THE POLITICS OF WELFARE POLICY REFORMS:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HOW AND WHY CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT AFFECT POLICY MAKING ON SOCIAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES IN ZAMBIA AND MALAWI.

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DECLARATION

I, Hangala Siachiwena, hereby declare that the work on which this thesis is based is my original work (except where acknowledgements indicate otherwise) and that neither the whole work nor any part of it has been, is being, or is to be submitted for another degree in this or any other university. I authorise the University to reproduce for the purpose of research either the whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Aford	Alliance for Democracy
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AISP	Agriculture Input Support Programme
ANC	African National Congress
ASPIRE	The World Bank's Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equality
AU	African Union
BWIs	Bretton Woods Institutions
CBN	Cost of Basic Needs
CCTs	Conditional Cash Transfers
CG	Child Grant
Code	Congress for Democrats
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSO-SUN	Civil Society Scaling up Nutrition Alliance
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DMMU	Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECF	Extended Credit Facility
EF	Empowerment Funds
EP&D	Economic Planning Department in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

ERP	Economic Recovery Plan
ESID	Effective Sates and Inclusive Development
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCP	Fertilizer Credit Programme
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FISP	Fertilizer Input Subsidy Programme (Malawi)
FISP	Farm Input Subsidy Programme (Zambia)
FNDP	Fifth National Development Plan
FSP	Food Security Pack
FSP	Fertilizer Support Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoM	Government of Malawi
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
GTZ	German Organization for Technical Corporation
HAI	Help Age International
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HSCT	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme
IECTP	Integrated Emergency Cash Transfer Programme

ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategy
KfW	German Development Bank
LCMS	Living Conditions Monitoring Survey
LIPWP	Labour Intensive Public Works Programmes
LIWPR	Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms
MANEPO	Malawi Network of Older Persons Organizations
MASAF	Malawi Social Action Fund
MCDMCH	Ministry of Community Development Mother and Child Health
MCDSS	Ministry of Community Development and Social Services
MCDSW	Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MCTG	Multi Category Transfer Grant
MDC	Movement for Democratic Congress
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIS	Management Information System
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MNSSP	Malawi National Social Support Programme
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFEPD	Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development
MoFNP	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
MoGCDSW	Ministry of Gender, Children, Disabilities and Social Welfare

MP	Member of Parliament
MT	Metric Tons
MTT	Mudzi Transformation Trust
MUZ	Mineworkers Union of Zambia
MVAC	Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee
NAC	National AIDS Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHI	National Health Insurance
NSO	National Statistical Office
NSPP	National Social Protection Policy
NSSP	National Social Support Policy
OAP	Old Age Pension
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OVCs	Orphaned and Vulnerable Children
PEIF	Presidential Empowerment Initiative Fund
PF	Patriotic Front
PP	People's Party
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRSPD	Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Division
PRT	Power Resources Theory
PSP	Platform for Social Protection
PSPF	Public Service Pension Fund
PWAS	Public Welfare Assistance Scheme

R-SNDP	Revised-Sixth National Development Plan
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SCT	Social Cash Transfer
SCTP	Social Cash Transfer Programme
SNDP	Sixth National Development Plan
SONA	State of the Nation Address
SP	Starter Pack
TA	Traditional Authority
TIP	Targeted Input Programme
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UP	United Party
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UPND	United Party for National Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VSL	Village Savings and Loans
WFP	World Food Programme
ZAMPOST	Zambia Postal Services Corporation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPD	Zambia Alliance for Persons with Disabilities

ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZMW	Zambian Kwacha
ZSIC	Zambia State Insurance Cooperation

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how and why social protection policy reforms happened after changes of government in Zambia and Malawi. It provides four case studies that account for the process of reforms to promote or constrain social cash transfer programmes (SCTs) by government administrations within and across the two countries over time. Recent research on social protection in Africa shows that politics matters for the expansion of programmes, but the literature discussing the specific forms of politics that drive or limit support for reforms is still emerging. There is also a paucity of evidence accounting for variation in reforms within and between countries on the continent over time. This thesis contributes to these knowledge gaps. The study argues that while donors introduced pilot SCTs in Zambia and Malawi and continue to promote reforms, domestic politics is important for understanding when, how and why national governments expanded donor supported pilots into national programmes. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to understand variation in political support for reforms within countries and to bring attention to the relative importance of partisanship. The study uses a process tracing method to understand the reform process from the mid-2000s until 2017. It draws on qualitative interviews with policy makers such as political elites, government technocrats and donor officials, and a review of policy documents. It also includes a statistical analysis of reforms in 10 East and Southern African countries to understand how Zambia and Malawi fit into a broader set of cases. The thesis demonstrates that in Zambia and Malawi, there was a greater incentive for political parties and the leaders within them to promote programmatic social protection when it had not already been seized as a mechanism for poverty reduction by the preceding government. Moreover, in cases where state support for social protection was limited, changes of government provided opportunities for international donors and government technocrats to persuade political elites in new ruling coalitions to push for faster reforms. This thesis accounts for the causal mechanisms that link changes of government and reforms and shows that the influence of international donors on political elites and the ideological, electoral and factional interests of elites and parties are crucial for understanding support for either clientelist or programmatic redistribution. Where the interests of donors and elites converge, there is a greater incentive for reforms to promote the provision of social protection. While the quantitative analysis does not provide evidence of a statistical relationship between changes of government and social policy reforms across the region, it demonstrates that democratization was associated with more social protection and shows that the interests of political elites and donor influence (controlling for other independent variables) were significant predictors of reform in the region. Furthermore, the trajectories of reform in Zambia and Malawi were similar to other low and lower middle-income democracies in the region but distinct from both upper middle-income democracies and weakly democratic low and lower middle-income countries.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

At the start of my PhD journey, I conducted preliminary research in Zambia to understand reforms that had happened to promote or constrain the expansion of social protection programmes.[1] I discovered that the government elected in 2011 had made significant reforms to promote the provision of social protection by expanding coverage of the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) scheme which started as a donor funded pilot in 2003. The newly elected government had assumed primary funding responsibilities for SCTs from international donors and made an almost threefold increase in the coverage of SCT beneficiaries. The government had also increased budgetary support towards related social protection programmes and published a national social protection policy. This was in stark contrast with the former governing party that had resisted donor pressure to implement reforms aimed at extending national SCT coverage (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016).

Elsewhere in the Southern African region, virtually every other country was implementing cash transfer programmes of some kind. This includes Malawi which introduced a donor initiated pilot scheme in 2006 that was modelled after Zambia's cash transfer programme (Devereux & Macauslan, 2006; Chinsinga, 2009). The available literature on Malawi showed that ruling political elites had opposed donor pressures to expand SCTs in the mid-2000s (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014). Nevertheless, a new president and governing political party that assumed office in 2012 embraced social protection and made it an important campaign issue during national elections in 2014 (Hamer & Seekings, 2019). Political elites in Zambia and Malawi resisted donor pressure to scale up pilot cash transfer schemes to national programmes during the 2000s, even though some support for programmes existed among technocrats in government departments. In both countries, reform accelerated only after changes in government.

Following subsequent changes of government in 2014 and 2015, in Malawi and Zambia respectively, the commitment to reform decelerated in both countries. Peter Mutharika's

[1] This research was conducted as part of the Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) research project in the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) at the University of Cape Town. The LIWPR project investigated factors that promote or militate against the expansion of welfare in 14 Anglophone African countries.

administration in Malawi reneged on commitments made by the previous government to expand social protection programmes out of tax. Meanwhile, during the first few years of Edgar Lungu's administration in Zambia, there were erratic payments to cash transfer recipients and a scandal involving the diversion of SCT funds by public officials. This belied the government's commitment to expand the programme.

The two country cases provided an opportunity for a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) comparative case study. Zambia and Malawi were similar in many of the important variables that this study focused on. Both countries had conducted regular multiparty elections since the early 1990s, most of which had been competitively contested between incumbent and opposition political parties. The two countries were among the few on the African continent to have witnessed more than one democratic change in (or turnover of) government from one political party to another. They both implemented donor-initiated cash transfer programmes that expanded after changes of government despite donor efforts to persuade previous administrations to reform. The evidence that exists to explain the distinct mechanisms through which partisan politics (including changes of government) affects public policy on social protection in Africa is growing but remains limited.

The global literature on welfare state building has emphasised the significance of partisan government (or partisanship) in understanding variation in welfare states, particularly in advanced capitalist democracies in North America and Western Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990) but also in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Huber & Stephens, 2012). This literature shows that alternation of power between left-wing and right-wing political parties affects the modes of social welfare distribution. Until recently, there has been a dearth of knowledge on whether and how changes of government in Africa (i.e. between political parties or ruling coalitions) affect social policy making.[2]

Furthermore, since the early 2000s, social protection has emerged as a popular response to poverty reduction within the interdisciplinary field of development studies and amongst international development agencies (Midgley, 2012; Ferguson, 2015). This was informed by a

[2] Studies in the 2010s that emerged out of the LIWPR project at UCT and the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) project at the University of Manchester, were among the first to present evidence of social protection reforms in selected African cases. Some of these studies focused on reforms under specific government administrations and the implication for changes in political settlements on social policy making.

shift amongst global development policy makers who began considering social assistance (and social safety nets) as a more sustainable means of reducing poverty, rather than a focus on emergency aid which was the focus in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, national governments developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as part of debt relief efforts under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In some instances (in Malawi for example) the PRSPs included pillars that recognized the importance of adopting safety nets as part of poverty reduction efforts (Bwalya et al., 2004).

By the mid-2000s, donors began exerting pressure on national governments in low-income countries to adopt social protection as part of anti-poverty policy strategies. However, the commitment to policy reforms varied across the continent, with some national governments adopting policies and implementing programmes at a faster pace than others. Even within countries, there has been variation in the pace of reforms over time between different government administrations. Some scholars on social policy reforms in Africa have identified the level of support amongst domestic political actors as a key factor for understanding the extent of reform within countries (Barrientos et al, 2005; Hickey, 2007; Devereux & White, 2010, Hickey et al., 2019; Opalo, 2019). This has led to crucial questions such as: what support is there for social protection among political actors? What drives this support?

This thesis contributes to filling this knowledge gap by focusing on two Southern African countries. Through a fuller understanding of African cases, this thesis contributes to a more global understanding of the drivers of policy reform and addresses enduring issues in the study of development, policy and politics.

1.2 The emergence of social protection

While global poverty has reduced significantly in the last three decades – with the number of people living below the international poverty line of US$ 1.90 reducing from 1.9 billion people in 1990 to 736 million in 2015 – the decline in extreme poverty has been uneven (World Bank, 2018). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for more than half of the world's poverty headcount ratio, while the number of people in the region living in extreme poverty has increased from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). Sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region where the absolute number of poor people has risen, despite falling poverty rates. Past interventions aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and reducing poverty have had limited success on the continent. National governments introduced the neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s to stabilize economies so that growth could resume – and poverty would reduce in the future – but these policies only heightened the extent of social exclusion. This in turn brought attention to the dire need for poverty reduction strategies directed at the poor (Ferguson, 2015: 3). As a result, global development organizations recognized the need for a shift in anti-poverty strategies.

The shift in anti-poverty strategies began in the early 2000s with the introduction of social protection programmes which proliferated across much of sub-Saharan Africa particularly in Anglophone East and Southern Africa (Hickey & Seekings, 2019). Although many African states had existing social welfare programmes rooted in the colonial and post-independence eras, most social assistance programmes were moribund by the early 1990s (Mkandawire, 2016). This was certainly not true for countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa which have much longer histories of providing widespread social assistance such as pensions and cash transfers to their citizens. Across much of sub-Saharan Africa, however, several decades of economic decline presented most national governments with shrinking fiscal space for social welfare (Hickey et al. 2019). Of the programmes introduced in the early 2000s, social cash transfers were probably the most popular amongst global development policy makers. In 2017, cash transfers were the most widespread form of social protection in Africa accounting for 41% of total spending on social safety nets (Beegle, Coudouel & Monslave, 2018: 7).

Most SCT programmes, specifically in low-income countries, started as donor funded pilots by international development agencies including the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the German Organisation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Help Age International, Irish Aid and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) (Devereux and White, 2010; Seekings, 2012; Hickey & Seekings, 2019). These include pilot programmes initiated by GTZ in Zambia (2003), UNICEF in Kenya (2004) and Malawi (2006), Concern Worldwide in Malawi (2006), and DFID in Kenya (2009) (Chitonge, 2012: 3). In a smaller set of African countries – including upper-middle income countries such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa – SCTs were initiated by national governments and were financed from domestic resources with minimal donor involvement (Devereux, 2010).

In lower income and lower middle-income countries, cash transfer programmes remain donor dependent. In 2017, donors accounted for an average of 86% of total funding in 24 countries (Beegle, Coudouel & Monslave, 2018: 1). Emerging research on social protection in Africa has interrogated how, when and why national governments have embraced cash transfer programmes and implemented policy reforms.

1.3 Determinants of welfare state development

The emergence of social protection (or social welfare) in Africa is recent. There is a growing literature – including regional or continental overviews – accounting for factors that drive support for reform (Niño-Zarazúa et. al., 2011; Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Hickey & Seekings, 2019; Hickey et.al., 2019; Opalo, 2019). Most of these studies recognize that the global literature on comparative welfare state development provides an important starting point for understanding how and why reforms to social welfare happen. The global literature is concerned with explaining differences in redistributive social policy and inequality between countries and over time (Huber & Stephens, 2012: 3). It addresses questions such as: what are the origins of welfare states? how have they evolved over time? why did governments undertake the provision of social insurance and services? and how have benefits been redistributed? (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008).

The comparative literature identifies at least four factors that explain distinctive welfare trajectories taken by different countries – focusing mostly on countries in North and Latin America, Europe and East Asia. These include: economic development (which emphasizes the contribution of modernization to the emergence of the welfare state); power resources theory (which considers how, in capitalist societies, classes mobilize politically over the redistribution of resources); political institutions (which considers the extent to which institutional design affects the responsiveness of governments to low-income groups); and national culture, which includes a concern for the role of ideas and norms and a general engagement with cross-national variation (Esping-Andersen, 1990; O'Connor & Olsen, 1998; Hicks & Esping-Andersen, 2005; Korpi, 2006; van Oorschot, 2007; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Van Kersbergen and Vis, 2014; Hickey et al, 2019).

In the typology of approaches above, capitalism, democracy and domestic politics are all important factors for welfare state development. Different scholars have focused specifically on different aspects of democracy and domestic politics which emphasise the importance of partisanship. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) demonstrated that in the post-war industrial era (i.e. between the 1950s and 1980s) the generosity of redistribution and the progress of social reform by the state were largely influenced by the history of political class formations. Social democratic, Christian democratic (or other conservative), and liberal parties differed in their provision of welfare to the poor with social democratic parties providing the most universal and egalitarian benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 4-5).

Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) compared the distinctive welfare states of Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe and concluded that the historical origins of social policy in the mid-twentieth century influenced the form of welfare reforms following democratization and globalization. They also looked at the more recent effects of democratization on changes in welfare regimes. Huber and Stephens (2012) also demonstrated that democracy was an important determinant of redistributive change in Latin America and showed that left leaning governments had significantly influenced social policy, but also identified international power structures as being important for influencing reforms. Similarly, Fairfield and Garay (2017) argued that political competition between left-wing and right-wing incumbents influenced the nature of redistribution in the region – although right-wing presidents and parties were often the actual agents of reform.

1.4 Social protection reforms in Africa

Politics has only recently begun to feature prominently as a factor in debates about the variation in progress made by low income African countries to expand the provision of social protection (Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Hickey et al., 2019; Opalo, 2019). This includes research which has focused on the "political settlements" framework. More broadly, a political settlement refers to a "combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic and political viability" (Behuria, Buur & Gray, 2017). In its application to social protection, the framework has been used to consider how the social protection agenda is shaped by the distribution of power among elites and between elite and non-elite factions. The bargaining that ensues from the negotiations and conflicts between the interest groups determines the mode of distribution of rents (Lavers & Hickey, 2016).

Other studies have focused on how democratization and electoral politics provided incentives for politicians to brand themselves differently on social issues including on redistribution (Hamer, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2019). Research has also paid attention to the contribution of ideas, ideology and beliefs of political elites and how they shape social policy in Africa (Seekings, 2014). This includes studies on Botswana, South Africa and Zambia which focus on opposition political parties that self-identify as 'liberal' and the attitudes of leaders within them towards poverty reduction and social welfare [(Hallink 2019a on Zambia; Hallink 2019b on South Africa; and Hallink 2019c on Botswana)]. Other studies considered how and why reforms happen over time both within and between countries and provide case-study overviews of how domestic politics contribute to the forms of redistribution over time [for example Grebe (2014) on Uganda, Chinyoka & Seekings (2016) on Zimbabwe, Granvik (2019) on Lesotho and Ulriksen (2019) on Tanzania]. The available literature (both case-studies and overviews) does not explicitly address the contribution of partisan politics to policy reform, which is the primary focus of this study.

Within the global literature on welfare state development, there is a widely held view that democratic regimes are more likely to provide better social welfare than authoritarian regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Huber & Stephens, 2012). Regarding Africa, even where democratic gains have been made, there is a view that the pervasive nature of neopatrimonialism and clientelism reinforces the strong position of political elites which entrenches the exclusion of poor and marginalized groups, despite some evidence showing that neopatrimonialism is not necessarily bad for development (Kelsall, 2011; Bleck & van de Walle, 2018). There is a conventional belief that African political elites redistribute resources as a means of rewarding loyal supporters or for targeting opposition strongholds to swing support away from other parties, in ways that exclude the extreme poor who are most deserving of resources (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016; Bleck & van de Walle, 2018). Also, it is generally believed that electoral competition in many African countries is driven primarily by ethnic considerations, even though economic concerns are also important (Hoffman & Long, 2013; Norris & Mattes, 2013; Gadjanova, 2015; Opalo, 2019).

Generally, political parties are crucial for policy making but their relative influence is better understood in industrialized democracies. Parties matter because they are an avenue through which political actors gain control of government and set the policymaking agenda (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995: 3). Political parties in Europe and North America tend to be more institutionalized and the behaviour of political actors is more predictable including on issues such as setting the policy agenda (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Wahman, 2014). Mainwaring and Scully (1995) identified four conditions to describe party institutionalization: (i) patterns of party competition manifest some regularity, (ii) parties have stable roots in society and tend to be consistent in their ideological positions, (iii) major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties, and (iv) party organizations matter and are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders.

On the contrary, Wahman (2014: 225) observes that there is a lack of party institutionalization in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by opportunism and frequent switching of political allegiances among political actors and even entire political parties shifting alliances frequently. Perhaps because of these reasons, the importance of African political parties for public policy including on redistribution is seldom discussed. One of the main arguments this study makes is that in countries such as Zambia and Malawi, where political parties are not fully institutionalized, ambitious political actors, powerful elite factions, and powerful interest groups, are crucial for policy reforms. The study also argues that changes of government result in the shift of power between different elite groups, which has the potential to affect public policy. Therefore, changes of government provide an important lens through which the relative importance of partisan politics for social protection policy reforms can be examined.

1.5 Changes of government and social protection policy reform

Between 1960 and 1989, few African countries conducted regular multiparty elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015: 102). This period was also associated with undemocratic rule and severe economic decline (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017: 1965). The incidence of elections increased significantly following the wave of (re)democratization in the early 1990s (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015; Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Bleck and van de Walle (2018) demonstrate that between 1990 and 2015, 184 multiparty elections for the executive were held in Africa which resulted in 37 cases of presidential alternation in 18 countries. Although covering the period up to 2015, their data only reports changes of government until 2013 and do not account for presidential alternations that occurred in Malawi in 2014, Nigeria in 2015, and The Gambia and Ghana in 2016. Changes of government because of the electoral defeat of an incumbent president happened in 17 countries but only in a few countries (including Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal and Zambia) did this happen two or more times (ibid:

75-76). In a few other countries (such as Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger), turnovers after the defeat of an incumbent happened at least once during this period (Bleck & van de Walle, 2018).

The growth of democracy in Africa because of regular multiparty elections and electoral turnovers, has attracted scholarly attention on the relationship between democratization and development on the continent (Carbone, 2012). This has been extended to examining whether democratization is associated with social welfare reforms. This includes studies which interrogate whether countries that have more changes in government over time provide more social welfare than countries with no or fewer instances of electoral alternation (Carbone, 2012; Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Carbone and Pellegata (2017) conclude that multiparty regimes in which electoral alternation has taken place more than once are more likely to provide better social welfare because changes in government resulting from democratic elections imply that voters were not satisfied with the performance of the previous government and thus require policy adjustments (ibid: 1973).

The quantitative analysis of the above study has at least three limitations. First, it does not account for the causal mechanisms though which changes of government contribute to social welfare reforms. Second, it does not discuss how and why the provision of welfare differs between government administrations within countries. Third, while it provides quantitative analysis of the sub-Saharan Africa sub region, it does not provide case study analyses of reforms. These are gaps that the process tracing research conducted for this study addresses.

1.6 What are changes of government?

Before explaining what is meant by "change of government", it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term "government". A common feature of liberal democracies is that the government is separated into three arms which exercise state power differently. The notion of separation of powers was advanced by John Locke and developed by Montesquieu who conceived of the government as constituting: "a legislature (which made laws), an executive (which implemented the laws) and a judiciary (which adjudicated disputes surrounding the laws)" (Landau & Bilchitz, 2018: 1-2).

For much of sub-Saharan Africa, the legislature and judiciary have limited or no roles in social policy making because social protection is not institutionalized. Rather, social protection programmes are implemented by the executive outside constitutional frameworks. A notable exception is South Africa where citizens deserving social protection are legally entitled to receive or claim benefits as a right (Seekings, 2015). A secondary function of the legislature is to provide oversight of the executive (Mezey, 2008: 179). In this role, parliaments approve national budgets which include allocations for social protection. They also hold the executive accountable for implementing programmes which may include demands from Members of Parliament (MPs) for more social protection for their constituents.

In view of the foregoing discussion, what then constitutes a change of government? This study considers two forms that a change of government may take. The first is a complete change of government. In this instance, executive office is assumed by a newly elected political party that comes into power through national elections after defeating the former governing political party. The second form is a partial change of government. This is characterized by a change in leadership within a governing ruling coalition, for example when a new president is elected from the same party as an outgoing president. A partial change also includes cases where constitutional provisions allow for a presidential succession without the need for fresh elections.

1.6.1 Why do changes of government matter for policy reform?

Why then would changes of government affect public policy? Literature on public policy in the United States provides insights that help explain the importance of electoral alternation to policy reform. In his book *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, first published in 1984, American political scientist John Kingdon sought to understand why the public policy agenda was composed in a specific manner and how and why it changed from one time to another (Kingdon, 1995: 3). Kingdon proposed a multiple-streams framework to explain how agenda setting worked in the United States. He demonstrated that separate streams of problems (issues that are of concern to the public), policy (solutions to problems developed by policymakers) and politics (factors that influence the body politic) come together at certain crucial times to shape the government agenda (Kingdon, 1995; Béland & Howlett, 2016).

Kingdon argued that at any given point in time, there are a range of policy proposals being pushed by different policy makers, including politicians and civil servants, yet some policies are adopted and not others. However, at certain instances, “policy windows” open, which provide opportunities for advocates of alternative policies to push their solutions and set the agenda (Kingdon, 1995: 203). Kingdon explained the circumstances under which a policy window may open and how this would lead to a shift in public policy.

> "Basically, a [policy] window opens because of a change in the political stream (e.g. a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats in Congress, or a shift in national mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the attention of government officials and those close to them. A change of government is probably the most obvious window in the policy stream…The new administration gives some groups, legislators, and agencies their opportunity – an open policy window – to push positions and proposals that they did not have the opportunity to push with the previous administration…The same is true of turnover of any of the political actors. The rise of a new congressional chair, a wholesale change in congressional membership, and new members on a regulatory body all open windows for the advocates of proposals that might get a sympathetic hearing with a new cast of characters" (Kingdon, 1995: 168).

Drawing from Kingdon's framework, this thesis argues that changes of government between political parties are significant for public policy. Political parties act as mechanisms for identifying, aggregating, and mobilizing interests in support of elites and are therefore crucial for agenda setting (Pitcher, 2012). Changes of government are also significant for social policy reforms in Africa for at least two broad reasons. First, in competitive African democracies, political parties and candidates may have distinct ideological, electoral or factional interests that provide them with incentives to promote different forms of redistribution. In cases where social protection has not already been seized as a brand by an incumbent candidate, an opposition challenger has a strong incentive to adopt this as part of their brand. In cases where an opposition candidate wins, there is an incentive for the new government to implement reforms to meet campaign pledges and to consolidate support for future elections. Second, when a change of government happens, this provides a policy window for international donors and government technocrats to push for alternative policy reforms that the previous administration did not adopt. If the interests of political elites in the new ruling coalition mesh with those of donors and civil servants, there is an incentive for reforms to promote more social protection. A change of government may also result in the appointment of new actors and policy makers who would seize the opportunity to implement reforms that align with the interests of powerful elites in the new ruling coalition.

1.7 Research focus

This thesis investigates the relative importance of changes of government to social policy making in Zambia and Malawi. It considers the differences and similarities between the two countries and between government administrations within each country. Through a fuller discussion of how these cases fit within a broader set of cases in Africa, the study contributes to broader debates about drivers of social welfare reform globally. Table 1.1 provides a summary of the five dimensions, what is considered for each of the dimensions, and the indicators used to measure reform.

Table 1. 1: Summary of reforms being investigated

Dimension	What is being considered	Indicators
Programmes expanded	What social protection or related social support programmes were expanded?	1. The extent to which expansion focused on clientelist or programmatic distribution
Coverage	What proportion of the deserving poor population receive social cash transfer benefits?	1. Number of households receiving cash transfers 2. Number of districts or regions implementing cash transfers
State expenditure	How much does the government spend on programmes?	1. Budgetary allocations to SCTs 2. Social protection spending as a percentage of GDP 3. SCT spending relative to competing social interventions
Generosity of benefits	How generous are social cash transfer benefits?	1. Changes in real value of benefits over time 2. Value of monthly benefits compared to poverty lines
Status of legislation	What legislation or policy framework is in place to support the implementation of programmes?	1. Status of social protection in legal frameworks including the Constitution, social protection policies, and national development plans

1.7.1 Research Questions

The overarching question addressed by this research is: *how and why do changes of government affect policy making on social protection programmes in Zambia and Malawi?* The thesis focuses primarily on social cash transfers which are the most prominent social protection interventions targeted at the extreme poor in both countries. It also considers reforms to other social programmes including farm input subsidy schemes which are a more popular form of distribution in both countries (in terms of state expenditure and coverage of beneficiaries). The following subsidiary questions are also addressed:

1. How and when has social policy been reformed (in terms of the five dimensions above)?
2. To what extent do changes in government affect state support for reforms?
3. What explains similarities and differences in the effects of changes in government on social policy reforms in Zambia and Malawi?
4. How do these two country cases compare with a broader set of cases within Anglophone East and Southern Africa?
5. What broader lessons can be learnt from this study about the contribution of partisan politics to social policy reforms?

1.8 Actors and public policymaking

For each case study, I identify actors that were crucial for social protection policymaking. Further, I demonstrate how and why a shift in power between political parties or factions provided (or did not provide) opportunities for donor and elite interests to converge on issues of redistribution. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the main actors in the social policy making process in both countries.

Within the executive and the legislature, the literature on the politics of social protection in Africa has identified political elites, political parties, and bureaucrats as important actors for social policy making (Hickey, 2007: 2-3). Two actors are particularly important. The first is the president, whose approval is necessary for any policy to be approved. The second is the finance minister who can recommend or oppose policies taking fiscal concerns into account. Furthermore, senior bureaucrats such as Cabinet Secretaries, Treasury Secretaries, and Permanent (or Principal Secretaries), and technocrats working in government ministries and departments are also central actors in agenda setting and implementing programmes.

Table 1. 2: Role of actors in policy making process

Actor	Role
President	Appoints Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats; chairs Cabinet meetings; presides over government agenda setting
Vice President	Deputizes president; plays senior advisory role to the president
Cabinet	Debate policy proposals and approve government policies
Minister of Finance	Presides over budget making process; sets government spending agenda
Minister of implementing ministry	Presides over design and implementation of programmes
Members of Parliament	Debate policy proposals; vote on budgetary allocations to programmes
Senior bureaucrats	Coordinate policy making process within and across government ministries and departments
Civil servants	Draft policy documents; implement programmes
International donors	Initiate policy ideas; draft policy documents; fund and implement programmes; cooperate with national governments on policy issues
Ruling party officials	Draft party manifestos; lobby Cabinet on electoral concerns

1.8.1 The policy making process [3]

Zambia and Malawi are both former British colonies and inherited colonial administrative systems that remain largely in place to this day. In both countries, the executive comprises the President who is directly elected, the Vice President (who is elected as a presidential running-mate, but only since 2016 in the case of Zambia) and Cabinet ministers appointed by the president from Parliament. Both countries have government agencies that provide oversight of the public service. This agency is known as Cabinet Office in Zambia and is headed by the Secretary to the Cabinet. The agency is known as the Office of the President and Cabinet in Malawi (hereafter also referred to as Cabinet Office) and is headed by the Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. At the bureaucratic level, government departments are headed by Permanent Secretaries (in Zambia) or Principal Secretaries (in Malawi), who hereafter I refer to as PSs, who report to the Cabinet Secretaries.

[3] The discussion in this section is based on conversations with policy makers in Zambia and Malawi on the policy making processes in each country. While the policy making processes in the two countries are similar, there are inevitable differences. This discussion does not seek to unpack the differences but to provide a general outline that is relevant for discussing both countries.

The policy making process is complex and involves interaction and bargaining between a multiplicity of actors who are faced with different constraints (Chinsinga, 2007: 1). In practice, there are at least three scenarios through which a policy may be initiated and implemented. In the first scenario, the idea for a specific policy originates from Cabinet. The president may direct Cabinet to develop a national policy to fulfil an election campaign pledge, to respond to an issue he or she considers crucial to voters, or to respond to a national or sub-national emergency. The minister in charge of the implementing ministry issues an instruction to the PS for a policy to be developed. In turn, the PS instructs directors and technocrats in the ministry to formulate the policy.

The process involves stakeholder consultations with technocrats in other government ministries that have interest in the specific policy, and non-state actors in the sector such as donors, civil society, labour unions, consultants and academics. Once consultations are complete, a draft policy is prepared by ministry technocrats who present it to the PS. The PS in turn presents it to the Minister. If the minister approves of the draft policy, the ministry prepares a memo (which provides a summary of the proposal) for Cabinet Office. The memo is sent to a Policy Unit within Cabinet Office (or to the Economic Planning and Development (EP&D) Department of the Ministry of Finance in the case of Malawi). Cabinet Office (or EP&D) sends the memo to all ministries through the PS for consultations on the draft policy.

At this stage, the ministries provide feedback to the Policy Unit which then reports to the Cabinet Secretary. Thereafter, Cabinet Office provides feedback to the ministry for it to revise its policy based on input from other ministries. Once the ministry has completed revising the draft, it is sent to Cabinet Office again. In the penultimate stage, Cabinet Office includes the policy in a memo for discussion at a Cabinet meeting chaired by the president. The minister presents the draft policy to Cabinet where a decision is taken to approve, reject or revise the policy.

In the second scenario, the idea to develop a policy is initiated by either a minister or technocrats within a ministry. In this instance, technocrats work closely with the PS and minister to develop a draft policy. The ministry presents the draft to Cabinet Office and the rest of the policy process follows the channels described in the first scenario. In the third scenario, policy ideas originate from other actors within or outside the government system. The Vice President or a Cabinet minister in charge of a ministry unrelated to the policy issue could influence the President to consider initiating a policy. Most commonly, bilateral and multilateral donors would initiate policy proposals to push for specific programmes or economic reforms. This includes winning the support of ministry technocrats, the responsible minister, other influential political leaders, and the president. Other actors who could initiate policy ideas include ruling party officials, organized business, labour unions, civil society and voters who would also have to win the support of important actors. Where ideas are initiated from outside formal channels, the policy making process could be influenced by forms such as bilateral or multilateral agreements, lobbying, protest, or informal networks.

In each of the case study chapters, I systematically outline the roles that policy makers played in the social protection policy process. In doing so, I demonstrate which actors were most crucial for social protection during different government administrations. I also explain how and why the roles and influence of policy makers were affected when governments changed.

1.9 Structure of thesis

This thesis comprises nine chapters, starting with this introduction.

Chapter Two reviews in more detail the existing literature relevant for this research. It begins by providing definitions of concepts that are central to this study. It identifies the four main approaches that have been used to understand global welfare state building and the nascent field of the politics of social protection in Africa. It also reviews the existing literature on social policy reforms in Zambia and Malawi. It then identifies the knowledge gap in the literature that this thesis addresses. Further, it discusses the conceptual framework adopted for this study, informed by the existing literature.

Chapter Three discusses the research methodology adopted for this study. It explains the process-tracing approach that was used and demonstrates why the approach was best suited for this study. It also considers the importance of comparative research and explains why a Most Similar Systems Design was appropriate for the study. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the two country cases and the case studies within them. It ends by providing a background to the quantitative methods that inform the analysis in Chapter 8. This includes a discussion on the value addition of analysing quantitative data to build a theory that extends beyond the two country cases that this study focuses on.

Chapter Four focuses on the first of four case studies that make up this research. It looks at reforms in Zambia from 2011 to 2014, under the Patriotic Front government led by President Michael Sata, following the 2011 full change of government. The chapter demonstrates that significant reforms to promote social protection happened after the PF was elected. It then accounts for the causal mechanisms that demonstrate how the change of government influenced the expansion of social protection during the Sata administration. It shows that the provision of cash transfers was expanded by the PF because the ideological and electoral interests of a dominant faction within the party converged with those of donors on the promotion of social protection.

Chapter Five focuses on the second case study which examines social protection reforms after a partial change of government from Sata to Edgar Lungu. The discussion in this chapter shows that Lungu was elected president representing a multi-patron coalition of politicians with significant business interests who were disposed to shifting the emphasis of redistribution from programmatic social protection interventions such as social cash transfers, to clientelist forms of distribution such as empowerment funds that targeted ruling party supporters. The interests of this faction diverged from those of donors on social protection. The provision of SCTs continued largely due to the influence of a policy coalition of donors and government technocrats that had been built since the mid-2000s.

Chapter Six discusses the first of the two Malawi case studies. It explains how and why the expansion of SCTs from a pilot to a national programme and the publication of a national policy, happened after the 2012 partial change of government from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under President Bingu wa Mutharika to the People's Party (PP) led by President Joyce Banda. This chapter demonstrates that donor supported reforms were constrained by the Mutharika administration which was more supportive of subsidised farming inputs. By contrast, Banda's administration implemented faster reforms. The chapter demonstrates how factional battles within the DPP led to the formation of the PP. It also shows how the unconventional circumstances through which Banda became president – and her desire to retain power – disposed her to seek donor support which compelled her administration to promote social protection.

Chapter Seven looks at social protection reforms that happened after Peter Mutharika of the DPP won the 2014 elections, resulting in a full change of government. The chapter shows that while SCTs continued to expand, this was largely due to a policy coalition of donors and government technocrats. It also shows that a dominant faction of the DPP allied to the Mutharika brothers was more supportive of farm input subsidies because of ideas about the contribution of agriculture to national development. Farm subsidies and related maize distribution programmes also provided incentives for wealth accumulation amongst DPP elites and were popular among the party's supporters. Therefore, the interests of elites in Mutharika's administration diverged from those of donors on state support for expanded social protection.

Chapter Eight provides a quantitative analysis of social protection reforms. It considers how the Zambia and Malawi case studies fit into a broader set of East and Southern African countries. In doing so, it extends the evidence that emerged from the qualitative process tracing to develop a theory about the significance of changes of government for social protection reforms.

The conclusion of this study is presented in Chapter Nine. It demonstrates how the causal mechanisms that link changes of government to social protection reforms were present in each case study. Furthermore, it provides a synthesis of the study and a summary of the broader implications to the body of knowledge. It shows that changes of government provide incentives for elites in new ruling coalitions to support different forms of redistribution from their predecessors. Moreover, when the interests of political elites and donors converged, there was a greater incentive for social protection programmes such as cash transfers to be promoted.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature on welfare state building both globally and in Africa. It also provides discussions of the existing literature on social policy reform in Zambia and Malawi. The chapter discussed the methods that previous studies have used to arrive at their findings and considers the extent to which process tracing and statistical analyses have been applied to existing studies. The discussion on methods used in previous studies provides a background to the application of process tracing and the quantitative analysis in this study. This chapter ends with a discussion on the conceptual framework which guides this study. The conceptual framework is informed by the discussion of the literature on social welfare reforms reviewed in this chapter. Before proceeding to discuss the literature, I first provide definitions of key concepts used in the study.

2.2 Definition of concepts

2.2.1 Welfare

"Welfare" is an ambiguous word that can be used to refer to people's well-being and to systems which are used to provide for people (Spicker, 2000: 66). Edling, Petersen & Petersen (2014: 13) note that the Old English word *wel faran* which means getting along and/or doing well, is of Nordic origin, and means welfare in modern English. Historically, the Swedish and Danish terminology for welfare became popular in the 1930s (ibid: 17). Wincott (2014: 127) notes that the German term for welfare, *wohlfahrtsstaat*, was widely used (in the 1930s) before the term welfare was popularized in Britain in the late 1940s. Even then, this was not the primary word to describe what we now call welfare or use to refer to the welfare state. After the Second World War, the word *welfare* was used in advanced capitalist democracies including the United States of America (USA) and countries in Western Europe to refer to programmes that promote happiness, social justice, or income inequality or equal life choices (Standing, 2007: 512).

The provision of welfare was based on principles of social responsibility but in more recent times, there has been a focus on the rights and responsibilities of beneficiaries (ibid). Spicker (2000) considers poverty and exclusion to be important factors vitiating welfare. For Spicker, a poor person lacks well-being, while a person faces exclusion when they lack social ties or have no relationships with other people in society (Spicker, 2000: 69-70). Typically, unemployment was a major cause of both poverty and exclusion and it is for this reason that the provision of welfare in the post-second world war era was done by the state to provide a basic modicum of welfare for individuals who did not earn wages (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19).

The term “welfare state” is widely used in academic discourse in debates about welfare in advanced capitalist democracies (including debates about how countries differ in the provision of welfare benefits). Below, I explain what is meant by the term welfare state and discuss why this term is seldom used in debates about social welfare (or social protection) in Africa.

2.2.2 Welfare sate

In Great Britain, the term “welfare state” was used in the 1940s to refer to “all social services and social insurance programmes that were introduced to universally ensure a national minimum of protection for all citizens against old age, disability and ill health, unemployment and other causes of insufficient income” (Skocpol, 1995: 12). The term “welfare states” is also commonly used across Western Europe and North America. Walker and Wong (2004: 117) posit that welfare states (and welfare regimes) have been constructed as both capitalist and democratic which essentially excludes other economic and political systems even when they provide similar benefits. Nonetheless, other societies outside Western democracies identify with democracy and capitalism, including countries in the former Soviet bloc and Asia, yet they are not identified as welfare states.

Walker and Wong (ibid: 119) observe that scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1990) consider welfare states and different welfare state regimes in Western democracies as a system of stratification and strategies of decommodification aimed at counteracting the tension between democracy (and its focus on equality amongst citizens) and capitalism (and its focus on the market as the primary mode of distributing social and economic resources). Perhaps because of this, the terms welfare and welfare states have not been applied to similar debates in Africa, where both the emergence of democracy and capitalism happened more recently (in the early 1990s).

Structural differences between Western democracies and Africa also account for why the term welfare is not commonly used in the latter. In contemporary Africa, poverty and exclusion have taken different forms from those observed in advanced capitalist democracies. For example, the Keynesian welfare state was premised on the notion of full employment in modern industrial economies (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 18). This assumed modest levels of unemployment, robust economic growth, universal home ownership as well as strong trade unions that provided worker protection and diminished wage inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 19). Yet, high levels of unemployment, sluggish economic growth, lack of assets, weak trade unions, and agrarian economies characterise most of sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the terms welfare and welfare state are less commonly applied in discussions on poverty and exclusion in Africa. Instead, concepts such as social policy and social protection (discussed below) are more widely used with respect to Africa.

2.2.3 Social policy

Before explaining the meaning of the term “social policy”, it is useful to explain what is meant by the term “policy”. Midgley (2009: 4) defines policies as “courses of action adopted by formal organizations”. In most countries, national governments are the largest organizations and are therefore more dependent on policies than other organizations. The policies serve as “prescriptive statements about goals, decision making, and organizational activities” (ibid). When policies are implemented by the national government, they are known as public policies (Midgley, 2009: 4).

National governments formulate public policies to address different issues or sectors of public concern. Social policies are those with a specific focus on addressing the social circumstances or well-being of individuals (Clasen, 2004: 93). The term social policy embodies two aspects. First, it refers to activities of the government (actual policies and programmes) that national governments implement that affect people’s well-being or social welfare (Midgley, 2009; Midgley & Livermore, 2009). Typically, these policies target disadvantaged groups such as orphaned children and low-income families (Midgley, 2009: 5). This includes the provision of basic services such as education and health, and in low-income countries, it also includes water, sanitation and social protection (Barrientos & Pellissery, 2013). Second, it refers to the academic field that is devoted to the “description, explanation, and evaluation of these policies” (Midgley, 2009: 5).

The term well-being or social welfare is crucial to social policy debates. The ways in which the term social welfare is understood is significant for African countries with high poverty rates because it affects the types of policies and interventions that are implemented.

2.2.4 Social welfare

Social welfare refers to a range of social provisions designed to promote the well-being of individuals (Midgley, 2009). The term can be defined in a narrow or broad sense. In a narrow sense, the definition of social welfare is limited to a range of social services provided by the state and non-state actors such as charities that target specific groups of people within society such as the extreme poor, needy and vulnerable (Midgley, 2009: 6). In a broader sense, social welfare refers to social interventions that stress the well-being of the whole society and not just the poor and vulnerable (ibid). This distinction is important in social policy debates because political elites make a distinction between supporting programmes that target society and those that target narrowly defined groups within society (ibid). For example, political elites may support interventions that address national economic concerns such as education, health and agriculture (in the case of low-income African countries) while offering limited social assistance for “deserving” citizens such as the old, disabled and orphaned children.

2.2.5 Policy reform

This study is primarily concerned with understanding how and why policy reforms happen. It is therefore necessary to also consider what is meant by *policy reform*. The World Bank defines policy reforms as “processes which improve equity, efficiency and effectiveness in key economic and social sectors which are often important elements of national poverty reduction strategies in low and middle-income countries” (World Bank, 2008: i). Similarly, Rodrik (1996) spoke of reforms as government strategies that should lead to improvement in the well-being of a large majority of the population. Regarding social policies, reforms could involve the state cutting back on welfare expenditure for either political or economic reasons or expanding the range of benefits to avoid social risks such as an increase in unemployment or to address market failures (Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014: 24). This study is concerned with the extent to which social policy reforms promote or militate against the expansion programmatic redistribution. Of concern for this study is the extent to which social policy reforms have affected the implementation of social cash transfer programmes which have emerged as popular responses to poverty reduction amongst global development policy makers (but not so much amongst political elites in low-income African countries).

2.2.6 Social protection

The term social protection is commonly used by transnational organizations when referring to poor people and the range of social programmes targeted at them in low-income countries (Barbier, 2014: 16). It is a broad term that encompasses several but related concepts. Social protection can be defined as "public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized; with the overall objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalized groups" (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004: iii). It includes three main components: social assistance (including food aid and cash transfers), social insurance (including contributory pensions and health insurance) and labour market interventions (Barrientos & Pellissery, 2013: 1). Of these three components, social assistance – which is primarily composed of non-contributory programmes – is most closely associated with poverty reduction in low-income countries. This is because few people in Africa are in formal employment and are therefore not covered by social insurance or labour market interventions. This in unlike Europe and North America where a larger proportion of the labour force is in formal employment and benefits from social insurance.

2.2.7 Social cash transfers

Social cash transfers refer to: "regular, tax funded and direct transfers of cash to poor or vulnerable individuals or households" (Schüring, 2012: 1). In practice, programmes designed to transfer cash to poor citizens are managed by the state, but multilateral agencies and international donors have also played prominent roles (including primary roles) in designing, funding and implementing cash transfer programmes in developing nations. Two different forms of cash transfers have been implemented in developing countries. In Latin American countries such as Mexico, national governments implemented conditional cash transfer programmes. These were income transfers directed towards the poorest on condition that households used the income to send children to school and to attend health centres with early childhood and nutritional interventions (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008: 14). In Africa, an unconditional cash transfer model was popularised by international donors in the early 2000s. Unconditional transfers allow beneficiaries to maximize utility by choosing a bundle of different goods and services that meets their preferences (Schüring, 2012: 19).

2.3 Comparative Literature on Welfare Policy Reforms

Literature on comparative welfare state building has been preoccupied with understanding the origins and types of welfare states in advanced capitalist democracies. The study of "welfare states" or "welfare regimes" in the Global North serves as an important starting point for understanding the emergence of social protection in the Global South, particularly regarding the African continent which has been considered a "laggard" relative to other continents (Seekings, 2014). Esping-Andersen (1990) demonstrated differences in provision of welfare in terms of "welfare regimes" and developed a typology of welfare states which showed that countries could be clustered into three distinct regimes. The first cluster is the "social democratic" welfare state which includes Scandinavian countries such as Sweden. The second cluster is the "conservative" or "corporatist" welfare state which includes countries such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy in continental Europe and the third is the "liberal" welfare state which includes Anglosphere countries like Australia, Canada and United States (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-29).

The three types of welfare regime differ on several dimensions such as generosity of benefits, social risks covered, the roles of the state, market and family, as well as the universality of coverage. With liberal welfare states, state provision of benefits is means-tested with modest universal transfers or social insurance. Work is encouraged over welfare and the state encourages the market to provide welfare benefits to workers (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26). Conservative or corporatist welfare states were shaped by the Church which supported strong family values. As such, the state typically intervened only when the family was unable to cope. It provided social insurance benefits to families to encourage motherhood while excluding support to unemployed mothers (ibid: 27). The social democratic welfare state was the most universal and egalitarian of the three regimes. It was pursued by social democratic political parties that wanted to promote equality between the working and middle classes by ensuring that the state played an active role in guaranteeing workers with the same quality of rights enjoyed by the middle class (ibid).

The existing literature on welfare regimes is important for understanding how advanced industrialized countries differed in their provision of welfare and in accounting for the origins of different kinds of welfare states. Below, I discuss the four dominant approaches to understanding welfare state building.

2.3.1 The Developmental Approach

The developmental argument considers welfare state building a consequence of modernization, industrialization and economic growth (Hicks and Esping-Andersen, 2005). The 'logic of industrialism' argument was popularized by Wilensky (1975) whose time series study of 64 industrialized countries showed that countries with higher levels of GDP per capita spent more on health and welfare programmes than countries with lower GDP per capita. Related to the economic growth argument is the actual impact that industrialization had on changing social structures and how this prompted demands for welfare. In the United States for example, industrialization, which was associated with the growth of industries and cities, resulted in the introduction of public measures to deal with work related risks such as illness and unemployment (Wilensky 1975 cited by Skocpol, 1995). The logic of industrialism approach concludes that modern nation states respond to the social challenges faced by a growing industrial and urban population by implementing social security policies. However, these policies are not extended to agrarian populations in rural areas that are not integrated into the modern industrial economy.

Studies on welfare state building in Latin America have also identified the level of industrialization as an important determinant of the welfare state especially in the 1980s (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2008; Pribble, 2010). This literature shows that an expansion of industrial employment led to more social security benefits. Women, for example, constitute an important demographic group that was incorporated into the labour market because of industrialization. Huber and Stephens (2012: 118) state that the transition to the service economy in industrial countries led to a rise in female labour force participation and with it a rise in demand for public social services and public transfers. This argument has been useful for understanding how the rise of women labour force participation in Latin America led to women friendly social policies such as family support through the provision of healthcare and cash transfers (Bradley et al., 2003; Huber & Stephens, 2008).

Some aspects of the developmental argument have been challenged. By the 1980s, high growth rates were associated with more economic openness and globalization. A major effect of globalization was that mobile capital was strengthened at the expense of unions and labour based political parties that weakened. This undermined the ability for marginalized groups to bargain for policies that would promote social protection (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008: 175-186). Furthermore, countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe experienced various economic crises during the 1990s which prompted structural reforms aimed at stabilization. These reforms also weakened the position of unions and labor based political parties (ibid: 196). More importantly, statistical (regression) analysis demonstrated that the relationship between economic circumstances (or modernization) and welfare legacies was not robust, with important variations around the means for a range of countries in the three regions mentioned above (ibid: 219). Furthermore, Skocpol (1995: 15-19) argued that the logic of industrialism argument was limited in its ability to explain variation in welfare state building amongst industrialized capitalist countries. She argues that the United States was one of the world's most industrialized countries before the 1930s, but it lagged far behind other industrialized countries (including some that were less urban and industrialized) in terms of instituting public pensions and social insurance (ibid: 15).

The developmental approach also has some limitations in its application to understanding reforms in low income African countries. The literature on welfare state building in advanced capitalist societies focuses on modern industrial societies with full employment. However, in countries such as Malawi and Zambia, the proportion of the formal workforce employed in the modern industrial economy is small relative to the entire labour force. The agriculture sector employs more than two-thirds of the labour force in both countries i.e. 64% in Malawi (National Statistical Office, 2017) and 66% in Zambia (Central Statistical Office, 2012). Unlike the other approaches discussed below, the developmental approach does not emphasize the importance of partisanship.

2.3.2 The Power Resources Approach

The original formulation of power resources theory (PRT) emphasized the power of labour, organized in unions and political parties (Huber & Stephens, 2012: 27). PRT considers the influence of political power on the nature and shape of a welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The PRT approach understands political power in broadly Marxian terms, i.e. in relation to classes in society. It is a political economy approach and not a more narrowly political one. Esping-Andersen (ibid: 105-138) conducted a quantitative cross-sectional analysis of 18 major industrialized capitalist democracies (including countries from Europe, North America, and Japan) to demonstrate the relationship between political power and welfare state characteristics. His findings showed that strong relationships between strong labour unions and left-wing political parties were strong predictors of generous welfare states.

Other PRT proponents have also established that, in the industrialised democracies of the Global North, "the size and structure of the welfare state is a function of the historic strength of left-wing political parties, mediated by alliances with the middle classes" (Iversen & Stephens, 2008: 600). Typically, left-wing political parties incorporated organizations that represented the urban working class or the rural poor (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). The incorporation of organizations such as trade unions by left-wing political parties allowed the working class or wage earners to articulate their demands and interests, which were addressed by the welfare state (Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014: 48). Haggard and Kaufman (2008: 361) argue that one of the strongest vindications of the power resources approach is Chile, which had a strong tradition (both before and after President Augusto Pinochet) of centre-left coalitions acting to strengthen the public-sector role in the provision of protection and services. Huber and Stephens (2012) demonstrate based on their analysis of Latin American countries that social policy making in democracies that are governed by *left* political parties is associated with increased coverage and spending on welfare programmes.

This approach has been more useful for predicting that parties with closer links to marginalized classes and that receive votes from these classes, are more inclined to spend more on social protection in Europe and Latin America. Recent evidence demonstrates that the expansion of social welfare in Latin America also happened under right-wing political parties. Between 2000 and 2012 in Mexico, and from 2010 to 2014 in Chile, right-wing governments unexpectedly expanded pro-poor social programmes and increased taxes targeting elites despite close ties to organized business (Fairfield & Garay, 2017). These governments were motivated to enact social policies because of electoral competition and a desire to consolidate the support of low-income voters who were previously excluded from healthcare, income support and pensions (ibid: 14).

The foregoing demonstrates that the PRT may not be adequate for explaining recent welfare reforms in African countries for at least two reasons. First, the class structures that exist in Europe and Latin America do not mirror the structures in most African countries which are characterized by large rural agrarian populations and poor peri-urban dwellers employed in the informal economy. A few exceptions here are Mauritius and South Africa which have large working-class populations relative to the rest of the continent (Seekings, 2014). In fact, Esping-Andersen's cross-sectional analysis of 18 major industrial capitalist democracies represented "a universe of comparable nations" and his findings were therefore not generalizable beyond the countries he analysed (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 111). Second, and partly because of the class structure, African political parties do not fit neatly onto the standard (Eurocentric) 'left-right' continuum (Elischer, 2010)[4]. Some observers have noted that African political parties are typically vehicles for ambitious politicians (or strong men) to contest for power and not movements rooted in social structures (van de Walle, 2003; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008; Conroy-Krutz & Lewis, 2011). To the extent that electoral competition would prompt the enactment of social policies in Africa, the incorporation of marginalized classes would almost certainly take a different form to that described by the PRT for Europe or much of Latin America.

2.3.3 The Political Institutions Approach

Proponents of the political institutions approach argue that factors such as processes of state formation, levels of democratization and bureaucratization result in distinctive forms of government institutions which in turn affect the types of social policies that are developed (Weir, Orloff & Skocpol, 1988: 31). These scholars have addressed issues such as why the United States did not develop a welfare-state like European countries which launched social programmes in the late 1800s. Skocpol (1995) shows that state formation in the United States was distinct and influenced the forms of social and economic policies. Unlike Britain for example, the United States did not have a monarchical history and the effect of war did not produce the kind of state that developed in Britain (nor the same class structure nor the same political ideologies). Rather, war in the U.S resulted in distinct constitution making and the formation of a federal system of government. Orloff (1988) demonstrates that federalism and division of powers resulted in fragmented authority which undermined the development of national welfare initiatives. This contrasted with parliamentary democracies in Europe which had more centralized decision making at the national level, especially in countries where the executive and parliament were controlled by the same political party (Immergut, 1990).

Institutionalist scholars believe that the relationship between state formation and types of institutions that emerge can predict the distinct forms of social policies that countries adopt which in turn explains variation across countries. These scholars further argue that social policy

[4] Although Elischer's study places African political parties on a left-right spectrum using a coding technique that had previously been used on Western and European political parties only, the study makes it clear that African political party manifestos, for the most part, demonstrate very little programmatic (or ideological) ideas. Rather, the study places parties on the spectrum by applying a crude method of subtracting right-wing content from left-wing content in the party manifestos.

reform is path dependent i.e. policy agendas are formulated in reaction to previous policies and not independently of them (Weir, Orloff & Skocpol, 1988). In other words, the types of political institutions in a country and previously enacted social policies shape the behavior of social policy makers (Béland, 2005). This helps to explain why the U.S for example continues to provide less generous social welfare benefits to its citizens compared to Western European countries. As Béland (ibid: 2) puts it, existing social programmes that emerged in the U.S in the post-war era have created vested interests amongst beneficiaries, interest groups and policy makers which makes wholesale reforms to programmes difficult.

Political institutions scholars also consider the extent to which political systems and institutions provide certain interest groups with veto powers. Immergut (1990) argues that for any area of policy making, certain interest groups can influence political decision making or at least block certain decisions. She demonstrated that there was variation in the provision of national health insurance in countries such as France, Sweden and Switzerland partly because of the distinct ways in which professional medical groups were able to influence politicians both in cabinet and parliament to implement reforms (Immergut, 1990: 393). Where professional medical groups had the most influence (in Sweden) a more generous national health system emerged. However, the distinct political features of each country mattered. For example, the differences between direct parliamentary rule, direct democracy and majority parliamentary rule provided different veto opportunities in the three countries. The distinct political systems meant political influence resided in different institutions (such as the executive in Sweden, parliament in France, and with voters in Switzerland) (ibid). This argument is useful for demonstrating that the extent to which interest groups can influence policy making at different stages matters for policy reforms. Where interest groups can influence policy making at the most crucial level of government, reforms are more likely to be successful.

Some critiques of the institutions approach argue that institutionalists are concerned by the extent to which institutions create obstacles and opportunities for reform, but they downplay the influence of ideas on policy making (Béland, 2005). Critiques argue that at every stage in the policy making process, there are competing ideas and policy agendas expressed by different actors. They posit that political actors pushing for reform are constantly aware of institutional constraints but constantly seek opportunities to implement alternative policy agendas and to reform the welfare state (Kingdon, 1995; Béland, 2005).

