Alexander in Caligula's reign he would have had to be judicious in his comments; but writing in Claudius' reign he could have attacked Caligula either by attacking Alexander or by suggesting the contrast between the two neo-Alexanders and between Caligula and Alexander. Claudius certainly kept the memory of his brother alive (cf. Suet. Claud. 11, 2).

There are indeed indications that Curtius had Germanicus and Caligula in mind. The story of the poisoning of Germanicus may have influenced Curtius' account of the rumours concerning Alexander's death (C.R. x, 10. 14-16 with Tac. Ann. ii, 69 sq. cf. Questa Maia ix, '57 esp. 315 sq. and cf. Curtius' elaboration of Alexander's illness at Tarsus [c.5; note 6.6]); phraseology in Tacitus' assessment of Germanicus appears too in Curtius' comments on Darius' character (8.5 with 12.19 infra, cf. Tac. Ann. ii, 73) where Curtius is in fact making a point about Alexander; the 'cupido' myth (cf. 1.16 infra) belongs to encomia of both Alexander and Germanicus (cf. St. Borzsák, Das Germani - cusbild des Tacitus Latomus xxviii, '69 esp. 592 sq. Germanicus himself, at least in an address to Alexandrians in the winter of A.D. 18-19, linked his aspirations with those of Alexander [E.G. Turner Ox.pap. xxv, 2435, p.102 sq.]); Alexander's determination not to be panicked by suspicion contrasts with the neurotic behaviour of Caligula (cf. p.97 infra). Lana was particularly struck by the connections between the story of Caligula's degeneration and Curtius' work. A manifestation of Caligula's loss of control was his imitation of Alexander (Suet. Cal. 52, and Dio lix, 17 and Lana thought that Curtius referred to aspects of Caligula's behaviour for example at x, 9. 16-19 (Philip Arrhidaeus' treatment of rebels, cf. Suet. Cal. 48), viii, 2.19 (Sisimithres' incest, cf. Suet. Cal. 24, Dio lix, 3.6), ix, 3.23 (Bucephalus, cf. Suet. Cal. 55) and v, 6.8 sq. (concubines, cf. Suet. Cal. 41; Lana RFIC xxvii, '49, 63 and 64 n.3). In the commentary on Bk.3 I have indicated further links with Caligula's story: thus at 6.15 Curtius' point about Alexander's concern for his sisters is not paralleled in the other sources and seems to reflect Caligula's 'pietas' towards his sisters; Curtius' version of Alexander's address to his troops before the battle of Issus (c.10) diverges from the versions found in the other sources, and the tone of Curtius' version is ironic: it may be that he is gently ridiculing the romantic imperialism of Caligula. Indeed it is when Curtius differs from the other sources and produces a comment that echoes Caligula's reign that one is nearest to establishing that Curtius wrote with Caligula in mind.

Curtius' treatment of Alexander's punishment of Bessus (vii, 5. 36 sq. and 10.10 and vi, 3. 9 sq.) is judicious, if it was written early in Claudius' reign when Claudius executed

Caligula's murderer Chaerea. Curtius' does not say that Alexander should have recognised the service performed by Bessus (contrast Dio lx, 3.4).

The internal evidence thus suggests that the Histories was completed in the early years of Claudius' reign. It is possible that the work was prepared, or partly written in Caligula's reign but the internal evidence offers no proof.

B. External Evidence

A senator by the name of Q. Curtius Rufus is known, likewise a rhetor, and if a Claudian date is accepted for the completion of the Histories, the historian could have been either the senator or the rhetor, or both. It will be convenient first to record the evidence:

Curtius RufusTestimonia

1. Tac. Ann. xi, 21: de origine Curtii Rufi, quem gladiatore genitum quidam prodidere, neque falsa prompserim et vera exequi pudet. postquam adolevit, sectator quaestoris, cui Africa obtigerat, dum in oppido Adrumeto vacuis per medium diei porticibus secretus agitatur, oblata ei species muliebris ultra modum humanum et audita est vox, 'tu es, Rufe, qui in hanc provinciam pro consule venies.'
2. Pliny ep. vii, 27.2: ... Curtio Rufo. Tenuis adhuc et obscurus obtinenti Africam comes haeserat. Inclinato die spatiabatur in porticu: offertur ei mulieris figura humana grandior pulchriorque; perterrito Africam se futurorum praenuntiam dixit; iturum enim Romam honoresque gesturum atque etiam cum summo imperio in eandem provinciam reversurum ibique moriturum.
3. Tac. Ann. xi, 21: tali omine in spem sublatus degressusque in urbem largitione amicorum, simulacri ingenio quaesturam et mox nobilis inter candidatos praeturam principis suffragio adsequitur, cum hisce verbis Tiberius dedecus natalium eius velavisset: 'Curtius Rufus videtur mihi ex se natus.'
4. Tac. Ann. xi, 20: Account of the award of triumphal insignia to Corbulo in A.D. 47, then - nec multo post Curtius Rufus eundem honorem adipiscitur, qui in agro Mattiaco recluserat specus quaerendis venis argenti.
5. Tac. Ann. xi, 21: longa post haec (referring to the praetorship) senecta, et adversus superiores tristi adulatione, adrogans minoribus, inter pares difficilis, consulare imperium triumphi insignia ac postremo Africam obtinuit; atque ibi defunctus fatale praesagium implevit.
6. Pliny ep. vii, 27.3: facta sunt omnia. Praeterea accedenti Carthaginem egredientique nave eadem figura in litore occurrisset narratur. Ipse certe implicitus morbo futura praeteritis, adversa secundis auguratus spem salutis nullo suorum desperante proiecit.

The following two items may refer to the consulship of the same Curtius Rufus:

7. Josephus AJ xx, I.2 I4: a letter of Claudius written when Claudius was δημαρχικῆς ἐξουσίας τὸ πέμπτον, ὕπατος ἀποδεδειγμένος τὸ τέταρτον κτλ. It ends with the words: ἐγράφη πρὸ τεσσάρων καλανδῶν <Ἰουλίου> ἐπὶ ἡμέρων Ῥούφου καὶ Πομπηίου Σιλουανοῦ. (The name of the month is supplied from mss. of the Latin version.) 28th June A.D.45.
8. M. Della Corte PP xviii, '5I 226 = AE lxiv, '52 50.
Cf. A. Degrassi Fasti Consolari p.13. A consular pair belonging to the period 8th-14th October of some year:
L. OPPIVS, CVRTIVS R[V F]VS.

The following two inscriptions from Vindonissa in Germania Superior may refer to Curtius' governorship in Germany, but the readings offered in CIL are highly tentative:

9. CIL xiii, 5204:

IM. I
ru]FO LE[g. Aug. pr. pr.?

10. CIL xiii, II5I4:

TI. CLAVDIO CA[esa]RE A/G GERM
IMP XII P.M. TR. PO[t. v] II COS IIII P.P. (A.D.47)
q. curtius r] v[fus le] G A/G PROPR.
M. LIC[inio st] O[lo]NE LEG A/G

By the end of 47 Claudius was IMP XV. The restoration of the inscription was suggested by Münzer.

The rhetor

- II. The index to Suetonius' de rhetoribus includes the following names:

L. Cestius Pius, M. Porcius Latro, Q. Curtius Rufus, L. Valerius Primanus, Verginius Flavus, L. Staius Ursulus, P. Clodius Quirinalis.

1. Curtius the SenatorCurtius' family and early career

Tacitus indicates that Curtius held the consulship as a 'novus homo' (T 3; esp. the phrase 'nobiles inter candidatos'), and Tacitus and Pliny agree in talking of the obscurity of his family (T. 1-3; an inscription from Orange, dateable to A.D. 77, refers to a 'duovir' by the name of Q. Curtius Rufus as the occupant of an estate there. It is possible that he was a relative of the consular Curtius [J. Sautel and A. Piganiol, Inscriptions cadastrales d'Orange Gallia xiii, '55 esp. pp. 34-36]). One need not take too seriously Tacitus' insinuation that the truth about his parentage was more scandalous than the story that he was the son of a gladiator. It was a mannerism of the Roman 'nobilitas' to pour scorn on the obscurity of an Italian family (Syme Tacitus ii, 621).

Curtius first appears in the service of Rome as a 'comes' of a quaestor in Africa (cf. P. Celer 'comes' of C. Helvidius Priscus q. in Achaëa before A.D. 51, Pflaum Garrières procuratoriennes no. 26). The quaestor's business was financial and administrative, and Curtius' record in Germany suggests that his talents lay in this direction (on Adrumetum, the scene of Curtius' dream, see L. Foucher Hadrumetum Paris '64, esp. 109-112: coins were minted there under the direction of a quaestor in 6-5 B.C., and the Quaestor's regular function in the town was the collection of direct taxation).

If he was not wealthy before he went to Africa he at least returned to Rome wealthy enough to aspire to the quaestorship, and to acquire wealthy friends (T. 3).

The quaestorship and praetorship (T. 3)

As Curtius was not of the senatorial order, it is possible that he did not hold a vigintivirate post, which was not a qualification for advancement to the quaestorship for equestrians, though it was for those of the senatorial order (A. McAlindon, Entry to the Senate in the early Empire JRS xlvii, '57 191 sq.

cf. the case of Velleius Paterculus: G.V. Sumner HSCP lxxiv, '70 271). No vigintivirate post is attested for Curtius Rufus, and, in view of Curtius' origins and his subsequent career, one may surmise that he obtained the grant of the 'latus clavus' whilst serving the 'militiae equestres' and so obtained the right to candidate for the quaestorship (on this line of advancement McAlindon, esp. 191-3).

In this period the minimum age for holding the quaestorship was 25 (for interpretations of this provision in the early Empire see G.V. Sumner Latomus xxvi, '67 426). Badian suggests that Curtius had gained the quaestorship before Augustus' death as Curtius' account of events in Babylon 323 echoes the proceedings in the Senate at the time of Tiberius' accession: Badian (1) 263.

Tacitus says that Curtius' candidature for the praetorship had the backing of Tiberius and as the minimum age for holding this post would seem to have been 30, Curtius must have been at least 30 in A.D. 37 (the difference between 'suffragatio', from which the term 'suffragium' developed, and 'commendatio' was that the former involved personal appearance in support of the candidate, whilst support by letter constituted 'commendatio'. Thus one might argue that Curtius candidated at some time other than during Tiberius' absence from Rome in the periods 21-22 and 26-37; and thus that he was at least 30 in A.D. 26. However the distinction in law [cf. Lex de Imperio Vesp. iv] was not necessarily followed by Tacitus: the lessons to be learnt from the discovery of the 'Tabula Hebana' counsel caution. On 'suffragatio' B.M. Levick Hist. xvi, '67 207 sq. and on Tiberius' policy with regard to the praetorship A.M. Astin Latomus xxviii, '69 872).

H. Hill (Nobilitas in the imperial period Hist. xviii, '69 230 sq.) translates the phrase 'nobiles inter candidatos', 'in competition with nobiles' (p.242), and comments that 'nobilitas' was still a social distinction that could be won in the early Empire. This reinforces the point that Curtius was an outsider, a 'novus homo', elevated to a higher social class. The historian seems to display a concern to identify himself with the ruling class in the way that one would expect of a new

arrival: the choice of the first person plural form 'habuimus' is indicative of this tendency (cf. Syme Tacitus 570 sq. and supra p. xxviii sq.).

The Consulship:

As a plebeian Curtius would have had to wait two years longer than a patrician to gain the consulship (on this as a feature of the post-Sullan era, E. Badian (1) 140 sq.), and is not likely to have held this office before the age of 42 (R. Syme Tacitus ii, Appendix 18, pp. 653 sq. on 'The Age for the Consulate'; it is true that a 'novus homo' might be accelerated up the cursus honorum through service of the Caesars, but this privilege was more for the military specialist, and the first clearly attested case, Q. Veranius [to whom Onasander dedicated his Strategikos], was consul in A.D. 49 [q. in A.D. 37; E. Birley DUJ '52 88 sq.; R. Syme JRS xliii, '53 152], later than Curtius' consulship).

The consulship has commonly been dated to A.D. 45 on the evidence of a letter, quoted by Josephus (T. 7), which was written on 28th June in the consulship of Rufus and Pompeius Silvanus, in the fifth year of Claudius' tribunician power (from 25th Jan. 45), when Claudius was consul designate for the fourth time (the consulship was held in 47). If Josephus' text is taken as being historically accurate the consular list for 45 may read:

Ordinarii:	H. Vinicius and T. Statilius Taurus Corvinus
Suffecti:	Ti Plautius Silvanus Aelianus - in the period
	1st March - 1st April.
Rufus	M. Pompeius Silvanus by 28th June.
Cn. Hosidius Geta	Ti. Flavius Sabinus
	by 1st August.
Cn. Hosidius Geta	L. Vagellius
	by 2nd September.

(References in A. Degraffi Pasti Consolari 12-13; E.M. Smallwood Documents and U. Weidemann Gn. xxxvii, '65 797).

This list is possible, but tentative insofar as the addition of Hosidius Geta, Flavius Sabinus and L. Vagellius depends on an interpretation of CIL x, 1401 and the inscription published by G.Q. Giglioli in RPAA 25/6 '49 - '51 71, cf. AE lxx, '53 12-13. Furthermore the cognomen Rufus need not refer to a Q. Curtius Rufus; there are other Rufi to be placed in the consular Fasti of the 40's: P. Anteius Rufus, who became governor of Dalmatia in A.D.50 (J.J. Wilkes Dalmatia '69 p. 444), and the colleague of P. Ostorius Scapula, P. Suillius Rufus, or Vellaeus Rufus (Degrassi Fasti Consolari 12; E.M. Smallwood Documents no. 362). Scapula's consulship has to be fitted in before 47 when he went to Britain as governor. A consular pair L. Oppius and Curtius R[uf]us are attested for the period 8-14th October of an unknown year (T. 8): the year could hardly be 45 if it is accepted that, after a Rufus, Hosidius Geta and L. Vagellius were consuls on 22nd September. According to Degrassi the consular lists can be considered complete for the years 23-38 and 46, and as Curtius was governor in Germany in 46-7 (argument *infra*) the year of Curtius' consulship seems to be restricted to the period 39-45. If Curtius was the colleague of L. Oppius in the early part of October the year is unlikely to have been 39, since on 2nd September Gaius dismissed the consuls and appointed Cn. Domitius Afer (Dio lix, 20. 1-3; the phrase τὸν συνάρχοντα ἀβύπῳ would imply that Gaius took the other consulship, but this is not mentioned by Suetonius, Gaius 17).

The date of Curtius' consulship is thus uncertain on this evidence and we must now consider what is known of his subsequent career, and then compare the data on his senior posts with other senatorial careers of the same period. The following table summarises the conclusions to be drawn from the data. A key to the notes appears on p. lv.

Name	Consular year (1)	Provincial Command (2)	Procos Africae (3, 4 and 5)	Further commands (6)
L. Salvius Otho M.F.	33		sc. 40-1	Dalmatia 42/3 (6)
Q. Marcius Barea Soranus	34?		41/3	
L. Livius Ocella Sulpicius Galba (<u>RE</u> Sulpicius no.63)	33	Germania Superior 39/41-2	2 yrs. beginning not earlier than May 44	
M. Servilius Nonianus (<u>RE</u> Servilius no. 69)	35		Earlier than A.D. 59	
C. Vibius Rufinus (<u>RE</u> Vibius no. 49)	39-42	Germania Superior (42?) 43/5		
L. Apronius L.f. Caesianus (<u>RE</u> Apronius no. 6)	39		perhaps before A.D. 54	
Q. Curtius Rufus	39-45	Germania Superior sc. 46-47	Date unknown	
P. Calvisius Pomponius Secundus (<u>RE</u> Pomponius no. 103)	44	Germania Superior 50/1		
T. Statilius Taurus (<u>RE</u> Statilius no. 37)	44		Earlier than the end of 53	
M. Pompeius Silvanus	45		53/4, certainly before 58	Dalmatia 67/70 (6)
Cn. Hosidius Geta (<u>RE</u> Hosidius no. 6; <u>PIR</u> iv, 1 ² no. 216)	(43? or) 45		Date unknown; perhaps c. 54- 5 (5) (7)	Crete and Cyrene (7)
Q. Sulpicius Camerinus	46		Before 58	
A. Vitellius (<u>RE</u> Vitellius no. 7 Supplbd. ix).	48		54 or 60/1 or 63	
Ser. Cornelius Salvidienus Orfitus (<u>RE</u> Cornelius no. 359; <u>PIR</u> ii ² no. 1444)	51		61/2 or 62/3	

- (1) Degrassi Fasti consolari
- (2) E. Ritterling Fasti des röm. Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat Wien '32.
- (3) Thomasson (1)
- (4) U. Weidemann Gn. xxxvii, '65 esp. 796-7
- (5) E. Birley JRS lii, '62 221 sq.
- (6) J.J. Wilkes Dalmatia London '69 esp. 443-4.
- (7) Thomasson (2) esp. p.185.

The governorship in Germany.

Tacitus mentions the award to Corbulo of triumphal insignia in A.D. 47 and goes on to mention the similar award shortly after to Curtius Rufus (T. 4). It seems therefore that Curtius held the rank of 'legatus Augusti pro praetore Germaniae Superioris' (title attested for A.D. 47 in CIL xiii, 11514 where the name has unfortunately not survived).

Curtius could not have been governor in the period 43-45, for C. Vibius Rufinus, cos. pre-24, is attested for 43 and 45 (CIL xiii, 6797 and ILS 2283; E. Ritterling Fasti des röm. Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat Wien '32). The next firmly attested governor of Upper Germany is P. Calvisius Sabinus Pomponius Secundus, cos. 44, in 50/1; Tacitus' phrase 'nec multo post' makes it unnecessary to go further than A.D. 51, and it may likewise refer to A.D. 47 in which case Curtius' governorship might belong to 46, or 47 (Sumner AUMLA '61 made it 46-8, whilst Ritterling made it 'c. 46' [op.cit. 15]). Galba and Pomponius Secundus, who became governors of Germania Superior in 39 and 50 respectively had to wait till the sixth year after their consulship for this command (vide the chart on p. liv supra). On this argument Curtius' consulship might have been as early as 40 or 41.

The nature of Curtius' distinction in Germany is an indication that he was chosen for the post as a financial rather than military specialist. The choice of a non-military type as governor in 46 or 47 would fit the historical context, for after the fighting in Germania Superior in the governorship of Livius Ocella Galba (39/41-2), there was apparently peace in the province till the

governorship of Calvisius Sabinus Pomponius Secundus (50/1; Tac. Ann. xii, 27); similarly in Germania Inferior after the fighting when P. Gabinius Secundus was governor (40/1), there was peace until after the death of Q. Sanguinius Maximus in A.D. 47. When peace was established in the German provinces Claudius had no interest in provoking armed conflict there, for his sights were set on the invasion of Britain (cf. the quotations from Ritterling's papers in E. Stein Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im röm. Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat Wien '32 27-8). Two fragmentary inscriptions (T. 9 and 10) from Vindonissa (mod. Windisch c. 50 km. E. of Basle) in Upper Germany may refer to Curtius, and one belongs to A.D. 47. Vindonissa at that time served as a base for the policing of Raetia and in 46-7 the main project was the construction of a road which ran along the Lech valley to the Danube (H. Schönberger JRS lix, '69 154).

It may be added that Vibius Rufinus and Calvisius Sabinus Pomponius were both writers: Vibius Rufinus' work on plants and trees was listed in the elder Pliny's bibliography, and the other was a tragedian (Quint. x, 1.98; Tac. Ann. xi, 13 and xii, 28). Literary talent was a recommendation in Claudius' opinion.

McQueen argued that as the historian's battle descriptions are 'so defective and sketchy that he can have had little or no acquaintance with war', and as Tacitus' Curtius 'saw a fair amount of military experience', the historian is not likely to have been the same as Tacitus' Curtius (Curtius Rufus, 25-6). The first premiss requires qualification, and the second is open to debate for as we have seen Tacitus' Curtius may have been chosen for the governorship of Germany as a man of administrative and financial skills.

Proconsul provinciae Africae

Pliny and Tacitus attest that he gained this post and died in office, and from Tacitus we learn that he was very old (T. 5 and 6).

Unfortunately the list of governors of this province is incomplete, and in the critical period few dates are known

(Thomasson Statthalter, which must be checked by reference to the reviews by E. Birley in JRS '62 221 sq. and U. Weidemann Gn. xxxvii, '65). Thomasson set Curtius' proconsulship early in Nero's reign or late in Claudius' reign on the assumption that Curtius was consul in 45 (Josephus' 'Rufus'), and from the argument that in this period the time gap between consulship and the governorship in Africa rarely exceeded ten years (ii, 39).

The table on p. liv illustrates, amongst other things, what is known of men who held the consulship in the same period as Curtius Rufus and went on, like Curtius, to a prestigious governorship in Africa. The scheme shows that an ex-consul could expect to wait six years before gaining a proconsulship, and might have to wait ten years or more. Curtius' governorship could be set almost in any year between 48 - about the earliest he could have been appointed after the governorship in Germany - and 60. If 45 is the correct year for Curtius' consulship then it is significant. A consul ordinarius of the previous year, Statilius Taurus, had served in Africa before the end of 53, and Pompeius Silvanus, possibly Curtius' colleague in 45, had served before 58.

As the internal evidence of Curtius' Historiae indicates a date of publication in Claudius' reign and we know of a senator of the same nomen and cognomen who held high office in Claudius' reign it is feasible that the senator was the historian. The identification is supported by passages in the history of Alexander which link its author with the senatorial class: for example, the significant use of the first person form 'habuimus' at x, 9.3; the echoes of M. Terentius' speech to the Senate (vii, 1.26 sq., supra p.xliv); the echoes of Senate meetings in A.D. 14 in Curtius' description of events in Babylon in 323; the passages in which Curtius deals with 'libertas' and the responsibilities of an advisory council (cf. infra on 2.10 sq.).

If the Curtius who died in N. Africa was our historian then it is clear that the work was written whilst he was still climbing in the public service and it was still in his interests to show due deference to the Emperor. It is indeed likely that the work was written before Curtius gained the consulship.

Tacitus' comments on the consular Curtius are found in the phrase 'adversus superiores tristi adulatione, adrogans minoribus, inter pares difficilis' (T. 5). Syme rendered the first phrase, 'subservient though surly towards his superiors' (AJP lxxix, '58 22). Here surely is the key to the Histories. Under a dictatorship or autocratic rule one may be cynical or satirize the situation, but survival or advancement may seem to demand acceptance of the aims and methods of the régime. Acceptance may then be demonstrated as a necessary hypocrisy. But the progression from hypocrisy to ignominious surrender is insidious, however obscure.

The hapless man is reduced to flattery, and perhaps to the doublethink of denying that it is flattery (cf. C.R. x, 9. 1 sq. and iii, 2.10, vii, 4.9; viii, 5.6 and 8.21).

2. The rhetor

Suetonius' list of rhetoricians includes a Q. Curtius Rufus (T.11). The first named, L.Cestius Pius, was active around 13 B.C.; the second, M.Porcius Latro, died in 4 B.C.; after Curtius comes Valerius Primanus, of whom nothing is known, Verginius Flavus, who taught Persius from A.D.46 and was exiled by Nero in 65, L.Statius Ursulus and P.Clodius Quirinalis, whom Hieronymus mentions under the years 56 and 47 respectively (the evidence on these men is discussed by R.D.Milns [(4) 503sq., who thinks that the rhetor was the historian] and Schanz-Hosius 347sq., 352 and 744). This list puts the rhetorician Curtius in the period stretching from the latter part of Augustus' reign to the early part of Nero's reign.

The case for identifying the senator with the rhetor and the historian is basically that the Histories is highly rhetorical in style, having close affinities with the schools' exercises on Alexander, that the three all belong to the same period, and that the senator was described by Tiberius as 'ex se natus' and a successful practice as a rhetorician would help to explain his rise in the cursus honorum. It rings true that a writer and rhetorician should have attained the highest magistracies under Claudius.

Curtius' sources and the composition of the Histories

This survey of the problems of identifying Curtius' sources is necessarily brief. Argument on many of the points made appears in the Commentary itself; it is furthermore assumed that the reader will have access to Pearson's book The Lost Histories of Alexander together with Badian's review of it, and Hamilton's Plutarch 'Alexander': A commentary.

In the Commentary I have linked consideration of Curtius' sources with analysis of the composition of the work, for it is necessary to make allowances for Curtius' own contribution to the development of the myth, when one considers points of divergence between Curtius and the other sources. Rabe's careful analysis of the sources, for instance, often seems unsatisfactory because she treats the secondary sources as structures built from units from earlier writers, and she is in danger of presenting Curtius and the other secondary sources as simple copyists.

Whilst many inconsistencies can be regarded as the product of Curtius' concern about the composition (cf. on 2.9, 7.1 and 8-10), there are still many cases where contradictions cannot be so explained and they indicate the contaminatio of differing traditions (vide on 7.5, 9.12, 11.13 and p. 200, and 12.13; contrast vii, 10.10 with vii, 5.43; on his contaminatio of two traditions on the destruction of the mole at Tyre [C.R. iv, 2.24-3.7] see Rutz Hermes xciii, '65 esp. 375 sq.; Schwartz [RE iv, 1879] cited as examples of Curtius' failure to harmonize conflicting traditions the difference in bias between tale of the trial of Amyntas and his brothers and the story of the fall of Philotas' family, and the difference in the judgement of Alexander's superstition between vii, 7.8 and 10.4; but contaminatio is difficult to establish where the inconsistency is in interpretation rather than facts).

Curtius refers to only three earlier writers: Cleitarchus, Timagenes and Ptolemy, and of these Timagenes is least known to us as a writer on Alexander's campaigns, for Curtius' reference (ix, 5.21 = Jacoby FGH 88 Frag.3) is the only one we have, though Livy records that Timagenes thought the Romans incapable of standing up to the brilliance of an Alexander (Livy ix, 18.6.

Detail in C.R. iii, 1.22 and 6.1 may possibly derive from Timagenes). He was brought to Rome in 55 B.C. and taught rhetoric there but although he was accepted into Antony's circle of friends and managed to switch sides when Octavian emerged as the new power, he advertised his contempt for Rome and was outspoken enough to anger Augustus. Banished from the Princeps' court he destroyed his manuscript of his history of Augustus' career. He apparently wrote as a separate work a general history, which was available to Strabo after the latter's return to Rome in 29 B.C. (the evidence on Timagenes is collected in Jacoby FGH no.88; I have here summarised points made by G.W. Bowersock, pp. 108 sq. and 123 sq.).

It has at various times been suggested that Timagenes was the source for Trogus' Philippica, a work which Curtius certainly read, as we shall presently see (the arguments for Trogus' use of Timagenes are rehearsed by Jacoby FGH IIC 220 sq.; limited use of Timagenes on the Parthians is argued by Th. Liebmann-Frankfort Latomus xxviii, '69 894 sq.). The fragments of Timagenes, however, are insufficient to establish whether Trogus used him on the history of Alexander, and whether Curtius used him directly or through perhaps Trogus (cf. Schwartz RE iv, esp. 1887 sq., Edson CP lvi, '61 200-1).

It will be convenient at this point to discuss further the relationship between Trogus and Curtius.

Curtius' Use of Trogus

Trogus' Philippica was a product of the Augustan age, completed after 20 B.C., to which date he carried his history of Parthia. The Philippica is known to us through the Eptome of Justinus, who completed his work by A.D. 321 (Edson CP lvi, '61 203) or perhaps before A.D. 226 (Steele [4]).

Tarn (ii, 124 and 79) found no evidence to prove use of Trogus by Curtius or use of Curtius by Trogus, and other scholars have generally supposed that similarities between Curtius' account and Justin's arose from their common use of the same or related sources (Schwartz RE iv, esp. 1883 sq., Bardon [3] esp.

123 sq., and Jacoby RE xi, 631, s.v. Kleitarchos, who argued that Curtius and Trogus both took Cleitarchus through an intermediary source. Von Gutschmid argued the case for rejecting Peterdorff's theory [in Eine neue Hauptquelle des Curtius Rufus 1884, known to me indirectly] that Curtius picked up Cleitarchus' account via Trogus, and Gutschmid's refutation was accepted by Schwartz [RE iv, 1884]). The view that Curtius used Trogus' source directly is commendable, in that the study of the sources on Alexander has tended to proliferate hypothetical intermediary sources. Then too the valid point has been made that Curtius could hardly have derived sufficient material for his ten books from the two books of Trogus' Philippica which related to Alexander.

Tarn had to admit that in one place a sentence of Curtius tallies practically verbatim with one in Justin's history: *ceterum nec mundus duobus solibus potest regi nec orbis duo summa regna, salvo statu terrarum, potest habere* (C.R.iv, II.22; J.xi, 12.15), and it is clear that Curtius and Trogus could not have produced so close a match had they been translating the same Greek sentence independently. Tarn posited that both took their Latin from a famous piece of advice which Areius was reputed to have given Octavian (cf. Plut. Ant. 81, Tarn ii, 79). In any case it is not safe to build too much on a sententia shared by two authors.

However there are other significant links (e.g. J.xii, 8.9 with C.R.ix, 2.3) and the coincidence of phraseology is not an isolated case: Dosson noted other instances (Etude 146-7). Clearly Curtius was familiar with a Latin history of Alexander whose phraseology coincided with Trogus' in many instances; in the absence of other candidates the natural conclusion is that the source was Trogus himself. What must now be recognised is that Curtius often adopted the language of Trogus' narrative and used Trogus' phrases whilst taking the historical material from other sources. Thus in the tale of Alexander's sickness at Tarsus Curtius adopts Trogus' expressions though his source for the historical detail was some other source (cf. on chapter 5 and 6 infra and esp. pp. 104 - 3). Then Curtius attributes to Alexander as part of his address to his troops before the battle of Issus ideas which occur in Justin's version of Alexander's

speech before Gaugamela (C.R.iii, 10.10 with J.xi, 13.11: hortatur spernant illam aciem auro et argento fulgentem, in qua plus praedae quam periculi sit. Trogus may have been influenced here by Livy, whose work he knew [J.xxxviii, 3.11] but this same book of Justin at least provides a guarantee that Justin was concerned to preserve something of the rhetoric of Trogus' speeches [See Trogus F. 152]: thus it is unlikely that Justin departed from Trogus' text to incorporate passages from Curtius). Curtius' account of Alexander's dealing with the Persian royal captives after Issus is closer to Justin's account in phraseology than in detail (cf. on 12.8 and 11 and p.219).

Edson picked out Curtius' account of the battle of Megalopolis to point to Curtius' dependence on Trogus, for this passage is almost identical with Justin's sketch of the battle of Sellasia (C.R. vi, l. 7-8 with J.xxviii, 4.2; C. Edson CP lvi, '61 199 [misleadingly the reference to Justin is incorrect and E. referred to the battle of Mantinea instead of Megalopolis]). Edson went on to suggest that whilst Curtius made direct use of Trogus, he did not manage, or trouble to harmonize the hostility of Trogus' presentation of Alexander with the more favourable picture which he found elsewhere: 'this accounts for many of the unfavourable and derogatory features of the view of Alexander given by Curtius, a hasty and irresponsible rhetorician who could not or would not coordinate the information derived from his various sources into a coherent picture of the king' (Edson art.cit. p. 200). In the case of the story of Alexander's illness at Tarsus Curtius borrowed from Trogus' account without, however, picking up the bias in Trogus' version, which was clearly to highlight Parmenion's integrity and efficiency.

It is too readily assumed that Curtius and Trogus were incapable of using a source without adopting its peculiar bias: thus Trogus' use of Timagenes is generally rejected because Timagenes' admiration for Alexander and contempt for Rome are allegedly not mirrored in Justin's epitome (Trogus' consistency is indeed somewhat illusory: the story of Gaugamela, for instance, is favourable to Alexander, though the tragedy of Darius' fall is an important motif [J.xi, 13-14] and J. Therasse has pointed out that Justin's account of Alexander's adoption of oriental practices is not hostile to Alexander nor moralist in

tone [AC xxxvii, '68 esp. 564 sq.]). Furthermore there is no necessity to assume that inconsistency in characterisation indicates that an author is mindlessly alternating between two divergent traditions: Tacitus' picture of Germanicus in the Annals is consciously multi-faceted (cf. Timpe Der Triumph des Germanicus '68 with the comments on it of K. Wellesley in JRS lix, '69 278).

Curtius and Arrian's sources, Aristobulus and Ptolemy

In many cases the phraseology of Curtius matches fairly closely Arrian's, and as Curtius wrote earlier than did Arrian the similarities may have arisen from Curtius' use of sources later employed by Arrian (similarities are noted for instance at 9.2 - A.iii, 11.7, 8.20 - A.iii, 11.12, 11.3 - A.ii, 9.1; some other parallels in phraseology and detail are indexed by Dosson Etude 141-3). It was not Arrian who copied Curtius for in many cases it can be demonstrated that Curtius mistranslated a Greek source or mutilated the sense by abbreviation whilst Arrian copied the same source accurately. These cases were carefully analysed by Steel ((3) 50 sq., following up a point made by Dosson Etude 187 sq.). For example, Curtius' mistranslation of the participle ἀπαγε produced the city of Arvae (C.R.vi, 4.23 with A.iii, 23.6 noted supra); his account of the fate of Aspastes at ix, 10.29 is a mangled version of a Greek sentence as given by Arrian at vii, 4.1; names are frequently garbled or confused or the father's name in the genitive case is turned into an accusative case and treated as a separate party in an episode (compare viii, 6.9 with A.iv, 13.4; Steele suggests that Zariaspen at ix, 10.19 represents a careless reading of νεωτερίσωντα preserved at A.vi, 27.3); even the reference to Catabolum at iii, 7.5 may be the fruit of such carelessness, in Steele's view (but see my note ad loc.).

Steele properly noted that Curtius is closer to Arrian than is immediately apparent as a divergence from Arrian may often be owing to Curtius' inclusion of an idea picked up from Livy (Steele (3) 41 sq.). Thus the difference between C.R.ix, 1.8 and A.v, 20.6 may be accounted for as Curtius' knowledge of Livy xxi, 24.4, and Curtius' development of the story of the mutilation of

the prisoners-of-war taken at Issus shows the influence of Livy (A.ii, 7.1, Livy xxx, 29.2, cf. commentary on 8.15); similarly Livian influence drew Curtius away from the source he shared with Arrian on the death of Spitamenes (C.R.viii, 3; A.iv, 17.7; Livy xxxviii, 24; Steele [1] 407). Steele went on to argue that Curtius read Arrian's Anabasis (Steele [3] 153 sq.), but the evidence on Curtius' dates shows this to be a false conclusion.

The evidence is there that Curtius used a source later employed by Arrian. Curtius himself refers to Ptolemy (ix, 5.21) and his use of Ptolemy is elsewhere discernible, as we shall see, but it is less easy to determine whether Curtius knew Arrian's other main source, Aristobulus: a link with Aristobulus is suggested below at 9.2 (cf. A.iii, 11.7). Tarn (ii, 107) stated that Curtius' account of the capture of Bessus (vii, 5.19 sq.) is 'Aristobulus' account written up', for Aristobulus recorded that Bessus' officers handed him over to Alexander, whereas Ptolemy wrote that he took Bessus after a forced march against the camp of Spitamenes and Dataphornes (A.iii, 30.5 and 29.6 sq.). Tarn suggested that more might be from Aristobulus. Since Tarn's case ultimately rests on his view of the story of Bessus, it must be noted that Welles has challenged the view that Aristobulus' version was unique whilst Ptolemy's was the correct and generally believed version (Welles [2] 109 sq., A.iii, 29.7 sq., C.R.vii, 5.19 sq., and D.S. 83.8). If Aristobulus altered the record one might have expected him to excise reference to the barbaric punishment of Bessus which Alexander permitted, for he was generally concerned to counter elements in the history of Alexander which detracted from his glory (Bessus' punishment: C.R.vii, 5.40, D.S. 83.9, cf. A.iv, 7.3. On the readiness of Aristobulus to defend Alexander: Jacoby FGH Frags. 7, 8, 33, 55, 58, 59, 62; Pearson [1] 156 sq., and Badian [1] 255-6; incidentally none of these fragments is matched by Curtius); conversely Ptolemy had something to gain from changing the record to set the capture of Bessus to his own credit. Furthermore in the case where Curtius contradicts Ptolemy he cites against him Cleitarchus and Timagenes (ix, 5.21), not Aristobulus.

Dosson saw a fragment of Aristobulus in Curtius' account of Alexander's wound received in the assault on the city of the Malli, for ix, 5.9 matches the quotation from Ptolemy at A.vi, 10.1 save that Curtius gives the length of the arrow as does Aristobulus (Plut. de fort.ii, 9; Dosson Etude 144). This argument is unsatisfactory for it presupposes that Arrian was incapable of shortening quotations, whereas we shall note that he did drop out details (vide on 7.3 and 8). Curtius might have taken all the information here from Ptolemy: collateral use of Aristobulus is not established.

In Bk.3 Curtius did not employ Aristobulus on the way in which Alexander broke the Gordian knot nor on the background to Alexander's collapse at Tarsus (1.18 and 5.2); it is further argued below that Curtius did not make use of Aristobulus' catalogue of Persian units at Gaugamela, and most likely did not use Aristobulus for his description of the Persian army assembled in 333 (cf. on 2.9 and p. 35sq. infra), and that Aristobulus was not Curtius' source on the tale of Darius' dream (cf. notes on 3. 2-7). Then Curtius did not include the story of the Sardanapalus monument at Anchialus, though Aristobulus gave it (Jacoby FGH Frag. 9, though Cleitarchus admittedly gave it too and his work was apparently known to Curtius).

By contrast there is direct reference to Ptolemy at ix, 5.9, and several passages suggest a link with Ptolemy's work: compare C.R. iii, 8.20 with A.iii, 11.2; C.R.iv, 1. 10-14 with A.ii, 14. 4-9 and Hamilton (1) 77; C.R.vii, 10.10 with A.iv, 7.3 (Hamilton (1) p.115); C.R.x, 2.24 with A.vii, 9.6 (Hamilton (1) 36-7 and Tarn ii, 296); C.R.viii, 13-14 with A.v, 8 sq. (Pearson (1) 198 sq. On the problems of identifying fragments of Ptolemy see too Strasburger (1) and (4)). It is tempting to attribute to Ptolemy data which Curtius and Arrian give in common on the battles and on military and civil administration.

However, in many cases detail given by Curtius does not tally with that given by Arrian (cf. Strasburger (1) 6-7). Further it is rather disturbing to find that Curtius' preserves details about Ptolemy's later opponents which do not appear in Arrian's account. Thus Curtius preserves information missing in Arrian, on Perdicas and Antinous, who clashed with Ptolemy after

Alexander's death, and comparison of Curtius and Arrian shows too that Ptolemy suppressed information on Leonnatus, Polyperchon and Antigonos (the evidence is discussed by Tarn ii, 110, Welles (2) esp. 107-8, Errington (1)). It emerges too that Ptolemy's work belongs to his early years in Egypt, when he had greatest cause to enhance his own reputation at the expense of others (Errington (1) esp. 241).

The sobering conclusion must be that Curtius had access to a source which was on many points more detailed and reliable than Ptolemy's. That source was not Callisthenes, for much of the relevant detail relates to the period after his death, and there are contradictions between Curtius and Callisthenes on other points (cf. on 1.24) nor was it Chares who was certainly not followed by Curtius for example at 11.10 and on Philotas' fall (cf. p. 216 *infra* and Badian (1) 253). It may have been Onesicritus, but it seems at least that he was not a source for Bk.3 (p.89-90 *infra*) and elsewhere detail given by Curtius disagrees with Onesicritus' information (contrast C.R.vi, 4.22 and D.S. 75, with Onesicritus, Jacoby FGH no.134, Frag. 3; the divergence is discussed by T.S. Brown Onesicritus 91 sq.). In other cases Curtius is closer to Onesicritus: compare C.R. ix, 1. 9-10 with Onesicritus Frag.22 from Strabo xv, 1.21; and C.R.x, 1.10 mentions Onesicritus on a mission which Nearchus reported without mentioning Onesicritus by name (A.viii,34.6): this suggests that Curtius' information derived from Onesicritus. There are however divergences from Onesicritus shared by Diodorus and Curtius which suggest that Onesicritus' work was known to these two writers indirectly, perhaps via Cleitarchus (so Hamilton [2] 457-8, Jacoby RE xi, 652-3; and cf. previous note on C.R.x, 1.10). A corollary of the argument concerning Curtius' inclusion of Onesicritus' name where Nearchus omitted it, is that Nearchus was not one of Curtius' sources. The fragments of Nearchus' work do not provide a prima facie case for considering him further.

Curtius, Diodorus Siculus and Cleitarchus

The parallels between Curtius and Diodorus are numerous and striking; indices may be found in Schwartz's article on Curtius

(RE iv, 1873-5, cf. RE v, 682-4), in Fränkel's Quellen (esp. 395 sq., and 407 sq., where differences are listed) and in Dosson's Etude (138-140). Book 3 of Curtius' Histories has numerous links with Diodorus' account, especially on the battle of Issus (see for example on 2. 10-19, 3.9, 7.7, 8.24, 11.4 and 20-26, and 12.17).

Tarn (ii, 116 sq.) attempted to show that Curtius read and used Diodorus, but his argument was rejected by Strasburger (3). Tarn's argument concerning Curtius' mention of 'argyraspids' (iv, 13.27) involved the assumption that Curtius had not read Hieronymus, who certainly used the term, and whose work was known to Diodorus; however analysis of Curtius' Book 10 shows that Curtius had in fact read Hieronymus (cf. Errington [2] Appendix 1). Thus there is no reason to suppose that Curtius must have picked up the anachronistic reference to 'argyraspids' from Diodorus.

As Curtius' account of Alexander's campaigns could not have been derived from Diodorus' meagre and patchy history of the period, one assumes that Curtius had access to one or more of Diodorus' sources, or, perhaps one should say, to Diodorus' source for Book 17 (we may leave open the question whether either author only knew the common source indirectly). The common source was Cleitarchus, in the opinion of most scholars.

Cleitarchus was apparently not with Alexander in 334, but may have joined the army at some point before Alexander's death, and 'his active lifetime might possibly span the year 300 B.C.' (Badian [10], the quotation is from p.10. Further on Cleitarchus' dates see Rabe, pp.8-36, who rejects Schnabel's case for dating Cleitarchus' work later than 260 B.C. Tarn's bid to date Cleitarchus later than Ptolemy, who was, in Tarn's view, later than Aristobulus, was soundly countered by Strasburger [3]). Cleitarchus was a popular author; as critics saw him, a rhetorician rather than a scholar. Curtius cites him twice (ix, 5.21 and 8.15) and Curtius and Diodorus might reasonably be expected to have read Cleitarchus (on his popularity see refs. in Jacoby FGH no.137). Pearson ([1]c.8) has analysed the fragments of his work and shown where Curtius and Diodorus appear to have used him.

There has, however, been a tendency to attribute too much to Cleitarchus without any justification (cf. the comments of Welles (1) 7 sq.) and it is salutary to record how few are the links between the fragments of Cleitarchus and Curtius. Fragment 9 in Jacoby's collection concerns the Carthaginian practice of immolating children as a thank-offering to 'Cronus', and this rite is mentioned by Curtius (iv, 3.23; noted as a quotation from Cleitarchus by Dosson Étude 135 and Edson CP '61 199-200). On the number of prostitutes attached to the Persian court Curtius tallies with Cleitarchus, but only if Curtius' text is emended (C.R.vi, 6.8; Cleitarchus F.10, vide note on 3.24). Cleitarchus, Frag.11, described Thais as inspiring the arson of Persepolis, and Curtius and Diodorus agree (C.R.v, 6.12 sq., D.S.72), and again on the visit of the Amazon queen to Alexander the three writers give basically the same story (Cleitarchus, Frag. 15; C.R.vi, 5. 24 sq. and D.S. 77. 2-3; cf. Pearson (1) 220-1). On the geography of Hyrcania Curtius and Diodorus both tell of trees, similar to oaks, which drip with honey (C.R.vi, 4.22 and D.S. 75.6); Diodorus goes on to deal with a bee-like insect called the 'anthredon', and his description is similar to Cleitarchus' (Frag.14): perhaps Curtius and Diodorus used Cleitarchus on the flora and fauna of Hyrcania, but the item on the honey-dripping trees goes back to Onesicritus (ap. Pliny n.h.xii, 34; Pearson (1) 93 and 220) and Cleitarchus actually called the insect the 'tenthredon', not 'anthredon' (cf. Fontana (1) 177). Aphorisms in a speech of Scythians are similar to sententiae attributed to Cleitarchus (compare C.R.vii, 8.12 and 15 with Cleitarchus Frags. 40, 43 and 48; Pearson (1) 222, n.42). Then on the number of Samburg' subjects killed by Alexander Curtius cites Cleitarchus and the number tallies with that given by Diodorus (C.R.ix, 8.15, D.S. 102.6). Incidentally Curtius and Diodorus proceed to describe the attack on the city of Harmata or Harmatelia and they agree on many points of detail: the position of the city in the kingdom, the number of light-armed troops sent against them by Alexander, the number of Indians who were enticed out of the city, the Indians' unsportsmanlike act of smearing poison on their weapons, the wounding of Ptolemy and Alexander's concern for him, and Alexander's dream of a snake offering a remedy for Ptolemy's wound (C.R.ix, 8.17 sq., D.S. 103. 1sq.). The two accounts are so close in detail and formulation that, if

Cleitarchus was in fact Curtius' source for ix, 8.15, he would seem to be the common source for the capture of Harmata too. Finally, Curtius cites Cleitarchus on the story of Ptolemy's actions at the city of the Malli, and shows by reference to Ptolemy's own work that Cleitarchus was inaccurate (ix, 5.21; it is unlikely that Curtius intended his comment as a sarcastic dig at Ptolemy, cf. Pearson (1) 207 n.83).

Thus very little can be firmly attributed to Cleitarchus and I have noted in the Commentary instances where we can say with varying degrees of certainty that Cleitarchus was not Curtius' source (vide on 3.19 and 24; 4. 1 and 3, and p. 234 sq.).

Fontana ((1) esp. 171 sq.) went so far as to argue that the differences between Diodorus and the fragments of Cleitarchus are so great that Cleitarchus can be excluded as Diodorus' main source, and she posited that Duris was his source. Dr. Errington (1) has, however, shown that Hieronymus, and not Duris, was Curtius' source for events immediately after Alexander's death, and I indicate below that items once attributed to Duris in Curtius' third book cannot be shown to derive from him (vide on 3.11 and 11.4; at vi, 5. 24 sq. Curtius gives the story of the Amazons' visit which Duris rejected as a fiction [ap. Plut. Alex. 46, 2]. Diodorus gives the same story [77], without noting that it was unhistorical. A certain contradiction appears between Diodorus xvi, 34.5 and Duris, Frag.36. On Duris' dates - his work stretched down to cover the funeral of Lysimachus in 281 B.C. - see J.P. Barron CR xii, '62 189 sq.).

Thus far we conclude that Curtius used several sources. He borrowed ideas and phraseology from Trogus, and knew, perhaps through Trogus, of the work of Timagenes. He knew Ptolemy's work, perhaps indirectly, and at the same time had access to a source which gave detail that Ptolemy suppressed. This latter source was apparently not Aristobulus. Curtius also made extensive use of a source which formed the basis for Diodorus Book 17, and this source may have been Cleitarchus.

Two sources which Tarn considered basic to Curtius' work have not survived subsequent rigorous examination: the Peripatetic

tradition, as Tarn described it, does not emerge from the evidence (Badian (7), E. Mensching Hist. xii, '63 274 sq., Atkinson AClass vi, '63 134 sq.), and the 'mercenaries' source' appears curiously ill-informed about what the mercenaries did and less informative about the Persian army than authors who relied presumably on what was divulged by prisoners-of-war (Brunt (2)). Wolf's thesis that Cleitarchus incorporated 'mercenaries' tales in his history breaks down on many points (for example see my commentary on 8.15).

Elements of Curtius' style

Each book of Curtius' Histories is centred on a few episodes, but whilst the narrative is episodic Curtius carefully inter-relates the parts for example by programmatic notes and references back (for example 3.28, 6.3, 12.18 and 13.17; iv, 7.32, v, 1.1-2, vi, 2.4, viii, 10.18; and for references back, iii, 7.7, iv, 9.9, and v, 9.1 [perhaps a reference to something in the missing books, but Artabazus' connections with Philip are mentioned in detail at vi, 5.2]). Indeed Curtius is superior to Arrian in his ability to construct a cohesive work (cf. Strasburger (5) 459).

Book 3 illustrates Curtius skill at structuring his material. The major episodes concern the Gordian knot, the assembly of the Persian army, Alexander's collapse in Tarsus, the battle of Issus and the subsequent capture of Damascus. Then there is a series of minor episodes, including Darius' exchange with Charidemus, the cowardice of the governor of Cilicia, the murder of Sisines, the council-of-war in Issus and so on. These narrative units are linked together by two major motifs running right through the book: first the contrast between the luxury, extravagance and savagery of the orientals and the rugged simple culture of the men who fought with Alexander; secondly the relationship between a king and his subjects, be they his nationals, or collaborators or prisoners. The cultural contrast explains in part what the war is about and why Alexander could defeat the Persians at Issus; the book finishes by showing that after Issus Alexander was strong enough to resist the temptations of wealth, but anticipates the irony of his

eventual submission to the forces of corruption in the empire he conquered. A subsidiary motif is the importance of the Greek mercenaries to Darius and Alexander's need of Greek aid (cf. on 1.1 and 19 sq., 2.10 sq., 3.1 etc.). The second motif provides a series of sketches of political situations where Curtius looks at the problems of leadership, explains Alexander's qualities, and illustrates his own ideas on the integrity and independence of thought which an officer or aristocrat should protect. Darius' exchanges with Charidemus, the mercenaries and his courtiers, Alexander's dealings with Parmenion, the doctor, Philip, Sisines and Sisygambis, and Parmenion's approach to Darius' governor in Damascus all concern problems of leadership, and in particular the nicety of the balance which has to be preserved between state security or self-preservation and the dignity that goes with trust. On the other side of government Curtius illustrates the ideal of libertas for example in the antithesis between the value of Charidemus' honest advice to Darius and the inane loyalty and orthodoxy of the Persian nobles. The development of this theme surely belongs to Curtius himself, writing with the experience of times when it was easy for senators to capitulate before the spectre of maiestas trials. When Caligula died no doubt many senators had cause for soul-searching. These motifs are further analysed in the Commentary (cf. notes on 2.10 sq., 6.1 sq., 7.11 sq., 8. 1-11, 12.7 sq., and chapter 13. An echo of the terror of Tiberius' rule from Capri is perhaps found in Curtius' frequent reference to secret correspondence [for example 6.4 sq., 7.12, and 13.2 sq.: the last two cases are not mentioned by the other sources]). A subsidiary motif here is the condemnation of cowardice and treachery: Darius' officers in Cilicia and Damascus are criticised for capitulating without a fight.

In the development of these motifs consistency of characterisation is sometimes set aside in favour of a neat antithesis. Thus, for example, whilst a central theme of the book is the simplicity of the Graeco-Macedonian culture as opposed to the luxury of the Persian culture and this is repeated in the tale of Gaugamela (for example iv, 14.16), yet Curtius presents a picture of Alexander's troops after the battle of Issus, looting and raping without restraint (11.20 sq.). The

inconsistency here is perhaps the by-product of the antithesis Curtius wished to establish between the material greed of his troops and Alexander's concern to hunt down Darius (12.1). There may be a link here with the tragedies of Seneca where it sometimes appears that one has the dialectic advanced by characters who stand for different principles in different scenes (cf. D. Henry and B. Walker, *Seneca and the 'Agamemnon'* CP lviii, '63 esp. p.8).

The episodic units can serve not only to build up the central motifs, but also to control the pace of the story: thus the story of Sisines' murder (7.11 sq.) holds up the beginning of the battle; similarly Curtius holds up the battle narrative after mentioning the exchange of war-cries, by inserting at that point a lengthy account of Alexander's address to his troops (10.3 sq.).

The influence of Roman rhetoric on the construction of the speeches is obvious (*Helmreich's Reden* is of value on this topic; for the general influence of rhetoric on Curtius see *Dosson Etude* 217 sq.). Less obvious is the influence of rhetoric where Curtius appears uncertain about the motivation or explanation of some action. It seems in fact to have been a rhetorical device, for it is found in Lucan and in Seneca's work where alternative theories are advanced without Seneca indicating his own view even where one of the theories represents a Stoic doctrine or his own belief (Marti *AJP* lxvi, '45 esp. 357 and n.20, where she quotes for example *Seneca ad Polyb.* 9,3 and 5, 1, *Ep.* 16, 5; examples in Curtius can be seen in 1.18, iv, 13.3, v, 1.9, vi, 7.35, vii, 2.34, viii, 6.20 and 12.3). Another feature of Curtius' work that shows the influence of rhetoric is surely the psychological observations expressed as neat *sententiae*; and rhetoricians were interested in the description of the emotions and the manifestations of these emotions (references in notes infra on 3.2, 6.5 and 11.12), but this is not to say that comments on psychology and emotions only came into the story with Roman writers (see on 6.10 and 8.20).

Curtius was certainly competent at dramatising his material; dramatic irony is an important element, often suggested by antithetical scenes (witness the contrasting pictures of the two

armies in chapters 2 and 3, and the series of scenes describing Darius' and Alexander's relationship with various advisers: 2.10 sq., 6.4 sq., 7.8 sq. and 8.2sq.); the pace of the story is well controlled with climaxes carefully built up and factual matter used to brake the narrative or to heighten the suspense (the story of Alexander's sickness at Tarsus illustrates these points, cf. pp. 103-4. Similarly Curtius' organisation of his material in the story of the preliminaries to the battle of Issus shows dramatic skill and shows that Curtius was ready to sacrifice plausibility to dramatic effect: see on 9.12 and 10.1-3); peripeteia is another element of his dramatic style (for example 8.16 and 24, 12.6 sq. and 13.4 sq.). Dramatic pathos is also created by the use of real or invented geographical detail and time references (for this type of geographical description, known as Topothesie, see on 8.18; time references: note on 5.10. On these and other features of Curtius' dramatic skill see Rutz Hermes xciii, '65 370 sq., whose analysis of the story of the siege of Tyre in Bk.4 is excellent).

Much has been written about inconsistencies in characterisation in the Histories. The general picture of Alexander is an heroic figure who was corrupted by success after the final defeat of Darius, and then could no longer control his arrogance and anger (this picture is epitomised by Curtius at 12.18 sq.). Yet Curtius notes points of weakness before Alexander's degradation began, and in his final summary of Alexander's merits and weaknesses, Curtius plays down the elements of Alexander's corruption which are highlighted in the main narrative (x, 5.26 sq.). Tarn expounded the theory that the inconsistency arose from Curtius' inability to harmonize two contrasting traditions: one the Peripatetic tradition, which presented Alexander as the victim of success, a man who started well but was corrupted by fortune and became a dissolute, vicious tyrant; and the other a tradition similar to the Stoic view, which saw in Alexander from the start the viciousness and arrogance that later characterised his megalomaniac rule (Tarn ii, 96 sq., cf. McQueen, Curtius Rufus 33 sq., Schwartz RE iv, 1880 sq.; on the Stoic picture of Alexander, J. Stroux, Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders Philologus lxxxviii, '33 222 sq.). However the evidence does not confirm the existence of a Peripatetic tradition, such as Tarn described (cf. Badian (7) and

p. lxix sq. supra), and the idea of fortune corrupting a man was a commonplace which Curtius could have picked up anywhere (notes on 2.18 and 12.18 sq.).

McQueen, like Tarn, has identified strands favourable and unfavourable to Alexander in Curtius' portrayal of Alexander, and he reduces the charge of inconsistency by arguing that Alexander was indeed a complex character, inconsistent in his behaviour, and Curtius appreciated this and attempted to delineate the various facets of his character (Curtius Rufus, esp. 37-38; cf. Bardon (3) 134 sq.: Curtius was concerned to produce a coherent and consistent portrait of Alexander).

Neither approach is adequate since the end-product of character portrayal can hardly be discussed meaningfully until the technique of characterisation has been analysed. This is not the place for a thorough study of techniques of character portrayal, and it may suffice to identify some of the elements of characterisation in Curtius' work. First we must note again the psychological observations couched in neat sententiae, and the use of the formula 'sive ... sive' to suggest alternative motives behind an action. These are elements of rhetorical style rather than of scientific analysis. Thus, for example, one can hardly argue (as Tarn does, ii, 100) that Curtius was using different sources when he described Alexander as 'interritus ad omnia' at iv, 10.4, and when he commented on Alexander's anxiety before the battle of Issus: *ut solet fieri, cum ultimi discriminis tempus adventat, in sollicitudinem versa fiducia est* (8.20). The latter is a rhetorical commonplace that suits the drama of the preparations for battle, thus it is misleading to say or imply that Curtius used a source which presented Alexander as fearful or anxiety prone (pace McQueen, p.37 and 42 n.61).

Secondly we must recognise that Curtius was influenced by the exercises of rhetoricians and philosophers who used historical exempla to describe moral qualities (the prose encomium was similarly constructed: 'The facts of character and career were utilized to exemplify and to demonstrate .. presupposed qualities' [D. Stuart Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography Berkeley '28 p.64]). The connection between history and this type of moralizing is shown by the fact that Trogus' account of Alexander's

cure by Philip at Tarsus was read both by Curtius and by Valerius Maximus, who recorded the tale under the heading de constantia. Curtius writes such an essay in chapter 12, on the theme continentia, where he deals with Alexander's treatment of the women captured at Issus. The story was a commonplace and its inclusion in the Histories tells us nothing about Curtius' source, nor does it indicate per se that Curtius saw continentia as one of Alexander's qualities. As will be seen in the Commentary it is the modifications in the story which tell us something about Curtius' style of characterisation.

Another feature of Curtius' style of character portrayal is the situational presentation, as opposed to general psychological description (compare A. Dihle's comment: *Die Antike und vor allem die Römer haben Charakterbilder stets besser mit Situationsschilderungen als durch reine psychologische Deskription entworfen* [RE 2.R. viii A.1 '55 s.v. Velleius Paterculus, 652]). Thus, for example, a relatively dull passage, like the opening chapter of Bk.3, says a great deal about Alexander: the episodes covered show Alexander acting resolutely to achieve his main objective, patiently clearing the ground and making careful preparations for action, and self-confident. Then in the story of the capture of Damascus in chapter 13 Curtius reveals through the narrative various facets of Parmenion's character: sound judgement, loyalty, his concern to act decisively and his tendency to overreact in an apparently dangerous situation.

Because the narrative is basically episodic it can happen that the individual story generates its own picture of the characters involved and inconsistencies may then occur between different episodes. Thus, for example, Alexander's readiness to quit when things went wrong during the siege of Tyre, contrasts with his determination to face Darius in 333, or again with his self-confidence in a difficult situation in the land of the Sudrae (Tyre: iv, 3.11 and 4. 1-2: Curtius did not invent the detail for compare D.S. 42.6 and 45.7, but he restructured the tale to use Alexander's supposed hesitancy for greater dramatic effect [cf. Rutz Hermes xciii, '65 377 and 380]; Sudrae: ix, 4.25). One must therefore consider the dramatic

structure of each episode as a factor that may upset consistency of characterisation (cf. pp.138-9, on 8. 1-11). Curtius' fondness for antithesis might too lead him into inconsistency (cf. on 6.5).

It is possible too for characterisation to be sacrificed to rhetoric. Thus, for example, Curtius' version of the clash between Alexander and Parmenion, over Darius' final offer before Gaugamela of a negotiated settlement, almost excludes Parmenion. His famous line is recast, and the term 'pecunia' inappropriately employed: 'et ego pecuniam quam gloriam mallet, si Parmenion essem' (iv, 11.14 contrast D.S. 54.4; A.ii, 25.2 and Plut. Alex.29,8). This passage is worked out like a rhetorical exercise: Darius' envoy argues that Alexander should halt his advance if he is to retain his 'moderatio' and 'continentia': 'difficile est enim continere, quod capere non possis' (iv, 11.7, 2 and 8); Parmenion's advice serves as a bridge passage: the quantification of 'continentia' allows Alexander to make the transition from 'pecunia' to 'gloria', and in the following reply to Darius Alexander refers to his own 'clementia' and 'liberalitas', virtues akin to 'moderatio', and argues that Darius is not a 'iustus hostis' - reason enough for Alexander to claim the 'gloria' of a military victory (iv, 11. 16 sq.).

Finally there are elements in Curtius' characterisation of Alexander and other figures in the story which are reflections of his own society rather than part of the historical tradition. It was as difficult for a Roman historian as it is for a modern writer to avoid interpreting history in terms of his own society: the famous passage in x, 9 shows the immediacy of Alexander's story to Curtius' own experience (other references to Curtius' own day are found at iv, 4.21; v, 4.31; 8.1; vi, 6.11; vii, 5.42; 10.16; viii, 4.28; 6.6 and 10.12; cf. Lana RFIC '49 60 sq. and his observation in Velleio Patercolo '52 189-190). A writer who had seen 'imitatio Alexandri' projected as part of the emperor's image could hardly fail to point the similarities or contrasts between Alexander and his emulator. Thus, the reference to Alexander's respect for his sisters would seem to be a reference to Caligula's relationship with his sisters (6.15 and p.xlvi). This item adds to the

characterisation of Alexander, but, as is argued in the commentary, Curtius did not find it in his source, and one need not worry about whether the item is favourable or unfavourable to Alexander, nor whether it is consistent with other facets of Alexander's character in Curtius' picture. Similarly the anachronistic reference in speeches delivered before the battle of Issus to plans for the capture of Bactria and India (10.5) seems to be Curtius' own invention; it has a bearing on the characterisation of Alexander for it suggests that he had from the start extraordinarily wide aims. This may be unhistorical and Curtius was perhaps writing with Caligula in mind who had romantic ideas of imperialism that were never brought to fruition. Curtius himself judged that consolidation was more prudent than further conquest: at least his comment on Alexander's plan to advance beyond the Hyphasis was 'vicit cupido rationem' (ix, 2.12 and 2.9 sq. and 3.7 sq.; on the implications of Rome's policy of consolidation under Tiberius see G. Alföldy Latomus xxiv, '65 824 sq.: it was not motivated by liberal sentiments).

Curtius writing under Claudius - the brother of Germanicus no less than the successor to Caligula - could only conclude that Alexander was a great man. Whatever he said in the individual episodes about Alexander, the only prudent conclusion at the end of his work was that Alexander's merits outweighed his weaknesses.

C O M M E N T A R Y

Q. CVRTII RVFI HISTORLARVM

LIBER III

Bardon's rendering of the title has the support of the better mss., for instance of P, which has at the end of Book 3:
Q. CVRTII RVFI HISTORLARVM LIBER III EXPLICIT. INCIPIT LIBER QVARTVS.

In terms of ancient theory Curtius' work is closer to history than biography (see McQueen's article on Curtius, esp. 17 sq.), and Curtius' words at the beginning of Book 5 indicate that he was writing history not biography. Furthermore it is significant that the work is carried on beyond the death of Alexander.

1.1: Arrangements made by Alexander at the close of the first campaigning season for the levying of mercenaries and the administration of Lycia and Pamphylia

1.1: inter hæc

As the second book of Curtius' Histories has not survived, we cannot be certain why he lumped together the despatch of Cleander and the pacification of Lycia and Pamphylia at the beginning of Bk. 3; but it is immediately clear that Curtius was not unduly concerned to be precise about the order of events. For example, Curtius is less precise than Arrian in dating Cleander's departure, for Arrian tells us that Cleander was sent off to the Peloponnese after the fall of Halicarnassus, at the same time as Alexander sent off the νεόγυμοι on leave for the winter 334/3 B.C. (A.i, 24.1), and before Alexander reached the city of Hyparna (A.i, 23.6; 24.1 and 4).

Further the other sources do not by book or chapter divisions show an arrangement of the material corresponding to Curtius' order. Thus, whilst the book division may have followed a source used by Curtius, yet there is no evidence to point to this directly (but see p.235).

Thus we may posit that Curtius' division of the material at this point was made for his own compositional reasons. Indeed we can see that the first item in Bk.3, Cleander's mission to the Peloponnese, introduces a minor motif of this book, namely Alexander's concern to secure reinforcements and the importance of Greek mercenaries (cf. e.g. on 2.16, 3.1 and 7.8). Then Curtius mentions the commission of

Cleander and the settlement of Lycia here, but does not refer to the dismissal of the Lyncestian Alexander from his command, although the latter event occurred later, after Alexander had reached Phaselis (A.i, 25.1). We know that Curtius dealt with the fall of the Lyncestian Alexander (cf. *infra* on 7.11 sq.), and the story must therefore have appeared towards the end of Bk.2, after the tale of the capture of Halicarnassus. The implication is that Curtius highlighted the episode concerning the Lyncestian by departing from the strict chronological sequence of events. This is the more likely in that the story of the Lyncestian concerned suspicions of treachery, and the emphasis in Bk.3 is repeatedly placed on stories of traitors and men falsely accused of treason.

1.1: ad conducendum ex Peloponneso militem

Cf. A.i, 24.2 (ἐπὶ ἐξυλλογῇ στρατιωτῶν). The men were to be engaged as mercenaries as Arrian makes clearer in talking of Cleander's appearance at Sidon with 4,000 μισθοφόρους (A.ii, 20.5; cf. C.R.iv, 3.11).

The success of Alexander's campaigns in 334 necessitated the recruitment of mercenaries, for Alexander required not only combat troops to advance but also garrison troops and patrols to hold what had been taken and to keep open the lines of communication (cf. G.T. Griffith (1) 13-14). The number of troops which Alexander could ask for from members of the Corinthian League was limited by political considerations, if not by formal agreement. Thus as the war escalated it was natural that the Greek servicemen in Alexander's army should form a smaller proportion of the total in arms.

At this stage, however, Alexander had not given up claims on the League cities: Elis was still to send him a cavalry force (A.i, 29.4), and he required the League to provide ships in 333 to guard the Hellespont, cf. *infra* §20.

1.1: Cleandro

Cleander's career (on which see Berve ii, no. 422) was no doubt made more promising in the early stages by his connection with Parmenion's family: his brother, Coenus, had married a daughter of Parmenion shortly before Alexander led the army off to Asia (C.R.vi, 9.30 with A.i, 24.1). Another important factor in Cleander's rise seems to be that his family was linked with Harpalus' family, both belonging to the aristocracy of Eliniotis (cf. Badian (2) esp. 22-3).

In 330 Cleander was persuaded to demonstrate his loyalty to Alexander by planning the murder of Parmenion; but Cleander in turn fell victim to Alexander (cf. Badian, [2] 21-2). Ironically Alexander could not trust a man who could agree to murder a relative to demonstrate his loyalty.

Alexander chose to send as a recruiting officer to the Peloponnese a Macedonian rather than a Greek, and this may be a minor indication that Alexander was switching the emphasis from his rôle as hegemon of the Corinthian League, to that of King of the Macedonian Empire.

Cleander's commission was probably ad hoc and he probably relinquished command of the mercenaries levied in the Peloponnese as soon as he reached Alexander's camp, for, as Berve has noted, officers did not normally command contingents of troops which they had levied (Berve i, 145 n. 1; G.R. iv, 3.11 for Cleander's return to Alexander's camp). Thus at the battle of Gaugamala we find Cleander commanding not these mercenaries from the Peloponnese but the ἀρχαῖοι ξένοι, presumably those who had served in the army since Alexander first crossed into Asia (Berve ii, no. 422, who argues too that Cleander could at the earliest have gained this command at Tyre in 331, cf. Griffith (2), 83 n. 21). This command, following the commission given to Cleander in the winter of 334/3, suggests that Cleander earned a reputation for being able to win the respect of Greek soldiers.

1.1: cum pecunia misso

Money matters must have been one of Cleander's chief problems. It is possible that the mint which Alexander opened in Sicyon probably in 330 B.C. was set there to facilitate the recruitment of mercenaries, for it would no longer be necessary to transport money to the Peloponnese with each recruitment drive (cf. Bellinger Essays 58-59).

If one allows at least 4 obols per day for pay and rations for each man, the 4,000 men whom Cleander recruited would have necessitated a budget of some 2,667 drachms per day, or c. 163 talents per annum (4,000: A. ii, 20.6; on the cost of maintaining troops G.T. Griffith (1) esp. 264 sq. and Parke (1) 232-3).

The precise state of Alexander's finances at this time is not known. Despite the gains from conquest (Sardis and Miletus: A. i, 17.3; D.S. 21.7 and 22.5; Halicarnassus) Alexander was obliged to disband his navy, it was said, partly because of his need to conserve his limited financial resources (A. i, 20.1; D.S. 22.5 and Plut. Alex. 17, 3). See further on § 20.

1.1: Lyciae Pamphyliaeque rebus compositis

The settlement of Lycia and Pamphylia was a military rather than constitutional exercise: Curtius uses the verb with similar connotation at vii, 10.13 'ad ea quae defectione turbata erant componenda processit' (cf. Plut. Alex. 17,5: ἠπεύγετο [sc. Alexander] τὴν παραλίαν ἀνακαθήρασθαι μέχρι τῆς Φοινίκης καὶ Κιλικίας. Componere appears with similar connotations frequently in literature of the Imperial era, vide TLL iii, 2119).

Arrian's brief account of Alexander's activities in Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia gives us some idea of why Alexander had to 'clean up' the area: Phaselis was being harassed by Pisidians, the Pisidians were a divided people wont to settle their differences by force, the Aspendians had grabbed land by force from their neighbours, and several cities resisted Alexander militarily, for example Syllium where the people shared the defence of the city with mercenaries (A.i, 24.6; 28.1; 27.4, representing the Macedonian point of view; 26.5). Clearly the Persians had not succeeded in pacifying and unifying the area, and the people who could challenge Alexander were not going to take for granted the invincibility of Alexander's army.

Alexander made a satrapy of this area, which Arrian terms 'Lycia and the territory bordering on it as far as Mount Taurus' (A.iii, 6.6, meaning that the satrap was responsible for Pamphylia too cf. C.R.x, 10.2; Testamentum Alexandri ed P.H. Thomas §117; Arr. Tὰ μετὰ Ἀλεξ., ap.FGH F 9, 37; D.S.xviii, 3.1 and J.xiii, 4.15).

Details of the personnel involved in the administration of Lycia in 334/3 B.C. are not available. An official of the Persian administration was a certain Artimas (A.D.H. Bivar, A 'satrap' of Cyrus the Younger NC 7th s. i, '61 119 sq., cf. infra on 4.3), and when Alexander took over control of Lycia he apparently appointed Nearchus as its first satrap (A.iii, 6.6; Berve i, 256; Pearson (1) c.5, esp. pp.114-5); other names are lacking.

1.1-8: Curtius describes a city in Phrygia, Celaenae, and Alexander's siege of it

1.1: ad urbem Celaenas

Celaenae (close to Apamea, mod. Dinar) was the capital of the satrapy of Phrygia under the Persian dispensation, cf. Xen. An.i, 2.7 and Livy xxxviii, 13.5 (cf. Ruge's article in RE xi, '22 133-4). It was of considerable strategic importance as it controlled a break

in the mountain range which the so-called Southern Highway crossed: This road ran from Ephesus via Hierapolis to Celaenae, then skirting the Sultan Dag, north to the Gaŷter valley (mod. Akar Çay) where it connected with a road leading into Cilicia (Magie i, 40 and 125, ii, 789 sq.).

Arrian says that Alexander entered Phrygia via Lake **Ascania**, from which point it took him five days to reach Celaenae (i, 29.1).

1.2: media illa tempestate moenia interfluebat Marsyas amnis

With this usage of 'interfluere' with the Accusative cf. 5.1. 'Illa tempestate' Vergés notes is an archaism commonly employed by Livy, Sallust and Curtius.

On the city and river cf. Hdt. vii, 26, Xen. An.i, 2.8 and Pausanias x, 30.9. The site was later abandoned, when, probably in the period 276-266 B.C., Antiochus Soter developed a new site, moved the people from Celaenae to it, and named it Apamea (Strabo xii, 8.15 577-8; D.S. xix, 69.2 and 93.4; Plut. Demetr. 6, 3; G. Radet De colonis a Macedonibus in Asiam cis Taurum deductis, Paris '02 no.78 p.31 and p.51). The course of the river in relationship to the new city was less dramatic. Strabo (loc.cit) and Livy (xxxviii, 13. 6-7) are imprecise on the geography of this area: the shift of site and the confusion of the Marsyas and Maeander conspire against clarity.

1.2: fabulosis Graecorum carminibus inclitus

'Fabulosis' is here used with a derogatory connotation (cf. e.g. Ann. Marc. xiv, 11.35 and other examples cited ad loc. by Mitzell), as can be appreciated from the following phrase 'locum poetarum mendacio fecit' (1.4).

Curtius demonstrates similar prejudice against Greeks at iv, 5.11 and viii, 5. 7-8. The latter passage provides another link with this, since Curtius there refers to the presence of poets in Alexander's entourage, composers of bad, adulatory verse, notably Agis of Argos and Cleo from Sicily (viii, 5.8; Berve ii, nos. 16 and 437; Agis is mentioned too by A.iv, 9.9; the Choerilus to whom Curtius refers was from Iasus and apparently likewise accompanied Alexander [Berve ii, no.829]; the influence of the poetasters on the Alexander legend was discussed in full by Tarn ii, 55 sq., but the poets were not alone in producing extravagant tales, cf. Pearson (1) 78). However mythology linking the Marsyas with Apollo and Athena was an established theme of Greek literature long before Alexander appeared in Celaenae (e.g.

Melanippus, c. 480 B.C., ap. Athen. 616 E; Telestes, c. 400 B.C., ap. Page Poetae Melici Graeci 162 p. 419; of Timotheus, c. 410 B.C., Page op.cit. p. 410 and in prose Xen. An.i, 9).

1.3: fons eius, ex summo montis cacumine excurrentis etc.

Curtius' account does not tally precisely with the accounts of the source of the Marsyas in other writers of the early Empire: Livy xxxviii, 13. 6-7; Strabo xii, 578; Pliny n.h. xxxi, 19, who quotes Theophrastus as his source.

On myths linked with the source of the river, Paus.x, 30 and Xenophon An.i, 9.

1.3: liquidus

Cf. Ovid Met.vi, 400: Phrygiae liquidissimus amnis.

1.3: suas dumtaxat undas trahens

'Drawing along nothing but its own waters'; contrast iv, 9.16 and Sall. Jug. 78, 3.

