Exploring attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, South Africa

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DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

Signature:_____ Date:_____

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ABSTRACT

Earlier studies conducted in South Africa suggest that negative attitudes towards immigrants are widespread and driven by resource strain, issues around national identity, and the process of 'othering'. This study uses data from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study, with a representative sample of young adults (n=2915), in order to explore attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town. Using a series of vignettes, that is, descriptions of situations in which the details are varied systematically, the researcher examines the extent to which the nationality and individual circumstances of immigrants affect support for deportation or the legitimacy of illegal direct action against them. The results indicate that although attitudes towards immigrants are generally negative, among young Adults in Cape Town, they are not monolithic. To some extent, immigrants' characteristics and circumstances affect attitudes towards them. This differentiation suggests some aspects of causality, but only indirectly. The discussion of the results illuminates the importance of considering other factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants, such as a respondent's labour market position and income, educational background and individual demographic characteristics. Evidence suggests that negative attitudes are not associated closely with any social or economic characteristics or the respondent, that is, negative attitudes are not especially pronounced in any particular economic, demographic or social group. This is somehow linked to the fact that manipulating the characteristics of the subject in the vignette has effects on respondents' attitudes. Evidence from a complementary qualitative study, using semi-structured interview techniques in five neighbourhoods in Cape Town (n=13), supported the argument that attitudes towards immigrants are generally negative, and are affected by the social milieu in which people are situated. The researcher concludes that further research, on the effect of manipulating the racial background and economic status of immigrants, could benefit from a more holistic ethnographic approach, which enables an expanded and more nuanced understanding of factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants.

ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CAPS	Cape Area Panel Study
CSSR	Centre for Social Science Research
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
EA	Enumerating Area
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW	Human Rights Watch
PSU	Primary Sampling Unit
R	Rand
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SAPS	South African Police Services
SASAS	South African Social Attitude Surveys
SSU	Social Survey Unit
USA	United States of America

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of democratic government in South Africa, in 1994, a number of studies (McDonald, 1998; Morris, 1998; Dobson and Oelofse, 2000; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Landau *et al*., 2005; Crush *et al*., 2008; Everatt, 2010; Misago *et al*., 2010) have found evidence of hostility towards African immigrants. The findings from these studies suggest that attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries are generally negative.

South African media reports explain the causal factors of the negative attitudes in relation to apartheid – the country's divisive and exclusionary past[1] – competition for limited economic resources[2], poor service delivery[3], and poor migration policies and strategies that fail to control the country's borders[4]. Some researchers (Neocosmos, 2008; Misago, 2009; Misago *et al.*, 2010) have argued that the negative attitudes towards immigrants derive from the micro-politics of the country's townships, compounded by the lack of institutional structures, state patronage, and leadership. Qualitative studies of the attitudes towards immigrants tend to be case studies of neighbourhoods with high levels of economic deprivation, most notably urban black informal settlements[5] and townships. Factors that relate to the formation of attitudes towards immigrants, coming out of these studies, focus on a culture of violence – as a means of solving social problems – that prevails in most urban black informal settlements and townships.

[1] "All of South Africa is guilty" *City Press* 17 May 2008

[2] "Editorial: Days of shame" *Mail and Guardian* 16 May 2008

[3] Ibid.

[4] "Pushed to the limit" *The Witness* 23 May 2008

[5] An informal settlement, also known as a squatter neighbourhood, is an unplanned, high-density residential area, which consists of shacks.

The violence so prevalent in South Africa can be traced back to the apartheid government's repression and legislated inequalities of resources and opportunities, as a result social services – education, employment, housing and infrastructure development – are highly politicised (Hamber, 1998). In post-apartheid South Africa, rapid urbanisation, which is partly a result of rural to urban migration, has exacerbated social problems – such as crime and poverty – in the cities. The mushrooming of large urban informal settlements makes policing of illegal activities in these sprawling unplanned settlements very difficult, and, as a result, crime and violence are rife there.

Although South Africa is a middle-income country, the majority of black South Africans are poor. Inequality and poverty along racial lines became entrenched during the apartheid era of separate development. Sixteen years after the advent of democracy, black South Africans are still experiencing the effects of a long history of the unequal distribution of economic and social resources. Poverty and social inequality are endemic, in black neighbourhoods, and some researchers (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000, Everatt, 2010) argue that immigrants present more economic threat to black South Africans. Attitude surveys conducted in South Africa appear to counter these findings as the basis for negative attitudes towards immigrants. The findings of these surveys suggest that attitudes towards immigrants are similar across class, income levels and race (Mattes *et al*., 1999; Crush *et al*., 2008). Generally, South Africans exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants – particularly immigrants from other African countries (McDonald *et al*., 2000) – and they exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants compared to citizens of other countries with comparable data (Crush and Pendleton, 2004).

1.1 The Use of Vignettes in the Study of Attitudes towards Immigrants

Although numerous studies explore attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, a search of the literature found no evidence that any of these studies made use of 'vignettes' as a research technique. Vignettes are a useful technique for the study of attitudes where responses are vulnerable to being tainted by anticipation of what is socially desirable or where context – economic, cultural, political or social – matters. According to Alexander and Becker (1978:94), vignettes are "short descriptions of a person or a social situation which contain precise references to what are thought to be the most important factors in the decision-making processes of respondents".

For many years, researchers have argued that abstract questions – typical of opinion surveys – are subject to unreliable and biased self-reports (Nosanchuk, 1972; Alexander and Becker, 1978; Finch, 1987). Researchers espouse the use of vignettes – for the study of attitudes – as a means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of respondents' opinions. For this reason, vignettes have been used in studies of kin relationships (Finch, 1989), racism (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993), civil liberties (Gibson and Gouws, 2003), and attitudes towards immigrants (Harell, Soroka and Andrew, 2011), to mention but a few.

In this study, the researcher uses vignettes as an alternative method of exploring attitudes towards immigrants. By varying the characteristics used in the descriptions, the vignettes make it possible for the researcher to analyse the effects on people's judgements.

1.2 A Brief Overview of the Study

There is an emerging trend of using both qualitative and quantitative data in social research. Surveys have weaknesses as well as strengths, by mixing qualitative with quantitative methods; a researcher can address some of the weaknesses of survey research. Therefore, this study has adopted a two-pronged approach in order to explore the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town. This study makes use of data collected through the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (henceforth CAPS 2009). This wave contained a new module, which used vignettes to probe attitudes toward immigrants. Complementary data from individual interviews, which formed part of a neighbourhood study in newly built low-income formal housing projects – in Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley informed this study.

1.2.1 Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to explore the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town. The researcher builds on the foundation laid by existing studies, but uses vignettes as a possible means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of the respondents' attitudes towards immigrants.

1.2.2 Aims of the Study

The aims of this study are:

a. To explore the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town,
b. To investigate the impact of manipulating an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances – thought to influence attitude formation – on attitudes towards immigrants, and
c. To describe the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in a way that captures both the scale and the real experiences of South Africans living in Cape Town.

1.2.3 Defining the Research Questions

In order to contribute towards understanding attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, this study answers the following questions:

a. What is the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town?
b. What characteristics and circumstances of an individual immigrant affect support for deportation or looting among young adults in Cape Town?
c. Which group of respondents, in Cape Town, exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants?

1.3 Outline of Chapters

The introductory chapter highlights the focus of the study. The following five chapters discuss the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants. The appendix also includes a description of the study site, an outline of the data used in the study, and a description of the method of data collection.

Chapter two presents the review of the theoretical literature, which seeks to explain attitude formation about immigrants. This includes the background to the situation in post-apartheid South Africa.

In chapter three, the researcher uses vignettes to explore the respondents' support for the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. This chapter describes two vignettes, comprising short stories about immigrants, which manipulate an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances in order to explore the extent to which these affect the respondents' support for the deportation of immigrants.

Chapter four addresses the issue of looting, or the use of violence against immigrants who operate small businesses in townships. One vignette explores the moral codes that inform the respondents' judgements, for or against, looting of the business of a specific national and of a trader whose nationality is unspecified.

Chapter five introduces thirteen home-owners from the new public housing projects in five areas of Cape Town (Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley). This chapter builds on the analysis provided in chapters three and four, but the focus shifts to analysing attitudes towards, and perceptions of, immigrants in an area that has undergone racial restructuring in post-apartheid Cape Town.

The final chapter offers concluding remarks, and the implications the findings have on the direction of future research.

CHAPTER 2: ATTITUDE FORMATION IN CONTEXT – A LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter forms the literature review for this study. The discussion focuses on the theories, which offer explanations about the formation of attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, and considers evidence from other countries. The theories illustrate the effect of the economic, political and social contexts on public opinion towards immigrants.

2.1 Attitudes towards Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, incidents of anti-immigrant protests in predominantly black urban townships and informal settlements, in the media, have prompted researchers to examine the factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. Local evidence of a variety of attitudes towards immigrants, at individual, community and national levels, are from qualitative and quantitative studies (Minnaar and Hough, 1996; McDonald *et al.*, 1998; Dodson and Oelofse, 2000; McDonald *et al.*, 2000; Landau *et al.*, 2005; Landau, 2008; Pillay *et al*., 2008; Crush *et al*., 2010; Everatt, 2010; Misago *et al.*, 2010).

2.1.1 The Content and Causes of Attitudes towards Immigrants in South Africa

A number of qualitative studies have focused on exploring attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. Their findings have been broadly similar, focusing on resource strain, national identity and processes of 'othering'.

In 1998, Morris profiled the lives of twenty Congolese and Nigerian immigrants living in Johannesburg. The study investigated the problems, which faced the immigrants, and described and analysed their interactions with South Africans. Morris suggests that the increase in documented and undocumented immigration coming into South Africa in the years following the advent of democracy, taken in a context of scarce resources, has seen increased negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Dodson and Oelofse (2000) conducted a series of interviews with immigrants and South African nationals in Mizamoyethu, an informal settlement in Hout Bay, Cape Town. The findings from this study suggest that, while social and cultural differences are straining neighbourhood relations, attitudes towards immigrants and the related violence are a result of competition for scarce resources, such as employment and housing.

Both Morris (1998) and Dodson and Oelofse (2000) found that competition for employment, housing and services is grounded in the national discourse on immigration, which fuels negative attitudes towards immigrants and the related violence – findings supported in other studies (Maharaj and Rajkurmar, 1997; McDonald, Mashike and Golden, 1999; Sinclair, 1999).

A study by Reitzes and Bam (2000) on Mozambican residents in Winterveld, found that negative attitudes towards immigrants, and the related violence, was even targeted against immigrants who had lived in South Africa for many years, and who were embedded in the local culture. The authors note a shift in attitudes towards immigrants after the advent of democracy. As a focal point of national identity, immigration issues are used to create a scapegoat for the ills of post-apartheid South Africa. In the absence of the racial 'other', immigrants are blamed for social, economic and political problems of the country.

Sensationalist media and an overtly exclusionary political discourse reflect the growth of negative attitudes towards immigrants. Danso and McDonald (2001) reviewed the South African English press from 1994 onwards, and concluded that the media was largely anti-immigrant, and non-critical in reporting on immigration issues. Published material was predominately sensationalist, reproducing statistics and assumptions, and negatively stereotyping immigrants – particularly those from other African countries. These stereotypes include framing immigrants as criminals, illegal and job takers. Several high-profile politicians and public figures have also added their voices to the negative discourse, as has been discussed by various authors (Croucher, 1998; McDonald *et al*., 2000).

While negative attitudes towards immigrants are evident from qualitative case studies of specific neighbourhoods (Dolan, 1995; Maharaj and Rajkumar, 1997; Morris, 1998; Sinclair, 1999; Reitzes and Bam 2000; Dodson and Oelofse, 2000) quantitative studies show the extent of these negative attitudes.

2.1.2 The Scope of Negative Attitudes in South Africa

The growing evidence of negative attitudes towards immigrants and the limited scope of previous research prompted the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP henceforth) to commission a national survey of South Africans' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues. The SAMP has conducted public opinion surveys on South African immigration attitudes; national surveys in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe; and surveys with immigrants in South Africa. The results of these studies are published in several reports (Reitzes and Crawhall, 1997; McDonald *et al*., 1998; Mattes *et al*., 1999; McDonald *et al*., 1999; Crush, 2000; Crush and Pendleton, 2004; Crush *et al*., 2008).

The SAMP survey series showed four key trends. Firstly, that negative attitudes towards immigrants are widespread (Crush *et al*., 2008). Although attitudes that favour restricting immigration do not automatically imply negative attitudes towards immigrants, in South Africa, nationalist attitudes go along with negative attitudes towards immigrants. Secondly, South Africans show greater hostility compared to other countries for which data are available (Crush and Pendleton, 2004). Thirdly, intolerance has risen since 1994, supporting the claims made in qualitative studies. Lastly, there is no profile for people who exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants, as attitudes cut across age, gender, income level and race (Mattes *et al*., 1999; Crush, 2000; Crush *et al*., 2008).

The SAMP surveys largely confirm the assessments and conclusions from local case studies with rigorous and nationally representative data. The surveys provide a description of negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues in South Africa. However, noticeably lacking in the literature on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, are the factors that underlie differences in attitudes at the local level, in particular, in relation to specific characteristics and circumstances of an individual immigrant. Even qualitative studies have taken a scientific and materialistic position, preferring to list causes, without testing the various hypotheses thought to cause negative attitudes towards immigrants.

2.1.3 A Brief Overview of the Comparative Literature

Comparative research provides an array of findings related to attitude formation about immigrants. One point of convergence, however, is that immigrant sentiments across Western countries are generally negative. In both Europe and in the United States of America (USA henceforth), evidence suggests that the underlying predictors of individual attitudes towards immigrants are the same. The main explanatory factors of attitude formation relate to the economic or cultural threat that immigrants pose to nationals.

Findings from much of the previous work on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues in Europe and the USA, is mainly quantitative and can be divided into two broad categories. A number of studies have found that race and ethnicity affect the formation of opinion about immigrants (Berg, 2009; Rocha *et al*., 2011). Another body of literature focuses on those factors that influence individual perceptions of the economic impact (both negative and positive) of immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Citrin *et al*., 1997; Hood and Morris, 1998). A review of the underpinnings of these two broad theoretical perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the analysis in the following chapters.

With regards to the economic threat, attitudes towards immigrants are the result of increased competition for scarce resources like jobs, government benefits and housing (Citrin *et al*., 1997). The economic threat hypotheses have been investigated at both the macro and individual level. At the macro level, findings suggest that when an economy is performing poorly, people are expected to be more hostile towards immigrants because competition for scarce resources, like jobs, is greater (Palmer, 1996). This is compounded by the number of immigrants in a neighbourhood (Hood and Morris, 1998). Quillian (1995) tested this argument and found support for it in the European context. Other research has found similar relationships between the state of the economy, levels of immigration and negative attitudes towards immigrants in the United States (Citrin *et al*., 1997) and in Canada (Palmer, 1996).

Individual-level evidence is somewhat mixed. The expectation is that people who are in direct competition for jobs, government benefits and housing with immigrants will exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants. Citrin *et al*. (1997) found that those with less education are often generally more hostile towards immigrants. However, Wilkes *et al*. (2008) found that the impact of economic factors did not vary with economic status. People tended to prefer higher-skilled immigrants, regardless of their personal situation (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010) – a finding at odds with the direct competition hypothesis, since that would suggest that highly skilled individuals would be threatened by highly skilled immigrants.

There is also a growing body of work suggesting that an individual's personal economic situation is wholly unrelated to his or her attitude towards immigrants (e.g. Citrin and Slides, 2008; Citrin *et al*., 1997). Thus, the economic threat argument has received substantial support at the macro level, but varied support at the individual level. Regarding the latter, one person's position does not seem as important as the economic characteristics of the immigrants themselves.

A second approach to understanding attitudes towards immigrants focuses on the cultural threats posed by immigrants. This approach focuses on cultural, ethnic and religious differences between nationals and immigrants. When differences are seen to be greater, so are negative attitudes towards immigrants. When immigrants are viewed as more culturally similar, they are more likely to be accepted by nationals. When it comes to immigration, immigrants are seen as culturally, ethnically and racially distinct, such that measures of ethnocentrism and racism are important predictors of attitudes towards immigrants (Pettigrew, 1998). Religion is another factor that influences popular perceptions of national identity (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990). Thus, when people think of immigrants as culturally or racially different – and when immigrants themselves espouse more ethnocentric attitudes – greater hostility towards immigrants is expected.

2.2 Formulating Hypotheses

There has been a great expansion in research on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. Evidence of increasingly negative public attitudes towards immigrants abound in many research reports. This chapter provides an overview of the existing evidence on factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. It is based on a review of the evidence available from research, opinion polls, and social surveys undertaken in South Africa and elsewhere.

The factors influencing attitudes towards immigrants are highly complex and frequently inter-related. A related difficulty is that these factors often reflect an individual's broader view, which develops over time and is based on a whole range of factors, which are additional to those which are immediate or obvious. Given the complexity of attitude formation, Hernes and Knudsen (1996) have constructed a model which offers a useful framework for identifying the factors that influence attitudes. According to this model there are a number of structural factors that provide the context within which group or individual attitudes are formed. These include: social and economic structure – housing market, labour market, education system, and government welfare arrangements; national culture – which include common beliefs and established relations with other nations and cultures; and the proportion and degree of integration of immigrants.

Within this overall context, Hernes and Knudsen identify a number of individual socio-economic and demographic attributes that potentially have an important influence on individual and group attitudes towards immigrants. These include labour market position, which refers to income and occupation or class; educational background; individual demographic characteristics such as age, gender and race; and values, for example, religious and political beliefs, sympathy towards development issues and openness to non-indigenous cultures. The model and theoretical analysis provided by Hernes and Knudsen suggests that it is a combination of these individual factors, combined with a number of subjective factors, which include the perceived fairness of government policies together with the actual or perceived relative deprivation which influence attitudes towards immigrants.

The researcher uses Hernes and Knudsen's framework together with evidence from previous studies, specifically examining factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants, to formulate hypotheses that are testable with the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 henceforth) data.

2.2.1 Cultural Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants

Hypothesis 1

Respondents in Cape Town are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries compared to immigrants from Europe and North America.

Throughout much of its history South Africa's immigration policies were tailored to benefit immigrants from North America and Europe, while at the same time they did not welcome immigrants from other African countries. Under the South African migrant labour system Africans from other African states where not regarded as immigrants, but as contract workers (Spiegel, 1980; Dodson and Crush, 2004; Crush, 2008). This pattern was significantly altered with the advent of democracy in 1994. In post-apartheid South Africa, the increase of immigrants from other African countries has resulted in perverse attitudes towards African immigrants (compared with the attitudes towards immigrants from North America and Europe). The increase in the numbers of Africans immigrating to South Africa has proven to be an important determinant of South Africans' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration related issues like employment (Morris, 1998). Thus, the researcher hypothesises that people in South Africa are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries.

The apartheid system of classifying people had an indelible effect on social order, and has made constructing a new South African national identity very difficult, (Landau *et al*., 2004; Neocosmos, 2008). This has also affected attitude formation about immigrants, with South Africans exhibiting more negative attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries than towards those from Europe or North America. This argument suggests that attitudes towards immigrants are linked to ethnocentrism and racism. Undoubtedly, individual experiences under apartheid affected how South Africans understand *others*. The argument that attitudes towards immigrants have their basis in apartheid's system of classifying people presents an interesting hypothesis. However, the researcher was not able to test the effect of ethnocentrism and racism on attitude formation due to data limitations. The challenge was

quantifying how experiences under apartheid have translated into attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 2

Black respondents are more likely to exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants compared to coloured or white respondents.

