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**SOCIAL IDENTITY VERSUS PERSONAL IDENTITY:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INTERACTION OF GROUP
AND PERSONAL STATUS WITH COLLECTIVE AND
WITH PERSONAL SELF-ESTEEM ON INGROUP
FAVOURITISM.**

*Thesis submitted to the Department of Psychology in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Masters of Arts (Psychology)**, in the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities.*

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ABSTRACT

The positivity of personal and minimal group social identity was manipulated by giving subjects bogus test feedback to induce differential levels of personal status (high, low, no feedback) and group status (high, low, neutral) in 237 13-15 year olds. This investigative experimental study used a MANOVA to explore the main effects and interactions between these factors with personal self-esteem (Rosenberg,1965) and collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen,1990) on the evaluations of products by (a) the ingroup in comparison with the outgroup, (b) self in comparison with the ingroup and (c) the difference between these self and ingroup favouritism measures. It was found that subjects with high but not low collective self-esteem engaged in less ingroup favouritism in comparison to self-favouritism when the group made a negative contribution to identity than when it did not. This result was explained through a social identity self-enhancement and self-consistency framework. Males showed more self-favouritism than females. This study did not confirm predictions of enhancement theories like Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner,1979) or research on the nature of self-esteem. Levels of self-esteem, group status and personal status had no significant effects on either self favouritism or ingroup favouritism.

A correlational study on the validity of collective self-esteem found that it was moderately correlated with Jewish identification (R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams,1986) and Gibbons & McCoy's (1990) measures of Negative Affectivity and not correlated with subtle racism (Duckitt,1990,1991a) or Watson, Clark & Tellegen's (1988) measure of Negative Affectivity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	viii
INTRODUCTION	ix
CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF SELF.	1
1.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE 'SELF'	1
1.1.1 Definition of the self	1
1.1.2 The self in history	2
1.2 THE SELF CONCEPT	5
1.2.1 The content of the self concept	5
1.2.2 The self-concept: stable or malleable?	6
1.2.3 Personal and social identity: the two major components of the self-concept	9
1.2.4 Mechanisms of self-concept formation	11
1.3 COGNITIVE BIAS	13
1.4 SELF-ESTEEM	15
1.4.1 Self-esteem	15
1.4.2 Characteristics of people with low trait self-esteem	16
CHAPTER 2 SELF-ESTEEM, SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND FAVOURITISM TOWARDS SELF AND GROUP	20
2.1 THE COGNITIVE MOTIVATIONS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-CONSISTENCY	20
2.1.1 Self-enhancement and self-consistency	20
2.1.2 The enhancement- consistency debate	23
2.2 SELF-ESTEEM AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM	27
2.2.1 Introductory remarks about ingroup favouritism.	27
2.2.2 Self-esteem and ingroup favouritism	29
2.3 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AS A COGNITIVE THEORY OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT ON THE SOCIAL LEVEL OF IDENTITY	34

CHAPTER 3	GROUP STATUS, INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND IDENTIFICATION	38
3.1	STATUS	38
3.1.1	Definition of status	38
3.1.2	Other socio-structural variables	40
3.2	GROUP STATUS AND IDENTIFICATION	41
3.2.1	Identification..	41
3.2.2	Identification and ingroup favouritism	42
3.2.3	Self-esteem and identification	42
3.2.4	Group status and identification.	43
3.3	GROUP STATUS AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM	44
3.3.1	Favouritism on consensually low status dimensions..	44
3.3.2	Favouritism on dimensions unrelated to status	47
3.3.3	Assessment of the research	49
3.4	THE EFFECTS OF GROUP STATUS ON SELF-ESTEEM	54
CHAPTER 4	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL STATUS AND GROUP STATUS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND IDENTITY	56
4.1	PERSONAL VERSUS SOCIAL IDENTITY	56
4.2	THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY FOR INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR	59
4.3	THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF GROUP STATUS AND PERSONAL STATUS	62
4.3.1	Group status and personal status and group identification	62
4.3.2	Group status and personal status combined and ingroup favouritism	63
4.4	GROUP STATUS, PERSONAL STATUS AND ESTEEM	66
4.4.1	Personal self-esteem	66
4.4.2	Collective self-esteem	68

CHAPTER 5	EXPERIMENT 1: THE CONCURRENT VALIDITY OF COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NEGATIVE AFFECTIVITY	71
5.1	OVERVIEW	71
5.2	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	72
5.3	METHOD	74
5.3.1	Experiment 1A	74
5.3.2	Experiment 1B	76
5.4	RESULTS	78
5.5	DISCUSSION	81
CHAPTER 6	EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL STATUS, GROUP STATUS AND ESTEEM ON INGROUP FAVOURITISM	84
6.1	OVERVIEW	84
6.2	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	85
6.3	METHOD	93
6.3.1	Pre-study	93
6.3.2	Experiment 2A	95
6.3.3	Experiment 2B	100
6.4	RESULTS	102
6.5	DISCUSSION	111
CHAPTER 7	SUMMARY DISCUSSION: PERSONAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION	119
REFERENCES		127

APPENDIX A: MEASURES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT

A1	Measure in experiment 1A
A2	Pre-study questionnaire
A3	Social Sensitivity test
A4	Colour Preference test
A5	Fly swatter answer form
A6	Experimental booklets experiment 2A
A7	Ingroup #1 fly swatter ideas
A8	Outgroup fly swatter ideas
A9	Ingroup #2 fly swatter ideas
A10	Experimental booklet experiment 2B

APPENDIX B: RELEVANT STATISTICS NOT PRESENTED IN THE RESULTS SECTIONS

B1	Inter-correlations of the measures in Experiment 1
B2	Cell means for the manipulation checks in Experiment 2
B3	ANOVA of 'Self vs. ingroup favouritism' on personal status, group status and Collective Self-esteem.

APPENDIX C: RAW DATA

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 6.1:	Residual analysis- CSE & Group status interaction on self vs ingroup favouritism	108
Figure 6.2:	Differences between male & female subjects in their evaluations of themselves and an ingroup member	111
Table 2.1.	Predicted favourability of feedback from others as a function of self-esteem	24
Table 3.1:	Findings reported by studies which have looked at the effect of group status on ingroup favouritism	53
Table 4.1 :	Extent of ingroup identification as a function of personal status	63
Table 4.2 :	Mean ingroup favouritism scores reported by Ng (1985)	64
Table 4.3 :	Extent of ingroup favouritism on an intergroup adjective checklist as a function of self-esteem and status	67
Table 4.4:	Extent of ingroup favouritism on an intergroup adjective checklist as a function of collective and private self-esteem and group status	69
Table 5.1 :	Descriptive statistics of the scales	79
Table 5.2 :	Correlations of CSE and self-esteem with NA	80
Table 5.3 :	Correlations of CSE with Jewish identity and racism	80
Table 6.1 :	Anticipated extent of favouritism in the experimental conditions	89
Table 6.2 :	MANOVA of personal and group status with the version of the experiment	102
Table 6.3 :	Manipulation checks	104
Table 6.4:	Group status, personal status and CSE effects - MANOVA and related ANOVA's	105
Table 6.5:	MANOVA statistics for the personal status effect	106
Table 6.6 :	Main effect on self-favouritism of personal status	107
Table 6.7 :	MANOVA statistics - group status x CSE interaction	107
Table 6.8:	Residual analysis - CSE and group status interaction	108
Table 6.9:	Group status, personal status and self-esteem effects MANOVA and related ANOVA's	110

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>ABBREVIATED EXPRESSION</u>	<u>SOURCE SECTION</u>
CSE	Collective Self-esteem	4.4.2
HGS	High group status	3.1.1
HPS	High personal status	3.1.1
HSE	High self-esteem	1.4.2
LGS	Low group status	3.1.1
LPS	Low personal status	3.1.1
LSE	Low self-esteem	1.4.2
MAACL	Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist	5.3.1
NA	Negative Affectivity	1.4.2
NAS	Negative Affect Schedule	5.3.2
SIT	Social Identity Theory	2.3

INTRODUCTION

The groups to which we belong and our personal characteristics are important components of our self-concept. In our attempt to view ourselves in as favourable and credible a light as possible we strive to be able to view both our social and our personal identities positively. Ethnocentrism on the national level is akin to self-aggrandisement on the individual level. This thesis investigates how our personal and social identities interact in our effort to have a positive self-concept. We will investigate how the positivity of our personal and social identity inter-relate in terms of ingroup favouritism. It has been argued that social identity will only be markedly enhanced through ingroup favouritism if personal identity makes a negative contribution to the self-concept.

There are individual differences in the extent to which people engage in self-aggrandisement of their self-concepts. Those with high self-esteem are better at engaging in self-enhancing behaviours and cognitions than those with low self-esteem. In a recent paper Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) suggested that there are parallel individual differences in the regard to which people hold their social identity, a trait which they called *collective self-esteem*. This study investigates the effects of self-esteem and collective self-esteem on the interrelation between personal and social identity in the extent of ingroup favouritism. In addition, various issues relating to the validity of collective self-esteem are examined.

In this study the positivity of personal and social identity was manipulated by giving performance feedback to subjects to induce differential levels of personal status (individual ability) and group status (group attributes). The experiment investigated (a) the combined effects of group status and personal status on ingroup favouritism and (b) the influence of the personality variables of self-esteem, and collective-esteem, on this relationship. An additional experiment used a correlational design to (c) investigate issues concerning the validity of collective self-esteem.

Chapter outline

This literature review builds up a theoretical framework which places social identity, at least to the extent to which it is operationalised in the experimental literature, as one of the main dimensions of the self-concept. To view one's group positively or negatively is equivalent to viewing aspects of oneself positively or negatively. The self-enhancement motive

operates at the level of self-categorisation as a group member as much as it does at the level of self-categorisation as an individual (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). For this reason the literature review section roots discussion of group favouritism in the literature on the 'self'. It is seen as a form of domain specific self-enhancement through intergroup social comparison. Such a viewpoint has been proposed by many authors (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 1988; J.D. Brown & Smart, 1991; Goethals and Darley, 1987; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Hogg & McGarty, 1990; Levine & Moreland, 1987; Ng, 1985; Schaller, 1991; D.M. Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987; D.M. Taylor, Moghaddam & Bellerose, 1988; S.E. Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wood, 1989).

Chapter One, presents the framework of a multidimensional and dynamic self-concept developed through social comparison. In particular personal identity and social identity as components of the self-concept are highlighted. An important goal of this section was to put this framework itself into an historical and psychological perspective. While this paper is based on many constructs, a deliberate attempt was made to show the problematical nature of many of them, often with reference to social constructionist writings. Trait self-esteem, the disposition relating to how people evaluate their self-concept, and some cognitive effects of this trait are discussed. Literature on cognitive self-biases is cited to demonstrate that the evaluation of self-relevant and social stimuli is highly biased and subjective.

The direction of these cognitive biases mentioned in chapter One are discussed in chapter Two, through two self-concept based theories of motivation - self-consistency theory and self-enhancement theory. It is suggested that these theories are 'two sides of the same coin', with trait self-esteem mediating between the sides. A review of this area is undertaken as it relates directly to the reasoning behind the results that were expected in our first study and to one of the predictions tested therein. The chapter then moves on to discuss ingroup favouritism, a form of self-enhancement and examines how self-esteem influences it. The final section of the chapter discusses Social Identity Theory as a cognitive self-enhancement theory focusing on the enhancement of the group levels of social self-categorisation.

Chapter Three and Four, contain the review of empirical work most directly pertaining to the empirical section. Chapter Three reviews research which has studied the relationship between group status and ingroup favouritism and identification. Chapter Four takes up the issue of personal versus social identity. Central to this section is the interaction between social and personal identity in general and the interaction between group and personal status in particular. It reviews research which has studied the effects of personal identity on ingroup favouritism and identification and experiments which have investigated the combined effects of group status and personal status on these phenomena. Discussed in this section is collective

self-esteem, considered to be the equivalent to self-esteem on the group level of the self-concept. This construct conceptualises social identity as a qualitatively distinct aspect of the self-concept. An alternative viewpoint would consider collective self-esteem as a manifestation of a general evaluative disposition. This section finally ties up the combined effects of the group status, personal status and the esteem measures on ingroup favouritism. It is these variables which were explored in our main study.

Chapter Five presents our first study, a correlational study which attempted to evaluate the construct validity of collective self-esteem by investigating if it correlated with a measure of real group identification. The possibility that it would correlate with a measure of racism, was tested as well. Chapter Six reports on the main study of the thesis, the experimental study on ingroup favouritism which manipulated personal and social identity and measured personal and collective self-esteem.

Chapter Seven, the final chapter, summarises the findings of the studies reported in the previous two chapters. It discusses them in relation to situations where individuals behave in terms of real group identities. Speculative implications of the studies findings are suggested. The conclusion stresses intrapersonal and intercultural differences in social identification and ingroup favouritism.

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF SELF

The purpose of this chapter is to present literature on the self-concept that will inform our attempt to root current theorising in the field of individual intergroup behaviour, with standard social psychological research that has been done on the self-concept. The chapter begins by giving an historical and theoretical background to the self-concept. Following this the nature of the self-concept is debated, particularly whether it is a stable or malleable entity. The social identity and personal identity components of the self-concepts, which are central to our study, are then identified. Mechanisms of self-concept formation are outlined focusing on social comparison. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the subject of cognitive bias and discusses the nature of self-esteem and its effects on cognition and behaviour.

1.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE 'SELF'

Social psychology has developed a 'growing fascination with the self' (Pelham,1991, p.518). Although it is a nebulous construct, the self concept 'is rapidly becoming the dominant concern in social psychology' (Gecas, 1982, p.27) and is experiencing a revitalisation in sociology as well (Gecas,1982). The self is in league with dissonance and attributions as one of the fundamental concerns of social and personality psychologists'(Baumeister, 1987). This could be a reflection of the 'cognitive revolution' within psychology (Gecas,1982),and the importance of the concept of self in contemporary Western culture (Baumeister, 1986, 1987). 'This continuing fascination with the self-concept is easy to understand:', explained McGuire & Padawer-Singer (1976), 'what we think about ourselves is probably the central concept in our conscious lives' (cited in Fleming & Watts,1980, p.921).

1.1.1 DEFINITION OF THE SELF

The 'self' and similar concepts 'like the ego (...) proprium (...) and identity (...) stand as the concepts foremost in the ranks of confusion' (Rosenberg,1979, p.5). The 'self' is 'an embarrassment as a term' because 'it is difficult to say what is meant by it' (Greenwald,1982, p.153).

The self is a process of reflexivity emanating from the dialectic between the 'I' and 'Me'. The self-concept is the product of this reflexive activity (Gecas,1982). It eludes easy definition because it is simultaneously a process and a structure, as William James observed (Suls,1982). The term 'self' can be dichotomised into references to 'self as agent or process' and 'self as object of the person's own knowledge and evaluation' (Wylie,1974), where this knowledge is postulated to be either available or unavailable to consciousness. As Gergen (1971) noted, in the former sense it refers to the 'process by which the person conceptualises or categorises his/her behaviour - both ... external conduct and internal states' and in the latter sense it refers to 'the system of concepts available to the person in attempting to define him/herself' (pp.22-23).

This property of reflexivity, the fusing of subject and object, is illustrated by the use of the hyphen to connect 'self' to a wide variety of abstract nouns as in 'self-concept', 'self-esteem', 'self-awareness' and 'self-presentation'. In the index of the *Psychological Abstracts* for the second half of 1979, 'self was used as the first part of a combination with 18 different nouns, covering 116 pages of citations' (Greenwald,1982,p.153). In a 1991 A.P.A. thesaurus of psychological index terms (Walker, 1991), self is used as a prefix for 42 entries. There were approximately 1300 articles on such entries in the 1991 edition of *Psychological Abstracts*.

Rosenberg (1979) gave a tidy definition of the self-concept defining it as 'the totality of the individual's thoughts and feelings with reference to himself as an object'(p.7).

1.1.2 THE SELF IN HISTORY

In human history

The existence and psychological importance of the 'self' is axiomatic to current Western thought. 'Self-based' ideologies like 'self-fulfilment', 'self-development' and 'self-actualisation' are the modern means to salvation. Social psychology's constructionist critics consider the conception of self in American psychology as a 'bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe...', however incorrigible it may seem to us, a

rather peculiar idea within the context of the world cultures' (Geertz,1979, p.229; cited in Sampson, 1989, p.1).

Baumeister (1986, 1987) basing himself on a psychological review of historical data, argues that the importance of self is a function of our current historical epoch. The self has historically not always been understood in the modern sense, or been accorded as much importance. In medieval times the concept of 'self' was of little importance and identity was a function of one's position in society. The church taught that fulfilment was not through life but through death. Literature of this period shows little concern with introspection, inner struggles or the individual and there is a scarcity of autobiographical material. A distinction between the 'inner' and 'outer self' was forged during the early modern period, as people ceased equating self with appearance. Identity became less pre-determined and the concept of 'self' became of increasing importance. This was strengthened by the introduction of the concept of secular individual fulfilment during the Romantic era. Today identity is left for individuals to define for themselves, and there is a wide array of possible identities on offer.

The discipline of psychology may owe much of its knowledge claim, power and credibility to its position as the scientific explorers of that secret, central concern of modern humanity- the self. As a reified concept, the lay concept of 'self' is in many ways the concept of 'soul' relocated in the 'brain' rather than in a spiritual locality. Psychologists have become the gatekeepers and promoters of the self, as priests were of the soul.

In psychological history

Debate around the nature of the self has early roots. Hume did not consider the self a special entity, calling it "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions (Greenwald, 1982, p.252). Kant, in contrast, had a unified formulation of the transcendental (or pure) ego. Modern psychology inherited this philosophical debate which informed early psychological investigation. For example, James (1890) gives a review of these early philosophical formulations (Greenwald,1982). It was Kant's view which psychologists followed.

William James was the first psychologist to grapple with the concept of self, firmly embedding the concept in the centre of psychological examination (Suls,1982), as a 'fundamental psychological fact' (James,1890, p.289, cited in Rosenberg, 1979,p.xi). He

defined the self as the 'sum total of all that he CAN call his' (James, p.291), making the distinction between the 'I', the conscious and knowing subject, and the 'Me' which is known to the 'I' (Deschamps, 1982). James's preferred metaphor to describe the self was a stream of successive thoughts which the self identified as the relation of the present thought to those that had preceded it- the present thought being 'the hook from which the chain of past selves dangles' (cited in Greenwald, 1982, p.154). Subsequent early psychologists like Hall and McDougall conceptualised the self as a 'cognitive/ perceptual structure organising perception of the individual's social world' (Markus & Sentic, 1982, p.41).

After James (1890), the study of self was pursued by introspectionalists (e.g. Calkins), who were methodologically incapable of dealing with this subject matter (Wylie, 1974). Early psychoanalysis was dominated by the 'id' and only in later years was more emphasis assigned to the 'ego' (Wylie, 1974). As the self was an anathema to the then dominant behaviourist and functionalist psychological schools, study of the self was discouraged. It was the post-behaviourists who freed the area for investigation (Wylie, 1974; Marcus & Sentic, 1982). It was not until Raimy in 1948 that systematic empirical research on the self appeared (Rosenberg, 1979). In the subsequent two decades over 2000 studies on the subject were published (Gergen, 1971).

After World War Two a proliferation of personality theories were developed, 'almost all' of which assigned importance to a 'phenomenal and/or nonphenomenal self-concept with cognitive and motivational attributes' (Wylie, 1974, p.3). Theorists for whom the self-concept is central include Adler, Allport, Cattell, Erikson, Fromm, Horner, Jung, Lecky, Maslow, McClelland, Mead, Rogers and Sullivan. Wylie writes that these theories are 'ambiguous, incomplete and overlapping, no one has received a large amount of systematic empirical exploration' (Wylie, 1974, p.4).

Research on the self has not decelerated. During the 80's the self has been a 'striking growth industry' (Schneider, 1991, p.529). We are, 'according to today's social psychologists, self-perceivers, self-presenters, self-evaluators, self-monitors, self-regulators, self-handicappers, self-enhancers and self-verifiers to list only a few' (Pelham, 1991, p.518). Self-enhancement and self-consistency (self-verification) will be taken up later in this paper (see section 2.1).

Despite the quantity of theorising and research which rests upon the self-concept; Wylie (1979) remains unimpressed. She concludes her classic and extensive two-volume review of the area thus:

'It is fascinating that hundreds of thousands of research hours have been devoted to studying self-concept variables, especially overall self-regard, and that both lay persons and professional individuals from many disciplines evidently continue to be impressed with the importance of the topic despite the paucity of definitive findings and indeed, despite numerous resounding failures to obtain support for some of their most strongly held hypotheses. One may notice here an analogy to the state of affairs in the study of certain other constructs in psychology, such as "intelligence" or "motivation"'(p.685).

1.2

THE SELF CONCEPT

Research on the self-concept is beset with confusion. Pelham (1991) characterises the situation as such:

'Few topics in contemporary social psychology have proven as controversial or as elusive as the self-concept. For example, is the self-concept best characterized as an attitude (...), an attribution (...), a component of personality (...) or a set of cognitive schemas (Markus,1977)? For that matter, can the self-concept ever be fully understood from a cognitive perspective, or is it partly an affective or 'primitive' entity (...)? Should the self-concept be measured objectively (e.g. Rosenberg,1965), 'spontaneously' (...) or unobtrusively (...)? Is the self-concept a stable, enduring aspect of the person (Rosenberg,1979) or is it a 'situational' construction (e.g. Fazio, Effrein & Falender,1981; Morse & Gergen,1970)? Does the self-concept have motivational properties? If so, what does it want- unadulterated praise and 'enhancement' (e.g. Baumgardner, Kaufman & Levy,1989; S.C. Jones 1973) or the familiar ring of 'consistency' at any cost (e.g. Aronson & Carlsmith,1962; Singer,1966; Swann,1983)?' (p.518)

This section will touch on many of these themes.

1.2.1 THE CONTENT OF THE SELF CONCEPT

Ng (1985) provides a useful definition of the self-concept as 'the sum total of knowledge and representations one has of one's self. It is not a fixed entity, but has to be constructed and negotiated in the social milieu'(p.298).

From a cognitive perspective, theorists such as Kelly, Sarbin, Epstein, Rejkowski and Kernberg have viewed the self-concept as a cognitive knowledge structure (Markus & Senti, 1982). This structure 'organises abstract and concrete memories about the self and controls the processing of self-relevant information' (Campbell, 1990, p.539). As such it 'selects and monitors incoming information from the environment, processing the data by means of specific cognitive operations, and produces a cognitive output that serves to regulate behaviour through its perceptual representation of the social situation' (Turner, 1984, p.526). Building upon Kelly's (1955) work, Epstein (1973) characterised the self-concept as a self-theory, a theory that the 'individual has unwittingly constructed about himself as an experiencing, functioning individual and is part of a broader theory which he holds with respect to his entire range of significant experience' (S.E. Taylor, 1989, p.66).

The self-concept has a knowledge (self-conception) and an evaluative (self-evaluation) component (Campbell, 1990; Suls, 1982). These correspond to the self as a subject and the self as an object. The evaluative component has been conceptualised as the trait of self-esteem, 'a global self-reflexive attitude addressing how one feels about the self when it is viewed as an object of evaluation' (Campbell, p.539). Research has been preoccupied with the evaluative component (McGuire & McGuire, 1982; Suls, 1982), possibly due to its motivational significance (Gecas, 1982).

The self-concept provides individuals with a self-definition, giving people a sense of who they are and how they should behave. It provides both a sense of individual uniqueness and of continuity, in that one remains the same over time (Baumeister 1986, 1987).

1.2.2 THE SELF-CONCEPT: STABLE OR MALLEABLE?

There is currently a resurgence of interest in the debate surrounding personality-situation consistency (c.f. Gergen, 1971; Mischel, 1976), as it applies to the self concept (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991)

The self-concept as stable

In one view, the self is seen as organised, multi-faceted, hierarchical, stable, developmental, evaluative and differentiable from related constructs (Flemming & Watts, 1980). Advocates of this viewpoint hold that there is 'considerable evidence that the self-concept is persistent and stable and that people will actively seek information that confirms their self-concept and reject information that threatens their general view of self (Greenwald, 1980; Swann, 1983, 1987; Wylie, 1979)' (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991, p.895). For example, research has found that relatively enduring self-schemata make important aspects of self more salient and easier to organise and remember (Markus, 1977). Self-descriptions are stable over time (see Wylie, 1974) and by late adolescence the core self-concept has been formed (Tesser & Paulhus, 1983). This conception of the self-concept as stable lies behind consistency theories of motivation (see section 2.1.1).

The self-concept as malleable

According to the opposing viewpoint, moment to moment self-conceptions, active at any time, regulate and direct behaviour. Thus the self-concept is dynamic and influenced by a host of situational and personal factors (Markus & Wurf, 1987). These include mood states, self-presentational behaviour, attentional focus and the composition of the social environment. Situational factors like success or failure and personal variables such as self-esteem interact to affect a person's momentary thoughts about the self (J.D. Brown & Smart, 1991). Our investigation studied the interaction between experimental success or failure manipulations and personal variables like self-esteem.

There is much evidence that situational variables can lead to momentary changes in self-evaluation as well as self-conceptions (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). For instance, Gergen & Wishnov (1965) found that praise, role-playing and type of comparison targets effected self-evaluations. These findings cast doubt on the existence of a unitary self-concept of which most psychologists, like laypeople envisage.

Attempts to resolve the debate

A number of explanations have attempted to resolve the debate surrounding the stability of the self-concept (see Gergen,1982). It has been suggested that the 'core' self-concept remains stable while peripheral areas of the self-concept are more malleable. This explanation is problematical as we can not define and determine what is a core and what is a peripheral component of the self-concept (Gergen,1982). Little is known about key elements in the structure of the self-concept such as which are its central dimensions, and the relationship between the self-concept as a global entity and its specific components (Rosenberg,1979). Another suggestion is that within a stable environment the self-concept remains stable. This too is a problematical explanation as even temporary variations in mood state are sufficient to alter self-evaluation (Gergen,1982).

According to Turner (1982) this debate stems from not distinguishing between the self-concept as a cognitive structure and between self-images which are produced by the functioning of this structure. Such a position is taken by Swann (1987):

'Most self theorists agree that self-knowledge is organized hierarchically, with global abstractions about the self at the top and highly specific, temporally or situationally bound information at the bottom (e.g. Epstein, 1973; Greenwald,1981). Enduring shifts in self-views occur only when generalized, abstract self-conceptions change. In contrast, transitory fluctuations in self-views occur when specific, concrete self-images change. In some respects, then, a self-conception is analogous to a composite of all the frames in a motion picture film; whereas a self-image is analogous to a single frame in that film' (p.1044).

The self-concept itself, only changes when there is a major reshaping of how one views oneself, and people begin to treat one in accordance with this new self-conception (Swann,1987).

1.2.3 PERSONAL AND SOCIAL IDENTITY: THE TWO MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE SELF-CONCEPT

Within the cognitive view of the self which we have outlined, the self-concept is seen as a system of categories which are used in defining the self (e.g. Markus, 1977). The self is conceptualised as a:

'system of self-schemata which are knowledge structures developed to understand, explain or integrate individual's own behaviour in particular domains. These schemata therefore serve a similar function to categories in that they systematize and organize the experiences of individuals and encourage selective perceptions. In this way a self-schemata emerge which is then part of the self and is automatically activated when the self-structure is activated' (Widdicombe, 1988, p.472).

The original cognitive conceptualisation of the self make no distinction between self-related and group related self-schemata. Gergen (1971) made such a distinction. He defined the self-concept as 'the system of concepts available to a person in attempting to define himself' (p.23). He proposed that self-definitions fall into two classes- those that denote roles and membership of formal and informal social groups and those of a more personal nature, denoting specific personal attributes. Gordon (1968) had found that responses to the 'Who am I? 20 statements test' fell into these classes, with people characterising themselves according to the former before the latter.

Gergen's (1971) understanding of social identity was elaborated upon by Tajfel (1972), to 'link the self concept with group membership and intergroup behaviour' (Turner & Giles, 1981, p.24). This enabled Tajfel to differentiate theoretically between intergroup and interpersonal relations, which was necessary for a non-reductionistic social psychology (Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Social and personal identity are 'hypothetical, cognitive structures which together account for most of the self-concept. Each component in turn, is made up of more restricted cognitive elements such as particular social categorizations or personal characteristics' (Widdicombe, 1988, p.18). Out of this understanding of social identity combined with a motivation for social identity enhancing intergroup social comparison, Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see section 2.3) was developed. SIT is the theoretical approach which most stresses social identity. Elements of SIT, in particular applying social psychological cognitive and motivational findings to the group level of the self-concept (i.e. social identity) have been incorporated within mainstream social cognition research.

Personal identity

Personal identity is that part of the self-concept which relates to personal self-descriptions. It relates to self-categorisations concerning specific individual characteristics that differentiate one person from another (particularly an ingroup members). These are expressed as adjectives and abstract categories (e.g. dispositions, skills, traits, tastes, interests and bodily characteristics). Personal identity is a singularly important component of identity in modern society (c.f. Baumeister, 1986,1987), to the extent that Allport and Odbert found 17,958 personal adjectives in the English dictionary (Rosenberg, 1979).

Social identity

Tajfel (1981,p.255) paraphrasing an earlier definition (Tajfel,1972) defines social identity as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership'. Placing the construct within its context Tajfel (1981) notes that 'it is best considered as a shorthand term used to describe (1) limited aspects of the concept of self which are (ii) relevant to certain limited aspects of social behaviour'(p.255). Social self-evaluation and social self-esteem are considered to be intricately bound up within social identity (Hogg & Abrams,1990; Wylie,1979). The categorical attributes which make up social identity are expressed as nouns (Rosenberg,1979), they do not necessarily characterise the person as an individual, but they do define him or her as a member of certain groups and not of others and differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup.

Within social psychology, the term 'social identity' is often used differently from our everyday usage. It has been used to denote the social part of personal identity. For instance, Emler & Hopkins (1990) discuss 'personal identity' as interrelations in term of personal relationships and 'social identity' as interrelations in terms of formal positions. Cheek & Briggs (1982), use the term to indicate personal or interpersonal standards of self-concept definition. Ng (1985) points out, that SIT's 'designation of social identity as social is specifically intended for intergroup categorisation and does not imply that personal identity is not social in the more general sense of the word'(p.298).

THIS STUDY

Our study attempts to operationalise both social and personal identity using a social comparison measure. This is done by calculating the difference between the marks subjects give to products of ingroup and outgroup members (social identity) and differences between their evaluation of their own products with that of another ingroup member (personal identity).

1.2.4 MECHANISMS OF SELF-CONCEPT FORMATION

There are complementary ways in which knowledge and evaluation of the self-concept can be developed.

Attribution

Events can be attributed to actors based on four classes of cues - bodily characteristics, possessions, actions (words and deeds) and most relevant to our purposes, group membership (Rijsman, 1983). Out of such causal attributions, made by a person, or by others, self-conceptions can develop. These self-conceptions can receive validation from others (Rijsman, 1983).

Efficacy

The self-concept develops and self-esteem is earned through efficacy, competent and active interaction with the environment (Bandura, 1982a,b; Crocker & Major, 1989).

Reflected appraisal

Early psychological and sociological theorists such as James, Cooley, Mead and Sullivan held that the self-concept is based on the appraisal of others (Suls,1977). Cooley 's (1902) 'looking glass self' theory saw the self-concept as a passive reflection of other peoples appraisals (especially the reference group's). Mead (1934) viewed the 'me' as an internalisation of social roles and the 'I' as the personal component. 'I' being the reaction of the organism to the attitudes of others, 'me' the sum of the attitudes of others, and the 'self' the interaction of the two (Deschamps,1982).

This line of theorising has sparked much empirical research (Suls,1977) and has been adopted by many sociologists. Sociologists have begun to criticise this model. Gecas (1982) cites a review which looked at empirical evidence for the 'looking glass self' in over 50 studies and found that self-perception agrees substantially with the way people think others see them, and does not agree with how they are actually viewed by others. Based on psychological evidence, Gecas & Schwalbe (1983) suggest that research should rather concentrate on how individuals construct their self-concept according to their individual psychological agendas and actions.

Social comparison

By comparing oneself with others on subjective value dimensions, people have a standard on which to evaluate themselves (Rijsman, 1983). Since Festinger (1954) outlined social comparison theory, it has 'held the dubious distinction of being social psychology's "second favourite theory" '(Arrowood,1978 cited in S.E. Taylor & Lobel,1989, p. 569).