1.4: color eius placido mari similis

A 'comparatio compendiaris' as Vergés notes, standing for 'color eius placidi maris coloris similis'; cf. Juvonal iii, 73-4.

1.4: nymphas amore amnis retentas

Marsyas, as a centaur, was the son of a nymph (Telestes ap. Page Poetae Melici Graeci p. 419), but Curtius' mention of the nymphs is not supported by other writers.

1.5: ceterum quamdiu intra muros fluit, nomen suum retinet

The tense used by Curtius must be the historic present, as, in Curtius' day, the site of Celaenae was no longer occupied (cf. supra on § 2).

1.5: Lycum appellans

Curtius apparently confused the Marsyas with a lower tributary of the Meander (cf. Pliny n.h. v, 105).

1.6: urbem destitutam ab suis

According to Arrian, the acropolis of Celaenae was held by a detachment of the satrapal army, viz a thousand Carians and a hundred Greek mercenaries (A.i, 29.1. Ada's collaboration with Alexander did not induce these Carians to surrender at his first appearance). Curtius' source was perhaps less informative than

Arrian's, but it is possible that Curtius or his source departed from the facts to enhance the drama of the situation. Either way, the progressive surrender of Asia Minor to Alexander forms a minor theme of Bk. 3; the book ends with the surrender of Damascus to Alexander.

1.6: *arceem*

The acropolis was reputedly fortified by Xerxes on his journey back to Persia after his defeat at Salamis (Xen. An.i, 2.8).

1.8: *sexaginta dierum indutias pacti, ut, nisi intra eos auxilium Dareus ipse misisset, dederent urbem*

Arrian does not mention the length of time, but a siege of sixty days might be historical and from Arrian's account it appears that Alexander stayed only ten days near Gelaenae but left a force of 1500 troops to maintain the blockade of Gelaenae (*πρὸς .. παῖς Κελαωναῖς φυλακὴν καταλείπει στρατιώτας ἑς χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίου* A.i, 29.3), though Arrian may mean that the city surrendered before Alexander left.

The emphasis in Curtius' account on the period of sixty days relates to a theme established in this chapter: Alexander's patient attention to each obstacle which he had to overcome before achieving his major objective, which was to tackle Darius (§ 19 infra). This combination of patience and determination to gain his major objective is illustrated by Alexander's strategy at Cellaenae, the rebuff of the Athenian envoys and even by his conduct at Gordium (cf. on 'nequaquam diu luctatus' in § 18). However if Curtius developed this picture on his own - and it will be noted that Diodorus and Justin cover this period before Issus quite differently -, then the question must remain open whether the figure sixty was likewise his own contribution.

1.9: the Athenian request for the release of Athenian prisoners-of-war taken at Granicus in 334

1.9: *superveniunt deinde legati Atheniensium*

This episode is not recorded by Diodorus, Justin and Plutarch but appears in lengthier form in Arrian's account (i, 29. 5-6). The two accounts agree on a number of points, as will be shown below, but they differ on a fundamental point: Curtius sets the event before Alexander took Gordium, whilst Arrian has the envoys reach Alexander in Gordium (A.i, 29.5; Kaerst 358 n.4 takes Curtius to mean that the envoys reached Alexander when he was still in Cellaenae). The similarities suggest that Curtius had read the source employed by

Arrian, and that Curtius was careless or unconcerned about the precise sequence of events. In the rhetorical structure of this chapter one notes that this episode complements the following item (in § 10) in depicting Alexander's singlemindedness. Curtius also indicates that he wished to highlight this attitude of Alexander by leaving out an explanation of Alexander's decision in terms of the effect that the release of these prisoners-of-war might have had upon the Greeks (by contrast A.i, 29.6 explains this motivation).

Thus Curtius' account does not provide us with positive evidence that Curtius' source was different from Arrian's.

It is clear from the two accounts that the Athenian envoys reached Alexander in the spring of 333 B.C.

The formula of this sentence appears slightly modified at vii, 6.11, where again Curtius' version has much in common with a passage in Arrian (iv, 5.1).

1.9: petentes ut capti apud Granicum amen redderentur sibi

Alexander's treatment of the Greek mercenaries caught at Granicus is described by Arrian (i, 16.6 with 29.5): they were sent in chains to Macedonia to do hard labour.

Curtius, like Arrian, offers no information on the political scene in Athens at the time it was decided to petition Alexander, and the source dealt with the event from the point of view of those in Alexander's army. An attempt is made in Appendix B to describe the circumstances of Athens' decision.

Alexander had shrewdly accorded Athens a special status within the Corinthian League after the Battle of Granicus by sending to Athens as an offering to Athena 300 Persian panoplies (A.i, 16.7), but the Athenians had to be cautious since, after the dismissal of the fleet, Alexander had still retained the services of twenty Athenian ships and their crews (D.S. 22.5; cf. Badian (5) p. 183), and a contingent of Athenian cavalry (Plut. Phoc. 16.6; G.L. Cawkwell CQ '69 179 n.5).

In this light the timing of the despatch of the envoys is important too. In the winter 334/3 B.C., the war was in a relatively dormant phase; the time was right to consider a diplomatic approach to Alexander, but the picture changed with the successes of Memnon in the spring of 333 B.C., Alexander's decision to press on eastwards,

which meant extending the lines of communication, and the absence of an engagement with the imperial army. One might speculate that the envoys arrived too late to achieve their objective.

1.9: non hoc modo, sed etiam ceteros Graecos

Curtius agrees with Arrian (i, 29.5) in implying that the Athenians appealed for the release only of Athenian prisoners-of-war.

1.9: finito Persico bello

Compare Arrian's statement that Alexander regarded it as dangerous to yield on the point ἔτι ξυνεστῶτος τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Πέρσην πολέμου (i, 29.6). The two accounts may derive from a common source.

In fact Alexander later promised to release the prisoners-of-war whilst he was in Egypt (C.R.iv, 8.12; A.iii, 5.1 and 6.2).

1.10: Dareo imminens

See on §§ 19 and 21 infra.

1.10: quem nondum Euphraten superasse cognoverat

This may imply that Darius was advancing to the war zone some time before Memnon died, but at 2.1 Curtius indicates that Darius' decision to lead an army against Alexander was a consequence of Memnon's death.

1.10: undique omnes copias contrahit

This will refer to the orders which Alexander sent to Pammenion from Gelaenae that he should move to link up again with Alexander at Gordium (A.i, 29.3). It may also refer to the Macedonian troops who were returning from leave and to the Macedonian and Greek reinforcements who joined Alexander at Gordium (A.i, 29.4).

1.11-18: Alexander and the Gordian knot

1.11: pluribus vicis quam urbibus frequens

Phrygia, like other districts of Asia, had rural tribes, such as the Hyrgaleis and Moxeani, which preserved their distinctive social forms despite the advent of Persians, Greeks and Romans. Their 'villages' became incorporated in the Roman administrative system but during the Principate the tribes were gradually urbanised. Urbanisation, it may be added was a policy applied in Asia by Claudius (on the tribes, villages and urbanisation see Jones Cities 38 sq. and 71 sq., Magie i, 142 sq., 546 sq., and ii, 1022 sq. and 1405). It

would seem that in the Hellenistic era there was little economic development in Phrygia except in the southern cities. Gordium itself shrank to the size of a hamlet (Strabo xii, 8.9 574 and Livy xxxviii, 18.11, on the experiences of Manlius Volso who was there in 189 B.C.) and archaeologists report that most of the city area was abandoned as early as the beginning of the second Century B.C. (R.S. Young AJA lix, '55 2).

'Frequens' apparently does not appear in prose with the ablative before Livy, as Vergés noted.

1.11: nobilen quondam Midae regian

This may imply that Midas, and not Gordius, was the first King (cf. A.ii, 3.6 with Aelian n.a. xiii, 1); in Justin's account the first king was Gordius (xi, 7.12).

1.12: Gordium nomen est urbi

For references to reports on excavations at Gordium (Yassihüyük) see R.S. Young AJA lxxii, '68 231 n.1.

Alexander's decision to travel via Gordium rather than Iconium and Cybistra or Tyana was no doubt partly taken to secure the northern route to the Hellespont and to expedite the junction of the reinforcements and returning troops with his army, since Memnon's navy was then dominant in the Aegean (Schachermeyr 162-3).

1.12: Sangarius amnis

The name occurs too at A.i, 29.5.

1.12: pari intervallo pontico et cilicio mari distantem

Curtius's description of Gordium as being equidistant from the Euxine and Cilician Seas is to be read alongside Livy's description: tria maria pari ferre distantia intervallo habet, Hellespontum, ad Sinopen, et alterius orae litora qua Cilices naritini colunt (xxxviii, 18.12). These descriptions possibly stem not from serious geographical study, but from a myth built up around the city of Gordium, that it was at the centre point, or omphalus of Asia Minor. The omphalus was no doubt represented on the yoke of the chariot in the temple of Zeus at Gordium, like the yoke which Priam's sons prepared for the mule-cart (Iliad xxiv, 273). The case for associating the omphalus symbol with Gordium has been argued by Radet REA xix, '17 98 sq., and Deonna, Le noeud gordien REG xxxi, '18 39-40. A number of places laid claim to being the centre of the

earth: Omphalion in Crete, and cities of the same name in Epirus and Thessaly, and the Mountain of Omphalimos near Euchaita in Galatia. Gordium, it seems, similarly laid claim to a rather special geographical position.

1.13: inter haec maria angustissimum Asiae spatium esse
conperimus

Curtius has stated that Gordium was equidistant between the Cilician and Pontic Seas and now states: 'We have learnt that the distance between these two seas across Asia Minor is shortest (sc. at this point)'. Assuming that this interpretation is correct we have here an example of Curtius' ignorance of geography: compare iv, 14.15 where he sets the battle of Gaugamela between the Euphrates and the Tigris (cf. H. Bardon (3) 129). Gordium did not lie on either of the two short routes across Asia Minor: neither on the line running between the Pamphylian Sea and the bay on the Euxine west of Heraclea Pontica (cf. note ad loc. in the Loeb edition), nor on the line running from the Gulf of Issus to Amisus or Sinope (Pliny n.h. vi, 2.7; Hdt.ii, 34; Strabo xii, 1.3 534). Furthermore he has lost the Pamphylian in the Cilician Sea, perhaps through ignorance of the convexity of the Cilician coast line:

Sinope may have marked the northern point of Curtius' line (cf. the preceding note with Livy xxxviii, 18.12 and Strabo xiv, 5.22 677 discussed infra), but Heraclea is also possible.

1.13: nisi tenue discrimen obiceret

Curtius demonstrates his geographical ignorance particularly in this phrase. However Curtius was not alone in describing the peninsula inaccurately: Apollodorus made a triangle of the peninsula by reducing the isthmus between Issus and Sinope to a negligible distance, according to Strabo (xiv, 5.22 677).

This passage recalls Lucan's description of Dyrrachium:

clausa profundo
undique praecipiti scopulisque vomentibus aequor
exiguo debet quod non est insula, colli (vi, 23-5).

Hosius suggested that Curtius was Lucan's inspiration, but both may have read a similar passage, perhaps in Livy's work (Hosius RhM xlvi, discussed by R. Pichon, 255).

1.14: urbe in dicionem suam redacta

Cf. J. xi, 7.15 and Plut. Alex. 18, 2.

1.14: Iovis templum intrat

Neither Plutarch nor Arrian mentions the temple of Zeus at this point, but a clear parallel is found in Justin's version: Alexander capta urbe cum in templum Iovis venisset, etc. (xi, 7.15).

Coins show that Zeus was one of the gods whose cult Alexander exploited for political ends, as he moulded together Greek, Macedonian and Asiatic elements from various religions (cf. Bellinger Essays esp. 21 sq., and Appendix C infra). Thus there was significance in Alexander's visit to a temple of Zeus, quite apart from the oracle.

1.14: vehiculum quo Gordium, Midas patrem, vectum esse constabat

Cf. J. xi, 7. 11 sq., but Arrian says that it was Midas who drove the wagon, albeit τὴν ἄμαξαν τοῦ πατρὸς, into the city (ii, 3. 5-6). An important feature of the Midas myth was that he was the son of Cybele (Hygin. fab. 274, fab. 191; Plut. Caes. 9): this is not mentioned in the sources on Alexander, but it shows that Midas had better claim to be the first king. The wagon symbolised kingship, as in Iranian society (on this and the myth of Midas and Gordius, von Gutschmid esp. 457 sq. and Schubert (1) 1-9; Kaerst 357 n.6 rejected von Gutschmid's argument and thought Justin's version earlier, since the emphasis on Telmissus, Aristander's mother-city, in Arrian's account indicates a revision of the tale to enhance Aristander's image).

Links between Macedonia and Phrygia through the stories of Midas and Gordius have been examined in detail by E.A. Fredricksmeier, Alexander, Midas and the Oracle at Gordium CP, lvi, 3 '61 160 sq. Alexander possessed historical consciousness (a facet of his πῶθος according to Ehrenberg 77) or at least exploited myth and history to suit his purposes, and thus it is likely that as Alexander occupied Gordium the Macedonian links were advertised. However this Macedonian theme failed to register a place in our surviving sources.

1.14: cultu

Vergés claims that 'cultus' in the sense of ornamentation, applied to inanimate objects, appears elsewhere only in verse and Silver Latin prose.

1.16: incolis deinde adfirmantibus editam esse oraculo sortem

Cf. Plut. Alex. 18, 2: λόγον ἐπ' αὐτῇ (sc. τῇ ἀμάξει) πιστευόμενον ὑπὸ πῶν βαρβάρων ἤκουσεν.

1.16: Asiae potiturum qui inexplicabile vinculum solvisset

The sources agree in relating the prophecy to the kingship of Asia, with the exception of Plutarch who has βασιλεῖ γενέσθαι τῆς οἰκουμένης (18, 2 and see Hamilton's commentary ad loc.). As Asia appeared in Arrian's source too, we have presumably to deal with the term as it was used in Alexander's day and thereafter in the fourth Century, viz as an equivalent of the Persian empire (cf. Tarn ii, 309 n.3; and (2) p.153 n.1).

The oracle may have related originally to the kingship of Gordium or Phrygia (Schubert (1) 1, Schachermeyr 161 and Hamilton (1) 47. Baumbach detected an 'antipersische Gesinnung' behind the oracle [Kleinasien, 46] and Mederer posited that the oracle referred to a wider area than Phrygia since Gordium was seen as the omphalos of the world [14]).

1.16: cupido incessit animo sortis eius explendae

'Cupido' occurs in Justin's version and Arrian refers to Alexander's πόθος to see the wagon (J. xi, 7.4; A. ii, 3.1). Ehrenberg (74-83) offers a discussion of the πόθος myth, suggesting that it originated in Alexander's own pronouncements, but that this particular case was a literary concoction inspired by the historical use of the formula when Alexander spoke of his desire to visit Siwah. Montgomery has argued that the πόθος myth in Arrian's work represents a convention of historiography and should not be traced back to Alexander himself (Gedanke u. Tat). In this particular case one has to set against the common appearance of cupido - πόθος in our sources the incidence of similar expressions in Latin historical works: for example, Livy i, 6.3 and xxxiii, 38.11, Sallust Jug. 93, 3, Tac. Hist. i, 48.2 and iv, 82.1 (the formula may have had a special link with the legend of Germanicus: supra p. xlvi).

The reassembly of the army at Gordium and the arrival of reinforcements (cf. A.i, 29.4) should be linked with Alexander's stunt. The solution of the knot problem was probably planned as a morale booster to mark the commencement of a new phase in the war.

Curtius goes on in the following section to describe the psychological and almost political significance of Alexander's

action amongst the witnesses.

1.17: haec sollicita ex temeraria regis fiducia

The effect of Alexander's rash self-confidence upon his troops emerges as a key motif in this work, cf. 5.14 and 6.18 and 8. 10-11 infra.

1.17: unde nexus inciperet quove se conderet nec ratione nec visu perspicī posset

Cf. A.ii, 3.7: τούτου (σχοτοῦ δεσμοῦ) οὔτε τέλος οὔτε ἀρχὴ ἐφαίνετο. The pole pin, to which Aristobulus referred, would have been necessary to prevent the rope link sliding on the shaft. Pictorial representations of the way in which the yoke may have been joined to the shaft can be found in Autenrieth's Homeric Dictionary s.v. ἔστορι, and Wace and Stubbings Companion to Homer, p. 539.

The 'knot' may well have been not a knot but a 'rope' with its ends plaited into one another, and perhaps with a plaited intersection (cf. Plut. Alex. 18, 3) giving the rope a figure of eight shape (cf. W. Deonna REG xxxi, '18 39 sq., esp. 61 sq., and 141 sq; Daremberg-Saglio s.v. Modus p. 88; K. Keyssner RE xvii, '37 s.v. Nodus, 803 sq., M.P. Nilsson GGR i, pp. 114 and 200 referring to work by P. Wolters).

1.17: solvere adgressus

(Sc. rex) solvere adgressus is a participial noun phrase meaning 'the King's attempt to undo the knot'.

1.17: ne in omen verteretur inritum inceptum

The 'knot' presented Alexander with a challenge, and to defend his prestige Alexander could neither ignore the challenge nor fail in the attempt to solve it. A similar challenge was presented to Vespasian in Egypt when he was called on to work miracle cures which Serapis prophesied would take place (Suet. Vesp. 7).

1.18: nequaquam diu luctatus

Bardon here follows the reading of P in preference to that of Σ (BFLMV): nequiquam diu luctatus, as P is marginally a better tradition (cf. Bardon's introduction to the Budé text). However, Bardon sought the best of both worlds by reading 'nequaquam' and translating as 'sans résultat'. In defence of the reading of P one may suggest that 'nequaquam' emphasizes the brevity of Alexander's

attempt to undo the knot and accords well with his impetuous character (cf. Mitzell's commentary and M. Paladini, Note de lecture, 25, Latomus xvi, '57 140. Paladini takes the word 'violentius' out of its phrase in Justin xi, 7.16 [violentius oraculo usus gladio loramenta caedit] to strengthen her case. There are several links between the accounts of Justin and Curtius on this episode, and 'nequaquam' is closer than 'nequiquam' to Justin's version). Curtius recognised 'celeritas' as one of the chief virtutes of Alexander (cf. v, 5.3; vii, 6.23; on 'celeritas' as a virtue in Roman political literature vide M. Rambaud Déformation historique 251 sq.).

'Nequaquam diu' is, however, not a combination for which I have found a parallel, and P^C apparently reads 'nequiquam' so that the latter reading has considerable support (and cf. Livy iv, 55.8: cum diu nequiquam oppugnata esset). Furthermore Curtius seems to be emphasizing in this chapter not Alexander's 'celeritas', but his dogged determination (cf. on §§ 8 and 19).

1.18: gladioque ruptis omnibus loris

Curtius' source for this statement was not Aristobulus, since Aristobulus maintained that Alexander uncoupled the yoke from the shaft by pulling out the pole pin (4. ii, 3.7; cf. Plut. Alex. 18.4. Tarn [ii, 262 sq.] argued that Aristobulus' version is the correct one, but Tarn missed the point that here as elsewhere Aristobulus altered the record to remove what appeared to him to detract from Alexander's glory, cf. notes on 5.1 sq. infra). With the term 'loris' compare Justin's 'loramentorum' (xi, 7.16): Plutarch and Arrian described the binding as cornel bark (φλοιὸς κρανίως), and they probably give what Callisthenes and Aristobulus wrote. 'Lora' are normally leather, though Pliny (nh. xiv, 1.3) once used the term to apply to a vine branch, and this prompts the recollection that there was a tradition that the binding was a vine branch, κλήματι ἀμπέλινῳ (Marsyas of Philippi, Jacoby FGH 135/6, F.4; Jacoby says that this Marsyas may have written before 168 B.C., [Kommentar p. 481]).

1.18: oraculi sortem vel elusit vel implevit

The contrasting verbs (elusit - made a mockery of; implevit - satisfied) carefully leave open two questions: whether Alexander played fair (contrast Justin xi, 7.16: violentius oraculo usus gladio loramenta caedit), and whether the oracle was bogus. Curtius' work

abounds in such alternatives, e.g. iv, 12.18; v, 1.9; 2.8; viii, 12.3; ix, 4.25; 5.27; and, whilst the historian must of necessity leave many issues undecided, yet Curtius' indecision is often unscientific since the alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities and the relevant facts are not properly analysed. What we lack in this instance is information on how Alexander's solution of the problem was received.

Mederer argued that the conclusion to Curtius' tale revealed his use of a tradition hostile to Alexander (12 and n.14; he includes J. xi, 7.16 in the same analysis), but Curtius does not in fact pass judgement; rather his closing comment adds the element of dramatic suspense.

1. 11-19: Sources and Composition

Inge Rabe analysed the tale of the Gordian knot in Arrian, Plutarch, Justin and Curtius, and concluded that Curtius and Justin reflect the Cleitarchean tradition, Plutarch used Cleitarchus for 18, 2 and 3 with a quotation from Aristobulus, and Aristobulus for 18.4 whilst Arrian's account throughout is based on Aristobulus, through whom Arrian knew of Cleitarchus' version (Rabe 44-51). Rabe does not justify her assumption that Cleitarchus' version was the dominant influence on Curtius and Justin. Both Plutarch and Arrian consulted Aristobulus but the reference to the fastening being of cornel bark does not appear in either account in the section where Aristobulus is expressly taken as the source. Thus Rabe's assumption that Aristobulus was the source of this detail is open to criticism; this objection in turn weakens the case for considering Cleitarchus as the basic source for the non-Aristobulean tradition, since neither Curtius nor Justin mention cornel-bark. Rabe's argument that Arrian used Aristobulus throughout ignores the point that Arrian introduces the palace as that of Gordius and Midas in ii, 3.1, but in his summary of the legend he implies that Midas was the first king (ii, 3.6): this contradiction, albeit a minor one, suggests the contaminatio of divergent traditions.

There are many points of difference between Justin's version of the Gordian legend and Arrian's, and it is reasonable to assume that they were following different sources; but Justin appears close to Curtius when he writes that it was Gordius who was driving the waggon (J. xi, 7. 11-12 cf. C.R. § 14), and was thus made king. This reference to Gordius may provide a link between Curtius' account

and one of Arrian's sources, since Arrian, as we have seen, refers to a palace of Gordius. Another link between the two accounts is the common reference to the river Sangarius (C.R. § 12; A. i, 29.5).

In § 17 Curtius deals with the effect of Curtius' acceptance of the challenge of the knot upon the native population and his own troops. Rabe, assuming that Curtius had little originality and that he followed Cleitarchus principally, argued that Curtius took this passage from Cleitarchus. Arrian attributed Alexander's decision to use a sword on the knot to the fear μή τινα καί τοῦτο ἐς τοῦς πολλοῦς κίνησιν ἐργάσεται (ii, 3.7); and this represents, in Rabe's view, Aristobulus' modification of what Cleitarchus wrote. However a key phrase in Curtius' version is 'ex temeraria regis fiducia', which emerges as a recurring motif in the Histories: the self-confidence -to others it often seemed recklessness- with which Alexander met various challenges. This theme provided scope for dramatic scenes contrasting Alexander's self-confidence with the caution, concern or fear of his men. This motif does not appear in the corresponding sections of Diodorus' and Justin's works (contrast here J. xi, 7.16; on Alexander's sickness at Tarsus contrast C.R. 5.14 and 6.18 with D.S. 31 and J. xi, 8.3 sq.; on his decision to travel to Siwah contrast C.R. iv, 7.8 with D.S. 49.2 sq. and J. xi, 11.1 sq., and on his heroic action at the Mallian city C.R. ix, 5.1 sq., with D.S. 99.1 sq., and J. xii, 9.4 sq.). This pattern suggests not that Curtius copied a motif from a source which Diodorus and Justin followed, but that Curtius developed the theme of Alexander's recklessness or self-confidence independently. The idea of a general's display of self-confidence inspiring his men with confidence was a commonplace which Curtius might perhaps have picked up from Livy (e.g. Livy xxxii, 5.13).

In fine Rabe's analysis is unsatisfactory on several counts. Cleitarchus' version is not known, and there are points of detail which cast doubt on her view of the interrelationship of the major accounts.

In terms of composition and phraseology Curtius' account is closer to Plutarch than to Arrian and Justin (cf. on §§ 16 and 18), and the possibility of a common source exists.

The links in phraseology between Curtius and Justin are not striking; only the following merit a mention:

cupido incessit animo - cupido eum cepit (J), Iovis
templum - templum Iovis (J), nexis - nexum, nexibus (J).

Thus on points of phraseology one cannot prove that Curtius did, or did not use the same source as did Trogus. Similarly there is no striking coincidence in the detail of the two stories, and Curtius' structuring of the tale is quite different from Justin's.

1. 19-21: the Western front

1.19: cum deinde Darcum ubicumque esset occupare statuisset

Cf. § 10 surpa and n. on § 8. Curtius here spells out the central theme of this chapter, Alexander's determination to track down Darius. The episodes covered in this chapter illustrate Alexander's patient and comprehensive preparations for this major offensive. Diodorus only speaks of Alexander's readiness to risk a clash with Darius à propos of the dismissal of the fleet, whilst Arrian first mentions a specific decision to face Darius in battle as the fruit of the war-council in Mallus (B.S. 23.1, using a source who wrote of Agathocles too [23.2]; A.ii, 6. 1-2; Arrian makes an oblique reference to such a plan in i, 29.6, cf. supra on 'finito Persico bello' § 9.)

1.19: Amphoterum classi ad oram Hellesponti ... praefecit

Amphoterus first appears in the history of Alexander's campaigns not as an officer in command of troops but as a messenger: Amphoterus was sent by Alexander to Parmenion from Phaselis: Amphoterus' mission was to convey instructions for the arrest of the Lyncestian Alexander (A. i, 25. 9-10). This episode provides the terminus post quem for Amphoterus' commission. Berve (ii, no. 68) posits that Amphoterus remained with Parmenion till Parmenion joined Alexander in Gordium in the spring of 333 B.C. Certainly Hegelochus and Amphoterus were not operational early enough to be able to check Memnon.

The relationship between Amphoterus and Hegelochus is discussed below. Here one may note that anecdote recorded by Plutarch that Philip said of Amphoterus and his elder brother Craterus:

'Each ('Ἐκατέρων) was sensible and practical, and Both ('Ἀμφοτέρων) was silly and foolish, and ... Each was both and Both was neither' (Moralia 177F Loeb translation). The anecdote

suggests that Amphoterus would have been regarded as Hegelochus' junior rather than equal.

The fleet which Amphoterus was sent to command was no doubt made up of boats left at the Hellespont to ferry and patrol, plus perhaps some of the ships which Alexander retained after the dispersal of the bulk of the fleet at Miletus (D.S. 22. 5; A. i, 20.1 is less precise). This accords with Arrian's statement that Hegelochus was busy collecting together a fleet, but had not a sizable enough fleet in time to be able to save Tenedos (A. ii, 2.3).

1.19: *copiis autem praefecit Hegelochum*

Curtius' belief that Hegelochus' command was separate from Amphoterus' (cf. iv, 5.14) does not tally precisely with Arrian's account that Hegelochus was responsible for building up a fleet in the Aegean (A. ii, 2.3), and later that Hegelochus detailed Amphoterus to lead a force of 60 ships to Cos (A. iii, 2.6). Arrian saw Hegelochus as Amphoterus' senior (cf. Kornemann (1) p. 112 n. 43; Berve ii, no. 341; Schäfer Demosthenes 173-4 n.1).

Arrian's version has the backing of his general reputation and is supported to a certain extent by what we know of Hegelochus and Amphoterus. Hegelochus' father, Hippostratus, might be identified with the brother of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337, since the tradition that Alexander liquidated all Cleopatra's relatives before he crossed into Asia (Satyros, ap. Athen. 557D; Justin xi, 5.1; Stähelin RE Suppl. iii, 1156 nos. 8-10) could be an exaggeration; nevertheless it is unlikely that a relative of Cleopatra would have enjoyed a career such as Hegelochus' under Alexander (on the fate of numerous individuals associated with Philip soon after Philip's death Badian (3)). Hegelochus was more likely the son of the distinguished hetairoi who died in action against the Illyrians (Didymus, ap. Marsyas FGH 136, F 17 cf. Berve ii, no. 390). This campaign may be dated to 344 (Baloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2 289, cf. F.R. Wüst Philipp II. von Makedonen München, '38, 54-5). Hegelochus was old enough to hold a command in the first year of the war in Asia.

It is commonly stated that Hegelochus became at some point before the battle of the R. Granicus commanding officer of the prodromoi (Berve i, 130; ii, no.341; A.F. Pauli RE xlv, '57 s.v.

πρόδρομος, 104), however all the evidence we have to work on is a statement that before the battle of Granicus Hegelochus led a reconnaissance party consisting of the sarissophoroi, who were

identical with the prodranoi, plus five hundred light-armed troops (A. i, 13.1). This is not the place to discuss the identity of the prodranoi and the list of officers, but it may suffice to note that Hegelochus was senior enough in rank to command a mixed force. He was senior enough to be a friend of Parmenion, according to Curtius (vi, 11.22), and he was regarded as competent enough to command an ile of Companion Cavalry at Gaugamela (A. iii, 11.8).

It appears that Alexander had picked a useful combination: Hegelochus had had experience as a commander and Amphoterus had demonstrated his trustworthiness in the political crisis when the Lyncestian Alexander was removed from his command. In terms of 'imperium' Curtius' statement in § 19 does not contradict Arrian's assumption that Hegelochus was senior; in terms of 'auctoritas' the evidence suggests that Hegelochus was senior. If, however, Amphoterus was commissioned by Alexander partly that he might act as a political commissar, then Amphoterus' status was not fixed, since loyalty to Alexander became more important than rank if a political crisis arose.

4.19: Lesbum et Chium COUNQUE praesidiis hostium liberaturos

Chios was betrayed to Memnon and the whole of Lesbos except Mytilene had fallen to him before his death, which occurred probably in the summer of 333 B.C. (cf. ad 2.1; A. ii, 1. 1-2; D.S. 29.2). Neither Arrian nor Diodorus mentions Cos in summarising Memnon's campaigns; Arrian only refers to Cos at a point shortly before the battle of Issus when Pharnabazus and Autophradates sent a force to Cos and Halicarnassus (A. ii, 13.4), but Diodorus implies that Cos was under Persian control at the time of the siege of Halicarnassus. When the officers realized that Halicarnassus could not hold out they transferred the bulk of the army and the money to the island of Cos (D.S. 27.5).

The other sources do not say whether Memnon planted garrisons in cities which fell to him. Furthermore Memnon used bribery to buy support in Greek cities (D.S. 29.4), and the 'surrender of Chios' to him may likewise suggest that he was keen for a political settlement where military force was not essential. Arrian says that in blockading Mytilene Memnon stationed ships off the Sigrium promontory to intercept ships from Chios and other places (A. ii, 1.2), and this may indicate that there was no substantial Persian garrison force in Chios. On the other hand it is likely that Memnon left troops where resistance had been active, and there is evidence that his successors

maintained a garrison in Chios (A. iii, 2.3), planted a garrison in Mytilene (A. ii, 1.5), and set a garrison in Tenedos after the revolt against Persia had been crushed (C.R. iv, 5.15). At the time of Memnon's death the troops engaged in the siege of Mytilene would have made the garrisoning of the other cities on Lesbos unnecessary.

Further on the chronology of Memnon's activity see Appendix A.

1.20: his talenta ad belli usum quingenta attributa

The reading of M, quinquaginta, must be rejected as giving too low a figure.

The total of this and the following amount, 1,100 talents, is quite high when one considers the shortage of money attributed to Alexander late in 334, the amount sent off with Cleander (cf. § 1) and the cost of maintaining the troops already in his service. Clearly the cities of Asia were paying heavily for their liberation (Aspendus had to pay 50 talents and Soli 200 [A. i, 26.3 and ii, 5.5]: the latter a 'fine', the former probably not). Alexander's financial position improved dramatically later in 333 with the capture of the Persian treasure in Damascus (cf. 13.16).

Curtius' figures here may be reliable, as in one place where we can check, his data on Alexander's assets tally with Arrian's data (C.R. x, 2.24 with A. vii, 9.6).

1.20: ad Antipatrum et eos qui Graecas urbes tuebantur D C missa

The result of Alexander's remission of funds to Antipater was probably the naval force which Proteas was commissioned to raise for the defence of Greece and the islands (cf. A. ii, 2.4 and Schachermeyr 160).

In terms of the settlement made by Philip when the League was established (or, to be more precise, when the Koine Eirene was reconstituted in 338/7 B.C.), officers were appointed whom [Demosthenes] styled οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι (xvii, 15). Their function, according to this source, was to act as watch-dogs to protect the constitutions of the cities under their control and to prevent revolution. The title and list of functions no doubt veiled the true function of these officers to keep Greek cities from rebellion against Philip (cf. Momigliano Filippo il Macedone 164-5 and 164 n.1; cf. La κοινὴ εἰρήνη dal 386 al 338 a.o. Riv. di Filol. xiii, '34 esp. p. 508; Schwahn, Heeresmatrikel

41-2 on the way guarantees of ἀπορρησία and garrisoning were reconciled within the framework of League agreements; Berve i, 231, who sees these officers as garrison commanders). The sources do not refer to such officers in Greece after the fall of Thebes till the mention of Corragus in the context of the fighting in 331 B.C. (vide Berve ii, no. 144); and the initial successes of Agis in rebellion may suggest that Alexander had discontinued Philip's system (modern accounts apparently assume the continuity of the system, vide e.g. H. Bangtson Die Strategie in der hellen. Zeit, i, '37 49-50). On the other hand Curtius' statement here may refer to such officers, and if Alexander did in fact continue to employ them then they surely must have provided the staff which Alexander needed at this point to organize the defence of Greece.

1.20: ex foedere naves sociis imperatae

There is epigraphical evidence that Chios was required to supply 20 ships in 332 B.C., to serve with the federal navy as long as it was in service (SIG³ 283 esp. 1.8 sq.; Kaerst 330 and n.1; on the surrender of Chios to Athens apparently sometime after Issus, A. iii, 2. 3-4). For a reference to a demand sent by Alexander to Athens for triremes see Plut. Phoc. 21, 1.

1.21: nondum enim Memnonem vita excessisse cognoverat.

The date of Memnon's death is discussed below at 2.1 and in Appendix A.

The career of Memnon is surveyed by Berve ii, no. 497.

1.21: in quem omnes intenderat curas

Diodorus similarly refers to Alexander's anxiety about Memnon's activity (31.3), cf. in milder form Plutarch's observation (Alex. 18, 5). Arrian offers no information on Alexander's psychological reaction to Memnon's progress and plans.

Curtius' comment is rather an overstatement of the position in that Alexander gave no sign in 333 of abandoning his plans to advance deeper into Asia Minor. Curtius' statement here accords with Diodorus' remark that Darius appointed Memnon general in charge of the entire war (29.1); however, Arrian only says that Memnon was commander in chief of the navy, with a mandate to carry hostilities into Greece (A.ii, 1.1, cf. D.S. 31.3). Arrian's formulation was probably nearer the truth, for Darius' decision to prepare for action against Alexander seems to have been taken before Memnon's death

(see commentary on chapter 2).

1.22: numero copiarum inito

This review of the troops is not mentioned by the other sources, and it must be considered alongside the reference to reinforcements in § 24 infra.

In the structure of Curtius' narrative this bare reference to a review of Alexander's army foreshadows the elaborate account of the review of Darius' army in c. 2, and the difference in treatment of the two events marks the antithesis.

1.22: huic iuncti erant Heneti unde quidam Venetos trahere originem credunt

Curtius probably added this piece of information since the link between the Heneti and Veneti might be of interest to Italian readers. The Heneti do not appear elsewhere in the histories of Alexander's campaigns, but they are mentioned by writers of the Early Empire: Strabo noted that the site of their geographical homeland in Paphlagonia was no longer known for certain (xii, 3.8 544); their migration westwards was linked with the end of the Trojan War (Strabo loc.cit.; Livy i, 1.2) or a war against the Assyrians (Arrian, Frag. 63 in Jacoby FGH).

Von Domaszewski suggested that the ultimate source of this and other digressions in c.1 was Callisthenes (Domaszewski, 14, Pearson (1) 44). There are however other possibilities: for example Timagenes who dealt with the migration of various peoples from Asia to the west (FGH 88 F. 2; Timagenes is cited by Curtius at ix, 5.21).

1.23: datis obsidibus

The detention of hostages was an important feature in the control of Alexander's empire (e.g. A. i, 27.4; v, 2.2; D.S. 73.6; 76.8; C.R. ix, 1.14; viii, 5.1 on the 30,000 ἐπιγόνου).

Many cases illustrate Alexander's skill in devising sophisticated screens for the realities of the situation in which hostages were demanded and held: the case of the Thirty Thousand 'epigonoi' is one example, the retention of the Athenian naval contingent during the winter of 334-3 is another (D.S. 22.5).

1.23: tributum, quod ne Persis quidem tulissent, pendere ne cogerentur impetraverunt

Herodotus set the Paphlagonians amongst those who paid

tribute to Persia (iii, 90), and Xenophon described Paphlagonia as a separate satrapy (An. vii, 8.25; cf. Mützell ad loc.), but during Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia Minor the Paphlagonians played an independent game and later their country was attached first by the dissident satrap of Cappadocia, Datames (Nepos Datames v, 5), and then in or before 360 by Artabazus, the satrap of Daskyleion (Dem. xxiii, c. Aristocr. 155; Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2. 154 and 257). Clearly no Persian satrap effectively controlled Paphlagonia during most of the fourth century. After Alexander's attachment of Paphlagonia it reverted to its former free status, despite the hostages taken, and the satrap presently had to invade the territory (C.R. iv, 1.34 and 5.13).

1.24: Calas huic regioni praepositus est

Arrian's version appears more accurate: the Paphlagonians were instructed to take orders from Calas, the satrap of (so. Hellespontine) Phrygia (A. ii, 4.2). We cannot argue from the two versions that Curtius must have used a different source from Arrian's.

Amongst Alexander's officers, Calas had the advantage of having served in the advance party in Asia Minor. When the Persian forces recovered lost ground Calas was forced back to Rhoeteium (D.S. 7.10), which he presumably held to form the bridgehead for the expeditionary forces under Alexander's command. Calas had acquired a reputation for knowing the area of Hellespontine Phrygia and this has been seen as the reason for his appointment as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (so Berve ii, no. 397).

He was one of Alexander's most senior officers, perhaps one of the Body Guards (C.B. Welles (2) 105).

1.24: ipse

Vergés commented that Curtius, like Livy, often used 'ipse' to denote the King as opposed to his subjects, or the general as opposed to his troops (note iii, 1.6); here 'ipse' refers to Alexander as opposed to his officer, Calas.

1.24: adsumptis qui ex Macedonia nuper advenerant

Curtius is alone in recording the arrival of reinforcements at this point, just as he is alone in speaking of Alexander awaiting the arrival of reinforcements at the time of the battle of Issus (cf. infra ad 7.8).

Curtius here seems to follow a source other than Callisthenes and Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Callisthenes, according to Polybius, noted the arrival of only one force of reinforcements between the start of Alexander's campaigns in Asia and the battle of Issus: μέλλοντι δ' εἰς Κιλικίαν ἐμβάλλειν ἄλλους ἐλθεῖν ἐκ Μακεδονίας πεζοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δ' ὀκτακοσίους (Polyb. xii, 19.2).

This does not square with Curtius' version, since Curtius says that Alexander was about to enter Cappadocia, not Cilicia. Still less does Curtius' statement agree with Arrian's version: reinforcements joined Alexander at Gordium in the Spring of 333 B.C.; these were the men recruited by the officers sent home to Macedon with the *ναύαμοι* for the winter of 334/3 B.C.; the reinforcements were made up of 3,000 Macedonian infantry, 300 cavalry, presumably Macedonian, 200 Thessalian cavalry and 150 Eleians (A. i, 29.4). In time and in distance Gordium was some way from the point where Alexander entered Cappadocia. Arrian next refers to reinforcements when Alexander had returned to Sidon after his expedition to Mt. Antilibanus (A. ii, 20.5).

The discrepancies between Arrian's and Polybius' passages in respect of numbers and place references can be resolved by supposing that reinforcements joined Alexander both in Gordium and perhaps in Cappadocia: Arrian omitted reference to the second arrival of reinforcements and Callisthenes' totals represented the overall figures of reinforcements before the battle of Issus. If reinforcements came in more than one party, despite the impression given by Polybius, then Curtius may be right that Alexander received reinforcements at this point. However he omitted reference to their arrival at Gordium, and thus these reinforcements may represent the Gordium group late or the Cappadocian group early.

Brunt has suggested that Callisthenes' reference to eight hundred cavalry reinforcements from Macedon may be the total of the three hundred Macedonian cavalrymen who joined Alexander at Gordium (A. i, 29.4) and a further group of five hundred Macedonians who joined Alexander on a separate occasion (Brunt (1) 36-7). This theory is, however, of limited value since it means that Polybius found no reference in Callisthenes to any allied cavalry units joining Alexander before the battle of Issus. Furthermore, the addition of eight rather than three hundred Macedonian cavalry would presuppose

either that the number of cavalry units in the army was thereby increased, or that the strength of each cavalry unit was substantially increased. There is no direct evidence to show that the former alternative was realized, and the evidence on the latter point indicates that the Macedonian cavalry ile remained unchanged at c.200 men (A. i, 5.10; 6.1; 18.1; iv, 17.3; 22.1; Domaszewski p. 34 and n. 4 and Brunt (1); for the prodromoi units vide R.D. Milns (1) 167-8; cf. Ekman's commentary on Xen. Hipp. '33 p. 47).

Milns suggested that the discrepancy between Arrian and Polybius might also be resolved by assuming that reinforcements reached Alexander on only one occasion and Arrian merely omitted mention of units that would account for the extra 2,000 infantry and 150 cavalry (Milns (2) 162 n. 19). This is improbable.

Whilst the facts remain uncertain, it must also be noted that Curtius ends c.1 as he began it, with a reference to reinforcements; in both cases the precise sequence of events may have been relinquished for artistic considerations.

1.24: Cappadocian petit

The route by which Alexander travelled from Ancyra to Tyana is not given by the sources and modern accounts differ: Tarn has Alexander keep to the western bank of the Halys, whereas Schachermeyr thinks that Alexander crossed the Halys and marched first to Pteria (Tarn i, 21; Schachermeyr Alexander 163).

Again Arrian is rather more informative than Curtius: on his way to Cappadocia Alexander won over (προσηλύετο) ^{the} all the territory this side of Halys, and much of the territory on the Persian side (A. ii, 4.2). Whichever side Alexander kept to, he no doubt sent units of his army across the territory on the other side of the river.

Curtius' failure to mention the Halys is noteworthy because he used a source for a later episode which appreciated the significance of the Halys as the traditional boundary between the Persian Empire and the west (iv, 11.5).

A more positive pointer to Curtius' use of his sources appears from a comparison of this passage with a fragment of Hieronymus (ap. App. Mith. 8) where it is stated that Alexander kept completely away from Cappadocia and kept to the southern coast on his way to Cilicia. Curtius has nothing on this divergent tradition but he seems to have used Hieronymus' work in the preparation of Bk.10 (cf. p. lxxvii supra).

2.1: Darius' decision to lead his army in person against Alexander

2.1: *muntiata Memnonis morte*

The implication of the references to Memnon's death in Curtius and Arrian is that either Memnon died whilst Alexander was in Gordium or that news of the death reached Alexander in Gordium (supra 1.21; A. i, 27.4 and ii, 1.1 sq.; the evidence is discussed in Appendix A); Diodorus and Plutarch offer little assistance. As for Darius' position when the news arrived, the sources are similarly vague: Diodorus and Curtius imply that Darius had not yet reached Babylon (D.S. 29.4; 31.1; Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2.311 and Brunt (2) 154 take C.R. iii, 2.2 to indicate that Darius was already in Babylon but this, I think, is a wrong interpretation); Plutarch suggests that Darius was in Susa when he heard of Memnon's death (Plut. Alex. 18, 6), but the reference is vague.

2.1: *statuit ipse decernere*

Curtius gives in the first few lines of this chapter a brief account of the plan adopted by Darius after the death of Memnon, whereas Diodorus' account is more expansive because the tale of Charidemus' clash with Darius is integrated into it (cf. ad § 10; Schwartz noted the difference in the sequence of events between the two accounts, RE iv, 1875).

Curtius and Diodorus both present Darius' decision to engage the Greek army with the Persian imperial army as a direct consequence of Memnon's death, but Arrian offers no account of when and why Darius decided on a direct confrontation, although he gives much detail that is relevant to the issue.

Memnon's part in Darius' strategy had been to check Alexander's advance by a major campaign in the Aegean culminating in an invasion of Macedon and Greece (A.ii, 1.1, cf. ii, 17.2; D.S. 30.1 and 31.3 cf. 18.3; for an assessment of this strategy, A.R. Burn JHS lxxii, '52 esp. 81-3). With Alexander only in Phrygia Darius could have afforded to stay in Susa and to wait for Memnon to settle the issue, but it would have been prudent to assemble an army in case of emergency. It is therefore quite possible that satrapal units were under orders to assemble in Babylon, or to prepare for mobilisation even before news of Memnon's death arrived in Susa.

Darius decided that he could not continue with this strategy after Memnon's death, though Pharnabazus and Autophradates assumed

command of the Persian forces immediately after Memnon's death (A. ii, 1.3). This emerges from Arrian's reference to Darius' decision to transfer the mercenaries from Pharnabazus' command to his own (A. ii, 2.1, cf. C.R. iii, 3.1 setting this event after Darius' decision to fight). Thymondas, the man Darius sent to take over the mercenaries, reached Pharnabazus after he and Autophradates had finished off the capture of Mytilene and had split the fleet into two sections. Darius therefore did not wait to see how Pharnabazus would shape as a commander but decided to concentrate his forces to check Alexander in Asia. Memnon, as a Greek, might achieve more than any Persian amongst the Greek communities (the charisma of Memnon in Diodorus' picture [29. 2-4], contrasts with the treachery and intimidation practised by Pharnabazus and Autophradates in Arrian's account [ii, 1. 4-5 and 2.3]: however, the complaints made against these Persians may reflect what was prudent to say when Tenedos and Mytilene were back in Macedonian control. Schachermeyr 165-6 stresses the importance of Darius' inability to find anyone who could replace Memnon's assets. In any event Alexander's decision to turn East from Gordium should have indicated to Darius that a diversionary strategy in the Aegean would not be adequate).

Apart from the implications of Memnon's death, there were other reasons why Darius should have decided to adopt a different strategy: having recently seized power he was no doubt concerned about his own image as a national leader. Diodorus' account shows some appreciation of the political factors involved (30.2, Charidemus' advice to Darius *μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκυβεῦσαι περὶ τῆς βασιλείας* but neither Diodorus nor Curtius gives information on internal security within Darius' Empire before Issus, though the non-appearance of various units of the empire at Issus may be relevant (C.R. iii, 2.9).

As the intentions of Alexander and Darius became clear Greek states moved into position to guard their own interests and to play their part against Alexander. Athens sent an envoy or mission to Darius, as did Thebes (A. ii, 15; C.R. 13.15). The decision by Athens to negotiate with Darius was probably taken after the failure of the approach made to Alexander at Gordium (supra ad 1.9). In the same period Agis sent Euthycles to present Sparta's case to Darius, and at the time of the battle of Issus, Agis himself had made contact with the Persian commanders at Siphnos (A. ii, 15.2; 13. 4-5; on Agis' plans see Badian (5) 170 sq.). Whilst Agis was to play an important part in the struggle against Alexander, his schemes

probably played no part in Darius' decision to engage Alexander, with the imperial army.

Curtius has not attempted a serious analysis of the factors that may have governed Darius' choice of plan.

2. 2-9: In camp near Babylon Darius reviews his army.

A catalogue of units in the Persian army.

2.2: quo maiore animo capesserent bellum

Curtius refers further on to the similar episode when Xerxes reviewed his army at Doriscus in 480 B.C. Whereas Herodotus merely records that Xerxes thought that Doriscus was a suitable site for a review of his army, Curtius, ever keen to rationalize, provides a motive for Darius' review of his army. The addition of the motive may be regarded as Curtius' contribution because of the part it plays in the structure of this whole highly rhetorical chapter. For Darius' army military reviews were the means of stimulating zeal for battle, but for the Macedonians it was military training and a tough way of life (infra §§ 13, n.b. didicerunt and 15, n.b. disciplina paupertate) that produced a fighting spirit.

2.2: Xerxis exemplo numerum copiarum inicit

Xerxes conducted a review of his army at Doriscus in the same manner (Hdt. vii, 58 sq., esp. 60). Curtius' account in this chapter follows the structure of Herodotus' account: first comes a list of the units with some detail added on the weapons they carried, then comes the tale of Charidemus' criticism of Darius' confidence in his army. The latter section corresponds to the dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratus (Hdt. vii, 101 sq.).

The influence of Herodotus' History can be seen in the earliest accounts and Alexander himself may have acted at times under the influence of the Herodotean epic (cf. Pearson (1) 10 sq.). In this case it was the historian, and not his subject, who followed Herodotus, and the problem is to decide whether this literary scheme was Curtius' idea or his source's.

2.4: Persarum erant centum milia, in quis eques xxx/implebat

The figure of 70,000 Persian infantry might be supported by the addition of the 10,000 Immortals, mentioned at 3.13, to the figure which Arrian gives for the Cardaces at Issus, 60,000 (A. ii, 8.6). Whilst the Cardaces were an ethnic group, whose name lived on with a

socio-ethnic class in the Seleucid empire, the term also seems to have been used to describe a class of 'ephebes', or regulars in the Persian army (cf. Walbank on Polybius v, 79.11; H. von Gall, 'Medische' Felsgräber, Beiblatt zum JDAI 81, '66/7: Archäologischer Anzeiger 1966 p.46; W. Aly Strabon von Amaseia vol.4, Bonn '57 142 on Strabo xv, 3.18; on the 'ephebes' see n. on 3.10 infra). However the term 'Cardaces' is not repeated in Arrian's list of the Persian troop dispositions at Gaugamela, and there the source was a Persian document which apparently was known to Arrian through Aristobulus' account. Thus the accuracy of Arrian's reference to 'Cardaces' is open to question.

The Kinsmen should be considered amongst the Persian cavalry (cf. on 3.14).

2.4: Medi decem equitum:

Median cavalry are mentioned again at 9.4.

2.5: Barcanorum

It has been suggested that Barcani was an alternative transliteration of the Old Persian form Varkāna, for which the usual rendering was Hyrcanici (Tomaschek RE iii (1899), 19). However Curtius here clearly distinguishes the Barcani from the Hyrcani (infra § 6): the numbers and weapons are different enough to show that this is not a case of doublets.

Stephanus regarded the Barcani and Hyrcani as separate nations (cf. Tarn (2) 83 n.1), and we know that Ctesias thought likewise (D.S. ii, 2. 2-3). Diodorus certainly consulted Ctesias directly (hence the extensive summary of Ctesias in Bk. ii, and the reference to him at xiv, 46.6). Thus it is possible that Curtius' source was one in which Ctesias' influence was present; however on another matter Curtius conflicts with detail provided by Ctesias (contrast C.R. v, 1.26 with D.S. ii, 7. 4-5 and cf. p. 65 infra). Many other names can be considered: a list is given in Pliny's bibliography (nh. i, 6) on the situs, gentes etc. of Asia, where heading no. 18 is 'gentes circa Hyrcanum mare': it includes Baeton, Cleitarchus, Onesicritus, Nearchus, and Megasthenes.

The Barcani do not appear as such in Curtius' list of the Persian units which fought at Gaugamela (iv, 12 1 sq.), nor does their name appear in Arrian's list for Gaugamela.

2.5: cetrae maxime speciem reddentibus

The order of the first two words as given by Bardon represents an inversion of the order given by the mss., but this is not noted in his apparatus criticus (cf. K. Müller (2) 630).

2.6: Armenii quadraginta milia miserant peditum, additis septem milibus equitum

The satrap of Armenia at the time of the battle of Gaugamela was probably Orontes (A. iii, 8.5 with D.S. xix, 23.3; Polyaeus iv, 8.3; Strabo xi, 14 15 531 and the analysis by Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2 138-141 and Berve ii, no. 593). The satrapal office had become vacant upon Darius' accession (cf. Justin x, 3.4 and Berve ii, nos. 244 and 593), thus it is likely that Orontes was appointed to the post at that time, and his appearance in Darius' army in 333 was a timely demonstration of loyalty.

In this passage Curtius terms these units *Armenii*, but in the catalogue of units at Gaugamela he produces the anachronistic distinction between '*Armenii minores*' and '*natio Maioris Armeniae*' (iv, 12. 10 and 12), a distinction which he certainly did not pick up from *Aristobulus* (cf. A. iii, 8.5).

2.6: Hyrcani egregiorum equitum, ut inter illas gentes, sex milia expleverant

'Excellent cavalry by the standards of those tribes': with the 'ut' phrase compare C.R. ix, 1.14. The insertion of this phrase is typically Curtian, putting the barbarians in their place.

The Hyrcanian cavalry is mentioned again at 9.5. The Hyrcanians only supplied cavalry at the battle of Gaugamela (A. iii, 8.4) which is a point that justifies in part the emendation followed by Bardon at the end of § 6, and the insertion of 'equitum' in the clause under discussion. It would otherwise be possible to emend the text to attribute to the Hyrcanians infantry as well as cavalry.

The Hyrcanians mentioned here will be men from Hyrcania proper, whereas those who fought at Granicus were rather Hyrcanians who had been settled in Lydia (D.S. 19.4 with Strabo xiii, 4.13 629 and other references collected by Domaszewski, 53 and n. 1).

2.6: additis equitibus † militatura idem vicies † quadraginta milia peditum armati erant

Bardon avoids a solution of this crux. The emendation

elaborated by Foss and modified by Hedicke remains attractive: 'additis equitibus mille Tapuris. Derbices quadraginta peditum milia armaverant'. Asyndeton is a characteristic of this passage; the two names suit the historical context and provide a plausible explanation of the corruption. The Tapyri appear elsewhere in the manuscripts as 'taphiros/is' and 'taurorum' (viii, 4.17 and vi, 5.24), but the Derbices are not mentioned elsewhere and the absence is an argument against the emendation suggested.

The Tapyri are not named in Curtius' list for the battle of Gaugamela, but were included by him in the Caspii commanded by 'Phradates' (iv, 12.9), since Curtius must there be referring to the cavalry squadrons of Tapyri and Hyrcanians whom Arrian put under the command of Phrataphernes (A. iii, 8.4).

The Derbices were neighbours of the Hyrcanians and the Tapyri (Strabo xi, 8.8 514 and 9.1 514). Pomponius Mela iii, 5.39 gives a rather different account of their geographical position setting them closer to the Amardi than the Hyrcanians. Further references are collected by Tomaschek in RE v (1905), s.v. Derbices 237-8.

The Derbices are mentioned neither by Curtius nor by Arrian in their accounts of the battle of Gaugamela. The tribe was certainly referred to by Ctesias (FGH 688, frags. 9 and 43) and Eratosthenes (as can be deduced from Strabo xi, 8.8 513/4). Tales of the customs of the Derbices as of other tribes in that area were well circulated (Strabo xi, 11. 8. 519), and writers such as Onesicritus (Strabo xi, 11.3 517) seized on such sensational material to add spice to their work. Thus it is not surprising to find a late reference to the Derbices, e.g. in Porphyry de abstin. iv, 21 sq., in a passage clearly derived from a history of Alexander (hence Porphyry's reference to Stasanor). Hedicke's reading therefore remains possible.

With more drastic surgery to the text one could include the Mardi rather than the Derbices: they provided Darius with archers at Gaugamela (A. iii, 11.5 cf. C.R. iv, 12.7 and D.S. 59.3; their name is corrupted to 'eardos' at C.R. viii, 4.17).

2.7: pluribus haerebant ferro praefixae hastae

So Bardon. Hedicke follows Voss in emending 'herebant' of the codd. to 'aere aut'.

2.8: A Caspio mari octo milium pedester exercitus..ducenti equites

In the list of Persian contingents at Gaugamela Curtius uses 'Caspia' to refer to Hyrcanians and Tapyri (C.R. iv, 12.9 and cf. note on § 6). In the same list he names several contingents which might have been termed 'Caspia' or 'a Caspio mari': Cadusii, Dahae, Mardi and the tribe known as the Caspia. Furthermore Curtius omits mention in the Gaugamela list of the Albani, another Caspian tribe whom Arrian mentioned (A. iii, 8.4); and Curtius does not refer to the Derbices and Barcani, who appear in the Issus list* and who could have been classified as Caspians (following the usage of Pliny n.h. vi, 39.46; Mela i, 2.12; Strabo xi, 5.8 506 cf. Hermann RE x, s.v. Kaspioi 2272-3; Herodotus' Κάσπιοι (iii, 93) were probably the Kassapiyas of the Lower Pandjab, cf. A. Foucher, Les satrapes orientales de l' empire Achéménide, CRAT '38, 347-9).

Curtius' use of the term 'Caspian' here differs from the usage at iv, 12.9, and the inconsistency may indicate that Curtius employed different sources for the two lists.

2.9: triginta milia Graecorum mercede conducta

Thirty thousand mercenaries was roughly the number which Charidemus in the strategy debate after Memnon's death urged Darius to collect together for a counter-offensive (D.S. 30.3); as the army assembled at Babylon Darius had with him thirty thousand Greeks, as we see from this passage; and at the battle of Issus thirty thousand was the number of mercenaries who saw action (C.R. iii, 9.2). Arrian too speaks of thirty thousand Greek mercenaries as stationed in the front line at Issus, but he goes on to say there were more in the rear (A.ii, 8.6 and 8). The tradition was thus well established that Darius had in his army c. 30,000 Greek mercenaries at the time of the battle of Issus.

This number was reached, however, at a point in time which the sources do not make clear, since they do not tell us precisely when Thymondas reached Darius' camp with the mercenaries whom he brought from Pharnabazus' army. Thymondas was present at the battle of Issus (C.R. iii, 9.2; A. ii, 13.2) which fixes the terminus ante quem, and he had reached Pharnabazus' camp after the fall of Mytilene (A. ii, 1-2.2). Curtius probably found it artistically convenient to list at this point all the units which fought for Darius at Issus (cf. on 3.1).

* in the case of the Derbices the argument depends on how §6 is reconstructed.

Greek mercenaries may have formed the force which the satrap of Egypt, Sabakes, commanded at Issus (refer to note on 11.10 infra). Gaps in Curtius' list of units at Issus would partially account for the discrepancy between Curtius' figures and those given by Arrian and Plutarch (ii, 8.8 and Alex. 18.6), or the lesser gap between Curtius' figures and those given by Diodorus and Justin (31.2 and xi, 9.1 respectively, viz. 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry, though this is not to say that such large figures are historically accurate).

2.9: *egregiae iuventutis*

The mercenaries are the only unit to receive an unqualified word of praise: contrast Curtius' comment on the Hyrcanian cavalry (§ 6). The point is developed in the following speech attributed to Charidemus.

2.9: *Indos ceterosque Rubri maris accolas*

Curtius' phrasology is an aid to the identification of his source for this section. Curtius here, and at iv, 12.9 where the same phrase appears though in a different case, links the nations living close to the Red Sea with the Indians, whereas Aristobulus links them with the Uxii, Babylonians and Sittaceni (A. iii, 8.5). Curtius, furthermore, in the second list mentions the Babylonians separately (iv, 12.10). One may fairly conclude that Curtius followed a source other than Aristobulus on the battles of Issus and Gaugamela.

The obvious way to interpret Curtius is to assume that he refers to the neighbours of the Indians along the coast of the Indian Ocean (the same thing as Curtius' *mare Rubrum* at viii, 9.6). However, Curtius was vague in his usage of this name, for *'mare Rubrum'* meant for him the Persian Gulf too (as at v, 1.15; for other usages of the term by authors of the early Empire, Syme Tacitus ii, Appendix 71), whose *'accolae'* would be tribes to the west of the Carmanians. But nations bordering on the Persian Gulf would not fit Curtius' point that there was too little time for them to be summoned to join Darius' army.

The difficulty of getting reinforcements swiftly from India and other unspecified satrapies is mentioned by D.S. xiv, 22.2.

2.9: ignota etiam ipsi gentium nomina

'Ipsi' refers to Darius, cf. on 1.24.

Cf. ignobiles aliae gentes in § 8 and iv, 12.9; a slur is intended (cf. J. xli, 1.4: vulgus sine nomine, said of the Parthians in the Persian era). Alexander's 'nomen' was a force in war and peace (C.R. v, 13.14 and x, 5.37; cf. J. xlii, 5.12: plusque Caesar magnitudine nominis sui fecit, quam armis facere alius imperator potuisset, but the idea appears too in Velleius, cf. E. Lana: Velleio Patercolo '52 204 sq.).

2. 2-9: Curtius' source for the catalogue of Persian army units

The catalogue of units in the Persian army can be compared with the catalogues given by Curtius and Arrian for the Persian army at Gaugamela (C.R. iv, 12.1 sq.; A. iii, 8.3 sq. and 11.3 sq.), though the cruces in the text especially at 2.6 and 7 impede the analysis. In Curtius' list for Issus certain names occur which do not reappear in his list for Gaugamela: Barcani, Hyrcani and perhaps Tapuri and Derbices; far more names appear in Curtius' list for Gaugamela that do not occur in the Issus list: for example, the Dahae, Arachosii, Susiani, and Massagetae; thirdly many names appear in Curtius' list for Gaugamela which are not to be found in Arrian's lists for the same battle: the Belitae, Gossaoi, Gortuae, Phrygae, Cataonae, and Massagetae; finally a few names appear in Arrian's list for Gaugamela which Curtius' list does not include: Albani, Carians, Sittaceni, Sacae and Sacasinae.

The differences between Curtius' two lists may suggest that he employed different sources (cf. on the Caspian nations, 2.8), but the differences - historical differences discounted - may merely reflect his own vagueness about the geography of Asia, and inadequate attention to detail. Curtius links the Indians with those living by the Red Sea in both lists (cf. on 2.9): his usage provides a link between the two passages and contrasts with Arrian's formulation. Other discrepancies between the lists of Arrian and Curtius for Gaugamela have been noted. The incidence of differences is significant, since Arrian indicates that his source was Aristobulus, who claimed that a Persian document had been seized detailing the line-up of Darius' troops (A. iii, 10.3). It is a priori unlikely that Curtius would have ignored Aristobulus' report on the Persian line-up at Gaugamela and yet have employed him on the battle of Issus: Aristobulus had an authoritative source in the first case.

The totals of the cavalry and infantry units given by Curtius come to 62,200 and 250,000 men respectively: a grand total of 312,200. This figure is well below that given by Arrian (ii, 8.8) and Plutarch (Alex. 18, 6), 600,000. Plutarch's source may have been Aristobulus, whom he quotes both on the Gordian knot and on Alexander's sickness in Tarsus (18, 4 and 19, 2); it may be objected that Arrian introduces the figure with the formula ἐλέγετο and not with a reference to Aristobulus, but it is at least possible that his source was in Aristobulus and that either he disbelieved Aristobulus or Aristobulus gave the figure with a comment that he thought it exaggerated. It is at least highly unlikely that Aristobulus gave figures as low as those offered by Curtius. Furthermore it would seem that Curtius' source was not the same as that followed by Diodorus and Justin since both give the totals as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry (D.S. 31.2 and J. xi, 9.1, though Rühl reads 300,000, cf. Orosius iii, 16.2), and the gap would not be closed by the addition of the 65,000 men mentioned in c. 3.

Even the low figures given by Curtius should be regarded as higher than the historical reality, and Curtius himself gives lower figures for Gauganela, 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry (iv, 12.13). However this need not suggest that the Issus catalogue is pure fiction (Kroll Studien 339 described this section as 'Phantasie').

The Herodotean associations at § 2 and in the following scene between Darius and Charidemus are of little help in determining Curtius' source as the influence of Herodotus was a general characteristic of histories of Alexander long before Curtius wrote (cf. Jacoby FGH Callisthenes F. 38; Pearson (1) 118 sq. on Nearchus' imitation of Herodotus, and p. 8 sq. for Alexander's own knowledge of Herodotus; cf. H.U. Instinsky Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont '49), and Curtius was no doubt capable of importing ideas picked up in his own reading of Herodotus (cf. Pearson (1) 218-9 on the links between C.R. v, 7.2 sq. and Hdt. v, 18-20; it may be added that the Herodotean echoes in v, 7.8 are sandwiched between a Roman formulation - unde tot gentes antea iura petebant - and a reference in § 9 to the Parthian empire in Curtius' day).

2.10-19: The clash between Charidemus and Darius

The composition of this passage is discussed on p. 67 and in the following note.

2.10: purpuratis solita vanitate spem eius inflantibus

The weakness of Darius' Persian advisers is contrasted with

the courageous independent stand taken by Charidemus. Curtius is working with ideas that were commonplace in the early principate: the 'purpurati' illustrate what the Senate should not be, whilst Charidemus symbolises 'libertas', without which the Senate would be meaningless (cf. *infra* on 'libertas' §18).

It seems that Curtius altered the story to introduce this antithesis, for Diodorus, by contrast, gives an important rôle to the Persian nobles, who favoured a strategy different from that advocated by Charidemus and could justify their plan: they opposed Charidemus' strategy and were suspicious of his motives (D.S. 30.1 sq.). Curtius could have reduced the part of the Persians to feeble acquiescence in order to heighten the dramatic effect of the clash between Darius and Charidemus. However Curtius consistently portrays the Persian nobles as unable to serve Darius as an advisory council should: in c. 8 they counsel the execution of the Greek advisers when Darius knows he must spare them (Prof. Badian drew my attention to the parallel cases in Rome: for instance when Tiberius 'saved' Lucius Ennius from trial on a 'maiestas' charge when the Senate demanded it: Tac. Ann. iii, 70), and after the battle of Gaugamela the nobles again differ from Darius, but his plan prevails, 'sive confirmatis eorum (sc. purpuratorum) animis sive imperium magis quam consilium sequentibus' (v, 1.9). Similarly in dealing with Bessus' followers Curtius ridicules their support of Bessus: graves mero (vii, 4.2) and temulentis (4.7), they exaggerated their own strength and mocked Alexander's cowardice and the smallness of his army.

Curtius' revision of the tale provides a peg for a pet idea of his; for Curtius frequently attacks flatterers and time-servers, put neatly at viii, 5.6: *perniciosa adulatio ... perpetuum malum regum* (cf. iv, 5.11 and 7.31; viii, 8.21 and x, 1.25 sq., cf. E.I. McQueen, Curtius Rufus p. 25 and nn. 16 and 17); but condemnation of flattery was practically a convention in the period of the early Empire, vide e.g. Pliny Panegyricus 41, 3, 54.1. Similar condemnation appears in Arrian's explanation of Darius' misguided decision to move from Sochi into Cilicia: Darius was encouraged ὑπὸ τῶν καθ' ἡδονὴν ξυνόντων τε καὶ ξυνεσομένων ἐπὶ κακῶ τοῖς δὲ βασιλεύουσιν (ii, 6. 4).

Finally as Curtius separated Charidemus' clash with Darius from Darius' decision to lead the army in person against Alexander (*supra* ad §-1), the rearrangement of the material shifts the focus from strategic and political issues (D.S. 30. 2-4), to the differences

between the two cultures, Graeco-Macedonian and Persian. Thus Charidemus is contrasted with the Persian nobles, and Charidemus compares the vulgar opulence of the Persian troops with the rugged qualities of the European forces. Curtius' racial sensitivity was fairly sharp: a common Roman weakness (cf. e.g. C.R. v, 1.36 sq.; vi, 2.2; vii, 8.10; viii, 2.19; 4.23; 9.31; 13.7; x, 5.33; 10.11). Seen in this light Curtius' criticism of the 'vanitas' of the Persian nobles is an element in his general judgement on the Persians.

2.10: Charidemum Atheniensen, belli peritum

Cf. D.S. 30.2. Charidemus came from Oreus in Euboea (Aelian v.h. ii, 41) and was granted Athenian citizenship (e.g. Dem. xxiii, 65. 641) for his services to Athens as commander of mercenaries (hypotheses to Demosthenes' speech (xxiii) against Aristocrates). It is difficult to establish the details of his career from the meagre evidence: the references are collected by Berve ii, no. 823, to which one may add the fragment of Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ann. 9 (Schol. Demosth. 2, 1 = Jacoby FGH 328 Frag. 50), and PA no.15380.

2.10: ob exilium infestum Alexandro, quippe Athenis iubente eo fuerat expulsus

Charidemus was amongst those whose expulsion from Athens Alexander required as the price for a settlement after the fall of Thebes (Plut. Dem. 23, A. i, 10.4). The Athenians negotiated for the release of these men from this penalty and Alexander conceded the point except in the case of Charidemus who was exiled from Athens (A. i, 10.6). The significance of the exile of Charidemus is discussed in Appendix B.

2.10: percontari coepit, satisne ei videretur instructus ad obterendum hostem

As we have seen, Curtius' version of the confrontation between Charidemus and Darius is different on many points from that of Diodorus' account. The very fact that the two versions are so different has been used as an argument for rejecting the whole episode as the product of imaginative writing, so Niese i, 71.7. Niese's argument has been queried (e.g. Kaerst 361 n.1, Beloch Griech. Gesch. iii, 1 619. 2; Berve ii, no. 823) but the whole question has been only slightly covered. Niese argued too that Charidemus is the stock character who offers sound but unheard advice (cf. Treves Athen.

'33 118 comparing the anecdote of Demades' exchange with Agis presumably in ^{the} context of the war in 331: Plut. Mor. 191 E and Lyc. 19.4). It is true that Curtius' account has much in common with Herodotus' account of Demaratus' conversation with Xerxes on the relative merits of Greek and Persian troops (Hdt. vii, 101 sq.), but Diodorus' account is totally dissimilar from Herodotus'. In any case literary elaboration is not an argument against the historicity of the episode itself.

Niese suggested that the tale may have been elaborated upon the basis of the later episode when Amyntas offered advice on strategy in the period before the battle of Issus (A. i, 6.3 sq; C.R. iii, 8.1 sq; Plut. Alex. 20, 1-4). Niese took the latter episode as historical, and saw the tale of Charidemus' clash with Darius as a doublet of it. The historicity of Amyntas' advice is suggested, presumably, by the reputation of the sources, Arrian and Plutarch; the tale could have been picked up from prisoners of war taken at Issus or from men from Amyntas' company which escaped to Egypt.

As for the Charidemus episode, Diodorus records it but not Amyntas' advice to Darius, whilst Arrian and Plutarch give only the latter tale. Whilst this could mean that Diodorus' source rehashed in a different context the tale related by Arrian's and Plutarch's sources, yet the fact remains that Charidemus went to the Persian court, is not heard of again after 333 B.C. and Dinarchus says (i,32) that his mission ended in failure. It is, in other words, attested that Charidemus fell foul of Darius.

2.11: verum, inquit, et tu forsitan audire nolis et ego, nisi nunc dixerō, alias nequiquam confitebor

The speech attributed to Charidemus opens with this 'captatio benevolentiae', cf. v, 9.3 (Helmreich Reden 207 sq.: he notes that the speech has elements both of the γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν and of the γένος συμβουλευτικόν). Similar phrases occur in the Herodotean model for this passage: Hdt. vii, 102 and 104.

2.13: immobiles cuneos peditum stabile agmen

Cf. Livy ix, 19.8: statarius uterque miles, ordines servans; sed illa phalanx immobilis etc. Curtius describes a phalanx at iv, 15.15.

2.13: ordines servare didicerunt

The reference to military training points out the contrast between the two armies and this theme is carried back into Curtius' preface to the review of the Persian army (cf. supra on § 2; on disciplina militaris as a 'virtue' that explained the rise and survival of the Roman empire see A. Neumann RE Supplbd. x, '65 esp. 175 sq., who refers for example to Val. Max. ii, 7).

2.14: obsistere callent

'Callere' with the infinitive is elsewhere a poetic and in prose a post-classical construction, as Vergés noted.

2.15: ne auri argentique studio teneri putes

cf. τῆ Ἑλλάδι πενήτη μὲν αἰεὶ κοτε σύντροφος ἔσται: Hdt. vii, 102, a parallel noted by Kaerst 361 n. 1. Compare too Plut. Mor. 332 A.

2.15: illa disciplina paupertate magistra stetit

'Disciplina' is a theme of this chapter, cf. supra on 2 and 13.

2.15: cibus quem occupati parant

Bardon here follows the codd.; Paladini (Latomus xx, '61 392) suggested the emendation 'occupaverunt' for 'occupati parant', explaining that 'parare' crept in through natural association with 'cibus'.

2.16: invicta bello manus

Steele saw as a parallel to this phrase Vergil's expression 'invicta bello dextera' (Aen. vi, 878-9; Steele-[1]410).

2.16: in illa terra quae hos genuit auxilia quaerenda sunt

Curtius has already said that Darius had in his army at this time some 30,000 Greek mercenaries. The general advice here offered to Darius differs from that offered by Charidemus in Diodorus' account, where Charidemus advocates as immediate strategy the despatch to the West of an army of which a third should be Greek mercenaries (D.S. 30. 2-3).

Curtius thus contradicts himself and attributes to Charidemus advice that would have seemed at best naïve. Curtius has not seriously considered the strategic issues.

2.17: erat Dareo mite ac tractabile ingenium, nisi etiam naturam plerumque fortuna corrumperet

Curtius repeats the comment that Darius was of mild disposition at 8.5 and v, 10.14. But Darius was corrupted by 'fortuna' and this behaved as a 'superbus' man (cf. 5.12; iv, 1.7). Curtius uses the commonplace of the corruptive power of success to describe the contradictions in Alexander's character too (this is foreshadowed for example at 12.19).

Tarn believed that Curtius followed what he termed 'the mercenaries' source' and so whitewashed Darius but his thesis on 'the mercenaries' source' has been undermined (e.g. by P.A. Brunt, (2) 141 sq.).

2.18: ille ne tum quidem libertatis oblitus

his phrase should be considered alongside Diodorus' comment that Charidemus fell διὰ παραρησῖαν ἄκατον (30.5). Diodorus' phrase makes it likely that Curtius here picked up an idea in his source, but Curtius gave it Roman colouring by using the term 'libertas', instead of periphrases such as 'libere loqui' 'libera oratione' which more closely translate παραρησῖα (Cic. ad fam. ix, 16.3 and iv, 14.1 cited by Gh. Wirszubski, Libertas as a political idea at Rome Cambridge, '50 p. 89 n.6).