It is also important to consider the role of the respondent's race as an influence on their attitude towards immigrants. An individual's race not only influences his or her perceptions about the impact of immigration on the economy and society, but also those who are 'non-white' are more likely to be in contact with people who are 'non-white', than white people are; and to be directly affected by negative or racist attitudes associated with immigration. Data from surveys conducted in the West also identifies significant racial differences in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues.

It is often difficult to ascertain how opinions vary by race because categories may differ in questionnaires, or there is a mismatch between how people (respondents) categorise themselves and how others (interviewers) classify them. South African racial categories fall into four broad groups: black, coloured, white and Indian. Survey research suggests that attitudes towards immigrants are similar across racial groups (Mattes *et al*., 1999 and Crush *et al*., 2008). These findings are inconsistent with case studies on attitudes towards immigrants that identify different attitudes among the racial groups (Everatt, 2010; Misago *et al*., 2010) In 2008 the SAMP published quantitative data, showing the extent of hostility towards immigrants, in South Africa. Follow up qualitative research undertaken by Everatt (2010) found that although there are strong similarities in the nature and causes of negative attitudes across race, the extent of hostility and the ways in which it is expressed varies, in some cases considerably, as a result of local factors and issues.

South Africa is a country of extreme economic and social inequalities, and the gap between the poor and the rich is profound. Based on the United Nations Development Programme (hereafter UNDP) Gini Coefficient measure of income inequality, South Africa ranks tenth in the world[6]. Inequality continues to rise in post-apartheid South Africa, and most cities in South Africa have experienced mass urbanisation and political transformation without

[6] The Gini Coefficient measures how evenly distributed a country's income or wealth is.

substantial changes in material circumstances. This has led some researchers to argue that persisting inequalities in South Africa give rise to negative attitudes towards immigrants and the related violence (Burns, 2008).

Earlier studies suggest that poor urban black South Africans are most critical of differences in wealth (Seekings, 2005; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). This is because expectations of change, after the advent of democracy, were high among the previously disadvantaged population groups. The demise of apartheid has resulted in many black South Africans who are yearning for education, housing, urban services and political rights (National Crime Prevention Strategy, 1996; Nattrass & Seekings, 1998) to feel ignored by their government. Thus, the researcher hypothesises that black respondents are more likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants than coloured or white respondents are.

It is also worth noting here that many opinion polls conducted, in the West on, attitudes towards immigrants identify significant differences in attitude according to the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The findings in relation to the role of these factors are often contradictory. Socio-demographic variables in this study include age, education, income, gender and language. In this section, the researcher looks at the impact of age and gender on attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 3

The gender of respondents may affect attitudes towards immigrants.

The role of gender in shaping attitudes towards immigrants is perhaps the least understood factor. Some researchers have examined the influence of gender on attitudes towards immigrants and have found that immigration affects men and women differently. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) found that females exhibit more negative attitudes towards undocumented immigrants than males. Citrin, Reingold and Green (1990) also found that females were more hostile towards immigrants than males. Other studies suggest that immigrants present more competition for women, as women tend to be employed in service occupations doing menial work (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Palmer, 1996). However, Hood *et al*. (1997) found gender to have no effect on attitudes towards immigrants. While gender may play a role in determining attitudes towards immigrants and immigration issues, no

consensus has emerged in the literature. Because of these limited findings, the researcher controls for gender, but has no prior expectations concerning the direction of the relationship.

Hypothesis 4

Due to cohort effect age is not a determinant of attitudes towards immigrants among respondents (young adults) in Cape Town.

The role of age in shaping attitudes towards immigrants is also contradictory. In theory at least, it might be expected that there would be a strong relationship between age and attitudes because age is a direct measure of life experience; because it captures the cohort effect and because age reflects an individual's position in a person's economic life cycle. Previous research suggests that older respondents exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration related issues, than their younger counterparts (Citrin, Reingold and Green, 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Older people may feel that they must now compete with immigrants for established welfare benefits. Parallel arguments hold for young people who are in the process of becoming established, in both the housing and labour market, as they may perceive themselves to be competing with immigrants. Since the fifth wave of the CAPS is based on a cohort of young adults, the researcher does not expect to find any relationship between age and attitudes towards immigrants.

2.2.2 Economic and Social Factors Affecting Attitudes towards Immigrants

Economic theories about attitudes towards immigration not only dominate popular explanations of anti-immigrant sentiments, but also many scholarly studies of public attitudes. Several western scholars have found that the economic threat posed by immigrants affects nationals' attitudes towards immigrants (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Hood *et al*., 1997). According to the labour market hypothesis, unemployment and insecurity in the labour market are characterised by an increase in negative attitudes towards immigrants (Citrin *et al.*, 1997). The labour market hypothesis postulates that poor, less-educated nationals are more likely to relate increased immigration to increased job competition, and this perception of threat may lead people to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. These perceptions may be warranted, given the relatively low occupational skills and educational levels of most undocumented and documented immigrants.

Hypothesis 5

Respondents who fear increased job competition from immigrants, will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

A common explanation of the hostility towards immigrants in South Africa is that of competition for limited resources, most notably employment opportunities and housing. The level of unemployment in a country is argued to be the main social context factor that affects attitudes towards immigrants. Western studies suggest that immigrants, in particular, are perceived as threatening a national's chance of employment in areas of above average unemployment (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Palmer, 1996). With an official/strict unemployment rate of 24 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2011: vi), it is perhaps inevitable that negative attitudes towards immigrants are so pervasive in South Africa[7].

The issue of immigrants (documented and undocumented) finding work in this country, while South Africans are unable to do so, further compounds tensions – between immigrants and nationals - and may create a constituency for populist politicians (Misago *et al*., 2010). A national study of unemployment among young adults in South Africa, found that unemployment in South Africa is disproportionately concentrated among poor, black South Africans (Centre for Development Enterprise, 2007; 2008). The study found that in South Africa young black adults tend to be unemployed for longer periods, and are burdened with the responsibility to support their immediate and extended family once they have completed their studies. The researchers concluded that unemployment presents a massive challenge to economic, political and social stability in South Africa, because the frustration associated with unemployment creates the potential for social unrest. Their study found that young adults, who remained unemployed for long periods, become dissatisfied with their lives, which may lead to antisocial behaviour. Evidence coming out of the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 hereafter) on young adults in Cape Town, also highlights significant levels of inequality in relation to some economic indicators (see Appendix 2). As such, the researcher expects to find that respondents who fear job competition from immigrants will exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants than respondents who do not.

[7] The Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2010 (QLFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) covers labour market activities of person aged 15 to 64 years.

The frequency with which the media and politicians in South Africa, frame the debate about immigration issues in economic terms, also raises the question whether public opinion towards immigrants is based on economic concerns. Earlier studies have shown that many immigrants in South Africa are more qualified, more experienced, and willing to work for lower wages than nationals (McDonald *et al.*, 1999; Ulicki and Crush, 2000; Landau *et al.*, 2005). Thus, immigrants, who accept lower wages, have the potential to push down the wages of those South African nationals who are employed. Because South Africa grapples with high levels of unemployment, immigrants present serious competition, particularly to economically disadvantaged and low-skilled South Africans. It is perhaps inevitable that the threat of competition in the labour market is often given as the basis of widespread negative attitudes towards immigrants. This study provides an opportunity to test the interplay of economic motives and attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 6

Less affluent and less-educated respondents will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The presence of this type of economic threat – job competition – can be gauged using standard indicators of income and education. Higher levels of education and income are often associated with stronger positive perceptions of immigrants, and support for a more liberal immigration policy. These attitudes develop as a result of the "liberalizing" influence of education (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993).

Curiously, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) found no relation between socio-economic status and attitude formation, whilst Palmer (1996) found an inverse relationship between socio-economic status and attitudes towards immigrants. The latter findings suggest that middle class and upper class respondents may perceive immigrants as a socio-economic threat. People who are successful in the country's economic system may view low-skilled and less-educated immigrants as a potential economic drain – because higher taxes and greater demands for social services will result because these immigrants will be an added burden on the state. For the purposes of this study the researcher expects to find those respondents with little or no education to exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 7

Respondents who fear that immigrants are an economic threat will exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

The inadequacy and inefficiency related to service delivery in South Africa, has generated theories that explain attitudes towards immigrants in relation to poor service delivery. South Africa faces housing shortages of crisis proportions, despite the efforts by the African National Congress (hereafter ANC) to provide housing for all. Some researchers have argued that neither the state nor the post-apartheid housing policies adequately address housing shortages (Gilbert *et al*., 1993). This is because inadequate living conditions have persisted despite massive investments in housing, infrastructure and service delivery.

To some extent, housing shortages reflects rural migration into urban areas. On the other hand, the rate of delivery has not only been slow, but also many poor urban dwellers cannot afford to own houses, or to meet services and upgrade charges (Gilbert *et al*., 1993). Respondents, who participated in the fifth wave of the CAPS, also highlighted the problem of housing in Cape Town (see Appendix 3).

South Africa has a long history of using violence as a means to protest. As such, numerous and repeated protests over housing and service delivery are reported in the media and research reports. Generally, people tend to blame the problems of housing shortages and service delivery on immigrants and politicians (McDonald, 1998; Hadland, 2008) – findings supported in other studies (see Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996). These documented tensions suggest an increasing hostility towards immigrants, because immigrants are seen as adding to the demand for affordable urban housing.

Analysis of post-apartheid housing provision in South Africa suggests there is a growing dissatisfaction with the housing policy and housing delivery in the townships and informal settlements, as the urban poor continue to live in conditions similar to those that they had to endure under apartheid. The housing policies of the ANC government are similar to that tried under apartheid (Oldfield, 2000; Lemanski, 2009). Families earning less than R3500 a month are eligible for housing subsidies under the post-apartheid government, but the residential areas are situated on the urban periphery, just as they were under apartheid. This imposes

high transportation costs on already impoverished families, and, in practice, excludes them from centres of economic and social opportunity (Oldfield, 2000; Millstein, 2007).

Whereas many South Africans live in townships and informal settlements because they cannot afford to live anywhere else, immigrants may be discouraged from entering the formal property market because of the social and legal insecurity of their position (Dobson and Oelofse, 2002; Pillay *et al*., 2008; Cooper, 2009). Earlier research suggests that the issue of immigrants settling in townships and informal settlements compounds the housing problem, and increases the potential for conflict over materials resources (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000, Pillay *et al*., 2008). These immigrants include refugees, who are not settled in controlled camps and have unrestricted mobility, as in other countries, (McDonald, 1998).

Furthermore, a commitment by the post-apartheid government to protect and guarantee protection and socio-economic services to anyone living within the country's borders has, in some instances, challenged the public administration's managerial and financial resources (Landau *et al.*, 2004). This has resulted in problems of service delivery and public frustrations. Claims that the government is spending millions in assisting immigrants – or that immigrants are otherwise burdening the government – provide a ready excuse for such shortcomings (Everatt, 2010). Public frustrations may turn to violence because a set of beliefs and ideologies exist among South Africans, which indicate that a situation is unfair and that taking action to bring about change is justified (Cooper, 2009).

On the other hand, earlier studies have found that South Africans living in the townships are often tempted to sell or lease their properties because they have such low incomes (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000; Pillay *et al*., 2008). Through these processes, immigrants have gained access to housing in many urban townships across the country. Selling state funded houses to immigrants not only worsens housing shortages but foments community tensions based on material concerns (McDonald, 1998; Dobson and Oelofse, 2000). The presence of highly visible immigrants in South Africa, most of who are seen to be in competition for privately rented accommodation, often exacerbates an already difficult situation, and could lead to hostility towards immigrants. Based on this, the researcher hypothesises that respondents who feel vulnerable, in terms of material well-being, are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 8

Respondents who have experienced violence at home and outside the home will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Political discourse in South Africa regularly portrays immigrants as criminals. The dominant view among South Africans is that immigrants threaten their property and physical security. Some researchers have even argued that the vigilante action – often associated with attitudes towards immigrants – is born out of a feeling that the police are not doing their job (Morris *et al*., 1999). Empirical data, however, show no areas in which immigrants contribute more to crime than South Africans. Findings from a national study suggest that immigrants are disproportionately victims of crime rather than perpetrators of crime (McDonald *et al.*, 1999). This suggests that violence against immigrants is considered a normal way of interacting in South Africa (McDonald *et al.*, 1999; Sigsworth *et al.*, 2008). Immigrants have become the target to blame for social ills and personal frustrations that are linked to a sense of relative deprivation, which arises because people believe that they are getting less than they are entitled (Morris 1998, Tshitereke, 1999; Harris, 2002). It is unclear why immigrants come to represent deprivation, poverty and unemployment in South Africa, given the role of immigration in the development of the South African economy, as discussed by several researchers (McDonald *et al.*, 1999, Posel, 2003, Crush and Frayne, 2007).

On the other hand, a national study among immigrants living in South Africa conducted by the SAMP revealed that immigrants are often harassed by the South African Police Service (SAPS hereafter). Immigrants who have had the misfortune of having a run in with the police spoke of the need to have money for bribes in order to escape summary arrest, the destruction of identity documents or being deported (McDonald *et al*., 1999; Misago *et al*., 2010). Findings from these studies suggest that immigrants living in South Africa felt safer in their home country and found the crime situation in South Africa worse than that at home. Similar findings were found in studies conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in which respondents identified their home country as a better place to raise a family than South Africa, as levels of crime and safety were considered better (McDonald *et al*., 2000).

Crime is endemic in South Africa. The 2006 South African Social Attitude Surveys (SASAS) found that South African are substantially more fearful to walk in their neighbourhoods during the day and at night (Davids and wa Kivilu, 2008; Roberts, 2008). Fear of crime among men was also reported to have matched, and in some instances surpassed that of women. Statistics from the SAPS annual report suggests that in 2009/2010 over 676,445 violent crimes were reported, including 16,834 murders, 113,755 robberies with aggravating circumstances, 205,293 assaults with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and 68,332 sexual offences.

However, de Kock (1990) has argued that undocumented immigrants may influence the level of crime by contributing to unemployment, through fraud relating to the issuing of identity documents, by reacting to exploitation, and by becoming involved in violent crime (de Kock, 1990:35). This could lead to undocumented immigrants being characterised as criminals, which could encourage vigilante justice and exacerbate already negative attitudes towards immigrants (Klaaren and Ramji, 2001).

Undocumented immigrants are the most vulnerable to abuses, because they are liable to be prosecuted and then deported for violating South Africa's immigration laws (Bloch, 2008). In South Africa, support for deportation is reported to be high, with nearly 50 percent of respondents who participated in a national study supporting the policy of deporting immigrants even those who live in the country legally (Crush *et al*., 2008). On the other hand, the Department of Home Affairs (hereafter DHA) actively pursues the arrest and deportation of undocumented immigrants. The DHA's (2009) annual report for 2008/2009 indicates that 280,837 people were deported from South Africa[8]. Evidently, the extent to which the rights of immigrants are abused and violated relates to their immigration status (Human Rights Watch, 1998; McDonald, 2000, Klaaren and Ramji, 2001, Bloch, 2008, Amit, 2010). Undocumented immigrants are often perceived as a potential fiscal burden, because they are seen as adding to the already heavy demands on social services.

[8] The 2009/2010 figures show that only 1060 undocumented immigrants were deported from the country (Department of Home Affairs, 2010), and it is probable that the moratorium on the deportation of Zimbabwean immigrants, introduced in April 2009, significantly reduced the number of deportations.

Fundamental to understanding violence are the risk factors that enhance the likelihood of a person or people engaging in violence or becoming victims of violence. The pattern of criminal violence in South Africa is rooted in the country's history of a violent and authoritarian regime (de Kock, 1990; Hamber, 1990; McKendrick and Hoffman, 1990; Morris *et al*., 1999). Other factors, which contribute to the high level of violent crime in South Africa, include access to firearms, a political culture of violence and crime, poverty, unemployment and youth marginalisation (Simpson and Rauch, 1993).

In post-apartheid South Africa, however, most cities have experienced an influx of migrants from the rural areas, such that levels of unemployment are higher in predominantly urban areas. The loss of support systems associated with rural areas and the relative deprivation associated with the development of urban consumer habits may result in people resorting to crime in order to satisfy their newly acquired expectations (de Kock, 1990; Thaler, 2010b). Researchers have argued that many poor South Africans perceive that the post-apartheid government has failed to meet the expectations of what political change would bring (Misago *et al.*, 2010). Unmet expectations and relative deprivation contribute significantly to violent crime and other forms of social conflict. The researcher expects those respondents who have experienced violence at home and in their neighbourhood to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Hypothesis 9

Young adults are more likely to exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards undocumented immigrants regardless of their personal circumstances.

Economic variables alone cannot comprehensively measure the threat that South Africans perceive immigrants to be. The opinions of individuals may also be influenced by the unique immigrant context of their surroundings. For instance, individuals who live in close proximity to immigrants (either documented or undocumented) may develop very distinctive attitudes towards immigrants as a group. Proponents of the realistic group conflict theory contend that increased contact among groups competing for scarce resources serves to intensify the level of intergroup conflict. Therefore, following this argument, South Africans who live in areas with high concentrations of immigrants might exhibit stronger negative attitudes because immigrants are also competing for the economic, cultural and social resources of the

community. This group threat may lead people to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Another body of literature, which suggests that increased intergroup contact actually leads to a reduction in in-group conflict, counters this theoretical approach. Proponents of the contact hypothesis contend that as competing groups interact, unrealistic negative perceptions are replaced by favourable experiences and more positive attitudes towards the other group. This suggests that South Africans living in close proximity to a large number of immigrants would exhibit stronger positive attitudes towards immigrants. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, the researcher was not able to test this hypothesis.

Some Unites States research has found that the perception of group threat is dependent upon the type of immigrant context – documented or undocumented – that is present (Hood *et al*., 1997; Hood and Morris, 1998). These studies found that people are supportive of legal immigration as the relative size of the legal immigrant population in their area increased; this offers support for the contact hypothesis. Conversely, people were found to be less supportive of legal immigration as the relative size of the illegal immigrant population in their neighbourhood increased, offering support for the realistic group conflict theory.

The media have been found to reflect, and consequently perpetuate, negative stereotypes of African immigrants. Researchers argue that the media in South Africa misrepresents the numbers of African immigrants entering the country, and the means by which they enter (McDonald, 1998; McDonald *et al.*, 1999; Danso and McDonald, 2001). National studies conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe show that undocumented immigration is less than has been reported in the media (McDonald *et al*., 2000). Immigrants are also often referred to as *aliens*, *illegal* immigrants or *makwerekwere*[9], terms which form part of a negative discourse that blames immigrants for contributing to crime, diseases and unemployment (Eyber, 1998). These derogatory terms dehumanise immigrants, and may lead to immigrants being marginalised, because they are denied their socio-economic rights and excluded from social welfare benefits (McDonald *et al.*, 2000; Neocosmos, 2008). The young adults, who participated in the fifth wave of the CAPS, also exhibited high levels of dislike for undocumented immigrants (see Appendix 5). Thus, the researcher expects the respondents

[9] Makwerekwere, a term used to refer to black African immigrant that mocks the sound of foreign languages.

to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards undocumented immigrants, no matter what the circumstances of the respondents.