Festinger's (1954) original formulation of social comparison theory has been extensively modified and reformulated (e.g. Brickman & Bulman,1977; Goethals & Darley,1977; Goethals & Darley,1987; Kruglanski & Mayseless,1990; Masters & Keil,1987; Suls & Miller,1977; Wood,1989). The notion of a drive to compare has been discarded. Comparisons are not only about abilities and opinions (Master & Keil,1987); comparison are not only done upwardly but downwardly as well (Goethals & Darley,1987; S.E.Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills,1981) and evaluation is not the the only motive for engaging in comparison

(Wood, Taylor & Lichman, 1985). One is most likely to compare oneself not with those who would be the most equivalent and therefore the most accurate, but rather with those who are similar on related dimensions and would be the most likely to validate one's own opinions (Goethals & Darley, 1977).

Festinger's (1954) theory explained interpersonal social comparison. Tajfel's (1972) major innovation was to extend Festinger's theory to incorporate intergroup comparison and it is this mechanism of self-concept formation which SIT focuses upon. Social comparison was the link which SIT forged between social categorisation which placed people in groups and with social identity which as 'value connotations, positive or negative, ...can only be derived through a comparison with other relevant social groups' (Tajfel, 1978, p.9). That social comparisons may be made at the level of the group as well as at the level of the individual, has been propagated in other theoretical formulations (e.g. Goethals & Darley, 1987; Levine & Moreland, 1987). For example, in a recent reformulation of social comparison theory regarding outcome evaluation, Levine & Moreland (1987) present a typology of comparisons. Comparisons can be on one of 3 levels (self/self, self/other or group/group), and in one of 2 social contexts (intragroup or intergroup). Festinger's original theory was concerned with self/other intragroup comparison. What Runciman (1966) called 'egoistic relative deprivation' would be classified under self/other intragroup comparison and 'fraternal relative deprivation' would be classified under self/other intergroup comparison. Within this framework SIT can be subsumed under group/group intergroup comparisons, comparisons which are restricted to dimensions which favour the ingroup.

In this framework, the type of comparison which would occur will depend on the salience of the comparison target and on the availability of information regarding the targets standing on the comparison dimension. The attractiveness of a target depends on the target's instrumentality in satisfying motives, some of which are discussed in the following chapter.

1.3

COGNITIVE BIAS

Reality is ambiguous. Stimuli can be perceived in a myriad of diverse perspectives. As individuals are unaware of their thought processes, not even knowing their own preferences (Evans, 1989; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, Dunn, Bybeer, Hyman & Rotondo, 1984; but see Evans for alternative viewpoints) which are 'non-conscious' (Evans, 1989) one can hardly expect people to be unbiased self-evaluators.

Within this ambiguous perceptual universe, our schemata based information processing apparatus is subjective, biased and partisan. The 'cognitive revolution' in psychology has uncovered cognitive mechanisms, which make 'rational' impartial thinking impossible (see Evans,1989; Fiske & Taylor,1984; Nisbett & Ross,1980; Rosenberg, 1979), these include: selective attention, selected causal attribution, selective interpretation, selective attention to facts, selected interaction, selective processing, selected imputation, selective validation and credibility confirmation bias (Evans, 1989). Cognitive biases are not unconstrained by reality, and accuracy too is a cognitive goal (Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Kruglanski & Mayseless,1990; Kunda,1990).

This partiality in negotiating reality is especially evident with social and self-relevant information, information which is highly subjectively loaded. Furthermore, there are few clear baseline-standards to classify human behaviour easily. People use different criteria to ascribe internal states (Rosenberg,1979). For example people have different dividing lines between pleasure and pain, aggressiveness and assertiveness? According to Self-Perception Theory individuals determine how they are feeling by observing their own behaviour (Gecas,1982) and the association that they have been trained to make between this and their inner states (Rosenberg,1979).

Due to this ambiguity, the social constructionist position held by most theorists (Jussim, 1991) holds that beliefs are created socially rather than reflecting reality. Given the partiality of information processing, it is clear that cognitive and motivational biases would be able to influence or even control our perceptions and cognition. Jussim urges a moderation of this extreme view. Beliefs, he argues, can sometimes create reality.

Motivation

People can select the version of reality they require. The version which is selected will depend on motivational forces. The notion that goals and motives guide information processing and reasoning has a 'controversial history in social psychology'(Kunda, 1990,p.480). Many advocates of the cognitive approach (e.g. Hamilton, 1979) have acknowledged that purely cognitive, non-motivational theories can not provide explanations for the direction of cognitive biases. Critics have held that all research making this claim could be interpreted in entirely cognitive, non-motivational terms (Miller & Ross,1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For instance, self-serving attributions are explained cognitively by people who were inclined to attribute

success internally more than they would failure (van Knippenberg & Koelen, 1985). As both cognitive and motivational accounts could be generated for any study, it was argued that this debate could not be resolved (Kunda,1990). Van Knippenberg & Koelen (1985) however cite a review which showed that information processing alone could not account for all reported instances of self-serving attributions.

Recent theorising shares the view of motivation as 'having its effects through cognitive processes: people rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion' (Kunda,1990, p.480). People access different beliefs, rules and social judgements on different occasions (Kunda,1987) in order to conclude what is in their motivational interest, within the bounds of reality. An 'illusion of objectivity' (Pyszczynski & Greenberg,1987; c.f. Kruglanski,1980) occurs, as people mistake these biases for rational thinking. Recently,there has been a growing focus on the 'interaction of motivational and cognitive factors in the maintenance of the self-concept through selective interaction and information processing' (Schneider,1991, p.529). The literature on social comparison illustrates this interaction (e.g. Tajfel & Turner,1979; S.E. Taylor, Buunk & Asspinwall,1990). Motivational and cognitive factors determine which targets and dimensions are selected for comparison. If necessary new targets and dimensions can be manufactured or the subjective value of old ones changed.

Of relevance to this review ^{are} is the perceptual effects of the cognitive personality variable 'self-esteem' and the motivational factors of self-enhancement and self-consistency.

1.4

SELF-ESTEEM

1.4.1 SELF-ESTEEM

Self-esteem is a 'personal judgement of one's own worth' (Fleming & Watts,1980,p.921). It is 'a global self-reflexive attitude addressing how one feels about the self when it is viewed as an object of evaluation'(Campbell,1990,p.539). The quantity and quality of research on self-esteem is impressive (Fleming & Watts,1980), encompassing thousands of studies (Campbell,1990). That the bulk of Wylie's(1974, 1979) two-volume

review on the 'self' concerned research on aspects of self-esteem, illustrates its dominance as a topic of research.

Self-esteem is 'widely recognised' as a central aspect of psychological functioning (Crocker & Major, 1989). It is one of the most important and heuristic concepts in the study of personality (McFarlin & Blascovich 1981), being related to many other variables, including general life satisfaction, depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Tennen, Hertzberger & Nelson, 1987), competition, conformity, causal attribution, achievement, responses to feedback and helping (see Wylie, 1974, 1979; Wells & Marwell, 1976 for reviews). An illustration of its predictive validity is Tennen, Hertzberger & Nelson's (1987) finding that global self-esteem was a better predictor of negative attribution styles than was depression.

Many scales have been devised to measure self-esteem (see Wylie, 1974 for review). Two empirically distinct components of self-esteem have been delineated (Crocker & Major, 1989; McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). Global chronic self-esteem (or trait self-esteem) involves general expectancies for success and failure based on past experience, confidence and self-value. The second component, domain specific self-esteem, is the esteem in one's ability and worth in a specific domain. A distinction must be made between chronic self-esteem and acute self-esteem. They are not comparable. The former is a trait variable. The latter has been typically manipulated in experiments by providing false feedback on success or failure (Rhodes & Wood, 1992).

1.4.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE WITH LOW TRAIT SELF-ESTEEM

Numerous investigations have shown that people with high trait self-esteem (HSE) and people with low trait self-esteem (LSE) diverge in response to negative outcomes (Campbell, 1990; S.E. Taylor & Brown, 1988). While those with HSE actively cope with failure, by for example emphasising their strong points (Baumeister & Tice, 1985) or blunting negative social comparison information (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYpern & Dakof, 1990) those with LSE passively accept failure (J.D. Brown & Smart, 1991).

Individuals with LSE lack confidence (Brockner, 1979; Wells & Marwell, 1976) and doubt their ability to defend self-enhancing claims (Schlenker, Weigold & Hallam, 1990). They are disproportionately concerned with protecting their self-esteem rather than enhancing

it (Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 1988). For example, they are more risk averse when making a decision that is potentially esteem threatening (Josephs, Larrick, Steele & Nisbett, 1992). LSE individuals focus not on their good points but on trying to minimise their weaknesses (Baumeister & Tice, 1985); have low performance expectations (Campbell & Fairey, 1985; Shrauger, 1975); try to lower those of others when they anticipate continued evaluation (see Schlenker, Weigold & Hallam, 1990) and are especially prone to feeling threatened (Leary, Barnes & Griebel, 1986). Compared to people with HSE, they are more willing to accept negative feedback (Brockner, 1979; Moreland & Sweeney, 1984) especially when the possibility of challenge looms than when it does not (Jones, 1973); make less self-enhancing predictions of their future performance (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981) and perform worse in front of an evaluative audience than in private (Brockner & Hulton, 1978).

In comparison with HSE people, LSE people show a self-depreciation bias. They are less responsive to interpersonal feedback (Campbell, 1990); rate themselves low after failure even on dimensions that are irrelevant to performance (Baumeister, 1982); and prefer objective (absolute) to relative performance ratings even if the relative ratings are more favourable than the objective ratings (Campbell, Fairey, & Fehr, 1986). As LSE people expect failure, they show internal attributions for failure. In contrast, for individuals with HSE failure is incongruous with their expectations so they attribute failure externally (Tennen & Hertzberg, 1987) but success internally. (Schlenker, Weigold & Hallam, 1990).

Individuals with LSE have a particularly plastic self-concept (Brockner, 1983). Campbell (1990) proposes that they have 'poorly articulated notions of who or what they are' (p.539) and may therefore not have as stable a view of themselves as a 'good person' as do those with HSE. LSE people are more susceptible to influence than are HSE people (Campbell, 1990). For example, in allocation experiments they are more highly influenced by their partners' reward allocations (Brockner, 1987). Brockner suggests that in their uncertainty of how to think and act, they scan the social environment for cues.

Low self-esteem as a form of Negative Affectivity

High and Low self-esteem may be symptomatic of a pervasive mood disposition. Watson and Clark (1984) show that diverse personality scales, including neuroticism, emotionality, trait anxiety, depression, ego strength, general maladjustment, repression-sensitisation, and social desirability, are highly intercorrelated. All these measures reflect the

same stable and pervasive underlying trait. They call this integrative, mood-dispositional, unitary dimension, *Negative Affectivity* (NA). NA reflect subjective differences in mood and self-concept, not objective differences. It reflects 'pervasive individual differences in negative emotionality and self-concept: High-NA individuals tend to be distressed and upset and have a negative view of self, whereas those low in the dimension are relatively content, secure and satisfied with themselves' (Watson & Clark, p.465). NA subsumes a 'broad range of aversive mood states including anger, distrust, scorn, guilt, fearfulness and depression' (Watson & Pennebaker, 1989, p.234). High-NA is associated with 'cognitive and behavioural characteristics such as low self-esteem, preoccupation and insecurity' (Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt & Poulton, 1989, p. 641). Individuals with High-NA are 'more likely to experience discomfort at all times and across situations, even in the absence of overt stress. They are relatively more introspective and tend differentially to dwell on the negative side of themselves and the world' (Watson & Clark, p.465).

Self-esteem may reflect NA dispositions (c.f. Campbell & Fehr, 1990), or vice versa. LSE is related to characteristics of depression and anxiety (Rosenberg, 1979). The effects of depressive cognition, e.g. lack of self-enhancement bias (Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987) can be explained through self-esteem (Abramson & Alloy 1981). Studies have been generally supportive of the role of self-esteem in mitigating depressive affects (Higgins, 1987). Tennen & Hertzberg (1987) found that self-esteem was a better predictor of a self-favouring attribution style than was depression. Controlling for self-esteem they eliminated the correlations between attribution style and both depression and anxiety.

There is evidence that self-esteem can be inferred from mood. The correlation between these measures is between 0.40 and 0.60 (Brockner, 1983). The poor self-esteem and negative mood of High-NA individuals, may be linked to their tendency to dwell upon and magnify negative outcomes (Watson & Clark, 1984). Heatherton & Polivy (1991), in contrast, argues that mood and self-esteem are conceptually distinct and that the failure to observe differences between them is due to imprecise measurement. Using an improved self-esteem scale they found that self-esteem could differentiate between the experimental conditions, which mood could not. They concluded that LSE can not be equated with depression or anxiety, even though it often is a symptom of depression or causally related to it.

THIS STUDY

In this study chronic self-esteem is measured. The effects of high and low self-esteem on ingroup favouritism is investigated in different personal and group status conditions. These status conditions can be regarded as manipulations of acute social and personal self-esteem.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER ONE

The historical and vague nature of the psychological concept of 'self' is acknowledged. A viewpoint of the self as a multi-faceted cognitive structure, different facets of which continuously become salient is presented. Components of this structure are conceptions of one's dispositions (personal identity) and membership groups (social identity). Through the process of social comparison a positive or negative evaluation of a facet of one's self-concept can be gained. The perception of self-relevant stimuli is subjective and biased. Trait self-esteem is a persons' chronic level of self-esteem. Low self-esteem is related to Negative Affectivity (NA), a general negative mood disposition towards all stimuli.

CHAPTER 2

SELF-ESTEEM, SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND FAVOURITISM TOWARDS SELF AND GROUP

This chapter is concerned with the cognitive biases which are produced in the attempt to gain self-enhancement and self-consistency. The final sections of the chapter deals with how these biases effect the evaluation of the ingroup against the outgroup. We begin by discussing the debate between self-enhancement and self-consistency as the motivation which gives direction to cognitive bias. The resolution of this debate and the relationship between self-esteem and ingroup favouritism involves the interaction between these motivations with levels of self-esteem. We then review empirical work on self-esteem and ingroup favouritism - a form of self-enhancement. The final section discusses Social Identity Theory as a self-enhancement theory on the group level of identity.

2.1 THE COGNITIVE MOTIVATIONS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-CONSISTENCY

2.1.1 SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-CONSISTENCY

The ambiguity and subjectivity in the processing of self-relevant information has led to the development of two theoretical viewpoints regarding the motivation directing these cognitive and behavioural biases. These are self-consistency theory and self-enhancement theory.

Self-consistency

According to self-consistency theory (Moreland & Sweeny, 1984; Singer, 1966; Swann, 1983,1987), originated by Lecky (1945), we are motivated to create, confirm and maintain a stable self-image, providing us with a sense of meaning, stability, prediction, expectancy and control over the world (c.f. Epstein,1973; Mead,1934). Lecky believed that an 'individual's conception of himself is the central axiom of his whole life theory' (Lecky,p.264-5 cited in Rosenberg,1979); without this guiding attitude there would be utter confusion. A state of self-consistency exists when 'behaviour implies a definition of self congruent with relevant aspects of the self concept' (Secord and Backman, 1961, cited in Jones, 1971,p. 186).

A variety of cognitive and behavioural strategies are engaged in to stabilise self-views (e.g. Swann,1983). Theorists (Epstein,1984; Swann 1983) have suggested that these activities are mediated by a cognitively based preference for stimuli that are predictable, familiar, stable and uncertainty reducing. Cognitive structures are such that self-confirmatory information seems especially trustworthy, diagnostic and accurate (Swann, 1987). Self-consistency is illustrated by strategies like selective interaction and attraction to those who view one as one views oneself (S.C.Jones,1973). Elements of self-consistency theory are integral to dissonance (Festinger,1957) and balance (Heider,1958) theories.

The self-consistency viewpoint proposes that people react most favourably to information congruent with their self-images. Therefore people with a negative self concept and hence low self esteem 'undermine opportunities to better themselves by engaging in cognitive and behavioural activities that perpetuate their self-views.' (Swann,Griffin, Predmore & Gaines,1987,p.881). The early work of Tajfel was influenced by this perspective and some theorists argue that self-consistency motives needs to be reconsidered in Social Identity Theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams,1990; see section 2.3).

Self-enhancement

Self-enhancement theory (c.f. Greenwald,1980; E.E. Jones,1964; Kaplan,1975; Rosenberg, 1979; Shrauger,1975; Swann,1987; S.E.Taylor & Brown 1988 for reviews; but

see Markus & Kitayama, 1991 who argue that conventional self-enhancement may only apply in less interdependent cultures) is 'one of psychology's most widely held theoretical viewpoints' (Swann,1987,p.1046). Based on the principle that 'all organisms like to "feel good" about themselves' (Becker,1968 cited in J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt,1988, p.445), it maintains there is a universal human motivation for the 'maintenance or enhancement of the self' (Snygg & Combs,1949 cited in Rosenberg,1979, p.53). In Tajfel and Turners' (1979) words 'individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-concept' (p.40).

Self-enhancement notions are long-established in the work of philosophers (e.g. Hobbes, Kant, Nietzsche, Rousseau), cultural anthropologists (e.g. Becker) and in psychological theories (e.g.Adler, Allport, Cohen, Horney, James, , Rogers and Sullivan) (J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt,1988; Moreland & Sweeny,1984). It was Horney and Rogers who in particular established the psychological basis of this theory (Swann,1987).

Striving for a maximal positive self-concept is engaged in for its own sake - to increase feelings of self-worth. It is not dependent on interpersonal self-presentational concerns (S.E.Taylor, 1989). In pursuit of this goal, individuals engage in numerous self-serving cognitive biases. Examples of these are self-serving attributions, excuse making, symbolic self-completion, taking credit for success, denial of responsibility for failure, self-handicapping, illusions of control, unrealistic view of self, overestimating actual control and unrealistic optimism (Geen,1991; Greenwald,1980; S.E.Taylor, 1989; S.E.Taylor & Brown,1988; Sackheim, 1983). Studies have even found unrealistic over-optimistic business planning (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977). As the self-concept is multi-dimensional, everyone can find a dimension they can enhance. Gergen characterises the broad sweep of this perspective:

'On the level of daily relations the individual might develop and sustain those forms of self conception that best support his or her sense of well-being. To view oneself in ways that cause one unhappiness (e.g. unlovable, self-centred, unintelligent, powerless, sinful, perverted, useless and so on) is often to choose against one's own valuation interests. Such conceptions cannot be adequately supported on factual grounds, no more than their opposites. As the antinomy in each case may provide far more self-satisfaction, the individual might be encouraged in such selection.' (Gergen,1982,p.146).

Greenwald & Pratkanis's (1984, p.165) review, cited by Hogg & Abrams (1990), concluded that there is a 'massive accumulation of evidence' for self-enhancement. The mechanisms of self-concept formation outlined in section 1.2.4 can be utilised in a self-enhancing manner (Rosenberg, 1979). For example social comparisons can function as a mechanism of self-enhancement (Brickman & Bulman,1977, Goethals & Darely, 1977,

Gruder,1977) Research has found that people 'prefer to think positively about themselves (e.g. Festinger) they like others to view them in a positive light (e.g. Schlenker,1975) and they like the groups to which they belong to compare favourably to other groups (e.g. Tajfel,1978)' (van Knippenberg,1989,p.59). As this quote indicates intergroup bias is a manifestation of the 'self-enhancement motive operating at the group level of self-categorization' (Hogg & McGarty,1990,p.20; see section 2.2.1).

In its 'drive reduction' format, the theory predicts that 'the need for self-enhancement increases the more the desire to think favourably of the self goes unfulfilled' (J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt,1988, p.445). Therefore those who have received a threat to their favourable self-image or have low self esteem, should be the most motivated to compensate for this by enhancing their self-image to restore a positive self-concept (S.C.Jones, 1973) possibly by engaging in self-enhancing cognitive distortions (J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt,1988).

2.1.2 THE ENHANCEMENT- CONSISTENCY DEBATE

Self-enhancement and self-consistency theories make different predictions. For individuals with high self-esteem (HSE) both theories predict that there will be a more favourably response to positive than to negative feedback. For individuals with low self-esteem (LSE) self-consistency theory predicts they will favour self-consistent negative feedback over self-inconsistent positive feedback. Self-enhancement theory predicts that people with LSE will favour positive feedback and will not favour negative feedback, more than will HSE people. This outlook regards self-serving biases as 'principally the refuge of those with low self-esteem' (J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988,p.445). These predictions are illustrated in table 2.1.

S.C.Jones (1973) reviewed studies which pitted self-enhancement against self-consistency theories, using this paradigm. Ten studies supported the predictions of self-enhancement theory and 6 supported the predictions of self-consistency theory, many of these 6 had 'serious' problems in interpretation and replication, and 3 of them were correlational.

Shrauger's (1975) review of the area reported that when favourability was measured on affective dimensions (e.g. emotional responses to feedback, feedback preferences) results

were in accordance with self-enhancement theory. When favourability was measured on cognitive measures (e.g. reception and retention of feedback, credibility judgements of feedback sources, perceptions of the self-descriptiveness of the feedback and expectations) results were in accordance with self-consistency theory. However, Shrauger gave little theoretical justification or empirical evidence for this conclusion (Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines (1987).

Table 2.1. PREDICTED FAVOURABILITY OF FEEDBACK FROM OTHERS AS A FUNCTION OF SELF-ESTEEM. (After S.C.Jones, 1973).				
	SELF-CONSISTENCY THEORY		SELF-ENHANCEMENT THEORY	
	FEEDBACK		FEEDBACK	
SELF-ESTEEM	positive	negative	positive	negative
high self-esteem	+	-	+	-
low self-esteem	-	+	++	--
KEY				
subjectively favourable feedback		++ + - --	subjectively unfavourable feedback	

As a result of the discrepant findings in this area, there have been calls to 'abandon an either-or approach that has characterised prior research in favour of a more integrative view' (J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988,p.445). A number of such integrations have been proposed:

(a) Self-enhancement may be dominant by default. People avoid esteem threatening situations rather than seizing opportunities to find out more about themselves (S.E.Taylor & Brown,1988). Gruder (1977) concluded that self-enhancement becomes the dominant motive when the comparison presents a specific threat to self-esteem and that self-consistency is the dominant motivation when people are confronted with a new situation. Self-consistency could arise when taking into account the implications of current self-enhancement on future esteem advancement. For example, as people with LSE expect failure, accepting flattering information may cause them to anticipate future social embarrassment (S.C.Jones, 1973; Rosenberg,1979).

(b) Alicke (1985) suggests that the self-concept is composed of an impartial cognitive self-evaluation subsystem through which self-understanding is gained. In addition there is an

esteem maintenance subsystem, which is a separate monitoring system operating consciously or unconsciously to bias the processing of the self-evaluation subsystem.

(c) Shrauger's (1975) distinction between cognitive and affective favourability have been supported by latter studies (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981; Moreland & Sweeney, 1984; Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines, 1987). Swann (1987) supports Zanjonc (1980, 1984) who argued that the cognitive and the affective are effectively independent systems (but see Lazarus, 1984 for a contrary opinion). On an affective level Swann et al (1987) found that positive feedback improved mood in subjects with both HSE and LSE. On a cognitive level, feedback is matched against a person's self-conceptions before it is accepted or rejected.

(d) Gibbons & McCoy (1991) argue that people with HSE and LSE use different techniques to enhance themselves. Gibbons & Gerard (1989) made students read descriptions about a troubled and an untroubled student. Subjects with LSE experienced a mood improvement after reading about the troubled student and those with HSE experienced a mood improvement after reading about the untroubled student. Gibbons (1986) found a similar result with depressed and non-depressed subjects respectively. Based on further experimentation Gibbons & McCoy (1991) proposed that when self-esteem is threatened, people with HSE engaged in 'active' downward comparison by derogating an outgroup target (a cognitive techniques) and LSE people engaged in 'passive' enhancement by improving their mood following a downward comparison opportunity (an affective technique) (c.f. Wills, 1981). This was because people with LSE 'are relieved simply to find that out there are others who are worse off' (Gibbons & McCoy, 1991, p. 420).

(e) LSE and HSE people, may engage in different forms of self-enhancement (c.f. Baumeister & Tice, 1985). In line with self-consistency theory, classic self-enhancement effects do not occur with people with LSE (e.g. Alloy & Abramson, 1979; J.D. Brown, 1986, Campbell, 1986). J.D. Brown Collins & Schmidt (1988) argue that individuals with both HSE and LSE seek ingroup self-enhancement, but it must be consistent with their self-concept. People with LSE only enhance their ingroup when this is defensible. People with HSE always enhance their ingroup, as this is consistent with their positive self-concepts. Brown et al (1988) found that people with LSE engaged in an indirect form of self-enhancement, enhancing areas which do not directly implicate the self (there is a description of their experiment in section 2.2.2 and a discussion in section 6.2). Brown et al (1988) proposed in Smith's (1968, p.368) terms, that people 'think as well of themselves as they can get away with'. 'What they can get away with' is subject to factors such as self-perceptions, beliefs about what others will accept and the objective evidence available. As individuals with HSE think highly of their abilities, they can confidently engage in direct self-enhancement- enhancement of areas that directly

involve the self. Individuals with LSE, with little confidence in their abilities, are as interested as people with HSE in promoting a positive view of themselves, but they require more evidence before they are prepared to support direct self-enhancing claims (Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990). J.D. Brown & Smart (1991) found that LSE subjects were as keen to self-enhance their personal identities, they only required more evidence before they were prepared to do so. In E.E. Jones' (1982) terminology HSE individuals have a higher 'latitude of acceptance' of positive self-information than people with LSE. In compensation, people with LSE bolster their self-worth indirectly. Examples of indirect self-enhancement is enhancement based on relationships with others (Tesser & Campbell, 1982) or a group (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see section 2.2 & 4.2).

(f) Swann and colleagues (Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines, 1987; Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi & Gilbert, 1990) argue that 'self-enhancement effects are self-verification effects in disguise' (Swann et al 1987, p.1046). In Western culture most children are brought up to have a positive self-conception, so they cognitively expect positive information about themselves. They cite evidence that people with negative self-views prefer and seek out unfavourable feedback, discount positive information and adopt interpersonal strategies which elicit unfavourable reactions especially towards those who view them positively. There are unresolved questions surrounding Swann's thesis (see Schlenker & Weigold, 1992).

The distinction between self-enhancement and self-consistency is artificial. Reykowski (1982) is correct in contending that 'both self-defining and self-enhancing motives are aspects of a personal meaning system and hence are highly related' (p.328). We would go further and argue that they are inseparable. J.D. Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) and Gibbons & McCoy (1991) support a consistency approach, arguing that people try to 'think as well as they can get away with', i.e. self-enhancement occurs in a self-consistent manner. This is a self-consistency position. Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines (1987), supporting self-consistency theory, argue that 'self-enhancement effects are self-verification effects in disguise' (p. 1046) i.e. people show self-enhancement when this is consistent with their predominantly positive self-concept. In other words self-consistency occurs in a self-enhancing manner. This is self-enhancement theory. Self-consistency theory leads logically to self-enhancement theory and vice versa. Any results can be explained by any approach. Acknowledging the consistency between these approaches would enhance this unnecessarily confused area.

THIS STUDY

J.D. Brown Collins & Schmidt's (1988) hypothesis is tested by taking measures of direct comparison (self vs. ingroup) and indirect comparison (ingroup vs. outgroup). Other issues with relevance to this section will be investigated. Is the ingroup favouritism of people with high self-esteem greater than that of those with low self-esteem? If people with low self-esteem are given 'evidence' of superior personal ability and/or evidence of their groups superior status/ability will this affect their willingness to engage in self-enhancing and group enhancing behaviour?

2.2 SELF-ESTEEM AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM

2.2.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Ingroup favouritism is a manifestation of the 'self-enhancement motive operating at the group level of self-categorization' (Hogg & McGarty, 1990, p.20). There is ample evidence that group members favour their own groups in evaluations and allocations (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). A recent meta-analysis found that ingroup favouritism is 'highly significant and of moderate magnitude'. In other words the effect is 'discernible with the naked eye' (Mullen, Brown & Smith, in press). Ingroup favouritism can occur in a number of ways: the ingroup can be enhanced by assessing it over-favourably yet assessing the outgroup fairly; the outgroup can be denigrated by assessing it unjustifiably negatively or by showing increased hostility towards it. In most instances 'group formation brings ingroup members closer to the self, but the distance to outgroup members remains relatively unchanged.' (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, Dovidio & Pomare, 1990, p.693). In other words, categorisation based ingroup favouritism operates primarily by elevating the ingroup rather than by devaluing the outgroup (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Gaertner et al, 1990; Schaller, 1991; Turner, 1981; but see Rosenbaum & Holtz, 1985, cited by Gaertner et al, 1990 for an alternative viewpoint).

The 'objective' socio-structural position of the group constrains and determines the type of attempts at identity enhancement which may be successful (see Ellemers & van Knippenberg, 1990). For example, if an ingroup is patently worse on a certain comparison dimension (e.g. sophistication), ingroup members could not gain a positive group distinctiveness on that dimension. Another strategies will then be undertaken like adopting a

dimension on which the group is comparatively superior (e.g. creativity) as the comparison dimension (see section 3.3.3).

Once categorisation has made a distinction between an ingroup and an outgroup salient, other consequences arise besides ingroup favouritism in allocations and evaluations. These include cognitive consequences. Categorisation engenders an initial ingroup bias which may guide and influence the manner in which group-relevant information is processed and assimilated. People may attempt to distort, discount or otherwise explain away instances in which the ingroup is associated with something undesirable. There will be a preference for information that accentuates ingroup similarity and outgroup dissimilarity. The result of these cognitive consequences is to further strengthen the salience of the original group distinction (Levine & Moreland, 1987; Schaller, 1991).

A motivational component is not incorporated in all theories of ingroup favouritism. Van Knippenberg (1984) argues that purely cognitive theories of ingroup bias such as Tajfel's (1959) and Doise's (1978) categorical accentuation theories, can explain neither the magnitude nor the direction of ingroup favouritism; neither why it arises in the absence of information, nor why different status groups behave differently (see section 3.3). To account for such phenomena, motivational forces need to be introduced (Brewer, 1979).

Group identification is a facet of the self-concept which has been neglected by most self theorists who have concentrated on the self-enhancement motive in terms of personal identity (see section 4.2). Increasingly research is investigating cognitive self-enhancement biases operating on the ingroup level of self-categorisation in other areas of social psychology such as self-biased attributions (Hewstone, 1989), illusory correlation (Schaller, 1991; Schaller & Mass, 1989) and social loafing (see Geen, 1991). For example Hewstone writes about the group-serving bias in attribution:

'Such a possible motivational bias is essentially a group-based equivalent of individual self-serving biases in attribution. Thus while a tendency has been found for individuals to explain events in ways that serve their own needs by enhancing their personal identity (...), group members also tend to explain events in ways that would enhance their social identity' (1989, p.32).

Turner (1981) makes a distinction between '*Ingroup Favouritism*', referring to partisan perceptions, attitudes or behaviours and '*Ingroup Bias*' which refer to instances of objectively unjustifiable ingroup favouritism. On the behavioural realm, Turner terms ingroup favouritism '*Intergroup Discrimination*' and on the perceptual and attitudinal realm favouritism is termed '*Differentiation*' (Turner, 1981). In this thesis none of these terminological distinctions will be

applied. These terms will be used interchangeably. This is because these distinctions are not central to this study and are confusing.

2.2.2 SELF-ESTEEM AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Self-esteem has been directly implicated with ingroup favouritism. The most prominent theory which makes this linkage is Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). It states explicitly that self-esteem is the motivation behind intergroup behaviour (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1990; see section 2.3).

Two corollaries related to self-esteem follow from SIT (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990):

- (i) engaging in ingroup favouritism will increase self-esteem as it enhances social identity.
- (ii) people with low or threatened self-esteem should be especially likely to engage in compensatory ingroup favouritism.

Self-esteem is thus both an independent and dependent variable in SIT (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990). Self-esteem is seen as 'both a cause and consequence of intergroup discrimination' (Diehl, 1990, p.271). As the brief review which follows will show, empirical support for both corollaries is lacking, supporting Messick & Mackie's (1989) contention that 'invoking the concept of self-esteem has not provided a definitive understanding of ingroup discrimination' (p.61).

The effect of ingroup favouritism on self-esteem

If ingroup favouritism is a strategy to protect or enhance self-esteem, then self-esteem should increase following such activity. This hypothesis has received mixed support.