2.3.4 The Cultural Approach

In recent times, a fourth approach to the study of welfare regimes has emerged which considers the contribution of ideas, ideology and culture. One of the leading proponents of the culture argument is van Oorschot (2007) who argues that in addition to understanding welfare states as resulting from industrial and economic growth, or from a power struggle between the interests of social classes, it can also be understood as a struggle between various ideologies (such as, in Europe, conservatism, liberalism and socialism). A cultural analysis of social policy understands a notion of culture as consisting of the values, norms and beliefs of welfare state actors, like policymakers, administrators, interest groups, churches, clients and taxpayers (ibid: 136). The role of global actors in persuading local actors to adopt social protection programmes is one way in which the importance of beliefs and values from one part of the globe can be used to inform decisions made by domestic actors in other parts of the world (Deacon, 2013; Peck & Theodore, 2015). Furthermore, globalization plays an important role in promoting welfare state reforms. Domestic actors are aware of international trends and may institute welfare reforms based on knowledge of what is obtaining in other parts of the world even without direct contact with global actors (Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014: 126).

This approach sees the ideas of policy makers as being relevant to understanding the nature of welfare systems that are developed and the kinds of benefits that are provided to recipients. The cultural argument is certainly important for understanding reforms in Africa especially as it relates to how the interaction between global and domestic policy makers contributes to social policies. But while ideas and beliefs of policy makers matter, they are not independent of the distinct ways in which democratization, economic growth and electoral competition prompt policy reforms.

2.3.5 Lessons from comparative welfare state building literature

The four approaches to understanding welfare state building are useful for explaining welfare policy reforms in advanced capitalist democracies that adopted welfare states in the first half of the twentieth century but also in other regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia that expanded welfare provision much later. The four approaches recognize the importance of industrial development, democratization, partisanship (including the relationship between political power and union mobilization), and cultural incentives of policy makers, in explaining how and why welfare states emerge and are reformed.

Taken together, there are at least three issues to consider from the four approaches. First, interests matter for reforms to happen. This includes interests of policy makers (including politicians and bureaucrats), voters, and social groups who have different motivations to promote or derail certain policy agendas. These interests are refracted through political parties which serve as the avenue through which political actors are elected to government to influence policy. Importantly, the interaction between the different actors and the extent to which their interests converge is important for distinguishing why reforms happen in some countries but not others. Second, institutional features in each country provide incentives and constraints for policy makers. This shows that in studying social policy reforms, attention should be paid to historical factors that shape the types of political institutions that emerge which in turn contribute to distinct reforms. Lastly, ideas matter in the development of welfare provision. It is necessary to consider who pushed or blocked specific reforms at a given point in a country.

The comparative literature on global welfare state building provides a useful starting point for discussing how and why social policy reforms happen in Africa. Yet, the literature does not provide answers to crucial questions that are relevant for discussing social policy in Africa. These include questions such as: What interests do policy makers in Africa promote? How important are political parties as institutions in the policy making process? What variation is there in the ideas of policy-making elites? I explore these issues in the next section by considering the existing literature on social policy reform in Africa.

2.4 Literature of social policy reform in sub-Saharan Africa

The main approaches to understanding the origins and nature of welfare states in in the Global North have little to say about Africa (Hickey et al., 2019). For the most part, Africa has been considered a “laggard” relative to other continents regarding the provision of social assistance (Seekings, 2014). While it is true that the type of welfare states that emerged in advanced capitalist democracies have been absent across Africa, the continent does have a history of providing social assistance tracing back to the colonial era (Mkandawire, 2016). Even then, the capacity for most African governments to provide social assistance was significantly constrained during the 1980s and 1990s due to economic decline which militated against the capacity for national governments to fund social welfare programmes (Ferguson, 2015).

A distinct form of social assistance has emerged on the continent in the last two decades. The first part of this section provides a brief background of the provision of social assistance on the African continent in the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras and discusses why state capacity to continue providing social assistance was eroded. It then turns to the core focus of this section which engages with literature that looks at the emergence and expansion of social protection in Africa. The literature review also discusses the main factors that have promoted or constrained the expansion of social protection, including democratization, the role of international organizations, and the contribution of elite interests.

2.4.1 Brief background of social assistance in Africa

Social protection programmes were implemented during the colonial era across parts of sub-Saharan Africa but were mostly targeted at white settler populations (Mkandawire, 2016: 3). In British settler economies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, a "white" welfare state emerged in the first half of the twentieth century aimed at providing "civilised" standards of living for settlers that were comparable to the living standards in Europe and superior to those of native Africans (Mkandawire, 2010: 1651). In South Africa, this included the provision of old age pensions and a state maintenance grant through which the state provided financial support for white and coloured single mothers with children (Seekings & Nattrass, 2015: 139-144). By the late 1930s, South Africa already had a well-developed welfare state for its white and coloured citizens (Seekings, 2013: 4). Non-contributory old age pensions were also introduced for white residents in South-West Africa (present day Namibia) and Southern Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) around the same time (ibid).

The trajectory of welfare state development was somewhat different between the British settler colonies and the rest of colonized Africa. In the British settler countries, white minority rule continued beyond the 1960s (the period during which independence was attained across much of the continent) even though the incorporation of non-whites started much earlier. Old-age pensions were introduced for Africans, in South Africa in 1944, and Namibia in 1973 (Seekings, 2013: 4). The apartheid government incorporated poor rural Africans and non-voting Africans to address the pervasive nature of rural poverty which threatened the stability of the apartheid government, and to placate non-voting black Africans (particularly in Namibia) (ibid).

In the early 1990s, settler countries such as Namibia and South Africa implemented relatively extensive welfare programmes. However, not all settler countries took the same trajectory. Zimbabwe for example, took a different trajectory and by the early 2000s, the state provided very little social assistance (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). The focus of this thesis is to understand reforms in countries where the emergence of social protection was primarily influenced by international donors. Even in these countries, the colonial and post-colonial histories are important for understanding the emergence of social protection.

In the dying days of colonial rule in the non-settler economies (during the 1950s), some colonial regimes made attempts to incorporate urban African workers by promoting provident funds or social insurance programmes to contain agitation for independence (Seekings, 2012). But the provision of social assistance for Africans was never extensive. In the post-colonial era, starting from the 1960s, social services were extended to a large section of the African population partly to correct inadequacies associated with colonialism but also to uplift the standards of living on the continent relative to the rest of the world (Awortwi, 2017: 6). This included the promotion of free and universal education, healthcare and sanitation in countries such as Ghana and Tanzania (ibid).

By the 1980s, many African countries were faced with severe economic decline and fiscal crises which constrained state capacity to maintain redistributive systems (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017: 1967). This resulted in the imposition of structural adjustment programmes – sponsored by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the World Bank and the IMF – which were aimed at macroeconomic stabilization (Awortwi, 2017: 1). Structural adjustment undermined the long-term development prospects on the continent by eroding state capacity to invest in social services (Mkandawire, 2001: 4). Household disposable incomes plummeted and the provision of social assistance to the poor and vulnerable became precarious (Awortwi, 2017: 1). The effect of structural adjustment on poverty and the criticisms directed at the BWIs put the multilateral institutions on a path that included a focus on poverty and development (Mkandawire, 2001). This shift in focus (combined with other global factors discussed below) contributed to the emergence of social protection.

2.4.2 The emergence and expansion of social protection in Africa

Since the early 2000s, social protection has grown in importance as a development strategy relative to the focus on economic growth and other development interventions that were popular in the preceding decades (Deacon, 2005; Ferguson, 2015; Hickey & Seekings, 2019). Several factors help to explain the growing significance of social policy in Africa in the 1990s. These include a shift in thinking about development from growth centred ideas to the expansion of human capabilities, following Amartya Sen's (1999) work on development and freedom and the introduction of development metrics other than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (such as the Human Development Index) (Mkandawire, 2001: 4). In the late 1990s, there was also recognition that the World Bank and IMF neoliberal supported structural adjustment programmes had retarded long term development prospects by weakening the legitimacy of the state and reducing social and physical investments for the poor (Mkandawire, 2001; Midgley, 2012; Ferguson, 2015).

Furthermore, the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s compelled the World Bank to integrate human development objectives in its response to crises and long-term development objectives (World Bank, 1999: 1). Similarly, the IMF developed a strong focus on social policy. It did so after recognizing that its reform programmes would be viable in the long run if they attached importance to equity and human development (Mkandawire, 2001: 4). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which had a strong focus on poverty reduction also upped the pressure for international organizations to rethink their development strategies towards developing countries (Midgley, 2012: 19). Around the same time, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was preoccupied with concerns about extending coverage of social insurance to workers in the informal sector who constituted larger populations than formal sector workers across the continent (Deacon, 2005; Deacon, 2013).

During the 1990s, some countries in the Global South such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia adopted large scale cash transfer programmes that aimed to transform the lives of some poor people in poverty (Hanlon, Barrientos & Hulme, 2010). The success of these programmes such as the Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Latin America, demonstrated how social protection could be implemented as a means of redistribution (Ferguson, 2015; Peck & Theodore, 2015). One important lesson from the success of the CCTs was that social protection was necessary for people out of employment (Hanlon, Barrientos & Hulme, 2010). By the start of the 2000s, global policy makers were keen to adapt the CCTs model to other parts of the world, particularly in regions like Africa where the extent of social exclusion had worsened despite aid and structural adjustment (Hanlon, Barrientos & Hulme, 2010; Ferguson, 2015; Peck &Theodore, 2015; Von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016). Consequently, the World

Bank funded conferences in Puebla, Mexico in 2002 and São Paulo, Brazil in 2004, which brought policy makers from Latin American countries to study the Mexican and Brazilian CCTs, *Opportunidades* and *Bolsa Família*, respectively (Peck & Theodore, 2015).

In the early 2000s, international organizations played a crucial role in promoting social protection on the African continent as part of a global anti-poverty agenda (Von Gliszczynski & Leisering, 2016). Several pilot cash transfer programmes were initiated by the World Bank, UNICEF, DFID, HAI and Concern Worldwide, among others in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, and Zambia (Chitonge, 2012: 3-4). The pilot cash transfers mostly targeted incapacitated households (households with no labour capacity) typically in rural areas. The beneficiaries were mostly the aged, orphaned and vulnerable children, the disabled, and the chronically ill (Davis et al., 2016). In a considerable number of African countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia, pilot cash transfers began as responses to donor interventions over HIV and AIDS (Seekings, 2016). In countries such as Ethiopia, cash transfers were designed as a response to humanitarian aid (Lavers, 2019) whereas Zanzibar introduced old age pensions partly in response to deagrarianisation and increased rural poverty (Seekings, 2016).

There is variation in the extent to which SCTs expanded across countries and over time. The variation in reforms was driven by different factors which are discussed below. In the discussion that follows, the drivers of reform are broken down into three categories: democratization, the role of international donors, and elite interests.

2.4.3 Democratization

The third wave of democracy that swept across sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s resulted in a transition from one-party rule (including military dictatorships) to multi-party democracy across much of the continent. The political failures in the pre-1990 period (including political instability) are blamed for many of the development failures experienced in Africa (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). With the advent of democratization, there were expectations that democracy would translate into more equality and social justice which would result in more political and socioeconomic development (Carothers, 2009).

The comparative literature on global welfare state building addresses the importance of democracy to development and the provision of social welfare. Some scholars argue that democracy provides incentives for political elites to incorporate social groups into the political system which has consequences for redistribution (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). Scholars of Latin America show that democracy has contributed to more social redistribution partly because it opened space for left-leaning political parties to directly affect public policy by influencing more social spending on poverty and inequality (Huber & Stephens, 2012). In recent times, scholars have also considered the importance of Africa's democracy for development broadly (Lynch & Crawford, 2011) and for social welfare specifically (Carbone 2012; Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Some studies have provided statistical evidence showing that African countries that conducted multi-party elections regularly provided more social welfare than those where elections were held less frequently (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Carbone (2012) shows that in Ghana (an example of democratic success in Africa) electoral pressures forced the government to implement ambitious health reform. He contrasts this with Cameroon (an enduring authoritarian country) which had a health policy driven by donors because similar electoral pressures were missing for the government to reform. These findings demonstrate that democracy is a useful mechanism for citizens to hold national governments accountable in terms of development and addressing inequality.

Despite this, the expansion of social protection in Africa has been supply rather than demand driven. In other words, the expansion of programmes has not be driven by citizens holding their governments accountable because of democracy but rather by the influence of donors and domestic elites with diverse interests. In the next two sections, I engage with literature that discusses the role of international donors and political elites in the reform process.

2.4.4 The role of international organizations

International organizations have been central to diffusing ideas from other regions to Africa but their power to influence national governments to scale up cash transfers nationwide has at times been limited (Barrientos et.al., 2005, Hickey et al., 2019). International organizations have been influential in linking the social protection agenda to lending policies, particularly in low income countries (Hickey, 2007). Donors have supported governments in drafting national social policy documents and have also designed and funded social protection programmes (Devereux, 2010). For example, the drafting of Zambia's national social protection policy in 2014 received both technical and financial support from international donors such as the ILO, Irish Aid, DFID and the World Food programme (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2014). Similarly, the Malawian government received support from the European Union, German Development Bank, Irish Aid, and GTZ among others in drafting a national policy and designing, implementing and funding social cash transfers (Government of Malawi, 2016).

Perhaps the most significant way in which donors have contributed to policy reforms has been through coalitions with government bureaucrats. In Uganda, donors were unable to win government support to expand the provision of social assistance during the early and mid-2000s. But from 2010 onwards, donors (prominently DFID) won the support of leading officials within the bureaucracy including planning and finance technocrats in the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (Grebe, 2014). DFID also won the support of domestic civil society and academia to promote the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) which had become the largest social assistance programme in Uganda by 2014 (ibid). Hickey et al (2019) observed that DFID and other donors won the support of senior bureaucrats and political leaders by inviting them to seminars and study tours where they were presented with evidence of the efficacy of cash transfers.

Donors are not limited in the ways in which they seek to influence social policy reforms. In addition to winning the support of bureaucrats, domestic civil society and political leaders, donors have also promoted social protection at a regional level. For instance, DFID partnered with UNICEF and Save the Children UK in 2009 (and were later joined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO) to create the Transfer Project which was aimed at providing evidence of cash transfers to influence policy at both national and regional levels (McCord et al., 2016: 23). The project involved impact studies and discussions of pilot cash transfers in six countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania) (ibid). The findings from this project helped to address the scepticism amongst senior government bureaucrats and politicians and contributed to decisions to scale up cash transfers, including in Lesotho where evidence played an important part in a government decision to assume primary responsibility for implementing the Child Support Grant (McCord et al., 2016; Pellerano et al., 2016). The Transfer project also contributed to informing regional agendas on social protection. In 2014, UNICEF collaborated with the African Union (AU) Commission and the Government of South Africa to shape the discourse of social protection at a regional level (McCord et al., 2016: 30).

Aside from DFID, other donors have sought to influence social policies in distinct ways. Hickey and Seekings (2019) observed that the World Bank supported “conditional” cash transfers based on the Latin American CCT model, with a strong emphasis on social risk management. This has included providing financial support for families with poor children as well as workfare programmes such as public works (Hickey et al., 2019). One way through which the World Bank has sought to achieve its objectives is by convincing national governments to reallocate exiting public expenditure from "fiscally unaffordable" programmes such farm input subsidy programmes to achieve national coverage of social protection that was "fiscally affordable" (Seekings, 2017: 8). In addition, the World Bank encouraged national governments to achieve high economic growth rates that would lead to an increase in tax revenue to achieve national coverage of programmes (ibid). The World Bank and other donor agencies such as the ILO estimated the costs of implementing various social protection programmes at scale but most national governments in Africa have resisted or rejected proposals for expensive reforms (Seekings, 2017). Instead, national governments have approved reforms that cost only 0.4% to 0.5% of GDP, falling far below recommended targets (Seekings, 2017; Hickey et al., 2019).

Despite the foregoing, process tracing conducted for several African case studies failed to uncover evidence that governments adhered to external agreements or recommendations from international actors (Hickey et.al., 2019). This has led to the conclusion that while international donors have been critical for introducing cash transfers, domestic politics explains the timing and variation in the implementation of programmes (Opalo, 2019: 5).

2.4.5 Elite interests

The literature on the politics of social policy making in Africa shows that political elites are driven to reform or not to reform by factors such as ideas, ideologies and beliefs about poverty and social protection, (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014; Seekings, 2014), and elections and political competition (Seekings, 2014; Hamer 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2019). In some countries where SCT pilots were initiated by donors, government technocrats bought into the social protection agenda early on but support amongst political elites was lacking (Grebe, 2014; Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). As I show in this study, the interests of individual political actors and political parties differ. I argue, therefore, that when changes of government happen, they provide opportunities for policymakers supportive of social protection to win support amongst new political elites. Where the interests of political elites mesh with those of donors, reforms to expand the provision of social protection are more likely to happen. In the sections below, I discuss three factors that would motivate elites to support social protection reforms or not. These include (i) ideas, beliefs and attitudes of ruling elites, (ii) electoral branding or competition and (iii) factionalism within ruling coalitions. I further engage with debates in the existing literature to show why these factors inform the interests of elites to reform or not.

2.4.5.1 Ideas, beliefs and attitudes of elites

The Global North literature on ideology contends that ideologies matter for public policy because they are a mechanism through which elites filter their ideas (Freeden, 2003: 6). Ideologies are "sets of political ideas, beliefs and attitudes that involve the adoption of practices which explain, support, justify or contest social-political arrangements, and which provide plans of action for public political institutions" (Freeden, 1998: 749). The Marxian conception of ideology associates the term with class (Freeden, 2003). For Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, ideology was an instrument that rulers – through the state – employed to exercise control and domination according to their interests (ibid).

While interests are filtered through ideology, ideology is filtered through policy. In agenda-setting, policy choices are influenced by the ideas of policymakers (Béland, 2005). Therefore, competing policy choices reflect competing ideas on the same issue. Inasmuch as the literature on African politics does not emphasize the importance of ideology in policy making, it is reasonable to assume that African elites have ideas, beliefs and attitudes towards social and economic issues. For example, in low-income African countries, there are competing ideas on how to address poverty reduction through public policies. In Malawi, the competing ideas are between providing subsidized farming inputs which are favoured by political elites and providing social cash transfers which donors support (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014).

Much of the literature on the drivers of social policy recognizes the influence of political leaders for reforms. But the beliefs political elites have about redistribution are not fully understood. Seekings (2014: 19) argues that the nature of welfare policy making in contemporary Africa provides evidence that ideas, beliefs and attitudes matter. For example, neoliberal ideas (or neoliberal ideology) were articulated by influential political elites in Zambia in the mid-2000s, a paternalistic conservatism was articulated in Botswana over time, and social democratic ideas (or ideology) were articulated in South Africa during the late 2000s (ibid). It remains unclear how much the ideas, beliefs and attitudes observed in welfare policy making are indicative of an overarching ideology of the ruling party or the consequence of ideologies held by influential individuals in the party and government.

Attention has also been paid to understanding the ideas political elites have about deserving and undeserving poor people. This considers ideas about whether programmes such as cash transfers are economically viable or are "handouts" that create dependency (Hickey et al., 2019). Recent research has shown that there is variation across countries and amongst bureaucrats and political leaders within countries (and even within political parties) regarding ideas on social protection. During the mid-2000s, elites in Malawi were opposed to cash transfers, arguing that they were "handouts" that would create dependency and undermine economic growth objectives (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014). Pruce and Hickey (2019) argue that in Zambia after 2011, bureaucrats, donors and political leaders in the newly elected PF government agreed that the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) which was the largest redistribution programme targeted at the poor, did not target the poorest in society. This prompted reforms to redirect spending from FISP to social cash transfers. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, decisions to expand social assistance have been associated with the need to promote regime legitimacy through inclusive socio-economic development (Hickey et al., 2019).

The existing literature demonstrates ways in which the extent of social assistance provision has been influenced by the ideas of elites. But much of the literature has not addressed how changes in government affect ideologies and ideas. It is unclear from the existing literature whether the election or appointment of new policy makers affects the approach to social protection, and if so, how.

2.4.5.2 Electoral branding (competition)

The LIWPR project attached importance to political institutions and the way democracy has shaped political parties and elections since the 1990s (Hickey et al., 2019). Seekings (2014: 20) argued that elections have provided a platform through which: "voters' preferences and political ideologies are expressed, which may lead to policy reforms". The expansion of social welfare for electoral purposes is not unique to the African continent and is observable elsewhere in the Global South. Partisan competition in Brazil between the centrist Social Democrats and the leftist Worker's Party during presidential elections in 1998 and in the run up to the 2003 presidential elections, contributed to the expansion of social assistance, including the *Bolsa Família* programme (Seekings, 2012: 20). In South Korea, pro-democracy demonstrations in the late 1980s compelled both the incumbent and opposition parties to promise more provision of social assistance in the 1987 elections, promises which have continued to feature in presidential and congressional elections since then (ibid: 22).

In Africa, democratization and electoral competition have also contributed to the expansion of social assistance in countries that score poorly on democracy indices. A case in point is Uganda. After assuming power through a military coup in 1986, Yoweri Museveni ruled without facing electoral competition until the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1996 (the first since 1980) (Stasavage, 2005). As part of his election campaign, Museveni promised universal primary education which was subsequently launched in 1997. The recommendation for the universalisation of primary education had been made in 1989 by an influential Education Policy Review Commission but was not acted upon until the issue became electorally salient (ibid: 53-58).

Since the emergence of social protection, programmes such as SCTs have begun to feature during election campaigns. In Zambia, the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) included the expansion of SCTs and related social protection programmes as part of its party manifesto during elections in 2011, even though this was not a salient campaign issue (Kuss, 2015; Pruce & Hickey, 2019). Perhaps the most prominent example of social protection featuring prominently during elections is the case of Joyce Banda in Malawi. After only two years in office, and faced with strong electoral competition, Banda adopted a pro-poor electoral brand during national elections in 2014. Her political agenda focused on the rural poor and women through a mix of handout initiatives including cash transfers, which contrasted with her main competitor's food security brand (Hamer, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2019). As Hamer and Hamer and Seekings show, Banda's social protection brand was not sufficient for her to win the election.

While branding on social protection does not necessarily guarantee electoral success, cross-country statistical evidence shows that African governments elected in multiparty elections spend more on social spending, including on primary education than governments in non-democracies (Stasavage, 2005). In more recent times, cross-country statistical data have provided evidence that countries that hold regular multi-party elections and in which electoral turnovers happened once or more, are likely to provide more social assistance than countries in which electoral turnovers never happened (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Carbone and Pellegata (2017: 1973) posited that newly elected governments have a greater incentive to provide better social assistance than their predecessors, partly because they recognize that the ousted government did not "satisfy voters' demands and expectations" but also to guarantee their own electoral support in future elections.

Statistical evidence has made an important contribution to understanding the relationship between electoral competition and social policy reforms by showing that newly elected and ousted governments may have different motivations to reform. But, process tracing research by the LIWPR and related research projects such as the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) project at the University of Manchester, has provided few accounts of: (a) how and why reforms happen within countries over time under different government administrations and, (b) how this variation differs across countries.

The LIWPR study on reforms under the GNU in Zimbabwe provides one such account. It explains how a partial change in government in 2009 (i.e. a coalition between the ruling party and main opposition after contentious national elections held in 2008) led to increased support for a Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT), although the reforms were driven primarily by donors (notably UNICEF) who won political support of opposition politicians in the GNU who controlled strategic government ministries, including Finance and the implementing ministry of social assistance programmes (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). The evidence demonstrates that changes in the composition of government at the executive level are consequential. It also shows that more attention needs to be paid to understanding the incentives that newly elected political leaders have and how their ideas, ideologies and beliefs differ from their predecessors in government.

2.4.5.3 Factionalism

The contribution of political factions to social policy reforms in Africa has not received much scholarly attention. Seekings (2015) shows that within South Africa's governing African National Congress (ANC), there were factional battles during the era of President Thabo Mbeki that pitted a faction comprising "middle and upper-class people with business interests" against a faction dominated by the ANC's alliance partners, the trade unions and the communist party (the centre-left). There was strong contestation for power between the two factions which was also reflected in opposing policy positions, including on issues such as redistribution. While the pro-business faction (which included Mbeki) was seen to be supportive of neoliberal economic reforms and the distribution of wealth to the poor through an expansive welfare state, the centre-left supported the vision of a "developmental state" which supported interventionist industrial policies that would ensure inclusive development and not handouts. Although the centre-left faction assumed control of the ANC in 2007, and state-power following the election of President Jacob Zuma in 2009, the welfare state continued to expand and the vision for a developmental state remained largely unfulfilled. The evidence from South Africa shows some of the distinct ways through which factionalism within ruling coalitions can promote or retard efforts to expand the provision of social protection.

It is worth noting that unlike parties in low-income and lower-income African countries, including Zambia and Malawi, parties in South Africa such as the ANC are more institutionalized and factions within the parties tend to have clearer ideological differences. Factional differences may take different (non-ideological) forms in other countries. For example, under the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2013 [which included the ruling Zimbabwe Africa National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Congress (MDC)], the provision of social cash transfers expanded but this was because MDC politicians held ministerial positions that were responsible for funding and implementing programmes. Furthermore, the MDC had much better relations than the ruling ZANU-PF with international donors supportive of social protection, which resulted in policy reform (Chinyoka & Seekings, 2016). Unlike the case of the ANC of factionalism within the ruling coalition, the GNU in Zimbabwe can be described as factionalism within government.

Some scholars on Zambia have discussed factionalism in Zambian politics but not necessarily relating to social policy. Le Bas (2011) showed that the MMD in Zambia was a broad church which included politicians, labour unions, business, professional bodies, as well as farmers' and student unions at its formation. These interest groups had different motivations for challenging Kaunda's statist policies and once in power, they were associated with different factions within the party. These include some Kaunda-era politicians who broke away to form the National Party in 1993 after opposing the leadership style of the President, Frederick Chiluba, and a group of young professionals known as the "Young Turks" who supported a more cautious approach to privatization, as opposed to Chiluba's rapid reforms (Rakner, 2003: 107). However, the extent to which factions within ruling coalitions matter for public policy is seldom discussed including regarding social policy, perhaps because the literature on social protection in Africa has not emphasized the contribution of political parties (and dynamics within them) to the reform process.

2.4.6 Lessons from literature on social policy reform in Africa

There are at least three lessons to learn from the foregoing review of literature. Firstly, the literature shows that the turn to democracy in the early 1990s has provided opportunities for policy reforms in Africa. Regular multi-party elections have incentivized political parties and candidates to respond to poverty and social exclusion by developing policy proposals that are communicated to voters in party manifestos and during election campaigns. In some instances, incumbents implement social protection programmes to broaden electoral support especially when faced with strong opposition. Secondly, international donors are crucial to policy reform in low-income countries, mostly in the design and implementation of programmes. Even then, donor influence is dependent on political support for reforms to happen. Lastly, the literature shows that political support is crucial for reforms to happen because the interests of political parties inform decisions to support programmatic or clientelist social programmes.

While the literature clearly shows that politics matters for policy reforms, it does not fully explore the different aspects of politics that drive reforms. Notably, the literature says very little about the contribution of political parties (or partisanship) for reforms. Furthermore, the literature says very little about the importance of electoral alternation on public policy. The emerging evidence from Zambia and Malawi shows the need for more scholarly attention in this regard.

2.5 Literature on social policy reform in Zambia and Malawi

2.5.1 Brief history of social protection in Zambia

Under Zambia's first president, Kenneth Kaunda, the state was interventionist and played a role in providing social assistance to deserving citizens. Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) government adopted the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) – a social protection programme established by the colonial government in the 1950s to assist war veterans – and modified it to provide assistance to widows and other needy groups (GRZ, 2014). The UNIP government also supported social welfare centres which, like PWAS, were established by the colonial government to provide welfare services to villages. Kaunda's administration extended the centres to poor townships in urban areas. The welfare centres provided a range of services such as free medical check-ups, free meals and vaccines for children and birth registration. These services were targeted at populations in remote parts of the country where access to such services were severely limited[5].

Zambia's economic trajectory began to take a downward trend in the mid-1970s following balance of payments deficits resulting from declining export revenue and fiscal deficits because of a drop in mineral tax revenue (Rakner, 2003). The steady decline in the Zambian economy from the 1970s led to a decrease in budgetary allocations to PWAS (GRZ, 2014). While the UNIP government remained interventionist by subsidising education, health services and farming inputs, the provision of social assistance to needy and vulnerable people was constrained by the lack of funding and by 1990 PWAS had effectively been abandoned (ibid). The worsening levels of poverty from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s led to calls from civic groups[6] in Zambia for an end to UNIP's one-party state rule and the abandonment of statist reforms (Rakner, 2003).

After 27 years in government, the Kaunda/UNIP administration was unseated by the MMD led by former trade unionist Fredrick Chiluba in the 1991 general elections. Guided by the World Bank and the IMF[7], the MMD adopted a neoliberal agenda and promoted market friendly policies including the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the liberalisation of the Zambian economy (Rakner, 2003). Despite the election of the MMD and a change from statist to neoliberal economic reforms, Zambia's economy continued to decline and living standards significantly fell to the extent that by 1995, Zambia's HDI was lower than its 1975 value (UNDP, 2003). These problems were compounded by the deleterious effects of AIDS and by 1997 the MMD decided to revive PWAS to mitigate escalating poverty levels by providing social assistance to vulnerable and needy people. Due to severe fiscal constraints in the 1990s, PWAS received erratic funding from the government and consequently had no significant impact on the welfare of households needing urgent social assistance (Schubert, 2005).

In 2001, Zambia held general elections which resulted in Levy Mwanawasa of the MMD succeeding Chiluba. The Mwanawasa administration introduced a farm input subsidy programme in 2002 which became the largest distribution programme from the state to the

[5] Interview with Sheila Nkunika, Social Policy Officer UNICEF, 23 March 2015 in Lusaka.
[6] Opposition to the Kaunda/UNIP administration came mostly from trade unions, student unions, church mother bodies, chamber of business houses and the Economics Association of Zambia.
[7] The MMD government implemented Structural Adjustment Programmes which were supported by the World Bank and IMF.

rural poor (I discuss the programme in more detail in chapter 4). Around the same period, Zambia was faced with an HIV and AIDS crisis which attracted global attention mostly because of the large number of orphans that resulted. In addition, the extent of poverty was exacerbated by a worsening life expectancy[8] and the effects of a drought (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). The World Bank, the ILO, GTZ and DfID began to consider "social safety nets" and "social protection" in response to Zambia's social and economic problems. In 2003, GTZ established a pilot cash transfer scheme in Kalomo district (in the Southern Province of Zambia) and began to provide transfers in cash to the 10 percent most destitute households most of which were headed by the elderly and/or women and were caring for orphaned and vulnerable children (Schubert, 2005; Kabandula & Seekings, 2014).

However, it was not until 2005 that the MMD government also began to commit to social protection through its national policy documents. In the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2011,[9] the Mwanawasa administration spelled out policies and key reforms to address social protection. While the document had a very clear commitment to social protection, the only reference to cash transfers was a commitment to link SCT with regular PWAS activities (MoFNP, 2006: 213). From 2005 to 2008, the MMD government resisted donor pressure to extend cash transfer schemes to other districts (Kabandula & Seekings, 2014). The finance minister at the time, Ng'andu Magande, strongly opposed cash transfers arguing that they encouraged laziness and did not contribute to the economy (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). Mr Magande also saw cash transfers as an external programme, driven largely by donors and not the MMD government (ibid). The MMD was unabashedly free market orientated and had a strong focus on cutting back on corruption, attracting foreign investment, securing steady economic growth, controlling inflation, cutting external debt and balancing the budget (Larmer & Fraser, 2007; Cheeseman et al, 2014). Influential leaders like Magande also believed that the government had to focus on programmes that contributed to productivity and economic growth (such as farm subsidies) and not handouts that mostly encouraged consumption (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). This in part explains why social protection did not receive the attention that donors hoped for.

[8] Zambia's life expectancy fell from 52 years in 1980 to 42 years in 2000.
[9] The FNDP was the first development plan published by the MMD. The first four national development plans were published by the UNIP government between 1964 and 1991 but the MMD abandoned development plans upon being elected.

In 2008, Mwanawasa died and was succeeded as republican president by the new MMD leader Rupiah Banda. In Chapter 4, I show that the partial change of government from the Mwanawasa to Banda administrations led to modest social protection reforms prior to the faster reforms after the 2011 elections and full change in government.

2.5.2 Past research on social policy reform in Zambia

The literature on the politics of welfare policy reforms in Zambia is nascent. Few empirical studies have been conducted, most of which provide analysis that is limited to explaining lack of reforms before 2011 or reforms after 2011. The literature that discusses reforms in the period before 2011 is primarily concerned with understanding why donor supported efforts for a national social cash transfer programme were resisted by the MMD government (Barrientos et al., 2005; Habasonda, 2009: Schüring & Lawson, 2011; Harland, 2014; Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). The DFID funded *Drivers of Change* study was the first such effort. It identified that the high poverty rates resulting from sustained economic decline and the negative effects of structural adjustment policies were conducive for promoting strong political pressures on the government for pro-poor economic reforms, including the expansion of social protection. The study found that lack of political will was a major barrier to reforms. The understanding of poverty and vulnerability among political elites drew a distinction between “the deserving” and “undeserving” poor, with elites more supportive of interventions targeting the “deserving”. For example, throughout the 2000s, political leaders supported various interventions targeting small-holder farmers such as the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) which targeted 900,000 beneficiaries by 2011 (Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2016).

In addition, the nature of Zambia’s political system concentrated power around individuals, particularly the Presidency rather than policies or ideological programmes (Barrientos et al., 2005: 8-11). Harland (2014) proffered similar sentiments, demonstrating that the entrenchment of neopatrimonialism and clientelism in Zambian politics concentrated political power around the Presidency. This, she argued, had created a pattern of distribution which targeted sections of the population that were crucial for political support at the expense of programmatic distribution targeted at the poorest (ibid: 371-372).

Subsequent research challenged some of the arguments above. This includes the argument that political elites in Zambia in fact represented ideological views and were not primarily driven by self-interest and a desire to secure votes. Habasonda (2009) observed that the neo-liberal ideology that the MMD espoused informed ideas that social protection programmes such as SCTs promoted consumption and would undermine long-term economic growth targets. This has been confirmed by Kabandula and Seekings (2016) whose process tracing research on why reforms were constrained during the Mwanawasa presidency found that a neo-liberal ideology propagated mainly by Magande, contributed to the antipathy towards "handout" programmes such as cash transfers. The MMD's support for neo-liberal orthodoxy was also evident in its broader policy orientation including on matters such as privatization and the roles of the state and market, which were stipulated in party documents including election manifestos (for example MMD, 2011).

Whilst Habasonda (2009) agreed with the principle argument made in the *Drivers of Change* study – that political will was lacking – it is reported that amongst MPs, the political potential for social protection has always been recognized (Schüring & Lawson, 2011). This clearly shows that arguments about lack of political will and lack of ideology may have been overemphasized. Barrientos et al (2005: 8-11) provided additional explanations for lack of reforms under the MMD government including lack of capacity within the implementing ministry (Community Development and Social Services, MCDSS) to effectively implement a national SCT programme, weak relations between the MCDSS and the Ministry of Finance, fiscal constraints, and the failure for democratization to be entrenched despite regular multiparty elections. These factors were compounded by the absence of legislation to support social assistance (Habasonda, 2009). Within a few years, notable but modest reforms had begun to happen. By 2010, relations between technocrats in the MCDSS and MOF had improved to the extent that a line for social protection was included in the budget and a modest expansion of the SCT scheme from one to five districts was implemented. This shift was also possible because a few cabinet ministers previously opposed to SCTs were won over by donors and domestic actors within the bureaucracy and civil society (Schüring & Lawson, 2011).

Studies conducted after 2011 have placed greater emphasis on the role of transnational organizations and domestic politics. Pruce and Hickey (2019) argue that "shifting dynamics within Zambia's political settlement" resulted in the formation of a policy coalition consisting of transnational organizations, government technocrats and political leaders that shaped the government's commitment to provide more social protection in the form of social cash transfers. It is clear from Pruce and Hickey that the change of government from the MMD to the PF was necessary for the shift in Zambia's political settlement. They demonstrate that the

PF’s 2011 election victory marked “a shift within the political and ideational dynamics and tendencies of Zambia’s political settlement” that promoted a leftist shift in policy making.

The leftist shift in policy making described above, can be attributed to the fact that PF had an avowed pro-poor platform that was evident at least since the 2006 general elections (Larmer & Fraser, 2007; Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010; Resnick, 2010; Helle & Rakner, 2012; Resnick, 2014). During campaigns for the 2011 general elections, the PF promoted a pro-urban working-class agenda which included proposals for an increased minimum wage (Pruce & Hickey, 2019). The fact that the Sata government expanded the SCT scheme to a national programme was therefore quite paradoxical because the main beneficiaries were rural dwellers who mostly resided in non-PF voting areas. Kuss (2015) attested to this point with her argument that the social protection expansion of 2013 was supply rather than demand driven. The incentives for the Sata government to reform were not promoted by voters but by political elites instead. This, Kuss suggested, made it possible that the provision of social protection would not be sustained in the long run, especially given that legal reforms to make social protection justiciable were not made.

Cheeseman et al (2014) correctly predicted that Sata would come under intense pressure to implement subsidies and handouts. They provided two important reasons to support their claim. First, 2009 Afrobarometer data showed that an overwhelming majority of PF supporters i.e. 90%, favoured high levels of state intervention. Second, Sata’s electoral promise to “put money in people’s pockets”[10] predisposed him to support pro-poor redistribution policies. Pruce and Hickey (2019) acknowledge that the PF’s predisposition to distribute resources to poorer groups was important for reforms but maintain that shifts in Zambia’s political settlement and efforts to avert a FISP crisis (by redirecting resources to cash transfers)[11] were the most important factors in the PF’s decision to reform.

There are still some gaps to be filled to understand social policy reforms in Zambia. Three of these gaps deserve mention. First, while the foregoing studies refer to partisanship, it is not a central argument in their discussion of the reform process. I address this gap by focusing on the importance of changes of government between political parties (or factions) for the reform

[10] The PF’s 2011 campaign slogan was “vote PF for lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets”
[11] According to Pruce and Hickey (2019), the FISP crisis refers to a 2013 scandal which revealed waste incurred by the previous government on agriculture subsidies including massive overspending on FISP.

process. I do this to demonstrate how and why a shift in power between political elites affects public policy and provides opportunities for policymakers such as donors and bureaucrats to push for reforms that may not have been possible under previous administrations. Second, perhaps excepting Kabandula & Seekings (2016) the literature places insufficient emphasis on the interests of political leaders and parties (including factions within them) to reform or not. I explore this area further to demonstrate the interests of political leaders and parties to brand themselves in favour for or against social protection issues (including during election campaigns) and explain how the political brands translate into policy positions. Lastly, Zambia has not been looked at in a comparative context to understand how its reform process compares to other countries and regions. There is also a dearth of knowledge on how partisanship in African countries like Zambia contributes to existing global literature on comparative welfare policy making.

2.5.3 Brief history of social protection in Malawi

Malawi gained independence from British colonial rule in 1964 under the leadership of Hastings Kamuzu Banda who led the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). In 1966, Malawi became a one-party state and the MCP became the only party by law (Chunga, 2014). The Malawian Constitution was amended in 1970 which allowed Banda to become Life President (Harrigan, 2008). Under Banda, Malawi adopted an agricultural-oriented export strategy based on "estate agriculture" which focused on the production of tobacco, tea and sugar (Chinsinga, 2002: 25). This development strategy contributed to rapid economic development and national food security between the 1960s and 1970s.

Much less attention was paid to smallholder agriculture, although the state provided subsidised farming inputs for farmers to grow crops such as maize for household consumption (Harrigan, 2008). In the late 1970s, the Malawian economy was hit by a "series of adverse exogenous shocks" such as a dramatic deterioration in the terms of trade – particularly a decline in tobacco prices – which brought economic growth to a halt (Harrigan & El Said, 2000: 79). The MCP government responded by "implementing fiscal policies based on foreign borrowing and running down foreign reserves" which exposed the country to a huge debt burden (Harrigan & El Said, 2000: 79-80). Because of its emphasis on estate agriculture and patronage politics, the MCP government neglected issues of poverty, redistribution and social protection which severely affected poor households at the height of the economic crisis (Harrigan, 2008: 241).

The Malawian government approached the IMF in 1979 and the World Bank in 1980 for support which led to the implementation of structural adjustment reforms (Harrigan & El Said, 2000: 81). The structural adjustment and stabilisation policies had profound effects on agriculture and the economy. These include the liberalization of the agricultural sector in the 1980s which resulted in the increase of food prices. Food input subsidies were phased out leading to a decline in smallholder production. This affected both national and household food security to the extent that the Malawian government was faced with a national food crisis in 1987 which required the highest level of food imports since the early 1970s (Harrigan, 2008). The Banda regime reverted to statist agricultural policies in the early 1990s by supplying free maize seeds to smallholder farmers after drought in the 1992 to 1993 farming season which reduced national maize production by over 50% (ibid: 242).

By the early 1990s, Malawi had begun to democratize. The onset of the decline in agriculture and the economy in the 1980s combined with Banda’s authoritarianism, precipitated events that led to the collapse of the Banda regime. Malawi transitioned from a one-party system to a multiparty democracy following a referendum in 1993 and multiparty elections in 1994 (Chunga, 2014). Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged winner of the presidential election with 47% of the vote. The transition to multiparty democracy was accompanied by donor pressure to abandon statist policies that included agricultural subsidies, in favour of economic liberalization (Chibwana et al, 2012). Malawi’s smallholder farmer credit clubs collapsed and subsidies on fertiliser and hybrid maize seed were removed. The Malawian kwacha was sharply devalued which resulted in farm inputs becoming unaffordable to smallholder farmers and a drastic increase in the price of maize, the country’s staple crop (Chinsinga and Poulton, 2014). The effect of the policy shift in agriculture, compounded by the effects of droughts in the early 1990s, was a severe and persistent food crisis that beleaguered Muluzi’s first term in office (Chibwana et al, 2012).

Faced with strong electoral competition, addressing Malawi’s food crisis was central to Muluzi’s re-election bid in 1999. The food crisis was dominated by concerns around maize which is grown by an average of 97% of farming households and accounts for over 70% of the country’s total cropped land. Malawi also holds the distinction of having the highest per capita maize consumption in the world (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014: 127). Aware of the threat posed to the UDF’s survival by the food crisis, Muluzi worked with donors to reintroduce farm subsidies through the implementation of the Starter Pack (SP) in 1998, through which the government provided small packs of hybrid maize seed, fertiliser and legumes which targeted smallholder farmers across the country (Harrigan, 2008).

Muluzi won re-election in 1999 but Malawi's food security challenges lingered during his second term. Amidst concerns from the IMF that the SP was interventionist and undermining the role of the private sector in delivering farm inputs, the SP was scaled down in 2000 into the Targeted Input Programme (TIP) which aimed to provide farm inputs to only the poorest smallholder farmers (Harrigan, 2008; Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014). By the 2004 elections, Malawi had been hit by two devastating hunger crises within a space of three years despite the implementation of input subsidy programmes (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014: 128). One crucial feature of the 2004 elections, therefore, was that the main presidential candidates all promised to implement agricultural subsidy programmes if elected (Harrigan, 2008).

Around this time, donors began to consider social protection as part of anti-poverty strategies. Several social protection interventions had been implemented in post-colonial Malawi (i.e. since independence in 1964) but it was not until the mid-2000s that concerted efforts were made to coordinate programmes and adopt a policy. Chinsinga (2009: 24) explains that by 2005, a total of 38 programmes, including three cash transfers which covered a total of 14,215 beneficiaries and other projects such as input subsidies, school feeding, cash-for-work, and food for work programmes, were implemented under the National Safety Nets Programme, albeit in an uncoordinated manner. Not only was the coverage of these programmes small, but they also offered parsimonious grants to beneficiaries. Additionally, the programmes, specifically cash transfers, were implemented by different international donors including Oxfam, Concern Universal, and Concern Worldwide, with little or no government input or coordination (*ibid*).

This changed in late 2005 when donors took the lead in advocating for a coordinated approach to social protection. Donors (led by UNICEF) initiated discussions for a comprehensive social protection policy to be adopted which was followed in 2006 by the introduction of a pilot social cash transfer. By 2006, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government led by President Bingu wa Mutharika (who was first elected in 2004) had begun to support efforts to enact a policy. Despite this, the pilot cash transfer programme was only scaled up to a national programme in July 2012, at the same time a national policy was enacted. These developments happened after a change of government in April 2012 to President Joyce Banda of the People's Party (PP).

2.5.4 Past research on social policy reform in Malawi

There is much less literature available on the politics of social policy reforms in Malawi than there is on Zambia. It is reasonable to opine that this is partly because Malawi is a predominantly agrarian country and discussions about its economy, politics and poverty reduction are inextricably linked to agriculture (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014; Dionne & Horowitz, 2016). Consequently, there is a large volume of research discussing how interventions to the agriculture sector (such as the distribution of farm input subsidies) contribute to providing social assistance for the poorest citizens.

The available literature on Malawi includes donor reports which pay significant attention to demonstrating the efficacy of cash transfers and their importance to broader debates around social protection. Some of these reports provide useful information for understanding how and why politics matters for social policy reforms. In 2006, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) commissioned three Malawi country studies on cash transfers and their role in social protection. The reports sought to explain how the interaction between politics and economics affected the efficacy of cash transfers in reducing poverty and vulnerability (Chinsinga, 2009), to examine the efficacy of cash transfers for poverty reduction (Farrington & Slater, 2009) and to examine government and donor perspectives on cash transfers (McCord, 2010).

The evidence shows that between 2006 and 2009, Cabinet considered cash transfers as short-term programmes that would assist the poor to increase their assets over a defined period, after which they would graduate to other social protection interventions (Chinsinga, 2009). This meant that Cabinet did not consider the SCTP as a long-term intervention requiring domestic resources (Chinsinga, 2009; McCord, 2010). Related to this point, the ODI reports also show that Cabinet had concerns about which categories of poor people were deserving of state provided social assistance, with preference given to those who were able to work to help themselves as opposed to those with labour constraints (Chinsinga, 2009; Farrington & Slater, 2009; McCord, 2010).

Because of Cabinet's attitude towards SCTs, the pilot was primarily funded by donors. By 2010, different donor actors including UNICEF were supporting six pilots while government had not committed to allocating domestic resources (McCord, 2010). While budgetary concerns and attitudes towards poverty and cash transfers were important, relations between international donors and Cabinet are also important for understanding why domestic resources were not committed to cash transfers. The evidence shows donor preferences informed a social protection agenda which did not consider domestic political considerations (Farrington & Slater, 2009). The expansion of cash transfers would have required the diversion of budgetary resources from other sectors, including the politically strategic agricultural subsidy programme – a decision that was strongly opposed by the Finance Minister Goodall Gondwe, and government officials in his ministry (Chinsinga, 2009). The ODI research also noted that across East and Southern Africa (including in Malawi) state support for the expansion of cash transfers was limited in countries where SCTs were of limited significance for the political survival of ruling elites (Farrington & Slater, 2009).

However, Cabinet's opposition to support the expansion of cash transfers did not stop it from supporting a donor driven initiative to scale up the pilot programme from one to six additional districts in 2008. Electoral concerns apparently motivated this decision. The timing of the scale up – in late 2008, months before national elections in May 2009 – prompted accusations from opposition parties that the ruling DPP government was using the programme to target voters in politically strategic districts (Chinsinga, 2009: 7). In fact, the scale up was touted as a government programme, even while donors designed, funded and implemented the pilot. This was largely because both donor and government officials had long sought to project cash transfers as fully owned by the government to give the programme legitimacy (Chinsinga, 2009). Nonetheless, there is hardly any evidence to suggest that cash transfers contributed to support for the DPP in 2009. Yet, there is evidence demonstrating that maize subsidies were crucial for Mutharika's re-election (Dionne & Horowitz, 2016).

The extent to which the attitudes of political elites constrained reforms under Mutharika's administration have been examined in much greater detail by Chipiliro Kalebe-Nyamongo and Heather Marquette. Their research was based on qualitative semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with up to 86 political elites. They found that most elites were opposed to cash transfers because they believed the poor had fatalistic mind sets and were to blame for their own poverty (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014). This study also confirmed that the DPP government supported the provision of social assistance for the poor with labour capacity who could work to help themselves and were opposed to providing "handouts" to "lazy" people.

Much less research has been conducted to understand social policy reforms after Mutharika's death in 2012. There is useful literature on reforms after 2012 examining the extent to which social protection was used for political purposes by Joyce Banda. In the 2014 national elections, Banda branded herself as a champion of pro-poor programmes, including cash transfers and other handout programmes to distinguish herself and her ruling PP from the DPP. The DPP presidential candidate, Peter Mutharika, branded himself as a champion of food security and agricultural subsidies (Hamer, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2019). Mutharika's success and Banda's poor performance in the elections, showed that cash transfers were of limited electoral significance in Malawi (Hamer & Seekings, 2019). It is evident from these studies that food security was an important policy issue for the DPP, but they do not examine how social protection reforms were affected by the election of the DPP in 2014.

The review of literature on reforms to social protection in Malawi highlights similar gaps to those identified in the preceding discussion on Zambia. The available literature on Malawi refers to attitudes of political elites and the relationship between political competition and social protection, but it does not examine how and why partisanship matters for understanding variation in the reform process under different government administrations. The similarities between Zambia and Malawi provide a basis to compare the contribution of partisanship to variation in reforms under different government administrations within each country and to examine the countries comparatively. This study also locates the two countries within regional and global literature on comparative welfare policy making to bring attention to the importance of changes of government for understanding reforms in Southern Africa. This remains an under-researched area that this thesis contributes to.

2.6 Discussion on methods of existing studies

A number of studies reviewed in this chapter, including those that focused on welfare reforms in the Global North (for example Esping-Andersen, 1990) and on the expansion of social welfare in Africa (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017) adopted quantitative methods to understand factors that explain variation in social welfare provision across countries and over time. These studies relied on statistical data that measured, among others, the level and changes of government spending on social welfare programmes, GDP growth rates and levels of democracy. Most of these studies relied on regression analysis to understand the contribution of factors such as economic growth and democracy to the variation in social welfare outcomes.

In contrast, studies conducted by the ESID and LIWPR research projects, adopted a qualitative process tracing methodology to understand the reform process for several African countries. Process tracing was used to explain important outcomes that were observable to the researchers. For example, it was observable that the PF government in Zambia had expanded the social cash transfer programme in 2013 even though the reasons were not immediately clear prior to studies being conducted. Therefore, process tracing was used to identify causal mechanisms that led to the identified outcomes.

Studies that adopted a process tracing methodology relied on various sources of data including the analysis of documents, public speeches, semi structured interviews with actors in the policymaking process who included political leaders, government technocrats, transnational actors and representatives of domestic organizations including civil society, trade unions and think-tanks. These sources were used to identify the different actors in the process and to establish the mechanisms through which the actors contributed to outcomes.

The studies demonstrate that process tracing is a useful methodological approach for conducting studies where the key outcomes can be identified but the causal mechanisms explaining the outcomes are unclear. The findings from the existing studies on Zambia and Malawi point to the importance of democracy (and domestic politics), the role of transnational actors, the interests of policymaking elites, and the interaction of all these factors. This thesis explores similar themes and therefore also adopts a process tracing methodology. The thesis adds to the existing knowledge and sets out to provide a fuller analysis of how domestic political factors contribute to explaining key outcomes i.e. the major expansion of social cash transfer beneficiaries within a few months or years of the formation of a new government. This thesis traces the social protection policymaking process in both countries to understand the causal mechanisms that led to reforms and engages with findings from existing studies in order to consider the veracity of competing explanations including the role of transnational actors.

2.7 Conceptual framework

This study proposes a conceptual framework that incorporates insights from literatures on welfare state development and public policy to demonstrate that changes of government matter for social policy reform. The framework goes beyond other frameworks that have been applied in research on social protection reforms in Africa that focus on political settlements, the role of transnational actors, and political competition and branding. The framework adopted for this accounts for domestic political factors that explain differences in support for programmatic or clientelist forms of redistribution between different government administrations within the same country and over time. The factors also have implications for decisions to promote or retard the expansion of social cash transfer programmes. The first part of the framework focused on how the interaction between transnational actors and domestic political elites (including political leaders and government technocrats) is affected when new policy makers are appointed to crucial policy making positions following changes in government at the executive level from one political party or ruling coalition to another. This aspect of the framework is informed by Kingdon's multiple streams framework that explains how the streams of problems, policy, and politics converge under different government administrations.

The second part of the framework focused on the interests of domestic political elites to support social protection policy reforms or not. This aspect of the framework is primarily concerned with contrasting the interests of political elites in current and preceding ruling coalitions within a country and over time, to understand how and why different government administrations respond differently to efforts to promote social cash transfers at different periods. Actors in the policy making process are driven by a range of interests (which I refer to as elite interests). Before discussing what is meant by elite interests in this study, it is necessary to consider what is meant by the term "elites." In the work by Higley and Burton (1989: 18) national elites are described as: "persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially." National elites refer to a group of individuals who hold top positions in politics, government, business, military, professional organizations, communications, cultural organizations and movements in society (ibid). This study is primarily concerned with political elites who hold influential position in politics (political parties) and government (Cabinet and Parliament).

Drawing on the work of Higley and Burton and the existing literature on social policy reform, there are three issues that this study takes into account when discussing elite interests: (i) ideological interests which accounts for the ideas, beliefs and attitudes of political elites within a new ruling coalition and considers how these contrast with those of ruling elites in the previous administration, (ii) electoral interests which accounts for the motivations of political parties and leaders to brand themselves differently on social issues such as cash transfers, particularly in contexts of competitive elections. This also considers how immediate past and future elections can influence support for different forms of redistribution from the state to citizens and (iii) factional interests which focuses on dynamics within ruling coalitions and how decisions to reform or not are made notwithstanding competing ideas and support for programmes amongst political leaders within the governing ruling coalition.

The framework recognizes that Zambia and Malawi have neopatrimonial political systems, despite both being democratic and politically competitive. Moreover, political parties in both countries are not fully institutionalized. The framework highlights the importance of individual actors in government such as presidents and the influence of powerful factions within political parties that wield political and economic power under each government administration. The framework used in this study assumes that social policy reforms in low-income and lower-income African countries (that are also competitive democracies) are more likely to occur when the following conditions are met: (i) political elites brand themselves around social protection or related issues, (ii) "policy windows" open for international donors and other policy makers supportive of social protection to push for policy reforms. In other words, in cases where national governments opposed reforms, changes of government provided an opportunity for the interests of donors and political elites to converge around social protection.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed four approaches that are useful for understanding welfare state development in advanced capitalist countries. The approaches recognize the importance of industrial development, power resources, political institutions, and the cultural incentives of policymakers for explaining how and why welfare states emerged. While this literature provides an important starting point for discussing how and why social policy reforms happen in Africa, it is not adequate for understanding domestic political factors on the continent. The chapter also considered the literature on the politics of social protection in Africa which demonstrated that democratization, transnational actors, and interests of domestic political elites were crucial for understanding reforms on the continent. Yet the existing literatures on Africa broadly, and on Zambia and Malawi specifically, do not fully explore the mechanisms through which domestic political factors (including partisanship) contribute to policy reforms. The literatures discussed in the chapter informed the conceptual framework and the process tracing methodology that this study adopted to understand the relative importance of partisanship on social protection policy reforms.

In the next chapter, I discuss the process tracing methodology adapted for this study in detail. The next chapter also discusses the selection of case studies and the conceptual framework that guided this study. Furthermore, this study considers how the results of the process tracing research can be extended to understand social protection policy reforms in a broader set of country cases. This is done to develop a theory informed by the findings of this research. The study does this by developing a dataset that allows for statistical analysis of the relationship between the variables identified in this study. The dataset and statistical analysis are also discussed in the next chapter and are the focus of Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

3.1 Introduction

The literature review in the preceding chapter shows that social policy making is a process that is influenced by various factors including the interaction between transnational actors and domestic politics. The process of making policies (and reforms) is driven by actors such as politicians, government technocrats and representatives of bilateral and multilateral organizations. Other actors in the policy making process include representatives of civil society organizations, trade unions, academics and think-tanks. These actors do not make decisions in a vacuum. Rather, they are driven by different ideological, political or organizational interests. The nature and extent of these interactions at any point in time, and over specific policy issues, results in distinct policy outcomes. This study accounts for how and why reforms to expand the provision of social cash transfer programmes in Zambia and Malawi are affected when changes of government happen.

The study uses a comparative case study research methodology and adopts a process tracing approach. The process tracing analysis is explorative and meant to identify the causal mechanisms that account for the relationship between social protection policy reforms and changes of government with the aim of theory building. The evidence uncovered by the process tracing research provides within-case analysis of the four case studies that are examined. While the evidence provides some basis for theory building, it is not sufficient to provide generalizations beyond the two country cases. Therefore, this study also extends the evidence from the process tracing research to a broader set of cases. This is done to determine whether the causal mechanisms explaining the relationship between changes of government and social protection policy reforms can explain similar phenomena in the rest of the sub-region. In this regard, the study included an analysis of quantitative data which focused on 53 cases of changes of government in 10 East and Southern African countries.