'Libertas' in extant literature of the early Empire emerges as a term in the vocabulary of emperors' critics from the senatorial class. Curtius was no revolutionary: he did not attack the 'purpurati' as members of an institution which was by its very existence a barrier to a free society. He criticised them rather for their failure to play their proper rôle, and he criticised Darius for failing to allow his nobles freedom to advise and criticize. For senators in the early Empire 'libertas' became synonymous with the assertion of the Senate's rights (cf. Wirszubski, p. 138). This Roman political idea seems to shine through Curtius' passage, since Charidemus as a conscientious and honest councillor warns Darius of the consequences of ignoring advice (consilii mei sprete) and tells him that he has been corrupted by power (licentia regni tam subito mutatus), cf. note ad loc. Darius' rejection of Charidemus' advice is symptomatic of his decision to rule in a despotic fashion, and that is a negation of 'libertas' (it may be added that Claudius was the first emperor after Augustus to advertise on his coins, Libertas Augusta, and that on coins minted in 41-2 [C.H.V. Sutherland Coinage

in Roman Imperial Policy 133 and pl. xiv,3 cf. Dio lx, 3.5 and Smallwood Documents nos. 45 and 367]. Thus if Curtius did write or revise his Histories early in Claudius' reign, he was in tune with the emperor's thinking).

Another connotation of 'libertas' was more personal, meaning the courage of an individual to think and speak out and to resist passive acceptance of authoritarian government: thus Tacitus wrote, 'libertas Thraseae servitium aliorum rupit' (Ann. xiv, 49.1) and reported a statement made by Seneca to the effect that 'nec sibi promptum in adulationes ingenium. Idque nulli magis gnarum quam Neroni, qui saepius libertatem Senecae quam servitium expertus esset' (Ann. xv, 61.3; cf. Wirszubski, op cit. 164-5). However it was recognised that such 'libertas' was a political skill that required judgement and tact, for as Tacitus observed, 'malignitati falsa species libertatis inest' (hist. i, 1). Thus it merits attention that Curtius does not criticize Charidemus as Diodorus does in the epithet ἀκαίρον (30.5; Curtius comes near to this in the phrase 'suae sortis et regiae superbiae oblitus', § 11, but this appears at an earlier stage in the story), nor does he have Charidemus lose his temper and indulge in abuse: contrast D.S. 30.4: παροργισθείς καὶ προχειρότερον ὄνειδίσας. In Diodorus' story both Darius and Charidemus are at fault, whilst Curtius presents a simple conflict between 'libertas' and tyranny.

2.18: habeo, inquit, paratum mortis meae ultorem

Curtius makes much of the dramatic irony in the tale. Charidemus, who had reason to hate Alexander (ob exilium infestum Alexandro), looked to Alexander to avenge his execution (habeo .. paratum mortis meae ultorem), and he predicted, 'expetet poenas consilii mei' spreti is ipse, contra quem tibi suasi'. Curtius was attracted by the irony of the situation in which a man was killed for offering advice that turned out to be valid.

2.18: licentia regni tam subito mutatus

Again Curtius appears to reflect political ideas expressed in his own day. Seneca recognised the absoluteness of an emperor's power but expected this to be controlled by the emperor's sense of responsibility:

Caesari quoque ipsi, cui omnia licent, propter hoc ipsum multa non licent (ad Polybium 7,2); non enim quantum fecerit, sed quantum facturus sit, cogitatur in eo, qui omnia potest (de clem. i, 8.5).

* Bardon inverts the order and reads 'mei consilii'

These two passages are considered by Wirszubski, Libertas p. 135, together with i.a. the remark attributed to Caligula:

memento .. omnia mihi et in omnis licere (Suet.Cal. 29).

2.18: homines quum se permisere fortunae, etiam naturam dediscere

The corruptive force of fortune was a common motif in Classical Greek, Hellenistic and Roman Literature but the idea became particularly popular in the late Republic and early Empire and served to explain why a state or an individual could crash from great success to ruin. Thus Seneca in the first choral ode in the Agamemnon couples with the Hellenistic commonplace of the fickleness of fortune (vv. 57-8, 71-2, 101-2) the development that success carries with it the seeds of disaster:

Licet arma vacent cessentque doli,
sidunt ipso pondere magna
ceditque oneri Fortuna suo (87-9);

cf. Horace Epod. xvi, 2, Propertius iii, 13.60, Lucan i, 67 sq., esp. 81 and E. Lefèvre, Schicksal u. Selbstverschuldung in Seneca's 'Agamemnon', Hermes xciv, '66 482 sq.

It is worth adding that Seneca goes on with an exchange between Clytaemnestra and the nurse:

G. ubi animus errat, optimum est casum sequi.

N. Caeca est temeritas quae petit casum ducom. (144-5)

Here the nurse advised Clytaemnestra against the use of violence, that is against assassination. The antithesis, therefore, between 'animus' and 'casus' or 'natura' and 'fortuna' need not be necessarily linked with advice to those in power; the matter concerned others no less. Curtius was careful to generalize his point hence his use of 'the word 'homines'.

2. 10-19: Curtius' source on the clash between Darius and Charidemus

It has been argued that whilst Plutarch and Arrian omitted this story, and Charidemus' fall may have been confused with a story of friction between Darius and his mercenary commanders before Issus (cf. on c.8), nevertheless there must have been a kernel of truth behind the tale about Charidemus and Darius (D.S. is surely wrong to attribute to Charidemus service under Philip [30.2]: either Diodorus was careless or his source was ill-informed about his record). The tale must have originated, if it is substantially correct, from

someone who was in the Persian capital before Darius assembled his army in Babylon. News of Charidemus' failure to gain anything of value for Athens leaked to Athens; as is apparent from Dinarchus' comment (i, 32). Dinarchus; however; was not concerned to lionize Charidemus' part in the Persian court; and this may explain why Ptolomy, Aristobulus and Callisthenes too were little interested in the tale (had any of these sources related the episode it might have appeared in Plutarch's or Arrian's work). It took an historian with some imagination to see how Charidemus could be built into the story of Alexander's advance into the Persian Empire.

The differences between the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius are basically compositional and Curtius adds much colouring from the political commonplaces of his own day; thus it cannot be proved that Curtius followed a source different from that which Diodorus used, nor yet can it be proved that they followed the same source. However it is likely that Diodorus' adoption of the tale prompted Curtius to follow suit.

3.1: Darius arranges for the transfer of the mercenaries from his army in the Aegean to his own camp

3.1: Thimodes erat, Mentoris filius

The codd. have Thimodes here and at 8.1, but at 9.2 P differs from the other mss. in reading Thymodes. Thimodes has been retained by Bardon, though most editors have been tempted to correct it to Thymondas (the form given by A. ii, 13.2 and IG ii, ²356). Curtius' source perhaps read Θυμῶδες which would have been an acceptable variant for Thymondas (Castiglioni SIFC xix, '12 128-9 comparing the variants Ἡρώνας - Ἡρώδες).

Mentor's brother was Memnon of Rhodes and they were brothers-in-law of Artabazus (D.S. xvi, 52. 3-4). Artabazus' son, Pharnabazus, was thus a nephew of Memnon (cf. A. ii, 1.3) and Thymondas was a cousin of Pharnabazus (on the family tree Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2 145-151; Berve ii, no. 380 on Thymondas, followed by Schwahn RE 2. Reihe vi A ('37) 716-7).

Curtius rarely cites patronymics and he clearly copied the name of Thymondas' father from his source, but if the fact had any significance for him he obscured it in his narrative. There was a risk that Pharnabazus might refuse to hand over his force of mercenaries, and Darius presumably calculated that Pharnabazus would be more likely to comply with the order if a relative was the intermediary.

Another member of the family is known to us from an Athenian inscription which records a decree in honour of a Memnon and is dated to the fourth prytany of 327/6 B.C. (IG ii² 356). Beloch posited that this Memnon was Thymondas' son, but, as Badian has noted, the inscription records Memnon's own achievements in some eleven lines each of 20 letters, so that he must have been old enough to have established a name for himself (Badian [5] 180 n.3). Berve's theory that the Memnon of the inscription was the son of Memnon of Rhodes (Berve ii, no 498) might be discarded for the same reason,[†] and in any case one should reject Berve's suggestion that the Athenian decree honoured a son of Barsine, Memnon's widow, to commemorate her giving birth to a son by Alexander: this Barsine was not the one whom Alexander married (cf. Tarn ii, 330 sq. cf. on § 23 infra). Badian has probably solved the problem with his theory that Memnon was a relative of the famous Memnon of Rhodes, possibly a son of Artabazus (cf. D.S. xvi, 52.3), who was left behind in Macedon when Memnon of

+ Memnon of Rhodes was born c. 380 B.C.

Rhodes and Artabazus left Philip's court. For a period he was loyal and Alexander left him in Europe as governor of Thrace, where Antipater could keep an eye on him. In 331 Memnon rose in revolt against Antipater (D.S. 62.4 sq.), no doubt in collusion with Agis, but abandoned his plans as Antipater turned his full army against him. He was nevertheless left as governor of Thrace till some time in 327/6 when he was ordered to join Alexander with reinforcements. His passage through Athens is indicated by IG ii² 356 and his arrival in Alexander's camp can be dated to the autumn of 326 on the strength of C.R. ix, 3.21 (Badian [5] 179-180).

The Athenian inscription carefully recalls the links between Memnon's family and Persian officials. The decree recorded the services to Athens of Memnon's forbears, Pharnabazus and Artabazus. Mentor was mentioned in the decree for his services when he saved the Greeks who were fighting in Egypt at the time when it fell into Persian hands (D.S. xvi, 42 sq. Kahrstedt [RE xv, '32 964 s.v. Mentor (6)] set the subjugation of Egypt in 343 B.C., cf. Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii 2, 284 sq.). Both at Sidon and subsequently at Bubastus in Egypt, Mentor played his cards to spare the lives of Greeks (D.S. xvi, 45 and 47-50).

Thymondas, therefore, belonged to a family which belonged politically to the Persian Empire, but which had strong ties with the Greek world.

3.1: iuvenis

Thymondas, Berve suggested (ii, no. 380), was c.22 at this time. However, his father, Mentor, is first recorded as involved against Autophredates in the Satraps' Revolt in 362 (Dem. xxiii, 154 and 157; D.S. xv, 90. 1 sq.). His son Thymondas could therefore have been at least as old as 30 in 333. A man of mature age would have found it easier to persuade Pharnabazus to surrender his Greek troops. Further Curtius clearly uses the term 'iuniores' at iv, 2.12 in the Roman sense of men eligible for military service, that is of the age group 17-40 (though see on § 10 infra).

3.1: cui praeceptum est a rege, ut omnes peregrinos milites ...
a Pharnabazo acciperet

Curtius' arrangement of his material is misleading (cf. supra note to 2. 9, triginta milia Graecorum), since Darius probably issued the order to Thymondas soon after Memnon's death. He could hardly have delayed taking a decision on finding a replacement for

for Memnon as Commander in Chief of Persian forces in the Aegean. Curtius and Arrian both link Thymondas' mission with the commissioning of Pharnabazus (A. ii, 2.1).

Curtius' reference to Thymondas' commission is picked up *infra* at 9.2 where Thymondas is cited as the commander of the mercenaries at Issus.

The report that Darius ordered Thymondas to bring him this force of mercenaries after Memnon's death seems to conflict with the earlier record that thirty thousand Greek mercenaries were included in Darius' expeditionary force (iii, 2.9). Furthermore Charidemus' advice to Darius to collect mercenaries (2.16) and his criticism of Darius' present forces makes more sense if Darius had no mercenaries with him at the time. Brunt argued from this that Curtius followed different sources for 2.9 and 3.1 (Brunt [2] 155). It can be added that in Curtius' version of Charidemus' advice, Charidemus advocates the enlistment of Greeks, rather than the transfer to the eastern zone of the Greek mercenaries or the employment of mercenaries already with Darius for a special mission (2.16; these alternatives are closer to Diodorus' version of Charidemus' advice: 30.3). In other words Curtius did not explicitly relate the two references to Greeks.

However, Brunt's conclusion is not inescapable, for Curtius' phraseology at 2.9, *his copiis triginta milia Graecorum mercede conducta .. adiecta*, is imprecise and may mean that these mercenaries joined Darius later. Certain units were with Darius in Babylon, mercenaries were added to his army but other units could not be called up in time. This interpretation is allowed by the Latin, and whilst the charge of lack of clarity may remain, the charge is not proven that Curtius followed different sources into contradiction. Further, as has been stated, the explanation may simply be that Curtius set the catalogue earlier than it appeared in the narrative of his source.

Diodorus fails to mention Thymondas and the transfer of the mercenaries to the eastern zone and their part in the battle of Issus, which is a point against Tam's thesis that Diodorus was heavily dependent on the Mercenaries' Source (cf. Brunt [2] 150). The information was generally available, as Arrian shows (ii, 2.1).

3.1: *in quis plurimum habebat spei*

Cf. 8.1: it is a motif running through this book, although the inclusion of the Charidemus episode produces a contradiction which

Curtius tries to resolve in the phrase 'vera dixisse confessus' in 2.19.

3.1: opera eorum usurus in bello

So read the codd. although the subject of 'usurus' must be Darius, and grammatically this participle should be in the Ablative case in agreement with 'a rege'. Lindgren supports the constructio ad sensum of the mss. reading because it gives a better, more typically Curtian clausula than the conjecture 'usurum se in bello' (Studia Curtiana 80-1; Steele [1] 404 assumed the conjecture to be the correct reading and used it as an example of Curtius' adoption of Livy's stylistic quirks). Prof. Badian suggests that one might put a full stop before 'opera' and a comma after 'bello'.

Rolfe took 'usurus' to agree with Thymondas, but whilst Curtius does perhaps exaggerate Thymondas' role in the ensuing battle (cf. 9.2), Curtius could not have imagined, as Rolfe's interpretation suggests, that Thymondas was to operate independently. Arrian makes it plain that Thymondas' commission was initially limited to conducting the mercenaries to Darius' camp (ἀνάγοντα παρὰ βασιλέα κτλ. ii, 2.1).

3.1: ipsi Pharnabazo tradit imperium, quod ante Memnoni dederat

Compare Arrian's statement: Pharnabazus' commission was ἄρχειν ὅσων Μέμνων ἦρχε (ii, 2.1). Arrian does not say whether Pharnabazus was to continue in readiness to carry the war over into Greece. The evidence, as we have seen, shows that Pharnabazus was to play a lesser rôle in the war than Memnon had done.

3.2-7: Darius' dream

3.2: anxium de instantibus curis agitabant etiam per somnum species imminentium rerum

The story of Darius' dream is given only by Curtius and Plutarch (Alex. 18), but the differences between the two versions are numerous (cf. notes to § 3 sq.): some being substantive, others due to the individuality of the writers concerned. In the passage under discussion Curtius describes Darius' state of mind: he was very anxious. Plutarch offers no such information, but Curtius' comment was probably the fruit of his own interest in psychology, rather than something culled from his source. Curtius' fondness for psychological observations is exemplified for instance at iv, 10.7; 10.10; 16.17; v, 4.31; 12.13; and ix, 7. 23-26.

It may be added that Curtius' interest in psychology should be considered in the context of Latin rhetoric in which much store was set by the ability to describe the emotions, or to adopt emotional poses (cf. W.S. Anderson, Anger in Juvenal and Seneca University of California Publ. in Class Philol. xix, 3 '64; B.F. Dick, Seneca and Juvonal X HSCP 73, '69 esp. p. 237).

In reading 'de' Bardon follows the codd., whilst Hedicke proposed the emendation de <inde>. However asyndeton is not infrequent in Curtius' work and ^{one might} follow Castiglioni in excising 'de' as an accretion resulting from the preceding 'dederat' (SIFC xix, '12 129-130).

3.2: sive illas aegritudo, sive divinatio animi praesagientis accersit

The first alternative adds to the psychological description of Darius; the latter accommodates the reader for whom omens are of religious significance (cf. iv, 15.26). Curtius implies that he was sceptical of the value of dreams as a source of divine revelation, and as the Stoics firmly believed in omens and dreams Curtius was questioning a Stoic tenet (which shows his open-mindedness according to E.I. McQueen, Curtius Rufus p. 33). Elsewhere Curtius expresses more direct criticism of the interpreters of omens (vii, 7.8).

3.3: castra Alexandri

Plutarch has by contrast, τὴν Μακεδόνων φάλαγγα (Alex. 18, 7).

3.3: in eo vestis habitu, quo ipse fuisset

Bardon here follows the codd., but there seems to have been a lacuna either before or after 'fuisset'. Müller following an earlier conjecture inserts 'quondam' after 'ipse', and Hedicke suggested: quo ipse factus rex fuisset. Hedicke's emendation is unlikely in view of the following reference to 'vulgari habitu' in § 4, and it does not explain how the error arose. Prof. Badian has suggested the addition of 'cum rex appellatus esset' after 'fuisset', repeating the formula of § 5; the omission would then be attributed to homoeoteleuton.

3.3: equo deinde per Babylona vectus

Plutarch does not mention that Alexander appeared on horseback, and instead of Babylon Plutarch refers to Alexander entering the temple of Baal.

Müller prefers the reading of the inferior mss., *Babyloniam*, as it produces a neat clausula, but the one given is acceptable.

3.4: in persico et vulgari habitu

In implying that Darius came to the throne from a humble position Curtius is at variance with the facts, at least as given by D.S. 5.3 sq., J. x, 3.3 sq., and Strabo xv, 3 24 736 (who says simply that Darius was not of a royal family), and this may indicate that Curtius knew Plutarch's source since Plutarch too gives a lowly origin to Darius, saying that he was a royal courier, ἀσπασθης, before he was called to be king (Alex. 18, 7 see Hamilton's note ad loc.). However the term ἀσπασθης is repeated by Plutarch in his essays de fort. aut virtute Alexandri 326 F and 340 B, and it may have been a commonplace in rhetorical exercises (cf. the myth of Marius' rise from 'rags to riches' in Valerius Maximus, T.F. Carney RhM cv, '62 esp. 294-5).

A similar tale appears in Bk.4 where Abdalonymus exchanges his 'squalor' for 'regiae vestis insignibus' (iv, 1.22) and later in this book Curtius shows the inanity of the splendour of Persian costumes (11.11 and 13.7).

3.5: quod vel regnum Asiae occupaturus esset, haud ambiguae rei

Bardon's emendation is acceptable; the codd. have: quodve regnum Asiae occupare habuisset haud ambiguae rei. Hedicke proposed: cui vel regnum Asiae occupare fatum esse, haud ambigue doceri; Müller proposed a more drastic change, involving a change of the word order: quod vestem Persicam habuisset, haud ambigue regnum Asiae occupaturum denuntiare. Prof. Badian suggested to me that a lacuna might be marked between 'occupare' and 'habuisset' to be filled perhaps by 'destinatum' (cf. 'habere' with the participle 'paratas' and gerundive phrase in v, 9.5).

3.6: vaginam acinacis Persioam

On the Persian scimitar see on § 18. Plutarch makes no mention of this detail.

3.6: Chaldaeos interpretatos

Plutarch says the interpreters were Magi (Alex. 18, 6). The Magi appear in Herodotus' work as interpreters of dreams (e.g. i, 107 and 108 and iii, 19), though this was only one of their minor functions. Dinon recorded an interpretation offered by the Magi to Cyrus: they predicted that he would rule for thirty years (Cic.

de divin. i, 23. 46; possibly an ex eventu concoction but as Cyrus became king at the age of 40 such a prophecy would not have been undiplomatic; contrast Plut. Alex. 18, 8 discussed below).

3.7: admodum laetus

This phrase recalls the introduction to Charidemus' criticism of Darius' confidence in his army (2.10), and serves to introduce a passage in which the point made by Charidemus is underlined.

3.7: castra ad Euphraten movere iubet

Curtius picks up the reference to Darius' advance to the Euphrates at 7.1.

3.2-7: Curtius source for the tale of Darius' dream

An item lacking in Curtius' account that appears in Plutarch's is an ex eventu interpretation relating to the brevity of Alexander's rule in Asia. The critical phrase in Plutarch's account reads: ταχὺ δὲ σὺν δόξῃ τὸν βίον ἀπολείψειν (18, 8) which was taken by Schwartz and others to indicate that Callisthenes was not Plutarch's source, since it refers to Alexander's untimely death (Schwartz RE iv, 1876 cf. Bardon [3] 127). However Plutarch may have tacked on the ex eventu interpretation himself (cf. Hamilton ad loc.), or one could argue that the ex eventu interpretation of the dream, that Alexander would be victorious but would not live long to enjoy his success, belongs rather to the theme of declamations, de varietate fortunae (on which cf. S.F. Bonner, Lucan and the declamation schools, AJP lxxxvii, '66 esp. 273-275). It is perhaps significant that Darius' position before he became king is given as royal courier (ἀσπιδόνης) both in the ex eventu interpretation of Darius' dream and in two places in Plutarch's essays de fort. aut virtute Alexandri (326 F and 340 B), cf. on § 4. With either of these explanations the case for excluding Callisthenes fails, though it is unlikely on other grounds that Callisthenes was Plutarch's source for this story.

On the other hand there are grounds for believing that Aristobulus may have been Plutarch's source: Aristobulus is quoted earlier in chapter 18 (at § 4) and is used again on the next episode, Alexander's sickness in Cilicia (Alex. 19.2: νόσων ἦν οἱ μὲν ἐκ κόπων .. προσπεσεῖν λέγουσι, cf. A. ii, 4.7 quoting Aristobulus). Further, Plutarch's source described Magi as

the interpreters of Darius' dream, and Aristobulus came into contact with Magi at the time when he was commissioned to restore Cyrus' tomb (A. vi, 29. 9-11). Both episodes show the Magi as supporters of resistance to Alexander.

One may add that, if Aristobulus was Plutarch's source on Darius' dream, Curtius' source was not Aristobulus; the differences between the two accounts are numerous. Then in the next major episode, Alexander's sickness at Tarsus, it is clear that Curtius' source was again not Aristobulus.

3.8-25: the Persian army in procession

This lengthy passage on the Persian army may be described as a digression since the details of Darius' marching column which he selects for comment are not strictly relevant to the narrative of Alexander's campaigns, and furthermore much of the detail is antiquarian, having to do with Persian customs.

Curtius' reason for drawing in details about the Persian army on the move is suggested by what has been observed in the previous chapter: Curtius was concerned to contrast the opulence and vanity of the Persian court and army with the rugged qualities of Alexander's army. Further Curtius had apparently read Herodotus and this is reflected here.

3.8: *patrio more Persarum traditum est orto sole demum procedere*

The Persian practice of waiting for the sun to rise before commencing the day's march (cf. Hdt. vii, 54) was a product of religious belief. Religion dictated that they should act only under the view of the Sun (cf. for a later example Fr. Spiegel Iranische Alterthumskunde, ii, Leipzig 1873, 69). Curtius represents the matter unfairly, if the implication behind 'demum' and the following phrase 'die iam inlustris' (cf. iv, 13.17 sq.) is that the Persians lacked the Macedonian eagerness and efficiency.

The phrase 'patrio more' is used of other Persian customs at 8.12 and iv, 10.23; 14. 26.

3.8: *imago solis crystallo inclusa*

The image of the sun may have served a double purpose, as a military signal (cf. C.R. v, 2.7) and as a religious symbol.

3.9: ignis quem ipsi sacrum et aeternum vocabant, argenteis altaribus praeferebatur

Cf. iv, 14.24 and D.S. 114. 4. Xenophon described a Persian procession in which men carried fire on a great altar (Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3. 12) but this description, like Strabo's record of his own observations (xv, 3. 15 733), differs on many points of detail from Curtius' account (cf. Ritter Diadem 12, who argues that Curtius' digression on Persian costumes could not be based on Xenophon's account, pace E. Neuffer Das Kostüm Alexanders, Giessen '29 31). Pictorial representations of fire-altars can be seen in the reliefs on royal tombs at Persepolis (Herzfeld Iran 263 and pl. 74 and F. Sarre Die Kunst des alten Persien, '22 plates 33-5; for the later development of this type of altar cf. R. Naumann, Sasanidische Feueraltäre IA vii, '67 72 sq. On the vexed question of the fixed fire-altars see D. Stronach, The Kūh-i-shahrak Fire Altar JNES xxiv, '66 217 sq.).

In calling the fire 'eternal' Curtius may have copied a source which confused this fire, which could be extinguished (cf. D.S. 114. 4), with the Bahram (cf. Strabo's πῦρ ἄσβεστον xv, 3.15 733) which was not extinguishable (M. Dieulafoy, L' Acropole de Suse 1890 sq., 396sq.), though he could simply mean that the Persians described fire as such as sacred and eternal.

3.9: Magi proximi patrium carmen canebant

Cf. v, 1.22 and Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3. 11.

The Magi's prime function was sacral rather than doctrinal (C. Glemen RE xiv, '30 s.v. Μάγος 509 sq.). Curtius distinguishes between Magi and Chaldaeans at v, 1.22; the Chaldaeans are mentioned alone at § 6 supra and x, 10.13.

3.10: trecenti et sexaginta quinque iuvenes

Strabo gives an account of the training given to Persians from the age of five to twentyfour and it included religious education (xv, 3.18 733, cf. Plato Alcib. 121 E sq.), and, if one can trust Xenophon, young Persians entered the class of ἑφηβοί at the age of sixteen or seventeen and remained in this group for ten years (Cyrop. 1, 2. 8-9). Plato puts the transition to the second stage at the age of fourteen (Alcib. 121 E).

The three hundred and sixtyfive young men may then have been

novices and it would seem that their function was sacral rather than martial. In this event the connotation of 'iuvenes' must be different from that of 'iuvenis' in § 1 and at iv, 2.12; a parallel for the usage in 3.10 can be found in the reference to Polydamas' brothers at vii, 2.12: iuvenes et regi ignotos ob aetatem.

An élite corps of young men can perhaps be found in the record that sons of Persian nobles were trained at the Palace (Xen. An. 1, 9.3): they no doubt formed thereby a special identifiable class corresponding to the βασιλικοὶ παῖδες in Macedonian Society (A. iv, 13.1) or the σύντροφοὶ of Hellenistic states (cf. G. Corradi Studi Ellenistici Torino '29 269 sq.).

3.10: diebus totius anni pares numero: quippe Persis quoque in totidem dies discriptus est annus

The reference to Roman practice indicated by the 'quoque' determines the emendation of the number of 'iuvenes', where the codd. offer 'trecenti'.

Dion apparently gave the length of the Persian year as 360 days (Plut. Artax. 27 ; for Plutarch's extensive use of Dion for this biography cf. Ed. Meyer Gesch. des Altertums iv, ⁴ '44 p. 9). Cleitarchus and also some of the men who crossed into Asia with Alexander stated that the Persian year was of 365 days (D.S. ii, 7.3; cf. Pearson (1) 221 and 226). This is of little help in identifying Curtius' source, and in any case the detail about the 'iuvenes' may be true and not just the importation of some historian with an obsession about the number 365. See further on § 24.

3.11: currum deinde Iovi sacratum albentes vehebant equi

The frieze from Persepolis showing the 'tribute procession' has two empty chariots: one would be for the god Ormazd (cf. Hdt. vii, 40) and the other would be for the King (cf. Hdt. vii, 41; here the King rides in his chariot. Herzfeld Iran 271 and pl. 77 gives the evidence from the Persepolis frieze).

The Persian name was known to Plutarch (Alex 30,5) but Arrian styles him Zeus (iv, 20.3).

3.11: hos eximiae magnitudinis equus, quem Solis appellabant, sequebatur

In Herodotus' account there were ten Nisaeae horses in the royal procession, but he does not say that they were dedicated to the

Sun (Hdt. vii, 40). Xenophon tallies with Curtius on the latter point, but he refers to horses rather than a horse (Cyrop. viii, 3.12). Xenophon mentioned three chariots, two pulled by white horses and sacred to Zeus and the Sun respectively (Cyrop. viii, 3.12).

Duris used the name Mithras (Jacoby FGH 76 F 45), which suggests that Curtius was not following Duris here, though he mentions the name Mithras elsewhere (iv, 13.12: Solem et Mithrem). Plutarch mentions Mithras in the story of Darius' receipt of news of his wife's death (Alex. 30,8), and his source was presumably neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, since Arrian gives the tale with the introductory remark λόγος κατέχεται (A. iv, 20.1).

Mithras perhaps only joined the official pantheon in the reign of Artaxerxes II (R. Ghirshman Iran Penguin, '54 155-6).

3.12: regentes equos

Vergés commented that the substantivisation of a participle coupled with the addition of a direct object was not a construction to be found in Golden Latin.

3.13: immortales .. ad decem milia

Herodotus believed that the Immortals were so called because their number was never allowed to drop below 10,000 (Hdt. vii, 83), but it is possible that the Greek designation was an erroneous rendering of the Persian anušīya (Frye Heritage of Persia p. 268 n. 82, following A. Pagliaro RAL ser. 8a ix, '54 149). Bardon criticised Curtius for imprecision of phraseology citing the phrase 'ad decem milia' as an example (Bardon [3] 130), but, if the number was not rigidly maintained, Curtius is vindicated, though he may have been inadvertently correct.

The Immortals formed an infantry unit, and one thousand of them constituted a royal bodyguard (δορυφοροί, Heracleides; bearers of χρυσέας ῥοτάς, Hdt. vii, 41), cf. infra ad 3.15

It is likely however that Herodotus' explanation was reinforced in the Hellenistic era, by the fact that ἀθάνατος was used in Ptolemaic documents to denote numerical constancy: for example πρόβατα δὲ σά, ἅμ μοι παραδοθήι, ἀθάνατα παρέξω (PSI iv, 377, 5 sq. 250/249 B.C.; Pagliaro loc. cit. 149-150).

3.13: illi aureos torques, illi vestem auro distinctam habebant manicatasque tunicas, gemmis etiam adornatas

Herodotus commented on the wealth of the Immortals and upon their impressive appearance (vii, 83), but Herodotus mentioned their armour as well as their finery.

Illustrations of the sleeved tunic can be found in friezes from Persian and Median graves (e.g. H.H. von der Osten Welt der Perser² '56 pls. 38 and 57 cf. Hdt. vii, 61). The accuracy of Curtius' reference to the other adornments is not conclusively supported from graphic testimonia. The figure of the King in full ceremonial attire carved on the front-gateways of the Hundred-Column Hall at Persepolis was probably adorned with golden bracelets and a necklace (E.F. Schmidt [2] p. 32), but that does not go far to support Curtius' statement.

Loose-fitting bracelets can be seen on the arms of Elamite guards depicted on glazed bricks from the palace of Artaxerxes Memnon at Susa (404 - 358 B.C.) (e.g. E. Porada Ancient Iran pl. 42; Couissin Institutions militaires pl. 33 n. 2), but Xenophon says that the wearing of necklaces and bracelets was a Median rather than Persian practice, and only a few of the Persian nobles in Cyrus' entourage wore such jewellery (Cyrop. i, 3.2 and An. i, 5.8 cf. An. i, 8.29).

Gold thread and gold plaques could be stitched onto garments (B. Goldman, Origin of the Persian Robe IA iv, '64, 133 sq.; A.L. Oppenheim, Golden Garments of the Gods JNES viii, '49 172 sq.).

Sleeved tunics (manicatas tunicas) were considered by Romans too effeminate for males (cf. Gellius vii, 12.1; Cic. in Cat. ii, 10.22).

Curtius makes no mention of rings, although these were worn by leading Persians (D.B. Thompson, Persian spoils, 285). In Rome the golden ring had denoted membership of the military equites, but in the Empire they were more generally worn (Pliny n.h. xxxiii, l. 29-30). Moralists saw the wearing of rings as a mark of degeneracy (Pliny n.h. xxxiii, l. 11-12; cf. A. Alföldi Der früh-römische Reiteradel '52 26 sq.).

3.14: quos cognatos regis appellant, decem et quinque milia hominum

The number appears in Dinon's reference to the Persian King's practice of dining with 15,000 men (Athen. iv, 146 c).

A thousand Kinsmen, forming a single cavalry squadron, fought in the centre at Gaugamela (D.S. 59.2 with A. iii, 11.5 and 16.1); the special squadron is referred to as ἡ βασιλικὴ Ἴλη by Arrian (iii, 11.6) and Plutarch (Alex. 33, 5).

Herodotus mentions the Seven Families (Hdt. iii, 84) but he does not mention a larger class of συγγενεῖς. However, he refers to two units of cavalry, each a thousand strong, representing the pick of the Persians, and οἱ ἀριστοὶ τε καὶ γενναϊότατοι 'would seem to be his description of one of the two groups (Hdt. vii 40 and 41). Οἱ συγγενεῖς are specifically mentioned by Xenophon as a class of men who were accorded special insignia by Cyrus (Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3.13). The same term was employed to denote a rank in the Lagid system (on this see K.M.T. Atkinson, Some observations on Ptolemaic ranks and titles Aegyptus 32, '52 204 sq.), but Dinon's statement referred to above provides an indication that Curtius' source had knowledge of pre-Lagid usage.

M.L. Strack suggested that the Graeco-Roman sources confused a Persian social class known as the Kinsmen with an élite cavalry corps, but the evidence is too scant for a detailed reconstruction of the scheme of Persian society (Griechische Titel im Ptolemäerreich RhM lv, '00, 173 n. 2). The Macedonian ἑταῖροι might be cited as an analogous case, since the title 'Companions' was applied both to the Macedonian cavalry and to a privileged social class (for refer^ences to recent work on this topic, D.Musti SCO xv, '66 p.III).

From Curtius and Diodorus we learn that Darius had thirty-thousand Persian cavalry (C.R. iii, 2.4), in whose number were counted some, but not necessarily all fifteen thousand Kinsmen; of the Kinsmen one thousand formed a special cavalry squadron (D.S. 59.2). These statements together with passages referring to Kinsmen engaged in fighting (D.S. 20.2) or in diplomacy (C.R. iv, 11.1) do not preclude the assumption of a common source and the link between Curtius' and Dinon's figures points to Cleitarchus as the common source.

3.14: muliebriter propemodum culta

Insinuations of effeminacy had become a commonplace of Roman political vituperation (e.g. Sall. BJ 85, 39 sq; Dio I, 27.1) and this type of insinuation has here been added to what derived from a Greek presentation of Persian society that was probably unfavourable in the first place. Alexander's adoption of

Persian costume was seen by Curtius as a deviation from a disciplined regimen vitae and abandonment to luxury (vi, 6. 1 sq). Greek presentations of Persian society were influenced by the ideology of hatred of tyranny (cf. A. Alföldi, *Gewaltherrscher u. Theaterkönig. Die Auseinandersetzung einer attischen Ideenprägung mit persischen Repräsentationsformen im politischen Denken etc.* Studies in Honour of A.M. Friend Princeton '55 17 sq.).

3.15: doryphorae vocabantur proximum his agmen, soliti vestem excipere regalem

Athenaeus, quoting Heracleides of Cyme, recorded that at the king's court the 'doryphoroi' and 'peltasts' received as their meals what was left over after the King and his guests had dined (iv, 145 f). Heracleides was concerned to disprove the allegation of sumptuous extravagance made against the Persian court, and argued in this case that the 'doryphoroi' and 'peltasts' received free meals by way of payment, just as mercenaries received remuneration from Greek rulers. The quotation goes on to say that other Persians of high rank similarly looked after their slaves. From this it would seem that these 'doryphoroi' were functional bodyguards rather than high-ranking nobles enjoying the title as a sinecure; in which case Curtius may be correct in attributing to them care of the royal robes.

This interpretation must be linked with another fragment of Heracleides (FGH 689 FI = Athen. xii, 514 B: διὰ τῆς
τῶν μηλοφόρων αὐλῆς. ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι τῶν
δορυφόρων, καὶ τῷ γένει πάντες Πέρσαι,
ἐπὶ τῶν στυράκων μῆλα χρυσᾶ ἔχοντες, χίλιοι
τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀριστίνδην ἐκλεγόμενοι ἐκ τῶν
μυρίων Περσῶν τῶν Ἀθανάτων καλουμένων),

which says that a corps of Immortals made up a section of the King's bodyguard. Thus perhaps the term 'the Bodyguard' was used of two distinct groups, first a corps of professional soldiers attached to the court, and then to an élite infantry unit (cf. the term *σωματοφύλακες* Arrian, on which see, for example, Badian (6) 161).

Xenophon refers to a force of six thousand accompanying the king in procession (Cyrop. viii, 3.15).

3.I6

utrumque .curtus latus deorum simulacra ex auro argentoque expressa
decorabant

Persians, Medes and Magi worshipped out of doors and without icons (Hdt. i, 131; Clem. Alex. Protr. iv, 65.1 = Dinon FGH 690 F28) until Artaxerxes (404-358) set up a statue of Aphrodite 'Αναίτις (Clem. Alex. Protr. v, 65.2 = Berossos FGH 680 F 11).

The carving of the King's chariot in the Persepolis frieze of the 'tribute procession' shows the nail in the wheelnave decorated with a female (?) figurine (E.E. Herzfeld Iran pl. 84; on p. 272 he describes it as a 'head of a dwarf').

3.16: quorum alterum Nini, alterum Beli

De Lorenzi (p. 71) defends the retention of the words 'gerebat offigiem', although they are not found in the better mss. He argues that the words provide too perfect a final clausula to have been merely a marginal gloss, and 'gerebat effigiem' could never have been added to explain the tangled reading 'quorum alterinalterutrum belli'. However his scansion seem to be at fault, for his reading does not match the recognised clausulae (cf. the list in RCCM x, 3 '68 305).

3.16: aquilam

The eagle was a symbol of the Persian monarchy (Xen. An. i, 10.12; Cyrop. vii, 1.4). The wings apparently symbolised the protection given to the King by the wings of Ormazd.

3.17: purpureae tunicae medium album intextum erat

Cf. Metz Epit. 2 (tunicam mesoleucum), D.S. 77.5 (τὸν διάλευκον .. χιτῶνα), Athen. xii 537E quoting Ehippus (χιτῶνα μεσόλευκον FGH 126, F 5), and Plut. Alex. 51.5, τὸν διάλευκον..χιτῶνα . It was also called α σάραπις : Gtesias apparently used the term (Hesychius s.v. σάραπις).

References to such a garment are frequent in classical literature, but there is little agreement amongst scholars as to what the tunic looked like. Berve's rendering of a phrase in Athen. v, 215 B-C. is almost certainly incorrect: πορφυροῦν μεσόλευκον χιτῶνα , 'einen halbpurpurnen, halbweissen Chiton' (Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen '67, i p. 429 though he was not referring to the Persian king but to Lysias of Tyre [1st. c. B.C.]); either the tunic had 'a broad white stripe or insertion down the breast' (A.S.F. Gow JHS 48, '28 146), or it had a white band around the waist

(Couissin Institutions militaires pl 34).

Ornate dress was a feature that marked out the tyrant (Thuc. i, 130.1; Polyb. vi, 7.7); and in the late Republic a purple robe and a diadem were his characteristic dress (Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14,3; J.R. Dunkle, The Greek Tyrant and Roman political invective of the late Republic TAPA 98, '67 170 and n.37). The pejorative associations at least of the term 'diadem' survived into the Imperial period (e.g. Vell. Pat. ii, 56.4; 68. 4-5; Suet. Iul. 79, 2; Lucan v, 60; Statius Silvae iii, 3.51; Dio xlv, 9.2; cf. K-W. Welwei, Das Angebot des Diadems an Caesar u. das Luperkalienproblem Hist. xvi, '67 esp. 65-6; Mau RE v, 1 s.v. Diadema).

3.17: pallam

The choice of word points the effeminacy of Darius' attire.

3.18: ex zona aurea muliebriter cincta acinacem suspenderat

The Persian belt is mentioned by Plut. Alex. 51, 5, and D.S. 77.5. Both are describing items of Persian costume adopted by Alexander. No doubt Alexander's adoption of oriental costume helped, no less than works on Persian antiquities, to preserve memory of Persian costume.

On muliebriter cf. ad § 14 supra.

The acinax (cf. Hdt. vii, 54; ix, 80; Xen. An. i, 8.29; Plato Pol. viii, 553 B-C; A. Hoffmann-Kutschke argued that a more accurate rendering of the word would be ἀκράτῳργς [Phil. lxvi, '07 189]) was 'a short straight poniard about a foot long, used for thrusting rather than cutting' (How & Wells, commentary on Hdt. vii, 54). Representations of the acinax can be seen, for example in Herzfeld Iran fig. 368 with comment on p. 266, and in Porada Iran Ancien pl. on p. 155, with comment on p. 162 (a poniard from Ecbatana 43.2 cm. in length).

The records of Athena's treasury in Athens mention Persian scimitars: for example the inventory of 368/7 B.C. refers to a steel scimitar with golden hilt (IG ii, 1425). Mardonius' scimitar was later stolen from the Treasury (Dem. xxiv, 129 [353 B.C.]; D.B. Thompson, Persian Spoils, 281 sq.).

3.19: cidarim Persae vocabant regium capitis insigne

A foreign word is introduced to add a little colour to the picture. The term 'cidaris' appears elsewhere in histories of

of Alexander at Itin. Alex. 27, 1.61. and A. iv, 7.4 and vi, 29.3. Arrian apparently regarded κίταρις and τιάρια as interchangeable terms (A. iii, 25.3 with vi, 29.3). Dinon almost certainly used the phrase κίταριν ὀρθήν (Plut. Artax. 26; Plutarch made extensive use of Dinon in writing this biography, of § 10 supra), though Cleitarchus may have used τιάρια instead (FGH F5).

Ancient writers were not agreed on the definition of cidaris, vide Suidas s.v. κίδαρις, and the efforts of modern scholars have not brought any final solution. In Achaemenid and post-Achaemenid art, it would seem that five basic Persian hat shapes can be distinguished: first, cylindrical, whether fluted, plain or cressellated (the plain cylindrical hat worn by the King and Persian (?) officials is called the 'cidaris' by G. Walser (1) 8sq., and (2) 69; the hard cylindrical hat with dentated top appears on Persian sigloi and is referred to as the 'cidaris' in modern works: G.F. Hill BMC for Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia, '22 148 sq. and S.P. Noe Two hoards of Persian Sigloi, N.Y. '56 e.g. pl.2); secondly, the high cap with rounded peak bent forwards or back, the type frequently depicted in Greek pictures of Orientals, which Herodotus probably described in the phrase: τιάριας καλεομένουσ πιλους ἀπαγέας (vi, 61; cf. Anne Bovon, La représentation des guerriers perses etc. BCH 87, '63 579 sq. and esp. 594-5); thirdly the tall hat with rounded crown, commonly said to be worn by Medes on the reliefs from Persepolis (e.g. E. Porada Ancient Iran: p. 152); fourthly there is the conical hat worn by Scythians on the Persepolis reliefs (e.g. G. Walser (2) pl. 18 with Hdt. vii, 64 Σάκαι .. κυρβασίας ἐς ὄξυ ἀπηγμένως ὀρθῶς εἶχον πεπηγυίας); lastly one can mention the 'Armenian tiara' found in Hellenistic Armenia and Commagene but probably of ancient Iranian origin (J.H. Young, Commagenian Tiaras: royal and divine AJA 68, '64 29 sq.).

The last four categories of hat could all be coupled with the diadem (J.H. Young loc. cit., other references to various combinations in H. Brandenburg Mitra 160 sq.), and one might argue e.g. from the baked clay sculpture of a Persian's head found at Persepolis that the diadem might also be worn with the cylindrical hat (E.F. Schmidt (1) vol. ii, pl. 32).

The King surely wore the cylindrical hat on state occasions, and the practice of wearing a diadem with it or one of the other forms of hat probably only began with Cyrus (cf. Xen. Cyrop. viii,

3.13). Greek writers employed the three terms *τιάρα*, *κίδαρις* and *κυρβάσις* without any clear agreement as to what was being described, although it was common practice to qualify the word with the adjective *ὀρθή*, or a phrase such as *ἐς ὄξυ ἀπηγμένη* (references collected in Blaydes' commentary on Aristophanes *Birds*, 1882 ad v. 487). A.S.F. Gow argued that the three terms were all used to describe the rounded hat (particularly of category two above) (Notes on the Persae of Aeschylus *JHS* 48, '28 143 sq.).

The cylindrical hat with dentated top was probably the only one that was worn exclusively by Kings, unless the running (?) figures on sigloi were supposed to be satraps (it is more likely that the kneeling-running figure symbolised the King as irresistible victor: so E. Schmidt, (3) 360-1).

With the phrase 'regium capitis insigne' compare Seneca's formula 'regium capitis decus' (*Herc.fur.* 257; *Ag.* 8; *Thyestes* 701), and Tacitus' reference to Germanicus bestowing on Zenon of Armenia 'insigne regium capiti' (*Ann.* ii, 56.3).

3.19: hoc caerulea fascia albo distincta circumibat

Dion described a Persian royal headpiece (*παράσημον*) made up of myrrh and labyzus (*Athen.* xii, 514 A). This does not contradict what Curtius says. Further in a passage that would seem to come from Dion, Plutarch describes a fillet (*ἕνα τῶν ἀνθινῶν στεφάνων*) dipped in myrrh with which Artaxerxes honoured Antalcidas of Sparta (*Artax.* 22). Cleitarchus may provide the link between Dion's views and Curtius', but not necessarily (cf. on § 24).

In relating Alexander's adoption of Persian costume, Curtius mentions 'purpurcum diadema distinctum albo' (vi, 6.4); this must be the same as the *fascia* in the passage under discussion. Diodorus (77.4) and Justin (xii, 3.8) use the term 'diadema' too, and from the points which link the three accounts it might be assumed that they were using a common source (cf. J. Therasse, *Le moralisme de Justin etc. L'Ant. Classique* 37, '68 570 sq. who assumes the source was Cleitarchus, but Cleitarchus was not Curtius' source for the reference to the concubines, cf. on § 24).

The fillet could be worn without the 'cidaris' (E.F. Schmidt (1) vol. i, p. 136 and pls. 114-7; ii, p. 7, H.W. Ritter *Diadem* covers the Hellenistic period well from the Greek angle), but the literary sources differ over the question whether the fillet was worn

with the 'cidaris' (Gurtius) or the 'tiara' (Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3.13, followed by Olmstead History of the Persian Empire p. 282 who saw the tiara as basically different from the 'cidaris' qua tall cylindrical hat).

Many classes of officials were entitled to wear the diadem, including the Kinsmen (οἱ συγγενεῖς, Xen. Cyrop. viii, 3.13; Brandenburg Mitra 162 sq.): Thus there was no particular reason to mention it only of Darius, but, as we have seen, the diadem was to Roman minds a symbol of tyranny (cf. supra ad § 17).

3.20: currum decem milia hastatorum sequebantur; hastas
argento exornatas, spicula auro praefixa gestabant

This group could be the μηλοφόροι, who were the same as the Immortals (cf. § 13 supra), but only a thousand of them had spears adorned with gold (Hdt. vii, 41). Alternatively they might correspond to the units of ἀίχμοφόροι, to whom Herodotus referred (vii, 40 and 41).

3.21: dextra laevaue regem ducenti ferme nobilissimi
propinquorum comitabantur

Curtius has already mentioned Cognati (συγγενεῖς) and if a parallel is to be found in Achaemenid society to these 'nobilissimi propinquorum', there remains to mention the group whose title was rendered in Greek ὁμότιμοι . In the Ptolemaic system the ὁμότιμοι τοῖς συγγενέσι may have been inferior to, or equal in rank with, the συγγενεῖς (Strack RhM. lv, 1900 regarded them as inferior, but see the cautious remarks of K.M.T. Atkinson Aegyptus 32, '52 204 sq.); but Lagid usage does not determine Achaemenid practice.

Before the fall of the Achaemenids the ὁμότιμοι formed an élite which served as a royal guard and as administrators (Xen. Cyrop. ii, 1.3; vii, 5.71 and 85).

It is clear that Arrian regarded the ὁμότιμοι as the highest rank within the Persian nobility (A. ii, 11.9). The same group was probably referred to by him in the phrase πῶν ἐντίμων Περσῶν (ii, II.8).

The former passage refers to the capture of Darius' wife and mother together with the wives of the ὁμότιμοι after the battle of Issus. Diodorus in dealing with the same passage says that the women caught at the camp were αἱ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων

γυναικας (35.3 cf. 31.1), with which one must compare Curtius' phrase 'propinquorum amicorumque coniuges' (§ 25).

If the ὁμότιμοι were fairly few in number, as Arrian's version seems to imply, and formed a cadre of officers, this would explain their absence from Aristobulus' list of units at Gaugamela (A. iii, 11.3 sq.). Then the ὁμότιμοι would not be the same as the Kinsmen plus the Friends.

Thus in the 'nobilissimi propinquorum' we may have a reference to ὁμότιμοι in Darius' army.

Curtius' account here too differs from Xenophon's as Xenophon has a force of one thousand δορυφόροι attending the King on either side of the royal chariot (Cyrop. viii, 3.15).

3.22: matrem Darei Sisigambin

Berve ii, no. 711.

3.22: coniux

That is his sister, Stateira (Plut. Alex. 30, 5; Berve ii, no. 721).

3.23: armamaxas

The word does not appear elsewhere in Latin Literature, but is frequently used in Greek Literature on Persia and Alexander's campaigns (e.g. Hd1, vii, 41 and 83; Xen. Cyr. iii, 1.40; Plut. Alex. 43.2; Athenaeus v, 206 E = Hieronymus [Jacoby FGH 154 F 2]).

Herodotus used the word at vii, 41 probably to refer to a throne waggon, such as Agamemnon used (Aeschylus Agam. 1054) and such as appeared in the inventory of Persian spoils in Athens (D.B.Thompson, Persian Spoils, 281 sq.). Curtius describes Darius as riding in a military chariot (§ 15 supra).

3.23: liberi regis

Darius had with him a son, by the name of Ochus, six years of age at the time of Issus (C.R. iii, 11.24; iv, 11.6; D.S. 36.2; Berve ii, no. 833; Curtius is the only writer to preserve the name), and two older daughters, Barsine and Drypetis (on Barsine A. vii, 4.4 and Tarn ii, 330 followed by Pearson (1) 159-160, and Hamilton (1) 55: Tarn showed that her official name was Barsine, and not Stateira, despite the record of C.R. iv, 5.1 and D.S. 107.6; D.S. loc.cit. gives the name Drypetis).

3.23: quae educabant eos

So reads Bardon following BcM (PV have educebant). The sense of the passage suggests that this version of the text is correct. Similar background information is given on the 'doryphoroi' at § 15 supra: soliti vestem excipere regalem.

3.23: spadonumque grex, haud sane illis gentibus vilis

Cf. vi, 6.8

It is not certain whether all the individuals in the Persian court and administration who are referred to as eunuchs were in fact eunuchs. The Aramaic title 'saris' perhaps denoted a satrapal official rather than a eunuch (P.J. Junge, *Hazarapatis Klio* xxxiii, '40 21 and n.4).

3.24: tum regiae pellices trecentae^{et}/sexaginta vehebantur

Ctesias (ap. Plut. *Artax.* 27), Dicaearchus (*Athen.* xiii, 557 B) and possibly Dinon (Plut. *Artax.* 27, D.S. ii, 7.3 and *Athen.* 556 B) recorded that the Persian King had three hundred and sixty concubines, whilst Cleitarchus and others set the figure at three hundred and sixty-five (cf. supra on §10). Thus several editors have been tempted to emend the text here by inserting 'quinque' (Mützell, Rolfe). However the codd. do not give 365 as the number of prostitutes in the parallel passage at vi, 6.8, nor is any link there made between the number of prostitutes and the length of the year (contrast D.S. 77.6). Thus one concludes that Cleitarchus was probably not Curtius' source, but that his source might have been some writer who used Dinon (cf. Tarn ii, 82 n.3; contra Pearson (1) 221-2).

Dinon commented on the special relationship that existed between the 'pellices' and the Persian queen (*FGH* 690 F 27 = *Athen.* xiii, 3. 556 B), and his description would suit the phrase earlier employed by Curtius: 'turba feminarum reginas comitantium' (§ 22). Here as perhaps elsewhere in this passage Curtius' embellishment of the basic account has produced duplication (cf. § 20).

3.24: pecuniam regis

Cf. 13.5 sq.

3.24: trecenti cameli

Cf. Hdt. vii, 83 and 125, but according to Herodotus the camels were used for carrying food (cf. Seneca *de ira* iii, 20.4).

Plutarch, like Curtius, presents the camels as the bearers of the king's wealth (Mor. 342 A). Diodorus was generally more precise than Curtius in specifying the type of camel to which he was referring, but this was because he adopted current Hellenistic terminology rather than because he found such detail in his source (P. Gaulowsky, κάμηλος δρομάς R Phil xli, '67 247 sq.).

3.25: propinquorum amicorumque coniuges

Cf. note ad § 21 supra. The 'propinqui' may be the same as the 'cognati', and the 'amici' may represent the ὁμότιμοι unless they are merely a projection back into Achaemenid society of the Hellenistic φίλοι.

3.26-28: the contrasting picture of the Macedonian army

3.26: contra si quis aciem Macedonum intueretur, dispar facies erat

The point of the digression is made plain at this point, Curtius wished to contrast the opposing forces, and the contrast is made with moral judgements favouring Alexander's side (cf. Jxi, 6. 3-7; xiii, l. 14.15).

3.27: intentum ad ducis non signum modo, sed etiam nutum

One may see here another reference to 'disciplina militaris' which was an essentially Roman virtue (cf. ad 2.15 supra), and the phrase echoes that attributed to Charidemus at 2.13.

3.28: Dareus, tantae multitudinis rex, loci in quo pugnavit angustis redactus est ad paucitatem, quam in hoste contempserat

This statement about Darius being caught in too confined a space anticipates even the prognostications of Alexander's and Darius' military advisers (7. 9-10; 8.2). Curtius' arrangement of his material is at least highly dramatic: Darius' preparations of a vast army are the seeds of his own defeat; there is irony in the scale of the operation and the disaster is foreshadowed.

The Composition and Sources of Chapters 2 and 3

Chapters 2 and 3 are dominated by the two pictures of the Persian army: in chapter 2 the list of units of the army with the emphasis on numbers, pointed by the comment in § 10, 'nec quicquam illi minus quam multitudo militum defuit'; in chapter 3 the description of the army procession. The catalogue is presented somewhat out of its chronological context for Curtius includes the 30,000 Greek mercenaries, whose arrival in Darius' camp is only mentioned much later in the narrative (cf. on 2.9 and 3.1). Then at 3.28 Curtius anticipates the tactical blunder which led Darius to engage Alexander in battle in an area too small for advantageous deployment of all his troops. Some would suggest that Curtius failed to organize his material into proper sequence as he was conflating passages from differing sources (so Brunt, cf. on 3.1). However this is to ignore the structure which Curtius gives his material. Each chapter presents an antithesis: chapter 2 contrasts the Persian numbers with the quality of the Graeco-Macedonian troops. The transition from the first to the second part of the antithesis is marked for instance by phrases in §§ 9 (egregiae iuventutis), 10 (multitudo militum), 12 (tanti, tot, totius). A secondary antithesis in chapter 2 strengthens the main antithesis, for Curtius contrasts the 'libertas' of Charidemus with Darius' 'superbia' and the 'vanitas' of his court.

Curtius' purpose in chapter 2 is further demonstrated by the speech which he attributes to Charidemus: it contains nothing like the arguments on strategy presented by Charidemus' speech in Diodorus' account (30). This does not mean that Curtius knew nothing of these arguments, for at 8.2 he attributes to the mercenaries advice such as Diodorus' Charidemus gave. Rather Curtius' composition of Charidemus' speech presented what was dramatically and artistically necessary at this point: the 'aemulatio' between east and west. We have noted in the commentary the influence of Herodotus and the influence of Roman rhetoric and politics.

3.1 breaks the flow of the story but the prosaic detail is needed to separate the two pictures of Darius' anxieties and the detail about Thymondas' commission relates to a main motif of this book - the importance to Darius of his Greek mercenaries.

The main antithesis of chapter 3 is between the extravagance of the Persian style of life and military pomp, and the

simplicity and discipline of Alexander's troops. The opening scene, relating Darius' dreams serves as a bridge passage. The ill omen of the dream echoes the ill omen of Charidemus' execution in 2.19; then the reference to Darius' cloak and scimitar (3.5 and 6) foreshadows the full description of Darius' gear.

The two chapters are thus complementary and serve to build up contrasting pictures of the two armies before the first engagement of the two kings. Further an antithesis is established between the picture in chapter 1 of Alexander's preparations for a major engagement and the picture in chapter 2 of Darius' inadequate preparation for the war: Darius was unable to trust his officers; Alexander had given great responsibility to Antipater, Amphoterus and Hegelochus; Alexander had made arrangements for the supply of reinforcements, but Darius' 'festinatio' made it impossible to call up units from the further satrapies (1.1, 10 and 24; 2.9). Then a relationship between chapter 3 and chapter 4 emerges: having made the point that Darius' army was superior in numbers alone, Curtius illustrates this with the story of Alexander's approach to the Cilician Gates and the abandonment of the position by a Persian force that could easily have held the Gates against Alexander.

The individuality of Curtius' account may therefore be attributed partly to his organisation of the material.

It has been indicated at various points that Curtius did not use Cleitarchus, Aristobulus, Ptolemy, Callisthenes and Duris for specific parts of these two chapters. He knew detail that can be found in the work of Ctesias, Dinon and Herodotus, and his knowledge of Herodotus would seem to have been direct.

Chapter 4: the invasion of Cilicia and Alexander's entry into Tarsus

4.1: Abistamene Cappadociae praeposito

Arrian gives as the first satrap of Cappadocia under Alexander's régime; Sabictas (A. ii, 4.2). It is possible that Abistamenes was a satrap of Cappadocia, but only as Sabictas' successor (so Berve ii, nos. 4 and 690; Klio 31, '38 138 and n. 1). Alternatively one can regard Curtius' text as a corruption of the correct form Sabictas (so Schachermeyr, 506 n. 107; who also suggests that Cleitarchus may have turned Sabictas into Sabictamenes in the same way as he turned Arsames into Arsamenes [D.S. 19.4]. However the source may not have been Cleitarchus and Curtius himself may have turned Sabictas into Sabictamenes).

Apart from the name ~~Abistamenes~~ in our text of Curtius, there is no evidence to support or refute the theory that Alexander appointed a successor to Sabictas at some stage.

The satrap's mandate was vague in that Alexander did not commit himself to the subjugation of the whole of Cappadocia and Ariarathes in northern Cappadocia established an independent kingdom (D.S. xviii, 16.1 cf. App. Nith. ii, 8, and Berve ii, no. 113). Similarly in Cappadocia by the Taurus the Cataonians appear to have remained out of Macedonian control, or to have rebelled against Macedonian overlordship. Another group of Cappadocians remained loyal to Darius and fought at Gaugamela (A. iii, 8.4; GR. iv, 12.11 and 12).

It is therefore likely that Sabictas was drawn from the ranks of the Cappadocian nobility rather than from the Persian officer class: indirect rule through a Cappadocian might have worked where rule through a Persian puppet would have exacerbated nationalist resentment.

4.1: Cilician petens

In Miltner's view Alexander's main objective in 333 B.C. was to reach the Cilician coast in the shortest possible time to seize control of Darius' coastal bases (JOAI xxviii, '33 esp. 69-70). His choice of route via Gordium and Ancyra shows, however, that in the early part of 333 he could not ignore the threat which Memnon posed to his communications through the Hellespont. The death of Memnon brought the war to a new phase, and it is reasonable to surmise that before Alexander entered Cilicia he had received information on Darius' movements (so Judeich, Issos 355; Diodorus

says that Alexander received reports - admittedly perhaps not before he had reached Tarsus - that Darius had set out from Babylon [31.6]), or on the transfer of the Greek mercenaries from the west.

The invasion of Cilicia was significant politically as it involved crossing the Halys-Taurus line, the frontier of 'Asia' (cf. G.F. Griffith (4)39). However Cilicia could still be classed as an area of Greek cities (cf. A. ii, 5.8 and 9), and from this point of view it was not obvious that Alexander's objective had dramatically increased.

4.1: regionem quae Castra Cyri appellatur pervenerat
Cf. A. ii, 4.3

The position of the camp may have been near Podandus (= modern Pozanti) c. 20 km. north of Gülekboğazi. There according to Xenophon, Cyrus camped for a day and night before crossing into Cilicia (An. i, 2.21). Cyrus' general route was from Dana (= Tyana) to Tarsus, Dana being in the area of the modern Kemerhisar (cf. E. Honigmann RE 2.R. vii A s.v. Tyana 1630 sq.; A. Boucher L' Anabase de Xénophon Paris 1913 p. 28 and n. 2). For the connection between Cyrus' route and the Royal Road see B. Levick, Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor Oxford '67, 10 sq.: the Road ran through Cybistra, Tarsus and the Syrian Gates, and not as was once supposed through Ancyra and Tavium (further on the roads of Asia see Magic ii, 786 sq.).

The 'regio' was a valley some 6.4 km. long and 3.2 km. wide (Ramsay Geog. Journ. xxii, '03 384 cf. A. Janke (1) 99).

4.1: stativa illic habuerat Cyrus cum adversum Croesum in Lydian duceret

Contrast Arrian's statement that the camp belonged to the younger Cyrus (ii, 4.3). It is unlikely that both Cyri camped in the same area (pace Mützell), for when Cyrus marched against Croesus he entered Asia Minor on the northerly route, as Pteria was his first objective (Hdt. i, 76), and he would not therefore have gone through the Cilician Gates. However, it is clear that Arrian and Curtius were following different traditions, or one of them deviated from a common tradition: either Curtius through carelessness (so Dosson Etude p. 186; Curtius has manifested in the preceding chapter his familiarity with Herodotus thus it would not

be surprising if he imported the Elder Cyrus here or switched to a source which featured the Elder Cyrus), or Arrian through concern to link his work with that of Xenophon (cf. P.A. Stadter, Flavius Arrianus: the new Xenophon GRBS viii, '67 155 sq.). Radet argued that Cyrus the Elder was brought into the story in Alexander's own day, since Alexander claimed to revere him (Strabo xi, 11.4 517), and Cyrus the Younger, a mere rebel, had little propaganda value beside the Father of the Persians (cf. Hd. iii, 89; though Cyrus the Younger must have had his supporters amongst the Alexander historians, for example, Onesicritus - cf. note on 6.1). As Callisthenes was the official historian, it is striking that in this chapter the Homeric references to Lyrnessos and Thebes have roots in Callisthenes' account (§ 10 infra). Thus it is quite possible that Curtius' reference to Cyrus the Elder goes back ultimately to Callisthenes (G. Radet, Le camp de Cyrus REA xviii, '16 121-2).

4.2: aberat ea regio quinquaginta stadia ab aditu quo Ciliciam intramus

The route of the Roman road is shown by W.M. Calder and G.E. Bean, A Classical Map of Asia Minor (= Supplement to Anatolian Studies vii, '57) and described by D. Magie i, 276-7.

The distance from the camp, at Pozanti, to the Gates at Gülekboğazı is c. 20 km. The reference to 50 stades between the camp and the 'aditus' is puzzling. The phraseology does not suggest that Curtius was giving the distance to the frontier of the Roman province (on which see § 7), though elsewhere his account was influenced by what was known in the Roman period about this route (§ 12 infra). 50 stades, c. 8.9 km., would take one to Aiva-Bey-Khan, but there appears to be no evidence to suggest that it had any significance in the Graeco-Roman period; furthermore Diodorus gave the length of the pass as 20 stades (xiv, 20.1) which is not long enough to bridge the gap between the Gates at Gülekboğazı and Aiva-Bey-Khan, c. 11-12 km. (Ramsay Geog. Journal xxii, '03).

4.2: Pylas incolae dicunt artissimas fauces

D. Magie (i, 276-7) gives a description of the Gates at Gülekboğazı (for further refs. Ruge RE xi, '21 s.v. Κιλίκια πύλαι, 389-390 and NID Turkey i, 152 with facing plate). The Gates were in a gorge in the valley of the Yesiloluk, a tributary of the Tarsusçay. Magie gives the width of the gorge as fifty feet, whereas Ramsay

estimated thirty to forty feet (loc. cit. and cf. note on § 12 infra)

4.2: munimenta ... naturali situ imitante

Eussner and Hedioke emended the last word to 'imitantes', but the ablative absolute should be retained (cf. iv, 1.40, v, 2.10 etc.; Castiglioni SIFC xix, '12 131-2).

4.3: Arsames, qui Ciliciae praecerat

Arsames was a Persian name (found on a satrapal seal from Egypt: G.R. Driver, Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. '54 p. 2 n. 4 cf. Aesch. Pers. 36) but Arrian here gives the name as 'Ἀρσίμας which may be an imperfect transliteration of the Iranian name 'rtym (Artimas).

A.D.H. Bivar has tried to establish that there was a family relationship between the two Persian officials of the name Artimas in Anatolia: first the governor of Lydia in 401/0 B.C. referred to by Xenophon (An. vii, 8.25), whose name appears in Aramaic and Greek on a cylinder-seal (BM no. 132504); and the Artimas of Arrian (as corrected). The link is found in a bilingual inscription from Limyra in Lycia recording the preparation of an ossuary by Artimas son of Arsapis [sc. 'Ἀρσίμου] ... πρόπαππος, which when considered along with the reference in Xenophon implies that three generations of the family served the Achaemenids in Asia Minor. The name may be found too on a coin issue minted somewhere in south-west Anatolia (A.D.H. Bivar, A 'satrap' of Cyrus the Younger NC. 7th s. i, '61 119 sq. with E.S.G. Robinson's editorial comment). The equation of the Artimas of Lycia with the Arsames of Cilicia must remain hypothetical.

Diodorus (19.4) refers to a satrap by the name of Arsamenes amongst the commanders at Granicus and in the same context Arrian refers to a στρατηγός by the name of Arsames (i, 12.8 cf. ii, 11.8). Presumably both these references are to the governor of Cilicia. Leuze argued from the literary and numismatic evidence that Mazaeus remained satrap of Cilicia till Alexander's invasion (Leuze Satrapieneinteilung esp. 242 sq. and cf. Appendix C on the coins of Cilicia). It is therefore possible that Mazaeus handed over the satrapal office to Arsames shortly before Alexander's invasion (cf. Bellinger Essays 60-1), or that Arsames was an army officer responsible to Mazaeus or Darius, and

it will be noted that Arrian does not at any point style him a satrap. Berve (ii, no. 149) took Diodorus' reference as accurate, but that is to ignore the evidence of the coins. Curtius used the term 'satrapes' (e.g. 13.1, vi, 6.20 with A. iii, 25.1), thus his formulation here may indicate that he like Arrian believed that Arsames was not a satrap.

If it was Cleitarchus who turned Arsames into Arsamenes, and Sabictas into Sabictamenes (supra ad § 1), then one must conclude that Curtius was not tied to Cleitarchus for the detail given here. In any case it shows the weakness of the common attribution to Cleitarchus of everything on which Curtius and Diodorus are not patently contradictory.

4.3: reputans quid initio belli Memnon suasisset

Memnon advised the western satraps to avoid pitched battle in Asia, to devastate country that lay in Alexander's path and to prepare a counter-invasion of Europe (D.S. 18.2; A. i, 12.9). Arrian's account differs from Diodorus', in that Arrian divorced the scorched-earth strategy from Memnon's plans for a counter-invasion of Europe (A. ii, 1.1), and Brunt argued that it would have been extremely difficult to mount an invasion at the same time as troops were needed to devastate Asia ([2] 149; his statement that 'Arrian does not credit him with the idea of a counter-offensive before 333', needs qualification cf. supra on 2.1 and Appendix A.).

Arrian's account of Memnon's scorched earth strategy differs from Diodorus' account in another detail, of more immediate relevance, for Arrian adds, μηδὲ τῶν πόλεων αὐτῶν φειδομένους (i, 12.9), and Memnon meant by 'cities' more than fortified acropoleis, as Arrian goes on to record that a satrap swore that he would not stand by and see the destruction of a single house belonging to any of his subjects. If this is correct then Memnon presumably advocated that the troops should assume responsibility for the evacuees and defend a line behind the retreating civilian population (a strategy employed by Philip V in 198 B.C., when he took with him as he left Thessaly the population and destroyed their cities as he went [Livy xxxii, 13.5 sq.]). Brunt (loc. cit) makes no mention of this implication but it casts doubt on the accuracy of Arrian's account (Fuller (p. 89) gives Arrian's account of Memnon's strategic plans without comment).

4.3: quondam salubre consilium sero exequi statuit

Curtius' assessment of Memnon's plan as 'quondam salubre' shows an absence of regard for political and psychological issues, although Curtius records below that Arsames' strategy led to a collapse of morale in Cilicia (§ 5 infra), and his account of Memnon's advice in 334 does not survive. His judgement that the plan was sound in the circumstances of 334 tallies with Diodorus' observation (18.3).

4.3: igni ferroque Ciliciam vastat

Arsames' strategy involved the evacuation of Cilicia by the satrapal forces, but apparently not the destruction of Tarsus (A. ii, 4.6) it is doubtful whether he contemplated a scorched-earth policy, cf. further ad § 14. He had much to gain from divorcing the combatants from the civilian communities - indeed Cilicia was lost when his troops in the mountains failed to prove themselves as guerrilleros - but he had nothing to gain from alienating the civilians.

4.5: paucis, qui callibus praesiderent, relictis

Here Curtius shows that Arsames' force was detailed to do more than merely block the narrow gorge known as the Cilician Gates. For, it was possible to bypass the Gates. Ramsay argued that Cyrus forced Syennesis to abandon the Cilician Gates because he avoided the Gates and crossed the mountain elsewhere by a path above the Çakıt Su (Geog. Journ. xxii, '03 368 sq.; this theory explains why Xenophon did not explicitly mention the Gates and it explains the distance of twenty five parasangs which Xenophon says Cyrus covered before he reached Tarsus [An. i, 2.23], twenty five parasangs, c. 92 miles (or 157 km.) being too far for a direct journey from Pozanti through the Gates to Tarsus).

If Ramsay is correct, and Cyrus had in fact demonstrated that the Gates could be bypassed, this must have added to the difficulties of holding the Gates.

The force left behind by Arsames was more impressive in Arrian's account (φυλακαῖς ἰσχυραῖς, ii, 4.3), a difference which Fränkel saw as an indication that Curtius here followed Cleitarchus rather than Aristobulus (Quellen 207-208), but the only legitimate conclusion is that Curtius probably used a different source from that used by Arrian. It is possible too that Curtius reduced the

size of the force for dramatic effect (*paucis ... vel pauciores*).

4.5: *populator terrae quam a populationibus vindicare debebat*

This fine sentiment sprang from a mind that was quick to make rhetorical points. A similar idea is expressed at 13.6, in a passage where Curtius returns to the theme of this chapter.

4.5: *Ergo qui relictis erant, proditos se rati, nec conspectum quidem hostis sustinere valuerunt*

Arrian similarly attributed the failure of these men to hold the Cilician Gates to a lack of nerve (ii, 4.4), though he says nothing of their feeling betrayed: they did not feel betrayed because in Arrian's account Arsames was not applying a scorched-earth strategy. Certainly Alexander pushed ahead too fast for any effective strategy to be applied against him in Cilicia. However, Alexander's progress did not depend solely on his being able to scare away any troops who tried to block the Gates; men, though not vehicles, could be led over the mountain at other points (cf. on Cyrus' tactics supra).

Arsames next appears in the battle of Issus, where he died in action (A. ii, 11.8).

4.5: *cum vel pauciores locum obtinere potuissent*

Curtius heightens the drama of the situation with such rhetorical additions (cf. § 11). The general bias in this section is hostile to Arsames for his failure to measure up to the skill of Memnon as a strategist. One can see in this book a bias in favour of Memnon (cf. 1.21, 2.1), and an interest in his relatives (3.1 and 9.2). However this interest is vestigial rather than explicit and suggests that Curtius used a source which highlighted Memnon and his relatives.

4.6: *perpetuo iugo montis*

The 'unbroken mountain ridge' refers to the main Taurus range, which with the ranges of the Anti-Taurus sealed off Cilicia from the North and West (description in NID Turkey i, 150 sq.). Curtius refers to this mountain chain again with the formula '*hoc dorsum, qua maxime introrsus mari cedit*' (§ 7). Cf. Xen. *An.* i, 2.

22: ὄρος δ' αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ πεδῖον) περιέχει ὄχυρόν καὶ ὑψηλὸν πάντη ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν.

4.6: altero cornu

The Gâvur range runs south west from Maras to the coast on the Gulf of Iskenderon west of Antioch. It thus shuts off the coastal plain north of Iskenderon from Syria.

4.7: tres aditus .. quorum uno Cilicia intranda est

Cf. Pliny n.h. v, 99 who refers to three Gates through the Taurus range: Armeniae, Caspiae and Ciliciae.

4.7: Campestris eadem, qua vergit ad mare, planitiem eius crebris distinguuntibus rivis

Campestris is here used as a geographical term (cf. Xenophon's description of the πεδῖον μέγα - An. i, 2.22), but Curtius must surely have known that the epithet was also used by Rome to denote an administrative district.

Cilicia had ceased to be a separate province possibly in 44 B.C., and Cilicia Campestris (Gk. Pedias) was incorporated in the province of Syria. Part of Cilicia Campestris reverted to the control of 'Tarcondimotus' family in 20 B.C. (Dio. liv, 9.2) and this kingdom apparently maintained its independence till A.D. 17 when Philopator died (Tac. A. ii, 42.7) and the ensuing period of turbulence possibly resulted in the reimposition of direct Roman rule. Cilicia was retained as the title of the area of Campestris, an administrative region, within the province of Syria (e.g. the epigraphical record of a (sc. financial) procurator of Cilicia in Nero's reign: JRS. ii, '12 p. 99 no. 31). Cilicia became a separate province again in Vespasian's reign, perhaps in A.D. 72 (on this whole subject R. Syme, Province of Cilicia Anatolian Studies prstd. to Buckler, '39 299 sq.; Magie ii, 1419 sq. and 1439; A.H.M. Jones Cities 184 sq. and 204). Cilicia Tracheia was granted to Archelaus of Cappadocia in 25 B.C. (Strabo xii, 1.4 535) and later it was governed by Antiochus IV of Commagene. Antiochus was deposed in A.D. 72 and Cilicia Tracheia was annexed by Rome (Joseph. BJ vii, 7.1; Suet. Vesp. 8, 4; Magie ii, 1435 and 1439 sq.). In all probability Cilicia Campestris was merged with Tracheia to form a single province in 72 (cf. Magie loc. cit).