The original experiment which tested this corollary, Oakes and Turner (1980) and a latter experiment by Turner & Spriggs (1982, cited by Lemyre & Smith, 1985) supported this

hypothesis. These experiments were riddled with methodological flaws. Lemyre and Smith conducted a study without these flaws. They found that the post-test self-esteem of categorised subjects who engaged in discrimination was greater than the post-test self-esteem of categorised subjects who had not done so. However, the self-esteem of categorised subject who engaged in discrimination was equal to that of the non-categorised subjects. Thus categorisation itself was a threat to self-esteem and lowered it. Ingroup favouritism, reduced this self-esteem threat by restoring self-esteem to the pre-categorisational levels. If this is correct 'the generalisability of studies using such categorization manipulations will be severely restricted' (Messick & Mackie, 1989, p.60)

Oakes and Turner (1980) suggest that categorisation on its own might elevate self-esteem. Hogg, Turner, Nascimento-Schulze & Spriggs (1986, cited in Abrams & Hogg, 1988) manipulated the extent of outgroup discrimination and category salience and examined their effects on self-esteem. Outgroup discrimination increased self-esteem, supporting the corollary, while category salience had no effect. Lemyre & Smith (1985) reported a similar result. Thus neither categorisation nor cognitive differentiation of the outgroup is sufficient to account theoretically for change in self-esteem. The effects observed by Hogg, Turner, Nascimento-Schulze & Spriggs (1986, experiment 1; cited by Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990) appear to have been mediated by trait self-esteem. In a second experiment Hogg et al (1986) found that those with pre-tested low self-esteem showed an increase in post-test self-esteem following ingroup allocation favouritism. This did not occur for those with high self-esteem.

Other studies have not supported this corollary. Vickers, Abrams, & Hogg (1988 cited in Abrams & Hogg, 1988) found that ingroup favouritism decreased self-esteem, possibly due to the violation of the norm of co-operation. SIT can not explain why, despite this, these subjects engaged in discrimination (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Hogg & Turner (1985a, 1985b, 1987, cited in Hogg & Abrams, 1990) found no post-test self-esteem difference between categorised subjects who had or had not discriminated. Wagner, Lampen & Syllwasschy (1986) found that discrimination within the Minimal Group Paradigm (see Diehl, 1990) was not associated with heightened post-test self-esteem compared to pre-test self-esteem scores. In a highly controlled study, designed to improve on the faults of previous studies, Hogg & Sunderland (1990) did not find that discrimination enhanced self-esteem. Hogg & Morkans (1989, cited in Hogg & Abrams, 1990) reported the same result in a similar experiment.

Levels of self-esteem and the extent of ingroup favouritism

If ingroup favouritism is driven by a 'need for positive self-esteem' (Turner, 1982,p.33) then those with low self-esteem (LSE) should have a stronger motivation for self-enhancement and should engage in more ingroup discrimination than those with high self-esteem (HSE) (Abrams & Hogg,1988).

Until recently, empirical studies and theory predominantly supported the view that people with LSE were more prejudiced (see Ehrlich,1973; Wylie,1979 for reviews) and more likely to engage in self-enhancing downward comparison (Wills, 1981) than those with HSE. Ashmore & DelBoca (1976, cited in Crocker & Schwartz,1985, p.380) summarised this research 'in sum, a negative self-concept does seem to predispose an individual towards ethnic prejudice, although the relationship may not be particularly strong, and the exact mechanisms underlying the effect are not well known'(p.85).

Correlational studies report a positive correlation between self-esteem and positive racial attitudes and that increases in self-esteem are associated with increasingly positive inter-racial attitudes (Abrams & Hogg,1988). It is possible that a third variable may determine both self-esteem and racial attitudes (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Abram and Hogg suggest social status or income as possible third variables. An experiment in our study investigates whether Negative affectivity could be such a third variable.

Other studies have found that HSE, and not LSE subjects, are more likely to engage in ingroup favouritism. Hogg, Turner, Nascimento-Schulze & Spriggs (1986, experiment 2 cited in Hogg & Abrams,1990) did not find that different levels of pre-test self-esteem mediated the extent of ingroup favouritism. Abrams (1982, 1983 cited in Hogg & Abrams,1988) found a slightly positive correlation between pre-tested self-esteem and a number of ingroup favouritism and identification measures.

Crocker & Schwartz (1985) and Crocker, Kayne & Alloy (1985) found that LSE and HSE subjects showed the same degree of ingroup favouritism. However, LSE subjects evaluated both the ingroup and the outgroup less generously. Owing to the minimal nature of these experiments, there was not much scope for self-enhancement. Therefore, Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987; see section 4.4.1) conducted a replication, using value-laden laboratory groups (experiment 1) and real groups (experiment 2). Here too, LSE subjects derogated both the ingroup and the outgroup. There was no tendency for them to

evaluate the ingroup more negatively relative to the outgroup. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990), replicating Crocker et al (1987, experiment 1) found the same results.

These results suggest that earlier studies had mistakenly concluded that LSE subjects were more prejudiced when they just tended to evaluate everything more negatively. This could be because LSE is a manifestation of Negative Affectivity (see section 5.2). People with LSE are psychologically less well-equipped to engage in group enhancing intergroup behaviour (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Research has accumulated showing that depressed and LSE individuals have a deficiency in their ability to engage in self-enhancing activity (see Alloy & Abrahamson, 1982; Tabachnik, Crocker & Alloy, 1983; S.E. Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tennen & Hertzberger, 1987; section 1.4.2) this precludes enhancing the self through enhancing the group (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Depressed and LSE people are more negative in relation to both themselves and to others (Alloy & Ahrens; 1987).

Research which has investigated both group status and self-esteem provides insights into the specific effects of trait self-esteem on ingroup favouritism. In an experiment using real groups (campus sororities) by Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987, experiment, 2), LSE subjects only engaged in ingroup favouritism when the ingroup was of a high status as opposed to a low status. This could be because, the high status ascribed to their ingroup could have given LSE individuals sufficient 'evidence' to be prepared to engage in group enhancement. Thus, findings of equivalence between HSE and LSE subjects, may be limited to cases which are neutral with respect to the self-concept (Crocker & Schwartz, 1985).

J.D. Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) found that people with LSE engage in an indirect form of self-enhancement, enhancing areas which do not directly implicate the self (see section 2.1.2 for Brown et al's theoretical rationale). They placed subjects into 2 arbitrary dot-estimation groups. While retaining their group identity, subjects in both groups were split into 2 task teams comprising members from both dot-estimation groups; where they were given a creativity brainstorming task. In the direct enhancement condition, the difference between subjects ratings of the creativity of ideas produced by members of the dot-estimation ingroup in the *same* task team with the ideas produced by members of the outgroup in that task team was calculated. In the indirect condition, the difference between subjects ratings of the ideas of members of their ingroup in *another* team with the ideas of members of the outgroup in that team was calculated. Subjects with HSE, but not with LSE, engaged in direct self-enhancement, showing ingroup favouritism in the direct enhancement condition. This was achieved directly, by enhancing their rating of the ideas of the ingroup. Subjects with LSE, but not with HSE, showed ingroup favouritism in their ratings in the indirect condition. This was achieved indirectly, by depressing the ratings of the outgroup. In a second experiment, HSE

and LSE subjects displayed indirect ingroup enhancement in reaction to low status group membership (threat), there was no ingroup favouritism in a high status group condition. This supports claims that group favouritism is in the service of esteem enhancement. This finding is contrary to that of Crocker & Luhtanen (1990)(see section 4.4.2). There is continued discussion on Brown et al's (1988) experiment, which is important to our study, in section 6.2.

The work of Gibbons & McCoy (1989,1991; see section 2.1.2) suggests that ingroup favouritism could function on the affective as well as the cognitive (evaluative) levels. The mood improvement they found after LSE subjects engaged in self-enhancement through downward social comparison with a less fortunate target could be similar to self-esteem elevation following positive social comparison. Recently the effects of affect on ingroup favouritism has been mooted. The cognitive and affective aspects of intergroup behaviour could be independent (R.J.Brown,1984b). Certain authors (e.g. Abrams & Hogg,1988; Crocker, 1990; Hogg and Sunderland,1990) suggest that emotions may be involved in minimal group paradigm ingroup favouritism (c.f. Dijker,1989; Skevington, 1989). Crocker & Luhtanen (1990; see section 4.4.2) argue that the level of self-esteem has not been found to affect the magnitude of ingroup favouritism. This suggests that contrary to group-enhancement theories, ingroup favouritism could be unrelated to esteem needs. They argue that such a conclusion is unwarranted. They found that the magnitude of ingroup favouritism relates to collective (group) self-esteem and not personal self-esteem which is the way esteem has been operationalised in the literature.

Discussion

Self-esteem has been misoperationalised by experiments studying these corollaries. Different levels of trait self-esteem do not only indicate differences in the positivity of the self-concept, but reflect pervasive, stable, cognitive and affective individual differences. LSE and HSE subjects may be different types of people (Hogg & Sunderland,1991) engaging in qualitatively different cognitive strategies. Theory and research should rather conceptualise self-esteem as an index of the 'objective' level of esteem which an individual or group possesses. This is an evaluative, not a dispositional definition.

Such a formulation would operationalise these corollaries in terms of levels of 'objective' self-esteem such as lowered or threatened personal or group esteem e.g. status differences. This is suggested by Lemyre and Smith's (1985) finding that discrimination

restored self-esteem, following a threat (categorisation). From this finding one could hypothesise that the greater the threat to esteem, the greater the extent of ingroup favouritism (Diehl,1990). Hogg & Sunderland (1991), but not Hogg & Morkans (1989, cited in Hogg & Abrams,1990), found that when subjects' personal esteem had been lowered through false feedback they showed more discrimination. Experiments which have studied the effects of levels of group status on ingroup favouritism are reviewed in the next chapter.

2.3 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AS A COGNITIVE THEORY OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT ON THE SOCIAL LEVEL OF IDENTITY

Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel 1978, 1981, 1982b; Turner & Giles,1981; Tajfel & Turner,1979; for reviews and elucidations see Abrams and Hogg,1988, 1990; Brewer,1979; Brewer & Kramer,1985; Hogg & Abrams,1988; Messick & Mackie,1989; Stephan,1985, Tajfel 1982a, Turner,1981a) is the dominant social psychological theory of ingroup favouritism (Hinkle & Brown,1990) and is the research tradition in which this study is located. For this reason the relevance of the framework of this review to SIT will be indicated.

SIT is an enhancement theory. Intergroup social comparison is the mode of enhancement. The motivation behind intergroup behaviour is to 'achieve a satisfactory concept or image of the self' (Tajfel, 1972,p.4) by positively distinguishing one's own groups from other groups. Self-esteem was explicitly referred to as the motivation behind intergroup behaviour: 'individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-concept'(Tajfel & Turner,1979, p.40). Whereas other enhancement perspectives focus on maintaining a positive personal identity, SIT is concerned with the motivation to maintain a positive social identity, a positive evaluation of one's own group.

SIT as an enhancement theory, is derived from other enhancement theories. Turner (1981b) stated, cited in Hogg & Abrams (1990), 'I do assume that there is a need for positive self-esteem, not as an axiom, but on the basis of extensive research (into for example, social comparison, cognitive dissonance, interpersonal attraction, self-presentation, defensive attribution and so on)' (p.31).

SIT did not inevitably develop a self-enhancement focus. Tajfel (1969) originally conceptualised stereotyping and prejudice, in line with balance theorists like Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg and Tannenbaum, as a search for coherence. 'The

need to preserve the integrity of the self-image', he wrote, 'is the only motivational assumption we need to make in order to understand the direction that the search for coherence will take' (Tajfel, 1969, p.92, cited by Abrams & Hogg, 1988, p.318).

When Tajfel (1972) introduced the concept of social identity the search for coherence was displaced by a self-enhancement through social comparison motive, adopted from Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, 1990). Festinger developed social comparison theory to explain interpersonal comparison, only briefly noting a self-enhancement motive (Suls, 1977). Tajfel utilised this theory to explain intergroup comparison with the postulate that social identity enhancement is the motivation directing comparison. So self-esteem enhancement replaced self-consistency as the motivational factor in Tajfel's thought in order to explain social change (Billig, 1985) and ingroup favouritism. Billig suggests that social categorization is the self-consistency component of SIT, that explaining stability.

Tetlock (1986) argues forcibly that SIT is in tune with, and a component of, the social cognitive Zeitgeist having been influenced by individualistic cognitive theories: 'There are no longer a shortage in social psychology of theories that assign a key causal role to the self-concept, that acknowledge group identification a major parts of the self-concept...' (p.256). We believe that a strong argument can be made that SIT is merely an extension of general self-concept theories, focusing on its dimension relating to group identity, and could be incorporated within such general theories of the self. For example, the cognitive component of SIT and Self Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) could be incorporated within a general social cognition framework (see section 2.3) and the social-motivational component could be incorporated within a social comparison enhancement theoretical framework. There are many examples of such frameworks, that of Levine & Moreland (1987) was outlined in section 1.2.4) and there are others (see section 2.3)

The role of trait self-esteem in SIT

For empirical (see section 2.2.2) and theoretical reasons Abrams and Hogg (1988) argue that self-esteem has been over-implicated in SIT's explanation of intergroup prejudice. They write:

'self-esteem can under some conditions, be incidental or even irrelevant. The posited "need for positive self-esteem" has no more logical link with manifest

intergroup behaviour, than does a "need for nourishment" (people do not eat outgroup members, except in certain notable cases)' (p.323).

They continue by arguing that SIT does not differentiate between global self-esteem and specific self-esteem to which Tajfel & Turner (1979) refer (see section 2.2.2). There is little reason why transitory self-concept change should 'overflow to bathe the entire self-concept' (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, p.323). Self-esteem may be a useful construct for research examining intragroup or interpersonal behaviour. With regard to real groups, however, as the level of esteem associated with them is socially fixed and influenced by sociological variables self-esteem is irrelevant. 'An individual's self-esteem could be plausibly associated with the esteem in which his or her group holds itself, but that in turn, is unlikely to be a cause of intergroup behaviour, so much as an aspect of it' (pp.324-325).

Recent papers on SIT (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Hogg & Sunderland, 1991) have suggested that self-esteem enhancement is not the only motive involved in intergroup discrimination. In particular, they stress the importance of self-consistency and the search for 'meaning and coherence'. Categorisation can be viewed as a cognitive process which maximises meaning. Stereotypes (Tajfel, 1969) can be seen as fulfilling an explanatory function, which may be internalised through self-categorization (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). The shift of emphasis from motivation to cognition is evident in Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), the latest development of SIT, where:

'the motivation is for a maximally meaningful structure and this is satisfied by the categorization process. The behavioural manifestation of this process may be intergroup discrimination, acquiescence, intragroup normative competition, elevated self-esteem, depression, self-esteem, in fact virtually anything, but predictable from socio-cultural and contextual factors' (Hogg & Sunderland, 1991, p.47).

Self-Categorisation Theory rests on 13 formal assumption (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which do not include any reference to self-esteem, positive distinctiveness, self-enhancement or motivation. In SCT the self-esteem corollaries of SIT are not formally rejected or incorporated (Hogg & Abrams, 1990). This fundamental issue has thus been left unresolved in SIT.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO

It is argued that people are motivated to enhance their self-views (self-enhancement theory) to the extent that this is believable to them (self-consistency theory). Those with low self-esteem require more evidence before they are prepared to engage in self (or group) enhancing behaviour. This was found when reviewing experiments investigating the relationship between trait self-esteem and the extent of ingroup enhancement. For these reasons, tests of group enhancement theories, like Social Identity Theory, stated in terms of levels of trait self-esteem are badly formulated and not well supported empirically.

CHAPTER 3

GROUP STATUS, INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND IDENTIFICATION

This chapter reviews research on the effects of levels of group status on the extent of ingroup favouritism and identification. We begin by defining status, and placing it in the context of other socio-structural variables. Group status and identification is then discussed, prefaced by an introduction to the concept of identification, and how it relates to self-esteem and ingroup favouritism. Literature on the effect of group status and ingroup favouritism is then reviewed. This is done in terms of field studies, experimental studies which have used real groups and experimental studies which have used laboratory created groups. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the effects of group status on self-esteem.

3.1

STATUS

3.1.1 DEFINITION OF STATUS

Sheriff & Sheriff (1969 cited by Morley,1982) defined status in terms of an individual's instrumental power to control and apply sanction. Indeed, Turner & Brown (1978) write that the basis of a group's status is ' its position in the political and socio-economic structure of society'(p.201). As political and soico-economic position is synonymous with power in our society, extending the Sheriff's definition onto the group level, is not unreasonable. Tajfel & Turner's (1979) choose not to do this. Instead they took their conceptualisation of status from Festinger (1954) who used it in terms of interpersonal comparison (Turner,1978). Tajfel and Turner (1979) conceptualised status as a quality of a group, not of an individual writing:

'Status is not considered here as a scarce resource or commodity, such as power or wealth; it is the outcome of intergroup comparison. It reflects a group's relative position on some evaluative dimensions of comparison. Low subjective status does not promote intergroup competition directly; its effects on intergroup behaviour are mediated by social identity processes. The lower is a group's subjective status position in relation to relevant comparison groups, the less is the contribution it can make to positive social identity' (p.43).

Elsewhere Tajfel and Turner (1979) define status as 'a ranking or hierarchy of perceived prestige' (p.37). It should be noted that this definition is criticised by Morley (1982) who argues that a distinction should be made between status and prestige. He notes that positive distinctiveness is a consequence of prestige, not of status. Prestige being the outcome of a social comparison process and status being the outcome of the struggle for a positive social identity through social comparison.

If a person receives favourable interpersonal comparison/ evaluation on a value dimension it will be termed in this thesis '*High Personal Status*' (HPS) or for an unfavourable comparison/evaluation '*Low Personal Status*' (LPS). If a person's group receives a favourable intergroup comparison/ evaluation this group will be termed the '*High Status Group*' (HSG) or for an unfavourable comparison/ evaluations the '*Low Status Group*' (LSG).

An unfavourable outcome of interpersonal or intergroup comparison is aversive. Outcome feedback has even been used as a mood manipulation (Gordon, Holly & Shaffer, 1990). It has a negative effect on the relevant identity domain, and can be conceptualised as a threat to a positive identity i.e. a threat to self-esteem (e.g. Wills, 1981). Thus the terms low status, negative feedback, low ability, failure feedback and threat, while having different theoretical denotations, operationally are often synonymous. Which term a study uses to describe these condition depends on its focus more than its specific methodology. This thesis uses the term 'status' but the conditions can be equally understood in terms of any of these perspectives. The search for positive distinctiveness is a strategic one. The effects of status on ingroup favouritism along an evaluative dimension are dependent on the structural texture of the intergroup situation.

THIS STUDY

Our study using the minimal group paradigm (see Diehl, 1990) created a social identity which was a 'consensual status system' (Turner and Brown, 1978). This is a socio-structural system which van Knippenberg (1989) would classify as 'rigid, stable intergroup relations without intergroup mobility. In the dominant (and virtually undisputed) social representation, intergroup status differences are attributed to inherited differences' (p.75).

3.1.2 OTHER SOCIO-STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

The ingroup enhancement strategies which are available to group members depends on structural factors in the intergroup context. In its fascination with motivation and cognition, social psychology has focused on cognitive and motivational aspects of intergroup behaviour (e.g. Abrams & Hogg,1990; Brewer & Kramer,1985; Brown,1988, Messick & Mackie,1989; Stephan,1985; D.M.Taylor & Moghaddam,1987; Turner 1987 and Turner & Giles,1981) neglecting socio-structural factors (Sachdev & Bourhis,1991). Status has been generally neglected in Social Identity Theory (SIT) experiments, even though it is a powerful determinate of positive or negative social identity (Sachdev & Bourhis,1987). This comment is particularly poignant in the context of SIT being social psychology's experimental tradition which has arguably most taken socio-structural factors into account.

The effects of structural variables other than status is out of the scope of this thesis. Many of the studies in the review which follows were concerned with other structural factors in addition to group status. Specifically: stability (Mummendey & Schreiber,1984; Tajfel,1978; Turner,1978; Turner & Brown,1978); Power (Sachdev & Bourhis,1991); permeability (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, De Vries & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke,1990); legitimacy (Breakwell,1978; Sachdev & Bourhis,1991; Tajfel,1978) and numerical minority or majority position (Sachdev & Bourhis,1991). With regard to these studies, this review will generally only consider the main effects concerned with group status. The effects of other structural variables, and their relationship with group status, are beyond the scope of this thesis (see Sachdev & Bourhis,1991; Tajfel,1978; van Knippenberg, 1978, 1984, 1989; van Knippenberg & Ellemers,1990). Status differences 'decrease intergroup differentiation when perceived as stable, but increase it when perceived as unstable' (Turner, 1978, p.238). Turner & Brown (1978) found that high status group (HSG) members were most discriminatory when a legitimate status was threatened or an illegitimate status was secure. This is because 'like low-status groups, the high-status groups will react to insecure social identity by searching for enhanced group distinctiveness' (Tajfel & Turner,1979, p.45). The literature suggests that ingroup favouritism is increased by intergroup similarity, instability, power, minority status and illegitimacy. However, laboratory and field studies on legitimacy and stability have often yielded different results (D.M.Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987).

In comparison to other socio-structural variables, status is particularly powerful. Sachdev & Bourhis (1991) manipulated status, power and numerical majority/minority position. Amongst these variables, status accounted for 84% of total variance.

3.2 GROUP STATUS AND IDENTIFICATION

3.2.1 IDENTIFICATION

Belonging to a group 'creates a sense of ingroup affiliation or social identification' (Skevington, 1981, p.44). Social identification being according to Turners (1982) conceptualisation 'the tendency to define oneself as a group member, to incorporate some group membership into one's self-concept' (Turner, Hogg & Smith, 1984, p.98). The definition of social identity used in Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has 3 facets - awareness of group membership, evaluation and affect (R.J. Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986). Brown et al (1986) criticise this conception of identity for ignoring the interpersonal relationships within groups, which they found was the most important component of identity for respondents.

The concept of identity is more complex than many social psychological theories suggest. For example social identity is not unidimensional as SIT implies. It is multidimensional having different meanings in different settings (Condor, Williams & Brown, 1984, cited in R.J. Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986; Mummendey and Schreiber, 1984; van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984). The cognitive (e.g. forms of ingroup favouritism) and affective (ingroup identification) aspects of intergroup behaviour are independent. The affective aspect has been neglected (Skevington, 1989). A number of scales have been developed to measure ingroup identification (see Hinkle & Brown, 1990). One of these is R.J. Brown et al's (1986) scale which was used in our study.

3.2.2 IDENTIFICATION AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Research has not found a strong positive relationship between ingroup identification and positive intergroup differentiation (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Messick & Mackie, 1989). Some studies have found some evidence for a positive association between these variables (e.g. R.J. Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, (1986). Other studies have found a negative correlation (see Hinkle & Brown's, 1990 review), a finding which contradicts SIT which predicts that the motivational impetus for positive social identity should increase with the strength of ingroup identity. Other studies have found no relation between these variables (R.J. Brown et al 1986).

These results could be due to groups not being salient. However recent studies have not found that ingroup favouritism increased when the salience of group membership was increased. Ng (1986) and Sachdev & Bourhis (1985) found bias for non salient groups. Sachdev & Bourhis (1987) found no salience effects (Messick & Mackie, 1989). Other studies have failed to find ingroup favouritism when out-group salience was limited (Brown & Turner, 1979; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Vanbeslaere, 1987; see Hinkle & Brown, 1990).

A study cited by Hinkle and Brown (1990) found that identity correlated more highly with ratings of the ingroup than it did with ratings of intergroup differentiation. This shows that social identity needs were being met more by the direct evaluation of the ingroup than by social comparison.

3.2.3 IDENTIFICATION AND SELF-ESTEEM

According to Social identity theories, simply being a member of a group gives a sense of belonging and contributes to a positive self-concept. Although some studies have found a positive relationship between a favourable cultural/group identity and a high self-esteem, other studies have found no relationship (see Phinney, 1990 for a review). An example of the latter is a recent study by Rotheram-Borus (1990) who found no relationship between the strength of ethnic identity and self-esteem.

3.2.4 GROUP STATUS AND IDENTIFICATION

As membership of a high status group (HSG) contributes positively to the self-concept (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries and Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1990; Cialdini, Border, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Sloane, 1976; Skevington, 1981), HSG members should be more motivated to identify strongly with their group than members of low status groups (LSG's) (Ellemers et al 1988, 1990). HSG members are more satisfied than LSG members (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). They want to associate with their HSG and disassociate from any LSG identities (c.f. Ellemers et al 1988, 1990; Snyder, Lassegard & Ford, 1986). Evidence for the desire to belong to a HSG is reported by Rijsman (1983). Subjects who were categorised in a group that was supposed to show a superior performance, improved their performance, presumably in an attempt to emphasise their association with this superior category. That social identity is enhanced through membership of a HSG, even when individuals have nothing to do with the group's positive outcome, is illustrated in a study by Cialdini, Border, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Sloane (1976). A greater tendency for students to wear campus apparel (Experiment 1) and to use the identification pronoun 'we' (Experiments 2 & 3) was found after their university's football team had been victorious than when it had not.

People tend to 'flaunt their association with a high status group, while they try to evade the identification as a member of a low status group' (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke, 1988, p.48). A LSG may provide its members with an unsatisfactory social identity. Accordingly, membership of a LSG was found to have a negative effect on people's self-esteem (c.f. B.B. Brown & Lohr, 1987; Wagner, Lampen & Syllwasschy, 1986). Members of a LSG try to dissociate themselves psychologically from LSG identities and attempt to engage in 'social mobility' into HSGs (De Vries & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers et al 1988, 1990; Snyder, Lassegard & Ford, 1986; Tajfel & Turner 1979; van Knippenberg, 1989). For example Snyder et al (1986) showed that subjects who were members of unsuccessful teams wanted to cease participating in their team. Moreover, compared to members of successful teams, they were reluctant to wear a team badge. This discussion pre-supposes intergroup relations in which the status dimensions are accepted by all parties.

3.3

GROUP STATUS AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Low status group (LSG) members in an attempt to attain a positive distinctiveness on a comparison dimension should have a greater motivation to engage in ingroup favouritism than do high status group (HSG) members, whose social identity is satisfactorily positive (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Commins & Lockwood, 1979; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Turner & Brown 1978). When a HSG's superiority is threatened, then its members too would engage in behaviour to protect their positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Knippenberg, 1984). These hypotheses are a different form of the second self-esteem corollary (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990) discussed in section 2.2.2. That corollary stated that those with low self-esteem would engage in more ingroup favouritism than those with high self-esteem. In this section esteem is conceptualised as the objective status of a group, rather than as a personality trait.

3.3.1 FAVOURITISM ON CONSENSUALLY LOW STATUS DIMENSIONS

If groups accept the legitimacy of the intergroup status relations, if for example the HSG is patently superior on a comparison dimension, then 'those of high status cannot deny their superiority, nor those of low status their inferiority' (Commins & Lockwood, 1979, p.282) on this dimension. In such a situation Turner & Brown (1978) suggest LSG members should be less prone to displaying ingroup bias on that dimension than HSG members, as LSG members are forced to create and rely on other strategies and comparison dimensions for a positive distinctiveness. This discussion can be understood in terms of an integrated self-enhancement and self-consistency framework developed in the previous chapter. LSG members will strive to enhance their group as much as this is 'objectively' believable. If a HSG is unmistakably superior on a comparative dimension, enhancement on that dimension will not be believable. On unrelated comparative dimensions ingroup enhancement would be credible.

Field studies with real groups

Researchers have investigated ingroup favouritism between real (natural) groups in societies with a consensually accepted status hierarchy (see section 3.1.1). Commins & Lockwood (1979) cite studies of real groups which found that LSG members accept their inferiority and show a bias in favour of the HSG. LeVine and Campbell (1972) and other contemporaries (see Turner & Brown, 1978) maintained that the 'law of ethnocentrism' did not apply to inferior groups reflecting the group's consensual inferiority. Tajfel & Turner (1979) attributed these findings to LSG members adopting an alternative strategy to create a positive social identity. This is illustrated by research using a paradigm where people rated the characteristics of bilingual speakers on a tape-recording. These studies, predominantly by Lambert (1960) found that both the higher status English and the lower status French subjects, gave more favourable ratings to English voices. A similar pattern was observed using Scottish and English and English and Jewish people and accents in studies cited by van Knippenberg (1978, 1984). In all these studies, subjects favoured the ingroup when judging the voices on characteristics unrelated to socio-economic status. This illustrates the use of another comparison dimension.

R.J.Brown (1978) did a field study in a British aircraft engine factory. Ingroup favouritism was manifested by both HSG and LSG workers. The higher status workers showed ingroup favouritism on the comparison dimensions. The low status workers acknowledged the superiority of higher-status tool room workers but showed ingroup favouritism by engaging in social creativity. The same pattern was observed with children by Yee and Brown (1988, cited in Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Members of egg and spoon relay race teams received performance feedback. Ingroup favouritism characterised the intergroup evaluations of the 'fast' teams, while outgroup favouritism was shown by the 'slow' teams.

Van Knippenberg (1984), presents a strategic response theory, which is a social identity (i.e. group level) equity theory. It posits that it may be in the strategic interest of HSG's to accentuate ingroup costs and to minimise ingroup benefits and advantage. It may be in a LSG's strategic interest to highlight intergroup inequality, when such evaluations can be communicated. Strategic response theory is able to explain the results of many studies. Van Knippenberg (1978) found that in comparison to engineering students from a higher institution of technology, students who only had a technical education rated dimensions on which they had a comparative disadvantage (e.g. future salaries) as of more importance. This finding was

replicated by De Vries (1982) cited in van Knippenberg (1984). Van Knippenberg & van Oers (1984) found that a higher status division of nurses, who had better prospects, denied their higher status, portraying the lower status division of nurses as higher on status and prestige. Skevington (1981), found that lower status nurses acknowledged the superiority of higher status nurses. The higher status nurses reversed the bias on some dimensions, in order to make the status quo appear less inequitable.

The interpretation of field studies using real groups is problematical. They make use of already existing groups, confounded by historical and structural intergroup relations. It is to account for these factors that strategic response theory is useful. Strategic response theory applies only to certain types of intergroup relations. Group enhancement theories, like Social Identity Theory have not been designed to take strategic factors into account. They have been mainly interested in the 'pure' cognitive and motivational processes behind intergroup relations. For this reason they have predominantly used an experimental methodology.

Experimental studies with a consensual status system

Turner & Brown (1978) told science and arts students that science (or arts) students usually performed better or worse on a task. Subjects in the HSG's group showed ingroup favouritism and subjects in LSG's showed outgroup favouritism in their subsequent evaluation of the alleged performance of group members at this task.

R.J.Brown & Ross (1982) found that subjects in minimal groups that were ascribed a higher status in term of reasoning ability, showed ingroup bias in their ratings of the alleged intellectual competence of ingroup and outgroup members. LSG members showed outgroup favouritism.

R.J.Brown & Wade (1987) had groups work together on a task. Bogus feedback on the quality of each group's work was the status manipulation. Subjects' evaluations of the perceived contribution of each group reflected the consensually agreed status difference, with the most bias being shown by the high status group, who received the least biased evaluations. Group status had no effect on subjects' evaluations of the friendliness of the groups, a comparison dimension unrelated to the status criteria.

In separate experiments Sachdev & Bourhis (1987, 1991) grouped subjects in minimal groups on the basis of their performance on a bogus creativity test. Subjects in the HSG and to a lesser extent subjects in the equal status group displayed ingroup favouritism in their evaluation of group performance on a second creativity task. Subjects in the LSG displayed outgroup favouritism. These results are analogous to R.J.Brown's (1984a, experiment 2) finding that, where there was clear consensus about status differences, higher status groups were evaluated more favourably than were lower status groups.

3.3.2 FAVOURITISM ON DIMENSIONS UNRELATED TO STATUS

Experimental studies utilising real group divisions

The studies reviewed in the preceding section involved situations where the status of groups was related to the measures of ingroup favouritism. In this section, experimental studies are reviewed which utilised a real (as opposed to experimental) categorisation to establish group divisions. In addition ingroup favouritism is measured on comparison dimensions which are ostensibly unrelated to this categorisation i.e. the measure of ingroup favouritism has no connection with the ascribed characteristics of the groups.

NO DIFFERENCE IN INGROUP FAVOURITISM BETWEEN HSG'S & LSG'S

Branthwaite, Doyle & Lightbown (1979, experiment 2), found no difference in the intergroup distribution allocations matrices of high status 'college' and lower status 'high school' subjects.

HSG'S SHOW MORE INGROUP FAVOURITISM THAN LSG'S

Doise & Sinclair (1973) found that members of a educationally HSG ('collegiens') engaged in ingroup favouritism in terms of intergroup descriptions. Members of the LSG ('apprentis') engaged in outgroup favouritism.

LSG'S SHOW MORE INGROUP FAVOURITISM THAN HSG'S

Studying matrix money allocations between high socio-economic status English and lower status Welsh subjects, Branthwaite & Jones (1975) found that Welsh students showed more outgroup discriminatory behaviour than English students. Outgroup favouritism was more common amongst English subjects. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987, experiment 2), found that low status college sororities showed more ingroup favouritism in terms of evaluations of sororities on trait adjectives than higher status sororities.

Studies with natural groups can be confounded by factors not related to individual psychological processes such as the historical relationship between the groups and strategic concerns. Some authors have attributed their results to these factors (e.g. Branthwaite & Jones, 1975). One cannot ensure that differences between groups, are due to the status position of the groups, rather than other factors such as a history of intergroup hostility.