The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections and proceeds as follows. The first section describes the process tracing method adopted for this study in detail. The second section discusses the rationale for adopting a case study approach. This is followed by the third section of the chapter which explains how process tracing informed case selection. The penultimate section of the chapter provides a reflection on the data sources relied on for this study and considers the implications of these sources for making inferences. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the methods used for the quantitative analysis – which is the focus of Chapter 8.

3.2 Discussion on process tracing methodology

The literature reviewed in the preceding chapter shows that recent research on social policy reforms in Africa has applied a process tracing methodology to understand the processes that have led to the promotion of social protection programmes such as social cash transfers. While the literature also shows that *large N* statistical studies have been useful for explaining factors that promote social welfare, such studies are limited in their ability to provide in-depth explanations of a single case or of the precise mechanisms through which variation arises. On the contrary, process tracing is a useful methodological tool to apply when the purpose of the research is to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under study within a single case or small set of cases, or to understand mechanisms of change. It is against this background that a process tracing methodology was considered the most appropriate approach for understanding how and why changes of government were associated with social protection reforms in Zambia and Malawi.

The term process tracing originated in the United States in the late 1960s or early 1970s in the field of cognitive psychology and was appropriated by political scientist, Alexander George, in 1979 "to describe the use of evidence from within case studies about historical explanations" (Bennett & Checkel, 2012: 7). Process tracing has had wide application in political science and has also been used by researchers in many social science disciplines including historical institutionalists in political research and some historical sociologists who have applied it to various empirical topics (Bengtsonn and Ruonavaara, 2017: 44-45). Although process tracing has been subjected to various but related definitions that have been modified over time, this study adopts a definition provided by Bennett and Checkel (2012). They define process tracing as "the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (Bennett & Checkel, 2012: 10). This definition is adopted primarily because the authors adapted this definition to improve on weaknesses identified in previous definitions (ibid: 9). Most notably, this definition was meant to build on the definition developed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett in *Case Studies and Theory Development* *in the Social Sciences,* which is regarded one of the major pioneering works in explaining process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2016).

A major ambition of process tracing is to trace causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms, which Andrew Bennett (cited by Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 25) defined as "processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific contexts to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities" aid researchers in understanding causation or, rather, "the theoretical mechanism(s) through which X produces Y" (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 25). This also helps us to understand process tracing as an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena (Collier, 2011: 824). For this study, process tracing is applied to understand the causal mechanisms that explain how changes of government result in reforms to either promote or limit the expansion of social protection programmes.

Bennett and Checkel (2012) emphasize that causal mechanisms should not be understood as intervening variables, even though earlier research on process tracing (for example George & Bennett, 2005) treated them as such. Intervening variables are often thought to transmit the causal force from the independent variable to subsequent intervening variables and the dependent variable without being altered in any form (Bennet & Checkel, 2012: 8). This, Bennett and Checkel argue, is not an accurate way to think about causal mechanisms because the observable events between the independent and dependent variables can be influenced by additional forces (ibid). This is relevant for this study because it is important to consider that actors involved in the social protection policymaking process can be constrained or impacted by various forces at any point. For example, a newly elected government with plans to expand social protection may be constrained by fiscal challenges, an urgent national crisis, or sudden political dynamics that could alter a planned course of action. Examples of such instances are demonstrated in the case study chapters of this thesis.

There are at least three known applications of process tracing that are relevant for this study to consider. Beach and Pedersen (2016) show that process tracing can be used for (i) theory testing, (ii) theory building, and (iii) explaining outcomes. With theory testing, the objective is to establish whether the causal mechanism that the researcher hypothesized links X and Y was present in the case being studied. For studies that seek to test theory, X and Y are known and there are existing plausible mechanisms linking the two variables. The researcher therefore aims to uncover if the existing theory explains causation in the study under investigation. With theory building, the objective is to build a theory that explains the casual mechanism between X and Y that can then be applied to a broader population of the phenomenon. Process tracing can be applied to theory building in cases where (i) there is a known correlation between X and Y but the causal mechanisms linking the two are not fully understood or (ii) there is an observable outcome (Y) but the plausible causes (X) are unknown or poorly understood. A major distinction between theory testing and theory building, therefore, is that the former takes a more deductive approach while the latter is more commonly applied inductively (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). The third, and perhaps most common application of process tracing, is explaining outcomes, which does not necessarily aim to build or test theories, but to provide explanations for known yet unexplained outcomes. The explaining outcomes approach can take either deductive or inductive forms.

The three different applications of process tracing have implications for how the methodological approach was applied in this thesis. At the start of this study, there was an observable link between changes of government (i.e. between political parties or ruling coalitions within a party) and support for state provision of social cash transfer programmes, particularly in Zambia. However, the causal mechanisms linking changes of government to social protection reforms were not known. The origins of this study meant process tracing could be applied to explain an outcome. At the same time, it could also be applied inductively, to build theory. In practice, there is overlap between how the three process tracing approaches can be applied to a study. This study used process tracing to explain outcomes but also to build theory. While the study aimed to provide in-case validations, it was also concerned with how the causal mechanisms uncovered from this study could be extended to explaining the same phenomena in other cases. The emphasis on theory building has implications for the quantitative analysis in this study discussed later in this chapter.

The foregoing does not suggest that explaining outcomes or theory building process tracing does not seek to engage with existing theories at all. On the contrary, even in these forms of process tracing, researchers start off with a hunch about plausible explanations, informed by theory, but seek to build a theory that can be extended to explaining similar phenomena in other cases. Nonetheless, researchers aiming to build theory must test their own findings against other plausible explanations and where necessary, to reject, validate or add to them. Therefore, this study considers how its findings sit with competing narratives that also seek to explain how and why social policy reforms happened in the Zambian and Malawian cases.

3.3 Rationale for adopting comparative case study approach

A comparative case design was used for this study. In this section, I explain the rationale for adopting a case study research design and why it was necessary to compare cases rather than focus on a single case.

Process tracing methods are commonly used in case study research where the focus is to make within-case inferences about the presence or absence of causal mechanisms in single case studies (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 4). Other forms of case study research seldom focus on providing within-case inferences but focus on cross-case inferences about causal relationships instead (ibid). Case study research is also preferable for addressing “how” or “why” questions. This is because such questions are more explanatory and deal with operational links needing to be traced over time (Yin, 2003: 1). Furthermore, case study research is relevant for gaining in-depth knowledge about a specific subject as opposed to brief knowledge about a larger number of cases (Gerring, 2007). The above-stated factors make case study research important for this study because its focus is to provide within-case analysis by providing in-depth knowledge to explain causal mechanisms linking changes of government and social protection policy reforms.

Case study research can also be applied comparatively when the goal of the research is to analyse more than one case (Gerring, 2007). David Collier observed that comparative case study research is useful because one important goal of social science research is to generalize findings beyond an initial case or set of cases (Collier, 1993: 110). Case study research has several uses which include testing hypotheses and building theory (Yin, 2003). While this study was interested in providing within-case analysis to uncover the causal mechanisms linking changes of government and social protection policy reforms, a secondary motivation of the study was to extend the analysis beyond a single case in order to develop a fuller picture of the phenomena under study. In the section that follows, I explain how process tracing methods informed case selection for this study.

3.4 Research design and case selection

There are two main research designs used in comparative research that focus on political phenomena (Anckar, 2008). The first is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and the second is the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). The nature of the research being conducted informs which of the two research designs can be applied (Anckar, 2008: 389). A major distinction between the two designs is that the MSSD is mostly applied in the comparative analysis of very few closely matched cases (small N studies) while the MDSD is mostly applied to a broader set of highly diverse cases (large N studies) (Collier, 1993). Anckar (2008) further explains that the MSSD is applied when the focus of research is to study countries that appear to be similar in as many background characteristics as possible even though the cases cannot be matched on all the relevant control variables. On the other hand, the MDSD focuses on cases that are as different as possible regarding extraneous variables (Anckar, 2008: 390).

This study adopted a most similar systems design because the focus of the study was to understand the relationship between changes of government and social protection policy reforms in cases that were as similar as possible. In a strict sense, the MSSD would be used deductively, in cases where countries were similar in several specified variables but only differed in terms of the independent variable (ibid). However, in practice, the MSSD can be used inductively, in a study where we would expect values on the dependent variable to vary (Anckar, 2008: 395). For this study, we would expect variation in social protection policy reforms (the dependent variable) for cases where changes of government had taken place (the independent variable). Therefore, the combined focus on a small set of similar cases, variation in the dependent variable, and the emphasis on an inductive process, motivated the decision to adopt the MSSD research design for this study. A MDSD would have been more appropriate if the focus of this study was to understand the differences in social protection policy reforms between countries that had experienced changes of government and those that had not. The MDSD would also have been more appropriate if the focus of the study was theory testing.

The decision to adopt the MSSD also informed the case selection for this study. Because the study was motivated by dynamics that were observed from a pilot study in Zambia, the focus of case selection was to identify other country cases that were similar to Zambia in terms of the main variables relevant for the study. Furthermore, due to time constraints to complete the study and available financial resources to conduct qualitative fieldwork research, it was realistic to limit the study to only two country cases. I outline below how the selection of country cases for this study was conducted.

This study had its origins in the LIWPR project. Therefore, the broader universe of cases for this study was the 14 countries that were the focus of the project: Botswana, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The LIWPR cases were predominantly East and Southern African Anglophone countries. Of these cases, the study narrowed its focus to countries that were as similar as possible on a few variables that were the most relevant for this research. This included countries that had social cash transfer programmes (or “flagship” social protection programmes) that were initiated by bilateral or multilateral agencies rather than the state, and where partial or complete changes of government had taken place. These criteria eliminated seven of the 14 LIWPR countries as potential cases for comparison. Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa all had social cash transfer or flagship social protection programmes that were state initiated and predominantly state funded. Eswatini was excluded because as an absolute monarchy, its domestic political dynamics were significantly different from the other cases. Meanwhile, Ghana’s “flagship” social protection programme, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, is credited as a domestic initiative of the government of then President John Kufuor, even though DFID was involved in the design of the programme (Grebe, 2015: 23). Both data and literature on social protection programmes in Mozambique were sparse early in this research project. This made it problematic to consider Mozambique as a possible case for comparison.

In view of the above, only seven of the original 14 LIWPR countries were considered possible cases for comparison. Table 3.1 lists the country cases and includes information about the flagship social protection programmes, the year the programmes were started by donors, and the main bilateral or multilateral donors that initiated programmes. The table also shows changes of government that occurred in each country in the period after programmes were introduced. Of the seven countries, Zambia and Malawi were the most similar in terms of the main control variables considered for this study. They were the only two countries in which electoral turnovers happened – from one political party to another after an election – and where other changes of government either within a governing party or from one ruling coalition within a party, also happened. Lesotho experienced three changes of government after the introduction of the Child Grant in 2009. However, these changes all involved the formation of coalition governments due to hung parliaments. Moreover, Lesotho also had an Old Age Pension programme introduced by the state in 2004 which was one of the two main social protection interventions in the country (Granvik, 2019). Therefore, the political dynamics in Lesotho and the origins of its flagship social protection programmes were quite distinct from those obtaining in Zambia. Although changes of government also occurred in Kenya and Tanzania, these were limited to coalition governments or changes of president within the same governing party. Zimbabwe had a partial change of government in 2009 but this was a government of national unity formed by two opposing political parties after disputed elections in 2008. In addition, Zimbabwe's flagship programme, the HSCT, did not precede a change of government but was introduced by the coalition government. Therefore, Zimbabwe did not fit the case selection criteria neatly. Uganda was the only case in which the same party and president had governed without any alternation.

Table 3. 1: Selection of country cases

Country	Programme	Year started	Main donor	Changes of government
Kenya	Cash Transfer for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children	2004	UNICEF	Coalition government (2007); Change of president within ruling coalition (2013)
Lesotho	Child Grant	2009	European Union/UNICEF	Change in coalition government (2012; 2015; 2017)
Malawi	Social Cash Transfer Programme	2006	UNICEF	Change of president and ruling coalition (2012); Electoral turnover (2014)
Tanzania	Productive Social Safety Nets	2013	World Bank	Change of president within governing party (2015)
Uganda	Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment	2010	DFID/Irish Aid	No change
Zambia	Social Cash Transfer Programme	2003	GTZ	Change of president within governing party (2008; 2015), Electoral turnover (2011)
Zimbabwe	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer	2010	UNICEF/World Bank	Coalition government (2009)

Source: Compiled from various LIWPR research publications

The preceding discussion demonstrates why Zambia and Malawi were considered the most similar cases for a comparative study on how and why changes of government affect policy making on social cash transfer programmes. In the section that follows, I provide summaries of the social and economic dynamics of the two country cases. The summaries demonstrate that Zambia and Malawi are not just similar in terms of the independent variable for this study, but also share similarities in terms of social and economic structures, including the salience of agriculture among rural populations. Debates around agriculture are crucial in discussing social protection in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa because until recently, African governments have tended to provide support to poor and rural communities through farm input subsidies and have only turned to social protection in more recent times (Seekings, 2017).

3.4.1 Country cases

In this section, I provide a brief discussion of each of the two country cases that the study focuses on. The discussion is intended to provide overviews of the two country cases, including important economic indicators and the extent of poverty. I then discuss the case studies that form the basis of this thesis.

3.4.1.1 Zambia

Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa sharing national borders with eight countries (including Malawi). The 2010 census on population and housing calculated Zambia's population at 13 million, although World Bank data[12] estimated the population to have grown to 17 million at the end of 2017 (Central Statistical Office, 2012). The 2010 census data show that 60% of the population resides in rural areas and the remaining 40% in urban areas. Most of the urban population resides in the capital Lusaka and the copper mining region, the Copperbelt Province. Levels of extreme poverty were higher in rural areas, estimated at 78%, compared to only 28% in urban areas.

Zambia is a lower middle-income country in Southern Africa, with GDP of about $25 billion and per capita income of USD 1,500.[13] Zambia's economy is highly dependent on copper mining even though most citizens are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods (Central Statistics Office, 2012). Mining contributes 12% to Zambia's GDP and accounts for 70% of

[12] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZM [accessed 27 November 2018]
[13] World Bank data. Available: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZM

total export value.[14] After a precipitous economic decline in the late twentieth century, Zambia recorded robust economic growth and received huge capital inflows in the 2000s. The growth has been supported by commodity prices which remain at historically high levels even after their recent decline (World Bank, 2013).

In terms of poverty, World Bank data show that the proportion of the population living below the US$1.90 threshold stood at 54% of the population in 1991. While this figure declined to 42% in 1996, the poverty ratio increased rapidly over the next decade and half and peaked at 64% in 2010, even while the economy was growing, before reducing marginally to 58% in 2015. Transnational actors played a primary role in addressing poverty during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the state assumed more control in the mid-2000s and 2010s.

Regarding employment, the 2010 census data show that the economically active age group (those aged 12 years and above) comprised of 7.7 million people, 57% of whom resided in rural areas and 43% in urban areas (Central Statistical Office, 2012: 33). Zambia had a labour force of about 4.3 million people out of whom 87% were employed (ibid: 36).

3.4.1.2 Malawi

Malawi is a landlocked country in Southern Africa, sharing national borders with three countries, including Zambia on its western border. The country is demarcated into three regions: The Northern, Central and Southern regions, which are sub-divided into 28 districts. It has a surface area of 118,480 km^2 a fifth of which is covered by a large water body – Lake Malawi (USAID, 2016). Malawi is one of Africa's most densely populated countries with a population of 16 million (as at 2015) and a national population density of 173 persons per square kilometre. At 223 persons per square kilometre, the population density is highest in the Southern Region which accounts for about 45% of the national population. Malawi also has one of the lowest urbanization rates of any African country. Just under 13% of the population resides in urban areas, while up to 86% of the population is rural (National Statistical Office, 2017).

Malawi is one of the world's poorest countries. It is a low-income country with a per capita income of USD 381 (World Bank, 2016). It ranks 170 out of 188 countries on the United

[14] http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/07/18/how-can-zambia-benefit-more-from-mining

Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) with a low human development score of 0.476 (UNDP, 2016). The Malawian economy is highly dependent on agriculture which contributes 30% of GDP and employs about two-thirds of the country's workforce (National Statistical Office, 2017; World Bank, 2016). Malawi is particularly dependent on rain-fed agriculture which has posed challenges for the economy, given the country's susceptibility to climate change and adverse weather conditions such as droughts and floods (World Bank, 2016).

Data on poverty trends in Malawi are sparse, but the available data show that the poverty headcount ratio was high in the mid-1990s and grew higher in the decade that followed. According to the World Bank's measure of poverty, the poverty headcount ratio of persons living on less than US$ 1.90 per day increased from 63% in 1997 to 73% in 2004 before declining slightly to 71% in 2010. The effect of famine and the consequences of implementing structural adjustment reforms during the 1990s, contributed to economic decline during this period. Transnational actors have played a primary role in poverty reduction in the democratic era and although the state has gradually assumed more control, donor support remains crucial for the implementation of poverty reduction programmes, much more than in Zambia.

In terms of employment, Malawi's workforce comprises 7 million people aged between 15 and 64 years. Of these, about 5.5 million people were in active employment (National Statistical Office, 2017). Of those employed, 64% were engaged in agriculture, with most engaged in peasant agricultural activities in rural areas.

3.4.1.3 Case studies

This study focuses on four cases – two each in Zambia and Malawi. Because the study explains social protection reforms under different government administrations, the unit of analysis is government administrations. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the four cases that make up this study.

Table 3. 2: Summary of Cases

Case	Country	Administration	Period covered
1	Zambia	Michael Sata (PF)	2011-2014
2	Zambia	Edgar Lungu (PF)	2015-2017
3	Malawi	Joyce Banda (PP)	2012-2014
4	Malawi	Peter Mutharika (DPP)	2014-2017

The study set out to gain in-depth knowledge of how and why reforms happened after changes in government in 2011 and 2012 in Zambia and Malawi, respectively. Because both countries experienced subsequent changes in government – in 2014 in Malawi and 2015 in Zambia – the study also focuses on reforms under the most recently elected administrations. An analysis of the four cases and not one case only, provides greater depth for an under-researched topic and provides more evidence for theory development. For each country, the first case focuses on the administration that initiated major reforms. The second set of cases for each country focus on administrations that succeeded the reforming governments. The administrations are identified by the president who led the administration, the political party they headed and the period they were in government. This study covers the period up to 2017 because the last phase of data was collected in March 2017.

3.5 Discussion on data sources

The process tracing methodology was adopted in order to establish the causal mechanisms linking changes of government between political parties or ruling coalitions, and social protection policy reforms. In order to explain the key outcomes and to identify the causal mechanisms that led to them, this study relied upon various sources of data. This involved a documentary analysis of reports, in-depth interviews with key informants and informal conversations with individuals who had expertise broadly related to the focus of this study (I discuss this in a bit more detail below). The documents that were analysed include reports published by national governments, bilateral and multilateral organizations, and academic institutions. The study also relied on political party documents such as election manifestos, speeches by political leaders and transcripts of parliamentary debates recorded in Hansard.

In-depth, semi structured interviews with key informants were arguably the most important data source relied on for this study. Key informants were identified by virtue of being involved in the policymaking process or because they were representatives of institutions that were involved in the process. In this sense, sampling of respondents was purposive and convenient. It also included an element of snowballing where respondents would at times refer me to other respondents who were deemed knowledgeable to provide useful information for the study.

I conducted three rounds of interviews in Zambia, including a pilot study between February and April 2015, fieldwork after the completion of my research proposal conducted between November 2015 and early February 2016, and fieldwork during the 2016 elections between July and August 2016. Two main objectives informed the data collection during the elections. The first was to understand the extent to which the partial change in government in 2015 had affected social protection reforms. The second was to understand the extent to which political parties and candidates addressed social protection and related issues during election campaigns. In total, the fieldwork in Zambia drew on interviews with 11 former or at the time current government technocrats mostly in ministries directly involved in implementing or funding social cash transfers, and 11 political leaders most of whom had served in either the MMD or PF government, or represented the official opposition, the UPND, in Parliament. Interviews were also conducted with nine representatives of bilateral or multilateral agencies, three civil society representatives and one trade union leader. I also had informal conversations in Cape Town and Lusaka with two academics with extensive knowledge about Zambian politics.

The fieldwork in Malawi was conducted between January and March 2017. It included in-depth semi structured interviews with eight government technocrats in government ministries or departments responsible for planning, implementing or funding social protection programmes, seven political leaders including individuals who had served in either the PP or DPP governments. Others interviewed were five representatives of bilateral or multilateral organizations based in Malawi, and four civil society representatives. I also had informal conversations with two academics with extensive knowledge about Malawian politics, one government technocrat, and a retired civil society representative.

There were at least three challenges that the data collected from semi structured in-depth interviews presented for this study. First, the fact that most respondents were closely involved with the policy making process did not mean they would always provide accurate information.

For example, retired technocrats in Zambia who served in previous administrations were more likely to speak freely and openly than technocrats who were serving in government at the time of the interview. Discussing politically sensitive information appeared to unsettle some technocrats, especially when interviewed in offices shared with their colleagues. A case in point was when respondents were asked to compare the policymaking process between current and former political administrations. This limited the extent to which accurate data could be collected. To address this concern, I had to corroborate information provided by respondents with that provided by others. Importantly, I had to weigh the evidence collected from this study with the evidence provided by other studies. This helped to determine the plausibility of certain claims or to fill gaps.

Second, corroborating information was not always easy or possible. For example, many respondents had been working in their positions or for their institutions, for a much shorter period than the period for which donor initiated social cash transfer programmes had been in existence. Therefore, it was not always possible to corroborate the information provided by the few respondents who provided information that could not be confirmed or disputed by others. Here again, it was necessary to consider how the evidence compared with the evidence provided by competing research accounts or counterfactual scenarios.

Finally, the study interviewed about twice the number of political leaders and government technocrats on the one hand than it did representatives of bilateral and multilateral organizations, and civil society on the other. This meant that the study was susceptible to providing a biased analysis that relied more on the insights of domestic political actors at the expense of their transnational counterparts. Nonetheless, the study adopted this approach because of a motivation to provide a fuller account of how and why politicians representing different government administrations within a country differed in their approach to social protection. Hitherto, understanding the motivations of political elites was not the primary focus of any other study, even though related studies on Zambia (for example Pruce & Hickey, 2019) did trace the policymaking process over time but with less focus on partisanship or comparing the reform process under a national government to predecessor and successor governments. Therefore, this study considered how competing narratives provided by other studies, transnational actors interviewed for this study and counterfactual scenarios, complimented my findings.

3.6 Discussion on quantitative analysis

This study conducted a qualitative process tracing research to understand how and why social protection policy reforms were affected by changes of government in Zambia and Malawi. The process tracing research was complemented by a quantitative analysis that examined the relationship between changes of government and policy reforms of 10 countries in East and Southern Africa, including Zambia and Malawi. The quantitative analysis is the focus of Chapter 8 of this thesis. The rest of this section discusses the value addition of incorporating a quantitative analysis to this study and discusses how the analysis was conducted.

The literature on case study research, [including studies by Przeworski and Teune (1970) and Przeworski (1987), cited by (Collier, 1993)] argues that a most similar systems design research based on a small number of cases, provides a weak basis for causal inference. The qualitative process tracing research discussed causal mechanisms in four case studies in two countries that explain the relationship between social protection policy reforms and changes of government. However, the analysis of the four cases studies was insufficient to generalize beyond the two countries. To generalize beyond the two countries and four case studies would require an analysis of a broader set of cases.

The review of literature in the preceding chapter demonstrates that quantitative analysis has been useful for explaining variation in social welfare policy reforms. This includes studies on major industrial capitalist democracies (Esping-Andersen, 1990), studies on the determinants on welfare state development in Latin America (Huber & Stephens, 2012), and the influence of electoral alternation on social welfare provision in Africa (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). These studies demonstrate that applying statistical analysis to a broad set of cases is useful for establishing causal inferences and for testing or building theory.

Beyond the initial two country cases and four case studies, this study also set out to answer the question: “How do these two country cases compare with a broader set of cases in Anglophone East and Southern Africa?” The purpose of addressing this research question was to determine whether the observed relationship between changes of government and social protection policy reforms, could be extended to understand debates regarding the expansion of social protection in other African countries. Moreover, to echo the claim made by Karl Popper (1959) cited in

Anckar (2008), falsification rather than verification is central to the progress of scientific research.

The quantitative analysis included 53 cases studies (i.e. cases of government administrations) in 10 countries that were part of the LIWPR project. Four countries were excluded from the quantitative analysis. Eswatini, Mauritius and Mozambique were excluded due to limited data. Ghana was the only country outside the East and Southern African region and was therefore excluded because it was geographically distinct from the rest of the countries. The analysis employed a most different systems design (MDSD) which is built on the principle of falsification (Anckar, 2008: 391). It is also argued that comparative studies in regression models using multi-level techniques are built on the logical foundations of a MDSD (ibid). The study included countries that were diverse in terms of origins of flagship social protection programmes (donor or state initiated). Countries were also diverse in terms of whether changes of government had occurred. The study considered social protection reforms that happened since 1990 (the period that coincided with the third wave of democratization) in order to provide a longer time horizon and more data points for comparison in a regression analysis.

3.6.1 Data

The study would have benefited greatly from using a dataset that provides quantitative data on various aspects of social protection (including expenditure on programmes and coverage) for many African countries over a long-time horizon. The World Bank's Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) database provides a comprehensive and comparable set of social protection indicators. However, the database is recent and does not include much data collected before 2010. This limits the use of the data for this study which looks at reform covering a longer period. In addition, to the extent that ASPIRE provides data since 2010, data are not available for every year for all indicators. In the absence of a reliable dataset, I had to create my own. The dataset for this study was primarily obtained from LIWPR research. The data collected focused on reforms to social cash transfer programmes for 53 cases (government administrations in 10 countries). The period considered for this study was from 1990 (the start of the third wave of democracy) to 2017 (when data collection for this study ended).

To create the dataset, I employed the use of "quasi-statistics." Prominent qualitative researchers such as Howard Becker and Martyn Hammersley have used quasi-statistics which refers to the use of simple counts of things to support terms such as “some”, “usually” and “most” (Maxwell, 2010). There are both advantages and disadvantages of using such statistics. Quasi-statistics can be used for the generalization of qualitative research claims to a broader set of cases. However, a major drawback of using simple counts is that while they may count things precisely, they may be inaccurate measurements which lack validity (ibid). Using simple counts, I code various aspects of reform and of changes of government.

For reform, I used existing data to code whether a reform happened under a government administration for each of the five dimensions of reform that this study focuses on. A more robust measurement would be to determine the extent of reform. For example, I use simple “yes” or “no” categories in response to the question “were there reforms to increase state funding for social protection programmes?” A more robust measure would consider actual expenditure on social protection and would measure reform by considering changes in spending between different governments. However, data on spending, coverage and other aspects of reform for most African countries going back to the early 1990s are either unavailable or difficult to obtain. This makes it impossible to collect accurate time series data on reform.

The quantitative analysis was conducted in an exploratory manner with a view to determine whether the relationship between social protection policy reforms and changes of government could be found beyond the Zambia and Malawi case studies. Nevertheless, the analysis had significant limitations. On the one hand, the study was limited to only 53 cases in 10 countries. The Africa Leadership Change Project, which forms the basis of Carbone and Pellegata’s study, is built on a dataset covering all 54 countries in Africa from 1960 to 2015. Such a dataset is more suitable for regression analysis and for making broad inferences. On the other hand, this study used simple counts to measure variables. Despite these obvious limitations, this study provides a foundation upon which further and more robust research can be conducted to examine the statistical relationship between changes of government and social protection policy reforms in Africa. Chapter 8 provides further discussion on the data and methodological approach for the quantitative analysis.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter explained the motivation for adopting a qualitative process tracing approach and discussed the rationale for using a comparative case study approach. It also discussed the case study research design and the process of case selection. Furthermore, the chapter provided a reflection on the sources of data for the qualitative semi-structured interviews and considered the implications of the sources on the analysis of this study. Finally, the chapter discussed the motivation for complementing the qualitative process tracing research with quantitative analysis and explains how the two approaches were adopted to contribute to building a theory on how and why social protection policy reforms happen after changes of government.

The next chapter introduces the first of four case studies. The four case studies provide a source of empirical evidence which contributes to the body of knowledge on social protection policy reforms globally and in Africa. They also add to the existing knowledge of the two country contexts: the Zambian context where there is a growing but limited knowledge on social protection reforms under the MMD and PF administrations; and in Malawi where there is still need for more research to understand how and why social protection reforms have happened since the introduction of pilot cash transfers.

CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY REFORMS IN ZAMBIA: 2011-2014

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explains how and why a change of government affected social protection reforms in the first case study. This case study focuses on reforms after the 2011 change of government in Zambia. It demonstrates how a change of government from the MMD to the Patriotic Front led by President Michael Sata resulted in significant social protection reforms, particularly regarding the expansion of the social cash transfer programme. Using a process-tracing approach, I explain why these reforms happened.

The existing literature on social protection policy reforms in Zambia under the Sata administration is limited. Regardless, there are two main studies that have provided compelling accounts for how and why the SCT programme was expanded from a donor pilot to a national programme under the PF administration. The first account by Kuss (2015) argues that the change of government from the MMD to the PF resulted in a shift from clientelist forms of distributing wealth to the rural poor to a more rights-based approach. Kuss argues that this shift was supply driven i.e. was led by political leaders within the PF and had much less to do with demand from rural citizens or even civil society and donors. The second account by Pruce and Hickey (2019) argues that the policy change under the PF government was informed by two main factors. The first was shifting dynamics within Zambia's political settlement. According to Pruce and Hickey, the PF lacked a clear policy agenda prior to its election but was intent on fulfilling its electoral pledge to implement pro-poor economic reforms. Following a 2013 public scandal involving budget overspends on farm input subsidies, the newly elected PF government was intent on boosting other forms of rent distribution to rural areas. The second dynamic identified by Pruce and Hickey (2019) refers to the promotional efforts of transnational actors who built support amongst government technocrats for over a decade which eventually paid off following changes in the political settlement.

The two accounts above both provide very useful explanations for how and why reforms to promote social cash transfers happened under the PF government. This chapter acknowledges that transnational actors won support for SCTs amongst government technocrats that contributed to the expansion of the programme. It demonstrates that reforms under PF were in part path-dependent and built on a decade of efforts advanced mostly by donors, government technocrats and even previous government administrations. This chapter goes beyond the evidence provided by these two accounts by tracing how domestic Zambian politics (and internal dynamics within PF) made reforms to expand the provision of social protection more probable after the 2011 change of government.

4.2. How did a change of government happen?

Before considering how and why a change of government was important for policy reforms, it is necessary to discuss how the change of government happened. In this section, I first provide a background of Michael Sata before discussing the formation of the Patriotic Front (PF) and its path to power. Sata's background is particularly useful for understanding his character and the impact this had on the identity of PF. It also provides useful context for understanding the nature of reforms that Sata – and by extension the PF – was disposed to. I argue that Sata's background as a trade union and UNIP branch leader on the Copperbelt in the 1960s, and as ward councillor, MP and Governor in Lusaka in the 1980s, helps to understand his brand as a pro-poor politician and his appeal to poor urban voters. It helps to understand the issues that were central to the PF as an opposition party. The discussion on PF's rise to power and its pro-poor branding (that contrasted with the MMD's market friendly policies) provides useful context for understanding the ways in which the competitive nature of Zambia's democracy incentivised the PF to adopt issues that helped to distinguish it from the MMD on social issues.

4.2.1. Background of Michael Sata

Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) records that Sata was born on 6 January 1936 in Mpika district in the northern part of what was then Northern Rhodesia.[15] He completed primary education in the Northern Province in 1955. Sata did not pursue his education further but moved to Lusaka the same year where he trained as a police officer. He then moved to a Copperbelt mining town where we worked as a police officer for the Northern Rhodesian government between 1955 and 1958. He was arrested in unclear circumstances in 1958, but very likely for associating himself with UNIP's liberation struggle. Upon his release from prison in 1960, he moved to Kitwe (the largest town on the Copperbelt) and joined a construction firm in a clerical position.

[15] Mpika was part of Northern Province when Zambia gained independence in 1964. It became part of Zambia's 10th province, Muchinga Province, which was created in 2011 after the election of the PF. Muchinga Province includes some districts that were previously part of Northern Province and some districts that were part of Eastern Province.

Between 1961 and 1964, Sata was a leader in various trade unions representing the building and construction industry. He first served as an organising secretary and later as a General Secretary for a union he formed in 1962. Sata became one of the most effective trade unionists on the Copperbelt in the 1960s and aligned his union to Kaunda's UNIP. He also became a Treasurer for a UNIP branch in 1963 (Sishuwa, 2016: 77-85).

Sata did not join national politics at independence but remained in the construction industry and the trade union. He first attempted to run for national political office as a parliamentary candidate in 1978 but had his application rejected by UNIP (ibid: 113). He made a second attempt in 1981 and was elected ward councillor for Bauleni, a large informal settlement in Lusaka, representing UNIP (Ruwe, 2014). Two years later, he successfully contested the Kabwata parliamentary seat (Sishuwa, 2016: 125). Sata was then appointed District Governor of Lusaka by President Kaunda in 1985 (Larmer & Fraser, 2007; Ruwe, 2014; Sishuwa, 2016). As Governor, Sata presided over a UNIP programme that constructed 10,000 low-cost housing units in Lusaka (Sishuwa, 2016: 85). His success at implementing the programme earned him the reputation as "the hardest working governor" in Zambia (Resnick, 2014; Ruwe, 2014). He was subsequently re-elected MP for Kabwata in 1988, winning 72% of the vote and then appointed Minister of State in the Ministry of Decentralization (Resnick, 2014; Ruwe, 2014; Sishuwa, 2016).

As popular demand for a return to multiparty democracy grew in 1990-91, and despite his previous loyalty, Sata was among the first MPs to resign from UNIP and aligned himself with the MMD (Larmer & Fraser, 2007: 624). He re-contested his Kabwata seat as an MMD candidate in 1991 and won 79% of votes cast.[16] During President Frederick Chiluba's first term, Sata served in various Cabinet positions including as Minister of Local Government and Housing, Labour and Social Security, and of Health (Ruwe, 2014). When the MMD went for its second national convention in June 1995 (the first having been held in 1990 when the party was formed), Sata won election as National Secretary of the party. This made him the third most senior member of the party after the president and his vice (Sishuwa, 2016). In 1996, he stood as an MMD parliamentary candidate in Mpika (where his family originated from) and won 85% of votes cast[17]. He was then appointed Minister without Portfolio, a position he held

[16] Data from Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/
[17] Data from Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/

until 2001 (Sishuwa, 2016: 162). As Minister without Portfolio, Sata's primary role was to coordinate party activities using government resources (ibid: 189). This made Sata one of the most influential MMD and Cabinet officials, and a close confidant of Chiluba.

4.2.2 Formation of PF

Sata expected to succeed Chiluba as MMD leader at the end of the latter's second term of office. Instead, Chiluba influenced the election of Levy Mwanawasa as his successor[18] (Resnick, 2014; Ruwe, 2014). Incensed by this move, Sata resigned from MMD and ran for republican president under his newly formed Patriotic Front in the 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections, which Mwanawasa won for the MMD (Rakner, 2003: 114-5). Sata placed seventh in a race contested by 11 presidential candidates after obtaining a meagre 3% of the vote. His party earned only one parliamentary seat in his ethnic Northern Province (ibid: 116).

After the 2001 elections, Chiluba and more than 10 of his close associates were prosecuted by the Mwanawasa administration for various charges of corruption committed during the former's time in office (Sishuwa, 2016). Chiluba and his co-accused (except for one) were all Bemba-speaking from Luapula and Northern Province, which prompted accusations that Mwanawasa (who had mixed parentage from Central and Copperbelt provinces) was deliberately marginalizing Bemba-speakers within the ruling party. This led to the creation of an anti-Mwanawasa Bemba-speaking faction which eventually allied itself with Sata's PF in the 2006 elections (Sishuwa, 2016).

Sata also began to broaden his electoral coalition beyond ethnic Bemba voters to one that articulated "the frustrations of the working class and urban poor" (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010: 64). In the economically strategic Copperbelt province, Sata built support around the important networks of employed and retired mineworkers who were affiliated to the Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ) (Larmer & Fraser, 2007). Historically, trade union structures have been important for mobilizing support in Zambian politics. UNIP was dependent on these structures during the struggle for independence in 1964 and so was the MMD during the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 (LeBas, 2011). Sata was clearly aware of the

[18] Mwanawasa was the first Vice President under the MMD government, from 1991 to 1994. He resigned his position in 1994 citing corruption in Chiluba's administration.

importance of incorporating trade union structures into his political party based on his own experiences as a trade unionist in the 1960s.

From 2002 to 2006, Mwanawasa presided over a growing economy supported by rising copper prices and recorded successes such as attaining massive debt relief, as well as "cutting back on corruption, controlling inflation, and balancing the budget" (Cheeseman *et al.*, 2014: 345). There was an increase in urban poverty despite these achievements. Poor urbanites also resented the fact that foreign investors benefited the most from high copper prices because of MMD policies (Resnick, 2014). Sata addressed these issues in his efforts to appeal to urban voters. Resnick (2010: 9) writes that after 2001, "Sata spent a majority of his time campaigning amongst street vendors, marketeers, bus and taxi drivers, and the youth (24 years old or younger), in Lusaka Province". His campaign focused on issues such as "health and safety standards in Chinese-owned mines, the shortage of market stalls for informal traders, inadequate urban housing, and the disorganized nature of bus stations" (Larmer & Fraser, 2007: 613). Sata's focus on labour reforms and housing was not surprising given his trade union background and his reputation for addressing an urban housing crisis during the 1980s.

With regard to the organization of the party, PF was built around Sata's charisma and the support of his close allies such as his Vice President Guy Scott (who was elected PF MP for Lusaka Central constituency in 2006) as well as party Secretary General Wynter Kabimba[19] and the National Treasurer, Emmanuel Chenda,[20] who had all known Sata since the 1980s. The PF was unlike the MMD in 1990-91 that was built around an alliance of trade union leaders, disgruntled UNIP politicians, academics and business leaders (Rakner, 2003; LeBas, 2011).

In the 2006 general elections, the PF increased its share of votes. Sata improved remarkably from a seventh finish in 2001 to runner up in 2006 after amassing 29% of the presidential vote while PF won 42 out of 150 parliamentary seats. He finished first in three provinces, including Luapula, where he drew support from the Bemba speaking population, the urban Lusaka

[19] Wynter Kabimba served as legal advisor to Sata when he was District Governor for Lusaka and later served as Town Clerk for Lusaka City Council in the 1990s when Sata was Minister of Local Government and Housing, lusakavoice.com/2013/09/18/wynter-m-kabimba.

[20] Emmanuel Chenda became Lusaka City Council's City Treasurer in 1986. He served as Town Clerk of Ndola City Council from 1991 to 2001. He was elected PF MP for Bwana Mukubwa in 2011 and held ministerial positions between 2011 and 2014 including Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, and Minister of Local Government and Housing, www.leadersmag.com/issues/2014.3_Jul/ROB/LEADERS-Emmanuel-Chenda.

province and the Copperbelt, which in addition to being urban, also comprised a large Bemba speaking population (Larmer & Fraser, 2007; Simutanyi, 2013). In the remaining five provinces, Sata and the PF performed poorly: Sata himself obtained on average only 8% of the votes while his party failed to win any parliamentary seat in these provinces (Simutanyi, 2013: 129). Mwanawasa won the presidential vote with 43% and the MMD won 73 out of 150 parliamentary seats (Larmer & Fraser, 2007; Helle & Rakner, 2012).

The untimely death of Mwanawasa in August 2008 necessitated a presidential by-election held on 30 October 2008. The election was closely contested by the MMD candidate, Rupiah Banda,[21] and Sata of the PF. Like his 2006 campaign, Sata focused on issues that resonated with the urban underclass. He favoured more state intervention in the economy and less foreign influence which led Cheeseman *et al.* (2014: 344) to argue that: "as with all populists, his worldview was an explicitly interventionist one: the government can make things better for ordinary Zambians, and it can do so quickly".

Banda won a narrow victory, receiving 40% of the vote and roughly 33,000 more votes than Sata who obtained 38%.[22] According to Simutanyi (2010: 3) Banda's win was unexpected in part because he had joined MMD from UNIP shortly before his appointment as Vice President in 2006. He therefore lacked grassroots support within the ruling party. In addition, Banda's selection as MMD candidate during an intra-party election, in which he defeated his closest rival (former Finance Minister) Magande, left the MMD National Executive Committee (NEC) and Cabinet divided between pro and anti-Banda factions (Simutanyi, 2010; Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010).

4.2.3 PF's rise to power

After three unsuccessful attempts, Sata won his fourth attempt with 42% of the vote. He defeated the incumbent, Banda, who obtained 36%, and Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND who won 18%. The PF won 61 of the 150 parliamentary seats, while the MMD won 55 seats and the UPND 29 seats.[23]

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[21] Banda had served as Mwanawasa's Vice President between September 2006 and June 2008 and as Acting President from June 2008 to October 2008, the period from Mwanawasa's incapacitation after suffering a stroke until presidential by-elections held after Mwanawasa's death.
[22] Data from Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/.
[23] Data from Electoral Commission of Zambia, http://www.elections.org.zm/.

Explaining why Sata and PF won in 2011 despite losing in all presidential and parliamentary elections from 2001 to 2008 probably has as much to do with decline in support for MMD as it did in Sata's ability to broaden his support base. In an Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2009, 31% of respondents blamed Zambia's economic problems on Banda's administration and only 7% blamed Mwanawasa's government, even though Banda had been president for about a year at the time of the survey (Cheeseman et al., 2014). Also, Banda's failure to contain factionalism that emerged in MMD after his selection as the party candidate in 2008 weakened his chances of winning in 2011. According to Simutanyi (2013) Banda expelled two MMD MPs for criticising him in 2009 and fired two ministers in 2010. These included individuals who were close to former president Mwanawasa who then supported Sata in 2011. By 2011, several prominent MMD members had defected to PF or endorsed the candidature of Sata. For the most part, the defectors were not drawn to PF on ideological grounds but rather to revive their (declining) political fortunes by supporting a popular presidential candidate who stood a chance of unseating Banda.

The PF also made inroads in MMD strongholds such as Western Province which increased Sata's share of the vote. Resnick (2014) argues that Sata capitalised on Banda's failure to address grievances among the Lozi speaking people of Western Province, who were advocating for secession. The secession calls emanated from arguments that the Barotseland Agreement[24] of 1964 had been abrogated. Using populist appeals, Sata promised to recognise the agreement to "restore the special rights and privileges" of the Lozi people (ibid: 220). The fact that PF now had prominent politicians within its ranks who originated from Western Province such as party Chairperson Inonge Wina[25] and Spokesperson Given Lubinda[26] appears to have contributed to the appeal of PF in Western Province. In the presidential vote, Sata obtained 23% of the vote in Western Province, which was a significant improvement from 10% in 2008.

[24] According to Resnick (2014: 220) "the Barotseland Agreement was signed in 1964 by the king of Barotseland, the British colonial secretary and Kenneth Kaunda in order to bestow the king and the Barotse Royal Establishment with particular rights and privileges that were not awarded to other traditional leaderships. In exchange, the king was to cease overtures for secession and the formation of an independent Barotseland. In 1969, Kaunda abrogated the Agreement."

[25] Inonge Wina was elected UPND MP for Nalolo constituency in 2001. She left UPND to join United Liberal Party (ULP) in 2006 which was a breakaway from UPND. She re-contested and lost her seat in 2006. ULP formed an electoral alliance with PF in 2006 and although the alliance did not last after the election, Wina later joined PF.

[26] Given Lubinda is MP for Kabwata constituency in Lusaka. He was first elected in 2001 as a UPND MP but left the party in 2006 to join ULP following an internal split. He later joined PF after the short lived electoral alliance with ULP in 2006.

Sata's pro poor brand and populist appeals to the electorate were undoubtedly also important to his 2011 success. He is reported to have had a "no nonsense approach to duty" when he served in different ministerial positions which earned him the tag "man of action".[27] During election campaigns, Sata presented himself to the electorate as a "man of action" while promising to transform the lives of the poor "within 90 days" of getting elected.[28] The PF's pro-poor brand rested on the charisma and popularity of Sata and was not necessarily a reflection of the entire party, although some of his closest allies appeared to share his leftist (pro-poor) views. I argue in this chapter that Sata's background and PF's rise to power were consequential for policy reform while considering that other factors also account for reforms.

4.3 What did a change of government entail?

The change of government in 2011 had important implications on the executive arm of government. Table 4.1 gives a summary of what changed about the government. The discussion that follows explains that the change of government resulted in a turnover of influential policy makers which resulted in social protection reforms.

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[27] "Man of Action sets his mark", New African Magazine, 14 November 2011, http://newafricanmagazine.com/man-of-action-sets-his-mark/.

[28] "Zambia's 90-day promise broken", Obert Simwanza, 25 December 2011, http://news.iafrica.com/worldnews/770000.html.

Table 4. 1: What changed about the government in 2011?

Composition of government	Before 2011 elections	After 2011 elections
Ruling Party	MMD	PF
President	Rupiah Banda	Michael Sata
Vice President	George Kunda	Dr. Guy Scott
Minister of Finance	Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane	Alexander Chikwanda
Minister of Community Development	Michael Kaingu	Dr. Joseph Katema (Sep 11-Mar 14)
		Emerine Kabanshi (Mar 14-Jan 15)
Secretary to the Cabinet	Joshua Kanganja	Dr. Roland Msiska
Secretary to the Treasury	Likolo Ndalamei	Fredson Yamba
Permanent Secretary-Community Development	Sherry Thole	Prof. Elwyn Chomba
Director of Social Welfare	Rosemary Mutupo	Stanfield Michelo (ca.2012 -ca.2014)

Table 4.1 shows some of the most important changes that happened to the executive arm of government after the 2011 general election. It highlights the positions that are crucial to the social protection policy making process and shows what changed after the September 2011 elections.

The discussion earlier in this chapter shows that the PF was formed by Sata as a vehicle for him to assume state power – unlike the MMD that was formed as a broad church. One implication of this is that many policy makers appointed in the PF administration had personal links to Sata and his family. For example, the Vice President, Guy Scott was a close political ally of Sata who joined PF in 2003, the Finance Minister Chikwanda was Sata's uncle and the Secretary to the Treasury, Fredson Yamba, was a brother-in-law of Sata's wife. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Dr. Roland Msiska (a medical doctor by training) was reportedly recommended for the position by Sata's wife (who was also a medical doctor). The first community development minister during the Sata presidency was Dr. Joseph Katema (a medical doctor) who served until March 2014 when he was replaced by Emerine Kabanshi. Both Katema and Kabanshi were PF MPs (first elected in 2006 and 2011 respectively) who had not served in government before 2011. The newly appointed PS, Elwyn Chomba, was also a medical doctor and university professor, who had not previously served in government. The Director of Social Welfare, Stanfield Michelo, was a career civil servant who joined the ministry in 1995.[29] Later in this chapter, I discuss how and why the turnover in social protection policy makers contributed to reforms after the 2011 change of government.

4.4 What social protection programmes were inherited?

By 2011, the Zambian government was implementing three social protection programmes and at least two related social programmes. Table 4.2 provides details of the programmes, including who the programmes targeted, the risks addressed, and the targeting method as at 2011. In the section that follows, I discuss the social protection programmes that the PF government inherited and discuss reforms that happened prior to 2011.

Table 4. 2: Social programmes inherited by the Sata administration

Programme	Who is covered?	Social risks covered	Targeting method
Public Service Pension Fund	Formal economy workers	Old age security	Contributory
Social Cash Transfer Scheme	Labour incapacitated households (women, OVCs, disabled, old aged)	Income security	Means-tested
Food Security Pack	Vulnerable but viable farmers	Food security	Means-tested
Farmer Input Support Programme	Small scale farmers	Food and income security	Non-means tested
Empowerment Funds	Youth, women, informal economy workers	Unemployment	Non-means tested

Of the five programmes listed in Table 4.2, only three programmes were classified as social protection programmes by the Zambian government: The Public Service Pension Fund, the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) scheme and the Food Security Pack (FSP). The PSPF was a social security programme while the SCT and FSP were both social assistance programmes. While

[29] Interview with Stanfield Michelo

the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) and Empowerment Funds (EFs) were not classified as social protection programmes, they addressed similar social risks. I argue in this study, that the SCT and FSP were both designed (and largely implemented) as programmes for programmatic redistribution of wealth from the state. On the contrary, FISP and EFs – although initially designed to be programmatic programmes – were both susceptible to manipulation by political leaders for clientelistic purposes.

This study focuses primarily on reforms to social assistance programmes. The SCT scheme was the largest social assistance programme implemented in both Zambia and Malawi. Both countries also had large farm input subsidy programmes that are crucial for understanding factors that promote or constrain social protection reforms. In the discussion below, I provide a summary of reforms to the SCT programme and FISP prior to 2011, which provides a context for understanding social protection reforms under the Sata administration.

4.4.1 SCT reforms prior to 2011

Zambia's SCT programme was almost exclusively donor funded until 2009. In Chapter 2, I showed that international donors had limited influence on pushing for social protection reforms during the Mwanawasa presidency, largely due to the Ministry of Finance's opposition to fund handout programmes out of tax revenue. The Minister of Finance at the time, Ng'andu Magande, was particularly opposed to SCTs on ideological grounds. He believed that the poor should work rather than receive money from the state for free. However, following a partial change of government in 2008 – when Banda succeeded Mwanawasa – modest reforms to social protection were made.

During the Mwanawasa years, the community development ministry was unable to persuade the finance ministry to provide funds to expand SCTs. This changed after 2008 when Banda was elected president and Situmbeko Musokotwane was appointed Finance Minister replacing Magande who was a strong opponent of SCTs (see Kabandula and Seekings, 2016). In 2007, the MCDSS conducted an evaluation of the Kalomo SCT programme (with technical support from GTZ) which provided evidence of increased food security and financial relief for destitute households (MCDSS, 2007). Donors (including UNICEF and DFID) and MCDSS technocrats persuaded Musokotwane and the Ministry of Finance to expand SCTs based on this evidence. In an interview for this study, Musokotwane said he had been convinced by the evidence which informed the decision to expand SCTs modestly in 2010.[30] Promotional efforts for SCTs by international donors had also begun to pay off by this time. For example, donors lobbied Musokotwane through an intermediary who worked as a consultant for donors and had longstanding ties to the minister and other influential politicians.[31] Musokotwane was much less rigid towards SCTs than his predecessor Magande and this certainly contributed to the first expansion of the SCT programme in 2010.

When the PF was elected in 2011, the SCT scheme was implemented in 19 realigned districts (from an initial five pilot districts) and was paying benefits to 24,500 households. The MMD government, in its Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) for the period 2011 to 2016, planned to expand the programme to 69,000 households by 2015. As I demonstrate in the next section, the pace of reforms under the PF was much faster than that envisaged by the MMD in the SNDP. I also argue that the modest expansion of the SCT programme in 2010, following the 2008 change of government, paved the way for faster reforms after 2011.

4.4.2 FISP reforms prior to 2011

In 2002, Mwanawasa's administration launched the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) to provide subsidized farm packages of maize to smallholder farmers (World Bank, 2010). This marked the return of large-scale input subsidies in Zambia after the 1991-2001 decade which was characterized by the implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes. At its launch, the FSP was meant to target 120,000 smallholder farmers. It was also meant to run for only three years before being eliminated (Mason, Jayne & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013: 5). Yet the MMD government continued to implement the FSP at a huge financial cost. From 2004 to 2011, it accounted for an average of 30% of total government spending on agriculture (ibid: 1).

During Banda's tenure, expenditure for the programme accounted for 0.8% of GDP.[32] This made farm inputs the most expensive redistribution programme in Zambia during the period 2002 to 2011. Later in this chapter, I show that by 2011, FISP had become a controversial programme for targeting underserving beneficiaries, inflated costs of implementation, and for being used as a mechanism for clientelistic redistribution by the MMD government. The

[30] Interview with Situmbeko Musokotwane (13 January 2016)
[31] Interview with Denis Wood (January 2017)
[32] Republic of Zambia 2011 Budget Address by Hon. Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, MP, Honourable Minister Of Finance And National Planning Delivered To The National Assembly On Friday 8th October, 2010

provision of input subsidies was opposed by international donors for fiscal reasons and by the opposition PF on political grounds. The argument in this chapter shows that debates around FISP are important for understanding social protection reforms under the Sata administration.

4.5 What social protection reforms happened after the 2011 change of government?

The PF government made notable social protection policy reforms between 2011 and 2014 during the Sata presidency. Central to these reforms was the expansion of the SCT programme and increased spending on related social programmes. In his first presidential address to the National Assembly of Zambia in October 2011, Sata stated that chronic poverty experienced by vulnerable groups such as women, children and people with disabilities was an obstacle to developing a sound social and economic future for all.[33] In his address, Sata promised that:

> "The government shall adopt a vibrant social protection policy aimed at ensuring that all citizens have access to basic social services such as education, health, water and sanitation. The policy shall also address the needs of the vulnerable groups that face special challenges such as the disabled and street children. In line with this, specific measures will be taken to strengthen the existing social safety-net and protection programmes. One such programme is the social cash transfer scheme which unfortunately is currently fully funded by donors thereby making it unsustainable and restrictive. My government will in collaboration with cooperating partners work out measures to improve the scheme and make it more sustainable by gradually supporting it from our domestic resources in the national budget".[34]

The promise to strengthen the existing social safety-net and social protection programmes was followed by an increase in the coverage of SCTs, an increase in state expenditure on cash transfers and related programmes, and the completion and publication of a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP). These reforms are discussed in more detail below.

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[33] Speech by His Excellency Mr Michael Chilufya Sata, President of the Republic of Zambia on the occasion of the official opening of the first session of the eleventh National Assembly, 14 October 2011.
[34] Ibid.

4.5.1 Programmes expanded

The expansion of the social cash transfer programme was the most significant social protection reform during the Sata presidency. The coverage of the SCT programme increased in terms of both numbers of beneficiary households and of districts implementing SCTs countrywide. Two other social assistance programmes, the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and the FSP, were implemented on an ad-hoc basis. PWAS offered supplementary assistance to that provided by communities and families during times of socio-economic shocks. While the FSP was considered a national programme, the actual coverage varied from one year to the next – depending on the extent to which vulnerable but viable farmers needed assistance during a specific farming season (Ellis, Devereux & White, 2009). As such, national development plans and annual budgets did not provide annual coverage plans for PWAS and FSP. In the sections that follow, I focus on discussing the expansion of cash transfers both in terms of coverage and expenditure.

4.5.2 Coverage of SCT programme

The coverage of the SCT scheme expanded in terms of number of beneficiary households and total number of districts implementing cash transfers. These changes are depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.

4.5.2.1 Beneficiary households

The number of beneficiary households increased from 1,200 in 2003 (in Kalomo district only) to 24,500 (in five districts) by the end of 2010 (Chilombo & van Ufford, 2015). When the PF formed government in 2011, it maintained SCT expansion plans initiated by the MMD in 2010 that were outlined in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011-2015, published in 2011 by the Banda administration. The SNDP included plans for the MMD government to increase the number of beneficiaries in phases from 26,500 households in 2011 to 69,000 households countrywide by 2015 (MoFNP 2011).

In 2014, the Sata administration published a Revised-Sixth National Development Plan (R-SNDP) for the period 2013 to 2016, which incorporated the "priorities of the PF government" into the SNDP (Ministry of Finance, 2014). The R-SNDP did not provide an annual breakdown for the number of households to be added to the SCT scheme but it included a target of "over 500,000 households to receive transfers by 2016" (Ministry of Finance, 2014: 129). This is against a total of nearly 2,500,000 households in the country (CSO, 2012: 23). In 2008, an ILO report which assessed Zambia's social protection system proposed a "social cash transfer system targeting the 10% most destitute households" which was informed by the model adopted in the first pilot cash transfer in Kalomo (Aguzzoni, 2011: xi). This suggests that the PF plans to target 500,000 households would impact about 20% of the population. By the end of 2013, a total of 61,000 households had been reached. The number increased to 145,000 households in 2014 and 190,000 in 2015. Figure 4.1 shows the expansion of the caseload from 2003 to 2015 which includes both the expansion plans for the period 2011 to 2015 as outlined in the SNDP and the actual expansion that happened during this period.

Figure 4. 1: Expansion of SCT beneficiary households 2003-2015



Source: Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Community Development and Social Services

Figure 4.1 shows that under Sata's administration, there were 83,000 more beneficiary households at the end of 2014 than had been targeted by the MMD government in the SNDP. The expansion of cash transfers continued in 2015 resulting in 107,000 beneficiary households more than the target set by Banda's government. Whereas the MMD had proposed slow expansion, the PF implemented rapid expansion: the number of households in 2015 was almost three times higher than envisaged by the MMD.