2.3 Conclusion

In summary, the evidence relating to the factors, which influence attitudes towards immigrants, suggests that these factors are highly complex and inter-connected. In terms of causal factors underlying an individual's attitude towards immigrants, economic theory predicts that negative attitudes will be strongly expressed by those who are most directly affected by immigrants competing in the labour market. However, to date the evidence is inconclusive, but suggests that there is no clear correlation between attitudes and labour market position and income. There is evidence that education plays an important role in shaping attitudes towards immigrants and that higher levels of education are associated with more positive attitudes. There is also some evidence that attitudes towards immigrants are currently becoming more negative among those who are university graduates. The role of individual socio-demographic factors, for example, age and gender, in shaping attitudes, are not well understood, and the evidence in relation to the role of these factors is largely contradictory.

The following chapter analyses attitudes towards immigrants based on respondents' support for deportation.

CHAPTER 3: DEPORTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

South Africa has grappled with negative attitudes towards immigrants since the advent of democracy in 1994. Increased numbers of documented and undocumented immigrants immigrating to the country compound negative attitudes (Morris, 1998). Case studies conducted in the aftermath of the violent attacks on immigrants, in May 2008, suggest that attitudes towards immigrants are generally negative, with people supporting deportation of immigrants from South Africa (Everatt, 2010).

A national study undertaken by the Southern African Migration Project (hereafter SAMP) in 2006 found that South Africans support the deportation of immigrants, even those who are living here legally (47 percent). Respondents also supported the deportation of immigrants who do not contribute to the economy (74 percent), as well as those who have committed serious criminal offences (86 percent), or who test positive for HIV or have AIDS (61 percent) (Crush *et al*., 2008:26). This suggests that, generally, South Africans support restrictive policy measures against immigrants (ibid).

Past surveys have tended to study attitudes towards immigrants, in the abstract, that is detached from an individual immigrant's characteristics or circumstances. Many researchers have argued that abstract questions – typical of opinion surveys – fail to take into account the complex and multidimensional nature of people's attitudes (Nosanchuk, 1972; Alexander and Becker, 1978; Finch, 1987). One way of incorporating nuanced questions – that make the actual questions true to life – is by specifying plausible situations, so instead of abstract questions vignettes are used. Finch (1987:105) describes vignettes as "short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond".

The researcher found no evidence that attitudes studies, in South Africa, have used vignettes in the study of attitudes towards immigrants. In Canada, Harell, Soroka and Andrew (2011) used a series of vignettes – that vary the racial background and social status of an individual applying for immigration – to assess the extent to which manipulating an immigrant's racial and economic status affects support for immigration. They found that specifying the

immigrant's economic status affected respondents' attitudes with respondents expressing a preference for higher skilled immigrants. The race of an immigrant did not seem to affect respondent's attitudes. This Canadian study suggests that manipulating the specification of immigrant's characteristics or circumstances in a vignette can matter in the study of attitudes towards immigrants. Vignettes are one way of incorporating descriptions, which closely resemble real-life situations. Based on two vignettes presented to a representative sample of young adults in Cape Town, this chapter examines the extent to which manipulating an immigrant's socio-economic status and nationality affects support for deportation. The researcher explores how respondents' support for the deportation of immigrants varies as different characteristics are added to the descriptions of immigrants, that is, differing situational contexts.

3.1 Exploring Attitudes towards Immigrants through Support for Deportation

To test the effect of manipulating the nationality and/or social status of an immigrant on the support for deportation, this chapter uses vignettes, because they allow for the "contextualisation of opinion, and the ability to test hypotheses about causal effects" (Gibson and Gouws, 2003:100). The researcher examines both the cultural and economic threat hypotheses, discussed in chapter two, using data from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 henceforth). The two vignettes presented to young adults in Cape Town assessed the circumstances, which would elicit responses that supported the deportation of immigrants. The circumstances described in the vignettes are factors, which, could potentially, affect the respondents' support for deportation of immigrants.

The vignettes began with a general opening statement: "*Now I shall describe some situations involving immigrants into South Africa*." The first vignette was about an undocumented immigrant from Zimbabwe. Manipulating an immigrant's employment status, HIV status, lack of food security[10] and/or the threat of political persecution[11] in the home country, resulted in twelve versions of the vignette (see Table 1).

[10] Some Zimbabwean households depend on family members living in South Africa for financial assistance, so some versions of the vignette specified that the immigrant's family left in Zimbabwe was starving. This was an attempt to sway the respondent's judgement on the support for deportation.

Table 1: Vignette Versions on the Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant

Question	Variable	Version	Variant	N
w5y_i28_1	w5y_i28_2	1	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment, and he is HIV positive.	235
		2	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment.	245
		3	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed, and he is HIV positive.	241
		4	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed.	260
		5	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment, and he is HIV positive. He will probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe.	261
		6	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment. He will probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe.	257
		7	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed, and is HIV positive. He will probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe.	242
		8	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed. He will probably be persecuted if he returns to Zimbabwe.	249
		9	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment, and is HIV positive. His family in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation.	221
		10	Imagine a young from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He has no employment. His family in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation.	215
		11	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed, and is HIV positive. His family in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation.	264
		12	Imagine a young man from Zimbabwe. He is an illegal immigrant here in South Africa. He is employed. His family in Zimbabwe is suffering from starvation.	225
			Total	2,915

Source: CAPS 2009

The employment and HIV status of the immigrant relate to the economic threat hypothesis: respondents who fear increased job competition from immigrants, or who fear that immigrants are a fiscal burden are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. The starvation and persecution manipulations test the possibility that presenting an immigrant in a dire situation may produce a positivity bias: the tendency for people to be more compassionate about specific situations than about situations that are more abstract.

[11] Similarly, some versions of the vignette specified that the immigrant might face political persecution if deported and returned to Zimbabwe.

Allocation of respondents to one of the twelve vignette versions was random, and each respondent heard only one version of the vignette. After listening to the vignette, the respondents were asked to decide whether an immigrant should or should not be deported to Zimbabwe.

The second vignette was about an immigrant family living in South Africa. Manipulating an immigrant family's country of origin[12] and the social traits exhibited by an immigrant family, produced six versions of the vignette (see Table 2).

Table 2: Vignette Versions on the Immigrant Family

Question	Variable	Version	Variant	N
w5y_i28_3	w5y_i28_4	1	Imagine a family from Nigeria. They are working in South Africa, paying taxes, and their neighbours like them.	484
		2	Imagine a family from Nigeria living here in South Africa. They do not have jobs, and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble.	504
		3	Imagine a family from Lesotho. They are working in South Africa, paying taxes, and their neighbours like them.	464
		4	Imagine a family from Lesotho living here in South Africa. They do not have jobs, and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble.	488
		5	Imagine a family from Britain. They are working in South Africa, paying taxes, and their neighbours like them.	500
		6	Imagine a family from Britain living here in South Africa. They do not have jobs and their neighbours complain that they cause trouble.	475
			Total	2,915

Source: CAPS 2009

The social traits of the immigrant family relate to the economic threat hypothesis, whilst the nationality of the immigrant family relates to the cultural threat hypothesis. The nationality manipulation relies on just three of many possible nationalities. The objective in using these three nationalities was to contrast attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries with attitudes towards immigrants from Europe.

Each respondent heard only a single version of the vignette, and allocation of the respondents to a particular version of the vignette, was random. After listening to the vignette, the respondents were asked to decide, "*Should this family be told to leave South Africa*?", in other words should the immigrant family be deported or not.

[12] The country of origin of the immigrant family varied. Some were traditional African immigrants from Lesotho and others were newer African immigrants from Nigeria. Immigrants from Britain were also included. Although the race of the immigrant is unspecified in the vignettes, most South Africans assume that immigrants from other African countries are black, whilst immigrants from Europe and North America are white.

3.1.1 Overall Distribution of Responses

Table 3 shows the distribution of the responses to the vignettes. A smaller proportion of young adults in Cape Town supported the deportation of immigrants, than had been shown in earlier studies (Crush, *et al*., 2008). Support for deportation was not widespread; about one-third of respondents (35 percent) supported the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, and about two-fifths of respondents (39 percent) supported the deportation of an immigrant family.

Table 3: Distribution of Responses on the Support for Deportation

	Percent[13]
w5y_i28_1 "Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe?"	
Yes	35
Maybe, it depends	27
No	35
Don't know	4
Total	100
w5y_i28_3 "Should this family be told to leave South Africa?"	
Yes	39
Maybe, it depends	21
No	38
Don't know	3
Total	100

Source: CAPS 2009

3.1.2 Effect of the Manipulations by Vignette Version

The extent to which the manipulations, specified in the vignette stories, affected the respondents' support for deportation become evident when the researcher considers the responses to each version of the vignette. It is overwhelmingly clear that varying an immigrant's circumstances affects the degree of support for the deportation of immigrants. The results presented in Table 4 suggest that more respondents supported the deportation of an unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrant. This is seen in version one of the vignette which shows that the majority of respondents (59 percent) supported the deportation of an unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrant. In contrast, twenty-four percent of respondents presented with version eight supported deportation. In this case, the immigrant was described as employed and facing persecution in Zimbabwe. The results appear to support the economic threat hypothesis, in relation to increased job competition or a higher fiscal burden from unemployed, HIV positive, undocumented immigrants. However, there is not more support for deporting employed immigrants – although they are the ones who have

[13] Percentages may not always add up to 100 due to rounding effect.

actually 'taken' a job that might have been done by a South African. Differences across versions were statistically significant (p=0.00) [14].

Table 4: Gross Effects of Manipulating the Circumstances of an Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant by Vignette Version

"Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe?"									
	Manipulation				**Percentages**				
Version (w5y_i28_2)	*Employment status*	*HIV status*	*Political persecution*	*Food security*	*Yes*	*Maybe/it depends*	*No*	*Don't know*	**Total**
1	Unemployed	HIV+	Unspecified	Unspecified	59	20	18	2	100
2	Unemployed	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	43	31	24	3	100
3	Employed	HIV+	Unspecified	Unspecified	37	27	29	7	100
4	Employed	Unspecified	Unspecified	Unspecified	34	28	37	1	100
5	Unemployed	HIV+	Persecution	Unspecified	35	27	33	6	100
6	Unemployed	Unspecified	Persecution	Unspecified	30	24	41	5	100
7	Employed	HIV+	Persecution	Unspecified	29	30	38	3	100
8	Employed	Unspecified	Persecution	Unspecified	24	30	42	5	100
9	Unemployed	HIV+	Unspecified	Starving	43	25	29	3	100
10	Unemployed	Unspecified	Unspecified	Starving	32	32	34	2	100
11	Employed	HIV+	Unspecified	Starving	28	29	40	3	100
12	Employed	Unspecified	Unspecified	Starving	27	22	47	4	100

Source: CAPS 2009

The strongest relationship, however, is with the manipulation of an immigrant family's social traits. Table 5 shows the gross effects of manipulating an immigrant family's country of origin and the social traits exhibited by an immigrant family. The results suggest that support for deportation is higher in circumstances where the immigrant family exhibited undesirable social traits. For example, in the vignette versions where the immigrant family did not have jobs and their neighbours complained that they caused trouble – versions two, four and six – approximately six out of ten of the respondents supported their deportation. Young adults in Cape Town expressed a distinct preference for an immigrant family that worked, paid taxes and got along with their neighbours.

The immigrant family's nationality was apparently irrelevant to the respondents' decision to support deportation; the effect of manipulating the immigrants' country of origin was negligible. There were no differences, whatsoever, in responses which supported deportation, based on the nationality of the immigrant family. However, differences across versions were statistically significant (p=0.00).

[14] Bivariate analysis was carried out to test whether the differences across versions was statistically significant (p<0.05) using Chi-square values.

Table 5: Effects of Manipulating the Characteristics of an Immigrant Family by Vignette Version

	"Should this family be told to leave South Africa?"						
	Manipulation		**Percentage**				
Version w5_i28_4	*Country of origin*	*Social traits*	*Yes*	*Maybe/it depends*	*No*	*Don't know*	**Total**
1	Nigeria	Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours	12	26	59	4	100
2	Nigeria	Have no jobs, and cause trouble	66	21	11	2	100
3	Lesotho	Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours	12	20	66	2	100
4	Lesotho	Have no jobs, and cause trouble	65	18	13	3	100
5	Britain	Work, pay taxes and liked by neighbours	12	23	62	3	100
6	Britain	Have no jobs, and cause trouble	65	19	15	2	100

Source: CAPS 2009

3.1.3 The Effect of the Manipulations by Immigrant Characteristics and Circumstances

Corroborating with the results presented in tables four and five are the results presented when the researcher pooled the responses by creating dummy variables representing the manipulations (see Table 6) [15]. A very important point about table six is that the respondents' judgements, on the support for deportation of an undocumented immigrant, are all in the expected direction. More respondents supported the deportation of the unemployed, undocumented immigrant, than the employed one; more supported the deportation of the HIV positive, undocumented immigrant; fewer people supported the deportation of the undocumented immigrant threatened by persecution. Curiously, whether or not an undocumented immigrant's family was starving made a small difference to the assessment.

The differences in support for deportation – based on manipulating the circumstances of an undocumented immigrant – were small: the differences varied from 29 percent to 40 percent. This suggests that as long as the immigrant was undocumented, a large minority of respondents had their minds made up to deport him, regardless of his other characteristics. Roughly, a third of the respondents were willing to deport an undocumented immigrant from South Africa, despite the threat of persecution (29 percent), or that the family in the home country faced starvation (32 percent). This implies that reality does not easily change the general predispositions about undocumented, and the rights of undocumented immigrants living in this country have a small impact on South Africans' attitudes towards immigrants. It

[15] As an effect of the design, the independent variables are not orthogonal. The maximum observed correlation among the dummy variables representing the manipulations – for both the undocumented immigrant vignette and the immigrant family vignette – is -0.50.

is also probable that the increased number of documented and undocumented immigrants from Zimbabwe, the nationality specified in the vignette, affected the respondents' judgements.

Table 6: The Effects of Manipulating an Immigrant's Characteristics and Circumstances

Vignette	Manipulation	Condition	Percentage				N
			Yes, it is right	*Maybe/it depends*	*No, it is wrong*	*Don't know*	
Undocumented context (w5y_i28_1)	Employment Status	Unemployed	40	26	30	3	1,481
		Employed	30	28	39	4	1,434
	HIV Status	HIV+	38	27	32	4	1,464
		Unspecified	31	28	38	3	1,451
	Political Persecution	Persecution	29	28	38	5	1,009
		Unspecified	38	27	33	3	1,906
	Food Security	Starving	32	27	38	3	925
		Unspecified	36	27	33	4	1,990
Desirability and respectability context (w5y_i28_3)	Country of Origin	Britain	38	21	38	2	975
		Lesotho	39	19	40	2	952
		Nigeria	39	23	35	3	988
	Lifestyle	Not working	65	19	13	2	1,467
		Working	12	23	62	3	1,448

Source: CAPS 2009

On the other hand, manipulating an immigrant family's social traits affected people's judgements on the support for deportation considerably. Differences in support for deportation – based on the social trait manipulation – varied between twelve percent and 65 percent.

3.2 Summary Statistics and Bivariate Relationships

The dependent variables, analysed in this chapter, draw on the respondents' decisions to support the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. Each vignette presented specific immigrant characteristics in order to see how they affected the respondents' support for deporting immigrants. To this end, the researcher created two dummy variables from the responses to the vignettes, *deport* and *expel*, coded one (''Yes") and zero ("Maybe, it depends" and "No"). "Don't know" responses were left out of the analysis because they were difficult to conceptualise.

Bivariate regressions using support for deportation as the dependent variable indicate that the manipulations, for the undocumented immigrant vignette, achieved statistical significance. Researchers who designed the survey instrument correctly perceived the manipulations as factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants, and efforts to sway the respondents'

decisions were effective. The results are consistent with the preceding descriptive statistics, with the unemployed and HIV positive immigrant characteristics affecting support for deportation positively. For instance, the marginal effect of an undocumented immigrant being unemployed (relative to being employed) is that support for deportation increases by eleven percentage points (see Appendix 8)[16]. On the other hand, a situation in which the undocumented immigrant's family is starving was negatively associated with support for deportation (-0.05; p=0.06; 95% CI -0.09, 0.00)[17]. The results, however, suggest that other factors not included in the regression model explain most of the variance in the support for deportation – in each case the pseudo r-squared is very low at less than 0.01.

The results also indicate that white respondents (the reference group), as opposed to black and coloured respondents, were less likely to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant. About a quarter of white respondents (28 percent) supported the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, compared to 37 percent of black and 36 percent of coloured respondents (see Appendix 6). Respondents who spoke English at home (the reference group) were less likely (29 percent) to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans (37 percent) or Xhosa (36 percent). With respect to education, respondents with tertiary education (the reference group) were less likely (26 percent) to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant than respondents with primary (42) or secondary (35 percent) education only. Language and level of education are significant in bivariate regression, though explained variances were small. There was no difference in the support for deportation by age, gender and employment status.

As expected, for the second vignette, when an immigrant family exhibited anti-social behaviour this had a strong, direct effect on support for deportation. The marginal effect of the subject being described as an unemployed and noisy immigrant family who cause trouble (compared to an employed immigrant family who get along with their neighbours) is that the probability of support for their deportation increased by a massive 45 percentage points (see Appendix 9). The immigrant family's nationality was statistically insignificant in bivariate regression.

[16] Some tables are relegated to the Appendixes due to word limitation.

[17] Coefficient, p-value, and 95 percent confidence interval.

The results also show that other indicator variables, such as language and class were significant factors. Respondents who spoke English or Xhosa at home were less likely to support the deportation of the immigrant family, compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans (the reference group). About two fifths (44 percent) of respondents who spoke Afrikaans at home supported the deportation of an immigrant family compared to 38 percent and 31 percent of respondents who spoke English or Xhosa, respectively. Upper (40 percent) and middle (39 percent) class respondents were more likely to support the deportation of an immigrant family compared to respondents in the working class (32 percent) category (the reference group).The explained variances are small.

3.3 Multivariate Regression Results

The researcher used multivariate regression models to determine whether the influence of the manipulations withstood the imposition of controls, and to interpret more fully causal underpinnings of the respondents' attitudes. The researcher tested a number of assumptions thought to connect an individual immigrant's characteristics or circumstances and attitudes towards immigrants. The analytical strategy was to introduce, sequentially, several distinct categories of explanatory variables as predictors. This approach – usually called hierarchical or nested analyses – enabled the researcher to test whether the inclusion of particular clusters of related variables improved the fit of the regression.

The first model (Model I) only incorporated the manipulations and assessed the impact of varying the immigrant's characteristics on attitudes towards immigrants. The next step was to add demographic variables, such as age, gender, and population group. The model tested the hypothesis that socio-demographic characteristics may affect attitudes towards immigrants. Two additional models explored the effect of economic variables (Model III) and subjective[18] variables (Model IV) as predictors. These models assessed the impact of socio-economic status and the social milieu on attitudes towards immigrants.