Experimental studies with experimentally created groups

To overcome the problems associated with using real group categorisations, many experimental studies have utilised laboratory created groups, in accordance with the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Diehl, 1990). These groups have no historical or interpersonal basis. This strength of design is a weakness as well. Owing to the minimal nature of the experimental groups they have negligible psychological relevance and indeterminable salience. Studies utilising this method are now discussed.

Two virtually identical versions of this paradigm have been used in studies of group status. In the first method, used in our study, subjects are categorised into groups using a bogus criteria, e.g. performance on a dot-estimation task (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974). To manipulate status, a higher status is then ascribed to one of the categories (e.g. 'overestimators' are better) and a lower status is ascribed to another category. In the second method subjects are given a task on which they receive real or bogus performance feedback. They are grouped in accordance with this feedback, those who allegedly performed badly are placed into one group, the LSG, and those who performed well are placed into another, the HSG.

NO DIFFERENCE IN INGROUP FAVOURITISM BETWEEN HSG'S & LSG'S

Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971) found that subjects, whose minimal groups were ascribed high or low status, showed no difference in the amount of ingroup favouritism, measured by allocations matrices, they displayed.

HSG'S SHOW MORE INGROUP FAVOURITISM THAN LSG'S

Commins & Lockwood (1979), using virtually the identical experimental design as Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971) found that subjects from HSG's showed more ingroup bias than subjects from LSG's. There was no manipulation check. Brewer (1979), concluded in her review that subjects in LSGs which had experienced failure engaged in less outgroup discrimination than subjects in HSGs. Subjects with LSG had in some studies she cited engaged in outgroup favouritism. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) grouped subjects into minimal groups on the basis of bogus task feedback. Subjects in the LSG showed less ingroup favouritism in terms of adjective ratings than subjects in the HSG.

LSG'S SHOW MORE INGROUP FAVOURITISM THAN HSG'S

That LSG members show more ingroup favouritism than HSG members was found by Branthwaite, Doyle and Lightbown (1979, experiment 1). Subjects were grouped according to bogus performance feedback and ingroup favouritism was assessed using distribution matrices. Their manipulation check was not successful. Finchilescu (1986) grouped subjects on the basis of false feedback scores. Subjects in LSGs which were compatible with their self-evaluations on the status dimension, showed more ingroup favouritism on allocation matrices than those in compatible HSGs. Similarly, J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt, (1988, study 2), found that subjects in a group which had been ascribed a lower status, showed more ingroup favouritism in the rating of group products than did HSG members. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) found that for ratings of above average and below average scorers (the group status manipulation) the low status minimal groups showed ingroup favouritism, the high status group did not.

3.3.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH

Experimental studies which investigated the effects of group status on ingroup favouritism, which were discussed in the previous section, are presented in tabular form in

table 3.1. As is evident from the table, taken together, experimental research on the effects of status groups on ingroup favouritism has yielded inconsistent results. In this regard Sachdev & Bourhis (1987) write:

'differences in subject samples, status operationalisation and dependent measures may well account for some of the discrepancies noted in the above studies. In addition, although in previous studies both high status group membership and discriminatory behaviour were supposed to provide group members with a positive social identity, these laboratory studies did not directly assess the hypothesised links between status, social identity and discrimination. Furthermore status manipulation checks have either not been successful (e.g. Branthwaite et al, 1979) or have not been employed (e.g. Commins & Lockwood, 1979)... Finally, recent conceptual attempts to resolve the above discrepancies have been mainly of a post hoc nature (e.g. van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1979; van Knippenberg, 1984)' (p.279).

Subsequent to the completion of our review, we receive a paper about to be published by Mullen, Brown & Smith (in press). They conducted a meta-analysis of 35 studies which had investigated different levels of status and measured ingroup favouritism in terms of evaluative ratings (as opposed to resource allocations). In 18 of these studies (87 hypotheses tests) the ingroup and outgroup were of unequal status. In contrast to Brewer's (1979) review, they found that:

'higher status ingroups will exhibit a stronger ingroup bias effect, but only in the context of artificial groups. In the context of real groups there is a nonsignificant trend for higher status groups to exhibit a weaker ingroup bias effect.' (p.15).

Finchilescu's (1991) brief narrative review concluded similarly that HSGs show more ingroup favouritism than LSGs. Mullen, Brown & Smith (in press) qualify their findings with the observation that:

'most of the studies showing ingroup bias among lower status ingroups have used global status cues whereas only half of the studies showing ingroup bias among higher status ingroups have used global status cues. Thus, a concentration on particular, transitory, task-specific conceptualisation of status would lead to the misguided conclusions that ingroup bias occurred predominantly in higher status groups' (p.16).

'Objective' reality may make outgroup superiority undeniable, rendering a non-delusional quest for a positive social identity impossible. This is especially true when inferiority is perceived as inherent and immutable, which could be the result of many experimental status manipulations. In many experiments the D.V. could reflect a 'performance distinction rather than group discrimination' (Messick & Mackie, 1989,p.65). This could

confound results. Ng (1986) found that the tendency to give a larger allocation to groups which performed better overrode ingroup favouritism. He called this the 'equity effect' and it could explain why LSG members do not show ingroup favouritism when their status position is not in dispute. This can occur even when a dimension is used as the ingroup favouritism measure which ostensibly is not directly related to group status. This problem is especially apparent in studies which have used the matrix allocation procedure (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) as the allocation could be perceived as a 'reward' and be susceptible to the 'equity effect'. Such a criticism has been made in reference to certain of the studies we have cited (see R.J. Brown, 1984a; Messick & Mackie, 1989; van Knippenberg 1990).

Responding to intergroup comparisons may reflect strategic and group level impression management considerations (van Knippenberg, 1984). According to Sachdev and Bourhis (1987) status can contribute to social identity over and above discrimination. Discrimination may only be the strategy of groups with an already positive identity (Hinkle & Brown, 1990) or among groups of relatively equal and high status and power (Hogg & Abrams, 1990).

Generalising these status studies to real group relations, where there are multiple comparison dimensions is problematical. Few groups are considered entirely bad and it is common for an ingroup to accept an outgroup's superiority on some dimensions. HSGs and LSGs may perceive superiority and inferiority on different dimensions. This provides for a 'positive social identity for ingroup and outgroup' (Johnson & Hewstone, 1991, p.194) and can be a subtle means to sustaining ingroup favouritism on more important dimensions (Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983, 1984; Mummendey & Simon, 1989). Group enhancement theories do not specify how much ingroup favouritism on one dimension is sufficient to offset outgroup favouritism on another (Hinkle & Brown, 1990). Mummendey and Simon (1989) found that outgroup superiority was only acknowledged on dimensions regarded as being unimportant.

The comparison dimensions used in the literature were often of minor psychological importance. If comparison groups are not relevant to a group's social identity (e.g. comparison with a far superior group) a person can engage in outgroup favouritism without it affecting his or her social identity. It is difficult for studies to specify relevant comparison groups a priori (Hinkle and Brown, 1990). These phenomena are illustrated by studies on interpersonal comparison. Tesser (1980; Tesser & Campbell, 1982; Tesser, Campbell & Smith, 1984) found that people choose friends who are superior to them on dimensions not central to their area of expertise. When another person, even one's child, threatens one's superiority on a dimension that is central to one's positive distinctiveness, it can cause distress.

In real social groups there are strategies besides outgroup discrimination. People can engage in what Lemaine (1974) termed 'social creativity', creating or emphasising a comparison dimension which they deem important and along which they can gain a positive distinctiveness. Numerous studies have supported this. Thus where multiple comparison dimensions are available, HSG members are likely to engage in direct comparison and LSG members are likely to engage in social creativity (R.J.Brown & Ross, 1982). There are other social creativity strategies like changing the subjective meaning of cues or changing the comparison group (Suls & Miller, 1977). Doise (1989) cites a study which argued that HSG members 'bolster interpersonal distinctiveness on "agentic" dimensions', while members of LSG's 'strengthen a sense of group cohesion or fusion on more "relational" dimensions'(p.58).

THIS STUDY

Our study used the minimal group paradigm to categorise subjects into groups using a bogus criterion. Status was manipulated by ascribing status (psychological adjustment) to these groups. An attempt was made to choose comparison dimensions along which status was defined and a D.V. on which favouritism was measured, that were not related. It would then be less susceptible to the 'equity effect'.

Table 3.1: FINDINGS REPORTED BY STUDIES WHICH HAVE LOOKED AT THE EFFECT OF GROUP STATUS ON INGROUP FAVOURITISM.

STUDY	N	SUBJECTS	D.V.: GROUP STATUS CRITERIA	I.V.: INGROUP FAVOURI- TISM MEASURE	FINDING: MORE FAVOURI- TISM SHOWN BY
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES WITH A CONSENSUAL STATUS SYSTEM					
R.J.Brown & Ross (1982)	95	junior school	reasoning test	performance reasoning task	HSG
R.J.Brown & Wade (1987)	156	students	writing task performance	performance 2nd writing task	HSG
Sachdev & Bourhis(1987)	120	students	creativity test	product creativity	HSG
Sachdev & Bourhis(1991)	160	students	creativity test	product creativity	HGS
Turner & Brown (1978)	48	arts & science male students	reasoning ability	performance reasoning task	HSG
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES UTILISING REAL GROUP DIVISIONS					
Branthwaite & Jones (1975)	50	English & Welsh students	political	allocation matrices	LSG
Branthwaite, et al (1979 (study 2)	120	college, High school	academic	allocation matrices	NO DIF.
Crocker et al (1987, study 2)	50	female students	sorority status	trait adjective ratings	LSG
Doise & Sinclair (1973)	105	college, apprenticeship high school male	academic	traits	HSG
THE TABLE CONTINUES ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE					

Table 3.1: CONTINUED FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE					
STUDY	N	SUBJECTS	D.V.: GROUP STATUS CRITERIA	I.V.: INGROUP FAVOURI- TISM MEASURE	FINDING: MORE FAVOURI- TISM SHOWN BY
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES WITH EXPERIMENTALLY CREATED GROUPS					
Branthwaite et al (1979, study 1)	56	students	creativity	allocation matrices	LSG
J.D.Brown et al (1988, study 2)	111	students	personality traits	rating of ideas	LSG
Commins et al (1979)	114	students	dot-estimation accuracy	allocation matrices	HSG
Crocker & Luhtanen (1990)	85	students	Social- Aptitude	adjective ratings of high & low status scorers.	LSG
Crocker & Luhtanen (1990)	85	students	Social- Aptitude	trait adjective ratings	HSG
Finchilescu (1986)	114	students	personality traits	allocation matrices	LSG
Tajfel et al (1971)	64	male High school	dot-estimation valuation	allocation matrices	NO DIF.
NOTES: Students = undergraduate university students 'HSG' = high status group, 'LSG' = low status group 'NO DIF' = no difference between the HSG and the LSG. For details please refer to the text.					

3.4 THE EFFECTS OF GROUP STATUS ON SELF-ESTEEM

That membership of low status social groups (LSG) (e.g. stigmatised groups) mediates low self-esteem is predicted by many theories including Social Identity Theory (Crocker & Major, 1989). As social identity is an important component of the self-concept, this should be reflected in lower self-esteem amongst members of LSGs. This prediction has not been supported by empirical research and is a challenge to theories of self-esteem formation (Crocker & Major, 1989).

The typical variance in self-esteem explained by social class is less than 4% (Gecas, 1982). Low self-esteem in 'not an automatic consequence of being black in a racist environment' (Milner, 1984, p.103). Most studies have either found no difference between the self-esteem of American blacks and American whites or found that American blacks have higher self-esteem than American whites (Gecas,1982). In the U.S. desegregation, which presumably signalled a status improvement, has had no effect on the self-esteem of black people (Stephan and Rosenfield, 1978). Abrams & Hogg (1988) cite studies which show that interracial contact, another signal of improved status, did not raise the self-esteem of black people. They cite studies which show a positive correlation between self-esteem and positive racial attitudes, and that increases in self-esteem are related to increases in the positivity of inter-racial attitudes.

A number of explanations for this discrepancy between empirical findings and theory have been advanced (see Crocker & Major,1989 for a review). Crocker & Major propose that LSG members blame the 'system', attributing negative feedback they receive to prejudice against their group. They engage in social creativity, 'selectively devaluing those dimensions on which their group fares poorly and valuing those dimensions on which their group excels' (Crocker & Major, p.608). They determine their situation through social comparison with members of their own subculture rather than with a more advantaged outgroup (Gecas,1982).

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER THREE

There is greater identification with a high status group than with a low status group. When status differences are perceived as deserved, ingroup favouritism on the status comparison dimension are constrained by this reality. On comparison dimensions unrelated to status differences, there is space for ingroup favouritism. Group-enhancement theories predict that in such a situation members of low status groups should engage in more ingroup favouritism than members of high status groups. Tests of this hypothesis have yielded contradictory results. A host of methodological problems and theoretical complexities confuse this area. Contrary to social identity theories, the status of real social groups has little influence on self-esteem.

CHAPTER 4

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL STATUS AND GROUP STATUS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INGROUP FAVOURITISM AND IDENTITY

The chapter opens by outlining ways which have been proposed to relate the personal and social components of the self-concept to each other. This is followed by a discussion on the key importance of personal identity in mediating social identity enhancement. The final sections of the chapter review literature which has studied different permutations of the effects of group status and/or personal status and/or esteem on ingroup favouritism and identification.

4.1 PERSONAL VERSUS SOCIAL IDENTITY

The relationship between social identity and personal identity is unclear. 'Is the concept of self entirely different when the "personal" or "social" system is functioning, or is it a difference of focus on the particular characteristics that define the self and can social identity excluded personal identity?' (Widdicombe,1988, p.473). These and related issues are beginning to gain increasing attention in the literature (e.g. Abrams,1989; Skevington,1989; Stephenson,1981; Widdicombe,1988). There are three possible relationships between social and personal identity: that they are mutually-exclusive, independent or co-variable.

The mutual-exclusivity of social and personal identity

Social identity theorists following Gergen (1971), have conceptualised social identity as being distinct from personal identity. The two components of the self-concept are seen as operating mutually-exclusively of each other, as opposite poles of the same continuum (R.J.Brown & Turner,1981). Depending on the context, people's salient self-concepts are such that their behaviour is based either on their personal identity or on their social identity when they behave as an exemplar group member. With regard to interpersonal relations this corresponds to relating to and conceiving of another person on the interpersonal level (as an individual) or on the intergroup level (as a group member). Social identity can therefore function to the exclusion of personal identity. Indeed, 'at certain times our salient self-images may be based solely or primarily on our group membership' (Reicher,1982, p.42).

Empirical support for this position comes from some minimal group paradigm experiments. Turner (1975) had subjects distribute money (Experiment 1) or points (Experiment 2) between themselves and ingroup members and afterwards between members of the ingroup and the outgroup. Subjects showed self-favouritism in the first allocation task, no ingroup favouritism was manifest in the second allocation task. This, Turner reasoned, was due to personal identity becoming more salient and social identity becoming less salient. When the sequence of distribution allocations was reversed, individuals did show ingroup favouritism in the intergroup allocation task and there was less self-favouritism against the ingroup in the self versus group allocation. Tajfel (1978) interpreted these results as implying that 'the two kinds of differentiation (self-other and ingroup-outgroup) should vary inversely: i.e. that an opportunity to engage in the first should cause the absence of the second' (p.12).

In an experiment using multidimensional scaling, Widdicombe (1988) found that adolescents' identities were composed of separate social and personal identity subsystems, as theorised by Self Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). She identified three dimensions of identity - self from ingroup (peers), ingroup from outgroup and personal identity from all other social stimuli. A shift from a personal to a social identity focus, resulted in a perception of self as more similar to the ingroup. Subjects had a conception of their personal identity, which was dissimilar to that of their social identity.

The independence of personal and social identity

Social and personal identity could operate as orthogonal continua. Stephenson (1981) suggests that 'interpersonal and intergroup behaviour vary along independent dimensions as opposed to inversely' (Turner & Giles, 1981, p.32). This view is in contrast to the conceptualisation of identity in Social Identity Theory which rules out the possibility of conflict between social and personal identity. In researching negotiations Stephenson (1981) found that 'both intergroup and interpersonal considerations inform all social behaviour to a greater or lesser extent, and that they may vary in salience independently of each other' (p.164). For example, strong interpersonal relations may co-exist with strong intergroup antagonism. Stephenson nevertheless argues that the theoretical distinction between the two must be maintained (Turner & Giles, 1981).

One of the assumptions of Self-categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) a derivative of Social Identity Theory, is that there 'tends to be an inverse

relationship between the salience of the personal and social levels of self-categorisation' (p.49). This relationship is however qualified. 'Personal-self and ingroup-outgroup categorisation, then, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they will tend to operate simultaneously most of the time, but their perceptual effects are inversely related' (Turner et al, 1987, p.50).

Abrams (1989) extended this thesis, citing a study demonstrating that individuals engage in, and display, both personal and social categorical aspects of their identity simultaneously (e.g. intersex communication). Marshall and Wetherell (1989) in a discourse analysis showed that people utilise the personal / social identity distinction in their accounts. These authors 'emphasise the need to see these aspects of identification as existing simultaneously; dynamically interacting to transform each other.' (Skevington, 1989, p.199).

The co-variation of social and personal identity

Deschamps (1984; cited in Doise, 1988) presents a 'co-variation hypothesis', that the 'interindividual level and the intergroup level are to some extent homologous and interrelated' (Doise, 1988, p.105). In term of Tajfel's continua, making one pole salient can simultaneously make the other pole salient so that 'intergroup differentiation and interpersonal differentiation can be seen to co-vary.' (Doise, 1988, p.105).

The complementary and compensatory nature of personal and social identity was noted in a study on outgroup homogeneity by Simon & Pettigrew (1990) where social identity was made salient. When social identity was negative (the ingroup was undefined) subjects accentuated and self-enhanced their positive personal identity. When social identity was positive (the ingroup was well defined) subjects were less dependent on personal self-enhancement and evaluated themselves less positively. They noted that these results do not imply that personal and social identity are negatively related rather that they covary:

'people may try to tap both sources ... though one source might contribute more than the other in a given social situation. In fact, there were positive, though very weak, correlations between individual self-evaluation and ingroup favouritism ..and substantial positive correlation between individual self-evaluation and ingroup evaluation' (Simon & Pettigrew, 1990 ,p.285).

Both social and personal identity could be influenced by a common third variable. If they are both facets of the self-concept they could be influenced by cognitive and motivational

forces which operate on the self-concept as a whole. Negative Affectivity (see section 1.4.2), for example, could cause the whole self-concept- including social and personal identity, to be viewed negatively.

Discussion

Social and personal identity could relate in different ways depending on what their points of reference are. In Minimal Group Paradigm experiments, where satisfying personal and social identity needs are placed in opposition, the personal and social identity components of the self-concept may appear to be mutually exclusive. In interpersonal interaction, like negotiations, interpersonal and intergroup factors may both operate. In terms of evaluation (social or personal esteem) a third factor like NA could affect both components similarly.

Theorists themselves are uncertain of the distinction and interrelationship between social and personal identity. Weakening the distinction Turner (1984) writes:

'The distinction between personal and social identity is not fully satisfactory since there are doubtless subtle and complex interconnections between the two, and, of course, there is no implication that personal identity is not fully social in nature. The distinction is advanced as an approximation. Its main merit is to recognise the simple fact that sometimes we seem to perceive ourselves primarily or solely in terms of our relevant group memberships rather than as differentiated unique persons: social identity is sometimes able to function to the relative exclusion of personal identity' (p.527).

THIS STUDY

This study derives a measure of personal identity (self vs. ingroup enhancement) and social identity (ingroup vs. outgroup enhancement). The relationship between personal and social identity was studied by investigating the correlations between these two measures.

4.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY FOR INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR

In explaining intergroup bias, research and theorising has focused on the significance of social identity, neglecting the importance of personal identity. This has been in part, due to

a deliberate effort to compensate for the over-emphasis in traditional social psychology on individuality (Turner,1988). Until recently, empirical research had not found that personal identity was an important variable in explaining ingroup favouritism. This can be seen in Brewer's (1979) review:

'there is evidence that feedback regarding total group outcomes can have more impact on the individual than feedback on his or her own performance (...) and that expected and perceived success is higher at the group level than at the individual level (...).' (p.320).

Recent literature has argued that intergroup processes cannot be explained solely by social identity. Personal identity has a more important role in explaining intergroup behaviour than had been acknowledged (Doise,1988; Ng,1985,1986; Simon & Pettigrew,1990; Stephenson,1981). Personal and social identity interact in a dynamic relationship (Stephenson,1981). Ng & Cram (1987,cited by Doise,1988) found that personal status was the factor which strengthened or weakened the extent of intergroup allocation discrimination. Syroit (1984,cited in Ng,1986, p.251), found that 'persons tend to confirm the (relative) status of their group in so far as this confirmation contributes to the attainment or maintenance of a positive self-identity'.

Palmonari, Carugati, Ricci, Bitti and Sarchielli (1984) argued that people's salient self-images are never based solely on their group membership. They found that 'the self occupied a central position within the set of categories which they deemed to be most significant for adolescent experience but ... the self was clearly differentiated from these categories' (Widdicombe,1988, p.472). Their conclusion was that self representation was not influenced by group affiliation.

Ng (1986) measured group status by the aggregated ratings of school childrens' assessments of the sporting ability of different classes. Perceived group status was measured by subjects' ratings of their own class. After receiving feedback on their class's rating, subjects had to allocate points to ingroup and outgroup, in a non-zero sum manner. Ng found that superior, as opposed to inferior performance, was under-rewarded in the high status group condition, when this status was incongruous with perceived group status. This showed that the bias was interpersonal as opposed to being group-based; personal identity was more important than social identity. Ng accounted for these results in a manner which explains the results of other studies:

'an incongruous intergroup status relationship , which directly weakens social identity, may have induced an insecurity in the person's overall self-concept ... Insecurity in the social part of the self-concept can sensitise the personal part to

potentially threatening stimuli. Hence compared to their counterparts in the congruous status condition, subjects in the incongruous status condition would more readily tend to perceive the superior performance of others as an additional threat to their personal identity, and in order to reduce this threat would downgrade this performance. Inferior performance poses little or no such threat, and hence requires no downgrading' (Ng,1986, p.247).

The dominance of personal over social identity can be seen in Turner's (1975,1978; Turner Brown & Tajfel, 1979) findings. When social identity is made salient, subjects were willing to sacrifice some personal monetary profit for the sake of positive group distinctiveness, but they still showed self-favouritism. However, in 'normal' situations individuals show self-favouritism at the expense of their ingroup. These results suggest that although there is a preference towards self, group loyalty may modify this bias (D.M.Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). This finding is not surprising. Western society is individualistic and competitive. One would expect that in most cases personal identity and individualistic strategies are given priority over social identity and intergroup enhancement strategies (Ng,1986; D.M.Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). Social Identity Theory 'does not incorporate, such a leaning toward this perhaps more realistic individual mobility strategy' (D.M.Taylor & Moghaddam, p.83).

Further evidence for the dependent nature of social and personal identity can be found in studies which have found a causal link between damage to personal self-image and increased enhancement of group membership. Individuals who have received a threat to the self-concept (i.e. low personal status) such as failure feedback, tend to derogate outgroup members (see Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman,1987; Wills,1981; Wylie,1979). Enhancing personal identity can compensate for a negative social identity, and enhancing social identity can compensate for a negative personal identity. Cialdini & Richardson (1980) found that after experiencing a personal failure (creativity test false feedback) university students enhanced the trait ratings they made of their home university and devalued their ratings of a rival university. In a second experiment they found that the greater the damage to self-image, the more subjects engaged in these enhancement tactics. Within the minimal group paradigm, Hogg & Sunderland (1990) found that when a subject's personal self-concept was lowered (through a false feedback manipulation), ingroup favouritism measured on Tajfel's matrices was increased. A similar finding was reported by Crocker et al (1987) in an experiment which studied the influence of self-esteem on this effect (see section 4.4.1).

4.3 THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF GROUP STATUS AND PERSONAL STATUS

Personal identity can function as a identity resource in its own right. The interrelationship between personal identity and social identity could be studied by manipulating operationalisations of both concepts. A way to do this would be by manipulating both personal status and group status in a multifactorial experimental design. This was done in our study. We know of only two sets of studies which have done the same. One set of studies examined the effect of these variables on ingroup *identification* (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vreis & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1990) and the other on ingroup *favouritism* (Ng, 1985), the D.V. examined in our study.

4.3.1 GROUP AND PERSONAL STATUS AND GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Social identity could serve as an alternative identity resource, which is used when satisfactory personal identity enhancement is not available. Enhancement theories would predict that those with a negative personal identity in a low status group would show stronger ingroup identification than subjects with a positive personal identity. Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke (1988, experiment 1 and 2) grouped subjects using the minimal group paradigm. Personal ability (status) was manipulated by bogus feedback about individual performance at a task. Group status was manipulated using bogus feedback on how many people in each group succeed in a similar task. Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke (1990) used the same design but increased control by using a computer to provide the manipulation tasks and feedback.

Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke (1988, experiment 1 & 2) and Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke (1990) found that ingroup identification (evaluated using a specially designed measure) was stronger in the high status group than in the low status groups. Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke (1988, experiment 1) found that ingroup identification was stronger among LSG individuals in the low personal status condition than those in the high personal status condition (see table 4.1). This is because 'group members that have relatively high individual ability (which is generally highly valued) are therefore not solely dependent on their group for achieving a positively valued identity. Group members with low ability, however, may only derive a positive identity from positively evaluated group

characteristics '(Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1988, p.49). This effect was not significant in the other experiments.

Table 4.1 : EXTENT OF INGROUP IDENTIFICATION AS A FUNCTION OF PERSONAL STATUS.
(Ellemers et al ,1988, 1990)

PERSONAL STATUS	GROUP STATUS	
	high	low
High personal status	+++	+
low personal status	+++	++

KEY: '++' = more ingroup identification than '+'

Ellemers et al (1988, 1990) manipulated both group status and personal status along the same ability dimensions by using a similar task for both manipulations. As these facets of identity were not independent, a high status on one level of identity would be incongruous with a low status on another. A different level of personal and group status could either indicate to subjects that they do not 'deserve' to belong to the group because they performed so badly in comparison, or because their individual ability is so much better than that of the group. Thus the personal and group status manipulations could have been confounded and Ellemers et al's conclusion not valid (see section 3.3.3). In our study, an attempt was made to manipulate personal status and group status along separate comparison dimensions.

4.3.2 GROUP STATUS AND PERSONAL STATUS COMBINED AND INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Group status and personal status manipulated along independent dimensions

The only experiment to manipulate both group status and personal status and measure ingroup favouritism was conducted by Ng (1985). Subjects were grouped on the basis of genuine results on a test about sport (group status manipulation). Feedback about whether subjects were above or below average on a problem solving task was the personal status manipulation. When personal status was low, ingroup favouritism occurred regardless of group

status. When personal status and group status was high, there was no ingroup favouritism. When personal status was high but group status was low there was outgroup favouritism. There was no overall group status effect which suggests that group status played a minor role and was only relevant when personal status did not allow for a positive personal identity. Ng's conclusion was that if personal status is threatened, people will use compensatory strategies like ingroup favouritism.

Ng (1985) measured ingroup favouritism using two D.V.'s (a) allocation matrices and (b) reward weightings. In the latter groups were required to perform two tasks on which they performed differentially. Subjects had to assign weightings to these tasks on the basis on which rewards would be allocated. Ingroup favouritism was measured by the extent to which these weightings favoured the ingroup. The levels of ingroup favouritism measured using both D.V. in the experimental cells are shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2 : MEAN INGROUP FAVOURITISM SCORES REPORTED BY NG (1985, table 2, p.304)				
D.V.'S	PERSONAL STATUS			
	high		low	
	GROUP high	STATUS low	GROUP high	STATUS low
MATRICES	-0.5	0.7	-0.3	-0.6
WEIGHTING	0.3	-3.1	1.8	1.7

The relationship between the non-significant matrix measure and the significant weighting procedure is telling. Allocation matrices are a well used, often validated, measure of ingroup favouritism. Ng (1985) dismisses them too glibly by claiming the superiority of the unvalidated weighting procedure because of its 'subtlety in detecting bias' (p.305). The only cell where allocation matrices showed ingroup favouritism (albeitly non-significantly) was the high personal status / low group status cell. This was the only cell on which the weighting measure showed outgroup favouritism. The non-findings using the allocation matrices cast some doubt on the validity of the conclusion which Ng draws on the basis of the weighting measure.

Ng's (1985) experiment is problematical for another reason. Both the D.V. tasks that had to be weighted and the group status manipulation criteria related to sport. The D.V. ingroup favouritism measure could have been confounded by the status manipulation. This

could have led to the D.V. being subject to the very 'equity effect' Ng (1986) warns against (see section 3.3.3).

Group status and personal status incompatible along related dimensions

Ng (1985) manipulated personal and social status on *different* comparison dimensions. Personal and social status have been manipulated in other studies along the *same* comparison dimension (e.g. Ellemers, van Knippenberg, de Vries & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1990). Another possibility is for personal and social identity to be made *incompatible* on the same comparison dimension. In some experiments, subjects are placed in a group which has a high status on the basis of a dimension on which subjects perceive themselves to have low ability (e.g. Finchilescu, 1986). In other experiments subjects gained entry into the ability based high status group illegitimately by cheating (e.g. Breakwell, 1979). These situations can not be equated.

Such experiments have found that membership of a high status group, which is illegitimate or incompatible with personal ability, increases the extent of ingroup favouritism. A number of explanations have been suggested for these findings. Incongruity between accorded status and subjective status results in an insecure identity which can threaten a positive identity. Engaging in ingroup favouritism actively confirms membership in a group and ingroup favouritism may be an attempt to reduce this identity threat. Engaging in ingroup favouritism on alternate dimensions is an example of social creativity. It is an attempt to establish positive social identity for the illegitimate or incongruous group on a dimension which is not incongruous with personal identity. When membership of a low status group is incompatible with perceived ability, subjects would disidentify from this low status group, manifesting little ingroup favouritism.

THIS STUDY

The only study to investigate the combined effects of group status and personal status on ingroup favouritism, the study by Ng (1985), had a number of flaws. To fill the gap, our study manipulated personal and group status and measured ingroup favouritism. All this was done on comparison dimensions which were not related ostensibly.

4.4 GROUP STATUS, PERSONAL STATUS AND ESTEEM

4.4.1 PERSONAL SELF-ESTEEM

Crocker and her associates have investigated the interaction between levels of trait self-esteem with group status and with personal status on ingroup favouritism. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987, experiment 1) placed subjects in minimal groups. They received high or low scores (personal status feedback) on their performance on a bogus 'Social-Cognitive Aptitude test' (SCAT). Using an adjective checklist subjects had to rate themselves and the average college student; members of the minimal group ingroup and outgroup; and people who score 'above average' and 'below average' on the SCAT. This last comparison created a second group distinction (above or below average scorers).

Subjects in the low personal status condition (low SCAT score) with high self-esteem (HSE) showed more ingroup favouritism than subjects in the high personal status condition. There was no difference between these conditions for subjects with low self-esteem (LSE). These results have been represented in table 4.3a. Thus ingroup favouritism was related to enhancement needs if trait self-esteem permitted such enhancement. Only subjects with low personal status who had HSE showed compensatory self-favouritism in their ratings of themselves in comparison with the 'average college student'. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987, experiment 2) using real groups (college sororities) found that members of high status sororities with HSE showed the least ingroup favouritism on an adjective checklist of sororities (see table 4.3b).

Neither the levels of self-esteem nor of personal identity affected ingroup favouritism toward the minimal ingroup in comparison with the outgroup. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) suggests that this was because of the minimal nature of the minimal group, the identity had negligible relevance to the self-concept.

As is evident from table 4.3, the studies, taken together, found that people with HSE showed the most reaction to low status (personal or social) identity. They increased their level of ingroup favouritism when they had low personal or group status in comparison to when they had high status.

Table 4.3 : EXTENT OF INGROUP FAVOURITISM ON AN INTERGROUP ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST AS A FUNCTION OF SELF-ESTEEM AND STATUS (Crocker et al, 1987).

(a) Experiment 1		(b) Experiment 2	
Ratings of above and below average scorers on the SCAT.		Ratings of sororities.	
SELF-ESTEEM	PERSONAL STATUS high low	GROUP STATUS high low	
high self-esteem	+ ++	+ ++	
low self-esteem	+ +	++ ++	
KEY: '++' greater ingroup favouritism than '+'			

An explanation for such findings was suggested by Crocker & Schwartz (1985) who argue that HSE individuals with HPS may, unlike people with LSE, lack the impetus to enhance their ingroup. Such an approach only considers social identity as being relevant when it serves to compensate for a lowered personal identity. They write:

'it may be important to distinguish between comparisons of self with others in general and comparisons of ingroups with outgroups, for the two types of comparison could be inversely related within individuals. That is, high self-esteem people, who believe they are better than other people, may have no need to seek self-enhancement through ingroup favouritism. Low self-esteem individuals on the other hand, who compare themselves even-handedly or negatively to others, may attempt to enhance themselves through identification with ingroup ("I may be a failure but my group is a success")' (p.381).