4.5.2.2 Beneficiary districts

The expansion of the SCT programme to additional districts has been done in three phases since inception. The first was the 'Pilot' phase between 2003 and 2009 which includes districts added by Mwanawasa's administration. The second was 'Scale-up Phase 1' which includes districts added from 2010 to 2013 by Banda's administration following expansion plans made in 2009. The third was 'Scale-up Phase 2 which includes districts added to the SCT programme following expansion plans in 2013 by Sata's administration. Figure 4.2 illustrates the number of districts added during the MMD years, from 2003 to 2011, the number added by the Sata administration, and the number of outstanding districts as at December 2015.

Figure 4. 2: SCT expansion by district 2003-2015



Source: Ministry of Community Development and Social Services

During the 'Pilot' phase from 2003 to 2009, several donors including GTZ, DFID and UNICEF funded pilot SCT programmes in five districts (i.e. 7 realigned districts). These programmes were implemented with limited coordination between them. Four pilots used the ultra-poor approach (also known as the 10 percent inclusive model, IM) which targeted the 10% poorest households in four districts (Kalomo, Kazungula and Monze in Southern Province, and Chipata in Eastern Province). The fifth district implemented a universal pension targeting elderly individuals (not households) in Katete district, Eastern Province (Arruda & Dubois, 2018).

The Pilot phase was followed by Phase 1 from 2010 to 2013. Twelve districts were added during this phase, bringing the total to 19 (after realignment). Different targeting and selection mechanisms were introduced for the districts added under Phase 1. Two targeting models were applied. The first was the Child Grant (CG) model which targeted poor households with children under the age of five. The CG model was introduced in the five districts with the highest child mortality rates i.e. Shang'ombo and Kalabo in Western Province, Kaputa in Northern Province, Zambezi in North-Western Province, and Milenge in Luapula Province. The second was the Multi Category Transfer Grant (MCTG) targeting poor households with elderly people and orphans, or widows and orphans, and households with members living with disabilities (Arruda & Dubois, 2018: 1-2).

In Phase 2, 31 districts were added by Sata's administration between 2014 and 2015. The most important criterion for district selection in this phase was the rate of extreme poverty. Even then, four urban districts, Kitwe, Livingstone, Luanshya and Lusaka were added in order to: "tackle the increasing urban poverty and the increasing population of persons with disability".[35] Technocrats in the MCDSS had responsibility for prioritising the selection of districts and targeting beneficiaries. Data from the 2010 Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey (LCMS) were used to determine the poorest districts in the country. The inclusion of urban districts (which were not among the poorest) was apparently due to the influence of some political leaders within the ruling party, however.[36] In total, the scheme was extended to 50 out of 102 districts under Sata, approximately half the country.

Figure 4.2 demonstrates that Luapula was the province with the largest number of districts added to the programme by the Sata administration. Of the 11 districts in the province, only 2 were added under the MMD and 7 under PF, with 2 uncovered by the end of Sata's term. Other additions in 2014 included four districts in Western province (which had the second highest poverty rate of the provinces), four districts in Muchinga province, and three in Northern Province. Furthermore, four districts were added in Copperbelt province and two in each of Lusaka, Southern and North Western provinces, and only one district in Central province. Fifty-two districts across the country remained uncovered. Of the 31 districts added under Sata, 20 included constituencies won by PF in 2011. Evidence from the LCMS showed that 27 of the 31 districts added by PF (excluding the four urban districts) were the poorest districts in the country. This demonstrates that the SCT reforms under Sata were largely programmatic and informed by the targeting criteria set out by donors and government technocrats.

[35] MCDSW Ministerial statement on the scale up of the implementation of the social cash transfer programme presented by the Honourable Emerine Kabanshi, MP Minister of Community Development and Social Welfare, 26 February 2016.

[36] This point was raised in separate interviews with a government official and a civil society representative.

4.5.3 Expenditure

Below, I discuss changes regarding government's contribution to funding cash transfers, government's budgetary allocations on social programmes, and social protection as a percentage of GDP.

4.5.3.1 Changes in government's contribution to SCT funding

Until 2013, cash transfers were funded almost entirely by donors, including DFID, UNICEF and Irish Aid, with government contributing less than a quarter of total funding. In October 2013, Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda presented the 2014 national budget to parliament and stated in his speech that: "In 2014, government's contribution to the social cash transfer scheme will be scaled up by over 700% in order to make a significant impact on reducing extreme poverty".[37] This was aimed at providing a more effective means of targeting the most vulnerable, as opposed to subsidy programmes that had been favoured by the MMD that did not benefit the "intended poor".[38] The decision announced by Chikwanda to increase SCT funding by over 700% resulted in the programme becoming mostly tax, as opposed to donor, funded. Figure 4.3 shows changes to budgetary allocations by donors and government in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW)[39] from 2013 to 2015.

Figure 4. 3: Donor and government contributions to SCT budget



Source: Chilombo & van Ufford (2015)

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[37] Republic of Zambia 2014 Budget Address by Hon. Alexander B. Chikwanda, MP Minister of Finance, delivered to the National Assembly of Zambia on Friday 11th October 2013.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] The exchange rate averaged around USD 1 = ZMW 5.5 between 2013 and 2014 and was around USD 1= ZMW 6 at the start of 2015. Bank of Zambia, http://www.boz.zm/.

The SCT budget was K72 million ($13 million) in 2013. Of this amount, donors contributed K54 million ($10 million), representing 76%, while government contributed K18 million ($3 million), or 24% of the budget. Donor funding was not targeted at selected districts but contributed to general costs. The increase in government expenditure in 2014 led to an increase in the SCT allocation to K199 million ($36 million). Government contributed K150 million ($27 million), which was an increase from K18 million ($3 million), while donor contributions reduced to K49 million (K9 million). As a result, government funding for the programme increased from 24% in 2013 to 75% in 2014 while donor funding reduced to 25% from 76% during the same period. In 2015, the total SCT budget was K80 million ($30 million). This was a reduction of K19 million ($3.5 million) from the preceding year. The reduction was the result of a cut in donor contributions which declined to K30 million ($5 million) while government's contribution remained fixed at K150 million ($25 million).

The decision for donor funding to reduce was based on an agreement signed between donors and the Zambian government in 2010. When President Banda's government expanded cash transfers, a Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) was signed between government and donors. The JAS was an agreement for donors to continue funding SCTs for 10 years but with a provision that donor funding would decrease each year, with a simultaneous increase in annual government funding for the same period. After 10 years, government would take full responsibility for funding the programme.[40]

4.5.3.2 Expenditure on social protection and related programmes

The Zambian national budgets for the period 2011 to 2015 classified three programmes as social protection programmes: The PSPF, the SCT and the FSP. The PSPF, which is a contributory social security programme, was implemented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The SCT and FSP were both implemented by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services. In addition to these programmes, the government also implemented two related social assistance programmes that reached similar numbers of beneficiaries. These were FISP, implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and empowerment funds (EFs) implemented by various ministries including the Youth Empowerment Fund in the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Child Development, the Citizens Economic Empowerment Fund

[40] Interviews with Mutale Wakunuma, Country Coordinator, Platform for Social Protection-Zambia (11 March 2015), Kelley Toole, DFID Zambia (17 November 2015), Nkandu Chilombo, Social Policy Specialist UNICEF-Zambia (17 December 2015) and Situmbeko Musokotwane, Former Minister of Finance 2008-2011 (13 January 2016).

in the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry, and the Women's Empowerment Fund in the Ministry of Gender. Figure 4.4 shows changes in budgetary allocations (including government and donor contributions) for FISP, PSPF, SCT, EFs and the FSP.

Figure 4. 4: Expenditure on SCTs and related social programmes (in kwacha millions)



Source: Ministry of Finance National Budget Speeches, 2011-2016

Although the PF was elected in September 2011, the 2011 national budget was presented to Parliament in October 2010 by the MMD government. Therefore, the 2012 budget was the first to be implemented by the PF government. Figure 4.4 shows that following the election of the PF, the budgetary allocation to FISP increased marginally in nominal terms (but reduced in real terms), from K485 million ($101 million) to K500 million ($97 million) between 2011 and 2012. Notably, there was a sharp nominal increase in allocations to the PSPF from K359 million ($75 million) to K474 million ($92 million) between 2011 and 2012. Allocations to EFs reduced both nominally and in real terms, while the SCT allocation increased by K13 million ($1.5 million) in the same period. The focus on increasing allocations to PSPF is not surprising given that the PF focused its 2011 election campaigns on addressing social security.

Figure 4.4 also shows that funding for SCTs increased significantly in 2011, but at a much smaller scale than the increase in the PSPF and the allocation to FISP – which remained unchanged in nominal terms from 2012 to 2014. The pattern of budgetary allocations in the first three fiscal years under Sata shows that the PF was committed to increasing allocations to both PSPF [which increased to K754 million ($122.6 million)] and the SCT programme which increased to K199 million ($32 million) in 2014. In fact, PSPF spending overtook FISP spending by K254 million ($41 million) in 2014. The pattern shows that the PF appeared committed to programmatic social protection reforms, even though it did not abandon FISP which was widely considered as a mechanism for clientelist redistribution even by PF leaders.

In the last national budget prepared by Sata's administration, the PSPF allocation increased further, and so did the allocation to FISP. However, FISP allocations more than doubled nominally, from K500 million ($81 million) in 2014 to almost K1.1 billion ($125.5 million) in 2015. In fact, FISP spending rose to K278 million ($32 million) more than PSPF spending nominally. Chikwanda stated in his 2015 budget address that the increase would allow the government to provide inputs to farmers both in terms of direct provision of maize production inputs and the provision of inputs for other crops that farmers could access through an E-Voucher system. The E-Voucher system was introduced as a mechanism to make the distribution of inputs more transparent, but it was implemented alongside the conventional FISP. As I argue later in this chapter, the PF recognized the electoral benefits of maintaining FISP, while also trying to reform the programme. This shows that as the 2016 elections drew closer, the PF began to shift its emphasis from programmatic to clientelistic forms of redistribution.

The allocation to the SCT programme declined in both real and nominal terms between 2014 and 2015. The allocation decreased nominally by K18 million ($11 million). It was noted in the preceding section that the reduction was the result of a cut in donor contributions [from K31 million ($3.6 million)], a decision informed by the 2010 JAS agreement, while government's contribution remained fixed at K150 million ($17 million) for 2015. The government maintained its level of funding because the MCDSS was unable to complete the 2014 expansion plan for the SCT programme. Based on expansion plans, 190,000 beneficiary households should have been added to the SCT programme by the end of 2014 but the MCDSS fell short of its target by 45,000 households. The target shortfall was blamed on limited technical capacity to manage a massive expansion within the MCDSS. As a result, the finance ministry decided not to increase SCT funding until the 2014 targets had been met.[41]

[41] Interviews with Government Official, Ministry of Finance (15 December 2015) and Government Official, Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare (4 February 2016).

4.5.3.3 Social protection spending as a percentage of GDP

The ILO data show that the average cost of implementing a full set of social protection benefits for 57 low-income and lower middle-income countries was 4.2% of GDP (Ortiz et al., 2017: 30). The benefits include allowances for all orphans, maternity benefits and pensions to all persons with severe disabilities, and universal pensions for older persons aged 65 years and older (ibid). In Table 4.3, I show the cost of implementing social protection programmes in Zambia from 2011 to 2015. Only three programmes were designated under the category of social protection programmes in the Zambian national budgets. These were the PSPF, the SCT, and the FSP.[42] The data in Table 4.3 show that social protection spending in Zambia lagged the average for low-income and lower middle-income countries by a significant margin.

Table 4. 3: Social protection spending as a percentage of GDP, 2011-2015

Year	Spending as % of GDP
2011	0.5
2012	0.5
2013	0.6
2014	0.7
2015	0.7

Source: Calculated using GDP data from the World Bank and social protection allocations in the national budget speeches.

The data in Table 4.3 show that while allocations for social protection programmes increased during the Sata years, actual spending as a percentage of GDP increased very little. In fact, the government’s decision to assume primary funding responsibilities for funding SCTs did not bring social protection spending close to the low-income and lower-middle income country average of 4.2%.

4.5.4 Generosity of benefits

The generosity of benefits was measured using three criteria. The first compared the amount of money beneficiaries received monthly with the World Bank international poverty line. The

[42] A fourth social protection programme, PWAS has received erratic funding in the last two decades. Since 2011, funding for PWAS has been aggregated with SCT funding in some years, including in 2013 and 2015. In other years, PWAS funding was not mentioned in the national budget.

second compared the value of the grants with the Zambian poverty line. The last was based on calculating the difference between the nominal and real values of the monthly grants to determine the generosity of benefits. The first two criteria were both based on comparing the value of the grants with poverty lines. The implications of the first two criteria are discussed below.

The World Bank poverty line of $1.90 per day is used as a measure of extreme poverty for low-income countries (Jolliffe & Prydz, 2016). The poverty line is calculated in terms of 2011 purchasing power parity. The Zambian Central Statistical Office used a Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach to determine the national poverty headcount threshold. The CBN calculated the cost of a basic food basket that meets minimal nutritional needs for a family of six (the average Zambian household size) in a month. The 2015 LCMS valued the food basket at K152 per adult. The CBN also makes provision for non-food basic needs which were valued at K62 per adult in 2015 (CSO, 2015). Therefore, the total (absolute) poverty line for an adult was calculated at K214 per adult and per month.

At the time of the SCT expansion which took effect in 2014, the monthly payments were K70 per month. The payments were made bi-monthly which meant that beneficiaries received K140 every two months. Thus, the monthly value of the grants remained unchanged notwithstanding the expansion of the SCT pilot into a national programme. A K70 monthly payment was equivalent to about K2.30 per day for a household of six. Based on the 2015 year-end US dollar-ZMW exchange rate, this was equivalent to about $0.40 per household per day. This was insufficient to meet the $1.90 per person per day international poverty line. Similarly, based on the Zambian national poverty line, entire households were subsisting on K70 per month, which was just over 30% of the value of the CBN threshold for individuals.

Comparisons between the monthly value of cash transfers with both the World Bank poverty line and the Zambian CBN demonstrate clearly that the SCT grant was inadequate to meet the cost of living in the absence of other forms of support, both before and after the 2013-2014 expansion. In addition, the real value of the SCT grant declined significantly over the years. Figure 4.5 shows changes in nominal and real values of the SCT grant in June 2009 prices. The real values were calculated using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data for Zambia, covering the period June 2009 (base year) to January 2015 (before the election of President Edgar Lungu).

Figure 4. 5: Value of Social Cash Transfers, 2009-2015, in nominal and real (2009) prices



Source: Calculated using CPI(X) data for Zambia available at ***http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zambia/consumer-price-index-cpi***

Figure 4.5 shows that the nominal value of the SCT grant remained constant, at K70, for the period under consideration (January 2009 to January 2015) calculated in June 2009 prices. However, the real value of the grant began to decline in July 2009 and was worth K60 by September 2011 when the PF was elected. The real value of the grant declined further to K55 in January 2015 just before the election of President Lungu. The evidence provided here shows that SCT payments were ungenerous both in nominal and real terms even after the SCT programme expanded.

4.5.5 Legislation and status of programmes

The PF completed and published the first National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) in June 2014. The process to formulate a national policy began under the MMD but was not concluded, which made the publication of the NSPP under the PF government significant. In collaboration with donors, the MMD government had drafted a social protection strategy in 2005 (Schüring & Lawson-McDowall, 2011: 2). This was followed by the inclusion of a chapter on social protection in the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010, published in 2006. Donors had been influential in persuading the MMD government under Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008) to include policies on social protection in national planning documents but the efforts did not result in actual policy reforms in part because of insufficient political support in key ministries such as Finance and Community Development (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016).

The SNDP also included plans to implement a social protection policy during the implementation period of the Plan. However, having lost general elections in 2011, the MMD did not implement the policy.

The introduction of the NSPP under President Sata finally provided a notional framework for the government to coordinate programmes included in the policy. These include programmes falling under different ministries such as the social cash transfer and the FSP in the MCDSS and FISP in the Ministry of Agriculture, that "aim to deliver social protection services to ensure that the quality of life of many Zambians is improved" (GRZ, 2014: 1). The publication of the NSPP was preceded by consultative meetings and the participants in the process included Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (at the time Social Welfare), Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training and Early Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Gender. It also included donor agencies such as ILO, UNICEF, DFID, Irish Aid and World Food Programme. Others were domestic civil society organisations including Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), Zambia Alliance for Persons with Disabilities (ZAPD), Platform for Social Protection Zambia (PSP) and Civil Society Scaling up Nutrition Alliance.

The Government of Finland co-financed the process of formulating the NSPP with the Zambian government while donors and domestic civil society were part of the Social Protection Sector Advisory Group alongside the Ministries of Community Development and Labour, that drafted the NSPP (GRZ, 2014: iv). Inasmuch as the preparation of the NSPP was led by government technocrats, it is evident that the process benefited substantially from the financial support and input of both donors and domestic civil society. This suggests that while the change of government from MMD to PF resulted in the introduction of the NSPP, the policy reform was not entirely driven by political actors in the PF but involved important contributions from non-state actors.

National development plans published before 2011, including the FNDP and SNDP, recognized social protection as an important sector for poverty reduction and outlined programmes and strategies to contribute to the security of all vulnerable Zambians. While building on previous development plans and strategies, the NSPP "pioneered a paradigm shift in social protection implementation" by proposing a framework that provided a more "comprehensive and integrated" approach to social protection under four main pillars: social assistance, social security, livelihood and empowerment, and protection (GRZ, 2014: 1). There were three major implications of the NSPP compared to previous national development plans: (i) it emphasised the need for a multi-sectoral approach to social protection including collaboration between different government departments and between state and non-sate actors, (ii) it emphasized the importance of coordinating programmes through a unit to be established at Cabinet Office, and (iii) it made social protection a strategy for achieving national development goals, which was hitherto not the case.

4.5.6 Limitations to social protection reforms

The expansion of the SCT programme in 2013-14 was significant for the reasons discussed above. Even then, the expansion had limitations which are discussed below.

4.5.6.1 Legislation of social protection

In 2005, DFID commissioned a study on "drivers of change for a national social protection scheme in Zambia" (Barrientos et al., 2005). The study was conducted to understand the institutional factors that were constraining a move towards securing a "political contract" for social protection based on government commitment to its citizens (ibid: 4). The report proposed constitutional reform in Zambia to secure legally recognized social protection rights for deserving citizens (ibid: 17). The social protection reforms made during Sata's presidency demonstrate that there was increased political will for state provision of protection for the extreme poor and vulnerable. Despite this, the Constitution of Zambia did not provide for the provision of social protection. Devereux (2010: 3) argues that one useful lesson from South Africa, which has a "comprehensive" social protection system, is that a "social contract" on social protection is formalized through a Bill of Rights and Constitution.

In Zambia, the PF government did not amend the Constitution despite expanding social cash transfers and publishing the NSPP. Domestic civil society organizations such as PSP lobbied government to make constitutional amendments to provide social and economic rights that would benefit the majority of the poor.[43] Guy Scott, who was Vice President under Sata from September 2011 to November 2014, and later Acting President (after Sata died) from November 2014 to January 2015, stated that the PF was committed to providing welfare for

[43] Interview with Mutale Wakunuma, Country Coordinator, Platform for Social Protection-Zambia (11 March 2015).

the poorest citizens but did not consider making constitutional amendments to address social protection. In an interview for this study, Scott argued that:

> "I have got an organization [the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU),[44] in the Office of the Vice President] which deals with food and we have policies which are obviously not counter to the interests of people so when people are hungry, we feed them. Now what do you hope to gain by putting that in the Constitution? ...What happens when someone needs money and I can't afford, am I supposed to go to go court and start fighting? Just keep the DMMU there that's what it is there for…what is in the constitution doesn't make any difference."[45]

The arguments made by Scott suggest that while the PF government was committed to expanding SCTs, there was concern that including social protection as a right in the Constitution would create problems for the government if paying beneficiaries became unaffordable. Scott also argued that it was the responsibility of any good government to assist the most vulnerable and this did not have to be spelled out in the Constitution. This could also mean that the PF preferred to take credit for providing social protection rather than implementing programmes because of a constitutional mandate.

4.5.6.2 Grant amounts

The evidence presented in section 4.5.4 demonstrates that the value of grants was inadequate for poor families to meet the cost of living in the absence of other forms of support. Civil society organizations argued that the grant amounts paid to beneficiaries were meager and strongly recommended an increment that would be adequate to address the high cost of living.[46] Emerine Kabanshi and technocrats in the MCDSS interviewed for this study, noted that Cabinet had taken the decision to achieve full coverage first before increasing the value of transfer payments.[47]

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[44] DMMU is a special unit under the Office of the Vice-President that provides support in response to natural disasters or shocks to people at risk of rapid deterioration in economic and social well-being and security (MCDMCH, 2014: 22).
[45] Interview with Guy Scott (17 November 2015).
[46] Interview with Vince Chipatuka, Research, Advocacy and Social Engagement Officer-Platform for Social Protection (3 November 2015).
[47] This includes an interview with former Community Development Minister, Emmerine Kabanshi (August 2017)

4.6 How and why did a change of government matter for social protection reforms?

Two broad factors are discussed in this section that explain how and why a change of government mattered for social protection reforms. The first focuses on the influence of transnational actors and discusses the relationship between international donor agencies both before and after the PF was elected. The second broad factor considered the interests of political elites which are broken down into three categories including ideological interests (ideas, beliefs and attitudes), electoral interests (party branding) and factional interests.

4.6.1 Relationship between international donor agencies and PF

Before discussing the implications of the relationship between international donors and the PF government, it is necessary to consider dynamics prior to the 2011 elections.

4.6.1.1 Before 2011

International donors had limited influence in persuading the MMD government to expand the SCT pilot into a nationwide programme. I argue in this study that one important factor explaining social protection reforms after the PF formed government was that international donors forged relationships with both an influential faction within PF and technocrats in the MCDSS before 2011. Donors built on these relationships after 2011 which contributed to the promotion of the SCT programme. Donors also benefited from the promotion of some technocrats, like Stanfield Michelo, who assumed more senior roles in the MCDSS after the PF came to power.

Sata was not an early supporter of the cash transfer programme. As an opposition leader, he questioned leaders within the PF about the feasibility of distributing cash to poor people and was concerned that the SCT programme would be fiscally unsustainable[48]. In this section, I trace the process through which international donors were able to influence senior leaders of PF to adopt social protection in the party manifesto for the 2011 national elections. This process can be traced as far back as 2008 as the discussion below shows.

After losing the 2008 presidential election by only 2%, Sata sought to broaden his electoral base. In the intervening period between the 2008 and 2011 elections, Sata began to champion

[48] Interviews with Guy Scott and Emmanuel Chenda

causes he had previously not emphasized such as constitutional reform and corruption. It was necessary for Sata to broaden his support to appeal to the urban middle class which appeared to be more supportive of the MMD. Hitherto, Sata had concentrated his efforts at the urban "underclass" and the ethnic Bemba vote. Consequently, Sata forged an alliance with civil society organizations that were championing similar causes (Sishuwa, 2016). These include the Oasis Forum (which comprised several CSOs and faith-based organizations pushing for constitutional reform) and the CSPR - a network of CSOs advocating for poverty reduction on behalf of the poor.[49] Sata's "coalition" with civil society also brought PF leaders into contact with both CSOs and international donors advocating for the expansion of social protection. The discussion that follows shows that there were at least three avenues through which donors forged a coalition with PF leaders that influenced the adoption of social protection and cash transfers as part of PF policy.

First, when the PF began drafting its manifesto for the 2011 elections, CSOs were invited to be part of the process together with academics and members of the PF Central Committee. This was in recognition of the relationship that Sata had forged with them since 2008. The PF's relationship with CSOs had the benefit of indirectly forging links with donors who were supportive of similar causes as CSOs. The CSPR was instrumental in advocating for social protection. In fact, the CSPR director at the time, Patrick Mucheleka, suggested that CSOs deserve the most credit for introducing the idea of social protection to the PF and for the subsequent expansion of the SCT programme after 2011.[50] Mucheleka's view is exaggerated, however, as I demonstrate shortly. While the first avenue linking donors and the PF was indirect, the other two avenues were more direct.

Second, the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) was instrumental in encouraging the PF to affiliate itself with social democratic parties in Germany and in adopting social democratic policies. It is observable from the 2011 manifesto that terms such as "social and economic development", "social justice", "social security", and "social protection", were used throughout the document (PF, 2011). A former FES Zambia country director noted that FES forged strong relations with individuals within PF aligned to a faction of the party that was supportive of pro-poor or social democratic ideas, including Wynter Kabimba and two former trade unionists,

[49] Sishuwa (2016) and interview with Patrick Mucheleka
[50] Interview with Patrick Mucheleka and Mutale Wakunuma

Fackson Shamenda and Rayford Mbulu. The FES also forged ties with other PF leaders not necessarily linked to this faction such as Given Lubinda and future PF and Zambian president, Edgar Lungu.[51] Both the former country director and FES programme manager noted that FES facilitated international trips for some of these individuals to meet social democratic politicians in Germany. This was aimed at winning support for social democratic policies amongst PF politicians, including in the party manifesto. The 2011 PF manifesto was reportedly printed with support from FES.[52]

Third, and perhaps most importantly, was the role that Charlotte Harland-Scott played as a bridge between international donors and the PF. Harland-Scott is the wife of then PF vice president, Guy Scott and was Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis, at UNICEF's Zambia office. Harland-Scott had worked as a consultant and a technocrat in the Ministry of Community Development from 1995 to the mid-2000s before joining UNICEF in 2007.[53] In her previous government role, she was strongly involved in designing Zambia's social cash transfer programme. Various respondents[54] interviewed for this study noted that Harland-Scott was responsible for drafting the chapter on "social sectors" in the PF manifesto, which included the party's commitment to expanding social cash transfers from tax revenues rather than donor funding. Sata was opposed to the inclusion of SCTs and reportedly deleted reference to the programme from the manifesto. However, Guy Scott (who had oversight for drafting the manifesto) unilaterally included reference to the programme in the version that was published without Sata's knowledge.[55]

4.6.1.2 After 2011

In May 2013, Sata announced that his government would remove consumer subsidies on fuel and reduce production subsidies to maize millers and maize inputs for farmers. He argued that subsidies did not target the most vulnerable groups in society.[56] This decision was welcomed by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which argued that subsidies were a drain on public resources and a distortion to the economy.[57]

[51] Interview with a former FES Zambia country director (18 June 2015) and Daniel Kumitz
[52] ibid
[53] Interview with Charlotte Harland-Scott (21 November 2015)
[54] Including Mutale Wakunuma, Daniel Kumitz, and Guy Scott
[55] Interview with Guy Scott
[56] Media statement on the removal of subsidies issued by George Chellah, Special Assistant to the President Press and Public Relations, 15 May 2013, www.statehouse.gov.zm.
[57] Interview with Paul van Ufford, Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis, UNICEF-Zambia (30 March 2015)

The World Bank convened a meeting later in May 2013 that was attended by 10 permanent secretaries representing various government ministries and the Secretary to the Cabinet in which the positive impacts of cash transfers were demonstrated and a draft policy to expand SCTs was proposed.[58] The meeting was convened to encourage government to channel resources saved from the removal of subsidies to cash transfers where they would have a direct impact on the poor.[59] As a result of this meeting, an understanding was reached that the Secretary to the Cabinet would discuss the proposals with the Minister of Finance to increase SCT expenditure in the 2014 budget.[60]

The precise impact of the meeting between donors and permanent secretaries is unclear. However, in interviews with donor and civil society representatives, it emerged that the Secretary to the Cabinet – Roland Msiska – and the Permanent Secretaries present at the meeting responded positively to donor proposals to expand SCTs. Scott refuted suggestions that the scale up of cash transfers was due to successful lobbying by donors and argued that SCTs were a PF manifesto programme. He further stated that Cabinet made a unanimous decision to expand SCTs when the matter was discussed in the months leading to the presentation of the 2014 national budget in October 2013.[61] Scott could not explain how discussions regarding SCTs were introduced to Cabinet. His dismissal of the role of donors was certainly unfounded. In the process of collecting data for this study, it became evident that the Secretary to the Cabinet was instrumental in introducing debates to expand the SCT programme to Cabinet. This was important because under the MMD government, social protection hardly featured in Cabinet memos because officials at Cabinet office did not prioritize it relative to other policy issues.[62] While it is unclear if Msiska had ideological reasons or the support of Cabinet members in prioritizing social protection in the Cabinet memos, it is clear that the May 2013 meeting with the World Bank and other donors was a crucial point in the reforms process. Once the debate was brought to Cabinet, there was enough support to

[58] Interview with Paul Van Ufford, Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis, UNICEF-Zambia (30 March 2015).
[59] Ibid.
[60] Interview with Paul Van Ufford (30 March 2015).
[61] Interview with Guy Scott (17 November 2015).
[62] This point was raised in an interview with Denis Wood. Wood was an independent consultant who was tasked by donors to convince then Finance minister, Situmbeko Musokotwane to support the expansion of SCTs. Wood noted that Musokotwane was expressed support to allocate more resources to SCT scheme but he (Musokotwane) also noted that Cabinet Office had not prioritized social protection when preparing Cabinet memos (official in Cabinet Office determined what items were most important for discussion by Cabinet from a list of possible items). Thus, social protection did not receive as much attention from Cabinet under the MMD as it did under PF.

reform in part because of the influence of Scott and Kabimba who were already disposed to the idea of social protection stemming in part from the interaction between the faction on one hand, and donors and CSOs on the other, prior to 2011.

Even then, donor agencies had built support for social protection amongst technocrats in government ministries and departments since the mid-2000s. Donors also persuaded individual PF leaders to support reforms, at times acting through intermediaries to win political support.[63] Put together, the foregoing shows that efforts to expand the provision of cash transfers were a decade long effort by donors which came to fruition when crucial political support, which was hitherto missing, was finally secured. This still begs the question: why was political support to promote social protection obtained only after the PF was elected? This is discussed by tracing the implications of the three forms of elite interests that this study focuses on.

4.6.2 Ideological interests (ideas, beliefs and attitudes)

Michael Sata's populist pro-poor brand of politics informed the PF's leftist (or social democratic) ideas about poverty reduction and redistribution. Sata and the PF were strongly opposed to the MMD's neoliberal economic policies even though some senior PF members including Sata, Scott and Chikwanda served under President Chiluba in the 1990s. PF leaders were particularly opposed to the inefficiencies associated with FISP – which appeared to disproportionately target MMD strongholds. The inefficiencies surrounding FISP were also shared by donors.

PF leaders were therefore keen to support alternative forms of distribution to address issues surrounding FISP but also for political purposes. Earlier in this chapter, I demonstrated that Sata had not been an early supporter of cash transfers. The chapter also shows that Sata was intent to articulate a pro-poor agenda that was shaped by his support for more interventionist policies. Sata was not known to be technocratic or someone to immerse himself in the details of policy. It was often left for Scott to package Sata's populist rhetoric into policy proposals, a point made by Sishuwa in his study on Sata (Sishuwa, 2016). Scott was supportive of redistributing wealth from the state to poor citizens and contributed to prevailing over Sata regarding the implementation of cash transfers.

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[63] Although Charlotte Harland-Scott was not mentioned by name, in at least one interview with a donor official, it was noted that she continued to play a crucial role in winning support for cash transfers through her links to the ruling party.

It is apparent that the ideas and beliefs of senior PF leaders towards SCTs were inconsistent over time. The ideas of PF leaders certainly do not provide a full account of why reforms happened after 2011. Nevertheless, Sata's support for a pro-poor agenda, Scott's belief in the efficacy of cash transfers, and the desire for PF leaders to find alternative forms of redistribution to FISP, all worked in tandem to achieve an ideological shift in how the state responded to issues regarding poverty reduction. This contrasted strongly with the ideas and beliefs of senior MMD leaders especially during the Mwanawasa era. Under the MMD, farm input subsidies, however inefficient, were the primary means of redistribution while the market (and not the state) was central to achieving national development. The change of government from the MMD to the PF resulted in a shift in ideas on issues such as national development and poverty reduction which resulted in increased support amongst political elites for SCTs. Even then, the ideological shift was not devoid of electoral interests.

4.6.3 Electoral interests (branding on social protection programmes)

The expansion of the SCT programme was also the consequence of electoral interests. The PF branded itself around issues of social protection as a way of distinguishing itself from the MMD which instead focused on farm subsidies. In this section, I discuss how the expansion of the cash transfer programme was influenced by concerns around FISP and the next national elections in 2016.

FISP began in the 2002/03 farming season as a programme known as the Fertilizer Support Programme (FSP) (Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2013: 3). Mwanawasa's administration launched the FSP as a response to challenges in the implementation of the Fertilizer Credit Programme (FCP) that the previous government administration had implemented from 1996/97 to 2000/01 and to severe droughts in the 2000/01 and 2001/02 farming seasons (ibid). The FSP provided subsidized input packages of maize to smallholder farmers unlike the FCP that was not a subsidy programme per se, but an initiative to provide inputs to farmers on credit with low repayment rates (World Bank, 2010; Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2013). The FSP was rebranded as FISP during the 2009/10 farming season by the Banda administration (Mason & Tembo, 2015). The government intended to target almost 900,000 farmers by the 2010/11 farming season (Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2013: 22). Despite its extensive reach, a World Bank evaluation published in 2010 (but conducted in the 2007/08 farming season) found the programme fraught with several important challenges such as rapid escalation of costs, late delivery of inputs to farmers and huge discrepancies between the amount of inputs released by government and what was successfully delivered to farmers (World Bank, 2010). Notwithstanding these challenges, the MMD continued to implement FISP amidst accusations from the then opposition PF that the government was using the programme to extend patronage to rural voters (Resnick, 2014). A study on political economy dimensions of input subsidy programmes in Zambia found that, controlling for other factors, successive MMD governments allocated an average of 16 to 23 kg more subsidized fertilizer to households in constituencies it won in elections between 1996 and 2006, compared to households in areas that it lost (Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2013: 7). The study also found that FISP generally benefited larger farmers within the target range (1-5 hectares) while smaller farmers benefited from the smaller and less generous food security pack programme. Even then, the distribution of fertilizer in previous years had no statistically significant effect on the vote share of an incumber president because voters were more responsive to reductions in unemployment, poverty and income inequality (ibid).

On the basis of the FISP evaluations, there were recommendations (between 2011 and 2013) from donors (mostly the World Bank and the IMF) and local associations (chiefly the Economics Association of Zambia) for the government to reduce spending on input subsidies and to redirect resources towards interventions that would target the extreme poor.[64] The recommendations of donors received support from PF leaders who were also eager to brand themselves around an alternative poverty reduction programme to the MMD's FISP. Although the PF had included support for expanding social cash transfers in its 2011 manifesto, it was not until 2013 that party leaders recognized its potential as a "flagship" programme for redistributing wealth from the state to poor citizens.

Emmanuel Chenda, who served in various ministerial capacities under Sata, noted that when PF formed government, the concerns surrounding the inefficiencies of FISP contributed to the decision by Sata's government to invest in the expansion of SCTs which were thought to be more effective for targeting the most vulnerable. In an interview for this study, Chenda stated:

> "FISP…would have been better administered if we followed the mode of the social cash transfer by identifying the actual vulnerable persons and paying them actual

[64] Interviews with Nkandu Chilombo, Social Policy Specialist, UNICEF Zambia (17 December 2015) and Paul Van Ufford, Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis, UNICEF Zambia (30 March 2015).

> cash so that they will use it to sustain themselves than to go the FISP route which had so many middle persons and players. The costs of administering the programme was actually much higher than the benefits which were getting to the people and you are not hitting the proper targets, so the cash transfer, it was easy!"[65]

Despite PF leaders like Chenda arguing that FISP did not adequately address rural poverty, the party had begun to recognize the electoral benefits of the programme by 2014. The PF government reduced the quantity of inputs delivered to farmers but spending on FISP more than doubled nominally from K485 million ($101 million) in 2011 to over K1 billion ($166 million) in 2015. The PF maintained spending on FISP for similar reasons that the MMD did.[66] A former minister in the Mwanawasa and Banda administrations noted that the MMD government was aware of the challenges related to the implementation of FISP but it was concerned that abandoning the programme would have political ramifications especially with rural voters.[67] With the 2016 elections drawing closer, the PF began to recognize the possible ramifications of drastically reforming FISP and instead continued to prioritize funding it. This also demonstrates that there was some reversal in the initial emphasis to shift from farm subsidies to cash transfers. Rather the PF decided to expand both programmes.

Beyond concerns with FISP, PF leaders were also faced with pressures to deliver on their pre-election pledges to implement pro-poor programmes that would benefit both urban and rural citizens. Writing shortly after Sata's election, Cheeseman et. al (2014) observed that the PF would likely pursue interventionist policies to satisfy their supporters who favoured high levels of state intervention in the economy. They observed that:

> "the great pressure on President Sata to deliver public services and "money in people's pockets" will make it extremely difficult for the PF to contain spending within manageable levels, while the strong public support for state intervention means that the government is likely to come under intense pressure to implement subsidies and handouts" (Cheeseman et. al, 2014: 341).

[65] Interview with Emmanuel Chenda (17 November 2015).
[66] Interview with Bradford Machila (12 November 2015).
[67] Ibid

The argument made by Cheeseman et.al appears to be true regarding the decision to promote social protection programmes. Senior PF leaders were under pressure to demonstrate that the party was more pro-poor than the MMD. The influential PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, who also served as Justice Minister, wanted the PF to implement its pro-poor manifesto successfully. He suggested that the PF manifesto would be "implemented to the letter"[68] while also imploring government ministers to: "use the manifesto as a guide in all their policy pronouncements instead of resorting to common sense or personal opinions as we have seen in some cases."[69] The desire for PF leaders to deliver on their 2011 pledges worked in tandem with a focus to retain power in 2016.

Carbone and Pellegata (2017) argue that the risk of electoral defeat provides incentives for ruling party officials to provide more social services as a means of maximizing their support. They argue that this is particularly the case in competitive democracies where electoral alternation has taken place at least once. PF leaders also recognized the importance of broadening the party's support to guarantee success in future contests. The PF had won elections in 2011 with support from urban regions and ethnic Bemba speakers in the north but performed poorly relative to the MMD and UPND in rural parts of the east, west and south of the country. Sata and Kabimba believed it was important for PF to extend its support beyond urban areas by implementing programmes that would benefit the rural poor. The two leaders were aware that the MMD once commanded urban support but was unable to sustain it in the long run.[70] Thus, expanding the SCT programme presented senior PF leaders with a programmatic approach to address rural poverty that served to address two crucial electoral interests. The first was to distribute wealth from the state to rural citizens in regions that had not previously supported PF. The second was to brand the PF differently on social issues from the MMD that had branded itself around farm input subsidies.

Moreover, the desire for leaders such as Kabimba to broaden PF's support to rural areas, was also the consequence of factionalism, which is discussed below. The implications of the factional interests are particularly instructive for understanding social protection policy reforms under the Lungu administration.

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[68] Lusaka Times, 24 September 2011.
[69] Ernest Chanda and Moses Kuwema, 22 February 2012, http://maravi.blogspot.co.za/2012/02/kabimba-challenges-ministers-to-explain.html.
[70] Conversation with a UK based Professor of Political Science and scholar on Zambian politics (8 May 2015).

4.6.4 Factional interests (factionalism)

There were factional divisions within PF which help to explain variation in social protection policy reform between the Sata and Lungu presidencies. The factional differences revolved around two broad concerns. The first was related to succession concerns within PF. Sata was in poor health for much of his presidency and two rival factions emerged to position their preferred candidates to succeed him in the event of his untimely death or if he did not seek re-election in 2016. The second concern was related to the distribution of rents and access to state resources.[71]The distinct concerns of the two factions also had implications on support for social protection.

The first faction was more ideological and supported Sata's pro-poor reform agenda. This faction included Scott, Kabimba and other ministers including Emmanuel Chenda[72], Labour and Social Security Minister Fackson Shamenda, Wylbur Simuusa[73] and Robert Sichinga[74]. Kabimba was the de facto leader and preferred successor to Sata of this faction. There were two distinct features about members of this faction. On the one hand, this faction included individuals who contributed to formulating PF policies and drafting the 2011 election manifesto. This faction appeared to be more influential in Cabinet than the rival faction, but less influential with the grassroots of the party. On the other hand, members of this faction did not share ethnic or regional ties with Sata. In other words, they were from non-Bemba speaking regions. This meant that they did not command support in rural areas (which is crucial for national support) either because they were parliamentarians representing urban constituencies (like Chenda, Scott, Shamenda and Simuusa) or they were nominated to Parliament and Cabinet and therefore lacked grassroots support (like Kabimba and Sichinga).

Programmatic forms of redistribution therefore presented Kabimba and his faction with a means to legitimate their aspirations to succeed Sata. Expanding social cash transfers would allow this faction to demonstrate that they had implemented Sata's pro-poor agenda while extending the support for the party to other rural provinces outside PF's traditional strongholds.

[71] This point is based on conversations with three Zambian (or Zambia based) academics who focus on political issues in Zambia.
[72] Ministries held by Emmanuel Chenda between 2011 and 2014 include Local Government and Housing; Commerce, Trade and Industry; and Agriculture and Livestock.
[73] Ministries held by Wylbur Simuusa between 2011 and 2014 include Mines and Natural Resources; Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection; Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Livestock
[74] Ministries held by Robert Sichinga between 2011 and 2014 include Commerce, Trade and Industry; Agriculture and Livestock.

Consequently, this faction supported the expansion of cash transfers because of the potential it presented to brand itself around programmatic forms of redistribution. This was also relevant for consolidating the factions' power within the party and broadening its national appeal for future national elections.

The second faction included wealthy businessmen who financed Sata's 2011 campaign. Most members of this faction were Sata's co-ethnics including Finance Minister Chikwanda, Defence Minister Geoffrey Mwamba and Willy Nsanda, who was Sata's campaign manager for the 2011 elections and Chairperson of the Road Development Agency during the Sata presidency. This faction was less supportive of Sata's leftist policies and instead supported pro-business reforms including infrastructure projects (such as road construction – a major focus of public policy under Sata) which provided opportunities for rents. Chikwanda was, for all practical purposes, the de facto head of this faction, even though he was not known to harbor presidential ambitions himself. This faction had the support of parliamentarians from Luapula, Muchinga and Northern provinces, which were traditional PF strongholds dominated by Bemba speakers. This faction could therefore rely on ethnic support and had the financial wherewithal to dispense patronage.

Although Chikwanda was finance minister and approved the budget to expand the SCT programme, he was reportedly not personally enthused by SCTs but acted at the instructions of Sata – who was influenced by members of the Scott and Kabimba faction in Cabinet.[75]Chikwanda was reportedly "business minded" and more likely to be attentive to large government projects, for example in road construction and mining, and much less so on issues such as social protection.[76]The foregoing does not suggest that members of the Chikwanda faction were opposed to promoting cash transfers. Rather, it demonstrates that support for social protection appeared to be uneven within PF.

The importance of factionalism for social protection reforms is further highlighted in the next chapter. True to the concerns of both factions, Sata died in office in October 2014, about two years before the next general elections. Edgar Lungu emerged as Sata's successor, with the

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[75] Chikwanda's decision to approve the SCT budget despite lacking personal enthusiasm was explained in interviews with Daniel Kumitz, Mutale Wakunuma and Denis Wood.

[76] This point was made in an interview with Denis Wood. Wood was an Independent Consultant in the area of social protection and had a personal friendship with Chikwanda dating back to the 1970s.

backing of the Chikwanda-led faction. As the next chapter shows, the partial change of government from Sata to Lungu resulted in a shift of power from the ideological faction to the pro-business faction. This resulted in declined political support for social protection in the period after 2014.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter shows that the change of government from the MMD to PF in 2011 led to the promotion of social protection reforms that resulted in the expansion of social cash transfer beneficiary households and an increase in implementing districts. A national social protection policy, which the MMD government had drafted but not completed, was also published. Furthermore, the PF government assumed primary funding responsibilities for social cash transfers from international donors.

The evidence provided in this chapter through process tracing research goes beyond explanations that other studies have put forward to explain how and why the Sata administration expanded the provision of social protection. The two most compelling studies in this regard are by Kuss (2015) and Pruce and Hickey (2019). Kuss argued that the change of government from the MMD to the PF in 2011 resulted in a shift from clientelist to programmatic forms of distributing wealth from the state to poor citizens. She further argues that the policy shift was supply rather than demand driven, demonstrating the interests of elites rather than citizens. On the other hand, Pruce and Hickey attributed the policy shift to two main factors: the influence of a coalition between transnational actors and government technocrats which produced significant results after a decade, and a change in the political settlement which resulted in a leftist shift in policy orientation. They further demonstrate that a 2013 scandal involving overspends in farm input subsidies was a crucial turning point for reforms to expand social cash transfers because of the opportunity it presented for both donors and politicians to support programmatic forms of distribution as an alternative.

The evidence provided in this chapter confirms the narratives presented in the abovementioned studies. It also goes beyond the existing evidence by demonstrating the distinct ways through which domestic politics matters. While Kuss rightly argues that reforms to promote social protection were supply rather than demand driven, her analysis does not account for the motivation of PF leaders to reform. Neither does her analysis consider the relationship between donors and PF leaders and its implication for policy reforms. This chapter shows that PF leaders were keen to brand themselves differently from the MMD on social issues by promoting social cash transfers as a counter to the MMD's farm input subsidy brand. Moreover, Sata's decision to embrace civil society after his narrow 2008 election loss created space for civil society and donors to forge a coalition with PF on social issues including cash transfers. Thus, although PF reforms on social protection were supply driven, they were in fact driven by broader electoral concerns. This point is very significant but underexamined by Kuss.

Pruce and Hickey (2019) provide a more detailed and compelling account of SCT reforms under the Sata administration than Kuss does. Their political settlements analysis confirms that the change of government from the MMD to the PF was crucial for reforms to happen. Yet their analysis focuses more on what the change in political settlement meant for the relationship between donors, technocrats and ruling party officials, while saying little about how and why the dynamics within the ruling party mattered for the political settlement. This is a crucial gap that the process tracing done for this study contributes to. From the outset, this chapter shows that the change of government was consequential for several reasons. First, Sata had a rich and unique political history having been a trade unionist in the 1960s, an elected UNIP official in the 1980s, an MMD Cabinet minister in the 1990s, and an opposition leader in the 2000s. Sata's background in the trade unions and UNIP, and his opposition to neoliberal economic policies for ten years, predisposed him to be supportive of "leftist" ideas. In Sata, donors supporting social protection found a politician whose background and interests converged with their agenda in ways that were not available to them through senior MMD leaders.

Furthermore, while Pruce and Hickey correctly identify that there was a leftist shift in the political settlement after 2011, they do not grapple with the ways in which factional dynamics within PF contributed to support for programmatic forms of redistribution. The significance of this point is made more apparent when considering how and why support for social protection declined after Lungu's election in January 2015. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates the importance of understanding the interests for political party leaders to reform or not, while acknowledging the important roles played by transnational actors and government technocrats.

Beyond the existing evidence on Zambia, this chapter also contributes to the literature on the emergence of social protection in Africa. Lavers and Hickey (2016) argue that political factors matter for the expansion of programmes but do not fully explore the forms of politics that matter. This chapter demonstrates the importance of unpacking domestic political factors to provide a fuller picture of how and why reforms happen. In this regard, this chapter shows that partisanship is crucial for policymaking including on social issues. The ideological, electoral and factional differences between the MMD and the PF were consequential for policymaking. This was evident in the distinct brands towards social issues, with the MMD supporting farm input subsidies and the PF pledging to reform FISP by redirecting resources to the deserving poor. The analysis of reforms after a change of government provides a lens for understanding how and why domestic politics contributes to reforms.

Finally, this chapter shows that in seeking to understand the emergence of social protection in Africa more fully, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of political parties, the leaders and factions within them, and how, why and when their interests converge with those of donors on policy issues including social protection.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY REFORMS IN ZAMBIA 2014-2017

5.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter explained how and why a change of government from the MMD to the PF in 2011 led to the promotion of social protection reforms. The most significant of these reforms was the rapid expansion of the social cash transfer programme, starting in 2013. Under Michael Sata, the number of districts implementing cash transfers and the number of household beneficiaries more than doubled within a year. Further, the Sata administration assumed primary funding responsibilities for the SCT programme from international donors and increased funding for other social assistance programmes such as the FSP. The chapter accounts for the interests that motivated the PF to distinguish itself from the former governing MMD on social issues including redistribution. Although social protection was not a salient issue for the PF whilst in opposition, the party was prompted to reform once in government because it recognized the importance of expanding social programmes out of tax as part of its broader agenda. The PF's pro-poor and interventionist agenda also converged with donor interests for programmatic distribution through an expanded cash transfer programme.

Chapter 5 examines what a subsequent change of government entailed for social protection reforms. Sata died in office in October 2014 and was replaced as republican president by Edgar Lungu in January 2015. I regard the transition from Sata to Lungu as a partial change of government because it entailed a change of president within the governing party. This differed from the 2011 change of government where an incumbent party and president were unseated by the opposition. The rest of this chapter demonstrates that government administrations differ in their motivations to support social protection.

The existing literature on the emergence of social protection in Zambia provides details about the 2013-14 expansion that happened during the Sata presidency but does not account for reforms since 2015. Kuss (2015) argued that because the social protection reform in Zambia under the PF was supply rather than demand driven, the progress of reforms in the long run would depend on the extent to which the government was motivated to sustain the provision of social protection. Pruce and Hickey (2019) made similar observations, arguing that although the provision of social protection had expanded in the first few years of Sata's term, there was a lack of traction within the normative views of political elites in Zambia. They further demonstrated that clientelist forms of redistribution such as farm input subsidies attracted significant resources away from programmatic social protection even after the 2013-14 expansion of social cash transfers. This was because of entrenched political interests in the distribution of rents via farm input subsidies. Both studies acknowledge that the reforms under Sata were significant but also recognize that the nature of competitive clientelism in Zambia's political settlement dynamics presented challenges in sustaining the programmatic distribution of rents in the long-term. Neither of the two studies provides an examination of the implications of social protection reforms beyond Sata's presidency. This is an important gap in the literature that this chapter contributes to.

This chapter provides evidence emerging from the application of a process tracing methodology to explain how and why social protection reforms happened from 2015 to 2017 under President Lungu. In doing so, the chapter goes beyond existing studies on Zambia by providing a case study of reforms in the first few years of Lungu's presidency. This chapter demonstrates that the change of government from Sata to Lungu had significant implications for social protection, notwithstanding the fact that both leaders represented the ruling PF. The chapter shows that the election of Lungu signified a shift in power from one PF faction to another. The interests of the faction that supported Lungu predisposed it to support clientelist distribution rather than social protection. Nevertheless, the SCT programme continued to expand largely due to the influence of a policy coalition that included donors, government technocrats and politicians. Yet there was a growing threat to the long-term sustainability of social protection under Lungu which is best understood by examining the implications of domestic politics on policymaking since the 2015 partial change of government.

5.2 How did a change of government happen?

This section considers Edgar Lungu's background and his rise to power. It demonstrates that Lungu was not previously associated with the faction that promoted social protection policy reforms, despite being a PF member since its inception. Rather, Lungu came to power with the backing of a multi-patron coalition that converged around a pro-business agenda. This predisposed Lungu and his coalition to support clientelist forms of distributing rents.

5.2.1 Background of Edgar Lungu

Edgar Lungu was born on 11 November 1956 in Ndola, the provincial capital of the Copperbelt. Although his parents hailed from Petauke in Eastern Province, he was raised on the Copperbelt. He attended primary schools in Ndola and Kitwe and completed his secondary education in Northern Province. He went to the University of Zambia in 1977, where be pursued a Law degree. After his admission to the bar in the early 1980s, he practiced law in the legal departments of various institutions. From 1983 to the early 1990s, he worked for the Zambia Army legal department, the Zambia State Insurance Corporation and Barclays Bank. In the early 1990s, he worked for a subsidiary of the state-owned mining conglomerate, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, but left to join a Lusaka based law firm – where he eventually became a partner.[77]

Lungu entered national politics in 1996 as an independent parliamentary candidate for Chawama Constituency – which is predominantly comprised of large informal townships in Lusaka.[78] Lungu was the runner up in the election with 20% of votes cast, behind the MMD candidate who obtained 56%.[79] He joined the UPND at its inception in 1998 but left shortly after to join the newly formed PF in 2001.[80] Lungu again contested the Chawama seat as a PF candidate in 2001 but finished seventh in a field of 11 candidates, amassing only 2% of votes cast.[81] Lungu was not a parliamentary candidate in 2006. The party selected Reverend Violet Sampa-Bredt to contest the Chawama seat which she won. While serving as MP, she defied a party directive to oppose MMD government sponsored legislation for the enactment of a new Constitution together with 13 other PF MPs – whom Sata referred to as “rebels”. Sampa-Bredt remained MP until 2011, but her rebel status alienated her from the party.[82] Consequently, Lungu was again selected as the PF candidate for Chawama in 2011 and won the seat with 54%. Sata appointed Lungu deputy minister in the Office of the Vice President – serving under Scott – in the first PF government. Lungu was promoted to Minister of Home Affairs in July 2012. In December 2013, he was moved to the influential defence ministry in the same

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[77] Herald Newspaper, 27 January 2015, “Meet Zambian President Edgar Chagwa Lungu”. Available at https://www.herald.co.zw/meet-zambian-president-edgar-chagwa-lungu/ [retrieved 25 October 2018]

[78] Ibid

[79] Data accessed from the Electoral Commission of Zambia website: https://www.elections.org.zm/ [retrieved 26 August 2014]

[80] “Profile of Edgar Chagwa Lungu: Zambia’s sixth president, in Zambian Analyst, January 29, 2015. Available at http://paulshalala.blogspot.co.za/2015/01/profile-of-edgar-chagwa-lungu-zambias.html

[81] Election results available at www.elections.org/zm

[82] “PF rebel MPs are irrelevant-Sata” in Maravi blogpost, July 28, 2008. Available at http://maravi.blogspot.co.za/2008/07/pf-rebel-mps-are-irrelevant-sata.html

capacity, replacing Geoffrey Mwamba, who resigned his position after personal differences with Sata.[83]

5.2.2 Lungu's rise to power

Michael Sata battled poor health throughout his presidency. The speculation that Sata would not seek re-election in 2016 led to a fractious intra-party power struggle. Despite this, Lungu did not emerge as a potential successor to Sata until the second half of 2014. In August 2014, Kabimba – who was the frontrunner in the succession race – was shockingly dismissed form his positions as PF Secretary General and Justice Minister by Sata.[84]In his place, Sata appointed Lungu to assume both positions – while maintaining his position as Defence Minister. The reasons for Kabimba's dismissal were not divulged although it is believed that his dismissal (and appointment of Lungu) was orchestrated by a rival faction, which prevailed over Sata as his health rapidly declined.[85] This faction was dominated by members of the party's Central Committee (the highest decision making organ of the party) and PF parliamentarians from the three northern Bemba speaking provinces. The faction included wealthy politicians with business backgrounds, including Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda and Willie Nsanda who was Sata's 2011 campaign manager and a Central Committee member. Members of this faction had also contributed heavily to funding Sata's 2011 campaign. They were reportedly "opposed to the radical and sometimes statist policies of President Sata" preferring more market-friendly policies instead.[86]

The major difference between the two factions was that one comprised more ideological members of the PF who actively developed the party's pro-poor agenda and the other comprised less ideological but pro-business individuals who provided funding for Sata and PF. The pro-poor faction did not have an obvious flagbearer after Kabimba's dismissal two months earlier. Although Scott was the most senior ranking member of the faction, his European descent presented constitutional challenges that appeared to bar him from contesting the presidency. Further, none of the other pro-poor faction members were from a dominant ethnic

[83] "Spotlight on Zambia's President Edgar Lungu" in The Africa Report, 9 March 2015. Available at http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/spotlight-on-zambias-president-edgar-lungu.html
[84] "Spotlight on Zambia's President Edgar Lungu" in The Africa Report, 9 March 2015. Available at http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/spotlight-on-zambias-president-edgar-lungu.html
[85] Four political analysts interviewed for this study suggested that Sata reluctantly, or perhaps unknowingly, signed a letter dismissing Kabimba.
[86] Africa Confidential, 29 August 2014, http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/5756/Sata_sacks_Kabimba

group and thus could not mobilise crucial ethno-regional support. The faction eventually supported the youthful Deputy Commerce, Trade and Industry Minister, Miles Sampa, a nephew (and co-ethnic) of Sata and a popular MP in Lusaka's Matero constituency. Chikwanda was the de-facto head of the pro-business faction and "promised to use his influence and connections with the business community to raise funds for Lungu's campaign."[87] Although this faction comprised mostly northern region MPs, it made the strategic decision to support Lungu, who was from the Nyanja speaking group in the Eastern Province.[88]

Guy Scott succeeded Sata as party and republican President in acting capacities.[89] Under his leadership, the PF scheduled a party convention to elect a new president who would be the party presidential candidate in a January 2015 presidential by election. This proposal was challenged by the rival faction which instead proposed delegating the responsibility of electing a successor to the Central Committee. Members of the Central Committee argued that the PF Chairperson, Inonge Wina, was responsible for managing the succession process and not Scott. Lungu was the preferred candidate amongst most Central Committee members and had the support of over 70 of the PF's 82 MPs who signed a petition endorsing his candidature.[90]

Under Scott's leadership, a convention was arranged with voting set for late November. Yet Wina –as PF Chairperson – hastily arranged to have the vote one day before the date scheduled by Scott. Lungu won unopposed but his election was not recognised by Scott.[91] Instead, another vote was held on 1 December 2014 in which Sampa was elected party president defeating eight other candidates. The Lungu faction challenged Sampa's election in Zambia's High Court, which ruled in favour of Lungu.[92]

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[87] "Zambia: Fights before the funeral". In Africa Confidential, 7 November 2014, Vol 55, No.22

[88] It was strategic for the PF to support a non-ethnic Bemba candidate to succeed Sata because the opposition UPND was perceived as a "Tonga tribal party" by its opponents (including PF) after electing an ethnic Tonga (Hichilema) to succeed another ethnic Tonga (Anderson Mazoka, the deceased founder of UPND). Replacing Sata with an ethnic Bemba would have exposed the PF to similar "tribal" accusations. Given the salience of ethnicity and regionalism in Zambian politics, accusations of "tribalism" against a party or candidate can have negative electoral consequences.