The analysis employed the same set of specifications for the two dependent variables. The researcher, discusses the results of the undocumented immigrant vignette first, and then points out the differences that resulted from analysing the immigrant family vignette. All

[18] Subjective variables in this research refer to variables that relate to the respondents' social milieu, or opinions and perceptions on a particular issue.

estimates draw on probit analysis techniques, and, unless stated, all predictors are dummy variables. Positive regression marginal effects mean that respondents with this characteristic support the deportation of immigrants from South Africa more than the reference group.

3.3.1 Support for Deportation of an Undocumented Zimbabwean Immigrant

Model I, which includes the vignette manipulations only, revealed that the effects of varying an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances are statistically significant. The results indicated that the marginal effect of an immigrant being unemployed (as opposed to being employed) increased the probability of support for deportation, by ten percentage points, controlling for other factors (see Appendix 10). On the other hand, the marginal effect of the threat of persecution (rather than this being unspecified) decreased the probability of support for deportation by eleven percentage points, controlling for other factors. The results suggest that manipulating the socio-economic status of an immigrant affects the respondents' support for deportation of individual immigrants. Respondents exhibited stronger negative attitudes towards an unemployed or HIV positive undocumented immigrant and showed compassion to an immigrant threatened by persecution, or an immigrant whose family was starving in the home country. The model does not explain much of the variation in support for deportation – pseudo r-squared is low at less than 0.03. The manipulations suggest some aspects of causality but only indirectly.

Model II, which includes the respondent's demographic characteristics as predictors, revealed that the manipulations remain significant even after the imposition of controls for background characteristics. As suggested by the first hypothesis, being black is statistically significantly associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants (0.44; p=0.01; 95% CI 0.13; 0.74). This finding from Cape Town counters the finding made by Crush *et al*. (2008), for South Africa as a whole, that attitudes towards immigrants are similar across racial groups. In comparison to white respondents (the omitted race category), black respondents were more likely to express support for deportation. Being coloured (relative to being white) was not statistically associated with negative attitudes towards immigrants. In this case, direct interaction with immigrants might explain why black respondents were more likely to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant compared to white (or coloured) respondents, because black South Africans in Cape Town are more likely to interact with immigrants compared to white (or white) South Africans. When the researcher considered the effect of language on the support for deportation, respondents who spoke Afrikaans (0.39; p=0.01;

95% CI 0.09, 0.69) or English (0.32; p=0.03; 95% CI 0.02, 0.62) at home were more likely to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant compared to respondents who spoke Xhosa, contradicting the effect of race on attitude formation. The reason for this contradiction was not clear. The results also indicated that age and gender do not affect the respondents' judgement on the support for deportation. It is probable that the effect of age reflects a cohort effect, rather than an age effect. Overall, the effect of adding demographic variables to the model are small, as the pseudo r-squared is still under 0.04.

Low socio-economic status – both lived and perceived poverty – does not appear to be associated with attitudes towards immigrants. Regarding basic economic issues, self-perceived class – which the researcher assumed would capture the non-job-related dimension of an individual's material level of living – employment status and level education were not statistically significant as factors that affect the support for deportation. The results counter the sixth hypotheses that less affluent and less educated respondents are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Curiously, respondents who reported that they would accept a job that paid less than R3000 per month, were more likely to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant (0.09; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.14), compared to respondents who said that they would not accept low status employment. The results appear to support the fifth hypothesis that respondents who fear increased job competition from immigrants are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Overall, the effect of economic variables is minimal; the predicting power raised the pseudo r-squared from three percent to four percent. The manipulations remain statistically significant, including language and race of the respondent. However, the intermediate models (Models II and III in Appendixes 10 and 11) suggest misleading findings, as indicated by the findings in the final model (Model IV).

In contrast to theories that stress the role of economic motives in shaping attitudes towards immigrants, other personal issues affect people's opinions. Model IV shows that subjective variables, which lie beneath negative attitudes toward immigrants, are also a significant concern. As expected, respondents who reported that they disliked undocumented immigrants supported for the deportation of the undocumented immigrant. Respondents with low self-esteem were more likely to support for deportation compared to those who had high self-esteem (0.05; p=0.09; 95% CI -0.01, 0.11). Respondents who did not trust other people were

also more likely to support for deportation compared to those who trusted others (0.16; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.11, 0.20). Having experienced violence outside the home also increased the respondents' probability for supporting deportation (0.06; p=0.01; 95% CI 0.01, 0.12). Curiously, respondents who reported that they did not feel safe walking in their neighbourhood during the day and at night were less likely to support the deportation of an undocumented immigrant compared to those who reported that they felt safe (-0.10; p=0.00; 95% CI -0.15, -0.04). Overall, the model explained eight percent of the variation on the support of an undocumented immigrant, and the manipulations remain statistically significant.

3.3.2 Support for Deportation of an Immigrant Family

Social traits of an immigrant family, manipulated in the vignette, had a marked effect on respondents' support (or lack of support) for deportation. The immigrant family's nationality did not affect attitudes towards immigrants. Unlike the manipulations related to the undocumented immigrant vignette, Model I on the immigrant family vignette explained 25 percent of the variance in support for deportation (see Appendix 11). The manipulations were more successful in terms of generating differential intolerance.

Concerning demographic variables, age, gender and race consistently failed to be predictors of judgements for or against the deportation of immigrants among respondents. However, language remained a statistically significant predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. Support for deportation was lower among respondents who spoke Xhosa at home (-0.23; p=0.04; 95% CI -0.46, -0.01) compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans (the omitted category). The results suggest that the vignettes measured different attitudinal dimensions, as there was inconsistency in the factors that affect support for deportation. Overall, the effect of demographic variables was minimal. Demographic variables improved the strength of the model by less than one percent.

In Model III, the absolute value of the marginal effects of the race variable increased. Coloured and white respondents were less likely to support deportation compared to black respondents (the omitted group), though the variation was small as the 95 percent confidence intervals were large. This means that we cannot be certain that race improves our understanding of factors that affect support for deportation of an immigrant family.

Unemployed respondents were more likely to support the deportation of an immigrant family compared to employed respondents (the reference group). Willingness to accept a low status job remained positive and statistically significant. The results appear to support hypothesis seven that fear of economic threat affects attitudes towards immigrants. Income variables, however, do not explain much of the variance on the support for deportation of an immigrant family, the pseudo r-squared increased by less than one percent.

In Model IV, all subjective variables, low self-esteem, lack of trust, dislike for undocumented immigrants, feeling unsafe in the neighbourhood and having experienced violence, were statistically significant. The explanatory power of the model increases by two percent. The social traits manipulation remains statistically significant

3.4 Discussion

The results presented in this chapter support several conclusions. The most significant observation is that the manipulations of the vignettes had unequal effects on support for deportation. However, the findings are consistent with an interpretation suggested earlier, that the two vignettes measure somewhat different attitudinal dimensions.

Secondly, manipulating an individual immigrant's characteristics and circumstances affects people's attitudes towards immigrants, but not in direct and simple ways. The undocumented immigrant vignette suggested that South Africans, in general, share the same attitudes towards undocumented immigrants. The undocumented immigrant status affects attitude formation negatively, because people have pre-existing perceptions about undocumented immigrants, which shape their degree of tolerance. Young adults in Cape Town live in a society in which undocumented immigrants are portrayed as aliens. Thus attempts to sway the respondents' opinion, by presenting life-threatening situations, had a small impact. Such, general attitudes about immigrants are extremely important because they shape how people perceive immigrants. On the other hand, immigrants who contribute positively to society were more likely to be tolerated than immigrants who exhibited undesirable social traits, which suggests that the perception that immigrants are a fiscal burden to tax payers affected attitudes towards immigrants. In this instance, the economic status of immigrants is a more powerful predictor of support for deportation than are differences in the nationality of immigrants.

Thirdly, the effects of the respondents' individual predictor variables had inconsistent effects on the support for deportation. There were no clearly definable traits in terms of who exhibits attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents' demographic characteristics and economic perceptions were not significantly associated with the support for deportation. So while people may give poverty and unemployment primacy in their accounting of the causes of attitudes towards immigrants, low socio-economic status has only indirect effects on attitude formation. Subjective variables were significant determinants of how young adults in Cape Town evaluate the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. The most salient respondent traits were low self-esteem, lack of trust, experience of violence outside the home, and dislike for undocumented immigrants.

CHAPTER 4: LOOTING AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

Chapter three revealed that support for the deportation of immigrants from South Africa, as measured in the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 henceforth), is lower among young adults who live in Cape Town than was measured in earlier national studies. Approximately one fifth of the CAPS 2009 respondents (21 percent) supported the deportation of immigrants compared to 47 percent in the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP hereafter) 2006 study. Most CAPS 2009 respondents exhibited compassion towards immigrants in difficult situations. The evidence from earlier studies was that South Africans exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants as a group. The discrepancies between the two studies may arise from the CAPS 2009 depiction of immigrants in real-life scenarios. Furthermore, the CAPS 2009 survey, which draws on situational factors thought to affect South Africans' attitudes towards immigrants, used vignettes to elicit the respondents' support (or lack of support) for the deportation of immigrants.

4.1 Exploring attitudes towards immigrants through the morality of looting

This chapter assesses attitudes towards immigrants among young adults who were living in Cape Town by testing their opinion about the morality of looting. Across South Africa, the government is confronted with the serious problem of South Africans looting small businesses owned by African immigrants. Such looting has accompanied anti-immigrant campaigns in urban townships and informal settlements. Several studies have reported on intermittent and persistent attacks of small immigrant businesses (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2000; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Cooper, 2009; Misago *et al.*, 2010). There is evidence that, in some instances, immigrants have been killed (Cooper, 2009; Misago *et al*., 2010). Some researchers (de Kock, 1997; Misago, 2008; Misago *et al*., 2010) have argued that the problem of looting in this country is compounded by the lack of an adequate deterrent in the criminal justice system, because prosecution rates are low.

On the other hand, immigrants claim that South Africans resent them for their ability to operate successful small businesses (Morris, 1998). On their arrival in South Africa, many immigrants often discover that finding a job is more difficult than establishing a small business. Self-employment becomes the most feasible option for earning a living. Other studies have also found that immigrants make their own opportunities (Reitzes and Bam, 2000).

There has been little research on the norms relating to the use of violence against immigrant entrepreneurs. Some researchers have argued that looting of immigrant businesses in South African townships and informal settlements is a result of the lack of job opportunities. Lacking employment and living in poverty causes frustration. This is compounded by aspirations, deprivation and urban needs (de Kock, 1990; Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Cooper, 2009; Misago et al., 2010).

This chapter focuses on a vignette included in the CAPS 2009 that probed whether the nationality of the trader affected opinions about the morality of looting. The focus of this chapter is to understand the dynamics of looting of African immigrants' businesses, by examining how young adults think about such looting. The findings will be compared to views revealed in earlier studies that such looting arise from three main factors: (1) high levels of inequality and poverty right across South Africa, (2) political discourse that these African immigrants have a negative impact on the well-being of South Africans, and (3) the micro-politics of the country's townships and informal settlements. There appears to be a widespread perception among South Africans that immigrants are financially more successful than nationals. This perception has led some researchers to argue that relative deprivation might be the root cause of attitudes towards immigrants (Cooper, 2009).

The results discussed in chapter three suggested that most respondents showed compassion when presented with situations testing for their degree of support for deportation of immigrants. The looting vignette explored the moral codes that inform the respondents' degree of support for looting a trader. Two versions specified the nationality of the trader, in another version the nationality was unspecified. Also specified in the vignette versions were the circumstances for looting (see Table 7). The vignette began with the opening statement "*Now I shall describe a situation where someone does something, and ask you whether you*

think that this action is Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good." The vignette told the story of a trader who operated a small business in a township; the business is looted by a group of young men.

Table 7: Looting vignette versions

Question	Variable	Version	Variant	N
w5y_i24_1	w5y_i28_2	1	Young men attack the shop of a Somali shopkeeper in a township, saying that the shopkeeper is getting rich by selling to poor people.	931
		2	Young men attack the shop of a shopkeeper in a township, saying that the shopkeeper is getting rich by selling to poor people.	1,011
		3	Young men attack the shop of a Somali shopkeeper in a township, saying that Somalis should not be allowed to run shops.	973
			Total	2,915

Source: CAPS 2009

4.1.1 Manipulations and Hypotheses

The vignette clearly implied that there was conflict between poor and rich, which derived from economic and social processes in which respondents might feel deprived in some way, for example, material possessions, in relation to immigrants. Earlier studies have suggested that immigrants who operate small businesses in historically poor urban communities are perceived as having achieved a level of economic and social privilege that still eludes many South Africans (Cooper, 2009, Misago *et al*., 2010). Thus, the looting of small businesses owned by African immigrants as an attempt to redress an unfair situation may seem justifiable. The vignette sought to determine how presenting respondents with a story about immigrants, who have acquired some material wealth, would affect judgments as to the morality of looting these immigrants' businesses.

The manipulation of the trader's nationality tested the cultural threat theory that the nationality of the trader affects the respondents' opinion about looting. Varying the circumstances for looting tested the economic threat theory, that fear of economic threat affects the respondents' judgement about looting. The allocation of the three versions of the vignette was random. Each respondent heard only one version. After listening to the vignette, the respondents made a judgement about whether it was "Very bad", "Bad", "Neither bad nor good", "Ok" or "Good" for the young men to loot the trader's business.

4.2 Judgements on Collective Looting

The pattern of responses to the vignette, as shown in Table 8, suggests that the overwhelming majority of respondents (91 percent) did not support looting irrespective of the nationality of the trader or the reason for looting.

At first glance, it appears that the vignette failed to generate intolerance, which may suggest that it was not a suitable measure for assessing attitudes towards immigrants. The judgements of most of the respondents on the morality of looting suggested that they shared a moral consciousness that recognises that even immigrants have socio-economic rights. If looting by a group of young men was an attempt to address an unfair situation, then the researcher would have expected many young adults to support looting. How is it then that the majority of the respondents – think it is either "very bad" or "bad" for young men to loot a trader's business?

Table 8: Basic judgments on looting

Collective looting vignette (w5y_i24_1) *"Is it Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good?"*	Percentage
Very Bad	44
Bad	49
Neither Bad nor Good	5
OK	1
Good	1
Don't know	1
Total	100

Source: CAPS 2009

Manipulating the nationality of the trader and the circumstances for looting do not appear to have elicited a larger number of anti-immigrant responses. It is possible that respondents were wary of giving negative responses because data collection occurred just after nationwide violence against immigrants.

4.2.1 The Effect of the Manipulations

Despite the finding that the respondents as a group did not condone the looting of an immigrant's business, the manipulation of the nationality factor and the circumstances for looting in the three versions of the vignette, produced some variations in judgements about looting. The results presented in Table 9 suggest that respondents were slightly more emphatic in their support for the young men looting a Somali trader than when a trader's

nationality was unspecified. Differences across versions using the Chi-squared test were statistically significant (p=0.00).

With responses highly skewed in one direction, however, only limited analysis is possible. The researcher, therefore, treated the responses "Neither bad nor good", "Ok" or "Good" as exhibiting a negative attitude towards immigrants, because immigrants have the right to conduct business in South Africa and, therefore, it was morally wrong to loot these traders businesses[19].

Table 9: Gross Effects of Manipulating the Immigrant's nationality and the Circumstances for Looting

"Is it Very bad, Bad, Neither bad nor good, Ok, or Good?"									
	Manipulation		**Per cent**						
Version	Nationality of the shopkeeper	Reason for young men looting the trader's business	*Very bad*	*Bad*	*Neither bad nor good*	*Ok*	*Good*	*Don't know*	Total
1	Somali	Getting rich selling to the poor	43	50	4	1	1	0	100
2	Unspecified	Getting rich selling to the poor	48	47	4	0	1	0	100
3	Somali	Somalis should not be allowed to run shops	41	50	6	2	1	1	100

Source: Cape Area Panel Study 2009

4.3 Summary Statistics and Bivariate Relationships

Concerning socio-demographic variables, more men (10 percent) compared to women (4 percent) supported looting (see Appendix 12). Support for looting was slightly higher among black respondents, and respondents who spoke Xhosa at home. Both language and population group were significant in bivariate regression (see Appendix 13). Among black respondents, thirteen percent supported looting compared to seven percent of coloured and two percent of white respondents. Respondents who spoke Xhosa at home were also more likely to support deportation (0.07; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.05, 0.09) compared to respondents who spoke Afrikaans or English (the omitted groups). Language and race were highly correlated (r=0.99), and only the effect of race is considered in the multivariate regression models. Support for looting was

[19] As an effect of the design, the independent variables are not orthogonal. The observed correlation between the dummy variables representing the manipulations is 0.52.

slightly higher among older respondents – aged between 27 and 35 years – (8 percent), though age was not significant in bivariate regressions.

Our findings are that four percent of respondents in the upper class category support looting, compared to nine percent in the middle class category and eight percent in the working class category, support the eighth hypothesis: respondents who fear economic threat from immigrants are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes. Low socio-economic status does appear to be associated with support for looting, and applies to both lived and perceived poverty. Middle income earning (R1751-R5000) and high income earning (R5001+) respondents were less likely to support looting than low income earning respondents (R101-1750). Respondents who had some secondary and/or tertiary education were also less likely to support looting, compared to respondents who only had primary education (the omitted category). This supports hypothesis six: that less affluent and less educated respondents will exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents who reported that they would accept a low-status job that paid less than R3000 a month were also more likely to support looting (0.07; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.05, 0.09), compared to those who said they would not (the omitted group). Respondents in the upper class category were less likely to support looting (-0.05; p=0.00; 95% CI -0.07, -0.03), compared to respondents in the middle and working class categories (the reference group).

It is also possible that poverty is associated with other mediating factors such as neighbourhood environment. Respondents who reported feeling nervous, hopeless, fidgety, depressed, everything was an effort, or worthless (conceptualised as low self-esteem), were more likely to support looting (0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.09), compared to those who did not. As expected, respondents who reported that they disliked undocumented immigrants (the omitted group) were more likely to support looting than respondents who reported that they liked undocumented immigrants (-0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI -0.09, -0.04) or respondents who reported neutral feelings (-0.04; p=0.00; CI -0.07, -0.01). Norms may shape violence by legitimating attacks against immigrants (the use of violence as a means of resolving conflict). Having experienced domestic violence was significantly associated with support for looting (0.11; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.08, 0.13), as was having experienced violence outside of the home environment (0.074; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.05, 0.10). The perception that there is so much

violence because the police and courts are ineffective was positive and significantly associated with support for collective looting (0.06; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.04, 0.08).

Bivariate analysis largely supported the hypotheses outlined in chapter two of this study. By evaluating the effect of various explanatory variables on the morality of looting, a multivariate regression analysis enabled the researcher to determine which groups of people exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants. The study used the vignette as a dependent variable in the regression analysis[20].