The epithet campestris or pedias does not appear to have been used later than the constitution of the province in A.D. 72 (Strabo used πεδῖον as the accepted designation of the area xiv, 5. I 668, but Appian did not use the terms τραχεῖα and πεδῖον Syr. 50; Wirth 105 sq. and 118, although they would have been convenient)

and it may be suggested that the designation 'campestris' was used at a time when the reunification of Cilicia was being considered: either in the period between Gaius' deposition of Antiochus IV and his reinstatement by Claudius (Dio lix, 8.2 and lx, 8.1 cf. Tac. Ann.xii, 55) or at the time that Vespasian deposed Antiochus.

4.8: Pyramus et Cydnus incliti amnes fluunt

The Pyramus corresponds to the modern Ceyhan (cf. Hans Treidler RE xxiv, 1.sq.), the Cydnus to the Tarsus Su (cf. on 5.1).

4.8: nec torrentes incurrunnt, qui placide manantis alveum turbent

Paladini has proposed emending 'manantis' to 'meantis' as this would better suit the sense of the sentence (Latomus xx, '61 393), and compare Tibullus' description:

An te, Cydne, canam tacitis qui leniter undis
caeruleus placidis per vada serpis aquis? (i, 7. 13-14)

However, the emendation is unnecessary.

4.9: frigidissimus

Cf. Strabo xiv, 5.12 673, but Strabo confines his comment on the coldness of the water to the stretch as far as Tarsus, and attributes it to Tarsus' propinquity to the source of the river, as well as to the fact that it flowed through the gorge. Curtius is less precise than Strabo and less scientific in his explanation of this geographical phenomenon. Steele ([2] 309) saw the influence of Strabo as marked in this section on the geography of Cilicia, but this is not convincing with regard to the Cydnus.

The link with Arrian's account is more important:

ὁ Κύδνος ψυχρότερός τε ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καθαρότερον (A.ii,
4.7: Curtius, liquore .. frigidissimus), though his explanation of the low temperature of the water also differs from Curtius' explanation.

4.9: multa .. amoenitate

As Vergés noted this abstraction means 'multis arboribus'.

4.10: monumenta vulgata carminibus

Cf. on 1.2.

4.10: monstrabantur urbium sedes Lyrnesi et Thebes,
Typhonis quoque specus et Corycium nemus ubi
crocum gignitur

With the first six words compare the fragment of Callisthenes ap. Strabo xiv, 4.1 667 (=Jacoby FGH 124 F 32): δαίχνησθαι Θήβην τε καὶ Λυρνησοῶν. . However, Callisthenes referred to τὸ Κωρύκιον ἄντρον (F. 33, cf. Lucan iii, 225), which does not match Curtius' 'nemus'; and Strabo's reference to the growing of saffron in the cave clearly does not come from Callisthenes (Strabo xiv, 5.5 670).

Furthermore, Callisthenes wrote that Lyrnessus and Thebes belonged to Pamphylia, whilst Curtius puts them in Cilicia (Strabo xiv, 5.21 676 cf. Pliny n.h. v, 96; a Lyrnessus appears east of Mallus in Dionys. perieg. 875; RE xiii, 2.2500-1). It was not irrational to link the cities of the Trojan Cilicians with Cilicia rather than Pamphylia, but Curtius offers no explanation for the transposition and one can conclude that he merely took over what his source recorded, and that Callisthenes was not his immediate source (pace Domaszewski, p.14. Pearson[1] 41-2 avoids decision on the point, but in a footnote says that it is probable that Curtius received Callisthenes' account through Cleitarchus; but there is no immediate reason why Cleitarchus should have been Curtius' source. Reference to these places was a commonplace by the 1st Century).

Lyrnessus and Thebes were associated in legend with Briseis and Andromache.

Mela described the Corycian and Typhonean caves as separate entities, but the two places may in reality have been one and the same (Mela i, 72 and 76; W. Ruge RE 2. R.viii A[s.v. Specus Typhoneus] 1798). Near Corycus a cave temple to Hermes has been found (JHS xii, 211 and 237), and other caves held a sanctuary of Zeus (Magie i, 268 and ii, 1143). Strabo says 'the cave' was some 20 stades from the hill of Corycus (xiv, 5.5 670).

This digression in §10 illustrates Curtius' Herodotean style. Arrian's geographical references are more utilitarian. Thus the absence of this detail in Arrian does not necessarily prove that Curtius and Arrian followed different sources at this point.

4.11: si fuissent qui subeuntes propellerent

Bardon here follows the codd., whilst Müller inserted 'in' before 'subeuntes'. Paladini (Latomus xvii, '58 543) supports Bardon's text here, but the parallels which she cites, viz. iii, 10.6; vi, 1.1; viii, 1.4; x, 8.4, do not really support the case, since the verb in

each instance implies direct contact with the persons or animals driven away. The codd. may be correct but the verb has rather a different connotation from the other cases cited.

4.12: iter vix quaternos capiebat armatos

This would have been a fair comment for the period after the construction of the Roman road, which was at no point wider than eleven feet through the pass (Ramsay Geog. Journal xxii, '03 380). The defile at its narrowest point was thirty to forty feet wide according to Ramsay (loc. cit. p. 378). Cyrus was able to get his waggons through the pass (Xen. An. i, 2.21), and the going was reasonable except when the river was in flood or the pass snow-bound (Cicero mentions that the Gates were closed by snow until late April in 50 B.C. [ad Att. v, 21.14, Magie ii, 1154 who adjusts Cicero's date to the Julian calendar]).

The narrowness of the pass may have been exaggerated, in any case, for dramatic purposes.

4.13: Thrakas tamen leviter armatos praecedere iusserat ...
sagittariorum quoque manus occupaverat iugum

Arrian says that when Alexander approached the Gates he left Parmenion with the heavy-armed troops and advanced with the hypaspists, archers and Agrianes (ii, 4.3). Curtius elsewhere distinguishes the Agrianes from the Thracians (e.g. iv, 13. 31), so Curtius and Arrian may differ here, the one mentioning Thracians, the other Agrianes, though at 9.10 Curtius refers to Agrianes as having recently arrived from Thrace. Then Arrian's version describes Alexander's initial approach to the Gates before the satrapal troops fled, whereas Curtius is dealing with the precautions Alexander took after the abandonment of the Gates was observed.

The task assigned to the archers in Curtius' version again suggests the danger to Alexander of guerrillas lurking in the mountains: control of the defile by itself was not decisive for either side.

Castiglioni proposed emending 'manus' to 'manu' (SIFC xix, '12 132-4), but the change is unnecessary.

4.14: Tarsos cui tum maxime Persae subiaciebant ignem

According to Arrian the Tarsians were afraid that the Persian troops would plunder (ἀππαγήν) their city before abandoning

it (ii, 4.5), but in fact the city escaped unscathed. The tense of the verb 'subiiciēbant' may denote intent rather than the commencement of the fire-raising as the city was saved (A. ii, 4.5 and infra § 15 urbem a se conservatam).

Curtius' emphasis on arson may reflect a Roman phobia for arson was particularly a serious threat in Rome (e.g. Cicero in Catilinam passim, Juv. viii, 233; Tac. Ann. xv, 67.2; Suet. Vit. 17.2). However, it has generally been assumed that Curtius differed from Arrian because he followed a different source: Fränkel suggested that here too Curtius followed Cleitarchus whilst Arrian followed Aristobulus (Quellen 207-8 cf. § 5 supra). Kaerst (362 n. 1) and Berve (ii, nos. 149 and 485) described the attribution of a scorched-earth strategy to Arsames and Mazaeus (D.S. 55. 1-2; C.R. iv, 9.14 and 10. 12-14) as a feature of the Cleitarchean tradition. As far as Tarsus was concerned Arrian states explicitly that Arsames only decided to evacuate the city when he heard that Alexander was into Cilicia (A. ii, 4.5), and Arrian makes no mention of Mazaeus' devastating territory to check Alexander's advance. However there is no evidence to justify the attribution of this theme to Cleitarchus.

Further, long before Diodorus wrote, the point had been noted that Alexander's general policy was to refrain from razing cities. It was mentioned for instance in the speech of the Isian Alexander to Philip, in 197 B.C. as Polybius gives it: Philip's tactic was φεύγοντα τὰς πόλεις ἐμπιπράναι διαρπάζειν, whereas Alexander, like the other kings of Macedon, fought openly and spared the cities (xviii, 3.3-5, cf. Livy xxxii, 33.11 sq.).¹

4.14: opulentum oppidum

Tarsus' wealth was partly a product of trade through its geographical position, and Tarsus was at various times an important producer of linen and a centre for lead and silver mining. The silver mines seem to have been reworked after Alexander's conquest of Cilicia (Cary Mélanges Glotz '32. 1, 136 and 141; Magie i, 375).

4.15: Parmenione ad inhibendum incendium cum expedita manu praemisso

We have two versions of the advance on Tarsus; Arrian's would seem not to depend on Aristobulus: Alexander made a dash to save Tarsus (ii, 4. 5-6), and according to writers other than Aristobulus, he arrived ἰδρωῶντα καὶ καύματι ἐχόμενον, thus dived into the river and was immediately taken ill (4.7).

1. The plans attributed to Arsames and Mazaeus were perhaps a byproduct of this topos.

Aristobulus said that Alexander collapsed with fatigue (4.7). The quotation from Aristobulus seems to be an insertion interrupting the run of the narrative of Arrian's main source, but Aristobulus could still have recorded that Alexander made a dash to save Tarsus.

It is possible that Curtius anticipated Parmenion's departure from the main body of the army, but this is unlikely as Curtius spells out two separate commissions: here to save Tarsus, and later a reconnaissance mission (*praemiserat ad explorandum iter* etc. 7.6). Curtius may have copied his source correctly. Parmenion's rôle in this history of the campaigns was no doubt distorted (cf. Hamilton (1) liii, and 89), at least in what was said and written in the period between his murder and Alexander's death, but the details of his military record were not completely forgotten (refs. in Berve ii, no. 606).

Arrian, or more likely his source - presumably Ptolemy - may have transferred from Parmenion to Alexander the credit for the vital dash to save Tarsus (Schubert, (I)50-I, suggested that the switch in the story originated with Callisthenes, who was concerned to portray Alexander in favourable light, but little concerned to portray Parmenion honestly). This would help to explain Alexander's collapse. It may be added that Parmenion is not said to have been left to follow with the heavy-armed units, although it is implied by the account of the preceding advance to the Cilician Gates (A. ii, 4.3) and by the story that Parmenion sent a letter to Alexander. If Alexander's rôle was exaggerated, no lie was explicitly told about Parmenion.

The support which Justin seems to give to Arrian's version (J. xi, 8.6) is flimsy, but that must be discussed in the context of the story of Parmenion's letter warning Alexander against Philip (6.4 infra). The points so far considered suggest, but cannot prove, that Parmenion did in fact lead the first assault party against Tarsus.

Chapters 5 and 6: Alexander's sickness at Tarsus

The relationship between Curtius' account and the other sources is considered at the end of the commentary on chapter 6. Valerius Maximus includes the story of Alexander and the doctor Philip as an example under the heading de constantia.

Chapter 5: Alexander falls sick

5.1: *mediam Cydnus amnis ... interfluit*

In dealing with the same story Valerius Maximus describes the Cydnus in similar terms: *Cydnus qui .. Tarsos interfluit* (iii, 8 Ext. 6), and the rarity of the incidence of 'interfluere' with the accusative meaning to flow through (as opposed to the meaning 'to divide'), makes the parallel more striking (these two cases together with C.R. 1.2 and iv, 3.6 account for more than half of the appearances of this formula. Apart from Valerius Maximus perhaps only the elder Seneca [Contr. ii, 1.13] used the form before Curtius).

5.1: *et diei fervidissimum tempus esse coeperat*

Bardon follows Orelli's emendation 'esse coeperat': the codd. read 'exceperat'. The case for the retention of 'exceperat' was argued by Nett, who noted i.a. similar use of the verb at Livy ii, 61.1 and Ovid Met. xv, 209 (Nett), 34); one might add that 'exceperat' provides a perfect clausula.

Ruge gave the mean temperature of Tarsus in July as 28.8° (RE xi, '21 387 s.v. Kilikie).

5.2: *pulvere simul ac sudore perfusum regem invitavit
liquor fluminis, ut calidum adhuc corpus ablueret*

Aristobulus records that Alexander collapsed in Tarsus through fatigue (ὑπὸ καμάρτου) whilst others related the tale of Alexander's swim in the Cydnus (A. ii, 4.7). Plutarch too records different traditions, but without mentioning Aristobulus' name: οἱ μὲν .. οἱ δὲ .. λέγουσι (Alex. 19, 2). Aristobulus was therefore not Curtius' source.

Linking this fragment of Aristobulus' work with that preserved at Plut. Alex. 75, 6 on Alexander's last illness one may

suggest that Aristobulus was concerned to be prosaic and undramatic in dealing with medical details, but in both cases Aristobulus' version of the facts shows his desire to protect Alexander against charges of lack of self-discipline (on the last illness cf. Pearson (1) 157-8). Curtius gives the story of Alexander's plunge into the Cydnus, but in the following sentence introduces an explanation of Alexander's action that answers any charge of recklessness. Curtius apologizes for Alexander's action by inventing a motive rather than the facts.

5.2: veste deposita

Cf. J. xi, 8.3; but as the legend developed Alexander was held to have dived into the water in full armour (Itin. Alex. xxviii).

5.2: in conspectu agminis (decorum quoque futurum ratus, si ostendisset suis levi ac parabili cultu corporis se esse contentum)

The statement that Alexander bathed in full view of his army is not given by Justin and Valerius Maximus, nor, for that matter by Plutarch, Arrian and Diodorus. The discrepancy does not, however, facilitate the identification of the source, as the comment in parenthesis shows why Curtius put the detail in: first, it gave Curtius an opportunity to comment on the qualities he expected of a military leader: Curtius returns to this topic at 6. 19-20; and secondly the emphasis on the simplicity of Alexander's style of living contrasts with the 'luxuria' of Darius' (3.17, though 'cultus' there refers to Darius' dress). 'Levi ac parabili cultu' was a significant phrase for Curtius, as the parallel phrase, 'parc^o ac parabili victu', used at vi, 2.3 and viii, 4.28, shows.

The Itinerarium Alexandri provides a similar motivation for Alexander's action, but it concerns the people of Tarsus rather than his own troops: his motive may have been 'ut fortitudinem sui intuentium civium theatro lactaret' (28).

5.3: vitalis calor

This phrase does not appear in the parallel passage of the other sources and is no doubt Curtian, repeated at vii, 3.14, viii, 4.8 and 12.

5.4: *ingens sollicitudo et paene iam luctus in castris erat*

Valerius Maximus words it rather differently: *maxima cum exaninatione totius exercitus* (iii, 8.36), but the idea is the same.

With these words Curtius introduces a lengthy section (5-8) representing the thoughts of Alexander's troops. Curtius here demonstrates his rhetorical skill. The passage is neatly constructed moving from grief at Alexander's fate to concern about the future and back in § 8 to pity for Alexander and complaint about the cruelty of Alexander's lot: the 'querebantur' of § 5 is repeated at the end of § 8 to round the section off.

5.6: *instare Dareum victorem*

Cf. in Valerius Maximus' account the phrase 'instantis victoriae spe'.

Silius Italicus, who perhaps borrowed elsewhere from Curtius, has at Punica ii, 250: *instat atrox terga increpitans fugientia victor*.

5.7: *quem signum daturum fugientibus? quem ausurum Alexandro succedere?*

Whilst this belongs to Curtius' rhetoric and cannot be taken as historical evidence, yet the implication that no one set himself up as Alexander's successor is probably valid.

Morale in the Macedonian camp was probably good in the summer of 333: men had been sent home on leave during the previous winter, the objectives were probably still modest (cf. 4.1), and so far the resistance on land had not been insuperable. Thus confidence in Alexander was probably high. The illness was obviously of short duration and Alexander was soon back in effective control.

5.7: *classem qua transeant quem praeparaturum?*

Proteas had a small federal fleet for the defence of the Greek coast (A. ii, 2. 4-5), but there is no mention of his name in Curtius (though see iv, 1.36). Curtius certainly knew that Hegelochus and Ampheterus were commissioned to build up a navy (iii, 1.19).

The men at Tarsus must have known that preparations were being made for a naval counter-offensive. Curtius' rhetoric obscures the facts, and furthermore comparison with 1.19 shows that he was content to sacrifice the facts to the rhetoric.

5.9: paulatim redeunte animo

Alexander's temporary recovery is not mentioned as such by Justin and Valerius Maximus. It did enable Alexander to deliver a speech and make soliloquies - duly recorded by Curtius. Justin, it seems, understood that Alexander remained in a comatose or semi-comatose state, hence the significant point in his account that Alexander had received Parmenion's letter of warning pridie, presumably on the day before he fell ill (J. xi, 8.5; cf. on 6.4).

Justin's 'pridie' should not be taken to mean the day before Alexander accepted Philip's medicine, in other words 'pridie' should not be regarded as the second day of Alexander's illness (infra 6. 3 and 8), since his reference to Parmenion being still in Cappadocia pushes the date of despatch of the letter earlier (cf. on 6.4).

5.10: quippe Dareum quinto die in Cilicia fore nuntiabatur

It is most unlikely that Alexander received such a report at Tarsus partly because of the great time lag between his arrival in Tarsus and the date of the battle, and partly because of what is known of Alexander's movements after his recovery (on these points see Appendix A).

Curtius in omitting details of Alexander's movements from Tarsus foreshortens the period between the sickness and the battle of Issus considerably. The result is that the history of the military events loses its rationale. Furthermore Curtius' abbreviation of the account raises the question whether he invented the report that Darius was only five days from Cilicia to heighten the drama of the situation: Alexander knew that Darius was approaching, but he delayed taking Philip's medicine for two days (C.R. iii, 6.3 and 8), and then he was not able to face his men for another two days (6.16). Then five reappears later as the number of days it took Darius to get his army across the Euphrates (7.1). However, Curtius' reference at 5.10 was at least partially taken

from his source, since Diodorus records that after Alexander's recovery, but before the despatch of Parmenion from Tarsus, Alexander heard that Darius was only 'a few days march' away (32.2).

Curtius proceeds in § 11 to a rhetorical elaboration of the imminence of the battle.

5.11-16: Alexander consults his doctors and friends

5.12: Dareus ergo cum tam superbas litteras scriberet,
fortunam meam in consilio habuit, sed nequiquam
si mihi arbitrio meo curari licet

For the much discussed letters that passed between Darius and Alexander (i.a. C.R. iv, 1.7 sq.) see Hamilton's commentary on Plut. Alex. 29, 7. The statement under discussion has apparently never been considered in connection with the other letters.

The first part of this statement fits in with what Curtius says about the other correspondence, for the tone of Darius' letters to Alexander was arrogant (cf. iv, 1.7 superbe scriptis), and in trying to persuade Alexander Darius played on the theme that 'fortuna' was fickle (iv, 5.2) and Alexander's very success presented him with grave dangers (iv, 11. 7 sq.). 'Fortuna' presumably has the same connotation here and does not refer to his misfortune in falling sick. For it is historically improbable that Darius learnt of Alexander's sickness and sent a letter to him before he began to recover, but one still has to explain Curtius' version. It does not suggest confusion with Darius' general offer of money for the murder of Alexander (§ 16 infra), nor his alleged communication with the physician Philip (6.4). However there is no other reference in the secondary sources to Alexander receiving a letter from Darius at this time. Perhaps therefore Curtius is referring back to correspondence which he mentioned in Bk. 1 or 2 - possibly to a letter written before or after the battle of Granicus. The Alexander Romance contains a plethora of letters and in Bk. 1, 39 mention is made of a letter addressed by Darius to his satraps west of the Taurus, presumably before Granicus: this may have evolved from the tradition that included our putative letter in the lost second book of Curtius' Histories (this point was noted by Vergés. Note too the letter of Darius sent to Alexander just before the

battle: Ps.Callisth. i, 40).

The phrase 'fortunam in consilio habere' recurs at v, 5.12,
cf. Livy xxxvi, 8.6.

5.13: lenta remedia et segnes medicos non expectant tempora
mea

Cf. Seneca de ira 3,1.2 mora, lentum praecipitis mali
remedium; de clem. 1, 17.1-2.

5.14: praeceps temeritas eius

Cf. on 1.17 and 8.10.

5.16: quippe Dareus mille talenta interfectori Alexandri
datum se pronuntiari iusserat

Darius may have claimed that he had hired Philip's murderers (A. ii, 14.5), but, whilst such a claim may have given him a propaganda advantage, it was not the truth and Darius hardly derived much benefit from Philip's murder (on the propaganda value of the claim Badian (3) p.248 and n.21). When Alexander was in Asia Darius could not be sure that the assassination of Alexander would check Macedonian imperialism, but by setting a price on Alexander's head Darius would have sown the seeds of suspicion and distrust in Alexander's camp. To this extent Curtius' statement here is plausible. However it is linked with the generally attested story of Darius' offer to Philip the physician (cf. 6.4 infra), and Curtius gives the same figure in both cases; thus Curtius may have invented a general offer from the particular case to add colouring to his dramatic picture of the desperate situation when Alexander lay ill and the doctors were too scared to attempt any radical cure. Indeed if Alexander was so well protected by the loyalty of his troops then no doctor could expect to kill Alexander and live to enjoy Darius' generosity.

Chapter 6: Philip the doctor offers a potent remedy, which Alexander takes despite a warning from Parmenion. Alexander is cured.

6.1: erat inter nobiles medicos ex Macedonia ..Philippus

The phraseology at the beginning of c.6 marks the beginning of a new section (the formula was used by Livy to introduce self-contained stories, e.g. erat tum inter equites .. [iv, 19.1], cf. iii, 11.6 and v, 27.1 and ii, 33.5 with the note ad loc. in Ogilvie's Commentary. Ogilvie [p.18] cites its use in the opening passages of novels, for example, Chariton of Aphrodisias i, 3 and Xenophon of Ephesus i, 1: ἦν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ πρῶτα ἔχεϊ δυναμένων, Δυκομήδης ὄνομα). This caesura, together with the following notes on Philip, checks the pace of the narrative and allows a fresh crescendo. The structuring in Diodorus' and Arrian's versions is less dramatic, with simple antitheses: τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων ἕκαστος ... Φίλιππος δὲ .. (31.5); τοῦς μὲν ἄλλους ἰατρούς ... Φίλιππον δὲ .. (ii, 4.8). Plutarch has a similar antithesis, fleshed out with comment on the doctors' fear of failure (Alex. 19, 3; cf. 5. 15-16 supra) Justin gives a different emphasis by starting 'unus erat ex medicis' (xi, 8.5).

6.1: Philippus, natione Acarnan

Cf. A. ii, 4.8 and D.S. 31.5.

A characteristic of Curtius' work is the denotation of Greeks and orientals by nationality rather than patronymics (cf. 3.1 supra and e.g. v, 5. 9 and 17), and the same can be observed in Diodorus' work too (e.g. 25.6; 64.5; 76.6), whereas Arrian more commonly gives the patronymic (e.g. ii, 13.7 [C.R. iv, 1.6 omits the patronymic]; 15.2 [contrast C.R. iii, 13.15]; iii, 5.4 [contrast C.R. iv, 8.5]; 6.8; but ii, 13.2; 15.5 and iii, 2.5). Duris was noted by Diogenes Laertius as an authority on the identification of cities to which people belonged (FGH 76 frags. 75-77), but there are no idiosyncracies in Curtius' prosopographical data to confirm a connection.

On this Philip, Berve ii, no. 788; P. Treves RE xix, 2549-2550.

6.1: inter nobiles medicos ... fidus admodum regi

Arrian's version is slightly different: Philip was highly trusted in medical matters and generally enjoyed a high reputation in the army (ii, 4.8). Curtius throws the emphasis on the personal element in Alexander's dilemma, hence the following background information to explain Philip's loyalty.

Diodorus does not mention Parmenion's letter warning Alexander against Philip, and thus he had no reason to mention the relationship between Alexander and Philip before Alexander's illness. However Diodorus concludes with the information that upon his recovery Alexander raised Philip εἰς τοὺς ἐθνουσιώτατους τῶν φίλων (31.6; Welles translates 'assigned him to the most loyal category of Friends', but the adjective suggests that the meaning is non-technical, 'made Philip one of the closest of his friends').

6.1: puero comes et custos salutis datus

Curtius elsewhere refers to Alexander's boyhood, in mentioning Hephaestion (iii, 12.16) and Lanike (viii, 1.21). Plutarch naturally makes many references to his boyhood, but Arrian only touches on it in referring to Lanike (iv, 9.3). Curtius was therefore interested in the early events of Alexander's life, and used a source which gave the details. Furthermore Curtius' references are quite neutral and do not therefore point directly to a tendentious account of the type assumed for Stoics, Cynics and Peripatetics by J. Stroux (Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders des Gr., Philologus lxxxviii, '33 222 sq., an article that must now be reconsidered in the light of the observations by Badian (7) 144 sq., and Mensing Hist xii, '63 274 sq.).

Callisthenes is not a likely candidate as Curtius' source, since his mandate was to write a history of the campaigns rather than a biography of Alexander. Aristobulus was prone to be discursive, but Curtius did not follow him on the story of Alexander's sickness with regard to the cause of the illness (5.2). But Callisthenes and Aristobulus cannot be ruled out. Similarly Cleitarchus cannot be excluded, although Curtius' references to Alexander's boyhood are not matched by Diodorus and Justin. One can however consider other possibilities: Timagenes, who wrote a discursive work On Kings which Curtius used at least at ix, 5.21; Marsyas of Pella, whose work on Alexander seems to have covered Alexander's boyhood and

education (FGH 135 with Jacoby's commentary); Chares, who recorded a tale involving the paedagogus, Lysimachus (Plut. Alex 24, 12). If Onesicritus did in fact write on Alexander's education (Diog. Laertius vi, 84 need not be taken as proof that he did: so argues Pearson (1) 83 sq.), then he is still not a likely candidate as Curtius' source, since Curtius could hardly have followed Onesicritus on the events of Alexander's stay in Cilicia without attributing the camp near the Cilician Gates to Cyrus the Younger. For Onesicritus was greatly influenced by Xenophon's works.

The friendship between Philip and Alexander was stressed too by Plutarch, Arrian and Valerius Maximus: erat autem ipsius amicus et comes (iii, 8. ext. 6). Significantly Valerius cites this story in his section de constantia; Justin and Diodorus did not comment on Alexander's unswerving trust in his friends à propos of this incident and naturally omitted mention of the friendship.

6.2: is non praeceps se, sed strenuum remedium adferre ... promisit

With the phrase 'non praeceps' contrast Diodorus' συνπρόμοις θεραπεύσεως. Compare 5.13 'lenta remedia' and Seneca's formula linking 'lentum' and 'praeceps': mora lentum praecipitis mali remedium (de ira 3, I.2).

Curtius prepares for the description of the grim effects which the drug had on Alexander.

6.2: nulli promissum eius placebat praeter ipsum cuius periculo pollicebatur

Valerius Maximus is alone in saying that the rest of the doctors supported Philip's proposed mixture.

Whilst Curtius and Diodorus say the drug was potentially dangerous to Alexander, Plutarch stresses the risk which Philip ran in offering the medicine: συγκινδυνεύσει .. παραβαλλόμενος. This participle echoes Diodorus' παραβόλοις and suggests that Plutarch knew the source which Diodorus used (Plut. Alex. 19, 4; D.S. 31, 5).

6.3: omnia quippe facilius quam moram perpeti poterat; arma et acies in oculis erant et victoriam in eo positam esse arbitrabatur, si tantum ante signa stare potuisset

Diodorus is the only other source to provide a motivation for the acceptance of Philip's proposal: it was reported that Darius

had already left Babylon (31.6). Curtius has already covered Darius' advance at 5.6 and 10: the mention here of the imminent battle marks the next dramatic stage in the foreshadowing of Issus.

Curtius comments not infrequently on Alexander's impatience, cf. on 1.17. The reference to Alexander's belief that victory would depend on his own participation in the next battle, reflects Curtius' concern to emphasize Alexander's personal contribution to the Macedonian run of successes (on this central theme see e.g. W. Rutz Hermes '65 esp. 374 sq.). The ground is here prepared for the description of Alexander's part in the battle of Issus (osp. 11.7 sq.).

6.3: id ipsum, quod post diem tertium medicamentum
sumpturus esset, - ita enim medicus praedixerat, -
aegre ferens

The time lapse before Alexander took the medicine appears too in Plutarch's account (Alex. 19, 6). Plutarch, however, does not mention the length of the delay before Alexander took the medicine. Curtius may have found the figure in his source, since Justin says that Alexander recovered on the fourth day (xi, 8.9; see further on § 16 infra; Rabe fails to deal with this point although it provides a solid link between Plutarch, Curtius and Justin) or he might have calculated the figure from a source that gave detail similar to that offered by Justin. Curtius' explanation for the delay ingeniously defies disproof. The delay assists the creation of a climax, and the characterisation of Alexander as an impatient man.

6.4: inter haec a Parmenione fidissimo purpuratorum litteras
accipit

Seneca's version of this episode (Dial. iv, [=De Ira ii] 23.2) attributes the warning letter to Olympias' hand: Seneca confused Parmenion's letter on Philip with Olympias' letter on the Lyncestian Alexander, or simply twisted the facts. Either way, Seneca's rehash of the myth makes his point de ira more dramatically but is consequently not of any value in a discussion on Curtius and his sources.

Curtius here appears to contradict himself as Parmenion is said to have reached Tarsus before Alexander (4.15 supra), and no mention has been made of his departure from Tarsus. It may be

posited from Curtius' account that Parmenion was at this time between Tarsus and Issus, as Alexander next met up with Parmenion at Castabulum (7.6 infra): thus Curtius may have omitted a stage in the narrative. Arrian after dealing with Alexander's sickness and then his recovery records that Parmenion was sent off to the Syrian Gates (ἐκ δὲ τούτου Παρμενίωνα μὲν πέμπει ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας πύλας A.ii, 5.1 cf. D.S. 32.2), but the phrase ἐκ δὲ τούτου need not be taken too literally in a temporal sense and Parmenion may have been sent ahead while Alexander was still sick and because he was sick (Schachermeyr 169-170 and n. 113, contra Judeich, *Issos*, 358, n. 2. Schachermeyr concentrates on historical probabilities but there is a more immediate point to be made: with the phrase ἐκ δὲ τούτου Arrian moves from a summary of the sickness and of the incident with Philip, given in oratio obliqua, back to the main narrative; thus the phrase indicates a switch from one source or group of sources to another, just as at ii, 1.1 Arrian uses the same phrase as he switches sources to digress on Memnon's activities. If the phrase is taken literally at ii, 1.1 it would mean that the capture of Chios came later than Alexander's entry into Gordium which is perhaps unlikely. The phrase is used again at iii, 18.1, perhaps coincidentally, to introduce another mission of Parmenion).

However, the development of the story of Parmenion's letter must be considered, and the mythical elements removed. According to Justin, Parmenion's letter was sent to Alexander from Cappadocia (xi, 8.4), but this conflicts with Arrian's report that Parmenion had passed through the Cilician Gates with the heavy-armed units before any attempt was made to take Tarsus (A. ii, 4.4 and 6). Parmenion may indeed have reached Tarsus before Alexander (cf. on 4.15 supra). It would be difficult to use Justin to disprove Curtius' statement that Parmenion was sent ahead to take Tarsus. Justin's account emphasizes Parmenion's ignorance of Alexander's collapse (xi, 8.6), whereas this is not stated by other authors and the natural implication of statements by Curtius in this paragraph and by A. ii, 4.9 and Plut. *Alex.* 19, 5, is that Parmenion was aware of Alexander's illness. Then Justin underlines Parmenion's ignorance that Alexander was in danger by recording that the king had received the letter 'pridie', presumably on the day before he fell ill (J. xi, 8.5), whereas the other writers set the arrival of the letter in the period after Alexander collapsed (C.R.'s 'inter haec' matches

the phrase ἐν νότῳ of A. ii, 4.9 and Plut. Alex. 19, 5; Valerius Maximus 'improves' upon this timing - iii, 8 ext. 6). In Justin's account, therefore, the point is stressed that Parmenion's letter was relevant to a crisis which he could not have anticipated. In the unabridged version of Trogus the point could have been developed for dramatic effect, but it could also have been used to stress Parmenion's innocence. This is significant, for, Justin's account of the fall of Parmenion and Philotas is marked by the belief that they were innocent and wrongly killed (xii, 5. 3-4), whereas, by contrast, Curtius thought that both had erred into treasonable action (e.g. vi, 9.13 and 11.21). The individuality of Justin's account of Parmenion's letter to Alexander is explicable.

The contradictions between Curtius' and Justin's accounts disprove Seel's thesis that Curtius based his account on Trogus (Trogus 92-3). The source used by Trogus presumably, like Arrian, recorded that Alexander led the advance party into Tarsus. Trogus, Curtius and Arrian therefore offer three different accounts in terms of the sequence of events.

This raises the question of the historicity of the letter (doubts about its historicity were expressed for instance by F. Rühl Neue Jahrbücher für Phil. u. Paedagogik ccxxiii, 1881 361-4 followed by Berve ii, p. 301 and no. 788. Hackmann suggested that the letters of iv, 10.16 were a doublet of Darius' letter to Philip [Kroll Studien 337 n. 13]).

Undoubtedly the tradition was generally repeated in the sources, and was altered in transmission (cf. the next note on the bribes offered to Darius, and Merkelbach Quellen 91). If the story was sound, how did it first emerge? Curtius presents a picture of an apparently private encounter between Philip and Alexander, and says that, before Alexander took the medicine, he told noone what was in the letter (§ 7 cf. Plut. Alex. 19, 5). Arrian's version means that Alexander revealed the contents of Parmenion's letter when the allegations it contained had been or could be proved groundless; in doing this he could make Parmenion look foolish. If the letter was genuine, Curtius' revision of the story is more likely to be correct: the matter was not publicized at the time. Further, if Parmenion had discovered positive evidence of bribery by Darius, it could have been used against Darius, but it is not mentioned in the catalogue

of grievances reputedly addressed by Alexander to Darius (A. ii, 14.4; the omission of the Lyncestian Alexander's dealings with Darius can be explained by the fact that he had not yet been brought to trial [C.R. vii, 1. 6 & 8, viii, 8.6 and D.S. 80.2]; Griffith has put the case for believing that Arrian's version of Darius' first letter was the one forged by Alexander [cf. D.S. 39. 1-2; G.T. Griffith (4) 33 sq.], but the point about Alexander's catalogue of grievances does not depend on acceptance or rejection of Griffith's theory, though the whole tradition about this letter may be false). If the story of Parmenion's letter only came out after his death, one has no guarantee of its historicity.

Parmenion's absence from Tarsus is necessitated by the story of the letter, but, if the story of the letter was invented, the necessity for Parmenion's absence is removed.

Parmenion's loyalty to Alexander's régime was demonstrated in a series of security actions: the elimination of Attalus (D.S. 2.4 sq. and 7.2 with Badian [3] 249-250), the exposure and arrest of the Lyncestian Alexander (A. i, 25. 4-10), the suppression of letters from Darius that had been intercepted (C.R. iv, 10. 16-17). Thus this story fits into a pattern, but the pattern does not prove its historicity.

The phrase 'fidissimo purpuratorum' may indicate that Curtius was using a source that was biased in favour of Parmenion, but the phrase may have been inserted for dramatic effect as it underlines the dilemma which Alexander faced on receiving the warning against his friend Philip, and, as a minor digression it helps to retard the pace of the story after the minor climax in § 3.

6.4: mille talentis a Dareo et spe nuptiarum sororis eius esse corruptum

The figure of 1,000 talents for the size of the bribe offered to the doctor Philip by Darius appears too in the anonymous history preserved in a papyrus probably of the second century A.D. (P.Ox. 1798 = Jacoby FGH II B no. 148 and Pearson (1) 255-6). Other writers refer to a bribe without giving any definite figure: Justin xi, 8.6, A. ii, 4.9; Plut. Alex. 19, 5. The Papyrus history, Curtius (iii, 6.4), Iul. Val. (ii, 24) and Ps. Callisthenes (ii, 8, both A and B traditions) say that Darius offered Philip the hand of his sister in marriage; Plutarch makes it Darius' daughter. The most generous offer appears in Ps. Callisthenes: $\chi\omicron\lambda\iota\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu\delta\omicron\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$

τῆς βασιλείας (ii, 8.5 with the reading of A).

The same figure appears in the earlier episode of the fall of the Lyncestian Alexander, who, according to Arrian, was offered one thousand talents if he staged a successful coup d'état (A. i, 25.3). This Alexander was a plausible candidate to be the figure-head of a coup d'état, and his fall was precipitated by Parmenion's arrest of a Persian agent Sisines. One may ask whether Darius had the Intelligence and Special Operations units capable of making such plans, but the answer in this case is that the initiative came from the Lyncestian and not from Susa (A. i, 25.3). Thus Darius' offer of support to the Lyncestian Alexander is within the bounds of historical possibility.

The doctor Philip was however not a possible figure-head for revolt (though he was an influential figure, A. ii, 4.8) and his long association with Alexander hardly made him an obvious target for Darius' agents. Furthermore the allegations made against Philip by Parmenion were shown to be false. We can exclude the possibility that Darius' agents planted false information against Philip, from the 'cui bono' argument and because Philip was not a possible figure-head for revolt.

Two possibilities would seem to remain: either Parmenion did in fact send a letter to Alexander motivated by some personal dislike of Philip and distrust of him: Philip was, after all a Greek and not a Macedonian; or the tale of Parmenion's letter was elaborated to make some point about Parmenion (cf. P. Treves RE xix ('38) s.v. Philippos (63) 2549: 'ad maiorem gloriam Parmenions' or 'ad maiorem gloriam der Geisteshöhe des Königs .. und .. der Treue und Vorsicht Parmenions'). The story could be told to glorify Parmenion's loyalty or to castigate him as a troublemaker (in Curtius' case the epithet 'fidissimus' points to the former).

Curtius accepted the story as historical fact and presented the tale sympathetically to the three parties concerned, which is significant, since Curtius had witnessed the work of delatores in Rome, but this did not make him overtly critical of the delatores in Alexander's court, though Parmenion was not a common delator and Curtius later deals with delation as a manifestation of Alexander's corruption (x, 1.39 sq.). Admittedly it was generally difficult to attack the delatores, as such action meant sawing at the

props of the principate. The bias in Curtius' narrative emerges later in this chapter where he describes Alexander's dilemma on receiving information against Philip (vide ad y 6 infra).

6.5: *ingentem animo sollicitudinem litterae inusserant*

Curtius indulges in a flight of imagination on Alexander's feelings upon receiving Parmenion's letter. §§ 5 and 6 are Curtian, but probably inspired by rhetoric found in a source cf. § 6 infra or in exercises of the rhetorical schools; In Valerius' account Alexander read the letter and promptly drank the medicine 'sine ulla cunctatione'.

The metaphorical use of 'incutere' is found frequently in Curtius' work, e.g. iii, 5.14; 8.25; iv, 10.2.

The attribution to Alexander of fear and anxiety in Curtius' account plays its part in the antithesis built up between Alexander and his enemy (cf. iv, 2.14 with 10-13 and Rutz Hermes '65 374; iv, 13.15 sq. with 13-14). Curtius, furthermore, adds a dynamic element to the story by making Alexander fluctuate between bold self-confidence and anxiety or fear (e.g. 7.3, 8.10 and 20 sq., 10.3 sq.). In this passage Curtius marks Alexander's transition from anxiety to confidence (§ 9), and contrasts Alexander's anxiety with the physician's self-confidence (5.14-6.2 and 10).

6.6: *at satius est alieno me mori scelere quam metu nostro*

This sentence closes a soliloquy attributed to Alexander by Curtius. His source or sources may have contained similar excrescences, for a parallel passage appears in Justin: *tutius tamen ratus dubiae se fidei medici credere quam indubitato morbo perire* (xi, 8.7). Curtius' version is more dramatic, adding a comment on Alexander's concern about his own prestige. Justin's version says that a man in danger cannot afford to fear the possible means of recovery, an idea such as appears in the exchange between the Nurse and Clytaemnestra in Seneca's Agamemnon:

Caeca est temeritas quae petit casum ducem.

Cui ultima est fortuna, quid dubiam timet? (145-6, cf. Ovid Trist. i, 4.4). Curtius combines this idea with the commonplace that fear must not stand in the way of the acquisition of glory: *letique metu decora alta relinquam?* asked Hannibal (Silius iii, 144, cf. Verg. Aen. iv, 176 and Lucan i, 460 and cf. Lucan viii, 576, Pompey's

thought - letumque iuvat praeferre timori). Curtius' version had significance for the period in which he lived. Curtius saw courage as a quality needed by a leader, and coupled with courage the confidence to demonstrate trust in his officers even in situations where their loyalty was being tested. Gaius Caligula was an excessively nervous man (Suet. Gaius 51, 1), at least in the period after his nervous breakdown, and he could not let any hint of disloyalty amongst his aides pass without question (Suet. Gaius 55, 1).

In Curtius' view it was natural and right that an emperor should receive information about disaffection amongst his officers, but he had to take calculated risks in order to foster mutual trust. Curtius develops the broader argument whether a leader should take risks, in dialogue which he attributes to Craterus and Alexander at ix, 6.3 sq., and there he repeats the point made here that the autocrat's defence against assassination is the loyalty of his officers and subjects (ix, 6.24 sq.).

6.7: nulli quid scriptum esset enuntiat epistulamque ...
pulvino cui incubabat subiecit

Plutarch says precisely the same (Alex. 19, 5).

6.8: biduo assumpto

Cf. §§ 3 and 16 and note on 5.10.

6.9: epistulam a Parmenione missam sinistra manu tenens

Cf. A. ii, 4.9: τὴν ἐπιστολὴν .. ἔτι μετὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντα.

6.9: tum epistulam Philippum legere iubet

Valerius Maximus likewise set Alexander's orders to Philip after he had drunk the medicine, whereas Justin, Plutarch and Arrian say that Philip read the letter as Alexander drank the medicine. The difference concerns the dramatic quality of the story rather than its historicity.

Bardon inverts the order of the words 'legere Philippum' without citing the reading of the codd. and without explanation (K. Müller (2) 630).

6.10: plus indignationis quam pavoris

Arrian similarly says that Philip was not smitten with fear (ii, 4.10).

6.10: semper quidem spiritus meus ex te pependit.

The combination of 'spiritus' and 'pependit' is clumsy. The metaphorical use of 'pendere' was normally associated with the abstract nouns, such as 'fama' (Livy ii, 7.10) or 'salus' (Silius iii, 109).

6.10: nunc vere arbitror sacro et venerabili ore tuo trahitur

The codd. read: ore trahitur. Bardon here follows, as he says, Dosson (though the emendation was proposed earlier by Arnoldus Hug: Büttner p.5). However this emendation produces an unacceptable pentameter ending. 'Ore trahi tuo' apparently first suggested by Meiser (1887), would provide an acceptable clausula. The emendation to 'trahi tuo' supplies the missing adjective, with minimal violation of the codd., and it removes the untypical parenthesis 'arbitror' by turning 'trahitur' into an infinitive dependent on 'arbitror'. Deferment of the possessive adjective to the end of the period occurs often (arguments in favour of 'trahi tuo' were carefully advanced by Büttner 5 and 36-7, though he did not deal with the issue of the clausula). Prof. Badian has suggested to me the simpler change: ore trahitur <tuo>.

The emotional rhetoric of this passage matches Plutarch's picture of Philip's behaviour on reading the letter (Alex. 19, 7-8).

6.11: non securum modo haec vox sed etiam laetum regem
ac plenum bonae spei fecit

The phraseology resembles that of Justin: 'ut securum conspexit, laetior factus est' (xi, 8.9), though whilst 'securum' in Curtius' version refers to Alexander, in Justin's it refers to Philip (See Trogus p.92, who notes too Trogus' liking for coupling 'securus' and 'laetus' - xiii, 2.1 and xlii, 4.8; the repetition would support my argument that Curtius read Trogus and was influenced by his style, but links in phraseology do not offset discrepancies in detail).

6.14: ceterum tanta vis medicamenti fuit, ut, quae secuta sunt,
criminationem Parmenionis adiuverint

Jacoby noted the contrast between the promptitude of the cure in Diodorus' account (31.6), and Curtius' more plausible account of a critical period that intervened before Alexander was cured (RE xi, s.v. Kleitarchos 646). However, it is not necessary

to assume that the two authors were here following different sources.

Plutarch also says that Alexander lapsed into a coma after taking the drug (Alex. 19, 9), thus the set-back was not invented by Curtius.

6.14: ille torpentem nunc cibi, nunc vini odore excitavit

Hoddicke proposed changing 'cibi' to 'cibo' (cf. Paladini Latomus xx, '61 394), but whilst the emendation might be a stylistic improvement it does not suit the context.

It is possible that the phraseology was consciously echoed by Silius Italicus in his description of Marus tending the wounded Serranus:

torpentes mitigat artus.

exin cura seni, tristem depellere fesso

ore sitim et parca vires accersere mensa

(vi, 93-5 ; R.T. Bruère argued that Silius took his inspiration for two episodes in his epic, Punica iii, 62-162 and iv, 763-822, from passages in Curtius, iv, 3.20 and 23; Bruère, GP '52 219 sq.),

6.15: matris sororumque

Alexander had only one blood-sister, Cleopatra, and his concern for her is recorded in Plutarch's reference to spoils which he sent to her after the capture of Tyre (Plut. Alex. 25, 6; Berve ii, no. 433).

Of his half-sisters Europa was one of the victims of the purge which followed on Philip's murder (Justin ix, 7.2 with Plut. Alex. 10, 8, and Athenaeus xiii, 557E; according to Pausanias the child was not a female but a male, viii, 7.7). Two half-sisters, Thessalonike and Cynnane, are recorded as still living after Alexander's death (Berve ii, nos. 370 and 456), but there is no evidence to shed light on Alexander's opinion of them. However Plutarch (Alex. 25, 6) supports the assumption of a special relationship between Alexander and Cleopatra, which is likely in view of the history of Philip's family.

Curtius repeats the reference to Alexander's sisters in a speech attributed to Alexander in Hecatompylus, where Alexander said that military considerations prevented him from yielding to the natural impulse to rush home 'ad penates neos, ad parentem sororesque

et ceteros cives' (vi, 3.5).

If Curtius completed his work in Claudius' reign then Curtius' otiose reference to Alexander's sisters here may have been inspired by Gaius' 'pietas' towards his sisters, especially Drusilla (cf. Suet. Gaius 24; when it was safe to denounce Caligula, 'pietas' was turned into incest; his other two sisters, Agrippina and Julia Livilla, enjoyed some status before their exile late in A.D. 39: G.W. Clarke speaks of their 'powerful influence' with their brother [Seneca the younger under Caligula Latonus xxiv, '65 65; he cites Suet. Gaius 15.3 and CIL xi, 5998a], but this is perhaps an exaggeration [E. Meise Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Julisch-Claudischen Dynastie '69, 100 and n.54]).

6.16: prino

Bardon changes the mss. reading 'prinum' to 'prino' without comment. The emendation is not justified (cf. Müller (2) 630).

6.16: post tertium diem quam in hoc statu fuerat in
conspectum militum venit

This probably means two days after taking the medicine (cf. 5.10), rather than two days after he fell sick, in other words on the same day as he took the medicine. Justin's expression: sanitaten .. quarta die recepit (xi, 8.9) supports the former interpretation. Curtius' statement differs from Diodorus Siculus' that the doctor effected an immediate cure: εὐθὺς ἀπήλλαξε τῆς νόσου τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον (31.6).

Curtius was clearly attracted to three day periods cf. v, 4.17, vii, 8.7, viii, 2.10 and 12.15.

6.17: grates habebant velut praesenti deo

Nett (pp. 34-5) proposed emending the verb to 'agebant' with the support of the original reading in a manuscript in the Vatican collection, but the lectio difficillior should be preferred. 'Grates' was a poetic form used again at ix, 6. 17; the formula was used too, for instance, by Plautus, Livy and Tacitus.

Hellenistic historians had numerous tales to tell of flatterers making ridiculous displays of sympathy when their king was ill or wounded (Athenaeus vi 248 f sq., 249 f sq., 251 a sq.; 251 c

quotes Phylarchus on an exchange between Alexander and a man called Nicesias [Berve ii, no. 564]; cf. Strasburger [2] 24 sq.), but Curtius here avoids a satirical tone.

6.17: erga reges suos venerationem

Cf. vii, 8.4: tanta erat apud eos veneratio regis.

6.18: nihil sine divina ope adgredi videbatur

In this peroration to the story of Alexander's illness Curtius plays again on the theme de Alexandri fortuna aut virtute. By using 'videbatur' he avoids committing himself to a belief that Alexander enjoyed divine aid (cf. the oratio obliqua clause at iv, 2.16: quod vix divina ope posset impleri; generally on Curtius' scepticism McQueen, Curtius Rufus 32-3).

After this mention of divine aid Curtius deals with facets of Alexander's leadership which particularly impressed him: Alexander's readiness to take risks, his ability to overcome the inexperience of youth and his submission to a soldier's way of life. The section is rounded off with the comment that Alexander owed his qualities both to the gift of nature and to his own efforts.

Diodorus has something similar, saying that Philip's treatment of Alexander was successful and Philip had the assistance of Alexander's natural strength and good fortune - τὴν φύσιν.. καὶ τὴν τύχην (3I.6).

6.18: temeritas

Cf. on 1.17.

6.19: aetas quoque, vix tantis matura rebus sed abunde sufficiens omnia eius opera honestabat

This may be contrasted with the description of the Immortals at 3.13: cultus opulentiae barbarae non alios magis honestabat. The verb is used again by Curtius only at vi, 2.6.

If one sees a reference in § 15 to Caligula's pietas towards his sisters, then this may veil a reference to Caligula's youthfulness.

6.19: quae leviora haberi solent, plerumque militari gratiora vulgo sunt

Much of Gaius Caligula's popularity rested on his military training (Suet. C. 9: per hanc nutrimentorum consuetudinem). Both

Alexander and the Roman emperors had to create for themselves charismatic rôles within their armies. Gaius was concerned 'ut se acrem ac severum ducem ostenderet' (Suet. C. 44, 1). The historical circumstances were different; but the dialectic was the same. Both built up and maintained professional armies, and the products of this professionalism were alienation from the civilian population and in many cases alienation from the objectives of the particular campaign or war. The identification of Alexander or the emperor with his troops was a means of countering this alienation.

Curtius mentions the symptom of the troops' discontent and a remedy. No doubt it was judicious to pursue the matter no further. However he had no reason to avoid a patronising comment on the common trooper, for he belonged to and was writing for the politico-officer class.

6.19: exercitatio corporis inter ipsos, cultus habitusque paulum a privato abhorrens, militaris vigor

In the structure of this book this list of Alexander's military qualities rounds off the story of his illness by echoing the opening section 5.2.

6.20: vel ingenii dotibus vel animi artibus

Vel .. vel are here correlatives rather ^{than} adversatives as the context makes clear. Thus Alexander possessed both virtus and fortuna.

6.20: ut pariter carus ac verendus esset, effecerat

Bardon follows M in reading 'verendus', against the reading of PBLV, verecundus. K. Müller noted that B^c abbreviated the word to 'verendus' with a symbol subscript to denote 'cu'. Müller cites this crux as an example of M's dependence on B via B^c (Müller [2] 633).

Chapters 5 and 6: Sources and Composition

The story in chapter 5 of Alexander falling sick and of the reluctance of the doctors to try any novel cure is highly elaborate when considered beside the other accounts. The rhetoric shows the influence of his source or sources and of the schools of rhetoric, but is surely fundamentally of Curtius' own invention, and,

as has been noted (§ 7), Curtius sometimes ignored the facts in concocting speeches.

Curtius is careful to present Alexander's plunge into the Cydnus not as a rash but natural impulse - this is how others saw it, and why Aristobulus denied a link between the illness and any swim in the river - but at least in part as a calculated move to impress his troops (§ 2). This establishes a theme that runs through these two chapters, Alexander's ability to impress his troops and hold their loyalty, his qualities as a general.

The latter part of chapter 5 emphasizes the pressure on Alexander's doctors not to endanger Alexander's life further by dangerous remedies. This is dramatic preparation for the story of Philip's bold proposal.

The story of Parmenion's letter is improbable as Curtius gives it: Curtius does not explain the circumstances of Parmenion's absence from the camp nor Parmenion's source of information, and the reference to Darius' offer to Philip of a marriage alliance with his sister must surely have struck Curtius as odd. Curtius develops the tale, rather as Valerius Maximus did, to make points about Alexander and the art of leadership, and also to show his own skill as a narrator.

The formula with which Curtius opens chapter 6 belongs to the style of Hellenistic novels. The amici are then pushed into the background as Curtius highlights the main characters, Philip and Alexander. Alexander's motivation for taking the drug and his frame of mind as he waited provide scope for both comment on his impatience and foreshadowing of the following battle (§ 3). Again a break is made, at the end of § 3, and Curtius builds up to a fresh climax as he tells of the arrival of the letter from Parmenion. The suspense is maintained as Alexander considers what to do (§§ 5-7, a mixture of stylized rhetoric and Curtius' ideas), and then resolves, without informing anyone of his dilemma, to trust Philip. The pitch is lowered by the pedestrian phrases at the beginning of § 8, and another climax is built up till Alexander takes the drug and Philip reads the letter. Philip's reaction and dialogue between him and Alexander provide a lengthy interruption in the narrative: the story seems to be over as Alexander accepts his word and shakes him by the hand (§ 12). Then, as a peripeteia, comes the record that Alexander

fell into a coma (§13). More padding is introduced (§§ 13-16) before the final recovery is mentioned. In the epilogue to the story Curtius deals with the army's relief at his recovery, and the reasons for Alexander's popularity with the troops (§§ 17 and 19): this section balances that at the beginning where the troops' dismay at Alexander's collapse is described (5.4 sq.).

Curtius must surely be credited with those elements that control the pace of the story and with the elaboration of the rhetorical dialogue and of the thoughts attributed to Alexander.

Before Curtius' sources are discussed it is necessary to comment on compositional elements in the versions of Valerius Maximus, Justin and Diodorus. Valerius is least important: the major point on which he diverges from the other sources is in maintaining that all the doctors concurred in Philip's prescription. Since Valerius' aim was to illustrate the constancy of Alexander's trust in his friends, and the nub of the story is that Alexander trusted Philip against Parmenion's warning, Valerius cannot be relied upon for detail incidental to the main part of the story. Justin's version is of greater importance and it contains as we have seen, three statements that do not appear elsewhere: Parmenion's letter was sent from Cappadocia, Parmenion wrote it unaware that Alexander was ill, and the letter reached Alexander on the day before Philip proposed a cure. These three statements are linked and demonstrate cumulatively that Parmenion acted independently and was not involved in any intrigue in that he had no idea that Philip had immediate cause to administer Alexander a drug. This version is more dramatic than the other accounts, but, as has been argued, the tale may have been composed to accord with the account, which appears in Justin xii, that Parmenion was innocent of any treason when Alexander had him killed. The consistency of these two passages may suggest that the individuality of Justin's account of Parmenion's letter was due to Trogus' writing of the story. So much is clear, that Justin's history is sympathetic to Parmenion, whereas Callisthenes was probably obliged - certainly after Parmenion's death - to take a less sympathetic line (cf. Badian (8) 329 n. 15, and Hamilton (1) p. 89 on Plut. Alex. 33, 10; Pearson (1) 47 fails to prove the contrary).

Diodorus' version differs from the other sources in omitting Alexander's swim in the Cydnus and the story of Parmenion's letter. As Curtius records that Parmenion was sent ahead to Tarsus

(4.15, cf. on 6.4) and Parmenion's presence in Tarsus would not fit in with the tale of his letter; it could be that Diodorus employed a source used by Curtius for 4.15, but not for 6.6. However Diodorus' omission could have been purely compositional. One can similarly explain another discrepancy: in Diodorus' version, Philip's status in Alexander's court resulted from his successful treatment of Alexander (31.6); in the versions of A., Plut. and Curtius Philip enjoyed some eminence before Alexander fell ill. Diodorus may have transposed the detail on Philip's status to the end of his tale to make the point that Alexander knew how to show gratitude; without the letter the story could not illustrate his willingness to run security risks.

Taking first the story of how Alexander fell sick we may tabulate the points of detail on which the sources differ as follows. In this table

0 = omitted, meaning more precisely that the source does not contradict

C = detail contradicted

	C.R.	J.	Val.	Max.	Itin.	Alex.	A.	D.S.	Plut.
a) The Cydnus flowed through Tarsus	X	X	X		X	X	0	0	
b) The temperature was high	X	0	X		X	X	0	0	
c) The water temperature was low	X	4.9	X	X	X	X	0	X	
This detail was perhaps not given by Aristobulus as it was irrelevant to his account of Alexander's sickness - cf. Plut. <u>Alex.</u> 19,2.									
d) explanation of iciness of the Cydnus	4.9	A	0	0	0	B	0	0	
e) illness the direct result of the swim but illness the direct result of fatigue - according to Aristobulus	X	X	X		X	X	0	X	
f) motivation for the swim:						X		X	
(i) to cool down and clean up	X	X	X		X	X	0	0	
(ii) the attractiveness of the river		X	X		X				
(iii) to impress the troops/ the citizens	X				X				
g) Alexander stripped for action	X	X	0		C	0	0	0	
h) insomnia a symptom of the illness	0	0	0		0	X	0	0	
i) (i) Darius reported 5/a few days away	X		0		0	but cf. 31	0	X	0
(ii) Alex. received this report in Cappadocia		X							
j) Darius' price on Alexander's head	X	0	0		0	0	0	0	

This analysis shows that Curtius did not follow Aristobulus, and as he differs from Arrian on two points of detail (d - C.R. 4.9 with A. ii, 4.7; and h - A. ii, 4.8, omitted by Curtius) it is likely that Curtius consulted a source not covered by Arrian's $\sigma\delta$. The difference between Curtius and Justin on point i (C.R. 5.10 with J. xi, 8. 1-2) is significant and likewise suggests the use of different sources.

The Itinerarium shows the accretion of detail for rhetorical and romantic effect.

Turning to the story of Philip's bid to save Alexander's life and Parmenion's warning letter, we can tabulate the substantive points on which the sources differ as follows (excluding the points about Parmenion which are peculiar to Justin's account):

	C.R.	J.	Val.	Max.	A.	D.S.	Plut.
a) Philip- trusted before this episode	X	0	X	X	0	X	
b) Philip - puero comes	X	0	0	0	0	0	
Callisthenes, <u>Aristobulus</u> and <u>Onesicritus</u> are unlikely to have been the source on this.							
c) Philip - alone in suggesting a risky cure	X		0		X	X	
Philip - the only one to offer any cure		X		X		X	
d) Darius' offer to Philip (1,000 talents (money	X	0	0	0	0	0	0
(ii) (Darius' sister	0	X	X	X	0	X	
(Darius' daughter	X	0	0	0	0	0	0
e) Alex. did not divulge the contents of <u>Parmenion's</u> letter before taking the medicine	X	0	0	0	0	0	X
f) Philip administered the drug in the presence of other officials	0	0	0	0	0	0	X
g) Alex.drunk before giving Philip the letter to read: the difference between the sources could be	X	0	X	0	0	0	0
h) Alex.fell into a coma ^{compositional}	X	0	0	0	0	0	X
i) temporal references quantified	X	X	0	0	0	0	0

It will be seen that Curtius differs from Plutarch on only one point that could not be compositional (d ii), the identity of the woman offered to Alexander, but even here Curtius and Plutarch are at one in mentioning a marriage offer: Arrian does not have this detail. A feature common to the accounts of Plutarch and Curtius is the mood of the troops before and after Alexander's recovery, and in items c and h Plutarch and Curtius offer detail not found in Arrian.

However Arrian's version is brief and discrepancies may have arisen from his abridgement.

Arrian's version was apparently not based on Aristobulus (pace Rabe who concluded that Arrian's whole account represents Aristobulus' compilation of several traditions [esp. p.70]) and perhaps not on Ptolemy either for Arrian gives the story in oratio obliqua after οὐ δὲ ... λέγουσι, and resumes the strategic narrative again at ii, 5.1.

Rabe's assumption that Curtius, Justin and Diodorus together preserve the Cleitarchean tradition (esp. p.68) is questionable in that they appear to have little in common. One can establish, however, connections between the Latin versions of Curtius, Justin and Valerius Maximus, as the following table shows. The Itinerarium Alexandri is added to show the lasting power of this purple patch.

C.R.	Justin	Itin.Alex.	Val.Max.
(multa riparum amoenitate - 4.9) <u>Mediam</u> Cydnus <u>amnis</u> .. <u>interfluit</u> <u>fervidissimum</u> tempus <u>pulvere</u> simul ac <u>sudore</u> perfusum regem invitavit <u>liquor</u> fluminis (cf.4.8) ut <u>calidum</u> adhuc corpus ablueret	captus Cydni <u>amoenitate</u> Cydni .. per <u>mediam</u> urbem fluentis plenus <u>pulveris</u> ac <u>sudoris</u> in praefrigidam undam se proiecit	Cydnium <u>amnem</u> urbis <u>media</u> pervadere <u>sudore</u> et <u>pulvere</u> <u>hausto</u> fluminis <u>frigore</u>	Cydnio, qui ..Tarson <u>interfluit</u> aestu et itineris <u>fervere</u> ..percalefactus aquae <u>liquore</u> <u>percalefactus</u> ex nimio <u>haustu</u> <u>frigoris</u>
vixque ingressi <u>subito</u> horrore <u>artus rigere</u> coeperunt	cum repente tantus <u>nervos</u> ..occupavit <u>rigor</u>	contractu <u>nervorum</u>	<u>subito</u> deinde obstupefactis <u>nervis</u> ac hebetatis <u>artibus</u>
sollicitudo et paene luctus in castris <u>instare victorem</u>			maxima cum exanimatione totius exercitus <u>instantis victoriae</u> ipsius
puero <u>comes</u> et custos salutis			amicus et <u>comes</u>
ne salutem suam Philippo committeret medico	a Philippo <u>caveret</u>		ut rex insidias Philippi <u>caveret</u>
mille talentis a Dareo ... <u>corruptum</u>	ingenti <u>pecunia</u> a Dareo <u>corruptum</u> illum tutius tamen ratus dubiae se		perinde ac <u>pecunia</u> <u>corrupti a Dareo</u>
damnem <u>medici</u> <u>fidem</u> at satius est alieno me mori scelere quam metu.	<u>fidei medici</u> credere quam indubitato morbo perire		

<u>C.R.</u>	<u>Justin</u>	<u>Val.Max.</u>
ille cum poculo in quo <u>medicamentum diluerat</u> <u>accipit poculum et</u> <u>haurit interritus</u>	<u>accepto poculo</u>	<u>medicamentum</u> <u>hausit</u>
<u>Tum epistulam legere</u> <u>Philippum iubet</u>	<u>epistulas medico</u> <u>tradidit</u>	<u>ac tum legendas</u> <u>Philippo tradidit</u>
<u>nec a vultu legentis</u> <u>movit oculos</u>	<u>oculos in vultum legentis</u> <u>intendit</u>	
<u>non securum modo</u> <u>haec vox</u> <u>sed etiam laetum</u> <u>regem fecit</u>	<u>ut securum conspexit</u> <u>laetior</u> <u>factus est</u>	

(There are no significant parallels in the latter part of the story between the Itinerarium and the other sources considered.)

As there are words and phrases which Curtius shares with Justin, but not with Valerius, and other cases where Justin and Valerius are linked, it would seem that both Curtius and Valerius had read Trogus' account (cf. Reuss RhM '02 567; Seel Trogus 92; we can reject the view of R. B. Steele (1) 411, who commented on the absence of verbal resemblances between the versions of Valerius Maximus and Curtius). Seel argued that Trogus must have been the source followed both by Valerius Maximus and by Curtius, but verbal similarities are only one criterion. Justin's account differs from Curtius' on several points of detail, most significantly in recording that Parmenion sent the letter from Cappadocia, that Parmenion was unaware of Alexander's illness, and that the letter arrived on the day before (sc.) Alexander fell ill, and since one should surely attribute these peculiarities to Trogus rather than Justin, one can hardly maintain that Curtius took his account from Trogus. As it is unlikely that Curtius and Trogus used an earlier Latin account and hence employed the same phrases, the natural conclusion is that Curtius wrote in an eclectic fashion borrowing phraseology from Trogus but taking his facts from some other source.

Chapter 7: Alexander's advance to Issus

7.1: at Dareus, nuntio de adversa valetudine accepto., ad
Euphraten contendit

The codd. have 'valetudine eius accepto': Bardon
departs from this reading without comment.

At 2.1 Curtius says that Darius' decision to fight was
motivated by Memnon's death, and then he says that Darius col-
lected his army together and headed for the Euphrates (3.7).
The artistic transition at this point from the troubles in
Alexander's camp to the external threat to his security has
been noted, for instance, by Kroll (Studien 338 and n. 15; cf.
v, 1.39). Curtius sacrifices consistency in detail to his
narrative art.

Plutarch suggests that Darius did not know about
Alexander's illness (Alex. 19, 1-2), which supports the argument
that Curtius invented this detail to provide a transition (McQueen,
Curtius Rufus p. 29).

7.1: iunctoque eo pontibus quinque tamen diebus traiecit
exercitum


Curtius refers again to this crossing at iv, 9.9 where
the number five is repeated, but this does not harmonize completely
with the preceding reference to Darius' advance. Certainly
Darius must have crossed the Euphrates earlier, if he was only
five days march away from Cilicia when Alexander fell ill (5.10),
but the earlier references to Darius' advance are the products
of artistic dramatization rather than of scientific historiography
(cf. supra on 5.10, 6.3, and 16).

Darius presumably crossed at Thapsacus, since he crossed
the Euphrates at that point after the battle of Issus (A. ii, 13.1),
and Mazaeus was there guarding two pontoon bridges when Alexander
later moved to cross the river (A. iii, 7.1).

Curtius refers to Thapsacus by name in a different con-
text (x, 1.19 cf. A. vii, 19.3 and Plut. Alex. 68, 2).

The geographical situation of Thapsacus is not known for certain. W.J. Farrell argued from Xenophon's data on the stages of Cyrus' journey and on the width of the Euphrates at Thapsacus, that it should be equated with Carchemish (Europus, mod. Carablus; Farrell, A revised itinerary of the route followed by Cyrus JHS lxxxix, '61 153-5). Such a northerly site is an unlikely point of crossing for Darius and Alexander, whatever its merits in the case of Cyrus.

The most obvious area for consideration is at the great bend of the Euphrates near Samûma (Meskenê), and el Hammam further east has also been considered (E. Honigmann RE 2.R. vi, 1272 sq. s. v. Θάψακος ; R.D. Barnett JHS lxxxiii, '63 3 and n. 8).



7.2: iamque

Again Bardon departs from the codd., which here read 'iam', without noting this in his apparatus criticus (cf. Müller [2] 630).

7.2: ad urbem Solos pervenerat

Soli was in the area of Mezitli, (the place and its history have been discussed e.g. by Ruge RE 2.R. iii ('29) 935-8 and D. Magie ii, 1148-9).

The sources differ on the nationality of the Greeks who established a colony at Soli, for it is recorded that in the negotiations with Rome in 189 B.C., Rhodes sought to recover independence for Soli, and claimed an interest in the matter on the grounds that Soli like Rhodes was a state founded by Argive colonists (Polyb. xxi, 24.10 sq., Livy xxxvii, 56.7 sq.), Strabo, **however**, said that Soli was founded by Achaeans and Rhodians from Lindus (xiv, 5.8 671, cf. Mela i, 71), but as the depopulation of the city (c. 83 B.C.) and its refounding as Pompeiopolis in 66 B.C. had intervened, Polybius' version is to be preferred. Further, Rhodes would hardly have minimized the strength of her ties with Soli - though she would hardly have made preposterous claims at the risk of endangering the benefits she was to enjoy from the Treaty of Apamea (Polyb. xxi, 24. 7-8; on this and Rhodian imperialism P.M. Fraser and G.E. Bean Rhodian Peraea Oxford '54 esp. 107 sq.) Thus Polybius' version of Rhodes' connection with Soli probably represents what was generally believed early in the second Century (Beloch Griech. Gesch. i² 1 262 supported Strabo's version as being the more authentic, but without advancing any argument to explain away Polybius' version). It is worth note that pottery of the archaic period found at Mersin, a city on the coast near Soli, puts Mersin 'within the sphere of Rhodes, in contrast to Daphnae and Histria, which belong to the orbit of Miletus' (R.D. Barnett LAAA xxvi, '40 p. 100 reprinted in J. Garstang's Prehistoric Mersin, Oxford '53 p. 254; cf. Boardman JHS lxxxv, '65 p. 15; Level III shows evidence of destruction by fire c. 500 B.C.), but this does not prove that Strabo was more correct than Polybius (pace Boardman).

The connection between Rhodes and Soli may have had some significance in Alexander's day, cf. on § 3, and Appendix C.

Another tradition linked Soli with Athens and Solon, but the tradition is late and played on the connection between the two names (Diog. Laert. i, 2.51). It can be discarded.

7.2: cuius potitus ducentis talentis multae nomine exactis,
arce praesidium militum imposuit

Arrian's account of the treatment of Soli is fuller and offers an explanation, however inadequate, for Alexander's actions. When Alexander first entered Soli, he fined the city and planted a garrison, because the people had been rather pro-Persian (A. ii, 5.5). Alexander left the city to campaign in the hills and presumably he left Soli under direct military rule. He then returned to the city, where, on hearing of Macedonian successes in the Aegean zone, he sacrificed to Asclepius and staged games. The constitution of Soli was then democratized (A. ii, 5.8) and, presumably at the same time, hostages were seized (A. ii, 12.2) to ensure that the democracy appreciated where the limits of its autonomy lay.

Curtius may have omitted Alexander's political settlement of Soli in the process of summarising the full history of this period: he runs together events of Alexander's two periods of residence in Soli (cf. Appendix A). The distortion on the subject of Soli is partly a byproduct of a rationalization of the story of events before the Battle of Issus, but the selection of detail excludes apologetic elements such as appear in Arrian's account: the lame explanation offered by Arrian for the punitive measures may reflect what was proper to remember after Soli assisted Alexander actively; Arrian's reference to the establishment of democracy in Soli shows the positive side of Alexander's treatment of the city, and the reference to his remission of the balance outstanding on the fine and to his release of the hostages (A. ii, 12.2) emphasizes Alexander's clemency. The emphasis in Arrian's work on the positive aspects of Alexander's campaigns in Greece and Asia may go back to Ptolemy (cf. Ptolemy on Thebes A. i, 8.1; 17.4; 23.6-8; Ptolemy reduced the extent of the carnage at Issus, A. ii, 11.8 contrast D.S. 34.9; and Arrian omitted mention of the crucifixion of Tyrians, ii, 24.5, with which contrast D.S. 46.4 and C.R. iv, 4.17). It would appear that Curtius did not follow Ptolemy in dealing with the cities of Asia Minor. Curtius shows no awareness that Soli was a Greek city and might have expected special treatment. However it

should be pointed out that, whereas the account adopted by Arrian was sensitive to moral considerations and was apologetic in tone, it does not necessarily follow that the tradition followed by Curtius - and Diodorus - was governed by ethical considerations and therefore hostile to Alexander (cf. T.S. Brown, Clitarchus AJP lxxi, '50 151 and n. 129. Brown argues that Cleitarchus was fond of atrocity stories, and suggests that Cleitarchus 'may have picked up the callous attitude towards a native population characteristic of Ptolemaic Egypt. No criticism of Alexander need have been implied'). Furthermore, Plutarch failed to cover Alexander's provisions for the administration of the Greek cities of Asia (Alex. 17, 1-2 on Sardis, Halicarnassus and Miletus, cf. 18, 1 and 5 on Phrygia, Paphlagonia and Cappadocia). The description of the sack of Thebes is a special case, and Plutarch's mention of the tradition that the Theban tragedy made Alexander more inclined to be merciful thereafter presumably reflects what was written after Alexander's death (Plut. Alex. 13, 3): Callisthenes is not likely to have produced such a postscript, unless it originated in Alexander's own propaganda. As Plutarch had access to Callisthenes' history it is striking that his biography of Alexander, like Curtius' and Diodorus' accounts, does not go beyond a catalogue of cities subjugated (cf. Jacoby FGH 124 F 30 on the capture of Miletus).

Curtius' own bias may have prejudiced his choice of source, but the source may have been almost anyone other than Ptolemy.

We can reject the idea of von Domaszewski that Curtius derived his account of Alexander's capture of Soli from Arrian, since Curtius' dates (vide Introduction) preclude the possibility that he could have seen Arrian's work, and in any case the differences between Arrian and Curtius run deeper than von Domaszewski (p. 7) suggested.

Curtius described the amount demanded from Soli as a fine, and this can be accepted (cf. P. Julien Satrapien 73-4). It was demanded upon Alexander's first occupation of the city, before the constitutional and political settlement was made. After the battle of Issus the balance outstanding, fifty talents, was remitted (A. ii, 12.2), and Soli apparently became one of the cities which contributed a syntaxis in the form of ships, for we know that Soli and Mallus sent three ships to join Alexander at Tyre (A. ii, 20.2). Soli, with a democratic constitution and under obligation to provide

ships, was perhaps drawn into the Corinthian League like other cities on the Asiatic mainland (E. Badian (4) esp. 50 sq. argued the case that the cities of Ionia and Aeolis were enlisted in the League, and raised the possibility that cities further east were also drawn in).

L. Müller thought that Soli functioned as a mint for Alexander (Numismatique d' Alexandre le Grand 1855, known to me only indirectly) but his theory has generally been discredited. Some coins of Alexander minted by the satrap Balakros in Tarsus have an Σ beneath the throne of Baaltars on the obverse, and it would seem that Tarsus minted such coins for Soli (cf. Hill BMC Lycaonia, Isauria and Cilicia 1900, p. 174 nos. 71 and 72 and p. 149; H. von Aulock, *Die Prägung des Balakros in Kilikien* JNG xiv, '64 79-82 produced evidence to show that the B on certain Cilician coin series must refer to Balakros). Even if there was not a mint in Soli itself, recognition was given to the status of Soli in this coin legend, an honour it shared only with Issus and Mallus (cf. BMC Lycaonia etc. 174-5).