[89] Although Edgar Lungu was Acting President at the time of Sata's death, the Constitution stipulated that only the Vice President could assume the role of Acting President in the event of a president's death, until a new president was elected in a by election.

[90]See for example: "Zambia: post-Sata, PF splits over Lungu's presidential bid" available at africanarguments.org/2014/11/17/zambia-post-sata-pf-splits-over-lungus-presidential-bid-by-arthur-simuchoba/

[91]See for example: "Edgar Lungu declared PF President at the General Conference, went through unopposed", Lusaka Times, 30 November 2014, available at ttps://www.lusakatimes.com/2014/11/30/edgar-lungu-declared-pf-president-general-conference-went-unopposed/

[92]See for example: "Zambia court rules in Edgar Lungu and Miles Sampa fight", BBC News, 4 December 2014 available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30327407

Lungu lacked personal resources to campaign extensively while Scott did not permit the use of state resources to support his efforts. Although Scott did not recognise Lungu's election until the court ruling, he spent his time as Acting President launching government projects across the country during the campaign period. This helped to consolidate the ruling party's support.[93] In an interesting turn of events, Lungu forged an alliance with former President Rupiah Banda of the MMD.[94] Unlike Sata who had campaigned on a pro-poor platform in 2011, Banda favoured market-friendly policies, which made his support for the PF candidate curious, not least because his own party fielded a presidential candidate. Banda provided substantial resources to the campaign "in return for special considerations".[95] It was reported that Banda's support for Lungu would "involve major policy compromises" in order to accommodate the former's business interests.[96]

Lungu's main challenger in the 2015 presidential election was opposition UPND president, Hakainde Hichilema. Lungu won the 2015 election with 807,925 votes against Hichilema's 780,168 votes. Lungu finished first in six provinces: Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Muchinga and Northern. Hichilema won in the remaining four provinces in the west and south of the country. The results show that Lungu obtained 49% of valid votes cast and won in the five provinces that Sata had won in 2011 and in Eastern Province (won in 2011 by Banda, for the MMD). This suggests that winning Eastern Province contributed significantly to Lungu's election. It is also important to note that Hichilema increased his national support from 18% in 2011 to 47% in 2015. Hichilema and UPND benefited from the collapse in the support for MMD after 2011, especially in rural provinces such as Central, Western and North Western.

Lungu was elected to complete Sata's term that was due to end in August 2016 and served as president for 18 months before seeking re-election. In 2016, Lungu faced Hichilema and seven other presidential candidates in an election that was competitively contested between the PF and UPND. An MMD faction aligned to Rupiah Banda formed an alliance with the ruling PF.[97]

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[93] "Zambia elections: the Lungu succession and rise of the UPND," Nicole Beardsworth, 29 January 2015, available at http://africanarguments.org/2015/01/29/zambia-elections-the-lungu-succession-and-rise-of-the-upnd-by-nicole-beardsworth/

[94] Rupiah Banda was Zambia's President from 2008 to 2011. He lost the 2011 elections to Michael Sata, who was his bitter rival.

[95] "Edgar Lungu's surprise alliance with ex-President Banda – which may involve major policy compromises – should carry the day at the polls". In Africa Confidential, 23 January 2015, Vol 56, No.2.

[96] Ibid.

[97] This faction was led by Felix Mutati, a former Commerce, Trade and Industry minister in the MMD from 2006 to 2011

Meanwhile, disaffected PF members marginalized by Lungu (including Scott, Sampa and Sichinga) supported the UPND candidate. Lungu won the 2016 presidential election with 1,860,877 votes representing 50.4% of valid votes cast, meeting a new constitutional requirement for a president to be elected with more than half of total valid votes. Furthermore, The PF won 80 out of 156 parliamentary seats.[98] Hichilema was second with 1,760,347 votes which represented 47.6% of valid votes cast while the UPND obtained 58 seats in Parliament. The voting patterns in 2016 resembled those in 2015, with Lungu and Hichilema winning the same rural provinces.

5.3 What did a change of government entail?

Table 5.1 shows how the composition of government and key social protection policy making positions were affected by the partial change of government following the 2015 presidential by elections and the 2016 general elections.

[98] The number of parliamentary seats increased from 150 to 156 ahead of the 2016 elections. Between 2011 and 2016, the number of districts in Zambia increased from 72 to 105. The creation of new districts affected constituency boundaries.

Table 5. 1: What changed about the government after 2015?

Composition of government	Before January 2015	After January 2015
Ruling Party	PF	PF
President	Michael Sata (Sep 2011 - Oct 2014) Guy Scott [Acting (Oct-2014-Jan 2015)]	Edgar Lungu
Vice President	Guy Scott	Inonge Wina
Minister of Finance	Alexander Chikwanda	Alexander Chikwanda (Jan 2015-Sep 2016) Felix Mutati (Sep 2016-Feb 2018) Margaret Mwanakatwe (Feb 2018-)
Minister of Community Development	Emerine Kabanshi	Emerine Kabanshi
Secretary to the Cabinet	Dr. Roland Msiska	Dr. Roland Msiska
Secretary to the Treasury	Fredson Yamba	Fredson Yamba
Permanent Secretary - Community Development	Prof. Elwyn Chomba	Prof. Elwyn Chomba (Jan 2015-Sep 2015) Dr. Davy Chikamata (Sep 2015 - Jan 2017) Rev. Howard Sikwela (Jan 2017-Feb 2018) Dr. Liya Mutale (Feb 2018-)
Director of Social Welfare	Stanfield Michelo	Kennedy Mumba (ca.2015-ca.2018)

After the 2016 general election, Wina returned to Cabinet as Vice President – after her election as Lungu’s running mate in the presidential election. Chikwanda retired as Finance minister and was replaced by MMD faction leader, Felix Mutati. Kabanshi was again appointed Minister of Community Development and Social Services and remained in her position until her dismissal in September 2018, following a public scandal involving the misuse of SCT funds. Lungu retained the Secretaries to the Cabinet and Treasury again but made PS level changes at Community Development in January 2017 and again in February 2018. Later in this chapter, I discuss how and why the turnover in social protection policy makers affected policy reforms under the Lungu administration.

5.4 What social protection reforms happened after the 2015 change of government?

The Lungu administration inherited both programmatic social protection programmes and clientelist forms of distribution from the Sata administration. This includes the SCT programme and FISP. While these programmes continued to expand under Lungu, the emphasis of redistribution shifted to empowerment programmes targeting the youth, women and informal economy traders. These include empowerment programmes initiated by previous government administrations.

5.4.1 Programmes expanded

Chapter 4 showed that budgetary allocations to FISP remained relatively unchanged for the first three years of PF rule. This changed in late 2014 following the publication of the 2015 national budget. Specifically, there was a significant increase in resources allocated to FISP. The expansion of FISP continued after 2015. The details in the rest of this section show that under Lungu, there was a shift in the emphasis of redistribution from programmatic social protection programmes targeting the deserving poor to clientelist programmes. In September 2015, a Presidential Empowerment Initiative Fund (PEIF) was introduced. The PEIF was administered by staff in the Presidency (at State House) unlike other social programmes that were administered by government ministries. As I show later in this chapter, the expansion of the PEIF coincided with erratic funding to cash transfers during 2015 and 2016. It was introduced as a mechanism for clientelist politics targeted at the 2016 general elections.

5.4.2 Coverage of SCT programme

The SCT programme continued to expand during the Lungu presidency both in terms of beneficiary households and districts. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide illustrations of the expansions.

5.4.2.1 Beneficiary households

Figure 5.1 shows that the number of household beneficiaries doubled from 242,000 in 2016 to 590,000 in 2017. The expansion was based on 2013 expansion plans stipulated in the R-SNDP. While the R-SNDP target to reach “more than 500,000 households” by the end of 2017 was met, Finance Minister Mutati announced that the programme would be expanded further to reach 700,000 households by the end of 2018.[99] The further expansion was aimed at redistributing resources from fiscally unsustainable subsidies to target poor households directly. This was part of the PF government's Economic Recovery Plan (ERP), which was championed by Mutati, to reignite economic growth following a decline in economic growth in 2015 and 2016.[100]

Figure 5. 1: Expansion of SCT beneficiary households 2003-2017



Source: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare

5.4.2.2 Beneficiary districts

Figure 5.2 shows the expansion of the SCT programme by districts. Until 2011, Zambia was divided into 72 districts, with 12 implementing SCTs while 60 districts were uncovered. By 2014, the number of districts had increased to 102, following the creation of new districts by the Sata administration. After the rapid SCT expansion that took effect in 2014, the number of districts covered increased to 50 with 52 districts uncovered. Following the election of President Lungu, the number of districts increased again, to 105. By the end of 2016, 78 districts were covered, and this increased to all 105 districts by the end of 2017. Although SCTs were extended to all districts, not all eligible beneficiary households had been added to the programme. This is largely because the process of targeting beneficiaries was seldom completed within a year.

[99] Republic of Zambia 2018 Budget Address by Honourable Felix C. Mutati, MP Minister of Finance Delivered to the National Assembly on Friday, 29th September 2017
[100] Statement by Honourable Felix Mutati, MP, Minister of Finance on the state of the economy and Economic Recovery Programme to be supported by the IMF.

Figure 5. 2: SCT expansion by district 2011-2017



Source: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Community Development and Social Welfare

5.4.3 Expenditure

Overall social protection expenditure increased after 2015. This includes expenditure on social cash transfers. This section shows the changes in government's contribution to SCT funding, the expenditure on social protection and related programmes, as well as social protection spending under the Lungu administration.

5.4.3.1 Changes in government's contribution to SCT funding

The 2016 national budget did not disaggregate SCT funding by government and donors. However, 2017 data show that of the K552 million ($58 million) allocated for SCT spending in 2017, 90% was to be funded out of tax [K500 million ($52 million)] while donors were to fund the remaining 10% [K52 million ($6 million)].

5.4.3.2 Expenditure on social protection and related programmes

Figure 5.3 shows that there were changes in funding priorities for social protection and related programmes after the election of Edgar Lungu. The 2015 national budget was the last to be prepared and published by the Sata administration. Therefore, the budgets presented and published by the Lungu administration were for the years 2016 and 2017.

Figure 5. 3: Expenditure on SCTs and related social programmes 2011-2017



Source: Ministry of Finance National Budget Speeches, 2011-2017

Figure 5.3 shows that the nominal expenditure increased for most social protection and related programmes in 2016. FISP spending remained relatively unchanged for the first three fiscal years under the Sata administration but increased significantly to K1.1 billion ($125.5 million) in 2015. In 2016, the year of a general election, FISP spending decreased slightly to K1 billion ($105 million). Also, in 2016, the allocations to PSPF remained unchanged (but reduced in US dollar terms) at K805 million ($93 million in 2015 and $78 million in 2016). The allocations to the SCT programme increased nominally to K302 million ($29million) in 2016 from K181 million ($21 million) in 2015. Notably, allocations to empowerment funds increased almost threefold nominally, from K128 million ($15 million) in 2015 to K373 million ($36 million) in 2016, while allocations to the FSP more than halved nominally, to K20 million ($ 1.85 million) in 2016 from K50 million ($6 million) in 2015.

The changes in allocation patterns show that during the election year, government priorities shifted to empowerment funds. In fact, 2016 allocations to EFs were more than that to SCTs for the first time since 2011. This happened at the same time FSP funding was reduced drastically. The import of this shift in priorities in 2016 is made clearer in the discussions on social protection limitations and political branding later in this chapter. After the elections, there were steep increases to funding for FISP and the PSFP, which more than doubled nominally in 2017. SCT funding increased to K552 million ($58 million) but allocations to EFs reduced to K219 million ($23 million) while FSP funding remained at K20 million ($2 million). The 2016 and 2017 national budgets also included funding allocations for the School Feeding

Programme (SFP). The SFP started in January 2003 as an initiative of the World Food Programme (WFP) that provided food assistance to community schools in Lusaka Province before expanding to the rest of the country.[101] It was only in 2016 that the government included the SFP as a national programme in the budget and provided state funding. In the 2017 budget address, Mutati stated that SFP would be funded because of its efficacy in rural areas.[102]

5.4.3.3 Social protection as a percentage of GDP

Table 5.2 shows that the pattern of social protection spending as a percentage of GDP remained relatively unchanged in 2016 (at 0.6%), from the levels of spending during the Sata administration that hovered between 0.5% and 0.7%. However, spending increased significantly to 1.1% of GDP in 2017, but this was mostly because of a steep increase in allocations to the PSPF and not so much because of increased social assistance spending.

Table 5. 2: Social protection spending as a percentage of GDP

Year	Spending as % of GDP
2011	0.5
2012	0.5
2013	0.6
2014	0.7
2015	0.7
2016	0.6
2017	1.1

Source: Calculated using GDP data from the World Bank and social protection allocations in the national budget speeches.

[101] Kate Vorley and Mary Corbett, "School Feeding Programme in Zambia", available at https://www.ennonline.net/fex/25/school [retrieved 31 October 2018]
[102] Republic of Zambia 2017 Budget Address by Honourable Felix C. Mutati, MP Minister of Finance Delivered to the National Assembly on Friday, 11th November, 2016

5.4.4 Generosity of benefits

In addition to increases in the number of beneficiary households and budgetary allocations to the SCT programme, the monthly benefits paid to households increased by K20 ($2) at the start of 2017. Ministry of Finance technocrats determined that the K20 increase was adequate to mitigate the loss in value to beneficiaries, resulting from the effects of economic decline and inflation in the preceding two years. However, Figure 5.4 shows that the nominal increment was inadequate to mitigate the loss in value of the benefits.

Figure 5.4 shows that while the nominal value of the cash transfer remained constant until January 2017, the real value declined rapidly, especially after 2011 and more so between 2015 and 2016. By December 2016, the real value of a K70 ($7) transfer to a beneficiary was only K37 ($3.70). Although the transfer increased to K90 ($9) in January 2017, the real value (in June 2009 prices) was only K47 ($4.70). The K20 increase was clearly insufficient to offset the effects of inflation.

Figure 5. 4: Value of Social Cash Transfer benefits, 2009-2017, in nominal and real (2009) prices



Source: Calculated using CPI(X) data for Zambia available at ***http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zambia/consumer-price-index-cpi***

5.4.5 Legislation and status of programmes

In September 2015, Lungu announced that his administration would draft a National Social Protection Bill to be published in 2016. This announcement was made during his first address to the National Assembly after his election earlier that year. Lungu constituted a Cabinet committee chaired by the Minister of Justice to formulate the Bill.[103] The Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) had primary responsibility for its drafting, although the Ministries of Health (MoH) and Community Development were also involved in the process. The ILO was also heavily involved in the process because of its close working relationship with the labour ministry.

The proposed Bill was guided by four main objectives. The first was to merge all pieces of legislation with a bearing on the current social security system. The second was to legislate the institutional mechanism for a Social Health Insurance Scheme and social assistance programmes including social cash transfers and the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme. Third, the Bill would establish three new entities including a “Fund” into which payments would be made during a person’s employment years, an “Authority” which would administer the Fund, and a “Regulator” which would be responsible for supervising all social protection schemes. Lastly, the Bill would also establish a four-pillar social security system. This would comprise a first pillar consisting the National Pension Scheme Authority and the Social Health Insurance Scheme, a second pillar comprising other occupational pension schemes, a third pillar constituting voluntary plans, and a fourth comprising social assistance programmes.[104]

By the end of 2017, the Bill had not been presented to Parliament. There were debates and disagreements amongst technocrats in the three drafting ministries about what should be contained in the Bill. Each ministry pushed for its own agenda.[105] The MLSS was primarily concerned with social security and was focused on extending coverage to informal sector workers. Meanwhile, the MCDSS was pushing for comprehensive social protection for all. The health ministry was more focused on a national health insurance scheme. The labour and health

[103] The Ministry of Justice has primary responsibility for drafting all Bills on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Zambia.
[104] Details of the Social Protection Bill – 2016, were provided in a document prepared by Ngosa Chisupa – a social security consultant involved in the drafting process – in response to questions I had emailed to him.
[105] Interviews with Joyce Nonde-Simukoko, Minister of Labour and Social Security (30 May 2017), Barnaby Mulenga, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Social Security (30 May 2017), Emerine Kabanshi, Minister of Community Development and Social Services (3 August 2017) and Kennedy Mumba, Director of Social Welfare, Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (3 August 2017).

ministries preferred to produce separate bills rather than a joint Bill with all three ministries. Only Community Development supported a composite Bill. There was pressure from the Secretary to the Cabinet (and Cabinet Office) for a coordinated approach involving the three ministries.[106] By August 2017, the three ministries had reconvened the drafting process. Yet, a National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill was presented to Parliament on 6 December 2017, before a Social Protection Bill could be presented.

The fieldwork for this study did not extend into 2018 and it is therefore unclear why the NHI Bill was published separately nor what its publication would entail for the main Bill. The narrative that emerged from this study revealed that the Health Minister Dr. Chitalu Chilufya had become a close ally of Lungu and an influential member of Cabinet.[107] It was reported that his influence contributed to the health ministry publishing a separate Bill which went against the aspirations of the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Minister of Community Development who both supported a unified Bill.

5.4.6 Limitations to social protection reforms

There were three important limitations to social protection reforms which relate to the implementation of the SCT scheme. The first relates to delayed payments of SCT benefits, the second to diversion of funds to other social programmes, and the third to a public scandal involving the misapplication of funds.

5.4.6.1 Delayed payments

There were delays in paying SCT beneficiaries for much of 2015 and 2016. These delays did not receive media attention at the time but were confirmed in interviews with donor officials. In 2015, cash transfer recipients did not receive payments for seven months. The government allocated K181 million ($21 million) for cash transfers in the 2015 budget, of which K150 million ($17 million) would be tax funded and K31 million ($4 million) provided by donors.

[106] Ibid

[107] Chilufya is a Member of Parliament for Mansa Central, the headquarters of Luapula Province. Since Lungu's 2016 election, MPs from Luapula have been linked (in media reports) to calls for the province to present a candidate to succeed Lungu in 2021 (should the courts rule he is ineligible to run for another term). These calls are informed by the fact that Lungu received his largest majority of the 10 provinces in Luapula in both the 2015 and 2016 elections. Chilufya has emerged as a prominent member from this group of MPs who are also referred to as "Luapula United". A medical doctor by training, Chilufya has been Mansa central MP since winning a parliamentary by-election in 2013 and won re-election in 2016. He previously stood as an MMD candidate in 2011 but lost to the PF candidate he succeeded in 2013.

However, the government only disbursed about K110 million ($13 million) during the year.[108] This compelled donors to provide K40 million – in addition to the initial K30 million allocated – to meet the government shortfall by December 2015.[109] By August 2016, up to 109,000 beneficiary households in four provinces (Eastern, Northern, North-Western, and Southern) had not received payments for May and June, but had received payments from January to April.[110] As I show below, the delayed payments were partly due to the diversion of funds to other clientelistic programmes during the election year but also due to fiscal challenges discussed later in this chapter.

5.4.6.2 Diversion of funds

While benefit payments for the SCT scheme were delayed, the Lungu administration increased spending on empowerment programmes ahead of the 2016 elections. Budgetary allocations to all empowerment funds increased from K128 million ($15 million) in 2015 to K373 million ($36 million) in 2016. Also, Lungu launched the PEIF in 2015 which was not part of the EFs included in the national budget. Rather, the PEIF relied on funding received from "well-wishers" and was administered by staff in the presidency at State House, and not a government ministry. [111] The PEIF aimed to provide interest free loans to informal sector traders. It was launched in Copperbelt Province and almost K2 billion had been disbursed to over 3,000 informal traders by March 2016. The beneficiaries included marketeers and vendors in Copperbelt Province and Kasama district in Northern Province. Plans were also announced for the initiative to be expanded to the rest of Northern Province and Eastern, Luapula and Muchinga Provinces during 2016.[112] The evidence shows that the PEIF was introduced less than a year before the 2016 general elections in provinces won by Lungu in 2015. It was administered outside the national budget and implemented by political appointees in the Presidency rather than technocrats in ministries. In addition, its beneficiaries constituted a large part of PF's support base. Put together, this showed that the PEIF was introduced as a mechanism for clientelist politics. It also showed an overall shift in prioritizing empowerment

[108] This was confirmed by two donor officials and a senior government technocrat in separate interviews.
[109] Interviews with MCDSW official (4 February 2016), donor official (21 January 2016) and donor official (27 July 2016).
[110] Interview with donor official (10 August 2016)
[111] Interview with Government Official (30 July 2016).
[112] "Presidential Empowerment Initiative Fund vehicle for up lifting living standards for marketeers- Chanda Kabwe" Lusaka Times, March 1 2016, available at https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/03/01/presidential-empowerment-initiative-fund-vehicle-for-up-lifting-living-standards-for-marketeers-chanda-kabwe/

programmes ahead of social protection, which could easily be manipulated for clientelistic purposes.

5.4.6.3 Misuse of SCT funds

In September 2018, it was reported that the UK had frozen aid to Zambia after $4.3 million of international donor aid had "gone missing". The missing aid included funds meant for social cash transfer beneficiaries.[113] Finland and Sweden also suspended aid when the SCT scandal emerged.[114] Funds were reportedly diverted to luxury vehicles for government officials and debt repayments.[115] President Lungu was reportedly aware of the missing funds at least six-months before the UK suspended aid, but did not act.[116] However, Kabanshi was dismissed as Community Development minister after the scandal broke but only after sustained pressure from donors and domestic civil society for Lungu to take action.

In October 2018, Vice President Wina issued a statement to Parliament addressing the suspension of donor funding towards the SCT scheme.[117] Wina noted that an internal audit report conducted in December 2017 by the Auditor General highlighted complaints from SCT beneficiaries regarding irregular payments. In April 2018, the MCDSS conducted spot-check visits to various districts across the country and confirmed the complaints of beneficiaries. Wina further noted that one of three payment service providers, the Zambia Postal Services Corporation [(ZamPost), a state-owned agency] was at the centre of the irregular payments. However, Wina did not provide reasons for ZamPost's failure to make regular payments to beneficiaries. She added that the MCDSS terminated the contract with ZamPost in August 2018 after a series of meetings at Cabinet office which included donor representatives. The government rescinded its decision to terminate the contract with ZamPost a week later but

[113] BBC News, 18 September 2018 "Zambia aid: UK suspends funding over corruption fear", available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45560404 Retrieved [1 November 2018]
[114] See for instance "Donors halt aid to Zambian social welfare scheme over suspected misuse". Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-zambia-corruption/donors-halt-aid-to-zambian-social-welfare-scheme-over-suspected-misuse-idUKKCN1LY1RZ [Accessed 2 March 2019]
[115] Africa Confidential, 14 September 2018, "Zambia: Graft worsens cash squeeze", available at https://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/12429/Graft_worsens_cash_squeeze Retrieved [1 November 2018].
[116] Ibid
[117] Statement by the Vice-President: Alleged misuse and misapplication of the Social Cash Transfer Scheme funds. Tuesday 30th October 2018. Available at http://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/7834. Retrieved [2 September 2019]

cooperating partners, including DFID, opted to withhold additional funds until a forensic audit and other investigations were completed.[118]

5.5 How and why did a change of government matter for social protection reforms?

Two broad factors are discussed in this section that explain how and why the partial change of government in 2015 affected social protection reforms. The first focuses on the influence of transnational actors and discusses the relationship between international donor agencies and Lungu's administration. The second considered the interests of political elites which are broken down into three categories including ideological interest (ideas, beliefs and attitudes), electoral interests (or party branding), and factionalism.

5.5.1 Relationship between international donor agencies and the Lungu administration

The change of government from Sata to Lungu resulted in the marginalization of ministers associated with the more ideological pro-poor faction of the PF. International donor officials had forged a coalition with members of this faction. A donor official interviewed for this study noted that when Lungu was first elected, donors were unsure if the new government would continue to support social protection programmes.[119] Consequently, some senior donor officials approached a Cabinet minister (possibly Kabanshi) to persuade Lungu of the importance of continuing with Sata era social protection reforms. According to the donor official, Lungu responded positively to the request. Donors (including DFID, Irish Aid and UNICEF) had by now cultivated a policy coalition with Kabanshi, technocrats at both community development and finance, and senior bureaucrats such as Secretary to the Cabinet, Roland Msiska. The influence of this policy coalition helps to explain why social protection reforms continued after 2015 despite Lungu's apparent disinterest in social protection.

Donors also played a significant role in promoting social protection when government efforts wavered. Donors provided additional funds to pay beneficiaries when the government was unable to. They also compelled government to address the 2018 scandal. Even though government commitment to social protection appeared to be on the decline under Lungu, donors retained significant influence to sustain the SCT scheme.

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[118] ibid

[119] Interview with donor official (20 January 2015)

5.5.2 Ideological interests (ideas, beliefs and attitudes)

Felix Mutati emerged as a key reformer and strong proponent for social protection reforms in Lungu's administration. His support for social protection was shaped by broader concerns and ideas regarding the economy. Mutati was one of two MMD faction presidents and represented the Rupiah Banda faction of the MMD that formed part of Lungu's multi-patron coalition. He was not a candidate in the 2016 national elections. Mutati was nominated to Parliament and appointed Finance Minister as a reward for supporting Lungu, replacing Chikwanda who retired at the age of 78. Mutati was previously an elected parliamentarian from Northern Province for fifteen years (2001 to 2016) and served in various ministerial capacities in the MMD government from 2002 to 2011, including as Deputy Minister of Finance and later Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry.[120]

As Finance Minister, he developed an economic recovery plan (ERP). The plan was developed as part of a broader effort to secure bailout funding from the IMF. The effects of heavy government borrowing under Sata (and subsequent debt repayments), and the decline in economic activity that persisted since 2015, had implications on foreign exchange earnings and budget execution. The ERP was meant to demonstrate commitment to prudent fiscal discipline before approaching the IMF for a bailout. The plan was built on five pillars: (i) strengthening of tax policy and administration, (ii) increased budgetary allocation to social protection, (iii) improving economic and fiscal governance, (iv) improving budget credibility and (v) greater economic stability.[121] The ERP included proposals to cut subsidies which cost the government over US$1 billion. Resources would then be redirected to support the poorest through the expansion of the SCT programme and to pay arrears owed to pensioners – beneficiaries of contributory schemes.[122] This led to the expansion of the SCT programme from 500,000 households – the target the government set to cover all deserving households nationwide by end of 2017 – to 700,000 households.

Mutati was not known to support social protection when he served in MMD governments. However, his motives to support social protection were informed by two major considerations.

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[120] Bloomberg, 14 September 2016. "Zambia's Lungu Appoints Felix Mutati as his Finance Minister." Available at: https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/zambia-s-president-lungu-names-felix-mutati-as-finance-minister-it37bvo4 [Accessed 28 February 2019]

[121] Bruce Chooma "Zambia: The case of an elusive economic formula". Available at: https://www.africablogging.org/zambia-the-case-of-an-illusive-economic-recovery-formula/ [Accessed 2 March 2019]

[122] Ibid

First, he recognized that the government could not afford to cut subsidies (including on food and fuel) without justifying the decision to the public. By arguing that he was redirecting resources to the poorest through social cash transfers, Mutati was hoping to allay public disaffection. In truth, the government could not afford to sustain the cost of subsidies due to a decline in foreign exchange earnings, but it could afford the cost of implementing social protection programmes which had significantly smaller budgetary allocations. Second, Mutati was aware that social protection had become an important policy issue for the Bretton Woods Institutions. Therefore, the ERP was designed to appeal to these institutions to secure bailout funds. Nonetheless, the SCT programme was erratically funded even during Mutati's tenure while government borrowing for infrastructure development – a major feature of public policy under both Sata and Lungu – continued unabated.

Mutati was unable to effectively implement his own recovery plan for at least two reasons. First, he was unable to persuade Lungu of the need to adhere to the plan. Lungu feared that an IMF bailout would impose conditions to reduce government expenditure.[123] This would be politically costly for Lungu who needed to maintain a patronage network based on access to state resources to ensure his bid for a controversial third term in 2021. Second, Lungu's 2016 Cabinet consisted recently promoted or appointed individuals who lacked their own power bases. These ministers were beholden to Lungu and could not oppose his penchant for profligate spending. As a result, Mutati had little support within Cabinet for the recovery plan.

In September 2017, Mutati also faced a rebellion from PF party members (including party Secretary General Davies Mwila) who demanded his resignation. They argued that he was not loyal to the ruling party because he retained his MMD membership. He was also reportedly planning to contest the 2021 presidential elections against Lungu.[124] Consequently, Mutati was demoted to the Ministry of Works and Supply in February 2018 and replaced by Margaret Mwanakatwe.[125] The Africa Confidential reported that he was demoted because of his efforts to curb government borrowing and because Lungu preferred to continue borrowing for

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[123] Nic Cheeseman "Zambia's slide to authoritarianism". Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-16-00-zambias-slide-to-authoritarianism [Accessed 2 March 2019]

[124] See for instance "Mwila joins PF youths asking for Mutati, other MMD ministers to go". Available at: https://diggers.news/local/2017/09/01/mwila-joins-pf-youths-calling-for-felix-mutati-other-mmd-ministers-to-go/ [Accessed 2 March 2019]

[125] Lusaka Times, 16 February 2018 "I am not leaving but just moving next door-Mutati". Available at: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/02/16/not-leaving-just-moving-next-door-felix-mutati/ [Accessed 2 March 2019]

infrastructure programmes at the expense of national debt. This put the Zambian government at odds with the IMF which had not approved a US$1.3 billion rescue package by December 2018.[126] Mutati was subsequently dismissed from Cabinet in November 2018. Thus, by the end of 2018, there were hardly any influential proponents for social protection left within Cabinet after the dismissal of Mutati and Kabanshi.

5.5.3 Electoral interests (branding on social protection programmes)

Lungu's narrow election win in 2015 and significant economic decline in the first 18 months of his presidency presaged a competitive electoral contest for the ruling PF against the opposition. This also prompted the PF to brand itself around social issues that were crucial to its core urban and rural north voting constituencies. Despite this, the PF highlighted the expansion of SCTs as one of its major achievements in addressing rural poverty in the preceding five years. This demonstrates that the PF embraced social protection for its campaign while expanding clientelist forms of distribution in practice.

A PF billboard for the 2016 election campaign, (which included images of Lungu and his running mate, Wina) stated that 1.2 million direct beneficiaries had received social cash transfers under the PF government. Further, the party's 2016 manifesto included the following passage on cash transfers:

> "The Patriotic Front has also gone a long way in reducing poverty amongst the most vulnerable households in Zambia by casting the Social Protection Safety Net wider from 42,000 beneficiary households in eight districts in 2011 to 242,000 households in seventy-eight districts in 2016. Through the Social Cash Transfer Programme, our vulnerable members of society have regained their dignity and hope for a better future" (PF, 2016: 4).

Despite the foregoing, the SCT scheme was inconsistently funded during the first two years of Lungu's administration. Moreover, Lungu promoted the PEIF administered by staff in the Presidency. The PEIF was a mechanism to ensure support for Lungu in urban areas among informal economy workers who were a core PF voting bloc. Lungu's empowerment brand

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[126] Nic Cheeseman "Zambia's slide to authoritarianism". Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2018-11-16-00-zambias-slide-to-authoritarianism [Accessed 2 March 2019]

differed from his main rival, Hichilema, who broadly supported agricultural support to the rural poor. Hichilema's agriculture brand was particularly popular with voters in Southern Province where UPND support was strongest.

At least three reasons explain why Lungu promoted the PEIF at the expense of the SCT scheme. First, the effects of Zambia's 2015-2016 economic decline were more likely to be protested by urban residents than their rural counterparts. Issues such as power outages and inflation had a significant impact on economic activity and livelihoods in urban areas. Second, because Lungu won the 2015 presidential election by a narrow margin (and failed to win rural provinces outside PF strongholds), it was crucial for him to maintain the party's urban support to win the 2016 elections. Lastly, given the limited time between the 2015 and 2016 elections, Lungu recognised the need to implement a handout programme that voters could identify with his presidency. These factors show that Lungu had a greater incentive to promote a handout programme targeting the urban poor (and the rural poor in PF strongholds) than to consistently fund the SCT scheme that benefited the rural poor in both PF and opposition strongholds.

5.5.4 Factional interests (factionalism)

Chapter 4 showed that the promotion of SCTs under Sata was informed by pro-poor ideas about development. These ideas were supported by a faction led by Scott and Kabimba. One major implication of the change of government from Sata to Lungu was that members of the pro-poor faction were marginalized by Lungu. They were replaced by political leaders drawn from Lungu's multi-patron coalition. Consequently, the centre of influence within Cabinet shifted from a more ideological and pro-poor faction to a pro-business faction. This shift also had implications for policymaking including on social protection. Under Sata, the PF demonstrated a commitment to implementing its 2011 pledge to implement pro-poor reforms. This included programmatic distribution and involved the redirection of resources from agriculture subsidies to pro-poor initiatives such as cash transfers.

On the contrary, Lungu's administration supported programmatic social protection but much of this support appeared to be rhetorical and limited to expansion plans presented in the national budget, speeches by government officials, and the party manifesto. In practice, there appeared to be limited political will to sustain programmatic social protection especially after Mutati's demotion and subsequent expulsion from Cabinet. While Kabanshi was previously considered as a champion for the promotion of social protection, the SCT scandals and her subsequent dismissal from Cabinet challenged earlier assumptions about her role.

The evidence provided in this chapter further demonstrates that the factional differences within PF that emerged during Sata's rule had long term implications for social protection. The turnover of senior PF leaders associated with the pro-poor faction resulted in a noticeable decline in support for programmatic social protection and increased support for clientelist forms of distribution, which served the interests of Lungu's multi-patron pro-business coalition. This also had implications for the policy coalition that donors had built over the last decade. While donor and PF interests had previously converged around social issues, they were increasingly diverging with the ascendency of the pro-business faction. The foregoing attests to the influence of domestic politics on policymaking.

5.6 Conclusion

The most compelling studies on the emergence of social protection in Zambia have focused on policy reforms under the MMD government (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016) and the Sata administration (Kuss, 2015; Hickey & Pruce, 2019). The existing literature has not provided a detailed account of reforms under Lungu's administration. In this regard, this chapter breaks new ground by providing a case study of how and why social protection reforms happened after the change of government from Sata to Lungu.

Studies by Kuss (2015) and Hickey and Pruce (2019) both argued that the sustainability of social protection in Zambia was not guaranteed in the long term. This was because of a lack of traction within the normative views of political elites in Zambia. The two studies also suggested that the competitive clientelist dynamics within Zambia's political settlement, made a shift away from the brief turn to programmatic distribution back to clientelist distribution very likely. However, neither of the studies grappled with the post 2015 (or post Sata era) dynamics and what they entailed for social protection in Zambia. The case study presented in this chapter therefore makes a crucial contribution to understanding social protection by discussing reforms beyond the initial expansion.

This chapter shows that programmatic social protection continued to expand under Lungu, largely due to a policy coalition involving donors and government technocrats. Yet the emphasis on promoting clientelist forms of distribution undermined efforts to expand the SCT programme. The implementation of the SCT programme was fraught by irregular payments to beneficiaries and the misapplication of funds. The misapplication of funds prompted some donors to suspend their support to the programme while the Community Development minister was dismissed from Cabinet for her complicity in the scandal.

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the partial change of government resulted in a turnover of policy makers within Cabinet. It led to a shift from a dominant leftist faction that supported pro-poor policy reforms and programmatic distribution, to a faction dominated by political elites with strong business interests. As a result, Cabinet ministers who supported the social protection reform agenda under Sata were marginalized by Lungu and replaced by political elites who were either less supportive of SCTs or were unable to influence policy in the same way Cabinet members such as Scott and Kabimba had done. Chapter 4 showed that the pro-poor faction was supportive of programmatic reforms because its most prominent leaders lacked rural political bases and viewed the successful implementation of the party's pro-poor agenda as the best means of consolidating power and winning crucial rural support. On the other hand, Lungu's faction could rely on ethnic Bemba support to maintain the rural vote and preferred to reward its urban supporters through empowerment programmes. This chapter shows that the ruling party's focus on urban voters was at the expense of funding social cash transfers which benefited rural citizens in both PF and opposition strongholds. The evidence in this chapter also demonstrates the limits of donor influence and how and why a convergence of donor and political elite interests is important for social protection reforms.

Beyond the Zambia focused studies, the existing literature on the emergence of social protection in Africa asserts the influence of domestic politics on social protection reforms (Lavers & Hickey, 2016). It also shows that changes of government in competitive African democracies in which electoral turnovers happened more than once are likely to provide more social welfare than countries in which turnovers happened less frequently (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). The argument presented by Carbone and Pellegata was limited to a large N study and did not provide a case study analysis to account for dynamics within a country. This chapter addressed this gap by providing a within-case analysis that illustrates the relationship between a change of government and social protection reform. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the importance of domestic politics to understanding reforms. It shows that when changes of government happen, political elites in the new ruling coalition will have distinct interests from their predecessors. This has implications for policy coalitions between ruling elites and donors. It also has implications for elite attitudes towards both clientelist and programmatic forms of distribution.

CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY REFOMS IN MALAWI, 2012-2014

6.1 Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 examined how and why social protection policy reforms happened in each of the two Zambian case studies. This chapter presents the first Malawian case study. It explains how and why social protection policy reforms happened in Malawi after the partial change of government from President Bingu wa Mutharika who led the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to Joyce Banda and the People's Party (PP). Using a process tracing approach, this chapter traces the process of reforms from the mid-2000s, when the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) was initiated as a donor pilot, until the end of Banda's presidency in 2014. It demonstrates how and why donor efforts to compel political elites to expand the SCTP into a national programme were constrained by the DPP administration but promoted by the PP-led government.

The existing literature on social protection policy reforms in Malawi remains scant. Three studies conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) showed that transnational actors designed and implemented SCT pilots in seven districts from 2006 to 2012 with limited government support (Chinsinga, 2009; Farrington & Slater, 2009; McCord, 2010). The three studies all covered the period before Joyce Banda's presidency and do not account for reforms that happened to expand the SCTP from a pilot to a national programme in 2012. Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) demonstrated why government support remained limited. They showed that most political elites in Malawi were opposed to handout programmes, including cash transfers, because they blamed the poor for their own poverty. Elites were more supportive of workfare programmes (like public works) and agriculture support through the implementation of large-scale farm input subsidies. Their study is limited to understanding elite attitudes and does not account for the processes through which social protection policies have been reformed over time. Hamer and Seekings (2019) consider the implications of political branding during competitive elections for social protection. The study revealed how the unconventional circumstances that led to Banda's presidency and her desire to counter the DPP's food security and agriculture subsidies brand, prompted her to expand social protection.

Neither of the foregoing studies provides a systematic account of how and why social protection reforms have happened in Malawi to expand cash transfers from a pilot to a national programme. This chapter identifies the causal mechanisms that explain how and why the change of government from Mutharika to Banda resulted in significant social protection reforms, including the publication of a national social support policy and the adoption of a national social protection programme – which included the expansion of cash transfers. In doing so, this chapter provides a more systematic and comprehensive account of social protection reforms in Malawi from the mid-2000s until the end of Banda's presidency than existing studies have done.

I demonstrate that donor supported reforms were unsuccessful during the Mutharika era because of dominant beliefs amongst DPP elites that cash transfers were unproductive handouts. DPP elites instead advocated for the poor to be assisted through popular maize production subsidies which also converged with their electoral interests. The change in government in 2012 provided incentives and opportunities for faster reforms. Banda embraced SCTs as an idea and political strategy but faced fiscal constraints which limited her government from assuming full responsibilities for funding the SCTP. This contrasted with the Zambian case under President Michael Sata where the government assumed primary responsibility for funding SCTs from donors. Furthermore, relations between the government and donors – which deteriorated under Mutharika – improved significantly during Banda's presidency. The new government was therefore more supportive of implementing donor supported economic reforms including on social protection. Banda recognized that donor support was useful for stabilising the ailing economy that she inherited, which would in turn help to broaden her electoral chances ahead of the 2014 national elections against a popular DPP.

6.2 How did a change of government happen?

Joyce Banda assumed the presidency of Malawi in 2012 after the unexpected death of Bingu wa Mutharika. Banda's background and path to the presidency are both important for understanding the nature of social protection reforms that happened under her government. The discussion that follows shows that Banda's background in the non-profit sector and women's empowerment, predisposed her to be supportive of donor supported initiatives and handouts. This sharply contrasted with Mutharika's background as a Pan-Africanist and international economist which contributed to his antagonistic approach to some donor supported reforms.

6.2.1 Background of Joyce Banda

Joyce Banda was born in 1950 in Zomba district, Southern Region of Malawi (then the colonial protectorate of Nyasaland). She earned Bachelor of Arts degrees through correspondence in Early Childhood Education and in Gender Studies from Columbus University and Atlantic International University, respectively. She also obtained a Diploma in Management of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Centre in Turin, Italy. Prior to entering politics, she earned a reputation as a relentless advocate for women's rights and champion for gender equality. She founded a women's empowerment organisation – the National Association of Businesswomen – which brought her into prominence with the Malawian public. She also founded the Joyce Banda Foundation to advance education for girls and established several businesses between 1985 and 1997. Banda entered national politics when she stood for selection as a United Democratic Front (UDF) parliamentary candidate for Zomba Malosa constituency in the Southern Region ahead of the 1999 national elections. She was selected by the UDF and was elected MP in the general election. She was then appointed Minister of Gender and Community Services by President Bakili Muluzi. Banda was re-elected to parliament in 2004 as a UDF candidate but soon after followed Mutharika into the DPP in 2005. Mutharika rewarded her with an appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2006.[127]

6.2.2 Formation of PP

Bingu wa Mutharika was first elected republican president as a UDF candidate in 2004, succeeding the party's founder, Bakili Muluzi. Only a year later, in 2005, Mutharika left the UDF to form the DPP[128] after differences emerged between him and Muluzi who reportedly sought to retain control of the party notwithstanding his retirement from active politics (Hamer, 2016). In 2009, Mutharika was due for re-election and was desperate to stave off competition from the UDF and the other former governing party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which commanded crucial regional support in the south and centre of the country, respectively. Thus, Mutharika selected Banda to be his running-mate because of her grassroots appeal and her influence in the Southern Region. She complemented Mutharika, who himself lacked

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[127] Joyce Banda's profile was compiled from various sources including: Up Closed https://upclosed.com/people/joyce-banda/ [accessed 26 July 2018], Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124716372665758.html [accessed 24 and 26 July 2018], Patel and Wahman (2014) and Hamer (2016).

[128] The Malawian Constitution allowed Mutharika to resign from the UDF and join the newly created DPP without his annulling his election as president.

grassroots appeal, largely because of his technocratic background but also because he had lived in the diaspora for about three decades prior to his return to Malawi in the mid-1990s. Banda became Vice President after Mutharika won the 2009 presidential elections but was forced to resign from the DPP shortly after. In 2010, Mutharika (who was term limited) set in motion plans for his younger brother, Peter Mutharika, to succeed him as both party and republican president at the end of his term in 2014. The plans to appoint Peter Mutharika as DPP president were at odds with Banda's own presidential aspirations. Bingu wa Mutharika pressurized Banda to endorse Peter Mutharika as DPP president, but she resisted the manoeuvres (Hamer, 2016). In turn, a pro-Mutharika faction within DPP demanded her resignation as republican vice-president. When Banda resisted these calls, she was fired from the ruling party (in December 2010), together with the party's second vice president Khumbo Kachali who also opposed the DPP's succession plan. Nevertheless, Banda remained republican Vice President in line with the Constitution. In September 2011, she formed the People's Party together with Kachali (Chinsinga, 2014; Patel and Wahman, 2014; Hamer, 2016).

6.2.3 PP's rise to power

Mutharika's death in April 2012, following cardiac arrest, created a political crisis. Even though the Malawian Constitution dictated that a President is succeeded by the Vice President in the event of death, some members of the DPP – including six Cabinet ministers now infamously referred to as the "Midnight Six" [129] – sought to block Banda's ascendency to the presidency because she was no longer a member of the DPP. The "Midnight Six" intended to install Peter Mutharika as president but were prevailed upon by the military, civil society, judiciary and media, who called for the country's constitutional order to be followed (Gabay, 2014: 1). Eventually, Banda was inaugurated as Malawi's fourth President on 7 April 2012.

With two years until the 2014 general election, Banda was under pressure to consolidate power. Kachali was appointed Vice President and by August 2012, Banda had convinced 110 MPs from the DPP, UDF, smaller parties and independents to either join or support the PP and her Cabinet (Svåsand, 2014). It is appropriate to describe the PP as a party that served as a vehicle for Banda and some MPs to assume control of public office and to seek re-election in 2014, rather than an organization rooted in ideology or shared beliefs about national development.

[129] The "midnight six" consists Jean Kalilani, Patricia Kaliati, Henry Mussa, Kondwani Nankhumwa, Nicholas Dausi, and Symon Vuwa Kaunda.

Englund (2002: 11-12) observed that it was common for Malawian politicians and entire parties to form “unpredictable and erratic” alliances in which leaders had “substantially divergent values and objectives”. The formation of PP certainly fits this description.

6.3 What did a change of government entail?

The change of government in 2012 resulted in only partial changes in the composition of government. Banda appointed a 32-member Cabinet that included MPs from six political parties and one Independent. The Cabinet included only 6 members from the ruling PP. Her Cabinet also included 17 DPP MPs (including 13 who were in Mutharika’s Cabinet). DPP MPs who supported Peter Mutharika were excluded from Cabinet. These include Goodall Gondwe (Finance Minister from 2004 to 2009), George Chaponda (who would later serve as Minister of the strategic Agriculture Ministry after 2014), and “the Midnight Six”. Gondwe and Chaponda were both close allies of Bingu wa Mutharika. Like the Mutharika brothers, they had also spent decades in the diaspora working for multilateral institutions, including the IMF and United Nations, respectively. Banda’s Cabinet also included 2 MPs from the UDF, and one each from the MCP, the Alliance for Democracy (Aford) and the Congress for Democrats.[130] There were also important changes regarding positions that were crucial for social protection policy making. Some of these changes are described in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 shows that Banda maintained several Cabinet officials from the Mutharika era including Finance Minister Ken Lipenga who was first appointed in 2011. Lipenga was replaced by Maxwell Mkwezalamba (a former World Bank economist who was nominated to Parliament) in October 2013 after a national scandal involving the abuse of public resources. She also appointed Anita Kalinde (who defected from the DPP to the PP) as Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare Minister, replacing Patricia Kaliati who was part of the “Midnight Six”. Banda maintained the Chief Secretary to the Cabinet Bright Msaka but replaced him with his deputy in March 2013 following revelations that he was linked to a plot to block Banda from succeeding Mutharika in 2012. Banda also maintained several bureaucrats from the Mutharika era.

[130] The Nation Newspaper, 27 April 2012. “Malawi President unveils new Cabinet.” Available at https://mwnation.com/malawi-president-unveils-new-cabinet/ Retrieved [3 September 2019]

Table 6. 1: What changed about the government in 2012?

Composition of government	Before 2012	After 2012
Ruling Party	DPP	PP
President	Bingu wa Mutharika	Joyce Banda
Vice President	Joyce Banda	Khumbo Kachali
Minister of Finance	Ken Lipenga	Ken Lipenga
		Maxwell Mkwezalamba (Oct 2013)
Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare	Patricia Kaliati	Anita Kalinde
Chief Secretary to the Cabinet	Bright Msaka	Bright Msaka
		Hawa Ndilowe (Mar 2013)

6.4 What social protection programmes were inherited?

Joyce Banda's administration inherited four major social protection or related programmes from the Mutharika administration. Unlike the Zambian case where modest reforms in 2008 contributed to faster reforms after 2011, social protection in Malawi under Mutharika was almost exclusively the domain of international donor agencies and NGOs.

Except for FISP, all the programmes in Table 6.2 were classified as social protection programmes. I argue in this study that the LIPWP, SCTP and VSL were designed and implemented as programmatic mechanisms for redistribution from the state to the poor. On the contrary, FISP – although initially designed to be programmatic – was susceptible to manipulation by political leaders for clientelist purposes.

Table 6. 2: Social protection programmes inherited by the Banda administration

Programme	Who is covered?	Social risks covered	Targeting method
Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP)	Small-scale farmers	Food and income security	Non-means tested
Labour Intensive Public Works Programmes (LIPWP)	Poor individuals with labour capacity	Income security	Non-means tested
Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP)	Labour incapacitated poor households (including women, OVCs, disabled and the aged)	Income security	Means tested
Village Savings and Loans (VSL)	Poor individuals with labour capacity	Income security	Non-means tested

Because the SCTP and FISP were both crucial for understanding social protection reforms in Malawi, I provide a summary of reforms to both programmes prior to 2012. This provides a context for understanding social protection reforms under Banda's government.

6.4.1 SCTP reforms prior to 2012

Discussions to introduce social cash transfers and a national social protection policy started in December 2005 following a workshop convened by DFID to address Malawi's unremitting levels of poverty. The workshop included participants from the Malawian government, civil society organisations and other international donors. The workshop discussed the implications of two studies commissioned by DFID on poverty in Malawi.[131] It recommended a shift from "ad hoc" social safety net programmes (i.e. programmes that were implemented to address short term crises) to social support policies, as a more effective means of addressing poverty (Chinsinga, 2009). Consequently, a pilot Social Cash Transfer Programme was introduced in Mchinji district in 2006 with support from UNICEF. The pilot programme was designed by

[131] The two studies are: Devereux, S. *et al*. (2005) Vulnerability to Chronic Poverty and Malnutrition in Malawi, Lilongwe: Malawi; and Devereux, S. and Macauslan, I. (2005) Review of Social Protection in Malawi: A Desk Study, Lilongwe: Malawi

German consultant Berndt Schubert who also designed Zambia's first pilot cash transfer in Kalomo district, three years earlier. Thus, the Mchinji pilot was a replication of the Kalomo model which focused on the 10% poorest households.

After the pilot was introduced, donors persuaded Mutharika's Cabinet to introduce a social protection policy. Two outcomes of the discussions between donors and Cabinet are worth highlighting. First, Cabinet made a request for the pilot to be extended to additional districts. This was aimed at generating evidence of the effectiveness of cash transfers. Second, in 2006, Cabinet decided to change the name of the draft policy from "social protection" to "social support". The change was aimed at demonstrating that beneficiaries were not "helpless victims of vulnerability and poverty who would remain in that state for the rest of their lives" but were individuals in need of support to graduate from the programme after a defined period (Chinsinga, 2009: 3).

Donors responded positively to Cabinet's request to extend cash transfers to additional districts. With technical support from UNICEF, the Malawian government [through the National Aids Commission (NAC)], developed a proposal to obtain funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). During this period, social protection was conceived as a response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic with cash transfers being targeted at orphaned and vulnerable children (OVCs). This was largely due to the influence of UNICEF whose core mandate is children, with a special focus on those afflicted by HIV/AIDS. This also explains why NAC was the lead government agency in the funding proposal. With funding from GFATM, the cash transfer pilot was extended to six additional districts in 2007. In that same year, GFATM took responsibility for funding the Mchinji pilot. This brought the total of districts piloting cash transfers to seven out of 28.[132]

In 2008, UNICEF working in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted an evaluation of the Mchinji pilot. The results showed that the programme had contributed to improved food security and an increase in the retention rate

[132] Interviews with Laurent Kansinjiro, Principal Social Welfare Officer-Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare (7 February 2017), Patience Masi, Senior Project Coordinator-KfW (7 February 2017), Tom Mtenje, Senior Technical Officer-Social Protection Programme-GIZ/Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development (8 February 2017), Chipo Msowoya, Programme Manager, Economic Governance and Social Protection-European Union (9 February 2017) and Sophie Shawa, Social Protection Officer, UNICEF-Malawi (14 February 2017)

amongst primary school children. Based on these findings, other bilateral and multilateral agencies expressed interest in funding additional districts. These included the German government through the German Development Bank (KfW) and the European Union (EU). Donors requested government to implement a social protection (or social support) policy as a precondition for funding. Discussions around developing a policy had been mooted by donors as early as 2005, but the drafting process only began in 2008 after the momentum generated by the impact evaluations. The process was led by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development – which had primary responsibility for drafting government policy documents – working in tandem with the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disabilities and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW) – which was responsible for implementing cash transfer programmes. International donors interested in supporting cash transfers and local civil society organisations also played important technical and advocacy roles in the process. However, the policy had not been implemented at the time of Mutharika's death in April 2012.[133] The SCTP also remained a pilot financed almost exclusively by donors.

6.4.2 FISP reforms prior to 2012

The DPP government introduced an ambitious fertiliser subsidy programme known as the Agriculture Input Support Programme (AISP) in 2005. Observers of Malawian politics have noted that the AISP was introduced primarily for political reasons – to contain threats from the opposition and to win legitimacy with the electorate after Mutharika abandoned the UDF to form the DPP (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; Chinsinga and Poulton, 2014). The AISP (which was renamed FISP in 2010) was also a response to Malawi's 2002 famine that was precipitated by drought. Granted that the famine was mitigated by emergency food imports, Malawi's food crisis persisted throughout 2003 and 2004. Through FISP, smallholder farmers were provided with subsidised farming inputs. The programme was designed and implemented in a manner that ensured that smallholder (and not large scale) farmers were the principal beneficiaries (Brazys, Heaney, & Walsh, 2014: 11). It was not until 2005/06 that Malawi recorded its first surplus in maize production since the 2000/01 farming season (ibid). The Finance Minister, Goodall Gondwe, presided over increased spending on farm input subsidies

[133] Interviews with Laurent Kansinjiro, Principal Social Welfare Officer-Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare (7 February 2017), Patience Masi, Senior Project Coordinator-KfW (7 February 2017), Tom Mtenje, Senior Technical Officer-Social Protection Programme-GIZ/Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development (8 February 2017), Chipo Msowoya, Programme Manager, Economic Governance and Social Protection-European Union (9 February 2017) and Sophie Shawa, Social Protection Officer, UNICEF-Malawi (14 February 2017)

which cost the government 7% of the 2006/07 budget, reaching 67% of deserving farmers (Hamer, 2016). Although donors opposed the implementation of FISP arguing that it ran counter to economic liberalization efforts and placed an “unnecessary and unsustainable fiscal burden on the state,” the programme turned out to be a huge success (Chinsinga & Poulton, 2014: 128).

In the 2007/8 farming season, “Malawi produced 1.3 million Metric Tons (MT) of maize over and above annual food requirements” (Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013: 1). This was a remarkable reversal of Malawi’s food security challenges, especially given that the country was only meeting 37% of its food consumption demand in 2004 (Hamer, 2016). At the same time, food inflation declined dramatically to single digits in 2007 in part due to low maize prices attributed to the implementation of FISP (Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013). Because FISP proved to be highly successful at ameliorating national food security, Mutharika’s government was reluctant to implement another subsidy or handout programme that would target the same category of poor people.