Within enhancement theory there is another possible explanation for the ingroup favouritism shown by people with LSE in HSGs. People with LSE require more 'evidence' before they are prepared to engage in self-enhancement than those with HSE (see section 2.1.2). This study, like others (e.g. Crocker & Luhtanen,1990), found that HSE but not LSE subjects minimise the effects of failure. Only when their group has high status do people with LSE 'feel justified' in enhancing their group, even on a ingroup favouritism measure irrelevant to the status dimension.

4.4.2 COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM

Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987; see section 4.4.1) found that self-esteem mediated the extent of ingroup favouritism after *personal* identity was lowered. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) investigated the effect of esteem after *social* identity had been lowered. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) argue that self-esteem is the measure of esteem in one's personal identity. As social identity is a different component of the self-concept, it is not affected by personal identity and its evaluative component- personal self-esteem. Luhtanen & Crocker (1989, cited by Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990), found stable individual differences in the extent to which people possess a positive social identity. They designed a measure for these individual differences called *Collective Self-esteem* (CSE), analogous to personal self-esteem on the group level (c.f. Crocker & Mayor, 1989; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is defined as the 'extent to which individuals *generally* evaluate their social group positively' (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990, p.60-61) i.e. the global esteem one has in the social groups of which one is a member. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) present their thesis thus:

'Collective self-esteem might operate in group contexts in a manner analogous to personal self-esteem in individual contexts. While personal self-esteem may moderate the extent to which one responds to a personal failure experience, collective self-esteem may moderate the extent to which one responds to a group failure experience. High collective self-esteem people may engage in ingroup-enhancing biases or distortion when faced with a threat to their collective identity, whereas low collective self-esteem subjects may show the absence of such in-group enhancing biases. Thus, the predictions of social identity theory may apply to high collective self-esteem individuals but not to those low in collective self-esteem' (p.61).

Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) conducted a study using a similar design to Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) with the exception that group status and not personal status was threatened and CSE as well as self-esteem was included as an individual difference variable. Group status was threatened by giving subjects bogus feedback about their groups average performance (with their score excluded) on the SCAT. In support of their thesis only subjects with high CSE in the low status group, altered their ratings of people who scored 'above average' or 'below average' on the SCAT test in an ingroup enhancing manner (see table 4.4); as predicted by social identity and other enhancement theories. The level of personal self-esteem had no effect. As CSE is a recent construct, little work has been done to validate it.

Table 4.4: EXTENT OF INGROUP FAVOURITISM ON AN INTERGROUP ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST AS A FUNCTION OF COLLECTIVE AND PRIVATE SELF-ESTEEM AND GROUP STATUS (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).

	GROUP HIGH	STATUS LOW
COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM		
HIGH COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM	+	++
LOW COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM	++	++
SELF-ESTEEM		
HIGH SELF-ESTEEM	+	+
LOW SELF-ESTEEM	+	+
Ratings of above and below average scorers on the SCAT. KEY: '++' = more ingroup favouritism than '+'		

In terms of ingroup favouritism shown towards the minimal group ingroup in relation to the outgroup, subjects in the high status group showed ingroup favouritism, subjects in the low status group did not. Neither the levels of personal nor collective self-esteem had an effect on these ratings. This replicates previous finding by Crocker (Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987) that levels of self-esteem did not affect favouritism in minimal groups. Crocker and associates suggest that ingroup favouritism in minimal groups may be unrelated to the self-enhancement motive, in terms of trait self-esteem or threats to the self-concept. Minimal groups may have too little psychological importance to impact on self-enhancement concerns.

There are problems in interpreting Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) and Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) experiments. While the SCAT scores are another group distinction, it is not a measure of ingroup favouritism. This is because evaluating 'above average' and 'below average' performance of the SCAT directly implicates personal identity. There is no indication that 'above' and 'below' average scorers had any salience as a social identity. This could have been a measure of self-favouritism. Furthermore, as Gibbons & McCoy (1991) point out, the experiments confounds the status manipulation and the SCAT outgroup. The low status (threat) identity is based on performance on the SCAT test, the outgroup is composed of people who did well on this test. Subjects were expected to derogate outgroup members who were objectively better. While this should not affect deductions based

on difference between conditions, it does affect generalising these results to situations where the identity dimensions and the evaluative dimension are separate (see section 3.3.3).

THIS STUDY

Our study investigated the effects on ingroup favouritism of personal status and group status in conjunction with self-esteem and with collective self-esteem. This interaction has not previously been studied. It examined Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) prediction that collective self-esteem, but not self-esteem, would differentiate between the extent of group enhancement in certain conditions. A second study investigates whether collective self-esteem would be a form of Negative Affectivity and examines the concurrent validity of collective self-esteem.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER FOUR

The literature is undecided as to the nature of the relationship between personal identity and social identity. Various theorists suggest that they are positively, orthogonally or inversely related. Studies manipulating personal status and measuring ingroup favouritism suggest that the group is only enhanced to compensate for a negative personal identity. Ng (1985), who manipulated both personal and group status, found that group status was only of any import when personal status was low. In contradistinction, Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) suggested the construct of collective self-esteem (theoretically independent of self-esteem), which measures the esteem in which an individual holds his or her membership group. They suggest that this measure and not self-esteem will mediate the extent of group enhancement in response to a negative social identity.

CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 1:
THE CONCURRENT VALIDITY OF COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NEGATIVE AFFECTIVITY

5.1

OVERVIEW

Experiment One was a correlational study, the purpose of which was to investigate issues around the construct validity of collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). We wanted to study whether collective self-esteem is (a) a form of Negative Affectivity and (b) relates to measures of real group degradation and identification.

The measures that were used were:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| a) Self-esteem | Rosenberg's (1965) <i>Self-esteem Inventory</i> . |
| b) Collective self-esteem | Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) private <i>Collective Self-esteem Scale</i> . |
| c) Negative Affectivity | Gibbons & McCoy's (1991) modification of the <i>Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist</i> (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). |
| d) Negative Affectivity | Watson, Clark & Tellegen's (1988) <i>Negative Affect Schedule</i> . |
| e) Racism: | Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) <i>Subtle Racism Scale</i> . |
| f) Identification: | R.J. Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) identification scale applied to Jewish identity. |

5.2

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Collective self-esteem and negative affectivity

Negative Affectivity (NA; see section 1.4.2) could be an underlying third variable, explaining both self-esteem and collective self-esteem (CSE; see section 4.4.2). As self-esteem is an evaluation of oneself and CSE is an evaluation of one's groups, people with high-NA should have the tendency to evaluate both themselves and their groups more negatively (see section 2.2.2) and should therefore have low CSE. Both low personal self-esteem and low CSE could be a product of high-NA.

Such theorising suggests the possibility that personal and social identity are not distinct components of identity but products of an underlying common factor. A correlation of 0.34 between self-esteem and CSE was reported by Crocker and Luhtanen (1990). Crocker & Luhtanen argue that the correlation between self-esteem and collective self-esteem does not negate the construct validity of CSE. They derived a measure of CSE from which all vestiges of self-esteem, measured on Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Inventory, were removed by calculating partial correlations and using residual scores. Using this measure they found that their ANOVA's remained significant. They concluded that 'taken together these analyses indicate that the interactive effects of collective self-esteem and threats to collective self-esteem on ratings of above- and- below-average scorers are due to the unique aspects of collective self-esteem and not its shared variance with personal self- esteem' (p.64).

Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) did not demonstrate that self-esteem and CSE measure the esteem of discrete aspects of the self-concept. Their findings do not negate our argument, but only demonstrate that CSE is a more predictive measure of esteem, as it relates to the manipulations in their experiment, than Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem inventory. Rosenberg's inventory is not primarily a measure of NA, although self-esteem is a form of NA. Our argument is not suggesting that the esteem one has in one's groups is an irrelevant construct, but that it may merely be reflecting a general manner of evaluating social stimuli.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Collective self-esteem is negatively correlated with Negative Affectivity.

H0: $p = 0$

H1: $p < 0$

Where: p = correlation between NA and CSE.

This study does not aim to determine whether NA causes CSE and/or self-esteem - a correlation study cannot do this. Rather it aims to evaluate the extent of this relationship. A strong relationship might suggest a causal link which could be investigated in further research. No relationship would negate our research hypothesis.

The concurrent validity of collective self-esteem

As CSE is a recent construct, there has been little work investigating its construct validity. CSE is a measure of the esteem in which people hold their membership groups in general. If CSE possesses concurrent validity it should reflect positive attitudes towards real groups. To this end, scores on a Jewish identification scale (R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade and Williams, 1986) will be correlated with CSE scores. If CSE has construct validity, it should be strongly related with positive Jewish identification.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Collective self-esteem is positively correlated with Jewish identification.

H0: $p = 0$

H1: $p > 0$

Where: p = correlation between CSE and Jewish identification.

CSE could conceivably relate to measures of outgroup denigration. Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) Subtle Racism Scale was administered and correlated with CSE. This investigation was an exploration rather than a test of CSE's validity. The theory does not prescribe that CSE should relate to outgroup denigration.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Collective self-esteem is positively correlated with Racism.

H0: $p = 0$

H1: $p > 0$

Where: p = correlation between CSE and racism.

5.3

METHOD

5.3.1 EXPERIMENT 1A

Subjects

Subjects were 142 Std 6 pupils, almost all aged between 13-14, at a co-educational Jewish middle school in Cape Town. The same subjects were used in experiment 2A (see section 6.3.2). A fortnight prior to their receiving the experimental manipulations of experiment 2A, these students were given a preliminary experimental booklet which included the measures used both in this study and in experiment 2A.

Procedure

The relevant measures (see appendix A1) were administered to classes at the beginning of their guidance period. The school psychologist administered the scales to five classes, and it was carried out on another class by the experimenter. Subjects were instructed to write their name and class on top of their scale booklets.

Measures

The measures used were: Rosenberg's (1965) *Self-esteem Inventory*, Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) *Collective Self-esteem Scale* and Gibbons & McCoy's (1991) modification of Zuckerman & Lubin's (1965) *Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL)*.

Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Inventory is the most commonly used measure of global self-esteem (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Wylie's (1974) review concluded it was the most reliable and valid self-esteem instrument. Many of the experiments cited in this paper selected Rosenberg's inventory as their measure of self-esteem (e.g. Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYpern & Dakof, 1990; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oaks & Turner, 1980; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Pelham, 1991; Rotheram-Brous, 1990; Shrauger & Terbovic, 1976; Tesser & Campbell, 1982). It has a test-retest reliability coefficient greater than 0.80 over a 6 week period (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman 1987), and greater than 0.85 over a 2-week period (Wylie, 1974). It has a high internal consistency (Crocker, Voell, Testa & Major, 1991). Rosenberg reported a reliability coefficient greater than 0.92 with a sample of high school students (Wylie, 1974). Rosenberg's scale was scored by adding the items such that a high self-esteem 'strongly agree' response received 4 points, 'agree' 3 points, 'disagree' 2 points and 'strongly disagree' 1 point. There was thus a maximum of 40 points (high self-esteem) and a minimum of 10 (low self-esteem). Rosenberg does not report standardised scores for his measure. Crocker et al (1987) had a median score of 34 with their university student sample.

Luhtanen & Crocker (1989) cited in Crocker & Luhtanen (1990), devised scales to measure four different aspects of collective self-esteem. Their 'private Collective Self-esteem' scale, which they used in their study, was administered. Crocker & Luhtanen do not indicate the range of the Likert scale they used for their 4 item collective self-esteem scale. This study used a 7-point scale, which we believe Crocker & Luhtanen must have used based on the median score they report. Thus scores range from 28 (high CSE) to 4 (low CSE). Crocker & Luhtanen report an median score of 23, Cronbach alpha coefficient > 0.83 , and test-retest reliability of $r=0.68$ over a 6 week period.

The Negative Affectivity (NA) measure used in this experiment was taken from the adjectives Gibbons & McCoy (1991) selected from Zuckerman & Lubin's (1965) Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL). We considered the mood items used by Gibbons & McCoy to reflect NA. The MAACL has been used as a quick mood scale in previous research (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa & Major, 1991). The scale is a 13 point 8 item Likert scale which ranged from 8 (low NA) to 104 (High NA). Gibbons & McCoy report an alpha coefficient of > 0.78 for the scale. They do not report descriptive statistics regarding their use of the measure.

5.3.2 EXPERIMENT 1B

The scale used to measure NA in experiment 1A (MAACL) was replaced in experiment 1B by Watson, Clark & Tellegen's (1988) *Negative Affect Schedule* (NAS). Unlike the MAACL the NAS was specifically designed to measure NA. The experimenter did not know of the NAS until after experiment 1A. In addition Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) subtle racism scale and R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) identification scale applied to Jewish identity were added. Using a Jewish identification scale and a scale measuring racism toward blacks enable us to measure ingroup favouritism and outgroup denigration towards two categories which are not directly related.

Subjects

Subjects were 106 Std.7 pupils, almost all aged 14-15, from the same school as subjects in experiment 1A. The experiment was run during three physical education periods when two school classes are combined. The same subjects as in experiment 2B (see section 6.3.3) were used because the measures used in this study were included as part of the experimental booklet given to subjects in experiment 2B (see appendix A10).

Procedure

All the measures were completed after the experimental manipulations and D.V. responses of experiment 2B. This differed from experiment 1A where the measures were completed a fortnight prior to the experimental manipulation of experiment 2A. The experiment was conducted by the experimenter and subjects were requested to keep their answers anonymous.

Measures

Watson, Clark, & Tellegen's (1988) Negative Affect Schedule (NAS) replaced Zuckerman & Lubin's (1965) Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL) as a measure of NA. All subjects completed the NAS and the CSE scales. In addition other measures were included in the experimental booklets used in experiment 2B. The measures were randomised in the experimental booklets such that subjects received two of the following three scales: Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) Subtle Racism Scale; R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) identification scale applied to Jewish identity and Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Inventory. Subjects did not receive all the scales because of time constraints.

The Negative Affect Schedule (NAS, Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) is a 5 point 10 item unidirectional Likert scale with scores ranging from 10 (low NA) to 50 (High NA). We used the version of the scale which instructed subjects to report how they feel 'in general'. The authors report a mean of 18.1, standard deviation of 5.9, Cronbach alpha coefficient > 0.87 and 8-week test-retest reliability > 0.71 in their run with 663 subjects.

Duckitt's (1990,1991a) Subtle Racism Scale was used as the measure of racism. This was because it has good psychometric properties and measures racism less blatantly than do other scales (Foster,1991). This should minimise the social desirability response effect, which one could expect to find in a sample of children from traditionally 'liberal' homes. Subjects completed the inventory on a scale of -3 to 3. Following Duckitt this score was converted to a score along a scale of 1 to 7, with a minimum subtle racism score of 10 and a maximum subtle racism score of 70. Duckitt reports a mean score of 35.4 , standard deviation of 14.2, and an alpha coefficient of 0.93 for his scale.

As our subjects attended a Jewish day school which stresses Jewish identity, it is reasonable to believe that Jewish identification is an important facet of identity for them. R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) developed an identity scale, which could be applied to any group. The word 'Jewish people' was inserted to make it applicable to that group. It is scored on a 5 point 10 item Likert scale. Scores range from 10 (weak identification) to 50 (strong identification). For comparison it can be noted that Brown et al (1986) reported an alpha coefficient of 0.71 and obtained a mean score of 41 and standard deviation of 5.4 when they used the scale to measure the identification of factory workers with

their department. Values on this scale are a function of the identification target group and cannot be standardised.

5.4

RESULTS

For Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Inventory 12 subjects left out an item, and two subjects left out 2 items. Missing items on the scale were dealt with by using a pro-rata adjustment.

Combining experiment 1A and experiment 1B

The mean scores on Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Inventory and Crocker and Luhtanen's (1990) collective self-esteem measure for each version of the experiment were compared. For collective self-esteem the mean, standard deviation and number of subjects was 22.35, 4.57 and 132 respectively in experiment 1A and 21.99, 4.35 and 105 respectively in experiment 1B. For self-esteem the relevant statistics were 31.13, 4.57 and 133 respectively for experiment 1A and 30.13, 3.9 and 54 respectively for experiment B. Multiple t-tests were done comparing the difference between the collective self-esteem and personal self-esteem scores in experiment 1A and 1B. As neither comparison was significant ($t < 1.5, p > 0.15$), the data set of both experiments was combined.

Psychometric data

The number of subjects tested, means, standard deviations and Cronbach Alpha internal reliability coefficients for each of the scales are shown in table 5.1. These values reported by the developers of the scales are tabulated in parenthesis in the table. All the scale have acceptable alpha coefficients and have similar descriptive statistics to these standardised scores.

Table 5.1 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SCALES.

Statistics in parentheses were reported by the developers of the scales. See text for details.

SCALE	N	MEAN	STD. DEV.	ALPHA >
Brown et al (1986)	57	44.29 (41)	5.06 (5)	0.80 (0.71)
Crocker et al (1990)	237	22.19 (23)	4.47 (-)	0.72 (0.83)
Duckitt (1990,1991a)	88	36.81 (35)	9.73 (14)	0.69 (0.93)
Gibbons & McCoy (1991)	130	30.78 (-)	15.5 (-)	0.82 (0.78)
Rosenberg (1965)	187	30.84 (-)	4.35 (-)	0.76 (0.92)
Watson et al (1988)	105	19.87 (18)	5.32 (6)	0.74 (0.87)

Some of these measures are known to be skewed, for example Rosenberg (1965) reports a skewness coefficient of 0.645. We found that all the measures we used except the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt,1990,1991a) and the Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark & Tellegen,1988) were significantly skewed (Tabachnik & Fidell,1984). Logarithmic transformations were performed on the skewed measures.

Collective self-esteem and negative affectivity

Hypothesis 1 that collective self-esteem correlates with NA received mixed support. Table 5.2 gives the relevant Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients for CSE and self-esteem with NA. While self-esteem correlated significantly ($p < 0.0001$) with the MAACL ($r = -0.56$) and the NAS ($r = -0.51$) measures of NA, CSE only did so with the MAACL ($r = -0.39$) measure of NA and not the NAS measure. Fischer's test to determine the difference between two independent correlations (Howell,1987) found the discrepancy between the correlations between CSE and MAACL and between CSE and the NAS significant ($z = 2.42$, $p < 0.05$).

CORRELATION	r	p <	N
COLLECTIVE SELF ESTEEM WITH NA (MAACL measure)	-0.389	0.0001	129
WITH NA (NAS measure)	-0.090	0.40	105
SELF-ESTEEM WITH NA (MAACL measure)	-0.558	0.0001	130
WITH NA (NAS measure)	-0.507	0.0001	53
COLLECTIVE WITH SELF-ESTEEM	0.268	0.0005	185

The concurrent construct validity of collective self-esteem

Hypothesis 2 regarding the construct validity of collective self-esteem, that it would correlate positively with a measure of real group identification, was supported. As can be seen in table 5.3, CSE correlated significantly with Jewish identification ($r=0.438$). Subjects with higher CSE showing more Jewish identification than subjects with lower CSE. As there was no significant relationship between racism and CSE, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

CORRELATION	r	p <	N
COLLECTIVE SELF ESTEEM WITH JEWISH IDENTIFICATION	0.438	0.001	56
WITH SUBTLE RACISM	-0.098	0.40	86
JEWISH ID. WITH SUBTLE RACISM	0.037	0.85	41

Other findings

Inter correlations between all the scales were calculated (see Appendix B1). Only self-esteem and subtle racism were significantly inversely correlated ($r=-0.441$, $p<0.01$, $N=38$). This is significant even when the significance level is tightened, using the Bonferroni method (Howell, 1987), to take account of the family-wise error due to the number of comparisons (5 comparisons).

5.5

DISCUSSION

Collective self-esteem and Negative Affectivity

The research hypothesis was that Collective Self-esteem (CSE) is a manifestation of Negative Affectivity (NA) expressed towards one's groups. This study did not attempt to test this hypothesis but to investigate whether a strong relationship between NA and CSE does exist. This experimental hypothesis received mixed support. The results do not support the research hypothesis for a number of reasons.

(a) The significant correlation of the MAACL measure of NA (Gibbons & McCoy, 1991) with CSE was not strong ($r = -0.39$). NA only explained 19% of variance in CSE. For the argument of our research hypothesis to be valid i.e. that CSE is virtually nothing but NA, required a stronger relationship.

The correlation coefficient which we calculated underestimated the relationship between CSE and NA due to measurement error within the scales themselves. To obtain an estimate of the correlation discounting the measurement error, we calculated the correlation correcting for attenuation (Nunnally, 1978). This produced a correlation coefficient of 0.57. Even this correlational estimation is not strong enough to support the argument of our research hypothesis.

One must be cautious about minimising the relationship between CSE and the MAACL. As the subjects in our sample were homogeneous, the resultant narrow range of CSE and MAACL scores would weaken the correlation.

The moderate r^2 between CSE and the MAACL does not necessarily minimise the importance of this relationship. In a controversial paper, Rosenthal (1990) argues that even if a factor only explains minimal variance, the relationship could be of considerable practical significance.

(b) CSE did not correlate with the NAS measure of NA (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Unlike the MAACL, which was adopted by us to measure NA, the NAS was specifically designed to measure NA. The discrepancies between the findings on the NAS scale and the MAACL are surprising. Both scales use Likert scale mood ratings of adjectives, are

simple to use, psychometrically sound and correlate significantly with self-esteem. There are indications that the NAS scale is not invalid within the context of this study. As the literature on NA predicts the NAS scale correlated significantly with self-esteem ($r=-0.51$, $p<0.0001$). The MAACL and NAS measures of NA were used in different versions administered to the Std.6 subjects and to the Std.7 subjects. It is unlikely that this was a confounding factor. There was no significant systematic differences between the versions of the experiment for any of the measures used in both versions.

(c) Our research hypothesis had greater validity with respect to self-esteem than with respect to CSE. Williams' (1959) formula for testing the difference between nonindependent correlations (cited in Howell,1987) established that the correlation with the NAS was significantly stronger with self-esteem than with CSE ($t=2.38$, $df=50$, $p<0.05$). Similarly the correlation with the MAACL was stronger for self-esteem than for CSE ($t=1.91$, $df=126$, $p<0.06$). CSE was thus related less strongly to NA than it was to self-esteem. This lends some credence to the antithesis of our research hypotheses - that CSE, at least in comparison to personal self-esteem, is tapping a component of the self-concept that is somewhat distinct from personal identity.

In sum, we found some evidence that CSE is related to NA (as are many other subjective measures). This relationship was not as strong as that between self-esteem and NA. Neither was it strong enough to support our thesis that CSE is merely a direct manifestation of NA. Rather than suggesting that CSE reflects an evaluative disposition of the general self-concept, these findings cannot dispute a claim that CSE measures esteem in a differentiated area of the self-concept.

Concurrent construct validity of collective self-esteem

Jewish identity could be said to be a particularly important aspect of identity for our subjects. CSE did correlate significantly in the right direction, with Jewish identification ($r=0.44$, $p<0.001$) giving moderate support to the concurrent construct validity of CSE. CSE only explained 19% of the variance in Jewish identification. Even when the formula to correct for attenuation (Nunnally,1978) is used, the adjusted correlation coefficient at 0.58 remains modest. As with our other correlations, the range restriction in our study could have underestimated the correlation.

Subtle Racism

As Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) Subtle Racism Scale is a new measure, discussion on some of its psychometric properties may be useful. The mean score of our subjects (36.8), who are young middle class adolescents from supposedly 'liberal' homes, was not different ($z < 1$) to that which Duckitt found in university students at one of the less liberal English universities (35.4). Our Cronbach alpha coefficient at < 0.69 was lower than that reported by Duckitt of < 0.91 . This is in line with a recent unpublished finding by Jacobs (1991) who reported an alpha coefficient of < 0.76 on a University of Cape Town student sample ($N=56$).

The finding that self-esteem and racism were significantly inversely correlated ($r = -0.44$, $p < 0.01$) is in agreement with the literature (see section 2.2.2). That Jewish identification did not correlate with racism ($r = 0.04$) is in accordance with findings that ingroup identification does not necessarily imply outgroup denigration (see section 2.2.1) and is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter. Subtle racism was not significantly related to NA (NAS), suggesting that the Subtle racism measure is not affected by mood.

CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 2:
THE EFFECTS OF PERSONAL STATUS, GROUP STATUS AND
ESTEEM ON INGROUP FAVOURITISM

6.1

OVERVIEW

STUDY: An investigative experimental study.

DESIGN: 3 (Group status: high, neutral, low) X 3 (Personal status: High, no feedback, low) X 2 (self-esteem or collective self-esteem: high, low).

D.V.'s.: 'Ingroup favouritism' measure:
(Ingroup #1 evaluation) - (outgroup evaluation)

'Self favouritism' measure:
(Self evaluation) - (ingroup #2 evaluation)

'Self vs. ingroup favouritism' measure:
('Self-favouritism') - ('ingroup favouritism')

TESTS: MANOVA (Group status X personal status X collective self-esteem) with all D.V.s

MANOVA (Group status X personal status X self-esteem) with all D.V.s. Only to study self-esteem effects.

This study utilises bogus performance feedback to manipulate levels of group status and personal status, along ostensibly independent status comparison dimensions. Group status was manipulated by assigning subjects to minimal groups of a high, low or neutral colour preference. This was done by giving subjects a phoney 'colour preference test'. Subjects were informed that based on this test, their colour preference put them in the 'sophisticated' (high status group) or the 'unsophisticated' (low status group) colour preference group, the former being better than the latter. In the neutral status condition, subjects were placed in the 'type 2', as opposed to the equivalent 'type 1' colour preference group.

Personal status was manipulated by bogus feedback on a phoney 'social perceptiveness test', on which subjects received 80% (high personal status), 30% (low personal status) or they received no feedback (neutral personal status).

Subjects had to write down the 5 best uses of a fly swatter they could come up with. Ingroup favouritism was measured by subjects rating (giving a mark out of 10) the quality of these ideas produced by different targets. All conditions were given an identical list of ideas, ostensibly written by a member of the ingroup and a list by a member of the outgroup. Two D.V. measures were taken: (i) the difference between the rating of the ideas of ingroup members and outgroup members ('ingroup favouritism' measure) and (ii) the difference between the rating of the subject's own ideas and another set of ideas by an ingroup member ('self favouritism' measure). These correspond to social identity enhancement and personal identity enhancement respectively. A third variable (iii) 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' was derived from the other two being the difference between the self favouritism and the ingroup favouritism measures. This represented the extent the self was enhanced more than the ingroup was enhanced.

The personality variables of self-esteem and collective self-esteem were measured and their possible interaction with the I.V. examined.

6.2

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The design of this experiment, and many of the experiments which have been previously reviewed, are based on the experimental paradigm used by Gerard & Hoyt (1974)

in the minimal group paradigm tradition of Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament (1971). Gerard & Hoyt assigned subjects to a minimal groups and used the evaluations of ingroup and outgroup products as a measure of favouritism.

In the experimental studies reviewed above, personal and group status were manipulated by providing positive or negative performance feedback (often through bogus test results) to subjects about their minimal groups. Often I.V.'s (status measures) and D.V.'s (ingroup favouritism) have been related to the same dimension (see section 3.3.3). Thus the D.V. could reflect a performance distinction based on consensual status differences and not on group discrimination (Messick & Mackie, 1989). The study of Ng (1985), had such a design. His has been the only experiment to manipulate both personal and group status and measure ingroup favouritism. Ng's personal and group status manipulations could have been incompatible and not independent. No study has examined the relationship between status and the extent of ingroup favouritism, in which both personal and group status are assessed along separate dimensions and the D.V. is unrelated to these dimensions (see section 4.3.2). This study attempts to do this. While it cannot be ensured that these dimensions were perceived to be unrelated, a questionnaire-type pilot study suggested that no strong relationship was perceived between these dimensions. If the D.V. is unrelated to the status dimensions, then identity enhancing evaluations on the D.V. dimension will be a form of social creativity.

While studies have looked at the effects of self-esteem on personal status and on Group status separately (e.g. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; see section 4.4.1) no studies have looked at the effects of self-esteem when both these variables were criss-crossed. Few studies have attempted to operationalise and measure the enhancement of both social identity (ingroup favouritism) and personal identity (self favouritism).

Our study was designed as an investigative experimental study. It cannot be classified as an exploratory study owing to its experimental nature and its grounding in much empirical work. Neither can it be classified as an hypothesis testing study as many of the effects investigated in this experiment had not been studied before and the results can not be completely anticipated. This is why we termed it an 'investigative study'.

The effects of the status manipulations and individual difference variables on the D.V.s will be explored. Based on our review of the literature, the effects of certain of these variables can be anticipated. As personal and social status have never been manipulated together when these were assessed on separate dimensions or when self-esteem is taken into account, we shall not make any formal hypotheses about main effects and possible interactions. Our statistical

analysis will treat the study as an exploratory study, using a MANOVA to test the significance of all possible main effects and interactions for each of the 3 D.V.s. This will be done separately with CSE and with self-esteem as the personality I.V.s. In certain cases, our study does allow us formally to test some hypotheses which were proposed in the literature.

The central research question underscoring this study was to investigate the relationship between personal and social identity using a subtly different methodological refinement to previous studies in this area. Personal identity can be conceptualised as the differentiation between the self and the ingroup and social identity as the differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroup (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). To do this, a 'self favouritism' measure rarely studied in the literature was used. This measures how much favouritism subjects show when evaluating themselves in comparison to an ingroup member. The main interest of this study, the relationship between personal and social identity, was operationalised by calculating the difference between this measure and the conventional ingroup favouritism measure (evaluation of the ingroup and outgroup) to form a measure of the extent to which subjects enhanced themselves (personal identity) in relation to the extent to which they enhanced their group (social identity) ('self vs. ingroup favouritism' measure). The 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' measure is the difference between the 'self favouritism' and the 'ingroup favouritism' measures. As only the self or the group can receive the highest mark, there is some trade off between a positive self-image and a positive group image. This trade off can be minimised by having a small relative difference between the rating given to the self and that given to the ingroup. The more important the ingroup is to one's identity, the smaller this difference should be. Both the 'self favouritism' and the 'ingroup favouritism' measures are of interest in their own right and were studied as independent D.V.s as well.

The investigative study- personal status, group status and esteem

We shall present a brief theoretical framework behind the effects and interactions we anticipate in the experiment. The principles behind these expectations derive from the literature which was cited previously and the reader is referred to the relevant sections. It should be recalled that as personal and social identity were manipulated on independent dimensions, a high status on one facet of identity is not incompatible with a low status on another. The D.V. evaluation is on a separate dimension, so ratings should not reflect consensual status differences.

People attempt to enhance themselves as much as they are able (see section 2.1). Individuals with low self-esteem (LSE) have less ability to do this (see section 1.4.2 & 2.2.2). People will enhance whatever level of self-categorisation - personal identity (self-other) or social identity (ingroup-outgroup)- which happens to be salient. This can involve showing ingroup favouritism (social identity) and self-favouritism (personal identity). According to enhancement theories, individuals should be most motivated to engage in enhancement to restore esteem following a negative identity (i.e. a threat to esteem). If this negative identity is undeniable, people can enhance their personal or social identity on another dimension of comparison. This effect should only occur for individuals with high self-esteem (HSE) with regard to low personal status and individuals with high CSE with regard to low group status (see section 4.4.2). Self-categorisation is a level of categorisation closer to the self than group-categorisation. Thus when both social and personal identity are salient, social identity will primarily be enhanced to compensate for a low personal identity (see section 4.2). (This is not immutable and the group can be placed above the self, as occurs in many collectivist cultures and with allocentric individuals- see section 4.4.2). Similarly, ingroup enhancement should be elicited more strongly in comparison with self-enhancement when social identity is positive and personal identity negative, than when personal identity is positive. This finding was expected in this study owing to the minimal nature of the experimental social identity.

The following effects and interactions were anticipated (see table 6.1):

SELF-ESTEEM

Subjects with LSE should show less ingroup favouritism, less self-favouritism and evaluate the self less generously in relation to the ingroup (self vs. ingroup favouritism) than subjects with HSE.

GROUP STATUS

Subjects in the low status group (LSG) condition should engage in more self-favouritism than subjects in the high status group (HSG) condition, as they disidentify from their social identity which is a negative identity resource. For this reason, subjects in the LSG condition should show greater enhancement of the self relative to the group (self vs. group

favouritism) than those in the HSG. The relationship between group status and ingroup favouritism will depend on the interaction between personal and group status.

PERSONAL STATUS

Subjects in the low personal status (LPS) condition should engage in more ingroup favouritism and in more self-favouritism than subjects in the high personal status (HPS) condition. The extent that social identity is enhanced in relation to personal identity (self vs. group favouritism) will depend on the interaction between personal and group status.