It is not certain whether Tarsus distinguished the coins made for Soli, Issus and Mallus in any way other than by the addition of the initial letter. There is one coin for example made in Tarsus for Soli under Balakros' régime, which is distinctive: the obverse shows Baaltars holding his sceptre in his right hand whereas other coins of this basic type show the sceptre resting in the crook of his arm SNG iii, '38 pl. 52 no. 3061 contrast SNG iv, 7 '67 pl. 110 nos. 5314-6 and BMC Lycaonia etc. pp. 174-5 nos. 67-78. 3061 has β beneath the throne on the obverse, and Σ to l., B to rt. The position of the hand can be seen on earlier coins of Mazaeus with Aramaic legends BMC vol. cit. 172-3 nos. 59-64). However other minor changes in coins produced in Tarsus appear with different city initials (e.g. BMC vol. cit. p. 174 no. 69 with M and 70 with Σ differing on one point of content from the obverse of the type illustrated as no. 67).

7.3: vota deinde pro salute suscepta per ludum atque otium reddens

The phrase 'vota ... pro salute suscepta' provides a motivation for the celebrations, which is missing in Arrian's account. Alexander's leisurely stay in Soli is contrasted by Curtius

with Darius' haste to reach Cilicia. Plutarch (Alex. 19, 1 and 20, 1 sq.), and Arrian (ii, 6.4, who refers to τριβή..οὐκ ὀλίγη .. ἐν Σόλοις) mention Alexander's lengthy stay in Cilicia and the encouragement which it gave to Darius, but they differ from Curtius in not presenting this encouragement as a motivation for a swift advance to the Euphrates.

7.3: Aesculapio et Minervae ludos celebravit

Arrian referring to the same episode in Soli only mentions rites performed in honour of Asclepius (A. ii, 5.8). The problem is to decide whether Curtius found the goddess in his sources, or imported her into the story through carelessness or to improve upon his sources. Soli was a city of some size and importance as can be judged from Arrian's references to it and the size of the fine imposed, and Soli did claim a place in the Alexander legend (e.g. Euphorion, b.c. 276/5 B.C., brought the city into his work entitled Alexander [Steph. Byz. s.v. Σόλοι, cf. Skutsch RE vi, (1909) 1179]). Alexander's escape from death at Tarsus and his actions immediately after were the subject of much dramatic writing (for example the anecdote about the Sardanapalus memorial in Anchialus: A. ii, 5. 2-4; Strabo xiv, 5.9 674-2 and Callisthenes FGH F. 34).

If Curtius introduced Minerva without the authority of his sources, one must explain the association of ideas in Curtius' mind. But it is in fact difficult to justify this aberration. If he had Alexander's recovery in mind he might have imported Minerva Medica, the goddess worshipped in Rome as early as the Republican era and tenuously linked with the Athenian Athena Hygieia (cf. Latte RR p.166; Pausanias mentions a statue in Athens of Athene Hygieia, daughter of Asclepius [i, 23.4] cf. Schäfer Demosthenes 194-5). However, in Latin Minerva is seldom linked with Asclepius: the TLL s.v. Aesculapius gives only an inscription from Dacia, 'I(ovi) o(ptimo) m(aximo), Iunoni, Minervae et Aesculapio etc.' (CIL iii, 1079), and that cannot antedate Trajan's annexation of Dacia.

Curtius may have imported Minerva as the goddess of artistic accomplishments since Alexander staged ἀγῶνα .. γυμνικόν καὶ μουσικόν (A. ii, 5.8), but Curtius does not explicitly mention an artistic programme, and, when Curtius next mentions Minerva, it is in his description of sacrifices offered after the battle of Issus. There the gods who received this sacrifice are given as Jupiter, Hercules and Minerva (iii, 12.27), and Minerva is

probably the war goddess (Gellius NA xiii, 23 links Mars, Nerio and Minerva; Latte RR p. 164), who later, in the time of ^{the} Severi, was as Minerva victrix the Roman equivalent of Athena Nike (Latte RR p. 165). In Soli the sacrifices were a thankoffering for the King's recovery, as Curtius says, and Minerva victrix was not an obvious goddess to thank for recovery from an illness.

There is record that Olympias sent a cup to Athens for dedication to Hygieia (Hypereides iv, 19).

It seems likely therefore that Curtius found reference to Minerva in his sources, since he was covering a period in the history of Alexander on which material was plentiful, and since there is no immediate reason to suppose that a Roman Minerva could have fitted the situation so perfectly as to be imported into the story.

A sacrifice to Athena would indeed fit the historical context very well partly because Alexander claimed a special relationship with the goddess, and partly because Athena was prominent in local cult. This point is further developed in Appendix C.

7.4: spectanti nuntius laetus adfertur Halicarnaso

According to Arrian Alexander received this report before the games were staged (cf. on § 5 infra; A. ii, 5. 7-8; Niese i, 73 n. 2).

Curtius' structuring of the story points to the irony of the situation as Darius receives a deceptively encouraging report about Alexander, whilst Alexander receives news of the solid gains of his commanders at Halicarnassus and elsewhere. These two contrasting reports are not similarly linked by Arrian (ii, 5.7 and 6.4) and Arrian does not say that Darius knew why Alexander was delayed in Tarsus. Curtius fails to mention that Cos and Halicarnassus soon fell into Persian hands again (A. ii, 13.4 contrast C.R. iv, 1.37), but to do so would have spoilt the dramatic value of this particular passage.

7.4: Persas acie a suis esse superatos

Arrian records it more fully: Ptolemy and Asander defeated the Persian garrison commander in a great battle in which seven hundred Persian infantry and fifty cavalry lost their lives and more


than one thousand were taken captive (ii, 5.7). These figures are credible in the light of Arrian's statement that Alexander left in Caria an army of three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry (i, 23.6). The numbers involved show the seriousness of the battle for control of the acropolis of Halicarnassus.

The successful commanders, Ptolemy and Asander, were respectively commander of the satrapal forces left in Caria, and satrap of Lydia (Berve ii, 165 and 674; A. i, 23.6; 17.7).

7.4: Myndios quoque et Caunios et pleraque tractus eius suae facta dictionis

Arrian mentions beside Myndus and Caunus (Dalyan), Thera, Callipolis and Triopium on the mainland, and the island of Cos (A. ii, 5.7; the mainland cities, with the exception of Thera, possessed either a coastal site or a strong position, and they all fell outside the area of the Incorporated Peraea and had therefore perhaps never been under Rhodian control: the evidence is discussed by P.M. Fraser and G.E. Bean, Rhodian Peraea '54 esp. 47 sq. and 71 sq., in part correcting L. Robert Études Anatoliennes Paris '37 491 sq.) On Alexander's relations with Rhodes see p.247 sq. *infra*.

Orontobates, who led the opposition to Alexander's forces, had taken over control of the satrapy of Caria after the death of Pixodarus, his father-in-law. Alexander supported the deposed satrap, Ada, and Ptolemy fought in Caria in support of her (A. i, 23.6-8). In a sense it was civil war. The intervention of the satrap of Lydia, Asander, is a pointer to the importance of the operations in Caria.



--- =area indicated by Fraser and Bean as in Rhodes' possession in the period 188-167 B.C.

7.5: igitur edito spectaculo ludicro

The position of 'igitur' is that normally employed by Curtius. Whilst the particle is occasionally used by Curtius with resumptive force, to revert to the narrative after a digression, yet Curtius does not in such cases repeat a detail already given (compare e.g. 4.3; iv, 9.17; v, 1.43; viii, 10.1; ix, 7.21), thus the 'spectaculo ludicro' probably does not refer to the 'ludos' of §3. 'Igitur' is therefore consequential rather than resumptive and in Curtius' view the news of victory in the west occasioned a second round of games, but this is not supported by Arrian (ii, 5.-8): perhaps another case of contaminatio by Curtius of two sources.

7.5: Pyramo amne ponte iuncto, ad urbem Mallum pervenit

The site of the ancient city of Mallus has not been definitively established (vide Ruge RE xiv, '30 916-7). F. Imhoof-Blumer (Coin types of some Kilikian cities JHS xviii, 1898 p.163) commented on a coin of Mallus, dateable to A.D. 217/8, which shows two river gods swimming one to the left, and one to the right: Mallus may have been situated at a spot where the Pyramus split into two arms on its passage to the sea. It was upstream from Magarsus, which was on the coast and should be identified with Karataş (Ruge RE xiv, 292); however, when Magie says that the Stadiasmus Magni Maris set 'Ἀντιόχεια ἐπὶ Πυράμου, which he argues was the same as Magarsus, 59 stades from Mallus, the distance is a conjecture since the text of the Stadiasmus has ρν' (150) stades (Stadiasmus § 163, Müller GGM i, 480; Magie ii, 1150).

Dieulafoy, following Bourgeois, set Mallus c. 22 km. further along the route from the point at which Alexander crossed the Pyramus (p.18; from his map one would judge the distance to be rather c. 16 km.): the shift of Mallus makes possible, in his view, the tradition that Alexander took only two days to march from Mallus to Myriandrus (A. ii, 6.2). However the link between Mallus and the Pyramus should not be overlooked and the Tabula Peutingeriana placed Mallus 25 Roman miles (c. 37 km.) from Aegaeae, which is in the vicinity of Yumurtalik: the Tabula's measurement would be roughly correct if Mallus was on the putative site on the Pyramus, but it does not support Dieulafoy.

7.5: alteris castris

This must mean that Alexander took two days to march from Mallus to Castabalum and this is credible: Xenophon described Cyrus' advance from the Pyramus to Issus as representing two stathmoi, fifteen parasangs (c. 80 km.) (An. i, 4.1), and Castabalum was only c. 7.4 km. before Issus (cf. infra). Two days would represent a fast time (c. 35 km. per day as opposed to an average rate of c. 18 km. per day, on which Milns [3]), but this accords with Arrian's implication that Alexander's advance from Mallus was very rapid.

Arrian's statement that Alexander marched from Mallus to Myriandrus south of Alexandria, in two days (ii, 6.2) has attracted undue respect: Miltner accepted Arrian's word and tried to justify the proposition that Alexander covered c. 120 km. in two days (JÖAI xxviii, '33 73-4), and Dieulafoy attempted to reconcile Arrian with common sense and Curtius by reducing the distance between Mallus and Castabalum and by taking Curtius to mean that Alexander reached Castabalum in one day, that is on the day after he arrived in Mallus (p. 20).

7.5: ad oppidum Castabalum

Curtius is the only source to mention Castabalum.

The most important town of such a name was Castabala Hieropolis (or Hierapolis), sited at Bodrum c. 12 km. north of Toprakkale (Magie ii, 1151 sq. and M.V. Seton Williams AS iv, '54 150, cf. A. Dupont-Sommer et L. Robert La déesse de Hiéropolis. Castabala Paris '64 36 sq.). Alexander might have passed through Hieropolis had he travelled via the Toprakkale Pass, but the shorter route via the Kara Kapu Pass suits Arrian's view that Alexander advanced at speed from Mallus, and Curtius refers to Toprakkale as the Amanic Gates at 8.13 but does not use that name for the pass by which Alexander advanced to Issus (6-7 infra).

Castabalum is therefore more likely to have been the place set 5 Roman miles (c. 7.4 km.) before Issus in the Tabula Peutingeriana. The identification is further discussed in Appendix D, where it is suggested that Castabalum was on the site of Kara Hüyük. It may be added that there is no obvious reason why Curtius should have invented either Castabalum or 'alteris castris':

neither appears to have any rhetorical or dramatic significance, though this is not to say that Curtius had a clear picture of the geography of the area (Steele (3) 51 suggested that Curtius here read carelessly his source which Arrian too was following at

ii, 5. 9: ἔνθεν δὲ ἐς Μαλλὸν ἀφίκετο καὶ Ἀμφιλόχῳ ὅσα ἤρωι ἐνήγισε καὶ στασιάζοντας καταλαβὼν τὴν

στάσιν αὐτοῖς κατέκλυσε. . Curtius then read the participle στασιάζοντας as σταδίους with a numeral and took the ^{other} participle as a place name. This theory is however vitiated by the Tabula Peutingeriana).

7.6: ibi Parmenio regi occurrit

Diodorus and Arrian, who likewise refer to Parmenion's mission, do not mention at what point Parmenion rejoined Alexander.

Some scholars have rejected the story that Parmenion returned to report in person to Alexander as a dramatic invention (so Domaszewski 62 and Miltner JOAI xxviii, '33 74 n. 22 and 76, n. 36).

7.6: praemiserat ad explorandum iter

Bardon here follows the better mss., and the omission of the subject 'rex' or the omission of the accusative demonstrative pronoun 'eum' can be supported by numerous other examples (Büttner [pp. 7 and 37 sq.] cites 32 and 61 cases respectively). However the omission both of 'rex' and of 'eum' is hard to accept, especially as there is a change of subject, thus an emendation is required, perhaps 'praemis<sus> erat'!!

Parmenion was apparently despatched on this mission from Tarsus, in Arrian's view after Alexander's recovery (cf. on 6.4 supra).

7.6: iter saltus per quem ad urbem Isson nomine penetrandum erat

The 'iter saltus' would seem to mean the Kara (or Karanlık) Kapu Pass, along the coastal route to Issus (cf. Janke (2) 139; Judeich, Issos p. 358 and H. Treidler RE Suppl. Bd. ix, '62 1363), as opposed to the Toprakkale Pass, the Amanic Gates of 8.13. A difference is that Castabalum was to the East of the Kara Kapu Pass, but Castabala Hieropolis at the northern end of the Toprakkale Pass; thus only if Alexander marched via Hieropolis could Parmenion have reported 'iter occupatum' (§ 7): by the other route Alexander would have cleared the 'iter saltus' before meeting Parmenion at

Castabalum. However Curtius' geography is regrettably imprecise (cf. Bardon [3] 130).

The site of Issus is not known for certain: the problem is discussed in Appendix D, where it is suggested that Issus was on the site of Kinet Hüyük.

7.7: atque ille, angustiis eius occupatis et praesidio modico relicto, Isson quoque desertam a barbaris ceperat

The angustiae of the Kara Kapu pass were termed by some authors the Amanic Gates (so Strabo xiv, 5.19 676, apparently following Artemidorus; Treidler RE Suppl. Bd. ix, '62 1355 sq.).

The abandonment of Issus by Persian troops marks the next stage in Curtius' narrative of their retreat from Cilicia (cf. 4.5 sq. and 15).

7.7: inde progressus, deturbatis qui interiora montium obsidebant, praesidiis cuncta firmavit

From Issus Parmenion could have turned north to secure the Toprakkale pass, or could have turned south to secure a way through the Merkes Su pass.

Curtius restricts Parmenion's orders to occupation of the pass leading to Issus, whereas Arrian's reference to 'the other gates', that is the gates marking the exit from Cilicia into Syria as opposed to the Gülekboğazi pass by which Alexander entered Cilicia carries Parmenion's orders further (A. ii, 5.1). The Gates that led into Syria were the pass known as the Merkes Su, north of Myriandrus and south of Issus (cf. on 8.13). Too much should not be made of the difference between Arrian and Curtius on this point since Curtius is generally imprecise, but the story concerns Parmenion, and the tale of his letter to Alexander about Philip has shown us that praise and denigration of Parmenion had distorted the facts long before Curtius wrote.

Unfortunately a lacuna occurs in Diodorus' version of Parmenion's orders: προκαταληψόμενον τὰς παρόδους καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζόμενας .. πύλας (32.2). It is tempting to fill the lacuna to bring Diodorus into line with Arrian's account, but since Curtius' version refers to the Kara Kapu gates, one must ask whether Diodorus is closer to Arrian or Curtius in this section of the narrative.

The phraseology of Curtius and Diodorus is similar here:

deturbatis qui interiora montium	τοὺς προκατειληφότας τὰς
obsidebant	δυσχωρίας βαρβάρους διασάμενος
praesidiis cuncta firmavit,	κύριος ἐγένετο τῶν
occupatoque itinere	παρόδων

The links are striking too because they are echoed later: in describing Alexander's invasion of the Mardian territory, Curtius and Diodorus use the phrases 'interiora regionis' and εἰς τὰς δυσχωρίας respectively, in the same context (C.R. vi, 5.13, with 'deturbati' in § 12, and D.S. 76.4). The link in phraseology does not however prove that Curtius was tied to the facts which he found in a source used by Diodorus.

7.8: Issus deinde rex copias admovit

Diodorus records detail not found in the other sources. The native population was unimpressed with Alexander and turned against him; he seized Issus by a show of force (καταπληξάμενος ἐξεπρώσατο 32.4). This implies that after Parmenion appeared in Issus the population decided to collaborate with the Persians. Like the tale of Parmenion's letter warning Alexander against Philip, this story could have been developed either to Parmenion's credit, showing the size of the problem which he tackled, or to his disadvantage, showing his failure to complete his assignment.

Diodorus' story of Alexander meeting with resistance in Issus would explain why Castabalum, a place so close to Issus was chosen as a resting place.

7.8-10: the council of war in Issus

7.8: ubi consilio habito

Arrian mentions a crucial council of war at Mallus, which was convened because of the arrival of a definite report on Darius' position. Following the council's decision, the army advanced directly to Myriandrus (A. ii, 6. 1-2). It seems likely that Parmenion's advance party reconnoitring as far as to the Belen Pass attracted Persian scouts to the area and enabled the Macedonians to discover the position of the Persian camp (Judeich, Issus 358-9, notes too that Parmenion's reconnaissance provided Darius with clues as to Alexander's strategy).

Curtius' account of the armies' movements before the battle does not differ on essential points from Arrian's. When Alexander left Mallus he was moving fast to engage Darius, hence the rapidity of his march to Gastabalum (7.5), hence the facts that Darius arrived too late to intercept Alexander and Alexander reached the Syrian border too quickly to receive word of Darius' position (cf. 8.13), and hence Darius' notion that Alexander's army was in flight (8.14). It could be argued that Curtius transferred the war council from Mallus to Issus for compositional reasons. For Curtius had detracted from the significance of the news that reached Alexander in Mallus, by the insertion of imaginary reports earlier (cf. 5.6 and 10 with note); then in chapter 7 he mentions reports in §§ 1, 4 and 7: the Mallus report was artistically surplus. Further Curtius in chapter 7 develops the antithesis between Darius' hurry and Alexander's nonchalance (contrast §§ 1 and 3). The pace of the story is deliberately checked as Curtius wishes to build up to a climax with a description of the kings clashing in battle.

However, one can also argue that Arrian and Curtius were describing separate war councils: the decision at Mallus was to advance whilst the decision at Issus concerned the choice of battle-field. It is perfectly credible that strategy was reconsidered when Alexander met up with Parmenion again. Again the involvement of Parmenion must make us cautious, for the Issus council may have been an invention to present Parmenion in good light, or conversely Arrian's source might have omitted the episode to minimize his contribution to the victory. It is also possible that Arrian, in abbreviating the narrative of the advance between Mallus and Myriandrus and in omitting details of the occupation of Issus left out the deliberations that took place after Parmenion rejoined Alexander.

Arrian specifies that the council participants at Mallus were hetaeroi (ii, 6.1). A characteristic of Arrian's work is the listing of men summoned to conference by Alexander (e.g. ii, 7.3; 16.8; iii, 9.3; v, 25.3), and there are variations from case to case. Strasburger developed the theory that Alexander held routine meetings with senior officers, and that for major policy decisions he called a general meeting of officers; Ptolemy suppressed the record of the regular consultations where freedom of discussion was allowed, and highlighted the general war councils where in effect Alexander sought endorsement for his plans (Strasburger (1)

34, 48 and 55). On this theory it should be noted that Strasburger draws on the 'Ephemerides' for evidence about the routine meetings (the relevant sections from A. vii, 25. 1 sq., and Plut Alex. 76 are set out in Jacoby FGH II 7 F 3, but the fragments of the 'Ephemerides' cannot be accepted as they stand as an authentic version of Alexander's royal diary (L. Pearson (2) esp. 429-439; Strasburger acknowledged that Arrian put the 'Ephemerides' into his own words [p.48 on παραγγέλλειν]). The available evidence shows only that Alexander called into consultation whom he wanted when he chose; the pressure on him to consult with his officers came from the political and military circumstances, rather than from a governmental procedure that had become normative.

7.8: novī milites quos ex Macedonia adventare constabat

Curtius alone mentions the prospect of reinforcements at this point.

The evidence relating to the reinforcements which Alexander received before Issus is discussed above (on 1.24). The next reference to reinforcements concerns the arrival in Sidon of 4,000 Greek mercenaries from the Peloponnese apparently in the spring of 332 (A. ii, 20.5 with C.R. iv, 3.11). We are told that at some stage Antigonos sent most of his 1,500 garrison troops from Celaenae to Alexander (C.R. iv, 1.35 with A. i, 29.3) and it is reasonable to suppose that these men were not despatched before the fall of Halicarnassus and the capture of Cos and other cities in Caria in the summer of 333 (§ 4 supra). It is quite possible that some of the 2,000 infantry and 300 cavalry left to garrison Caria were similarly sent to Alexander, presumably after the fall of Halicarnassus (Beloch Griech.Gesch. iii, 2 332-3). These men could have reached Alexander in the period autumn-winter 333/2. If Curtius was here referring to them his phraseology is imprecise.

However, further analysis of other references to reinforcements is unnecessary, for Curtius' mention of the expected reinforcements may represent imaginative writing. An obvious reason for this invention would be that it heightens the drama of Alexander's predicament at Issus; but this is only part of the tale, since Curtius links this statement with comment on Parmenion's rôle as an adviser: whilst the council was deliberating whether to advance or hold back and wait for reinforcements, Parmenion advocated the occupation of a position suitable for battle. Parmenion, normally

a cautious man, saw when the time had come for action (see further p. 126 and c. 13).

The prospect of reinforcements arriving at Issus, whether the rumour was historical or the story was invented later, may have owed something to the fact that Issus was the place where Cyrus received reinforcements from Sparta (Xen. An. i, 4.2; for a reminiscence of Cyrus' expedition in the Issus story see A. ii, 7.8).

7.9: illic utriusque regis copias numero futuras pares, cum angustiae multitudinem non caperent

Cf. A. ii, 7.3, attributed to Alexander, and Plut. Alex. 20, 2, advice of Amyntas to Darius.

7.9: Persas recentes subinde successuros, si laxius stare potuissent

'Persians would periodically be taking over, fresh for action, if they were given the chance to hold a less restricted position'. Curtius frequently used 'subinde' in the sense 'periodically', cf. e.g. 11.26; iv, 1.2 and v, 1.30. The adjective 'laxus' is used with a similar spatial connotation by Livy x, 5.6, cf. Seneca ep. 88, 35.

7.10: inter angustias saltus hostem opperiri statuit

Curtius' vagueness about the geography of the battle area is a major weakness of this book. The 'angustias saltus' were not as in § 7 the Kara Kapu Pass.

It emerges later in Curtius' account that Alexander went straight through 'the pass' and had to retrace his steps (8.16, 19 and 23). The contradiction is not explained.

7.8-10: the story of the war-council at Issus

Curtius alone gives this story and it may represent his own invention for compositional reasons, for his version of the war council heightens the dramatic irony of the situation: Alexander, in Darius' eyes was hiding in the coastal defiles, too scared to advance, and Darius believed that he had the free choice to catch Alexander in such terrain (8. 10-11), whereas in fact Alexander had deliberately chosen the battle site and Darius was lured into a trap

(3.28; 7. 8-10; 8. 19 and 23). In Arrian's account dramatic irony is created by Darius' misunderstanding of Alexander's protracted stay in Cilicia, but it is not suggested that Alexander trapped Darius at Issus according to a definite plan. The picture presented by Plutarch (Alex. 20, 1-6) and Diodorus (33.1) agrees with Arrian's account.

However, Curtius was conscious that the story of the war council in Issus did not harmonize with the fact that Alexander was south of the Merkes Su pass before the battle. Thus he picks up the war council's decision again at 8.23, saying that, when Alexander learnt of Darius' position, he hurried back, 'ad angustias quas occupare decreverant'. This clumsy reconciliation of differing tales might suggest 'contaminatio' of divergent traditions. Further there is internal evidence in the story of the Issus council to suggest that Curtius was not its inventor. The options presented in § 8 are, to wait, in Issus presumably, for reinforcements, or to advance to the pass; but there is no other evidence that reinforcements were expected at that time, and Curtius seems to have made a 'topos' of the arrival or non-arrival of reinforcements (cf. on 1.1 and 24 and 2.9). Then in the development of the argument Parmenion appears to be concerned with the choice between waiting in the defiles of Cilicia and advancing into Syria against Darius (§ 9: compare the choice as seen by Darius esp. 8. 2 and 11). It would seem therefore that Curtius found in a source a tale of Parmenion advising Alexander against advance into Syria, and that Curtius modified this by the introduction of a reference to reinforcements. The story would have been to Parmenion's credit as the advice was proved correct, and Curtius himself styles it 'salubris consilii', § 10. The historicity of the council is uncertain, but it is clear that as with the tale of Parmenion's dash to save Tarsus Curtius had access to a source which presented Parmenion in favourable light (cf. on 4.15).

7.11-15: Sisinos is suspected of treason by Alexander and murdered
legally the offence might more correctly be styled mis-
prision of treason

7.11: erat in exercitu regis Sisenes Perses. quondam a praetore Aegypti missus ad Philippum donisque et omni honore cultus, exsilium patria sede mutaverat, secutus deinde in Asiam Alexandrum inter fideles socios habebatur

In Arrian's history a Persian called Sisines was sent by Darius as an agent to make contact with the Lyncestian Alexander under cover of a formal mission to the satrap of Phrygia, Atizyes (i, 25.3). One can reconcile the two accounts to the extent of suggesting that a Sisines joined the Macedonian court in Philip's day, but returned to Persia early enough to be employed as an agent by Darius in the winter of 334/3 (so Berve ii, no.710). The continuity of Sisines' attachment to the Macedonian court, as described by Curtius, is not consistent with Arrian's reference to the man's activities.

Before we conclude either that there were two men called Sisines or that one or other character was the product of imaginative writing, we should first examine the story of the Lyncestian Alexander. He was arrested at some stage in 333; according to Arrian Alexander interrogated Sisines and on the basis of information gained thereby he consulted 'the friends' about the Lyncestian (i, 25. 4-5). Curtius' statements that he was 'delatus' and 'convictum' (vii, 1.6 and viii, 8.6) before his detention do not contradict what Arrian says about who heard the evidence and took the decision. Similarly Diodorus does not contradict Arrian (80.2). The novelty in Curtius' account occurs in his reference to the source of the evidence against the Lyncestian: duobus indicibus (in both passages cited and on this pp.130-I infra) and 'litterisque suis' (viii, 8.6). Arrian mentions that Amyntas took to Darius oral and written communications from the Lyncestian Alexander (A.i, 25.3), but it is not said that such a letter was seen by Alexander when Sisines was caught: indeed there is little reason to suppose that Sisines might have been wandering about carrying a letter that had been sent to Darius. If the letter was historical, then it must have been amongst papers captured when Susa was taken, (or, at the earliest when Darius' impedimenta at Danascus fell into Alexander's hands). The existence of such a letter was necessary if the Lyncestian Alexander was to be convicted of treason: Darius' offer to him did not make him a traitor, but he was a traitor if he made the first approach to Darius. When Sisines was arrested

the proof of treason was, as we have argued, not available to the king. It was discovered, or invented, later. Thus Alexander of Lyncestis was no doubt spared immediate execution partly because there was no conclusive evidence against him. At the time when he was executed, Parmenion was away from the main camp and about to be murdered, and Amyntas had died in Egypt. In other words, the three key figures in the case were no longer available to speak against - or for the Lyncestian; the letter was mute. Thus the Sisines of Arrian's account might well have been murdered on Alexander's orders, but we do not know.

However, Curtius' notes on Sisines suggest that he had not appeared in Curtius' account of the arrest of the Lyncestian Alexander (see further pp. 130-1). As the story of Sisines' long attachment to the Macedonian court is inherently improbable - if correct it would have merited mention by other sources -, Arrian's reference to Sisines is more likely historical.

7.12: Cretensis miles

As Cretans killed Sisines, the involvement of a Cretan in his act of folly is not surprising and could have occurred to any writer. Cretans were in any case traditionally characterised as shifty, disloyal and ready to do anything for gain (cf. Cic. Rep. iii, 15, Ovid ars am. i, 298, Lucan viii, 872).

7.12: Nabarzanes, praetor Darei

Nabarzanes was a chiliarch (A. iii, 23.4: ὁ Δαρείου χιλιάρχης), the highest office in the Persian army. The chiliarch, or *hazarapati, now performed administrative functions, but was originally the commander of the élite corps of the Immortals, the Melophoroi (cf. supra on 3.13; R.N. Frye Heritage of Persia '62 p.98 and P.J. Junge, Hazarapatīs Klio xv, '40 13 sq.). Technically the chiliarch was commander of an infantry unit, but Nabarzanes commanded the cavalry on the Persian right at Issus (C.R. iii, 9.1).

The Macedonians took the office over, but the scope of the office was reduced perhaps even after the death of Hephaestion. In 320 at Triparadeisos Cassander was appointed chiliarch under Antigonos, who at this time took over command of Perdikkas' army (D.S. xviii, 39.7; Errington [2] 69).

Curtius employed the term 'chiliarcha', but used it of posts created for the Macedonian army (v, 2.3).

7.13: utpote innoxius

With this and the following clause 'suspicionem initi scelesti consilii praebuit' compare the phrase used to describe Callisthenes at viii, 8.21: initi consilii in caput regis innoxius.

7.13: cum tot curis apparatuque belli regem videret urgueri

Similarly Philotas put off bringing Gebalinus and Nicomachus before Alexander because the king was preoccupied with weightier matters (Plut. Alex. 49, 5). The two stories have many points in common.

7.14: namque epistula, priusquam ei redderetur, in manus Alexandri pervenerat

Censorship of mail by Alexander is mentioned again by Curtius at iv, 10. 16-17. On that occasion Alexander took Parmenion's advice not to divulge to the Greeks what he had found in Darius' letters to them. In both episodes Curtius summarizes the contents of letters, which, as he suggests, were not made public.

A letter from Parmenion to Nicanor and Philotas was, according to Curtius, intercepted and used as evidence in the trial of Philotas (vi, 9.13), but this is probably fiction since Arrian knew of no evidence against Parmenion (iii, 26.4 cf. Plut. Alex. 49, 13 with Hamilton's commentary).

Curtius liked cloak-and-dagger scenes (cf. Badian [8] 331) and especially tales of secret correspondence. The latter topic had no doubt acquired special significance since the period when Rome was governed indirectly from Capri. Significantly no other source carries the tale of Sisines and the letter which he received. Comparison with the tale of Tiberius and the king of Cappadocia, Archelaus (or Sisines), in Tac. Ann. ii, 42 cf. Dio lvii, 17.4, suggests another possible influence on Curtius' story.

7.15: in agmine a Cretensibus haud dubie iussu regis occisus

Sisines, therefore, was murdered by Cretan soldiers. Alexander's responsibility for this is conjecture, however, reasonable. As the man was not charged, tried nor convicted, the background to his death as given by Curtius must be viewed with suspicion.

7. 11-15: The story of Sisines' fall: Sources and Composition

The story of Sisines is not given by the other sources, and discussion of its historicity and Curtius' sources must involve analysis of the tale which appears in Diodorus' narrative at this point, the tale of Olympias' letter warning against the Lyncestian Alexander (32. 1-2), and analysis of Arrian's account of the demotion of the Lyncestian Alexander, when a Sisines gave information against this Alexander (A. i, 25. 3-5).

References to the Lyncestian Alexander appear at three points in the story. First in the winter of 334/3 when Alexander was at Phaselis, Sisines fell into Parmenion's hands and gave information against the Lyncestian (A. i, 25. 3-5; Justin does not mention Sisines by name, but has 'indicio captivi' [xi, 7.1] a phrase that is significant for the discussion of C.R. vii, 1.6). Justin says that the Lyncestian was put in chains at this stage, whilst Arrian reports the decision of the 'hetaeroi' that he should be removed from the command of the Thessalian cavalry and put out of the way (ἐκποδῶν, A. i, 25.5). Alexander would hardly have demoted the Lyncestian on such a charge without detaining him (Badian (8) 325 suggested a time gap between Alexander's removal from his command and his arrest. Professor Badian has since indicated in correspondence with me that this time gap might be eliminated.)

Then in dealing with the period immediately after Alexander's sickness, in the latter half of 333 Diodorus records that on receipt of a warning letter from Olympias and because of many other circumstantial pieces of evidence, Alexander had the Lyncestian arrested (32. 1-2). Diodorus is alone in describing the arrest at this point, but both he and Curtius say that at the time of his trial (or retrial) and execution (330 B.C.) this Alexander had been in detention for three years: *τριετη .. χρόνον ἐν φυλακῇ τηρούμενος διετέλεσε* (D.S. 80.2 cf. C.R. vii, 1.6: *tertium iam annum custodiebatur in vinculis*).

Diodorus' reference to the three year period of detention is consistent with his account at 32. 1-2; however, Curtius has nothing on the Lyncestian at that point. Further Curtius' note, 'a duobus indicibus, sicut supra diximus' (vii, 1.6) should be taken literally, since, where we can check, he is reliable in giving

back references, and it is not easy to harmonize the *duobus indicibus* with Diodorus' letter from Olympias and πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων εὐλόγων συνδραμόντων (32. 1-2). Thus it seems that '*duobus indicibus*' refers back to the incident described by Justin and Arrian, whilst the reference to three years detention was taken from another source, a source which gave an account of the 'trial' of the Lyncestian, and which gave, as Diodorus' account, the later date for his arrest.

On the arrest of Alexander, Curtius differs from Justin and Arrian, since neither of them mentions a second informer. If Justin's '*captivus*' was not Sisines, Curtius could have combined traditions found in Trogus and Arrian; otherwise he employed a different source from them. Curtius was apparently not following the source used by Diodorus on the arrest of the Lyncestian in Cilicia.

The murder of Sisines was perhaps historical (cf. on §11), and could indeed have occurred in the latter half of 333, for a date in that period was crucial in the history of the Lyncestian Alexander's fate (D.S. 80.2 and C.R. vii, 1.6). However, Curtius cannot be cited as an authority for the murder of Sisines, since his story is patently a mixture of borrowed ingredients: secret correspondence, perfidious Cretans and elements taken from the tale of Philotas' fall. Curtius' account of the circumstances of the fall of the Lyncestian Alexander apparently did not mention Sisines. Sisines is rather a symbol of the collaborator for a romantic tale invented by Curtius (cf. the governor of Damascus in c. 13). Curtius' elaboration of this episode provides a tale to balance the story of Parmenion's letter against Philip.

Both stories concern Alexander's assessment of the '*fides*' of his followers (6.6 and 7.14 one a Greek, the other a Persian) and in both cases Alexander avoided ambivalence and trusted his judgement. In the following chapter the antithesis between Alexander and Darius is pointed, as Darius claims to accept the '*fides*' of his Greek mercenaries, but is influenced by his court to reject their advice.

Chapter 8, 1-11: Darius clashes with his Persian advisers over the strategy advocated by his Greek mercenaries

Compare A. ii, 6.3 sq.; Plut. Alex. 20, 1 sq. and a similar passage in D.S. 30.

8.1: Graeci milites quos Thimodes a Pharnabazo acceperat

This picks up the story left at 3.2

8.1: praecipua spes et propinquum unica

This was Charidemus' assessment of the Greek mercenaries, cf. 2.16. The idea reappears at 9.2, but in the battle description from 11.1, where it is said that Darius wanted to make it a cavalry battle, the mercenaries are not spot-lighted (cf. D.S. 34.9 and by contrast A. ii, 10.4 sq.; the point was noted by Ste Croix Examen Critique 251).

8.1: ad Dareum pervenerant

Darius was presumably at Sochi, c. 25 km. from the Belen Pass, as Arrian sets this episode there (ii, 6.1 and 3), and Curtius in § 2 implies that Darius had already crossed the Euphrates. Keil suggested that one reason for Darius' stay in Sochi was to wait for the arrival of this contingent of mercenaries (Mitt. Ver. klass. Phil. Wien i, '24 16).

The detachment of these troops from Pharnabazus may have contributed to the decision on the Macedonian side to reduce the garrisons in the western satrapies (cf. on 7.8 supra).

8.2: hi magnopere suadebant

Plutarch and Arrian identify the Macedonian Amyntas as the mercenaries' spokesman (Alex. 20, 1 and A. ii, 6.3). As Kaerst noted, the Greeks play an important rôle in Curtius' work, and their attachment to Darius provides a major theme in the story of Darius' last days (v, 11.1 sq.; Kaerst 363 n. 1), but this feature is not peculiar to Curtius' account, compare A. iii, 21.4, and, as has been noted, the part of the mercenaries in the battle of Issus is virtually ignored.

8.2: ut retro abiret spatiososque Mesopotamiae campos repeteret

Kaerst misinterpreted this passage, saying that the mercenaries gave their advice to Alexander, 'als er schon in die

Küstenebene von Issos eingetreten war', but §§ 12-13 infra show that Curtius, like Plutarch and Arrian, set the episode before Darius' advance to Issus (Kaerst 363, n. 1).

Plutarch (Alex. 20, 2) and Arrian (ii, 6.3) say that Amyntas' advice was that Darius should remain encamped just where he was.

8.2: at ille divideret saltem innumerabiles copias, neu sub unum fortunae ictum totas vires regni cadere pateretur

The coupling of 'at' with 'saltem' and 'at' with a pronoun in the apodosis of a conditional sentence occurs frequently (c.g. Livy i, 12.5 and 41.3 respectively).

The advice here offered by the Greeks recalls the advice attributed to Charidemus (D.S. 30. 2-3).

8.3: minus hoc regi quam purpuratis eius displicebat
Cf. D.S. 30.4.

8.3: ancipitem fidem et mercede venalem; proditionem imminere

Bardon follows the codd. in reading 'proditionem' (cf. M.L. Paladini Latomus xvii, '58 544), but Hedicke, and more recently Müller adopted Bentley's emendation, 'proditioni'. The corruption would be explained as arising from the attraction of the accusative 'venalem' and the influence of the following word 'imminere'; 'imminere' with the Dative in the sense of 'to press for' 'to be keen for' can be paralleled at ix, 1.21. However the manuscript reading makes good sense and should be retained.

The Persian nobles fail to appreciate the soundness of the Greeks' advice and Persian fears of Greek advisers are mentioned too by Arrian with regard to Memnon (i, 12.10), and by Diodorus with regard to Charidemus (30.4). The Persian satraps' suspicion of Memnon may explain their odd decision to post the Greek mercenary infantry behind the cavalry at Granicus (E.W. Davis in *Laudatores Temporis Acti, Studies - Caldwell* '64 43 sq.). The intriguing of Amyntas in Egypt (A. ii, 13.3; C.R. iv, 1.30 sq.; D.S. 48.2 sq.; Berve ii, no. 58) gave substance, ex post facto to Persian suspicions of him.

8.5: at Dareus ut erat sanctus ac mitis

The adjective 'mitis' is used of Darius at 2.17, and v, 10.14.

Tacitus says in the context of Germanicus' death that people at the time compared Germanicus with Alexander, and amongst the characteristics on which they differed, people mentioned that Germanicus was 'mitem erga amicos' (Ann. ii, 73.3; cf. de Laude Pisonis 118 sq. with 'mitis' in 129). Curtius later says that Alexander did not refrain from 'inter epulas caedibus amicorum' (12.19). Darius was 'mitis' in the same sense as was Germanicus.

8.6: *neminem stolidum consilium capite luere debere*

Later when Darius saw through the treacherous advice of Nabarzanes, Artabazus urged Darius, *ferret aequo animo qualiumcumque suorum tamen vel stultitiam vel errorem* (C.R. v, 9.12). Earlier he yielded to the impulse of pride and killed Charidemus for offering advice in an insubordinate manner. There is then a certain irony in the sentiments attributed to Darius, an irony that is suggested too by their context, for Darius saw some sense in the Greeks' advice (§ 3) and his reply to the Greeks was couched in more pretentious claims than the circumstances justified (§ 12).

The idea that a man should not be punished for offering bad advice appears in Diodotus' speech at Thuc. iii, 42.5 (noted by Mitzell); and Cassius Dio attributed the same idea to Maecenas in a speech supposedly made before Augustus in 29 (lii, 33.7; one may admit that Dio composed the speech for the benefit of Caracalla; so F. Millar Study of Cassius Dio '64 p.104, but this particular idea was not novel).

8.6: *nec tamen melioris fidei haberi*

A genitive of value or quality used predicatively; Verges compares Csr. hg. vii, 77.3 'hic magnae habitus auctoritatis'.

8.7: *ceterum si retro ire pergat*

Cf. § 2. The structure of the speech beginning at this point is analysed below, p. 140.

8.7: *fama bella stare*

Cf. J. xi, 9.3.

Gaius Nero, according to Livy, told his troops in 207: *famam bellum conficere* (xxvii, 45.5), and Seneca, writing later than Curtius, if we assume a Claudian date for Curtius, repeated the idea:

quae conficere bellum solet, fama (ep. xiii, 8). The idea recurs at iv, 4.2; v, 13.14 and viii, 8.15 (at v, 13.14 'fama' is linked with the term 'momentum' as by Livy at xxvii, 45.5).

When Darius failed to salvage his reputation, or rather to justify what rumour might say about the strength of his army, he could then warn the Persians not to be influenced by the reputation(sc.) of Alexander's army (iv, 14.13).

8.8: trahendi vero belli vix ullam esse rationem

The phrase 'trahere bellum' was frequently associated with the complaints of radicals in Rome against members of the aristocracy (e.g. Sall. Jug. 83, 3 and Livy xxii, 34.4 and 7). In Justin's account it is Alexander who decides that it would be too dangerous to 'differre bellum' (xi, 9.3), and 'differre' did not have the same pejorative connotation as 'trahere' (compare:

ceu clandestino traheretur foedere bellum, Silius vii, 267); similarly before Gaugamela Justin's Alexander expressed his fear of 'longam belli moram, si Persae exercitum divisissent' (xi, 13.3), and the same idea occurs in Diodorus' account (56. 3-4).

A Roman audience would appreciate the dramatic irony of Curtius' account of Darius' decision not to play the Cunctator, but to stake everything on immediate action. Curtius found in his sources, as did Diodorus and Justin, comment on the significance of Darius' refusal to split up his army and apply a policy of attrition; such comment is lacking in Arrian's introduction to the battle of Issus (ii, 6; Arrian concentrates on Darius' folly in leading his army into terrain that cancelled out its numerical advantage) and in his introduction to the battle of Gaugamela (where the phrases ξὺν δυνάμει πολλῇ [A. iii, 8.2], and ξὺν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει [8.7] contrast with the phraseology attributed to Darius by Curtius, iv, 14. 10-11; there is nothing in Alexander's speech [A. iii, 9. 5-8] which precisely corresponds with Diodorus' εἰς ἓνα τόπον ἠθροικότα τὰς δυνάμεις and πολυχρονίων κινδύνων [56. 3 and 4 with J. xi, 13.3]).

On the battle of Issus, Plutarch is closer to Arrian, stressing the folly of Darius' advance from the plain into the constricted coastal region around Issus, and stressing Darius' impatience to fight the decisive battle (Alex. 20, 2 sq.); but in dealing with the battle of Gaugamela Plutarch is closer to Justin,

Curtius and Diodorus, when he refers to Alexander's relief that the Macedonians were ἀπηλλαγμένοι τοῦ πλανᾶσθαι καὶ διώκειν ἐν πολλῇ καὶ κατεφθαρμένῃ φυγομαχοῦντα χώρα Δαρειῶν (Alex. 32, 3, cf. J. xi, 13.3; D.S. 56.3; G.R. iv, 13. 23 sq., and 14. 10-11).

8.8: tantae enim multitudini

According to Tarn (ii, 94 and cf. 106), this passage shows Curtius' critical powers, for Curtius alone of the historians saw that Darius could not have fed the vast armies attributed to him. However this passage does not manifest a disbelief in the vastness of Darius' army, it merely points to the difficulties which Darius as a general would face in trying to provision his army during the winter months, cf. Sallust Cat. 58, 6; Jug. 100, 1; and Livy xxii, 1.2 and 32. 2-3; Merguet's Lexikon zu den Schriften Cäsars gives some 156 references to 'frumentum' in Caesar's Commentaries, cf. M. Rambaud Déformation historique 250-1.

Tarn's comments on the size of the Persian army at Issus are based on a misinterpretation of 3.28, 7.9 and 10.2 q.v.

8.8: cum iam hiems instaret

The reference to the approach of winter would seem to derive from a source used by Curtius. The battle was supposed to have taken place in Maenakterion (November 333; A. ii, 11.10 see further Appendix A).

8.8: in regione vasta et invicem a suis atque hoste vexata

The historicity of the scorched-earth policy attributed to the Persians is open to serious doubts cf. on 4.3 supra.

8.9: ne dividi quidem copias posse servato more maiorum

This argument is not mentioned in the other sources and the structure of the Persian army presupposed the delegation of military authority (cf. on 8.12 infra).

8.10: cautum pro temerario factum

Cf. 1.17: temeraria regis fiducia, and 5.14. In Curtius' account Darius misjudged Alexander's caution before Issus and his daring (temeritas) before the battle of Gaugamela (iv, 14.13).

8.10: delituisse

'Delitescere' was used by Vergil (Aen. ii, 136 with R.G. Austin's note [Vergili Aeneidos Liber Secundus, Oxford '64]), but it was used predominantly in prose: for example, 'exercitus (sc. of Q. Minucius Thermus) .. inter vepres in latebris ferarum noctem unam delituit' (Livy xxxviii, 46.8 from a speech made against Cn. Manlius in 187 B.C.; cf. 49. 7-8 with 'saltus .. qui angusti erant' in the same sentence); and it was not always used in a military context, e.g. Sen. ep. 79, 15 of Epicurus, and Suet. Claudius 5.

M. Acilius Glabrio spoke of Antiochus' position at Thermopylae in similar vein (Livy xxxvi, 17. 10-12).

8.10: inter angustias saltus

The 'angustiae saltus' by which Parmenion advanced to Issus (7. 6-7) were the Kara Kapu Pass, whether Curtius knew it or not, and the 'angustiae saltus' where Alexander hoped to engage Darius (8.23) were the coastal strip north of the Merkes Su Pass. It seems clear that Alexander did not encamp at Myriandrus before Darius prepared to leave Sochi (cf. p.260).

Diodorus uses the term τὰς δυσχωρίας of Alexander's position (32.3) and Plutarch has εἴσω τῶν στενῶν (Alex. 20, 2).

8.10: ritu ignobiliū ferarum

Cf. the phrases at iv, 13.14 and v, 9.6 both used of reckless rather than cowardly behaviour. At v, 3.19 Curtius uses the phrase 'ferarum ritu' of the way some troops of Alexander were trapped and killed in the defile of the Gates of Susa. In these passages the comparison with wild animals does not have the moral connotations found for instance in Vergil's Aen. iv, 551:

non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam
degere more ferae, talis nec tangere curas

and Justin xviii, 6.3. The range of connotations of comparisons

of men with animals in Latin literature is illustrated by A.S. Pease Vergili Aeneidos liber IV '35 449-451.

8.10: quae strepitu praetereuntium audito silvarum latebris
se occulerent

Nett tried to defend the reading of the codd., 'occulerint', but the sense requires Acidalius' emendation. Curtius reports a generalization, 'in the manner of shameless wild animals who hid in forest lairs when they heard the noise of people passing by'.

8.11: iam etiam valetudinis simulatione frustrari suos milites

This agrees with Arrian's account to the extent that Darius thought that Alexander's actions in Cilicia were delaying tactics to avoid a confrontation (A. ii, 6.4).

8.11: oppressurum esse cunctantes

The participle 'cunctantes' adds to the Roman colouring observed in 'trahendi .. belli' in § 8. The strong position of the participle at the end of the sentence, and at the end of the speech, shows the importance Curtius attached to Darius' view of Alexander in the structure of his narrative.

The coupling of 'cunctari' and 'opprimere', or their compounds, is frequent in Livy, e.g. x, 20.10, xxi, 5.2 and 56.4.

8.11: haec magnificentius iactata quam verius

Livy used the adjective 'magnificus' and its adverbial form in describing Hannibal's promises to the Capuans (xxiii, 10.2; xxv, 22.15), and in another context coupled 'magnifice' with 'iactare' (ix, 41.9).

8.1-11: Darius and the advice of the Greeks: Sources and Composition

Plutarch and Arrian both record Darius' rejection of advice from his Greek mercenaries, but they identify Anyntas as the spokesman of the mercenaries (Alex. 20, 1 and A. ii, 6.3). Furthermore Curtius differs from Plutarch and Arrian in his summary of the mercenaries' advice: the phrase 'ut retro abiret',

§ 2 repeated substantially in § 7, contrasts with the formulation of Plutarch, κατὰ χώραν ὑπομένειν κτλ. (Alex. 20, 2) and of Arrian, τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον .. μὴ ἀπολιπεῖν (ii, 6.3). These substantive differences suggest that Curtius was not following sources used by Plutarch and Arrian (on the differences between Plutarch's and Arrian's versions, Kornemann (1) 50-51).

Another difference concerns Darius' reaction to the Greeks' advice (cf. on § 3). Plutarch does not suggest that Darius had any sympathy for their advice. In Curtius' account Darius' realization that the Greeks' advice had some merit, despite the views of his court, matches the situation in the story of Alexander's sickness, when Alexander accepted the advice of Philip despite the unanimous view of his court that Philip was not to be trusted (cf. 6.3). The point of the antithesis is that Darius, unlike Alexander, yielded the initiative in decision-taking to his court. By contrast Arrian's version says that Darius initially accepted and applied Amyntas' policy, but in time changed his mind (ii, 6.3 sq.; to this Arrian attaches the common idea that Darius was strengthened in his whim by time-servers in his court; the phrase is repeated at A. vii, 29.1, and cf. C.R. iii, 2. 10 and viii, 5.6). Similarly Diodorus describes Darius' reaction to Charidemus' **advice: initially the King accepted Charidemus' advice**, but changed his mind when Charidemus adopted a more abusive style (30.4). However, one cannot postulate two traditions on Darius' relations with his court, the one followed by Diodorus and Arrian, and the other by Curtius, for, in Curtius' account of the Charidemus episode Darius turned against Charidemus in the same way as Darius does in Diodorus' account (save that Curtius omits mention of Darius' initial approval of Charidemus' strategy), furthermore in Bk. 5 Curtius depicts Darius leading, rather than being manipulated by his court, until the time of the conspiracy against him.

Thus the presentation of Darius in this episode can be said to differ from the tradition recorded by Arrian for compositional reasons; the difference need not be attributed to the sources employed by Curtius and Arrian.

Tarn believed that the narrative in c. 8 of Darius' exchange with the Greeks was taken from the 'mercenaries source' (ii, 105; Kaerst's view is mentioned in note on § 2 supra), but it can be added that Plutarch and Arrian covered the same ground,

and even gave Amyntas' name, which Curtius omitted, and further the advice attributed to Amyntas was obviously right - ex eventu. In any case Curtius implies (esp. in § 7) that the Persian nobles advised Darius privately, and one cannot take too seriously from a non-participant a report of a secret meeting, but, if the mercenaries were not the source on the Persian war council meetings, Persian nobles who later fell into Macedonian hands could have provided the material for historians (cf. Brunt (2) esp. 143-4).

There are many links between Curtius' version of the Greeks' advice to Darius, and Diodorus' version of Charidemus' advice to Darius (cf. on §§ 2 and 3). This may mean that Curtius transposed ideas which he had picked up from a source on the tale of Charidemus, and employed them for his version of Amyntas' advice to Darius.

In § 7 Curtius introduces in oratio obliqua a speech of exhortation; its structure fits the γένος συμβουλευτικόν as analysed by Helmreich à propos of the paired speeches in iv, 14 (Helmreich Reden 11 sq. A speech of exhortation by a general to his troops would be a παρακλήσις or παρακέλυσσις, whilst a λόγος συμβουλευτικός, or demegoria, would be a speech to an assembly or council, but the distinction between these types was not strictly observed [Walbank ii, p.385 on Polyb. xii, 25, a3]). In § 7 the proposed action is justified as being necessary and expedient (cf. iv, 14. 9-11). The argument is then developed, first taking the topos of the 'necessarium' (Helmreich p.18 on iv, 14.10 sq., comparing Livy xxi, 41.15 and Thuc. vii, 64.1): the Persian army could not winter in the area, and Persian traditions would not permit the splitting up of the army before a major confrontation (§§ 8 and 9). The argument then turns to the topos of the 'possibile', blending two themes which are characteristic of this topos: magnification of one's own strength and resources, and making light of the enemy's power (Helmreich p.20 quotes Anaximenes of Lampsacus on these themes: τὰ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ταπεινοῦν, τὰ δ' ἡμέτερα μεγάλα καθιστάναι, illustrated respectively by C.R. iv, I4. I3sq of Livy xxiii, 42.5, and C.R. iv, I4. I2 with Lucan vii, 355sq.).

8.12-16: the advance of Darius from Sochi to Issus and then to the Pinarus

8.12: pecunia omni rerumque pretiosissimis

Diodorus says that Alexander sent to Damascus τὰ σκευοφόρα καὶ τὸν περιττὸν ὄχλον (32.2). Curtius here and at 13.2, 5, 11 and 16 mentions the mass of money and luxury goods, but a link with Diodorus comes in 13.16 where Curtius speaks of 30,000 men and 7,000 iumenta taken in Damascus. The difference at this point (8.12) between Diodorus and Curtius may be due to Curtius' desire to spotlight the vulgar opulence of the Persian army, a major theme in this book (2.12 sq., and 3.8 sq.).

8.12: Damascus Syriae cum modico praesidio militum missis

Diodorus too records the despatch of the baggage to 'Damascus in Syria' (32.2), whilst Arrian mentions it only after his description of the battle (A. ii, 11.10).

8.12: insequentibus more patrio agmen coniuge et matre

On these women cf. 3.22. For the traditionalism of Darius' organization of this campaign cf. 3.8 sq. and 8.9, and D.S. 35.3. Curtius and Diodorus were not alone in talking of the force of Persian tradition: Arrian mentions it in a comment on Darius' position in the battle-line at Issus (ii, 8.11).

The historicity of this Persian custom is questionable. Cambyses took his wife with him into Egypt (Hdt. iii, 31), and his next wife, Atossa, joined him in Egypt or Syria, unless she was with the army from the outset of the campaign (Hdt. iii, 31 and 64 and 88), but Atossa apparently did not accompany her son into Greece.

8.12: virgines quoque cum parvo filio comitabantur patrem

Curtius is here more precise than he was in referring to Darius' 'liberi' at 3.23. Later he specifies that Darius had a six-year-old son and two daughters (11. 24-25). Arrian gives the same information, except for the age of the son (A. ii, 11.9). Diodorus agrees with Curtius (36.3 and 38.2; cf. Fragmentum Sabbaticum, Jacoby FGH 151 § 5).

8.13: forte eadem nocte

Cf. Plut. Alex. 20, 5: ἐν δὲ τῇ νυκτὶ διαμαρτώντες ἀλλήλων. Arrian mentions that Darius slipped in behind Alexander, but does

not include a temporal reference (A. ii, 7.1), but whilst Curtius says that Alexander reached the Gates (sc. the Merkes Su Pass) at night, Arrian says that Alexander camped near Myriandrus where there was a heavy storm during the night (ii, 6.2). If both Arrian and Curtius are correct, then they may be referring to separate nights, and indeed they both imply that it took Alexander a day to march back from his camp to the Gates (A. ii, 8.2; C.R. § 23 *infra*). However, the idea that the two armies passed each other in the night was probably an invention for dramatic purposes; no one who knew the geography of the area and the routes taken by Darius and Alexander would have needed to draw in the darkness of night to produce an apologetic for Alexander.

'Forte' may be translated 'as it happened' or 'as a matter of fact'.

8.13: et Alexander ad fauces quibus Syria aditur

Curtius' source was probably referring to the Merkes Su Pass as opposed to the Belen Pass (cf. on 7.7. Pliny called the Belen Pass the Syrian Gates [*n.h.* v, 80] cf. Arrian's Assyrian Gates, ii, 6.1; Alexander historians may have unknowingly confused the two passes). In Arrian's account the pass which Parmenion had to secure and Alexander crossed before reaching Myriandrus appears to be styled 'the Gates which divide Cilician and Assyrian territories' (A. ii, 5.1); the Belen Pass was too far south to be in Cilician territory, as Myriandrus fell in the Persian administrative zone of Phoenicia (Xen. *An.* i, 4.6, cf. Scylax 102 and U. Kahrstedt (2) 5). Then the Merkes Su Pass was styled the Cilician Gates by Callisthenes (Polyb. xii, 17.2: Alexander had already gone through τὰ στενὰ καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας as Darius descended into Cilicia behind him. Similarly Arrian records that when Alexander turned back at Myriandrus, he had to go back through the Gates [one set] and the narrows [στενόπορα τὰ χωρῖα, A. ii, 6.2 and 8.2]). Callisthenes' 'Cilician Gates' were the same as 'the Gates' of Arrian ii, 5.1 and 6.2, the pass of Merkes Su. Curtius seems to refer to the same pass.

From Xenophon's description of the Pass (*An.* i, 4.4) it seems that the stretch either side of the Merkes Su (or Saraseki) was termed the Gates (Janke (1) 21 sq. for a description of the area, with map on pl. 1). Cicero's comment on the ease with which

the angustiae could be held and block entrance from Syria may refer to the same pass (ad fam. xv, 4.4).

Incidentally the site of Myriandrus is not known. Xenophon says it was five parasangs (c. 27 km.) from the Merkes Su Pass (An. i, 4.6). The Merkes Su was c. 11 km. from Alexandria, therefore Myriandrus may have been c. 16 km. south of Alexandria.

8.13: et Dareus ad eum locum quem Amanicas Pylas vocant,
pervenit

Darius was proceeding in a southerly direction, at least at the time of the battle for Curtius says that the sea was to his right (§ 27).

The Amanic Gates would seem to be the Toprakkale Pass; but certainly could not be the Kara Kapu Pass, to which Strabo gave the name Amanid Gates (xiv, 5.18 676 and cf. on 7.7 supra). Pliny refers to 'portae Amanii montis' south of Issus and the Pinarus (n.h. v, 80), and he may be thinking of the Merkes Su Pass (cf. Treidler RE Supplbd ix, '62 1356-7). Curtius' source was presumably in harmony with ^{the} tradition of the Alexander histories for Callisthenes (Polyb. xii, 17.2) and Arrian (ii, 7.1) both state that Darius approached Issus via the Amanid Gates. Illustrations of the Pass are provided by Janke (1) pp. 37 and 38. However, even if Curtius followed a source that was roughly correct on geographical points, it does not follow that Curtius must have understood it correctly (cf. on § 16).

8.14: nec dubitavere Persae quin Isso relicta, quam ceperant,
Macedones fugerent

Curtius saw the dramatic irony in the situation when Alexander turned and Darius found himself face to face with Alexander instead of in pursuit of a fugitive army (§ 24 infra). It is, therefore, possible that Curtius invented this detail for the dramatic effect; certainly Callisthenes put it differently: πυθόμενον (sc. τὸν Δαρεῖον) παρὰ πῶν ἐγγχωρίων προάγειν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὡς ἐπὶ Συρίαν .. (Polyb. xii, 17.3 cf. on 8.24).

Curtius' version adds to the picture presented earlier in the chapter of Darius' failure to assess Alexander's temperament and motives correctly. There is a dramatic change in § 24 when Darius suddenly realizes his mistake.

8.15: *instinctu purpuratorum barbara feritate saevientium*

Wolf comments on this episode, 'Die Verstümmelung der makedonischen Kranken vor Issos geht nicht auf den Befehl des Dareios zurück, sondern ausdrücklich auf den seiner Würdenträger' (Soldatenerzählungen p.18). This, thinks Wolf, is one indication that Curtius derived material from a source which incorporated mercenaries' tales, for Darius' mercenaries had an interest in demonstrating his humanity.

However, the 'purpurati' only goaded Darius on; they did not issue any order (cf. x, 8.6: *ille [sc.Arrhidaeus] Meleagri instinctu se iussisse respondit*, the order being for the arrest of Perdikkas), and after the atrocity had been perpetrated, Darius ordered the prisoners to inspect his camp and report on it to Alexander. Curtius' account does not read like an apologia for Darius' actions. On the contrary, the very fact that Darius let himself be guided by the villainous men in his court detracts from his merits as a leader (cf. 2.10; 8.3), for Curtius develops the antithesis between this weakness of Darius, and Alexander's confidence in his own judgment, typified by his differing reactions to advice from Parmenion (6. 4-7; 7.10; iv, 11. 14-15; 13.3-10; see further on 7.8 supra).

8.15: *praecisis adustisque manibus*

Arrian says that Darius had all the Macedonians taken at Issos murdered (ii, 7.1, *αἰχμασόμενος ἀπέκτελλεν*; the participle provides a link with Curtius' story of the mutilation of the prisoners).

The mutilation story recalls the episode when Alexander approached Persepolis and was met by a column of Greek prisoners-of-war who had been maimed whilst in Persian hands. The episode is described by Justin xi, 14. 11.12, Diodorus 69. 2-9, and Curtius v, 5.5-24; all mention that the Greeks called on Alexander to avenge their suffering, but declined his offer to have them escorted back to Greece; none of these three writers cited this incident as a justification for the atrocities that followed on Alexander's capture of Persepolis (D.S. 70.2 and C.R. v, 6.6sq. cf. Plut. Alex. 37, 3), but a difference occurs between Justin and Curtius over the number of Greek prisoners-of-war (800, J. xi, 14.11 against 4,000, C.R. v, 5.5).

It has been suggested that Callisthenes' work would not have covered the capture of Persepolis, and that, since Arrian does not recount the tale of the mutilated prisoners-of-war, Ptolemy considered it not worth reporting (Schachermeyr 512 n. 163 and Wolf Soldatenerzählungen 72.3). However those questions be answered, it remains the case that Curtius, Diodorus and Trogus (Justin) are the three writers who described the mutilation of prisoners-of-war by the Persians.

The story of the Issus prisoners is extraneous in the sense that Curtius does not present their fate as a goad to the allied forces against Darius. For example Alexander does not mention the incident in his speech to his Greek troops before the battle (10.8 but neither does Alexander in Arrian's account. This need not mean that Curtius found the mutilation story in a source and repeated it without troubling to integrate it into his story; for it is equally possible that he inserted here a detail which he found in the Persepolis story, for this libel against the Persians added to the contrast which he was trying to present in this book between the Graeco-Macedonian and Persian character and customs.

8.15: circumduci, ut copias suas noscerent, satisque omnibus spectatis, nuntiare quae vidissent regi suo iussit

Curtius' version conveniently explains how Alexander first learnt of Darius' arrival in the vicinity of Issus. However, Arrian said that Alexander killed all those captured (A. ii, 7.1).

It is said that before the battle of Zama, Scipio similarly forced Carthaginian spies who had fallen into his hands, to inspect his camp, and then sent them back to Hannibal, and Scipio's intention was to demoralize Hannibal and his troops (Polyb. xv, 5.4 sq., who mentions three spies, with Livy xxx, 29.2). In an earlier context, Laevinus is said to have treated one of Pyrrhus' spies in the same way (Dion. Hal. xix, 11; Zon. viii, 3.6; Frontin. Strat. iv, 7.7), and in the context of Xerxes' preparations for the invasion of Greece Herodotus records that three Greek spies, who were caught in Sardis, were shown the Persian forces and released so that the Greeks would learn that reports on the size of the Persian army were not exaggerated (Hdt. vii, 146-147). It appears, therefore, that the release of captured spies was a commonplace of military history,

if not a common tactic in psychological warfare. This makes it less likely that Curtius' account is correct, and Arrian's wrong; Darius may have tortured the men caught at Issus before killing them, as nearly happened to the Greek spies, caught in Sardis in 481 B.C. (with Arrian's ἀλιξιόμενος compare Herodotus' βασανισθέντες [vii, 146.1]).

R.B. Steele noted the verbal links between Curtius' account and Livy's version of the episode in N. Africa:

praemissi speculatores cum excepti a custodibus Romanis deducti ad Scipionem essent, traditos eos tribunis militum, iussosque omisso metu visere omnia per castra qua vellent circumduci iussit; percontatusque satin per commodum omnia explorassent ... retro ad Hannibalem dimisit (xxx, 29. 2-3; Steele (1) 404; Hannibal gained a depressing picture of Scipio's 'fiducia' from the incident, 29.4: Alexander's 'fiducia' turned to anxiety, C.R. iii, 8.20). The verbal similarities, such as they are, suggest that Curtius knew the Livian passage.*

8.16: motis ergo castris superat Pinarum amnem

The statement that Darius crossed the Pinarus before Alexander turned to approach him for battle is not supported by Arrian nor by Polybius' version of Callisthenes' account; the other accounts establish nothing relevant to the question. Curtius appears to contradict himself at § 28 where he states that Darius sent a force of 20,000 men plus units of archers across the river, that is to the side which Alexander was approaching: in other words the main body of the Persian army had not crossed the Pinarus. Arrian agrees with this second version: Darius advanced from Issus to the river Pinarus (ii, 7.1), and later Darius sent across the river 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 light infantry (ii, 8.5).

It is possible that Curtius tried to run together two conflicting traditions, such as existed over the battle of the Granicus where Arrian makes Alexander's crossing of the river an integral part of the battle (i, 14.5 sq.), whereas Diodorus tells that Alexander put his army across without opposition before the battle began (19.3). However there is no other evidence to support this (pace Domaszewski [p. 62] who thought that Diodorus preserved a radically different tradition from that of Callisthenes

* Dosson (Étude 244-5) suggested that Curtius was reflecting the theme of a declamation; but the influence of Livy is more obvious.

and Arrian's sources, and attributed this particular peculiarity to Curtius' adoption of Cleitarchean material; cf. on § 27 *infra*).

There are features of Curtius' work which may explain this departure from the main tradition. In the first place there is Curtius' uncertainty about the geography of the area: he fails to label the coastal defiles, and there was little agreement amongst ancient writers about the names and positions of the passes. Then there is Curtius' tendency to omit detail which was not necessary for the immediate dramatic effect (cf. on Parmenion's movements 4.15 and 6.4). Now a substantial section of the Persian army had in fact crossed the river before the battle, for Arrian says that Darius put across the river 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 light infantry (ii, 8.5) and when his phalanx was properly deployed he recalled the cavalry (A. ii, 8.10 and cf. Curtius 8.28) and put most of them on his right wing. It is therefore possible that Curtius' statement that Darius crossed the Pinarus is a reference to this movement, and Curtius has omitted the details of the units involved and of their subsequent withdrawal back across the Pinarus.

8.16: Pinarum amnem

The identity of the Pinarus has been much discussed, and between the two rivers most frequently mentioned, the Payas and the Deliçay the balance of the evidence still favours the latter. The evidence is discussed in Appendix D.

8.17: vix fides habebatur

Cf. A. ii, 7.2: ἐπεὶ οὐ πιστὸς αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος ἐφαίνετο.

8.17: speculatores maritimas regiones praemissos explorare iubet, ipse adesset

Bardon thus follows the reading of the codd., which is just, defensible as Büttner argued (pp. 9-10), though it means that 'explorare' is followed by both a direct object and an indirect question. Such a combination occurs at Columella Res Rustica ii, 4.3: eum (sc. agrum) porro an recte araretur frequenter explorare debet agricola; but in this passage the direct object is itself the subject of the indirect question, and thus the link is stronger than in Curtius' sentence. The word order also makes the reading unlikely, as it is natural to take 'praemissos' with the preceding

phrase. Vogel's emendation 'in maritimas regiones', followed by Müller, is preferable, and it is easy to see how the preposition could have disappeared, under the influence of the following 'm'.

Meiser's emendation, followed by Hedicke, reads 'mari in eas regiones', and it produces a perfect match, with A. ii, 7.2: ἀναβιβάσας εἰς τριακόντορον τῶν ἐταίρων τινὰς ἀποπέμπει ὀπίσω ἐπὶ Ἴσσοῦν, but the convenience of this match does not justify the emendation: it is not justified palaeographically and 'eas' is meaningless.

With or without Vogel's emendation, it is not clear whether Curtius thought the scouts went by boat or overland: contrast the explicit phraseology of iv, 1.27 'in naves militibus impositis Cyprum transmisit', or iv, 4.2 The imprecision may again reflect Curtius' uncertainty about the movements of the two armies before the battle.

8.17: ipse adesset, an praefectorum aliquis speciem
praebuisset universi venientis exercitus

Compare A. ii, 7.2: ἀπαγγέλλουσιν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐν
χερσὶν εἶναι Δαρεῖον.

8.18: procul ingens multitudo conspecta est

As Alexander's army still had to recross the Merkes Su Pass it is most unlikely that Darius' army was in sight: the distance and the terrain suggest that Curtius should not be believed. 'Topothesis', or the remoulding of geographical descriptions for dramatic purposes, is a feature of Curtius' style (cf. Introduction D.1xxiii), and here Curtius sacrifices geographical accuracy to present a dramatic scene.

8.18: maxime propter iumenta

Curtius appears to invent this to add to the picture of Darius' incompetence and the unpreparedness of his army for battle. In fact the bulk of the baggage had been diverted to Damascus with at least 7,000 pack animals (A. ii, 11. 9-10; D.S. 32.3; Plut. Alex. 20, 11 and 24.1; C.R. 13.16 cf. on § 12).

8.19: quod omni expetierat voto

If Darius' move was 'the answer to all Alexander's prayers' this does not mean that Curtius thought the gods were responsible for Darius' error. Curtius' phrase has a formulaic ring, cf. vii, 10.6 and ix, 9.4, and it is clear from the Histories as a whole that he avoided commitment to a belief in divine intervention (cf. on 6.18 supra). Arrian, who was a Stoic, had fewer inhibitions about the intervention of the divine in the war: to Alexander he attributes a statement that ὁ θεός drove Darius to leave the open country (A. ii, 7.3), and then in his own voice he says that Darius was prompted to take the wrong advice by some supernatural force (καὶ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον τυχόν, ii, 6.6; cf. ἐχρήν, ii, 6.7). The idea that the gods willed the defeat of Darius reappears in the correspondence between Darius and Alexander after the battle of Issus (A. ii, 14.3 and 7, and cf. A.B. Breebart Historiografische Aspecten 98 sq. G.T. Griffith (4) argues that Arrian's version of Darius' letter in ii, 14 represents Alexander's forgery, which means, if Griffith is correct, that the reference to the gods in c.14 should be attributed to Alexander rather than Arrian).

Plutarch says that τύχη presented Alexander with the advantage of the battle site, but this belongs to the rhetorical theme 'de Alexandri fortuna', for Plutarch goes on to say that Alexander's generalship proved to be an advantage superior to that of his luck over the terrain (Alex. 20, 7).

8.19: decernendum fore

Lease cited this as an example of gerundive with 'fore' as a combination which does not occur before Livy (AJP xl, '19 268-9).

8.20-24: Alexander's thoughts before the battle and the advance of the Macedonian army during the night before the battle.

8.20: ut solet fieri, cum ultimi discriminis tempus adventat

Compare A. iii, 11.2: ὅτι περ φιλεῖ πρὸ τῶν μεγάλων κινδύνων γίνεσθαι. Kornemann ([1] p.187) took Arrian's observation there to be a quotation from Ptolemy, but failed to justify the attribution. The verbal coincidence is striking and it would seem possible either that Arrian read Curtius, or that both had read

Ptolemy, for the differences between Curtius and Arrian on the catalogue of units with Darius at Gaugamela would seem to exclude the possibility that Aristobulus was a common source (cf. supra on c. 2. 2-9).

8.20: in sollicitudinem versa fiducia est

Curtius was not the only writer to state that Alexander was apprehensive before the battle began: Justin and the papyrus history record Alexander's perturbation at the prospect of the battle (J. xi, 9.1; P.Ox. xv, 1798 = Jacoby FGH 148, 44 col. 2); the papyrus history mentions Alexander's ἀγωνία, a term used by Diodorus of Alexander at 3.1. We may reject Tam's view that Diodorus took from the 'mercenaries' source the attribution to Alexander of intense anxiety or despair (Tam ii, 67 n. 9) and Sinclair's view that these feelings belong rather to Diodorus' own attempt at the portrayal of Alexander's character (R.K. Sinclair, Diodorus and the writing of history PACA vi, '63, 43-4). We have here to do with a source which presented Alexander as a commander reflecting on the topos of the uncertainty of the fate in war.

Curtius moulds this rhetorical Topos into a dramatic structure, as he contrasts the anxiety of Alexander, which turns into confidence, with the panic of Darius and his troops (§ 25 sq.). One feature of this book is the series of antithetical pictures of the states of mind of the opposing forces in the war (cf. Kroll Studien 337-8).

8.20: nec iniuria ex his quae tribuisset sibi, quam mutabilis esset reputabat

Thus Bardon and Müller opted for the emended reading 'quam mutabilis'. The reading of PBFLV is 'quamque mutabilis'. Apart from omitting to give the reading of the codd. in his apparatus criticus Bardon has erred in rejecting the '-que'. The parenthesis is confined to 'nec iniuria', for the subjunctive mood of 'tribuisset' shows that its clause is in oratio obliqua and the clause must go with the main clause, which means a link particle is required before the following indirect question. Translate: that very fortune .. he (now) feared - and not without reason - on account of what she had bestowed on him, and he reflected how fickle she was (Professor Badian provided me with this translation in comment on this crux).

Büttner (p. 10) correctly defends the reading of the codd., and notes as parallels to the parenthetic 'nec iniuria' similar phrases associated with verbs of fearing at iv, 15.13 and x, 7.10.

8.22: itaque corpora milites curare iussit

Similarly Arrian says that Alexander ordered his men to take a meal, and that during the night he led the army to reoccupy the Gates (ii, 8. 1-2).

8.22: tertia vigilia

Curtius here introduces a feature from Roman army practice. The Romans divided the night into four equal watches (Polybius vi, 33; A.R. Neumann RE Supplbd. ix, '62 1693 sq.).