FISP also proved to be popular with Malawian citizens. Afrobarometer data show that by 2008, 53% of respondents believed government was ensuring enough food to eat, an increase from only 20% in 2005 (Hamer, 2016). The success also translated into electoral benefits for Mutharika and the DPP. In 2009, Mutharika was overwhelmingly re-elected after obtaining 66% of the presidential vote, an increase from 36% when he ran as a UDF candidate in 2004 while the DPP obtained 114 out of 187 parliamentary seats (Hamer, 2016). Beyond the performance of the economy, the impressive showing of the DPP in parliamentary elections was also the result of a massive defection of UDF and independent MPs who won re-election as DPP candidates (Svåsand, 2014).

Aside from FISP, Mutharika’s attitude towards cash transfers can also be traced to his Pan-African ideas and scepticism towards programmes championed by donors who, incidentally, were opposed to some of his interventionist policies. FISP was introduced amidst strong opposition from donors, notably the World Bank, who viewed subsidy schemes to be disastrous based on experiences of similar programmes implemented by African countries in the 1980s (Hamer, 2016: 15). Donors were also dismayed at the huge cost to the government of implementing farm subsidies at a time when external budgetary support was as high as 41% (Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013).

6.5 What social protection reforms happened after the 2012 change of government?

Joyce Banda became president in April 2012 and two months later, in June 2012, the PP government published a National Social Support Policy (NSSP) and introduced the Malawi National Social Support Programme (MNSSP). The MNSSP had a four-year life span, from 2012 to 2016. It comprised five interventions including some already existing programmes such as the SCTP and the LIPWP.

6.5.1 Programmes expanded

Five social protection programmes were expanded into national programmes with the introduction of the MNSSP. The programmes were coordinated by the Malawian government although a consortium of international donors provided primary funding. Table 6.3 lists the programmes and shows details of the funding organizations.

Table 6. 3: Malawi National Social Support Programme 2012-2016

Programme	Main Funders
SCTP	World Bank, European Union (EU), Irish Aid, German Development Bank (KfW), Government of Malawi (GoM)
LIPWP	EU, World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP)
VSL	World Bank, UK Department for International Development (DFID), Norway, Irish Aid
School Meals Programmes	Mary's Meals, WFP, GoM, Germany
Micro-Finance Programmes	NGOs, GoM, Commercial banks

Source: Government of Malawi

Of the five MNSSP programmes, only the SCTP, LIPWP and the VSL were inherited from the previous administration. The School Meals Programme and Micro-Finance Programmes were adopted during the design of the MNSSP following consultations involving donors, government, civil society and other actors, regarding other interventions that could be adopted to provide social support to poor citizens. The Government of Malawi contributed funds to implement all programmes, excepting the LIPWP and the VSL, which were primarily donor or NGO funded.

6.5.2 Coverage of SCTP

Although the MNSSP consisted of five programmes, this study is primarily concerned with reforms to social cash transfers. Following the 2012 social protection reforms, the coverage of the SCTP expanded in terms of both beneficiary households and the number of implementing districts. These expansions are illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.

6.5.2.1 Beneficiary households

Data on the actual number of beneficiary households that were added from the inception of the SCTP in 2006 until 2014 are sparse and difficult to verify. At least three related factors explain this. First, only 14% of Malawi's districts (4 out of 28) have fully functional databases (GoM, 2016: 32). This means that data at district level of eligible households and beneficiaries are uncomprehensive in 24 districts. This was exacerbated by the fact that – at least by March 2017 – the Malawian government did not issue its citizens with national identity cards. This made the task of maintaining an accurate registry of beneficiaries somewhat burdensome for the MoGCDSW. Second, because different donor organisations were implementing cash transfers in different districts, donors kept separate records of beneficiaries and the MoGCDSW had to harmonize the separate records. Due to several factors such as resource constraints for adequate staffing in the ministry, and the absence of a Management Information System (MIS), the ministry's records were not adequately updated.[134] Finally, reports published by government departments, donors and academics at times provided inconsistent data on coverage. This is not surprising given the lack of comprehensive data. This presented challenges with verifying data for this study. The limited verifiable information on coverage by households is presented in Figure 6.1. The figure shows the targets that were set by a policy coalition of donors and government technocrats to expand the SCTP to additional households and what was achieved from 2006 to 2014.

[134] This point was raised by an official in the MoGCDSW at a workshop I attended in Lilongwe to review the 2012-2016 MNSPP 16 February 2017. The workshop was organized by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and included representatives from MoGCDSW, various donor agencies, civil society and academia.

Figure 6. 1: SCTP expansion, 2006-2014



Source: Angeles et.al. (2016)

Figure 6.1 shows that the SCTP pilot started with 2,442 households in Mchinji district in 2006. Donors and the MoGCDSW planned to extend coverage to 32,000 households by 2008 and 143,000 by 2013. The plan was for 250,000 households to be covered by the end of 2014. It is not clear if annual expansion targets were made for the intervening years, but the number of beneficiary households increased to 3,000 in 2008 and to almost 24,000 by 2009. By December 2014, the SCTP had expanded to 68,550 households. This was almost three times the number of households that had been added to the programme at the end of Mutharika’s presidency in 2012. Yet it was almost four times less than the set targets.

6.5.2.2 Districts

At the end of Banda’s term in 2014, the SCTP had expanded to 18 out of 28 districts across the three regions of Malawi. Seven districts were added to the scheme under the DPP era while 11 were added by the PP government, with 10 districts uncovered. Figure 6.2 shows the expansion of the SCTP by districts.

Figure 6. 2: Expansion of SCTP coverage by government administration, region and districts as at December 2014



Source: Angeles et.al (2016)

Most districts added during Banda's era were in the Southern Region where poverty levels in Malawi were highest. By 2012, funding from GFATM for cash transfers in the seven pilot districts had ended. After the implementation of the policy, the German government through the KfW assumed responsibility for funding the seven districts in 2012. In the same year, the EU funded an additional seven districts. In 2013, Irish Aid assumed responsibility for funding one district while the World Bank funded cash transfers in two districts under the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF),[135] which were implemented by the Local Development Fund – an agency of the Malawian government responsible for funding and implementing local development initiatives.[136] Also in 2013, the PP government announced plans to fund one district beginning in 2014.

6.5.3 Expenditure

Overall social protection expenditure increased during the two fiscal years of Banda's presidency (2012-13 and 2013-14). This included a marginal increase of tax funding for SCTs. Meanwhile, Banda's administrations committed more funds to FISP while the expansion of cash transfers was supported primarily by donors.

[135] In 1996, the Malawian government established MASAF with funding from the World Bank. MASAF was designed to promote the empowerment of local communities as part of the then UDF government's poverty alleviation programme (Kishindo, 2001).
[136] Interviews with Laurent Kansinjiro, Patience Masi, Tom Mtenje, Chipo Msowoya and Sophie Shawa

6.5.3.1 Changes in government's contribution to SCT funding

In terms of SCTP funding, the DPP government started contributing funds to meet administrative costs in 2010. These involved costs to pay salaries for government staff at district level. Government's contribution amounted to about 10% of the total cost of implementing the SCTP, with donors meeting the remaining 90%. After the PP government committed to funding one district, the government's contribution increased marginally to about 13%. However, as I discuss later in this chapter, the government struggled to disburse funds to pay SCTP beneficiaries. This meant that the actual contribution to funding the SCTP was much less than 13%. Technocrats in the MoGCDSW interviewed for this study estimated that the government's contribution remained much closer to 10% even during the Banda years.

6.5.3.2 Budgetary allocations to social protection and related programmes

Although the Malawian government was implementing five social protection programmes and FISP, data on coverage and allocations for most of the MNSSP programmes were scarce. Programmes were implemented by various NGOs and donor organizations and the MoGCDSW had inadequate data on most programmes. Data for expenditure on FISP, LIPWP and the SCTP were much easier to ascertain. The data on budgetary allocations for the three programmes is presented in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3 shows that there were increases in budgetary allocations to all three programmes during the two fiscal years of the PP government. The allocations for the SCTP only include the amounts committed by the government. The 2012/2013 national budget was the first presented by the PP government. In Banda's first year, the SCTP allocation increased nominally (but decreased when expressed in US dollars) from K700 million ($2.8 million) in 2011/2012 to K1 billion ($2.7 million). In the 2013/2014 budget, the SCTP allocation more than tripled, to K3.4 billion ($9 million). While the amounts poured in to the SCTP by the government were modest, Banda announced during her February 2013 State of the Nation Address (SONA) that her government had received almost K24 billion ($63 million) since July 2012 for cash transfer funding from the EU, Irish Aid and UNICEF.[137]

[137] State of the Nation Address by Malawi's President Dr. Joyce Banda, 7th February 2013. Available at https://www.nyasatimes.com/state-of-the-nation-address-by-malawi-president-dr-joyce-banda-full-text/

Figure 6. 3: Budgetary allocations to social protection and related programmes, 2010/11-2013/14



Source: Ministry of Finance Budget Speeches 2010/2011-2013/2014

Although Banda's administration did more to expand the provision of the SCTP than the Mutharika government, FISP and the LIPWP continued to be the two largest social programmes in Malawi. The FISP budget more than doubled nominally in Banda's first year, from K17.4 billion ($70 million) in 2011/2012 to K40.6 billion ($110 million) in 2012/2013. The allocations further increased to K60 billion ($160 million) in 2013/2014. Similarly, the nominal allocations to the LIPWP more than doubled in Banda's first year, from K3.2 billion ($12.8 million) in 2011/2012 to K8.9 billion ($24 million) but remained relatively unchanged at K9 billion ($24 million) in 2013/2014.

The data show that while funding for all three programmes increased, the PP government allocated more funds to FISP which was funded mostly out of tax, as opposed to the LIPWP and the SCTP which were almost entirely donor funded programmes. This demonstrates that while the PP government was committed to programmatic social protection reforms through its implementation of the MNSSP and publication of the NSSP, it committed more funds into FISP – which had the potential to be manipulated for clientelist politics.

In addition, Banda introduced other handout programmes in 2013. These include the Cow-a-Family initiative and the Mudzi Transformation Trust (MTT)[138] that targeted women, children

[138] Mudzi is the chiChewa (the main Malawian local language) word for village

and the poor. The former was introduced ahead of the 2014 general elections and was designed to provide poor families with one dairy cow to assist them out of poverty. By April 2014, 756 cows had been distributed in 24 districts while 8,680 goats and sheep were also distributed through a parallel Small Stock Project (Hamer, 2016: 31). The MTT was a Banda-led initiative to build houses for the poor in both rural and urban areas. Five hundred houses were built around the country by the end of 2013 at a cost of around US$2.5 million (ibid: 33). Banda also distributed maize to poor people in bags branded "Joyce Banda" during the 2014 election campaigns (Hamer & Seekings, 2019). While it is significant that Banda presided over significant social protection reforms, the foregoing shows that the PP government was more supportive of clientelist forms of distribution than it was to programmatic distribution through programmes such as the SCTP.

6.5.3.3 Social protection as a percentage of GDP

The ILO calculated the cost of implementing FISP, LIPWP, SCTP, and the VSL as a percentage of GDP for the fiscal years 2010/2011 to 2013/2014 (Van Meerendonk et al, 2016). FISP was not classified as a social protection programme which means that a more accurate calculation of social protection spending would focus on the other three programmes only. However, disaggregated data for the three social protection programmes could not be determined for this study. Therefore, data for all four programmes were used as a best estimate.

Table 6. 4: Social protection as a percentage of GDP, 2010-2014

Year	**Spending as % of GDP**
2010/2011	2.4%
2011/2012	2.2%
2012/2013	4.8%
2013/2014	6.5%

Source: Van Meerendonk et al, 2016

Table 6.4 shows that the Malawian government spent 2.4 % of GDP on the four programmes in 2010/2011. This doubled to 4.8% in 2012/2013 after Banda assumed office and rose to 6.5% of GDP in 2013/2014 during the last year of her presidency. The sharp increase in GDP spending for the programmes was largely due to the significant increase on FISP spending after Banda became president.

6.5.4 Generosity of benefits

The reforms under Banda's administration included nominal increases in the value of benefits paid to SCTP beneficiaries. From 2006 to 2012, transfer amounts to households remained unchanged. After the introduction of the MNSSP, the amounts were adjusted upwards. SCTP beneficiaries for household with one person received K600 ($2.40), while households with four or more persons received K1,800 ($7.20). The SCTP also provided a school bonus for households with school going children. Households received K200 ($0.80) for each primary school child and K400 ($1.60) for each secondary school child.[139] Following the nominal increase in SCTP transfer amounts in 2013, households with one person received K1,000 ($2.70), while households with four or more persons received K2,400 ($6.50). The school bonus for primary children increased nominally to K300 ($0.80) and to K600 ($1.60) for secondary school children.[140] The changes in transfer amounts are shown in Table 6.5.

Table 6. 5: Changes in SCTP Transfer Amounts by Household Size and School Bonus

Household Size	**Monthly Cash Transfer (Malawian Kwacha)**	
	2006-2012	2013-2015
1 Person	600	1000
2 Persons	1000	1500
3 Persons	1400	1950
4+ Persons	1800	2400
School Bonus		
Per child in Primary	200	300
Per child in Secondary	400	600

Source: Angeles et al (2016)

[139] The MWK to USD conversions for the 2006-2012 transfer amounts were calculated using the 2012 exchange rate obtained from the National Statistical Office data.
[140] The MWK for USD conversions were calculated using the 2013 exchange rate obtained from the National Statistical Office data.

Figure 6.4 shows changes in the real value of the SCTP transfer amounts from 2006 to 2014. It shows that the K1,800 transfers for a family of four or more persons were worth only K800 in 2006, less than half of the nominal value. The value of all transfers declined to the extent that the real value of the transfer for a family of four was only K600 in 2012. This shows that the increase in transfer amounts in January 2013 was necessary to offset the decline in the real value of transfers. It should also be noted that the National Statistical Office (NSO) revised its calculations of Malawi's CPI in 2013. The NSO only provided the annual CPI for 2013 without providing monthly values. Furthermore, from 2014 onwards, the base year was revised from 1990 to 2000.[141]

Figure 6. 4: Real value of SCTP transfer amounts, 2006-2014



Source: calculated using data CPI data obtained from Trading Economics <https://tradingeconomics.com/malawi/consumer-price-index-cpi> and National Statistical Office of Malawi <http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=204%3Aconsumer-price-indiex-national-2014&catid=3&Itemid=37>

While it is important that transfer amounts were increased in 2013, when the data in Figure 6.4 are compared to poverty lines, it is evident that the benefits were not generous. Malawi's 2010/2011 Integrated Household Survey calculated the national poverty line at K37,002 ($150) per person per year. This included K22,956 ($93) for food and K14,045 ($57) for non-food items. Based on the national poverty line, the SCTP transfer amounts were not generous enough to allow each household member to live above the poverty line. For example, a household with four or more persons with at least one child in primary and another child in secondary school

[141] http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=1

would receive up to K3,300 per month or K39,000 per year. This means that each household member would subsist on much less than the K37,002 per year per person threshold in the absence of other forms of support. If the World Bank poverty line of $1.90 were used, the transfer amounts would still be inadequate to ensure that every household member lived above the poverty line. This confirms that even after the increase in transfer amounts in 2013, benefits remained parsimonious.

6.5.5 Legislation and status of programmes

Although the SCTP pilot was extended to six additional districts in 2008, the DPP government did not approve or publish a national policy. Yet within two months of becoming president, Banda's PP government published a National Social Support Policy which paved way for the introduction of the Malawi National Social Support Programme. The NSSP had four strategic objectives which were:

> "to provide welfare support to those unable to develop viable livelihoods, to protect assets and improve the resilience of poor and vulnerable households, to increase productive capacity and the asset base of poor and vulnerable households, and to establish coherent synergies by ensuring strong linkages to economic and social policies, and disaster management" (GoM, 2016: 5).

The NSSP was launched alongside the MNSSP which was developed as an instrument to operationalize the policy. One notable outcome of the NSSP was that it defined social cash transfers as interventions targeted at the ultra-poor who were defined as consisting the 10% poorest households in each district. This was a departure from the SCTP pilot which conceived of cash transfers as interventions targeting OVCs afflicted by HIV/AIDS.

6.5.6 Limitations to social protection reforms

Joyce Banda was president for only two years. Therefore, even though her administration made important reforms to expand the provision of social protection, the extent of reforms was limited. Most notably, the government was unable to pay beneficiaries in Thyolo district which it had committed to funding. I discuss this in more detail below.

6.5.6.1 Non-payment of benefits

The SCTP expanded to over 68,000 households in 2014. In practice, not all targeted households received payments. Of all households targeted to receive benefits, less than 30,000 households were receiving transfers (Angeles et al, 2016). Although donors had committed resources to increase the number of beneficiaries, the process of targeting households and adding them to the SCTP was the responsibility of government technocrats at the district level. The MoGCDSW had capacity constraints that led to delays in completing the targeting process within Banda's two years in office. In addition, Banda's government was unable to provide adequate funding for Thyolo district which the government had committed to funding in 2013. The targeting process to identify beneficiaries started in 2013 but had not been completed at the time of the May 2014 general elections. While some transfer payments were made to households that were targeted, they were inconsistent.[142]

Technocrats in the MoGCDSW reported that the government was unable to adequately pay SCTP beneficiaries in Thyolo because of fiscal constraints. These constraints were partly because international donors withheld $150 million in budgetary support after the emergence of a major corruption scandal in September 2013 which implicated senior government bureaucrats in the looting of $30 million of donor funds. Despite this, the PP government provided funds to implement clientelist programmes such as the Cow-a-Family initiative and sunk large amounts of tax revenue into expanding FISP. As I argue later in this chapter, Banda prioritised handout programmes for which she was the main benefactor because of the potential for those programmes to translate into votes.

6.6 How and why did a change of government matter for social protection reforms?

Two broad factors are discussed in this section that explain how and why the partial change of government in 2012 affected social protection reforms. The first focuses on the influence of transnational actors and discusses the relationship between international donor agencies and Banda's administration. The second considers the interests of political elites which are broken down into three categories including ideological interest (ideas, beliefs and attitudes), electoral interests (or party branding), and factionalism.

[142] Interviews with Laurent Kansinjiro and Patience Masi

6.6.1 Relationship between international donor agencies and the Banda administration

Historically, international donors have played a significant role in Malawi's development. Donors have provided budgetary support – which stood at over 40% in the mid-2010s – and provided direct support to poverty reduction interventions (Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013). Because of the centrality of donors to Malawi's development, Joyce Banda re-established relations with international donors, including the IMF, who had severed ties with Malawi during Mutharika's presidency. As I show later in this chapter, it was necessary for Banda to restore relations with donors as a response to the economic challenges she inherited. Banda also had much better personal relations with international donors than her predecessor did, which contributed significantly to the social protection reforms implemented by her administration. Banda had close ties to several donor officials tracing back to her years working in the NGO sector and her involvement with women's empowerment programmes, which were mostly donor funded. The fact that Banda had also served as community development minister meant that she had interacted closely with international donor agencies, especially given that programmes run by the MoGCDSW were almost exclusively donor funded. Banda was reputedly close to the head of Irish Aid in Malawi who invited her to launch the Irish Aid funded SCTP pilot in Balaka district in 2013. This was the first SCTP pilot to be launched by a president. During the rest of her presidency, she also spoke about the need to expand the provision of cash transfers in speeches to parliament.[143]

Donors had also established a policy coalition with technocrats in ministries involved in the planning and implementing of cash transfers since the mid-2000s. However, during the Mutharika era, technocrats in the Treasury department of the Ministry of Finance had been opposed to funding the SCTP out of tax because of concerns that cash transfers did not contribute to economic growth. This was a position shared by the DPP era Finance Minister, Gondwe and Mutharika himself. The two individuals who served as finance ministers under Banda (Lipenga and Mkwezalamba), were both known to be more receptive to committing government resources to cash transfers than Gondwe was.[144]The coalition of donor officials and government technocrats benefited from Banda's presidency because of her commitment to implement donor supported reforms and because her finance ministers did not oppose them.

[143] Interviews with donor officials

[144] This point was made in interviews with technocrats in the MoGCDSW

Moreover, donors played an important role in funding all but one of the 18 districts implementing cash transfers. This also suggests that until 2014, Malawi's social protection sector was largely driven by donors notwithstanding the government's ownership of the programmes. This contrasted significantly with policy reforms in Zambia where the expansion of SCTs was accompanied by government assuming primary funding responsibilities from donors. Instead, reforms in Malawi were limited to the government providing a policy framework for donors to provide a more coordinated approach to implementing social protection.

6.6.2 Ideological interests (ideas, beliefs and attitudes)

The PP was not an ideologically coherent party but a coalition of ambitious politicians who chose to support Banda. Banda's motivation to support the social protection agenda was not driven by a coherent ideological position but by ideas about the role of donors in addressing Malawi's economic challenges. These ideas differed from Mutharika's. Banda's support for donor supported ideas were also shaped by electoral concerns (which I discuss in detail later).

Bingu wa Mutharika had opposed donor involvement in stabilising the Malawian economy largely due to a clash between donor ideas regarding economic reforms in Malawi and his purported support for Pan-Africanist development ideas. In the mid-2000s, the IMF placed Malawi on an Extended Credit Facility (ECF). Adherence to the ECF was a precondition for continued budgetary support from other development partners. Mutharika's government was reluctant to implement two specific conditions. The first was to liberalize the pricing of essential commodities including maize and fuel, and the second was to devalue the Malawian kwacha. This was in response to the governments' introduction of price controls and a fixed exchange rate regime. For his part, Mutharika argued that lifting price controls would make essential commodities unaffordable for most Malawians while floating the kwacha would lead to perpetual depreciation and in turn lead to run-away inflation.

The IMF dismissed the above stated arguments, suggesting that devaluing the currency would not have a significant effect on inflation, and that an equilibrium in the exchange rate would be reached eventually. Because Mutharika did not give into IMF demands, some donors including the German government, threatened to withdraw budgetary support. By 2011, donor funding was restricted to strategic sectors including education, health and FISP. Even though donors opposed farm subsidies, they began to provide modest funding towards FISP in 2005/06 in response to Mutharika's threats to redirect resources from other strategic sectors to farm subsidies. Thus, after donors withdrew budgetary support in 2011, the British government through DFID increased funding towards FISP to ensure that funding towards education and health was not affected.[145]

Moreover, Mutharika was determined to implement "African solutions to African problems" and argued that: "the best way to attain African renaissance is to free the African mind-set from colonial and neo-colonial indoctrination" (Malawi High Commission, 2011). Mutharika viewed FISP as an indigenous solution to food security – which he considered to be Malawi's preeminent problem. Encouraged by his impressive 2009 electoral performance, he was emboldened to challenge donors on policy issues including social cash transfers. A minister who served in Mutharika's government from 2009 to 2012 noted:

> "[cash transfers] are what we call pro-poor programmes. Sometimes [Bingu wa Mutharika] couldn't understand when you say pro-poor, what are we really talking about? [He would ask] things like…when you say pro-poor, what is it that we mean as a country and even as a world because sometimes these are catch words which have been advanced by the World Bank, IMF and what have you."[146]

Similar sentiments were made by Khumbo Kachali, who held various Cabinet posts under Mutharika between 2004 and 2010. Kachali noted regarding Mutharika's attitude to cash transfers that:

> "My assumption is that at that particular moment, President Mutharika may not have been in good books with [donors] and then looking at a policy which gives leeway with [donors], you recall…that it was cat and mouse with [Mutharika and donors]. So, anything that was coming from [donors], I doubt if the late President would have had a blessing on it".[147]

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[145] Interviews with Tom Mtenje and Chipo Msowoya

[146] Interview with Ephraim Chiume, Member of Parliament (People's Party) and Minister of Foreign Affairs 2012-2014 (28 February 2017)

[147] Interview with Khumbo Kachali, Member of Parliament (People's Party) and Vice President, 2012-2014 (24 February 2017)

The estrangement between donors and Mutharika's administration had huge implications on Malawi's economy by the time Banda became president. Chinsinga (2014: 19) notes that by the end of the first quarter of 2012, Malawi was "perched on the precipice of economic collapse… grappling with a chronic shortage of drugs in hospitals, high food prices and high transportation costs". In response to these challenges, Banda normalised relations with donors and implemented economic reforms her predecessor had opposed. The PP government yielded to demands to reinstate the implementation of the IMF sponsored ECF that Mutharika had suspended. Aware that devaluing the kwacha and removing fuel subsidies would hurt the poorest, the IMF and international donors encouraged the PP government to expand the provision of social protection. Since the Malawian government was unable to expand social protection from domestic resources due to fiscal constraints, donors pushed government to complete a national social support policy which Banda's government did within its first two months. This paved the way for donors to support the MNSSP.

The change of government from the DPP to the PP did not result in an ideological shift in the same way as a change of government in Zambia from the MMD to the PF in 2011. Yet, the transition from Mutharika to Banda affected ideas about the role of donors in the Malawian economy including on social issues.

The PP's ideas about redistribution were also informed by the normative views of leaders like Banda and Kachali. The preamble to the 2014 party manifesto noted that: "Her Excellency President Dr. Joyce Banda comes from a background where she has a passion for serving the people of this country, especially the most vulnerable" (ibid). In addition, in her message to Malawians in the party manifesto, Banda said the following:

> "I am committed to continue to champion the cause of the rural and urban poor. I am committed to continue champion the cause of women and youth. I am committed to continue champion the cause of the workers, the people with disability and the elderly. I am committed to continue champion the cause of the business community. Yes, I am committed to continue champion the cause of students. Indeed, I am committed to rural transformation as the centre-piece of my transformational agenda" (ibid: iii-iv).

The transformational agenda that Banda referred to was meant to remind voters of her own background and how that would translate into a more pro-poor agenda than her predecessor had articulated. Banda's pretensions as a champion of the most marginalized communities were also shared by her Vice President, Khumbo Kachali. In an interview for this study, Kachali stated that he strongly supported Banda's social protection agenda because it blended with his own background and brand of politics. Kachali was arguably the second most influential member of the PP. Prior to joining politics, Kachali was a prominent businessman from Mzimba district in the Northern Region and Vice President of the Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. He joined politics as Treasurer General of UDF from 2002 to 2004. Kachali was elected MP for Mzimba South West Constituency in 2004 as a UDF candidate but was among several MPs who joined DPP at its inception a year later.

Kachali was appointed Second Vice President of the DPP in 2005 and held several junior ministerial posts until his appointment as Minister of Health in 2008 and later of Public Transport and Infrastructure in 2009. He was fired from the DPP alongside Banda in 2010. Like Banda, he was opposed to Peter Mutharika assuming the leadership of the DPP because it threatened his own political ambitions.[148] He joined the PP in 2011 as its founding Vice President. Kachali argued that his background disposed him to be supportive of handout programmes that would empower poor Malawians and that he and Banda had similar backgrounds that allowed them to work closely, including on social protection reforms. Kachali stated that:

> "I am a private sector person…I was Vice President of the [Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry] before I joined politics. She was in the NGO section. So, the two experiences blended us to make meaningful development. With her background, she made sure that she used her contacts to help us in sustaining the programmes that we were doing. So, the participation of the [donors] was quite paramount [during Banda's presidency]." [149]

[148] Profile of Khumbo Kachali was compiled from a personal interview on 24 February 2017, and supplemented by online sources including Office of President and Cabinet of Malawi http://www.opc.gov.mw/index.php/presidency/menu-showcase-3/khumbo-kackali [accessed 25 July 2018] and Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khumbo_Kachali [accessed 25 July 2018]

[149] Interview with Khumbo Kachali

The change of government from the DPP to the PP resulted in a new Cabinet headed by a President and a Vice who both supported the donor driven social protection agenda. The normative ideas of Banda and Kachali, which were shaped by their grassroots backgrounds, converged with donor ideas about social protection.

6.6.3 Electoral interests (political branding)

Banda's decision to restore donor relations and to expedite the implementation of the social support policy were not only aimed at addressing the economic challenges she inherited. The reforms were also aimed at enhancing her chances of winning elections in 2014. Banda adopted a social protection brand to distinguish herself from the DPP and MCP who were the PP's main challengers. It was important for Banda to adopt a brand that would resonate with voters not least because Mutharika had successfully cultivated a food security brand that was instrumental to his 2009 resounding victory. Peter Mutharika succeeded his brother as leader of the DPP and adopted the food security brand as his main campaign platform for the 2014 elections (Hamer, 2016; Hamer & Seekings, 2019). While Banda expanded FISP much more than the DPP did, her election campaign was dependent on handout programmes for which she was the main benefactor. Ephraim Chiume, who was Banda's Foreign Affairs Minister, posited that Banda's handout programmes were essentially for clientelist purposes. Chiume noted in an interview for this study that:

> "When [Joyce Banda] came in, she literally just took over the Bingu kind of programmes. The only thing which she had was that she was coming in and immediately she was going to campaign. So, she had to balance the real development issues and strategic issues with the populist kind of strategies which can make her re-elected."[150]

International donor officials also held the view that Banda's support for social protection programmes was largely informed by political motivations. When the government announced it would fund a cash transfer programme in Thyolo district, donors expressed reservations at the district government had chosen to fund. The criteria for funding districts was developed by an independent consultant (Ayala Consulting) in 2011, which provided guidelines for the order in which districts would be targeted based on poverty profiles for each district. The data for the

[150] Interview with Ephraim Chiume

districts were obtained from the 2007 Integrated Household Survey.[151] While Thyolo was the next district to be targeted after the 17 that were already implementing cash transfers at the time, donors and government technocrats were concerned that political considerations had motivated the decision. Thyolo district was a DPP stronghold and the home region of the Mutharika brothers. It was also the home region of Anitta Kalinde, the Gender and Social Welfare Minister in Banda's government. Incidentally, Kalinde was MP for Thyolo North constituency, having been elected as a DPP member in 2009, before crossing the floor to the PP in 2012. Therefore, funding Thyolo appeared to be aimed at bolstering Kalinde's popularity in her constituency, especially given that she would be seeking re-election on a PP ticket in 2014. It was also viewed as an attempt for the ruling party to win support away from the DPP in its stronghold. Still, Banda's government was unable to provide adequate funding for Thyolo. In the end, both Banda and Kalinde lost to the DPP in Thyolo district in the 2014 elections.

While Banda's administration faltered in its commitment to fund cash transfers, it secured the resources needed to promote programmes for political patronage. The distribution of Joyce Banda branded maize, the Cow-A-Family initiative and the Mudzi Transformation Trust houses were mostly financed through resources raised by Banda and her party, and not through the national treasury. This at times put Banda at odds with some members of her own Cabinet, including her vice, who were not always in agreement with the way some of the programmes were implemented. Speaking about the MTT, Kachali stated in an interview for this study that:

> "One of the challenges is that the programme targeted very few people. It was a pilot [and] it wasn't in the budget. The funding I think came from South Korea. I think the president was handling that herself. I was not involved because I had my own reservations."

Reservations towards some of Banda's social assistance programmes were also held by opposition politicians, technocrats and donors. Some interviewees believed that Banda's penchant for handouts proved inimical to her presidency and electoral prospects. A donor official submitted:

[151] Interview with Patience Masi

> "When Joyce Banda came in…she spent the whole two years that she was the president just giving out stuff. That was what she used to do. On a daily basis…she was on the road giving out maize and cows. That's not being president…She was crazy!"

Joyce Banda lost the 2014 elections to Peter Mutharika who won the presidency for the DPP. The evidence in this section suggests that Banda's social protection brand was not adequate to ensure her electoral success after only two years as president. Other factors were certainly crucial for Banda's loss and Mutharika's win. Yet the fact that Banda adopted a social protection brand to counter the DPP's food security brand, demonstrates the extent to which electoral pressures prompted action for Banda to implement important donor supported social protection reforms which her predecessor had opposed.

6.6.4 Factional interests (factionalism)

The People's Party was formed as a breakaway from the DPP by Banda, Kachali and other leaders whose prospects of assuming higher leadership positions within the DPP and government were frustrated by Mutharika. The PP established itself as a party aiming to achieve more than the DPP had accomplished and to address the challenges created by the Mutharika administration which included poor political and economic governance (PP, 2014: iii). As Hamer (2016) observed, the PP recognized the need to brand itself differently to voters from the DPP by adopting a pro-poor social protection brand to counter Mutharika's food security brand. The shift in power between the two political factions provided incentives for the factions to brand themselves differently on redistribution even though they did not display distinct ideological positions.

The fact that factional battles between the PP and DPP were devoid of distinct ideological differences also points to broader dynamics within Malawian politics where ethno-regional voting, in a country with a predominantly rural and agrarian population, is salient. This provides a contrast to the Zambian case where rural and urban cleavages, and the distinct motivations of voters in both regions, provided incentives for factions within the ruling PF to support either programmatic or clientelist forms of distribution. It should also be noted that Banda's coalition comprised many former DPP leaders who joined the PP for opportunistic reasons. As such, many members of Banda's coalition very likely remained supportive of Mutharika era ideas such as FISP, which had proven electoral benefits.

Even then, the discussion in this chapter shows that factional battles to succeed Bingu wa Mutharika that emerged in 2010, were directly related to the formation of the PP in 2011, which in turn provided incentives for Banda and her followers to support other forms of distribution to counter the electoral threat posed by the DPP during her two year stint. The significance of factionalism as a factor accounting for social protection policy reforms is amplified in Chapter 7 where I discuss the implications of the re-election of the DPP in 2014 – and a shift in power back to the pro-Mutharika faction – on the implementation of Malawi's SCTP.

6.7 Conclusion

Studies on social protection in Malawi have provided little detail about how and why reforms to promote social protection happened. Studies by Chinsinga (2009), Farrington and Slater (2009) and McCord (2010) all discussed the extent to which transnational actors supported social protection in Malawi from 2006 to 2010. All three studies were conducted prior to reforms that began in 2012 and do not provide details about reforms during Banda's presidency. Similarly, Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) demonstrated the extent to which attitudes of Malawian elites towards the poor and poverty reduction constrained state support for a national social cash transfer programme. While their study provides an authoritative account explaining the implications of elite attitudes for social protection, it was limited to explaining attitudes in the period before Banda's presidency. Hamer and Seekings (2019) provide a more detailed examination of social protection expansion in Malawi than either of the abovementioned studies. Their analysis demonstrates the extent to which competitive elections provided incentives for Banda to adopt a social protection brand, which had implications for promoting a policy framework and an expanded cash transfer programme. However, Hamer and Seekings focused more narrowly on electoral competition and did not consider a broader range of factors that account for social protection reforms in Malawi.

Therefore, the case study presented in this chapter is plausibly the first detailed analysis of how and why social protection reforms were promoted by Banda's administration. In this regard, this chapter goes beyond existing studies by identifying causal mechanisms that account for how and why donor supported reforms for an expanded social cash transfer programme were constrained by Mutharika's administration but promoted after a change of government. This chapter shows that under Joyce Banda's leadership, a national social support policy was completed and published, a national social support programme was introduced, and the number of districts and beneficiaries of social cash transfers expanded. These reforms which were supported by donors, had been resisted by political leaders in the previous administration.

The narrative that emerged from the process tracing conducted for this study shows that the interests of political elites in Malawi were refracted through intra-party factionalism and electoral competition, which provided incentives for political parties to adopt different approaches to social protection. The distinct interests of factions were also associated with diverging ideas about the role of donors in poverty reduction which disposed them to adopt different political brands, with the DPP supporting farm input subsidies and the PP promoting social protection, even though both factions supported FISP as the main mode of distribution. The 2012 change of government also led to a turnover of policy makers within Cabinet that provided an opportunity for donors and government technocrats to push for reforms that the preceding Cabinet had opposed. The departure of Mutharika and senior ministers like Gondwe who were opposed to SCTs, provided a policy window for donors and government technocrats to push for faster reforms.

Unlike the two Zambian case studies, reforms in Malawi were much limited in terms of both the scale of expansion and the role of the state in implementing programmes. Reforms in Malawi were driven largely by donors with the support of government technocrats in the planning and implementing ministries. This also demonstrates that while donors were crucial for the emergence of social protection and reforms to expand SCTs from a pilot to a national programme, domestic political factors and the interests of political elites are necessary for understanding the limited expansion of cash transfers during Banda's presidency.

CHAPTER 7: SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY REFORMS IN MALAWI, 2014-2017

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 6, I examined how and why a change in government from Bingu wa Mutharika to Joyce Banda led to important social protection reforms. The reforms included the publication of a national social support policy, the implementation of a national social protection programme, and the expansion of cash transfers. The narrative that emerged from the process tracing research showed that donor efforts to persuade the government to promote social protection were constrained during the DPP era but promoted by the PP-led administration. Under the DPP administration, the ideas that Mutharika and his ruling faction had about the role of bilateral and multilateral development agencies in development, and their support for agriculture input subsidies for both economic and electoral purposes, diverged from the interests of donors on the promotion of social protection. This contrasted from Banda and her ruling coalition whose ideas about the role of donors and electoral interests, converged with those of donors on the promotion of social protection. Despite this, social protection reforms during Banda's two-year presidency were largely driven by a policy coalition of donors and government technocrats, with limited state support in funding and implementing social protection. Moreover, Banda was more supportive of a range of handout programmes that were implemented as mechanisms for clientelist politics while facilitating a policy framework that allowed donors to push for faster programmatic social protection reforms.

This chapter examines what a subsequent change in government meant for reforms, following the 2014 national elections that brought Peter Mutharika and the DPP back into power. It traces the reform process from the May 2014 election until 2017 when the fieldwork for this study was concluded. Existing studies on social protection policy reforms in Malawi have not delved into explaining reforms during Peter Mutharika's presidency. Therefore, the evidence provided in this chapter is possibly the first systematic and comprehensive account explaining how and why social protection reforms happened after the re-election of the DPP in 2014. Some previous studies provide insights that are useful for this case study. The analysis by Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) shows that the ideas, beliefs and attitudes of Malawian elites towards the poor, poverty reduction and cash transfers, were crucial to understanding why donor support for the promotion of social protection was limited during Bingu wa Mutharika's presidency. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the election of the younger Mutharika resulted in a return of political elites who were more supportive of workfare and agriculture subsidies at the expense of cash transfers. I go beyond the evidence provided by Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) to show that despite the ideas, attitudes and beliefs of DPP elites, Malawi's SCTP was expanded nationwide. However, this was due to the influence of donors who provided primary funding for cash transfers.

Another insightful study, by Hamer and Seekings (2019), demonstrates how political branding between the PP and the DPP in 2014 prompted incentives for Banda to expand social protection and other handout initiatives to counter Mutharika's food security brand. Yet the study does not account for the implications of branding in 2014 for social protection policy making after the elections. It also fails to account for factors beyond branding and electoral competition that are pertinent to understanding reforms in Malawi. These are gaps that the within-case analysis presented in this chapter contributes to.

7.2 How did a change of government happen?

The ruling People's Party contested its first national elections in 2014 after its formation in 2011 and ascent to power in 2012. Like most elections since Malawi's 1994 founding elections, the 2014 contest was competitively contested. The contest was a three-way race between the ruling PP, the DPP and the MCP. Peter Mutharika of the DPP won the 2014 presidential elections. This chapter demonstrates that the election of Mutharika resulted in a shift of power from the PP back to a DPP faction that was loyal to former President Bingu wa Mutharika. This faction was associated with the introduction of FISP and was therefore less inclined to provide tax funding for social cash transfers.

7.2.1 Background of Peter Mutharika

Arthur Peter Mutharika (more commonly referred to as Peter Mutharika or APM) was born in 1940. He was born in Zomba district in the Southern Region of Malawi. He received a Law degree from University of London in 1965. Between 1966 and 1969, he received LL.M and JD degrees from Yale University.[152] Thereafter, Mutharika had an extensive career as a Law professor at universities in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the USA, including a 30 year stint

[152] Profile of Peter Mutharika, available at UP Closed <https://upclosed.com/people/peter-mutharika/> [accessed 15 November 2018]

at Washington University that lasted until around 2003.[153] While based in the USA, Mutharika joined the United Party (UP) in 1999 which was formed by his elder brother, the late Mutharika. The two brothers joined Muluzi's UDF in 2001 after dissolving the UP even though APM remained in the USA. When the older Mutharika was selected by the UDF in 2003 to run for the 2004 presidential election, Peter Mutharika joined his brother's campaign as a strategic advisor concentrating on foreign relations (Skwiot, n.d). APM had returned to Malawi by 2004 and from that year until 2009, he served as a presidential advisor to his brother while also serving as Chair of the Institute for Democracy and Policy Studies in Malawi.[154]

In 2009, Mutharika stood as a parliamentary candidate in Thyolo East as a member of the DPP. He won the parliamentary election with 85% of votes cast. He was appointed to Cabinet in 2009, first as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and then as Education Minister. In September 2011, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.[155] It was during his time heading the foreign ministry that the British High Commissioner to Malawi was expelled. The expulsion of the High Commissioner created a diplomatic crisis between Britain and Malawi that also resulted in the suspension of foreign aid (including from other donors). Diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored when Banda became president in 2012.[156]

7.2.2 DPP's return to power

Bingu wa Mutharika was expected to complete his second (and last) term in 2014. In Chapter 6, I described how an intra-party struggle emerged between two factions to succeed him. The first faction included Mutharika and his close allies such as Goodall Gondwe, George Chaponda and his brother Peter Mutharika. The most prominent members of this faction shared technocratic backgrounds and had lived in the Malawian diaspora for decades working for international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. The second faction was led by Vice President Joyce Banda and some DPP MPs including the party's Second Vice President, Khumbo Kachali. Its most prominent members (Banda and Kachali) had grassroots appeal and lacked the technocratic backgrounds of the pro-Mutharika faction. In 2010, Mutharika chose his brother (Peter) to succeed him at the end of his second term, a decision that was protested

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[153] Ibid

[154] Profile of Peter Mutharika, available at UP Closed <https://upclosed.com/people/peter-mutharika/> [accessed 15 November 2018]

[155] Ibid

[156] Elliot Ross, "A very short introduction to Peter Mutharika, Malawi's new President" available at Africa is a Country, https://africasacountry.com/2014/06/a-very-short-introduction-to-peter-mutharika-malawis-new-president [accessed 15 November 2018]

by the Banda faction. As a result, Banda and some of her allies were dismissed from the DPP and formed the People's Party a year later. When Bingu wa Mutharika died in office in 2012, his brother was constitutionally ineligible to assume the presidency which was assumed by Joyce Banda instead. Yet, Peter Mutharika and the DPP returned to power only two years later.

Malawi held general elections on 20 May 2014. Twelve presidential candidates contested including Banda (PP), Mutharika (DPP), Lazarus Chakwera (Malawi Congress Party) and Atupele Muluzi – the son of former President Bakili Muluzi – who stood as the United Democratic Front candidate. In the presidential vote, the four parties that had governed Malawi since independence won a combined 98% of the vote, while the remaining eight parties shared just under 2% of the presidential vote (Patel & Wahman, 2015). Peter Mutharika won the presidential vote with over 1.9 million votes cast representing 36% of total valid votes. Chakwera was second with close to 1.5 million votes, representing 28% of valid votes. Banda performed poorly for an incumbent, finishing third with slightly over a million votes and 20% of valid votes. Muluzi was fourth with almost 14% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, Independents (many of whom were either DPP or MCP members who lost party primaries) won 52 seats, followed closely by the DPP with 50 seats. The MCP won 48 seats followed by PP with 26 and the UDF with 14. Two smaller parties won a seat each (Patel & Wahman, 2014; Patel & Wahman, 2015).

Ethnic and regional voting patterns were evident in the 2014 presidential elections. Except for 2009, such patterns were also evident in every presidential election held from 1994 to 2004. In 2014, Mutharika won the most votes in the Southern Region where he had strong support in districts dominated by the largest ethnic group in the region, the Lomwe, of which the Mutharikas belonged to. Chakwera of the MCP won the most votes in the Central Region. The MCP was popular among ethnic Chewa's who are the largest ethnic group in the Central Region. Chakwera and Malawi's first President, Kamuzu Banda, were both Chewa-speaking. Joyce Banda won the most votes in the Northern Region. Although Banda came from the Southern Region, her husband was from the Northern Region. This helped Banda to receive crucial endorsements from prominent northern politicians (Hamer, 2016). Mutharika won the Southern Region only, but he also finished second in the Northern and Central regions. This gave him an edge over his closest rivals (Patel & Wahman, 2014; Dulani & Chunga, 2014; Hamer, 2016).

Peter Mutharika was inaugurated as Malawi's fifth president on 2 June 2014. His running mate in the 2014 elections, Saulos Chilima, was inaugurated republican Vice President. Chilima was not previously linked to the DPP but was chosen to run alongside Mutharika because of his age and business background. At 42, Chilima appealed to much younger voters (Chinsinga, 2014: 27). This was significant because the most prominent DPP leaders including Mutharika, Gondwe and Chaponda, were all septuagenarians at the time. Chilima's background as a business executive (including his position as Managing Director of an international telecommunications company) also endeared him to younger voters, including unemployed youth in urban areas who considered him a role model for the youth (ibid).

7.3 What did a change of government entail?

Table 7.1 shows how the composition of government and key social protection policy making positions were affected by the change of government in 2014. When Banda became President in 2012, her Cabinet included many MPs who served in her predecessor's administration. She also maintained several civil servants from the previous era including some who held important social protection policy making positions. Under Peter Mutharika, DPP MPs who remained loyal to the party in 2012 (and did not join the PP) were rewarded with Cabinet positions. These include Goodall Gondwe who was appointed Finance Minister, a position he held in the first DPP government from 2004 to 2009. Other Mutharika allies appointed to Cabinet include George Chaponda and all members of the Midnight Six. This includes Patricia Kaliati who was appointed Minister of Gender, Children, Disabilities and Social Welfare (MoGCDSW) in 2014 and Jean Kalilani who succeeded her in 2016. Mutharika also made changes to the civil service which included the appointment of a new Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, George Mkondiwa and senior social protection policy makers in the MoGCDSW and the Directorate of Poverty Reduction and Social Protection in the Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development (MoFEPD).[157] The Chief Secretary to the Cabinet and senior social protection policy makers were all career civil servants who served under previous governments in different positions.

[157] The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development were merged by President Peter Mutharika.

Table 7. 1: What changed about the government after 2014?

Composition of government	Before 2014	After 2014
Ruling Party	PP	DPP
President	Joyce Banda	Arthur Peter Mutharika
Vice President	Khumbo Kachali	Saulos Chilima
Minister of Finance	Maxwell Mkwezalamba	Goodall Gondwe
Minister of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare	Anita Kalinde	Patricia Kaliati (2014-2016)
		Jean Kalilani (2016-2018)
Chief Secretary to the Cabinet	Hawa Ndilowe	George Mkondiwa
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare	unknown[158]	Dr. Esmie Kainja
Director Poverty Reduction and Social Protection, Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development	unknown[159]	Harry Mwamlima

Later in this chapter, I discuss how and why the turnover in social protection policy makers affected policy reforms after the change of government from the PP to the DPP.

7.4 What social protection reforms happened after the 2014 change of government?

This section discusses the social protection reforms that happened from 2014 to 2017 during the first three years of Peter Mutharika's administration. It first considers the programmes that were expanded by the DPP.

7.4.1 Programmes expanded

The Malawi National Social Support Programme (MNSSP 2012-2016) continued to expand under the DPP government. The five social support programmes were primarily funded by international agencies. In the second half of 2016, the government (led by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development) initiated a process to develop a new MNSSP for the

[158] I was unable to confirm details of previous Principal Secretaries in the Banda and Bingu wa Mutharika administrations.
[159] I was unable to confirm details of previous Directors of Poverty Reduction and Social Protection in the Banda and Bingu wa Mutharika administrations.

period 2018 to 2023. Other social programmes also expanded including FISP which remained the largest redistribution programme in Malawi.

7.4.2 Coverage

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the expansion of the SCTP in terms of beneficiary households and implementing districts.

7.4.2.1 Beneficiary households

Figure 7.1 shows that the number of household beneficiaries more than doubled between 2014 and 2015 from about 68,000 to over 150,000. Yet, this figure was significantly below the initial target of reaching 250,000 households by the end of 2015. Projections were then revised downwards by technocrats in the Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Division (PRSPD) in the MoFEPD (in consultation with donors and MoGCDSW technocrats) to expand the SCTP to 193,400 households in 2016. Although coverage increased to over 170,000 households at the end of 2016, this was still short of the target by about 20,000 households. The goal for the SCTP was to eventually reach 319,000 households countrywide – which consisted the 10% poorest labour-constrained households in each district of Malawi (GoM, 2016). By the end of 2016, coverage of the SCTP had expanded to about 54% of the target. Timelines to achieve nationwide coverage were not stipulated.

Figure 7. 1: Expansion of SCTP beneficiary households, 2006-2016



Source: ILO; GoM; and Angeles et al (2016)

7.4.2.2 Expansion of SCTP by districts and funders

Eighteen out of 28 districts were implementing the SCTP at the end of 2014. In 2016, the World Bank announced it would assume responsibility for funding cash transfers in the remaining 10 districts. These districts would be added by the end of 2017. The DPP government also informed donors that it could no longer fund the SCTP in Thyolo district due to fiscal constraints. By February 2017, the government was negotiating with the World Bank for the latter to assume responsibility for funding Thyolo.[160] Figure 7.2 shows a breakdown of SCTP funders by district and shows that social cash transfers in Malawi were primarily funded by the World Bank, KfW, EU and Irish Aid.

Figure 7. 2: Expansion of SCTP by districts and funders



Source: GoM

7.4.3 Expenditure

Below, I discuss changes regarding government's contribution to funding cash transfers, government's budgetary allocations on social spending, and social protection as a percentage of GDP, from 2014 to 2017.

7.4.3.1 Changes in government contribution to SCT funding

The government's contribution to the total SCTP budget was about 10% of the total cost. This was a marginal drop from about 13% under the PP government after the DPP administration decided to stop funding Thyolo district. Government funds were for administrative costs,

[160] Interview with technocrat in the MoGCDSW

including salaries of government staff.[161] In this dimension, the DPP was less supportive to the promotion of social protection than the preceding administration because it did not attempt to increase the proportion of tax funding for cash transfers. In practice, the PP administration had never achieved its 13% target. Therefore, the DPP administration may have taken its decision considering fiscal conditions prevailing at the time.

7.4.3.2 Expenditure on social protection and related programmes

Data showing the extent of donor funding for social protection programmes between 2014 and 2017 were difficult to determine. National budgets, Medium Term Expenditure Framework reports, and donor reports did not provide annual breakdowns of funding. Furthermore, respondents interviewed for this study were unable to provide comprehensive data.

The scarcity of data was acknowledged by the Malawian government. A review of the first MNSSP published in 2016 showed that the government had challenges collecting information on budgetary allocations and expenditure for programmes. Below is a passage from the report that I quote at some length to provide context:

> "Funding arrangements of the MNSSP are fragmented and inefficient. Concerns over fiduciary risks have led to the limited utilization of Government financial systems by donors contributing to the MNSSP, which has created fragmented and inefficient funding systems. No programme under the MNSSP has a harmonised approach to financing and there is lack of coordinated planning documents, such as harmonized budgets and work plans. Essentially each donor has different financing modalities, funding timeframes, and reporting requirements. Developing the right environment to allow the harmonization and pooling of funds is a key suggestion going forward. Within the SCTP, which was often cited as the most coordinated of the five MNSSP programmes, there are four distinct financing models between the five sources of funding. Timelines for funding often are not aligned and the burden of management and reporting for the differing models falls to the District level. Some progress has been made in aligning financial procedures and requirements, specifically the management of EU funds for the SCT by KfW, and the joint financial audits of the SCT between Irish Aid and the EU" (GoM, 2016:16).

[161] Interview with technocrat in the MoGCDSW

The delays in reporting from the district to the national level explain why data were available for earlier periods but inaccessible for the most recent years. The very limited available information shows that K5.9 billion ($12.8 million) was spent on the SCTP in 2014/2015. Furthermore, the World Bank had allocated $107 million for the LIPWP for the period 2014 to 2018 which would benefit 677,502 households in 28 districts. The WFP had also allocated $3.96 million for public works which would benefit 85,000 individuals and 15,500 household between 2014 and 2017 (Van Meerendonk et al, 2016: 70).

Meanwhile, FISP spending reduced from K60 billion ($160 million) in 2013/2014 to K50.8 billion ($77 million) in 2014/2015. It reduced further to K40 billion ($56 million) in 2015/2016 and to K31.4 billion ($43 million) in 2016/2017.[162]The decline in FISP allocations was largely due to a reduction in FISP beneficiaries from 1.5 million farmers in 2015/2016 to 900,000 in 2016/2017. According to Gondwe, government reduced the number of FISP beneficiaries ostensibly due to "evidence of a decline in poverty over the last ten years". [163] In truth, poverty levels in Malawi remained stubbornly high. Furthermore, the DPP administration was faced with declining national revenues and an aid crisis occasioned by cuts to budgetary support. The aid crisis traces back to September 2013 when international donors withheld budgetary support because of a public scandal (known as Cashgate) that involved the looting of public funds by public officials. Even though the Cashgate scandal was exposed during Banda's presidency, donors did not resume support after the DPP won elections. By early 2017, the DPP administration was still in negotiations with international donors, most notably the World Bank, for increased budgetary support.[164]

7.4.3.3 Social protection as a percentage of GDP

According to the Malawian government, it cost 0.5% of GDP to provide cash transfers to over 150,000 households in 2015 and it would cost 1.1% of GDP to reach 319,000 households (GoM, 2016: 39). Yet, allocations to FISP were equivalent to 1.2% of GDP in 2015, 1% in 2016, and 0.7% in 2017.[165] Data for allocations to the LIPWP were not disaggregated into

[162] Data on FISP allocations obtained from the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 budget speeches.
[163] 2016/2017 Budget Statement by Goodall Gondwe. Available at https://www.finance.gov.mw/index.php/documents/doc_view/237-2016-2017-budget-statement
[164] Ibid
[165] Calculated using GDP data for Malawi obtained from the World Bank and Ministry of Finance allocations on FISP.

annual figures. Therefore, it was not possible to calculate how much public works cost as a percentage of GDP.

7.4.4 Generosity of benefits

Reforms to social protection under the DPP government included an increase in SCTP transfer amounts. Table 7.2 shows the changes in transfer amounts in Malawian kwacha over time. It shows the transfer amounts at the inception of the SCTP in 2006 and the two increases made in 2013 (by the PP administration) and in 2016 (by the DPP administration).

Table 7. 2: Changes in SCTP transfer amounts, 2006-2017

Household Size	**Monthly Cash Transfer (Malawian Kwacha)**		
	2006-2012	2013-2015	2016-2017
1 Person	600	1000	1700
2 Persons	1000	1500	2200
3 Persons	1400	1950	2900
4+ Persons	1800	2400	3700
School Bonus			
Per child in Primary	200	300	500
Per child in Secondary	400	600	1000

Source: Angeles et al (2016)

The data in Table 7.2 show that SCTP benefits increased in 2016. However, the increments belied the fact that the real value of the transfer amounts declined significantly over time. Figure 7.3 shows changes in both nominal and real values of the benefits.

Figure 7.3 shows that the K2,400 benefits paid to a household comprising four or more persons were worth K1,800 in 2013, increased to K5,600 at the start of 2014 (after the base year was revised) but dropped to about K3,000 by the end of 2015. Benefits for households with four or more persons increased in real terms, to about K4,300 in January 2016 but the real value in transfers declined steadily thereafter, to K3,700 by March 2017.

Figure 7. 3: Real value of transfer amounts, 2013-2017



Source: calculated using data CPI data obtained from Trading Economics <https://tradingeconomics.com/malawi/consumer-price-index-cpi> and National Statistical Office of Malawi <http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=204%3Aconsumer-price-indiex-national-2014&catid=3&Itemid=37>

If primary and secondary school benefits were included, households could earn between K32,000 and K62,400 per annum. The size of the household and the number of school-going children determined the total benefits due to a household. Compared to the Malawi national poverty line which stood at K37,002 per person per year, cash transfer payments were inadequate to bring beneficiaries to subsist above the poverty line in the absence of other forms of support. Similarly, compared to the World Bank poverty line which stood at $1.90 per person per day, the transfer amounts were not adequate to ensure that members of beneficiary households would meet the threshold. Therefore, the evidence in Figure 7.3 shows that reforms to increase the value of benefits were insufficient to offset changes in real prices.

7.4.5 Legislation and status of programmes

The DPP government published a policy on older persons in 2016. The administration also adopted a second MNSSP which succeeded the first MNSSP that expired in 2016. These reforms are discussed below.

7.4.5.1 National Policy on Older Persons

In October 2016, the DPP government published a National Policy on Older Persons. The policy was aimed at providing a framework to coordinate all efforts by public and private sector organizations working to address the needs and rights of older persons (GoM, 2016b: 10). The policy identified older persons as vulnerable to poverty because most had worked in the informal sector with no entitlement to pensions in old age. At the same time, older people were likely to be frail and unable to work to sustain themselves (GoM, 2016: 11).