GROUP STATUS AND PERSONAL STATUS INTERACTION

Ingroup favouritism will be at it highest in the low personal status (LPS) / HSG condition and its lowest in the high personal status (HPS)/ LSG condition. Self-favouritism will be at it highest in the LPS/ LSG condition, and its lowest in the HPS/ HSG condition. Social identity will only be enhanced more in relation to personal identity (self vs. ingroup favouritism) when personal status is low and group status high than in other conditions. Table 6.1 shows the anticipated interactions within the three D.V.s.

Table 6.1 : ANTICIPATED EXTENT OF FAVOURITISM IN THE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS.			
D.V.	GROUP STATUS CONDITION	PERSONAL STATUS	
		high	low
SELF FAVOURITISM	high group status	+	+++
	low group status	++	+++
INGROUP FAVOURITISM	high group status	++	+++
	low group status	+	++
SELF VS. INGROUP FAVOURITISM	high group status	++	+
	low group status	++	++
KEY: Extent of favouritism '+++>' > '++>' > '+>'			

SELF-ESTEEM AND PERSONAL STATUS INTERACTION

Subjects with LSE should show less ability to engage in enhancement in reaction to a negative personal identity than subjects with HSE (see section 4.4.1). Subjects with HSE should show more favouritism in a LPS condition than in a HPS condition. Subjects with LSE should show no difference in their degree of favouritism within these conditions.

SELF-ESTEEM AND GROUP STATUS INTERACTION

It is possible that subjects with LSE would be 'suspicious of any group that would have them as a member', as Brown, Collins & Schmdit (1988) paraphrased Groucho Marx. They would not identify with a HSG and identify only with an esteem-congruent LSG. Subjects with LSE should then show outgroup favouritism when in the HSG condition and ingroup favouritism in the LSG condition. ++

COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM AND GROUP STATUS INTERACTION

Subjects with low CSE should show less ability to engage in ingroup enhancement in reaction to a negative social identity than subjects with high CSE (see section 4.4.2). Subjects with high CSE should show more favouritism in a LSG condition than subjects in a HSG condition. Subjects with low CSE should show no difference in their degree of favouritism within these conditions.

GROUP STATUS AND PERSONAL STATUS AND SELF-ESTEEM INTERACTION

Levels of 'self-favouritism' and 'ingroup-favouritism' should only change as a function of the personal and social status conditions for people with HSE. There should be no difference for subjects with LSE.

The relationship between social and personal identity

The relationship between social identity and personal identity is disputed. According to some theorists, social and personal identity are orthogonal continua (uncorrelated); according to others they are opposite ends of a single dimension (inversely correlated) and others argue that they co-vary (positively correlated) (see section 4.1).

We investigated the relationship between enhancement of the self (personal identity) and enhancement of the group (social identity). This was done by studying the correlation between the 'self favouritism' and 'ingroup favouritism' measures.

Formally, the hypothesis:

$$\begin{aligned} H_0: p &= 0 \\ H_1: p &< > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Where: p = correlation of 'self favouritism' with 'ingroup favouritism'

Test of J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988)

J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988; see sections 2.1.2 & 2.2.2) found that people with HSE engaged in direct self-enhancement by enhancing work done by ingroup members in the same task team as themselves. They did not enhance the work of ingroup members in a different task team. People with LSE engaged in indirect self-enhancement by enhancing work done by ingroup members in a different task team as themselves. They did not enhance the work of ingroup members in the same task team as themselves.

There are a number of problems apparent in J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt's (1988) study. One would have expected subjects with HSE to have engaged in ingroup favouritism when they had to evaluate ingroup members in a different task team (there were different subjects in the own task team and other task team conditions). This did not occur. Furthermore Brown et al (1988) could have confounded the direct and indirect enhancement condition by the use of cross-cutting categorisations. For the ingroup the targets of the different task team conditions were in relation to the subjects members of an ingroup on one dimension and members of an outgroup along another. The effects of cross-cutting categorisation on ingroup favouritism is unclear (see Arcuri,1982; R.J.Brown & Turner,1979; Deschamps,1977; Doise,1978; Robins,1990; Vanbeselaere,1987).

In our study both direct enhancement ('self-favouritism') and indirect enhancement ('ingroup favouritism') are measured. J.D. Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) would regard the 'ingroup favouritism' measure as a measure of indirect enhancement as the comparison does not implicate the self directly. In its strong form Brown et al's (1988) work would suggest that subjects with HSE and LSE should show different patterns of favouritism on the 'ingroup favouritism' and the 'self-favouritism' measures. Subjects with HSE should show more favouritism than subjects with LSE on the 'self favouritism' measure as well as less favouritism than subjects with LSE on the 'ingroup favouritism' measure. In a weaker form their findings would suggest that there should be a difference between subjects with high and low self-esteem in the 'self favouritism ' but not in the 'ingroup favouritism ' measures.

What is behind status differences in ingroup favouritism?

Many studies have used only two levels of status - high status and low status. This does not allow one to infer whether differences between these levels are due to the effects of positive identity (high status), negative identity (low status) or due to the effects of both. Using a neutral condition, as a baseline variable makes it possible to study the specific effects of the status manipulations further. To examine this, the difference between the neutral condition and the high and low status conditions will be investigated for any significant effects. If there are differences between the status conditions, but no difference between one of these conditions and the neutral condition, the effect should be attributed to the effect of the other condition.

If the high status condition $<>$ the neutral status condition $<>$ the low status conditions, then both high and low status conditions effect the D.V. If the low status condition $<>$ the high and neutral status conditions, which are equivalent, then the effect can be attributed to the effects of negative identity. If the high status condition $<>$ the low and neutral status conditions, which are equivalent, then the effect can be attributed to the effects of positive identity.

Sex differences in ingroup favouritism

The issue of sex differences in social comparison has received little study. Many studies have found no sex difference in ingroup favouritism (e.g. J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987). However, Gibbons & McCoy (1991) cite a number of studies which suggest that males might be more likely to respond to threat by derogating an outgroup than would females. Gibbons & McCoy (1991) found that both sexes showed derogation of the target person but along different dimensions.

6.3

METHOD

6.3.1 PRE-STUDY: DETERMINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE DIMENSIONS

A pre-study was done to select the personal status, social status and D.V. dimensions to be used in the experiment which would be perceived as not strongly related.

SUBJECTS

Subjects were 9 Psychology III students at the University of Cape Town, in a tutorial group tutored by the experimenter.

PROCEDURE

At the end of a tutorial, subjects received a questionnaire (see appendix A2) in which they had to write down, using a 7-point Likert scale, the degree of correlation which they

perceived between various dispositions. The scale ranged from 1 (no perceived correlation) up to 7 (strongly perceived correlation). Some dispositions were selected from status manipulations and D.V.'s used in previous studies and others were original. The adjectives against which they had to rate the dispositions were taken from the 16 item adjective checklist used by Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987).

RESULTS

The mean perceived correlation between each of the dimensions was calculated. Based on these results, we felt justified in selecting the dispositions of 'social perceptiveness' and 'psychological adjustment' as the I.V. dimensions and 'creativity' as the D.V. dimension. People rated the mean association of 'social sensitivity' with 'creativity' as 2.33 (SD=1.05) and between 'psychological adjustment' and creativity as 3.56 (SD=1.88).

DISCUSSION

This exercise was not a scientific, hypotheses testing experiment. Generalising from personality perception of a small sample of university students to those of High School pupils is clearly problematic. The purpose of this exercise was to do no more than provide guidance in selecting appropriate status and D.V. dimensions. At best this exercise indicates that the selected dimensions are not perceived by our small sample to be highly interconnected.

Demand characteristics in an experiment could suggest a connection between even the most apparently unconnected set of dimensions. This is unavoidable. By providing some assessment of perceived intercorrelations this study attempted to minimise this possibility.

This pre-study did not assess perceived intercorrelations between 'psychological adjustment' and 'social sensitivity' so we have no independent corroboration of our assertion that they were perceived as separate non-associated attributes.

6.3.2 EXPERIMENT 2A

Subjects

Subjects were 142 Std. 6 pupils, almost all aged between 13-14, at a co-educational Jewish middle school in Cape Town. The experiment was conducted in classes, during 50 minute long guidance periods. The classes were not streamed. Seven subjects had heard mention of the experiment from previous subjects. Twelve subjects were discarded as the questions in the manipulation check revealed that they had some idea of the purpose behind the experiment (e.g. 'groups') or the nature of the manipulations. This left 130 subjects. Due to missing values, the responses of all subjects were not available for every analysis.

Procedure

The experiment was conducted with 6 classes during the fortnightly 50 minute long Guidance period of each class. This occurred a fortnight after experiment 1A. The experimenter was introduced to the class by the Guidance teacher. The experimenter directed the subjects in experimental decorum. At each stage of the experiment, verbal instructions were given. Subjects were given five minutes to complete a 'social perceptiveness test' (the personal status manipulation; see Appendix A3 for the test) and a 'colour preference test' (the minimal group status manipulation; see Appendix A4 for the test). Subjects were instructed to write their names on top of these tests. On completion the tests were collected. The experimenter informed the subjects that he would mark them while they completed their next task. This was a 'creativity test' in which subjects had 5 minutes to brainstorm and write down the '5 best uses they could think of for a fly swatter', on the answer form provided (see Appendix A5). A variant of this procedure was used by J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988). On the top of the creativity answer form was written 'group:'. Subjects were told to leave this blank until they received their test results, which would reveal the group to which they belonged. While subjects were busy with this exercise, the experimenter feigned marking the tests.

THE STATUS MANIPULATIONS

A bogus social perceptiveness test was used by Crocker and associates in their experiments (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987). We constructed such a test by presenting subjects with information about 10 couples who had begun to date. Three personality traits were ascribed to the male and 3 to the female in each couple. To equalise descriptions, the traits were taken from the work of Alicke (1985) who categorised traits in terms of desirability. For each person in a couple, their traits descriptions were taken from the low, moderate and high desirability lists. Subjects were instructed to indicate whether, based on these personality traits, they thought these couples would still be dating in 6 months time. The tests were printed to appear as genuine psychological instruments. This was done by printing the names of 'authors' and the University from which they came at the top of the test.

For the minimal group assignment a bogus 'colour preference test' was constructed by giving subjects 8 pairs of colours, for each pair subjects had to circle the colour they preferred. 8 colours were chosen and two qualifiers for each colour were selected from a thesaurus. This gave a pool of 16 colours. These 16 colours were randomly paired, so that no pair had the identical root colour.

To establish the plausibility of these bogus tests, they were pilot tested on 15, undergraduate 3rd year psychology students (a different sample to that used in the pre-study, section 6.3.1). All but one student believed the tests were genuine. If 3rd year students found the tests plausible, it was reasoned that the experimental population should certainly find the test plausible. A spot-check of the pattern of the pilot test responses revealed no patterns in the answers to any of the items, answers appearing random, with an equivalent number of subjects affirming both possible answers. This demonstrated that there was no consensus as to the correctness of any item. As subjects did not know the 'correct' answer to any item they could therefore not ascertain their performance on these tests.

THE I.V. MANIPULATIONS

Following the creativity exercise, the following cassette tape instructions, read by a male voice unknown to the subjects was played:

'You will now be given your results of your performance on the social-perceptiveness and the colour-preference tests. Both tests are used by psychologists. The social-perceptiveness test measures psychological insight, a very important personality trait and social ability. Those who score below 40 percent on the social-perceptiveness test tend to be somewhat lacking in social insight, they don't understand people very well. Those who scored above 70 percent tend to be very socially insightful. They have the ability to really understand other people.

'The colour preference test, tests one's colour tastes. Psychological research has found that people's colour preferences fall into two groups- those with 'sophisticated' and those with 'unsophisticated' colour preferences. Whether you have 'sophisticated' or 'unsophisticated' colour preferences reveals fundamental things about your psychological make-up and personality. For many reasons psychologists have found that people with 'sophisticated' colour preferences tend to be better psychologically well adjusted than those with 'unsophisticated' colour preferences. So it is much better to be in the sophisticated colour preference group.'

In the neutral group status condition the last paragraph was replaced with the following:

'One's colour preference are one's colour tastes. Psychological research has found that people's colour preferences fall into two groups- those with 'type one' and those with 'type two' colour preferences. Whether you have 'type one' or 'type two' colour preferences reveals fundamental things about your psychological make-up and personality. However neither group is better than the other.'

Utilising a recording standardised the status manipulations in all classes and allowed more time for the experimenter to pretend to mark the tests. After the tape recording, the experimenter apologised for unfortunately having insufficient time to mark all the social-sensitivity scripts. Experimental booklets, with the subject's names clipped on to them were handed out individually by the school psychologist (see Appendix A6). The experimenter explained to the subjects what they were required to do. On the cover of these booklets were subjects' test results - their colour-preference group and their social-perceptiveness test score. Group status was manipulated by giving a 'sophisticated', 'unsophisticated' or 'type 2' colour preference group categorisation. All subjects in a class shared the identical status group condition. The 3 group status conditions were allocated randomly between classes. Personal

status was manipulated by giving subjects a mark of 30% (low personal status), 80% (high personal status) or no mark (neutral personal status) for the social perceptiveness test. Personal status conditions were randomly assigned within a class.

A fortnight prior to experiment 2A, experiment 1A had measured the self-esteem and collective self-esteem of individuals in each class. Based on a median-split of these esteem scores (the medians were 31 and 8 respectively) subjects were classified as having high or low self-esteem and/or high or low collective self-esteem. Subjects were assigned to experimental conditions to facilitate a balanced number of high and low self-esteem subjects in each condition. An effort was made to ensure there was an equal number of high and low collective self-esteem subjects within each cell as well. In short, prior to the experiment, names and test results had been filled in on the experimental booklets.

Subjects were requested to unclip their names from the booklet. This was to suggest anonymity during the remainder of the experiment. However, a pen dot was made underneath a letter on the front page of the booklet. The position of the letter above the dot corresponded to the experimental identity number of the subject. Using this method, any experimental booklet could be traced to its subject and their self-esteem score.

On receiving their results, subjects were asked to fill in their colour-preference group on top of their fly swatter ideas. This was to make colour-preference group membership salient. Within the experimental booklet, two sheets of handwritten fly swatter ideas, one allegedly authored by a member of the ingroup and the other of the outgroup, were inserted (see Appendix A7, A8). Subjects had to rate in their booklets the quality of these ideas. Gerard & Hoyt (1974) used a similar method as a measure of ingroup favouritism. The rating was done along a Likert scale adjective checklist, comprising 5 adjectives taken from J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988). They also had to give a mark out of ten for the quality of the ideas in general. On the evaluation sheet, subjects had to indicate the group membership of the author of the ideas they had evaluated. One happened to be a member of the ingroup ('ingroup #1' measure) and the other a member of the outgroup ('outgroup' measure). This difference between these two measures comprised the 'ingroup favouritism' measure.

Following this, subjects were handed an additional handwritten set of fly-swatter ideas, done by an ingroup member (see Appendix A9). Subjects had to do the identical exercise as before, only they had to evaluate their own ideas ('self' measure) as well as the new set of ideas done by someone in the ingroup ('ingroup #2' measure). Again subjects had to indicate

the group from which the 'author' of the new ideas came from. The difference between these two measures comprised the 'self favouritism' measure. The order of ingroup and outgroup evaluations were not counterbalanced as J.D. Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) found no effect for the order of evaluation.

THE D.V. TASK

In developing the experiment, 20 Std. 4 and 5 pupils, aged between 12-13, from what could be described as a 'Jewish Sunday school' had been given the creativity exercise. Their ideas for the uses of a fly swatter were collated and the most frequent 15 ideas were selected. These were randomised into three sets of 5 ideas. These sets of ideas were judged by 3 people to be of equivalent quality. One set of ideas was used as the ingroups ideas, one set of ideas was used as the outgroup ideas, and the third set of ideas was used as the ingroup ideas in the second evaluation task. Three assistants wrote a set of ideas for subjects in each condition. Thus there were 3 sets of ideas in different handwritings, each written in the name of a person in the 'sophisticated', 'unsophisticated', 'type 1' or 'type 2' groups. All subjects received an identical, handwritten lists of fly-swatter ideas, but only the groups to which these ideas were attributed varied according to the condition. Having the same handwriting for the ingroup and outgroup set of ideas was an attempt to control for the confounding effects of different handwritings in evaluations. The use of handwritten rather than photostated lists of ideas made it more plausible that these ideas were indeed written by subjects in another class.

Subjects evaluated the fly swatter ideas on independent adjective checklists. To make the ingroup favouritism measure flexible and not obviously competitive, separate assessment scales (Mummendey and Schreiber, 1983) for each set of creativity ideas were used. Implicit social comparison was introduced by placing the ratings of the ingroup and the outgroup next to each other on a page, and ratings of the self and the ingroup next to each other on a page.

On the last page of the booklet subjects completed a number of Likert scale manipulation check questions. These were taken from manipulation check questions used in the literature (e.g. by Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991). Subjects in the neutral personal status condition could not answer some of the personal status manipulation check questions, owing to the nature of the manipulation. Open-ended questions probed subject suspicions regarding the experiment, and whether they had previously heard about it. At the

completion of the experiment, subjects were debriefed. They were strongly instructed not to speak about the experiment to other classes.

Analysis

The ingroup 'mark out of 10' favouritism measure was calculated by subtracting the 'mark out of 10' given to the ingroup from the 'mark out of 10' given to the outgroup. Similarly the 'self favouritism' measure was calculated by subtracting the 'mark out of 10' rating given to self from that given to the ingroup. The same procedure was done with the adjective checklist measures, except that first the ratings on each of the 5 adjective were summed to get an aggregated rating. The Likert scale of adjectives evaluating the ingroup, outgroup#1, self, outgroup#2 had good internal consistency with alpha coefficients of > 0.79, 0.82, 0.85 and 0.87 respectively. The 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' measure was calculated by subtracting the 'self favouritism' measure from the 'ingroup favouritism' measure.

Manipulation checks showed that the personal status and group status manipulations were successful. Preliminary hypothesis tests were conducted on the data. There were indications of potentially significant results when the the 'mark out of 10' measure was used but not when the adjective checklist measure was utilised. It was decided to continue running the experiment, using the next highest standard of the school. A number of improvements and refinements were made in the second running of the experiment.

6.3.3 EXPERIMENT 2B

Subjects

Subjects were 106 Std.7 pupils from the same school as the subjects in experiment 2A. The experiment was run during the physical education period. On two occasions the experiment was run with two school class combined and on the third occasion with only one class.

Nine subjects had heard mention of the experiment from previous subjects. Eleven subjects were discarded as the questions in the manipulation check revealed that they had some idea of the purpose behind the experiment or the nature of the manipulations. This left 94 subjects. Owing to missing values, the responses of all subjects could not be available for every analysis.

Procedure

The experimenter was introduced to the subjects by the physical education teacher. No self-esteem measure was taken prior to the experiment. Each of the 3 runnings of the experiment, had a different group status condition. Within each trial subjects were randomly allocated to personal status conditions, such that there were an equal number of subjects in each condition.

This replication refined experiment 2A, introducing a number of improvements. A copy of the experimental booklet is provided in Appendix A10. The D.V. was simplified. In evaluating creativity ideas the adjective checklist was discarded and only the 'mark out of 10' measure was retained. Following this, subjects had to fill in Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) Collective Self-esteem Scale and the Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). In addition 2 of the following 3 scales, which were used in experiment 1B, were included in the booklet- Duckitt's (1990, 1991a) Subtle Racism Scale, an adaptation of R.J.Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) identification scale applied to Jewish identity and Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale. The mix of these scales was divided randomly within the different conditions. Rosenberg's self-esteem scale was completed by 54 subjects. The sex of subjects was included as a question in the booklets. It had not been a question in experiment 2A.

6.4

RESULTS

Combining the data sets

As many subjects did not complete all the items in the experimental booklet there are many missing values in the data set. Preliminary tests were conducted to investigate whether experiments 2A and 2B could be pooled into one data set for analysis. A MANOVA with group status, personal status and the version of the experiment (2A or 2B) was run on the D.V.'s in the study (see table 6.2). As is evident from the table the version of the experiment did not significantly interact with any of the manipulations.

Table 6.2 : MANOVA OF PERSONAL AND GROUP STATUS WITH THE VERSION OF THE EXPERIMENT.

SOURCE	df	F	p <
Versio	(3,140)	2.58	0.06
Version X group status	(6,280)	1.79	0.11
Version X personal status	(6,280)	1.04	0.4
Version X personal X group	(12,371)	1.1	0.4

NOTE : F-score for the MANOVA is Wilks' Lambda

Analysing the main effect of version in terms of the 3 Way ANOVA's for each D.V., revealed that version was only a significant main effect in the ANOVA on the 'self-favouritism' measure, $F(1,142) = 2.36$, $p < 0.05$. Subjects in experiment 2B gave higher 'self-favouritism' ratings (Mean=0.73, SD=2.10, N=79) than subjects in experiment 2A (Mean=0.0, SD=2.0, N=81).

Further analysis revealed that the main effect of version was significant in the 'ingroup favouritism' measure too. While this effect was not significant in an ANOVA with 'ingroup favouritism' ($p < 0.1$), a Scheffe test on this effect was significant ($df=142$, $MSE=4.0$) at the 0.05 significance level. The same pattern as with the self-favouritism measure was apparent. Subjects in experiment 2B gave higher ingroup favouritism ratings ($M=-0.03$, $SD=2.33$) than subjects in the experiment 2A ($M=-0.9$, $SD=1.6$).

While there were main effects for experimental version, this is unsurprising due to the different age groups in the versions of the experiment. Main effects are not a hindrance to combining data sets unless there are interactions as well. There were no prior reasons to suspect that such an interaction should take place. As the versions of the experiment did not interact significantly with the D.V.s in the MANOVA we felt justified in combining the data sets of experiment 2A and 2B.

Manipulation checks

A MANOVA on the personal status and group status manipulation check questions was successful. The results are tabulated in table 6.3, and the cell means for the D.V.'s are contained in Appendix B2. Post Hoc Tukey (HSD) tests revealed that subjects in the high personal status (HPS) condition were more satisfied with their scores on the social-perceptiveness test and less desirous of a higher score than subjects in the neutral personal status (NPS) condition who in turn were more satisfied than subjects in the low personal status (LPS) conditions.

Subjects in the LPS and NPS conditions were more desirous of a higher social-perceptiveness score than subjects in the HPS condition. Subjects in the HPS condition considered the social perceptiveness test to be a more accurate measure than subjects in the LPS condition. No difference in perceived test accuracy was found between the NPS condition with either the LPS or the HPS conditions on this question.

In short, the personal status manipulation successfully differentiated the HPS from the LPS and NPS conditions. There is no indication that the NPS and LPS conditions represent separate manipulations.

The significant difference between the high and/or low status conditions and the neutral conditions in the first two manipulation check question is misleading. As the subjects in the NPS condition did not receive a social-perceptiveness test mark, only 11 subjects did in fact answer the first two questions.

Post hoc Tukey (HSD) tests revealed that subjects in the low status group (LSG) were less satisfied with, and felt less belonging towards their colour-preference group than subjects in the high status group (HSG) or the neutral status group (NSG). No distinction between the

NSG and the HSG emerged. The last two group status manipulation checks were not successful.

Table 6.3 : MANIPULATION CHECKS					
	DF	F	p <	ORDER	SIG.DIF.
PERSONAL STATUS CONDITION (Social sensitivity Test)					
MANOVA	(8,254)	17.64	0.0001		
ONE WAY ANOVAS					
Satisfaction with	(2,130)	79.74	0.0001	H>N>L	H>N>L
Higher score on	(2,130)	26.96	0.0001	N>L>H	L>H, N>H
Importance of	(2,130)	2.20	NOT	SIGNIFICANT	
Accuracy of	(2,130)	9.85	0.0001	H>N>L	H>L
GROUP STATUS CONDITION (Colour Preference Test)					
MANOVA	(8,290)	13.63	0.0001		
ONE WAY ANOVA					
Satisfaction with	(2,148)	62.70	0.0001	H>N>L	H>L, N>L
Belonging to	(2,148)	18.78	0.0001	H>N>L	H>L, N>L
Importance of	(2,148)	1.55	NOT	SIGNIFICANT	
Suitability of	(2,148)	2.06	NOT	SIGNIFICANT	
NOTES: F-score for the MANOVA is Wilks' Lambda. 'H'= High', 'N'= 'neutral' and 'L'= 'low' status conditions. 'SIG. DIF' = significant difference on Tukey (HSD) post hoc test.					

The investigative study

Owing to the investigative nature of this study, in which any effect or interaction would be of interest, type 1 errors are a threat. This is aggravated by the use of 3 way ANOVAs on 3 D.V.'s. To control for the type 1 error, a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was run to maintain the significance level threatened by the number of D.V.'s and the ANOVA models contained all possible effects and interactions.

Table 6.4 : GROUP STATUS, PERSONAL STATUS AND CSE EFFECTS-
MANOVA AND RELATED ANOVA'S

EFFECT	DF	F	p <
PERSONAL STATUS MANOVA	(6,262)	2.07	0.058
self favouritism	(2,133)	5.13	0.008
ingroup favouritism	(2,133)	0.91	0.405
self vs. group fav.	(2,331)	2.13	0.123
GROUP STATUS MANOVA	(6,262)	1.80	0.101
self favouritism	(2,133)	3.06	0.051
ingroup favouritism	(2,133)	2.32	0.103
self vs. group fav.	(2,133)	1.97	0.144
COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM MANOVA	(3,131)	0.95	0.420
self favouritism	(1,133)	1.86	0.176
ingroup favouritism	(1,133)	0.10	0.753
self vs. group fav.	(1,133)	1.58	0.211
GROUP STATUS X PERSONAL STATUS MANOVA	(12,347)	0.87	0.582
self favouritism	(4,133)	0.56	0.692
ingroup favouritism	(4,133)	0.54	0.708
self vs. group fav.	(4,133)	0.69	0.599
GROUP STATUS X CSE MANOVA	(6,262)	2.13	0.051
self favouritism	(2,133)	1.62	0.202
ingroup favouritism	(2,133)	2.30	0.105
self vs. group fav.	(2,133)	4.41	0.014
PERSONAL STATUS X CSE MANOVA	(6,262)	0.81	0.566
self favouritism	(2,133)	1.79	0.172
ingroup favouritism	(2,133)	0.24	0.786
self vs. group fav.	(2,133)	1.94	0.149
PERSONAL X GROUP X CSE MANOVA	(12,346)	1.05	0.401
self favouritism	(4,133)	0.13	0.974
ingroup favouritism	(4,133)	2.17	0.077
self vs. group fav	(4,133)	1.78	0.136

NOTES: F-score for the MANOVA is Wilks' Lambda.

Statistics were calculated using the General Linear Model (GLM) program on the SAS statistical program. As the design had unbalanced cell sizes, the 'Type III Sums of square tables' in the SAS output were consulted (SAS Institute Inc., 1985). As this was an exploratory study all ANOVA models included main effects and all possible interactions. Fifty more subjects completed the collective self-esteem (CSE) measure than completed the self-esteem measure. For this reason, the MANOVA which included CSE as the individual difference variable was analysed with regard to the main effects and interaction of personal status and group status on their own, in addition to the main effects and interactions which involve CSE. The MANOVA which included self-esteem as the individual difference variable was only relevant when there was a significant main effect or interaction which involved self-esteem.

A MANOVA was conducted on group status (3: high, neutral, low) X personal status (3: High, neutral, low) X collective self-esteem (2:high,low) and the three D.V.s ('ingroup favouritism', 'self favouritism' and 'self vs. ingroup favouritism'). All possible main effects and interactions were included in the model. The results of this analysis are tabulated in table 6.4. The MANOVA indicated two significant effects in the analysis. A main effect for personal status and an interaction between group status and CSE.

MAIN EFFECT OF PERSONAL STATUS WITH 'SELF FAVOURITISM'

The MANOVA statistics for the main effect of personal status are presented in the table 6.5. As 3 of the MANOVA statistics are close to the 0.05 significance level; Roy's Greatest Root statistic is significant at this level; the use of a MANOVA itself is precautionary and a Scheffe post hoc test on the effect was significant at the 0.05 level (DF= 133, MSE=4.1) the effect was taken as significant.

MANOVA STATISTICS	DF	F	p <
Wilks Lambda	(6,262)	2.06	0.058
Pillai's Trace	(6,264)	2.06	0.058
Hoteling-Lawley Trace	(6,260)	2.07	0.057
Roy's Greatest Root	(3,132)	3.41	0.02

As the MANOVA was significant for personal status the univariate ANOVA's of each D.V. were examined to see if personal status was significant within any of them. Only in the

ANOVA where 'self favouritism' was the D.V. was there a significant effect for personal status. For 'self favouritism' as the D.V., the 3 Way ANOVA (Group status X personal status X CSE) with all possible interactions, had a significant F-score for the overall model, $F(17,133) = 1.74, p < 0.05$. Within this ANOVA, personal status had a significant main effect, $F(2,133) = 5.13, p < 0.01$. This effect had an omega-squared (w^2) statistic of 0.05. Thus 5% of total variation can be explained by the effect of personal status.

The cell means of the personal status conditions are presented in table 6.6. Tukey's HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) post-hoc tests were conducted on these conditions. The neutral personal status condition was significantly ($p < 0.05$) different from the low personal status condition (1.12 vs. 0.02) and the high personal status condition (1.12 vs. -0.18). There was no significant difference between the high and low personal status conditions. This finding was not anticipated.

LEVEL OF PERSONAL STATUS	MEAN	SD	N
Neutral personal status	1.12	2.06	50
Low personal status	0.02	1.9	52
High personal status	-0.18	2.18	49

INTERACTION BETWEEN CSE AND THE GROUP STATUS WITH 'SELF VS. INGROUP FAVOURITISM'.

The MANOVA statistics for the interaction of CSE with group status are presented in table 6.7. The effect was taken as statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

MANOVA STATISTIC	DF	F	p <
Wilks Lambda	(6,262)	2.13	0.051
Pillai's Trace	(6,264)	2.12	0.052
Hotelling-Lawley Trace	(6,260)	2.13	0.050
Roy's Greatest Root	(3,132)	3.16	0.016

As the MANOVA was significant for the interaction between group status and CSE the ANOVA's of each D.V. were examined to see if this interaction was significant within any of them. Only in the ANOVA where 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' was the D.V. was this interaction significant (see table 6.4). For 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' as the D.V. the 3 Way ANOVA (Group status X personal status X CSE) with all possible interaction, had a significant F-score for the model overall, $F(17,133)=2.16$, $p < 0.01$. Within this ANOVA (refer to Appendix B3 for the full table) the interaction between group status and CSE was significant, $F(2,133) = 4.41$, $p < 0.05$. This effect had an omega-squared (w^2) statistic of 0.04. Thus 4% of total variation can be explained by this interaction.


Residual analysis ^{see fig. 6.1} was done on the interaction (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984, 1989). This involved studying the residuals of the interactions- the interaction effect when the main effects are removed. In order to illustrate the interaction in terms of the mean cell scores, the residuals were added to the cell means. The Cell means and descriptive statistics are shown in the table 6.8. Figure 6.1 plots the residual effect added to the cell means.

Table 6.8: RESIDUAL ANALYSIS - CSE AND GROUP STATUS INTERACTION

GROUP STATUS CONDITION	M*AN	S.D	N	RESIDUAL
LOW COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM				
Low status group	0.78	3.04	42	-0.588
Neutral status group	1.26	2.64	19	0.667
High status group	1.36	2.28	22	0.546
HIGH COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM				
Low status group	2.71	2.62	23	1.073
Neutral status group	-0.56	2.57	18	-0.704
High status group	-0.07	2.61	27	-0.445

The interaction is due in the main to subjects with High CSE showing more self favouritism compared to ingroup favouritism, when in a low status group rather than a high or

**Figure 6.1: RESIDUAL ANALYSIS -
CSE & GROUP STATUS INTERACTION
ON SELF VS INGROUP FAVOURITISM**



	LOW	HIGH
LOW	0.2	3.07
NEUTRAL	1.93	-1.26
HIGH	1.9	-0.52

COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM



neutral status group. For subjects with low CSE, group status made little difference to the nature of favouritism.

Subjects with high CSE only showed an increase in the favouritism shown towards the self as compared to the group when group status was low and the group could therefore not make a positive contribution to the self-concept. Subjects with low CSE showed a pattern of self favouritism as compared to ingroup favouritism regardless of the status of the ingroup.

Self-esteem

A three way Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on group status (3: high, neutral, low) X personal status (3: High, neutral, low) X self-esteem (2: high, low) and the three D.V.s ('ingroup favouritism', 'self favouritism', 'self vs. ingroup favouritism'). All possible main effects and interactions were included in the model. The MANOVA indicated no significant main effects or interactions which implicated self-esteem.