4.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis

The chosen analytic approach focused on the effect of economic and cultural threat perceptions on the respondents' support for looting. Although structural factors were important determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, it was difficult to capture the direct impact of shifts in the economic and social structure, since the study is based on cross-sectional data. The independent variables addressed the assumption that respondents who perceived immigrants as worsening the socio-economic position of nationals, would exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Multivariate probit regression models were used to examine the impact of the various sets of variables on attitudes towards immigrants. The results from a sequential regression analysis – usually called hierarchical or nested analyses – are reported in appendix fourteen. Model I shows results when the nationality of the trader and the circumstances for looting are varied. Varying the nationality of the trader relates to the cultural threat hypothesis, whilst the circumstances for looting refer to the economic threat hypothesis. Model II shows results when demographic variables were included as independent variables. Socio-demographic variables address the cultural threat hypothesis. In Model III, labour market variables, which relate to the economic threat hypothesis, were added. Model IV displays the effects when all the objective variables were included with the subjective explanatory variables. The implicit

[20] To create the dependent variable for the analysis, opinion on collective looting is transformed into a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent said "Ok", "Good" or "Neither bad nor good", and a value of 0 if the respondent said "Very bad" or "Bad". The researcher also created dummy variables based on the manipulations of the vignette, with a value of 1 if a Somali immigrant owned the shop and a value of 0 if a shopkeeper, nationality unspecified, owned the shop.

hypothesis is that people who perceive immigrants as undermining their socio-economic well-being will exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants and support looting.

Model I demonstrates that manipulating the nationality of the trader has a significant influence on opinion about the morality of looting (p=0.00); varying the circumstances why the young men would loot a small trader was not statistically significant (p=0.32). Specifying the nationality of the trader had a significant impact on attitudes towards immigrants, and supported the first hypothesis that respondents are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants from other African countries, particularly when they are perceived as worsening the socio-economic position of nationals. The marginal effect of a small business being owned by a Somali trader was that the probability of a respondent supporting looting rose by three percentage points. However, the 95% confidence intervals cross is such that we cannot really be sure that there are real differences in the respondents' normative beliefs relating to looting the Somali trader as opposed to looting anyone else. The model has limited explanatory power as it does not explain much of the variation, the pseudo r-squared is low, less than 0.02.

The second regression model (Model II) demonstrates that race has a significant influence on support for looting. In South Africa, race is often also an indicator of social class and the researcher – in this chapter – compared the views of black respondents against those of coloured and white respondents (the control group). She did so because: (1) the vignette is understood within a township setting – townships are predominantly urban black residential areas, and (2) the attitudes of blacks' dealings with immigrants operating small businesses differ substantially from those of coloureds and whites due to the first mentioned propinquity.

Holding other background variables constant, the marginal effect of being black (relative to being non-black) is that the probability of supporting collective looting rose by seven percentage points. Judging from the regression output, race stands out clearly as having a bigger impact on attitudes towards immigrants than gender. In the previous chapter gender had no impact on the support for deportation, in the case of looting women were four times more likely to support looting compared to men. Western research on the impact of gender on attitudes towards immigrants has found contrasting results on the effect of gender on attitudes formation. The age variable had no significant impact at the bivariate and multivariate level,

and it is probable that the effect reflects a cohort effect rather than an age effect. An explained variance of around seven percent indicates that this simple regression model does explain some of the variation at the individual level.

In the next model, Model III, economic variables were added to those already included. Economic variables increased the model's explanatory power by little more than one percent, which is not a marked difference. Willingness to accept unskilled labour is the only economic variable that affected attitudes towards immigrants (0.04; p=0.00, 95% CI 0.02, 0.06). Willingness to accept a job that pays less than R3000 per month, which reflected poverty in the researcher's mind, was significant as a predictor for support for looting. Immigrants operating small businesses may be perceived as taking business opportunities from South Africans, and consequently worsening the socio-economic situation of South African nationals. Such views may lead people to exhibit pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Although the impact of labour market position and class position were in the expected direction at the bivariate level, they are not statistically significant at the multivariate level. Being unemployed (relative to being employed), as was the case in chapter three, appeared not to affect support for looting (0.00; p=0.70; 95% CI -0.02, 0.02); a finding that supported the results of other studies (see Schissel *et al.*, 1989). Being in the upper class category (relative to being in the middle class or working class category) was not statistically significant at the multivariate level. Economic variables in themselves do not appear to play an important role in affecting attitudes towards immigrants. The results of this research study suggest that public statements based on the economic roots of attitudes towards immigrants are counterproductive and do not help solve the social problem of anti-immigrant sentiments of many young adults in Cape Town.

The effect of the manipulations and demographic variables shown in Model II is only marginally modified when labour market position and income variables are added. Manipulating the nationality of the trader and gender continue to show a significant, direct effect on attitudes towards immigrants. In Model III, the marginal effect of being black (in relation to being non-black) is that support for looting decreases from seven to five percentage points, other factors holding constant. This suggests that willingness to accept

unskilled labour, as a subjective measure of poverty, improves our ability to predict the respondents' opinion towards looting.

The final model, Model IV, including the subjective variables in the analysis strengthens the model significantly. The explained variance increases from 9 percent to 21 percent. The subjective variables improve our ability to understand why some respondents do not support looting while others do. Variables that reflect the experience of violence (at home and outside the home) affect attitudes towards immigrants markedly. For example, the marginal effect of having experienced domestic violence increased the probability of supporting for looting by 9 percentage points. Dislike for undocumented immigrants was another variable that improved our ability to predict young adults' attitudes towards immigrants. Ineffective policing (0.05; p=0.00; 95% CI 0.03, 0.08) was regarded as a cause for violence, this may be because the South African Police Services (henceforth SAPS) is frequently depicted as corrupt and inefficient. De Kock (1997:32) has argued that ineffective policing is compounded by a "low police/population ratio, poor community-police relations and inadequate police training".

The variable measuring the respondents' feelings of control in the last thirty days, a subjective measure for self-esteem, was not statistically significant in the multivariate analysis (0.01; p=0.34; 95% CI -0.01, 0.04). The researcher had expected that respondents who had expressed feeling any of the following: nervous, hopeless, restless or fidgety, depressed, or that everything was an effort or worthless, within the last thirty days would be vulnerable and were more likely to perceive immigrants who operated small businesses as affecting their (the respondent's) socio-economic well-being, which in turn would affect support for looting as a good thing.

Overall, the results suggest that each category of independent variables incorporated into the final model, except for economic variables, impacts on the support for collective looting. The effect of the manipulations is unaffected by the introduction of other variables, including for example, demographic variables and subjective variables. Compared with the effect of the demographic variables, the impact of income variables appears small. Curiously, the experience of violence (at home and outside the home) had a strong impact on attitudes towards immigrants.

4.5 Discussion

By using support for looting as a measure of young adults' attitudes towards immigrants, the researcher extracted pattern of judgements relatively similar to that of support for deportation presented in chapter three. Just as the analysis of the effect of varying an immigrant's characteristics and nationality on the support for deportation, the situational context affects support for looting, albeit marginally. Respondents showed compassion, with very few respondents reporting that looting was either "Ok" or "Good". The findings reported in chapter three and four suggest that the method that is used to assess attitudes towards immigrants affects the extent and nature of people's attitudes. Policy interventions aimed at reducing negative attitudes towards immigrants may need to take into account the effect of manipulating an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances on attitude formation.

As noted in the discussion of the literature, negative attitudes towards immigrants are a complex socio-economic phenomenon that is moulded by economic, political and social factors. The results presented in this chapter, to a certain extent, support the argument that people who perceive immigrants as a threat to their socio-economic well-being are more likely to exhibit stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Social position indicators such as gender, race correlated with support for looting. The effect of race, compared to the other social position variables, stresses the high levels of inequality and poverty in Cape Town (see Appendix 2). Poverty reduces people's life chances, as illustrated in the analysis by the respondents' – willingness to accept a low-status job. The results from the regression analysis show that the experience of violence adds much to the explanatory power of the model in statistical terms. Earlier studies have suggested that suggests that poverty enhance the likelihood of a person or group engaging in violence or becoming a victim of violence (Butchart and Emmett, 2000; Burns, 2008; Thaler, 2011). In sum, the results suggest that manipulating and immigrants characteristics and circumstances has an effect on attitudes towards immigrants, in particular the nationality of a trader operating a small business – in this instance a Somali trader.

CHAPTER 5 PERCEPRTIONS ABOUT IMMIGRANTS IN FIVE NEIGHBOURHOODS IN CAPE TOWN

This chapter is an analysis of experiences with, and perceptions of, immigrants among South Africans[21] living in five neighbourhoods in Cape Town - Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley[22]. The analysis presented in this chapter complements the findings made in the previous chapters; though the focus shifts to a qualitative study. Findings in the previous chapters suggest that there are few clear-cut characteristics, which correlate with specific attitudes towards immigrants; making it difficult to identify and label the factors that affect people's perceptions about immigrants, with exactitude. In this chapter, the researcher presents findings in a unified argument. Locating what people say (the data) in their economic, political and social milieu. The researcher pays close attention to the ways in which the respondents expressed negative attitudes towards immigrants, and relates attitudes to the context in which the individual interviewees find themselves.

5.1 Factors that Affect People's Attitudes towards Immigrants

This section unpacks the interviewees' differentiated experiences with immigrants, by exploring their descriptions of their experiences and perceptions of immigrants against the background of their social milieu. Through the investigation of the lived experiences, the study begins to build a picture of the factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants. In this section, the researcher begins by introducing five respondents. In their stories, we see that various factors, such as relations across race, negative stereotypes and religion affect attitudes towards immigrants.

[21] The researcher has changed all the interviewee's names to pseudonyms to maintain confidentiality.

[22] For the purposes of this study, the researcher selected a small sample of thirteen interview transcripts from the original sample of 51 interviewees interviewed in these five neighbourhoods. Large variations in the interviewees' lived experiences emerged from this small sample, and a larger sample would have made the analytical task unmanageable without adding depth to the analysis. Discourses of perceptions and patterns in the interviews indicated that more interviews would not have generated new data of any significance. The thirteen transcripts provided rich and diverse data for analysis. The selection of the interview transcript was purposive to ensure that the sample covered the range of experiences.

5.1.1 Sindiswa

Sindiswa is a 35-year-old widow who lives in Weltevreden Valley with her three children. She grew up in the Eastern Cape and moved to Cape Town in 1997. When she first arrived in Cape Town, Sindiswa lived with her brother in Crossroads. She then moved to join her husband's family in Philippi. Due to a family dispute involving her in-laws, Sindiswa and her husband moved into an informal settlement in Samora in 1998. Whilst living in Samora, Sindiswa registered on the housing waiting list, and waited for a year and a half before the housing authorities allocated her a house in Weltevreden Valley in 2000.

In terms of material wealth, Sindiswa states that she is the same as people living in her community. Sindiswa does not regard herself as poor, because to her "*a poor person is someone who does not have anything*." Like most people living in her neighbourhood, Sindiswa is unemployed but she receives child support grants[23] for two of her youngest children.

In addition, Sindiswa sells meat at home and leases a shack in her backyard in order to supplement her income: "*[Zimbabweans] live at the back of my house, and they have lived with me for four years*." Sindiswa described her tenants as people who "*do not have too many friends*." In the past, Sindiswa leased her backyard shack to other tenants. Describing her previous experience with South African tenants, Sindiswa uses common stereotypes that people of different cultures and race in South Africa have about each other: "*Tshangane are rude, they are the same as coloureds. They fight and they want the whole world to see that they are fighting. On weekends, they drink the whole night and they make noise. I did not like them and I chased them out.*"

Curiously, Sindiswa's perception on social integration reflected positive attitudes towards immigrants: "*I like it when we are mixed. My tenants show me how they live in their country, and I show them how we do things*." Sindiswa is supportive of the rights of immigrants living in her community, and shows an appreciation for cross-border immigration*:* "*Your job might transfer you to Mozambique, which is not your country. How do you think [Mozambicans] will react when you are there? Our people are there, so why should we say [immigrants] do not have rights*?"

[23] In 2009, the Child Support Grant (CSG) was worth R240 per child.

5.1.2 Dylan

Dylan grew up in Parrow and moved to Delft Leiden in 2002 when the local government authorities allocated him a house there. Like most residents in Delft Leiden, Dylan had been on the waiting list for a house for a long time. He reflected on how difficult it was to acquire a house: "*I was on a waiting list for a long time. My wife and I had done the application for the house in 1985 and since that time, we were waiting for the house*."

Dylan lives with his wife and two children, and is a self-employed tailor. He does not have a steady income and receives between R1000 and R5000 per month, but he expressed satisfaction with his income and lifestyle. In addition, friendly neighbours who "*are like family*", and whom he can trust with his children should he and his wife need a child minder, surround Dylan. These neighbours include immigrants who live in his street: "*Up the street here there is one [immigrant] from Pakistan and we are very close to each other. The other one comes from Somalia and we are also very close to each other*." He explained just how close his relationship with his immigrant neighbours was: "*The Somali people are doing business here, and my friend has got a barber shop. I usually go there on my way to work. He knows that every month I cut my hair by him, sometimes for free, as a friend, and that is because of our relationship."* Although they are not competing for the same resource, Dylan does not mention feeling resentment because his immigrant neighbours own businesses.

Commenting on social integration in Delft Leiden, Dylan feels that people should "*communicate more with each other*." In the immediate future, Dylan sees the success of social integration as depending on children: "*Our children can make a difference because they are growing up communicating with people of different backgrounds*." Dylan is open-minded about social integration, which he explains very eloquently: "*My neighbours are people of different backgrounds. My next-door neighbour is coloured, my other next-door neighbour is black and the one next to him is white. The communication is very good, and we do not have a problem with each other*." Like Sindiswa, Dylan says that he does not discriminate against immigrants living in his community. Rather, he takes pride in the community's diversity and sees cultural integration as a way to bring people together.

5.1.3 Ryan

Ryan is 41 years old and lives with his wife and four children (aged twenty-one, nineteen, twelve and five), in Tambo Square. They have been married for twenty-two years. He met his wife whilst living in Manenberg, sharing a house with a friend. Unlike Dylan, Ryan only had to wait for nine months before the housing authorities allocated him a house. Since 1999, Ryan has been living in Tambo Village, and gets along well with his neighbours, who are predominantly coloured.

Ryan works in a waterproofing company and receives R300 a day. However, his work is seasonal and greatly affected by rainy weather. This means that some weeks he is not able to work and therefore earns nothing. In addition to the income from Ryan's job, the family receives monthly child support grants for their two younger children. Understandably, Ryan is dissatisfied with his income and he explains this when he says, "*everything that we earn feeds us; we do not have enough to save*."

Crime and violence are rife in Ryan's neighbourhood, and this could be a consequence of poverty: "*When we first moved here and people were shooting we would all lie on the ground. Now we are used [to it]. When they shoot, we all run to go and see because the fear has gone, the softness is gone*." The extent of violence in Ryan's neighbourhood becomes clearer when he reflects on the events of May 2008, when violence against immigrants erupted there. He describes how he helped his immigrant neighbours to escape: "*When [neighbourhood members] came over to kill the Somalis and set their shacks alight, I put all of them in the car and drove them to Bellville. I was the only person in this whole [neighbourhood] who helped*." His act of heroism, however, did make him unpopular with his South African neighbours: "*When I got back, [neighbourhood members] wanted to assault me*." This indicates the range of responses to immigrants: some nationals want to attack immigrants, and even attack South African nationals who help immigrants; and other nationals are prepared to assist immigrants even at some risk to their selves.

Since rescuing the Somalis from an unimaginable fate, Ryan feels that he is closer to his immigrant neighbours than before: "*When [the Somalis] returned some of them came to shake my hands to thank me, they hugged me. That is why, when I go to their shop I spend more than half an hour because they stand and speak to me*." Ryan says that immigrants have

as much right to stay in Tambo Square as South Africans do: "*[Somalis] are human like we are, and they are God's creation. Many people are against them coming in for work, they do not have it easy, in their country there is war*." Religion seems to affect the perceptions that Ryan holds about the rights bestowed to immigrants, which might explain why he was willing to risk his life in assisting immigrants to escape the violence of May 2008.

5.1.4 Dumisa

Dumisa grew up in the Eastern Cape, near King William's Town, and in 1991 came to Cape Town to look for employment. Before moving to Delft Leiden in 2003, Dumisa stayed in Joe Slovo, a predominantly black township. Like Dylan, Dumisa waited for several (eight) years before the Cape Town Housing Department allocated him a house. At the time of the interview, Dumisa had recently lost his job and was living with his girlfriend, who operated a small business from his home. Their monthly income was less than R3000 per month.

Sadly, Dumisa had a very strained relationship with his neighbours, whom he accused of being jealous and spreading rumours about him: "*I have no relationship with my neighbours because they are jealous of me. My neighbours told my former girlfriend that I was in love with another girl around the area, and that the girl I was in love with was HIV positive. Even the girlfriend I am living with now, they say the same thing to her*." As a result, Dumisa had limited interaction with his neighbours: "*We greet each other good morning and good afternoon, but we do nothing together*." An unstable relationship with other South Africans seems to have affected his interaction with immigrants living in his neighbourhood, some of whom are also his neighbours: "*I cannot tell you about people who come from other countries because I do not know about them, I just know they are from Nigeria and Zimbabwe*."

Dumisa mistrusts his neighbours, and feels that crime is rife in Delft Leiden. He illustrates this when he says, "*I do not trust anyone, and there are many thieves here because we are a mixed [coloured and black] neighbourhood*." His view of coloureds is very unflattering: *"Coloureds are very, very silly because they smoke drugs, they drink liquor, they are rude and they do unnecessary things*." As a result, Dumisa felt that most of the problems faced by Delft Leiden residents result from social integration. Dumisa holds very fond memories of his relationship with his neighbours in Joe Slovo: *"Joe Slovo was a very tight [neighbourhood] my friend. There is a very big difference between Delft [Leiden] and Joe Slovo. In our area in*

Joe Slovo we were staying alone, blacks only." Dumisa obviously does not trust coloureds, and alleges that during the May 2008 violence against immigrants, coloureds were responsible for chasing immigrants away from Delft: "*[Coloureds] chased away the people who do business here from Ethiopia and Somalia. It was the coloured people, no black people supported that*." These statements speak of the subtle racial tension between racial groups in Delft Leiden.

Although Dumisa feels that social integration has not been successful in Delft Leiden, he is adamant that true integration is achievable in post-apartheid South Africa. He says, "*It is possible to live together, but we must understand that we are all equal now. If we can unite and build our community and secure our community as well I think it would be good for us*." This might be the reason why, despite having no interaction with immigrants in his community, Dumisa feels that immigrants have a right to live in Delft: "*[Immigrants] do nothing wrong to us, so I do not know how I can say they have no right to stay with us*." Dumisa appreciates the contribution that immigrants make to the neighbourhood, without prejudice: "*[Immigrants] come to help us. They open shops in our area, the shops that [South Africans] do not know how to open*." As such, Dumisa holds stronger negative attitudes towards coloureds, than he does immigrants.

Dumisa's negative experience with his neighbours has induced negative attitudes towards coloureds in general, and it is probable that Dumisa has a cultural affinity with immigrants living in his community, since his descriptions are about African immigrants. On the other hand, Dumisa may resent coloureds more because of their slightly superior status to that of black South Africans during apartheid. He may see himself as struggling for social equality with otherwise better off coloureds. Dumisa came from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town in search of better prospects, so it is reasonable to infer that he may feel like an immigrant in his native country.

5.1.5 Dineo

When Dineo was born, her family were renting a house in Gugulethu, Cape Town. However, her parents lost the house when her father was involved in an accident and could no longer pay the rent. Her family then moved to an informal settlement, and later moved to Tambo Square when the Housing Department allocated her parents a house. Dineo now lives with her two children, her sister and her sister's child in her parents' house. She is unemployed,

but sells medicines to cover her living expenses. When business is good, Dineo can earn up to R2000 per month in profit. In terms of material wellbeing, Dineo considers herself to be just about the same as others "*because [she] eats before [she] sleeps every day*."