8.22: instructos et armatos esse

Miller suggests that the rhythm could be improved and made more Curtian by reading 'instructos esse et armatos', cf. iii, 5.5 and ix, 9.24. However the text is acceptable and the same clausula occurs for instance at 3.4 and viii, 2.12; similar ponderous clausulae may be found for instance at iii, 2.15, 13.16; iv, 2.21 and 3.25. The manuscript reading must be retained and the heaviness of the ending must be regarded as intentional.

8.22: sacrificium dis praesidibus loci fecit

This is not found in the major accounts but P. Ox. 1798 (FGH 148, 44 col. 2) has: πρὸς εὐχὰς ἐτρόπη Θέτιν καὶ Νηρηΐδας καὶ Νηρέα καὶ Ποσειδῶνα ἐπικαλούμενος, ὃ καὶ τέτρωρον ἄρμα ἐκέλευσεν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος ἀναγαγόντας βεῖψαι

(the chariot thrown into the sea recalls Alexander's act at the mouth of the Indus when he threw golden objects into the sea for Poseidon, A. vi, 19.5).

8.23: tertium ... signum tuba miles acceperat

According to Vegetius the beginning of each watch was marked by the sounding of a 'tuba', whilst the end of the watch was indicated by a blast on a 'cornu' (iii, 8). The beginning of the third watch would match Arrian's phrase ἀμφὶ μέσας νύκτας (ii, 8.2).

8.23: oriente luce pervenerunt ad angustias quas occupare decreverant

According to Arrian the Gates were taken during the night and the army camped there for the rest of the night (ii, 8.2).

Curtius failed to distinguish between the narrow plain where the battle was fought and the defile at the Merkes Su Pass. This again shows his vagueness and lack of concern about the geography of the battle area.

8.24: Dareum xxx inde stadia abesse praemissi indicabant

This is not found in Arrian's account, but Diodorus records that Alexander's scouts reported that Darius was only thirty stades away (c. 5.5 km., D.S. 33.1), but Diodorus' point of reference is more obscure than Curtius', since his preceding sentence relates to Alexander's capture of Issus. In Arrian's account of the battle of Gaugamela the armies were likewise 30 stades apart when Alexander drew up his battle line (A. iii, 9.3) and Curtius elsewhere refers to Alexander withdrawing 30 stades from the Persian Gates (v, 3.23; D.S. makes it 300, 68.4). The 30 stades are therefore possibly formulaic. The detail is mentioned again in Appendix D.

8.24 - 30: Panic grips the Persian army as Alexander's approach is reported.

8.24: Dareo adventum hostium pavidi agrestes nuntiaverunt

In the dramatic structure of the story the terrified peasants who informed Darius of Alexander's approach balance the victims of Darius' capture of Issus who informed Alexander of Darius' position (§ 16 supra). In this second of the balancing scenes Curtius introduces the second peripeteia, this time affecting Darius.

Fränkel (Quellen 408-9) cited this passage as a case where Curtius seems to differ on a substantive point from Diodorus. Diodorus says that as the two armies approached Issus, the native population thought it wiser not to cooperate with Alexander any more, and gave Darius their whole-hearted support (32.4). However there is no need to assume a contradiction: the native population dismissed Alexander's chances because his forces were so small (τῶν Μακεδόνων ὀλιγότητος καταφρονήσαντες, 32.4; cf. J. xi, 9.1: movebat haec multitudo hostium respectu paucitatis suae Alexandrum; and C.R. iii, 3.28: Dareus .. angustiis redactus est ad paucitatem quam in hoste contempserat); they closed Alexander out of Issus, but he terrified them into submission (32.4 καταπληξάμενος ἐχειρώσατο); thus, when they heard that Alexander had turned and was heading back towards Issus, their reaction could well have

been terror as Curtius says. Curtius and Diodorus are describing native reactions at different stages in the conflict, and their accounts are not inconsistent. They are furthermore the only two sources to mention the native population.

8.25: ergo non mediocris omnium animos <capiebat> formido
The codd. lack a verb and read 'animo'.

M.L. Paladini criticised Bardon's reading and offered her own emendation, inserting the verb 'suberat': animo suberat formido (Latomus xx, '61 840-1). Plausible emendations are numerous; for instance, F. Walter argued for the insertion of 'turbavit' before 'ergo' (Ph. Woch. xlvii, '27 1565), whilst Castiglioni argued a case for inserting 'incesserat' after 'erant' (SIFC xix, '12 140-3).

8.25: quippe itineri quam proelio aptiores erant
Steele ([1], p. 404) compares Livy xxxiii, 9.5:
phalanx aptior itineri quam pugnae.

More immediately one notes the contrast with the description of Alexander's army at § 23: miles .. itineri simul paratus ac proelio. The parallel phraseology marks the antithesis.

8.26: alii in iugum montis evaserant, ut hostium agmen
inde prospicerent; equos plerique frenabant

It was a characteristic of Hellenistic historiography to describe a confused mass of people by focusing on the actions of individual groups (Burck (1) p. 201 and n. 1, who cites Livy v, 41. 4-10; D.S. xvii, 25.4 and 34.8 and xix, 7. 2-3 [from Duris]).

8.27: Dareus initio iugum montis cum parte copiarum occupare
statuit, et a fronte et a tergo circumiturus hostem

Arrian says that Darius posted c. 20,000 men on his left flank on the slopes of the mountain, and these men found themselves κατόπιν τοῦ δεξιού κέρως τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου during the battle (A. ii, 8.7). Curtius refers to these units again at 9.10.

On the identification of the ridge see Appendix D.

8.27: a mari quoque, quo dextrum eius cornu tegebatur, alios
obiecturus

The reference to the sea being on Darius' right makes it plain that at least for the battle itself Curtius was following a

source which made Darius approach Issus from the north.

Consistent with this is Curtius' record that Darius took Issus before he reached the Pinarus. This point may be developed to disprove Domaszewski's thesis that as far as § 24 Curtius follows the Cleitarchean tradition which is given by Diodorus, and that from § 24 Curtius switches to the tradition preserved by Arrian, which differs from the Cleitarchean tradition in that Cleitarchus presents Darius' advance as being in a northerly direction whilst Arrian marks his advance as being south from the Toprakkale Pass (Domaszewski, esp. 61-2; cf. on § 16 supra.).

8.28: praeter haec viginti milia praemissa cum sagittariorum manu Pinarum amnem, qui duo agmina interfluebat, transire et obicere sese Macedonum copiis iusserat

Curtius fails to specify whether the 20,000 were infantry or cavalry: as the troops in the preceding sentence were presumably infantry, judging by the terrain where they were to station themselves one might expect the 20,000 to be infantry. Arrian says this advance force was made up of 30,000 cavalry plus 20,000 light-armed troops (A. ii, 8.5). The movement of the cavalry is discussed on § 16 supra; Curtius appears to have separated the manoeuvring of the cavalry and infantry.

8.28: si id praestare non possent, retrocedere in montes et occulte circumire ultimos hostium

Arrian says that these troops were to screen the deployment of the Persian phalanx, and that the cavalry was presently recalled and integrated into the Persian battleline (ii, 8.10). Arrian in turn is guilty of omission: he fails to record what happened to the light-armed troops; either they scattered, some to the hills, hence the story that they were under orders to take to the hills (given the width of the plain such a plan is unlikely. In any case this story may have been invented because Curtius, or his source had no information on what happened to the light-armed troops after they crossed the Pinarus), or they in turn recrossed the river and formed the frontal screen of 26,000 iaculatores, funditores and sagittarii (9.1 and 5 infra).

8.30: quippe alii prae metu imperium exequi non audebant,
alii frustra exequabantur, quia ubi partes labant,
summa turbatur

The picture of panic in Darius' army is contradicted by Arrian to the extent that the cavalry recrossed the Pinarus in orderly fashion and the flank force kept Macedonian units tied down (ii, 8.10 and 9.4), but Curtius provides a fine rhetorical flourish to close the chapter. The balancing clauses with 'alii .. alii' offer in a conventional way a view of a disorganized mass of men (cf. on §26); and Curtius finishes with a sententia that halts the narrative.

Chapter 9: There is a break after chapter 8, and Curtius now introduces a description of the Persian battle line and the Macedonian line (§§ 7-10) without marking the stages by which the lines were deployed.

9.1: Nabarzanes

Cf. on 7.12 supra. At Gaugamela the Persian right was commanded by Mazaenus (D.S. 59.5; A. iii, 8.6 and 11.4 says that he commanded Syrian and Mesopotamian cavalry units on the right); neither the command, nor even the presence of Nabarzanes is attested.

9.1: equitatu dextrum cornu tuebatur, additis funditorum
sagittariorumque viginti fere milibus

Callisthenes mentioned 30,000 cavalry stationed by Darius on the sea-ward side (Polyb. xii, 18.2), and no balancing force on the flank by the mountain. Links can be seen connecting the accounts of Arrian, Curtius and Callisthenes: Arrian says that Darius put across the river 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 light infantry (ii, 8.5) and when his phalanx was properly deployed he recalled the cavalry (A. ii, 8.10 and cf. Curtius 8.28) and put most of them on his right wing, the first reference to cavalry on Darius' right. Then Darius realized that little could be achieved by cavalry on his left, and so transferred the bulk of his left cavalry force to the right (A. ii, 8.11 cf. on 11.3 infra). In other words almost all of the 30,000 cavalry were deployed on his right before the battle began.

Curtius' statement that the 20,000 slingers and archers were stationed on the right is not contradicted by Polybius and Arrian (the light-armed troops mentioned at A. ii, 8.8 did not necessarily include the advance guard).

9.2: in eodem Thimodes erat, Graecis peditibus mercede
conductis, triginta milibus, praepositus

The presence of 30,000 mercenary infantry is mentioned too by A. ii, 8.6 and Polyb. xii, 17.7 and 18.2 but Curtius is the only one to name Thymondas (= Thimodes, cf. on 3.1) as the commander. Curtius' reference to Thymondas follows on earlier

references to him at 3.1 and 8.1. However in the story of the escape of the mercenaries from Issus to Egypt, Thymondas appears as of no higher standing than fellow mercenary officers Amyntas, Bianor and Aristomedes (A. ii, 13.2; Aristomedes' command at Issus is mentioned, § 3 infra); Curtius and Diodorus both mention Amyntas as the leader of the fugitive Greeks (D.S. 48.2 and C.R. iii, 11.18). It is quite possible that the shift in prominence from Thymondas to Amyntas in Curtius' narrative reflects the historical position, rather than a switch by Curtius from one source to another (Schubert (1) 36 argued that Curtius took from Aristobulus the mention of Thymondas as commander-in-chief of the mercenaries, and from Cleitarchus the picture of Amyntas as their commander; but Schubert's basic assumption of such a contradiction is questionable).

9.2: *robur exercitus par Macedonicae phalangi acies*

Compare Arrian's comment on the stationing of the Greek mercenaries at Gaugamela exactly opposite the Macedonians, ὡς μόνον δὴ ἀντίπροποι τῆ φάλαγγι (iii, 11.7). The comment hardly came from the Persian document listing the troop dispositions, and may represent what Aristobulus wrote (cf. A.iii, 11.3). In Curtius' account the potential of the Greek mercenaries is not matched by their performance in the battle (contrast A. ii, 10.4).

9.3: *in laevo cornu Aristomedes Thessalus XX milia barbarorum peditum habebat*

In Callisthenes' account the gap between the mercenaries and the mountain was filled by peltasts (Polyb. xii, 17.7). Arrian mentions a flank guard of 20,000 covering Alexander's right (ii, 8.7, cf. on § 10 infra). Callisthenes, Arrian and Curtius may be referring to the same unit.

On Aristomedes of Pherae (A. ii, 13.2) cf. on § 2 supra and Berve ii, no. 128. His presence at Issus and subsequent escape to Cyprus were mentioned by Anaximenes (Jacoby FGH 72 F 17), but Curtius probably did not follow Anaximenes, for like Diodorus, Curtius mentions only Amyntas as leading the Greek fugitives from Issus (11.18 infra).

It is possible that he was the Aristomedes who fought for Persia against Philip (Theopompus, Jacoby FGH 115, F 222), in which case one can perhaps date his departure from Pherae to 343, when Philip attacked the city for rebelling against him (Dem. xix, 260, ix, 12, and [Dem] vii, 32; M. Sordi La Lega Tessala Rome '58, 360-1).

9.4: ipsum regem in eodem cornu dimicaturum

Callisthenes set him in the centre (Polyb. xii, 18.9: κατὰ μέσην ὑπάρχοντα τὴν τάξιν), as did Arrian, who adds that Persian custom demanded it (A. ii, 8.11; Arrian appeals to the evidence of Xenophon [An. i, 8. 21-2]).

The transference of Darius from the centre to the left wing can be explained as a preparation for the 'aristeia' of Alexander (Curtius 11.7 sq. infra; Diodorus 33.5 sq.). Alexander was on the right (Diodorus 33.2; A.ii, 10.3), thus it was simple to conclude that if Alexander and Darius clashed, Darius was on his left wing. However the 'aristeia' as described by Curtius and Diodorus should not be preferred to Arrian's account (cf. on 11.7 infra).

Of course Curtius only mentions the left and the right, and not the centre, thus Darius is left of centre rather than on the far left. Nevertheless Darius' position before the battle began was clearly a significant point at an early stage in the formulation of the myth, for Callisthenes said, according to Polybius, that Darius originally wanted to station himself directly opposite Alexander but subsequently changed his mind (22.2). Presumably Callisthenes suggested that Darius owed his survival in part to his change of plan.

9.4: tria milia delectorum equitum, adsueta corporis custodia

In the battle of Gaugamela Darius was surrounded by οἱ τε ξυγγενεῖς οἱ βασιλέως .. καὶ οἱ μηλοφόροι (A.iii, 11.5) the two élite guard units, and of these the Kinsmen were cavalymen, some 1,000 strong (D.S. 59.2, and cf. note on 3.14 supra).

9.4: et pedestris acies, quadraginta milia

These 40,000 together with the 20,000 oriental infantry

mentioned in § 3 might represent the 60,000 said by Arrian to have been stationed next to the mercenaries (A.ii, 8.6). However Arrian says that the oriental infantry, which he styles the Cardaces, was either side of the mercenaries - ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν whilst Curtius implies that this infantry was all on the Persian left (but Arrian's ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν might be taken to mean 'either side of the King').

One could arrive at the 40,000 infantry by adding together the 30,000 infantry of 3.21 and either the Immortals, or, if they were really a separate category, the 10,000 infantry of 3.20 (cf. 3.13).

Callisthenes said that the Persian infantry on the left was a peltast force (Polyb. 17.7) and whilst Arrian says that the Cardaces were hoplites, they were inferior to the Macedonian hoplites since their swords and lances were too short and their defensive armour inadequate (on the weapons: D.S. 53.1 and A.i, 15.5; for the inadequacy of their armour: C. Hignett Xerxes Oxford '63 p.43; Darius' need to place archers in front of the Cardaces, and Alexander's cavalry charge against them suggests that they could not provide a front comparable with that of the Macedonian phalanx [Fuller 160; Walbank ii, p.368]). On the Cardaces cf. n. on 2.4 supra).

9.5: Hyrcani deinde Medique equites

The total strength of the Hyrcanian and Median cavalry appears to have been 16,000 (2.4 and 6 supra). These units are not mentioned by Arrian and Polybius.

9.5: his proximi ceterarum gentium ultra eos dextra
laevaue dispositi

The phraseology recalls Arrian's description of the Cardaces, in particular the phrases ἐπὶ τοῦτοις and ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν. Further, Arrian says that the troops stationed behind the mercenaries and Cardaces were light-armed and hoplites (ii, 8.8). Thus one might consider emending 'ceterarum gentium' to something such as 'cetratorum (quadra?) ginta [milia]'; using 'cetrati' to denote peltasts (cf. 2.5 and Livy xxxv, 27.5 and xxxi, 36.2; other references in TLL s.v. 'caetrati' col. 116, l. 24 sq.).

Either way 'dextra laevaue' suggests that Arrian's ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν was taken from a source that described the disposition of the troops either side of Darius.

9.5: VI milia iaculatorum funditorumque

These units may have been part of the force which earlier crossed the Pinarus to screen the deployment of the Persian battle-line, cf. on 8.28.

9.7-9: the Macedonian line.

9.7: dextrum cornu Nicanor, Parmenionis filius, tuebatur

Arrian specifies that Nicanor commanded τῶν πεζῶν τό τε ἄγγμα καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς (ii, 8.3). Curtius at iv, 13.27 and Diodorus at 57.2 anachronistically called these troops 'argyraspids'.

Nicanor appears first in tactical command of the phalanx, qua the infantry, in a battle fought north of the Danube in 335 (A.i, 4.2). Arrian mentions him as in command of the hypaspists at Granicus and again at Gaugamela (i, 14.2 and iii, 11.9). He held the same position during the chase after Darius (A.iii, 21.8). He died in 330 from some illness (A.iii, 25.4; Curtius vi, 6. 18-19).

9.7: huic proximi stabant Coenos et Perdicas et Meleager et Ptolomaeus et Amyntas, sui quisque agminis duces

This list of commanders of the τάξεις of the Macedonian Companion Infantry tallies with that given by Arrian ii, 8. 3-4. (Domaszewski [p.8] found these parallels striking enough to suggest that Curtius here paraphrased Arrian's account. However the dates of Curtius (see Introduction) rule out this possibility, and it is unlikely that Arrian would have copied Curtius if he had access to Ptolemy and Aristobulus). Both accounts separate Craterus from the other Companion commanders and say that Craterus was detailed to take orders from Parmenion.

All these commanders but Ptolemy served in the battle of Granicus, and it seems that Ptolemy had taken over the command of Philip's 'taxis'. Beloch noted that the reinforce-

ments that joined Alexander at Gordium were numerous enough to have necessitated the establishment of an additional 'taxis' (Beloch (2) 219-220), and that a Philip appears as a 'taxis' commander in 327; hence Beloch concluded that Ptolemy was the commander of a taxis established from reinforcements, and the Philip who served at Granicus remained as a taxiarch but was absent from the battle of Issus, perhaps left in charge of a force at Myriandrus (Griech.Gesch. iii, 2. 326-7). This is, however, a tenuous argument and was rejected by Berve i, 114 n.3 (cf. ii, nos. 670, 775 and 784). The 'taxis' commander at Issus was apparently Philip s. of Amyntas (A. i, 4.5 and 14.2), whilst Curtius (iv, 13.28) and Diodorus (57.3) mention a Philip s. of Balacrus as a 'taxis' commander at Gaugamela. However the man at Gaugamela must be Simmias (A. iii, 11.9); where then was Beloch's Philip?

At least some of the brigades of Companion Infantry were constituted territorially, for Diodorus says that the 'taxeis' commanded at Gaugamela by Coenus, Perdicas and Polyperchon were respectively made up of men from Elimiotis, Orestis with Lyncestis, and Tymphaia (D.S. 57.2, the implication may be that the others were not so organized; Berve i, 114 sq.; G.T. Griffith (5) esp. 136-7). Curtius refers to this in a muddled way at iv, 13.28.

9.8: in laevo, quod ad mare pertinebat, Craterus et
Parmenio erat, sed Craterus Parmenioni parere iussus

Compare A. ii, 8.4: Craterus' command was limited to the infantry, whilst Parmenion had overall command of the left.

Craterus is not explicitly described as a $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ commander by either Curtius or Arrian, but this clearly was his position, since Craterus commanded a $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ both at Granicus (A.i, 14.3) and at Gaugamela (A.iii, 11.10). Craterus was given overall command over the infantry on the left (A.ii, 8.4), a position he held again at the battle of Gaugamela (A.iii, 11.10).

9.8: dextrum Macedones Thessalis adiunctis ... tuebantur

Arrian mentions as the cavalry units on the right wing τοὺς τε ἑταίρους καλουμένους καὶ τοὺς

Θεσσαλοῦς καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας (ii, 8.9). This means that well over half Alexander's cavalry was on the right. The Thessalian cavalry is referred to again in the battle narrative (C.R. 11.3).

The status of Thessaly's troops in Asia remains obscure: they may have represented the contingent called for in terms of a decision by the Corinthian League (cf. Schwahn Heeresmatrikel 34; the wording of D.S. 4.1 suggests that Alexander subordinated the Thessalian Federation to the Corinthian League); however the separate mention of the Thessalians in Diodorus' Catalogue (17.4) and the privileged position of the Thessalians in Alexander's army provide material for the argument that the Thessalian cavalry represented the Thessalian Federation enlisted directly by Alexander (cf. U. Kahrstedt (1) 120 sq.). A corollary of this argument is that the number of Thessalians with Alexander need not be linked with the number of representatives which Thessaly was entitled to send to the Synod of the Corinthian League in terms of its charter (the figure is ten; Tod GHI ii, no. 177 and H.H. Schmitt Die Staatsverträge des Altertums iii, '69 4-5 both provide the text of the document) thus Schwahn's calculations on the basis of this document are in turn irrelevant (Heeresmatrikel esp. 23, 31 and 34; Schwahn concluded that Alexander took 1,500 Thessalians with him into Asia).

Diodorus states that 1,800 Thessalian cavalry were with Alexander at the outset of the war (17.4), and 200 Thessalian cavalry reinforcements reached Alexander at Gordium (A. i, 29.4). Beloch proposed reducing Diodorus' figure to 1,200 to make the figures given in the cavalry catalogue tally with the grand total given by Diodorus, (Griech. Gesch. iii, 2 324; cf. J.G. Droysen Hermes xii, 1877 pp. 238 and 240). However whilst the emendation severs the Gordian knot with regard to the Catalogue, it is not obvious why the number of Thessalian cavalry should be reduced by 600. If one argues from the total of cavalry at Gaugamela, 7,000, the higher figure for the Thessalians is preferable (A. iii, 12.5; Polyb. xii, 19.2 and A. i, 29.4 and iii, 5.1 provide the only information on cavalry reinforcements).

9.8: laevum Peloponnesii tuebantur

Arrian mentions as the cavalry units on the Macedonian left, τοὺς .. ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τὸ συμμαχικόν (ii, 8.9 cf. 9.1).

Alexander subsequently transferred the Thessalian cavalry to the left (A. ii, 9.1; C.R. iii, 11.3). Diodorus mentions only the Thessalians on the left (33.2).

9.9: ante hanc aciem posuerat funditorum manum sagittariis admixtis

Compare Curtius' statement that Darius set slingers and archers on his right wing (§ 1). Arrian says that Alexander stationed in the fore of his right wing 'prodromoi' and Paeonian cavalry and archers (A. ii, 9.2).

9.9: Thraces quoque et Cretenses ante agmen ibant

Arrian says that Cretan archers and Thracian infantrymen were stationed on Alexander's left (A. ii, 9.3), apparently between the phalanx and the cavalry.

9.10: Agrianos opposuit ex Graecia nuper advectos

Livy used the form 'Agrianes' (e.g. xxviii, 5.12).

The reading is disputed because at least some Agrianes had been with Alexander from the start (e.g. A. i, 14.1; 18.3 and D.S. 17.4), and the Agrianes were from Thrace rather than Greece (Berve i, 137 sq.; Kalleris [Anciens Macédoniens, p.88 n.4] notes that later writers confused the Paeonian Agrianes with their namesakes in Aetolia: cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἀγρίαι; Launey Arméeshellénistiques i, 404 sq.). Hence various editors have changed 'Graecia' to 'Thraecia' or have inserted an 'et' between 'opposuit' and 'ex'. The former emendation is desirable.

Some Agrianes were with Alexander from the start of the war, but it may be that Alexander received some Agrianian reinforcements in 333, for Diodorus says that when Alexander arrived in Asia he had 1,000 Agrianes and archers (D.S. 17.4), whilst in 331 a force of 1,000 Agrianes is mentioned (C.R. v, 3.6) and the gap between Arrian's and Polybius' figures of reinforcements allows for the arrival of Agrianian reinforcements

before Issus (cf. on 1.24 and 7.8; reinforcements from Thrace are cited for 331, C.R. v, 1.41). However one must suspect that Curtius stretched the facts for effect, for the arrival and non-arrival of reinforcements is a dramatic theme in Bk. 3: vide 1.1 and 24; 2.9 and 16; 3.1; 7.8; 8.1; the theme is exploited again in the description of the siege of Tyre: iv, 3.11 with 19 sq.

It would appear that the Agrianes were javeliniers (A.i, 14.1 and iii, 13.5 with discussion by Berve, i, 137-8).

9.10: *Parmenioni autem praeceperat, ut, quantum posset, agmen ad mare extenderet, quo longius abesset acies montibus, quos occupaverant barbari*

The term 'extendere' appears not to have been used in this military sense by Caesar, Tacitus and Justin. The normal connotation suggests a thinning, or opening out of the ranks (e.g. Livy xxii, 47.8; C.R. iv, 13.34 and 14.8), but it can refer simply to the deployment of troops (Livy vii, 14.9 allows this interpretation). The latter is the more desirable here, in view of the motivation which follows: he had ordered Parmenion to deploy his line as far as he could towards the sea, so that the Macedonian battle line might be further from the mountains etc. The motivation can be linked with Polybius' observation that Alexander must have kept his line a reasonable distance from the mountains, *πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑποπεπτωκέναι τοῖς κατέχουσι τὰς παρωρείας* (xii, 21.5).

Arrian too shows that before the battle began there was a gap between Alexander's right wing and the mountains, and Alexander was in danger of being outflanked on the right (A.ii, 9.3 sq., cf. C.R. 11. 1-2).

However Arrian and Polybius make it clear that the Macedonian right was only kept away from the mountain until, with the attack on the Persian flank guard, it was safe to extend the line to the right. Parmenion's order to deploy his men right to the sea edge was motivated not by a plan to keep the line from the mountains, so much as by the realization that the Persians might outflank the Macedonian left (A.ii, 8.4). Curtius' version magnifies the danger posed by the Persian flank guard, and this makes the action described in § 11 more climactic.

9.11: at illi neque obstare venientibus nec circumire
praetergressos ausi funditorum maxime aspectu
territi profugerant

Arrian too describes the neutralization of the units stationed on the mountain side by Darius, and he too presents this as a preliminary to the battle. Curtius differs from Arrian on two main points: first he dismisses the Persian flank force with the word 'profugerant', whereas Arrian says that the Persians retreated to the top of the mountain, and Alexander had to leave 300 cavalry there to prevent them from mounting an attack (ii, 9.4; the 300 cavalry were probably not the two units of cavalry mentioned by Curtius at 11.2). Secondly, Curtius says that the Persians were scattered by 'funditores', whilst the Agrianes who drove them back were javelineers and not slingers (cf. on § 10 supra), and Arrian couples archers with the Agrianes in this action (as very often: for example i, 5.10, 8.3, 14.1, 28.4; iv, 4.6, 6.3 and 23.1).

9.12: xxx et duo armatorum ordines ibant

Callisthenes stated that when Alexander first ^{order} initiated the transition from marching order to battle he had the infantry form up 32 deep (Polyb. xii, 19.6). In close formation (πύκνωσις) the phalanx marched with three feet (c. .92 m.) spacing between columns (Arr. tact. 12, 6 specifically referring to the Macedonian phalanx; Asclep. iv, 1 and 3, who mentions too spacing of a cubit if the phalanx was drawn up to resist an advancing force; Polyb. xviii, 29.2 who says that this was the combat position). If we take Polybius' calculation that Alexander had some 32,000 infantry at Issus, it appears that the width of the army at this stage must have been c. 5.16 stades or .92 km. ($\frac{32000}{32} \times .92$ m.; allowing 178 m. per stade [as does Pédech, in a note on Polybius xii, 19.7]). This calculation is only a very rough guide since the numbers of infantry at Issus are not known for certain, cf. on 1.24 and 7.8 supra.

Furthermore Polybius and Arrian mention only the phalanx and the hoplites in this context (Pol. xii, 19. 5-6; A.ii, 8.2), which may mean that the light-armed infantry is excluded from the calculation.

Chapter 9: Sources and Composition

In § 12 Curtius breaks the flow of the narrative by tracking back to the point when Alexander left the coastal pass and began to move his men from marching to combat order. At this point the cavalry was still riding behind the infantry; and here Curtius agrees with Arrian (ii, 8.3) and apparently Callisthenes (ap. Pol. xii, 19.5 sq. and note supra on § 12). Earlier in the chapter Curtius has recorded what happened after Alexander moved his heavy infantry into battle order (9.7 sq.). As it is unlikely that Curtius copied a narrative account in reverse order (compositionally there was sense in balancing the details of the two battle orders, but the first part of § 12 could easily have been incorporated earlier without dulling the antithesis), we may have an indication here that Curtius used different sources for the Macedonian battle order and the march towards the battlefield (Curtius was not the only historian to have difficulty in describing battles from different sources, cf. Walsh Livy 146).

There is a basic contradiction between Curtius' account of the Macedonian line and Diodorus' version for the latter states that Alexander set the infantry behind the cavalry (33.1): thus we may say that Curtius' source was not Diodorus'.

There are many links between Curtius and Arrian, and one may wonder if Curtius used Ptolemy's account. However the match is not close: for instance in their lists of the commanders of the Companion Infantry Arrian and Curtius give the same names but Curtius sets all but Craterus' $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ on the right, whereas Arrian puts only the units of Coenus and Perdiccas on the right; further none of the parallels has to be attributed to a common source: for instance Curtius does not use the rare word employed by Arrian - the cardaces, and the details of the commanders of the Companion Infantry need not have been taken by Curtius from a source used by Arrian as Diodorus offers corresponding information for the battle of Gaugamela (57.2 sq.). Finally Curtius and Arrian differ in detail in their accounts of the preliminary action on Alexander's right (§ 11).

Curtius' description of the Persian battle-line is not built on the catalogue of Persian units in chapters 2 and 3, which again indicates disregard for consistency.

Compared with Arrian's version, Curtius' description of the Macedonian and Persian lines is imprecise and inaccurate. The detail is included as necessary colouring in his story of the battle of Issus, and the imprecision suggests that Curtius was not slavishly copying from a source (ex Graecia/Thraecia nuper advectos in § 10 is probably his own addition; likewise the balancing 'archers and slingers' of §§ 1 and 9), and possibly that he was writing from memory.

10.1-2: the exchange of battle-cries before the battle of Issus

10.1: iam in conspectu, sed extra teli iactum utraque acies erat

This sentence is picked up and balanced at the beginning of c. 11.

10.1: priores Persae inconditum et trucem sustulere clamorem

Curtius uses 'inconditus' with 'clamor' at iv, 15.29, and the combination reappears at Pliny ep. ix, 13.4; Panegyricus iii, 29.2 (O.C.T.), and Ammianus xxxi, 7.11.

The battle-cries at Issus are mentioned by Diodorus (33.4), and Diodorus' phrase βoήν ἐξαίσιον indicates that Curtius had read the source used by Diodorus.

Battle-cries are a common feature of battle descriptions (e.g. Livy xxii, 47.1, Vergil A. ix, 504, Josephus BJ iii, 250), but it suited Curtius' style to include detail that would help conjure up the appropriate state of mind (Kroll Studien 337). The battle-cry sometimes had a religious association, cf. A.i, 14.7 and Nilsson GGR i, 519 (on the link between Eryalios and the battle-cry).

10.2: maior exercitus numero

Tarn misinterpreted this phrase, for in quoting it to show that Alexander's army at Issus was larger than Darius' (ii, p.106), he apparently failed to see that 'maior' agrees with 'clamor', and 'exercitus' is in the genitive and not nominative case.

This example of 'comparatio compendiaria' is the equivalent of 'maior quam pro numero exercitus' (Vergés), and may be translated: the Macedonians replied with a battle-cry that was louder than the size of their army merited.

10.3: identidem manu suos inhibens

Cf. A.ii, 10. 2-3, and J.xi, 9.7: inter haec identidem consistere aciem iubet.

The description of Alexander checking his men from precipitate action adds to the credit of Alexander's generalship, in the same way as Caesar's leadership is enhanced in his Commentaries by reference to his firmness in controlling the impatience of his troops (b.g.vii, 19 and b.c. i, 72; Rambaud Déformation historique 245).

10. 1-3: the exchange of battle-cries; sources and composition

On the exchange of battle-cries Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed the same source, but Curtius' version reflects his originality - a point to which Prof. Badian drew my attention. Diodorus' βοὴν ἐξαίσιον can be linked with Curtius' 'inconditum clamorem'; similarly Curtius' comment that the noise made by the Macedonians was greater than that to be expected from their number, 'maior exercitus numero', may owe something to the idea expressed by Diodorus in the words τὸ μέγεθος τῆς βοῆς ὑπερῆρε τὴν προγεγεννημένην κραυγὴν (33.4). Both writers mention the echo from the surrounding hills, Curtius at greater length. Two main differences can be seen between the two accounts: first, Curtius sets the exchange of battle-cries before the two sides were within missile range and before Alexander's exhortation to his troops, whereas in Diodorus' account the men shouted after Alexander spoke and after the first volley of missiles by the Persians; secondly Diodorus has the Macedonians shout first, Curtius the Persians.

The sequence of events is more natural as Diodorus has it, but Curtius' arrangement adds dramatic effect. The exchange of battle-cries would be expected to mark the beginning of a charge, but Curtius checks the pace of the story by interposing at this point Alexander's speech of exhortation to his troops. This arrangement of the material also serves to illustrate Alexander's powers of leadership, for he is shown able to control his men even when they had demonstrated their readiness to charge. Then in making the Macedonians respond to the Persian battle-cry Curtius returns to the motif of Darius' delusion that the initiative rested with himself (cf. 8. 10 sq. and 24). The Macedonian battle-cry is a response and Curtius

has it that the echo effect from the surrounding woods and cliffs intensified the Macedonian response. Thus Curtius' arrangement of the material (if Diodorus copied his source correctly this means that Curtius invented the sequence of cries and transferred the comment on the echo to the Macedonian cry) underlines again Darius' error and Alexander's exploitation of the geographical features of the battle area.

10.4-10: Alexander's address to his troops before the battle

Compare J.xi, 9. 4-6; A.ii, 7. 3-9, who sets it before the reoccupation of the Merkes Su Pass.

10.4: Macedones, tot bellorum in Europa victores

In strict grammar this may be taken as a parenthesis added by Curtius but cf. J.xi, 9.5: Macedonas .. nunc Europae victae admonet; and Arrian says that when Alexander addressed his troops before the battle he recalled all their past achievements (τῶν .. ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ξὺν λαμπρότητι ἤδη πεπραγμένων, A.ii, 7.7). Reference to previous victories was conventional in this type of speech (e.g. Livy xxi, 40.5 and 43.13 sq.), and not only in prose histories for one finds it a feature in epic poetry and rhetorical exercises (e.g. in Hannibal's battle speeches in Silius Italicus ix, 189 sq., and xvii, 295 sq.; then the elder Seneca mentions 'enumeratio bellorum prospere ab Atheniensibus gestorum' as a feature of a rhetorical exercise counselling resistance to Xerxes, in Suas. v, 5).

10.4: ad subigendam Asiam atque ultima Orientis

Cf. J.xi, 9.5: Macedonas .. admonet .. Asiae expetitae.

One must, if possible, distinguish the original aims of the invasion of Asia, as understood by the Corinthian League, the stages by which Alexander announced the extension of the campaign's objectives, and thirdly Alexander's ultimate objectives (P.A. Brunt (3) 205 sq., offers a general survey and suggests that Alexander had from the start an ambition to carve out from the Persian Empire an extension to his own realm.

Alexander's successes encouraged him to entertain ever growing ambitions).

The ceremonies when Alexander first landed in Asia, his message to the Athenians (cf. on 1.9), the severing of the Gordian knot and his crossing of the Halys line (cf. on 1.24) may all have been pointers to the widening of Alexander's aims. Yet, even if one could demonstrate that the phrase 'ad subigendam Asiam atque ultima Orientis' was not anachronistic in a speech delivered before Issus, one still has to allow for the influence of stereotyped rhetorical essays on Alexander which took his achievements - or, depending on the point of view, his enormities-for his objectives (reflected for example in Seneca de benef. i, 13.2 sq., and Livy ix, 19. 10-11).

9.4: non ipsius magis quam suo ductu profecti

In the corresponding speech in the account of Justin, Alexander is self-effacing in his reference to the earlier part of the war (cf. on §7). Arrian, by contrast, has Alexander mention his own prestige as a general: ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀντιστρατηγεῖν Δαρδίῳ (7.5).

10.4: inveteratae virtutis admonebantur

'Inveteratus' is more commonly used in a pejorative sense, but with this case compare Livy xxviii, 43.1: inveterata (or -ae) prudentiae fama, Curtius' usage at vi, 8.7 and viii, 5.20.

10.5: illos terrarum orbis liberatores

The oxymoron in the coupling of 'liberatores' with the phrase 'omnibus gentibus imposituros iugum' is striking. The common pejorative connotations of the following reference to Alexander's emulation of Hercules and Dionysus suggest that Curtius wrote this with his tongue in his cheek.

10.5: emensosque olim Herculis et Liberi patris terminos

The direct object after 'emetiri' usually denoted the ground covered before the completion of one's travels or campaigns: thus 'emensis tot terras' in Alexander's speech before Gaugamela (iv, 14.1); Hannibal addressing his men before

the battle of the Ticinus referred to them as 'tantum itineris per tot montes fluminaque et tot armatas gentes emensos' (Livy xxi, 43.9), cf. Seneca Herc.O. 1477: hic tibi (sc. Herculi) emenso freta terrasque et umbras finis extremus datur.

Similarly Iris disguised as Beroe told the Trojan women:

septima post Troiae excidium iam vertitur aestas,
cum freta, cum terras omnes, tot inhospita saxa
sideraque emensae ferimur.. (V. Aen. v, 626-8).

Writing later than, and perhaps under the influence of, Curtius, Silius Italicus produced a speech for Hannibal before the battle of Cannae and in this section occur the lines:

non verborum, inquit, stimulantum, Poenus, egetis,
Herculeis iter a metis ad Iapygis agros
vincendo emensi (Punica ix, 184-6).

Curtius' variation adds conceit to the rhetorical formula.

In Philip's day Isocrates set up Heracles as a model for Philip to emulate as hegemon of the Greeks. Whether Philip merely liberated the coastal cities of Asia Minor, or detached from the Persian Empire the whole of Asia Minor as far as the Cilicia-Sinope line, he would be acting like Heracles whose Pillars represented the frontiers of the Greek world, ὄρουσ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων χώρας (Isocrates Philip 123, 120 and 112). Isocrates added the encouraging thought that he would not expect Philip to imitate all the exploits of Heracles (Philip 114; the Heracles theme is examined by G. Dobesch, Der panhellenische Gedanke im 4.Jh. v. Chr. und der 'Philippos' des Isokrates Ost. arch. Institut, Wien, '68 esp. 145 sq.).

Alexander himself showed respect for Heracles and Dionysus (e.g. A.ii, 15.7 sq.; i, 4.5; v, 2.6 and vi, 3.2 of. iv, 8.1 sq.), and at some stage he perhaps spoke of rivaling the achievements of the two gods (A.v, 2.1, vii, 10.6; Strabo iii, 5.5 171; Lucian dial.mort. 14, 6. On this whole subject Korzeniewski, 38 sq.). The link between Alexander's imperialism and his emulation of Heracles and Dionysus became a commonplace of rhetorical exercises, for example Seneca de benef. i, 13.2 sq., and Seneca Maior Suas. i, 1 and 2 (on Alexander as a topic for rhetorical exercises see, for example, E. Albertini, La Composition dans les ouvrages philosophiques de Sénèque Ecoles françaises d' Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 127, Paris '23 esp.p.234).

The topic was developed in a sense hostile to Alexander, for his rivalry of the gods was derided as double-talk for greed, brutality and senseless expansionism: this development can be found in a nationalist context (Livy ix, 18.4), in philosophical treatises (Seneca de benef. i, 13.2 sq.; ep 94 esp. 63), and in political literature of anti-Caesarian bias (Lucan x, 20 sq., who does not mention the gods, but the attack on Alexander follows the lines running through Seneca's presentation of Alexander. Cf. B.M. Marti AJP lxvi, '45 352 sq., and S.F. Bonner AJP lxxxvii, '66 274. Compare Sen. Ep. 94, 63 -

it tamen ultra oceanum solemque, indignatur a Herculis
Liberique vestigiis victoriam flectere, ipsi naturae vim
parat - with Lucan x, 30 sq., and esp. 36-7:

Oceano classes inferre parabat
exteriore mari.

The same line appears in rhetorical exercises too: vide Seneca Maior, Suas. i, 1: intra has terras caelum Hercules meruit ...

ita est, Alexander, rerum natura: post omnia Oceanus,
post Oceanum nihil; i, 2 ultra Liberi patris tropaea
constitimus). In Curtius' work cf. vii, 9.15, ix, 2.29 and 4.21.

10.5: Macedonum provincias Bactra et Indos fore

The coupling of Bactria and India is fairly frequent in Curtius' work, cf. 2.9, iv, 5.4 (a letter of Darius to Alexander), v, 9.5 (a speech of Nabarzanes) and vi, 3.9 (a speech of Alexander). There is no reason to suppose that Alexander foresaw in 333 the annexation of Bactria and India as Macedonian provinces: this theme belongs rather to rhetoric developed after Alexander's conquest and indicates that this speech cannot be historical as it stands.

This extravagance in a speech supposedly delivered before the battle of Issus suggests that Curtius may have written this in satirical vein.

10.6: non in praeruptis petris Illyriorum et Thraciae
saxis sterilem laborem fore

Compare Hannibal's speech before Ticinus in Livy's account: Satis adhuc in vastis Lusitaniae Celtiberiaeque

montibus pecora consecrando nullum emolumentum tot laborum periculorumque vestrorum vidistis (xxi, 43.8), and C.R.vi, 3.16.

Curtius here refers to Alexander's campaigns in 335. Alexander went first via Amphipolis to tackle the Triballi and this campaign took him as far as the Danube; later Alexander turned to deal with Macedon's western neighbours, and it was a rumour that he had been killed in Illyria (or Thrace) which sparked off the Theban revolt (A.i, l. 4 sq., D.S. 8. 1-2, J.xi, 2. 8).

10.6: spolia totius Orientis offerri

In Livy, Hannibal's speech before Ticinus continues: tempus est iam opulenta vos ac ditia stipendia facere (xxi, 43.9), and cf. Livy xxx, 33.9.

10.6: vix gladio futurum opus

Again we have the 'possible' topos (cf. on 8. 10-11 supra), involving exaggeration this time of the strength of the Macedonian army, and disparagement of the Persian army. Again there is perhaps irony in Curtius' exaggeration.

10.6: suo pavore

The possessive adjective is equivalent in sense to an objective genitive.

10.7: victor ad haec Atheniensium Philippus pater invocabatur; domitaeque nuper Boeotiae et urbis in ea nobilissimae ad solum dirutae species repraesentabatur animis

Curtius here refers to the defeat of Athens in the battle of Chaeronea (338), and to Alexander's capture of Thebes in 335.

This section has a parallel in Livy's version of Hannibal's speech before the battle of the Ticinus: an me in praetorio patris, clarissimi imperatoris, prope natum, certe eductum, domitorem Hispaniae Galliaeque, victorem eundem non Alpinarum modo gentium sed ipsarum Alpium cum semenstri hoc conferam duce . . .? (xxi, 43.15). In each case

the son exploits memories of his father's greatness; both recall past victories in the way that Roman gentes preserved the gloria of their forebears' military achievements, without regard for the morality of imperialism. Curtius gives an emphatic position to 'victor' and 'domitae' matching that of Livy's 'domitorem' and 'victorem'.

A difference between the two passages, and indeed between the two speeches, is that Curtius' Alexander does not talk of his own merits as a commander and contrast them with the deficiencies of Darius, whilst Hannibal is concerned to build up trust in his own capabilities as a commander. Alexander is almost self-effacing as he refers to his troops as 'non ipsius magis quam suo ductu profecti' (64): the contrast with Arrian's version has already been noted.

10.7: Granicum amnem

Alexander defeated an army commanded by satraps of the western provinces on the banks of the Granicus in May/June 334 (A.i, 13-16; D.S. 18. 4-21.6; J.xi, 6. 10-13; Plut. Alex. 16 with Hamilton's commentary).

10.7: urbes ... in fidem acceptas

The phraseology belongs to the Roman system of empire building - another element introduced by Curtius.

10.7: omniaque quae post tergum erant, strata et pedibus ipsorum subiecta memorabat

The necessity for total subjugation is argued later in a speech which Curtius has Alexander deliver in Hecatompylus (vi, 3. esp. 5-11), and in the speech before the battle of Gaugamela Alexander catalogued his army's achievements, 'ingentia spei gloriaeque incitamenta' (iv, 14.1).

The disregard for moral issues may seem a natural phenomenon in a pre-battle address and is found for instance in Thucydides' version of Nicias' appeal to the metics at Syracuse (vii, 63) and in Livy's version of Valerius Corvus' speech before his battle with the Samnites (vii, 33.6; J.P. Scott [Aggression Chicago '58] argued against the theory that frustration is the sole cause of aggression, and showed that success in fighting

can of itself stimulate aggression). Further, Aristotle dealing with the γενὸς συμβουλευτικόν, commented that the orator was concerned with advocating what was expedient and warning against what would be harmful, and in this type of speech moral considerations were subordinate; he added that it would not be unusual for an orator to pass over the point, ὡς ..οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἄδικοῦντας (Arist. Rhet.i, 3.6 1358B).

10.8: admonebat ab his gentibus inlata Graeciae bella

The decision of the Corinthian League to mount the expedition into Asia was formally motivated by a desire to exact vengeance from the Persians (A.ii, 14.4; D.S. 4.9; J.xi, 2.5 and cf. on 1.9 supra).

In this type of speech it was unnecessary to trace back the grievances that justified military action, but Curtius may have been in part influenced by Livy, for the speeches which Livy attributes to Hannibal and Scipio before the battle of Ticinus deal with the background grievances. A difference arises in that Curtius mentions only the facts whereas Livy mentions the incitement of passions, of 'dolor', 'iniuria' and 'indignitas' (xxi, 44.4) and 'indignatio' and 'ira' (xxi, 41.10).

10.8: Darei prius deinde Xerxis insolentia aquam ipsos
terramque poscentium

The episodes are mentioned by Herodotus vi, 48 and vii, 32 (on the myth making around this topic see Busolt Griech. Gesch.ii² 1895 p.571 n.5).

10.8: ut neque fontium haustum nec solitos cibos relinquerent
deditae

Although Curtius elsewhere shows knowledge of Herodotus (see notes on chapters 2 and 3) he here goes beyond Herodotus' text in providing a bizarre motivation for the demand made by Darius and Xerxes.

An intermediary stage is perhaps to be found in Livy xxxv, 17.7, as Mützell noted: initium semper a parvis iniusta imperandi fieri; nisi crederent, Persas, cum aquam terramque ab Lacedaemoniis petierint, gleba terrae et haustu aquae eguisse.

The immediate source of inspiration may have been some rhetorical essay: Xerxes is featured in the Elder Seneca's Suasoriae 2 and 5.

10.9: Illyrios.et Thracas, raptō vivere adsuetos

Cf. J. xi, 9.4. Arrian adds to this group Paeonians and Agrianes, and he includes no comment on these people to match that of the parenthesis in Curtius' version, 'raptō vivere adsuetos' (A.ii, 7.5).

10.9: aciem hostium auro purpuraque fulgentem intueri iubebat, praedam, non arma gestantem

Cf. Livy ix, 17.16: quem (sc. Dareum) mulierum et spadonum agmen trahentem inter purpuram atque aurum oneratum fortunae apparatibus suae, praedam verius quam hostem etc. (and cf. Livy ix, 40.5).

Curtius had perhaps read Trogus' version of Alexander's speech before the battle of Gaugamela, for the verbal link here with J.xi, 13.11 is noteworthy: spernant illam aciem auro et argento fulgentem, in qua plus praedae quam periculi sit.

10.10: irent et inbellibus feminis aurum viri eriperent

Cf. on 3. 14 and 18 supra. In Arrian's version Alexander refers to τὰ ἀπονώτατά τε καὶ μαλακώτατα τῆς Ἀσίας γένη (ii, 7.5).

The close association between Alexander history and rhetorical essay is illustrated here too if one compares Livy ix, 19.10: ne ille (sc. Alexander) saepe, etiamsi prima prospere evenissent, Persas et Indos et imbellem Asiam quaesisset et cum feminis sibi bellum fuisse dixisset. Cf. too Livy vii, 32. 6-7.

Curtius returns to this theme in the speech which he attributes to Alexander before the battle of Gaugamela: inbelles ex latebris suis erutos nihil praeter nomina adferre (iv, 14.4 cf. ix, 4.19 sq.).

10.10: aspera montium suorum iuga nudasque calles et
perpetuo rigentes gelu ditibus Persarum campis
agrisque mutarent

The invitation to settle in Asia is not mentioned by Justin and Arrian. However Alexander did settle veterans in Asia and perhaps had plans to resettle Asiatics in Europe and Europeans in Asia (on this item in Alexander's 'Last Plans', Badian (9) 194-5).

Chapter 10, 4-10: The composition and sources of Alexander's pre-battle speech

This chapter prepares for the description of the battle by covering two topics - the exchange of the battle cries and Alexander's speech to his men which indicates the state of mind of the combatants before the battle began.

The speech of Alexander to his troops is split into three sections by the device of making him address the Macedonians (4-7), Greeks (8-9) and Illyrians and Thracians (9-10) separately. Arrian and Justin, who both record Alexander's appeal to his men before Issus, similarly report that Alexander addressed the three different groups along different lines, though Arrian restricts the occasion to a gathering of officers (ii, 7). This device was used by Thucydides, who attributed to Nicias a speech in which he addressed separately the resident aliens and the full citizens in his army (vii, 63 and 64, compare Livy xxi, 45. 5-7) and Silius Italicus has Hannibal speak separately to Carthaginians and allies before the battle of Cannae (Punica ix, 202 sq., and 209 sq.). However the coincidence of the structure of these three versions of Alexander's speech at Issus is striking, especially as other pre-battle speeches attributed to Alexander are not similarly constructed (contrast J.xi, 13. 8-11; A.iii, 9. 5 sq.; C.R. iv, 14 l sq., and perhaps ix, 4. 19 sq.). Clearly we are dealing with a common tradition on his speech at Issus.

Despite this common pattern there are major differences between their versions: whilst Curtius and Justin present the speech as divided into three parts, Arrian limits Alexander's address to each group to a captatio benevolentiae, as with each

group Alexander dwells on their merits and contrasts them with the degeneracy of the orientals and the shabby conduct of Darius' mercenaries (A.ii, 7. 3-5). It was a topos of literary - if not historical-prebattle speeches to exploit national character differences and the differences between social and political systems as a means of boosting morale: cf. Thuc. v, 9.1 for example). The divergence is accentuated by Curtius' own contribution: for instance whilst Alexander may have styled the Thracians, Paeonians, Illyrians and Agrianes τούς εὐρωσσοτάτους ... καὶ μαχιμωτάτους (A.ii, 7.5), Curtius' description of them as 'raptō vivere adsuetos' matches Curtius' racialism better than the diplomacy one might expect of Alexander.

Other basic differences can be seen in that only in Arrian's account does Alexander appear to advance his own generalship as a cause for confidence (cf. on 10.4), and, secondly, only Arrian includes argument about the tactical advantages on Alexander's side (A.ii, 7.3; cf. iii, 9. 7-8; tactical issues were featured in Thucydides' speeches, e.g. iv, 10. and 92, v, 9 and vii, 62, but the trend was for rhetoric to take precedence. This feature of Arrian's version may reflect experience which Arrian himself had had of army life).

Looking at the separate sections of the speech we can see that Justin's version of Alexander's appeal to his Greek troops would summarize Curtius' version: Graecos veterum bellorum memoria internecivique cum Persis odii accendebat (J.xi, 9.4), and that the same applies to the two versions of Alexander's appeal to the Illyrians and Thracians: Justin has, 'Illyrios et Thracas opum ac divitiarum ostentatione ... accendebat' (J.xi, 9.4).

Curtius' version of Alexander's address to the Macedonians differs from the other versions on a major point, the emphasis on the continuation of the war after the immediate battle. The key phrase in Justin's account reads, 'ceterum et laborum finem hunc et gloriae cumulum fore' (xi, 9. 5-6). 'Laborum finem' provides a link with Arrian's account, where Alexander promised that οὐδὲν ὑπολειφθήσεταί σφισιν ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ ἀγῶνι ὅτι μὴ κρατεῖν τῆς Ἀσίας ξυμπάσης καὶ πέρας τοῖς πολλοῖς πόνοις ἐπιθεῖναι (A.ii, 7.6).

(perhaps Caligula): the former seems to be excluded as Curtius has Alexander promise that Gaugamela would be the end of the fighting (iv, 14.1) and the exaggerations of this speech suggest irony (cf. p. 173).

Thus, allowing for Curtius' originality and Roman borrowings and the abbreviated form of Justin's account, we cannot affirm nor deny that Curtius and Justin followed the same source. Their accounts are basically similar and together differ from Arrian's, which suggests that Arrian followed different sources from them.

It appears that Arrian used more than one source (the phrase λέγεται δὲ at ii, 7.8 suggests a transition to a different source from that used for the earlier part of the chapter; further the link between ὀνομαστὶ ἕκαστον .. ἀνακαλῶν [7.7] and τὰ ὀνόματα .. ἀνακαλῶν .. ὀνομαστὶ [10.2] may indicate that Arrian fused together the tradition that Alexander delivered a single pre-battle speech, such as Curtius has, and a tradition that he first addressed the officers and at a later stage spoke directly to the troops), though here too one must allow for extraneous influences: the reference to Xenophon and the Ten Thousand (A.ii, 7.8), no doubt reflects again Arrian's personal interest in Xenophon's work, and the influence of Thucydides is perhaps to be seen, for instance in Alexander's direct appeals to individuals (A.ii, 7.7 and 10.2 with Thuc. vii, 69.2: ἀνεκάλει .. ὀνομαστὶ).

Arrian's principal source may have been Ptolemy or Aristobulus, possibly Ptolemy as the link between ii, 7.7 and 10.2 suggests that the source on the tripartite speech was also Arrian's source on the battle itself and Ptolemy is quoted at ii, 11.8; on the other hand the comment on Darius' mercenaries in A.ii, 7.4 may seem to be a point which Ptolemy might have omitted for political reasons and it is already clear that Aristobulus was not a source much used by Curtius (cf. on 1.18 and 5. 2-3), and therefore differences between Curtius and Arrian in this speech might have arisen from Arrian's use of Aristobulus.

Chapter 11. The Battle of Issus

11.1-3: the Persians open the action with a cavalry charge on the Macedonian left; Alexander reinforces his wings.

Compare D.S. 33. 2-3; A.ii, 9.1 and 3, 10.3, 11.2.

11.1 iam ad teli iactum pervenerant

The corresponding formulae of Arrian (ii, 10.3: ὡς δὲ ἐντὸς βέλους ἐγίνοντο) and Diodorus (33.3: ὡς δ' αἱ δυνάμεις ἐντὸς βέλους ἐγίνοντο) occur at a later stage of the narrative, as both indicate that Alexander had completed the redeployment of his wings before the two armies were within missile range. The discrepancy may result from Curtius' desire to produce balancing self-contained chapters: it is clear that Curtius here opens the chapter with a clause to balance the opening remark of the preceding chapter.

11.1: Persarum equites ferociter in laevum cornu hostium invecti sunt

This means that the Peloponnesian and Greek cavalry were in action before the Thessalian cavalry appeared on the left. Callisthenes reported that the Persian right charged across the river (Polyb. xii, 18.11). Arrian mentions this action late on in his narrative (ii, 11.2), but he implies that it took place before Darius saw reason to flee and before Darius' mercenaries lost ground to the Macedonian phalanx. Perhaps Curtius was influenced by a source that gave prominence to Parmenion's part in the battle, whereas Arrian's source played down the importance of the action on the Persian right to minimize Parmenion's contribution.

The precedence which Curtius gives to the charge of the Persian right has, therefore, a different rationale from that of the rearrangement of material mentioned in the preceding note.

11.1: quippe Dareus equestri proelio decernere optabat

Arrian attributes to the Persians great confidence

in their cavalry before the battle (ii, 6.5) and it seems that before the battle Demosthenes confidently stated in Athens that the Persians would win a cavalry victory: ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος . . . ἔμελλεν . . . συμπατηθήσεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου (Aesch. iii, 164; the letters which Demosthenes flourished about may have been communications from the Persian side).

In his battle description Arrian merely says that Darius concentrated his cavalry on the right because the terrain was more suitable than it was on his left (ii, 8.10). The difference in emphasis is noteworthy and again may suggest that Curtius followed a source which highlighted the action on the Macedonian left to make some point about Parmenion.

11.1: phalangem Macedonici exercitus robur esse coniectans

Darius' mercenaries were formidable enough to counter the Macedonian phalanx, says Curtius at 9.2 (cf. 9.7), but these two passages are not contradictory: Darius' hopes had to be pinned on those units in which he enjoyed an advantage over Alexander.

11.1: iamque etiam dextrum Alexandri cornu circumibatur

Arrian again reduces the Persian initiative, saying simply that the Persians looked like outflanking Alexander's right (ii, 9.3). The Persians could not meaningfully outflank the Macedonians unless the river banks could be negotiated by men in arms: Janke used this point to reject identification of the Payas as the Pinarus, for in his view the upper section of the Payas could not have been crossed in battle (Janke (2) 159-160).

11.2: duabus alis equitum ad iugum montis iussis subsistere

Arrian likewise refers to the transfer of two ilae of cavalry to the right. He identifies them as territorial units of the Companion Cavalry and names their commanders, and, another point of difference, he says that their orders were to conceal their movements (A.ii, 9.3). These two units should probably be distinguished from the 300 cavalry detailed to screen the Persian flank force (A.ii, 9.4 and cf. on 9. 10-11), since the Companion Cavalry had the different function of pre-

venting the Persian left outflanking the Macedonian right; the 300 cavalrymen belong to the force mentioned by Arrian at ii, 9.2.

Plutarch says that Alexander succeeded in outflanking the Persian left (Alex. 20, 8).

11.3: subductis deinde ex acie Thessalis equitibus

This movement was necessitated by Darius' transfer of cavalry to his right (cf. 9.1 supra). Arrian describes the movement of the Thessalian cavalry in similar terms (ii, 9.1).

11.3: praefectum eorum occulte circumire tergum suorum
iubet

Cf. A.ii, 9.1: κελεύσας μὴ πρὸ τοῦ μετώπου τῆς πάσης τάξεως περιπνεῦσαι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς τοῖς πολεμίοις γενέσθαι, μεταχωροῦντας, ἀλλὰ κατόπιν τῆς φάλαγγος ἀφανῶς διελθεῖν. Kornemann ([1] 54 n.53) cited this as a case where Curtius preserves an extract from Ptolemy's account.

The emphasis on Alexander's skill at this point, may have been directed to conceal the fact that Alexander was temporarily outwitted by Darius and in the opening phase of the battle he had insufficient men to hold Darius' right.

11.3: Parmenionique coniungi et, quod is imperasset,
inpigre exequi

This gratuitous reference to Parmenion does not have a parallel in Arrian's account of the battle. Cf. on § 13 infra and pp. 200-I.

11.4-6: an infantry scrimmage develops which is bloody
but indecisive.

Curtius' account is difficult to follow in detail, for comparison with the other sources shows that he rearranged the material to heighten the drama and consequently had to fudge the facts. According to Arrian and Diodorus Alexander initiated the action with a charge against the Persian left: this was a cavalry charge supported by a charge of the units of the

Macedonian phalanx (A.ii, 10. 3-5; 11.1; D.S. 33.2 and 34.9). The Persians fell back before the cavalry charge and the infantry taxeis with Alexander had relatively little to do (D.S. 34.9; A.ii, 10.4; 11.1) but the taxeis in the centre were immediately engaged in a fierce and indecisive action against Darius' mercenaries (A.ii, 10. 4-6; 11.1, cf. Polyb.xii, 18.6).

Curtius has the infantry engage first; the issue is subsequently decided by a cavalry charge led by Alexander. Thus the textual problem at the beginning of § 4 arises from Curtius' holding back of the cavalry charge. He has perhaps run together elements from the infantry action on the Macedonian right and from the clash of the rest of the Macedonian phalanx with Darius' mercenaries.

Furthermore this section is to be regarded as in part a free composition on the topic of an infantry scrum.

11.4: iamque immissi in medium Persarum undique circumfusi
egregie tuebantur se

The repetition iam .. iamque (1) ... iamque (4) marks off stages in the battle.

The reading of P^c and the other mss. is 'ipsi', which Foss emended to 'immissi'. The main verb 'tuebantur' shows that 'circumfusi' must mean 'surrounded' rather than 'surrounding', thus a verb or participle is required to govern the adverbial phrase 'in medium Persarum'; further where Curtius uses 'circumfusi' with an active connotation the object of the encirclement is given in the Dative case (cf. iii, 9.12; iv, 13.6 and 15.21; ix, 1.16). Thus 'immissi' provides a plausible solution. The substantival use of the participle can be paralleled for instance in the case of 'praemissi' at 8.24.

It is possible that 'ipsi' is a corruption of a phrase that originally included the word 'pedites', or that P's 'ipse' is part of the correct reading, perhaps 'iam quos ipse immisit'.

11.4: conferti

Cf. 'conferta robora', 2.13. The word was much used by Livy: for instance, ii, 46.4, xxv, 34.11 and xxviii, 2.6.

11.4: tela vibrare non poterant

Cf. Lucan vii, 492 sq. The similarity between these two passages may reflect their common indebtedness to Livy (cf. Livy xxiii, 27.7).

11.4: in eosdem concurrentia implicabantur

'Eosdem' is the reading of P^C and Σ and is followed by Bardon. The following clause shows that Curtius was thinking of missiles becoming entangled in flight. Thus the emendation suggested by Castiglioni merits consideration: in <se> eodem concurrentia implicabantur (SIFC xix, '12 143-4).

With this passage compare D.S. 33.3: τοῖς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπέρριψαν οἱ βάρβαροι τοσοῦτον πλῆθος βελῶν ὥστε διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα τῶν βαλλομένων ἀλλήλοις συγκρουόντων ἀσθενεστέρας γίνεσθαι τὰς πληγὰς. The verbal links are striking, and it would seem that Curtius here borrowed from the source used by Diodorus, but differed in not applying the idea only to Persian missiles.

Schubert ([1] 43) claimed that these two passages were inspired by Herodotus' picture of a cloud of Persian arrows blotting out the sun (vii, 226), and that Curtius and Diodorus had as their common source Duris, who was much influenced by Herodotus. This argument is too tenuous to be acceptable, and there is no real connection between Herodotus and the other two passages.

11.4: levique et vano ictu

Cf. ἀσθενεστέρας .. τὰς πληγὰς, D.S. 33.3.

11.5: ut .. mucrones in ora dirigerent

Striking at the face appears to be a conventional feature of the accounts of this war; compare A.i, 16.1; iii, 14.3; C.R.iv, 15.31.

The parallel passage in Diodorus' account reads: οὔτε γὰρ ἀκοντίσας οὔτε πατάξας οὐδεὶς ἄπρακτον ἔσχε τὴν πληγὴν ὡς ἂν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐτοίμου τοῦ σκοποῦ κειμένου (33.7), which occurs after Diodorus has mentioned the cavalry charge led by Alexander. This under-

lines the point that Curtius rearranged the material found in his sources.

11.5: collato pede

Cf. Livy vi, 12.10: ubi haerere iam aciem collato pede videris, also x, 29.6, xxvi, 39.12, xxxiv, 14.11 and xxxviii, 21.3.

11.7-12: .Alexander on the right wishes to gain the glory of killing Darius personally; he leads a cavalry charge which results in heavy casualties amongst the Persians. Darius extricates himself and flees; his troops consequently panic and take to their heels.

Links between this section and the accounts of Diodorus and Arrian are tabulated on pp. 196-7.

11.7: opimum decus caeso rege expetens

This statement like the similar expression of Diodorus (33.5), may derive ultimately from Callisthenes who reported that Alexander wanted to fight opposite Darius (Polybius xii, 22.2; Kaerst, 365 n.1, says the influence is 'unmistakable', but this is an exaggeration).

Curtius provides an appropriate introduction to Alexander's heroic action, an 'aristeia' (on which term see e.g. the title of Iliad v, and Cic. ad Attxvi, 9 and Kroll Studien 335), and at the same time he gives it Roman colouring, the adjective 'opimum' recalling the 'spolia opima'. The spoils were won on only three occasions, by Romulus, Cornelius Cossus in 437 and M. Claudius Marcellus in 222 (refs. in RE 2.R. iii, A.2 1845-6) but in the Empire the spoils were a feature of imperialist myth (so Vergil Aeneid vi, 855 sq., and Silius Italicus iii, 586-7) and, bound up with this, of flattery of the ruling emperor (Pliny Pan. 17, 3).

11.7: Dareus curru sublimis eminebat

Steele, (1) 406, noted a parallel phrase in Livy xxxviii, 9.15: itaque iret alter consul sublimis curru, though Livy is

dealing with a triumph not a battle. But the link is closer where Curtius refers back to this episode at iv, 1.1: triumphantis .. more curru sublimis inierat proelium.

Plutarch described Darius at Gaugamela in a similar way: καλὸν ἄνδρα καὶ μέγαν ἐφ' ἄρματος ὑψηλοῦ περῶτα (Alex. 33,5).

11.7: et suis ad se tuendum et hostibus ad incessendum ingens incitamentum

The 'aristeia' did not require strategic motivation, since it was natural for a war-leader to remove his opposite number. However in post-heroic Greek and Roman warfare there was little place for the heroic duel. It has been suggested that in Caesar's Commentaries attention is switched between Caesar and the troops in such a way that Caesar's mistakes are concealed but he receives the credit whenever the tide of battle turns in favour of his army (Rimbaud Déformation historique 208 sq.). In Livy's history the generals appear in battle scenes to save desperate situations, thus Sempronius at Trebeia (xxi, 55.3), Aemilius Paulus at Cannae: occurrit saepe ... et aliquot locis proelium restituit (xxii, 49.2), and P. Scipio in his attack on Indibilis' force in 212 B.C.:

pugnanti hortantique imperatori et offerenti se ubi plurimus labor erat (xxv, 34.11). Thus both Caesar and Livy spotlight the battle commander not as a hero looking to distinguish himself by his individual action, but as a leader giving physical and psychological support where his troops are in difficulty.

Curtius here by explaining the psychological effects of Darius' presence upon the Persians and upon Alexander's forces, rationalizes Alexander's desire for a duel with Darius, and makes Alexander conform with the Roman image of a general. Compare Curtius' account of Alexander's leadership at Gaugamela: he leaves aside any ideas Alexander had of heroic single combat with Darius, and describes his rôle much as Livy might have done: Alexander territōs castigare, adhortari, proelium quod iam elanguerat, solus accendere (iv, 15.19).

11.8: frater eius Oxathres

Oxyathres would be a more accurate transliteration of the name (Berve ii, no.586; and further on his career Berve's entry in RE xviii, 2 '42 s.v. Oxyathres, 1). Diodorus gives the same form of the name as Curtius (77.4), whilst Plutarch renders it 'Ἐξάθρης (Alex. 43, 7).

In the Alexander Romance, Oxyathres appears as the man who before Issus advised Darius to take to the offensive and to lead the Persian army personally (Ps. Call. ii, 7.5 sq.).

Oxyathres is later mentioned as one of the Persians whom Alexander admitted into his own administration as 'hetaeroi' (Plut. Alex. 43, 7; C.R.vi, 2.9; D.S. 77.4), and he features too in the story of the punishment of Bessus, for Alexander handed Bessus over to Oxyathres for him to avenge his brother's murder (D.S. 83.9, contrast C.R.vii, 5. 40 sq., and J.xii, 5.11 and see Hamilton's note on Plut. Alex. 43, 6). His daughter Amastris was later married to Craterus at Susa (A.vii, 4.5).

The elaboration of his story may well have postdated his admission into the ranks of the 'hetaeroi' but there is no evidence that the role given to Oxyathres in histories of Alexander was a by-product of partisan literature written for his son-in-law, Craterus.

11.8: animo vero et pietate in paucissimis

In his book on Livy's art of narration Burck argued that whilst Hellenistic historians in dealing with individual performances in battle were content to describe the combatant displaying bravery and endurance, Livy was more concerned to develop battle scenes by building in character studies; and such concentration on character study was a distinguishing feature of literature of the Augustan era (Burck (1) 55-6 and 203-4). The passage under discussion, mentioning Oxyathres' 'pietas' no less than his courage, does introduce a comment on Oxyathres' character which is illustrated by a scene in the battle. Since Diodorus has a similar comment (34.3: νομίσας τὸ φιλάδελφον τῆς ψυχῆς οἴσειν αὐτῷ περιβόητον παρὰ Πέρσαις δόξαν), we need not assume that Curtius drew his inspiration from Livy; Oxyathres' loyalty to his

brother was clearly an established element in the story long before even Diodorus wrote.

11.9: tum vero similis ruinae strages erat

Dosson (Étude p.224) noted this clause as an example of Curtius' tendency to abandon the sobriety of history for the vigorous style of oratory.

11.9: omnes in ora proni

This should perhaps be linked with Diodorus' statement: πολλοὶ τραύμασιν ἐναντίοις περιτυγχάνοντες ἔπιπτον (33.7), though this appears in the context of the general mêlée before Oxyathres' intervention.

11.10: inter hos Atizyes et Rheomithres et Sabaces

Allowing for textual variations, Arrian and Diodorus give the same three names (A.ii, 11.8; D.S. 34.5), and Arrian adds two more, Arsames and Boubaces.

11.10; Atizyes

Diodorus mentions a Persian of this or a similar name amongst the casualties at Granicus (21.3), but Arrian mentions him neither in the context of the council of war before the battle, nor in the casualty list. Later Arrian refers to an Atizyes who was satrap of Phrygia (A.i, 25.3). It is possible that this satrap fought at Granicus, that Diodorus inserted his name in the casualty list by producing a doublet of the entry in the Issus list, and finally that Arrian simply omitted to mention Atizyes in his account of the war council (omissions by Arrian are not infrequent, cf. on 7.3 and 8 supra; a doublet in Diodorus' account: Berve ii, no.179; Leuze [Satrapieneinteilung 246 [402] n.1] noted that the reading at D.S. 21.3 is uncertain, and that there could have been two men of the same name).

Leuze argued that the man who fell at Issus was not the same as the satrap of Phrygia since Arrian calls Sabaces a satrap, but does not attach the title to Atizyes (Leuze loc.cit.; A.ii, 11.8); however it is quite possible that Arrian's source reflected the Macedonian view in late 333: Phrygia was now in Macedonian control, Egypt was still a Persian satrapy.

11.10: Rheomithres

A Rheomithres played an important part in the Satraps' Revolt, 362 B.C. (D.S.xv, 92.1 sq.; Xen. Cyrop.viii, 8.4), but he might have been too old for active service in 333 (cf. Leuze Satrapieneinteilung 247 [403] n.1 who rejects the identification made by Kahrstedt and Berve ii, no.685). If he were the Rheomithres who fell at Issus, one might have expected to find in Arrian's account some comment on the man, for Rheomithres exemplified turpitude to Xenophon, and Arrian was greatly influenced by Xenophon's work (cf. on 4.1 supra).

Rheomithres is mentioned as a military officer at Granicus (A.i, 12.8 and ii, 11.8), but there is no indication to which satrapy he belonged.

11.10: Sabaces, praetor Aegypti

The better mss. give the name as Sataces, and the form with 't' appears at iv, 1.28. Arrian renders the name Sabakes (ii, 11.8), whilst Diodorus has Τασιάνης (34.5). On his career nothing is known except for the record that he fought and died at Issus (Berve ii, n.689). Arrian and Diodorus (48.3) say that he was satrap of Egypt.

Sabaces is described as one of the 'magnorum exercituum praefecti', but Curtius, in his catalogue of troops who fought on the Persian side at Issus, does not refer to any Egyptian contingent (the catalogue is given in 2. 4-9). It remains possible that the Egyptian contingent joined the army at a later stage, but the catalogue includes the Greek mercenaries (cf. on 2.9). In any case, the phrase 'magnorum exercituum praefecti' may be a rhetorical addition by Curtius.

Lehmann-Haupt (RE 2. Reiheii, A.1 s.v. Satrap, 128 sq.) supports Krumbholz's case for assuming that satraps commanded units raised in their own satrapies.

11.10: Macedonum quoque non quidem multi .. caesi sunt

Contrast Diodorus' statement that Macedonian casualties were heavy (34.5). Curtius was perhaps following a source other than that which he shared with Diodorus, for at § 27 infra his figures differ from Diodorus' (at 36.6).

11.10: inter quos Alexandri dextrum femur leviter
mucrone perstrictum est

Justin records simply that Alexander was wounded (xi, 9.9), whilst Diodorus has a passage more closely matching Curtius': συνέβη καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τραπηῆναι τὸν μηρόν, περιχυθέντων αὐτῷ τῶν πολεμίων (34.5).

The testimony of Plutarch Mor. 341c must be cited: ξίφει τὸν μηρόν, ὡς Χάρης φησίν, ὑπὸ Δαρείου τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ συνδραμόντος (cf. 327a: διεκόπην ἐν .. Ἴσῳ ξίφει τὸν μηρόν).

This shows, first of all, that the subject of Alexander's wound had become a 'topos' of rhetoricians, and secondly that the tale of Alexander's duel with Darius went back to writers from Alexander's own court. One can see something of the origin of the legend: Alexander in a letter to Antipater wrote that he had been wounded, but made no mention of who had struck the blow (Plut. loc.cit. and Alex. 20, 9); then Callisthenes wrote that Alexander wanted to engage Darius personally: τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον σπουδάζειν κατὰ τὴν τάξιν ἵνα κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον αὐτὸν ποιήσῃται τὴν μάχην (Polyb.xii, 22.2). Chares took this a step further by stating that Darius inflicted Alexander's wound (Plut. Mor. 341c, and Alex. 20, 8-9). The myth of Issus seems to have taken form in Alexander's day (cf. W.B. Kaiser JDAI lxxvii, '62 235 sq.; Mederer 15 sq.).

It is obvious that Curtius did not follow Chares on this incident. In passing, Chares' addition to the myth of Issus must cast doubt on his reliability as a historian (cf. Hamilton Plutarch 'Alexander' p. lvi).