In 2005, the MoFEPD collaborated with the University of Malawi and the Aged Support Society of Malawi (a civil society organization supporting issues related to ageing) on a study that provided evidence of the pervasive nature of poverty among older persons (ibid). It is unclear why the policy was adopted more than a decade after the study was complete. It is reasonable to conclude that Bingu wa Mutharika's administration did not support the policy because of dominant attitudes towards social protection at the time. Later in this chapter, I demonstrate that Peter Mutharika's administration was opposed to categorical targeting of beneficiaries. This placed Cabinet at odds with some international donors who supported categorical targeting. Cabinet preferred poverty targeting that would encompass all categories of the poor. This certainly raises curiosity about how the older persons policy was eventually adopted. Unfortunately, the evidence needed to answer this question was not available for this study.

7.4.5.2 The second Malawi National Social Support Programme

The MNSSP was introduced as a four-year programme in June 2012 and expired in June 2016. In April 2016, the Malawian government launched a six-month stakeholder-driven review process to assess the performance of each MNSSP programme against strategic outcomes and objectives, and to develop a successor programme for the period 2017-2021 (which eventually became 2018-2023) (GoM, 2016). The process was led by the Department of Economic Planning and Development (EP&D) in the MoFEPD.[166]The findings of the review were reported on 1 February 2017 at a workshop to start the development of the second MNSSP. Based on the findings of the review, six thematic groups were established to address the main challenges of the MNSSP: (i) graduation, (ii) targeting, (iii) life cycle vulnerability and nutrition (to address basic needs of specific life cycle vulnerabilities e.g. early childhood, school age, working-age, elderly, disabilities), (iv) harmonisation of financing and payment systems, (v) coordination of programmes, and (vi) shock sensitive social protection (to

[166] Until 2014, the Department of Economic Planning and Development existed as a separate ministry i.e. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. Peter Mutharika reduced the number of ministries when he was elected in 2014 as part of cost cutting measures by his government. This resulted in the ministry becoming a department within the Ministry of Finance – which was then renamed Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development.

determine lessons to be learnt from crises and to link emergency responses to longer term planning). The thematic groups were formed by a task force leading the design of the MNSSP II, which included technocrats from EP&D and donor officials from UNICEF, GIZ, EU, UNICEF, Irish Aid and ILO.

The MNSSP II was published in March 2018. Unlike the first MNSSP which was a four-year programme, the second was designed as a five-year programme, expiring in 2023. The main departure from the first MNSSP can be summed up in the following passage taken from the executive summary:

> "MNSSP II recognizes that the needs of poor and vulnerable people change over their life cycles and during times of shocks. As such, MNSSP II is not structured around individual interventions or programmes that target specific population groups. Instead it recognizes the need for all social support programmes to coordinate and work together to provide consumption support and build resilient livelihoods. Improving the shock-sensitivity of the social protection system will better protect people's livelihoods against shocks" (GoM, 2018: iii).

There are two important points worth highlighting from the passage above. First, the MNSSP II was designed to ensure that the ultra-poor would be eligible to benefit from more than one social protection intervention provided the different programmes addressed different dimensions of poverty. With the first MNSSP, beneficiaries could only receive benefits from one programme. Second, because of recurring adverse climatic conditions which affected rainfall patterns and food production, responses to climate change were incorporated into social protection interventions. This included the provision of once-off benefits in the form of emergency cash transfers (which I discuss below) to individuals facing a crisis.

7.4.6 Emergency cash transfer programmes

The extent of food insecurity in Malawi increased in the early and mid-2000s due to climate change and adverse weather conditions during farming seasons. The Malawi Vulnerability and Assessment Committee (MVAC)[167] data show trends in the population vulnerable to food

[167] MVAC is a committee comprising government, inter-government, academic, donor and non-profit member organisations. It is responsible for providing assessments of areas affected by adverse weather patterns and determining the number of affected households in the areas. It also determines the extent of food deficits.

insecurity from the 2007/2008 to the 2015/2016 farming seasons. Figure 7.4 shows that the extent of food insecurity began to escalate in the 2012/2013 farming season. In that season, over 1.6 million people were reported to be vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. Malawi also experienced droughts in the 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 farming seasons. The population vulnerable to food insecurity increased to about 3 million people (almost 20% of the national population). The vulnerable population more than doubled in the 2016/2017 farming season, affecting 6.5 million people (about 40% of Malawi’s population).

Figure 7. 4: Population vulnerable to food insecurity, 2007-2017 farming seasons



Source: Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee

The DPP government introduced an Integrated Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (IECTP) in December 2014 as a response to food insecurity challenges. This followed a March 2014 report by MVAC which showed that adverse weather conditions in the 2013/2014 farming season had contributed to household food insecurity in 21 of the country’s 28 districts (MVAC, 2014). The IECTP provided short-term emergency food to vulnerable households through monthly cash transfers. Funding for the emergency cash transfer was provided by a consortium of development organizations operating in Malawi including Save the Children (which led the emergency response), Oxfam, Goal Malawi, Concern Universal, Concern Worldwide and Christian Aid. The WFP limited its involvement to food distribution. By January 2015, over 80,000 beneficiaries in 8 districts had been targeted and were paid once-off transfers of between K6,000 and K21,000 (i.e. between US$8 and US$28) depending on the severity of the food crisis in the district (Mbendela and Makoka, 2016). Households benefiting from other social protection interventions including cash transfers, farm inputs and public works, were not exempt from receiving emergency cash transfers.[168]

Drought in the 2014/2015 farming season put further strain on Malawi's food security position which demanded supplementary interventions (in addition to the IECTP) to support affected households. In March 2015, MVAC projected that close to 2.9 million people (about 17% of the national population) in 25 districts would face food deficits for periods ranging between 3 and 8 months before the end of 2015. The projections showed that about 124,000 MT of maize were required to meet the food deficit and emphasised the need for humanitarian assistance to continue in 2016 (MVAC, 2015). In May 2016, President Mutharika reported (during his SONA) that the affected population had been provided with relief maize drawn from the national Strategic Grain Reserve. He also noted that government resources and funds from the World Bank (through the Malawi Floods Emergency Recovery Project) would be used to procure maize, including 100,000 MT that the government would import from neighbouring Zambia and sell locally at subsidized prices.[169]

Despite improved rainfall patterns in the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 farming seasons, food shortages persisted in 2016 and early 2017. Because of the extent of the crisis, MVAC harmonized government efforts to provide relief maize with donor supported efforts to provide cash (through the IECTP) to vulnerable households. In late 2016, MVAC conducted an assessment by collecting data from villages and Traditional Authorities in all 28 districts to determine market functionality in each district before recommending the distribution of cash or relief maize. Based on the assessments, MVAC recommended cash transfers for 30% of the affected population through the IECTP. These were individuals in districts that had functional markets – i.e. districts with readily available maize at local markets close to the targeted population. This population included individuals in urban centres such as the capital Lilongwe and surrounding districts in the Central Region, and the second largest city Blantyre in the

[168] Conversations with Laurent Kansinjiro (19 October 2016) and Mathias Mbendela, Research Fellow, Malawi Public Policy Research and Analysis Project (MPPRAP), Department of Economic Planning and Development (19 October 2016)
[169] "Malawi President Peter Mutharika's SONA Speech" available at http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-president-mutharikas-sona-speech/

Southern Region. The NGO consortium led by Save the Children provided K21,000 (US$28) in cash transfers to beneficiary households.[170]

MVAC also recommended relief food to the remaining 70%. Donors supplemented the government efforts to provide relief food. The WFP had primary responsibility for distributing food with the support of NGOs. Between July 2016 and March 2017, Care International provided emergency cash transfers to about 50,000 households in five districts. Beneficiary households received K6,000 (US$8). Beneficiaries of the regular cash transfer programme in food insecure districts were considered more susceptible than non-beneficiaries and were therefore also entitled to emergency relief.[171]

In December 2016, the government imported 100,000 MT of maize from Zambia. However, media reports in early 2017 showed that the Malawian government had reportedly paid US$13 million more than it should have to import the maize in a corruption scandal dubbed "Maizegate". The Agriculture Minister, George Chaponda, was implicated in the scandal and the ensuing investigations resulted in cash worth nearly US$200,000 being unearthed at his home.[172] Chaponda was subsequently fired from his position, albeit after initial hesitation by Mutharika who only dismissed the minister after a sustained outcry from the public, media, civic organisations and opposition political parties.

7.5 How and why did a change of government matter for social protection reforms?

This section discusses two broad factors that explain how and why the 2014 change of government affected social protection reforms. The first focuses on the influence of transnational actors and discusses the relationship between international donor agencies and Peter Mutharika's administration. The second considers the interests of political elites within the DPP which are broken down into three categories including ideological interest (ideas, beliefs and attitudes), electoral interests (or party branding), and factionalism.

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[170] Interviews with Frank Musa, Research Fellow, Malawi Public Policy Research and Analysis Project (MPPRAP), Department of Economic Planning and Development (2 March 2017) and George Chimseu, Technical Advisor-Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) (2 March 2017)

[171] Interview with Geoffrey Kumwenda, Programme Director-Care International (7 February 2017)

[172] "Malawian President Fires Cabinet Minister over Maize Deal Scandal" available at https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-president-fires-cabinet-minister-over-maize-deal-scandal/3735100.html

7.5.1 Relationship between international donors and the Mutharika administration

At the time of the DPP's election in 2014, multilateral partners and international donors (including the IMF and World Bank) had withdrawn budgetary support to Malawi following the 2013 Cashgate scandal. As a condition to resume funding, donors demanded an investigation into the scandal and for action to be taken against the perpetrators.[173] Investigations into Cashgate were conducted but by March 2017, the DPP government had not released its report, amidst allegations in the Malawian media that allies of former President Bingu wa Mutharika, who were serving in Peter Mutharika's government, were implicated in the scandal.[174] Although Cashgate was unearthed in 2013, it is believed that the scandal – i.e. the looting of donor funds – goes back to 2009 when the late Mutharika was president.

The poor relationship with donors and the reduction in budgetary support constrained the government's ability to fund public programmes adequately. Funding to FISP was also affected. Donors continued providing financial support to social protection programmes. They also played a prominent role in designing the MNSSP II with the support of technocrats in the EP&D. During my research in Malawi, I attended four planning workshops for the development of the MNSSP II. It was evident from the meetings that donors had more influence than government technocrats in shaping the design of the programme. The facilitators of the workshops were international experts invited to Malawi by donors. The Task Force was also dominated by donor officials. When I presented this observation to Kalilani, she suggested that individual donor agencies at times advanced their own agendas at the expense of what government wanted. For example, the government supported the idea of ad-hoc interventions such as emergency cash transfers and supported increasing the eligibility threshold for the SCTP from the poorest 10% to the poorest 20%. Instead, donors preferred to support the complementarity of programmes rather than increasing the threshold for eligibility. Political elites in the DPP government were concerned about creating a dependency culture if the poor benefited from multiple programmes. Kalilani also stated that Cabinet had concerns that the government would not afford the cost of assuming responsibility for funding all programmes if donor support ended. Although the prospect of donor support ending was unlikely (at least

[173] Conversation with Ngeyi Kanyongolo, Chancellor College-University of Malawi (19 October 2016) Johannesburg

[174] Conversations with Mathias Mbendela, Centre for Social Research Malawi; and Ngeyi Kanyongolo, Chancellor College-University of Malawi, 19 October 2016, Johannesburg.

not until the MNSSP II expires in 2023), it does show that the government did not fully trust donors.[175]

For their part, donor officials believed that political elites in Cabinet were not fully supportive of social protection interventions. They held the view that Mutharika and Gondwe were not enthusiastic about cash transfers. Some donor officials interviewed for this study considered it necessary to improve communications with influential Cabinet members, including Gondwe, to win support for increased government funding. They also reported a lack of support from influential technocrats in the Treasury who still had concerns about the contribution of cash transfers to broader economic growth strategies. Although donor-government relations were complicated, donors were crucial in promoting the social protection agenda. This was largely due to the fiscal capacity of donors and the policy coalition that existed with technocrats in the planning and implementing ministries.

7.5.2 Ideological interests (ideas, beliefs and attitudes)

The DPP's ideas regarding social protection were shaped in the mid-2000s when Bingu wa Mutharika was president. Two broad issues are central to understanding these ideas. First, the DPP adopted a developmentalist agenda that was rooted in productivism and economic growth. Central to the DPP's agenda was the role of agriculture subsidies in achieving growth which would in turn result in sustained poverty reduction. Peter Mutharika's Finance Minister, Goodall Gondwe, was one of the principal architects of FISP (in his capacity as Finance Minister at the time) when the programme was launched as AISP in 2005. Because of the proven success of FISP, senior DPP leaders were reluctant to redirect resources to social protection interventions such as cash transfers because they were viewed as unproductive handouts that created dependency and did not contribute to growth. Second, some senior DPP leaders were sceptical about the role of donors in Malawi. Some of these concerns related to the negative impact of structural adjustment in the 1990s. Bingu wa Mutharika and Gondwe were international economists who had worked for multilateral institutions, and were critical of the impact of World Bank and IMF supported economic reforms on eroding state capacity in countries like Malawi. Therefore, they supported interventionist policies that focused on productivity and growth unlike Bakili Muluzi who implemented market friendly policies that were detrimental to the crucial agriculture sector and the economy at large.

[175] Interview with Jean Kalilani

In the 2014 elections, the DPP did not define itself in ideological terms. Rather, it demonstrated a commitment to continue with late Mutharika's policies that emphasized agriculture. In the 2014 election manifesto, the DPP defined itself as a party that stood for "people-centred development" (DPP, 2014: 10). It promised to "implement bottom-up economic policies aimed at getting the poor out of poverty into prosperity" if elected. The party also emphasised diversification of the economy from primary agriculture to sustain economic growth and promoting food security using fertilizer (ibid). The 60-paged manifesto made no mention of social cash transfers nor did it have a dedicated section to social protection.

After the 2014 elections, APM's administration, with Gondwe as a key policy architect, again emphasized farm subsidies. DPP leaders were aware that international donors would continue to support social protection programmes. At a time when the government was faced with severe fiscal constraints, leaders like Gondwe recognized the importance of supporting programmes that donors had much less interest in. Some DPP leaders interviewed for this study opined that it was useful for the government to prioritize sectors such as agriculture, education and health, given that donors had committed to support social protection. This demonstrates that ideas regarding social protection were also shaped by the normative views that DPP elites had about the distinct roles of the state and donors in achieving national development. Donors were better placed to provide social protection while the state focused on economic growth.

7.5.3 Electoral interests (electoral competition and branding)

The DPP became an opposition party in 2012 without losing an election. Since democratization in 1993, Malawi witnessed arguably its most significant economic gains under President Bingu wa Mutharika. Malawian citizens rated the performance of the DPP highly. A 2014 Afrobarometer survey (conducted before the national elections) showed that Peter Mutharika was the most trusted of all candidates to manage the economy and handle food security (two of the most important problems facing Malawians at the time) (Dulani & Chunga, 2014: 246).

Chinsinga and Poulton (2014: 128-129) observed that Malawian political parties all placed emphasis on agricultural subsidies and only differed on the strategies and modalities for implementation. Although the 2014 manifestos of the PP, DPP and MCP confirmed that the leading parties all prioritized agriculture, their ideas regarding redistribution differed especially in terms of the programmes they emphasized. The parties also differentiated themselves from each other to voters by emphasizing distinct characteristics of their leaders and parties.

Joyce Banda campaigned on a pro-poor platform and branded herself as a champion of the most vulnerable including women, the youth, the elderly, the disabled and students. The People's Party placed emphasis on promoting good governance to achieve economic growth and wealth creation (PP, 2014). This was mostly in response to alleged bad governance during Mutharika's second term which had contributed to general economic decline (PP, 2014: iii; Dulani & Chunga, 2014). The PP manifesto recognized that the agricultural sector was key to Malawi's development, and emphasized several social protection programmes that Banda had initiated and would continue with if re-elected. These included: "the Cow-A- Family, public works, social cash transfers, school bursary and school feeding programmes, FISP, and the food aid programme" (PP, 2014: 56). The manifesto also proposed a fertilizer input loan programme for farmers who would wean out of social protection programmes (ibid).

The DPP campaigned on its record of good economic management during its eight-year rule. On the campaign trail, Peter Mutharika's theme was to: "continue from where my brother left off" (Hamer, 2016: 39). Regarding its policy positions, the party's 2014 manifesto stated that:

> "The DPP has been tried and tested and has proved its salt. We made promises which we kept. Promises to drastically reduce the number of households which were perpetually without food…The DPP government will not pursue the trickle-down economics, but rather will implement bottom-up economic policies aimed at getting the poor out of poverty into prosperity. We have done this before; impacted on the lives of millions of Malawians through food security and economic opportunities; our government brought down poverty levels in Malawi from 64% down to 42%, in addition to making history for Malawi as the fastest growing economy in Africa. We will simply perfect our approach to the development of Malawi, increase productivity and make life better for all Malawians" (DPP: 8-10).

The DPP won re-election on the back of its implementation of FISP and good economic management. This motivated DPP leaders to focus on food security after 2014. Even then, there were attempts within the DPP to appropriate cash transfers as an initiative of the government in places where donors were implementing them. For example, Patricia Kaliati who was MoGCDSW minister from 2014 to 2016, posited that political leaders had an obligation to provide social assistance to the poorest that were responsible for electing them. In an interview for this study, Kaliati opined:

> "Some of us who have these (elected) positions because of the poor person who woke up early in the morning to vote for us, we need to think about that person. And we need to be accountable to that person. So, we need to do things in that quick pace so that we can close the gap (between the rich and the poor) as quickly as possible. One way of saying thanks so much is to make sure that we bring these programmes (cash transfers) to them".[176]

Kaliati's purported support for cash transfers belied the fact that the DPP government had not committed tax funding for the SCTP. The DPP administration had also resisted proposals from donors and technocrats to redirect resources from farm subsidies to cash transfers. DPP leaders were aware of the electoral benefits of farm subsidies and recognized the limits of Banda's social protection brand in 2014.

7.5.4 Factional interests (factionalism)

The DPP was a coalition of political leaders with diverse backgrounds, including many who had previously belonged to other parties. Nonetheless, political power within the DPP resided with a small group of elites including Peter Mutharika, Goodall Gondwe (The DPP Vice President for the Northern Region and Finance Minister), George Chaponda (the DPP Vice President for the Southern Region, Agriculture Minister, and Leader of Government Business in Parliament) and Jean Kalilani (DPP Presidential Advisor and Minister of Gender, Children, Disabilities and Social Welfare). These individuals were all close allies of Bingu wa Mutharika. Like the late Mutharika, they had spent decades working for international organizations (including the African Development Bank, the IMF, the UN and the World Bank) before returning to Malawi and joining politics. Although they did not publicly identify with the late Mutharika's Pan-Africanist ideas, they were closely associated with his policies and were crucial to implementing the DPP's food security brand.

The DPP leaders were consistent in their approach to public policy when they served in Cabinet between 2004 and 2012 and again after 2014. Moreover, FISP and maize imports provided opportunities for DPP elites to accumulate wealth, provide party funding, and redistribute rents to potential voters. Although FISP began as a programme that targeted small-scale farmers who were deserving of subsidized inputs, it had morphed into a programme with vested business

[176] Interview with Patricia Kaliati

and political interests by 2012. This was like the Zambian case, where powerful interests called the "maize mafia" had emerged to control and benefit from the distribution of fertiliser and collection of maize from rural areas (Pruce & Hickey, 2019). A case in point in Malawi was the maize gate scandal. While Chaponda was at the centre of the scandal, it emerged that prominent businessmen and other powerful elites linked to the DPP were involved in various stages of the purchase and distribution of relief maize. This included contracts to resale maize and to transport maize across the country.[177] It is believed that the interests that were involved in the maize scandal were also crucial to the distribution of subsidized fertiliser. Although Joyce Banda had also promoted FISP, her faction was not directly associated with the powerful interests that controlled the distribution of farm inputs. Neither was she able to dismantle the entrenched interests of the Malawian "maize mafia" that was also crucial to supporting the DPP's return to power.

The discussion above does not suggest that support for maize distribution and social protection are mutually exclusive. However, the evidence shows that when the Malawian government was faced with a severe food crisis, it limited itself to the distribution of relief food (and the distribution of subsidized fertiliser) while leaving donors to implement emergency cash transfers. Moreover, the link between the DPP and powerful interests in the distribution of FISP and maize, disposed Mutharika's administration to promote agriculture interventions. This demonstrates some of the ways through which clientelist politics militates against the promotion of programmatic social protection.

7.6 Conclusion

The existing literature on social protection reforms in Malawi mostly covers the period before 2014. Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette (2014) provide a compelling examination of the role of ideas in limiting the promotion of cash transfers. Their analysis correctly identifies an important factor that explains the limited expansion of cash transfers in the period before 2012. Yet the analysis does not account for factors beyond ideas. Furthermore, it does not focus on reforms during Peter Mutharika's presidency. Hamer (2016) and Hamer & Seekings (2019) show how political parties branded themselves differently on social issues during the 2014 elections but do not discuss the relationship between branding and public policy after the

[177] In interviews with scholars of Malawian politics and opposition MPs, it was suggested that Mutharika did not initially dismiss Chaponda during the Maizegate scandal because the DPP as a party benefitted from the proceeds of the maize import deal.

elections. Therefore, this chapter provides a more systematic and comprehensive account of social protection reforms in Malawi from 2014 to 2017 than existing studies have provided. The analysis provided in this case study goes beyond ideas and political branding and considers the role of transnational actors (and how they relate with ruling elites) and the factional interests that ruling elites have to promote social protection and other forms of distribution.

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the change of government from the PP to the DPP was consequential for social protection reforms. Although the two parties were not ideologically distinct, and many MPs had served as Cabinet ministers under both administrations, the PP and DPP served as vehicles for rival political factions to assume state power. The competitive nature of Malawian politics and the desire for accumulation, provided incentives for the two factions to brand themselves differently on social issues. The distinct interests of the rival factions also provided international donors and technocrats with different opportunities to push for social protection policy reforms. Whereas Banda's background and unconventional political dynamics disposed her to embrace donor supported reforms, including to promote social protection, the interests of senior DPP leaders disposed them to provide large scale agriculture support at the expense of cash transfers.

Beyond the literature on Malawi, this chapter makes an important contribution to understanding social protection reforms in Africa. Lavers and Hickey (2016) suggested that domestic political factors that promote or constrain the promotion of social protection need to be explored in more detail. This chapter demonstrates the ways in which partisan politics – refracted through a change of government – contributes to a deeper understanding of how and why Malawi's social protection agenda remains largely donor driven despite notional efforts at state supported social protection during Banda's presidency. This chapter also demonstrates the limits of Carbone and Pellegata's (2017) analysis which argues that electoral turnovers lead to more provision of social welfare in Africa. This chapter shows that while electoral competition increases the likelihood of more social assistance, it is more important to understand the incentives of political elites in the ruling coalition that emerges after a change of government to reform or not. Furthermore, it is important to understand the extent to which the interests of donors converge with those of political elites on social protection.

CHAPTER 8: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICY REFORM AND CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

8.1 Introduction

The last four chapters provided case studies of how and why changes of government affected social protection policy making in Zambia and Malawi. The process tracing methodology that was used for the case studies explained the causal mechanisms through which changes of government led to reforms to promote or constrain the provision of social cash transfer programmes. However, the evidence could not be used to make inferences about reforms beyond the two countries. This chapter goes beyond the case studies and develops an explanation of the implications for changes of government on social protection policy in a broader set of cases. It does this by addressing the research question: "How do these two country cases compare with a broader set of cases in Anglophone East and Southern Africa?" It demonstrates how Zambia and Malawi fit into a broader set of African cases by examining the statistical relationship between changes of government and policy reform in Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The quantitative analysis is built on the logical foundations of a Most Different Systems Design.

8.2 Theoretical and empirical evidence

This section briefly presents the main theoretical approaches and empirical evidence that informed the quantitative analysis in this chapter. Because this study was primarily interested in understanding the relative importance of changes of government – which are rare in East and Southern Africa – on variation in the expansion of SCT programmes, I drew insights from studies that examined the effect of political variables on social policy reforms in other regions.

Much of the global literature examining welfare state development and reforms to social protection, has focused on the contribution of democratization, partisanship, economic development and regional diffusion on social welfare outcomes. Studies show a generally strong and positive effect for democracy on at least some measures of welfare provision.

Evidence from 114 developing countries in the Global South,[178] from 1990 to 2011, shows that higher levels of democracy were associated with an increased likelihood of adopting any form of cash transfers (both conditional and unconditional) (Brooks, 2015). The evidence was similar for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Brown and Hunter (1999) found that for a set of 17 Latin American countries, from 1980 to 1992, governments in democratic countries were relatively more sensitive to political pressure from groups that benefitted from social security (meaning, primarily, social insurance) than governments of authoritarian countries. Cruz-Martinez (2017) did not find evidence to suggest that democratization was the main driver of welfare state development in Latin America and the Caribbean, in eight out of 17 countries that he examined, but he found that low levels of democratization appear to have been the main reason behind low welfare state development. More recently, a study on 35 sub-Saharan African countries also found evidence showing that the level of democracy had a positive and statistically significant correlation with total spending on social protection (Opalo, 2019).

The foregoing studies focused on different dependent variables and had different measures of welfare state provision. It is likely that democracy might have more of an effect on some measures than others. Moreover, the studies controlled for other demographic and development variables that show different effects for democracy on social welfare. Brooks (2015) found that democratic countries with a small youth population size relative to the working age population had a higher likelihood of adopting cash transfer programmes. She also found that democracies with higher levels of per capita income were more likely to enact CCTs compared to unconditional cash transfers, while the reverse was true for countries with low levels of per capita income. Similar effects were evident in Latin America. Brown and Hunter (1999) found that the poorest democracies increased social insurance spending by a substantial margin over authoritarian regimes, controlling for other independent variables in their model.

There is also evidence supporting the contribution of partisan effects on social welfare. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) found that in 14 Latin America countries from 1973 to 1997, popular based governments (parties with strong historical links to labour unions or "the popular sector") were more likely to protect and expand spending on pensions and other forms of welfare transfers. Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2012) found that amongst 18 Latin

[178] East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

American countries, democracy enabled left wing governments to provide more social spending because of the effect of left political strength which relied on support of poorer classes. However, recent evidence from developing countries shows that the effect of partisanship on social spending differs depending on the type of programmes. Brooks (2015) demonstrated that across the Global South, the expansion of conditional cash transfers was in neither the left nor the right of the political spectrum (as discussed further by Fairfield & Garay, 2017). Rather, the adoption of CCTs was more likely when governing power between the executive and the legislature was more deeply divided between ideological rivals. This was because conditionalities provided a potential compromise between ideological polarities on welfare state provision. Furthermore, partisanship appeared to have no systematic effect in the adoption of unconditional cash transfers (Brooks, 2015).

Although the study by Brooks (2015) also included cases from the sub-Saharan Africa region, studies examining the effect of partisanship for African countries only remain very limited. Carbone and Pellegata (2017) did not address partisanship explicitly but they considered the effects of changes of government between political parties on measures of social welfare. Their study found that multiparty democracies in which electoral turnovers took place over time were more likely to provide more social welfare for their citizens than countries in which such instances occurred less frequently or never took place at all.

Regarding economic development, there appears to be a consensus that high levels of growth contributed to more social spending across regions. Schmitt et al. (2015) found that for 177 territories and independent states, economic growth was a catalyst for welfare state development, with rich countries spending more on social security than poor countries. Cruz-Martinez (2017) could not provide evidence that high levels of industrialization were the common path that conditioned welfare state development in Latin America and the Caribbean, but he found that low levels of industrialization appeared to be one of two main reasons behind the low welfare state development for eight countries in the region.

Finally, studies have also examined the contribution of regional diffusion on the adoption of some social welfare programmes. For example, Schmitt et al. (2015) showed that there was strong evidence for the existence of regional diffusion of social security programmes and that membership of the ILO had a clear impact on the adoption of work, injury, sickness and old age programmes. Furthermore, Brooks (2015) found that as more countries of the same geographic region implemented CCTs, the likelihood of subsequent adoptions among regional peers increased, but the effect was sharpest in Latin America compared to other regions she considered.

The foregoing discussion shows that democratization, partisanship (including changes of government), economic development and regional diffusion were among the most significant explanatory variables for social spending or the adoption of social programmes. Therefore, this study considered variables that provided measures of similar outcome and explanatory variables adopted by other global and regional studies. In the section that follows, I discuss how these variables were measured before providing a discussion on the data and methods used for this study.

8.3 Analysis of data and variables

While this study focuses primarily on SCTs, most of the quantitative analyses on welfare state development have focused on other forms of social welfare provision. This includes dependent variables that measure social spending on social welfare or on social security. The rest of this section examines the data that other studies used for cross national statistical analysis and considers how the main dependent and independent variables were measured.

Most studies have focused on social spending on various aspects of social welfare (‘effort’) for their dependent variables. For example, in a study to analyse the determinants of social spending, poverty and inequality for a cross national study of 18 Latin American countries, Huber and Stephens (2012) computed outcome variables for education, health and social security spending as percentages of GDP. The data were obtained from the United Nations University Worldwide Institute for Development Economics Research’s Income Inequality Database and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean. These datasets provided survey data that were comparable across country-years.

Some studies focus on the introduction of welfare programmes. Schmitt et al. (2015) sought to determine the international and domestic factors that explain when and why national governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection. Their study covered 177 territories and independent states[179] for the period 1820 to 2013. Using data obtained from the United States Social Security Administration, the study computed outcome variables for the introduction date of five dimensions of social security legislation (compensation in case of work injury, sickness, old age, unemployment, and family support). This provided the researchers with data that were comparable for all territories and independent states for the period under consideration.

Other studies also used comparable data on social spending for a range of countries over time. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) used IMF data on social spending (including per capita spending, spending as percentage of GDP, and share of central government spending) on social security, education and healthcare for their time series cross section analysis of fourteen Latin American countries from 1973 to 1991. Brown and Hunter (1999) used social spending and social spending per capita on programmes in education, health, sanitation, housing, and social security as outcome variables. Carbone and Pellegata's (2017) study on the effect of changes of government on social welfare focused on four social welfare outcome variables: health expenditure, primary school enrolment rate, life expectancy at birth, and under five mortality-rate.

Most of the studies highlighted above did not focus on SCTs for their dependent variables. One study that did consider cash transfers is Brooks (2015) which examined factors that explained variation in the adoption of cash transfers. Brooks did not focus on social spending on programmes but focused instead on whether countries had adopted a conditional or unconditional cash transfer. Her emphasis was on the year programmes were introduced, which she coded 1 for a year a programme was introduced and 0 otherwise. By using a binary dependent variable, she was able to use a dynamic logit model to estimate the likelihood that in any given year between 1990 and 2011, a country had adopted a cash transfer programme.

In terms of independent variables, various measures of democracy, partisanship, economic development and regional diffusion have been used in different studies. For Huber and Stephens (2012), the main political (independent) variables included democracy (regime type), long-term democracy, left-political strength (proportion of left and centre-left legislative seats over time), and repressive authoritarianism. Polity 2 Score was a commonly used measure of

[179] From Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and The Americas

democracy and was also useful for classifying autocracies and democracies (Brooks, 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015). Measures of partisanship included binary measures of left-wing government and right-wing government (e.g. Brooks, 2015). Meanwhile, GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation rate were the most common measures of economic development. The economic measures were at times used as control variables together with measures such as population size, age dependency, and exchange rates. For the regional diffusion measure, studies considered the probability of a country adopting programmes if similar decisions were made elsewhere in the geographic region and the impact of membership to organizations such as ILO (Brooks, 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015).

In the section below, I consider how the data, variables and methods used in this study are similar or different to those in the studies discussed in this section.

8.4 Data, variables and methods

This study was primarily concerned with reforms to promote social cash transfer programmes. It would have been appropriate to measure the dependent variable by considering spending on social protection since 1990 for all 10 countries like studies from other regions have done with measures of social security. The study would also have benefited from adopting a measure of changes in the absolute number of beneficiaries over time. However, the required time series data on SCT spending and coverage were unavailable for the region. The unavailability of data points to a broader challenge in accessing country level measures of social protection across sub-Saharan Africa from both national governments and international agencies. This explains why the study resorted to using simple counts (or quasi-statistics) to measure the dependent variable and the main independent variables, a point also explained in Chapter 3. The data used for this study were drawn from LIWPR case studies and supplemented by additional country studies from other sources. A detailed list of data sources is provided in Appendix 2. The LIWPR studies did not provide time series data to measure reforms, but they provided historical qualitative accounts (which sometimes also included quantitative data) of reforms that have been implemented in respective country cases. Through a careful review of the country studies, I was able to determine whether respective national governments had implemented the kinds of reforms examined in preceding chapters.

The dependent variable for this study – "social protection reform" – is an index that measures whether a government administration implemented five dimensions of reform. The index score ranges from 0 to 5, corresponding to the number of dimensions of reform that were implemented. Granted, reforms are in many instances path dependent. This means that administrations that succeeded high scoring reformers may have lower scores (although few of the counties have the coverage or expenditure recommended by international organisations).

The key independent variable measures whether there was or was not a change of government. This variable is more like the measure used by Carbone and Pellegata (2017) rather than a measure of partisanship that classified national governments on a left- to right-wing spectrum. The change of government variable was measured on a scale that considered whether there was no change, a partial change or a complete change of government for each national election held since 1990, when the democratic wave began, until 2017. This corresponds to 53 data points for the change of government variable for the 10 countries.

The other independent variables were "donor influence," a dummy variable which measures whether reforms to promote SCTs were influenced by transnational actors and "elite interests" which is an index of three variables measuring ideological interests, electoral interests and factional interests. The quantitative studies discussed in the previous sections did not consider the influence of elite interests. This was a major focus of this study. While some studies considered the effect of donor influence, it was regarding the effect of membership of countries to organizations like ILO to programme adoption and to a limited extent to regional diffusion of programmes.

Existing studies have used measures of democracy and economic growth as either independent or control variables. These measures were used as control variables in this study. Polity2 Score, which places countries on a scale from strongly autocratic to strongly democratic, was adopted as a measure of democracy. The Polity2 Score data, provided by the Sustainable Competitiveness Observatory website, were available for all countries for the period considered. The rate of GDP growth was used as a measure of economic growth. The World Bank's online data bank provided data on GDP growth for all 10 countries for the period under consideration. The analysis also included control variables for period over time (or year) and for lower income countries, both of which were dummy variables.

Table 8. 1: Summary of variables in quantitative analysis

Variable	Category	Description
Social protection reform	Index	Did the government administration implement reforms to: (1) increase state expenditure on social protection programmes, (2) increase coverage of social protection programmes (3) introduce a national policy on social protection or national document with section on social protection (4) increase the value of benefits paid to beneficiaries, and (5) expand social protection programmes
Change of government	Ordinal scale	Was there a change of government? 0=no change, 1=partial change, 2=complete change
Donor influence	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with the influence of donors? 0=no, 1=yes
Factional interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associate with the interests of a faction within the ruling coalition? 0=no, 1=yes
Ideological interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with ideological interests of the ruling party? 0=no, 1=yes
Electoral interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with the electoral interests of the party in government? 0=no, 1=yes
Elite interests	Index	A scale from 1-3 measuring the number of interests for which each government administration scored ‘yes’

Variable	Category	Description
Polity2 Score	Composite scale	Measure of democracy. Scale ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
GDP growth	Continuous	Rate of GDP growth in the last year of each term of office for the government administration
Year	Dummy	Coded 0 for years from 1990 to 2004 and 1 for years from 2005 to 2015.
Lower Income Countries	Dummy	Is the country a lower income or lower middle-income country or not? 0 = No, 1 = Yes

8.5 Results

This section reports the results of the statistical analysis. It reports descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and linear regression results.

8.5.1 Descriptive statistics

The statistical analysis begins by providing descriptive statistics for the five items that were used to compute the dependent variable (social protection reform) and the three items used to compute the variable for elite interests. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8.2.

Table 8. 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variable items

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Expansion of programmes	.38	.489	0	1
Increase in Expenditure	.60	.494	0	1
Increase in Coverage	.75	.434	0	1
Introduction of Policy	.43	.500	0	1
Increase in Benefits	.34	.478	0	1
Ideology	.13	.342	0	1
Factionalism	.25	.434	0	1
Electoral Competition	.19	.395	0	1

Furthermore, descriptive results for the dependent variable, three independent variables, and two control variables are reported in Table 8.3.

Table 8. 3: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Social Protection Reform	2.51	1.56	0	5
Change of Government	.72	.794	0	2
Elite Interests	.57	.844	0	3
Donor Influence	.21	.409	0	1
GDP Growth t-1	4.76	4.58	-17.67	16.67
Polity2 Score	5.02	3.86	-4	9
Year	.496	.505	0	1
Country Classification	.698	.463	0	1

Figure 8.1 shows the average score – on a scale of 0 to 5 – of social protection reform for the 10 countries. Namibia (3.8), Botswana (3.6), South Africa (3.6) and Lesotho (3) had the highest scores and were above the average for the ten countries. Zambia (2) and Malawi (1.8) both scored below the average but were ahead or equal to the four lowest scoring countries, with Zimbabwe (1.3) recording the lowest average. The data show that upper-middle income countries with programmes initiated by national governments achieved higher scores of reforms than low-income and lower-middle income countries with donor-initiated programmes.

Figure 8. 1: Average social policy reform



Furthermore, a cross tabulation was conducted to display the relationship between social protection reform and the three categories of changes of government. There were 26 cases of no change, 16 of partial change, and 11 of complete change. Appendix 1 categorises governments according to the extent of reform and the degree to which there was a change of government (showing the date of government formation in brackets). Sixteen out of 53 government administrations had a high score of social protection reform (i.e. scored 4 or 5). These include 4 administrations in Namibia, three each in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, and one each in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia.

To provide a fuller picture of how the 10 country cases performed over time, I show the distribution of "social protection reform" from 1990 to 2017. I show how distinct clusters of countries have performed over the years under different government administrations.

Figure 8. 2: Reform over time in upper middle-income countries



Figure 8.2 shows the first cluster which includes the three upper middle-income countries: Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. These countries had already adopted SCT programmes by the early 1990s and had also developed domestic comprehensive social protection systems by the early 2000s. One implication of this is that the extent of reforms gradually declined in the 2000s under successive national governments.

Figure 8.3 shows the second cluster which includes the four low and lower-middle income democratic countries in the analysis: Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia. These four countries had similar trajectories.

Figure 8. 3: Reform over time in low and lower middle-income democratic countries



Except for Lesotho, the countries in this cluster did not implement national SCT programmes in the 1990s and the extent of social protection reform was very low during this period. With the introduction of donor pilot cash transfer programmes in the early and mid-2000s, the extent of reform gradually increased, and most countries achieved high “social protection reform” scores after changes of government in the late 2000s and 2010s. The countries in this cluster also had a distinct trajectory from the countries shown in Figure 8.4.

The third cluster includes low and lower middle-income countries that were weakly democratic: Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Figure 8.4 shows that these three countries had low scores throughout the 1990s. Even with the proliferation of cash transfer programmes in the region in the 2000s, these countries achieved modest levels of reform over time, which were on average lower than those achieved by countries in the first and second clusters.

Figure 8. 4: Reform over time in low income weakly democratic countries



The countries with the highest score of reforms were the upper-middle income countries, regardless of whether they had experienced changes of government or not. This suggests that changes of government may not have influenced social protection reforms in the 10 countries. Rather, upper-middle income countries with SCTs driven by domestic politics appeared more likely to have higher scores of reforms than low-income and lower-middle income countries that had donor-initiated programmes. This finding provides some evidence that confirms arguments made by Devereux (2010) Niño-Zarazúa et. al. (2011) and Hickey et al. (2019) who argue that variation in social protection reforms in Africa can be explained by differences in national wealth, with wealthier countries providing more comprehensive social protection to their citizens than poorer countries. However, descriptive statistics were inadequate to draw major conclusions. In the sections that follow, I present bivariate and multivariate analyses to test the relationships between the study variables further.

8.5.2 Bivariate correlations

Table 8.4 shows the results of an inter-item bivariate correlation among the variables considered in the quantitative analysis. It demonstrates how the items were associated with each other.

Table 8. 4: Inter-item Pearson Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Reform								
(2) Change of Government	.057							
(3) Donor Influence	**.282***	.054						
(4) Elite Interests	**.564***	.258	.210					
(5) GDP Growth t-1	-.036	.019	-.149	-.135				
(6) Polity2 Score	**.574****	**.279***	.022	**.409****	.024			
(7) Year	**.359****	.042	.335	.103	.209	.182		
(8) Lower Income Countries	**-.553****	.093	**.337***	**-.292***	.048	**-.437****	.070	

**p* <.05, ***p* < .01

Correlations were computed for social protection reform, change of government, donor influence, elite interests, GDP growth t-1, Polity2 score, year and for lower income countries (or country classification) for 53 cases of change of government in 10 countries. The results demonstrate that 10 out of 28 correlations were statistically significant and were greater or equal to $r(51) = +.27, p < .05$. *Social Protection Reform* was statistically associated with *Donor Influence* [$r(51) = +.28, p < .05$], *Elite Interests* [$r(51) = +.56, p < .01$], *Polity2 Score* [$r(51) = +.57, p < .01$], *Year* [$r(51) = +.36, p < .01$] and *Lower Income Countries* [$r(51) = +.55, p < .01$]. Other significant results were correlations between *Change of Government* and *Polity2 Score* [$r(51) = +.28$, p $< .05$], and *Donor Influence* and *Lower Income Countries* [$r(51) = +.34, p < .05$]. *Elite Interests* was correlated with *Polity2 Score* [$r(51) = +.41$, p $< .01$] and *Lower Income Countries* [$r(51) = -.29, p < .05$]. Finally, *Polity2 Score* was correlated with *Lower Income Countries* [$r(51) = -.44, p < .01$].

In general, the results suggest that the extent of social policy reform across the 10 countries was most closely associated with the level of democratization followed closely by the interests of political elites and the economic status of the country. Importantly, the results show that changes of government were not statistically associated with social protection reforms even though they were associated with democratization. Furthermore, the results show that over time, donor influence was associated with both the World Bank's country classification of a country and social protection reforms. This is consistent with literature showing that donors promoted social protection in poor countries from the early 2000s onwards (e.g. Hickey et al., 2019).

8. 5.3 Multiple linear regression

A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict social protection reform based on change of government, donor influence, elite interests. A second regression model included controls for GDP growth t-1, Polity2 Score, year, and lower income countries[180]. The results are reported in Table 8.5.

[180] This variable includes both 'low-income countries' and 'lower-middle-income countries.'

Table 8. 5: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of Predictors of Social Policy Reform

	Model 1	Model 2
Change of govt.	-.070	-.020
	(.559)	(.826)
Donor influence	.171	**.331****
	(.152)	(.002)
Elite interests	**.546****	**.244***
	(.000)	(.014)
GDP Growth t-1		.021
		(.811)
Polity2 Score		**.206***
		(.048)
Year		**.218***
		(.020)
Lower Income Countries		**-.518****
		(.000)
Adjusted R^2	.311	.667

**p* <.05, ***p* < .01

A significant regression equation was found in the first model F(3,49) = 8.827, p < .001, with an Adjusted R^2 of .311. This shows that 31% of the variation in social protection reforms can be explained by the three main predictor variables. The results show that when *Social Protection Reform* was predicted, *Elite Interests* (β =.546, p < .01) was the only significant predictor. High scores on *Elite Interests* were associated with higher social protection scores. *Change of Government* (β = -.070, p = .559) and *Donor Influence* (β = .171, p = .152) were not significant predictors of social protection reform.

A significant regression equation was also found in the second model F(7,49) = 15.879, p < .001, with an Adjusted R^2 of .667. The model explained 67% of the variation in social protection reforms (more than double the variance explained by the first model). The results also show that controlling for economic development, democracy, year and income level of the country, *Elite Interests* had a statistically significant but much smaller effect on social protection reform (β =.331, p < .01) than in the first model. Three of the four control variable, *Polity2 Score* (β =.206, p < .05), *Year* (β =.218, p < .05) and *Lower Income Countries* (β =-

.518, $p < .01$) were also significant predictors of reform. It is instructive to note that when controlling for a country's economic growth rate, level of democracy, time and World Bank country classification, *Donor Influence* was a significant predictor of reforms ($\beta = .331$, $p < .01$). The results further show that democratization had a stronger unique effect on social protection reform than elite interests. The remaining independent and control variables were not statistically significant in the second model.

The evidence emerging from the case study chapters shows that changes of government were consequential for reforms. Yet the results of the regression analysis show that changes of government did not predict social protection reform. However, the statistical analysis shows that controlling for other independent variables, both elite interests and donor influence were predictors of reform. This confirms that the casual mechanisms linking changes of government to social protection reforms in Malawi and Zambia, were also present elsewhere in the East and Southern African region, regardless of whether changes of government happened or not.

8.6 How do Zambia and Malawi fit into a broader set of African cases?

Based on the evidence emerging from the descriptive statistics (including Appendix 1), at least four distinctive categories emerge to categorise national governments in terms of the relationship between changes of government and social protection reforms.

8.6.1 No changes of government and no reforms

The first category includes cases with no changes of government and no social protection reforms. The cases in this country (including the 1992 and 1997 Moi administrations in Kenya, the 1994 Muluzi administration in Malawi, and the 1996 and 2002 Mugabe administrations in Zimbabwe) are predominantly national governments in the 1990s, before the introduction of donor-initiated cash transfer programmes. In the Kenya and Zimbabwe cases, they also included long serving presidents.

8.6.2 Changes of government and no reform

The second category includes cases with complete changes of government but no reforms. These include cases such as the 1991 Chiluba administration in Zambia and the 1994 Muluzi administration in Malawi. Complete changes of government were not sufficient for reforms in these cases partly because national governments were ideologically and fiscally committed to scaling back the state as they implemented structural adjustment reforms. Moreover, the first and second categories comprise cases where social protection had not yet emerged on the agenda. These two categories are inconsistent with the four case studies that this thesis focuses on – where partial and complete changes in government happened after the social protection agenda had emerged.

8.6.3 No changes of government and reforms

The third distinctive category includes “deviant” cases in which significant social protection reforms happened without changes in government. These cases, mostly from the mid and late 2000s, include the 2004 Mogae administration in Botswana, the 2007 Mosisili administration in Lesotho, and the 2010 Pohamba administration in Namibia. Evidence from process tracing research provides insights that explain why changes of government were neither necessary nor sufficient for significant social protection reforms under these government administrations.

In Botswana, welfare provision for orphaned and vulnerable children and public works programmes were expanded during Festus Mogae’s second and final term of office (Chinyoka, 2019a). Although political competition in the 2009 elections contributed to the decision to expand social provision, the main drivers of reforms were response to the 2008 global economic crisis which resulted in an increase in people living in poverty due to job losses in the mining sector, and the effects of AIDS which had contributed to an increase in households with OVCs (ibid). The Botswana case shows that changes in government did not matter for reforms because structural factors (the economy and AIDS) were the primary drivers of reforms.

In Lesotho, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili won a second term in 2007 the same year that the European Union and UNICEF initiated a means-tested Child Grant Programme (Granvik, 2019). Although Mosisili is credited for the introduction of an old age pension in 2004, the Child Grant was primarily implemented and funded by international donors (although the next government assumed ownership of the programme) as a response to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, and was not driven by domestic political factors such as a change in government (ibid).

In Namibia, Hifikepunye Pohamba was elected to a second and final term in 2010 and his administration presided over substantial social protection reforms which included the introduction of a poverty targeted Vulnerable Grant in 2014 (Chinyoka, 2019b). In the Pohamba case, a change in government was neither necessary nor sufficient for reforms. Chinyoka (2019b: 19) described Pohamba as a "reformist" who supported programmatic reforms. Even then, the ruling SWAPO party had come under pressure from international donors such as UNICEF and the ILO, as well as domestic civil society, to implement a basic income grant but the SWAPO leadership adopted the Vulnerable Grant instead. This grant also served as a political tool to win the support of the rural and urban poor, and unemployed parents who were not recipients of existing grants. Another factor that explains the significant reforms in Namibia after 2010, was the appointment of Hage Geingob as Prime Minister in 2012 who was much less ambivalent about cash transfers than his predecessor (ibid: 21-22). This paved the way for faster reforms (even though reforms stalled after Geingob was elected in 2014).

The "deviant" cases discussed above were also inconsistent with the case studies discussed in this thesis. For the cases in the third category, significant social protection reforms happened because of the importance of structural factors, the role of international donors and domestic politics. Reforms happened in the absence of electoral alternation.

8.6.4 Changes of government and reforms

The fourth distinctive category included cases where partial or complete changes of government were consequential for reforms. This includes the 2012 Thabane complete change of government in Lesotho and the 2007 partial change of government in Kenya. In the Thabane case, the All Basotho Congress led ruling coalition took over funding of Child Grant benefits in 2013 and published a National Social Protection Strategy in 2014 (Granvik, 2019). While domestic politics was crucial for the adoption of cash transfers, international donors such as the EU and UNICEF played prominent roles in persuading the government to reform (ibid). The available process tracing evidence on reforms in Lesotho does not fully explore the extent to which the 2012 change of government (and domestic politics) was consequential for social protection but it appears that significant reforms to promote pensions and modest Child Grant reforms under the former Prime Minister, Mosisili, led to faster reforms under Thabane (ibid). This suggests that reforms were in part path dependent although electoral competition in a fragmented political system (where coalition building is the norm) may also have contributed to reforms.

The 2007 partial change of government in Kenya, when President Mwai Kibaki formed a coalition government with his main rival, Raila Odinga, resulted in significant reforms to promote social protection which led to an expansion of coverage and increased budgetary allocations for all cash transfer programmes from 2010 onwards. Moreover, the ruling coalition made the provision of social protection for the deserving poor a constitutional right that same year (Wanyama & McCord, 2017). Kenya's social protection agenda initially began ahead of elections in 2002, when UNICEF and domestic civil society convinced politicians from the then opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), led by Kibaki, to sign a memorandum on social protection (Wanyama & McCord, 2017: 14). Consequently, NARC adopted social protection in its manifesto and implemented modest reforms during Kibaki's first term. But disputed elections in 2007 led to the formation of a government of national unity. According to Wanyama and McCord (2017), the large multi-ethnic government coalition formed by the two rivals (Kibaki and Odinga), led to a political settlement that promoted programmatic redistribution that benefited politicians in the coalition.

Therefore, the Malawi and Zambian case studies fit more neatly into other cases where partial or complete changes of government were consequential for reforms (even though other factors also mattered). They were also distinct from cases where structural factors appear to have been the primary driver of reforms. Furthermore, they were distinct from the upper-middle income cases that achieved significant reforms in the 1990s, before the introduction of donor-initiated cash transfers elsewhere in the region. Moreover, Malawi and Zambia were most similar to other democratic low and lower middle-income countries in the analysis which experienced increased levels of electoral competition (and higher possibilities of turnovers) over time. This is consistent with theoretical arguments that democratization and electoral competition have provided incentives for political leaders in developing countries to be more responsive to poverty reduction and to the influence of transnational actors on social protection (e.g. Carbone & Pellegata, 2017; Hickey et al., 2019).

8.7 Conclusion

This chapter set out to achieve two objectives. The first was to determine how Zambia and Malawi fit into a broader set of East and Southern African countries and the second was to develop a theoretical argument from the statistical evidence. The evidence showed that advancements in democracy were most closely associated with social protection reforms while the interests of political elites and donor influence (controlling for other independent variables) were significant predictors of reform. This suggests that Zambia and Malawi were like other countries in the region which had democratized since the 1990s regardless of whether changes of government had occurred or not. Even then, the trajectory of reforms that the two countries took had more in common with other low and lower middle-income democratic countries in the analysis and were quite distinct from the upper middle-income countries and the weakly democratic low and lower middle-income countries. Moreover, the evidence shows that changes of government may not be a strong predictor of reforms across the region. Yet the quantitative analysis presented in this chapter was limited by several factors which had implications on the results. A more robust analysis would have relied on spending and coverage data, focused on a larger set of country cases, and collected comparable time series data for all countries.

The regression analysis provided in this chapter was insufficient to build a theoretical argument regarding the relative importance of changes of government for social protection policy reforms that can be applied to all 10 cases in the analysis. Nonetheless, the statistical evidence demonstrates that the causal mechanisms linking changes of government to social protection reforms in the case study chapters, were predictors of reforms in the cross-country analysis, with the interests of political elites being more significant than the role of donors.

The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter also has implications for the theoretical and empirical evidence observed in other regions. Five implications are discussed here. First, the study relied on simple counts to compute the main variables and did not use time series cross national data. The data used were also not necessarily comparable across time because they were dependent on various (mostly qualitative) sources. Second, the global studies measured reforms for a much larger set of cases (up to 177 in the case of Schmitt et al., 2015). By focusing on 10 country cases only, the modest medium-n analysis was limited in its ability to generate the kind of robust analyses observed in other studies. Third, this study included a measure of elite interests which was a significant predictor of social policy reform. Other studies reviewed did not consider a similar measure. Fourth, the study did not have a measure for regional diffusion, even though this was found to be a significant predictor of social welfare reforms elsewhere. Instead, this study focused on the influence of donors on domestic political actors. Lastly, statistical analyses measuring reforms to SCTs remain limited. This contrasts with studies that have focused on other forms of social welfare, especially measures of social security.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to understand how and why policy reforms to promote or constrain the expansion of social cash transfer programmes happened after changes of government in Zambia and Malawi. More broadly, the study sought to understand how domestic politics – and partisanship specifically – contributed to state support for social protection reforms in contexts where donor influence was crucial for the introduction and implementation of programmes. It contributes to knowledge and evidence on the factors that contribute to social policy reforms in Africa. This thesis also addressed enduring issues in the study of development, policy and politics.

The study focused on four cases of changes of government: two in Zambia and another two in Malawi. In both countries, SCTs were introduced by international donors who had a long history of implementing poverty reduction programmes. Both countries had strong traditions of neopatrimonial political systems that concentrated power and decision making in the president and powerful individuals. This study was therefore concerned with understanding reforms under different presidential administrations. Later in this chapter, I show how changes in president affected the composition of government for each case study. The two case studies in Zambia were: (i) the change of government from the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) [under President Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008) and Rupiah Banda (2008-2011)] to the Patriotic Front (PF) under President Michael Sata in 2011 and (ii) the change of government from Sata [(2011-2014) and Acting President Guy Scott (October 2014 to January 2015)] to President Edgar Lungu (PF) in 2015. In Malawi, the case studies were: (i) the change of government from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) under President Bingu wa Mutharika to the People's Party (PP) under President Joyce Banda in 2012 and (ii) the change of government from Banda to the DPP led by President Peter Mutharika in 2014.

This chapter concludes the thesis. It provides a summary of the main thesis findings and addresses research questions posed in Chapter 1 of the study. In this chapter, I explain how each of the cases was a change of government and then compare the differences in reforms across the four cases. I then explain the mechanisms through which changes of government contributed to reforms. Thereafter, this chapter discusses the similarities and differences in the Zambia and Malawi cases. The chapter then accounts for similarities and differences in the effects of changes of government on social policy reforms in Zambia and Malawi. The thesis then discusses the broader theoretical and methodological implications of this study for understanding drivers of social policy reform globally and for addressing enduring issues in the study of development, politics and policy in Africa. It also provides recommendations for further research.

9.2 Summary of changes of government and reforms

I begin by providing a summary of how changes of government happened, reforms to SCTs after changes of government, the effect of the relationship between donors and government on policy making, and the influence of political elites on reforms. The summary also provides a synthesis of the main findings of the four case study chapters. Furthermore, it addresses how social policy was reformed in terms of the five dimensions considered in this study and the extent to which changes of government mattered for reform.

9.2.1 Changes of changes of government

Table 9.1 provides a summary of how a change of government happened in each case. It explains how the government changed, what changed about the government, and what remained the same.

In all four cases, the most significant change was the president of the country. Presidents assumed office through different mechanisms including an electoral turnover (Zambia in 2011 and Malawi in 2014), a Vice President succeeding a President upon death according to constitutional provisions (Malawi in 2012), and a partial turnover – change of president within the same political party following a presidential by-election after the death in office of a president (Zambia in 2015). In all cases, the change of government resulted in a shift of power between political factions (or coalitions) supporting the president. As I show later in this chapter, the shift in power between parties and factions had important implications for social policy making across all cases.