Since moving to Tambo Square in 1997, Dineo finds that relations with her neighbours are more formal. She recalls days in the informal settlements, with nostalgia: "*In the shacks, it was not like here. If I was short of beef stock, I could go to my neighbour. Here people stay in their houses; we just greet each other when we pass*." As a result, Dineo keeps to herself, because she "*[does] not want to irritate*" her neighbours. Concerning immigrants living in her neighbourhood, Dineo is very selective about who has or has not the right to stay there. She feels that immigrants increase the rate of crime in South Africa: "*People from Zimbabwe are here because of the situation there. I understand why they came to live here, so I do not have a problem with them. There are those people from other countries who bring crime. I am not saying that there is no crime in South Africa, but they make it worse. So no, they do not have a right to belong here*." What is curious is the nature of the criminal activity that Dineo is concerned about: "*I hate this thing they are doing of dubbing CD's and making copies, that is what I hate the most*." However, Dineo is strongly against the use of violence against immigrants, and reflects on the events of May 2008 with regret: "*When [immigrants] were beaten I did not like it. I wished they were given their things and given time to leave*." It appears Dineo is against the use of violence towards immigrants, but not against their deportation from South Africa. Her argument is that immigrants increase crime, and do not have the right to live in South Africa, unless they have a good reason to remain in the country.

5.2 Discussion

The previous section opened with the respondents' experiences, and perceptions, about immigrants living in their neighbourhoods. Upon examining the respondent's descriptions about immigrants, the researcher was able to show that the respondents' relations and economic realities affect attitudes towards immigrants. The racially desegregated housing allocation in Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley adds a curious and challenging dynamic to communal relations and attitudes towards immigrants: a population with various socio-economic and cultural cleavages, which are a potential source for discord.

The life histories of the respondents reflected severe material deprivation, as most respondents were unemployed and lived in impoverished circumstances: *"I am not working and I cannot support myself and my children. We receive a child support grant for my grandson who is ten and it sustains us for the whole month"* (Buthle, Delft South).

Concerning jobs, some respondents felt that immigrants are responsible for the increase in the high levels of unemployment in their neighbourhood, because the latter take opportunities, to operate businesses and have a job, away from South Africans (Hypothesis 5). The respondents' descriptions reflected feelings of exclusion and resentment: *"The Somalis and the Zimbabweans are taking all the work, because they work for lower wages. That is why there are no jobs for South Africans*" (Celeste, Delft South). This could lead to individual or collective violence against immigrants. The interviewees' descriptions suggested that living in poverty and lacking employment strains relationships between immigrants and nationals, as people associated immigrants with stealing jobs, causing crime and bringing disease like HIV/AIDS to South Africa.

Analysis in chapters three and four showed that poverty and unemployment have only indirect effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Unemployment was not significant as predictor of the support for deportation or looting. The relationship between labour market position, poverty and unemployment has not been explored widely in the South African context, though Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) have found that unemployment affects attitudes towards immigrants negatively.

Due to the high level of material deprivation in these five neighbourhoods, interviewees stated that financial strain exacerbated negative attitudes towards immigrants (Hypothesis 7). Respondents perceived immigrants to be financially more successful, the evidence was the former's ownership of material goods. The researcher found many descriptions of immigrants who operate successful businesses in the respondents' narratives, Somali and Nigerian immigrants in particular: *The Nigerians and Somalis are here to make money, small shops and barbershops. The Somalis cut the hair, the Nigerians have shops and they keep their prices low, they make [South Africans] poor*" (Deon, Delft North). This sometimes led to

protests: "*There was a protest here because Nigerians and Somalis are selling their goods cheaper than coloureds"* (Ayanda, Delft North).

Whilst, some respondents, for example, Dylan and Dumisa, showed no resentment towards immigrants operating businesses in their neighbourhoods, for others, these neighbourhood businesses run by immigrants trigger negative attitudes towards, which are often associated with criminal activities:

"*There are Somalis and Nigerians staying here, and they are a problem. They sell everything at a very low cost, and the reason for that is because they are selling drugs and they are also selling fake things*"(Anya, Delft North).

"*Somalis and Nigerians rob people. They have beautiful cars and money because they deal with diamonds and drugs*" (Celeste, Delft South).

The nationality of immigrants' appears to have a strong effect on people's perceptions that some immigrants are engaged in crime (Hypothesis 1). Reitzes and Bam (2000) support this finding. In the regression analysis, though, an immigrant's nationality tended to have only indirect effect on attitudes towards immigrants. Yet immigrants from African countries were a major concern for the interviewees, which maybe because the majority of immigrants living these neighbourhoods (based on the interviewees' descriptions) are from other African countries. Generally, the interviewees blamed immigrants for a variety of social ills, which afflict their neighbourhoods. Interviewees saw immigrants as agents of crime and social decay:

"*If your [mobile] phone is stolen [immigrants] are able to unlock it even if you block it. It is such criminal activities that I do not like. South Africans do not know what to do when a phone is blocked."* (Luzuko, Weltevreden Valley)

The perception that immigrants spread diseases also affected attitude towards immigrants, and it is probable that the high rates of HIV/AIDS prevalence, in the South African, compound these perceptions. The results presented in chapter three showed that support for deportation was stronger for an undocumented immigrant who was unemployed and/or HIV positive. A similar trend was observed among interviewees who supported restrictive immigration policies on immigrants, regardless of an immigrant's circumstances:

"*[Immigrants] do not belong here. During apartheid, how was it? The apartheid government did not allow them access here. What will happen if I go to Somalia now, if I open a shop there? Will they like it? The other day I read in the newspaper about [an immigrant] working as security guard who is paid very little. The man said that he had left his wife and children in Somalia, or wherever. He came to make money here, but he does not even make enough money to take care of himself. What is the use, to come here and struggle, because he could have stayed and struggled there*" (Deon, Delft North).

Yet some respondents were compassionate, and acknowledged that immigrants alone cannot take the blame for all the social ills in this country: "*Some people say that Somalis bring drugs and AIDS into the country that is bullshit, they are just jealous*" (Ayanda, Delft North). In addition, respondents appeared to sympathise more with some groups of immigrants, particularly Zimbabwean immigrants, most of who have fled their country due to economic insecurity and political persecution – the findings in chapter three of this dissertation supported this conclusion: *"Because of poverty and hardships from where [Zimbabweans] come from, I don't judge them. I welcome them. It is terrible where they come from, poverty, no jobs, and all those things*" (Sikhumbuzo, Tambo Square).

Religion also seemed to play an important role in determining the respondents' attitudes towards immigrants: *"I do not have the right to say '[immigrants] do not belong here' because they are a creation of God, the only difference is that they are from another place, but they are still God's creation*" (Rosalie, Delft South). It is probable that religious beliefs encourage a more tolerant attitude, and promote interaction in churches and mosques, though there are no studies that confirm this relationship. Social values shape the way people perceive others, such that attitudes towards immigrants are a product of socialisation. Thus, religious organisations can mould norms and values that individuals hold, as reflected in the respondents' descriptions. Some researchers have argued that religious organisations offer a place for progressive theological reflection and practical action on moral formation and social justice (Deacon and Simbayi, 2006).

On the other hand, immigrants also appeared to have adopted some strategies to integrate into the neighbourhood. Rosalie, who lived in Delft South, explained how immigrants learnt the local languages in order to communicate with South Africans, or married South African

nationals in order legitimise their stay in South Africa: "*[Immigrants] get married to South Africans to get a visa and citizenship, and learn how to communicate with us*."

Overall, the interviewees' descriptions, which were analysed in this chapter, suggest that in attitudes towards immigrants in the five neighbourhoods considered were generally negative. The respondents' relationships and economic realities affected the formation of their attitudes towards immigrants. The negative attitudes were no illusion as the overwhelmingly negative discourses about immigrants show. The respondents perceive immigrants as a group to be untrustworthy, violent, and that they bring disease, compete for employment and commit crime.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

This study has analysed attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town, South Africa, using a two-pronged approach. This study originated from a concern about the widespread negative attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. Using survey data, first of all, the researcher assessed the effect of manipulating an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances, on attitudes towards immigrants among young adults in Cape Town. The quantitative analysis revealed that varying an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances, does affect attitudes towards immigrants, although sometimes in unexpected ways. Secondly, the researcher examined the lived experiences and perceptions of immigrants among homeowners who were living in five – newly-built, low-income neighbourhoods – in Cape Town.

In chapter two the researcher reviewed local studies that have documented the negative attitudes towards immigrants, in South Africa and elsewhere. Evidence that negative public attitudes in South Africa have increased can be found in attitude surveys and local case studies. Factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants are complex and interconnected, to such an extent that it was difficult to construct a framework for assessing attitudes towards immigrants for this study. The researcher then considered attitude studies conducted in the West (USA and Europe) in order to formulate hypotheses that were testable using data from the CAPS 2009. Hernes and Knudsen (1992) provided a useful framework for identifying the factors that affect attitude formation. They identified structural factors that provide the context within which group or individual attitudes are formed. Within this overall context, Hernes and Knudsen identified a number of socio-economic and demographic attributes that influence individual and group attitudes towards immigrants. Drawing on these factors and evidence from previous studies, the researcher formulated nine hypotheses, which related mainly to economic and cultural threat theoretical models.

In chapter three the researcher examined vignette data on young adults' support for the deportation of immigrants from South Africa. The analysis considered two vignettes – short stories about immigrants – that varied the characteristics and circumstances of individual immigrants living in South Africa. Analysis of the first vignette - about an undocumented immigrant from Zimbabwe – showed that attitudes towards immigrants, gauged by support for the deportation of an undocumented immigrant, were generally negative, with a third of

respondents (35 percent) supporting deportation. Young adults expressed negative attitudes towards an unemployed (40 percent) and HIV positive (38 percent) immigrant, but showed compassion for an immigrant threatened with persecution (29 percent) or whose family was starving in the home country (32 percent). The effects of the manipulations were small, and provided little evidence that young adults were making distinctions between a desirable or undesirable immigrant based on the immigrant's circumstances. This could be a consequence of an immigrant's legal status. At a theoretical level, these findings suggest that, consistent with the work of several other researchers (e.g. Crush *et al*., 2008; Everatt, 2010), there are boundary conditions for successfully improving less restrictive policy measures against immigrants. When an immigrant is described as undocumented, as is the case for the undocumented immigrant vignette, support for deportation may actually rise regardless of the immigrant's circumstances.

The second vignette, about an immigrant family in South Africa, was more successful in generating intolerance. Young adults expressed a distinct preference for immigrants who work and pay their taxes, with only a minority (12 percent) supporting the deportation of an immigrants family who work and get along with their neighbours. Manipulating the immigrant family's nationality did not matter at all. In this regard, economic factors, rather than cultural factors, appear to make a significant difference in the young adults' support for deportation. In terms of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, the findings did not support the view that national identity can have a significant impact on the support for deportation. This is promising because changing people's conceptions of national identity is a difficult task (Esses *et al*., 2006). Immigrants perceived to be a fiscal burden, as they did not contribute to the country at all, were more likely to elicit support for their deportation (Hypothesis 7). The effect of the individual characteristics of respondents (on whether they supported the deportation option or not) were inconsistent. Both economic – class, education (Hypothesis 6), employment (Hypothesis 5) – and cultural – age (Hypothesis 4), gender (Hypothesis 3), race (Hypothesis 2) – variables explained small variations in the respondents' support for deportation, and there were no clearly definable traits common to those who exhibited stronger negative attitudes towards immigrants. Subjective variables (which related to the respondents' social milieu (Hypotheses 8 and 9)) were a little more successful in explaining a respondents' support for deportation, compared to economic and socio-demographic variables.

Chapter 4 presented quantitative data, but shifted the focus to assessing attitudes towards immigrants based on the morality of looting. It again provided the opportunity to manipulate the trader's nationality and the circumstances for looting. Support for looting was very low; the majority of respondents (93 percent) reported that looting was either "Very bad" or "Bad". Manipulating the nationality of the trader affected support for deportation (Hypothesis 1). In this instance, a Somali immigrant who was described as more successful, in terms of material wealth and within a township setting, triggered negative attitudes among some groups of respondents. Varying the reason for looting had no effect on the support for looting. The nationality of the immigrant (cultural threat), mattered more than the circumstances given for looting (economic threat), which contrasts with the findings in chapter three in which the nationality of the immigrant family did not matter, compared to the social status of the immigrant family. It is probable that the nationality variable represented by a Somali trader, which was manipulated in the looting vignette, was interpreted as an economic threat (Hypothesis 7) by the respondents who supported looting, as it is common for Somali traders to operate businesses in South African townships. Immigrants who operate businesses in the townships are perceived more successful than locals, in terms of material wealth, but it is also the case that they make opportunities for employing South Africans.

Among those who supported looting, regarding a respondent's individual characteristics, it seems that those respondents, who are more likely to have direct contact with Somali traders in the townships, supported looting. Demographic factors that were associated with support for looting, include race (blacks were more likely to support looting, compared to coloured and white respondents – Hypothesis 2); and gender (female respondents were more likely to support looting than male respondents – Hypothesis 3). The effect of gender is difficult to explain, but the townships are predominantly poor black urban neighbourhoods, and many case studies have found evidence of competition for scarce resource between immigrants and nationals (Dobson and Oelofse, 2000; Pillay *et al*., 2008). Economic factors (Hypotheses 5 and 6) had an indirect effect on the support for looting, compared to subjective variables. Whilst economic variables increased the explanatory power of the multivariate regression model by two percent, subjective variables increased the model's explanatory power by approximately 12 percent. More research is needed to better establish the presence or absence of interactions between economic variables and immigrant characteristics that affect support for looting. The experience of violence at home and outside the home (Hypothesis 8) had a

marked effect on support for looting. This stresses the relationship between poverty and violence, common in black urban townships, which may exacerbate hostile attitudes towards immigrants. In summary, chapters three and four indicated the effects of manipulating an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances produced more positive and differentiated attitudes.

The researcher was also interested in capturing people's perceptions of their experiences of immigrants living in their neighbourhoods, as opposed to presenting people with stories about immigrants. Data presented in chapter five showed that homeowners who participated in a neighbourhood study, exhibited negative attitudes towards immigrants. Competition for material resources affected attitudes towards immigrants. This finding resonated with the conclusions in chapter four. The most common explanation for these negative attitudes was a sense that immigrants exacerbate unemployment (Hypothesis 5) because they are seen to be taking business opportunities away from South African nationals. The results also showed that immigrants were accused of a variety of social ills which were rampant in these five neighbourhoods. Most notable was the perception that immigrants were involved in criminal activities. Immigrants from Nigeria and Somalia were particularly liable to be stereotyped as criminals, who traded in diamonds and drugs, or who laundered money. These stereotypes were often linked to their relative wealth in contrast to the severe material deprivation in these neighbourhoods. This contrast came out strongly in respondents' descriptions. As a result, interviewees supported restrictive immigration policies and felt that immigrants had no right to live in their neighbourhoods. Yet not all interviewees were intolerant of immigrants. As in the quantitative analysis, respondents also showed compassion towards some groups of immigrants, Zimbabwean immigrants in particular. Religion appeared to play an important role in mediating people's attitudes towards immigrants.

Finally then, this study suggests that vignettes offer an alternative method of exploring attitudes towards immigrants. The effects of manipulating an immigrant's characteristics and circumstances suggest that attitudes towards immigrants among young adults in Cape Town are generally negative, but not monolithically so. The immigration policy in South Africa needs to be revisited and young adults in South Africa need to be educated around issues of immigration. Given the relative importance of the situational contexts manipulated in the current research, it would be useful to replicate this research in South Africa and elsewhere.

In this way, we may be able to more clearly pinpoint whether the vignette technique is a means of producing more valid and more reliable measures of respondents' opinions on immigrants and immigration issues. Further research, using this method in studying attitudes towards immigrants, could also benefit from a more holistic ethnographic approach, in order to gain an expanded and more nuanced understanding of the factors that affect attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. Of course, relations between immigrants and non-immigrants are not one-sided. Just as it is important to determine how citizens of a nation respond to immigration issues, it is important to examine how these issues influence immigrants to the nation.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Study methods

In this section, the researcher provides an overview of the study methods.

The Study Site

Cape Town (the largest city in the Western Cape Province) is a multi-cultural city. Pronounced socio-economic inequalities and residential segregation along racial lines characterise the geography of the city. Unlike other South African cities, coloureds comprise the majority of the population, this group makes up 48 percent of Cape Town's population, which is estimated at three million[24] (City of Cape Town, 2001). Under apartheid, Cape Town was a coloured labour preference area (Saff, 1998). The government of that time deliberately separated black residents from their white counterparts. There were strict laws to prevent the mass urbanisation of black South Africans. This has given Cape Town a distinctive racial composition and cultural character (Seekings *et al.*, 2005; Seekings, 2007a; 2007b).

Cape Town grapples with many of the socio-economic problems confronting the rest of South Africa, the most crucial of which are unemployment and housing shortages. According to Seekings (2007b, 2007c), the poverty and inequality in Cape Town is a legacy of South Africa's apartheid past, which discriminated against black South Africans. Racial residential segregation, unemployment and an unequal distribution of labour are still characteristic of contemporary Cape Town more than a decade after the transition to democracy.

In Cape Town, poverty coexists with great affluence (ibid). Many black South Africans in Cape Town are extremely poor, with the majority living in townships and informal settlements, which are characterised by great poverty and social deprivation. Many black South Africans had high expectations that political change would reduce poverty and inequality (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).

[24] It is noted that the figures presented here are based on the 2001 Census and do not accurately reflect the population of Cape Town today.

Most townships in Cape Town are at a considerable distance from the central business district and the affluent suburbs. Under apartheid, black South Africans were disposed of valuable land because of forced removals. The townships were dormitory areas for black workers employed in white businesses and homes. Underdeveloped and remote rural areas in the Eastern Cape, called homelands, were the preserve of black South Africans. With the establishment of democratic government, black South Africans migrated into formerly white cities (Gilbert *et al.*, 1997; Saff, 1998). Inequality and poverty in Cape Town persist, in part, because of the large-scale migration of poor black South Africans from the Eastern Cape. Rural to urban migration has reinforced urban inequality and poverty because of the high level of unemployment. This has also resulted in increased pressure on social services, and in rampant crime.

According to Saff (1998:90), competition for housing, jobs and land has increased racial tensions between blacks and coloureds. Many coloureds in Cape Town argue that post-apartheid government policies favour blacks over coloureds. Cape Town, however, presents an enabling and favourable environment – particularly in terms of relative tolerance towards immigrants – and attracts a large number of immigrants from neighbouring African countries. Many immigrants come to Cape Town with little or no economic resources; they have fled from conflict or are searching for a better life. Because of their limited financial resources, many immigrants reside in predominantly black townships and informal settlements, where conditions are appalling. Despite South Africa's relative wealth compared to the rest of Africa, and its superior economic position in the region, the country grapples with unemployment, and the government services directed at meeting the needs of the poor are very under resourced and poorly administered. Because of the huge burden of unmet basic human needs of the majority of South Africans, these circumstances can easily lead to conflict between South Africans and immigrants.

The Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS)

The quantitative data used in this study comes from the fifth wave of the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS 2009 hereafter), which was conducted by the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR hereafter) at the University of Cape Town. The CAPS 2009 comprises a representative sample of young adults aged between 19 and 35 years. The unweighted sample consisted of 2,915 young adults.