See table 6.9

The relationship between social and personal identity

It was hypothesised that personal and group enhancement should correlate, showing the direction of the relationship between personal and social identity. This hypothesis was not supported. 'Self favouritism' did not significantly correlate with 'ingroup favouritism', $r = 0.10$, $p = 0.1667$, $N = 160$.

Test of J.D. Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) hypothesis


According to Brown, Collins & Schmitt (1988), self-esteem should interact significantly with the 'self favouritism' measure, but not with the 'ingroup favouritism' measure. As self-esteem did not interact significantly with either, this thesis could not be tested.

Table 6.9: GROUP STATUS, PERSONAL STATUS AND CSE SELF-ESTEEM MANOVA AND RELATED ANOVA'S			
EFFECT	DF	F	p <
SELF-ESTEEM MANOVA	(3,82)	0.11	0.953
self favouritism	(1,84)	0.28	0.598
ingroup favouritism	(1,84)	0.04	0.834
self vs. group fav.	(1,84)	0.24	0.625
SELF-ESTEEM X GROUP STATUS MANOVA	(6,164)	0.60	0.729
self favouritism	(2,84)	0.71	0.495
ingroup favouritism	(2,84)	0.86	0.429
self vs. group fav.	(2,84)	0.64	0.529
SELF-ESTEEM X PERSONAL STATUS MANOVA	(6,164)	0.83	0.549
self favouritism	(2,84)	0.79	0.459
ingroup favouritism	(2,84)	1.08	0.346
self vs. group fav.	(2,84)	1.70	0.190
SELF-ESTEEM X PERSONAL X GROUP MANOVA	(12,217)	1.40	0.167
self favouritism	(4,84)	0.67	0.614
ingroup favouritism	(4,84)	1.66	0.167
self vs. group fav.	(4,84)	2.09	0.090
NOTES: F-score for the MANOVA is Wilks' Lambda.			

Sex effects

To investigate whether there were sex differences in enhancement behaviour, one way ANOVAs were done on sex and the 'self-favouritism' and 'ingroup favouritism' measures. There were significant differences in the extent of 'self favouritism' between the sexes, $F(1,74) = 9.21$, $p = 0.005$. This difference is shown in figure 6.2. Males showed more self-favouritism (mean=1.51, SD=2.42) than females (mean=0.09, SD=1.58). This effect had an omega-squared (w^2) statistic of 0.101. Thus 10% of total variation can be explained by sex. There was no significant differences between the sexes in the extent of 'ingroup favouritism',

Figure 6.2: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MALE & FEMALE SUBJECTS IN THEIR EVALUATIONS OF THEMSELVES AND AN INGROUP MEMBER (N=77)



SELF	7.47	6.89
- INGROUP	5.97	6.8
= SELF FAVOURITISM	1.5	0.09

SUBJECT SEX

■ SELF	■ INGROUP
■ SELF FAVOURITISM	

$F(1,74) = 0.04, P < 0.85$. The difference between sex and 'self favouritism' is significant even when one controls the significance level to account for family-wise error rate.

To investigate the sex effect in the 'self-favouritism' measure further, the components of 'self-favouritism' were analysed. Self-favouritism is the difference between the mark given to the self and the mark given to an ingroup member. As is evident from figure 6.2, males evaluated the ingroup member substantially lower $F(1,44) = 3.37, p < 0.08$, than did females. Males evaluated themselves minimally and non-significantly higher, $F(1,74) = 1.86, p < 0.18$ than females. Thus, the difference lay mainly in males derogating the ingroup comparison target, females showed no derogation.

6.5

DISCUSSION

Findings

There was a significant interaction between group status and collective self-esteem (CSE) in terms of the extent of the favouritism shown to the self in relation to the favouritism shown to the group; i.e. the extent of personal identity in relation to social identity enhancement ('self vs. ingroup favouritism measure'). We found that group status mediated the extent of 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' for subjects with high CSE but not with low CSE. Subjects with high CSE showed more 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' when group status was high or neutral than when it was low. For subjects with low CSE the level of group status did not effect the amount of 'self vs. ingroup favouritism'. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) found this effect with their ingroup favouritism measure.

Our results could be interpreted as showing that individuals with high CSE are more sensitive to group status feedback than individuals with low CSE, who are more likely to identify less with a low status group. Both self-consistency theory and self-enhancement theory (see section 2.1) can be used to speculate tentatively on the reason behind this finding. According to self-consistency theory, a negative social identity would be incongruous with the favourable social identity of people with high CSE. This incongruity could lead them to identify less with a low status group. According to self-enhancement theory, people with high collective self-esteem could be especially prone to treating social identity as a resource with

which to gain a positive self-concept. If social identity does not fulfil this function, social identification is less likely to occur. These ideas are discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter.

The neutral personal status (NPS) condition showed significantly more 'self-favouritism' than the high personal status (HPS) and the low personal status (LPS) conditions. There was no statistical difference between the HPS and LPS conditions. We had expected that the LPS condition would show more 'self-favouritism' than the HPS condition. This unexpected finding of an extreme value for the NPS condition could be due to a methodological problem in the nature of the NPS manipulation. Personal status was not determined along a continuous scale. Those with HPS were given a high mark on a bogus test, those with LPS were given a low mark. Those with NPS were not given a mark, but told that the experimenter had not had time to mark their scripts. Thus the NPS manipulation was qualitatively different and this difference could have confounded the condition. For example, the NPS condition could have been a threat to self-esteem in that subjects felt deprived at not having received a mark like everyone else.

Sex was found to have an effect on the extent of self-favouritism but not of ingroup favouritism. J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt (1988) and Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) did not find sex differences in ingroup favouritism either. The lack of a sex difference in the extent of ingroup favouritism could be due to the minimal nature of the ingroup. We found that males derogated the ingroup member against whom they had to compare themselves but females did not. This finding accords with studies which have found that males engage in more outgroup derogation than females (see Gibbons & McCoy, 1990).

No correlation was found between the extent of ingroup favouritism and self-favouritism. As a result nothing can be inferred regarding the relationship between personal and social identity.

Self-esteem

That self-esteem had no effects on the conditions is an observation which goes against many empirical findings regarding the nature of trait self-esteem (see section 2.2.2). This negative finding could have been due to methodological shortcoming in our study.

Low and high self-esteem as conceptualised in this study, reflect qualitative cognitive differences. It does not reflect above or below average scores on a self-esteem measure, which is the way self-esteem was operationalised. Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines (1987) convincingly argue that as the majority of people in many populations have a positive self-concept, the use of the median split method to identify individuals who are low in self-esteem is futile. This point they stress 'is not a minor methodological quibble' (p.1046). This problem is apparent in our sample. The lower quartile self-esteem score was only 3 points below the median on a scale with a range of 30 points. The median was 31, where 40 is the maximum positive self-esteem score. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) report a median Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem median score of 34, which is higher than that of our sample. The same criticism applies to collective self-esteem (CSE). For our sample the lower quartile of CSE was only 3 points below the median on a scale with a range of 24 points. Our median CSE score was 23 and mean 22.2 (out of a maximal positive esteem score of 28). Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) obtained the same median score.

Swann, Griffin, Pedmore & Gaines (1987) submit that only subjects who score in the lowest 10 to 30 percent on a self-esteem scale have low self-esteem. Certain studies which have been cited have used such a technique, only regarding people who score in the extreme percentiles as having HSE or LSE (e.g. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987; Crocker & Schwartz, 1985; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Swann et al, 1987). Sample size prevented us from using this method. Swann et al's argument can explain post facto why certain experiments with self-esteem did not have significant results. However, many studies examining the areas which our studies focused upon, and using a similar methodology, found a significant effect associated with self-esteem or CSE *even* with the use of the median split method (e.g. Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990; Strube & Roemmele, 1985; Tesser & Campbell, 1982). Furthermore, self-esteem was a highly non-significant factor in our study (see table 6.9). The most extreme example of the non-significance of self-esteem as an effect was the F-score of its main effect in the MANOVA of ($F=0.11$). If self-esteem did have an effect, even if only at the extreme percentiles, it should have been reflected in a somewhat higher F-statistic.

Methodological problems

There are a number of methodological issues and problems in our study which should be addressed.

A) INGROUP FAVOURITISM IN THE STUDY

This study did not replicate the ingroup favouritism effect obtained in many previous studies. This could have been due to the measure of ingroup favouritism that was used. Ingroup favouritism was measured by the difference in the marks given to ideas produced by an ingroup member and by an outgroup member. The identical list of ideas was used for the ingroup and outgroup in all conditions. While an attempt was made to ensure that the ideas attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup were of equivalent quality, there is no indication that subjects perceived them as such. The same applies to the self favouritism measure. It is quite possible that the ideas that subjects generated themselves were superior to the ideas they were given by an ingroup member. The mean extent of ingroup favouritism was -0.41 ($SD=2.06$, $N=181$). In our experiment the outgroup's ideas could have been objectively superior. It is possible that subjects judged the ideas of the outgroup only slightly, as opposed to greatly, better than the ideas of the ingroup. This would itself be a sign of ingroup favouritism. It is just as possible that the idea of the ingroup were better; in this case this score would indeed be an indication of outgroup favouritism. None of these issues were problematical in our design because we were concerned with differences in the levels of ingroup favouritism between conditions.

Similarly one cannot conclude from the cell means in our interaction between group status and CSE in terms of 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' that people with high CSE, in a high status group, enhanced their social identity more than their group identity. The difference between the quality of the ideas of the ingroup in comparison to the outgroup could have been 'objectively' greater than the difference in the quality of ideas between the self and the ingroup. We can only say that in the high status group, subjects with high CSE enhanced their group in relation to their enhancement of themselves, more than did subjects with high CSE in the low status group.

B) THE SALIENCE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP

The arguments presented in the previous paragraph suggesting why ingroup favouritism was not found in this experiment, are tenuous. That our study did not find ingroup

favouritism, in fact it found outgroup favouritism, could cast dispersions on the salience of the experimental group in this experiment.

That neither personal status nor group status had an effect on 'ingroup favouritism' in our minimal experimental group is not unusual. Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman (1987) manipulated personal status and Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) manipulated group status. They found neither ingroup favouritism nor any interactions between self-esteem and status for the minimal groups in these experiments. Other studies however, have predominantly found that group status affected the level of ingroup favouritism in minimal groups (see section 3.3).

We have no indication that the experimentally created 'colour preference group' became salient. This is a problem common to experimental work using the minimal group paradigm. Our manipulation checks only showed that the group status manipulations were successful as a status manipulation; they did not indicate whether the group itself was salient. As we explained above, the extent of ingroup favouritism shown in the study cannot be utilised as an indicator variable enabling one to assess whether the experimental group was salient.

The group status manipulation could have manipulated a second dimension of personal status rather than manipulating group status. Subjects were placed in colour-preference groups ostensibly based on their personal performance on a 'colour preference test'. The group to which they were categorised thus reflected personal feedback. The colour preference manipulation could have engendered a low personal identity due to subjects believing that they had unsophisticated colour preferences and the psychological consequences which they were informed went with it. We have no indication whether the 'colour preference group' as a social identity was a sufficiently salient categorisation for subjects to be perturbed by a negative social identity with regards to this group per se.

This issue relates to a problem in SITs conceptualisation of social and personal identity. SIT blurs the distinction between social and personal factors. Bornwass and Bober (1987) argue that in SIT social categories are determined by reference to individually ascertained properties, the different identities comprising different individual self-concepts. Every individually determined adjective can be used as a basis for social identification. The group is no longer conceptualised as an organised whole in terms of 'holistic' properties of the group itself (e.g. norms, roles, organisation etc.) that exists independently of individual factors. Just because an individual identifies with a 'class' or at best a 'collective', does not mean that such a 'group' exists as an organised or structured whole. SIT thus conceptually contaminates individual and social identities as identification with the properties of the group is not possible.

The result of this, Bornwass and Bober write, is that 'each identity is to be seen as social identity. There is no room for personal identity ...it is difficult to differentiate unambiguously between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour. Every form of behaviour is interpreted as category based group behaviours.'(p.269).

This conceptual problem is reflected in many of the studies on status, in that the same dimension can be used in reference to personal or social identity. For example, if a subject scores badly on a creativity test, this can be regarded as a low personal status. If subjects are grouped on the basis of low creativity scores (low creativity group), this is regarded as a low group status manipulation. Subjects in such a group could be considered with equal validity as being in a low status group condition or a low personal status condition. Similarly, in real social situations, a creative person (personal identity) can regard himself or herself as a member of the group of 'creative' people (social identity). This argument applies even to social categorisations based on more social factors. For example, being a 'woman' can be regarded as a social identity (belong to the collective of women) or a personal identity (possessing certain physical characteristics).

An indication that the experimental group could have not been salient is that there was no sex difference for the 'ingroup favouritism' measure ($F=0.04$), while there was for the 'self favouritism' measure ($F=9.21$). If sex makes a difference in self favouritism, it seems likely sex should make a difference in levels of ingroup favouritism too. If the groups were not salient, the ingroup favouritism scale would be an objective measure of the difference between evaluations of two sets of ideas, and self favouritism would be a measure evaluating favouritism to the self in comparison with an 'other' rather than with an ingroup member. In such a scenario the 'self vs. ingroup favouritism' measure would be meaningless.

Even if we assume that the experimental group was not salient, this still does not explain why there were no significant effects or interactions of status with the 'self favouritism' measure. The self is nearly always salient in self-related tasks.

C) THE NATURE OF THE D.V.'S

It could be argued that the D.V. did not measure ingroup favouritism as the D.V.'s required subjects to evaluate the quality of ideas produced by an *individual* who happened to be a member of an ingroup or outgroup. This is different from evaluating the quality of ideas produced by an ingroup or outgroup (as in J.D.Brown, Collins & Schmidt, 1988). Evaluations of the work of a ingroup member and of an outgroup member as a measure of ingroup favouritism was used by Gerard & Hoyt (1974). We would argue that as the only information subjects had about the comparison target was the individual's group membership, this should have become salient and the comparison would have occurred on an intergroup and not an interpersonal level. A positive evaluation of a member of the ingroup would be taken as a reflection of the group as a whole.

D) USE OF INDEPENDENT COMPARISON DIMENSIONS

Many studies in the literature used a similar comparison dimension to manipulate group status and to measure ingroup favouritism. The ingroup favouritism found by these studies could have merely reflected the 'objective' status differences created in these experiments (see section 3.3.3). This experiment in contrast attempted to use unrelated comparison dimensions for the group status manipulation and the D.V. This could account for the reason why group status did not relate to the extent of ingroup favouritism in our study. If this is so, our findings go against studies which have used unrelated dimensions and found that group status did affect ingroup status.

E) TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS

As with any study, the significant results could be due to type I errors. In an attempt to control for type I errors, which are especially problematic in an investigational study of this nature, with a number of D.V.'s and I.V.'s, a MANOVA was run using models which included all possible interactions and effects. Huberty & Morris (1989) argue that an MANOVA-ANOVA approach, as is commonly used in many leading journal and was used in

our study, is seldom appropriate and the 'myth' that it controls for type I errors is questionable. If they are correct, the validity of our inferential statistic would be uncertain.

In our study all effects, even if they had strong support from previous research, were treated as post-hoc comparisons. This method of controlling for type I errors could have increased the type II errors rate which possibly could be reflected in the lack of significant results in this study.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY DISCUSSION: PERSONAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION

More for historical than for empirical reasons, the study of the social and the personal has remained somewhat isolated. This can be seen in the formation of two disciplines - sociology and social psychology. While such a distinction might be justified when studying different levels of analysis (Doise, 1986), such as the intergroup and the intrapersonal, the tradition in social psychology of keeping separate social and personal factors which operate on an intrapersonal level has impoverished the field.

An understanding of a dynamic self-concept, which incorporates both personal and social aspects of identity, has gone some way towards integrating social aspects of identity into an increasingly cognitive social psychology (see section 1.2). One of the most prominent theories to have done so is Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see section 2.3.1). Such an approach is quite compatible with 'mainstream' social and personality psychology and has indeed been incorporated in to many such formulations (see section 2.3.1). A major benefit of SIT is that it allows for the inclusion both of personal factors such as self-esteem, and socio-structural factors such as status, permeability, legitimacy and stability (see section 3.1.2). It thus allows for predictions on how socio-structural factors can impact on the intergroup behaviour of individuals. While SIT has been applied successfully to explain intergroup relations on the group level of analysis (c.f. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978), in the form in which it is theoretically stated - in terms of individual motivational and cognitive factors - it remains an intrapersonal cognitive-motivational theory. This point is accentuated by the most recent derivative of SIT, Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) which emphasises cognition.

Within SIT, personal factors have been sidelined, possibly as 'affirmative action' to compensate for the lack of emphasis on social factors in mainstream psychology (see section 4.2). SIT research has focused on what can be construed as a form of personal identity, conceptualised in terms of socio-structural factors. An example is social mobility. Opportunities for social mobility may be dependent on the socio-structural environment. Often it is a strategy only available to individuals with superior personal ability.

The neglect of the study of the effect of personal identity on intergroup behaviour is unfortunate. Many of the studies which have researched both the factors related to personal identity and those related to social identity have suggested that personal status may be a stronger predictor of group enhancement than social status (see section 4.2). The purpose of this thesis was in some way to contribute to the integration of personal and social factors in social psychology. We termed our study an 'investigative study' as we were not primarily studying the relationship between social and personal identity to confirm any predictions (although we did anticipate certain results, which were not found). Rather our aim was to investigate what relationship would develop between these factors.

A recently introduced construct which links both personal and social identity is *Collective Self-esteem* (CSE; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). It involves both personal identity and social identity as CSE is a disposition variable and CSE is the measure of the esteem in which people generally hold their social groups. Its authors propose that CSE mediates the extent to which people respond to feedback regarding their group i.e. the extent individuals will be motivated to engage in ingroup favouritism in order to enhance their social identity in response to a threat to this identity.

The first experiment which we conducted investigated issues surrounding the construct validity of CSE. We suspected that CSE in particular, and social identity in general, would be 'nothing but' an aspect of personal identity. If this is so, CSE may be a reflection of cognitive and affective personality factors relating to how one generally perceives self-related stimuli rather than being related to factors associated with how one views one's groups. Our misgivings were not confirmed but neither were they allayed. While CSE was correlated moderately with one measure of Negative Affectivity - a generalised negative mood disposition - unlike self-esteem it did not correlate with a second. This would support the integrity of CSE, in comparison to self-esteem, as an evaluation of a distinct component of the self-concept.

In order to examine the concurrent construct validity of CSE, we correlated CSE with a measure of real ingroup identification (Jewish identity) and real outgroup denigration (racism). These groups were chosen as the ingroup and the outgroup are unrelated. Subjects with high CSE did show stronger Jewish identification than subjects with low CSE.

CSE did not correlate with Duckitt's (1990, 1991) *Subtle Racism Scale*. There was no theoretical reason why CSE should have been related to outgroup derogation, but our study wanted to examine this possibility. That subjects who showed stronger ingroup identification

did not show more outgroup denigration is evident in our finding that there was no correlation between Jewish identification and racism. This suggests that a tendency to view one's ingroup positively is not necessarily related to a tendency to engage in outgroup derogation. Such a finding is consistent with reviews of SIT which have concluded that ingroup favouritism is not necessarily associated with outgroup denigration (see section 2.2.2). Incidentally, such findings are at variance with Duckitt's (1991b) theory, which he bases on SIT, that the prejudice shown by people with authoritarian personalities is due to their intense identification with their group.

In the main experiment of this thesis, a socio-structural factor (group status) which related to the experimentally created social identity and a factor relating to personal identity (personal status) were simultaneously manipulated. This was done by providing subjects with bogus positive (high status) or negative (low status) performance feedback relating to their personal status (ability) and their social status (the status of a group into which subjects had been categorised on the basis of a spurious 'personality' test). In addition two dispositional variables, self-esteem and CSE were measured. Of interest was how these factors impacted on the extent of social identity enhancement (ingroup favouritism) and personal identity enhancement (self-favouritism). Of particular interest was how these factors related to the difference between these measures- the extent of self favouritism in relation to the extent of ingroup favouritism (self vs. ingroup favouritism). This variable can be understood as a crude measure of the extent to which social identity was enhanced in relation to personal identity.

Our study attempted to use an experimental design to mirror the equivalent of a real group situation, where unrelated attributes can function as social and personal identity resources and people have the opportunity to engage in ingroup favouritism on a dimension unrelated to those on which status has been determined. We wanted to investigate whether there would be a difference in the extent of ingroup favouritism, or the extent in which social identity is enhanced relative to personal identity for people in low status groups in comparison to people in high status groups. How would an individual's personal status influence this effect? For example, assume being 'white' is perceived by a person to hold a high status. Would such a white person who has low personal status (e.g. low intelligence) be more likely than another such white person who has high personal status (e.g. high intelligence) to try to enhance his or her self-concept by engaging in ingroup favouritism? This could take the form of racism, and/or the form of regarding their social identity (being a 'white') in relation to their personal identity as being of particular importance. Similarly, would there be a difference between those in a low status group (e.g. untouchables) who have high personal status with those who have low personal status? What of the difference between people with low personal status in a group which has high status in comparison with a group with low status? To the extent that

traits influence an individual's perceptions of his or her social or personal identity, these should be influencing factors. For example, a person may consider him or herself to be intelligent or unintelligent depending on his or her level of self-esteem.

None of these variables had any effect on favouritism in our experiment. Subjects with low personal or group status did *not* engage in more ingroup or self-favouritism than did subjects with high personal or group status as compensation for their lowered identity. Levels of self-esteem in conjunction with status had *no* effect on favouritism. These findings should not be interpreted as weakening SIT, as the manipulations of personal and social identity might not have been of sufficient psychological importance. There is much evidence supporting the effects of self-esteem (see section 2.2.2), and group status (see section 3.3). Some other studies which have used minimal group manipulations have not found that personal or social status had any effect on group identification (see section 6.5).

Our study did find that subjects with high CSE in a low status group engaged in less ingroup enhancement in comparison to self enhancement than those in a high or neutral status group. Subjects with low CSE showed no difference in their comparative amounts of ingroup favouritism and self favouritism as a function of group status. This illustrates an interaction between a personal disposition and a socio-structural variable in determining the 'level' of social and personal identity. This finding suggests that group status is more important for, and has a greater impact on, individuals with high CSE than those with low CSE.

We propose two tentative explanations for this finding. One relates to self-consistency theory and the other to self-enhancement theory (see section 2.1.1). Previously we argued that these theories were 'different sides of the same coin' (see section 2.1.2), in that people will enhance themselves as much as is consistent with their self-concept. The same could be said about these two explanations.

a) Individuals with high personal self-esteem utilise their *personal* identity as a resource with which to gain a positive self-concept. Similarly people with high CSE may use their *social* identity as a resource with which to to gain a positive self-concept. This is seen in people with high CSE being favourably disposed to their groups in general. However, as social identity is a self-enhancement resource, people with high CSE are likely to identify less with a social identification if it contributes negatively to the self-concept than if it does not. For people with low CSE, for whom social identity is utilised less as a self-enhancement resource, the status of their social identities is not as material. This explanation is in accordance with Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) finding that only subjects with high CSE engaged in increased

ingroup favouritism in response to a lowered social identity. While our study did not support this finding in terms of ingroup favouritism, it did find this effect in terms of the extent of social as compared to personal enhancement.

b) Individuals with high self-esteem hold a positive view of themselves and are therefore resistant to accepting negative personal information. Similarly, people with high CSE hold a positive view of their groups. They should be less likely to accept a negative social identity which would be incongruous with their positive social identity. To resolve the inconsistency, people with high CSE should be prone not to identify with groups which have a negative identity. As people with low CSE do not have such a positive view of their groups, a negative identity will be less incongruous and they will thus be less inclined not to identify with a negative group.

Our speculations suggest that people who are generally more favourably disposed to their groups (i.e high CSE) should be more likely to try and enhance their social identity if a group's positive distinctiveness is threatened. If this is unsuccessful or impossible they should be *more* likely not to identify with this low status group than people who are generally less favourably predisposed to their groups (people with low CSE). This suggests that those individuals who are most likely to enthusiastically identify with a group could be those who are most likely to subsequently forsake their group as enthusiastically if things turn against the group. This idea could be examined in future research.

Our study found that the sex of subjects had a significant effect, with males, but not females, engaging in self-favouritism. This was predominantly due to males, but not females derogating the comparison target through an unfavourable evaluation. There was little difference between the sexes in self-evaluation. There was no sex difference in the extent of ingroup favouritism. This finding illustrates how personal differences can affect self-favouritism.

Our studies found that personal differences, in the form of CSE, affected social identification. Our first experiment found that subjects with high CSE had stronger Jewish identity than subjects with low CSE and our second study found that subjects with high CSE were less likely to enhance their social identity in relation to their personal identity when the group made a negative contribution to identity than when it did not. Group status had no influence on subjects with low CSE.

Certain people characteristically may identify more strongly with all the groups with which they are a member. For example, a person who identifies more strongly with his or her country should be more likely to identify more strongly with his or her faculty. This suggests the possibility, which future research could investigate, that people with high CSE may be more likely to have a trait such as authoritarianism, which Duckitt (1991b) conceptualised as 'intense (and insecure) identification with an important social group' (p.197).

That trait factors can affect social identity has some far-reaching implications. To the extent that people in a culture share personal/social dispositions, individuals in different cultures should differ in their patterns of group-enhancing behaviour and the importance with which they view social identity relative to personal identity. Recent research (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988) has suggested that cultures and individuals vary in the extent to which they 'emphasise interpersonal competition, individual achievement and separation from the ingroup versus co-operation within the group, collective achievements and close ties with ingroup members' (Hinkle & Brown, 1990, p.65-66). Those cultures for whom the ingroup is of prime importance have been termed '*collectivist*' because their members 'feel concerned about their communities and ingroup [and] feel proud of their groups' achievements' (Triandis et al, 1988, p.325,335). Hinkle & Brown suggest that SIT may only be applicable within a limited cultural context. As western society is individualistic, SIT theory would have the ironic distinction of being a Western-produced theory which is more applicable to the more collectivist non-Western cultures which are more collectivistic.

Within cultures, Triandis (Triandis, 1989; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988) parallels '*collectivist*' people who emphasise the ingroup (allocentric individuals) and '*individualist*' people (idiocentric individuals). Hinkle & Brown propose that SIT would only apply to allocentric people. This is similar to Crocker & Luhtanen's (1990) claim that the predictions of SIT may only be applicable to people with high CSE. We would argue that CSE and allocentrism/idiocentrism are theoretically distinct constructs. That persons are idiocentric does not imply that they they will view their groups less positively when the self-concept is defined in terms of social identity. While social identity should be more important to allocentric people than to idiocentric people, there is no reason to believe that, when social identity is made salient, they will be more favourably disposed towards it. Further research will have to determine if this thesis is correct.

Hinkle & Brown (1990) suggest that the individualist-collectivist distinction is better than the interpersonal-intergroup distinction because it is more general in distinguishing groups. What Hinkle and Brown overlook is that, if enhancing social identity is of central

importance in collectivist societies, this does not imply that it would be of no importance in individualistic societies. The distinction between collectivism and individualism in terms of social identity may be a difference in degree rather than in direction.

An additional goal of our second experiment was to attempt to measure self-favouritism and ingroup-favouritism as operationalisations of personal identity and social identity. This was to enable us to study the interplay between these facets of the self-concept. As we found no correlation between these measures nothing could be deduced about the nature of the relationship between social and personal identity.

Distinguishing between self-enhancement based on social identity and that based on personal identity is beneficial. Society should maximise the number of valued comparison domains so that people can gain a positive distinctiveness through performing well on at least some comparison dimensions (Smith, Diener & Garonzik, 1990). Often it may be difficult, for objective reasons, to enhance one's chronic personal identity. This should not constrain a person from enhancing his or her social identity. Even an individual whose life has been an unmitigated failure can derive positive regard from a positive social identity that he or she has constructed (e.g. being a 'white'). Thus society should try and maximise opportunities for identification with as large a variety of positive (and moral) social identifications as possible. This would increase the possibility of engaging in positive social identification. Alternatively society could promote a superordinate powerful and positive identification. The psychological benefit of such a nationalistic identification could explain the success of fascism (c.f. Duckitt, 1991b). Increased ingroup favouritism to the extent that it contributes to a positive self-concept can be healthy. Channelled properly it need not lead to outgroup denigration - in the laboratory at least.

The importance of a positive social identity in terms of one's overall favourable self-regard will differ in different cultures and amongst different individuals. Individual differences can mediate the manner in which people will engage in group favouritism in response to socio-structural forces.

If we were to summarise the findings of our study in one line it would be that 'personal differences affect ingroup identification and the extent social identity is enhanced in relation to the extent that personal identity is enhanced'. While such a finding is self-evident, little research has explored this area. Recent research has begun uncovering differences in regards to social identification between cultures (e.g. collectivism/ individualism) and between individuals (e.g. allocentrism/ idiocentrism, self-esteem and collective self-esteem). We believe that this

issue will increasingly be studied. This will be the product of a consensus that appears to be developing within social psychology, namely, that social identity is an integral part of the self-concept, subject to the same self-enhancement and self-consistency motivations (see section 2.3). Within this approach, there seems to be no empirical reason to regard intergroup psychological cognitive processes as being qualitatively distinct from interpersonal or intrapersonal behaviour. The danger of such an approach which regards social identity as just another dimension of the self-concept is that research may lose sight of how individuals respond to socio-structural forces in society. These forces can define social identity and constrain strategies of group enhancement. Just as a social psychological approach which ignores personal factors is mistaken, so too is an individualistic approach which ignores social factors.

Personal identity, social identity and cognitive dispositions are all important components of the self. An appropriate understanding of ingroup favouritism and identification will only be gained if all these factors as well as the social context, which defines and constrains these factors, are taken into account. The search for that elusive space, where the social and the personal embrace, is the mythical 'pot at the end of the rainbow' for social psychology. To define the social exclusively in terms of the individual is to fall into the trap of reductionism. To define the individual exclusively in terms of the social is to say everything and to say nothing. To ignore either is to misrepresent all.

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**APPENDIX A:
MEASURES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT**

A1	Measure in experiment 1A
A2	Pre-study questionnaire
A3	Social Sensitivity test
A4	Colour Preference test
A5	Fly swatter answer form
A6	Experimental booklets experiment 2A
A7	Ingroup #1 fly swatter ideas
A8	Outgroup fly swatter ideas
A9	Ingroup #2 fly swatter ideas
A10	Experimental booklet experiment 2B


APPENDIX A1: Measure in experiment 1A

PLEASE WRITE DOWN YOUR NAME: _____ AND CLASS _____

INDICATE YOUR ANSWER TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE GIVEN ALTERNATIVES.

SA=STRONGLY AGREE
A=AGREE
D=DISAGREE
SD=STRONGLY DISAGREE

- | | | | | |
|--|----|---|---|----|
| 1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 2. At times I think I am no good at all. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 6. I certainly feel useless at times. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. | SA | A | D | SD |
| 10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. | SA | A | D | SD |



WE ARE ALL MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL GROUPS OR CATEGORIES. SOME OF THESE SOCIAL GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PERTAIN TO GENDER, RACE, RELIGION, NATIONALITY, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIAL CLASS. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN THESE PARTICULAR GROUPS OR CATEGORIES, AND RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: ON THE BASIS OF HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THESE GROUPS AND YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN THEM.

Use the following scale:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 NOT AT ALL VERY MUCH

Write your answers (a number from 1 - 7) in the blocks provided.

- A. I feel good about the social groups I belong to. 2
- B. In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to. 3
- C. Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile. 4
- D. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do. 5

PLEASE INDICATE HOW THE FOLLOWING WORDS DESCRIBE HOW YOU ARE CURRENTLY FEELING
 Use the following scale:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
 NOT AT ALL VERY

- A. HOPELESS 6
- B. HAPPY 7
- C. DISCONTENTED 8
- D. SECURE 9
- E. PLEASED 10
- F. TENSE 11
- G. DISSATISFIED 12
- H. DISCOURAGED 13

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.

APPENDIX A2: Pre-study questionnaire

RESEARCH ON THE LINK BETWEEN PERSONALITY TRAITS AND ABILITIES

BACKGROUND

Psychologists have devised tests to measure a wide variety of abilities/ dispositions. Those tests relevant for our purposes are:

- * verbal ability (eg. essay writing ability, vocabulary).
- * mathematical ability.
- * decision making ability.
- * social sensitivity (eg. social perception, the ability to sense peoples thoughts and feelings, which relationships will last etc.).
- * problem solving ability (eg. ability to solve anagrams, puzzles).
- * pessimistic outlook (eg. negative outlook on life).
- * optimistic outlook (eg. positive outlook on life):
- * creativity (eg. creative ideas, originality, etc).
- * perceptual overestimation or underestimation (tendency to over or underestimate the number of items in a visual stimulus, eg. dots.).
- * psychological adjustment (psychological normality/health).