Table 9. 1: **Summary of changes of government**

Change of government	**How did the government change?**	**What changed about the government?**	**What remained the same?**
Zambia			
Mwanawasa/Banda (MMD) to Sata (PF): 2011	General election (complete turnover)	Ruling party, President, Vice President, largest party in parliament, senior bureaucrats	A few members of cabinet had served in previous governments, civil servants
Sata/Scott (PF) to Lungu (PF): 2015	Presidential by-election (partial turnover) following death of incumbent	President, Vice President, exclusion of cabinet ministers loyal to Sata, appointment of cabinet ministers loyal to Rupiah Banda	Ruling party, most cabinet members served under Sata, senior bureaucrats, civil servants
Malawi			
Bingu wa Mutharika (DPP) to Banda (PP): 2012	Succession of president upon death of incumbent (partial turnover)	Ruling party, President, Vice President, political affiliation of Cabinet ministers (from DPP and UDF to PP), ministers of finance and social welfare)	Most members of Cabinet were formerly in preceding ruling party, senior bureaucrats, civil servants
Banda (PP) to Peter Mutharika (DPP): 2014	General election (complete turnover)	Ruling party, President, Vice President, most members of Cabinet did not serve under Banda	Most ruling party MPs previously belonged to other parties, senior bureaucrats, civil servants

Table 9.1 shows that where changes of government happened after a general election, a new ruling party assumed government resulting in significant changes in the composition of cabinet. This happened in 2011 and 2014, in Zambia and Malawi, respectively. In certain instances, such as the 2011 Zambian case, changes of government resulted in important changes at senior

levels of the bureaucracy as well, including Permanent Secretaries and the Secretary to the Cabinet.

In cases where changes occurred after the death in office of a sitting president, new presidents maintained most members of cabinet and senior bureaucrats in the civil service. This study shows that the shifts in power between presidents and ruling coalitions were important for two reasons. First, the strong contestation for power between factions prompted candidates to brand themselves differently on social issues with some providing more support for social protection while others were more supportive of clientelist forms of redistribution. Second, the changes of government resulted in shifts in the relationship with donors on social issues. Below, I provide a summary of how the changes of government affected policy making on social cash transfers.

9.3 Social Cash Transfer (SCT) reforms after changes of government

This study measured reforms to social cash transfer programmes after changes of government on five dimensions: Programmes expanded, coverage, state-expenditure, generosity of benefits, and status and legislation of programmes. Table 9.2 provides a summary of these reforms for each of the four changes of governments. It also includes notable reforms that each government opposed or did not implement. These include reforms advocated by donors and civil servants that were not implemented by the government administration.

Table 9. 2: **Summary of reforms**

Reforms	Zambia		Malawi	
	PF - Sata (2011-14)	**PF - Lungu (2015-17)**	**PP - Banda (2012-14)**	**DPP - Mutharika (2014-17)**
Programmes expanded	SCTs, Food Security Pack, farm input subsidies (in 2014)	Empowerment funds, farm input subsidies, SCTs	Farm input subsidies, SCTs, and handout programmes (livestock, building materials etc)	Farm input subsidies scaled back, reversal of govt. commitment to SCTs
Coverage	More than doubled	Inherited expansion plans and extended coverage nationwide	Increased from 7 pilots to 18 districts	Extended nationwide
State expenditure	Major increase	Inherited budgetary allocation plans	Modest increase for one district	Reversed commitment to fund district
Generosity of benefits (in real terms)	Decline	Decline	Decline	Decline
Status of legislation	Introduction of National Social Protection Policy	Draft Social Protection Bill, National Health Insurance Bill	Publication of National Social Support Policy and Malawi National Social Support Programme (MNSSP)	Publication of MNSSP II, National policy on older persons
Reforms rejected	Provision of SCTs as a constitutional right	Provision of SCTs as a constitutional right	N/A	Categorical cash transfer programmes (including universal old age pension), increase in tax-funding for SCTs

9.3.1 Programmes expanded

The first dimension of reform considered in this study was programmes expanded. The case-studies considered the social protection or related social programmes that were the primary focus of redistribution in terms of coverage and state expenditure under each administration.

This gave an indication of whether an administration was more disposed to clientelist or programmatic distribution. In all cases, national governments implemented social programmes inherited from previous administrations. In some instances, new programmes were introduced including handout programmes initiated by Banda between 2012 and 2014, and some empowerment programmes initiated by Lungu after 2015.

Of the four case studies, the Sata administration was the most programmatic in terms of reforms. The PF government emphasised the expansion of programmatic social protection programmes such as SCTs and the Food Security Pack (FSP). It also inherited the Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) – the largest redistribution programme in the country – from the MMD administration but was initially opposed to expanding it. The FISP budget increased significantly in 2014 to increase the proportion of rural farmers benefiting from subsidised farm inputs. As I argue in Chapter 4, this was meant to win support in hitherto MMD strongholds and to consolidate PF's support ahead of national elections in 2016. It also represented a departure from the PF's initial programmatic approach to a more clientelist one.

Under Lungu, SCT funding was erratic resulting in delayed payments to beneficiaries during the 2015 to 2016 period. Instead, resources were poured into expanding a range of empowerment programmes that targeted women, the youth and urban informal economy workers. At the same time the nominal cost and coverage of FISP increased at a much faster rate than it did under Sata. The discussion in Chapter 5 shows that these programmes served as mechanisms for clientelist politics, especially in the period between Lungu's first election in 2015 and his re-election in 2016, both to maintain the party's urban support and to broaden its rural vote share.

In Malawi, Banda expanded existing social interventions, including the Fertiliser Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) which was introduced by her predecessor and SCTs introduced by donors. Moreover, she also introduced a range of handout programmes, such as the One-Cow-A-Family initiative, and a livestock project that distributed goats to poor families. These programmes had limited reach, both in terms of geographic coverage and number of beneficiaries. The discussion in Chapter 6 shows that the political circumstances that surrounded Banda's rise to power prompted her to seek donor support to stabilise a struggling economy. Donor support included proposals for her government to publish a social protection policy as a precondition for a donor funded national cash transfer programme. Social protection and other handout programmes also served as mechanisms for Banda to adopt an electoral brand that contrasted from the food security brand adopted by the DPP, ahead of the 2014 national elections.

Chapter 7 shows that the DPP government retained power in 2014 and focused on implementing farm input subsidies while donors expanded SCTs. Because the DPP won election during a period of economic decline, the government implemented budget cuts which included a reduction to the number of FISP beneficiaries. The Mutharika administration also reneged on commitments made by Banda's administration to increase the proportion of tax-funding towards the SCT budget. Instead, a coalition of donors and bureaucrats led the process of designing and implementing the MNSSP II, with the World Bank assuming responsibility for funding uncovered districts.

9.3.2 Coverage

I show in this thesis that there was a rapid expansion in the number of beneficiary households and districts implementing social cash transfers in Zambia after a change of government from the MMD to the PF in 2011. The number of beneficiary household more than doubled (from 61,000 to 145,000) as did the number of implementing districts (from 19 to 50) – in one fiscal year (2013 to 2014). This was against an eligible 500,000 households in 102 districts. The expansion was led by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services and international donors who provided technical support and funding. By the time of the 2015 change of government in Zambia, the social cash transfer programme was expanding steadily – i.e. based on ministry expansion plans (which were also stipulated in the 2013 Revised-Sixth National Development Plan) to increase the number of beneficiaries each year until 2016 when nationwide coverage would be achieved – after an initial rapid expansion in 2013. Therefore, the extent of reforms to expand coverage under President Lungu was path dependent and not necessarily influenced by factors unique to the Lungu administration.

Similarly, in Malawi, the number of beneficiary households and districts implementing cash transfers increased rapidly after the change of government from the DPP to the PP. During

Banda's presidency, the coverage of cash transfer beneficiaries increased from 25,000 households to almost 69,000 households and from 7 to 18 districts, between 2012 and 2014. This was against an eligible 319,000 households in 28 districts. Notably, the expansion was led by donors who funded different districts even though the expansion was coordinated by the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disabilities and Social Welfare. Reforms to expand coverage of cash transfers continued after the 2014 change of government from the PP to the DPP under Peter Mutharika, albeit at an unpredictable pace. Because the SCTP was primarily funded by multiple international donor agencies, expansion plans were dependent on the commitments of individual donors. This differed from the Zambian case where expansion plans were stipulated in government documents.

9.3.3 Expenditure

International donors provided exclusive funding for social cash transfers when they were initiated in both countries. Donors persuaded national governments to increase the share of tax financing with varying degrees of success. This study considered the extent to which government contributions as a share of total funding changed over time as a dimension of reform. The PF government under President Sata increased the share of government expenditure to the social cash transfer programme in the national budget from 24% in 2013 to 75% in 2014. When President Lungu was elected in 2015, his administration maintained Sata era commitments to increase the state's allocation to SCTs steadily each year.

In Malawi, the proportion of government spending increased to 10% of the SCTP budget under President Banda in 2013. Banda's government also committed funds to implement SCTs in one district. The previous administration did not pour funds into paying SCT beneficiaries but only provided funding to meet administrative costs – for logistics and government staff implementing SCTs. After the 2014 change of government, the DPP government maintained the government's share of funding at 10% of the SCT budget. The government also reversed a Banda era decision to fund one district.

9.3.4 Generosity of benefits

Since the introduction of social cash transfers in both countries, the benefits paid to beneficiaries have been parsimonious. Although the social cash transfer scheme expanded rapidly during the presidency of Michael Sata, the nominal value of cash transfer payments remained unchanged – at the same levels they were at the time of the 2011 general elections. The transfer amounts were insufficient to meet an international poverty line of US$1.90 a day. Following the 2015 partial change of government, the transfer amounts were increased by the equivalent of US$2 per month in January 2017. This was in response to rapid economic decline and depreciation of the Zambian kwacha against the US dollar between 2015 and 2016, which eroded the real value of transfer payments. Even with the small increase in the nominal value of transfer payments, the real value in 2009 prices was about half of the 2017 value and inadequate to meet the US$1.90 poverty line in the absence of other forms of support.

Transfer amounts for social cash transfers in Malawi have been far less generous than payments in Zambia. From 2006 to 2012, households received the equivalent of between US$2.40 and US$8.80 – the highest possible payment if benefits for households with secondary school going children were added. Under Banda, the benefits were increased nominally in 2013. Peter Mutharika's administration also increased benefits nominally in 2015. The data show that despite reforms to increase the value of benefits paid to beneficiary households under both administrations, the benefits remained parsimonious and insufficient to meet the internationally recognised World Bank poverty line in the absence of other forms of income support.

9.3.5 Status and legislation of programmes

Sata's government completed and published a national social protection policy document. The policy set out a set of social protection programmes that the government would presumably implement and provided a framework for co-ordinating programmes across government ministries and departments. The publication of the policy was significant because the previous administration had resisted donor pressure to publish and implement the document. For donors, a policy document was necessary for long-term donor support for social protection programmes. During the Lungu presidency, a Social Protection Bill was drafted which was a precursor to a Social Protection Act. The draft was not completed due to disagreements amongst government technocrats across government ministries (i.e. ministries of Community Development, Health, and Labour and Social Security). Moreover, there were also disagreements in Cabinet regarding contents to be included and omitted in the final draft. Partly due to this, the Ministry of Health drafted and published a National Health Insurance Bill in 2018 separately from the Social Protection Bill.

In Malawi, Joyce Banda’s government completed and published a National Social Support Policy (NSSP) within two months of taking office. The policy was accompanied by the introduction of a Malawi National Social Support Programme for the period 2012 to 2016. The draft was completed by Bingu wa Mutharika’s government but was not published before his death. After 2014, the DPP government implemented a policy on older persons. Furthermore, it was under President Peter Mutharika that a policy coalition of donors and government technocrats developed a second MNSSP for the period 2018 to 2023. The MNSSP II ensured that donors would continue supporting Malawi’s social protection agenda.

9.4 Summary of empirical findings

This study considered how the relationship between international donors and national governments contributed to social policy reform. It also addressed the contribution of elite interests in the reform process. These interests were shaped by the ideas, beliefs and attitudes of elites, inter-party electoral competition, and intra-party factionalism. Table 9.3 provides a summary of how these factors contributed to social policy reform after changes of government in the four case studies.

Table 9. 3: **Implications of conceptual framework on policy reforms**

	Zambia		Malawi	
Variable	**Sata-PF administration**	**Lungu-PF administration**	**Banda-PP administration**	**Mutharika-DPP administration**
Relationship with donors	Positive: PF government was receptive to donor influence on reform	No effect: SCT scheme continued to expand despite deteriorating government-donor relations because of influence of donors	Positive: Donors influenced Banda to reform	Negative: SCT scheme continued to expand due to influence of donors amidst weak government -donor relations
Interests				
Ideological interests	Positive: PF assumed power promising to implement a pro-poor development agenda.	Negative: Pro-business faction that assumed office in 2015 was less disposed to programmatic social assistance	Positive: Banda's support for pro-poor reform provided support for both programmatic and clientelist social assistance programmes	Negative: Strong support for economic growth and food production and aversion to handouts amongst influential DPP elites
Electoral interests	Positive: SCT scheme was expanded in attempt to broaden rural electoral support in future contests.	Negative: Support was directed towards clientelist programmes targeting PF voters.	Positive: Banda supported SCTs to brand herself differently from the DPP's food security brand to appeal to voters	Negative: DPP won election on the back of a food security brand and was less supportive of social protection than preceding government
Factional interests	Positive: The pro-poor faction allied to Sata was supportive of programmatic redistribution to consolidate its own power.	Negative: Pro-business faction allied to Lungu was more supportive of clientelist form of redistribution and less supportive of social protection reform than the preceding administration.	Unclear: Banda had loose coalition including MPs from DPP, UDF and MCP, who were united in a quest for political power	Negative: Peter Mutharika had support of faction that was key to supporting his late brother, Bingu wa Mutharika. Faction was supportive of economic growth and commercial maize contracts.

9.4.1 Relationship between donors and government

The evidence provided in this study shows that donors were instrumental in reforms to expand programme coverage and levels of state funding in Zambia from 2011 to 2014, and in Malawi from 2012 to 2014. In Chapter 6, I demonstrated that in an effort to unseat the MMD in 2011, the PF embraced social democratic policy ideas promoted by the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and a donor official from UNICEF. This contributed to the PF adopting social protection as a strategy in its 2011 party manifesto. Even then, the PF did not promote social cash transfers until 2013 when donors, led by the World Bank, persuaded the national government to redirect resources form wasteful subsidy programmes (that did not benefit the poorest) to cash transfers. Donors continued to play a prominent role in the implementation of the SCT programme in Zambia under President Lungu despite a decline in political support to fund SCTs, with funds redirected to empowerment programmes instead. Efforts to expand the provision of SCTs continued because of the influence of a policy coalition of international donors (including DFID, ILO, Irish Aid and UNICEF), senior bureaucrats, and government technocrats who were supportive of SCTs.

In Malawi, donor and government relations were weak during much of Bingu wa Mutharika's presidency. This had implications for the promotion of social protection, with the government resisting donor efforts to expand pilot social cash transfers into a national programme. When Banda became president, her government restored relationships with bilateral and multilateral donors. The IMF and the World Bank persuaded the government to implement much needed economic reforms which included proposals to publish a national social protection policy. This paved the way for other donor agencies such as the EU, GTZ, KfW, Irish Aid and UNICEF to fund a national SCT programme. However, the relationship between the government and donors waned after 2013 following the Cashgate scandal. This affected budgetary support but did not affect direct support for programmes such as cash transfers. After the re-election of the DPP in 2014 under President Peter Mutharika, the relationship between international donors and the government declined further due to the government's failure to implement good governance reforms proposed by donors in the wake of scandals involving public finances. This did not affect the expansion of the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) which was largely donor driven – especially by the World Bank which provided support for SCTs in all the previously uncovered districts. The poor donor-government relations affected the extent to which donors were able to influence the government to increase tax funding for further expansion.

9.4.2 Elite interests

This study argues that changes of government matter for social policy reform because they provide opportunities for new policy makers to assume control over agenda setting. In cases where new policy makers have interests in promoting social protection, this leads to the provision of more social protection. The interests of political elites are shaped by at least three factors which are discussed below.

9.4.2.1 Ideas, beliefs and attitudes (ideological interests)

Changes of government mattered for reform because they resulted in shifts of power between political parties or ruling coalitions. While parties in both countries implemented neoliberal economic policies, the ideological interests of presidents and influential policy makers in Cabinet influenced public policy. In the Zambian case, Sata and a dominant "leftist" faction of the PF supported a pro-poor development agenda which contrasted with the free market approach implemented by the MMD government for twenty years. While in opposition, senior PF leaders developed close ties with domestic civil society organizations, and senior officials representing multilateral and bilateral organisations including UNICEF and FES. These relationships exposed the party to social protection ideas which were then incorporated into the party manifesto despite social protection lacking popular support within the broader party leadership or even amongst the party's predominantly urban supporters. In government, PF leaders sought to reform agriculture subsidies – which they had opposed while in opposition. Although PF leaders did not initially turn to cash transfers as an alternative, they embraced the idea when the World Bank proposed redirecting spending from subsidies to cash transfers which would minimise waste and benefit the deserving poor.

The change of government from Sata to Lungu had important implications for the PF's ideological positions. Lungu led a coalition that comprised pro-business elites from PF and the opposition MMD. I argue in Chapter 6 that this faction was opposed to Sata's "leftist" ideological positions and was also less interventionist. This faction was more supportive of clientelist forms of redistribution that targeted urban citizens. Lungu's post 2016 finance minister, Felix Mutati (who was from the MMD), promoted the expansion of social protection programmes as a safety net for the poor and as part of a broader strategy for obtaining an IMF bailout to stabilize the Zambian economy. However, Mutati's proposed reforms for an IMF bailout and austerity measures were rejected by Lungu and the rest of Cabinet for fear that IMF conditionalities would rein in profligate spending on programmes that served clientelist purposes. Mutati's tenure also coincided with erratic payments to SCT beneficiaries and was followed by a public scandal involving donor funds. Thus, the shift from Sata to Lungu was associated with a change in attitudes within the ruling coalition that constrained efforts to sustain the expansion of social protection.

Ideas, attitudes and beliefs towards poverty and social protection were also crucial for reforms in the Malawi case studies. I show in Chapter 6 that Bingu wa Mutharika was sceptical of the influence international donors had in shaping policy in Malawi, including proposals for the expansion of the SCTP into a national programme. At the same time, Mutharika's ideas about empowering smallholder farmers by distributing subsidised farm inputs were opposed by donors. Mutharika's ideological views were shared by others in his Cabinet who had lived in the Malawian diaspora for decades and had worked for multilateral agencies, including his finance minister. When Banda succeeded Mutharika, it was evident that the dominant attitudes towards cash transfers under the PP government were shaped by the new president. In Chapter 6, I showed that Banda had a background with domestic non-profit community-based organizations that supported the poor and vulnerable, particularly women. She had also served as community development and social welfare minister under the UDF government where she presided over programmes funded and implemented by international donors. Thus, although Banda's coalition was ideologically incoherent (since it comprised politicians from various parties) her ideas and beliefs about poverty and redistribution strongly shaped the PP administration's attitudes towards poverty reduction and social protection in ways that were distinct from the DPP government.

Chapter 7 provides further evidence of the extent to which ideas influenced policy reform after a change of government. After the 2014 national elections, Peter Mutharika's Cabinet comprised DPP leaders who were closely associated with policy making in the first DPP government. This faction supported farm subsidies and maize distribution as a response to a national food crisis. The reluctance to expand cash transfers out of tax amongst senior DPP leaders was influenced by ideas and beliefs that cash transfers were unproductive handouts that did not promote growth.

9.4.2.2 Electoral competition and party branding (electoral interests)

Zambia and Malawi both have large rural populations that are dependent on agriculture. In both countries, programmes targeting smallholder and large scale (commercial) farmers, such as the distribution of subsidised farming inputs, are crucial to poverty reduction strategies. Evidence from both countries shows that farm inputs either have significant vote winning potential (Dionne & Horowitz, 2016) or can be used to reward constituencies loyal to the ruling party (Mason, Jayne, & van de Walle, 2013). Because cash transfers and farming inputs are both targeted at predominantly rural populations, political elites in Zambia and Malawi have often considered the two programmes as alternative strategies for rural poverty reduction, with farm input subsidies typically receiving more support.

In Zambia, evidence shows that during the 2000s, the MMD government implemented a farm input subsidy programme that was also used as an incentive to reward its supporters (Mason, Jayne & van de Walle, 2013). The preference for farm subsidies partly explains why the MMD government was reluctant to expand the provision of social cash transfers. In Chapter 4, I argued that prior to 2011, the PF opposed the MMD's distribution of farm inputs arguing that they served clientelistic purposes, to reward constituencies that had voted for the then governing party in previous elections. This informed the PF's position during the 2011 election campaigns against clientelistic handout programmes and in favour of programmatic programmes. PF leaders were not enthusiastic in their support for SCTs while in opposition and only expanded the programme two years into office. Yet, because of the party's dominance in urban areas and limited support in non-ethnic Bemba rural regions, the party was inclined to expand its rural support by implementing programmes that rural voters would identify with the ruling party. Thus, concerns about future elections and a desire to promote an alternative redistributive programme to FISP, prompted PF leaders to support programmatic social protection.

In Chapter 5, I demonstrate that electoral interests contributed to Lungu's attitude towards cash transfers. The chapter showed that because of the factional battles that ensued prior to Lungu's election as PF leader, he assumed the leadership of a weakened party. In addition, Lungu presided over a period of significant economic decline as republican president. Lungu was also contesting the 2016 elections only 18 months after his first election against a resurgent opposition that posed a significant threat to his electoral prospects. Because of these factors, Lungu's administration prioritised the expansion of clientelistic handout programmes such as empowerment funds that targeted informal sector workers in urban areas, at the expense of making transfer payments to SCT beneficiaries. This was aimed at retaining the PF's urban support where the effects of economic decline (including power outages and increased cost of living) were most visible.

Electoral interests also contributed to the variation in the scale of social policy reforms under the Banda and Mutharika administrations. The introduction of a farm input subsidy programme by the DPP government in 2005 led to huge electoral returns in 2009 (Dionne & Horowitz, 2016). Senior DPP leaders were therefore reluctant to expand another redistribution programme, especially one initiated by donors. Therefore, when Banda became president in 2012, she branded herself around social protection issues to distinguish her party from the DPP's food security brand. I show in Chapters 6 and 7 that Banda's social protection brand had a limited impact on voters.

Chapter 7 shows that the 2014 change of government from the PP to the DPP had important implications for social policy reforms. DPP leaders recognized that they could win re-election without promoting cash transfers and were therefore not disposed to support efforts to increase tax-funding once in government. This also informed DPP attitudes towards continued support for farm subsidies at the expense of social protection programmes. The two Malawi case study chapters demonstrate that the provision of cash transfers expanded under Banda in part because of the threat of electoral defeat and was not strongly supported by the two DPP governments because failure to support the SCTP did not threaten its electoral prospects.

9.4.2.3 Factionalism (factional interests)

One of the main arguments made in this study is that changes of government matter for public policy because they result in a shift of power between political parties or ruling coalitions within the same party. In Chapter 4, the study showed that the 2011 change of government in Zambia resulted in a shift of power from the MMD (which implemented neoliberal economic reforms and opposed statist policies, including cash transfers) to PF (which campaigned on a pro-poor, social democratic platform that embraced social protection). Although senior PF leaders such as Sata and Scott previously belonged to the MMD, it was convenient for them to adopt a more interventionist agenda.

As a governing party, PF consisted of two large factions which had implications for public policy both during and after the Sata presidency. One was an ideological faction that was crucial to formulating the PF's pro-poor platform while the other was a pro-business faction that financed Sata's 2011 campaign. The two factions were engaged in an intense power struggle to succeed an ailing Sata in the event of his death or resignation. From 2011 to 2014, members of the pro-poor faction dominated Cabinet and policy making and successfully persuaded Sata to implement "pro-poor" policies, including social protection. In Chapter 5, the study shows that following Sata's death in late 2014, the pro-business faction assumed control of PF and supported Lungu in the 2015 election. Under Lungu, members of the pro-poor faction were excluded from Cabinet. As a result, there was much less support for social protection amongst leaders in Lungu's administration and more support for programmes that promoted the business interests of elites within the ruling coalition. Members of this faction were also more supportive of programmes that targeted the party's urban support base.

This study further demonstrates that factionalism contributed to social policy reform in Malawi. In Chapter 6, the study shows that factional battles within the DPP forced Banda to form the PP in 2011. The DPP faction revolved around the Mutharika brothers and their close allies who had technocratic backgrounds. This faction had poor relations with some bilateral and multilateral donors and opposed their influence on policy making. This faction promoted economic growth, including through generous agriculture input subsidies, and opposed SCTs which were considered to be unproductive handouts. The change of government in 2012 resulted in a shift of power to Banda and close allies such as Kachali, who had backgrounds with domestic civic and business organizations, but lacked the technocratic experience that Mutharika and his allies had. This faction was also more supportive of handout programmes which served as mechanisms for patronage. In Chapter 7, I showed that the DPP won elections in 2014 and members of the Mutharika faction were central to the new government. This faction maintained the same focus towards redistribution as it did prior to 2012, which emphasised the importance of farm input subsidies at the expense of cash transfers.

9.5 What explains similarities and differences in social policy reform after changes of government in Zambia and Malawi?

9.5.1 Similarities between cases

There are three major similarities identified in this study. First, although this study did not examine the extent to which Malawian and Zambian citizens demanded social protection, the evidence provided by the process tracing research suggests that cash transfers were not electorally beneficial. PF won the 2011 Zambian elections on a pro-poor platform but it did so by appealing to social security issues (such as taxes and the minimum wage) and the conditions of urban informal economy workers. The PF also won subsequent elections in 2015 and 2016 by addressing the concerns of urban voters (who did not demand social protection) at the expense of rural voters. In Malawi, Banda expanded the SCTP even though her government spent more on farm input subsidies than it did on cash transfers. Furthermore, her social protection brand proved less popular with voters than the DPP's food security brand. The fact that both countries were competitive democracies helps to explain why some governments supported social protection reforms. Electoral competition provided incentives for political elites to adopt competing brands on redistribution to incorporate more poor voters into their coalitions and to increase chances of winning national elections.

Second, both countries implemented farm input subsidy programmes which were the largest mechanisms for redistribution from the state to citizens. Therefore, political attitudes towards the expansion of SCTs were closely associated with attitudes towards farm input subsidies. In Zambia, political elites were more supportive of implementing SCT reforms when they had a greater incentive to cut back on the provision of agriculture subsidies. The PF was supportive of reforms to scale back FISP because the programme targeted citizens in predominantly non-PF rural strongholds. Thus, there was an incentive for the PF to associate itself with a different redistribution programme that voters could identify it with. This was also true for Banda who branded herself on social protection issues to distinguish herself from the DPP's food security brand.

Third, government administrations within countries differed in their support for social protection. Sata's administration embraced social protection as part of its pro-poor agenda but there was less enthusiasm after 2015, despite the ruling party retaining power, albeit under a different president. In Malawi, there was strong support for social protection after the 2012 change of government but following the 2014 turnover, enthusiasm for reforms waned under the new government. In both countries, the interests of ruling elites had implications for whether the state provided more support for clientelist or programmatic forms of redistribution.

9.5.2 Differences between cases

Three differences in reforms between the two countries are discussed. First, there was more state ownership of SCTs in Zambia than Malawi. While both countries started off with donor-initiated pilots, the state assumed primary responsibility for implementing SCTs in Zambia after the PF formed government. Even after the partial change of government in 2015, the state remained the primary owner of the programme, accounting for about three-quarters of budgetary support. The opposite was true in Malawi. SCTs remained donor driven despite important reforms implemented by the Banda administration. Donors had primary responsibility for funding programmes even after the 2014 change of government. One possible factor that explains this difference is that Zambia has a stronger statist tradition and a history of state supported social assistance. From 1964 to 1991, the Zambian government implemented the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) and although the programme was moribund by the time the MMD was elected in 1991, the government attempted to revive PWAS in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, Malawi has a much stronger tradition of donor dependence to fund and implement programmes. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the Malawian government implemented farm subsidy programmes and safety net programmes that were primarily donor funded (Harrigan, 2008; Chinsinga, 2009). Furthermore, Malawi has been more dependent on donor support than Zambia for executing its national budgets and implementing poverty reduction programmes. Malawi received 20% in budgetary support from donors in the 2016/17 fiscal year, a reduction from 41% the preceding year after some donors suspended aid. On the contrary, the Zambian government received less than 8% of donor support in the 2017 fiscal year and was more dependent on domestic revenues to implement programmes.

Secondly, farm input subsidies were more crucial for electoral support in Malawi than in Zambia. About 85% of Malawi's population is rural and agrarian while less than two in 10 people reside in urban areas. This contrasts with Zambia where 40% of the population is urban (and urbanisation occurred much earlier and is therefore more comprehensive). Urban citizens in Zambia had a broader range of concerns such as labour conditions in the mines and housing in urban slums. Because of this, Zambian political parties and candidates branded themselves differently between urban and rural voters. Although farm subsidies had vote winning potential among rural voters, the ability for parties such as PF to win on the back of urban support and a few rural provinces (where ethnic and regional ties were a factor) meant that farm subsidies were less crucial for electoral support in Zambia. This also provided incentives for the PF government to promote other redistributive programmes at the expense of agriculture subsidies. On the contrary, food security was the most important issue for Malawian voters. This meant that parties and candidates in Malawi were all supportive of implementing national input subsidy programmes and only differed on the modes of implementation. This reduced the incentive for Malawian elites to promote other forms of redistribution at the expense of subsidies.

Thirdly, political elites were more supportive of SCT reforms in Zambia than in Malawi. Although the MMD in Zambia had opposed SCTs in the early and mid-2000s, a partial change of government in 2008 – and a turnover in some key policy making positions – led to modest reforms which created space for faster reforms after 2011. In Malawi, the support for reforms amongst political elites was limited both before and after Banda's presidency. The difference in attitudes towards social protection between elites in these countries could be explained by the effect that the distinct geographic and economic conditions of the countries have on the nature and character of political parties. In Zambia, the PF (prior to forming government) adopted an interventionist agenda that focused on labour conditions in urban areas including mining towns. This contrasted with the MMD that pursued market friendly policies for twenty years and appealed predominantly to rural voters in the latter half of its rule. In the points above, I showed that Malawian parties were constrained by the salience of farm input subsidies while national governments were beholden to donor influence. Taken together, parties and elites in Zambia had more space to broaden their electoral support around a broader range of policy issues than their Malawian counterparts.

9.6 Theoretical implications of study

This thesis engaged with global literature on welfare state building in advanced capitalist democracies (North America and Western Europe) (Esping-Andersen, 1990) as well as in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America (Brown & Hunter, 1999; Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Fairfield & Garay, 2017) which demonstrates that democratization and partisanship were crucial for welfare state development. It also engaged with literature on the politics of social protection in Africa which recognizes that domestic politics is central to understanding how, when and why national governments have promoted donor initiated social cash transfer programmes (Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Hickey et al., 2019; Opalo, 2019). The research identified that democratization, electoral competition and electoral turnovers (Carbone, 2012; Brooks, 2015; Carbone & Pellegata, 2017) provided incentives for national governments in Africa and other low-income countries to provide more support to the extreme poor including through social welfare. The literature further highlighted that changes of government provided opportunities (or policy windows) for policymakers and elites in new governments to promote credible and alternative policies to address poverty and development that preceding administrations had not supported (Kingdon, 1995; Béland & Howlett, 2016).

The above literatures informed the conceptual framework that was adopted for this study. The framework identified causal mechanisms which accounted for how and why changes of government contributed to social protection reforms in Zambia and Malawi. The framework identified two broad sets of factors (or mechanisms) through which policy reforms happened after changes of government. The first was the relationship between transnational actors and domestic political elites and the second was the interests of domestic political elites to either promote programmatic social protection or clientelist forms of redistribution. The interests of domestic elites were informed by ideas, beliefs and attitudes of influential leaders, electoral competition (or branding) and factionalism, which all had implications for public policy.

9.6.1 Implications for conceptual framework

Evidence from various country cases in Africa shows that during the 2000s, political elites were generally opposed to promoting donor initiated social cash transfers because of concerns about handouts creating dependency and also because SCTs presumably did not promote growth (Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014 on Malawi; Kabandula & Seekings, 2016 on Zambia). Furthermore, the neopatrimonial nature of African politics, which concentrated political power and policymaking around powerful individuals such as the president, disposed national governments to implement programmes that served as mechanisms for patronage at the expense of programmatic social protection that donors promoted (Barrientos et al., 2005; Harland, 2014). Donors gradually won the support of national governments through a mix of strategies including providing technical assistance for drafting policy documents (Devereux, 2010). Agencies such as DFID in Uganda (Grebe, 2014) and HelpAge in Zanzibar (Seekings, 2016) won the support of bureaucrats using evidence and invitations to international seminars and study tours. Others such as the World Bank have won support for cash transfers by persuading national governments to reallocate public expenditure from fiscally unsustainable programmes to more fiscally affordable ones (Pruce & Hickey, 2019).

This thesis contributes to the literature on the influence of transnational actors on persuading national governments to promote reforms in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the extent to which high levels of electoral competition provide donors with opportunities to promote the social protection agenda. Chapter 4 shows how FES and a donor official from UNICEF persuaded an opposition party to adopt social protection as a policy issue by influencing senior leaders of the PF. Similarly, Chapter 6 shows how longstanding ties that a Malawian president had with international donors prior to assuming office, provided some donor agencies with opportunities to influence agenda setting. The extent to which donors can influence opposition parties – that later form government – has not featured prominently in debates about social protection policy making. Evidence from the study by Chinyoka and Seekings (2016) on policy reforms in Zimbabwe under the GNU government and by Wanyama and McCord on Kenya

(2017) demonstrate that donor influence on opposition parties has potential for faster reforms when they form government. This is consistent with the findings of this study.

Secondly, the thesis provides evidence that donors may have more influence in more competitive democracies, where electoral turnovers are also more likely to occur, such as in Zambia and Malawi, than they would in weakly democratic and one-party dominant systems. Evidence from other cases studies, such as Uganda (Grebe, 2014) and Tanzania (Ulriksen, 2019), show that donors were more successful at persuading social assistance bureaucrats to buy in to reforms but much less so with political elites. It is reasonable to suggest that regular changes of government (or the likelihood of alternation) create a political environment where donor ideas can easily find acceptance amongst domestic political elites desperate to find alternative policy responses to address poverty and development, than would be possible in political environments where incumbents are less likely to face defeat.

The second part of the framework focused on the interests of political elites to reform or not, beginning with ideological interests. The literature shows that ideas, beliefs and attitudes of political elites towards poverty reduction and developmentalism, inform how political elites respond to cash transfers. For example, a pro-poor agenda adopted by the PF in Zambia aligned with donor proposals for cash transfers while the need to promote regime legitimacy in Ethiopia and Rwanda contributed to the promotion of cash transfers (Hickey et al., 2019). This thesis contributes to debates about the role of ideas by demonstrating how agenda setting in weakly institutionalized political parties is typically influenced by powerful individuals within the ruling party and government. A turnover of policymakers, which can happen after a partial or full change of government, can result in ideological shifts that reflect the ideas, beliefs and attitudes of powerful individuals in the new ruling coalition. This highlights the importance of understanding how ideas are shaped within political parties, in low income democratic contexts with a high likelihood of turnovers, such as Malawi and Zambia.

Elite interests were also informed by electoral competition. Some studies show that branding on social issues during national elections has provided incentives for political parties and candidates to adopt brands that contrast with those adopted by their main competitors (Hamer

& Seekings, 2019) while others show that electoral turnovers put pressure on newly elected governments to expand social welfare to address the failures of their predecessors and consolidate support for future elections (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). This thesis makes an important contribution to debates about the role of electoral competition and branding on social protection. Strong electoral competition prompts political parties and candidates to mobilize different constituencies of voters using different interventions such as empowerment funds for urban informal economy workers, farm subsidies for rural smallholder farmers, and cash transfers for the incapacitated poor in rural areas. Where parties and candidates are aware that they can mobilize some but not all crucial voting constituencies, they are more likely to adopt brands that target the most crucial voting blocks. This then provides incentives for parties to adopt either more programmatic or more clientelist forms of distribution. This challenges the notion that changes of government lead to more social protection. Rather, changes of government can lead to more social protection or more clientelist forms of redistribution (at the expense of social protection) depending on which constituencies of voters are crucial for sustaining an incumbent party or for broadening the support of an opposition party.

Finally, the framework also considered how factionalism contributes to social protection reforms. Political parties in low income countries are usually coalitions of disparate groups and individuals that are typically united in a quest for power but may not hold shared ideological positions. The contestation for power between different groups (or factions) within political parties has at times extended to contrasting positions on salient policy issues, such as privatization in Zambia in the 1990s (Rakner, 2003) and the role of the welfare state in South Africa (Seekings, 2015). This thesis shows that frequent changes of government in Zambia and Malawi have coincided with heightened factionalism within ruling coalitions.[181] Factionalism has also led to the formation of multi-patron and cross-party ruling coalitions that require policy compromises to accommodate the interests of the most powerful individuals. Such policy compromises help to explain why the Lungu administration in Zambia and the Peter Mutharika administration in Malawi were unable to sustain momentum for social protection despite the policy gains made by their predecessors. This suggests the need for a fuller understanding of

[181] Zambia has had four presidents and two governing political parties since the inception of SCTs in 2003 while Malawi has had four president and three governing political parties since the inception of SCTs in 2006 – with the most recent turnover occurring in July 2020.

intra-party-political dynamics and their implications for policy making, including on social protection.

9.6.2 Implications for global welfare state literature

The four approaches to understanding welfare state development demonstrated that industrialization, power resources, political institutions and cultural incentives of policy makers, explained welfare state development in the Global North. This literature examined the implications of welfare state development in advanced capitalist democracies and other regions that were more industrialized and more democratic than sub-Saharan Africa. These regions were also characterized by institutionalized political parties that could be placed onto a left-right spectrum. By contrast, African political parties operated in neopatrimonial political systems and did not meet the criteria for institutionalization discussed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Wahman (2014).

This study makes two important contributions to the global literature. Firstly, this study argues that neopatrimonialism and weakly institutionalized political parties may not necessarily be antithetical to programmatic reforms in low income competitive democracies. While parties do not represent distinct class interests in the same manner that parties in the advanced capitalist economies of the Global North do, they tend to promote regional (and even ethnic) interests which are linked to distinct ideologies and translate into varied policy appeals and broader developmental agendas.

Secondly, the case studies discussed in this thesis demonstrate the distinct ways through which development matters for policy reforms in low income contexts. The increased level of extreme poverty in Africa (World Bank, 2018) – and particularly deagrarianization and increased rural poverty (Seekings, 2016; 2019) – has generated opportunities for new political ideologies. For much of the 1990s and 2000s, national governments in Malawi and Zambia implemented neoliberal reforms that had a strong focus on macroeconomic stabilization and growth, while farm input subsidies were promoted to address rural poverty. The failure of these policies to address extreme poverty contributed to the emergence of pro-poor political agendas to counter more market friendly agendas. The extent of extreme poverty also created opportunities to implement reforms targeted at constituencies not covered by existing social programmes.

9.6.3 Implications for literature on politics of social protection in Africa

It is widely asserted that national politics matters for understanding variation in the expansion of social protection in low-income African countries (Lavers & Hickey, 2016; Hickey et al., 2019; Opalo, 2019). Studies emerging from the ESID and LIWPR research projects have considered the influence of "political settlements" and political institutions – especially political parties and elections – for explaining social protection reforms in various country cases (Hickey et al., 2019). This thesis focused primarily on the influence of political institutions for understanding social protection reforms and discussed the mechanisms through which political parties and elections contributed to reforms.

By focusing on the contribution of changes of government to understanding social policy reforms in Zambia and Malawi, this study demonstrated that partisanship was important for explaining variation in the expansion of social protection in at least two ways. First, it highlighted variation in the implementation of social protection between different government administrations within a country over time and shows that political elites in the two country cases promote different ideas about development. The evidence shows that the confluence of ideas, electoral incentives and factionalism within political parties, provided parties and candidates with incentives to promote either programmatic or clientelist forms of redistribution which addressed the distinct concerns of regions, ethnic groups and social classes. This further highlighted that reforms to promote programmatic social protection can be achieved even in neopatrimonial political systems with weakly institutionalised political parties.

Second, drawing on Kingdon's multiple streams framework, this study found that the partial or complete turnover of a government provided opportunities for the promotion of social protection. When new governments inherit (or are faced with) significant economic challenges, face a threat of strong electoral competition in future contests, but have limited policy alternatives, it creates a policy window for the new ruling coalition to embrace credible alternative policies promoted by international donors and government bureaucrats. In cases where social protection has not already been embraced – and where it can serve as a mechanism to address a problem – elites in a new ruling coalition have an incentive to adopt it. This shows that political parties may also be motivated by broader developmental concerns even when they serve as vehicles for ambitious politicians to assume power or when they are consequences of what Englund (2002) describes as "erratic" coalitions.

9.6.4 Implications for development and policymaking

Social protection has emerged as a credible solution to poverty reduction across sub-Saharan Africa with SCTs accounting for almost half (and growing) of total spending on programmes (Beegle, Coudouel & Monslave, 2018). Despite this, the long-term sustainability of cash transfers is not guaranteed. Even though partial and complete changes of government in Malawi and Zambia provided opportunities for the promotion of social protection, reforms were not accompanied by legal frameworks to guarantee timely and continuous payments to beneficiaries. In the absence of legal frameworks that compel governments to provide social protection to citizens, SCTs are susceptible to political manipulation. Politicians may promote social protection for short-term political gain but reverse course when it no longer serves the interests of ruling elites or a new ruling coalition. In both Malawi and Zambia, ruling coalitions that succeeded social protection "reformers" were less enthusiastic about promoting reforms despite inheriting expansion plans. This was evident from the case of delayed payments to beneficiaries and a public scandal involving SCT funds in Zambia, and the governments' decision to renege on funding a district in Malawi. This points to one way that neopatrimonialism can militate against the sustainability of programmatic reforms and development more broadly.

9.6.5 Implications of quantitative analysis for case studies

The statistical analysis presented in Chapter 8 demonstrated that changes of government were not predictors of reforms across 10 East and Southern African countries. The evidence showed that, controlling for other independent variables, elite interests and donor influence were significant predictors of reforms. This evidence demonstrated that the causal mechanisms linking changes of government and social protection reforms in the four case studies, were present in a broader set of cases. The statistical evidence was also consistent with major findings in the literature. The evidence showed that over time, democratization (and the increased likelihood of turnovers) provided incentives for donors and political elites to provide more social protection. The trajectory of reforms in Malawi and Zambia had more in common with trajectories in other low and lower middle-income countries in the analysis. But it had much less in common with the trajectories of upper middle-income countries and low and lower middle-income authoritarian countries.

9.6.6 Limitations of the study

This study has at least two major limitations. The first limitation was that the research focused mostly on domestic political factors and relied significantly on information provided by actors very close to the policy making process. While the study made effort to corroborate the accounts provided by research informants, there was potential for the thesis to provide a biased narrative. The second was that the study primarily focused on the contribution of changes of government for social policy reforms and did not set out to fully consider how other factors may have also contributed to reforms. A fuller discussion of economic factors and the role of transnational actors would have provided more insights to the reform process in the two countries. This includes the extent to which bilateral and multilateral agencies influence policy makers including in opposition parties, and the distinct ways that different transnational agencies promote reforms,

9.6.7 Further research

Recent research on social protection has considered the contribution of public opinion on the promotion of social cash transfers. Opalo's (2019) study that focuses on a public opinion survey on citizen attitudes towards social cash transfers in Kenya, provides insightful individual-level attitudes towards social protection. Similar public opinion data on cash transfers in Malawi and Zambia would highlight the extent to which citizens demand more social protection and highlight variation in attitudes between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, ethnic groups and regions. This would also demonstrate the extent to which variation in attitudes towards social protection across different constituencies informs the adoption of social protection amongst political parties as they seek to broaden their electoral coalitions.

Future research on reforms to SCTs in Malawi and Zambia would do well to provide more robust quantitative analysis – which employs data on actual spending and coverage of programmes – to investigate the effect of democracy (more broadly) and changes of government (specifically) on social protection policy reforms within and between countries on the continent.

9.7 Conclusion

This thesis set out to understand the forms of politics that drive or limit support for the expansion of social cash transfers in countries where programmes were initiated by international donors. The study focused on the relative importance of partisanship by examining the distinct ways that reforms were implemented within the same country under different government administrations. The main findings from the four case studies show that changes of government in Zambia and Malawi had implications for the implementation of SCTs. The thesis demonstrated that in competitive electoral contexts where social protection had not already been seized as a mode of redistribution by ruling political elites, there was an incentive for rival parties and candidates to embrace it as an electoral brand and to implement reforms to expand the provision of social protection once elected. Furthermore, where changes of government happened, they provided policy windows for international donors to advocate for alternative redistribution policies that were not embraced by previous administrations. Moreover, the study shows that the interests of political elites (which are shaped by ideas, beliefs and attitudes, inter-party electoral competition, and intra-party factionalism), provide incentives for government administrations to focus on either clientelist or programmatic forms of redistribution. When the interests of international donors and political elites converge on poverty reduction and redistribution, there is a greater incentive to expand the provision of social protection.

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APPENDIX 1: Cross tabulation of social protection reform following formation of government

Pace of reform	No Change	Partial Change	Complete Change
0	Kenya-Moi (1992)		Zambia-Chiluba (1991)
	Kenya-Moi (1997)		Lesotho-Mokhehle (1993)
	Malawi-Muluzi (1999)		Malawi-Muluzi (1994)
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (1996)		
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (2002)		
1	Uganda-Museveni (1996)	Tanzania-Mkapa (1995)	Kenya-Kibaki (2002)
	Zambia-Chiluba (1996)	Malawi-Bingu (2004)	
	Tanzania-Mkapa (2000)		
	Uganda-Museveni (2001)		
	Zambia-Mwanawasa (2006)		
2	Uganda-Museveni (2011)	Zambia-Mwanawasa (2002)	Malawi-Mutharika (2014)
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (2013)	Tanzania-Kikwete (2005)	
	Botswana-Khama (2014)	Botswana-Khama (2008)	
3	Lesotho-Mosisili (2002)	Zambia-Banda (2008)	Namibia-Nujoma (1990)
	Uganda-Museveni (2006)	Zimbabwe-Mugabe-Tsvangirai (2009)	Lesotho-Mosisili (2015)
	Malawi-Bingu (2009)	South Africa-Zuma (2009)	
	South Africa-Zuma (2014)	Kenya-Kenyatta (2013)	
	Tanzania-Kikwete (2010)	Tanzania-Magufuli (2015)	
		Zambia-Lungu (2015)	
		Namibia-Geingob (2015)	
4	Botswana-Masire (1994)	South Africa-Mbeki (1999)	Lesotho-Mosisili (1998)
	Namibia-Nujoma (2000)	Kenya-Kibaki-Government of National Unity (2007)	Zambia-Sata (2011)
	Botswana-Mogae (2004)		Lesotho-Thabane (2012)
	South Africa-Mbeki (2004)		
	Lesotho-Mosisili (2007)		
5	Namibia-Nujoma (1995)	Botswana-Mogae (1998)	South Africa-Mandela (1994)
	Namibia-Pohamba (2010)	Namibia-Pohamba (2005)	
		Malawi-Banda (2012)	

APPENDIX 2: Data Sources for Quantitative Analysis

Country	Data Sources
Botswana	Seekings, J. 2016. Building a conservative welfare state. CSSR Working Paper No.388. Cape Town: CSSR, University of Cape Town
	Chinyoka, I. 2019. Familial child welfare regimes: The case of Botswana, 1966-2017. CSSR Working Paper No.430. Cape Town: CSSR, Univeristy of Cape Town
Kenya	Bosworth, J., Alviar, C., Corral, L., Davis, B., Musembi, D., Mwasiaji, W., Ochieng, S., Pearson, R., Pozarny, P., Ward, P. & Wiseman, W. 2016. The Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children: the catalyst for cash transfers in Kenya. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
	Granvik, M. 2019. The initiation and evolution of Kenya's OVC cash transfer programme. Unpublished CSSR Working Paper. Wanyama, F.O. & McCord, A. 2017. The politics of scaling up social protection in Kenya. *ESID Working Paper 87.* Manchester: Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester.

Country	Data Sources
Lesotho	Granvik, M. 2019. Policy diffusion, domestic politics and social protection in Lesotho, 1998-2012. *CSSR Working Paper No. 357*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Pellerano, L., Daidone, S., Davis, B., Farooq, M.H., Kardan, A., Masasa, M., Niang., O., Ramirez, B. & Safi, N. 2016. Does evidence matter? Role of evaluation of the Child Grants Programme in the consolidation of the social protection sector in Lesotho. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malawi	Fieldwork research
	Hamer, S. 2016. Championing the poor: Branding around poverty reduction as a response to electoral competition in Malawi, 2005-2014. *CSSR Working Paper No. 371*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Hamer, S. & Seekings, J., 2017. *Social protection, electoral competition, and political branding in Malawi* WIDER Working Paper No. 2017/99. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
	Angeles, D., Abdoulayi, S., Barrington, C., Handa, S., Kainja, E., Mvula, P., Mwamlima, H., Tsoka, M. & Spadafora, T. 2016. The Social Cash Transfer Programme of Malawi. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Country	Data Sources
Namibia	Chinyoka, I. 2019. Namibia’s child welfare regime, 1990-2017. *CSSR Working Paper No. 431*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2015. Presentation on welfare grants in Namibia. Conference presentation 1st Namibia Social Protection Conference, 7-9 July 2015. Windhoek, Namibia.
	Subbaro, K. n.d. Namibia's social safety net: issues and options for reform. World Bank
	Pelham, L. 2007. The politics behind the non-contributory old age social pensions in Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. CPRC Working Paper 83. Chronic Poverty Research Centre
South Africa	Seekings, J. 2015. The ‘Developmental’ and ‘Welfare’ State in South Africa: Lessons for the Southern African Region. *CSSR Working Paper No. 358*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Samson, M., Heinrich, C., Hoddinott, J., Laryea-Adeji, G., Buthelezi, T., Cluver, L., Jehoma, S., Mogotsi, M., Stevens, T., van Nierkerk, I. & Nyokangi, E. The impact of a promise realized: South Africa's Child Support Grant. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tanzania	Ulriksen, M. 2019. The development of social protection in Tanzania, 2000-2015. *CSSR Working Paper No. 377*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Jacob, T. and Hundsbæk Pedersen, R. 2018. Social protection in an electorally competitive environment (1): The politics of Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) in Tanzania

Country	Data Sources
Uganda	Grebe, E. 2014. Donor agenda-setting, bureaucratic advocacy and cash transfers in Uganda (2002-2013). *CSSR Working Paper No. 352*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Grebe, E. & Mubiru, J.B. 2014. Development and social policy reform in Uganda: The slow emergence of a social protection agenda (1986-2014). CSSR Working Paper No. 353. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
Zambia	Fieldwork research
	Kabandula, A. & Seekings, J., 2016. Donor Influence, the Minister of Finance and Welfare Policy Reform in Zambia, 2003–11. *CSSR Working Paper*, *395*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
Zimbabwe	Chinyoka, I. & Seekings, J. 2016. Social policy reform under the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe, 2009-13. *CSSR Working Paper No. 373*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Seidenfeld, D., Dumba, L., Handa, S., Muwoni, L., Reeves, H. & Sammon, E. 2016. Zimbabwe: Using evidence to overcome political and econoic challenges to starting a national unconditional cash transfer programme. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

APPENDIX 3: Zambia Respondents

Name	Organization	Position
Vince Chipatuka	Platform for Social Protection	Research, Advocacy and Social Engagement Policy Officer
Charlotte Harland	UNICEF Zambia	Chief of Social and Economic Policy (2007-2012)
Patrick Mucheleka	UPND	UPND Deputy Secretary General; Independent MP (2011-2015); Executive Director-Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (c.2008-2011)
Bradford Machila	UPND	Cabinet Minister (Lands; Livestock and Fisheries) 2006-2011; MMD Chairperson for Legal Affairs (c.2012-c.2016)
Kelley Toole	DFID	Regional Climate Change Advisor DFID Southern Africa; Former Programme Officer Human and Social Development DFID Zambia
Dolika Nkhoma	DFID	Programme Officer Human and Social Development
Guy Scott	GRZ/PF	Lusaka Central MP (2006-2016); Vice President (2011-2014); Acting President (Oct 2014-Jan 2015)
Emmanuel Chenda	GRZ/PF	PF MP (2011-2016); Cabinet Minister (Agriculture; Commerce, Trade and Industry) 2011-2014
Highvie Hamududu	UPND/National Assembly of Zambia	UPND MP (2006-2016); Chairperson Parliamentary Committee on Estimates (2011-2016)

Name	Organization	Position
Geoffrey Lungwangwa	UPND	UPND MP (2016-present); MMD MP (2006-2016); Cabinet Minister (Education; Transport and Communications) 2006-2011
Ngosa Chisupa	GRZ	Permanent Secretary Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2006-2009); Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs (2009-2011)
Sherry Thole	GRZ	Permanent Secretary Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (2010-2011)
Lazarous Mwelwa	GRZ/Ministry of Finance	Senior Budget Analyst
Nkandu Chilombo	UNICEF-Zambia	Social Policy Specialist
Situmbeko Musokotwane	UPND	UPND MP (2016-present); Minister of Finance (2008-2011); MMD MP (2011-2016)
Borniface Phiri	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions	Director of Research
Anne Anamela	Irish Aid	Programme Manager & Public Financial Management Advisor
Kryticous Nshindano	CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
Likando Mufalali	UPND/National Assembly of Zambia	UPND MP (2011-2016); Chairperson Parliamentary Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Services
Stanfield Michelo	GRZ	Director Social Welfare Department-Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (c.2012-c.2014)

Name	Organization	Position
Daniel Kumitz	UNICEF-Zambia	Social Policy Specialist; Former Programme Manager-Social Compact (FES)
Milimo Mwiba	Irish Aid	Programme Manager
Simon Kampata	GRZ	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Department of Community Development, MCDSW
Gift Makungo	GRZ	Department of Community Development, MCDSW
Cornelius Mweetwa	UPND	UPND MP (2011-present)
Morris Moono	GRZ	Provincial Community Development Officer, Southern Province, MCDSW
Joyce Nonde	GRZ	Minister, Labour and Social Security
Luca Pellerano	ILO	Chief Technical Advisor on Social Security
Barnaby Mulenga	GRZ	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Emmerine Kabanshi	GRZ/PF	Minister, Community Development and Social Welfare (2014-2018); PF MP (2011-present)
Kennedy Mumba	GRZ	Director of Social Welfare, MCDSW
Ebby Sichembe	GRZ	Chief Planner, MCDSW
Mervis Chisanga	GRZ	Senior Planner, MCDSW
Denis Wood	Independent	Social Security Consultant
Mutale Wakunuma	Platform for Social Protection	Executive Secretary
Herryman Moono	FES	Programme Manager-Continental Social Protection programme

APPENDIX 4: Malawi Respondents

Name	Organization	Position
Geoffrey Kumwenda	Care International	Program Director
Symon Sauzande	Congress for NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA)	Deputy Coordinator
Chipo Msowoya	European Union	Programme Manager - Economic Governance and Social Protection
Selvi Vikan	GIZ	Deputy Team Leader - Social Protection Programme
Tom Mtenje	GIZ/Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development	Senior Technical Officer - Social Protection Programme
Collins Magalasi	Government of the Republic of Malawi	Chief Economic Advisor and Executive Assistant to the President
Patricia Kaliati	Government of the Republic of Malawi	Minister of Information, Civic Education and Community Development/Former Gender & Social Welfare Minister 2009-10; 2014-2016
Jean Kalilani	Government of the Republic of Malawi	Minister of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare
Esmie Kainja	Government of the Republic of Malawi	Principal Secretary, Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare
Florian Jurgens	International Labour Organization	Social Protection Officer
Patience Masi	KfW	Senior Project Coordinator
Elias Chakwera	Malawi Congress Party	Member of Parliament/Chair of Parliamentary Committee on Education, Science and Technology

Name	Organization	Position
Richard Chimwendo Banda	Malawi Congress Party	Member of Parliament/Chair of Parliamentary Committee on Social and Community Affairs
Alexander Dzonzi	Malawi Congress Party	Member of Parliament/MCP Spokesperson for Finance
Andrew Kavala	Malawi Network of Elderly Persons Organizations (MANEPO)	Chairperson
Frank Musa	Malawi Public Policy Research & Analysis Project -MoFEPD	Research Fellow
George Chimseu	Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee-MoFEPD	Technical Advisor
Bessie Msusa	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development	Principal Economist
Laurent Kansinjiro	Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare	Principal Social Welfare Officer
Khumbo Kachali	People's Party	Member of Parliament/Vice President of Malawi 2012-2014
Ephraim Chiume	People's Party	Member of Parliament/Minister of Foreign Affairs 2012-2014
Simekinala Kaluzi	Platform for Social Support/Congress for NGOs in Malawi (CONGOMA)	PSS Coordinator/Program Officer CONGOMA
Sophie Shawa	UNICEF	Social Protection Officer