11.11: qui Dareum vehebant equi, confossi hastis et dolore efferati, iugum quaterere ... coeperant

Diodorus and Curtius mention in the same sequence the Persian casualties, Alexander's wound and Darius' trouble with his horses. In phraseology this sentence is close to Diodorus' at 34.6.

11.11: veritus ne vivus veniret in hostium potestatem

Diodorus says virtually the same thing, except that whilst Darius in Curtius' version was in danger of falling from his chariot, in Diodorus' version Darius' danger lay in the horses' bolting towards the Macedonian lines (34.6).

Tarn ([ii] 105) claimed that the excuse made for Darius' flight was taken by Curtius directly from 'the mercenaries' source', but it is not clear why Curtius should have taken this detail from such a source whilst omitting mention of the mercenaries' part in the battle.

11.11: desilit et in equum qui ad hoc ipsum sequebatur
inponitur

At this point Curtius diverges from both Diodorus and Arrian, since Diodorus records that Darius changed to a second chariot before he eventually switched to a horse (34.7; 37.1), whilst Arrian records that Darius fled from the battle-field in his original chariot and only switched to a horse when he left level terrain (A.ii, 11.5).

Plutarch and Aelian both said that Darius escaped on a mare, but Plutarch has this in the context of the battle of Gaugamela (Alex. 33, 8), whilst Aelian sets the episode at Issus (hist.anim. vi, 48). Plutarch's reference to the mare being νεοτόμον reflects the explanation given by Aelian for the choice of a mare, and one can link the two accounts. The question then arises whether Plutarch or Aelian erred from his source on the identity of the battle (cf. Mederer 26, n.31).

The historical basis for the story was probably that Alexander captured Darius' chariot after the battle of Issus (A.ii, 11.6; Plut. Alex. 20, 10); however that does not establish at what point Darius abandoned the chariot. Diodorus and Curtius seem to have followed the same tradition, for their remarks about the chariot horses tally (cf. note supra) and contrast with Plutarch's version (Alex. 33.8). On Gaugamela Curtius differs from Plutarch in that he explicitly states that Darius left the battlefield in his chariot (iv, 15.32; Diodorus' account does not explicitly contradict Curtius' [D.S. 60.2 sq., and 61.1]) and neither Diodorus nor Curtius records that the King's chariot was seized by the Macedonians. However,

Arrian records that Darius' chariot, shield and bows again fell into Alexander's hands after the battle of Gaugamela, when Arbela was occupied (iii, 15.5).

We can conclude that the story of the abandonment of the chariot on a battlefield - as opposed to in a neighbouring city - originated in the fact that Darius' chariot was taken after the battle of Issus. The story was built up as part of the 'aristeia' between Darius and Alexander, for the chariot story presupposes that Darius was right in the thick of a battle. Whilst the abandonment of the chariot on the battlefield became a brick for the construction of rhetorical battle descriptions, a serious historian would still try to rationalize it into a credible context. This probably explains why Plutarch inserted the item in the context of the battle of Gaugamela. Plutarch was impressed by Alexander's letter to Antipater: clear enough proof that Alexander did not penetrate through to where Darius was fighting; and Plutarch knew that Alexander seized Darius' chariot. On the battle of Gaugamela Plutarch had apparently read Callisthenes' account and combined it with other versions (33.1 and 10) and he knew that Darius had difficulty in extricating himself from the battle. The chariot story seemed to him to fit the context, and he took the story that the horse was a mare that had recently foaled from popular accounts: contrast the ὡς φασὶ of 33.8: θήλειαν δ' ὡς φασὶ νεοτόκον ἵππον, with ὡς Καλλισθένης φησὶ in 33.1 and 10.

In art as in rhetoric elements of battle stories were fused together: thus it has been suggested that the Alexander Mosaic from the Casa del Fauno in Pompeii represents an amalgam of heroic deeds attributed to Alexander in the battles of Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela (M. Bieber Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art '64, 46-7). Thus, while it shows Darius leaving his chariot, this does not prove anything about either Issus or Gaugamela.

11.11: insignibus quoque imperii, ne fugam proderent,
indecore abiectis

Curtius specifically mentions the 'amiculum' at 12.5, which is the same as the χάνδυς in Arrian's account 'ii, 11.5).

Schubert suggested that Curtius took from Duris the story that Darius threw his cloak away as he escaped, for many of the fragments of Duris concern dress and many other passages might derive from Duris, and more particularly, Duris inspired other tales of kings discarding their distinctive garments in flight, for example at Polyaeus vii, 37; iii, 7.1 sq.; iv, 9.6 and Plut. Dem. 9, (R. Schubert [1] 44 and [2] 66 sq.; Jacoby, 76 frags. 14, 50 and 60 exemplify Duris' interest in costume). However this line of argument is unsatisfactory, and in this particular case there is no need to trace the story back to Duris, for Arrian too records that Darius' sandals were found by the Macedonians (ii, 11.6).

The discarding of the symbols of office foreshadows the dramatic tale of the Persian women's reaction to the discovery of the cloak (12.5 infra). The motive attributed to Darius may represent Curtius' rationalization of the story. Diodorus chose to omit the episode.

11.12: tum vero ceteri dissipantur metu

Curtius thus sets the beginning of the rout of the Persians after the escape of Darius, but Arrian places less emphasis on the rôle of Darius: Alexander's charge broke the Persian line and isolated its left (ii, 10.4, 11.1 and 4); Darius immediately fled (11.4) as Alexander was in a position to attack the Persian centre from its left flank (11.1). It appears that the Greek mercenaries in the Persian centre were not affected by Darius' flight (A.ii, 10. 6-7 and 11. 1-2).

Curtius' version is closer to Diodorus (34. 7-9).

11.12: adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat

This section of the narrative is rounded off with a neat sententia, cf. 8.30.

11.7-12: Curtius' source for the 'aristeia'

It has been argued that Curtius himself set the infantry clash before Alexander's cavalry charge to heighten the drama of Alexander's intervention. The structure and detail of this particular episode are close to those of Diodorus' account and a common source seems to underlie the two accounts. The connection is underlined by the following table of parallels:

Curtius	Diodorus	Arrian
Alexander non ducis magis quam militis munia exequabatur opimum decus caeso rege expetens	σπεύδων οὐχ οὕτω καταπροτερῆσαι τῶν Περσῶν ὡς τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ περιποιή- σασθαι τὴν νίκην(33.5, cf. 57.6&60:1)	
frater eius Oxathres	'Οξάθρης..ἀδελφός ὦν Δαρείου ...	
cum Alexandrum instare ei cerneret	ὡς εἶδεν τὸν Ἀλέξ- ανδρον ἀκατασχέτως ἰέμενον ἐπὶ τὸν Δαρεῖον (34.2)	
equites quibus praeerat (equitum agmen §9)	ἀναλαβὼν οὖν τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἰπέων τῶν μεθ' αὐτοῦ τεταγμένων μετὰ πούτων ἐπέρραξε τοῖς περὶ τὸν 'Αλέξανδρον (34.3)	
ante ipsum currum regis obiecit	προεμάχετο τοῦ Δαρείου τεθρίππου(34.3)	
animo ..	κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπαινούμενος (34.2)	
et pietate in paucissimis	νομίσας τὸ φιλ- ἀδελφον τῆς ψυχῆς οἴσειν αὐτῷ περι- βόητον παρὰ Πέρσαις δόξαν (34.3)	
inprovide instantes	τοῦ ζῆν οὐδεμίαν ἐποιοῦντο φειδῶ (34.4)	
prostravit	πολλοὺς ἀπέκτεινε(34.3)	
Macedones .. cum ipso (in equitum agmen) inrumpunt	'Αλέξανδρος..μετὰ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἰπέων ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐφέρετο τὸν βασιλέα (33.5)	(πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ κατ' 'Αλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τεταγμένος δρόμῳ ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐνέβαλον. ii, IO.3)
tum vero similis ruinae strages .. circa currum Darei iacebant..duces.. morte defuncti	περὶ τὸ τοῦ Δαρείου τέθριππον ταχὺ νεκρῶν ἐσωρεύθη πλῆθος (34.4)	
nobilissimi duces	πολλοὶ τῶν παρὰ Πέρσαις ἐπιφανῶν ἡγεμόνων (34.5)	
omnes in ora proni..adverso corpore vulneribus acceptis	πολλοὶ τραύμασιν ἐναντίοις περιτυγχάνοντες(33.7)	

inter hos Atizyes et Rheomithres et Sabaces, praetor Aegypti	'Αντιζύης καὶ 'Ρεομίθρης καὶ ὁ τῆς Αἰγύπτου σατράπης Τασιάκης (34.5)	ἀπέθανον ('Αρσάμης ..καὶ)'Ρεομίθρης καὶ 'Ατιζύης..καὶ Σαβάκης ὁ Αἰγύπτου σατράπης (καὶ Βουβάκης..)(ii,II.8)
obscurior turba		τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πλῆθος (II.8)
Alexandri dextrum femur . mucrone perstrictum est qui Dareum vehebant equi	αὐτὸν τὸν 'Αλέξανδρον τρῶθῆναι τὸν μηρόν (34.5)	
confossi hastis	οἱ δὲ τὸν τοῦ Δαρείου τεθρίππου ζυγὸν ἐπέχοντες ἵπποι, τραυματιζόμενοι	
et dolore efferati	πυκνῶς καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περὶ αὐτοὺς σωρευομένων νεκρῶν πτυρόμενοι	
iugum quaterre .. coeperant veritus ne vivus veniret in hostium potestatem	τὰ μὲν χαλινὰ διεσεύοντο (34.6) παρ' ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Δαρεῖον εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξήνεγκαν (34.6)	
desilit et in equum..inponitur insignibus quoque imperii indecore abiectis (amiculum quod Dareus abiecerat:II.5)		αὐτὸς δὲ ἵππου ἐπιβάς ἔφευγε(II.5) τὸ μὲν ἄρμα ἀπολείπει αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸν κἀνδύον ἐκδύς (II.5)

The parallels on Oxathres' action and in the description of how Darius' chariot horses nearly bolted, are particularly striking and suggest that Curtius and Diodorus had read the same source. The identification of this source is restricted by the exclusion of Chares (cf. on § IO) and the probable exclusion of Arrian's main sources, Aristobulus and Ptolemy; Schubert's attempt to present Duris as the source for at least part of the story is without solid foundation (cf. on § II).

11.13-15: the fighting on the wings

11.13: instabat fugientibus eques a Parmenione missus

The movement is not mentioned in the other sources, and Curtius, as Kaerst noted (365 n.1), contradicts himself for the following phrase 'at in dextro Persae' indicates that Curtius here thought that Parmenion was on the Macedonian right, whereas at 9.8 and 11.1-3 Parmenion is presented as being in command on the left.

The implication may be that Curtius employed two sources, one which described the pressure put on the Thessalians and one which portrayed Parmenion in favourable light as the initiator of some successful action: instead of reconciling the two traditions Curtius resolved the difficulty by transferring Parmenion to the Macedonian right. There would seem, furthermore, to be some confusion with the story of Alexander's charge against the Persian left which caused the wing to break away from the Persian centre: a section of Alexander's force pressed on to outflank this breakaway section (A.ii, 11.1).

However one must also remember Curtius' readiness to sacrifice historical accuracy to immediate dramatic effect: his style is episodic and there are many cases where the opening of a new episode is created without concern for factual consistency: compare for instance 8.1 with 2.9 and 7.1 with 2. 1-2. Another feature of his style is the constant use of antithesis. Curtius achieves an antithesis here by contrasting the action on the Macedonian wings: then is the mention of Parmenion on the Macedonian right, at the beginning of this episode a case where Curtius juggled with the facts for compositional reasons? An affirmative answer does not exclude the charge of contaminatio.

11.13: at in dextro Persae Thessalos equites vehementer urgebant

Cf. A.ii, 11.2 and Polyb.xii, 18. 11-12; Diodorus mentions the Thessalians as being on Alexander's left (33.2).

11.14: iamque una ala ipso inpetu proculcata erat

This is consistent with the following remark that the Persian cavalry was mailed.

11.14: cum Thessali, strenue circumactis equis, dilapsi
rursus in proelium redeunt sparsosque et inconpositos
.... ingenti caede prosternunt

Curtius' description of the action on the Macedonian left suggests that the Persian cavalry was not suited to close combat, but was well equipped for a cavalry charge. His description would fit cataphract cavalry armed with lances and he reflects the view of antiquity that against such cavalry the best tactic was to fall back before the charge and then to engage in close combat (Zosimus hist.nov.i, 50. 3-4; Plut. Luc. 28, 2-4; Gabba, Parti e Romani 64 sq.). However as will be seen below, it is not certain that the Persian cavalry was armed with lances (next note and Appendix E).

11.15: equi pariter equitesque Persarum, serie lamnarum
grave agmen, ob id genus pugnae, quod celeritate
maxime constat, aegre moliebantur

The codd. have: lamnarum ob id genus graves agmen quod etc., Müller proposed the emendation 'laminarum graves, agmen ad id genus pugnae, quod ...'. For the combination of 'agmen' and 'moliri' used transitively compare v, 8.8. Post's version reads: serie lamnarum obdita genus tenuis graves, but this is questionable because we have no evidence that the cavalry of Darius' army and the Seleucid armies used kneelength trappers, and the earliest suggestion that the Parthians may have used such a trapper occurs in Plutarch's account of the battle of Carrhae (Crassus 25, 8; the evidence for earlier practice is considered in Appendix E). One must recognise that at the time when Curtius wrote, the clashes with the Roxolani had not yet taken place and the cataphracts illustrated, for example, by Heliodorus in his Ethiopica ix, 15, by the Dura graffito and by the relief at Tang - 1 Sarvak in Khuzistan were of the future (Roxolani: Tac. hist. i, 79; F.E. Brown [Dura Report VI '36 445 sq.] and Gabba [Parti e Romani 63] deal with Heliodorus' account as a product of the third Century. Feuillâtre [Études sur les Ethiopiques Paris '66] argued that Heliodorus wrote in the Hadrianic era, but his theory is rejected, for example, by J. Leclant REG lxxxi, '68 629-632, who reverts to a date later than A.D. 350.

For the Dura graffito see Dura Report IV 216 sq., with pl.xxii, 2. The Sarvak relief of a Parthian cataphract is described by A. Stein Old Routes 110-1 and pl. 37; an inferior reproduction appears in L. vanden Berghe Archéologie pl. 89). This material shows the use by Iranian cavalry of trappers of scale (Dura and Sirvak) or chain mail (Heliodorus), which stretched down to the horse's knees; but no such evidence exists for the period before Curtius.

This passage sheds light on Curtius' dates and indicates that he wrote earlier than the establishment of a cataphract squadron in the Roman army, probably by Trajan. Such a periphrasis would have been unnecessary after that squadron was constituted (cf. Introduction p. xxii).

11.13-15: the sources of Curtius' account of the fighting on the wings

Curtius gives prominence to the Thessalians, and the bravery of the Thessalians in Alexander's army was a commonplace (e.g. Livy ix, 19.5). Kaerst argued that this emphasis derived from Callisthenes' account, as Callisthenes recorded the campaigns as a panhellenic war with Alexander as the champion of the Greeks and the Thessalians as the bravest unit in the allied forces (Kaerst, p. 365 n.1 and 338 n.1). However the real significance of the prominence given to the Thessalians in the account of Issus emerges from the fact that both Curtius and Arrian (ii, 11.2) omit to mention the lead given by Parmenion, the commander on Alexander's left. Curtius describes the Thessalians as routing the Persian cavalry by their courage and skill, whilst Arrian presents the flight of the Persian cavalry as the result of Darius' flight and the collapse of the Persian centre (A.ii, 11.2). In view of Parmenion's demise one cannot regard this circumstance as fortuitous. Arrian surely followed a tradition in which Parmenion's rôle at Issus was suppressed. Curtius followed this same tradition, but the mention in § 13 of Parmenion's initiative at some stage in the battle indicates that Curtius also read a source in which Parmenion's contribution was recognised - if not exaggerated. A similar difference of presentation of Parmenion occurs in the accounts of the battle of Gaugamela, where it is Diodorus who gives the favourable

tradition on Parmenion (60. 5-8) whilst Arrian again follows a tradition that suppressed Parmenion's contribution (A.iii, 15.1; cf. note supra on 4.15 and p.104).

11.16-19: the rout of the Persians

11.16: Alexander non ante ausus persequi barbaros, utrimque iam victor instare fugientibus coepit

Arrian too speaks of Alexander delaying the pursuit of Darius, but he says that Alexander waited for the Persian right and the mercenaries in the Persian centre to be driven back from the river (ii, 11.7).

11.16: haud amplius regem quam mille equites sequebantur

Contrast D.S. 37.2: Alexander pursued Darius with the Companion Cavalry and the pick of the rest of the cavalry.

Ptolemy was in the party with Alexander (A.ii, 11.7), thus it is worth noting that Curtius' account does not contain the detail which Arrian records from Ptolemy's account of the pursuit.

11.17: sed quis aut in victoria aut in fuga copias numerat

Vergés noted a similar idea in v, 13.22.

11.18: at Graeci qui in Darei partibus steterant ..

abrupti a ceteris, haud sane fugientibus similes evaserant

Cf. A.ii, 13.2; C.R.iv, 1.27 sq., D.S. 48.2. Curtius and Diodorus gave the number of Greeks who went with Amyntas to Egypt as 4,000, whilst Arrian has 8,000 as the number of men with Amyntas, Thymondas, Aristomedes and Bianor (this could mean that the group split up; Anaximenes was quoted by Didymus only for the information that Aristomedes escaped to Cyprus, Egypt is not mentioned: Didymus ix, 43 sq. = Jacoby FGH 72 F 17, and cf. on 9.3 supra). Other mercenaries, not more than 4,000, fled with Darius (A.ii, 13.1), whilst 8,000 mercenaries who escaped from Issus were subsequently enlisted by Agis (D.S. 48.1; C.R.iv, 1.39).

11.18: Amynta duce - praetor hic Alexandri fuerat,
tunc transfuga

Amyntas, son of Antiochus, had fled from Macedon before the Persian expedition was mounted, and at the time of the battle of Granicus was with the garrison forces in Ephesus (A.i, 17.9; Berve ii, no.58). He may have decamped soon after Philip's death, because he had been associated with Amyntas, s. of Perdikkas, and Amyntas' claim to the throne was strong enough for Alexander to have him promptly murdered (J.xii, 6.14 cf. Berve ii, nos. 58 and 61 and cf. Hamilton on Plut. Alex.20, 1, and Badian [3] 249 and n.26).

The phrase 'Amynta duce' cannot be taken to mean that Amyntas held a senior command before his flight, thus Curtius is consistent (cf. on 9.2). Amyntas rather came into his own when he deserted Darius; no doubt Darius had been cautious of this Macedonian whose ties had been with the Macedonian monarchy rather than Greek mercenaries.

11.18: fugam intenderunt

This formula marks a development of the Golden Latin combination 'iter/viam intendere', as Vergés noted.

11.19: alii ... quidam ... pauci

On this literary device cf. note on 8.26.

11.19: quidam circuitu rupes saltusque montium occultos
petivere

A map showing the minor passes over the Amanus Mountains can be found attached to the article by U.B. and H. Alkim, Excavations at Gedikli Belleten xxx, no.117 '66. For the route over the Tiyek Pass see AS xv, '65 30.

11.20-26: Alexander captures Darius' camp and Persian non-combatants including members of Darius' family

11.20: ingens auri argentique pondus

Arrian says that not more than 3,000 talents were taken in the Persian camp, for the bulk of the Persian treasure and baggage had been sent to Damascus (A.ii, 11.10). Curtius deals

with the capture of Damascus in c.13.

Compare here D.S. 35.2 and J.xi, 10.11.

11.20: non belli sed luxuriae apparatus

J.xi, 10.1: divitiarumque adparatum

11.20: cumque plus raperent, quam capere possent

Vergés compares v, 6.4. Plutarch's phraseology is similar: τοὺς Μακεδόνας τὸν .. πλοῦτον φέροντας καὶ ἄγοντας ὑπερβάλλοντα πλήθει (Alex. 20,II).

11.21: iamque ad feminas perventum erat

The treatment of the Persian women captured by Alexander forms a motif running through Curtius' work (cf. Kroll Studien 338 and n.16).

Diodorus gives the same picture of the assault on the Persian women found in Darius' camp. According to Arrian only a few women were taken there, members of Darius' family and a few wives of Persian 'homotimoi', for the rest of the womenfolk had been evacuated to Damascus (A.ii, 11.9); Diodorus says that the women were members of the royal family and the wives of the Kinsmen and Friends (35.3). Curtius implies that a greater number was captured and only restricts it at 12.4 by the qualification 'nobilibus'.

11.22: omni planctu tumultuque .. castra repleverant

Hedicke's emendation of 'omnia' to 'omni' is thus accepted by Bardon, as it is by Müller. Castiglioni argued the case for retaining 'omnia' and excising 'castra' as a gloss. If 'omni' was the original reading the corruption is difficult to explain; and the emendation advocated by Castiglioni produces a formula matched by Livy at xli, 5.2, omnia terrore ac tumultu .. impleverunt, and elsewhere by Curtius, for example at iii, 8.26 and 13.10.

11.23: inpotentis fortunae species

There is a double entendre in this phrase for 'inpotentis fortunae' could mean both 'the weakness of social status' and 'the unrestrained force of (fickle) fortune'.

'Impotens' in the latter connotation was used by Curtius again for example at x, 8.1 and cf. Seneca Agam. 247-8:

superba et impotens flatu nimis
fortuna magno spiritus tumidos daret.

Diodorus includes a passage on the sympathy which thoughtful Macedonians showed for the Persians at the reversal of their fortune (36.1).

11.23: namque id solum intactum omiserant milites, ita
tradito more, ut victorem victi regis tabernaculo
exciperent

Arrian (ii, 12.3) and Plutarch (Alex. 20, 11) both record that the Macedonians reserved Darius' tent for Alexander.

Cf. D.S. 36.5: the royal pages prepared Darius' possessions for Alexander, ὅπως .. καταλαβὼν ἐτοίμην
πᾶσαν τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ Δαρείου οἰωνίσθηται τὴν
ὅλην τῆς Ἀσίας ἡγεμονίαν.

Curtius alone refers to the 'traditus mos' and the pathos of the troops' respect for tradition in the midst of anarchy may be the creation of Curtius' own dramatic skill. Other 'customs' recorded by Curtius are also suspect (cf. on 8.9 and 8.12, and note on 12.17 re viii, 5.6).

11.24: converterant

The codd. in fact have 'averterant': Bardon omits to give the manuscript reading in his apparatus criticus.

11.24: mater

Sisygambis, cf. 3.22.

11.24: coniuxque Darei

Cf. 3.22; her name is given as Stateira (Plut. Alex. 30, 5).

11.24: receperat in sinum

A similar phrase occurs in the picture of Darius' mother with her granddaughters after the death of Stateira: iv, 10.21.

11.24: filium nondum sextum annum aetatis egressum

Cf. A.ii, 11.9 and D.S. 36.2, who gives his age as six (at 38.2).

11.25: adultae virgines duae

Cf. 3.22; A.ii, 11.9, D.S. 36.2, Plut.Alex. 21, 1, J.xi, 9.12.

The mss. in fact read 'duae virgines'. The inversion made by Bardon removes the jingle but he should at least have recorded the mss. reading in the apparatus criticus.

11.25: ingens .. turba

Contrast A.ii, 11.9, who says that not many Persian women were taken in the camp.

11.25: nobilium feminarum

Cf. A.ii, 11.9: wives of Persian homotimoi; D.S. 35.2: wives of the Kinsmen and other officers; cf. notes on 3.14, 21 and 25.

11.25: laceratis crinibus abscissaque veste

The same detail appears in Diodorus' similar account of the frantic grief of the Persian women (35. 4-7).

11.25: turba .. inmemores .. invocantes

The plural form of the adjective and participle after 'turba' represents a constructio ad sensum.

11.26: sed illum equos subinde mutantem longius fuga
abstulerat

Diodorus likewise mentions Darius' frequent change of horses and he says that Alexander chased him two hundred stades before giving up (D.S. 37. 1-2). The difference between the two accounts seems to be that Curtius used the detail for dramatic effect, emphasizing the pathos of the Persians' trust in Darius when his only concern was to escape as fast as possible.

11.20-26: Curtius' source for the capture of Darius' camp

The detail relating to the preparation of Darius' tent, the age of Darius' son, the behaviour and treatment of the captured women, and Darius' flight all indicates a connection between Curtius' account and Diodorus'; the digression on 'fortuna' in § 23 can likewise be matched in Diodorus' account. It is reasonable to suppose that they followed a common source.

11.27: the casualty figures

11.27: in acie autem caesa sunt Persarum peditum C milia,
decem equitum

Diodorus gives the same figures (36.6); Plutarch gives a round figure of 100,000 for the total of Persian casualties (Alex. 20, 10); Justin differs in detail giving the tally as 61,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry dead and 40,000 taken prisoner (xi, 9.10) which gives a grand total of 111,000 - fairly close to that of the other three sources.

Arrian similarly mentions a total figure of 100,000 casualties of whom 10,000 were cavalry (ii, 11.8). Arrian goes on to describe an incident from Ptolemy's memoirs concerning a pile of Persian corpses trampled over by Darius' pursuers. It does not prove that Ptolemy gave an estimate of the number of Persian dead (pace Pearson [1] 190-1), but Ptolemy was, it seems, inclined to magnify enemy losses (A.iv, 25.4; the high figure for Gaugamela may be his, A.iii, 15.6, and cf. i, 2.7).

11.27: at a parte Alexandri ad quattuor et quingenti saucii
fuere, ex peditibus XXX omnino et duo desiderati sunt,
equitum centum quinquaginta interfecti

Bardon accepts the low figures offered by the codd., and this is justified by Curtius' concluding remark. On the number of cavalry losses Diodorus (36.6) and Justin (xi, 9.10) agree, but Diodorus gives the figure of infantry losses as 300, and Justin has 130. Arrian mentions that 120 distinguished Macedonians lost their lives in one sector of the fighting (A.ii, 10.7), but offers no figures for the final casualty list.

12. 1-12: Alexander is disturbed by the wailing and ululating and sends Leonnatus to reassure them

Cf. A.ii, 12.3 sq., D.S. 37 and Plut. Alex. 20, 11 sq.

12.1: rex qui diu Dareum persequendo fatigabatur

Thus Bardon retains the mss. reading 'qui diu' and changes 'fatigatus' into 'fatigabatur', but this is unconvincing as it is unlikely that a scribe would have made a major change in the verb form to destroy the grammar. Stangl, followed by Hedicke and Müller, proposed the retention of 'fatigatus' and the emendation 'avidius' for 'qui diu' but this is rather far from the text and in formulae with the comparative of avidus/-e the connotation is usually pejorative, which does not suit the context here (so. Tac. Hist.ii, 24 and iv, 65 and C.R.v, 7.4, though the adjective is used in a neutral sense for example at v, 1.19). Vergés reads 'quidem' instead of 'qui diu' which merits consideration, unless one follows Castiglioni, who suggested that one might simply erase 'qui' as a case of ditto-graphy arising from the similarity of QVI and DIV (Gn.xxix, '57 136).

Curtius presents an antithesis between Alexander's troops, whose only concern was plunder, and Alexander whose prime concern was to press the advantage he had gained in the battle (a similar picture emerges in Livy's account of the aftermath of Cannae, when Sempronius Tuditanus concentrated on salvaging the military situation whilst Hannibal failed to press his victory and concentrated on taking booty: Livy xxii, 50.6 sq.; 51. 1 sq.; E. Burck [2] 98 sq.).

On Alexander's fatigue compare D.S. 37.2: τὸν ἐκ τῆς κακοπαθείας κόπον.

12.1: postquam et nox adpetebat et consequendi spes non erat in castra paulo ante a suis capta pervenit

Cf. A.ii, 11. 5-6: καὶ ἡ νύξ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐπιγενομένη ἀφείλετο αὐτὸν τὸ πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἄλῶναι. Ἀλέξανδρος γὰρ ἔστε μὲν φάος ἢν ἀνά κράτος ἐδίωκεν, ὡς δὲ συνεσκόταζε τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πρὸ ποδῶν ἀφανῆ ἦν, εἰς τὸ ἔμπαλιν ἀπετρέπετο ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον.

Diodorus says he advanced 200 stades before turning back; he reached camp *περὶ μέσας νύκτας* (37.2), whilst the Alexander - Romance gives the distance as 60 stades (Ps. Callisth. i, 41).

Given a date in November for the battle and the distance covered by Alexander before the battle one might assume that Arrian's phrase *ὁ δὲ διὰ μακροῦ* was a further indication that night fell not long after the battle turned into a rout. But the phrase itself is imprecise.

It would have taken Alexander some while to cover 200 stades (c. 36 km.) and to retrace his steps, but Curtius refers to the capture of Darius' camp as preceding Alexander's return 'paulo ante'. However one cannot prove that Curtius and Diodorus followed different sources, for the phrase 'paulo ante' is too vague and Curtius omitted details of Alexander's pursuit.

12.2: *invitari deinde amicos*

Cf. Plut. Alex. 20, 12 sq. and D.S. 37.2.

12.2: *quippe summa dumtaxat cutis in femine perstricta non prohibebat interesse convivio*

Alexander's drinking habits created problems even for his admirers (Aristobulus FGH 139, F 62) and presented splendid material for the irreverent. Hellenistic histories were rich in satirical references to the drinking habits of national leaders (Strasburger (2) esp. 26 sq.). Curtius later criticizes Alexander's love of prolonged parties (vi, 2.2 and viii, 1.22), thus there may be a satirical overtone in this comment on the party at Issus. The parallel account by Diodorus does not contain a similar comment.

12.3: *lugubris clamor, barbaro ululatu planctuque permixtus*

Cf. D.S. 37.3, A.ii, 12.3, Plut. Alex. 21, 1.

12.4: *cum captivis nobilebus*

Cf. on 11.25.

12.5: amiculum .. sicut paulo ante dictum est

This was the κάλυδος to which Arrian refers at ii, 11.5. Curtius refers back to what he has said at 11.11.

There has been much debate about the identification of the 'candys', and one has to allow for the limitations of the Graeco-Roman sources (cf. on 3.17; for a general introduction, Amelung on χειρῖδωτος χιτῶν in RE iii, 2 [1899] 2206 sq., esp. 2207-8). The dominant view has been that the 'candys' was the flowing robe worn by the King of Persia, Persians and Susians=Elamites (for example Walser [2] 71 with n.13 and 72 with n.15, and plates 4-7, 9 and 35-7; Schmidt [1] i, 39 [Behistun] 83 sq., 117 and pl.75. This costume is thought to be of Elamite origins). The composition of this costume has been variously described: Herzfeld presented it as a rectangular piece of material which had a hole for the head and was fastened by a belt around the waist; but it is possible that it was a two-piece costume: a skirt with pleats and folds, and a separate cape, distinguished by four pleats inserted behind the elbow (Herzfeld Iran 259; contra Anne Roes Bibliotheca Orientalis viii, '51 137-141, known to me through the discussion by Georgina Thompson in Iran iii, '65 esp. 123-4).

However other writers think that the 'candys' was the full-length plain coat with long sleeves worn by Medes in Achaemenid reliefs (the garment is shown and described by Herzfeld Iran 205 and pl.76, cf. Schmidt [1] i, 85 and pl.27; the Medes wore with this coat a tunic (sarapis) and trousers (saravāra, ἀναξυρίδες). The case for styling this coat the 'candys' has been put by G. Widengren, Some remarks on riding costume Arctica [Uppsala] xi, '56 228 sq., esp. 235 sq., and G. Thompson Iran iii, '65 121 sq.). Certainly Xenophon described the 'candys' as Median, and said that Cyrus wore it loose (Cyrop i, 3.2; viii, 3.13: κάλυδον ὀλοπόρφυρον; 3.14: τὰς χεῖρας ἔξω τῶν χειρῖδων εἶχε), whilst the King's subjects were obliged to put their arms through the sleeves of the 'candys' in his presence (Hell.ii, 1. 8 [κόρη] and Cyrop. viii, 3.10).

A reasonable conclusion is that the Persian robes were used for ceremonial occasions and at court, whilst the simpler 'candys' was worn on military campaigns.

Diodorus makes no mention of this cloak but his version of the false message refers to Alexander as having stripped Darius of his arms, Δαρειῶν ἐσχυλευκῶς (37.3; though elsewhere he used the term κἀνδύς at 77.5). In Arrian's account Darius' family ~~was~~ told that Alexander had possession of the King's candies, bow and shield (ii, 12.4), whilst Plutarch mentions that the women saw Darius' chariot and bow-or bows-which had fallen into Alexander's hands (Alex. 20, 10 and 21, 1). Plutarch makes no mention of any robe and this may indicate that his source differed from the tradition followed by Arrian and Curtius.

12.5: ratusque interfecto detractum esse, falsum nuntium
mortis eius attulerat

Diodorus' version differs in that the final humiliation of Darius is attributed to Alexander himself (37.3). Again Curtius' account is rather closer to Arrian's than Diodorus'.

12.6: pietati earum

Cf. J.xi, 9.15: motus tanta mulierum pietate.

12.6: Mithrenem, qui Sardis tradiderat, peritum linguae
Persicae

The surrender of Sardis is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 17, 1) and Diodorus at 21.7, where the mss. offer Μιθρήνουσ and Μιθρήνουσ; the story is told by Arrian (i, 17.3 sq.).

He was later appointed satrap of Armenia (C.R.v, 1.44).

12.7: veritus deinde ne proditor captivarum iram doloremque
renovaret

In Curtius' work Mithrenes appears as an exemplum of a Persian official who was rewarded by Alexander for the betrayal of his trust. Curtius indicates that Alexander was not wholly consistent in his treatment of those who betrayed Darius. Thus he attributes to Darius the belief that resistance was preferable to surrender: nisi forte satius est expectare victoris arbitrium et Mazaei et Mithrenis exemplo precarium accipere regnum nationis unius, ut iam malit ille gloriae suae quam irae obsequi

(v, 8.12). At times Alexander reacted harshly against what he considered treachery: thus Bessus' treachery against Darius was not mitigated by Bessus' professed motive of wanting to surrender his country to Alexander (vii, 5.39), and his punishment of the Branchidae for the treason of their ancestors was, in Curtius' view, sadistic, and not a justifiable act of revenge (vii, 5.35). The fact that the Branchidae surrendered to Alexander without a fight (vii, 5.29) did not help them.

However Curtius appreciated that Alexander could not exercise 'clementia' without qualification. Mithrenes was reliable, but in this particular episode we see that Alexander judged that to use a collaborator with the Persian captives would be counter-productive. In many cases Alexander for various reasons could not trust former members of the Persian administration (Strato, iv, 1.16; Sisines, 7.11 sq. supra). The last chapter in this book concerns the problems caused by the officer who betrayed Damascus to Parmenion.

As Curtius alone mentions Mithrenes at this point it is clear that Curtius' interest in Alexander's treatment of the collaborators went beyond a simple appreciation of his 'clementia in devictos' (x, 5.28).

12.7: Leonnatum ex purpuratis

A.ii, 12.5: Λεοννάτων ἕνα τῶν ἑταίρων,
cf. D.S. 37.3 and Plut. Alex. 21, 2.

Curtius says he had royal blood in him (x, 7.8). He was appointed a 'somatophylax' in the winter of 332/1 on the death of Arrhybas (A.iii, 5.5). According to Diodorus he was a 'somatophylax' under Philip (xvi, 94.4), which, if correct, would mean that he was deposed at the time of Philip's death, hence his subsequent appointment by Alexander. However Arrian does not term it a reappointment, and Welles has suggested that Perdikkas, Leonnatus and Attalus were too young to have been 'Bodyguards' of Philip, and were perhaps 'bodyguards' of Alexander before his accession (Welles [2] p.103 n.9) - the word being used loosely in the latter case.

Further on his career Berve ii, no.466, and Hamilton (1) 54.

12.8: ut armatos conspexere

Cf. J.xi, 9.13: conspectis armatis. Here and subsequently there are indications in the phraseology that Curtius had read Trogus' account, but Justin is speaking of Alexander's visit to the women. Thus either Justin merged together Trogus' version of Leonnatus' visit to the women and his account of Alexander's visit, or Trogus' account differed in detail from Curtius' main source but Curtius was influenced by the phraseology of Trogus' version.

12.10: expectato diu qui se intromitteret

Curtius commonly omits the antecedent of a relative clause where it is understood as the subject of an ablative absolute phrase (cf. 1.24, and e.g. Seneca de ira 1, 2).

12.11: provolutae ad pedes

Cf. J.xi, 9.14: provolutae deinde genibus Alexandri.

12.11: orare coeperunt ut, priusquam interficerentur, Darei corpus ipsis patrio more sepelire permetteret

Cf. J.xi, 9.14: non mortem, sed, dum Darei corpus sepeliant, dilationem mortis deprecantur.

12.12: sed etiam apparatu pristinae fortunae reginas fore

Cf. iv, 11.3, Arrian mentions that Alexander allowed them to retain their royal titles (ii, 12.5). 'Apparatus' is represented by κόσμος in the accounts of A. (ii, 12.5), Plut. (Alex. 21, 4) and D.S.: περιέθηκε γὰρ αὐτῇ (sc. Sisygambis) κόσμον τε βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸ προγεγονὸς ἀξίωμα ταῖς προσηκούσαις τιμαῖς ἀποκατέστησε (38.1). Arrian like Curtius includes this assurance in Leonnatus' message, whereas Diodorus' reference to the royal trappings comes in his account of Alexander's visit to the women. Plutarch's version similarly separates the κόσμος reference from Leonnatus' message.

With the phrase 'reginas fore' compare J.xi, 9.15: et haberi et salutari ut reginas praecepit, and cf. § 25 infra.

Curtius omits reference to the retinue allowed to the women, contrast θεραπεία in the accounts of A., Plut. and D.S. (cf. Hamilton's note on Plut. Alex. 20, 11).

12. 13-26: Alexander visits the Persian royal captives:
Sisyambis mistakes Hephaestion for Alexander.

Cf. J.xi, 9.13 sq., D.S. 37. 5 sq., and A.ii, 12. 6 sq., who indicates that this story did not have the support of Ptolemy and Aristobulus.

12.13: postero die cum cura sepultis militibus

Cf. A.ii, 12.1. As a time reference for Alexander's visit to the women it is inconsistent with what Curtius says at iv, 10.24.

12.13: matricem Darei permittit quos vellet patrio more sepeliret

Cf. Plut. Alex. 21, 4.

12.15: Hephaestione

As Curtius says, Hephaestion was the closest of Alexander's friends. His career is discussed by Berve ii, no.357 and Hamilton (1) 130-1.

12.16: non alius ius maius habebat

In inserting maius before 'habebat' Bardon follows F. Walter whose emendation was proposed in PhWoch xlvii, '27 1565.

12.16: sicut aetate par erat regi, ita corporis habitu praestabat

Arrian (ii, 12.6) and Diodorus (37.5) likewise say that Hephaestion was taller, and Sisygambis for this reason mistook Hephaestion for Alexander.

12.17: suo more veneratae sunt

Curtius here refers to 'proskynesis', cf. D.S. 37.4 and A.ii, 12.6. Originally it meant only blowing a kiss, but Curtius thought of it in the developed sense, involving prostration: iussitque (sc. Alexander) more Persarum Macedonas venerabundos ipsum salutare, prosternentes humi corpora (viii, 5.6; discussion and references in Balsdon Hist. i, '50,

esp. 371 sq., and Hamilton (1) 15C sq.).

'Venerari' could be used of respect for men no less than for worship of the gods, and for the Persians 'proskynesis' was not in itself a religious act, but in Bk.8 Curtius attaches a religious connotation to 'proskynesis' in dealing with Alexander's introduction of 'proskynesis' into court ceremonial, and Callisthenes' opposition to it (see esp. viii, 5. 5, 8, 10 - 11 and 15 sq.). Thus one can link with 'veneratae sunt' Diodorus' phrase ' ὡς θεὸν προσεδέξαντο ' (37.4).

12. 18-21: digression on Alexander's character with programmatic notes on the way he was to be corrupted by success

Lana suggested that Curtius may have had in mind the change in Caligula's character and his adoption of Alexander as a model for his actions (RFIC xxvii, '49 esp. p.63).

12.18: continentia animi

Continentia, according to Cicero, was the virtue 'per quam cupiditas consilii gubernatione regitur' (de inv. ii, 164). It appears rarely in political works, only once in Caesar's Commentaries: when Caesar calling on his troops to check their impatience told them that he required of them 'modestiam et continentiam' (b.g. vii, 52.4). The word was used more in rhetorical and philosophical essays: Valerius Maximus (iv, 3) has a chapter on 'abstinentia et continentia', much of it to do with the ability to resist the lure of wealth, and one example concerns Alexander - Alexander vero cognomen invicti adsecutus continentiam Diogenis cynici vincere non potuit (ext.4).

Curtius later couples 'continentia with 'moderatio' and 'mansuetudo' (iv, 10.23 and vi, 6.1).

12.18: cum Liberi patris imitaretur triumphum ab Hellesponto usque ad Oceanum omnes gentes victoria emensus

Cf. 10.4 sq.

12.19: sic vicisset profecto superbiam atque iram, mala
invicta

Cf. Plut. Alex. 21, 7: 'Αλέξανδρος, ὡς ἔοικε,
τοῦ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ

βασιλικώτερον ἡγούμενος, though Plutarch is referring to
the control of sexual instincts.

Alexander himself was apparently keen to project an
image of himself as invincible, but an anecdote concerning
Demosthenes' reaction to a proposal that Alexander be honoured
as an invincible god suggests that even before Alexander's
death the contrast between his military invincibility and his
moral weakness was the subject of satirical comment (on the
'invincible' epithet F. Pfister Hist. xiii, '64 37 sq., esp.
39 sq.; Hypereides i, 32. 3 sq.; re Demosthenes, Hyper. i,
31. 15 sq., Dinarchus c. Dem. 94, cf. E.J. Bickerman, Sur un
passage d' Hypéride Athenaeum 41, '63 70 sq. and esp. p.84).

This theme was developed in Roman nationalist
literature, for whilst Alexander's invincibility was challenged
for the glorification of Rome's military strength (e.g. Livy ix,
18.17 and 19.9; viii, 3.6 sq.; Plut. Pyrrhus 19, 1-2 =
Malcovati ORF³ 1, Ap. Claudius Caecus, F.10), moralizing was
almost inseparable from the glorification of Rome's potential
superiority over Alexander, as the point was stressed that
military invincibility could be negated by moral vulnerability
(So Livy ix, 18.1 sq.). The same idea occurs in a non-
nationalist context for instance in Val. Max. iv, 3 Ext.4
quoted above on § 18.

12.19: sic abstinisset inter epulas caedibus amicorum

The phraseology recalls a passage in Justin's account
where Alexander regrets the murder of Cleitus: amicumque senem
et innoxium a se occisum inter epulas et pocula dolebat (J.xii,
6.6), and Curtius echoes Livy's comment: referre in tanto rege
piget ... inter vinum et epulas caedes amicorum (ix, 18.4).
Compare too Seneca de benef. i, 13.3.

12.20: sed nondum fortuna se animo eius superfuderat

Curtius deals with the change in Alexander's character
at vi, 2.1 sq.

The nautical metaphor appears too in Livy: loquimur de Alexandro nondum merso secundis rebus, quarum nemo intolerantior fuit (ix, 18.1).

12.21: continentia

The connotation of 'continentia' in §§ 21-23 is control of the sexual appetite (cf. iv, 10.23; Val. Max. iv, 3.1 and a related passage in Gellius vii, 8. 2-3 where Alexander's respect for Darius' wife is discussed as exemplifying 'continentia').

Compare in particular Plutarch's account in Alex. 21, and note § 7 quoted on § 19 supra.

12.22: coniugem eiusdem

Cf. supra on 3.22.

12.22: quam nulla aetatis suae pulchritudine corporis vicit

Cf. Plut. mor. 338e, 522 a, Al. 21, 6, and Ath. xiii, 603 c.

12.22: adeo ipse non violavit

A popular version, propagated at least by Apion Pleistonikas and Carystius, had it that Alexander refused to visit Darius' wife in person (Gellius vii, 8. 2-3; Ath. xiii, 603 c; cf. Plut. mor. 522 a). Curtius says that Alexander saw the wife only on the day of her capture and then he only intended to see Darius' mother (iv, 10.24. The time reference does not quite tally with iii, 12.13).

12.23: nec quicquam ex pristinae fortunae magnificentia captivis praeter fiduciam defuit

Cf. Athen. xiii, 603 c: οὐδὲ ἐκείνας μαθεῖν ἐποίησεν ὅτι εἰσὶν αἰχμάλωτοι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔτι Δαρείου ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ ὄντος πάντα αὐταῖς χορηγεῖσθαι ἐκέλευσεν; cf. Plut. Alex. 21, 4.

The ironical addition of the phrase 'praeter fiduciam' was probably Curtian (cf. Tac. Ann. xiii, 45.2); translate, nothing of the grandness of their former status was denied to

them save their self-confidence.

Concern for the social standing (*fortuna*) of captured aristocrats appears as a virtue in Livy's work: *movit et Scipionem .. fortuna pristina viri (sc. Syphax) praesenti fortunae collata* (xxx 13.8; this belongs to the section in which Sophoniba's tale is related: a passage that Curtius had no doubt read, hence the verbal links between Livy xxx, 12.12 and Curtius iv, 1.22 and 6.28).

12.25: *ego me tuam famulam esse confiteor*

Thus Sisygambis emphasizes her consciousness that she has lost her freedom, and she rejects the temptation to collaboration which Alexander's grant of privileges to the royal party entails. The connotations of the term 'famula' for a Roman audience covered the indignity and humiliation of slavery and the denial of *libertas* (cf. Seneca *Phaedra* 991, *Agam.* 796 and *Troad.* 747), and the Roman connotations are of more importance than any connotation relating to Persian law (on the satrap as 'slave' of the King of Persia, Tarn ii, 107-8).

12.25: *tua interest quantum in nos licuerit si id potius clementia quam saevitia vis esse testatum*

'It is in your own interests, if you want the extent of the power which you have gained over us to be shown up through mercy rather than brutality'. In this pragmatic analysis of the situation Sisygambis demonstrates her reason for confidence. Thus paradoxically she finds humiliating Alexander's concern that she should not lose her self-respect by forfeiting the symbols of her status; and at the same time in refusing to be lured by the trappings of an artificial status she reveals pride and self-confidence which Alexander meant to deny her (§ 23).

Her attitude to defeat and collaboration contrasts with that of Mithrenes and that of the Persian commander in Damascus, whose story forms the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter 12. 1-26: Composition and sources

The story of Leonnatus' visit to the Persian women is recorded by Plutarch, Arrian, Diodorus and Curtius, and Arrian read the story in the accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus (ii, 12.6), but he does not say which source he followed on points of detail. The story of Alexander's personal visit to the women was not recorded by Ptolemy and Aristobulus (A.ii, 12.6), and as Plutarch does not record it, this may indicate that Callisthenes too and likewise perhaps Chares were not its source. If, however, Alexander actually visited the women and was accompanied only by Hephaestion the story must have been recorded by a source close to Alexander's court (thus Wolf [Soldatenerzählungen 26 sq.], who used the argument to show that if the episode became part of the myth elaborated by mercenaries it must have originated from the Macedonian rather than the Persian side). The episode is thus unlikely to be historical if Ptolemy, Aristobulus, Callisthenes and Chares all omitted or rejected it.

Plutarch's failure to mention Darius' candys amongst the items which gave rise to the report that Darius was dead, may indicate that his source on Leonnatus' visit was not the same as the source or sources used by Arrian and Curtius (cf. on § 5). However only Plutarch and Curtius mention that Alexander gave permission to Sisygambis and her suite to bury the Persian dead as they pleased (cf. on § 13).

A link between the accounts of Arrian and Plutarch is the motivation which Leonnatus offers for Alexander's clemency to the women - a point omitted by Curtius (Plut.Alex. 21, 2; in Arrian's account it explains rather Alexander's generosity): in Arrian's version it reads ἐπεὶ οὐ κατὰ ἔχθραν οἱ γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς Δαρεῖον ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς Ἀσίας διαπεπολεμηῖσθαι ἐννόμως (ii, 12.5). This explanation of Alexander's purpose foreshadows the views attributed to him in the letter which he wrote in Marathus in response to the communication from Darius (A.ii, 14.4 sq., cf. C.R. iv, l. 10 sq.), and the emphasis was on the legitimacy of Alexander's bid to depose Darius. But in the development of the story of Alexander's treatment of the Persian women, the focus was more on Alexander's freedom from hatred. Thus in Plutarch's account of Darius' reaction

to the news that Stateira had died and had been buried with full ceremonial, Darius laments the fact that he had not been pitted against an angry and savage enemy (ὄμῳ καὶ σκυθρωπῳ. .

ἔχθρῳ), for such a man would not have mocked her with feigned grief (Alex. 30, 8-9), but Curtius in dealing with the same episode couples the two motifs, the legitimacy of Alexander's challenge to Darius and the hatred which Darius thought was Alexander's driving force (C.R.iv, 10.29). Thus the absence of these motifs in this chapter cannot prove that Curtius was following a source different from that or those used by Plutarch and Arrian on Leonnatus' visit.

Similarly we cannot attach too much significance to differences that may otherwise be explained as the product of narration. Thus, for example, Plutarch differs from Curtius in saying that Alexander heard of the women's wailing - in Curtius' account he heard it himself, and that the women saw the captured items and drew their own conclusions - in Curtius' account they learnt of Darius' death from the messenger who deduced this from what he had seen (δ5).

Tentatively one concludes that Curtius may have used a source employed by Arrian, but his source is less likely to have been the one followed by Plutarch, particularly as he does not mention the candys nor Alexander's own visit to the women.

It has been noted that Curtius' phraseology matches Justin's in places, thus Curtius had surely read Trogus' account. Curtius' version of Leonnatus' visit to the women echoes Justin's account of Alexander's visit, both in phraseology and in detail: for example in their request for permission to bury Darius before they were executed; at the same time Justin records only the visit by Alexander. It is most likely that Justin conflated Trogus' account of the two separate visits, though one cannot exclude the possibility that Curtius transferred elements of Trogus' story of Alexander's visit to his own story of Leonnatus' visit.

The uncertainty is regrettable for Curtius' account of Leonnatus' entry into the women's tent is not paralleled in the other accounts, save for the links in phraseology between Curtius and Justin (cf. notes on δδ 8 and 11). Sections 8-10 may therefore have been inspired by Trogus.

There are numerous links between Curtius and Diodorus: note for example that Diodorus too says that Alexander visited the women the next day (37.5), Alexander referred to Hephaestion as his second self and styled Sisygambis his mother (37.6), he embraced Darius' son and was impressed by the boy's courage (38. 1-2). One cannot prove that Diodorus' source was not one which Curtius also used.

Determination of Curtius' contribution to the story must centre on two topics, the reference to Mithrenes and Alexander's dealings with Sisygambis. The mention of Mithrenes in Curtius' account is not paralleled in the other accounts, and the detail is historically possible. However as we have seen Mithrenes was known to Curtius as a traitor, and in this book a motif is the fate or fortune of Persians who betrayed Darius and collaborated with Alexander. Furthermore the introduction of Mithrenes provides a double 'peripeteia' in the story, for Alexander reversed his decision to send Mithrenes to the women out of respect for their feelings but in fact Leonnatus caused them greater distress, as the purpose of his mission was misconstrued. Certainly Mithrenes is integrated into Curtius' story and was not mentioned simply to preserve an otiose piece of historical detail. Alexander's concern not to arouse the Persians' anger and misery by sending a Persian to them (§ 7) is matched by the scene later in the chapter when Sisygambis tells Alexander that his considerate behaviour cannot cancel out her humiliation (§25). This takes us to the topic of Alexander's dealings with Sisygambis

Another feature of Curtius' account is the emphasis on the modesty of Sisygambis' wishes: she and Darius' wife asked only of Leonnatus that they be allowed to bury Darius (§ 11; cf. J.xi, 9.14); then Sisygambis avoided burying the Persian dead with full Persian ceremonial as this would be offensive when the Macedonian casualties were being cremated simply (§ 14). Curtius too makes less of the grants and privileges offered to the members of the Persian royal family: there is no mention of the retinue which they were allowed to retain (Θεραπειά. A.ii, 12.5; Plut. Alex. 21, 4; D.S.38.1), no mention of the increased allowances which Alexander gave them (Plut. Alex. 21, 4), nor of the lavish dowries which he placed upon Darius' daughters (D.S. 38.1, cf. J.xi, 9.16).

The individuality of Curtius' account on these two scores would seem to be compositional: first, the modesty of Sisygambis' desires introduces the antithesis between her moral victory in defeat and Alexander's eventual failure to match his military victories with moral victories (§ 19 sq.), though at this stage Alexander matches her and even gives her a lead; secondly, it would not have been consistent with Curtius' favourable opinion on Alexander's 'continentia animi', if he had shown Alexander offering to the Persian women extravagant material gifts, rather than sufficient to maintain the dignity of their rank (§ 12). Curtius repeats the offer in § 23 in lengthier form, but a twist to the tale comes in the phrase 'praeter fiduciam' which is developed in the following passage where Sisygambis demonstrates a form of moral superiority over Alexander in rejecting the blandishments to collaboration (§25). This final development is not matched by the other sources: none of whom comments on her resolve not to overlook the degradation of defeat. Most significantly there is no sign of this in Justin's account (neither in xi, 9 nor in a related passage in xi, 12), although Justin marks the beginning of Alexander's moral decay in the capture of the Persian train after Issus. Trogus might have been expected to suggest that the captives showed greater nobility than did the victor, but there is no trace of this in Justin's account; conversely there was point in Trogus' contrasting the propriety of Alexander's behaviour towards the captives with the symptoms of moral degeneracy which began to appear subsequently as a result of the material gains made from the battle.

The evidence, meagre as it is, favours the conclusion that the elaboration of Sisygambis' exchange with Alexander was Curtius' own, and, if so, the reference to Mithrenes may likewise have been formulated by Curtius.

In the moralizing passage Curtius deals first with 'continentia' as the determination to control one's anger (§§ 18-19), and then after the programmatic note in § 20, with 'continentia' as sexual temperance. Lana (RFIC 27, '49 esp. p.63) took the programmatic note as a reference to Gaius Caligula's degeneration, of which a symptom was his emulation of Alexander (see Introduction pp.xlvi), however the corruption of Alexander's character was a commonplace: reference has already

been made to Livy ix, 18.1, and in Justin's account Alexander's moral decay began at this point in the narrative (xi, 10.1 sq.; Schwartz RE im, 1880 noted that whilst Plutarch, Arrian and Diodorus present Alexander's respect for the women to the credit of Alexander, Curtius qualified such praise of Alexander's virtue by the addition of the comment that Alexander was not yet corrupted by success). Furthermore Arrian (ii, 12.8), Plutarch (Alex. 21, 5 and 7) and Diodorus (38. 4-7) offer similar moralizing comment on the propriety of Alexander's treatment of Darius' womenfolk. It may be added that the passage in Diodorus though couched as a personal comment, was perhaps taken over from his source: Diodorus only expressing his own idea in 38.7 (cf. Jacoby RE sv. Kleitarchos 637, who suggests that the source may be Cleitarchus).

12.27: tribus aris in ripa Pinari amnis Iovi atque
 Herculi Minervaeque sacratis

On Alexander's attachment to Zeus and Minerva cf. on 1.14 and 7.3 respectively. His respect for Hercules emerges, for example, in the story of his assault on Tyre (cf. C.R.iv, 2. 2 sq.; A.ii, 15.7 and 16. 1 sq.; D.S. 40.2 and Plut.Alex. 24, 5), and Alexander perhaps wished to associate his own image with that of Heracles in coin portraiture (cf. Bellinger Essays 13 sq.).

The altars were presumably set up on the spot mentioned by Cicero: castra in radicibus Amani habuimus apud Aras Alexandri (ad fam. xv, 4.9 of Jan. 50 B.C.). The identification of this place is discussed in Appendix D, where it is argued that the shrine may be situated on the Deliçay, at least as Roman cartographers thought.

Chapter 13: Damascus is betrayed to Parmenion. The camp-followers and baggage train are seized.

13.1: atque cum praecessisse et Darei satrapam conperisset

Bardon follows the codd., whilst many editors have departed from them to provide the verb with a subject: thus Hedicke proposed 'at ille', Castiglioni 'atque ille cum' (SIFC xix, '12 146) and Müller followed Castiglioni, as often, though he innovated by turning 'et' into 'eo'. However the subject of 'conperisset' is named in the ablative absolute phrase right at the end of the preceding sentence and emendation is therefore unnecessary.

It seems that the satrap of Syria at the time of Issus was Mazaeus, for coins were issued in Syria with his name in the fourth year of Darius' reign, Summer 333 to Summer 332 (argumentation in Leuze's Satrapieneinteilung 236 sq.). In defence of his theory Leuze tackled the problematic passage in v, 13.11 by the emendation: occurrit Brochubelus Mazaei filius, Syriae quondam praetor <is>; is quoque etc. (op.cit. 239; Brochubelus' name is rendered as Antibelus in A.iii, 21.1). The emendation is plausible (Berve ii, no.82 takes the text as it stands to mean that Brochubelus was an administrator (praetor) of some district within the satrapy; Honigmann [RE 2.R., iv A s.v. Syria, 1608] left open the possibility that Brochubelus replaced his father as satrap of Syria).

The position of Mazaeus at this time is not attested, but the fact that he commanded units from Coele Syria at Gaugamela (A.iii, 8.6) is significant (the only other western satrapy represented was Cappadocia [A.iii, 8.5], but Alexander controlled little of it. Hieronymus even denied that Alexander entered Cappadocia [FGH 154, F. 3]). Mazaeus perhaps organized resistance in Syria to the Macedonians.

13.1: veritus ne paucitas suorum sperneretur, accersere maiorem manum statuit

The 'paucitas' of the Macedonian forces provides a theme running through the book (cf. 3.28; 8.2; 11.27), and Parmenion is shown, as before Issus, cautiously calculating on the support of reinforcements (cf. 7.8). In dramatic terms

the smallness of Parmenion's force heightens the risk Parmenion ran of being ambushed on his way to Damascus.

According to Polyaeus Parmenion's force included three cavalry squadrons (iv, 5), and Plutarch records that the principal units in this force were the Thessalians, who were to gain from the spoils a reward for their exceptional bravery in the battle (Alex. 24, 2).

13.2: natione Mardus

There was a tribe of this name living near the Caspian Sea, the Median Mardi, and another tribe, referred to now as the Persian Mardi (Ptolemy vi, 2.5, Strabo xi, 13. 3 and 6 523-4, Hdt.i, 125, C.R.v, 6.17; for other references and discussion vide Weissbach RE xiv, '30 1649 sq. s.v. Mardoï 3-5). Curtius apparently refers to the Median Mardi at vi, 5.11 and viii, 3.17 and to the Persian Mardi at iv, 12.7 and v, 6.17. If the distinction meant anything to him he has not shown it in this case.

13.2: praefecto Damasci

The governor of Damascus was presumably Copen, s. of Artabazus, whom Darius had sent with all the baggage before the battle (A.ii, 15.1, cf. C.R.iii, 8.12).

13.3: cui traderet quaecumque rex penes ipsum reliquisset

Thus Bardon follows the emendation offered by Vogel and Dosson for the mss. reading: cumque rex tenens ipsum reliquisset. The emendation adopted by Hedicke is: cui quae rex penes ipsum reliquisset traderet; Bardon incorrectly set this down as 'qui quae etc.' However it is not clear why 'traderet' should have dropped out after 'reliquisset', but one can see that a scribe might have jumped from 'cui' to 'cum', leaving out the intervening letters. Thus the emendation followed by Bardon is more likely to be correct.

13.4: felicitati tamen regis sui confisus

Cf. vii, 7.28.

In Republican Rome a military command might be awarded to a man because of his 'felicitas', qua military record (Cic.

de imp. Cn. Pompei 47-8; the converse of this idea appears in 2.1 supra), and a story told of Julius Caesar was that when he was sailing from Apollonia to Brundisium and the captain decided to turn back rather than continue in the storm Caesar encouraged the man with the assurance, *Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν*

Καίσαρος τύχην συμπλέουσιν (Plut. Caes. 38, 5, cf. Lucan v, 580 sq., and Dio xli, 46.3; Rambaud Déformation historique 256 sq; H. Ericsson, Caesar u. sein Glück Eranos xlii, '44 57-69; F. Bömer, Caesar und sein Glück Gymn. lxxiii, '66, 63 sq., who argues that Caesar was using a hellenistic idiom to a Greek).

The implication of Curtius' phraseology is that Parmenion was unreservedly loyal to Alexander.

13.4: *quarto die ad urbem pervenit*

Arrian's reference is vague: Damascus was taken *δλίγον ὕστερον* (ii, 11.10). The distance from Issus to Damascus would be in excess of 380 km., which could hardly have been covered in 4 days, though Curtius does not of course say where Parmenion was when he began this journey.

13.5: *gazam Persae vocant*

For similar notes on Persian lexicography see 3.19 and § 7 infra and iv, 9.16. The comment is odd as the term has been used earlier at 12.27, and it occurred fairly frequently in literature before Curtius (Livy xxv, 25.13; Cic. de imp Cn. Pomp. 66, Val. Max. i, 6. ext.2, Nepos Dat.v, 3; other references in TLL s.v.): the implication is that here in § 5 Curtius was following his source closely whereas at 12.27 he anticipated what appeared at a later point in his source. In Alexander history the term 'gaza' is used by Diodorus (64.3) and the Papyrus History (FGH 148).

13.6: *multa milia virorum feminarumque*

Athenaeus records a letter from Parmenion to Alexander listing according to occupation the numbers of members of Darius' staff taken prisoner at Damascus: the total comes to 821 (Athen.xiii, 607 f - 608 a).

Curtius gives the total number of captives as 30,000 in § 16 infra.

13.6: urbium graecarum legatos

Müller (2) 630-1 citos this as a case where Bardon departs from the codd. without explanation. It appears from Mitzell's note, however, that some mss. at least gave the reading 'urbium graecarum legatos' and not 'graecarum urbium'.

13.7: gangabas

Cf. on 'gazam' § 5..

The TLL gives no other reference to the use of this term in Latin.

13.7: procella subito nivem effuderat

This would seem to support Arrian's statement that the battle was fought as late in the year as November (ii, 11.10). In the area of Damascus snowfalls are not common and the snow never stays long before melting; snow is unlikely to fall outside the period November to February (cf. NID Syria 85 and 406).

13.8: intentiore cura

A phrase used by Livy for example at v, 7.13 and xxv, 22.4. This phrase together with the following 'quasi ad iustum proelium' suggests that Parmenion over-reacted to the threat from the fleeing column.

13.8: equis calcaria iubet subdere

Parmenion had Thessalian cavalry with him (Plut. Alex. 24, 2).

13.10: illa pecunia stipendio ingenti militum praeparata

In Golden Latin 'praeparare' was generally followed by 'ad' with the Accusative and not the Dative.

13.11: si qua res avaritiam moraretur

Plutarch says that the taste of wealth, women and oriental living made the Macedonians obsessive about tracking down Persian wealth (Alex. 24, 3).

13.12: iamque etiam ad eos qui primi fugerant ventum erat

Cf. 11.21. The repetition draws attention to the links between the parallel scenes.

Jacoby (RE xi, s.v. Kleitarchos 647) argued that Cleitarchus heightened the drama of the capture of the Persian camp by conflating that story with details of the capture of the Persian treasure in Damascus; Curtius then duplicated the scene, describing the capture of Damascus in terms of the story of Darius' camp.

13.12: tres fuere virgines Ochi

Artaxerxes III Ochus was king of Persia from 358-338. On his reign see Judeich's article in RE s.v. Artaxerxes (3). One of his daughters was Parysatis, whom, according to Aristobulus, Alexander later married at Susa (A.vii, 4.4).

13.12: olim quidem ex fastigio paterno rerum mutatione detractae

Translate, 'once already dragged down from their father's high status by a coup d' état'. Ochus was poisoned by the chiliarch Bagoas, and his son Arses was set up as king (D.S. 5. 3 sq., A.ii, 14.5). Curtius and Curtius' Alexander (vi, 2. 7sq.) were sympathetic to the relatives of Ochus in their humiliation, though Curtius' knew that Ochus' rule had been savage and bloody (x, 5.23 cf. D.S. 5.3 and J.x, 3.1).

13.13: Oxathrisque - frater hic erat Darei - filia

On this man, more correctly styled Oxyathres cf. on 11.8. His daughter Amastris later married Craterus at Susa (A.vii, 4.5).

13.13: coniunx Artabazi principis purpuratorum

On Artabazus' status in the Persian court cf. v, 9.1 and A.iii, 23.7 (Berve ii, no. 152). His wife was a sister of Mentor and Memnon (D.S.xvi, 52.4; cf. n. on 3.1). One of his sons was Pharnabazus, mentioned below in § 14 and supra at 3.1.

13.13: filiusque cui Ilioneo fuit nomen

The codd. read 'filius cui' and a connective particle has to be found. The simplest explanation is that 'que' was turned into 'cui' under the influence of the following 'I'. Thus Stangl read 'filiusque: Ilioneo'; this matches a formula not infrequent in Curtius, a parenthetic clause with asyndeton giving the name in the Dative, cf. iv, 7. 18: Arabes: Trogodytis cognomen est, and vi, 4.6: amnem . . .: Rhidagno nomen est (cf. Büttner 12-13).

Hedicke changed the name into Hystanes presumably because this is an Iranian name closest in form to that given by the codd. of Curtius.

13.14: cui summum imperium maritimae orae rex dederat

On Pharnabazus' appointment to succeed Memnon see 3.1 supra and note.

13.14: Mentoris filiae tres

On Mentor cf. note on 3.1. A daughter of Mentor and Barsine was married to Nearchus at Susa (A.vii, 4.6; on the various women called Barsine see Tarn ii, 330 sq. and Hamilton (1) 55).

13.14: nobilissimi ducis Memnonis coniunx et filius

Diodorus records that at the time of the siege of Halicarnassus Memnon sent his wife and children to Darius for their own protection and as a pledge of his loyalty (23.5). Since Curtius mentions only a son it is possible that his source differed from Diodorus'.

Memnon died in the spring or early summer of 333 (cf. on 1.21). His wife was perhaps as Plutarch says the daughter of Artabazus (Alex. 21, 9), but we cannot be sure that Plutarch is correct in calling her Barsine, for he seems to have confused Darius' daughter, Barsine, whom he did marry (A.vii, 4.4), with Memnon's widow who was also captured at Damascus: the muddle arose from the appearance in 309 B.C. of a pretender who claimed to be a son of Alexander and Barsine, according to Duris a daughter of Artabazus (Plut. Eum. 1; on this whole subject Tarn ii, 330 sq., and Hamilton (1) 55). It is possible that upon

Mentor's death Memnon married his widow Barsine, but there is no direct evidence for this (Berve misleadingly states it as a fact (ii, no.206)).

13.15: Lacedaemonii et Athenienses societatis fide violata
Persas secuti

According to Arrian when Alexander became king the Spartans refused to accept Macedonian hegemony in any campaign against Persia (A.i, 1.2), and their neutrality is attested in the dedication on the spoils sent by Alexander to Athens after the battle of the Granicus (Plut. Alex. 16, 18; A.i, 16.7). Thus if the Spartans had an agreement with Alexander it was of a different order from the Athenian agreement with Macedon, as Athens was a full member of the Corinthian League with troops committed to service.

13.15: Aristogiton et Dropides et Iphicrates inter Athenienses
genere famaue longe clarissimi

Of these three men only Iphicrates is mentioned by Arrian as among those captured at Issus (A.ii, 15.2); Dropides and the four Spartans whom Curtius mentions appear in Arrian's account of the arrest of Greek envoys to Darius in Hyrcania (A.iii, 24.4). It is possible that Curtius relied on his memory in writing this passage and so confused two quite different lists.

Sealey suggests that the three men were together at Issus but Dropides escaped capture till 330 (BICS '60 39-40).

Iphicrates was the son of the famous mercenary leader and his career is described in PA no.7736 and Berve ii, no.393. He was apparently linked with the other two politically, if we suppose that this Aristogeiton was from Aphidna, and a descendant of the tyrannicide. For in 362 Iphicrates or his brother married a daughter of Timotheos, who cooperated in politics with Harmodius, a descendant of the other tyrannicide (the evidence is discussed and this theory advanced by Sealey in BICS vii, '60 33 sq.). Aristogeiton's father had to flee into exile in about 338, perhaps soon after a descendant of Harmodius, related to the exile, was imprisoned. The evidence suggests that the families of Aristogeiton and Harmodius together with Iphicrates were in political harmony, and as the key figures all belonged to

northern demes a link emerges with Dropides, for there is record of a Dropides as a leasee of mines and his deme is given as Aphidna (IG ii.² 2636; M. Crosby Hesp xix, '50 261 no.19; Sealey BICS '60 39). Thus Aristogeiton, Dropides and Iphicrates all belonged to northern demes. However Sealey's reconstruction is weakened by the fact that Aristogeiton's record from 338 makes it unlikely that he would have supported a diplomatic approach to Darius in 333 (see further Appendix B).

13.15: Lacedaemonii Pasippus at Onomastorides cum Onomante et Callicratide

Arrian gives as the list of Spartan envoys to Darius apprehended in Hyrcania in 330/329: Καλλιστρατίδαν τε καὶ Παύσιππον καὶ Μόνιμον καὶ Ὀνόμαντα (iii, 24.4). Allowing for the carelessness of Curtius and the scribes we may say that the two lists tally. Since Arrian separately gives a list of the envoys taken at Damascus (ii, 15. 2-4) and the names differ from the list for Hyrcania, whilst Curtius gives only this list of envoys captured (Curtius' account at vi, 5. 6sq. mentions only Democrates of Athens by name), we may expect Arrian to be nearer the truth. Thus the Spartan taken at Damascus was Euthycles and not one from Curtius' list.

Euthycles was surely a relative of the Euthycles who represented Sparta in Susa in 367 B.C. (Xen. Hell. vii, 1.33, Berve ii, no.312, Badian (5) 174 and n.1), and as this was apparently Agis' first approach to Darius he would naturally use as an envoy a man whose family was already known to the Persians.

The four Spartans apprehended in Hyrcania were surely sent to Darius before or soon after Agis began the military challenge to Macedon in Greece in the Spring of 331 B.C. (cf. V. Ehrenberg RE xviii, '39 516 s.v. Onomastoridas; Berve RE xvi, '35, 125-6 s.v. Monimos; the dates of Agis' rebellion are fixed in particular by C.R. vi, 1.21 and A.iii, 6.3 and 16. 9 sq., cf. Badian (5) esp. 190 sq.; Cawkwell's argument [CQ xix, '69 esp. 171 sq.] for setting the commencement of the rebellion in late summer 331 and its failure late in 330 is unsatisfactory, especially when he tries to dismiss the implications of Diodorus' statement that the revolt began after the battle of Gaugamela [D.S. 62. 1-2]. After the battle Sparta had no chance of significant aid from Persia and Diodorus' blunder

is sufficient to show that his account does not provide a sound foundation for the establishment of the chronology of the revolt).

13.16: summa pecuniae signatae fuit talentorum II milia et sescenta, facti argenti pondus quingenta acquabat

The 2,600 talents of coined money plus 500 lbs of silver have to be added to the amount of less than 3,000 talents found in Alexander's camp (A.ii, 11.10). On the value of the talent in terms of military salaries compare the notes on 1.1 and 20.

The financial gains at Issus enabled Alexander to back up Cleander's recruitment of mercenaries with the guarantee that wages could be paid (cf. Badian (5) 177 and Bellinger Essays 47-8), and he used part of the spoils to reward each of his troops (A.ii, 12.1, cf. Plut. Alex. 24, 2).

13.16: praeterea XXX milia hominum cum VII milibus iumentorum dorso onera portantium capta sunt

Justin refers to the capture of 40,000 men at Issus (xi, 9.10). The capture of pack animals is mentioned by Polyaeus (iv, 5).

13.17: dei ultores

The codd. have between 'proditorem' and 'celeriter' the word 'sepulturae', which does not make sense and leaves a subject to be supplied. F. Walter proposed the emendation '<dei> semper ultores' which supplies the missing subject and explains the corruption, and Quintilian too refers to 'dii ... semper ultores' (Declam. Mai. xv, 14; Walter PhWoch xlvii, '27 1565, followed by Müller). Castiglioni rejected this emendation and suggested rather 'di saepe ultores' or 'di seri ultores' (Gn xxix, '57 137); in the latter suggestion he was anticipated by Vergés, who used as an argument in favour of 'di seri ultores' the Greek proverb: ὄψε θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά (Appendix Proverbiorum, v. Leutsch u. Schneidewin, iv, 48, cf. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathematicos i, 287). 'Seri' however is inappropriate in view of the following 'celeriter', and Walter's emendation is more convincing. Mützell cites an early proposal, 'superi ultores', which is worth consideration as

it removes the difficulty of explaining how 'dei' dropped out of the text.

13:17: regis vicem

The king's office, cf. Livy i, 20.2 and 41.6.

13.17: exolevisse

Bardon here follows the reading of M. The TLL follows the remaining mss. in reading 'exsoluisse', and notes the reading 'exsoluerant' at vii, 5.29.

The phraseology is echoed by Seneca quaest.nat. vii, 17.2 and 30.5: cum memoria exoleverit, and cf. Livy xxvii, 1.9.

Curtius rounds the book off with a programmatic note, looking forward to the renewed struggle against Alexander at Gaugamela and the tragedy of the treachery against Darius after that second defeat.

Chapter 13: Sources and Composition

Curtius' source was surely not one employed by Arrian on the capture of Damascus, for Arrian does not say that the city was betrayed (A.ii, 11.10 and 15.1) nor does his list of the envoys caught in Damascus tally with Curtius'.

Curtius probably did not invent the story, for an exemplum cited by Polyaeus concerns Parmenion's capture of the baggage train that was in flight from Damascus (iv, 5). The differences between the two accounts suggest that Polyaeus, who dedicated his work in A.D. 162, was not copying Curtius; and in other cases detail in Polyaeus conflicts with detail given by Curtius (e.g. iv, 3.4 with C.R. iv, 3.1 and iv, 3.27 with C.R. v, 3.17; 4.20 and 30). However the links between Polyaeus and Trogus appear to be numerous (O.Seel, Trogus, Caesar und Livius bei Polyainos Rh.M. ciii, '60 230 sq. esp. 232 sq.), and, since Trogus presented Parmenion in favourable light (cf. pp. 92 sq. and 104 supra), it is worth noting that the anecdote in Polyaeus iv, 5 demonstrates Parmenion's astuteness, and the reference to Parmenion's presence at Tyre whilst Alexander was fighting around Mt. Libanus fits in with the comment of Justin

that before the attack on Tyre Parmenion had been detailed 'ad occupandam Persicam classem' (J.xi, 10.4; Polyaeus iv, 3.4).