CAPS, which began in 2002, and was continued in 2003/2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009, is a longitudinal survey of young adults living in Cape Town. It focused on a series of economic, political and social attitudes. The first wave of the CAPS, conducted in 2002, had an original sample of 4,752 young adults, whose ages ranged from 14 to 22 years[25]. Significantly, the CAPS began eight years after South Africa's first democratic election. Although young adults in post-apartheid South Africa have more opportunities than previously for access to housing, education, employment, health and welfare the country grapples with unemployment, crime, violence and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. By studying the challenges and opportunities that these young adults have to meet, the CAPS makes it possible for researchers and policy makers to explore the complicated transition that faces young people in Cape Town.

Data Collection

The original CAPS used a stratified two-stage sampling design, which included young adults from each of the three major population groups (black, coloured and white) in Cape Town. The selection of the sample was random. Selection involved a complex process of dividing the 1996 population census into three strata depending on whether the population in each enumerating area (EA henceforth) was predominantly black, coloured or white[26]. The proportions of representatives drawn from the different racial groups meant that the sample was both purposive and representative.

The first stage of sampling involved selecting sample clusters or primary sampling units (PSUs henceforth) using the EAs as the basic sampling units. The second stage of sampling involved selecting households within each cluster. The process of selecting 25 households from within the PSUs was done using aerial photographs combined with onsite inspection. The final sample of households interviewed included all screened households with members aged between 14 and 22. Fieldworkers interviewed up to three young adults in each household[27].

[25] For a full description of the CAPS survey design and survey instrument visit http://www.caps.uct.ac.za/.

[26] An enumerating area (EA) is the geographical area enumerated by one census representative.

[27] In cases where a household had more than three young people, fieldworkers interviewed the three young people in the household with the most recent birthdays.

In 2009, the fifth wave of the CAPS re-interviewed 2,915 of the respondents selected in wave one, who were re-interviewed in the second, third and forth waves. Three of the official languages spoken in South Africa, Afrikaans, English and Xhosa, were use to administer the questionnaire. The starting target for the CAPS 2009 was 4,100 respondents. Due to attrition (respondents moving away, death or mental illness), however, the realised sample was 2,915 respondents. An important feature of the CAPS 2009 is that it included a new module that used vignettes to investigate attitudes towards immigrants, which provided data relevant for this study.

Key Demographic Indicators

This section briefly discusses the key demographic indicators of the CAPS 2009 using weighted data. The CAPS 2009 sample included interviews with 1,326 blacks, 1,425 coloureds and 164 white respondents[28]. Almost half of the sample were coloured (49 percent), and less than ten percent were white. Slightly more women participated in the survey compared to men. Approximately two fifths of the respondents were unemployed, and the income profile of the respondents suggested that a significant proportion of the respondents were poor.

Table 10: CAPS 2000 Sample Characteristics

	Percentages[29]			
Attribute	Black	Coloured	White	All respondents
Gender				
Female	54	51	48	51
Age				
18-26	69	71	81	72
27-35	31	29	19	28
Language				
Afrikaans	0	68	42	44
English	1	32	58	28
Xhosa	99	0	0	28
Education				
Primary	7	10	0	7
Secondary	89	85	68	83
Tertiary	4	6	32	10
Employment status				
Unemployed	56	37	39	41
Income				
R101-R600	3	1	0	1
R601-R1750	37	15	10	19
R1751-R5000	54	66	46	60
R5001-R1400	6	18	36	18
R14001+	0	0	9	1

Source: CAPS 2009

[28] Whites include Indians who made up less than 1 percent of the total population.

[29] Percentages may not always add up to 100 due to rounding effect.

Data Analysis

The researcher describes the specific statistical techniques used for analysing the survey data in the relevant chapters.

Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley Neighbourhood Work[30]

The CSSR originally conducted the neighbourhood study in five housing projects, Delft Leiden, Delft North, Delft South, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley, in order to assess whether allocating houses to South Africans who are diverse, racially or in other terms, lead to identifiable economic, political or social problems. However, the interviews revealed attitudes towards immigrants, which provided data relevant for this research.

Data Collection

The Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley Study employed a combination of multi-stage cluster and purposive sampling in the selection of the samples. The researchers used purposive sampling because it is ideal for qualitative studies of specific neighbourhoods. The samples were based on the researchers' knowledge of the population and the aims of the study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). At the first stage of sampling, project researchers grouped the research site into large clusters. The second stage involved selecting sub-clusters within the large clusters in accordance with the number of interviews required. These sub-clusters existed as a number of houses bound by roads within the large cluster. The final stage of sampling involved purposively selecting houses within each sub-cluster, and then interviewing the homeowner about the quality of the neighbourhood.

Interviews were semi-structured to provide in-depth information about the nature of the respondents' experiences, and to allow the interviewees to speak freely so they could add more texture and depth: the interview schedule was only a guide. A team of the project researchers and a fieldworker conducted, recorded and transcribed all interviews (verbatim). They interviewed the head of each household. Depending on the interviewee's language preference, interviews were conducted in Afrikaans, English or Xhosa. Afrikaans and Xhosa interviews were later translated into English.

[30] For a full description of the Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley neighbourhood study see Seekings et al. (2010).

Table 11: Neighbourhood Study Sample Characteristics

Respondent	Race	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Employment Status	Housing Area
Anya	Coloured	47	Female	Married	Unemployed	Delft North
Ayanda	Coloured	40	Female	Married	Unemployed	Delft North
Buthle	Black	-	Female	Widow	Unemployed	Delft South
Celeste	Coloured	-	Female	Single	Unemployed	Delft South
Deon	Coloured	45	Male	Married	Employed	Delft North
Dineo	Black	36	Female	Single	Unemployed	Tambo Square
Dumisa	Black	-	Male	Partner	Unemployed	Delft Leiden
Dylan	Coloured	-	Male	Married	Self-employed	Delft Leiden
Luzuko	Black	-	Male	Single	Part-time employment	Weltevreden Valley
Rosalie	Coloured	39	Female	Married	Unemployed	Delft South
Ryan	Coloured	41	Male	Married	Employed	Tambo Square
Sindiswa	Black	35	Female	Widow	Unemployed	Weltevreden Valley
Sisipho	Black	49	Female	-	Unemployed	Tambo Square

Demographically the interviewees were broadly similar. The intention was not to make generalisations from their homogeneity, but to explore similarities and differences in their responses. There were both female and male interviewees, and they were either black or coloured. Most interviewees owned their houses. Almost all interviewees were unemployed and dependent on government grants (child welfare grants, disability grants and old age pensions) in order to support themselves and their families. Employed interviewees had unstable jobs, doing menial work.

The Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley neighbourhood study employed two core questions to examine attitudes towards immigrants:

1. *Do people from other countries live in this community?*
2. *Tell me about other people from other countries who live in this community and how you get along with them?*

The first question served as a general orientating question to the discussion about the interviewees' attitudes towards, and perceptions of, immigrants in their neighbourhood. The interviewees' responses revealed both differences and similarities, and it immediately became clear that attitudes towards immigrants result from different experiences, which are neither static nor simple.

Data Analysis

To analyse the qualitative data, the researcher chose Miles and Huberman's (1994) method of qualitative data analysis, with the aid of QSR NVivo – a computer software package.

The first analytical step was to read the transcripts in order to become acquainted with the data and to get an initial feel of issues arising from the data, de Wet and Erasmus (2005) outlined this process. The second step involved coding the data. Miles and Huberman (1994:56) define coding as the "process of assigning units of meaning to the text passages that contain references to particular categories of data". For the analysis, the researcher used Miles and Huberman's first level coding, "a process of naming and classifying data, to produce working categories" (Fielding and Lee 1998:41). The next stage of the analysis involved using Miles and Huberman's second level coding to identify regularities in the data (ibid, 1998:42).

Limitations of the Study

The study, by its very nature, is specific to Cape Town and the researcher cannot draw conclusions about the factors that influence attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa as a whole. The study provides an alternative and innovative research technique to understanding the factors associated with South Africans' attitudes towards immigrants. Since the study draws on a cross-sectional data the study, in itself, does not provide insight into how attitudes towards immigrants have evolved. The results presented in this study bring out some salient features of the extent and nature of attitudes towards immigrants in Cape Town.

The understanding of the factors that affected attitudes towards immigrants is limited to those aspects probed by the particular research questions. For example, the CAPS 2009 survey does not address the multidimensional nature of factors that affect the formation of attitudes towards immigrants, because it is a large study on a variety of topics. This was particularly problematic and presented a challenge when analysing the data, because the researcher was obliged to adapt questions in ways that were not always optimal for her specific research interests: apart from the vignettes used to explore attitudes towards immigrants, the CAPS 2009 did not contain any specific issues relating to immigrants or immigration policy.

With regard to the qualitative data, the researcher acknowledges that the sample for the Delft, Tambo Square and Weltevreden Valley study is not a representative sample. The study provides complementary information to the researcher's study objectives.

Ethical Considerations[31]

In all studies, measures were taken to ensure that no harm occurred to any of the respondents. The consent of the respondents was sought before each interview, and respondents were required to fill in consent forms before they could take part in the studies. The respondents were assured that their identity would be kept confidential, and the data analysis maintained strict confidentiality.

[31] Research conducted by the CSSR operates under the approval of Human Subjects Review Board at the University of Cape Town. All CSSR project staff and fieldworkers involved in the projects received training in issues of informed consent and confidentiality.

Appendix 2: Concerning Employment (CAPS 2009)

Young adults who participated in the CAPS 2009 highlighted significant levels of inequality in Cape Town, in relation to some economic indicators. As a subjective measure of income and poverty, the survey asked respondents how they would classify their household's overall financial situation. The differences across population groups were huge. While 36 percent of black respondents classified their overall household financial situation as "very poor" or "poor", it is true of three percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents classified their overall household financial situation as "very poor" or "poor", the majority (92 percent) classified their overall household financial situation as "very comfortable" or "comfortable". Self-perceived household financial classification was consistent with individual income, as 40 percent of black respondents reported a total monthly income of R1750 or less, compared to sixteen percent of coloured respondents and ten percent of white respondents. An indicator documenting the number of days a household went without enough to eat in the last 30 days reflected just what these economic class differences mean. Whilst 42 percent of black respondents reported that their household had not had enough to eat in the last 30 days, this is true of six percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents reported not having enough to eat (see Figure 1).

Class differences, as judged by the researcher, reflect employment status. Employment status among the CAPS 2009 respondents reflected the catastrophic levels of unemployment afflicting young adults in Cape Town, with a massive 41 percent of the respondents reporting that they were unemployed. Whereas 56 percent of black respondents reported that they were unemployed, 37 percent of coloured respondents and 28 percent of white respondents were in a similar position. When the researcher considered unemployment by age group, 44 percent of the 18-26 year old grouping said they were unemployed, compared to 32 percent of the 27-35 year old grouping. It is probable that a sizable proportion of young adults in the 18-26 year old grouping was still studying, and was doing so because they could not find employment. The crucial question is whether these young adults would be able to find employment once they completed their studies. Employment status also had an important gender dimension, as more women (43 percent) than men (38 percent) indicated that they were unemployed (see Figure 2). It is also probable, that a proportion of the women designated as unemployed, had chose not to enter the work force, because of the cultural and social roles assigned to women.



Figure 1: Number of days a household did not have enough to eat



Figure 2: Employment status by gender and population group

An analysis of the reasons why unemployed young adults were not looking for work shows that lack of employment opportunities was the main reason given by the respondents. Other reasons for not looking for work were the expense related to the employment search, or that the respondent was studying; care giving was an important reason among female respondents. A question that asked respondents what they thought was the most important problem facing the country that the government should address, confirmed that unemployment was a problem among respondents. Job creation and unemployment ranked highest (50 percent) as the most important problem, followed by crime (27 percent), housing (7 percent) and poverty (7 percent). There are counter perceptions that black South Africans are unwilling to undertake unskilled employment, or that they are primarily concerned about how much they earn (Reitzes and Bam, 2000; Misago *et al.*, 2010). The survey asked respondents if they would accept a low-status job that paid less than R3000 per month, and a significant finding is that 80 percent of black respondents reported that they would, compared to 45 percent of coloured respondents and three percent of white respondents (also see Figure 3).



Figure 3: Acceptance of a low-status job by gender and population group

Appendix 3: Concerning Housing, Sanitation and Water (CAPS 2009)

Housing distribution among the CAPS 2009 sample reflected socio-economic differences. A substantial proportion (13 percent) of young adults in Cape Town lived in an informal dwelling, and four percent of the informal dwellings were backyard structures. The percentage of black respondents living in an informal dwelling, however, differed dramatically compared to that of coloured or white respondents. While a third of black respondents (30 percent) reported that they lived in an informal dwelling, this was true for two percent of coloured respondents. No white respondents reported living in an informal dwelling.

Table 12: Housing Distribution

Housing type	Percent			
	Black	*Coloured*	*White*	*All respondents*
House or brick structure on separate stand or yard	55	67	79	66
Flat in block of flats	10	10	10	10
Town/cluster/semi-detached house (simplex, duplex or triplex)	1	18	9	12
Brick house/flat/room in backyard (including converted garages etc)	3	2	1	2
Informal dwelling/shack, in backyard	9	2	0	4
Informal dwelling/shack, NOT in backyard, e.g. in an informal settlement	21	0	0	9
Room/flatlet not in backyard, but on shared property	0	0	0	0
Room inside house (i.e. rented from owner of the house)	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: CAPS 2009

All households had access to water, and the majority of households (84 percent) accessed water from an inside tap. Of the respondents living in an informal dwelling, thirteen percent reported that they had access to water from an inside tap, and the most common water sources for these respondents was water from a yard tap (43 percent) or a free public tap (40 percent). On the other hand, five respondents reported that their household did not have a toilet; these respondents also lived in an informal dwelling. The majority of respondents (82 percent), however, had a flush toilet inside the dwelling. Of the 2,071 respondents who reported that they had a flush toilet in their dwelling, sixteen percent lived in an informal dwelling.

Appendix 4: Concerning Crime and Violence (CAPS 2009)

The CAPS 2009 highlights poverty and unemployment in Cape Town as endemic. Violence in Cape Town reflects deepening inequality, marginalisation of the youth, poverty, social disorganisation and social tensions, as well as high levels of unemployment. On the list of problems facing the country that the government should address, respondents ranked crime second. Most respondents attributed the increase in violence in the country to unemployment and poverty, a lack of respect for the law and alcohol consumption (see Table 13). Contrary to expectations, just over half of the respondents identified ineffective courts and police as the reason for increased violence in South Africa. It is significant that unemployment and poverty were not the only factors in people's explanations of the rise of violence in the country. This implies that in order to tackle the problem of crime there is need to restore a sense of morality, social responsibility and a culture of respect for others and authority. Furthermore, employment creation has to be prioritised, as well as the socialisation of young adults to respect and obey authority, and to exercise greater tolerance and more respect for the human rights of others.

Table 13: Views about violence by population group

There is so much violence because...	Percent who said "Strongly agree" or "Agree"			
	Black	Coloured	White	Total
Of unemployment and poverty.	90	88	79	87
Young people do not learn about respect and discipline in the home or at school.	75	82	68	77
Men drink too much alcohol.	73	75	43	69
The police and courts are ineffective.	51	63	39	55

Source: CAPS 2009

The distribution of respondents who reported that they knew someone who had committed a crime in their neighbourhood was disproportionate by population group (see Table 14). Coloured respondents were more likely than black or white respondents to know someone who sold drugs, stole from other people or had been to jail. In his documentary on gangs, Ross Kemp found that there was a strong culture of crime and violence among coloured communities in Cape Town, and this was due to inequality and poverty. The documentary referred to the infamous *Numbers Gang*, which operates on the Cape Flats in the coloured neighbourhoods. Thus, young coloured adults, in Cape Town, are more likely to experience or become victims of crime and violence than their black or white counterparts. Males are also far more likely to be victims and perpetrators of violence than females.

Table 14: Awareness of crime and violence by population group

Do you know people who live in your neighbourhood who...	Percent who said "Yes"			
	Black	Coloured	White	Total
Sell or deal in drugs?	27	65	6	44
Steal from other people?	39	64	6	46
Is or has been to jail?	44	66	10	49

Source: CAPS 2009

Curiously, very few respondents had been victims of crime in the last three years (see Table 15). Slightly more black respondents reported that they had been victims of assault, robbery or burglary, compared to coloured or white respondents.

Table 15: Experiences of crime by population group

In the past three years, have you ever been a victim of...	Percent who said "Yes"			
	Black	Coloured	White	Total
Physical assault?	13	8	4	8
Armed robbery?	14	8	5	9
Burglary at home?	10	5	9	7

Source: CAPS 2009

Very few respondents also reported that they had concealed a weapon or physically assaulted another person in the last three years (see Table 16).

Table 16: Perpetrators of crime by gender

In the past three years have you ever...	Percent who said "Yes"		
	Male	Female	Total
Carried a concealed knife or gun, outside your home?	13	2	8
Hit or physically assaulted a girlfriend/boyfriend/partner or any adult in your family?	10	8	9
Hit or physically assaulted a friend or neighbour?	12	6	9
Hit or physically assaulted a stranger or someone you do not know well?	12	4	8

Source: CAPS 2009

Appendix 5: Concerning Undocumented Immigrants (CAPS 2009)

In the CAPS 2009, respondents were asked to report how they felt about undocumented immigrants using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means "Dislike them very much" and 10 means "Like them very much". Overall, young adults in Cape Town averaged 4.75 for dislike of undocumented immigrants, and the standard deviation of responses was 3.56. Treating dislike as a continuous variable, the researcher inferred that moving up a "step" (for example from dislike level 0 to dislike level 1) corresponds to approximately a 10 percent decrease in dislike of undocumented immigrants, given that the scale has ten steps. An analysis of the mean dislike level for each population group suggests that, on average, black respondents have the highest level of dislike for undocumented immigrants, followed by coloured respondents. The least intolerant were white respondents. When the researcher considered dislike by gender, women, on average, had a higher level of dislike compared to men. Figure four shows the results when the researcher considered dislike across gender and population group. Clearly, the respondent's gender related with reported dislike more than the respondent's population group. The graph suggests that differences in levels of dislike between population groups vary when categorised by gender. The most significant difference between male and female respondents was among black respondents.



Figure 4: Mean stigma by gender and population group

Appendix 6: Summary statistics (Undocumented Immigrant)[32]

"Should this person be deported back to Zimbabwe"					
	Percent				
Indicator	*Yes*	*Maybe, it depends*	*No*	*Don't know*	**Total**[33]
Gender					
Female	34	28	35	3	100
Male	35	26	34	5	100
Race					
Black	37	27	31	6	100
Coloured	36	28	33	3	100
White	28	26	44	2	100
Age group					
18-26 yrs	35	26	36	3	100
27-35 yrs	34	31	31	4	100
Language					
Afrikaans	37	26	35	3	100
English	29	30	37	3	100
Xhosa	36	27	32	6	100
Education					
Primary	42	26	29	3	100
Secondary	35	27	34	4	100
Tertiary	26	26	47	1	100
Employment					
Employed	33	28	35	4	100
Unemployed	37	27	33	4	100
Income					
R101-R600	50	27	16	7	100
R601_R1750	41	25	30	3	100
R1751-R5000	34	28	34	3	100
R5001-R14000	25	29	42	4	100
R14000+	20	24	56	0	100
Class					
Upper class	33	28	36	3	100
Middle class	36	29	33	3	100
Working class	38	22	34	7	100

Source: CAPS 2009

[32] "Selected" independent variables are key demographic variable.