THE EXERCISE: PART 1

How do scores on these psychological tests relate to various personality traits?

What you are required to do, is to indicate how much of a link (correlation) you think there is between a high or low score on these tests and various personality traits. For example, to what extent is verbal ability related to ambition?

Please do this using a 7 point scale ranging from:

- 1 - the tested ability and the trait are not at all related to
 7- the tested ability and the trait are strongly related.

<u>ABILITIES</u>	<u>VERBAL ABILITY</u>	<u>MATHEMATICAL ABILITY</u>	<u>DECISION MAKING</u>	<u>SOCIAL SENSITIVITY</u>	<u>PROBLEM SOLVING</u>
<u>PERSONALITY TRAITS</u>					
AMBITIOUS	---	---	---	---	---
CONSIDERATE	---	---	---	---	---
CREATIVE	---	---	---	---	---
FRIENDLY	---	---	---	---	---
INTELLIGENT	---	---	---	---	---
MOTIVATED	---	---	---	---	---
SINCERE	---	---	---	---	---
TRUSTWORTHY	---	---	---	---	---
APATHETIC	---	---	---	---	---
BORING	---	---	---	---	---
INCOMPETENT	---	---	---	---	---
INSENSITIVE	---	---	---	---	---
RUDE	---	---	---	---	---
SELF-CENTRED	---	---	---	---	---
STUPID	---	---	---	---	---
UNINFORMED	---	---	---	---	---

ABILITIES	PESSIMISM	OPTIMISM	CREAT- IVITY	OVER/UNDER ESTIMATION	PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT
<u>PERSONALITY TRAITS</u>					
AMBITIOUS	—	—	—	—	—
CONSIDERATE	—	—	—	—	—
CREATIVE	—	—	—	—	—
FRIENDLY	—	—	—	—	—
INTELLIGENT	—	—	—	—	—
MOTIVATED	—	—	—	—	—
SINCERE	—	—	—	—	—
TRUSTWORTHY	—	—	—	—	—
<hr/>					
APATHETIC	—	—	—	—	—
BORING	—	—	—	—	—
INCOMPETENT	—	—	—	—	—
INSENSITIVE	—	—	—	—	—
RUDE	—	—	—	—	—
SELF-CENTRED	—	—	—	—	—
STUPID	—	—	—	—	—
UNINFORMED	—	—	—	—	—

THE EXERCISE: PART 2

Suppose people were grouped on the basis of their scores on these tests (eg. a high verbal ability and a low verbal ability group). You are required to allocate money or points to these groups. How would you do this?

Please use the following scale from 1 to 7:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
give lower scoring group more	scoring		give both groups the same		give higher scoring group more	

ABILITY	ALLOCATION OF MONEY OR POINTS
VERBAL ABILITY	—
MATHEMATICAL ABILITY	—
DECISION MAKING	—
SOCIAL SENSITIVITY	—
PROBLEM SOLVING	—
PESSIMISM	—
OPTIMISM	—
CREATIVITY	—
OVER/UNDERESTIMATION	—
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT	—

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

WRITE YOUR NAME : _____

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THE WATSON-CLARK SOCIAL-PERCEPTIVENESS TEST

University of New Brunswick, Michigan.

YOU WILL BE GIVEN PERSONALITY TRAITS OF 10 MALE AND FEMALE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, WHO HAVE STARTED DATING. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT THEY PROBABLY WILL STILL BE GOING OUT IN 6 MONTHS TIME. YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE SCORED AGAINST ANSWERS GIVEN BY A PANEL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS.

Indicate your answer by circling YES if you think they probably will still be going out in 6 months time and NO if you think they won't. Answer all questions.

1. MALE: Creative, reserved and unappreciative.
FEMALE: Smart, forgetful and insecure.
YES NO
2. MALE: Changeable, uncultured and humourless.
FEMALE: Bright, cunning and unpleasing.
YES NO
3. MALE: Punctual, fearless and false.
FEMALE: Witty, discontented and lazy.
YES NO
4. MALE: Philosophical, dissatisfied and vain.
FEMALE: Intelligent, tidy and arrogant.
YES NO
5. MALE: Clear-headed, ordinary and unkind.
FEMALE: Ethical, withdrawn and gullible.
YES NO
6. MALE: Quick, unpopular and unpleasant.
FEMALE: Observant, impulsive and rude.
YES NO
7. MALE: Perceptive, impressionable and impolite.
FEMALE: Intellectual, tiresome and mean.
YES NO
8. MALE: Sharp-witted, passive and unethical.
FEMALE: Level-headed, bossy and dishonest.
YES NO
9. MALE: Mature, bashful and cold.
FEMALE: Honourable, restless and hostile.
YES NO
10. MALE: Lively, lucky and dishonourable.
FEMALE: Wise, timid and ill-mannered.
YES NO

P.T.O.

FILL IN YOUR COLOUR-PREFERENCE GROUP HERE: _____

USE THIS PAGE TO WRITE DOWN ONLY THE 5 BEST IDEAS THAT YOU HAVE.

YOU WILL BE TOLD WHAT COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP YOU BELONG TO LATTER.

CREATIVITY EXERCISE: ANSWER FORM

IDEA # 1:

IDEA # 2:

IDEA # 3:

IDEA # 4:

IDEA # 5:



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THE U.C.T. DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, THANKS YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT. YOUR COMPLETE CO-OPERATION, CONCENTRATION AND PATIENCE IS REQUESTED.

YOUR SOCIAL-PERCEPTIVENESS SCORE:

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

14

YOUR COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP:

SOPHISTICATED
COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP

UNSOPHISTICATED
COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP

15

16

PLEASE NOTE:

- * Do not turn over any pages in this booklet before you are asked to.
- * There must be no talking or communication during these exercises.
- * Take all tasks seriously.
- * Listen carefully to all instructions, and read carefully what is written about each exercise before attempting it.
- * Remove the slip with your name on from this booklet.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE GROUP MEMBERSHIP OF BOTH PEOPLES WHO'S IDEAS YOU ARE EVALUATING. IT DOESN'T MATTER WHICH ONE IS FORM NO.1 OR FORM NO.2.

2. JUDGE THE CREATIVITY TASK IDEAS OF THE TWO PERSONS YOU HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

Use the following scale:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
 NOT AT ALL VERY

3. PLACE YOUR ANSWER (A NUMBER FROM 1 TO 11) IN THE BOXES PROVIDED.

EXERCISE:

	<u>FORM NO. 1</u>	<u>FORM NO.2</u>
CIRCLE the appropriate group.	SOPHISTICATED GROUP	SOPHISTICATED GROUP
	UNSOPHISTICATED GROUP	UNSOPHISTICATED GROUP
interesting	<input type="text"/> 17	<input type="text"/> 22
creative	<input type="text"/> 18	<input type="text"/> 23
original	<input type="text"/> 19	<input type="text"/> 24
imaginative	<input type="text"/> 20	<input type="text"/> 25
clever	<input type="text"/> 21	<input type="text"/> 26

WHAT MARK OUR OF 10 WOULD YOU GIVE THE IDEAS?:

<input type="text"/> 27	<input type="text"/> 28
-------------------------	-------------------------

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENT.
WRITE YOUR ANSWERS (A NUMBER FROM 1 TO 5) IN THE BOXES PROVIDED.

THE SOCIAL-PERCEPTIVENESS TEST

1. Were you satisfied with your performance on the social-perception test? 41
VERY UNSATISFIED 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SATISFIED

2. Would you have liked a higher score on this test? 42
NOT VERY MUCH 1 2 3 4 5 VERY MUCH

3. Do you consider social-perceptiveness important? 43
NOT VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY IMPORTANT

4. How accurate a measure of social-perception do you think this test is? 44
NOT VERY ACCURATE 1 2 3 4 5 VERY ACCURATE

THE COLOUR PREFERENCE TEST
5. Were you satisfied with your colour-preference group? 45
VERY UNSATISFIED 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SATISFIED

6. Do you see yourself belonging to your colour preference group? 46
NO VERY MUCH SO 1 2 3 4 5 VERY MUCH SO

7. Do you consider colour-preference important? 47
NOT VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY IMPORTANT

8. Do you think colour preference is a suitable test of personalities? 48
NOT VERY SUITABLE 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SUITABLE

THE EXPERIMENT

1. Has anybody already told you anything about this experiment?

YES NO

If Yes what have they told you?

2. What did you think this experiment was about?

3. Was there anything odd or unusual about the experiment? Are there any aspects of the experiment about which you have questions or comments?

APPENDIX A7: Ingroup #1 fly swatter ideas

PAGE 3

FILL IN YOUR COLOUR-PREFERENCE GROUP HERE:

unsophisticated group

USE THIS PAGE TO WRITE DOWN ONLY THE 5 BEST IDEAS THAT YOU HAVE.

YOU WILL BE TOLD WHAT COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP YOU BELONG TO LATTER.

CREATIVITY EXERCISE: ANSWER FORM

IDEA # 1: spoon

IDEA # 2: sword

IDEA # 3: fan

IDEA # 4: life object with

IDEA # 5: spade

FILL IN YOUR COLOUR-PREFERENCE GROUP HERE:

sophisticated group

USE THIS PAGE TO WRITE DOWN ONLY THE 5 BEST IDEAS THAT YOU HAVE.

YOU WILL BE TOLD WHAT COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP YOU BELONG TO LATTER.

CREATIVITY EXERCISE: ANSWER FORM

IDEA # 1: *to use to stir*

IDEA # 2: *strainer*

IDEA # 3: *board duster*

IDEA # 4: *spoon*

IDEA # 5: *to hit people with*

APPENDIX A9: Ingroup #2 fly swatter ideas

PAGE 3

FILL IN YOUR COLOUR-PREFERENCE GROUP HERE:

unsophisticated group

USE THIS PAGE TO WRITE DOWN ONLY THE 5 BEST IDEAS THAT YOU HAVE.

YOU WILL BE TOLD WHAT COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP YOU BELONG TO LATTER.

CREATIVITY EXERCISE: ANSWER FORM

IDEA # 1: bookmark

IDEA # 2: sieve

IDEA # 3: bat

IDEA # 4: carpet duster

IDEA # 5: ~~plot~~



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PAGE 1

THE U.C.T. DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, THANKS YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT. YOUR COMPLETE CO-OPERATION, CONCENTRATION AND
PATIENCE IS REQUESTED.

YOUR SOCIAL-PERCEPTIVENESS SCORE:

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

YOUR COLOUR PREFERENCE GROUP:

TYPE 1 COLOUR
PREFERENCE GROUP

TYPE 2 COLOUR
PRFFERENCE GROUP

PLEASE NOTE:

- * Do not turn over any pages in this booklet before you are asked to.
- * There must be no talking or communication during these exercises.
- * Take all tasks seriously.
- * Listen carefully to all instructions, and read carefully what is written about each exercise before attempting it.
- * Remove the slip with your name on from this booklet.

1. IN THIS BOOKLET, SHOULD BE 2 LISTS OF IDEAS, WRITTEN BY PEOPLE IN ANOTHER CLASS. READ THEM.

2. TAKE EITHER ONE OF THESE LISTS OF IDEAS

3. CIRCLE the group from which the person who wrote it comes from.

TYPE 1 GROUP

TYPE 2 GROUP

4. TAKING ALL THE IDEAS ON THIS LIST AS A WHOLE, WHAT MARK OUT OF 10 WOULD YOU GIVE THESE IDEAS? PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOX PROVIDED.

5. TAKE THE OTHER LIST OF IDEAS

6. CIRCLE the group from which the person who wrote it comes from.

TYPE 1 GROUP

TYPE 2 GROUP

7. TAKING ALL THE IDEAS ON THIS LIST AS A WHOLE, WHAT MARK OUT OF 10 WOULD YOU GIVE THESE IDEAS? PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOX PROVIDED.

1. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A THIRD LISTS OF IDEAS, WRITTEN BY A PERSON IN ANOTHER CLASS. READ IT.

2. TAKE YOUR LISTS OF IDEAS

3. CIRCLE your group.

TYPE 1 GROUP

TYPE 2 GROUP

4. TAKING ALL YOUR IDEAS AS A WHOLE, WHAT MARK OUT OF 10 WOULD YOU GIVE THEM? PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOX PROVIDED.

5. TAKE THE NEW LIST OF IDEAS

6. CIRCLE the group from which the person who wrote it comes from.

TYPE 1 GROUP

TYPE 2 GROUP

7. TAKING ALL THE IDEAS ON THIS LIST AS A WHOLE, WHAT MARK OUT OF 10 WOULD YOU GIVE THESE IDEAS? PLEASE WRITE YOUR ANSWER IN THE BOX PROVIDED.

WE ARE ALL MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL GROUPS OR CATEGORIES. SOME OF THESE SOCIAL GROUPS OR CATEGORIES PERTAIN TO GENDER, RACE, RELIGION, NATIONALITY, ETHNICITY, AND SOCIAL CLASS. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO CONSIDER YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN THESE PARTICULAR GROUPS OR CATEGORIES, AND RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THESE GROUPS AND YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN THEM. USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

NOT AT ALL VERY MUCH

Write your answers (a number from 1 - 7) in the boxes provided.

- A. I feel good about the social groups I belong to.
- B. In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.
- C. Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile.
- D. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.

THIS SCALE CONSISTS OF A NUMBER OF WORDS THAT DESCRIBE DIFFERENT FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS. READ EACH ITEM AND THEN MARK THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER IN THE SPACE NEXT TO THAT WORD. INDICATE TO WHAT EXTENT YOU GENERALLY FEEL THIS WAY, THAT IS, HOW YOU FEEL ON THE AVERAGE. USE THE FOLLOWING SCALE TO RECORD YOUR ANSWERS.

1	2	3	4	5
very slightly or not at all	a little	moderately	quite a bit	extremely

distressed

upset

hostile

irritable

scared

afraid

ashamed

guilty

nervous

jittery

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, IN THE BOXES PROVIDED, USING THE FOLLOWING RATING SCALE (FROM -3 TO +3):

-3	-2	1	0	+1	+2	+3
Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Neutral Undecided	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree

1. Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to perform as well as whites in any field.
2. It would be unfair if greater expenditure on black education were to be funded by the white taxpayer.
3. Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule could result in a stable, prosperous and democratic South Africa.
4. Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee social peace in this country.
5. The large scale extension of political rights to blacks will inevitably lead to chaos.
6. The wealth of this country is almost entirely due to the hard work and leadership of the whites.
7. Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the country that whites retain political control.
8. It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable division of the wealth of this country.
9. If all races were permitted to mix freely they would probably live in peace.
10. It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed.

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENT.
WRITE YOUR ANSWER (A NUMBER FROM 1 TO 5) IN THE BOXES PROVIDED.

THE SOCIAL-PERCEPTIVENESS TEST

1. Were you satisfied with your performance on the social-perception test?
VERY (UNSATISFIED) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SATISFIED
2. Would you have liked a higher score on this test?
NOT VERY MUCH 1 2 3 4 5 VERY MUCH
3. Do you consider social-perceptiveness important?
NOT (VERY IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY IMPORTANT
4. How accurate a measure of social-perception do you think this test is?
NOT (VERY ACCURATE) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY ACCURATE

THE COLOUR PREFERENCE TEST

5. Were you satisfied with your colour-preference group?
VERY (UNSATISFIED) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SATISFIED
6. Do you see yourself belonging to your colour-preference group?
NOT (VERY MUCH SO) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY MUCH SO
7. Do you consider colour-preference important?
NOT (VERY IMPORTANT) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY IMPORTANT
8. Do you think colour preference is a suitable test of personality?
NOT (VERY SUITABLE) 1 2 3 4 5 VERY SUITABLE

THE EXPERIMENT

1. Had anybody already told you anything about this experiment?
YES NO
If Yes what had they told you?
2. What did you think this experiment was about?
3. Was there anything odd or unusual about the experiment? Are there any aspects of the experiment about which you have questions or comments?
4. Are you MALE or FEMALE? Please circle.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT

APPENDIX B:
RELEVANT STATISTICS NOT PRESENTED IN THE RESULTS
SECTIONS

- B1 Inter-correlations of the measures in Experiment 1
- B2 Cell means for the manipulation checks in Experiment 2
- B3 ANOVA of 'Self vs. ingroup favouritism' on personal status,
 group status and Collective Self-esteem.

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > |R| under Ho: Rho=0 / Number of Observations

NOTE: LOGARITHMIC TRANSFORMATIONS WERE DONE ON JEWISH IDENTITY, COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM, SELF-ESTEEM AND NA - MAACL

	JEWISH ID	COLLECTIVE SE	SELF-ESTEEM	SUBTLE RACISM	NA- MAACL	NA-NAS
JEWISH ID	1.00000 0.0 57	0.43751 0.0007 56	0.47498 0.1010 13	0.03726 0.8171 41	.	-0.07831 0.5662 56
COLLECTIVE SELF-E	0.43751 0.0007 56	1.00000 0.0 237	0.26822 0.0002 185	-0.09775 0.3706 86	-0.38944 0.0001 129	-0.08979 0.3623 105
SELF-ESTEEM	0.47498 0.1010 13	0.26822 0.0002 185	1.00000 0.0 187	-0.44068 0.0056 38	-0.55810 0.0001 130	-0.50721 0.0001 53
SUBTLE RACISM	0.03726 0.8171 41	-0.09775 0.3706 86	-0.44068 0.0056 38	1.00000 0.0 86	.	-0.00369 0.9731 86
NA - MAACL	.	-0.38944 0.0001 129	-0.55810 0.0001 130	.	1.00000 0.0 130	.
NA - NAS	-0.07831 0.5662 56	-0.08979 0.3623 105	-0.50721 0.0001 53	-0.00369 0.9731 86	.	1.00000 0.0 105

MANIPULATION CHECKS OF THE PERSONAL STATUS MANIPULATION (SOCIAL-SENSITIVITY TEST)

Level of PERSONAL STATUS	N	SATISFACTION WITH -----CHECK1-----		WISH A HIGHER SCORE ON -----CHECK2-----		IMPORTANCE OF -----CHECK3-----		ACCURACY OF -----CHECK4-----	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
High	62	4.32258065	0.80519204	2.56451613	1.16817032	3.95161290	1.13697066	2.83870968	0.99496352
Low	60	2.01666667	1.17157965	4.05000000	0.99872800	3.63333333	1.17843140	2.03333333	1.00787857
Neutral	11	3.18181818	1.07871978	3.45454545	1.43969694	3.27272727	1.10371274	2.36363636	1.02691064

MANIPULATION CHECKS OF THE GROUP STATUS MANIPULATION (COLOUR-PREFERENCE TEST)

Level of GROUP STATUS	N	SATISFACTION WITH -----CHECK5-----		BELONGING TO -----CHECK6-----		IMPORTANCE OF -----CHECK7-----		SUITABILITY OF -----CHECK8-----	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
High	48	4.41666667	0.76723691	3.77083333	0.97281306	2.81250000	1.21438628	2.54166667	1.25407138
Low	81	2.35802469	1.19696117	2.50617284	1.23615793	2.40740741	1.41224801	2.12345679	1.13338780
Neutral	22	3.86363636	0.99021184	3.22727273	1.15188534	2.72727273	1.24142078	2.45454545	1.26217019

Dependent Variable: SELF VS INGROUP FAVOURITISM

Independent Variables:	Code	Levels	Values	Code
PERSONAL STATUS =	PERSON_S	3	H L N = High, Low, Neutral	
GROUP STATUS =	GROUP_S	3	H L N = High, Low, Neutral	
COLLECTIVE SELF-ESTEEM =	C_ESTEEM	2	H L = High, Low	

Source	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
Model	17	249.23946454	14.66114497	2.16	0.0081
Error	133	904.80027056	6.80300955		
Corrected Total	150	1154.03973510			

R-Square	C.V.	Root MSE	SELF VS INGROUP FAV Mean
0.215971	325.4933	2.60825795	0.80132450

Source	DF	Type III SS	Mean Square	F Value	Pr > F
PERSON_S	2	29.00315878	14.50157939	2.13	0.1227
GROUP_S	2	26.82882334	13.41441167	1.97	0.1432
PERSON_S*GROUP_S	4	18.86052481	4.71513120	0.69	0.5980
C_ESTEEM	1	10.76763452	10.76763452	1.58	0.2106
PERSON_S*C_ESTEEM	2	26.34716376	13.17358188	1.94	0.1483
GROUP_S*C_ESTEEM	2	60.06781051	30.03390525	4.41	0.0139
PSTATU*GSTATU*C_ESTE	4	48.53358050	12.13339512	1.78	0.1358

APPENDIX C:

RAW DATA

KEY

<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
OBS	Observation
STD	Version '6' = Std 6 - version 1A and 2A '7' = Std 7 - version 1B and 2B
CSE	Collective self-esteem
SELF_EST	Personal Self-esteem
NA_MAACL	Negative Affect - Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (MAACL)
NA_NAS	Negative Affect - Negative Affect Schedule
SRACISM	Subtle Racism Scale
JEWISHID	Jewish Identity scale
GROUP_S	Group status condition 'H' - high 'N' - neutral 'L' - low
PERSONAL_S	Personal status condition 'H' - high 'N' - neutral 'L' - low
SE_MED	Self-esteem median split 'H' - high 'L' - low
CSE_MED	Collective self-esteem split 'H' - high 'L' - low
SEX	Sex of subjects 'F' - female 'M' - male
ING_OUTG	Difference between ingroup(1) and outgroup evaluations on the adjective checklist measure
SELF_ING	Difference between self and ingroup(2) evaluations on the adjective checklist measure
SLF_GRP	Difference between ING_OUTG and SELF_ING
ING#1_MK	Mark out of 10 given to ingroup#1 member
OUTG_MK	Mark out of 10 given to outgroup target
SELF_MK	Mark out of 10 given to self
ING#2_MK	Mark out of 10 given ingroup#2 member
IN_OU_MK	Difference between ING#1_MK and OUTG_MK (ingroup favouritism measure)
SL_IN_MK	Difference between SELF_MK and ING#2_MK (self favouritism measure)
SL_GR_MK	Difference between IN_OU_MK and SL_GR_MK (self vs. group favouritism measure)
CHECK1 - CHECK8	Manipulation check questions numbers 1 to 8.

OB	ST	CS	SE	MA	NA	SRA	JEW	GR	PER	CS	SE	ING	SEL	SEL	ING	ING	SL	SL	CH	CH	CH	CH	CH	CH	CH	CH
S	D	E	EST	A	A	AC	ISH	OU	SON	SE	SE	NG	LF	LF	NG	NG	TM	GR	CK	CK	CK	CK	CK	CK	CK	CK
				CL	AS	IS	ID	PS	NS	ED	ED	OUT	OUT	GRP	1	2	HK	HK	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
148	7	25	26	.	20	38	.	L	L	L	H	M	5	3	5	5	1	5	1	
149	7	19	28	.	26	.	47	L	L	L	L	M	3	4	2	2	2	3	3	
150	7	19	34	.	12	.	49	L	L	L	L	M	4	2	3	3	3	3	2	
151	7	27	38	.	19	46	.	L	L	H	H	M	5	3	3	3	3	5	
152	7	27	29	.	18	40	.	L	L	H	H	M	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	
153	7	21	19	.	34	48	.	L	L	L	L	L	-1	2	5	5	3	4	3	
154	7	21	29	.	23	.	46	L	L	L	L	L	4	.	3	3	3	3	1	
155	7	23	.	.	26	30	.	L	L	L	L	L	-3	3	3	3	2	3	1	
156	7	19	.	.	14	37	.	L	L	L	L	L	
157	7	17	27	.	18	35	.	L	L	H	L	L	1	5	3	3	3	2	3	
158	7	24	28	.	27	42	.	L	L	H	H	L	-3	4	3	3	3	3	3	
159	7	27	32	.	29	34	.	L	L	H	H	L	-1	4	2	1	1	1	2	
160	7	20	32	.	16	.	50	L	L	L	H	L	-3	2	5	3	2	1	1	
161	7	20	28	.	22	32	.	L	L	H	H	L	2	2	3	2	4	3	3	
162	7	28	39	.	15	33	.	L	L	H	H	L	1	5	3	5	2	1	2	
163	7	22	29	.	25	49	.	L	L	N	L	L	-2	4	4	4	2	2	3	
164	7	22	28	.	19	.	45	L	L	H	H	L	4	4	2	2	4	2	4	
165	7	27	34	.	15	38	.	L	L	N	H	H	2	
166	7	27	34	.	18	31	.	L	L	H	H	L	0	5	2	4	4	3	2	
167	7	22	31	.	15	25	.	L	L	L	L	L	0	2	4	3	1	3	2	
168	7	20	28	.	25	.	.	L	L	L	L	L	0	0	4	5	3	4	2	
169	7	22	24	.	30	39	.	L	L	L	L	L	-3	2	3	3	3	4	3	
170	7	26	32	.	17	.	.	L	L	N	H	L	-2	1	4	2	1	1	2	
171	7	22	31	.	15	.	45	L	L	N	L	L	-1	2	2	1	3	3	1	
172	7	27	23	.	24	41	.	L	L	L	H	L	-2	2	4	5	1	2	2	
173	7	22	34	.	26	20	.	L	L	N	H	L	4	2	4	5	1	4	2	
174	7	24	30	.	13	38	.	L	L	H	L	H	4	4	5	3	2	3	2	
175	7	28	25	.	22	37	.	L	L	H	L	H	-2	4	1	3	1	4	1	
176	7	10	31	.	13	53	.	L	L	L	L	L	-10	1	3	5	1	2	5	
177	7	16	34	.	18	.	48	L	L	N	H	L	2	3	5	4	3	4	5	
178	7	15	35	.	25	.	.	L	L	H	H	L	
179	7	24	28	.	15	.	45	L	L	N	L	L	
180	7	15	32	.	19	.	46	L	L	H	H	L	-1	7	8	
181	7	17	34	.	17	.	49	L	L	L	L	L	-1	2	4	2	.	.	.	
182	7	16	32	.	22	47	.	L	L	N	H	L	
183	7	22	26	.	17	52	.	L	L	L	L	L	-2	-3	3	3	3	3	1	
184	7	28	30	.	18	44	.	L	L	L	L	L	-1	4	5	10	6	1	2	
185	7	15	.	.	15	43	.	L	L	N	L	L	1	5	4	4	4	2	4	
186	7	.	32	L	L	L	L	H	
187	7	28	.	.	22	33	.	40	H	L	L	H	-1	-3	2	4	3	1	5	
188	7	28	.	.	12	46	.	H	L	L	L	H	0	3	5	4	2	3	.	
189	7	13	24	.	29	53	.	H	H	L	L	L	-1	1	5	4	3	3	5	
190	7	10	.	.	21	41	.	27	H	L	L	L	-1	1	5	3	2	5	3	
191	7	26	.	.	35	30	.	45	H	L	H	L	3	-1	5	1	3	1	5	
192	7	25	.	.	21	48	.	50	H	L	L	H	2	3	5	2	5	4	
193	7	24	.	.	17	56	.	43	H	H	H	H	-1	4	3	3	2	4	2	
194	7	24	.	.	10	44	.	43	H	H	H	H	3	
195	7	21	.	.	11	33	.	45	H	H	H	H	4	4	4	3	4	4	
196	7	27	.	.	15	50	.	46	H	H	H	L	1	4	2	4	3	5	5	

OBS	ST	CSE	SEL EST	NA HAS	SRA CISM	JEWISH ID	GROUP S	PERSON S	SEMED	CSEMED	SEX	ING OUTG	SEL TNG	SLFGRP	ING#1	OUTG	SEL HK	ING#2	ING	SLTNG	SLGR	CHECK1	CHECK2	CHECK3	CHECK4	CHECK5	CHECK6	CHECK7	CHECK8
197	7	22		20	37	43	H	N	L	M					4	4	10	6	0	4									
198	7	20		19	32	43	H	H	L	L	M				8	6	9	8	2	1	-1								
199	7	25	26	17	46				L	H	F				5	4	8	10	-2	-3	3								
200	7	28		21	17	49	H	H	L	H	F				7	8	7	8	-1	-1	0								
201	7	18		23	30	46	H	H	L	L	F				5	3	8	8	2	2	0								
202	7	21		26	26	44	H	H	L	L	F				7	8	7	8	-1	-1	0								
203	7	22		15	19	44	H	H	L	L	F				6	8	9	9	-2	0	2								
204	7	20		25	49	44	H	H	L	L	F				4	4	6	6	1	1	-1								
205	7	24		16	35	43	H	H	L	L	F				5	7	9	7	-2	2	2								
206	7	20		17	36	37	H	H	L	L	F						8	5											
207	7	26		25	36	40	H	H	L	H	F				4	4	4	6											
208	7	28		14		50	H	H	L	H	F				5	7	8	8	-2	0	2								
209	7	25		20	38	50	H	H	L	H	F				7	5	8	8	8	0	-2								
210	7	17		18	40	32	H	H	L	L	F				2	6	8	5	-2	3	7								
211	7	25		10	37	46	H	H	L	L	M				4	6	8	8	-2										
212	7	22		14	34	46	H	H	L	L	M				5	5	7	5			1								
213	7	21		14	35	42	H	H	N	L	F				6	5	8	8	1	1	0								
214	7	23		25	29	50	H	H	N	L	M				6	5	8	4	1	4	3								
215	7	27		19	17	45	H	H	N	H	F				5	5	8	4	0	4	4								
216	7	24		21	36	45	H	H	N	H	F				8	7	7	8	1	-1	-2								
217	7	24		28	40	50	H	H	N	H	F				6	8	9	8	-2	1	3								
218	7	22		15	50	48	H	H	N	L	F				6	5	8	7	1	1	0								
219	7	16		14	25	34	H	H	N	L	F				5	8	7	7	-3	0	3								
220	7	18		27	42	48	H	H	N	L	M				6	4	9	6	2	3	1								
221	7	26		21	40	44	H	H	N	H	M				8	4	8	2	2	6	4								
222	7	27		12	49	45	H	H	N	H	M				6	2	9	4	6	5	-1								
223	7	24		25	49	42	H	L	L	H	M				6	6		7	0		2								
224	7	28		19	33	45	H	L	L	H	F				8	7	9	8	1	1	0								
225	7	17		21	21	47	H	H	L	L	M				4	4	10	4	0	6	6								
226	7	27		14	55	49	H	H	L	H	M				6	4	8	4	2	4	2								
227	7	16		25	36	26	H	H	N	L	M				2	2	6	2	0	4	4								
228	7	15	26	22	51		N	H	L	L	L																		
229	7	13		25	39	46	N	H	L	L	F				7	5	8	8											
230	7	23		19	32		N	N	L	L	M				3	5	6	8	-2	0	2								
231	7	25	34	16	37		N	N	H	L	M				3	2	7	7	1	0	-1								
232	7	22		19	43		N	N	L	L	F				5	9	6	9	-4	-3	1								
233	7	17	35	11	19		N	N	H	L	F				7	6	8	8	1	0	-1								
234	7	20	30	21	32		N	N	L	L	M						8	6											
235	7	21	27	21	33		N	N	L	L	F				5	3	5	4	2	1	-1								
236	7	20	32	11	30		N	H	H	L	M				3	6	7	7	-3	0	3								
237	7	22	31	18	43		N	N	L	L	M				4	6	8	9	-2	-1	1								
238	7	24		19	43	44	N	H	L	H	F				6	7	5	8	-1	-3	-2								
239	7	19	30	27	33		N	N	L	L	F				5	6	7	7	-1	0	1								
240	7	25		21	38	45	N	N	L	H	F				6	5	8	7	1	1	0								
241	7	13	31	27		41	N	N	L	L	M				6	7	8	9	-1	-1	0								
242	7	26	35	19	11		N	H	H	L	M				5	8	8	9	-3	-1	2								
243	7	23	30	20	41		N	N	L	L	M				3	7	8	6	-4	2	6								
244	7	17		24	20	41	N	N	L	L	F				7	5	7	6	2	1	-1								
245	7	18	31	17		48	N	N	L	L	M				4	8	9	6	-4	3	7								

OBS	STD	CSE	SELF EST	NA - NA CL	NA - NA S	SRACISM	JEWISH ID	GRUPPES	PERSONS	SEMED	CSEMED	SEX	ING OUTG	SELF INGP	ING#1	OUTG	SELF	ING#2	ING#3	SLTN	SLGR	CHCK1	CHCK2	CHCK3	CHCK4	CHCK5	CHCK6	CHCK7	CHCK8
246	7	25	.	13	.	40	N	L	H	M	.	.	.	5	3	8	8	2	0	-2	3	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	
247	7	26	30	.	20	22	.	N	H	L	H	F	.	.	4	5	6	-1	2	3	5	4	5	2	4	3	1	1	
248	7	25	28	.	30	41	.	N	N	L	H	F	.	.	5	3	7	6	2	1	-1	.	.	1	2	.	.	1	1