Another part of the tradition of Parmenion's capture of Damascus is the report supposedly sent by Parmenion to Alexander, which includes a lengthy and detailed list of Persian attendants caught in Damascus (Athenaeus xiii, 607F - 608A; if the document was a piece of imaginative writing we can at least compliment its author for resisting the temptation to make the number of prostitutes taken 360 or 365: 329 is the figure given).

Part of the individuality of Curtius' account must be due to his own creativity, and he chose to devote the last chapter of this book to Parmenion's handling of a ticklish situation created by an unnamed Persian traitor. Kroll cites the tale of the garrison commander's fate as an example of dramatic 'paradox', and saw a doublet to it in the story of the execution of Parmenion's murderers (x, 1.6; Kroll Studien 339). This however is an inadequate description of the content of c.13, for it isolates the story from other linked passages in Bk.3: the exchange between Darius and Charidemus, Darius' defence of the Greek mercenaries against his Persian advisers, Alexander's treatment of Sisines, Mithrenes, Darius' family and, since he was not a Macedonian, Philip. The book thus contains a series of studies of the relations between a ruler, qua king or victorious military commander, and his subjects, whether subjects by constitutional right, collaboration or force majeure. These studies have a psychological and moral rather than a political bias, although the terminology belongs in many cases to Roman political thought, thus for example, 'fides' (6.6 and 13; 8.3, 6), 'libertas' (2.18¹; 12.16), and at the close of this chapter, 'maiestas'.

In the tale of the fall of Damascus Curtius repeats two themes of the book, first a condemnation of treason in the form of a cowardly surrender: Arsames' abandonment of Cilicia foreshadows the action of the governor of Damascus; secondly insistence on the duty of a ruler to test accusations, or his own suspicions of treason, and to avoid precipitate action before evidence of guilt exists. In the latter respect, Parmenion shows a proper balance between caution and a willingness to test the governor's good faith.

1. In chapter 2 the political bias is more pronounced.

Thus the Damascus story is integrated into the structure of the book as a whole, and its themes recur in the later books.

As for the structure of the story itself, there are many features characteristic of Curtius' dramatic style: the story is retarded in § 1 by Parmenion's decision to call up more troops; then a peripeteia is introduced with the phrase 'sed forte' as the Mardian messenger is captured, and another peripeteia occurs with his escape (§ 4); Parmenion's attack on the fugitives from Damascus provides another opportunity for the description of a chaotic crowd scene, and the elements add to the misery of the fugitives (§ 7). The description of the goods captured in Damascus echoes a central theme of this book, the antithesis between the extravagance and luxury of oriental society and the simplicity of Graeco-Macedonian society (Jacoby [RE Kleitarchos 647] saw the description of the march on Damascus as an excuse for a second description of the Persian wealth captured after Issus. However we should regard this facet of c. 13 as subordinate to the study of Parmenion's handling of the Persian traitor, and to the psychological implications for Darius of the murder of the traitor [§ 17]).

When we allow for those elements which reflect Curtius' own interest and narrative techniques, there remains a core of material which qualifies his choice of sources. First the prominence given to Parmenion must reflect a feature of his source, and, as has been noted, Parmenion played a significant role in Trogus' history of Alexander. The second point concerns the division between books 3 and 4; Diodorus split his narrative at 39.4 by terminating a year, but it appears that the division of events between the year of Issus and the following year was not strictly determined by chronology, for in c. 39 he recounts the withdrawal of Darius to Babylon, the exchange of letters at Marathus and the rearmament of the Persian forces together with the enlistment of new units, but he defers to the new year Alexander's activities after the battle, the burial of the dead, the sacrifices to the gods and the advance into Phoenicia (40. 1-2). Clearly the division of events between these two years is compositional rather than chronological, and the effect is to show the rapid recovery of Darius after the battle, whilst Alexander's actions, being reserved for the story of the following

year, throw the spotlight again onto the central figure of the story at the commencement of a new chapter.

If Diodorus' source was Cleitarchus it seems likely that Cleitarchus' Book 4, which included reference to Sardanapalus (Jacoby FGH F2), covered Darius' retreat to Babylon and his preparations for the next round, whilst Book 5, which included reference to Byblos (F3), opened with Alexander performing religious rites for the Macedonian dead and in honour of the gods for his victory.

Such a division is not repeated in Curtius' account: for example, the Marathus correspondence is not mentioned in book 3. A discrepancy between Diodorus and Curtius in the sequence of events could be attributed to compositional factors, but since Curtius' sequence is here fairly close to Justin's we have to do rather with two separate traditions.

In the Trogus-Curtius tradition there occurs after the battle description a second reference to wealth taken after the battle (J.xi, 10.1; Curtius 13), mention of Parmenion (J.xi, 10.4) and Barsine (J.xi, 10.2 with Curtius § 14), the story of Abdalonymus, the account of the capture of Tyre and the invasion of Egypt, and the record of the correspondence between Darius and Alexander. Justin deals with the correspondence only in c.12, whereas Curtius mentions the Marathus correspondence in its proper place chronologically (iv, 1.7 sq.); however the most significant point is that both present the establishment of a fresh Persian army as a consequence of the failure of the second diplomatic exchange between Darius and Alexander (J.xi, 12.3 sq.; Curtius iv, 5.1 sq., and 9.1 sq.).

The conclusion therefore to be drawn is that if Diodorus used Cleitarchus for his narrative of events between the two major battles, Curtius did not; further, Curtius and Trogus followed related sources, if indeed they were not identical. Differences exist between Curtius and Arrian on the fall of Damascus, and the minimal explanation is perhaps that Curtius did not follow Aristobulus (cf. pp. lxiv-v), and perhaps not Ptolemy.

The date of the battle of Issus is problematic, though Arrian sets it in November 333. The problem centres on four interrelated topics:

1. Memnon's activities 334-3 B.C.

It is difficult to date precisely the activities of Memnon after his part in the defence of Miletus. Diodorus sets the story of Memnon's campaigns in the section covering the year of the archon Nicocrates, 333/2 B.C., and Arrian summarises Memnon's exploits after he has described Alexander's arrival in Gordium. Both writers summarize Memnon's campaigns whilst referring to Memnon's death, which Diodorus sets in the Athenian year 333/2 (31.4). In Arrian's account the story of Alexander's activities in Gordium is interrupted with the story of events on the Aegean front, which is introduced by the phrase ἐκ δὲ τούτου (A.ii, 1.1): this may indicate as Prof. Badian has suggested to me, a transition from one source to another, and cannot in any case be taken as an accurate temporal reference.

After the fall of Miletus Memnon was appointed commander-in-chief in the west (A.i, 20.3; D.S. 23.5 set the appointment in the opening stages of the year 333/2, a mistake that may have arisen from confusion between the Athenian and Macedonian years [the latter began c. 10th October, Beloch Griech. Gesch. iii, 2. 304 sq.]). Initially Memnon was preoccupied with the defence of Halicarnassus which fell probably in September or early October 334/3 (Beloch Griech. Gesch. iii, 2. 304 sq., cf. M.J. Fontana (2) 37 sq.). Memnon moved from Halicarnassus to Cos (D.S. 27.5), and in the new Macedonian year was able to concentrate on the islands. We can only guess at the delays which Memnon experienced owing to bad weather and political and military factors, but we can hardly accept Diodorus' record that Memnon did not swing into action before July 333.

Memnon took Chios and most of Lesbos, and organised the ~~siege~~ siege of Mytilene, but died before the city was taken (A.ii, 1. 1 sq.).

The sources seem to agree in setting the death of Memnon after Alexander had occupied Gordium presumably in the spring or early summer of 333, since Arrian reports that Alexander was joined in Gordium by the troops whom he had sent back to Macedon for the winter, (A.i, 29.4) and one may assume that these men reached Gordium before the end of May (so Beloch Griech. Gesch. iii, 2, 311-4; Brunt (2) 153).

Curtius implies at 1.21 that Memnon died whilst Alexander was in Gordium, or at least before he reached Ancyra, but does not say at what point Alexander received news of his death. The implication of Curtius' transition from Alexander's advance towards Cappadocia to Darius' reaction to the news (1.24 and 2.1) may be that Alexander received the report before he entered Cappadocia. Plutarch implies that Alexander learnt the news after he had entered Cappadocia (Alex. 18, 5).

Diodorus records Alexander's receipt of the news and proceeds to the story of Alexander's sickness at Tarsus after the introductory phrase μετ' ὀλίγον (31.4). Brunt took this to show that Alexander had already arrived in Cilicia when he heard the news (Brunt (2) 154; in his view Alexander probably reached Tarsus in June). However Diodorus' narrative does not permit such precision.

2. Arrian's date for the battle of Issus

Arrian records that the battle was fought in the month Maemacterion of the year of Nicocrates' archonship, that is 333/2 (A.ii, 11.10). The Athenian year 333/2 was intercalary, for the first prytany was 39 days long (IG ii² 338 cf. BCH '57 293). W.K. Pritchett has adduced evidence of the freedom of officials to tamper with the calendar by intercalating or suppressing days (Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone, Univ. of California Publications in classical Archaeology iv, 4 '63 esp. 340 sq.), and in the year 333/2 B.C. at least one day was intercalated in the ninth month, Elaphebolion (IG ii² 358). On the other hand the evidence for tampering with the archon's calendar is stronger for the second than the fourth century B.C. B.D. Meritt claimed that 333/2 was a regular year of 384 days, following two years of 355 and 354 days since the previous intercalary year (Athenian Year Univ. of California Press, '61 132-3), but his reconstructions of IG ii² 339, 340 and 358 are not conclusive. Only one certain equation exists between dates in the prytany and archon's² calendars and that is only for the thirtyninth day (IG ii² 338). Thus one concludes that whilst 333/2 was intercalary it is not known whether it was regular.

Since the year was intercalary it is quite possible that Maemakterion fell relatively early in relationship to the Julian calendar. Thus the Battle of Issus need not be assigned unquestioningly to November.

Furthermore there is doubt whether Arrian's dating of the battle to the month Maemakterion is itself reliable, for Arrian dated the battle of Gaugamela to Pyanepsion, whereas the actual date was more likely in the preceding month, Boedromion (A.iii, 15.7; Plut. Cam. 19, 5; further references in Hamilton's note on Plut. Alex. 31, 8; cf. Fontana (2) 47, n.10).

There are three points on the weather at the time of the battle which support a date as late as November. First Arrian says that Alexander's advance from Myriandrus was held up by a storm and gale (ii, 6.2): modern records at Iskenderon show that December to February are the wettest months averaging 3.5 inches of rain per month, October and November coming next each with an average rainfall of 2.9 inches (NID Turkey 223-4 and Table xii, p.415); thunder storms occur most frequently in the period October to May (op. cit. p.228). Secondly Curtius in his account of the capture of Damascus says that the temperature was low and snow fell (iii, 13.7): the Naval Intelligence Division's Handbook on Syria (p.85 and Table 13 on p.406) shows that Damascus might expect snow from November and most would fall in January. Thirdly, Curtius attributes to Darius a desire for a prompt full-scale battle, because winter was imminent (8.8).

Ancient writers were prone to exaggerate climatic hazards in war and the climate of Turkey and Syria may have changed in many respects through the centuries; nevertheless Curtius and Arrian seem to set the battle in winter.

If the month is fixed the hours of sunrise and sunset on the battleday can be calculated (see Appendix F) but the references in our sources to the sunset are too vague to be useful (cf. on 12.1 supra).

If the battle was fought as late in the year as November the next problem is to consider what Alexander and Darius were doing between Memnon's death and the battle.

3. Alexander's movements before the battle

Alexander, as we have seen, was joined by reinforcements in Gordium, which implies that he was there in May. From Gordium the army marched via Ancyra into Cappadocia and Memnon died sometime in that period. Alexander pushed south via the Gülekboğazi Pass to Tarsus, a distance of some 500 km. for which Brunt allows a month ((2) 154), setting Alexander's arrival in Tarsus in mid-June. This period should perhaps be stretched, for behind the bald statement of Arrian, that Alexander won over the territory west of the Halys and much of the territory east of the Halys (ii, 4.2), there must lie the record of numerous military actions.

In Tarsus Alexander fell ill, and we are left to guess how long he was under intensive care and then recuperating. Leaving Tarsus he marched on Anchialus and then Soli (A.ii, 5.2 and 5; Curtius mentions only Soli, 7.2), a distance of c. twenty kilometres presumably a two day journey. He then spent seven days campaigning against communities in the hills (A.ii, 5.7), an episode not recorded by Curtius. He then returned to Soli and staged a festival of sport and the arts (A.ii, 5.8, C.R. iii, 7.5), a period long enough for Curtius to comment on the 'otium' taken by Alexander (7.3). He then returned to Tarsus (A.ii, 5.8), taking presumably two days to cover the distance. Then he moved on to Magarsus (A.ii, 5.9), a journey that must have taken at least three days, as Cyrus took three days from Tarsus to the River Pyramus (Xen. An.i, 4.1). Alexander busied himself with religious and political matters in Magarsus, before he moved on to Mallus (A.ii, 5.9). Curtius omits mention of Magarsus. Alexander's stay in Soli was quite long (cf. A.ii, 6.4), and one can perhaps posit a period of a month between his departure from Tarsus and his arrival in Mallus (Beloch, Griech. Gesch. iii, 2 362, suggests a month from Alexander's departure from Tarsus to his departure from Mallus; Judeich, Issos 358 n.2).

In Mallus Alexander received a definite report on Darius, to the effect that he had camped at Sochi (A.ii, 6.1) and from that time Alexander advanced swiftly to the Syrian Gates. For Arrian Mallus was the turning point when Alexander decided to march directly against the Persians; the delays had occurred earlier in Tarsus and Soli (A.ii, 6.4, cf. Plut. Alex. 19 and J. xi, 9.2). The battle appears to have been fought on the sixth day after Alexander left Mallus.

With the detail at our disposal we might suppose that not more than three months separated his departure from Gordium and the battle of Issus. This would necessitate dating the battle earlier than November.

4. Darius' movements before the battle

The position of Darius at the time when he received the news of Memnon's death is not clear, but Diodorus and Curtius imply that he was not in Babylon (D.S. 31.1 and C.R. iii, 2.2 with note

ad loc.). If Darius was in Susa when the news came, then we may calculate that he must have left Susa no later than 1st August 333, if the battle was fought in November (A.ii, 11.10): from Susa to Babylon would have taken at least 20 days (cf. A.iii, 16.7; Antigonos took 22 days, D.S. xix, 55.2; the distance was c. 370 km. as the crow flies, and a daily rate of 18.5 km. would have been a fast pace, cf. Milns [3]); from Babylon to Thapsacus would have taken some 50 days (Cyrus covered the distance between Thapsacus and Cunaxa, at least 700 km., in 40 days [Xen. Anab. i, 4.19 - 8.1 and Cunaxa was c. 80 km. north of Babylon [Barnett JHS lxxxiii, '63 16]); then we should allow at least 20 days for the time it took Darius to move his men from Thapsacus to Issus (D.S. xiv, 21.5 gives 20 days for the journey from Thapsacus to the Amanic Gates). The journey itself might therefore have taken some 90 days, without allowing for the time which he spent encamped at Sochi (90 days was the normal travelling time between Susa and Sardis, Hdt. v, 54: one may assume a slower pace for Darius' army). If the date of the battle is advanced to late September (as Beloch suggested) this would imply that Darius left Susa by about 1st June. The whole process will have taken longest if Darius only issued orders for mobilisation and left Susa himself after he had heard of Memnon's death; in this event he must surely have received the report no later than the middle of June, which would in turn indicate that Memnon died no later than the middle of May (Brunt (2) 154-5 allows apparently about a month for the news to travel from Mytilene to Babylon. A message might get from Sardis to Susa in seven days by the Persian relay system [Xen. Cyrop. viii, 6.17-18; Fuller 77], but Alexander had no doubt broken this communication line).

Another consideration is Darius' plan to transfer the mercenaries from the west and to use them against Alexander. For between Memnon's death and the battle one has to set the time it took for the news to reach Darius, plus the time it took for him to send Thymondas to the Aegean to collect the mercenaries, and the time it took for this force to join up with Darius. This would seem to make September the earliest month in which the battle could have been fought.

In fine we cannot disprove Arrian's statement that the battle was fought in November, but the date could have been earlier, but not earlier than September.

+ On the Persian relay system and the speed of service see Reincke RE xvi ('35) s.v. Nachrichtenwesen, 1522 sq. and 1537 sq.

Appendix B. Athenian politics and Macedon 338-331 B.C.

This is not the place to discuss Athenian politics in detail, but the following arguments may help to indicate the background to three episodes briefly mentioned by Curtius.

1) Charidemus (2.10 sq.).

In the period after the disaster at Chaeronea there was apparently a popular movement in Athens, symbolised by the appointment of Charidemus as a general and the radical proposals of Hypereides (Plut. Phoc. 16; Hyp. frag. 18, 3; Plut. Mor. 848 F sq.). However, the Areopagus stepped in to check this movement and to recover control. Charidemus was removed from office and replaced by Phocion. The view taken of Charidemus by the Athenian 'Establishment' is reflected in Plutarch's comment that his followers were all anarchists and revolutionaries (ἄνομοτοι καὶ νεωτεριστῶν: Plut. Phoc. 16, 3).

The Areopagus, it seems, wanted a more pragmatic policy towards Philip. The man who replaced Charidemus, Phocion, spoke of resistance but steered away from a belligerent policy (cf. the quotations in Plut. Phoc. 16). The aggressiveness of the citizens who looked to Charidemus for leadership was perhaps as short-lived as Charidemus' generalship in 338, but the militancy periodically revived: the survivors (cf. D.S. xvi, 86.5) no less than the casualties of Chaeronea preserved the old issues and attitudes. The removal of Charidemus from the generalship may reflect the fact that whilst the Ekklesia was a popular assembly at which the vote was free, yet the citizens were, as M.I. Finley has put it, bound by the conditioning of class, family ties, prejudices, values, aspirations and fears (Athenian demagogues, Past and Present 21, '62 esp. p. 13). Thus the tendency was for voters to revert to traditional habits even when it was in their power to effect a significant change. However instabilities in the economy posed a constant threat to political peace: the problems of this period are illustrated by the high price of corn (cf. W.K. Pritchett Hesp. xxv, '56 197), the rise in taxation ([Plut.] Vit. X Orat. 842 F and 852 B) and the activities of a man like Leocrates, who disposed of his assets in Athens after the battle of Chaeronea and used the proceeds to exploit the corn trade without regard to the results of his actions for Athens (Lycurgus in Leocratem 18 sq.).

Athenian aristocrats after Chaeronea did not match talk of opposition to Alexander with determined action. The measures taken by Demosthenes and Lycurgus to improve Athens' defences and military preparedness did not involve a commitment to military action and the motivations for these measures may have been economic and social no less than concern for the physical defence of the city (references are conveniently collected by Mitchel, Gand R xii, '65 esp. 194 sq.). The chauvinistic element of Lycurgus' patriotism offered a satisfying alternative to militant nationalism or revolution. Demosthenes backed a show of jubilation at Philip's death and made approaches to Alexander's likely opponents (Plut. Dem. 22, 1 with Aesch. iii, 160; Plut. Dem. 23, 2), but when Alexander was firmly established as king Demosthenes' activism lost much of its steam. When Thebes faced destruction in 335 B.C. Demosthenes did little to help and perhaps

even dissuaded the Arcadians from marching into Boeotia to assist Thebes (Aeschines iii, 163; D.S. 8. 5-6; Demosthenes did not answer the charge that he had received 300 talents from Darius to organise revolt but had failed to use it as was intended [Din. i, 10 and 20 cf. Aesch.iii, 173 and 239 sq. and D.S. 4. 7-9]). Then when Agis began the revolt against Macedon in 331 B.C., Demosthenes was silent (Aesch.iii, 163 sq., Plut. Dem.24, 1; his connection with Demades is important as the latter thwarted plans to send aid to Agis: Plut. Mor.818 E cf. Badian (2) 34 and n.134 and (5) 182). Aeschines mentions two other occasions when Athens might have engaged Alexander in war: first when Alexander crossed into Asia, and then in 333 when Darius advanced into Syria and Alexander was generally expected to be utterly defeated by the Persian forces (iii, 163 and 164).

Behind the façade of nationalist or Hellenic opposition to Alexander, Athenian leaders such as Phocion, Demosthenes and Aeschines, established links with Macedon and profited from the association (Dem. xviii, 41 and 320; xix, 145; Plut.Phoc. 18; Hypereides C. Euxenippum 19-23; Marsyas ap. Jacoby FGH I35/6 F.20; Schäfer Demosthenes esp. I93sq.).

However it was a risky game to follow the mood of the people in foreign and military policy and to champion a militant line only when the situation was not desperate, for ordinary people were prone to turn apathetic or might easily be disillusioned by empty talk; and this is illustrated by the setbacks which Demosthenes suffered in this period (see the analysis by Cawkwell in CQ xix, '69 163 sq.).

Charidemus, however, was isolated from the aristocratic Establishment both by his background and by his emergence as a popular leader in 338. Whether he was exiled, or, as Dinarchus suggests, he left Athens and was subsequently declared an exile (i, 32), it is clear that in 335 he paid the price for having offended the political establishment. Dinarchus goes on to say that when Charidemus left for Persia with the intention of winning support for Athens Demosthenes went round advertising Charidemus' mission and associating himself with the plan (Din. i, 32). This story at least reflects the fact that Charidemus enjoyed popular support and Demosthenes was not above exploiting the situation.

2) The envoys sent to Gordium in Spring 333

The year 334/3 was apparently calm politically, with conservatives firmly in power, and the leading factions nicely balanced. The City Treasurer was probably Xenocles, a friend of Lycurgus, whilst the military treasuryship was in the hands of Demades, an associate and perhaps relative of Demosthenes, but a rival of Lycurgus (Xenocles: Meritt Hesp.xxix, '60 2-4; Demades: IG ii² 1493-5 with Mitchel TAPA xcii, '62 213-229). Lycurgus had another ally it seems in the strategos Diotimus (SEG xxi, '65 no.276; Plut.Mor. 844 A). Phocion's circle was represented in power by Conon, s. of Timotheus, who was another strategos (IG ii² 2970, with Mitchel Hesp.xxxiii, '64 349-350). Conon was a member of the Keryx genos, and it was this clan which honoured Xenocles perhaps in 334 (Hesp.xxix, '60 2 sq.; on the gene and Athenian politics of this time see P. MacKendrick The

Athenian Aristocracy 399 to 31 B.C. Harvard University Press, '69), thus a link can be seen between Phocion's group and Lycurgus'. Another general was Sophilus, s. of Aristotle, probably a respected conservative: he reappears in good company in 329/8 B.C. as one of the ten distinguished delegates sent to perform sacrifices to Amphiaraios at Cropus (IG vii, 4254).

At the end of Alexander's first campaigning season in Asia, Athens had been challenged by his retention of naval units after the other federal maritime units had been disbanded. Another, though less direct, challenge, lay in the detention of Athenian prisoners-of-war in Macedonia. No doubt there was pressure for action and the result was a low-key response as envoys were sent to plead for clemency for the Athenians detained in Macedonia. The modesty of this request is consistent with the picture that emerges from the list of magistrates for this year: power was in the hands of conservatives who preached and practised loyalty to the state with varying degrees of sincerity, and who were not contemplating a death or glory action.

The result of this mission to Alexander indicated the limit of Alexander's respect for Athens; many would wish to avenge this diplomatic defeat; and as the year advanced and Alexander approached what many believed would be a disastrous defeat, no doubt Athenians thought about the consequences for Athens of a Persian military victory. In this context we must set the approach made to Darius.

3) The envoys to Darius, Aristogeiton, Dropides and Iphicrates
(13.15)

Sealey (BICS vii, '60 33 sq.) has argued that this Aristogeiton was the son of Cydimachus, and that his deme was Aphidna. Cydimachus' son is known to us chiefly through the speeches of his opponents Demosthenes (xxv and xxvi), Dinarchus (ii), and Hypereides (frag.18 in the Loeb volume Minor Attic Orators). Sealey further argued that a connecting link between Aristogeiton and Dropides would be membership of the deme Aphidna (the demotics are argued from IG ii² 6569, 1927 and 2636), and both would be linked with Iphicrates by membership of northern demes. Sealey also posited that Aristogeiton and Iphicrates were connected by their association with the Phocion-Eubulus and Timotheus-Conon groups respectively, and that these groups had at least been cooperating for some time.

At the outset it must be recognised that Curtius is the only writer to record Aristogeiton's mission to Darius, and Curtius is apparently inaccurate in stating that Dropides was taken at Damascus (contrast A.iii, 24.4). There is nothing on this episode for instance in what survives of Dinarchus' speech against Aristogeiton, nor in the two speeches against Aristogeiton in the Demosthenic corpus. Thus it is not proven that the son of Cydimachus went as an envoy to Darius in 333.

Further Aristogeiton's place in the political scene is shown in part by his prosecution of Hypereides in the aftermath of Chaeronea (Hyp.frag 18; Plut.Mor. 848 F sq.). On that occasion he stood with the reactionaries in defence of Athens' traditional customs with regard to slave-ownership and the citizenship law. He was on the same side as Phocion in resisting a

+ Whilst these two speeches postdate Chaeronea it is admittedly possible that they antedate the mission of 333.

militant policy that might endanger the character of Athenian society. It is further recorded that in the period after Chaeronea Aristogeiton prosecuted Demosthenes on seven occasions at the instigation of Philip's agents ([Dem.] xxv, 37).

If Aristogeiton was associated with Phocion or had the same approach to foreign affairs as Phocion it is unlikely that he would have endangered Athens' arrangement with Alexander by initiating a diplomatic approach to Darius. The possibility may then be considered that a three man mission went to Darius - three being the usual number of such delegations - and one of them was perhaps called Aristogeiton but was not the son of Cydimachus. Alternatively it is possible that only two men were sent from Athens, Dropides and Iphicrates, and since three was the normal number, the purpose of a two-man delegation may have been exploratory, rather than to negotiate a firm agreement (on the number cf. de Ste Croix CQ xiii, '63 p.113 n.4). This makes admirable sense for Athens could hardly advertise a firm decision to make an agreement with Darius in view of the hostages held by Alexander; furthermore an exploratory mission would match what is known of the foreign policy of the leading politicians of 334/3, and it would represent the safest active response which Athens could have made to the rebuff from Alexander in Gordium.

Appendix C The sacrifice to Athena at Soli: C.R. iii, 7.3.

It has been argued in the commentary on 7.3 that Alexander probably did sacrifice to Athena in Soli, as Curtius says, and the question then arises which Athena was honoured in Soli. Much can be learnt from numismatic evidence and in this discussion the following abbreviations are used:

BMC = Hill, British Museum Catalogue - Lycaonia, Isauria and Cilicia 1900.

SNG = Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: London i, Part 2 (Davis Collection, Aberdeen) '36, esp. pl. 17; iii (Lockett Collection) '38, esp. pl. 52; iv, 7 (Fitzwilliam Collection, Cambridge) '67, esp. pl. 109 and 110.

JNG = Hans von Aulock, Die Prägung des Balakros JNG xiv, '64 79-82.

The incidence of Athena types on Cilician coins of the fourth Century B.C. reinforces the probability that Alexander did in fact offer sacrifice to her. Therefore we can first consider Cilician coin series which in the fourth Century depicted Athena and the coins to be considered were either minted in Soli as a city issue - witness the absence of reference to the satrap, whereas other series have legends in Aramaic and mention the satrap's name - or minted in Tarsus under the direction of a satrap of Alexander. Satrapal issues of Datames and Mazaeus have been included in the following table to indicate the development of certain types (Athena appeared on other series too: her head in crested Athenian helmet on the obverse side of a silver coin from Holmi (BMC p.85, I); a seated Athena appeared on the obverse of two series from Mallus, one reverse showing Nike kneeling (BMC p.100, 26 and 27); then Nagidus in Cilicia Tracheia has been regarded as the source of a series minted in 379-374 B.C. which showed on the reverse Athena in triple-crested helmet standing and with Nike (BMC p.112, 15). The coins of Holmi and Mallus may postdate Alexander's occupation of Cilicia. The coin of Nagidus may have been based on Pheidias' Athena Parthenos (cf. C.C. Vermeule, GBS, i, '58 99); a similar design was adopted in 296 B.C. for the reverse of coins minted by Lysimachus (Bellinger Essays 87 and pl.2, fig.5)).

Minted in Soli	Satrapal issues, i.e. minted in Tarsus.
A from c. 400 B.C. Staters	
Obv. Head of Athena facing rt.in Attic helmet decorated with griffin	
Rev. Bunch of grapes (i) in diamond incuse <u>SNG</u> iv,7. 5283 and 4; iii 3045 (ii) in circular incuse	Coins of Datames 378-2 B.C. Silver
<u>SNG</u> iv,7. 5285 and 6; iii, 3046	
	1.Obv. Baaltars standing. Aramaic legends. <u>BMC</u> p.167 no.31; <u>SNG</u> i, 2, 335

Minted in Soli	Satrapal issues, i.e. minted in Tarsus.
	2.Obv. Head full-face copied from the Arethusa of Cimon on coins of Syracuse
	Rev. Head perhaps of Ares in crested Athenian helmet.
B Before 333 B.C. Silver coins	Aramaic legends
Obv. Head of Athena in triple-crested Corinthian helmet	<u>BMC</u> p.167 no.29; <u>SNG</u> i, 2. 336
Rev. Bunch of grapes; variants incl incl: (i) owl, rose or star plus legend, ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΙ, ΣΟΛΕΩΝ supra. <u>BMC</u> p.149, 29 and 30 (ii) Kantharos, and legend IHNOΣ	Coins of Mazaeus 361-333. Main series
<u>BMC</u> p.149, 31	Obv. Baaltars seated on diphros.
(iii) rose, and legend ΦΙΑ <u>BMC</u> p.149, 32.	Rev. (i) lion tearing bull (ii) lion tearing bull above two lines of battlements.
	Aramaic legends e.g. <u>SNG</u> iv, 7 5306-5312 staters.
	C. Coins of Balakros 333 -
	Obv. Baaltars seated on diphros. Legends: B, or in two cases BAAAKPOY (<u>JNG</u> xiv, '64 80); City mark T and/or I/Σ/M No Aramaic.
	Variants
	(i) <u>SNG</u> iii, no.3061. Baal as on coins of Mazaeus <u>BMC</u> pp. 172-3, nos. 59-64.
	(ii) (a) with bunch of grapes left <u>SNG</u> iv, 5315 and <u>BMC</u> p.174, '67.
	(b) ear of corn and grapes left <u>SNG</u> iv, 5314; <u>BMC</u> p.174, 69 and 70.
D Coins of Third to First Centuries - Bronze	

Minted in Soli	Satrapal issues, i.e. minted in Tarsus.
Obv. Head of Athena in Corinthian helmet	(c) with crested Corinthian helmet rt.
Rev. (i) Dionysus with Kantharos and thyrsos. Legend ΣΟΑΕΩΝ <u>SNG</u> iv, 7. 5288	<u>BMC</u> p.174, 72.
(ii) Eagle on thunderbolt <u>SNG</u> iv, 7. 5289	Rev. Two basic types appear (i) Head of Athena full face in triple-crested Attic helmet <u>SNG</u> iv, 5314-6. (ii) Lion tearing bull above two lines of battlements. Above, club and B. No Aramaic legends <u>SNG</u> iv, 5313.

It seems that no coins were issued by Mazaeus (361-333 B.C.) with the head of Athena: certainly none of the coins bearing his name in Aramaic shows Athena. Balakros took over both Mazaeus' obverse type of the seated Baaltars, and the reverse type of a lion attacking a bull above two lines of battlements; and in the process he dropped the Aramaic legends and added either B or his name in full. Thus we can safely conclude that under Balakros' regime the mint in Tarsus first produced coins with Athena's features.

The coins of Soli depicting Athena in Attic helmet (A), continue in their reverse types the design that was used for coins said to have been minted in the city in the fifth Century (e.g. SNG iv, 7 5280 and iii, 3043). This fact suggests that the series noted under 'A' followed hard upon the fifth century issues and preceded the group denoted as B. Alexander's invasion of Cilicia apparently terminated the existence of the mint in Soli, since the coin series produced under the direction of Alexander's satrap, Balakros, bear the initials I, Σ, M and T, for the four leading cities of Cilicia, but all these coins seem to have come from a single mint, Tarsus.

Athena's head appears on the coins of Soli in profile with first the Attic and then the Corinthian triple-crested helmet, but the Athena of Balakros' coins differs from the Soli types as Athena is shown practically full-face and she wears the triple-crested Attic helmet without the griffin decoration seen on the helmet of group A. Balakros' Athena is closer in style to the Arethusa seen on the coins of Datames. The choice of the Attic helmet is of limited significance since one of Balakros' coins adds on the obverse a crested Corinthian helmet (C Obv. ii,c). Another addition of immediate relevance is that the club on the reverse of Balakros' coins with the lion tearing a bull over two lines of battlements. The club symbolises Heracles, and Alexander sought to establish a connection between himself and Heracles no less than with Athena. To this topic we shall return.

The coins show that Athena held a special place in the mythology of Soli, and it was Alexander's practice to offer sacrifices to local gods: for example, Ister, the god of the Danube, on the Danube (A.i, 4.5), Athena Magarsis in Magarsus (A.ii, 5.9), and Apis in Memphis (A.iii, 1.4). The local goddess, Athena Ilias, appears to have been employed as the cult goddess of the Federation of the Troad (the earliest evidence for this confederacy is an inscription of 305 B.C. SIG³, 355, but even if it was not founded by Alexander it developed out of the situation which he created. Magie ii, 869 sq.; H. Gallet de Santerre [Alexandre le grand et Kymé d' Eolide BCH 71-2 '47/8 302 sq.] argued that Alexander founded the Troad Federation and federations based on Cymae and Mycale with the local Apollo and Poseidon respectively as the gods of the federal cults.). It was practical politics to respect local cults, and, if Alexander offered sacrifice to the Athena of Soli, this would have been entirely consistent with his general policy.

Since Rhodes later claimed a special relationship with Soli and Athena was revered on the island of Rhodes at Lindus, one may ask whether the Athena of Soli had any links with Athena Lindia (on whom see Nilsson GGR ii, p.80), and whether Alexander deliberately played on such links. On the first point the evidence seems too tenuous for any firm decision. Timachidas (Lindian Chronicle Jacoby FGH 532, 33) quotes Xenagoras (who probably wrote earlier than Polybius: Jacoby Kommentar on 240) for the record that the people of Soli (Σολεῖς, and therefore Cilician Soli cf. Diog. Laert. i,2. 51) once offered a phiale to Athena Lindia, as a tithe on plunder seized (possibly in the archaic age as the reference is to the first book of Xenagoras' Chronicle. The following section mentions the statue destroyed sc. in the fire of c. 391 B.C. - cf. infra). On the other hand the fourth Century representation of Athena Lindia differs from that of Athena of Soli in that the Rhodian goddess exchanged the helmet seen in earlier figurines for the polos (C. Blinkenberg and K. Kinch, Lindos: fouilles de l' Acropole i, Berlin '31 esp. 18 sq. and the commentary on nos. 2332 sq. and 2866 sq. The British Museum Catalogue does not show any Lindian coin with a portrait of Athena. The change in style of portraiture of Athena Lindia probably began with the reconstruction of the temple, destroyed by fire, in Fraser's opinion, c. 391 B.C. [PP vii, '52 197]). In portraiture the Athenas of Soli and Lindus had gone their separate ways by Alexander's day.

On the second point, whether Alexander played on any link between the Lindian and Soli Athenas, the balance of evidence suggests a negative answer: the death of Memnon of Rhodes earlier in 333 B.C. had removed a political obstacle to a settlement between Rhodes and Alexander, although Thymondas was still fighting on the Persian side. Furthermore Rhodes did cooperate with Alexander in 332, and ships from Soli and Rhodes served together on the Macedonian side at Tyre (A.ii, 20.2). Then after the battle of Gaugamela Alexander offered a sacrifice to Athena Lindia and sent weapons to be dedicated to Athena Lindia (Timachidas xxxviii [= Jacoby FGH 532], quoted by Hiller von Gärtringen RE Supplbd.v, 777, who gives other references). The Alexander Romance provides plenty of material to demonstrate the friendly relations between Alexander and Rhodes (P.M. Fraser, Alex. and the Rhodian Constitution PP vii, '52 192 sq. esp. 202 sq.). On the other hand this material is highly suspect, as Fraser has shown (loc.cit.), and one must set against it the tradition that Rhodes 'surrendered' to Alexander (C.R.iv, 5.9, cf. J. xi, 11; Curtius sets the surrender later than the involvement of Rhodes in the action at Tyre, but error may lie

in the chronology rather than the individual facts, alternatively the Rhodian ships at Tyre did not represent an official contingent under obligation to join Alexander. Cf. Badian (4) p.65 n.53). Then it is known that a garrison planted in Rhodes by Alexander was still there at the time of his death (D.S. xviii, 8.1; its historicity has been argued by Fraser loc.cit. and Badian loc.cit). In this context Alexander's actions at Soli were probably not designed as a public-relations operation to impress the Rhodians: the imposition of a fine and a garrison and the seizure of hostages would in any case appear as a threat. There is no evidence to show that any link between the Athena of Soli and the Lindian cult was exploited by Alexander when he occupied Soli. The conclusion is supported by the minor argument that exploitation of the link between Aesculapius and Cos, which was captured at the same time as Rhodes, is not attested.

We return to a consideration of Alexander's sacrifice at Soli in the wider context of his association with the goddess Athena. The association perhaps began when Alexander visited Athens after the Battle of Chaeronea (J. ix, 4.5; Kleiner 19); it was well established by Alexander's concern to pay honour to Athena Ilias (A.i, 11.7; Plut. Alex. 15,7; D.S. 18.1; F.W. Goethert and H. Schleif, Der Athenatempel von Ilion Berlin '62 34 sq.). He remembered Athena after the battle of Granicus (A.i, 16.7), and offered sacrifices to the goddess on numerous occasions, even after he had reached India (A.iv, 22.6 and 30.4; the evidence has been covered by numerous writers: suffice it to refer to Kleiner 18 sq. and Berve i, 85 sq.). Discussion has centred on three points in particular: first, whether Alexander exploited the connection between Macedonia and the cult name, Gygaie, of Athena Ilias (Lycophron Alex. 1141 sq.; 1152; Hdt.v, 21 and viii, 136); secondly whether the coupling of Nike with Athena on Alexander's coins was programmatic or commemorative (Kleiner op.cit. taking the latter line opposed by Bellinger Essays, 5 sq; the link between Minerva and Victoria at C.R.iv, 13. 15 and viii, 2.32 and 11.24 will require separate discussion at a later stage); thirdly, whether Alexander's choice of a Corinthian or Attic helmet for portraits of Athena signified an attempt to win favour in either Corinth or Athens (S. Perlman, Coins of Philip II and Alexander the Great NC n.s. v, '65 esp. 63 sq. argued that the figures on Alexander's gold coins, Athena in Corinthian helmet and winged Nike, were consciously taken from Athenian models, and employed as part of a general policy of conciliation towards the Greek world in general and towards Athens in particular).

However, to see Alexander's Athena from only one angle is clearly a mistake. Athena was on various occasions the goddess of the city concerned, be it Athens, Ilium, Priene, Soli, Magarsus or some other city. The parts added up to a collective deity who had meaning for different sections of people in his empire. The coins of Tarsus show an innovation in the portraiture of Athena, developing local traditions with the importation of alien elements. If the choice of helmet worried anyone, the answer was to include both an Attic and a Corinthian helmet on one coin. The imperial gold coins showed Athena Promachus with Corinthian helmet, perhaps under Athenian influence (cf. Bellinger Essays 3-6), but the figure was intended to be generally identifiable (the Athenians themselves were not consistent in the type of helmet given to Athena. The panathenaic prize amphorae produced during Alexander's era show Athena in a helmet that is sui generis, and it in time gave way to a 'baroque Corinthian' helmet [CVA (Brit. Museum) i, 3 pl. 3 1 and 2; pl.4 1, 2 and 3; J.D. Beazley Development of Attic Black-Figure, Univ. of California Press, '51 91 sq.]).

One must conclude that Alexander paid honour to the local goddess of Soli and in so doing brought her into the spectrum of his own pantheon; at the same time he was reinforcing his own well-publicized cult of Athena. One might say that the local goddess of Soli was to the satrapal Athena, as the satrapal Athena was to the imperial goddess, whilst the last mentioned incorporated i.a. the other two. Curtius' mention of her must be historical.

Appendix D The geography of the area around Issus

1. Issus, Castabalum and the Three Altars

None of these places has yet been conclusively identified. In the absence of definitive evidence we can only relate the ancient evidence to the reports of archaeologists, and make suggestions.

On receipt of news that Darius was at Sochi, a two day march from the 'Assyrian Gates' (sc. Belen Pass), Alexander consulted his officers and next day led his army off from Mallus (A. ii, 6.1) first to Issus (A. ii, 7.1; C.R. iii, 7.8; D.S. 32.4). Alexander continued on his way towards Darius' position in Syria (εἰς Συρίαν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνον: Plut. Alex. 20, 4; A. ii, 6.2 [with Schachermeyr P.507 n.116]; Callisthenes recorded it as the view of the native population: πυθόμενον (sc. τὸν Δαρσῆτον) παρὰ τῶν ἐγχωρίων προάγειν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ὡς ἐπὶ Συρίαν [Polyb. xii, 17.3; the ὡς reinforces the ἐπὶ without suggesting that Alexander feigned the intention to advance into Syria, cf. F. Krebs Die Präpositionen bei Polybius 18 and Pédech's commentary on Polybius xii ad loc., p.107] cf. C.R. 8.13). Alexander's route from Issus took him through a pass which he later had to recross before the battle (A. ii, 6.2 and 8. 1-2; Polyb. xii, 17.2; Plut. Alex. 20, 5; C.R. 8.23). He had reached Myriandrus south of Alexandria and was held up there by a storm when he heard that Darius had entered Cilicia behind him (A. ii, 6.2 alone mentions Myriandrus by name).

It appears that the army advanced from Mallus to Issus (or a place nearby) in three columns, as Parmenion had been sent ahead with numerous infantry and cavalry units (A. ii, 5.1), and Philotas perhaps led the rest of the cavalry independently to Issus (he was detached at Soli and sent across the Aleian Plain to the River Pyramus - A. ii, 5.8, cf. Strabo xiv, 5.17 676, who implies that the assembly point was Issus: Ἰσσοῦν πεδῖον δι' οὗ Φιλώτας διεήγαγεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὴν ἵππον, ἐκεῖνον τὴν φάλιγγα ἀγάγοντος ἐκ τῶν Σόλων διὰ τῆς παραλίας καὶ τῆς Μαλλώτιδος ἐπὶ τε Ἰσσοῦν καὶ τὰς Δαρσῆτου δυνάμεις.

In this case Philotas will have travelled via Mopsuestia [Misis]). Parmenion's task was to open up the route for Alexander, and this meant via the Kara Kapu Pass (cf. on 7.6), the shortest way to Issus.

If this is accepted, it must follow that the place where Parmenion and Alexander met up, Castabalum (C.R. 7.5), was not Castabala Hieropolis (Bodrun), pace A.H.M. Jones Cities 198. Castabalum should perhaps be equated with the place which is referred to in the Itineraries as Catabolo (Tabula Peutingeriana x, 4, Itinerarium Antonini 146, 1, Magie ii, 1153; Bauer JGAI ii, 1899, 123 sq.; C. Müller GGM i, 477 and 479; Ruge RE x, 2336. For the Tabula Peutingeriana see K. Miller Die Peutingersche Tafel reprinted by Brockhaus, Stuttgart '62; the relevant section is reproduced in an article by A.C. Levi and B. Trell in Archaeology xvii, '64 227 sq., esp. fig. 1). There is an error in the Tabula Peutingeriana: the coast road runs from Catabolo 5 miles (Roman miles, therefore c. 7.40 km.) to Issus, then only 6 miles (c. 8.88 km.) to 'Alexandria catisson', then 28 miles (c.41.44 km.) to 'Rosus' (modern Arsuz or Uluçinar). The distance between Issus and Alexandria (Iskenderon) was far more than 6 miles:

Xenophon says that it was a day's march or 5 parasangs from Issus to the Gates (the Merkes Su Pass, or Pillars of Jonas) which would be c.26.75 km, if one calculates 5.35 km. per parasang (Xen. An. i, 4.4; for the distance of the parasang R.D. Barnett JHS lxxxiii, '63 1 with E. Weidner Archiv für Orientforschung xvi, '52 19-20; some consider that the parasang was the average distance one might walk in an hour, a rough guide rather than a precise measurement); the distance from Saraseki, on the Merkes Su, to Alexandria was c. 11 km: a total distance therefore of c. 38 km. from Issus to Alexandria. Another error in the Tabula Peutingeriana seems to be that the junction of the Toprakkale road and the coast road is set at Alexandria, with Epiphania 30 miles from Alexandria (c.44.40 km.) on the Toprakkale road: it would seem impossible that two roads could have run south to Alexandria side by side. The obvious solution seems to be that the cartographer confused Alexandria with Nicopolis, the name which Alexander gave to Issus (not mentioned by the major sources on Alexander; Steph. Byz. referred to it in his Ethnica, schol. Dionys. Perieg. 118, RE ix, 2247. The city founded as Nicopolis was in fact near Islahiye: CIL iii, 6728), or more likely to the shrine which Alexander set up after the battle and which is referred to in the Stadiasmus Maris Magni 154-5 as 'Hieron' (C.Müller GGM 477-8; for Alexander's establishment of a shrine, or more correctly three altars, C.R. 12.27).

Combining this data with the archaeological evidence one might posit the following identifications: Epiphania (Geniandus) may have been on the site of Gösene (Güze Han) which is west of Erzin, c. 11km. south of Toprakkale and 48.2 km. from Alexandria (cf. Judeich, Issos 368 n.2). The earliest material unearthed by archaeologists is Roman, but it is assumed that Hellenistic material is overlaid (M.V. Seton Williams AS iv, '54 121 sq.; he considers the identification certain). Issus (Nicopolis) might then be identified with Kinet Hüyük, a site on the coast c. 7 km. north west of Dörtüol and c. 40 km. from Alexandria. Archaeological finds from this site span the Middle Bronze Age, Hellenistic and Roman eras (M. Seton Williams AS iv, '54 121 sq.). The distance between Kinet Hüyük and the Pillars of Jonas matches the measurement of Xenophon, 5 parasangs, c. 27 km, for the journey from Issus to the Pillars (An. i, 4.4). Castabalum may then be sited near Burnaz at Kara Hüyük, c. 7 km. SE of Erzin station and 15 km. S. of Toprakkale, where remains of the Early Bronze Age, Hittite and Iron Age periods have been found (M. Seton Williams, art cit. The strategic narrative and the distances offered by the itineraries preclude identification of Castabalum with the Kastabel ruins north east of Yumurtalik).

The Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum, a document of the fourth Century A.D., supports this identification for it gives 16 miles from Tardequeia, which seems to have been on the site Kürtkülak, to Catavolo and 17 miles from Catavolo to Baiae, that is Payas, (c. 24 and 25 km. respectively K. Miller Itineraria Romana '16 p.lxx, with Seton-Williams AS iv, '54 128).

Hieron, or the Three Altars, would then lie on or near the Deliçay, Rabaçay (c. 4.5 km. S. of the Deliçay) or perhaps even the Kuruçay, depending on which of these rivers is identified as the Pinarus. It is worth adding that the Stadiasmus Maris Magni set the distance by sea from the Cilician Gates - that is the Merkes Su Pass - to the Hieron as 120 stades, or c. 21.6 km, whilst Janke gives as the distance from the Pillars of Jonas to the Deliçay

21.4 km. (Stadiasmus §154 ap. C. Müller GGM i, 477; Janke (1) 62-3).

2. The Pinarus

The battle of Issus was fought across a river called the Pinarus by our Graeco-Roman sources (cf. 8.16), and scholars have been divided over its identification, most favouring the Deliçay and some the Payas. The Deliçay has been advocated by Janke, Judeich and Maj. General Fuller, and the Payas has found its best advocate in Commandant Bourgeois, whose 679 page manuscript on the battle of Issus is known to us through Dieulafoy's article.

The difficulties are compounded by the physical changes that may have occurred since 333 B.C. Thus it is possible that two other rivers, the Kuruçay and the Rabatçay, 6.5 and 2.25 km. south of the Deliçay respectively, might also be seriously considered, though the Kuruçay is, according to Janke ([1] 55), only a dry bed now and the Rabatçay is practically dry till after the snows have melted. They may have been more significant in Alexander's day. However the sources do not record that Darius sandwiched his army in between two rivers, which would suggest that Darius was not on the Rabatçay with the Deliçay in his rear (Freya Stark suggested the Kuruçay as a possibility, partly because it would reduce the distance which Alexander had to cover from his position on the morning of the battle: Alexander's Path from Caria to Cilicia London '58 p.6).

The earliest description we have of the Pinarus is Callisthenes', preserved in part by Polybius.

We should accept Polybius' word that Callisthenes failed to reconcile his geographical description of the battle area with the implications of the battle narrative. Callisthenes wrote that in the upper course of the Pinarus the banks were precipitous (ἐκρήγματα τῶν πλευρῶν 17.5, not 'gaps in the bank' as the Loeb translation has it; Polybius picks the description up again at 20.4: ἐκρήγματα .. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κοιλώμασι. With the ἐκρήγματα of the 17.5 compare Josephus AJ xiv, 15.5 422: ὄρεσι ἐξερωγῶσι); in the lower course the banks were sheer ridges difficult to climb (ἀποτόμους .. καὶ δυσβάτους λόφους; 17.5, cf. 22.4). Polybius clearly saw that Callisthenes' picture of the battle area did not square with his description of a cavalry battle across the river, Alexander's advance with a regular phalanx, and the advance of the Macedonian phalanx against the bank of the river on the Persian side (Polyb. xii, 18. 11-12; 20. 6-8; 22.4). Callisthenes' account of the terrain is surely, as Polybius saw, unreliable. In Arrian's account too there is perhaps a measure of exaggeration: certainly Arrian followed a source which dwelt on the geographical obstacles that Alexander had to overcome at various stages on his advance into Asia Minor (cf. for example A. i, 26.1, 27.1 and 5 sq., 28.2 and 4 sq., 29.1, ii, 18. 2 sq., and 26. 1 sq.). Arrian describes the river banks at two points in his narrative: Darius' army before the battle rested ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῖς ὄχθαις πολλαχῆ μὲν ἀποκρήμνοις οὔσαις, ἔστι δὲ ὄπου καὶ χάρακα παρατείνας (sc. ὁ Δαρεῖος) αὐταῖς, ἵνα εὐεφοδῶτερα ἐφαίνετο, οὕτως ἔμενον (ii, 10.1). Then he says that when the Macedonian phalanx tried to cross the river,

+ also known as the Kurudere

πολλαχῆ κρημνώδεσι ταῖς ὄχθαις ἐντυγχάνοντες τὸ μέτωπον
τῆς φάλαγγος οὐ δυνατοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει διασώσασθαι (10.5).

Janke argued that the details of the battle can be used to identify the Pinarus as the Deliçay and to exclude identification with the Payas. He observed that the Deliçay could have been crossed by Alexander's army even in the upper reaches (the 2 km. from Usudschulu to the Odschaklū bridge), where the banks of the river are only 2-3 m. high, according to Janke (1) p.56. The Payas, however, is very different, for its banks are perpendicular and c. 10.m. high in the upper stretch, rising to 20 m. in places and in the middle stretch, that is the 1.30 km. down to the bridge south of the Payas castle, the banks could not have been negotiated by troops in battle formation (Janke [1] 53 sq., and [2] 155 sq.). Janke estimated that only the last c. 1.15 km. of the river's course offered a suitable crossing point for troops in battle formation. When one allows for physical changes that may have occurred in the Payas valley since 333 B.C., it remains a valid point that the upper stretch of the Payas is deeply cut into the mountain slope and does not present the sort of terrain where the two armies could have contemplated charging across the river (cf. note on 11.1).

The width of the plain where the battle took place is a key issue and here too Callisthenes is of dubious assistance, though he alone offers a definite measurement. According to Polybius (17.4) he said that the plain was only fourteen stades (2.59 km.) wide where the battle took place. Janke gave the length of the Deliçay from the mouth to the point where it issues from the mountains as 7.5 km., but noted that the plain is effectively reduced to a width of c. 6 km. by the contour of the mountain east of Dörtyol (= Chak Mersin. Janke [1] 56 and 61). The width of the plain by the Payas is c. 4 km. ([1] 54). Callisthenes' figure fits neither case, and perhaps should not be taken too seriously: the height of the mountains c. 2,000 m. would have made the plain seem narrower to anyone who trusted to guesswork rather than measurement (cf. Janke (1) 54), furthermore the narrower the plain the more foolish Darius must appear as a tactician. We know that Darius' folly cost the lives of many Greeks who fought for him at Issus; we are told that the Greek mercenaries warned Darius against getting trapped; and it is clear that Callisthenes wrote at least in part for a Greek audience (Badian (1) 251). Thus Callisthenes' measurement of the width of the plain cannot be used to reject identification of the Pinarus as the Deliçay even though his figure is closer to the actual width of the Payas plain than to that of the Deliçay. It may be added that silting has widened the coastal plain since Callisthenes' day, particularly round the mouth of the Deliçay.

A convincing point against the Payas is the contour of the coast north of its mouth. Darius' right wing would have been in grave danger of being separated from the rest of the army and of being driven back into the sea (Janke [1] p. 72).

The identification of the river depends too on the identification of the 'iugum montis' to Darius' left, where units were stationed to outflank the Macedonian right (C.R. 8.27 and 9.10; A. ii, 8.7). Janke identified as the mountain mentioned by Curtius and Arrian a hillock c. 30 m. high at the eastern end of the plain to the south of the Deliçay, and north east of

Odschaklū. The hillock extends for c. 800 m. from east to west, and is protected to the south by a channel running east-west with walls c. 10-20 m. high (Janke [1] 61, [2] 165 sq.). It has been objected that this hillock is too low and could never have allowed the Persians to pose a threat to the Macedonian rear (Judeich, Issos p. 371). The Persian flank force might then have occupied positions on the mountainside to the east of Dörtyol. In Janke's view Arrian's description of this position was sufficient to exclude the Payas, for the projection of the foothills into the plain c. 2 km. south of the Payas is too small to accommodate any body of troops, and its northern flank merges into the plain above the middle course of the Payas and would not have allowed Persian troops to establish themselves behind and above the Macedonian lines (A. ii, 8.7; Janke (2) 165 sq.).

In the accounts of the movements of the two armies before the battle three figures are given for the distance between the two armies at different stages. First the armies were 100 stades apart for Polybius' version of Callisthenes reads πυθέσθαι τὴν Δαρείου παρουσίαν εἰς Κιλικίαν ἑκατον ἀπέχοντα σταδίου ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, διαπεπορευμένον ἤδη τὰ στενά (xii, 19.4). Janke suggested that this meant that Alexander had already cleared the Pillars of Jonas on his way back north when Darius was reported 100 stades (c. 18.5 km) away ([1] p.63). Janke thought that the Deliçay was the Pinarus, and his interpretation of Polybius was a prop for his theory, as the Pillars of Jonas are c. 21.40 km. from the Deliçay. However, his interpretation is invalid for the phrase διαπεπορευμένον ἤδη τὰ στενά should be taken closely with the following sentence: διόπερ ἔξ ὑποστροφῆς πάλιν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῶν στενῶν κτλ. (19.5), in other words Alexander was south of the Herkes Su Pass, that is south of the Pillars of Jonas too, when he received the report that Darius was 100 stades to the north; then Alexander recrossed the Pass and came considerably closer to Darius than 100 stades. But rejection of Janke's interpretation of Polybius 19. 4-5 does not mean that the Deliçay has to be discounted. In the first place it is clear that if the distance between the two armies was falsified for dramatic effect it would have been shortened rather than lengthened. Thus the 100 stades probably reflects the minimum rather than maximum distance.

Secondly we are told that Alexander received in Myriandrus news of Darius' arrival in Issus (A.ii, 7.2); scouts were sent to establish the enemy position and to establish whether Darius was with the army (A. ii, 7.2 with C.R. 8.17). Polybius' version seems to reflect the report from the reconnaissance mission: a distance was established and it was ascertained that Darius was there in person (τὴν Δαρείου παρουσίαν). It is possible that Polybius-or Callisthenes - ran together the Myriandrus report and the report made by the reconnaissance party. Further we can see that, if Alexander had been told in Myriandrus that Persian troops had entered Cilicia via the Toprakkale Pass, he could not afford to let the Persians occupy both the coastal defile at the Pillars of Jonas and the Belen Pass. He must have marched north towards the Pillars of Jonas without waiting for detailed information on the enemy units at Issus. Thus his distance from Darius would first have been established as he, on marching north, met up with his reconnaissance party.

Those who were sent by sea to spy on the Persians apparently returned before Alexander retook the Gates (A. ii, 7.2; 8.2 mentions the reoccupation of the heights of the Pillars of Jonas; Curtius' reference at 8.23 is vague, q.v.).

The 100 stades (18.5 km.) might represent the distance between the Deliçay and Alexander's camp just south of the Pillars of Jonas, which were c. 21.4 km. from the Deliçay.

The reconnaissance party travelling by boat may have miscalculated the land distance, but Callisthenes is unreliable in the other distance which he gives (for the width of the plain). It is more likely that the distance between the two armies was reduced for dramatic effect than that it was exaggerated. Thus the Deliçay remains a possibility.

The next figure to be considered comes in Polybius' analysis of Callisthenes' account of how Alexander disposed his troops as he approached the Persian position: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησι μετωπηδὸν ἄγειν τὴν δύναμιν, ἀπέχοντα τῶν πολεμίων περὶ τεττάρηκοντα σταδίους (xii, 20.1). Polybius takes this to mean that Alexander's army advanced 16 deep for the 40 stades, and he clearly understood that μετωπηδὸν applied to this second stage in the deployment of the phalanx, and not to the whole section from when Alexander had his men change from marching in column to a line thirty-two deep (on which Polyb. xii, 19.6; A. ii, 8.2; Wallbank, in a note on Polyb. 20.2, assumes that Polybius misread Callisthenes, but it is clear that Callisthenes' account of the battle was inaccurate and inconsistent; there is no compelling reason why one should accuse Polybius of misrepresenting Callisthenes). To advance any distance with a phalanx in battle order was, as Polybius saw, odd: at Gaugamela Alexander set his men in battle positions when the armies were closer than 30 stades (A. iii, 9.3). However at Issus there were reasons why the battle line should have been disposed at an early stage: the Persian advance guard was south of the Pinarus, the flank-guard on Alexander's right posed a threat, and there was a psychological advantage to be gained from using the narrow plain to exaggerate the size of the Macedonian front.

If Callisthenes is to be trusted the identification of the Pinarus will depend on our finding an area where Alexander could have advanced for 40 stades (c. 7.4 km.) in battle formation. The Payas seems to be excluded: c. 2 km. south of the Payas a spur of the mountain narrows the plain to c. 1.5 km. and c. 4 km. south of the Payas one stands on the hill of the Eski Ras Payas which drops down into the long coastal defile leading to the Pillars of Jonas (Janke [1] 72; [2] 150 sq.).

C. 1 km. north of the Payas the plain narrows again, to c. 2.5 km. By the Kuruçay stream, c. 6.50 km. from the Deliçay, the plain widens to c. 3.5 km. The plain continues to widen, and the Rabatçay, c. 4.25 km. north of the Kuruçay is, according to Janke easy to wade, and could have been dry at the time of the battle (Janke [1] 55).

This argument then supports the Deliçay, but is admittedly weak.

The other figure mentioned in the sources is 30 stades (c. 5.5 km.) as Diodorus and Curtius both record that Alexander received a report on Darius' position at this distance from the Persian lines (D.S. 33.1 and C.R. 8.24). If this detail is historical, it may indicate the point at which the redeployment of the infantry to eight men deep took place. This would have been possible if Alexander was approaching the Deliçay, and not the Payas, for the hill c. 2 km. south of the Payas reduces the width of the plain to c. 1.5 km (Janke (1) 72; this point was ignored by Dieulafoy though he argued that Alexander advanced more than 7 km. to the Payas with a front of at least 1.7 km. (p.26)).

Linked with these references to distances is the general problem of how far Alexander could have marched with his army and still have fought the battle before sunset. If Arrian's dating of the battle to November is accepted the time of sunrise and sunset at Issus can be fixed. The major imponderables are the time one should allow for the battle itself and the time one should allow for each deployment. One shrinks from voicing an opinion on military matters 'am grünen Tisch' (note the scathing comments of Colonel Janke (2) esp. 151 sq.), thus I have tabulated in Appendix F the views of men who have analysed this battle with some experience of what is militarily feasible. Janke and Fuller, it will be seen, lend their auctoritas to the view that Alexander could have marched from the Merkes Su Pass to the Deliçay in a day in time to fight the battle before sunset.

It is thus possible that the Deliçay was the scene of the battle: both armies could have reached the river within the time limits indicated by the sources. The Deliçay fits the battle narrative, whereas the Payas does not fit the picture because of the contour of the coast immediately north of the Payas, the difficult terrain in the upper stretch of its course, and the absence of a ridge that would have enabled the Persians to threaten the Macedonian rear.

The position of Castabalum, Issus and the Three Altars likewise makes the Deliçay the more likely candidate. Finally it appears that when Darius learnt of Alexander's line of march from Issus, he chose the battle site (A. ii, 7.1 and 8.5), and one must ask why, if he chose the Payas, he did not secure the Merkes Su Pass too: there is no record of Macedonian casualties in the passage of the coastal defile. This is a minor point but supports the contention that Darius was not as far south as the Payas.

C.R. iii, ll.15: equi pariter equitesque Persarum, serie lamnarum grave agmen, ob id genus pugnae, quod celeritate maxime constat, aegre moliebantur

Curtius is here describing the type of cavalry known as 'cataphract'. This passage must be considered alongside that at iv, 9.3. The circumlocutions employed by Curtius have a bearing on Curtius' dates: see Introduction pp.xxii.

The origins and development of cataphract cavalry have been much discussed (the article by J.W. Eadie, The development of the Roman mailed cavalry JRS lvii, '67 161 sq. gives some of the references) but the evidence is scattered and scrappy.

With regard to the Achaemenid army before Alexander's day we learn from Herodotus that the cavalry commander Masistiis wore a breastplate of scale armour under his purple tunic (θώρηκα... χρύσειον λεπιδωτόν , Hdt. ix, 22; the type of armour may perhaps be illustrated by the pieces of scale armour found at Persepolis: some scales were backed with loops through which leather straps could be threaded [Herzfeld Iran 266-7 and fig. 371], others were perforated for attachment to material or leather).

Xenophon gives a description of armoured cavalry in Cyrus' army (An. i, 8.6 sq.), for Cyrus had a force of 600 cavalry armed with swords and javelins (i, 8.7 and 3), wearing breastplates, helmets and thigh-pieces (παραμηρίδια), and their horses were protected by chamfrons and poytrels (προμετωπίδια and προστερνίδια; the προμετωπίδιοις frequently seen in Assyrian art, according to D. Opitz, Ein altorientalisches Pferdebild, in Miscellanea Orientalia dedicata Antonio Deimel Rome '35 esp. 262 but the example which he discusses seems doubtful. Poytrels were frequently depicted in pre-Achaemenid art: R. Ghirshman Fouilles de Sialk Paris ii, '39 p.63 with Pl.xxx, 5 [a cylinder seal from B. Necropolis dated to c. 1000-800 B.C., and pp. 108-9 with fig. 13. The rider incidentally brandishes a sword or long dagger]; Lefèvre des Noëtttes L' attelage vol.ii, figs. 19-27; in vol.i, p. 39-40, he suggests that the poytrel was ornamental as well as functional, or merely ornamental, but not a protective covering.

Xenophon elsewhere mentions trappers and thigh-pieces [παραπλευρίδια and παραμηρίδια ; Cyrop. vi, 4.1 and vii, 1.12] but he mentions them with chariot horses and saddle-horses respectively, so that they are not relevant to our discussion and furthermore with Xenophon one must distinguish his historical descriptions from his theoretical pictures [cf. J.K. Anderson, Notes on some points in Xenophon's περί ἵπικῆς JHS lxxx, '60 p.8]. Cyrus' cavalry horses in this account were not protected by trappers. Trappers were depicted on chariot horses and the horses of mounted archers and lancers in the reliefs from the Palace of Ashurbanipal (668-626 B.C.) in Nineveh, but the material was probably leather rather than mail (R.D. Barnett Assyrian Palace Reliefs London '60 pl. 108; J.A.H. Potratz Pferdetrensen pl. xli, fig.91; Lefèvre des Noëtttes L' attelage i, p.39 and ii, fig.24). There is little in common between the Assyrian mounted lancer and Cyrus' heavy cavalry.

Cyrus' armoured cavalry was armed with javelins (παλτά, Xen. An.i, 8.3) and the cavalry sabre, termed 'the Greek machaera' (67; A.M. Snodgrass Arms and Armour of the Greeks '67 97 and 109). The force of 600 men was not immediately engaged but held back till decisive action was necessary to prevent encirclement. They charged, and presumably hurled their javelins and then apparently engaged in close combat (66 24-26). It appears from Xenophon's account that Cyrus regarded the sabre as his 'secret weapon'.

At Persepolis many scales of armour belonging to the Achaemenid period have been discovered, and it has been suggested that some of the larger pieces may have come from horse armour (.E.F. Schmidt (1) ii, 97 sq. and esp. 100). Thus Curtius may be right that Darius' cavalry horses wore armour. However Curtius' reference to 'cataphracts' has to be qualified by points that emerge from the literary sources: from Arrian's account of the battle of the Granicus it emerges that the Persian cavalry was armed with sabres (i, 15.7, κοπίς), and that the riders and the horses were vulnerable to lance thrusts in their faces (A.i, 16.1), no doubt because they were armed with javelins rather than lances (D.S. 20.3 and A.i, 15.2; or they had lances that were too short, cf. D.S. 53.1, but this is less likely). Thus the cavalry seems to have been much the same in style as Cyrus'. Arrian's version of the battle of Issus includes reference to the weight of armour of the Persian cavalrymen (ii, 11.3), but does not confirm Curtius' statement that the horses were heavily armoured. When Curtius deals with Darius' preparation of a new military machine, he apparently includes in the list of novelties: equitibus equisque tegumenta erant ex ferreis lamminis serie inter se conexas (iv, 9.3). Did he, therefore, anticipate the appearance of cataphracts at Gaugamela in his account of Issus? The similarity of phraseology makes this more likely than that he copied different sources on the two battles. Further Arrian's account of Gaugamela shows that Darius had a new tactical force a unit of Scythian cavalry, armoured and riding armoured horses (iii, 13.4; the Massagetae of C.R. iv, 12.7 and 15.2. The Massagetae and Chorasmians were displaced by Alexander's conquests, and in migrating they merged with the Sarmatians; the product was a style of cataphract warfare that Roman forces encountered when the Sarmatian Roxolani raided into Moesia in A.D. 62 and then 69 [Tac. Hist. i, 79 who refers to a 'tegimen ferreis lamminis aut praeduro corio consortum'; B. Rubin Hist. iv, '55, 264 sq.; T. Sulmirski, The forgotten Sarmatians, in Vanished Civilizations ed. E. Bacon, London '63 esp. 289-290]).

Thus it is unlikely that the Persian cavalry on Darius' right at Issus was cataphract. Developments in cavalry warfare in the Hellenistic period seem to have influenced Curtius' description, and no doubt he knew the story of Roman clashes with Parthians.

When Roman troops went into action against Tigranes' cataphracts at Tigranocerta in 69 B.C., two points about their equipment attracted special notice: first, the riders were so well armoured that only their legs and thighs were exposed and their horses were decked out in scale armour (Plut. Luc. 28, 4 and Sallust [Hist. iv, 64 (M)] says of the cataphract horses sc. at Tigranocerta: equis paria operimenta erant, nam <que> linteo ferreas laminas in modum plumae adnexuerant, cf. J.xli, 2.10: munimentum ipsis equisque loricae plumatae sunt quae utrumque toto corpore tegunt); secondly the cataphracts depended on lances (μὲν γὰρ ἀλκὴ τῶν καταφράκτων κοντός, Plut. Luc. 28, 3). Tigranes depended on his 17,000 catphracts to play a major rôle in the battle (26, 7 and 28, 2). These troops

were heavy and could not easily redirect their line of action and thus were vulnerable to an oblique attack, and this brought Lucullus victory.

The Parthian cataphracts who fought at Carrhae were similarly armed with lances, and the horses may have been protected by trappers, for it is recorded that Gauls attacked the horses by darting underneath to stab them in the belly (Plut. Crassus 25,8).

Curtius' account of the cavalry action on the Persian right appears to be inaccurate, and the explanation would seem to be that Curtius anticipated details of the Persian army at Gaugamela, and that he inserted into the story anachronistic elements.

Appendix F: The Sequence of events on the day of the battle according to modern writers

In the following table I have set down in schematic form the theories of Dieulafoy, Judeich (Issos), Janke ((2) 151) and Fuller, to show the range of possibilities advanced by modern authorities who have considered what would be militarily feasible. The divergence of their conclusions counsels caution, but three of the four identified the Pinarus as the Deliçay, and even Dieulafoy's scheme could be modified to allow the same identification.


In the left-hand column the distances are indicated, but whilst these represent the generally agreed figures, the distance between Myriandrus and the Pillars of Jonas, is not known for certain, as the site of Myriandrus has not yet been positively identified.

These four writers follow the sources in assuming that Darius left Sochi some time before Alexander arrived in Myriandrus. Beloch developed a contrary theory that the two armies were for a while camped either side of the Belen Pass, till Darius took the initiative (his theory rested particularly on Aesch. c.Ctesiphon. 164, C.R. iii, 7. 8-10, and A. ii, 6.1, where Δαρείου στρατοπέδου is interpreted as meaning that Darius 'angelangt sei' in Sochi [Griech Gesch. iii, 2 362-3]; Beloch's theory was refuted by Judeich, Issos 360 n.1, Keil Mitt. Verein. klass. Phil. Wien '24 15 sq., and Wilcken, p.106 n.1).

Dieulafoy (63 [23]) offers the following information on the hours of sunrise and sunset in the area of the battle:


	First light	Sunrise	Sunset	Last light
1st Nov.	5.13 a.m.	6.42 a.m.	5.18 p.m.	6.47 p.m.
15th Nov.	5.24 a.m.	6.55 a.m.	5.5. p.m.	6.36 p.m.
30th Nov.	5.33 a.m.	7.6 a.m.	4.54 p.m.	6.27 p.m.

	Dieulafoy	Janke (2) 151	Judeich	Fuller
	10 th Nov. Evening: Darius entered Issus			
	10/11 Nov. Night: Alex. entered Myriandrus			
	11 Nov. a.m.: Maced. runner told of Darius' advance Reconnaissance ship went to Darius' camp and back - max. distance 56-64km. in 8 hrs.	[11/12 Nov]: Alex. left Myriandrus on night-march to		
	p.m. council of war 10 p.m.-midnight: Alex. moved to position S. of the Pillars of Jonas			
27km.	12 Nov. 5.30(+) ^{a.m.} : advance party set off via Pillars of Jonas to Merkes Su Pass			midnight: Alex. seized the Pillars 5.30 ^{a.m.} : Alex. left the Pillars
30km.	6.30/7 a.m.: first troops at N. exit of the Pass.		p.m.: Alex. took the Pass	
	10.30 a.m.: tailenders through the Pass. 1 st . Deployment 11 a.m.: 2 nd Deployment			
31.6km.	3 rd Deployment - to 8 deep. 40 stades from Darius			
35km.	noon: 4 th Deployment Cavalry to the wings (A ii, 8.9)	Eski Ras Payas 6.30 a.m.: Alex. left Eski Ras Payas	p.m.: Alex. c. 100 stades from Darius camped on slopes of Eski Ras Payas c. 6.30 a.m.: Alex. left Eski Ras Payas	c. 4.8 km. N. of the Pass - deployment - A.ii, 8.2.
37.5km.	c. 1.30 p.m.: 5 th Deployment (A.ii, 9.2 sq). Advance 1+ km. 6 th Deployment - completed by 2 - 2/30/3 p.m.			
39km.	PAYAS - battle fought 5 p.m. Sunset; 6.30 p.m. total darkness	Alex. rested by the Payas		
42km.		8 a.m.: Alex. reached Kurudere	Deployment to line 32 deep S. of Kurudere c 40 stades from Darius	
44km.			Alex. on slopes nr. Bubacay	
49km.		9.30 a.m.: Alex. reached Delicay 12.30-1.30 p.m.: BATTLE BEGAN	2 p.m. BATTLE BEGAN	2.30 p.m.: Alex. reached Delicay 4 p.m.: BATTLE BEGAN

Cities

Anc.	Mod.
Tyana	= Kemerhisar
Cybistra	= Eregli
Soli	= Mezitli
Corycus	= Kizkalesi
Magarsus	= Karatas
Mopsuestia	= Misis
Alexandreia	= Iskenderon
Rhosus	= Arsuz
Castabalum?	= Kara Hüyük
Issus	? = Kinet Hüyük
Aegaeae	= Yumurtalik
= means 'on or near the site of'	

Road


 denotes modern road from Pozanti to Tarsus.

Rivers

Anc.	Mod.
Cydnus	= Tarsus Su
Sarus	= Seyhan
Pyramus	= Ceyhan
Pinarus ?	? = Delicay

Passes

Cilician Gates (C.R. 4.2)	= Gülekboğazi
'iter saltus' (C.R. 7.6.	= Kara Kapu
	= Amanic Gates - Strabo xiv, 5.19).
Amanic Gates (C.R. 8.13)	= Toprakkale
Syrian Gates (Pliny)	}= Belen
Assyrian Gates (A)	



ISSUS & THE PINARUS