[33] Totals may not always add up to 100 due to rounding effect.

Appendix 7: Summary Statistics (Immigrant Family)[34]

"Should this family be told to leave South Africa?"					
	Percent				
Indicator	*Yes*	*Maybe/it depends*	*No*	*Don't know*	**Total**[35]
Gender					
Female	40	22	37	1	100
Male	37	20	39	4	100
Race					
Black	32	23	39	6	100
Coloured	42	21	35	2	100
White	39	18	43	0	100
Age group					
18-26 yrs	38	20	39	2	100
27-35 yrs	39	24	34	3	100
Language					
Afrikaans	44	20	34	2	100
English	38	20	42	0	100
Xhosa	31	24	39	6	100
Education					
Primary	44	23	30	2	100
Secondary	38	22	37	3	100
Tertiary	39	13	48	0	100
Employment					
Employed	38	21	39	2	100
Unemployed	40	21	36	3	100
Income					
R101-R600	25	17	53	4	100
R601_R1750	38	22	37	4	100
R1751-R5000	39	22	37	2	100
R5001-R14000	33	23	43	1	100
R14000+	16	9	75	0	100
Class					
Upper class	40	21	37	1	100
Middle class	39	22	37	3	100
Working class	32	20	42	6	100

Source: CAPS 2009

[34] "Selected" independent variables are key demographic variables.

[35] Totals may not always add up to 100 due to rounding effect.

Appendix 8: Bivariate Regressions (Undocumented Immigrant)

Indicator[36]	*dx/dx*	*Std. Err*	*P|z|*	*Psuedo r-squared*[37]	**95% CI**
Manipulations					
Unemployed (base = employed)	0.11	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.06, 0.16
HIV positive (base = not specified)	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.03, 0.11
Family starving base = not specified)	-0.05	0.02	0.06	0.00	-0.09, 0.00
Persecution (base = not specified)	-0.08	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.13, -0.04
Independent variables					
Male (base = female)	**0.01**[38]	**0.02**	**0.56**	**0.00**	**-0.03, 0.06**
Black (base = white)	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.00	**0.00, 0.20**
Coloured (base = white)	0.09	0.05	0.10		**-0.02, 0.19**
18-26 years (base = 27-35 years)	**0.01**	**0.03**	**0.63**	**0.00**	**-0.04, 0.06**
Afrikaans (base = English)	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.01, 0.15
Xhosa (base = English)	0.08	0.03	0.01		0.02, 0.14
Primary (base = tertiary)	0.17	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.05, 0.29
Secondary (base = tertiary)	0.11	0.05	0.03		0.01, 0.20
Unemployed (base = employed)	**0.03**	**0.03**	**0.20**	**0.00**	**-0.02, 0.08**
R101-R1750[39] (base = R5001+)	0.18	0.43	0.00	0.01	0.10, 0.27
R1751-R5000 (base = R5001+)	0.11	0.41	0.01		0.03, 0.19
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job)	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.06, 0.15
Upper class (base = working class)	-0.06	0.03	0.06	0.00	-0.13, 0.00
Middle class (base = working class)	**-0.04**	**0.03**	**0.16**		**-0.09, 0.02**
Low esteem (base = high esteem)	0.11	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.05, 0.16
Low stigma (base = high stigma)	-0.15	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.21, -0.08
No stigma (base = high stigma)	-0.16	0.03	0.00		-0.21, -0.11
Distrust people (base = trust people)	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.10, 0.19
Experienced violence (base = no experience of violence)	0.11	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.06, 0.16
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe neighbourhood)	-0.07	0.03	0.02	0.00	-0.12, -0.01

Source: CAPS 2009

[36] All variables are dummy variables.

[37] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.

[38] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

[39] The income variable included income earned from the most recent job for respondents who reported that they were unemployed at the time of the survey. This was problematic for the researcher, as it does not reflect the respondents' economic position at the time of the survey, and the income variable was left out of the multivariate regression models.

Appendix 9: Bivariate Regressions (Immigrant Family)

Indicator[40]	*dx/dx*	*Std. Err*	*P|z|*	*Psuedo r-squared*[41]	**95% CI**
Manipulations					
Lesotho (base = Britain)	**0.01**[42]	**0.03**	**0. 87**	**0.00**	**-0.05, 0.06**
Nigeria (base = Britain)	**0.01**	**0.03**	**0.82**		**-0.05, 0.06**
Anti-social (base = sociable)	0.45	0.01	0.00	0.25	0.44, 0.47
Independent variables					
Male (base = female)	**-0.02**	**0.02**	**0.53**	**0.00**	**-0.06, 0.03**
Coloured (base = Black)	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.05, 0.14
White (base = Black)	**0.05**	**0.04**	**0.23**		-0.03, 0.14
18-26 years (base = 27-35 years)	**-0.01**	**0.03**	**0.68**	**0.00**	**-0.07, 0.04**
English (base = Xhosa)	-0.07	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.13, -0.00
Xhosa (base = Xhosa)	-0.12	0.03	0.00		-0.16, -0.07
Secondary (base = Primary)	**-0.06**	**0.04**	**0.11**	**0.00**	**-0.13, 0.01**
Tertiary (base = Primary)	**-0.06**	**0.06**	**0.28**		**-0.18, 0.05**
Unemployed (base = employed)	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.32**	**0.00**	**-0.02, 0.07**
R101-R1750 (base = R5001+)	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.00	-0.01, 0.15
R1751-R5000 (base = R5001+)	0.08	0.04	0.03		0.01, 0.16
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job)	0.04	0.02	0.11	0.00	-0.01, 0.08
Upper class (base = working class)	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.01, 0.13
Middle class (base = working class)	0.06	0.03	0.03		0.01, 0.11
Low esteem (base = high esteem)	-0.06	0.03	0.03	0.00	-0.11, -0.01
High stigma (base = no stigma)	0.12	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.07, 0.17
Low stigma (base = no stigma)	0.08	0.03	0.02		0.02, 0.15
Distrust (base = trust people)	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02, 0.11
Experienced violence (base = no experience of violence)	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.00	-0.00, 0.09
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe neighbourhood)	**-0.04**	**0.03**	**0.15**	**0.00**	**-0.10, 0.02**

Source: CAPS 2009

[40] All variables are dummy variables.

[41] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.

[42] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

Appendix 10: Sequential[43] Multivariate Regression Models (Undocumented Immigrant)

Indicators[44]	Immigrant context as independent variable only Model I		Background variables added Model II		Labour market position and income variables added Model III		Subjective variables added Model IV	
Contextual manipulations								
Unemployed	0.11	(0.02)***[45]	0.10	(0.02)***	0.10	(0.02)***	0.11	(0.02)***
HIV positive	0.07	(0.02)***	0.08	(0.02)***	0.08	(0.02)***	0.08	(0.02)**
Family starving	-0.11	(0.03)***	-0.10	(0.03)***	-0.10	(0.03)***	-0.10	(0.03)***
Persecution threat	-0.14	(0.03)***	-0.13	(0.03)***	-0.13	(0.03)***	-0.14	(0.03)***
Demographic variables								
Male (base = female)			**0.02**[46]	**(0.02)**	**0.03**	**(0.02)**	**0.02**	**(0.02)**
Black (base = white)			0.44	(0.16)***	0.38	(0.15)***	0.24	(0.15)*
Coloured (base = white)			**0.06**	**(0.05)**	**0.03**	**(0.05)**	**-0.03**	**(0.05)**
18-26 years (base = 27 - 35 years)			**0.03**	**(0.03)**	**0.02**	**(0.03)**	**-0.01**	**(0.03)**
Afrikaans (base =Xhosa)			0.39	(0.16)***	0.37	(0.15)***	0.28	(0.14)**
English (base = Xhosa)			0.32	(0.15)**	0.33	(0.15)**	0.25	(0.14)*
Economic variables								
Primary (base = tertiary)					**0.08**	**(0.06)**	**0.04**	**(0.07)**
Secondary (base = tertiary)					**0.05**	**(0.05)**	**0.03**	**(0.05)**
Unemployed (base = employed)					**0.01**	**(0.03)**	**0.01**	**(0.03)**
Low status job (base = decline low-status job)					0.09	(0.03)***	0.05	(0.03)*
Upper class (base = working class)					**0.04**	**(0.04)**	**0.02**	**(0.04)**
Middle class (base = working class)					**-0.01**	**(0.03)**	**-0.03**	**(0.03)**
Subjective variables								
Low esteem (base = high esteem)							0.05	(0.03)*
Low stigma (base = high stigma)							-0.12	(0.03)***
No stigma (base = high stigma)							-0.18	(0.02)***
Distrust people (base = trust people)							0.16	(0.02)***
Experienced violence (base = not experienced violence)							0.06	(0.03)***
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe neighbourhood)							-0.10	(0.03)***
N		2,799		2,799		2,753		2,509
Pseudo r-squared[47]		0.03		0.03		0.04		0.08

Source: CAPS 2009

[43] These are usually called hierarchical or nested analyses.

[44] All variables are dummy variables.

[45] Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and ***significant at the 0.01 level.

[46] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

[47] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.

Appendix 11: Sequential[48] Multivariate Regression Models (Immigrant Family)

Indicators[49]	Immigrant context as independent variable only Model I		Background variables added Model II		Labour market position and income variables added Model III		Subjective variables added Model IV	
Contextual manipulations								
Britain (base = Nigeria)	**-0.01**[50]	**(0.02)** [51]	**-0.01**	**(0.02)**	**-0.01**	**(0.02)**	**-0.00**	**(0.02)**
Lesotho (base = Nigeria)	**-0.00**	**(0.02)**	**-0.00**	**(0.02)**	**-0.01**	**(0.02)**	**0.00**	**(0.02)**
Antisocial (base = sociable)	0.45	(0.01)***	0.45	(0.01)***	0.45	(0.01)***	0.46	(0.01)***
Demographic variables								
Male (base = female)			**-0.02**	**(0.02)**	**-0.01**	**(0.02)**	-0.03	(0.02)*
Coloured (base = Black)			**-0.22**	**(0.12)**	-0.20	(0.12)*	**-0.14**	**(0.11)**
White (base = Black)			**-0.24**	**(0.13)**	-0.22	(0.13)*	**-0.16**	**(0.12)**
18-26 years (base = 27-35 years)			**0.01**	**(0.02)**	**0.00**	**(0.13)**	**-0.01**	**(0.02)**
English (base = Afrikaans)			-0.04	(0.03)*	**-0.03**	**(0.03)**	**-0.01**	**(0.03)**
Xhosa (base = Afrikaans)			-0.33	(0.12)***	-0.31	(0.12)***	-0.23	(0.11)**
Economic variables								
Secondary (base = primary)					**-0.02**	**(0.03)**	**-0.02**	**(0.03)**
Tertiary (base = primary)					**-0.00**	**(0.06)**	**0.02**	**(0.06)**
Unemployed (base = employed)					0.05	(0.02)**	0.03	(0.02)*
Low-status job (base = decline low status job)					0.05	(0.02)**	0.04	(0.02)**
Upper class (base = working class)					0.05	(0.03)*	**-0.03**	**(0.03)**
Middle class (base = working class)					**0.02**	**(0.03)**	**-0.00**	**(0.03)**
Subjective variables								
Low self-esteem (base = high self-esteem)							-0.07	(0.02)***
Low stigma (base = high stigma)							-0.06	(0.03)**
No stigma (base = high stigma)							-0.13	(0.02)***
Distrust people (base = trust people)							0.09	(0.02)***
Witnessed violence (base = no experience of violence)							0.04	(0.02)*
Unsafe neighbourhood (base = safe neighbourhood)							-0.04	(0.02)*
N		2,817		2,817		2,770		2,520
Pseudo r-squared[52]		0.25		0.26		0.27		0.29

Source: CAPS 2009

[48] These are usually called hierarchical or nested analyses.

[49] All variables are dummy variables.

[50] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

[51] Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and ***significant at the 0.01 level.

[52] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.

Appendix 12: Summary statistics (Trader)[53]

"Is it very bad, bad, neither bad nor good, ok or good"							
	Percent						
Indicator	*Very bad*	*Bad*	*Neither bad nor good*	*Ok*	*Good*	*Don't know*	**Total**[54]
Gender							
Female	44	51	3	1	0	0	100
Male	44	47	7	1	2	1	100
Race							
Black	51	35	9	2	2	1	100
Coloured	37	57	3	3	1	1	100
White	53	44	2	0	0	0	100
Language							
Afrikaans	39	56	3	1	1	1	100
English	45	50	4	0	0	0	100
Xhosa	51	35	9	2	2	1	100
Age group							
18-26 yrs	45	48	4	1	1	1	100
27-35 yrs	42	49	6	1	1	0	100
Education							
Primary	38	51	5	4	2	2	100
Secondary	44	49	5	1	1	1	100
Tertiary	50	47	3	0	0	0	100
Employment							
Employed	46	48	4	1	1	0	100
Unemployed	42	49	6	2	1	1	100
Income							
R101-R600	48	46	6	0	0	0	100
R601_R1750	49	39	7	3	2	1	100
R1751-R5000	38	55	4	1	1	0	100
R5001-R14000	44	51	4	0	0	0	100
R14000+	76	24	0	0	0	0	100
Class							
Upper class	43	52	3	0	1	0	100
Middle class	41	49	6	2	1	1	100
Working class	54	38	4	2	2	1	100

Source: CAPS 2009

[53] "Selected" independent variables are key demographic variables.

[54] Percentages may not always add up to 100 due to rounding effect.

Appendix 13: Bivariate Regressions (Trader)

Indicator[55]	*dx/df*	*Std. Err*	*P|z|*	*Psuedo r-squared*[56]	**95% CI**
Contextual factors					
Somali shopkeeper (base = not specified)	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01, 0.06
Disallow Somali traders (base = getting rich by selling to poor people)	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01, 0.05
Independent variables					
Female (base = male)	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03, 0.07
Black (base = non-black)	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05, 0.09
Xhosa (base = non-Xhosa)	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05, 0.09
18-26 years (base 27-35 years)	**-0.01**[57]	**0.01**	**0.39**	**0.00**	**-0.03, 0.01**
Secondary (base = primary)	-0.03	0.02	0.05	0.01	-0.06, -0.00
Tertiary (base = primary)	-0.08	0.03	0.00		-0.13, -0.03
Unemployed (base = employed)	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00, 0.05
R1751-R5000 (base = R101-R1750)	-0.06	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.11, -0.01
R5001+ (base = R101-R1750)	-0.04	0.01	0.00		-0.07, -0.02
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job)	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05, 0.94
Upper class (base = non-upper class)	-0.05	0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.07, -0.03
Low self-esteem (base = high self-esteem)	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04, 0.09
No stigma (base = high stigma)	-0.06	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.09, -0.04
Low stigma (base = high stigma)	-0.04	0.02	0.00		-0.07, -0.01
General distrust (base = trust people)	**-0.01**	**0.01**	**0.38**	**0.00**	**-0.01, 0.03**
Distrust people in neighbourhood (base = trust people in the neighbourhood)	**-0.01**	**0.01**	**0.45**	**0.00**	**-0.03, 0.01**
Causes of violence:					
Unemployment and poverty (base = disagree)	**0.03**	**0.02**	**0.14**	**0.00**	**-0.01, 0.06**
Young people do not learn about respect and discipline in the home or at school (base = disagree)	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00, 0.06
Men drink too much (base = disagree)	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.20**	**0.00**	**-0.01, 0.04**
Police and courts are ineffective (base = disagree)	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.04, 0.08
People in the family often lose their temper (base = family do not lose their temper)	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.23**	**0.00**	**-0.01, 0.03**
People in the family sometimes hit each other (base = family do not hit each other)	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.08, 0.13
Witnessed violence outside of the home (base = no experience of violence)	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05, 0.10
Feel unsafe during the day (base = safe during the day)	**-0.02**	**0.02**	**0.23**	**0.00**	**-0.05, 0.01**
Feel unsafe during after dark (base = safe after dark)	**0.01**	**0.01**	**0.54**	**0.00**	**-0.02, -0.03**

Source: CAPS 2009

[55] All variables are dummy variables.

[56] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.

[57] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

Appendix 14: Sequential Multivariate Regression Models (Trader)

Indicators[58]	Immigrant context as independent variable only Model I		Background variables added Model II		Labour market position and income variables added Model III		Subjective variables added Model IV	
Contextual manipulation								
Somali shopkeeper (base = not specified)	0.03	(0.02)**[59]	0.03	(0.01)***	0.03	(0.01)***	0.05	(0.01)***
Disallow Somali trader (base = getting rich by selling to poor people)	**0.02**[60]	**(0.18)**	**0.01**	**(0.01)**	**0.01**	**(0.01)**	**0.01**	**(0.01)**
Demographic variables								
Female (base = male)			0.04	(0.01)***	0.04	(0.01)***	0.04	(0.01)***
Black (base = non-black)			0.07	(0.00)***	0.05	(0.01)***	0.05	(0.01)***
18-27 years (base = 27-35 years)			**-0.01**	**(0.01)**	**-0.02**	**(0.01)**	**-0.01**	**(0.01)**
Economic variables								
Secondary (base = primary)					-0.03	(0.02)*	**-0.02**	**(0.02)**
Tertiary (base = primary)					-0.04	(0.03)*	**-0.02**	**(0.03)**
Unemployed (base = employed)					**0.00**	**(0.01)**	**0.01**	**(0.01)**
Low-status job (base = decline low-status job)					0.00	(0.01)***	0.02	(0.01)*
Upper class (base = non-upper class)					**-0.01**	**(0.01)**	**-0.01**	**(0.01)**
Subjective variables								
Low esteem (base = high-esteem)							**0.01**	**(0.01)**
No stigma (base = high stigma)							0.05	(0.01)***
Low stigma (base = high stigma)							0.03	(0.02)**
Distrusts people (base = trust people)							0.04	(0.02)**
Distrusts people in the neighbourhood (base = trust people in the neighbourhood)							**-0.02**	**(0.02)**
Causes of violence:								
Poverty (base = disagree)							**0.00**	**(0.02)**
Lack of respect (base = disagree)							**0.02**	**(0.01)**
Men drink much (base = disagree)							**0.00**	**(0.01)**
Ineffective police (base = disagree)							0.05	(0.01)***
Family lose temper (base = family do not lose temper)							-0.03	(0.01)***
Family hit each other (base = family do not hit each other)							0.09	(0.01)***
Witnessed violence outside the home (base = no experience of violence)							0.04	(0.01)***
Neighbourhood unsafe during the day (base = neighbourhood safe during the day)							-0.04	(0.02)***
Neighbourhood unsafe after dark (base = neighbourhood safe after dark)							**-0.02**	**(0.01)**
N		2,894		2,894		2,846		2,404
Pseudo r-squared[61]		0.01		0.07		0.09		0.21

Source: CAPS 2009

[58] All variables are dummy variables.

[59] Standard errors reported in brackets. *Significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level and ***significant at the 0.01 level.

[60] Bold face coefficients indicate statistical insignificance.

[61] The pseudo r-squared is based on a probit regression models without the survey (svy) specification.